Ballistic Missile 

Defense 

Past and Future 

Jacques S. Gansler 

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND 

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

WASHINGTON, DC 

April 2010
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The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the 

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iii 

Contents 

Introduction vii 

Chapter 1 

Overview 1 

Chapter 2 

Types of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems 11 

Chapter 3 

Countermeasures 33 

Chapter 4 

Costs 35 

Chapter 5 

Historic Highlights 37 

Chapter 6 

Proliferation 55 

Chapter 7 

Multinational Defense Considerations 59 

Chapter 8 

Recent Policy Considerations 63 

Chapter 9 

Dispelling Myths and Misconceptions 67 

Chapter 10 

A Proposed Middle Path to Ballistic Missile Defense 71 

Chapter 11 

Summary 75

About the Author 77

 v 

Acknowledgments 

 wish to thank Hans Binnendijk, the director of the National 

Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy, for his encouragement and partial funding of this book. 

Also, my colleagues at the University of Maryland’s School of Public 

Policy’s Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, William 

Lucyshyn, Caroline Dawn Pulliam, and Aly Rodriguez for their help 

with the manuscript. 

I 

 vii 

Introduction 

o help put the potential value of a national missile defense 

system in perspective, consider three scenarios, one modeled on 

a historical event, the other two hypothetical. First, suppose that 

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurs 20 years later, which is to say, 

about now. Saddam Hussein has an arsenal of two or three long-range 

missiles equipped with biological or nuclear warheads. These weapons 

are aimed at New York and/or Washington (or even closer targets, such 

as Tel Aviv or London). He threatens to launch them if the United 

States attempts to throw him out of Kuwait. In the absence of a missile 

defense system, what options does the President of the United States 

have for dislodging Iraq from Kuwait—or preventing occupation of 

Saudi oilfields? 

The second scenario is a real, near-term possibility. Russian 

command and control over the launch of ICBMs has deteriorated, The 

Russian leadership continues to fear a U.S. first strike and believes it 

must keep its ICBMs on high readiness. The President of the United 

States receives a “hotline” call from the President of Russia saying: 

“You were right to keep warning us about the possibility of an 

inadvertent launch of one of our long-range missiles. In fact, this just 

happened, and the missile is on its way to strike Washington, D.C. You 

have my sincere apologies about this catastrophic event, and we will 

certainly do everything we can to make sure that your people 

understand this was not intentional. But, recognizing that you have no 

defensive capability, and that this means a catastrophic loss of 

American lives, we still think it is the wisest course for you not to 

respond in any equivalent or escalatory fashion, as it will undoubtedly 

result in an all-out nuclear exchange and the destruction of both of our 

countries.” Faced with the decapitation of the U.S. Government, what 

options does the President have for defending the Nation? 

Now consider what might happen if the government of Pakistan 

comes to be led by an extremist, anti-U.S. fanatic, perhaps as the result 

of an election manipulated by pro-Taliban groups, or of massive 

protests against U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Predator strikes in 

Pakistan. Pakistan has Scud ballistic missiles, an intermediate range 

ballistic missile under development (with a range of over 2,000 km), 

sensitive missile and guidance technology provided by China, and is 

T 
viii • Jacques S. Gansler 

believed to have approximately 60 nuclear warheads.1 In the near future 

Pakistani nuclear-armed missiles could threaten major cities of nations 

allied with the United States. Depending on how much outside help 

Pakistan receives, it could soon threaten the United States. What 

options are open to the American President as Pakistani armed forces 

come under the control of leaders who are implacably hostile to the 

United States? 

These three scenarios (others could be constructed around North 

Korea, Iran, and Syria) make a point argued by proponents of continued 

exploration and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems: that it 

is essential to give future Presidents of the United States options for 

defending the homeland against missile attack. As demonstrated by the 

attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, there are 

those in some parts of the world who are not deterred by the threat of 

invasion or even nuclear retaliation (including some rulers of so-called 

rogue states). A national missile defense system could provide a shield 

from destruction in the event of a threatened or actual launch by a 

rogue-state leader or a powerful transnational terrorist group, as well as 

an unintentional launch by Russia or China. (These limited defense 

systems are not intended to be effective against high-volume and 

sophisticated attacks from either Russia or China.) It is for this reason 

that serious consideration and funding is being provided for a limited 

ballistic missile defense system that could potentially be effective 

against such increasingly likely events. Needless to say, the degree of 

international interest in this topic increased significantly after North 

Korea launched a long-range Taepodong-1 over Japan in 1998. 

Today, there is widespread disagreement as to whether such a 

system can be developed to be effective against such eventualities. 

There is also heated discourse as to whether or not such a system 

should be developed and deployed. These are the two big questions of 

the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debate. It must be emphasized that the 

 

1

 “According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, 

though it could have more; a recent public estimate from two prominent 

experts on the subject stated that the country has between 70 and 90 nuclear 

weapons.” Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: 

Proliferation and Security Issues, CRS Report for Congress RL 34248, 

updated December 9, 2009, 3. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 

RL34248_20091209.pdf. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • ix 

 

answer to these two questions is irrelevant with regard to tactical 

ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. With the widespread proliferation 

of these tactical offensive weapons, there is multinational agreement on 

the need for the development and deployment of tactical anti-missile 

systems. And there have been sufficient successful demonstrations of 

the technical feasibility of such systems. Thus, the answer to whether 

these tactical defense systems can and should be implemented is 

affirmative. 

As the range of proliferated offensive missiles continues to expand, 

the distinction between what is tactical and what is strategic becomes 

increasingly vague, and, the required range capability of “tactical” antimissile systems becomes greater and greater. For Europe or Israel, the 

distinction between tactical and national (i.e., “strategic”) missile 

defense largely disappears. For the United States, the issue of national 

missile defense remains highly controversial. It is this latter specific 

issue that this book addresses. 

It is my opinion, based on a lifetime of personal involvement in the 

field,2

 that in answer to the question of whether a national missile 

defense system could be implemented against the set of hypothesized 

threats—namely, a small number of unsophisticated missiles launched 

from a developing country, or a single, inadvertent launch from either 

Russia or China—the answer is that we can develop such a capability, 

but that the system will not be “perfect.” Realistically, no defensive 

system can be 100 percent effective. However (especially employing 

multiple defensive launches), it should be adequate to serve the purpose 

of saving a very significant number of lives in either of the two types of 

situations, and it could provide an additional defensive option to the 

President in a future international crisis. As to the second question, 

“should it be done?,” I believe that a limited system should be deployed 

because of its deterrent value and the possibility of saving so many 

American lives, but R&D and testing should be continued to enhance 

its capability against evolving threats, and deployment should be done 

in connection with extensive international agreements and controls 

related to a new, national strategic posture, based on both offense and 

defense systems, as well as tightened proliferation controls. 

Finally, since the 9/11 attacks, many have argued that “because 

terrorist attacks (of a variety of forms, from traditional to biological and 

 

2

 See “About the Author” at the end of this book. 
x • Jacques S. Gansler 

even nuclear) are more likely than ballistic missile attacks, we should 

not waste money on the latter.” I personally believe (and will argue 

herein) that ballistic missile attacks, while admittedly less likely than 

terrorist attacks, are nonetheless such a potentially lethal danger, and of 

a reasonable likelihood, that it is only prudent for nations to provide a 

deterrence against their use and insurance against the destruction they 

could cause. 

Clearly, the United States has been increasingly exploring antiterrorism capabilities. In fact, the major share of the $40 billion or so of 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Budget, plus a major share of 

the Intelligence Community’s budget, plus a significant share of the 

DOD budget—involved in the “war on terrorism,” e.g., in 

Afghanistan—are all focused on anti-terrorism. While the amount 

being spent on ballistic missile defense is an order of magnitude less 

(around $11 billion a year) it is well within the affordability range in a 

DOD annual budget of $500 to $600 billion plus. 

Undoubtedly—and necessarily—the anti-terrorism budget will 

continue to increase, but I do not believe that this is an either/or choice. 

Both terrorism and ballistic missile threats are of an asymmetric nature, 

with weaker nations being more likely to use such tactics against the 

United States and its allies. Since conventional deterrence may not 

work against some future adversaries (from rogue nations to terrorists, 

and the likely combination thereof), I believe that continued 

development and limited deployment of a national ballistic missile 

defense system is even more warranted today. The horrible acts of 

September 11, 2001, were committed by people willing to die in order 

to kill Americans. In the face of such an enemy, traditional deterrence 

theory is brought into question. 

Public opinion in the United States has moved strongly toward 

support for national missile defense, against the urgings of outspoken 

opponents. A 2008 poll by Opinion Research Corporation and CNN 

found that 87 percent of the American public supports creation of the 

multilayered U.S. ballistic missile defense system, and 65 percent 

believe the U.S. missile defense system should protect allies as well. 
 1 

Chapter 1

Overview 

ver since Germany launched the first ballistic missiles against 

England on September 8, 1944, (one V-2 landing in London and 

a second one near Epping 16 seconds later), there has been 

considerable controversy over the desirability of being able to defend a 

nation against ballistic missile attack. There has been little question of 

the need to defend troops against such threats, particularly as the 

accuracy and the destructiveness of missile attacks have increased. If 

any doubt of the danger to troops remained, it was erased in 1991, 

when Iraq launched a Scud missile against the U.S. military barracks in 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, at the end of Operation Desert Storm, killing 

28 U.S. soldiers and wounding 99. However, the issue of national 

missile defense has been far more controversial. Debate was heated in 

the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s, as the Soviet Union 

grew to be an increasing ballistic missile threat, and the United States 

began to develop a capability for at least some form of national missile 

defense. In fact, widespread deployment was given very serious 

consideration (and its initial phases begun) prior to the signing of the 

anti-ballistic missile treaty in 1972. The debate revived when Ronald 

Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (dubbed “Star 

Wars” by its critics) in 1983. Controversy ignited again with President 

George W. Bush’s decision to abrogate the treaty and initiate early 

deployment of the ground-based national missile defense system, along 

with aggressively accelerating development of air-, sea-, and spacebased systems. 

Two things stand out in regard to this decades-long debate. First is 

the extreme polarization of the opposing positions that have been taken. 

Consider this statement: 

“The whole ABM question touched off so intense and 

emotional a debate as to be virtually without precedent of any 

issue of weaponry. Highly-knowledgeable and specificallyinformed people could be found on both sides of the argument. 

Scientists, engineers, and others disagree with each other about 

E 
2 • Jacques S. Gansler 

the reliability or basic workability of the system. The amount 

of obvious bias on each side was often wondrous to behold.”1

This passage happens to be referring to the 1960s and early 70s, but 

it could just as easily have been written last week. 

At the extreme level, those against development and deployment of 

such a system argue, with an almost religious fervor, that it won’t 

work; and even if it could, it would start an arms race. Those in favor of 

national missile defense (again at the extreme) argue that it is 

irresponsible not to build a system to defend America, and we should 

deploy it as soon as possible. What is particularly interesting about this 

debate is that the parties who might be counted on for a more objective 

and independent perspective, such as the news media and think tanks, 

are equally biased—not just in their editorials, but in their reporting. 

For example, Peter Jennings, on ABC’s Worldwide News Tonight, 

called missile defense a system “that has never been proven to work 

and may never work.”2

 The Los Angeles Times suggested that missile 

defense would put the country at “greater risk of attack.” NBC’s Jim 

Miklaszewski questioned whether such a system is “worth it, in light of 

its possible threat to United States/Russian Relations.” Newsweek

asserted that, “it’s time to Deep-Six this Mega-Billion dollar fiasco.” 

William J. Broad of the New York Times and others compare missile 

defense to failed military defenses of the past, such as the Great Wall of 

China and the Maginot Line. 

Such extreme views have also been reflected in Congressional 

debates. Senator Howell Heflin3

 stated that, “The ballistic missile 

defense program has always been turbulent, buffeted more than most 

defense programs by partisan political debate and contentious strategic 

theories.”4

 He went on to state that, “the ‘Weapons in Space’ objective 

was so pervasive and intense that it resembled an evangelical 

 

1

 Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Cross Bow to H -Bomb

(Bloomington, Indiana, University Press, 1973), 305–306. 

2

 Sean Vinck, “The Media War on Star Wars: Where never is heard an 

Encouraging Word,” Weekly Standard, July 24, 2000. 3

 Dissertation by Glenn LaMartin, “Political Theories of Public Policy 

Making: A Test of the Ability of Political Theories to Predict the Features of 

the Policy Process,” University of Southern California, August 1999, 94. 

4

 Senator Howell Hefflin, “Reflections on the course of Ballistic Missile 

Defense Programs” National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1997. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 3 

 

religion.”5 About the same time, Representative Curt Weldon charged 

that intelligence information is being heavily politicized to support the 

Clinton Administration’s policy of keeping Americans undefended 

from missile attacks.6

Interest group advocacy is also strongly argued and equally 

polarized—including groups that were, in theory, independent and 

objective. Such nonprofit organizations as the Union of Concerned 

Scientists have issued statements (including those by former Nobel 

Prize winners) that “showed” why not only would the system not work, 

but why it was wrong to deploy it. For example, in an article titled 

“Technical Realities,” the Union of Concerned Scientists stated that the 

system to be deployed in late 2004 “will have no demonstrated 

capability and will be ineffective against real attack by long-range 

ballistic missiles,” and went on to state that the Bush Administration’s 

“claims that the system will be reliable and highly effective are 

irresponsible exaggerations.” Similarly, John Pike published an article 

with the title “National Missile Defense: Rushing to Failure.”7

 Eight 

years later, William Hartung published “Anti-Missile Missiles in 

Europe: A Weapon that Doesn’t Work for a Threat that Doesn’t 

Exist.”8

 At the extreme, perhaps, after a successful intercept (direct hit) 

of a target intercontinental ballistic missile, one of their members, Ted 

Postol of MIT, wrote to the President of the United States stating that I, 

as Under Secretary of Defense and thus responsible for the ballistic 

missile defense program, had “fixed” the test so that the interceptor 

missile (launched from the Marshall Islands, out over the Pacific) 

would “home on a signal from the target.” (An allegation that had no 

factual basis whatsoever.) 

Another extreme position was that taken by the Director of “Project 

Abolition,” who maintained that mutual assured destruction (MAD) is 

 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 “Ballistic Missile Defense: Responding to the Current Ballistic Missile 

Threat,” Hearing before the Subcommittee of National Security, International 

Affairs and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and 

Oversight, May 30, 1996. 

7

 John Pike, “National Missile Defense: Rushing to Failure,” Journal of the 

Federation of American Scientists, 52, no. 6, November-December 1999. 8

 William Hartung, “Anti-Missile Missiles in Europe: A Weapon that Doesn’t 

Work for a Threat that Doesn’t Exist,” April 26, 2007, available at 

http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/updates/042607.html#1. 
4 • Jacques S. Gansler 

“morally indefensible,” and that the only realistic, sustainable, 

affordable solution to the moral and security problems posed by nuclear 

weapons “is their complete elimination.”9

These attacks on the U.S. missile defense system greatly weaken its 

deterrent effect—in terms of discouraging adversaries not only from 

using ballistic missiles, but also acquiring and proliferating them—as 

well as cause allies to question our ability to defend them, with the 

perverse effect of motivating them to develop their own nuclear 

offensive deterrent forces. Certainly, claims about the system’s 

effectiveness must have credibility. But, if valid, the availability of 

these system effectiveness facts is critically important to the future 

security of the United States and its allies. Thus, steps must be taken to 

assure allies and adversaries of the effectiveness of the system (by not 

hiding behind security classification; by allowing observers at tests; by 

joint developments and operations; etc.). 

Contrary positions (in support of development) are held just as 

strongly by such organizations as the Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, and the Center for Security Policy, which argue that it is 

immoral not to have a ballistic missile defense system to protect 

American citizens. The public is similarly split, often along Republican 

(“conservative”) and Democratic (“liberal”) perspectives. However, a 

2001 poll by the Council on Foreign Relations10 reported that 51 

percent of Americans favored the deployment of a national anti-missile 

defense system and only 38 percent opposed it. Of self-described 

liberals, 45 percent favored building it (as compared to the 70 percent 

of the self-described conservatives who favored it). Another poll earlier 

that same year by the Washington Post and ABC News11 reported that 

80 percent of the American population was in favor of building a 

missile defense system; however, they posed many reasonable 

questions about it: Will it work? Will it be affordable? Will it lead to an 

arms race? And will Europe pay for their share? Thus, the population 

 

9

 Kevin Martin, Director, Project Abolition, Goshen, Indiana, Washington 

Post, July 26, 2001. 10 Paul Richter, “Majority in U.S. Backs Missile Shield, Poll Finds,” Los 

Angeles Times, June 12, 2001.

11 ABC News/The Washington Post January 2001 [Computer file]. ICPSR 

version. Horsham, PA: Taylor Nelson, Sofres Intersearch [producer], 2001. 

Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 

[distributor], 2001. doi:10.3886/ICPSR03193. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 5 

 

wants “protection,” but it is clearly aware of some of the issues that 

have been raised, and they want answers. And, as the data in the 

“Introduction” noted, public opinion has clearly been shifting in favor 

of the system (with, by 2008, 87 percent in favor). If nothing else, at 

least all of the emotional discussions following the North Korean 

launch of a missile over Japan in 1998 served to make the public much 

more aware of the issues associated with national missile defense. Prior 

to that event, the public either had very little interest in the topic or was 

uninformed on the issues. In fact, a January 1995 poll showed that 57 

percent of the American population believed that the military could 

destroy a missile fired at the United States before it could hit and do 

damage.12

Today, there are still questions as to whether the “facts” presented 

to the public validly reflect both sides of the issue, or are even correct. 

This is a terrible shame. If the system can be shown to be effective, and 

the data are made public, it can have a very significant impact on the 

missile defense system achieving its intended objectives (and of 

convincing the U.S. public, the Congress, and U.S. allies and friends—

as well as potential adversaries—of its value). Specifically, these 

objectives include: 

• Limiting damage (to lives and property, if attacked) 

• Deterring adversary use (since their objective will likely not be 

achieved, and they now will face retaliation) 

• Giving the President options (besides preemption or total 

counterattack) 

• Aiding achievement of arms control agreements (by 

overcoming risk of non-compliance or breakouts) 

• Providing assurance to allies and friends (of our support, since 

we are less vulnerable to threats to attack us, if we come to their 

defense) 

• Discouraging proliferation of ballistic missiles (since buyers 

have less incentive if the purchased missiles are not effective) 

The second thing (besides the extreme polarization and emotional 

fervor) that stands out about the sets of debates that have taken place on 

 

12 Dissertation by Glenn LaMartin, “Political Theories of Public Policy 

Making: A Test of the Ability of Political Theories to Predict the Features of 

the Policy Process,” University of Southern California, August 1999, 227. 
6 • Jacques S. Gansler 

National Missile Defense—first in the 1960s and early 1970s, again in 

the late 1980s and 1990s, and continuing today—is that they exhibit a 

great deal of consistency over time, despite obvious differences in 

technology, threats, and system approaches. Specifically, the ABM 

systems being considered in the 1960s were aimed at either the reentry 

or the immediately preceding exoatmospheric phase of the trajectory of 

an ICBM warhead coming at the United States; and the kill mechanism 

was an interceptor missile with a nuclear warhead. In contrast, the 

system being debated in the 1990s was intended to intercept outside the 

atmosphere (during the midcourse of an ICBM attack on the United 

States), and the kill mechanism was kinetic impact (sometimes called 

“hit-to-kill”). Of course, as described below, numerous other 

combinations of defense systems have been considered over the years, 

from interceptors launched from space, to airborne, high-energy lasers 

for boost-phase kills. 

Finally, the threat being addressed in the 1960s was from the Soviet 

Union, while the focus since 1991 has been on a more limited and less 

sophisticated threat from a “rogue” nation, such as North Korea or Iran, 

and a potential inadvertent launch from Russia or China. Despite these 

differences, the arguments on both sides of the missile defense issue are 

still almost identical. 

The arguments against the deployment of an anti-missile system 

tend to fall in the following categories: 

• It will trigger an arms race. Russia will not only move toward 

increased offensive capability, and perhaps also defensive 

capability, but will certainly break all arms control agreements 

with the United States. China will dramatically expand its nuclear 

arsenal, which would then accelerate nuclear weapons programs in 

India and in India’s rival, Pakistan; and possibly prompt their 

development and deployment in Taiwan and in Japan (both of 

whom are concerned about China’s expanding power). It might 

also jeopardize any Chinese diplomatic efforts to achieve a freeze 

on North Korea’s or Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.13

• Putting defensive weapons in space (which would provide 

worldwide boost-phase intercept coverage) would start both an 

offensive and defensive arms race (including anti-satellite 

 

13 Senator Joseph Biden, “Senator Biden Attacks Missile Defense Plans as 

Costly, Risky,” Washington Post, September 11, 2000. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 7 

 

systems). Also, a space-based anti-missile system would appear to 

be aimed at the Chinese (as a way to cover their large land mass) 

and would be highly inflammatory. 

• Deployment of the NMD system would damage the diplomatic 

relations that the United States has been trying to improve with 

both Russia and China. Missile defenses will undercut arms 

control negotiations. Arms control has historically been the key to 

maintaining a peaceful relationship between the two “Super 

Powers,” and has been especially important to slowing the buildup of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of 

mass destruction. 

• Even a limited missile defense will create greater instability. 

The defended nation will be tempted to initiate a massive first 

strike in a crisis (including against its adversary’s missiles), and 

then absorb the more limited retaliatory strike by the other side (a 

product of being able to shoot down surviving ICBMs). 

• The technology is not available to achieve the hit-to-kill 

capability (i.e., “the systems won’t work”), and a nuclear kill 

mechanism (as planned in the 1960s systems) would have 

numerous problems, both offensively and defensively. 

• Even if the system can be made to work against a single target, 

the opposition will shift to complex countermeasures, such as 

sophisticated decoys, maneuvering reentry vehicles, saturation 

with multiple re-entry vehicles, etc., and render the deployed 

system ineffective. 

• The deployment of this system, even if it does work, will simply 

shift the focus of potential adversaries to other means of attacking 

the United States. These alternative scenarios are already 

considered to be “more likely,” and include terrorist attacks with 

biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. 

• No government would be foolish enough to try to launch a 

missile against the United States, knowing that its nation would be 

immediately wiped out with a nuclear counter-strike. Therefore, 

no real threat exists, and it does not make sense to develop and 

deploy a national missile defense system. 

• And, even if it does work, and even if it makes sense to 

develop and deploy it, the system is far too expensive to be 

affordable.
8 • Jacques S. Gansler 

Certainly, this is a very strong set of arguments. Each has an 

element of truth in it, and each must be addressed. 

Equally strong arguments are made by advocates for development 

and deployment of NMD: 

• As provided in the Constitution, it is the government’s 

responsibility to “provide for the common defense.” Without a 

deployed anti-missile system the Nation is defenseless against any 

missile attack on the United States. Even one nuclear weapon 

impacting an American urban area would cause hundreds of 

thousands—if not millions—of deaths. There is no question that a 

defense system should be implemented if it can be done with any 

reasonable confidence. 

• In fact, it need not be 100 percent perfect, since it will still 

present a credible deterrent and likely would save many lives. 

Additionally, it will be possible to have multiple shots at the target 

if the system is properly designed, which increases the probability 

of both destroying the incoming warhead and saving lives. The 

odds of success are high enough to warrant implementation of a 

missile defense system. 

• Americans clearly feel “unprotected,” and that’s why the 

majority of the people want to deploy a system today, if it can be 

made reasonably effective. 

• The threat is real. Numerous nations have, or will shortly have, 

the capability to attack cities in both the United States and allied 

nations, and many of those countries have declared open hostility 

to the United States—including North Korea and Iran. Iraq’s use of 

Scud missiles against Tel Aviv (despite Israel’s capability to 

retaliate with nuclear weapons) indicates that these countries would 

be willing to use their missiles against the United States, even if 

faced with nuclear retaliation. 

• The United States needs a missile defense system to deter rogue 

countries from trying to keep the United States out of regional 

conflicts in which we should be involved. They can achieve this 

simply by threatening us, knowing that we have no defense against 

their threats. The President must have the flexibility to exercise 

various options, and a defense system provides that flexibility. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 9 

 

• The presence of a missile defense system will reduce the 

current, extensive proliferation of ballistic missiles by reducing the 

value of offensive weapons. 

• The United States should be protected against the accidental 

launch of a missile from Russia or China, rather than being forced 

either to accept the destruction of a U.S. city or retaliating to 

destroy one or more cities in either Russia or China. Such a 

situation would likely escalate into the nuclear annihilation of both 

the United States and either Russia or China.

• The development and deployment of such a system, which 

might cost around $10 billion per year, is certainly affordable, 

within a $500 to $600 billion-plus annual defense budget. It is 

simply a question of priorities, and the protection of the American 

public is a very high priority.

• It is believed that Russia (and, later, China) would agree to 

modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (thus preserving 

the overall treaty regimes for strategic systems), since they would 

recognize that the limited and relatively cruder defense systems 

being proposed would have essentially no capability against their 

higher numbers and/or more sophisticated capabilities. 

• It is technically feasible (as it has been, and will be further 

demonstrated to be) to build an effective defensive system against 

the threats currently expected from rogue nations.

• It is possible to make a safe transition from reliance on 

“assured mutual destruction” to dependence upon strategic defense; 

since we would have the cooperation of Russia (and, later, China) 

in this transition. 

• Russia already deploys a defense system around Moscow, and 

presumably understands the need for the United States to have a 

credible defense system. However, our limited defense system must 

be one that is not aimed at eliminating the benefits of the ABM 

Treaty and its stabilization benefits for the United States and Russia 

(and potentially, for China).

Again, there is much truth in each of these arguments. Taken 

together they constitute a formidable case for the development and 

deployment of a limited defense system. Certainly, they also support 

continuing R&D, as well as added testing, to thoroughly demonstrate 
10 • Jacques S. Gansler 

an effective capability against the potential threat from a rogue nation 

or an inadvertent Russian or Chinese launch. 

The extremely emotional and bifurcated argument for and against 

national missile defense has been going on for most of the past 50-plus 

years, as will be demonstrated by the following discussion of the 

history of anti-missile programs and the enduring issues concerning 

their deployments. The only possible exception is the period from 1972 

to 1983, when the strategic posture of both the Soviet Union and the 

United States was total reliance on the deterrence of mutual assured 

destruction. 

Naturally, these pro and con arguments will have varying degrees 

of sophistication and subtlety as one begins to address the specifics of 

the numerous types of systems that have been, or are now, under 

consideration. In order to both understand the options for the future, we 

need to briefly consider the various types of ballistic missile defense 

systems (and their many elements) and look at the history of the field. 

 
 11 

Chapter 2 

Types of Ballistic Missile 

Defense Systems 

here are four ways in which a ballistic missile defense system 

can be categorized: 1) the phase of the offensive missile 

trajectory in which it is attempting the intercept; 2) the location 

of the interceptor (land, sea, air, or space); 3) the kill mechanism 

utilized by the interceptor; and 4) the types and location of the sensors 

used to track and intercept the target. Let us briefly describe each of 

these, and their advantages and disadvantages, recognizing that any 

system is likely to be a combination of some or all of these. 

Target Trajectory Phase Categories 

A ballistic missile can be categorized by four phases. First, it has a 

pre-launch phase, during which the missile is on the ground, in a ship, 

buried in a silo, or on a mobile vehicle. In this phase, the missile is 

highly vulnerable to a preemptive strike. However, both mobile 

(especially submarine-launched) and hardened (silo-based) missiles are 

difficult to kill prior to launch and, therefore, represent a “second 

strike” capability. 

Second, when the missile is launched it is initially in its boost 

phase, in which large rockets are lifting the warhead on its way. Since 

they are burning, they have a very large heat and light signature, so the 

target can easily be seen and tracked. It is highly vulnerable, as it is 

large and “soft,” and moves relatively slowly as it accelerates up to full 

speed. This powered flight phase lasts from 200 to 300 seconds. 

Because of this short duration, any attempt to kill the target in the boost 

phase requires that the interceptor be very nearby and very fast. 

Additionally, since the launch happens without much warning, there is 

very little time for deciding whether this target is an ICBM heading 

toward the United States or an ally, or is a non-threatening launch of a 

communication satellite or other space launch; thus, sensors for 

determining this are clearly required. Surely, there is no time in this 

phase for a coordinated decisionmaking process, either among agencies 

or, especially, among nations. The response must be instantaneous. 

T 
12 • Jacques S. Gansler 

A major advantage of attempting to eliminate the target during this 

phase is that it difficult to develop offensive countermeasures, such as a 

decoy to lure the kill mechanism away from the target. However, more 

sophisticated techniques are certainly possible; including more rapidly 

burning rockets and the use of multiple rockets. Finally, it is important 

to consider that Iran or North Korea would utilize a minimum-energy 

ballistic attack path in which their missiles would fly over the North 

Pole (known as “great circle routes”). In doing so, they are flying over 

territories such as Russia and China (not over water); thus, if we were 

to have ground-based interceptors in a position to kill the targets during 

their boost phase, this would have to be done on a cooperative basis 

with those countries on the flight path. 

On a related note, because of the very large size of both Russia and 

China, there is no way that any ground-based, boost-phase system 

could be used against either of these countries. This is one of the main 

arguments often used to urge the development of a ground-based boostphase system (to be used against “rogue nations”), since it is clearly not 

a threat to China or Russia. However, a space-based boost-phase 

intercept system would be capable of covering Russia and China, so it 

could not be argued that it was limited only to rogue nations. 

Third, after the rocket burns out, the warhead goes through an 

extended exoatmospheric mid-course phase in which it is simply 

following a ballistic trajectory—unless it intentionally performs 

maneuvers. (From North Africa, the Middle East or Asia, an 

intercontinental missile would have to travel 3,000 to 6,000 miles to 

reach the continental United States; Alaska and Hawaii are closer to 

Asia.) This mid-course phase (lasting up to 20 minutes) is the one that 

is most attractive for interception of a warhead, because it is in “freefall,” allowing for long time periods of analysis and human 

decisionmaking prior to committing to an intercept. However, this is 

the phase in which it is most easy to use a decoy to simulate the reentry 

(warhead) vehicle. This is because, absent atmospheric resistance, 

objects such as balloons, aluminum chaff, and other lightweight objects 

have the same trajectory characteristics as a heavy reentry vehicle. That 

makes this phase of the flight the most difficult for discrimination 

between the warhead and the many decoys that could be released. 

Obviously, the more sophisticated the decoying capability that a 

country has for its ICBM’s, the more challenging a mid-course phase 

intercept becomes. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 13 

 

Finally, the large “cloud” of decoys and the reentry vehicle (or 

vehicles) will reach the atmosphere near the target area. For the last 60 

to 90 seconds of the flight—the “terminal,” or “reentry” phase—these 

objects are “sorted out” by the atmosphere; the dense, pointed reentry 

vehicle will move rapidly through the atmosphere, while the lighter 

objects will slow down. From a discrimination perspective, the use of 

the atmosphere is very attractive, but from a timing perspective, it is 

extremely challenging to wait for the sorting to take place and then 

commit interceptors to kill the reentry vehicle, prior to its rapid 

approach toward its target. 

As can be seen, each of these phases has significant advantages and 

disadvantages relative to an anti-ballistic missile system. As history has 

shown, each option will have its advocates and critics; and known 

problems have been and/or are currently under consideration for 

solutions. 

Interceptor Location Categories 

The most obvious place initially considered for a missile defense 

system is in the vicinity of the defended area. Thus, ground-based 

systems located near the target form the first approach to interception. 

This certainly would be the first choice for the defense of troops, 

command centers, and even population centers, and it is currently the 

approach for theater (tactical) systems. It is the basis of several defense 

systems, including: the Russian system around Moscow; the Army’s 

Patriot (PAC-3) system (figure 1), which was used in the Persian Gulf 

conflict against Iraqi Scud missiles; the Army’s longer-range THAAD 

system (figure 2);1

 and—although not located in the primary target 

area—the limited National Missile Defense system (figure 3) that is 

being deployed, initially with 20 interceptors, divided between Fort 

Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, for 

protection against rogue nation launches against the United States 

 

1

 Available at http://www.mda.mil/news/gallery_thaad.html; accessed on 

September 17, 2009. 
14 • Jacques S. Gansler 

Figure 1. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Army 

conducted a successful test of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC03) 

missile at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., February 5, 2000. The PAC-3 

missile is a high velocity, hit-to-kill missile and is the next generation 

PATRIOT missile being developed to provide increased defense capability 

against advanced tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile aircraft. 

The PAC-3 missile uses kinetic energy (i.e. “hit-to-kill” to destroy targets 

rather than employing a high explosive warhead. It is the basis of the 

U.S./German/Italian, and now NATO, theater missile defense system (known 

as MEADS). 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 15 

 

Figure 2. On March 17, 2009, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD) missile defense element completed a successful intercept of a 

ballistic missile target at the Pacific Missile Range Facility off the island of 

Kauai in Hawaii. THAAD is a mobile system designed to intercept short to 

medium range ballistic missiles. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery 

Brigade conducted launcher, fire control, and radar operations using tactics, 

techniques, and procedures developed by the U.S. Army Air Defense School. 
16 • Jacques S. Gansler 

Figure 3. A Ground-Based Interceptor is shown shortly after liftoff from a silo 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, on December 5, 2008. The launch, 

designated FTG-05, was a test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

element of the National Missile Defense System. The missile successfully 

intercepted and vaporized a long-range target launched from Kodiak, Alaska, 

several minutes earlier (see figure 4). 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 17 

 

Figure 4. Infrared imagery of December 5, 2008, National Missile Defense 

System target kill of an ICBM re-entry vehicle over the Pacific. 
18 • Jacques S. Gansler 

Figure 5. An Arrow anti-ballistic missile is launched July 29, 2004, as part of 

the ongoing U.S./Israel Arrow System Improvement Program. The missile 

intercepted a short-range ballistic missile target west of San Nicolas Island on 

the Point Mugu Sea Range in California. This was the twelfth Arrow intercept 

test and the seventh test of the complete Arrow system. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 19 

 

A ground-based system is also the chosen basing mode for Israel’s 

Arrow system (figure 5), which is particularly focused on Iran’s missile 

launches; for the U.S./German/Italian, and now NATO, troopprotection system (known as MEADS); and for the French/Italian 

SAMP/T (tactical) system. 

The second area for interceptor location consideration is that of a 

sea-based system. Naturally, this is immediately considered for defense 

of the fleet, but its use has also been considered for boost-phase 

intercepts against missiles that are launched close to water and/or fly 

over water (for example, a launch from North Korea targeting Hawaii). 

The sea-based system could be used against any of the phases of an 

ICBM: if close by, it could be used during the boost phase; if the target 

is flying overhead, it could be used in the mid-course phases; it could 

even be located near an urban area or in a harbor, and used in the 

terminal phases. 

Figure 6. AEGIS Cruiser Launch of Standard Missile-2 Block IV. 
20 • Jacques S. Gansler 

However, modern day interceptor use in the boost phase would 

require the development of a new, high-speed interceptor. (Because it is 

trying to catch up with the booster, it would probably have to have 

acceleration capability in the range of 30Gs and speed in the range of 8 

kilometers/per second at burnout.) Also, it would certainly have to 

address the question of ship vulnerability, either from submarine 

launched torpedoes and/or ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles 

aimed at the ships themselves. It could only be used for those limited 

cases in which the geometry was favorable to a ship-based system. 

Finally, a sea-based boost intercept may require new, special-purpose 

ships, which would drive the cost of this approach up significantly. 

Nonetheless, the United States currently has a very effective, shipbased tactical anti-missile system—the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) 

(figure 6)—and has even used it for a successful anti-satellite kill, so 

this option cannot be quickly dismissed. And, for this reason, further 

development of the Standard Missile (SM-3) is continuing. In fact, this 

is a particularly attractive option for an island defense system 

(especially against mid-range missile systems), so it is attractive for and 

Taiwan. 

In a joint missile defense intercept test with the Missile Defense 

Agency to intercept a medium-range, a Japanese DDG launched an 

SM-3 to intercept a separating target that had been launched minutes 

earlier from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, 

Hawaii (see figure 7). The ship’s crew detected and tracked the target, 

and its weapons system developed a fire-control solution and then 

launched the SM-3. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 21 

 

Figure 7. An SM-3 is launched in mid-Pacific from the Japanese Ship (JS) 

CHOKAI (DDG 176. (Photo courtesy of MDA.) 

Another possibility is an air-launched system, whereby flying the 

interceptor close to a missile launch site could gain some advantages, 

and—if ready for the launch and with a high-speed interceptor—

perhaps achieve a boost-phase kill. But the mission places the aircraft 

in a vulnerable area and requires it to be airborne for long periods of 
22 • Jacques S. Gansler 

time, waiting for the offensive missile launch. An attractive option for 

the airborne system is the use of a high-energy laser aboard the aircraft, 

so that it does not have to have to carry many interceptors and can 

achieve a high-speed kill (literally, at the speed of light) by heating the 

“soft” and explosive booster (see below). 

Finally, the system can be spaced-based. This was the initial 

concept of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. In this case, a 

large number of low-altitude satellites, containing either interceptors, or 

high-energy lasers, or neutral-particle beams, would be continuously 

orbiting the earth. These satellites could attempt to shoot down any 

launches in either the boost or mid-course phases. This is likely to be 

the most expensive of all the systems, and it is the only one of the 

various systems under consideration that is equally applicable to Russia 

and China, as well as to rogue states. For this reason, it is of most 

concern to those who would like to maintain a stable strategic posture 

based on offensive and defensive systems; but could be achieved with 

agreement from Russia and China as to its mutual desirability (a topic 

that will be addressed later). There is also a very real concern that the 

implementation of a space-based system might be considered 

destabilizing because during deployment of the system there is a period 

of potential first-strike vulnerability that a U.S. adversary might attempt 

to exploit. This is especially true when one takes into account the fact 

that after deployment a successful first strike would be impossible—

assuming the space-based system was sufficiently robust to handle 

large attacks. In spite of the high cost, technical questions, and political 

issues associated with space-based lasers, there has been periodic 

pressure to, at the minimum, conduct the research and demonstration of 

such capability (see below). 

Kill Mechanism Categories 

Because of the difficulty of “hitting a bullet with a bullet,” and 

because of the discrimination difficulties associated with finding the 

warhead in a group of decoys, the first kill mechanism considered was 

a nuclear warhead on the interceptor vehicle. This is the approach that 

was used by both the Russian system and the early U.S. programs. It 

has obvious disadvantages in terms of nuclear fallout in the defended 

area and the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) impacts on the defensive 

system (for example, by blanking out the radars). 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 23 

 

The traditional mechanism for shooting down airplanes has been 

kinetic kill, whereby the interceptor directly hits the target and totally 

destroys it. This is referred to as “hit-to-kill” (in the anti-missile case) 

because of the very high closing velocity between the target and the 

interceptor (15,000 miles per hour). In the case of antiaircraft missiles, 

the interceptor uses a high explosive and/or a heavy metal expanding 

warhead to kill the target from a few feet away. It does this by utilizing 

a fusing device that sets the warhead off at the precise time required. 

For many years it was thought that the extremely high speed of an 

intercontinental ballistic missile and the very high speed required for 

the interceptor to get to the target would result in such a high closing 

velocity between the two that would make it almost impossible to cover 

the closing distance with high accuracy. However, two U.S. antimissile flights in 2001 successfully demonstrated that direct hits can be 

achieved when the interceptor is initially guided from the ground to the 

proximity of the oncoming target warhead. It can then use its own 

discrimination and homing capability maneuvers to be at the right spot 

for a direct intercept. (See figure 8 for location of interceptor on front 

of booster vehicle. See figure 9 for the interceptor vehicle; sensor on 

top, control thrusters on bottom). 

One of the reasons that kinetic kill is so attractive is that the direct 

impact of two warheads will completely vaporize the threatening 

warhead (as was shown in figure 4), which is obviously highly 

desirable if the reentry vehicle contains a biological or nuclear 

warhead. 
24 • Jacques S. Gansler 

Figure 8. Exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) interceptor on launch pad. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 25 

 

Figure 9. The Missile Defense Agency achieved a successful intercept of a 

ballistic missile target on March 15, 2002. The test successfully demonstrated 

exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) flight performance and “hit-to-kill” 

technology to intercept and destroy a long-range ballistic missile target. 
26 • Jacques S. Gansler 

The last of the kill mechanisms under consideration is a highenergy laser. Until relatively recently, this was not considered a stateof-the-art approach; however, major developments have led to the 

feasibility of this option. In 2000, a joint U.S.-Israeli ground-based 

laser system was used to shoot down Katyusha rockets.2

 This geometry 

is particularly challenging, because of the difficulty of pointing, 

tracking, and continuous lasing, as the laser beams go through the low 

altitude atmosphere. The Air Force’s Boeing 747-based airborne laser 

system (see figures 10 and 11) has the advantage of operating at higher 

altitudes, where the atmosphere is thinner and there are fewer 

disturbances. 

Figure 10. YAL-1 Airborne Laser (ABL) is a heavily modified Boeing 747-

400F fitted with a megawatt-class chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL). Prior 

to termination of the program, the Air Force envisioned a fleet of seven 

aircraft. 

 

2

 These flights took place in 2000, and the destruction was done by the tactical 

high-energy laser (THEL) at White Sands, New Mexico. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 27 

 

Figure 11. Cutaway view of YAL-1. 

With the high-energy laser, the kill mechanism is the heating of the 

booster rocket case, causing the rocket to explode prior to releasing the 

reentry vehicle. If this happens late in the powered flight, the reentry 

vehicle can still continue on some path, and might hit an alternate 

target. Therefore, an early kill is highly desirable. Also, there are 

counter-measures that could be used against a laser kill, such as 

reflective paint on the booster, or spinning the booster so that the heat 

can be disbursed. Nonetheless, as discussed below, there have been 

significant investments made on airborne lasers in the 60s, then again 

in the 70s, and again in the 90s. And, on February 11, 2010, the 

airborne laser successfully shot down a ballistic missile two minutes 

after it was launched.3

 (However, for operational, technical, and cost 

considerations, Secretary of Defense Gates terminated the further 

procurement of the airborne laser program.) The potential for using 

lasers in space is also attractive because of the lack of atmosphere. 

Additionally, since a multi-satellite, space-based system covers the 

whole earth at all times, it overcomes the severe operational problem of 

an aircraft-based system of having to be always airborne in the area of 

the target launch (since there is the possibility of a launch, without 

warning, almost all of the time). However, the space-based laser does 

present significant problems, in terms of technology and cost. As noted 

 

3

 “Airborne laser shoots down missile in mid-flight,” Chris Gaylord, The 

Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 2010. 
28 • Jacques S. Gansler 

above, it also has important considerations for arms control agreements 

with Russia and China. 

Types and Locations of Sensors 

Any ballistic missile defense capability is likely to combine a 

number of sensors. First, sensors must warn the defense system that a 

missile has been launched; then, they must track and establish the 

missile’s path; next, they must be able to discriminate between the 

warhead (or warheads) and the cloud of decoys, and then guide the 

interceptor to the warhead, and kill it. Finally, it would be desirable to 

be able to determine whether an intercept was successful (in order to be 

able to do a ripple-fire, i.e. based on a “shoot-look-shoot” strategy). 

Since a lot of these sensors may be distributed in different locations, 

and many of the defensive systems will want to have a “man in the 

loop” decision process, before shooting down a target, there is a need 

for a very complex, secure, and reliable command, control, and 

communication system for any of the systems proposed. 

The types of sensors involved in most of these systems would 

include: 

Warning Systems. Space-based, missile-launch-warning satellites 

have been deployed by both the United States and Russia for many 

years. Located in a geo-synchronous orbit, they utilize their heatsensing (infrared) detectors to look for launches of missiles anywhere 

in the world. In most cases, the sensed launches have been missile tests 

that were or were not previously announced; these instances can be 

used for testing the sensor systems. The United States has committed to 

an upgraded version of these sensors (known as the “Space-Based 

Infrared System—High,” or “SBIRS-High”), which will be more 

sensitive and capable of establishing the post-launch target tracks (and, 

therefore, launch intent) more accurately than prior systems. An area of 

great concern is the deterioration of the Russian sensor system, which 

could incorrectly indicate a U.S. missile launch and result in a Russian 

“launch-on-warning” of a massive nuclear strike against the United 

States. For this reason, the United States has offered to share its 

warning data with Russia. 

Tracking and Evaluation Systems. These can be ground-based 

radars that are forward located (such as in Greenland, on the Aleutian 

Islands (Shemya), in England (Fylingsdale), in Central Europe, and on 

Cape Cod, or even sea-based (see figure 12.) 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 29 

 

Figure 12. The Sea-Based X-Band radar arrives in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 

aboard the heavy lift vessel Blue Marlin on January 9, 2006. 

Additionally, the United States has explored large (over 500 feet 

long), ultra-long-endurance (30 days), high altitude (65,000 feet), 

lighter-than-air airships to carry sensors aloft.4 The sensors can take (or 

generate) warning data (i.e. target detection), and then begin the 

process of tracking and discrimination among objects in space. For 

 

4

 Robert Wall, “Surging Aloft,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 

October 6, 2003, 52. 
30 • Jacques S. Gansler 

precision tracking and discrimination, an “X-band” radar with the 

capability to distinguish a golf ball at a distance of 2,400 miles (the 

distance from Washington, DC, to Seattle, Washington) would be 

utilized.5

 With detailed computer processing of the target signals 

received back from such a radar, many of the characteristics of size, 

tumbling, etc. associated with warheads and decoys can be determined.

Additionally, a space-based infrared tracking system operating in lowearth orbits can do additional mid-course discrimination amongst the 

various bodies, based on characteristics such as heat. (The United 

States intends to deploy about 20 of these low-altitude, space-based 

infrared systems, known as “SBIRS-Low,” with infrared sensors for 

mid-course discrimination.) Finally, the X-band tracking radars can be 

located near the target area for terminal phase tracking and 

discrimination. In addition, these forward-based and/or terminal phase 

radars can be used for the target-kill evaluation (to assess the need for 

additional interceptor launches).

Homing Sensors. Lastly, the interceptor itself should contain 

sensors so that it can do the final guidance and control maneuvers 

required to achieve a direct hit on the target. This can either be a small 

radar or, more likely, an infrared and/or optical system, in order to first 

perform the final discrimination among objects near the warhead, and 

then to assure that the interceptor is hitting the precise place on the 

reentry vehicle to achieve maximum damage. 

It is the combination and, particularly, the integration of multiple 

sensors, discriminating on multiple criteria, that allows some degree of 

confidence in being able to discriminate between warhead and decoys 

(which are intentionally made to appear, in various forms, as threats). 

The Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy launched a prototype 

Standard Missile-2 Bloc IVA from the “Desert Ship” complex at White 

Sands Missile Range, NM, on January 25, 2002. A hit-to-kill intercept 

occurred. An example of the seeker imagery from that test is presented 

in figure 13. 

 

5

 Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF Director, Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization, before the House Subcommittee on National 

Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on 

Government Reform, September 8, 2000. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 31 

 

Figure 13. Infrared interceptor seeker image of target. 

Overall System 

From the description of the various elements of a ballistic missile 

defense system, the extreme complexity of the overall system becomes 

obvious. This is further compounded by the fact that the ultimate 

configuration will be a “layered” system—combining many of the 

boost, midcourse and terminal elements, and the individual full 

systems—making it not only a difficult technical and budgeting 

challenge, but a multi-Service, and even multi-national organizational 

challenge. In addition, as the threat and the technologies change, the 

overall system must continue to evolve. In fact, the NMD system 

acquisition approach is to utilize “Spiral Development,” with a new 

“block” coming on line every two years. For example, as adversaries 

utilize multiple re-entry vehicles and decoys on a single ICBM, the 
32 • Jacques S. Gansler 

United States has been considering “multiple kill vehicles” (more than 

a dozen) launched on a single interceptor.

Overall, perhaps the biggest challenge for the integrated, ballistic 

missile defense system is the Command and Control system; 

particularly when other nations are involved. Even a long-range shot 

(e.g., one from North Korea to the Western United States) is still only 

25–30 minutes—and less to Europe. So, in this time, the target must be 

detected, its path established (to determine if it is a threat), then a 

launch decision made (and coordinated, if multi-national), the battle 

management worked out (e.g. multiple interceptors lunched, or shootlook-shoot), then evaluation of kill and decision on further actions. 

Naturally, all of this will have to be done with computers (but with a 

“man in the loop”). The software and communication challenges for 

this system are massive—linking (in real time) the many distributed 

sensors, the command and control systems, the interceptors and their 

guidance systems, etc. It is estimated that the software for this system 

will require more than 1.2 million lines of code.6

 Thus, it comes as no 

surprise that ballistic missile defense is one of the most challenging of 

defense weapon systems. Yet the results to date prove it can be done. 

But the questions still remain: how effectively, and at what cost? 

 

6

 “Missile Defense: Software Integration,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, June 28, 2004, 50. 
 33 

Chapter 3 

Countermeasures 

As the above discussion makes clear, and as will be examined in 

even more detail by the following history discussion, the concept of 

simply hitting a target during the various phases of flight, with an 

interceptor, has now largely been (or could easily be) successfully 

demonstrated. There are of course operational problems associated with 

the boost-phase intercept and the terminal-phase intercept, and there are 

significant problems associated with the discrimination problem in the 

mid-course phase (especially if more than just the reentry vehicle and 

the boost vehicle are present). The degree of difficulty of this 

discrimination challenge is a function of the sophistication of the threat. 

Since the earliest days of ballistic missile defense research, the 

United States has also had research underway associated with countermeasures that it could use in penetrating Soviet defense systems. 

Because the latter was based on a largely terminal-phase intercept, the 

U.S. counter measures program was focused on that area (under an 

effort being performed by the Defense Advanced Projects Agency and 

the U.S. Air Force, known as the ABRES Program, which stood for 

Advance Ballistic Reentry Systems). Here, areas such as maneuvering 

reentry vehicles; multiple reentry vehicles; many forms of passive 

decoys; passive penetration aides (e.g. “darts” and “jacks”); and 

electronic-warfare penetration aides were all investigated. This was 

funded during the 1960s and early 70s, at a level of $300 to $400 

million per year;1

 and covered research and development as well as 

production of U.S. countermeasures. (In current dollars this would be 

about $2 billion per year.) It is extremely important to highlight the fact 

that more sophisticated counter-measures, such as maneuvering reentry 

vehicles, fast-burn boosters, sophisticated decoys, electronic countermeasures, impact fusing of nuclear weapons, precursor nuclear 

explosives or even anti-satellite weapons, are not believed to be 

available to third world countries2

 in the foreseeable future, but could 

certainly be available to countries such as Russia and China; and to 

others in the longer-range. 

 

1

 “Counter Measures,” Union of Concerned Scientist, April 2000, 145. 

2

 Charles Glasser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future 

of US Nuclear Weapons’ Policy,” International Security, 2001. 
34 • Jacques S. Gansler 

The “game” of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures goes 

on in every aspect of military operations, as is the case here. The 

offense always has a distinct advantage, as it can decide what it wants 

to do; the defense must guess what the offense will do and develop 

counters to anticipated attacks. One of the ways in which the defense 

can try to overcome their inherent disadvantage is by taking a wide 

variety of approaches. This is the logic behind the current U.S. strategy 

of developing a “layered defense,” which would have some aspects of 

intercepting a missile in multiple phases (e.g., boost, mid-course, and 

terminal); as well as utilizing different types of platforms and 

interceptors (e.g., ground, ship, air, and space launch of kill vehicles) 

and/or utilizing high-energy laser kill mechanisms; and combining a 

variety of terminal sensors and utilizing a wide range of techniques for 

discrimination of decoys from warheads, such as multispectral sensors 

(e.g., infrared and X-band radars), or even pushing a gas cloud out front 

of an exoatmospheric interceptor to separate the heavy warhead from 

the decoy balloons.3

 

3

 This idea was suggested by Richard Garwin. 
 35 

Chapter 4 

Costs 

aturally, the cost of any missile defense system will vary 

widely as a function of the type of system and its complexity. 

Therefore, the early ground-based, terminal-phase systems 

(with their limited range intercept systems) would require a very large 

number of interceptor locations around the country, in order to defend 

the cities and critical sites at which they were located. In 1966, Defense 

Secretary McNamara estimated a cost of about $15 billion for enough 

firepower to defend a significant part of the country (over $100 billion 

in today’s dollars).1

 Later that year, he said that a “limited” system, 

aimed at protecting some cities against a few unsophisticated Chinese 

missiles, would be very effective and only cost $8 to $11 billion 

(around $50 billion in today’s dollars).2

 

The limited NMD system that was developed during the Clinton 

Administration began at a level of around $4 billion a year, and was 

accelerated by the George W. Bush administration. It was estimated to 

have an initial deployment cost of under $20 billion for the single site 

in Alaska, plus an added $10 to $15 billion for upgrading.3

 The General 

Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the cost for deployment and 20 

years of operation of the limited NMD system (including the spacebased infrared warning and tracking systems and 100 ground-based 

interceptors) would be about $60 billion. Finally, a 1988 estimate for a 

space-based system done by the independent Cost Analysis Group of 

the Pentagon put a laser-based defense system’s total deployment at 

around $115 billion. It also stated that if the program were structured to 

eliminate the lasers and have a more limited deployment on a spacebased system (such as using kinetic interceptors), it would cost around 

$55 billion (both estimates in 1988 dollars). 

What is important about all of these numbers is that they are very 

large. However, if this is a high-priority program, they are affordable

 

1

 Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI 1944-1983, University of Kansas 

Press, 1992, 17. 

2

 Ibid, 26. 

3

 Stephen J. Hadley, “A Call to Deploy,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 

2000. 

N
36 • Jacques S. Gansler 

within an annual defense budget that is well over $500 billion a year 

(recognizing that the large estimates for the full deployment and 

support of any of the systems are divided over a significant number of 

years). For example, the GAO cost estimate of $60 billion over 20 

years is $3 billion per year—or (on average) less than 1 percent of the 

annual DOD budget (even after adjusting for inflation). The early-year 

costs would, of course, be higher, and thus compete with other highcost priorities. 

To answer some of the basic questions about BMD—and in 

particular the two critical questions, “can it be done?” and “should we 

do it?”—it is necessary to put the current situation into perspective by 

examining the long history of ballistic missile defense. 
 37 

Chapter 5 

Historic Highlights 

Phase I: 1944 –1972 (from the V-2 to the ABM Treaty) 

1944—The first V-2 ballistic missile attacks on England. (The “V” 

stood for Vergeltungswaffe, which means vengeance weapon; it was 

aimed at killing civilians). 

1945—The first atomic bomb is dropped on Japan. 

1946—After the war, the United States learns that Germany had plans 

for an intercontinental missile to hit New York (in 1946!).1

 U.S. efforts 

at ballistic missile defense begin (under Project Defender), with two 

contracts to develop a defensive missile. (The programs were known as 

“Wizard” and “Thumper.”) 

1949—Soviet Union tests an atomic device. 

1955—Soviet Union begins development of a ballistic missile defense 

system (which was not publicly announced until 1966). 

1957—First Soviet ICBM test. U.S. Intelligence estimates that the 

Soviet Union will have 500 ICBMs by 1962. 

—Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first satellite. 

—U.S. Army NIKE/Zeus anti-ballistic missile program begins. It 

was an expansion of the NIKE anti-aircraft missile through the 

utilization of a nuclear warhead. 

1958—The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is founded, 

largely in response to the launching of Sputnik. It later became the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). ARPA begins 

broad-based research and development work on defense against 

Russian missiles, under the Project Defender program; funded at 

approximately $200 million per year (in 1958 dollars). A number of 

different options were explored, such as lasers and particle beams for 

kill mechanisms, and a space-based boost-intercept system (known as 

“BAMBI”), intended to utilize kinetic-kill mechanisms and infrared 

homing. ARPA also examined a satellite-based detection and tracking 

 

1

 MDA Historian, “Hit-to-Kill Intercept Tests,” Introduction, August 8, 2009. 
38 • Jacques S. Gansler 

38

system with ground-based interceptors, designed to meet their midcourse targets over the North Pole, and utilize nuclear warhead kills 

(one option had a ground-based radar located in Norway). Another 

concept they explored was known as “ARPAT” (for ARPA Terminal), 

in which unmanned vehicles loiter at an altitude of 60,000-foot, armed 

with interceptors that could be fired on guidance commands. These 

commands would be initiated after ground-based radars performed 

atmospheric sorting of the reentry vehicles from the decoys; the 

vehicles would then perform a kinetic kill of the warheads. Finally, 

“Project Defender” did a great deal of work on the development of 

large, ground-based, phased-array radar systems (the first was finished 

in 1960). This led to the demonstration of the ability to electronically 

steer a radar beam in two dimensions, using computers to control the 

beam. This has become a key element in ballistic missile defense 

systems, for both tactical and strategic purposes, replacing the prior, 

mechanical slewing of an antenna. 

—First U.S. ICBM (ATLAS) intercontinental flight. 

1959—A major milestone in the history of anti-missile technology: a 

ballistic missile is intercepted for the first time. Intercept was achieved 

by modifying the Hawk anti-aircraft missile’s radar receiver’s speedgate to handle the higher closing velocities of missile-to-missile 

intercepts. It was able to shoot down an Honest John tactical ballistic 

missile at the White Sands test range. 

—U.S. Navy initiates (again, in response to Sputnik) an antisatellite program known as “Early Spring,” to be launched from a 

Polaris missile in mid-ocean (so that the source would be unknown) 

and intercept the satellite at the apogee of the interceptor’s trajectory. It 

would then use terminal homing for the intercept. The program was 

announced to Congress in 1961, but the White House terminated it in 

the late ‘60s for political reasons. 

1962—First ICBM “intercept,” by the NIKE/Zeus missile, is achieved. 

Interceptor was launched from Kwajalein, in the Marshall Islands of the 

South Pacific, against a Minuteman ICBM launched from the Pacific 

Missile Range; the “intercept” was based on the miss-distance required 

for a kill using a nuclear warhead. (This is the identical geometry for 

the launch and first intercept of the NMD system in 1999, 37 years 

later, which utilized a hit-to-kill missile.) Simulations (on an analog 

computer) estimated that the ballistic missile defense system would be 

highly accurate, and the intercept by the NIKE/Zeus proved this to be 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 39 

the case. However, the successful NIKE/Zeus intercept did not lead to 

system deployment. The stated reasons for this were: 

1. Questionable discrimination capability. 

2. Concerns regarding the nuclear warhead detonation effects. 

3. High costs of the system. 

—The similarity of the flight test results of the NMD system 

intercepts, almost 40 years later, provoked the same questions, and the 

same programmatic results: i.e. “begin studies of alternatives, and 

continue the R&D—no deployment.” 

—Then came the Cuban Missile Crisis. This clearly made the 

possibility of an exchange of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles between 

the United States and the Soviet Union more credible—drawing 

renewed attention to defensive systems. 

1963—NIKE X begins. This was a layered system with the Spartan 

missile (an extended-range NIKE/Zeus) for intercepts in space (prior to 

re-entry) and the Sprint missile (a shorter-range, high-acceleration 

missile) for atmospheric intercepts. Both systems used nuclear 

warheads for the target kill, and the low-altitude intercept of the Sprint 

required that the radars be hardened against the detonation of its own 

nuclear warheads. Additionally, Secretary McNamara announced that 

fallout shelters were required for the population, as the Soviet Union 

could detonate nuclear weapons upwind of the defended region, and the 

radioactive fallout could spread to the target area. Also, there would be 

fallout from the defense system’s nuclear detonations. 

—A “partial nuclear test ban treaty” is signed. This treaty was 

strongly opposed by many ballistic missile defense proponents (then, 

and in the following years) because they wanted to begin atmospheric 

testing on the warhead of the NIKE/Zeus. (Arguments about nuclear 

testing have revived recently, as many nuclear scientists want to resume 

testing to assure the performance of nuclear warheads on U.S. strategic 

offensive weapons on the grounds that it is necessary to preserve 

nuclear deterrence.) 

1964—Soviet “Galosh” anti-ballistic missile system detected. It was a 

ground-based system utilizing nuclear warheads for the kill mechanism. 

It was to be deployed around Moscow. 

—By the end of 1964, a number of leading U.S. scientists said that 

the NIKE/Zeus system should not be deployed. They believed that it 

would be ineffective and destabilizing. They also stated that it would be 
40 • Jacques S. Gansler 

40

“virtually hopeless” to develop an effective system.2 Other leading 

scientists took the opposing position, as was the case over 35 years 

later, when leading scientists argued on both sides of the debate 

regarding NMD. 

—The “Betts Commission” Report, ordered by Secretary 

McNamara, found that: 

1. The offensive and defensive technologies of the United 

States and the Soviet Union were roughly parallel. 

2. Ballistic missile defense would limit the loss of U.S. lives 

and property. 

3. Ballistic missile defense would not disrupt the balance of 

deterrence.3

—China explodes a nuclear device, leading Secretary McNamara 

to examine how the NIKE X might be modified to cope with the kind 

of “light, unsophisticated attack” (“Nth country threat”) that China 

might be able to mount in the 1970s. Again, this shift, from an 

exclusive focus on the Soviet Union to a focus on a “light” system 

against an “Nth country,” has direct similarities to the shift that took 

place in the 1990s, when the United States refocused its system from 

Russia to “rogue nations.” 

1966—China demonstrates both an atomic weapon and an 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). 

—Secretary McNamara announces that the Soviet Union is fielding 

an ABM system around Moscow, known as “Galosh,” and that it had 

been under development in the Soviet Union since 1955. This led to 

initial discussions of an ABM Treaty, and increased efforts by the 

United States to develop penetration aides against the Soviet’s defense 

system. 

—Congress and the Joint Chiefs wanted to deploy the NIKE X 

system, but Secretary McNamara, President Kennedy and later 

President Johnson did not. 

1967—The United States decides to deploy the Sentinel system against 

China. It was a limited defense system not aimed at the Soviet Union (it 

could not handle multiple reentry vehicles, which the Soviet Union 

 

2

 Donald Baucom, The Origins of SDI (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas 

Press, 1992), 21–22. 

3

 Ibid, 22–23. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 41 

had). The “Sentinel” system was a layered system based on the Sprint 

and Spartan missiles. 

—McNamara argues that because the Soviet Union and the United 

States each has a second-strike capability (i.e., from a land-mobile or 

submarine-based ICBMs, that could survive a first strike), a limited 

anti-ballistic missile system would be worthless for either of them. 

Thus, a limited BMD system against an unsophisticated nth country, 

without a second-strike capability, was the only one that made sense—

and it clearly would be no threat to the Soviets. This, of course, is the 

argument that is being advanced today, due to the fact that the limited 

U.S. National Missile Defense system will only be used against rogue 

nations and would be useless against Russia or even China (once China 

deploys its mobile and sea-based systems). McNamara did state, 

however, that the system could be used for an accidental Soviet launch. 

Once again, this same argument resurfaced almost 40 years later during 

the George W. Bush administration. 

—Soviet Premier Kosygin stated “Defense is moral; Offense is 

immoral.” As Henry Kissinger later added, the Soviets never accepted 

the idea that vulnerability was a desirable characteristic, as required 

under the mutual assured destruction concept. 

—Secretary McNamara said that the U.S. reaction to the Soviet 

deployment of a ballistic missile defense system would not be the 

deployment of more U.S. defensive systems; instead, it would be the 

deployment of more and better offensive systems. Interestingly, this is 

the same position, but reversed, taken by Russian President Putin in 

2001, declaring Russia would increase their offensive ICBMs when 

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld declared that they would break 

the ABM Treaty and deploy the U.S. NMD system. 

—The United States successfully demonstrates two types of 

inertially guided, maneuvering reentry systems launched as payloads on 

ICBMs and intended to defeat the Soviet Galosh system. 

1969—President Nixon announces the decision to deploy anti-missile 

systems around two Minuteman sites, with a growth capability to 10 

sites, to handle the developing Chinese threat. He called this system 

“SafeGuard.” It was the same as the Sentinel system, but was intended 

to guard missile sites rather than cities. Interestingly, 40 years later, the 

fear in both Russia and China was that the “limited system” then being 

deployed in Alaska might grow to handle both the Chinese and Russian 

threat, instead of its intended use against rogue nations. 
42 • Jacques S. Gansler 

42

—With the decision to deploy SafeGuard around Minuteman sites, 

the ABM debate heated up again. Scientists went on strike, held mass 

meetings, and marched on Washington—all in protest of the planned 

SafeGuard limited deployment. Congress was split on the issue (with 

the Senate divided 50/50 on votes), as were scientists. The public was 

generally in favor, with various polls showing from 47 percent to 84 

percent approval, but many were uninformed and/or indifferent. 

—Because nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet 

Union had been reached by the end of 1968 (with each country capable 

of withstanding a first strike and having an effective second strike), it 

was concluded that no one could “win” a nuclear exchange. It was also 

decided that mutual assured destruction, at the levels of the offensive 

weapons then in existence on both sides (and even below), would 

justify the initiation of strategic arms control negotiations and 

subsequent arms-reduction agreements. 

1970—SafeGuard deployment begins in Grand Forks, North Dakota, 

around the Minuteman silos. It was approved in the Senate by a vote of 

51 to 49. It was argued that the decision to begin deployment would be 

a “bargaining chip” to persuade the Soviets to reduce the number of 

strategic missiles—and, if they agreed, there would be no need for the 

deployment. (This was perhaps the first linking of treaty negotiations 

on offense limits with defensive systems, a precursor to future 

negotiations.) 

1972—Both the ABM Treaty (limiting anti-ballistic missile systems) 

and the Salt I Treaty (limiting strategic offensive weapons) are agreed 

to by the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the SafeGuard 

deployment was halted (although inertia kept it going for 4 more 

years). The assumption was that each side would effectively remain 

defenseless—even though each was initially allowed two defensive 

sites (which 2 years later was reduced to one defensive site). Thus 

began the era of mutual assured destruction as the basic strategic policy 

of the United States. 

—As part of the ABM Treaty agreement, each country agreed not 

to deploy ABM systems for the defense of its national territory, nor 

create a base for such a defense. They also agreed that a maximum of 

100 ABM interceptors and launchers could be deployed at the two sites 

(either the national capital or an ICBM deployment area). They also 

agreed that each country would accept restrictions on the number, 

power, and location of ABM radars and other radars that can be used in 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 43 

place of an ABM radar. Finally, they both agreed not to develop, test, 

or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based 

ABM systems. 

Phase II: 1973-1983 (from the ABM treaty to the SDI) 

1974—The ABM Treaty is amended so that each side would have only 

one site (Moscow and Grand Forks, N.D.). 

1976—With the ABM Treaty in place and the bargaining-chip rationale 

gone, Congress cancels the funding for the ABM system; 

dismantlement was completed the same year. Even though the site for 

SafeGuard was allowed by the treaty, the same concerns about its 

viability still existed, especially in the areas of discrimination and 

kinetic (vs. nuclear) kills—two of the major uncertainty areas of the 

systems historically, and to date. Other areas in which research 

continued (in addition to discrimination and hit-to-kill technology) 

included high-energy lasers (with demonstrations by each Service on an 

airplane, a ship and a vehicle) and the laser’s integration with precision 

pointing and tracking systems. (ARPA had been funding research on 

high-energy lasers for ABM since 1961, under project “Seaside.”) 

1978—The Joint Chiefs of Staff order that work begin on a “low-risk 

Anti-Satellite system using off-the-shelf technology... employing 

pellets as its kill mechanism.”4

 (However, the description of this system 

was never made public.) 

1979—The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. 

1981—Ronald Reagan is elected, and begins internal discussions on the 

formulation of a policy for defense of the country against ballistic 

missile threats. The prior year, he and the Republican Platform had 

made a joint statement that “the Republicans reject the Mutual Assured 

Destruction (MAD) strategy ... which limits the President during crisis 

to the Hobson’s Choice between mass, mutual suicide and surrender.” 

They went on to urge “vigorous R&D of an effective ABM system.” 

1982—Army tests prototype hit-to-kill, exoatmospheric Homing 

Overlay Experiment (HOE), from Kwajalein on a modified minuteman 

rocket. 

 

4

 Federation of American Scientists website (regarding “Early Spring”), 

http://www.fas.org. 
44 • Jacques S. Gansler 

44

1983—President Reagan announces the Strategic Defense Initiative 

(SDI), in which he rejects MAD in favor of “defense for the country.”5

His concept was to be based on space-based laser kills, and was to 

“assure survival for us and our allies.” He also offered to share it with 

the Soviet Union, “so that all countries could be protected.” 

—Opponents immediately named SDI “Star Wars,” while Reagan 

emphasized that it would save lives, not avenge them. Yet he clearly 

recognized the difficulty, costs, and time required to develop the 

system. 

—Importantly, Reagan said that he wanted to keep within the 

constraints of the ABM Treaty (which explicitly prohibited space-based 

systems); so he must have had in mind a treaty revision that could be 

mutually agreed to. 

Phase III: 1984 to 1993—(Strategic Defense Initiative) 

1984—The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is 

established.

1985—A Titan Rocket is destroyed by an infrared, advanced chemical 

laser.

1987—A layered defense system is planned, with space-based boostintercept, and ground-based, mid-course and terminal phases, and with 

space and ground-based sensors. The United States continued to pursue 

the full range of R&D options. A program called “Brilliant Pebbles,” 

containing 1000 space-based interceptors, and space-based “Brilliant 

Eyes” to do tracking and discrimination, was investigated (reminiscent 

of the 1958 “BAMBI” system, the space-based kinetic-kill ABM 

system). Also, ground-and ship-based theater and national defense 

systems were continued.

1989—Berlin Wall falls. Collapse of the Warsaw Pact. 

1991—Collapse of the Soviet Union. The “Cold War” officially ends. 

—President George H.W. Bush announces a refocused SDI, called 

GPALS (for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes). The strategy 

had three parts: 

1. A theater defense system for U.S. troops and allied nations. 

 

5

 For a full discussion of SDI, see Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 

1944-1983 (Modern War Studies), University Press of Kansas, 1992. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 45 

2. A national system which was ground-based and treaty 

compliant (sic) to protect the American people. 

3. A space-based global system for small (nth nation) attacks 

against any country. 

—The Gulf War, which many claim was the last of the 20th 

Century “conventional” conflicts (i.e., massed tanks on the battlefield). 

—The first operational military engagement between ballistic 

missiles and ballistic missile defenses; Patriot missiles are used against 

Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf War. 

—A Scud launched from Iraq achieves the first U.S. casualties 

from a ballistic missile when it hits military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi 

Arabia, killing 28 soldiers and wounding 99. 

1993— President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin sign START II. 

—The Strategic Defense Initiative is ended by President Clinton. 

The program office is renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Organization and focus shifts to defending against a few, relativelyunsophisticated, long-range missiles, launched from “rogue nations” to 

destroy the United States—as well as having a secondary role in 

maintaining defensive capability against an inadvertent launch of a 

Russian missile. The concept of mutual assured destruction was no 

longer being questioned; it would remain the basis for the strategic 

balance between the United States and Russia. However, “limited” 

missile defense would be the new focus, aimed at “rogue” nations. 

Phase IV: 199 –2001 (from the end of SDI to 9/11) 

1994—Start I enters into force, establishing a limit on strategic missile 

numbers for the United States and Russia. 

—The Republican Party’s “Contract with America” calls for 

renewed commitment to National Missile Defense. 

1995—First flight test of the Army’s ground-based, Terminal High 

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. 

1996—The National Missile Defense (NMD) program officially 

begins. It was to be a ground-based system, utilizing “hit-to-kill” 

targeting as the kill mechanism, in order to assure the vaporization of 

biological or nuclear warheads. Its eventual location was to be Alaska, 

in order to protect all 50 states. It would use space-based sensors and 

ground-based radars. The R&D undertaken would be compatible with 
46 • Jacques S. Gansler 

46

the ABM Treaty, though it was recognized that when deployment 

began there would have to be treaty modifications (or an abrogation by 

the United States; with 6 months warning to the Russians). 

—Also, the first multinational, anti-ballistic missile program was 

established that year. The program was known as MEADS (Medium 

Extended Air Defense System), and it was to be a mobile, theater 

system for defending maneuvering forces of the United States, Italy and 

Germany, as well as fixed installations, against tactical ballistic 

missiles, low and high-altitude cruise missiles and all forms of aircraft. 

Its design was to be based on the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 missiles 

(originally anti-aircraft missiles), with Ka-band radar terminal homing. 

1997—The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization establishes a joint 

(multiservice) program office to design and develop the NMD system; 

to be completed by the year 2003—a highly optimistic goal. However, 

this date was set in recognition of growing worldwide proliferation of 

long-range ballistic missiles, and with considerable Congressional 

pressure in mind. It would be “possibly achievable,” if everything went 

perfectly. 

—President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin agree on an 

outline of the START III treaty, reducing nuclear arsenals to between 

2,000 and 2,500 warheads each. 

1998—India and Pakistan test nuclear devices. 

—North Korea tests a long-range missile (the Taepodong-1), which 

was fired in a trajectory over the island of Japan. It was observed that 

they also had the Taepodong-2 under development, and that it could 

reach Hawaii and Alaska from North Korea. 

—The “Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat” (known 

as the Rumsfeld Commission,6

 for its chairman Donald Rumsfeld) 

found that ballistic missiles pose a growing threat to the United States, 

and that a number of potentially hostile nations could have the ability to 

inflict major damage on the United States within about 5 years of 

seeking to acquire such a capability. 

—A separate study by the National Defense Industries Association 

reached similar conclusions. They emphasized the political 

ramifications of a third-world country coming to possess a relatively 

 

6 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, 1998, 

Washington, D.C. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 47 

inaccurate, unreliable missile equipped with a chemical or biological 

warhead—even if it was never launched.7

 They found that “third-world 

countries willing to accept limited performance, and choosing to use 

innovative approaches, can develop or otherwise acquire a long-range 

ballistic missile capable of striking parts of the United States within 3 

to 5 years.” 

—Defense Secretary Cohen stated that missile defense is now a key 

element of U.S. strategic strategy, within the context of the ABM 

Treaty and the Start II and Start III environment (the expectation being 

that future negotiations with Russia on the ABM Treaty modifications 

would include a combination of offense and defense). 

1999—The National Missile Defense Act is passed by Congress and 

signed by President Clinton. This Act commits the nation to NMD “as 

soon as technically feasible—and if affordable and within the overall 

national security interest of the nation.” 

—America and Russia resume strategic arms talks that include 

modification of the ABM Treaty. 

—The first integrated flight test of the National Missile Defense 

System is performed with an interceptor launched from Kwajalein in 

the Marshall Islands. The interceptor is deployed against a Minuteman 

launched from the Pacific Missile Range. A decoy is also launched. 

Although initially targeted by the interceptor, it is able to correctly 

distinguish the decoy from the true missile, shifting its focus to the reentry vehicle target. It achieved a direct hit, causing an evaporation of 

the target warhead. 

—DOD adds budget funds that would allow it to deploy an NMD 

system, should it prove desirable. 

—NATO initiates studies of multinational ballistic missile defense 

systems. 

2000—The second and third integrated flight tests of the overall 

National Missile Defense System both experience reliability failures. 

The first has an interceptor cooling system failure about 5 seconds 

before intercept; the second has a booster-warhead interface system 

failure, so the kill vehicle is never released. 

 

7

 National Defense Industry Association, Washington D.C., 1998, 77. 
48 • Jacques S. Gansler 

48

—The Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT release a report 

challenging the effectiveness of the planned anti-missile system against 

countermeasures. 

—President Clinton decides not to authorize work to begin to 

deploy the National Missile Defense System because the technology 

has yet to be proven. The R&D program is to remain on track. 

2001—In his confirmation hearings, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld refers 

to the ABM treaty as “ancient history.” 

—Russia, China and North Korea formally tell the U.N. 

Disarmament Commission that a U.S. missile defense system would 

threaten international security; trigger a new arms race; and undermine 

the ABM Treaty. This was a culmination of comments received from 

many countries (including numerous, historically-strong allies of the 

United States), questioning whether or not it was worth destroying the 

ABM Treaty over deploying a U.S. National Defense Missile System. 

—President George W. Bush calls for a Missile Defense System; 

with funding for the program, in his first budget (Fiscal Year ’02), set 

to dramatically increase. 

—The fourth integrated system test of the NMD system achieves a 

successful intercept, making the record 2 successes out of 4 attempts. 

—President Bush announces his plan to establish an ABM Treatycompliant missile test range in Alaska; which could be converted to an 

initial National Missile Defense System as early as 2004.8

 Also, it is 

recognized that the United States can begin testing of future sea, air and 

space-based systems as long as the testing is done on the land (which 

would be in accordance with the ABM Treaty). 

—President Bush (in a speech at the National Defense University) 

announces his potential future intent to examine basing options for a 

missile defense system in Eastern Europe. 

Phase V: Post 9-11 

2001—In December, President Bush announces the intent to withdraw 

from the 30-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and agrees to 

significant missile cuts by the United States and Russia. 

—The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is renamed the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to give it greater prestige; with an 

 

8 Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2001. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 49 

approximate doubling of its budget and a major restructuring and 

expansion of the overall program. 

—Three successful intercepts in a row (by the NMD system) 

provide increased confidence in the ability to consistently “hit-to-kill” 

at intercontinental ranges (with the “score-card” reading five successes 

out of seven flights—and the two failures being due to parts 

unreliability, not design deficiencies). 

—The focus of the ballistic missile defense program shifts to the 

integration and consolidation of a few, next-generation, layered 

systems, covering the domains that had previously been referred to as 

“theater” and “strategic” systems, and including defense against 

increasingly-sophisticated decoys. 

—There is growing interest in the United States, Europe, and Asia 

about the importance of multi-national considerations in ballistic 

missile defense. 

—China conducts a full-scale anti-missile test. 

—Anthrax attack on Capitol Hill raises concerns about multiple, 

small biological warheads. 

2002—Bush Administration “National Security Presidential Directive 

23” officially withdraws from the ABM treaty and commits the United 

States to deploy an initial [national] missile defense capability in 2004 

(released to the public in May 2003); which represented a withdrawal 

from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former Soviet 

Union. 

—Russia strongly objects to U.S. deployment of BMD missiles in 

Poland and radars in Czech Republic (claims they are “a threat to 

Russia”) and states they will respond with increased ICBMs. 

2003—MDA temporarily suspends plans to move forward with a 

space-based, kinetic-energy, boost-phase intercept program, claiming 

the technology is not mature enough. 

—DOD selects Adak, Alaska for a sea-based, X-band radar (on a 

self-propelled, modified oil-drilling platform) to perform detection, 

tracking and discrimination. 

2004—ABM missiles began entering Fort Greely, Alaska silos. 

—Russian Topol-M long-range (6000 miles) deploys initial mobile 

(off-road) version (of the silo-based system). 
50 • Jacques S. Gansler 

50

—Abdul Qadeer Khan admits that he had passed on Pakistan’s 

nuclear technology to Libya, North Korea, and Iran (often via Dubai, in 

UAE). 

—Funds requested to expand U.S. missile defense system to 

Europe (sites to be determined).9

—Airborne laser runs into cost and technical problems (overrun by 

$2 billion). 

2005—NATO officially adopts the U.S./German/Italian MEADS for 

theater missile defense (with deployment around 2012). 

—Secretary Rumsfeld directs that cruise missile defense not be 

under the Missile Defense Agency. 

—Missile defense budget (under President Bush) grows to $9.9 

billion (from $4.2 billion). 

—Japan increases its emphasis on missile defense. 

—MDA initiates unmanned, high-altitude airship (to hover above 

60,000 feet with 500 pounds of sensors) 

2006—MDA pushes Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) to allow over 20 kill 

vehicles (for exoatmospheric kills) in space formerly occupied by a 

single kill vehicle. 

—SM-2 achieves intercept of long-range ballistic missile in 

terminal phase; prior intercepts had been boost or mid course. 

—United States has deployed 10 interceptors (at Fort Greely, 

Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California) and Congress 

approves initial funding for third site (in Europe). 

—Russia announces development of maneuverable warheads to 

penetrate missile defense systems. 

—Iran launches Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles in “Gulf War 

Games.” 

2007—China performs a successful anti-satellite weapons test, 

destroying an aging Chinese weather satellite target at over 500 miles 

altitude with a kinetic kill vehicle launched on a ballistic missile 

(results in a large number of space debris objects). 

 

9

 Robert Wall, “Growth Path,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 

2, 2004, 31. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 51 

—Army soldiers at Pacific Missile Range conduct a successful 

“high endoatmospheric” (just inside Earth’s atmosphere) intercept of a 

“SCUD-type” ballistic missile launched from Hawaii. 

—An NMD interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force 

Base in California and successfully hit (and killed) a threatrepresentative target, launched from Kodiak, Alaska. The full NMD 

system (satellite warning, multiple tracking radars, etc.) was utilized. 

—Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (utilizing their Aegis ship 

and a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)) on December 17th successfully 

intercepted a ballistic missile approximately 100 miles above the 

Pacific Ocean. 

—Japan also deployed land-based PAC-3 (for the first time) as a 

“second layer,” to complement the ship-based SM-3, against North 

Korean launches. 

—Russia tests a mobile ICBM (SS-24) capable of carrying 

multiple, independent warheads; which they state was intended to 

overcome missile defenses. 

2008—United States shoots down errant U.S. spy satellite with a 

modified, high-altitude SM-3 (to prevent earth impact of a 1,000-pound 

tank of hazardous hydrazine rocket fuel).10

—President Bush received agreement from Czech Republic and 

Poland to deploy BMD sites (missiles and radars) in Eastern Europe 

(for defense against Iranian launches). Russia strongly objects. 

2009—Japan purchases sea-based SM-3 and ground-based THAAD for 

defense against North Korean launches. 

—United States and Russia agree to a joint facility for monitoring 

missile launches around the world (a clear confidence building action). 

They also agree to cut nuclear arsenals; to work together to assess 

threats posed by countries such as Iran and North Korea; and to further 

explore cooperation in missile defense (clearly linking future control 

agreements to a combination of offense and defense actions). 

—Secretary Gates cancels airborne laser program production—due 

to costs, as well as operational and technical issues. 

—President Obama requests DOD to cut missile defense budget for 

2010 by approximately $2 billion. 

 

10 N. Kaufman and J. White, “Spy Satellite’s Downing Shows a New U.S. 

Weapon Capability,” Washington Post, February 22, 2008, A03. 
52 • Jacques S. Gansler 

52

—North Korea conducts an underground nuclear weapons test, and 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn testifies that within 3 years (i.e. by 

2012) North Korean missiles could hit the United States. 

—Iran tests a multi-stage, solid-propellant missile with a range of 

1,200 to 1,500 miles, putting much of Europe within range. 

—Secretary Gates approves deployment of THAAD missile 

defense weapons and radar system to Hawaii in case of a North Korean 

launch. 

—House Armed Services Committee approximately triples the 

procurements of THAAD and SM-3 missiles, and approves 30 of the 

National Missile Defense missiles for deployment in Alaska and 

California. 

—President Obama announces change in plans for European BMD 

deployment, from Eastern Europe to ship-based and future land sites (to 

be determined). 

2010—In response to a Congressionally-mandated direction, on 

February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates released the results of an 

11-month study11 stating: “The protection of the United States from the 

threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority.” 

It was to be “a small number of long-range ballistic missiles.” 

—The report also states: “The ballistic missile threat is increasing 

both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so 

over the next decade.” 

—Finally, the report emphasizes the “important priority” of taking 

a multinational perspective on this issue. Specifically, it states: “In 

Europe, the Administration is committed to implementing to new 

European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context.” In East, 

Asia, the U.S. is utilizing “a series of bilateral relationships.” It is 

“pursuing strengthened cooperation with a number of partners in the 

Middle East.” And, it “seeks to engage Russia and China on missile 

defense.” (Specifically noting that with Russia this includes “shared 

early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and 

even operational cooperation.”) 

 

11 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, 

February 2010. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 53 

—The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced on January 11 

that it had successfully tested a “ground-based, midcourse missile 

interception technology.”12

 

12 L.C. Russell Hsiao, “In a Fortnight: Aims and Motives of China’s Recent 

Missile Defense Test,” Jamestown Foundation, “China Brief,” Volume X, 

Issue 2, January 21, 2010. 

 55 

Chapter 6 

Proliferation 

n 1998, significant amounts of unclassified information began to 

appear about the rapid proliferation of ballistic missile systems—

first in the Rumsfeld report, and later from both independent groups 

and Congressional Committees. Specifically, the Rumsfeld report 

maintained that “some 25 or 30 countries have, or are seeking to 

develop, ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical, biological or 

nuclear warheads to portions of, or all of, the United States.” In 2006, 

more than one hundred foreign ballistic missiles were launched around 

the world1

 (with the non-U.S. ballistic missile flight tests growing at 

about 10 percent per year).2

 North Korea launched multiple, shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles 

(MRBMs) on July 4, 2006, and a Taepodong-2 ICBM. Iran staged 

coordinated, near-simultaneous launches of multiple SRBMs and its 

Shahab-3 MRBMs in November 2006 and again in January 2007. 

(And, it is known to be developing a 2,000-kilometer-range variant of 

its deployed Shahab-3 ballistic missile.3

) In 1998, the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Government Affairs identified Russia, China and North 

Korea as principal proliferators.4

 They also pointed out that the leakage 

of nuclear, biological and chemical information from Russia, driven by 

the economic needs of Russian scientists, was of grave concern. They 

specifically noted that Russia, China, the U.K., France, and the United 

States already had nuclear weapons, and that Israel, India, Pakistan, and 

South Africa had demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, 

and North Korea and Iraq were pursuing them. They further noted that 

had China provided technical assistance and complete ballistic missile 

systems to North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Iran, and possibly others. 

 

1

 MDA Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Estimates Overview, 3. 2

 Craig Covault, “Eyes on China and Iran,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, April 9, 2007, 51. 3

 Testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, Director, DIA, before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2005. 

4

 Committee on U.S. Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, The Proliferation 

Primer (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1998). 

I 
56 • Jacques S. Gansler 

56

In 2004, Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that 40 countries 

could make a nuclear bomb if they wanted to.5

 China is known to be 

developing a ground mobile and a submarine-based intercontinental 

missile system capable of reaching the United States—both aimed at 

overcoming missile defenses. The latter (the Julang 2 missile) carries 

multiple, independently-targeted warheads; 16 of these missiles could 

be carried by the type 094 nuclear submarine.6

 The deployment of 

SLBMs would give China second strike capability, which clearly puts 

China into a special “second-strike category,” along with Russia. 

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea also have significantly stepped up their 

efforts on advanced missiles and weapons.7

 Results were expected over 

a 10 year period, and many capabilities have already been 

demonstrated. The North Korean No Dong system (based on the 

Russian Scud) is the basis of Iran’s Shahab-3 and Pakistan’s mediumrange missile.8

 As demonstrated by the launch of the Taepodong-1, 

North Korea is the most advanced of these three nations. While the 

Taepodong-1 warhead can only bear the weight of biological or 

chemical warheads if launched toward the United States (still a 

considerable threat), the Taepodong-2 can carry such payloads as early 

generation nuclear weapons toward the United States. Finally, the CIA 

stated9

 that in the year 2000, Russian, North Korean and Chinese 

“entities” supplied fresh ballistic missile-related equipment and 

knowledge to Iran; in this time period, Iran was “pressing ahead with 

an effort to develop a domestic capability to build chemical, biological, 

and nuclear weapons,” plus their delivery systems. In 2001, they 

estimated that Iran would have a capability to reach portions of the 

United States “within 15 years.” Further, a November 2006 

Congressional Research Service report noted that Israeli intelligence 

 

5

 BBC News, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” September 23, 2004. 6

 Edward Cody, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington 

Post, April 12, 2005, A01. 7

 Shelby G. Spires, Third World poses top missile threat, CIA official says,

Huntsville Times, August 22, 2001. 8

 Vernon Loeb, “Preparing for ‘Network-Centric’ Warfare,” Washington Post, 

August 27, 2001. 

9

 “CIA Says Iran Got New Missile Aid,” Washington Post, September 8, 2001. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 57 

stated that North Korea had shipped to Iran eighteen 1,500 mile range 

BM-25 ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.10

By 2009, the total number of ballistic missiles worldwide—

excluding the United States, Russia, China, and NATO—was over 

5,900.11 The Asian scholar Paul Bracken wrote earlier, in “Fire in the 

East,” “The spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in Asia 

is like the spread of the six-shooter in the American Old West.”12 It is a 

cheap and deadly equalizer, and more likely to be used by the poorer 

countries. 

While 10- or 15-year projections of ballistic missile threat 

capabilities may seem too distant to warrant immediate countering 

strategies, it should be emphasized that the development of a 

sophisticated U.S. military system typically takes 15 to 20 years before 

it can be fully fielded. Thus, these threats to the United States and its 

allies need to be addressed in the near term. Stopping their 

development is obviously the best approach to take. However, because 

this cannot be guaranteed, the “insurance policy” of a defense system 

against such threats appears warranted.

 

10 Craig Covault, “Iran Set to Try Space Launch,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, January 26, 2009. 11 Lt. General O’Reilly, National Defense University Conference, June 2, 

2009. 

12 As quoted in “Missile Defense in Asia” (Washington, DC: The Atlantic 

Council, June 2003). 

 59 

Chapter 7 

Multinational Defense 

Considerations 

n the last few years, other countries have begun to recognize that 

the ballistic missile threat is more and more real, perhaps even 

more so for them, since many— for example, Europe, Japan, 

Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, and India — are closer to the likely launch 

sites. 

There has also been an increasing focus on the multinational need 

to address a combination of anti-proliferation actions and modifications 

to various treaties. The goal is to maintain the overall strategic regime, 

established by both the offensive and defensive treaties that have been, 

or were, in effect for years, and bring them up to date for the new, 

globalized environment. 

A focus on international considerations also becomes a high 

priority, in light of three important facts: 1) threats against our allies 

significantly impact America’s own options; 2) the United States 

requires its allies’ cooperation for warning and discriminationenhancing radars on their territories; and, 3) the United States needs 

geopolitical support if it is to go ahead with its own program. 

In 1999-2000, NATO initiated two major studies on the design of 

joint, multinational missile defense systems that would protect all 

NATO countries. One of the explicit issues to be addressed was not just 

the technical question of “can it be done?” but the economic question 

of “who would pay for it?” This is a significant dilemma for many 

European countries, as many of their leaders have explicitly 

acknowledged the existence of the threat, yet have not budgeted for any 

defense against it. (For example, in 2004, the U.K. spent only $9 

million on missile defense.) Finally, perhaps the most difficult issue is 

the development of agreements (in this multinational environment) of a 

rapidly-responding command and control system to operate in the 

“seconds” between target launch-detection and interception. 

I 
60 • Jacques S. Gansler 

60

A first step toward a multinational missile defense system was the 

joint U.S./German/Italian development of a theater, mobile, anti-missile 

system, known as MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System). 

Technology was initially being shared among the three countries for 

this program, with the intention of having a deployable and 

interoperable system to protect the three nations’ troops as soon as 

possible. Then, in 2005, the system was officially adopted by the 26 

nations of NATO. However, this still begs the “strategic” (i.e., national) 

issue of a multinational defense system for Europe (possibly involving 

the United States). 

With the growing recognition of the threat to Europe (and 

elsewhere) of ballistic missiles, the heads of state issued a statement at 

the NATO Summit on April 4, 2009 that “ballistic missile proliferation 

poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory, and populations. 

Missile defense forms part of a broader response to counter this 

threat.”1

 The plan is for a layered defense, combining the multinational 

MEADS (utilizing the U.S. PAC-3 missile) with the French/Italian 

SAMP/T (based on the French Aster 30 missile). It has been stated that 

this overall system is likely to be the largest and most complex 

cooperative project ever undertaken.2

 The U.S. General Accountability 

Office (GAO) estimated the cost for the proposed NMD European 

interceptor and radar sites alone (excluding the weapons, radars, etc.) at 

approximately $1 billion.3

 And the combined “theater” systems (of 

which many more are required) will add to the large total. 

Perhaps for obvious reasons, Israel is the one country that has 

explicitly accepted not only the existence of the threat but the need to 

directly address it. Initially driven by the SCUD missiles that were fired 

against Tel Aviv during the 1987 Persian Gulf War, there is no question 

that Israel takes very seriously the need to fund, develop and deploy 

missile defense systems. One-third of the population of Israel is under 

the threat of tactical ballistic missiles from Iran and other potential 

adversaries; so, to Israel, those tactical missiles are a strategic threat. 

Together with the United States, Israel has developed the ARROW 

 

1

 Lt. General O’Reilly, National Defense University Speech, June 2, 2009. 2

 ISN (Switzerland), “NATO Launches Missile Defense Program,” March 17, 

2005. 

3

 GAO, “BMD: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on 

Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites,” August 6, 

2009. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 61 

missile defense system (including its ground-based radars)—for 

defense against the Shahab-3—and has not only successfully tested it 

(by 2004 it had achieved 6 out of 7 hit-to-kill intercepts of SCUD (or 

SCUD-like) targets),4

 but had deployed the first operational battery, 

with the intent to deploy up to three batteries to protect the whole 

country. They have also integrated the Arrow system with the shorterrange PAC-3 System, which will provide them with a layered defensein-depth. Then, in 2006, Israel initiated the potential to add another 

layer to the defense by addressing an airborne system that could go 

after the launchers and/or the boost phase. Finally, Israel and the United 

States have jointly developed, and successfully demonstrated, the 

THEL ground-based laser system to shoot down Katyusha rockets; the 

two countries have been exploring other variants of this system to gain 

greater military capability, including mobility. 

In 1998, the over-flight of Japan by a North Korean Taepodong-1 

spurred the island country to explore defense against ballistic missile 

attacks. However, because of strong concerns regarding Japanese 

constitutional issues, Japan initially chose to limit its involvement to 

joint research and development activities with the United States on a 

“theater” defense system (built on the U.S. ship-based missile defense 

system). However, in 2009, as noted above, Japan decided to not only 

deploy the sea-based SM-3, but also to procure the land-based, highaltitude, U.S. Army THAAD system, and to deploy an X-band radar for 

target discrimination. 

The area that will require the most attention in the coming years is 

assuring the cooperation of Russia and China (probably in that order) 

for a new ABM Treaty that will allow the United States and its allies to 

deploy missile defense systems geared to defend against rogue nations 

and unintentional launches. However, the United States must be careful 

to stress that this increased defense would be no threat to either Russia 

or China, in terms of their strategic deterrent postures. It is essential 

that they recognize that the U.S. system is not intended for use against 

them. In fact, it will be necessary to show how it cannot become a 

threat to them—even with growth and enhancements in the future—

through treaty constraints and verification techniques. Perhaps the best 

approach here is through joint programs (e.g. sharing of missile 

warning centers, sharing of radar tracking sites, etc.). This will, of 

course, require changes in U.S. technology export controls (ITAR, 

 

4 Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 23, 2004. 
62 • Jacques S. Gansler 

62

EAR, etc.).5 The increasing globalization of industry, technology, and 

particularly security, is increasingly making such changes mandatory, 

in any case. 

 

5

 Brad Graham, “U.S. Controls Hamper Foreign Role in Missile Defense,” 

Washington Post, October 19, 2003. 
 63 

Chapter 8 

Recent Policy 

Considerations 

allistic missile defense is rapidly evolving (in technology and in 

strategic policy). It is still highly controversial; and the debate 

has intensified since the September 11th terrorist attacks on New 

York and Washington. In fact, after the attacks—and the declaration of 

the “war on terrorism”—many were urging a shift of resources from 

NMD to antiterrorism, suggesting that the latter was a more urgent 

demand. Others (the author included) argued that both terrorism and 

ballistic missiles presented likely “asymmetric” threats over the coming 

years, based on credible rationale (such as that presented at the 

beginning of this book). It is not an “either/or” choice; rather, both need 

to be addressed; and, in today’s globalized, geopolitical environment, 

both need to be addressed multi-nationally (as the prior chapter 

highlighted). Finally, the resources required for the increased efforts 

against terrorism should come from other sources than missile defense 

(including from current DOD investments in more “traditional” 

weapons platforms, such as those intended for 20th-century warfare 

scenarios). 

Clearly, two considerations have been driving the advocacy of 

NMD in recent years: first, the widespread proliferation of long-range 

missile technology and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and 

biological) into the hands of “rogue” actors (states and non-state); and 

second, the basic insecurity that many feel knowing that these weapons 

exist, that they are growing in number, and that there has been little 

deployed in defense against them. 

Addressing these concerns would, of course, only be addressing a 

subset of problems concerning America’s national security strategy—

which recognizes that, in the future, countries will not try to match the 

U.S. plane-for-plane, ship-for-ship, aircraft-for-aircraft, etc. Instead, 

adversaries will use so-called “asymmetric” approaches; namely, those 

which can be effective against the overall military and economic 

strengths of the United States. Asymmetric threats include terrorism 

B 
64 • Jacques S. Gansler 

64

and the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons; information 

(cyber) warfare; and long-range ballistic missiles. The fact that many of 

the leaders of rogue states (and non-states) have stated the objective of 

killing as many Americans as possible, and that they have no fear of 

retribution and the death of many of their own supporters, is what gives 

substance to their threats. (Obviously, both points were clearly 

demonstrated in the September 11, 2001, suicide attacks on the World 

Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC) 

Because each type of ballistic missile defense system has both its 

strengths and its weaknesses, the United States tends to favor a 

“defense-in-depth” approach (i.e. a layered defense system). Such an 

approach emphasizes a combination of a ground-based, a ship-based, a 

potential airborne laser, and even a potential future space-based laser or 

space-based kinetic kill system; covering the full domain from boostphase intercepts, through midcourse, to terminal-phase kills. In any 

case, there is a desire to continue R&D on all of these approaches in 

order to see which ones will “work, for the time periods in which they 

could be available”—fully taking into account the relevant technical, 

economic, and geopolitical issues. 

There is recognition that concentration on non-proliferation 

becomes an absolutely essential first priority, as many in America—

and elsewhere—witness the widespread proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. However, because of the 

difficulty of stopping proliferation, a “second best” solution appears to 

be the development and, when demonstrated to be effective, 

deployment of a limited defense system—one that would include both 

the United States and its allies. 

Because of the obvious need for a “fresh look” at America’s overall 

strategic posture (offensive and defensive, and their combination), in 

2009 a special “Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States” was established; with former Department of Defense 

Secretaries Dr. William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger as co-chairs. 

They concluded1

 that missile defense is an “integral part” of U.S. 

strategic posture. (That same year, U.S. Strategic Command took on the 

role of “integrating offensive and defense strategic systems in 

operations.”) Specifically, the Commission concluded: 

 

1

 “America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” U.S. Institute of 

Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2009. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 65 

• “Missile defenses can play a useful role in support of the basic 

objectives of deterrence” by “raising doubts in a potential 

oppressor’s mind about the prospects of success in attempts to 

coerce or attack others” and by reducing the risks the United States 

would face in protecting them against a regional aggressor. 

• “The Commission strongly supports continued missile defense 

cooperation with allies.” 

• The focus of U.S. ballistic missile defense should be on 

“protecting against limited strikes” while “taking into account the 

legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability.” 

• “Current U.S. plans for missile defense should not call into 

question the viability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.” 

• “The United States should ensure that its actions do not lead 

Russia or China to take actions that increase the threat to the United 

States and its allies and friends.” 

• The United States and Russia “need to come to an 

understanding on missile defense, if possible.” To do this, “the 

United States should explore more fully Russian concerns”; and 

“the two should define measures that can help build needed 

confidence.” “This might facilitate and include genuine and 

mutually-beneficial technical and operational collaboration in this 

area. 

 67 

Chapter 9 

Dispelling Myths and 

Misconceptions 

efore moving on to a specific set of recommendations for the 

future, let me briefly summarize the actual “realities” (based on 

the data above) relative to the many misperceptions that 

currently exist concerning ballistic missile defense: 

There is no threat. Because of the widespread proliferation of 

ballistic missiles to rogue countries (as described above), and the erratic 

behavior of their leaders (in many cases appearing, to us, as both 

irrational and immoral), it should be of great concern to the American 

people that we have no defensive capability. This makes the United 

States not only vulnerable to attack, but to threats of attack; and such 

threats must be considered possible and potentially highly lethal. 

Additionally, the deteriorating condition of the Soviet control systems 

for their missiles, which are maintained in a continuously “ready” state 

(unlike the Chinese, who keep their warheads separate from their 

missiles), makes the possibility of an inadvertent Russian launch quite 

realistic. 

This ballistic missile defense “stuff” all started with Reagan’s SDI. 

As elaborated in the prior historical review, there has been extensive 

work and analysis conducted on this problem, in the United States, for 

more than 50 years. “Star Wars” is not the only system—nor the most 

likely system—being considered, although the critics continue to insist 

on using that terminology. 

You can’t hit a bullet with a bullet. As noted above, five of the first 

seven flight tests of the U.S. NMD system were successful in hitting 

and destroying the warhead, in the presence of limited decoys. The 

other two didn’t “miss”; they had reliability problems, which prevented 

mission completion (so, for those two attempts, we don’t know if the 

missiles would have “hit” their intended target). Given the five direct 

hits, it is clearly possible to achieve intercept, as subsequent test flights 

continue to demonstrate. In fact, in the 10 years from 1999 to 2009, the 

combination of the land-based (PAC-3 and THAAD), the sea-band 

(SM-3) and silo-based (NMD) anti-ballistic missile “hit-to-kill” 

B 
68 • Jacques S. Gansler 

68

systems achieved a total of 43 successes out of 53 attempts1—an 81 

percent record. This is a particularly high success rate for any R&D 

program—especially for one so complex and challenging. (For 

example, “Discover,” an early intelligence satellite program, had 12 

failures before it succeeded, and the highly successful Polaris 

submarine-launched ballistic missile program had many early failures.) 

The reality is that on R&D programs (perhaps counter-intuitively), we 

learn more from a failure than a success. And, if there is adequate 

testing in an R&D program, and if an approach of “fly-find-fix-fly” is 

followed, the reliability of success continues to grow—and this has 

been found for the anti-ballistic missile program, since from 2007 to 

2009 there were 16 successes out of 18 attempts2

—an 89 percent 

success rate. 

It is important to emphasize that, while no system is perfect, as 

General James Cartwright (then head of U.S. Strategic Command, and 

later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) has stated3

 even 

modestly effective defense (and the data above indicates far more than 

“moderately effective”) against long-range missiles is worth the 

investment—even compared to competing military priorities—because 

they might deter a nuclear attack. He went on to state that “To me, 

you’ve got to have a credible offense and defense. The offense is not 

enough to bother them.” 

Of course, work still remains to be done on ensuring that the 

interceptor will properly target the warhead (versus sophisticated 

decoys) through enhanced discrimination techniques—and this 

capability is the focus of continuing R&D and test efforts. Nonetheless, 

the ability to “hit a bullet with a bullet” has been clearly demonstrated; 

and, with the possibility, if needed, of salvo launches, has an extremely 

high probability of success. 

Deployment of a ballistic missile defense system will cause an arms 

race. This is definitely a potential danger and must be carefully 

 

1

 MDA Historian’s Office, “Hit-to-Kill Interceptor Test Summary (Ballistic 

Missile Targets Only),” August 5, 2009. Similar data (from 2001 to 2009) of 

37 successes of 46 attempts, was presented by Lt. Gen. Trey Obering and Eric 

Edelman, “Defense for a Real Threat,” Washington Post, July 6, 2009. 2

 Lt. General O’Reilly, presentation at National Defense University, June 2, 

2009. 

3

 General James Cartwright, as reported in Inside the Pentagon, “Cartwright: 

Missile Defense-Based Deterrent is Worth the Cost,” May 13, 2005. 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 69 

monitored. However, it is clear that if Russia continues to abide by the 

current strategic arms limitations, and future agreements include 

regulations of not only offensive but defensive systems to the 

satisfaction of both Russia and the United States, then an arms race is 

not likely (even if Russia could afford it—which it can’t). In the case of 

China, it is clear they are already continuing to build up their strategic 

forces, and have geared toward a second-strike capability. These efforts 

will likely continue whether or not there is a National Missile Defense 

system. Nonetheless, it is important to assure them, and to demonstrate, 

that the proposed system is not aimed at defending against them. Arms 

control negotiations must be completed with Russia and China, 

including verification techniques, and covering both offensive and 

defensive systems. As for the other countries, the emphasis on nonproliferation is absolutely essential; and this certainly applies to support 

from Russia and China. In fact, such support is required if an arms race 

is not to be extended to other countries. 

An NMD system is not affordable. The current levels of expenditure 

on National Missile Defense (NMD) have been in the range of $4 

billion per year. Even with some increases (such as those incurred 

during the Bush Administration), this is still very affordable within 

National Security expenditures of over $500 billion per year. The 

question is one of priorities; increasingly, homeland defense is 

becoming a major priority for the United States and its allies. 

The United States is more vulnerable to terrorists or to attacks by 

nation states using suitcase-based weapons of mass destruction, so why 

“waste” money on NMD? Clearly, these threats also need to be 

addressed. However, it is not a question of one or the other. The issue is 

how to address both forms of threats within future budgets. In the 

nation’s 2001 budget, the United States devoted around $12 billion to 

anti-terrorist actions, and around $4 billion to national missile defense. 

By 2008 those numbers (as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks) 

rose to an anti-terrorism budget of well over $100 billion (depending 

upon how much of the “war on terrorism” is included, along with the 

share of the Dept. of Homeland Security and the Intelligence budgets); 

and the Bush administration drove the total missile defense budget 

(including theater missile defense systems) to over $12 billion. 

However, to ignore one realistic threat because of another simply 

doesn’t make sense—the risk is too high, and the insurance is 

affordable. 
70 • Jacques S. Gansler 

70

Fear of nuclear retaliation will prevent anyone from using ballistic 

missiles on cities. This certainly was not the case when Saddam 

Hussein used SCUDs against Tel Aviv, even though he knew that Israel 

had nuclear weapons. Some postulate that this may have deterred him 

from using chemical or biological warheads, but it certainly did not 

deter him from attacking civilian populations. The suicide attacks on 

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the fact that Saddam 

was willing to use chemical weapons on his own people in the Iran/Iraq 

war, has convinced many people that attempting to deter irrational 

actors by possessing the ability to retaliate against their population is 

not a sufficient defense (and certainly not a high-confidence one). 

Nonetheless, this issue does highlight that it is critically important for 

policy makers in the United States to better understanding the minds, 

language and culture of future potential adversaries (what has become 

known—in “DOD talk”—as “human terrain understanding”). The 

actions of others may appear to us to be “irrational,” but their behavior 

may be very “rational” from their perspective. We need to understand 

exactly how they perceive our statements and our actions, especially as 

we plan our security policies, including offensive and defensive control 

agreements. 

We already have systems deployed that can shoot down those 

missiles. The majority of Americans, amazingly, believe that we 

already have the deployed capability to handle an ICBM attack. It is 

important to dispel this myth. The reality is that we do not currently 

have such a capability fully deployed. However, with the initiation of 

the Alaska and California sites, the process has begun; and (as of 

February 2010) with 30 ground-based interceptors in place, the 

U.S. does not have potential protection against a limited, 

unsophisticated set of missiles.4

 

4

 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, 

February 2010. 
 71 

Chapter 10 

A Proposed Middle Path to 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

n the post-Cold War era, most people in both Russia and the United 

States believe that a new national security posture is required. In 

fact, in 2001, Russian President Putin acknowledged the need for a 

“new architecture of security,”1

 an idea later advocated by both 

President Bush and, later, President Obama. There is widespread 

agreement that a new strategic posture needs to be one that is mutually 

agreed to. This should not simply be because it is in writing, but 

because it will satisfy each nation’s national security needs and is, 

therefore, self-sustaining. Additionally, there seems to be widespread 

agreement that there can not simply be a bilateral strategy between the 

United States and Russia alone. Eventually it will need to include other 

countries that are affected, from Europe (both the E.U. and individual 

countries), to China, India, Japan, and others. Finally, there is growing 

agreement that this new strategic posture should have a balance of both 

offensive and defensive considerations. Given the issues outlined 

above, I propose the following 6-point program: 

1. The first and primary emphasis must be on proliferation 

control—not just in terms of preliminary negotiations, but in terms of 

effective controls and implementation by all countries. This must be 

done on a bilateral, multi-lateral and worldwide basis. . Thus, the focus 

needs to be not just on treaties and agreements, but on implementation 

and monitoring. 

2. We must work, proactively, with our allies, as well as Russia 

and China, to develop a stable new strategic posture—one that includes 

both offensive and defensive systems. This cooperation is necessary in 

order to achieve the stability required for mutual security. In fact, in 

 

1 Newsweek, June 25, 2001. 

I 
72 • Jacques S. Gansler 

72

2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated his insistence that 

any new nuclear treaty should include agreements on missile defense.2

On the defensive side, the United States must work with Russia on 

replacing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with an agreement that 

allows limited defenses against rogue states, but bars the United States 

and Russia from developing defenses that threaten the other’s nuclear 

deterrent. The two nations must work together in this area, as 

“confidence building” steps (and similar steps must be taken also with 

China). In 2007, Russia and the United States began negotiating the 

sharing of global missile launch data, in a center to be created outside 

Moscow. And, that same year, Russian President Putin proposed to 

President Bush the conversion of the Russian-operated radar in Gabala, 

Azerbaijan into a joint Russian-American BMD facility.3

 Both of these 

examples represent important moves at cooperation and stability. 

On the offensive side, it is essential that Russia work on enhancing 

its systems of warning, and command and control; in particular, it must 

demonstrate a reliable control over any inadvertent missile launch. A 

major step in this direction would be the reduction of both U.S. and 

Russian offensive systems from their current “instant-alert” status. (A 

condition that, fortunately, China has not pursued—so there is far less 

likelihood of a catastrophic, inadvertent launch.) Additionally, since 

both Russia and the United States have an extensive overkill capability, 

in terms of the numbers of strategic warheads that each country has, 

they should both rapidly move toward an agreement that would 

dramatically reduce arsenal numbers; however, these efforts must be 

consistent with both the ability to have a nuclear second strike deterrent 

and to recognize the presence of each other’s missile defense systems. 

At the end of the Cold War, the United States had 5400 strategic 

warheads on land and sea; 1750 nuclear bombs and cruise missiles for 

airborne delivery by B52’s and B-2’s; 1670 “tactical nuclear weapons”; 

and approximately 10,000 nuclear weapons in “storage” (to match a 

potential Russian buildup, in case of a future “breakout” need).4

 In 

January of 1993, President George H. W. Bush and Russian President 

Boris Yeltsin each agreed to go down to the range of 2000 to 2,500 by 

the end of 2007. Since then, both countries have been talking about 

 

2

 Reuters, May 20, 2009. 

3

 Richard Weitz, “A Bush-Putin Decision on the Radar,” Washington Post, 

June 20, 2007. 

4 Newsweek, June 25, 2001.
Ballistic Missile Defense—Past and Future • 73 

going down to levels in the range of 1,000 to 1,500 (including in a 

summit discussion in 2009, between President Obama and President 

Medvedev), which is still quite adequate to assure mutual destruction of 

both societies and their military capabilities (this prediction takes into 

account that a thermonuclear attack on Washington is estimated to kill 

between 500,000 and 900,000 people, compared to the World Trade 

Center loss of approximately 3,000 people). 

3. Research, development and testing must be continued on 

options for a limited, national missile defense system that could be 

deployed within a reasonable time period, and that could be consistent 

with the new ABM treaty discussed above. The overall design of this 

system must place an increased emphasis on the multi-national aspects 

of the system’s architecture, with particular consideration given to 

allies’ defense. The system must also stay in accordance with the 

explicit intent to be limited to its capability against small numbers of 

unsophisticated launches by rogue states, and possibly an inadvertent 

launch from Russia. But with growth capability to handle increased 

decoy sophistication from rogue states (still on a limited-quantity 

basis—consistent with the above-noted treaties). 

It must be emphasized that, because test flights are so very 

expensive (for the interceptor, the target, the range implementation, 

etc.) it is essential that a great deal of effort be expended on modeling 

and simulation of the many possibilities (e.g. geometries, 

countermeasures, etc.); and that the test flights themselves be seen as 

not only proofs of the designs, but primarily as validations of the farless-costly models and simulations. 

4. We must also make sure that deployment planning for the 

limited, multi-national system is within treaty constraints that have 

been mutually agreed to. This will help to ensure that it can’t grow to 

threaten Russia’s, or even China’s, likely treaty-controlled deterrent 

force in the future. 

5. The system should be deployed as soon as it is shown to work 

effectively. This does not mean it has to be 100 percent effective, but it 

does mean that it is sufficiently reliable and will be effective against 

reasonable threat scenarios from rogue states. We must also continue to 

evolve the capability of this “limited” system in terms of target 

discrimination, as intelligence inputs indicate an increasing 

technological sophistication of potential threats. Clearly, the emphasis 

of this system must be on saving American lives. While this can’t be 
74 • Jacques S. Gansler 

74

done perfectly, the decision criterion is that it can be done effectively, 

in order to warrant the investments and the potential political risks of 

deployment. 

Additionally, a major share of the continuing program effort must 

be devoted to achieving maximum reliability of the overall system (not 

just the interceptors, but the command and control system, the sensors, 

the computers, and the communication system that links it all together). 

This is a mission for which reliability is crucial, and it must receive 

continuing attention. 

6. Finally, it is crucial to defer space-based kill systems 

deployment because of the potential, perceived threat to Russia and 

China. However, we must continue to place urgent emphasis on 

resolving all of the issues associated with items 1 through 5—

including, working closely with Russia and China on them. Since any 

space-based kill system is at least a decade away, a decision on such 

deployment must wait until we see how much progress can be made in 

the next few years without it. 
75 

Chapter 11 

Summary 

 mentioned at the beginning that the issue of ballistic missile 

defense is a highly polarizing one, and people often address it with 

an almost religious fervor. However, it is clearly time to step back 

and address the issue in a more thoughtful fashion. If, as most people 

now acknowledge, there is a growing threat from widespread 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery capabilities 

for them, then we need to address how this threat can be deterred 

and/or countered. My personal view is that, in answering the two basic 

questions (“can it be done?” and “should it be done?”), I believe we 

will find that it can be done, and we have no alternative to doing it. But 

it must be done within an environment that recognizes the need for a 

mutually-agreeable and stable overall security posture. This posture is 

one that includes the needs of not only the United States but also of 

traditional allies in North America, Europe and Asia, as well as 

countries such as Russia and China. I genuinely believe that this can be 

done, but we must start now, in order to have it in place in future years. 

It must be part of America’s early 21st century national security 

posture. Our citizens deserve it, and so do the citizens of the many 

other countries involved. 

I 

77 

About the Author 

The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler is a Professor and holds the 

Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the 

School of Public Policy, and is Director of the Center for Public Policy 

and Private Enterprise. Additionally, he is the Glenn L. Martin Institute 

Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering, 

an Affiliate Faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business 

and a Senior Fellow at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of 

Leadership (all at the University of Maryland). He also served as 

Interim Dean of the School of Public Policy 2003–2004, and as Vice 

President for Research for the University of Maryland 2004–2006. 

He chairs numerous committees and task forces of the National 

Academy of Engineering and of the Defense Science Board. He is also 

a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a 

member of the General Accountability Office’s Board of Advisors. 

Dr. Gansler served as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics from November 1997 to January 2001. In 

this position, he was responsible for all matters relating to Department 

of Defense acquisition, research and development, logistics, acquisition 

reform, advanced technology, international programs, the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization, environmental security, nuclear, 

chemical, and biological programs, and the defense technology and 

industrial base. (He had an annual budget of over $180 billion and a 

workforce of over 300,000.) 

Dr. Gansler was Executive Vice President and Corporate Director 

for TASC, Incorporated, an applied information technology company 

(1977–1997), in which position he played a major role in building the 

company from a small operation into a large, widely-recognized, and 

greatly-respected corporation, serving both the government and the 

private sector. From 1972 to 1977, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Materiel Acquisition), responsible for all defense 

procurements and the defense industry; and as Assistant Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics) responsible for all 

defense electronics research and development. Prior to this, he was a 

Vice President of ITT Avionics; a Program Manager for maneuvering 

re-entry guidance systems at General Precision; and a designer of antiaircraft missile guidance systems at Raytheon.