Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Washington, D.C. 

OP4_WMD_cov.indd 1 
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counter­proliferation 

Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American 

security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the 

WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to 

the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, 

President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing 

“vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, 

and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security 

implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and 

outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates 

to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, 

and operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center 

hosts annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and 

participants from the government and private sectors.

Cover 2 

OP4_WMD_cov.indd 2 
Defining “Weapons of 

Mass Destruction”

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Defining “Weapons of 

Mass Destruction”

by W. Seth Carus

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Occasional Paper 4

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

February 2006

newOP4.indd 3 1/10/06 2
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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

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First printing, February 2006

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Contents

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Words of Mass Distraction. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

Disarmament Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.S. National Security Policy. . . . . . . . . . . 3

Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine. . . . . . 4 

American Political Discourse . . . . . . . . . 6 

Assessing the Alternative 

Definitions for DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

Selection Criteria for a DOD Definition. . . . 14 

Disarmament Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

Developments after World War II. . . . . . . . 19 

The Commission for 

Conventional Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

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Treaties Controlling Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

Other International Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . 30 

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 

A. Executive Branch Definitions of WMD

B. WMD Defined in Law

C. Selected International Definitions of WMD

D. Selected Definitions of WMD in State Law

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

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vii

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Paul Bernstein, 

Marshall Brown, Lew Dunn, Robert Joseph, Milton Leitenberg, 

Michael Moodie, and Brad Roberts in writing this paper. All 

helped in some way, although the author undoubtedly owes some of them 

an apology for failing to heed useful advice or suggestions that would 

have strengthened the final product. In addition, Richard Love offered 

considerable useful advice and served as a sounding board during the 

researching and writing of this paper. Any remaining errors are the fault 

of the author.

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Defining “Weapons of 

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Introduction

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a 

scornful tone, “It means just what I choose it to mean—neither 

more or less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can 

make words mean so many different things.” “The question 

is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”

—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

I

n January 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that 

U.S. Strategic Command become “the lead combatant commander 

for integrating and synchronizing DOD [Department of Defense] in 

combating WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”1 This assignment was 

in response to the White House’s December 2002 National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

2

The Secretary’s memorandum, however, raised a thorny definitional 

problem with clear bureaucratic implications: what are weapons of mass 

destruction? Unfortunately, that is not an easily answered question. There are 

numerous definitions of WMD with some official or semi-official standing 

(more than 40 are identified in this paper), although most are variations of 1 

of 5 basic definitions. In fact, even DOD has adopted alternative and fundamentally inconsistent definitions, including some different from the one used 

by the White House in its strategy and policy documents.

Depending on the definition adopted, the scope of the combating 

WMD mission could change substantially. Hence, selecting an appropriate definition was a critical step in determining the appropriate range of 

the responsibilities assigned to Strategic Command.

This paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction. To give historical context for the rest of the paper, the first several 

sections summarize how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, U.S. national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, 

and American political discourse. Next, the paper identifies alternative 

definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for 

the Department of Defense. The following sections expand upon the use 

of the term throughout recent history, from its first appearance in 1937 

through developments after World War II and subsequent international 

negotiations. Finally, the conclusion provides some suggestions for future 

use of the term within the U.S. Government.

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Words of Mass Distraction

The problem associated with defining WMD starts with a 

widespread perception that there is no accepted definition for the term 

and that it means whatever the user wants it to mean.

The phrase “weapons of mass destruction” . . . is an amorphous 

one, changing meaning according to the whims of the speaker. 

Raising the specter of WMD is more a way by which politicians 

assign blame or take a stand on seemingly objective moral 

standards than a way by which they assess a particular 

weapons system.3

Others find fault with existing definitions and offer new definitions 

that differ in some radical way from those commonly accepted.4 Still others, believing that the traditional definitions for WMD are intellectually 

problematic, propose to drop the term altogether.5

This paper adopts a different position. Contrary to the views of many 

pundits, there are authoritative definitions specifying the meaning of 

WMD. Moreover, it is impossible to drop the term or arbitrarily adopt an 

alternative definition. WMD is an inseparable component of the disarmament lexicon because it appears in several arms control treaties. As such, it 

has the precise meaning adopted by the negotiators of the treaties.

The term has a precise meaning in other significant contexts as well. 

It appears in authoritative national security policy documents issued by 

the White House since the early 1990s. Similarly, the Soviets used the 

term in their military doctrine starting in the late 1950s, and it still retains 

a place in Russian military doctrine.

Finally, the term has become an integral part of American political 

discourse. As a result, it is probably no longer possible to abandon the 

term, even if other factors did not militate against such an effort.

As will become clear, the supposed amorphousness of the term 

WMD has less to do with any lack of clarity than with the almost universal lack of familiarity with the history of its origins and use. From this 

perspective, a better definition is unnecessary. What is essential is a better 

understanding of the existing ones.

Disarmament Negotiations

The term WMD first appeared—as far as can be determined—in 

December 1937 in an address given by the Archbishop of Canterbury.6

Modern usage, however, actually dates to 1945, with the insertion of the 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 

words “weapons adaptable to mass destruction” in a document signed by 

President Harry Truman.7 Subsequently, that phrase appeared in the first 

resolution passed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.8 Within 

a few years, an alternate form, “weapons of mass destruction,” became the 

preferred usage. As such, the term became an integral part of the lexicon 

of post–World War II disarmament diplomacy. Not surprisingly, the UN 

adopted a standard definition in 1948:

[WMD are] . . . atomic explosive weapons, radio active material 

weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any 

weapons developed in the future which have characteristics 

comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or 

other weapons mentioned above.9

Subsequently, the United States became a party to three treaties that refer 

directly to control of “weapons of mass destruction” (the Outer Space 

Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), in 

addition to those agreements that limit specific types of WMD (such as 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention).10 Given that these treaties 

impose specific obligations on the United States and other adherents 

to them, it is inconceivable that treaty negotiators thought that WMD 

was an amorphous term that could mean whatever anyone wanted it 

to mean. The United States adopted the UN definition above for use in 

these negotiations.11

U.S. National Security Policy

WMD also assumed growing importance in the United States as a 

term of art in the policy arena after the end of the Cold War. The first 

sentence in National Security Directive 70 (“United States Nonproliferation Policy”), signed by President George H.W. Bush on July 10, 1992, 

asserts, “The spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of 

mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a continuing 

threat to U.S. national security interests.”12 His successor, President Bill 

Clinton, was even more comfortable with the term, as is evident from 

the frequent references to WMD in his speeches and official documents. 

WMD appears 31 times in the Clinton administration’s 1998 National 

Security Strategy of the United States of America and 33 times in its 1999 

revision.13 The administration of President George W. Bush follows this 

trend: weapons of mass destruction or WMD appear 24 times in its 2002 

National Security Strategy.14

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Although the 2002 Combating WMD Strategy never explicitly defines 

WMD, the document clearly means nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 

weapons when WMD is used: “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—

nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.”15

Significantly, this is the same meaning assigned to the term in 

official documents issued by the Clinton administration. President Clinton issued Executive Order 12938 (“Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction”) on November 12, 1994, which stated:

the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 

(“weapons of mass destruction”) and of the means of delivering 

such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat 

to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 

United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal 

with that threat.

This Executive order remains in effect, renewed annually by Presidents 

Clinton and Bush.16 Similarly, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, 

“U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” issued June 21, 1995, by the National 

Security Council under the signature of President Clinton, includes a 

section discussing policy toward WMD that clearly equates WMD with 

NBC weapons:

The United States shall give the highest priority to developing 

effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage 

the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) 

materials or weapons use by terrorists.

The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a 

terrorist group is unacceptable.17

Other documents issued by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 

appear to follow this pattern.18

Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine

The term WMD has had significance in arenas other than disarmament diplomacy. Perhaps most importantly, the Soviet Union used it to 

define an element of its military doctrine. The Russian term for WMD 

(Oruzhiye massovogo porazheniya) means “Weapons used to inflict heavy 

casualties. They include nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological agents.”19

Unfortunately, no one has written a history of the use of the term WMD

by the Soviets. This makes it difficult to understand why they adopted the 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 

term and the role that it played in their military doctrine. The answer may 

lie in the comments given in a 1978 National Intelligence Estimate produced on Soviet chemical warfare doctrine: “The Soviets categorize chemical weapons—as they do nuclear and biological weapons—as ‘weapons of 

mass destruction’ whose initial use must be authorized at the highest political level.”20 This suggests that to the Soviets, WMD had a political character 

that made them different from other weapons. Whatever the case, the term 

was used by senior Soviet officials—civilian and military—starting in the 

1950s and continued in use through the collapse of the Soviet Union.21

The term retains a place in Russian military doctrine. The 1993 

Russian Federation Military Doctrine contained a lengthy discussion of 

nuclear weapons and “other types of weapons of mass destruction.” The 

following comes after a discussion of Soviet nuclear policy:

The Russian Federation’s policy regarding other types of 

weapons of mass destruction consists of:

n promoting the full implementation of the Convention on the 

Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and 

Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction and the 

maximum expansion of the parties to it; 

n ensuring compliance with the regime of the Convention 

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons 

and on Their Destruction; 

n preventing the creation of new types of weapons of mass 

destruction and the development, production, stockpiling, 

acquisition, storage, or proliferation of means, materials, and 

technologies which help create these weapons; 

n maintaining readiness to counter effectively the consequences 

of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction 

and providing guarantees of the security of citizens, society, 

and state.22

This appears to follow the definition adopted by the United Nations. 

In addition to nuclear weapons, the Russians considered chemical and 

biological weapons to be WMD, as well as leaving open the possibility of 

“new types” of WMD.

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, issued in April 2000, no 

longer has such a lengthy discussion of other types of WMD, but still uses 

the term five times. Its articulation of Russian nuclear doctrine includes 

the following use:

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The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in 

response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 

destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to 

large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations 

critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.23

American Political Discourse

WMD also has long been a small but not insignificant part of the 

American political lexicon. Ten of the last eleven Presidents used the 

term in a public speech at least once.24 The term has appeared in every 

Democratic Party platform since 1988 and in every Republican Party 

platform since 1992.25 It earned a place on lists of the most used or 

overused phrases of 2002 and 2003.26

Its pattern of use in the New York Times over the years probably 

reflects accurately the growing saliency of the term in political discourse.27 

Except for 1973, at least one article in the newspaper used the term at 

least once a year from 1945 to 2005. WMD appeared in 1,069 stories in 

2003 and 632 times in 2004. The frequency of use, however, varied widely 

over time, as is evident from a review of figure 1.28

Figure 1: Frequency of Articles Mentioning WMD in the New York Times, 

1945–2004

Source: Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851–2001). The tabulations also include mentions of the term weapons 

adaptable to mass destruction, which appeared a total of 46 times, almost all between 1945 and 1949.

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 

Assessing the Alternative Definitions for DOD

Research for this paper identified more than 40 different definitions 

of WMD.29 Some of the definitions with official standing are identified 

in appendix A (used in the U.S. executive branch), appendix B (enacted 

into U.S. Federal law), appendix C (versions used internationally), and 

appendix D (enacted into U.S. state laws). Almost all of the more than 40 

definitions listed in the appendices fit into 1 of 5 alternative definitions, 

allowing for some slight variations in meaning.30

n WMD as a synonym for nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) weapons31

n WMD as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons32

n WMD as CBRN and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons33

n WMD as weapons that cause massive destruction or kill large 

numbers of people, and do not necessarily include or exclude 

CBRN weapons34

n WMD as weapons of mass destruction or effect, potentially including CBRNE weapons and other means of causing massive disruption, 

such as cyberattacks.35

None of these definitions is perfect. All suffer from flaws, either 

conceptual or in the implications of their use to guide policy. DOD in 

particular faces the problem of having multiple definitions. In fact, it is 

possible to find variants of four of the five definitions in official DOD 

publications. The definition in the DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, issued by the Joint Staff, is supposedly the official 

definition and offers a version of the third definition (CBRNE).36 In 

other contexts, DOD has adopted definitions that limit WMD to only 

NBC or CBRN weapons37 (the first and second definitions), and the fifth 

definition uniquely belongs to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WMD as NBC

Background. Defining WMD to include nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons is a traditional meaning of the term. It is codified in the earliest 

definition for WMD that appears in U.S. law (see appendix B, definition 1) and 

is the meaning invariably assigned to the term in White House documents.

Pros. This definition has two significant positives. First, it is the 

definition used in the 2002 National Strategy for Combating WMD, 

which is the key policy document currently guiding executive branch 

activity in this arena. Moreover, it is consistent with White House usage 

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since at least 1994, suggesting that this meaning is not idiosyncratic to a 

particular administration.

Equally important, NBC weapons have been the focus of intense 

international disarmament negotiations, resulting in the 1925 Geneva 

Protocol, the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1972 Biological and 

Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC). As such, NBC weapons represent a group of weapons that the 

international community accepts as particularly abhorrent. This distinguishes 

them from other weapons, such as conventional munitions, that could 

cause massive death and destruction but that the international community 

traditionally accepted as routinely usable instruments of armed conflict.

Cons. There are at least two conceptual problems with this definition. 

First, not all chemical and biological weapons cause mass effects. Chemical 

and biological weapons can be highly discriminate, as evidenced by their 

use to assassinate. Moreover, biological and chemical agents generally 

do not cause destruction as usually defined, even if they may cause mass 

mortality. Second, NBC weapons are not the only types of weaponry that 

can inflict mass destruction. Conventional armaments used in sufficient 

quantity can cause effects equal to or greater than those of nuclear 

weapons, as demonstrated by the bombing raids on Dresden and Tokyo 

during World War II. Moreover, as recently demonstrated by the genocide 

in Rwanda, quite primitive weapons can cause mass casualties.

There are two significant policy objections to this definition. 

This definition varies slightly from the one adopted for international 

disarmament negotiations, neglecting to mention explicitly radiological 

weapons. It also is inconsistent with the one used by the homeland 

security and law enforcement communities.

DOD Perspective. This definition has saliency given its use by 

the White House in a series of key policy documents, especially the 

2002 Combating WMD Strategy. If DOD wants to be consistent with 

Presidential guidance, it must follow this definition. It also appears useful 

in providing a clearly defined scope of action for a DOD mission.

WMD as CBRN

Background. This definition is the closest to the meaning used 

by the international community for international disarmament 

negotiations, as defined by a UN disarmament commission in 1948.38 

The United States accepted a version of this definition when it 

negotiated international treaties that placed restrictions specifically on 

“weapons of mass destruction.”

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In the view of some officials, however, this is only an extension or 

a variant of the first definition. Thus, some officials involved in drafting 

the 2002 Combating WMD Strategy claim that their reference to WMD 

included radiological weapons as a subset of nuclear weapons, despite the 

lack of explicit reference to radiological devices in the document.39 From 

this perspective, the mention of nuclear weapons in the first definition 

(NBC) was shorthand for both nuclear and radiological weapons, making 

NBC and CBRN synonyms.

Pros. This definition makes explicit the addition of radiological 

weapons to the first definition. As such, it provides the closest fit to 

the 1948 definition offered by the UN Committee on Conventional 

Armaments, which was subsequently adopted by the UN General 

Assembly as the internationally recognized definition. This also suggests 

that this definition is sufficiently close to the first one to serve as a 

synonym for NBC and to be consistent with national guidance.

Cons. Most of the criticisms identified with the first definition—

equating WMD with NBC weapons—apply here. This definition is 

inconsistent with the one used by the most significant of DOD domestic 

interagency partners and retains the conceptual weaknesses of the 

first definition. As an added negative, some people argue strongly that 

radiological weapons are not capable of mass destruction. Significantly, 

the international community has never negotiated a treaty prohibiting 

radiological weapons, despite the inclusion of such systems in the UN 

definition of WMD.

DOD Perspective. This was the official DOD definition before 1999 

and is generally consistent with that used in disarmament negotiations. 

If treated as a variant of the first definition, it would be consistent with 

the Combating WMD Strategy. As with the first definition, it narrows the 

focus of activities encompassed by WMD in a manner useful for DOD in 

distinguishing mission space.

WMD as CBRNE

Background. Certain U.S. Government agencies, including the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Federal law enforcement officials, and some homeland 

security organizations, define WMD to include certain explosive devices 

in addition to CBRN weapons. This definition originated in a provision 

of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 

103–322), an omnibus piece of legislation best known for its initiation 

of Federal funding for local police. Included in the bill was the Federal 

Death Penalty Act of 1994, which allowed Federal courts to impose the 

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death penalty for nearly 60 different crimes, including killing someone 

through WMD use.40 That legislative definition was highly idiosyncratic 

(see appendix B, definition 4), including any “destructive devices as 

defined in section 921 of this title.” Such destructive devices include 

bombs, grenades, mines, or any gun with a barrel larger than one-half 

inch.41 As a result, Congress effectively declared that a wide range of 

conventional armaments were really WMD.

Federal prosecutors have relied extensively on this legislation during 

the past decade, typically using it to prosecute cases involving “destructive 

devices” and not CBRN weapons. Prosecutors indicted and convicted 

Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols for using WMD in their April 

19, 1995, bombing attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City.42 In that case, the WMD consisted of a large two- to 

three-ton ammonium nitrate truck bomb. Similarly, prosecutors indicted 

Zacarias Moussaoui for conspiring to use WMD, specifically “airplanes 

intended for use as missiles, bombs, and similar devices, and other 

weapons of mass destruction.”43 Richard Reid pled guilty to a charge 

of attempting to use WMD—trying to use a shoe bomb to destroy an 

aircraft.44 Other prosecutions have involved possession of pipe bombs 

and sawed-off shotguns.45 More appropriately, some prosecutions under 

this law have involved individuals who threatened to use chemical or 

biological agents, usually anthrax hoaxes.46

Nine states and the District of Columbia subsequently adopted 

laws treating explosive devices as WMD (see appendix D). The District 

of Columbia, Idaho, Ohio, and South Carolina drafted laws essentially 

duplicating the Federal legislation. Eight states adopted definitions that 

diverge from the one in 18 U.S.C. 2332a.47

Perhaps more significantly, Federal agencies with homeland 

security responsibilities sometimes rely on this definition. This is perhaps 

understandable, given the leading role assigned to the law enforcement 

community in terrorism response until the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS).48 DHS adopted a version of this definition for 

its December 2004 National Response Plan.

49

Pros. This definition is the existing DOD definition.50 More significantly, 

it corresponds closely to the one used by the Federal law enforcement 

community and in many contexts by homeland security agencies. In addition, 

this definition addresses some of the concerns of critics who contend that the 

most destructive and deadly weapons have been conventional.

Cons. This definition is inconsistent with national guidance and 

with the usage preferred by the Department of State and the international 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 11

community. In addition to incorporating chemical, biological, and 

radiological weapons that could be used in ways that do not cause mass 

destruction, this definition also includes a fifth category of weapons, 

high explosives, which rarely inflict mass destruction. This definition 

also may be difficult to operationalize, given the breadth of its coverage. 

Virtually the entire arsenal of a modern military force is WMD under this 

definition.51 Given the international consensus that WMD are weapons 

that should be prohibited or controlled, widespread adoption of this 

definition would imply that international disarmament negotiations 

should ensure that most conventional military armaments should be 

prohibited or at least subjected to arms limitations.

DOD Perspective. This definition merits further consideration 

simply because it is the one used by key interagency partners. Thus, 

this would be the favored definition if the primary DOD objective 

was consistency with Federal homeland security and law enforcement 

agencies. On the other hand, this definition is the most problematic 

for other DOD interests. Adoption of this definition in disarmament 

negotiations, or for application to existing treaties, could result in controls 

on conventional armaments that DOD may not want to have limited by 

international agreement, such as antisatellite weapons or naval mines. 

Finally, it may be impossible to operationalize within a DOD setting. 

Most weapons used by the Armed Forces would be treated as WMD 

using this definition, suggesting that a combatant commander assigned 

the responsibility for combating WMD would essentially be in charge of 

dealing with the full range of adversary military forces.

WMD as Weapons Causing Mass Destruction

Background. This definition focuses not on specific types of weapons 

but rather on the magnitude of the impact. Although this rationale is 

the underlying basis for all WMD definitions, this usage differs from the 

preceding ones in one important respect. The first three definitions specify 

the types of weapons that are WMD (NBC or CBRN or CBRNE). Such 

weapons may or may not be WMD using this definition. Interestingly, this 

type of definition was adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency for its 

post–Operation Iraqi Freedom investigation of the Iraqi WMD programs:

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/

or being used in such a manner as to kill large numbers of 

people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological 

weapons but excludes the means of transporting or propelling 

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the weapons where such means are a separable and divisible 

part of the weapon. Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons 

need to be of a certain size to count as WMD—single chemical 

or biological artillery rounds would not be considered to be 

WMD, due to the limited damage they could produce.52

This definition is unique to the Iraq WMD investigation, and its merits 

are unclear. Some who advocate expanding the definition of WMD to 

include small arms and other conventional weaponry seem to advocate 

using a definition of this type.

The international community has never negotiated a disarmament 

agreement that bans WMD. Rather, it has chosen to impose geographic 

limitations on the location of WMD (outer space and the seabed) and has 

limited its prohibitions to specific categories of WMD, such as the treaties 

prohibiting chemical and biological weapons.53 Hence, the Chemical 

Weapons Convention prohibits possession of any chemical agents, “except 

where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,” such 

as for use in developing defenses. Similarly, the Biological Weapons 

Convention (BWC) prohibits possession of biological agents “of types 

and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 

other peaceful purposes.” It also bans any weapons “designed to use such 

agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

While it is possible to possess chemical and biological agents and 

remain in compliance with international law, these agreements prohibit 

possession of even a single munition intended for hostile purposes. The 

rationale for relying on a zero tolerance standard is obvious: allowing 

possession of even small stocks of weapons for use in armed conflict 

would undermine verification because discovery of such weapons caches 

would not necessarily be proof of a violation.

Pros. This definition has the singular virtue that it starts with the 

primary meaning of the concept. As such, it has greater intellectual 

consistency than the others. It permits intellectually rigorous distinctions 

with types of weapons that only sometimes cause mass mortality (such as 

chemical and biological weapons). This definition inherently incorporates 

the provision of the UN definition that covers new types of WMD.

Cons. This definition is inconsistent with those used in national 

strategy documents and by the international community. Moreover, it may 

complicate response to the proliferation of NBC weapons by suggesting 

that as a practical matter the United States would be willing to tolerate 

possession of limited stockpiles of some CBRN weapons and would not 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 13

respond to use so long as the employment did not cross some threshold. 

In contrast, the United States until proven otherwise currently operates on 

the assumption that the presence of any chemical or biological weapons 

constitutes a violation of the CWC or BWC. This makes it harder for 

proliferating countries to break out of their treaty obligations.

As such, this definition raises significant verification issues. Do we have 

sufficient confidence in our intelligence to be certain that we would really 

know the size of an adversary CBRN arsenal? If we found a single device, 

would we be confident that no others exist? Moreover, this definition implies 

that we would ignore activities that lead to minimal capabilities but that we 

would seek to interdict or otherwise respond to activities that lead to CBRN 

activities consistent with mass destruction capabilities. Operationalizing such 

an approach would be extremely difficult.

DOD Perspective. This is the most intellectually pure definition but 

also potentially the hardest to operationalize. It is inconsistent with national 

guidance, the practice of disarmament negotiations, and the U.S. criminal code.

WMD as “Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect”

Background. This is the most recent attempt to redefine WMD. It 

first appeared in the 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of 

America issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.54 That document contains the 

following reference to the National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America issued by the Bush administration in 2002:

The NSS [National Security Strategy] directs an active strategy 

to counter transnational terrorist networks, rogue nations and 

aggressive states that possess or are working to gain weapons of 

mass destruction or effect (WMD/E).

A footnote at the end of the previous sentence defines WMD/E:

The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities 

that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high 

explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” 

They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive 

kinetic effects. For example, cyberattacks on U.S. commercial 

information systems or attacks against transportation networks 

may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a 

relatively small release of a lethal agent.

Whatever the merits of WMD/E as a concept, the available evidence 

does not support the assertion that it came out of the National Security 

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14 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Strategy. The term weapons of mass destruction appears 13 times in 

the text of the September 2002 National Security Strategy, including 8 

times in a chapter devoted specifically to the threat of WMD. The only 

association of the word effects with WMD occurs in the phrase “effects 

of weapons of mass destruction use,” which appears three times in a 

paragraph discussing consequence management. While the National 

Security Strategy never explicitly defines WMD, the chapter on combating 

WMD focuses exclusively on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, 

and their associated delivery systems. Moreover, the WMD/E definition 

clearly is inconsistent with other uses of the term by the White House.

Pros. This is an attempt to address some of the deficiencies with other 

definitions, particularly those arising from terrorism concerns. It focuses 

on disruptive effects as well as necessary destruction and can include any 

attack that might have a significant impact on the target, whether real or 

virtual. This approach is particularly useful in the context of understanding 

the full range of terrorist threats, which can have devastating effects even if 

using weapons not traditionally defined as WMD.

Cons. WMD/E is a new term that is currently unique to the Joint 

Staff and does not appear to have gained traction outside the military. The 

Joint Staff has failed to make clear its rationale for adopting this term or 

to signal if it intends WMD/E as a replacement for WMD. Because the 

concept is nascent, it is unclear if it defines categories amenable to creating 

organizational frameworks. Moreover, it is unclear whether WMD/E 

includes all NBC weapons or only those capable of causing mass disruption. 

The breadth of the concept, and its dissimilarity to the use of WMD in 

strategy documents issued by the White House, suggests that it is poorly 

suited for use in supporting DOD implementation of Presidential guidance.

DOD Perspective. This revision of the traditional concept of WMD 

does not appear suited to address the issues that led the international 

community to focus on CBRN weapons as armaments of special concern. 

In addition, it may be the hardest to operationalize from a combatant 

commander’s perspective. The types of adversary capabilities associated 

with this definition are wide ranging, suggesting that it may be hard to 

determine with particularity exactly what activities are associated with a 

combating WMD/E mission.

Selection Criteria for a DOD Definition

The requirement for a definition of WMD arises from the DOD 

decision to define combating WMD as a mission and to give the combatant 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 15

commands a new framework within which to address the challenges posed 

by the spread and potential use of WMD. As such, this new mission should 

be a focal point within DOD for implementation of the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued by the White House in 2002.

Clearly, to the extent that DOD is acting in the context of a national 

strategy, DOD should be consistent with the use of the term by the White 

House. Moreover, review of this National Strategy indicates that while 

some of its elements focus on activities naturally under the cognizance of 

the military, other elements are the primary responsibility of others. This 

suggests that DOD will need a definition acceptable to the agencies that it 

will be supporting.55

Arms control considerations should play a role in the DOD 

definition, if only because of the potential impact on the interests of the 

Defense Department. The United States is a party to treaties imposing 

constraints on weapons of mass destruction, which were negotiated 

using the official UN definition. Because these agreements impose legally 

binding obligations on the United States, a precise definition for WMD 

is essential. In this context, DOD may not want to adopt definitions that 

undermine the boundaries established during the treaty negotiations.

Of less significance (but still important) are other uses of WMD 

in disarmament negotiations. Several UN resolutions (from both the 

General Assembly and Security Council) articulate a consensus that 

WMD as a class of weapons should be prohibited and that disarmament 

negotiations aimed at WMD as a class of weapons should take precedence 

over the control of conventional munitions. The international community 

generally treats WMD as weapons that are particularly dangerous and 

hence has given priority to elimination or control of them over other 

types of armaments. This may be why some proponents of controls 

over conventional munitions want to expand or change the traditional 

definition of WMD to include conventional armaments.56

This context suggests that DOD cannot define WMD in a vacuum. 

Rather, the Defense Department must assess how its definition fits with 

usage in other contexts. In particular, DOD should pay attention to 

alternative usages that might have negative consequences for its interests. 

These issues include the following, not necessarily in priority order:

n DOD activities will occur in the context of a national strategy. This 

suggests that DOD should be consistent with White House guidance 

on the meaning of WMD. Maintaining consistency with Presidential 

directives is essential if DOD wants to assert that its activities implement a national strategy.

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n DOD will need to operate in cooperation with other organizations 

that may have their own definitions of WMD.

Most importantly, DOD will implement its mission in cooperation 

with other U.S. Government agencies. This implies that DOD 

needs to understand alternative definitions for WMD that have 

standing in other communities. This is especially true when DOD 

may be acting in support of another agency with lead responsibility 

for a combating WMD activity.

DOD also will work with foreign and international organizations 

that may have their own definitions. It would be useful to 

synchronize a DOD definition with those of its non-U.S. partners.

n DOD should be sensitive to the potential intersection between its definition of WMD and the use of the term in international disarmament negotiations and treaties. In particular, DOD should be aware 

that its selection of a definition could have implications for its equities in the context of disarmament and arms control negotiations.

n DOD will use the definition to implement actions in the realm of 

combating WMD that should distinguish such activities from others undertaken by DOD in other areas of armed conflict. As such, it 

should serve internal DOD needs to differentiate between combating 

WMD and addressing other military challenges.

n The definition should take into account the unique characteristics of 

the weapons in question, the potentially unique response capabilities 

required to deal with them, and the impact of a definition on DOD 

organization and force structure.

Practically, some of these matters are more important than others. In 

particular, four of them are especially critical and can be operationalized 

to form the key criteria for selecting a definition:

n consistency with Presidential guidance (in particular, the National 

Strategy for Combating WMD)

n congruence with DOD long-term interests related to disarmament 

diplomacy. This criteria strongly supports adoption of a definition 

compatible with the one used by negotiators in international disarmament diplomacy, suggesting use of the second definition (WMD 

= CBRNE). To the extent that NBC = CBRNE, the first definition 

also would be acceptable. International adoption of the alternative 

definitions might lead to imposition of constraints on DOD use of 

weaponry that the United States could find unacceptable. Thus, 

DOD should avoid the last three definitions, and especially definition three (equating WMD with CBRNE), because adoption of those 

definitions for interpretation of U.S. treaty obligations could negatively impact U.S. interests.

n consistency with the position of key interagency partners (primarily 

law enforcement and homeland security agencies)

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 17

n utility in separating WMD-related matters from other issues of operational significance for DOD.

From a DOD perspective, it is important to adopt a definition 

that clearly differentiates WMD from the conventional armaments that 

are the primary instruments of the military’s warfighting capabilities. 

CBRN weapons require specialized capabilities that are distinct from 

those required to deal with conventional munitions or other threats 

(such as cyberattacks). This expertise, often rare in the military, puts 

a considerable burden on what are currently high-demand/lowavailability resources.

NBC weapons rely on effects that are often radically different from those 

associated with conventional munitions. Nuclear and radiological weapons 

are associated with radiation, chemical weapons with chemical toxicity, and 

biological weapons with disease. Responding to these challenges puts heavy 

responsibilities on communities (such as military medicine) that either do not 

have a role in conventional warfighting (radiation expertise, for example) or 

that are normally considered support services (as with medicine).

Clearly, none of the definitions is decisively superior to any of the 

others. Using the criteria identified at the start of the previous section, 

however, results in a focus on only three of the definitions: the first two 

(WMD = NBC; WMD = CBRN) and the third (WMD = CBRNE). The 

reasons for this particular focus come from the answers to the four key 

criteria identified at the start of the previous section:

n Consistency with Presidential guidance. The current administration 

and its immediate predecessor both clearly adopted the first definition (WMD = NBC). This is explicit in the Bush administration’s 

Combating WMD Strategy.

n Congruence with DOD long-term interests related to disarmament 

diplomacy. This criterion strongly supports rejection of the last three 

definitions and suggests one of the first two definitions is preferable 

(NBC or CBRN) because of possible problems the third, fourth, and 

fifth definitions (particularly the third, equating WMD with CBRNE) 

could create for DOD in the arena of disarmament diplomacy. 

n Consistency with the position of key interagency partners. Although 

DOD national security partners in the Interagency usually favor 

NBC, they have few operational concerns regarding this definition, 

while some homeland security and most law enforcement agencies 

are strongly wedded to the third definition (CBRNE).

n Utility for DOD in defining a distinct mission. This criterion is less 

helpful than the others. If the main concern is narrowing the scope of 

the associated activities to manageable proportions, then the first two 

definitions are best (NBC or CBRN). Similarly, if the primary focus 

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of the effort is on traditional DOD warfighting activities, those definitions are probably most appropriate. However, if homeland security and cooperation with law enforcement agencies are the intended 

focus of the effort, then the more appropriate definition is the third 

definition (CBRNE).

This review tends to suggest that the best definition is probably one 

that equates WMD with NBC weapons but that CBRN is an acceptable 

alternative. The CBRNE definition is only acceptable if the intended focus 

of the new mission is homeland security and support to law enforcement 

and homeland security agencies.

This implies that DOD should revise its existing definitions of 

WMD to make them consistent with national guidance and international 

disarmament diplomacy. As such, it should probably revert to the official 

DOD definition used until 1999.

Disarmament Diplomacy

The first known use of the term weapons of mass destruction dates 

to the December 1937 Christmas address delivered by the Archbishop 

of Canterbury, William Cosmo Gordon Lang. During the course of his 

sermon, entitled “Christian Responsibility,” the Archbishop stated:

Take, for example, the question of peace. Who can think 

without dismay of the fears, jealousies, and suspicions which 

have compelled nations, our own among them, to pile up their 

armaments? Who can think at this present time without a 

sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, 

the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? 

Who can think without horror of what another widespread war 

would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of 

mass destruction [emphasis added]?57

While the Archbishop’s remarks gave no clear indication of what he 

meant by WMD, there is no particular reason to believe that he was thinking 

only of aerial bombardment and explosive weapons.58 The reference to 

the wars in Spain and China certainly suggest that the Archbishop had 

concerns about the widely publicized bombing of cities during 1937 by the 

Fascists in Spain and the Japanese in China.59 However, the Archbishop 

was gravely concerned about the dangers of chemical weapons, having 

addressed the subject during a Parliamentary debate following the initial 

reports of the 1936 Italian chemical attacks in Abyssinia.60 Moreover, it is 

likely he was aware of concerns that a future European war would involve 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 19

chemical attacks on cities.61 It is even possible that he could have known of 

public discussions in the 1920s and 1930s relating to the potential threat of 

bacteriological (meaning biological) warfare.62

Developments after World War II

There is no evidence to suggest that the Archbishop’s address was 

responsible for subsequent uses of the term WMD. Rather, post–World 

War II use of the term clearly dates to November 15, 1945, when 

the President of the United States, the prime minister of the United 

Kingdom, and the prime minister of Canada issued a joint declaration 

calling for international control of atomic energy and advocating the 

creation of a UN commission to identify ways to bring atomic weaponry 

under control. Significantly, the declaration was not limited only to 

nuclear weapons:

Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other 

weapons [besides atomic weapons], or of new methods of 

warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as 

the military use of atomic energy.

. . .

In particular the [proposed UN] Commission should make 

specific proposals:

. . .

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic 

weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass 

destruction [emphasis added].

63

According to an explanation offered by a senior State Department 

official to a military colleague, “weapons adaptable to mass destruction” 

were mentioned due to concerns that if the commission considered only 

atomic weaponry, its “recommendations would be lop-sided if in fact 

there were other important weapons on which similar controls should 

be placed.”64

The terminology in the tripartite declaration entered the lexicon 

of international disarmament diplomacy when it was incorporated 

into the first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly (January 

24, 1946), which established a “Commission to deal with the Problem 

Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy.” That commission was 

directed to “make specific proposals . . . for the elimination from national 

armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable 

to mass destruction [emphasis added].”65 The deadlock over nuclear 

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weapons controls ensured that the UN Atomic Energy Commission 

never addressed the problem of “other major weapons adaptable to 

mass destruction.”66 As a result, it never clarified the General Assembly’s 

resolution by defining the term.

The Commission for Conventional Armaments

In 1948, the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments 

(CCA) generated the first considered definition of WMD. The CCA 

was established in 1947 under the auspices of the Security Council 

in response to a recommendation contained in General Assembly 

Resolution 41(I).67 That resolution, which recommended creation of 

such a committee, made three mentions of the need to eliminate or 

prohibit “atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the 

future to mass destruction.” The commission was directed to develop 

proposals for the reduction and regulation of armaments and armed 

forces but was told to exclude any matters that were the responsibility of 

the Atomic Energy Commission.

This meant that the CCA needed to determine what was within 

its mandate and what was more appropriately within the purview of the 

Atomic Energy Commission. An August 12, 1948, resolution of the CCA 

provided that guidance:

The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to advise 

the Security Council: 1. that it considers that all armaments and 

armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass 

destruction, fall within its jurisdiction, and that weapons of 

mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive 

weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal chemical and 

biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future 

which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to 

those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.68

Significantly, the Soviet Union voted against this resolution and 

blocked its submission to the Security Council in 1948.69 The CCA 

definition essentially equated WMD to CBRN, although it mentions only 

lethal chemical and biological weapons and also incorporated unspecified 

weapons “developed in the future” having the “destructive effects” of the 

specified CBRN weapons.

In 1977, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 32/84, which 

formally accepted the CCA definition for use in disarmament diplomacy. 

According to that resolution, the General Assembly

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 21

reaffirms the definition of weapons of mass destruction, 

contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional 

Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of 

mass destruction as atomic explosive weapons, radioactive 

material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons 

and any weapons developed in the future which might have 

characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the 

atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.70

This resolution resulted from a 1975 Soviet proposal that the international 

community negotiate a treaty to prohibit the development and manufacture 

of all weapons of mass destruction.71 General Assembly resolutions related 

to the “[p]rohibition of the development and manufacture of new types 

of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons” 

mentioned the CCA definition in 1996, 1999, and 2002.72

Treaties Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States has adhered to at least three treaties that place 

limitations on weapons of mass destruction as a class (rather than 

specifically on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons): the 1967 Outer 

Space Treaty, the 1972 Seabed Treaty, and the 1991 Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty. One additional treaty, the 1979 Moon Agreement, also 

contains language related to WMD, but the United States (and most of the 

international community) never accepted that agreement. Additionally, 

WMD appears in the preambles of at least three other treaties: the 1967 

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,73 the 

1972 Biological Weapons Convention,74 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons 

Convention.75 This contrasts with the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which does not use the term.

Outer Space Treaty

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies (generally known as the Outer Space Treaty) prohibits 

placement of WMD in outer space.76 The key language appears in Article IV:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 

around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 

other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons 

on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in 

any other manner. [Emphasis added.]

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The idea for a disarmament treaty focused on outer space originated 

during the Eisenhower administration. (In 1957, the Western powers 

submitted a draft treaty that limited use of space to peaceful and scientific 

purposes. The Soviet Union rejected this proposal.77 Moscow offered its 

own draft treaty, which would have demilitarized outer space, and thus 

would have prohibited the presence of any weapons in space.78) In his 

September 29, 1960, address before the United Nations, President Dwight 

Eisenhower made the following proposal:

We must not lose the chance we still have to control the future 

of outer space.

I propose that . . . [we] agree, subject to appropriate 

verification, that no nation will put into orbit or station in outer 

space weapons of mass destruction.79

While these efforts did not produce results, they put the issues of WMD 

and outer space on the disarmament agenda.

The following year, President John F. Kennedy offered a proposal of 

his own in a September 25, 1961, address before the UN General Assembly:

we shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to 

the limits of man’s exploration in the universe, reserving outer 

space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction

in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and 

benefits of space to every nation.80 [Emphasis added.]

The United States then submitted a draft treaty for complete disarmament 

that incorporated the following language: “The parties to the treaty 

would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass 

destruction.”81 Following this, the White House initiated a comprehensive 

review of U.S. policy on disarmament in space. This ultimately led to an 

interagency recommendation that the United States support a ban on 

WMD in space. At the same time, the Kennedy administration issued 

a declaratory statement that outlined that position. On September 5, 

1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, gave a speech, 

reportedly cleared by President Kennedy, declaring, “We have no program 

to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit.”82 [Emphasis added.]

The definition of WMD was a subject of a somewhat confused 

discussion at a meeting of the Committee of Principals on October 

8, 1963. According to the meeting memorandum, the Joint Staff had 

advocated using the term WMD instead of directly mentioning nuclear 

weapons, although the rationale was unclear. Secretary of State Dean 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 23

Rusk asserted that using WMD would be seen as “nuclear weapons plus 

something else,” noting that the “Joint Chiefs intention seemed to be 

to leave open the question of interpretation.” Similarly, the President’s 

science adviser added that he had thought WMD meant nuclear weapons 

plus “BW–CW.” The Joint Staff representative at the meeting admitted that 

the military wanted to retain the option of placing in orbit small nuclear 

weapons for use as antisatellite weapons. However, even he conceded that 

it would be necessary to withdraw from an agreement should the United 

States deploy such weapons. When pressed by Secretary Rusk, Paul Nitze, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (the 

functional equivalent of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 

current structure), indicated that DOD did not want a clear definition of 

WMD, apparently hoping to leave open the possibility that small nuclear 

weapons could be excluded from a definition. This position was not 

acceptable to the other participants, and the official conclusions of the 

meeting reported the following: “‘Weapons of mass destruction’ would 

have to be interpreted as including all nuclear weapons.”83

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union were in 

complete agreement on the substance, domestic political considerations 

led President Kennedy to favor a General Assembly resolution over 

negotiation of a treaty at that time.84 The result was UN General Assembly 

Resolution 1884 (XVIII):

The General Assembly

. . .

1. Welcomes the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of their intention not to station 

in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons 

of mass destruction.

2. Solemnly calls upon all States:

(a) To refrain from placing around the Earth any objects carrying 

nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing 

such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer 

space in any other manner;

(b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any other way 

participating in the conduct of the forgoing activities.

The issue reemerged in 1966, when President Lyndon Johnson 

accepted a proposal from the State Department to push for negotiation 

of an outer space treaty. Following the language of the earlier 

discussions, a May 7, 1966, White House press release, issued in the 

President’s name, advocated that “No country should be permitted to 

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station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body.”85 Following 

discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, each of the 

countries issued substantively similar draft texts. As a result, relatively 

little negotiation was required to achieve a final text, which opened for 

signature on January 27, 1967.

The definition of WMD was raised several times during the 1967 

Senate ratification hearings. The initial target of the questions was Arthur 

Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who was the lead 

American negotiator:

The Chairman [J. William Fulbright]. What are the other 

weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. Goldberg. Bacteriological, any type of weapons which 

could lead to the same type of catastrophe that a nuclear 

weapon could lead to.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Goldberg. It does not refer to any conventional weapon. It refers 

to a weapon of the magnitude of a nuclear, bacteriological weapon.86

Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance provided a more complete 

answer in a subsequent hearing:

Senator [John Sherman] Cooper. The treaty refers to weapons 

of mass destruction as well as nuclear weapons. Can you give us 

some statement about that?

Mr. Vance. Yes, I believe it would include such other systems 

as chemical and biological weapons, sir, or any weapon which 

might be developed in the future which would have the 

capability of mass destruction such as that which would be 

wreaked by nuclear weapons.87

Although there are differences in the articulation of the definition, both 

appear to relate to the definition adopted by the CCA in 1948. Both 

mention the inclusion of certain specific weapons taken to have effects 

comparable to those of nuclear weapons (Goldberg only mentions 

biological, while Vance added chemical weapons). Only Vance mentioned 

a provision including future weapons having comparable effects.

Seabed Treaty

Article I of the 1972 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement 

of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 

Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof also imposes 

restrictions on the geographic placement of WMD:

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 25

The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or 

emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil 

thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in 

article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of 

mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or 

any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or 

using such weapons.88 [Emphasis added.]

The origins of this treaty go back to 1967, when the Maltese delegate 

to the UN First Committee proposed negotiation of an agreement to 

ensure the peaceful use of the ocean’s seabed. The Soviet Union tabled the 

original draft treaty, which would have banned any military facilities on 

the seabed.89

It took time for the United States to formulate an agreed position on 

this new treaty. There was universal agreement in Washington that the 

United States could not accept a treaty along the lines of the one proposed 

by the Soviets, which could have limited the ability of the United States to 

deploy undersea submarine tracking facilities. At the same time, however, 

the Department of Defense objected to a treaty that might limit its ability 

to deploy nuclear weapons mounted on mobile platforms on the seabed. 

The United States announced its support for a partial limit in President 

Johnson’s 1968 speech at the United Nations:

We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the 

seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General 

Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a number of 

proposals for arms limitations on the seabed. Your conference 

should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable, 

and effective international agreement which would prevent the 

use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of 

mass destruction.

90 [Emphasis added.]

Ultimately, the Defense and State Departments reached an agreement 

that directed the American negotiator to deliver the following language:

The United States proposes that the ENDC [Eighteen 

Nation Disarmament Committee, the predecessor body to 

the Committee on Disarmament] examine the question as to 

whether a viable international agreement may be achieved in 

which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of 

mass destruction on the seabed or deep ocean floor.

The next year, the Nixon administration tabled a draft treaty that also 

added the reference to nuclear weapons found in the final treaty.

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Ambassador James Leonard, then Deputy Director of the Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, articulated the position of the U.S. negotiators on 

the meaning of WMD during Senate hearings on treaty ratification:

Senator [Claiborne] Pell. What would be your general 

definition of a weapon of mass destruction? What was the 

definition at the Geneva Conference?

Mr. Leonard. Mr. Chairman, the term “weapons of mass 

destruction” is one that has come into quite a number of 

international documents, treaties and so on, and it has, I 

think, generally the meaning of embracing nuclear weapons, 

embracing also chemical and biological weapons, and then being 

open-ended, if I may express it that way, in order to take care 

of developments which one cannot specify at the present time, 

some form of weapon which might be invented or developed in 

the future, which would have devastating effects comparable to 

those of nuclear or biological or chemical weapons, but which 

one simply cannot describe at the present time.91

This is a restatement of the CCA definition (CBRN weapons, as well as 

possible future weapons).

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) reiterates 

the prohibitions contained in the Seabed and Outer Space Treaties. 

These prohibitions are similar to the ones negotiated for the 1979 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty, which the United 

States never ratified.92

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

. . .

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement 

on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal 

waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile 

launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with 

the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and 

inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations 

provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty 

shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, 

including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 

1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 

Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 

Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 27

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any 

other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional 

orbital missiles;

Common Understanding to subparagraph (c). The provisions 

of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX of the Treaty do not require 

the dismantling or destruction of any existing launchers of 

either Party.93

While the Senate never ratified the SALT II Treaty, the United States 

agreed to abide by its provisions so long as the Soviets did the same.

The operative section of the 1991 START document appears in 

Article V, paragraph 18. While subparagraph (b) refers to the official 

title of the Seabed Treaty, but does not otherwise mention WMD, 

subparagraph (c) does not mention the Outer Space Treaty but does 

explicitly ban WMD in Earth orbit or in “a fraction of an Earth orbit.”

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

. . .

(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement 

on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds 

of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in 

or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of 

such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, 

the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, 

or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply 

to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the 

seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the 

Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 

Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean 

Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or 

any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit 

or a fraction of an Earth orbit.

The reference to “fraction of an Earth orbit” clearly is an expansion of the 

prohibition in the Space Treaty.94

Moon Agreement

In 1979, the General Assembly opened for signature the Agreement 

Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 

Bodies, commonly known as the Moon Agreement. Despite the name, 

the provisions of the agreement also applied to other celestial bodies 

in our solar system. It entered into force on July 11, 1984, but only for 

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28 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

the signatory states. As of January 1, 2004, 10 states had ratified the 

agreement and another 5 had signed but not ratified it.95 The United 

States never signed the agreement. Article 3 of the Moon Agreement 

contains the following:

States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory 

to or around the Moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 

other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such 

weapons on or in the Moon.

While the language differs, this is clearly consistent with the existing language of the Outer Space Treaty. There is no indication that this 

provision provoked any significant disagreement. Rather, the controversy 

surrounding the Moon Agreement relates to Article 11, which contains language regarding the “Common Heritage of Mankind” that raised concerns 

about the status of property rights.It is widely argued that the agreement has 

dubious international standing due to its lack of international acceptance.96 

Proposed WMD Treaty

In 1975, the Soviet Union asked the international community 

to consider negotiation of a treaty banning new types of WMD.97 In 

response, the General Assembly passed a resolution that year calling on 

the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider 

the “prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons 

of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.”98

The matter was discussed at the General Assembly in 1975 and 1976, 

as well as at the 1976 session of the CCD. During the negotiations, the 

Western powers argued against the Soviet treaty, even as they accepted 

the underlying principles it affirmed. They agreed on the principle of 

prohibiting new types of WMD, and accepted the Soviet position that 

the 1948 CCA definition covered more than the four explicitly declared 

types of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological). On the 

other hand, they argued that it was not evident that the international 

community could identify any new categories of weapons that qualified as 

WMD. In particular, the Western powers argued that the categories of new 

WMD offered by the Soviets were too vague or did not qualify as WMD. 

Moreover, they argued that if a new type of WMD was identified in the 

future, the international treaty should draft a treaty to ban that specific 

type of weapon. In conclusion, the Western powers argued that the United 

Nations should not adopt a new treaty banning WMD but should keep the 

matter under review.

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 29

The result of the deliberations was General Assembly Resolution 

32/84, adopted December 12, 1977. This resolution reaffirmed UN 

adherence to the CCA definition of WMD. It also provided policy 

guidance that appears to have defined the subsequent UN agenda on 

WMD. Part A of the resolution, adopted at the insistence of the Soviets, 

contained two significant passages:

1. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 

to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified 

governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of 

an agreement on the prohibition of the development and 

manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and 

new systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific 

agreements on this subject.

. . .

3. Urges all States to refrain from any action which would 

impede international talks aimed at working out an agreement 

or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological 

progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass 

destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The text of part B was introduced by the United Kingdom and 

supported by the United States. It declares that the General Assembly:

1. Urges States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass 

destruction based on new scientific principles;

. . .

4. Welcomes the active continuation of negotiations relating to 

the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass 

destruction;

5. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 

while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under 

review the question of the development of new weapons of mass 

destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider 

the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of 

any specific new weapons which may be identified.

While part A merely discussed “new types” of WMD, part B made 

clear that the new WMD originated from new scientific principles. This 

suggests that the advocates of part B were attempting to clarify that the 

CCA definition could not be expanded to encompass types of weapons 

that existed in 1948, but that it could be expanded beyond CBRN if the 

new types relied on technologies not known or possible when the term 

was originally defined.

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30 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

This issue was addressed once again during the 1978 Tenth Special 

Session of the General Assembly (the so-called Special Session on 

Disarmament). The final document generated by that meeting laid out 

international priorities for the negotiation of disarmament agreements:

Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear 

weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including 

chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which 

may be deemed to be injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; 

and reduction of armed forces.99

Since that time, prohibition of new types of WMD has been on 

the UN disarmament agenda, first at the CCD and then its successor 

entity, the Conference on Disarmament.100 While no new types of WMD 

have been identified, there appears to be widespread support in the 

international community for sustaining the prohibition on existing and 

new types of WMD.101

Other International Diplomacy

As the earlier discussion highlights, WMD has been a focus of 

discussion at both the Security Council and the General Assembly since 

1946. A few developments since the end of the Cold War highlight 

this continuing UN use of the term WMD in its deliberations. At the 

conclusion of the 1992 meeting of the Heads of State and Government 

of the member states of the UN Security Council, the president of the 

Security Council made the following statement with the authorization of 

the participants:

The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes 

a threat to international peace and security. The members of the 

Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread 

of technology related to the research for or production of such 

weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.102

This was further emphasized in 2004, when the Security Council adopted 

Resolution 1540, which reaffirmed the 1992 declaration by the Security 

Council’s president, “including the need for all Member States to fulfill 

their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to 

prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction.” 

Significantly, this was the only mention of WMD in the resolution’s text. 

The rest of the document refers to “nuclear, chemical, and biological 

weapons and their means of delivery.”103

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 31

A 1995 UN General Assembly Resolution mentioned WMD three 

times in connection with measures related to their control or abolition, 

including an affirmation that the General Assembly “calls upon all States 

to implement fully their commitments in the field of disarmament and 

non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”104 In 1996, the General 

Assembly adopted a resolution on the “prohibition of the development 

and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 

systems of such weapons.” In that resolution, the General Assembly 

declared its adherence to the CCA definition and noted that it was

determined to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons 

of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in 

destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction 

identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction 

adopted by the United Nations in 1948.

Moreover, the resolution reiterated that the General Assembly “reaffirms 

that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new 

types of weapons of mass destruction.”105

The United States is party to several agreements that include 

definitions of WMD. The Guidelines for the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR) contain the following language: “weapons of mass 

destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons).” Hence, 

WMD means NBC in the context of implementation of the MTCR.106 In 

2004, the United States signed three bilateral ship-boarding agreements 

(with Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama) to support the objectives 

of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The agreements ensure 

that the United States has the legal authority to search and seize ships 

belonging to the fleets of those countries should they be carrying WMD 

or related cargoes. The three agreements contain identical language 

specifying that “‘weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ means nuclear, 

chemical, biological and radiological weapons.”107 For purposes of these 

PSI agreements, WMD is equivalent to CBRN.

Conclusion

As this paper suggests, weapons of mass destruction is not a new term, 

and it is not one used only by arms control specialists. Rather, it has a 

history in international diplomacy that extends back nearly 60 years. As one 

would expect of a term used in international agreements, it has an accepted 

meaning for use in disarmament negotiations and in defining treaty 

obligations accepted by the United States. That specific definition is clearly 

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32 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

the one proposed to the United Nations in 1948 and used in subsequent 

disarmament negotiations. Hence, any definition of the term weapons of 

mass destruction used as a matter of policy by the U.S. Government should 

be consistent with that one, effectively meaning either nuclear, biological, 

and chemical, or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear.

The law enforcement community has never advanced a rationale 

for the adoption of the broader definition that equates weapons of mass 

destruction to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive 

weapons as found in the U.S. criminal code. There was no discussion of 

this provision when Congress enacted the original legislation containing 

that provision. Moreover, many of the crimes prosecuted under provisions 

associated with that definition clearly are prosecutable under other 

provisions of the criminal code. Hence, given the contradictions between 

the definition in the U.S. criminal code and the one that the United States 

accepted in treaty obligations, there is a case for making U.S. domestic law 

consistent with the international definition of WMD.

Afterword

In August 2005, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) generated yet 

another definition for the term weapons of mass destruction. The memorandum establishing the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction contained the following language:

The term “WMD” is defined as weapons—nuclear, biological, 

chemical and radiological—and their means of delivery that are 

capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in 

such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people or cause 

significant infrastructure damage. 108

This definition is a unique formulation that combines elements of 

the second (WMD as CBRN) and the fourth (WMD as massively destructive weapons) alternative definitions. A similarity with the language 

appearing in the DOD Dictionary (I–3) suggests that it is a significantly 

modified variant of that Joint Staff definition. It varies in three significant 

ways: the Strategic Command definition excludes high explosives, adds a 

reference to infrastructure damage, and expands the category of included 

delivery systems to cover even those that are “divisible and separable.”

This definition appears to exclude many small-scale uses of chemical and biological agents that are of concern to other agencies. Hence, 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 33

terrorist acquisition of ricin or of improvised chemical devices, neither 

of which are likely to cause significant destruction or damage, are clearly 

excluded by the USSTRATCOM definition. Moreover, it is unclear if 

the Strategic Command definition is intended to cover highly disruptive 

attacks that cause few fatalities, such as the 2001 anthrax letter attack. The 

terminology used in this definition (destruction, destroy, and damage) are 

words more typically associated with explosive devices, leaving unclear 

whether biological attacks are included in the definition.

As a result, this definition poses certain challenges. It differs from 

definitions used by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and is at variance with those adopted by the State Department 

and by the White House in national strategy guidance documents. The 

differences may lead to policy disconnects if the different components 

attempt to interpret activities rigorously through the prism of their own 

definitions. Moreover, the decision of USSTRATCOM to assign its own 

unique meaning to a term of art suggests that there are challenges ahead 

as it seeks to undertake its assigned responsibility for integration and 

synchronization of combating WMD in the Defense Department.

As a practical matter, this new definition may not make much difference. U.S. Strategic Command is likely to follow the lead of other agencies 

in addressing WMD matters. Nevertheless, adding a new definition to an 

already crowded field cannot help and is potentially counterproductive to 

the work of its new Combating WMD Center.

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Appendix A. Executive Branch Definitions of WMD

Source Definition

1 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, December 2002

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

2 President Bill Clinton, Executive Order 12938, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction,” November 14, 1994 (as amended on July 28, 1998, by Executive Order 13094 and as extended through November 2005 on November 4, 2004 [Federal Register, November 5, 2004]), 64, 637

Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (“weapons of mass destruction”)

3 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms (as amended through March 23, 2004). The definition used through at least 1998 in this publication was identical to the one appearing in A–7 below.

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD.

4 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January

2001; available at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>

weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles

5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997; 

available at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html>

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their delivery means, often referred to as weapons of mass destruction

6 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004 As defined in Title 18, U.S.C. § 2332a: (1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more tha

4 ounces, or missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or similar device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or theiprecursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation

7 Department of Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 

AR 310–25, March 1969 (Joint and Army term). This definition appears in versions of Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, through the edition of June 10, 1998.

In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbeof people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separate and divisible part of the weapon.

8 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 2004 The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biologica

radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” They may rely more on disruptive imthan destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyberattacks on U.S. commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks mahave a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.

9 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 

DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Duelfer Report), September 30, 2004

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or being used in such a manner as to kill large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapons where such means are a separaband divisible part of the weapon. Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons need to be of a certain size to count as WMD—single chemical or biological artillery rounds would not be considered to be WMD, due to the limited damage they could produce.

10 Ambassador James Leonard, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency, Seabed Arms Control Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Congress, 2d Session, on EX. H. 92–1, Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, January 27, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), 13

“the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is one that has come into quite a number of international documents, treaties and so on, and it has, I think, generally the meaning of embracing nuclear weapons, embracing also chemical and biological weapons, and then being open-ended, if I may express it that way, in order to take care of developments which one cannot specify at the present time, some form of weapon which might invented or developed in the future, which would have devastating effects comparable to those of nuclear or biological or chemical weapons, but which one simply cannot describe at the present time.”

11 United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations 

Weapon of Mass Destruction—A WMD is any device, material, or substance used in a manner, in a quantity or type, or under circumstances 

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Appendix B. WMD Defined in Law

Source Definition

1 The Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992, enacted as Title XV of the 

Defense Authorization Act of 1993, P.L. 102–484 (enacted October 23, 1992)

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (hereinafter in this title referred to as “weapons of mass destruction”)

2 U.S. Code, 50 U.S.C. 2366, enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1997, October 11, 1996

REPORTS.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligencshall submit to Congress a report on—

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development o

production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanceconventional munitions

3 U.S. Code, 50 U.S.C. 2302, enacted as part of the Defense Against Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, September 23, 1996, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104–201

(1) The term “weapon of mass destruction” means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of—

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;(B) a disease organism; or(C) radiation or radioactivity.

4 U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. 2332a, enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and 

Law Enforcement Act of 1994, September 13, 1994, P.L. 103–322; subsequently amended

The term “weapon of mass destruction” means—

(A) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title;(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of to

or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;

(C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or(D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life

18 U.S.C. 921:The term “destructive device” means—

(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas—

(i) bomb,

(ii) grenade,

(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce,

(v) mine, or

(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;

(B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suita

for sporting purposes) by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter; and (C) any combinatioparts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device described in subparagraph (A) or (B) from which a destructive device may be readily assembled. The term “destructive device” shall not include any device which is nedesigned nor redesigned for use as a weapon; any device, although originally designed for use as a weapon, which is redesigned use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device; surplus ordnance sold, loaned, or given by the Secretary of Army pursuant to the provisions of section 4684(2), 4685, or 4686 of title 10; or any other device which the Secretary of the Treafinds is not likely to be used as a weapon, is an antique, or is a rifle which the owner intends to use solely for sporting, recreationcultural purposes.

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Appendix C. Selected International Definitions of WMD

Source Definition

1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and Way Ahead,” Press Release (95) 124, November 29, 1995; available at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-124.htm>

“WMD” and “NBC weapons” can be used interchangeably

2 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP–6, 2004; available at <www.nato.

int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm>

weapon of mass destruction/arme de destruction massive: A weapon that is capable of a high order of destruction and of being used in such a manner as to destroy people, infrastructure, or other resources on a large scale (1/10/2003)

3 Missile Technology Control Regime, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant 

Transfers, January 7, 1993, available at <www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/mtcr_anx.html>

The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

4 Mission Statement, WMD Branch of the United Nations (UN) Department for 

Disarmament Affairs; available at <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd>

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch provides substantive support for the activities of the United Nations in the area of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons), including the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorist acts, as well as missiles

5 UN Committee For Conventional Armaments, August 1948 weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal chemical and biologic

weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or otweapons mentioned above

6 Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United 

Nations, “International Law, Security, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2002 Spring Meeting of the Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association, New York, May 9, 2002; available at <http://disarmament2.un.org/speech/statements.htm>

weapons of mass destruction . . . today consist of nuclear, biological, and chemical arms

7 Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, published under the auspices of 

the U.S. Air Force, Soviet Military Thought, vol. 9, trans. DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 148

Oruzhiye massovogo porazheniya (weapons of mass destruction)—Weapons used to inflict heavy casualties. They include nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological agents.See also the entry for zashchita voysk ot oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya (protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction): “The complex measures taken for the purpose of preventing injury to personnel and damage to combat materiel and equipment by the weapons and agents usenuclear, chemical and bacteriological warfare” (80).

8 Civil Defense (Grazhdanskaya Oborona), M.N. Titov, P.T. Yegorov, B.A. Gayko et al., 

ed. G.A. Christy (Moscow: Publishing House for Higher Education, 1974). Trans. Joint Publications Research Service, Arlington, VA (for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency), and Joseph Lewin, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL–38–2845, July 1975

Mass destruction weapons is a term used to designate nuclear and chemical weapons capable of inflicting death, injury, and damage in a short period of time on a large number of humans, animals, and plants over extensive areas. Nuclear weapons in addition cause the destruction of buildings, installations, and other structures. (The chapter that follows then proceeds to describe nuclear [but not radiological], chemical, and biological weapons.)

9 Tajikistan Criminal Code, available at <http://www.policy.hu/zaripova/PCode.htm> SECTION XV. CRIME AGAINST THE PEACE AND SAFETY OF MANKIND

Chapter 34. Crime Against the Peace and Safety of Mankind

Article 397. Production or Distribution of Mass Destruction Weapons

Producing, purchasing, keeping, transporting or selling nuclear, neutron, chemical, biological (bacteriological), climatic or othekind of mass destruction weapons prohibited by international treaty, as well as transferring initial or special fissionable matertechnologies which may be used for creating mass destruction weapons to any state which does not have nuclear weapons transferring other kinds of mass destruction weapons to anybody or components which are necessary for producing them, is 

newOP4.indd 36 1/10/06 2
Appendix D. Selected Definitions of WMD in State Law

Source Definition

1 Arizona

A.R.S. § 13–2301 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means:

(a) Any device or object that is designed or that the person intends to use to cause multiple deaths or serious physical injuries through the use of an explosive agent or t

release, dissemination, or impact of a toxin, biological agent, poisonous chemical, or its precursor, or any vector.

(b) Except as authorized and used in accordance with a license, registration or exemption by the radiation regulatory agency pursuant to section 30–672, any device or o

that is designed or that the person intends to use to release radiation or radioactivity at a level that is dangerous to human life.

2 Arkansas

The Homeland Security Information Act, Act 1366 of 2003, April 15, 2003

“Weapon of mass destruction” means an explosive, chemical, radioactive, or biological agent, or any other substance or device capable of causing extensive property damage, death, or serious physical injury to multiple persons in a single act or series of acts.

3 California

Cal. Penal Code § 11417 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” includes chemical warfare agents, weaponized biological or biologic warfare agents, restricted biological agents, nuclear agents, radiological agents, ointentional release of industrial agents as a weapon, or an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle, as described in Section 34500 of the Vehicle Code, which is used as a destructive weapon.

4 District of Columbia

D.C. Code § 22–3152 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means:

(A) Any destructive device that is designed, intended, or otherwise used to cause death or serious bodily injury, including:

(i) An explosive, incendiary, or poison gas:

(I) Bomb;

(II) Grenade;

(III) Rocket;

(IV) Missile;

(V) Mine; or

(VI) Device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;(ii) A mortar, cannon, or artillery piece; or

(iii) Any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device described into a device described in sub-subparagraphs (i) through(iii) of this paragraph and from which such device may be readily assembled;

(B) An object similar to or used to achieve the same destructive effect of any of the devices described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph;(C) Any weapon that is designed, intended, or otherwise used to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of a toxic or 

poisonous chemical;

(D) Any weapon that is designed, intended, or otherwise used to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of a biological agent o

toxin; or

(E) Any weapon that is designed, intended, or otherwise used to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of radiation or radioact

or that contains nuclear material.

5 Florida

Florida Annotated StatutesFla. Stat. § 790.166 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means:

1. Any device or object that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any human or animal, or severe emotional or mental harm to any human, 

through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;

2. Any device or object involving a biological agent;3. Any device or object that is designed or intended to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human or animal life; or4. Any biological agent, toxin, vector, or delivery system.

6 Georgia

O.C.G.A. § 16–7–80 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means any device which is designed in such a way as to release radiation or radioactivity at a level which will result in internal or external bodily injurdeath to any person.

newOP4.indd 37 1/10/06 2
Appendix D, cont.

7 Idaho

Idaho Code § 18–3322 (2004)

The term “weapon of mass destruction” means:

(a) Any bomb or destructive device, as those terms are defined in section 18–3318, Idaho Code;(b) Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or the 

precursors of such chemicals;

(c) Any weapon involving a disease organism; or(d) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

§ 18-3318. DefinitionsDefinitions as used in sections 18–3319, 18–3320 and 18–3321, Idaho Code:

(1) “Bomb” means any chemical or mixture of chemicals contained in such a manner that it can be made to explode with fire or force, and combined with the method or 

mechanism intended to cause its explosion. The term includes components of a bomb only when the individual charged has taken steps to place the components in proximity to each other, or has partially assembled components from which a completed bomb can be readily assembled. “Bomb” does not include: rifle, pistol, or shotammunition and their components; fireworks; boating, railroad and other safety flares or propellants used in model rockets or similar hobby activities.

(2) “Destructive device” means:

(a) Any explosive, incendiary or poisonous gas:

(i) Bomb;

(ii) Grenade;

(iii) Rocket having a propellant charge of more than four (4) ounces;(iv) Missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-fourth (1/4) ounce;

(v) Mine;

(vi) Similar device.

(b) Any type of weapon, by whatever name known, which will, or which may be imminently converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other 

propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than 0.700 inches in diameter, except rifled and unrifled shotguns or shotgun shells.

(c) Components of a destructive device only when the individual charged has taken steps to place the components in proximity to each other, or has partially 

assembled components from which a completed destructive device can be readily assembled.

(d) The term “destructive device” shall not include:

(i) Any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon;

(ii) Any device which, although originally designed for use as a weapon, has been redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety o

similar device;

(iii) Otherwise lawfully owned surplus military ordnance;(iv) Antiques or reproductions thereof and rifles held for sporting, recreational, investment or display purposes;

(v) Rifle, pistol or shotgun ammunition and their components.

8 Indiana

Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 35–41–1–29.4 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means any chemical device, biological device or organism, or radiological device that is capable of being used for terrorism.

9 Minnesota

Minn. Stat. § 609.712 (2003)

“Weapon of mass destruction” includes weapons, substances, devices, vectors, or delivery systems that:

(1) are designed or have the capacity to cause death or great bodily harm to a considerable number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or 

poisonous chemicals, or their precursors, disease organisms, biological agents, or toxins; or

(2) are designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

10 Nevada

NRS § 202.4445 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means any weapon or device that is designed or intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to a large number of persons.

newOP4.indd 38 1/10/06 2
Appendix D, cont.

11 North Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–288.21 (2004) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–288.8 (2004)

§ 14–288.21 The term “nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction,” as used in this Article, means any of the following:(1) Any weapon, device, or method that is designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of:

a. Radiation or radioactivity;b. A disease organism; orc. Toxic or poisonous chemicals or their immediate precursors.

(2) Any substance that is designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury and:

a. Contains radiation or radioactivity;b. Is or contains toxic or poisonous chemicals or their immediate precursors; orc. Is or contains one or more of the following:

1. Any select agent that is a microorganism, virus, bacterium, fungus, rickettsia, or toxin listed in Appendix A of Part 72 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulatio2. Any genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements from an organism on Appendix A of Part 72 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, show

to produce or encode for a factor associated with a disease.

3. Any genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins listed on Appendix A of Part 72 

Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or their toxic submits.

§ 14–288.8 The term “weapon of mass death and destruction” includes:(1) Any explosive or incendiary:

a. Bomb; orb. Grenade; orc. Rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces; ord. Missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce; ore. Mine; orf. Device similar to any of the devices described above; or

(2) Any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell of a type particularly suitable for sporting purposes) which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a project

by the action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter; or

(3) Any firearm capable of fully automatic fire, any shotgun with a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length or an overall length of less than 26 inches, any rifle with a barrel 

or barrels of less than 16 inches in length or an overall length of less than 26 inches, any muffler or silencer for any firearm, whether or not such firearm is included within this definition. For the purposes of this section, rifle is defined as a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder; or

(4) Any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any weapon described above and from which a weapon of mass death and destruction 

may readily be assembled.

The term “weapon of mass death and destruction” does not include any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon; any device, although originally designefor use as a weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line-throwing, safety, or similar device; surplus ordnance sold, loaned, or given by the Secretary of the Apursuant to the provisions of section 4684(2), 4685, or 4686 of Title 10 of the United States Code; or any other device which the Secretary of the Treasury finds is not likely to be usas a weapon, is an antique, or is a rifle which the owner intends to use solely for sporting purposes, in accordance with Chapter 44 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

12 Ohio

ORC Ann. 2917.31 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means any of the following:

(a) Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious physical harm through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or 

their precursors;

(b) Any weapon involving a disease organism or biological agent;(c) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life;(d) Any of the following, except to the extent that the item or device in question is expressly excepted from the definition of “destructive device” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

921(a)(4) and regulations issued under that section:

(i) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiar

charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or similar device;

(ii) Any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any item or device into any item or device described in division (E)(3)(d)(i) of this 

newOP4.indd 39 1/10/06 2
Appendix D, cont.

13 Pennsylvania

18 Pa. C.S. § 2715 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction.” A bomb, biological agent, chemical agent or nuclear agent.

14 South Carolina

S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–710 (2003)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means:

(a) any destructive device as defined in item (7);(b) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or 

their precursors;

(c) any weapon involving a disease organism; or(d) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

(7) “Destructive device” means:

(a) a bomb, incendiary device, or any thing that can detonate, explode, be released, or burn by mechanical, chemical, or nuclear means, or that contains an explosive, 

incendiary, poisonous gas, or toxic substance (chemical, biological, or nuclear materials) including, but not limited to, an incendiary or over-pressure device, or any othdevice capable of causing damage, injury, or death;

(b) a bacteriological weapon or biological weapon; or(c) a combination of any parts, components, chemical compounds, or other substances, either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive de

which has been or can be assembled to cause damage, injury, or death.

15 Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–13–803 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” includes chemical warfare agents, biological or biologic warfare agents, weaponized agents, weaponized biological or biologic warfare agents, nuclear agents, radiological agents, or the intentional release of industrial agents as a weapon.

16 Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 76–10–401 (2004)

(a) “Weapon of mass destruction” means:

(i) any item or instrumentality that is designed or intended to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury to multiple victims;

(ii) any item or instrumentality that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous 

chemicals, or their precursors;

(iii) any disease organism, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector which is used or intended to be used as a weapon;(iv) any item or instrumentality that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life and that is used or intended to be used as a weapon

(v) any substance or material or combination which has been prepared or altered for use in the creation of a weapon described in Subsections (6)(a)(i) through (iv).

(b) “Weapon of mass destruction” does not include firearms or rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, reloading components, or muzzleloading equipment.

17 Vermont

13 V.S.A. § 3501 (2004)

“Weapon of mass destruction” means a chemical warfare agent, weaponized biological or biologic warfare agent, nuclear agent, or radiological agent.

18 Wyoming

Wyo. Stat. § 35–9–152 (2004)

“Weapons of mass destruction” means as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332(a) as of April 1, 2004, or as subsequently defined by rules and regulations of the homeland security director.

newOP4.indd 40 1/10/06 2
Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 41

Notes

1

 Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum, “Designation of Responsibilities for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) to Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM),” January 6, 2005. 2 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 1, available at <www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>. The strategy was not signed by President George W. Bush and 

did not contain a forward released under his signature (as was done with the National Security Strategy issued the 

previous September). However, the White House issued a press statement attributed to the President making clear 

that the Combating WMD Strategy reflected his views:

Today I have issued the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

The strategy establishes a comprehensive approach to counter the growing threat from 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, radiological, biological, and 

chemical weapons. This strategy is integral to the National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. We will not permit the 

world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten our Nation and our friends and 

allies with the world’s most destructive weapons.

See George W. Bush, “Statement by the President,” December 11, 2002, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2002/12/20021211-8.html>. 3

 Susan D. Moeller, “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Center for International and Security 

Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, March 9, 2004, 28, available at <www.cissm.umd.edu/

documents/WMDstudy_full.pdf>. 4

 For example, Ashton B. Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004), 73, asserts 

that WMD are generally considered to be nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery means, 

as well as so-called “dirty bombs” (radiological dispersion devices). He argues that this definition “is too broad” 

and proposes to define WMD as only nuclear and biological weapons. Similarly, Gert G. Harigel, “Introduction 

to Chemical and Biological Weapons—Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and 

Environment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, argues that neither chemical nor biological 

weapons should be considered WMD based on the numbers of people actually killed by use of such weapons, 

but that most conventional munitions should. Available at <www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Harigelreport.

asp?p=8&from=pubauthor>.

A systematic attempt to develop an alternative definition for WMD was proposed in National Security Policy 

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Staff, “Emerging WMD Technologies and the U.S. Air Force,” Air Force 

Emerging Issues Project, December 2004. The paper proposes a Mass Destruction Index to create a quantitatively 

comparable measure of destructiveness and gives examples of its application but provides no details into how the 

index was constructed. The authors of that study suggest adoption of a quantitative, effects-based definition, but 

admitted to failure in attempting to create such an alternative. 5

 For example, George Perkovich, “Deconflating WMD,” Paper No. 17, WMD Commission, n.d., accessed at

<www.wmdcommission.org>. 6

 “Archbishop’s Appeal: Individual Will and Action; Guarding Personality,” The Times (London), December 28, 

1937, 9. 7

 In a joint declaration signed by President Harry Truman, Prime Minister Clement Attlee of the United 

Kingdom, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada. See Department of State, Historical Office, Documents 

on Disarmament, 1945–1969, Volume I: 1945–1956, Publication 7008, August 1960, 1–3. 8

 UN Assembly Resolution 1(I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problem Raised by the 

Discovery of Atomic Energy,” January 24, 1946. Unless specified otherwise, all UN General Assembly resolutions 

available at <www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>. 9

 Commission for Conventional Armaments, UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as quoted in United 

Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 28. 10 There is a fourth treaty now in force, the Moon Agreement, which also controls WMD. Most countries, 

including the United States, have not become a party to it for reasons that have nothing to do with disarmament 

issues. The Outer Space Treaty, Seabed Treaty, and Moon Agreement impose limitations on “nuclear weapons or any 

other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” 11 This background casts doubt on those who contend that there is no legal meaning associated with the term, 

as argued, for example, by David P. Fidler, “Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law,” ASIL Insights, 

February 2003, accessed at <www.asil.org/insights/insigh97.htm>:

Contemporary international legal analysis generally follows this conventional definition 

of WMD, even though neither treaty law nor customary international law contains an 

authoritative definition of WMD. The reason such a definition does not exist is that states 

have historically used international law to address each category of weapons within the 

WMD rubric. International law specifically on WMD is, thus, composed of three different 

sets of rules for each WMD technology. 

It is unclear, however, whether Fidler was aware of the history recounted here. 12 An online search of the Public Papers of President George H.W. Bush maintained by the Bush Presidential 

newOP4.indd 41 1/10/06 2
42 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

Library located 98 instances in 75 files in which the term WMD appears, although some of the documents may be 

duplicates. A scan of these documents indicates that the President never defined the term. The earliest document in 

which he used WMD as President is “Remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement Ceremony 

in New London, Connecticut,” May 24, 1989, accessed at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89052401.

html>. NSD–70 apparently is the only National Security Council document from his administration that mentions 

WMD; accessed at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2070/0001.pdf>. 13 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (October 1998), 6; accessed at <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/

EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf>. The December 1999 edition of that document is available at <http://clinton3.

nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr-1299.pdf>. WMD appears 29 times in the Clinton administration’s 

1996 strategy document. See A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996; available 

at <www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>. 14 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, 

September 2002), 14, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. 15 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. There is no definition in the 2002 National Security 

Strategy. The closest it comes is in a discussion of proliferation on page 14:

In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic 

missiles and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD 

arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. 16 President George W. Bush most recently extended it for an additional year on November 4, 2004. See “Notice 

of 4 November 2004: Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Federal Register, 

November 8, 2004, 64,637. 17 A redacted version of the Presidential Decision Directive is available at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.

htm>. An unclassified summary is at General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to 

Implement National Policy and Strategy, GAO/NSIAD–97–254, September 1997, 70–72. 18 As, for example, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the National Emergency Regarding Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” November 9, 2000, Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton—2000, vol. 3 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 2,507; or Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy 

for Homeland Security, July 2002, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf>. The latter 

document mentions WMD more than a dozen times, but also mentions “chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear” weapons more than three dozen times. 19 Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, Soviet 

Military Thought, vol. 9, trans. DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, 

Ottawa, Canada (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 148. 20 Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO (NIE 11–14–79), January 31, 1979, National Intelligence Estimate, vol. 

I—Summary Estimate, 23, accessed at <http://www.foia.cia.gov>. 21 The Soviets accepted the term in disarmament diplomacy from 1946, as evident from a review of articles in 

the New York Times. The earliest use of the term by a Soviet military official appears in Osgood Caruthers, “Soviet 

Aide Calls West Too Weak,” The New York Times, February 4, 1959, 1, which quotes Marshal R. Ia. Malinovskii, 

Soviet Minister of Defense, using the term. It originally appeared in Soviet Military Strategy, ed. and trans. Marshal 

V.D. Sokolovskii (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 274. A different translation is in Military Strategy: 

Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, ed. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii (New York: Praeger, 1963), 170. Soviet Military Strategy

contains a footnote that quotes Marshal R. Ia. Malinovskii using the term in 1961 (page 287). 22 “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” November 1993, available at <http://

www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>. 23 “Text of Russian Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), April 22, 2000, 5–6 [“Russian Federation 

Military Doctrine, Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict of 21 April 2000”]. CEP20000424000171. 24 Based on a search of the Public Papers of the Presidents made available by the American Presidency Project 

at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>. The only President who does not appear to have mentioned WMD in a speech 

is Gerald Ford. Excluding reports, letters, and printed messages, and counting only speeches or press conferences, 

instances of known use in public statements are as follows:

Truman 3

Eisenhower 2

Kennedy 4

Johnson 6

Nixon 1

Ford 0

Carter 1

Reagan 6

Bush 14

More than 200 documents in the public papers of President Clinton use WMD. This database covers only the first 

6 months of the second Bush administration, but it appears he uses the term with a frequency similar to that of 

his predecessor. Eisenhower, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush used WMD in response to 

questions from journalists during news conferences. Such instances are particularly interesting because they most 

likely involve use or reflect words with which a President is comfortable.

newOP4.indd 42 1/10/06 2
Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 43

25 Based on a review of the party platforms collected by the American Presidency Project, available at <www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php>. 26 The American Dialect Society made WMD its word (or phrase) of the year in 2002. See <www.

americandialect.org/index.php/amerdial/2002_words_of_the_y>. In 2003, WMD was on the “List of Words 

Banished from the Queen’s English for Mis-Use, Over-Use and General Uselessness,” issued annually since 1976 

by the Lake Superior State University. See <www.lssu.edu/banished/archive/2003.php>. YourDictionary.com made 

WMD one of its top 10 phrases of 2003. See <http://www.yourdictionary.com/about/topten2003.html>. 27 Based on New York Times searches (1851–2001). 28 The term WMD appeared in 61 stories during the first 3 months of 2005, an annual average of about 245 

stories. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, stories with the term appeared about 30 times year, declining to an 

average of only 20 a year in the late 1950s and the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an average of fewer 

than nine stories every year. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, precipitated increased use of the term. During 

the early 1990s, it was used an average of more than 100 times, growing to more than 160 times a year in the late 

1990s (peaking at 370 appearances in 1998). 29 Despite this, the review is not comprehensive. While it covers the most significant alternatives from the 

perspective of U.S. Government policy, there are undoubtedly others that were not identified. A useful starting point 

for this research was a survey of alternative definitions provided by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, available at <www.

nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a1.html>. Extensive investigation of Internet sources indicates that many other sites contain 

significant inaccuracies in their discussions of the definition of WMD. 30 The most significant exception is Georgia (appendix D, definition 6), which considers only nuclear and 

radioactive weapons as WMD. Similarly, while most definitions exclude delivery systems, a few specifically consider 

NBC delivery systems as WMD (see appendix A, definitions 4 and 5; definitions 3 and 9 include the delivery 

systems only when it is impossible to separate them from the NBC payload). More typical is the usage found in the 

Bush administration’s December 2002 National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (“WMD and 

their delivery means”), suggesting that delivery systems are different but closely related. 31 See appendix A, definitions 1 (President Bush), 2 (President Clinton), 4 (Secretary of Defense), 5 (Secretary 

of Defense), and 10 (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency); appendix B, definitions 1 (Public Law) and 2 

(U.S. Code); and appendix C, definitions 1 (NATO), 3 (Missile Technology Control Regime), 4 (United Nations), 

6 (United Nations), 7 (Soviet), and 8 (Soviet). As noted in the appendix, some of these definitions diverge from 

the WMD = NBC definition in small or large ways. Hence, definition 10 in appendix A follows a UN definition 

(appendix C, definition 5) that allows for the addition of new categories of weapons also capable of causing mass 

destruction. 32 See appendix A, definition 7 (Department of the Army); appendix B, definition 3 (U.S. Code); appendix C, 

definition 5 (United Nations); and appendix D, definitions 3 (California), 5 (Florida), 8 (Indiana), 9 (Minnesota), 

11 (North Carolina), 15 (Tennessee), and 17 (Vermont). Note that California amended its definition following the 

attacks of September 11 to include any “aircraft, vessel, or vehicle” that met certain parameters. The North Carolina 

definition applies only to a “nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction”; that state also has a 

separate definition for “weapon of mass death and destruction” including only conventional munitions. 33 See appendix A, definitions 3 (Joint Staff) and 6 (Department of Homeland Security); appendix B, definition 

4 (U.S. Code); and appendix D, definitions 1 (Arizona), 2 (Arkansas), 4 (District of Columbia), 7 (Idaho), 12 (Ohio), 

13 (Pennsylvania), 14 (South Carolina), and 18 (Wyoming). 34 See appendix A, definitions 9 (CIA) and 11 (Clinton Interagency); appendix C, definition 2 (NATO); and 

appendix D, definitions 10 (Nevada) and 16 (Utah). 35 See appendix A, definition 8 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

36 “Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology,” Department of Defense Directive 5025.12, June 30, 

2004, accessed at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d502512_063004/d502512p.pdf>. 37 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, accessed at <www.

defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>, suggests that WMD are NBC weapons plus missile delivery systems. DOD 

has been directed by Congress to use definitions that differ from both Joint Staff definitions, as seen with definitions 

1 and 3 in table 2. 38 The UN definition differs from CBRN by the addition of the provision allowing the international community 

to add categories of weapons to the list of WMD. However, the international community has regularly reviewed this 

issue since the late 1970s, and has yet to identify any new types of WMD. Hence, the UN definition effectively is 

equivalent to CBRN. 39 Interviews with former National Security Council and DOD officials involved in drafting the document.

40 For a comprehensive review of the Federal death penalty laws, see Rory K. Little, “The Federal Death Penalty: 

History and Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice’s Role,” Fordham Urban Law Journal, March 1999, 

349–508. In 1972, the Supreme Court invalidated all existing Federal death penalty laws. The Federal Death Penalty 

Act of 1994 corrected the Constitutional defects that prevented application of most existing Federal death penalty 

statutes and extended the death penalty to additional criminal acts. 41 See U.S.C. Title 18, section 2332a. Its WMD definition originally covered CBRNE, but subsequent 

amendments excluded chemical weapons when Congress passed the implementing legislation for the Chemical 

Weapons Convention. The current provision is as follows:

§ 2332a. Use of certain weapons of mass destruction

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44 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 4

(a) Offense Against a National of the United States or Within the United States.—A person who, without 

lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction (other 

than a chemical weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)—

(1) against a national of the United States while such national is outside of the United States;

(2) against any person within the United States, and the results of such use affect interstate or 

foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected 

interstate or foreign commerce; or

(3) against any property that is owned, leased or used by the United States or by any department 

or agency of the United States, whether the property is within or outside of the United States, 

shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by 

death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(b) Offense by National of the United States Outside of the United States.—Any national of the United 

States who, without lawful authority, uses, or threatens, attempts, or conspires to use, a weapon of mass 

destruction (other than a chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F)) outside of the 

United States shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished 

by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 42 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy James McVeigh, Defendant-Appellant., No. 97–1287, 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 153 F.3d 1166; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21877; 50 Fed. R. Evid. 

Serv. (Callaghan) 541, filed September 8, 1998; and United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Lynn 

Nichols, Defendant-Appellant, No. 99–1438, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 2000 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 33183; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6738, filed December 18, 2000. 43 “Second Superseding Indictment as to Zacarias Moussaoui,” U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 

accessed at <http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/DocketSheet.html>. 44 United States of America, Appellee, v. Richard C. Reid, Defendant-Appellant, No. 03–1159, United States Court 

of Appeals for the First Circuit, 369 F.3d 619; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10453, May 27, 2004, Decided. 45 Cases prosecuted under this act have involved possession of pipe bombs and sawed-off shotguns. United 

States of America, Appellee, v. Lafi Khalil, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Defendant-Appellants, Docket Nos. 98–1723(L), 

99–1134, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 214 F.3d 111; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11965; 54 Fed. 

R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1016, decided May 31, 2000, reviews an appeal of a conviction under the provisions of 

2332a for possession of a pipe bomb. For an example of a prosecution involving a sawed-off shotgun, see United 

States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kendrick Shafer Doakes, Defendant-Appellant, No. 03–4713, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 98 Fed. Appx. 251; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10731, Decided June 2, 2004.

A number of additional cases are reported in Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States, 

2000–2001, n.d., accessed at <www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.pdf>: Ronald Mike Denton was 

indicted for plotting to use explosives to destroy an oil refinery (18), Donald Rudolph was charged with planning to 

destroy propane storage tanks in California with explosives (19), and Abu Doha was charged in connection with the 

planned millennium bombings of aircraft flying from the Los Angeles airport (21). 46 Examples of anthrax threats involving use of this law are United States of America, Appellee, v. Christopher 

Martin Cole, Appellant, No. 03–1079, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 357 F.3d 780; 2004 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 1631, September 10, 2003, Submitted, February 4, 2004, Filed; and United States of America, PlaintiffAppellee, v. Larry D. Reynolds, Defendant-Appellant, 03–41634, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 

381 F.3d 404; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16474, August 10, 2004, Filed. In other cases, prosecutors used a different law, 

18 U.S.C. 876, which makes it a crime to send a “communication . . . containing any threat . . . to injure the person 

of the addressee.” See, for example, United States of America v. Rosemary Zavrel, Appellant, No. 03–1474, United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 384 F.3d 130; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19587, January 26, 2004, Argued, 

September 21, 2004, Filed.

One of the rare examples in which the law was applied against individuals actually contemplating use of a 

WMD (as opposed to threatening with no intention of using) was the indictment of three members of the Republic 

of Texas, a separatist militia, for plotting to attack government officials with botulism, rabies, or anthrax. See 

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnie Wise and Jack Abbott Grebe, Jr., Defendants-Appellants, No. 

99–40247, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 221 F.3d 140; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18282, July 31, 

2000, Decided. Another case involved Lawrence A. Maltz, who threatened government officials with biological, 

chemical, and nuclear devices, and apparently took steps to acquire the materials necessary to produce chemical 

agents. He ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of sending threatening communications. See Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Terrorism in the United States, 1998, n.d., 6, accessed at <www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror1998.

pdf>.47 At least 17 states and the District of Columbia have definitions incorporated into their criminal code (see 

appendix D). Of the 18 definitions identified in appendix D, 10 adopt some variation of CBRNE (except that Utah 

excludes any firearms). There are also six variations on CBRN (except that California also includes aircraft and 

certain other vehicles as WMD), one instance of a blanket reference to mass destruction with no specific mention 

of CBRN weapons (Nevada), and one (Georgia) that covers only weapons with radiological effects (presumably 

meaning both radiological and nuclear devices). At least two states adopted definitions prior to 9/11 (California and 

North Carolina). There is a legislative history of the California definition in Kimberly A. Felix, “Crimes: Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: The Changing Threat and the Evolving Solution,” McGeorge Law Review, Winter 2003, 391–397.

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 45

48 The Clinton administration made the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the Lead Federal Agency for crisis 

management in responding to a terrorist incident under the provisions of Presidential Decision Directive 39. See 

note 17. However, the FBI often does not use the CBRNE definition in many of its publications. For example, the 

2004 FBI Strategic Plan specifically identifies WMD as equaling CBRN. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic 

Plan 2004–2009, n.d., 27, accessed at <www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf>. 49 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, 74, accessed at <www.dhs.

gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf>. The plan explicitly adopts the definition given in 18 U.S.C. 2332a. 

On the other hand, the White House adopted a more traditional definition in Office of Homeland Security, National 

Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, which equates WMD with CBRN weapons. Similarly, the FBI has used 

WMD in this same way in its terrorism reports. The FBI periodic report, Terrorism in the United States, ostensibly 

an annual publication but produced only once since 2001, carefully delineated the difference between WMD 

terrorism (meaning involvement of CBRN weapons) and other types of terrorist violence (such as bombings). Note, 

for example, two excerpts from the 1999 edition of the report:

• Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons—often collectively referred to as weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD)—have the potential to kill large numbers of people and 

cause mass fear.

• WMD Cases—those cases primarily dealing with the threatened use or procurement of 

chemical, biological, or radiological materials with intent to harm—have shown a steady 

increase since 1995.

Both excerpts taken from FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 1999, 20 Years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective 

Edition, n.d., 37, accessed at <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf>. The 2000–2001 edition of the 

report uses the term weapons of mass destruction only four times, and three of those are in connection with criminal 

indictments for activities that did not involve CBRN weapons. By comparison, the 1999 edition mentioned WMD 

nearly 30 times, always in the sense of CBRN except for two criminal indictments not involving CBRN weapons. See 

FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 2000–2001, n.d., accessed at <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_

2001.pdf>. 50 Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2001). 51 The definition of WMD used by the homeland security community (see the Department of Homeland 

Security definition [appendix A, definition 6], based on the U.S. Code [appendix B, definition 2]) includes almost 

all weapons used by modern ground forces with the exception of small arms. Thus, the combating WMD mission 

could be seen requiring responses to the armaments used in land, naval, and air warfare. Among the armaments 

covered by the homeland security CBRNE definition are hand grenades, antitank and antipersonnel mines, the 

Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the Abrams battle tank. Similarly, essentially every weapon carried by combat 

aircraft (bombs, missiles, guns) fit the definition, as do those mounted on most naval combatants (whether missiles 

or guns). Hence, the definition would treat most modern military forces as operators of WMD. 52 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Duelfer 

Report), September 30, 2004, vol. III, “Glossary and Acronyms,” 15. 53 Efforts during the 1970s to negotiate a treaty banning WMD as a category of weapons are discussed in the 

current essay in the section entitled “Proposed WMD Treaty.” 54 For background on the document, see Thom Shanker, “A New Strategy Document Calls Attention to the 

Transition Between War and Peace,” The New York Times, May 22, 2004, A11. 55 National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 56 See the discussion in Harigel, “Introduction to Chemical and Biological Weapons,” who argues that neither 

chemical nor biological weapons should be considered WMD based on the numbers of people actually killed by 

them, but that most conventional munitions should. This follows the earlier observations of the UN Secretary 

General, Kofi Annan, The Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “We the Peoples”: The 

Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations, 2000), 52.

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems—and in most years greatly exceeds the 

toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, 

indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction.”

Note the comment in the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: 

A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993): “Because of the terrible toll on civilians, land mines 

can be considered a weapon of mass destruction in slow motion.” This phrase was used nearly a decade later in 

2002 in a letter to President George W. Bush from a large group of nongovernmental organizations calling on the 

United States to accept the Mine Ban Treaty, accessed at <www.pcusa.org/washington/issuenet/gs-020318.htm>. It 

is also on the Web site of the United States Campaign to Ban Land Mines at <www.banminesusa.org>. The 1997 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 

their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty) bans all antipersonnel mines. 57 “Archbishop’s Appeal: Individual Will and Action; Guarding Personality,” 9. Lang was archbishop from 1928 

to 1942. Karin Lion located this source using a reference found on Wordorigins.org. The use of WMD in 1937 

is mentioned on other Web sites, which assert that certain unnamed British newspapers used the term in 1937, 

but only Wordorigins.org identified both a particular newspaper and specific date. Even it attributed the usage 

to the newspaper, not to the Archbishop. In contrast, on February 12, 2003, the British Broadcasting Company 

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(BBC) posted a report on its Web site claiming that the term WMD was used during 1937 in unspecified British 

newspapers, but provides no additional details; accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2744411.stm>. While 

the BBC may have found other uses predating the Archbishop’s sermon, it provides no supporting information. 58 Numerous Web sites assert that the use of the term in 1937 related to aerial bombing using conventional 

weapons, apparently copying the BBC Web site. 59 Guernica was a Basque city town attacked by German bombers supporting Spanish Fascist forces on April 

26, 1937, causing extensive destruction and much loss of life. Similarly, the Japanese bombed Chinese cities during 

1937 during the Second Sino-Japanese War sparked by the so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937. 

The Archbishop had close ties to senior officials in the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was 

a friend) and was interested in disarmament issues. See his biography, J.L. Lockhart, Cosmo Gordon Lang (London: 

Hodder and Stoughton, 1949), 373. There is nothing in the biography, however, to suggest a deep interest in the 

subject. A review of the index to The Times (London) gives no indication that he ever addressed the bombing of 

Guernica, although he spoke out often about the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. 60 The Archbishop condemned Italy’s use of chemical weapons in Abyssinia during a session of the House of 

Lords, as reported in The Times (London), March 31, 1936, 8. His comments make clear that he was aware of the 

horrors of chemical weapons use during World War I. 61 It was widely believed in the 1930s that a future war would invariably involve bomber attacks on cities with 

chemical weapons. In 1935, the British Home Office released its first Air Raid Precautions Circular and initiated a 

well-publicized preparedness program that focused heavily on defenses against chemical weapons. These issues are 

discussed in T.H. O’Brien, Civil Defence (History of the Second World War) (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 

1955). Given the Archbishop’s close ties to government officials (he had relations with successive prime ministers), 

it is certainly possible he knew of these views. 62 The 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited use of chemical weapons in warfare, also extended its ban to 

bacteriological weapons. Moreover, in 1934, a British journalist (notably a former editor of the London Times) 

reported—purportedly using German documents—that the Germans were researching biological warfare. See 

Martin Hugh Jones, “Wickham Steed and German Biological Warfare Research,” Intelligence and National Security 7, 

no. 4 (October 1992), 379–402. 63 This declaration is the first document reproduced in Department of State, Historical Office, Documents on 

Disarmament, 1945–1969, Volume I: 1945–1956, Publication 7008, August 1960, 1–3. It appears to have inspired 

the first known use of WMD in the New York Times. See Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: In Other Words—Truman, 

Attlee, King,” The New York Times, November 16, 1945, 16. 64 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume I: General; The United Nations

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 733, from the minutes of a Meeting of the U.S. 

Delegation to the Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly, January 18, 1946. Benjamin V. 

Cohen, Counselor, Department of State, and Advisor, U.S. Delegation to the UN, provided the explanation. He 

was responding to a question from “Admiral Turner” (presumably a reference to Richmond Kelly Turner). Admiral 

Turner, who gained prominence as an amphibious force commander in the Pacific during World War II, was then 

the U.S. Naval Representative to the UN Military Staff Committee. A brief account of Admiral Turner’s activities at 

the UN appears in George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. 2, 1,113–1,135. 65 This established the UN Atomic Energy Commission at which the United States proposed the Baruch Plan for 

the international control of atomic weapons. UN General Assembly Resolution 1(I), January 24, 1946. 66 See the observations in A.M. Rosenthal, “Ban on Germ Warfare by the U.N. is Unlikely,” The New York Times, 

August 9, 1948, 3. 67 General Assembly Resolution 41 was adopted on December 14, 1946. The CCA was established by Security 

Council Resolution 18 (1947), S/268/Rev. 1/Corr. 1, adopted February 13, 1947. For a history of the CCA, see 

Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 

1961), 83–94, 136–141. The CCA and the Atomic Energy Commission were disestablished and replaced by the 

Disarmament Commission in 1951. 68 Commission for Conventional Armaments, UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as quoted in United 

Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 28. 

It is also reproduced in “Resolution Defining Armaments,” State Department Bulletin, August 29, 1948, 268. 69 An account of CCA activities related to its adoption of a WMD definition can be found in the footnotes to 

pages 311–312 and 377–378 in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume I, Part 1: 

The United Nations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). 70 See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1977, Publication 101, June 

1979, 838–841. The General Assembly reaffirmed its adherence to this definition in 1999: “Determined to prevent 

the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive 

effect to those weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by 

the United Nations in 1948.” UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/44, December 1999, “Prohibition of the 

development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.” 71 In the context of subsequent international negotiations, the Soviets clarified their position on the definition 

of WMD by publicly accepting the 1948 CCA definition, indicating that other countries had urged them to do 

so. “Statement by the Soviet Representative (Likhatchev) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: 

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Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 47

Weapons of Mass Destruction, August 9, 1977,” as found in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 

Documents on Disarmament 1977, 498–502. The revised text of the draft treaty is found at pages 493–496.

During those same negotiations, the United States also went on record as fully agreeing with the 1948 definition. 

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1977, 512–515 (but especially 514). The 

British representative, speaking on behalf of 10 other countries, also cited the CCA definition in his comments to 

the First Committee of the General Assembly on November 7, 1977 (669–700). 72 “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 

systems of such weapons,” UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/37, December 10, 1996; “Prohibition of the 

development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,” UN 

General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/44, December 23, 1999; “Prohibition of the development and manufacture 

of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,” UN General Assembly Resolution 

A/RES/57/50, December 30, 2002. 73 Officially known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 

(or, more commonly, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco), the preamble includes the comment, “Recalling that the United 

Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a 

coordinated programme of disarmament ‘the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and 

weapons of mass destruction of every type.’” 74 The preamble to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains two references to WMD. It 

starts by asserting, “The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective 

progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of 

weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling 

of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will 

facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” A 

subsequent phrase avers that “Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, 

through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological 

(biological) agents.” 75 The first paragraph of the preamble to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction includes the phrase: “The States Parties 

to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete 

disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types 

of weapons of mass destruction.” 76 For a history of the treaty negotiations, see Raymond L. Garthoff, “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space,” 

International Security 5 (Winter 1980/1981), 25–40. 77 The Soviet Union apparently feared that the Western bloc was trying to limit development of intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, which was an area of Soviet strategic advantage over the West, and was resistant to Western 

demands for intrusive inspections to ensure treaty compliance. 78 The original treaty text, proposed by the Soviet Union, would have imposed “a ban on the use of cosmic space 

for military purposes.” See Department of State, Historical Office, Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, Volume 

II: 1957–1959, Publication 7008, August 1960, 973–977 and 1,228–1,230, especially the footnotes. 79 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address Before the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York City, 

September 29th, 1960,” available at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>. 80 John F. Kennedy, “Address in New York City Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 

25th, 1961,” available at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>. 81 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1962, vol. I: JanuaryJune, Publication 19 (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, November 1963), 360. 82 “Kennedy to Tour Space Facilities,” The New York Times, September 6, 1962, 16. 83 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security 

Policy; Foreign Economic Policy–Microfiche Supplement (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1997), documents 

222 and 223. 84 The contentiousness of the Senate debate over the Test Ban Treaty made President Kennedy hesitant to 

negotiate another potentially controversial treaty and led him to favor this alternative approach. 85 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the Need for a Treaty Governing Exploration of Celestial 

Bodies,” May 7, 1966, available at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>. 86 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Treaty on Outer Space,” hearings before the 90th Congress, 1st

session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 23. The question was asked again by another 

Senator, Frank Carlson (R–KS), and Ambassador Goldberg responded, “This is a weapon of comparable capability 

of annihilation to a nuclear weapon, bacteriological. It does not relate to a conventional weapon” (76). According to 

Ambassador James Leonard, Ambassador Goldberg was a brilliant negotiator but often careless of details. Leonard 

was told that Goldberg’s testimony was replete with factual and legal errors. James Leonard, telephone interview 

with author, February 16, 2005. 87“Treaty on Outer Space,” 100.

88See the full text of the treaty at < http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5187.htm#treaty>.

89 See Robert Lambert and John Syphax, International Negotiations on the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 

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Publication 68 (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 1973). Its narrative draws 

primarily on publicly available documents, including many that appear in various editions of U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 

various dates). Especially important for this discussion were Documents on Disarmament 1968, Publication 52, 

September 1969, 824–827; and Documents on Disarmament 1969, Publication 55, August 1970, 746–749. Essential 

are the documents that appear in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Johnson Administration, 

Volume XI: Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), available at 

<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xi/index.html>. The volumes in this series covering the Nixon 

administration have not yet been published. An insider’s account of the negotiations was provided by Edward Wenk, 

The Politics of the Ocean (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 288–293. 90 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on Its Reconvening in 

Geneva, July 16th, 1968,” available at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>. 91 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Seabed arms control treaty,” hearing before the 92d

 Congress, 

2d session, on EX. H.92–1, January 27, 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 22. 92 The extract is from Article IX. The agreements formal name was Treaty Between the United States of America 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 93 Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html>.

94 The treaty negotiators also addressed how to deal with new, nonnuclear strategic weaponry, a question related 

to the “weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of 

the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” in the 1948 UN definition. According to the Second Agreed 

Statement, “The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party 

considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such 

an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph 

(c) of Article XV of the Treaty.” See the Agreed Statements Annex found at <www.state.gov/documents/

organization/27361.pdf>. Marshall Brown brought this provision to the author’s attention. 95 United Nations treaties and principles on outer space, Addendum: Status of international agreements relating to 

activities in outer space as at 1 January 2004, ST/SPACE/11/Add.1/Rev.1, February 2004. 96 See, for example, Kevin V. Cook, “NOTE: The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a 

Workable Moon Treaty,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 11 (Spring 1999), 647–704. 97 A summary of the negotiations discussed here is given in Department of Political and Security Council 

Affairs, UN Centre for Disarmament, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume I: 1976 (New York: 

United Nations, 1976), 201–209. 98 UN General Assembly Resolution 3479 (XXX), December 11, 1975.

99 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1978, Publication 107, October 

1980, 420. 100 The issue appears every year in the review of Conference on Disarmament (CD) deliberations. The last time 

the CD reported substantively was in the context of the report of the 1992 Conference on Disarmament sessions, 

summarized in paragraphs 89–92 of CD/1173. 101 There was a subsequent failed effort to negotiate a treaty to ban radiological weapons. Although the 

United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a joint approach, the two superpowers were unable to convince 

the Committee on Disarmament to give priority to their initiative. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 

Radiological Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament, August 8, 1980, in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1980, Publication 116, December 1983, 355–358, discusses some of the 

problems that prevented the international community from reaching a consensus on pursing a treaty. 102 UN Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council,” S/32500, January 31, 1992, accessed at 

<http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-unsc23500.html>. 103 S/RES/1540 (2004), adopted April 28, 2004. While the resolution did not define WMD, it did define delivery 

systems (“for the purpose of this resolution only”): “missiles, rockets, and other unmanned systems capable of 

delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.” 104 UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/50/70, December 12, 1995 (section C). 105 UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/51/37, December 10, 1996. 106 Text of the guidelines is available at <www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm>. 107 The agreement with Croatia was signed June 1, 2005; the one with Liberia was signed on February 11, 2004; 

the Marshall Islands agreement was signed August 13, 2004; and the one with Panama was signed May 12, 2004. The 

text of the agreements, and short fact sheets describing them, are available at <www.state.gov/t/np/c12386.htm>. 108 Memorandum from Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Subject: Establishment of United States Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM) Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC), August 26, 2005, SM# 

218–05.

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49

About the Author

Dr. W. Seth Carus is deputy director of the Center for the Study of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and a distinguished research fellow at the 

National Defense University. His research focuses on homeland security, biodefense, biological warfare threat assessment, and the role of the 

Department of Defense in responding to chemical and biological terrorism. He also is researching allegations of biological agent use by terrorists 

and criminals and has written a working paper, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century,” and several 

articles on that subject. From 2001 to 2003, Dr. Carus was detailed to the 

Office of the Vice President, where he was the senior adviser to the Vice 

President for Biodefense. From 1991 to 1994, Dr. Carus was a member 

of the Policy Planning staff in the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Before joining the Federal Government, he was a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy. Dr. Carus received his PhD from The Johns Hopkins University in 

Baltimore, Maryland.

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Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counter­proliferation 

Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American 

security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the 

WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to 

the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, 

President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing 

“vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, 

and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security 

implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and 

outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates 

to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, 

and operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center 

hosts annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and 

participants from the government and private sectors.

Cover 2 

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Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Washington, D.C. 

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