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Management Alert · 


Unclear Rules Regarding 


Executive Protection 


Details Raise Concerns 


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_ l LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

r 

. tan· September 14, 2017 

} OIG·17·103·MA 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington , DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

September 14, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM: 

The Honorable Elaine C. Duke 

Acting Secretary 

John Roth ~k'\(oh. 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding 

Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns 

I. Overview 

As a result of whistleblower complaints, we examined the use of 

executive security and logistics details by Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) component leadership. We determined that two DHS 

components -Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) - have created their own internal 

authorizations for executive protection details, staffed them, and funded 

them, without clear legal authority. 

Because these security details incur substantial monetary and personnel 

costs, provide transportation and logistical services not necessarily tied 

to any demonstrated security concern, and are often authorized by those 

receiving the services, these details give the appearance to some 

observers of being more related to executive convenience and status 

than protection. Since they operate without departmental guidance or 

written approval, and are subject to the appearance of impropriety, and 

have significant cost implications, we make several recommendations at 

the conclusion of this memorandum. 

II. Insufficient Legal Authority 

Except for the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Commandant of 

the Coast Guard, there is no statutory authority for the use of protection 

details. Both ICE and CBP rely on the generic legacy Customs statute, 

19 U.S.C. § 1589a, which permits "an officer of the customs" to "perform 

any other law enforcement duty that the Secretary of the Treasury may 

designate." The designations for both ICE and CBP rely on this statute. 

ICE's protection detail, known within ICE as the "Executive Logistics and 

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Security Detail" (ELSD), was authorized by a single-page summary order 

issued by the Deputy ICE Director in his capacity as Acting Director 

in February 2014. 1 Similarly, CBP relies on an internal, unsigned "draft" 

directive of its own. Both documents reference the broad legal authority 

delegated to each component for the performance of their functions, rather 

than any specific statutory authority for a security detail. The components 

also cite to a forty-year-old opinion of the Comptroller General that 

considered the practice of the Treasury Secretary using a Secret Service 

detail without statutory authorization. Although that nonbinding opinion 

concerned the Secretary, a cabinet-level official, it stated in dicta that other 

officials could be entitled to protection if threatened and in danger 2 

In contrast to ICE and CBP, other law enforcement agencies rely on express 

statutory language for their authorizations. Thus, agents of the Department 

of Justice and the Department of State are authorized specifically to provide 

protective services to specified senior leadership 3 In contrast, the statute 

governing non-Secret Service OHS law enforcement agents omits any such 

authorization. 4 Likewise, the statute governing the Secret Service provides a 

list of Executive Branch and other protectees, using straight-forward 

language authorizing protective activities.s Again, neither the ICE Director 

nor the Commissioner of CBP is included in the Secret Service statute. 

Given that Congress has clearly provided for security details for some 

positions and not others, we do not believe that these general provisions 

authorize permanent security details comprised of special agents and a fleet 

of vehicles for the leadership of ICE or CBP in the absence of a showing of 

specific, credible threats to those executives.6 

1 See Appendix A, Director's Designation No. 10005.l (Feb. 28, 2014). 2 See 54 Comp. Gen. 624, modified by 55 Comp. Gen. 578. 3 See 22 U.S.C. § 2709(a)(3) (authorizing Diplomatic Security agents to "protect and perform 

protective functions directly related to maintaining the security and safety of [ ... )"listed 

officials); 28 U.S.C. § 533 (authorizing the Attorney General to appoint "investigative and other 

officials[... ) to assist in the protection of the person of [the President and the Attorney 

General)"). 

4 19 U.S.C. § 1589a. 5 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) ("the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following 

persons ... "). 6 The legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing means the 

exclusion of others) supports this point, given the specific inclusion of protection authority for 

some agencies and not for others. See e.g. Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 

Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981). Likewise, under the legal maxim ejusdem generis 

(general terminology takes its meaning and limits from the specific terms listed), it would be 

hard to conclude that Congress intended protective details to be included in the "other duties" 

2 

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Our concern that the details are operating without sufficient legal authority 

is further supported by the fact that neither the ICE Director nor the 

Commissioner of CSP presently qualify for home-to-work use of a 

government vehicle. The "passenger carrier use" statute prohibits home-towork use of a government vehicle, subject to limited statutory exceptions. 

The first category of exceptions concerns specified senior government 

officials entitled to home-to-work use of a government vehicle by virtue of 

their position, including cabinet officials,7 the FBI Director, the Director of 

the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the Administrator of the Drug 

Enforcement Agency, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.8 Neither the 

Director of ICE nor the Commissioner of the CSP are cabinet officials, nor 

are they listed elsewhere in the passenger carrier use statute. 

The passenger carrier use statute provides for three other exceptions to the 

home-to-work prohibition: (1) when the Secretary personally determines in 

writing that "highly unusual circumstances present a clear and present 

danger, that an emergency exists, or that other compelling considerations 

make such transportation essential to the conduct of official business"; or 

(2) when it is "required" for field work; or (3) when it is "essential" for 

intelligence, counter-intelligence, protective service, or law enforcement. The 

"passenger carrier use" statute is emphatic in that any determination of 

home-to-work authorization may not be made solely or principally for the 

comfort or convenience of the employee.9 

Neither the Director of ICE, nor the Commissioner of CSP are entitled by this 

statute to use government vehicles, 

-

Department to date determined that such transportation is necessary for 

reasons of safety, or essential for them to perform their jobs. 

, the heads of these two agencies 

·for transportation between their homes and offices. Nor has -the 

language of customs officers (see 19 U.S.C. § 1589a(4)). According to the Supreme Court, 

"[w]hen a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline the 

attributes of the office." Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). Moreover, "[a)ny 

additional duties performed pursuant to a general authorization in the statute reasonably 

should bear some relation to the specified duties." Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. ICE commented to 

us that, in its view, the relative youth of ICE and CBP as agencies, and the lack of an updated 

statute for ICE and CBP agents, have created this discrepancy, which Congress should remedy. 7 Specifically, "officers compensated at Level I of the Executive Schedule pursuant to section 

5312 of Title 5" are authorized home-to-work transportation under 31 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(3)(A). 8 31U.S.C.§1344(b). 

9 See 31 U.S.C. § 1344. Our review does not reveal any evidence that CBP failed to comply with 

the passenger carrier use statute in connection with the security detail. 

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III. No Articulated Justification for the Level of Security Provided 

The ICE and CBP executive security details have operated historically 

regardless of whether specific, credible threats exist. No witness could 

identify any specific, credible threat to the previous ICE Director, either 

historically or recently. The formal written threat assessments that ICE's 

Office of Professional Responsibility undertook also did not document any 

specific or credible threat to the previous ICE Director. CBP, with a detail 

similar in size to ICE, could only point to a couple of internet-based threats 

in the last few years as specific threat justification for the previous 

Commissioner's security detail. 

ICE executives explained that the existence of the detail is predicated not on 

any specific or credible threat to the Director. Rather, it is based on the 

general nature of the position coupled with ICE's involvement in "hot 

button" topics like immigration enforcement and removal. Also, due to ICE's 

enforcement profile, ICE believed that there was always a potential risk from 

organized crime and terrorist groups. 

Similarly, CBP claimed that because the Commissioner is responsible for 

counter-terrorism enforcement and combatting transnational organized 

criminal organizations, he may become a target for these groups to disrupt 

enforcement efforts. 

However, in the absence of specific statutory authority, and the clear 

Congressional directive that the use of such government vehicles must be 

limited, we believe that the use of executive protection details for ICE and 

CBP must be justified by the articulation of a more immediate, direct threat. 

In fact, we found that the security detail has actually served to draw public 

attention to the previous ICE Director. One field agent who worked on the 

ICE executive detail in Texas said in his view, "you could put [the Director] 

in a photo line-up and show it to 100 people in downtown Dallas and maybe 

two might recognize her." A number of agents stated that this same 

previous ICE Director was never recognized in public, but that the detail 

attracted attention. 

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IV. Consequences of Questionable Security Details 

The resources spent on these executive protection details are not 

inconsequential. For example, ICE has special agents for 

handling the Director's logistics and protection wh ile in Washington. 

CBP's protection detail recently increased from 

agents. According to CBP, the personnel costs for a , 

protection detail, exclusive of travel and operational expenses, is 


$700,000 per year. In addition, both agencies have paid to acquire 


multiple SUVs or other vehicles of a similar nature to provide the 


protection details.10 


Additionally, we found that there could be a significant drain on field office 

resources when a component head travels. This can lead to diversion of 

resources away from priority criminal enforcement, creating operational 

challenges and degrading morale. For example, the former Director traveled 

to her home city of Dallas more frequently than any other city, a t times for 

six-day stays, requiring the ICE field office to divert - 1 agents from 

working cases for visits which would last, on average, six days. A special 

agent told OIG investigators that one lengthy executive visit had "drained 

resources" from the already busy HSI Dallas Field Office. Another agent 

described supporting the details as a "massive undertaking." 

In a d dition to the diversion of resources from mission-related activity, 

extensive protective details expose component leadership to allegations that 

the protective details are largely for status and convenience, rather than 

being motivated by protection conside rations. 

In our review, we found a number of special agents who stated that they 

viewed the former ICE Director's detail as more about convenience and 

logistics than security. One agent stated: "It's definitely more about 

convenience and logistics [than security). It's all about [the Director's! 

convenience. Nights, weekends, we have to send agents out. We're just 

treated like we are expendable." Another agent noted the inconsistency from 

a security perspective of the times and places that the detail was provided to 

the Director. There was "absolutely no protection at times ... then [she 

would requirej rides to the airport." Agents also performed tasks not directly 

10 We believe that both ICE and CBP do not capture the full costs of their protection details in 

their estimates. For example, according to the OMB-approved DHS cost model for calendar 

year 2016, the fully-burdened annual cost of a GS-13 (step 1) law enforcement agent in the DC 

area is about $275,000. Given: I and other costs not included, 

such as travel and vehicles, we believe the true annual cost of each detail could exceed $1 

million. 

5 

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security-related, such as airport expediting services and collecting luggage a t 

airports and using additional government vehicles and personnel to deliver it 

separately to the ICE Director's destination. 

As with any government employee, component heads may use government 

vehicles while on official government business, whether that is within the 

Washington, D.C., area or to visit various field offices. 11 However, absent 

specific threats, such transportation arrangements rarely justify elaborate 

security arrangements, including multiple car convoys, diverting multiple 

agents and officers for extended time periods, and the establishment of 

stand-alone protection and logistics offices. 

V. Recommendations 

It is axiomatic that no government employee can use government resources 

for his or her own private benefit, and every government employee has the 

duty to protect and conserve government resources and only use them for 

authorized purposes. 12 The current situation is based on questionable legal 

authority and invites abuse. 

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 

that: 

1. The CBP and ICE security details be discontinued pending a legal review 

by the DHS Office of General Counsel of the legal sufficiency for such 

protective details, unless the Secretary makes a written finding of physical 

security threats meeting the requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 1344, the only 

explicit authority currently available without a specific risk assessment. 

DHS Response: Non-concur. While the Department will review further the 

CBP Commissioner's and ICE Director's security details, DHS believes that a 

reasonable basis exists to maintain the status quo during the review of 

these security details. The Department believes that sufficient legal 

authority exists for security details-if the requisite risk is determined to 

exist-such that the status quo should remain in place pending further 

review. 

OIG Analysis: For the reasons stated below, we consider this 


recommendation open and unresolved. 


While DHS' response demonstrates an intent to address the issues raised by 

11 41C.F.R.§301- 10.201. 12 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.702, 2635.704. 


6 


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our findings and that a preliminary review of the legal sufficiency and risk 

basis for continuation of the security details has already occurred, we 

believe it important to assess the final review before we can resolve this 

recommendation. Although we are sympathetic to the situation presented, 

in the absence of a documented threat assessment conducted by an entity 

outside of the component head's chain of command, or statutory 

authorization similar to that of other federal law enforcement organizations, 

we believe that the significant funds spent on such protective details are 

unauthorized. This recommendation will remain open and unresolved until 

DHS provides us with its final review of the legal sufficiency for the CBP and 

ICE protective details. 

2. If the Office of General Counsel determines that there is sufficient 

statutory authority for such security details, the Undersecretary for 

Management issue a directive on the scope and circumstances under which 

a security detail is permitted for component heads, including the 

requirement for Departmental-level authorization. Such a directive should 

also require periodic reporting on the travel of covered individuals, including 

domestic travel, and the cost of maintaining and operating the security 

details. 

DHS Response: Concur. The DHS CSO will lead efforts, involving others 

across the Department, to develop a DHS directive outlining an approval 

process for senior leadership executive protective details and Headquarters 

oversight, as appropriate. ECD: June 20, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: DHS's response does not meet the intent of this 

recommendation. DHS has not articulated the reasons a fairly simple policy 

should take a year to issue, particularly given the fact that the Department 

has been aware of the issue since at least November of 2016. This 

recommendation will remain open and unresolved, until DHS provides 

evidence that it has completed its directive. 

7 

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1 

Appendix A 

Department of Homeland Security Director's Designation 

' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

DESIGNATED BY: 

Acting Director 

r-.o=-:RD=Ea=-N ~~~eEa: _ --"T'"!l ':":: iss':'.: =-= TE=-= FE""""""'.' "'!!'~~14--T"I' '!!!'! EF Ecr1v:":'!'-'E::": ::""':-= , ~- 10 1	 01 SUBJECT: 

Designation of a Protective Detail for Law EnfoFcemeot Purposes 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY: . SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS: 

• 	 19 u.s.c. § 1589a 

• 	 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. I 07- I None 


296 (as implemented through Reorganization Plans 


dated November 25, 2002 and January 30, 2003) 


• 	 Department of Homeland Security (OHS) 


Delegation Order 7030.2, Delegation of Authority 


to the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and 


: 	 Customs Enforcement (ICE} (November 13, 2004), 

or as undated 

DESIGNATION: 

By virtue ofthe authority granted to me by law and by the Secretary of OHS in Delegation No. 7030.2, or as 


updated, I hereby designate that there be created within ICE a protective detail, comprised ofSpecial Agents 


with customs officer authority, dedicated to provide protective services to anyone occupying the position of 


I: ~rmingofficial duties oftbat office. 	 · 

Acting Director 


1l S Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Appendix B l!.S. Depm·tmcnt of Homeland Sccuril) 

Management's Response Wm,hington. DC 20521< 

HoIneland 

Security 

June 8, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 John Roth 

Inspector General 

FROM: ~:;.,~~;rumpacker, CIA, C~ '...-\\ l. ,t___...., 0 

Departmental GAO-OIG Liai~ 0ffice 

SUBJECT: 	 Management's Response to OIG Draft Report: "Management Alert ­

Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise 


Concerns" (Project No. 17-084-0GC-DHS) 


Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS/the Department) appreciates the work of the Office oflnspector General 

(OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Critical Need for Executive Protection 

It is vital that DHS protects its senior leadership from acts which may jeopardize their safety and 

security and thus impede their ability to safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our 

values as they relate to accomplishing our core missions ofpreventing terrorism and enhancing 

security, managing our borders, administering immigration laws, securing cyberspace, and ensuring 

disaster resilience. This includes protecting these leaders from threats (i.e., a declaration or 

indication of imminent danger or harm), risks (i.e., a possible injury or loss), and vulnerabilities (i.e., 

an injury or loss that is possible but not necessarily probable or improbable) associated with 

terrorism and/or criminal acts, which could result in serious injury or death. 

Both the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) leadership positions have been the subject of a number of incidents of harassing and menacing 

behavior from a variety of individuals. In May 2016, for example, the CBP Information Center 

received threats directed at the Commissioner ofCBP instructing him to "resign or please die soon" 

and threatening to rape his wife and sexually molest his grandchildren. Similarly, in May 2015, the 

CBP Information Center received emailed threats directed at the Commissioner and members of his 

family. These threats included a statement that the Commissioner would "pay," and a series oftacit 

threats to rape and murder the Commissioner's wife and mother. 

CBP's headquarters is also the site of numerous protests, at least one per month, with unknown 

protesters sometimes entering the building and remaining just outside of CBP office space. Even 

within that office space, agency leadership could easily become the target for an insider threat. For 

example, during the course of imposing routine discipline, CBP management regularly encounters 

employees, some of whom are armed law enforcement officers, who are discontented with the real 

or perceived loss oftheir livelihood, opportunity for advancement, and reputation. On many 
occasions, discontented employees have directly emailed the Commissioner to express their anger, 

claims, and allegations. 

The former Directors of ICE have been the victims of similarly aggressive behavior while in office. 

Recently, a former ICE Director and an Acting Director have been victims of "doxxing," whereby 

personal information such as home addresses and telephone numbers are published on the Internet in 

order to facilitate harassment or violence. In 2017, ICE identified numerous social media postings 

inciting potential acts of violence against ICE officers, generally. In 2007, the ICE Assistant 

Secretary received more than a dozen emails containing vulgar comments directed at her. 

For both the Commissioner of CBP and the Director ofICE, the high profile and contentious work 

that they oversee, combined with the incidents ofthreats and abuse that have been directed at them, 

give rise to legitimate concerns for their safety and security, that could impair their ability to carry 

out their duties to the detriment oftheir agencies, the Department, and the United States. 

The Appropriate Legal Standard for Executive Protection 

The DHS Office of the General Counsel is assessing currently the relevant authorities related to 

security details and the points made in the OIG's draft report. At this time, however, while further 

review is ongoing, we believe that an arguable basis for maintaining the status quo exists. 

While we understand the OIG looked to the home-to-work transportation standard found in 

31 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(9) (clear and present danger), we believe it is unlikely that the§ 1344 standard 

applies. First, the § 1344 standards only apply to determine whether home-to-work transportation 

may be authorized. Section 1344 specifically prohibits such transportation at the Government's 

expense except as specifically authorized by the statute. 1 Home-to-work transportation is not at 

issue in the present matter. Thus, DHS is not legally required to apply the § 1344 standards to the 

instant inquiry concerning protective details during an official's hours ofduty. 

Second, the standards in 31 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(9) are unsuitable for the present situation because they 

are specifically tailored to address Government vehicle use for home-to-work transportation. In 

particular,§ 1344(b)(9) addresses safety concerns that reach beyond an official's work day, duty 

station, and official responsibilities such that the agency must provide home-to-work transportation 

for the official's daily commute. Section 1344(b )(9) is highly restrictive as a result of its narrow 

scope and purpose.2 The standards articulated in 31 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(9) would limit the ability of 

CBP and ICE to protect their officials during duty hours to only the highly unusual clear and present 

danger circumstances which may authorize home-to-work transportation. 

The OIG's draft report is certainly correct in noting that the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) opinions are not binding on the Executive Branch. Those opinions, however, especially in 

light of agency practice, can be highly persuasive. As relevant to this inquiry, the Comptroller 

General of the United States has advised that an agency may authorize the use of its appropriated 

funds, personnel, and assets to protect agency officials, without specific statutory authority, where 

1 See, 31U.S.C.§1344(a)(l)-(2), (b). 
 2 See 3 I U.S.C. § 1344(b)(9) (2012) ("an officer or employee with regard to whom the head of a Federal agency makes a 


determination, in accordance with subsection (d) ofthis section and with regulations prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) 


ofsubsection ( e ), that highly unusual circumstances present a clear and present danger, that an emergency exists, or that 


other compelling operational considerations make such transportation essential to the conduct ofofficial business."). 


2 
(1) there are indications that the official may be in danger giving rise to legitimate concerns for the 

official's safety, and (2) it is administratively determined that the risk is such as to impair the 

official's ability to carry out his or her duties and may thereby adversely affect the efficient 

functioning ofthe agency. 3 Where these conditions have been met, an agency may utilize its 

appropriated funds to provide security for the relevant official. 

More specifically, the Comptroller General advised that agencies may use their resources to provide 

protection for their officials in the absence ofspecific legislative authority.

4 The Comptroller 

General explained that 

if a government official were threatened or there were other indications that he was in 

danger, and if it were administratively determined that the risk were such as to impair his 

ability to carry out his duties, and hence to affect adversely the efficient functioning ofthe 

agency, then funds of his agency, the use ofwhich was not otherwise restricted, might be 

available to protect him, without specific statutory authority.5 

Further, the Comptroller General opined that the GAO "would not object" to an agency providing 

protection services to its officials "where there is legitimate concern over the safety of an official and 

where the agency's functioning may be impaired by the danger to that official - to an agency."6 

Relying on this rationale, the GAO opined that the "Secretary [ofthe Treasury] - in a proper case ­

may arrange for his protection by personnel ofthe Department ofthe Treasury or by the Secret 

Service, but in the latter case only on a reimbursable basis" even when the Secretary was not one of 

the officials the Secret Service was authorized to protect under 18 U.S.C. § 3056.7 

The Comptroller General's reasoning has formed the basis for a number of other GAO reviews of 

agency-provided protective measures. 8 The GAO determined that the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) could enclose and secure a carport at the DEA Administrator's residence 

because the nature ofthe DEA's mission and documented threats against the Administrator created a 

legitimate concern for the Administrator's safety.9 Similarly, the GAO determined that U.S. 

Customs Service could provide home and automobile security devices for officers because the nature 

ofthe Customs officers' work and past threats aimed at Customs personnel, among other factors, 

formed a legitimate concern for the officers' safety. 10 

3 See e.g., In re the Secret SenJ. Prot.for the Sec'y ofthe Treasury, 54 Comp. Gen. 624, 628-29, B-149372 (Jan. 28, 


1975), as modified, 55 Comp. Gen. 578, B-149372 {1975); see also, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 


GAO/GGD/OSl-00-139, SECURITY PROTECTION, STANDARDIZATION ISSUES REGARDING PROTECTION OF EXECUTIVE 


BRANCH OFFICIALS, B-283892, at 12 (July, 2000) (noting that agencies may provide protection to their officials "ifit is 


administratively determined that the efficiency ofthe agencies would be affected because ofthreats or other legitimate 


concerns over the safety of officials that would impair their abilities to carry out their duties"). 
 4 54 Comp. Gen. 624. 
 5 Id. at 628. 
 6 Id. at 629. 
 7 Id at 630. 
 8 See e.g., 1 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GA0-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW (3'd ed. 


2004) (citing favorably to 54 Comp. Gen. 624 and Matter of Home & Auto. Sec. Sys.for US. Customs Serv. Pers., B251710 (July 7, 1993) in which the Comptroller General determined that the U.S. Customs Service may provide security 


devices for agents based on the risk created by their law enforcement responsibilities, the threat environment, and past 


threats against Customs personnel). 
 9 See Drug Enforcement Admin. - Permanent Improvements to Leased Property, 71 Comp. Gen. 4, B-243866 and 


243866.1 (Oct. 3, 1991). 
 10 See Home and Auto. Sec. Sys.for US. Customs SenJ. Pers., B-25 1710 (Comp. Gen. July 7, 1993). 


3 
Moreover, the Comptroller General's reasoning has formed the basis for security details in numerous 

agencies that do not have specific statutory authority to provide security services to their officials. 11 

As the GAO has noted, "[f]rom fiscal years 1997 through 1999, security protection was provided to 

officials holding 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies."12 The GAO 

catalogued security services provided to 14 Cabinet secretaries, 4 deputy or under secretaries, and 24 

other high-ranking officials. 13 Ofthese, "(o]nly two executive branch agencies ... -the Secret 

Service and the State Department-had specific statutory authority to protect executive branch 

officials, including the authority to carry firearms in carrying out their protective responsibilities."14 

The GAO in its review explained that "[a]lthough none ofthe other agencies cited specific statutory 

authority to protect their officials, that does not mean that the agencies are not authorized to provide 

such services."15 The GAO further cited to its prior opinions for the proposition that: 

"agencies can expend appropriated funds to protect their officials as a necessary expense. Such 

protection is warranted if it is administratively determined that the efficiency ofthe agencies 

would be affected because ofthreats or other legitimate concerns over the safety of officials 

that would impair their abilities to carry out their duties."16 The justification for these security 

services at the agencies reviewed by the GAO varied. Some agencies provided security to 

respond to specific or perceived threats and others provided security because of available 

protective intelligence." 17 

Accordingly, we believe that the GAO's standard, not the home-to-work transportation standard 

found in 31U.S.C.§1344(b)(9), is likely the prevailing standard used across the Government for 

protection of agency officials, during duty hours, who do not otherwise have protection provided by 

statute. Against this historical backdrop, we are not aware ofCongress expressing its disagreement 

through legislation that changes the applicable rules or standards. But, we note that the review of 

this matter continues. 

The draft report contained two recommendations, one with which the Department non-concurs and 

the other with which it concurs. Attached please find our detailed response to each recommendation. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical 

comments were previously provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me ifyou have 

any questions. We look forward to continuing our work with OIG to improve the effectiveness and 

efficiency ofOHS programs, operations, and activities. 

Attachment 

11 See SECURITY PROTECTION, STANDARDIZATION ISSUES REGARDING PROTECTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, 

B-283892. 

12 Id. at 2. 13 Id. at 7. 14 Id. at l l. 15 Id. at 11. 16 Id. at 11-12. 17 Id. at 14-17. 

4 
Attachment: DHS Management Response to Recommendations 


Contained in OIG Project No. 17-084-0GC-DHS 


The OIG recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct that: 

Recommendation 1: The CBP and ICE security details be discontinued pending a legal review by 

the DHS Office ofthe General Counsel (OGC) ofthe statutory authorization for such protective 

details, unless the Secretary makes a written finding ofphysical security threats meeting the 

requirements of 31U.S.C.§1344. 

Response: Non-concur. While the Department will review further the CBP Commissioner's and 

ICE Director's security details, DHS believes that a reasonable basis exists to maintain the status quo 

during the review ofthese security details. 18 The DHS ChiefSecurity Officer (CSO) will oversee the 

completion of a Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment (PSVA) for each ofthese leaders by the 

Component's Office ofthe CSO, working with U.S. Secret Service (USSS), as well as other subject 

matter experts across the Department, as needed. The scope ofthese PSV As will be tailored to 

account for the differing environments and needs of each leader, and upon completion, decisions 

about the continuation ofthese security details will be made, as appropriate. 

It is important to note that the very nature of both the CBP and ICE positions subject them to intense 

attention and hostility, and increases the likelihood that they may be the subjects of attack while 

performing their official duties at any number of events or publicly known government offices. 19 

According to a study conducted by the U.S Department ofJustice's National Institute ofJustice and 

the USSS, would-be assassins often commit violence as a means of solving a perceived problem or 

as a result ofsome triggering event or change in circumstance.20 An attacker's motives may include 

avenging a perceived wrong; retaliating against a perceived injury; and bringing attention to a 

personal or public problem. 21 The study found that "[a]lthough some threateners may pose a real 

threat, usually they do not. However, most importantly, those who pose threats frequently do not 

make threats."22 

18 When describing instances in which Department officials received security details, the OIG report focuses primarily 

on security details that took place while the ICE Director was on TDY in Texas. While the Department shares the OIG's 

concerns regarding those particular instances, the Department does not have information that would lead to the 

conclusion that the circumstances ofthose security details were typical ofDHS security details generally. 19See ROBERT A. FEIN AND BRYAN vOSSEKUIL, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE THREAT 

ASSESSMENT lNVESTIGATIONS; A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS at 19 { 1998) {"NIJ 

Study") (stating that, "Many attackers and near-lethal approachers craved attention and notoriety, while others acted to 

bring attention to a particular problem. A number of assailants ofpublic officials and figures were consumed with 

seeking revenge for perceived injuries or harm."). 20 NIJ Study, at 15-19 (stating that, "Most people who attack others consider violence the means to a goal or a way to 

solve a problem. The problem may be that the potential perpetrator feels unbearably unhappy, enraged, overwhelmed, or 

bereft.... Violence-especially assassination-is an event in which a person, triggered by an event or change, and 

operating in a situation that facilitates, permits, or does not prevent violence, takes action against a designated target."). 21 SeeNIJ Study, at 19. 22 NIJ Study, at 14. 

5 
As the USSS noted, a lack of articulated threats directed at an official does not necessarily indicate a 

lack of actual threats to that official.23 Further, as noted by the GAO, "research on protective 

intelligence and threat assessments suggest that the number ofthreats received against protected 

officials may not be the most accurate measure ofthe level ofthreat against officials."24 CBP and 

ICE leadership oversee large law enforcement agencies that regularly incite emotional, familial, and 

professional turmoil among their enforcement targets and affiliated individuals. It is reasonable to 

assume that some of those adversely affected by ICE and CBP may seek to lash out at a visible, 

high-profile figure representative ofthe agency. 

We believe that sufficient legal authority exists for security details-ifthe requisite risk is 

determined to exist-such that the status quo should remain in place pending further review. 

Estimated Completion Date (ECD): December 31, 2017. 

Recommendation 2: Ifthe Office ofGeneral Counsel determines that there is sufficient statutory 

authority for such security details, the Undersecretary for Management issue a directive on the scope 

and circumstances under which a security detail is permitted for component heads, including the 

requirement for Departmental-level authorization. Such a directive should also require periodic 

reporting on the travel ofcovered individuals, including domestic travel, and the cost ofmaintaining 

and operating the security details. 

Response: Concur. The DHS CSO will lead efforts, involving others across the Department, to 

develop a DHS directive outlining an approval process for senior leadership executive protective 

details and Headquarters oversight, as appropriate. ECD: June 30, 2018. 

23 SECURITY PROTECTION, STANDARDIZATION ISSUES REGARDING PROTECTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, B283892, at 15-16 (citing, "Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, July I 998," 

and noting that, "According to the Secret Service, persons who pose actual threats often do not make threats, especially 

direct threats. In the Secret Service's study ofthe 83 attackers and near-lethal approachers ofprominent public officials 

and figures from 1949 to 1996, less than one-tenth communicated a direct threat to the target or to a law enforcement 

agency"). 

24 SECURITY PROTECTION, STANDARDIZATION ISSUES REGARDING PROTECTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, B283892, at 15. 

6 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Under Secretary for Management 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public 

Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

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