strategic effectiveness of the military not only in the comin

years but the distant future as well. 

New Requirements and Technologies

U.S. defense strategy and forces are entering an era of major chang

partly because the globalizing, turbulent world is producing new

threats, requirements, and missions. Equally important, new militar

technologies are emerging far more quickly than they did over th

past decade. Information technology is one example, but parallel de

velopments are taking place in several other areas, for example, mis

sile defenses, precision deep-strike weapons, ultra-smart munition

robotics, stealth aircraft, new naval ship designs, long-range ar

tillery, lightweight armor, and nanotechnology. As these new tech

nologies arrive at an accelerating rate, they will interact with new

threats and strategic requirements to create opportunities for U.S

military forces to innovate in responsive ways or risk being lef

behind the future’s power curve.

formation can perform a similar function. The first and third pre

cepts are well documented. The second, however, needs greater

attention—not only because adaptability is important although

easily overlooked, but also because it is a bridge between the

other two precepts. These three precepts incorporate the main

characteristics needed by the Armed Forces:

■ A core military capability to win wars today and support peacetime goals—a near-term concern.

■ The adaptability to modify that existing core capability to meet

new strategic conditions—a mid-term concern.

■ A wise transformation that reorients the military to take advantage of new technologies for the long term.

These precepts are compatible but must be pursued in a

balanced and integrated manner that reflects their interconnection. The pursuit of near-term capabilities should be accompanied by enhanced efforts to create broader options for the mid

term, in ways that establish a sound strategic foundation for

longer-term visions. The near-term capability of the military can

be preserved by keeping them sufficiently large and ready and by

June 2001 Defense Horizons 1

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security Policy in June 2001 to study the implications of technological innovation

for U.S. national security policy and military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of current strategic and defense

policy issues. Its major initial areas of focus include: (1) technologies and concepts that encourage and/or enable the transformation of the Armed Forces, 

(2) developments by defense laboratories, (3) investments in research, development, and acquisition and improvements to their processes, (4) relationships among

the Department of Defense, the industrial sector, and academe, and (5) social science techniques that enhance the detection and prevention of conflict. The staff is

led by two senior analysts who will hold the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology and who can call on the

expertise of the university community and colleagues at institutions nationwide. The papers published in the Defense Horizons series present key research and

analysis conducted by the center and its associate members.
characteristic or timeframe can be pursued to the damaging neglect

of others. It spreads the agenda of change, along with its associated

risks and opportunities, over time. Indeed, its goal is to make sustained, affordable, and achievable improvements to the military in

all three areas and all three timeframes. 

Staying Capable with Existing Technologies 

Within the Department of Defense, the goal of keeping forces highly

capable has acquired the status of dogma. But what exactly does the

term highly capable mean? Capability can be seen as a military’s

current force structure, readiness, and armaments, set against the

missions that force is asked to undertake. It is a measure of strategic effectiveness: the capacity of forces to perform key missions and

to achieve the twin goals of decisively defeating opponents on the

battlefield and strongly supporting U.S. foreign policy activities.

While requirements for effectiveness in war and peace are sometimes hard to pinpoint, there is a big difference between a posture

that solidly meets them and one that falls short. 

Staying capable is always important, but it is a special priority

in the near term because crises and wars can erupt suddenly, with no

time for preparation. Some analysts judge that world affairs will be

them to win wars decisively, with few losses. Keeping them capable

however, is not something to be taken for granted or interpreted i

static, near-term ways. Highly ready units with a gleaming arsena

of weapons are no guarantee that the U.S. military will forever b

able to attain its peacetime security goals or to defeat its wartim

adversaries. In particular, battlefield superiority is relative, a prod

uct of many factors, and a transient status that is hard to achiev

yet easy to lose. 

For this reason, a high level of capability must constantly b

sought, preserved, and re-ratified. Because new technologies appea

and new threats regularly emerge, the military must continually im

prove. If no new threats appear, improvements normally can b

gradual, but over a decade, they must have a significant cumulativ

effect. If the Armed Forces are strengthened in appropriate way

they will retain an adequate core capability, not only in absolut

terms but also in relative terms of missions, goals, and requirement

If not, they will steadily lose this capability even if, on the surface

they appear as impressive as before. 

Because a sufficient quantity of forces is needed to carry out na

tional strategy, the foundation of a core capability is a posture tha

fields adequate numbers of joint combat forces: ground, air, and nava

assets. The current posture of 13 Army and Marine Corps active div

sions, 12 Navy carrier battle groups and 316 major ships, and 20 Ai

Force fighter wings has met this requirement since 1993. But often 

has been stretched thin by the need to provide a capability to figh

and win two major theater wars (MTWs) while also carrying out othe

missions. In response, calls have arisen in recent years for enlargin

the posture by 10–15 percent, perhaps recreating the Base Force o

the early 1990s, which had 15 divisions, 26 fighter wings, 12 carrier

2 Defense Horizons June 200

Hans Binnendijk holds a chair in technology and national security at the

National Defense University. He may be contacted at (202) 685–2557 or via 

e-mail at binnendijkh@ndu.edu. Richard L. Kugler is a distinguished research

fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University and may be contacted at (202) 685–2328 or kuglerr@ndu.edu.
higher degree of tiered readiness. The

Army has stricter readiness standards

for all of its forces. Perhaps a broader,

staggered readiness profile also should

be considered for the Army, in which

some forces can respond instantly but

others mobilize more slowly. If so,

greater tiered readiness could permit

both sufficient forces and adequate

readiness, rather than sacrificing the

former on behalf of the latter. In addition, reductions in spending on

domestic defense infrastructure and low-priority O&M may provide a

viable means to generate savings, thereby reducing the need to sacrifice either force structure or readiness.

The act of strengthening the military often is seen as a longterm endeavor propelled by modernization and procurement. Yet its

quality can be enhanced through multiple, relatively less expensive

technologies and related measures that take effect in the near term.

One measure is to increase joint training and exercises so that forces

from all services become better able to work together. A second measure is to increase the use of equipment prepositioning, swift-deploying forces, and standoff strike assets to become better at forcible intervention in conflicts where adversaries can seriously contest U.S.

access. A third measure is to acquire more low density/high demand

assets such as electronic warfare aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles,

naval special forces, construction engineers, and civil administrators.

Because these specialized assets are in short supply, adding more of

them could enhance the ability of the military to perform a wide

handle other events. Virtually every

body agrees that the military shoul

be adaptable and flexible. But whil

these terms are often endorsed in ke

DOD documents, they are seldom ana

lyzed in any depth. Left unaddresse

are key questions: How do we know

when U.S. forces are sufficientl

adaptable? How can adaptability bes

be increased? How can it be lost, per

haps unintentionally? What is the agenda of the future? Becaus

adaptability is becoming more important, the time has arrived to e

evate it to a position of major status in defense plans. Similar to ca

pability, it should not be taken for granted. Instead, it must be con

sciously created and nurtured in ways that respond to the changin

times. The need for greater attention to adaptability may require ap

propriate changes to the planning, programming, and budgeting sys

tem and acquisition processes, as well as operational planning.

Forces are adaptable when they can respond to new situation

and unexpected challenges by making quick, effective changes in how

they are organized and operated. Adaptability calls for a menu of ca

pabilities, choices, and options from a force posture that can perform

many different missions reasonably well, rather that one mission su

perbly. Adaptability includes the strategic flexibility and mental agilit

to depart quickly from a prepared script to sensibly improvise a new

one. This is not a natural hallmark of most forces, which often are ta

lored to carry out a single dominant design in ways that can leav

them ill-prepared to do anything different. For example, the Frenc

June 2001 Defense Horizons 3

capable will be diminished 

if forces are so rigidly

prepared for one set of wars

and operations that they

cannot handle other events
4 Defense Horizons June 200

terrorist or cyber attack event, attacks on space assets, or massive

peacekeeping in Central Asia would all present challenges not faced

in traditional MTW scenarios. Such events are possible in the mid

term and make this a potentially dangerous and chaotic time. 

Fortunately, the Armed Forces possess many of the physical

characteristics needed to adapt to these new strategic conditions.

This is the case not only because of their size and strength, but also

because they are so multifaceted. They field a balanced mix of

ground, air, and naval forces that are backed by logistic support and

other sustainment assets. Each service component, moreover, is diverse: the Army, for example, has a full panoply of armored, mechanized, light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions. The Navy,

Marine Corps, and Air Force are similarly equipped. The presence of

U.S. military commands in all key regions further enhances this flexibility. In theory, forces from all four services can be brought together for joint operations, swiftly deployed overseas aboard airlift

and sealift assets, and employed to carry out a range of battlefield

campaigns. In practice, this strategic and operational flexibility was

demonstrated in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo conflicts. Current

forces are not perfect, but they are the most versatile in the world—

a product of concerted effort over many years.

Even so, the emerging situation merits a sober stocktaking of

the military’s adaptability coupled with a careful appraisal of ways to

foster it. Enhancing adaptability normally does not require new platforms, but instead efforts to organize and employ forces more

effectively. A main challenge will be that of deciding whether all

forces should have a broad set of response options, or instead, some

byproduct of standard simulations, modeling, and programming. 

The need for strategic and operational adaptability is a key rea

son why the Department of Defense should craft a broader plannin

framework to replace the two-MTW standard. Forces will need to re

main capable of waging MTWs, including in the Persian Gulf and Ko

rea. But a narrow preoccupation with two concurrent MTWs in thes

places can create blinders to the wider set of conflicts and new

geostrategic settings that might be encountered, perhaps leaving th

military unprepared to deal with them. A new planning framewor

should be attentive to the normal needs of key commanders in chie

(CINCs) in situations short of regional war: their many missions dur

ing peacetime and small crises create special requirements fo

forces and other resources. A new planning framework should als

create a different wartime standard of 1+ 1

/2 + 1/2 conflicts, namely, 

single larger theater war, coupled with two smaller warfighting op

erations, one with high-technology strike forces and the other wit

traditional forces capable of low-intensity combat. Meeting such 

standard would produce a military force with much greater adapt

ability for the medium term. 

Regardless of the standard adopted, each major CINC shoul

have a family of operation plans (OPLANs) for small, medium, an

large wars. Today, CINCs typically are prepared for small and big con

flicts, but their response options could be improved if they are give

medium-sized strike packages that can be employed flexibly in 

wide range of settings. Improvements of this sort could help provid

not only flexible OPLANs but also new ways to examine the forces t

ensure that they are adequately versatile. The menu of militar

options can be further broadened by improvements in network
sensors, and munitions. The effect can be to increase the efficiency

and effectiveness of U.S. forces in a range of contingencies.

Steps to acquire better counter-WMD strike assets and

weapons for defeating enemy antiaccess and area-denial strategies

also can help in the mid term by allowing the United States to get

greater mileage out of the forces that already exist, rather than build

new forces or create entirely new generations of technologies. As one

of the panels involved in the recent defense review pointed out, the

Department of Defense can develop significantly better capabilities

for fast, forcible entry by configuring only a small portion of its entire

force posture for this mission. Provided a joint command structure is

created and adequate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) systems

are developed, a swift forcible entry effort can begin with massed

cruise missile strikes from bombers and ships. Following this step

can come insertion of a carrier task force, Patriot missile batteries,

and air interceptors to create a protective air defense umbrella.

Then reception facilities can be opened, followed by the flow of large

air, ground, and naval strike forces. A fully sophisticated forcible entry capability might take 15 years or more to develop, but in the mid

term, existing technologies and systems can be used to create a

valuable interim capability.

New technologies will be arriving in the mid term that will help

steadily broaden opportunities for making U.S. forces more adaptable.

The acquisition of ballistic missile defenses, global information sys

tems, and space-based assets often is viewed as long-term transforma

tion. If acquired in the next 5–10 years, they can contribute impor

tantly to mid-term adaptability as well. Likewise, procurement of new

weapons now emerging from the research and development pipelin

can help enhance adaptability. For example, the F–22 and joint strik

fighter can strengthen Air Force ability to retain control of the battle

field airspace, thereby allowing air strikes against mobile ground tar

gets to have maximum impact. The Army Crusader artillery system

and Comanche helicopter will greatly enhance the range and volum

of its long-range fires, thereby allowing ground combat forces to ma

neuver and strike more powerfully. The Navy cooperative engagemen

system will enhance the capacity of carrier battle groups to survive en

emy missile strikes and to use their F/A–18 E/F aircraft in joint oper

ations in littoral areas. 

Each new technology and associated weapon system must b

evaluated on the basis of technical performance, affordability, cost

effectiveness, and operational role. As in the past, some weapon

likely will be procured fully, others partly or slowly, and a few not a

all. The key point is that when the emerging generation of technolo

gies is seen as a whole, it offers an opportunity to improve U.S. force

significantly, rather than waiting 20 years for a distant generation o

exotic technologies to emerge. Indeed, the act of fielding thes

June 2001 Defense Horizons 5

strike systems have the same effect, allowing tactical combat aircraft and ground units to remain outside fire envelopes of enemy forces. Meanwhile, better

defenses (including missile defenses) will enhance force survivability when closely engaging enemy units. DH
deploy a combination of fighters, bombers, and other assets. The

Navy and Marines are networking carrier battle groups, amphibious

ready groups, and other forces to operate together and to carry out

joint missions with the other services. These efforts are being carried

out under the mantle of Joint Vision 2020, which is focused on creating new-era capabilities for dominant maneuver, precision strikes,

and other battlefield imperatives. To the extent they also enhance

adaptability by providing for a wider scope of operations, forces will

become better prepared and more effective in the mid term. 

Other innovative ideas for reorganizing U.S. forces may merit

consideration. Existing divisions, fighter wings, and carrier battle

groups are inherited from the Cold War. Their effectiveness perhaps

can be strengthened by employing information-era technologies to

streamline and update them. For example, some analysts argue in favor of replacing Army divisions and brigades with new combat groups

and joint command structures. Another idea is to add unmanned

combat aerial vehicles to service fighter wings, thereby broadening

force employment options. Ideas for the Navy include adding cruise

missiles to submarines, buying smaller littoral ships, and employing

carriers and amphibious assault ships in a wide range of missions.

Such ideas must be examined carefully; while some may not prove

attractive, others may justify a break from the past.

Reengineering for adaptability likely can also be applied to the

U.S. overseas presence. The current presence of about 235,000

troops in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf was designed a decade

ago, mostly for the purpose of carrying out traditional border defense

missions that are now fading. In all three theaters, a new overseas

presence should be tailored to reflect new missions and new information-era force structures. Such a reengineered presence may be

and elsewhere, which need greater capability, adaptability, and in

teroperability that can be created through reengineering of existin

assets. For example, European members of NATO possess over 5

mobilizable divisions and 3,000 combat aircraft, but few of them ca

be swiftly deployed outside their borders. If only 10–20 percent o

them are reengineered for this purpose, they will greatly increas

NATO flexibility for new-era missions. A combination of better mo

bility assets, logistic support, information systems, and precisio

weapons would greatly enhance the capacity of European forces t

work with U.S. forces in new missions. 

Transforming Wisely with New Technologies

The prospect of creating entirely new military technologies is wha

makes long-term transformation an appealing vision. Transformatio

is best pursued not as a separate endeavor unto itself, but instead a

a natural progression of ongoing efforts to achieve capability an

adaptability, which ideally should create a foundation for lookin

ahead and seeing clearly. For transformation to succeed, it must b

guided by a coherent philosophy that blends future strategic require

ments with new technologies. In recent years, transformation has be

come a major DOD activity, a long-term process of change aimed a

producing new and better forces for the 21st century. It is animated b

future missions, the revolution in military affairs, modern informatio

systems, and new technologies that are altering the nature of warfar

The goal is to create a full-spectrum force that can dominate futur

battlefields by carrying out the precepts of Joint Vision 2020 issued b

the Chairman. This vision, however, is abstract: its specific contour

6 Defense Horizons June 200
June 2001 Defense Horizons 7

-

g

0

n

f

e

-

n

o

t

n

s

d

g

e

-

-

t

y

n

.

e

y

s

g

at their disposal in order to fight effectively on the modern battlefield. Ongoing DOD experimentation is designed to identify, test, and

evaluate new approaches. It will play a key role in determining the

blend of the old and new systems to adopt and the pace at which it

is pursued. 

The Army has proclaimed its intent ultimately to create a new

Objective Force, which will be characterized by high-technology divisions that are more mobile, leaner, and more agile than now, but

just as lethal and survivable as today’s armored forces. The Navy and

Marine Corps already have dominance over our sea lines of communication and are concentrating on new technologies to enhance their

ability to operate forward from the sea and to gain continued access

to the littoral. The Air Force is creating more capable and mobile expeditionary forces for traditional air campaigns as it transforms to an

air and space force. Within about 20 years, the ultimate promise of

these efforts is to create new-era forces that are quite different from

and substantially more capable than those now deployed.

Because it is so portentous, transformation is an endeavor

that must be guided wisely. While it offers immense promise, some

critics fear that it will be slowed down by status-quo thinking. An

equal risk is that it will proceed briskly but result in undesirable

outcomes, including forces that are boldly innovative with glittering new technologies but that are strategically ineffective or vulnerable in new ways. A new force posture that can carry out one

type of military operation brilliantly but lacks the flexible capacity

for other missions likely would prove ineffective overall. Especially

because transformation is a futurist process of experimentation

abroad plays a major role in its national security strategy for

peace, crisis, and war. A key facet is the stationing of large joint

forces in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf—some 225,000 

military personnel in total. Equally important is the ability to use

prepositioned equipment, airlift, and sealift to deploy large reinforcements from the continental United States within a few weeks 

or months to theaters where vital national interests might be

endangered.

Overseas presence includes approximately 16 percent of the

total strength of the active force, providing a capacity to train with

allies and engage with other countries and react immediately to

crises and wars.

Europe: 109,000 military personnel; forces include 2 Army divisions 

(4 brigades), 1 Navy carrier battle group and 1 amphibious ready group,

and 2.3 Air Force fighter wings

Asia: 93,000 military personnel; forces include 1 Army division, 

1 Navy carrier battle group and 1 amphibious ready group, 1 Marine

division and air wing, and 2.2 Air Force fighter wings

Persian Gulf: About 20,000 military personnel; forces include select

Army units, 1 Navy carrier battle group and 1 amphibious ready group, and

1 Air Force fighter wing-equivalent

Strategic mobility forces: Prepositioned stocks maintained overseas

help speed deployments from the United States in a crisis. Included is

equipment for 8 Army brigades, 4 Marine brigades, and multiple air

bases—distributed in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Airlift includes

162 C–5s and C–17s; 88 C–141s; 418 C–130s; and 536 KC–10s/KC–135s.

Sealift includes 112 DOD-owned ships, 198 U.S.-flagged commercial 

fleet ships, and 175 ships in effective U.S. control fleet. In addition to

airlift and sealift, the civilian reserve air fleet program offers access to

about 75 percent of commercial cargo-carrying capacity. DH
8 Defense Horizons June 200

long term, the mid term is a potentially dangerous period of world a

fairs in which the Armed Forces could find themselves caught shor

if they are not steadily improved in key ways.

To a significant degree, pursuit of new technologies, innovativ

force structures, and other programs can enable the Department o

Defense to make effective use of available resources, thereby closin

the gap between requirements and capabilities. If the military ca

fulfill this agenda, it likely will be able to keep the peace and win th

Nation’s wars. In the final analysis, nothing more can be asked of th

Armed Forces, and nothing less should be expected. DH

which might be called a rapid evolutionary approach, is to rely upon

newly arriving legacy platforms (for example, the JSTARS aircraft,

F–22, V–22 Osprey, joint strike fighter, F–18E/F, DD–21, Crusader,

and precision munitions) and information technology to help create

fresh doctrines and structures. This strategy likely will yield a steady,

evolutionary transformation, with benefits that flow continuously

over the coming 10–20 years, but no sudden, great leap forward. A

second, more revolutionary strategy is the polar opposite: to skip

much of this next generation of improved legacy platforms—on the

premise that modernization is merely recapitalization and not true

transformation—in order to pursue a great leap forward in technology and forces 20 years from now. In theory, this strategy could create dramatically different forces with new platforms and exotic

technologies in the long term, such as unmanned combat aircraft, a

new Army future combat vehicle, small carriers, and nanotechnology. But in the interim, it likely would produce a slower rate of improvement than the first strategy.

A choice likely must be made between these two strategies, because fiscal constraints will probably rule out pursuing both of them

simultaneously. Based on the history of military transformation during the past 50 years, the rapid evolutionary path runs fewer risks

than the revolutionary skip-a-generation approach, and it is more attentive to new strategic requirements in the foreseeable future. The

United States is unlikely to have the luxury of a strategic pause to

absorb the higher risks of the revolutionary approach. Even if the

rapid evolutionary approach is chosen, however, the Department of

Defense Horizons is produced by the Publication Directorate of the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (INSS) which publishes books, monographs, and reports on national

security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy for the National Defense

University. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/

press/ndup2.html. INSS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/

jfq_pubs/index.htm.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any

other agency of the Federal Government.

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode George C. Maerz

Director of Publications General Editor, NDU Press Supervisory Editor, NDU Press