i

From the Sea to the Stars

iii

From the Sea to the Stars:

A Chronicle of the U.S. Navy’s 

Space and Space-related Activities,

1944-2009

Sponsored by

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (C3I and Space)

Dr Gary A. Federici

Edited by

The Applied Research Laboratory

The Pennsylvania State University

Revised and updated edition, 2010

v

CONTENTS

Illustrations...................................................................................................................................................... xi

Preface ............................................................................................................................................................xiii

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................................... xiv

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1 – THE NAVY GETS INVOLVED IN SPACE (1944-1961)................................................................... 7

Early Navy Space Programs (1944-1958) ..................................................................................................... 9

The Space Probes...................................................................................................................................... 9

Naval Research Laboratory's Space Probes ......................................................................................... 9

Applied Physics Laboratory's Space Probes....................................................................................... 10

The Rockets............................................................................................................................................. 11

NRL's Viking Rockets........................................................................................................................ 11

APL's Aerobee Rockets...................................................................................................................... 11

Project PAMOR ...................................................................................................................................... 12

Early Navy-Air Force Competition over Space Development..................................................................... 14

First Satellites in Orbit................................................................................................................................. 15

The International Geophysical Year: 1957–1958 ................................................................................... 15

Sputnik .................................................................................................................................................. 16

Navy Launches its First Satellite—Vanguard ......................................................................................... 16

The U.S. Organizes Seriously for Space (1958-1961)................................................................................. 17

"Military" versus "Scientific" Satellites .................................................................................................. 18

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)....................................................................... 18

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)......................................................................................... 19

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)........................................................................................... 19

The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961)..................................................................................... 21

Communications Moon Relay (CMR) System ......................................................................................... 23

Origin of the Transit Navigation System................................................................................................. 24

Navy's Pioneering Satellite Communications Relays.............................................................................. 28

Passive Satellite Communications Relay (Echo)................................................................................ 28

Active Satellite Communications Relay (Score, Courier, and Advent).............................................. 29

Origin of the Navy's Covert Satellite Reconnaissance System (DYNO/GRAB/Tattletale) ...................... 30

Navy Project Tattletale: GRAB/DYNO—The World’s First Reconnaissance Satellite .................... 31

Navy Environmental Sensing Satellites in the 1950s .............................................................................. 33

Navy Spacecraft Tracking Systems ......................................................................................................... 33

APL's TRANET System..................................................................................................................... 33

NRL's Minitrack System .................................................................................................................... 34

The U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR)—“Space Fence” ................................ 35

CHAPTER 2 – SATELLITES FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE (1961-1970) ............................................................... 39

A 1961 DoD Decision on Space Catches Navy by Surprise........................................................................ 39

Satellite Navigation Systems in the 1960s................................................................................................... 41

The Transit Navigation System Goes Operational.................................................................................. 41

Prototype Transit Satellites ("Oscar" Series)...................................................................................... 42

Satellite Time Measurement/Passive Ranging ........................................................................................ 43

Navy Timation Program.......................................................................................................................... 43

Air Force 621B Program.................................................................................................................... 44

The Tri-Service Navigation Satellite Executive Group...................................................................... 44

Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s........................................................................ 45
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Navy Organization in the 1960s for Satellite Communications.............................................................. 45

"Spy Ship" Communications (TRSSCOM) .............................................................................................. 46

Navy Plans for Using DSCS Satellites.................................................................................................... 47

The DSCS Satellites........................................................................................................................... 47

Navy SHF Terminals for DSCS ......................................................................................................... 48

Navy Communications Experiments with Commercial Satellites............................................................ 49

Satellite Communications Experiment Ships..................................................................................... 49

The NRL Satellite Communications Terminal at Waldorf, Maryland ............................................... 49

Compass Link..................................................................................................................................... 50

Commercial Communications Satellites ............................................................................................ 50

The Tactical Satellite Communications (TacSat-1) Experiments............................................................ 51

Lofti Research ......................................................................................................................................... 53

Navy's Satellite Reconnaissance System during the 1960s.......................................................................... 54

Navy's Early Space-based Radar Programs................................................................................................. 55

Albatross................................................................................................................................................. 56

Navy Radar for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Program....................................................... 56

Dissemination of Space-derived Surveillance Information to the Fleet in the 1960s.................................. 57

Navy Exploitation of Weather Satellites in the 1960s................................................................................. 57

TIROS, NOAA, and GOES ...................................................................................................................... 57

Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)............................................................................... 58

Navy Environment Sensing Satellites in the 1960s ..................................................................................... 58

NRL SolRAD Satellites during the 1960s................................................................................................ 58

APL's Environmental Research Satellites during the 1960s................................................................... 59

Geodesy ........................................................................................................................................... 59

Space Physics..................................................................................................................................... 61

Ionospherics ....................................................................................................................................... 62

Navy Space Cadre—The Early Years.......................................................................................................... 62

Navy Participation in Manned Space Flight Programs in the 1960s............................................................ 63

Navy Astronauts...................................................................................................................................... 63

Project Mercury ...................................................................................................................................... 63

Project Gemini ........................................................................................................................................ 63

Project Apollo ......................................................................................................................................... 63

Navy Participation in MOL..................................................................................................................... 64

The Navy Spacecraft Recovery Force (Task Force 140)............................................................................. 65

Navy Range Instrumentation Ships.............................................................................................................. 65

Navy Anti-satellite Programs during the "Strategic Defense" Epoch.......................................................... 67

U.S. ASATs.............................................................................................................................................. 67

Navy Entries in the ASAT Race ............................................................................................................... 68

Emergence of the Soviet ASAT threat ..................................................................................................... 68

Navy Contributions to Satellite Technology during the 1960s.................................................................... 68

Satellite Stabilization .............................................................................................................................. 69

Satellite Station-keeping in Orbit............................................................................................................ 69

Multiple-launch Technology ................................................................................................................... 69

Timation .................................................................................................................................................. 69

Getting the DoD Space Systems Acquisition Directive Revised, 1970 ....................................................... 70

CHAPTER 3 – NAVY TACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SPACE EMERGE IN THE 1970S........................................ 73

Navy’s Need to Reduce Dependence on Overseas Bases............................................................................ 73

Soviet Tactical Exploitation of Space Alerts U.S. Navy.............................................................................. 74
Contents vii _________________________________________________________________________________

Strengthening the Navy's Space Organization in the 1970s......................................................................... 75

Management of Navy Space Acquisition Programs................................................................................ 75

Navy Space Program Sponsorship.......................................................................................................... 75

The OPTEVFOR Detachment at Sunnyvale............................................................................................ 75

Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Office Established.............................. 76

Satellite Communications for the Fleet........................................................................................................ 77

The Radio Frequency Band Tradeoffs .................................................................................................... 77

Development of UHF Satellite Communications .................................................................................... 78

The Fleet Satellite Communications Concept is Defined................................................................... 79

Development of Navy UHF Terminals for FLTSATCOM ................................................................ 80

Acquisition of the FLTSATCOM Satellites....................................................................................... 80

The Fleet Satellite Broadcast.............................................................................................................. 82

The Gapfiller Satellites....................................................................................................................... 83

Navy's SHF Terminals for DSCS ............................................................................................................ 83

EHF and the Beginning of Milstar.......................................................................................................... 84

"Common-user" Requirements Modify the Milstar Satellites............................................................ 85

Development of the Navy EHF Terminals......................................................................................... 86

Satellite Laser Communications for Submarines.................................................................................... 86

Space-based Navigation Systems in the 1970s............................................................................................ 87

Transit System Improvements ................................................................................................................. 87

The Joint Services GPS Program............................................................................................................ 89

Space-based Ocean Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the Fleet............................................................ 92

Outlaw Hawk .......................................................................................................................................... 92

Fleet Data Correlation Demonstrations................................................................................................. 93

Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements Evolve ......................................................................... 94

The Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Targeting Requirement............................................................................ 94

Outlaw Shark...................................................................................................................................... 96

Validating Navy Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements..................................................... 98

Navy Ocean Surveillance System............................................................................................................ 99

Navy's Continuing Initiatives to Get Space-based Radar in the 1970s................................................... 99

The Satellite Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS).............................................................................. 99

XOS-19 ......................................................................................................................................... 100

Clipper Bow ..................................................................................................................................... 100

Navy Exploitation of Weather and Environment Satellites in the 1970s................................................... 100

Navy's Shipboard Antennas for Meteorology........................................................................................ 101

The Weather Satellites .......................................................................................................................... 101

NOAA Weather Satellites................................................................................................................ 101

GOES Weather Satellites ................................................................................................................. 101

DMSP Weather Satellites................................................................................................................. 102

Navy Space-based Environmental Support in the 1970s....................................................................... 102

Seasat ......................................................................................................................................... 102

Navy Countermeasures Against Soviet Satellites in the 1970s.................................................................. 103

Navy Countertactics Against Satellite Surveillance.............................................................................. 103

Proposed Sea-based ASAT Weapons.................................................................................................... 104

CHAPTER 4 – MATURING OF NAVY SPACE-BASED TACTICAL SUPPORT (1980-1991)................................. 105

Naval Space Organizational Changes in the 1980s.................................................................................... 105

Changes on the OPNAV Staff and Space Acquisition Organizations.................................................... 105

The Naval Space Command is Established ........................................................................................... 106

Background: U.S. Space Command ................................................................................................. 106

The Naval Space Command ............................................................................................................. 106

The Naval Center for Space Technology............................................................................................... 108
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Space System Applications Program Office (SAPO)............................................................................. 108

Navy TENCAP Establishes Key Role in Fleet Support ......................................................................... 109

The "Tactical Support Group," 1988-1989....................................................................................... 110

CNA Assessment of Navy TENCAP Projects ................................................................................. 110

Navy Space Cadre in the 1980s............................................................................................................. 110

Space Curriculum Established at Naval Postgraduate School ............................................................. 111

The Navy’s Space Strategies in the 1980s................................................................................................. 112

Naval Space Policy (1984) and Space Strategy (1986)......................................................................... 112

Effect of the 1984 Naval Space Policy and the 1986 Naval Space Strategy ......................................... 114

Navy's Funding Practice for Space....................................................................................................... 114

Refining Navy Satellite Communications in the 1980s............................................................................. 116

UHF Tactical Communications Satellites in the 1980s ........................................................................ 116

FLTSATCOM .................................................................................................................................. 116

Navy LEASATs ............................................................................................................................... 117

EHF Communications for the Fleet ...................................................................................................... 117

GPS Replaces Transit for Fleet Navigation ............................................................................................... 118

Satellite Systems for Tactical Surveillance and Targeting, 1980-1989 ..................................................... 120

The "Sensor-to-Shooter" Approach....................................................................................................... 120

The Improved Ocean Surveillance System............................................................................................ 121

Space-based Radar Efforts.................................................................................................................... 122

Integrated Tactical Surveillance System (ITSS)............................................................................... 122

The Space-Based Wide-Area Surveillance (SBWAS) Program....................................................... 122

Infrared Surveillance and Warning....................................................................................................... 123

Slow Walker..................................................................................................................................... 123

Direct Tactical Reporting........................................................................................................................... 123

TADIXS-B ............................................................................................................................................. 123

Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) and its Derivative Terminals......................................................... 124

Evolution of the TRAP Broadcast ......................................................................................................... 126

Tactical Data Correlation and Display ................................................................................................ 127

Stand-Alone Tracker-Correlators and Displays ............................................................................... 128

Implementations of TRE Connectivity in the Fleet.......................................................................... 129

Satellite Reconnaissance Imagery to the Fleet in the 1980s ...................................................................... 132

Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST) ............................................................................................... 132

Top Scene.............................................................................................................................................. 133

Navy Environmental Sensing Programs in the 1980s................................................................................ 133

GEOSAT................................................................................................................................................ 133

Naval Remote Ocean Sensing System (NROSS).................................................................................... 134

Space Systems Survivability Considered................................................................................................... 135

The Soviet Anti-space Threat in the 1980s............................................................................................ 135

Revival of Navy’s Space Survivability Program ................................................................................... 136

CHAPTER 5 – NAVY SPACE CHALLENGES: UNCERTAINTY AND RESOLUTION (1992–2003)....................... 139

Navy Space Organization and Changes..................................................................................................... 141

Major Change in Relationship between the NRO and the Navy in 1992 .............................................. 142

Navy Interest in Space Temporarily Languishes................................................................................... 142

A Renewal of Navy Interest in Space: The (First) Smith Panel............................................................. 143

Consolidating Management of Navy Space Acquisition ....................................................................... 144

Naval Space Command Subordination to NETWARCOM, 2002 .......................................................... 144

Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR) Goes to the Air Force............................................. 146

Naval Space Reserve............................................................................................................................. 146

“Golden Age” of Navy TENCAP Contribution......................................................................................... 146
Contents ix _________________________________________________________________________________

Radiant Topaz....................................................................................................................................... 147

Space Program of the Naval Postgraduate School in the 1990s................................................................. 148

Advances in Utilization of Tactical Data from National Surveillance....................................................... 149

NRO’s Operational Support Office (OSO) Interface with Navy and other Users................................. 149

Expanded Combat System Connectivity and Integration ...................................................................... 149

Submarines....................................................................................................................................... 150

Tomahawk Missile System .............................................................................................................. 150

Aegis Ships....................................................................................................................................... 150

SURTASS ........................................................................................................................................ 151

ASW/Maritime Patrol Aircraft......................................................................................................... 151

Electronic Warfare Aircraft.............................................................................................................. 151

Anti-air Warfare/Command-and-Control Aircraft ........................................................................... 151

Improving Tactical Dissemination of Satellite Imagery ............................................................................ 152

Challenge Athena.................................................................................................................................. 152

Navy Management of Satellite Imagery ................................................................................................ 153

JSIPS-N Concentrator Architecture (JCA) ........................................................................................... 154

Imagery Dissemination by the Global Broadcast Service..................................................................... 155

Infrared Surveillance and Warning ............................................................................................................ 155

Radiant Ivory ........................................................................................................................................ 156

Space Radar—Reemergence and Cancellation.......................................................................................... 157

Navy Satellite Communications in the 1990s............................................................................................ 158

Navy's UHF Satellite (Narrow-band) Communications........................................................................ 158

SHF and EHF Satellite Communications Proliferate ........................................................................... 159

SHF Wideband Satellite Communications Program ........................................................................ 159

Commercial Wideband Satellite Communications (CWSP) Program.............................................. 160

Development of Global Broadcast Service (GBS)........................................................................... 160

EHF Implementation ........................................................................................................................ 162

Navy Satellite Navigation during the 1990s.............................................................................................. 162

Satellite Environmental Sensing in the 1990s............................................................................................ 162

GEOSAT Follow-On (GFO) ................................................................................................................. 162

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS)................................... 164

Air Force Becomes Executive Agent for Space—Once Again.................................................................. 164

The Rumsfeld Space Commission.......................................................................................................... 164

Navy Responses to the Rumsfeld Commission Recommendations–The Second Smith Panel.................. 166

The Second Smith Panel........................................................................................................................ 166

Naval Studies Board, Committee on Navy's Needs in Space, 2003....................................................... 168

CHAPTER 6 – RE-EMERGENCE OF NAVY SPACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004–2009)............... 169

Navy Space Organizational Changes in Response to the New Challenge ................................................. 170

Stand-up of PEO Space Systems ........................................................................................................... 170

Formalizing the Navy Space Cadre ...................................................................................................... 170

Establishing a Navy Space Science and Technology Budget ................................................................ 172

Residual Navy Space Organization in 2009.......................................................................................... 172

Evolution of Navy TENCAP in the Twenty-first Century......................................................................... 173

Expanded Integration of All-Source Tactical Narrow-band Data into the Fleet........................................ 174

Project Quickbolt .................................................................................................................................. 175

Satellites for Naval Communications in the Twenty-first Century............................................................ 175

UHF—Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).................................................................................... 175

SHF Wideband Communications Program Continues.......................................................................... 176
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GBS Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 176

Future Communications Satellite Programs......................................................................................... 176

Polar Satellite Communications....................................................................................................... 176

Transformational Communications Satellites (TSAT)..................................................................... 177

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT).................................................................................................... 177

Environmental Sensing and Celestial Navigation...................................................................................... 177

Changes in NPOESS and Navy Initiation of GFO-2............................................................................. 177

Coriolis WindSat................................................................................................................................... 178

Celestial Navigation–Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Satellite Missions.......................... 178

Counter-Space Initiative: Navy ASAT Demonstration.............................................................................. 179

Space Vulnerability and Mitigation ........................................................................................................... 180

Global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Considerations................................................................... 181

Maritime Automated Ship Track-Enhanced Reporting (MASTER)....................................................... 182

Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Space Initiatives........................................................................... 183

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Initiative................................................................................. 183

TacSats 183

Establishment of ORS Office................................................................................................................. 185

Navy Space Science and Technology in the Twenty-first Century............................................................ 186

EPILOGUE – NAVY SPACE IN 2009: A FIFTY YEAR RETROSPECTIVE.......................................................... 189

Appendix A Principal Sponsors of Space and Space-Related Activities on the CNO Staff ......... 195

Appendix B Principal Navy Space Systems Acquisition Directors and Managers....................... 199

Appendix C Navy Space Leadership in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy .......................... 205

Appendix D Commanders of Naval Space Command..................................................................... 207

Appendix E Navy Research Laboratories and Facilities ................................................................ 209

Appendix F Key Contributors to National System Direct-Broadcast Concept and Capability .. 213

Appendix G NRO Space Pioneers..................................................................................................... 215

Appendix H List of Acronyms........................................................................................................... 217

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................................. 227

Index ............................................................................................................................................................. 233
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Illustrations

Figures

Figure 1. A successful Vanguard launch .......................................................................................11

Figure 2. APL's Aerobee rocket .....................................................................................................12

Figure 3. The famous Sputnik-I, the world’s first man-made satellite on orbit (USSR photo) .......17

Figure 4. Echo satellite sphere, used by the Navy for pioneering satellite communications.........28

Figure 5. Postage stamp commemorating the first space mail......................................................29

Figure 6. GRAB-2 with turnstile antennas......................................................................................31

Figure 7. Thor Ablestar launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral with GRAB-1 .....................................32

Figure 8. Interior of a GRAB hut ....................................................................................................33

Figure 9. Minitrack, the first U.S. satellite tracking system, 1956 ..................................................35

Figure 10. NAVSPASUR transmitter at Kickapoo Lake, Texas.....................................................37

Figure 11. NRL's Timation satellite ................................................................................................43

Figure 12. USNS Kingsport (AG-164) configured for communications demonstrations, 1963......49

Figure 13. NRL's Lofti communications satellite ............................................................................53

Figure 14. SolRAD-10 satellite.......................................................................................................59

Figure 15. USNS Range Tracker (AGM-1), 1962 ..........................................................................66

Figure 16. APL's Transit navigation satellite (APL Photo) .............................................................87

Figure 17. TIP-II Navy navigation satellite undergoes pre-launch tests (APL photo)....................89

Figure 18. An Outlaw Shark terminal installed in a Navy EP-3 aircraft .........................................94

Figure 19. Artist’s conception of a Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite ...........................119

Figure 20. A mobile version of the Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE).......................................124

Figure 21. Rendering of MUOS satellite ......................................................................................175

Figure 22. TacSat Program..........................................................................................................185

Tables

Table 1 – Experimental and Pre-production Transit Satellites.......................................................27

Table 2 – Locations of the 17 TRANET Stations ...........................................................................34

Table 3 – U.S. Space Surveillance System ...................................................................................37

Table 4 – The NRL Classified Programs in the 1960s...................................................................54

Table 5 – APL Environmental Research Satellites during the 1960s ............................................60

Table 6 – Transit Improvement Program (TIP) Satellites ..............................................................89

Preface

The importance of space and space-related activities to support global military 

operations has expanded significantly over the past 50 years--and is still evolving.

Today, the U.S. Navy is perhaps the most reliant of all the Services on space for

communications,navigation, surveillance, weather, and oceanographic support.

In today's multi-dimensional environment it is important to recognize the historic 

role the Navy has played in space systems development. In 1958 the Naval Research 

Laboratory successfully launched one of the earliest man-made satellites (following the 

Soviet Union's two Sputniks and the U.S. Army's Redstone missile). During the same 

year, the Navy's Space Surveillance System was fielded to detect and track all manmade objects in space, and provide data for day-to-day operations of the Fleet, Fleet 

Marine Forces, and U.S. Space Command, until the system was turned over. to the U.S. 

Air Force in 2004. In the early 1960s, while the Air Force and Central Intelligence 

Agency concentrated primarily on imagery from space, the Navy built and operated the 

world's first satellite system for collecting electronic intelligence. Throughout the

1960s, the Navy and Marine Corps provided the majority of astronauts for NASA's 

manned space flight program, and during this period the Navy also launched Transit, 

the world's first satellite navigation system that provided U.S. and Allied navies, and 

eventually the world's merchant ships, with primary navigation support until the 

appearance of the jointly acquired Global Positioning System.

In the 1970s the Navy led the way in developing satellites for communications at 

sea, and by 1980 the jointly acquired Fleet Satellite Communications system was in 

universal use for Navy's tactical and long-haul command and logistic support 

communications--eventually adopted by all the services. In the 1980s, with the 

National Reconnaissance Office, the Navy pioneered a breakthrough capability for 

delivering tactical reports directly to operational commanders and units at sea,

urgently needed for targeting support of long-range weapons and other applications.

The other Services soon adapted these capabilities and joint forces used them in the 

Persian Gulf War, which was dubbed ''The First Space War." From the 1990s to 

present day, the Navy has continued to lead the way in demonstrating the direct 

delivery of satellite imagery to tactical commanders.

We are indebted to the late Dr. Gary A. Federici, who served as my principal 

advisor on Navy space technology and acquisition matters from 2008 to 2010, and 

who was a strong advocate for developing the tactical applications of space, for his 

efforts over the last quarter century in gathering and preserving this record of Navy 

space for future generations. We are also grateful to CAPT Kent B. Pelot, USN

(Ret.), Naval-NRO Coordination Group, for leading the effort to bring this 2010 edition 

to completion. I am pleased to present this volume, which describes these and many 

other Naval space and space-related activities during the 50-year period from 1959 

through 2009.

Sean J. Stackley

Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Research, Development, and Acquisition

30 July 2013

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Acknowledgments

In the early 1980s, when tactical exploitation of space progressed most rapidly,

Commander Fenton Carey of the Navy's Special Projects Office recognized the desirability 

of documenting the Navy’s key role (along with the other military services and the national 

agencies) in implementing these applications. He asked Mr. James Wilson (a staff member 

of the Naval Studies Board) to compile from official NASA and DoD sources an extensive 

chronology of the significant events in the Navy's involvement with space activities. As there 

was not, at that time, a Navy office with appropriate responsibility for publishing such a 

history, Rear Admiral Tom Betterton, head of the Navy's Special Projects Office, directed 

that custody of Wilson's chronology be given to me while at the Center for Naval Analyses 

(CNA) and supporting his office.

Several years later, with the strong support and leadership of the commander of the 

Naval Space Command, then Rear Admiral Lyle Bien, I obtained funding to produce a Navy 

space history. In 1994, I asked Dr. Robert Hess to draft a Navy space history, drawing 

heavily on Mr. Wilson's chronology and other sources. The resulting document was not 

widely disseminated, however, as it was highly classified.

In 1997, Dr. Ron Potts provided additional materials on the Navy's classified work, and 

Mr. Fred Glaeser, professional consultant with the Navy's Tactical Exploitation of National 

Capabilities (TENCAP) Office, edited and expanded the Navy Space History and revised the 

title to "From the Sea to the Stars." The resulting document, still highly classified, is on file at 

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in the archives of the NRO Historian, accessible 

to those with appropriate security clearances. At the request of the U.S. Naval Reserves, we 

produced an unclassified extract of this document for the Director of Naval History, 

Washington, DC, by removing all classified sections from the document. In 2003, this 

unclassified extract was again revised and updated to include events through the year 2000.

In 2004, I assumed the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C4I and 

Space, and pressed to bring the effort to completion. By 2008, the manuscript was ready to 

be finalized. I contracted with The Pennsylvania State University Applied Research 

Laboratory to edit the previous version and coordinate with the original authors and other 

contributors to produce the work appearing here.

The principal authors of the current version were Dr. Robert Hess, Dr. Bruce Wald, Mr. 

Kent Pelot, and Mr. Fred Glaeser. Other significant contributors were Mr. Lee Hammarstrom, 

Mr. Michael Hurley, Dr. Robert McCoy, Mr. Vance Morrison, Mr. Randy Nees, Mr. John 

Newell, Mr. Troy Tworek, Dr. Wayne Vaneman, Mr. Gegory Tornatore, and the OPNAV N6 

staff. The manuscript was reviewed by Admiral William Smith (Ret), Rear Admiral Thomas 

Betterton (Ret), and Rear Admiral Rand Fisher (Ret). Dr. Richard Hughes at Penn State ARL 

served as the editor-in-chief. Special thanks go to Mr. John Thackrah, who provided strong 

encouragement and support, and to the National Reconnaissance Office, which provided a 

thorough security review of the manuscript.

Dr. Gary A. Federici

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (C3I and Space)

October 2009

1

Introduction

The operators of early Navy ships, like all seafarers, depended on accurate 

observations of the moon and the planets, along with the sun and other stars, for 

navigation when sailing beyond the sight of shore landmarks and navigation aids. The 

Naval Observatory, established in 1830, worked to improve the knowledge of heavenly 

bodies by computing and publishing their accurate positions and movements and 

developing improvements in the equipment (including chronometry) used to make 

accurate measurements of them—a precursor to the Navy's engagement with artificial 

satellite applications a century and a half later.

This book tells the story of the U.S. Navy's first half century of space and spacerelated activities to support its sea, air, and land-projection operations. Much of its 

satellite capability was acquired jointly in cooperation with the other military services 

and agencies of the U.S. It is important to note that the United States does not at this 

writing have either spacecraft-based weapons systems or plans to acquire them (and if 

it did, that their acquisition and operation would very likely come under the Air Force 

rather than the Navy.)

During the roughly half century encompassed by this story, important changes 

occurred in the world geopolitical situation, the Defense Department organizational 

structure, and some Navy weapons systems and tactics. This history, therefore, is 

divided by chapters into epochs reflecting the changing circumstances.

Chapter 1, 1944-1961, reports how the Navy first became involved in space 

programs. Having acquired extensive technical experience with rockets and highaltitude space probes during the years immediately following World War II, the Navy 

was in a position to respond quickly to the international challenge when the Soviets 

unexpectedly orbited the world's first satellite, Sputnik, in October 1957. The U.S. 

Navy's first satellite was launched into earth orbit in March 1958. The Navy then 

participated extensively in both the nation's "scientific" satellite program (unclassified) 

under the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and in the (classified) "military" 

satellite program under the Defense Department. During this epoch the Navy also 

developed and operated the nation's spacecraft tracking systems, while also making 

significant contributions to advancement of spacecraft technology.

Chapter 2, 1961-1970, was the era during which the nation was concerned with 

satellites primarily for strategic defense. A DoD decision made in 1961 to put all military 

satellite systems acquisition and operation under the Air Force caught the Navy by 

surprise. At that time the possibility of strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union 

fronted national concern, and the Air Force accordingly focused its space systems on 

providing strategic warning, collection of information for the national intelligence 

community, and providing operational support for the Strategic Air Command. Within the 

bounds of these constraints, the Navy continued to make some significant contributions 

during this epoch. The Navy, along with the Marine Corps, provided over half the 

astronauts for NASA's Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo manned-spacecraft flight programs; 
2 Introduction

_________________________________________________________________________________

provided the range instrumentation ships, and operated the extensive spacecraft 

recovery force. The Navy's space-based environmental sensing programs were 

continued. Under a military program supporting Navy strategic missile submarine 

operations, the Navy developed and fielded the world's first space-based navigation 

system, Transit (although this system eventually became unclassified and was used 

worldwide commercially and by other navies). And under the unclassified cover of 

environmental sensing programs of these years, the Navy developed the world's first 

electronic reconnaissance satellite, DYNO, also called GRAB, which was subsequently 

placed under a classified program of the National Reconnaissance Office. Finally, Navy 

research during this era continued making significant advances in satellite technology.

Chapter 3 recounts the emergence of Navy tactical applications of space that 

occurred throughout the 1970s. As a result of the Cuban missile crisis the Soviets 

decided to build up anti-ship forces to challenge the U.S. Navy worldwide, and by the 

early 1970s their enormous investment in tactical missile ships and submarines was 

evident in increasing Soviet deployments in strength worldwide. Furthermore, these 

anti-ship missile forces were directly supported by the Soviet navy's surveillance and 

reconnaissance satellites. In 1970, the Secretary of Defense canceled the 1961 

Directive and issued a new Directive, which authorized all military services to develop 

space systems under DoD oversight. A new era of Navy space development began.

The Navy had recognized increasingly urgent needs to replace its former worldwide 

network of land-based communications-relay stations and navigation stations that 

supported its deployed tactical forces, as well as the need to supplement area 

surveillance coverage by shore-based surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft. The 

Navy also recognized an urgent need to improve its anti-ship targeting-support 

capability for its own long-range anti-ship missiles at distances over the horizon from the 

sensors of their launching platforms. Navy leaders, recognizing that satellites could 

provide much of the answer to each of these emerging U.S. tactical requirements, 

quickly took advantage of the new DoD Directive. Navy strengthened its space 

organization, consolidating its space acquisition interests in a Navy Space Project Office 

initially under the Chief of Navy Material, and later under the Naval Electronic Systems 

Command (NAVELEX). In 1971, soon after the new directive was signed, DoD 

authorized the Navy to develop the Fleet Satellite Communications System for global 

tactical communications, and a joint program was begun. Navy also joined actively with 

the other services in the program to develop the new and improved satellite navigation 

system (GPS), which adopted the Navy’s clock technology and system design. In 

satellite reconnaissance, Navy initiated developments and operational exercises during 

this period that demonstrated the capability and value of satellite surveillance and 

reconnaissance for tactical warning, anti-ship targeting, and tactical situation 

awareness. Much of the Navy's space budget during this epoch, however, was invested 

in developing, procuring, and installing shipboard user terminals.

Chapter 4 reports the maturing of Navy space-based tactical support that took 

place from 1980 through 1991. By 1980 it was evident to both the U.S.S.R and the U.S. 

that tactical war at sea was a more likely Cold War contingency than exchange of 

strategic missiles, and so both shifted their plans and preparations accordingly. The 
Introduction 3 _________________________________________________________________________________

year 1980 also marked the beginning of a period of remarkable transformation within 

the U.S. Department of Defense and the services. Under President Reagan, an 

outspoken supporter of a strong military, U.S. defense budgets were dramatically 

increased, and a controversial new Secretary of the Navy began to inject a sense of 

new purpose into the fleet. The Navy took steps to further strengthen its space 

organization: in 1981 a Navy Space Systems Division was created on the staff of the 

Chief of Naval Operations; in 1983 a Naval Space Command was established to be the 

Navy's operational component command under the U.S. (joint) Space Command; in 

1985 NAVELEX was renamed as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

(SPAWAR), and the previously consolidated Navy/NRO responsibilities were assigned 

to two separate Flag billets; the Naval Center for Space Technology was established; 

and a System Applications Program Office was formed under the Navy-managed 

Program Office of the NRO. The jointly acquired GPS navigation system became 

operational in the fleet in the late 1980s. During this epoch the Navy also shook 

longstanding U.S. intelligence concepts by consummating the ability to distribute 

surveillance/reconnaissance data from national satellite systems directly to Navy tactical 

users (adopted eventually by all the services).

Chapter 5 describes the transition of the Navy space program from 1992 until 

2003. Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the Soviet Navy all but vanished 

as a threat. With that disappeared the focus of U.S. Navy planners and decision-makers 

whose experience during the previous three decades had been primarily in preparation 

against the Soviet navy. In its place there quickly arose the possibility of multiple 

conflicts throughout the world, with a potential role of the U.S. Navy primarily as a 

supporting force in joint-service operations that emphasized land warfare. The Navy's 

Tomahawk anti-ship missiles in deployed ships and submarines were replaced in 1992 

by the tactical land-attack variant, with the result that the need for Navy satellite support 

against sea targets languished. Much attention was turned to correcting Navy (and 

other service) communications and intelligence shortfalls for land operations that had 

been experienced in the Gulf War and Bosnia, and a crash program was undertaken to 

equip all U.S. major combatant ships with terminals to receive EHF and SHF wideband 

communications. Building on the seminal work of the previous decade, this became a 

golden age for the Navy's TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) 

organization, due in large part to significantly increased cooperation by U.S. intelligence 

agencies--since the Gulf War, those agencies had to justify their budgets in terms of 

supporting tactical combat forces.

But the foregoing era also became one of some uncertainty for the future of Navy 

space. While the fleet continued to be fully dependent on satellites for communications, 

navigation, and surveillance, it was becoming less clear how space systems that might 

be needed for future Navy-unique requirements might be acquired. In 1992, the Navymanaged Program C of the National Reconnaissance Office was disestablished as part 

of a functional reorganization. Although its Navy personnel remained in the new jointly 

staffed Program Office, and the Program Director remained a Navy Captain, Navy no 

longer had a uniquely identified corporate role in the program that had pioneered 

applications of national satellite surveillance/reconnaissance for tactical users. In 
4 Introduction

_________________________________________________________________________________

addition, after 1993, Navy no longer had a flag presence in the NRO. In 2000 the new 

Secretary of Defense made it clear that the Air Force was to be designated, once again, 

as Executive Agent for all space major defense acquisition programs (a policy that was 

formalized by a DoD policy directive in 2003). The one major exception was the 

acquisition of tactical satellite communications, which remained under Navy 

management. In 2002 the Navy disestablished its Naval Space Command; its functions 

were assigned to the Naval Network Warfare Command, and in 2004 the Naval Space 

Surveillance System was turned over to the Air Force.

The uncertainty with respect to the Navy's future role in the National 

Reconnaissance Office was addressed in 1997 by a panel convened under retired 

Admiral William B. Smith. Recommendations by the Panel for reassigning a Navy 

acquisition flag to the NRO and broadening Navy’s role in the NRO by redistributing 

Navy personnel throughout all of its major programs were implemented. A second Panel 

was convened under Admiral Smith in 2001 to address Navy’s strategy with respect to 

all of the National Security Space programs, leadership of which had been consolidated 

under the Under Secretary of the Air Force who was dual-hatted as DoD Executive 

Agent for Space and Director of the NRO. The Panel recognized that the Air Force as 

Executive Agent for Space would have to continue its practice of building tactical 

systems for joint use based on "common-user" requirements, so that if Navy-unique 

space requirements were to be satisfied in the future, Navy personnel would have to 

participate actively throughout the entire development and acquisition process for each 

system of Navy interest. For this to happen, the Navy would have to continue to develop 

and maintain a cadre of personnel qualified in space systems acquisition and 

operational applications, sustain a program of space research and technology, and put 

a flag officer in charge.

Chapter 6 addresses the resurgence and evolution of Navy space activities and 

the implementation of the recommendations of the Second Smith Panel after 2003. The 

Secretary of the Navy promulgated a new Navy space policy in 2004. Funding for Navy 

space research and technology was provided, to be administered by the Office of Naval 

Research. In 2004, a flag-level Program Executive Office was established for Space 

Systems, headed by the dual-hatted Navy flag officer in the NRO. The Navy Secretary 

issued a formal directive to recruit, educate, and qualify a professional Space Cadre.

(By the end of 2008 this cadre had grown to 850 active duty officers serving in the 

National Reconnaissance Office, OPNAV staff, and space-related billets at various joint 

and Navy commands, and the fleet; 140 Reserve officers, and over 300 civilians.) In the 

fleet, the jointly acquired Global Broadcast Service became widely used during this 

epoch, consolidating direct broadcast of national geospatial intelligence, or imaging,

information. The Operational Support Office of the NRO, modeled after the Navy’s 

former System Applications Program Office, continued to help improve national 

interfaces with users by developing and fielding equipment for Navy surface ship, 

submarines and aircraft (as well as for Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical 

users), and by working directly with Navy and other systems-acquisition offices to 

integrate the information into combat-system designs. In view of Navy's experience and 

success in developing and operating the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites in the 1990s,
Introduction 5 _________________________________________________________________________________

it was decided that acquisition of the new Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 

communications satellite system would be Navy managed. (MUOS, scheduled for onorbit capability commencing in 2011, was the only major satellite acquisition program by

the Navy during the 2000s, supplemented by the Naval Research Laboratory’s 

experimental Tactical Satellites (TacSats), sponsored by the Defense Department’s 

Office of Force Transformation and later, by the Air Force-led Operationally Responsive 

Space Office.)

The Appendices list the Navy offices in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; 

the Navy bureaus, system commands, and research and development laboratories and 

facilities; the Naval Space (Operations) Command; and the Office of the Secretary of 

the Navy that had principal responsibility for the Navy’s space and space-related 

activities, with respective chronologies of the directors and managers who held these 

offices. The Appendices also contain a list of Naval personnel recognized by the 

National Reconnaissance Office as space pioneers, and recognition of key contributors 

that helped to make national system direct-broadcast capability to the fleet a reality.

The year 2009 is an appropriate ending point to this chronicle, as it marks fifty 

years since the Chief of Naval Operations identified and promulgated nine requirements 

foreseen by the Navy for space capabilities. This half century spans the Cold War and 

U.S. engagements in Southeast Asia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. During this 

period the Navy grew increasingly dependent on using space technology to support its 

tactical and strategic missions. This book concludes with an epilogue that summarizes

the respective degrees to which those nine Navy requirements for space capabilities 

were fulfilled in the fifty intervening years after their promulgation.
6 Introduction

_________________________________________________________________________________
7

CHAPTER 1 – THE NAVY GETS INVOLVED IN SPACE

(1944-1961)

During the century leading up to World War II, there had been no lack of 

imagination as to the potential applications of space. In 1865, for example, French writer 

Jules Verne had fired imaginations with his famous book, “From the Earth to the Moon"; 

his spaceship was remarkably prophetic of developments that occurred a century later.

Verne’s spaceship was launched from a giant cannon, and spacecraft recovery was 

accomplished by splashdown in the sea. (At a 1987 AIAA/DARPA Conference at the 

Naval Postgraduate School, an electromagnetic gun was actually proposed as a 

modern means for placing satellites in orbit.) A very popular comic strip during the 

1930s was "Buck Rogers in the 25th Century," whose rocket-propelled hero crossed the 

Galaxy in a variety of spacecraft.

Of course, the Navy, from its beginnings, had a vital interest in space. Navigation 

in the open ocean depended on accurate observations of the moon, the planets, the 

sun, and the stars. In 1830, the Navy established the Naval Observatory in Washington, 

DC to improve the knowledge of heavenly bodies, publish their accurate positions and 

movements, and develop improvements in the equipment (including chronometry) used 

to make accurate measurements of them. This concerted effort on celestial navigation 

aids served as a forerunner of the Navy's space applications with artificial satellites a 

century and a half later.

The knowledge required to place military satellites in orbit predated the capability 

to do so by a considerable period. The laws governing motion of the planets, artificial 

satellites, and eventually ballistic missiles had been discovered by Johannes Kepler in 

the early 1600s. Over the years, these scientific laws became well understood by 

military scientists and mathematicians.

The first U.S. space-advocacy group, the "American Interplanetary Society," was 

founded in 1930. But the Russians appear to be the first to have seriously contemplated 

exploitation of space; in 1903, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky published a report on rocket 

propulsion for space vehicles. Several treatises on space travel and rocketing followed 

after the Communists came to power. The USSR's "Society for the Study of 

Interplanetary Travel" was founded in 1924 (but disbanded in the 1930’s).

During World War II and even before, the height advantage that naval aircraft 

offered as observation platforms for wide-area surveillance, reconnaissance, early 

warning, and targeting at sea had become obvious. These operations gave the Navy 

experience and insight into the potential advantages of the even higher altitudes of 

artificial earth satellites to support naval and military operations in the future (a lesson 

also learned by the Army Air Corps, soon to become the Air Force.)

Early on, rockets were recognized as the only practical way to put spacecraft into 

orbit. The physical laws of today's rocket propulsion (as well as the movements of 
8 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

_________________________________________________________________________________

objects in space) had been developed by Isaac Newton by 1687. Rocket propulsion for 

military weaponry was developed initially in China and was refined during the eighteenth 

century by Britain, Austria, and Russia. The theory of rocket power was highly refined 

by Russian scientists in the early 1900s. In the United States, Robert Goddard

conducted the first launch of a liquid propellant rocket in 1926. During the 1930s, rocket 

research progressed in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.

U.S. Navy scientists and engineers contributed to the ongoing progress with 

rockets. From 1941 to 1945, the Navy contracted with the California Institute of 

Technology to establish and operate the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, 

California, and the tests there included rockets for naval weapons. At the Engineering 

Experiment Station, Annapolis, Maryland, a Navy team working on jet-assisted take-off 

(JATO) rockets for seaplanes made discoveries concerning spontaneous ignition of 

liquid propellants, which contributed significantly to the U.S. rocket development 

program. During World War II, the Navy established a Jet-Propelled Missile Board

which, in response to the threat to Navy ships from Japanese Kamikaze attackers, 

authorized work on a surface-to-air missile called the Lark. The Lark featured a liquidpropellant main engine and solid-propellant booster, with midcourse correction, semiactive homing, and terminal guidance. (The Lark missile was not ready before hostilities 

ended, but was tested after the war.)

Meanwhile, during World War II, German rocketeers under the technical direction 

of Wernher von Braun developed powerful V-2 rocket-powered missiles. (In World War 

I, the Germans had fielded long-range artillery and bombarded Paris from the German 

lines, and, because of this, the Treaty of Versailles forbade future German development 

of heavy artillery; the treaty, however, said nothing to forbid rocket development.) In 

1931, the German military established a rocket research facility at Kummersdorf 

Weapons Range, near Berlin. The first civilian employee at this facility was von Braun.

In 1937, this facility was moved to Peenemunde on the Baltic Coast. The first test flight 

of a V-2 rocket was made in October 1942, and the V-2 became operational in 

September 1944, only a few months before the end of World War II in Europe. Germany 

bombarded London and both Antwerp and Liege, Belgium, with thousands of V-2s from 

German mobile bases during the last months of the war.

At the end of that war, the Soviet Army captured most of the German V-2

production facilities, while the Western allies captured the R&D facilities and most of the 

rocket technicians and scientists, including von Braun, as part of Operation Paperclip.

With the help of engineers of the General Electric Company, the Army assembled about 

eighty V-2 rockets from the captured parts. The U.S. now had rockets capable of lifting 

payloads into space (but not yet into orbit). The U.S. Army offered some of the captured 

V-2s to the U.S. Navy, and the offer was accepted on behalf of the Navy by the Naval 

Research Laboratory (NRL) and by the (Navy-sponsored) Applied Physics Laboratory 

(APL) of Johns Hopkins University.

The history of Navy Space begins, in effect, in 1944. (By 1945, both the Naval 

Research Laboratory and the Applied Physics Laboratory were using the captured 
Early Navy Space Programs (1944-1958) 9 _________________________________________________________________________________

German V-2 rockets for atmospheric soundings. In 1947, the Navy launched a V-2

rocket from the deck of the USS Midway (CVA-41), demonstrating that such weapons 

could be launched at sea.)

Early Navy Space Programs (1944-1958)

During this early period, the Navy had two programs in which space probes were 

used for scientific research, and both of these programs led to development of 

operational U.S. rockets. One program, conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory in

Washington, DC, developed and operated the U.S. Viking rocket. The other program, 

executed by the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University, resulted in 

development of the Aerobee rocket.

The Space Probes

In the mid-1940s, the U.S. Navy began taking scientific measurements in the 

upper atmosphere and in the space above it. These experiments were initially launched 

on the German rockets captured in World War II and then subsequently on rockets 

developed specifically for this purpose by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the 

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). These rockets were only capable of lifting the probe 

payloads to high altitude, which then fell back to earth. (It was not until 1958 that the 

Navy was able to launch rockets that achieved sufficient altitude and speed to actually 

place payloads in orbit around the earth.)

Naval Research Laboratory's Space Probes

Construction of the Naval Experimental and Research Laboratory, authorized by 

Congress on 4 March 1917, began on 6 December 1920 on the Potomac River in

Washington, D.C., about two miles from the Capitol. The name was changed to the 

Naval Research Laboratory in the mid-1920s.

In 1944, toward the close of World War II, the Naval Research Laboratory 

established its Rocket-Sonde Research Branch to measure and study solar and cosmic 

radiations in the upper atmosphere, primarily to better understand their effects on Navy 

communications and to help predict usable radio channels. This step toward research 

conducted in outer space was the first such program in the United States.

In 1946, NRL was offered the use of some of the captured German V-2 rockets.

Engineers and scientists at NRL equipped their V-2s with instrumentation for probing 

radiation in the earth's upper atmosphere. On 28 June 1946, NRL launched the first of 

these missions. This first rocket, which reached an altitude of 67 miles, carried radio 

transmitters for telemetry transmissions, a spectrograph, pressure and temperature 

gauges, and a Geiger counter telescope to probe for cosmic rays.

Between 1946 and 1952, NRL launched sixty-three of these modified V-2 rockets, 

most of them from White Sands, New Mexico. The rockets carried a total of over twenty

tons of scientific instrumentation, to altitudes ranging between 50 and 100 miles.
10 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Applied Physics Laboratory's Space Probes

Military work at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of the Johns Hopkins 

University had begun during World War II when a small group of scientists and 

engineers designed a very successful proximity fuse for U.S. antiaircraft guns. (Over 

time, APL was involved in developing the Polaris ballistic missile system, the Terrier, 

Talos, and Tarter antiaircraft missiles, the Tomahawk anti-ship cruise missile, and the 

Aegis system for fleet air defense.)

Prior to World War II, the Navy had discovered that the upper atmosphere had a

significant impact on long-range communications. Because the mechanisms that 

affected communications were not well understood (and could not be reliably predicted),

Navy-sponsored post-war research was directed toward learning more about the upper 

atmosphere. Part of this effort included work by APL, using captured German V-2

rockets, under the direction of James Van Allen.

The V-2s reached an average altitude of 70 miles and a maximum altitude of 114 

miles, but the rocket could not remain in the upper reaches of the atmosphere more 

than a few minutes. To obtain the data Van Allen wanted, the rocket had to rise more 

than twenty-two miles above the earth, and from the time it passed that level on the way 

up until it came hurtling back down, the instruments had only about five minutes to 

obtain their data. During that brief time, data from particle counters were recorded on 

rotating steel cylinders in the rocket's nose and were transmitted via telemetry to 

receiving stations on the ground. Since the rockets crashed when they returned to 

earth, the steel cylinders were constructed to withstand extreme conditions. One V-2

nose cone was lost in the desert for nearly two years before it was finally recovered and 

its data retrieved.

Van Allen and his team of APL physicists proved particularly adept at designing 

experiments to take advantage of the limited window of opportunity provided by the V2s. On 30 July 1948, a rocket bearing APL instruments soared 100 miles above the 

earth's surface, setting a high-altitude record and bringing back a wealth of information 

about the cosmic ray particles that constantly bombard the earth. According to Van 

Allen's findings, secondary particles (known as mesons) formed by the collisions of 

cosmic protons with the earth's upper atmosphere were far more abundant than 

previously believed.
Early Navy Space Programs (1944-1958) 11 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 1. A successful Vanguard launch

The Rockets

NRL's Viking Rockets

In the late 1940s, the Naval Research 

Laboratory developed the Viking rocket as a 

replacement for its then-dwindling supplies of 

German-built V-2s. The first successful launch of 

a Viking took place at White Sands Proving 

Grounds in 1949. The next year, one of the 

Vikings was launched from the deck of the USS

Norton Sound (AVM-1). It achieved what was at 

that time the record high altitude of 106 miles –

almost but not quite high enough to put a payload 

into low-earth orbit.

The Viking rocket was used extensively 

during the International Geophysical Year, 1957–

1958, and the Vanguard rocket (Figure 3) which 

placed the first Navy satellite in space in 1958

was a derivative of the Viking. All of the Navy's 

unused Viking rockets, however, were transferred 

by NRL to the National Aeronautic and Space 

Administration (NASA) (along with the entire 

Vanguard program) when NASA was formed the 

next year.

APL's Aerobee Rockets

Although APL also continued to enjoy 

access to selected V-2 launches, the limited 

supply of these rockets persuaded the APL 

director to recommend that the Laboratory 

develop its own simpler, relatively inexpensive 

alternative. Such a project would also enable the 

Laboratory to obtain first-hand experience with 

liquid rockets as potential guided-missile boosters. Under a Navy agreement with APL, 

the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance funded the project, APL provided the design and 

technical supervision, and associate contractors — in this case, Aerojet Corporation, 

Douglas Aircraft (later McDonnell-Douglas), and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the 

California Institute of Technology — performed the actual engineering and production 

work. The result was the Aerobee rocket (Figure 1), a 20-ft long, 1,650 lb liquid-fueled 

rocket, much smaller than the V-2 and capable of reaching a height of 75 miles at 

speeds of 35,000 miles/hour (far higher and faster than the Army's Wac Corporal, the 

only other large American rocket in existence at that time.)
12 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 2. APL's Aerobee rocket

An Aerobee could carry a payload of 150 lbs 

in its 88-in long, pressure-tight nose cone. The 

first of these rockets was launched on 24 

November 1947, for a flight of only 35 seconds.

The second Aerobee launch on 5 March 1948 

was highly successful, providing valuable new 

data on the intensity and distribution of cosmic 

rays above the appreciable atmosphere.

To provide a more expansive testing range 

in a variety of latitudes for both the V-2 and the 

Aerobee, the Navy converted a seaplane tender, 

the USS Norton Sound, into a seagoing rocket 

laboratory in 1948 and dispatched the ship to the 

Pacific Ocean. With its deck protected by a 

special metal sheath, Norton Sound launched 

numerous APL rockets in 1948-1949, obtaining 

through telemetry significant data on cosmic ray 

intensity and other atmospheric phenomena, 

including the dimensions of the ozone layer and 

the extent of solar radiation.

By January 1951, when APL's high-altitude 

program came to an end, APL had launched nine

V-2 and twenty-one Aerobee rockets from sites 

around the globe.

Project PAMOR

In 1947, two engineers from the Radio Countermeasures Branch at the Naval 

Research Laboratory, James Trexler and Howard Lorenzen, began to experiment with 

methods to capture radar signals originating in the Soviet Union and Europe that (under 

certain atmospheric conditions) bounced off the ionosphere. However, in June 1948, 

after becoming aware of a study on the possibility of using the moon as a 

communications relay, Trexler shifted his focus to capturing radar signals reflected from 

the moon. (The U.S. Army's Signal R&D Laboratory had bounced radar signals off the 

moon as early as 1946. The Army concluded, however, that nothing of military use 

would come of this work and consequently ended the experiments.)

Early experimental successes with large long-wire antennas designed for 

observation of the moon led to the creation and funding of Project PAMOR (PAssive 

MOon Relay) in 1950. Trexler calculated that with a sufficiently high gain antenna, one 

could receive radar and communications signals originating in the Soviet Union and 
Early Navy Space Programs (1944-1958) 13 _________________________________________________________________________________

reflected from the moon during those periods when the moon was visible from both the 

transmitting and receiving points on the Earth. To achieve a large aperture antenna with 

consequently high gain at an affordable price, he arranged to have a parabolic hole dug 

in the ground near Stump Neck, Maryland, which was then lined with reflecting mesh.

Rather than moving the entire antenna (as is ordinarily done to point a radar antenna), a 

small feed near the focal point of the parabola could be rotated to provide limited 

steerability of the antenna’s beam. The elliptical opening of the antenna was 220 ft by 

263 ft and was, for a brief time, the largest parabolic antenna in the world.

The first radar contact with the moon was initiated in October 1951, and the 

received echo was of surprisingly high fidelity. Trexler and others studied the nature of 

these reflections and found that despite the Moon being a diffuse optical reflector, it was 

also a quasi-smooth radio reflector, with a substantial part of the reflection coming from 

a specular “hot spot.” (Due to its potential military value, this discovery was not reported 

in the open literature until some years later.) The success of this and subsequent trials 

proved that the project’s potential was greater than originally anticipated, and it 

eventually led to an entirely new, unclassified project that was called Communications 

Moon Relay, or CMR (discussed below).

By 1954, however, the Stump Neck antenna had proven itself too weak to 

consistently and reliably collect Soviet radar signals. Trexler calculated that a much 

larger antenna would be required to achieve the desired performance objectives. Plans 

were made and eventually approved for a 600-ft diameter fully steerable antenna to be 

constructed near Sugar Grove, West Virginia. The site was selected because it was free 

of industrial sources of radio noise and in a valley whose walls would shield it from 

remote noise sources. A National Radio Quiet Zone was established in 1958 to protect 

the radio environment, and the National Science Foundation built a smaller radio 

telescope within the zone in Green Bank, West Virginia.

The 600-ft radio telescope would have been the largest moveable structure in the 

world, surpassing the famous Jodrell Bank telescope of 275-ft diameter. Construction 

began in 1959, but the estimated cost to complete the Sugar Grove project rose to over 

$200,000,000, leading to delays in its completion. Meanwhile, a group of NRL 

engineers, who worked in the same Branch only fifty feet away from the group 

designing the Sugar Grove telescope, had led the design and development of the first 

electronic reconnaissance satellite (see page 30) in a project that cost less than 

$10,000,000. Because such satellites could intercept emanations from the Soviet Union 

more effectively, the construction of the radio telescope was cancelled after only its 

turntable and pintle bearing had been completed. However, a much smaller-diameter 

radio telescope had been installed at the site for supporting research and was 

subsequently put to work relaying data back to the United States that electronic 

reconnaissance ships such as the USS Liberty had collected (see page 46). This 

operation required relatively large-diameter antennas on the ships and was 

discontinued when communications satellites with active transponders requiring much 

smaller terminal antennas became available.
14 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

_________________________________________________________________________________

In the years following the 1962 cancellation, the 600-ft radio telescope project was 

often called a fiasco, referred to as an example of engineering overreach, and, because 

radio astronomy was the cover story for the project, was called a scientific boondoggle 

by those who opposed Government investment in pure science. The NRL historian 

officially revealed the true story of the radio telescope in 2001.

As mentioned above, the 1951 experiments at Stump Neck produced intense 

interest in using the moon as a communications relay, and experiments began shortly 

thereafter. On 24 July 1954, NRL transmitted the first voice messages via the earthmoon-earth path using a 100-watt 220-MHz communications transmitter.

Transcontinental communications were demonstrated in November 1955 when teletype 

messages were transmitted from Washington, DC, to San Diego, CA. Two months later,

NRL conducted transoceanic communications via moon-satellite transmissions between 

Washington, DC, and Hawaii.

Early Navy-Air Force Competition over Space Development

After World War II, the earliest U.S. military study into the feasibility of artificial 

earth-satellites was conducted by the Navy. The Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics formed a 

“Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space Rocketry” on 9 October 1945, and 

the committee prepared a satellite development proposal, which the Bureau turned over 

to industry for refinement. Based on this effort, the Navy submitted its first satellitedevelopment proposal on 7 March 1946 to the joint Army and Navy Aeronautical Board, 

a group established during WWII to coordinate R&D between the Army Air Corps and 

the Navy.

The Army Air Corps (soon to become the U.S. Air Force) was caught off guard by 

the Navy proposal, and the next meeting of the joint Aeronautic Board's R&D 

Committee was delayed until 14 May 1946 to give the Army Air Corps time to prepare a 

response. In a crash effort to develop "equal competence" with the Navy on satellites, 

and thus avoid being excluded from future military space research, General Curtis Le 

May, then director of R&D for the Army Air Force, assigned Douglas Aircraft Company

and its Project RAND Group to undertake a three-month study on the service's behalf.

Given the constraints on time, RAND produced a remarkably comprehensive report, not 

only on the technical feasibility but also on the future utility of space vehicles.

While RAND prepared its assessment, the Commanding General of the Army Air 

Forces was informed of the Navy satellite development proposal, and, in 1946, the Air 

Staff argued that the Army Air Forces should have primary responsibility for any military 

satellite as such vehicles would essentially be an extension of strategic air power. This 

position was to be reiterated by the Air Force many times over the next five decades.

At the May 1946 meeting of the Aeronautical Board's R&D Committee, no 

agreement was reached as to which proposal, Navy or Army Air Corps, should be 

approved. The Board also postponed the decision as to service responsibility for 

satellite development until it received higher-level guidance.
First Satellites in Orbit 15 _________________________________________________________________________________

After serious exploration of concepts for putting a satellite in orbit, the Navy's 

committee for evaluating space rocketry folded in early 1948, succumbing primarily to 

post-World War II budget cuts.

In mid-1948, the Navy then proposed to undertake a joint project with the Air Force 

to develop earth-orbiting satellites, a proposal that was rejected by the Air Force. The 

Navy abandoned further efforts to form a joint satellite program in late 1948.

Proposals for space-related activity continued to be set forth by the Navy, Army 

and Air Force, but all such proposals were opposed by Vannevar Bush, head of the 

powerful joint Research and Development Board. (Bush also opposed development of 

rocket boosters for long-range missiles.) In 1948, the Secretary of Defense reported, 

with respect to space, that the (joint) Committee on Guided Missiles "recommended that 

efforts in the field (of earth satellite vehicles) be limited to studies."

Reshuffling of the military services as the consequence of the National Security 

Act of 1947 garnered most of the attention of the services for the next few years, and 

space took a back seat.

First Satellites in Orbit

During the 1950s, Wernher von Braun aggressively lobbied the U.S. government 

to develop a vehicle for launching artificial earth satellites into orbit, using components 

available from the Army Ordnance Corps. It would be an Army development, but von 

Braun believed it was essential to obtain the support of all three of the U.S. military 

services. The Navy responded favorably, but the Air Force declined to participate.

By the spring of 1955, the Army and Navy had worked out details for a joint 

satellite concept, called Project Orbiter. The Army began work on the project, but the 

Navy's participation was cut short by a decision to make its own preparations for the 

1957–1958 International Geophysical Year.

The International Geophysical Year: 1957–1958

A group of eminent international scientists proposed that the year 1957–1958 

should be dedicated to worldwide scientific endeavor, to be called the International 

Geophysical Year (IGY). The IGY Coordination Committee accepted a U.S. proposal to 

launch earth-orbiting satellites as part of the effort, and the White House announced on 

29 July 1955 that the U.S. would launch a satellite as part of 1957–1958 IGY activities.

The Soviet Union submitted a similar proposal at an IGY meeting hosted by the U.S. 

National Academy of Sciences in June 1957.

Although the IGY satellite project was designed to be primarily a scientific 

enterprise, the U.S. military services recognized that military benefits might accrue from 

participating. All three of the services submitted IGY proposals for an earth-orbiting 

satellite. The three proposals were:
16 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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• Army: Project Orbiter (later called Explorer-I), using an Army Redstone (later 

called Jupiter C) missile.

• Navy: Naval Research Laboratory's Project Vanguard, using a modified Viking

research rocket.

• Air Force: Project World Series, using a combination of Atlas and Navy/APL 

developed .Aerobee rockets.

The Navy's proposal was selected, because it was felt that NRL's Viking rocket 

would most likely be considered by the world to be "scientific," whereas the Army and 

Air Force proposals were based on ICBM technology. (It is also possible that the Army's 

proposal was rejected in part because its chief engineer was one-time Nazi weapon 

builder, von Braun, a matter of concern barely ten years after WWII.) A final factor in the 

selection by the U.S. of the Navy's proposal was a desire not to interfere with ICBM 

development by the Army and Air Force.

The Naval Research Laboratory began briskly preparing for the launch of what 

was anticipated to be the world's first artificial earth-orbiting satellite as part of the 1957-

1958 IGY. What was not fully appreciated (then or now) was the major technological 

leap forward that would be required for Vanguard. The advanced technology – which 

included gimbaled rocket motors, advanced fuel pumps, and innovative staging 

concepts—was conceptually sound but could not be easily accelerated.

Sputnik

On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union surprised the world by launching Sputnik, the 

world's first artificial satellite; on 3 November 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik-2.

Despite the fact that the Soviets had announced it in advance, Sputnik's success greatly 

shocked the American people.

Sputnik evoked fast action on the part of the Eisenhower Administration. On 7 

November 1957, the President announced the appointment of a Special Assistant who 

would chair the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The next day, as a 

backup to Project Vanguard, the Army was authorized to proceed with its proposed 

satellite program using the Redstone missile (thereby abandoning the U.S. attempt to 

maintain that its participation in the IGY was purely non-military and lowering ICBM 

development to second priority).

Navy Launches its First Satellite—Vanguard

The hedging of this bet came none too soon. The first NRL attempt to launch its 

Vanguard satellite, in December 1957, was an embarrassing failure for the Navy and
The U.S. Organizes Seriously for Space (1958-1961) 17 _________________________________________________________________________________

the nation. The rocket blew up on the launch pad. As a result, the decision was made to 

go to the Army Redstone program, producing the first successful U.S. satellite launch 

on 31 January 1958.

The U.S. Navy did successfully launch and place in orbit the world's fourth—and 

the country’s second—man-made satellite, a Vanguard, on 17 March 1958.

The U.S. Organizes Seriously for Space (1958-1961)

The U.S. had ended World War II as the most militarily powerful nation the world 

had ever known. In spite of massive demobilization at the end of the war, Americans 

remained supremely confident that the U.S. monopoly in nuclear weapons provided all 

the clout needed for the foreseeable future. But the double shocks of the Soviet 

detonation of a nuclear device (1949) and the magnitude of the conflict in Korea (1950–

1953) undermined U.S. confidence and generated urgent requirements for information 

about Soviet military capabilities and intentions. At the time, the Soviet Union was one 

of the most secretive and closed societies in the world. The U.S. had tried a wide range 

of techniques intended to acquire the intelligence it needed, including spies, airborne 

reconnaissance, electronic surveillance, and even balloons, but the U.S.S.R. had 

successfully countered all of these efforts. The failure of these and other approaches to 

obtain the needed intelligence on the Soviet Union led the Eisenhower Administration to 

consider developing satellites for reconnaissance, as an alternative.

Figure 3. The famous Sputnik-I, the world’s first manmade satellite on orbit (USSR photo)
18 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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There was much concern about two political aspects of the proposed space-based 

reconnaissance: (a) how would the Soviets respond; and (b) would the rest of the world 

object to U.S. satellite surveillance?

"Military" versus "Scientific" Satellites

Throughout the late 1950s there were strong U.S. and international sentiments 

(encouraged by a major Soviet propaganda effort) that any U.S. use of space ought to 

be limited strictly to "peaceful" applications. This meant that, in order to accommodate 

world opinion and to avoid offending the Soviets, the United States would have to limit 

overt space programs to scientific applications; any development of space by the 

military would have to be done covertly. (The Soviet Union's worldwide propaganda 

effort attempting to constrain U.S. space efforts to non-military applications turned out to 

have been a cover for the fact that the Soviets were working on their own satellite 

reconnaissance and other military space systems and were simply trying to delay U.S. 

military space efforts in order to get a head start.) 

The Eisenhower Administration determined, therefore, to pursue space goals in 

two distinct divisions: military and civilian. The civilian division would be overt, 

"scientific," highly advertised and fully exploited for its world propaganda value. The 

military division would be covert and highly secret. (The high degree of secrecy was 

both to keep the Soviets from knowing the details and to avoid bad publicity abroad.)

This "military" versus "civilian" (called "scientific") dichotomy was to be rigorously implemented by the U.S. Government. The mere existence of U.S. spying and other sensitive 

military applications from space would not be acknowledged openly by the U.S. 

government for several more decades.

(The Soviet Union, it turned out, never did press the issue of violation of its 

territorial integrity by U.S. satellite over-flights; they were hardly in a position to do so, 

considering their pursuit of similar space-based reconnaissance programs).

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

President Eisenhower initially opposed the creation of a civilian space agency 

separate from the Department of Defense as an unnecessary and costly duplication of 

effort, arguing that DoD could be the operational agent for all U.S. space programs. In 

March 1958, however, he bowed to growing pressure to set up an independent, civilian 

organization for non-military use of space.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established by 

Congress on 2 April 1958. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 directed 

that NASA assume responsibility and direction for all space activities except for those 

primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, which would be 

retained by the Department of Defense.

Its merits notwithstanding, establishment of NASA as an organization separate 

from DoD resulted in competition within the U.S. space program over the years. The 

most important impact was on the U.S. Air Force, which eventually took over the DoD 

space-launch responsibilities and competed with NASA for the launching of U.S. military 
The U.S. Organizes Seriously for Space (1958-1961) 19 _________________________________________________________________________________

spacecraft. (There was also a brief struggle between NASA and the Air Force over 

manned space flight—see Chapter 2.) In 1958, staffing for the newly created NASA

organization drew heavily on the military services' base of space-qualified technical 

people, and the Army was required to transfer von Braun and several thousand 

members of its rocket team to NASA.

The Navy had to share the highest proportion of its space-technology base with 

NASA. More than 300 space scientists and technical personnel were transferred from 

the Naval Research Laboratory in 1958 to help fill NASA's billets. NRL's Vanguard

group, a total of approximately 200 scientists and engineers, remained housed at NRL 

until the new facilities at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Beltsville, Maryland, 

became available in September 1960. The Navy's Vanguard program and all of its 

Viking missiles were turned over to NASA at that time. NASA's manning requirements 

were later to place another demand on the Navy, in another personnel area: Naval (that 

is, Navy and Marine Corps) officers eventually provided more than half the astronauts 

for NASA manned space flight programs.

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

The military part of the Eisenhower Administration's response to Sputnik was to 

expand and accelerate the Department of Defense side of the U.S. space program. One 

of the President's first concerns was eliminating the competition among the military 

services for space funding by attempting to concentrate all the military space funding in 

a single agency. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established for 

that purpose on 27 November 1957.

Although some space operations at that time were assigned to the individual 

military services, all space research and development was assigned to ARPA. Thus, 

during the relatively brief period that ARPA was in charge of the U.S. military space 

program, it contributed funding to the Navy’s space programs that included: APL’s 

Transit satellites, the Communications Moon Relay (CMR) System, and NRL’s 

Tattletale/DYNO/GRAB) satellites.

The coordination between ARPA and NASA did not work well, nor was ARPA ever 

able to establish a working relationship with the Air Force concerning space matters.

The DoD Deputy Director for Research and Engineering, Dr. Herbert York, believed that 

the creation of ARPA had actually increased the amount of rivalry between the military 

services. Therefore, in September 1959, all of the space projects under ARPA's control 

were transferred back to the military services, and ARPA was left to conduct only 

advanced space research.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

During the 1950s, the RAND Corporation recommended that the Air Force pursue 

research into satellite reconnaissance missions, and the Air Force R&D command 

pursued the recommendations under the name Project Feedback. In March 1954, 

Feedback personnel recommended that the Air Force develop and operate a satellite 

reconnaissance vehicle as a matter of "vital strategic interest to the U.S." This project, 

which was to be conducted in strictest secrecy, was approved by the Office of the 
20 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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Secretary of Defense (OSD) in May 1954 and was given the unclassified title "Advanced 

Reconnaissance System," designated WS-117L. The operational objective, defined in 

Air Force General Operational Requirement No. 80, was to provide surveillance of "preselected areas of the earth" (in particular, the land-mass of the USSR and any other 

area potentially denied to U.S. access for intelligence) in order "to determine the status 

of a potential enemy's war-making capability." The Executive Agent for Project 

Feedback was the Air Force R&D Command.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had simultaneously become interested in 

strategic reconnaissance for national intelligence, but using high-flying aircraft rather 

than satellites. For example, the CIA was responsible for developing the U-2. In 1958, 

President Eisenhower directed the CIA to develop a reconnaissance satellite system.

While this decision ran counter to his persistent desire to avoid duplication, the 

President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence reported in February 1958 that 

the Air Force's WS-117L Advanced Reconnaissance System would not be able to meet 

its near-term commitment. This was because the system depended on the Atlas

booster, which was a long way from becoming operational. The Board recommended 

that the CIA develop reconnaissance satellites that could be launched from the existing 

Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile. The CIA project, known as CORONA, was 

funded largely by the CIA and indirectly by the Air Forces' Discoverer program, which 

served as its "white world" cover.

Lockheed (the builder of the CIA's U-2) was selected as the prime contractor for 

the Air Force WS-117L program. The company was also prime contractor for the 

CORONA.

The CIA imagery system differed from the Air Force system in one important way:

the CIA system depended on jettison of film canisters from the satellite and recovery in 

mid-air, while the Air Force system depended on televising the satellite's photography.

By the summer of 1959, the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program was in a state 

of crisis. The CIA-managed CORONA/Discoverer tests had not had a single success, 

and the Air Force-managed program (first called Sentry, and later Samos) was slipping 

at an enormous rate due to technical problems. Concern over this lack of progress led 

directly to the creation of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in August 1960.

The NRO consolidated the CIA's and Air Force's covert reconnaissance programs and 

eventually added a Navy program. Operation of the NRO was so clandestine that its 

very existence was only inadvertently revealed by the Senate in 1973.

Initially, the NRO was organized into two lettered “Programs.” Program A, 

managed by the U.S. Air Force, was responsible for booster/satellite integration and 

launch, as well as those overhead reconnaissance projects that had been initiated by 

the Air Force (both imaging and ELINT). Program B, managed by the CIA, was 

responsible for those overhead reconnaissance projects that had been initiated by the 

CIA.
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 21 _________________________________________________________________________________

Both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Strategic Air Command (which 

was using data from the Navy DYNO/GRAB satellites) argued to include the Navy’s 

DYNO Program (page 30) in the National Reconnaissance Program. As a result, the 

Navy-managed Program C was added to the NRO structure in July 1962 to incorporate 

the existing Navy reconnaissance satellite program.

The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961)

The first serious efforts by the Navy to exploit space came in the late 1950s, when 

an ad hoc group chaired by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Air 

Warfare (OP-05) published a study, "Navy in the Space Age," which recommended a 

substantial increase in Navy space organizations. As a result, the Chief of Naval 

Operations established the Astronautics Operations Division (OP-54) and the Space 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Division (OP-76) within his headquarters.

Within the Bureau of Naval Weapons, an assistant director was appointed for the Pacific 

Missile Range and Astronautics.

In November 1957, just two months after Sputnik I, Rear Admiral J. E. Clark, 

speaking for the Chief of Naval Operations, presented to the Armed Forces Policy 

Council one of the earliest formal statements of U.S. military requirements for space.

The Navy, he stated, had at that time operational requirements for

reconnaissance/surveillance satellites (most urgent need), navigation satellites, 

communication satellites, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) satellites. Additional 

requirements (listed as common to all three services) included weather satellites, 

electronic countermeasures satellites, and nuclear-armed missile space platforms.

In late 1957, the Naval Research Laboratory appointed an ad hoc committee on 

rocket, satellite, and space research. The committee's report (officially forwarded to the 

Chief of Naval Operations in January 1958) recommended continuation of the Vanguard

rocket program, albeit as a scientific program, under a new division to be created at the 

Naval Research Laboratory. The report recognized that "the Navy must play some 

important part" in development of the space programs by both the National Aeronautics 

and Space Agency (NASA) and the Defense Department's Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (ARPA), and it emphasized an R&D program to accelerate 

development of "the military, operational, and scientific satellites themselves."

On 23 September 1959, Vice Admiral John Hayward, Vice Chief of Naval 

Operations (VCNO), officially signed out nine formally stated and relatively detailed 

Navy Operational Requirements for military "astronautics" (space) systems to the

cognizant Navy bureaus and offices (for prosecution) as well as to ARPA. These stated 

requirements were as follows:

• SC-14402, requirement to develop a satellite system for providing accurate, allweather, worldwide navigation for naval surface ships, aircraft, and submarines.
22 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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• IO-09502, requirement to provide satellite reconnaissance/ surveillance 

systems, with supporting equipments, to obtain continuous and up-to-date 

information not obtainable by other known systems on ocean and sea targets, 

air targets, and land targets of naval interest.

• IO-14503, requirement to provide a system capable of obtaining weather 

information "over areas void of meteorological observations," for the support of 

naval forces.

• IO-13701, requirement to develop a system for obtaining and utilizing geodetic, 

geophysical, mapping, ice-reconnaissance, and sea-surface-temperature 

environmental data.

• AD-07703, requirement to develop an anti-satellite weapon system, to be 

operable from fleet units and be immediately responsive to fleet requirements.

• AD-01502, requirement to develop sea-based, manned interceptor spacecraft 

to intercept enemy surveillance/ reconnaissance and communications satellites 

and manned weapon-bearing "trajectory" (ballistic?) spacecraft posing threats 

to fleet units.

• SR-01502, requirement to develop equipment and techniques for the fleet to 

launch satellites with tactical payloads into orbit and control them in orbits and 

orientations for proper functioning of the payload.

• IO-09501, requirement to develop a satellite system capable of detecting, 

locating, and processing deliberate and inadvertent electronic emissions from 

foreign nations, to be used for technical intelligence, strategic warning, and 

mission planning.

• SC-06302, requirement to provide satellite capability for Navy fixed point-topoint communications, communications among mobile units, communications 

between mobile units and shore facilities, and broadcast communications from 

shore to ships and submarines.

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) recognized that seven of these nine 

Navy requirements were paralleled by similar requirements of the Army or Air Force.

The Navy's policy, he stated, would be to "support vigorously, by funding and otherwise, 

all of the operational requirements that are unique to the Navy, and to participate fully in 

the development of [all] those operational requirements which have Naval applications."

In a sense, the remainder of this Navy Space historical chronicle provides an 

account of how well these nine Operational Requirements stated by the Navy in 1959 

were (or were not) fulfilled during the next half century.
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 23 _________________________________________________________________________________

Communications Moon Relay (CMR) System

On the basis of the initial success of the NRL’s Project PAMOR experiments (see 

page 12), the Chief of Naval Operations directed the establishment of the 

Communications Moon Relay (CMR) system in 1956 for transmission of teletype and 

facsimile messages between Washington, DC, and Hawaii. In the Washington, DC, 

area, the transmitter was located at the U.S. Naval Radio Station, Annapolis, Maryland, 

while the receiver was located at Cheltenham, Maryland. The Hawaiian facilities were 

located at Opana and Wahiawa on the island of Oahu. The Washington, DC, and 

Hawaii terminals each used two 84-foot-diameter dish antennas—one for transmitting

and the other for receiving.

The inaugural test of CMR was conducted in January 1960 when the Chief of 

Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, sent a teletype message to the Commanderin-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood). The teletype message was 

followed by two facsimile images: the first, a photo of a "moon maiden," of the centerfold 

variety; the second, a more appropriate public affairs photograph. A U.S. postage stamp 

to commemorate the event was issued later in that year.

A CMR receiver and 16-ft steerable parabolic dish antenna were installed in USS

Oxford (AG159) in 1961. The Naval Research Laboratory demonstrated the first shoreto-ship satellite communications relay on 15 December 1961, when ceremonial 

messages were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral G. W. Anderson) to 

USS Oxford from NRL's Stump Neck, Maryland, satellite research facility. The first twoway ship-to-shore satellite communications were conducted when USS Oxford was at 

sea between Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro on 30 March 1962.

The Navy's CMR system carried operational message traffic between Hawaii and 

Washington, DC, for half a decade. The ground stations were manned by Navy 

personnel from four to eight hours daily (that is, from moonrise in Hawaii to moonset in 

Maryland).

The CMR system offered very reliable communications and was resistant to 

jamming. Curiously, the National Security Agency and the Naval Security Group did not 

allow encrypted message traffic on the CMR link, arguing that anyone could intercept 

the link because "all the world could hear it"—despite the fact that encrypted messages 

had been transmitted on the Medium Frequency/High Frequency (MF/HF) broadcasts 

for years. The principal operational disadvantage of the CMR was simply the availability 

of the moon, which had to be within sight of both of the link terminals. As observed by 

then-Lieutenant Commander Burton Edelson at the Bureau of Ships, this was only a 

single-satellite system, and, for reliable 24-hour communications, the Navy would need 

a constellation of multiple (artificial) satellites.

CMR was the only operational satellite communications relay system in the world 

until the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) came on line on 16 June 

1966. (The CMR capability was disestablished in the mid-1960s, and its antennas were 
24 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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used in the Technical Research Ship Special Communications (TRSSCOM) System—

see page 46.)

Origin of the Transit Navigation System

In July 1957, the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University,

like the Naval Research Laboratory, established a space exploration study group to look 

into ways of applying the Laboratory's technical expertise to the field of space research.

Although this ad hoc study group never submitted any formal proposals, it did create an 

area of research interest and specialized knowledge within the Laboratory so that "when 

an idea that was really good came up, they saw it." That one "really good" idea arose in 

the autumn of 1957, in the wake of the Soviet Union's launch of its Sputnik satellite on 4 

October.

The consternation that Sputnik had aroused at APL was tempered by the fascination that this Soviet achievement aroused in many members of the Laboratory who, in 

the words of one senior-level APL official, "thought it was pretty neat." One of those 

individuals captivated by the Sputnik episode was Dr. William Guier, who had joined the 

Laboratory in 1951. Sputnik was launched on a weekend. "The next Monday I came in," 

remembered Guier, "and to my surprise, no one was listening to it. They kept saying 

you could get it on twenty megacycles, and I thought someone would be listening, with 

all the receivers all over this place. So in the early afternoon, I decided I'd see if I could 

get that thing." He did.

Guier had been working recently in the Research Center with George 

Weiffenbach, a physicist who had joined APL at about the same time. As part of his 

experiments in microwave spectroscopy, Weiffenbach had been using a shortwave 

receiver that could pick up very sensitive radio signals. Around four o'clock that 

afternoon, Weiffenbach stuck a piece of wire into the antenna connection on his 

receiver, and he and Guier began listening to the distinctive "beep-beep" signals 

emanating from Sputnik. When Weiffenbach analyzed the tape recordings with the aid 

of a wave analyzer, the result was "an absolutely gorgeous Doppler shift." In other 

words, the satellite's signals sounded higher pitched as Sputnik came closer to 

Washington and lower as it went away, just as a bystander would hear the whistle of a 

freight train change pitch as the train approached and passed.

While waiting for the satellite's next pass over the United States, Guier realized 

that the slope of the Doppler shift could help him ascertain the distance to Sputnik. To 

compute the satellite's path, he and Weiffenbach used the estimated time of Sputnik's 

arrival over Washington, as broadcast by a Moscow short-wave radio station that 

Weiffenbach had serendipitously picked up on his receiver. After listening and recording 

data for several days, the two physicists discovered they could use a mechanical 

calculator to predict the satellite's orbit much more accurately than could the elaborate 

tracking system employed by the Navy's research station in downtown Washington.

Unfortunately, Sputnik-I stopped sending signals after the first week because its storage 

batteries were depleted. But Guier took his calculations and began processing them on 

the Laboratory's recently installed Univac 1103 digital computer.
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 25 _________________________________________________________________________________

When the Soviets launched Sputnik II on 3 November, the signals from space 

resumed, and Weiffenbach and Guier discovered that, with the aid of the Univac, they 

were able to carry out even more sophisticated experiments with their Doppler data.

They still were tracking the satellite more accurately than anyone else in the nation; 

moreover, they were doing it from a single station, thereby defying the conventional 

wisdom that at least two stations were needed to track a spacecraft accurately. For 

nearly six months, Guier and Weiffenbach and a small team of colleagues persisted in 

tracking first Sputnik-II and then the first U.S. satellite, Explorer-I, which was launched 

at the end of January 1958. Their superior, Dr. Frank McClure, then realized that if one 

can find a satellite from a listening station on earth using the Doppler-shift data, then 

one can find the listening station on earth from the orbit.

Within a week, he and an APL colleague had designed a navigation system on this 

principle. The system would consist of four basic elements: (1) a satellite containing a 

highly precise crystal-driven clock or cycle counter, a frequency generator, and a dualfrequency radio transmitter to beam signals to earth; (2) a network of tracking stations to 

measure the frequency of the received satellite signals; (3) an injection station or 

communication channel, to permit ground engineers to insert the predicted orbital 

positions of the satellite (to be calculated using the previous day's tracking data) into the 

spacecraft's memory every twelve hours; and of course, (4) a shipboard navigation set 

to receive and interpret the signals broadcast by the satellite. The proposed navigation 

system came to be known as Transit.

At the time Transit was first proposed, in the spring of 1958, the world had only five 

small, relatively simplistic, artificial satellites on orbit: the two Soviet Sputniks, the U.S. 

Army's Explorer, and two U.S. Navy Vanguards. Less than three years later, the Navy 

succeeded in developing and demonstrating, through the Applied Physics Laboratory, a 

space-based navigation system. This was an astounding accomplishment; within those 

three years, APL had developed and demonstrated the satellites, the satellite tracking 

system, all the ground-based calculation and support facilities, and the users' navigation 

terminals.

Obtaining funding for development of Transit was tricky because of the Eisenhower Administration's policy that only ARPA was authorized to develop military satellite 

systems. The Navy's approach to "leveraging" ARPA funds was both innovative and 

elegant. The dynamic Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, had created a 

Special Projects Office which was charged with developing both submarines and 

missiles for the Polaris program. One of the challenges faced by the Polaris program 

was the need for high targeting accuracy. A source of targeting error was the accuracy 

with which the submarine's position was known at the time of launch. The Polaris

program had developed sophisticated Ships Inertial Navigation Systems (SINS) and 

periscope star trackers to provide more accurate own-ship position, but these systems 

still drifted, and star fixes could not be updated in poor weather. Concern about the 

accuracy of Polaris missiles reached the highest levels in 1957, when President 

Eisenhower personally challenged Admiral Burke to address this problem. The 

proposed Transit satellite navigation system would provide the answer. The Polaris
26 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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program office successfully argued this requirement when it prevailed upon ARPA to 

fund the development of the Navy Transit program.

While the first experimental Transit satellite was being constructed at APL, the 

Laboratory also designed and built the Transit tracking stations and transported them to 

four locations: Austin, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Las Cruces, New Mexico; and 

Argentia, Newfoundland. A fifth tracking station was located at the APL facility in 

Howard County, Maryland. In addition, the British government built and erected its own 

station at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough, Hampshire. All these 

stations were connected by telephone and telegraph to the Transit Control Center in 

Howard County, Maryland, as were the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral and 

the APL Computing Center.

On Friday, 17 September 17 1959—barely nine months after the Laboratory 

received the initial Transit funds from ARPA—the first APL satellite, known as TransitlA, was ready for launch from Cape Canaveral. (The 130-pound satellite had been 

shipped in a plain wooden box from the Laboratory to the cape by truck, with little 

publicity.) All the components had been so thoroughly tested ahead of time that few 

among the Transit team had any doubt the satellite would operate as designed; instead, 

they were far more concerned about how long it would last in the uncertain environment 

of outer space.

Two minutes after lift-off, APL observers learned that the Howard County station 

was locked onto two frequencies from the satellite as it sped across the Atlantic, rising 

to an altitude of approximately two hundred miles. Shortly thereafter, the tracking station 

at Argentina reported that it too was receiving signals from the satellite. Using these 

signals, technicians at APL determined the Doppler frequency shift and plotted the data 

on large charts. For the first eleven minutes, the frequency shifts exactly matched the 

theoretical curves that had been calculated weeks in advance. But then, where there 

should have been a break in the curve signaling acceleration from the ignition of the 

third stage of the rocket, the curve simply continued to follow a smooth course.

Meanwhile, the Farnborough station reported that clear signals had been received from 

the satellite for several minutes and then suddenly died away.

By this time, it had become clear to the Transit team at APL that the third stage of 

the rocket had failed to ignite, sending the satellite plunging into the sea. However, in 

those first brief minutes of radio contact, the spacecraft had demonstrated that the 

electronic gear had withstood the shock, vibration, and acceleration of launch. Perhaps 

most significantly, the brief event proved that ground stations could use the satellite's 

signals to plot its orbit.

On 1 January 1960, the Applied Physics Laboratory officially established its Space 

Development Division. On 13 April, the second Transit satellite (Transit 1B) was 

launched from Cape Canaveral. Again, the Transit tracking stations heard the signals as 

the satellite soared skyward; this time the spacecraft made it safely into orbit.
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 27 _________________________________________________________________________________

The satellites designed and launched during the experimental development phase 

of the Transit program are summarized in Table 1. Each satellite was progressively 

more sophisticated and tested one or more new elements of the technology that would 

be needed in an operational system.

Table 1 – Experimental and Pre-production Transit Satellites

Mission # Launch Date Status Comments

1A 17 Sep 1959 Failed to orbit

1B 13 Apr 1960 Navigation & tracking experiments

2A 22 Jun 1960 Navigation & tracking experiments

3A 30 Nov 1960 Failed to orbit

3B 21 Feb 1961 Navigation & tracking experiments

4A 29 Jun 1961 Fleet navigation trials

4B 15 Nov 1961 Fleet navigation trials

5A1 19 Dec 1962 Failed 20 hours after launch

5A2 5 Apr 1963

5A3 16 Jun 1963 Memory problems in orbit; never 

operational

5BN-1 28 Jun 1963 Prototype with nuclear power 

source

5BN-2 5 Dec 1963 Operational; satellite with nuclear 

power source

5BN-3 21 Apr 1964 Failed to orbit

5C1 4 Jun 1964 Prototype with solar power only

O-4 24 Jun 1965 Operational Prototype

O-6 22 Dec 1965 Operational Prototype

O-8 25 Mar 1966 Operational Prototype

O-9 19 May 1966 Operational Prototype

O-10 18 Aug 1966 Operational Prototype

O-12 14 Apr 1967 Operational Prototype

O-13 18 May 1967 Operational Prototype

O-14 25 Sep 1967 Operational Prototype

TRIAD/TIP-I 2 Sep 1972 Transit improvement program 

(failed 60 days after launch)

TIP-II 12 Oct 1975 Never operational; solar panel 

problems

TIP-III 1 Sep 1976 Never operational; solar panel 

problems

O-11/TRANSAT 28 Oct 1977 Operational prototype and beacon 

for range calibration

All of the experimental and prototype Transit satellites listed above were built for the Navy by the Johns 

Hopkins University -Applied Physics Laboratory. (Production Transit satellites were called Nova and 

were built by RCA Astro-Electronics under a Navy contract; the first Nova satellite was launched 15 May 

1981; see Chapter 2.
28 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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All of these experimental Transit satellites were launched on the Air Force's new 

Thor Able-Star launch vehicle, one of the earliest examples of inter-service cooperation 

in space. Only Transits 4A and 4B were launched perfectly. Transits 1B, 2A, and 3B

went into orbit at uncomfortably low altitudes. (The launch of these experimental Transit

satellites, it was said, served as much to "debug" the Thor Able-Star launch vehicle as 

they did to demonstrate the Transit system.) However, each of these experimental 

Transit satellites—even Transits 1A and 3A which went into ballistic trajectories—

provided useful data.

The Transit 4A satellite was one of three in a triple payload (the second was an 

INJUN scientific satellite designed by Dr. James Van Allen and the third an NRL 

satellite). Even though it was not intended to become an operational navigation satellite, 

Transit 4A provided navigation data used for calculating the accurate positions of ships 

at sea (in post-operation or post-exercise reconstruction, rather than in real time, 

however). Transit 4B, like Transit 4A, had a nuclear (radioisotope) power supply.

Navy's Pioneering Satellite Communications Relays

Passive Satellite Communications Relay (Echo)

During the late 1950s, the Naval Research Laboratory undertook a joint project 

with NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and the Bell Laboratories of AT&T to 

conduct radio-communications relay tests using passively-reflecting, artificial satellites.

NASA provided the Echo-I satellite, a self-inflating 100-ft diameter aluminum-coated 

plastic sphere, the surface of which was half the thickness of cellophane wrappings on a 

package of cigarettes (Figure 4). The Navy's CMR ground facilities were combined with 

a JPL station in California and a Bell Telephone station in New Jersey to form a ground 

network.

Echo-I was launched into an orbit a thousand miles above the earth by a ThorDelta rocket from Cape Canaveral on 12 August 1960. Within three days, NRL 

scientists and technicians had bounced voice and other messages off the passively 

reflecting satellite and established communications with the other stations. Many other 

Figure 4. Echo satellite sphere, used by the Navy for pioneering satellite 

communications
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 29 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 5. Postage stamp 

commemorating the first space mail

radio and optical tests were made by cooperating stations in the U.S. and overseas.

Tests with the Echo satellite proved the feasibility of long-haul communications via 

passive (electronically unamplified) artificial satellites and demonstrated various coding 

and modulation schemes.

At the request of the U.S. Post Office Department, 

NRL transmitted "space-mail" in the form of a facsimile 

letter for the first time over a man-made satellite 

communication circuit on 10 November 1960. A special 

stamp was issued by the Department in commemoration

(Figure 5).

Active Satellite Communications Relay (Score, Courier, and Advent) 

In 1957, shortly before the first Sputnik was launched, the Naval Research 

Laboratory proposed to the Navy Department an R&D program on communications 

satellites with active transponders, to supplement the passive communications work 

using the moon and artificial satellites like Echo which was in progress at that time. In 

1959, this proposal was expanded to include equipping a ship for satellite 

communication experiments. This proposal was adopted by the Navy, and issued by the 

Chief of Naval Operations as the Navy "Satellite Communication Plan," which was sent 

to the Secretary of Defense for formal approval. The Navy proposal was turned down, 

however, because of the White House policy that only ARPA could fund military satellite 

developments.

The first U.S. military communications satellite was Score, a 130-lb payload built in 

just a few months by DoD. Score was built into the side of an Atlas rocket and was 

launched in December 1958. It was a "store-and-forward" system that recorded 

messages received over one area of the earth and rebroadcast them over a different 

area. Score transmitted President Eisenhower's 1958 Christmas message to the world,

which became known as the first "voice from space." The 8-watt VHF transmitter was 

powered by non-rechargeable batteries and died on New Year's Eve.

The second DoD satellite communications experiment was Courier. It was a true 

satellite, of the store-and-forward variety, and was designed as a technological stepping 

stone to an operational satellite communications system. The Courier satellite was 130 

centimeters in diameter and weighed 500 pounds. The satellite incorporated solar cells,

four receivers, four transmitters, and five tape recorders, and it was capable of relaying 

both voice and digital data at several kilobits per second. Courier was launched in 

October 1960, on an Air Force Thor Able-Star rocket, into a 600-nautical mile orbit. An 

on-board system fault shut the satellite down after only eighteen days of operation, 

providing scientists and engineers an early demonstration of the perils of complexity in 

orbiting systems.
30 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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In 1959, the Department of Defense authorized development of the first operational satellite communications system, called Advent. It was to serve as an active 

communications relay for all the military services. The program called for developing 

three 1-ton stabilized, high-powered microwave satellites and placing them in 

geosynchronous orbit in two years.

The management organization for Advent was complicated. ARPA was to provide 

overall direction. The Air Force was responsible for building the spacecraft. The U.S. 

Army (Signal Corps) was responsible for designing the communications repeater in the 

spacecraft. The Air Force was to provide the first stage booster (Atlas), and NASA was 

to provide the second-stage booster (Centaur). The Army was responsible for all the 

ground terminals, and the Navy, in accordance with its earlier proposals, was 

responsible for the shipboard terminals.

The Advent program proved an abysmal failure and was canceled in 1962 after the 

expenditure of $170 million. The failure was blamed on many things, including the 

setting of requirements beyond the technological capability to meet them. However, the 

fundamental reason for the failure was the impossible management structure.

The Navy did accomplish its part of the project, by converting a ship (USNS

Kingsport) into an ocean-going terminal for the Advent system. The Kingsport came out 

of the shipyard in 1962, just in time for program cancellation. The Kingsport turned out 

to be a useful output of the Advent project, however, as it became the research ship

used for many important communications experiments with DoD and commercial 

satellites later in the 1960s (see Chapter 2).

Origin of the Navy's Covert Satellite Reconnaissance System (DYNO/GRAB/Tattletale)

In the aftermath of the launch of the first Sputnik, ARPA challenged the Defense 

Department to perform “some function from space.” Admiral Arleigh Burke, the CNO, 

relayed the message to Navy researchers, asking “all hands to consider how they could 

use space in their design ideas for the Navy.” Reid Mayo, an NRL engineer, was 

working on a crystal video receiver for a submarine periscope (modeled after a captured 

German device designed to warn of radars in the submarine’s area). The challenge 

from the CNO set Mr. Mayo to thinking that a submarine ELINT receiver might also work 

from a satellite. On the evening of 29 March 1958, on the back of a restaurant paper 

placemat, he calculated that one should be able to receive signals from typical Soviet 

search radars out to the horizon, if the periscope receiver was raised to altitudes of 

several hundred miles. Mayo took the placemat with the calculations back to NRL and 

showed it to his supervisor, Howard Lorenzen.

During the same period, NASA was formed, and a Navy officer assigned there 

suggested to Mr. Lorenzen that spacecraft then being planned would be capable of 

putting payloads of about 100 pounds into several-hundred-mile orbits. Reid Mayo and 

his assistant, Vince Rose, were called in to describe the periscope crystal-video 

receiver, which they had tested successfully against ships in the Chesapeake Bay.
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 31 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 6. GRAB-2 with turnstile antennas

Navy Project Tattletale: GRAB/DYNO—The World’s First Reconnaissance Satellite

Lorenzen and others at NRL began promoting the idea of an electronic intelligence 

(ELINT) receiver in space, under the name of Project Tattletale. In December 1958, the 

idea was presented by Rear Admiral Reed of the Office of Naval Intelligence to the 

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, who approved it. The concept was 

approved by Secretary of the Navy Gates in January 1959. In April 1959, ARPA agreed 

to provide funding, and the project was approved by the Secretary of Defense in July 

1959. Presidential approval, which was required for the NRL project, came from 

President Eisenhower in August 1959.

In spite of President Eisenhower’s desire to avoid an international confrontation 

over the Tattletale mission, the New York Times learned about Project Tattletale and 

published an article about it. In response, the President wrote a directive ostensibly 

killing the Tattletale program and personally admonished the Director of Naval 

Intelligence about the New York Times disclosure. There was, however, no intent to 

stop the program; Project Tattletale was 

“cancelled” and a new program, Project DYNO, 

was put in its place. The entire project was placed 

under the management of the Director of Naval 

Intelligence, Rear Admiral Laurence Frost.

Project DYNO became highly classified, as 

did all U.S. military space efforts at that time, due 

to the political sensitivity of using space systems 

for military purposes. However, the price was substantially less than most other satellite 

programs at that time. Mayo and Rose got together with that part of the Vanguard crew 

remaining at NRL and built a 42-lb satellite containing the crystal-video receiver.

In parallel with the engineering work on DYNO, a multi-service, multi-agency 

committee called the Technical Operations Group (TOG): was formed to develop a 

concept-of-operations for the DYNO system. Eight DYNO ground stations were 

established to receive the data from the DYNO satellite. Five of the sites were operated 

by the Navy, one by the Air Force, and one was a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force site.

NRL designed and built transportable, self-contained data-collection shelters containing 

the electronic equipment used for receiving the DYNO downlink and deployed the 

shelters to each of the sites. NRL technicians accompanied the equipment to each 

location to perform initial setup and calibration.

The DYNO satellites were designed and built at NRL (Figure 6). The first DYNO

satellite was transported to Cape Canaveral in the station wagon of one of the NRL 

engineers. NRL’s unclassified cover name for the overall project, including the classified 

DYNO ELINT receivers, the unclassified DYNO ELINT receivers, and the unclassified 

scientific payloads, was GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background). [The Air Force 

called the project GREB (Galactic Radiation Energy Balance.)]
32 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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GRAB-1 was launched in tandem 

with a Transit payload on 22 June 

1960 on a first-stage Thor booster with 

a second-stage Able-Star (Figure 7).

The satellite was tested on orbit from a 

site on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, in 

July 1960. This was the first collection 

of ELINT signals from a man-made 

satellite. This first DYNO satellite 

lasted about three months, but it 

collected a wealth of data on Soviet 

radar. Admiral Frost took NRL’s first 

report on their ELINT satellite to the 

Joint Intelligence Committee. It 

stimulated so much interest that 

funding was provided from ARPA, the 

Transit program, and other Navy 

sources to continue the program. In 

fact, when NRL ran out of its initial 

funding, Admiral Tom Connelly was adamant about continuing the program. He made 

additional funds available from four different Navy offices, one of which was the Transit

program.

The year 1960 was one of the grimmer years of the Cold War in so far as 

reconnaissance is concerned. On 1 May 1960, the Soviet Union brought an end to four

years of overflights by U.S. U-2 aircraft when Gary Powers was shot down. On 27 June 

1960, the Soviets shot down a U.S. RB-47 SIGINT aircraft over international waters in 

the Barents Sea. In this climate, the White House demanded tight control over all 

reconnaissance assets. President Eisenhower’s concern about the “overflights” after the 

U-2 incident was such that he insisted on personally approving the activation of the 

DYNO satellite every time it passed over the Soviet Union, the only area from which 

intelligence of this sort was desired.

The DYNO program actually had a very good cover, as the satellites also carried 

sensors to measure solar radiation (SolRAD) and other data for an unclassified NRL 

program headed by Dr. Friedman. The results of the space radiation program were 

published in unclassified journals. When NRL’s Tattletale engineers showed up at 

launch sites, however, they had to be very careful to stay out of the photographs and to 

keep a low profile, as they were recognized experts of the ELINT and electronic warfare 

communities.

The DYNO program worked very well and the Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, and 

NSA participants were very impressed. They had previously been looking at radars 50 

to 100 miles inside the USSR from traditional ELINT sites, but were now able to “see” 

into the Soviet heartland. This could occur several times per day, although the first 

satellite was only turned on about twenty times over its three-month lifetime.

Figure 7. Thor Ablestar launch vehicle at Cape 

Canaveral with GRAB-1
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 33 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 8. Interior of a GRAB hut

During 1965-1967, the Navy/Program C 

phased out the earlier huts used for GRAB and 

upgraded data quality by installing new equipment 

in buildings at host installations (Figure 8). This 

upgrade improved manual analysis in the field.

(In 1962, the GRAB program was replaced by 

its successor program, Poppy (see page 54). The 

GRAB program was partially declassified by the 

Director of Central Intelligence in the winter of 

1997-1998. The “fact of” the Poppy program was 

declassified in 2004.)

Navy Environmental Sensing Satellites in the 1950s

Not long after the launch of the first Sputnik, it was recognized that satellites, 

rather than probes, would provide better platforms for observing the sun and monitoring 

radiations that affect naval communications. The Naval Research Laboratory was quick 

to take advantage of this potential. NRL's first SolRAD satellite was developed, 

launched, and in use to monitor solar radiations by June 1960, just two years after 

Sputnik.

In the Transit program, the APL team found that the shape of the earth, especially 

the northern hemisphere, was far less regular than previously believed. The satellites 

moved in an orbit; however, it was a much more complex orbit than early theory had 

indicated, and this had potential impact on the Transit navigation system accuracy. To 

learn more about this "gravitational error" phenomenon, the Transit group instituted an 

intense effort to measure and map the earth's surface and predict the effects on satellite 

orbits. Soon the Laboratory's geodesy program had grown into a significant research 

and satellite-building operation of its own.

Navy Spacecraft Tracking Systems

During the early years of the U.S. space program, the principal satellite-tracking 

systems were those of the U.S. Navy. This was not the result of any deliberate Navy 

planning to undertake such a mission, but the initial result of efforts to monitor the downrange trajectories and subsequent orbits of Navy Vanguard and Transit satellites.

APL's TRANET System

To support the development of the Transit navigation system and its associated 

geodetic-research program, the Applied Physics Laboratory built a worldwide network of 

satellite tracking stations (called TRANET) for the Navy. This system tracked Navy 

satellites and determined their positions accurately using signals transmitted by the 

satellites. During the early 1960s, TRANET had 17 stations (Table 2).
34 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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NRL's Minitrack System

The Minitrack system, which was developed under the supervision of Mr. Roger L. 

Easton at NRL, became operational in 1957 as part of the Vanguard program. Signals 

transmitted by the Vanguard satellites were collected at down-range stations (

Figure 9) and were transmitted to the Vanguard Control Center at NRL. The ground

segment of this system comprised a chain of down-range stations, each with a "fence" 

of common antenna beams that extended from Blossom Point, Maryland, to Santiago, 

Chile. Additional Minitrack stations were located in Australia, South Africa, and San 

Diego, California. The Navy turned over operation of the Minitrack system to NASA, as 

part of the Vanguard program, in 1958.

Table 2 – Locations of the 17 TRANET Stations

Station Number Location

003 Las Cruces, New Mexico

006 Lasham, Englanda

008 San José dos Campos, Brazil

011 San Miguel, Philippines

012 Smithfield, Australia

013 Misawa, Japan

014 Anchorage, Alaska

017 Tafuna, Samoa

018 Thule, Greenland

019 Antarctica

092 Austin, Texas

*100 Wahiawa, Hawaii

111 APL, Howard County, Maryland

115 Pretoria, South Africa

*200 Point Mugu, California

*300 Minneapolis, Minnesota

*400 Winter Harbor, Maineb

a This station was not operated by APL, but was built and operated by the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough.

b Moved from its original location in Newfoundland.

* The asterisked stations became the tracking stations for the Transit navigation system when it became operational. The 

other stations eventually became part of a system operated by the Defense Mapping Agency
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 35 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 9. Minitrack, the first U.S. satellite tracking system, 1956

The U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR)—“Space Fence”

As early as 1958, some scientists and engineers recognized that the United States 

would need to be able to track large numbers of earth-orbiting satellites—its own and 

those launched by other nations. Knowledge of the presence, positions, and identity of 

objects in orbit would be necessary for both controlling U.S. satellites and detecting 

potential threats to national security.

Most of these satellites and related space "junk" did not provide cooperative 

emissions to aid in their identification. Similarly, tracking systems such as NRL's 

Minitrack or APL's TRANET, which depended on signals received from the spacecraft, 

would not suffice. For this reason, the Navy developed the world's first system for 

detecting and tracking non-emitting space objects.

This system, built by NRL, consisted of: (a) a ground-based 50-kilowatt, continuous-wave transmitter at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, (provided by the Army Signal 

Corps Engineering Laboratories) to bounce signals off the orbiting objects; and (b) 

NRL's Vanguard Minitrack tracking station at Blossom Point, Maryland, to receive them.

A Russian Sputnik satellite (1957 Beta) was the first satellite tracked with this system.

On 29 June 1958, following a successful demonstration of this experimental 

system, ARPA asked the Navy to develop a U.S. space surveillance system to detect, 

identify, and track earth-orbiting satellites and other orbital objects. The system, built by 

NRL and still in operation today, consists of three transmitter and six receiver sites 

placed from Georgia to California at latitude 33.5 degrees north, as shown in Table 3.

This system provided a "fence" through which all lower-orbiting objects must pass at 

least once per day. (As a result, the system attained the nickname Space Fence.) The
36 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

_________________________________________________________________________________

sites had antennas varying from 1,000-10,000 feet in length and transmitters with power 

ranging from 50 kilowatts to 1 megawatt.

In operation, the transmitters of the Space Surveillance System illuminated objects 

in space; the reflected radio-frequency signals were detected at the receiving sites and 

were processed using a technique called radio-interferometry. The data from the 

receiving stations was then transferred via land line to the control system at Dahlgren, 

Virginia. The first two stations of the Space Surveillance System began operating on 29 

July 1958, less than six weeks after NRL was tasked to build the system. The final 

station was completed in June 1961.

The Space Surveillance System typically made several hundred thousand 

observations per month, on about two thousand detectable earth-orbiting objects. Of 

these, about one-third were satellite payloads and the remainder were last-stage 

rockets and other space clutter. The data from the Space Surveillance System 

(designated WS-434) provided an important input to the Air Force's Space Detection 

and Tracking System (SPADATS). Ephemeris and other data computed by 

NAVSPASUR on satellites of military interest (e.g., foreign reconnaissance satellites) 

were sent directly to the operating forces of the U.S. Navy and other services. Technical 

data for international scientific satellites was provided, via NRL, to the worldwide 

scientific community.

The Space Surveillance System, WS-434, was operated by the Naval Research 

Laboratory until the Secretary of the Navy established the U.S. Naval Space 

Surveillance Facility (NAVSPASUR) at Dahlgren, Virginia, on 19 April 1960 to take 

responsibility for operating the system. (Operation of NAVSPASUR was subordinated to 

the Naval Space Command in 1983 and was eventually turned over to the Air Force in 

2004.)
The Navy's Space Program Burgeons (1958-1961) 37 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 10. NAVSPASUR transmitter at Kickapoo Lake, 

Table 3 – U.S. Space Surveillance System

Transmitter Locations Receiver Locations

Jordan Lake, Alabama Fort Stewart, Georgia

Hawkinsville, Georgia

Kickapoo Lake, Texas Silver Lake, Mississippi

Red River, Arkansas

Gila River, Arizona Elephant Butte, New Mexico

San Diego, California
38 Chapter 1 – The Navy Gets Involved in Space (1944-1961)

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39

CHAPTER 2 – SATELLITES FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE

(1961-1970)

Continuing the earlier Eisenhower doctrine, U.S. space programs during the 1960s

were either '"scientific" or they did not overtly exist. U.S. "military" space programs, 

designed primarily to support national strategic-defense objectives, were highly 

classified.

The U.S. Navy engaged in both aspects of this 1960s space program—"scientific" 

and "military." Navy interests in space-based weather, environment sensing, and 

communications were pursued during this period within the realm of "scientific" 

research. The Navy's unclassified participation in NASA's manned space flight program 

was "scientific," while the Navy's brief participation in DoD's joint Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory program was "military" (and therefore classified). The Naval Research 

Laboratory (NRL) developed a highly classified satellite reconnaissance system and at 

the same time participated with the scientific community in unclassified space research 

(which served in some cases as a cover for the NRL's classified work). The Navy's 

Transit navigation satellite development at the Applied Physics Laboratory proved an 

exception to the rule: initially funded and developed as a classified effort to provide 

precision navigation for Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (Polaris) submarines, information 

about Transit’s capability as a general aid to maritime navigation was eventually 

released to the public (since its existence would be impossible to keep secret once the 

system became operational).

A 1961 DoD Decision on Space Catches Navy by Surprise

After President Kennedy was elected (but before he took office in 1961), he 

appointed an "Ad Hoc Committee on Space" (headed by Jerome Wiesner of the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to examine the national space program and 

recommend space policies for the future. On 10 January 1961, the Wiesner Committee

reported that the U.S. was lagging behind the Soviet Union in missile and space 

technology and attributed this to duplication and lack of coordination among NASA, 

DoD, and the three services. The committee's report deplored the tendency of each 

military service to create independent space programs and called for the establishment 

of a single point of responsibility for space programs among the military services.

The Secretary of the Air Force was reportedly promised at that time by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense that the Air Force would be given the space mission, on condition 

it would "put its house in order"—a reference to the fact that Air Force Research, 

Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) was not centralized. The Air Force so 

promised and the Air Force Systems Command was created on 1 April 1961.

The new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, directed the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) to review the responsibility for military space research and 

development (R&D). A far-reaching DoD Directive (5160.32) on Development of Space 
40 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Systems was issued on 6 March 1961. Under this new directive, the Air Force was 

assigned responsibility for development and acquisition of all future U.S. military space 

systems. Each of the services was permitted to conduct basic research on new ways of 

using space technology. Any proposals for advanced development based on this 

research would be reviewed by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

(DDR&E) and, if given final approval by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), would be 

assigned (except under certain conditions) to the Air Force for implementation. Further, 

on 28 March 1961, the Air Force was given responsibility for research, development, 

and operation of all future DoD (but not CIA) imaging reconnaissance satellite systems.

This 6 March 1961 DoD Directive came without any apparent warning to the Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his senior advisors on the Office of the Chief 

of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, as well as the civilian planners in the office of the 

Secretary of the Navy, were caught by surprise by the decision to turn all future military 

space systems acquisition over to the Air Force. The Navy's space programs for 1962-

65 had been approved by DoD and Congress. The Navy's five-year plan and budget for 

space systems acquisition had been approved and funded, and there seemed to be 

strong support at all levels for the Navy's program in space.

Rear Admiral T.F. Connoly, one of the Navy's chief space planners, wrote an 

insightful analysis of what had happened. His major points included:

• There is no reason, beyond the Air Force telling everybody so, that makes 

military space an Air Force "mission."

• Whatever pressures produced the 1961 space directive, a need to resolve 

problems of "unwise duplication, waste, or mismanagement" in the U.S. space 

program was not among them. Such problems did not exist, nor were they 

brewing.

• The better the Navy's space programs became, the stronger the Air Force 

perceived the need to chop the Navy off.

• The Navy had been overly optimistic about its space programs during the Fiscal 

Year 1962 budget review and was late in discovering the dominant role DDR&E 

would have in the issue.

• A combined Navy-Air Force approach to military space is a natural and will 

eventually prove a necessity.

• If the Navy loses heart and gives up in military space matters, this may well 

prove to have been the point at which the Navy declined as a prime element of 

national security.

In 1962, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) sponsored a study to 

recommend policy and resource allocations for Navy space programs under this new 
Satellite Navigation Systems in the 1960s 41 _________________________________________________________________________________

DoD policy. The study concluded that the Navy should concentrate on systems which 

would enhance global operations and sea control, augment national efforts where the 

Navy had a demonstrated capability and, where possible, meet Navy requirements by 

participation in national programs. The only new system proposed was an ocean 

surveillance satellite system.

Little action followed, and the CNO disestablished the Astronautics and Range 

Division (OP-54) in 1964. However, the Navy Space Program Division in the Research, 

Development, Test and Evaluation Directorate (OP-76) continued to exist for space 

RDT&E, eventually evolving into the Command and Control Development Division (OP098). Also in 1964, the Navy Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Field Office was 

created at the Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), now the U.S. Air 

Force Space and Missile Command, Los Angeles. This office supported the Navy MOL

program until the MOL demise in 1967, and was renamed the Navy Space Systems 

Activity in July 1968.

The 1961 DoD decision to turn over acquisition of all future military space systems 

solely to the Air Force effectively blunted Navy space efforts for the next ten years. The 

only major programs to continue during this 1961—1970 epoch were Transit and 

Tattletale (which vanished from public view into the National Reconnaissance Office 

structure). This policy was not rescinded until 1970; see page 70.

Perhaps the greatest adverse impact of the 1961 directive on the Navy was its 

effect on those military and civilian personnel in the Navy Department who were caught 

up in the personal excitement and professional interest associated with space activities. 

Approximately 200 of these people left the Navy to work for NASA during the early 

1960s.

Satellite Navigation Systems in the 1960s

The Transit Navigation System Goes Operational

Successful demonstration of all the elements of the Navy's Transit navigation 

system was completed with the experimental Transit satellites 4A and 4B in the fall of 

1961. The decision was made in early 1962 to build and deploy an operational system.

The operational concept called for a constellation of four or five satellites orbiting 

the earth at a relatively low altitude (about 600 nautical miles). Each satellite would send 

out radio signals from which users within line-of-sight could determine the position of the 

satellite at any moment. By measuring the Doppler shift of the radio signal as a satellite 

passed by, each user could automatically determine his position relative to the satellite 

along a hyperbolic line on the earth's surface. By similarly determining his position from 

a second Transit satellite, the user could determine his position on the earth's surface at 

the intersection of the two hyperbolic lines. Navigational data stored in each satellite's 

memory would be kept accurate by updating it periodically with computations

transmitted from a ground station, based on tracking data gathered by multiple ground 

stations. The initial goal for navigational accuracy using the Transit system was half a 
42 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

nautical mile; as the development progressed, however, the accuracy turned out to be 

much better (about twenty-five meters).

In keeping with the early 1960s U.S. policy of secrecy concerning any satellite 

having military applications, DoD decided that program names such as Transit could be 

too revealing and banned further use of words for military space programs. What had 

been the Transit Program now became Program 435. Not long after that, the program 

received an ultimately revealing name, the "Navy Navigation Satellite System" (NNSS)."

Official names notwithstanding, nearly everyone, inside the Navy and out, simply 

continued to call the satellite navigation system Transit. (In 1967, the U.S. Government 

released the Transit system for worldwide international use.)

Four tracking stations for the operational Transit system were constructed in 

Hawaii, California, Minnesota, and Maine. The computing center for the system was 

collocated with the tracking station at Point Mugu, California, as was the facility for 

transmitting the data to update satellite memories. This facility was managed by the 

Navy Astronautics Group, the first military space operations command. To help make 

the Transit system survivable in the event of nuclear war, a backup computational and 

transmission station was located and maintained operationally ready in Maryland (using 

the Transit equipment at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) that had been built for 

the prototype development).

APL developed the navigation equipment to be used by Navy and other shipboard 

users. There were three types of equipment:

• AN/BRN-3, for use in U.S. submarines. This system was deployed in all U.S. 

strategic (SSBN ballistic missile) submarines and tactical (SSN attack) 

submarines.

• AN/SRN-9, for use in surface ships. This system was deployed in U.S. and 

Allied surface combatants.

• Transit Simplified (TRANSIM), less accurate than the AN/BRN-3 or AN/SRN-9, 

but still accurate enough for most maritime users, this system was produced 

commercially (eventually by at least 26 different manufacturers).

Prototype Transit Satellites ("Oscar" Series)

In 1964, because of the success of the developmental Transit satellites, the Navy 

decided to go directly into operations with a series of prototype Transit satellites called 

Oscars.

The first three satellites in the Oscar series were built by the Naval Avionics 

Facility at Indianapolis. There were production problems, and the satellites built there 

had operating lifetimes of only a few weeks, which was unacceptably short. It was 

determined that production should be transitioned back to APL. Nine of the Oscar

satellites were produced and launched by APL, beginning 24 June 1965 (Chapter 1,

Table 1). The first five of these had operational lifetimes of less than a year. They failed 
Satellite Navigation Systems in the 1960s 43 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 11. NRL's Timation satellite

due to thermal stresses caused by the repeated passing into and out of the earth's 

shadow. This problem was solved by the time Oscar-12 was launched, in April 1967.

Oscar-12 attained an operational lifetime of more than twelve years, and subsequent 

Oscars operated much longer than that. Oscar-14, launched 25 September 1967, was 

the last of the prototype operational navigation satellites.

(APL built and launched four additional experimental satellites from 1972–1977.

Three of these were the Transit Improvement Program (TIP) satellites (see page 87). 

The fourth was Oscar-11/TRANSAT, launched on 28 October 1977, which served a 

dual role as a navigation satellite and a space-based beacon for calibrating U.S. range 

tracking systems. The RCA Astro-Electronics Division won a Navy contract to build the 

production version of Transit, which was officially named Nova. The first Nova satellite 

was launched 15 May 1981.)

Satellite Time Measurement/Passive Ranging

Early on, it had been recognized that if precise 

enough clocks could be made available, measurement 

of the time it takes for a radio signal to travel from a 

satellite to a user could be used to determine the 

satellite's distance, and if two or more pairs of 

satellites were visible, the three-dimensional position 

of the user could be determined. The accuracy would 

be at least as good as that of any improved Transit

system and would be instantaneously calculated 

(rather than taking several minutes, as with the 

Doppler measurements used in Transit). Although 

atomic clocks had been invented and developed in the 

1950s which gave the promise of providing the 

necessary precision, the masers of that period were a 

dozen feet long, requiring a temperature-controlled 

environment and a room full of power supplies to 

operate them.

Navy Timation Program

By the mid-1960s, Mr. Roger Easton and his researchers and engineers at the 

Naval Research Laboratory NRL) had gained considerable experience using newer 

atomic clocks, time-synchronization, and ranging measurements incident to their work 

on NRL’s Minitrack satellite tracking system and the Naval Space Surveillance Fence.

They demonstrated that the accuracy and availability of electronic time-keeping devices 

had advanced to such a degree that it would be possible to use separate, highly 

synchronized clocks (one in the user's platform and others potentially in satellites) for 

passive ranging to accurately determine a navigator's position. Further, they solved the 

critical problem of how to provide the necessary synchronization updates to user 

receiver clocks, using the transmitted signal. Based on that work, Easton conceived and

developed a satellite navigation system based on this passive ranging technique; after 

difficulties with classification were resolved, he also received a patent for this system.
44 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

The 1961 Defense Directive on Development of Space Systems (still in effect 

through 1970) permitted the Navy to "conduct basic research on new space 

technology." Accordingly, Easton and his NRL colleagues tested and demonstrated his 

navigation system concept, using NRL’s "Time Navigation (Timation)" satellites (Figure 

11). Timation-I, launched in May 1967 on a Thor-Agena rocket, validated the principle of 

navigation by passive ranging and range-rate measurements, including the transfer of 

synchronized clock time to the user. Timation-II, launched in September 1969, included 

improved clock synchronization and a larger power supply for continuous operation.

(The results of these tests provided the initial proof-of-concept for the development of 

the GPS satellite navigation system; page 89).

Air Force 621B Program

Meanwhile, in the early 1960s, the Aerospace Corporation had begun to promote 

the idea of developing a new military satellite system to provide three-dimensional 

positioning for navigation. Dr. Ivan Getting, founding President of Aerospace 

Corporation and an influential engineer and physicist, promoted this proposal for a 

Navigation System, which was to be based on Time and Ranging (hence, "NAVSTAR").

Dr. Getting advocated that the proposed system development could meet the 

navigation requirements of all four services, and he began a decade-long campaign to 

convince potential buyers of its military benefits. He argued that the accurate positional 

information would increase the accuracy of weapons delivery by bombers, improve 

close air support, and facilitate all-weather rendezvous of fighters with tankers. It was 

not easy selling his NAVSTAR concept, even to the Air Force (as the Strategic Air 

Command was content to use existing inertial navigation, aided by airborne Doppler and 

conventional radars, and the Air Force Tactical Air Command was equipping its fighters 

with Loran-C for navigation). Convincing the Navy and the Army became even more of 

a challenge.

To refine the system concept for this proposal, the Air Force established a program 

designated "621B.” The concept that evolved was to be based on measuring the timedifference-of-arrival of signals from pairs of satellites, similar to the approach in the 

ground-based Loran navigation system (rather than on measuring the range of each 

satellite, using the synchronized clocks, as with the Navy’s Timation satellites.)

The Tri-Service Navigation Satellite Executive Group

Late in the 1960s, the Naval Air Systems Command, which had sponsored 

Easton's work at the Naval Research Laboratory, invited the Army and Air Force to join 

a "Tri-Service Navigation Demonstration." Together, from January through June 1968, 

this group conducted air and ground tests to validate the concept of passive ranging.

The three services then set up a committee, called the Navigation Satellite Executive 

Group (NAVSEG), to further study the issue.

Meanwhile, Aerospace Corporation and Dr. Getting re-intensified their promotion

of the military satellite navigational system to the Air Force, which gradually became an 

advocate for its development.
Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s 45 _________________________________________________________________________________

(These ongoing efforts of the Navy Timation satellite program and of the Air Force 

621B program provided the starting point for the NAVSTAR/GPS program (page 89.).)

Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s

In 1962, following the failure of the Advent satellite communications project (see 

page 30), Secretary of Defense McNamara established the Defense Communications 

Agency (DCA). The DCA was given the responsibility for centralizing all joint-service 

requirements, plans, and operations for strategic and joint communications applications; 

however, tactical communications remained a function of each military service.

Development of U.S. satellite communications systems during the 1960s, like other 

U.S. satellite programs, proceeded along two lines – military and civilian. The military 

satellite program during this period was under direction of the DCA and focused on 

strategic and logistic requirements. The Defense Satellite Communications System 

(DSCS) evolved from this effort.

On 31 August 1962, President Kennedy promulgated a "Policy Statement on 

Communications Satellites." The statement established U.S. government policy for 

coordinating communications satellite activities, called for implementation by the private 

sector, and proposed an international effort with a goal towards building a Global 

Satellite Communications Network. Kennedy extended the invitation to ". . . invite all 

nations to participate in a communications satellite system in the interest of world peace 

and closer brotherhood among people of the world."

To implement this policy, the U.S. Congress passed the Communications Satellite 

Act of 1963, which led to the formation of the Communications Satellite Corporation 

(Comsat), formed under UN auspices in 1964. Intelsat-1 (known as Early Bird) was 

launched 6 April 1965. The International Commercial Satellite (Intelsat) 

Communications Consortium completed the first global network during the late 1960s.

Navy Organization in the 1960s for Satellite Communications

Within the Navy, the Bureau of Ships (BuShips) was designated the lead bureau 

for communications, and it managed the Navy's satellite communications program. One 

of the strongest proponents of the Navy's participation in satellite communications 

during this period, and for several years thereafter, was (then) Lieutenant Commander

Burt Edelson. During the course of his career, he published more than 50 articles in the 

open literature explaining and promoting Navy use of space-based systems.

The Navy satellite-communications effort during the early 1960s included the 

building of NRL's microwave communications satellite terminal at Waldorf, Maryland,

and the equipping of a communications ship as an ocean-going terminal to participate in 

communications experiments. These Navy terminals cooperated extensively with both 

the military and the civilian programs involving DoD, NASA, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and 

commercial companies.
46 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Coordination of these joint efforts was aided enormously by the existence of the 

Technical Committee for Communication Satellites. This committee included 

representation from such organizations as NASA and Lincoln Laboratory, as well as 

both administrative and technical representatives of each of the military services.

Chairmanship of this group rotated periodically. Monthly meetings were held.

Committee members kept a close eye on commercial research with satellite

communications. The Technical Committee proved to be an effective mechanism for 

promoting progress.

Because the 1961 Directive on satellite-systems acquisition was in effect at this 

time, the Navy did not directly acquire communications satellites during this period, but 

relied instead on the satellites built by Lincoln Laboratory, private industry, and the Air 

Force. (The sole exception was an experimental Lofti satellite with potential applications 

in anti-submarine warfare – details to follow on page 53).

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) continued its work on satellite 

communications throughout the 1960s, funded both by BuShips and by the Office of 

Naval Research to the tune of about $300,000 each per year. In 1968, Dr. Alan Berman, 

Director of Research at NRL, established the Satellite Research Branch as a separate 

organization to consolidate this work. The Branch was placed under the direction of J. 

Plumer Leiphart, whose contributions to space communications were becoming 

increasingly recognized. The Branch consisted of small but highly effective task groups, 

each working, promoting, and advancing its projects as rapidly as technical advances 

and Navy operational interest in the applications developed. Leiphart and his NRL 

colleagues felt that this approach was much more productive than the highly organized 

and extensively programmed way in which the Air Force approached the initiation and 

administration of its counterpart development project. The benefits of the NRL small 

task-group approach paid off later when TacSat-1 was developed.

"Spy Ship" Communications (TRSSCOM)

In 1964, the U.S. Navy established the world's first operational ship-shore satellite 

communications system to provide telecommunications support for Navy Signals 

Intelligence (SIGINT) surveillance ships that were deployed in several oceans of the 

world. This communications system was named the "Technical Research-Ship Special 

Communications System" (TRSSCOM) in keeping with the cover story that these ships 

were for "technical research" rather than surveillance.

The TRSSCOM System derived from the Communications Moon Relay (CMR)

concept (see page 23). To obtain the equipment needed for TRSSCOM, the Naval 

Research Laboratory disestablished the CMR link between Hawaii and Washington,

DC, and the CMR antennas were then installed at Cheltenham, Maryland (for the 

Second and Sixth Fleets); Wahiawa, Hawaii (Third Fleet); and Okinawa (Seventh Fleet).

The TRSSCOM system went operational with the USS Oxford on 25 February

1964. Other "technical research" ships were added as equipment became available:

USS Georgetown, 1966; USS Jamestown, 1966; USS Liberty, 1967; USS Belmont, 
Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s 47 _________________________________________________________________________________

1968; and USS Valdez, 1969. TRSSCOM provided support to the intelligence collection 

mission of these ships.

The TRSSCOM installation in USS Liberty was totally disabled during the Israeli 

attack on that ship during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. (The "Technical Research" 

ships were placed in reserve, and the TRSSCOM system was suspended in the fall of 

1969, bringing to a close the Navy’s first operational satellite communications program.)

Navy Plans for Using DSCS Satellites

After the Advent program was canceled in 1962, the Secretary of Defense 

assigned the newly established Defense Communications Agency to come up with a 

plan for acquiring a U.S. military communications satellite system.

Congress, in response to the President's “Policy Statement on Communications 

Satellites," passed legislation in 1963 establishing the Comsat Corporation, a 

government-controlled for-profit corporation with a charter and exclusive license to 

pursue commercial satellite communications for the U.S. Considerable debate took 

place within DoD as to whether the newly established Comsat Corporation should 

develop the military satellite communications system. It was finally decided that the Air 

Force, rather than Comsat Corporation, should develop the Defense Satellite 

Communications System (DSCS). The Navy was to be responsible for developing the 

shipboard terminals, Army for its ground terminals, and the Air Force for the airborne 

terminals.

The stated purpose of the DSCS was to enable military commanders to send 

“logistic” messages. To a certain extent, this was true, but the DSCS system intended to

support additional applications that were at least as important as logistics. First, it would 

be used for command and control of the U.S. strategic forces. Second, it would carry 

intelligence data from the new satellite systems being developed by the National 

Reconnaissance Office to the various intelligence nodes and the National Command 

Authorities. Third, it would connect the National Command Authorities with the theater 

Commanders-in-Chief and Commanders of the general purpose forces. Navy and other 

requirements were added as the development progressed.

DSCS became a major component of the Defense Communications System 

(DCS)—the U.S. military communications for worldwide telecommunications among 

DoD and various government agencies. For many years, the DCS relied primarily on the 

DSCS satellites for overseas communications traffic.

The DSCS Satellites

The DSCS-I system was designed from the start to be survivable in wartime, 

including nuclear warfare. The orbit was near-synchronous, selected such that each 

satellite in the constellation moved about thirty degrees per day; if one was destroyed, 

another would soon drift into view. There was no command system in the satellite, so no 

enemy could take control of the system. To provide some jamming resistance, and to 

make sure there would be enough bandwidth, the Super High Frequency (SHF) 

communications band was selected. After U.S. negotiations at the International 
48 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Extraordinary Administration Radio Conference in Switzerland, frequency channels in 

the 8,000-MHz region were designated for the DSCS-I uplink and those in the 7,000-

MHz region for the downlink.

DSCS-I was built under contract by Philco-Ford. It was successful and provided 

communications services to the Defense Communications Agency for about ten years.

A total of twenty-six DSCS satellites were placed in orbit during the period June 1966 to 

June 1968.

DSCS-I was followed by two more versions: DSCS-II (built by TRW) and DSCS-III

(built by General Electric). The follow-on DSCS-II and DSCS-III satellites were 

geosynchronous. Each system incorporated major improvements over its predecessor.

The requirements for survivability under wartime conditions, including nuclear war, 

became increasingly important. The requirements for such measures as radiation 

hardening, redundancy, and capability for system reconstitution became successively 

more stringent with DSCS-II and DSCS-III. The DSCS-III satellites also incorporated 

advanced antenna nulling as a further countermeasure against enemy jamming.

Navy SHF Terminals for DSCS

The Navy was responsible for providing the DSCS terminals for ships. The effort to 

provide these terminals began in the mid-1960s (and continues today). The design 

originally proposed for DSCS-I would have used very wide bandwidths for the 

communication links. This would have necessitated the use of very large antennas—

infeasible for use aboard even the largest Navy ships. In 1966, the Navy obtained a 

compromise that reduced the bandwidth so as to make shipboard terminals possible.

Even with this compromise, DSCS terminals were only practical for large ships.

The first shipboard DSCS terminal, the AN/SSG-2, was installed in a transportable 

shelter. Two of the shelters were built and placed on Atlantic and Pacific fleet ships. The 

Commanding Officer of USS Arlington, the Pacific fleet ship, expressed his feelings 

about the unwieldy system by reporting it as "out of commission" in his daily casualty 

report each day the shelter was embarked.

The Navy then contracted with the Collins Radio Company to build an AN/SSG-6

DSCS terminal that would use the stabilized antennas developed by Hughes, but 

incorporate new electronics. Two AN/SSC-6 terminals were delivered and installed in 

the Sixth Fleet flagship (USS Albany) and Seventh Fleet flagship (USS Oklahoma City).

The terminals worked, but the antenna stabilization servos wore out rapidly because of 

the ships' pitch and roll.

(Later, during the 1970s, the AN/SSC-6 terminals were refined and installed in 30 

major ships. The DSCS satellite communications system became a major component of 

the Defense Communications System and was used by the Navy for long-haul 

communications to major ships equipped with SHF terminals for military logistics, 

dissemination of wideband intelligence, control of strategic forces, and various highlevel command support functions.)
Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s 49 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 12. USNS Kingsport (AG-164) configured for communications 

demonstrations, 1963

Navy Communications Experiments with Commercial Satellites

The Navy, like the other services, experimented during the 1960s with the potential 

of commercial satellites to meet its communications-relay requirements.

Satellite Communications Experiment Ships

As part of its contribution to project Advent (the military's first effort to employ 

communications relay satellites), the Navy had equipped a ship to demonstrate the 

communications capability. A shipboard communications terminal and a 30-ft satellite 

dish antenna were installed in a former Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) 

Victory ship, USNS Kingsport (AG-164) (see Figure 12).

In the meantime, the Army provided ground terminals for the Advent

demonstrations at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and at Camp Roberts, California.

The Kingsport completed its conversion at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in December 

1962. The first job of the Navy's new communications ship was to operate with the Army 

ground stations in experiments using NASA's Syncom satellites. Syncom-II was placed 

in orbit in July 1963 and positioned over Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. USNS

Kingsport, stationed off Nigeria, made the first transmissions via the satellite. The ship 

then steamed to the Mediterranean for operational demonstrations with the U.S. Sixth 

Fleet.

The first demonstrations of two-way satellite voice communication from an aircraft 

in flight to a ship under way took place between a Navy aircraft off the Virginia coast 

and USNS Kingsport near Morocco on 2 October 1963. The ship then proceeded to 

Guam and supported the launch of Syncom-III, which was placed in orbit over the 

International Date Line in August 1964.

The NRL Satellite Communications Terminal at Waldorf, Maryland

In the mid-1960s the Naval Research Laboratory built an experimental satellitecommunications facility at a former Nike missile site near Waldorf, Maryland. This 

facility contained a 60-ft parabolic dish antenna, transmitters, and a low-noise receiving 

system. It was also fully equipped for satellite tracking, data processing, and 

communications modulation experiments. The installation was completed in 1967.
50 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

One of the Navy's goals in building the Waldorf facility was to test satellitecommunications technology at frequencies higher than Ultra High Frequency (UHF), 

where, for example, there would be plenty of bandwidth available for new techniques 

such as anti-jam modulation. The first transmitter installed at the Waldorf facility was in 

the SHF communications band (radar X-band) of the microwave spectrum. During the 

late 1960s the Waldorf facility was heavily involved in testing both U.S. commercial 

satellites and the Defense Satellite Communications System.

In the 1970s the Waldorf facility was a participant in tests of satellite 

communications in the Extremely High Frequency (EHF) band (involving experiments 

with the MIT Lincoln Laboratory Experimental Satellites, LES 8 and 9). These tests were 

part of the Military Strategic, Tactical and Relay (Milstar) development effort. In the late 

1970s, the Waldorf facility also played a role in tests of the Fleet Broadcast Processor, 

as part of the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) program.

Compass Link

The Waldorf facility was used during the Vietnam War as part of a special satellitecommunications operation called Compass Link, established by the Defense 

Communications Agency to pass high-quality target photography from Vietnam to 

Washington, DC.

In 1967, President Johnson made it known that he wanted to personally see 

military pictures taken in Vietnam rather than relying on someone else to evaluate them.

He also wanted to see the pictures sooner than they could be delivered from Vietnam 

by courier. President Johnson's desire for this effort resulted from an incident in which 

the Soviets claimed that two of their ships sustained damage during a U.S. strike on 

Haiphong Harbor. The President initially denied the charge but was forced to reverse 

himself when the Soviets published photographs of the damage. Compass Link was set 

up to provide the imaging transmission for this requirement.

Compass Link was established using two DSCS satellites, providing two hops: 

Vietnam to Hawaii, and Hawaii to Waldorf, Maryland. From Waldorf, the imagery was 

transmitted by land line directly to the White House and the Pentagon. Compass Link

was used extensively until the end of the Vietnam War.

Commercial Communications Satellites

Telstar, the first commercial experimental communications satellite, was launched 

by Bell Telephone Laboratories of AT&T on 11 July 1962, about a month after the 

cancellation of the military Advent program. Telstar was to become the most famous of 

the experimental communications satellites. Its impact on the public was so great that,

for a while, the name Telstar became generic for "communications satellite."

Syncom, the first commercial experimental satellite to be placed in a 

geosynchronous orbit, was to become the most important of the experimental satellites 

to the Navy and DoD, as well as to the general public. The concept for Syncom had 

been proposed by the Hughes Aircraft Company, turned down by DoD, and then 

awarded a contract by NASA in 1961. The Syncom satellites were designed to work 
Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s 51 _________________________________________________________________________________

with the Army and Navy terminals from the recently defunct Advent program. Syncom-I, 

launched in February 1963, did not achieve orbit. Syncom-II (launched in July 1963) 

and Syncom-III (in August 1964) succeeded and demonstrated the great utility of 

geosynchronous orbit for almost all subsequent U.S. communications satellites. The

Navy participated in many experiments with the Syncom satellites, using both the 

shipboard terminal in USNS Kingsport and the facility at Waldorf, Maryland.

MIT Lincoln Laboratory, which had originally been established by the U.S. Air 

Force to conduct research in strategic air defense, became very active in developing 

satellite-communications technology, especially for the military services. In the course of 

their communications technology program, Lincoln Laboratory developed a number of 

experimental satellites, called Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES), using Air Force 

funds. LES-5 and LES-6 operated in the military UHF band and provided much of the 

experimental technology for the UHF satellite communications system. Others operated 

in the SHF communications band (like DSCS) and EHF communications band (like 

Milstar). The Navy used LES satellites in many of their tests during the 1960s and 

1970s.

The Tactical Satellite Communications (TacSat-1) Experiments

It was recognized from the start by the military operating forces that DSCS would 

not be suitable for most tactical applications. The large, directional, stabilized antennas 

required for the DSCS terminals could not be used in maneuverable platforms including 

most ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground-mobile vehicles. The printed hard-copy 

format of the DSCS messages was not at all suited to many tactical requirements. The 

Air Force, in particular, wanted voice-transmission capability for its satellitecommunications operations. The Navy, in addition to voice, had a requirement for digital 

data transmission to support its planned tactical information-exchange systems. For 

these purposes, the operating forces required a tactical satellite communications 

system.

A Tactical Satellite Communications (TacSat-1) Executive Steering Group, with 

senior members representing each of the services, was established in the mid-1960s.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force for R&D served as the 

advisory committee. At the working level, both the OPNAV staff and Navy Material 

Command were represented.

Lincoln Laboratory began pushing for use of the "military UHF" communications 

band (225 to 400 MHz) for tactical applications, using small, omnidirectional antennas.

The transmit/receive "footprint" for an omnidirectional UHF antenna is much larger (at 

bandwidths required for voice and tactical data) than the relative spot beams at SHF –

making UHF much more suitable for both the uplinks and the downlinks in many naval 

applications.

The first requirement was to determine whether the operating forces could use the 

same UHF radios and antennas with which their ships, aircraft, and mobile ground 

forces were already equipped for conventional line-of-sight communications. Tests were 

performed with LES-5 in 1967 and with the more capable LES-6 in 1968. It was found 
52 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

that the existing fleet UHF transmitters and receivers had inadequate frequency stability 

and that the receivers lacked sufficient sensitivity. New satellite-compatible terminals 

would have to be designed.

At this particular phase in the history of U.S. space communications, there was a 

sense of cooperation and enthusiasm among the services in planning for tactical 

satellite communications. Their common "adversary," at this point, was the Defense 

Communications Agency (DCA), whose engineers, in the view of the tactical operators, 

promoted the DSCS satellite system and did not appreciate the requirements of the 

operating forces to have access to voice and tactical-data communications with small 

omnidirectional antennas. There was apprehension that the DCA would move to take 

over responsibility for tactical communications.

In 1969, the Navy, Air Force, and Army undertook a joint program to obtain a 

satellite with which to continue UHF experimentation toward a tactical satellite 

communications capability. The Air Force was assigned to provide the TacSat-1 satellite 

(in keeping with the satellite-systems acquisition directive of 1961, which was still in 

effect). The Navy, Army, and Air Force were each to develop their own TacSat-1

terminals.

The Navy designed satellite-communications transceivers for shipboard use 

(AN/WSC-1s), which provided five UHF satellite-communications channels compatible 

with voice, teletype, and digital data. The counterpart airborne terminals (AN/ARC-1), 

ground-transportable terminals (AN/TRC-156/-157), and ground-mobile terminals 

(AN/MSG-58) designed by the Air Force and Army were single-channel.

The TacSat-1 satellite (the only one acquired under this program), was a large, 

spin-stabilized UHF communications repeater, built under Air Force contract by the 

Hughes Aircraft Company (their first major effort on a satellite communications system).

TacSat-1 was launched by the Air Force into synchronous orbit on a Titan-3 booster on 

9 February 1969 and operated satisfactorily for about three years. The satellite was 

positioned over the Pacific Ocean, and its communications supported Navy ships 

operating in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War. Communications tests 

conducted in 1969 and 1970 included voice, teletype, and tactical data transmissions.

In 1969, the Naval Electronic System Command developed and tested low-cost 

satellite communications terminals to demonstrate how UHF-satellite terminals could be 

made affordable for large numbers of Navy ships in future procurements. (The resultant 

AN/WSC-3 became the standard UHF terminal for ships and submarines for both 

satellite and conventional line-of-sight communications.)

Of the three services, the Navy used TacSat-1 the most. (Later, in the 1970s after 

the 1961 Directive had been canceled, the Navy initiated the FLTSATCOM program 

based on the UHF capabilities demonstrated using the TacSat-1 (and LES-5 and -6) 

satellites (Chapter 3).
Navy's Role in Satellite Communications during the 1960s 53 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 13. NRL's Lofti communications satellite

Lofti Research

During the 1960s, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) designed, constructed, 

and launched communications satellites for communications relay in the Very Low 

Frequency (VLF) portion of the radio spectrum as part of a scientific-research program.

Since only VLF radio waves penetrate the sea sufficiently to communicate with 

submerged submarines, the Navy wanted to investigate the possibility of transmitting 

messages to submarines from satellites on VLF. It was, therefore, necessary to learn 

more about the propagation of VLF signals, especially through the ionosphere. The 

Bureau of Ships funded the experiments at NRL for this purpose.

The initial name proposed for this project was Trans-Ionospheric Propagation 

System (Tipsy). Louis Gebhart, head of the Radio Division at NRL, did not deem this 

acronym dignified enough to reflect the lofty goals of the experiments; thus, the 

acronym Lofti (Low-Frequency Trans-Ionosphere) was coined.

Under this program, NRL set up a series of experiments to measure the 

transmission of VLF signals between the earth and a satellite. Because it was easier to 

transmit the VLF signals from the ground than from the satellites, the first experiments 

were designed with the satellites instrumented to receive the signals and telemeter the 

results back to earth. VLF transmitters were positioned at Naval Radio Stations in North 

and South America and in Australia.

The Lofti satellites launched by 

NRL were:

• Lofti-I (Figure 13), 21 

February 1961, as a sharethe-ride launch with a Transit

satellite, to an altitude of a 

few hundred miles.

• Lofti-II, 24 January 1962, as 

a share-the-ride launch with 

five other Navy satellites, did 

not attain orbit.

The experiments provided significant scientific data on the propagation of VLF 

radio waves through the ionosphere. In the end, it turned out that the ionosphere is an 

unpromising medium for VLF signals, because the waves at these frequencies are 

strongly affected by re-radiation from ions and tend to bend along the earth's magnetic 

field rather than follow a straight line path from earth to satellite similar to radio waves at 

higher frequencies. The program was terminated.
54 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Navy's Satellite Reconnaissance System during the 1960s

When the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was organized officially in 1962, 

the Navy’s DYNO satellite project (page 30) was designated as NRO “Program C” and, 

for a time, the Director of Naval Intelligence continued as the program director. Funding

for the DYNO satellites, budgeted originally by ARPA and then by Navy, was transferred 

to the National Reconnaissance Office as of fiscal year 1963. Under NRO, the DYNO

satellites were renamed POPPY. The Naval Security Group used the unclassified name 

“SISS ZULU” to refer to its participation in the Poppy project.

A principal effect of transferring the DYNO program to the NRO, as far as the 

Naval Research Laboratory was concerned, was that the NRO agreed to pay for all 

future launch costs. No longer were NRL SolRAD payloads required as cover for the 

Navy electronic intelligence satellite launches.

The transfer of the Navy reconnaissance satellite program to the NRO also made a 

difference in that POPPY was switched to the Air Force’s Thor-Agena booster, which 

made it possible to launch multiple satellites with more sophisticated payloads on a 

single rocket.

The placing of the Navy reconnaissance satellite program under the NRO also had 

two important administrative effects on NRL. First, there was a much more formal 

system of accountability: management, inventory, schedules, budgets, etc. were subject 

to much stricter procedures and controls. Second, the program was now within the 

classification system of the NRO, and this severely restricted the number of people in 

the Navy who had access to program details (but not necessarily the intelligence 

collected.)

The POPPY satellites were designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory.

On 13 December 1962, the first pair of POPPY spacecraft was launched from 

Table 4 – The NRL Classified Programs in the 1960s

Date of Launch Name Other Unclassified Name

Air Force NRL

13 Dec 1962 POPPY-1 GREB II None

15 Jun 1963 POPPY-2 None SolRAD-VI

Dosimeter

11 Jan 1964 POPPY-3 None SolRAD VIIA

GGSE-I

9 Mar 1965 POPPY-4 None SolRAD

GGSE-2

31 May 1967 POPPY-5 None GGSE-IV

GGSE-V

30 Sep 1969 POPPY-6 None None

14 Dec 1971 POPPY-7 None None
Navy's Early Space-based Radar Programs 55 _________________________________________________________________________________

Vandenbug. POPPY-1 worked well and collected valuable intelligence over the course 

of its lifetime. NSA analysts were startled at how much more electronic intelligence they 

received at that time from POPPY than from any other source.

POPPY-2 was launched on 15 June 1963. This time there were three spacecraft.

The launch used an Agena rocket as the second/third stage booster. The booster put 

the spacecraft into a degraded orbit, where it operated successfully throughout a short 

mission duration.

POPPY-3 was launched on 11 January 1964. This mission consisted of three 

satellites, one of which was the first of the series to be stabilized using gravity gradient 

booms. The Agena second stage put the three satellites into orbit.

POPPY-4 was launched on 9 March 1965. This time there were four spacecraft, 

weighing in excess of 100 pounds each.

Program C launched POPPY-5 on 31 May 1967. After an engineering checkout, 

this mission collected data on a new Soviet radar, which allowed U.S. analysts to “map” 

the Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system completely. This significant success led to 

the tasking of the POPPY ground stations to report detections of Soviet ABM signals as 

cues to other U.S. SIGINT and anti-missile resources.

Intelligence derived from data that the Navy-NRO POPPY system collected 

provided:

• The Intelligence Community with clues to the location and capabilities of sites 

within the Soviet Union

• The SAC with locations of air defense equipment to support the U.S. Single 

Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)

• Ocean surveillance information to Navy operational commanders

• Along with data from the CORONA imaging reconnaissance satellite, a more 

complete picture of the overall Soviet military threat

(In September 2005, the Director of Central Intelligence partially declassified the 

POPPY program.)

Navy's Early Space-based Radar Programs

From the earliest days of Navy involvement with space, the idea of putting radar in 

space had seemed a good one. Ship-based radars had proved their worth as 

surveillance and tracking devices in World War II. Putting radar in aircraft had increased 

the surveillance horizon to over 200 miles. The concept of putting surveillance radars in 

low-orbiting satellites promised to increase the radar's horizon even more. Because 
56 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

satellites orbit the earth several times a day, it might then be possible for low-orbiting, 

space-based radar to search entire oceans daily, unobstructed by cloud cover or the 

darkness of night.

Albatross

The first serious effort to determine the feasibility of Navy space-based radar was 

project Albatross, sponsored by the Astronautics Program Office of the Bureau of Naval 

Weapons in 1960 and conducted by the Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, California.

The concept was to detect and image ships using synthetic aperture techniques from a 

constellation of six satellites at a 300-mile altitude. Each satellite would have two radars 

to cover each side of the ground track simultaneously. However, Project Albatross was 

terminated after the study stage.

Navy Surveillance Sensors for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Program

As part of its contribution to the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) 

program in the mid-1960s, the Navy provided an experimental package consisting of a 

number of surveillance sensors (passive signal-intercept, optics, and camera) to be 

operated in real time by observers in the MOL. When the MOL Program was terminated 

in 1969, the Navy's related space-based effort ended with it.

The knowledge and experience gained from the MOL program led to a growing 

interest in some Navy circles in lighter-weight radar that could be orbited in space. In 

1964, the feasibility of a small, lightweight radar system was investigated for installation 

in the nose cone of a Polaris A-3 missile (Project 485). In 1965, the G.W. Preston 

Company submitted an unsolicited proposal for lightweight, low-powered, space-based 

radar. NRL made a study of these proposals and concluded that radar would be feasible 

for ocean surveillance.

This and other work led to Program 749. This exploratory development program, 

funded by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Albert Hall, and 

managed by the Navy, was to investigate the feasibility of space-based radar for ocean 

surveillance. The design was for simple, conventional radar operating at L-band, fixed to 

the satellite and scanning to the side as the satellite moved along its track. The design 

was assessed to be feasible for detecting and locating ships, but not for identifying 

them.

The proposal to transition Program 749 into concept development was reviewed in 

1969 by an OSD Committee headed by Mr. Bennington (the "Bennington Committee'), 

which recommended against transitioning Program 749 into concept development. The 

principal objection was that the radar could only detect and track ships, not identify 

them, and was in essence a "blob detector." (The Committee appears to have 

overlooked the potential of operating radar in conjunction with other sensors, i.e., 

electronic surveillance, that do have target identification capabilities.) The DoD Decision 

Paper that followed the Bennington Committee's report acknowledged that a 

requirement existed for space-based radar for ocean surveillance but concluded that 

space-based radar that can detect and locate but not identify ships was not sufficient 
Dissemination of Space-derived Surveillance Information to the Fleet in the 1960s 57 _________________________________________________________________________________

(thereby setting a precedent for decisions on space-based radars that carried over into 

succeeding decades).

Dissemination of Space-derived Surveillance Information to the Fleet 

in the 1960s

To gather and correlate intelligence information from all sources that could be 

useful to the fleet, the Navy operated a Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center 

(NOSIC) at Suitland, Maryland, and installed a shore-based Fleet Ocean Surveillance 

Information Center/Facility (FOSIC/FOSIF) in each theater where naval forces operated.

The information collected and correlated at the FOSIC/FOSIFs was then transmitted in 

the form of classified message reports on the Fleet Broadcast to the commanders of 

deployed surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft.

Some of the information derived from national satellite reconnaissance was 

included, along with intelligence from several other sources, on these broadcasts during 

the latter part of the 1960s.

One of the functions performed at the FOSIC/FOSIFS was to "sanitize" such 

information, by removing evidence of its source, before transmitting it, so that fleet 

personnel could be permitted to handle the otherwise highly classified information and 

commanders could exploit it for operational purposes. (This transparency of the 

information source had a downside, however, in that very few operational commanders 

and operators were aware they were receiving space-collected surveillance information, 

and, consequently, most Navy planners were unaware of the operational importance of 

satellites to the Navy.)

Navy Exploitation of Weather Satellites in the 1960s

TIROS, NOAA, and GOES

The first true U.S. weather satellite was the Television and Infrared Observation 

Satellite (TIROS), which had evolved in the late 1950s from concepts developed by the 

U.S. Army, the Rand Corporation, RCA Corporation, and Mr. Harry Wexler of the U.S. 

Weather Bureau. TIROS, an R&D program, was sponsored initially by the Advanced 

Research Project Agency (ARPA).

When the NASA was formed in 1959, the TIROS project had been transferred to 

NASA, and the first TIROS weather satellite was launched in April 1960. TIROS was in 

a polar orbit, permitting the satellite to monitor the entire surface as the earth rotated 

slowly beneath the orbiting satellite. TIROS was successful from its inception. The data 

the satellite collected were so valuable that military and civilian forecasters used the 

processed information, even though the program was categorized as a "research" effort.

The TIROS imagery, essentially high-definition television, was processed at the U.S. 

Weather Bureau Meteorology Satellite Laboratory in Maryland and telefaxed to Navy 

and other users. Ten first-generation TIROS satellites were launched from 1960—1965.
58 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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TIROS-VIII, launched in December 1963, was the first weather satellite capable of 

transmitting data directly to Navy sites and other facilities, in addition to the Weather 

Bureau Laboratory.

The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was formed 

in 1970, and their first weather satellite was launched in December 1970; the design 

was based on the TIROS satellites. (The NOAA satellites, which have been upgraded 

continually over the years, were still used by the Navy in 2009.)

In 1966, NASA launched its Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-1), the first 

weather satellite to operate in a geosynchronous orbit. NOAA’s Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) were patterned after the ATS-1. (The 

GOES satellites were also still used by the Navy in 2009.)

Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)

When the CIA's Discoverer/CORONA imaging satellites became operational and 

went into use over the Soviet Union in 1960, it soon became apparent that 

approximately 50% of the Discoverer images were obscured by clouds—an expensive 

proposition for a satellite that took images using a film camera and ejected capsules 

which were parachuted down through the atmosphere and caught by waiting aircraft.

Recognition of this problem coincided with the major successes demonstrated by the 

TIROS polar-orbiting weather satellites developed by NASA. The U.S. Air Force, 

frustrated by the recent decision to give the imaging-satellite mission to the CIA, took on 

the task of building a Defense Meteorological Satellite, based on the TIROS design that 

had been proven by NASA.

The first four operationally successful Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

(DMSP) satellites were launched in 1965. (The DMSP has been upgraded significantly 

over the years, but remained the only U.S. military weather satellite system and was still 

used by the Navy in 2009.)

Navy Environment Sensing Satellites in the 1960s

Scientific programs utilizing environmental-sensing satellites (see page 33) were 

continued at both the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Applied Physics 

Laboratory (APL) during the 1960s.

NRL SolRAD Satellites during the 1960s

Following the 1961 DoD space systems acquisition decision, NRL's Solar 

Radiation (SolRAD) program of "scientific" research was one of the Navy's space 

programs that was allowed to continue.

Advances in solar-radiation data collection and data transmission were 

incorporated into successive SolRAD satellites (Figure 14).
Navy Environment Sensing Satellites in the 1960s 59 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 14. SolRAD-10 satellite

Data collected by the SolRAD satellites was down-linked initially to NRL's Satellite 

Command and Telemetry Readout Site at Hybla Valley, Virginia (the site of today's 

Huntley Meadows wildlife preserve). Later in the program, data was sent to NRL's 

Tracking and Data Acquisition Facility at Blossom Point, Maryland. The collected data 

was then relayed to NRL's SolRAD Data Operations Center for analysis.

The information derived from SolRAD data was used throughout the Navy as an 

aid to communicators in selecting radio channels least affected by solar activity. Beyond 

the Navy, SolRAD data were furnished on a routine basis to the Environmental Services 

Space Disturbance Forecast Center at Boulder, Colorado, and the U.S. Air Force Air 

Weather Service.

In addition to the SolRAD satellites, NRL developed solar-radiation measurement 

and data-transmission equipment, which was also used in NASA satellites and Skylab

during this period.

APL's Environmental Research Satellites during the 1960s

Like the work at NRL, the space program at the APL during the 1960s included 

scientific experiments in addition to development of space systems for military 

application. These APL scientific programs were primarily in the areas of geodesy, 

space physics, and ionospheric measurements. Scientific research satellites that were 

built and launched by APL during the 1960s are summarized in Table 5.

Geodesy

The Navy sponsored an extensive research program in geodesy at APL to 

measure the earth's shape and gravitational fields. This information was needed to 

precisely determine the Transit satellite orbits and to improve the accuracy for the 

Transit navigation system. The geodesy research and development program utilized the 

sixteen world-wide tracking stations built and operated by APL as part of the Transit
60 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

tracking network, plus one station operated by the Royal Aircraft Establishment at 

Lasham, England.

The satellites used for obtaining geodetic data were in six different orbits and were 

of three kinds: Transits 4A, 4B, and 5A1, funded by the Navy's Transit Program; 

Satellites BE-B and BE-C, funded by NASA's Beacon Explorer Program; and ANNA-1A 

and 1B, acquired through a joint Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force.

Table 5 – APL Environmental Research Satellites during the 1960s

Satellite Launch Primary Mission(s) Sponsor

TRAAC 15 Nov 1962 Space physics Navy

ANNA-1A 20 May 

1962

Geodesy; tracking Army, Navy, NASA, Air 

Force

ANNA-1B 31 Oct 1961 Geodesy; tracking Army, Navy, NASA, Air 

Force

5E-1 28 Sep 1968 Space physics Navy

5E-3 5 Dec 1963 Space physics Navy

BE-A 19 Mar 1964 Ionospheric; geodesy NASA

5E-2 13 Dec 1964 Space physics Navy

BE-B 9 Oct 1964 Ionospheric; geodesy NASA

5E-5 13 Dec 1964 Space physics Navy

BE-C 29 Apr 1965 Ionospheric; geodesy NASA

PAPA 765 22 May 

1965

Ionospheric DNA

Geos-A 6 Nov 1964 Geodesy NASA

DME 29 Nov 1965 Ionospheric NASA

DoDGE 1 Jul 1967 Stabilization DoD

Geos-B 11 Jan 1968 Geodesy NASA

LIDOS 16 Aug 1968 Geodesy Navy
Navy Environment Sensing Satellites in the 1960s 61 _________________________________________________________________________________

ANNA. The Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force (ANNA) program originated with the 

Navy and was coordinated by NASA. Under this program, APL provided ANNA 

satellites that carried three different tracking systems: a Doppler system provided by the 

Navy, the Secor ranging system supplied by the Army, and a flashing-light optical 

system supplied by Air Force. Although the ANNA experiment was designed to compare 

the accuracy of the three ranging systems, its principal value turned out to be in refining 

information on the shape of the earth and its gravitational field. ANNA-1A failed to 

achieve orbit; ANNA-1B was launched successfully on 31 October 1961. (Before 

launch, someone recognized that this satellite, which was to be launched into a 50-

degree inclination, would look like a missile being aimed at the Soviet Union during its 

ascent to orbit. The State Department decided this matter would have to be resolved by 

the heads of the two governments involved. Only after President Kennedy was 

convinced that President Krushchev would guarantee no retaliatory missile launch was 

APL given permission to launch ANNA-1B.)

GEOS. APL built two satellites to provide geodetic data for NASA's GEOS

(Goddard Earth Observing System) program. GEOS-A (also called Explorer-29) was 

launched in 1965 and GEOS-B in 1968. (A third satellite launched in 1975, GEOS-C, 

carried an altimeter that was a precursor to subsequent satellite-based altimeters in 

Seasat and the Navy's GEOSAT.)

LIDOS. In the late 1960s, the Navy asked APL to build a geodetic-research 

satellite called Low-inclination Doppler-only Satellite (LIDOS). "Doppler-only" meant that 

it was intended to be tracked by the Doppler method, similar to Transit. It was decided 

later to place the LIDOS satellite in a high-altitude, near-polar orbit; to keep the same 

acronym, its name was changed to "Large" inclination Doppler-only Satellite." LIDOS

was launched on 16 August 1968 with nine other satellites on an Atlas/Burner-II vehicle, 

but all of the satellites were lost when the heat shield failed to open.

Space Physics

In 1960, the Navy provided funds to APL to establish a space physics program 

having two purposes: (1) to measure the properties of the space environment in which 

Transit navigation satellites would have to operate; and (2) to undertake a general, 

scientific program in space physics.

APL's Transit Research and Altitude Control (TRAAC) satellite, built and launched 

in 1961, had as its dual mission: (a) testing gravity gradient as a means of satellite 

stabilization; and (b) measuring the densities of certain atomic particles (protons and 

neutrons) in orbit. When the U.S. Starfish high-altitude nuclear test took place over 

Johnson Island in the Pacific in July 1962, TRAAC provided the U.S. with important 

information about nuclear radiation in space from nuclear detonations, information used 

by the U.S. satellite survivability program. (Radiation from the Starfish detonation turned 

out to have a fatal effect on the solar power supplies of both TRAAC and Transit 4-B.)

The Navy then asked APL to build five space-physics research satellites called 

Series 5E. These satellites were designed to be launched in tandem with a Transit-4B

series navigational prototype satellite. Four of the 5E series were launched between 
62 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

_________________________________________________________________________________

1963 and 1964. The fifth was converted into the DoD Gravity Experiment (DODGE) 

satellite and launched 1 July 1967 to demonstrate the feasibility of gravity-gradient 

stabilization of satellites at synchronous altitude.

The 5E-series satellites carried instruments for measuring charged-particle 

densities and measuring the earth's magnetic field. An ultraviolet telescope operating in 

the range from 1300 to 1650 angstroms was carried by 5E-2 (which failed to orbit) and 

by 5E-5. This telescope was used to make the first survey of ultraviolet radiation in 

space beyond the wavelengths absorbed by the earth's atmosphere. The 5E-series 

provided a rich source of scientific data on space particles, space radiation, and residual 

radiation from nuclear detonations. At least forty-four scientific papers on space physics 

were published by APL staff based on data from this series of satellites.

Sponsorship of the APL space physics program was transferred from the Navy to 

NASA in the mid-1960s.

Ionospherics

Like NRL, the Applied Physics Laboratory conducted satellite-based 

measurements on the ionosphere and studied the effects of highly-charged solar 

particles on radio communications. Four of the APL ionospheric-research satellites were 

orbited during the 1960s (See Table 5).

Navy Space Cadre—The Early Years

In August 1959, CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke stated in a memorandum to his staff:

“I think it is time for each of the Fleet Commanders and possibly CINCLANT and 

CINCPAC to have a Space Section in their Staffs whose main function would be to 

ensure that the commands are fully cognizant of all Space activities and their 

influence upon war planning, readiness, et cetera. The initial staff sections need 

not be more than one officer but that officer should be very good and should be 

thoroughly briefed before he takes the job. There should be a system set up so 

these officers are kept fully cognizant of the rapidly changing Space Picture.”

Admiral Burke understood the need to integrate space systems capabilities into the 

fleet. (He was not alone at that time.)

Although the Navy's early space personnel were not yet recognized to be an 

organized space cadre, Navy scientists, engineers, and military personnel were already 

making huge contributions to naval and national space programs. The Navy space 

cadre in the 1950s and 1960s included primarily engineers and scientists at the Naval 

Research Laboratory and the Applied Physics Laboratory as well as astronomers at the 

Naval Observatory.

A Navy Astronautics Group was commissioned in 1962 with the mission of 

operating the Navy's satellites, which consisted at that time primarily of the Navy
Navy Participation in Manned Space Flight Programs in the 1960s 63 _________________________________________________________________________________

Navigational Satellite System, known as the Transit navigation system. (The Navy 

Astronautics Group performed this mission for the next three decades. In 1990 it 

transitioned into the Naval Satellite Operations Center, which at that time operated the

Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) constellation and the Geodetic Satellite 

Follow-on (GFO) satellites.)

Navy Participation in Manned Space Flight Programs in the 1960s

After the Soviet Union achieved the significant Cold War coup of putting the first 

satellite into orbit, the U.S. began to evaluate the feasibility of achieving a first in the 

next significant space milestone, putting a man in orbit. These assessments led to the 

establishment of Project Mercury in 1959. It was decided that the program to put a man 

in orbit would be a civilian effort, under the auspices of NASA, but that the first 

astronauts were to be selected from the ranks of military (or former military) test pilots.

Navy Astronauts

Throughout the U.S. manned space program, Navy and Marine Corps personnel 

(active duty and reserves) and former members of the naval service have comprised 

approximately half of the astronaut corps. This commitment by the Navy has come at a 

price. Lieutenant Commander Roger Chaffee died in a raging fire in an Apollo capsule 

during a mission rehearsal on 27 January 1967, and Commander Michael Smith was 

among those killed during the explosion of the Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986.

Project Mercury

Although Project Mercury was largely a Cold War propaganda effort with little 

apparent military value, none of the services could resist the opportunity to place their 

best and brightest in the forefront of the undertaking. Three Navy officers (Alan 

Shepard, Scott Carpenter, and Walter Schirra) and one Marine (John Glenn) were 

among the seven Mercury astronauts. In spite of an aggressive Mercury development 

schedule, the Soviets won the race to put the first man in orbit when Cosmonaut Yuri 

Gagarin attained that honor on 12 April 1961. On 5 May 1961, 23 days later, Alan 

Shepard was launched into a sub-orbital trajectory—the first U.S. manned space flight. 

It was nine additional months (on 2 February 1962) before John Glenn became the first 

U.S. astronaut to reach orbit.

Project Gemini

A few days after Shepard's flight, President John Kennedy startled and inspired the 

nation with a proposal to send a man to the moon within the decade. Kennedy's 

challenge was soon turned into a practical plan (beginning with Project Gemini) to 

develop the necessary skills and technology for a mission to the moon. Project Gemini

involved ten manned launches using a larger two-man capsule. Of the twenty Gemini

astronauts who reached orbit, nine were Navy officers. Gemini was, however, only a 

stepping stone to Project Apollo—the actual effort to put a man on the moon.

Project Apollo

From 11 October 1968 to 15 July 1975, the U.S. launched 15 Apollo missions.

Eleven of these involved moon-related missions; three were dedicated to the Skylab
64 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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space station; and the final mission was the so-called Apollo-Soyuz mission, which 

involved a rendezvous between a U.S. and a Soviet spacecraft in orbit. Twelve Navy 

astronauts participated in moon-related missions, and six Navy officers walked on the 

moon. Four Navy and two Marine Corps officers participated in Skylab missions, 

accumulating an aggregate of 256 man-days in orbit.

(Once the U.S. won the race to the moon, however, it was difficult to justify the 

cost of the full schedule of Apollo missions and the program was terminated, even to the 

point of allowing the Skylab space station to reenter the earth's atmosphere and burn 

up. NASA's follow-on to the Apollo program was the reusable Space Transportation 

System, known popularly as the Space Shuttle. Navy and Marine Corps personnel 

contributed significantly to this effort. The first Shuttle orbital flight was an all-Navy 

mission commanded by Commander John Young and piloted by Commander Robert 

Crippen. Dr. Kathryn Sullivan, the first U.S. woman to complete a "space walk," was a 

Naval Reservist.)

Navy Participation in MOL

The only military man-in-space program undertaken by the U.S. was the Manned 

Orbiting Laboratory (MOL).

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced an intention to explore the 

requirements for military personnel in space in a speech on 10 December 1963. The Air 

Force was given the lead in this effort. A concept for an orbiting "laboratory," based on 

NASA's Gemini capsule, was eventually approved. The purpose of the MOL program 

(put forth for public consumption) was to learn about space, to test equipment, and to 

conduct experiments. Many in the Air Force, however, were interested in the potential of 

the MOL to be used as an orbiting platform from which to conduct reconnaissance and

gather intelligence (using telescopes and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) receivers).

The Navy and Marine Corps selected four astronauts for the MOL program:

Lieutenant John Finley, USN; Lieutenant Richard Truly, USN; Lieutenant Robert 

Crippen, USN; and Captain Robert Overmyer, USMC.

As the U.S. became more deeply mired in Vietnam and demands on the defense 

budget grew, so did the pressure on programs that could not justify their military utility.

MOL funding was steadily "nibbled" away until the program was no longer sustainable 

and schedules began to slip. Three additional factors resulted in the final demise of the 

MOL program: (1) the Air Force was never able to formulate a convincing mission for 

the orbit; (2) growing experience with manned and unmanned satellite programs 

revealed that the cost of a manned space program could grow as much as 30% more 

than an unmanned program; and (3) results from the classified CORONA satellite 

imaging program were excellent, eliminating the requirement for a redundant manned 

imaging platform. President Richard Nixon canceled the MOL program on 10 June 

1969.

Upon termination of the program, one of the three Navy MOL astronauts, 

Lieutenant Finley, returned to the fleet. The remaining two Navy and one Marine Corps 
The Navy Spacecraft Recovery Force (Task Force 140) 65 _________________________________________________________________________________

MOL astronauts (Lieutenant Truly, Lieutenant Crippen, and Captain Overmyer) 

transferred to NASA and made significant contributions to the Shuttle program. (In 

1985, Rear Admiral Truly would become the first commander of the Naval Space 

Command—see page 106.)

The Navy Spacecraft Recovery Force (Task Force 140)

NASA managed the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs; the Air Force 

launched them into space. The Navy's role (in addition to providing many astronauts) 

was to recover the space capsules and astronauts upon their return to earth.

When NASA decided to use water landings as the recovery mode for U.S. space 

capsules, the Navy was asked to support these missions. The Navy responded by 

forming Task Force 140 (TF-140), with headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. Task Force 

140 was not a standing force, but a collection of ships, squadrons, and swimmers who 

were trained and equipped for recovery missions on an as-needed basis.

Although television viewers became familiar with images of Navy ships, Navy and 

Marine Corps helicopters, and Navy swimmers as central features of each recovery 

operation, the public had little insight into the massive effort required of the Navy for 

each operation. Ships, helicopters, and swimmers had to train and then be on station in 

primary and alternate recovery areas, for both launch and landing. Navy EC-121 "Willy 

Victor" radar surveillance aircraft were routinely deployed from Guam and 

Newfoundland to provide surveillance and communications along the Atlantic and 

Pacific legs of the launch and recovery orbits. From 1961 through 1975, TF-140 

supported thirty-one manned space flights. USS Lake Champlain and a Marine Corps 

helicopter, for example, picked up Alan Shepard after his Freedom 7 sub-orbital flight.

USS Hornet greeted the Apollo 11 astronauts when they returned from the first moon 

landing, and USS Iwo Jima provided safe haven to the Apollo 13 astronauts following 

their harrowing mission.

(Task Force 140 was disbanded after completion of the Apollo program, but 

selected Navy units continued to support manned space operations. It was, for 

example, common for Navy E-2C squadrons to be tasked to fly range sanitization 

missions in support of early Shuttle flights.)

Navy Range Instrumentation Ships

A need for shipboard range instrumentation was recognized very early in the U.S. 

space program, since many launches were made toward the ocean for reasons of 

safety.

The first range instrumentation ships carried very simple equipment, mostly 

telemetry gear adapted from shore equipment. In some instances, for the sake of 

expediency, range equipment was not even installed in the ships but was brought 

aboard in vans.
66 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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Figure 15. USNS Range Tracker (AGM-1), 1962

As requirements for precision and the complexity of tracking, telemetry, and control 

(TT&C) instrumentation became more demanding, shipboard range equipment was 

developed specifically for shipboard use. The first range ship with a fully instrumented 

TT&C system was the USNS Range Tracker (AGM-1), which became operational on 

the Pacific Missile Range in late 1961 (Figure 15). Victory- and Mariner-class ships 

were provided eventually for both national ranges. These ships were fitted with large 

stabilized parabolic tracking and telemetry antennas, digital computers for processing 

satellite data, and ultra-precise navigation, timing, and data-recording systems. USNS 

Twin Falls Victory and USNS American Mariner were outfitted with such upgraded 

acquisition, tracking, and inertial navigation systems and operated out of Port 

Canaveral, under the operational control of the Air Force National Range Division, 

Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, during the U.S. space program's Gemini, Lunar Orbiter, 

and Surveyor missions, from 1962 to 1968. (The last active AGM, USNS Wheeling, was 

retired in 1981.)

The Navy established an Instrumentation Ship Project Office (PM 5) at the Bureau 

of Ships to build five instrumentation ships for the Apollo space project. Three ships 

were constructed to support spacecraft earth-orbit insertion and lunar-orbit injection 

(USNS Vanguard, USNS Redstone, and USNS Mercury, built at the General Dynamics 

shipyard at Quincy, Massachusetts), and two ships were acquired for tracking 

spacecraft re-entry (USNS Watertown and USNS Huntsville). These ships were huge--

over 600 feet in length. For operations, they were turned over to Air Force control and 

formed part of the worldwide twenty-five-station Apollo network. Commander (later Vice 

Admiral) Earl Fowler of the Pacific Missile Range's Ship Engineering Division, with 

Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) John Newell, the PM-5 Apollo Ships Program 

liaison officer, supervised the acceptance, integration, turnover, and initial mission 

support of these ships. They operated through Apollo Mission 8 in December 1968.

Of interest was the urgent requirement for shipboard satellite communications for 

these instrumentation ships. After the first Apollo mission, their long haul high frequency 

(HF) radio was replaced by Super High 

Frequency (SHF) satellite 

communications (page 48). (Lessons 

learned during these early days of 

shipboard satellite communications 

were later brought into the 

telecommunications architecture 

planning for the Navy's satellite 

communications; page 78.)
Navy Anti-satellite Programs during the "Strategic Defense" Epoch 67 _________________________________________________________________________________

Navy Anti-satellite Programs during the "Strategic Defense" Epoch

U.S. military development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems had begun almost 

concurrently with development of the first U.S. satellites. In 1957, all three military 

services had made proposals to develop ASATs: the Army, for an ASAT lifted to orbit on 

a modified Nike Zeus antiballistic missile; the Navy, for an ASAT lifted to orbit on a 

Polaris missile; and the Air Force, for its proposed Project SAtellite INTerceptor

(SAINT).

During the latter stages of the Eisenhower administration, each of the services 

proposed to expand their respective ASAT studies into advanced development.

President Eisenhower resisted these proposals, for the following stated reasons:

• U.S. strategic weapon delivery was by aircraft and intermediate range or 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, not by satellite, and there was no perceived 

threat from Soviet strategic weapons carried by satellites.

• Space-based strategic defense against Soviet ballistic missiles was not 

considered technologically feasible at that time.

• The value to the Soviets of satellite reconnaissance (at that time limited to lowresolution photo reconnaissance) did not warrant large expenditures for U.S. 

ASAT systems.

These points of view were further refined into an argument that the Soviets had 

more to gain from ASAT weapons than the U.S. because the U.S. was more dependent 

on satellites for collection of intelligence over the USSR than the USSR was for 

intelligence over the U.S.

To hedge this bet, the argument continued, the U.S. should continue research on 

an ASAT technology base. (This argument prevailed as the basis for U.S. ASAT policy 

over the next 20 years.)

U.S. ASATs

SAINT was a U.S. satellite system proposed by the Air Force for inspecting, and 

potentially shooting down, enemy satellites. It was to be launched into co-orbit with an 

uncooperative target, approach it as closely as needed, "inspect" it, and radio the 

information to a ground station. The SAINT satellite could just as well be equipped with 

a small warhead to destroy the inspected target and thus was a potential anti-satellite 

(ASAT) interceptor. With complexity came increasing costs. The purpose of SAINT

(inspection versus destruction) never became very clear, and the program was 

canceled 3 December 1962 by the Air Force. After the demise of SAINT, Air Force 

proposals to develop interceptors emphasized nuclear warheads, using the Air Force's 

Thor missile.

The 1961 Directive that made Air Force solely responsible for any further 

acquisition of space systems did permit the Navy and Army to continue research on 
68 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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space-related applications. Under these terms, the Navy and Army also continued their 

respective studies and research on ASAT systems. During this period, the Army 

conducted research on ASATs, using the Nike Zeus booster.

Navy Entries in the ASAT Race

Early Spring. This name was applied to several proposals for a submarinelaunched, direct ascent ASAT based on the Polaris missile. None of these proposals 

were pushed to maturity, in part because of a reluctance to use costly and scarce 

Polaris missiles for this purpose.

Skipper. This name was used in association with several concepts to develop 

seaborne ASATs, based on the Scout rocket, which could be launched from surface 

ships and submarines. None of these concepts proceeded beyond the discussion 

phase.

HiHo. This ASAT project, which went beyond the discussion phase, was based on 

the concept of an air-launched missile. The concept was tested, using a Navy F-4

Phantom fighter and Caleb rockets, at the Pacific Missile Test Range in 1962. During 

one test, a zoom-climbing F-4 fired a rocket to an altitude of 1,000 miles, in theory able 

to reach any non-U.S. intelligence satellite in orbit at that time.

Emergence of the Soviet ASAT threat

In October 1968, the Soviets began testing a "co-orbital" ASAT system. This 

system was based on the capability of a space interceptor to be placed in the same 

orbit as the target satellite and then moved within kill range. The Soviets demonstrated 

their system several times in the late 1960s.

(The U.S. did not attempt either to match or to develop a direct counter to this 

Soviet capability because of the enormous diversion and fiscal burden of the Vietnam 

Conflict.)

Navy Contributions to Satellite Technology during the 1960s

Despite the fact that a large part of the Navy’s space-qualified technical base had 

been transferred to NASA when it took over the Navy’s Viking and Vanguard programs

(in 1958) and despite the 1961 DoD decision giving the Air Force responsibility for 

development and acquisition of U.S. military space systems, a number of spacequalified scientific and technical personnel remained at Navy-associated facilities

(particularly the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Applied Physics Laboratory

(APL)). During the 1960s, these individuals continued to conduct relatively small but 

highly effective space science and technology programs. They made contributions that 

significantly furthered U.S. satellite technology and that had a lasting value to U.S. 

space programs. The following are some of the recognized Navy contributions during 

the 1960s.
Navy Contributions to Satellite Technology during the 1960s 69 _________________________________________________________________________________

Satellite Stabilization

Most space-based sensors and communications satellites must be stabilized so 

that one side of the satellite always faces the earth. Under its Navy program, APL 

pioneered the use of the earth's gravitational field for this purpose. The Transit

Research and Attitude Control (TRAAC) satellite was launched in 1961 to gather data; 

on 15 June 1963, Transit 5A-3 became the first artificial satellite to achieve gravity 

gradient stabilization.

In simple terms, the gravity-gradient technique relies on the fact that the 

gravitational attraction between two bodies decreases as the distance between the 

bodies increases. If a mass is placed on the end of a telescoping boom that is extended 

from a satellite once orbit has been achieved, the combination of mass-boom-satellite 

will tend to align itself along an imaginary line extending from the center of the earth to 

the satellite. The desired satellite orientation (boom either toward or away from the 

earth) can be varied by carefully selecting the mass attached to the boom. Although the 

boom and attached mass increase the launch weight of a satellite, the net increase is 

less than that of more complex stabilization systems.

The gravity-gradient technique was to become the most commonly applied U.S. 

method for stabilizing satellites when two-axis stability suffices.

Satellite Station-keeping in Orbit

NRL was the first space research activity to develop a technique for keeping 

satellites on station in orbit. The techniques, which employed ammonia gas thrusters 

capable of developing millionths of a pound of thrust, were first demonstrated on NRL's 

GSSE-3 satellite—launched on 9 March 1965.

In 1965, NRL built more powerful gas thrusters, capable of delivering thousandths 

of a pound of thrust. These thrusters were first used to spin-stabilize the SolRAD series 

of satellites, beginning with SolRAD-8—launched on 19 November 1965.

Multiple-launch Technology

All of the world's first artificial satellites were launched separately on individual 

boosters. The Naval Research Laboratory pioneered the concept of launching multiple 

satellites on a single booster and developed the technology to make this possible. NRL 

was instrumental in conducting: the world's first dual-satellite launch, 1960; the first 

triple launch, 1961; the first quadruple launch, 1962; the first five-satellite launch, 1963; 

the first six-satellite launch, 1965; the first seven-satellite launch, 1967; and the first 

nine-satellite launch, 1969.

Timation

In the early 1960s, NRL began developing ultra-precise clocks carried by satellites.

The initial application was for determining satellite positions to calibrate the Navy's 

Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR). In April 1964, Mr. Roger L. Easton, an NRL 

engineer, proposed that these ultra-precise clocks would also make it possible for ships 

and aircraft to determine their navigational positions—by measuring the time-difference 
70 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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of the arrival of signals from two or more satellites, which would be quicker and more

accurate than measuring the Doppler shifts from the satellites as done in the Transit

navigation system. Easton's concept was transformed into an experiment using a 

quartz-crystal clock in the Timation-1 satellite launched on 31 May 1967, under the

Transit program. The quartz-crystal clock worked in principle, but it proved difficult to 

control in the cold of space. In addition, the quartz was affected by radiation 

encountered in space. NRL then adopted the rubidium oscillator (the so-called "atomic

clock") as a technique for overcoming the limitations of quartz oscillators. NRL research 

with this satellite technology demonstrated that it would be feasible to obtain threedimensional position-fixing accuracies measured in tens-of-feet or better.

Responsibility for this work transferred from NRL to the Naval Air Systems 

Command in 1970 and was handed over to the Naval Material Command (PM-16) in 

1971. (NRL’s Timation development provided the timing technology that was selected 

for the joint Global Positioning System (GPS) when that program began in 1973; see 

page 89.)

Getting the DoD Space Systems Acquisition Directive Revised, 1970

In 1967, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), directed that a 

review of Navy space programs be conducted. This review produced two specific 

recommendations: (a) that a stronger Navy commitment to exploring the potential 

tactical applications of satellites was imperative; and (b) that the Navy needed to be 

bolder in translating fleet requirements into a space policy. Admiral Moorer responded 

to these recommendations, in part, by creating a new staff position, the Director of Navy 

Space Programs (OP-76). This new position was placed under OP-07, the Director of 

Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) in recognition of the 1961 

DoD Acquisition Directive that still limited Navy space activities to research.

To fill this new position, the CNO selected Rear Admiral Bill Moran. The two 

officers had been stationed at China Lake together when the first Soviet Sputnik was 

launched and had discussed the potential naval applications of satellites. Rear Admiral 

Moran subsequently "pestered" Admiral Moorer on several occasions as to what the 

Navy was doing about getting a Navy space program started. Now as CNO, Admiral 

Moorer directed his former shipmate to "get the Navy started again on a space 

program."

A 1969 Presidential Space Task Group reviewed the NASA and DoD space 

programs, of which the Navy was a participant, and recommended that the DoD 

investment in satellite systems be at least doubled. With the Vietnam conflict now 

consuming a growing share of the defense budget, the recommendation was rejected.

However, the Navy proceeded on its own to the extent that policy would permit, by 

creating the Navy Space Project Activity as a formal interface between the Navy and the 

National Reconnaissance Office.
Getting the DoD Space Systems Acquisition Directive Revised, 1970 71 _________________________________________________________________________________

In 1970, Rear Admiral Fritz Harlfinger, Director of Navy Command and Support 

Programs (OP-094), joined with his peers in the Army and Marine Corps in a concerted 

effort to overturn the stifling 1961 DoD Acquisition Directive. Their efforts struck a 

responsive chord with Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.

In 1970, Secretary Packard cancelled the 1961 Directive and issued a new DoD 

Directive—5160.32. Under this new policy, all services were henceforth permitted to 

develop space systems, with oversight to be provided by the DoD Deputy Director of 

Research and Engineering (DDR&E).

The Navy was quick to take advantage of the new DoD space acquisition policy.

Only six weeks after Secretary Packard signed the new Directive, Rear Admiral 

Harlfinger (OP-094) obtained DoD authorization to develop a Fleet Satellite 

Communications System to provide the fleet with global tactical-communications 

(page 78). A new era of Navy space research and development had begun.
72 Chapter 2 – Satellites for Strategic Defense (1961-1970)

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73

CHAPTER 3 – NAVY TACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SPACE

EMERGE IN THE 1970S

While the Navy's overt space efforts during the 1960s had focused on scientific

programs (like those of the other military services), the Navy and the other services 

had covertly pursued classified programs in support of strategic defense. The DoD 

space systems acquisition directive of 1961 had constrained new Navy space 

initiatives—the Air Force had been made responsible for developing/acquiring all 

military space systems, thus limiting the Navy's (and the Army's) space efforts to 

research only. However, Secretary Packard's 1970 DoD directive changed all that—

encouraging the Navy and Army to once again develop space systems, under the 

oversight of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DDR&E).

This DoD policy change came just in time because the world situation had rapidly 

changed. Now it was the tactical forces of the Navy and the other services (the 

"General Purpose" forces in Congressional budget documents) that most urgently 

needed support from space-based systems. However, the Air Force space leadership 

continued to emphasize national-intelligence and strategic-defense priorities, while 

doing very little to address the requirements of the Navy and other tactical forces—not 

as a deliberate policy, but simply as a continuation of momentum in what they had 

done best in the 1960s. Navy innovators, given new opportunity and faced with a nowimperative set of Navy tactical needs, began during the 1970s to push the applications 

of space-based support for tactical users.

Navy’s Need to Reduce Dependence on Overseas Bases

After World War II and through the 1960s, the Navy had relied on the mediumand high-frequency (MF/HF) portion of the radio frequency spectrum for long-haul 

communications. The Navy had established an extensive worldwide network of shorebased MF/HF communications stations to support the deployed fleets in all the 

geographic theaters where the Navy operated. However, in the late 1960s, world 

politics and continuing cuts in Navy budgets dictated that many of these 

communications stations be closed. Therefore, in the 1970s, the Navy faced the 

challenge of rebuilding a long-haul communications-support capability to support fleet 

operations in all of these theaters.

In similar fashion, several of the overseas shore-based LORAN, LORAN-C, and 

Omega navigation stations that had supported the navigation requirements of 

deployed U.S. Navy ships and air wings were forced to close, during the time when the 

U.S. Navy was deploying more "general-purpose" forces worldwide. Finally, whereas 

the Navy in the 1960s had continued to provide broad-area surveillance through the 

use of shore-based maritime patrol (P-3A) and electronic warfare (EP-3C) aircraft 

based at locations around the world, the political and fiscal considerations of the time

had forced the closing of several of these bases. Consequently, at the beginning of the 

1970s, the Navy had no effective alternative to the use of satellites for replacing the 
74 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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communications, navigation, and ocean-surveillance support for its tactical forces 

worldwide.

Soviet Tactical Exploitation of Space Alerts U.S. Navy

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Navy (which until then had been a coastaldefense and ground-forces support service) was given the mission of protecting the 

Soviet Union against the U.S. and NATO navies. Since it had not been politically, 

economically, or technically feasible for the Soviets during the postwar period to build 

a large-ship sea-borne strike force such as that of the U.S. and its NATO allies, the 

Soviets adopted the Japanese Kamikaze model—manned suicide aircraft that had 

proved so successful in the final phases of W.W. II against U.S. and Allied Navy ships.

Rather than manned suicide aircraft, however, the Soviets developed and deployed 

remotely directed, unmanned anti-ship cruise missiles capable of automatically 

seeking and homing on U.S. aircraft carriers and other ships.

To provide tracking and targeting information for these long-range anti-ship

missiles, the Soviets developed and fielded an integrated information system (under 

the operational control of the Soviet Navy) that included satellites as well as longrange aircraft, surface units, and submarines for surveillance and targeting support.

The entire surveillance and reconnaissance complex consisting of satellites, aircraft, 

and command-and-control nodes was designed from the top down (together with the 

missile ships, submarines, and long-range bombers and some of the anti-ship missiles 

themselves) to be operated as a coordinated and synchronized system.

While in the 1960s the Soviets had deployed these anti-ship missile naval forces 

primarily as an element of their overall strategic-defense posture (with the mission of 

opposing any U.S. carrier-based forces that might threaten to strike the Soviet Union),

the Cuban missile crisis brought about a major shift in policy. Reacting to the chagrin 

of not being able to deploy their naval forces overseas as an influencing factor in the 

face-down during that crisis, the Soviets made the decision to begin building up and 

adapting their anti-ship forces for a worldwide naval presence to challenge the U.S. 

Navy in influencing future world events.

The Soviets launched large numbers of new ships and submarines with 

advanced types of anti-ship cruise missiles, and by the 1970s their enormous 

investment in these "blue-water" forces was evident in increasing Soviet deployments 

(in strength) in the Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and southwestern 

Pacific. The advantages of having well-integrated Soviet surveillance satellites to 

support these deployed anti-ship missile forces became clear. Whereas the U.S. Navy 

did retain overall advantage over the Soviet Navy through carrier-based naval air 

power, the U.S. was disadvantaged in that it could not support its independently 

operating surface combatants and submarines as well as the Soviets supported their 

deployed long-range anti-ship missiles with their satellite-based targeting. This 

situation was exacerbated when funding for all U.S. military space programs 

plummeted by 20% in 1970.
Strengthening the Navy's Space Organization in the 1970s 75 ________________________________________________________________________________

In 1972, on the release of the Navy from its former heavy commitments to the 

conflict in Vietnam, resources began to become available again. It now became 

possible to do the planning to improve its "blue water" operations against the Soviet 

naval threat—including serious considerations of U.S. satellites for tactical support.

Strengthening the Navy's Space Organization in the 1970s

Having had only limited involvement in space during the 1960s, the Navy now 

needed to strengthen its organization to sponsor, develop, and manage satellite 

systems.

Management of Navy Space Acquisition Programs

The Navy Space Project Office (PM 16) was established directly under the Chief 

of Naval Material to consolidate the Navy's space acquisition interests. One of the 

Office's first projects was Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM); another was 

the Navy's ocean surveillance system (see page 99). In 1974, the functions of the 

Navy Space Project Office were transferred to the newly established Navy Space 

Projects Office (PME 106) within the Naval Electronic Systems Command 

(NAVELEX).

Navy Space Program Sponsorship

In 1971, the Navy consolidated its responsibilities for satellite systems 

requirements by establishing the Coordinator of Satellite Programs (OP 094W). Rear 

Admiral Lloyd Moffitt was assigned as the first coordinator. He was an excellent choice 

for this assignment, based on his previous involvement in developing the so-called 

"Moffitt matrix" which had been used in getting ocean surveillance requirements 

recognized as a national intelligence objective by the U.S. Intelligence Board.

In 1974, the CNO separated the sponsorship of Navy space systems along 

functional lines, putting responsibility for satellite communications under OP-094, 

Director of Command and Control, and space-based surveillance under OP-095.

The OPTEVFOR Detachment at Sunnyvale

In the early 1970s, under Fleet Objective-265, the Navy began a program of 

exercises and demonstrations to explore the feasibility of delivering selected 

intelligence information from national satellite and other systems to the fleet, to 

observe the ability of Navy operators to handle it, and to assess the usefulness of such 

information to tactical commanders (see page 94).

The CNO assigned responsibility for assessing this effort to the Commander of 

the Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR), at Norfolk, 

Virginia. In 1972, the commander, Rear Admiral Red Carmody, established a 

detachment (the OPTEVFOR DET) at Sunnyvale, California, close to the contractor 

primarily involved in the early demonstrations (Lockheed Corporation) and where the 

Detachment would be in the best position to coordinate fleet demonstrations in the 

Pacific. Personnel of the Detachment had appropriate clearances to work with the 
76 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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national sensor systems and constituted a base of expertise for assessing interfaces 

between fleet systems and the national satellite-surveillance and other systems.

The first of these exercises/demonstrations was Outlaw Hawk (see page 92).

OPTEVFOR DET continued to participate in and evaluate the series of exercises 

referred to as Outlaw Shark (see page 96). Through the 1970s and much of the 1980s, 

the OPTEVFOR DET continued to assess the operational utility and effectiveness of 

interfaces between national satellite systems and Navy equipment, including the 

Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) and combat systems such as the Tomahawk

Weapon Control System (TWCS), the Submarine Combat & Control System (CCS), 

the Tactical Flag Command & Control Center (TFCC), and the Ocean Surveillance 

Information System (OSIS) Baseline Upgrade (OBU) (see page 123).

(OPTEVFOR DET Sunnyvale was disestablished in 1989, after the latter systems 

had transitioned into operational use.)

Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Office Established

The U.S. Army began in 1973 to explore the potential for using national satellite 

reconnaissance systems in support of its tactical forces in the field. The Army's efforts 

were focused on developing concepts and equipment that could permit corps-level 

elements to receive and exploit national systems data. This Army effort excited the 

attention of Congress, which in 1977 invited the Navy and Air Force to establish similar 

programs.

Within the Navy, this "invitation" from Congress was initially routed to the naval 

intelligence community for action. Considering that naval intelligence already had 

access to all of the information it needed from the national satellite reconnaissance 

systems and was already engaged in exploiting the applicable part of the data to 

support the fleet (and noting further that no provision had been made for additional 

billets to man any new office), the Director of Naval Intelligence turned down 

Congress's suggestion. Shortly after that, Congress offered funding for ten additional 

Navy billets for the TENCAP effort. This changed the DNI's perspective, but it was too 

late. The operational side of the Office of the CNO had in the interim recognized and 

seized the opportunity, and the new billets authorized by Congress were used to 

establish the TENCAP Office as a branch (OP 0943E) within the Office of the Director 

of Navy Command and Control (OP 094).

(Over the years, this choice proved to be a good one. Although the Navy 

TENCAP Office worked with and depended on the intelligence community, the spacesystem capabilities that were to be exploited were primarily for fleet applications that 

were in the warfighters' "white world," and their contacts and sponsors were on the 

operational side of OPNAV.)

While the Army made its TENCAP organization responsible for acquiring

TENCAP systems and for full life-cycle support of equipment they developed, the 

Navy's TENCAP activities were limited to research, development, and training. During 

the initial years of the TENCAP effort (1977-1981), the focus of the Navy TENCAP
Satellite Communications for the Fleet 77 ________________________________________________________________________________

program was primarily on educating fleet personnel on capabilities and limitations of 

national systems. Initial Navy TENCAP efforts involved injecting information on 

satellite reconnaissance systems into the war games of the Naval War College, 

providing materials to the Fleet Training Centers, and working with the other services 

to develop a manual, "Tactical Exploitation of National Systems."

Of the ten billets initially authorized for this office, only eight were filled, as the 

Navy was being manned at 80% of authorized strength at the time. Congress 

responded by cutting the billet authorization to eight, of which the Navy then filled only 

six. The TENCAP Office was a lean organization from the beginning. During its initial 

years, the program's budget (other than for billets) was taken out-of-hide and never 

exceeded $1 million in any fiscal year.

(During the next two decades, Navy TENCAP was to become a significant factor 

in improving the usefulness of space-based surveillance and reconnaissance to the 

fleet; see Chapters 4 and 5.)

Satellite Communications for the Fleet

By 1973, the management of Navy satellite communications acquisition was 

consolidated in the Navy Space Projects Office under the Naval Electronic Systems 

Command.

Three Navy laboratories provided technical support. By informal agreement 

among them, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, D.C., provided the 

expertise on the modulation techniques for the satellite links. The Naval Electronics 

Laboratory Center (NELC, subsequently named the Naval Ocean Systems Center

(NOSC, and later, NRAD)) at San Diego, California, developed the Navy terminals for 

shipboard use. The Underwater Sound Laboratory (USL) in New London, Connecticut, 

provided antenna-design expertise for submarines.

The Radio Frequency Band Tradeoffs

In the Navy, there were advocates for Ultra High Frequency (UHF), Super High 

Frequency (SHF), and Extremely High Frequency (EHF), respectively, as the 

frequency band that should be used for the fleet's tactical communications satellites.

UHF was the only radio communications band that could be used by naval 

aircraft and smaller ships because the antennas needed for that band were small and 

nearly omni-directional, allowing these platforms to maintain satellite communications 

even while maneuvering. However, the total bandwidth in the military UHF band (225 

to 400 MHz) was limited while the demand for channels was high; therefore, the 

bandwidth available per channel was relatively narrow (adequate for voice and 

tactical-data exchange, for example, but not for fast transmissions of imagery or large 

amounts of data). Moreover, the limitation on bandwidth in the UHF spectrum 

precluded incorporation of complex anti-jamming modulation techniques.
78 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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At the other end of the spectrum, selection of the EHF band for communications 

satellites offered plenty of bandwidth, not only for very high-capacity communications 

(including fast transmission of imagery) but also excellent anti-jam resistance. EHF 

antennas could also be made quite small. The downside was that EHF satellites would 

generate relatively narrow beams, which meant that users would have to point their 

antennas at the EHF communications satellites and keep them pointed there as long 

as they needed to communicate. Similarly, the satellites had to be continuously 

pointed in the vicinity of the users, their footprint at EHF being limited—all factors 

which together dictated that EHF satellite communications at that time be limited 

essentially to use in the larger Navy ships.

Use of the SHF band would allow tradeoffs in the advantages and the limitations 

between the UHF and EHF bands, but SHF communications would have the 

disadvantage of requiring relatively large antennas.

The Military Satellite Office (MSO) of the Defense Communications Agency 

offered an answer when it recommended that military satellite communications 

systems be pursued in all three frequency regimes, as follows:

• Initiate an EHF satellite communications system for use by strategic and other 

high-command applications (which led to the joint Milstar program).

• Continue the DSCS satellite communications system (SHF) for "logistic" 

communications.

• Initiate a satellite communications system (UHF) for tactical use by generalpurpose forces.

Development of UHF Satellite Communications

In accordance with this MSO recommendation, the Navy submitted its plan to 

develop UHF tactical communications satellites in 1971. Among all the services, the 

Navy had been the only one to follow up on the UHF tactical communications 

demonstrated during the joint experiments with LES-5/6 and TacSat-1 in the 1960s.

On 27 September 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the 

development of the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system. The Navy, 

which had provided the funding and most of the requirements for the UHF system, was 

designated overall program manager, but the Air Force was assigned to develop the 

satellites, provide for their launch and on-orbit control, and to develop airborne 

terminals. The Army was made responsible for the ground terminals and Navy for the 

shipboard terminals.

The concept proposed by the Navy, which was eventually implemented, was that 

the FLTSATCOM system would provide communications support to the fleet and other 

U.S. tactical users worldwide (except for the near-polar regions), by means of four 

geosynchronous satellites arranged around the earth's equator. A special 

transmitter/receiver package riding on the FLTSATCOM satellites, called AFSATCOM, 
Satellite Communications for the Fleet 79 ________________________________________________________________________________

would provide communications for Air Force strategic bombers. The solar-powered 

three-axis-stabilized FLTSATCOM satellites would each weigh a little over a ton and 

be launched by Atlas-Centaur.

Once the FLTSATCOM concept-definition phase got started, many more 

potential users began to submit requirements—not only the military services, but also 

the State Department and White House. The demand for channel capacity grew to the 

point that the growth in communications payload weight threatened to exceed the 

booster lift capability. Requirements had to be prioritized and resolved.

The Fleet Satellite Communications Concept is Defined

The FLTSATCOM system defined by the Navy and approved by the DoD (and 

eventually acquired) consisted of:

• One channel for the Fleet Satellite Broadcast, a one-way broadcast from Navy 

communications ashore to commanders and units afloat (SHF uplink and UHF 

downlink)

• Nine UHF channels for Navy use, including:

- Two channels for secure voice

- One channel for the Naval Modular Automated Communications 

Subsystem (NAVMACS) and the Common User Digital Information 

Exchange Subsystem (CUDIXS) for ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship 

transmission of teletype and other addressed messages (essentially to 

replace the MF/HF ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship message 

communications)

- One channel for the Tactical Intelligence (TACINTEL) broadcast, a oneway broadcast of special intelligence (SI) data from Ocean Surveillance 

Information System (OSIS) nodes ashore to commanders and units at 

sea

- One channel for the Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange 

Subsystem (OTCIXS), a two-way automated data net interconnecting 

battle groups for purposes of tactical battle coordination and over-thehorizon targeting

- One channel for the Submarine Satellite Information Exchange 

Subsystem (SSIXS), an automated data net linking submarines at sea 

with support facilities ashore

- One channel for a Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS)

- Two spare channels

• Twelve channels for Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM)

• One channel reserved for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

• Some channels for classified users
80 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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A Navy communications station ashore transmitted the Fleet Satellite Broadcast 

from each theater and, where necessary, interconnected FLTSATCOM with the 

Defense Satellite Communications System.

FLTSATCOM system operations was controlled by the Naval 

Telecommunications Command Operations Center (NTCOC) at Washington, DC, 

supported by: Naval Communications Area Master Stations (NAVCAMS) at Norfolk, 

Virginia (Atlantic theater and Second Fleet), Finegayan, Guam (Western Pacific and 

Seventh Fleet); and Wahiawa, Hawaii (Eastern Pacific and Third Fleet); and by the Air 

Force Satellite Control Facility.

Development of Navy UHF Terminals for FLTSATCOM

The Navy's terminals for FLTSATCOM were developed by Naval Electronic

Systems Command with technical input from the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center 

(NELC, which later became NOSC and then NRAD) at San Diego, California, and from 

the Naval Research Laboratory. The types of shipboard terminals developed and 

procured by the Navy were:

• AN/WSC-3, produced by E-Systems, for installation in all Navy submarines, 

all surface combatants, and some naval aircraft (e.g., EP-3s). (The AN/WSG3 demonstrated a remarkable record for reliability, attaining a 15,000-hour 

mean-time between failures, and cost only about $25,000 per installation.)

• AN/WSC-5, produced by Rockwell International (using assets from the 

AN/WSC-1 development), for installation ashore.

• AN/SSR-1, produced by Motorola, for shipboard reception of the Fleet 

Satellite Broadcast (for ships not equipped with the AN/WSC-3).

• ON-143, FLTSATCOM data modem for exchange of tactical data.

Acquisition of the FLTSATCOM Satellites

The Air Force, as Executive Agent for the Fleet Satellite Communications 

(FLTSATCOM) and Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) satellites, 

assigned a program manager at Space and Missiles Systems Organization, Los 

Angeles. The program office had a Navy deputy program manager and ten military 

and civilian staff positions. The FLTSATCOM satellite specifications were drafted by 

the Naval Research Laboratory. Proposals were solicited, and the FLTSATCOM

contract was awarded to TRW in 1972.

The Navy, now committed to satellite communications for its operating forces, 

proceeded on a program to convert all its surface and air units and shore support 

facilities to satellite communications, both long-haul and tactical. Once committed to 

this program, there was no turning back the schedule, because, unlike the other 

services, Navy no longer had an available communications option for its deployed 

surface and air units (page 116). The Air Force, following traditional, proven aerospace 
Satellite Communications for the Fleet 81 ________________________________________________________________________________

systems-acquisition practices, undertook a careful but typically complex program to 

acquire the necessary satellites.

As a result of this difference in perspective, the FLTSATCOM acquisition program 

faced inherently critical problems. A major problem first arose when difficulties were 

encountered in isolating the satellite's several antennas from each other to avoid interchannel interference. The Air Force opined that the Navy was pursuing its own agenda 

rather than a joint effort and that NRL, in particular, had presented unworkable 

specifications. When the technical difficulties appeared with FLTSATCOM, the Air 

Force called on the Aerospace Corporation to "fix the problem," and one of 

Aerospace's first steps was to question the specifications that had been provided by 

NRL.

For its part, the Navy became impatient with Air Force management practices. As 

costs climbed, Congress threatened to cancel the program. At this point, the Air Force 

capped the cost of TRW's cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, forcing the contractor to invest 

its in-house funds to pursue solutions to problems that had not been addressed in the 

specifications.

The antenna-isolation problems were eventually solved by modifying the uplink 

and downlink antennas. A joint Air Force, Aerospace, NRL, and TRW team developed 

solutions for the inter-channel interference problem.

Subsequently, an unfortunate fire at TRW's facility resulted in a delay in 

production. A more serious potential delay developed when discussions arose on

phasing out the Atlas-Centaur booster, which was needed to put FLTSATs in a 

geosynchronous orbit. Navy leaders became quite anxious at this point because heavy 

investments had been made in preparation for fleet introduction of FLTSATCOM—not 

only in funding but in the potential impacts on fleet operating schedules due to the 

programmed closing of overseas MF/HF communications stations in anticipation of 

FLTSATCOM.

As a result, Navy leaders approached Congress with a proposal to lease some 

commercial UHF satellite channels for fleet use until the FLTSATs were operationally 

ready. Congress approved this proposal, and the Navy leased its Gapfiller channels 

(see page 83).

Meanwhile, contention between the Navy FLTSATCOM Program Office and the 

Air Force Program Office became so intense that the Air Force Program Manager had 

to be relieved. The Air Force then made a happy choice in selecting Colonel Forest 

McCartney, USAF, as the new head of its FLTSAT Program Office. Colonel 

McCartney brought strong credentials in satellite communications to the job and 

quickly established cordial working relationships with Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler

(OP-094) and Rear Admiral Earl Fowler at the Navy's Electronics Systems Command, 

both of whom had remained strong FLTSAT proponents. Colonel McCartney also 
82 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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began a mutually educational dialog with Commander Scott Monroe, Navy Liaison 

Officer to his Program Office, on the Navy's tactical-communications needs.

Improvements in Navy-Air Force program relationships soon became apparent.

In fact, within his own Air Force chain of command, Colonel McCartney stood up for 

the Navy's concerns so vigorously at times that his growing cadre of Navy supporters 

feared for his career. There was widespread gratitude and relief in Navy circles when 

he was selected for Brigadier General.

The understanding and respect fostered by McCartney paid big dividends. When 

an eleventh-hour routine reliability check uncovered possible welding flaws in the 

satellite wiring, Navy and Air Force quality assurance experts began to question the 

desirability of proceeding to launch of the first satellite. After detailed discussions with 

Admirals Nagler and Fowler, Brigadier General McCartney made the decision to 

proceed, winning strong endorsement from the Navy.

The first FLTSAT was launched in February 1978, followed by FLTSAT-2 in May 

1979. The full operational constellation of four FLTSATs was in place by October 

1980.

The Fleet Satellite Broadcast 

When the decision had been made to use UHF for the fleet's satellite 

communications, strong attention was given to reducing the vulnerability of the fleet 

satellite broadcast to enemy jamming. Navy planners recognized that if an enemy 

attempted to jam a UHF satellite downlink, the hostile jammer would need to close 

within line-of-sight of the targeted ship's receiver, where Navy forces could use 

weapons to neutralize any attempt to close within a distance where such downlink 

jamming would be effective. On the other hand, jamming against a satellite-relay 

uplink could be effective from any location within the satellite's footprint—an area of 

approximately one quarter of the earth's surface in the case of each of the 

geosynchronous satellites. With this vulnerability in mind, NRL focused on methods to 

protect the uplink of the proposed Communications Satellites Broadcast.

For this purpose, NRL developed the Fleet Broadcast Processor (FBP), for which 

it was determined that the uplink would use the SHF portion of the radio-frequency 

spectrum. In the SHF band, they were able to take advantage of wideband, spreadspectrum modulation and the increased radiated power available from highly 

directional shore-based antennas to provide a large margin of resistance to jamming.

Tests of the FBP proved the validity of the concept, and NRL was directed to procure 

FBPs for the FLTSATCOM Program.

Later, the Air Force, in its capacity as Program Manager for the FLTSATs, and 

mindful of its former role in acquiring satellites for strategic defense in the 1960s, 

levied a requirement on NRL that the FBP for the Navy's tactical broadcast must be 

hardened against nuclear attack. The radiation hardening was accomplished, although 

at great additional expense for the satellite segment of the FLTSATCOM system.
Satellite Communications for the Fleet 83 ________________________________________________________________________________

The FBP worked well in the Fleet Satellite Broadcast as implemented in the 

FLTSATs, and this concept for the Fleet Satellite Broadcast was retained in 

subsequent U.S. military communications satellites (the Leased Satellites (LEASATs), 

the UHF Follow-Ons, and in certain Navy DSCS applications).

The Gapfiller Satellites

In the mid 1970s, as a result of uncertainties and delays in the acquisition of the 

FLTSATCOM satellites, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications and Intelligence (C3

I), Eberhart Rechtin, approved a Navy request to 

lease UHF satellite communications capability directly through commercial sources.

These Gapfiller satellites were to be used on an interim basis until the FLTSATCOM

satellites would become available. Congress approved the authorization.

The Navy contracted with Comsat General to use the UHF-relay channels on 

three of its Marisat satellites, which had been built for commercial maritime use. (The 

Navy leased the military-UHF (225 to 400 MHz) channels, while Marisat's commercial 

users operated on the 1.5-1.9 GHz channels.) In 1976, three UHF Gapfiller satellites 

were placed on operational service for Navy use. Special UHF terminals were 

provided for Navy use and were installed at first in a handful of Navy combatant ships 

for high-priority use with the Gapfillers.

The Gapfiller satellites succeeded in providing the fleet with satellite 

communications two years before the Air Force FLTSATs were ready and met the 

Navy's communications needs adequately (except for the Fleet Satellite Broadcast) for 

the next four years. (The Gapfiller satellites continued to provide point-to-point UHF 

tactical communications service to the fleet for the next several years (inter-operational 

with the FLTSATCOM system), even after the first FLTSATCOM satellites became 

operational.)

Navy's SHF Terminals for DSCS

Navy development of terminals for DSCS, begun in the 1960s, continued through 

the 1970s. DSCS terminals were intended for installation only in major flagships 

whose commanders had to have access to high-level communications and 

intelligence, and whose flagship could accommodate the large, directional antennas 

required by the DSCS SHF links.

After the several aborted starts with SHF shipboard terminals for DSCS during 

the 1960s (see page 48), the Navy tried again, with a contract awarded to ITT 

Corporation to develop the AN/WSC-2 SHF communications system. This undertaking 

turned out to be too costly, and the installation too large for even the largest 

combatants. Based on lessons learned from the AN/WSC-2 development, NAVELEX

then obtained authority from OPNAV for a development to reduce the size and cost of 

shipboard SHF terminals. NRL’s Satellite Research Branch developed the AN/WSC-6, 

which used dual antennas to obtain hemispheric coverage around the ship's 

superstructure—a pair of eight-foot diameter antennas for large combatants and a pair 

of four-foot diameter antennas for smaller combatants. Installations were limited to 

about 30 major flagships, including aircraft carriers. These terminals provided the 
84 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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commanders of Battle Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups, and numbered fleets with 

high-level access to the DSCS net.

An anti-jam modulator-demodulator (modem) was developed concurrently with 

these antennas to provide an anti-jam command link for Navy, Air Force, and Army 

commands. The OM-55 modem was developed for shipboard use, to be interoperable 

with the AN/USC-28 modem developed by the Army and Air Force. The Navy's OM-55

incorporated robust forward-error correction encoding to allow for signal losses during 

switching between the dual antennas and a time-division mode for spectrum sharing 

with threat warning receivers on the ships.

SURTASS. During the 1970s, an application evolved in which the Navy's 

eighteen Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships (essentially 

converted fishing boats operating mobile towed arrays as part of the Navy's 

underwater sound system) were equipped with a wideband communications link to 

pass high-fidelity acoustic data ashore for near-real-time processing. The AN/WSC-7

(a modified AN/WSC-6) was built by NRL to enable the SURTASS ships to utilize the 

DSCS satellite communications for this application.

EHF and the Beginning of Milstar

The Navy had arranged with MIT Lincoln Laboratory in the 1960s to explore the 

feasibility of providing a jamming-resistant communications capability, using the 

Extremely High Frequency (EHF) portion of the radio spectrum. A proposal came forth 

for an EHF satellite communications capability using a combination of measures to 

reduce vulnerability to jamming and direction-finding. These measures included: (1) 

wideband spread-spectrum modulation, to provide a substantial link-margin advantage 

over any practicable jammer; (2) keeping multiple spacecraft within sight, so users 

could select a satellite not being jammed; and (3) highly directional antennas, both at 

the surface and on the satellite, to provide an additional margin of protection against 

jammers outside the communications beam. The shorter wavelengths of EHF would 

permit directional antennas significantly smaller than those needed at SHF (for DSCS). 

The designers chose to employ a previously little used part of the EHF 

communications band, around 38 GHz.

When this EHF communications proposal was briefed, senior Navy planners liked 

the idea. EHF satellite communications not only provided the Navy's flagships with an 

alternative in the event of jamming, but it also had the potential to provide U.S. 

submarines at periscope depth with a covert means of transmitting their 

communications (since the wideband spread-spectrum links would not be detectable 

by conventional receivers). EHF communications had additional advantages, such as 

providing an "order wire" to reestablishing other communications nets, including 

FLTSATCOM, if they were disrupted. Finally, wide bandwidths available at EHF 

assured that high-level commanders would have all the communications capacity they 

needed.
Satellite Communications for the Fleet 85 ________________________________________________________________________________

The proposed EHF satellite communications system was also attractive to the 

national intelligence community, which was looking for improvements over DSCS for 

moving critical information to users.

The EHF satellite communications capability, as proposed by the Navy, did not 

require development of a new satellite, but simply called for development of an EHF 

package (a concept which had already been demonstrated with the LES-series 

satellites) to be carried piggy-back on existing FLTSATCOM satellites.

The Chief of Naval Operations approved the proposal for an EHF satellite 

communications package and sent it on to the Secretary of Defense with a request for 

acquisition. With this request, the Navy earmarked $3 billion from its funds for the 

acquisition. At this point, the Air Force intercepted the proposal and strongly objected 

to it. The Air Force proposed, instead, to pay for EHF satellite-communications 

acquisition entirely out of Air Force funds, as long as the Air Force was designated 

Executive Agent for the project. This offer—relinquishing Navy lead for Air Force 

funding—was accepted (although both services were to regret it later).

In 1974, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the military services, 

authorized the EHF satellite communications program (eventually named Milstar

(Military Strategic, Tactical & Relay)) to proceed under a joint program office headed 

by the Air Force. An acquisition review board was established, under OSD (C3

I), with 

representation from all of the services and the Defense Communications Agency 

(instead of the Air Force Systems Command, which usually provided acquisition 

review for Air Force programs). The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) of the 

Air Force Space Division (formerly SAMSO) was assigned to develop and procure the 

Milstar satellites. Each service was to develop its own EHF terminals for Milstar, as 

had been the case with the DSCS and the UHF FLTSATCOM acquisitions.

"Common-user" Requirements Modify the Milstar Satellites

Under Air Force direction, significant changes emerged in the Navy's EHF antijam communications concept.

First, the Air Force decided to develop an entirely new satellite system, rather 

than simply hosting EHF packages on existing satellites that the Navy had proposed.

Second, under the joint program concept, the Air Force applied a "common user" 

approach to solicit requirements from all of the military services and national agencies.

Requirements emerged for strategic military applications, tactical military applications, 

and intelligence-systems support. This composite of "common user" requirements 

provided the acronym for the system's name: the Military Strategic, Tactical and Relay 

(Milstar) system.

Third, the Milstar downlink frequency was changed to 20 GHz (to be compatible 

with the 20-GHz downlink of the DSCS-III satellites), and the uplink was changed to 44 

GHz rather than 38 GHz as proposed by Lincoln Laboratories and the Navy.
86 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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Further changes were made in the specifications to accommodate all of the 

diverse "common-user" requirements. For example, to address some of these needs,

a number of UHF channels were added—but not enough to meet all of the services' 

requirements. To satisfy strategic survivability requirements, satellite-to-satellite user 

links were specified.

The Milstar development made some progress but proceeded very slowly over 

many years, experiencing many delays and escalating costs. Many of the problems 

resulted from changes in priorities and requirements among the large number of joint 

users. At one time or another, Milstar was touted as a replacement for the (strategic) 

DSCS system, as a replacement for tactical FLTSATCOM system, or as a 

replacement for intelligence-support relay communications.

(Later, in 1982, after more delays with the Milstar program were experienced, the 

issue of executive agency resurfaced; see page 117).

Development of the Navy EHF Terminals 

At EHF frequencies, it is possible to build highly directional antennas with very 

small physical dimensions. Part of the Navy's EHF satellite communications concept 

was to equip fast attack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)

with periscope-mounted antennas to permit low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) 

communications. Both the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and Naval Ocean 

Systems Center (NOSC) developed concepts for an EHF periscope antenna. The NRL 

design included a unique circular wave-guide that is used in periscopes today as part 

of a submarine direction-finding system. NOSC teamed with TRW and developed a 

competing system.

The Naval Electronic System Command (PME-117) wrote a system specification 

which incorporated elements of both the NRL and NOSC/TRW designs and solicited 

proposals from industry. Raytheon won the contract and developed both the SSN and 

the SSBN versions of the submarine EHF satellite communications terminal.

Prototypes of both systems were tested, using EHF packages on the LES-8 and -9

experimental satellites.

Satellite Laser Communications for Submarines

In the mid-1970s, laser technology had matured to the point that it appeared 

technically feasible to use space-based lasers for communications. The Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed to conduct experiments with 

blue-green lasers, which penetrated seawater to greater depths than other light 

frequencies. The concept was to develop a means for communicating with submerged 

submarines as an alternative to: EHF (which required submarines to raise a periscope 

to communicate), VLF (which required a trailing wire antenna), or ELF (which had a 

very low data rate).

The Navy never became enthusiastic about this concept, but it struck a 

responsive chord in Congress, and the Navy agreed to pursue the idea if DARPA 

could demonstrate a brassboard capability. DARPA's tests were successful in a 
Space-based Navigation Systems in the 1970s 87 ________________________________________________________________________________

technological sense (messages were transmitted from an aircraft to a submerged 

submarine operating at depth, using a blue-green laser), but the submarine's location 

had to be known with such precision that the Navy was skeptical of any operational 

utility. Additionally, the technical risks and associated costs for developing a satellite 

laser communications system were significant. In particular, the chemical laser and 

frequency doubler combination then considered for the space source was inefficient 

and had a questionable lifetime.

(The Navy attempted to abandon the submarine laser-communications 

development effort, but interest in Congress was strong and funds were inserted in 

Navy budgets to support research into such a system until the late 1980s. As the Cold 

War wound down, the concept of a laser satellite communications system was 

eventually dropped. However, as of late 2008, recent developments of efficient, longlived solid-state lasers have revived interest in this capability.)

Space-based Navigation Systems in the 1970s

With recognition of the emerging operational need for a military satellite system to 

use for tactical (as well as strategic) applications, and the new Directive of 1970 that 

permitted all the Services to develop space systems, Navy attention soon turned to 

space-based navigation.

Transit System Improvements

From the early 1960s the Transit satellites (Figure 16) served as the satellite 

navigation system for the U.S. Navy and the Allied navies. During the period they had 

been in operation, the navigational accuracy of the Transit system, initially about half a 

nautical mile, improved to about 25 meters (for relatively slow-moving users).

Figure 16. APL's Transit navigation satellite (APL Photo)
88 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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Although Transit was a very successful satellite navigation system, it did have 

limitations. The biggest shortcoming was the low number of satellites in view at any 

given time. Users could copy the signal from one satellite pass and derive a line-ofposition on a chart but then had to wait several minutes (up to large fractions of an 

hour) for a second satellite to come into view in order to obtain a crossing line-ofposition. Then, the user had to wait even longer for a third satellite to improve the 

accuracy of a fix. For submarines at periscope depth, such delays were agonizing. For 

aircraft moving at high speed, the delays increased the uncertainty of position.

Early on in the Transit program, the Navy recognized that adding satellites to the 

constellation (or raising the altitude of their orbit) would put more satellites within users' 

view at any given time and reduce the users' delays in obtaining a fix. However, that 

solution would have required the Navy to expend funding needed for projects other 

than navigation, and thus was not implemented.

In 1970, the Navy, concerned about survivability of the Transit system in the 

event of war, did task the Applied Physics Laboratory to take steps to make the Transit

system usable for protracted periods of time even if the ground stations were put out of 

service as a result of enemy action or system failure. This led to the Transit

Improvement Program (TIP). Transit satellites had been dependent on commands 

from a ground station (at least twice a day) to maintain their orbits with the desired 

accuracy and to control satellite systems. Under the TIP program, a Disturbance 

Compensation System (DISCOS) of micro-thrusters and a satellite onboard computer 

were developed to fine-tune the satellite's orbits.

Three satellites were developed and launched as part of the TIP program (see 

Table 6 and Figure 17). The DISCOS unit in TIP-I operated excellently for two and 

one-half years until its supply of fuel was exhausted. In one experiment, the satellite 

position was predicted ahead for 90 days, and the error at the end of that time was 

only 300 meters. (The solar panels for both TIP-II and TIP-III failed to open, and the 

missions were aborted.) Subsequent Transit satellites that incorporated the TIP

technology were able to continue performing accurately for more than a week without 

interaction with a ground station.

These experimental satellites were followed by the series of operational Transit

satellites, called Nova, which incorporated the DISCOS that had been demonstrated 

with TIP-I. The first Nova satellite was launched on 15 May 1981. These later Transit

satellites proved to be exceedingly reliable; the lifetime was so long that several never 

had to be replaced on orbit.
Space-based Navigation Systems in the 1970s 89 ________________________________________________________________________________

The Joint Services GPS Program

In October 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally identified an operational 

requirement for a new satellite navigation system, with accuracy of one one-hundredth 

of a nautical mile (60 feet) in three dimensions, continuously available, worldwide, for 

military airborne users. Defense Deputy Director of Research and Engineering 

(DDR&E) John S. Foster signed out an enabling Development Concept Paper, titled 

"The Defense Navigation Satellite Development Program," on 12 August 1972. It cited 

the Navy's ongoing Timation program and the Air Force's 621B concept development 

program as the two system concepts that could be developed to meet the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS) requirement and become operational "in the early 1980s." (Improving 

the Transit system had evidently already been ruled out as a candidate concept.)

In April 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Air Force as the 

Executive Service for the “Defense Navigation Satellite Development Program 

Figure 17. TIP-II Navy navigation satellite undergoes 

pre-launch tests (APL photo)

Table 6 – Transit Improvement Program (TIP) Satellites

Satellite Launch Date Power Supply Comment

TIP-I 2 Sep 72 Nuclear DISCOS

TIP-II 12 Oct 75 Solar panel Prototype of NOVA satellite

TIP-III 1 Sep 76 Solar panel Backup to TIP-II

NOVA 15 May 81 Solar panel Operational Transit
90 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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(DNSDP)” and directed the Air Force to "establish a joint Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 

and Air Force program office, which will prepare detailed plans for the DNSDP and will 

manage and execute it if it is approved." As guidelines, it declared that the Navy 

should complete the fabrication and launch of a medium-altitude Navigation Satellite, 

NTS-1 (formerly called Timation-III), during 1974, and that the Air Force should design 

and deploy a constellation of four "synchronous, repeater Navigation Experimental 

Satellites (NESs)" during 1977.

A Joint Program Office was established in December 1973 to develop and, if 

approved, procure the new "Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging Global 

Positioning System" (NAVSTAR/GPS). Colonel Bradford W. Parkinson, USAF, was 

appointed as the Program Manager.

Fortunately for future Navy operating forces, Colonel Parkinson was a Naval 

Academy graduate who appreciated the Navy's tactical need for navigation support 

and succeeded in winning over much of the Navy's leadership by selecting a number 

of design features to accommodate the Navy's concerns. This included putting the 

satellites into NRL’s recommended 12-hour circular orbits, rather than the 24-hour 

high-elliptical synchronous orbits proposed by the Aerospace Corporation. The Navy 

had been concerned that if funding for the NAVSTAR constellation was ever reduced, 

the Air Force would choose to position the NAVSTAR satellites to emphasize strategic 

coverage of the western hemisphere and perhaps Europe or Korea, rather than the 

worldwide ocean areas where the Navy operated. The Navy-proposed 12-hour orbits 

would routinely cover the whole world.

At the same time, selection of NRL’s proposed circular orbits for the GPS

constellation mollified the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command, which had registered 

concern over the lack of coverage of arctic latitudes that would have resulted with 

Aerospace’s proposed inclined orbits.

Selection of the Navy-proposed circular orbits also solved a difficult technical 

problem that the Air Force-proposed elliptic-orbit configuration would have 

encountered involving the theory of relativity. Although the orbital speed of satellites is, 

in general, small compared to the speed of light, it is sufficiently high to result in a 

significant relativity effect on passage of time, causing an unacceptable error in the 

ultra-precise atomic clocks. The nearly constant speed of satellites in the circular orbits 

is readily correctable in the GPS system, while the rapidly changing speeds of 

satellites in the high-elliptical orbits proposed in the 621B concept would have 

produced difficult corrections, for which the 621B program did not offer a specific 

solution.

On Labor Day weekend, 1973, Colonel Parkinson met with Aerospace engineers, 

together with Mr. Easton of the Naval Research Laboratory and Navy Captain Daniel 

Holmes, to "synthesize" details of the GPS constellation. At one point, Colonel

Parkinson reportedly came into the room and said, "Well, we've got a problem: our 

system is too expensive," and Captain Holmes replied, "Why don't you take our 
Space-based Navigation Systems in the 1970s 91 ________________________________________________________________________________

[Timation] system and manage it?" That, in effect, is essentially what happened; the 

concept settled on was the one designed and demonstrated in Easton's Timation

satellites.*

With approved funding from the Joint GPS Program, Roger Easton and his team 

at the Naval Research Laboratory continued the Timation satellite program—renamed

Navigation Technology Satellites (NTS). As NTS-1, the Navy-built Timation-IIIA

satellite was launched in July 1974. In addition to further demonstrating the validity of 

the passive-ranging concept for position determining, NTS-1 carried NRL's new 

rubidium time standard into space. NTS-2, launched into the GPS-constellation orbit in 

June 1977, had as objectives: (1) to demonstrate the feasibility of using a cesium 

atomic-clock standard developed by NRL in future GPS satellites; (2) to demonstrate 

the GPS navigation payload, and (3) to function as one of the satellites in the GPS

Phase I constellation. NTS-2 achieved the JCS-required three-dimensional accuracy 

of “less than 60 feet” against aircraft flying over a calibrated test range. The success of 

NTS-2 helped keep support for the GPS program alive in 1977, when it had serious 

cost and schedule problems.

A major challenge in operationalizing NTS-2 for the GPS constellation was to 

increase the altitude of the Timation launches from low-altitude to mid-altitude, at a 

reasonable cost. In the early 1970s the Thorad-Agena boosters that NRL had used to 

launch the Timation-I and Timation-II satellites were being discontinued, and the Air 

Force proposed that NRL begin using the Titan-2 boosters. This was an expensive 

booster, potentially adding so much cost as to lead to termination of the GPS program.

Mr. Peter Wilhelm, head of NRL's satellite design and launch for Timation-I, TimationII, NTS-1, and NTS-2, found that Atlas-F ballistic missiles recently removed from their 

missile silos could be refurbished and used as a lower-cost option, if solid-propellant 

engines could be found for the upper stages. To solve this problem, Wilhelm backed a 

concept proposed by Fairchild for a second stage, with a smaller motor then placed 

inside the NTS satellites to be used for final insertion into orbit. This concept worked 

well, enabling the addition of a second solid propellant stage to NTS-2 with enough 

energy to launch NTS-2 into the 10,980-mile NTS-2/GPS orbit. (This pioneering AtlasF configuration, with solid propellant upper stage, was used for eleven GPS launches 

before the Space Shuttle was scheduled to (but did not) begin putting the GPS

satellites in orbit.)

Under the proposed GPS concept, it was planned for the Air Force to maintain

responsibility for launching the satellites as well as to operate and control the GPS

satellites on orbit, in lieu of Navy's Astronautics Group at Point Mugu (although the 

 * The steps reported here in the operationalization of the Navy’s Timation system into GPS were 

carefully and thoroughly documented. Air Force historians, however, do not concur with the Navy’s 

version of the story here. Col. Parkinson later contended that the design concept for the GPS resulted 

from the “1973 Labor Day weekend” session and was based on the concept envisioned by the Air Force 

621B program, rather than on what had been demonstrated by NRL’s Timation satellites. Aerospace 

Corporation’s Dr. Getting, whose visionary lobbying had prodded the GPS program into being, later in 

his writings omitted reference to the primary contribution of the Timation effort (other than crediting NRL 

for satellite-borne synchronous clocks.)
92 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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latter was to continue to operate the Transit satellites for maritime navigation). At least 

initially, the Navy's Transit computation facilities at the Naval Weapons Center, 

Dahlgren, Virginia, were to be used to provide the NAVSTAR/GPS ephemeris 

calculations, rather than expanding the Air Force facilities at Colorado Springs. Each 

of the four military services were to have responsibility for acquiring the receivers for 

its operating forces.

The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) approved the 

concept development plan of the "NAVSTAR (Global Positioning System)" in 

December 1973, after terminating the Air Force 621B program in August 1973. In 

addition to the Navy's NTS-1 satellite, the system approved by the DSARC was the 

24-satellite, 12-hour-orbit GPS constellation recommended by NRL.

Rockwell International was the prime contractor that developed and built the 

NAVSTAR/GPS satellites. Approximately sixty percent of the work was subcontracted.

In 1974, the Naval Research Laboratory turned over the details of the Timation

satellites to Aerospace Corporation and the subcontractors, and Mr. Easton and his 

team at the Naval Research Laboratory provided integration support across the major 

GPS interfaces, so that the Joint Program Office did not need a systems integration 

contractor. Aerospace Corporation continued to provide technical and other support to 

the Joint Program Office. Technical disagreements arose predictably between 

Aerospace and the Naval Research Laboratory, but they were eventually resolved, 

and GPS development proceeded.

The GPS Program had to be restructured in 1977 due to development problems it 

had encountered. Spacecraft and component manufacturers' technical problems 

resulted in late deliveries to Rockwell, the prime contractor. The anticipated completion 

of Phase I was postponed more than once.

As the 1970s drew to a close, GPS was still under development. (It would be 

another decade before GPS became operational; see page 119).

Space-based Ocean Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the Fleet

Outlaw Hawk

In the early 1970s, the Navy undertook an imaginative and potentially farreaching project under the auspices of the Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, 

Special Operations, and Naval Intelligence Systems (REWSON) Project Office to 

investigate whether intelligence provided by some of the national satellites and other 

systems would be operationally useful to deployed Navy battle-group commanders. In 

the initial demonstration, called Outlaw Hawk, the information from these remote 

sources was to be correlated with the battle group's own tactical surveillance 

information aboard a commander's flagship. Special communications arrangements 

were established to deliver the test information from national satellites and other 

sensor systems to an aircraft carrier; the national systems were tasked to support the 
Space-based Ocean Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the Fleet 93 ________________________________________________________________________________

demonstration; and security clearances and arrangements were made for the ship's 

force to handle the information which was expected from multiple sources.

The Outlaw Hawk demonstration took place during a fleet exercise in 1972. The 

results showed mixed success. When assessed, it was found that some of the planned 

information from national sources did not get to the ship due to various disconnections 

and diversions. Of the information which did arrive at the ship, some of it did not flow 

from the compartment where it was received to a compartment where it could be used.

Ship's companies were often stymied by highly classified messages (some in 

unfamiliar formats), and there was much difficulty in correlating any of the information 

from the new sources with the tactical information gathered by the carrier group's 

organic sensors. Of the information from non-organic sources that did arrive at places 

where it could be used, most of it was too late for anything but post-exercise analysis.

For all the shortcomings, Outlaw Hawk succeeded nonetheless in awakening the 

interest of Navy leaders to the potential of national satellites and other sensor systems 

for expanding the tactical intelligence available to Navy commanders afloat. A Navy 

effort was begun, sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for submarines 

(OP-02), to address the lessons learned from Outlaw Hawk and begin improving 

capabilities to exploit the information from national and joint surveillance and 

reconnaissance systems for tactical use.

Fleet Data Correlation Demonstrations

Mr. Jerre Patterson and a team at Lockheed Corporation (part of which later 

broke off and formed a separate company, Tiburon Systems, Inc.) then developed 

special equipment to assist Navy sailors by automatically filtering and displaying the 

contact reports from satellite and other remote surveillance sources (most of which 

turned out to be from the Navy's ocean-surveillance system), correlating the surface 

and air contact reports with information from organic sensors sources, and sorting and 

assembling the surface contacts into tracks of (exercise) targets and background 

shipping.

This concept, referred to as Outlaw Shark, materialized in the form of hardware 

and software packaged into transportable work stations. This Outlaw Shark equipment 

was installed in a guided-missile cruiser, USS Josephus Daniels. In 1977, the Navy 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force tested and assessed the equipment and the 

ability of the sailors who operated it to handle and utilize the contact reports from 

national surveillance satellites and other remote sources.

Outlaw Shark workstations (Figure 18) were then installed and tested in various 

combinations of deployed destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, and naval 

aircraft, as well as in the Navy's shore-based ocean-information intelligence nodes 

(FOSICs/FOSIFs), to support a succession of Special Exercises, fleet exercises, and 

fleet operations conducted in the late 1970s through the early 1980s (see page 96).
94 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements Evolve

One of the responses of the U.S. Navy to the threat from Soviet anti-ship missiles 

was to develop an anti-ship cruise missile of its own, called Harpoon. Although

Harpoon had much less range than cruise missiles carried by the ocean-going Soviet 

Navy units, it did have a range advantage over the shorter-range anti-ship missiles 

with which the Soviets had equipped coastal craft of client navies (which had become 

a threat to independent operations by U.S. Navy surface combatants in the littorals of 

several theaters)—thus giving U.S. surface combatants standoff ability to strike such 

coastal craft before they could launch their missiles. The Harpoon missiles began to 

deploy in 1974.

The Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Targeting Requirement

A problem with Harpoon, however, was that to achieve its standoff advantage, 

the Harpoon missiles had to be launched at targets while they were at distances 

beyond the horizon of radar, optical, and other sensors carried by the launching ship.

An intensive "over-the-horizon targeting" effort was begun within the fleets, at the 

Naval systems commands, and at the Navy's analytical facilities (primarily APL and 

CNA) to develop capabilities and concepts to enable the Navy's Harpoon-equipped 

ships and its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft to detect, classify, and track their Harpoon

targets (and any unintended targets nearby) while they were still over the horizon from 

Harpoon launch platforms. A major program of fleet exercises and demonstrations was 

undertaken in connection with this effort. (Resolution of the over-the-horizon targeting 

problem for Harpoon was found to be dependent primarily on the high-frequency 

direction-finding (HFDF) capability in the Spruance-class destroyers, the surveillance 

helicopters based on Harpoon-equipped ships, the surveillance by shore-based P-3C

Figure 18. An Outlaw Shark terminal installed in a Navy EP-3 aircraft
Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements Evolve 95 ________________________________________________________________________________

aircraft, and the contact reports being reported by the Navy ocean surveillance 

system.)

However, the stakes in the "over-the-horizon" targeting challenge were soon

significantly raised. In the early 1970s, the Defense Department had been directed to 

develop a nuclear-tipped, strategic land-attack cruise missile to augment the U.S. 

strategic missile forces, but capable of being launched from deployed tactical units—

forward-deployed Navy submarines and surface combatants, Army mobile units, and 

Air Force tactical bombers. The idea was that, in the event of a nuclear exchange 

between the U.S. and the USSR, large numbers of these cruise-missile carrying units 

would survive any preemptive strikes by the USSR, hence adding a significant 

deterrent to a Soviet strike. The Navy established a Joint Cruise Missile Office and 

proceeded (without great zeal) to develop its part of this remarkable nuclear-deterrent 

weapon, eventually called Tomahawk. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

Zumwalt, then directed Rear Admiral Walt Locke, head of the Cruise Missile Project, to 

see if it were possible to take advantage of this situation to build a variant of this 

strategic cruise missile that could be used tactically, against Soviet ships. When that 

was learned to be feasible, Locke was also directed to develop a conventionalwarhead, anti-ship version for the Navy, which he did.

The resulting anti-ship version of Tomahawk, called the Tomahawk Anti-ship

Missile (TASM), had more range than any Soviet anti-ship cruise missile, thus 

potentially solving the problem of standoff range needed by independently operating 

U.S. surface combatants to launch against Soviet ships before they could launch their 

missiles against U.S. ships. The guidance system of the Tomahawk missile had the

capability to acquire and accurately home on any target within its field of view.

However, no one had yet figured out how Navy warfighters launching Tomahawk antiship missiles from cruisers and SSNs were supposed to know where their target was 

located, or whether there were unintended targets in the immediate vicinity of the 

target(s).

It was widely recognized at that time that surveillance satellites had the potential 

to solve this over-the-horizon targeting problem for the long-range Tomahawk anti-ship 

missiles. However, the idea of improving this surveillance capability was resisted by 

many Navy leaders, for three reasons—all of a programmatic nature. First, it was 

anticipated that if the Navy were to identify a formal requirement for an improved 

space-based surveillance system to provide the over-the-horizon targeting data for its 

anti-ship missiles, the entire cost of one or more very expensive space systems might 

be charged against the Navy budget, thus jeopardizing the numbers of ships, aircraft 

and weapons the Navy was struggling to build. Secondly, the naval aviation 

community, in particular, feared that if the Navy were to acknowledge it depended on 

satellites for this purpose, Congress could challenge any continuing need for Navy 

sea-based and land-based surveillance aircraft. Third, the submarine, surface warfare, 

and Navy weapons planners worried that a major command-and-control complex 

might be needed for handling and organizing all the data from satellite-based and 

other new sensors and that the cost of the Navy's entire command-and-control 
96 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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capability might thus be shifted to their platform- and weapons-system programs if the 

requirement were to become associated with a specific weapon system.

The OTH-targeting issue for Tomahawk was brought into sharp focus in 1976 

when Congress gave the Navy one year to present a plan for developing a solution to 

the OTH-targeting problem for the anti-ship Tomahawk missile, or have the entire 

program canceled. In October 1977, the Navy provided Congress with a response.

The plan presented by the Navy was basic rather than specific; it had five elements:

• The Navy would establish an Over-the-Horizon steering committee of flag 

officers, with representatives from each of the war-fighting and support 

communities.

• Multiple sensor sources would be used from satellites, aircraft, and other 

sources (such as the Navy's undersea sound system).

• In addition, the Navy would proceed to develop satellite-based radar.

• To help Navy tactical users correlate the multiple-source information and 

interface it with the weapon systems, correlation techniques such as those 

tested as part of the Outlaw Shark effort would be employed in each 

Tomahawk platform as well as at the Navy's shore fusion nodes.

• A project office would be created to promote the development and evaluation 

of fleet concepts, tactics, and procedures for over-the-horizon targeting.

The Navy's OTH senior steering committee was appointed and began meeting 

concurrent with submittal of the plan. Responsibility for development of space-based 

radar, called Clipper Bow, was assigned to a division of PME 107 (see page 100).

The Numbered Fleets established an OTH Working Group to develop fleet 

concepts and tactics for OTH targeting support for the already deployed Harpoons and 

the anticipated Tomahawk anti-ship cruise missiles.

To support this effort, the Naval Electronic Systems Command established an 

OTH Detection, Classification, and Targeting project in 1978, under PME-108. This 

office coordinated and supported a succession of fleet operational exercises and 

demonstrations and provided the necessary resources to assist the operating forces in 

developing the OTH targeting concepts and tactics.

Outlaw Shark

Upon completion of the Outlaw Shark operational test and evaluation in USS 

Josephus Daniels (see page 93), the equipment was reinstalled in a deploying guidedmissile destroyer, USS McDonough. (One Outlaw Shark terminal was installed in a 

secure compartment, controlled by the Naval Security Group detachment in USS

McDonough; a second terminal was in the combat information center (CIC), operated 
Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements Evolve 97 ________________________________________________________________________________

by the ship’s radarmen). Concurrently, Outlaw Shark equipment was installed in a 

Navy electronic-surveillance aircraft (Ranger 25), successively in two attack 

submarines (Bluefish and Russell), and in the Operational Command Center at 

Naples, Italy. Throughout USS McDonough’s Mediterranean deployment until 

December 1978, Captain Bill Hunter (Commander of Destroyer Squadron TwentyFour) headed operational exercises and experiments with these operational assets to 

test and demonstrate the value of space-based surveillance support for over-thehorizon targeting and other tactical applications and to develop Navy tactics for their 

use.

Exercises using satellite and other remote-surveillance sources for over-thehorizon targeting support were then conducted by Navy units in each of the Numbered 

Fleets. These exercises commonly made provision for information from national 

satellite surveillance systems, land-based aircraft (Navy EP-3Es and P-3Cs, Air Force 

RC-135s, etc.) and other remote sources. PME-108 typically installed Outlaw Shark

terminals in the participating ships, submarines, surveillance aircraft, and OSIS nodes 

on a temporary basis, as a tool to help the fleet operators in these demonstrations and 

exercises with filtering, sorting, and correlating all the contact reports. On completion 

of each demonstration or exercise, the Outlaw Shark terminals were usually removed 

and cross-decked to another set of platforms for the next scheduled exercise.

Once they had been installed, a growing demand arose among participating fleet 

units and commanders to retain the Outlaw Shark terminals onboard (and any similar 

equipment they could get) for operational use as interim command-and-control 

terminals until planned equipment such as the Tomahawk Weapons Control System 

(TWCS), Tactical Flag Command & Control Center (TFCC), and Electronic Warfare 

Combat System (EWCS) became available to perform these functions. In early 1980,

the Outlaw Shark terminal was given the official designation AN/USQ-81(V). PME-108

fell into the role of a hardware-acquisition office, procuring an increasing number of 

these terminals for the fleet.

This quick-reaction acquisition practice, however, was soon recognized as 

conflicting with approved development plans of the offices responsible for acquiring 

the new systems, and PME 108 was directed in 1980 not to procure more Outlaw 

Shark terminals. The user-selectable filtering function they had performed was 

designed into the Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) then under development, and the 

Outlaw Shark tracking algorithms were to be incorporated into the TFCC for flagships, 

the TWCS for cruise-missile ships, SSC Mark 1 for tactical submarines, OSIS upgrade 

terminals for the FOSICs, and later in the Tactical Data System for Aegis cruisers.

The OTH Detection, Classification, and Targeting office continued to support the 

operating forces in over-the-horizon targeting demonstrations and exercises, using the 

AN/USQ-81(V) and prototype Outlaw Shark terminals remaining on hand. (PME 108

was disestablished when the Naval Materiel Command was restructured and the 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) was established in 1985; 
98 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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the "sensor-to-shooter" approach that evolved during the mid-1980s (page 120) 

essentially grew out of this effort.)

Validating Navy Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements

In 1977, a major study was made under joint direction of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to determine Navy and other users' 

requirements for future national surveillance and reconnaissance satellite systems 

(other than imaging). Participants included the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps, as well as State Department and other departments and intelligence agencies 

of the Government. Inputs for the study were solicited not in terms of performance for 

systems, but rather in descriptions of operational tasks to be performed by the 

respective users and the parameters of information needed to support them (e.g., 

content, frequency of reporting, timeliness, geographic regions of interest, etc.)

The operational tasks presented by the Navy, for which it was anticipated satellite 

surveillance support might be required, were:

• Ocean surveillance of ships, submarines, and aircraft

• Anti-ship targeting support

• Aircraft early warning

• Targeting support against land-mobile weapons

• General information for battle-group commanders' situational awareness

A consequent effort was then made by the Intelligence Community and 

supporting national agencies to convert the above users' needs into system 

performance requirements and to see what part of them could be met by current 

national systems and what part would require improvements or new systems. A third 

effort was then undertaken, in 1978, again under the joint direction of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to determine what part of the above 

requirements for new capabilities to support users' operational tasks would best be 

met by current or planned surveillance and reconnaissance assets other than 

satellites. The residual requirements were then defined in terms of responsiveness to 

the operational tasks that the Navy and other users had defined and described. These 

were reviewed by the services and agencies that had submitted the tasks. The 

findings on Navy requirements were reviewed and approved by the fleet commandersin-chief and the Chief of Naval Operations.

During this review process, the Navy formally raised a concern that if the Navy 

were to allow itself to become dependent on national surveillance systems for 

peacetime operations, these national resources would be diverted away and focused 

on theaters of high national interest in times of crisis or war, thus leaving naval forces 

in distant theaters without the support on which they depended and for which they had 

trained. In cognizance of this concern, the Navy registered a formal caveat that any 
Tactical Surveillance and Targeting Requirements Evolve 99 ________________________________________________________________________________

national surveillance system, if it were to be used by the fleets for tactical support, 

would have to be designed in a way that would automatically continue to provide 

coverage everywhere in the world that the Navy operated, without need to task the 

system to do so. The Navy also insisted on an additional caveat that for tactical 

applications, any future national satellite surveillance system would have to deliver its 

contact reports at security levels and in formats that could be automatically processed 

by existing or programmed Navy and joint tactical data systems.

These caveats on the Navy's tactical surveillance and targeting requirements for 

future space support, raised by the fleets, were voiced formally by Vice Admiral 

Edward Waller and the Navy leadership on the "operational" rather than the 

"intelligence side" of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Radically new in concept 

to the Intelligence Community, they formed the basis of subsequent development of 

exploitation of National space systems for tactical support and were eventually 

endorsed and adapted to the needs of all the Services.

Based on these reviews, and with the above conditions added, the Navy and the 

other services and agencies submitted their approvals to the Intelligence Community 

through their respective intelligence commands. These requirements, including the 

needs for tactical intelligence newly submitted by the Navy, were then adopted by the 

national community as criteria for justifying development of future surveillance satellite 

systems.

Navy Ocean Surveillance System

To meet these new requirements, an ocean surveillance system was developed, 

deployed, and operated under Navy management during the 1970s that grew into a 

prodigious and important source of wide-area surveillance for tactical users.

Information products of this system were disseminated not only to Navy and national 

intelligence-fusion centers ashore, but also to deployed Navy commanders, ships, 

submarines and aircraft. Initially intended to support the operating forces of the Navy, 

this capability was expanded to include land and airborne contact reports of tactical 

interest to all of the U.S. services. Details are still classified.

Navy's Continuing Initiatives to Get Space-based Radar in the 1970s

The Satellite Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS)

The satellite ocean surveillance system (SOSS) effort began in the early 1970s

with yet another study of applicable radar technology. It was now determined that a 

60-ft circular parabolic antenna offered the most cost-effective potential for a spacebased radar for ocean surveillance. The SOSS was envisioned as a four-plane, loworbiting constellation for tracking surface ships worldwide in all weather. The radar 

would be a sweeping type system that searched along the ground track of the satellite.

The system would take two looks, fore and aft, and perform range, course, and speed 

determination. SOSS included nuclear hardening, resistance to jamming, and an 

interface to the emerging Navy Command and Control System through FLTSATCOM.
100 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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To validate the SOSS concept, the Navy commissioned detailed assessments by 

the Navy laboratories, the Federally Funded R&D Centers (FFRDCs), and two 

experienced industry teams. A minimum cost for the proposed capability was 

determined to be on the order of $3.5 billion for a five-year life cycle. Research 

continued, primarily at NRL, but two major aerospace teams also were brought in:

TRW/Raytheon and McDonnell-Douglas/RCA. The bulk of the funding was from office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Because of the costs, 

involvement and interest by OPNAV were minimal, and little was done to get a 

planning wedge into the budget. The SOSS effort was terminated by mid-decade as 

Navy planners shifted budget priorities away from the Soviet surface fleet to the 

growing submarine threat.

XOS-19

When SOSS was terminated, Navy emphasis shifted to a less expensive radarsatellite concept, more suited to monitoring of "choke points." The XOS-19 project 

focused on a drastic reduction in cost, as compared to SOSS, in the hope that once a 

radar satellite was in orbit the information it provided would become so valuable that a 

full program would be authorized. XOS-19 was, therefore, recast as a research effort.

Expensive elements of the SOSS concept were dropped in favor of a simple staring 

mode radar and less expensive ground processing. It was estimated that one 

prototype satellite could be built and launched for approximately $300 million. In the 

post-Vietnam conflict budget environment, however, even this smaller amount was not 

available, and the project was terminated.

Clipper Bow

By the late 1970s, one of the tactical challenges the Navy began to ponder was 

how the forthcoming Tomahawk anti-ship missiles could be employed in a true overthe-horizon mode if the "shooter" did not have enough information on "background" 

ships in the vicinity of the intended target—ships that might inadvertently divert antiship Tomahawks in their terminal homing phase and be hit instead of the intended 

target. Concept definition of the Clipper Bow radar satellite was undertaken in 1977 as 

part of the solution to this targeting dilemma.

By the time the Clipper Bow concept was ready for development, however, the 

Soviet Backfire bomber, with its potent anti-ship missile, had emerged as another 

major threat to the U.S. fleet—a threat Clipper Bow could not address. Clipper Bow

was terminated in 1979, primarily because the $600 million price tag was considered 

too high for a system that would provide targeting support against surface ships only.

Navy Exploitation of Weather and Environment Satellites in the 

1970s

The Navy continued during the 1970s as beneficiary of weather information from 

the satellites managed by the Air Force, NASA, and the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration.
Navy Exploitation of Weather and Environment Satellites in the 1970s 101 ________________________________________________________________________________

Navy's Shipboard Antennas for Meteorology

In 1971, the Naval Electronic System Command borrowed an Air Force 

communications van and installed two large S-Band tracking antennas aboard the 

aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (one on each side of the ship) in order to demonstrate 

the ability to receive weather satellite data directly aboard ship. The test was 

successful, and the Navy then developed its own S-Band antenna, the AN/SMQ-10; 

the first prototype installation was in USS John F. Kennedy, in 1974. The AN/SMQ-10

was approved for production in 1975. These antennas were installed in all aircraft 

carriers and large amphibious ships, enabling them to acquire weather data directly 

from the weather satellites. Smaller ships and units continued to receive weather 

forecasts and warnings from the Fleet Numerical Weather Center and the 

Meteorological and Oceanographic Centers (METOCs). (At the end of the century, the 

AN/SMQ-10 antenna and/or an upgraded version, the AN/SMQ-11, were still in use in 

the Navy's aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships.)

The Weather Satellites

The Navy became a major consumer of information collected, processed, and 

disseminated by weather satellite systems. In view of the criticality of meteorology to 

fleet operations, it is surprising that the Navy never had a significant role in designing 

or acquiring weather satellites. The weather satellites upon which the Navy depended 

in the 1970s were two civilian satellite systems (NOAA and GOES) and a joint military 

weather satellite system (DMSP).

NOAA Weather Satellites

In 1970, the U.S. Commerce Department established the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which included the renamed U.S. Weather 

Service, to take control of all U.S. non-military weather satellites. The first NOAA

satellite, launched in December 1970, was derived from the TIROS satellites that had 

been developed and demonstrated by NASA during the 1960s (page 57).

The NOAA low-orbiting, sun-synchronous satellites carried a variety of 

radiometers that view the earth in a number of different frequency bands, providing: (1) 

visible and infrared images of clouds and polar ice, (2) atmospheric "soundings" for 

water vapor and temperature, and (3) sea surface temperature.

GOES Weather Satellites

One of NOAA's first actions in 1970 was to begin developing a Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES), based on NASA's ATS-1, the first 

weather satellite to operate in geosynchronous orbit (page 57).

The first GOES was launched in 1974, just in time to participate in a test known 

as the "Atlantic Tropical Experiment," which was an intense effort to collect all 

available data (from space and terrestrial systems) during the 1974 Atlantic hurricane 

season. This project tracked Hurricane Carmen in September 1974, providing the first 

significant input to the weather models that are used today to predict the formation and 

track of these dangerous storms. The GOES system provided direct S-Band downlink 
102 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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of: (1) visible and infrared images of nearly a full-earth hemisphere, and (2) profiles of 

atmospheric moisture and temperature.

DMSP Weather Satellites

The U.S. military weather satellite system was operated by the Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). The DMSP satellites were developed by the 

Air Force during the 1960s, for the purposes of: (1) supporting the U.S. national 

imaging satellites of that era, by determining in advance when intelligence targets in 

the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere were obscured by cloud cover; and (2) satisfying other DoD 

requirements for high-resolution weather data.

Products derived from DMSP data and delivered to Navy ships included: visible 

and infrared images of clouds, atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles, highresolution ice-edge mapping in polar regions, ocean wind velocity, and ionospheric 

data. (The DMSP satellites, upgraded over the years, remain the only U.S. military 

weather satellites.)

Navy Space-based Environmental Support in the 1970s

By the early 1970s Navy and civilian oceanographers had begun to recognize the 

potential for improving their understanding of the oceans (particularly currents and 

bottom contours) by using observations from space.

Seasat 

The first serious effort to explore this potential was Seasat, a NASA project 

begun on 27 June 1978. The concept was that a space-based, high-precision radar 

altimeter, placed in a near-polar orbit, could, over time, measure the height of the 

ocean at virtually all locations. It was predicted that “piled up” water in the vicinity of 

major currents, underwater mountain ranges, and trenches would affect sea surface 

topography. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, which had gained 

considerable expertise in space systems while developing the Navy Transit satellite 

navigation system, designed and built the primary radar altimeter for Seasat.

Seasat failed after only 109 days in orbit, but collected so much data that 

scientists were kept busy for years attempting to understand what had been revealed.

The general assumption that the height of the ocean varied considerably over the 

earth was readily confirmed. NASA began planning another mission almost 

immediately (which eventually evolved into the Ocean Topography Experiment 

(TOPEX), a joint venture with the French Space Agency).

Navy observers of Seasat saw the potential to apply space-based, high-precision 

radar altimeters to operational problems and started work on the Geodesy Satellite 

(GEOSAT) program and the proposed Naval Remote Ocean Sensing System 

(NROSS); see page 133.
Navy Countermeasures Against Soviet Satellites in the 1970s 103 ________________________________________________________________________________

Navy Countermeasures Against Soviet Satellites in the 1970s

By the 1970s, the Soviets were regularly testing their anti-satellite (ASAT) 

interceptors in preparation for wartime use against U.S. low-orbiting satellites 

(including the Transit navigation satellite system), and they were operating their own 

Rorsat, Eorsat, and ELINT low-orbit satellites to provide ocean surveillance in support 

of their forces against the U.S. Navy.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement of 1972 (SALT-I) between the U.S. and 

USSR prohibited future interference with each other's "national technical means of 

verification,” which included strategic reconnaissance satellites. The Soviets argued 

that their low-orbit satellites were "tactical support systems" and not "national means of 

verification." The U.S. (which at that time had no satellite reconnaissance systems 

exclusively dedicated to tactical support) insisted that all satellite reconnaissance 

systems constituted "national technical means of verification" and that an attack on 

any U.S. reconnaissance satellite, low or high-orbiting, would be considered a violation 

of the treaty and subject to appropriate retaliation.

As a matter of practicality, many people in the U.S. government made the 

argument that since satellites provided intelligence that was more important to the U.S. 

than to the Soviets (as a result of the high degree of secrecy within the Soviet Union), 

the U.S. should not threaten the Soviets with an anti-satellite system that might cause 

them to respond in kind. The fact that the Soviets already had an operational ASAT

weapon system and that they were operating tactical satellites that directly threatened 

the U.S. Navy (e.g., Rorsat, Eorsat), was not compelling—outside of Navy circles. The 

U.S. policy argument opposing the development of U.S. ASAT weapons, which had 

begun under President Eisenhower in the 1960s, continued to govern the U.S. ASAT

policy until the last days of President Ford's administration. President Ford reversed 

this policy in February 1976, when the Soviets resumed ASAT interceptor testing after 

a four-year hiatus.

Navy Countertactics Against Satellite Surveillance

In 1978, three separate efforts were undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of 

Navy space systems supporting the Navy: (1) a Space Net Technical Assessment, 

sponsored by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, (2) a Navy Space Study, under the 

auspices of the Director of Command and Control (OP-094), and (3) a study by the 

Navy Space Panel of the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

These three efforts concurred in two broad conclusions:

• Soviet satellites represented a major threat to the U.S. Navy, and prudent 

measures should be undertaken to counter any tactical advantages the 

Soviets had gained by using space systems.

• The Navy was the largest user of space systems among the services, but had 

little influence within DoD concerning space matters.
104 Chapter 3 – Navy Tactical Applications of Space Emerge in the 1970s

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In the absence of any weapon to use against the Soviet ocean-surveillance 

satellites, the U.S. Navy developed a range of tactical responses to reduce the 

vulnerability of U.S. ships to space-based (and other) surveillance, including such 

measures as satellite-orbit prediction, task-force routing to avoid detection, selective 

control of radar and other electronic emissions, and various deception techniques.

However, the continuing absence of any U.S. ASAT weapon meant that the Soviets 

had the option of employing their ASAT weapons against the low-orbiting navigation, 

reconnaissance, and surveillance satellites that the U.S. Navy depended on for tactical 

operations, without fear of retaliation against the Soviet satellites that supported their 

navy's operations.

Proposed Sea-based ASAT Weapons

In 1978, the Carter administration adopted a so-called "twin track" policy with 

regard to ASAT weapons: attempt to reach an ASAT arms control agreement with the 

Soviet Union, but simultaneously authorize a U.S. ASAT development program to 

provide bargaining leverage during the negotiations and insurance if the negotiations 

proved unsuccessful.

The Air Force had reinitiated its ASAT program. New technology in guidance and 

infrared sensing allowed an inexpensive ASAT weapons system to be conceptualized.

The concept was to use F-15 aircraft to launch an existing missile, with a new second 

stage to loft a sensor package (about the size of a tomato juice can) with enough 

accuracy to intercept Soviet low-earth orbiting satellites. The kill mechanism was to be 

via kinetic energy upon impact; there was no explosive warhead. Air Force F-15s were 

to be based on both the East and West Coasts of the United States, and, upon orders 

to intercept, would take off and fly to a weapons release point and release the 

missile—all under computer control. The Naval Air Systems Command was working 

with Air Force Systems Command on a version to be launched from carrier-based F14s. This was the status quo as the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff took up the 

issue of ASAT weapons in 1982.

Over a three-month period, the OPNAV staff reviewed three concepts for 

launching the Air Force ASAT weapon from deployed Navy units—which would be in 

better position than land-based F-15s to intercept those Soviet satellites having orbital 

parameters most threatening to Navy forces at sea. The options considered were for 

launch: (1) by carrier-based F-14s, (2) on SM-2N missiles from Aegis cruisers, and (3) 

on Poseidon missiles from ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Shortly thereafter, however, it was determined that launching of U.S. ASAT

weapons was to be exclusively an Air Force mission (not Navy), and all work on the 

proposed sea-based launching of ASAT weapons was terminated at that time.
105

CHAPTER 4 – MATURING OF NAVY SPACE-BASED

TACTICAL SUPPORT (1980-1991)

In the 1980s, the shift continued toward an emphasis on the use of space assets to 

support tactical operations and away from the preeminence of strategic-defense 

priorities.

The heavy investments the USSR had made in their navy became evident by their 

sustained deployments during the early 1980s of Soviet missile cruisers and 

submarines to the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the southwest Pacific. In the 

U.S., popular denigration of the U.S. military that had characterized the Vietnam Era 

was reversed by dramatic international events such as the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan and the overrunning of the U.S. Embassy and taking of U.S. citizens as 

hostages by Iran. In 1981, Sixth Fleet F-14 fighters shot down two Libyan aircraft that 

threatened U.S. units exercising the right of "freedom of navigation" on the Gulf of Sidra.

In 1982, Second Fleet units spearheaded the invasion of Grenada in a powerful slap at 

Cuban expansionism.

A period of remarkable transformation began within the U.S. Department of 

Defense and each of the services. The inauguration of President Reagan, an outspoken 

supporter of a strong military, led to dramatically increased defense budgets. A dynamic 

but controversial new Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John Lehman, began to inject a new 

sense of purpose and vitality into the fleet.

Naval Space Organizational Changes in the 1980s

Changes on the OPNAV Staff and Space Acquisition Organizations

In 1981, the CNO created the Navy Space Systems Division (OP 0943) and 

assigned as its first director Rear Admiral Bill Ramsey, a former battle group 

commander, to consolidate sponsorship and oversight for all Navy space programs.

Subsequently, in 1985, OP-094 was renamed the Space, Command and Control, and 

Electronic Warfare directorate.

In 1985 NAVELEX was renamed as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command (SPAWAR), and the previously consolidated Navy/NRO responsibilities were 

assigned to two separate Flag billets: Space and Systems Directorate (PD-40) and the 

Assistant Commander for Space Technology.

A separate Program Executive Office (PEO) reporting directly to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition was established in 

1990 to manage the Navy's satellite communications program. (This Program Executive 

Office existed until 1999 (when it was disestablished), and all Navy space systems 

acquisition was consolidated under the newly formed PD-14.)
106 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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The Naval Space Command is Established

The idea of forming a Joint Services command to oversee the operation of all U.S. 

military space systems had first surfaced as early as 1959 from musings by then Chief 

of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke. No serious effort toward forming a joint 

space command, however, was started until the early 1970s, when Congress had urged 

the U.S. Air Defense Command to broaden its perspective on issues such as strategic 

warning, threat characterization, and command and control, to include existing and 

planned satellite systems.

Background: U.S. Space Command

In the early 1980s, Congress took more forceful action and pushed the Air Force 

toward consolidating the Air Defense Command, the Air Force Space Command, and 

the U.S. portion of the North American Air Defense Command into a single organization.

As a result of this prodding, the Air Force formulated a concept for a U.S. Space 

Command, to be headed by a Commander-in-Chief (CINC). This concept was catalyzed 

by President Reagan in March of 1983 when he proposed a Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI)—soon called "Star Wars" after a popular science fiction movie of the time. The 

President's vision of SDI did not delineate any specific technological approach to 

neutralizing nuclear weapons, but the responses that emerged soon thereafter had a 

strong space-based component, including both satellite sensors and orbiting battle

stations. It was only a small step to envision the inclusion of anti-satellite weapons in 

such a mix. If space was to become a legitimate theater for conflict, a CINC Space was 

thought by some to be a logical evolution. (The fact that no orbiting battle stations or 

anti-satellite weapons were ever built as operational systems later gave rise to 

questions about the need for a joint space command.)

U.S. Space Command was established on 1 October 1984. The Commander of 

the U.S. Space Command was also "triple-hatted" as the Commander of the Air Force 

Space Command and the Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense 

Command.

The Air Force strongly urged that the Navy establish a counterpart space 

command for operating any space assets the Navy might have and that it be placed 

operationally under the new U.S. Space Command. Creation of such a Navy component 

command under the U.S. Space Command, even if quite small relative to the Air Force 

component, would help justify a new four-star billet for the Air Force-designated 

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Space Command, as he would be commander of a 

joint-services rather than an all-Air-Force space command. On 23 September 1985, the 

Naval Space Command (even though it had yet to be created) was designated as the 

Navy component command of the U.S. Space Command.

The Naval Space Command

On 1 October 1985, the Secretary of the Navy announced the formation of the 

Naval Space Command, under command of a distinguished former astronaut, Rear 

Admiral Richard Truly. This action by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was widely 
Naval Space Organizational Changes in the 1980s 107 _________________________________________________________________________________

publicized in order to send a message that the Navy intended to remain a player in 

space activities.

When Rear Admiral Truly took command of Naval Space Command, he had been 

with NASA (away from the Navy) for almost two decades. However, he had also been 

on the leading edge of manned U.S. efforts in space and had significant credibility as a 

spokesman and advocate for Navy space interests. Naval Space Command began with 

seventy-two military and civilian personnel. The initial organization chart for the 

command indicated responsibility for the activities of the Navy Astronautics Group and 

the Naval Space Surveillance Center, the missions of which are summarized below.

The Navy anticipated at the time that Naval Space Command would form the third 

and final node of a triad that included: (a) Naval Space Command, to operate any space 

assets the Navy had and to identify and validate requirements for satellite support for 

fleet operations; (b) Navy Space Systems Division of OPNAV (OP 0943), to formulate 

and sponsor programs; and (c) Navy Space Projects Office (PME 106) in NAVALEX, to 

execute the programs and deliver space systems.

The Naval Space Command took on the task of orienting Navy and Marine Corps 

personnel with the potential contributions of satellite systems to their respective combat 

missions. A variety of teaching tools was developed, including: creation of the Senior 

Officers Space-Awareness Wargame; briefings on space tactical awareness and spacethreat briefings; establishment of a space cell at Naval War College war-games;

creation of a course on joint space intelligence operations; sponsoring of a Space Chair 

at the Naval War College; making a video on orbital mechanics; and fielding space 

support teams to work with fleet staffs.

Operationally, the Naval Space Command managed the Navy’s UHF satellite 

communications and the Navy Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR).

(Although not a space system, ROTHR was viewed as a component of a wide-area 

surveillance "system-of-systems" that also included satellite reconnaissance systems.)

Naval Space Command also assumed responsibility for the Navy's Slow Walker

program (see page 123).

By 1989, the commander of the Naval Space Command had responsibility for the 

following activities:

• The Naval Space Surveillance Center, Dahlgren, Virginia, which operated the 

U.S. radar tracking for satellite detection and tracking (Space Fence)

• The Navy Astronautics Group (later renamed the Naval Satellite Operations 

Center, NSOC) at Point Mugu, California, which controlled Navy satellites such 

as GEOSAT and the remaining Transit satellites)

• The Naval Space Command Detachment, Colorado Springs, Colorado, a 

liaison office at U.S. Space Command headquarters
108 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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• Naval Space Command Detachment Echo, which provided Navy personnel for 

Slow Walker operations at DSP ground stations

• The Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Detachment 

at Dahlgren, Virginia (two billets)

• Naval Space Command Reserve Unit and a Marine Corps Reserve 

Augmentation Unit

In 1990, Naval Space Command established an Alternate Space Defense 

Operations Center (ASPADOC) as a backup to the U.S. Space Command's Space 

Defense Operations Center (SPADOC). The role of the SPADOC/ASPADOC was to 

detect attempts by foreign powers to interfere with operation of U.S. satellite systems 

and to implement countermeasures where available and appropriate. (It was also 

intended that the SPADOC/ ASPADOC would play a role in the employment of U.S. 

anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, if any became operational; however, none did.)

Besides operating the above systems and serving as the Navy component of the 

U.S. Space Command, Naval Space Command acted as an advocate for naval 

exploitation of space, the Navy’s corporate memory on space requirements and 

capabilities, and as a source of expertise to assist deployed forces in exploiting space 

capabilities.

The Naval Center for Space Technology 

In 1984, the Secretary of the Navy's new space policy directed that a Navy-led 

laboratory be designated to preserve and enhance a space technology base and to 

provide expert assistance in developing and acquiring space systems in support of 

naval missions. In response, two of NRL's divisions were merged in March 1984 to form 

NRL’s Space Systems and Technology Division. In March 1985, the Chief of Naval 

Research designated NRL to host the technology center for naval space activities. On 1 

October 1986, this transformation was formally completed when the Space Systems 

and Technology Division was renamed the Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST) 

and placed under the leadership of Mr. Pete Wilhelm, one of the Navy's best known 

space engineers.

The NCST remained in the forefront of research and development in space, 

seeking tasking and funding from all U.S. government organizations that were building 

space systems, including the National Reconnaissance Office and the Strategic 

Defense Initiative Office, as well as the Navy.

Space System Applications Program Office (SAPO)

In the late 1980s two divisions of the Navy Special Projects Office were merged to 

form the System Applications Program Office (SAPO). The role of SAPO was to help 

introduce to the fleet the capability of national satellite systems for near-real-time 

contact reporting and to encourage and assist tactical operators to utilize this 

information. The SAPO orchestrated implementation of the Tactical Receive Equipment 

(TRE) and Related Applications (TRAP) broadcast (page 126), acquired and provided 
Naval Space Organizational Changes in the 1980s 109 _________________________________________________________________________________

TREs for ships to receive the broadcast, helped the Naval Systems Commands plan 

interfaces of this information with the fleet's command-and-control and weapons-control 

systems, developed and provided tactical data terminals for stand-alone use, equipped 

selected EA-6B and P-3C aircraft with TREs (or a more compact version called MATTs) 

and displays, and conducted training visits to fleet commands and units.

During the Gulf War 1991-1992, the TRAP/TRE connectivity was used very 

effectively by combat units of all the military Services for receiving, processing, and 

displaying time-critical data from the supporting satellite systems. This played a 

significant role in the overwhelming success of the U.S. forces in that war during both 

the air and ground phases, and the Navy's SAPO was accredited a large part in this 

success. (In August 1992, the SAPO, along with its Navy and contract-support 

personnel, was transferred to the National Reconnaissance Office, there to undertake a 

program on behalf of all the national systems and all the military Services, similar to that 

the SAPO had performed under the Navy Special Projects Office.)

Navy TENCAP Establishes Key Role in Fleet Support 

The Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Office in 1982 

launched a high-risk but potentially high-payoff research and development program.

This rapid prototyping R&D approach would, during the next two decades, 

fundamentally change the manner in which national satellite systems supported U.S. 

and allied combat operations at the tactical level.

The establishment of Naval Space Command in 1985 resulted in transfer of two 

TENCAP billets to Dahlgren, Virginia, and that became Navy TENCAP’s first field office. 

During the mid-1980s, Navy TENCAP's research program earned a reputation for 

successfully challenging conventional wisdom concerning capabilities and limitations of 

national satellite systems. Navy TENCAP R&D projects were notable for their ingenuity 

and frugality, often attaining results rapidly and at a tenth the cost of similar efforts by 

sister Services or intelligence organizations. This resulted in an influx of "funds from 

others" who wished to partner with the Navy. From this experience, Navy TENCAP 

personnel learned the value of undertaking projects that had wide joint service and 

interagency appeal. This insight became a fundamental aspect of TENCAP's approach 

to R&D.

Rapid increases in both the scope of Navy TENCAP sponsored R&D and funds 

available to execute projects soon outstripped the capabilities of the TENCAP Office.

There was no option to increase the size of the Office, because of severe cutbacks in 

the Navy staff. TENCAP turned to the commercial sector and hired its first Systems 

Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractor in 1987. Over the next few 

years, contractor support grew (both at the Pentagon and Naval Space Command) to 

the point that TENCAP manning became half government and half SETA. This worked 

to TENCAP's advantage because the frequent turnover of project officers brought fresh 

insights into fleet operational requirements, while the SETA contractors provided

continuity in the R&D process.
110 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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The "Tactical Support Group," 1988-1989

In 1988, Navy TENCAP pushed for a project in which personnel from operational 

commands familiar with joint procedures and the operational situation in the western 

Pacific would work within the National Security Agency (NSA) to explore whether there 

was untapped information that could be exploited if made available in near-real-time to 

combat commands in the Pacific theater. Eight enlisted intelligence analysts (two from 

each service) of the U.S. Pacific Command were placed under a Navy TENCAP officer, 

in one of NSA's covert facilities.

NSA resisted the concept of this year-long Tactical Support Group, citing lack of 

funds as the reason. Persistence on the part of the Air Force-Navy team in validating 

the operational requirement, coupled with Navy TENCAP funding for online databases 

and system interfaces, eventually led to a prototype operational capability. This

capability was tested and demonstrated as part of Joint Project Night Fury, for which 

Navy TENCAP was executive agent.

The Tactical Support Group continued to operate for a year, gleaning satellitederived (and other) intelligence and sending it as tactical information to combat forces.

This operational reporting was used extensively during Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm in the 1990–1991 Gulf War. The reporting worked well, and after the 

Tactical Support Group left, the concept capability remained in use to support U.S. 

operations and exercises.

CNA Assessment of Navy TENCAP Projects

TENCAP soon realized that fast-paced R&D projects needed rigorous, 

independent assessments of technical tests and operational demonstrations in order to 

understand whether or not prototype capabilities had the potential to satisfy fleet 

operational requirements. To this end, TENCAP established a long-term relationship 

with the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), beginning in 1983. It was necessary for the 

TENCAP-CNA relationship to be stable for two reasons: (a) a considerable amount of 

time and staff work was required to obtain the required security clearances for CNA 

analysts; and (b) it took an even longer period of time to convince managers of sensitive 

national intelligence facilities that CNA analysts who periodically showed up at their 

sites were there to assess the performance of TENCAP prototype concepts, not to 

evaluate the sites themselves.

Navy Space Cadre in the 1980s

Perhaps the most widely recognized early space cadre included the Navy 

astronauts at NASA. More than seventy current and former astronauts served in the 

United States Navy, including Alan Shepard, the first American in space, and William 

Shepherd, the first commander of the International Space Station.

Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), a core group of 

unrestricted line officers and cryptologists staffed the Navy TENCAP Office and served 

as resource sponsors for Navy space communications, navigation, environmental and 

ISR capabilities, including both satellite systems and user terminals.
Naval Space Organizational Changes in the 1980s 111 _________________________________________________________________________________

In the early 1980s, most of the Navy officers and civilians involved in space 

systems acquisition were concentrated in the Navy Space Projects Office of the Naval 

Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX), PME 106. This included the Navy's Special 

Projects Office, PME 106-5. The organization had evolved under Rear Admiral Robert

Geiger, who had been responsible for Navy space programs, including FLTSATCOM, 

and was also one of three Program Directors in the National Reconnaissance Office

(NRO). NAVELEX was restructured as Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

(SPAWAR) in 1985, and the previously consolidated Navy/NRO responsibilities were 

assigned to two separate Flag billets: Space and Sensor Systems Directorate (PD-40) 

and the Assistant Commander for Space Technology.

When U.S. Space Command opened its doors in the early 1980s, Navy personnel 

were assigned as space staff officers. In 1985 Naval Space Command was formed in 

Dahlgren, Virginia, as the Navy component of the U.S. Space Command. A large 

collection of Navy active duty and reserve personnel, who were conducting spacerelated work at the time, were organized under Naval Space Command, including the 

Navy Astronautics Group and the Naval Space Surveillance Center (operating the Navy 

Space Fence). Along with operating the Navy Space Fence and providing backup 

operations to the Air Force's Cheyenne Mountain, Naval Space Command support 

teams deployed worldwide to help deliver space capabilities to the Fleet. (The Naval 

Space Command later transitioned to become part of Naval Network Warfare Command

in 2002.)

Another source of Navy space expertise was the cryptologic and intelligence 

special duty officer and enlisted personnel assigned throughout various Navy and 

national offices and services agencies, skilled in knowledge of satellite system 

operations and information dissemination.

Space Curriculum Established at Naval Postgraduate School

In 1982, the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, with the support of 

the Naval Electronic Systems Command, formalized a space program to educate: (1) 

space-knowledgeable officers who would return to the fleet to help determine 

requirements for future space systems and to develop concepts of operations for their 

use; (2) Naval engineers and program managers to participate in joint space systems

acquisition and to develop any Navy-unique space systems.

In that year, the Postgraduate School formed a Space Systems Academic 

Committee (soon to become the Space Systems Academic Group) eventually 

consisting of faculty from ten academic departments. Under the leadership of Dr. Alan 

E. Fuhs, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering, two space curricula were developed:

• Space Systems Operations—a two-year curriculum, emphasizing general 

knowledge of space-system end-to-end architectures and insight as to future 

space applications for warfighters)
112 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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• Space Systems Engineering—also a two-year curriculum, focusing on space 

technology, satellite and subsystem design, and space systems acquisition 

management, with each class ending with an engineering design problem.

To provide students in these curricula with hands-on experience and expertise, 

state-of-the-art laboratories were established at the Naval Postgraduate School, 

including a Secure Computing Laboratory, FLTSATCOM Laboratory, Small Satellite 

Laboratory, Spacecraft Robotics Laboratory, and a Spacecraft Research and Design 

Center.

The first Master of Science degree in Space Systems Operations was awarded by 

the Naval Postgraduate School on 22 June 1984. The Space Systems Engineering 

Program awarded the first Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering also in 

1984, and the first Master of Science degree in Astronautical Engineering in 1989.

(An average of ten Navy officer students annually entered each of these curricula.

Classes frequently included students from the Marine Corps and the Air Force. Navy 

graduates of the space systems curricula were assigned a space-qualified subspecialty 

code. See page 148.)

The Navy’s Space Strategies in the 1980s

Naval Space Policy (1984) and Space Strategy (1986)

In 1981, the Space Panel of the Naval Studies Board advised the Chief of Naval 

Operations (CNO) that the Navy should take more aggressive steps on its own to 

provide space-based support to the fleet and should begin to develop a clearer Navy 

position on space matters. In response, the OPNAV Director of Command and Control 

(OP-094), Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler, directed his staff in 1982 to draft a Naval Space 

Master Plan to address these issues. When the completed draft of the Master Plan

began circulating for review, it became evident that since the Navy had no approved 

space policy, there was no basis for evaluating the proposals of the draft Master Plan.

The CNO thereupon requested the Secretary of the Navy to sponsor development of a 

Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) Space Policy. A draft Naval Space Policy document 

was completed by OP-06 in early 1983. Following reviews by the staffs of the CNO, the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), 

the Secretary of Defense signed out a new Department of Navy Space Policy (SECNAV 

Instruction S5400.39) on 6 February 1984. This Policy:

• formally recognized the increasing dependence of naval forces on space 

systems for conducting naval operations, and

• directed the Navy and Marine Corps to ensure the effective deployment and 

use of space and space systems in fulfilling the missions and requirements of 

all elements of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The Navy’s Space Strategies in the 1980s 113 _________________________________________________________________________________

In the spring of 1984, the National Security Council reviewed and updated U.S. 

national space strategy, and a new National Space Strategy National Security Decision 

Directive (NSDD) was issued in August 1984. The NSDD dealt with a number of 

previously unaddressed sensitive space issues, including the arms-control implications 

of space, development of space-based strategic defense systems, and Command, 

Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) systems to support the operating forces 

as well as the National community.

In October 1984, the CNO and the Fleet CINCs devised a plan-of-action for 

formulating a naval space strategy responding to the guidelines of the new National and 

SECNAV policies. The plan-of-action they devised consisted of two prongs. The first 

prong was a Naval Space Strategy Working Group (NSSWG), headed by Rear Admiral 

Dennis Brooks under a Flag Advisory Group reporting to the CNO, to formulate the 

Navy's role in space as needed to support the Fleet CINCs' operational requirements.

The second effort was a Space Exploitation Task Force (SETF), chaired by Mr. Jim 

Woolsey under the CNO Executive Panel, to formulate the Navy's role in space from a 

national perspective.

With the inputs from these two efforts, the CNO and the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps (CMC) then drew up a broad-based Naval Space Strategy. In SECNAV's 

endorsing memorandum, the Navy and Marine Corps were directed to continue to 

assess requirements, roles and missions in space and to take required actions in those 

areas which support naval missions or areas where unique naval capabilities contribute 

to national objectives.

The Naval Space Policy and the Naval Space Strategy comprised a formal 

declaration of Navy Department intention that:

• The Navy and Marine Corps would continue to use space systems to support 

their operations;

• Where possible, the Navy would continue working jointly with other services 

and offices to obtain the space-based resources needed to support naval 

requirements;

• If that approach failed, the Navy would acquire any space systems needed to 

meet its Navy-unique requirements.

The following are extracts from the Department of the Navy Maritime Strategy 

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) published in 1986:

“C3I combine to form the glue that binds this entire [warfighting] effort together.

And space is an essential factor in C3I. The Navy is the number one tactical user of 

information from space. We recover the information, fuse it in real-time, and 

continuously disseminate it to all tactical users at sea. Although we have long 
114 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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understood the importance of space intuitively, the Maritime Strategy clarifies the 

essentiality of space for a Navy with global responsibilities.”

“[There is] . . . the growing awareness of the importance of a space-based systems 

to maritime forces. For too many years, we viewed space as a technological and 

scientific playground outside the mainstream of naval warfare. But the process of 

developing a global, forward strategy and using it to drive Navy programs has brought 

into sharp focus the essential contributions of space-based systems across all missions 

and platforms. This awareness has led to establishment of the Navy Space Command 

..., the formation of a Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and ... 

programmatic actions to develop new systems and make better tactical use of existing 

ones.”

Effect of the 1984 Naval Space Policy and the 1986 Naval Space Strategy

The new Naval Space Policy and Strategy had little apparent effect on either the

scope or the funding level of Navy space programs. They did, however, successfully 

raise the Navy’s high-level visibility of space.

Symbolizing the above policy and intent, OP-094 was renamed the Space, 

Command and Control, and Electronic Warfare Directorate, and the Naval Electronic

Systems Command was renamed the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

(SPAWAR).

Shortly thereafter, a Program Executive Officer (PEO) reporting directly to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition was 

appointed to manage the Navy’s satellite communications program, paralleling the 

Navy’s existing “black” program which continued under SPAWAR’s Assistant 

Commander for Space technology. (This Program Executive Office existed until 1999, 

when it was disestablished, and all Navy space systems acquisition was consolidated 

under the newly formed PD-14; see page 144. Then in 2004, a PEO for Space Systems 

was established to mange the Multi-Use Objective System (MUOS) program; page175).

Navy's Funding Practice for Space

Promulgation of the new Naval Space Policy and Strategy in the mid-1980s

invoked concerns among Air Force planners that the Navy had not only the capability 

but now probably the intent to acquire and operate space systems, which they believed 

should be solely the Air Force's mission to acquire and operate. The Air Force and its 

major contractors now renewed their lobbying to have the Air Force designated as the 

sole authority for acquiring military space systems. Staffers in Congress became 

alarmed. Senator Sam Nunn expressed concern over his (mis)perception that the Navy 

was "operating a whole fleet of satellites in competition with the Air Force.

These concerns, however, proved to be inconsequential. In fact, the new Naval 

Space Policy and Strategy had very little impact on the Navy's allocation of funds to 

support space programs. Clearly the U.S. Navy remained the largest user of satellite 

systems for support of its tactical forces. However, most military satellite systems are 

very expensive—comparable with the costs of aircraft squadrons and major ships. In 
The Navy’s Space Strategies in the 1980s 115 _________________________________________________________________________________

the press of Navy budgeting for ships, aircraft, and weapon systems over the years, the 

Navy never made funding contributions for space-based systems commensurate with 

the degree of the Navy's dependence on them. Instead, Navy leaders consistently 

hoped, and came to expect, that “someone else” (primarily the Air Force, the NRO, 

DoD, or NOAA) would pay for the acquisition, launch and operation of the satellites. It 

was this funding strategy (or lack thereof), as much as any national or DoD policy 

constraints, that resulted in the fact that the Navy did not undertake the development 

and acquisition of any costly satellites (other than the Transit navigation system in the 

1960s, and later some of the UHF communications).

Instead of allocating funds for development of space programs (or even 

contributing a "fair share," according to the Air Force), the Navy chose to make minimal 

investments (about 300–400 million dollars per year) and attempted to leverage this into 

acquisition, by others, of the space systems needed to support Navy communications, 

navigation, surveillance, targeting support, and environmental data collection.

During the 1980s, the Navy allocated approximately half of its space budget to the 

funding of:

• A share of the UHF satellites used by all the services for tactical 

communications

• part of the costs of the Improved Surveillance System

• acquisition of relatively low-cost, usually one-of-a-kind special-purpose Navy 

satellites such as GEOSAT

• a modest RDT&E program in space technology at the Naval Research 

Laboratory (specifically, the Navy Center for Space Technology when it was 

formed at the NRL in 1986)

• the Navy TENCAP Office (annual budget of about a million dollars, growing to 

ten million by the end of the decade), which during the 1980s pioneered new 

applications of national space systems for the operating forces of the Navy (see 

page 109)

• the relatively small Naval Space Command (with approximately 400 military 

and civilian personnel, compared to about 20,000 personnel assigned to the Air 

Force Space Command)

• support of the two space curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School (Space 

Systems Engineering, and Space Systems Operations)

• representation on space systems working groups and committees (SIGINT 

Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS), Committee on Imagery 

Requirements & Exploitation (COMIREX), SIGINT Requirements Validation & 
116 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES), Defense Reconnaissance Support 

Program (DRSP) Working Group, and joint-service committees on space 

systems)

The remaining portion of the Navy's space budget each year (about half) was for 

development, procurement, and installation of users' terminals (including the terminals 

for UHF fleet communications, DSCS and potentially Milstar communications, GPS

navigation satellites, NOAA and DMSP weather satellites, and, later, TRE terminals to 

receive information from national satellite systems).

Refining Navy Satellite Communications in the 1980s

Acquiring tactical satellite communications for the fleet was not an easy process. A 

repeated stumbling block was the strain between the respective acquisition approaches 

of the Navy and the Air Force. In simple terms, the Navy had a very urgent operational 

requirement to meet and was willing to exploit any existing commercial or other 

technology to accelerate the fielding of satellite communications capability it needed.

(The Navy no longer had fallback alternatives for its tactical communications; most of 

the shore-based communications stations that had formerly supported overseas MF/HF 

radio-communications were gone, and, unlike ground-air forces, Navy units over the 

horizon from each other at sea could not use land lines or microwave relay stations for 

relaying communications.) The Air Force, in its perceived role as DoD lead for space 

systems, felt compelled to transform each satellite project into a "joint" system which 

could satisfy most or all DoD requirements. The large, joint DoD programs that resulted 

generally became bogged down in negotiations over "common user" requirements and 

funding, and the protracted development and acquisition process frustrated Navy 

managers as well as the operating forces.

UHF Tactical Communications Satellites in the 1980s

FLTSATCOM

The Air Force contract for the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM)

satellites had been signed in 1972, in expectation of initial operational service by 1976.

When the FLTSAT program began to slip in schedule and grow in cost (primarily due to 

the many additional users who wanted channels), the Navy needed to make interim 

arrangements. DoD and Congress authorized the Navy to lease UHF communications 

channels on existing commercial "Gapfiller" satellites, and the Gapfiller service began in 

1976 (page 83).

The first FLTSATCOM satellite was then launched in 1978, and a constellation of 

four Air Force-acquired FLTSATCOM satellites achieved operational status in 1980. As 

the FLTSATCOM satellites came on line, they phased out the Gapfiller satellites, one by 

one, in providing the Navy tactical and long-haul communications including the Fleet 

Satellite Broadcast. The other Services also began using the UHF radio services of the 

FLTSATCOM system for tactical communications.
Refining Navy Satellite Communications in the 1980s 117 _________________________________________________________________________________

The original FLTSATCOM program called for the acquisition of up to ten satellites, 

as needed, over the years. But the operational need for expanded communications 

service grew faster than the Air Force FLTSATCOM program could handle, and so the 

Navy sought Congressional approval to lease the services of commercial 

communications satellites.

The proposed leasing arrangement was particularly innovative, in that the Navy

would lease the satellite services on a "turnkey" basis—that is, the Navy would pay for 

the communications service only when the satellites were on orbit and operable. This 

approach depended on getting a commercial vendor to a fixed-price contract for 

delivering the services of fully-tested UHF communications satellites, on orbit. Congress 

liked the idea and authorized the Navy to proceed.

Navy LEASATs

Within six months, NAVELEX and the Naval Material Systems Command 

completed the requirements definition for the Leased Satellite (LEASAT) source 

selection. Hughes Aircraft Company won the contract for five such LEASATs, with 

service to begin in 1982. The advantage of the Navy's "turnkey" approach became 

evident from the start, for there was a delay in the NASA Space Shuttle's availability to 

deploy the LEASATs, and the first LEASAT did not become operational until late 1984.

Then, when LEASAT-3 failed to power up after being deployed from a Space Shuttle 

bay, the contractor bore the entire cost of a NASA repair mission in August 1985 to 

activate the satellite. An even more dramatic confirmation of the Navy's foresight came 

with the launch of LEASAT-4, which failed eight days after deployment and was 

replaced at no cost to the Navy or the Defense Department.

These program delays in getting the LEASATs on orbit prompted Congress to 

authorize the Navy to purchase three additional FLTSAT satellites, FLTSATs-6, -7, and 

-8. And FLTSATs-7 and -8 were configured to carry the FLTSAT EHF package 

(page 117) as well as UHF communications.

The next generation of fleet UHF tactical communications satellites was designated the UHF Follow-On (UFO) series. Because of the success of LEASAT, the Navy was 

assigned responsibility for acquiring the UFO system. The Navy signed a contract with 

Hughes in 1988, with options, to provide ten UFO satellites.

EHF Communications for the Fleet

In the meantime, the Air Force had sized and tested a Milstar Extremely High 

Frequency (EHF) satellite (see page 84) purported to meet all of the “common user” 

requirements negotiated with the services (including survivability in a nuclear war).

However, the Milstar cost estimate had grown, accordingly, by a factor of five, and the 

Air Force lost enthusiasm for funding it. At that point, the Air Force offered the Milstar

executive service role as well as the program management position to the Navy, with 

the stipulation that the Navy make the program manager's job a flag billet and that he be 

assigned to the Air Force Space Division in Los Angeles. On the Navy's behalf, Vice 

Admiral Gordon Nagler (OP-094) turned down the offer.
118 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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The Air Force then attempted to cancel the Milstar program, using the end of the 

Cold War and a perceived lack of any further need for strategic-defense 

communications as justification. By this time, however, both the Army and the Navy 

resisted abandoning the project. The Army had made a significant investment in Milstar

ground terminals, particularly to support the large "trunking" systems needed at Corps 

and Echelon-Above-Corps levels.

The Navy maintained a continuing interest in EHF communications for certain fleet 

applications, because the uplinks and downlinks of EHF communications have tight 

beams that resist jamming, and the wide bandwidths available at EHF make possible 

not only high-volume communications but the use of sophisticated modulation techniques that further resist jamming. EHF antennas are small, making them suitable for 

use on extendable masts or periscope mounts on submarines. Another reason the Navy 

needed Milstar was that the high-elliptical component of the Milstar constellation 

provided communications coverage at far-northern latitudes, for which the Navy had no 

other option. (However, for many applications EHF satellites could not replace the 

Navy's need for UHF satellites, because the focused EHF uplinks require users to keep 

their EHF antennas pointed at the satellite, and the focused EHF downlinks require the 

satellite operator to know fairly precisely where the surface units to be supported are 

located—a problem generally experienced in supporting moving fleet units and 

particularly troublesome to submariners.)

The Navy therefore acquired EHF equipment developed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory

for installation as Fleet EHF Packages (FEPs) on FLTSATs-6 and -7, as test payloads 

for Milstar. At this time the NAVELEX SATCOM program manager, Navy Captain John 

Newell (PME-106-1) was dual-hatted to also manage the newly-formed Milstar EHF 

Joint Terminal Project Office (JTPO). To provide earliest on-orbit EHF capability for 

testing and use with the joint Milstar terminals, he obtained approval to launch FLTSAT7, with its EHF package first, in 1986, ahead of FLTSAT-6. (This decision proved to be 

most fortuitous, since FLTSAT-6 was lost in 1987 when its launch vehicle failed.)

Successful operation of the EHF packages on FLTSAT-7, and on FLTSAT-8, 

launched in 1989, convinced Congress to authorize the Navy to put FEPs on UFO-1

through UFO-4 (page158).

GPS Replaces Transit for Fleet Navigation

Throughout the 1980s the Navy continued to rely on the Transit system for satellite 

navigation—as did the NATO navies and thousands of commercial and private users.

Transit (which had been designed to what was initially perceived to be a "Navyunique" requirement and had attained initial operation within only six years after its 

program authorization) remained the only satellite navigation system available during 

the almost twenty-five-year period during which GPS was under development and 

procurement. In 1983, an estimated 36,350 Transit receiver sets were in use worldwide.
GPS Replaces Transit for Fleet Navigation 119 _________________________________________________________________________________

Transit improvements proposed in the early 1970s (page 87), which through 

improved technology and augmented numbers of satellites might have provided global 

positioning accuracies comparable to that of GPS, were never implemented. Instead, 

the Navy's effort toward improved satellite navigation became focused (through the 

Joint GPS program) on acquisition of the passive-ranging capability of GPS, based on 

time measurements rather than on Doppler-shift measurements as in Transit.

In the early 1990s, when GPS finally did become operational, there were still about 

65,000 Transit receiver sets in use worldwide for maritime navigation. In keeping with 

international commitments made by the U.S., the Naval Space Command continued 

operating the Transit satellites for eight more years as an interim navigational aid.

Meanwhile, the joint-services military program to acquire GPS continued 

throughout the 1980s. Although the GPS program had won approval of many elements 

of the services, funding for the system always seemed at risk. As GPS was a "commonuser" system, no one service wanted to be in the position of having to pay for the major 

share of the funding. The Air Force, with Defense Department backing, ultimately forced 

most of the funding into the DoD budget.

Further program delays to the GPS program resulted from the loss of the Space 

Shuttle Challenger and from a late requirement to harden the GPS satellites from 

nuclear effects. GPS receivers finally began to appear in 1988, and the GPS

constellation attained full operational status in the early 1990s (Figure 19).

(Today, the satellites are operated for the 

Defense Department by the Air Force. The GPS

system has proved successful not only for the 

Navy and other maritime navigational users, as 

had been the case with Transit, but by all the 

military services. In addition, the accuracy and 

convenience of the GPS receivers have been 

extensively exploited by commercial and private 

users as well. In the early 2000s, the National 

Academy of Sciences found there were tens of 

millions of GPS receiver sets in use.)

Figure 19. Artist’s conception of a 

Global Positioning System 

(GPS) Satellite
120 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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Satellite Systems for Tactical Surveillance and Targeting, 1980-1989

The "Sensor-to-Shooter" Approach

In 1983, the U.S. Navy was struggling to develop targeting processes for 

Tomahawk and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, whose standoff ranges exceeded the 

horizon-limited ranges of shooters’ organic line-of-sight sensors. Critics of these 

missiles questioned the value of over-the-horizon weapons that required targeting data 

from remote sources. At that time, data collected by ocean surveillance satellites 

concerning enemy ships were sent from Regional Reporting Centers, operated by the 

Naval Security Group, to ships at sea via messages known as Ships Emitter Locating 

Reports (SELOR).

A new, and initially controversial, approach evolved to use surveillance satellites

for tactical purposes, informally referred to as the "sensor-to-shooter" concept. In this

scheme, contact reports from National satellites were to be made available 

automatically, in near-real-time, directly to the weapons-control stations in deployed 

ships, submarines, and aircraft—reflective of the way in which Navy ships and aircraft 

were already exchanging tactical data in near-real-time among ships and surveillance 

aircraft via tactical-data systems. The purpose was to facilitate delivery of time-critical 

information on moving and rapidly changing targets directly to the weapons controllers 

more quickly, more frequently, and in more detail than could be achieved by relaying the 

contact reports through intervening intelligence nodes—on occasions and under 

conditions selectable by the individual tactical users. This approach was not intended to 

replace the need for the intelligence nodes; all the contact reports from the satellites 

would continue to be reported in parallel to national and naval intelligence and ocean 

information nodes for fusion with all-source intelligence.

This concept was revolutionary, however, in that it was to require:

• Surveillance satellite systems to collect, process, and automatically report the 

needed information, all in near-real-time. (It was initially anticipated that there 

would be two components: the Improved Surveillance System and satellitebased radar. Additional surveillance systems were later appended, but the 

radar component was not implemented.)

• A direct communications path from the satellites to deployed tactical units. This 

was initially implemented as the Tactical Data Information Exchange SystemBroadcast (TADIXS-B) and later the Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) and 

Related Applications (TRAP) Broadcast, which eventually evolved into the

Integrated Broadcast Service - Simplex (IBS-S).

• Equipment modifications aboard the tactical units to receive the contact reports 

and distribute them automatically to the weapons-control stations. (The TRE

and follow-on terminals were developed for this purpose.)
Satellite Systems for Tactical Surveillance and Targeting, 1980-1989 121 _________________________________________________________________________________

• A means within tactical units to correlate the satellite contact reports with 

surveillance data from other sources. (For Navy applications, this initially took 

the form of the prototype Outlaw Shark terminals provided by PME-108, 

functions of which were subsequently to be incorporated into the TFCC, TWCS, 

EWCS, SSC, and OSIS baseline upgrade; these were supplemented by 

various stand-alone correlation and display systems developed and provided by 

the Navy Special Projects Office (PME 106-5), such as the Prototype Ocean 

Surveillance Terminal (POST) and others; page 128.)

A successful implementation of this sensor-to-shooter concept would also require 

some revolutionary changes in the cultural traditions of professional communities. The 

fleet warfighters would have to learn to work with the satellite-generated contact 

reports—on occasions and under conditions selectable by individual users—as "tactical 

data" rather than as "intelligence" reports. Conversely, the national and naval 

intelligence communities would have to accept that, in many cases, timeliness of 

reporting can be more critical to tactical operators, so as to be actionable, than 

information value added by evaluation prior to reporting. Moreover, the intelligence 

communities would have to recognize that Navy operators routinely evaluate tacticaldata reports received, correlating these reports with information from organic sensor 

systems and other sources locally available.

The Improved Ocean Surveillance System

Details are still classified, but the Improved Ocean Surveillance System was the 

first U.S. satellite surveillance system specifically designed for the tactical requirements 

of Navy and other users. The attributes contrasting its characteristics with those of 

systems that had been designed to collect "intelligence" are generalized as follows:

• Surveillance and processing of contacts everywhere in the world, reported 

automatically to all U.S. users, routinely, without the need to be specifically 

tasked (compared to the "intelligence" and "reconnaissance" systems that are

focused on geographic areas based on detailed requests and tasking for 

collection and reporting).

• Inclusion of all friendly, neutral, unknown, and potentially hostile contacts 

(compared to only the "hostile and potentially hostile" targets that comprise the 

defined charter of the Intelligence Community). (This feature was needed for

over-the-horizon (OTH) surveillance and targeting, where it was necessary to 

know, regardless of nationality, the presence and movements of all "iron in the 

water" in the vicinity of surface targets.)

• Frequent updating of all contact reports to enable tactical users to track moving 

and rapidly changing background and targets of interest (compared to the 

intelligence systems, which try to filter out repetitive reports on the same target 

for the sake of reducing redundancy).
122 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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• Delivery of the contact reports at a classification level and in a format that can 

be automatically processed by the Navy and joint tactical-data systems.

• Ability of each tactical user to select the occasions and the types and 

parameters of the information of interest based on respective local conditions 

(compared to selection of information by remote intelligence specialists based 

on pre-submitted requests from the users).

Space-based Radar Efforts

During the 1980s, the Navy continued its unsuccessful efforts to obtain spacebased radar through the Integrated Tactical Surveillance System and the Space-Based 

Wide Area Surveillance Program.

Integrated Tactical Surveillance System (ITSS)

In 1980, the Navy commissioned an Integrated Tactical Surveillance System 

(ITSS) study under the auspices of CNO's Director of Command, Control, and 

Communications (OP-094). This $30 million dollar effort engaged several of the largest 

U.S. aerospace firms in a two-year assessment of potential technological solutions to 

U.S. Navy requirements for over-the-horizon targeting and for air defense against Soviet 

bombers. Space-based radar was one of the technologies considered, along with 

infrared, electronic-intelligence, and other sensors. The ITSS study effort ended with its 

final report, which recommended a "system-of-systems" approach to wide-area 

surveillance, with heavy reliance on satellites, including possible new initiatives for 

infrared and radar, as well as continuation of existing surveillance systems.

The Space-Based Wide-Area Surveillance (SBWAS) Program

In 1987-88, the Navy established a program to enhance its wide-area surveillance 

capability through acquisition of additional components to augment the Improved Ocean 

Surveillance System. This program began by performing yet another study, the result of 

which was a recommendation that the Navy develop space-based wide-area radar 

(Classic Thunder) and a space-based infrared sensor system (Classic Guardian).

This Navy recommendation to develop space-based radar for wide-area ocean 

surveillance, coupled with the fact that the Navy now had a program in place to implement it, attracted serious Air Force attention. The Air Force promptly counter-proposed 

that the system be developed and acquired by the Air Force. The space-based radar 

proposed by the Air Force would be a joint system, designed as usual to meet 

"common-user" requirements of all the services. Operational requirements for it were 

hastily solicited and collected from the services; these requirements were found to span 

a spectrum of applications, and they entailed a number of tradeoffs in technology. At 

one end of this spectrum was the Navy's need for a system having worldwide coverage

to detect ships and large bombers; at the other end, there was an Army requirement for 

a staring-type radar system with high enough resolution, for example, to count the 

number of wheels on land vehicles.

In the Navy's view, there were several deficiencies in the Air Force's proposed 

common-user system. The set of common user requirements was so large that the 
Direct Tactical Reporting 123 _________________________________________________________________________________

radar would have to be a priority-tasked system, meeting the needs of only a small 

number of users at any one time. There would be no capability to classify ships. New, 

separate, and costly processing and reporting architecture would have to be 

constructed to support the proposed Joint SBR and disseminate its product. In addition, 

just the Navy’s part of the Air Force's Joint SBR would have cost more than the total 

cost of the Navy-proposed wide-area SBR/IR capability.

The Navy persisted in its arguments for a few months but then acquiesced in the 

face of strong Air Force opposition and the potentially irresolvable set of technical, 

operational, fiscal, and political issues. Subsequently, the Air Force, no longer alarmed 

that the Navy would attempt to develop and procure its own satellite system, lost 

interest in the Joint SBR and abandoned the effort. In 1990, in recognition of the 

changing military picture vis-à-vis the Soviet naval threat, Congress terminated all 

funding for the SBWAS Program.

The demise of SBWAS brought an end to nearly three decades of Navy advocacy 

of space-based radar surveillance systems capable of detecting and tracking ships and 

aircraft.

Infrared Surveillance and Warning

The Navy did plan funds for infrared (IR) experiments in the 1992 budget, but the 

effort ended when the SBWAS Program was terminated in 1990.

Slow Walker

In 1982, the Navy TENCAP Office followed up on a discovery by Mr. Leo Brubaker

of the Defense Intelligence Agency (under a program called Sudden Dawn) that IR data 

provided by the Defense Support Program (DSP) strategic warning satellite system 

contained information that could be useful to tactical users. Navy personnel were 

detailed to the DSP ground stations, under the project name Slow Walker. When the 

Naval Space Command was formed in 1983, it assumed responsibility for the Slow 

Walker detachments.)

Direct Tactical Reporting

TADIXS-B

The direct communications path from satellites to tactical users developed in 

accord with the "sensor-to-shooter" approach was initially implemented as a broadcast 

to be called Tactical Data Information Exchange System Broadcast (TADIXS-B). This 

was a specially formatted one-way link, patterned after the (two-way) TADIXS channel 

of Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM). The TADIXS-B broadcast was 

designed for reception via narrowband UHF channels by all Navy ships, submarines 

and surveillance aircraft (as well as by increasing numbers of Army, Marine Corps, and 

Air Force tactical units that used UHF narrowband communications).
124 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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Eventually, two U.S. satellite surveillance systems, including the Navy-designed 

Improved Ocean Surveillance System, incorporated the capability to broadcast nearreal-time contact reports via TADIXS-B to tactical users. (This TADIXS-B capability was 

used effectively by operating forces for many years.)

Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) and its Derivative Terminals

The Navy Special Projects Office (SPO) undertook the development of the 

receiving terminals for the Navy's ships, submarines, and aircraft to receive and use the 

information on the TADIXS-B broadcasts. In the early 1980s, Navy leadership was 

briefed on the sensor-to-shooter concept and the TADIXS-B plans for the fleet. Rear 

Admiral Bill Ramsey, Director of the Navy Space Systems Division (OP 0943), laid 

down some guiding precepts for the TADIXS-B terminals.

For Navy applications, the terminals were to incorporate:

• No new radio antennas, because Navy surface ships have little additional mast 

space for them, and installations of cable runs for new antennas are costly.

• No additional personnel, either to maintain or to operate the equipment, 

because submarines and most surface combatants had no room for berthing 

additional personnel. (For Navy applications, this precept dictated using already

installed radio equipments for the TADIXS-B terminals.)

• In addition, the terminal design should accommodate the requirements of Army, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps as well as Navy tactical users.

• For Navy submarines and small ships, no new stand-alone display equipment, 

because of the lack of space.

The Navy ship and submarine terminals developed in response to this guidance, 

termed Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE), consisted simply of: an adapter to enable 

use of already installed shipboard UHF satellite-communications radios, a decryptor, a 

data-filtering unit, and cabling. The TRE was designed to automatically reformat the 

TADIXS-B contact reports correctly for each shipboard user's weapons-control 

processor or display and allowed each of these users to independently set the criteria 

for the delivery of contact reports to the user’s station (by geographic coverage, type of 

contacts, and minimum acceptable geolocation accuracy), while automatically filtering

out all other contact reports.

The prototype TREs were designed and built by 

the Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San 

Diego, California. In 1988, an engineering 

development model of the TRE underwent successful 

operational evaluation by the Navy's Operational Test 

and Evaluation Force. Funding was programmed for 

TRE installations in more than 300 Navy surface 

ships and submarines (Figure 20).

Figure 20. A mobile version of the 

Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE)
Direct Tactical Reporting 125 _________________________________________________________________________________

The first hundred or so TREs deployed consisted of Engineering Development 

Models, procured by the Navy's System Project Office through NOSC. The cost of each 

of these TREs (installed) was relatively low—a mixed blessing, as it turned out.

Although the low TRE cost minimized budget impacts for ship-systems and weaponssystems managers, the cost was so low that when the interfacing of the TRE with 

combat systems experienced some management delays, this matter did not attract 

Navy leadership attention at a high enough level to be resolved quickly. Integrated 

logistic support for the deployed Navy TREs was managed by a NOSC office 

established and funded for that purpose. NOSC and personnel from the Special 

Projects Office provided the TRE training for the fleet.

(About 1990 the responsibility for procuring the remaining hundred or more Navy 

TREs was turned over to a "white-world" systems-acquisition office of SPAWAR. Rather 

than reproduce NOSC's functional Engineering Development Model that had passed 

operational evaluation and was already being successfully and widely used 

operationally, the contractor attempted to redesign the TRE with new state-of-the-art 

technology. It proved impossible under this acquisition process to match either the low 

cost or the rapid acquisition of the TREs that had been achieved by the Navy SPO 

through NOSC. The programmed funds evaporated before any further TREs were 

delivered. The fleet continued to use NOSC's old Engineering Development Models, 

with cross-decking between deploying ships and submarines, supplemented by an 

expediently "stripped down" version of the TRE called the OL-444, until a Navy decision 

was made in 1995 to acquire an Army version of the TREs to augment the aging Navy's 

Engineering Development Models.)

The Air Force and Army, whose operating forces were not as universally equipped 

as the Navy's for UHF satellite communications, made the decision to incorporate a 

UHF radio into their TRE units. The Air Force procured and fielded 250 such TREs 

(called Constant Source), based on NOSC's TRE Engineering Development Model.

The Army Space Program Office (ASPO) incorporated their TRE modules into a 

new, multichannel Success radio for equipping the Army TENCAP vans. ASPO also 

developed a new TRE-like system, the Command Tactical Terminal (CTT) and procured 

250 of them for Patriot missile, artillery, and Army aviation commands.

In 1990 the Navy Special Projects Office began to develop a more compact 

adaptation of the TRE terminals, called the Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal 

(MATT). These terminals for reception of the TADIXS-B broadcast were installed in 

attack submarines, Navy EP-3 electronic-surveillance aircraft, Harpoon-equipped P-3C

maritime patrol aircraft, E-2C anti-air warfare aircraft, and EA-6B electronic-warfare 

aircraft, as well as in selected Air Force aircraft (B-1 and B-52 bombers, F-117 fighters, 

C-141 and MC-130 transports, and E-3 reconnaissance aircraft), Army UH-60

helicopters, and other space-constrained platforms. (Milestone I for the MATT receivers 

was achieved in 1993, and responsibility for the acquisition and support of subsequent 

MATT receiver terminals was transferred to USSOCOM, which continued as the multiservice system program office in the ensuing years.)
126 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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Evolution of the TRAP Broadcast

To provide the operating forces advance operational experience with the sensorto-shooter way of delivering contact reports from national and other surveillance 

systems (as the basis for developing tactics and procedures to use when TADIXS-B

became operational), a series of special exercises was scheduled by the Navy TENCAP

Office during the mid-1980s. These exercises were conducted by all the Numbered 

Fleets, in several theaters, involving various combinations of surface combatants, 

tactical submarines, shore-based aircraft, and the Ocean Surveillance Information 

System (OSIS) nodes.

Because TADIXS-B was not yet operationally available, special arrangements 

were made to support each of these exercises with an information broadcast that 

simulated TADIXS-B. For this purpose, SPAWAR, the Navy TENCAP Office, the Naval 

Security Group (NAVSECGRU), and the Navy SPO (with essential support by the Naval 

Ocean Systems Center (NOSC)) made special arrangements to interconnect existing 

national surveillance systems with the participating fleet units; the contact reports from 

these systems were reformatted in real time (in TADIXS-B format) and broadcast on a 

dedicated communications link. Each of the participating units was provided with a 

prototype TRE. Upon completion of each exercise, this simulated TADIXS-B broadcast 

was disassembled, and the equipments were transported to support the next exercise in 

another theater.

In cooperation with the Navy SPO and NAVSECGRU, the Navy TENCAP Office 

(with engineering support from NOSC) conducted an operational demonstration 

between a Regional Reporting Center and USS Spruance in October 1984, off the U.S. 

Atlantic coast. The Center for Naval Analysis provided independent assessment of the 

tests, which revealed that the prototype capability had consistently delivered ocean 

surveillance information (derived from satellite data) to the USS Spruance in less than 

ten minutes.

Members of the staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet read CNA’s report and asked the 

Navy TENCAP Office to assist them in organizing a follow-on operational demonstration 

during exercise PAC FAC-86. Commander Michael Ketron of the Naval Security Group

(on CINCPACFLT’s staff) proposed and helped arrange for an extension of the first 

test—with an operational demonstration of over-the-horizon targeting and other warfare 

applications involving a battleship, aircraft carrier, cruiser, and submarine in the Pacific 

during the fleet's PAC FAC-86 exercise. PACFLT also expanded the concept by using 

an operational FLTSAT communications satellite as the delivery path between the 

designated Regional Reporting Center and ships in the Hawaiian Operating Area.

This latter demonstration immensely impressed the operational participants and 

commanders. Upon completion of that exercise, Ketron and others suggested that, 

instead of dismantling the simulated TADIXS-B broadcast that had been set up to 

support it, arrangements be made to find a way to replace it as a permanent operational 

capability. This proposal was not received enthusiastically by the National 

Reconnaissance Office, which operated the satellites, or by naval intelligence 
Direct Tactical Reporting 127 _________________________________________________________________________________

personnel. The NRO was concerned that failure would have a negative impact on the 

credibility of satellite-derived data. Naval intelligence personnel were unhappy that 

sensitive information would be sent directly to tactical operators and without being 

assessed by intelligence experts.

The response of the Director, Navy TENCAP to both concerns was that the best 

strategy for the SPO and NAVSECGRU was to work with TENCAP to make the 

research project a success. To the credit of each of the organizations, they did precisely 

that, and the TRE and Related Applications (TRAP) Broadcast was born.

The TRAP Broadcast not only proved to be effective, but it radically altered the 

relationship between the national space community and tactical forces. A TRAP

Steering Group was formed in 1989 with representation from the Service TENCAP 

Offices, JCS, DIA, USSOCOM, and NSA. The newly formed System Applications 

Program Office (SAPO) of the Navy SPO was assigned programmatic responsibility for 

sustaining the TRAP Broadcast, and NAVSECGRU stepped up as operational 

manager. TRAP was soon expanded to support the fleets in all theaters worldwide. The 

Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical forces began using it. Additional satellite 

surveillance/ reconnaissance systems made arrangements for some of their information 

to be broadcast on TRAP to tactical users, and non-satellite surveillance systems also 

added their information. The TRAP Broadcast revolutionized the way tactical reporting 

by national and other systems was to be delivered for decades to come.

With this widespread success of the direct tactical broadcast came claims for 

recognition. Literally scores of individuals went on record as having been responsible for 

the TRAP concept, and most of these claims were valid. This tactical broadcast had 

required: significant changes in the way national systems processed and reported data; 

provision to tactical users of hundreds of tactical terminals; extensive modifications of 

interfaces with weapons-control systems; major expenditures by the NRO for 

development or modification of surveillance sensor systems; development of tactics and 

procedures to use the information; and development of and adherence to standard 

formats for compatibility. Amazingly, this entire effort was not directed from top down 

and had no formal organization. The individuals who made it happen all had to work 

"outside the box" of their respective organizations. Appendix A lists some key 

individuals without whom the near-real-time broadcasting of satellite-surveillance 

information direct to tactical users (the "sensor-to-shooter" approach, and the 

consequent TRAP Broadcast) would not have happened.

Tactical Data Correlation and Display

For almost all Navy tactical applications, the surface and air contacts of interest 

move, so they must be tracked. For this purpose, each individual contact report from a 

space-based (or other) source must either be correlated to a previous track or initiated 

as a new track, all based on analysis of the relative positions and track projections of 

contacts in the geographic area of interest, or on measured physical features of the 

contacts reported, or both. In the 1970s these correlation and display functions had 

typically been performed by computer-aided systems such as the Naval Tactical Data 
128 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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System (NTDS) and its derivatives, or by manual analysis and plotting from (automated) 

print-outs.

The TRE was originally intended primarily for use with the automated tactical data 

systems afloat (NTDS and JOTS), and with weapons-direction systems such as the 

Tomahawk Weapons Control System (TWCS) and the submarine Combat Control 

System (CCS), and with the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) ashore.

With accelerating fleet demand in the 1980s for reporting of data from national 

space systems directly to Navy and other tactical users via the TADIXS-B and TRAP

broadcasts, the process of integrating TRE connectivity directly to the combat 

information and weapons direction systems in ships, submarines, and aircraft was 

unable to keep up. To fill this gap, stand-alone systems were developed by the Special 

Projects Office to help perform the track-correlation function and display the tracks, 

enabling the operators to enter the tracks manually into the tactical-data systems.

Stand-Alone Tracker-Correlators and Displays

Although developed primarily for operational concept development, tests, and 

demonstrations, a large number of additional Outlaw Shark terminals (page 96) were 

acquired during the early 1980s, through the "white-world" Over-the-Horizon Detection, 

Classification, and Targeting Office (PME 108) and installed temporarily in deploying 

surface combatant ships to perform the track-correlation and display of TRE reports.

Because the Outlaw Shark algorithms had been designed to correlate and display the 

TRE-reported and other contacts whether they were reported as hostile, friendly, 

neutral, or unidentified, these terminals proved especially useful in supporting the overthe-horizon targeting (OTH-T) requirement (page 94).

In the meantime, the Navy's Special Projects Office (PME 106-5) had recognized 

the need to develop tactical data processors to help operators visualize, analyze, and 

exploit the national surveillance/reconnaissance reports, and a Prototype Development 

Engineering Center (PDEC) was established in the late 1980s. A series of stand-alone 

tracker-correlator and display terminals (POST, PAWS, ATPs, and others) were 

developed. Initially, they were optimized for use by intelligence personnel operating in 

secure spaces afloat and ashore. The efficient correlation algorithm of these terminals, 

designed by Chuck Chrisman of the PDEC, was initially based on the assumption that 

the reported contacts to be correlated would be those identified as hostile or potentially 

hostile (meaning in the 1980s, that the contacts of interest would be ships or land forces 

of Communist nations). Later, to broaden the operational utility, capability to process all 

kinds of contacts was added, through an arrangement for non-hostile contacts to be 

reported with arbitrarily assigned identification notations.

The Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal (POST) developed by the PDEC was 

first deployed in the USS Enterprise in the Indian Ocean in 1983 and found immediate 

favor with operators. At the urgent request of Seventh Fleet, the Navy's Afloat 
Direct Tactical Reporting 129 _________________________________________________________________________________

Correlation System (ACS) Program* designated the POST terminals as the "Interim 

Afloat Correlation System," and beginning in 1986 POST terminals were installed in all 

the large flagships.

In 1989, the Special Project Office designed another PDEC system, the Advanced 

Tracking Prototype (ATP), for correlating reports of air and land-based threats. In 

addition, low-cost stand-alone terminals were developed:

• Control and Alert Reporting Terminal (CART), providing users with TRE filter 

controls and a geographic plot of contact reports, but no tracker-correlator

• The Standard TRE Display (STRED), a smaller, more compact version similar 

to CART

• GALE-Lite, like STRED, but with a tracker-correlator

Thousands of the STREDs were produced and deployed in ships, typically at 

several stations in each ship, during the late 1980s (and for the next quarter of a 

century.) The Navy, however, never established a formal program of record for the 

stand-alone terminals, and as a consequence, the production of Gale-Lites had to be 

turned over to the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2000.

The Navy Tactical Command Systems-Afloat (NTCS-A) program was established 

in late 1989, and a decision was made to transition the functions of the ACS, POST, 

ATP, and other stand-alone terminals into NTCS-A. Soon thereafter, however, 

Operation Desert Storm created an urgent need to mass produce POSTs and ATPs for 

large numbers of Navy ships, and the NTCS-A program contracted with the Navy 

Special Projects Office to immediately provide and support ATPs in thirty-three Navy 

ships operating in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. (NTCS-A did successfully 

incorporate the POST functions and the ATP functions by 1993, at which time the POST

and ATP terminals were removed from the afloat inventory.)

Implementations of TRE Connectivity in the Fleet

In the 1980s the Navy's Special Projects Office worked with the Cruise Missile 

Program Office to develop a capability to use national surveillance data to support OTHtargeting for the Tomahawk Tactical Anti-Ship Missile (TASM). As an interim capability, 

POST terminals were installed in tandem between the TRE and the Tomahawk Weapon 

Control System (TWCS) to provide the track correlation of the TRE contact reports for 

the TWCS in battleships and some destroyers. Expedited development began in 1988 

to embed the Outlaw Shark track-correlation function directly into the TWCS; this 

capability completed successful testing and evaluation at the Tomahawk Test and 

Evaluation Facility and in a destroyer, USS David R. Ray (DD-971), in 1989. This TRE-

 * The Afloat Correlation System (ACS) was an overly ambitious program in the 1980s to develop an allencompassing shipboard system for correlating national and organic tactical data and was intended to 

replace the Tactical Flag Command & Control (TFCC) System and various other C3I systems. It did not 

achieve a final design concept and was eventually phased into other programs.
130 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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TWCS direct interface capability was then rapidly fielded fleetwide to provide 

Tomahawk-equipped ships with time-critical OTH-targeting and background shipping 

data. The commander of Destroyer Squadron Twenty, embarked in USS John Rodgers, 

fired the first live TASM aided by this direct TRE-TWCS interface, as part of Fleet 

Exercise 1-90. All four battleships and several other Tomahawk-equipped ships 

deployed with this capability during Desert Storm. (After the Soviet Union collapsed, 

however, U.S. Navy ships no longer deployed with TASMs, and the direct TRE interface 

to the TWCS was no longer sustained; the GCCS-M eventually developed a capability 

to provide correlated tracks to the Advanced TWCS for the land attack version of the 

Tomahawk subsequently carried by Navy ships and submarines.)

For Aegis cruisers and destroyers, a prototype capability was developed in 1988 to 

automatically insert relevant air contacts into the Naval Tactical Data System and Link 

11, and plans were outlined to integrate TRAP data into the Aegis Weapon System 

long-range Tactical Data Display. During Operation Desert Storm, two Aegis cruisers 

were outfitted with an interim stand-alone terminal to provide this capability. (After the 

collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Soviet Navy as a threat, 

attention turned to the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the use of national 

sensor data by Aegis ships for cueing; see page 150.)

TREs were installed in 1988 in two attack submarines (SSN 696 in the Pacific 

Fleet and SSN 719 in the Atlantic Fleet), and a prototype capability to feed correlated 

tracks into the submarine Combat Control System (CCS) was demonstrated, using a 

correlator designed by the Tiburon company as the track-correlation processor. In 1991,

NAVSEA PMS-425 sponsored and the Navy Undersea Warfare Center (at Newport, 

Rhode Island) developed a direct interface between the TRE and the CCS MK II, by 

adding a computer for front-end track correlation. Successful technical and operational 

evaluation of this TRE-CCS MK II direct interface upgrade was completed in early 1992 

in USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723). (This direct interface capability was used effectively 

for several years; however, when the production TREs failed to materialize, only eight, 

rather than all, of the attack submarines were so equipped.)

TRE installations in aircraft carriers initially included TRE interconnections only to 

ship's intelligence spaces (SUPPLOT and SSES). In the USS Enterprise, after a TRE

post-installation liaison visit enroute and during subsequent operations in the Indian 

Ocean in 1987, the battle group commander directed (over the objections of the 

intelligence personal of both the battle group staff and the ship's company), that TRE

connections be run also to the electronic-warfare module in the Combat Information 

Center and to the Tactical EA-6B Mission Support System (TEAMS) planning cell.

These new connections soon became a standard part of carrier TRE installations. USS 

John F. Kennedy deployed to the Mediterranean in 1988-89 with a similar TRE

connection to TEAMS.

The display for the TRE data in both these early deployments was simply a 

keyboard printer. As this device had no graphical map display, contact reports of 

interest had to be manually plotted or manually entered into a separate computer for 
Direct Tactical Reporting 131 _________________________________________________________________________________

plotting. Later in 1988, however, the EA-6B Program provided an automated TRETEAMS interface connection, giving operators the ability to control the TRE filters and 

display correlated tracks onto graphical displays at the communications work-station. In 

1990, this configuration was named the Data Fusion Processor (DFP) and was 

successfully employed in three carriers for Operation Desert Storm. (This TRE interface 

remained a standard capability until TEAMS was replaced by the Joint Mission Planning 

System in 2007.)

By 1990, aircraft carriers typically had the following TRE connections:

• SUPPLOT (POST terminal)

• SSES (secure POST terminal)

• EW module in CIC (CART terminal)

• TEAMS (TI-1200 printer, subsequently the DFP)

• Tactical Flag Command & Control (CART terminal)

An EA-6B tactical electronic-warfare aircrew first used tactical information directly 

from national sensor systems in 1991, when an aircraft from Squadron VAQ-132

specially configured to receive the TRAP broadcast saw action during Operation Desert 

Storm. The contact reports were printed on a keyboard printer with no ability to display 

them onto maps. Although cumbersome, the information proved valuable for beyondline-of-sight contact awareness, and it validated the requirement to integrate this 

capability directly into the AN/ALQ-99 weapon system (page 151).

In early 1987 a backpack version of the TRE (the AN/PFC-3) was installed in an 

EP-3 aircraft. The TRE contacts were correlated and displayed using a system called 

Prototype Airborne Reporting and Ground Operations Node (PARAGON). By February 

1989 similar equipment was installed in all VQ-1 and VQ-2 aircraft. This capability was 

used extensively during Desert Storm missions. (The EP-3 program subsequently 

integrated TRAP/TADIXS-B reception capability as part of the Airborne Reconnaissance 

Integrated Electronic System II (ARIES II) upgrade, in the 1990s.)

In 1989 a TRE was installed in an ISAR-equipped P-3C maritime patrol aircraft.

The data received was displayed on a desktop computer and used to assist in cueing 

the ISAR radar onto surface contacts and help confirm the identification of surface 

targets. (In 1993 a P-3C successfully launched a Harpoon missile at a mobile at-sea 

target while remaining beyond line of sight of the target, using exclusively TRE data; this 

led to the expedited fielding of the Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program that 

integrated TRAP, TADIXS-B, TIBS, and OTCIXS data into the P-3C weapons system; 

see page 151.)

Early in the 1980s, the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) added a 

track-correlation capability for processing all-source information, including contacts 

received on the TRAP Broadcast), as part of the OSIS Baseline Upgrade (OBU). 

(Timely information on mobile and fixed targets continued to be shared with Navy units 

afloat for the next two decades.)
132 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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Satellite Reconnaissance Imagery to the Fleet in the 1980s

As satellite imagery of areas of the world (other than the Soviet Union) became 

more readily available in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fleet Intelligence Centers 

began to prepare packages of "hard copy" imagery (i.e., photographs and transparencies) for delivery to Navy battle groups prior to deployment. Selection of the satellite 

images was based on the theater to which the battle group was scheduled to deploy 

and on potential contingency operations within the theater. There was, however, no 

assurance that a particular target would be covered in the photographs, and no 

procedure for updating the deployment package other than by courier. The flexibility and 

responsiveness of Navy operations to unforeseen problems often left fleet strike 

planners without the imagery required, other than what could be obtained by RF-8 or F14 Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) aircraft.

Transmission of imagery over satellite and other communications links had long 

been possible. Facsimile transmission had been available to Navy users for two 

decades or more. However, the quality of imagery and the speed at which that imagery 

could be sent are limited by the resolution and speed of the technology for scanning it 

and by the available bandwidth of the communications channel over which it is transmitted. (For example, transmission of the full quality of a single 5"x10” satellite-derived 

image would take several hours over a standard UHF narrowband link.)

Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST)

The first effort to resolve this problem began in the early 1980s with the 

development of the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST). The FIST imagery was 

transmitted via UHF satellite communications. FIST terminals were put aboard aircraft 

carriers and large amphibious ships, which could then receive transmissions of satellite 

imagery from Fleet Intelligence Centers during pre-scheduled time slots each day. The 

product sent via FIST was known as "secondary imagery." (Primary imagery was the 

original quality provided by the satellite sensor, which had to be handled in special 

security channels.) Secondary imagery, classified at a lower level, was cropped from 

the original image and had a reduced number of shades of gray, as a means of 

reducing bits that had to be transmitted.

FIST was a first step, but it never truly met the fleet's needs, because:

• If a photograph had to be digitized (i.e., scanned) before transmission from the 

Fleet Intelligence Center, resolution and contrast were degraded during the 

process.

• The UHF data transmissions were painfully slow, and large portions of image 

files were often lost when the data flow was interrupted by communications 

difficulties (such as another unit transmitting during the prearranged FIST time 

slot). Two or three usable FIST images per day were considered good output.
Navy Environmental Sensing Programs in the 1980s 133 _________________________________________________________________________________

• The area captured in the cropped 512 by 512 pixel images was small, generally 

covering the specific target but not the surrounding terrain—information needed 

by pilots for rapid orientation as they approached a target under fire.

• When the received FIST image was printed aboard ship, an additional 

reduction in resolution and contrast occurred.

(FIST was used during Desert Storm operations in 1991. It performed erratically, 

largely because of conflicting priorities for use of scarce UHF satellite channels. Fleet 

units had to rely principally on couriers to deliver imagery products used for mission 

planning.)

Top Scene

In the late 1980s, the Navy began to install Top Scene systems aboard aircraft 

carriers. This system was faster than FIST, but it worked only on pre-stored data. It was 

loaded with a database that combined high-quality satellite imagery with Digital Terrain 

Elevation Data provided to the Navy by the Defense Mapping Agency: Top Scene

permitted strike planners to "rehearse" their missions by "flying" through threedimensional depictions of their intended strike routes.

(The U.S. Carrier Battle Groups participating in Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm did not have the databases for Kuwait or Iraq and were, therefore, unable 

to make use of the Top Scene system during the conflict.)

Navy Environmental Sensing Programs in the 1980s

GEOSAT

The accurate altimetry data from NASA’s Seasat in the late 1970s (see page 102) 

had revealed that differences between high and low regions of the ocean surface could 

vary by hundreds of feet. A relative high spot in the ocean, representing a greater 

accumulation of water than the nominal average, would have a small but measurably 

higher gravitational field than a relative low spot on the ocean surface. This could have 

an effect on accuracy of the trajectories of U.S. missiles.

To continue these measurements, the Navy contracted with the Applied Physics 

Laboratory (APL) to design and build GEOSAT, which was launched successfully on 12 

March 1985 into a near-polar orbit at an altitude of approximately 500 miles. The 

GEOSAT radar altimeter had an accuracy of three centimeters. This precision was, of 

course, of little value unless GEOSAT's orbital altitude was known with similar accuracy.

APL's solution to this challenge was to equip the GEOSAT with ultra-precise digital 

clocks and a highly stable reference signal, making it possible to track the GEOSAT

satellite using the inverse of the navigation principle of the Transit satellites.

GEOSAT was controlled by the Naval Space Command's Navy Astronautics 

Group, at Point Mugu, California. The geodesic data collected by GEOSAT was 

processed at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. The GEOSAT data 
134 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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was also sent to the Navy Oceanographic Research and Development Activity, Bay St. 

Louis, Mississippi, to support oceanographic research, and to the Fleet Numerical 

Oceanography Center, Monterey, California, from which information on ocean currents 

and similar phenomena was sent to the fleet.

The geodesy mission of GEOSAT was completed nineteen months after launch, 

and the satellite was then dedicated to military oceanographic research beginning in 

November 1986.

(GEOSAT remained in operation until its altimeter failed in 1990. The highly 

accurate geodesic data collected by GEOSAT was not released until after the Cold War, 

when Vice President Gore (on the advice of a space panel convened by the White 

House) authorized the Navy to release the GEOSAT data to the public, in 1995. The 

GEOSAT mission continued under the Navy’s GEOSAT Follow-On (GFO) program in 

the late 1990s; see page 162.)

Naval Remote Ocean Sensing System (NROSS)

In 1980, the Naval Oceanographic Command got approval for a Naval Remote 

Ocean Sensing System (NROSS) program. NROSS satellites were proposed as a 

replacement for the National Oceanographic Sensing System (NOSS), a joint NASANavy program that had been cancelled by Congress because of escalating costs. The 

NROSS satellites, to be acquired by the Navy, were to carry many of the instruments 

already developed for NOSS, including:

• A scatterometer, to make measurements of waves, from which local surface 

winds could be derived. (Estimating surface winds was important for Tomahawk

and Harpoon cruise missile anti-ship targeting.)

• An altimeter, to supplement GEOSAT coverage for measuring local ocean 

heights.

• A Low-Frequency Microwave Imager (LFMI), a new instrument enabling indirect 

measurement of sea-surface temperature (an important input for threedimensional modeling of the ocean temperature profile, considered vital for 

both submarine and tactical ASW operations, as well as for the Sound 

Surveillance System (SOSUS)).

NROSS was proposed for a 1985 development start. The concept was to orbit an 

NROSS constellation of two satellites in a 600-nautical mile sun-synchronous orbit.

Readout would use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) data relay 

network to get the data to the Fleet Numeric Weather Center in Monterey, California.

The NROSS satellites would also have onboard processing and direct downlink to 

ships, such as aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships, equipped with the AN/SMQ10 antenna system.
Space Systems Survivability Considered 135 _________________________________________________________________________________

The program was to be relatively inexpensive compared to other satellite programs, because there was a perceived opportunity for a "free ride" on the launch of 

DMSP satellites. In 1983, however, the Air Force made it clear that the Navy's NROSS

package would not be given a free ride with DMSP. This led to a sharp increase in the 

projected NROSS cost.

In 1985, a Milestone-II decision declared that the NROSS program was ready for 

full-scale engineering development, and the Navy's Space and Warfare Systems 

Command (SPAWAR) began the acquisition process. A request for proposals was 

issued in the summer of 1986. The bids submitted by the contractors exceeded the 

funding that the Oceanographer of the Navy had been authorized for NROSS

acquisition by 10-20%, and SPAWAR approached the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 

with a request for additional funding for the program. A CNO Executive Board was 

convened in early 1987 to review the request. Presentations to the Board were 

ambivalent concerning the purpose of the proposed system; it was either: (a) to gather 

scientific data to enable the Navy to model the oceans, or (b) to provide operational 

data in direct support of the Navy's submarine and anti-submarine warfare forces. After 

the presentations, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), Admiral James Busey, 

asked the Board if any Navy sponsor present was willing to provide the additional 

funding to get the products proposed by NROSS; no sponsor was willing to do so, and 

the VCNO terminated the program.

Space Systems Survivability Considered

During the late 1970s, some Navy and other planners in the Pentagon had begun 

having second thoughts as to whether space-based systems, upon which the Navy had 

come to depend for critical support, could survive in wartime. If the Navy could not rely 

on satellite support in combat, they argued that the Navy should not allow itself to 

become dependent on satellites for operations in peacetime.

The Soviet Anti-space Threat in the 1980s

Then, in 1981, a revolutionary change took place in Soviet military doctrine which 

impacted the U.S. view toward the wartime survivability of satellites. This newly 

developed Soviet doctrine allowed that a U.S.-Soviet theater war could escalate to a 

global war that was global but not nuclear. The Soviets became convinced that they 

could win such a war that was conventional from start to finish. According to the new 

Soviet doctrine, the USSR now would plan to fight NATO without provoking the U.S. into 

escalating to the nuclear level.

This shift in war-planning assumptions had far-reaching implications for Soviet 

anti-satellite doctrine. New rules were developed for determining which U.S. systems 

could be attacked, and under what circumstances, without risking nuclear war. As long 

as the war remained conventional, the USSR would not attack U.S. space-based 

systems they thought the U.S. would consider vital for warning of nuclear attack or for 

Command and Control of strategic forces (DSP, DMSP, DSCS, etc.).
136 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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In keeping with this new policy, the Soviets transferred their primary responsibility 

for anti-satellite planning and operations from their (strategic) anti-space defense force 

(PKO) to the respective Soviet theater (TVD) Commanders. In 1986, the Soviet 

definition of their tactical TVDs was officially redefined to include the "near earthaerospace-region" (okoluzemnoe vozdushno-kowmchuskoe prostronstro), implying 

satellites with orbits up to 1,000 nautical mile altitude. Anti-satellite measures available 

to the TVD Commanders included: jamming of those U.S. space-based communications 

systems the Soviets considered not essential to U.S. strategic warfare (but specifically 

including FLTSATCOM); attacks on in-theater ground nodes of non-strategic systems 

such as local tactical communications nodes; and cover and deception (maskirovka) 

operations to deny or deceive the sensors on U.S. surveillance reconnaissance 

satellites.

Revival of Navy’s Space Survivability Program

In the spring of 1988, a study task force of senior Navy technical experts and flag 

officers was assembled by Rear Admiral Richard Macke, Commander, Naval Space 

Command, to examine the survivability of U.S. space systems and the implications for 

the Navy's tactical war-fighting in response to this new Soviet policy. Under retired Rear 

Admiral Robert Geiger, the task force examined all the space systems used by the 

Navy, as well as: (1) the operational and technical capabilities of the real and projected 

anti-satellite threats, (2) war-game outputs addressing employment of the space and 

anti-space systems, (3) alternatives to U.S. loss of space systems, and (4) recommendations on survivability alternatives. Principal conclusions of the task force were:

• Significant threats against the U.S. satellites critically needed by U.S. Navy 

tactical forces were from Soviet “radio-electric combat” (including 

communications jamming), attacks on U.S. overseas ground stations, and 

possibly from physical ASATs.

• The Soviets had incentive to attack our satellites because: (a) they had operational ASATs and the U.S. did not; and (b) the U.S. could not readily replace 

lost satellites and the Soviets could.

• But the only totally effective Soviet anti-satellite capability would be the 

continued perception by U.S. operators and planners that U.S. space systems 

will not survive and hence should not be used by tactical forces.

• U.S. space systems used by tactical forces can be made to be as survivable as 

the forces they support, and DoD should take steps to ensure that those space 

systems that perform critical functions for naval forces in wartime are designed 

and operated to ensure survivability and durability to that designated level.

• Navy operators and planners have a legitimate need-to-know concerning the 

degree of survivability and availability of national space systems which provide 

critical support to warfighters.
Space Systems Survivability Considered 137 _________________________________________________________________________________

The Naval Space Command started a program to brief the fleets concerning the 

above findings on survivability of space systems. Recommendations were also made to 

DoD for specific improvements in survivability of selected space systems.

With the end of the Cold War, Navy concerns about the survivability of U.S. 

satellite systems largely evaporated. (The concerns were to reappear later in the 2000s, 

with growing awareness of the tactical importance of space systems and the potential 

threats of domestic and international terrorism to fixed ground stations.)
138 Chapter 4 – Maturing of Navy Space-based Tactical Support (1980-1991)

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139

CHAPTER 5 – NAVY SPACE CHALLENGES: UNCERTAINTY

AND RESOLUTION (1992–2003)

World events at the beginning of the 1990s refocused missions of the U.S. Navy 

and reshaped the Navy's space activities.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved by 1991. The Cold War was 

suddenly over. The Soviet Navy, which had been the primary objective of U.S. Navy 

attention for three decades, now became neglected and partly divided among the 

former Soviet republics. It all but disappeared as a threat to the U.S. Navy.

In early 1991, U.S. military and naval power was unleashed instead on the nation 

of Iraq, whose forces had invaded Kuwait in August 1990; the Iraqi forces were driven 

out and decimated by a U.S.-led coalition force seven months after their invasion. The 

U.S. Navy participated in the buildup and preparation of forces (Operation Desert 

Shield) and the ensuing ground-air combat operations (Desert Storm) in that land war, 

contributing primarily carrier-based air power, sea-launched cruise missiles, and 

amphibious transport. In the wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia, NATO decided to 

provide military help to Bosnia in 1995–1996, and the U.S. Navy again contributed seabased air power and cruise missiles to support the ground and air operations in that 

theater.

Space-based intelligence systems supported the U.S. tactical forces in the Gulf 

War operations, much of it made possible through the applications pioneered by the 

Navy Special Projects Office (SPO), including its recently formed Space System 

Applications Program office (SAPO), the Naval Space Systems Directorate, and the 

Navy TENCAP Office. Intensive use was made of the TRAP Broadcast, the outgrowth 

of the Navy's sensor-to-shooter approach of the 1980s (page 126). Space support to 

tactical forces became recognized as a major contributing factor in the overwhelming 

successes of those forces in Desert Storm.

All of this left intelligence organizations such as the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA), which had previously justified 

their budgets on national strategic imperatives, scrambling for funding. These 

organizations began focusing on "Support to Military Operations" (SMO) as the 

keystone to their long-term fiscal survival. However, the term "SMO" was variously 

interpreted. To some organizations, it implied improving the national intelligence 

provided to the Joint Chiefs, the U.S. Commanders-in-Chief, and other high-level 

decision-makers. To the Navy, and increasingly to the other services, SMO meant 

extending tactical support to commanders and units at all levels.

Navy planners and decision-makers, whose experience had been in preparation 

for combat against the Soviet Navy, now began warily to consider the possibility that the 

Navy's primary concern might no longer include offensive and defensive operations 

against enemy ships, submarines, and missile-carrying aircraft at sea. Rather, the 

Navy's primary mission in the foreseeable future would probably be in joint operations in 
140 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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land theaters and the littorals. Navy planning and preparations were adjusted 

accordingly. The deployed Tomahawk anti-ship missiles in Navy ships and submarines, 

for example, were replaced by the tactical land-attack variant, and plans for targeting 

the land-attack version were intensified. Much attention was turned to correcting 

shortcomings in the Navy's communications and intelligence for support of land attack 

missions that had been experienced during Desert Storm and Bosnia operations.

With the election of President Clinton in 1992, a new executive administration 

came into power. The Air Force and its major contractors began pressuring, once again, 

for the Air Force to be given sole authority over acquisition and operation of U.S. military 

satellites. Prospects for deep cuts in military defense programs and significant changes

in Defense Department organization in 1992 (see page 142 and 164) forced a 

fundamental rethinking about the Navy's future role in space.

Some of the Navy's top leaders questioned why the Navy should invest in retaining 

any space expertise, at all. They argued, in effect: "If the Air Force wants an exclusive 

role in acquiring military satellites, let them have it; the Air Force should pay for the 

satellite programs; and if the Navy has any requirements for space support, we can 

obtain it from the Air Force through requirements submitted by the fleet commanders-inchief."

A dichotomy in viewpoint was evident, for the Navy in the 1990s was still, in fact, 

the military user most dependent on space. Navy commanders and units continued to 

depend on spacecraft to communicate, navigate, and extend the eyes and ears of battle 

groups to watch the movements of potential adversaries, enable targeting of precision 

weapons, find downed pilots, track the weather, and reconnoiter landing areas. Of the 

four services, the Navy had led the way in applying communications, surveillance, and 

other satellite systems to tactical operations. It became clear that the Air Force wanted 

to build—but not necessarily fund—any space systems that might be needed 

specifically for Navy requirements; as it turned out, the Air Force would continue to 

pursue joint systems designed to "common-user" requirements.

In addition, during this epoch the Navy began putting heavier emphasis on 

“network-centric” operations to improve combat effectiveness. That is, the Navy 

emphasized investing more resources and tactics in command-and-control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4 ISR) 

rather than in weapons and platforms themselves. This placed even more potential 

dependence of the Navy on satellite systems.

Advocates for a continuing Navy participation in space programs foresaw that the 

Navy would not be able to obtain the space-support capability needed in the future by 

simply "throwing requirements over the transom" and expecting to receive space 

capability back that would meet all the Navy's needs. Rather, the Navy would have to 

continue to participate in the end-to-end process of trading off capabilities, costs, and 

schedules throughout each development process. To be able to do this, the Navy-space 

proponents argued, the Navy would have to maintain:
Navy Space Organization and Changes 141 _________________________________________________________________________________

• A cadre of personnel qualified in space technology, acquisition, and operations, 

in grades through flag and Senior Executive Service, experienced in naval 

operations as well as space systems

• A funded space technology base

• An effective space systems acquisition base able to partner with the Air Force 

and national space providers and/or to acquire Navy-unique space capabilities

should that be necessary

• A component to provide space training assistance to the fleet units and schools 

and for war-games and fleet exercises

• Support of the Naval Postgraduate School space curricula

• A deliberate effort within the Navy to integrate space with combat systems

The Navy’s efforts during the ensuing decade would be spent resolving these 

challenges.

Navy Space Organization and Changes

At the beginning of 1992, the Navy's organization for space activities consisted of:

• The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), headquartered 

at Washington, DC: responsible for the Navy people participating in national 

space programs and for the office that in the late 1980s had managed the 

(unsuccessful) effort to field space-based radar. (In 2000, SPAWAR

headquarters was moved to San Diego, California.)

• A major program managed by the Navy within the NRO, headed by a Navy flag 

officer.

• A Program Executive Office (PEO) for Space, Communications, and Sensors, 

in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 

and Acquisition: responsible for acquiring the UHF Follow-On communications 

satellite system.

• The Naval Space Command at Dahlgren, Virginia: responsible for operation of 

the Naval Space Surveillance Network, the U.S. Alternate Space Defense 

Operations Center, and the Naval Satellite Operations Center, and for 

supporting fleet space training.

• The Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST), at the Naval Research 

Laboratory, Washington, DC, seeking a regular source of Navy funding to 
142 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

_________________________________________________________________________________

supplement its non-Navy sources of funding for NCST projects.

• The Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC, later NRAD), San Diego, with most 

of the Navy's engineering expertise in developing and installing the equipments 

enabling Navy ships to communicate via and receive information from satellites.

• The Navy TENCAP Office, which consisted of only six naval officer billets 

supported by a small contract team.

• Naval Security Group Command, involved with processing and disseminating 

space-derived information to the fleet.

• A small core of analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 

experienced in measuring the effectiveness of satellite applications in naval 

operational scenarios.

• The Space Engineering and Space Operations curricula at the Naval 

Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Major Change in Relationship between the NRO and the Navy in 1992

In 1992, a major restructuring of the National Reconnaissance Office took place; 

the three program offices that had been managed for the NRO respectively by the Navy, 

the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force were disestablished. In their place, 

the NRO reorganized along functional lines, by intelligence disciplines.

In effect, this 1992 reorganization divested the Navy of further ability to direct the 

one NRO Program that had pioneered application of NRO satellite surveillance for 

tactical users, that had acquired the first NRO system actually designed to tactical 

users' requirements, and that had established an office (SAPO) to interface the NRO 

directly with tactical users. (President Reagan had formally recognized the Navy 

program in 1986 for its achievements.) Rear Admiral Tom Betterton, who had 

dynamically and effectively led the NRO's Navy Program, retired. For eighteen months, 

the Navy continued to manage the former Navy tactical space program through a flag 

officer (Jay Sprague), and then appointed a captain to replace him.

Navy Interest in Space Temporarily Languishes

With a flag officer no longer representing the Navy on the Board of Directors of the 

NRO, and with no specific Navy responsibility in the NRO, the Navy’s ability to influence 

national space plans and programs eroded. Within the Navy, a basic question arose:

why should the Navy continue to fill billets within the National Reconnaissance Office,

now that Navy had been relieved of it responsibility to manage and direct an NRO 

Program?

The Navy leadership’s interest in space matters on the staff of the Chief of Naval 

Operations languished. In 1993-1994, the Navy missed potentially beneficial 

opportunities to participate in a sequence of joint space programs. Navy funds for the 
Navy Space Organization and Changes 143 _________________________________________________________________________________

Naval Center for Space Technology dried up, and the Center had to resort to funding 

from non-Navy sources to keep its projects going.

In 1994, the Navy issued a new Navy Space Policy document. Although it directed

that the Navy should

“Integrate space into every facet of naval operations, including requirements and 

resourcing, doctrine and policy, technology and systems development, acquisition, 

operations, a supporting cadre of personnel with expertise in space . . .”,

it also portended lean funding ahead, by emphasizing that the Navy should pursue the 

acquisition of the space capability it needed through “maximum leverage of non-DoN 

systems and organizations.”

A Renewal of Navy Interest in Space: The (First) Smith Panel

Upon the recommendation of Captain Dwight Denson, chief of the Navy’s Special 

Project Office, and at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 

Development and Acquisition) and of the Director of the NRO, a blue ribbon panel was 

formed under retired Navy Admiral William D. Smith in May 1997, referred to as the 

First Smith Panel, to address the above and related issues. The First Smith Panel’s 

members included Rear Admiral Thomas Betterton, USN (Retired); Major General 

Richard Phillips, USMC (Retired); Dr. Gary Federici (CNA); Mr. Jimmie Hill (former 

Deputy Director, NRO); Dr. Bruce Wald (formerly NRL); and Colonel William Savage, 

USAF (Retired). After talking with many Department of the Navy (DON) seniors in 

reaching its conclusions, the Panel recommended a number of specific actions, based 

on the above-listed findings, to reestablish DON’s vital and enduring role as a partner in 

the National Reconnaissance Program. The signed Panel Report was forwarded to the 

Secretary of the Navy and the Director of NRO. The Smith Panel’s report included the 

following findings:

• Navy people were valuable to the NRO, because they brought an 

understanding of naval war-fighter's needs that is invaluable in designing 

operationally responsive, state-of-the-art systems.

• By contributing only about 8% of the NRO total manpower, the expected return 

to the Navy would be high (military operational support being now the NRO's 

design driver, and 66% of NRO's resources were focused on acquisition of 

satellite systems).

• The Navy should therefore commit the resources necessary for a full NavyNRO partnership.

• All of the Navy’s space programs and personnel, both in SPAWAR and the 

NRO, should be consolidated with a single flag-level manager.
144 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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The Panel’s report got the attention of the Navy’s senior leadership. The above 

and all of the Panel’s other recommendations were implemented, including establishing 

a Naval-NRO Coordination Group to explore opportunities for both the Navy and the 

NRO; increasing Navy presence in high payoff areas of the NRO; and addressing Navy 

space acquisition organizational issues.

Consolidating Management of Navy Space Acquisition

In 1999, in keeping with the Smith Panel’s recommendations, the Navy 

consolidated all of its space systems acquisition personnel, programs and interests 

under a single command. An experienced and competent space systems acquisition 

manager, Rear Admiral Rand Fisher, was triple-hatted as: (1) Director of the Navy's 

Space Technology Systems Directorate (PD-14) of the Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Command; (2) Commander of the SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA); and 

(3) Director of the Communications Directorate of the NRO, a role in which he sat on the 

Board of Directors of the NRO, co-equal with the Air Force and CIA directors. Navy 

personnel in the SSFA were redistributed throughout all the NRO disciplines and 

programs in which the Navy had an interest. The Program Executive Office for Space, 

Communications, and Sensors in the Office of the ASN (RDA) was disestablished, and 

Navy responsibility for acquisition of UHF communications satellites was transferred to 

PD-14. (Subsequently, in 2004, PEO Space Systems was established to provide a 

formal PEO structure for Navy space acquisition programs—see page 170).

Naval Space Command Subordination to NETWARCOM, 2002

The importance of information in warfare became apparent during the closing 

decades of the 20th century. Many authors attributed the Coalition’s swift and decisive 

victory in Desert Storm to information superiority, and some captioned it as “The First 

Information War.” Guidance from the Joint Staff stated “the emerging importance for 

information superiority will dramatically impact how well our Armed Forces can perform 

its duties in 2010” as it described a future military with less kinetic mass and permanent 

overseas presence that can maintain “full spectrum dominance.” Vice Admiral Arthur 

Cebrowski and others introduced the concept of “network-centric warfare” and urged 

that robust networks allowed the superior information sharing that leads to improved 

combat power.

Space capabilities had played a major role in the information superiority 

demonstrated in Desert Storm. Not only was satellite communication an essential 

enabler, but also, for the first time, space surveillance systems (originally built to gather 

strategic intelligence) demonstrated in combat that they could provide direct support to 

military operations.

The recognition of the importance of space to future military dominance led to the 

enunciation of a national policy that stated: “consistent with treaty obligations, the U.S. 

will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of 

action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.” DoD 

defined space control as “combat and combat support operations to ensure freedom of 

action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an 

adversary freedom of action in space.”
Navy Space Organization and Changes 145 _________________________________________________________________________________

Similarly, the recognition of the importance of information superiority led to a 

growing emphasis on information warfare, or information operations, which involve both 

the defense of one’s own information systems and attacks on adversary information 

systems.

Of course, the Navy had recognized the importance of protecting the space 

systems on which it depends. It pioneered the protection of communications satellites 

from jamming by introducing a state-of-the-art anti-jam processor in the very first Fleet 

Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) satellite.

However, the growing recognition of the importance of information in warfare may 

have had an unintended adverse consequence on Navy space interests. Recognizing 

the centrality of information in modern warfare, and being advised that it needed a 

functional type commander for information, the Navy formed the Naval Network Warfare 

Command in 2002 to serve that function. Some twenty-three organizations from several 

commands, including the Naval Space Command, Naval Computer and 

Telecommunications Command, Fleet Information Warfare Center, and Navy 

Component Task Force-Computer Network Defense, were brought together to form the 

Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), emphasizing the organization's 

focus on the operation and defense of the Navy’s networks. (In 2005, with the 

disestablishment of Naval Security Group Command, NETWARCOM assumed 

responsibility for the former Naval Security Group Activities, significantly reduced in 

number from the period of the Cold War, and the mission of the Navy’s cryptologic 

forces changed, fundamentally, to that of Information Operations.)

Because the Navy’s space interests were largely confined to communications and 

information flow—it had never been interested in force application from space, had 

given up developing kinetic anti-satellite weapons, and had surrendered management of 

the space surveillance system it had pioneered—it seemed logical to fold the Naval 

Space Command into NETWARCOM and move its personnel from Dahlgren, VA, to the 

latter’s Norfolk area headquarters. However, faced with the challenge of managing the 

Navy’s burgeoning computer networks during a period of contracting manpower, 

NETWARCOM converted nearly all of its space-oriented billets into other categories.

(While Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) had a Flag Officer and scores of 

military and civilian personnel at Dahlgren in past decades performing a variety of 

advocacy, requirements generation, and fleet support functions, as of January 2009, 

there was no senior officer and only a handful of others at NETWARCOM headquarters 

devoted to space matters.)

The DoD continued to recognize the importance of information, establishing it as a 

warfighting domain and defining it broadly to include telecommunications networks and 

computer systems. This new domain intersected the physical ground, maritime, air, and 

space domain (its physical components span all four domains), and the Defense 

Department recognized that all combatant commanders, military departments, and other 

defense components need to operate freely in this new domain.
146 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR) Goes to the Air Force

The Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to transfer program management of 

the Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR), the nation’s oldest sensor built to 

track satellites and debris in orbit around the earth, to the Air Force beginning in 

October 2003. The Air Force requested that the Navy continue to operate the space 

surveillance sensor, also known as the Space Fence, through fiscal year 2004. The 

Navy transferred operation of the system to the Air Force during formal ceremonies on 

01 October 2004.

The transfer of Space Fence operations to the Air Force brought an end to more 

than 40 years of Navy control of this sensor system from Dahlgren, Virginia, first by the 

NAVSPASUR, then assumed by Naval Space Command in 1993, and finally by Naval 

Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) when that organization was established in 

2002.

In addition to assuming operation of the Navy’s space surveillance system, the 

20th Space Control Squadron (SPCS) Det. 1 also took on the Alternate Space Control 

Center (ASCC) mission, which had been first assigned to NAVSPASUR in 1987. In its 

ASCC role, NAVSPASUR—followed by Naval Space Command and finally 

NETWARCOM—served as the backup computational and command and control node 

for the Space Control Center at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base, Colorado.

Naval Space Reserve

The Naval Space Reserve Program (NSRP) was established in 1995. It grew 

quickly to ten organized Reserve units, manned by space-experienced personnel 

designated to specifically augment and support the following Navy space offices and 

commands: SPAWAR 40 (later, SSFA); the Office of the CNO; NAVSPACECOM (later, 

NETWARCOM); and USSPACECOM (later, USSTRATCOM). (In 2002, the NSRP was 

merged with the Telecommunications Reserve into the Naval Reserve Space and 

Network Warfare Program.)

“Golden Age” of Navy TENCAP Contribution

Many observers had believed that the end of the Cold War in 1989 would bring 

about the demise of the service TENCAP Offices. But the actual result of the near backto-back fall of the Iron Curtain and Operation Desert Storm was to introduce a “golden 

age” of TENCAP activity. Intelligence agencies that had received annual funding without 

much debate in support of Cold War strategic priorities were suddenly required to justify 

their budgets in terms of supporting tactical-level combat forces. The intelligence 

community turned to the service TENCAP offices for advice in determining how their 

resources might best be employed to support tactical units. This led to a decade of 

unprecedented cooperation between the Service TENCAP Offices and intelligence 

agencies. Significant progress was made in developing space-based solutions to 

problems that arose during Desert Storm and subsequent operations in Bosnia and 

Kosovo.
“Golden Age” of Navy TENCAP Contribution 147 _________________________________________________________________________________

Based on in-depth understanding of tactical commanders' needs for space-derived 

operational information and detailed knowledge of the communications and processing 

architectures by which the information is disseminated to combat forces, Navy TENCAP

conducted numerous projects to improve the quality, quantity, and rapidity of tactical 

information from National space systems through innovative applications of technology 

in tests and exercises. These initiatives by Navy TENCAP proved instrumental, for 

example, in improving the tactical dissemination of satellite-derived imagery (Radiant 

Cirrus) and tactical exploitation of infrared surveillance (Radiant Ivory); the latter project 

is discussed in a following section.

In addition, a Navy TENCAP project called Radiant Mercury developed the first 

fully automated sanitization and downgrading system certified by the Director of the 

National Security Agency for use with formatted intelligence information. Acquisition of 

Radiant Mercury terminals began in Fiscal Year 1997. Prototype systems were installed 

at fleet headquarters and theater intelligence centers. (They are used today to 

automatically generate tactical broadcasts for U.S. Navy ships and Allied forces that do 

not have direct access to highly classified databases.)

TENCAP further expanded its personnel resources in the mid-1990s by 

establishing a Research Center at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 

California. For a modest annual investment, TENCAP gained access to experienced 

members of the NPS faculty and highly motivated thesis students, some of whom 

learned about TENCAP for the first time and subsequently sought tours of duty as 

TENCAP project officers.

Radiant Topaz

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, there was a realization that national, 

theater, and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance sensors would be more effective if 

managed as a system-of-systems. In the early 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

had validated requirements for a system that would allow theater commanders to track 

the information needs of combat units and the allocation of surveillance and 

reconnaissance assets to satisfy those needs. The Army was designated Executive 

Agent for development of a Joint Collection Management Tool (JCMT).

A planned component of JCMT, known informally as JCMT-Lite, was intended to 

provide a means for tactical commanders to input information needs into theater 

collection management processes and to track satisfaction of those needs. Each 

service had planned to insert JCMT-Lite into its respective version of the Global 

Command and Control System (GCCS). The subsequent collapse of the JCMT program

thus left a gap in the Navy’s GCCS-Maritime (GCCS-M).

In early 1999, the Resource Sponsor for GCCS-M (code N62 on the Navy staff) 

approached the Director, Navy TENCAP with a proposal to use its rapid-prototyping 

techniques to develop a software application to fill the gap in GCCS-M resulting from 

the failure of JCMT-Lite. N62 pointed to the JCS-validated GCCS Requirements 

Integrated Database, to which all fleet commanders had contributed. TENCAP agreed 

and began a project named Radiant Topaz.
148 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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Two elements were proposed. A software application, named the Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance Management Tool (SRMT) \r “srmt” , would be developed as a plug-in 

to GCCS-M. It would assist afloat commanders in: (a) drafting information needs; (b) 

inserting information needs into theater collection management processes; and (c) 

tracking satisfaction of fleet information needs.

The second element was a Collection Awareness Web Portal (CAWP) that would 

be activated on INTELINK (a highly classified network with functional elements of the 

Internet and World Wide Web). The CAWP should give fleet commanders direct, nearreal-time insight into how the chain-of-command and U.S. intelligence agencies were 

responding to tactical-level information needs. CAWP was completed in six months and 

was activated on INTELINK to obtain user feedback. CAWP quickly became one of the 

most popular sites on INTELINK. In 2000, TENCAP’s CAWP was formally 

acknowledged as the most innovative new service on INTELINK during that year.

In early 2000, given the positive fleet response to the CAWP, Navy TENCAP’s 

SRMT was chosen by the JCS as the official replacement for JCMT-Lite in GCCS-Joint.

Starting in 2001, the schedule for technical and operational evaluations of 

GCCS-M began to slide, first to 2003 and eventually to 2005. The challenge for 

TENCAP was to sustain (for an additional three years) what had been planned as a 

three-year project, while remaining compliant with frequent technical changes in the 

parent program. SRMT eventually participated in the technical and operational 

evaluations of GCCS-M in 2005 and it passed. Unfortunately, SRMT addressed 

requirements that were six years old and was close to being obsolete when compared 

to concepts for information management in use at that time. The CAWP, however, 

provided an 80% solution to the fleet’s needs for situation awareness concerning 

tasking and priorities of surveillance and reconnaissance systems in support of tactical 

information needs.

Space Program of the Naval Postgraduate School in the 1990s

During the 1990s, several offices of the Navy (Naval Space Command, Navy 

TENCAP, the Navy Special Projects Office, the Navy Program Executive Office for 

Space Communication and Sensor Systems (PEO-SCS), and others), as well as the 

National Reconnaissance Office, NASA and industry, sponsored faculty chairs in the 

Space Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering curricula at the Naval 

Postgraduate School and offered appropriate topics for research by the students.

Small-satellite research at the Postgraduate School (begun in 1987) resulted in the 

development of a series of small satellites during the 1990s, including the Petite 

Amateur Naval Satellite (PANSAT), launched successfully in 1998.

By the end of the 20th Century, the space program at the Naval Postgraduate 

School had graduated about 400 officers and senior civilians, representing all the 
Advances in Utilization of Tactical Data from National Surveillance 149 _________________________________________________________________________________

military services and other government organizations. (The Navy graduates comprise 

more than half of the space-qualified officers in today's Navy Space Cadre.)

Recognizing a continuing need for space and space-related education of 

personnel throughout the Navy, the Naval Postgraduate School created two distance 

learning programs for non-residents in the 1990s, leading to a Space Systems 

Certificate (starting in 2002) and a Master of Science in Space Systems Operations 

(starting in 2003). (By 2009, over 140 personnel had graduated from these programs.)

Advances in Utilization of Tactical Data from National Surveillance

The 1990s saw improvements in direct reporting of surveillance and 

reconnaissance data to Navy and other tactical users. The TRAP Broadcast (page 126) 

evolved in the early 1990s into the TRE Data Dissemination System (TDDS)

(subsequently called the Tactical Data Dissemination System), and in the late 1990s, 

TDDS was incorporated as part of the Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) and called 

IBS-Simplex (IBS-S). It achieved widespread use by the tactical forces of the Navy and 

the other Services.

NRO’s Operational Support Office (OSO) Interface with Navy and other Users

When the NRO was restructured in 1992 (page 142), the functions and personnel 

of the Navy’s System Application Projects Office were transferred to the NRO and 

renamed the Operational Support Office (OSO). (Although formally a joint organization, 

the OSO continued to be largely Navy-led and Navy-manned for the next fourteen 

years.) Throughout this epoch, the OSO continued to work directly with the Services on 

integrating national systems data with the combat systems of the Navy and the other 

military Services, as well as those of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

As part of this effort, the OSO developed software called the Tactical Receive 

Segment (TRS) that enabled filter-setting and message-processing functions of the 

Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) (page 124) to be run on standard personal 

computers (PCs). OSO also developed an even smaller, lightweight, low-cost version of 

the TRE called the Embedded National Tactical Receiver (ENTR), which included a four 

channel receiver, crypto, and the above TRS/TRE software. One version of the ENTR

was embedded in IBS radios, to replace the MATT/TRE terminals in Navy aircraft.

(In 2006, the OSO’s functions and personnel were split up between NRO’s User 

Engagement Group and Operational Solutions Group, both under the Deputy Director 

for Military Support.)

Expanded Combat System Connectivity and Integration

During this epoch, the Navy expanded the connectivity and the integration of 

national systems data with its submarines, the Tomahawk Missile System, Aegis ships, 

ASW/Maritime patrol aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and anti-air warfare/commandand-control aircraft.
150 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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Submarines

Interest in delivering contact reports from national sensor systems directly to attack 

submarines was reawakened in the mid-1990s, following deployment of the USS 

Boston with a Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) as part of Exercise 

Dynamic Impact 94 and a deployment of similarly equipped USS Cavalla in the Western 

Pacific in 1995. Subsequently, many deploying attack submarines carried similar "walkon" systems, most typically a MATT receiver with a GALE-Lite processing and display 

terminal, to receive and display tactical data from the TRAP and TADIXS broadcasts. In 

1999 funding was identified to integrate an Embedded National Tactical Receiver 

(ENTR) as part of the AN/BLQ-10 electronic warfare system. (This integrated capability 

became operational in 2008 and was programmed for all attack and ballistic-missile 

submarines.)

Tomahawk Missile System

In 1992, following the Gulf War and the demise of the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy 

changed the load-out of its Aegis ships from Tactical Anti-Ship Missiles (TASMs) to the 

Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) version. At first, all TLAM missions were planned at 

a Cruise Missile Support Activity ashore and linked out to the firing platform. In 1997 the 

Navy then fielded a Tomahawk Afloat Planning System (APS) to provide TLAM mission 

and threat avoidance planning and replanning at sea. NRO's Operational Support Office 

worked with the Tomahawk Washington Planning Center toward integrating TRAP and 

TADIXS-B information directly into the APS. (Later, following a Navy decision to 

discontinue support of the APS concept, the OSO-Navy effort shifted to planning 

inclusion of real-time reporting of national surveillance information to the (shore-based) 

Maritime Operations Center.)

Aegis Ships

Soon after the 1991 Gulf War, the focus of part of the Aegis program turned to 

theater Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and a requirement to provide a BMD cueing 

connection from national systems to the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) was formalized. 

TREs were installed in two Aegis cruisers, USS Port Royal and USS Lake Erie, and 

TRAP reports were delivered to an AWS Adjunct Processor to build the scan acquisition 

volumes needed for the Aegis system's AN/SPY-1 radar to acquire and track the TBM 

targets. In June 1995, the capability of this prototype installation was demonstrated at 

sea during the Aegis Extended Tracking and Control Experiment at the Kauai Pacific 

Missile Test Range, in which two live theater ballistic missiles were the radar targets.

Testing resumed in the late 1990s, when the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) became 

available, designed for capability to shoot down theater ballistic missiles. Two Aegis

ships were specially modified in 1998 to utilize BMD contact reports, called Linebacker,

and sea trials were made using time-critical BMD contact reports for cueing the 

AN/SPY-1 radar for SM-3 target acquisition. (The first Aegis ships to have fully 

integrated capability to use the BMD reports for cueing were in 2004, and in February 

2008 an Aegis cruiser with this integrated capability for cueing shot down a low-orbit 

inactive U.S. satellite; page 179).
Advances in Utilization of Tactical Data from National Surveillance 151 _________________________________________________________________________________

SURTASS

The Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships were equipped 

with the capability to utilize the surveillance data from national systems, beginning in the 

1980s. This consisted of simply a TRE receiver and a stand-alone display such as the 

Standard TRE Display (STRED) or a CART.

ASW/Maritime Patrol Aircraft

In 1993, a P-3C aircraft participated in Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Targeting 

demonstration Radiant Oak on the Point Mugu at-sea test range, successfully launching 

a Harpoon missile at a moving at-sea target beyond the line-of-sight horizon, and using 

exclusively the contact reports received on the TRAP broadcast for the targeting data.

This demonstration led to expedited fielding of the Anti-surface warfare Improvement 

Program (AIP), which integrated TRAP, TADIXS-B, TIBS, and OTCIXS information 

directly into the P-3C weapons system. The contact reports were correlated and 

displayed at the OTH Airborne Sensor Information System (OASIS) work-station. By the 

end of 1996, five P-3C aircraft had been upgraded to this OASIS configuration, and the 

Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Centers (ASWOCs) were compatibly equipped.

(Most aircraft in the P-3C fleet were eventually upgraded to the AIP configuration.)

Electronic Warfare Aircraft

Also in 1993, a Naval Reserve EA-6B squadron (VAQ-209) led a series of concept 

demonstrations during Exercise Talon Sword, showcasing the operational utility of offboard information in support of suppression of enemy air defenses. Tactical data 

received from the MATT receiver was displayed to EA-6B operators on laptop 

computers having the map-based Standard TRE Display (STRED) software developed 

by the Navy SPO (page 129). In this demonstration, an EA-6B successfully located the 

target and launched a High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), while remaining well 

below the radar horizon, using solely the tactical data on TRAP and TADIXS-B; the 

HARM acquired the target and scored a direct hit. VAQ-209 then led targeting 

demonstrations at the Point Mugu at-sea test range, as part of coordinated, low altitude 

war-at-sea strike during Exercise Radiant Oak, in which an EA-6B used nationalsystems targeting data on the TADIXS-B and TRAP broadcasts to successfully launch a 

HARM missile at an over-the-horizon mobile target at sea, demolishing the radars on 

the target vessel. In 1995, ten MATT-equipped EA-6B aircraft operated in the Bosnia 

war, with such success that congressionally-directed funding was subsequently 

identified to equip all 126 EA-6B aircraft with this capability. (Unfortunately, the EA-6B

aircrews continued to depend on the STRED laptop to display contact reports from the 

national sensors, until MATT connectivity was fully integrated into the EA-6B digital 

displays as part of a major upgrade 2005).

Anti-air Warfare/Command-and-Control Aircraft

A requirement to integrate data from national and other off-board sensor systems 

into E-2C airborne early warning/command and control aircraft was formally identified in 

December 1994 by the E-2C Hawkeye 2000 Program Manager (PMA-231) and user 

representatives from the E-2C community as part of an E-2C Operators Advisory Group 

(OAG). In early 1997, Northrop-Grumman was tasked to develop and integrate a 
152 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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SATCOM Data Processor and Fusion capability as part of the E-2C Mission Computer 

Upgrade. The resulting effort provided capability to receive TRAP and TADIXS-B

broadcasts and integrate the contact reports directly into the E-2C avionics. (This 

integrated capability underwent operational evaluation in 2007, and four E-2C

squadrons were configured in May 2008 (page 174).

Improving Tactical Dissemination of Satellite Imagery

The period immediately following Desert Storm saw a flurry of activity to improve 

dissemination of imagery to tactical forces. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm in 1990 and 1991, U.S. military and leased commercial satellite communications 

channels had become so overwhelmed with traffic that crucial maps and intelligence 

imagery had to be airlifted to the warfighters. The need for a high-throughput broadcast 

of military information was highlighted as a critical shortcoming.

Initial Navy steps had been taken by SPAWAR to improve the capability of FIST

(page 132), using imagery provided by the new Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) which 

were replacing the individual services' intelligence centers. The JICs were given the 

capability to select pixel images four times larger than previously available and to inject 

the digital images directly into communications without the quality-reducing printing and 

digitizing processes. FIST was upgraded to handle these images, and better printers 

were put aboard the FIST-equipped ships.

To provide the additional communications-link bandwidth needed for rapid imagery 

transmission, efforts were made to accelerate installation of SHF terminals of the 

Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) aboard aircraft carriers and 

amphibious command ships (see page 159). DSCS provided significant additional 

throughput capacity, but competition for these limited resources often left Navy units 

short on access.

Several initiatives were undertaken during the 1990s to provide communications 

for transmitting high-throughput imagery rapidly and reliably to Navy commanders 

afloat. One of these efforts was led by Lieutenant Commander John Hearing, assigned 

to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, who had recently completed a Naval 

Postgraduate School Master’s Degree thesis on potential uses of commercial satellite 

communications and believed his ideas might solve the problem of satellite-imagery 

delivery to fleet flagships. Other efforts were undertaken by Navy TENCAP, under its

Radiant Ivory project (see page 156).

Challenge Athena

With the approval of his supervisor, Captain Ed Enterline, and endorsement by 

Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (OPNAV N6), 

Lieutenant Commander Hearing supervised arrangements for using a commercial SHF 

(C-Band) satellite link to deliver imagery from a classified U.S. intelligence site to an 

aircraft carrier at sea. This effort was code-named Challenge Athena.
Improving Tactical Dissemination of Satellite Imagery 153 _________________________________________________________________________________

Mr. Ed Engle, a retired naval aviator then employed in the NRO’s Operational 

Support Office (OSO) , proposed working with the Army/NRO project and adapting their 

technology; he then developed a system architecture and provided the engineering skill 

to adapt it to the Navy’s application. Dr. Gary Federici of the Center for Naval Analyses

coordinated the solicitation of concept approval (and eventually special funds) from the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, key Congressional 

staffers, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to enable transmitting 

primary imagery from a national source directly to the Navy flagship via commercial 

satellite. A portable C-Band receive antenna was placed aboard USS George 

Washington (CVN-73), a commercial link (Intelsat) was provided, and an imagerytransmission test was conducted in the Puerto Rico Operating Area in September 1992.

The 1.5 Megabit per second data rate was the highest ever achieved to a Navy ship at 

sea up to that time.

A second demonstration, this one during an entire deployment by the carrier, was 

conducted under the name Challenge Athena II. For this demonstration, a full duplex 

(i.e., transmit and receive) antenna was installed on a sponson on the USS George 

Washington to serve as a dedicated path for primary satellite imagery and other highthroughput communications. The demonstration began during the USS George 

Washington battle group's fleet exercise in March 1994 and continued through 

November of that year.

Challenge Athena was a stunning technical achievement. The ready availability of 

current intelligence information meant that Navy battle force commanders afloat were 

now in a position to both receive and disseminate national imagery and other 

intelligence and operational information at high volume levels comparable to those of 

the national and joint intelligence centers ashore.

Challenge Athena was upgraded to a formal program; terminals were scheduled 

for installation in aircraft carriers and amphibious flagships, and commercial 

communications satellite services were leased (see the CWSP Program, page 160).

Navy Management of Satellite Imagery

Although the addition of military and commercial SHF satellite links to large 

combatants succeeded in providing the additional bandwidth necessary to support 

imagery dissemination, it did not solve the imagery-management problem. In 1992, 

Navy TENCAP and SPAWAR sponsored an operational demonstration of these new 

capabilities under the name Radiant Cirrus. During the two weeks of Exercise Tandem 

Thrust 92, the Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific (JICPAC) transmitted about 500 images 

to the Third Fleet Commander embarked in USS Coronado. This demonstration, 

although technically successful, revealed that fleet analysts could not digest the flood of 

imagery they were now receiving. The Navy's approach to solving this problem involved 

two parallel efforts, as described below.

The first effort occurred immediately after the Gulf War. The Office of the Secretary 

of Defense had sponsored development of software to allow remote tactical users to 

access imagery files from a centrally located computer. A test of this software, called 
154 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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Demonstration of Demand-Driven Digital Data (5-D), was conducted in 1992 by the U.S. 

Air Forces, Pacific. In 1993 (during Special Project Eidolon Lance as part of USPACOM

Exercise Tandem Thrust-93), Navy TENCAP and SPAWAR provided capability for 

intelligence specialists on the staff of Commander, Seventh Fleet to use this concept of 

"user pull" to access satellite-imagery databases at JICPAC. Similar demonstrations in 

the Mediterranean were supported by Navy TENCAP, SPAWAR, and the NRO’s 

Operational Support Office during projects Radiant Cirrus-III and -IV. This approach 

proved successful, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence gave Navy TENCAP funding to accelerate this 

capability in support of U.S. operations in Bosnia in 1996.

The second of the two efforts involved taking software from the Joint Deployable 

Intelligence Support System (JDISS), which incorporates very powerful database-query 

tools, and installing it in the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System 

(JMCIS). When the JDISS software was installed in JMCIS and JMCIS was connected 

to high-capacity satellite communications, fleet operators were able to "reach out and 

touch" a very large number of imagery and other sources and to "pull" from these 

sources precisely what they needed. This became the primary tactical processing and 

display configuration in most large Navy combatants.

JSIPS-N Concentrator Architecture (JCA)

As the Navy improved its management of satellite imagery, fleet lessons learned 

revealed that the vast majority of imagery being disseminated via Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI) channels was releasable at the Secret General 

Service (GENSER) level. In addition, significant cost savings could be realized by using 

network-based terrestrial dissemination rather than point-to-point links. Buoyed by the 

success of Challenge Athena, PMA-281 collaborated with the Office of Naval 

Intelligence and the National Reconnaissance Office to produce a new, network-based 

dissemination architecture at the Secret level for dissemination of imagery to carriers 

and large-deck amphibious ships equipped with Challenge Athena. Called the Joint 

Service Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N) Concentrator Architecture (JCA), 

this new architecture replaced the old National Input Segment to the Fleet and achieved 

initial operational capability in 2002. It consisted of a national imagery feed to a 

concentrator at the Office of Naval Intelligence having ready access to six months of 

imagery and a tape archive of up to five years, a backup concentrator at an alternate 

location, ATM terrestrial communications links, the Challenge Athena space segment, 

and the ships and shore sites which received and utilized the imagery for targeting, 

intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and battle damage assessment.

Imagery was distributed to JCA equipped ships via the traditional Imagery 

Exploitation Support System (IESS) and Dissemination Element (DE); however, a single 

DE and IESS Server was utilized at the concentrator rather than a DE and IESS server 

aboard every ship.

The JCA gave large-deck Navy ships the ability to receive the National feed of 

imagery at the Secret GENSER level for the first time, increasing its utility to naval 

warfighters. The sizing of the concentrator and the bandwidth of the communications 
Infrared Surveillance and Warning 155 _________________________________________________________________________________

links assured that time-critical targeting was supported. (The JCA was then upgraded 

from ATM to Gigabit Ethernet and was absorbed into the Distributed Common Ground 

System-Navy (DCGS-N).

Imagery Dissemination by the Global Broadcast Service

Operational implementation of the Global Broadcast Service (GBS), developed in 

the late 1990s (page 160), made possible the rapid dissemination of wideband 

information, including high-definition imagery. In 2000, the PMA-281 project office of the 

Navy and the Operational Support Office (OSO) of the National Reconnaissance Office 

spearheaded exploitation of the GBS Phase II for imagery dissemination to the fleet.

The JCA (page 154) was integrated with GBS Phase II and the National Imagery and 

Mapping Agency's Web-based Access and Retrieval Portal (WARP). At first, the Buzzlite fly-away GBS suite was deployed, aboard USS Harry S. Truman and USS Mt. 

Whitney. Later, OSO utilized the Immediate File Delivery Service of GBS to provide 

imagery to the USS Roosevelt, without having to install any new equipment, with final 

delivery to the ship's Image Product Library.

Thousands of satellite and other images were delivered to Navy ships in support of 

the air war in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the spring of 2003, leading to the conclusion 

that imagery transfer via GBS should utilized in all deployed carriers and large-deck 

amphibious ships. (A prototype IP-based Buzz-lite terminal was placed aboard USS 

Truman in 2004, enabling the ship to receive thousands of images in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom; portions of this capability were subsequently adopted in 

the DCGS-N.

Infrared Surveillance and Warning

During the early 1990s, the Naval Space Command had continued to support a 

detachment at Colorado Springs, Colorado, to provide information to U.S. tactical forces 

on any launch of theater missiles based on the Slow Walker concept work 

demonstrated with DSP infrared warning satellites a decade earlier (page 123). The 

manual methods for detecting and reporting launches of theater missiles, however, 

proved too slow and inaccurate. As the result of operations during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, there was consensus among theater and tactical commanders that an 

automated process was needed. The Navy developed a Tactical Detection and 

Reporting (TACDAR) capability, and the Army developed a Tactical Surveillance 

Demonstration (TSD) system for this purpose.

The Navy and the Army approached the Air Force Foreign Technology Division 

and the Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center to participate in independent 

assessments of test results of TACDAR and the TSD. At a meeting with the respective 

commanders of the Naval, Army, and Air Force Space Commands and the Navy's 

Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (OPNAV N6) in early 1991, the Commanderin-Chief of the U.S. Space Command not only approved the test proposals but thanked 

the Army and Navy for "dragging the Air Force kicking and screaming into the TwentyFirst Century."
156 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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Technical testing of TACDAR-TSD fusion commenced in February 1992 and 

continued through June 1992. During these tests, TACDAR demonstrated the first fully 

automatic near-real-time cross-sensor fusion ever performed using U.S. satellite 

systems. The Naval Space Command arranged for the infrared test targets. The Center 

for Naval Analyses analyzed and documented the results, convincing U.S. Space 

Command decision-makers of the validity and potential operational utility of the results.

By late summer of 1992, Navy TENCAP was ready to commence operational 

broadcast of near-real-time reporting to combat units via existing tactical circuits. U.S. 

Space Command authorized this new level of testing, and operational demonstrations of 

TACDAR and joint TACDAR-TSD cross-sensor fusion were conducted through the 

remainder of 1992.

Radiant Ivory

One of the lessons learned during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990–

1991 was that U.S. missile warning systems (i.e., space-based sensors, ground 

processing, and information dissemination) built to detect and report launches of InterContinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles were 

ineffective against SCUD-class tactical ballistic missiles. Navy TENCAP personnel had 

revolutionary ideas for how the existing system (which was developed for Cold War 

strategic purposes) might be improved in support of tactical forces. TENCAP was, 

however, uncertain about a fleet requirement for such a capability. Commander, U.S. 

Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT) clarified the issue in discussions with TENCAP personnel 

in 1991. COMSIXTHFLT identified three requirements:

• When U.S. Marines were being put ashore, a fleet commander was responsible 

to provide indications and warning of approaching threats until command of the 

Marines was shifted ashore.

• Fleet commanders were responsible for the defense of shore facilities in their 

areas of operation, any of which might become targets for tactical ballistic 

missiles (e.g., shore-based airfields in the Mediterranean).

• The Navy was developing an anti-missile capability for Aegis cruisers and it 

would be prudent to get a launch-detection and reporting system in place 

before such weapons were deployed.

With these requirements clearly stated, Navy TENCAP began an ambitious R&D 

effort under the name Radiant Ivory. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

the NRO, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) quickly joined the 

project. BMDO was a silent partner (providing much-needed funds) that did not want to 

be seen to be in conflict with the Air Force, which was most unhappy that the Navy, 

Army, and NRO proposed to tread on what the Air Force believed was its exclusive turf.

TENCAP realized early on that there would be numerous challenges to the validity 

of any claims of success made as a result of Radiant Ivory tests and demonstrations.

TENCAP asked the Center for Naval Analyses to organize a robust data collection and 
Space Radar—Reemergence and Cancellation 157 _________________________________________________________________________________

analysis effort that could withstand intense scrutiny. In addition, TENCAP recognized 

that it would not be possible to create statistically relevant numbers of tests and 

demonstrations using live rockets, which cost a minimum of $1 million each, and came 

up with the idea of using high-performance jet aircraft (Navy F-14, Tomcat, fighters) as 

surrogates for testing prototype computer algorithms and reporting timelines under 

controlled conditions.

During 1992, live Radiant Ivory technical tests were conducted at Naval Air Station 

Fallon, Nevada, and the U.S. Navy Mobile Sea Range off the coasts of Georgia and 

South Carolina. A two-week operational demonstration was conducted aboard USS 

Saratoga under the auspices of COMSIXTHFLT in the Mediterranean. In addition to 

tests using surrogates, TENCAP collected data for all live rockets launched by other

U.S. organizations.

The data collected during one year of technical tests and an operational 

demonstration was methodically reduced and synthesized by CNA and, as predicted, 

reviewed meticulously by analysts from U.S. Space Command, the joint organization 

that had operational oversight of all U.S. missile warning and reporting capabilities.

At a meeting at the Headquarters, U.S. Space Command in March 1993, the Air 

Force four-star Commander asked his staff for final comments before he decided 

whether or not to sign a letter authorizing a new operational Theater Event System 

(TES) based on Radiant Ivory’s prototype concepts. The lead analyst for U.S. Space 

Command was the last to speak. He told the general that Navy TENCAP had completed 

the most comprehensive set of tests and analyses he had ever seen and that the 

Radiant Ivory team now understood the tactical support capabilities and limitations of

U.S. missile launch detection and reporting systems better than the Air Force or U.S. 

Space Command. He recommended that the general sign the letter immediately, and he 

did so.

One year later, the Army completed development of its Joint Tactical Ground 

Station (JTAGS), which had been tested as part of Radiant Ivory. U.S. Space Command 

added JTAGS to TES. Army and Naval Space Commands entered into an agreement to 

jointly man JTAGS systems in Korea and Germany. TES was the mainstay of launch 

detection and reporting of tactical ballistic missiles for more than a decade. (The system 

was eventually replaced by the Air Force Space-Based Infrared System.)

Space Radar—Reemergence and Cancellation

Plans to place a radar satellite constellation in space had been discussed since the 

1970s. Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance (SBWAS), mentioned previously in 

page 122, was the first attempt at such a capability. The DARPA Starlite project and 

Discoverer-II (D-II), which was a joint venture between the USAF, DARPA and the 

NRO, followed in the late 1990s. Following cancellation of D-II, the Space Based Radar 

(SBR) program was kicked off in the fall of 2001 by the Department of Defense. Unlike 

other programs of its type, SBR was deemed a “White Space” program, with the lead for 
158 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

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overall program development given to the USAF. The other services, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the

Intelligence Community all participated in requirements development. The goal of the 

SBR program, which was renamed Space Radar Program (SRP) in January 2005, was 

to place a constellation of radar satellites in space. SBR’s objective was to provide 

multiple types of information, including point and area SAR imagery, Surface Moving 

Target Indicator (SMTI), High Resolution Terrain Information (HRTI), Open Ocean 

Surveillance (OOS), and Advanced Geo-Spatial Intelligence (AGI).

The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) kicked off an Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) for SBR in the fall of 2001. Naval Space Command provided initial Navy 

representation to the program. As the scope of the project increased, Navy 

representation was shifted to OPNAV N6 in the spring of 2002. Representatives from 

Navy TENCAP provided the initial support from N6. The project resulted in the issuance 

of a Presidential Decision Memorandum (PDM) that shifted the overall lead within Navy 

for SBR to OPNAV N2, with support being provided by OPNAV N6.

(After the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved a Memorandum 

of Agreement (MOA) and an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), work on the 

Capabilities Description Document (CDD) commenced in December 2005 and 

continued through 2007. The final version of the CDD was being readied for JROC 

staffing when Congress canceled the program in March 2008. High projected program 

costs and continued differences between DOD and the IC over program requirements 

were cited as the reason for the SRP program’s cancellation.)

Navy Satellite Communications in the 1990s

During the 1990s, the Navy continued to depend primarily on narrowband UHF 

satellites for tactical communications among its ships, submarines, and aircraft and 

similarly equipped Joint units. In addition, a crash program was undertaken to also 

equip large ships with Super High Frequency (SHF) and Extremely High Frequency 

(EHF) satellite terminals, to give fleet and battle-group commanders needed access to 

high-capacity, secure communications, including imagery transmission.

Navy's UHF Satellite (Narrow-band) Communications

All Navy surface ships, submarines, and aircraft continued to carry Ultra High 

Frequency (UHF) satellite-communications terminals for narrow-band communications 

(voice, teletype, facsimile,, and digital data), as did the Marine Corps and an evergrowing number of Army and Air Force units.

A total of eleven UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites were acquired by the Navy, 

through the program managed by the Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW146) at San Diego, California. In 1995, eight UFO satellites (plus one spare) were 

operating on orbit in a geosynchronous configuration, providing near-complete global 

coverage from 70 degrees north latitude to 70 degrees south latitude. (The later UFO

satellites also carried packages for the Global Broadcast Service and for EHF 
Navy Satellite Communications in the 1990s 159 _________________________________________________________________________________

communications; see pages 160 and 162). Telemetry, tracking, and command of these 

satellites was provided by the Integrated Satellite Control System at the Naval Satellite 

Operations Center, Point Mugu, California.

UFO-11, the last of the UFO series, lifted off from Cape Canaveral in a spectacular 

night launch on 15 December 2003.

SHF and EHF Satellite Communications Proliferate

The pressing demand after the Gulf War for wide communications bandwidths to 

accommodate high-data-rate intelligence, including rapid transmission of imagery (see 

page 152), brought a sense of urgency to the Navy in outfitting its aircraft carriers and 

amphibious and other large ships for SHF and EHF communications.

The initial response for obtaining additional communications bandwidth in 1991 

had begun to accelerate the programming of the Navy's SHF terminals in order to 

provide Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) capability aboard aircraft 

carriers and amphibious command ships. Despite the accelerated program, the 

operational demand for the high-throughput SHF antennas exceeded the rate at which 

they could be acquired and installed. A demonstration under the project name Radiant 

Cirrus explored the potential of using existing AN/SMQ-11 weather antennas for 

sending satellite imagery to ships. Tests in June 1991 proved successful in transmitting 

primary imagery to USS Mt. Whitney (LCC-20), but not as reliably as would be required 

for an operational system (much to the relief of fleet meteorologists, who were not 

anxious to have a new, high-priority use for "their" antennas).

SHF Wideband Satellite Communications Program

Until 1991, communications for most units of an aircraft carrier or expeditionary 

strike force was restricted to Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications.

Only the fleet commander flag ships had the additional Super High Frequency (SHF) Xband with reach-back capability to Satellite Communications Facilities 

(SATCOMMFACs), which today are referred to as DoD Teleports.

During the beginning stages of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all ships were provided 

with the commercial SATCOM International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) dial-up 

capability, providing secure voice at 2.4 Kbps with the use of a secure STU-III unit. This 

was followed with the fielding of an SHF X-band capability on aircraft carriers and largedeck amphibious platforms, which included a borrowed terminal from the Marine Corps 

(TSC-93), the FCC-100 Multiplexer for baseband and borrowed X-band space segment 

from the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) community via the 

Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). This system was commonly known 

as QuickSAT and provided a capability of 16 Kbps for voice and data.

In the mid 1990s, the AN/WSC-6 SHF X-band terminal was improved and installed 

on all aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious platforms, replacing the QuickSAT

system. This terminal provided an initial capability of up to 2.048 Mbps.
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In addition to the improved capability with the AN/WSC-6 terminal, a commercial 

SATCOM (C-Band) was introduced in the mid-to-late 1990s to provide an augmentation 

capability on aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious platforms (see page 160). For 

unit-level and small ships, the commercial SATCOM INMARSAT B High Speed Data 

(HSD) terminal was fielded, initially providing in the mid 1990s up to 64 Kbps; a later 

modem enhancement provided up to 128 Kbps.

Commercial Wideband Satellite Communications (CWSP) Program

As an outgrowth of the Challenge Athena demonstrations (see page 152), the 

Navy established the Commercial Wideband Satellite Communications (CWSP)

Program. This program provided high-data-rate communications (up to 2.048 Mbps) in 

the C-Band part of the SHF spectrum. Commercial sites provided the shore-based 

uplink and downlink facilities; Navy sites (the Naval Computer and Telecommunications 

Area Master Station (NCTAMS) and the National Conference on Telecommunications 

Technologies (NCTT)) provided the gateway hubs. Under this program the Navy bought 

commercially developed antennas, designated the AN/WSC(V)-1 and -2, for aircraft 

carriers, amphibious assault ships (LHA and LHD) command ships (AGF and LCC), 

hospital ships, and a submarine tender. These antennas received Milestone-III full 

production approval in December 2000. CWSP, with commercial Ku-band satellites, 

allowed the use of more compact shipboard terminals, and although their tailored 

footprints covered less open ocean, they were used by naval units operating in many 

littorals.

Development of Global Broadcast Service (GBS)

The Direct Broadcast Service (DBS), a commercial venture, was intended to 

compete with cable television by using high-powered satellite transponders to beam 

television signals directly to users’ 18-inch dish antennas on the ground. In 1994, Vice 

Admiral Jerry Tuttle asked Navy TENCAP to investigate potential applications of this 

technology for delivering video and large databases to ships at sea.

In response, Navy TENCAP undertook a project called Radiant Storm. Led by 

retired Navy Captain Rick Sowers, it pushed Tuttle’s concept from inception, through 

proof-of-concept, to a signed contract for acquisition of operational capability within the 

remarkably short span of sixteen months. Using a Hughes commercial satellite (DBS-1), 

a technical test was made at the Navy Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance

Center’s RDT&E Directorate (NRAD) at San Diego. The test was successful, leading 

directly to an operational demonstration as part of Special Project 95 (Night Vector), for 

which Navy TENCAP was the Executive Agent. It was conducted a part of US Central 

Command’s Roving Sands missile-defense exercise in Texas and New Mexico. This 

demonstration of DBS applicability was followed by another in 1995 as part of the Joint 

Warrior Interoperability Demonstration. A commercial DBS antenna was installed in an 

Aegis cruiser, USS Lake Champlain, and Air Tasking Orders and Tomahawk, Mission 

Updates were sent via DBS satellite to the cruiser. These transmissions took only a few 

seconds, rather than the hours usually required through then-existing fleet 

communications.
Navy Satellite Communications in the 1990s 161 _________________________________________________________________________________

The resulting enthusiasm for the Navy and the other services for Direct Broadcast 

Service became widespread, and DoD decided to acquire such a capability for the 

operating forces, under the name Global Broadcast Service (GBS). In the fall of 1995, 

Navy TENCAP, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the 

NRO’s Operational Support Office (OSO) developed a prototype GBS, called the Joint 

Broadcast Service. Prototype GBS systems were installed in USS George Washington, 

Guam, and San Jacinto, to support U.S. operations in Bosnia.

To operationalize the satellite segment of the GBS, the Navy decided to deploy 

GBS transponders on UFO satellites 8, 9, and 10 as a quick means for initiating 

widespread military service. Since the Hughes Aerospace Corporation manufactured 

both the UFO satellites and the DBS satellites, a low-risk low-cost approach was 

feasible, and the Navy signed a contract for this purpose in February 1996.

In March 1996, the GBS Joint Program Office was formed. The program was 

directed to use "commercial off-the-shelf, Government off-the-shelf and non-developmental items" to the greatest degree possible—echoing the approach pioneered by the 

Navy in acquiring previous satellite communications capabilities. The Air Force was 

designated as overall executive agent for GBS, while Navy Captain Joe Delpino was 

named as the first program manager.

The GBS Program Office was given just two years in which to take the program 

from inception to initial operational capability. Congress envisioned the GBS users' 

terminals costing $300 to $500 each, although the receiver units fielded by GBS's 

prototype program (the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation) had cost on the 

order of $150,000 each (the principal reasons for the difference being costs for military 

encryption devices, and satisfying the environmental specifications for the military and 

naval users' terminals).

The GBS space segment for the first phase of operations was supplied by 

commercially leased satellites; the second phase was supplied by the EHF (Ka-band) 

GBS transponders hosted on UFOs-8, -9, and -10. Responsibility for production of the 

GBS users' terminals, initially programmed to be acquired by the Program Office, 

transitioned to the individual services, as had been the case with other joint satellite 

communications systems. The GBS began operations in 1999, three years after 

program inception—a year late, primarily due to slips in the delivery of encryption 

devices by the National Security Agency.

The accelerated acquisition approach taken by the GBS program had controversial 

aspects. The Air Force's review board found that the program's shortcut procedures, 

derived from the streamlined acquisition practices of the NRO and the Navy, were "not 

right" by Air Force standards. At the same time, the GBS Joint Program Office team 

received the Navy's official appreciation for "compressing acquisition time and 

improving joint war-fighting capability."
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The Global Broadcast System received data from multiple information sources, 

combined it for uplink to a satellite, and relayed it to a receive broadcast manager to 

decrypt and decompose into component data for dissemination to users. The GBS sent 

a 5-inch by 10-inch annotated image in a few seconds—compared to a few minutes by 

Milstar or several hours by UHF narrowband satellites.

Beginning in 2000, the GBS was modified by PMA-281 and NRO's Operational 

Support Office (OSO) to provide rapid dissemination of imagery to the fleet (page 155).

EHF Implementation

Six of the Navy-acquired UFO satellites carried Extra High Frequency (EHF) 

packages in a geosynchronous configuration, which provided Navy and other users 

access to EHF communications everywhere between 70 degrees north and 70 degrees 

south latitude. By the early 1990s, the Navy's EHF Satellite Communications program 

comprised the Navy's part of the joint Milstar program. A Milestone-III acquisition 

decision was approved in 1993. The first Milstar communications satellite became 

operational in 1996 (after three decades under tri-service development). Three Milstars 

were eventually launched, extending the Navy's and other users' EHF communications 

coverage to the polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) regions.

The EHF users' antenna (AN/USQ-38) accommodated secure voice and fleet 

broadcast. A production contract for a medium-data-rate time-division multiple-access 

interface processor was awarded in November 1998, and pre-production models were 

delivered in March 2000.

Navy Satellite Navigation during the 1990s

By 1992, GPS had completely replaced the Transit system for Navy satellite 

navigation. The Naval Space Command continued to operate the Transit satellites to 

support merchant and other navigation, in accordance with U.S. international 

agreements, until 1996 when the Transit system ceased operation.

Satellite Environmental Sensing in the 1990s

GEOSAT Follow-On (GFO)

The Geodesy Satellite (GEOSAT) Follow-On (GFO) program was the Navy's 

initiative to develop a radar altimeter satellite to succeed the GEOSAT Exact Repeat 

Orbit, which was in operation until 1990 (see page 133).

Navy requirements for geodetic information, which had been met by the Navy’s 

previous GEOSAT mission, as well as for oceanographic information had been a driving 

force through the history of satellite radar altimetry. In the early 1990s, however, Navy 

tactical focus shifted from blue-water anti-submarine warfare to an integrated ocean 

monitoring and prediction system that would support Navy needs in blue water, on the 

slope, and on the continental shelf (coastal waters). 
Satellite Environmental Sensing in the 1990s 163 _________________________________________________________________________________

While radar altimeters in NOAA, NASA, and international community space-borne 

platforms partially mitigated the loss of GEOSAT, these other altimeter missions were 

tailored toward climate study. The Navy's preferred orbit for tactical oceanography is the 

seventeen-day, exact repeat orbit, which provides the detail necessary to resolve such 

mesoscale features as ocean currents and fronts/eddies required for Navy AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) operational support and in using basin-scale data for 

generating eddy-resolving global ocean models.

The length and time scales of these processes are too large for conventional inthe-water oceanographic instrumentation configurations to measure. Satellite altimetry 

is the only known method by which oceanographers can precisely measure sea surface 

topography. The shape of the sea surface is the only physical variable directly 

measurable from space that is directly and simply connected to large-scale movement 

of water and the total mass and volume of the ocean. The GFO satellite included all the 

capabilities necessary for the precise measurement of both mesoscale and basin-scale 

oceanography. The spacecraft added a water vapor radiometer and GPS receiver to the 

basic GEOSAT measurement capability.

The Meteorological and Oceanographic Center (METOC) Systems Office of the 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command had overall responsibility for executing 

the procurement of GFO. Competitive procurement in 1992 resulted in the selection of 

Ball Aerospace Corporation as the prime contractor for the spacecraft. Subcontractors 

included: E-Systems Corporation (payload integration and fabrication of the altimeter), 

AIL Systems Inc. (manufacturer of the microwave radiometer), Rockwell International

(manufacturer of the GPS receiver), and Lockheed Missile and Space Company (launch 

vehicle manufacture and operations).

GFO was launched on 10 February 1998 aboard an LLVI booster from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California into the same near-polar orbit as GEOSAT. As 

with the GEOSAT, all data from the GFO mission was available to the civilian 

community through National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

All payload data were provided on an encrypted, continuously operating tactical 

downlink to AN/SMQ-11-equipped Navy ships and facilities. Sea surface topography 

derived from the altimeter data was used for tactical environmental aids and for 

boundary conditions for shipboard ocean models. Also, payload data was dumped 

approximately every 12 hours and sent to the Naval Oceanographic Office 

(NAVOCEANO) Altimeter Data Fusion Center (ADFC) at Stennis Space Center, 

Mississippi, for processing.

The GFO Ground Segment included two Naval Satellite Operations Center

(NAVSOC) remote tracking sites at Prospect Harbor, Maine, and Pt. Mugu, California.

Satellite payload and engineering data was relayed to the Satellite Operations Center 

(SOC) at NAVSOC Headquarters with payload data sent directly to the Payload 

Operations Center (POC) at NAVOCEANO. The SOC provided all system and satellite 

operations with remote commanding via the remote sites.
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Assimilation of altimeter data into an integrated ocean monitoring system proved to 

be a dramatic application of GFO altimetry. (Lasting twice as long as its mission-design 

life, the mission was ended in late 2008 due to degraded performance of several 

components, particularly the battery and two of the four reaction wheels, three being

needed for operation).

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS)

Since the 1960s, the United States had operated separate civil and military polarorbiting environmental satellite systems which collected, processed and distributed 

remotely sensed meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental data. The 

Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

was responsible for the Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES)

program. Key aspects of the POES mission included collecting atmospheric data for 

weather forecasting, global climate research and emergency search and rescue 

purposes.

The Department of Defense was responsible for the Defense Meteorological 

Satellite Program (DMSP), the mission of which was to collect and distribute global 

visible and infrared cloud data and other specialized meteorological, oceanographic and 

solar geophysical data to provide a survivable capability in support of military 

operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), through its 

Earth Observing System (EOS) development efforts, provided new remote sensing and 

spacecraft technologies that could potentially improve satellite operational capabilities.

The National Performance Review, led by Vice President Gore, called for merging 

the two operational satellite programs, as well as incorporation of appropriate aspects of 

NASA's EOS in order to reduce duplication of effort and generate cost savings. On May 

5, 1994, President Clinton approved converging the civil and military polar-orbiting 

satellite systems into a single operational program, National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). A tri-agency program, NPOESS was jointly 

administered by DoD, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), with the Air Force as the acquisition authority. Development of 

NPOESS represented a significant change in the way the U.S. acquired, managed, and 

operated environmental satellites. It was to become a critical means through which the 

Navy, as a user, would be able to meet its global operational environmental observation 

and forecasting requirements for the foreseeable future. In the early 2000s, NPOESS

was still under development.

Air Force Becomes Executive Agent for Space—Once Again

The Rumsfeld Space Commission

In 1999, Congress established “The Commission to Assess United States National 

Security Space Management and Organization,” which was chartered to examine the 

military utility of space and the way space activities are managed and coordinated. The 

legislation specifically called for consideration of establishing either (1) a separate 
Air Force Becomes Executive Agent for Space—Once Again 165 _________________________________________________________________________________

military department or (2) a Space Corps within the Air Force. It also called for 

consideration of establishing a separate Major Force Program for space. These options 

were widely seen as an answer to the complaint expressed by some that the Air Force 

was not giving sufficient priority to space in the competition for people and funding

between aircraft and space assets. (This perception was reinforced by additional 

language in the FY 2001 Authorization that called for consideration of removing the 

requirement that certain officers in the U.S. Space Command be Air Force flight-rated 

and substituting the requirement that all senior officers in the U.S. Space Command 

have space, missile, or information operations experience.)

The charter of the Commission gave ammunition to those in the Navy who 

opposed investing more people or dollars in space-related matters. They argued that 

Navy’s space-experienced people could be lost to such a new Space Service, and that 

dollars programmed for space could be lost to the Navy and swept up into the new 

Major Force Program whose management would be dominated by another service.

This Commission worked under the leadership of the former (and soon to be once 

again) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and submitted its report in January 2001. 

The report’s conclusions emphasized the importance of space to national security, 

endorsed the need for a space control mission, noted a need for the defense and 

intelligence communities to unify their disparate efforts, and emphasized the importance 

of investments in space science and technology. Although the Rumsfeld Commission’s 

organizational recommendations did not include prompt establishment of a Space 

Service, it did note that a Space Corps within the Air Force was a mid-term possibility 

and that the Space Service was a long-range possibility. (Some observers saw this as a 

warning to the Air Force to give space sufficient priority or risk losing the mission.) Other 

recommendations included establishing a new Major Force Program for Space;

establishing the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space; and ending the Air Force’s 

triple-hatting of CINCSPACE, CINCAFSPACE, and CINCNORAD, thereby removing the 

stipulation that CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD be an Air Force rated pilot. The 

Commission specifically recommended that “The Army and the Navy would still 

establish requirements and develop and deploy space systems unique to each Service,” 

but this language only partially allayed the Navy’s fears regarding the loss of control 

over funds that they might program for space systems.

To foster better coordination of the NRO’s “black” space programs and the Air 

Force’s “white” space programs, the Rumsfeld Commission further recommended the 

following actions: “Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director of the 

National Reconnaissance Office [and] designate the Under Secretary as the Air Force 

Acquisition Executive for Space.”

Official comments by the Navy and Marine Corps tried to emphasize that military 

requirements should flow to and be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC), and that the Executive Agent should not diminish a service’s Title 10 

responsibilities to equip and train its force.
166 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Not all of the improvements envisioned by the Rumsfeld Commission fully 

materialized. The Commission may have intended to put the Air Force on notice not to 

starve its space programs for resources, but cost growth in aircraft acquisition programs 

exacerbated Air Force competition for resources. Furthermore, serious delays and cost 

growth occurred both in Air Force programs such as the Space Based Infrared System 

(SBIRS) and also in NRO programs such as the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) 

because of requirements accretion, overly optimistic cost estimation, technology 

overreach, and excessive concurrency, as documented by the Defense Science Board 

and the Government Accountability Office.

A possible further impediment to the unity of effort that was the intent of the dualhatting of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and the Director of the NRO was the 

splitting of the Space Senior Acquisition Executive functions that occurred when the 

2005 Milestone Decision Authority for major defense systems was transferred to the 

Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L)) while 

Milestone Decision Authority for major intelligence space systems moved to the Director 

of Acquisition in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

In 2003, DoD formalized new policy by issuing a directive establishing the Air 

Force as Executive Agent for Space, with planning and oversight responsibilities for all 

space Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Requirements would flow to the JROC 

through the Executive Agent but the JROC would adjudicate disputes. A Major Force 

Program for Space was not established, but the directive noted that the Executive 

Agent’s budget programming oversight could be construed as a “...‘virtual’ Major Force 

Program.” The other Services were each to develop and maintain their space cadres

and “...continue to develop, acquire, and fund space research, development, and 

acquisition programs that meet DoD Component requirements and submit such 

program information to the DoD Executive Agent for Space [the Air Force] in 

accordance with this Directive.”

Navy Responses to the Rumsfeld Commission Recommendations–

The Second Smith Panel

In order to address the implementation of the Rumsfeld Space Commission—as 

well as declining Navy investment in space, a shrinking base of space expertise, and 

reduced Navy flag officer involvement in space—two major assessment efforts were 

undertaken for the Navy: one by the Naval Studies Board, the other by the Second 

Smith Panel.

The Second Smith Panel

The Second Smith Panel, formally entitled the “Panel to Review Naval Space 

Capabilities for Critical Mission Support,” was formed in December 2001 and chaired by 

Admiral (Retired) William Smith. Its members included Admiral Steve Abbot, USN 

(Retired); Vice Admirals Lee Gunn, David Frost, Lyle Bien and Herb Browne, all USN 

(Retired); Rear Admirals Jack Batzler, Richard Nibe, and Thomas Betterton, USN 

(Retired); Major General Donald Hard, USAF (Retired); Drs. Gary Federici, Bruce Wald, 
Navy Responses to the Rumsfeld Commission Recommendations–The Second Smith Panel 167 _________________________________________________________________________________

Robert Hess, William Graham, Alf Andreasson, and Ann Berman; and Messrs. David 

Kier, Robert Davis and Manuel Cohen.

This Panel’s discussions emphasized the need for naval involvement in all phases 

of acquisition, not merely requirements generation. Much debate centered on whether 

the Navy should accept responsibility for the acquisition of the Mobile User Objective 

System (MUOS), the successor to the UHF Follow-On (UFO) communications satellite.

Some were opposed to the Navy assuming responsibility for a program whose eventual 

overruns could be zero-summed against the Navy’s Total Obligation Authority (TOA).

However, the prevailing counterargument was that, without hands-on responsibility for a 

major space acquisition, the Navy could not produce a new generation of engineers with 

the skills to attain major positions of responsibility in national space programs.

The Panel concluded, in its report dated 19 March 2002, that while space remains 

vital to the application of maritime power, the Navy was not postured to ensure future 

space support, having lived off past investments and successes. The Panel also 

concluded that the Space Commission implementation provided a brief window of 

opportunity for a new vision and model for partnership with the Air Force and the NRO.

Specific observations included: the Air Force and Navy have different but compatible 

roles in space; no one was in overall charge of the Naval Space program; the Navy was 

not postured to deal with the new Executive Agent for Space; additional budgets would 

be required for Navy space S&T; the Navy Space Cadre had to be better organized and 

nurtured; and coordination with the Air Force on space control was needed.

The Panel’s specific recommendations included:

• Draft and publish a new Navy Space Policy

• Assign Navy space management to OPNAV N6/7 (Warfare Requirements and 

Programs) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

• Establish a new Navy relationship with the Executive Agent (EA) for Space (the 

Air Force)

• Identify and advocate specific investment areas for Navy space science and 

technology

• Develop and propose a space acquisition management role for Navy

• Review the future need for Navy control of the Naval Space Surveillance 

System and other Navy space operational tasks

• Perform a complete review of the Navy Space Cadre and establish a Space 

Cadre Manager in OPNAV N1 (Personnel) on the staff of the CNO
168 Chapter 5 – Navy Space Challenges: Uncertainty and Resolution (1992–2003)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Naval Studies Board, Committee on Navy's Needs in Space, 2003

At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Studies Board of the 

National Research Council assembled a high-level committee for a six-month period in 

2003 that studied the Navy's needs for space in providing its future operational and 

technical capabilities. The committee's recommendations, summarized below, followed 

along lines compatible with those of the Second Smith Panel, above:

• Develop new Department of the Navy space policy, to provide a framework for 

Navy to assist the DoD Executive Agent for Space (the Air Force) in developing 

maritime space capabilities, focused on space mission areas critical to the 

implementation of naval operational missions.

• Strengthen the Navy's process for analyzing, determining, and articulating 

naval space needs.

• Increase Navy's participation in National Security Space activities (Air Force, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Reconnaissance 

Office, other government, and commercial).

• Maintain a critical level of space mission area funding to reinvigorate Navy 

space science and technology.

• Enhance maritime and joint forces experimentation in the development of 

space systems.

• Strengthen the naval space cadre.

• Take technical and programmatic steps to leverage/exploit National Security 

Space opportunities for naval space needs.

These Naval Studies Board recommendations, like those of the Second Smith 

Panel and the Second Smith Panel, were to have significant impact on how the Navy 

would participate in National Security Space in the future (pp 170-173).
169

CHAPTER 6 – RE-EMERGENCE OF NAVY SPACE IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004–2009)

The Navy’s operations in the 2004–2009 era emphasized support of U.S. and 

allied forces on the ground against protracted insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

together with miscellaneous other operations, including anti-piracy operations off the 

Somali coast. In size, the navy was down to the smallest number of ships it had in 

decades. Yet the Navy continued to be the military Service most dependent on space 

support.*

The challenge in this era was how the Navy would continue obtaining the space 

capability needed to meet Navy-unique requirements. Reorganization of the National 

Reconnaissance Office in 1992 had resulted in the disestablishment of its Navymanaged program; the Navy, in response, on the recommendations of the First Smith 

Panel, decided to continue resourcing its investment in the partnership with the NRO, 

although divested of further ability to direct the one NRO program that had pioneered 

surveillance for tactical users (pages 142 and 143). Then, under new Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Air Force Under Secretary was designated to be DoD’s 

Executive Agent for acquisition of all military space systems, as well as Director of the 

NRO (page 164).

In response to this situation, the Second Smith Panel in 2001 developed a series 

of recommendations to reconsider and formalize space-related policy, organizational 

relationships, acquisition management, operations, and resource investment (see page

166), as did the Naval Studies Board of 2003 (see page 168). The Navy accepted the 

Panel’s recommendations, and their implementation beginning in 2004 marked the start 

of the current epoch in this Navy space chronicle. A summary of the implementation of 

these recommendations is as follows:

• A new Navy Space Policy (SECNAVINST 5400.39C) was issued on 4 April 

2004.

• OPNAV N6/7 (Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs), and 

later, OPNAV N6 (Deputy CNO for Communications Networks), despite several 

internal OPNAV reorganizations, assumed an increasingly active role in 

managing Navy space matters.

• A Navy Letter to the (Air Force) EA for Space and the Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office was signed out by the VCNO each year detailing the 

Navy’s emerging and unfulfilled needs for space capabilities in support of

 * In earlier years, the Navy had been by far the “largest” user of space. However, by the 21st Century, the 

U.S. Army, with its legions of GPS users, gained that distinction. However, the breadth and depth of the 

Navy’s dependence on space support—for communications, navigation, surveillance, reconnaissance, 

weather, and environmental measurements—remained more critical to its operations.
170 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Maritime Domain Awareness, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and other 

mission areas. The continuing need for wide-area maritime surveillance was 

stressed repeatedly in these letters.

• A $50M budget line was established for Navy space science and technology 

(see page 172).

• The Navy’s Program Executive Officer for Space Systems was established as a 

concurrent responsibility of the Navy’s permanently assigned flag officer in the 

NRO.

• Navy turned over its Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR)

responsibilities to the Air Force by 2004 (page 146).

• A comprehensive review of the Navy Space Cadre was conducted, a Cadre 

Manager position was established in OPNAV N1 (Deputy CNO for Personnel), 

and Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command assumed the role of 

leading the Navy Space Cadre (page 170).

Navy Space Organizational Changes in Response to the New 

Challenge

Stand-up of PEO Space Systems

In 2004, the Navy established the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Space 

Systems to manage and procure narrowband communications satellites in support of 

the Department of Defense (DoD) and to coordinate all Department of the Navy (DON) 

space research, development, and acquisition activities. PEO Space Systems 

headquarters was located in Chantilly, Virginia, with additional staff members located in 

San Diego, California co-located with the original program office (PMW-146), which 

retained its designation as the Communications Satellite Program Office. RADM Rand 

Fisher became the first PEO.

As of January 2009, this PEO’s responsibilities included executive management 

and oversight for the Leased Satellite (LEASAT), Ultra High Frequency (UHF) FollowOn (UFO), and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite communications 

(SATCOM) programs (page 175). Additionally, the PEO served as the Navy’s space 

program executive officer called for in the DoD National Security Space Acquisition 

Policy (NSSAP) 03-01. Finally, PEO Space Systems served concurrently as 

Commander of the SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA), which was the parent 

organization for most of the Navy personnel assigned to the NRO, and as the Director 

of NRO Communications Acquisition and Operations.

Formalizing the Navy Space Cadre

The report of the Rumsfeld Space Commission (page 164), released in 2001, 

contained a recommendation to create and sustain within the government a trained 

cadre of military and civilian space professionals. The Second Smith Panel (page 166) 
Navy Space Organizational Changes in Response to the New Challenge 171 _________________________________________________________________________________

responded by recommending that the Navy refocus the management of its Navy Space 

Cadre.

In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed all of the services to identify 

and actively manage their space experts. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed 

the formation of the Navy Space Cadre, not as a community, but as a distinct body of 

expertise residing within existing officer, enlisted, and Department of the Navy (DON) 

civilian communities called out for focused management due to its value to the 

Department.

Captain Cheryl Spohnholtz, serving under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 

for Personnel (OPNAV N1) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 

Requirements and Programs (OPNAV N6/7), was designated as the first Navy Space 

Cadre Advisor in September 2002. A Navy space management plan was drafted to 

define, identify, track, educate, and train the Navy Space Cadre. Active duty officers 

from existing professional communities with space-related experience or education from 

the Naval Postgraduate School were selected as the first members of the Navy Space 

Cadre. In 2003, 292 initial members of the Navy Space Cadre were announced by the 

Chief of Naval Operations.

Further guidance to maintain qualified space professionals in the services was 

issued in the June 2003 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5101.2, “DoD 

Executive Agent (EA) for Space.” This was followed by the “Human Capital Resource 

Strategy, A Report to Congressional Defense Committees,” issued by the DoD EA for 

Space in February 2004. This strategy directed each DoD component to create a 

human capital resource management team “to ensure organizations have the right 

people, with the right skills, doing the right jobs, in the right place, at the right time.”

In 2003, the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council extended the 

work of the Panel to Review Navy Space. This study, published as “Navy's Needs in 

Space for Providing Future Capabilities,” recommended that the Chief of Naval 

Operations strengthen and expand the Navy Space Cadre (see page 168).

The Navy responded with SECNAVINST 5400.39C, “Department of the Navy 

Space Policy,” 6 April 2004, to recruit, educate, qualify, and retain a professional Space 

Cadre. To address the recommendations of the Naval Studies Board, the Chief of Naval 

Operations identified the Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs 

(OPNAV N6/7) as the Navy Staff Space Lead, with Naval Network Warfare Command

as the Space Type Commander (TYCOM) for the Fleet and the Space Cadre Functional 

Authority (Community Sponsor). The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) was designated 

as the Navy’s Space Science & Technology Executive. The Department of the Navy’s 

Program Executive Officer for Space Systems (PEO-SS) was identified to manage the 

Navy-directed, joint narrowband satellite communications program and was also 

designated as the Commander of SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA). As such, the 

flag officer serving in this position was designated as the senior Navy flag officer at the 

NRO, responsible for Navy manpower and personnel support to National Security 
172 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

_________________________________________________________________________________

Space. A follow-on OPNAVINST (5400.43 series) further delineated the Navy roles and 

responsibilities in space. In 2006, the Navy Staff Space Lead transitioned to the Deputy 

CNO for Communications Networks (OPNAV N6) in an OPNAV staff reorganization.

As the Navy came to recognize the efforts of the Major Force Program in achieving 

the Navy mission, efforts were made to designate civil service personnel and reserve 

officers as part of the Navy’s Space Cadre. In 2005, the Navy designated its first 120 

civilian space cadre members. Navy Reserve officers were also recognized for their 

impact on space-related programs, and in 2006, eighty-three reserve officers were 

identified as members of the Space Cadre.

By 2009, the Navy Space Cadre had grown to more than 850 active duty officers, 

140 reserve officers and over 300 civilians. There were over 300 active duty officer 

billets and over twenty reserve officer billets designated as requiring space-related 

education or experience. The Space Cadre’s next steps at that time included identifying 

civilian billets that require space-related expertise, with a future goal of also identifying 

an enlisted component of the Space Cadre.

Establishing a Navy Space Science and Technology Budget

In 2004, a line item was established in the Navy budget amounting to $50 million 

annually for space science and technology, under the direction of the Chief of Naval 

Research.

Residual Navy Space Organization in 2009

As of January 2009, the focal points for the Navy’s space efforts were:

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks

(OPNAV N6), which included the Navy TENCAP Office

• Staff officers assigned to the OPNAV Directorates of Personnel (N1), 

Intelligence (N2), and Plans (N5).

• Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM)

• Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)

• SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA)

• Navy Center for Space Technology (NCST)), Naval Research Laboratory
Evolution of Navy TENCAP in the Twenty-first Century 173 _________________________________________________________________________________

The flag officer assigned full-time to space wore three hats:

• Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Space Systems

• Commander of the SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA) at the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

• Director of the NRO Communications Acquisition and Operations

and also served as the link between the Navy and NRO leadership for Navy space 

operational requirements and employment.

Evolution of Navy TENCAP in the Twenty-first Century

In 2003, the Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs (OPNAV N6/7) 

directed a set of significant changes in policy and procedures for the Navy TENCAP 

Office. These changes were intended to improve the rate of transition of successful 

TENCAP R&D projects into Navy programs of record by establishing links (in the form 

of written Transition Agreements) between each TENCAP R&D project and a formal 

acquisition program managed within the N6/7 directorate. This link was especially 

important to provide for the proper planning for near-term sustainment of prototype 

capabilities delivered to the Fleet, as well as for long-term integration of these 

capabilities into the formal programs. Establishing these programmatic links, however, 

required acquisition program managers to assume some of the risk of TENCAP R&D 

projects.

It is not surprising, then, that Navy TENCAP found itself under pressure to 

substantially lower levels of risk for its R&D projects. Moreover, any R&D project for 

space-based capabilities that could not be linked to existing programs could not be 

undertaken. These constraints on R&D ultimately led to a termination of the Navy 

TENCAP Office’s ten-year partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School. In addition, 

it was determined that TENCAP no longer needed to conduct rigorous, independent 

technical tests and operational demonstrations, and so the twenty-year relationship with 

the Center for Naval Analyses was severed.

Despite these new constraints, after 2003 there was an explosion in the number of 

TENCAP projects—from 15–20 projects per year to 35–40 projects per year. It 

appeared that every program of record wanted a TENCAP project—perhaps because of 

the Navy TENCAP Office’s reputation for success.

During the period 2003-2008, TENCAP conducted some excellent research in 

areas such as: (a) Information Operations (in partnership with the Office of Naval 

Research); (b) miniaturizing Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) receivers and processors, for 

use aboard proposed Navy unmanned aerial vehicles; and (c) assessing capabilities 

and limitations of space sensors in non-acoustic anti-submarine warfare (in partnership 

with the Air Force Research Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory).
174 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

_________________________________________________________________________________

During the same period, however, other promising projects were never initiated, 

either because the R&D risk was too great, or because there was no link to an existing 

OPNAV N7 acquisition program.

Expanded Integration of All-Source Tactical Narrow-band Data into

the Fleet

The Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A) (page 129) evolved to 

become the Joint Maritime Command System (JMCIS) and then the Global Command 

and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M). This all-source capability afloat incorporated 

reporting from national space systems. It was interfaced directly into selected combat 

systems; for the most part, however, the GCCS-M operated as a networked system 

using separate terminals to display a correlated, common operational picture across the 

battle group.

Aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, command ships, and some Aegis

cruisers and destroyers were equipped with IBS receivers to obtain direct space-derived 

surveillance/reconnaissance reports, and stand-alone GALE-Lite terminals to correlate 

and display them.

Smaller ships, including non-Aegis cruisers and destroyers, were configured to 

receive this information via the SIPRNET using a limited IBS capability called Radiant 

Ether, but with only a Standard TRE Display (STRED) for operators to use the contact 

reports from national or other off-board surveillance/reconnaissance sources. As of 

2009 the Navy still did not have a program office for providing STREDs or GALE-Lite for 

the small-deck combatants.

The Operational Support Office (OSO) at NRO continued to work with NAVAIR 

systems acquisition managers to integrate IBS-S data directly into the avionics of naval 

aircraft. MATT was fully integrated with the EA-6B digital displays as part of a major

upgrade in 2005.

Integration of national systems tactical data directly into the avionics of E-2C early 

warning aircraft was completed in 2007, when Hawkeye 2000 Software Configuration 

Set 5 passed its operational evaluation. Four VAW squadrons were equipped with this 

upgrade, and the Fleet Readiness Squadron instituted a national systems training 

program in May 2008.

A concept demonstration in 2003 validated the operational utility of making 

national real-time surveillance data available in the Navy's new Mark V Special 

Operations Craft. In 2004 the first two Mark V craft were equipped with a walk-on Data 

Hawk terminal (an ENTR-based receiver installed in a hardened laptop computer) and 

deployed to the Philippines. A requirement to fully integrate the ENTR into the JTWS 

was funded in 2006.
Satellites for Naval Communications in the Twenty-first Century 175 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 21. Rendering of MUOS satellite

Project Quickbolt

Continuing a long tradition of innovation, the Navy Space Cadre in the NRO have 

been the catalyst for creating capabilities that employ national systems in support of 

naval weapon systems. For example, Project Quickbolt, the brainchild of a Navy 

Lieutenant assigned to NRO, provided near-real-time BDA (Battle Damage 

Assessment) to the AARGM (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile) as well as nearreal-time updates of the electronic order of battle. The AARGM Bomb Hit Indication 

report, enabling rapid BDA and retargeting decisions, was a first in self-assessing 

weapon technology. The first successful AARGM test shot with integrated weapon 

impact assessment took place in early 2009.

Satellites for Naval Communications in the Twenty-first Century

UHF—Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

To eventually replace the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites developed in the 1990s, 

the Navy proposed a new generation of UHF narrowband (64 Kbps and below) 

satellites, the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). The MUOS constellation of four 

geosynchronous satellites plus a spare was designed to provide tactical narrowband 

netted, point-to-point, and broadcast services of voice, video, and data to joint, non-DoD 

agency, coalition and allied users. The MUOS satellites were also to provide a legacy 

UHF payload as well as a third-generation Wideband Code-Division Multiple Access 

(WCDMA) payload. MUOS improvements included higher data rates, increased number 

of accesses, and better link margins using the WCDMA waveform. (The WCDMA 

waveform was to be used in the Joint Tactical Radio System.)

In view of the Navy's experience and success in developing and operating the 

UFOs, it was decided that acquisition of MUOS would be managed by the Navy’s

Program Executive Office for Space Systems. MUOS was the only significant satelliteacquisition program in the Navy during the 2000s. As of January 2009, MUOS on-orbit 

capability was scheduled for 2011.
176 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

_________________________________________________________________________________

SHF Wideband Communications Program Continues

In 2007, with the availability of the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS), increased Xband access (including the Ka-band) became possible for ships with AN/WSC-6

terminals. Coupled with the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS), a shipboard 

router, and the efficiencies from the Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM), the 

fleet’s bandwidth capacity nearly doubled. For example, aircraft carriers and large-deck 

amphibious platforms had capacities of up to 4 Mbps, and unit-level ships (including 

Guided Missile Cruisers (CGs) and Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs)) had capacities 

from 384 Kbps up to 768 Kbps. Additionally, as of December 2008, the next-generation 

commercial SATCOM terminal and architecture capability was being fielded to replace 

the legacy AN/WSC-8; International Marine/Maritime Satellite High Speed Data 

(INMARSAT B HSD) terminals were also being fielded to continue augmenting 

bandwidth not available from Military Satellite Communications Wideband Global 

Satellites (MILSATCOM WGSs). The AN/WSC-6 terminal was scheduled to be replaced 

by the Navy Multiband Terminal in the 2011–2012 timeframe.

GBS Implementation

As of 2008, the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) was installed on aircraft carriers, 

assault ships, command ships and a limited number of destroyers and cruisers. These 

systems provided Fleet and Strike Group commanders with real-time, broad bandwidth 

satellite receive capability, up to 23.5 Mbps per channel using the UFO satellites. GBS

was to begin to use newly launched Wideband Global Satellites (WGS) as they became 

available and on-orbit. As of December 2008, WGS-1 reached initial operating capability 

(IOC) while the remaining constellation was to reach full operating capability (FOC) by 

2012 (assuming a five-ball constellation). The utilization of WGS with GBS increased

throughput capacity to 45 Mbps. Products received include audio, video and data, 

including Predator UAV video.

The original GBS concept considered using “open-loop” broadcasts akin to TV 

channels and did not provide protected capacity for Internet Protocol communications.

More recently, the Navy has introduced a split asymmetrical mode in which data 

packets go from shore to ship on GBS and from ship to shore on Military Strategic, 

Tactical and Relay (Milstar) satellites.

Future Communications Satellite Programs

At the beginning of 2009, the Navy was involved in the development of other 

satellite communications systems that would impact future operations. The following 

sections describe these efforts and their status as of January 2009.

Polar Satellite Communications

Recognizing the need to support military communications in latitudes above 65

degrees north, DoD was planning a constant protected SATCOM service in the polar 

region. The initial system and its planned replacement were to be hosted on a satellite 

with a classified mission. Both constellations would fly in a highly elliptical orbit. The first 

set of satellites, initially launched in 2001, was called the Interim Polar System (IPS) 

and provided limited data rate services. The replacement system would provide 
Environmental Sensing and Celestial Navigation 177 _________________________________________________________________________________

extended data rate similar to the Advanced EHF SATCOM system. The Enhanced Polar 

System (EPS) was planned for launch in 2016 and was to consist of two satellites and

provide twenty channels of service. U.S. Navy submarines were to be the primary and 

almost exclusive users of the polar SATCOM systems, as only submarines have 

routine, frequent excursions to the region.

Transformational Communications Satellites (TSAT)

Selected as a follow-on to the AEHF SATCOM system, the Air Force’s 

Transformational Communications Satellites (TSAT) was supposed to launch initially in 

2019. The constellation would provide both EHF and SHF services. This satellite 

system would be the first system to provide onboard Internet Protocol Routing (IPR), 

greatly reducing the need to back-haul IP traffic to earth terminals. In addition, the TSAT

would employ laser communications to support satellite cross-links as well as 

connectivity to space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

In early 2009, the Secretary of Defense cancelled the TSAT program. The Air 

Force and the Navy continued to leverage the investment in TSAT to future EHF and 

SHF satellite communications systems.

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)

The Navy was developing a new SATCOM terminal to support tactical unit and 

shore site access to both EHF and SHF MILSATCOM satellites. The terminal would 

replace the Navy EHF SATCOM Program (NESP) Follow-On Terminal (FOT) and 

AN/WSC-6 terminals installed on most large and medium ships. The terminal would be 

able to simultaneously access the Milstar, Advanced EHF, Defense Satellite 

Communications System (DSCS), Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) and Polar satellite 

systems. The Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) would also allow removal of the GBS

antenna on GBS-equipped units. The NMT would be the first Navy terminal to provide 

multiband services and would reduce the antenna and equipment footprint aboard Navy 

units. The Navy planned for NMT to reach initial operating capability in 2011.

Environmental Sensing and Celestial Navigation

Changes in NPOESS and Navy Initiation of GFO-2

The original satellite environmental sensor suite planned for the National Polarorbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS), the development of 

which had been ongoing since the mid-1990s, included a radar altimeter for ocean 

height measurements. In view of that, the Navy decided not to pursue a Navy-only

follow-on altimeter to the GEOSTAT Follow-On (GFO) satellite (page 162). In 2006, the 

NPOESS program had to be restructured due to excessive cost overruns, which 

resulted in the elimination of the altimeter sensor. As a consequence, the Navy was 

directed to devise a plan for future capabilities to address the resultant altimeter gap 

and loss of continuity due to NPOESS restructuring. The Navy’s response to this 

directive was planned for 2009, with the beginning of the acquisition process for GFO-2.
178 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

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(The original GFO mission lasted until 2008, when system component degradation 

forced mission termination.)

Coriolis WindSat

The 1994 directive to combine Department of Defense and Department of 

Commerce polar-orbiting satellite programs into NPOESS resulted in the cancellation of 

Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP) Block 6, which was to include 

advanced sensors that would provide the Navy with more accurate sea surface wind 

measurements. This led the Navy to advocate for sea surface wind to be one of the six 

environmental Key Performance Parameters for NPOESS to ensure continued 

availability of this important data.

Coriolis WindSat, a satellite-based multi-frequency polarimetric microwave 

radiometer developed by the Naval Research Laboratory under SPAWAR program 

management for the U.S. Navy and the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO), was 

launched in January 2003 as an interim response to validated Navy requirements for 

global ocean surface wind vector and as a risk reduction for the NPOESS Conical 

Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS).

Microwave sensors such as WindSat could penetrate clouds and retrieve Sea 

Surface Temperatures (SSTs) in cloud-contaminated regions where Infrared (IR)

sensors could not. WindSat products included sea surface wind vectors, sea surface 

temperature, rain rate, integrated water vapor, cloud liquid water and sea ice 

boundaries.

As a risk-reduction mission for the NPOESS CMIS sensor, WindSat demonstrated 

the capability of polarimetric microwave radiometers to estimate the ocean surface wind 

direction. Additionally, WindSat data was provided to the NPOESS IPO and their 

contractors for NPOESS system design, algorithm development and risk reduction.

WindSat achieved its three-year mission design life in January 2006 and continued to 

operate as of January 2009.

Celestial Navigation–Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Satellite Missions

The Navy, via the U.S. Naval Observatory (USNO), has had the responsibility for 

maintaining the astronomical reference frame(s) for celestial navigation and orientation 

of space systems. This reference frame has historically been defined in star catalogs 

used in conjunction with star trackers to determine orientation (or attitude) of spacebased sensors supporting both civil and national security needs and requirements.

However, the accuracy of star positions was degrading with time due to the movement 

of stars since the last highly accurate space-based measurements of star positions (on 

the order of 1 milli-arcsecond) were made in 1991—published in the Hipparcos star 

catalog. Hipparcos, a European Space Agency mission, was the first and only (as of 

January 2009) space-based measurement of the stars. It pinpointed the positions of

more than one hundred thousand stars with high precision and more than one million 

stars with lesser precision. The degradation of the Hipparcos catalog necessitated remeasurement of star positions to support current and future civil and national security 

needs for space-based orientation knowledge.
Counter-Space Initiative: Navy ASAT Demonstration 179 _________________________________________________________________________________

The Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), signed out by the Secretary of 

Defense in May 2008, directed the Navy, in coordination with other Defense 

components, to update the star catalog and develop the next generation of star trackers 

to meet satellite attitude determination requirements.

The Naval Observatory, in concert with other activities and agencies in the 

National Security community, developed a proposal to satisfy the emerging 

requirements for a new high-accuracy star catalog through a space-based astrometry 

mission that would also “pathfind” new star tracker technology for future National 

Security systems. Producing star catalogs with sufficient accuracy to meet these 

requirements can only be done from space platforms due to atmospheric interference 

on ground-based systems and the physical limitations of high atmospheric aircraft. The 

project to develop the required space platform (satellite) for this mission was called Joint 

Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey (JMAPS). JMAPS program efforts began in 2008,

with a projected launch in 2012, which should result in updated star catalogs in 2016.

Counter-Space Initiative: Navy ASAT Demonstration

Until 2008, the U.S. had no demonstrated operational anti-satellite (ASAT) 

capability. The only operationally demonstrated ASATs were those of the Soviet Union 

(beginning in the 1960s) and of China (in the 2000s). The first U.S. ASAT capability to 

be demonstrated was a satellite shoot-down in February 2008, and it was with a 

weapon (a Standard Missile SM-3) that was developed, fielded, and launched from an 

operational combatant ship by the U.S. Navy. It came about in association with the AntiStrategic Missile Defense (ASMD) program, as described below.*

In December 2006, satellite USA 193 had been launched from Vandenberg Air 

Force Base with a classified payload; however, shortly after achieving its low-earth orbit, 

the satellite began tumbling out of control from its intended orbit and headed slowly 

back toward earth. Re-entry into the earth's atmosphere was predicted for mid-March 

2008. U.S. Strategic Command was directed to determine whether the U.S. had the 

capability to shoot down the crippled vehicle and to recover any satellite debris when it 

fell. The crippled satellite carried a 1,000-pound tank of hydrazine fuel that would be 

chemically dangerous if the tank ruptured on the ground in a populated area—there 

being no way to predict where the vehicle would land.

As part of Joint Task Force Burnt Frost, a Navy Aegis missile cruiser, USS Lake 

Erie (CG-70), was assigned to shoot down the satellite using a Standard SM-3 (antiaircraft) missile. On 21 February 2008, off the coast of Hawaii, the ship launched the 

SM-3, which intercepted the fast-moving satellite after 166 seconds of flight. Sensors in 

the Pacific confirmed that its hydrazine tank (the critical target) was destroyed. Three 

 * The jobs of intercepting low-earth-orbit satellites or strategic ballistic missiles are quite similar, in that the 

satellites and the ballistic missiles are both in earth orbits – the difference being that the missiles' orbits 

intersect the earth's surface (at the launch point and the target), whereas the satellites' orbits do not.
180 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

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hours after the successful intercept, the largest piece of debris detected was no larger 

than a football, and the other pieces were no larger than marbles.

Operation Burnt Frost took the Navy’s ballistic missile defense capability to the 

next level. During Burnt Frost, the Navy’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program achieved 

several firsts: the first satellite shot down by the Aegis weapon system, the highest 

target ever intercepted, and the fastest target ever intercepted. Operation Burnt Frost 

was a major success for the military-industrial team, which in six weeks’ time planned 

and executed an operation that normally would have taken years.

Space Vulnerability and Mitigation

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the attention and resources devoted to 

protecting national security satellites and associated infrastructure, including the global 

network that moves information to and from deployed forces, were minimal. This began 

to change, slowly, as our national security strategy began to recognize China’s military 

buildup during the first decade of the new century. When China, aware of the increasing 

dependence of U.S. (and other first-rate military powers) on space, launched an ASAT

in early 2007, the U.S. national security space community went on alert.

Fortuitously, Vice Admiral James McArthur, Jr., Commander, Naval Network 

Warfare Command, had anticipated in 2005 the need to improve space system 

robustness and asked PEO Space Systems, Rear Admiral Vic See, to assess the 

vulnerabilities of our space systems in the context of major contingency operations.

This assessment, the first to determine the likely impact of lost or degraded space 

capabilities on Navy mission accomplishment, was widely briefed to fleet commanders 

and Washington flags and Department of the Navy executives. It spawned further 

analyses and studies by OPNAV, resulting in programming of resources for both 

material and non-material mitigation of key space vulnerabilities. Another result was the 

introduction of realistic scenarios into fleet exercises and greater fidelity in campaign 

analyses which define operational gaps that drive resource allocation.

At the national and DoD levels, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Air 

Force Space Command joined in leading a Space Protection Program, which initially 

emphasized international collaboration, situational awareness, and system redundancy.

This program, at the recommendation of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy-Research 

Development Acquisition (ASN-RDA), adopted the Strategic Submarine Ballistic 

Nuclear (SSBN) Security Program as a model for pursuing space protection.

In March 2009, the Naval-NRO Coordination Group convened a large number of 

senior military and intelligence officials to discuss the space vulnerability issue, its 

relationship to the network and cyber warfare, and to consider actions that should be 

taken by the Naval Services.
Global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Considerations 181 _________________________________________________________________________________

Global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Considerations

Although the Navy has an obvious need for knowledge of maritime activity in areas 

where it is operating, or soon will be operating, and fills this need with information 

collected by organic, theater, and national means, it historically did not feel responsible 

for maintaining knowledge of every ship everywhere in the world—much of which 

knowledge would have to be derived from surveillance from space. Although there was 

a national need for maritime domain awareness (MDA) to prevent Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) proliferation and to anticipate terrorist operations (a need formalized 

by a Presidential Directive), it was unclear how meeting this need should be allocated 

among naval, intelligence, and law enforcement entities. An early move toward 

coordinating these efforts was in locating the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination 

Center on the site of the Office of Naval Intelligence’s headquarters in Suitland, 

Maryland, facilitating an evolution into the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

An extensive interagency effort led to the National MDA Plan. It defined MDA as 

“the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 

impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States” and 

assigned the DoD a wide range of leadership responsibilities in the fusing and 

dissemination of MDA information. Although the Memorandum and Directive formally 

appointing the Department of the Navy as the DoD’s Executive Agent for MDA was not 

issued until later, it was understood from the outset that the Navy would have to 

shoulder the DoD’s MDA responsibilities.

Nevertheless, it was difficult for the Navy to integrate these MDA responsibilities 

with the Navy’s requirements generation and resourcing procedures. In 2004, the 

Navy/NRO Coordination Group tasked a senior panel led by Dr. Bruce Wald to identify 

ways in which space could best meet Navy’s needs, with the intent to influence the 

Fiscal Year 2006 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) budget process. However, 

OPNAV’s POM process was focused on closing gaps identified by a warfare analysis 

process that models combat campaigns and measures how quickly the campaign can 

be won with acceptable loss of assets. Because global MDA supported pre-combat 

naval operations, as well as served other national security needs, it had not been 

identified as a gap in the FY 2006 POM processes. Nevertheless, the panel highlighted 

the role of space in MDA, as well as identifying other opportunities to use information 

from space to close the recognized gaps.

As of January 2009, the Navy had begun to incorporate MDA into its planning 

process with a view toward establishing a program of record to acquire MDA capabilities 

beginning in FY 2010. To this end, an MDA concept paper was completed, and the 

documents required by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) process were being prepared. The Functional Solution Analysis was completed 

at the end of 2008, and an Analysis of Alternatives was expected to begin sometime in 

2009.
182 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

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Maritime Automated Ship Track-Enhanced Reporting (MASTER)

Meanwhile, the Department of the Navy Secretariat, perhaps more attuned to 

interagency politics than the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had not waited for 

these sometimes-ponderous budgeting processes.

Principal MDA impediments within DoD’s assigned responsibilities were (1) the 

lack of automation in the fusion and dissemination of MDA information, and (2) the 

barriers to fusion resulting from the disparate security and administrative domains within 

which the information is collected. These impediments severely limited the number of 

ships that could be tracked to a relatively small number that had been previously 

identified as “vessels of interest”. In 2003, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy John 

Young tasked Dr. Daria Bielecki of NRL’s Naval Center for Space Technology, through 

the Office of Naval Research, to lead the development of an automated system that 

would take space-derived information from its very restricted security domain, fuse it 

with information derived from a wide variety of classified and unclassified sources, 

maintain track on all ships on which information was available, and make the 

information available at an intermediate security level to watch standers at the Coast 

Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC). Such a system was delivered to 

the MIFC-LANT in Norfolk, VA, in September 2006. A feed from the NRL prototype was 

later made available to the National Maritime Intelligence Center.

The success of this prototype led to two Joint Capabilities Technology 

Demonstrations (JCTDs). The first JCTD was called Comprehensive Maritime 

Awareness (CMA) and was sponsored by the U.S. Combatant Commanders. It 

introduced federated worldwide tracking and other improvements, allowed some data 

sharing with Singapore, and maintained operator interfaces at an intermediate security 

level. 

The second JCTD was called Maritime Automatic Ship Track-Enhanced Reporting 

(MASTER) and was sponsored by the Office of Naval Intelligence. It incorporated some 

highly classified sources; processed shipping (crew and cargo) information; and 

presented its output at a high security level. CMA hardware and software was also sent 

to a national intelligence site that contributed space-derived maritime data, as well as to 

Navy sites and the Coast Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, Pacific (MIFCPAC).

Following an early 2007 planning effort among OPNAV and SECNAV staffs, the 

Secretary of the Navy concluded that “the Department of the Navy is now well 

positioned to begin fielding an operational enduring MDA capability” and directed that

“we must move swiftly to achieve an initial operating capability by August 2008.”

Employing rapid development authorities, PEO C4I selected the CMA core (above), 

and, with NRL’s assistance, integrated developmental anomaly detection tools and 

incorporated other available intelligence-related software.

The MASTER hardware and software were transitioned to the Office of Naval 

Intelligence (ONI) beginning in May 2008, where this capability was renamed Sealink 
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Space Initiatives 183 _________________________________________________________________________________

Advanced Analysis (S2A). In February 2009, it successfully completed its final 

operational demonstration, with participation by the Joint Interagency Task Force-South 

(JIATF-S); the National Maritime Intelligence Center; the Maritime Intelligence Fusion 

Center, Atlantic; the Maritime Intelligence Center, Pacific; the Pacific Fleet; and US 

Northern Command.

By early 2009, MASTER (now S2A) became the authorized source for multiintelligence ship tracks in support of worldwide maritime defense and maritime security 

operations. In 2009, MASTER ship-tracking information was received by the Maritime 

Operations Centers (MOCs) of the Second, Third, and Fourth Fleets, and directly by 

selected aircraft carriers; and, through ONI, by the US European, Central, Pacific, and 

Northern Commands, by the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, and by the US Coast 

Guard’s two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers.

Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Space Initiatives

In November 2002, the Secretary of Defense established the Office of Force 

Transformation (OFT) to support his vision of challenging the Department with new 

technologies and concepts for their employment. He appointed retired Vice Admiral 

Arthur Cebrowski, a champion of network centric operations, as its director. Citing Vice 

Admiral Cebrowski on space in particular: “Space is another area where a new business 

strategy combining new technology with new operational concepts can have a profound 

impact on how information energy can be applied on the battlefield. This may involve 

capabilities to generate very small payloads, very quickly on orbit.”

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Initiative

One of OFT’s first efforts was the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

initiative, whose purpose was to begin development of and experimentation with 

operationally responsive, space-based systems. Several elements of this ORS initiative 

were based on an NRL study briefed to OFT in February 2003. In April 2003, OFT 

began their ORS initiative within Mr. Lloyd Feldman’s S&T division and with 

Commander Greg Glaros as OFT’s principal investigator. OFT assigned management 

of the program to the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), and NRL’s Naval Center for 

Space Technology assigned Michael Hurley as the program manager.

This ORS initiative was as much about a new business model and process as it 

was about new technologies and capabilities. OFT believed in frequent operational 

experimentation and development spirals and sought to better match development 

spirals with today’s rapid technology cycles, enabling frequent capability improvements.

TacSats

Consistent with this philosophy and process, the TacSat-1 experiment was 

developed as the first in a series experiments. The overall goal was to demonstrate the 

utility of a broader complementary business model and provide a catalyst for energizing 

DoD and industry in the area of operationally responsive space. The TacSat-1 mission 

was required to be completed within one year, to feature several enabling ORS system 

characteristics, and be completed for under $15M (including launch). The strategy 
184 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

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employed was to tailor the “requirements” to what could be accomplished within the 

mission constraints. For example, UAV and ship-based payloads were converted for 

TacSat-1 use to meet cost and schedule as well as to feature the benefits of 

complementary business models—in this case the space community benefiting from the 

aviation and ship community investments. Christopher Huffine was the payload lead. He 

provided an RF payload for precision geolocation when used in coordination with 

airborne assets by repackaging the Copperfield-2 unit, originally developed for UAV 

applications. He also incorporated an RF emitter identification payload originally 

designed and deployed for ship use by NRL’s Tactical Electronic Warfare Division and 

later NAVSEA IWS-2. The TacSat-1 spacecraft was completed in May 2004 (within one 

year) at a cost of $10M and with a weight of 132 kg.

The TacSat-1 system design featured enabling ORS system elements, including a 

highly automated micro-satellite bus, modular payloads, a virtual mission operations 

center (VMOC) for tasking and data dissemination via the SIPRNET, and a low-cost, 

rapid response launch. For this launch, NRL contracted with the SpaceX Corporation for 

their promising new Falcon-1 launch vehicle. Unfortunately, launch vehicle development 

issues delayed the satellite for several years and ultimately led to the end of the mission 

without it ever launching. Despite the lack of launch, the TacSat-1 experiment provided 

understanding and generated excitement by rapidly moving the DoD and industry out of 

the viewgraph stage into an implementation stage. TacSat-1 was featured in the DoD’s 

2004 Science and Technology Strategy and was cited by the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) many times for “best practices” in their first report about 

TacSats.

The concept of responsive and affordable satellites found favor in Congress, which 

increased funding to add ORS bus standards development and ORS technology 

development to the OFT’s ORS initiative managed by NRL. In parallel, Congress began 

to lay the groundwork for transition to a joint program office, a tactical satellite program 

and for transition of that program from the Office of Force Transformation to the 

administration of the joint program office.

Many things happened in the 2004-2005 time period. The TacSat-2 experiment 

began development, while TacSat-3 and TacSat-4 were selected under a joint process 

involving both the operational and S&T communities. In this same time period, the Chief 

of Naval Research at the Office of Naval Research (ONR) initiated a “Tactical Space” 

Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) Program beginning in Fiscal Year 2006 that continued 

to fund NRL’s efforts in operationally responsive space (see page 186). This ONR 

program provided the core funding and Navy leadership for the TacSat-4 experiment.

In December 2006, TacSat-2, led by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 

launched on a Minotaur-1 rocket from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia.

TacSat-2 contained an Air Force imager and a Navy RF payload, dubbed the Target 

Indicator Experiment (TIE). TIE upgraded the TacSat-1 payload by adding an Advanced 

Information Systems (AIS) collection capability, a ten-element AIS antenna, and fully 
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Space Initiatives 185 _________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 22. TacSat Program

integrating the emitter identification capability for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 

demonstrations.

TacSat-3, led by the AFRL, was to have an Air Force-provided hyperspectral 

imager as its primary payload and a Navy (ONR)-provided payload for two-way, Internet 

Protocol (IP)-based buoy communications. TacSat-3 was scheduled to launch in spring 

of 2009.

TacSat-4, led by ONR/NRL, was to provide ten ultra high frequency (UHF) 

channels for communications, data exfiltration, or Blue Force Tracking. The highly 

elliptical orbit would also augment geosynchronous communications by allowing nearglobal, but not continuous, coverage, including the high latitudes. Finally, TacSat-4

would also have the ONR payload for two-way, IP-based buoy communications.

TacSat-4 was scheduled to launch in fall of 2009.

Establishment of ORS Office

A jointly written plan for an ORS Office was submitted to Congress in April of 2007.

In May 2007, STRATCOM approved the “Initial CONOPS for ORS,” and on 17 May 

2007, the DEPSECDEF officially established the ORS Office. In addition to the 

Congressional mandate for this office, the Chinese ASAT demonstration in January 

2007 spurred the Executive Agent of Space, Dr. Ronald Sega, to secure approximately 
186 Chapter 6 – Re-emergence of Navy Space in the Twenty-first Century (2004–2009)

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$100 million per year for the office. As of early 2009, the ORS Office coordinated ORS

activities, provided launch and Joint Military Utility Analysis for the TacSats built by the 

S&T community, and had begun the first “ORS-1” satellite to augment an intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) need.

Navy Space Science and Technology in the Twenty-first Century

Prior to 2006 the majority of space science and technology (S&T) funded directly 

by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and indirectly through the Naval Research 

Laboratory (NRL), consisted of basic research focused on understanding the sun, the 

upper atmosphere and ionosphere to help mitigate space weather impacts on DoD and 

Naval space systems. NRL space research funded from the ONR Base Program and 

heavily leveraged by NASA, developed spaceflight instruments to monitor explosive 

events on the sun and models of solar activity to develop a forecast capability for 

geomagnetic storms at the Earth. Ultraviolet remote sensing research from space led to 

the development of techniques for determination of upper atmospheric and ionospheric 

densities. These techniques were adopted by the Defense Meteorology Satellite 

Program (DMSP) and flown operationally as the Special Sensor Ultraviolet Limb Imager 

(SSULI) series of operational sensors.

In this same period ONR funded space research on the lower ionosphere focused 

on understanding terrestrial propagation of ELF/VLF waves to ensure 24/7 global 

communication with the submarine force. A spin-off of this research showed that these 

long wavelength waves could propagate through the ionosphere where they could lead 

to the depletion of high energy “killer electrons” in the magnetosphere. This discovery 

has spurred further research and several satellite programs to investigate the possibility 

of rapidly depleting the magnetosphere of high energy electrons in the event of a high 

altitude nuclear event to protect low earth orbiting (LEO) satellites. Additional ONR 

funded research, in partnership with NRL, led to the development of assimilation 

ionospheric models and transition to the Air Force Weather Agency to improve systems 

depending on propagation through the ionosphere. Additional research was directed to 

developing an ability to monitor and predict ionospheric scintillation that leads to 

outages of GPS navigation, HF communication and UHF SATCOM.

In 2006, following the successes in the TacSat program (see page 183), ONR 

established the Tactical Space Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) program to develop 

small, low-cost maritime payloads for flight on TacSats. The INP funded several 

maritime demonstration payloads, including UHF communications, blue force tracking, 

data exfiltration, maritime hyperspectral imaging, and tracking ships from space.

The Ocean Data Telemetry Microsatellite Link (ODTML) data exfiltration 

transceiver was launched from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia in May 2009 

on TacSat 3. Two more payloads were manifested for launch in 2010. The 

Hyperspectral Imager of the Coastal Ocean (HICO) was launched to the International 

Space Station in September 2009. The Comm-X UHF payload, the primary payload on 
Navy Space Science and Technology in the Twenty-first Century 187 _________________________________________________________________________________

TacSat 4 was scheduled for launch aboard a Minotaur 4 launch vehicle in late summer 

2010.

In 2006, the Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST) successfully completed 

and operated a low-cost advanced propulsion spacecraft designed for the precision 

orbital transfer of small satellites. The Upper Stage launched on a Boeing Delta II from 

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in June 2006 and completed the transfer and release 

of the small satellites.

The Upper Stage is a propulsion module that also functions as a standalone 

spacecraft. As such, it contains all hardware necessary for autonomous operations, 

including processing, software, RF communications, attitude determination/control and 

power. The Upper Stage provided the propulsion necessary to transfer two 

experimental small satellites from the Delta II and provided Geosynchronous Transfer 

Orbit (GTO) to the final geosynchronous orbit. The NCST engineering team completed 

integration of the Upper Stage with the small satellites, fueling of all vehicles, and 

integration with the launch vehicle. Once launched, NCST engineers operated the 

spacecraft from the NRL Blossom Point Mission Operations Center in southern 

Maryland.

In 2008, as a result of the success of the INP program, the Chief of Naval 

Research began investing in space science and technology across the Five Year 

Defense Program. Initial investments were targeted at developing an RF architecture 

with software programmable radios for inclusion in small satellites for maritime 

applications including synthetic aperture radar, satellite communications, and tactical 

electronic warfare.
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189

EPILOGUE – NAVY SPACE IN 2009: A FIFTY YEAR 

RETROSPECTIVE

In 1959 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations signed out nine requirements for space 

capabilities to support the Navy. He noted that several of these requirements were 

shared by other Services and stated that Navy's policy would be to "participate fully in 

the development of [all those joint] operational requirements which have Naval 

applications," and to "support vigorously, by funding and otherwise, all of the operational

requirements that are unique to Navy." What follows is a semicentennial report card 

noting the degree to which each of these nine requirements had been fulfilled during the 

years after its promulgation.

NAVIGATION

1959 requirement: "develop a satellite system for providing accurate, allweather, worldwide navigation for naval surface ships, aircraft, and 

submarines."

Fulfillment: Transit (page 24) was developed and demonstrated in 1961, 

became operational in that decade, and eventually had 60,000 users. It was 

superseded in the 1990s by GPS (page 89), which has many millions of

civilian and military users.

Navy role: Navy conceived, developed, and fielded Transit. For the jointly 

acquired GPS, Navy developed enabling technology (page 43) and the GPS

proof-of-principle satellites page 87).

RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE

1959 requirement: "provide satellite reconnaissance/surveillance systems, 

with supporting equipments, to obtain continuous and up-to-date information 

not obtainable by other known systems on ocean and sea targets, air targets, 

and land targets of naval interest."

Fulfillment: Reconnaissance/surveillance satellites operated by the National 

Reconnaissance Office began collecting intelligence in the 1960s. Initially, 

information from these satellites was shared with the Navy only though highly 

classified channels. Beginning in the late 1960s, information on ocean and 

sea targets, air targets, and land targets of interest were disseminated to 

Navy commands and units afloat through the regional Fleet Ocean 

Surveillance Centers (page 57). In the 1980s capability was established for 

broadcasting near-real-time sea-, air-, and land contacts directly to all Navy 

units (page 123), and in the 1990s connectivity was implemented also for 

rapid dissemination of satellite reconnaissance imagery to the larger ships 

(page 152). The surveillance/reconnaissance coverage was global and 

continual (or continuous but not global), as limited by orbital mechanics and 
190 Epilogue

_________________________________________________________________________________

an affordable number of satellites. The aircraft carriers and amphibious 

command ships were configured to receive rapid imagery as well as the realtime contact reports. By 2009, submarines and Navy combat-support aircraft 

were equipped to receive the near-real-time sea-, air-, and land contact

reports, integrated into their respective combat direction and control systems, 

and Aegis ships assigned to tactical ballistic missile defense were similarly 

equipped to receive and utilize theater ballistic missile contact reports 

(pages 155, 174). Non-Aegis cruisers and destroyers were equipped to 

receive and display near-real-time contact reports, but these were not yet 

integrated into their combat direction and weapons control systems.

Navy Role: The Navy pioneered exploitation by the operating forces of the 

NRO surveillance satellites (page 57) and developed and fielded connectivity 

and equipment for reporting the surveillance contact reports directly to 

tactical forces in near-real-time (pages 92 and 123). Navy and joint efforts 

over the years to acquire radar satellites, to complement NRO's

surveillance/reconnaissance capability, were not successful (pages 55, 99, 

and 122). The lack of an active space-based wide-area surveillance system 

covering the oceans of the world remains an impediment to achieving fully 

effective maritime domain awareness.

WEATHER

1959 requirement: "provide a system capable of obtaining weather 

information over areas [otherwise] void of meteorological observations, for 

the support of naval forces."

Fulfillment: Defense satellites and many civil satellites provided meterological 

information for Navy worldwide weather reporting and forecasting (pages 57

and 100).

Navy role: Navy's major ships were configured to receive satellite-derived 

meteorological data directly, beginning in 1975 (page 101).

ENVIRONMENTAL DATA

1959 Requirement: "develop a system for obtaining and utilizing geodetic, 

geophysical, mapping, ice-reconnaissance, and sea-surface temperature 

environmental data."

Fulfillment: Satellites were used extensively for geodetic and geophysical 

measurements, mapping of sea-surface heights, wave heights, sea-surface 

temperatures, and other environmental data.

Navy role: The Applied Physics Laboratory conducted a major geodetic 

program during the 1960s to map the earth's shape and gravitational fields 
Navy Space in 2009: A Fifty Year Retrospective 191 _________________________________________________________________________________

affecting satellite orbits and missile trajectories. The Navy used satelliteborne altimeters for mapping sea-surface heights (pages 102 and 133). The

Meterological and Oceanographic Command acquired a GEOSAT Follow-on 

(GFO) satellite and operated it from 1998 to 2008, providing data extending 

the Navy's mapping of ocean currents and fronts/eddies needed to support 

Navy's littoral operations (page 162). Navy orbited the Coriolis Windsat in 

2003 to make oceanographic measurements (page 178).

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON SYSTEM

1959 Requirement: "develop an anti-satellite weapon system, to be operable from fleet 

units and be immediately responsive to fleet requirements."

Fulfillment: Proposals by the Navy and other Services to develop submarine-, 

surface-ship-, and naval-aircraft-launched anti-satellite weapons were 

dropped in the early 1960s for polito-strategic reasons (page 67), and there 

was no development of direct-ascent anti-missile weapons by any of the U.S. 

military services until much later. After Soviet military policy in the early 

1970s shifted away from global strategic warfare and toward planning for

tactical warfare, including war at sea, U.S. Navy's concern turned to the 

potential threat from existing Soviet low-orbiting ocean reconnaissance 

satellites and proposed in 1978 to develop sea-based anti-satellite weapons, 

but little came of it (page 103). DoD then determined that development and 

launch of kinetic anti-satellite weapons were to be the sole responsibility of 

the Air Force; however, despite Navy's expressed concerns at the time, 

funds were not identified by the Air Force to develop any fleet-defense 

ASATs. Then with dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990, that 

threat subsided, and the Navy's ASAT requirement with it (page 135).

Navy role: No Navy (or other U.S. military) program was undertaken to 

develop an anti-satellite weapon system. In the 1990s some Navy's Aegis

ships were assigned the mission of ballistic missile defense and equipped for 

that purpose with the Standard Missile-3, designed to shoot theater ballistic 

missiles. In February 2008 an Aegis cruiser was ordered to shoot down an

inactive low-orbiting U.S. satellite over the Pacific, and the cruiser acquired, 

tracked and destroyed the satellite, demonstrating the first U.S. anti-satellite 

weapon to be operable from fleet units (or from any U.S. platform, for that 

matter).
192 Epilogue

_________________________________________________________________________________

SEA-BASED MANNED INTERCEPTOR SPACECRAFT

1959 requirement: "develop sea-based, manned interceptor spacecraft to 

intercept enemy surveillance/reconnaissance and communications satellites 

and manned weapon-bearing 'trajectory' spacecraft posing threats to fleet 

units. (This requirement, stated in 1959, was apparently envisioned as an

analogy to sea-based, manned interceptor aircraft that Navy uses to intercept 

enemy aircraft).

Fulfillment: No development of sea-based manned spacecraft of any kind 

ever ensued. (But see the sea-based unmanned anti-satellite capability, 

above.)

Navy role: Although the Navy provided many astronauts for NASA's manned 

spacecraft programs, no manned spacecraft had a military mission 

(page 63). The Navy did contribute technology to the Air Force's (military) 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program during the 1960s, but when the 

MOL Program was terminated in 1969, the Navy's participation ended with it 

(page 64).

FLEET LAUNCH AND CONTROL OF SATELLITES

1959 requirement: "develop equipment and techniques for the fleet to launch 

satellites with tactical payloads into orbit and control them in orbits and 

orientations for proper functioning of the payload."

Fulfillment: Until 2008, no program was undertaken to develop equipment or 

techniques for ships or submarines either to launch satellites or to control 

them on orbit. In 2008, an Operationally Responsive Space Office was 

established, under the Office of Force Transformation of the Secretary of 

Defense, to generate very small satellite payloads that can be placed quickly

on orbit, and a series of small demonstration satellites called Tacsats was 

developed. The initial concept of operations, approved by the Strategic 

Command in 2008, called for launch of the TacSats by the Air Force from the 

continental U.S., rather than from ships or submarines, but with potential to 

place them under control on orbit by tactical forces (page 183).

Navy role: TacSat development was managed initially by NRL's Naval Center 

for Space Technology (and later transitioned to a joint program, with 

partipation by the Office of Naval Research).

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE SATELITES

1959 requirement: "develop a satellite system capable of detecting, locating, 

and processing deliberate and inadvertent electronic emissions from foreign 
Navy Space in 2009: A Fifty Year Retrospective 193 _________________________________________________________________________________

nations, to be used for technical intelligence, strategic warning, and mission 

planning."

Fulfillment: Development of electronic intelligene (ELINT) satellites became 

subsumed, along with all other military surveillance/reconnaissance 

satellites, in the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Navy role: The Navy developed and successfully flew the world's first 

electronic-intelligence reconnaissance satellites, in 1960 (page 30). (This 

program was turned over to the National Reconnaissance Office shortly after 

it was formed in 1962 (page 54).

COMMUNICATIONS

1959 requirement: "provide satellite capability for Navy fixed point-to-point 

communications, communications among mobile units, communications 

between mobile units and shore facilities, and broadcast communications 

from shore to ships and submarines."

Fulfillment: With the environmental dependence and uncertainties of MF/HF 

radio, and anticipating loss of the Navy's worldwide network of shore-based 

communications stations in the 1970s, the Navy's need for long-haul 

communications became urgent (more critically so than the other Services, 

which had access to land lines and microwave relay towers). By the late 

1970s, UHF satellite communications entirely replaced the former mediumand high-frequency (MF and HF) radio for long-haul secure voice, teletype, 

facsimile, and digital data communications, shore-to-shore, shore-to-ship 

(including the Fleet Broadcast), ship-to-shore, and ship-to-ship. SHF satellite 

communications antennas and equipment were installed in the major ships 

whose commanders needed the wider bandwidth for intelligence, weather, 

and high-level communications, and whose flagships could handle the large 

SHF antennas. In the 1990s, EHF satellite capability was added in the major 

ships for rapid delivery of imagery and other applications requiring the even 

greater bandwidth and security.

Navy role: The Navy participated in development of, and by operational 

urgency drove the schedule of, the Fleet Satellite Communications 

(FLTSATCOM) system (pages 78 and 116). Based on success in early 

acquisition satellite communications, including commercial leasing, the Navy 

was assigned to manage acquistion of UHF Follow-on (UFO) satellites 

(page 158) and later the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) (page 175).

In the late 1980s, the Navy flew EHF communications relay packages on 

UHF satellites to provide fleet and other users with interim EHF 

communications capability (page 162) until the joint Milstar systems became 

available in 1996. In the early 1990, the Navy conducted demonstrations of 

near-real-time delivery of satellite imagery via EHF that excited operators' 
194 Epilogue

_________________________________________________________________________________

interest, with the result that all large combatant ships were fully equipped 

with EHF-SHF broadband capability (page 152).

SPACE SYSTEM SURVIVABLITY

In addition to the above requirements, promulgated in 1959, subsequent

experience with space systems applications disclosed an important

additional Navy need: "take steps to ensure system survivability for those 

space systems that are critical to Navy mission performance, so they remain 

available for use in combat despite losses or impairment from hostile or other

events."

Fulfillment: In the 1960s during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Air 

Force designed and operated certain satellite systems to survive in wartime, 

including nuclear war. NRO's surveillance/reconnaissance satellites were 

intially designed to fulfill their function by the end of the precursor stage of 

nuclear war. In the 1970s and 1980s with Cold War concerns having shifted 

to possibility of conventional war, including war at sea with the Soviet Union, 

steps were taken to improve the survivability of some U.S. military satellite 

systems: improvements to the Navy's deployed Transit navigation systems 

(page 87); renegotiation of survivability requirements for the joint-services 

Milstar communications system under development (pages 85 and 117); and 

design of robustness into the Improved Surveillance System (page 121). In 

1988 the Naval Space Command assembled a panel of Navy technical 

experts and flag officers to examine the survivability of U.S. space systems

and the implications for Navy's tactical warfighting, and a program was 

initiated to brief the fleet on these findings (page 136).

Navy role: The Navy's Transit navigation sysem was designed to withstand 

nuclear war (page 41).

CONCLUSION

By 2009, the Navy had largely fulfilled its requirements for space as spelled out by 

the Chief of Naval Operations 50 years prior. In doing so, the Navy’s global missions 

had become critically dependent on those space systems, processes, and organizations 

that were developed. The replacement and evolution of those systems have become 

vital requirements for the Navy.
195

APPENDIX A PRINCIPAL SPONSORS OF SPACE AND 

SPACE-RELATED ACTIVITIES ON THE CNO STAFF

The offices and officers listed in this appendix were responsible, on behalf of the Chief 

of Naval Operations (CNO), for determining Navy operational requirements, identifying 

funding sources, programming, and budgeting the resources for space and spacerelated activities; evaluating the operational utility of these activities; and defending the 

respective space programs in budget competitions.

The following were the Navy’s space sponsors on the CNO’s staff in the early years.

SPACE NAVIGATION (TRANSIT) PROGRAM SPACE RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

Submarine Warfare Division (OP31) under the Fleet 

Operations Deputate Director of Naval Intelligence

Responsible for TRANSIT in the 1950s and 1960s.

RANGE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAMS

RADM Laurence Frost*........................1959–1961

RADM Vernon L. Lowrance*................1962–1963

RADM Rufus L. Taylor*........................1963–1966

RADM Eugene B. Fluckey*..................1966–1968

RADM Frederick J. Harlfinger*.............1968–1971

Astronautics and Range Division (OP54) of the Naval Air 

Deputate

Air/Space Warfare Division of Naval Intelligence

RADM J. P. Monroe ..........................1962 CAPT Lloyd Moffitt ...............................1969

As a result of RADM William Moran’s discussions in 1969 with his old friend, then Chief 

of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Moorer, sponsorship for space research activities 

(to which the Navy had been constrained by the 1961 DoD policy—see page 70) was 

established within the Navy Space Program (OP 76) of the Research and Development 

Directorate. In 1971, this became the Space and Command Support Division (OP 986) 

of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Directorate (OP 098). Its space 

branches were surveillance; navigation and geodesy; meteorology (weather); and 

tactical communications. 

Navy Space Program (OP 76) of the Research and Development Directorate (1969–1971)

Space and Command Support Division (OP 986) of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Directorate (OP 

098) (1971–1989)

RADM William J. Moran ...................................... 1969–1970

RADM Horace H. Epes........................................ 1970–1971

RADM Lloyd W. Moffitt ........................................ 1971–1974

RADM Robert K. Geiger...................................... 1975–1975

CAPT Robert T. Darcy......................................... 1976–1977

RADM Grover M. Yowell ..................................... 1977–1978

CAPT Kenneth R. Haas....................................... 1979–1982

CAPT John R. Seeholtz....................................... 1983–1984

 * Double-hatted as NRO Director of Program C. (Later, beginning in 1972, Navy systems acquisition 

directors, rather than program sponsors, were double-hatted as Program C Directors; see Appendix B
196 Appendix A

_________________________________________________________________________________

CAPT T. E. Stone ................................................ 1984–1985

CAPT J. C. Kranz ................................................ 1985–1987

CDR James A. Carlson ....................................... 1988–1989

 _________ _____

To direct the programming of funds for Navy (and joint) space systems transitioning 

from research and exploratory development into further development and procurement, 

the following additional structure was established in the Command and Support 

Directorate (OP 094):

CAPT S. L. Gravely* Coordinator of Navy Satellite Communications Program (OP 094E)..1969–1970

RADM Lloyd Moffitt Coordinator of Satellite Programs (OP 094W)....................................1971–1974

From 1974 to 1979, the OPNAV space functions under OP 094 were divided between 

the Command and Support Directorate (OP 094) and the Antisubmarine Warfare and 

Ocean Surveillance Directorate (OP 095).

Coordinator of Navigation and Communications Satellites (OP 

094W until 1975, then OP 941) Ocean Surveillance Division (OP 951)

CAPT Samuel B. Wilson......................1974–1975

CAPT R. E. Enright..............................1976–1978

RADM R. J. Early.................................1974–1975

RADM R. D. Snyder.............................1976–1978

(To OP 0945 in 1979)

Ocean Surveillance Division (OP 0945)

RADM R. D. Snyder.............................1979–1980

Responding to the recommendations of a sequence of annual meetings of the Space 

Panel of the Naval Studies Board, Navy space advocates began seeking to have a 

“home” established on the OpNav staff, with flag authority to act as a single focal point 

of advocacy and sponsorship for space matters. In 1979, as an interim step, RADM 

Snyder’s OP 951 Division was redesignated as OP 945 and placed, along with OP 941, 

under OP 94. A more permanent solution arrived in 1981, when all OpNav 

responsibility for space and space-related matters (other than research and technology)

was consolidated into a newly created division on the staff of the CNO, called the Navy 

Space Systems Division, under a flag officer, with four branches: Navy satellite 

communications; navigation and environmental satellites; Navy Tactical Exploitation of 

National Capabilities (TENCAP); and ocean surveillance (each listed separately below). 

From 1981-1993, this division was under the Command, Control, and Communications 

Directorate (OP 094). In 1993, when the Office of the CNO was significantly 

reorganized, this division was redesignated as N63 and placed under the Director of 

Space and Electronic Warfare (N6). In 1995, it became simply the Navy Space Division, 

still under the N6 Directorate.

 * Double-hatted as chief of OP 764.
Principal Sponsors of Space and Space-Related Activities on the CNO Staff 197 _________________________________________________________________________________

Navy Space Systems Division (OP 943) of the C3 Directorate (OP 094) (1981–1993)

Navy Space Systems Division (N63) of the Space and Electronic Warfare Directorate (N6) (1993–1999)

RADM William E. Ramsey................................... 1981–1985

RADM D. Bruce Cargill........................................ 1985–1986

RADM D. V. Becker............................................. 1987–1988

CAPT Phillip S. Anselmo ..................................... 1988–1989

CAPT F. H. Hauk ................................................. 1989–1990

CAPT E. R. Enterline........................................... 1991–1995

CAPT D. Thompson ............................................ 1996–1998

Navy Satellite Communications (OP 0943C) 1981–1993

Navy Satellite Communications (N631) 1993–1999 Navigation and Environmental Satellites (OP 0943D)1981–1992

CAPT William B. Pierce ...................... 1981–1982

CAPT Arthur E. Rowe ......................... 1982–1983

CAPT H. M. Walters............................ 1983–1984

CAPT T. N. Danner ............................. 1985–1988

CAPT Joseph Daughtry ...................... 1989–1990

CAPT W. C. Clair ................................ 1991–1992

CDR A. W. Boyd.................................. 1993–1995

CAPT R. Leininger .............................. 1997–1999

(To N61 in 2000)

CAPT Robert J. Munn ......................... 1981–1985

CDR Robert A. Engle .......................... 1986–1987

CAPT J. B. Hodge ............................... 1988–1990

CAPT G. A. Barrett.............................. 1991–1992

(Combined with N633 in 1992)

Navy TENCAP (OP 0943E) 1981–1993

Navy TENCAP (N632) 1993–2009

CAPT W. D. Holsten............................ 1980–1981

CAPT Phillip N. Edson ........................ 1981–1982

CAPT Kent B. Pelot............................. 1983–1986

CAPT Frank J. Zak.............................. 1986–1989

CAPT Lawrence Clark......................... 1989–1991

CAPT Robert W. Stoddard.................. 1992–1994

CAPT Allan W. Legrow ....................... 1994–1998

CAPT Edward Abbot ........................... 1999–2000

CAPT Robert Huddleston.................... 2001–2002

CDR Maria Lyles ................................. 2003–2003

Ms. Rosemary Wenchel ...................... 2003–2005

CAPT W. J. Campbell ......................... 2006–2007

CAPT Joseph Cheneler ...................... 2007–2009

Ocean Surveillance Satellites (OP 0943F) 1981–1993

Ocean Surveillance and Navigation Satellites (N633)1993–2002

CAPT Thomas C. Adams.................... 1981–1982

CAPT Henry L. Phillips........................ 1982–1982

CAPT Taylor H. Meese ....................... 1982–1984

CAPT James N. Mahood..................... 1985–1986

CAPT E. Benford................................. 1986–1986

CAPT Gary McDowell ......................... 1987–1989

CAPT Thomas Herting ........................ 1990–1991

CAPT J. G. Ross ................................. 1991–1991

CAPT T. S. Eseman............................ 1992–1992

LCDR J. M. Burton (acting) ................. 1993–1993

CAPT E. Wallace................................. 1994–1994

CAPT D. Riffle ..................................... 1994–1995

LCDR M. Sturges ................................ 1995–1995

CAPT M. Crawford .............................. 1996–1998

CDR M. Copolof .................................. 1999–2002

 ________ ______
198 Appendix A

_________________________________________________________________________________

In 2000, a deputy directorate for Space Information (N612) was established in the 

Information Transfer Division (N61) of the CNO’s Space and Electronic Warfare 

Directorate (N6). This office sponsored the Navy’s EHF/UHF communications satellite, 

SHF communications satellite, commercial satellite, and advanced satellite programs.

CAPT R. Leininger............................................... 2000–2001

CDR T. Pinto-Sassman ....................................... 2001–2002

While N6/7 was amalgamated from 2003 to 2009, space systems sponsorship by 

OPNAV did not appear explicitly in that structure. (In 2009, N6 and N2 functions were 

combined to form the Information Dominance Directorate (N2/N6), and space 

sponsorship was placed under a two-star Division Director, N2/N6E.)
199

APPENDIX B PRINCIPAL NAVY SPACE SYSTEMS 

ACQUISITION DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS

Over the span of this chronicle, responsibility for development and acquisition of 

the Navy’s space systems development and acquisition activity was based at one time 

or another in the following Navy systems commands:

• Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS): renamed the Naval Ships Systems Command 

(NAVSHIPS) in 1966 (and combined with the Naval Ordnance Systems 

Command in 1974 to form the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)).

• Bureau of Naval Weapons (BUWEPS), which in 1966 split into the Naval Air 

Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Naval Ordnance Systems Command 

(NAVORD).

• Naval Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX): established in 1966, 

renamed the Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) in 1985.

• Naval Material Command (NAVMAT): established in 1966 under the Chief of 

Naval Material; disestablished in 1985.

The following were the principal offices responsible for developing and acquiring 

Navy space systems (and the Navy’s work with other Services on joint space systems) 

prior to 1966, with their respective leaders.

Satellite Communications and Astronautics Programs of the Warfare Systems Division Assistant Chief of Staff of 

BUSHIPS for Research and Development

LCDR Burton I. Edelson.......................................1961–1962

CDR Keith N. Sargent ..........................................1963–1963

Mr. L. E. Johnson .................................................1964–1964

(To NAVAIR 538 in 1964)

ADVENT Program Manager

Assistant Chief of Staff of BUSHIPS for Research and Development

(Satellite communications terminals for Navy ships)

CAPT Paul C. Combs...........................................1961–1962

(Missile) Range Programs, Bureau of Naval Weapons

(included range ships development and operations, as well as satellite range operations and instrumentation)

CAPT Joseph J. Pace ..........................................1962–1964

Mr. Frederick J. Hall .............................................1965–1966

(To NAVMAT PM-5, in 1966)

Range and Astronautics Division

CAPT Harry D. Helfrich, Jr. ..................................1962–1963

(To PM 5, NAVMAT, in 1966)
200 Appendix B

_________________________________________________________________________________

Astronautic Programs, Bureau of Naval Weapons

(including TRANSIT program; geodedic, weather, and surface-surveillance satellites; space surveillance (from the 

ground); and astro-defense

CAPT Robert F. Freitag........................................1960–1963

CAPT William T. O’Bryant....................................1964–1965

CAPT C. C. Andrews............................................1965–1966

(To NAVAIR 538 in 1966)

In March 1966, as part of a major reorganization, the Navy placed all of its material 

support commands under the newly appointed Chief of Naval Material, who reported to 

the Chief of Naval Operations. Shortly thereafter, in June 1966, the Naval Electronic 

Systems Command (NAVELEX) stood up, assuming the functions of the electronic 

divisions of three of the former Bureaus. Initially, the Navy’s space activities could be 

found in NAVSHIPS, NAVWEPS, and NAVELEX, as well as under Program Managers 

(PM 5 and PM 16) directly under the Chief of Naval Material. NAVMAT provided 

designated program managers that spanned across these systems commands and that 

required a degree of independence in their operations. By 1974, however, all of these 

Navy space programs had been placed in NAVELEX.

Astronautics Division (NAVAIR 538), Naval Air Systems Command (1966–1971)

(Branches: Navigation/TRANSIT, Geodedic, Weather, and Surface-surveillance Satellites; Space Surveillance (from 

the ground); and Astro-defense

Space Systems Division, Naval Air Systems Command (1971–1973)

(Branches: Satellite Communications, Satellite Navigation, and Satellite Observations (environmental)

CAPT J. N. Miller..................................................1967–1968

CAPT C. B. Crockett, Jr. ......................................1969–1969

CAPT John T. Geary............................................1970–1972

(To NAVMAT PM 16 in 1973)

Instrumentation Ships Program (PM 5), NAVMAT

CAPT Alex F. Hancock.........................................1966–1967

CAPT Earl B. Fowler ............................................1968–1968

(To NAVSHIPS in 1969)

Satellite Communications (PME 116), NAVELEX

CAPT Merton D. Van Orden ................................1967–1969

CAPT H. H. Felt....................................................1969–1973

(To NAVELEX PM 106-1 in 1974)

Navy Space Project Office (PM 16), NAVMAT

RADM Robert K. Geiger.......................................1971–1974

(To NAVELEX PME 106 in 1974)
Principal Navy Space Systems Acquisition Directors and Managers 201 _________________________________________________________________________________

Navy Space Projects Office (PME 106), NAVELEX

(Branches: Navy satellite communications; navigation systems; environmental satellites; and special and advanced 

system projects, each of which is listed separately below)

RADM Robert K. Geiger.......................................1974–1975

CAPT Robert T. Darcy .........................................1976–1977

RADM Grover Yowell ...........................................1977–1980

CAPT LeRoy Patterson........................................1980–1982

COMO Dennis Brooks..........................................1982–1985

(To SPAWAR 004 and PD40 in 1985)

DoD Space Programs

Satellite Communications (PME 106-1)

National Space Programs

Advanced Systems

(PME 106-4)

CAPT C. E. Reid ..................................1974–1974

CAPT John W. Pope............................1975–1978

CAPT John Newell...............................1978–1983

CAPT F. F. Mackenzie.........................1984–1985

(To PME 142-1 in 1985)

CAPT Gordon Jayne ........................... 1973–1975

CAPT Dennis Glover........................... 1976–1980

CDR William Kendrick ......................... 1981–1984

CAPT Vernon C. Block........................ 1984–1985

Navy Project Manager, Navigation Systems/NAVSTAR/GPS

(PME 106-2) Special Project Office (PME 106-5)

CDR J. R. Tuttle...................................1973–1973

LCDR J. P. McGahan ..........................1974–1974

Mr. Guy Burke......................................1974–1982

CDR K. D. Aanerud..............................1983–1984

CAPT William Boissenin ......................1984–1985

CAPT Grant Haggquist........................ 1974–1976

CAPT Frank Quigley ........................... 1976–1979

CAPT/COMO Thomas Betterton......... 1979–1986

(To SPAWAR 004-5 in 1985)

MILSTAR Joint Project

CAPT Robert C. Bates.........................1984–1985

Environmental Satellites (PME 106-3)

Mr. Duane G. Robbins .........................1975–1980

 _________ ______

Aerospace Ocean Surveillance (PME 106-6)

CAPT Leon Wardle ..............................1983–1985

In 1985, NAVELEX was redesignated as the Space and Naval Warfare Command 

(SPAWAR), at which time the above space-system management functions were divided 

between two offices within SPAWAR: Director of Space and Sensor Programs, 

overseeing DoD space programs, and the Assistant SPAWAR Commander for Space 

Technology, managing Navy’s participation in National space programs. Each was

headed initially by a flag officer. In 1990, the Navy created the Program Executive Office 

for Space Communication and Sensor Systems (PEO-SCS), and the programs of the 

SPAWAR Space and Sensor Program directorate were transferred to PEO-SCS. After 

1992, the Assistant Commander for Space Technology became the Director of Space 

Technology (SPAWAR 40).
202 Appendix B

_________________________________________________________________________________

DoD Space Programs

SPAWAR Space and Sensor Programs (PD 40)

National Space Programs

Asst SPAWAR Commander for Space Technology (SPAWAR 004)

SPAWAR Director of Space Technology (SPAWAR 40) (after 1992)

RADM Thomas K. Mattlingly................1985–1989

RADM D. Eaton....................................1989–1990

Dr. Frank R. Diederich .........................1991–1992

RADM Thomas Betterton .................... 1985–1992

RADM Jay W. Sprague........................ 1993–1994

CAPT Delio Lopez ............................... 1994–1995

CAPT Dwight Denson.......................... 1995–1999

Space Systems Program (PMW 142) Special Project Office (SPAWAR 004-5)

Dr. Frank R. Diederich .........................1985–1988

CAPT William Norris ............................1988–1989

CAPT C. Thomson...............................1989–1992

CAPT Arthur Collier ............................. 1986–1990

CAPT Delio Lopez ............................... 1991–1994

(Disestablished as a Navy office and 

functions transferred to National programs in 1993)

Satellite Communications (PMW 142-1) Advanced Development (SBR-IR) (SPAWAR 004-4)

CAPT F. Mackenzie .............................1985–1986

(Vacant)................................................1987

CDR J. Jaudon.....................................1988–1988

LCDR N. Brownsberger .......................1989–1990

CAPT Albert Skroch............................. 1986–1990

CAPT George Mitschang..................... 1991–1992

NROSS Satellite Program (PMW 142-7)

CAPT N. Holben...................................1986

Program Executive Officer for Space Communication and 

Sensor Systems (PEO-SCS)

RADM L. E. Blose ................................1990–1991

John DeSalme......................................1992–1998

Mr. Bill Eaton........................................1998–1999

Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW 146)

Mr. Richard W. Hoffman.......................1993–1995

CAPT James Loiselle...........................1995–2000

(continued under PD-14/PEO-SS)

In 1999, the PEO-SCS was disestablished, and all of the Navy’s space acquisition 

functions were consolidated under a single flag officer triple-hatted in the Space and 

Naval Warfare Systems Command (see page 144). In 2004, these programs came 

under the newly created Program Executive Office for Space Systems (PEO-SS).
Principal Navy Space Systems Acquisition Directors and Managers 203 _________________________________________________________________________________

Space Technology Systems Program Office (SPAWAR PD 14) 1999-2004

Program Executive Office for Space Systems (PEO-SS) 2004-

CAPT Dwight Denson ..........................................1999

RDML Rand Fisher...............................................2000–2004

RDML Victor See..................................................2004–2008

RDML Liz Young ..................................................2008–2009

DoD Space Programs

Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW 146)

(continued)

National Space Programs

(To SPAWAR Space Field Activity)

Mr. Robert E. Tarleton .........................2000–2004

CAPT David Porter ..............................2004–2007

Mr. Wayne Curles ................................2007–2009
204 Appendix B

_________________________________________________________________________________
205

APPENDIX C NAVY SPACE LEADERSHIP IN THE OFFICE OF 

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The following offices within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy (that is, not within the 

Span of control of the Chief of Naval Operations) were also involved in fostering and 

promoting space in support of Navy and Marine Corps operations.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN) for Space Technology

Dr. Herbert Rabin .................................................1980–1984

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) for C3I and Space Programs(1984–1990)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) for C4I, EW, and Space Programs(1991–2003)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) for C4I and Space Programs (2004– )

Harold Kitson, Jr...................................................1984–1985*

Dr. E. Ann Berman ...............................................1986–1988

Dr. Robert Lefande (acting)..................................1989

RADM Brent M. Bennitt (acting)...........................1990

Dr. Edward C. Whitman........................................1991–1993

Dr. Marvin Langston.............................................1995–1997

Dr. Ann Miller........................................................1998–1999

Dr. Dale Uhler.......................................................1999–2003

RDML Michael Sharp (acting)..............................2004

Dr. Gary Federici ..................................................2005–2010

During the 1990s, the Navy, in response to Congressional direction, began the process 

of appointing a Program Executive Officer (PEO) for each of its major acquisition 

programs in its several systems commands. Thenceforth, each PEO reported directly 

to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. 

The Navy’s PEOs for space systems were the PEO for Space Communication and 

Sensor Systems (PEO-SCS), responsible for the “white world” programs formerly under 

SPAWAR PD 40, from 1990 to 1999, and the PEO for Space Systems (PEO-SS),

responsible for the acquisition of all Navy space systems beginning in 2004. The PEOs, 

as well as their major subordinate program offices, are listed in Appendix B.

 * Mr. Kitson was appointed the DASN (RD&A) for C3I in 1982. His title changed in 1984 to DASN (RD&A) 

for C3I and Space when the DASN for Space Technology was disestablished after Dr. Rabin stepped 

down.
206 Appendix C

_________________________________________________________________________________
207

APPENDIX D COMMANDERS OF NAVAL SPACE COMMAND

The Naval Space Command was established on 1 October 1985 and was 

designated the Naval component of US Space Command. The command was 

disestablished and its billets transferred to the Naval Network and Space Operations 

command (which later became the Naval Network Warfare Command) in 2002.

Commanders of Naval Space Command

Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly ................Oct 1985 – Feb 1986

Rear Admiral D. Bruce Cargill.................Feb 1986 – Sep 1986

Rear Admiral Richard C. Macke .............Oct 1986 – Mar 1988

Rear Admiral David E. Frost ...................Mar 1988 – Apr 1990

Colonel Charles R. Geiger, USMC .........Apr 1990 – May 1990

Rear Admiral L. E. Allen, Jr.....................May 1990– Aug 1991

Rear Admiral Herbert A. Browne, Jr .......Aug 1991 – Oct 1993

Rear Admiral Leonard N. Oden ..............Oct 1993 – Jan 1994

Rear Admiral Lyle G. Bien ......................Jan 1994 – Dec 1994

Rear Admiral Phillip S. Anselmo .............Dec 1994 – Apr 1995

Rear Admiral Katharine L. Laughton.......Apr 1995 – Feb 1997

Rear Admiral Patrick D. Moneymaker.....Mar 1997 – Sep 1998

Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor.............Sep 1998 – Jun 2000

Rear Admiral J. J. Quinn.........................Jun 2000 – Mar 2001

Rear Admiral Richard J. Mauldin ............Apr 2001 – Dec 2001

Rear Admiral John Cryer ........................Dec 2001 – Jul 2002
208 Appendix D

_________________________________________________________________________________
209

APPENDIX E NAVY RESEARCH LABORATORIES AND 

FACILITIES

From the beginning, research and development of space technology has been an 

essential part of the Navy’s space activities. Three organizations have been prominent 

in this area: the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL); the Johns Hopkins University 

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL); and the Naval Electronics Laboratory and its 

successor organizations. The following is a list of key organizational elements and 

leadership in the Navy’s development of space technology.

Naval Research Laboratory

Mr. Howard O. Lorenzen Radio Division Superintendent................................................ 1943–1980

Mr. Reid D. Mayo Branch Head in Radio Division ............................................... 1943–1990

Mr. Vincent Rose Section Head in Radio Division .............................................. 1950–2000

Mr. Martin J. Votaw Branch Head, Satellite Techniques Branch ........................... 1947–1963

Mr. Edgar E. Dix Branch Head, Satellite Techniques Branch ........................... 1955–1965

Mr. Peter G. Wilhelm Director, Naval Center for Space Technology ....................... 1959–

Mr. Robert E. Eisenhauer Superintendent, Space Systems Development Department . 1962–2008

Mr. Robert T. Beal Superintendent, Spacecraft Engineering Department ........... 1962–1993

Mr. Lee M. Hammarstrom Superintendent, Space Systems Technology Department .... 1967–2002 

Mr. Frederick V. Hellrich Associate Director, Naval Center for Space Technology ....... 1967–2006 

Mr. Roger Easton Head, Space Applications Branch ......................................... 1943–1980

Dr. Herbert Friedman Superintendent, Space Science Division ............................... 1945–1990

Dr. Herbert Gursky Superintendent, Space Science Division ............................... 1990–2005

Dr. Jill Dahlberg Superintendent, Space Science Division ............................... 2006–

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Dr. Frank T. McClure, Dr. William H. Guier, and George C. Weiffenbach, in March 1958 made the first 

measurements on the Soviet Union's Sputnik and originated the U.S. Navy's Transit space navigation 

concept (see page 24.)

JHU/APL Space Development Division (1959–1969)

JHU/APL Space Department (1969–)

Dr. Richard Kershner Division/Department Head ...................................................... 1959–1978

(Managed development of Transit Navigation System 1959-1969)

Mr. Theodore Wyatt Transit Project Engineer.......................................................... 1960–1969

Transit Program Manager

Dr. John Dassoulas ..............................................1969–1976

Mr. Robert Danchik ..............................................1976–1991

Mr. Lee Pryor........................................................1991–1995
210 Appendix E

_________________________________________________________________________________

JHU/APL Fleet Systems Department

Mr. H. Gregory Tornatore Navy Space Communications Program Area Manager.......... 1985–2001 

Mr. Samuel B. Wilson Naval Space Surveillance Systems Program Manager.......... 1985–1995

The U.S. Navy Radio and Sound Laboratory (NRSL), was established in 1940 in San 

Diego. It became the U.S. Navy Electronics Laboratory (NEL) in 1945; the Naval 

Command, Control, and Communications Laboratory Center (NCCCLC) in 1967, and 

the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC) later in 1967. In 1977, NELC merged 

with the Naval Undersea Center (NUC) to form the Naval Ocean Systems Center 

(NOSC). In 1992, NOSC absorbed several other organizations to become the Naval 

Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) RDT&E Division, or 

NRAD. NRAD became the SPAWAR Systems Center (SSC) San Diego in 1997, and

SSC Pacific in 2008.

NELC Satellite Systems Program Office (Code 1400)

R.E.Shutters .........................................................(through1977)

NELC LOS and Satellite Communications Div (Code 2400)

Frank M. Tirpak ....................................................(through 1977)

NOSC Aerospace Systems Div (Code 815)

Communications Department

H.J. Wirth................................................ 1977-1983

NOSC Surface/Aerospace Surveillance Dept (Code 73)

R.E. Shutters .......................................... 1977-1983

NOSC Space Systems Division (Code 84)

Communications Department

Dr. Marlan S. Kvigne .............................. 1984-1992

NOSC Space Systems & Technology Division (Code 76)

Surveillance Department

R.E. Shutters .......................................... 1984-1986

Ken Regan.............................................. 1987-1990

Frank M. Tirpak ...................................... 1991-1992

NRaD Satellite Communications Division (Code 84)

Communicatiions Department

Carl Gibbens........................................... 1992-1995

Donald O. Milstead................................. 1995-1997

NRaD Space Systems and Technology Div (Code 76)

Surveillance Department

James Wangler....................................... 1992-1997

SSC San Diego Satellite Communications Div (Code 284)

Communication and Information Systems Department

Donald O. Milstead................................. 1997-2005

SSC San Diego Joint & National Systems Div (Code 273)

Surveillance Department

Tom Knight ............................................. 1997-2002

Pat M. Sullivan........................................ 2002-2006

Diana Holifield ........................................ 2006-2008
Principal Navy Space Systems Acquisition Directors and Managers 211 _________________________________________________________________________________

SSC San Diego RF Communications Div (Code 552)

Communications and Network Department

James Parsons....................................... 2005-2007

SSC Pacific Joint & National Systems Div (Code 273)

Surveillance Department

Diana Holifield ........................................ 2008-

SSC Pacific RF Communications Div (Code 552)

Communications and Network Department

James Parsons....................................... 2008-
212 Appendix E

_________________________________________________________________________________
213

APPENDIX F KEY CONTRIBUTORS TO NATIONAL SYSTEM 

DIRECT-BROADCAST CONCEPT AND CAPABILITY

The following people were key contributors to the concept and capability of delivering 

real-time contact reports from national sensor systems directly to tactical forces.

Navy Captain Bill Smith, Naval Electronic Systems Command: conceived the 

"sensor-to-shooter" approach; organized and directed Navy's OTH detection, 

classification, and targeting effort.

The Honorable David E. Mann, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 

Engineering, and Systems), swayed a skeptical Naval Intelligence Community to 

endorse and forward the original operational requirements approved by OP 095 

for national satellite surveillance data in direct support of Navy tactical operations.

Navy Captain Al Best, and later Commander Pat Hanson, Joint Cruise Missile 

Project Office: promoted and implemented incorporation of near-real-time data 

from National systems into Tomahawk targeting.

Navy Captain Denny Glover, Naval Electronic Systems Command: designed 

near-real-time contact reporting into space-based radar (not procured); 

demonstrated sailors' ability to use the satellite data for convincing Navy 

leadership on the "sensor-to shooter" concept.

Mr. Tom Boyd, USN (retired), Navy Special Projects Office: conceived and 

designed the TADIXS-B and TRAP format; directed design of the space segment 

of the Improved Surveillance System.

Navy Captain Fenton Carey, Navy Special Projects Office: strongly promoted 

and sold the direct tactical broadcast concept to Navy senior leadership.

Air Force Colonel Ron Knecht, Air Force TENCAP Office: led the successful 

effort by the joint TADIXS-B Working Group to oppose the Intelligence 

Community’s attempts to put the direct tactical broadcasts under authority of the 

National Security Agency rather than the joint military services.

Mr. Lee Hammarstrom, Naval Research Laboratory: insisted that the original 

design of the ocean surveillance system have specific capability for tactical 

surveillance and targeting needs.

Naval Reserve Captain Dr. Bob Hess, consultant to Navy Special Projects 

Office: defined Navy tactical needs for National sensor systems to provide 

"sensor-to-shooter" inputs; coordinated review and approval by Navy CINCs; 

provided long-term concept continuity.

Mr. Jim Wangler, Navy Ocean Systems Center: engineered and implemented 

the communications connectivities to support the TADIXS-B simulations for 
214 Appendix F

_________________________________________________________________________________

exercises and the TRAP Broadcast.

Mr. Alan Keimig, consultant to the Joint Cruise Missile Office, engineered the

TADIXS-B and TRAP interfaces with Tomahawk weapons controllers.

Mr. Tom Knight, Navy Ocean Systems Center: designed the Tactical Receive 

Equipment (TRE) to meet special needs of ships, submarines, ground units.

Mr. Carl Gibbens and Henry Gok, Navy Ocean Systems Center: adapted TREs

for installations in carriers, cruisers, battleship, and submarines and for tactical 

ground users.

Retired Navy Commander Gerry Brown, Naval Space Command: successfully 

promoted "sensor-to-shooter" demonstrations with tactical commanders; 

orchestrated exercises.

Navy Commander Mike Ketron, Naval Security Group: leading participant in the 

fleet OTH targeting working group; initiated transformation of the simulated 

TADIXS-B Broadcast into the permanent operational broadcast (TRAP) and was 

instrumental in coordinating its implementation.

Naval Reserve Captain Randy Nees, consultant to the Navy Special Projects 

Office: promoted development and acquisition of tactical receive equipment for 

Navy and other aircraft; as an aviator, demonstrated their effectiveness in 

operational exercises.

Retired Navy Commander Fred Glaeser, consultant to Navy TENCAP: wrote 

the plans to demonstrate tactical value of National and other sensors in fleet and 

joint exercises; pioneered new sources of surveillance and reconnaissance on the 

TRAP Broadcast.

Navy Captain John Newell: discovered the modulation technique employed for 

the first TRAP Broadcast, and engineered subsequent versions.

Navy Lieutenant Commander Jim Helm: Naval Space Command, supervised 

tests proving feasibility of the TRAP Broadcast.

Navy Captain Kent Pelot, USN (Director of Navy TENCAP, later consultant to 

the Navy Special Projects Office and the NRO): advocated the “sensor-toshooter” concept in high-level policy papers and briefings.

Dr. Gary Federici, Center for Naval Analyses (now CNA Corporation): directed 

analyses of "sensor-to-shooter" exercises and operations; advised senior Navy 

leadership on the significance and implications of results.
215

APPENDIX G NRO SPACE PIONEERS

The following Navy personnel have been officially recognized as “Space Pioneers” by 

the National Reconnaissance Office.

Robert Eisenhauer: pioneered techniques enabling precise time-of-arrival signal 

recovery for intelligence satellites.

Lee Hammarstrom: conceived and integrated a major Program C satellite 

system; later served as NRO's Chief Scientist.

Fred Hellrich: pioneered the architecture, design, development, and deployment 

of computer processing for a major Program C satellite system.

Howard Lorenzen: advocated and directed development of the nation's first 

electronic intelligence satellite and subsequently led Navy teams in developing 

far more technically sophisticated satellite systems.

Reid Mayo: conceived and designed the nation's first electronic intelligence 

satellite.

Jim Morgan: Navy champion of electronic intelligence satellite support to military 

operations, developed the tasking and dissemination architecture for Program C 

systems.

Vince Rose: designed the receivers for early and subsequent Program C 

satellite systems.

Pete Wilhelm: developed multiple-launch dispensers, orbital insertion and 

maneuver techniques, and long-life and low-cost high-performance satellites; 

served as chief spacecraft engineer of the Naval Space Technology Center.
216 Appendix G

_________________________________________________________________________________
217

APPENDIX H LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACS Afloat Correlation System

ADFC Altimeter Data Fusion Center

AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory

AFSATCOM Air Force Satellite Communications

AFSPC The Air Force Space Command

AGF Miscellaneous command ship

AGI Advanced Geo-Spatial Intelligence

AIP Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program

AIS Advanced Information Systems

ANNA Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

APL Applied Physics Laboratory

ARIES Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASAT Anti-Satellite

ASCC Alternate Space Control Center

ASD(I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

ASMD Anti Strategic Missile Defense

ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy

ASPADOC Alternate Space Defense Operations Center

ASPO Army Space Program Office

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

ASWOC Anit-Submarine Warfare Operations Center

AT&L Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

ATP Advanced Tracking Prototype

ATS Applications Technology Satellite

AWS Aegis Weapon System

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

BP Blossom Point (NRL Mission Operations Center)

C3I Control, Communications and Intelligence

C4 ISR Command-and-Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CAPT Captain

CART Control and Alert Reporting Terminal

CASREP Casualty Report

CAWP Collection Awareness Web Portal

CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

CCS Combat Control System (submarines)
218 Appendix H

___________________________________________________________________________________

CDD Capabilities Description Document

CDR Commander

CG Guided Missile Cruiser

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIC Combat Information Center

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet

CMA Comprehensive Maritime Awareness

CMIS Conical Microwave Imager/Sounder

CMR Communications Moon Relay

CNA Center for Naval Analyses (now CNA Corporation)

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CNR Chief of Naval Research 

COMIREX Committee on Imagery Requirements & Exploitation

COMO Commodore

COMOPTEVFOR Commander of the Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force

Comsat Communications Satellite Corporation

COMSIXTHFLT Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet

CTT Command Tactical Terminal

CUDIXS Common User Digital Information Exchange Subsystem

CWSP Commercial Wideband Satellite Communications

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DBS Direct Broadcast Service

DCA Defense Communications Agency

DCGS-N Distributed Common Ground System-Navy

DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

DCS Defense Communications System

DDG Guided Missile Destroyer

DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering; 

Deputy Director of Research and Engineering

DFP Data Fusion Processor

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISCOS Disturbance Compensation System

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DNSDP Defense Navigation Satellite Development Program

DoD Department of Defense

DODGE DoD Gravity Experiment

DON Department of the Navy

DRSP Defense Reconnaissance Support Program Working Group

DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

DSP Defense Support Program

EA Executive Agent

EHF Extremely High Frequency
List of Acronyms 219 ___________________________________________________________________________________

ELF Extremely Low Frequency

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

ENTR Embedded National Tactical Receiver

EOS Earth Observing System

EPS Enhanced Polar System

EWCS Electronic Warfare Combat System

FBP Fleet Broadcast Processor

FEP Fleet EHF Package

FFRDC Federally Funded R&D Center

FIA Future Imagery Architecture

FIST Fleet Imagery Support Terminal

FLTSATCOM Fleet Satellite Communications

FOC Full Operating Capability

FOSIC/FOSIF Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center/Facility

FOT Follow-On Terminal

GBS Global Broadcast Service

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GCCS-M Global Command and Control System-Maritime

GDF Guidance for Development of the Force

GEOS Goddard Earth Observing System

GEOSAT Geodesy Satellite

GFO Geodetic Satellite Follow-on

GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites

GPS Global Positioning System

GRAB Galactic Radiation and Background

GREB Galactic Radiation Energy Balance

GTO Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit

HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile

HF High Frequency

HICO Hyperspectral Imager of the Coastal Ocean

HRTI High Resolution Terrain Information

IBS Integrated Broadcast System

IBS-S Integrated Broadcast System-Simplex

IC Intelligence Community

ICD Initial Capabilities Document

IGY International Geophysical Year

INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite

INMARSAT B HSD International Maritime Satellite High Speed Data (commercial satellite 

communications)

INP Innovative Naval Prototype

INTELINK A highly classified network with functional elements of the Internet 

and World Wide Web

Intelsat International Commercial Satellite Communications Consortium

IOC Initial Operating Capability

IP Internet Protocol
220 Appendix H

___________________________________________________________________________________

IPO Integrated Program Office

IPR Internet Protocol Routing

IPS Interim Polar System

IR Infrared

ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

ITSS Integrated Tactical Surveillance System

JATO Jet-Assisted Take-Off

JCA JSIPS-N Concentrator Architecture

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

JCMT Joint Collection Management Tool

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCTD Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration

JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

JMAPS Joint Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey

JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System

JOTS Joint Operational Tactical System

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSIPS-N Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy

JTAGS Joint Tactical Ground Station

JTPO Joint Terminal Project Office

JTWS Joint Threat Warning System

LCC Amphibious command ship

LCDR Lieutenant Commander

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

LEASAT Leased Satellite

LES Lincoln Experimental Satellites

LFMI Low-Frequency Microwave Imager

LHA Landing Helicopter Assault

LIDOS Low-inclination Doppler-only Satellite

Lofti Low-Frequency Trans-Ionosphere

LPD/LPI Low Probability of Detection/Intercept

LPI Low-Probability-of-Intercept

MASTER Maritime Automated SuperTrack Enhanced Reporting

MATT Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

METOC Meteorological and Oceanographic Center

MF Medium Frequency

MIFC Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center

MIFC-LANT Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center-Atlantic

Milstar Military Strategic, Tactical and Relay

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

Modem modulator-demodulator
List of Acronyms 221 ___________________________________________________________________________________

MOE Measures of (operational) Effectiveness

MOL Manned Orbiting Laboratory

MOP Measures of (technical) Performance

MRB Mission Requirements Board

MSO Military Satellite Office

MSTS Military Sea Transportation Service

MUOS Mobile User Objective System

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Agency

NAVCAMS Naval Communications Area Master Stations

NAVELEX Naval Electronic Systems Command

NAVMACS Naval Modular Automated Communications Subsystem

NAVOCEANO Naval Oceanographic Office

NAVSECGRU Naval Security Group

NAVSEG Navigation Satellite Executive Group

NAVSOC Naval Satellite Operations Center

NAVSPACECOM Naval Space Command

NAVSPASUR Naval Space Surveillance System

NAVSTAR Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging

NCCOSC Naval Command and Control and Ocean Surveillance Center

NCST Naval Center for Space Technology

NCTAMS Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station

NCTT National Conference on Telecommunications Technologies

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NELC Naval Electronics Laboratory Center

NES Navigation Experimental Satellite

NESP Navy EHF SATCOM Program

NETWARCOM Network Warfare Command

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NMIC National Maritime Information Center

NMT Navy Multiband Terminal

NNSOC Naval Network and Space Operations Command 

NNSS Navy Navigation Satellite System

NNWC Naval Network Warfare Command

NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

NOSC Naval Ocean Systems Center

NOSIC Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center

NOSS National Oceanographic Sensing System

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System

NPS Naval Postgraduate School

NRAD NCCOSC Research and Development

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NROSS Naval Remote Ocean Sensing System

NSA National Security Agency

NSDD National Security Decision Directive
222 Appendix H

___________________________________________________________________________________

NSOC Naval Satellite Operations Center

NSRP Naval Space Reserve Program

NSS National Security Space

NSSAP National Security Space Acquisition Policy

NSSWG Naval Space Strategy Working Group

NTC Naval Transformational Communications

NTCOC Naval Telecommunications Command Operations Center

NTCS-A Navy Tactical Command Systems-Afloat

NTDS Naval Tactical Data System

NTS Navigation Technology Satellites

OBU OSIS Baseline Upgrade

ODTML Ocean Data Telemetry Microsatellite Link

OFT Office of Force Transformation

OOS Open Ocean Surveillance

OPTEVFOR DET Operational Test and Evaluation Force Detachment

ORS Operationally Responsive Space

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSIS Ocean Surveillance Information System

OSO Operational Support Office (within National Reconnaissance Office)

OTCIXS Officer in Tactical Command Information eXchange Subsystem

OTH Over-The-Horizon

OTH-T Over-The-Horizon-Targeting

PAMOR PAssive MOon Relay

PANSAT Petite Amateur Navy Satellite

PARAGON Prototype Airborne Reporting and Ground Operations Node

PAWS Prototype Analyst Worstation System

PDEC Prototype Development Engineering Center

PDM Presidential Decision Memorandum

PEO Program Executive Office(r)

PEO-SS Program Executive Officer for Space Systems

PKO Anti-Space Defense Force (Russian)

PNT Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

POC Payload Operations Center (at NAVOCEANO)

POES Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite

POST Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal

PSAC Presidential Science Advisory Committee

RADM Rear Admiral, Upper Half

RDA Research Development Acquisition

RDML Rear Admiral, Lower Half

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

REWSON Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations, and Naval 

Intelligence Systems

RF Radio Frequency

ROTHR Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar

SAINT SAtellite INTerceptor
List of Acronyms 223 ___________________________________________________________________________________

SALT-I Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement of 1972

SAMSO Space and Missile Systems Organization

SAR Synthetic-Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SATCOMMFAC Satellite Communications Facility

SBIRS Space Based Infrared System

SBR Space Based Radar

SBWAS Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction

SELOR Ships Emitter Locating Reports

SETA Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance

SETF Space Exploitation Task Force

SHF Super High Frequency

SI Special Intelligence

SINS Ships Inertial Navigation Systems

SIOP Single Integrated Operations Plan

SIPRNET Secret Internet PRotocol Network

SIRVES SIGINT Requirements Validation & Evaluation Subcommittee

SM Standard Missile

SMC Space and Missile Systems Center

SMO Support to Military Operations

SMTI Surface Moving Target Indicator

SOC Satellite Operations Center (at NAVSOC Headquarters)

SolRAD Solar Radiation

SORS SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee

SOSS Satellite Ocean Surveillance System

SOSUS Sound Surveillance System

SPADATS Space Detection and Tracking System

SPADOC U.S. Space Command's Space Defense Operations Center

SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

SPCS Space Control Squadron

SPO [Navy] Special Projects Office

SRMT Surveillance and Reconnaissance Management Tool 

SRP Space Radar Program

SSBN Designation for Nuclear-Powered Strategic Ballistic Missile 

Submarines

SSC Surface Surveillance and Control system

SSES Ship’s Signal Exploitation Space

SSFA SPAWAR Space Field Activity

SSIXS Submarine Satellite Information Exchange Subsystem

SSN Designation for Nuclear-Powered Fast Attack Submarines

SST Sea Surface Temperature

SSULI Special Sensor Ultraviolet Limb Imager
224 Appendix H

___________________________________________________________________________________

STRED Standard TRE Display

SUPPLOT Supplementary Plot

SURTASS Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System

TACDAR Tactical Detection and Reporting

TACINTEL Tactical Intelligence

TacSat Tactical Satellite

TADIXS Tactical Data Information eXchange System

TADIXS-B Tactical Data Information eXchange System-Broadcast

TARPS Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System

TASM Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile

TBM Theater Ballistic Missile

TEAMS Tactical EA-6B Mission Support System

TENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities

TES Theater Event System

TFCC Tactical Flag Command & Control Center

TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast Service

TIE Target Indicator Experiment

Timation Time Navigation

TIP TRANET Improvement Program

Tipsy Trans-Ionospheric Propagation System

TIROS Television and Infrared Observation Satellite

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TOA Total Obligation Authority

TOG Technical Operations Group

TOPEX Ocean Topography Experiment

TRAAC Transit Research and Altitude Control

TRANET Tracking Network

TRANSIM Transit Simplified

TRAP TRE and Related Applications

TRE Tactical Receive Equipment

TRSSCOM Technical Research Ship Special Communications

TSAT Transformational Communications Satellites

TSD Tactical Surveillance Demonstration

TT&C Tracking, Telemetry, and Control

TVD Theatre of Military Operations (Russian)

TWCS Tomahawk Weapons Control System

TYCOM Type Commander

UFO UHF Follow-On

UHF Ultra High Frequency

USAF United States Air Force

USL Underwater Sound Laboratory

USNO U.S. Naval Observatory

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM United States Space Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
List of Acronyms 225 ___________________________________________________________________________________

VADM Vice Admiral

VCNO Vice Chief of Naval Operations

VLF Very Low Frequency

VMOC Virtual Mission Operations Center

WARP Web-based Access and Retrieval Portal (NGA)

WCDMA Wideband Code-Division Multiple Access

WGS Wideband Global Satellite

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
226 Appendix H

___________________________________________________________________________________
227

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___________________________________________________________________________________
233

Index

A

Abbot, Steve 166

Ad Hoc Committee on Space (U.S.) 39

Advanced Reconnaissance System WS-117L 20

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

Advent 30

DYNO/GRAB 30, 31, 32, 54

establishment 19

NAVSPASUR 35

TIROS 57–58

Transit 25–26, 26

Advent communications satellite 30

Navy ship experiments 49

Aegis Weapon System

ASAT concept 104

ASAT demonstration 179

DBS/GBS 160

IBS 174

TRE 130, 150

Aerobee rockets 11–12, 16

Aerojet Corporation

Aerobee 11

Aerospace Corporation

FLTSATCOM satellite acquisition 81

GPS 90, 91, 92

NAVSTAR 44

AIL Systems

GFO 163

AIP (Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program)151

Albatross 56

Alternate Space Defense Operations Center 

(ASPADOC) 108

Altimeter Data Fusion Center (ADFC) 163

American Interplanetary Society 7

Anderson, G. W. 23

Andreasson, Alf 167

ANNA (Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force) program 61

Anti-satellite (ASAT)

Early Spring 68

fulfillment of Navy requirements 191

HiHo 68

in the 1960s 67–68

Navy demonstration 179–80

Navy requirements (1959) 22

SAINT 67

satellite surveillance counter tactics 103–4

sea-based capability 104

Skipper 68

U.S. policy under SALT-I 103

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL)

Aerobee rockets 11–12, 16

and Navy space requirements 190

environmental sensing satellites in the 1960s

geodetic research 59–61

ionospherics 62

space physics 61–62

GEOS 61

GEOSAT 133

key organizational elements 209

satellite technology, 1960s 68

Seasat radar altimeter 102

space cadre, 1960s 62

Space Development Div est 26

TRANET 33

Transit See Transit

V-2 rockets 8, 10

Army and Navy Aeronautical Board 14

Astronauts, Navy 19, 63–65

Atlas rocket 16, 20, 29, 30, 61, 79, 81

ATP (Advanced Tracking Prototype) 129

and NCST-A 129

ATS-1 (Applications Technology Satellite) 58, 101

B

Ball Aerospace Corporation

GFO 163

Batzler, Jack 166

Beacon Explorer 60

Bell Laboratories

Echo-I 28

Berman, Alan 46

Berman, Ann 167, 205

Betterton, Thomas xv, 142, 143, 166, 201, 202

Bielecki, Daria 182

Bien, Lyle xv, 166, 207

Brooks, Dennis 113, 201

Browne, Herb 166, 207

Brubaker, Leo 123

Burke, Arleigh 23, 25, 30, 31, 62, 106

Burnt Frost 179

Busey, James 135

Bush, Vannever 15

C

California Institute of Technology

Aerobee 11

China Lake 8

Cape Canaveral, Florida

DYNO/GRAB 31
234 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

Echo-I 28

SolRAD 31

Transit 26

UFO 159

Upper Stage 187

Carmody, Red 75

Carpenter, Scott 63

CART (Control and Alert Reporting Terminal) 129, 

131, 151

CAWP (Collection Awareness Web Portal) 148

CCS (Combat Control System), submarines

and TRE 130

Centaur rocket 30, 79, 81

Center for Naval Analyses

and Navy space organizaiton in the 1990s 142

Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)

and Navy TENCAP 110, 173

Challenge Athena 153

Radiant Ivory 156

TACDAR 155–56

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

and NRO 20–21, 142

and reconnaissance/surveillance satellites 20

CORONA 20–21, 58

Discoverer 20, 58

Program B 20

user requirerments study, 1977 98

Chaffee, Roger 63

Challenge Athena 152–53, 154–55, 160

Cheltenham, Maryland

CMR 23

TRSSCOM 46

China Lake, California 8, 70

Chrisman, Chuck 128

Classic Guardian 122

Clipper Bow 96, 100

CMR (Communications Moon Relay) 13, 19, 23–24, 

46

Cohen, Manuel 167

Collins Radio Company

DSCS 48

Communications Satellite Act of 1963 45

Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) 45, 

47

Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW146) 158, 170, 202, 203

Communications satellites

Advent 30, 49

commerical experimentation, Navy 49–51

Compass Link 50

Courier 29

CWSP 160

DSCS 47–48, 83–84, 152

Early Bird 45

EHF 162

EPS 176–77

FEPs 118

FLTSATCOM See FLTSATCOM

frequency band tradeoffs 77

fulfillment of Navy requirements 193

Gapfiller 81, 83, 116

GBS 160–62, 176

INMARSAT 159

Intelsat 45, 153

IPS 176–77

laser communications, 1970s 86–87

LES 51

Lofti (Low-Frequency Trans-Ionosphere) 53

MUOS 167, 175

Navy requirements, 1959 22

NMT 177

QuickSAT 159

Score 29

SHF terminals 159–60, 176

Syncom 49, 50

TacSat 1960s 51–52

TacSat 2000s 183–85

Telstar 50

TSAT 177

UFO 117, 158–59

WGS 176

Compass Link 50

Connelly, Thomas 32

Connoly, T. F. 40

Constant Source 125

Coordinator of Satellite Programs (OP 094W) 75

Coriolis WindSat 178, 191

CORONA 20–21, 58

Counterspace initiatives 179–80

Courier communications satellite 29

Crippen, Robert 64–65

CTT (Command Tactical Terminal) 125

CUDIXS

FLTSATCOM channel 79

CWSP (Commercial Wideband Satellite 

Communications) Program 160

D

Dahlgren, Virginia

GEOSAT 133

Naval Space Command 111, 141

NAVSPASUR 36, 146

TENCAP Detachment 108, 109

Transit 92

DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency)
Index 235 ___________________________________________________________________________________

Discoverer-II 157

GBS 161

satellite laser communications 86

Starlite 157

Data Hawk 174

Davis, Robert 167

DBS (Direct Broadcast Service) 160

DCGS-N (Distributed Common Ground System-Navy)

GBS 155

JCA 155

Delpino, Joe 161

Department of Defense (DoD) Directives on space

1961 Directive 1, 39–41

1970 Directive 2

DFP (Data Fusion Processor) 130–31

Direct broadcast

CTT 125

data correlation See Tactical data correlation and 

displays

IBS-S 174

sensor-to-shooter 120

in the 1990s 149–52

in the 2000s 174

TADIXS-B

and ASW 151

and AWACS 152

and EW aircraft 151

and TLAM 150

and TRAP 126–27

and TRE 124–25

development of 123–24

sensor-to-shooter 120

TRAP

evolution of 126–27

key contributors 213

sensor-to-shooter 120

steering group 127

TRE

connections to 129–31, 149–52

Constant Source 125

Data Hawk 174

development of 124–25

ENTR 149, 150, 174

MATT 125, 150, 151, 174

OL-444 125

Success radio 125

Discoverer program 20, 58

Discoverer-II 157

DMSP (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program)

and NPOESS 164, 178

and NROSS 134

in the 1970s 102

origin 58

technology in the 2000s 186

Douglas Aircraft Company

1946 RAND study 14

Aerobee 11

DSCS (Defense Satellite Communications System)

and Compass Link 50

and imagery delivery 152

and NMT 177

and SURTASS 84

background 45

development of 47–48

Navy SHF terminals for 48, 83–84, 159

DYNO program 2, 30–33

and NRO Program C 21, 54

concept of operations 31

funding 19, 32, 54

TOG 31

E

Early Bird 45

Easton, Roger 34, 43, 44, 69, 90, 92, 209

Echo-I 28–29

Edelson, Burton 23, 45, 199

ENTR (Embedded National Tactical Receiver) 149, 

150, 174

Environmental sensing satellites

ANNA 61

APL research efforts in the 1960s 59–62

Coriolis WindSat 178, 191

fulfillmentof Navy requirements 190–91

GEOS 61

GEOSAT 133–34

GFO 162–64

GFO2 177–78

in the 1950s 33

in the 1960s 58–62

JMAPS 179

LIDOS 61

Navy requirements (1959) 22

NOSS 134

NPOESS 164, 177–78

NROSS 134–35

PNT missions 178–79

Seasat 102

Series 5E 61

SolRAD See SolRAD

TacSats

HICO 186

ODTML 186

TRAAC 61

EPS (Enhanced Polar Systems) 176–77

E-Systems Corporation

FLTSATCOM UHF terminals 80
236 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

GFO 163

Executive Agent for Space 4

and loss of authority in 2005 166

in the 1960s 1, 41

in the 2000s 4, 169

Explorer-I 16, 25

F

Fairchild

Timation/NTS launch concept 91

Federici, Gary xv, 143, 153, 166, 205, 214

Feldman, Lloyd 183

FEP (Fleet EHF Packages) 118

Finegayan, Guam

FLTSATCOM system operations 80

Finley, John 64–65

Fisher, Rand xv, 144, 170, 203

FIST (Fleet Imagery Support Terminal) 132–33, 152

Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center/Facility 

(FOSIC/FOSIF) 57, 93, 97

FLTSATCOM (Fleet Satellite Communications)

acquisition 80–82

and Soviet ASAT policy 136

channels 79

concept 79–80

FEPs 85

Fleet Broadcast Processor (FBP) 82–83

fulfillment of Navy requirements 193

funding 78

Gapfiller satellites 81, 83, 116

in the 1980s 116–17

initial satellite launch 82

Navy Space Project Office (PM-16) 75

NPS Laboratory 112

program establishment 78–79

system operations 80

UHF terminals 80

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

NAVSPASUR 35

Foster, John 89

Fowler, Earl 66, 81, 200

Frost, Laurence 31

Fuhs, Alan 111

Funding for space programs 19, 22, 74

in the 1980s 114–16

in the 1990s 143, 165

in the 2000s 168

G

G.W. Preston Company

space-based radar 56

Gagarin, Yuri 63

GALE-Lite 129, 150, 174

Gapfiller satellites 81, 83, 116

GBS (Global Broadcast Service) 4, 160–62, 176

and NMT 177

imagery dissemination 155

GCCS-M (Global Command and Control SystemMaritime)

and JCMT 147

and NTCS-A 174

and SRMT 148

Gebhart, Louis 53

Geiger, Robert 111, 136, 195, 200, 201

General Electric Company

DSCS 48

V-2 rockets 8

GEOS (Goddard Earth Observing System) 61, 164

GEOSAT (Geodesy Satellite) 102, 133–34

fulfillment of Navy requirements 191

GFO (GEOSAT Follow-On) 162–64

GFO-2 177–78

public release of data 134

systems control 107, 133

Getting, Ivan 44, 91

Glenn, John 63

Goddard, Robert 8

GOES (Geostationary Operational Environmental 

Satellites) 58, 101

GPS (Global Positioning System) 2, 3

and GFO 163

development in the 1980s 118–19

fulfillment of Navy requirements 189

funding 119

launch concept 91

Navy Program Managers 201

NTS 91

orbits 90

program establishment 89–92

replacement of Transit 162

Timation satellites, use of 90–91

GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background) See DYNO

Graham, William 167

GREB (Galactic Radiation Energy Balance) See DYNO

Green Bank, West Virginia

NSF radio telescope 13

Guier, William 24–25, 209

Gunn, Lee 166

H

Hall, Albert 56

Hammarstrom, Lee xv, 209, 213, 215

Hard, Donald 166

Harlfinger, Fritz 71, 195

Harpoon 94–95, 120, 125, 131, 151

Hayward, John 21
Index 237 ___________________________________________________________________________________

Hearing, John 152

Hess, Robert xv, 167, 213

HICO (Hyperspectral Imager of the Coastal Ocean)

186

Hill, Jimmie 143

Holmes, Daniel 90

Hopwood, Herbert 23

Huffine, Christopher 184

Hughes Aerospace Corporation

GBS 161

Hughes Aircraft Company

LEASAT 117

Syncom 50

Tacsat,1960s 52

UFO Satellites 117

Hurley, Michael xv, 183

I

IBS-S (Integrated Broadcast System-Simplex)

evolution of 149

integration into naval aircraft 174

integration into Navy ships 174

Radiant Ether 174

sensor-to-shooter 120

INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite) 159

Intelsat 45, 153

International Geophysical Year (IGY) 15–16

IPS (Interim Polar Systems) 176–77

ITSS (Integrated Tactical Surveillance System) 122

ITT Corporation

Navy DSCS SHF terminals 83

J

JCA (JSIPS-N Concentrator Architecture) 154–55

integration with GBS 155

JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System)

154

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)

Aerobee 11

Echo-I 28

Jet-Propelled Missile Board 8

JMAPS (Joint Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey) 179

JMCIS (Joint Maritime Command Information 

System) 154, 174

Joint Broadcast Service 161

JSIPS-N (Joint Service Imagery Processing SystemNavy) 154–55

JTAGS (Joint Tactical Ground Station) 157

Jupiter C missile 16

K

Ketron, Michael 126, 214

Kier, David 167

L

Lark (Surface-to-air missile) 8

LEASAT (Leased Satellite) 117

Lehman, John 105, 106

Leiphart, J. Plumer 46

LeMay, Curtis 14

LES (Lincoln Experimental Satellites) 51, 86

LIDOS (Low-inclination Doppler-only Satellite) 61

Lincoln Laboratory 45

EHF satellites 118

Navy EHF communications 84

Linebacker 150

Lockheed Corporation 75

Outlaw Shark 93

WS-117L 20

Lockheed Missile and Space Company

GFO 163

Lofti (Low-Frequency Trans-Ionosphere) 53

Lorenzen, Howard 12, 30, 31, 209, 215

M

Macke, Richard 136, 207

Manned space flight

Apollo 1, 63–64

Gemini 1, 63

Mercury 1, 63

MOL (Manned Orbiting Laboratory) 64–65

Navy range instrumentation ships 66

spacecraft recovery 65

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 181–83

MASTER 182–83

S2A 183

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 39

Lincoln Laboratory See Lincoln Laboratory

MASTER (Maritime Automatic Ship Track-Enhanced 

Reporting 182–83

MATT (Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal)

development of 125

EW aircraft 151, 174

submarines 150

Mayo, Reid 30–31, 209, 215

McArthur, James 180

McCartney, Forest 81–82

McClure, Frank 25, 209

McDonnell-Douglas

SOSS 100

McNamara, Robert 39, 45, 64

Military Satellite Office (MSO) 78

Milstar (Military Strategic, Tactical & Relay)

and NMT 177

Common-user requirements 85–86

FEPs 118
238 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

fleet applications 118

fulfillment of Navy requirements 193

funding 85

in the 1980s 117–18

in the 1990s 162

Navy EHF terminals 86

Navy project managers 201

origins 84–85

Minitrack 34, 35

Minotaur 187

Moffitt, Lloyd 75, 195

MOL (Manned Orbiting Laboratory) 64–65

Monroe, Scott 82

Moorer, Thomas 70, 195

Moran, William 70, 195

Motorola

FLTSATCOM UHF terminals 80

MUOS (Mobile User Objective System) 5, 175

fulfillment of Navy requirements 193

Second Smith Panel 167

N

Nagler, Gordon 81, 82, 112, 117

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 18

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA)

and Advent 30

and ARPA 19

and GEOSAT loss mitigation 163

and Navy efforts in 1960s 45

and Navy space S&T 186

and NPS 148

and TacSats 184

ANNA 61

APL space physics sponsorship 62

ATS-1 58, 101

Beacon Explorer program 60

Echo-I 28

establishment 18–19

GEOS 61, 164

manned space flight See Manned space flight

Minitrack 34

Navy astronauts 110

NOSS 134

NPOESS 164, 177–78

Seasat 102, 133

Space Shuttle and LEASAT 117

Syncom 49, 50

TIROS 57–58, 58

transfer of Navy personnel, 1960s 41

Viking rockets 11

National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) 181, 

182

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA)

and GEOSAT loss mitigation 163

and GFO 163

and Naval Studies Board, 2003 168

establishment 101

GOES 101

NOAA satellites 101

NPOESS 164

POES 164

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA)

GOES 58

NOAA satellites 58

National Reconnaissance Office

and Navy Space Project Activity 70

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

and CIA 20–21

and DSCS 47

and establishment of SPAWAR 105

and First Smith Panel 143

and fulfillment of Navy requirements 189, 193

and MDA 181

and Naval Studies Board, 2003 168

and Navy requirements, 2000s 169

and Navy space cadre 4, 171

and NCST 108

and NPS 148

and PEO-SS 4, 170

and Rumsfeld Space Commission 165

and SAPO 3, 109

and Second Smith Panel 167

and TRAP evolution 127

changed relationship with Navy, 1992 4, 142

Communications Directorate 144, 173

Discoverer-II 157

establishment 19–21

Executive Agent for Space 4, 166

JCA 154–55

OSO See Operational Support Office

Poppy 54–55

Program A 20

Program B 20

Program C See Program C

Quickbolt 175

Radiant Ivory 156

space pioneers 215

Space Protection Program 180

SSFA 173

support to military operations 139

TADIXS-B 126

User Engagement Group 149

National Security Act of 1947 15
Index 239 ___________________________________________________________________________________

National Security Agency (NSA)

and CMR 23

and direct broadcast 213

and DYNO 21

and GBS 161

and Poppy 55

and Radiant Mercury 147

and Tactical Support Group 110

and the Tactical Support Group 110

and TRAP Steering Group 127

support to military operations 139

Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST)

and MDA 182

Coriolis WindSat 178

establishment 3, 108

in the 1990s 141

in the 2000s 172

in the1990s 143

ORS initiative 183

TacSats 5, 183–85

Upper Stage 187

Naval Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX)

and NPS 111

consolidation of satcom acquisition 77

DSCS SHF shipboard terminals 83

establishment 200

FLTSATCOM terminal UHF terminals 80

LEASAT 117

Navy Space Projects Office (PME 106) See Navy 

Space Projects Office

OTH Project Office See OTH Project Office

Satelite Communications (PME 106-1) 118

transition to SPAWAR 3, 105, 111, 114

Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC)

FLTSATCOM UHF terminals 80

Navy satcom terminals, 1970s 77

Naval Network Warfare Command

establishment 144–45

NAVSPASUR 146

Navy Space Cadre in the 2000s 170, 171

space vulnerability assessment 180

subordination of Naval Space Command 4, 145

Naval Observatory 1, 7, 62

and PNT missions 178–79

Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center 

(NOSIC) 57

Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC)

Milstar Navy EHF terminals 86

space-related expertise 142

TRAP evolution 126–27

TRE Engineering Development Models 124–25

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

and Navy space cadre 171

and Navy TENCAP 147, 173

PANSAT 148

space curriculum 111–12

space programs in the 1990s 148

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)

and communications satellite research 46

and MDA 182

and Poppy program 54–55

and V-2 rockets 8–9

Blossom Point Facility 59

CMR 23

construction of 9

Coriolis WindSat 178

DSCS shipboard SHF terminals 83

early Navy satcom plan 29

Echo-I 28–29

FLTSATCOM UHF terminals 80

GPS orbits 90

GPS system integration 92

Hybla Valley Facility 59

key space personnel 209

Lofti 53

Milstar Navy EHF terminals 86

Minitrack 34, 35

multiple-launch technology 69

NCST See Naval Center for Space Technology

NTS 91

ORS initiative 183

PAMOR 12–14

Radio Countermeasures Branch 12

Rocket-Sonde Research Branch 9

satellite communications support 77

Satellite Research Branch 46

satellite technology, 1960s 68

SolRAD See SolRAD

space cadre 1960s 62

Space Surveillance System 36

TacSats 5, 183–85

Timation See Timation

Upper Stage 187

V-2 rockets 8

Vanguard 15–16, 16, 17, 19, 21, 31, 33, 34, 35, 68

Viking rocket 11, 16, 19, 68

Waldorf SATCOM terminal 49

Naval Satellite Operations Center (NSOC)

GFO 163

origin 63, 107

UFO 159

Naval Security Group

and CMR 23

and TRAP evolution 126–27

disestablishment 145

Poppy 54
240 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

Regional Reporting Centers 120

Naval Space Command

and Navy space cadre 107

and Navy TENCAP 108, 109

and NPS 148

and ROTHR 107

and Slow Walker 107

ASAT 108

ASPADOC 108

Commanders 207

establishment 3, 106–8, 111

GEOSAT 133

JTAGS 157

NAVSPASUR 36

responsibilities 107–8

Slow Walker 123, 155

space survivability program 137

space survivability task force 136

subordination to NETWARCOM 2002 144–45

TACDAR 155–56

Transit operations 119, 162

Naval Space Reserve Program (NSRP) 146

Naval Space Strategy Working Group (NSSWG) 113

Naval Studies Board 2003 168, 171

Navigation satellites

fulfillment of Navy requirements 189

GPS See GPS

Navigation Satellite Executive Group (NAVSEG) 44

NAVSTAR 44

NTS 90, 91

Program 621B 44

Timation See Timation

NAVMACS

FLTSATCOM channel 79

NAVSPASUR (Naval Space Surveillance System)

and Naval Space Command 111

and Timation 69

composition 35

origin 35–36

transfer to Air Force 2004 146

NAVSTAR

and GPS See GPS

concept 44

Navy Astronautics Group

and Naval Space Command 107, 111

establishment 62

GEOSAT 133

in the 1990s 107

Transit operations 42

Navy MOL Field Office 41

Navy Navigation Satellite System (NNSS) See Transit

Navy range instrumentation ships 65–66

Navy space cadre

and Naval Space Command 107

and Naval Studies Board, 2003 168

and NPS 149, 171

and Rumsfeld Space Commission 166

and Second Smith Panel 167

civil service and Navy Reserve 172

early years 62–63

in the 1980s 110–11

in the 2000s 4, 170–72

Navy space organization

in 2009 172

in the 1970s 75–77

in the 1980s 105–12

in the 1990s 141–42, 141–46

in the 2000s 170–73

Navy Space Project Activity 70

Navy Space Project Office (PM 16) 2, 75

Navy Space Projects Office (PME 106) 107, 111

Directors 201

establishment 75

Navy space requirements

fulfillment of 189–94

Navy Space Systems Activity 41

Navy Spacecraft Recovery Force (Task Force 140) 65

Navy Special Projects Office (PME 106-5) 111, 139

and NPS 148

and NTCS-A 129

data correlation and displays 121

MATT development 125

SAPO 108–9

tactical data correlation and displays 128

TRE 124–25

TRE connections to TWCS 129

Newell, John xv, 66, 118, 201, 214

Nibe, Richard 166

NMT (Navy Multiband Terminal) 177

Norfolk, Virginia

COMOPTEVOR 75

FLTSATCOM system operations 80

MIFC-LANT 182

Naval Network Warfare Command 145

NAVCAMS 80

NOSS (National Oceanographic Sensing System) 134

Nova satellites See Transit

NPOESS (National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environment Satellite System 164, 177–78

and Coriolis WindSat 178

NRAD

GBS 160

space-related expertisse 142

NROSS (Naval Remote Ocean Sensing System) 134–

35

NTCS-A (Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat)
Index 241 ___________________________________________________________________________________

establishment 129

evolution to JMCIS and GCCS-M 174

NTS (Navigation Technology Satellite) 90, 91

O

OASIS 151

OBU 76

ODTML 186

Office of Space Transformation (OFT)

initiatives 183–86

ORS 183

Operation Paperclip 8

Operational requirements, Navy space 21–22

Operational Support Office (OSO) 4

and TRAP/TADIXS-B to TLAM 150

Challenge Athena 153

establishment 149

GBS 161

GBS and imagery dissemination 155, 162

IBS-S integration into naval aircraft 174

Radiant Cirrus 154

OPTEVFOR Detachment at Sunnyvale

and space systems operational assessments 76

disestablishment 76

establishment 75–76

ORS (Operationally Responsive Space)

initiative 183

office establishment 185–86

TacSats 183–85

Oscar satellites See Transit

OSIS (Ocean Surveillance Information System) 131

and Outlaw Shark 97, 121

and TRAP evolution 126

FLTSATCOM channel 79

OTCIXS

FLTSATCOM channel 79

OTH Project Office (PME 108)

disestablishment 97

establishment 96

Outlaw Shark 96–98, 121, 128

Outlaw Hawk 92–93

Outlaw Shark

and over-the-horizon targeting 96–98

and TRE 128, 129–30

origins 93–94

Overmyer, Robert 64–65

Over-the-Horizon (OTH) targeting

requirement 94–96

P

Packard, David 71, 73

PANSAT (Petite Amateur Naval Satellite) 148

Parkinson, Bradford 89–92

Passive Moon Relay (PAMOR) 12–14

and CMR 23

Patterson, Jerre 93

PEO for Space Communication and Sensor Systems 

(PEO-SCS) 205

and NPS 148

disestablishment 202

establishment 201

incumbents 202

PEO for Space Systems (PEO-SS) 205

and Navy space cadre 171

and NRO 170

establishment 4, 170

incumbents 202

MUOS 175

responsibilities 170

Phillips, Richard 143

POES (Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite) 164

Point Mugu, California

GEOSAT operations 133

Naval Missile Center 56

Naval Satellite Operations Center 107, 159

Navy Astronautics Group 91, 133

OTH targeting demonstration 151

Transit Computing Center 42

UFO operations 159

Polaris 25

Poppy Program 54–55

POST (Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal)

and TWCS 129

development of 128–29

in 1990 131

removal from the fleet 129

Powers, Gary 32

Program 435 See Transit

Program 749 56–57

Program C

and Navy Space Projects Office 111

and SPAWAR 141

Directors 195, 201

disestablished 3

DYNO 21, 54

establishment 2

Poppy 54–55

Project Feedback 19

Project Orbiter 15, 16

Project World Series 16

Prototype Development Engineering Center (PDEC)

ATP 129

established 128

POST 128–29
242 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

Q

Quickbolt 175

QuickSAT 159

R

Radiant Cirrus 147, 153, 154, 159

Radiant Ether 174

Radiant Ivory 152, 156–57

Radiant Mercury 147

Radiant Topaz 147–48

Ramsey, William 105, 124

RAND Corporation

satellite reconnaissance study, 1950s 19

TIROS 57

Raytheon Corporation

Milstar Navy EHF terminals 86

SOSS 100

RCA Corporation

SOSS 100

TIROS 57

Transit/Nova 43

Reconnaissance/Surveillance satellites

direct broadcast See Direct broadcast

DYNO/GRAB/Tattletale See DYNO program

fulfillment of Navy requirements 189–90, 192–93

imagery dissemination, tactical

5-D 153–54

Challenge Athena 152–53, 154–55, 160

FIST 132–33, 152

GBS 155, 176

JCA 154–55

JDISS/JMCIS 154

Top Scene 133

Improved Ocean Surveillance System 121–22

ITSS study 122

Navy Ocean Surveillance System 99

Navy requirements (1959) 22

Poppy 54–55

radar See Space-based radar

space-based IR See Space-based infrared

TacSat 2000s 183–85

Redstone missile 16, 17

Rockets

Aerobee 11–12, 16

Atlas 16, 20, 29, 30, 61, 79, 81

Atlas-F and GPS 91

Centaur 30, 79, 81

Falcon-1 184

for military weaponry 8

Minotaur 187

propulsion theory 7

Redstone/Jupiter-C missile 16, 17

Thor Able-Star 28, 29, 32

Thor missile 20, 67

Thor-Agena 44, 54

Thor-Delta 28

Upper Stage 187

V-2 8–10

Vanguard 11, 16, 19

Viking 11, 16, 19, 68

WAC Corporal 11

Rockwell International

FLTSATCOM UHF terminals 80

GFO 163

GPS 92

Rose, Vincent 30, 31, 209, 215

Rumsfeld Space Commission 164–66, 170

Rumsfeld, Donald 165, 169

S

S2A 183

Samos 20

Satellite stabilization 61, 69

Satellite station-keeping in orbit 69

Savage, William 143

SBR (Space Based Radar) program 157–58

SBWAS (Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance)122–23

Schirra, Walter 63

Score communications satellites 29

Seasat 102, 133

See, Victor 180, 203

Sega, Ronald 185

SELOR (Ships Emitter Locating Reports) 120

Sensor-to-shooter concept 120–21

Sentry 20

Shepard, Alan 63, 65, 110

Shepherd, William 110

SINS (Ships Inertial Navigation Systems) 25

Slow Walker 123, 155

and Naval Space Command 107

Smith Panel, First 4, 143–44, 169

Smith Panel, Second 4, 166–67

implementation 169–70

recommendations 167

Smith, Michael 63

Smith, William xv, 4, 143, 166, 213

SolRAD (Solar Radiation) satellites

cover for DYNO 31, 32, 54

mission 33, 58–59

stabilization of 69

SOSS (Satellite Ocean Surveillance System) 99–100

Soviet Union ASAT capability

in the 1970s 103

in the 1980s 135–36

Sowers, Rick 160
Index 243 ___________________________________________________________________________________

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

(SPAWAR) 141, 172

and First Smith Panel 143

and TRAP evolution 126–27

and TRE acquisition 125

Coriolis WindSat 178

establishment 3, 105, 111, 114, 199, 201

FIST 152

Radiant Cirrus 153

SSFA 144, 170, 171, 172

Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) 108

Space Fence See NAVSPASUR

Space policy, Navy

1984 112–14

1994 143

Space science and technology

HICO 186

in the 1960s 68–70

in the 2000s 186–88

multiple-launch technology 69

satellite stabilization 69

satellite station-keeping in orbit 69

Timation 69–70

Upper Stage 187

Space strategy, Navy

1986 113–14

Space system survivability

fulfillment of Navy requirements 194

in the 1980s 135–37

vulnerability assessment 180

Space Systems Division (OP 0943) 3, 105, 107, 124, 

196, 197

Space-based infrared surveillance

Classic Guardian 122

JTAGS 157

Radiant Ivory 152, 156–57

TACDAR 155–56

TES 157

Space-based radar

Albatross 56

Classic Thunder 122

Clipper Bow 96, 100

Discoverer-II 157

early efforts 56–57

Program 749 56–57

SBR 157–58

SBWAS 122–23

SOSS 99–100

Starlite 157

XOS-19 100

SpaceX Corporation

TacSats 184

SPADATS (Space Detection and Tracking System) 36

SPAWAR Space Field Activity (SSFA) 144, 170, 171, 

172

SPO See Navy Special Projects Office

Spohnholtz, Cheryl 171

Sprague, Jay 142, 202

Sputnik 1, 24–25, 35

SRMT (Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

Management Tool) 148

SRP (Space Radar Program ) See SBR

SSIXS

FLTSATCOM channel 79

Starlite project 157

Strategic Air Command

and DYNO 21

STRED (Standard TRE Display) 129, 151, 174

Stump Neck, Maryland

CMR 23

PAMOR 13

Success radio 125

Sudden Dawn 123

Sugar Grove, West Virgina

Project PAMOR 13

Sullivan, Kathryn 64

SURTASS (Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System)

and DSCS 84

and QuickSat 159

and TRAP 151

System Applications Program Office (SAPO) 4

and OSO 149

and TRAP 127

establishment 3, 108–9

T

TACDAR (Tactical Detection and Reporting) 155–56

TacSat (Tactical Satellite) 5

communications experiments, 1960s 51–52

fulfillment of Navy requirements 192

ORS initiative, 2000s 183–85

Tactical data correlation and displays 127–31

AIP 151

ATP 129

CART 129, 131, 151

DFP 130–31

GALE-Lite 129, 174

NTCS-A 129

OASIS 151

OSIS 131

Outlaw Shark 128

POST 128–29, 129, 131

STRED 129, 151, 174

Tactical Space Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) 186

Tactical Support Group 110

Tactical Surveillance and Targeting
244 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

Navy requirements 98–99

TADIXS-B

and ASW 151

and AWACS 152

and EW aircraft 151

and TLAM 150

and TRAP 126–27

and TRE 124–25

development of 123–24

FLTSATCOM channel 79

sensor-to-shooter 120

TASM (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile) See Tomahawk

Tattletale See DYNO

TDDS (TRE Data Dissemination System) 149

TEAMS (Tactical EA-6B Mission Support System)

and TRE 130–31

Technical Committee for Communication Satellites

46

Technical Operations Group (TOG)

DYNO concept of operations 31

TENCAP, Navy xv, 3, 158

and Army TENCAP 76

and CNA 110, 173

and Naval Space Command 108, 109

and NPS 148, 173

and TRAP evolution 126–27

CAWP 148

Directors 197

establishment 76–77

funding in the 1980s 115

GBS 160–62

in the 1990s 146–48

in the 2000s 173–74

Radiant Cirrus 147, 153

Radiant Ivory 152, 156–57

Radiant Mercury 147

Radiant Topaz 147–48

research and development program 109

Slow Walker 123

SRMT 148

TACDAR 155–56

TES (Theater Event System 157

Thor Able-Star 28, 29, 32

Thor missile 20, 67

Thor-Agena 44, 54

Thor-Delta 28

Tiburon

CCS track correlation 130

Tiburon Systems

Outlaw Shark 93

Timation

and GPS 89, 90–91

NTS 91

origin 43–44

technology 69–70

TIP (Transit Improvement Program) 87–89

TIROS (Television and Infrared Observation Satellite)

57–58

Tomahawk

and APL 10

and Clipper Bow 100

and NROSS 134

and OTH Targeting Req 94–96

and sensor-to-shooter 120

and Sunnyvale 76

and TRE 129–30, 150

Top Scene 133

TRAAC (Transit Research and Altitude Control) 61

TRAAC (Transit Research and Attitude Control) 69

TRANET 33

TRANSIM (Transit Simplified) 42

Transit 2

and DYNO 32

and geodesy research 59

and GEOSAT 133

and Lofti 53

and Navy Astronautics Group 63

computation facilities 92

design 25

development of (1960s) 43

fulfillment of Navy requirements 189

funding 19, 25

gravitational error 33

in the 1980s 118–19

navigation equipment 42

Nova satellites (production) 43, 89

operational concept 41

origin 24–28

Oscar satellites (prototype) 42

replacement by GPS 162

satellite missions 27

systems control 107

TIP 87–89

TRAAC 61, 69

tracking stations 26, 42

TRANET 33

TRANSIM 42

TRAP (TRE and Related Applications) broadcast

and Aegis 150

and AIP 151

and ASW 151

and AWACS 151–52

and EW aircraft 151

and TLAM 150

evolution of 126–27

key contributors 213
Index 245 ___________________________________________________________________________________

sensor-to-shooter 120

steering group 127

TDDS 149

TRE (Tactical Receive Equipment)

connections to 129–31

Aegis 130, 150

aircraft 131

aircraft carriers 130–31

ASW aircraft 151

AWACS 151–52

EW aircraft 151

submarines 130, 150

SURTASS 151

TASM 129–30

TLAM 150

Constant Source 125

Data Hawk 174

development of 124–25

ENTR 149, 150, 174

IBS-S 174

MATT 125, 150, 151, 174

OL-444 125

Success radio 125

TRS 149

Trexler, James 12–14

TRS (Tactical Receive Segment) 149

TRSSCOM (Technical Research Ship Special 

Communications) System 24, 46–47

Truly, Richard 64–65, 106

TRW

and FLTSATCOM satellite acquisition 80–82

Navy EHF terminals 86

SOSS 100

TSAT (Transformational Communications Satellites

177

Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin 7

Tuttle, Jerry 152, 160

U

U.S. Army

and V-2 rockets See V-2 Rockets

U.S. Space Command 106

UFO (UHF Follow-On) 4

in the 1990s 158–59

initial contract 117

UHF satellite communications

in the 1960s 51–52

in the 1970s 77–83

in the 1980s 116–17

in the 1990s 158–59

Underwater Sound Laboratory (USL) 77

Upper Stage 187

USNS American Mariner 66

USNS Huntsville 66

USNS Kingsport 30, 49, 51

USNS Mercury 66

USNS Range Tracker 66

USNS Redstone 66

USNS Vanguard 66

USNS Watertown 66

USNS Wheeling 66

USS Albany 48

USS Belmont 46

USS Boston 150

USS Cavalla 150

USS Coronado 153

USS David R. Ray 129

USS Enterprise 128, 130

USS George Washington 153, 161

USS Georgetown 46

USS Harry S. Truman 155

USS Hornet 65

USS Iwo Jima 65

USS Jamestown 46

USS John F. Kennedy 101, 130

USS John Rodgers 130

USS Josephus Daniels 93, 96

USS Lake Champlain 65, 160

USS Lake Erie 150, 179

USS Liberty 13, 46

USS McDonough 96

USS Midway 9

USS Mt. Whitney 155, 159

USS Oklahoma City 48, 130

USS Oxford 23, 46

USS Port Royal 150

USS Saratoga 157

USS Spruance 126

USS Valdez 47

V

V-2 rockets 8–10

and APL 8, 10

and atmospheric research 10

and NRL 8–9

and U.S. Army 8

development of 8

Van Allen, James 10, 28

Vanguard rocket 11, 15–17, 16, 19

Vanguard satellite 16, 17, 19, 33, 34

Viking rocket 11, 16, 19, 68

von Braun, Wehrner 16

von Braun, Wernher 8, 15, 19

W

WAC Corporal rocket 11
246 Index

___________________________________________________________________________________

Wahiawa, Hawaii

CMR 23

FLTSATCOM system operations 80

TRSSCOM 46

Wald, Bruce xv, 143, 166, 181

Waldorf, Maryland

and FLTSATCOM 50

and LES tests 50

Compass Link 50

NRL SATCOM terminal 45, 49

Waller, Edward 99

Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia

TacSats 184

Weather satellites

ATS-1 58, 101

DMSP 58, 102, 134, 164, 178, 186

early efforts 57–58

fulfillment of Navy requiremements 190

GOES 58, 101

Navy requirements (1959) 22

NOAA 58, 101

shipboard antennas 101

TIROS 57–58

Weiffenbach, George 24–25, 209

Wexler, Harry 57

WGS (Wideband Global Satellite) 176

and GBS 176

and NMT 177

Wiesner Committee See Ad Hoc Committee on Space

Wiesner, Jerome 39

Wilhelm, Peter 91, 108, 209, 215

Woolsey, James 113

X

XOS-19 100

Y

York, Herbert 19

Young, John 64, 182