NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RICHARD ATAFARI LAWRENCE, AKA 

Steve Hibbert, AKA Richard Lawrence, 

AKA Richard Lee Lawrence, AKA Oneil 

Lindo, AKA Oneil Orlando Lindo, AKA 

Michael Lee Overton, AKA Kevin Predue, 

AKA Damion Right, AKA Damon Jamaal 

Right, AKA Brandon Telloford, AKA 

Duncan Thomas, AKA Damion William, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50383 

D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00470-JAK-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 8, 2020**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Richard Atafari Lawrence appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-50383 

challenges the 12-month sentence and 18-month term of supervised release 

imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lawrence contends that the district court violated his due process rights and 

procedurally erred by basing his sentence on dismissed state charges and unreliable 

hearsay concerning those charges. This claim fails because the record reflects that 

the district court did not consider the dismissed allegations; rather, it based the 

sentence on the admitted failure to report violations. See United States v. 

Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009) (to establish a due process 

violation, a defendant must show the sentence was based on unreliable 

information). To the extent the court considered the nature of the dismissed

charges in assessing the circumstances of Lawrence’s failures to report, Lawrence 

has not shown that the court relied on any unreliable information. See id. at 936

(information is unreliable “if it lacks some minimal indicium of reliability beyond 

mere allegation” (internal quotations omitted)). 

Lawrence also contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing 

to consider his mitigating arguments. We review for plain error, see United States 

v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that 

there is none. The record shows that the court considered Lawrence’s written and 

oral arguments in favor of a lower sentence. It was not required to specifically 
3 19-50383 

address each of Lawrence’s arguments. See United States v. Perez-Perez, 512 F.3d 

514, 516 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Lastly, Lawrence argues that the district court improperly relied on the 

seriousness of the revocation conduct, resulting in a substantively unreasonable 

sentence. The record does not support Lawrence’s claim that the court placed 

improper weight on the seriousness of his violations. See United States v. Simtob,

485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (district court may consider severity of the 

conduct underlying the revocation as long as it does impose the sentence solely or 

primarily on that basis). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 

totality of circumstances, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), 

including, as the district court noted, Lawrence’s repeated breaches of the court’s 

trust and criminal history, see Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1062.

AFFIRMED.