23 December 2010

Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations

Joint Publication 3-68
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PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides doctrine for planning and conducting joint noncombatant 

evacuation operations throughout the range of military operations. Specific information on 

repatriation operations is also provided. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. 

It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the 

force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity 

of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant 

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these 

commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

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iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-68 

DATED 22 JANUARY 2007 

• Added a vignette on the issue of evacuating third country nationals to Chapter I, 

“Overview.” 

• Added language per the Department of State policy on the issue of evacuating pets. 

• Incorporated additional considerations (strategic communication, military 

deception, defense support to public diplomacy, and information sharing) as part 

of Chapter V, “Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures” under 

paragraph 4, “General Considerations.” 

• Changed “geospatial intelligence contingency packages” to “geospatial intelligence 

base for contingency operations” per the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s 

change in terminology. 

• Deleted Appendix C, “Psychological Operations Considerations.” 

• Updated DD Form 2585 in Appendix F, “Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet.” 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-68 

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v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................ I-1 

• Terminology .............................................................................................................. I-2

• Special Nature of Evacuation Operations .................................................................. I-2 

• Operational Environments ......................................................................................... I-3 

• Military Planning and Forces ..................................................................................... I-4 

CHAPTER II 

 ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION 

• Introduction ...............................................................................................................II-1 

• Department of State ..................................................................................................II-1 

• United States Embassy Representatives ...................................................................II-3 

• Other Agencies .........................................................................................................II-6 

• Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and 

United States Military Commands ............................................................................II-8 

• Host Nation .............................................................................................................II-10

• Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations .......................................II-11 

• Multinational Noncombatant Evacuation Operation ..............................................II-11 

CHAPTER III 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. III-1 

• Command Relationships ......................................................................................... III-1 

• Command and Control ............................................................................................ III-3 

• Joint Task Force Organization ................................................................................ III-7 

CHAPTER IV 

 CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

• United States Embassy and Consulate Plans .......................................................... IV-1 

• Military Planning—Combatant Command Plans ................................................... IV-1 

• Intelligence Sources ................................................................................................ IV-2 

• Notification Procedures .......................................................................................... IV-4 

• Notification Phases ................................................................................................. IV-4 

• Evacuee Identification ............................................................................................ IV-7 

• Coordination With Senior In-Country Military Officials ....................................... IV-9 
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• Embassy Security and Operations .......................................................................... IV-9 

• Repatriation Considerations .................................................................................. IV-10 

CHAPTER V 

 EMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEDURES 

• Evacuation Plan Implementation ............................................................................. V-1 

• Advance Party .......................................................................................................... V-1 

• Joint Task Force Main Body Organization and Missions ..................................... V-13 

• General Considerations .......................................................................................... V-18 

CHAPTER VI 

 EVACUEE PROCESSING 

• Evacuation Control Center ..................................................................................... VI-1 

• Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart .................................................................. VI-1 

• Evacuee Processing ................................................................................................ VI-1 

• Evacuation Control Center Organization and Operations ...................................... VI-3 

• Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees ................................. VI-10 

CHAPTER VII 

 INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE AND SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS 

• Intermediate Staging Base ..................................................................................... VII-1 

• Temporary Safe Haven Site ................................................................................... VII-3 

• Alternate Safe Haven ............................................................................................. VII-5 

• Organization and Functional Considerations ......................................................... VII-5 

APPENDIX 

 A Rules of Engagement and the Law of War ................................................. A-1 

 B Legal Considerations ...................................................................................B-1 

 C Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Considerations ................C-1 

 D Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists ............................................... D-1 

 E Sample Notice Forms .................................................................................. E-1 

 F Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet ....................................... F-1 

 G Operational Risk and Safety ....................................................................... G-1 

 H References .................................................................................................. H-1 

 J Administrative Instructions .......................................................................... J-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-5 
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vii

FIGURE 

 I-1 Objectives Concerning Protection and Evacuation of 

United States Citizens and Other Designated Personnel From 

Threatened Areas Overseas ............................................................................. I-2 

 II-1 Members of the Country Team ......................................................................II-7 

 III-1 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/Repatriation Operations 

Organization Chain of Command ................................................................ III-2 

 IV-1 Contents of Emergency Action Plans .......................................................... IV-2 

 IV-2 Notification Phases ...................................................................................... IV-5 

 V-1 Forward Command Element Tasks ............................................................. V-10 

 V-2 Joint Task Force Main Body ....................................................................... V-13 

 VI-1 Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart........................................................ VI-2 

 VI-2 Classifications of Evacuees ........................................................................ VI-11 

 VII-1 Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base ............................................. VII-1 

 E -1 Sample Stand Fast Notice .............................................................................. E-1 

 E -2 Sample Leave Commercial Notice ................................................................ E-2 

 E -3 Sample Evacuation Notice ............................................................................. E-3 

 E -4 Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice ........................................................... E-4 

 E -5 Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity ................................................... E-4 

 F -1 Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet ............................................................................................ F-1 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Provides an Overview of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) 

• Discusses NEO Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

• Covers NEO Command and Control 

• Discusses Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

• Covers Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

• Provides Guidance on Evacuee Processing 

• Discusses NEO Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations 

Overview

A noncombatant 

evacuation operation 

(NEO) is conducted to 

evacuate US citizens 

whose lives are in danger. 

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are 

conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in 

evacuating US citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) 

civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and 

third country nationals (TCNs) whose lives are in danger 

from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe 

haven. The United States Government (USG) will consider 

evacuating TCNs and host country nationals on a case-bycase, space available/reimbursable basis. Although 

normally considered in connection with hostile action, 

evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in 

response to, any natural or man-made disaster. 

NEOs have special 

characteristics. 

NEOs have humanitarian, military, economic, diplomatic, 

and political implications. NEOs usually involve swift 

insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, 

and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.

Special nature of 

evacuation operations. 

The command and control structure and the political and 

diplomatic factors involved in timing the execution of the 

military support of NEOs make them different from other 

military operations. During NEOs, the US ambassador, not 

the geographic combatant commander (GCC) or 

subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior 

USG authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately 
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responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and 

the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate a US 

embassy and the order to execute a NEO is political. 

The GCC may decide to create a joint task force (JTF) to 

conduct a NEO or may task a component commander to 

conduct the NEO. 

Rules of engagement may be such that the JTF should be 

prepared to protect personnel (military and evacuees) from 

a wide variety of threats while not necessarily having the 

authority to preempt hostile actions by proactive military 

measures. 

NEOs may occur in 

permissive, uncertain, or 

hostile environments. 

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty and 

may be directed without warning because of sudden 

changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic 

or military relationships with the United States, a sudden 

hostile threat to US citizens from a force within or external 

to an HN, or a devastating natural or man-made disaster. 

Some key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are 

situational awareness; a correct appraisal and understanding 

of the changing diplomatic, political, and military 

environment in which the evacuation force will operate; 

time constraints and risk; and preparation of the evacuation 

force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive 

to uncertain or hostile. Alternative plans should be 

developed for permissive, uncertain, and hostile 

environments. 

Roles Coordination and Interaction

At all levels, Department 

of Defense and 

Department of State 

personnel need to 

cooperate to successfully 

execute the NEO. 

Washington Liaison Group (WLG). Secretary of State 

(SECSTATE) and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

established the WLG to ensure coordination of the work of 

their departments in fulfilling their responsibilities for 

protection and evacuation of US citizens abroad. The WLG 

is responsible for coordination and implementation at the 

national level of all emergency and evacuation plans by 

DOS and DOD and by other USG agencies as appropriate.

SECSTATE and SecDef have established regional liaison 

groups (RLGs) colocated with combatant commands as 

necessary to ensure coordination of emergency and 

evacuation planning by their departments in the field. Each 

RLG is chaired by a DOS representative. Membership 

includes representatives of the appropriate combatant 
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xi 

commander and any subordinate component commands as 

desired. 

Emergency Action Committee (EAC). This organization 

is established at a foreign service post by the ambassador 

for the purpose of directing and coordinating the post’s 

response to contingencies as well as drafting the post’s 

emergency action plan (EAP). The EAC is the focal point 

for DOS and DOD evacuation site interface. 

United States embassy 

representatives. 

The ambassador is the personal representative of the 

President to the government of the foreign country or to the 

intergovernmental organization (IGO) to which he or she is 

accredited and, as such, is the chief of mission (COM), 

responsible for recommending and implementing national 

policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and for 

overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. 

The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making 

authority as the senior USG official on the ground during 

crises. 

United States Defense Attaché Office is an office of 

Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. A US senior defense official/defense attaché 

(SDO/DATT) heads the defense attaché office in country 

and is a member of the country team. The SDO/DATT is 

the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and 

national security issues, the senior diplomatically 

accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US 

diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all 

DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements 

assigned to or working from the embassy. 

The Security Assistance Officer (SAO) maintains liaison 

with the HN military forces and is authorized by law to 

perform certain military functions with the HN military. 

The advance party forward command element (FCE) 

should coordinate with the SAO. 

Secretary of Defense, 

combatant commanders, 

and US military 

commands. 

SecDef advises and assists SECSTATE and the heads of 

other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in 

planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of 

US citizens in overseas areas. 

When authorized by SecDef, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) coordinates the deployment and 
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employment of US forces in support of a NEO and 

monitors US force participation in the protection and 

evacuation of noncombatants. CJCS also recommends 

transportation movement priorities to SecDef and the use of 

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 

to provide the appropriate transportation resources in 

support of DOS requests. 

Secretary of the Army acts as the designated DOD 

executive agent for repatriation planning and operations, 

and coordinates within DOD and other USG agencies, as 

well as state and local agencies, as needed, in planning for 

the reception in the United States and onward movement of 

DOD dependents, nonessential DOD civilians, US 

nationals, and designated aliens evacuated from overseas 

areas. 

Secretary of the Navy, in accordance with (IAW) the 

mission and priorities assigned by USTRANSCOM, 

provides military sea transportation for the evacuation of 

noncombatants, as required. 

Secretary of the Air Force, through the Air Force Service 

component of USTRANSCOM, provides air transportation 

as well as aeromedical evacuation to support medical NEO 

requirements. 

GCC Responsibility. IAW DOD policy, GCCs must 

prepare and maintain plans for the protection and 

evacuation of US noncombatants abroad for whom DOD is 

responsible. 

USTRANSCOM, through its mobility components, can 

leverage its ability to obtain commercial lift by using 

existing services contracts. At a minimum, the strategic lift 

requirements for evacuation of noncombatants should be 

coordinated with USTRANSCOM. 

Command and Control

Within the country, the 

ambassador has been 

designated as the 

responsible authority for 

the operation. 

The US ambassador, with the approval of the Under 

Secretary of State for Management, can authorize the 

ordered or authorized departure of USG personnel and 

dependents other than uniformed personnel of the Armed 

Forces of the United States and designated emergencyessential DOD civilians who are not under the authority of 

the US ambassador. While the ambassador cannot order the 
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xiii 

departure of private US citizens and designated other 

persons, the ambassador can offer them USG evacuation 

assistance. Normally an evacuation starts IAW the 

embassy’s EAP, using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, 

or surface transportation. 

Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador, 

responsibility for the conduct of military operations in 

support of an evacuation and security of personnel, 

equipment, and installations within the designated 

operational area is vested with the JFC. 

Joint task force (JTF) 

organization. 

The supported GCC has the authority to organize forces to 

best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept 

of operations (CONOPS). As such, the supported GCC 

could decide to assign the NEO mission to a Service 

component or establish a JTF. The JFC is responsible for 

all phases of the operation to include the intermediate 

staging base (ISB) and temporary safe haven (if located 

outside the United States and within the joint operations 

area [JOA]). An ISB or temporary safe haven outside the 

JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported 

GCC. The NEO JTF is typically responsible for support 

and transport of the evacuees to ISBs and safe havens 

outside the JOA. The JFC exercises operational control 

over assigned and attached forces with the authority to 

organize forces to best accomplish the assigned tasks based 

on the CONOPS. 

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

Emergency action plans. US embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs for 

the area under their cognizance. The ambassador is 

responsible for the preparation and maintenance of EAPs, 

one section of which addresses the military evacuation of 

US citizens and designated foreign nationals. The GCC is 

responsible for reviewing and commenting on EAPs. EAPs 

are not tactical operation plans (OPLANs) in the sense that 

military planners think of, but they are the reference 

materials that support the formulation of an OPLAN. The 

GCC should review the adequacy of the EAP to support 

military operations. A copy of the current EAP should be 

on file and maintained at the appropriate GCC’s 

headquarters (HQ). 
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Military planning—

combatant command 

plans. 

Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JFC 

receives the warning order from the GCC and lasts until the 

evacuation force deploys to either an ISB or the evacuation 

site. Prior coordination with the staffs of the GCC and 

embassy can significantly improve planning for the JFC. 

The GCC and staff can provide the JFC with information to 

begin planning, such as the general OPLANs. 

Notification procedures. To develop a realistic evacuation plan, the JTF staff should 

know how long it will take to assemble the evacuees once 

the decision to evacuate has been made. Communications 

with potential evacuees may be via a warden system, 

which is a notification system used to communicate to the 

US population through wardens using telephones, faxes, emails, and direct personal contact. A warden coordinator 

prepares lists of wardens and other contacts to cover areas 

of assigned responsibilities. The wardens prepare, update, 

and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of US 

citizens residing in their assigned areas. 

There are several groups 

of evacuees, some of 

whom the ambassador 

may direct to evacuate and 

some whom the 

ambassador cannot. 

The first question most often asked by both diplomatic and 

military planners is, “Who are the evacuees, and how many 

of them will there be in a crisis?” Understanding how 

evacuees are organized, notified, and moved to assembly 

areas helps in determining the number of potential evacuees 

and assembly time estimates. 

The report of potential evacuees, also known as the F-77 

Report, identifies the numbers of potential evacuees at each 

embassy. Each embassy or consulate is required to submit 

to the DOS an annual report, on 15 December, of the 

estimated number of potential evacuees in its assigned area. 

These counts, however, are only yearly estimates. The 

accuracy of the estimate will vary with the speed and 

severity of the crisis. 

Embassy security and 

operations. 

Security outside the 

embassy is the 

responsibility of the host 

nation (HN), while 

security of the ambassador 

and embassy grounds is 

In many cases, US embassies do not have security forces or 

personnel. If security is provided, the regional security 

officer (RSO) has DOS security personnel and a small 

Marine security guard (MSG) detachment to accomplish 

this mission. During the evacuation, the MSG detachment 

personnel receive their orders from the RSO, while JTF 

personnel receive their orders from the JFC. JTF personnel 

do not receive orders from the RSO. These command 

relationships can potentially cause problems, especially 

when MSG personnel and JTF personnel work together 
 Executive Summary 

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the responsibility of the 

regional security officer. 

during the evacuation operation. It is vital that the JTF staff 

work out missions and command relationships before the 

operation. The JFC must understand the ambassador’s 

security plan and integrate the joint forces as smoothly as 

possible.

In some cases local contract guards control the perimeter of 

each embassy. These personnel may or may not be armed. 

Quality of the local guard force varies by country. Some 

local guards are professional and staffed with personnel 

who have proven their loyalty to the embassy’s staff. These 

local guards can be very useful in assisting US forces 

assigned to perimeter security duty. 

MSGs control access into critical facilities where classified 

material is processed and stored. MSGs have reaction plans 

to defend these facilities and destroy or evacuate sensitive 

material or equipment, if necessary. 

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

Once the Secretary of 

State approves an 

evacuation, the 

ambassador has the 

authority to implement the 

plan in a crisis. 

DOS, acting on the advice of the ambassador, will 

determine when US citizens and foreign nationals are to be 

evacuated. When unexpected violence flares up or appears 

imminent and communications with DOS are cut off, the 

ambassador may invoke such elements of the plan and 

initiate such actions as the situation warrants. 

Advance party. As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the 

advance party and requests permission to send it to the site 

of the operation. The advance party may consist of two 

elements: the FCE and the evacuation site party. In a 

permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE should be 

inserted before any evacuation site parties. In a hostile 

environment, the ambassador’s decision will probably be to 

insert the entire evacuation force to immediately commence 

the operation. 

Forward command 

element. 

The FCE coordinates with the ambassador and members of 

the country team for information and assistance. The FCE 

normally submits situation reports to the JFC. When the 

main body enters the country, the FCE rejoins the 

evacuation force and continues operations with the JTF 

HQ. 

Evacuation site party. The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, 

establishes the assembly areas, evacuation sites, and the 
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evacuation control center (ECC) site. When the evacuation 

force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the 

evacuation site party becomes the operations center and/or 

section of the ECC. 

JTF main body. A JTF “main body” will deploy to conduct the on-scene 

evacuation process. After insertion of the main body, each 

element prepares for its part in the operation. As the 

advance party rejoins the main body, the main body may 

consist of a HQ, marshalling element, security element, 

logistic element, and special operations forces. The size of 

the main body depends on the number of evacuees, 

evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation.

Evacuee Processing

Evacuation control center. The ECC supports DOS, which conducts processing, 

screening, and selected logistic functions associated with 

emergency evacuation of noncombatants. The JTF should, 

however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS 

responsibilities, if required. Size and composition of the 

ECC will be determined by the number of evacuees, 

evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation 

area. Of primary importance is the nature of the emergency 

causing the evacuation; it may be natural, political, or 

military based. 

Evacuee processing may take place in country at an air 

terminal, onboard ship, or at a temporary safe haven site. 

Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for reception, 

accounting, and care of evacuees should be implemented. 

The primary duties of the commander, JTF, include 

maintaining order at the evacuation site and supporting the 

ambassador’s efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees. 

Guiding principles for the 

evacuation control center. 

The three guiding principles for any ECC are accuracy—all 

personnel are accounted for; security—evacuees and the 

evacuation force are safeguarded from all threats; and 

speed—processing must be accomplished quickly and 

efficiently. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to 

the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the 

evacuees. The purpose is to prepare the evacuees for 

eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or 

the United States. All evacuees should be screened to 

certify identification and to ensure that documentation is 

accurate and all information provided is current. The 

processing center performs the necessary screening, 
 Executive Summary 

xvii 

registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure 

an orderly evacuation. 

Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations

An intermediate staging 

base is a temporary 

location used to stage 

forces prior to inserting 

the forces into the HN. 

Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC many 

advantages over deploying directly from the home station. 

The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the 

home station increases and the likelihood of hostilities 

increase. The ISB may be located in another country close 

to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship 

under US control. Ideally, the ISB will also function as a 

temporary safe haven, if one is required. The ISB may also 

serve as an airfield for support forces, such as additional 

airlift for unforeseen movement requirements and/or 

combat forces (such as air units capable of offensive 

attacks and airborne infantry units) in the event that a 

forcible entry is required. 

Temporary safe haven 

site. 

A temporary safe haven, designated by DOS, is a location 

in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved 

quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the 

United States; however, circumstances may exist that 

require an intermediate or temporary safe haven. Adequate 

transportation may not be available to move all evacuees 

directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. An 

intermediate safe haven may be a US Navy ship; however, 

the evacuees should be removed from the ship to landbased safe havens (in the United States or a third country) 

as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is 

required, DOS coordinates with the government in the 

country where it will be located. Coordination for the use 

of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, 

and billeting is required. 

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for planning and 

conducting joint NEO throughout the range of military 

operations. Specific information on repatriation operations 

is also provided. 

 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-68 

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I-1 

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

1. Introduction 

a. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the 

Department of State (DOS) in evacuating US citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) 

civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and third country nationals (TCNs) 

whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. 

The United States Government (USG) will consider evacuating TCNs and host country 

nationals on a case-by-case, space available/reimbursable basis. Although normally 

considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in 

anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster. 

b. US Policy 

(1) Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness 

Responsibilities (as amended), DOS is responsible for the protection or evacuation of US 

citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property abroad, in 

consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services. 

(2) The US policy has resulted in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between 

DOD and DOS entitled the Memorandum of Agreement Between Departments of State and 

Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad. 

The MOA addresses the roles and responsibilities of each agency in implementing 

evacuations. DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of all US citizens abroad 

and is generally responsible for evacuating US citizens. However, under the MOA, DOS can 

request DOD assistance. Once the decision has been made to use military personnel and 

equipment to assist in the implementation of emergency evacuation plans, DOD is solely 

responsible for conducting the evacuation, in consultation with the principal US diplomatic 

or consular representative in the affected country. During an evacuation, the MOA calls for 

high-level coordination between DOS and DOD through a liaison group that is responsible 

for evacuation planning and implementation. The objectives of the MOA are summarized in 

Figure I-1. 

c. Characteristics. NEOs have humanitarian, military, economic, diplomatic, and 

political implications. NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation 

of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. 

“The people’s safety is the highest law.” 

Legal and Political Maxim 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-68 

2. Terminology 

 For the purpose of simplification, the term “ambassador” is used throughout this 

publication. An ambassador is a diplomatic agent of the highest rank. Variations of the title 

ambassador or other titles referring to the senior DOS diplomatic agent or chief of mission 

(COM) (e.g., chargé d’affaires, consul general, or principal officer) at a particular diplomatic 

post could be interchanged throughout this publication and not change its relevancy. 

3. Special Nature of Evacuation Operations 

a. The command and control (C2) structure and the political and diplomatic factors 

involved in timing the execution of the military support of NEOs make them different from 

other military operations. During NEOs, the US ambassador, not the geographic combatant 

commander (GCC) or subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior USG authority 

for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the 

NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate a US embassy and the order to 

execute a NEO is political. The order to evacuate may not be given at the most opportune 

time, but rather may be delayed until the last possible moment to avoid actions that may be 

viewed as a tacit admission of political failure. 

b. The GCC may decide to create a joint task force (JTF) to conduct a NEO or may task 

a component commander to conduct the NEO. 

OBJECTIVES CONCERNING PROTECTION AND 

EVACUATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND 

OTHER DESIGNATED PERSONNEL FROM 

THREATENED AREAS OVERSEAS







Protect US citizens and nationals and designated other 

persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their 

evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.

Reduce to a minimum the number of US citizens and nationals 

and designated other persons subject to the risk of death 

and/or seizure as hostages.

Reduce to a minimum the number of US citizens and nationals 

and designated other persons in probable or actual combat 

areas so that combat effectiveness of US and allied forces is 

not impaired.

Figure I-1. Objectives Concerning Protection and Evacuation of 

United States Citizens and Other Designated Personnel From 

Threatened Areas Overseas 
Overview 

I-3 

c. Rules of engagement (ROE) may be such that the JTF should be prepared to protect 

personnel (military and evacuees) from a wide variety of threats while not necessarily having 

the authority to preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures. The JFC influences 

the ROE to provide maximum flexibility to the JTF so as to not unduly restrain use of force. 

The JFC should be given sufficient ROE to ensure the successful accomplishment of the 

mission. ROE must ensure that the military commander has the authority to protect civilians 

while demonstrating restraint and, when appropriate, using force proportional to the threat. 

See Appendix A, “Rules of Engagement and the Law of War,” for additional guidance 

concerning ROE. 

(1) Dissemination and use of clearly defined ROE are critical within all 

components of the JTF. Although the objectives (diplomatic and military) are not to destroy 

enemy forces and armed conflict should be avoided whenever possible, an appropriate and 

proportional use of force may become necessary. ROE must be as precise as practical; 

however, ROE must never deny the use of appropriate self-defense measures. 

(2) The JFC shall discuss the ROE with the ambassador as early and as frequently 

as required. Modifications to the ROE must be made and approved by the appropriate 

authorities via the supported GCC. 

4. Operational Environments 

a. General. Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty and may be 

directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented 

diplomatic or military relationships with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US 

citizens from a force within or external to an HN, or a devastating natural or man-made 

disaster. Some key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are situational awareness; a 

correct appraisal and understanding of the changing diplomatic, political, and military 

environment in which the evacuation force will operate; time constraints and risk; and 

preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to 

uncertain or hostile. Alternative plans should be developed for permissive, uncertain, and 

hostile environments. Additionally, the impact of introducing US forces into an already 

unstable environment could be further destabilizing. As a result, a primary planning 

limitation may be direction from DOS to maintain a small footprint, thus limiting the level of 

forces or activity to the minimum required. 

b. Permissive Environment. Under this condition, no resistance to evacuation 

operations is expected, and thus the operation would require little or no assembly of combat 

forces in country. Evacuees may or may not have been processed and assembled at 

designated assembly areas, evacuation points, and sites. In such an environment, a JTF can 

expect HN concurrence and possible support. The JTF’s primary concerns may be logistic 

functions involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, 

and coordination with DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation. While a 

minimum number of security forces may be used, prudent preparations should be in place to 

enable the force conducting the NEO to respond to threats as required. 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-68 

c. Uncertain Environment. An operational environment in which host government 

forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the 

HN territory and population is an uncertain environment. Because of the uncertainty, the 

JFC may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units or a reaction 

force. Approved ROE are disseminated early to ensure that the joint force has knowledge of 

and is sufficiently trained and proficient in application of the ROE. Planning for NEOs 

conducted in an uncertain environment must always include the possibility for escalation to a 

hostile environment. The primary concerns associated with a permissive environment 

remain unchanged. 

d. Hostile Environment. Noncombatants may be evacuated under conditions ranging 

from civil disorder, to terrorist action, to full-scale combat. Under such conditions, the JTF 

must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. The JFC may elect to deploy a sizable 

security element with the evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the 

evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). In addition to normal functions 

associated with noncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and 

services), the JTF may be required to conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive 

perimeters, escort convoys, participate in personnel recovery (PR) operations, and perform 

the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by DOS officials. 

5. Military Planning and Forces 

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of US 

Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, assigns the responsibility to plan 

and conduct NEOs in support of DOS to the GCCs. Actual evacuation assistance can be 

provided only upon the request of the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) to either the Secretary 

of Defense (SecDef) or the President. Once requested, approved, and directed, the 

combatant commander (CCDR) will order assigned and/or attached forces to conduct 

evacuation operations in support of DOS and the US ambassador. The ambassador is not in 

the military chain of command, but as the senior US official on scene is responsible for the 

NEO and protection of US citizens, citizens of the HN, or TCNs who have been designated 

for evacuation. It is imperative that the ambassador’s evacuation plan and the JFC’s plan for 

the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated. 

b. Military Response. Normally, the JFC or a Service component commander will 

receive authorization from the supported GCC before using any forces and facilities in a 

foreign country for protection and evacuation. However, if a JFC or Service component 

commander receives a request from the ambassador or responsible US diplomatic 

representative to provide assistance and the delay in obtaining authorization would 

jeopardize the safety of US citizens, the JFC or Service component commander should 

respond to the extent deemed necessary and militarily feasible and notify the supported and 

supporting CCDRs of contemplated actions. 

c. Force Options and Considerations

(1) Force options to conduct a NEO may, first and foremost, depend on the 

operational environment in which the NEO will be conducted. Many of the GCC’s 
Overview 

I-5 

components are capable of conducting a NEO in a permissive environment. However, a 

NEO in an uncertain or hostile environment may require formation and deployment of a JTF. 

An exception to this is the forward-deployed amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine 

expeditionary unit (MEU), which is trained and certified to conduct NEOs. A sea base may 

also be established to support a NEO. The sea base can include the ARG/MEU, or consist of 

other forces, both US and multinational, as needed to accomplish the mission. For a largescale NEO, forces from other components and supporting CCDRs will normally be required. 

(2) The HN’s support capabilities may play a major role in determining courses 

of action (COAs) for the conduct of NEOs. The supported GCC should consider a flexible 

force option that provides both early response to a developing situation and a capability to 

quickly expand should the operational environment become hostile. To provide the smallest 

opportunity to a potential adversary, evacuation forces entering foreign territory should 

be kept to the minimum number required for self-defense and for extraction and 

protection of evacuees, and for accomplishing the normal functions associated with 

noncombatant evacuations. The GCC may initiate a joint sea base to provide the required 

NEO capability from international waters, while minimizing the footprint ashore. 

(3) Command of the Joint Task Force. Military forces employed in a NEO may 

be composed of units from more than one Service. Once ordered to support a NEO and 

following the supported GCC’s decision to employ a JTF, a JFC will be designated to 

exercise overall control of operations. 

As the operational environment dictates, the joint force commander may task security 

 forces to assist in the evacuation of noncombatants. 

THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS 

Current policy on third country nationals is outlined in the Department of 

State’s (DOS’s) 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook-1, Emergency Planning 

Handbook. Essentially this provision states that in the event of a 

noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), the United States Government 

(USG) will consider extending—on a humanitarian, space available but 

reimbursable basis—evacuation assistance to foreign nationals. 

In practice, we have repeatedly assisted virtually all governments requesting 

assistance in evacuating their nationals from countries in which a NEO has 

become necessary. 

DOS refrains from entering into formal agreements with other governments 

on the evacuation of their nationals. We have two long-standing agreements 

with the Canadians and British to consult with each other with respect to 

evacuation planning. All foreign governments (including Canadian and 

British) are urged to plan for their own nationals’ evacuation and not to 

depend on USG resources. 

Memorandum of Agreement Between Departments of State and Defense 

on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and 

Designated Aliens Abroad
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-68 

For additional guidance on JTF headquarters (HQ) functions, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 

3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

(4) Force Sequencing. Force sequencing is the phased introduction of forces into 

and out of the operational area. Force sequencing provides the JFC with the option to 

provide a flexible and rapid response to a NEO through employment of forward-deployed 

forces, which may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed from an ISB. 

Effective force sequencing requires detailed knowledge of available Service, joint, and 

multinational military capabilities. Force sequencing is frequently discussed in terms of the 

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD contains time-phased force 

data, movement data, and non-unit related cargo and personnel data for the operation plan 

(OPLAN). 

d. Multinational Forces (MNFs). In planning for a NEO, the ambassador, GCC, and 

JFC may consider the possibility of operating with MNFs. However, the approval for US 

participation in a multinational NEO will come only from the President of the United States. 

When the NEO is to evacuate US citizens and nationals and designated other persons abroad 

using an MNF, SECSTATE may approve the use of an MNF. Under an emergency situation 

involving the safety of human life or the protection of property, offers of voluntary service 

from other countries may be accepted prior to approval. 

(1) Many situations that would cause the United States to initiate a NEO would 

likely cause other countries to react similarly. It may be politically or militarily expedient 

to employ an MNF in conducting the operation. These may be either HN forces 

cooperating in the evacuation or third nation forces whose citizens are also threatened. 

(2) The use of an MNF in a potential NEO should be a planning consideration. If 

seriously contemplated, detailed multinational planning and rehearsal are important factors 

in ensuring a successful operation. The difficulties of obtaining unity of effort within an 

MNF may cause serious difficulties in a time-sensitive NEO.

(3) Other nations’ forces need not be integrated with US forces unless diplomatic 

considerations recommend such action or in the event that the other nations’ forces have 

trained and operated with US forces. Although the United States may elect not to operate 

with MNFs directly, coordination and deconfliction with other countries involved in NEOs is 

essential. The JFC should consider an exchange of liaison officers (LNOs) with all other 

countries involved in their own NEO to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of effort. 

Consequently, GCCs should consider pre-NEO coordination with partner nations to facilitate 

such coordination and deconfliction. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

1. Introduction 

This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of principal persons and 

organizations, whether governmental, civil, intergovernmental, or military, with whom the 

JFC may interact while planning or executing a NEO. Additionally, specific roles and 

responsibilities that these organizations may have for repatriation operations are found later 

in this chapter and Chapter III, “Command and Control.” 

For further information on other USG, nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs’), and 

intergovernmental organizations’ (IGOs’) roles and responsibilities, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

2. Department of State 

a. At all levels, DOD and DOS personnel need to cooperate to successfully execute the 

NEO. This is most important at the ambassador and JFC level and includes their staffs and 

all other personnel. While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remains paramount, 

NEOs will probably be conducted in an environment where political concerns and 

constraints are key considerations. In most cases, the United States may not be actively 

engaged militarily against the forces posing a threat to the noncombatants. Military action 

may therefore be limited by the situation. Political and diplomatic constraints may also be 

imposed on the introduction of military personnel into a country prior to an evacuation 

operation, thus hampering planning and preparation. The JFC will fully support the 

ambassador’s plans and cooperate with DOS and embassy personnel without compromising 

mission requirements. DOS and embassy personnel will keep the JFC fully apprised of the 

on-scene conditions and are influential for coordinating actions that greatly affect the NEO. 

These actions include political and diplomatic influences on the JFC’s legal issues, 

agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, the ISB, and the safe 

haven. 

b. Washington Liaison Group (WLG). SECSTATE and SecDef established the WLG 

to ensure coordination of the work of their departments in fulfilling their responsibilities for 

protection and evacuation of US citizens abroad. The WLG is responsible for 

coordination and implementation at the national level of all emergency and evacuation 

“As specified in EO [Executive Order] 12656, the Secretary of Defense shall advise 

and assist the Secretary of State and the heads of other federal departments and 

agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and 

repatriation of US citizens in overseas areas.” 

Department of Defense Directive 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of US 

Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad (Short Title: 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations)
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-68 

plans by DOS and DOD and by other USG agencies as appropriate. The WLG is 

chaired by a DOS representative. The WLG may invite representatives of other USG 

departments and agencies (e.g., Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], 

Department of Homeland Security [DHS] [US Coast Guard], Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Agency for International 

Development [USAID]) to participate in its meetings or attend as observers. The 

representatives on the WLG are the points of contact for their department or agency on all 

matters pertaining to emergency evacuation planning, implementation of plans, and 

coordination of repatriation activities. To fulfill its responsibilities, the WLG: 

(1) Recommends the establishment of such regional liaison groups (RLGs) as are 

advisable, along with their terms of reference, to SECSTATE. 

(2) Provides advice on evacuation planning and protection of US citizens and 

TCNs and designated other persons to RLGs, US diplomatic and consular posts, and military 

commands in country. 

(3) Monitors the activities of the RLGs and provides direction as required through 

appropriate channels. 

(4) Periodically reviews protection and evacuation capabilities relative to the 

number of US citizens and TCNs and designated other persons throughout the world. 

(5) Coordinates operations of DOD and DOS incident to the evacuation and/or inplace protection of US citizens and nationals and designated other persons abroad and the 

use of the DOD noncombatant evacuee accountability system. Upon activation of the 

SecDef Crisis Coordination Center and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff crisis response elements 

within the National Military Command Center during an emergency or actual evacuation, the 

WLG’s responsibilities for coordination of the operations of DOD and DOS during the crisis 

may be discharged through these elements together with the respective task force or working 

group within the DOS Operations Center. 

c. Regional Liaison Groups. SECSTATE and SecDef have established RLGs 

colocated with combatant commands as necessary to ensure coordination of emergency and 

evacuation planning by their departments in the field. Each RLG is chaired by a DOS 

representative. Membership includes representatives of the appropriate CCDR and any 

subordinate component commands as desired. The RLG may invite representatives of other 

USG departments and agencies to participate in its meetings when appropriate and useful. 

The chairperson of each RLG receives instructions from SECSTATE. Each RLG performs 

the following functions. 

(1) Provides support to officials at diplomatic and consular posts and military 

commands within its region by: 

(a) Providing liaison between the WLG and the posts. 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-3 

(b) Ensuring coordination exists between the various posts, and between the 

posts and appropriate military commands. 

(c) Assisting posts and appropriate military commands in planning for the 

evacuation and/or in-place protection of US citizens, HN nationals or TCNs, and designated 

other persons in an emergency. 

(d) Reviewing the emergency action plans (EAPs) created on the Crisis and 

Emergency Planning Application that are prepared by posts. Forward them to DOS for 

approval and distribution to ensure the information contained therein is adequate to meet the 

requirements of DOS and DOD, review post plans and US and allied military OPLANs to 

determine if they conflict, and ensure plans of all posts in the area are coordinated when 

necessary. 

(2) Refers to the WLG relevant issues that cannot be resolved. 

(3) The military members of each regional group shall receive their instructions 

from SecDef through the appropriate GCC. 

d. Emergency Action Committee (EAC). This organization is established at a foreign 

service post by the ambassador for the purpose of directing and coordinating the post’s 

response to contingencies as well as drafting the post’s EAP. The EAC is the focal point for 

DOS and DOD evacuation site interface. Another important aspect of the EAC mission is to 

brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation or protection of US noncombatants and certain 

TCNs or HN nationals in a crisis, whether by regular commercial, chartered, or US military 

transportation. The EAC normally is composed of representatives of each USG and foreign 

affairs agency present at the post or under the authority of the ambassador, and would most 

likely include the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) and/or the chief of 

the military mission. 

3. United States Embassy Representatives 

a. Joint forces involved in NEOs should familiarize themselves with the duties of the 

following positions normally found at US embassies and/or missions. 

b. Ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the 

government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which he or she is accredited and, as 

such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy 

regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in 

the mission. The President with the advice and consent of the Senate appoints the 

ambassador. The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior 

USG official on the ground during crises. 

c. Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career 

foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the 

ambassador. Although not appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-68 

Senate, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in 

chargé status. 

d. United States Defense Attaché Office (USDAO). The USDAO is an office of 

Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A US SDO/DATT heads the 

defense attaché office (DAO) in country and is a member of the country team. The 

SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, 

the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic 

mission, and the single point of contact (POC) for all DOD matters involving the embassy or 

DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The DATT is normally the senior 

Service attaché assigned to the mission. The SDO/DATT is the in-country focal point for 

planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country US defense 

issues and activities that are not under the purview of the parent DOD components. The 

attachés serve as liaisons with their HN counterparts and are valuable sources of information 

for the COM and GCC on the military affairs of the HN. The DATT may be accredited to 

more than one country. The SDO/DATT is also the in-country representative of SecDef, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the GCC and is responsible (under the 

direction of the COM) for coordinating administrative and security matters for all DOD 

elements assigned to the country, except those under the control of a GCC. The attachés 

assist in the foreign internal defense program by exchanging information with the GCC’s 

staff on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions and 

interagency coordination. 

e. Security Assistance Officer (SAO). The SAO maintains liaison with the HN 

military forces and is authorized by law to perform certain military functions with the HN 

military. The advance party forward command element (FCE) should coordinate with the 

SAO. JFCs should be cognizant that not all embassies have an SAO; rather, some may have 

a DAO or no military personnel at all. In many countries, security assistance functions are 

performed within the DAO. The SAO—which may comprise a military assistance advisory 

group, another military activity, or a SAO—operates under the direction of the COM but 

reports administratively to the GCC and is funded by the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects 

of the security assistance program. The SAO also helps the country team communicate HN 

assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. In addition, the SAO 

provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. 

f. Chief of Station (COS). As the senior intelligence advisor to the ambassador, the 

COS is an excellent source of information on the country and the current situation. As senior 

intelligence advisor, the COS should provide an updated threat description for the proposed 

NEO. 

g. Administration Officer. The administration officer is responsible for various 

activities at the embassy compound(s), which may include security at small posts; running 

the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling monetary aspects of 

embassy business, including foreign service national payroll, cash collection, and the budget. 

At a small post with no security officer assigned, the administration officer assumes the 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-5 

functions of the post security officer (PSO) and has operational control (OPCON) of the 

Marine security guard (MSG) detachment. Because of his frequent dealings with HN 

businesspeople, the administration officer is an excellent source of information on local 

indigenous personnel. 

(1) General Services Officer (GSO). The GSO works for the administration 

officer and is responsible for buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance. 

(2) Information Management Officer (IMO). Formerly called the 

communications project officer, the IMO runs the post communications center, processes 

and tracks all classified pouch material, and oversees the computer system at the embassy. 

The IMO is the POC concerning the communication capabilities available at the post. 

h. Political Officer. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates 

with the host government, and represents views and policies of the USG. The political 

officer maintains regular contact with host government officials, political and labor leaders, 

and other influential citizens of the HN, as well as other countries’ diplomats. The political 

officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture. 

i. Commercial and/or Economic Officer. The commercial and/or economic officer 

analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors, DOS, and DOD personnel on economic matters 

in the HN. Economic officers also negotiate with the host government on trade and financial 

issues. 

j. Consular Officer. The consular officer’s major role is to screen, process, and grant 

US passports and visas. Other responsibilities the consular officer may be assigned include 

attending to the welfare of US citizens and administrative tasks such as maintaining a census 

of US nationals within the HN. The consular officer provides the requisite number of 

personnel needed to screen documents of all potential evacuees during a NEO and provides 

instructions to any evacuation control center (ECC) personnel needed to staff processing 

stations. In countries where thousands or tens of thousands have to be evacuated in a short 

period due to high risk, the US embassy will not have adequate in-house consular 

capabilities. The US embassy may have to request support from DOS to obtain additional 

consular personnel to assist in processing. This is in addition to task organizing embassy 

personnel to fulfill requirements. 

k. Regional Medical Officer. The regional medical officer is qualified for general 

practice and is trained to set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The regional 

medical officer may also advise the JFC on indigenous diseases and proper preventative 

procedures for forces executing the NEO. 

l. Regional Security Officer (RSO). The RSO is a DOS security officer responsible 

for the security functions of all US embassies and consulates in a given country or group of 

adjacent countries. The RSO provides direction to the MSG detachment via the detachment 

commander. The RSO oversees the following personnel: 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-68 

(1) Post Security Officer. Posts with no RSO have a PSO. The PSO has general 

security duties at a specific embassy (or consulate) and is usually the administration officer. 

(2) Mobile Security Division (MSD). The MSD consists of DOS employees of 

the Diplomatic Security Service who respond to crises in foreign countries. The MSD is 

trained to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at an embassy, provide 

additional security, and provide immediate response to a security-related incident. 

m. Public Affairs Officer (PAO). The PAO is the ambassador’s advisor concerning 

public affairs (PA) and overseer of US cultural center operations. The PAO will be 

responsible for all press releases and press inquiries for information directed to the embassy. 

The PAO usually speaks at press conferences when the ambassador is unable to attend. 

n. United States Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment. A MSG detachment 

will have a minimum of six Marines, with the maximum number assigned dictated by need. 

The Marine detachment commander is normally a member of the EAC and is responsible to 

the RSO or PSO for internal security and protection of classified material and US personnel 

assigned to the embassy. Administrative control of detachment Marines is through the 

regional Marine officer (RMO). This detachment remains part of the embassy security force 

and normally will not be subsumed under JFC control. 

o. Country Team. The interdepartmental country team consists of key members of the 

US diplomatic mission or embassy that work directly with the HN government. Its purpose 

is to unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign 

country under direction of the ambassador. The country team meets regularly to advise the 

ambassador on matters of interest to the United States and reviews current developments in 

the country. 

(1) The country team members usually include those shown in Figure II-1. 

(2) One aim of the country team focus is to direct attention toward identification of 

potential sources of conflict and threats to US interests in a country and to minimize 

problems by introducing programs designed to assist the economy, enhance medical care, 

and improve the infrastructure of the country. 

p. DOD Force Protection Detachments (FPDs). The primary mission of DOD FPDs 

is to detect and warn of threats to DOD personnel (military, civilian, and dependents) and 

resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent DOD counterintelligence (CI) 

presence. FPDs serve as force protection multipliers for the US embassy country team in 

support of the DOD presence in those overseas locations. 

4. Other Agencies 

During NEOs, the JFC will probably be required to coordinate with agencies outside 

DOS. Other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs include the 

following: 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-7 

a. US Agency for International Development. USAID is an autonomous agency 

under the policy direction of SECSTATE. It plays a vital role in promoting US national 

security and foreign policy. USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic 

growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and 

enhancing democracy in developing countries. Administratively, it functions within DOS 

and operates under an administrator who also serves as the special coordinator for 

international disaster assistance. USAID administers and directs the US foreign economic 

assistance program and acts as the lead federal agency (LFA) for US foreign disaster 

assistance. USAID works largely in support of DOS and manages a worldwide network of 

country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic growth, 

encourages political freedom and good governance, and invests in human resource 

development. Responding to natural and man-made disasters is one of USAID’s primary 

missions. 

b. Department of Health and Human Services. By law (Title 42 US Code, Section 

1313) and Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 

the DHHS is the LFA for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS 

personnel meet and assist evacuees at the US port of entry. Their plans rely on state and 

local governments to carry out the operational responsibilities of repatriation. In wartime, 

the DHHS Repatriation Plan as governed by Executive Order 12656 will be implemented. 

In nonemergency conditions, the embassy and DOS will coordinate DHHS assistance 

rendered to evacuees. 

c. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The USCIS is part 

of the DHS. If the United States is designated as the safe haven, the USCIS may meet 

Ambassador

Deputy Chief of Mission

Political Officer

Senior Defense Official

Security Assistance Officer

Defense Attaché

Consular Officer

MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM

Administration Officer

Chief of Station

Commercial and/or Economic 

Officer

Regional Security Officer

Regional Medical Officer

Public Affairs Officer

Figure II-1. Members of the Country Team 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-68 

evacuees at the port of entry. USCIS representatives in country can assist in identifying the 

foreign nationals to be evacuated. Responsibilities of the USCIS include the following: 

(1) Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to 

the United States. 

(2) Adjudication of immigrant visa petitions. 

(3) Adjudication of naturalization petitions. 

(4) Adjudication of asylum and refugee applications. 

d. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA support teams (NSTs) 

provide a strong forward presence and have been very successful in supporting geospatial 

intelligence (GEOINT) operations at National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG) 

partner sites. They can provide timely, relevant, and accurate GEOINT in direct support of 

NEOs. NGA provides on-site GEOINT products, services, and direct representational 

authority, in cooperation with NSG mission partners, to the mission partner along a 

continuum of support, the basis of which is the cross-functional NST, composed of analysts, 

technicians, staff officers, and managers. The NST chief or senior NGA representative is 

designated by the Director, NGA, as the senior representative to the mission partner’s 

commander or director and is the primary POC for all GEOINT support provided by NGA at 

the site. 

For information on NGA capabilities and NSTs, see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support 

to Joint Operations. 

5. Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and United States Military 

Commands 

a. Secretary of Defense. SecDef advises and assists SECSTATE and the heads of 

other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, 

evacuation, and repatriation of US citizens in overseas areas. SecDef has primary 

responsibility for the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants at the US Naval Base, 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When authorized by SecDef, CJCS 

coordinates the deployment and employment of US forces in support of a NEO and monitors 

US force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. CJCS also 

recommends transportation movement priorities to SecDef and the use of United States 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the appropriate transportation 

resources in support of DOS requests. In addition, the CJCS coordinates with the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments and CCDRs on evacuee personnel accounting actions. 

c. Secretary of the Army (SECARMY). SECARMY acts as the designated DOD 

executive agent for repatriation planning and operations, and coordinates within DOD and 

other USG agencies, as well as state and local agencies, as needed, in planning for the 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-9 

reception in the United States and onward movement of DOD dependents, nonessential DOD 

civilians, US nationals, and designated aliens evacuated from overseas areas. Also, 

SECARMY is responsible for establishing and operating a joint reception coordination 

center (JRCC) and managing all of the DOD noncombatants’ needs as specified in the Joint 

Plan for DOD Noncombatant Repatriation (Non-Emergency). 

d. Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). SECNAV, in accordance with (IAW) the 

mission and priorities assigned by USTRANSCOM, provides military sea transportation for 

the evacuation of noncombatants, as required. Also, SECNAV provides augmentation 

support to the JRCC, when requested, including appropriate Marine Corps and, if transferred 

to Navy operational control, Coast Guard resources. Further, SECNAV monitors all 

Department of the Navy noncombatants when evacuated to a safe haven. 

e. Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). SECAF, through the Air Force Service 

component of USTRANSCOM, provides air transportation as well as aeromedical 

evacuation (AE) to support medical NEO requirements. Also, SECAF provides 

augmentation support to the JRCC, when requested, and monitors all Department of the Air 

Force noncombatants when evacuated to a safe haven. 

f. Geographic Combatant Commander Responsibility. IAW DOD policy, GCCs 

must prepare and maintain plans for the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants 

abroad for whom DOD is responsible. Plans will include the evacuation of military 

personnel not included in consular and/or embassy plans. Plans will also include 

identification of emergency-essential civilians operating in support of combat units who will 

not be evacuated. When conditions of potential hazard warrant, the GCC will recommend 

evacuation of DOD noncombatants to the CJCS, and the GCC may direct that DOD 

personnel under his control be evacuated from a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven 

when authorized by SecDef in coordination with SECSTATE. 

g. Special Responsibilities of the Commander, US Northern Command 

(CDRUSNORTHCOM), Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), and 

Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM). Under conditions of a 

nonemergency evacuation, CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM are the safe haven commanders for DOD repatriation in their 

respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Additionally, CDRUSPACOM is responsible for 

repatriation operations in Hawaii and US territories in the Pacific. While the Department of 

Army is the DOD executive agent for repatriation of DOD noncombatant evacuees, 

CDRUSNORTHCOM may provide repatriation services to non-DOD personnel for the 

continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Canada, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, 

Mexico, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands. 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM is responsible for repatriation operations within the designated AOR. 

h. Commander, US Coast Guard Atlantic Area, and Commander, US Coast Guard 

Pacific Area. Due to its reputation as a humanitarian Service, the Coast Guard may be 

called upon to play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation situations. The relatively 

nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft make them an option in cases where 

a DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-68 

i. Special Responsibilities of the Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command (CDRUSSOCOM). As a member of the WLG, the special operations forces 

(SOF) representative coordinates with DOS, the GCCs, and the Services to ensure the 

adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning and coordination in support of NEOs. 

j. Commander, US Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM, through its 

mobility components, can leverage its ability to obtain commercial lift by using existing 

services contracts. Additionally, USTRANSCOM will have visibility over unused legs of 

contracted missions which can be obtained quickly and converted to round trip at minimal 

cost, thereby flowing evacuation missions with other scheduled commercial missions. At a 

minimum, the strategic lift requirements for evacuation of noncombatants should be 

coordinated with USTRANSCOM. 

k. Marine Corps Security Force Regiment (MCSFR). The MCSFR has three fleet 

antiterrorism security team (FAST) companies totaling 18 platoons of one officer and 45 

enlisted Marines and one Navy corpsman each. These FAST platoons can provide a rapidly 

deployable augmentation of the MSG, providing the CCDR and ambassador with a lowvisibility reinforcement capability. MCSFR and its assets are OPCON to respective fleet 

commanders if currently deployed. If not deployed, all MCSFR assets fall under Marine 

Forces Command. 

l. Regional Marine Officer. The RMO is the company commander of the MSGs 

within a specific geographic region. 

m. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The DMDC is a component of the 

DOD field activity, Department of Defense Human Resources Activity. DMDC has two 

responsibilities associated with a NEO conducted by DOD: the centralized procurement and 

distribution of NEO tracking system (NTS) to a geographic combatant command and the 

maintenance of the DMDC NTS Web site at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/nts during the 

conduct of a NEO. 

n. Comptroller of the Department of Defense. The DOD Comptroller establishes 

financial arrangements with DOS and issues instructions to the DOD components for 

obtaining reimbursement for the costs of protecting and evacuating personnel for whom 

DOD is not responsible. When DOS incurs expenses for personnel for whom DOD is 

responsible, the DOD Comptroller completes arrangements for the reimbursement of costs. 

6. Host Nation 

a. Political and Legal Considerations. Coordination and interaction with the HN and 

en route HN governments will be required to determine, among other things, legal authority 

to conduct a NEO, overflight rights, ROE constraints due to HN laws, status of international 

agreements (e.g., status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], memorandums of understanding 

[MOUs]), request and/or approval for and NEO-related intelligence collection activities, and 

the legal status of evacuation force personnel. The outcome of this effort will influence the 

level of freedom and ease with which the evacuation force may execute its mission. 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-11 

See Appendix B, “Legal Considerations,” for further guidance. 

b. Actions. The response and activities of the HN during a NEO likely will be 

determined by the existing operational environment—permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The 

HN may assist the NEO by providing security outside the embassy property, around 

evacuation sites, and along evacuation routes. Continuous liaison and coordination between 

the embassy RSO and local police/military force commanders likely will be required to 

ensure this support is established and maintained. The HN also may be capable and willing 

to provide interpreters and intelligence, logistic, and communications support to the embassy 

staff and evacuation force. Other host-nation support (HNS) such as traffic control, airspace 

control, and port operations likely will be vital to NEO execution relieving the burden on the 

evacuation force. 

7. Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 

a. NGOs are organizations that may be in a country providing humanitarian assistance 

or relief when an evacuation takes place. They also may voluntarily assist dislocated 

civilians during all or selected stages of NEO. Approximately 350 agencies capable of 

conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with USAID. USAID 

publishes a yearly report, titled Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, that describes the aims and 

objectives of the registered organizations. The JTF should be cautioned that personnel 

working for these organizations cannot be ordered to leave a country. However, they may be 

able to provide valuable up-to-date information as to the location of US citizens. Some of 

these agencies or organizations may not support US goals. An early determination of their 

position in relation to US policy is essential. 

b. Regional and Intergovernmental Organizations. Regional organizations or IGOs 

may provide assistance to refugees during a US evacuation from a foreign country. 

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for more information 

on coordination with NGOs and IGOs. JP 3-08 also provides a discussion on relationships 

between the Armed Forces of the US and NGOs and IGOs. 

8. Multinational Noncombatant Evacuation Operation 

a. Initiation. Multinational evacuations involve multiple nation diplomatic 

initiatives—with coalition/combined forces conducting a NEO in a supporting role. A 

political decision from each of the participating nations is required to conduct a NEO with an 

MNF. However, military-to-military engagement can be conducted to facilitate unilateral 

national NEOs, so long as no formal agreements are initiated—because binding agreements 

fall under the auspices of DOS. Should the political powers decide on a requirement for a 

multinational NEO, an initiating directive (ID) should be issued to enable detailed 

operational planning to commence. The ID establishes the authority and parameters for the 

NEO. An ID normally includes guidance regarding the situation, political objectives, 

mission, participating nations, and timing. Specific guidance on conducting NEOs within 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is provided in Allied Joint Publication 

(AJP)-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-68 

b. Command and Control

(1) Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador(s), the multinational force 

commander (MNFC) is responsible for the conduct of military operations in support of an 

evacuation, and for the security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the 

assigned operational area. Although the ambassador(s) is the responsible national authority 

for a NEO, during a multinational NEO the MNF conducts operations in response to ID 

guidance—the ambassador(s) does not exercise military command over the MNF. In cases 

when significant differences between the MNFC and an ambassador become an obstacle to 

success of the operation, they will seek resolution from their respective superiors. 

(2) The primary goal of the MNFC is to support the ambassadors’ plans and 

cooperate with the diplomatic missions without compromising military mission 

requirements. The diplomatic missions can keep the MNF apprised of the on-scene 

conditions and can be influential for coordinating actions that may affect the NEO. These 

actions may include political or diplomatic constraints on the joint force, legal issues, 

agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, an ISB, and a 

temporary safe haven, if established. 

(3) Depending on the magnitude and anticipated duration of a NEO, the MNFC

may request designation of a coordinated lead diplomatic mission within the HN. Such a 

request would need to be discussed and agreed upon within the national foreign ministries. 

A designated coordinated lead diplomatic mission should have sufficient personnel and C2 

assets to serve as a focal point for coordinating NEO efforts among the alliance/coalition and 

other diplomatic missions included for evacuation. The intent of creating a coordinated lead 

diplomatic mission is to foster a degree of unity of effort and lessen the liaison burden on the 

MNF. 

c. Liaison. An MNF LNO and reconnaissance team (i.e., FCE) should be deployed to 

act as a link between the MNFC and the ambassador and gather information. In addition to 

information gathering, the early deployment of LNOs to the HN should be considered to: 

(1) Brief the ambassador(s) on NEO procedures, the likely forces involved, and 

other military considerations. 

(2) Coordinate with the military attachés and staffs, the diplomatic mission staffs, 

HN military, and the military personnel or forces of other nations deployed in the operational 

area. 

(3) Review the evacuation plans and coordinate with military plans. 

(4) Commence NEO planning to include initiating the commander’s estimate and 

OPLAN on behalf of the MNFC and the tactical planning for the MNF components. 

(5) Compile local information not otherwise available. 
Roles, Coordination, and Interaction 

II-13 

(6) Test or provide a communications system at the diplomatic mission. 

d. Organization

(1) General Composition. The MNF will be a task-organized tailored force whose 

composition will be determined mostly by the needs of the entry/withdrawal and supporting 

operations within the overall NEO. Typically, the MNF will consist of an MNF HQ and 

functional components. 

(2) Operational Elements. The MNF likely will task-organize to form an 

advance HQ, main body, and evacuation force. The advance HQ coordinates with the 

ambassador(s) and diplomatic mission staff(s) for information and assistance. The advance 

HQ reports to the MNFC. The MNF “main body” HQ joins the advance HQ as operations 

continue, and it coordinates and directs the MNF components during the NEO. The LNOs 

continue to coordinate directly with the diplomatic missions and other agencies as required. 

In most instances, the evacuation force is established from a designated MNF 

component, with other MNF components in a supporting role. For instance, if the NEO 

is permissive or uncertain with noncombatants departing primarily by air, the joint force air 

component commander may be designated the evacuation force commander. 

(3) Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Coordination Center (NEOCC). 

Depending on the magnitude and duration of the multinational NEO, the MNFC might 

consider establishing a NEOCC within the MNF HQ. The purpose of the NEOCC would be 

to create a centralized focal point providing a conduit for information exchanges between the 

various diplomatic missions and the MNF. 

e. Planning

(1) Review all available evacuation contingency plans, to include the mission’s 

EAP. 

(2) Perform a commander’s estimate. Note: A sample NEO estimate is contained 

in Annex B, Sample Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Estimate Format, of AJP-3.4.2, 

Allied Joint Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

(3) Obtain through direct liaison(s) the unique constraints and restraints (e.g., 

regarding the use of force), security plans, procedures for “walk-ins,” and plans for the 

protection/evacuation/destruction of classified material from the ambassador(s) relevant to 

the MNF’s assistance. 

(4) Develop/modify an OPLAN through the appropriate alliance/coalition process. 

f. Execution. A multinational NEO may be conducted in four phases—preparatory 

operations, preliminary operations, evacuation operations, and withdrawal and 

redeployment. These phases are usually sequential, but may have significant overlap. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-68 

(1) Preparatory Operations. Activities during this phase include gathering 

intelligence, generating the MNF, training and rehearsals, logistic buildup, and other 

administrative preparations. 

(2) Preliminary Operations. During this phase the MNF will likely deploy to a 

secure ISB(s), identify evacuation points, and assist in the establishment of the ECC as 

required. If the NEO is conducted in a hostile environment this phase may include forcible 

entry operations or operations to shape the operational environment. 

(3) Evacuation Operations. The main effort during this phase is the safe and 

swift evacuation of evacuees enabled by a rapid insertion of the MNF. The MNF should 

secure vital areas; support reception centers, ECCs, and embarkation points; evacuate the 

noncombatants; and provide force protection. 

(4) Withdrawal and Redeployment. The military end state for a NEO is the safe 

evacuation of all noncombatants to designated safe havens and the withdrawal of the MNF. 

Thereafter, redeployment to home station or to other tasks will normally occur. 

g. Logistics

(1) Support. NEOs, by their very nature, normally occur in nations where there 

seldom is a logistic support structure established by one or any of the allies or coalition 

partners. Therefore, the only guarantee of sufficient logistic support is if the MNF 

provides its own or makes solid short-notice, in-country support arrangements. A 

logistic estimate must be conducted to ascertain requirements. Although not an exhaustive 

list, some of the support arrangements that could be established are as follows: 

(a) If a legitimate government exists, and there is sufficient time to negotiate 

an agreement, the implementation of HNS under an umbrella MOU can be arranged. 

(b) In cases where an HNS agreement is not practical, resources may still be 

obtained locally. In-country resources, in the form of local contracts, can be made between 

the MNF and individual civilian providers, rather than the national government acting as a 

guarantor of support. 

(2) Organization. The allies or coalition partners normally are expected to provide 

all the personnel and equipment required to conduct their portion of the NEO. Further, 

nations may be required to transfer some level of authority over their national logistic force 

contributions at an agreed time for a specified period. In an extensive NEO, the MNFC may 

establish a multinational logistic command, which may consist of an operational element and 

a multinational joint logistic center, as its core. 

h. Terminology. When planning a multinational NEO, some differences in 

terminology used by the alliance or coalition nations and that used in this publication will 

become evident. Annex I, NATO/National NEO Terminology, of AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint 

Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, provides some examples. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

1. Introduction 

a. The US ambassador, with the approval of the Under Secretary of State for 

Management, can authorize the ordered or authorized departure of USG personnel and 

dependents other than uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and 

designated emergency-essential DOD civilians who are not under the authority of the US 

ambassador. While the ambassador cannot order the departure of private US citizens and 

designated other persons, the ambassador can offer them USG evacuation assistance. 

Normally an evacuation starts IAW the embassy’s EAP, using scheduled airlines, chartered 

flights, or surface transportation. 

b. Military assistance is provided in a variety of circumstances, not just when 

requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission. When SECSTATE requests 

military assistance from DOD, approval and the military response are directed by the 

President or SecDef through CJCS to the appropriate GCC, who will initiate military 

operations. When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear 

imminent, the ambassador may invoke such elements of the EAP as the situation warrants, 

including requesting assistance of the appropriate military commander, while simultaneously 

informing DOS. 

c. The President should be advised as appropriate by SecDef (or a designated 

representative) when forces are pre-positioned to support a possible evacuation, before the 

execution of a NEO, and as necessary, thereafter. 

2. Command Relationships 

a. Within the country, the ambassador has been designated as the responsible authority 

for the operation. Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador, responsibility for the 

conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation and security of personnel, 

equipment, and installations within the designated operational area is vested with the JFC. 

Figure III-1 depicts the chain of command for a NEO. 

b. Decisions During Planning. Due to time constraints and the unusual command 

relationship with respect to NEOs, operational planning and decision making must be based 

on a foundation of common understanding of perspectives (political and/or military) 

concerning the situation, mission, objectives, procedures, and free exchange of information. 

In cases when significant differences between the JFC and ambassador become obstacles to 

the success of the operation, they are referred to their respective superiors for resolution. 

“Your greatness does not depend upon the size of your command, but on the 

manner in which you exercise it.” 

Marshal Ferdinand Foch 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-68 

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS / 

REPATRIATION OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Support Military Service Bases / 

Installations

Chairman of The

Joint Chiefs 

of Staff

(NEO Support)

Supporting 

Combatant 

Commanders

Joint Task Force Commander

(Execution of NEO)

FunctionalService

Components/

Forces

CDRUSPACOM

(J- 1)

Executive 

Repatriation 

Operations in 

Hawaii and US 

Territories in the 

Pacific

CDRUSNORTHCOM

(J-1)

Executive 

Repatriation 

Operations in 

CONUS, Alaska, 

and US Territories 

other than in the 

Pacific

CDRUSSOUTHCOM

(J-1)

Executive 

Repatriation 

Operations in 

CONUS and US 

Territories within the 

Caribbean

Ambassador

President

Command

Coordination /

Support

Washington

Liaison

Group

Secretary of 

Defense

Geographic 

Combatant 

Commander

Defense Department Executive Agent for 

Repatriation Plans and Operations

(Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army)

CONUS

J-1

NEO

continental United States

manpower and personnel directorate 

of a joint staff

noncombatant evacuation operation

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States 

Northern Command

CDRUSPACOM

CDRUSSOUTHCOM

Commander, United States 

Pacific Command

Commander, United States 

Southern Command

Secretary of 

State

Figure III-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations/Repatriation Operations Organization 

Chain of Command 
Command and Control 

III-3 

c. Consultation Between the Ambassador and JFC. In the course of planning and 

executing a NEO, the ambassador obtains and considers the opinions and professional 

judgment of the JFC. This requirement, however, in no way limits the ambassador’s overall 

responsibility. 

d. Direction to Personnel. All necessary orders from the ambassador, the GCC, or the 

JFC to corresponding personnel are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate chain 

of command. In the event communications cannot be established with higher authority or if 

the situation deteriorates to one of combat operations rather than a NEO (regardless of the 

environment) and US lives are at risk, the responsible military commander takes whatever 

action is necessary to protect the lives of US personnel, informs the ambassador of actions 

taken, and requests guidance through the DOD chain of command. 

3. Command and Control 

a. Guidance provided by higher authority normally covers areas of key concern to the 

President and SecDef and provides the supported GCC with an overview of the diplomatic 

and political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and objective of 

US involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response are often provided in 

general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The 

CJCS warning order defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any 

planning constraints. The warning order also identifies available forces and strategic 

mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution or requests that the GCC 

develops as part of his COA. 

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS is responsible for the following: 

(1) When authorized by SecDef, coordinate the deployment and employment of US 

forces and equipment in support of the NEO. 

(2) Appoint the CJCS representative of the WLG to coordinate the execution of 

NEO responsibilities. 

(3) Monitor the capability and effectiveness of military forces in the protection and 

evacuation of noncombatants. 

(4) Recommend to SecDef transportation movement priorities and 

USTRANSCOM taskings to provide the appropriate transportation resources in support of 

DOS requests. 

(5) As a member of the WLG, coordinate with DOS, CCDRs, and the Services in 

the recommended designation of temporary safe havens and ISBs. 

(6) When conditions of potential hazard warrant, recommend to the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) that the movement of DOD 

noncombatants into affected countries be suspended. 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-68 

(7) Periodically evaluate overseas command procedures for NEOs, particularly 

during scheduled CJCS exercises. 

(8) Develop operational oversight guidance for a GCC’s employment of the NTS in 

a NEO. 

(9) Establish a standard procedure for the employment of the NTS in support of a 

NEO. 

c. Secretary of the Army. The responsibilities of SECARMY include the following: 

(1) Appoint the Army member of the WLG. 

(2) Act as the designated DOD executive agent for repatriation planning and 

operations, and coordinate within DOD and other federal agencies (as well as state and local 

agencies) in planning for the reception of all noncombatants evacuated to the United States 

during a NEO. 

(3) Establish and operate a JRCC. 

(4) Ensure the procedures are in place to meet the needs of DOD noncombatants at 

safe haven locations. 

(5) Ensure that procedures are in place to collect valid personnel data from 

evacuees during the safe haven period and ensure this data is distributed to other DOD 

agencies as appropriate. 

(6) As specified in the Joint Plan for DOD Noncombatant Repatriation, manage all 

requirements identified in support of DOD noncombatants. 

(7) As required, provide support for Army dependents evacuated as noncombatants. 

d. Secretary of the Navy. The responsibilities of SECNAV are as follows: 

(1) Appoint the Navy and Marine Corps members of the WLG. 

(2) Provide for the designation and training of port LNOs. 

(3) When requested, provide augmentation support to the JRCC, including 

appropriate Marine Corps and (if OPCON is delegated to the Navy) Coast Guard assets. 

(4) As required, provide support for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 

dependents evacuated as noncombatants. 

e. Secretary of the Air Force. The responsibilities of SECAF are as follows: 

(1) Appoint the Air Force member of the WLG. 
Command and Control 

III-5 

(2) Provide augmentation support to the JRCC, when requested. 

(3) As required, provide support for Air Force dependents evacuated as 

noncombatants. 

f. Geographic Combatant Commanders. The responsibilities for the commanders of 

geographic combatant commands are as follows: 

(1) Prepare and maintain plans for the protection and evacuation of US 

noncombatants IAW DOS and DOD MOU. 

(2) Cooperate with the ambassador and principal officers in the preparation of a 

consular or the embassy’s evacuation plan, contained in the EAP. 

(3) Appoint the military members to the RLGs. 

(4) Review all DOS EAPs for countries and consular districts in their AOR. If 

during the review of EAPs any of the criteria are not met, corrective action should be 

requested via the appropriate ambassador. Criteria to evaluate include the following: 

(a) Adequate provisions to protect and evacuate noncombatants. 

(b) Accurate references to the use of US military facilities. 

(c) Accuracy of specific planning guidance. 

(d) Distribution lists for subordinate and adjacent military commands and joint 

forces. 

(e) Procedures for periodic review. 

(5) Prepare and maintain plans for the evacuation of military personnel not 

included in consular and/or embassy plans, and these plans must also identify the 

emergency-essential civilians who will not be evacuated. 

(6) Ensure that plans are prepared for evacuation of military personnel not included 

in the embassy, staff, and DOD key and emergency essential civilians operating in support of 

combat units who will be evacuated after the NEO is executed. 

“Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting 

with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.” 

Sun Tzu 

The Art of War

c. 500 BC 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-68 

(7) When conditions of potential hazard warrant, recommend to SecDef that 

movement of DOD noncombatants into countries or areas be suspended. Also, recommend 

evacuation of DOD noncombatants if conditions warrant. 

(8) If time precludes adequate communication with DOS or DOD and upon request 

of the ambassador, provide assistance for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. If 

timely communication with the ambassador or the senior DOS representative is not possible, 

take proper actions necessary to secure the safety of participating personnel as well as other 

US personnel and foreign nationals who request assistance. 

(9) Upon completion of an evacuation involving DOD resources or personnel, 

provide SecDef with an after action report containing a summary of the activities and 

recommendations for improving future operations. 

(10) Determine lift requirements; if they exceed theater capabilities, coordinate the 

request for, and the tasking of, airlift and sealift to support the NEO. Lift requirements and 

AE are requested through USTRANSCOM, where they must be validated prior to action 

being taken by Air Mobility Command 

(AMC) or the Military Surface Deployment 

and Distribution Command. 

(11) Maintain geospatial 

intelligence base for contingency 

operations (GIBCOs): The GIBCO is a 

merging of the geospatial-intelligence 

contingency package and the geospatialintelligence base mobile visualization tool. 

GIBCO is an NGA mobile visualization 

tool on digital video disc (DVD) available 

through NGA or through the Defense 

Logistics Agency. 

(12) Request assistance from US 

Special Operations Command Integrated 

Survey Program and other geographic 

combatant commands, as appropriate, 

when requirements exceed the capabilities 

of the theater personnel. 

(13) Designate a JFC, as required. 

(14) Arrange for overflight and 

access agreements within their AORs to 

support en route activities and provide 

transportation and other force and asset 

requirements as requested by the supported 

GCC. 

The successful, safe, and orderly evacuation of 

noncombatants largely depends on the geographic 

combatant command’s ability to coordinate the 

operation with the Department of State and 

supporting commands. 
Command and Control 

III-7 

(15) Ensure the required quantities of NTS are on hand, operational, and readily 

available to support the anticipated volume of evacuees. 

(16) Coordinate with DOS and supported embassies to identify support required at 

evacuation sites and temporary safe havens; in cases where DOS needs assistance, provide 

contracting support to facilitate life support of evacuees. 

g. US Special Operations Command. The responsibilities of CDRUSSOCOM are as 

follows: 

(1) Be prepared to provide SOF in support of NEOs conducted by GCCs. 

(2) Appoint the SOF representative of the WLG. 

(3) Ensure the NTS connectivity requirement during a NEO is addressed in each 

GCC’s SOF communications plan and that satellite communications (SATCOM) 

connectivity is available at the NEO site. 

h. US Transportation Command. The responsibilities of the Commander, 

USTRANSCOM, include providing transportation to meet requirements as requested by the 

JFC and validated by the supported GCC. 

i. US Strategic Command. The responsibilities of the Commander, United States 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), are to function as the single POC for military space 

operational matters, except as otherwise directed by SecDef. USSTRATCOM’s Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSPOC) serves as the POC for GCCs for military space operational 

matters. JFCs and their components should request space support early in the NEO planning 

process to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. USSTRATCOM provides space 

force enhancement operations such as weather data, strategic warning, communications, 

navigation, and intelligence in support of military operations. The JSPOC can also provide 

necessary coordination for space support from national, civil, and commercial agencies. 

4. Joint Task Force Organization 

a. The supported GCC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the 

assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). As such, the supported 

GCC could decide to assign the NEO mission to a Service component or establish a JTF. If 

a JTF is formed, it will be established and organized IAW JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. The JFC is 

responsible for all phases of the operation to include the ISB and temporary safe haven (if 

located outside the United States and within the joint operations area [JOA]). An ISB or 

temporary safe haven outside the JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported 

GCC. The NEO JTF is typically responsible for support and transport of the evacuees to 

ISBs and safe havens outside the JOA. The JFC exercises OPCON over assigned and 

attached forces with the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned tasks 

based on the CONOPS. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-68 

b. Composition. The JTF’s composition is delineated in the establishing directive. The 

JFC exercises OPCON over assigned forces and normally over attached forces through 

designated component commanders. Other forces may operate in support of or under tactical 

control of the JFC, as directed by the GCC. 

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 

In 1996, the US military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans 

from Liberia when that nation’s civil war reignited into factional fighting and 

general violence. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense 

street fighting during the ongoing civil war, about 500 people sought refuge 

on American Embassy grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American 

housing area. On 6 April, the President approved the US ambassador’s 

request for security, resupply, and evacuation support. 

Elements of the USS Guam amphibious ready group and the 22nd Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)], were ordered 

to the vicinity of Monrovia, Liberia. Upon arrival, the 22nd MEU(SOC) 

commanding officer assumed command of Joint Task Force-Assured 

Response (JTF-AR) which included Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces. 

Between 9 April and 18 June 1996, JTF-AR evacuated 2,444 people (485 

Americans and 1,959 citizens of 68 other countries). Initially, Navy-Marine 

Corps forces provided embassy security and evacuated 309 noncombatants, 

including 49 US citizens. The bulk of noncombatants were evacuated by Air 

Force forces from Special Operations Command Europe. On 9 April, less 

than 72 hours after the decision to deploy US forces, the first MH-53 

helicopter landed in Monrovia to begin operations. Air Force KC-135 tankers 

and C-130 transports were put on alert in Europe to support 24-hour 

operations, while other mobility aircraft began to deliver critical medical 

supplies, food, water, fuel, and communications gear. 

Those evacuated continued on US helicopters through Freetown, Sierra 

Leone, then on MC-130s to Dakar, Senegal, all under the cover of AC-130 gun 

ships. Throughout the rest of the week, the evacuation continued, as well as 

airlift of critical supplies, to sustain the effort. By 14 April, the evacuation 

was essentially complete, however, security and sustainment operations 

continued through 3 August. 

While still conducting this operation, elements of JTF-AR were ordered to 

Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct similar operations. A special 

purpose Marine air-ground task force, embarked on the USS Ponce and with 

10 days’ notice, relieved the USS Guam task force and assumed the duties of 

Commander, JTF-AR. This was done to allow the Guam ready group and the 

22nd MEU(SOC) to return to the Adriatic Sea and provide US European 

Command’s desired over-the-horizon presence during the Bosnian national 

elections.

SOURCE: GlobalSecurity.org 
Command and Control 

III-9 

c. Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization. The JFC organizes the JTF staff. 

The JTF HQ composition, location, and facilities may have a major influence on what the 

JFC and staff can accomplish. An afloat JTF HQ may have limitations that could affect 

staffing levels and equipment capabilities. A JTF HQ located in a neighboring country may 

not have restrictions on space or amount of equipment. However, such a JTF HQ may 

encounter restrictions resulting from increased distances, political sensitivities (of the 

neighboring country), and other types of limitations. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

1. United States Embassy and Consulate Plans 

a. Emergency Action Plans. US embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs 

for the area under their cognizance. The ambassador is responsible for the preparation and 

maintenance of EAPs, one section of which addresses the military evacuation of US citizens 

and designated foreign nationals. The GCC is responsible for reviewing and commenting on 

EAPs. EAPs are not tactical OPLANs in the sense that military planners think of, but they 

are the reference materials that support the formulation of an OPLAN. The GCC should 

review the adequacy of the EAP to support military operations. A copy of the current EAP 

should be on file and maintained at the appropriate GCC’s HQ. EAPs include, but are not 

limited to, the information shown in Figure IV-1. 

b. Emergency Planning Handbook. The DOS Emergency Planning Handbook

(EPH), Volume 12, Foreign Affairs Handbook-1 (12 FAH-1) is a consolidated source of 

guidance for foreign service posts for planning and dealing with certain emergency 

situations. The EPH serves as the principal reference for posts in preparing and revising the 

EAP. Every foreign service post is required to have an operative EPH designed to provide 

procedures to deal with foreseeable contingencies. This handbook provides a detailed 

agenda to be addressed by the ambassador and the emergency team for planning an 

evacuation operation. It also provides a two-page checklist of questions (Military 

Implementation Checklist) most often asked by military commanders and planners 

concerning an impending evacuation operation. Appendix D, “Sample Emergency Action 

Plan Checklists,” provides an example of a checklist for a US military assisted evacuation. 

2. Military Planning—Combatant Command Plans 

 Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JFC receives the warning order 

from the GCC and lasts until the evacuation force deploys to either an ISB or the evacuation 

site. Prior coordination with the staffs of the GCC and embassy can significantly improve 

planning for the JFC. The GCC and staff can provide the JFC with information to begin 

planning, such as the general OPLANs. See Appendix C, “Noncombatant Evacuation 

Operations Planning Considerations.” 

“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of 

thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three 

stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of 

action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is 

worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.” 

Hans von Seekt 

Thoughts of a Soldier 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-68 

3. Intelligence Sources 

a. GIBCOs contain specific maps, charts, imagery, and other geospatial products to 

support evacuation planning and operations. GIBCOs are replacing the NEO package for 

each country, city, or region. The NGA produces GIBCOs, which give users flexibility 

through the use of Web browser technology for navigation and display of geospatial data. 

Applications of the GIBCO are broad, including the capability to become familiar with a 

foreign environment; develop a battle scene; plan, coordinate, and execute noncombatant 

evacuations, contingency operations, urban area missions, and search and rescue operations; 

as a desk-side reference; and as a means of access to geospatial data and navigation aids 

where networks or infrastructure have been damaged or do not exist. Tailored to each 

CONTENTS OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

Possible courses of action for different threat environments

Location of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports, beaches)

Anticipated number of evacuees (total number by area) 

categorized by medical status:

Persons not requiring medical assistance

Persons requiring medical assistance prior to evacuation

Persons requiring medical assistance prior to and during 

evacuation

Persons requiring emergency medical evacuation

Location of assembly areas and major supply routes

Location of command posts

Key personnel (name, location, and desired means of 

contacting them)

Description of the embassy communications system, 

transportation fleet, and warden system

Quantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at the 

embassy

Quantity of class III (fuel)

Availability of class VIII (medical supplies)

Standard map products of the local area, with annotations 

identifying critical landmarks

Figure IV-1. Contents of Emergency Action Plans 
Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

IV-3 

customer’s request, each DVD can hold an entire country or an intensified coverage down to 

a single facility. 

b. The Defense Intelligence Agency maintains various databases that provide details on 

diplomatic facilities and associated areas for use in evacuation planning and execution. 

c. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity produces joint expeditionary support 

products containing maps, charts, imagery, points of entry, and route studies for use during 

expeditionary operations including evacuation planning and execution. 

d. USTRANSCOM maintains the port and airfield collaborative environment Web site, 

which provides detailed overviews of ports and strategic airfields (capable of C-130s and 

above) worldwide. 

e. Each GCC’s joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) maintains Web sites and 

databases that provide varying degrees of intelligence support for particular countries. 

f. During a crisis, the most current situational information available would be found on 

the DOS Web site (www.state.gov) for the country of interest. If a special link to the 

evacuation has not yet been established, click on A-Z country pages, then click on the 

alphabet of the country. 

g. Basic information and maps of all of the countries of the world are available in the 

Central Intelligence Agency home page at www.cia.gov (link to country of interest via the 

Factbook). 

Emergency action plans vary considerably, depending upon the embassy’s physical 

characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and its security configuration. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-68 

h. Additionally, combat support agencies may deploy personnel as part of a national 

intelligence support team (NIST) to work with the NEO, consistent with other military 

operations. 

For additional information on a NIST, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

4. Notification Procedures 

a. To develop a realistic evacuation plan, the JTF staff should know how long it will 

take to assemble the evacuees once the decision to evacuate has been made. 

Communications with potential evacuees may be via a warden system, which is a 

notification system used to communicate to the US population through wardens using 

telephones, faxes, e-mails, and direct personal contact. A warden coordinator prepares lists 

of wardens and other contacts to cover areas of assigned responsibilities. The wardens 

prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of US citizens residing 

in their assigned areas. During an evacuation, each warden receives and distributes 

messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation, and other relevant 

information. 

b. Shortwave Radio and Commercial Telephone. Frequently, US citizens and 

foreign nationals reside outside the large population centers (for example, capitals, large 

cities, and military bases). Embassy contact with these individuals is often restricted to 

shortwave radio and commercial telephone systems, which are seldom secure. Shortwave 

radio and commercial telephone should be used to notify these individuals only if better 

means are not available. However, only the minimum unclassified information necessary 

should be transmitted. Significant delays can occur in notifying these citizens that an 

evacuation has been ordered. This can result in one group of evacuees being at the assembly 

area while another has yet to be notified of the evacuation. 

c. Recall. In some cases, a recall system for embassy or consulate personnel is a 

citizens’ band radio system tied to a telephone recall. It is usually fast, reliable, and efficient. 

d. Runners. In the event of a severe communications outage, personnel acting as 

runners may be the only way to pass information. 

5. Notification Phases 

a. Understanding the phases in which potential evacuees are notified is essential in 

developing a sensible evacuation plan. Figure IV-2 delineates typical notification phases. 

b. Drawdown. The basic options for drawdown are authorized departure and ordered 

departure. Departure may be authorized or ordered when it is of national interest to require 

the departure of some or all employees and/or their eligible family members, or if there is 

imminent danger to the life of the employee or the lives of the immediate family of the 

employee. When a drawdown is necessary to protect the lives of US citizens, the COM may 

act on his or her own authority. In all other circumstances, however, prior approval from 
Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

IV-5 

DOS must be obtained. The embassy, referred to as the post, is required to prepare lists of 

personnel to remain at the post in an emergency situation. The list of employees to remain 

will include those needed to manage an eventual evacuation of US citizens. 

(1) Authorized Departure. The ambassador must request authorized departure 

status from DOS. Employees who wish to leave the post must obtain approval from the 

ambassador. Family members who wish to leave the post as an official evacuee must also 

obtain approval from the ambassador. Family members who wish to leave the post not as an 

official evacuee may do so at any time. When the authorized departure status is terminated, 

the official evacuees must return to the post. 

(2) Ordered Departure. The ambassador may determine that a situation has 

deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for 

their safety. Ordered departure is not optional; family members and employees will be 

issued orders to leave. When the ordered departure status is terminated, official evacuees 

must return to the post. 

c. Evacuation. The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw 

down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, notification of potential evacuees 

involves communicating via the established warden system. As a rule, written messages are 

more reliable than oral messages and should be used whenever possible. There are four 

notification phases for an evacuation. 

(1) Stand Fast. When a country’s political or security environment has 

deteriorated and it is perceived that US citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is either not 

required or is temporarily impossible, all US citizens are requested to “stand fast” and are 

given preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country. The embassy identifies 

NOTIFICATION PHASES

DRAWDOWN

Authorized Departure

Ordered Departure

EVACUATION

Stand Fast

Leave Commercial

Evacuation

Embassy or Post Closing

Figure IV-2. Notification Phases 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-68 

the wardens and activates its emergency action organization. The embassy’s personnel 

review the evacuation plans, options, and support requirements, and the ambassador may 

consider requesting military assistance. The supported GCC may direct the deployment of a 

liaison team, activate crisis action response teams, and assign a subordinate JFC as 

appropriate. For a sample stand fast notice, see Appendix E, “Sample Notice Forms.” 

(2) Leave Commercial. Due to the gravity of the situation, nonessential US 

citizens may be told to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If 

commercial transport will not be available or adequate, the US embassy may coordinate for 

increased commercial flights or contract flights to assist US citizens departing voluntarily. 

The following other actions may take place. The embassy’s internal security force may be 

reinforced by additional MSGs and/or DOS security personnel, or a JTF may be formed to 

assist in the evacuation. The ambassador might request the deployment of a small JTF 

liaison team to the embassy to assist in evacuation planning and in anticipation of the 

requirement for military assistance to conduct the evacuation. For a sample leave 

commercial notice, see Appendix E, “Sample Notice Forms.” 

(3) Evacuation. When the political or security environment is believed to have 

deteriorated to the point that the safety of US citizens is threatened, the ambassador (with 

DOS approval) orders the departure of the personnel listed below in subparagraph 6c, 

“Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance,” keeping only essential personnel of the 

country team. The embassy would assemble, document, and begin assisting in the 

movement of US citizens, HN nationals, and TCNs to designated safe haven sites. Of note is 

per the DOS 12 FAH-1, Emergency Planning Handbook, safe haven in the United States is 

not available for either TCNs or foreign service nationals. Requests for exceptions will be 

sent to SECSTATE for a decision. A mix of commercial charter, private, or military 

transport might be necessary, depending on the availability of scheduled commercial 

transportation. At some point in this phase, the ambassador might request military 

assistance, either because the transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity 

of the threat to the evacuees. Once requested, the supported GCC, upon direction from 

SecDef through CJCS, commences military evacuation operations. These may range from 

simple transportation support to the deployment of a JTF. A sample evacuation notice is 

provided in Appendix E, “Sample Notice Forms.” 

(4) Embassy or Post Closing. The situation may deteriorate to the point that the 

embassy must close and all remaining US citizens and embassy employees must be 

evacuated. This will not include private US citizens and their dependents who desire to 

remain in the country. A list of personnel who cannot be ordered to depart a country is 

provided below in subparagraph 6c, “Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance.” 

Military assistance might not be required until this phase of the evacuation. JTF operations 

could range from removing the remainder of the country team to full-scale evacuation 

operations. A sample embassy or post closing notice is provided in Appendix E, “Sample 

Notice Forms.” 
Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

IV-7 

6. Evacuee Identification 

a. The first question most often asked by both diplomatic and military planners is, 

“Who are the evacuees, and how many of them will there be in a crisis?” There are several 

groups of evacuees, some of whom the ambassador may direct to evacuate and some whom 

the ambassador cannot. Understanding how evacuees are organized, notified, and moved to 

assembly areas helps in determining the number of potential evacuees and assembly time 

estimates. 

b. Report of Potential Evacuees. The report of potential evacuees, also known as the 

F-77 Report, identifies the numbers of potential evacuees at each embassy. Each embassy or 

consulate is required to submit to DOS an annual report, on 15 December, of the estimated 

number of potential evacuees in its assigned area. A copy of the most recent report must be 

filed with the EAP. F-77 Reports are available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router 

Network (SIPRNET) at http://ses.state.sgov.gov/f77/. 

(1) The accuracy of the report depends on the general level of interest in the 

potential for an evacuation. The fear that an evacuation may be required is often the most 

powerful motivator to get an accurate evacuee estimate. 

(2) These counts, however, are only yearly estimates. The accuracy of the estimate 

will vary with the speed and severity of the crisis. If the whole population of a country 

suddenly perceives a deadly threat, evacuee numbers and panic will be abnormally high. 

Evacuee estimates will probably be fairly accurate if the period preceding the evacuation has 

allowed for an orderly assembly of people who want to get out and the perceived threat at the 

time of the evacuation remains relatively constant. Note, too, that the estimate may be high 

or low due to seasonally dependent tourism. 

c. Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance

(1) The following prioritized categories of personnel are eligible for evacuation 

assistance and can be ordered to depart. 

(a) US civilian employees of all USG agencies (except DOD employees of 

military commands who have been designated as emergency essential). 

(b) US military personnel assigned to the embassy (e.g., DAO, security 

assistance personnel, MSGs). 

(c) Peace Corps volunteers. 

(d) US citizens employed on contract to a USG agency if the contract so 

provides. 

(e) Legal and authorized family members of those above. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-68 

(f) Family members of all other US military personnel (command-sponsored 

dependent and noncommand sponsored). 

(2) The following categories of personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance, but 

cannot be ordered to depart. If these individuals refuse to evacuate, the JTF marshalling 

team should obtain their signature on the Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity (see Figure E5), which should be forwarded to the embassy. If they depart the country, they may return at 

their discretion and at their expense. These personnel are as follows: 

(a) US citizens employed by non-USG organizations (e.g., World Health 

Organization). 

(b) US citizens employed by or assigned to IGOs and NGOs (e.g., United 

Nations [UN] Disaster Relief Coordinator, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 

International Medical Corps). 

(c) US citizens employed on contract directly by the host government, even 

though the contract may be funded by the USG. 

(d) US citizens employed by private entities, such as relief organizations, even 

though the employer may receive some USG funding. 

(e) Fulbright grantees and US citizens in comparable roles. 

(f) Other private US citizens. 

(g) Family members of private US citizens, to include alien spouses, children, 

and other bona fide residents of the household. 

(3) The category of non-US citizens seeking assistance can be the largest and most 

difficult to control during a fast-moving evacuation in an uncertain or hostile environment. 

The ambassador should establish the policy identifying who will receive evacuation 

assistance. While the United States does not have agreements that guarantee evacuation 

assistance to any nation, DOS can grant evacuation assistance to citizens from third countries 

following the initiation of an evacuation. Also, planners should keep in mind that facilities 

to process US citizens will become overwhelmed if the points of departure do not have the 

required processing facilities to handle non-US citizens and the volume of people a NEO can 

create. To the maximum degree possible, NEOs that include non-US citizens should be 

conducted with commercial aircraft delivering to major commercial international airports. 

When military airfields/military aircraft are used and non-US citizens are a part of the 

evacuation, initiate reception planning with DOS and the HN if another country is designated 

as a safe haven, or if evacuating to the US, DHS should be notified as far in advance as 

possible. 
Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

IV-9 

7. Coordination With Senior In-Country Military Officials 

a. The JFC should establish and maintain close liaison with the SDO, who is usually the 

DATT or the SAO. The SDO will be able to assist in the coordination of JTF activities with 

the embassy and to assist the JFC in obtaining the ambassador’s evaluation of the situation. 

Additionally, the SDO is able to provide information on the general scope of in-country 

activities for all DOD noncombatant command elements, including missions, locations, 

organizations, and unique security requirements. 

b. As part of the planning process, the JFC prepares a commander’s estimate covering 

the various options deemed feasible and any pros and cons relating to each, including 

political constraints. The CJCS or GCC warning order will normally provide the JFC with a 

concise statement of the US national interests at stake in the NEO, to include: 

(1) The safety and welfare of US citizens. 

(2) The continued stability of the local government. 

(3) The maintenance of a firm posture against terrorism. 

(4) A demonstration of support for international commitments. 

(5) The probable environment in which the NEO will be conducted. 

c. The ambassador should summarize the political objectives and constraints relevant to 

the JTF’s assistance, the nuances involved, and any constraints on the use of force that might 

be appropriate. While these may be obvious to those intimately involved with the situation, 

the JFC will be better prepared to comply effectively with a request for help if the reasons 

have been clearly explained. 

8. Embassy Security and Operations 

a. Security outside the embassy is the responsibility of the HN, while security of the 

ambassador and embassy grounds is the responsibility of the RSO. In many cases, US 

embassies do not have security forces or personnel. If security is provided, the RSO has 

DOS security personnel and a small MSG detachment to accomplish this mission. During 

the evacuation, the MSG detachment personnel receive their orders from the RSO, while JTF 

personnel receive their orders from the JFC. JTF personnel do not receive orders from the 

RSO. These command relationships can potentially cause problems, especially when MSG 

personnel and JTF personnel work together during the evacuation operation. It is vital that 

the JTF staff work out missions and command relationships before the operation. The JFC 

must understand the ambassador’s security plan and integrate the joint forces as smoothly as 

possible. 

b. The embassy evacuation plans may not provide for the embassy site to be a primary 

assembly area or evacuation site. However, experience shows that during times of crisis 

large numbers of US citizens, citizens of the HN, and TCNs will go to the US embassy. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-68 

These people will be frightened and may want to leave the country, but may not have been 

included in the notification plan or could not reach the designated assembly area or 

evacuation site. Separate plans should be developed to deal with these crowds, both as a 

threat to the embassy and as evacuees. 

c. Local citizens wishing to volunteer information may arrive at the embassy perimeter 

without prior notice. These individuals are called walk-ins. Embassies have standing 

operating procedures (SOPs) on the treatment of walk-ins designed to ensure quick and 

secure access to the appropriate embassy officers. JTFs should familiarize themselves with 

these SOPs. 

d. In some cases local contract guards control the perimeter of each embassy. These 

personnel may or may not be armed. Quality of the local guard force varies by country. 

Some local guards are professional and staffed with personnel who have proven their loyalty 

to the embassy’s staff. These local guards can be very useful in assisting US forces assigned 

to perimeter security duty. Planning must consider that some or all local loyal contract 

guards may desire to be evacuated. Planning for numbers to be evacuated should include 

this additional group. In addition, in the event these guards desire to be evacuated at the last 

minute, consideration must be made for replacement security. 

e. MSGs control access into critical facilities where classified material is processed and 

stored. MSGs have reaction plans to defend these facilities and destroy or evacuate sensitive 

material or equipment, if necessary. 

9. Repatriation Considerations 

a. General. Repatriation is the procedure whereby US citizens are officially processed 

back into the United States following evacuation from overseas. Although repatriation is not 

part of, but subsequent to a NEO, the information provided below should be understood by 

the NEO JFC and other key joint force members. 

b. Plans

(1) DODD 3025.14, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, designates 

SECARMY as the designated DOD executive agent for repatriation planning and 

operations. SECARMY is responsible for repatriation of DOD noncombatants. When 

requested, the Army shall also provide repatriation services to non-DOD personnel. 

Consequently, the Army has developed the Joint Plan for DOD Noncombatant 

Repatriation (Non-Emergency). 

(2) For the role of DHHS in repatriation of evacuees returning to the United States, 

see Chapter II, “Roles, Coordination, and Interaction,” paragraph 4, “Other Agencies,” 

subparagraph b, “Department of Health and Human Services.” 

(3) All GCCs must plan for possible repatriation contingencies. 
Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations 

IV-11 

c. Coordination

(1) Commander, USTRANSCOM, along with the supported GCC and the 

JRCC, coordinates the flow of evacuees to ports of debarkation. 

(2) The JRCC maintains oversight of the entire repatriation operation and keeps 

DOD and other federal agencies informed about repatriation matters. 

d. Funding. The Services and DOD agencies provide funding for safe haven expenses 

for their respective evacuees. The Service components have the authority to provide special 

allowances for their Service members and family members under an authorized or ordered 

evacuation from an overseas location. Federal employees and their family members are also 

authorized pay and special allowances. Financial entitlements include, but are not limited to, 

advance payments (when authorized by sponsor), travel, safe haven allowances, and 

subsistence expense allowances to authorized individuals, and legal claims settlements when 

authorized by SecDef and/or parent organization. 

e. Public Affairs. The Office of the Assistant SecDef (Public Affairs) supervises the 

PA aspects of all repatriation operations and approves the proposed PA guidance submitted 

by subordinate DOD organizations and commands. 

f. Evacuee Information Documentation

(1) Instrument. Department of Defense (DD) Form 2585, “Repatriation 

Processing Center Processing Sheet,” is the standard form used to document the movement 

of an evacuee from a foreign country to a designated safe haven. DD Form 2585 should be 

provided to the evacuees and completed by them prior to their arrival at the 

repatriation center. See Appendix F, “Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet.” 

(2) Purpose. DOS uses the information for evacuation management and planning 

purposes. The American Red Cross requires the data for communication evacuation 

information to sponsors remaining in theater. USCIS uses the information for tracking 

foreign nationals evacuated to the United States. DHHS uses it to facilitate delivery of 

personal and financial services, to recoup those costs and to identify individuals who might 

arrive with an illness requiring quarantine. Additionally, state and local health departments 

need and use the information to further implement the quarantine of an ill individual. 

Finally, DD Form 2585 provides a basic data source for the information recorded in the NTS 

and the Automated Repatriation Reporting System. Information in these two automated 

systems is routinely used to inform evacuee’s family members of their current location and 

final destination. 

g. Family Assistance. DOD family centers provide assistance for DOD and/or nonDOD civilian employees and family members affected by an evacuation from an overseas 

country throughout the entire safe haven period. These family centers provide essential 

services during the repatriation operation and follow-on assistance and aid when families 

reach their final safe haven destinations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-68 

h. Pets. Although the evacuation of pets is not authorized by Federal regulations, 

experience has shown that evacuees will bring their pets; therefore, repatriation centers and 

intermediate staging/processing locations should be prepared to take care of pets if approved 

by DOS. Families are financially responsible for moving their pets to and from the theater. 

Transportation of pets at government expense is not an entitlement. Veterinary assistance for 

pets should be made available at the repatriation sites as required. 

i. NEO Documents. GCCs and Service commanders outside the United States should 

identify the documents an individual would require to assist them in preparing for an 

evacuation during their initial assignment in-processing. A complete listing and explanation 

of all suggested NEO packet items, to include all of the documentation required for each 

evacuee and/or family to receive proper safe haven entitlements and process through the 

repatriation site expeditiously, may be found in the Joint Plan for DOD Noncombatant 

Repatriation (Non-Emergency).
V-1 

CHAPTER V

EMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEDURES

1. Evacuation Plan Implementation 

a. While the military may play a key role in planning and conducting the operation, it is 

most often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options. It is important for the 

JFC and staff to understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation. It might be 

quite natural to assume that the evacuation is a unilateral military operation and prepare the 

evacuation plan in a vacuum, ignoring the ambassador’s requirements and perspective for the 

NEO. The military and DOS representatives must therefore conduct extensive coordination 

to ensure the development of a feasible and supportable military plan that supports the 

ambassador’s requirements and objectives.

b. Evacuation Site Operations. Operations at the evacuation site are clearly delineated 

between those performed by DOS personnel and those performed by the JTF. However, in 

cases of emergency the JTF should be prepared to perform functions that are normally 

executed by embassy staff. This includes an awareness of movement plans using 

commercial and private aircraft, ships, and vehicles and all COAs being considered by the 

ambassador.

c. Authority to Invoke. Once SECSTATE approves an evacuation, the ambassador 

has the authority to implement the plan in a crisis. DOS, acting on the advice of the 

ambassador, will determine when US citizens and foreign nationals are to be evacuated. 

When unexpected violence flares up or appears imminent and communications with DOS are 

cut off, the ambassador may invoke such elements of the plan and initiate such actions as the 

situation warrants.

2. Advance Party

a. As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the advance party and requests 

permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party may consist of two 

elements: the FCE and the evacuation site party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, 

the FCE should be inserted before any evacuation site parties. In a hostile environment, the 

ambassador’s decision will probably be to insert the entire evacuation force to immediately 

commence the operation. The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and HN 

authorities (when authorized by DOS) and establishes a communication link among the 

JFC, supported GCC, and DOS. Additionally, the supported GCC may want direct 

representation with the ambassador during a NEO. The evacuation site party conducts 

reconnaissance to determine and establish assembly areas and evacuation sites. If the 

“A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing [an operation] 

exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too 

little.”

Carl von Clausewitz
Chapter V

V-2 JP 3-68 

JFC elects not to deploy an evacuation site party, the FCE is responsible for performing all 

of the responsibilities normally assigned to the evacuation site party. 

b. Preparation and Planning. Deployment of the advance party depends on the 

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and 

political considerations. The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive in 

the HN in civilian clothes on civilian aircraft. This is possible only if the necessary passport 

and visa arrangements can be made and the environment is permissive. An uncertain or 

hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of military aircraft allows the advance 

party to carry additional equipment that may be needed in setting up the evacuation site and 

establishing communication and liaison. The following advance party tasks should be 

accomplished during this phase: 

(1) Request permission from the ambassador for the advance party to enter the 

country. The number of FCE members allowed and the insertion method should be 

requested. 

(2) Deploy as soon as possible, and in advance of the main body, to allow 

maximum time for coordination and to determine external support requirements. 

(3) Develop and brief a communication plan for the advance party. 

(4) Acquire and review appropriate maps. 

(5) Review the embassy’s EAP and the EAP checklists, examples of which are 

provided in Appendix D, “Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists.”

(6) Assemble and inspect required equipment.

(7) Develop and brief a PR plan for the advance party. 

(8) Obtain visitor visas for all members of the advance party.

(9) Due to possible sensitivity of the political situation in the HN, determine 

whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.

(10) Consider weapon and ammunition requirements based on the threat 

assessment and limitations imposed by the ambassador (COM). 

(11) Examine the need for specialized equipment; for example, ordnance to assist 

DOS officials in destruction of classified equipment and documents or sufficient SATCOM 

systems to establish communications with the JTF or combatant command HQ.

(12) Determine the medical requirements.

(13) Identify translator and linguistic requirements.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-3 

(14) In coordination with the embassy, request overflight and landing rights for 

appropriate countries IAW DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance 

Guide. 

(15) Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO; obtain assistance to 

create requests for information to fill gaps created by missing data.

(16) Assess news media interest in the situation and activities of the JTF and its 

involvement in the evacuation. 

(17) Develop location/staging area to segregate medical evacuees from general 

evacuees if practical.

c. Forward Command Element. The FCE coordinates with the ambassador and 

members of the country team for information and assistance. The FCE normally submits 

situation reports (SITREPs) to the JFC. When the main body enters the country, the FCE 

rejoins the evacuation force and continues operations with the JTF HQ. 

d. Forward Command Element Composition. The JFC in coordination with the 

ambassador or his designated representative determines the size and composition of the FCE. 

The FCE may include the following personnel: 

(1) Officer in Charge (OIC). Provides direct liaison with the senior DOS official 

at the embassy to ensure orders of the JFC and the desires of DOS are accomplished. 

(2) Intelligence Officer

(a) Provides a conduit for intelligence directly from the embassy and 

evacuation sites.

(b) Coordinates with the DAO, COS, and RSO to provide the evacuation force 

updated intelligence estimates. The DAO can facilitate access to the daily embassy SITREPs 

and other intelligence.

(c) Obtains information and intelligence products, including GIBCOs to satisfy 

JTF intelligence requirements from the country team and other embassy sources. 

(d) Considers the following when conducting joint intelligence preparation of 

the operational environment and developing priority intelligence requirements and other 

intelligence requirements:

1. Climatological, tidal, astronomical, and lunar phase data.

2. Assets, characteristics, capabilities of ports, airfields, beaches, 

helicopter landing zones (HLZs), drop zones (DZs), and key facilities of the HN government 

for communications, utilities, and health services. 
Chapter V

V-4 JP 3-68 

3. Identification of hostile and potentially hostile forces and threat 

systems, including local government forces, rebel groups, dissident forces, student groups, 

and unorganized mob action, with the focus on their location and potential to become 

organized. 

4. Identification of any third parties (i.e., external countries) that may 

attempt to hinder evacuation operations. 

5. Identification of friendly third parties that could assist the NEO.

6. Potential for hostile infiltration of evacuees.

7. Imagery and other NGA products of required areas (if available).

8. Liaison with intelligence representatives of other US, third country, and 

HN agencies as appropriate.

9. Need for linguists to assist with debriefings or conduct liaison with 

foreign nationals as required. 

(e) Provide pertinent medical intelligence in support of the NEO to medical 

staff.

(3) Operations Officer

(a) Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities of the advance party and the 

JTF.

(b) Answers operational questions concerning the evacuation plan. Briefs the 

OIC concerning any information the embassy presents that may affect the evacuation plan.

(c) Ensures that support is provided to manifest noncombatant evacuees using

the DOD NTS. 

(d) Assesses the requirement for deployment of combat forces. 

(e) Defines and identifies strategic and/or theater lift requirements.

(f) Coordinates pet policy with DOS representative so veterinary support can 

be planned, if required. 

(4) Logistics Officer

(a) Coordinates HN transportation assets needed by the advance party and JTF.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-5 

(b) Arranges for supplies the JTF needs but cannot bring (such as water, fuel, 

medical supplies, and rations). 

(c) Coordinates nonorganic JTF heavy equipment and materials handling 

equipment support. 

(d) Provides on-site logistic assistance to facilitate the evacuation.

(e) Coordinates and/or executes contractual HNS agreements.

(f) Reviews strategic and/or theater lift requests for logistic constraints and 

feasibility.

(5) Security Officer

(a) Coordinates with the SDO, RSO, PSO, and/or MSG on security matters. 

(b) Determines and advises the OIC on security requirements before and 

during the NEO. 

(6) Communications Detachment

(a) Sets up and operates necessary communications equipment. 

(b) Determines areas of compatibility between military and DOD and/or DOS 

on-site communications equipment.

(c) Resolves any frequency problems that may occur. 

(d) Determines if HN communications equipment is similar to, or compatible 

with, US equipment. 

(e) Ensures that required single-channel communications equipment is planned 

for and deployed (high frequency, very high frequency, ultrahigh frequency, and SATCOM). 

Ensures the NTS airtime requirement is identified in the SATCOM communications plan.

(f) Develops an understanding of the operation of the HN’s phone system. 

Existing domestic telephone lines can be used to back up the military communication 

systems. Although telephone lines are not secure, manual encryption devices may be used to 

pass classified traffic and should be planned for. Telephone lines may be the most reliable 

form of communication, especially to remote evacuation sites. Communications personnel 

should verify the serviceability of these lines, record numbers, and ascertain dialing 

procedures for possible use during execution of the NEO. 

(g) Establishes reliable and redundant communication links and procedures 

among the diplomatic mission, supported GCC, and JFC. Communications must be 
Chapter V

V-6 JP 3-68 

established between the embassy and JFC so diplomatic and politically sensitive situations 

can be controlled. 

(h) Identifies sensitive equipment and/or material that will need to be 

evacuated or destroyed.

(7) Medical Team

(a) Advises the OIC of medical considerations that affect the NEO, to include 

recommendations for emergent and urgent patient movement (PM) (casualty evacuation 

medical evacuation [MEDEVAC], AE, etc.)/transport.

(b) Provides immediate medical assistance as required.

(c) Determines characteristics of the evacuation area that are related to the 

cause and spread of disease; such as terrain, soil, climate, animals, plants, sanitary standards 

of the native population, and endemic and epidemic diseases present. 

(d) Determines the need for special preventive medicine units. 

(e) If authorized by the embassy, determines veterinary requirements to 

prepare pets for movement. 

(8) Air Support Coordinator

(a) Coordinates both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft support. 

(b) Determines air traffic control requirements.

(c) Provides advice concerning the number and type of air assets required, the 

technical aspects of HLZs and DZs (including the type of security required), fixed-wing 

landing strips, and air evacuation routes. 

(d) Selects landing zones (LZs).

(e) Provides interface for air-to-ground operations. 

(f) Surveys air facilities for possible use to support follow-on forces for 

conduct of defensive combat operations. 

(9) Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and/or Fire Support Officer

(a) Identifies and confirms prospective targets to support the NEO (uncertain 

and/or hostile environments). 

(b) Coordinates targets with appropriate embassy personnel.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-7 

(c) Provides initial terminal guidance support and supporting arms control as 

required. 

(10) Public Affairs Officer

(a) Advises and assists the OIC on matters concerning the news media.

(b) Serves as a liaison between the OIC and ambassador for PA. 

(c) Works with the embassy PAO to publicize evacuation efforts in an effort to 

generate confidence in and a positive perception of the operation. This is always 

accomplished in close coordination with the embassy’s staff and within the guidelines of 

approved DOD PA policy. 

(d) Provides clear, concise, and timely information through the combatant 

command PA staff to senior DOD PA agencies. Provides information to the PAOs at the 

safe havens concerning media opportunities prior to the arrival of evacuees.

(e) Provides security review of media products to ensure that operations 

security (OPSEC) is not compromised. 

(f) Establishes an effective command information program. 

(11) Information Operations (IO) Officer

(a) Serves as liaison between the OIC and the supporting IO organization 

commanders/OICs. 

(b) Coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes IO core, supporting, and related 

capabilities that support the NEO. 

(c) Coordinates with the JTF PAO, embassy PAO, and embassy information 

officer to ensure that themes and messages are congruent. 

(d) Validates the IO and military information support operations (MISO) plans. 

(e) As required, obtains the ambassador’s approval for MISO products and 

execution of the IO plan. If a hostile environment exists, the approval authority for MISO

products and execution is SecDef, unless the approval authority has been delegated to the 

supported GCC. 

(12) Military Information Support Operations Officer

 

(a) Serves as liaison between the OIC and the supporting MISO organization 

commanders/OICs. 
Chapter V

V-8 JP 3-68 

(b) Coordinates and monitor execution of MISO to support the NEO. 

(c) Coordinates with the JTF PAO, embassy PAO, and embassy information 

officer to ensure that themes and messages are congruent. 

(d) Validates the MISO plan. 

(e) As required, obtains the ambassador’s approval for MISO products and 

execution of the MISO plan. If a hostile environment exists, the approval authority for 

MISO products and execution is SecDef, unless authority has been delegated to the 

supported GCC. 

(13) Civil Affairs (CA) Officer

(a) Conducts an initial civil-military operations (CMO) assessment of the 

operational area to validate information and assumptions of the CMO estimate and advise the 

OIC of CMO-related issues affecting the NEO.

(b) Advises the OIC on how to minimize population interference with 

evacuation operations. 

(c) Maintains close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective 

interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

(d) Assists the JTF in accomplishing its mission by obtaining civil or 

indigenous support for the NEO. 

(e) Assists DOS in the identification of US citizens and others to be evacuated.

(f) Assists embassy personnel in receiving, screening, processing, and 

debriefing evacuees.

(14) Legal Advisor

(a) Advises the OIC on such legal issues as may arise on scene in preparation 

for and during execution of the NEO. 

(b) Assists in preparing instruction packages on ROE, use of force, use of riot 

control agents (RCAs), applicable SOFAs, HN laws, weapons confiscation, search and 

seizures, and civilian detention, and conducts legal review of relevant authorities. 

(c) Conducts liaison with embassy and local officials on legal issues as 

required. 

(d) Coordinates plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the 

United States with appropriate embassy personnel. 
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-9 

(15) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician

(a) Advises the OIC and embassy staff on bomb identification measures.

(b) Inspects the embassy and potential ECC sites. 

(16) Religious Support Team (RST)

(a) Advises the FCE OIC on religious support requirements of evacuees that 

may impact the evacuation process. 

(b) Advises the FCE OIC on HN religious issues that may impact the 

evacuation process.

(c) Provides immediate religious support to military personnel, their 

dependents, and other authorized recipients, as required. 

(d) Provides liaison to HN religious leaders and/or government 

cultural/religious affairs officials for assistance to the evacuation.

(e) Provides liaison to religion-based NGOs for assistance to the evacuation.

e. Forward Command Element Tasks. FCE tasks are shown in Figure V-1. 

f. Evacuation Site Party. The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, 

establishes the assembly areas, evacuation sites, and the ECC site. When the evacuation 

force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the evacuation site party becomes 

the operations center and/or section of the ECC. Additional information explaining ECC 

operations can be found in Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing.” 

g. Evacuation Site Party Composition. The composition of the evacuation site party 

is determined by the JFC; however, the size may be limited by the ambassador. It may 

consist of the following personnel: 

(1) HQ commandant or OIC. 

(2) Operations officer.

(3) Intelligence officer.

(4) Communications and/or electronics officer. 

(5) Personnel officer. 

(6) Logistics officer.
Chapter V

V-10 JP 3-68 

(7) Security officer.

(8) CA officer.

(9) IO officer.

(10) PA officer.

(11) Legal advisor.

Initiate liaison with the diplomatic mission:

 Brief Department of State (DOS) representatives on 

 the capabilities and missions of the advance party 

 and the joint task force (JTF)

 Establish a forward command post that can be 

 expanded to the JTF headquarters staff

Provide a continuing presence for planning and ensure 

a complementary role with DOS personnel

Determine whether the operational environment is 

permissive, uncertain, or hostile

Advise the joint force commander (JFC) regarding the 

size and composition of forces required. If specified in 

the initiating directive, determine whether the JTF is 

appropriate for the mission

Advise the JFC regarding the time, place, and method 

for the arrival of the evacuation force

Determine existing political and sociological 

considerations

Determine attitude of the local population

Establish communications between the forward 

command element and the JFC:

 Make the communication link to JFC available to 

 the senior DOS representative

 Maintain continuous communications for exchange 

 of planning and intelligence information

FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT TASKS

Figure V-1. Forward Command Element Tasks
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-11 

(12) Air support coordinator. 

(13) Medical officer.

(14) RST.

(15) Engineer officer.

h. Evacuation Site Party Tasks

(1) Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body. 

(2) Provide direct liaison with the chief of the embassy consular office. 

(3) Maintain liaison with civilian or HN government agencies involved in the 

evacuation.

(4) Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, 

beaches, HLZs and/or DZs, airports, and ports; obtain photographs, where possible. To 

ensure that aircraft configurations are taken into account, the air support coordinator will be 

fully aware of the requirements of potential pickup and delivery sites. 

(a) Recommend and/or confirm assembly areas, evacuation sites, and HLZs 

and/or DZs. If required to move assembly area operations, coordinate approval with the 

ambassador.

(b) Prepare initial evacuation site defensive plan and evacuation security 

requirements.

(c) Plan and coordinate emergency AE operations for evacuees with serious 

medical problems.

(d) Plan and coordinate operations of assembly areas and evacuation areas with 

DOS representatives.

(5) Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to include 

the following: 

(a) Clear minor obstacles.

(b) Plan and layout assembly areas and evacuation sites.

(c) Plan and provide for initial terminal guidance at beaches and HLZs and/or

DZs.

(6) Collect essential planning information that includes the following:
Chapter V

V-12 JP 3-68 

(a) Assessment of hostage threat.

(b) Number and categories of evacuees. 

(c) Medical status of evacuees.

(d) Safe havens (intermediate, temporary, final) determined by DOS.

(e) Political constraints.

(f) Number of HN personnel and TCNs to be evacuated. 

(7) Assist DOS personnel with news media. 

(8) Establish and maintain communications with the FCE and embassy. 

(9) Coordinate additional security requirements the HN police may be able to 

provide. 

(10) During permissive NEOs, coordinate for overflight rights. In uncertain or 

hostile environments, consider the need for OPSEC and airspace coordination prior to 

coordinating overflight rights. 

(11) Plan and coordinate health care needs of the evacuee population. Determine 

endemic disease and environmental threats to the population at risk, mission, and operational 

commander. Plan for the health care needs of evacuees in transit to safe havens in concert 

with joint, other USG, intergovernmental, and multinational agencies as necessary. 

(12) If pet evacuation is authorized by DOS, establish pet storage and care area.

i. Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell. A GCC may elect to stand up a 

deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC), a liaison and augmentation asset 

that can be deployed in advance of a JTF advance party. The DJTFAC can serve as both the 

JFC’s advance party and the GCC’s liaison until the JTF advance party is deployed and 

operational.

j. Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ[CE]). A GCC may 

utilize a SJFHQ(CE) as an advance party to a JTF. The SJFHQ(CE) provides the CCDR 

with a trained, standing joint C2 capability to accelerate the formation of a JTF HQ. 

For additional information on SJFHQ(CE), refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and US Joint 

Forces Command’s Web-based Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating 

Procedure. 
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-13 

3. Joint Task Force Main Body Organization and Missions 

a. A JTF “main body” will deploy to conduct the on-scene evacuation process. After 

insertion of the main body, each element prepares for its part in the operation. As the 

advance party rejoins the main body, the main body may consist of a HQ, marshalling 

element, security element, logistic element, and SOF. The size of the main body depends on 

the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation. Figure 

V-2 depicts the JTF main body. Overall, the JTF organization will comply with JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force 

Headquarters. 

b. JTF HQ. The JTF HQ coordinates and directs the evacuation. 

(1) Forward Command Element. The FCE joins the evacuation force and 

continues operations with the JTF HQ. Effective liaison with the embassy will be made by 

the FCE.

JOINT TASK FORCE MAIN BODY

Advance Party

Main Body

Joint Task Force

Headquarters

Joint

Communications 

Support Element

Logistic

Element

Command

Group

Liaison

Team

Administration Team 

and/or

Evacuation Control 

Center

Processing

Center

Forward

Command

Element

Marshalling

Element

Security

Element

Evacuation Site 

Party

COMMAND

COORDINATE

Figure V-2. Joint Task Force Main Body
Chapter V

V-14 JP 3-68 

(2) Liaison Team. The liaison activities continue with the embassy, supported 

GCC, and other agencies as required.

(3) Administrative Team. The administrative team joins the evacuation site party 

to form the ECC. The administrative team is responsible for the smooth operation of the 

ECC processing center. Processing center operations are discussed in Chapter VI, “Evacuee 

Processing.”

c. Marshalling Element. The marshalling element moves to and secures predesignated 

assembly areas, brings evacuees to the assembly areas, and escorts them to the ECC. The 

size of the marshalling force depends on the number of sites and evacuees.

(1) Marshalling Team. One marshalling team controls an assembly area and 

evacuates the citizens in that area. The marshalling team should be large enough to organize 

into two sections that consist of search squads and security squads. Search squads may not 

be needed if the embassy’s evacuation plan has been successfully implemented and all 

evacuees have been notified. If it has been determined that all evacuees have been informed, 

then search squads should not leave the assembly area except in emergency cases.

(a) The search squads locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. 

Each search squad should have an interpreter and, if possible, a guide. A lost squad in a 

potentially hostile environment can create significant problems for the evacuation force. 

Interpreters may be required to assist the search squads in moving from the assembly areas 

and to locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

In accordance with mission priorities and available assets, noncombatant evacuation operations 

may use a number of transportation modes, to include small craft sea transportation.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-15 

(b) A security squad provides security to the team during movement and in the 

assembly area.

(c) Planners consider marshalling team C2 requirements. MISO units (both 

Army and Marine Corps), military police units, military linguists, contract interpreters, and 

host and partner nation assets are all examples of assets or units that may be able to provide 

additional capability. 

(2) Marshalling Force Operations. The marshalling team locates evacuees and 

moves them to assembly areas and eventually to the ECC. The marshalling team may have 

several search squads under the control and direction of the team’s OIC. The following 

should be considered during marshalling operations: 

(a) Sufficient transportation for the search and/or security squads and 

evacuees. All evacuees should be prepared to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and 

tracked or wheeled vehicles. Other considerations include: 

1. The use of local drivers, if available, because of their experience and 

familiarity with the local road network.

2. Availability of sufficient mechanics for emergency repairs.

3.

(b) Movement control requires:

 Briefing of military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

1. Identification of environmental factors that will hamper movement 

(e.g., flooding, weather effects on ground lines of communications). 

2. Identifying primary and alternate routes and checkpoints.

3. Having local road maps available for each driver.

4. Planning for convoy control and security. 

5. Identifying safe houses or areas if vehicles break down or become 

separated or lost.

6. Ensuring that adequate communications equipment is available for 

convoys. 

(c) Assembly area operations include: 

1. Establishment of perimeter security, even in a permissive environment.

2. Sufficient transportation available to move evacuees to the ECC. 

Vehicles belonging to the evacuees may be used to transport personnel to the ECC. 
Chapter V

V-16 JP 3-68 

3. Coordination of staggered movement schedules between several 

assembly areas and the movement schedule of evacuees to the ECC.

(d) Search squad operations include: 

1. Obtaining a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer.

2. Obtaining copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee. 

3. Having copies of the Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity readily 

available (see Appendix E, “Sample Notice Forms”) for evacuees who refuse to leave.

4. Briefing each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the embassy, 

positive identification requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be 

transported. 

5. Recording the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and 

citizenship of each evacuee.

6. Escorting evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC (evacuees 

may drive their vehicles directly to the ECC, and search personnel should note the 

individual’s name and intent). 

7. Identifying evacuees not on the list provided by the embassy. 

d. Security Element. Security forces are used as necessary at the evacuation sites, 

ECC perimeter, LZs, aircraft, staging and/or parking areas, and landing sites for naval 

landing craft. Security forces can also provide a reaction force if a marshalling team or other 

unit encounters difficulty or requires assistance. To determine the size of the security force, 

consider the following: 

(1) Enemy threat to evacuation operations. 

(2) Anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in 

and around the evacuation objective area.

(3) Crowd control requirements at each site. 

(4) Number of evacuees.

(5) Number of marshalling and search teams required to search for evacuees.

(6) Number of evacuation sites.

(7) Size of the ECC.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-17 

(8) Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.

(9) Personal security of the ambassador.

(10) Type of resources used to evacuate personnel. 

e. Logistic Element. The logistic support provided should be limited to the minimum 

essential support required for the evacuation. Consideration should be given to the following 

factors in determining requirements for logistic support of the JTF: 

(1) Characteristics of the evacuation area.

(a) Resources available:

1. Existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF, such as facilities 

for the storage and distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, 

medical facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities.

2.

(b) Climate, weather, and terrain.

 Food, water, fuel, and consumables. 

(c) Number of evacuees and their needs.

(2) Potential threats to the evacuation.

(a) Adversary and/or potential adversary strength and activity. 

(b) Disposition and location. 

(3) Strength and composition of the JTF. 

(a) Total troop strength. 

(b) Composition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and maritime combat 

forces, combat support, and combat service support units. 

(c) Logistic support capabilities of each component and separate unit. 

(4) Time constraints and duration of operation. 

(5) Logistic support required by the embassy and evacuees.

(6) Availability and suitability of HNS as an alternative to deploying US military 

logistic support. 

(7) Prearranged HNS and/or inter-Service support agreements as appropriate.
Chapter V

V-18 JP 3-68 

(8) Capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to provide rapid 

evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties.

4. General Considerations

a. Medical and Dental. During evacuation operations, it may be difficult to insert and 

establish the medical support function for the JTF because of time and operational 

constraints. Comprehensive and detailed casualty and medical support planning should be 

implemented to cover immediate medical and surgical treatment points. Special units 

organized for this purpose may save lives and permit a more expeditious evacuation. 

Depending on the size and scope of the evacuation operation, there may be the potential for 

large numbers of both military and civilian casualties. The JFC’s medical staff should 

identify tailored medical packages to treat disease and nonbattle injuries, and to identify and 

mitigate potential environmental health threats.

(1) Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC). The GPMRC is 

a joint activity reporting directly to USTRANSCOM. The GPMRC provides medical 

regulating services, including clinical validation, limited patient in transit visibility, and 

evacuation requirements planning for intertheater PM and intratheater for CONUS. The 

GPMRC coordinates with supporting resource providers to identify available assets and 

communicates transport to bed plans to Service components, or other agencies, to execute 

the mission.

(2) Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). Both US 

Pacific Command and US European Command have a permanent TPMRC that manages the 

validation and regulation of intratheater PM within their respective theaters. The TPMRC is 

responsible for theater-wide PM (e.g., medical regulating and AE scheduling) and 

coordinates with theater medical treatment facilities to allocate the proper treatment assets 

required to support its role. The TPMRC communicates this transport to bed plan to the 

theater Service transportation component or other agencies responsible for executing the 

mission. The TPMRC coordinates with the GPMRC for intertheater PM. 

(3) AE is the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between 

medical treatment facilities by air transportation. The Air Force is responsible for operating 

a common-user, fixed-wing AE system. HQ AMC is responsible for serving as the single 

AE proponent for the Air Force, managing and operating the intertheater and CONUS AE 

systems. Intratheater AE is a responsibility of the GCC through the TPMRC. 

USTRANSCOM, through the GPMRC, will task HQ AMC to provide AE forces to airfields 

in theater, to evacuate casualties between theaters (intertheater), or from a theater of 

operations to CONUS reception airfields. Further distribution of patients within CONUS

will be coordinated by GPMRC in conjunction with the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center. 

Intratheater common-user AE will be provided using a combination of theater-assigned AE 

units and/or deployment of theater-specific AE elements. Refer to JP 4-02, Health Service 

Support, for additional information on AE. 

(4) Other considerations for medical staffs planning NEOs include the following:
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-19 

(a) Experience has shown that the common medical complaints of personnel 

being evacuated are nausea, dehydration, and diarrhea. Most frequently, sick evacuees will 

be children. 

(b) Particularly effective medical staffs during NEOs include general medical 

officers, family practitioners, pediatricians, internists, and psychiatrists and/or psychologists. 

Additionally, there are usually requirements for medical support staff, including physician 

assistants, nurse practitioners, nurses, medical corpsmen and/or technicians, and public 

health officers.

(c) Well-established liaison with local hospitals or medical centers and 

ambulance service is essential.

(d) A separate area close to the disembarkation point should be designated to 

perform medical assessments, dispense medication, and conduct patient staging. 

(e) Medical staff should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to 

aid in identification.

(f) Medical staffs may anticipate medicinal requests that include antibiotics, 

antidiarrheals, pain relievers, antibacterial creams, eye and ear drops, cough and cold 

formulas, high blood pressure medications, and insulin. 

(g) Special plans and attention to the situation will be required to move and 

evacuate personnel hospitalized in HN medical facilities.

(h) AE missions may require movement of urgent or priority patients in 

aircraft not completely filled. Due to patients’ severe conditions, the aircraft will normally 

not be delayed for nonmedical evacuees to be moved to the airfield in order to fill the aircraft 

to maximum capacity.

(i) Preventive environmental health services are particularly necessary in some 

locales to minimize acquiring diseases while waiting in relatively unprotected circumstances.

(j) Primary casualty receiving and treatment ships (PCRTSs) may provide 

medical treatment resources offshore. 

(k) Predeployment planning for medical logistics, to include coordination with 

the most appropriate theater lead agent for medical materiel for the affected theater, is 

imperative to ensure proper medical supplies and a resupply process. 

(5) Veterinary support may be required if DOS allows pet evacuations. Additional 

considerations may include means of movement, kennel requirements, identification 

microchips, gaining country quarantine requirements, vaccination requirements, outgoing 

physical examinations, health certificates, and rabies certificates. 
Chapter V

V-20 JP 3-68 

b. Personnel Recovery. If the NEO environment becomes uncertain or hostile, the JFC 

may need to establish a joint PR center to plan and coordinate PR missions. While primarily 

organized to recover US military or DOD civilians and DOD contractors authorized to 

accompany the force, authority also may be granted by the President or SecDef to recover 

other US or foreign nationals who have become isolated during the NEO. 

For further guidance on planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing a PR mission, 

refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

c. Mortuary Affairs. Mortuary affairs personnel ensure proper and dignified treatment 

of human remains. The JTF should plan for mortuary affairs for both military personnel and 

evacuees. Even in a permissive NEO environment, deaths among elderly, critically ill, or 

newborn evacuees may be encountered. The decision to transport remains is dependent on 

but not limited to the specifics of the situation, to include the tactical environment, weather, 

and capacity of receiving ships and aircraft. (Note: PCRTSs are outfitted with limited 

morgue facilities.) Under no circumstances should remains be transferred before all 

evacuees have been safely transported.

For guidance and information pertaining to the search, recovery, evacuation, and 

identification of the dead or temporary burial of remains in theaters of operations, refer to 

JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs. 

d. Strategic Communication. The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide 

top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in 

specific situations. SC-related activities may play a more important role in the NEO if the 

environment becomes uncertain or hostile. SC is focused USG processes and efforts to 

understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable 

to advancing national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, 

themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national 

power. SC’s primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public 

diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort. The 

predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages are PA, IO, and DSPD. 

(1) Public Affairs. The JFC will ensure that accurate and timely release of 

information about the operation is made to the media to the maximum extent possible 

consistent with DOD-approved PA guidance, OPSEC, and the safety of personnel involved. 

Speed of media transmission makes it probable that a worldwide audience will have 

immediate access to information about the conduct of the operation and its participants. To 

ensure that the media do not provide intelligence to persons hostile to the operation, the PAO 

working with embassy personnel needs to manage PA through accurate and timely releases 

concerning the NEO. During NEOs, the JTF PAO needs to ensure that all PA 

announcements have been approved by the ambassador or the designated representative. 

Additional PAO responsibilities include the following:

(a) Advise the JFC on all aspects of PA.
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-21 

(b) Develop a PA plan that coordinates all public (media and general public) 

and command (internal) information functions, including publication of JTF bulletins, 

newsletters, video tapes, Web pages, and press releases.

(c) Review materials prior to public release.

(d) Establish procedures IAW guidance promulgated by higher authority. 

(e) As required, obtain appropriate clearances for press releases. 

(f) Distribute information pertaining to the JTF and its operations IAW 

established command security policies. 

(g) Serve as liaison and escort for civilian and military information media 

representatives. In anticipation of, and prior to operations: 

1. Ensure that the information plan is updated daily. 

2. Determine PA personnel and equipment requirements. 

3. Obtain a current list of legitimate media representatives in country to 

coordinate release of information during a crisis. 

(h) Determine and disseminate JFC guidance on the release of public 

information. 

(i) Provide civilian and military media office space, to include press room or 

news center near the proposed command post, emergency operations center, or ECC. 

(j) During operations: 

1. Establish a press conference schedule and conduct press briefings. 

2. Provide rapid response to press queries. 

3. Disseminate a daily JTF information news bulletin.

4. Disseminate news to subordinate units as appropriate. 

For further guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

(2) Information Operations. IO are the integrated employment of the core 

capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations, MISO, military 

deception (MILDEC), and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting that of friendly forces. During a NEO, there may not be an 
Chapter V

V-22 JP 3-68 

identified adversary, and some of the capabilities listed above may not be appropriate or 

relevant. However, the fluid situation often present during a NEO and the frequent 

occurrence of NEOs with other military operations necessitate the coordination of the 

appropriate capabilities listed above through the joint IO cell. OPSEC cannot be 

overemphasized, especially in a nonpermissive environment. It greatly contributes to the 

protection of forces and the personnel being evacuated. 

For further guidance on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations, JP 3-13.1, Electronic 

Warfare. 

(a) Military Information Support Operations. The purpose of MISO is to 

induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

MISO can greatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments. MISO efforts and 

assets can execute programs and disseminate products that induce an attitude and/or behavior 

of noninterference toward the NEO among the local populace. Prudent employment of 

MISO can prevent the degeneration of a permissive or uncertain environment into a hostile 

environment. JFCs should begin MISO planning as early as possible to ensure approval for 

execution in support of operations. MISO resources and capabilities provide the commander 

with a means of influencing hostile and potentially hostile personnel (combatant and civilian) 

through employment of appropriate media and using the appropriate language(s) and 

symbols and/or terms of reference. If the JFC desires to employ MISO, that decision should 

be coordinated with the ambassador and appropriate members of the country team. DOS 

personnel should be able to provide JTF MISO personnel with valuable information about 

the target audience and any programs similar to MISO they may have been using in 

preparation for the NEO or the crisis that precipitated the NEO requirement. MISO efforts in 

support of NEO can produce the following results: 

1. Explain the purpose of US actions and manage and counter 

disinformation, deception, confusion, and rumor. 

2. Assist in establishing control of civilian evacuees, the neutral local 

populace, and other groups in the operational area to minimize casualties and to prevent 

interference with friendly military operations.

3. Prevent or deter interference by hostile forces or other nations. 

4. Provide continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to maximize 

political and psychological effects of the operation.

5. Exploit withdrawal of US forces while creating positive perceptions of 

US intent and goodwill. 

6.

For further guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. 

 Support PA, MILDEC, and OPSEC, as required 
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-23 

(b) Military Deception. Use of MILDEC to support a NEO in a hostile or 

uncertain environment can help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, 

locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. The MILDEC representative to the IO 

cell is responsible for incorporating/deconflicting actions planned by other IO capabilities 

into the deception plan. 

For further guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

(3) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. DSPD can be used to complement PA 

and IO efforts during a NEO in a hostile or uncertain environment. PA activities should be 

planned and coordinated with any other DSPD activities to ensure unity of effort and 

maximum effectiveness. DSPD can entail the use of a military information support team 

(MIST) to support a US embassy within a HN. The MIST prepares information products, 

based on the guidance of the country team to communicate country-specific themes and 

messages. It could also involve the deployment of a joint public affairs support element 

(JPASE) team to a contingency location where JPASE representatives work out of the US 

embassy and coordinate military PA activities with embassy goals and objectives. DSPD 

requires coordination with both the interagency and among DOD components. 

e. Information Sharing. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with the 

NGOs and international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in 

sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and 

understanding of the objectives to achieve the mission. However, classified information will 

only be shared with or released to individuals with the appropriate security clearance and 

need to know based on policy and guidance pertaining to the specific operation being 

conducted. Ensure compliance with National Disclosure Policy-1, National Policy and 

Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments 

and International Organizations. 
Chapter V

V-24 JP 3-68 

LEBANON NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION (NEO) 2006

The United States began to evacuate some citizens from Lebanon on 16 July 

2006. On 17 July, two Marine Corps CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters aided in 

the voluntary departure of 42 American citizens from the US Embassy in 

Beirut, Lebanon. The citizens were flown to Royal Air Force Base Akrotiri in 

Cyprus. US citizens who were flown out via helicopter were the elderly, 

those with small children, and those with special medical needs. Sixty more 

people were airlifted from the US Embassy on July 18. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) hoped to evacuate approximately 300 people by air per day. 

Around 200 people were evacuated by air on 19 July. The Orient Queen (a 

cruise ship charter by DOD to evacuate US citizens) docked in Beirut on 18 

July and left the 19th with about 900 people on board for its first round of 

transporting evacuees. The ship was escorted by the USS Gonzales (DDG 

66) and arrived in Cyprus on the 20th. 

The US Sailors and Marines from the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group 

(ESG) and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) assisted in the 

authorized departure of American citizens from Lebanon. In addition to the 

Iwo Jima Strike Group and USS Gonzales, three more US ships from US 

European Command also assisted (USS Barry [DDG 52], USS Mount Whitney 

[LCC 20], and USNS Big Horn [T-AO 198]). The commander of US Naval 

Forces Central Command indicated that people were evacuated on US Navy 

ships as well as the chartered cruise ship. On 20 July, 341 Americans were 

evacuated out of Southern Lebanon, via a bus convoy, and taken to Beirut 

Harbor to board the Orient Queen for transport. Also on the 20th, a group of 

US Marines from Interim Marine Corps Security Force (IMCSF) Bahrain 

arrived in Beirut to provide security for the commercial vessel Orient Queen 

as it assisted with the voluntary departures of US citizens. The IMCSF 

coordinated the security aboard the contracted ship and worked to ensure 

the safe and orderly transport of each passenger who boarded the vessel. 

The Marine security team, along with the help of Marines from the 24th MEU, 

also screened passenger luggage prior to loading it on the vessel. 

A landing craft utility (LCU) operated by Sailors assisting the 24th MEU 

landed in Lebanon, 20 July, to begin transporting American citizens who had 

chosen to depart that country. The LCU deployed from the USS Nashville 

(LPD 13) and was the first US naval vessel to land in Lebanon in support of 

the voluntary departure of US civilians. American citizens boarded the LCUs 

and were transported to USS Nashville in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. 

The USS Nashville then transported the Americans to Cyprus where they 

made further arrangements for follow-on transportation and 

accommodations. More US Sailors and Marines from the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 

7) ESG and the 24th MEU arrived on station 21 July to assist in the 

authorized departure of American citizens from Lebanon. 

On 21 July, the USS Trenton, the USS Whidbey Island, and the contract 

carrier Rahmah carried around 4,200 American citizens to safety. The Navy 

ships carried evacuees to Cyprus, and the Rahmah carried roughly 1,400 

Americans to Mersin, Turkey. Turkey offered the seaport of Mersin as an 

overflow area. Once American evacuees arrived in Mersin, they were bussed
Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures 

V-25 

to nearby Incirlik Air Base, where the Department of State had chartered air 

lines to transport them back to the United States. 

The Defense Logistics Agency assisted with the evacuation effort by 

immediately shipping 24,000 individual military meals by military air to 

Cyprus. The agency also provided 2,000 cots and blankets and ensured fuel 

was available for US military planes and vessels involved in the evacuation. 

On 23 July, the total number of Americans evacuated from Lebanon reached 

10,000. A total of 3,994 American citizens left Lebanon on the 22nd. Navy 

and contract ships lifted 1,815 from the embattled country on the 23rd. The 

USS Whidbey Island transported 792, and the contract carriers Orient Queen 

and Rahmah took 983 and 933 Americans, respectively, to Cyprus. 

US Transportation Command arranged commercial and military aircraft to fly 

the evacuees. On July 22, two military flights transported 199 Americans to 

McGuire Air Force Base, N.J. Chartered commercial flights took evacuees to 

Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport and 

Philadelphia International Airport. 

On 24 July, 957 US citizens were evacuated from Lebanon to Cyprus aboard 

the contracted cruise ship Orient Queen, bringing the total to 12,870 since 

the crisis in Lebanon began 16 July. 

On 25 July, the contract vessel Rahmah ended its contract period with the 

US effort and made its final run from Beirut to Cyprus 

On 26 July, a group of 100 US citizens were taken from southern Lebanon to 

the port city of Tyre by civilian vehicles, and they joined another 110 

Americans leaving on a Canadian ship. About 725 Americans left Lebanon 

aboard the contracted vessels Orient Queen and Vittoria M. 

On July 26, the US military performed its final scheduled evacuation of US 

citizens from Lebanon. The military had evacuated almost 14,000 US 

citizens from Lebanon. The US Embassy in Beirut estimated that the vast 

majority of US citizens wishing to leave Lebanon had now been evacuated. 

The Orient Queen, the contracted vessel Vittoria M, and the Swift, a highspeed vessel manned by US Navy personnel, would continue to make runs 

into Beirut evacuating American citizens or delivering humanitarian 

supplies. The USS Nashville, USS Trenton, USS Whidbey Island, USS Mount 

Whitney, USS Gonzalez, USS Barry, and the Swift—part of the USS Iwo Jima 

ESG—remained in the region. 

Various Sources
Chapter V

V-26 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank
VI-1 

CHAPTER VI

EVACUEE PROCESSING 

1. Evacuation Control Center 

 The ECC supports DOS, which conducts processing, screening, and selected logistic 

functions associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. The JTF should, 

however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required. Size 

and composition of the ECC will be determined by the number of evacuees, evacuation 

environment, and location of the evacuation area. Of primary importance is the nature of the 

emergency causing the evacuation; it may be natural, political, or military based. 

2. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart 

 Figure VI-1 contains a recommended ECC flow chart. 

3. Evacuee Processing 

a. Evacuee processing may take place in country at an air terminal, onboard ship, or at a 

temporary safe haven site. Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for reception, 

accounting, and care of evacuees should be implemented. The primary duties of the 

commander, JTF (CJTF), include maintaining order at the evacuation site and supporting the 

ambassador’s efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees. 

b. Procedures During Processing. At an air terminal, port, or beach, the evacuee 

processing should be located in a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide shelter 

and safety to the evacuees. The area should be staffed with security, interpreter, local 

immigration, embassy, support liaison, and medical personnel. The following procedures 

should be considered: 

(1) Use military police when available. 

(2) Use easily recognizable markings on US personnel, vehicles, and equipment. 

(3) Disarm evacuees prior to evacuation processing. 

(4) Establish a policy concerning responsibility to secure evacuee valuables during 

processing, to include pets (if allowed). 

“there must be a clear-cut, long-term relationship established between 

operational intentions and administrative resources. Successful administrative 

planning is dependent on anticipation of requirements.” 

Montgomery of Alamein 

Memoirs, 1958
Chapter VI

VI-2 JP 3-68 

(5) Provide interpreters for bilingual information at control sites. 

(6) Upon initial screen, use tags for visual identification. 

(7) Establish provisions for searching women, children, and disabled and/or 

injured. 

(8) Use DOS personnel of the same sex as evacuees to conduct searches. 

(9) Have medical personnel present. 

(10) Have RST personnel present. 

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER FLOW CHART

Represents Very Important Person Processing

(at the Direction of Ambassador 

and On-Scene Commander)

Assembly Area Assembly Area

Evacuation Control 

Center

Dismount Point

Reception Station

Registration Station

Interview

Station

Transportation

Station Very Important 

Person

Processing Comfort Station

Station

Embarkation

and/or 

Evacuation Site

Debriefing Station

Baggage

Collection

Station

 Pet Holding 

Area

(if approved)

Detainee

Area

Hold

Medical

Station

Figure VI-1. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-3 

(11) Establish procedures (separate desk or room) for USG employees or 

dependents, private US citizens, and TCNs. If required, a very important person (VIP) 

registration station should be made available. 

(12) Ensure CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) elements are present to conduct 

intelligence collection, debriefing, screening, and threat vulnerability assessments. 

(13) Organize evacuees and ensure the following: 

(a) Establish a single POC between the evacuee group and the JFC. 

(b) Contact civic officials to increase control and response for the evacuation. 

(14) Request additional diplomatic license plates for authorized use by JTF 

personnel during the operation. 

(15) Determine the need for EOD personnel (HN or US military). 

(16) Establish a veterinary support facility, if DOS allows pet evacuation. 

c. Onboard Ship. Should the environment on land preclude the use of an in-country 

ECC, evacuees may be processed onboard a ship. If it is a US Navy ship, the responsibility 

for processing evacuees rests with the ship’s commanding officer. The activities of the ECC 

will be accomplished onboard ship. Accounting and manifesting should be accomplished by 

using the NTS. 

d. Minimum Processing Requirements. Prior to implementation of minimum evacuee 

processing procedures, the procedures will be coordinated between the ambassador and the 

GCC. Minimum processing requirements are used in those cases when there is a 

documented concern for the protection and safety of evacuees and the evacuation force. The 

procedures used will meet the following guidelines: 

(1) Force protection will not be compromised to expedite processing. 

(2) Processing of persons with life threatening medical problems will be expedited. 

 

(3) All evacuees will be screened for verification of identity and documentation as 

well as prioritization. Classification, priorities, and considerations for evacuees are 

explained in paragraph 5, “Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees.” 

(4) A registration station should be established, and manifesting should be 

accomplished by using the NTS. 

4. Evacuation Control Center Organization and Operations 

a. The three guiding principles for any ECC are accuracy—all personnel are accounted 

for; security—evacuees and the evacuation force are safeguarded from all threats; and 
Chapter VI

VI-4 JP 3-68 

speed—processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently. As the marshalling teams 

bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The 

purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe 

haven or the United States. All evacuees should be screened to certify identification and to 

ensure that documentation is accurate and all information provided is current. 

Representatives from the embassy’s consular affairs office should be in the ECC to 

determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If evacuees arrive without escort, 

processing personnel should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to 

allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The processing center performs the necessary 

screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation 

and consists of the following: 

b. Headquarters Section. The HQ section is responsible as follows: 

(1) Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the ECC. 

(2) Maintains liaison with local representatives of DOS and other agencies 

involved in the evacuation. 

(3) Advises the JFC on the progress of the evacuation. 

(4) Maintains communications with all elements of the evacuation force to include 

ships, controlled aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, HN security 

forces, and the ECC. 

c. Reception Station. The reception station personnel collect all available information 

from the marshalling teams who escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling 

team’s log book is valuable because it may reduce the processing time. The evacuees should 

be moved into a holding area where the following should be accomplished: 

(1) Receive, search, segregate, and brief incoming evacuees in conjunction with 

DOS representatives. The initial briefing should provide sufficient information to ease fears 

about the evacuation process. It should include the following: 

(a) Summary of the reasons for the evacuation. 

(b) Stations through which the evacuees will process. 

(c) Need for an inspection of personnel and baggage. 

(d) What support to expect at the temporary safe haven. 

(e) What to expect upon arrival in the United States. 

(f) What the repatriation center will provide. 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-5 

(g) Amnesty opportunity for any restricted items. 

(h) Explanation of the procedure and requirement to establish 100 percent 

accountability. 

(i) Pets policy. 

(2) Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity where possible) based 

on political, cultural, social, religious, etc., differences, where applicable, and proceed 

through a process to establish accountability of each evacuee. Use the NTS to create an 

evacuee roster with the following data: nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, 

destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for 

notification. 

(3) Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center. 

The escort should be furnished a list of names for those in their group for control purposes. 

VIPs and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides if available. 

(4) Inspect for restricted items. Each evacuee and all baggage should be inspected 

at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual inspections should be screened. 

Hand-held metal detectors and/or explosive detectors can expedite the inspections. All 

restricted items should be confiscated. 

(5) Many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that US law requires a 

Successful evacuee processing begins with the initial briefing from senior Department of 

State representatives, which provides sufficient information to ease fears about the 

evacuation process. 
Chapter VI

VI-6 JP 3-68 

prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team can aid in identifying these 

drugs. 

(6) All weapons, excluding those of authorized USG personnel, will be impounded 

and receipts issued to the owners. Embassy or customs officials should be consulted about 

the disposition of these weapons. Unless the weapons are illegal in the United States, they 

will be returned to the owners at the repatriation center. 

(7) The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors authorized 

to go to the US are exempt from search under any circumstances without specific direction 

from DOS. Individual registration is required for accounting and manifesting purposes. 

(8) The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign diplomats (other than 

ambassadors) authorized passage to the United States are exempt from search. However, 

personal baggage may be searched if there is reasonable cause to believe that the baggage 

contains restricted items. All searches should be conducted in the presence of the diplomats 

or their authorized agent. Individual registration is required for accounting and manifesting 

purposes. 

(9) Diplomatic pouches will not be searched. 

(10) Based on reasonable belief, the JFC may refuse to evacuate any baggage 

suspected of containing weapons or explosives. 

The Evacuation Control Center supports the Department of State in processing evacuees 

accurately, securely, and in a quick and efficient manner. 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-7 

(11) Evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals should be segregated 

and escorted to the screening station. The screening should be voluntary, but considered a 

prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the interviewing, the evacuees will be 

allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area. 

d. Registration Station. Evacuees should complete all administrative paperwork 

required to evacuate. When the situation allows, risks are few, and time is available, the 

evacuee should complete all required forms prior to leaving the ECC. However, when the 

security situation requires rapid movement, only the minimum essential processing for 

accountability and manifesting will be accomplished. There should be no requirement for 

evacuees to complete all administrative paperwork as a precondition for evacuation. 

Establishing initial accountability is not considered administrative paperwork. Foreign 

nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy or secure 

approval from the US embassy before they can continue processing. The ambassador or 

designated DOS representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee 

identification. If there are doubts about a person’s identity, the matter will be turned over to 

DOS and the person should not be evacuated until cleared by DOS. Registration station 

personnel should ensure that foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for 

evacuation or escorted outside the ECC. Military police should be available to react to any 

hostile incidents. Each evacuee should do the following: 

(1) Prove identity by presenting a passport, dependent identification card, seaman’s 

paper, or anything that unquestionably establishes US citizenship. 

(2) Provide information to the registration clerks concerning background and 

personal history. DOS’s EPH provides for a standard one-page OF (Optional Form)-28, 

Evacuee Documentation Card, that has three carbon copies. All critical information is 

recorded on the form, to include personal data, health and citizenship status, privacy 

warning, and promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the copies 

can be used as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the 

temporary safe haven. 

(3) Receive a copy of DD Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center Processing 

Sheet (see Appendix F, “Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet”), which should be 

completed before arrival at the repatriation center. A complete listing and explanation of all 

suggested NEO packet items, to include all of the documentation required for each evacuee 

and/or family to receive proper safe haven entitlements and process through the repatriation 

center expeditiously, may be found in the Joint Plan for DOD Noncombatant Repatriation.

e. NEO Tracking System. The NTS is an automated data processing hardware and 

software package designed to assist JFCs in maintaining visibility and accountability of 

noncombatant evacuees as they proceed through the evacuation pipeline. The NTS uses the 

paradigm of assigning a bar code to a package and then tracking the package through to its 

delivery. The NTS provides near real-time accountability of evacuees by enabling operators 

to create and maintain a database of information (bar code) for each evacuee (to include pets) 

as they enter, proceed through, and finally exit the NEO process at a repatriation site or other 
Chapter VI

VI-8 JP 3-68 

exit point. Operators input data by hand into the NTS from sources such as the DD Form 

2585, Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet, or data is electronically transferred 

from military identification cards and passports that meet current electronic transfer 

standards. The NTS collects data from “smart cards” and other electronic data sources and is 

capable of exchanging data with other DOD systems such as the global transportation 

network and the Automated Repatriation and Recording System. Web-based access is 

possible. Access to the NTS should be available at the ECC processing center when DOD 

assists DOS in an evacuation. 

f. Debriefing Station. This station is optional, depending on the situation and the time 

available to conduct the evacuation. It should be staffed by personnel who are trained to 

debrief/screen and are able to speak the local language. Suitable personnel include, but are 

not limited to, CI, HUMINT, security, and linguists. Each evacuee should be debriefed to 

obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the evacuees, or other 

USG activities in the country. Areas of interest might include the following: 

(1) Locations of other potential evacuees. 

(2) Changes in the political situation. 

(3) Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might 

oppose the evacuation. 

(4) The true intent of a threatening third party—consider the following: 

(a) Capability and likelihood of carrying out a threat. 

(b) Can the third party be influenced? 

(c) Can the potential threat be stopped or countered? 

(5) Information/sources of activity, criminal behavior, or civil disorder that 

affect the NEO: 

(a) Evacuation routes that are being blocked off or have been closed. 

(b) Physical abuse or assault being done to deter evacuation. 

(c) Counterfeiting activities that are targeting required evacuation 

documentation. 

(d) Type of weapons being used by personnel interfering with evacuation. 

(e) Use of vehicles or armored vehicles to interfere with evacuation. 

(f) Public messages or fliers that gave wrong information for evacuation 

procedures. 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-9 

(g) Criminal groups or organizations that are interfering with evacuation. 

(6) Information/sources from people with unknown boxes or packages being 

transported for pay, favors, or gifts. 

g. Medical Station. The medical station provides emergency medical treatment and 

immunizations required by the safe haven country. As required, injured or ill evacuees may 

proceed through the medical station for first aid and to identify medical conditions that may 

have an effect on the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for 

evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded 

persons complete processing prior to being evacuated. Medical personnel should: 

(1) Screen to determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or 

evacuation. 

(2) Perform emergency treatment as required. 

(3) Isolate persons infected with contagious diseases. 

(4) Perform disease and annoyance vector control. 

h. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Medical Management. 

The medical management of casualties resulting from infectious disease exposure to CBRN 

hazards, in particular biological agents, will require significant augmentation and specialized 

considerations to care for the resultant casualties. AE capabilities for CBRN-contaminated 

and contagious casualties are very limited. The JFC should consult with USTRANSCOM to 

determine whether casualty evacuation or treatment in place is appropriate. 

For additional information on the unique aspects of CBRN medical management, including 

decontamination and triage, collective protection, and patient evacuation, refer to JP 3-11, 

Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

i. Transportation Station. Transportation personnel prepare each group of evacuees 

for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. Some considerations are as 

follows: 

(1) Coordinate surface and/or air transportation to include movement of personnel 

to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated aircraft and/or landing craft, 

and internal evacuation site requirements. 

(2) Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard 

vehicles, aircraft, and/or landing craft. 

(3) Establish the manifest of all embarked personnel showing destination and 

identifying information by scanning evacuee’s wrist bracelet using NTS. 
Chapter VI

VI-10 JP 3-68 

(4) Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding passes for 

aircraft, and verify baggage tags. 

(5) If NTS is not used, ensure that information on the passenger manifest agrees 

with information provided on the evacuee register. 

(6) Ensure sufficient transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage 

to the point of embarkation. 

(7) Establish a pet holding area, if required. 

j. Comfort Station. The comfort station is a controlled access area for evacuees while 

they await evacuation transportation. Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees’ 

stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy. Some considerations are 

as follows: 

(1) Evacuees should be segregated by transportation groups (chalks). A manned 

cordoned off area may be required. 

(2) Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies. 

(3) Sufficient sanitation facilities. 

(4) Senior personnel, medical personnel, and RSTs available to counsel evacuees, 

especially families with young children. 

(5) Medical personnel should observe evacuees for any visible symptoms of 

illness/injury that may impede or disrupt the NEO. 

(6) Male and female personal items. 

5. Classification, Priorities, and Considerations for Evacuees 

a. General. For organizational purposes all evacuees receive a number priority and 

classification designator. These categorizations are critical to the smooth execution and 

success of the operation and are used when identifying, moving, and locating evacuees. The 

JTF staff should keep abreast of changes in the projected number of potential evacuees by 

receiving periodic updates from the embassy’s staff. These updates will be provided in the 

form of a total number for all evacuees and number by category. 

b. Classification. The following system, shown in Figure VI-2, governs priorities of 

evacuations. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and capital 

letter indicating major and minor priorities assigned to each individual. Designated other 

persons for whom the US provides evacuation assistance are classified using applicable 

criteria within major and minor categories. 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-11 

c. First Priority. US citizens in the following order (within each category, other 

priorities may exist for those with certain medical conditions that require transport to save 

life, limb, or eyesight): 

(1) Those with current identification such as passports, birth certificates, DOD 

identification cards, seaman’s papers, air crew cards, and anyone designated as first priority 

by the ambassador, regardless of national affiliation. The ambassador is the final authority. 

(2) Those with expired US passports less than 10 years old. 

(3) Those with expired US passports over 10 years old. 

d. Guidelines. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows: 

(1) Evacuees are not detainees. 

(2) The minimum force required should be used. 

CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVACUEES

MAJOR CATEGORIES

MINOR CATEGORIES

I American citizens

II Non-American immediate family members of 

American citizens

III Foreign service national and third country

national employees of the US Government

IV Eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill, 

injured, or whose lives are in imminent peril

(but who do not qualify for a higher priority)

V Others eligible (as directed by the ambassador)

A - Pregnant women

B - Unaccompanied children under 18

C - Aged and infirm

D - Adults with children/accompanied child

E - Adults 18 or older

Figure VI-2. Classifications of Evacuees 
Chapter VI

VI-12 JP 3-68 

(3) Evacuation can be an unsettling experience, especially for children and families 

who have become separated. As a rule, presenting a patient, courteous, and professional 

attitude will do much to calm the situation and all evacuees. 

(4) Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited. 

(5) People should not be separated from their baggage. 

(6) Baggage will be searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or items 

declared to be restricted items. Be considerate but firm; the safety of personnel is 

paramount. 

(7) The ambassador should establish a policy concerning pets. Whenever possible, 

allow pets to accompany evacuees except in situations where lives will be jeopardized or 

security compromised. If pets arrive for evacuation, a pet holding area should be 

established. Although DOD authorities have gone to great effort to make plans to evacuate 

pets, this may not be feasible in all evacuations, and families must make plans for their pets 

to stay behind or be transported commercially. The costs of any commercial transport of 

pets must be borne by the family. If DOD can accommodate the transportation of pets 

through a military or chartered aircraft, families must bring the following with their pets to 

the assembly area. 

(a) Separate airline-approved pet containers for each animal except those with 

nursing litters. Note: Crates with watering bowls and limited towels and/or blankets are 

preferred. Do not include rawhide chew toys. Dog and cat food will be available at 

intermediate staging areas and US repatriation sites. 

(b) Movement orders and health and vaccination certificates should be 

attached in a waterproof bag to the outside of the crate. Written medication or special care 

instructions should be provided to personnel at the assembly point. 

(c) Dogs and cats should wear collars with owner identification, and pet 

owners shall have a leash or harness for their pet and muzzles for agitated or aggressive 

animals. 

(d) Pets other than dogs or cats also must be in airline-approved crates. 

Families should secure all permits required to import the pet to the safe haven. A copy of the 

permit plus any health or vaccination certificates should be attached to the crate in a 

waterproof bag. Additionally, special food requirements sufficient to cover the duration of 

the evacuation process must accompany the pet. 

(e) Owners of any exotic pets must provide warnings and handling instructions 

and include same on any container. 

(8) Personnel must not accept gifts, tips, bribes, or any personal favor. All 

personnel must be aware of this prohibition. 
Evacuee Processing 

VI-13 

(9) All questions about an evacuee should be referred to DOS representative. 

(10) Persons of higher priority may elect evacuation in a lower priority to avoid 

separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the entire 

family will be evacuated medically (dependent on time constraints and space availability). 

(11) Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance service is 

essential. 

(12) Medical personnel and RST personnel should consider wearing distinctive 

clothing or markings to aid in identification. 

(13) When possible, patients should be given written instructions for medical care, 

especially care for children. 

e. Request for Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge. International law and 

customs have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to 

anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. It is the policy 

of the US to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to 

TCNs solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in 

imminent danger the life or safety of a person, such as pursuit by a mob. The officer in 

command of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides which measures can prudently be 

taken to provide temporary refuge. No information shall be released to the media concerning 

requests for political asylum until cleared by DOS. Any requests by foreign governments for 

the return of an individual must be reported to the DOS representative. Until determination 

is made by DOS, safeguard those who have requested political asylum or temporary refuge. 

Do not release personnel against their will to a third party force. The safety of JTF personnel 

and security of the unit must be taken into consideration along with the following: 

(1) Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent 

danger, irrespective of whether political asylum or temporary refuge is requested. 

(2) Let DOS representatives handle political asylum requests through the 

appropriate channels. 

(3) Establish procedures to notify the GCC of actions taken in cases of requests for 

political asylum. 

See Appendix B, “Legal Considerations,” for additional guidance on political asylum or 

temporary refuge. 
Chapter VI

VI-14 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank 
VII-1 

CHAPTER VII

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE AND SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS 

1. Intermediate Staging Base 

a. An ISB is a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into 

the HN. Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC many advantages over 

deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance 

from the home station increases and the likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISB may be 

located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship 

under US control. Ideally, the ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is 

required. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces, such as additional airlift 

for unforeseen movement requirements and/or combat forces (such as air units capable of 

offensive attacks and airborne infantry units) in the event that a forcible entry is required. 

b. Advantages. The items shown in Figure VII-1 can be accomplished at the ISB. 

“The work of organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually 

adapted to new and anticipated conditions.” 

Ralph J. Cordiner, Chief Executive Officer 

General Electric Company, 1950–1964 

ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

The joint force commander can finalize evacuation plans

The joint task force (JTF) staff can gather additional 

information, including intelligence, information on criminal 

activity, and information for counterintelligence

The JTF can conduct rehearsals and briefings

Units have the opportunity to redistribute and finalize loads

Personnel can recuperate after a long trip from their 

deploying base

A reaction force or additional security personnel can prestage for contingency operations

It can function as the temporary safe haven for the 

operation

Figure VII-1. Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base 
Chapter VII

VII-2 JP 3-68 

c. Coordination. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, 

DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. If the ISB is an 

established US base in a foreign country, using the ISB as a staging point for launching 

forces into another country can pose significant political problems. Since ISBs are typically 

airfields or seaports, the supported GCC should query USTRANSCOM for available 

transportation infrastructure on-hand information related to facilities and sites being 

considered as likely ISBs. 

d. Selection Criteria. Selecting an ISB for the NEO is a time-sensitive issue. DOS 

will inform the GCC of the location and availability of countries for establishment of 

possible ISBs. The JFC should ensure the ISB meets operational requirements and advise 

DOS of these requirements. The ISB should meet the following criteria: 

(1) Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation. 

(2) Possess effective communication with JTF and combatant command HQ, 

advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, ISB, and the embassy. 

(3) Have adequate facilities for billeting, messing, provision of emergency medical 

treatment, and sanitation for the evacuation force and evacuees if used as the temporary safe 

haven. 

(4) Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft. 

(5) Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical 

supplies; and ammunition. 

(6) Be close to major medical facilities, if possible. 

(7) Be located to provide maximum possible OPSEC. 

(8) Have overflight and access rights IAW DOD 4500.54-G, Department of 

Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. 

(9) Have a PA contingency plan for planned or “no-notice” media presence. 

(10) Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the 

evacuation can transit without refueling. 

(11) Have adequate local and area security forces to protect US personnel and 

equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the HN or by security forces 

from the deployed ISB support element. 

e. Composition. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is required 

and what is already on site at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires 
Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations 

VII-3 

substantially less than one at a lesser developed location. Some considerations for the ISB 

force are as follows: 

(1) Maintenance and service personnel for aircraft. 

(2) Liaison with the embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and 

others as required). 

(3) Interpreters. 

(4) Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation. 

(5) Contracts for local services and supplies. 

(6) Local security. 

(7) Air traffic control and airfield management. 

(8) Movement control. 

(9) HN medical infrastructure. 

(10) Overflight rights. 

2. Temporary Safe Haven Site 

a. A temporary safe haven, designated by DOS, is a location in an area or country to 

which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the 

United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary 

safe haven. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from 

the evacuation sites to the United States. An intermediate safe haven may be a US Navy 

ship; however, the evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens (in 

the United States or a third country) as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is 

required, DOS coordinates with the government in the country where it will be located. 

Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and 

billeting is required. While arranging for support of evacuees is the responsibility of DOS, 

commanders in theater must be prepared to assist DOS in arranging for life support of 

evacuees at the temporary safe haven. In crisis situations, DOD has greater capacity, and 

often experience, in arranging for contracted support. 

b. The following factors should be considered when selecting a site: 

(1) OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success 

and prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe haven government. 

(2) Capability to communicate with the ECC, JTF HQ, and the embassy. 
Chapter VII

VII-4 JP 3-68 

(3) Airfield or port capacity suitable for the aircraft or ships being used, both for 

the evacuation and later onward movement for the evacuees. Consideration should be given 

to the following: 

(a) Twenty-four-hour operations for the airfield and port. 

(b) Availability of HN controllers to control the airfield and the requirement 

for JTF controllers. 

(c) Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of 

anticipated air flow. 

(d) Total numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation. 

(e) Condition of aircraft parking areas. 

(f) Length, width, and condition of runways and taxiway. 

(g) Airfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic support. 

(h) Airfield maintenance support. 

(i) Capabilities of airfield facilities. 

(j) Channel and harbor depth. 

(k) Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages. 

(l) Types and capabilities of tugs. 

(m) Availability of equipment to load and/or offload ships, if required. 

(n) Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations. 

(4) Proximity to major transportation hubs. 

(5) Adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary 

safe haven force. 

c. Although the temporary safe haven operates under the authority of the host 

government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population. It may be a prime target 

for terrorism and riots. The JFC should plan for such situations and protect the evacuees and 

the JTF personnel. 
Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations 

VII-5 

3. Alternate Safe Haven 

a. During a NEO, evacuees may prefer to reside somewhere other than the designated 

safe haven (normally CONUS). Most often the request is for the family to reside overseas in 

the spouse’s native country. At the time of the evacuation, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense will designate the individual with the authority to approve requests for alternate safe 

havens. 

b. Families who seek alternate safe havens should be cautioned that, as temporary 

residents in foreign safe haven locations, they do not have official status with the HN. They 

may enter the HN as tourists, and may need visas or be required to pay taxes on their 

personal property. Sponsors should be advised that the SOFA is for the sponsor and 

accompanying family members, not for isolated family members. Additionally, family 

members who choose a safe haven in a foreign country are no longer command sponsored 

and may not be authorized to use exchange or medical facilities, DOD schools, base housing, 

or US mail services. The sponsor’s request for an alternate family safe haven therefore must 

be justified and must show why the designated safe haven is not suitable for the evacuees. 

4. Organization and Functional Considerations 

a. The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC’s processing section, 

operates under the control of the JFC in coordination with the appropriate DOS 

representative. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic 

requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A 

limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may 

consist of the following elements. 

b. Command Group. The command group coordinates the overall operation and 

should consist of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned officer in charge, 

communications officer, family center staff, chaplain, LNOs, and interpreters. The family 

center staff provides and coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The 

RST personnel plan and coordinate comprehensive religious support for the safe haven force 

and evacuees. The LNOs and interpreters maintain contact with the US embassy and the 

host government. The command group: 

(1) Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary safe haven. 

(2) Maintains liaison with local DOS representatives and other agencies that may 

be involved with the operation. 

(3) Advises the JFC on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations. 

(4) Establishes procedures for government officials and TCNs if not previously 

established by the CJTF. 
Chapter VII

VII-6 JP 3-68 

(5) Establishes provisions for searching women and children as well as disabled 

and injured persons. 

c. Reception Team. This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section. 

(1) Briefing Section. This section should brief the evacuees on their arrival 

concerning the following: 

(a) Current political situation in the HN. 

(b) Description and operation of the temporary safe haven. 

(c) Further traveling options and arrangements. 

(d) Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven. 

(e) Projected departure times for flights to the United States. 

(f) Restrictions applicable to evacuees while at the temporary safe haven. 

(g) Medical threat surveillance related to HN. 

(h) Accountability requirements and procedures. 

(i) Pet policy (when applicable). 

(2) Public Affairs Section. Release of information on the NEO or temporary safe 

haven operations within each country is the responsibility of the ambassador. The temporary 

safe haven PAO has the same responsibilities as the JTF PAO, which are provided in 

Chapter V, “Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures.” Temporary safe haven 

PAO responsibilities are as follows: 

(a) Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA. 

(b) Coordinate and supervise all PA and PA-related command information 

functions, to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information 

media. 

(c) Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA. 

(d) Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its 

operations to the news media per JTF policies. 

(e) Escort civilian and military news media representatives. 
Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations 

VII-7 

(f) Ensure that appropriate guidelines are in place for news media to protect the 

privacy of evacuees in billeting areas. 

(g) Ensure that interviews of JTF personnel and evacuees are held only with 

the permission of the JFC and the individual concerned. 

(h) Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to 

the public. 

d. Processing Team. This team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, 

but should verify that all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct. 

(1) Administrative Section. This section registers and accounts for all evacuees 

and ensures that all information required by DOS or the JTF has been collected. The 

administrative section should have legal personnel advise evacuees on claims procedures and 

assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and HN nationals. The following 

should be accomplished: 

(a) Receive and register incoming evacuees, using NTS, in conjunction with 

DOS representatives. 

(b) Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe 

haven. It should list the nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, destination, and 

name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification. 

(c) Provide escorts for groups of personnel. VIPs and emergency medical 

cases should be provided individual guides if available. 

(d) Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for 

onward transportation to the United States. 

(e) Provide assistance as needed in locating separated family members. 

(2) Transportation Section. The transportation section is responsible for assisting 

in the onward movement of evacuees to their final destination. The USG does not provide 

funding for the movement of persons other than USG (military and civilian) employees and 

family members to their final destination. See Chapter IV, “Contingency and Predeployment 

Planning Considerations,” subparagraph 6c, “Personnel Eligible for Evacuation Assistance,” 

for additional information. Nongovernment employees evacuated by US-funded charter, 

whether commercial or military, are asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of 

transportation. The following transportation functions should be considered to ensure an 

orderly movement: 

(a) Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to 

the United States and then coordinate this movement flow with the JRCC. 
Chapter VII

VII-8 JP 3-68 

(b) Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the JRCC at the repatriation 

site. 

(c) Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard 

aircraft, ships, or vehicles. 

(d) Maintain a manifest of all embarked personnel showing destination and 

identifying information. 

(e) Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or wounded in 

coordination with the medical section. 

(3) Intelligence Section. This section may debrief each evacuee if a debriefing 

was not conducted at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary 

ISB, intelligence personnel should arrange to pass information gained from evacuees to the 

combatant command JIOC to advise forces who are returning to a threat area for follow-on 

operations. 

(4) Medical Section. The medical section provides support to the temporary safe 

haven force. Additionally, this section may need to conduct evacuee medical screening if it 

was not performed at the ECC. Medical services may include any or all of the following 

functions: 

(a) Determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment. 

(b) Perform emergency treatment as required or coordinate with a local safe 

haven country hospital to perform the treatment. 

(c) Advise the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine. 

(d) Inspect food and water obtained from local sources. 

(e) Evaluate the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to 

pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases. 

(f) Provide veterinary support for pet health care as required. 

e. Comfort Team. This team provides logistic support for the operation. It is 

responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation. A 

contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to coordinate services with the HN. 

Some considerations are as follows: 

(1) Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or 

contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may be required to 

establish a tent city. In this event, the temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to 
Intermediate Staging Base and Safe Haven Operations 

VII-9 

accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving. The JFC may consider contracting locally 

for the labor and sanitation facilities. 

(2) Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies of 

their own; meals, ready to eat, can be used as a temporary solution. However, the temporary 

safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide special diets 

to personnel involved in the evacuation. 

(3) If the climate of the country is substantially different from the evacuee’s former 

residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing. 

(4) Due to the situation, evacuees may have not had the opportunity to pack 

personal, comfort, or hygiene items prior to arriving at the evacuation site. The following is 

a partial list of items the evacuees may need: 

(a) Baby formula. 

(b) Trash bags. 

(c) Baby food and/or juice. 

(d) Diapers. 

(e) Toilet tissue. 

(f) Feminine hygiene supplies. 

(g) Toothpaste and/or toothbrush. 

(h) Soap. 

(i) Shampoo. 

(j) Razors. 

(k) Laundry detergent. 

(l) Sheets. 

(m) Towels. 

(n) Blankets. 

(o) Wash bucket. 

(p) Pet food (dog and cat). 
Chapter VII

VII-10 JP 3-68 

f. Scheduling Team. This team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from 

the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following: 

(1) Coordinate with the transportation section for arrangements made for leaving 

the temporary safe haven. 

(2) Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of 

embarkation. 

(3) Manifest authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights 

using NTS. 

g. Security Team. This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the 

temporary safe haven site. 

h. Religious Support Team. This team performs or provides for comprehensive 

religious support for the temporary safe haven site. 

i. Family Support Services. The GCC may task a Service component that has a 

demonstrated capability to provide family support services to provide a team to support the 

temporary/intermediate safe haven. 
A-1 

APPENDIX A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE LAW OF WAR

1. Rules of Engagement 

a. The ROE for NEOs reflect the limited military objective to be accomplished. 

NEO ROE limit the use of force to force that is necessary to successfully complete the 

mission and provide for the self-defense of US military personnel and defense of 

noncombatant evacuees. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US 

Forces, is the basic source for standing rules of engagement (SROE)/standing rules for 

the use of force, and Enclosure G specifically governs actions to be taken by US forces 

conducting a NEO. The SROE reflect the limited objective of NEO and provide the 

baseline from which all supplemental ROE are drafted and approved. 

b. Upon receipt of an ID or warning order, the JFC immediately reviews the ROE to 

evaluate their impact on evacuation operations. Normally, the JFC is told in the warning 

order that the SROE will apply and is instructed to request specific supplemental 

measures as the mission dictates. Potential problems should be identified, and requests 

for deletion or modification of ROE are forwarded via the GCC to the issuing authority. 

ROE must be tailored to support mission accomplishment and may impact the choice of a 

CONOPS.

c. Commanders have an inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means 

available and to take all appropriate actions in the self-defense of their unit and other US 

forces in the vicinity. ROE do not diminish this right and obligation, but govern the use 

of force for mission accomplishment. 

(1) Defensive Actions

(a) Conducted only as aggressively as necessary to protect US lives (and 

those of designated TCN evacuees, as authorized and tasked), property, and equipment. 

The use of force should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or 

demonstrations of hostile intent. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity 

of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration, and scope of force used should 

not exceed what is required.

(b) May include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer a threat to US 

personnel (and designated TCN evacuees), property, and equipment. 

(2) Subordinate commanders should ensure that personnel are thoroughly 

trained in the need to use only necessary force. All personnel must be instructed as to the 

importance of good order and discipline when conducting NEOs. 

(3) Commanders at all levels should exercise caution to use only the force 

necessary to provide for the successful defense of evacuees and complete the mission.
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-68 

d. Ideally, ROE should allow for approval of requests to employ nonlethal weapons 

(such as military information support and RCAs) and for joint fire support (such as naval 

surface fire support and close air support). The use of joint fires, the ability to act in 

defense of non-US persons, and the use of RCAs should be addressed in the ROE. As 

stated in CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides, the use of 

RCAs is restricted to US bases, posts, or US controlled portions of foreign installations 

where the authority to approve peacetime employment of RCAs resides with the CCDR. 

Use of RCAs outside of these parameters requires higher approval. See SROE for 

specific approval authority. Additionally, authority for the use of RCA may be obtained 

pursuant to Enclosure I to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing 

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 

e. The use of force is normally a measure of last resort. When time and 

circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent 

should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. 

Employment of MISO assets and capabilities should be considered toward this end. 

2. Law of War Principles

It is DOD policy that law of war principles govern actions to be taken by JTF 

personnel in defense of US personnel, selected HN personnel, and property and 

equipment. Some of the law of war principles to be considered during the planning 

process are as follows:

a. Military Necessity. The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of 

force required to accomplish the mission. However, this principle is not applied in a 

vacuum. It must be applied in conjunction with other law of war principles. Military 

necessity generally prohibits the intentional targeting of protected persons (civilians, 

hostile personnel who have surrendered or are otherwise “out of combat,” etc.) and places 

(objects or places that are used for purely civilian purposes, such as hospitals, schools, 

and cultural property that have not been converted to or for military/hostile use) because 

they do not constitute legitimate military objectives in furtherance of the accomplishment 

of the mission. 

b. Unnecessary Suffering. This principle requires forces to actively avoid taking 

action that would cause unnecessary suffering and normally applies to the legality of 

weapons and ammunition. Generally, weapons and ammunition that have been issued by 

DOD have been reviewed to ensure compliance with the law of war and this principle. 

However, approved weapons and ammunition also may not be used in a way that will 

cause unnecessary suffering or injury. A weapon or munition would be deemed to cause 

unnecessary suffering if, in its normal use, the injury caused by it is disproportionate to 

the military necessity for it, that is, the military advantage to be gained from its use. 

c. Distinction. This principle requires that combatants be distinguished from 

noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property or 
Rules of Engagement and the Law of War 

A-3 

protected places. Parties to a conflict shall direct their operations only against 

combatants and military objectives. Military objectives are combatants and those objects 

which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military 

action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 

circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definitive military advantage.

d. Proportionality. The anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental 

to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 

expected to be gained. Proportionality is a way in which a military commander must 

assess his or her obligations as to the principle of distinction, while avoiding actions that 

are indiscriminate.
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank
B-1 

APPENDIX B

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 

This appendix provides general information and guidance for handling legal matters 

that may arise during a NEO. The JFC and subordinate commanders of the evacuation 

and ISB should have a legal advisor attached to their staffs to advise on military and 

international legal matters. 

1. General 

a. The JFC and subordinate commanders must ensure that JTF personnel abide by 

the standards of international law, including the applicable law of war and Uniform Code 

of Military Justice (UCMJ), as well as the provisions of the operation’s ROE. The JFC 

should establish procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating 

violations of these standards. The JFC must report all possible, suspected, or alleged 

violations IAW applicable DOD and Service regulations, and should notify the embassy 

of a suspected violation within 24 hours of learning about its occurrence. 

b. Role of JTF Legal Advisor. The JTF legal advisor will provide guidance on 

legal issues involving the NEO, in coordination with higher HQ, USG agencies, NGOs, 

IGOs, foreign governments, and the HN government. The key emphasis will be on 

assisting with interpretation of and compliance with applicable US laws and regulations; 

relevant international agreements, including any pertinent SOFAs; and multilateral and 

bilateral transit agreements impacting a NEO. 

c. Legal Imperatives. When planning and conducting a NEO, commanders must 

be cognizant of legal imperatives derived from US domestic law, international 

agreements, and customary international law, and they should consider HN law. In view 

of this governing framework of laws and regulations, as well as the complexity of legal 

issues relating to NEOs, commanders must obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO 

planning and execution, particularly during the early planning stage. 

d. Legal Input for Operational Planning. Commanders should ensure that legal 

advisors at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational 

guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. Additionally, OPLANs, warning 

orders, commander’s estimates, ROE, operation orders, executive orders, and other 

operational documents should be systematically reviewed by the JTF legal advisor to 

ensure compliance with applicable law and regulations. 

2. Specific Guidance and Terminology 

a. Foreign Diplomat. A foreign diplomat of an embassy staff authorized to go to 

the United States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment IAW international law. 

Ideally, the individual as well as personal effects and papers are not to be searched, 

detained, or seized. Family members are also entitled to the same immunity unless they 

are citizens of the United States. The diplomatic pouch of a diplomatic courier from a 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-68 

state recognized by the United States shall also be immune from any search, inspection, 

detention, or seizure by US personnel. However, foreign diplomats may be subject to 

inspection, under certain circumstances, for weapons or other dangerous materials prior 

to boarding any vehicle, ship, or aircraft. Refusal to submit to inspection may result in 

the individual being barred from boarding. Foreign diplomats and their family members 

must follow accountability and manifesting procedures. 

b. Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge. JTF commanders may not grant 

political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under 

emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any 

person. Commanders must understand that if temporary refuge is granted, Secretary of a 

Military Department approval is necessary to release the individual. All requests for 

asylum should be referred to the embassy or senior DOS representative available. CJCSI 

3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US 

Forces, includes a specific section addressing protection and disposition of foreign 

nationals in the custody of US forces. 

c. Status-of-Forces Agreement. Any SOFA between the HN and the United States 

should be reviewed to determine how it applies, if at all, to the current situation involving 

the NEO. If time permits, it should be modified as necessary prior to the JTF arrival. If 

no agreement exists, the embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if 

time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement, customs, and other legal 

matters. DOS is responsible for negotiating any SOFA changes. Given the emergency 

nature of the NEO, however, it is likely that no special SOFA provisions will be 

negotiated. 

d. Detainee Treatment. The embassy should determine the disposition of a 

detainee in advance of the JTF deployment. In the absence of this determination, it is US 

policy to treat all detainees humanely and IAW US law, including the law of war, and 

applicable US policy. Anyone detained by US forces in an attempt to deter or in 

response to hostile action will be provided with the protections of the Geneva Convention 

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, until some other legal status is 

determined by competent authority. The embassy, with the HN, will negotiate the 

disposition of the detainee. 

e. Claims. The JTF legal advisor or designated claims officer shall develop a plan 

for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan will be 

coordinated with the appropriate embassy staff member. 

f. International Legal Considerations

(1) Law of War. Traditional legal issues associated with the law of war will 

not normally arise in the context of a NEO, as NEOs typically occur during times of 

escalating confrontation short of international armed conflict. However, the protections 

afforded civilians, the sick, and/or the wounded under the law of war are almost 

universally accepted humanitarian norms respected in many cases despite the absence of 
Legal Considerations 

B-3 

international armed conflict. NEO planning and execution should adhere as closely as 

possible to international law principles as a matter of consistent practice. 

(2) National Sovereignty. The GCC and subordinate commanders must ensure 

that the NEO planners are aware of sovereignty of other foreign nations and do not 

violate the sovereignty of any nation other than the HN. NEO planners and operators 

must be cognizant of the potential impact of operations on relations with other nations 

and of all relevant international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral 

and bilateral transit agreements. 

g. Legal Assistance. Implementing plans should provide for preventive law 

programs designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal 

assistance when evacuation becomes imminent or is implemented. To the extent 

practical and authorized, legal assistance and advice will be made available to eligible 

beneficiaries at safe haven points and collection processing points, in coordination with 

the US diplomatic mission. 

h. Military Justice. Military justice will be administered IAW the UCMJ, JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 1-04, Legal Support to 

Military Operations.

i. Reporting Violations of the Law of War. All possible, suspected, or alleged 

violations of the law of war, for which there is credible information, including conduct 

that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict, 

shall be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by 

corrective action, as follows: 

(1) With respect to possible, suspected, or alleged violations of the law of war 

committed by or against members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, their 

commands, commanders should promptly investigate, collect and evaluate evidence, and 

report IAW applicable DOD and Military Department guidance. Additionally, forward 

reports immediately through command channels. Ensure alleged law of war violations 

are reported by appropriate law enforcement investigators. 

(2) With respect to possible, suspected, or alleged violations of the law of war 

committed by or against allied military or civilian personnel, commanders should conduct 

appropriate preliminary investigation to determine involvement of JTF personnel and 

report as required through US operational channels. Once a determination is made that 

the JTF was not involved, further US investigation will be undertaken only at the 

direction of the supported GCC. 

(3) In all instances of reported law of war violations, make immediate message 

notification to the appropriate CCDR. Service component commanders should provide 

such notification as soon as the tactical situation permits, rather than awaiting complete 

investigation. Additional details may be supplied by supplemental reports. 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-68 

j. Host-Nation Support

(1) The GCC and subordinate commanders must be aware of applicable basing 

rights and the status of US forces within the country when planning and executing a 

NEO. Advance coordination should be made to ensure necessary landing, embarkation, 

and transit rights are in place to support a given operation. 

(2) Additionally, the changing political and military situation must be taken into 

account prior to relying on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Liaison with DOS 

officials responsible for the particular NEO site must be accomplished in a timely 

manner. 

k. Legal Review of Rules of Engagement. In all cases in which use of force is a 

possibility, legal advisors shall be consulted in the planning or preexecution phases to 

determine the legal basis for intervention and use of force, shall review proposed ROE, 

and shall assess the legal risks and potential liabilities entailed under international law. 

l. Applicable Rules of Engagement. Commanders at every level must ensure 

understanding of ROE by all personnel. Requests for supplemental ROE must be 

handled IAW the SROE. 

m. War Powers Resolution. Operations conducted may require consultation with, 

or reporting to, Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. War Powers 

Resolution reports will be initiated, as required, by DOS. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework 

for evacuation planning and operations. These questions may serve as focus for the 

detailed planning and operational dialogue between diplomats and military forces that 

must precede any successful evacuation operation. These questions also serve as a good 

starting point for GCC priority information requirement development. 

1. Will the operational environment be permissive, uncertain, or hostile? If it is 

permissive, are unarmed hostilities expected? If it is uncertain or hostile, will pursuit 

forces be necessary? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities?

2. What MNFs, NGOs, or IGOs will be operating in the area?

a. Are MNFs integrated into the JTF plan?

 b. How are plans being deconflicted if the evacuations are separate?

c. What are the appropriate C2 arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a 

multinational operation?

 d. What support is available from other participating nations?

e. What support is required by other participating nations? 

3. What is the current situation in the country? In the embassy? Near the US citizens? 

Near the TCNs and HN personnel to be evacuated?

4. Who is the senior US official in charge of the evacuation operation? 

5. Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the 

evacuation site?

6. What is the chain of command for US military forces?

7. What is the relationship of the GCC and subordinate commanders with the 

ambassador?

8. Will all US mission and/or embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain? 

9. Who will screen the evacuees?

a. Are there embassy personnel assigned to screen?
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-68 

 b. Are there any evacuees (e.g., wardens) who will be able to help with processing 

and screening?

c. What are the JTF requirements for screening?

 d. Who will be available to physically search female evacuees?

10. Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting prior to final evacuation 

departure? Will the DOD NTS be used?

11. Is the embassy’s EAP available? Is it up to date?

12. Who is the primary POC within the embassy to work with the JTF on details of the 

operation? 

13. What steps are being taken by the embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?

14. Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in 

the HN recently?

15. What information is needed immediately from the evacuees?

16. Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes been 

verified and surveyed? 

a. Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as LZs, 

concentration of US citizens, port facilities, and landing beaches? How will this 

information be made available to the JTF? Who is responsible for updating this 

information to ensure it is current? 

 b. What is the total number of US personnel to be evacuated? 

17. Have the screening and processing areas been verified?

18. What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees (e.g., 

TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be evacuated? 

a. Number per priority category. 

 b. Identification.

19. What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those 

listed in the EAP?

20. If families must be separated, is there a method of identifying unaccompanied 

children with parents/guardians during repatriation periods (e.g., matching numbered 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Considerations 

C-3 

wrist bands if parent/guardian is with child at evacuation site, parent/guardian matching 

database)?

21. What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potential 

troublemakers? Do any present a possible/credible threat?

22. What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?

23. What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum? 

24. Who and how will the baggage and personal property of all evacuees be searched for 

weapons or explosives? It may be necessary to expedite this process in a nonpermissive 

or combat environment, but even in such an environment, consideration must be given to 

asymmetric threats.

25. What proof of US citizenship is acceptable? 

26. Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?

27. Will the US embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedules 

evacuation?

28. What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Will 

protective clothing be required? Will food be required? 

a. Type.

 b. Quantity. 

c. Location.

29. Has DOS established a pet policy? Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling 

on the designated transportation? Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at 

the safe haven location? Is veterinary support required? 

30. Will JTF search teams be sent after missing evacuees?

31. Is there any sensitive equipment or material at the embassy that will need to be 

evacuated or destroyed? Will personnel with requisite clearances be required to assist in 

evacuating or destroying sensitive equipment or material?

32. Are there procedures in place to handle claims against US civilians?

33. If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance 

party? 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-68 

34. What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF evacuation force to 

avoid confrontation? 

35. Who are the key HN personnel and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation? 

36. What unusual environmental health conditions are likely to be faced by Service 

members and evacuees in this location? Will medical support be available from the 

embassy or HN? Have MEDEVAC procedures been coordinated with the HN? Where 

are the HN health services?

a. Location.

 b. Availability.

c. Capability.

37. What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? What is the physical 

condition of all evacuees? Are patient evacuation assets required? If so, is there a need 

to pre-stage those assets nearby? What are the MEDEVAC procedures? 

38. Where are the HN police forces?

a. Location.

 b. Availability.

c. Capability.

 d. Loyalty to the host government. 

e. Hostility to the United States.

f. Factional infighting present.

39. Where are the HN fire services?

a. Location.

 b. Availability.

c. Capability.

40. Where are the HN military forces?

a. Location.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Considerations 

C-5 

 b. Availability.

c. Capability.

 d. Loyalty to the host government. 

e. Hostility to the United States.

f. Factional infighting present.

41. Will the HN be providing any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites?

a. Location.

 b. Unit.

c. Size of security force.

42. What is the potential threat?

a. Size.

 b. Activity.

c. Location.

 d. Unit.

e. Time.

f. Equipment. 

43. What are the possible enemy COAs?

a. Delay.

 b. Reinforce.

c. Attack.

 d. Withdraw. 

44. Will interpreter support be available from the embassy or the HN?
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-68 

45. What communications support will be available from the embassy and how will the 

communication architecture be set up to support the operations (i.e., networks, 

frequencies, secure equipment availability, SATCOM availability, need for relays)?

46. Can portable communications equipment be sent to the embassy to facilitate 

improved and secure communication? 

47. Does the adversary have an EW capability that may impact friendly communications, 

air operations, or ground movement? Will adversaries attempt to jam or disrupt 

nonsecure communications?

48. Will transportation support be available from the embassy or the HN? 

a. Type. Note: If evacuees will be transported via ARG ships, consider follow-on 

transportation requirements to move personnel out of theater if appropriate. 

 b. Location. 

c. Capacity.

 d. Condition. 

e. Operators required. 

49. Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is the lead PA 

director? Will media representatives be evacuated?

50. Are there areas from which the media are restricted or where access is restricted? Is 

there a media support plan? 

51. What are the ROE for the JTF?

52. What is the guidance on the use of MISO? 

53. What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the NEO and/or the 

NEO MISO plan? 

54. Will the HN media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO MISO plan? 

55. What is the role of CA in NEO?

56. Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors and insert special operation forces? 

57. Have all requirements for strategic transportation system been directed to the 

USTRANSCOM command center and/or crisis action team?
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Considerations 

C-7 

58. What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel? 

a. Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying US 

military assets?

 b. Have air requirements for units and equipment been identified in the Joint 

Operation Planning and Execution System?

c. Are US naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?

 d. Would commercial air carriers be willing to add charter flights for the NEO?

e. What commercial sealift assets are available?

f. What commercial transportation has the US embassy already contracted to assist 

US citizens if departing voluntarily?

g. At what point would commercial sea or air carriers cut back or halt operations?

 h. What transportation is available on retrograde flights by USTRANSCOM 

controlled aircraft deploying forces to the AOR? 

i. What is the maximum on ground capacity and fuel availability at possible 

evacuation airports?

j. Would the cost of meals, baggage handling, and other service requirements be 

incorporated into the contract? 

 k. Are emergency loading waivers required to load evacuees on cargo planes or 

surface vessels? Note: Emergency waivers are required from USTRANSCOM to load 

evacuees on military aircraft not configured for passengers or not for over-water flights. 

Emergency waivers are also required from the Commandant, US Coast Guard, to 

transport evacuees on cargo vessels not configured or equipped for passengers. Under 

emergency conditions, both of these options may need to be considered by transportation 

planners. 

59. Who will provide climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information? 

60. What support is available from other US sources? 

61. What support is required by other US agencies? 

62. Are trained EOD personnel available through the HN?

63. Are map products of the JOA and the embassy compound available? What are the 

sources?
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-68 

64. Who controls and ensures familiarity with GIBCOs and other geographic 

information? 

65. Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious disease, 

exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?

66. Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support 

capabilities?

67. Will the ambassador allow an FCE to deploy? 

68. What HN religious events, holy days, festivals, celebrations, or other significant 

religious activities will occur during the evacuation that could adversely impact the 

operation? 

69. What HN religious sites, shrines, buildings, facilities, or other locations do JTF 

marshalling teams need to be aware of to avoid desecrating them and antagonizing the 

populace? 

Possible Dilemmas

Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. 

JTF personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following: 

1. Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given 

situation. When is deadly force authorized? 

2. Interpretation of the ROE. 

3. Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF.

4. Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.

5. Terrorism.

6. Bomb threats and/or suicide bombers. 

7. Snipers, antitank guided missiles, etc.

8. Nonambulatory evacuees, to include those with contagious diseases or possible CBRN 

contamination. 

9. Language and/or cultural background problems. 

10. Religious and/or ethnic background problems. 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Planning Considerations 

C-9 

11. Potential evacuee’s name not on list provided by the embassy but appearing to be a 

bona fide evacuee.

12. Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.

13. Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown identifications. 

14. Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband. 

15. Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the evacuation 

sites to request evacuation. 

16. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.

17. Evacuee attempting to give bribes to gain favor. 

18. Inaccurate evacuation lists.

19. Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area. 

20. Evacuees carrying large amounts of money, gold, jewelry, and other valuable items 

and forms of wealth. 

21. Friendly EW operations’ impact on local emergency communications networks. 
Appendix C 

C-10 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank
D-1 

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS 

 This appendix contains sample checklists based on the DOS Emergency Planning 

Handbook, 12 FAH-1. The checklists found in an embassy EAP should be the actual 

checklist used for NEO. 

 CHECKLIST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTED EVACUATION 

1. Name and title of American official in charge of the evacuation: ________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

2. American officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names, means of contact). 

3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list—see 

DOS Emergency Planning Handbook Exhibit 120—update to show name, probable 

location, and means of identification and contact of officer performing each relevant 

function.) 

4. How many military personnel will be needed to assist in screening evacuees and 

where will they need to be located? __________________________________________ 

Who will assist the military? ________________________________________________ 

5. Is the operational environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile? _______________ 

6. Perimeter security needs: _______________________________________________ 

Assembly areas and embarkation points: ______________________________________ 

7. What security will the HN or controlling authority provide? ___________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available if required? _______ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Where are the GIBCOs located and who has custody of them? _____________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

9. Could unauthorized and/or hostile persons forcibly or surreptitiously attempt to join 

the evacuation? If so, what action does the post recommend? _____________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

10. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum? _________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-68 

11. Will the post’s OIC vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some 

evacuees or should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted? _______________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

12. Does the ambassador desire the military to physically search those evacuees that 

cannot be validated? ______________________________________________________ 

13. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search? 

________________________________________________________________________ 

14. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modified 

priority: ________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

15. Will food be required? __________ Total meals:__________ 

16. Is potable water available? __________ 

Quantity of bottled water required:__________ 

17. Does the post anticipate that any Americans will refuse evacuation? _____________ 

18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? ________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 a. If pets are allowed to be transported, have requirements such as customs and 

quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be allowed into the safe 

haven? _________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 b. If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with 

them to the evacuation processing centers? ____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

19. Does the embassy anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for 

missing evacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio 

call sign frequencies, if known.) _____________________________________________ 

20. Would a search operation meet armed resistance? ___________________________ 

21. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment? _____________ 

22. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees 

(consider all likely points): 

 How many sets? ________ Frequencies? _______ Additional needs? __________ 
Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists 

D-3 

23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees? 

 Embassy: ___________________________________________________________ 

 Military: ____________________________________________________________ 

24. Under extreme circumstances families might be separated, and there must be a 

method of identifying unaccompanied children with parents/guardians during repatriation 

periods, etc. 

25. Other items that may affect NEO: 

 a. Travel restrictions, curfew, roadblocks. 

 b. Local military activities. 

 c. Political or security factors affecting evacuation. 

 d. PA considerations. 

26. If interpreters are needed, can the embassy provide? _________________________ 

27. Provide updated copies of the embassy’s: 

 a. EPH Section 1540 and exhibits for same. 

 b. Communications annex. 

 c. Logistics annex. 

 d. Transportation annex. 

 e. F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report. 

 f. GIBCOs. 

28. Give number of evacuees who are: 

 a. Wounded, injured, or ill: litter ________________________________________ 

 b. Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory ___________________________________ 

 c. Pregnant: _________________________________________________________ 

 d. Any contagious diseases or infections present? ___________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-68 

29. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required? ________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

30. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex: 

 0–7 years: male __________ female __________ 

 8–16 years: male __________ female __________ 

 17–20 years: male __________ female __________ 

 21+ years: male __________ female __________ 

31. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees? _________________________ 

32. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees? ______ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

33. Weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation: 

__________ pounds __________ cubic feet 

34. Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status, to 

include possible threats to transportation assets. 
Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists 

D-5 

ASSEMBLY AREA 

LOCATION: ___________________________ DATE: _________________________ 

Assembly Area ______________________ Primary ____________________________ 

Embarkation Point ____________________ Alternate __________________________ 

1. Location: ___________________________________________________________ 

2. Grid coordinates: _____________________________________________________ 

3. Reference points: _____________________________________________________ 

4. Size: _____________________ Estimated capacity: ________________________ 

5. Shelter: _____________________________________________________________ 

6. Cooking facilities: ____________________ Water: _________________________ 

7. Food stocks: _________________________________________________________ 

Estimated person/days on hand: _____________________________________________ 

8. Latrine and shower: ___________________________________________________ 

9. Security: ____________________________________________________________ 

10. Control point: ________________________________________________________ 

11. Telephone: _______________________ Radio call sign: ____________________ 

12. Access, chokepoints: __________________________________________________ 

 Alternates: __________________________________________________________ 

13. Nearest police station: _________________________________________________ 

14. Nearest medical treatment facility: _______________________________________ 

15. Emergency power supply: ______________________________________________ 

16. Distances to embarkation points: _________________________________________ 

17. If HLZ, identify: _____________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-68 

 _________ Sketch attached _________ Video attached ________ Photo attached 

18. Availability of fuel for surface vehicles: ___________________________________ 

This report prepared by: ___________________________________________________ 
Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists 

D-7 

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE 

LOCATION: _______________________DATE: ______________________________ 

1. Designator: __________________________________________________________ 

2. Location: ___________________________________________________________ 

3. Grid: _______________________________________________________________ 

4. Reference point(s): ____________________________________________________ 

5. Dimensions: _________________________________________________________ 

6. Surface: ____________________________________________________________ 

7. Obstacles: ___________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

8. Recommended air approach(es): _________________________________________ 

9. Recommended ground approach(es): _____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s): _________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

11. Fuel availability: _____________________________________________________ 

12. Comments: __________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

This report prepared by: ___________________________________________________ 

 _________ Sketch attached __________ Video attached __________Photo attached 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-68 

AIRFIELD SURVEY 

LOCATION: ______________________DATE: _______________________________ 

1. Name of airfield: _____________________________________________________ 

2. Location (map coordinates): ____________________________________________ 

3. Fuel (type and availability): _____________________________________________ 

4. Materials handling equipment: __________________________________________ 

5. Elevation: ___________________________________________________________ 

6. Runway length: ______________________________________________________ 

7. Runway width: _______________________________________________________ 

8. Surface composition and estimated single wheel loading factor: ________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

9. Available parking area: ________________________________________________ 

10. Largest aircraft accommodated: _________________________________________ 

11. Instrument approach facilities; navigation aids: _____________________________ 

12. Aircraft obstacles: ____________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

13. Are runways/taxiways lighted? __________________________________________ 

14. Communications (frequencies, call signs used): _____________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

15. Physical security: _____________________________________________________ 

16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control? _____________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue: 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists 

D-9 

18. Does the airfield meet any USTRANSCOM accepted (e.g., International Civil 

Aviation Organization, NATO, Federal Aviation Administration) standards for signs, 

markings, and other applicable requirements? If so, which standards? _______________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

19. What is the availability of HN certified, civilian, or military air traffic controllers? 

________________________________________________________________________ 

20. Key contacts: ________________________________________________________ 

21. Distance from assembly area to airport: 

 Primary: _________________________ Secondary: ________________________ 

22. Conditions of roads leading to airport: ____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports: ____________________ 

 

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity: _____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

25. Latrine and shower facilities: ____________________________________________ 

26. Feeding facilities and capacity: __________________________________________ 

27. Text or copy of description in “Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World”: _____ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

This report prepared by: ___________________________________________________ 

 _____ Sketch attached _____ Video attached _____ Photo attached 

Note: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an 

evacuation. 
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 3-68 

SEAPORT SURVEY 

LOCATION: _________________________________DATE: ____________________ 

1. Name of seaport: _____________________________________________________ 

2. Location (map coordinates): ____________________________________________ 

3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage: _____________________________ 

4. Channel depth, depending on season: _____________________________________ 

5. Water depth at berths: _________________________________________________ 

6. Tide, depending on season: _____________________________________________ 

7. Pilots required or available: _____________________________________________ 

8. Navigational aids: ____________________________________________________ 

9. Port or beach obstacles: ________________________________________________ 

10. Wharf (description and capabilities): ______________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

11. Materials handling equipment: __________________________________________ 

12. Fuel (type and availability): _____________________________________________ 

13. Physical security available and in use: ____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

14. Distance from post to seaport: ___________________________________________ 

15. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport: _________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

16. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport: _____________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

17. On-site assembly areas and capacity: _____________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

18. Dining facilities and capacity: ___________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists 

D-11 

19. Latrine and shower facilities: ____________________________________________ 

20. Location of nearest medical treatment facility: ______________________________ 

21. Key contacts, key personnel: ____________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

This report prepared by: ___________________________________________________ 

 _____ Sketch attached _____ Video attached _____ Photo attached 
Appendix D 

D-12 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank 
E-1 

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE NOTICE FORMS 

Figure E-1. Sample Stand Fast Notice 

SAMPLE STAND FAST NOTICE

NAME OF POST:______________________________DATE:______________ 

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans 

remain in their homes. Only the most essential outside activities should be 

conducted, and public areas should be avoided until the situation improves. 

Since there is always the possibility the situation will deteriorate and you will be 

required to move elsewhere, this office recommends that you promptly take the 

following precautions: 

1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) 

of food, water, and fuel. If you have a personal automobile, be sure it is ready 

for immediate use; fill the gas tank and check the oil, water, tires, and battery. 

2. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, 

contact us immediately at telephone ________________. 

3. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, 

marriage, divorce, and naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance 

policies; bank books; as well as US and local currency. 

4. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in 

duplicate. 

5. Prepare for each family member one suitcase (66 pounds or less) to 

contain, as applicable, warm clothing regardless of season, eyeglasses, babies’ 

and children’s supplies, and special medications. 

6. Listen to the local media and Voice of America, US Armed Forces Radio, 

or the British Broadcasting Company closely for announcements from the local 

government or this office. 

Your warden is ______________________________, 

who can be reached at __________________________. 

We are monitoring the situation and will provide you with further guidance. 

Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy 

for reference. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-68 

Figure E-2. Sample Leave Commercial Notice 

SAMPLE LEAVE COMMERCIAL NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_____________________________DATE:_______________ 

1. In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends 

that Americans whose presence in the country is not essential, depart by 

commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult US citizens have 

compelling reasons for remaining in the area, we suggest that dependents 

depart with their pets while normal commercial facilities are still available. 

2. American citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid 

passports or visas should not come to this office for travel arrangements. 

Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with transportation 

companies or travel agents. 

3. Persons departing are requested to inform this office by telephone, 

______________, or mail of their departure plans, providing the following 

information: name(s), date(s) and place(s) of issuance of passports, probable 

date(s) and mode(s) of transportation, and names and addresses of next of kin 

or other point of contact in the United States or travel agents. 

4. This office cannot accept any personal or real property for protection, but 

will accept copies of inventories of property left in the country and attempt to 

arrange for protection of such property through the local authorities. 

5. American citizens without valid passports or who are unable to arrange for 

their own travel or that of their dependents because of insufficient funds or 

other reasons should report to this office as soon as possible. They should 

bring with them: 

 a. American passports or other proof of US citizenship. 

 b. For non-American spouses, children, and dependents: passports or 

identification cards and proof of relationship (birth or marriage certificates). 

6. Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it 

handy for reference. 
Sample Notice Forms 

E-3 

Figure E-3. Sample Evacuation Notice 

SAMPLE EVACUATION NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_____________________________DATE:_______________ 

Because of the situation in this country, the ambassador has determined that the 

evacuation of all US citizens is advisable. As the operations of this office may be 

terminated with little or no advance warning, American citizens wishing US 

Government assistance should contact their wardens or this office immediately 

(telephone _________________). The embassy/consulate is arranging chartered 

transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets 

is not feasible, and all persons being evacuated will be asked to sign promissory 

notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The Department of State will bill 

evacuees later for the costs incurred. (US Government personnel and their 

dependents travel on official orders and therefore their respective agencies will be 

billed.) To provide proper protection and to help you leave safely, we ask you to 

follow these instructions: 

1. Your warden is ________________ and may be contacted at __________. 

2. Your assigned assembly area is at _______________________________. 

 

 ____ a. Please be there at _____. 

 ____ b. You will be told later when to report. 

 ____ c. Do not bring your vehicle to the assembly point. 

 ____ d. Bring enough food for each family member to have _____ meals. 

 ____ e. Cooking facilities are not available, so bring ready-to-eat food 

(canned items, sandwiches, etc.). 

 ____ f. Bring an unbreakable container with _____ quart(s) of water per 

person. 

 ____ g. Pets will be transported during this NEO and are allowed at the 

assembly point. 

(Only checked items apply) 

3. Prepare to bring with you all important personal papers (passports, inoculation 

cards, cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 pounds or less) 

per person containing clothing suitable for the local climate as well as for a change 

of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and baby/children supplies. 

Do not bring firearms or liquor. Pets are allowed only if specifically authorized 

above. 

4. Adult family members should consider the possibility of becoming separated 

temporarily. Problems can be avoided by exchanging data concerning bank 

accounts, addresses, and telephone numbers of relatives in the United States, and 

powers of attorney. 
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 3-68 

Figure E-4. Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice 

Figure E-5. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity 

SAMPLE EMBASSY/POST CLOSING NOTICE

NAME OF POST:______________________________DATE:______________ 

The situation in this country is such that the US Government is closing its 

offices here effective ______________________________________________. 

The embassy of ____________________, located at ___________________, 

will protect US interests until further notice. 

We recommend that American citizens leave the country immediately. Until this 

office ceases operations, we will make every effort to assist US citizens still 

wishing to depart. Those who plan to remain should provide their names, 

addresses, and next of kin so this office can pass the information to the 

Department of State and to the ___________________________________ 

embassy. 

Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy 

for reference. 

SAMPLE WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made, this _________ day of _____________, 20_____, 

between _______________________________ and the military forces of the 

United States. 

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to 

evacuate_______________________________________________________. 

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above named individual(s), with 

the understanding that the offer will not be repeated. 

4. Evacuee Signature ____________________________________________ 

 Evacuee Signature ____________________________________________ 

 Evacuee Signature ____________________________________________ 

 Evacuee Signature ____________________________________________ 
F-1 

APPENDIX F

REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER PROCESSING SHEET 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-68 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet (cont.) 
Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet 

F-3 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet (cont.) 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 3-68 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet (cont.) 
Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet 

F-5 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet (cont.) 
Appendix F 

F-6 JP 3-68 

Figure F-1. Department of Defense Form 2585, Repatriation Processing Center 

Processing Sheet (cont.) 
G-1 

APPENDIX G

OPERATIONAL RISK AND SAFETY 

1. Risk Management 

a. Principles. Risk management (RM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and 

controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk 

cost with mission benefits. Four rules can be used to guide the JFC’s RM process: 

(1) Integrate RM into NEO planning. 

(2) Accept no unnecessary risks. 

(3) Make risk decisions at the proper command level. 

(4) Accept risk if benefits outweigh the potential losses. 

b. Process. There are five steps to the joint RM process as follows: 

(1) Identify the Hazards. This is begun during planning and continued 

throughout the NEO. Each operation has both general and unique hazards. Potential 

hazards for NEOs are discussed below. 

(2) Assess the Hazards. Each hazard is analyzed to determine the probability 

of its causing a problem and the severity of the consequences should such a problem 

occur. This step concludes with a risk assessment that describes the impact of the 

combined hazards. The result is a statement that quantifies the risk associated with the 

NEO—extremely high, high, medium, or low. 

(3) Develop Controls. Leaders at each command level weigh the risks against 

the benefits. The higher the risk the more likely a decision should be elevated. 

Ultimately, a commander will have to decide not to take risk in a particular area or 

establish controls that will mitigate the risk. 

(4) Implement Controls. The commander then integrates specific controls into 

plans, orders, SOPs, training, and rehearsals. Knowledge of these controls must extend to 

each joint force member. 

(5) Supervise and Evaluate. Finally, leadership at all levels must supervise to 

ensure compliance with the established controls. They also must reevaluate their 

effectiveness and make adjustments accordingly. 

c. Operational Environment. The conditions that prompt a NEO present the joint 

force with difficult choices during execution. The force mix of combat, combat support, 

and combat service support depends upon a sound evaluation of the threat. Further, the 

operational environment likely will be fluid and may change rapidly from permissive to 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-68 

hostile. Operating aircraft, ships, landing craft, and land vehicles under adverse weather 

conditions is inherently more hazardous. This situation can be exacerbated by the general 

unfamiliarity of joint force personnel with the operational area. 

d. Potential Hazards. Hazards may be identified by brainstorming the possibilities 

within the categories of mission, adversary or enemy, terrain and weather, troops and 

support available, and time available. The following list contains typical hazards (not an 

all-inclusive list) that should be considered when planning a NEO. 

(1) Accelerated deployment with short planning and preparation time. 

(2) Urban terrain—congestion, unfamiliar local customs/laws. 

(3) Temperature/humidity extremes. 

(4) Underdeveloped infrastructure—roads, ports, aircraft facilities, communications. 

(5) Water availability/contamination. 

(6) Disease vectors. 

(7) Fatigue due to jet lag or 24/7 operations. 

(8) HQ/command post facilities and location. 

(9) Chain of command clarity. 

(10) Local populace interference. 

(11) Spontaneous terrorism/insurgency activity. 

(12) Night operations. 

(13) Rotary-wing operating area characteristics—wires, LZ conditions, density 

altitude, forward arming and refueling points. 

(14) Vehicle operations—speed, loading and unloading noncombatants, 

overloading, bridge capacities, and escorts. 

(15) Weapons/ordnance handling. 

(16) Disabled vehicles/aircraft recovery. 

(17) PR. 
Operational Risk and Safety 

G-3 

(18) Ship/landing craft operations—slippery spots, tiedowns, flight deck 

operations, hearing, and head protection. 

(19) Evacuation route characteristics—roadblock potential, trafficability, and 

threat exposure. 

(20) Fratricide potential. 

e. Reaction Force. Because the operational environment can change quickly, a 

reaction force capable of protecting the NEO force elements and noncombatants from 

adversary advances is imperative. This force should be on short-notice alert and 

positioned close to the operating area. 

f. Hazard Awareness. While joint force members will be informed of the hazards 

and mitigating controls associated with the military operation, noncombatants likely will 

be unaware. Further, the general alertness of the noncombatants will be impaired (to 

some degree) by stress and fatigue resulting from their sudden departure. 

2. Safety Considerations 

a. Command Evaluation. All commanders involved in a NEO are responsible for 

the safety of their personnel. The JFC and subordinate and supporting commanders share 

responsibility for the safety of noncombatants with the ambassador. This unique 

situation requires that the commanders carefully evaluate the associated risks discussed 

below considering the general unfamiliarity of joint force personnel with the operational 

area and evacuees unfamiliarity with military procedures and equipment. Thereafter, 

specific safety precautions should be briefed and implemented to mitigate the operational 

risks. 

b. Protecting the Force. Before beginning any NEO, certain standard safety 

procedures should be implemented as follows: 

(1) Brief joint force personnel on the safety aspects and necessary precautions 

that must be considered for safe operations. When more than one operation takes place in 

parallel, personnel should be assured that the hazards of any one operation will not 

inadvertently affect any of the other operations. 

(2) Conduct an inspection to determine the physical condition of equipment. 

(3) Ensure that personnel who have been instructed and/or given written 

instructions do, in fact, understand these instructions; ensure that certifications for all 

operations requiring certified operators are current. 

(4) Exercise all equipment. 
Appendix G 

G-4 JP 3-68 

(5) Ensure that appropriate safety devices are used and worn and that safety 

procedures are followed. 

(6) Brief all personnel on the special safety procedures to be taken when 

working near noncombatants. 

(7) NEOs that involve operations on or near water can be particularly dangerous 

because of adverse weather, operational task hazards, and adversary action. The 

efficiency of an operation may also be seriously curtailed by carelessness of personnel 

who permit dangerous conditions to exist or fail to repair faulty equipment. The 

following special precautionary steps should be taken to prevent accidents. 

(a) Shipboard Safety. Accidents aboard ship most frequently result from 

falls, explosions, falling objects, faulty electrical equipment, unsafe handling procedures, 

and lack of protection for the eyes and extremities. Life jackets are required during 

loading, transport, and unloading evolutions with landing craft. Landing craft should be 

equipped with swimmers qualified in lifesaving techniques. All lines on deck should be 

made up in such a manner that no one can get tangled in them or trip on them. Rigging 

must be properly stowed and frequently and properly inspected and maintained. All 

personnel should wear proper clothing and use correct tools and safety gear. 

(b) Bulk Petroleum Products. Oil and grease spillage should not be 

allowed to accumulate on decks; spillage should be wiped up as it occurs. When fuel is 

being distributed, no bare lights, lighted cigarettes, or any electrical apparatus that have a 

tendency to spark should be permitted within 50 feet of an oil hose or fuel tank. Only 

spark-proof tools will be used to connect or disconnect fuel lines. 

(c) Fire Prevention. “No Smoking” signs will be posted wherever 

potential fire hazards exist. Smoking will be permitted only in designated areas. 

(d) Embarkation and Debarkation. Personnel embarkation and 

debarkation at ships moored offshore should only be conducted in sea state three or 

below. 

(e) Protective Gear. Personnel should wear protective headgear and 

hearing protection. The ship’s officers should brief embarked military personnel and 

noncombatants on any special safety requirements. 

c. Protecting Evacuees. Although the ambassador is ultimately responsible for the 

safety of US citizens, the JFC shares that responsibility since the evacuees will be in the 

custody and direct control of the joint force during the military operation. The following 

considerations are provided to enhance the protection and safety of evacuees. 

(1) Safety Briefing. This brief should be part of the reception and search 

station brief described in Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing.” 
Operational Risk and Safety 

G-5 

(2) Manning and Expertise. Adequate manning of the various NEO force 

elements and stations is key to help evacuees avoid hazardous situations. An adequate 

presence of embassy and joint force personnel in a supervisory role accompanied by 

interpreters aids communication with the evacuees, enhancing their awareness of 

hazardous conditions and overall safety of the various movement and loading evolutions. 

d. Accident Reporting. Procedures for reporting ground and aviation accidents are 

well established within Service chains of command. However, the JFC should establish 

temporary procedures (i.e., accident reporting SOP) that accommodate Service 

procedures and keep the JFC informed. Typically, there will be an initial telephonic 

report. Thereafter, a hard-copy report is forwarded up the chain of command. The 

content of each type of report should be specified in the joint force SOP. 
Appendix G 

G-6 JP 3-68 

Intentionally Blank 
H-1 

APPENDIX H

REFERENCES

 The development of JP 3-68 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. General

a. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 

as amended. 

b. Department of State Emergency Planning Handbook, 12 FAH-1. 

2. Department of Defense

a. Memorandum of Agreement Between Departments of State and Defense on the 

Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Nationals and Designated Aliens from 

Threatened Areas Overseas. 

b. DODD 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and 

Temporary Refuge. 

c. DODD 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens 

in Danger Areas Abroad. 

d. DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies. 

e. DOD Foreign Clearance Guide (www.fcg.pentagon.mil). 

f. Joint Plan for Department of Defense Noncombatant Repatriation. (NonEmergency), Headquarters, Department of the Army. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, (JSCP). 

b. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

c. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations. 

d. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

e. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

f. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 
Appendix H 

H-2 JP 3-68 

g. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

h. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

i. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. 

j. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. 

k. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

l. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

m. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

n. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

o. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

p. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

q. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs. 

r. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

s. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

t. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.02C, Joint 

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III (Crisis Action TimePhased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution). 

u. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II 

Planning Formats. 

v. CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides.

4. Other

a. AJP 3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

b. Field Manual 90-29, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

c. Center for Naval Analysis 37 39-0003, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 

(NEOs): An Analyst’s How-To Guide. 
J-1 

APPENDIX J

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Marine Corps. The Joint Staff doctrine 

sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-68, 22 January 2007, Noncombatant Evacuation 

Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//C427// 

 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3// 

 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes 

to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix J 

J-2 JP 3-68 

5. Distribution of Printed Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) and on 

the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 
GL-1

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AE aeromedical evacuation 

AJP allied joint publication 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARG amphibious ready group 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, United States Southern Command 

CI counterintelligence 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CMO civil-military operations 

COA course of action 

COM chief of mission 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONUS continental United States 

COS chief of station 

DAO defense attaché office 

DATT defense attaché 

DCM deputy chief of mission 

DD Department of Defense (form) 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DJTFAC deployable joint task force augmentation cell 

DMDC defense manpower data center 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOS Department of State 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

DVD digital video disc 

DZ drop zone 

EAC emergency action committee 

EAP emergency action plan 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-68 

ECC evacuation control center 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EPH emergency planning handbook 

EW electronic warfare 

FAH foreign affairs handbook 

FAST fleet antiterrorism security team 

FCE forward command element 

FPD force protection detachment 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GIBCO geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations 

GPMRC Global Patient Movement Requirements Center 

GSO general services officer 

HLZ helicopter landing zone 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HQ headquarters 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IAW in accordance with 

ID initiating directive 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IMO information management officer 

IO information operations 

ISB intermediate staging base 

JFC joint force commander 

JIOC joint intelligence operations center 

JOA joint operations area 

JPASE joint public affairs support element 

JP joint publication 

JRCC joint reception coordination center 

JSPOC Joint Space Operations Center 

JTF joint task force 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer 

LZ landing zone 

MCSFR Marine Corps security force regiment 

MEDEVAC medical evacuation 

MEU Marine expeditionary unit 

MILDEC military deception 
Glossary 

GL-3

MISO military information support operations 

MIST military information support team 

MNF multinational force 

MNFC multinational force commander 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MSD mobile security division 

MSG Marine security guard 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NEOCC noncombatant evacuation operation coordination center 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIST national intelligence support team 

NSG National System for Geospatial Intelligence 

NST National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team 

NTS noncombatant evacuations operation tracking system 

OIC officer in charge 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PCRTS primary casualty receiving and treatment ship 

PM patient movement 

POC point of contact 

PR personnel recovery 

PSO post security officer 

RCA riot control agent 

RLG regional liaison group 

RM risk management 

RMO regional Marine officer 

ROE rules of engagement 

RSO regional security officer 

RST religious support team 

SAO security assistance officer 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SC strategic communication 

SDO senior defense official 

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SECARMY Secretary of the Army 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-68 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SECNAV Secretary of the Navy 

SECSTATE Secretary of State 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SITREP situation report 

SJFHQ(CE) standing joint force headquarters (core element) 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SOP standing operating procedure 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

TCN third country national 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

TPMRC theater patient movement requirements center 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

UN United Nations 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

USDAO United States defense attaché office 

USG United States Government 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VIP very important person 

WLG Washington Liaison Group 
GL-5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and 

between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Also called AE. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-02) 

all appropriate action. Action taken in self-defense that is reasonable in intensity, 

duration, and magnitude, based on all the facts known to the commander at the time. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-68 as the source JP.) 

authorized departure. A procedure, short of ordered departure, by which mission 

employees or dependents or both, are permitted to leave post in advance of normal 

rotation when the national interests or imminent threat to life require it. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

Automated Repatriation Reporting System. The Defense Manpower Data Center uses 

this system to track the status of noncombatant evacuees after they have arrived in an 

initial safe haven in the United States. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

command-sponsored dependent. A dependent entitled to travel to overseas commands at 

government expense and endorsed by the appropriate military commander to be present 

in a dependent’s status. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or 

on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 

foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 2-0) 

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by 

the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission. Also called CT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.4) 

dependents/immediate family. An employee’s spouse; children who are unmarried and 

under age 21 years or who, regardless of age, are physically or mentally incapable of 

self-support; dependent parents, including step and legally adoptive parents of the 

employee’s spouse; and dependent brothers and sisters, including step and legally 

adoptive brothers and sisters of the employee’s spouse who are unmarried and under 

21 years of age or who, regardless of age, are physically or mentally incapable of 

self-support. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

dislocated civilian. A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that 

includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a 

refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-29) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-68 

emergency action committee. An organization established at a foreign service post by 

the chief of mission or principal officer for the purpose of directing and coordinating 

the post’s response to contingencies. It consists of consular representatives and 

members of other local US Government agencies in a foreign country who assist in 

the implementation of a Department of State emergency action plan. Also called 

EAC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

evacuation. 1. Removal of a patient by any of a variety of transport means (air, ground, 

rail, or sea) from a theater of military operation, or between health service support 

capabilities, for the purpose of preventing further illness or injury, providing 

additional care, or providing disposition of patients from the military health care 

system. (JP 4-02) 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given 

locality. (JP 3-68) 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping 

unserviceable or abandoned materiel, US or foreign, to appropriate reclamation, 

maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. (JP 4-09) 4. The ordered 

or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by Department of 

State, Department of Defense, or appropriate military commander. This refers to the 

movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The 

evacuation is caused by unusual or emergency circumstances and applies equally to 

command or non-command sponsored family members. (JP 3-68) (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-68 as the source JP for Definition #2; JP 4-09 as 

the source JP for Definition #3; and JP 3-68 as the source JP for Definition #4.) 

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons 

of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

force sequencing. The phased introduction of forces into and out of the operational area. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

foreign service national. Foreign nationals who provide clerical, administrative, 

technical, fiscal, and other support at foreign service posts abroad and are not 

citizens of the United States. The term includes third country nationals who are 

individuals employed by a United States mission abroad and are neither a citizen of 

the United States nor of the country to which assigned for duty. Also called FSN. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations. A mobile visualization tool 

available through National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Defense 

Logistics Agency. Applications are broad, including the capability to become 

familiar with a foreign environment, develop a battle scene, plan and execute 

noncombatant evacuations, contingency operations, urban area missions, and provide 

access to geospatial data where networks or infrastructure have been damaged or do 

not exist. Also called GIBCO. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7

geospatial-intelligence contingency package. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-

02.)

hostile environment. Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as 

well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit 

intends to conduct. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 

Also called HN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign 

forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-0) 

intermediate staging base. A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, 

sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area. Also called ISB. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-35) 

joint reception coordination center. The organization, established by the Department 

of the Army as the designated Department of Defense executive agent for the 

repatriation of noncombatants, that ensures Department of Defense personnel and 

noncombatants receive adequate assistance and support for an orderly and expedient 

debarkation, movement to final destination in the United States, and appropriate 

follow-on assistance at the final destination. Also called JRCC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task 

force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military 

forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and 

action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

military information support operations. Planned operations to convey selected 

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 

objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of military information support 

operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the 

originator's objectives. Also called MISO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have 

formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 1) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-68 

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who 

exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two 

or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander’s command 

authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State 

or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, 

whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are 

endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by 

the Department of State. Also called NEOs. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

noncombatant evacuation operations tracking system. An automated data processing 

hardware and software package that has the capability to provide evacuee in-transit 

visibility to combatant commanders and senior leadership during the conduct of a 

noncombatant evacuation operation. Also called NTS. (Approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

noncombatant evacuees. 1. US citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent 

authority include: a. civilian employees of all agencies of the US Government and 

their dependents, except as noted in 2a below; b. military personnel of the Armed 

Forces of the United States specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants; 

and c. dependents of members of the Armed Forces of the United States. 2. US 

(and non-US) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily 

ordered to evacuate) by competent authority include: a. civilian employees of US 

Government agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country 

concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated; b. 

private US citizens and their dependents; c. military personnel and dependents of 

members of the Armed Forces of the United States outlined in 1c above, short of an 

ordered evacuation; and d. designated personnel, including dependents of persons 

listed in 1a through 1c above, as prescribed by the Department of State. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

ordered departure. A procedure by which the number of US Government personnel, 

their dependents, or both are reduced at a foreign service post. Departure is directed 

by the Department of State (initiated by the chief of mission or the Secretary of 

State) to designated safe havens with implementation of the combatant commander 

noncombatant evacuation operations plan. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country military and 

law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-9

personnel recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and 

execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-50) 

procedures. Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: CJCSI 5120.02) 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 

engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with 

interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

61) 

regional liaison group. A combined Department of State–Department of Defense 

element collocated with a combatant command for the purpose of coordinating post 

emergency evacuation plans. Also called RLG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

repatriation. 1. The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are 

officially processed back into the United States subsequent to an evacuation. (JP 3-

68). 2. The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in 

accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 

of War. (JP 1-0). (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-68 as the source 

JP for Definition #1.) 

risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising 

from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission 

benefits. Also called RM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0) 

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate 

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called 

ROE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-04) 

safe haven. 1. Designated area(s) to which noncombatants of the United States 

Government’s responsibility and commercial vehicles and materiel may be 

evacuated during a domestic or other valid emergency. (JP 3-68) 2. Temporary 

storage provided to Department of Energy classified shipment transporters at 

Department of Defense facilities in order to assure safety and security of nuclear 

material and/or nonnuclear classified material. Also includes parking for commercial 

vehicles containing Class A or Class B explosives. (JP 4-01.6) 3. A protected body 

of water or the well deck of an amphibious ship used by small craft operating 

offshore for refuge from storms or heavy seas. (JP 4-01.6) (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-68 as the source JP for Definition #1.) 

tactics. The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: CJCSI 5120.02) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-68 

techniques. Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or 

tasks. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: CJCSI 5120.02) 

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not 

have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended 

operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

warden system. An informal method of communication used to pass information to US 

citizens during emergencies. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

Washington Liaison Group. An interagency committee and/or joint monitoring body, 

chaired by the Department of State with representation from the Department of 

Defense, established to coordinate the preparation and implementation of plans for 

evacuation of United States citizens abroad in emergencies. Also called WLG. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-68 Operations