Colombia’s War: 

Toward a New Strategy

by John A. Cope

Strategic Forum

American policy toward Colombia is

being challenged by an altered political and security atmosphere inside

each country. Colombia’s new president,

Alvaro Uribe, is confronting the growing

threat to his administration’s ability to govern

and control national territory. A protracted

internal war that involves a complex assortment of illegal armies, paramilitary forces,

and symbiotic narcotics traffickers poses a

significant threat to Colombian democracy.

The Colombian crisis has long-term

implications for U.S. and hemispheric security as a test of American resolve to help

restore stability and establish legitimate

authority over large areas of the Andean

region where criminal and terrorist networks

have deep roots. Washington can no longer

deal only with the symptoms of Colombia’s

problem and seems to be signaling deeper

involvement.

The U.S.-Colombian partnership needs a

shared, overarching, and cohesive purpose

that does not view Colombia’s war primarily

through the prism of suppressing drug trafficking and terrorism. A new, integrated U.S.-

Colombian campaign plan that seeks to

enhance public security, governance, defense relations, and community development,

as well as bring about a political settlement,

could best advance the interests of both

countries and would mark an important

turning point in strengthening both Colombian

and regional security.

Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, is

confronting a protracted internal war and

moving to assert national political authority.

Hopes are being pinned on Uribe, the new “law

and order” president who took office on August

7, 2002, with an overwhelming mandate to end

violence, narcotics, and official corruption.

The violence that dominates the Colombian political and security atmosphere has

intensified since former President Andres 

Pastrana’s high-profile but unsuccessful effort

to negotiate an end to the country’s decadeslong internal war. The strains on daily life have

increased as the nation’s ability to manage

insecurity disappears. Economic growth has

slowed, public debt mounts, and poverty deepens. A new upsurge in violence nationwide

greeted Uribe, who declared a limited state of

emergency and used this power to impose a

special tax to yield an additional $778.5 

million—mostly for the Ministry of Defense,

whose annual budget only recently exceeded 

$2 billion.

The new administration in Bogotá is

intent upon reshaping Colombian reality.

Unlike his predecessor, who emphasized the

pursuit of peace, President Uribe’s focus is on

improving governance. To do so, he is committed to reform bureaucratic inefficiency, restore

state authority, and increase the central government’s presence in the war-torn countryside

in order to provide public security and, ultimately, peace. Negotiations with illegal armed

groups are possible but would have to be on

Uribe’s terms. Success (and U.S. support) will

depend on his ability to sustain a higher level

of national sacrifice for and participation in

the country’s internal war.

The United States and Colombia have

reached a critical juncture in their relationship. The United States is eager to work with

the new president, but major policy shifts in

Washington remain uncertain due to domestic

political stakes and apprehension about where

change could lead. From the U.S. standpoint,

events since September 11, 2001, have heightened sensitivity to the dangers of global terrorism, coupled with growing concerns about the

propensity for international criminal and

terrorist networks to exploit ungovernable

spaces for operations, training, or revenuegenerating purposes. Colombia presents such

a case involving a complex assortment of

national illegal armies, paramilitary forces,

and symbiotic narcotics trafficking organizations. U.S. policy for Colombia recently has

entered a new phase with the granting of legal

authority allowing the use of counterdrug aid

to support Bogotá’s unified campaign against

narcotics trafficking and terrorist organizations, as well as in emergency circumstances

to protect human health and welfare, if congressional conditions and administration

guidelines are met.1

Since the late 1980s, the United States has

seen bilateral relations through a counternarcotics lens. This has been the element of the

Colombian crisis most germane to U.S. interests and the approach with the best chance of

garnering bipartisan congressional support.

The intent has been to keep Americans out of

Colombia’s internal war. To achieve

counterdrug goals as circumstances

change, leaders have broadened

the policy toward Colombia.

Programs ranging from

promoting human

No. 194

October 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

Post-9/11 Critical 

Issues Series

No. 194, October 2002
rights and the rule of law, to the Andean Trade

Preference Act, to supporting peace processes

and encouraging economic and social alternatives to illegal crops have been folded piecemeal into U.S. policy, each carefully formulated to satisfy congressional interests and

funding stipulations. Inclusion of counterterrorist support is the most recent step toward

improving the results of drug-centric policy,

which congressional critics assail for falling far

short of expectations.2

This juncture can become a turning point

if leaders in both capitals are willing to look at

Colombia’s war through the same lens and

integrate their policies. Until the Uribe administration, Colombian society had denied the

seriousness of the political challenge and tried

to manage insecurity. By viewing all bilateral

issues through a counternarcotics lens and

avoiding greater involvement in Colombia, U.S.

policy also has been in denial. The relationship

is too important to continue in this way. President Uribe’s recent emergency actions demonstrate his recognition of the urgent need to

change course to restore “democratic security.”

The United States seems to be signaling deeper

involvement, and in doing so must decide what

constitutes success for its policy.

President Uribe is determined to confront

the political and psychological challenge to the

Colombian state’s ability to govern and control

territory. These two tasks are at the heart of the

country’s undeclared internal war—in which

the United States has become an important

actor. Washington can no longer limit its focus

to the symptoms of Colombia’s problems of

narcotics trafficking and terrorist violence.

Policymakers can no longer satisfactorily

explain U.S. policy solely in terms of counterdrugs, and counterterror lacks clarity given the

vagueness of its definition. The cumulative

effect of broadening the policy over the last

decade suggests a new direction that emphasizes governance, a premise that is shared with

the Uribe administration. This approach is

consistent with U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere that stresses the importance of

“responsible government stewardship.”3 It also

recognizes that the crisis in Colombia has

long-term implications for U.S. and hemispheric security and is a test for American

policy in support of national efforts to control

ungoverned space as well as for the interconnected wars on drugs and terrorism.

The proposed way forward begins with

understanding the nature of Colombia’s war

and recognizing past U.S. policy limitations.

From such a starting point, we can clarify

plausible U.S. objectives in Colombia and devise

a national integrated campaign plan to achieve

U.S., Colombian, and regional interests that the

White House and Congress can support.

Understanding the War

As President Uribe took office on August 7

amid violent attacks around the capital, his

effective writ encompassed roughly half the

country. Forces on the extreme political left, as

well as anti-insurgent paramilitary groups,

have been engaging each other and the state

for control of territory and population in much

of the countryside and poor barrios in many

cities. The conflict involves approximately

35,000 members of the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the smaller

National Army of Liberation (ELN), as well as

illegal paramilitary groups, many of which are

linked loosely to the United Self-Defense Forces

of Colombia (AUC), and finally, over 150 narcotics organizations.4 A relatively limited assault on this criminal industry, largely funded

and carried out by the United States, adds

another dimension. Last year, roughly 3,500

Colombians (civilians and military) died in the

war, and an estimated 350,000 were displaced

within the country. About a fifth of the country’s 1,200 municipalities lack government

presence. Neither the state nor any of the illegal armed factions, however, has the military

capacity to deliver a knockout blow. Despite this

inability, the impressive strength and capability

of FARC fronts and paramilitary groups continue to increase.5

Colombia’s new political leader confronts

the challenge of restoring the authority of the

state and bringing security to the country. The

Uribe administration assumes three fundamental tasks. The state has to

■ reacquire national territory

■ establish permanent government presence

(for example, police, judges, representatives from

departmental and national agencies) to provide 

law and order, development opportunities, and 

other services

■ negotiate with three illegal armed groups to

end the fighting.

Formulating a national campaign plan to

change Colombia’s reality demands a clear

understanding of the war’s dynamic interplay of

political aims, psychological pressures, competing wills, and violence. The Bush administration and Congress face an equally decisive act

of judgment in designing a policy approach

that meshes with President Uribe’s efforts to

achieve responsible governance while continuing to pursue U.S. antinarcotics interests.

The past 12 years have seen a subtle trend

in both countries toward depoliticizing the

crisis. The narrow U.S. focus on narcotics

perhaps has encouraged this depoliticization to

some degree. The trend is apparent when

policymakers minimize the seriousness of the

38-year FARC quest for political power, citing as

proof an inability to attract a mass following

for its goal of reshaping an admittedly flawed

democratic society. Respected polls indicate

consistently that less than two percent of society

supports FARC and ELN. Mainstream leaders

often characterize rural and urban violence as

a persistent national infection in need of the

right remedy or as competition for territory

between FARC and AUC narcotics cartels.

Policymakers who minimize the political

nature of the war fail to appreciate FARC strategy. In the 1980s, its leadership decided to

exploit narcotics and other illegal activities to

create and sustain a liberation army, recruited

from marginalized parts of society and

equipped to be capable of defeating security

forces, controlling territory in order to isolate

cities, undermining legitimacy of government

at all levels, weakening societal will to resist,

and ultimately winning the revolutionary

struggle. The strategy has been very successful,

and this illegal army regularly challenges state

legitimacy. For example, FARC forced the mandate for a peace process on its own terms into

the 1998 election, and there have been high2 Strategic Forum No. 194, October 2002

John A. Cope is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. He may be contacted at (202) 685–2373 or by e-mail at copej@ndu.edu.

Washington can no longer

limit its focus to the

symptoms of Colombia’s

problems of narcotics

trafficking and terrorist

violence
profile assassinations, kidnappings of political

and religious leaders, and videotaped exploitations of famous political prisoners to suggest

that Bogotá cannot even protect the elite.

Since Uribe’s election in May, FARC has

demanded the resignation of all departmental,

municipal, and village officials because of what

they represent to the state. Faced by the government’s powerlessness to react, over 200 mayors

and municipal officials have heeded its threats

to resign or die, effectively destabilizing many

local governments.6 The FARC upsurge of violence since the inauguration appears designed

specifically to embarrass the new president and

his defense and military leaders.

Bogotá’s frequent inability to respond to

FARC (and ELN) challenges has facilitated the

unchecked growth, aggressiveness, and popularity of paramilitary organizations, but these

autodefensas do not seek to overthrow the

government. Emerging in areas where the state

is unable to guarantee lives, property, and

honor,7 these rural vigilante groups use terror

against actual and suspected insurgents and

their supporters to control territory. Many

Colombians see these organizations as the only

means to defeat FARC and ELN and to restore

order. Many also see them as the defenders of

the local status quo. With weak national security forces dispersed and often isolated, collusion undoubtedly occurs at the local level. As a

result, forces affiliated with AUC and those that

follow the Peasant Self-Defense Groups of

Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) and others represent a serious, long-term threat to the legitimacy and authority of the Colombian state.

Washington’s intensified interest in terrorism places a spotlight on an old dimension of

Colombia’s war, a dimension that U.S. executive and legislative branches chose to avoid.

The FARC and ELN have been on the U.S. list of

Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1997. The

Bush administration added AUC before September 11. It is important that the United States

and Colombia understand terrorism in the

same way. The term terrorism has long been

used to describe a large and diverse category of

political violence, ranging from the international jihad of Islamist extremists against the

United States to national resistance campaigns

waged by illegal armed groups within and

outside state boundaries.

The FARC, ELN, and AUC are in the national resistance category. The terrorist activities of these groups have a message: the act of

violence is intended to make a political rather

than a military point. Like insurgency, cumulative violent acts are intended to undermine

another’s political legitimacy and power. Unlike insurgency, a political ideology is less

prevalent in Colombia. When terrorism and

narcotrafficking are presented as equal threats

to stability, as has occurred in U.S. policy, the

political aim of terrorist violence is minimized

and the financial and logistical nature of the

trafficking is accentuated. This distorts the true

nature of the war.

Terrorism needs support. While its agenda

is different, the illegal narcotics industry in

Colombia fuels and invigorates all three terrorist organizations, generating most of the

wealth needed to finance logistical and personnel requirements and thus minimizing the

need for widespread popular support. Colombian analysts estimate that FARC and AUC

receive respectively over $300 million and $200

million annually from narcotics trafficking.

Within loose FARC and AUC structures, there

often is no distinction between people who

push drugs and rebels who practice terrorism.

Kidnapping and extortion also are very lucrative sources of support for FARC and ELN, and

paramilitary groups augment their finances

with voluntary and forced contributions from

commercial interests eager to protect holdings.

No illegal armed group is totally dependent on

drug trafficking.

Seizing the Moment?

Both Colombia and the United States have

a great deal at stake at this juncture, but

progress requires that Bogotá and Washington

confront political conundrums at the core of

their security relationship. These hard questions, illuminated by recent events, have been

difficult to address in each government’s approach to the other—and answering these

questions will require that both administrations make hard decisions about redefining the

nature and scope of the relationship.

Colombia. By most measures, the country

is fed up with living in a chronic, dangerous,

psychologically debilitating environment in

which the absence of peace and security has

seriously hurt the national economy and international trade. While Colombia is not teetering

on the verge of collapse, daily life has taken a

decided turn for the worse. Frustrated citizens,

attracted to Uribe’s proactive “change” agenda

to restore the authority of the state and to bring

security to the country, elected this independent

politician on the first ballot, both unprecedented events.

No. 194, October 2002 Strategic Forum 3

progress requires that

Bogotá and Washington

confront political conundrums at the core of their

security relationship

COLOMBIA
4 Strategic Forum No. 194, October 2002

President Uribe has promised his constituents, as well as the United States, that he

will address the nation’s central conundrum.

Can he dispel any doubt that a weak state with

a relatively modest economy and a heretofore

largely unengaged society can change course,

demonstrate a united, patriotic, and fighting

spirit, and make the resource and manpower

sacrifices required to end the national crisis? He

has committed his administration to move in

this direction.

The test of Uribe’s leadership will be

twofold. On the defense side, he must set a high

standard for military and national police

readiness, professionalism, and human rights

awareness in the conduct of operations; demand close cooperation between civil and

military sectors of government; and develop a

mindset in the armed forces that seeks to build

long-term national self-sufficiency in matters

of defense and security. On the civilian side, he

must convince Colombians to make the sacrifices required to support his drive to realize

“homeland security,” social progress, and

economic growth. President Uribe must convince the people that all Colombians are responsible for security.

The United States. Congress continues to

ask the hard question: Where is the administration going with Colombia policy? A counterdrug explanation is no longer adequate; the

recent inclusion of counterterrorism adds a

new dimension to a series of steps rooted in

counternarcotics that have broadened policy to

improve effectiveness and return on investment, steps such as the Andean Trade Preference Act, promotion of the rule of law, and

alternative development. But a holistic and

cohesive purpose and long-term commitment

are missing.

U.S. policymakers have recognized the

weakness in Colombian governance and the

country’s deteriorating internal stability, but

there has been a determined reluctance to get

involved with the political and military aspects

of its long-simmering internal war. By 1990,

U.S.-Colombian relations were narcotized; all

bilateral interaction had become dependent on

the drug issue.8 Explicit legislation and President William Clinton’s policy at the end of the

decade limited military assistance to antinarcotics efforts and specifically barred its use in

Colombia’s fight against armed movements.

The Bush administration carried forward

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 73, “The

Colombia Initiative,” which remains in effect.

Washington has seen the association with

Bogotá as of secondary rather than strategic

importance, which is at the heart of the U.S.

conundrum. Is the extent and scope of U.S.

involvement in Colombia commensurate with

its importance? This beleaguered friend is the

political, economic, and security linchpin in

an alarmingly unstable Andean region as well

as the anchor for related solutions.9 In terms

of international crime, Colombia is the source

of over 80 percent of the cocaine and 50

percent of the heroin entering the United

States. Over 80 percent of the cocaine consumed in Europe originates here as well.

Colombia also is the showcase for constitutional civilian rule and economic liberalization, as well as an ally with roots reaching

back to the Korean War. Maintaining access to

its oil and gas and expanding trade are extremely important. The manner in which the

United States deals with Colombia is the test

for its commitment to hemispheric security

and the global wars on drugs and terrorism.

In sum, Colombia has strategic importance, but will Washington define a policy

purpose and establish measurements of success

in a way that is consistent with Colombia’s

importance and help President Uribe establish

control over ungoverned spaces, pressure the

illegal armies to seek peace, and prevent the

spillover of Colombia’s problems into vulnerable neighboring countries?

Legacy of the Past

The longstanding logic governing U.S.-

Colombian policy stipulates that an end to

drug production and trafficking achieves an

American national security goal. In the late

1990s, an expanded logic added that undermining funding of illegal groups would help

Colombia achieve peace, prosperity, and security. Implementation of the policy has evolved

through two distinct phases. The first phase

(1990–1998) focused on eliminating the

Medellin, Cali, and Atlantic Coast cartel leadership. The second phase (1998–2001) covered

the initiation of President Pastrana’s so-called

Plan Colombia.

During these phases, U.S. knowledge

about the organization and dynamics of the

criminal narcotics industry steadily improved,

as did the U.S. perception of the Colombian

Army. An initial low opinion of the army’s

professionalism and human rights record led

the United States to assist the Colombian

National Police. Washington minimized its

association with the Colombian Army until

1999. By then, national military leaders had

instituted organizational and professional

reforms, many focused on human rights

awareness, officer development, and tactical

training. Improved combat results led to national trust and growing popularity. Reforms

enabled an expansion of U.S. military contact

for counterdrug operations and antiterrorism

training and support.

Policy implementation began with relatively small budgets that emphasized resources

of the Drug Enforcement Agency and U.S.

supporting agencies as well as modest aid to

the Colombian National Police. The “kingpin

strategy” decapitated cartel leadership but did

little to reduce the drug trade. In the aftermath, the FARC, ELN, and ultimately AUC

became more aggressively involved with drug

trafficking, which led to an explosion in coca

cultivation and drug production. In the shorter

second phase, marked by support to Plan

Colombia, the United States confronted the

narcotics crisis. In a successful move to defuse

allegations that the Clinton administration

had not done enough to fight the drug war, the

United States expanded the scope of its policy

to incorporate Colombian military units that

had been evaluated for human rights violations and trained for tactical operations in

support of coca and poppy eradication and

cocaine and heroin interdiction. The United

States also expanded alternative development

and institutional reform programs and added

programs intended to foil kidnappings and

other acts of terror.

Policy implementation hit a peak with

congressional bipartisan support for Plan

Colombia in 2000. The Colombian plan, developed with American assistance, envisioned

the manner in which the

United States deals with

Colombia is the test for

its commitment to

hemispheric security and

the global wars on drugs

and terrorism
amassing $7.5 billion over 3 years, including

$4 billion from Colombia that was never

achieved completely. The effort supported social

programs, judicial and fiscal reform, economic

recovery, increasing military strength, counterdrug-related programs, and the peace process.

President Pastrana’s negotiations with FARC

precluded addressing local security. Washington provided $1.3 billion over 2 years, over

$700 million of which was earmarked for

counterdrug-related military activities, the

highlight of which was the creation of a

Colombian Army Counter Narcotics Brigade.

Other international actors contributed only

$500 million for counterdrug programs.

Again, the suppression of drug production

and trafficking was the centerpiece of U.S.

policy in this Plan Colombia phase. The dominant perspective held that aerial eradication

(starting in southern Colombia, where 40

percent of coca is grown) and interdiction of

air and river transit systems nationwide are

keys to a counternarcotic-based victory in

Colombia. If these actions succeed and there

are parallel efforts to strengthen national

institutions, drug production will decrease (so

the theory went). This, in turn, will cut the

wealth of FARC, ELN, and paramilitary groups.

A reduction in money will diminish their

ability to purchase weapons, ammunition, and

technical expertise, to pay personnel, and

otherwise to sustain their armed agenda

against the pressure of the Colombian Armed

Forces. Reduced wealth also will undermine

their legitimacy in the countryside. A depletion

of funds ultimately will hasten their pursuit of

a political solution. In the end, the state will

regain its authority. In practice, however, reality

has not conformed to theory.

Congressional and other critics have

found Plan Colombia performance to date

discouraging. Coca and poppy cultivation has

increased; alternative economic development

programs have produced few tangible results;

peace negotiations have collapsed; and the

armed conflict has intensified with attacks on

infrastructure and municipalities. Bogotá’s

inability to sustain local security and control

territory for extended periods has been a glaring weakness. Colombia’s small police and

military forces are dispersed for more immediate priorities.

American officials have come to realize

that in order for Colombia policy to be effective, Washington has to broaden its focus to

confront the three illegal armed groups that

dominate over 40 percent of the countryside

and operate easily in another 30 percent. The

United States must help security forces gain

control of municipalities stripped of government presence and the lawless urban barrios,

as well as continue to eradicate coca and poppy

plants and interdict trafficking.10 This shift in

thinking changes the logic that guided the

second phase of implementation. Termination

of President Pastrana’s peace negotiations with

FARC opened the door for greater attention to

national terrorism, a Bush administration

request to Congress for expanded legal authority to address the problem, and the beginning

of the Colombia policy’s third phase.

The Bush administration successfully

urged Congress to let Colombia openly use the

units from the American-trained counternarcotics brigade under Plan Colombia and the

brigade’s U.S.-provided helicopters to fight

terrorism when specific conditions are met. The

new legal authorities do not modify existing

congressional requirements, such as human

rights vetting of all Colombian military units

receiving assistance and the personnel caps for

U.S. personnel (400 military, 400 civilian

contractors). Congress granted expanded authority for the duration of the fiscal year with

the expectation that it will be continued in

fiscal year 2003.

The Uribe government, however, must first

commit itself in writing to pursuing the counterdrug policies of the Pastrana administration,

implementing significant national budgetary

and personnel reforms of the armed forces and

providing substantial additional financial and

other resource support to Plan Colombia.11 This

is a positive, if limited and conditioned, step

forward that suggests congressional reluctance

to make a serious change in the original

Colombia policy. The White House now must

replace PDD 73 with its own national security

policy decision. The administration is expected

to add guidelines, such as that only vetted units

that have received U.S. training on helicopter

operations can use the aircraft and that the

United States must agree before counterdrug

assets are employed.12

Missing Ingredients

A reexamination of U.S. policy reveals

several elements that are either missing from

Washington’s drug-centric approach, or until

recently, have been given scant attention. The

focus here is on four missing elements that

require further development in the current

phase of U.S. policy:

An overarching strategic purpose. In his

National Security Strategy, President Bush

stated that our fundamental purpose in Colombia is to help that country “defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed

groups . . . by extending effective sovereignty

over the entire national territory and provide

basic security to the Colombian people.”13 As

yet, however, the administration has not tied

together the various tasks implied in that

vision—suppressing terrorists and drug trafficking and promoting rule of law and respect

for human rights—in a fashion that establishes priorities or clarifies realistic measures of

success.

Unity of effort. The U.S. approach to the

Colombian Armed Forces in the 1990s casts a

shadow over a previously warm military-tomilitary relationship. The lifting of restrictions

after 1999 for the counterdrug mission introduced new tensions. The armed forces, for

example, had to accept the creation of a counternarcotics joint task force that the Colombian

high command could not employ. Aviation

resources were divided among five competing

elements (army, navy, air force, police, and

Joint Task Force South). Intelligence sharing

was limited to narcotics trafficking. Until

March 2002, the Colombian priority for spare

parts in the U.S. Department of Defense system

was routine. U.S. policy often exacerbated a

split within the Colombian government between civilian officials who are willing to work

with American conditions and military leaders

who believe that their institution is being

demeaned. Rebuilding senior Colombian

military confidence in U.S. counterparts is an

important challenge for the success of the third

phase of U.S. policy.

Measures to generate greater Colombian ownership of their conflict. For the

majority of Colombians who live in urban

No. 194, October 2002 Strategic Forum 5

rebuilding senior

Colombian military confidence in U.S. counterparts is an important

challenge for U.S. policy
areas, the war in the countryside and the barrios is an event seen on the nightly news. Under

Colombian law, the illegal armed groups are

not considered hostile. Their members are

suspected criminals, not combatants. The

detached mindset has been reflected in a low

level of national spending in wartime (3.5

percent of gross domestic product for both the

military and national police in early 2002).

While President Uribe’s special 1.2 percent tax

on estates (personal and business) over

$57,000 is a welcome sign of heightened commitment, the public response to his move has

yet to be seen.

Security cooperation among Colombia’s

neighbors. The United States provides counterdrug funding for neighboring Andean countries but has not tried to develop cooperation

among military institutions or between Colombia and its neighbors. The illegal logistical

systems, military and narcotics, are vulnerable

in adjacent countries. The importance of cooperation will increase as the capacity and activity of the Colombian Armed Forces increase in

the months ahead and the war intensifies.

There will be a tendency for the war to spill

over borders. This underscores the need for an

initiative to engage Latin states in a cohesive

regional effort to minimize the impact.

A Way Forward

At his inauguration, President Uribe promised to spare no effort in confronting bureaucratic inefficiency and committed to promote

development, guarantee social equity, and

provide public order.14 He focused on national

unity and effective governance on all fronts:

foreign investment, health and education,

transportation and communications infrastructure, underdevelopment and poverty, the system

of justice, and defense of the state. The new

administration is eager to show success in

changing Colombian reality. In the security

realm, the president plans to double the army’s

combat force of 100,000 soldiers and the national police to 200,000, organize a nationwide

force of civilian informers, and perhaps create

some type of local security structure.

The United States plays a role on both

sides of Colombia’s internal war. On the one

hand, regrettably, narcotics consumption helps

to finance three illegal armies and their operations. On the other hand, with support for Plan

Colombia, the United States is an important

player on the side of the state. At this point,

U.S. policy is moving from the “narcotized”

approach of the last decade toward President

Uribe’s efforts to govern responsibly and take

control of territory and population from FARC,

ELN, AUC, and other paramilitary groups.

Congressionally supported programs such as

crop eradication and drug interdiction, alternative development, and institutional reform

overlap with Bogotá’s initiatives to bring security and peace to the countryside and poor

barrios. To expedite progress in Colombia, both

national approaches must intersect.

Integrated Campaign Plan

This critical juncture can become a

turning point if both governments view

Colombia’s turmoil through the prism of

governance and commit to conjoin national

policies using the vehicle of an integrated

U.S.-Colombian campaign plan. Such a

plan would establish a shared long-range

purpose. The goal of the strategic partnership

is an end-state in which the Colombian state

has established its ability to defend its democratic institutions, control national territory,

and provide security to its citizens in a fashion

that ultimately leaves illegal forces no viable

choice than to end the violence in favor of

participating in the democratic process. Bogotá’s efforts to reform and modernize the

institutions of governance would continue.

Washington brings to the partnership valueadded contributions of training and assistance

beyond the counternarcotics focus of Plan

Colombia but short of involvement in combat

operations. Bogotá brings national leadership

that realizes the war’s outcome rests on

Colombian society, not just the military and

national police, and is committed to increase

its participation. An integrated campaign plan

would include public security as well as political, social, and economic components and

foreign policy support. Adopting this approach

keeps values associated with democracy visible

and presses Colombians to advance them. In a

similar way, the integrated campaign plan

concept helps to shape conditions in Colombia

(and the international arena) so that Bogotá

can attain the shared purpose.

An integral part of the concept is the

adoption of shared standards for measuring

success in a number of important objective and

subjective areas. Standards in eight areas

common to any integrated campaign plan are

discussed below. Success in each will require

time. Before an integrated campaign plan can

achieve positive results, there must be a building period for the Colombian armed forces and

national police during which it might appear

that the fortunes of the illegal forces are ascendant. With clear vision and determination to

achieve it, this situation should change as

military and police capabilities improve. The

eight standards for measuring success include:

Drug trafficking. The ongoing campaign

of eradication and interdiction must be assimilated into Colombian military strategy to

ensure that counterdrug and combat operations are mutually reinforcing. This will require close operational coordination between

Colombian and U.S. counternarcotics planning elements.

Armed forces and national police. The

public forces must overcome an operational

mindset developed over years of having insufficient capability. Success in this category will

come in four parts:

■ development of a modern training base able

to accomplish in 3 years or less, to high standards,

the force structure growth required by President

Uribe’s intention to double the size of the army and

the national police

■ production of a doctrine for combined

counternarcotics, counterterror, and area-control

operations in an environment marked by improved

strategic agility and greater military capability

■ creation of modern command and control,

logistical, and medical structures and associated

doctrines designed to meet the requirements of

highly mobile public forces

■ institutionalization of professional 

channels of communication between senior 

Colombian military leaders and their staffs and U.S.

counterparts.

Local control. A national ancillary

security force under Ministry of Defense control must be created and trained to supplement public forces in rural municipalities and

6 Strategic Forum No. 194, October 2002

the goal of the strategic

partnership is an end-state

in which the Colombian

state has established its

ability to assert authority

nationwide
urban barrios. It would help to provide order

and gather information. The structure should

include a national oversight mechanism to

counter attempts to politicize the force, reinforce human rights awareness, and investigate

allegations of human rights violations. This

organization must offer a credible, transparent alternative to the appeal of the paramilitary groups.

Colombian defense relations. Success

requires a leadership approach rather than a

managerial one to national defense and security and has two dimensions:

■ development of a government-wide working

environment that welcomes the inclusion of military expertise in planning and decisionmaking

processes and minimizes past differences in culture

■ institutionalization of reforms within the

Ministry of Defense that will realize joint cooperation among the services and with the police and

centralize control of strategic and operational air

mobility assets. The United States must continue to

provide a positive example.

Institutional reform and community

development. A comprehensive strategy based

on Plan Colombia must be formulated and

consistently implemented to strengthen local

political institutions, economic development,

and rule of law and civil society. This strategy

must be implemented within the areas that the

government controls in marginalized areas of

the countryside. This effort initially will require

establishing military-civilian entities at the

department level to plan, coordinate, and execute civic programs behind a security screen.

Level of effort. Success in this category

has two dimensions:

■ positive steps taken by the Colombian

government to increase national participation in

defending the state and establishing law and order

nationwide. Examples include mobilization of

reserve forces and additional military manpower,

sustained increases in defense spending, and the

end of artificial legal restrictions that have hampered military operations. 

■ institutionalizing a professional politicalmilitary mindset within the Ministry of Defense that

demands high standards for military and police

preparedness and pursues the future development of

self-sufficient public forces.

Regional cross-border cooperation.

Cooperation means creating a coalition for

greater regional security involving Colombia

and its neighboring states. The United States

would not have to be a member. While respecting national sovereignty, as a minimum, the

coalition would share intelligence on military,

narcotics, and interstate criminal issues and

interdict FARC, ELN, AUC, and other paramilitary logistical and drug-trafficking routes that

cross national territory.

Political settlement. Over the long term

and in tandem with the above elements, the

government should develop a broad outline of

a political settlement that includes, inter alia,

the demobilization, disarmament, and reincorporation of the illegal forces and their militias

and noncombatant supporters into society.

The integrated U.S.-Colombian campaign

plan proposed here differs from Plan Colombia,

which has focused on cutting the drug supply

and reducing the income flow to the illegal

armed groups. The campaign plan’s logic

argues that substantially greater Colombian

military pressure on illegal forces—when

combined with the growing presence of statecontrolled local security forces in contested

areas and more responsive government institutions—will undermine FARC, ELN, and paramilitary domination, weakening their capability and resolve to fight and thereby hastening a

political solution. The logic envisions aggressive military and police operations against the

illegal forces, their logistical infrastructures,

and narcotics associations (by eradication 

and interdiction).

From a U.S. perspective, the new logic has

three sets of assumptions. First, U.S. conditions

on human rights awareness and support for

non-counterdrug aspects of Plan Colombia will

continue for the long term. Second, Colombia

can mobilize greater resources to face its own

national challenge. And finally, a new U.S.

executive-legislative policy consensus along 

the lines of this approach can be achieved to

ensure uninterrupted U.S. assistance. The

integrated U.S.-Colombian campaign plan

approach defines a clear purpose (and thus

answers a question frequently asked by Congress) for U.S. assistance to Colombia in that

country’s complex security environment.

To implement an integrated U.S.-Colombian campaign plan, the U.S. Government

should lead by example, providing a model for

effective intergovernmental relations. The

magnitude of the foreign policy challenge calls

for a dedicated senior-level policy director with

a small staff. This individual would interact

with a core group of Washington’s interagency

actors for coordinating and managing implementation of the new approach and, ideally,

would have the ability to make resource decisions within the context of approved budgets.

Of equal importance, the policy director would

be a member of an integrated planning commission with Colombian leaders that meets at

least quarterly. The U.S. side also would include

the ambassador, a senior official of the Department of Defense, and the commander of U.S.

Southern Command. The commission would

manage the many offers of assistance from U.S.

Government agencies and commercial companies and coordinate U.S. support of President

Uribe’s national security strategy.

What are the consequences if change does

not occur? If the United States follows a business-as-usual approach with its focus still

riveted fundamentally on the drug war, U.S.

assistance will remain under the cloud of legal

and policy uncertainty that ultimately will

affect the ability of the Colombian government

to develop its own multiyear plans with any

assurance that U.S.-funded counterdrug and

possibly other resources would be available to

help Bogotá improve its capacity to assert state

to implement an integrated U.S.-Colombian

campaign plan, the U.S.

Government should lead

by example, providing a

model for effective intergovernmental relations

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

No. 194, October 2002 Strategic Forum 7
authority nationwide. In the end, FARC and

paramilitaries continue to grow in size and

sophistication, leading to higher civilian

casualties and more internal displacements

from the conflict. A second flawed peace

process on terms other than the government’s

could be the result.

Strengthening Security

Washington’s policy choices at this critical

juncture are being shaped in part by a changed

political and security atmosphere inside each

country. The element of Colombia’s war most

germane to U.S. interests is no longer merely

narcotics. Today, the United States is concerned

about the propensity for international criminal

and terrorist networks to exploit ungovernable

spaces in the Andean region. Washington,

therefore, is becoming directly involved in the

crisis and must work more closely with its

partner to address the core issue of governance

while focusing on the criminal drug trafficking

and national terrorism that are manifestations

of that weakness. In practical terms, the Bush

administration should find a way to support

the Uribe government in reacquiring national

territory, establishing permanent government

presence to provide law and order, developing

opportunities and other services, and, at some

point, negotiating with illegal armed groups to

end the fighting. By adopting a policy in which

both governments view Colombia’s turmoil

through the prism of governance and commit

to conjoin national policies using the vehicle of

an integrated U.S.-Colombian campaign plan,

this juncture becomes an important turning

point in strengthening not only Colombian but

also regional security.

Notes1

The Bush administration received the new authority in

late July for the remainder of the fiscal year (FY). The authority

must be negotiated again for FY03. See U.S. House of Representatives, House Rpt. 107-593, “ Making Supplemental Appropriations for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks

on the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30,

2002, and for Other Purposes,” accessed at <http://thomas.

loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp107:FLD010:@1(hr593)>. 2

See “Relevant text of S.2779 and Senate Appropriations

Committee Report 107-219, the Foreign Appropriations Act, July

24, 2002,” accessed at <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/

03forops.htm>. 3

“Our policy is based on the four pillars of democracy,

development, governmental integrity, and security.... Responsible government stewardship is essential to achieving each of

these goals.” See Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary of State for

Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western

Hemisphere,” Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 12, 2002, accessed at

<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/8751.htm>. 4

The Colombian government has confirmed an estimated

162 drug-trafficking organizations with over 4,000 members and

ties to more than 40 international criminal syndicates. See “New

Drug Gangs Spreading in Colombia,” STRATFOR, April 3, 2002,

accessed at <http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.

php?ID=203754>. 5

The Colombian Ministry of Defense estimates that the

strength of FARC grew from 5,800 in 1990 to 11,930 in 1998 to

16,980 in 2002. The paramilitary grew during the same period

from 4,500 to 6,400 to 13,200. For information on casualties and

displaced persons, see “ Colombia: State Department Human

Rights Report for 2001, March 4, 2002,” accessed at <http://

www.ciponline.org/colombia/02030401.htm>. 6

“Colombia: FARC Order Capture, Execution of Departmental Officials Who Do Not Quit,” Stockholm New Colombia

News Agency, July 18, 2002, in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (henceforth FBIS–Colombia), July 18, 2002; and

“Colombia: FARC Threats Have Been Effective Strategy,” El

Tiempo, July 13, 2002, in FBIS–Colombia, July 14, 2002. 7

“Colombia: Drugs, War and Democracy,” The Economist, April 21, 2001, 1–16. 8

Major General Gary Speer, Acting Combatant Commander of U.S. Southern Command, Hearing of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, U.S.

House of Representatives, Federal News Service, April 10, 2002,

accessed at <www.lexis-nexis.com>. 9

Russell Crandell, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy

Towards Colombia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 30. 10 Colombia’s important commercial natural resources—

such as oil, natural gas, coal, and coffee—are also found in the

areas where coca and poppies are grown. The export of these

commodities is crucial for Bogotá’s ability to finance its war. 11 House Rpt. 107-593, “Making Supplemental Appropriations for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks

on the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30,

2002, and for Other Purposes,” accessed at <http://thomas.loc.

gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp107:FLD010:@1(hr593)>. 12 Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs, Department of State, Hearing of the Foreign Operations

Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, U.S. House of

Representatives, Federal News Service, April 10, 2002, accessed at

<www.lexis-nexis.com>. 13 The National Security Strategy of the United States of

America (The White House, September 17, 2002), p. 10, accessed

at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> 14 “Inaugural Address by Colombian President Alvaro

Uribe Velez at Congress’ Elliptic Room in Bogota,” Santa Fe de

Bogota Office of the President, August 7, 2002, in FBIS–Colombia, August 7, 2002.

8 Strategic Forum No. 194, October 2002

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