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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Ground-Aided

Precision Strike

Heavy Bomber Activity

in Operation Enduring Freedom

ERIC E. THEISEN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 31

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

July 2003
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are avail

able electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Pres

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

The advent of near-precision weapons, particula

the joint direct attack munition (JDAM)—combined w

the flexibility of the heavy bomber—offers the co

bined/joint force air component commander a new t

to utilize for close air support (CAS) operations. Ho

ever, Lt Col Eric E. Theisen asserts that this miss

goes beyond the support of forces on the ground a

should be classified as a new mission, with heavy p

cise firepower being the maneuver element in the s

supported by small groups of forces on the grou

Does the coordination between heavy bombers and t

minal attack controllers along with employment of ne

precision weapons constitute a new mission for 

United States Air Force? He proposes calling this m

sion ground-aided precision strike (GAPS).

The use of the heavy bomber during Operation E

during Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on 

flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of 

war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground a

the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupt

command and control nodes. Orbiting close over pr

lem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground termi

attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. T

bombers were supplying something different than tra

tional CAS. This new form of warfare used small part

of ground troops in support of the massive firepow

that the bombers could provide. Each war is differe

and in this case, there were virtually no external thre

to the bombers. With total air dominance and the fr

dom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing he

bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combi

tion of the JDAM along with improved communicatio

systems made this new mission a reality. With the s

cess of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes 

USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, a

training changes to accommodate this mission.

iii
As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided 

the spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and s

ous consideration of the issues. We encourage your 

sponses.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War Colle

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Eric E. Theisen is a graduate of the Air War C

lege, Class of 2003. Prior to his current assignment, 

served as the commander of the 393d Bomb Squadr

509th Bomb Wing, at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), M

souri, and served as an operations officer and instruc

pilot flying the B-2 stealth bomber. He has completed to

at Vance AFB, Oklahoma; Griffiss AFB, New York; Ho

man AFB, New Mexico; and Edwards AFB, Californ

Colonel Theisen entered the Air Force as a Distinguish

Graduate from Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University 

1983. He is a command pilot with more than 5,100 ho

in the B-2, F-16, F-15, C-23, B-52, T-37, and T-38. He w

hand selected for a SAC/TAC exchange tour and the B

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation team. He hold

Master of Science in aviation science from Embry–Rid

Aeronautical University and is a graduate from Air Co

mand and Staff College. Following graduation from Air W

College, Colonel Theisen was assigned to the J-3 divis

on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

v
Ground-Aided Precision Strike

Heavy Bomber Activity

in Operation Enduring Freedom

If you had offered the B-1 with JDAMs in direct support of

ground forces as a solution 10 years ago, I would have

laughed heartily because it’s not what we envisioned.

—Maj Gen Daniel Leaf, 2002 Director

––Operational Requirements for Air

––and Space Operations

The advent of near-precision weapons, particularly 

joint direct attack munition (JDAM), offers the combin

joint force air component commander (C/JFACC) a new t

to utilize for close air support (CAS) operations. In the ab

epigraph, Maj Gen Daniel Leaf describes how the USAF ne

envisioned bombers supporting ground troops with this fo

of CAS. However, this mission goes beyond the suppor

forces on the ground. This is a new mission in itself, w

heavy precise firepower being the maneuver element in 

sky, supported by small groups of forces on the ground. T

following question is central to this paper: Does the coo

nation between heavy bombers and terminal attack c

trollers along with employment of near-precision weap

constitute a new mission for the USAF? A proposed term 

this new mission is ground-aided precision strike (GAPS).

The current use of the heavy bomber during Operat

Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on 

flexibility of airpower. The order of battle in Afghanistan w

a new way of American war. Bombers in the early stages 

the war destroyed the Taliban’s small air force and the l

ited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupted command a

control (C2) nodes.1 Starting on 21 October 2001, bomb

flexed from flying mostly preplanned target missions 

flying missions in support of the Northern Alliance agai

Taliban troops.2 Orbiting close over problem areas, airbo

bombers—guided by ground terminal attack controller

precisely struck key targets. But the bombers were supp

ing something different than traditional CAS. This new fo

of warfare used small parties of ground troops in suppor

the massive firepower that the heavy bombers could prov

1
The air situation in Afghanistan was different than in p

wars; there were no surface-to-air or air-to-air threats to 

heavy bombers. With total air dominance, freedom to ra

over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in 

GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM a

new communications systems made this new mission a re

ity. With success of these operations, the USAF is initiat

doctrine, rules of engagement (ROE), and training change

accommodate this mission. Will future battlefield conditi

allow the heavy bombers to be used in this role again? W

future conflicts offer the C/JFACC the opportunity to prov

massed precision firepower delivered by our legacy syste

to ground forces? 

New weapons and improved communications have grea

increased the capability of heavy bomber platforms to e

cute the CAS/GAPS mission. Much has been written ab

the CAS mission and its history, but little has been writ

about bombers performing this difficult mission. This pa

looks at the utilization of heavy bombers in the CAS/GA

role during OEF and offers recommendations for future e

ployment of these platforms in conjunction with revi

ROEs and aircrew training.

Doctrine for Close Air Support

It is important to understand the definitions of doctr

for the CAS mission. The USAF defines doctrine as 

statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfight

principles that describe and guide the proper use of 

and space forces in military operations.”3 Joint Publicat

(JP)1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military a

Associated Terms, describes doctrine as “fundamen

principles by which military forces or elements ther

guide their actions in support of national objectives. I

authoritative, but requires judgment in application.”4 

other words, our doctrine is not directive but requires 

uational awareness or “air sense” in its application.

CAS is described by USAF doctrine in Air Force Doctr

Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, Counterland Doctrine, as “air act

by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets wh

are in close proximity to friendly forces and which requ
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire a

movement of these forces.”5 The two key factors when app

ing CAS have always been the need to provide flexible re

time targeting guidance to CAS aircraft and the need to av

hitting friendly ground forces in close proximity to the tar

CAS as defined by US Army doctrine in Army Field Man

(FM) 100-5, Operations, is “missions that support land op

ations by attacking hostile targets close to friendly forc

CAS missions require positive identification of friendly for

and positive control of aircraft.”6 Joint doctrine describes 

CAS mission as “providing firepower in offensive and def

sive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, or de

enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. CAS 

quires detailed planning, coordination, and training for ef

tive and safe execution.”7

A common friction point between the doctrines is the 

support coordination line (FSCL). This is defined in JP 3

Doctrine for Joint Operations, as “control and coordinat

measures.” The document also states that the FSCL app

to all types of fires and is often the most important fire s

port coordination measure on air-to-ground operations.8 T

C/JFACC must coordinate on its placement and moveme

This will optimize the effects of friendly forces and avoid 

tential geographic sanctuaries for the enemy.

Another friction point is that the Air Force has definiti

for two terms close proximity and detailed integration, wh

joint doctrine does not address. Once again, it is up to 

C/JFACC to coordinate the definition of these terms w

his ground component commander. With a common agr

ment on these terms, the air and space component can 

lect the proper type and mix of CAS applications. Both 

Force and joint doctrine define two types of CAS reque

preplanned and immediate. The heavy bomber platfor

with JDAM are well suited for the preplanned role, and a

bomber with remaining munitions can fill an immedi

CAS request. During the planning for the 1991 Persian G

War, Lt Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner developed what 

came to be known as “Push CAS” to maximize air and sp

support of the ground component commander.9 Push CA

a planned concept where the missions are spaced out 

provide 24 hours of air coverage along with the required 

procedures to task the missions. With Push CAS, the 
Force can support the ground commander with “on c

firepower and have a ready and waiting supply of weap

to choose from.10

Another issue to address is the concept of kill box

Many combatant commanders utilize them in lieu of, o

conjunction with, the FSCL to facilitate expeditious co

dination of fires. Kill-box size varies according to the si

ation; but to employ heavy bombers in this role, the 

boxes will have to be large enough to accommodate 

larger turn radius of these platforms or the air operati

center (AOC) must be aware that bombers can fly throu

multiple kill boxes before they drop their ordnance in 

correct box. The use of kill boxes represents a first step 

wards improving the coordination and control measu

on the battlefield and will help to take us beyond the 

ear and synchronized measures of today toward a m

fully integrated joint effort tomorrow.11

The common theme for the CAS mission is that it 

quires weapons to be dropped in close proximity to frien

forces, and it needs to be controlled and coordinated to p

vent friendly force fire incidents. The introduction of ne

precision, all-weather, coordinate weapons have added 

additional dimension to CAS employment. This new dim

sion is GAPS, and doctrinal changes are necessary to fu

exploit this emerging mission. 

JDAM: A Weapon for Our Time

The most important development that makes the GA

mission possible is the JDAM. The GBU-31 JDAM is a gu

ance kit built by the Boeing Corporation that converts fr

fall bombs into near-precision-guided munitions. The ki

attached to existing 1,000-pound (lb) Mk-83 and 2,000 

Mk-84 dumb bombs. The GBU-31 version 3 incorpora

the BLU-109 penetrating bomb body. A 500 lb version is 

development. A precursor to JDAM—the Global Position

System (GPS)-Aided Munition GAM-113 or GBU-37—i

5,000 lb class-penetrating weapon, which is only carried 

the B-2 stealth bomber.12

The JDAM kit consists of a strap-on movable tail fin u

strap-on fixed strakes, and an inertial navigation syst
capable of receiving updates from GPS. JDAM provides 

all-weather guided weapon capability. Bombers deli

JDAM munitions in a straight and level pass. JDAM h

aerodynamic strakes that provide an off-axis and dow

range capability for the weapon. The strakes prov

enough lift so that when the tail fins move, the bomb c

glide to a specific point on the ground, rather than fall

wherever gravity and the wind would take it. When GPS 

dates are available, JDAM can strike targets within 

specified circular error of probability (CEP) of 13 mete

During the test program and in actual use, JDAM has c

sistently dropped within 9.6 meters CEP.13

JDAM enables both single-pass multiple-target enga

ments with individual weapons and single-pass single-tar

engagements with multiple weapons. JDAM is reprogra

mable in flight, allowing the aircrew to adjust target co

dinates or use onboard systems to update target locati

Depending on the platform used, up to 24 desired me

points of impact (DMPI) can be struck by a single bom

on a single pass.14 The JDAM/bomber combination is 

first system that lets the C/JFACC think in terms of t

gets struck per single sortie instead of multiple sorties 

strike a single target.

One of the lessons learned from earlier air campai

and OEF is that large stocks of precision weapons are n

essential for any modern air campaign. In 1991 the p

centage of smart weapons used was 9 percent. This rose 

29 percent during Operation Allied Force, but cloud co

hindered the employment of laser-guided weapons. In O

smart weapons accounted for approximately 60–70 p

cent of the weapons dropped, with the majority be

JDAMs.15 In past conflicts, smart weapons were carefu

allocated for high-value targets, but the experience in O

is that many if not the majority of the targets were servi

with a JDAM when they could have been serviced wit

more abundant munition. This employment of JDAMs 

the targeteers could lead to severe JDAM shortages if t

type of thinking is allowed to continue. 

To alleviate this problem in the future, the Boeing Co

pany—the sole producer of the JDAM tail kits—has acce

ated production of the weapon. By January 2003, there w

17,000 kits in the Air Force inventory. Congress in 20
boosted funding for the JDAM by $1 billion out of conc

that OEF had seriously depleted supplies. The most rec

production plan calls for 2,800 JDAM tail kits per month 

August 2003. The Air Force plans on buying upwards 

236,000 kits, which include tail kits for all the services.16

Bombers

With regard to the bombers at Diego, I could not be happier

with their performance. They have broken new ground and

their credibility is extremely high. I doubt if very many people

know the magnitude of what the bombers have done for air

power in general.

—Lt Gen Charles Wald

—2001 Commander

—Ninth Air Force/CENTAF

A brief discussion on the capabilities of the three c

rent bomber platforms follows to gain an understanding 

what each aircraft brings to the fight. The oldest bomb

range in age from the 1950s’ era B-52 to the more mod

B-2. The bomber mission has evolved from Cold War n

clear deterrence to conventional bombing during the V

nam War and Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force 

standoff cruise missile attacks and to precision atta

using new “J”-series weapons. Bombers offer long ran

great firepower, and flexibility to the C/JFACC.

B-52H Stratofortress

The B-52H, built in 1961 and modified from earlier ser

has been upgraded over its career to carry a variety 

weapons. From “dumb bombs” to cruise missiles and to 

JDAM, the B-52 has seen it all. The B-52 can carry a var

of mixed payloads. Some combinations include 3 AGM-

HAVE NAP missiles and 27 Mk-82 500 lb bombs, 13 GBU

JDAM and 27 Mk-82s, or 16 CBU-103 wind-corrected mu

tion dispensers (WCMD).17 (WCMD is a standard clus

bomb unit outfitted with a GPS guidance kit similar 

JDAM, which allows the B-52 to drop cluster bombs on 

ordinates, in a tight pattern.) Other available weapons 

clude the M-117 750 lb bomb, the Mk-84 2,000 lb bom

the M-129 leaflet dispenser, CBU-89/97 cluster bomb un
the conventional air launched cruise missile, and Mk

Sea mines.18 Target coordinates can be preplanned or 

dated in-flight by the aircrew. Future weapons additi

include the AGM-154 joint standoff attack weapon (JSO

and the joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASS

Long loiter time and massive firepower allow the B-52 

provide around-the-clock coverage for CAS operations. B-

are based at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Minot A

North Dakota. 

B-1B Lancer

The B-1B Bone, as the crews that fly it normally refe

it, was developed in the 1970s and produced in the 198

The B-1’s speed, large payload, and superior handl

qualities make it a key element in a joint force packa

The B-1 was first used in combat against Iraq in Operat

Desert Fox in December 1998. The B-1 was developed a

dual-role nuclear-conventional bomber and has since b

designated as a conventional weapons carrier only.19 T

B-1 is capable of carrying 56 Mk-82 500 lb class weap

and 10 CBU-87 cluster bomb units, or 63 Mk-82 bom

or 24 GBU-31 JDAMs. Weapons also available for the B

include the CBU-89/97, the Mk-84, and Mk-62 Sea mine

Future weapons integration for the B-1 includes 

WCMD, JSOW, and the JASSM. Currently, a weapons 

grade program is ongoing that includes improvements 

weapons carriage, electronic countermeasures, and 

proved communications.21 Like the B-52, the B-1 c

bring massive firepower and long time over target to C

operations. The USAF is consolidating B-1 operations 

Dyess AFB, Texas, and Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. 

B-2A Spirit

The B-2A fuses long-range, stealth, firepower, and pr

sion into a single aircraft. Used in a dual role for both nucl

and conventional bombing, the B-2 is the USAF’s prem

penetrating bomber. The Block 30 aircraft have underg

additional modifications incorporating advanced surf

treatments, avionics, and communications upgrades. T

B-2 can carry 16 JDAMs or JSOWs in mixed combinatio

or eight GBU-37s, or up to 16 JASSMs in internal weap
bays.22 These near-precision weapons can be independen

targeted, updated in flight, and allow multiple kills per pa

A unique capability of the B-2 is its synthetic aperture ra

(SAR) system. This system incorporates the GPS-Aided T

geting System to refine target location. Imaging the tar

area with the SAR radar, the crew can refine and re-de

nate the location of the target using a sophisticated m

matching algorithm. The near-photographic quality of 

radar image allows the B-2 aircrew to positively identify 

target location or flex to emerging aimpoints in a tar

area.23

Although not used in the GAPS role during Operation E

during Freedom, the B-2 has all the communications g

and weapons to be used in a stealthy GAPS mission 

needed. Assuming that air superiority is obtained to uti

bombers in the GAPS role, this mission could be better 

lized by the B-1 and B-52. Using the B-2 in a first-night fi

strike role to “kick down the door” for follow-on forces wo

be a better use for this limited asset.24 A future improvem

in the carriage capability of the B-2 is the addition of 

independently targeted Mk-82 JDAMs. While providin

tremendous capability—two B-2s could drop on 160 DMP

this also causes an immense targeting problem for the t

person crew if they need to rapidly modify all the DMPIs i

short amount of time.25 However, a B-2 with 80 indepe

ently targeted JDAMs and long loiter capability could b

formidable force to support forces on the ground. The B-

located at only one base, Whiteman AFB, Missouri. 

A Brief History of Bomber CAS Operation

Various smaller attack aircraft have historically flown C

missions. The heavy bomber has shown its flexibility in 

past by being utilized for the CAS mission, although CAS 

not a primary mission for this fleet. The following discuss

will be limited to the use of the modern heavy bomber. 

The first use of the B-52 in the CAS role during the V

nam War was actually an accident. B-52s flying out o

Tapao, Thailand, dropped bombs within the three-kilome

safety zone of a US Marine position.26 Subsequently, 

Marines called for tests utilizing the B-52 in this role, and 
USAF and the Marines jointly came up with procedures a

tactics to make this a viable mission for the B-52. Using 

Combat Skyspot system, which was a radar control van, 

Marines guided effective CAS strikes with the B-52.27

Demonstrating the persistence of airpower during the b

tle for Khe Sanh, B-52s flew from Guam and Thailand a

arrived over the Khe Sanh combat base every 90 minu

with more than 2,500 sorties to support the 26th Mar

Regiment during the heavy firefight. The B-52 proved it p

sible to use the bomber in Southeast Asia in tactical supp

of the maneuvering ground units with some success if pre

rations were appropriate.28

During the Persian Gulf War, B-52s were once again ca

upon to perform the CAS mission. B-52 crews bombed 

merous Republican Guard positions and were occasion

called off preplanned targets to support the ground forc

The Iraqi attack on Khafji is just one example. B-52 cre

identified armor columns with onboard radar systems a

struck these emerging targets from safe altitudes.29

In Operation Allied Force, B-52s were used in the CAS r

as airborne alert interdiction (XINT) sorties. These missi

were flown in support of the Kosovo Liberation Army agai

Yugoslavian Police and army (VJ) forces.30 The XINT conc

was born at the USAF Weapons School as a way to halt 

ground forces in the vicinity of the FSCL. The B-52s drop

Mk-82, Mk-84, and M-117 munitions in this effort.31

The B-1 was first used in combat during Operat

Desert Fox. There are no instances of CAS operations p

formed by the B-1 until Operation Enduring Freedo

Even though heavy bombers were used in a CAS role d

ing various conflicts, there was no extensive or continu

use of the heavy bomber in this role over the years. 

Transformational Bomber Operations

Marty Kauchak, writing in the Armed Forces Jour

International, called the OEF air campaign a revolution 

military affairs. “It was the performance of precisi

guided munitions and other new technologies and the 

of new combat tactics that provided glimpses of the 2

century battlefield.”32 All three heavy bombers saw act
in OEF. The tally of the bombers as of March 2002 w

that they flew more than 48 percent of the combat missi

in Afghanistan, dropping nearly 7,000 tons of munition

approximately 75 percent of the OEF total—and dama

or destroyed nearly three-quarters of the planned t

gets.33 B-1s and B-52s deployed to Diego Garcia, and B

staged out of Whiteman AFB. B-2s struck targets 

Afghanistan, performed engine-running crew changes 

Diego Garcia, and then returned to Whiteman AFB. B

only flew on the first three nights of the air campaign. T

B-1 and B-52 have flown all of the bomber XINT a

CAS/GAPS missions so far in this ongoing operation.

Eighteen B-52s and B-1Bs deployed forward to Di

Garcia in the Indian Ocean just before the start of OEF. Ty

cally, the C/JFACC could count on four sorties per day fr

the B-1B group and five from the B-52 group. For the f

time in combat, both the B-1 and B-52 were equipped w

links into a data net that allowed them to receive secure t

get changes and instructions in flight.34 Early missions in 

campaign were flown with preplanned target coordina

but that soon changed for the B-1 and B-52. Using capa

ity that Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the USAF, ca

“transformational,” bombers engaged emerging targets ca

in by small parties of ground troops.35 Planners schedu

aircraft to be available 24 hours a day for operations wit

the engagement zone. The AOC changed the flow of airc

into the engagement zone to strike time-sensitive targ

called in by terminal attack controllers on the ground. B-

at the end of October 2001 were dropping JDAMs on 

front edge of the battle area north of Kabul on the Shom

front lines.36

By March 2002, B-52s had flown more than 500 com

sorties over Afghanistan. The 20th and 40th Expedition

Bomb Squadrons flew more than 5,000 mishap-free fly

hours in just over 100 combat sortie days. “Five hund

sorties is an impressive milestone,” said Col Steven W

borsky, the 40th Air Expeditionary Wing vice commande

This far exceeded the annual flying hour allocation the u

normally receives back home, and the hours were flown 

just four months. The launch reliability rate for the B-52s 

eraged around 99 percent. To complement the large num

of flying hours expended in March, the B-52s had delive
more than 13 million pounds of munitions since 8 Octo

2001. The totals exceeded those flown in Desert Storm wh

B-52s flew a total of 414 missions.38

Operations in Afghanistan continue to this day. B-1s a

B-52s have supplied the maneuvering heavy firepower s

ported by US ground forces coming in contact with the 

maining Taliban forces. Bombers used JDAMs on 1 J

2002 as the main firepower around the Afghanistan provi

of Uruzgan, and then again in December 2002 arou

the Shindand Air Base in southern Herat province.39 Th

has been no letup in GAPS operations into March 20

Bombers have continued to provide heavy firepower 

attacks on 28 January and as recently as 12 Februar

Bombers loitered overhead for 12–14 hours, the main sh

in the operation, once again proving the utility of long-ra

airpower.41

Along with the successes of the bombers in OEF, th

were missteps as well. An unfortunate friendly fire incid

occurred on 5 December 2001 when a B-52 dropped JDA

on a friendly position. A terminal controller was calling 

airstrikes with a portable lightweight GPS receiver (PLG

unit as the unit’s battery failed.42 After replacing the batte

the PLGR initialized and displayed the combat controll

current position, not the enemy position. He unfortuna

passed this position to the B-52 crew, which inserted the 

ordinates correctly and dropped a JDAM that killed three 

Special Forces members and injured as many as 19 other

This rapid innovation can bring its own hazards, such 

the example above. General Jumper has referred to this k

of warfare as a “whole new realm of thinking.”44 Can we th

in terms of a new evolving mission utilizing these capabiliti

A New American Way of War

The ingenuity of young people who put together old and new

systems to give us the capability we need to deal with a complex situation in Afghanistan is nothing short of amazing.

—Gen John P. Jumper

––USAF Chief of Staff, 2002

On-call air and space power linked to the immediate ne

of the ground force commander provided a winning com
nation in OEF. A near-perfect example of decentralized e

cution at its best came when a B-52 put ordnance on tar

within minutes of the request. Northern Alliance forces 

horseback came across a Taliban military outpost with 

tillery, barracks, and a command post. The outpost was 

engaged with the ground force at the time, but the North

Alliance identified it as a stronghold. The commander 

quested a strike on the target within the next few days. H

ever, the target lay in a location with engagement zones 

ready established. The terminal attack controller radioed 

an orbiting B-52. The B-52 dropped its ordnance within 

minutes of the request.45

Does this constitute a new American way of war? In 

recent past, America has fought wars of limited durat

and objectives. Relying heavily on airpower to achieve 

objectives, the United States has rapidly deployed airpow

to be the first in the fight. The heavy bomber coupled w

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) teams on the ground h

flourished in OEF. No other capability can bring long lo

times and massive firepower to bear to destroy fleet

enemy targets. Small teams on the ground can call in 

biting bombers to unleash their loads on unsuspect

enemy forces. However, this type of operation require

permissive environment. The Taliban possessed no 

force, had limited air defenses, and was in effect a v

weak regime.46 Small teams on the ground supporting p

cision strikes from the air could be termed GAPS, to dif

entiate it from traditional uses of CAS. 

Terminal Controllers: The Lynchpin

for Successful Operations

Bomber GAPS operations would not be possible if it w

not for the terminal controllers on the ground in the thea

of operations. They provided the coordination and direct s

port to perform effective GAPS operations. The air force 

ploys small TACP teams with army units to serve as grou

terminal attack controllers. A small group of special ope

tions forces made a huge impact supporting the troops fig

ing Taliban forces in Afghanistan. During one engageme

the AOC noticed that the strike teams with air force com

controllers were having a better success rate with air stri
than the teams without them.47 In the battle for the Balk V

ley in northern Afghanistan, air force combat control

played a key role in calling in air strikes to reduce the ene

threat and minimize the ground resistance. Bomber JD

strikes were effectively utilized to clear out the Taliban 

sistance and gain a foothold for Northern Alliance troops

Machine-to-Machine Interface

The USAF and the joint community are embarking o

TACP modernization program. When thinking of the TA

mission, the end result— bombs on target—is what peo

usually think about. However, C2 coordination—how 

weapon gets on the target—is the most important face

this operation. Interoperability is the key to this missi

TACP requires one standard of equipment to speak to 

aircraft, C2 platforms, the Army, and anyone else on 

battlefield. Rapid and accurate information is mandato

fat fingering of information can cause mistakes. Autom

tion is the key to future employment.

Early in OEF, the terminal strike controllers did not h

the capability to pass coordinates to JDAM-equipped 

craft. DOD acquired off-the-shelf Leica GeoSystems Vi

laser range finder binoculars to triangulate targets 

Afghanistan.49 This system evolved into what is now kno

as the Modular Advance Reconnaissance System (MAR

which is a compilation of several components tied togeth

MARS uses the Viper laser range finder coupled with 

upgraded GPS PLGR module called the PLGR+96. T

Viper is a fully integrated binocular/range finder with 

board digital magnetic compass and inclinometer. The Vi

is capable of a lasing distance from 25 meters to 4,0

meters.50 The unit runs off of a commercial camera b

tery. The PLGR+96 is a software upgrade to the curr

AN/PS-11 PLGR. The GPS converts the laser spot to l

tude and longitude. The PLGR+96 is a wide area GPS t

allows for autonomous position accuracy to four mete

The terminal controller would then transmit the coor

nates via voice radio to the aircraft.51

However, the aircraft does not just need a position to 

stroy the target. In CAS operations there will always 

friendly troops in near proximity to the enemy. In orde
bomb the target without killing the friendlies, the aircr

must be in voice contact with the TACP who guides the 

craft to the correct target. In other words, it is not enou

just to lase the target and pass the location to the aircr

while calling GAPS. The introduction of the MARS equ

ment along with an interface to transmit the location of 

target and the terminal controller position on a mov

map display to the aircraft would greatly benefit sit

tional awareness. This capability along with an automa

transmission of the target coordinates into the weap

themselves would greatly reduce input errors by operato

The terminal controller would be able to lase the target a

the surrounding terrain. This information along with 

terminal controller position on the aircrews moving m

display would be an outstanding aid to allow the aircraf

strike the correct target without fear of fratricide. The 

crew could watch their aircraft on a display as it flew to 

correct target. Other modifications with the MARS in 

experimentation stage include transmitting pictures of 

target area along with battle damage assessment after 

strike.52 Inputting errors are fallibilities that can be 

moved from the system. General Jumper says that data 

best fed directly into a weapon and then merely confirm

by the human in the loop. Fat-fingering data, particula

in the cockpit, should be avoided wherever possible.53

A proof of concept demonstration to successfully trans

a CAS J-Fire nine-line message from the TACP to a B

aircrew so they could correctly read and process the m

sage was accomplished on 18–20 September 2002. The 

sults of the test were successful. Messages transmit

and received included an on-station message to the TA

from the B-52, a J-Fire nine-line message to the B-52, fr

text messages both ways, and the transmission of 

TACP position on the B-52 moving map display.54

This test was conducted by the Air Force Command a

Control Battlelab and was called the B-52 CAS enhan

ment. A spiral development 120-day test phase is be

implemented to further validate the concept. This equ

ment should be installed as soon as possible on all th

bombers. All three heavy bombers have the capability 

install the moving map display, and they are alre

equipped with secure radios.55
Other ways to identify friendly elements on the grou

to aircraft are being developed. A beacon identifying the 

minal attack controller is being developed to reduce 

chances of friendly fire incidents. This consists of the SM

1,000 beacon which the B-1 and B-52 are able to paint w

their onboard radar systems.56 The beacon weighs about 

pound and is easily carried by TACP personnel. In the c

of the B-52, the onboard radar can “see” the SMP-1,000 fr

90 miles away with about 1,000 feet of accuracy. This vis

ability will help identify the TACP personnel on the grou

and reduce the chances of dropping on friendly forces.57

Along with the SMP-1,000 beacon, another tracking s

tem is the Grenadier beyond line-of-sight reporting a

tracking (BRAT) system. This system consists of a transp

der, handheld terminal, small ultrahigh frequency trans

antenna, and a GPS receiver. This system contains com

nents that are currently only mounted in vehicles or helic

ters. By providing near-real-time tracking of blue-force un

the system reduces fratricide and gives commanders cru

information such as grid location, speed, direction, and m

sion status of the aircraft or vehicle. A more portable a

compact system is being developed. It is called the m

transmitter—MTX—system, and it allows commanders 

track the locations of dismounted soldiers on the battlefi

Many of these smaller units are being fielded currently 

support of OEF. A prototyping effort is underway to downs

the Grenadier BRAT system into the format of the Air For

combat survivor evader locator, a handheld system that u

satellites and military GPS to aid in combat search and r

cue efforts.58 The decision to fully develop which system 

long overdue. If GAPS is to mature, then a positive means 

identifying the friendly ground forces to the attacking airc

is required. A common system that allows the services to t

to one another is necessary. This is the only way to ens

reduction of friendly fire incidents. 

Rules of Engagement

CAS has typically been a visual operation. Historica

the controller on the ground has visual with the target a

the aircraft delivering the ordnance. The aircraft deliver
the ordnance has a visual with the target and is eit

talked on to the target or has some other visual indicat

of the target’s location. This system could include smoke 

phosphorous rockets fired from the supporting forward 

control aircraft or a laser spot directed by a terminal str

controller. The JDAM/bomber combination comes wit

dilemma; how can a terminal controller on the grou

have visual with a bomber at 30,000 to 40,000 feet, m

away from the desired aimpoint? This new situation c

for revised ROEs to support GAPS. 

After the B-52 friendly fire incident, the Joint Requ

ments Oversight Council convened an executive steer

committee to look into this incident. This committee w

cochaired by the USAF and United States Marine Corps a

attended by Army, Navy, Joint Staff, Joint Forces Co

mand, and Special Operations Command members. T

committee recommended 15 issues and 55 action item

The top three actions included training standardization 

tween the services, equipment interoperability, and a C

distributed training mission needs statement. 

One of the major accomplishments of the confere

was the writing of a CAS capstone requirements docum

(CRD). This document should ensure interoperability a

addresses the concept of operations, architectures, and 

formation exchange requirements. It also provides 

threshold and objective requirements along with key p

formance parameters. JP 3-09.3—the joint CAS tact

techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual—is in mana

ment level coordination and was scheduled to be publish

in January 2003. In addition to the CRD and TTP manu

the first joint CAS action plan has been written, approv

and published. Progress is occurring in the developmen

standardized air liaison officer and joint terminal att

controller training. The Marine Corps is examining meth

to leverage the Air Force’s TACP modernization progra

The CAS community has contributed to the developmen

the concept for operations for the joint tactical radio s

tem, which includes the joint CAS community in its ini

membership for fielding.60

A joint CAS symposium at Eglin AFB, Florida, recen

concluded, and revised ROEs are being written for inc

poration into existing aircraft-series tactics manuals.61 T
demonstrated value of getting representatives of the jo

CAS community together annually to review issues, 

velop solutions, and share insights should be sustained 

the future with additional CAS symposiums. There is gr

momentum today in the resolution of joint close air s

port issues—momentum that must be sustained and 

panded to include GAPS. The biggest problem confront

this new mission is the lack of visibility the ground c

troller has on the delivering aircraft. New ROEs that 

dresss this situation must be developed if GAPS is to 

effective over the battlefield.

New Training Required

A conference was held at Hurlburt Field, Florida, on 11

March 2002 to gain the tactical lessons learned during 

opening rounds of OEF. The consensus from that confere

was that conventional airpower and unconventional grou

forces on the nonlinear battlefield did not have an effec

process to employ ROEs and fire support measures e

ciently and in a timely manner. Each member of a TACP te

noted that lack of training by conventional airpower w

TACP teams resulted in “on the fly” tactics developme

They also noted that TACP teams usually train with one 

plane at a time, and it was difficult for them to adjust to 

different types of aircraft providing firepower in a sh

amount of time. Bomber crews mentioned that they did li

or no training with TACP teams, the CAS mission, and 

training whatsoever for the GAPS mission prior to depl

ment for OEF. It took some time for each community to le

each other’s capabilities. The TACP controllers require n

training to learn the capabilities of the new J-series weapo

Some targets are JDAM worthy and some are not. Calling 

a B-1 to go “Winchester” (drop all weapons) on its first p

is a quick way to deplete the limited numbers of JDAMs 

the current inventory.62

The Air Force director of operations released an inte

CAS TTP message that makes several TTP changes. First, 

emphasized the need to use standard J-Fire nine-line m

sage format. Every terminal attack controller that was in

viewed in Afghanistan emphasized the need to follow the 
sics. The standard briefing ensures both the terminal att

controller and aircrew have the minimum required inform

tion. Although there may be circumstances where it is 

practical, he did mandate it when using coordinate depe

ent weapons such as JDAM. Additionally, the read back 

the message is mandatory, and target elevation was added 

the format. Previously, the aircrew was only required to r

back when the terminal attack controller requested it. T

message also requires the aircrew to provide the terminal 

tack controller the coordinates that the aircrew entered i

the coordinate dependent weapon. This TTP was added to 

applicable unit-level flight crew information files. Changes 

mission design series specific multi-command manual 

tactics series will be added in upcoming editions.63 The J-F

nine-line format is also a suitable message format for 

GAPS mission.

Training for bomber aircrews is changing as a resul

CAS/GAPS operations in OEF. There has not been form

CAS training in either the current B-1B or B-52 bomber 

tial qualification syllabus besides a few hours of academ

There is a short course on bomber CAS that is offered at 

USAF Weapons School. This course consists of about th

hours of academics and two airborne missions.64 Bom

units have been participating in Air Warrior exercises at N

lis AFB, Nevada, that emphasizes CAS missions. Individ

bomber squadrons have been instituting units plan for 

CAS/GAPS mission to catch up their aircrews on this ev

ing mission. The Air Force is starting an initiative to ame

existing initial qualification syllabi for each platform and 

corporating training on bomber GAPS operations. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war. Power

is increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information; safety is gained in

stealth; and forces are projected on the long arc of precisionguided weapons. 

—President George W. Bush

The heavy bombers and near-precision weapons p

formed and are continuing to perform superbly during Op
ation Enduring Freedom. Once again, these versatile p

forms and aircrews showed their flexibility and ingenuity 

adapting to a new, unrehearsed mission over the skies 

Afghanistan. The aircrews are adapting well to this new m

sion, but there are issues that can be resolved to maxim

the capability of the bombers and aircrews. 

The work on an effective means to ensure machine

machine passing of coordinates must be continued. T

friendly fire incidents underscore the necessity for pr

sion in coordinates along with precision inherent in 

weapons. A system to relay coordinates directly to 

weapons interface is needed to reduce this type of a

dent. A human in the loop checking coordinates is a be

means to ensure the correct position is inputted into 

weapon. To address these data link and interoperability 

sues, the Air Force has created a new position of 

deputy chief of staff for warfare integration.65 Hopefu

this position, along with Joint Forces Command, will 

the central coordination element to ensure standardizat

of future initiatives in GAPS operations. 

CAS and GAPS operations do not care what color of 

power is delivering the weapons. Certain segments of 

USAF wanted to break out the use of heavy bombers a

term it “bomber CAS.” However, at the joint CAS sym

sium held at Eglin, the Navy and Marine Corps were s

cessful in not letting the Air Force call this by a differ

name.66 If heavy bombers are supporting ground troops 

the traditional CAS role, then a name change for that 

pect is not needed. However, the author proposes to br

this out as a new mission. Instead of calling this bom

CAS, let us go a step further. Precision firepower called 

by TACPs on the ground should be termed GAPS a

should require further training and doctrine changes. T

situation in Afghanistan was unique; there was no

large-standing opposing army that was conducting m

neuvers to bring firepower to bear against our forces. 

airpower ranged freely over Afghanistan. The United Sta

had small roving fire support teams trying to track do

and isolate the remaining Taliban forces. Airpower was 

maneuvering element that was supported by the small 

support teams on the ground. The small ground units h
been instrumental in calling in the precise air strikes. T

emerging mission goes beyond the joint definition of CA

JDAM has brought a new dimension to the GAPS m

sion. Rules of engagement changes are necessary to al

full-unrestricted use of this capability. Bombers and ot

aircraft can deliver the JDAM precisely on known coor

nates through the weather, miles away from the target. T

terminal controller will not have the delivering aircraft 

sight. Different ROE that is flexible enough to supp

JDAM deliveries must be instituted to allow future use 

this unique capability. This flexibility will be especially 

portant as smaller, more precise weapons are fielded.

Schoolhouse training for US Marine Corps TACPs, US

TACPs, and special tactics teams differ because the indiv

ual services courses emphasize different training based 

the background of those attending the courses. A comm

end state is required for all schoolhouses. They need to 

velop a standardized training curricula that produces a 

ward air controller/terminal attack controller who can dir

and control GAPS missions and advise the ground unit co

mander on all matters pertaining to this new mission. 

Continued development of a 500 lb JDAM is essential 

the GAPS mission. The 500 lb class munition will ena

strike aircraft to destroy a set of targets with fewer sort

because they will be able to carry more bombs with each m

sion. General Leaf remarked, “It enables you to get the 

sired effects with a smaller warhead, decreasing the poten

of unintended collateral damage, and clearly this has a gr

value in the close air support role.”67 The need for small, f

ible, and affordable munitions that provide a level of ef

capability for joint forces should be developed. The 250 

small smart bomb that is under development will fit 

GAPS nicely.

During Operation Enduring Freedom, the heavy bom

has yet again proved the flexibility of airpower. “The bigg

change when you jump from Desert Storm to Kosovo 

Afghanistan is the use of the Joint Direct Attack Muniti

We now truly have a precision-guided munition that is d

night and all weather.”68 This statement made by Maj G

Walter E. Buchanan III, director of Operations for the dep

chief of staff for Air and Space Operations, clarifies his po

by saying that “close-air support has traditionally been d
by fighters because of its precise nature and because of 

danger of dropping bombs in close proximity to frien

troops. However, in Afghanistan, we have changed all 

rules.”69 Heavy bombers performing near precision atta

with JDAM has offered the C/JFACC a new tool to use in 

war against terrorism. In a future war, if the C/JFACC d

not have air dominance over the battlefield, then the use 

heavy bombers orbiting overhead for GAPS operations m

not be possible. However, in past conflicts the United Sta

has gained air dominance; and with it, the United States 

expect massive, near-precision firepower from maneuver

bombers supported by tactical air control teams on 

ground. 

Notes

1. Anthony Davis, “How the Afghan War Was Won,” Jane’s Intellige

Review, February 2002, 8.

2. Ibid., 6.

3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doct

September 1997, 1.

4. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionar

Military and Associated Terms, 21 April 2001, 132.

5. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland Doctrine, 27 August 1999, 4.

6. Army Field Manual (FM)100-5, Operations, June 1993, 2–19.

7. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close 

Support (CAS), 1 December 1995, ix.

8. Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center (Headquarters AFD

“Doctrine Watch #9, Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL),” 20 A

2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 January 2003, available from htt

www.doctrine.af.mil/DoctrineWatch/ DoctrineWatch.asp?Article=9.

9. Tom Clancy with Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, Every Ma

Tiger (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1999), 244–46.

10. Headquarters AFDC, “Doctrine Watch #11, Close Air Support,

July 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 January 2003, available f

www.doctrine.af.mil/DoctrineWatch/ DoctrineWatch.asp?Article=11.

11. Headquarters AFDC, “Doctrine Watch #9.”

12. Loren Thompson, “The Joint Direct Attack Munition: Making 

quisition Reform a Reality,” Lexington Institute, November 1999, n.p., 

line, Internet, 26 September 2002, available from http://www.lexin

institute.org/whatworks/whtwrks8.html. 

13. Ibid.

14. “Joint Direct Attack Munitions,” Air Combat Command (ACC

telligence Web site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 September 2002, avail

from http://in.acc.af.smil.mil/accis/int/meaweb/weapons/Joint%

Direct%20Attack%20Munition.html. (Secret) Information extracted is 

classified.
15. Tim Robinson, “Analysis: Afghan Air Power Revolution,” BBC Ne

5 March 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2003, available f

http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1855473.stm.

16. Tony Capaccio, “Boeing Produces Adequate Supply of JD

Smart Bombs,” Bloomberg.com, 17 January 2003, n.p., on-line, Inter

21 January 2003, available from http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/s20

1247720.html.

17. Susan H. Young, “Gallery of USAF Weapons,” Air Force Maga

85, no. 5 (May 2002): 134.

18. Briefing, 28th Air Expeditionary Wing, subject: Operation En

ing Freedom, 17 December 2001.

19. Maj Joel S. Westa, “Unleashing the Beast: Using the US

Strategic Bomber Force to Shape the Fight on the Expanding Battlefi

Research Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Mili

Studies, 1998), 23.

20. Briefing, 28th Air Expeditionary Wing.

21. Young, 132.

22. Ibid., 134.

23. Rebecca Grant, The B-2 Goes to War (Arlington, Va.: Iris Pr

2001), 14.

24. Gen John P. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force: A Transform

Concept, Forged by Experience,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 1 (sp

2001), 30.

25. Young, 134.

26. Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietn

Ideas and Actions (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1987), 13

27. Bernard C. Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Washing

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973), 116.

28. Ibid., 81.

29. Westa, 11.

30. Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Santa Mon

Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001), 6–7.

31. Briefing, 2d Operational Support Squadron, subject: B-52 

Employment, 11 July 2002.

32. Marty Kauchak, “Focus on OEF’s Air Campaign,” Armed Fo

Journal International, March 2002, 20.

33. Ibid.

34. Rebecca Grant, “The War Nobody Expected,” Air Force Maga

85 (April 2002): 38.

35. Ibid., 37.

36. Davis, 8.

37. Lt Col Douglas Lefforge, “500th B-52 Sortie Supports Operation A

conda,” Air Combat Command News Service, 8 March 2002, n.p., on-line

ternet, 25 September 2002, available from http://www2.acc.af.mil/

news/mar02/02117.html.

38. Ibid.

39. “B-52 Backs U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” CNN.com, 2 Decem

2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2003, available from http://a

cnn.com/2002/world/asiapcf/central/12/02/afghanistan.bombing.
40. Suzann Chapman, “Airpower Aids OEF Forces,” Air Force Maga

Online, March 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 27 April 2003, available f

http://www.afa.org/magazine/March2003/0303world.asp#anchorone.

41. Carlotta Gall, “U.S. and Its Allies Fight Rebel Force on Afg

Peaks,” New York Times, 29 January 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet

January 2003, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/

international/asia/29AFGH.html.

42. Dawn Stover, “New War in Space,” Popular Science, October 20

n.p., on-line, Internet, available from http://www.popscience.com.sh

43. Sgt Kathleen T. Rhem, “3 US Service Members Die in ‘Frie

Fire’ Accident,” Air Force Link, 5 December 2001, n.p., on-line, Inter

20 September 2002, available from http://www.af.news/Dec20

n20011205_1735.shtml.

44. Nick Cook, “Military Priorities and Future Warfare,” Jane’s 

fence Weekly, 5 September 2002.

45. Grant, 40.

46. Robinson, 4.

47. Christian Lowe, “Controllers Key to Autumn Offensive,” Air F

Times, 25 March 2002.

48. TSgt Ginger Schreitmueller, “Combat Controller Brings Air Po

to Fight,” Air Force Link, 8 February 2002, on-line, Internet, 20 Sept

ber 2002, available from http://www.af.mil/news/.

49. “U.S. Used Leica GeoSystems ‘Vipers’ to Target Taliban,” Bl

berg.com, 3 April 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 24 January 2003, avail

from http://bloomberg.com/USUsedLeicaGeoSystems.htm.

50. Ibid., 2.

51. “Modular Advance Reconnaissance System (MARS),” 7–8 

1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 18 January 2003, available from htt

geoastor.ch/penmap/files/MARS.html.

52. Ibid.

53. Cook.

54. Briefing, Air Force Command and Control Battlelab, subject: B

Close Air Support Enhancement, 14 October 2002.

55. Ibid.

56. Briefing, Headquarters ACC, subject: Bomber CAS Operations

June 2002.

57. Briefing, 2d Operational Support Squadron.

58. Emily Hsu, “Soldiers in Afghanistan to Receive New Blue-F

Tracking System,” Inside the Army, 28 October 2002, n.p., on-line, In

net, 29 October 2002, available from http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct20

s20021028soldiers.htm.

59. Briefing, Headquarters USAF, subject: CAS Update to CSAF

June 2002.

60. Ibid.

61. Briefing, 2d Operational Support Squadron.

62. Briefing, Headquarters USAF.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Andrew Koch, “Afghanistan: The Key Lessons,” Jane’s Defe

Weekly 37, 2 January 2002, 20–27.
66. Briefing, 2d Operational Support Squadron.

67. Glenn Goodman, “Close Air Support,” Armed Forces Journal In

national, January 2002, 54.

68. SSgt Tim Dougherty, “Bombers: A Formidable Weapon in F

against Terrorism,” Air Force Link, 7 March 2002, n.p., on-line, Inter

20 September 2002, available from http://www.af.mil/news/Mar20

n20020307_0370.shtml.

69. Ibid.
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26
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———. Subject: Machine-to-Machine Interface, 27 Aug

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from http://in.acc.af.smil.mil/accis/int/meaweb/

apons/Joint%20Direct%20Attack%20Munition.htm

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

Lefforge, Lt Col Douglas. “500th B-52 Sortie Supports Op

ation Anaconda.” Air Combat Command News Serv

8 March 2002, n.p. On-line. Internet, 25 Septem

2002. Available from http://www2.acc.af.mil/ac

ws/mar02/02117.html.

“Modular Advance Reconnaissance System (MARS),” 7 M

1997, n.p. On-line. Internet, 18 January 2003. Availa

from http://www.geoastor.ch/penmap/files/MA

html.

Rhem, SSgt Kathleen. “3 US Service Members Die 

‘Friendly Fire’ Accident.” Air Force Link, 5 Decem

2001, n.p. On-line. Internet, 20 September 2002. Av

able from http://www.af.news/Dec2001/n200112

_1735.shtml.

Robinson, Tim. “Analysis: Afghan Air Power Revolutio

BBC News, 5 March 2002, n.p. On-line. Internet, 

January 2003. Available from http://news.bbc

uk/1/hi/world/americas/1855473.stm

Schreitmueller, TSgt Ginger. “Combat Controller Brings 

Power to Fight.” Air Force Link, 8 February 2002, n

On-line. Internet, 20 September 2002. Available fr

http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2002/n20020208.shtm

Stover, Dawn. “New War in Space.” Popular Science, Septe

ber 2002, n.p. On-line. Internet, 20 September 20

Available from http://www.popscience.com. shtml.

Thompson, Loren. “The Joint Direct Attack Munition: M

ing Acquisition Reform a Reality.” Lexington Institu

November 1999, n.p. On-line. Internet, 26 Septem

2002. Available from http://www.lexingtoninstitu

org/whatworks/whtwrks8.html.

“U.S. Used Leica GeoSystems ‘Vipers’ to Target Taliba

Bloomberg.com, 3 April 2002, n.p. On-line. Intern

24 January 2003. Available from http://www.blo

berg.com/USUsedLeicaGeoSystems.htm.

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