Defense Nuclear Agency

Alexandria, VA 22310-3398

DNA 6041F

For the Record—A History of the Nuclear Test

Personnel Review Program, 1978 -1993

JAYCOR

1608 Spring Hill Road

Vienna, VA 22182-2270

March 1996

Technical Report

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-91-C-0022

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For the Record—A History ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Review

Program, 1978 - 1993

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6. AUTHOR(S)

F. Gladeck (JAYCOR) and A. Johnson (SAIC)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

JAYCOR

1608 Spring Hill Road

Vienna, VA 22182-2270

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Defense Nuclear Agency

6801 Telegraph Road

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AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

DNA 604 IF

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RARP 3500A 25904D.

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This volume is a history ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) program from 1978 through September 30,

1993. It identifies the origins, missions, and historical evolution ofthe effort, focusing on the contributions ofthe

Defense Nuclear Agency, the NTPR teams, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of Energy. In addition,

the narrative describes U.S. nuclear operations, including weapons testing and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, Japan, personnel participation in those operations, and radiation safety measures. The report also discusses

radiation dose determination and medical studies of potential dose effects.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Nuclear Test Personnel Review

Hiroshima/NagasakiOccupation Radiation Safety

Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing Radiation Dose Determination

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

242

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OF REPORT

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PREFACE

The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) established the Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR)

Program in 1978. This report For the Record - A History ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Review

Program. 1978-1993 has two purposes: (1) to provide the public with information concerning

personnel participation in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing and the postwar U.S. occupation of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, and (2) to provide a public accounting ofthe NTPR effort, which

has involved a series of actions on behalf of the nuclear test participants and veterans of the

Hiroshima and Nagasaki occupation. This edition is an update ofthe original For the Record - A

History ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program. 1978-1986. published as DNA 604IF in

1986.

For the Record synthesizes information from a substantial number of published sources,

including the 41-volume, 9,082-page history ofthe atmospheric nuclear testing program published

by DNA. It also presents data elicited from unpublished sources, such as letters, memoranda and

speeches, and from interviews with involved personnel. Readers desiring additional information

should consult the original sources, which are identified in Appendix F and general references

identified in Appendices G and H.

The text is divided into three basic parts. Sections 1 through 4 introduce the NTPR program

and highlight organizational contributions. Sections 5 through 7 concentrate on the nuclear

operations, describing the detonations, personnel participation, and radiation safety measures.

Sections 8 and 9 focus on radiation dose, the former on radiation dose determination and the latter

on medical studies ofpotential radiation effects.

Section 1, "Introduction to the Defense Nuclear Agency and the NTPR Program," identifies

the origins, scope, and accomplishments ofthe program and presents summary tables ofradiation

doses for veterans ofthe nuclear tests.

Section 2, "Work of the NTPR Teams," highlights the NTPR efforts of the four military

service teams and a separate team at DNA's Field Command in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from

1978 to 1988. While DNA directed the NTPR program, the five teams executed the assigned tasks.

This chapter identifies the resources that were available to each team, in terms ofboth personnel and

funds, and itemizes the results, including statistics on the assignment of doses and the notification

ofpersonnel concerning available medical examination programs.

Section 3, "The Consolidated NTPR Program Under DNA," describes the progress ofthe

NTPR program since the elimination of the Service teams and the consolidation of work under

DNA's direct supervision in 1987 and 1988. It points out the impact of Congressional legislation

passed since consolidation, especially that of Public Law 100-321, which as interpreted by the

Department ofVeterans Affairs (VA), allows claims by several new groups of veterans, the largest

being those who participated in the occupation ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, after World War

II. It also looks at some likely trends in the future.

Section 4, "Other Interactions in the NTPR Program," discusses the efforts ofthe Department

ofEnergy (DOE) and Department ofVeterans Affairs (VA) which make important contributions to

in
the program, although neither has an NTPR organization. It also describes the legislation that

brought the Department ofJustice (DOJ) into the administration ofradiation compensation. Finally,

it briefly summarizes contractor support ofNTPR activities.

Section 5 focuses on the U.S. postwar occupation ofJapan. Entitled "The Atomic Bombings

and U.S. Occupation ofHiroshima and Nagasaki," the section describes the detonations, the residual

radiation, and the participation and radiation doses of U.S. occupation troops. DNA expanded the

NTPR program in 1979 to incorporate research and assistance efforts on behalf of the former

occupation troops. The program was expanded still further following passage of Public Law 100-

321.

With 21 subsections, Section 6, "U.S. Nuclear Testing from Project TRINITY to the

PLOWSHARE Program," is the most extensive part of the volume. It summarizes the test series

from 1945 to the end of U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing, which came with the last Pacific test on

3 November 1962. The narrative delineates the background, purpose, and operations for each series,

and provides a summary of doses according to Service participation. This history is current as of

30 September 1993, with the exception of yield information for a number of U.S. atmospheric

nuclear tests in the Pacific. Declassified by DOE, these yields were announced on 7 December 1993.

Section 7, "Radiation Safety at U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Tests," is a companion to Section

6. It discusses radiation safety at the nuclear tests, concentrating primarily on protective measures

against exposure to initial and residual radiation and personnel contamination. The chapter identifies

radiation detection/measurement instruments used for survey and/or personnel monitoring. It also

describes protective measures taken to prevent internal radiation exposure from the inhalation or

ingestion ofradioactive material.

Section 8, "Radiation Dose Determination," focuses on dose determination for the veterans

of both nuclear testing and the Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation. It discusses the use offilm badge

data from badged personnel to estimate individual doses for unbadged personnel. In addition, it

presents the methods for dose reconstruction employed when film badge data were unavailable or

unrepresentative ofindividual or group activities.

Section 9, "Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation and Medical Follow-up Studies of

Veterans," addresses two topics. It first discusses the health effects ofionizing radiation as generally

understood by both national and international experts. The chapter then summarizes the

epidemiological studies ofthe veterans ofthe nuclear tests and the Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation.

The studies have been conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Argonne National

Laboratory, the National Research Council (NRC) ofthe National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and

the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a support organization of Congress.

The six appendices are designed to assist the reader in using this volume and in conducting

additional research. Appendix A, "Chronology of Selected Events Relevant to the NTPR Program,"

highlights key information presented in the text. Appendix B, "Glossary," defines technical and

organizational terms pertinent to the commentary; Appendix C lists abbreviations and acronyms.

Appendix D, "Public Resources for Documents on U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing,"

IV
discusses the availability of documents for purchase at the National Technical Information Service

(NTIS) and at the DOE Coordination and Information Center (CIC), Las Vegas, Nevada, and for

research at CIC or the DNA reading room. Appendix E identifies the DNA personnel-oriented

histories of atmospheric nuclear testing, all ofwhich are for sale at NTIS and available for review

at CIC, VA Regional Offices and numerous public libraries nationwide. Appendix F identifies the

source documents used for preparing this report. Appendix G lists selected references concerning

radiological conditions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The volume ends with Appendix H,

"Selected Bibliography," which specifies selected resources for further information that should be

available through major public and university libraries.

This volume quantifies program results in several places, particularly in Section 1.4, "NTPR

Program Accomplishments;" Section 1.5, "Summary of Radiation Doses;" and in the "Results"

sections of Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6. These statistics are current as of 30 September 1993, when

research for this book was completed.

To facilitate the reading ofthis volume, the most current and commonly accepted names of

locations and organizations are generally used throughout the text. Hence, the continental test site,

which was called the Nevada Proving Ground from 1952 to 1955, is consistently referred to as the

Nevada Test Site (NTS). Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) is used as the designation ofthe primary

oceanic test site, which was also sometimes termed the Enewetak Proving Ground or Bikini Proving

Ground. Furthermore, local times and dates are used throughout this volume, rather than Greenwich

Mean Time. In addition, the weapons development laboratories are cited by their present

designations: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), instead of Los Alamos Scientific

Laboratory (LASL), as it was known earlier; and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),

rather than previous names, such as University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL).
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

PREFACE iii

APPENDICES xi

FIGURES xi

TABLES xii

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCYAND THE NTPR

PROGRAM 1

1.1 ORIGINS OF THE NTPR PROGRAM 1

1.2 FOCUSING THE NTPR PROGRAM 4

1.3 SCOPE OF THE NTPR PROGRAM 6

1.4 NTPR PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS 7

1.5 SUMMARY OF RADIATION DOSES 17

2 WORK OF THE NTPR TEAMS 20

2.1 COMMON CHALLENGES 20

2.1.1 Documentation from the Testing Period 20

2.1.2 Responses to File A Personnel 21

2.2 NAVY NTPR EFFORTS 22

2.2.1 Resources 23

2.2.2 Results 24

2.3 ARMY NTPR EFFORTS 26

2.3.1 Objectives 27

2.3.2 Resources 28

2.3.3 Results 29

2.4 AIR FORCE NTPR EFFORTS 30

2.4.1 Resources 30

2.4.2 Results 31

2.5 MARINE CORPS NTPR EFFORTS 33

2.5.1 Resources 34

2.5.2 Results 34

2.6 FIELD COMMAND NTPR EFFORTS 37

2.6.1 Resources 38

2.6.2 Results 38

3 THE CONSOLIDATED NTPR PROGRAM UNDER DNA 40

3.1 REASONS FOR CONSOLIDATION 40

3.2 MECHANICS OF CONSOLIDATION 41

3.3 NTPR WORK UNDER THE CONSOLIDATED SYSTEM 41

3.3.1 Work in Established Channels 41

VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Section Page

3.3.1.1 Responding to Inquiries. 41

3.3.1.2 Research. 42

3.3.2 Impact of Recent Legislation 43

3.3.3 Resources 44

3.3.4 Results 45

3.4 PROGRAM TRENDS ...46

4 OTHER INTERACTIONS IN THE NTPR PROGRAM 47

4.1 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOE AND THE NTPR PROGRAM 47

4.1.1 The Master File of Dose Records 47

4.1.2 The Coordination and Information Center 48

4.2 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VA AND THE NTPR PROGRAM.".'. 49

4.2.1 VA Service-Connected Disability Program 51

4.2.2 VA Medical Examinations and Health Care Services 52

4.2.3 Ionizing Radiation Registry 54

4.3 NTPR COOPERATION WITH DOJ 55

4.4 CONTRACTORS 55

4.4.1 JAYCOR ....56

4.4.2 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) 56

4.4.3 GE/Kaman Tempo 56

5 THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS AND U.S. OCCUPATION OFHIROSHIMA AND

NAGASAKI 57

5.1 EARLY RADIATION SURVEYS 57

5.2 RESIDUAL RADIATION IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 58

5.2.1 Induced Radioactivity at the Hypocenters 58

5.2.2 Radioactivity Downwind of the Cities 59

5.3 OCCUPATION OF JAPAN .'!!!! 62

5.3.1 Hiroshima Occupation 62

5.3.2 Nagasaki Occupation 63

5.4 RADIATION DOSES 63

6 U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING FROM PROJECT TRINITY TO THE

PLOWSHARE PROGRAM 65

6.1 PROJECT TRINITY 66

6.1.1 Background and Objectives of Project TRINITY 70

6.1.2 TRINITY Test Operations 70

6.1.3 Dose Summary for Project TRINITY 72

6.2 OPERATION CROSSROADS ......12

6.2.1 Background and Objectives of CROSSROADS 73

6.2.2 CROSSROADS Test Operations 75

6.2.3 Dose Summary for CROSSROADS 76

Vll
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Section Page

6.3 OPERATION SANDSTONE 77

6.3.1 Background and Objectives of Operation SANDSTONE 78

6.3.2 SANDSTONE Test Operations 78

6.3.3 Dose Summary for Operation SANDSTONE 78

6.4 OPERATION RANGER 79

6.4.1 Background and Objectives of Operation RANGER 79

6.4.2 Establishment of the Nevada Test Site 80

6.4.3 RANGER Test Operations 80

6.4.4 Dose Summary for Operation RANGER 82

6.5 OPERATION GREENHOUSE 82

6.5.1 Background and Objectives of Operation GREENHOUSE 83

6.5.2 GREENHOUSE Test Operations 83

6.5.3 Dose Summary for Operation GREENHOUSE 83

6.6 OPERATION BUSTER-JANGLE 85

6.6.1 Background and Objectives of Operation BUSTER-JANGLE 85

6.6.2 BUSTER-JANGLE Test Operations 86

6.6.3 Dose Summary for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE 86

6.7 OPERATION TUMBLER-SNAPPER 87

6.7.1 Background and Objectives of Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER. . 88

6.7.2 TUMBLER-SNAPPER Test Operations 88

6.7.3 Dose Summary for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 89

6.8 OPERATION IVY 89

6.8.1 Background and Objectives of Operation IVY 90

6.8.2 IVY Test Operations 92

6.8.3 Dose Summary for Operation IVY 92

6.9 OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 93

6.9.1 Background and Objectives of Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. 94

6.9.2 UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Test Operations 94

6.9.3 Dose Summary for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 96

6.10 OPERATION CASTLE 97

6.10.1 Background and Objectives of Operation CASTLE 97

6.10.2 CASTLE Test Operations 97

6.10.3 Dose Summary for Operation CASTLE 99

6.11 OPERATION TEAPOT 100

6.11.1 Background and Objectives of Operation TEAPOT 101

6.11.2 TEAPOT Test Operations 101

6.11.3 Dose Summary for Operation TEAPOT 101

6.12 OPERATION WIGWAM 102

6.12.1 Background and Objectives of Operation WIGWAM 102

6.12.2 WIGWAM Test Operations 103

6.12.3 Dose Summary for Operation WIGWAM 103

vm
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Section Page

6.13 OPERATION REDWING 104

6.13.1 Background and Objectives of Operation REDWING 106

6.13.2 REDWING Test Operations 106

6.13.3 Dose Summary for Operation REDWING 107

6.14 OPERATION PLUMBBOB 108

6.14.1 Background and Objectives of Operation PLUMBBOB 109

6.14.2 PLUMBBOB Test Operations 109

6.14.3 Dose Summary for Operation PLUMBBOB 109

6.15 OPERATION HARDTACK 1 110

6.15.1 Background and Objectives of Operation HARDTACK 1 112

6.15.2 HARDTACK I Test Operations 112

6.15.3 Dose Summary for Operation HARDTACK 1 113

6.16 OPERATION ARGUS 114

6.16.1 Background and Objectives of Operation ARGUS 114

6.16.2 ARGUS Test Operations 115

6.16.3 Dose Summary for Operation ARGUS 115

6.17 OPERATION HARDTACK II 115

6.17.1 Background and Objectives of Operation HARDTACK II 116

6.17.2 HARDTACK II Test Operations 117

6.17.3 Dose Summary for Operation HARDTACK II 117

6.18 SAFETY EXPERIMENTS 118

6.18.1 Objectives of the Safety Experiments 120

6.18.2 Test Operations at the Safety Experiments 120

6.18.3 Dose Summary for the Safety Experiments 120

6.19 OPERATION DOMINIC 1 121

6.19.1 Background and Objectives of Operation DOMINIC 1 124

6.19.2 DOMINIC I Test Operations 125

6.19.3 Dose Summary for Operation DOMINIC 1 125

6.20 OPERATION DOMINIC II 126

6.20.1 Background and Objectives of Operation DOMINIC II 127

6.20.2 DOMINIC II Test Operations 127

6.20.3 Dose Summary for Operation DOMINIC II 127

6.21 PLOWSHARE PROGRAM 128

6.21.1 Background and Objectives of the PLOWSHARE Program 129

6.21.2 PLOWSHARE Test Operations 129

6.21.3 Dose Summary for the PLOWSHARE Program 129

7 RADIATION SAFETY AT U.S. ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS 131

7.1 PROTECTION AGAINST INITIAL RADIATION 131

7.2 PROTECTION AGAINST RESIDUAL RADIATION 131

7.2.1 Identification and Control of Radiation Areas 131

IX
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Section Page

7.2.2 Use of Radiation Detection and Measurement Instruments 132

7.2.3 Protection Against Internal Doses 134

8 RADIATION DOSE DETERMINATION 137

8.1 PROCEDURE 137

8.2 UNIT LOCATIONS AND ACTIVITIES 138

8.3 FILM BADGE DOSES 139

8.4 STATISTICAL METHODS OF DOSE DETERMINATION 139

8.5 RECONSTRUCTION OF RADIATION DOSES 140

8.5.1 Characterization of the Radiological Environment 140

8.5.2 Activities of Participants 141

8.5.3 Calculation of Radiation Dose 141

8.5.4 Uncertainty Analysis 142

8.5.5 Comparison with Film Badge Records 143

8.6 RESULTS OF DOSE RECONSTRUCTIONS 143

8.7 REVIEW OF RECONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY 143

9 HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION AND MEDICAL

FOLLOW-UP STUDIES OF VETERANS 145

9.1 HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION 145

9.2 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL STUDIES 148

9.3 ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY STUDY 150

9.4 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL STUDIES 151

9.4.1 The Five-Series Mortality Study 151

9.4.2 Study of Multiple Myeloma Among Hiroshima/Nagasaki

Veterans 155

9.5 PROPOSAL FOR A VA STUDY 157
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Appendix Page

A CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED EVENTS RELEVANT TO THE NTPR

PROGRAM A-l

B GLOSSARY B-l

C LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS C-l

D PUBLIC RESOURCES FOR DOCUMENTS ON U.S. ATMOSPHERIC

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING D-l

E DNA NTPR PUBLICATIONS ON THE CONUS AND OCEANIC

ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993 El

F REFERENCE LIST F-l

G SELECTED REFERENCES CONCERNING RADIOLOGICAL

CONDITIONS AT HmOSHIMA/NAGASAKI G-l

H SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY HI

FIGURES

Figure Page

1-1 Organization of NTPR until 1986 8

1-2 Organization of NTPR under consolidated operation 9

2-1 Letter sent to the Second Marine Division Association

as part of the MCNTPR Outreach Program 36

4-1 Selected DOE screening criteria for CIC document collection 50

5-1 Manhattan Engineer District Survey of Hiroshima, Japan, 3-7 October 1945 .... 60

5-2 Manhattan Engineer District Survey of Nagasaki, Japan,

21 September-4 October 1945 61

6-1 The Pacific Proving Ground 67

6-2 The Nevada Test Site 68

6-3 Location of Alamogordo Bombing Range 69

6-4 Shot BAKER emerging amidst the unmanned target fleet,

25 July 1946 74

6-5 AEC handbill announcing the beginning of the RANGER test 81

XI
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

FIGURES (Cont'd)

Figure Page

6-6 Shot MIKE, 1 November 1952 91

6-7 Shot GRABLE, only test of the 280mm atomic artillery shell, 25 May 1953 .... 95

6-8 Shot BRAVO, 1 March 1954 98

6-9 Observers facing away from the detonation of ERIE, 31 May 1956 105

6-10 SWORDFISH spray dome with USS AGERHOLM (DD 826) in the foreground,

11 May 1962 123

7-1 Radiation monitor wearing protective clothing and using radiological safety

equipment 135

TABLES

Table Page

1-1 NTPR Government and contractor person years from 1978 through

30 September 1993 10

1-2 NTPR funding in millions of dollars from 1978 through 30 September 1993. . . 10

1-3 Congressional hearings at which DNA representatives have given testimony ... 14

1-4 Summary of external doses for DoD atmospheric nuclear test participants as of

30 September 1993 18

2-1 Average File A letter processing requirements 22

2-2 NNTPR personnel effort 23

2-3 NNTPR costs 23

2-4 NNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs 25

2-5 NNTPR outgoing correspondence totals 26

2-6 ANTPR personnel effort 28

2-7 ANTPR costs 28

2-8 ANTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs 29

2-9 AFNTPR personnel effort 31

2-10 AFNTPR costs 31

2-11 AFNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs 32

2-12 MCNTPR effort 34

2-13 MCNTPR costs 34

2-14 MCNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs 35

3-1 File A activities 45

3-2 Other correspondence 45

3-3 Trends in the Veterans' Assistance Program 46

Xll
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

TABLES (Cont'd)

Table Page

4-1 Diseases covered by Public Laws 98-542, 100-321, 102-86, 102-578, 101-426, and

101-510 53

6-1 Chronological list of U.S. atmospheric nuclear test series 65

6-2 Summary of external doses for Project TRINITY as of 30 September 1993 72

6-3 CROSSROADS shots 73

6-4 Summary of external doses for Operation CROSSROADS as of

30 September 1993 77

6-5 SANDSTONE shots 77

6-6 Summary of external doses for Operation SANDSTONE as of 30 September 1993 79

6-7 RANGER shots 79

6-8 Summary of external doses for Operation RANGER as of 30 September 1993 ... 82

6-9 GREENHOUSE shots 82

6-10 Summary of external doses for Operation GREENHOUSE as of

30 September 1993 84

6-11 BUSTER-JANGLE shots 85

6-12 Summary of external doses for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE as of

30 September 1993 87

6-13 TUMBLER-SNAPPER shots 87

6-14 Summary of external doses for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER as of

30 September 1993 89

6-15 IVY shots 90

6-16 Summary of external doses for Operation IVY as of 30 September 1993 92

6-17 UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE shots 93

6-18 Summary of external doses for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE as of

30 September 1993 96

6-19 CASTLE shots 97

6-20 Summary of external doses for Operation CASTLE as of 30 September 1993 ... 99

6-21 TEAPOT shots 100

6-22 Summary of external doses for Operation TEAPOT as of 30 September 1993 . . 102

6-23 Summary of external doses for Operation WIGWAM as of

30 September 1993 104

6-24 REDWING shots 106

6-25 Summary of external doses for Operation REDWING as of

30 September 1993 107

6-26 PLUMBBOB shots 108

6-27 Summary of external doses for Operation PLUMBBOB as of

30 September 1993 110

xiii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

TABLES (Cont'd)

Table Page

6-28 HARDTACK I shots Ill

6-29 Summary of external doses for Operation HARDTACK I as of

30 September 1993 113

6-30 ARGUS shots 114

6-31 HARDTACK II shots 115

6-32 Summary of external doses for Operation HARDTACK II as of

30 September 1993 117

6-33 Safety experiments, 1956-1958 118

6-34 Summary of external doses for Project 56 Experiments 1 through 3 120

6-35 DOMINIC I shots 122

6-36 Summary of external doses for Operation DOMINIC I as of

30 September 1993 126

6-37 DOMINIC II shots 126

6-38 Summary of external doses for Operation DOMINIC II as of

30 September 1993 128

6-39 Projects GNOME and SEDAN 128

6-40 Summary of external doses for the PLOWSHARE Program as of

30 September 1993 130

7-1 Radiation survey instruments used during nuclear tests 136

9-1 Acute effects of exposure to ionizing radiation 145

9-2 Lifetime risk of excess cancer mortality from gamma radiation 146

9-3 Five series in the NAS study 151

xiv
SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY

AND THE NTPR PROGRAM

The United States Government, primarily through the Manhattan Engineer District (MED)

and its successor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), conducted some 235 nuclear

weapons tests from 1945 to 1962, during the atmospheric nuclear testing program. The testing

was principally conducted in Nevada and the Pacific. An estimated 205,000 Department of

Defense (DoD) personnel, military and civilian, took part in the tests.

In March 1977, 15 years after the last above-ground nuclear test, the VA Regional Office

in Boise, Idaho, received a claim for disability benefits from retired Army Sergeant Paul R.

Cooper. A patient at the VA hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, Cooper attributed his acute

myelocytic leukemia to the radiation exposure he had received as a participant in Shot SMOKY,

conducted on 31 August 1957 as part of the 1957 series of nuclear tests, Operation PLUMBBOB.

The VA initially denied Cooper's claim but later reversed its decision. The appeals board noted

that sufficient signs of the disease had been present when Cooper was on active duty to support

the claim as Service connected. The board did not comment, however, on Cooper's assertion that

his leukemia resulted directly from radiation exposure he had received at Shot SMOKY.

The VA's decision on the Cooper claim initiated a series of events that ultimately involved

the military services, DNA, DOE, NAS, the Department of Health and Human Services and the

White House. Questions fueling that involvement concerned, among other issues, the possible

radiation doses received by test participants and the possible long-term health effects resulting

from those doses.

1.1 ORIGINS OF THE NTPR PROGRAM.

Through a series of meetings held in 1977, representatives of DoD, DOE, VA, and CDC,

among other agencies, concluded that research should be conducted concerning personnel

participation in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons test program. DoD, including DNA

representatives, made commitments to establish an effort that would coordinate this research

during hearings held by the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce during 24-26 January and 14 February 1978. Their

statements, along with decisions made during the 1977 meetings, laid a basis for the official

establishment of NTPR in 1978.

An initial step was taken by the physician assigned in February 1977 to the Paul Cooper

case at the Salt Lake City, Utah, VA hospital. Concerned over the possibility of a connection

between his patient's illness and his earlier participation in Shot SMOKY, the physician contacted

Dr. Glyn G. Caldwell, Chief of the Cancer Branch of CDC in Atlanta, Georgia. Dr. Caldwell,

an epidemiologist who had an interest in leukemia studies, then contacted Colonel LaWayne R.
Stromberg, MC, USA, Director of the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) .

Dr. Caldwell informed Colonel Stromberg that he wanted to investigate the question of a possible

relationship between participation in a nuclear test and later development of cancer. Colonel

Stromberg agreed to support the effort by attempting to retrieve dosimetry readings for the names

of DoD personnel forwarded to him by Dr. Caldwell.

Shortly thereafter, the VA decided against Paul Cooper's claim. Sergeant Cooper then

took his case to the media, which accorded him considerable attention. "Almost immediately the

subject became a part of the public consciousness," to quote from a document tracing NTPR

origins that was drafted by Paul H. Carew, DNA Comptroller. According to Carew, CDC

received correspondence within a few days from "several dozen people" who claimed to have

participated in the nuclear weapons tests. The number of letters increased to approximately 2,000

within four months.

During March and April 1977, against the backdrop of increasing media attention,

representatives from CDC, AFRRI, and the Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, discussed

the research effort proposed by Dr. Caldwell and the need for a mechanism to address relevant

issues and process inquiries. With the support of the DNA Director, the Surgeon General of the

Army appointed an ad hoc committee to coordinate a detailed review of troop participation in the

U.S. atmospheric nuclear test program. Headed by Dr. Stromberg, the committee included

representatives from various Army organizations, such as the Office of the Surgeon General,

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and Office of the Chief of Public

Affairs. The committee convened on 6 May 1977 to formulate its goals and agenda.

On 13 May 1977, an AFRRI representative met with Dr. Caldwell at CDC in Atlanta to

discuss the information CDC had and needed and to assess progress on the work undertaken. In

reviewing his efforts, Dr. Caldwell noted that he had identified three confirmed cases of leukemia

among the personnel who had written to CDC and indicated their participation in Shot SMOKY.

This number was of interest to CDC because it appeared to be higher than expected for a group

of that size. Dr. Caldwell had accordingly received CDC approval to conduct an epidemiological

study of the entire SMOKY population. He required, however, a list of SMOKY participants

complete with radiation exposure histories from DoD. Upon conclusion of the meeting, the

AFRRI representative recommended that DoD provide the requested roster and data.

It soon became clear that the requisite data were incomplete and scattered in repositories

across the country. To discuss data needs, as well as other concerns, a meeting of the ad hoc

committee was scheduled for June 1977 at the DOE Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas.

DOE Nevada Operations Office was the center for testing activities at NTS and a central archive

for DOE information on the atmospheric nuclear test program.

Convened on 3 June 1977, the meeting involved 24 participants representing the military

services, DNA, DOE, LANL, and Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo), a DOE

contractor based in Las Vegas, Nevada. The discussion focused on the availability of information,

*AFRRI is a DoD activity responsible for studying the biological effects of ionizing radiation.

2
particularly from the REECo records indicating personnel exposures to ionizing radiation during

the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests. These records provided useful information on personnel who

had worn film badges. There were no entries, though, for the participants who did not wear film

badges. The committee concluded that information would be needed to supplement the data made

available by the REECo files and that cooperation would be required between the participants in

the testing and CDC. The Army representatives supported this conclusion but announced they

would proceed with a unilateral investigation of Army personnel at Shot SMOKY. They

accordingly requested access to information on Army personnel exposures and related data as they

were identified.

During the next two weeks, Major Alan L. Skerker, USA, Office of the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Operations and Plans, developed a roster for one of the Army contingents that had been

at Shot SMOKY: the Provisional Company, 82nd Airborne Division. He recovered names from

such sources as yearbooks housed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Individual dosimetry

information came from records kept at the Lexington Blue-Grass Signal Depot, Lexington,

Kentucky. These data were sent on 15 June 1977 to Dr. Caldwell after the dose information had

been removed according to constraints believed to be imposed by Public Law 93-579 of 1974,

commonly known as the Privacy Act of 1974. It was later learned that the dose information could

be provided to CDC.

By mid-August 1977, the ad hoc committee, which had been restructured to include the

Surgeon General of the Air Force, the Surgeon General of the Navy, and DOE, had summarized

its findings. The committee agreed to the following:

• That the concerned Federal agencies support Dr. Glyn Caldwell in his attempt to

identify, locate, and obtain the necessary medical data on SMOKY participants;

• That the ad hoc committee be established formally as an interagency committee

with DoD, DOE, VA, and the U.S. Public Health Service as members;

• That the review of DoD personnel exposure records associated with the nuclear

weapons testing be continued.

On 3 November 1977, the interagency committee held a preliminary meeting to discuss

the possible long-term health effects resulting from participation in U.S. atmospheric nuclear

weapons testing. The attendees recommended that a major epidemiological study of test

participants be undertaken under the direction of an independent scientific organization, such as

NRC of the NAS, and that this effort be funded jointly by DoD and DOE. They suggested,

moreover, that a central administrative unit be established within DoD to coordinate all related

activities. The final recommendation was for a meeting of senior officials of the concerned

agencies, to be held as soon as possible, to organize the effort (Carew, 3 May 1979).

On 1 December 1977, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs convened a

meeting to address the U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program and the possible

relationship between participation in the program and an increased incidence of disease attributable
to radiation exposure. Participants included representatives from the military services, DNA,

DOE, VA, CDC, and NRC/NAS, as well as epidemiological consultants from Walter Reed Army

Medical Center. The meeting resulted in a decision to solicit a formal proposal for a study from

NRC of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test participants. It also resulted in the unofficial agreement

that DNA would function as DoD executive agency for all matters pertaining to DoD personnel

participation in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test program (Carew, 3 May 1979; Mclndoe, 23

January 1978).

The Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce held hearings during 24-26 January and 14 February 1978 on DoD actions

to collect data on DoD personnel who participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

These hearings functioned as a catalyst for official establishment of the NTPR Program in late

January 1978. In their testimony, DoD, DOE, and DNA representatives not only highlighted the

research initiated by concerned Federal agencies in 1977, but made commitments to establish an

effort that would develop histories of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, describe

radiation safety policies and procedures in effect during the tests, identify participation and

radiation doses for DoD military and civilian personnel who took part in the tests, and make the

resulting information available for review by scientific organizations. These commitments

emerged as the primary NTPR tasks (Johnson, 13 June 1986).

1.2 FOCUSING THE NTPR PROGRAM.

The early history of the NTPR program can be traced through memoranda drafted during

the initial months of the effort. Most of the initial documents discussed in this section were

written by or to Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, USN, Director of DNA from March 1977 to

August 1980 and principal architect of the NTPR.

DNA responsibility for the NTPR officially started with two memoranda dated 28 January

1978 and signed by John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve

Affairs, and Logistics. One of the documents, addressed to the Director of DNA, made the

agency responsible for the following tasks and "for any others that may develop" (White, 28

January 1978, a):

• Develop a history of every U.S. atmospheric nuclear event that involved DoD

personnel;

• Identify the radiation monitoring control policies, procedures, and requirements

that were in effect;

• Assemble a census of personnel at each event. Identify their location, movements,

protection, and radiation dose exposure;

• Make this information available for scientific review and appraisal;

• Handle public affairs matters in cooperation with the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); and
• Handle congressional affairs matters in coordination with the Office of the

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.

These tasks evolved over time, as indicated in section 1.3, and were the basis of the NTPR

effort.

The other 28 January 1978 memorandum was important because it gave the DNA Director

"authority to task the Military Departments and other DoD elements and components" in

responding to the assignments. This document was sent to the Secretaries of the Military

Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense,

among others (White, 28 January 1978, b).

Using his given authority, Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, Director, DNA, delineated

the respective responsibilities of DNA and the military services in a 13 February 1978

memorandum directed to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary

of the Air Force. DNA, he emphasized, would "organize and direct the overall effort," while

each military service would be responsible for NTPR research pertinent to that Service and for

follow-up communications with Service personnel (Monroe, 13 February 1978).

DNA coordinated its approach with DOE and CDC in meetings held during March and

April 1978. Representatives from DNA explained the NTPR program to DOE Nevada Operations

Office and its contractors at a 9 March 1978 meeting. DOE hosted a meeting on 4 April 1978 that

was attended by representatives of the DoD NTPR, National Archives, REECo, LANL,

NRC/NAS, and each DNA contractor organization. The discussion focused on methods for

identifying and obtaining records on U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing (Brady, 10 April

1986).

An 8 June 1978 memorandum by Vice Admiral Monroe directed the NTPR teams toward

consistency in research. It asked them to collect the following information on test participants:

1) full name (no initials); 2) branch of service (if civilian, Service/contractor/laboratory

affiliation); 3) unit or ship (at time of test); 4) grade, rank, or rating (at time of test); 5) service

serial number(s); 6) social security number; 7) date of birth; 8) shots participated in; 9) radiation

exposure data, in as much detail as possible (e.g., total atmospheric test exposure; exposure by

radiation type; exposure by shot, series, or time period; badge issue and turn-in dates; bioassay

data; etc.); 10) sources of above data elements. The memorandum also required the teams to

research individual medical records, which would be a major effort involving considerable time.

The rationale for this records search was as follows:

First, the NTPR effort could scarcely be considered thorough, searching, or even

competent if this basic source is not explored. Second, radiation exposure data is

so central to the purpose of NTPR, and recorded information elsewhere is known

to have such limitations, that no potential source can be overlooked. Third, since

future research efforts (epidemiological, claims, etc.) will, in many cases, retrace

this same ground, knowledge even of absence of information in medical records

will be of considerable value. Finally, an understanding of the Services' past

success or failure in recording exposures will be important in devising new systems

(Monroe, 8 June 1978).
With a memorandum dated 3 October 1979, DNA expanded the NTPR effort to include

U.S. service personnel who had participated in the postwar occupation of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. Vice Admiral Monroe noted that the original NTPR charter had not included these

personnel because the effort had been "limited to test participants" and the "wartime bombings

were not tests." Nevertheless, he added, they had "the same need for DoD research and

assistance" as did the former test participants. "Unless otherwise directed," he concluded, the

NTPR program "is being expanded to include those U.S. servicemen who might have been

exposed to low-level ionizing radiation as a result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings"

(Monroe, 3 October 1979). Vice Admiral Monroe was "so confident this step was right," he later

explained, that he did not preface his statement to his superiors with "1 recommend" (Monroe, 8

July 1985).

The central management decisions that emerged from the memoranda cited above and the

other documents drafted in the early months of the NTPR effort were:

• To undertake the NTPR program as a major, multi-year, multi-million dollar

effort;

• To organize the NTPR program with DNA exercising centralized guidance and the

military services having responsibility for the execution of Service research and

follow-up with their own Service personnel;

• To pursue the NTPPv program as a scientific and historical inquiry, producing

factual results without regard to preconceptions or political acceptability; and

• To remain alert to any possible new requirement or any additional action that might

seem needed and to modify the NTPR program accordingly (Monroe, 8 July 1985).

1.3 SCOPE OF THE NTPR PROGRAM.

During the early years of the program, the specific tasks of NTPR became more detailed

and numerous. The 28 January 1978 memorandum cited in the preceding section itemized six

tasks. Nine tasks eventually emerged, as listed below (Defense Nuclear Agency, April 1984):

1. To compile a roster of the DoD personnel involved in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear

tests;

2. To develop a history of each atmospheric nuclear event that involved DoD personnel;

3. To declassify all possible nuclear test related source documents that bore a security

classification;

4. To provide estimates of radiation doses-both as a check on film badge readings and

as a substitute for them in those cases where badges were not worn or readings were

either not recorded or retrievable-and to submit the methodology for the estimates

to the NAS for peer review;
5. To establish personal contact with as many test participants as possible;

6. To identify those individuals who received a higher radiation dose than those doses

recommended under current Federal guideline for radiation workers, to notify those

individuals of their dose, and to offer veterans free medical examinations at

Government hospitals;

7. To sponsor, in conjunction with the DOE, independent mortality studies by NAS of

selected test participants;

8. To carry out a detailed research program, in conjunction with the ongoing NTPR

program, to recover all data pertaining to possible radiation exposure of U.S. postwar

occupation troops at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan; and

9. To provide assistance to veterans, the VA, and interested organizations by researching

and providing as complete data as possible on individual participation and radiation

doses.

As NTPR was originally organized, an NTPR team in each military service and a separate

team at the DNA Field Command worked with DNA in meeting these tasks, as explained in

Section 2. By late 1986, DNA's leadership came to believe that elimination of the Service teams

and consolidation of NTPR under DNA's direct control was the best approach in a time of

reduced funding. The progress of the NTPR program under consolidation is described in Section

3. During the entire NTPR effort, DNA has employed contractors to provide specialized support

services. Figure 1-1 shows the basic organization of NTPR until 1986. The five NTPR teams

and the contractors reported to the NTPR Program Manager, who was responsible to the Director

of DNA. Figure 1-2 shows the consolidated arrangement since 1987. Succeeding Vice Admiral

Robert R. Monroe as DNA Director were Lieutenant General Harry A. Griffith, USA, August

1980 to August 1983; Lieutenant General Richard K. Saxer, USAF, August 1983 to June 1985;

Lieutenant General John L. Pickett, USAF, June 1985 to May 1987; Rear Admiral John T.

Parker, USN, September 1987 to August 1989; Major General Gerald G. Watson, USA, August

1989 to April 1992, and Major General Kenneth L. Hagemann, USAF, April 1992 to the present.

1.4 NTPR PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

The NTPR program has been pursued on a high-priority basis. Table 1-1 shows NTPR

government and contractor person years from 1978 to 30 September 1993. Table 1-2 itemizes

DNA and DoD annual NTPR funding for the same period (Johnson, 20 December 1985; Johnson,

6 June 1986; Defense Nuclear Agency, 3 September 1986). This section presents the results

achieved from these expenditures.
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TASK1

In mid-1986 it was believed that the first NTPR task, the development of a roster of DoD

participants in the nuclear tests, was nearly complete. However, the passage of Public Law

100-321, "Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988," resulted in the VA (and

therefore, NTPR) identifying several new categories of participants (see Section 3.3.2).

Consequently, the NTPR data base of participants more than doubled since 1986 and new

participants continue to be discovered. As of 30 September 1993, the NTPR data base of

participants had 415,392 records (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993).

TASK 2

The personnel-oriented history of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test program has been

completed. This 9,086-page history comprises 41 volumes. The reports, organized by series and

shots, identify the participating organizations and their activities, and discuss radiological safety

procedures and exposure data. The reports have been distributed to over 700 locations, including

many public and college libraries and all VA Regional Offices throughout the United States. The

distribution list is included at the back of each volume and is available upon request from DNA.

TASK 3

DNA has declassified over 1,000 publications containing information pertinent to the

personnel aspects of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests. These documents are catalogued for easy

reference and placed for ready availability at NTIS in Springfield, Virginia, and CIC in Las

Vegas, Nevada. DNA has also declassified hundreds of relatively brief documents, such as

memoranda and letters, and placed them at CIC. Appendix D explains NTIS and CIC holdings

and procedures.

TASK 4

The NTPR dose reconstruction program emerged from this task, to provide estimates of

radiation doses. This program has been used where film badge readings were not available or

incomplete for personnel in participating units and to reconstruct individual doses in specific

cases, as in support of veterans claims. Part of this effort is a separate analysis of possible

internal dose due to inhalation and ingestion of radioactive materials. This process was submitted

for peer review to NAS. On 7 February 1986, NAS released its report, and found that:

...the procedures used to estimate external radiation doses were reasonably sound.

The NTPR has developed procedures that permit satisfactory estimates to be made

of the external doses received by these participants. There are uncertainties in the

dose estimates, but it appears that 99 percent of the personnel received doses of

less than 5 rem, which is approximately the average dose received by the general

population during the last 30 years from exposure to natural radiation and the use

of ionizing radiation during medical procedures. [The committee] found no

11
evidence that the NTPR teams had been remiss in carrying out their mandate. If

any bias exists in the estimates, it is probably a tendency to overestimate the most

likely dose, especially for internal emitters or when the statistical procedure for

assigning dose is used. (National Research Council, 1985)

TASK 5

DNA and NTPR personnel have taken various actions to establish personal contact with

as many test participants as possible. On 9 February 1978, DNA initiated its nationwide toll-free

call-in program for participants to report their involvement in U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests. The

agency then issued multiple news releases that identified the purpose of the NTPR program, the

toll-free number, and the DNA address. Releases were disseminated in part through the U.S.

Army Home Town News Center in Kansas City, Missouri, which mailed information to 8,066

daily and weekly newspapers, as well as 720 television and 6,394 radio stations. DNA sent letters

to news directors and editors asking them to issue an enclosed press release as a service to

members of their audiences who participated in atmospheric nuclear testing (Department of the

Army, 24 September 1987, p. 8).

The response to the initial nationwide news release was overwhelming. During the first

two weeks after the toll-free lines were established, almost 13,000 persons called to report or

inquire about their test participation. DNA progressively increased the toll-free lines from two

to 20 (Monroe, 28 April 1980). The calls have continued to the present, although in diminishing

numbers. By 1984, DNA was averaging 150-200 calls a week and by 1985, about 65 a week

(Loeffler, 1 May 1984; Zillig, 16 April 1985). The highest monthly total since consolidation was

934 calls in September 1989 (the results of an August 1989 DNA mailout apprising previous

callers of program developments). As of 30 September 1993, a total of approximately 76,000

individuals had called or written to the agency requesting participation information*. The

information extracted from the telephone calls and letters comprises what has come to be known

as the File A database. (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993, p. 5).

DNA has also conducted four major mailings to all veterans of the atmospheric nuclear

tests and the Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation for whom it had current addresses (Johnson, 6 June

1986):

• In June 1983, DNA and the Navy mailed copies of an NTPR fact sheet and VA

Circular 10-83-61 to about 40,000 veterans. VA Circular 10-83-61 authorized

treatment of test participant veterans for any ailments except those that clearly are

not radiogenic in origin.

• In July 1983, DoD mailed copies of the 1983 NAS study "Multiple Myeloma

Among Hiroshima/Nagasaki Veterans," discussed in Section 9, to the

approximately 1,000 callers who had reported participation in Hiroshima/Nagasaki.

*The toll-free number is 1-800-462-3683. The collect number is (703) 285-5610. The

mailing address is: Defense Nuclear Agency, ESN/NTPR, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,

VA 22310-3398.

12
• In June 1985, DNA mailed to about 45,000 veterans a packet of information

containing the following:

Results of the CDC study "Mortality and Cancer Frequency Among

Military Nuclear Test (Smoky) Participants, 1957 through 1979," published

in the Journal of the American Medical Association on 5 August 1983

(see Section 9).

Results of the 1985 mortality study, entitled Mortality of Nuclear Weapons

Test Participants.

NTPR program developments.

Information on free medical benefits available through the VA.

Request for comments on the proposed rules for responding to VA/NTPR

inquiries (see Chapter 4).

• In August 1989, DNA mailed to about 42,000 veterans a packet of information

containing the following:

Four fact sheets describing the NTPR program which included current

NTPR call-in numbers.

A copy of Public Law 100-321, "Radiation-Exposed Veterans

Compensation Act of 1988."

An excerpt from the Federal Register dated 21 June 1989, implementing

PL 100-321.

As the DoD executive agent for the NTPR program, DNA has responded to requests for

information from Congress, medical and scientific communities, veterans groups, lawyers, and

citizens with special interests in NTPR. It has sent approximately 1,450 letters to the offices of

U.S. senators and representatives, governors, and the White House, in response to requests for

information on the program or on behalf of constituents (Johnson and others, 1 August 1986;

Defense Nuclear Agency, no date; JAYCOR, 4 September 1991 through 6 October 1993). In

addition, DNA representatives have testified at Congressional hearings from the very start of

NTPR. The Director of DNA, along with other agency and DoD personnel, made statements at

the hearings identified in Table 1-3 (U.S. Congress, House, January and February 1978; U.S.

Congress, House, April and July 1978; U.S. Congress, Senate, May 1979; U.S. Congress,

Senate, June 1979; U.S. Congress, Senate, July 1979; U.S. Congress, Senate, October 1981; U.S.

Congress, Senate, April 1983; U.S. Congress, House, May 1983; U.S. Congress, Senate,

November and December 1985; U.S. Congress, House, November 1991). The last time DNA

officials testified on NTPR was November 13, 1991.

13
Table 1-3. Congressional hearings at which DNA representatives have given testimony.

Committee Date of Testimony

Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce

— Emphasis on actions then underway in DoD to collect data

on DoD personnel who participated in U.S. atmospheric

nuclear weapons testing.

25 January and

14 February 1978

Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of

the House Committee on Government Operations

- Emphasis on DoD research to identify participants in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear weapons testing and possible exposures

to ionizing radiation resulting from their participation.

13 July 1978

Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Poliferation, and Federal Services

of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Emphasis on health effects of low-level ionizing radiation;

radiation safety; identification of personnel involved in

testing; and fallout from tests.

7 March 1979

Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services

of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

-- Emphasis on progress made by DNA and the Service teams

to identify participants in U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons

testing and possible exposures to ionizing radiation resulting

from their participation.

8 May 1979

Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs

— Emphasis on declassification of documents relevant to U.S.

atmospheric nuclear weapons testing and on dose

reconstruction for test participants with no or incomplete

dose records.

20 June 1979

Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources with incomplete

dose records

— Emphasis on proposed Bill S. 1483, which would make the

U.S. liable in incidents related to fallout from U.S.

atmospheric nuclear tests.

27 October 1981

14
Table 1-3. Congressional hearings at which DNA representatives have given testimony. (Cont'd)

Committee Date of Testimony

Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs

- Emphasis on the status of the NTPR program and VA's

adjudication process.

6 April 1983

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House

Committee on Veterans' Affairs

- Emphasis on the NTPR program, Operation CROSSROADS,

and the Stafford Warren papers.

24 May 1983

Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs

- Emphasis on issues resulting from a General Accounting

Office (GAO) report on radiation exposures received by

participants in Operation CROSSROADS, the first postwar

nuclear test series, conducted in 1946 at Bikini Atoll.

11 December 1985

Compensation, Pension, and Insurance Subcommittee of the House

Committee on Veterans' Affairs

-- Emphasis on the extension of the list of presumptive Serviceconnected diseases and the requirement that DoD and VA

study additional radiation exposure activities.

13 November 1991

DNA has also responded to requests for information from U.S. and foreign print and

electronic media. It has provided data on NTPR to both national and local television programs

and publications, including "60 Minutes," "20/20," "Good Morning, Washington," National

Geographic. People magazine, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.

TASK 6

NTPR's sixth task was to identify and notify individuals whose radiation doses exceeded the

current federal exposure guideline for radiation workers and to offer veterans free medical

examinations at VA hospitals. Notification and medical examination programs exist for three

categories of DoD test participants: over-25-rem* participants, Desert Rock officer volunteer

observers, and over-5-rem participants. In addition, free VA medical examinations are available

upon request to all veterans of atmospheric nuclear testing. See Section 4 for a discussion of the

VA examination process.

*See Appendix B, Glossary, for definitions of rem and other technical terms.

15
In March 1979, the notification and veterans medical examination program was initiated

for all test participants with cumulative doses from U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing in excess of

25 rem. The threshold of 25 rem was selected because it was the recommended national guideline

for a one-time, planned exposure under emergency conditions.

As of 1986, NTPR had identified 39 DoD personnel who received doses over 25 rem.

Most of these exposures resulted from a wind shift at Shot BRAVO, detonated on 1 March 1954

at Bikini as part of Operation CASTLE (see Section 6.10). Of the 37 participants who had

identifiable addresses and could be contacted, 19 wanted examinations, five did not; 12 veterans

took the examinations (Johnson, 6 June 1986).

In May 1979, the DoD notification and VA examination program was expanded to include

officer volunteer observers who took part in the Desert Rock troop exercises during the testing.

These volunteers were closer to ground zero than any other participants at shot-time. The officer

volunteer observers at Shots NANCY (24 March 1953), BADGER (18 April 1953), SIMON (25

April 1953), and APPLE 2 (5 May 1955) also received measureable neutron radiation doses

(Defense Nuclear Agency, April 1984). The first three of these shots were part of Operation

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE and are discussed in Section 6.9. The fourth, Shot APPLE 2, was part

of Operation TEAPOT and is discussed in Section 6.11. As of 1986, NTPR personnel had located

current addresses and written 40 of the officer volunteer observers, as noted in Sections 2.2.2,

2.3.3, 2.4.2, and 2.5.2 (Johnson, 6 June 1986).

In June 1979, the DoD notification and VA medical examination program was expanded

to include all veterans with doses over 5 rem in 12 consecutive months. Five rem per calendar

year is the current Federal guideline for allowable annual dose to radiation workers. As of 1986

this program included 1,430 personnel, and NTPR had contacted about 70 percent of them, using

records 25 to 40 years old in their effort to find current addresses.

TASK 7

Work continues on this NTPR task, to sponsor independent NAS studies of the mortality

of test participants. Sections 9.4.1 and 9.5.1 discuss these studies.

TASK 8

Early in the NTPR Program it appeared that DNA and the NTPR teams had completed this

task, research on the U.S. occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. DNA issued a detailed fact

sheet about the occupation forces on 6 August 1980 and has since provided this data to all

occupation personnel who have called or written DNA. A detailed dose reconstruction, using

assumptions chosen to give an estimate of the maximum possible dose, has also been completed.

The conclusion, reported in Section 5, is that the radiation doses received by members of the

occupation forces were very low (Defense Nuclear Agency, 6 August 1980). After the passage

of Public Law 100-321, which resulted in the VA defining the term "occupation of Hiroshima or

Nagasaki, Japan, by United States forces," DNA made a concerted effort to identify these

participants. As of 30 September 1993, DNA had identified 195,814 personnel. (Personnel who

were at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki are counted twice in this total.)

16
TASK 9

NTPR personnel research individual participation and radiation exposure data in response

to inquiries from veterans and their families, the VA, Congress, and other interested parties. This

is an ongoing effort.

1.5 SUMMARY OF RADIATION DOSES.

Doses to participants in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests are determined through several

means. Film badge dosimetry, when available, provides a measure ofthe external gamma radiation

doses to persons wearing film badges. The primary source ofrecorded film badge dose data is the

file maintained by REECo, the official DOE master repository of dose records for U.S. nuclear

weapons tests.

Using contractor support, DNA also provides reconstructed doses for those personnel who

were not issued film badges and/or whose dose records are missing or incomplete. These dose determinations, described in Section 8, are based on specific unit activities and actual radiological

conditions. Doses so determined correlate well with film badge readings when the circumstances

of exposure are generally known.

Findings to date indicate that most external gamma doses to personnel at the tests were quite

low-averaging about 0.63 rem. (The 1986 edition ofFor the Record notes that this average was 0.5

rem. The increase is primarily due to the discovery of additional information concerning the

completeness ofrecorded dosimetry data and the application ofreconstructed doses from available

radiological information to cover unbadged periods.) Many participants received no dose at all, and

less than one percent exceeded 5 rem, the current annual whole body dose limit recommended by

the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Table 1-4 presents data provided

by NTPR that show the breakdown of all external gamma doses, both recorded and reconstructed.

The dose totals given in Table 1-4 do not precisely match the estimated numbers of

participants for the specific test series given in Section 6 or the estimated number of DoD

participants in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests. This is because some individuals were in more

than one test series. Consequently, the table of dose totals contains some double counting.

However, while the numbers in Table 1-4 will be adjusted with further research and analysis, the

overall results are not expected to change appreciably—the preponderance of doses are expected to

remain in the level below 0.63 rem. DoD participants in this table and the tables summarizing

external doses for each test series in Section 6 represent military personnel, civilian employees of

the military services and their contractors.

17
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Consequently, civilians do not form a distinct category in some tables as was the case in the 1986

edition of this history.

During Operations UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE (1953), TEAPOT (1955), and PLUMBBOB

(1957), all at the NTS, about 10,000 military observers and maneuver troops were exposed to

neutron radiation while observing nuclear tests from forward locations in the shot areas. Of these,

44 were volunteers positioned closer to ground zero than the other troops. Through

reconstruction methods described in Section 8, neutron doses for the volunteers were determined

to be as high as 28 rem, while the highest neutron dose received by regular troops was 1.4 rem

for the 500 observers at Shot TESLA, Operation TEAPOT. Neutron doses to all other troops

were calculated to be less than 0.5 rem.

At some operations, the circumstances of radiation exposure were such that some

participants may have ingested or inhaled radioactive materials. Another aspect of the NTPR dose

reconstruction program is the estimation of such internal doses, where applicable. A "dose

screen" methodology is applied to each internal exposure situation investigated to determine the

possibility that the 50-year committed dose to the bone could exceed 0.15 rem. The internal dose

assessment for over 85% of the participants falls below that level. (See Section 7.2.3.)

19
SECTION 2

WORK OF THE NTPR TEAMS

Since January 1978, DNA has been the executive agent for the NTPR program; however,

the military service teams and a separate team at DNA's Field Command in Albuquerque, New

Mexico, performed the tasks assigned the Agency from 1978 until the program was consolidated

under DNA in late 1987 and early 1988. These five teams expended considerable time, personnel

effort, and funds meeting their responsibilities. This section sketches their common challenges

and traces the efforts and accomplishments of each team.

2.1 COMMON CHALLENGES.

Each NTPR team was responsible for a different constituency and had a distinctive history.

At the same time, the teams shared a number of experiences. They all, for example, had certain

problems with inadequate documentation from the testing period, although some teams had more

difficulties in this area than others. These problems posed challenges to the teams in fulfilling

their responsibilities, such as determining a veteran's role in a nuclear test.

2.1.1 Documentation from the Testing Period.

Inadequate documentation was a significant problem, even though many of the source

materials are detailed and useful. The sources, written some 30 to 50 years ago, are housed in

some 194 private, public, and government repositories scattered nationwide. In addition, the

extant DoD records of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test program do not emphasize personnel

participation and exposure data, as Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe explained in testimony given

on 20 June 1979 before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs (U.S. Congress, Senate, June

1979):

The reason that DoD records do not meet today's needs in this specific area derives

from the views of medical science in the 1940s and 1950s concerning the hazards

of ionizing radiation. Both national and international authorities at that time were

more certain than they are today that there is negligible health risk from exposure

to low-levels of ionizing radiation (e.g., a few rem). Thus the DoD-allowed

exposure limits per test or series (typically 3 to 5 rem) were regarded primarily as

operational safety guides, and once doses had been kept within these limits, their

recording was not, in all cases, accomplished with an eye on permanency.

A major fire at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) in St. Louis, Missouri,

compounded the difficulties. Beginning on 12 July 1973, the fire burned for four days. It

damaged 17.5 million records of Army personnel discharged between 1912 and 1959, 2,000

records of Army personnel discharged in 1973, and one million records of Air Force personnel

whose last names began with the letters I through Z and who had been discharged between 1947

and 1963. Many other records were water damaged. Only 10 to 15 percent of the 1912 to 1959

Army records were recovered, while about 40 percent of the Air Force records were salvaged

(General Service Administration, April 1977, pp. 31, 36, 60). The destruction of these documents

created problems particularly for the Army, as is discussed in Section 2.3.

20
2.1.2 Responses to File A Personnel.

The NTPR program evolved into a much more extensive effort than had originally been

envisioned by Congress, government organizations, and the NTPR teams. The demanding and

lengthy procedure required to respond to File A personnel provides one example of this effort.

According to established guidelines, the NTPR interviewer requested the following

information from each caller on the toll-free DNA telephone lines: participant's name, social

security number, telephone number, date of birth, address, caller's name, caller's relationship to

participant, test series, test event, test location, date of test, participant's receipt of dosimeter,

participant's use of dosimeter, armed service rank, service number, unit during test, place of

birth, cause of death if participant was deceased, year of death, and remarks. DNA proceeded

with a follow-up letter to the caller providing information on the program. The responsible NTPR

team then conducted research to secure accurate participation and dose data, which were sent in

a final letter to the caller. Each service NTPR team responded to its own File A personnel.

The teams did not formulate any set approach for processing File A inquiries at the

beginning of the task. They did, however, generally use the procedures identified below.

• Collected information

Requested specified data from each caller on the DNA toll-free lines

Accumulated records from over 100 repositories

Gathered data from individuals knowledgeable about the U.S. atmospheric

nuclear weapons tests and personnel participation

• Established data base

Entered participants' personal and participation data

Incorporated relevant dosimetry information from medical records, REECo

files, Lexington Blue-Grass Signal Depot records, as well as some 80 other

sources

• Provided missing dosimetry information

Reviewed assembled data for gaps

Incorporated reconstructed dose information into the data base

• Developed final response

Determined participation and dosimetry information

Sent a letter to each caller.

21
The final File A letters were the conclusion of a lengthy procedure. The drafting and

processing of these letters was a considerable effort in itself, although not as demanding as the

preceding research. In 1984 the Navy NTPR (NNTPR) team estimated the average time spent on

this correspondence as shown in Table 2-1 (Buckley, 29 August 1979):

Table 2-1. Average File A letter processing requirements.

Function

Number of

People

Time Per Record

(minutes)

NTPR Work Hours

Daily (for 30 records)

Draw Records 1 3 1.5

Process Dose Data 1 10 5

Research/Draft Letter 3 45 22.5

Type Letter 1 15 7.5

Quality Control 1 10 5

Signature 1 2 1

Mail, Refile, Log 1 3 1.5

Supervision 1 8 4

Total 10 1 Hr. 36 Min. 48 Hrs.

The next five sections summarize the work of the individual service NTPR teams. The

commentary focuses on key efforts, including responses to File A inquiries from veterans or

family members, assignment of doses, notification of medical examination programs, and

investigations for VA claims.

2.2 NAVY NTPR EFFORTS.

The NNTPR was responsible for tracking the largest group of test participants, 52 percent of

the total number reported by the military services as of mid-1986 (Baciocco, 11 July 1984).

NNTPR identified 106,942 Navy personnel, believed to be virtually all of its participants (Bell,

20 May 1986). In addition, the Navy claimed about one-third of the approximately 50,000 File

A inquiries made by that time (Johnson, 2 May 1985).

The NNTPR had distinct advantages over the other teams in locating its personnel. Most

of the Navy participants, for example, were in ships during the tests, and their exact locations

could be identified through the use of ship logs and daily diaries. The NNTPR had access, too,

to the personnel records system maintained by the Navy. Making good use of these advantages,

the NNTPR made the best initial progress of the Service teams on the tasks DNA assigned it.

The NNTPR concentrated on quality control in the handling and processing of data and

assembled information that will be useful for years to come. With these data, the NNTPR

22
prepared a number of tables, a sample of which is given below, that summarized its efforts and

the participation of Navy personnel in the nuclear tests.

2.2.1 Resources.

The NNTPR office was established at the Pentagon on 21 February 1978. The Project

Managers, from the beginning of the effort until April 1987, were Captain Thomas H. Sherman,

February to April 1978; Captain Andrew G. Nelson, May 1978 to June 1979; Captain James R.

Buckley, June 1979 to April 1981; Commander R. Thomas Bell, May 1981 (Acting Project

Manager); Captain William H. Loeffler, June 1981 to September 1984; Commander R. Thomas

Bell, October 1984 to September 1986; and Commander Karl G. Mendenhall, September 1986

to April 1987, when DNA took over NNTPR's work. As of 1 May 1986, the NNTPR had used

195 person years and spent $9,256,000 (Johnson, 8 July 1986). Tables 2-2 and 2-3 itemize the

annual expenditures (Bell, 20 May 1986):

Table 2-2. NNTPR personnel effort,

(in person years)

FY78* FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85** FY86

Military

Officer

Enlisted

2.08

0.75

4

2.17

3.75

1.71

2.92

2.06

3

1.25

3

1

3

1

2

1

2

1

Civil Service 0.83 3.42 3.62 3 2 2 2 1 1

Contractor 1.67 29.67 35.07 21.11 15 14 14 4 4

Total 5.33 39.26 44.15 29.09 21.25 20 20 8 8

* FY78-FY84: Research and program development phase.

** FY85-on: Maintenance office phase.

Table 2-3. NNTPR costs,

(in thousands of dollars)

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86

Separately

identifiable

costs *

205 1,524 1,748.1 1,032.7 839 953 801 300 300

Salaries and

benefits **

71.6 173.6 177.7 191.7 220.6 208 210 150 150

Total 276.6 1,697.6 1,925.8 1,224.4 1,059.6 1,161 1,011 450 450

* Contracts, services, travel, materials, equipment rental, etc. less items in**.

** Uniformed military and civil service personnel only.

23
2.2.2 Results.

The NNTPR identified and assigned external gamma doses to virtually all of the Navy test

participants. The summaries in this section detail the team's fulfillment of its assigned

responsibilities.

Response to File A Personnel. As of 1 May 1986, the NNTPR had mailed nearly 20,000 File A

letters containing information on participation and dosimetry data to Navy personnel who had

contacted DNA (Bell, 20 May 1986). Approximately 300 follow-up letters were sent as dose

reconstructions were completed. The NNTPR also mailed more than 1,500 final letters to callers

who reported participation in the occupation of Hiroshima/Nagasaki as well as to callers found

to be non-participants in either the occupation or U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing.

Assignment of Doses. The NNTPR had recorded and/or calculated radiation doses for nearly 99

percent of all Navy test participants. The team and its contractors assembled this information by

searching through medical and historical records, by using film badge information, and by

reconstructing doses when film badges were not available, or complete.

The NNTPR reviewed over 99 percent of the participants' medical records (more than

105,000 records). Researchers accomplished most of this work during a one-year period, when

they examined about 1,700 records a week (Johnson, 2 May 1985).

Doses had to be reconstructed for more than half the Navy participants since only about

45 percent of these personnel had recorded exposure data. The effort was even greater for

Operation CROSSROADS, conducted in 1946 at Bikini as the first postwar nuclear test series.

Because no participants were badged for the entire operation and many were not badged at all,

reconstructed doses covering at least a portion of the operation were needed for all of the then

estimated 38,000 Navy participants in this operation. The NNTPR spent more time determining

the doses for CROSSROADS personnel than it did for Navy participants in all the other series

combined. Commander R. T. Bell, acknowledged the challenge of CROSSROADS when he

referred in an interview to the "massive effort" expended by the NNTPR and DNA contractors

on dose reconstruction (Johnson, 2 May 1985).

Notification of VA Medical Examination Programs. The NNTPR had a total of three personnel

in the Over-25-rem Program, five in the Volunteer Observer Program, and 503 in the Over-5-rem

Program, as shown in the table below. Approximately 65 percent of those in the Over-5-rem

Program participated in Shot BRAVO of Operation CASTLE (Bell, 20 May 1986).

The NNTPR sent notification letters to all personnel in these programs having identifiable

addresses, a number totaling 464. Of this group, 150 participants stated that they wanted the

medical examination being provided by the VA. Only 108, or 23 percent of the personnel

notified, actually took the examination (Bell, 20 May 1986).

Table 2-4 provides a breakdown of the NNTPR medical examination programs.

24
Table 2-4. NNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs

(Bell, 20 May 1986).

1. Over-25-rem Program Number

Total 3

Notifications sent

Replies received

Number deceased

Number desiring examinations

Number not desiring examinations

Number not making preference clear

Examinations administered

3

2

1

0

0

2

0

2. Officer Volunteer Observer Program

Total 5

Notifications sent

Replies received

Number deceased

Number desiring examinations

Number not desiring examinations

Examinations administered

5

5

0

2

3

2

3. Over-5-rem Program

*

Total 503

Notifications sent 456

Replies received 285

Number deceased 58

Number desiring examinations 148

Number not desiring examinations 95

Examinations administered 106

Investigations for VA Claims. The NNTPR provided information on participation and dose data

to the VA for 1,045 claims filed for compensation benefits by Navy personnel who believed their

diseases or disabilities were caused by their exposure to ionizing radiation from U.S. atmospheric

nuclear weapons testing (Bell, 20 May 1986).

*The memorandum of 20 May 1986 gives the number ofreplies received as 285, but it

accounts for only 243, indicating that 148 Navy personnel replied who desired exmainations and

95 replied who did not desire examinations.

25
In compiling data for the VA, the NNTPR developed over 360 unit histories, usually from

one to three pages long, for the ships, squadrons, and staffs associated with the oceanic

atmospheric nuclear tests. These histories provided unit locations and activities during the test

series, unit dosimetry data, and, when available, the radiological conditions present (Bell, May

1986).

Correspondence Summary. In fulfilling its obligations, the NNTPR processed considerable

amounts of correspondence. Table 2-5 summarizes both the type and volume of correspondence

for selected years (Bell, May 1986):

Table 2-5. NNTPR outgoing correspondence totals.

Type 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986

Personal Inquiry 11 1,226 217 218 107 47

VA Request 14 325 132 212 223 62

Congressional 8 46 42 17 20 8

Request from Family 1 25 13 9 18 1

Request from Employer 0 12 8 2 2 0

Miscellaneous 291 58 262 227 164 30

Memorandum for the

Record

33 114 58 59 16 1

FOIA 0 2 35 16 24 2

Attorney's Request 0 13 7 6 4 2

Special Medical Letter 0 586 0 0 0 0

Over-5-rem Letter 0 163 13 0 4 0

Medical Records Request 0 483 21 0 2 2

Form Letter 0 552 89 124 135 127

Final File "A" Letter 0 0 5,170 6,632 182 170

Non-Participant Letter 0 0 523 271 9 4

Total 358 3,605 6,590 7,793 910 456

2.3 ARMY NTPR EFFORTS.

The Army NTPR (ANTPR) had 50,989 participants, the second largest group, about 25

percent of the total. Of these, about 77 percent took part in continental United States (CONUS)

tests and 23 percent in the Pacific tests.

26
The ANTPR presented these figures, along with others, in its History of the Army Nuclear

Test Personnel Review (1978-1987). the only such summary developed by an NTPR Service team

(Department of the Army, 24 September 1987). Unless otherwise documented, the following

sections are drawn from this text.

2.3.1 Objectives.

In 1978, the ANTPR began pursuing its assigned tasks by researching Army documents,

developing a data base, and corresponding with individual participants (Johnson, 25 June 1985).

It concentrated first on personnel identification and records retrieval for the operations involving

Desert Rock exercises performed to train troops in tactics for possible use on a nuclear battlefield.

The operations incorporating these exercises were BUSTER-JANGLE (1951),

TUMBLER-SNAPPER (1952), UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE (1953), TEAPOT (1955), PLUMBBOB

(1957), and DOMINIC II (1962). This particular focus was selected because of the continuing

CDC epidemiological investigation of Shot SMOKY, which was one of the PLUMBBOB tests,

and because of Congressional requests for information. After completing this phase of the

research, the ANTPR team turned its attention to Army participants in the oceanic series of

atmospheric nuclear tests.

ANTPR researched available Service and medical records for participants and reviewed

the morning reports of Army units. The effort was challenging because of inadequate

documentation of Army personnel participation:

• The 1973 fire at NPRC had destroyed about 85 percent of the Army personnel

records for veterans who had left the Service from 1912 to 1959;

• About 50 percent of the Army participants had been assigned to provisional Desert

Rock units which did not require permanent recordkeeping; and

• The extant records did not provide sufficient information on personnel activities

and locations at the test sites.

To gain the needed information, ANTPR researchers had to check virtually every morning report

for every unit identified as having participated in or having sent members to participate in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. The sheer volume of morning reports made the task extremely

time-consuming.

The ANTPR approach, like that of the other NTPR teams, evolved in response to DNA

directives, along with Congressional and public needs. By August 1979, the ANTPR team had

shifted its primary emphasis from research on individuals to responses to specific groups, such

as the Over-25-rem and Over-5-rem participants, officer volunteer observers, and VA claimants.

Section 2.3.3 presents statistics on these efforts.

In late 1982, the ANTPR data entry staff decreased in number, as personnel and financial

resources were redirected to handle new priorities within the Army, such as the Agent Orange

Task Force. At about the same time, programming and data entry errors created problems in the

ANTPR computer system. In early 1983, the ANTPR Program Manager sent a memorandum to

the DNA NTPR Program Manager indicating that these problems, along with the decrease in staff,

27
had resulted in considerable curtailment of data entry within the past quarter. DNA and the Army

worked together in the latter half of 1983 to identify the difficulties and prescribe solutions.

In a meeting with DNA on 31 January 1984, the Army agreed to provide funds to contract

for technical support, especially for purifying the ANTPR data base. The contract was awarded

in September 1984, and work commenced immediately toward accomplishment of the five major

ANTPR tasks, beginning with the data base purification. Subsequent tasks involved identifying

personnel and units, determining radiation exposure and entering information into the ANTPR

data base, notifying test participants of their exposure, and responding to requests for information

from veterans, the VA, and Congress. With the assistance of its contractor, the ANTPR's

progress toward its objectives was much more rapid.

2.3.2 Resources.

The ANTPR had five chief administrators: Colonel Victor J. Hugo, February 1978 to

September 1978; Colonel David P. Lucke, September 1978 to October 1979; Lieutenant Colonel

Darwin M. Way, 17 October 1979 to June 1980; Mr. Waldemar A. Anderson, June 1980 to

March 1981; and Mr. Richard S. Christian, March 1981 to September 1987.

As of 24 September 1987, the ANTPR had used 265 person years and spent over

$5,600,000. Table 2-6 and 2-7 itemize these expenditures on an annual basis. As shown in the

table on costs, the expenditures for such items as contracts, services, and equipment increased in

fiscal year 1984, when the ANTPR engaged a contractor to purify its data base and provide other

technical support (Department of the Army, 24 September 1987).

Table 2-6. ANTPR personnel effort.*

(in person years)*

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87

10 41 41 37 37 33 15 17 17 17

* Some of the numbers shown differ from the ones provided in the 1986 edition of this

history. They are based on a later Department of the Army report (dated 24 September

1987).

Table 2-7. ANTPR costs.*

(in thousands of dollars)

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87

Separately

identifiable

costs**

23 25 36 40 160 110 720 730 730 730

Salaries and

benefits***

168 448 552 507 50 60 66 150 150 150

Total 191 473 588 547 210 170 786 880 880 880

* Some of the numbers shown differ from the ones provided in the 1986 edition of this history.

They are based on a later Department of the Army report (dated 24 September 1987).

** Contracts, services, travel, materials, equipment rental, etc. less items in***.

*** Uniformed military and civil service personnel only.

28
2.3.3 Results.

The numbers given below were current as of 24 September 1987.

Response to File A Personnel. By September 1987, when ANTPR was disestablished and its work

taken over by the consolidated effort at DNA, the team had sent final letters to 11,494 participants

after work was completed on dose information and reconstruction (Department of the Army, 24

September 1987).

Notification of VA Medical Examination Programs. Among the NTPR teams, ANTPR had the

largest number of individuals, a total of 24, in the Volunteer Observer Program. Table 2-8 below

shows statistics ofthis program, as well as the Over-25-rem and Over-5-rem Programs. The ANTPR

notified all personnel in these programs who had identifiable addresses.

Table 2-8. ANTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs.

1. Over-25-rem-Program Number

(Samiljan, 8 July 1987)

Total 4

Notifications sent 4

Replies received 2

Number deceased 1

Number desiring examinations 1

Number not desiring examinations 1

Examinations administered 1

2. Volunteer Observer Program

(Samiljan, 8 July 1987)

Total 24

Notifications sent 24

Replies received 11

Number deceased 2

Number desiring examinations 5

Number not desiring examinations 6

Examinations administered 1

3. Over-5-rem-Program

(Nelson, 5 October 1987)

Total 558

29
Table 2-8. ANTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs. (Cont'd)

Personnel notified 301

Desiring physicals 90

Not desiring physicals 54

No responses 157

Personnel not notified 257

Insufficient information*

(no address/no SSN) 153

Addresses (known) 1

SSN (no addresses)* 38

Deceased 65

* Includes those returned for incorrect/unknown address.

Investigations for VA Claims. The ANTPR provided participation, unit histories, and dose data for

about 1,200 VA inquiries received concerning Army veterans (Samiljan, 8 July 1987). Because of

the inadequate documentation of Army personnel participation as discussed earlier, ANTPR

researchers had to scrutinize individual unit morning reports and secondary sources to verify

claimants' participation in the atmospheric nuclear tests.

2.4 AIR FORCE NTPR EFFORTS.

The Air Force NTPR (AFNTPR) team was responsible for about 25,000 participants, which

is approximately 12 percent ofthe total number of U.S. nuclear test participants. It was tasked with

assembling participant and dose information for its personnel in those series after 1947, when the

Air Force was established as a separate military service. The Army Air Force personnel who took

part in the two preceding operations, TRINITY (1945) and CROSSROADS (1946), were the

responsibility ofthe ANTPR. The exception involved Army Air Force participants who later entered

the Air Force and took part in subsequent atmospheric nuclear test series. DNA assigned

responsibility to AFNTPR for compiling Army and Air Force records on these personnel in response

to claims filed with the VA (Johnson, 23 May 1985).

2.4.1 Resources.

The AFNTPR Team Chief, part ofthe Air Force Surgeon General's office, oversaw the effort,

which was conducted at the Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL), Brooks

Air Force Base (AFB), Texas. OEHL had a radiation services division and was a logical

organization for involvement.

AFNTPR was officially established in March 1979. During 1978, when a basis was being

laid for the AFNTPR, Lieutenant Colonel George S. Kush, USAF, attended NTPR meetings. The

first AFNTPR Team Chief was Colonel Paul F. Fallon, who held the position from March 1979 to

February 1984. His successor was Colonel William D. Gibbons, February 1984 to June 1988. The

following Project Officers managed the AFNTPR office at OEHL: Captain John L. Ricci,

September 1978 to September 1979; Captain Robert J. Berger, September 1979 to May 1981;

30
Captain David S. Pitts, May 1981 to June 1985; Mr. John A. Herman, June 1985 to January

1986; and Mr. William D. Holland, January 1986 to June 1988.

As of 1 May 1986, the team chiefs and project officers had overseen a total AFNTPR

expenditure of 175 person years and $3,924,000. The numbers were largest in the early 1980s,

as with the other Service teams. Tables 2-9 and 2-10 indicate the annual expenditures (Gibbons,

30 May 1986; Pitts, 23 May 1985):

Table 2-9. AFNTPR personnel effort,

(in person years)*

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86

0.18 7.65 33.7 44.30 38.30 25.5 16.0 7.0 2.0

* Does not include Air Staff time.

Table 2-10. AFNTPR costs,

(in thousands of dollars)

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86

Separately identifiable

costs**

1.5 148 525 722 590 486 7 2.5 1.5

Salaries and benefits*** 4.1 100 187 285 315 231 236 58 24

Total 5.6 248 712 1007 905 717 243 60.5 25.5

** Contracts, services, travel, materials, equipment rental, etc., less items in ***.

*** Uniformed military and civil service personnel, but does not include salaries for Air Staff.

Inquiries at the Air Force Office of the Surgeon General, Boiling AFB, Washington, D.C., and

at Brooks AFB, did not reveal records documenting the AFNTPR personnel effort or costs after

1 October 1986.

2.4.2 Results.

By 1985, the AFNTPR believed it had successfully completed most of its tasks. Team

project officers attributed much of the success to a solid research effort, conducted at such sites

as Brooks AFB, Kirtland AFB, Maxwell AFB, Randolph AFB, Scott AFB, Tinker AFB, LANL,

and REECo (Johnson, 23 May 1985).

Response to File A Personnel. The AFNTPR finished sending letters to participants who called

DNA on the toll-free number. As of 1 May 1986, the team had completed 8,047 File A cases,

which comprised 100 percent of the then known Air Force cases (Gibbons, 30 May 1986).

31
The AFNTPR was responsible for a lesser number of File A personnel than the NNTPR

and the ANTPR. The task for the AFNTPR was compounded, however, because many Air Force

participants attended more than one series and thus required comparatively more research.

Moreover, some Air Force personnel were crewmembers aboard aircraft that staged from

air bases outside the immediate area of NTS and returned to those bases after participation without

landing near NTS. These men, numbering perhaps several hundred, have proved very difficult

to identify.

Assignment of Doses. As of 1 May 1986, compilation of dose information for then-known Air

Force test participants neared completion. The AFNTPR had identified 23,403 of the estimated

205,660 total participants (Gibbons, 30 May 1986). This data base became an integral part of the

Air Force Master Radiation History Repository at OEHL.

Notification of VA Medical Examination Programs. The Air Force had 32 individuals in the

Over-25-rem Program, the largest number of participants for this program among the NTPR

teams. Twenty-five Air Force participants were stationed on Rongerik Island where an

unexpected high level of fallout from Shot BRAVO of Operation CASTLE (1954) occurred. (See

Section 6.10.)

Cloud-sampling pilots and crews often received higher doses than did other test participants

because their missions required them to fly near and through the clouds resulting from the nuclear

detonations. The cloud-sampling teams were commonly authorized special exposure limits so they

could accomplish their assigned tasks. As noted in Section 6, these limits ranged from 3.9 rem

at such series as BUSTER-JANGLE, TUMBLER-SNAPPER, IVY, UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, and

TEAPOT, among others, to 10 rem at Operation HARDTACK II and 20 rem at Operation

DOMINIC I.

Table 2-11 presents statistics on the Volunteer Observer Program, the Over-25-rem

Program, and the Over-5-rem Program. The AFNTPR notified all personnel in these categories

that had identifiable addresses.

Table 2-11. AFNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs.

1. Over-25-rem Program Number

(AFNTPR, 1 Oct 1986)

Total 32

Notifications sent 30

Replies received 22

Number deceased 2

Number desiring examinations 18

32
Table 2-11. AFNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs. (Cont'd)

Number not desiring examinations 4

Number not making preference clear 8

Examinations administered 11

2. Officer Volunteer Observer Program

(Gibbons, 30 May 1986)

Total 6

Notifications sent 5

Replies received 3

Number deceased 1

Number desiring examinations 0

Number not desiring examinations 3

Examinations administered 0

3. Over-5-rem Program

(AFNTPR, 1 October 1986)

Total 508

Notifications sent 334

Replies received 185

Number deceased 61

Number desiring examinations 138

Number not desiring examinations 47

Examinations administered 53

Investigations for VA and Department of Labor CD6L) Claims. The AFNTPR provided

participation and dose information for 266 VA claims filed by Air Force test participants

(Gibbons, 30 May 1986). It gave the same kinds of data to the DoL for the one DoL claim filed

by a civilian working under contract to the Air Force during nuclear testing (Herman, June 1985).

2.5 MARINE CORPS NTPR EFFORTS.

As of 30 September 1986, the Marine Corps NTPR (MCNTPR) was responsible for an

estimated. 11,100 participants in the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests (Martinez, 1 October

1986). To provide participation and dose information for these personnel, the MCNTPR

developed and pursued a vigorous outreach program, which was one of the most distinctive

characteristics of its efforts. The MCNTPR completed most of its assigned tasks, as noted below.

33
2.5.1 Resources.

From its inception in early 1978 to May 1986, the MCNTPR engaged a total of 26 Marine

Corps personnel, including four project coordinators: Major Rafael Negron, January 1978 to

April 1979; Captain James W. McNabb, May 1979 to June 1982; Major Michael J. Shinabeck,

July 1982 to May 1983; and Major Daniel G. Martinez, May 1983 to April 1987.

As of 1 April 1987, the MCNTPR effort cost approximately 40 person years and

$848,250. The largest expenditures were during 1980-82, as shown in Tables 2-12 and 2-13 the

following tables (Martinez, March 1985; Johnson, 10 July 1986; Gladeck, 16 August 1993):

Table 2-12. MCNTPR effort,

(in person years)

:.:;;.:;:.;:/-:-:-:-,;-v.:::::>:.:.:;;

FY85 ;; FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 ;FY8l' FY87

1.5 4.8 6.8 6.5 6.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.75

Table 2-13. MCNTPR costs,

(in thousands of dollars)*

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 Iffcl! FY84 FY85 FY8£ FY87

22 77 168 160 160 70 50 60 65 16.25

* To 1 April 1987 when MCNTPR was disestablished.

The dollar costs are for salaries and benefits. Specific data are not available for contracts,

services, travel, materials, and equipment rental during FY78 through FY87, although the

expenditures were minimal.

2.5.2 Results.

The personnel effort and dollar costs brought some "positive results," to quote Major

Daniel Martinez, the last MCNTPR Project Coordinator (Johnson, 14 May 1985). This section

discusses accomplishments beginning with an outreach program, which included commentary on

the MCNTPR response to File A personnel.

Outreach Program. One of the specific NTPR tasks, as noted in NTPR fact sheets of the early

and mid-80's, was to "establish personal contact with as many test participants as possible"

(Defense Nuclear Agency, April 1984). The MCNTPR developed an active outreach program,

making this effort its highest priority in 1985 and 1986. The emphasis resulted in a considerable

amount of additional information from participants who had not yet contacted DNA.

34
As of 1 May 1986, the MCNTPR had sent letters with information on participation and

dosimetry data to 3,600 of the 4,500 Marine Corps personnel who used the toll-free DNA

telephone number or wrote to the Agency. The correspondence went to all participants having

identifiable addresses. Because addresses had changed and return addresses were not provided,

325 letters were returned (Martinez, 1 July 1986).

The MCNTPR used several strategies to locate additional personnel. One of the first

involved a computer comparison between known participants in the nuclear tests and retired

Marines. Personnel who had not yet contacted DNA were sent questionnaires filled in with

available information. They were asked to check the incorporated data, complete, and then return

the forms in the stamped and self-addressed envelopes that had been enclosed (Johnson, 16 May

1985). The last of these questionnaires were mailed in August 1985.

The MCNTPR had good results from the placement of advertisements in periodicals, such

as Leatherneck Magazine and the Marine Corps Gazette, and from letters sent to Marine Corps

associations celebrating reunions. Among the groups contacted were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th,

and 6th Marine Division Associations; the Marine Corps League; and the Woman Marines

Association. The MCNTPR sent 3,000 copies of the circular shown in Figure 2-1 to the 2nd

Marine Division. This circular alone drew 500 responses (Johnson, 16 May 1985). Through the

outreach program, the MCNTPR team, to quote from the letter sent to the 2nd Marine Division

Association, collected "useful information that normally cannot be obtained from service records."

Assignment of Doses. As of 30 September 1986, the MCNTPR verified the participation of

11,067 of the estimated 11,100 Marine Corps test participants. It had dose information for

10,767, or approximately 97 percent, of these participants (Martinez, 30 September 1986).

Notification of VA Medical Examination Programs. The MCNTPR and the Field Command

NTPR (FCNTPR) (see Section 2.6) were the only NTPR teams having no personnel in the

Over-25-rem Program. Six Marine Corps personnel were in the Officer Volunteer Observer

Program and 29 in the Over-5-rem Program, as shown in Table 2-14. The MCNTPR notified

all of the participants, 27, who had identifiable addresses (Martinez, 30 September 1986).

Table 2-14. MCNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs.

1. Officer Volunteer Observer Program Number

Total 6

Notifications sent 6

Replies received 6

Number deceased 0

Number desiring examination 4

Number not desiring examinations 1

Number undecided or unspecified 1

Examinations administered 3

35
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

May 1984

Second Marine Division Association Members

Dear Fellow Marine:

Please excuse the informality of this letter, but this is the best way for me to get in touch with

you.

Since 1978, the Marine Corps Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) has been trying to identify

every Marine who participated in at least one nuclear weapon event. The purpose of the NTPR

is to compile data on Marines who could have been exposed to weapon-induced ionizing radiation.

NTPR data will be studied in an effort to elucidate the health effects of exposure to low-level

ionizing radiation. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) is the NTPR executive agency for the

Department of Defense.

Marines of the Second Marine Division have taken an active role in America's use and

development of nuclear weapons. Nagasaki, Japan, was destroyed by a nuclear weapon on August

9, 1945, and Second Division Marines occupied that area some six weeks later. Between 1945

and 1962, the United States conducted 235 atmospheric nuclear weapon detonations and tests in

which many Second Division Marines participated.

If you participated in the post World War II occupation of Nagasaki or in at least one nuclear

weapon test, I urge you to call DNA's toll-free NTPR telephone number. Call 800-336-3068 to

provide some basic information about your role in nuclear weapon-related events. If you know

other Marines whom we might be interested in hearing from, please pass this information on to

them.

It has been our experience that Marines are able to provide for the NTPR much useful information

that normally cannot be obtained from service records. To contact the Marine Corps NTPR, write

to Commandant of the Corps (Code MMRB-60), Washington, D.C. 20380. If you already have

contacted DNA, please keep your mailing address current by calling the toll-free number.

Best wishes to you, and I hope that your reunion will be a great success.

Sincerely,

D. G. MARTINEZ

Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Project Coordinator

Marine Corps Nuclear Test Personnel Review

By direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps

Figure 2-1. Letter sent to the Second Marine Division Association as part of the MCNTPR

Outreach Program.

36
Table 2-14. MCNTPR personnel eligible for medical examination programs. (Cont'd)

2. Over-5-rem Program Number

Total 29

Notifications sent 21

Replies received 13

Number deceased 3

Number desiring examinations 11

Number not desiring examinations 1

Number undecided or unspecified 1

Examinations administered 4

Investigations for VA Claims. The MCNTPR provided participation and dose information for 217

VA claims filed by Marine Corps personnel (Martinez, 30 September 1986).

2.6 FIELD COMMAND NTPR EFFORTS.

On 1 May 1951, the organization that became Field Command, DNA, was established as

part of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP). AFSWP was redesignated the

Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) in 1959 and then DNA in 1971. On 7 June 1978, DNA

sent a tasking letter to Field Command DNA requiring it to function generally "in the same

manner as the four military services to provide an input to the NTPR covering the personnel of

AFSWP and their contractors and laboratories for all atmospheric tests" (Isengard, 6 June 1978).

William S. Isengard, the first FCNTPR Project Officer, noted that FCNTPR was starting

"several months downstream" of the other NTPR teams and that the delay was both bad and good.

The disadvantage was that FCNTPR would have "less time" for research on Shot SMOKY and

the other nuclear tests. The advantage was that FCNTPR could learn from the experience of the

other teams (Isengard, 6 June 1978).

Although the initial tasking to FCNTPR seemed straightforward enough, the development

of the NTPR program led the team to cope with the group of nuclear test participants most

difficult to track and quantify. Included were:

1. Civilian employees of DoD organizations at the Secretary of Defense level, such as

AFSWP, and their contractors.

2. Civilian employees of agencies other than DoD and DOE and their contractors.

3. U.S. civilian observers, such as members of Congress and corporation executives,

and

4. Foreign observers, military and civilian.

37
In practice, FCNTPR functioned as a holding area into which unidentified participants

were put for further screening (Gladeck, 19 August 1993). The team identified about 11,900

personnel as participants (Nelson, 12 June 1989). However, most turned out not to fall within

the scope of the NTPR program because no DoD connection could be established.

2.6.1 Resources.

Field Command recognized the challenge of the NTPR tasking and acknowledged that

"some of our best people" would be required. The personnel needed would include at least two

researchers and a computer systems analyst/programmer (Isengard, 8 June 1978). From its

inception in 1979, the FCNTPR team usually consisted of three persons, military and civilian.

The following Project Officers coordinated the team: Mr. William S. Isengard, 1978; Major

James E. Thomas and Major David E. Hanson, 1979; Captain Mark L. Davis, 1980 to August

1982; Joe A. Stinson, August 1982 to February 1988. As of 1 May 1986, the FCNTPR effort

had cost 24 person years and $240,000 (Stinson, 3 March 1986; Johnson, June 1986). The annual

FCNTPR budget, excluding military pay, was about $29,000 and included salaries and benefits

for civilian personnel, transportation, equipment, supplies and materials, and contracted services

(Johnson, 11 July 1985). FCNTPR was disestablished on 2 February 1988. Exact figures for

total expenditures and person years during the team's existence are not available, but estimates

of $288,000 and 28 person years seem reasonable based on the record up to May 1986.

2.6.2 Results.

Compared to the other NTPR teams, FCNTPR had a greater challenge identifying its

personnel, their participation, and their doses. The FCNTPR lacked good source documents.

Unlike their counterparts on the other teams, FCNTPR researchers were unable to use ship logs,

morning reports, or the records generated by military retirement pay centers. Moreover, they

experienced difficulties finding information on certain DoD contracting organizations, many of

which no longer existed. To assist research on these organizations, Major Stinson developed and

published a reference book listing the contracting organizations that had been identified (Stinson,

May 1986).

Response to File A Personnel. The FCNTPR contacted over 500 participants who used the DNA

toll-free lines. Many of these participants, however, were transferred to the other NTPR teams.

As of 1 May 1986, the FCNTPR File A consisted of 297 participants who had been identified as

employees of DoD joint-service organizations and their contractor. The team sent final letters on

participation and dose to 119 of these personnel for whom it had addresses. FCNTPR researchers

also identified approximately 500 Canadian observers of the CONUS tests and believed there may

have been as many as 500 more. FCNTPR received permission from DNA to contact the

Canadian government concerning these personnel.

38
Notification of VA Medical Examination Programs. The FCNTPR obtained dose information,

primarily from film badges, for almost all of its personnel. Unlike most of the other NTPR

teams, it had no participants in the Volunteer Observer Program or Over-25-rem Program. The

team had only one participant in the over-5-rem program. Researchers did not succeed in finding

a current address for this individual.

Investigations for Department of Labor Claims. None of the Field Command personnel had filed

a claim with the DoL (Johnson, 11 July 1985).

39
SECTION 3

THE CONSOLIDATED NTPR PROGRAM UNDER DNA

From its beginning in 1978, NTPR made considerable progress in collecting, organizing,

and disseminating information on veterans who participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing

and the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, following World War II. By 1986,

however, shortcomings of the five-team approach became apparent. Moreover, it was believed

that activity in the program would decrease, and enter a maintenance phase. DNA's leadership

decided that these problems called for phasing out the Service teams and consolidating the work

under DNA's direct control.

3.1 REASONS FOR CONSOLIDATION.

In a memorandum dated 29 September 1986, distributed to each of the Service secretaries,

Lieutenant General John L. Pickett, USAF, Director, DNA, proposed the consolidation of all

NTPR functions under DNA (Pickett, 29 September 1989). He pointed out that NTPR had

accomplished almost all of the original goals set forth in February 1978 by Vice Admiral R. R.

Monroe, USN, then Director, DNA (Monroe, 13 February 1978). The program's major

accomplishments included:

Publishing a 41-volume history of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests from 1945

to 1962;

Identifying 198,000 of the approximately 200,000 participants;

Compiling dose information for 190,000 participants;

Sponsoring NAS studies; and

Corresponding with over 50,000 veterans to provide them with relevant

information.

General Pickett explained that the original research assignment was no longer appropriate.

Original planning had called for each NTPR Service team to complete its research and shift to a

maintenance program. This, however, would lead to duplication of effort among the teams and

unnecessary use of resources in a time of reduced funding.

The proposed reorganization would save DoD approximately $900,000 and open up nine

personnel slots over the next four fiscal years. To fund the consolidated operations at first, each

Service would transfer money to DNA in proportion to the number of that Service's personnel

involved in atmospheric nuclear testing. After fiscal year 1990, DNA would assume all NTPR

financial burdens. General Pickett recommended that because both the Air Force and Navy had

completed their research and moved into a maintenance phase; their NTPR work would be

consolidated with DNA in fiscal year 1987. ANTPR still had one year left in its research phase,

so General Pickett suggested that the Army delay transferring functions until fiscal year 1988 or

when the research was complete. After fiscal year 1987, DNA would provide all the manpower

needed for the Army portion of NTPR. FCDNA and MCNTPR were not mentioned in General

Pickett's memorandum.

40
3.2 MECHANICS OF CONSOLIDATION.

The Services agreed to consolidation and began turning over their functions and records

to DNA. MCNTPR and NNTPR closed in April 1987 and ANTPR in September 1987.

FCNTPR closed in February 1988, and AFNTPR closed in June of that year (JAYCOR, no date).

Consolidation required considerable work. For example, records filling 130 boxes were

packed and trucked from AFNTPR headquarters at Brooks AFB, San Antonio, Texas, to the

Washington, D.C., area, to be unpacked and installed in the NTPR facility. Each Service team

had maintained its own computer data base of information on veterans, generally referred to as

File B. Each team's File B was housed on a different model computer and each had similar but

not matching data fields. In mid-1988 after considerable effort, the data bases were merged to

form the NTPR data base.

3.3 NTPR WORK UNDER THE CONSOLIDATED SYSTEM.

Contrary to expectations, the program did not enter a maintenance phase. No major new

tasks arose, but the work pace in established channels was brisk, and much new information was

uncovered and had to be assimilated. Moreover, Congress passed new legislation allowing many

more veterans to make claims for radiation injury.

3.3.1 Work in Established Channels.

By the time consolidation was complete, NTPR work had settled into two major categories:

(1) Responding to mail and telephone inquiries, and (2) research. These are not isolated from

each other. Responding to inquiries often requires research beyond checking a data base or folder

in a filing cabinet.

Despite all the work by program personnel in NTPR's early days, troublesome gaps exist

in the program's information. This is true for both information about the activities of personnel

and units and about individual exposure to radiation. Although some of this information is lost

forever, some can still be retrieved and program personnel are continuing to search for data.

3.3.1.1 Responding to Inquiries. Word of NTPR continues to spread, and veterans who have

not previously contacted the program call or write. Their unverified data is entered in the File

A data base. Then research is conducted to determine whether their participation in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear testing can be verified. Available substantiating data is subsequently entered

in the NTPR data base. Correspondents are then provided with a written response.

41
Claims continue to arrive from the VA. As with File A inquiries, research is conducted

to verify participation and when required, dosimetry data is provided. For many cases that effort

is fairly straightforward, but some require intense dosimetry records research. In a case where

dosimetry has gaps or does not exist, the veteran's dose must be reconstructed, an often laborintensive, time-consuming process.

Less numerous than File A contacts and VA claims are personal letters from veterans who

have already contacted the program, letters from members of Congress seeking information for

constituents, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. File A and VA responses often

follow established patterns that help speed the process. Personal and Congressional inquiries and

FOIA requests are very diverse and often require unique research and non-standardized replies.

3.3.1.2 Research. Several categories of research continue.

1. Research required to meet short-term requirements.

For example, a veteran contacting NTPR for the first time may have belonged to

a unit not previously identified as having members that participated in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear testing. In these cases, recorded dosimetry is often lacking.

Therefore, considerable effort is often required to verify the veteran's participation

and to assess radiation exposure.

2. Research required to improve the dosimetry data base.

Originally each NTPR Service team was responsible for collecting and maintaining

dosimetry data for identified participants. Disparities occurred in the way key

terms, such as participant, test site, and operational period, were defined and

applied.

Moreover, each Service team had established its own criteria for:

assigning reconstructed doses,

responding to inquiries,

entering attach and detach dates,

reporting doses,

applying "benefit of the doubt," and

maintaining an audit trail of dose data

With consolidation and the creation of a unified data base, these differences

became apparent. Research, programming, and data entry continue to identify and

resolve these disparities.

In addition, the dosimetry records of several test series pose major research

challenges.

42
For example: During Operation CROSSROADS in 1946, relatively few personnel

were issued film badges, so NNTPR undertook a massive dose reconstruction

effort. As experience with dose reconstructions matured and new data became

available, the dose reconstructions of significant numbers of CROSSROADS

participants required modification.

During Operation GREENHOUSE in 1951, many participants were not badged,

and after the operation, fallout doses were added to some participants' medical

records or to the 5x8 inch cards on which their badge readings were recorded. The

details of the methods used to calculate these fallout doses are unknown. NTPR's

program managers decided to recalculate the fallout doses by the same method used

for other NTPR reconstructions.

The 1954 dosimetry records from Operation CASTLE (1954) are especially hard

to interpret. Badges were generally issued to a representative number of people

and dates of issue and/or return were often not recorded. Also, many gaps exist

in the badging data. CASTLE dosimetry data is therefore undergoing extensive

review and analysis. This CASTLE data reevaluation will take several more years

to complete.

3. Archival Research.

In the early years of NTPR, the Service teams and those writing the series histories

undertook a major effort to locate relevant documents in government archives and

repositories nationwide. Improved understanding of NTPR's requirements and of

the federal record system have resulted in the discovery of promising records not

previously reviewed. Since NTPR consolidation, DNA personnel have often

visited records centers to review these materials. These research trips continue,

as needed.

3.3.2 Impact of Recent Legislation.

On 20 May 1988, Public Law 100-321, "Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act

of 1988," was enacted (see Section 4.2.1). The VA, in its implementing regulations of this law,

defined as participants, not only veterans who had been at test sites during the period of testing,

but also veterans who:

Had been at a test site or test staging area and had performed official military

duties in connection with completing test projects or decontaminating test

equipment during a six-month period after the end of a testing period, or

Had served as a member of the garrison or maintenance forces on Enewetak Atoll

for a defined period after Operations GREENHOUSE, REDWING, or

HARDTACK I, or

43
Were assigned duties involving decontamination at Navy shipyards of ships

involved in CROSSROADS.

Additionally, the VA defined the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, as:

...official military duties within 10 miles of the city limits of either

Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan, which were required to perform or

support military occupation functions such as occupation of

territory, control of the population, stabilization of the government,

demilitarization of the Japanese military, rehabilitation of the

infrastructure or deactivation and conversion of war plants or

materials.

Former prisoners of war who were interned within 75 and 150 miles of Hiroshima or

Nagasaki city limits, respectively, or were repatriated through Nagasaki, were also considered

eligible participants by the VA. (Department of Veterans Affairs, 3 March 1989)

As of 30 September 1993, 195,814 Hiroshima and Nagasaki participants had been

identified since February 1989, when research required by PL 100-321 began. The list of

participating units includes over 500 Army company-size units, more than 80 Marine Corps

company-size units, and over 700 vessels. The total for ships includes not only those that

anchored or docked at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also those that passed through the waters

within 10 miles of each city.

Personnel now verified as participants by virtue of service at test sites or staging areas in

the six-month post-operation periods, as members of the Enewetak garrison or maintenance

forces, or at shipyards after CROSSROADS number 14,146.

3.3.3 Resources.

In April 1987, when consolidation began, first-line supervision of the NTPR effort was

already vested in DNA's Radiation Policy Division (RARP). Dr. David L. Auton headed the

effort with Commander R. Thomas Bell, MSC, USN, as NTPR program manager. On 31 August

1988, Commander Bell retired from the Navy, and Carlton T. Chapman became acting program

manager. On 5 October 1988 Captain W. J. Flor, MSC, USN, became program manager. Mr.

D. M. Schaeffer succeeded him on 21 April 1993.

From 1987 through 30 September 1993, RARP oversaw total NTPR expenditures of 506

person years and $28 million. See Tables 1-1 and 1-2.

44
3.3.4 Results.

NTPR's program of aid to veterans consists of File A activities; processing VA, personal,

Congressional and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) correspondence; and doing the research,

including dose reconstruction and data base building, to support the entire effort. Table 3-1

summarizes File A activities from 1 September 1988 to 30 September 1993. (September 1988 is

the first month of the consolidated NTPR effort for which full statistics are available.)

Table 3-1. File A activities.

(Defense Nuclear Agency, no date; JAYCOR 4 September 1991 through 6 October 1993)

Incoming information

Telephone calls 13,869

Letters 1,716

Returned questionnaires 2,671

Action taken

Letters with questionnaires mailed 5,698

Other (previous contact, non-participant) 3,516

Table 3-2 summarizes the processing of other correspondence from 1 September 1988 to

30 September 1993.

Table 3-2. Other correspondence.

(Defense Nuclear Agency, no date; JAYCOR 4 September 1991 through 6 October 1993)

Incoming correspondence

Congressional 294

FOIA 56

VA claims 4,729

Other (includes VA Medical Center, White

House, personal, 5-rem and DOJ)

2,218

Outgoing Correspondence

VA claims 5,126

45
Table 3-2. Other correspondence. (Cont'd)

Outgoing Correspondence

Other (includes Congressional,White

House, FOIA, personal follow-up, 5-rem,

VA Medical Center, and DOJ)

2,823

3.4 PROGRAM TRENDS.

Although figures for the NTPR Program are incomplete for 1988, the level of activity

appears to have been low compared to both earlier and later years. The busiest year since

consolidation was 1989. The pace of activity in the NTPR Veterans' Assistance Program

decreased significantly in 1990 and 1991. Incoming veterans' claims increased slightly in 1992,

but the downward trend continued in incoming File A calls, letters, and returned questionnaires.

However, as of 30 September 1993, the 1993 total for incoming File A calls, letters, and returned

questionnaires was already greater than for all of 1992, while the 1993 total for incoming VA

claims makes it appear that the total for the year will exceed that for 1992 by about 10 percent.

Table 3-3 summarizes calls and correspondence activity from 1989 through 1993.

Table 3-3. Trends in the Veterans' Assistance Program.

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993*

Incoming File A calls, letters

and returned questionnaires

7,391 4,514 2,626 1,446 1,536

Incoming VA claims 1,356 941 686 702 587

Projection based on figures up to 30 September 1993.

46
SECTION 4

OTHER INTERACTIONS IN THE NTPR PROGRAM

DOE and VA interact significantly with the NTPR program. Furthermore, as a result of

recent legislation, DOJ has established the Office of Radiation Programs which also interacts with

NTPR.

4.1 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOE AND THE NTPR PROGRAM.

DOE, through its contractor, REECo, maintains the official master file of dose records for

nuclear weapons testing from 1945 to the present. A subset of those data for the period of U.S.

atmospheric nuclear testing from 1945 to 1962 was the basis from which the NTPR master table

was developed. NTPR dosimetry research and dose reconstructions are added to the master file

as they become available. DOE/NV also has key responsibilities for the Coordination and

Information Center (CIC). A public archives housed in Las Vegas, Nevada, CIC contains

unclassified and declassified historical documentation relevant to U.S. atmospheric nuclear

weapons testing.

4.1.1 The Master File of Dose Records.

REECo was a prime support contractor of the DOE (originally the AEC) throughout most

of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. It supports DoD and the military Services

through agreements between DOE and DoD (Reynolds Electrical Engineering Co., Inc., no date).

In 1943, REECo was selected to construct electrical facilities at Los Alamos, New Mexico,

the site where the atomic bomb was developed. The company began construction at the NTS for

the AEC in December 1950. In July 1955, the company assumed responsibility for radiological

safety services at the test site. It maintained this responsibility throughout the remaining period

of U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing (Reynolds Electrical Engineering Co., Inc., no date).

As early as 1957, REECo began receiving requests for dosimetry information, and it

started collecting all records indicating personnel exposures to ionizing radiation during the U.S.

atmospheric nuclear tests. This quickly developed into a major effort, resulting in a substantial

number of records concerning individual film badge issues, accumulations of badges for an

individual for a given series, contemporaneous summations of the badge data, some of the badges

themselves, and a collection of other documents pertinent to personnel dosimetry.

In 1966, DNA funded REECo to automate the information on radiation doses. From 1967

to 1969, five keypunch operators transferred approximately 400,000 records to 80-column

punched cards, organized by continental and oceanic nuclear testing, by year. Of these records,

more than 232,000 were for the U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing period. By 1971, the records

had been transferred to 35-millimeter microfilm, and by 1974 to 16-millimeter microfilm cassettes

and microfiche. In addition, REECo microfilmed 400 boxes of source documents for the

dosimetry records. These documents, like the dose records, were organized chronologically,

47
according to continental and oceanic nuclear test series, and were placed on 16-millimeter

microfilm cassettes. In 1978, DOE and DNA began funding REECo for a dosimetry project to

establish a database of all U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing records. The total REECo database

now comprises about 5.14 million dose records, including those from underground nuclear tests.

Of these, 1,422,394 are dose records for DoD and AEC participants in U.S. atmospheric nuclear

testing (Johnson, 9-10 July 1985; Reynolds Electrical Engineering Co., Inc., 23 November 1992).

To check the accuracy of the dose data and complete participants' radiation exposure

history, the NTPR program conducted:

• Research into the historical documentation of numerous individual shots and test

series;

• Verifications of radiation dose records obtained from 7,900 medical records of

Navy personnel;

• Dose reconstructions for participants in several shots and series, including Shot

SMOKY of the 1957 Operation PLUMBBOB; and

• Sample selection of film badge readings for members of units that maneuvered in

proximity to each other and thus should have received comparable exposures.

The NTPR program has always been supported by the REECo dose data. REECo has

provided dose data and accompanying source documents on request to U.S. government

organizations and individuals. The DOE managers of the dosimetry research project have been

John D. Moroney, 1978-1980, and Michael A. Marelli, 1980 to the present. REECo's efforts

were directed primarily by W. Jay Brady until his retirement in August 1991, when C. Thomas

Bastian assumed those duties.

4.1.2 The Coordination and Information Center (CIC).

In March 1979, DOE established the CIC, which is a public archive for unclassified

documents relating to U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing and offsite fallout. Administered

by the DOE Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, CIC is operated by REECo.

CIC began document collection in the fall of 1979. Since then, CIC staff have indexed

about 260,000 documents. Some of them were originally classified. The classified documents

were declassified or sanitized; all are now unclassified. Collection activities continue, and it is

anticipated the CIC will ultimately contain about 390,000 documents (Department of Energy, 4

March 1991; Gladeck, 2 September 1993).

DOE is responsible for data collection. One of its contractors, History Associates

Incorporated (HAI), is collecting pertinent information under the direction of the Historian's

Office, DOE Headquarters. The effort initially focused on sources concerned with offsite

radioactive fallout from U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing at the NTS. It was later

broadened to include documents relevant to onsite fallout, oceanic nuclear testing and military

participation.

48
HAI has reviewed and sent to CIC selections from some major collections, including

materials from DOE Headquarters and LANL. The collection at DOE Headquarters provided

minutes from meetings ofthe AEC, the General Advisory Committee established by AEC to advise

on the testing, and the AEC/Military Liaison Committee, as well as staff papers and records ofthe

Division of Military Application and the Division ofBiology and Medicine. The LANL archives

made documents available concerning the Test Organization, which was responsible for conducting

a number ofthe atmospheric nuclear test series; scientific studies performed as part ofthe tests; and

fallout resulting from the detonations. In addition, some significant collections were located at such

sites as the Navy Bureau of Ships, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, and the Oak Ridge

Center for Atomic Research (Johnson, 29 May 1985).

CIC is a valuable public resource on U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. A

substantial number of the documents have been selected by professional historians according to

established screening criteria, some ofwhich are highlighted in Figure 4-1. These researchers have

identified the materials by location, collection, and folder title. Such identifiers make it possible to

trace the documentation to its original source (Johnson, 29 May 1985; Department of Energy, May

1985).

Appendix D provides further information on the scope ofthe CIC collection and on facility

policies and procedures.

4.2 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VA AND THE NTPR PROGRAM.

On 15 June 1979, Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, USN, DNA Director, and Dorothy L.

Starbuck, ChiefBenefits Director at VA, signed a "Memorandum ofUnderstanding on behalf ofthe

Department ofDefense and the Veterans Administration" (later the Department ofVeterans Affairs).

The understanding was "to formalize and improve existing procedures to ensure the most complete

investigation of veterans' ionizing radiation claims." DoD and VA representatives had cooperated

closely regarding these claims during the preceding year, but thought they were "in a position to do

more, particularly in cases for which no recorded radiation dosage is available." As stated in the

document, VA would "determine the critical elements ofinformation necessary to support each case"

and DoD would "thoroughly research each case to develop as much as possible the information

needed" (Monroe and Starbuck, 15 June 1979). This general procedure has remained intact, despite

the fact that the memorandum was subsequently superseded by various pieces of legislation.

Through its Service teams, the NTPR program gave the VA information useful for its determination

of eligibility for medical care, compensation programs, and service connected benefits (Johnson, 25

July 1985). The same sort of information has been provided since consolidation.

49
DOE SCREENING CRITERIA FOR DOCUMENT COLLECTION (6)

GENERAL CRITERIA

All pertinent policy, program, correspondence, and public relations documents ofthe Atomic Energy

Commission and other Government agencies and organizations relating to 1) radiological fallout

onsite and offsite from atmospheric and underground nuclear testing between 1945 and 1972 and

the technology of predicting and measuring that fallout; 2) the biological and environmental effects

of radiation; 3) the organizational structure and responsibilities, planning, and conduct of nuclear

testing; 4) the development of radiation safety standards, and 5) safety issues and operations in

nuclear testing.

SELECTED SPECIFIC CRITERIA

• All pertinent documents relating to specific military or civilian personnel at the

Nevada or Pacific Test Sites, including units, locations, assignments during

atmospheric testing, any radiation dosage received, organization responsibilities, job

position descriptions, delegations of authority, and test series histories as they relate

to test organization.

• All pertinent documents relating to both on-site and off-site fallout, including

atmospheric nuclear test exposure or dose predictions, exposure/dose data, and

monitoring policy, technology, instrumentation, training, personnel and field team

notes.

• All pertinent documents relating to atmospheric nuclear test safety, the development

of radiation safety standards, and reports of and requirements for decontamination

and evacuation either offsite or onsite.

• All pertinent "after action" reports concerning atmospheric nuclear tests.

• All aerial and ground monitoring records, including air sampling, air crew, or cloud

tracking.

• All pertinent documents relating to cleanup activities, including efforts to

decontaminate tracking aircraft and ships.

Figure 4-1. Selected DOE screening criteria for CIC document collection.

50
4.2.1 VA Service-Connected Disability Program.

Public Law 98-542, enacted 24 October 1984 as the "Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation

Exposure Compensation Standards Act," required the VA to conduct rulemaking regarding its

guidelines for the adjudication of compensation claims. The VA procedures formalized in

response to this act were published in the Federal Register on 26 August 1985 and became

effective on 25 September 1985. Amendments were published in the Federal Register on 18

October 1989 and 26 March 1993. According to these procedures, the VA Chief of Benefits

Director reviews claims based on U.S. atmospheric nuclear test participation only if the following

criteria are met: (1) the veteran was exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of participation in

U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing or the postwar occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki,

Japan; (2) the veteran subsequently developed one of several specified illnesses; and (3) the illness

became manifest during the specified time (Department of Veterans Affairs, 26 August 1985;

Department of Veterans Affairs, 18 October 1989; Department of Veterans Affairs, 26 March

1993).

Public Law 98-542 also mentioned DNA specifically for the first time, thereby formally

bringing the Agency into the VA claims process. The law directed the Secretary of Defense to

promulgate regulations for the reporting of radiation dose estimates used by the VA in its

adjudication of claims. On 21 October 1985, as executive agency for the DoD NTPR program,

DNA published its final rules, establishing minimum standards for reporting nuclear radiation

doses for DoD participants in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test program (Defense Nuclear

Agency, 21 October 1985).

In reviewing a claim brought under Public Law 98-542, the VA Chief Benefits Director

considers such factors as the most probable dose, the relative sensitivity of the involved tissue to

induction of the specified condition by ionizing radiation, the veteran's gender and pertinent

family history, the veteran's age at time of exposure, the time elapsed between exposure and onset

of the disease, and possible contributions to the disease made by exposures to radiation or other

carcinogens that were not Service connected. The Chief Benefits Director may request an

advisory medical opinion from the VA Chief Medical Director or from an outside consultant

selected according to the provisions of its final rules. The Chief Benefits Director then submits

his decision on the claim to the Regional Office of jurisdiction, which makes the final

determination (Department of Veterans Affairs, 26 August 1985).

Under Public Law 100-321, "Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988,"

enacted 20 May 1988, no dose determination is required for veterans with one of the diseases

specified in the law. A connection between participation in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing and

the disease is presumed by the statute. Therefore, the veteran's disease, its time of manifestation,

and documentation of participation in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing are the relevant issues

(Department of Veterans Affairs, 21 June 1989). Except for leukemia, the illnesses identified in

the law had to be manifested within 40 years beginning on the last date on which the veteran

participated in a radiation-risk activity; the presumptive period for leukemia was 30 years

(Department of Veterans Affairs, 21 June 1989). The VA published its implementing regulations

for Public Law 100-321 on 21 June 1989 in the Federal Register.

51
Public Law 102-86, "Veterans' Benefits Program Improvement Act of 1991," enacted 14

August 1991, amended Public Law 100-321 by making the presumptive period for all illnesses

listed 40 years. It also expanded coverage of Public Law 100-321 to members of the Reserves

and National Guard who participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing.

Public Law 102-578, "Veterans' Radiation Exposure Amendments of 1992," enacted

30 October 1992, further amended Public Law 100-321 by entirely eliminating the 40-year

presumptive period and by adding salivary gland and urinary tract cancers to the list of illnesses.

Public Law 102-578 also amended Public Law 98-542 by requiring the identification and review

of other possible radiation-risk activities performed by military personnel prior to 1970 and to

review scientific evidence on whether bronchio-alveolar cancer was caused by ionizing radiation.

The diseases covered by Public Laws 98-542, 100-321, 102-86, and 102-578 are listed in

Table 4-1. Also shown in the table are the illnesses covered under Public Laws 101-426 and 101-

510 (see Section 4.3).

If a veteran or eligible family member believes a veteran's disease or disability resulted

from radiation exposure incurred during U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing or the

Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation, they may file for benefits with the nearest VA Regional Office.

The VA then requests DNA verify a veteran's participation and determine the radiation dose

(when applicable). NTPR personnel research all claims from the VA that have as a basis

participation in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests or the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Up to mid-1986, the Service teams had provided VA with information for 2,302 claims.

Section 2 gives these statistics for each Service team. From January 1988, when consolidation

was in progress, through September 1993, NTPR responded to 5,431 VA claims (Defense Nuclear

Agency, no date; JAYCOR, 4 September 1991 through 6 October 1993). Claims statistics for the

period from mid-1986 to January 1988 are not available.

On 18 November 1988, Public Law 100-687, "Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988,"

was enacted. The law established a new Court of Veterans' Appeals for the review of claims

denied by the VA Board of Veterans' Appeals. This law has had minimal impact on the NTPR

program.

4.2.2 VA Medical Examinations and Health Care Services.

Since the beginning of the NTPR effort, VA has provided, upon request, a complete

physical examination, including all requisite tests, to any veteran exposed to ionizing radiation

during the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests or the Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, occupation.

When the veteran requests the physical, VA writes DNA, which attempts to verify participation

and responds with the research results. The NTPR teams sent special notifications concerning the

availability of these examinations to personnel whose radiation doses exceeded the Federal

guideline of 5 rem per year for whom it had addresses.

52
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53
The "Veterans' Health Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act of 1981," enacted

on 3 November 1981 as Public Law 97-72, authorized the VA to provide hospital and nursing

home care and limited outpatient services to veterans who may have been exposed to ionizing

radiation while in service at a U.S. atmospheric nuclear test or during the Hiroshima/Nagasaki,

Japan, occupation. This care is not, however, available for disorders determined to be the result

of causes other than exposure to ionizing radiation. These exceptions are:

1. Congenital or developmental conditions (conditions the veteran was born with or

which are hereditary);

2. Conditions the veteran had before military service;

3. Conditions resulting from injury;

4. Conditions having a specific and well-established cause, such as tuberculosis and

gout; and

5. Common, well-understood conditions, such as inguinal hernia and acute

appendicitis (Department of Veterans Affairs, no date).

To receive VA health care, a veteran must have been at the site of U.S. atmospheric

nuclear testing or in occupied Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan. The veteran is asked to supply

information to a VA official, who then transmits the data for confirmation to NTPR. The required

information is:

name,

branch of service,

service number,

social security number,

name of test series,

date of test series, and

assigned unit during test series (Smith, May 1985)

A medical history, complete physical examination, and diagnostic studies are done for each

veteran requesting VA medical care under the provisions of Public Law 97-72. The examining

physician is directed to pay particular attention to parts of the body most sensitive to ionizing

radiation: the blood, thyroid, salivary glands, lung, bone marrow, and skin (Smith, May 1985).

4.2.3 Ionizing Radiation Registry.

Public Law 99-576, "Veterans' Benefits Improvement and Health Care Authorization Act

of 1986," signed 28 October 1986, required VA to establish an Ionizing Radiation Registry. It

is to contain the names of veterans who participated in atmospheric nuclear testing or the

occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan and who:

Apply for hospital or nursing home care;

54
File a claim for compensation on the basis of a disability that may be associated with

exposure to ionizing radiation; or

Die and are survived by a spouse, child, or parent who files a claim for dependency

and indemnity compensation on the basis of exposure of the veteran to ionizing

radiation.

DNA has been requested to provide available doses for these veterans and gives the VA

computer tapes ofthe NTPR database upon request.

4.3 NTPR COOPERATION WITH DOJ.

Public Law 101-426, "Radiation Exposure Compensation Act," enacted 15 October 1990,

established the Radiation Exposure Trust Fund and authorizes payments from it to:

1. Individuals who were exposed to radiation and contracted specified cancers and other

diseases because they were in designated affected areas downwind from NTS, and

2. Employees in uranium mines in specified states who were exposed to designated

amounts of radiation and developed lung cancer and non-malignant respiratory

diseases.

Public Law 101-510, "1991 DoD Authorization Act," signed into law 5 November 1990,

expanded coverage to government employees and others who were onsite during U.S. atmospheric

nuclear tests (18). The law required the Attorney General to develop regulations for the submission

and resolution of claims. It directed him to consult with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary

of Energy to establish guidelines for determining what constitutes documentation that an individual

participated onsite during an atmospheric nuclear test and what constitutes participation. On behalf

ofDoD, Captain W. J. Flor, MSC, USN, NTPR Program Manager, advised the DOJ group drafting

the implementing regulations.

Final rules establishing criteria and procedures for dealing with claims allowed by that

legislation were published in the Federal Register on 10 April 1992 (Department ofJustice, 10 April

1992). DOJ created the Office ofRadiation Programs (OoRP) to administer the program. The final

rules require that it forward to DNA for verification claims made by any employee of DoD or its

contractors. DNA began receiving DOJ claims in September 1992. By 30 September 1993, it had

received 221 claims, an average of 17 per month.

4.4 CONTRACTORS.

Throughout the NTPR program, DNA has had contractor support. Basically, this has been

oftwo types: labor-intensive operations and highly technical matters involving detailed research.

Three major contractors have been involved.

55
4.4.1 JAYCOR.

In 1978 JAYCOR was tasked to set up DNA's call-in program and continues to perform that

function. JAYCOR personnel wrote the first two histories of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear test

series. The company also provided assistance to the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard NTPR

eforts. Since the consolidation ofNTPR under DNA, JAYCOR personnel have unified the Service

team databases into the single NTPR database, now also including Hiroshima and Nagasaki

participants; performed most ofthe research required to support the program; and drafted for review

and signature by DNA personnel responses to queries from the VA, veterans, Congress, and other

interested parties. In addition, JAYCOR personnel have monitored Congressional hearings,

provided litigation support, reorganized DNA's library of NTPR documents, and updated this

history.

4.4.2 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).

In 1978, when there was concern over an apparent cluster of leukemia cases among military

personnel at Shot SMOKY of Operation PLUMBBOB (1957), DNA asked SAIC to assess the doses

received by troop units who maneuvered at SMOKY and to compare the findings with attendant film

badge dosimetry. SAIC has been continuously engaged in dose reconstructions for the NTPR from

that time forward. It has produced two-dozen published reports of radiation exposure assessments

covering major troop organizations, which have formed a basis for individualized assessments for

more than 1,300 participants. It has also produced (via a subsidiary, JRB) DoD-oriented historical

reports of most CONUS atmospheric nuclear tests and (with JRB) the original "For the Record."

SAIC's ongoing mission is summarized as follows:

• Evaluate technologies and develop methodologies relevant to ionizing radiation dose

reconstruction,

• Collect and evaluate data relevant to the radiation exposure potential of U.S.

atmospheric nuclear test participants,

• Reconstruct external and internal radiation doses to generic and individual DoD

atmospheric nuclear test participants, and

• Report for open scrutiny the above radiological assessments and respond to official

and public feedback.

In the latter capacity, SAIC has supported the NTPR before organizations including NAS, the

General Accounting Office (GAO), OTA, and the Federal District Court, as well as contributing to

Congressional responses.

4.4.3 GE/Kaman Tempo.

GE/Kaman Tempo, originally part of General Electric and later part of Kaman Sciences

Corporation, produced all ofthe histories ofthe oceanic U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests series except

WIGWAM. During the first part ofthat effort, it had R. F. Cross Associates as a sub-contractor.

Moreover, it operates the DoD Nuclear Weapons Information Analysis Center (DASIAC) at Santa

Barbara, California, a major repository for both classified and unclassified reports and data on

atmospheric nuclear testing. Especially in the early stages of NTPR, before extensive archival

research had been done, DASIAC was an important source of information for the program.

56
SECTION 5

THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS AND U.S. OCCUPATION OF

HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

The United States had two atomic bombs ready for use in early August 1945. They were

both dropped on Japan, the first over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the second over Nagasaki

on 9 August. The Hiroshima weapon was smaller, with a yield of about 15 kilotons compared

to the 21 kilotons for the Nagasaki detonation. They were both air bursts, detonated at about

1,670 and 1,640 feet, respectively. These burst heights were chosen to maximize blast damage

and to minimize residual radiological contamination.

The objective of the bombings was to bring World War II to a quick end, thereby avoiding

the death and destruction that would inevitably result from the planned invasion of the Japanese

home islands. During the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, 1 April through 21 June 1945, the U.S.

casualties included about 12,000 killed, and the Japanese losses approached 100,000 killed. On

26 July 1945, President Harry Truman urged the Japanese to surrender unconditionally or face

"prompt and utter destruction." The Japanese ignored the warnings, having heard similar

predictions before fire raids. Subsequently, they lost more than 75,000 people in Hiroshima and

more than 35,000 in Nagasaki. On 2 September 1945, Japan officially surrendered to Allied

forces. The early radiation surveys and the American occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

followed shortly thereafter.

5.1 EARLY RADIATION SURVEYS.

In the months immediately following the detonations, U.S. scientists conducted a number

of onsite surveys to be sure that any residual radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not

present a health hazard to occupation troops or to the Japanese remaining in the cities. General

Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff in Washington, addressed the first concern in a message sent

to General MacArthur, the Theater Commander. General Marshall emphasized the importance

of early radiation surveys so that the occupation troops "shall not be subjected to any possible

toxic effects, although we have no reason to believe that any such effects actually exist." Three

series of early radiation surveys followed:

• Scientists from the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), the organization that had

developed the bombs, made rapid radiation surveys of Hiroshima on 8 and 9

September 1945 (one month before occupation troops arrived in that area) and of

Nagasaki on 13 and 14 September (10 days before the occupation troops arrived).

- They reported negligible levels of radioactivity in the areas surveyed (Farrell,

1977).

57
• The Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group made more extensive

surveys in Nagasaki from 20 September to 6 October and in Hiroshima from 3 to

7 October 1945.

~ Their measurements, showed the levels of residual radioactivity to be

extremely low (Tybout, 6 April 1946).

• The Naval Technical Mission to Japan surveyed Nagasaki during 15 to 27 October

1945 and Hiroshima on 1 to 2 November 1945 (Pace and Smith, 16 April 1946).

- Their findings of negligible levels of radioactivity corroborated the earlier

measurements.

In addition to these surveys, the U.S. investigation teams used data from numerous

separate radiation monitoring surveys, soil and debris sampling programs, and other analyses

conducted by Japanese scientists after the bombings.

The initial and rapid measurements taken by the MED served the critically important

purpose of allowing the American occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to proceed as scheduled.

The more extensive surveys by the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group and the

Naval Mission to Japan resulted in reports since regarded as basic source documents and listed

in Appendix G.

5.2 RESIDUAL RADIATION IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI.

After the bombings, two areas of low-level residual radioactivity remained in each city:

An area of induced radioactivity around ground zero and a downwind area contaminated by

rainout/fallout.

5.2.1 Induced Radioactivity at the Hypocenters.

Roughly circular patterns of residual radiation were created at the times of detonation,

when the high-intensity burst of neutrons from the bomb encountered elements in the soil and

building materials, such as concrete, metal, and tile, in the area beneath the detonation and caused

them to become radioactive. (Examples of elements in which radioactivity can be induced are

aluminum, sodium, manganese, cobalt, scandium, and cesium.) The induced radioactivity

decreased rapidly since many of the radionuclides produced in this manner had short half-lives

(the time required for the radiation intensity to be reduced from any given value to one-half that

value). For example, aluminum-28 has a half-life of about 2.3 minutes, and manganese-56 has

a half-life of about 2.6 hours.

58
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 clearly illustrate the area of neutron-induced radioactivity around the

hypocenter (ground zero [GZ]) in each city as of the radiological survey dates indicated. By the

time of occupation force arrival (23 September 1945 at Nagasaki; 7 October 1945 near Hiroshima)

the radiation intensity at the hypocenter had decayed to very low levels (0.1 milliroentgens* per

hour or less) and the area of measurable radioactivity had diminished to within about one mile

from GZ. It should also be noted that the radioactivity was well within the area of almost total

destruction.

5.2.2 Radioactivity Downwind of the Cities.

As the radioactive cloud moved downwind from the center of each city, rainshowers within

the hour after the detonation caused some of the fission products and unfissioned residue of the

bomb to be carried to earth in a manner similar to fallout. This "rainout" produced a small

pattern of radioactivity on the west side of Hiroshima, near Takasu; and a somewhat larger area

east of Nagasaki, with peak levels in the vicinity of the Nishiyama Reservoir.

Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the areas and intensities of residual radioactivity caused by the

rainout/fallout. Of the four patterns of measurable residual radioactivity remaining in and around

the two cities upon the arrival of the occupation troops, the most significant was in the vicinity

of the Nishiyama Reservoir outside Nagasaki, indicated in Figure 5-2. A peak intensity of about

one milliroentgen per hour was measured near the reservoir about the time of the troop arrival.

The terrain in the area was rugged, characterized by steep slopes and heavy vegetation, with few

trails or roads and even fewer buildings. The Japanese population was sparse, and there was little

need for occupation force presence in the area.

The small rainout pattern west of Hiroshima, had a peak intensity of about 0.05

milliroentgen per hour when the occupation troops reached this part of Japan.

By the time of the occupation, the intensity of the radioactivity (mixed fission products)

caused by rainout had dropped to less than a thousandth of the intensity one hour after the

detonation. The main reason for this was the rapid overall decay of fission products. In general,

the radioactivity one hour after a detonation (H+l) will decay to one-tenth its former level within

the next seven hours. Two days after the detonation, the radiation intensity would have dropped

to about one-hundredth of its H + l value. Two weeks after the detonation, the intensity would

have decayed to about one-thousandth of its H+l value.

*A milliroentgen equals one-thousandth of a roentgen.

59
HIROSHIMA

if;:"-'*::

c

.**>

10.01

k02

\

V

-N04)45 S 7

PARAOe

GTOUNDS

*-

*&

W&&

7*%*

^

>

"~V***

HEAVYVINOUS--.,CORP.

£.Ä'

Built-up area of city

^£0^^^^230.0

scale in yards

Severe blast and

fire damage to

structures within

Figure 5-1. Manhattan Engineer District Survey of Hiroshima, Japan, 3-7 October 1945.

60
NISHIYAMA

RESERVOIR

Severe blast and fire damage

to structures within

Built-up area of city

1000 2000

scale in yards

Figure 5-2. Manhattan Engineer District Survey of Nagasaki, Japan,

21 September - 4 October 1945.

61
The reduction of radioactivity was aided by heavy rains during autumn 1945 that washed

away some of the residual radiation. Between the bombings and the start of the occupation,

approximately 62 centimeters (24 inches) ofrain fell in Hiroshima and 82 centimeters (32 inches)

in Nagasaki. The heavy rainfall continued during the occupation, and by 1 November the cumulative

total since the bombing was 91 centimeters (36 inches) in Hiroshima and 122 centimeters (48 inches)

in Nagasaki.

5.3 OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

The occupation of the western portion of Honshu Island (which contains Hiroshima), the

southern Japanese islands of Kyushu (where Nagasaki is located), and Shikoku was the

responsibility ofthe Sixth U.S. Army, consisting ofthe I and X Army Corps and the V Amphibious

Corps (Marines). Each Corps had three divisions and supporting units. The occupation force for

this portion ofJapan totaled some 240,000 troops. The Army had primary responsibility for the

occupation of Hiroshima and the Marine Corps had primary responsibility for the occupation of

Nagasaki.

The mission ofthe occupation troops was to establish control ofthe home islands ofJapan,

ensure compliance with the surrender terms, and demilitarize the Japanese war machine. The duties

did not include the "cleanup" ofHiroshima, Nagasaki, or any other areas, nor the rebuilding ofJapan.

5.3.1 Hiroshima Occupation.

Two divisions, both part ofX Corps ofthe Sixth Army, accomplished the occupation ofthe

area in the immediate vicinity of Hiroshima:

• 41st Division, 7 October 1945 to December 1945

• 24th Division, December 1945 to 6 March 1946, when the U.S. occupation of

Hiroshima came to an end.

The occupation troops landed at Kure, about nine miles southeast of Hiroshima. One ofthe

first actions carried out by the 186th Infantry Regiment, 41st Division was to set up a roadblock in

the vicinity of Kaidaichi to prevent entry into Hiroshima by military personnel. Units of the two

divisions were billeted in barracks, rehabilitated buildings, hotels, and private residences in Kure,

Hiro, Ujina, Tenno, Eta Jima, Koyaura and Kaidaichi (all within 10 miles of the city limits of

Hiroshima). With the possible exception of a few troops supporting scientific groups, none ofthe

occupation forces were billeted within the city limits of Hiroshima.

Units ofthe 186th Infantry Regiment, 41st Division, conducted reconnaissance patrols and

other specific daily assignments throughout their area of responsibility, which included the city of

Hiroshima. It is assumed that individuals ofthe regiment made occasional patrols into the destroyed

area of the city and that individuals from nearby units of the 41st Division may have made brief

sightseeing trips into the area. Radiation doses received by these participants and the other

occupation troops are summarized in Section 5.4.

62
5.3.2 Nagasaki Occupation.

While the Hiroshima occupation primarily involved Army troops, the occupation of

Nagasaki consisted mostly of Marine Corps units, with small supporting Navy and Army

elements.

Responsibility for the Nagasaki area was assigned to the 2nd Marine Division, a unit of

the V Amphibious Corps. During the first three months of the occupation, Division strength in

Nagasaki is estimated at approximately 10,000 troops. Division strength averaged about 5,000

to 7,000 for the next three months, through February 1946, and 3,000 to 4,000 for the last four

months of the occupation, through 30 June 1946.

Three units of the 2nd Marine Division had key roles during various periods of the

occupation, as indicated below:

• 2nd Regimental Combat Team (RCT-2), 23 September to early November 1945.

The zone of occupation included the east side of the Nagasaki Harbor and most of

the nearby county east of the Urakami River.

• RCT-6, 23 September to December 1945. The zone of occupation included the

west side of the Nagasaki Harbor and most of the nearby county west of the

Urakami River.

• 10th Marine Regiment, November 1945 to June 1946, when the Marine Corps

occupation of Nagasaki came to an end. The Regiment assumed the

responsibilities of RCT-2 and RCT-6 upon their departure from Japan.

Specific billet locations have not been identified for all division units, which also included

the 8th RCT, a Headquarters Battalion, Service Troops, an Engineer Group, a Tank Battalion,

an Observation Squadron, and some smaller organizations. It is known, however, that RCT-2 was

billeted in the Kamigo barracks and RCT-6 in the Oura barracks, both shown in Figure 5-2. The

other troops also were billeted in areas well clear of the hypocenter, which was cordoned off.

Five companies of the Army's 34th Infantry Regiment moved to Nagasaki and Omura

during the last 10 days of June 1946. Approximately 25,000 Marines and 2,000 Army personnel

participated in the occupation of Nagasaki.

Section 5.4 summarizes doses for Nagasaki participating personnel.

5.4 RADIATION DOSES.

Few world events have been as thoroughly documented at the time, and as intensively and

continuously studied since, by as many different groups of scientists as the atomic bombings and

related radiation exposures at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, the patterns of residual radiation

are well understood. This understanding, with other information, provides a solid basis for

radiation dose determination.

The extensive radiation measurements and soil sample analyses taken by numerous

Japanese and U.S. scientists in the weeks following the bombings are still available. These results

63
and subsequent radiation measurements and sampling have formed the basis for intensive research

over the past 48 years by Japanese and U.S. scientists of every aspect of the bombings and the

radiation after-effects. The Japanese Government and the American NAS have stimulated,

supported, and advanced this research.

Documentation of the U.S. occupation of Japan is voluminous in Army, Navy, and Marine

Corps archives. Unfortunately, however, no central listing of participating units exists.

Consequently, to meet the requirements of Public Law 100-321 (see Section 3.3.2), extensive

research has been required to determine which units were present, when they arrived, where they

were stationed, what their missions were, and when they left.

In spite of the still-existing gaps in unit data, detailed technical dose reconstructions have

determined the maximum possible radiation doses that might have been received by any

participant. Section 8, Radiation Dose Determination, addresses this process, explaining the

"worst case" analysis used to identify the highest possible dose. Using all possible "worst case"

assumptions, the maximum possible dose any occupation force member might have received from

external radiation, inhalation, and ingestion is less than one rem. This does not mean that any

individual approached this exposure level. In fact, it is probable that the great majority of

personnel assigned to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki occupation forces received low radiation

exposures and that the highest dose received by anyone was a few tens of millirem.

64
SECTION 6

U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING FROM

PROJECT TRINITY TO THE PLOWSHARE PROGRAM

The United States conducted Project TRINITY, the world's first nuclear detonation, in

1945. From 1946 to 1963, when the limited nuclear test ban treaty was signed, the U.S.

conducted 19 atmospheric nuclear test series, identified below as operations, and a program of

testing called PLOWSHARE. In addition, the U.S. staged safety experiments to determine the

weapons' susceptibility to fission due to accidents in storage and transport. This chapter provides

historical summaries of the tests, as shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Chronological list of U.S. atmospheric nuclear test series.

Project TRINITY, 1945 (CONUS) Operation WIGWAM, 1955 (Oceanic)

Operation CROSSROADS, 1946 (Oceanic) Operation REDWING, 1956 (Oceanic)

Operation SANDSTONE, 1948 (Oceanic)

Operation RANGER, 1951 (CONUS)

Operation GREENHOUSE, 1951

(Oceanic)

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951

(CONUS)

Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER, 1952

(CONUS)

Operation IVY, 1952 (Oceanic)

Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, 1953

(CONUS)

Operation CASTLE, 1954 (Oceanic)

Operation TEAPOT, 1955 (CONUS)

Operation PLUMBBOB, 1957 (CONUS)

Operation HARDTACK I, 1958 (Oceanic)

Operation ARGUS, 1958 (Oceanic)

Operation HARDTACK II, 1958 (CONUS)

Safety Experiments, 1955-1958 (CONUS)

Operation DOMINIC I, 1962 (Oceanic)

Operation DOMINIC II, 1962 (CONUS)

PLOWSHARE Program, 1961-1962

(CONUS)

Most of the oceanic tests were conducted at the PPG, which consisted principally of the Enewetak

and Bikini Atolls in the northwestern Marshall Islands of the Pacific Ocean. The Marshall Islands

are in the easternmost part of Micronesia. The Marshalls spread over about 2 million square

65
kilometers of the earth's surface, but the total land area is only about 180 km2

*. Two parallel

chains form the islands: Ratak (or Sunrise) to the east, and Ralik (or Sunset) to the west; both

Enewetak and Bikini are in the Ralik chain at its northern extreme. Figure 6-1 shows these

islands in the central Pacific. It also indicates the locations of Christmas and Johnston Islands,

the sites for most of the DOMINIC I tests.

Most of the CONUS atmospheric tests were conducted at NTS. Established by the AEC

in December 1950, the NTS is in the southeastern part of Nevada, 100 kilometers northwest of

Las Vegas. Figure 6-2 shows the current NTS, an area of high desert and mountain terrain now

encompassing approximately 3,500 square kilometers in Nye County. On its eastern, northern,

and western boundaries, the NTS adjoins the Nellis Air Force Range.

Below are short histories of each U.S. atmospheric nuclear test operation. Each history

includes a table summarizing external dosimetry information contained in the NTPR data base as

of 30 September 1993. In these tables the roentgen equivalent in man (rem) is used. It is a

modern unit of dose and is considered equal to the roentgen (R), the unit of radiation exposure

in use during U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing. If readers compare these tables with those in the

1986 edition of this history or with other reports generated by the NTPR effort, they will see that

these numbers have changed over time. There are many reasons for these changes. New

participants have been identified and personnel previously considered participants have been found

to be non-participants. Reconstructed doses have been added for some personnel whose previous

dose data was based solely on film badges. Reconstructed doses have been recalculated based on

new information. Dosimetry records, such as issue sheets have been reviewed, revealing new

information. Film badges themselves have been reexamined yielding new interpretations. The

numbers in the tables will continue to change as new information is still being found even though

the NTPR program has been in operation since 1978.

6.1 PROJECT TRINITY.

Project TRINITY was the first detonation of a nuclear weapon. The plutonium-fueled

implosion device was detonated on a 100-foot tower at 0530 hours, 16 July 1945. The test, which

occurred on the Alamogordo Bombing Range in south-central New Mexico, had a nuclear yield

equivalent to the energy released by exploding 21 kilotons of TNT. Figure 6-3 shows the location

of the bombing range. It left a depression in the desert 9.5 feet deep and 335 meters wide (Maag

and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, pp. 1, 23).

* Throughout this section, surface distances are given in metric units. The metric conversion

factors include: 1 meter = 3.28 feet; lmeter = 1.09 yards; and 1 kilometer = 0.62 miles.

Vertical distances are given in feet; altitudes are measured from mean sea level, while heights are

measured from surface level, unless otherwise noted.

66
67
I

Nevada

Indian

Springs

AFB

UTAH

ARIZONA

100

_L

Kilometers

Figure 6-2. The Nevada Test Site.

68
Utah Colorado

Arizona

• Los Alamos

• Santa Fe

• Albuquerque

• Socorro

»-[TRINITY Ground Zero

Alamogo;

Bombing

Range

iii. Alamogordo

Oklahoma

»El Paso

Mexico

Texas

100 200

kilometers

Figure 6-3. Location of Alai; ogordo Bombing Range.

69
People as far away as Santa Fe, New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas, saw the brilliant light of

the detonation. Windows rattled in the areas immediately surrounding the test site, waking sleeping

ranchers and townspeople. To dispel any rumors that might compromise the security ofthis first

nuclear test, the Government announced that an Army munitions dump had exploded. However,

immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, the Government revealed to

the public what had actually occurred in the New Mexico desert (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December

1982, p. 33).

6.1.1 Background and Objectives of Project TRINITY.

The United States' effort to develop a nuclear weapon came during World War II in response

to the potential threat of a German nuclear weapon. On 6 December 1941, President Roosevelt

appointed a committee to determine if the United States could construct a nuclear weapon. Six

months later, the committee gave the President its report, recommending a fast-paced program that

would cost up to $100 million and that might produce the weapon by July 1944 (Maag and Rohrer,

15 December 1982, p. 33).

The President accepted the committee's recommendation. The effort to construct the weapon

was turned over to the War Department, which assigned the task to the Army Corps ofEngineers.

In September 1942, the Corps of Engineers established the MED, under the command of Major

General Leslie Groves, to oversee the development of a nuclear weapon. This effort was code named

the "Manhattan Project" (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 13).

During the first two years of the Manhattan Project, work proceeded at a slow but steady

pace. Significant technical problems had to be solved, and difficulties in the concentration of

uranium-235 and production of plutonium, particularly the inability to process large amounts, often

frustrated the scientists. Nonetheless, by 1944 sufficient progress had been made to persuade the

scientists that their efforts might succeed. A test ofthe plutonium implosion device was necessary

to determine if it would work and what its effects would be. Led by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,

Manhattan Project scientists at LANL were "to make preparations for a field test in which blast, earth

shock, neutron and gamma radiation would be studied and complete photographic records made of

the explosion and any atmospheric phenomena connected with the explosion" (Maag and Rohrer, 15

December 1982, pp. 13-14).

The planned firing date for the TRINITY device was originally 4 July 1945. On 14 June

1945, Dr. Oppenheimer changed the test date to no earlier than 13 July and no later than 23 July. On

30 June, the earliest firing date was moved to 16 July, even though better weather was forecast for

18 and 19 July. The TRINITY test organization adjusted the schedule because the Allied conference

in Potsdam, Germany, was about to begin and the President needed the results ofthe test as soon as

possible (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 26).

6.1.2 TRINITY Test Operations.

About 850 military and civilian personnel are verified as having participated in Project

TRINITY or having visited the test site from 16 July 1945 through 1946 (JAYCOR,

70
6 October 1993). All participants, civilian as well as military, were under the authority ofthe MED.

Project activities included scientific studies. Military exercises were not conducted at TRINITY

(Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 1).

LANL, which was staffed and administered by the University of California (under contract

to the MED), conducted diagnostic experiments. Before the detonation, civilian and military

scientists and technicians, assisted by other military personnel, placed gauges, detectors, and other

instruments around ground zero. An evacuation detachment consisting of 144 to 160 enlisted men

and officers was established in case protective measures or evacuation of civilians living offsite

became necessary. Such action was not deemed necessary, however, and the evacuation detachment

was dismissed late on the day of the detonation for return to Los Alamos (Maag and Rohrer, 15

December 1982, p. 1).

For the detonation, at least 263 DoD participants were at the test site. Among this group

were 99 personnel divided among three shelters approximately 9,175 meters north, south, and west

of ground zero. No one was closer to ground zero at shot-time (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December

1982, p. 31).

To determine the extent ofthe radiation resulting from the detonation, a network of detectors

with remote read-out was installed along routes between ground zero and each shelter. In addition,

trained monitors with portable radiation survey instruments were assigned to each shelter. No

radiation was detected at the south and west shelters. The remote detectors north of ground zero

indicated that the radioactive cloud was moving in that direction, and a monitor in the north shelter

observed a sharp increase in the radiation level. The shelter was consequently evacuated shortly

after the detonation. It was learned later that the monitor had inadvertently changed an adjustment

on his instrument, which resulted in a false reading. Very little contamination occurred at the north

shelter (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, pp. 1-2).

To measure offsite fallout, four two-man teams were organized. They established monitoring

posts in towns north ofthe test area. These towns were Socorro, Nogal, Roswell, and Fort Sumner,

all in New Mexico. Following the detonation, offsite teams surveyed areas beyond the test area by

car (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 47).

The radioactive cloud the explosion produced moved toward the northeast at an elevation of

between 45,000 and 55,000 feet. Radioactive fallout did not reach the ground in significant amounts

for the first 16 to 24 kilometers ofthe cloud's path. Once fallout began, it created a swath offairly

high radioactivity in a northeasterly direction on the ground covering an area about 160 kilometers

long and 48 kilometers wide (Weisskopf and others, 5 September 1945).

Offsite monitoring teams surveying northeast of ground zero encountered gamma readings

ranging from 1.5 to 15 R/h two to four hours after the detonation. Three hours after the detonation,

surveys taken in Bingham, New Mexico (located 30 kilometers northeast of ground zero), found

gamma intensities of about 1.5 R/h. Radiation readings at the town of White, nine kilometers

southeast of Bingham, were 6.5 R/h three hours after the detonation and 2.5 R/h two hours later.

Another team monitoring in a canyon 11 kilometers east of Bingham found a gamma intensity of

71
about 15 R/h. Five hours later, the intensity had decreased to 3.8 R/h. It was estimated that peak

intensities of gamma radiation from fallout on shot-day were about 7 R/h at an occupied ranch house

in this canyon area (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 47).

A substantial amount of activity took place at the test site during the first three days

following the detonation, as scientists entered the ground zero area to retrieve instruments or perform

experiments. Their entry into, activities at, and exit from the test site were carefully controlled.

When the itinerary indicated operations in regions of known radiation intensity, a limit was set on

the time spent in the area. Radiation detectors were provided, when possible, to permit continuous

monitoring of the exposure. Film badges were also provided to each person for subsequent

determination and recording ofthe doses received. The number of personnel at the TRINITY test

site diminished rapidly after 19 July, as the emphasis shifted to preparing the devices that were to

be used over Japan (Maag and Rohrer, 15 December 1982, p. 38). In late August a fence was built

around the site to help keep out unauthorized personnel.

6.1.3 Dose Summary for Project TRINITY.

The dose limit for TRINITY participants was 5.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation during a

two-month period (Abersold, January 1947, p. 29). Table 6-2 summarizes the available dosimetry

information:

Table 6-2. Summary of external doses for Project TRINITY as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >L0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army * 377 143 64 110 73 17 3

Navy 8 11 1 2 0 1 0

Total for Each

Column

Cumulative toi

385

al

154 65 112 73 18 3

810

* At the time of TRINITY, the Air Force was part ofthe Army and no Marines were present.

6.2 OPERATION CROSSROADS.

Conducted in 1946 at Bikini, CROSSROADS involved approximately 250 ships and 160

aircraft. Verified DoD participants number about 47,400 (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The series

consisted of an airdrop detonated at a height of 520 feet and an underwater shot conducted at a depth

of 90 feet, as shown in Table 6-3.

72
Table 6-3. CROSSROADS shots.

Shot

Date

(1946) Type

Yield

(kiiofons)

ABLE 1 July Airdrop 21

BAKER 25 July Underwater 21

The nuclear devices were similar to the TRINITY device and to the weapon detonated over

Nagasaki, Japan (Berkhouse and others, 1 May 1984, p. 17).

Among the numerous observers of these two detonations was First Lieutenant David J.

Bradley, an Army doctor trained as a radiological safety monitor. He made the following

observations ofABLE and BAKER from a Navy aircraft approximately 20 nautical miles from each

detonation:

ABLE: At twenty miles [it] gave us no sound or flash or shock wave.... Then, suddenly we

saw it ~ a huge column of clouds, dense, white, boiling up through the

strata-cumulus, looking much like any other thunderhead but climbing as no storm

cloud ever could. The evil mushrooming head soon began to blossom out. It

climbed rapidly to 30,000 or 40,000 feet, growing a tawny-pink from oxides of

nitrogen, and seemed to be reaching out in an expanding umbrella overhead.... For

minutes the cloud stood solid and impressive, like some gigantic monument, over

Bikini. Then finally the shearing ofthe winds at different altitudes began to tear it

up into a weird zigzag pattern (Bradley, 1948, p. 55).

BAKER: This shot in broad day, at fifteen miles, seemed to spring from all parts ofthe target

fleet at once. A gigantic flash — then it was gone. And where it had been now stood

a white chimney ofwater reaching up and up. Then a huge hemispheric mushroom

of vapor appeared like a parachute suddenly opening.... By this time the great geyser

had climbed to several thousand feet. It stood there as if solidifying for many

seconds, its head enshrouded in a tumult ofsteam. Then slowly the pillar began to

fall and break up. At its base a tidal wave ofspray and steam arose, to smother the

fleet and move on toward the islands. All this took only a few seconds, but the

phenomenon was so astounding as to seem to last much longer (Bradley, 1948, p.

93).

Figure 6-4 shows the BAKER detonation.

6.2.1 Background and Objectives of CROSSROADS.

After the strategic atomic bomb attacks on Japan had abruptly ended World War II, many

military leaders felt that military science was at a crossroads. Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, who

directed CROSSROADS declared that "warfare, perhaps civilization itself, had been brought to a

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74
to a turning point by this revolutionary weapon." With this thought in mind, he named the initial

postwar test series (National Geographic Magazine. April 1947, p. 529).

As early as August 1945, the Chairman of the Senate's Special Committee on Atomic

Energy proposed that the effectiveness of atomic bombs be demonstrated on captured Japanese

ships. In September, the General of the Army, H. H. Arnold, Commander of the Army Air

Forces, put the question of such a test before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The ensuing

discussion and recommendations led President Harry Truman to announce, on 10 December 1945,

that the U.S. would further explore the capabilities of atomic energy in the form of scientific

atomic bomb tests under JCS jurisdiction (Berkhouse and others, 1 May 1984, p. 18).

CROSSROADS was designed to produce information not available from the TRINITY test

or the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The primary purpose was to determine the effects of

atomic bombs on naval vessels. The secondary purposes were to provide training for aircrews

in attack techniques using atomic bombs against ships and to determine atomic bomb effects upon

other military equipment and installations (Berkhouse and others, 1 May 1984, p. 18).

6.2.2 CROSSROADS Test Operations.

A fleet ofmore than 90 target vessels was assembled in Bikini Lagoon for CROSSROADS.

The target fleet consisted of older U.S. ships, such as the aircraft carriers USS SARATOGA (CV

3) and USS INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22), the battleships USS NEVADA (BB 36), USS

ARKANSAS (BB 33), USS PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38), and USS NEW YORK (BB 34), surplus

U.S. cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and a large number of auxiliary and amphibious vessels.

The German cruiser PRINZ EUGEN and two major captured Japanese ships, the battleship

NAGATO and the cruiser SAKAWA, also were targets. The support fleet comprised more than

150 ships that provided quarters, experimental stations, and workshops for most of the

approximately 43,000 participants, more than 39,000 of whom were Navy personnel (Berkhouse

and others, 1 May 1984, pp. 1, 84).

In contrast to all other U.S. atmospheric nuclear test series, a large media contingent was

present for both CROSSROADS detonations. Quartered aboard USS APPALACHIAN (AGC 1),

the correspondents numbered 131 and were from newspapers, magazines, and the radio networks

(Anonymous, no date). Included were correspondents from Australia, Canada, France, the

Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. All Hands, a Navy magazine of

the period, reported that:

The press will be allowed to cover the test atomic bomb explosions at Bikini with

sufficient thoroughness to satisfy the public as to the fairness and general results

of the experiment, but not so completely that military information of value to the

enemy will be disclosed (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1 July 1946).

ABLE operations went smoothly. The radioactivity created by the airburst had only a

transient effect. Within a day, radiation intensities in the lagoon had decayed to less than 0.1

R/24 hours, and nearly all the surviving target ships had been safely reboarded. The ship

75
inspections, instrument recoveries, and remooring necessary for the BAKER test proceeded on

schedule (Berkhouse and others, 1 May 1984, pp. 1, 217).

BAKER, on the other hand, presented difficulties. The underwater detonation caused most

of the target fleet to be bathed in radioactive water spray and debris. With the exception of 12

target vessels in the lagoon and the landing craft beached on Bikini Island, the surviving target

fleet was too radiologically contaminated for many days for more than brief on-board activities.

During the first week of August, attempts were made to decontaminate the vessels. By 10

August, upon the advice of Colonel Stafford Warren, the Chief of the Radiological Safety

Division, the Task Force Commander decided to terminate these efforts and tow most of the

remaining target fleet to Kwajalein Atoll for possible decontamination (Berkhouse and others, 1

May 1984, pp. 178-187).

In the latter half of August 1946, the surviving target ships were towed or sailed to

Kwajalein Atoll. Eight of the major ships and two submarines were towed back to the U.S. for

radiological inspection. Twelve target ships were so lightly contaminated that their crews

remanned them and sailed them back to the United States. The remaining target ships were

destroyed by sinking off Kwajalein Atoll, near the Hawaiian Islands or off the California coast

during 1946 to 1948. The support ships were decontaminated as necessary at various Navy

shipyards, primarily in San Francisco and Long Beach, California (Berkhouse and others, 1 May

1984, pp. 178-187).

6.2.3 Dose Summary for CROSSROADS.

CROSSROADS operations were undertaken under radiological supervision intended to

keep personnel doses below 0.1 R (rem) of gamma radiation per day. About 15 percent of the

participants were issued film badges. Personnel anticipated to have the most potential for

exposure were badged, and a percentage of each group working in less radioactive areas were

badged (Berkhouse and others, 1 May 1984, pp. 2-3). Thus, because radiation dose data are not

complete, reconstructions have been made of personnel doses for unbadged crewmembers of the

ships involved. The calculations rely upon the radiation measurements recorded by radiation

safety personnel in 1946 and use the types of methods discussed in Section 8.

In the fall of 1983, the papers of Colonel Stafford Warren, the chief of radiological safety

at CROSSROADS, were released. His papers revealed certain data that had not been found in

previous archival searches. When introduced into the reconstruction model, the data had the

effect of reducing the reconstructed doses of many CROSSROADS personnel. Table 6-4

summarizes the presently available dosimetry information:

76
Table 6-4. Summary of external doses for Operation CROSSROADS as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 > 0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 > 3.0-5.0 >5.0-

10.0

>10.0

Army * 2,290 1,070 147 9 1 0 0

Navy 6,917 23,258 7,448 4,038 11 0 0

Marines 211 378 0 0 0 0 0

Coast

Guard **

1 5 1 0 0 0 0

Foreign

Military

Observers

0 3 0 0 0 0 0

Total for

each column

9,319 24,714 7,596 4,047 12 0 0

Cumulative total 45,689

**

At the time of CROSSROADS the Air Force was part of the Army.

Coast Guard personnel were present at some oceanic test series.

6.3 OPERATION SANDSTONE.

Conducted at Enewetak Atoll in 1948, Operation SANDSTONE consisted of three tower

shots, all detonated at a height of 200 feet, as shown in Table 6-5 (Berkhouse and others,

19 December 1983, p. 1).

Table 6-5. SANDSTONE shots.

Shot

Date

(1948) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

X-RAY 15 April Tower 37

YOKE 1 May Tower 49

ZEBRA 15 May Tower 18

77
6.3.1 Background and Objectives of Operation SANDSTONE.

Operation SANDSTONE was the second test series carried out in the Marshall Islands.

It differed from the first, CROSSROADS, in that it was primarily a scientific series conducted by

the AEC. The AEC was activated on 1 January 1947 to assume the responsibilities formerly held

by the MED, dissolved at the end of 1946. The Armed Forces had a supporting role in

SANDSTONE, whereas they had assumed a lead role in CROSSROADS (Berkhouse and others,

19 December 1983, p. 1).

SANDSTONE was a proof-test of second-generation nuclear devices. The two weapons

detonated at CROSSROADS were the same type of weapon dropped on Nagasaki. On 3 April

1947, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC recommended development and testing of new

weapons. When the President approved the preliminary SANDSTONE test program on 27 June

1947, the U.S. apparently had only 13 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. One year later, despite

heavy emphasis on increased production of fissionable material, the number of weapons was only

about 50, far short of the number that military planners calculated would be required in a war with

the Soviet Union. The great expansion in the U.S. stockpile evident by the end of 1949 was the

direct result of the higher production rates of fissionable material and the more efficient weapons

proof-tested at SANDSTONE (Berkhouse and others, 19 December 1983, pp. 17-18).

Meetings were held on 9 July 1947 at Los Alamos, New Mexico, to define test

responsibilities for SANDSTONE. LANL, the organization that had developed the wartime

atomic weapons and that did research and laboratory development of new nuclear weapons

designs, was to provide technical leadership and the military services were to provide supplies and

support (Berkhouse and others, 19 December 1983, p. 18).

6.3.2 SANDSTONE Test Operations.

Numerous technical experiments were conducted in conjunction with each of the three

detonations. These experiments measured the yield and efficiency of the devices and attempted

to gauge the military effects of the events. The studies were similar at each of the shots but were

carried out more precisely with YOKE and ZEBRA as collective experience grew (Berkhouse and

others, 19 December 1983, pp. 2, 102).

Operation SANDSTONE has approximately 14,200 verified participants, most of whom

were military personnel (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The DoD personnel had support roles and

some had duty stations at the AEC weapons design and development laboratories or were part of

units performing separate experiments (Berkhouse and others, 19 December 1983, pp. 1-2).

6.3.3 Dose Summary for Operation SANDSTONE.

The dose limit for SANDSTONE participants was 0.1 R (rem) of gamma radiation per

24-hour period and a maximum 3.0 R (rem) for certain approved and specific missions (Berkhouse

and others, 19 December 1983, p. 2). Table 6-6 summarizes the available dosimetry information:

78
Table 6-6. Summary of external doses for Operation SANDSTONE as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.u-10.0 >10.0

Army 28 1,603 11 16 3 2 0

Navy 285 7,233 17 9 2 0 0

Marines 3 259 1 1 0 0 0

Air Force 30 2,130 28 16 1 0 0

Field

Command

17 9 0 1 0 0 0

Total for

Each Column

363 11,234 57 43 6 2 0

Cumulative total 11,705

6.4 OPERATION RANGER.

Operation RANGER was the first atmospheric nuclear weapons test series conducted by

the AEC at the NTS. This 1951 series consisted of five nuclear events, all of which were airdrops

detonated at heights of about 1,000-1,400 feet. In addition, RANGER included one nonnuclear

high-explosive test detonated two days before the first nuclear event. Table 6-7 provides specifics

on the nuclear shots (Maag and others, 26 February 1982, pp. 1,4).

Table 6-7. RANGER shots.

Shot

Date

(1951) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

ABLE 27 January Airdrop 1

BAKER 28 January Airdrop 8

EASY 1 February Airdrop 1

BAKER-2 2 February Airdrop 8

FOX 6 February Airdrop 22

6.4.1 Background and Objectives of Operation RANGER.

In November 1950, LANL discovered that insufficient data were available to determine

satisfactory design criteria for nuclear devices to be tested in Operation GREENHOUSE, a series

79
of AEC nuclear tests scheduled for the Pacific from 7 April through 24 May 1951. The LANL

scientists believed that variations in the compression of the fissionable material could affect the

yields of the GREENHOUSE devices. To confirm this hypothesis, LANL held conferences on

6 and 11 December 1950 and concluded that a series of small nuclear tests should be conducted

to improve the GREENHOUSE design criteria. On 22 December 1950, LANL requested

approval for a continental series from the AEC Division of Military Application (DMA). DMA

approved the request and asked for Presidential approval to expend the fissionable material

required for the series and to use part of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range in Nevada

for the tests. The White House responded affirmatively to both requests on 11 January 1951,

formally creating Operation RANGER.

The same day that Operation RANGER was approved by the President, the AEC

distributed its only announcements of the coming tests. Handbills were circulated in the area of

the test site, stating that from 11 January 1951 the Government would be conducting nuclear tests

at the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range. Figure 6-5 shows this handbill (Maag and others,

26 February 1982, pp. 18-20).

6.4.2 Establishment of the Nevada Test Site.

Nearly six years passed between the detonation of TRINITY at Alamogordo, New Mexico,

on 16 July 1945, and the next CONUS nuclear test, ABLE of the RANGER series. The AEC had

considered establishing a continental test site in 1948 after SANDSTONE, as a way to reduce

construction and logistic costs, but rejected the idea after concluding that the physical problems

and domestic political concerns would be too complicated. When the Korean War began in the

summer of 1950, however, the AEC doubted that the Pacific could be used for nuclear weapons

testing because of the possibility of the Korean War expanding throughout the Far East, thus

endangering shipping lanes. On 13 July 1950, the AEC Chairman wrote the Chairman of the

Military Liaison Committee that the possibility of a national emergency required a joint effort by

the AEC and DoD to find a continental test site. The DoD agreed, and the search began for a

suitable site.

The AEC and DoD surveyed six sites within the continental United States before choosing

the Frenchman Flat area of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range, renamed the Nellis Air

Force Range in 1956. The Government picked this site because it best suited AEC criteria for

favorable meteorological conditions, distance from population areas, and proximity to operational

facilities (Maag and others, 26 February 1982, pp. 19-20). Known first as the NTS, then as the

Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) beginning in early 1952, the site since 1955 has again been called

the NTS, the designation used throughout this volume.

6.4.3 RANGER Test Operations.

Only about 320 DoD personnel have been verified as participants in RANGER, which was

primarily an AEC activity (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). They were engaged in support services,

scientific experiments, weather support, communications security, and observer activities. The

majority participated in the air support services conducted primarily by Air Force personnel from

the Special Weapons Command (SWC) and Headquarters, Air Force. At each event, air support

activities included the airdrop of the nuclear device, cloud sampling, cloud tracking, aerial surveys

80
WARNING

January 11, 1951

From this day forward the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has been authorized to use

part of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range for test work necessary to the atomic weapons

development program.

Test activities will include experimental nuclear detonations for the development of atomic

bombs - so-called "A-Bombs" - carried out under controlled conditions.

Tests will be conducted on a routine basis for an indefinite period.

NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TIME OF ANY

TEST WILL BE MADE

Unauthorized persons who pass inside the limits of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery

Range may be subject to injury from or as result of the AEC test activities.

Health and safety authorities have determined that no danger from or as a result of AEC

test activities may be expected outside the limits of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.

All necessary precautions, including radiological surveys and patrolling of the surrounding

territory, will be undertaken to insure that safety conditions are maintained.

Full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act will apply to the work in this area.

RALPH P. JOHNSON, Project Manager

Las Vegas Project Office

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Figure 6-5. AEC handbill announcing the beginning of the RANGER tests.

81
of the terrain, and courier service. Air Force personnel also provided meteorological services and

communications security and monitored worldwide radioactivity from the RANGER test for the

Atomic Energy Detection System. Since RANGER was only a 13-day operation, the same units

and participants performed the same duties throughout the series (Maag and others, 26 February

1982, p. 1).

6.4.4 Dose Summary for Operation RANGER.

Table 6-8 summarizes the available dosimetry information. Four doses exceeded the 3.0

R (rem) limit of gamma radiation per 13-week period (Maag and others, 26 February 1982, p. 3):

Table 6-8. Summary of external doses for Operation RANGER as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 15 9 3 3 2 0 0

Navy 0 3 1 0 1 1 0

Marines 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

Air Force 9 92 0 0 0 0 0

Total for

Each Column

24 104 5 3 3 1 0

Cumulative total 140

6.5 OPERATION GREENHOUSE.

GREENHOUSE was the fourth postwar atmospheric nuclear weapons test series.

Conducted in 1951 on the northeastern islands of the Enewetak Atoll, the series consisted of four

tower shots as shown in Table 6-9. Two shots were detonated at 200 feet and two at 300 feet

(Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 1).

Table 6-9. GREENHOUSE shots.

Shot

Date

(1951) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

DOG 8 April Tower 81

EASY 21 April Tower 47

GEORGE 9 May Tower 225

ITEM 25 May Tower 45.5

82
6.5.1 Background and Objectives of Operation GREENHOUSE.

The purpose of the four GREENHOUSE tests was to continue development of nuclear

weapons for defense. More specifically, work was proceeding at this time on developing

thermonuclear weapons, and the GREENHOUSE tests were part of this process (Berkhouse and

others, 15 June 1983, p. 1).

In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb, providing the impetus for the

United States to proceed with development of a bomb whose energy would come from the fusion,

or joining, of light elements. Such a weapon is also called a thermonuclear, or hydrogen, bomb.

The AEC received presidential approval for work in this area in January 1950 after lengthy debate

in high defense circles over the feasibility and advisability of such weapons.

Although the GREENHOUSE nuclear devices were not thermonuclear devices, two of

them involved thermonuclear experiments, and one test, GEORGE, was an important step toward

thermonuclear devices. GEORGE demonstrated the initiation of a sustained thermonuclear

reaction by use of a fission reaction. This led directly to the first successful thermonuclear test,

MIKE (Operation IVY), some 16 months later. In addition, ITEM, the fourth test of the series,

involved boosting the efficiency of fission explosions. Development of this experiment had been

planned before the Soviet test in 1949 (Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 21; JAYCOR, 6

October 1993).

6.5.2 GREENHOUSE Test Operations.

The Navy had provided most of the DoD personnel for the earlier Pacific nuclear test

series. It contributed the largest number to GREENHOUSE, too, but the Army and Air Force

were also well represented in the testing area. Approximately 9,570 DoD participants supported

the eight GREENHOUSE scientific programs, which consisted of projects recommended by the

Army, Navy, Air Force, AFSWP, and the AEC (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The programs were

of three types: those dealing with the chemistry and physics of atomic explosions; those dealing

with the effects of such explosions on the natural environment, on man-made objects, and on

various plants and animals; and those designed to help develop means to detect nuclear detonations

at great distances so that U.S. authorities could monitor nuclear developments in other countries

(Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 130).

6.5.3 Dose Summary for Operation GREENHOUSE.

The maximum permissible dose for Operation GREENHOUSE participants was 0.1 R

(rem) of gamma radiation per day (0.7 R (rem) per week), not to exceed a total of 3.9 R (rem)

for 13 weeks. A total of up to 3.0 R (rem) on any one day could be authorized in specific cases.

When this authorization was made, however, individuals were not to exceed 0.1 R (rem) per day

during the remainder of the operation (Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 64).

83
Film badges were issued to individuals who might be exposed to radiation while

performing their duties. In addition, over 75 film badges for each test were distributed among

the six participating ships, to be worn from the day of the test to seven days thereafter. Among

the men in the test area during all or part of the testing operations, approximately 4,000 were

badged one or more times (Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 2; JAYCOR, 1 October

1993).

Fallout occurred on the inhabited islands of Enewetak, Parry, and Japtan, and on the six

task force ships after three of the four shots in the series. Fallout from Shot DOG was

approximately twice as great on Parry and Japtan than it was on Enewetak, where the majority

of the island-based participants were located. Shot EASY fallout was insignificant and affected

all residence islands equally. Shot ITEM fallout, on the other hand, was approximately twice as

great on Enewetak as it was on Japtan (Berkhouse and others, 15 June 1983, p. 3). Overall,

calculated fallout doses for personnel remaining on the residence islands until the end of May,

when the rollup phase was virtually complete, were nearly equal on all three of the islands:

Enewetak, 2.93 R (rem); Parry, 3.10 R (rem); and Japtan, 2.57 R (rem).

The amount of fallout received by the six ships varied with their locations and

decontamination procedures. The fallout exposure was lower aboard ship than on the islands due

to water washdown, shielding, and decontamination of external surfaces (Berkhouse and others,

15 June 1983, p. 3). Table 6-10 summarizes available dosimetry data.

Table 6-10. Summary of external doses for Operation GREENHOUSE as of 30 September

1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 7 162 31 885 711 27 0

Navy 744 673 479 1,199 79 16 4

Marines 2 2 2 40 2 0 0

Air Force 469 378 367 458 831 130 5

Field

Command

0 5 2 8 0 0 0

Coast Guard 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

Total for

Each Column

1,222 1,220 882 2,590 1,624 173 9

Cumulative total 7,720

84
6.6 OPERATION BUSTER-JANGLE.

Conducted in 1951, Operation BUSTER-JANGLE was the second series of atmospheric

nuclear weapons tests at the NTS. The series consisted of seven nuclear detonations, as shown

in Table 6-11.

Table 6-11. BUSTER-JANGLE shots.

Shot Date (1951) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

ABLE 22 October Tower <0.1

BAKER 28 October Airdrop 3.5

CHARLIE 30 October Airdrop 14

DOG 1 November Airdrop 21

EASY 5 November Airdrop 31

SUGAR 19 November Surface 1.2

UNCLE 29 November Underground 1.2

Up to this point in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing program, all detonations had been

from towers or by air drops, except for the shallow underwater Shot BAKER of Operation

CROSSROADS. BUSTER-JANGLE included the first surface detonation (SUGAR) and the first

shallow underground (-17 feet) detonation (UNCLE) of the testing program (Ponton and others,

21 June 1982, pp. 1, 6)

6.6.1 Background and Objectives of Operation BUSTER-JANGLE.

This series was originally planned as two separate weapons testing programs: Operation

BUSTER and Operation JANGLE. BUSTER, the plans for which began in late 1950, was to

evaluate new devices developed by LANL and to obtain data on the basic phenomena associated

with these devices. Plans for JANGLE originated with Operation CROSSROADS, conducted at

Bikini in 1946. Scientific studies of the underwater CROSSROADS detonation led to inquiries

concerning the effects and possible military value of an underground nuclear detonation. The JCS

accordingly obtained AEC agreement to conduct tests involving an underground and a surface

nuclear detonation. The general objectives of the tests were to determine the effects of these

detonations and to study the devices for inclusion in the nuclear arsenal.

In 1950, AEC and DoD representatives selected Amchitka Island, one of the Aleutian

Islands, as the site for the underground and surface tests, to be called Operation WINDSTORM

and to be conducted from 15 September to 15 November 1951. During March 1951, they decided

that the tests should be conducted at the NTS and should be coordinated by the Air Force. The

two nuclear events were subsequently renamed Operation JANGLE.

85
Because BUSTER and JANGLE were both scheduled for the fall of 1951 at the NTS,

AFSWP recommended that the two series be conducted as consecutive phases of one series,

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE. On 19 June 1951, the AEC approved the AFSWP

recommendation (Ponton and others, 21 June 1982, pp. 20-22)

6.6.2 BUSTER-JANGLE Test Operations.

Verified DoD participants in Operation BUSTER-JANGLE number about 9,700, serving

in observer programs, tactical maneuvers, damage effects tests, scientific and diagnostic studies,

and support activities (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Approximately 6,500 of these participants

took part in Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and III, Army programs involving members from all four

armed services. The remaining DoD personnel provided support for the Desert Rock exercises

or participated in scientific activities.

Exercise Desert Rock I was conducted at Shot DOG, and Exercises Desert Rock II and III

at Shots SUGAR and UNCLE, respectively. The troop exercises were the first staged by the

Armed Forces during U.S. continental atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. The Desert Rock

exercises included observer programs, tactical maneuvers, and damage effects tests. Observer

programs, conducted at DOG, SUGAR, and UNCLE, generally involved briefings on nuclear

weapons effects, observation of the nuclear detonation, and a subsequent tour of a display of

military equipment exposed to the detonation. Tactical maneuvers, conducted after DOG, were

designed both to train troops and to test military tactics. Damage effects tests, at DOG, SUGAR,

and UNCLE, were performed to determine the effects of a nuclear detonation on military

equipment and field fortifications (Ponton and others, 21 June 1982, pp. 1)

6.6.3 Dose Summary for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE.

The AEC established a dose limit of 1.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation for participants in

Exercise Desert Rock I and a limit of 3.0 R (rem) for the following: participants in Exercises

Desert Rock II and III; the test organization, which coordinated BUSTER-JANGLE; and SWC,

which provided weather and air support, among other functions, for the test organization. SWC

sampling pilots and crews were authorized to receive up to 3.9 R (rem) because their mission

required them to penetrate the clouds resulting from the detonations (Ponton and others, 21 June

1982, p. 4). Table 6-12 summarizes the available dosimetry information:

86
Table 6-12. Summary of external doses for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE as of30 September

1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0,5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 2,025 3,904 476 451 287 5 0

Navy 48 111 72 105 26 0 0

Marines 177 15 1 2 0 0 0

Air Force 168 367 44 53 21 0 0

Field

Command

2 23 3 10 2 0 0

Total for

Each Column

2,420 4,420 596 621 336 5 0

Cumulative total 8,398

6.7 OPERATION TUMBLER-SNAPPER.

Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER, conducted in 1952, was the third series of nuclear

weapons tests at the NTS. The operation consisted of eight nuclear detonations as shown in Table

6-13.

Table 6-13. TUMBLER-SNAPPER shots.

Shot

Date

(1962) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

ABLE 1 April Airdrop 1

BAKER 15 April Airdrop 1

CHARLIE 22 April Airdrop 31

DOG 1 May Airdrop 19

EASY 7 May Tower 12

FOX 25 May Tower 11

GEORGE 1 June Tower 15

HOW 5 June Tower 14

87
6.7.1 Background and Objectives of Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER.

As the defense policy evolved in the early 1950s, two particular factors challenged the

ability of U.S. Armed Forces to defend American interests and to protect its allies during limited

hostilities:

• The commitment of U.S. ground forces to the Korean peninsula, and

• The inability of European allies of the U.S. to develop effective military

capabilities.

In both cases, the United States experienced difficulties because of limitations in military

manpower, which emphasized the need for a new U.S. policy based not on large standing armies,

but on new technological advances, particularly in nuclear weapons.

In 1951, the Chairman of the AEC strongly advocated the development of nuclear weapons

for tactical purposes. "We could," he asserted, "use an atomic bomb today in a tactical war

against enemy troops in the field, against military concentrations near battle areas and against

other vital military targets without risk to our own troops." TUMBLER-SNAPPER was

accordingly designed both to advance the development of effective nuclear weapons and to train

troops in tactical nuclear warfare (Ponton and others, 14 June 1982, p. 25).

The series, like BUSTER-JANGLE, was originally planned as two separate testing

programs: Operation TUMBLER, to be conducted at the NTS before 1 May 1952; and Operation

SNAPPER, scheduled to begin at the NTS on 1 May 1952. Because the programs planned for

the two series sometimes overlapped, they were combined into one operation,

TUMBLER-SNAPPER (Ponton and others, 14 June 1982, pp. 26-28).

The series consisted of two phases. The TUMBLER phase, of primary concern to the

DoD, featured four weapons effects tests: ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, and DOG. These

airdropped devices were detonated to collect information on the effect of the height of burst on

overpressure. Shots CHARLIE and DOG were also part of the SNAPPER phase, of primary

concern to the AEC and LANL. The other weapons development tests in the SNAPPER phase

were EASY, FOX, GEORGE, and HOW. The primary purpose of these four tower shots was

to gather information on nuclear phenomena and to improve the design of nuclear weapons

(Ponton and others, 14 June 1982, p. 1).

6.7.2 TUMBLER-SNAPPER Test Operations.

Approximately 7,350 of the about 10,400 verified DoD participants in Operation

TUMBLER- SNAPPER took part in Exercise Desert Rock IV (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The

remaining DoD personnel assisted in scientific experiments, air support activities, or

administrative and support activities at the NTS (9: 1) (Ponton and others, 14 June 1982, p. 1).

Exercise Desert Rock IV, a training program sponsored by the Army but involving

personnel from all the armed forces, included observer programs at Shots CHARLIE, DOG,
FOX, and GEORGE and tactical maneuvers after Shots CHARLIE, DOG, and GEORGE. The

tactical maneuvers were designed in part to provide realistic training for ground units when

supported by tactical atomic weapons and to determine the psychological reactions of troops

participating in the exercise. The DOG tactical maneuver was the first Marine Corps maneuver

of the CONUS tests. In addition to these activities, Exercise Desert Rock IV involved

psychological tests at CHARLIE, FOX, and GEORGE to gauge the troops' reactions to witnessing

a nuclear detonation (Ponton and others, 14 June 1982, pp. 1, 5).

6.7.3 Dose Summary for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER.

A dose limit of 3.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation per 13-week period was established for

participants in Exercise Desert Rock IV, the joint AEC-DoD organization (coordinator of the

series), and most of the Air Force Special Weapons Center (AFSWC) activities (Ponton and

others, 14 June 1982, p. 7). Table 6-14 presents the available dosimetry information:

Table 6-14. Summary of external doses for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER as of

30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 83 4,437 493 124 18 7 1

Navy 55 427 44 57 3 0 0

Marines 5 2,043 1 1 0 0 0

Air Force 173 1,000 41 47 22 4 0

Field

Command

97 154 25 33 7 0 0

Total for

Each Column

413 8,061 604 262 50 11 1

Cumulative total 9,402

6.

de

8 OPERATION IVY.

IVY, conducted at Enewetak Atoll during the autumn of 1952, consisted of tv

donations. These two detonations, identified in Table 6-15, were the largest nuclear explosio

) to that time:

89

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Table 6-15. IVY shots.

Shot Date (1962) Type Yield

MIKE 1 November Surface 10.4 megatons

KING 16 November Airdrop 500 kilotons

The description of the MIKE detonation by the author of History--Task Group 132.1 and

reproduced in History of Operation IVY bears repeating (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982,

pp. 1, 187):

The Shot, as witnessed aboard the various vessels at sea, is not easily described.

Accompanied by a brilliant light, the heat wave was felt immediately at distances

of thirty to thirty-five miles. The tremendous fireball, appearing on the horizon

like the sun when half-risen, quickly expanded after a momentary hover time and

appeared to be approximately a mile in diameter before the cloud-chamber effect

and scud clouds partially obscured it from view. A very large cloud chamber

effect was visible shortly after the detonation and a tremendous conventional

mushroom-shaped cloud soon appeared, seemingly balanced on a wide dirty stem.

Apparently, the dirty stem was due to the coral particles, debris, and water which

were sucked high into the air. Around the base of the stem, there appeared to be

a curtain of water which soon dropped back around the area where the island of

Elugelab [Eluklab] had been.

Figure 6-6 is a photograph of the MIKE cloud.

6.8.1 Background and Objectives of Operation IVY.

President Truman made the decision to pursue the development of thermonuclear weapons

in 1950. Operation GREENHOUSE was an initial step toward this end, as Section 6.5 explains.

Operation IVY considerably extended the GREENHOUSE advances. MIKE, an experimental

device, produced the first thermonuclear detonation, which means that a substantial portion of its

energy was generated by the fusion, or joining, of hydrogen and other light atoms. KING was

a stockpile weapon, modified to produce a large yield. The energy from KING was generated by

the fission, or splitting, of plutonium atoms (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, p. 1).

The IVY test program was the result not only of scientific and technical considerations,

but also of an intense controversy within elements of the U.S. Government concerned with foreign

policy and defense matters. During the early 1950s, various plans rapidly evolved to meet the

challenge posed by the initial Soviet detonation of 1949. Most plans called for increased

development and production of fission weapons and the required delivery systems. One plan

called for the development of fusion, or thermonuclear, weapons with vastly greater explosive

power. Opponents of fusion weapons argued that the Soviets could be persuaded not to develop

these weapons if the United States would refrain. A further argument, among others, was that

such weapons were not much more effective than high-yield fission weapons.

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The advocates offusion weapons prevailed, and MIKE became the centerpiece of Operation

IVY and the proof-test of the new technology. KING, however, represented a test of the kind of

high-yield fission weapon some ofthe fusion opponents had in mind. To a degree, the KING device

also offered a backup to help ease the national sense of vulnerability in the event that the initial

attempt at a fusion reaction detonation was unsuccessful (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982,

pp. 18-19).

6.8.2 IVY Test Operations.

Operation IVY has approximately 10,600 verified DoD participants (JAYCOR, 6 October

1993). Most military personnel and civilians, either DoD or otherwise, were on Enewetak Atoll or

on task force ships based at the Atoll (JAYCOR, 1 October 1993). These personnel were removed

to evacuation ships before the detonation of MIKE. Most ofthe additional military were Air Force

personnel who were based at Kwajalein, approximately 300 nautical miles southeast of Enewetak

(Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, pp. 178-181).

The experimental program for IVY focused primarily on the MIKE experiment and

secondarily on KING. The effort, subdivided into 11 specific programs, was heavily oriented to

weapons development experiments and focused to a lesser extent on effects experiments (Gladeck

and others, 1 December 1982, pp. 118).

6.8.3 Dose Summary for Operation IVY.

The generally smooth MIKE operations were marred by an accident when a cloud-sampling

pilot was lost at sea after his aircraft ran out of fuel. A seven-man rescue crew flew their aircraft

through a fallout zone to reach the area ofthe downed airplane as soon as possible. In the process,

the crewmembers received radiation doses ranging from 10 to 17.8 R (rem). These levels

considerably exceeded the maximum permissible limit of 3.9 R (rem) of gamma radiation

established for Operation IVY participants.

A crew of 12 in a second aircraft was overexposed when caught in fallout debris while on

a photographic mission just after the MIKE shot. The highest dose for a member ofthis crew was

11.6 R (rem) (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, pp. 18-19). Table 6-16 summarizes available

IVY dosimetry data.

Table 6-16. Summary of external doses for Operation IVY as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 47 1,225 15 30 3 1 0

Navy 17 5,762 23 42 3 0 0

Marines 32 167 1 8 0 0 0

92
Table 6-16. Summary of external doses for Operation IVY as of 30 September 1993. ( Cont'd)

0 >0-0.5 >0.S-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0«5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Air Force 109 2,590 39 43 3 5 14

Field

Command

202 10 0 3 0 0 0

Coast Guard 0 2 0 0 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

407 9,756 78 126 9 6 14

Cumulative total 10,396

6.9 OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE.

Conducted at the NTS in 1953, Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE consisted of 11 nuclear

tests, a number exceeding that of any previous nuclear test series. Table 6-17 summarizes these

shots.

Table 6-17. UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE shots.

Shot

Date

(1953) Type

Yield

(kilotoss)

ANNIE 17 March Tower 16

NANCY 24 March Tower 24

RUTH 31 March Tower 0.2

DIXIE 6 April Airdrop 11

RAY 11 April Tower 0.2

BADGER 18 April Tower 23

SIMON 25 April Tower 43

ENCORE 8 May Airdrop 27

HARRY 19 May Tower 32

GRABLE 25 May Airburst 15

CLIMAX 4 June Airdrop 61

93
ANNIE, the first device tested, was an "open shot," meaning that reporters were allowed to

view the detonation from News Nob, 11 kilometers south of the shot-tower. The Government

wanted to show the American public that nuclear weapons could be used defensively, without

destroying large urban centers and populations (Ponton and others, 11 January 1982, pp. 1,3,30-31).

Among the experiments conducted during ANNIE was Operation DOORSTEP, which investigated

the effect of a nuclear explosion on two typical two-story frame houses.

The firing of GRABLE from a 280 mm cannon, shown in Figure 6-7 marked the first time

an atomic artillery shell was fired and detonated. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the

Army, and the Army Chief of Staff, along with 96 Congressional observers, viewed the detonation

from an area 11 kilometers west of ground zero (Massie and others, 15 January 1982, p. 120).

6.9.1 Background and Objectives of Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE.

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE went a step further than the previous CONUS series,

TUMBLER-SNAPPER, which had explored the use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes.

Designed to address both the tactical and strategic considerations of the U.S. defense policy,

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was designed to accomplish the following (Ponton and others, 11 January

1982, p. 33):

• Establish military doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons, and

• Improve the nuclear weapons used for strategic bomber delivery and those used for

tactical battlefield situations.

Like the earlier BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-SNAPPER series, UPSHOTKNOTHOLE was initially envisioned as two separate weapons testing programs: Operation

UPSHOT and Operation KNOTHOLE. Plans began in late 1951 for a large military effects test,

later called Operation KNOTHOLE, to be conducted during the spring of 1953 at the NTS. The

objective was to obtain general weapons effects information to supplement the data obtained from

Operation GREENHOUSE, conducted at the Pacific during the spring of 1951.

Meanwhile, the AEC was planning Operation UPSHOT, with the earliest test date set for

spring 1953. The DoD consequently accelerated its planning for Operation KNOTHOLE so that

arrangements for the AEC and DoD tests could be coordinated. In June 1952, the DoD and AEC

agreed to conduct the spring of 1953 tests as a combined operation, designated

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE (Ponton and others, 11 January 1982, p. 32).

6.9.2 UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Test Operations.

Verified DoD participants in UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE number about 18,900 in observer

programs, tactical maneuvers, scientific studies, and support activities (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993).

The largest DoD participation was in Exercise Desert Rock V, which involved members of all four

armed services. Exercise Desert Rock V included troop orientation and training, a volunteer officer

observer program, tactical troop maneuvers, operational helicopter tests, and damage effects

94
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evaluation. The troop orientation and training included briefings before the detonation on nuclear

weapons characteristics and effects and on personal protection. Troop orientation and training also

involved observation of a nuclear detonation, as did the volunteer officer observer program. For the

latter, trained staff officers calculated the effects of a nuclear detonation to determine a minimum

safe distance for observing the blast; they later watched the detonation from the calculated position.

Among the other activities, the operational helicopter tests performed by the Marine Corps were

designed to investigate the capability of helicopters and their crews to withstand a nuclear burst and

its effects (Ponton and others, 11 January 1982, p. 1).

6.9.3 Dose Summary for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE.

The maximum permissible dose for participants in the Joint Test Organization (JTO), which

coordinated UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, and AFSWC was 3.9 R (rem) of gamma radiation for the

series. The limits were higher for Desert Rock V participants, according to the requirements oftheir

missions. Desert Rock V troops were restricted to a maximum of 6.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation

for the series, with no more than 3.0 R (rem) of prompt radiation. The volunteer officer observers

were limited to 10.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation, with no more than 5.0 R (rem) ofprompt radiation

per test, and a total of no more than 25.0 R (rem) for the exercise.

The calculated mean gamma and neutron doses for the volunteer observers have been

reconstructed as 0.64 rem gamma and 0.63 rem neutron for Shot NANCY; 7.2 rem gamma and 2.4

rem neutron for Shot BADGER; and 13.6 rem gamma and 28 rem neutron for Shot SIMON (Goetz

and others 28, April 1981, p. 95). Table 6-18 summarizes available UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

dosimetry.

Table 6-18. Summary of external doses for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE as of 30 September

1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-l,0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 : >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 147 3,736 1,028 5,208 1,848 60 11

Navy 109 300 191 202 88 17 1

Marines 92 214 5 911 1,006 20 1

Air Force 370 838 269 278 44 17 4

Field

Command

6 13 4 2 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

Cumulative tot

724

al

5,101 1,497 6,601 2,986 114 17

17,040

96
6.10 OPERATION CASTLE.

CASTLE was conducted at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls during the spring of 1954. The first

event of this series, Shot BRAVO, had a yield of 15 megatons and was the largest device ever

detonated by the U.S. Government as part of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. Table 6-19

provides specifics on this detonation, shown in Figure 6-8, as well as the other five in the series

(Martin and Rowland, 1 April 1982, p. 1):

Table 6-19. CASTLE shots.

Shot

Date

(1954) Type Yield

BRAVO 1 March Surface 15 megatons

ROMEO 27 March Barge 11 megatons

KOON 7 April Surface llOkilotons

UNION 26 April Barge 6.9 megatons

YANKEE 5 May Barge 13.5 megatons

NECTAR 14 May Barge | 1.69 megatons

6.10.1 Background and Objectives of Operation CASTLE.

CASTLE was the culmination in the development ofthe hydrogen bomb that began in 1950.

Shot GEORGE, a test in the 1951 GREENHOUSE series, had demonstrated the initiation of a

sustained thermonuclear reaction by use of a fission reaction. Fusion, or thermonuclear, reactions

had been used in 1952 to generate the very powerful detonation ofthe MIKE device in Operation

IVY, but MIKE was not a deliverable nuclear weapon. In BRAVO, the first CASTLE test, a device

more powerful than MIKE was exploded that, although not a weapon, was capable of delivery by

an aircraft.

CASTLE also was the first Pacific series in which LLNL provided a nuclear device for

testing, detonated as Shot KOON. All previous nuclear test devices had been designed at LANL

(Martin and Rowland, 1 April 1982, p. 26).

6.10.2 CASTLE Test Operations.

Numerous technical experiments were carried out in conjunction with each of the six

detonations. These experiments measured the yield and efficiency ofthe devices and attempted to

gauge the military effects ofthe explosions. The approximately 18,500 verified DoD participants

in this series had duty stations at the AEC design laboratories or were members ofunits performing

separate experiments or various support roles (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Almost all ofthe Navy

support personnel were at Bikini, where Navy ships provided living quarters for participants who

97
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were evacuated from the islands for the first test and then could not return to live there because of

the potential for radiation exposure from BRAVO fallout (Martin and Rowland, 1 April 1982, p. 2).

6.10.3 Dose Summary for Operation CASTLE.

Among the CASTLE detonations, only BRAVO produced significant, unexpected personnel

radiation exposures. This first shot ofthe series, which significantly exceeded its expected yield,

released unprecedented quantities of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. Ambient winds

dispersed the radioactive particles over a much larger area than had been anticipated. This resulted

in contamination and exposure ofMarshall Island residents, Japanese fishermen, and U.S. personnel

on distant atolls or aboard various vessels. Acute radiation effects were observed among some of

these people.

Some DoD personnel exceeded the maximum permissible limit of 3.9 R (rem) of gamma

radiation within any 13-week period ofthe operation. BRAVO fallout on some Navy ships resulted

in personnel who had doses approaching or exceeding this limit. To allow for completion ofthe

CASTLE tests, it became necessary to issue a number ofwaiver authorizations permitting doses of

as much as 7.8 R (rem) to specific individuals. In a limited number ofshipboard cases, even this

level was exceeded. Substantial overdoses from BRAVO, the highest for any test series, were

accrued by the 28 Air Force and Army personnel on Rongerik Atoll. Film badge readings suggest

that three members ofthe U.S. Navy Bikini Boat Pool also may have received substantial doses in

excess ofthe series limits; however, a thorough investigation at the time failed to indicate reasons

for these readings (Martin and Rowland, 1 April 1982, pp. 243-244). As a result ofBRAVO, 21

individuals on USS PHILIP (DDE 498) and 16 on USS BAIROKO (CVE 115) sustained lesions that

were classified as beta burns, all of which healed without complications (Martin and Rowland, 1

April 1982, pp. 243-244). Table 6-20 summarizes available dosimetry data.

Table 6-20. Summary of external doses for Operation CASTLE as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 27 338 795 344 65 13 2

Navy 417 4,359 1,457 2,385 686 336 12

Marines 3 169 8 99 29 5 0

Air Force 286 807 201 967 63 32 32

Field

Command

4 3 3 8 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

737 5,676 2,464 3,803 843 386 46

Cumulative total 13,955

99
6.11 OPERATION TEAPOT.

Conducted in 1955, Operation TEAPOT was the fifth series of CONUS tests. Two ofthe

14 nuclear detonations in the series, APPLE 1 and WASP PRIME, occurred on the same day,

although in different parts of the NTS. ESS, the only TEAPOT subsurface detonation (-67 feet),

forced tons of earth upward, thereby creating a crater 88 meters wide and 96 feet deep. APPLE 2

was an "open shot," that is, press coverage was allowed.

The TEAPOT schedule was continually revised as the AEC waited for appropriate weather

conditions for firing the test shots. The delay in one shot often resulted in postponing subsequent

shots, regardless ofthe weather. The many schedule changes, affecting all but the first two shots,

caused a six-week extension of TEAPOT from 1 April to 15 May. Table 6-21 provides data on the

TEAPOT tests (Ponton and others, 23 November 1981, pp. 1-9, 29).

Table 6-21. TEAPOT shots.

Shot Date (1955) Type

Yield

(kiiotons)

WASP 18 February Airdrop 1

MOTH 22 February Tower 2

TESLA 1 March Tower 7

TURK 7 March Tower 43

HORNET 12 March Tower 4

BEE 22 March Tower 8

ESS 23 March Crater 1

APPLE 1 29 March Tower 14

WASP PRIME 29 March Airdrop 3

HA 6 April Airdrop 3

POST 9 April Tower 2

MET 15 April Tower 22

APPLE 2 5 May Tower 29

ZUCCHINI 15 May Tower 28

100
6.11.1 Background and Objectives of Operation TEAPOT.

Operation TEAPOT furthered the efforts of a previous CONUS series, Operation UPSHOTKNOTHOLE (1953), which had studied both the tactical and strategic uses ofnuclear weapons (see

Section 6.9). Authorized by President Eisenhower on 30 August 1954, TEAPOT had two primary

objectives:

• To establish military doctrine and tactics for the use of ground forces on a nuclear

battlefield, and

• To improve the nuclear weapons used for strategic bomber delivery and missile

delivery and those used for tactical battlefield situations.

The DoD conducted Exercise Desert Rock VI to achieve the first objective, and the AEC fielded

scientific experiments to achieve the second (Ponton and others, 23 November 1981, pp. 27-28).

6.11.2 TEAPOT Test Operations.

Observer programs, tactical maneuvers, scientific studies, and support activities involved the

approximately 10,300 verified DoD participants (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The largest number,

about 8,000, took part in Exercise Desert Rock VI, which included observer programs at Shots

WASP, MOTH, TESLA, TURK, BEE, ESS, APPLE 1, and APPLE 2 and troop tests at Shots BEE

and APPLE 2. The largest single TEAPOT activity was the Marine Brigade Exercise at BEE, which

involved about 300 officers and 1,950 enlisted men. The objective of the exercise was to train

personnel and to test the tactics and techniques employed if a nuclear detonation were used to

support an air-ground task force. The troop test at APPLE 2, involving about 1,000 troops, was

designed to demonstrate the capability of a reinforced tank battalion to seize an objective

immediately after a nuclear detonation. APPLE 2 also included Operation CUE conducted by the

Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The FCDA conducted 40 separate projects for

Operation CUE. All projects were designed to evaluate the effects of a nuclear detonation on a

civilian community and to test the capabilities oflocal civil defense organizations to respond to such

an emergency with prompt rescue and recovery operations. In addition to these activities, technical

studies were conducted at 10 ofthe shots (Ponton and others, 23 November 1981, pp. 1-7, 51-52).

6.11.3 Dose Summary for Operation TEAPOT.

The maximum dose limit for personnel ofthe JTO, which coordinated Operation TEAPOT,

and AFSWC was 3.9 R (rem) of gamma radiation during the series. The limit for Desert Rock

troops was 6.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation during the series, with no more than 3.0 R (rem) of

prompt radiation. The Desert Rock troops had this higher limit because they, unlike JTO and some

AFSWC technical personnel, were not likely to be exposed to radiation after the tests (Ponton and

others, 23 November 1981, pp. 2-3)

101
The 10 Desert Rock volunteer officer observers at APPLE 2 were authorized a special limit

of 10.0 R (rem) of gamma radiation. Their calculated mean gamma and neutron dose are 1.6 rem

gamma and 4.5 rem neutron (Goetz and others, 15 July 1980, p 77). Table 6-22 summarizes

available dosimetry data.

Table 6-22. Summary of external doses for Operation TEAPOT as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 284 2,471 1,117 878 636 62 3

Navy 134 204 47 202 24 0 4

Marines 58 437 1,446 4 0 0 0

Air Force 467 537 75 105 55 4 4

Field

Command

7 10 3 10 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

950 3,659 2,688 1,199 715 66 11

Cumulative total 9,288

6.12 OPERATION WIGWAM.

Operation WIGWAM consisted of only one nuclear detonation, a deep underwater test

conducted in the Pacific Ocean approximately 500 miles southwest of San Diego, California. The

device was suspended by cable from an unmanned barge and detonated at a depth of 2,000 feet in

water 16,000 feet deep. The test, which had a yield of 30 kilotons, occurred on 14 May 1955 at 1300

hours Pacific time (Weary and others, 1 September 1981, p. 9).

The test site was chosen after careful deliberation. At DoD request, Scripps Institution of

Oceanography surveyed various locations in the Pacific, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic. The site

had to be deep enough to contain the detonation, yet away from undersea or sea bottom

perturbations, such as sea mounts, ridges, and islands. Migratory fishing areas were to be avoided.

In addition, the site was to have fairly well-known currents and thermal gradients, a predominance

of good weather, and isolation from shipping lanes. The area selected was judged the best to fulfill

the requirements (Weary and others, 1 September 1981, p. 1-11).

6.12.1 Background and Objectives of Operation WIGWAM.

Prior to WIGWAM, nuclear weapons had been tested in the atmosphere, on the surface of

the earth or water, or at a shallow depth either underwater or on land. Considerable interest

developed, particularly within the Navy, in investigating deep underwater effects by detonating a

102
weapon at sufficient depth to contain all the initial energy of the nuclear explosion in the water

(Weary and others, 1 September 1981, p. 1-3).

The Navy needed to know how a deep underwater shot would affect naval forces and,

specifically, the answers to two leading questions: (1) What are the characteristics and lethal ranges

ofthe resulting underwater shock wave; and (2) What are the effects ofthe radioactivity, following

the explosion, on naval tactical operations? For example, could a surface vessel use a nuclear depth

charge to destroy submerged enemy submarines without endangering itself? Specific answers to

these questions were required to plan possible naval use ofthese weapons (Weary and others, 1

September 1981, pp. 1-3,1-5).

6.12.2 WIGWAM Test Operations.

Operation WIGWAM has about 6,810 verified participants, aboard 30 ships and supporting

land-based aircraft (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). They conducted or supported the four scientific

programs designed to collect the desired data (Weary and others, 1 September 1981, pp. 9, 1-3).

A six-mile towline connected the fleet tug, USS TAWASA (ATF 92), and the barge from

which the nuclear device was suspended. Located along this towline were a variety of

pressure-measuring instruments, unmanned and specially prepared submerged submarine-like hulls

(called squaws), as well as unmanned and instrumented surface vessels (Weary and others, 1

September 1981, p. 1-12).

The ships and personnel conducting the test were positioned five miles upwind from the

barge that suspended the nuclear device. The only exceptions were for USS GEORGE EASTMAN

(YAG 39) and USS GRANVILLE S. HALL (YAG 40). These two extensively reconfigured ships,

equipped with special shielding to prevent radiological exposure, were stationed five miles

downwind from the barge. Recovery parties later reentered the test area with radiological safety

monitors after aerial surveys showed the general location and size ofthe contaminated water area

and the radiation levels (Weary and others, 1 September 1981, pp. 1-14,2-7).

6.12.3 Dose Summary for Operation WIGWAM.

The maximum dose limit established for WIGWAM was 3.9 R (rem) ofgamma radiation for

the duration ofthe operation. The two vessels (YAG 39 and YAG 40) stationed downwind ofthe

detonation were subjected to contamination by water droplets of the base surge. Because of the

special shielding, however, none ofthe YAG personnel exceeded the radiation limit. All doses were

low because most ofthe radioactivity was confined deep under the surface ofthe water (Weary and

others, 1 September 1981, pp. 10-11).

WIGWAM was the first series in which nearly all participants were issued film badges.

Personnel whose duties were such that exposure to radiation was possible (such as sampling

radioactive water, recovering equipment or instruments) were issued additional film badges on a

daily basis. One ofthe vessels, the USS WRIGHT (CVL 49), contained a film processing center

103
where badges were read and personnel exposures were recorded. Table 6-23 summarizes available

dosimetry data.

Table 6-23. Summary of external doses for Operation WIGWAM as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >Q.5-L0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.§

Army 8 2 0 0 0 0 0

Navy 6,151 452 1 1 0 0 0

Marines 118 13 0 1 0 0 0

Air Force 36 26 0 0 0 0 o

Total for Each

Column

6,313 493 1 2 0 0 0

Cumulative tota? 6,809

6.13 OPERATION REDWING.

REDWING was conducted in 1956 as the sixth nuclear test series at the Marshall Islands,

specifically at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls. The series consisted of 17 detonations as shown in

Table 6-24. Figure 6-9 presents a photograph taken during the ERIE detonation, the fifth shot of

the series. It shows a group on Enewetak facing away from the detonation as it breaks the predawn

darkness.

Table 6-24. REDWING shots.

SÜsOt Date (1956) Type Yield

LACROSSE 5 May Surface 40 kilotons [

CHEROKEE 21 May Airdrop 3.8 megatons j

ZUNI 28 May Surface 3.5 megatons

YUMA 28 May Tower

j 0.19 kilotons

ERIE 31 May Tower 14.9 kilotons

SEMINOLE 6 June Surface 13.7 kilotons |

FLATHEAD 12 June Barge 365 kilotons

BLACKFOOT 12 June Tower 8 kilotons

KICKAPOO 14 June Tower 1.49 kilotons

104
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105
Table 6-24. REDWING shots. (Cont'd)

Shot Date (1956) Type YieJd

OSAGE 16 June Airdrop 1.7 kilotons

INCA 22 June Tower 15.2 kilotons

DAKOTA 26 June Barge 1.1 megatons

MOHAWK 3 July Tower 360 kilotons

APACHE 9 July Barge 1.85 megatons

NAVAJO 11 July Barge 4.5 megatons

TEWA 21 July Barge 5 megatons

HURON 22 July Barge 250 kilotons

6.13.1 Background and Objectives of Operation REDWING.

The main purpose ofOperation REDWING was to test high-yield thermonuclear devices that

could not be tested in Nevada. The only shot ofthe series not expressly for weapons development

was CHEROKEE, which was airdropped from a B-52 bomber. Its primary purpose was to

demonstrate the ability ofthe U.S. to deliver large-yield nuclear devices. The event was viewed by

15 press observers, the first such group invited to view a Pacific nuclear test since the

CROSSROADS detonations of 1946. Seventeen invited Civil Defense officials also observed the

shot (Bruce-Henderson and others, 1 August 1982, pp. 2-23, 177).

During CASTLE, the fifth nuclear test series conducted in the Marshall Islands, a serious

fallout contamination incident from Shot BRAVO had affected not only U.S. personnel but Marshall

Island residents and Japanese fishermen as well. On 27 April, eight days before the first REDWING

detonation, a joint DoD-AEC press release identified the safety precautions in effect for the series.

It described the improved fallout prediction capability available and the extensive monitoring that

was to be done both at the PPG and beyond. It also described programs for surveying marine life

in the Pacific. Moreover, the release stated that the yields ofthe devices to be tested were expected

to be lower than the largest ofthose detonated as part of Operation CASTLE (Bruce-Henderson and

others, 1 August 1982, pp. 21-22).

6.13.2 REDWING Test Operations.

Numerous technical experiments were carried out in conjunction with each of the 17

detonations. These experiments measured the yield and efficiency ofthe devices and attempted to

gauge the military effects ofthe explosions. Operation REDWING has about 14,700 verified DoD

participants (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Also present at the tests were several thousand personnel

from the AEC and its contractors, a few from other Government agencies, and some foreign

observers as well (Bruce-Henderson and others, 1 August 1982, p. 2).

106
Most of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel were on ships operating around Bikini

providing supply, evacuation capability, and other support to the tests there. Most ofthe Army and

Air Force personnel were on Enewetak. All the Services had personnel assigned to laboratory

organizations whose operations were conducted on both atolls as well as other locations in the

Pacific (Bruce-Henderson and others, 1 August 1982, p. 3).

6.13.3 Dose Summary for Operation REDWING.

TEWA, the last REDWING event fired at Bikini, led to an increase in personnel doses. The

edge of the TEWA cloud passed over Enewetak causing fallout on the Enewetak base camp.

Because the incident occurred toward the end ofthe series, some personnel had already returned to

the United States. The remaining Enewetak personnel, however, received additional doses

calculated at 2.0 to 3.3 R (rem) from this incident.

The personnel limit was set at 3.9 R (rem) of gamma radiation for the series. The highest

doses were received by Air Force flight officers whose missions required them to penetrate the

clouds resulting from the nuclear detonations (Bruce-Henderson and others, 1 August 1982, pp. 3-4).

Table 6-25 summarizes available dosimetry data.

Table 6-25. Summary of external doses for Operation REDWING as of 30 September 1993.*

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 X)-0.5 XK5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 15 294 689 876 657 57 1

Navy 816 2,512 1,837 1,630 242 18 0

Marines 13 76 65 123 7 0 0

Air Force 230 810 519 1,104 714 87 13

Field

Command

6 31 2 32 0 0 0

Coast Guard 0 5 0 8 4 0 0

Total for Each

Column

1,080 3,728 3,112 3,773 1,624 162 14

Cumulative total 13,492

* Many of the REDWING doses are possibly overstated due to environmentally damaged film

badges.

107
6.14 OPERATION PLUMBBOB.

Conducted at the NTS in 1957, Operation PLUMBBOB included the 24 nuclear detonations

summarized in Table 6-26. The series also included six safety experiments, conducted to ensure that

no nuclear reaction would occur ifthe high explosive components ofthe device were accidentally

detonated during storage or transport (Harris and others, 15 September 1981, pp. 1,6,7). These tests

are discussed with the subsequent safety experiments in Section 6.18.

Table 6-26. PLUMBBOB shots.

Shot Date (1957) Type Yield

BOLTZMANN 28 May Tower 12kilotons

FRANKLIN 2 June Tower 140 tons

LASSEN 5 June Balloon 0.5 tons

WILSON 18 June Balloon lOkilotons

PRISCILLA 24 June Balloon 37 kilotons

HOOD 5 July Balloon 74 kilotons

DIABLO 15 July Tower 17 kilotons

JOHN 19 July Air to air missile about 2 kilotons

KEPLER 24 July Tower 10 kilotons

OWENS 25 July Balloon 9.7 kilotons

STOKES 7 August Balloon 19 kilotons

SHASTA 18 August Tower 17 kilotons

DOPPLER 23 August Balloon 11 kilotons

FRANKLIN PRIME 30 August Balloon 4.7 kilotons

SMOKY 31 August Tower 44 kilotons

GALILEO 2 September Tower 11 kilotons

WHEELER 6 September Balloon 197 tons

LAPLACE 8 September Balloon 1 kiloton

FIZEAU 14 September Tower 11 kilotons

NEWTON 16 September Balloon 12 kilotons

RAINIER 19 September Tunnel 1.7 kilotons

108
Table 6-26. PLUMBBOB shots. (Cont'd)

Shot Date (1957) Type Yield

WHITNEY 23 September Tower 19kilotons

CHARLESTON 28 September Balloon 12 kilotons

MORGAN 7 October Balloon 8 kilotons

6.14.1 Background and Objectives of Operation PLUMBBOB.

Largely a joint AEC/DoD effort, Operation PLUMBBOB was planned as an integral part of

the continuing U.S. program for developing the means to conduct nuclear warfare in defense ofthe

nation. The AEC wanted to test a number of nuclear devices scheduled for production for the

defense stockpile or to test improvements in weapons design. Shot RANIER was exploded in a

tunnel and no radioactive release was detected. Consequently, it was the first U.S. nuclear test

contained underground. The DoD used the series to continue its study ofmilitary weapons effects

and, with Exercises Desert Rock VII and VIII, its training ofpersonnel in nuclear operations (Harris

and others, 15 September 1981, p. 34).

6.14.2 PLUMBBOB Test Operations.

About 13,200 DoD personnel are verified PLUMBBOB participants in observer programs,

tactical maneuvers, weapons development effects experiments and support activities during

Operation PLUMBBOB (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Exercises Desert Rock VII and VIII,

consisting of training programs, tactical maneuvers, and technical service projects, engaged the

largest DoD participation. At Shot HOOD, approximately 2,150 Marines took part in a maneuver

involving the use of a helicopter airlift and tactical air support. An estimated 1,144 Army troops

(Task Force WARRIOR) participated in an airlift assault at Shot SMOKY, and about 110 Army

troops (Task Force BIG BANG) were interviewed at Shot GALILEO to determine their

psychological reaction to witnessing a detonation (Harris and others, 15 September 1981, pp. 1,4-5).

6.14.3 Dose Summary for Operation PLUMBBOB.

The maximum dose limit established for Desert Rock troops was 5.0 R (rem) of gamma

radiation in any six-month period, with no more than 2.0 R (rem) to be from prompt radiation.

Participants in activities ofthe AEC Nevada Test Organization and AFSWC were limited to 3.0 R

(rem) for any 13-week period and 5.0 rem for one calendar year (Harris and others, 15 October 1981,

pp. 2-3). Table 6-27 summarizes available dosimetry data.

109
Table 6-27. Summary of external doses for Operation PLUMBBOB as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

III:!'"11 >0«0.S >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3,O-5.0 >5,0-10.0 >10.0

Army 969 4,992 707 543 56 18 1

Navy 375 202 36 133 4 2 1

Marines 216 523 1,232 180 2 1 0

Air Force 961 790 120 104 22 18 3

Field Command 359 250 36 30 0 0 0

Total for each

column

Total personnel \

2,880

vith exte

6,757

rnaldose

2,131 990 84 39 5

12,886

6.15 OPERATION HARDTACK I.

HARDTACK was the designation for U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing in both the Pacific

and Nevada during 1958. Phase I, discussed in this section, consisted of 34 Pacific nuclear

detonations. The series encompassed a wide variety of events, as indicated in Table 6-28 (Gladeck

and others, 1 December 1982, pp. 23-24).

All but two ofthe detonations were at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls in the Marshall Islands.

TEAK and ORANGE, high-altitude detonations, occurred 77 and 43 kilometers over Johnston

Island, which lies about 700 nautical miles west-southwest of the Hawaiian Islands. A Honolulu

resident described the TEAK burst, which took place ten minutes before midnight, in a front-page

story for the 1 August Honolulu Star-Bulletin (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, pp. 1, 266).

I stepped out on the lanai and saw what must have been the

reflection ofthe fireball. It turned from light yellow to dark yellow

and from orange to red.

The red spread in a semi-circular manner until it seemed to

engulf a large part ofthe horizon.

A cloud rose in the center ofthe circle. It was quite large and

clearly visible. It remained visible for about a half hour.

It looked much closer than Johnston Island. The elevation of

the circle was perhaps 20° above the horizon.

110
Table 6-28. HARDTACK I shots.

Shot Date (1958) Type Yield

YUCCA 28 April High Altitude (Balloon) 1.7 kiloton

CACTUS 6 May Surface 18kilotons

FIR 12 May Barge 1.36 megatons

BUTTERNUT 12 May Barge 81 kilotons

KOA 13 May Surface 1.37 megatons

WAHOO 16 May Underwater 9 kilotons

HOLLY 21 May Barge 5.9 kilotons

NUTMEG 22 May Barge 25.1 kilotons

YELLOWWOOD 26 May Barge 330 kilotons

MAGNOLIA 27 May Barge 57 kilotons

TOBACCO 30 May Barge 11.6 kilotons

SYCAMORE 31 May Barge 92 kilotons

ROSE 3 June Barge 15 kilotons

UMBRELLA 9 June Underwater 8 kilotons

MAPLE 11 June Barge 213 kilotons

ASPEN 15 June Barge 319 kilotons

WALNUT 15 June Barge 1.45 megatons

LINDEN 18 June Barge 11 kilotons

REDWOOD 28 June Barge 412 kilotons

ELDER 28 June Barge 880 kilotons

OAK 29 June Barge 8.9 megatons

HICKORY 29 June Barge 14 kilotons

SEQUOIA 2 July Barge 5.2 kilotons

CEDAR 3 July Barge 220 kilotons

DOGWOOD 6 July Barge 397 kilotons

POPLAR 12 July Barge 9.3 megatons

111
Table 6-28. HARDTACK I shots. (Cont'd)

Shot Date (1958) Type Yield

PISONIA 18 July Barge 225 kilotons

JUNIPER 22 July Barge 65 kilotons

OLIVE 23 July Barge 202 kilotons

PINE 27 July Barge 2 megatons

TEAK 31 July High Altitude (Rocket) 3.8 megatons

QUINCE 6 August Surface Zero

ORANGE 11 August High Altitude (Rocket) 3.8 megatons

FIG 18 August Surface 0.02 kilotons

6.15.1 Background and Objectives of Operation HARDTACK I.

HARDTACK I consisted of three parts. The first, aimed at the development of nuclear

weapons, continued the type of device design testing that had been conducted at Enewetak and

Bikini during the early and mid-1950s. The AEC weapon development laboratories (LANL and

LLNL) detonated experimental devices, with the DoD providing support and conducting military

effects experiments that did not interfere with AEC activities.

The second part, sponsored by DoD, consisted of two underwater tests: Shot WAHOO,

which was detonated in the open ocean about four miles south of the barrier reef that surrounds

Enewetak Lagoon and Shot UMBRELLA, which was detonated in the lagoon. These tests, which

furthered efforts undertaken with the 1946 CROSSROADS and the 1955 WIGWAM series, were

designed to gain additional data on the effects of underwater explosions on Navy ships and material

(Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, p. 1).

The third part, sponsored by DoD, addressed a military problem that was newer: nuclear

weapons in air and ballistic missile defense. Shots YUCCA, TEAK, and ORANGE, also called

Operation NEWSREEL by DoD, were directed to this concern (Gladeck and others, 1 December

1982, p. 3).

6.15.2 HARDTACK I Test Operations.

The HARDTACK experimental program incorporated two aspects: the development ofthe

weapons and the measurement of the explosive and radiation effects. The AEC was primarily

interested in weapons development, and the DoD focused on weapons effects, specifically

concerning the military application ofthe weapons (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982, p. 3).

112
Verified DoD participants in HARDTACK I number approximately 17,800 (JAYCOR,

6 October 1993). They took part in the weapons development experiments by providing

cloud-sampling aircraft and crews, along with ship patrols, instrument placement and recovery, and

radioactive sample return. Their primary participation, however, was in the effects experiments

associated with the underwater and high-altitude shots (Gladeck and others, 1 December 1982,

p. 105).

6.15.3 Dose Summary for Operation HARDTACK I.

The maximum permissible dose for HARDTACK I personnel was set at 3.75 R (rem) of

gamma radiation per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 R (rem) for the operation.

The crew of air-sampling aircraft were authorized a special limit of 10.0 R (rem). In case of

operational error or emergency, an additional dose of 10.0 R (rem) would be accepted (Gladeck and

others, 1 December 1982, pp. 3-4).

During the series, one incident involved the unplanned exposure of participants to

significantly elevated radiation levels. On 14 May, the base islands of Enewetak and Parry at

Enewetak Atoll received fallout from a test shot detonated at Bikini the day before (Gladeck and

others, 1 December 1982, pp. 4-5). According to current calculations, the period of fallout, which

lasted about 60 hours, could have contributed 1.64 R (rem) through 31 May 1958, 2.2 R (rem)

through 30 June 1958, and 2.53 R (rem) through 31 July 1958 to personnel on the residence islands

of Enewetak Atoll. Table 6-29 summarizes available dosimetry data.

Table 6-29. Summary of external doses for Operation HARDTACK I as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0~0.5 >0.S-1.0 >1.0«3.G >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >1<K0

Army 101 220 266 1,047 64 2 0

Navy 1,680 3,384 3,369 1,424 21 1 0

Marines 5 60 109 48 3 0 0

Air Force 670 899 476 1,818 181 72 8

Field

Command

14 21 22 42 1 0 0

Coast Guard 3 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total for each

column

2,473 4,584 4,242 4,379 270 75 8

Cumulative total 16,031

113
6.16 OPERATION ARGUS.

ARGUS, the code name for the only U.S. atmospheric nuclear test operation in the Atlantic

Ocean, consisted ofthe three high-altitude, low-yield detonations identified in Table 6-30. The

nuclear devices were lifted to an altitude of 300 miles by rockets fired from the missile trials ship

USS NORTON SOUND (AVM 1), one ofthe nine ships participating in the series (Jones and others,

30 April 1982, p. 1).

The operation was conducted in the South Atlantic at about 45° south longitude. The location

placed the task force outside regular shipping lanes but kept the launch well within the range ofU.S.

military forces required for support ofARGUS scientific projects (Jones and others, 30 April 1982,

p. 19).

Table 6-30. ARGUS shots.

Shot

(1958)

Type Yield

(kilotons)

ARGUS I 27 August Rocket 1-2

ARGUS II 30 August Rocket 1-2

ARGUS III 6 September Rocket 1-2

6.16.1 Background and Objectives of Operation ARGUS.

ARGUS was unique among U.S. atmospheric nuclear test operations in a number ofrespects.

It was one ofthe most expeditiously planned and executed of all U.S. nuclear tests, requiring just

five months from inception to execution, in contrast to the normal period of one or more years.

Besides TRINITY, it consisted ofthe only clandestine tests conducted during the 18-year period of

U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing. The intentions of all phases of the ARGUS operation were

concealed not only from other nations but also from the majority of DoD participants in the tests.

In addition, ARGUS was the first shipboard launch of a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead

(Jones and others, 30 April 1982, pp. 11, 18).

Most significant of all, the purpose ofARGUS did not fit the usual categories: the ARGUS

shots, strictly speaking, involved neither diagnostic tests of a weapon design nor effects tests on

military systems. The objective was to establish the practicality of a theory, postulated by Nicholas

Christofilos, a physicist at LLNL, that a very-high-altitude nuclear detonation of proper yield would

produce phenomena of potentially significant military importance by interfering with

communications and weapon performance. When the Eisenhower Administration officially

announced the occurrence ofthe tests on 19 March 1959, the New York Times headlined ARGUS

as the "Greatest Scientific Experiment Ever Conducted" (Jones and others, 30 April 1982,

pp. 11-12).

114
The operation proved the validity ofthe Christofilos theory. It not only provided data on

military considerations, but also produced a great mass ofgeophysical information (Jones and others,

30 April 1982, p. 2).

6.16.2 ARGUS Test Operations.

The series was conducted by Task Force 88, a naval organization consisting ofnine ships and

about 4,520 verified DoD participants (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Coordinated measurement

programs using satellite, rocket, aircraft, and surface stations were carried out by the Services and

other government agencies and contractors throughout the world.

6.16.3 Dose Summary for Operation ARGUS.

The ARGUS operation plan was silent about maximum permissible levels of radiation

exposure, and the detonation occurred at such distances above the earth that the possibility of

personnel exposures to ionizing radiation was considered remote (Jones and others, 30 April 1982,

p. 50). The highest level recorded by the 264 film badges distributed to the task force personnel was

0.010 R (rem). The highest level recorded, 0.025 R (rem), was by a control film badge, which was

not issued to personnel but remained in storage in a radiation-free area within a ship. Another

control badge read 0.020 R (rem). These readings were so low that they probably were spurious and

the result of environmental effects on film emulsions (Jones and others, 30 April 1982, p. 2).

6.17 OPERATION HARDTACK II.

HARDTACK II was the continental phase of Operation HARDTACK, also conducted in

195 8. HARDTACK II consisted of 19 nuclear weapons tests and 18 safety experiments (Ponton and

others, 3 December 1982, p. 1). The next section, 6.18, discusses the safety experiments. This

section concentrates on the weapons related tests, identified in Table 6-31.

Table 6-31. HARDTACK II shots.

Shot Date (1958) Type Yield (kilotons)

EDDY 19 September Balloon 0.083

MORA 29 September Balloon 2

TAMALPAIS 8 October Tunnel 0.072

QUAY 10 October Tower 0.079

LEA 13 October Balloon 1.4

HAMILTON 15 October Tower 0.0012

LOGAN 16 October Tunnel 5

DONA ANA 16 October Balloon 0.037

115
Table 6-31. HARDTACK II shots. (Cont'd)

Shot Date (1958) Type Yield (kilotons)

RIO ARRIBA 18 October Tower 0.090

SOCORRO 22 October Balloon 6

WRANGELL 22 October Balloon 0.115

RUSHMORE 22 October Balloon 0.188

SANFORD 26 October Balloon 4.9

DE BACA 26 October Balloon 2.2

EVANS 29 October Tunnel 0.055

MAZAMA 29 October Tower Zero

HUMBOLDT 29 October Tower 0.0078

SANTA FE 30 October Balloon 1.3

BLANCA 30 October Tunnel 22

6.17.1 Background and Objectives of Operation HARDTACK II.

HARDTACK II was the last nuclear test series before the United States adopted a nuclear

test moratorium, which had originally been intended to last one year but continued until 1961. The

HARDTACK II tests were conducted to evaluate the yield and efficiency of newly developed

nuclear devices (Ponton and others, 3 December 1982, pp. 1, 7).

Concern about nuclear weapon proliferation intensified throughout the 1950s, particularly

after the BRAVO test of Operation CASTLE and the heavy fallout resulting from this shot. At that

time, Prime Minister Nehru ofIndia proposed a cessation oftests. The call for a test ban figured

repeatedly in disarmament discussions, most importantly, those ofthe Disarmament Subcommittee

ofthe United Nations Disarmament Commission, in session from 18 March to 6 September 1957.

Continuing pressure on the nuclear powers to reach an agreement on limiting testing resulted in the

Conference on Discontinuance ofNuclear Weapons Tests, which began in Geneva on 31 October

1958 and was attended by U.S., British, and Soviet delegates. The next day the United States began

a unilateral test moratorium, declaring it would not test ifthe Soviet Union also refrained.

Because the testing and improvement of various nuclear weapons was crucial to American

defense policy, a number of tests needed to be conducted before the moratorium began. On 28

August 1958, President Eisenhower approved an accelerated series of nuclear tests code named

Operation MILLRACE to be completed at the NTS before the start of the moratorium. On 29

August 1958, by AEC directive, the name of the series was changed to Operation HARDTACK,

Phase II (Ponton and others, 3 December 1982, pp. 28-29).

116
6.17.2 HARDTACK II Test Operations.

HARDTACK II has approximately 1,660 verified DoD participants (JAYCOR, 6 October

1993). This number is relatively small compared with previous nuclear weapons testing series

because ofthe weapons development emphasis ofthe program and because ofthe substantial DoD

involvement (about 16,000 personnel) in HARDTACK I. The primary DoD involvement in

HARDTACK II was at Shots HAMILTON and HUMBOLDT, the two weapons effects tests

cosponsored by the DoD and LLNL. Projects at these tests were planned to develop delivery

systems for small nuclear devices, to design military equipment that could withstand the effects of

a nuclear detonation, and to determine the military requirements for future nuclear device designs.

In addition to participation in these projects, DoD personnel at HARDTACK II provided air and

ground support, including radiological safety monitoring, and administrative staffsupport (Ponton

and others, 3 December 1982, pp. 1-2,29).

6.17.3 Dose Summary for Operation HARDTACK II.

HARDTACK II participants, with the exception of AFSWC personnel on cloud-sampling

missions, were limited to a gamma plus neutron dose of 3.0 R (rem) per calendar quarter or a total

of 5.0 R (rem) per year. The AFSWC personnel involved in cloud-sampling were permitted to

receive up to 10.0 R (rem) during the series. Individuals who participated in cloud-sampling at

HARDTACK II who were also at HARDTACK I were authorized to receive 15 R (rem) for the total

operation (Ponton and others, 3 December 1982, pp. 5,74). Table 6-32 summarizes doses for both

the weapons-related events and the safety experiments.

Table 6-32. Summary of external doses for Operation HARDTACK II as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 304 161 41 14 2 3 2

Navy 46 28 1 5 1 0 0

Marines 7 0 0 0 0 0 0

Air Force 217 123 30 31 6 2 0

Field Command 397 200 9 8 0 0 0

Total for each

column

971 512 81 58 9 5 2

Cumulative total 1,638

117
6.18 SAFETY EXPERIMENTS.

The nuclear weapons testing program included 33 safety experiments, conducted at the NTS

and PPG from 1955 to 1958 (Massie and Gravitis, 2 August 1982, pp. 8-9, 11-12):

• Four experiments called PROJECT 56 and conducted in November 1955 and January

1956, after Operation TEAPOT;

• Six experiments conducted by Test Group 57 in April, July, August, and September

1957 before and during Operation PLUMBBOB;

• Four experiments identified as PROJECT 58 and conducted in December 1957 and

February and March 1958, after Operation PLUMBBOB; and

• Nineteen experiments conducted from July to October 1958 during Operations

HARDTACK I and II.

Eleven ofthe tests were surface detonations, while nine occurred in shafts, six in tunnels, and

one on a barge. Ofthe remaining safety experiments, five were tower detonations and one was a

balloon test. Ten ofthe experiments had no measurable yield while one, COULOMB C, had 0.5

kiloton, which was the highest yield of any safety experiment. Table 6-33 shows the safety

experiments.

Table 6-33. Safety experiments, 1956-1958

Project 56 (1955-1956).

Event Date Location Type Yield (Tons)

Project 56 #1 1 November 55 NTS Surface Zero

Project 56 #2 3 November 55 NTS Surface Zero

Project 56 #3 5 November 55 NTS Surface Virtually No

Yield

Project 56 #4 18 January 56 NTS Surface Very Slight

Project 57 24 April 57 NTS Surface Zero

Coulomb A 1 July 57 NTS Surface Zero

Pascal A 26 July 57 NTS Shaft Slight

Saturn 9 August 57 NTS Tunnel Zero

Pascal B 27 August 57 NTS Shaft Slight

Coulomb B 6 September 57 NTS Surface 300

118
Project 58 (1957-1958)

Event Date Location Type Yield (Tons)

Pascal C 6 December 57 NTS Shaft Slight

Coulomb C 9 December 57 NTS Surface 500

Venus 22 February 58 NTS Tunnel Less than 1

Uranus 14 March 58 NTS Tunnel Less than 1

Safety Experiments during Operations HARDTACK I and II (1958)

Event Date Location Type Yield (Tons)

SCAEVOLA 14 July 58 Enewetak Barge Zero

OTERO 12 September 58 NTS Shaft 38

BERNALILLO 17 September 58 NTS Shaft 15

LUNA 21 September 58 NTS Shaft 1.5

MERCURY 23 September 58 NTS Tunnel Slight

VALENCIA 26 September 58 NTS Shaft 2

MARS 28 September 58 NTS Tunnel 13

HIDALGO 5 October 58 NTS Balloon 77

COLFAX 5 October 58 NTS Shaft 5.5

NEPTUNE 14 October 58 NTS Tunnel 115

VESTA 17 October 58 NTS Surface 24

SAN JUAN 20 October 58 NTS Shaft Zero

OBERON 22 October 58 NTS Tower Zero

CATRON 24 October 58 NTS Tower 21

JUNO 24 October 58 NTS Surface 1.7

CERES 26 October 58 NTS Tower 0.7

CHAVEZ 27 October 58 NTS Tower 0.6

GANYMEDE 30 October 58 NTS Surface Zero

TITANIA 30 October 58 NTS Tower 0.2

119
6.18.1 Objectives of the Safety Experiments.

Except for PROJECT 57, the safety experiments Test Group 57 conducted were for the same

purpose: to determine the weapons' susceptibility to nuclear detonation during accidents in storage

and transportation. High-explosive portions of these devices were fired to simulate accidental

detonation and to determine the potential for such firings to result in a significant nuclear yield. The

test results were used to develop devices that could withstand shock, blast, fire, and accidents

without initiating a nuclear chain reaction and producing a nuclear detonation. The PROJECT 57

test was conducted to spread alpha-emitting material (plutonium) in a defined area to study the

biological effects of alpha radiation and to test monitoring and decontamination procedures (Massie

and Gravitis, 2 August 1982, pp. 8, 23).

6.18.2 Test Operations at the Safety Experiments.

DoD personnel participation during these experiments is difficult to determine. Although

most ofthe employees ofLANL and LLNL were civilians, some DoD personnel also were assigned

to these organizations. Some ofthe project activities engaged DoD participation and a DoD effects

project was conducted at four of the safety experiments. Other DoD participation involved

cloud-tracking and cloud-sampling missions (Massie and Gravitis, 2 August 1982, p. 12).

6.18.3 Dose Summary for the Safety Experiments.

Dosimetry for personnel who worked on SCAEVOLA, the safety experiment during

HARDTACK I, is included with that operation's dosimetry in Section 6.15.3. Dosimetry for

personnel who worked on the HARDTACK II safety experiments is included with that operation's

dosimetry in Section 6.17.3.

The dosimetry for PROJECT 56, for the safety experiments conducted before and during

PLUMBBOB, and for PROJECT 58 has not been fully studied to determine the extent of military

involvement in these activities.

The first three experiments of PROJECT 56 were conducted at NTS from 1 October 1955,

to 1 January 1956. An AEC memorandum dated 5 January 1956, lists cumulative exposure at NTS

for 197 personnel from a number of organizations during that time. It is assumed that these men

participated in Experiments 1 though 3 of PROJECT 56 because no other tests were in progress.

Military rank for 24 personnel is given in the memorandum. Their dose distribution is shown in

Table 6-34.

Table 6-34. Summary of external doses for Project 56 Experiments 1 through 3.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0-0.5 0.501-1 1.001-3

16 6 2

120
The highest dose was 2.2 rem gamma, which did not exceed the 3.9 rem limit (Sanders,

6 January 1956).

However, four doses exceeding the 3.9 R (rem) limit were recorded during Experiment 4 of

PROJECT 56 conducted on 18 January 1956. The readings, which may have resulted from the

participants' handling a hot instrumentation cable, were 28, 18.5, 13.7, and 4.3 rem (Massie and

Gravitis, 2 August 1982, p. 21) These men were civilians. One worked for LANL, and the other

three, including the man with the highest dose, worked for REECo. Only one military man appears

to have participated in Experiment 4, and his dose was 0.045 rem (Sanders, 30 January 1956).

At least 63 DoD personnel participated in PROJECT 57, the first ofthe safety experiments

conducted by Test Group 57 before and during Operation PLUMBBOB (Sanders, 6 January 1956;

Wilson and others, 6 February 1961, p. 3; Dick and Baker, 3 March 1967, pp. 5-6; Butler and Miller,

31 January 1962, pp. 7-8,37). Additional research would be needed to determine the exact total and

how many were military. In order to determine if any personnel were exposed to inhalation or

ingestion ofradioactive particles released by the experiment, nose swipes were taken from men who

visited Area 13, the experiment location for post-detonation activities. The highest reading appears

to have been 8 disintegrations per minute. Most readings were 0 (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,

no date).

The other safety experiments, Test Group 57, conducted were COULOMB A, PASCAL A,

SATURN, PASCAL B, and COULOMB B. These shots occurred during the PLUMBBOB

operational period. Badges issued for the safety experiments cannot be distinguished from those

issued for regular PLUMBBOB activities because period-coverage badging applied concurrently to

both. For all ofthese safety experiments except SATURN, some radiological safety statistics are

available, such as number offilm badges issued, amounts ofprotective clothing issued, and number

ofvehicles and personnel decontaminated. These numbers tell nothing, however, about the exposure

ofindividual military personnel or ofmilitary personnel as a group (Massie and Gravitis, 2 August

1982, pp. 31-32,36,38). Data is absent for SATURN because it was a tunnel shot without a nuclear

yield.

The radiological safety statistics are much the same for PASCAL C and COULOMB C of

PROJECT 58. The limited historical record gives the impression that no military personnel

participated in VENUS and URANUS (Massie and Gravitis, 2 August 1982, pp. 43,46, 50-51).

6.19 OPERATION DOMINIC I.

Operation DOMINIC, like Operation HARDTACK, consisted oftwo phases: DOMINIC

I, the oceanic nuclear tests discussed in this section; and DOMINIC II, the continental tests

considered in Section 6.20. Shot TIGHTROPE of DOMINIC I, detonated 3 November 1962 over

Johnston Island, was the last U.S. atmospheric nuclear test (Berkhouse and others, 1 February 1983,

pp. 1,2).

121
DOMINIC I consisted of the 36 nuclear tests identified in Table 6-35. Most ofthe shots

were detonated in the air after having been dropped from B-52 bombers. Twenty-four of the

airdrops took place from 25 April through 11 July 1962 over the ocean just south of Christmas

Island, United Kingdom territory, 1,200 nautical miles south of Honolulu. Five more airdrops were

detonated in October over the open ocean in the vicinity of Johnston Island, U.S. territory, 780

nautical miles west-southwest of Honolulu. The five rocket shots, designated FISHBOWL events,

were launched from Johnston Island and detonated at high altitudes, up to 400 kilometers. The Navy

conducted the other two shots: FRIGATE BIRD, launched by a Polaris missile from the submarine

USS ETHAN ALLEN (SSBN 608) and detonated east of Christmas Island; and SWORDFISH, a

rocket-launched antisubmarine nuclear depth charge detonated 400 miles west of San Diego

(Berkhouse and others, 1 February 1983, pp. 1-2). Figure 6-10 shows the SWORDFISH spray

dome and USS AGERHOLM (DD-286), from which the rocket was fired.

Table 6-35. DOMINIC I shots.

Shot Date (1962) Type Yield*

ADOBE 25 April Airdrop Intermediate

AZTEC 27 April Airdrop Intermediate

ARKANSAS 2 May Airdrop Low megaton range

QUESTA 4 May Airdrop Intermediate

FRIGATE BIRD 6 May Rocket **

YUKON 8 May Airdrop Intermediate

MESILLA 9 May Airdrop Intermediate

MUSKEGON 11 May Airdrop Intermediate

SWORDFISH 11 May Underwater Low

ENCINO 12 May Airdrop Intermediate

SWANEE 14 May Airdrop Intermediate

CHETCO 19 May Airdrop Intermediate

TANANA 25 May Airdrop Low

NAMBE 27 May Airdrop Intermediate

ALMA 8 June Airdrop Intermediate

TRUCKEE 9 June Airdrop Intermediate

YESO 10 June Airdrop Low megaton range

HARLEM 12 June Airdrop Intermediate

122
t'.?*iH

PM»^

ON

rH

5?

00

INüi$

NO

9

123
Table 6-35. DOMINIC I shots. (Cont'd)

Shot Date (1962) Type Yield*

RINCONADA 15 June Airdrop Intermediate

DULCE 17 June Airdrop Intermediate

PETIT 19 June Airdrop Low

OTOWI 22 June Airdrop Intermediate

BIGHORN 27 June Airdrop Megaton range

BLUESTONE 30 June Airdrop Low megaton range

STARFISH PRIME 8 July Rocket 1.4 megatons

SUNSET 10 July Airdrop Intermediate

PAMLICO 11 July Airdrop Low megaton range

ANDROSCOGGIN 2 October Airdrop Intermediate

BUMPING 6 October Airdrop Low

CHAMA 18 October Airdrop Low megaton range

CHECKMATE 19 October Rocket Low

BLUEGILL 3 PRIME 25 October Rocket Submegaton

CALAMITY 27 October Airdrop Intermediate

HOUSATONIC 30 October Airdrop Megaton range

KINGFISH 1 November Rocket Submegaton

TIGHTROPE 3 November Rocket Low

* Low yield is less than 20 kilotons and intermediate yield is 20-1,000 kilotons.

** Not announced.

6.19.1 Background and Objectives of Operation DOMINIC I.

On 1 November 1958, at the conclusion of Operation HARDTACK II, the U.S. initiated a

one-year suspension of nuclear testing, which was later extended throughout 1959. On 29 December

1959, the U.S. announced an end to its moratorium, effective 31 December, but with a promise not

to resume testing without advance public notice.

On 3 January 1960, the Soviet Premier pledged that the Soviet Union would not conduct

nuclear tests unless the Western nations resumed their testing. On 31 August 1961, however, the

124
U.S.S.R. abruptly announced plans to resume atmospheric testing and then detonated a nuclear

device at the Semipalatinsk test range in Central Asia the next day. This began an extensive Soviet

series that continued into November 1961 and included more than 30 nuclear shots, among which

were a 58-megaton detonation (the largest ever) and high-altitude tests.

On 15 September 1961, the U.S. resumed nuclear testing with a tunnel shot at NTS, followed

by a series of underground tests. The President approved planning for resumption of atmospheric

tests on 10 October 1961 but did not approve DOMINIC until 2 March 1962 (Berkhouse and others,

1 February 1983, p. 25).

Operation DOMINIC I was conducted with four primary objectives: to develop nuclear

weapons (the 29 airdrops); to study the effects ofnuclear detonations (the five high-altitude bursts);

to test the Polaris weapon system (the FRIGATE BIRD event); and to test the Navy nuclear

antisubmarine rocket (Shot SWORDFISH) (Berkhouse and others, 1 February 1985, p. 1).

6.19.2 DOMINIC I Test Operations.

DOMINIC I has approximately 22,500 verified DoD participants as well as personnel from

AEC, contractors and various other federal agencies (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). The DoD

participation was extensive in all parts of the DOMINIC I experimental program: weapons

development, weapons effects, and operational tests. Even the experimental program for the weapon

development shots at Christmas Island and later at Johnston Island, conducted by AEC laboratories,

involved DoD personnel and units for device placement, cloud-sampling, operation of airborne data

recording stations, and general support. The weapons effects and operational tests were DoD

programs, the former involving a number of experimental projects (Berkhouse and others, 1

February 1983, p. 11).

6.19.3 Dose Summary for Operation DOMINIC I.

With exceptions for specified Navy and Air Force participants, the maximum permissible

dose for Operation DOMINIC I personnel was established at 3.0 rem of gamma radiation for the

series. Navy personnel who were to collect samples ofweapon debris from the radioactive pool of

water created by SWORDFISH were authorized a maximum limit of 7.0 rem. Air Force personnel

associated with cloud-sampling (crew, maintenance, sample removal, or decontamination) could

receive up to 20 rem of gamma radiation (Berkhouse and others, 1 February 1983, p. 3).

Table 6-36 summarizes available dosimetry information for DOMINIC I participants.

Existing evidence indicates that some ofthe film badges had been defectively sealed or damaged by

the environment and that they gave higher readings than the dose actually received by the wearer.

According to the National Research Council:

DOMINIC I film badge exposures should be related to known activities of the

wearers. If an individual was not a cloud-sampling and crew unit, not on the ship

(USS Sioux) that sampled water from the radioactive pool, not involved in

125
recovering instrument pods, nosecones, or other contaminated or activated material,

or not a Rad-Safe monitor, then any indicated film badge exposure was likely to have

been caused by environmental damage. (Masse and Lalos, 1989, p. 180.)

Table 6-36. Summary of external doses for Operation DOMINIC I as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 344 365 10 14 1 0 0

Navy 9,185 8,054 162 268 7 0 0

Marines 342 499 1 5 0 0 0

Air Force 1,297 1,373 63 74 9 9 9

Field

Command

101 77 2 1 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

11,269 10,368 238 362 17 9 9

Cumulative total 22,272

6.20 OPERATION DOMINIC II.

Also known by the DoD code name of Operation SUNBEAM, DOMINIC II was the

continental phase ofthe DOMINIC nuclear tests. The four shots ofthis series were conducted at the

NTS from 7 July through 17 July 1962, during the period of DOMINIC I, the nuclear test series

conducted at the PPG from 25 April through 3 November 1962.

DOMINIC II consisted of the four low-yield shots as shown in Table 6-37. LITTLE

FELLER I, one ofthe surface shots, was part of Exercise IVY FLATS, the only military training

exercise conducted at DOMINIC II (Ponton and others, 31 January 1983, pp. 1, 5).

Table 6-37. DOMINIC II shots.

Shot

Date

(1962) Type

Yield

(kilotons)

LITTLE FELLER II 7 July Surface Low*

JOHNNIE BOY 11 July Crater 0.5

SMALL BOY 14 July Tower Low

LITTLE FELLER I 17 July Surface Low

* Less than 20 kilotons

126
6.20.1 Background and Objectives of Operation DOMINIC II.

The United States resumed nuclear weapons testing on 15 September 1961 with a series of

underground tests conducted at the NTS: Operation NOUGAT, from 15 September 1961 to 30 June

1962; and Operation STORAX, from 6 July 1962 to 25 June 1963. Operation DOMINIC II was

conducted during the period of Operation STORAX but was not a part of STORAX (Ponton and

others, 31 January 1983, pp. 19,20).

Operation DOMINIC II, designed to provide information on weapons effects, originally

consisted only of Shot SMALL BOY, to be detonated on a 10-foot tower. Subsequent planning

added three Little Feller shots, but in the end only LITTLE FELLER I and II were part ofthe series.

LITTLE FELLER II was detonated first, using a warhead suspended three feet above the ground.

For LITTLE FELLER I, Army personnel launched a weapon that exploded near the surface about

3,100 yards from the launch point as part ofExercise IVY FLATS, a troop maneuver and observer

program (Ponton and others, 31 January 1983, pp. 1, 73,114).

Plans for JOHNNIE BOY, the last shot added to the series, were not made until May 1962.

Detonated two months later, JOHNNIE BOY was designed to explore the cratering effects of a

subkiloton nuclear device fired in a shallow emplacement (Ponton and others, 31 January 1983,

p. 94).

6.20.2 DOMINIC II Test Operations.

There are about 3,500 verified DoD military and civilian personnel participants in Operation

DOMINIC II in Exercise IVY FLATS (Shot LITTLE FELLER I), scientific and diagnostic tests, and

air support or administrative support activities (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993). Approximately 1,000

of these were Sixth Army military personnel who took part in Exercise IVY FLATS, which

consisted of an observer program and a troop maneuver. The observers, who wore protective

goggles, witnessed the detonation from bleachers about 3.5 kilometers southwest of ground zero.

Five participants from the IVY FLATS maneuver task force launched the weapon from a rocket

launcher mounted on an armored personnel carrier. After the initial radiological surveys were

completed, the IVY FLATS troops entered their vehicles and moved into the shot area, where they

spent about 50 minutes conducting maneuvers (Ponton and others, 31 January 1983, pp. 1, 3).

6.20.3 Dose Summary for Operation DOMINIC II.

DOMINIC II participants were subject to a quarterly dose limit of 3.0 R (rem) and an annual

limit of 5 R (rem) (Atomic Energy Commission, February 1964, p. 25). Cloud-sampling pilots were

authorized to receive a 12 R (rem) annual limit (Air Force Special Weapons Directorate, 13 June

1962,p.B-3-l).

Table 6-38 summarizes the dosimetry data available for DOMINIC II.

127
Table 6-38. Summary of external doses for Operation DOMINIC II as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.5-1.0 >1.0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5.0-10.0 >10.0

Army 1,797 333 52 110 4 0 0

Navy 36 22 19 32 0 1 0

Marines 42 26 11 18 2 0 0

Air Force 103 120 23 15 1 0 0

Field

Command

512 66 21 7 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

2,490 567 126 182 7 1 0

Cumulative tota! 3,373

6.21 PLOWSHARE PROGRAM.

Conducted from 1961 to 1973, the PLOWSHARE Program consisted of 27 nuclear

detonations, four of which occurred before the signing of the 1963 limited test ban treaty. The

detonations, all ofwhich had yields of no more than 200 kilotons, were staged at the NTS and other

sites in Colorado and New Mexico. The tests were all subsurface, being either shaft or cratering

shots.

As indicated by Table 6-39, this section discusses only Projects GNOME and SEDAN, the

first two PLOWSHARE events. These two experiments were selected for consideration because

they were conducted during the period of U.S. atmospheric testing and they had documented,

although limited, DoD participation. In addition, the extant sources were sufficient in number and

detail to enable a summation ofthe events (Gravitis and others, 18 March 1983, p. 1). There are

about 340 DoD verified participants in these two projects (JAYCOR, 6 October 1993).

Table 6-39. Projects GNOME and SEDAN.

Event Date Type

Yield

(kilotons)

GNOME 10 December 1961 Shaft 3

SEDAN 6 July 1962 Crater 104

128
6.21.1 Background and Objectives of the PLOWSHARE Program.

From the earliest days ofnuclear research and nuclear weapons testing, scientists were aware

of the potential for peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including nuclear detonations. This

recognition became U.S. policy in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which stated that "atomic energy

is capable of application for peaceful as well as military purposes." The opportunity for American

scientists to apply nuclear detonations to peaceful ends was delayed, however, by several factors,

including the greater priority of developing efficient weapons applications, concern over radioactive

contamination, and international suspicion of the intent of the research. Nevertheless, the AEC

ultimately succeeded in initiating the PLOWSHARE Program, which had been planned in the late

1950s (Gravitis and others, 18 March 1983, pp. 17-19).

The PLOWSHARE detonations were designed to determine nonmilitary applications of

nuclear explosives. The primary potential use envisioned was in large-scale geographic engineering,

in such projects as canal, harbor, and dam construction, the stimulation of oil and gas wells, and

mining. GNOME was planned in part to provide information on the characteristics of an

underground nuclear detonation in a salt medium, while SEDAN was to extend knowledge on

cratering effects from detonations with yields of 100 to 200 kilotons. Considering the peaceful

objectives ofPLOWSHARE, the AEC took the name ofthe program from the Bible: "And they shall

beat their swords into plowshares" (Isaiah 2:4) (Gravitis and others, 18 March 1983, pp. 1-3).

The ultimate goal of PLOWSHARE, the peaceful applications of nuclear explosives, was

never realized. The limited test ban treaty, signed on 5 August 1963 in Moscow, ended nuclear

testing in the atmosphere, on land, and underwater, although not underground. Hence, a number of

the PLOWSHARE experiments had to be canceled. Other contributing factors were changes in

national priorities, Government and industry disinterest in the program, public concern over the

health and safety aspects ofusing nuclear detonations for civil applications, and shortages offunding

(Gravitis and others, 18 March 1983, p. 26).

6.21.2 PLOWSHARE Test Operations.

LLNL, which provided technical direction for the PLOWSHARE Program, conducted an

extensive series of scientific projects at GNOME and SEDAN. Given the objectives of

PLOWSHARE, the DoD did not stage military exercises during the program and had limited

involvement in the shots. The primary role ofthe military was to provide logistical support. DoD

personnel did, however, participate at GNOME and SEDAN in the VELA UNIFORM program,

conducted by the DoD to develop U.S. capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear

detonations. In addition, the AFSWC performed cloud-sampling, cloud-tracking, and support

missions at the shots (Gravitis and others, 18 March 1983, p. 3).

6.21.3 Dose Summary for the PLOWSHARE Program.

PLOWSHARE participants were limited to 3.0 R (rem) of gamma and neutron radiation per

calendar year and not more than 5.0 R (rem) annually (Grevitis and others, 18 March 1983, p. 3).

129
The dosimetry information available for GNOME and SEDAN participants is included in Table

6-40.

Table 6-40. Summary of external doses for the PLOWSHARE Program as of 30 September 1993.

Gamma dose R (rem)

0 >0-0.5 >0.S-L0 >L0-3.0 >3.0-5.0 >5,0-10,0 >10.0

Army 13 0 0 0 0 0 0

Navy 8 2 0 0 0 0 0

Marines 29 1 0 0 0 0 0

Air Force 55 19 1 2 0 0 0

Field Command 199 6 0 0 0 0 0

Total for Each

Column

Cumulative total

304 28 1 2 0 0 0

130
SECTION 7

RADIATION SAFETY AT U.S. ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS

The possible hazards associated with exposure to ionizing radiation were a major concern

to the planners of the nuclear tests. Consequently, many of the nation's leading experts on the

subject were consulted and often served as staff members for each operation. A Health Group

consisting of 35 personnel was established for Shot TRINITY, detonated on 16 July 1945 as the first

test of a nuclear weapon. The group was headed by Dr. Louis Hempelmann, Medical Director of

LANL; he reported to the test director, Dr. Kenneth T. Bainbridge. Colonel Stafford Warren,

medical advisor to the Commanding General of the Manhattan Project, served as a special

consultant. The primary function ofthe group was to provide for the safety of project personnel, as

well as offsite citizens.

Some nuclear test participants were exposed to initial radiation (neutron and gamma rays)

emitted from the fireball and the cloud column during the first minute after the detonation. Others

were exposed to residual radiation, which is emitted primarily by radioactive fission products and

other bomb debris in fallout, and to neutron-induced radioactivity in the soil and structures in

proximity to the detonation.

7.1 PROTECTION AGAINST INITIAL RADIATION.

Protection from initial radiation was provided by ensuring that test participants were

positioned at a safe distance from the detonation. The safe distance was usually calculated from

empirically or theoretically derived equations that considered such factors as the type or design of

the nuclear device, the expected yield ofthe device, environmental conditions including humidity,

and any shielding between the detonation and the participant. For several ofthe CONUS tests, for

example, military maneuver and observer troops were situated in trenches that were 3.2 to 4.6

kilometers from ground zero and that provided considerable shielding. Unshielded participants were

customarily positioned much farther away from ground zero.

7.2 PROTECTION AGAINST RESIDUAL RADIATION.

Procedures for protection against residual radiation were more complex because operations

in a contaminated environment involved potential exposure to radiation sources both external to and

inside the body, the latter resulting primarily from inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material.

The next sections address these protective measures.

7.2.1 Identification and Control of Radiation Areas.

The fundamental approach for protection against residual radiation was to control access to

contaminated areas. The first step was the identification ofthe radiation areas and measurement of

the associated radiation levels. Authorized entry into a radiation area was made through a control

point and preceded by some form of survey by trained radiation monitors using state-of-the-art

radiation detection and measurement equipment for that time. In a military maneuver, radiation

monitors preceded the advancing troops to steer them away from radiation areas contaminated above

131
preestablished limits. Re-entry into the shot area by scientific project personnel or military troops

visiting a display area normally was delayed until a "Recovery Hour" was declared after completion

of an initial radiation survey ofthe area. The initial survey team used radiation detectors to locate

and mark various radiation intensities approaching the detonation site. In some cases, early entry

was authorized for certain scientific project personnel; however, these personnel were accompanied

by their own radiation monitors.

The radiation levels measured by these monitors were used to determine the amount oftime

the participants could remain in the area. "Stay times" were calculated and observed to ensure that

external gamma radiation exposure limits were not exceeded. Only gamma radiation was considered

for this purpose since normal clothing provided adequate protection against external alpha and beta

radiation exposure.

The possible spread of contamination to clean areas was controlled by requiring personnel

who entered a contaminated area to exit through a check point where they could be monitored and

decontaminated as necessary. Most scientific project or other personnel whose activities required

entry into highly radioactive areas were issued anti-contamination clothing (including coveralls,

booties, and gloves) that could be easily removed, if needed, at the check station decontamination

point. Such clothing did not provide any more protection against external radiation (alpha, beta, or

gamma) than did ordinary clothing or military fatigues. This disposable clothing was provided

simply as a convenience for contamination control and laundry purposes. Ordinary clothing and

fatigues that could not be decontaminated also had to be replaced at the check station

decontamination point.

7.2.2 Use of Radiation Detection and Measurement Instruments.

Monitors used several types of radiation survey instruments. The majority were gas-filled

detectors, specifically ionization chambers, Geiger-Mueller counters, and gas-flow proportional

counters. These detectors determined the intensity of the incident radiation by the effects of

ionization produced by the radiation in a gas-filled "sensitive volume." Some of the other

instruments took advantage of the fact that certain materials emit light when struck by radiation.

These instruments, called scintillation detectors, simply derive the intensity ofthe incident radiation

from the amount of light produced in the detection medium. Both gas-filled and scintillation

detectors were used, depending on the basic design ofthe instrument, to detect and measure alpha,

beta, and/or gamma radiation.

The survey instruments mentioned above portray the radiation intensity in terms ofrate (e.g.,

milliroentgens or roentgens per hour or counts per minute). In some cases, test participants were

issued pocket dosimeters that provided information on cumulative exposure. These dosimeters,

about the size and shape of a writing pen, consisted of a small ionization chamber coupled to a

miniature electroscope. One type of pocket dosimeter (self-reading) included an optical system that

allowed the wearer to determine his cumulative exposure while in the field. Other types required

a separate charger-reader.

The primary device used to determine the wearer's cumulative radiation exposure was the

film badge. A film badge consisted of one or more small pieces of photographic-type film wrapped

132
in an opaque paper packet and enclosed in a plastic envelope or other special metal or plastic holder

that could be clipped or otherwise attached to the wearer's outer clothing. Film badges incorporated

one or more special metal filters to improve performance. When processed, a film exhibited a

darkening (net optical density) that is proportional to the cumulative radiation exposure. Optical

density is measured with a densitometer and compared with a calibrated standard to determine total

exposure. Film badges worn during the period of nuclear testing were primarily used to measure

gamma radiation exposures. Some attempts (most unsuccessful) were made to obtain quantitative

measurements of beta radiation exposures, and special neutron film badges were employed during

the later stages ofthe test program.

Some veterans have questioned the accuracy and reliability ofthe film badges used during

atmospheric nuclear testing between 1945 and 1962. To provide an independent assessment ofthe

issue, DNA commissioned the NRC on 28 September 1987 to organize a Committee on Film Badge

Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Committee members included recognized experts in

photographic film processing, development, and interpretation; film badge dosimetry and

applications; statistical treatment of uncertainties; radiation characteristics of nuclear weapons; and

legal implications of study results. One committee member had continuous involvement with

nuclear testing for many years (Masse and Lalos, 1989, pp. vii-viii).

The committee's mandate was to:

Evaluate the reliability offilm badge results from atmospheric nuclear testing;

Recommend procedures for deriving the best dose estimates from these badges; and

Quantify the uncertainty ofthese estimates.

After an 18-month investigation, the committee found that:

Film badges were adequate and reliable from the beginning oftesting, particularly

for measurement of exposures above O.lr;

The reliability and precision generally improved throughout the period oftesting; and

While uncertainty increases with lower exposures, the overall uncertainty was small

enough to make the data useful for consideration of potential biological effects in

individual participants (Masse and Lalos, 1989, p. 2).

Moreover, the committee quantified the uncertainties in film badge readings for specific

operations and dose ranges.

The NTPR program has located a considerable number of film badge dosimetry records,

which have been entered into the master repository of dose records from U.S. nuclear testing

maintained by REECo. As indicated by Table 1-3, presented in Section 1.4 ofthis report, the vast

133
majority of doses were well below established radiation protection standards. The records attest to

the effectiveness ofthe radiation protection efforts made during atmospheric nuclear testing.

Figure 7-1 shows a radiation monitor wearing protective clothing and using radiological

safety equipment. Table 7-1 provides a list of radiation detection and measurement instruments

used for survey and personnel monitoring purposes. The list is not all-inclusive but identifies the

instruments most commonly used. It is apparent that some instruments employed during an

operation were replaced by improved equipment during subsequent operations. Other instruments,

such as the MX-5, the TlB(AN/PDR-39), and the AN/PDR-27, were used (modified as necessary)

for several years.

7.2.3 Protection Against Internal Doses.

As mentioned earlier, procedures for protection against residual radiation had to consider

internal doses resulting from inhalation and ingestion ofradioactive material. Respiratory protection

(respirators) normally was provided for scientific project personnel involved in operations where

inhalation ofradioactive material was considered a potential problem. Military maneuver troops

carried standard gas masks for use in dusty, possibly radioactive environments.

The degree ofinternal exposure resulting from inhalation or ingestion ofradioactive material

by DoD test participants was not routinely monitored. Other than a considerable number of urine

and blood samples analyzed during Operation CROSSROADS, bioassays were rare among military

personnel. To fill this gap, a methodology has been developed to calculate internal doses from

reconstructed exposure scenarios and radiological environments, as noted in Section 8. Using a

comprehensive screening methodology, the dose commitment due to internal emitters has been

determined to be less than 0.15 rem to the bone for more than 185,000 test participants; and research

and subsequent screening of additional personnel is continuing. The 0.15 rem level is one percent

ofthe dose limit recommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

in effect in 1986. This level is also less than one percent of the annual dose limit set by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission for occupational exposure to radiation in Title 10, Code of Federal

Regulations, Part 20.

The choice of bone dose as a screening factor is useful because the ratio of other-organ dose

to bone dose has a relatively predictable maximum for nuclear device debris, whereas the converse

is not true. Certain actinide radionuclides, which have a highly shot-specific abundance relative to

fission product radionuclides, increase the dose to bone (including its constituent red marrow and

bone surface tissues) in greater proportion to other organs.

134
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136
SECTION 8

RADIATION DOSE DETERMINATION

This chapter focuses on radiation dose determination for DoD personnel exposed to ionizing

radiation as a result oftheir participation in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing or the postwar

occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The narrative outlines general procedures, the

identification ofunit locations and activities, the use offilm badge doses, statistical methods for dose

determination, and the reconstruction ofradiation doses.

8.1 PROCEDURE.

The primary way researchers determine personnel radiation exposure data is by reviewing

film badge records. Film badges were generally issued to scientific personnel, both military and

civilian, to personnel expected to be exposed to significant amounts of radiation, and to

representative personnel, if not all personnel, in troop and naval units with common activities and

relationships to the radiological environment.

Before using a film badge reading for dose determination, researchers must ascertain that the

badged period covers the entire period ofexposure. Second, ifrepresentative badging was used, they

must determine that the activities—locations, times, protection~ofthe badged personnel adequately

represent the activities ofthe group as a whole, so all personnel in the group can be judged to have

received the dose(s) ofthe representative badge(s).

If a large number of personnel in an exposed group were badged, a statistical examination

offilm badge doses can be used to determine the mean dose, the variance, and the confidence limits.

An estimated dose, equal to a high (usually 95 percent) probability that the actual exposure did not

exceed the estimate, can then be assigned to unbadged personnel. NRC evaluated this procedure and

concluded it had the effect of increasing the dose estimates for most veterans whose doses are

assessed in this way (National Research Council, 1985, p. 2).

When dose data from film badges are either not available or incomplete (for example badges

were lost, damaged or data not recorded), or when there is reason to believe that the data does not

adequately characterize actual exposure, alternative approaches are used as circumstances warrant.

All approaches have in common the investigation of individual or group activities and their

relationship to the radiological environment. First, ifit is apparent that personnel were not present

in the radiological environment and had no other potential for exposure, the assigned dose is zero.

Second, if sufficient members of a group had film badge readings and others did not-and if all

members had a common relationship with the radiological environment-doses for small numbers

of unbadged personnel can be statistically calculated. Third, where sufficient badge readings or a

common relationship to the radiological environment did not exist, a dose reconstruction is

performed by correlating a unit's or individual's activities with the quantitatively determined

radiological environment.

137
The three approaches are summarized as follows:

1. Activities of an individual or his unit are researched for the period of participation

in an atmospheric nuclear test. Unit locations and movements are related to areas of

radiation. If personnel were far from the nuclear detonation(s), did not experience

fallout or enter a fallout area, and did not come in contact with radioactive samples

or contaminated objects, they are judged to have received no dose.

2. Film badge data from badged personnel may be used to estimate individual doses for

unbadged personnel, provided that the group of badged participants is sufficiently

large and had common characteristics and potential similar to the unbadged

personnel for radiation exposure. Then, using proven statistical methods, an

estimated dose equal to 95 percent probability that the actual exposure did not exceed

such estimate is assigned to unbadged personnel. This practice ensures that

unbadged personnel are assigned doses that are considerably higher than the average

or mean dose ofthe group.

3. Dose reconstruction is performed iffilm badge data are unavailable for all or part of

the period ofradiation exposure, iffilm badge data are partially available but cannot

be used statistically for calculations, if atypical activities are indicated for specific

individuals, or if other types of radiation exposures are indicated. In dose

reconstruction, the conditions of exposure are reconstructed analytically to determine

the radiation dose. Such reconstruction is standard scientific practice used by health

physicists when the circumstances of a radiation exposure require investigation. The

underlying method is the same in each case. The radiation environment is

characterized in time and space, as are the activities and geometrical position ofthe

individual. The rate at which radiation was accrued is determined throughout the

time of exposure, from which the total dose is integrated.

An uncertainty analysis ofthe reconstruction provides a calculated mean dose with

confidence limits. The specific method used in a dose reconstruction depend on what

type of data are available to provide the required characterizations, as well as the

nature ofthe radiation environment. The radiation environment was not limited to

the gamma radiation that would have been measured by a film badge, but also

included neutron radiation for personnel sufficiently close to a nuclear detonation,

as well as alpha and beta radiation (internally) for personnel whose activities

indicated the possibility ofthe inhalation or ingestion ofradioactive particles.

Section 8.5, Reconstruction ofRadiation Doses, discusses the third approach in detail.

8.2 UNIT LOCATIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

To determine the precise locations and activities ofunits and individuals that could have been

exposed to the radiological environment, extensive use is made of historical records and reports,

augmented by personal interviews where necessary to fill gaps in the archival material. The result

138
is a profile of activities for each definable group or individual. The locations and activities of

military units, whose operations were closely monitored and controlled by radiological safety

personnel, are usually well defined. The same is true for observers, who were restricted to specific

locations both during and after the nuclear bursts (as described in Reference 1, for example). Ships'

locations and courses, with times, are usually known with a high degree ofprecision from deck logs.

Aircraft tracks and altitudes are also usually well defined. Personnel engaged in scientific

experiments often kept logs oftheir activities, noting times, locations, members ofthe party or crew,

and unusual circumstances. Moreover, the locations oftheir experiments are almost always a matter

ofrecord, and the schedules oftheir early reentry times are often documented.

Where the records are insufficiently complete for the degree of precision required to

determine radiation exposure, participant comments are used and reasonable judgments are made

to further the analysis. In every case, both the distance from the detonation and the movement of

the unit or individual with respect to the radiological hazards are determined. Careful consideration

is given to possible or potential contact with contaminated objects. Activities are described in

sufficient detail to permit assessment of the dose due to inhalation or ingestion of contaminated

material, such as dust, debris, or food. For example, maneuver troops who crawled in radioactive

areas, or who conducted helicopter operations in such areas, are afforded extensive analysis oftheir

potential for inhaling radioactive dust that, when metabolized in the body, could have resulted in

doses to internal organs over periods ofseveral years. When there is a reasonable possibility that

a given activity or set of circumstances could have existed for the unit, the benefit ofthe doubt is

given. Possible variations in the activities, as well as possible and reasonable individual deviations

from group activities, with respect to both time and location, are considered in the uncertainty

analysis ofthe radiation dose calculations.

8.3 FILM BADGE DOSES.

Before film badge readings can be used to characterize the radiation dose to a group or to an

individual, it is first determined, primarily through analysis ofthe available film badge record(s) and

the activities involved, that the badge readings represent the entire period of exposure. Ifthey do

not, or there is reason to believe that the badge(s) did not fully represent the entire conditions of

exposure, alternative methods, such as statistical assignment or dose reconstruction, are pursued.

This is obviously required in cases of exposure to initial radiation where neutrons were emitted from

the burst, or in instances where inhalation or ingestion or radioactive particles is an issue. Neither

ofthese types of exposure would have been recorded on a film badge.

8.4 STATISTICAL METHODS OF DOSE DETERMINATION.

To use badge readings to estimate the radiation doses to unbadged personnel, a group of

participants is first identified that had common activity characteristics and a similar potential for

exposure to radiation; that is, individuals must have been doing the same kind of work or activity

and all members ofthe group must have had a common relationship to the radiological environment

in terms oftime after burst, location, duration of exposure, and behavior. Identification ofthese

groups is based upon research of historical records, technical reports, or correspondence. For this

purpose, a military or naval unit may, therefore, have consisted ofseveral groups, or several units

139
may have comprised a single group. This method is useful for personnel whose activities were

confined to a ship or in situations where such activities could be assigned to the entire group under

consideration.

Using proven statistical methods, the badge data for each group are examined to determine

ifthey adequately reflect the entire group and are therefore valid for use in statistical calculations,

or ifthe badge data indicated, by such characteristics as a bimodal distribution, that the group should

have been subdivided into smaller groups where the distribution ofreadings was more normal. Only

when the group data meets the above tests can the mean dose, variance, and confidence limits be

used for assigning doses to unbadged personnel. When using this method, an estimated dose equal

to 95 percent probability that the actual exposure did not exceed the estimate is then assigned to

unbadged personnel. This high-sided, but statistically sound, procedure ensures that the assigned

doses are much higher than the average or mean for the badged group.

8.5 RECONSTRUCTION OF RADIATION DOSES.

The general methodology for dose reconstruction consists of characterizing the radiation

environments to which participants, through all relevant activities, were exposed. The environments,

both initial and residual radiation, are correlated with the activities of participants to determine

accrued doses due to initial radiation, residual radiation, and/or inhaled/ ingested radioactive material

(Goetz and others, 31 May 1979; Goetz and others, 9 April 1980). Because of the variety of

activities, times, geometries, shielding, and weapon characteristics, as well as the normal spread in

the available data pertaining to the radiation environment, an uncertainty analysis is performed. This

analysis quantifies the uncertainties due to time and space variations, group size and available data.

An automated (computer-assisted) procedure is often used to facilitate handling the large amounts

of data and the dose integration, and to investigate the sensitivity to variations in the values of

parameters used. The results of the calculations are then compared with film badge data as they

apply to the specific period of the film badges and to the comparable activities of the exposed

personnel, to validate the procedure and to identify personnel activities that could have led to

atypical doses.

Radiation dose from neutrons and dose commitments due to inhaled or ingested radioactive

material were not detected by film badges (Goetz and others, 31 May 1979; Goetz and others, 9

April 1980). Where required, these values are calculated and recorded separately.

8.5.1 Characterization of the Radiological Environment.

This process describes and defines the radiological conditions as a function oftime and space

for all locations of concern, that is, where personnel were positioned or where their activities took

place. The radiation environment is divided into the two standard categories: initial radiation and

residual radiation.

The initial radiation environment resulted from several types of gamma and neutron

emissions. Prompt neutrons and gamma radiation were emitted at the time of detonation, while

delayed neutrons and fission-product gamma from the decay ofradioactive products in the fireball

140
continued to be emitted as the fireball rose. In contrast to these essentially point sources ofradiation,

there was gamma radiation from neutron interactions with air and soil, generated within a fraction

of a second (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Because ofthe complexity ofthese radiation sources and

their varied interaction properties with air and soil, it is necessary to obtain solutions of the

Boltzmann radiation transport equation (Huang, 1963). The radiation environment thus derived

includes the effects of shot-specific parameters, such as weapon design and yield, neutron and

gamma output, source and target geometry, and atmospheric conditions. The calculated neutron and

gamma radiation environments are checked for consistency with existing measured data. In those

few cases displaying significant discrepancies that cannot be resolved, an environment based on

extrapolation ofthe data is used ifit leads to a larger calculated dose.

The residual radiation environment is divided into two general components: the

neutron-activated material that emitted, over a period of time, beta and gamma radiation; and

radioactive debris from the fission reaction or from unfissioned materials that emitted alpha, beta,

and gamma radiation (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Because residual radiation decayed or

diminished, the characterization ofthe residual environment is defined by the radiation intensity as

a function oftype, time, and space. Radiological survey data is used to determine specific intensities

at times ofpersonnel exposure. Interpolation and extrapolation ofthe existing survey and exposure

data are based on known decay characteristics ofthe individual materials that comprised the residual

contamination (Goetz and others, 15 July 1980; Goetz and others, 31 May 1979). In those rare cases

where insufficient radiation data exists to define the residual environment adequately, source data

is obtained from the appropriate weapon design laboratory and applied using standard radiation

transport codes to determine the initial radiation at specific distances from the burst (Oak Ridge

National Laboratory, September 1978; Union Carbide Corporation, 1967; Defense Nuclear Agency,

January 1976). This radiation, together with material composition and characteristics, leads to a

description ofthe neutron-activated field for each location and time ofinterest. In all cases, observed

data, as obtained at the time ofthe operation, is used to normalize the calculations.

8.5.2 Activities of Participants.

This part ofthe process is precisely the same as that described in Section 8.2. It is important

that this step be carefully accomplished to define unique groups for which the radiation exposure was

essentially common. Possible and reasonable variations in group activities, as well as individual

deviations from those ofthe group as a whole, with respect to both time and location, are considered

in each uncertainty analysis, described in Section 8.5.4.

8.5.3 Calculation of Radiation Dose.

The initial radiation doses to close-in personnel (normally positioned in trenches at the time

of the detonation) are calculated from the above-ground environment by simulating the radiation

transport into the trenches. Various calculational approaches, standard in health physics, are

employed to relate in-trench to above-trench doses for each source ofradiation (Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, September 1973; Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February 1975). Detailed modeling

ofthe human body in appropriate postures in the trench is performed to calculate not only the gamma

dose that would have been recorded on a film badge, but also the maximum neutron dose (National

141
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, January 1971). The neutron, neutron-generated

gamma, and prompt gamma doses were accrued during such a short interval that the posture in a

trench could not have been altered significantly during this exposure. The fission-product gamma

dose, however, was delivered over a period of many seconds (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).

Therefore, the possibility ofindividual reorientation (e.g., standing up to observe the rising fireball)

in the trench is considered (Goetz and others, 15 July 1980; Goetz and others, 28 April 1981).

The calculation ofthe dose from residual radiation follows from the characterized radiation

environments and personnel activities. Because radiation intensities are calculated for a field (i.e.,

in two spatial dimensions) and in time, the radiation intensity is determinable for each increment of

personnel activity regardless of direction or at what time (Goetz and others, 15 July 1980; Goetz and

others, 31 May 1979). The dose from exposure to a radiation field is obtained by summing the

contribution (product of intensity and time) to dose at each step. The dose calculated from the

radiation field does not reflect the shielding of the film badge afforded by the human body. This

shielding is determined for appropriate body positions by the solution of radiation transport

equations as applied to a radiation field (Goetz and others, 31 May 1979). Conversion factors are

used to arrive at a calculated film badge equivalent dose, which not only facilitates comparison with

actual film badge data, but also serves as a substitute for any unavailable film badge reading.

The calculation of the dose from inhaled or ingested radioactivity primarily involves the

determination of what shot-specific radioisotopes could have entered the body in what quantity.

Published conversion factors are then applied to these data to arrive at the radiation dose and future

dose commitments to selected internal organs, such as bone marrow, lungs, and thyroid (Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, November 1977; Oak Ridge National Laboratory, June 1978 and

November 1979). Inhalation or ingestion ofradioactive material is calculated from the radioactive

environment and the processes of making these materials inhalable or ingestible. In addition to

direct descent offallout, activities and processes that would have caused material to become airborne

(such as wind, traffic, or decontamination) are used with empirical data (Stewart, June 1964;

Arspaugh, October 1975) on particle lofting to determine airborne concentrations under specific

circumstances. Volumetric breathing rates and durations of exposure are used to calculate the total

material intake. Data on time-dependent weapon debris isotopic composition, and the

above-mentioned conversion factors, are used to calculate the dose commitment to the body and to

specific body organs (Goetz and others, 9 April 1980; Defense Nuclear Agency, 1985).

8.5.4 Uncertainty Analysis.

Because ofthe uncertainties associated with the radiological data or the calculations used in

the absence of data, as well as the uncertainties with respect to personnel activities, confidence limits

are determined where possible for group dose calculations. The uncertainty analysis quantifies the

errors in available data or in the model used in the absence of data. Confidence limits are based on

the uncertainty of all relevant input parameters; thus, the range of uncertainty varies with the quality

ofthe input data. The possible range of doses due to the size ofthe exposure group being examined

is also considered. Typical sources of error include orientation of the weapons, specific weapon

yields, inherent instrument error, fallout intensity data, time(s) at which data were obtained, fallout

142
decay rate, route ofpersonnel movements, and arrival/stay times for specific activities. Goetz and

others, 28 April 1981, and Goetz and others, 31 May 1979, discuss these in detail.

8.5.5 Comparison with Film Badge Records.

When this reconstruction methodology was first developed in 1978 and 1979, the

calculations of gamma dose were compared with film badge records for two military units at

Exercise Desert Rock VIII, Task Force WARRIOR and Task Force BIG BANG, both ofwhich were

involved, either directly or indirectly, in Shot SMOKY, Operation PLUMBBOB. Where all

parameters relating to exposure were identified, direct comparison of gamma dose calculations with

actual film badge readings was possible. The comparisons of actual and calculated doses were

remarkably good, and the resultant correlations provided high confidence in the reconstruction

methodology. References 3 and 4 illustrate these comparisons.

Film badge data may have been, in some cases, unrepresentative ofthe total exposure of a

given individual or group. For example, there may have been additional unbadged opportunities for

radiation exposure, as well as possible damaged film badges. Nevertheless, such information has

proven extremely useful for direct comparison of incremental doses for specific periods, e.g.,

validating the calculations for the remaining, unbadged periods of exposure. Moreover, a wide

distribution offilm badge data has often led to more definitive personnel or activity groupings for

dose calculations and to further investigation ofthe reason(s) for such distribution. Goetz and others

31 May 1979, describes such distribution and subsequent investigation.

In no cases, however, were film badge data used in the dose calculations; rather, they have

been and continue to be used solely for comparison with and validation of the calculations. In

virtually all cases, comparison has been favorable and within the confidence limits established by

the uncertainty analysis of each calculation.

8.6 RESULTS OF DOSE RECONSTRUCTIONS.

Dose reconstructions have been completed for all operations for which there is no film badge

dosimetry and there was a reasonably high potential for significant radiation exposure to large

groups or units, such as ship crews or maneuver troop units. These reconstructed doses provide, in

the absence of dosimetry, the readings ofwhat probably would have been recorded on film badges,

had they been worn. Because film badges did not record neutron doses or doses from inhaled or

ingested radioactive contaminants, doses for these types of exposures, must be reconstructed

separately.

8.7 REVIEW OF RECONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY.

The dose reconstruction methodology and processes have been reviewed, in whole and in

part, by several independent authorities throughout the NTPR program. The first NTPR report

dealing with dose reconstruction, Task Force WARRIOR at Shot SMOKY (Goetz and others,

31 May 1979), was critically reviewed in 1979 by nationally recognized radiation experts from

scientific laboratories, as well as by the OTA (at the request of Senator Alan Cranston, Senate

143
Committee on Veterans' Affairs), and the Medical Follow-up Agency of the NAS/NRC. These

reviews provided the confidence to finalize the methodology and to adapt it to many other exposure

scenarios. Other dose reconstructions were subsequently reviewed by committees appointed by the

NAS. One such review was conducted in 1980-81 ofthe Hiroshima-Nagasaki dose reconstructions

(National Academy of Sciences, 21 August 1981), and another review, that of the entire dose

reconstruction effort, was conducted in 1984-85 (National Research Council, 1985). No major

deficiencies were noted that would reflect unfavorably on the technical aspects ofthe external dose

reconstruction methodology or on the radiation doses calculated therefrom.

Ofthe work on internal dose, the reviewers wrote:

Methods used to assign internal doses associated with inhalation or Ingestion of radioactive

material were in general based on unsupported assumptions. The methods often attempted

to relate internal dose to the magnitude of external radiation and tended to overestimate

possible internal doses. There is considerable evidence that, with the exception of doses to

the thyroid, doses to any organ from internal emitters were far smaller than the external dose.

The Committee came to this conclusion from follow up data obtained from Bikini natives,

Japanese fisherman, and veterans who had been exposed to fallout from Shot Smoky. From

these groups, modern methods ofradiochemical analysis of urine and whole-body counting

make it possible 20 or 30 years after exposure to set upper limits of dose commitments as

low as 500 mrems from exposure to strontium-90 and plutonium-239 (National Research

Council, 1985,pp.2-3).

As a result of concerns over the doses received by participants at CROSSROADS, Senator

Cranston asked the GAO to investigate alleged improprieties or deficiencies associated with

CROSSROADS records, dosimetry, and dose reconstructions. The investigation, completed in

1985, did not assess the methodology used to calculate radiation doses, but nonetheless concluded

that film badge dosimetry, personnel decontamination procedures, and contaminant ingestion could

have led in some instances to higher doses than were reported (General Accounting Office,

November 1985). Even if doses were higher, as suggested by the GAO study, they would not have

exceeded the established Federal guideline for occupational radiation exposure.

144
SECTION 9

HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION AND

MEDICAL FOLLOW-UP STUDIES OF VETERANS

This chapter outlines what is known about the health effects ofionizing radiation. It then

summarizes the studies conducted by several agencies to ascertain if such effects exist among

veterans who participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and in the postwar occupation

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.

9.1 HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION.

The biological effects resulting from exposure to ionizing radiation can be grouped into two

general categories, acute (quickly observed) and delayed.

Examples of acute effects are erythema or reddening ofthe skin, blood changes, vomiting,

loss of hair (epilation), and even death in the extreme case. Before such effects can be observed, a

certain minimum radiation dose, or threshold, must be exceeded. The magnitude ofthe effect and

normally the speed at which it occurs increase with the size ofthe radiation dose. In cases where

the radiation dose is above the threshold level, where acute effects are observed, and below the level

that produces fatalities, the observed acute effects usually disappear after a period of time. For

example, blood will return to normal, hair will grow back, and skin burns will heal, although some

scarring and pigmentation loss may occur.

Acute effects and their threshold doses are well known. Table 9-1 below indicates the acute

effects ofwhole-body exposure to various levels ofionizing radiation (Cember, 1983). Observable

acute effects do not occur at radiation doses below approximately 25 rem, as noted in the table.

Better than 99 percent of all doses received by nuclear test participants were well below this

threshold; therefore, such effects were not evident.

Table 9-1. Acute effects of exposure to ionizing radiation.

Dose (rem) Effect

25-50 Blood changes. For example, white blood cells are reduced in number.

Temporary sterility in men.

75 Vomiting in 10 percent ofthose exposed.

200 Depression or ablation of bone marrow. Nausea and vomiting within hours.

Epilation (loss of hair) within two or three weeks.

300 Erythema (reddening ofthe skin).

450 Lethal dose for 50 percent ofthose exposed. Death within 30 days.

1000 Loss ofintestinal wall. Death within one or two weeks.

2000 Unconscious within minutes, death within a few hours.

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Examples of delayed effects include cataracts, several forms of cancer, and genetic disorders

in offspring. Cataracts appear after a latency period ofseveral years and require a threshold dose of

at least 200 rem. Genetic effects have been demonstrated only in animal studies; they have not been

observed in humans. For example, data collected on more than 30,000 children conceived after their

parents were exposed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not reveal statistically significant increases in

stillbirths, neonatal deaths, birth weight, or congenital malformations (Neel, 1963; Schull and others,

11 September 1981).

According to current medical opinion, no threshold dose is required for cancer induction.

Since cancer occurs naturally in the general population and cannot be distinguished from

radiation-induced disease, the problem ofrisk assessment, especially at low doses, is complex. The

only way to determine the magnitude ofthe cancer risk is to study large groups of exposed personnel

and compare their cancer incidence with that of a similar, unexposed group.

Numerous national and international authorities have conducted such studies. It is beyond

the scope ofthis history to discuss these studies in any detail; however, some relevant findings are

summarized in Table 9-2 (Cember, 1983; Upton, August 1991).

Table 9-2. Lifetime risk of excess cancer mortality from gamma radiation.

Source*

Deaths per 100,000 per

single dose of 10 rem

BEIRI(1972) 115-621

ICRP(1977) 125

UNSCEAR(1977) 100

BEIR III (1980) 67-226**

UNSCEAR(1988) 710

BEIR V (1990) 800

**

The BEIR reports were prepared by the NAS Committee on the Biological Effects ofIonizing

Radiation. ICRP is the International Commission on Radiological Protection, and UNSCEAR

is the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

The number cited is the majority opinion. One dissenting member estimated cancer deaths as

158-501 per million person rem, and another dissenting member estimated 10-28 deaths per

million person rem.

The risk estimates presented above are in terms of cancer deaths among a population of

100,000 exposed to a one-time dose of 10 rem. They are not the same, but they are similar. The

differences in risk estimates result from differences in data and methodology and show the difficulty

of answering the risk question except approximately. Research indicates that the veterans who

participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests received an average dose of 0.63 rem (see Section 1.5).

About 1,700 of these men had one-year doses over 5.0 rem, the present Federal guideline for

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exposure of nuclear plant workers. Scientists face two basic problems of analysis. First, without

good understanding ofthe biological mechanisms through which small doses ofradiation may cause

cancer, they estimate the risks of cancer from low level radiation by extrapolating from the effects

oflarger doses. Second, at the radiation dose levels encountered by nuclear test veterans, the number

ofpredicted excess cancer cases is at most very small. These few possible excess cancers would be

extremely hard to identify among the cancer cases that naturally occur in human populations. The

mortality estimate of 800 deaths per 100,000 people exposed to 10 rem given in the above table

converts to 800 fatal cancers in a population of one million exposed to 1 rem. According to current

cancer statistics, approximately 180,000 fatal cancers will occur naturally in a population of one

million persons. In smaller groups with only slightly elevated exposure, any increase in cancer

incidence is easily obscured by the statistical variation in the naturally occurring cancer cases.

The report Health Effects ofExposure to Low Levels ofIonizing Radiation, usually referred

to as BEIR V (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation), has generated considerable controversy

because some believe it says that the risk values are three times larger for solid cancers and four

times larger for leukemia than those given in The Effects on Populations ofExposure to Low Levels

ofIonizing Radiation. BEIR III.

To understand the situation, one must understand how the BEIR III and BEIR V reports are

alike and how they differ in data and methodology. BEIR V uses essentially the same data and study

populations as BEIR III but with updated mortality statistics covering the intervening 10 years and

incorporation ofthe most recent estimates ofthe radiation outputs ofthe nuclear weapons dropped

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Most important, the authors ofBEIR V make several important

assumptions that are different from those used in BEIR III. They are described below:

1. The mathematical model used in BEIR V to extrapolate risk values into the low-dose

region where there is no observed data is more conservative by a factor of about 2.

2. BEIR V ignores the fact that a threshold effect has been observed for some cancers

and that some data is equally well-fitted by the previous, less conservative

assumptions.

3. The extrapolated risk values used in BEIR V do not include a risk reduction factor

(Dose Rate Effectiveness Factor [DREF]) to account for the observed lessening of

radiation effects as dose and dose rate decrease. When applied as recommended by

the authors ofBEIR V, this factor would lower risk values by a factor of between 2

and 10. The authors ofBEIR III included a DREF of 2.5 directly in the risk values

they presented.

4. Data for doses greater than 400 rad were excluded from BEIR V, tending to increase

the risk values by about 25 per cent for solid tumors.

5. Data for the youngest groups ofthose exposed still must be extrapolated from that

of older exposed individuals because the youngest groups have not attained the age

at which the full expression oftheir potential cancers, either naturally occurring or

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excess, has occurred. Because the authors of BEIR V used more conservative

assumptions to make these projections, the assumed risk values are higher than in

BEIR III.

As the result ofthe differences listed above, the numbers in BEIR V appear to indicate higher

risk; but when all the modifying factors are taken into account, the increase is modest at most,

The following statement is from BEIR V:

Finally, it must be recognized that derivation of risk estimates for low doses

and dose rates through the use of any type of risk model involves

assumptions that remain to be validated. At low doses, a model dependent

interpolation is involved between the spontaneous incidence and the

incidence at the lowest doses for which data are available. Since the

committee's preferred risk models are a linear function of dose, little

uncertainty should be introduced on this account, but departure from linearity

cannot be excluded at low doses below the range of observation. Such

departures could be in the direction of either an increased or decreased risk.

Moreover, epidemiologic data cannot rigorously exclude the existence of a

threshold in the millisievert dose range. Thus the possibility that there may

be no risks from exposures comparable to external natural background

radiation cannot be ruled out. At such low doses and dose rates, it must be

acknowledged at the lower limit of the range of uncertainty in the risk

estimates extends to zero (National Research Council, 1990, p. 181).

Several studies have been conducted to determine whether there is an increased incidence

of certain cancers among various groups ofveterans who participated in nuclear tests. The following

sections briefly summarize these efforts.

9.2 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL STUDIES.

The CDC was the first organization to study military participants in the atmospheric nuclear

weapons tests from a health point ofview. In 1977, CDC learned of a veteran who claimed his acute

myelocytic leukemia resulted from radiation exposure allegedly received during participation at Shot

SMOKY, a 44-kiloton detonation that took place on 31 August 1957 as part of Operation

PLUMBBOB. Extensive publicity regarding this case prompted the CDC to initiate a study to

determine ifthere was an excess incidence ofleukemia among the nuclear test participants that might

be attributable to radiation exposure. Plans were to focus on the military participants at Shot

SMOKY.

The identification of a SMOKY cohort proved more difficult than expected. The index case

was a member of Task Force BIG BANG, an Army unit selected to study how well military

personnel who had never witnessed a nuclear explosion would perform various military tasks after

such an experience. Because of an unexpected shift in wind direction, the exercise planned for Task

Force BIG BANG had to be postponed. As a result, the unit observed Shot SMOKY from the press

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area approximately 30 kilometers away. After observing Shot GALILEO, detonated on 2 September

1957, the unit conducted its exercise in an area contaminated by two-day-old SMOKY fallout in

addition to fallout from at least three previous PLUMBBOB shots. Another military maneuver was

conducted in conjunction with Shot SMOKY. Task Force WARRIOR, a reinforced infantry

company from the 1st Battle Group, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, performed exercises

upwind ofthe SMOKY ground zero shortly after the shot. The area was essentially free of SMOKY

fallout but was contaminated by fallout from previous PLUMBBOB shots.

To complicate matters further, there was no central listing ofparticipants by name. A study

cohort was finally identified from research by AFRRI. The list named 3,153 military personnel* who

had been issued film badges at the NTS for the period that included 31 August 1957, the date ofShot

SMOKY. Seventy-one names were added from other sources, thereby making a total cohort of

3,224 individuals. This number of individuals was used in the study.

Several sources were explored to identify cases ofleukemia and other cancers among this

cohort. Four leukemia cases were identified from a list ofmore than 3,000 individuals who made

inquiries resulting from the publicity surrounding the index case. Ofthese personnel, 447 had been

at the NTS on 31 August 1957. The AFRRI list was also compared with various clinical files,

including those ofthe Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), the VA death benefit file, and

personnel records at NPRC. Four more cases were identified from these records, which made a total

of nine (including the index case).

Each case was confirmed by CDC, and the total exceeded the statistically expected incidence

of 3.5 leukemia cases in this cohort. The expected incidence was calculated by applying age- and

sex-specific incidence rates published by the National Cancer Institute to the person-years

accumulated by the SMOKY cohort from 1957 through mid-1977. Eight ofthe nine cases had died

by the time ofthe study. This exceeded the expected mortality of 2.9 calculated from U.S. rates for

the 1970s. Both comparisons were considered statistically significant, even iftwo ofthe cases that

could be questioned with regard to inclusion in the cohort were dropped.

Radiation exposure was considered as a possible cause of this increased incidence. The

available dosimetry (film badge results) and radiological analyses oftissue from two patients did not,

however, support this hypothesis. Therefore, CDC tentatively concluded that, ifthe apparent excess

of leukemia was not a chance occurrence, the SMOKY participants may have received higher

radiation doses than supposed (perhaps from neutrons or inhaled radioactive material not detected

by film badges) or radiation was more carcinogenic at low doses than previously assumed.

The CDC published a preliminary report ofthese findings in the 3 October 1980 issue ofthe

Journal ofthe American Medical Association (Caldwell and others, 3 October 1980). The CDC

continued to study the incidence of all forms of cancer as well as causes of death among the cohort,

*Primarily U.S. Army personnel who were assigned to Exercise Desert Rock and wore film

badges provided by the U.S. Army Signal Depot, Lexington, Kentucky.

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which was eventually refined to 3,217 veterans. Disease incidence and mortality data were collected

through 1979 on over 95 percent ofthe cohort.

The follow-up study identified a total of 112 cancer cases, which is below the expected

number of 117.5 cases in this study cohort. The incidence ofsome specific cancer types was slightly

higher than expected, but the increase was not considered statistically significant with the exception

of leukemia (one additional case was identified). Cancers of the digestive system, respiratory,

genital, and urinary systems occurred less often than expected. No cancers ofthe bone/joints, soft

tissue, endocrine system, or multiple myeloma were found.

With regard to mortality, the cohort had considerably fewer total deaths than expected. The

number of deaths increased in only three categories: infectious and parasitic diseases, accidents, and

killed in action. Deaths from individual types of cancer exceeded the norm in five categories: -

leukemia, brain and nervous system, eye and orbit, genital system, and skin melanoma. Again, only

the increased incidence ofleukemia deaths was found statistically significant.

An analysis ofthe film badge dosimetry available for the cohort showed that, in general,

radiation doses were well within current occupational exposure standards. The analysis also showed

that the mean dose received by participants engaged in the military maneuver was higher than the

mean dose received by support units. However, the frequency of cancer was higher among the

participants assigned to support units. Assuming that the dosimetry is correct, at least in a relative

sense, the opposite would be expected if radiation were the cause.

The findings, published in the 5 August 1983 issue ofthe Journal ofthe American Medical

Association, indicated several biases that affected the study. The authors noted, for example, that

the index case was included in the sample and that one ofthe leukemia cases was for a deceased Air

National Guard pilot whose presence at SMOKY was questionable.

In summary, the CDC 1983 study revealed an increase in the incidence of leukemia and

resulting deaths among a group of nuclear test participants issued film badges at the NTS for the

period covering the date of Shot SMOKY. The incidence of other forms of cancer, other selected

diseases, and the overall mortality among the cohort was typical ofthat for the general population.

The conclusion was as follows: "Although uncertainty remains about the exact amount of radiation

exposure, the lack of a significant increase after 22 years in either the incidence of or the mortality

from any other cancer and the apparent lack of a dose effect by units lead to the consideration that

the leukemia findings may be attributable either to chance, to factors other than radiation, or to some

combination ofrisk factors possibly including radiation" (Caldwell, 5 August 1983).

9.3 ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY STUDY.

The CDC study discussed above concluded that the increased incidence of leukemia among

the "SMOKY" cohort may be attributable to chance or the result of an unknown combination of

factors. A possible factor was that the radiation doses might have been higher than reported, since

only external gamma radiation exposures were considered. One hypothesis was that significant

internal doses resulted from inhalation or ingestion ofradioactive material.

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As a check, a group of 19 veterans was selected from the SMOKY cohort by the CDC to be

sent to the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) for special testing. The group was chosen on the

basis ofhigh film badge readings and/or potential for internal exposure. None ofthe group exhibited

any clinical signs of radiogenic malady. Three members of the group, however, chose not to

participate in the study.

The remaining 16 veterans visited ANL during 1979, where they were interviewed regarding

their participation (exposure scenario) and checked for evidence ofresidual internal radioactivity that

might be attributable to such participation. Whole-body and thorax gamma-ray counts were made

looking specifically for cesium-137, a fairly long-lived fission product that distributes throughout

the body after intake. Using different instruments, similar measurements were made for

plutonium-239 in the thorax and skull. While at ANL, the veterans also provided 24-hour urine

specimens that were analyzed for plutonium-239 and strontium-90.

None of the tests revealed internal radioactivity in excess of that found in the general

population. Thus, the authors concluded that they had "no evidence that these subjects received any

significant internal dose from their participation in the SMOKY weapon test" (Tookey, 14 August

1981).

9.4 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL STUDIES.

The NRC/NAS concluded two medical studies pertinent to this report: Mortality ofNuclear

Weapons Test Participants (1985), referred to as the Five-Series Mortality Study, and "Multiple

Myeloma among Hiroshima/Nagasaki Veterans" (1983). In addition, a follow-on to the Five-Series

Mortality Study and a mortality study of CROSSROADS participants are planned. This section

discusses these studies.

9.4.1 The Five-Series Mortality Study.

Preliminary reports by the CDC in 1979 that a statistically significant increase in leukemia

incidence was occurring in the "SMOKY cohort" caused considerable concern. DNA requested the

Medical Follow-up Agency ofthe NRC/NAS, an independent non-Government agency, to undertake

a study ofthis issue. The details ofthe study were left to the NRC. Funded by both DNA and DOE,

the effort was to determine whether participants at nuclear tests other than SMOKY were also

experiencing an increased incidence of leukemia, other cancers, or any other fatal disease. The

Medical Follow-up Agency chose a study cohort made up of the participants in the five series

identified in Table 9-3. These personnel comprised about one-fourth ofthe total participants in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear testing.

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Table 9-3. Five series in the NAS study.

Scries Year Location

No. of

detonations

GREENHOUSE 1951 PPG 4

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 1953 NTS 11

CASTLE 1954 PPG 6

REDWING 1956 PPG 17

PLUMBBOB 1957 NTS 24

As for the CDC study of Shot SMOKY, complete rosters of participants in these series did

not exist. The NTPR teams, using such sources as ship deck logs, unit morning reports, special

orders, after-action reports, and film badge dosimetry logs, identified by name a total of 49,148

participants by March 1983. This list was selected as the cohort for the NRC study. Only persons

identified from valid records were included in the study; self-reported participants were not accepted

by NAS.

Because of the large number of participants, tracing each individual's health status, in

particular for incidence of disease, was considered impractical for both technical and financial

reasons. It was decided, therefore, to limit the study to mortality and to use records maintained by

the VA. A mortality study would indicate any unusual incidence and would tell if a morbidity study

was warranted.

Names and other identification, such as social security numbers, were submitted to the VA

Beneficiary Identification Records Locator Subsystem (BIRLS) to ascertain who had died through

1982 and the location oftheir VA records. Death certificates for those confirmed dead by the BIRLS

were ordered from the VA Regional Offices. No record existed in the BIRLS for many ofthe names

submitted. These names were directed to the NPRC in St. Louis, Missouri, for further research using

such files as the VA Master Index.

The records search confirmed a total of 5,113 deaths from all causes. This number represents

11.1 percent ofthe study cohort, and is 83.5 percent of the number of deaths that normally would

be expected among the U.S. general population.

Mortality in this cohort from accidents, acts ofwar, and other external causes was six percent

higher than the expected, rate compared with the general U.S. population. On the other hand, the

1,046 cancer (including leukemia) deaths were only 84 percent of the number expected, and the

2,579 deaths from other diseases were only 69 percent of expectation. Similar results emerged when

each test series was examined separately. However, a statistically significant excess number of

deaths from prostate cancer (not thought susceptible to causation by radiation) was found among the

Operation REDWING participants.

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As a check on the methodology used in the study, the SMOKY participants at Operation

PLUMBBOB were subjected to the same mortality ascertainment procedures used for participants

at other shots and test series. The size ofthe cohort increased to 3,554 participants, slightly higher

than that of the CDC study, and 10 leukemia deaths were found. This incidence, 2.5 times the

expected number (3.97), is considered statistically significant. No cancers other than leukemia were

found in excess, and the total number of cancer deaths (67) was less than the number expected (83.8)

using U.S. population rates. These results parallel those reported earlier by CDC and lend credence

to the methodology pursued in the NRC study.

The following conclusions, quoted from the published findings, resulted from the study

(Robinette and others, May 1985):

1. The finding by Caldwell et al. that an excessive number of cases of leukemia has

occurred among former participants at Shot SMOKY ofthe PLUMBBOB series was

confirmed.

2. No evidence was found that leukemia mortality was increased among participants at

PLUMBBOB tests other than SMOKY or among participants at UPSHOTKNOTHOLE, GREENHOUSE, CASTLE or REDWING.

3. Generally accepted estimates ofthe rate of excess leukemia induction per rem when

applied to estimates made by DNA ofthe radiation doses to participants result in an

expected increase ofleukemias among SMOKY participants ofless than 0.2 case.

The observed excess mortality from leukemia among these men, then, either was a

chance aberration or argues that the mean radiation doses at SMOKY (but not at the

other test series) were several times the doses recorded by the film badges that were

used.

4. No evidence was found that any cancer other than leukemia occurred excessively

among former SMOKY participants.

5. Mortality from cancer in all groups of participants was, in general, found to be less

than the number expected at population death rates, and mortality from other disease

was much less than expected, a consequence of selection for good health by the

physical screening employed for active duty servicemen.

6. Although there were significant excesses of leukemia among SMOKY participants

and ofprostate cancer among REDWING participants, no form of cancer was found

to be increased in more than one test series. Since many independent comparisons

of cancer rates were made, the two "significant" excesses may well have resulted

from chance.

7. The total body of evidence reviewed does not convincingly either affirm or deny that

the higher than statistically expected incidence of leukemia among SMOKY

participants (or of prostate cancer among REDWING participants) is the result of

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radiation exposure incident to the tests. However, when the data from all the tests

are considered, there is no consistent or statistically significant evidence for an

increase in leukemia or other malignant disease in nuclear test participants.

Because limitations in the original study have become evident, a follow-up study was

initiated in September 1992 with the NAS to address such questions as (Defense Nuclear Agency,

16 September 1992):

• The first study compared cancer mortality data oftest participants to like incidence

data for the general U.S. population. The follow-on study will use comparable

Service personnel who were not participants at the time oftesting as the comparison

population. It is known that personnel selected for military service were healthier

than the general population.

• A 1989 comparison ofpurified participant data to the 1981 data used in the original

study revealed that there were some names which could not be matched to those in

the study population and others which had been excluded. The follow-on study will

concentrate on a more accurate and thorough review ofmilitary records, participant

names, and Service numbers to determine the correct assignment of personnel from

the current data base to the test participant group.

• Since 1981, the cutoff year for collecting data for the first study, over 10 years of

additional mortality data has accumulated for the participant group. In studies of

Japanese survivors from Hiroshima/Nagasaki, leukemia is the earliest appearing

cancer following radiation exposure. For other cancer types, it may take 30 years or

more for them to appear under similar exposure conditions. It is important to see if

there are excess incidences of cancers emerging among the test participants,

especially leukemias, which should have become completely apparent in the

participant groups ifthey are related to radiation exposure.

• Dose records used in the first study did not fully reflect all periods in which some

participants were exposed to radiation at these test series. Also, monitoring devices

worn at that time by participants registered most, but not all of their dose from

external radiation exposure. Since then, reconstructed radiation doses have been

calculated from historical data. These reconstructed doses account for periods when

participants were exposed, but monitoring devices were not worn or were lost during

the test series. Dose reconstructions have also been performed to account for

unregistered external doses and for doses from inhaled or ingested particles of

fallout. These calculated doses, which have already been added to the participants'

recorded doses, will be used in the follow-on study.

The results ofthe follow-on study are expected to provide a current assessment ofmortality due to

cancer occurrence in U.S. atmospheric nuclear test participants. Comparison ofresults from the two

studies will indicate the influence ofthe key issues on the new study's conclusions. The study report

is expected to be completed in fall 1997.

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9.4.2 Study of Multiple Myeloma Among Hiroshima/Nagasaki Veterans.

The DNA Director requested the NRC undertake the multiple myeloma study in response

to allegations by various veteran groups that the disease was occurring with increased frequency

among participants in the U.S. postwar occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The effort

began with formation of a panel of experts from various medical and scientific disciplines. On 13

and 14 May 1981, a workshop was held at the NAS to review the available data to advise DNA

concerning the feasibility and desirability ofperforming epidemiologic studies ofthe Hiroshima and

Nagasaki occupation forces.

While invitations to participate were sent to a number of veteran organizations, only

representatives of the Committee for U.S. Veterans of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the National

Veterans Law Center accepted. Representatives-of the American Veterans Committee and the

Disabled American Veterans were present as observers.

DNA representatives briefed the panel on the details of the occupation, such as the units

involved, troop arrivals and departures, billet locations, and mission and assignments. SAIC, a DNA

contractor, then provided a worst-case estimate ofthe radiation doses received by the occupation

forces based on historical reports of occupation troop activities and radiological data taken directly

fromjournals and technical reports available to the panel. Staff members ofthe Radiation Effects

Research Foundation and the National Cancer Institute also provided expert testimony.

Representatives ofthe veterans group took part in the discussions following these presentations.

Based on the data presented at this workshop, the panel concluded the following, quoted from

the report summarizing their meeting (National Academy of Sciences, 21 August 1981):

1. Scientifically sound studies of morbidity among military personnel who entered

Hiroshima or Nagasaki soon after the bombings are impractical. Records of

morbidity in this population are just not available, nor could they be assembled in

any objective or systemic fashion.

2. Studies of mortality among these men are feasible. However, from a strictly

scientific point of view, such studies appear to carry inordinate cost in relation to the

potential benefit.

3. No study ofthe population in question could detect effects that would be predictable

from existing knowledge of health hazards associated with radiation exposure.

4. The possibility that multiple myeloma is occurring in excess in these veterans, as has

been alleged, should be explored. This should not at first involve a full-scale

epidemiologic study. The number of confirmed cases of the disease in this

population should first be determined, and an evaluation made as to whether this is

excessive before any further studies are recommended ... Even if an excess number

of cases of multiple myeloma is present in this population, it is unlikely to be

attributable to ionizing radiation.

155
DNA requested that conclusion 4 be pursued. The NAS accordingly appointed a new panel

tasked to investigate all alleged cases ofmultiple myeloma among the occupation troops, verify the

diagnosis, and compare the number of verified cases with the number of cases that would be

expected in a similar (unexposed) population.

Twenty-eight possible cases of multiple myeloma were identified from two lists of veterans

who said they had served in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. DNA compiled one of the lists as part of its

NTPR program. The other list was provided by the National Association of Atomic Veterans

(NAAV), which had polled its membership of about 2,000. The DNA list contained 687 names, and

the NAAV list approximately 500 names.

The NTPR Service teams and participating NAS staffmembers screened military records of

the 28 veterans possibly having multiple myeloma. They eliminated nine ofthe veterans because

their records did not confirm military assignments to either Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

Clinical records were sought from the 19 remaining cases. The veteran or, if deceased, his

next-of-kin was asked for permission to obtain his medical records (including X-rays and microscope

slides) from the appropriate medical authority. Six more cases were eliminated, five ofthem because

the veterans or next-of-kin did not respond to NAS inquiries and one because a physician did not

respond to the request for medical records. Four cases were eliminated from the remaining 13 when

further military record searches revealed that two ofthe personnel had not been assigned to either

Hiroshima or Nagasaki and the medical records of the other two made no reference to multiple

myeloma.

The panel confirmed nine cases of multiple myeloma among the Hiroshima/Nagasaki

veterans. Five of the cases had been assigned to the Nagasaki occupation; the other four were

associated with Hiroshima. All cases were diagnosed between the ages of 51 and 61, the time when

the disease normally appears.

On the basis ofmultiple myeloma incidence rates reported by the National Cancer Institute

and assuming that at least 20,000 men were assigned to occupation duty at Nagasaki, the panel

calculated that 9.5 cases of the disease would be expected by 1980 if all of the troops had been

between the ages of 15 to 19 years at the time of the occupation. At least 18.2 cases would be

expected ifthe ages had been between 20 and 24, and 29.2 cases would be expected if the ages had

been between 25 and 29 in 1945. Similar figures were not calculated for Hiroshima since it is not

possible to estimate the number of Service personnel who may have visited the city. (Occupation

forces for the area were not billeted in Hiroshima proper.)

Since only nine cases were confirmed among the Hiroshima and Nagasaki occupation forces,

the panel concluded that the incidence of multiple myeloma was no greater than that in the U.S.

population. Their conclusion was qualified by the admission that it is quite possible that not every

case had been identified (National Research Council, June 1983).

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9.5 PROPOSAL FOR A VA STUDY.

The Veteran's Health Care Amendments of 1983 (Public Law 98-160) tasked the VA

Administrator, in consultation with the Director of OTA, to:

Provide for the conduct of epidemiological study of the long-term adverse health

effects of exposure to ionizing radiation from the detonation of nuclear devices in

connection with the test of such devices or in connection with the American

occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during the period beginning on

September 11, 1945, and ending on July 1,1946, in persons who, while serving in

the Armed Forces ofthe United States, were exposed to such radiation. Such study

shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, a study ofidentifiable prevalent illnesses, including malignancies, in the persons exposed.

The law further states that the requirement to carry out the study will "cease to have effect as if

repealed by law" ifthe VA Administrator, in consultation with the OTA Director, finds that such a

study is not feasible.

In December 1984, the VA completed its proposed study plan, "VA Assessment ofVeterans

with Military Service at Sites ofTemporarily Augmented Ionizing Radiation." A two-phase health

assessment was proposed.

The first phase called for a questionnaire to be mailed to all veterans who participated in the

Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation or any ofthe U.S. continental or oceanic atmospheric nuclear tests.

The questionnaire would be designed primarily to collect information on physical health, particularly

regarding cancer and other chronic disease, but it would also seek information on mental health and

lifestyle factors. The same questionnaire would also be sent to a similar number ofveterans who had

no history ofsuch participation. Results from the two groups, adjusted for age, occupation, smoking

habits, and other influences, would be compared.

The second phase would include medical and physiological examinations of an unspecified

number of veterans and the collection of data regarding possible congenital or genetic abnormalities

in their children. The methodology for the analysis ofthis information was not addressed.

The VA plan was first reviewed by a panel of Government scientists, headed by Dr. Glyn

Caldwell, who had authored the SMOKY study at CDC. The Caldwell review was then submitted

to the Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination (CIRRPC). Both the

Caldwell committee and CIRRPC concluded that the VA plan did not describe a feasible study since

it would be impossible to detect the small excess of disease expected in a group of approximately

200,000 personnel exposed to the reported low levels ofradiation.

The VA plan and the Caldwell/CIRRPC review were submitted to the Director of OTA for

review in January 1985. OTA examined these documents and conducted its own independent review

ofthe feasibility ofthe epidemiological study. The independent OTA study analyzed two strategies

for assessing the health ofthese veterans. The first was similar to that proposed by the VA, that was

157
to study approximately 200,000 participants in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests. (The

Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation troops were excluded since the doses were so low that their

inclusion would weaken rather than strengthen the power ofthe study.) The second strategy was to

study approximately 1,400 veterans with measured or estimated doses greater than 5.0 rem. The

power of each strategy to detect the expected excess ofradiogenic cancers was calculated based on

the radiation dose information available. These calculations were repeated for doses several times

higher to account for possible understatement ofreported dose.

The OTA concluded, as had the Caldwell committee and CIRRPC, that such "global" studies

concerning the health ofnuclear test veterans are not feasible. The agency did, however, suggest two

more specific studies that could provide useful information (Office of Technology Assessment, July

1985):

1. Continue to follow the "SMOKY" cohort previously studied by the CDC/NRC. If

the excess leukemia detected was simply a matter of chance, no excess of other

radiogenic cancers would be expected.

2. Conduct a mortality study of the veterans who participated in Operation

CROSSROADS pending the results of a GAO review ofthe radiation dose estimates.

In determining the feasibility and desirability of an epidemiological study or studies, the VA

Advisory Board considered the recommendations ofthe Caldwell committee, CIRRPC, and OTA.

It also reviewed commentary given in the following: the GAO report Operation CROSSROADS:

Personnel Radiation Exposure Estimates Should Be Improved (8 November 1985), discussed in

Section 8.7; the NAS report Review of the Methods Used to Assign Radiation Doses to Service

Personnel at Nuclear Weapons Tests (7 February 1986), discussed in Section 8.7; and the hearing

held by the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs on 11 December 1985 regarding issues pertinent

to possible radiation exposures received by CROSSROADS participants.

During February 1986, the VA Advisory Board listened to presentations by DNA, GAO, and

NAS on dose determination for CROSSROADS participants. As a result of Board

recommendations, the VA decided that it would not participate in a mortality study of

CROSSROADS veterans but that it would continue the follow-up of SMOKY personnel. The VA

Administrator informed OTA ofthese decisions in April 1986.

OTA reviewed the VA decisions and considered a NAS proposal to conduct a mortality study

of CROSSROADS personnel. In March 1986, DNA had indicated to the Senate Committee on

Veterans Affairs that it would be willing to provide part ofthe funding if OTA considered the study

feasible and ifCongress decided against appropriating funds specifically for the effort. DNA's offer

was accepted; the decision was made that the NAS Medical Follow-up Agency would conduct the

study, and DNA would provide NAS with data from the NTPR files concerning CROSSROADS

participants. NAS is developing protocols for the study. The study report is expected to be

completed in spring 1996.

158
* * * * *

The NTPR effort and related activities continue. Further medical follow-up studies may be

conducted ofthe participants in the U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program. Veterans

and other interested parties continue to use the DNA toll-free line, request information concerning

participation and dose, and file claims with the VA. Anniversaries ofthe Hiroshima and Nagasaki

bombings periodically refocus national attention on veterans ofthe occupation, as well as on the

atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.

DNA responds to continuing requests for data. With the support from DOE and the VA, the

NTPR program has assembled and organized a body ofinformation that should be useful for years

to come.

159
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED EVENTS RELEVANT TO THE NTPR PROGRAM

Early 1977

6 May 1977

CDC identified a former participant in U.S. atmospheric nuclear

weapons testing who had leukemia. CDC suspected an abnormal

incidence ofleukemia among participants in Shot SMOKY, conducted

on 31 August 1957 as part of Operation PLUMBBOB.

Ad hoc DoD committee met to formulate goals and an agenda for

conducting a detailed review of troop participation in the atmospheric

nuclear test program. The committee was chaired by the Director ofthe

DNA's AFRRI and included representatives from various Army

organizations, such as the Office ofthe Surgeon General, Office ofthe

Deputy Chief of Stafffor Operations and Plans, and Office ofthe Chief

of Public Affairs.

3 June 1977

15 June 1977

3 November 1977

DoD, DOE, REECo, and LANL representatives met at the DOE Nevada

Operations Office in Las Vegas to determine the availability of

information on personnel exposures to ionizing radiation during the

atmospheric nuclear tests.

Army provided initial participant information to CDC concerning the

Provisional Company, 82nd Airborne Division, which was one of the

Army contingents that had been at Shot SMOKY.

Interagency committee, involving DoD, DOE, VA, and the U.S. Public

Health Service, met to discuss the possible long-term health effects

resulting from participation in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. The

attendees recommended that a major epidemiological study of test

participants be undertaken under the direction of an independent

scientific organization and that a central administrative unit be

established within DoD to coordinate all related activities.

1 December 1977 Meeting convened by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health

Affairs to address the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program and

the possible relationship between participation in the program and an

increased incidence of disease attributable to radiation exposure.

Participants included representatives from the military services, DNA,

DOE, VA, CDC, and NRC/NAS, as well as epidemiological consultants

from Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Results ofthe meeting were

decisions to solicit a formal proposal for a study of the atmospheric

nuclear test participants from NRC and the unofficial assignment of

DNA as the DoD executive agency for all matters pertaining to DoD

personnel participation in the atmospheric nuclear test program.

A-l
January 1978

25 January and

14 February 1978

28 January 1978

9 February 1978

13 February 1978

4 April 1978

7 April 1978

9 May 1978

8 June 1978

23 June 1978

13 July 1978

DOE began its research on the nuclear test participants with specific

emphasis on identifying military personnel.

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on

Health and Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce. They summarized DNA efforts to develop data on

DoD participants in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. DOE also

testified regarding DoD participants and exposures.

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and

Logistics, officially designated DNA as DoD executive agent to develop

information on DoD personnel participation in the U.S. atmospheric

nuclear weapons tests.

DNA initiated its nationwide toll-free call-in program for veterans ofthe

atmospheric nuclear tests to report their participation.

DNA initiated the NTPR program by a memorandum to the Secretaries

of the Military Departments that established basic relationships and

procedures. The Services were to identify their respective personnel and

individual exposures.

DOE hosted a meeting attended by representatives of the DoD NTPR,

National Archives, REECo, LANL, NAS/NRC, and each DNA

contractor organization. The agenda focused on methods for identifying

and obtaining records pertaining to atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

VA issued Circular 10-78-69 authorizing physical examinations for

nuclear test participants.

The White House directed the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare (HEW) to coordinate a task force investigation concerning the

health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation.

DNA established the data elements to be developed by the military

services for each test participant.

DNA accepted NAS protocol for study of the participants in the

atmospheric nuclear tests.

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on

Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources ofthe House Committee

on Government Operations. They discussed DoD research to identify

participants in the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and possible

exposures to ionizing radiation resulting from their participation.

A-2
7 March 1979

March 1979

April, May, and

August 1979

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Senate Committee

on Governmental Affairs. Issues discussed included health effects of

low-level ionizing radiation; radiation safety; identification ofpersonnel

involved in testing; and fallout from tests.

DNA initiated a notification and medical examination program for all

DoD test participants with cumulative doses from atmospheric nuclear

testing in excess of 25 rem.

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, conducted four hearings to consider

health and safety issues related to the atmospheric nuclear testing

program. The hearings, directed to civilian residents downwind ofthe

tests, were on 19 April 1979 in Salt Lake City, Utah; 23 April 1979 in

Las Vegas, Nevada; and 24 May and 1 August 1979 in Washington,

D.C.

May 1979

8 May 1979

June 1979

15 June 1979

20 June 1979

3 October 1979

August 1980

28 September 1980

DNA expanded the notification and medical examination program to

include the Desert Rock volunteer observers.

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on

Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs. They identified the progress made

by DNA and the Service teams to collect data on DoD participants in

atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

The DoD notification and VA medical examination program was

expanded to include all veterans with doses in excess of 5.0 rem during

any 12-month period.

DoD and VA representatives signed a formal Memorandum of

Understanding concerning the investigation ofionizing radiation injury

claims from veteran atmospheric nuclear test participants.

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Senate Committee

on Veterans' Affairs. They discussed the declassification of documents

relevant to atmospheric nuclear weapons testing and dose reconstruction

for test participants with no or incomplete dose records.

DNA expanded the NTPR effort to include U.S. Service personnel who

had participated in the postwar occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Japan.

DNA issued a detailed fact sheet on the U.S. postwar occupation of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The CBS television program "60 Minutes" aired a segment on the NTPR

program.

A-3
3 October 1980 Preliminary findings of the CDC study concerning the incidence of

leukemia among SMOKY participants appeared in the Journal of the

American Medical Association.

5 March 1981 The ABC television program "20/20" reported on Operation WIGWAM,

conducted in the Pacific on 14 May 1955. The report was based on an

article on WIGWAM in the January 1981 edition of New West

magazine.

13-14 May 1981 At the request of DNA, NRC convened a panel to review available data

concerning personnel participation in the occupation of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, Japan. The panel subsequently advised DNA that the

incidence of multiple myeloma among the occupation forces should be

explored.

4 June 1981 VA issued Circular 10-81-99, updating procedures for physical

examinations of atmospheric nuclear test participants.

July 1981 DOE opened CIC, a public archive in Las Vegas, Nevada, housing documents pertinent to U.S. nuclear weapons testing and NTPR.

1 September 1981 DNA published Operation WIGWAM, the first ofthe DNA histories on

a U.S. atmospheric nuclear test series.

27 October 1981 DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Senate Committee

on Labor and Human Resources. They commented on proposed Bill S.

1483, which would have made the U.S. liable in incidents related to

fallout from the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.

3 November 1981 Congress enacted Public Law 97-72, "Veterans' Health Care, Training,

and Small Business Loan Act of 1981" which authorizes the VA to

provide hospital and nursing home care and limited outpatient services

to veterans exposed to ionizing radiation while participating in U.S.

atmospheric nuclear testing or the Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation. This

law does not, however, provide for the care of conditions resulting from

causes other than exposure to ionizing radiation.

April 1983 VA Circular 10-83-61 authorized treatment oftest participant veterans

for any ailment except those that are clearly not radiogenic in origin

(e.g., appendicitis and traumatic injury).

6 April 1983 DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Senate Committee

on Veterans' Affairs. They reported on the status ofthe NTPR program

and related matters.

A-4
24 May 1983 DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Veterans'

Affairs. They outlined the scope and accomplishments of the NTPR

program and discussed the Stafford Warren papers and Operation

CROSSROADS.

June 1983 NRC completed its "Multiple Myeloma Among Hiroshima/Nagasaki

Veterans," a study concluding that "the reported incidence of nine

verified cases of multiple myeloma among U.S. veterans of the

occupation forces stationed in or near Hiroshima and Nagasaki

constitutes an incidence no greater than that in the general U.S.

population." This report was mailed to all Hiroshima/Nagasaki veterans

for whom DNA had a current address.

June 1983 DNA and the Navy NTPR mailed information to about 40,000 veterans

of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing identifying free medical benefits

available to them through VA.

5 August 1983 The results of the updated CDC study of Shot SMOKY participants

appeared in the Journal of American Medical Association. The

conclusions were that participant deaths due to cancer and total numbers

of cancer cases were slightly less than the statistical norm. The only

abnormal finding was a larger number than expected ofleukemia cases.

This number was attributed primarily to chance.

1 May 1984 DNA published Operation CROSSROADS 1946, the last ofthe DNA

histories on a U.S. atmospheric nuclear test series.

24 October 1984 Congress enacted Public Law 98-542, "Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation

Exposure Compensation Standards Act," which defined rules for

adjudicating VA claims and established a panel ofexperts for addressing

scientific issues.

1 May 1985 NRC published Mortality ofNuclear Weapons Test Participants, which

discussed the results ofits study by cause of death of46,186 participants

in the nuclear tests. However, limitations in the study have led to plans

for a follow-on study for which protocols are being developed.

28 May 1985 VA issued Circular 10-85-83, which replaced VA Circular 10-83-61 and

provided free medical care for participants in the atmospheric nuclear

tests.

7 June 1985 DNA mailed information to about 45,000 veterans of atmospheric

nuclear weapons testing outlining the NRC and CDC studies, the efforts

ofNTPR, and the free medical benefits available to them through VA.

DNA also requested comments on its proposed rules for responding to

VA claims.

A-5
July 1985

26 August 1985

21 October 1985

8 November 1985

3 December 1985

11 December 1985

7 February 1986

OTA issued its report entitled An Evaluation of the Feasibility of

Studying Long-Term Health Effects in Atomic Veterans. OTA

concluded that global studies concerning the health of nuclear test

participants were not feasible. It suggested, however, that the SMOKY

cohort previously studied by the CDC/NRC be researched at five-year

intervals and that a mortality study be conducted of the participants in

Operation CROSSROADS.

VA published its final rules on "Adjudication of Claims Based on

Exposure to Dioxin or Ionizing Radiation," in the Federal Register, Vol.

50, No. 165, pp. 34452-34461.

DNA published its final rules on "Guidance for the Determination and

Reporting of Nuclear Radiation Dose for DoD Participants in the

Atmospheric Nuclear Test Program" in the Federal Register. Vol. 50,

No. 203, pp. 42520-42525.

GAO published its report Operation CROSSROADS: Personnel

Radiation Exposure Estimates Should Be Improved. Regarding the

CROSSROADS participants, GAO stated that (1) allowances had not

been made for film badge inaccuracies, (2) personnel decontamination

procedures were inadequate, and (3) DNA did not adequately evaluate

internal radiation exposure.

President Reagan signed Public Law 99-166, "Veterans Administration

Health-Care Amendments of 1985." This law extended certain portions

of Public Law 97-72, which provided health care benefits for eligible

veterans.

DNA representatives testified at a hearing held by the Senate Committee

on Veterans' Affairs. They commented on issues pertaining to the

possible radiation exposures received by participants in Operation

CROSSROADS, conducted in 1946 at Bikini as the first postwar

atmospheric nuclear test series.

NAS made public its report entitled Review of the Methods Used to

Assign Radiation Doses to Service Personnel at Nuclear Weapons Tests.

This report reviewed the entire dose reconstruction effort and judged the

methodology and processes to have sound scientific merit: "Although

the committee concentrated only on methods, it found no evidence that

the NTPR teams had been remiss in carrying out their mandate. If any

bias exists in the estimates, it is the tendency to overestimate the most

likely dose."

A-6
7 April 1986

1 August 1986

29 September 1986

28 October 1986

January-February 1987

20 February 1987

March 1987

1 April 1987

8 April 1987

9 April 1987

29 May 1987

The President signed Public Law 99-272, "Consolidated Omnibus

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985," which included a provision for VA

inpatient care with no disability or means restrictions for all atmospheric

nuclear test participants.

DNA published For the Record - A History of the Nuclear Test

Personnel Review Program. 1978-1986 (DNA 604IF). It described the

origins, missions, and evolution of the effort, focusing on the

contributions ofthe DNA, the NTPR teams, the VA, and the DOE. In

addition, the narrative described U.S. nuclear operations, including

weapons testing and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

personnel participation in those operations, and radiation safety

measures. The report also discussed radiation dose determination and

medical studies of potential dose effects.

LTG John L. Pickett, Director, DNA, sent letters to each ofthe Service

secretaries proposing consolidation of the NTPR effort under DNA's

control.

President Reagan signed Public Law 99-576, "Veterans' Benefits

Improvement and Health Care Authorization Act of 1986," which

required VA to establish an Ionizing Radiation Registry. Under the law,

DNA is required to provide the relevant information to VA.

A DOJ contractor began duplication ofNTPR records for the NARS v.

Turnage suit in the Northern District of California. A major portion of

the program's paper records were copied as part ofthe effort with some

disruption ofregular activities.

DNA supplied Senator Cranston with a listing ofthe high doses for each

test series, to include: badge doses, reconstructed doses, and total doses.

Each ofthe Service teams transferred tapes ofits data base to the VA for

the Ionizing Radiation Registry.

MCNTPR disestablished.

MCNTPR files transferred to DNA.

NNTPR files transferred to DNA.

DNA delivered tapes containing CROSSROADS data from Army, Navy,

and Marine Corps File B data bases to NAS for CROSSROADS

mortality study.

A-7
29 September 1987 GAO published Nuclear Health and Safety: Radiation Exposures of

Some Cloud-Sampling Personnel Need to Be Reexamined

(GAO/RCED-87-134). GAO concluded that for some Air Force

personnel at Operations REDWING and DOMINIC I external radiation

exposure was understated. Moreover, ground personnel during

Operations TUMBLER-SNAPPER and REDWING did not consistently

wear protective breathing devices when working around contaminated

aircraft. Consequently, the amount of internal radiation they received

needed to be evaluated.

1 October 1987 The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps NTPR teams were formally

consolidated under DNA.

23-25 November 1987 Commander R. Thomas Bell, DNA, testified at NARS suit in Northern

District of California.

28 Januar)' 1988

22 February 1988

24 February 1988

DNA and its NTPR contractors briefed the NAS committee investigating

accuracy of film badges used at atmospheric nuclear tests.

DNA took over the work ofthe Field Command NTPR team.

Commander R. Thomas Bell and Carlton Chapman of DNA briefed an

American Legion group - some 60 service officers and 15 Washington

office staffers.

8 April 1988

20 May 1988

8 June 1988

DNA's Radiation Policy Division relocated from the agency's main

building to the nearby Telegraph Village shopping center where it set up

a public reading room for veterans and other interested parties.

President Reagan signed Public Law 100-321, "The Radiation-Exposed

Veterans Compensation Act of 1988," which provided a presumption of

Service connection to veterans who participated in atmospheric nuclear

tests and the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, after World

War Two. The bill identified 13 radiogenic diseases for compensation.

Air Force NTPR work and records consolidated at DNA.

18 November 1988

26 May 1989

President Reagan signed Public Law 100-687, "Veterans Judicial

Review Act," which established procedures for the adjudication of

veterans' benefits claims. Although the procedures apply to all veterans'

claims, the legislation resulted largely from pressure brought through

lobbying by atomic veterans' organizations. The legislation created the

Court of Veterans Appeals to consider appeals from denials of claims.

Director, DNA, met with representatives from the American Legion,

VFW, DAV, NAAV, and NARS.

A-8
14 June 1989

21 June 1989

August 1989

1 August 1989

12 and 26 September

1989

2 October 1989

2 October 1989

16 October 1989

18 October 1989

7 February 1990

23 February 1990

April and May 1990

15 October 1990

NTPR informational material was sent to Retired Officers Association,

Fleet Reserve Association, Retired Enlisted Association, Shift Colors.

Army Echoes, and Afterburner.

VA published its final implementing regulations for Public Law 100-

321, in the Federal Register. Vol. 54, No. 118, pp. 26027-26030.

DNA began mailing information on Public Law 100-321 to all veterans

with current addresses on the File A data base, a group of about 42,000

at the time.

DNA provided training to adjudication officers from VA Regional

Offices.

DNA provided training about NTPR to stafffrom VA Regional Offices.

VA published an amendment to its final rule on "Evaluation of Studies

Relating to Health Effects of Dioxin and Radiation Exposure," in the

Federal Register. Vol. 54, No. 189, pp. 40388-40392.

DNA provided training to VFW National Service Officers in

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Court of Veterans' Appeals convened and began work.

VA promulgated (in the Federal Register. Vol. 54, No. 200, pp. 42802-

42803) an amendment to its final regulations on "Claims Based on

Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," which added posterior subcapsular

cataracts and non-malignant thyroid nodular disease to the list of

diseases adjudicated in accordance with Public Law 98-542.

The Court of Veterans' Appeals heard its first case, that of Ernest

Erspamer, a participant in Operation CROSSROADS.

The Court of Veterans' Appeals instructed the VA to resolve the

Erspamer case within six months.

DNA provided NTPR dosimetry tapes to VA for the Ionizing Radiation

Registry as called for in Public Law 99-576.

President Bush signed Public Law 101-426, "The Radiation Exposure

Compensation Act," which provided compensation for certain person

who lived downwind from the nuclear weapons tests in Nevada and to

certain uranium miners.

A-9
5 November 1990

August 1991

14 August 1991

13 November 1991

26 March 1992

10 April 1992

11 June 1992

August 1992

President Bush signed Public Law 101-510, "1991 DoD Authorization

Act," which amended Public Law 101-426 to include among the eligible

beneficiaries those who participated onsite in atmospheric nuclear

testing. This expansion included veterans.

VA established a toll-free National Radiation Help Line to assist

veterans and their families with radiation disability claims.

President Bush signed Public Law 102-86, "Veterans' Benefits Program

Improvement Act of 1991," which amended PL 100-321 to extend the

presumptive period for leukemia from 30 years to 40 years and to extend

eligibility for presumptions to members of the Reserves and National

Guard who participated in U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing.

DNA representative testified before the Compensation, Pension, and

Insurance Subcommittee ofthe House Committee on Veterans' Affairs

during hearings on the extension of the list of presumptive Serviceconnected diseases and the requirement that DoD and VA study

additional radiation exposure activities.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California

entered judgment in the NARS lawsuit. The Court found the $10.00

attorney fee limitation unconstitutional and required the VA to notify

potential eligible class members of their right to have prior claims

readjudicated ifthey retain an attorney.

DOJ published final rules for Public Law 101-462, "Claims Under the

Radiation Exposure Compensation Act," as amended by Public Law

101-510, "DoD Authorization Act," in the Federal Register. Vol. 57, No.

70, pp. 12428-12461.

VA published Circular 21-92-5 regarding the readjudication of ionizing

radiation claims as a result ofthe NARS case.

OTA issued a background paper titled "A Discussion of Questions about

the 1985 NAS Report Mortality of Nuclear Test Participants." OTA

found that the inaccuracies reported by DNA to NAS in 1989 concerning

the number of veterans misidentified as participants as well as the

number not included in the study were overstated. However, OTA found

that even the lower numbers were substantial and the resulting

inaccuracies could have affected the results ofthe study. Moreover, the

dose information on the participants had been updated and those changes

could also affect analyses of cancer risks. OTA concluded that the study

should be redone, although it remained an open question whether an

explicit internal control group was needed.

A-10
10 August 1992

30 October 1992

26 March 1993

GAO published Nuclear Health and Safety: Mortality Study of

Atmospheric Nuclear Test is Flawed (GAO/RCED-92-182). GAO

concluded that there were inaccuracies in the list of participants and

exposure data used by NAS in preparing the report Mortality ofNuclear

Weapons Test Participants.

President Bush signed Public Law 102-578, "Veterans' Radiation

Exposure Amendments of 1992." It amends Public Law 100-321 by

eliminating the latency period for the diseases listed in that legislation

and by adding salivary gland and urinary tract cancers to the list of

diseases that are presumed to be service-connected. It also amends

Public Law 98-542 in two ways. It requires (1) a review ofinformation

on other activities military personnel performed before 1 January 1970

that may have exposed them to ionizing radiation to determine whether

there were adverse health effects in a significant number of these

veterans, and (2) a review ofinformation on bronchio-alveolar cancer to

see whether it should be considered radiogenic.

VA promulgated (in the Federal Register. Vol. 58, No. 57, pp. 16358-

16359) an amendment to its final regulations on "Claims Based on

Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," which added ovarian cancer and

parathyroid adenoma to the list of diseases adjudicated in accordance

with Public Law 98-542.

A-ll
APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

The following technical and organizational terms are used in this volume.

ABSORBED DOSE The amount of energy absorbed per unit mass of irradiated material.

Absorbed dose is measured in rads.

AIR BURST The explosion of a nuclear weapon at such a height that the expanding

fireball does not touch the earth's surface.

AIR SAMPLING

for

RADIOACTIVITY

The process of collecting certain volumes of air to determine the level of

radioactivity in the air.

ALPHA PARTICLE

ATOM

ATOMIC ENERGY

BETA BURNS

A form of particulate radiation emitted from the nuclei of certain

radioactive elements. An alpha particle is composed oftwo neutrons and

two protons and is identical to the nucleus of a helium atom, having a

double positive charge. An alpha particle cannot penetrate clothing or

the outer layer ofskin, so it is not an external exposure hazard. Such a

particle can be extremely hazardous, however, if exposure occurs

internally.

The smallest particle of an element that still retains the characteristics of

that element. Every atom consists of a positively charged central nucleus,

which carries nearly all the mass ofthe atom. The nucleus is generally

composed of uncharged neutrons and positively charged protons. It is

surrounded by electrons that carry a negative charge.

Energy released by various nuclear reactions, such as fission, fusion, or

radioactive decay. Great amounts of energy are released during fission

and fusion processes. The release of this energy in a very short time

makes nuclear weapons far more powerful than conventional explosives.

Nuclear energy is another and a more appropriate label for this energy.

Skin lesions caused by deposition of beta-emitting fallout particles onto

bare skin.

BETA PARTICLE A particle with a single negative charge and very small mass emitted

spontaneously from the nuclei of certain radioactive elements. Physically,

the beta particle is identical to an electron moving at high speed.

B- 1
BIOAS SAY The determination ofthe concentration ofmaterials, including radioactive

materials, within the body by sampling and analyzing tissue or body

fluids.

BURST

CHAIN REACTION

An explosion or detonation.

A reaction that stimulates its own repetition, usually referring to fission

or fusion reactions.

CLOUD-SAMPLING

CLOUD STEM

CLOUD TRACKING

CONTAMINATION,

RADIOACTIVE

CUMULATIVE

DOSE

The process of collecting samples of the cloud resulting from a nuclear

detonation to determine the amount of airborne radioactivity, both

particulate and gaseous, contained in the cloud. This was usually

conducted by specially equipped aircraft.

The visible column of debris (and possibly dust and water droplets)

extending upward from the point of burst of a nuclear device.

The process of using either radar or aircraft to monitor the drift of a

cloud resulting from a nuclear detonation.

The presence of unwanted radioactive material on or within areas,

objects, or persons.

The total dose resulting from repeated or continued exposure to

radiation.

DECAY,

RADIOACTIVE

DECONTAMINATION

DEVICE,

NUCLEAR

The spontaneous emission of radiation, in the form of alpha or beta

particles or by gamma rays. The radiation is emitted by an unstable

isotope. As a result ofthe emission, the radioactive isotope is converted

into a different element that may or may not be radioactive.

The reduction in the effect of contaminating radioactive material or the

removal of contaminating radioactive material from a structure, area,

object, or person.

An explosive device deriving the energy of its explosion from either a

fission reaction or a combination of a fission and a fusion reaction.

Devices using fission only are usually referred to as atomic or nuclear

weapons. Those using the combination offission and fusion reactions are

often termed hydrogen weapons. A device's yield is determined by the

details of its construction.

DOSE See ABSORBED DOSE or DOSE EQUIVALENT.

B-2
DOSE

EQUIVALENT

DOSIMETER

DOSIMETRY

The absorbed dose expressed in terms ofits biological effect. It is the

product of the absorbed dose in rads multiplied by a quality factor and

any modifying factors. The dose equivalent is expressed in rem.

A device for measuring and recording the total accumulated dose of(or

exposure to) ionizing radiation. Devices worn or carried by individuals

are called personnel dosimeters.

The theories about and applications of the techniques involved in

measuring and recording radiation doses and dose rates. Its practical

application includes the use of various types of radiation detection

instruments and devices to measure radiation.

EXPOSURE, X or

GAMMA

RADIATION

FALLOUT

FILE A

FILEB

FILM BADGE

FIREBALL

A measure ofthe ionization produced by gamma (or X) rays in air. The

exposure rate, exposure per unit oftime, is commonly used to indicate

the gamma radiation intensity of a source. The unit of exposure is the

roentgen (R).

The descent to the earth's surface of particles contaminated with

radioactive material as a result of a nuclear detonation. The term also

applies to the contaminated particulate matter itself.

TheNTPR data base consisting of information extracted from telephone

calls to the DNA toll-free lines and from letters sent by participants in the

atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and in the postwar occupation of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The NTPR data base that has been created with verified information on

individual veterans gathered by NTPR researchers since the program

began in 1978. Originally, each Service team had its own, but these were

combined after consolidation. Each record has space for, among other

things: the veteran's name, serial number, social security number,

address, whether he has filed a VA claim, date of birth and death, cause

of death, participation data, and dose data. Currently it is more often

referred to as the NTPR data base rather than File B. As of 30

September 1993, it contained about 401,000 records.

A personnel dosimeter which uses photographic film to measure the

radiation dose of the wearer. The badge is usually clipped to an outer

garment above waist level. The dose is calculated from the degree offilm

darkening that results from exposure to radiation.

The luminous sphere of hot gases that forms a few thousandths of a

second after a nuclear detonation.

B-3
FISSION

FUSION

GAMMA RAYS

GROUND ZERO

(GZ) or SURFACE

ZERO (SZ)

HALF-LIFE,

RADIOLOGICAL

HEALTH PHYSICS

HEIGHT OF BURST

HIGH-ALTITUDE

BURST

INDUCED

RADIOACTIVITY

INITIAL NUCLEAR

RADIATION

INTENSITY,

NUCLEAR

RADIATION

The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two or more radioactive nuclei,

accompanied by the release of a large amount of energy and generally one

or more neutrons and one or more gamma rays.

The formation of a heavier nucleus from two lighter nuclei, accompanied

by the release of a large amount of energy.

A form of electromagnetic radiation emitted spontaneously from the

nuclei of certain radioactive elements, often in conjunction with the

emission of alpha or beta particles. Gamma rays also result from other

nuclear reactions, such as fission and neutron capture. Gamma rays are

identical to X-rays, except that they originate within the nucleus. Gamma

rays travel great distances in the air and can easily penetrate most

substances.

The point on the ground vertically below or above the center of a nuclear

burst; frequently abbreviated GZ. This is also referred to as surface zero,

especially for underwater or overwater bursts.

The time required for a radioactive substance to lose one-half of its

activity by radioactive decay.

The branch of radiological science dealing with the protection of

personnel from exposure to ionizing radiation.

The height above the earth's surface at which a device is detonated.

A detonation at an altitude over 100,000 feet.

Radioactivity produced in certain materials as a result ofthe capture of

neutrons. In a nuclear detonation, neutrons induce radioactivity in the

weapon debris as well as in the surroundings.

Nuclear radiation (essentially neutrons and gamma rays) emitted from the

fireball and the cloud during the first minute after a nuclear explosion.

One minute is the time required for the source of part of the radiations

(such as fission products in the cloud) to attain such a height that only

insignificant amounts of radiation from the cloud reach the earth's

surface.

The amount of energy of any radiation incident on an area. This term,

usually applied to gamma radiation, expresses the exposure rate (in

R/hour) at a given location.

B-4
IONIZATION The removal of an electron from an atom, leaving a positively charged

ion. The detached electron and the remaining ion are referred to as an

ion pair.

IONIZING Electromagnetic radiation (gamma rays or X-rays) or particulate radiation

RADIATION (alpha particles, beta particles, or neutrons) capable of producing ions

during its passage through matter.

KILO- A prefix denoting 1,000. For example, one kiloton means 1,000 tons.

MANHATTAN The district ofthe U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, organized in 1942, that

ENGINEER developed the atomic bomb.

DISTRICT

MEGA- A prefix denoting 1,000,000. For example, one megaton means

1,000,000 tons.

MONITORING The procedure or operation of locating and measuring radiation and

radioactive contamination by means of survey instruments. Persons

engaged in this activity are referred to as radiological monitors.

NEUTRON One ofthe elementary particles of an atom. Neutrons are uncharged and

have a mass number of one. They are necessary to initiate the fission

process, and large numbers of them are produced in fission and fusion

processes. They constitute a significant portion ofthe prompt radiation

from both fission and fusion detonations. Neutrons travel great distances

in the air and can readily penetrate most substances.

NEVADA TEST The region in southeast Nevada set aside for the continental atmospheric

SITE (NTS) nuclear weapons testing program. Known first as the Nevada Test Site,

then as the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) beginning in early 1952, the

site since 1955 has again been called the NTS.

NUCLEAR A general name given to any explosion in which the energy released

DETONATION results from reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion or

both.

NUCLEAR Radiation emitted from unstable nuclei. Important nuclear radiations are

RADIATION alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear

radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true. X-rays, for

instance, are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear

radiations since they do not originate from atomic nuclei.

B-5
NUCLEAR TEST

PERSONNEL

REVIEW (NTPR)

OFFSITE

ONSITE

A program established by the DNA to conduct a series of wide- ranging

actions on behalf of U.S. atmospheric nuclear test participants and

veterans of the postwar U.S. occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Japan.

The area outside the boundaries ofthe NTS.

The total area encompassed by the NTS, including Camp Mercury,

Frenchman Flat, Yucca Pass, and Yucca Flat. For oceanic testing, the

various test sites and the official zone around each from which ships not

affiliated with the tests were excluded for security and safety reasons.

PHOTON

PROMPT

RADIATION

RAD

RADIATION

RADIOACTIVITY

REM

RESIDUAL

RADIATION

RESPIRATOR

A very small parcel of radiant energy.

Radiation emitted from a nuclear detonation within a microsecond of

detonation. It consists mainly of neutron and gamma radiation.

For contaminated testing, the unit of absorbed radiation dose that

represents the absorption of 100 ergs of ionizing radiation per gram of

absorbing material, such as body tissue.

Energy radiated in the form of waves or particles. In the case of nuclear

explosions and the radioactive material created by them, the waves of

concern are electromagnetic waves with wave lengths from 10"11 to 10"3

centimeters, especially gamma rays, and the photons associated with

them. The particles of concern are alpha and beta particles and neutrons.

The spontaneous emission of alpha or beta particles, neutrons, or gamma

rays from the nuclei of unstable atoms. As a result ofthis emission, the

radioactive atom decays into another atom that may or may not also be

radioactive. Ultimately, as a result of one or more stages of radioactive

decay, a stable (nonradioactive) end product is formed.

The unit of dose equivalent, which is the amount of any ionizing radiation

that produces the same biological effect as one rad of gamma or

X-radiation. The rem is the product ofthe absorbed dose (rads) times a

quality factor and any other modifying factor. For gamma and x-rays, the

1 rad equals 1 rem and both are approximately equal to 1 roentgen.

Nuclear radiation, chiefly beta particles and gamma rays, that persists

after the first minute following a nuclear detonation. The radiation is

emitted mainly by fission products and materials in which radioactivity

has been induced by the capture of neutrons.

A device worn over the mouth and nose to prevent the inhalation of

hazardous material.

B
ROENTGEN A unit of exposure to gamma radiation or X-radiation. It is the quantity

of gamma rays or X-rays that produces 2.08 x 109ion pairs in a cubic

centimeter of air at standard temperature and pressure. An exposure of

one roentgen is approximately equal to an absorbed dose of one rad in

soft tissue.

SHIELDING Any material or obstruction that absorbs or attenuates radiation and thus

tends to reduce exposure of personnel on the side away from the

radiation source. A moderately thick layer of any opaque material will

provide satisfactory shielding from thermal radiation, but a considerable

thickness ofmaterial of high density may be needed to provide shielding

from gamma rays.

SURFACE BURST The explosion of a nuclear device at a height above the surface less than

the radius ofthe fireball. An explosion in which the device is detonated

on the surface itself is called a contact surface burst or a true surface

burst.

THERMONUCLEAR An adjective referring to the process in which very high temperatures are

used to bring about the fusion ofhydrogen nuclei with the accompanying

liberation of energy. A thermonuclear device is one in which part ofthe

explosive energy results from thermonuclear fusion reactions. The high

temperatures required are obtained by means of a fission explosion.

Penetrating electromagnetic radiation similar to gamma rays but of

non-nuclear origin and generally oflower energy.

The total effective energy released in a nuclear detonation. It is usually

expressed in terms ofthe TNT equivalent required to produce the same

energy release in an explosion. Nuclear detonation yields are commonly

expressed in kilotons or megatons (thousands or millions oftons) of TNT

equivalent.

Many ofthe definitions cited above have been adapted from Glasstone and Dolan; Atomic Energy

Commission, Nuclear Terms: and Bureau ofRadiological Health Publication Number 2016.

X-RAYS

YIELD

B-7
APPENDIX C

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

This volume uses the following abbreviations.

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AFB Air Force Base

AFIP Armed Forces Institute ofPathology

AFNTPR Air Force Nuclear Test Personnel Review Team

AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

AFSWC Air Force Special Weapons Center

AFSWP Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

ANL Argonne National Laboratory

ANTPR Army Nuclear Test Personnel Review Team

BEIR Biological Effects ofIonizing Radiation

BIRLS Beneficiary Identification and Records Locator Subsystem (VA)

CDC Centers for Disease Control

CIC Coordination and Information Center

CIRRPC Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination

CONUS Continental United States

DASA Defense Atomic Support Agency

DMA Division ofMilitary Application

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency

DoD Department ofDefense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department ofJustice

DoL Department ofLabor

DREF Dose Rate Effectiveness Factor

EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen, & Grier, Inc. (former name)

FCDA Federal Civil Defense Administration

FCNTPR Field Command Nuclear Test Personnel Review

GAO General Accounting Office

HAI History Associates Incorporated

HEW Health, Education, and Welfare

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JTO Joint Test Organization

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory, previously the Los Alamos Scientific

Laboratory (LASL)

LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, previously the University of

California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL)

MED Manhattan Engineer District

MCNTPR Marine Corps Nuclear Test Personnel Review Team

NAAV National Association of Atomic Veterans

C- 1
NARS National Association ofRadiation Survivors

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NNTPR Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review Team

NPG Nevada Proving Ground

NPRC National Personnel Records Center

NRC National Research Council ofthe National Academy of Sciences

NTIS National Technical Information Service

NTPR Nuclear Test Personnel Review

NTS Nevada Test Site, known as the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) from 1952

to 1955

NV Nevada Operations Office

OEHL Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory

OoRP Office ofRadiation Programs

OTA Office of Technology Assessment

PHS Public Health Service

PPG Pacific Proving Ground, sometimes called the Enewetak Proving Ground or

Bikini Proving Ground

RARP Radiation Policy Division

RAEM Environments and Modeling Division

REECo Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Incorporated

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SWC Special Weapons Command

UCRL University of California Radiation Laboratory

UNSCEAR United National Scientific Commission on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

VA Veterans Administration; on 26 March 1989 became the Department of

Veterans Affairs

VARO Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office

C-2
APPENDIX D

PUBLIC RESOURCES FOR DOCUMENTS ON U.S.

ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

Documents pertinent to the continental and oceanic series of atmospheric nuclear tests can be

located at the NTIS and at CIC, introduced in Section 3.1.2. This appendix provides detail on both

ofthese resources.

D.l NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE.

The NTIS, an agency ofthe Department of Commerce, is the central source for the public

sale of Government-sponsored research reports and analyses. The NTIS Bibliographic Data Base

consists of documents from a number of Government agencies but primarily from the DOE, DoD,

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The agency supplies its customers with

about 23,000 information products daily and approximately four million documents and microforms

annually.

The NTIS information collection comprises over one million titles, all of which can be

purchased under the provisions of Title 15 U.S. Code 1151-7. This law established NTIS as a

clearinghouse for scientific, technical, and engineering information and directed the agency to

recover its costs through the sale ofinformation and services.

Documents available for purchase at NTIS include the 41-volume history of atmospheric

nuclear weapons testing developed by DNA as part ofthe NTPR program. Appendix E lists these

volumes according to title, DNA number, date of publication, number of pages, NTIS price code,

and NTIS order number. Other NTIS materials relevant to the nuclear testing program are over 1000

documents declassified by DNA in partial fulfillment ofNTPR tasking.

The address is: National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield,

Virginia 22161. The telephone number (703) 487-4650 should be used when the caller has the NTIS

order number and the price code. The caller should dial (703) 487-4780 when he or she does not

have this information for a document.

NTIS standard prices for documents and microfiche are identified below. For billing

purposes, NTIS accepts the American Express Card, Master Card and VISA accounts, as well as

personal checks. There is a $3 handling charge per order.

D-l
NTIS DOMESTIC PRICE SCHEDULES EFFECTIVE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1992

Price Codes and Prices for Documents

Microfiche and Paper Copv Reports

Price Code Price

A01 $ 9.00

A02 12.50

A03 17.50

A04 and A05 19.50

A06 through A09 27.00

A10 through A13 36.50

A14 through Al7 44.50

Al8 through A21 52.00

A22 through 25 61.00

D.2 COORDINATION AND INFORMATION CENTER.

Most ofthe unclassified documents available at the NTIS are also accessible at CIC. This

section presents information from a DOE fact sheet (dated 4 March 1991) detailing the CIC

purposes, scope, and procedures, including the current fee schedule.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

COORDINATION AND INFORMATION CENTER

Purpose

The purpose of CIC is to:

• Collect and consolidate, for long term preservation, all historical documents, records,

and data dealing with offsite radioactive fallout from all U.S. testing of nuclear

devices;

• Provide resources and methods for identification and retrieval of documents based

on subject and content; and

• Allow access to the collected documents by all interested parties, including the

general public.

Scope

The CIC, as a publicly accessible facility, contains only unclassified documents. Many

formerly classified documents have been declassified or sanitized and are included in the CIC

collection. There are no classified documents available at or through the CIC.

D-2
The scope ofthe collection includes:

• Data and documentation on the detection and measurement ofradioactive fallout and

related factors resulting from nuclear device test activities at the NTS, the TRINITY

event, the PPG, and other on-continent test locations;

• Policy documents dealing with procedures and conduct oftests and with public safety

considerations and actions;

• Published and primary sources describing the development and state-of-knowledge

ofthe health effects of radiation;

• Documents dealing with public information as disseminated through such media as

pamphlets, news releases, and news publications; and

• Related studies and reports produced by the scientific and technical field.

Sources and Types ofInformation

The CIC began document collection in the fall of 1979. Since then it has indexed an estimated

260,000 documents. Collection activities are continuing, and it is anticipated that approximately

390,000 documents will ultimately be included in the collection.

To date, documents have been received from over 80 individual and agency contributors. The

major source of documents have been the DOE Headquarters; the DOE/NV; the Las Vegas and

Washington, D.C., offices ofthe Environmental Protection Agency; the DoD's DNA and Defense

Technical Information Center; the DOE Technical Information Center in Oak Ridge; the DOE

Environmental Measurement Laboratory in New York City; the LANL; the University of California

Project 37 Files; the Utah State Archives in Salt Lake City; the Nevada State Archives in Carson City;

the Weather Service Nuclear Support Office; and the Technical Library of REECo, at Mercury,

Nevada.

The following describes, in general, the content of some ofthe most significant collections:

• Documents collected from the archives in the Historian's Office of the DOE

Headquarters focus primarily on the policy and decision making activities ofthe AEC.

These include the minutes of the AEC, the General Advisory Committee, and the

Advisory Committee for the Division of Biology and Medicine, executive

correspondence, secretariat papers, staff papers, and special reports for the AEC, the

Division ofBiology and Medicine, and Division ofMilitary Applications.

• The DOE Nevada Operations files yielded a wide variety of documentation, including

operational and administrative orders, reports, procedures, and correspondence

regarding conduct of nuclear testing.

D-3
The files ofthe Las Vegas Environmental Protection Agency (successor to the Public

Health Service) contains monitoring, sampling, and surveillance data and reports of

the monitoring program in the offsite area out to 250 miles from the NTS from 1954

to the present.

DOE's Environmental Measurements Laboratory collection contains monitoring,

sampling, and surveillance data and reports from the area beyond 250 miles from the

NTS.

The files of Project 37 of the University of California deal with soil sampling,

monitoring, and the persistence of fallout from select test events within the 250 mile

radius ofthe NTS.

By request of the HEW Department, a review ofthe records from the Washington,

D.C., offices of the old Public Health Service was conducted in 1979. This review

produced a three volume report, "Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing on Health

Report of the Panel of Experts on the Archives of PHS Documents," which lists

approximately 12,000 documents. The three volume report and microfilm copy of all

documents listed are in the CIC collection.

The NTPR program produced a series of summary reports on the Pacific and

continental atmospheric weapons tests in which DoD and military personnel

participated. The CIC is a repository for the summary reports and for many ofthe

reference documents used as sources.

In January 1979, at the request of Governor Scott M. Matheson, all Utah State offices

surveyed their records and files and produced a collection of documents dealing with

fallout, the health effects of ionizing radiation, and related topics. Microfilm copy of

this collection is resident in the CIC.

The initial group of documents obtained from LANL contains copies ofthe original

offsite monitoring logs for Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE in 1953. The logs

contain original recordings and summation of radiation measurements, sampling

collections and related data. A second more extensive collection of the LANL

documents contains reports, correspondence, and data related to LANL involvement

in nuclear testing.

The University ofWashington and the Scripps Institution ofOceanography collections

include data and reports covering their projects to document the ocean and oceanic

ecosystems during the Pacific atmospheric testing era.

The CIC collection includes press releases issued by DOE and predecessor offices as

well as an extensive collection of newspaper articles which reflect the concern for

public information and the public attitude and knowledge about the testing program

in Nevada.

D-4
CIC Facilities and Services

The CIC facility provides accommodations for:

A public reading room where documents of general public interest are available for

review,

A research area where requested documents may be used for more in-depth study,

Computer terminals for staff-assisted research ofthe data base and files,

Printed and microfiche indices to the collection,

Microform reader/printers for review and copy of documents contained only on

microform, and

Document duplication equipment.

A staff oftechnical and clerical personnel is available to provide research assistance and access to

documents.

CIC is open for visitors from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Requests for

services should be made to Coordination and Information Center, Reynolds Electrical and

Engineering Co., Inc., Post Office Box 98521, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193 or by calling commercial

(702) 295-0731 or FTS 575-0731.

D.3 DNA NTPR LIBRARY.

DNA maintains a library of unclassified material on U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing for the

use ofveterans and the public. The library's holdings include a full set ofthe NTPR histories, a full

set of the dose reconstruction publications, and a modest number of declassified documents on

nuclear testing from the 1945 to 1962 period. Microfilm and microfiche readers are available to read

material in those forms. The library is open from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday through Friday.

Appointments can be made by calling (703) 325-7744 or writing:

Defense Nuclear Agency

ATTN: RAEM/NTPR

6801 Telegraph Road

Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3398

D-5
APPENDIX E

DNA NTPR PUBLICATIONS ON THE CONUS AND OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC

NUCLEAR TESTS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

An availability statement is included at the end ofthe reference citation for those readers who

wish to read or obtain copies of source documents.

Source documents bearing an availability statement of NTIS may be purchased from the

National Technical Information Service. When ordering by mail or phone, both the price code and

NTIS number should be included. The price code appears in parentheses before the NTIS order

number.

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road Phone: (703) 487-4650 (Sales Office)

Springfield, Virginia 22161 (703) 487-4780 (Identification)

Source documents bearing an availability statement ofCIC may be ordered or reviewed at the

following address:

Department ofEnergy

Coordination and Information Center

(Operated by Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.)

3084 South Highland

P.O. Box 98521, Mail Stop 548 Phone: (702) 295-0731

Las Vegas, Nevada 89193 FTS: (702)575-0731

E- 1
NTPR PUBLICATIONS ON THE CONUS AND OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC

NUCLEAR TESTS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1993

I GENERAL

Reference Manual. DNA-6031F. Apr 83. 224 pp. (A10) AD\A136 818.*

"Radiac Instruments and Film Badges Used at Atmospheric Nuclear Tests."

DNA-TR-84-338. Sep 85. 84 pp. (A05) AD\A163 137*

H HISTORIES

A Continental U.S. Tests

Project TRINITY 1945-1946. DNA-6028F. Dec 82. 76 pp. (A05) AD\A128 035.*

Operation RANGER-Shots ABLE. BAKER. EASY. BAKER-2. FOX-25 January -

6 February 1951. DNA-6022F. Feb 82. 182 pp. (A09) AD\A118 684.*

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE 1951. DNA-6023F. Jun 82. 191 pp. (A09) ADVA123

441.*

Shots ABLE - EASY: The First Five Tests of the BUSTER-JANGLE Series 22

October - 5 November 1951. DNA-6024F. Jun 82. 141pp. (A07) AEAA122 358.*

Shots SUGAR and UNCLE: The Final Tests of the BUSTER-JANGLE Series 19

November - 29 November 1951. DNA-6025F. Jun 82. 133 pp. (A07) AD\A122

243.*

Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1952. DNA-6019F. Jun 82. 220 pp. (A10)

ADVU22 242.*

Shots ABLE. BAKER. CHARLIE & DOG: The First Tests of the TUMBLERSNAPPER Series 1 April - 1 May 1952. DNA-6020F. Jun 82. 234 pp. (All)

AD\A122 241.*

Shots EASY. FOX. GEORGE & HOW: The Final Tests of the

TUMBLER-SNAPPER Series 7 May - 5 June 1952. DNA-6021F. Jun 82. 180 pp.

(A09) ADVU22 240.*

Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 1953. DNA-6014F. Jan 82. 266 pp. (A12)

AD\A121 624.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-2
Shots ANNIE - RAY The First Five Tests ofthe UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Series 17

March- 11 April 1953. DNA-6017F. Jan 82. 208 pp. (A10) AD\A121 635.*

Shot BADGER-A Test of the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Series 18 April 1953.

DNA-6015F. Jan 82. 100 pp. (A05) ADVU21 671.*

Shot SIMON-A Test of the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Series 25 April 1953.

DNA-6016F. Jan 82. 94 pp. (A05) AD\A121 667.*

Shots ENCORE to CLIMAX The Final Four Tests of the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

Series. DNA-6018F. Jan 82. 232 pp. (All) AD\A121 634.*

Operation TEAPOT 1955. DNA-6009F. Nov81. 275 pp. (A12)AD\A113 537.*

Shots WASP to HORNET The First Five TEAPOT Tests 18 February - 18 March

1955. DNA-6010F. Nov81. 188 pp. (A09) AD\A114 080.*

Shot BEE-A Test ofthe TEAPOT Series 22 March 1955. DNA-6011F. Nov81. 87

pp. (A05) AEAA113 539.*

Shot APPLE 2-A Test of the TEAPOT Series 5 May 1955. DNA-6012F. Nov81.

105 pp. (A06)AD\A113 538.*

Shots ESS through MET and Shot ZUCCHINI The Final TEAPOT Tests 23 March

- 15 May 1955. DNA-6013F. Nov81. 260 pp. (A12) AD\A114 082.*

PLUMBBOB Series 1957. DNA-6005F. Sep 81. 311pp. (A14) AD\A107 317.*

Shots BOLTZMANN to WILSON The First Four Tests ofthe PLUMBBOB Series 28

May- 18 June 1957. DNA-6008F. Sep 81. 144 pp. (A07) AD\A118 681.*

Shot PRISCILLA-A Test of the PLUMBBOB Series 24 June 1957. DNA-6003F.

Feb81. 104 pp. (A06) AD\A105 674.*

Shot HOOD-A Test ofthe PLUMBBOB Series 5 July 1957. DNA-6002F (Rev). 13

May 83. 110 pp. (A06) AD\A138 287.*

Shots DIABLO to FRANKLIN PRIME The Mid-Series Tests of the PLUMBBOB

Series 15 July - 30 August 1957. DNA-6006F. Sep 81. 202 pp. (A10) AD\A118

683.*

Shot SMOKY-A Test of the PLUMBBOB Series 31 August 1957. DNA-6004F.

May 81. 155 pp. (A08) ADVU03 828.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-3
Shot GALILEO-A Test ofthe PLUMBBOB Series 2 September 1957. DNA-6001F.

Feb81. 85 pp. (A05) AD\A103 829.*

Shots WHEELER - MORGAN The Final Eight Tests of the PLUMBBOB Series 6

September - 7 October 1957. DNA-6007F. Sep 81. 146 pp. (A07) AD\A118 680.*

Safety Experiments. November 1955 - March 1958. DNA-6030F. Aug 82. 80 pp.

(A05)AD\A123 423.*

Operation HARDTACK II. 1958. DNA-6026F. Dec 82. 242 pp. (All) AD\A130

929.*

Operation DOMINIC II-Shots LITTLE FELLER II. JOHNIE BOY. SMALL BOY.

LITTLE FELLER 1-7 July - 17 July 1962. DNA-6027F. Jan 83. 218 pp. (A10)

AD\A128 367.*

Projects GNOME and SEDAN The PLOWSHARE Program. DNA-6029F. Mar 83.

132 pp. (A07)AD\A130 165.*

B Oceanic Tests

Operation CROSSROADS 1946. DNA-6032F. May 84. 568 pp. (A24) AD\A146

562.*

Operation SANDSTONE 1948. DNA-6033F. Dec 83. 222 pp. (A10) AD\A139

151.*

Operation GREENHOUSE 1951. DNA-6034. Jun 83. 334 pp. (A15) AD\A134

735.*

Operation IVY 1952. DNA-6036F. Dec 82. 364 pp. (A16) AD\A128 082.*

CASTLE Series 1954 DNA-6035F. Apr 82. 530 pp. (A23) AD\A117 574.*

Operation WIGWAM DNA-6000F. Sep 81. 252 pp. (A12) AD\A105 685.*

Operation REDWING 1956 DNA-6037. Aug 82. 442 pp. (A19) AD\A134 795.*

Operation HARDTACK I 1958 DNA-6038F. Dec 82. 474 pp. (A20) AD\A136

819*

Operation ARGUS 1958. DNA-6039F. Apr 82. 135 pp. (A07) ADVA122 341.*

Operation DOMINIC I 1962. DNA-6040. Feb 83. 436 pp. (A19)AD\A136 820.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-4
m DOSE RECONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS

A World War II

Radiation Dose Reconstruction U.S. Occupation Forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Japan. 1945-1946. DNA5512F. Aug 80. 80 pp. (A05) AD\A097 038.*

B Continental Tests

Analysis ofRadiation Exposures for Observers and Maneuver Troops. Exercise Desert

Rock IV. Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER. DNA-TR-85-277. Aug 85. (A04)

AD\A171 79.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure. 2nd Marine Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade,

Exercise Desert Rock V. Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. DNA-TR-82-03.

Feb82. 54 pp. (A04) AD\A124 279.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Maneuver Units. Exercise Desert Rock V,

Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. DNA-TR-84-303. Aug 84. 67 pp. (A04)

AD\A168 116.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers. Exercise Desert Rock Vr

Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. DNA-5742F. Apr 81. 124 pp. (A06)AD\A116

921.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure. Task Force RAZOR. Exercise Desert Rock VI,

Operation TEAPOT. DNA-TR-83-07. Jul 83. 68 pp. (A04) AD\A152 997.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure. Third Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise

Brigade. Exercise Desert Rock VI. Operation TEAPOT. DNA-TR-84-13. Feb 84.

50 pp. (A03)AD\A152 189.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers. Exercise Desert Rock VI,

Operation TEAPOT. DNA-5354F. Jul 80. 98 pp. (A05) ADVA121 701.*

Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR. Shot SMOKY. Exercise

Desert Rock VII-VIII. Operation PLUMBBOB. DNA-4747F. May 79. 114 pp.

(A06)AD\A070 239.*

Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Task Force BIG BANG, Shot GALILEO. Exercise

Desert Rock VII-VIII. Operation PLUMBBOB. DNA-4772F. Apr 80. 94 pp. (A06)

AD\A085 801.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-5
Analysis of Radiation Exposure 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise

Brigade. Exercise Desert Rock VII. Operation PLUMBBOB. DNA-5774F. Jun81.

80 pp. (A05) ADVU22 204.*

C Oceanic Tests

Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Naval Units of Operation CROSSROADS. Vol.

I - Basic Report. DNA-TR-82-05-V1. Mar 82. 168 pp. (A08) AD\A152 702.*

Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Naval Units of Operation CROSSROADS. . Vol.

II - (Appendix A) Target Ships. DNA-TR-82-05-V2. Mar 82. 186 pp. (A09)

AD\B090 882.*

Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Naval Units of Operation CROSSROADS. . Vol.

III - (Appendix B) Support Ships. DNA-TR-82-05-V3. Mar 82. 450 pp. (A20)

AD\B090 883*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation SANDSTONE.

DNA-TR-83-13. Aug 83. 50 pp. (A03) AD\A152 188.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation GREENHOUSE.

DNA-TR-82-15. Jul 82. 130 pp. (A07) AD\A151 621.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure on the Residence Islands of Enewetak Atoll after

Operation GREENHOUSE. 1951-1952. DNA-TR-85-390. 20 April 1987. 15 pp.

(A03) AD\A181 506.*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation IVY.

DNA-TR-82-98. Mar 83. 74 pp. (A04) AD\A152 190*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation CASTLE.

DNA-TR-84-6. Jan 84. 173 pp. (A09) AD\A660 33*

Analysis of Radiation Exposure. Service Personnel on Rongerik Atoll. Operation

CASTLE. Shot Bravo. DNA-TR-86-120. Jul 87. 36 pp. (A03) AD\A193 520.*

IV INTERNAL DOSE ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTS

Internal Dose Assessment. Operation CROSSROADS. DNA-TR-84-119. Oct 85. 90

pp. (A05) AD\A168 803.*

Low Level Internal Dose Screen—CONUS Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review.

DNA-TR-85-317. 22 December 1986. 96 pp. (A06) AD\A182 563.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-6
Low Level Internal Dose Screen-Oceanic Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review.

DNA-TR-88-260. Oct 91. 103 pp. (A06) AD\A241 923.*

V INHALATION AND INGESTION DOSE DOCUMENTS

FIIDOS--A Computer Code for the Computation ofFallout Inhalation and Ingestion

Dose to Organs. DNA-TR-84-375. Dec 85. 161 pp. (A08) AD\A168 148.*

VI NEUTRON DOSE

Neutron Exposure for DoD Nuclear Test Personnel. DNA-TR-84-405. Aug 85. 32

pp. (A03)AD\A175 839.*

See Availability Information page.

*Available from NTIS; price code and order number appear before the asterisk.

Also available at CIC.

E-7
APPENDIX F

REFERENCE LIST

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Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, LA-616, January 1947. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Air Force NTPR, Air Force NTPR Program Summary, Medical Examination, 1 October 1986,

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Air Force Special Weapons Directorate, "Operation Plan 8-62, SMALL BOY Support," Kirtland

Air Force Base, New Mexico, 13 June 1962. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Anonymous, "These Were the Correspondents Who 'Rode the Apple'," no date.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Anspaugh, L.R., "Resuspension and Redistribution of Plutonium in Soils," Health Physics. Vol.

29, No. 4 , pp. 571-582, October 1975. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Atomic Energy Commission, Report ofthe Test Manager. Operation STORAX. Nevada

Operations Office, NVO-6, February 1964. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Baciocco, Albert, Jr., VADM, USN, Memorandum for Chief ofNaval Operations, Subject:

Status ofthe Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NNTPR), Department ofthe Navy,

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, Washington, DC, 11 July 1984.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Barrett, H. M., and others, Low Level Internal Dose Screen - CONUS Tests. Defense Nuclear

Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-TR-85-317, 22 December 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Bell, R. Thomas, CDR, MSC, USN, Memorandum for the Director, Biomedical Effects, DNA,

Subject: Quarterly Navy NTPR Report, Navy NTPR, Washington, DC, 12 April 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Bell, R. Thomas, CDR, MSC, USN, Memorandum for the Director, Biomedical Effects, DNA,

Subject: Navy NTPR Report, Navy NTPR, Washington, DC, 20 May 1986.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Bell, R. Thomas, CDR, MSC, USN, Personal Communication with Paul Boren, Assistant NTPR

Program Manager. Navy NTPR, Washington, DC, May 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Berkhouse, Linda H. and others, Operation DOMINIC 11962. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6040F, 1 February 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-l
Berkhouse, Linda H. and others, Operation GREENHOUSE 1951. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6034, 15 June 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Berkhouse, Linda H. and others, Operation SANDSTONE 1948. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6033F, 19 December 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Berkhouse, Linda H. and others, Operation CROSSROADS 1946. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6032F, 1 May 1984. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Bradley, David, No Place to Hide. Little Brown and Company, New York, NY, 1948.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Brady, William J., Technical Advisor, Enclosures to a letter to Paul Boren, Assistant NTPR

Program Manager, Environmental Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical and

Engineering Co., Inc., Las Vegas, NV, 10 April 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Bruce-Henderson, S. and others, Operation REDWING 1956. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6037F, 1 August 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Buckley, J. R., CAPT, USN, "Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review," Navy NTPR (OP-981T),

Washington, DC, 29 August 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Bureau ofNaval Personnel, "The Results ofthe Tests," All Hands, the Bureau ofNaval

Personnel Information Bulletin, p. 7, 1 July 1946. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Butler, R.E. and Miller, H. M, Operation PLUMBBOB. Test Group 57. Program 74. Surface

Alpha Monitoring as a Method of Measuring Plutonium Fallout. Sandia Corporation,

Albuquerque, NM, WT-1513, pp. 7-8, 37, 31 January 1962. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Caldwell, Glyn G. and others, "Leukemia among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear

Bomb Test: A Preliminary Report," Journal ofthe American Medical Association. Vol.

244, No. 14, pp. 1575-1578, 3 October 1980. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Caldwell, Glyn G. and others, "Mortality and Cancer Frequency among Military Nuclear Test

(Smoky) Participants, 1957 through 1979," Journal ofthe American Medical Association.

Vol. 250, No. 5, pp. 620-624, 5 August 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Carew, Paul H., "NTPR-A Case Study," Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, 3 May

1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Cember, Herman, Introduction to Health Phvsics. 2nd Edition, Permagon Press, New York, NY,

1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-2
Committee to Evaluate Cases of Multiple Myeloma Among Hiroshima, "Multiple Myeloma

among Hiroshima/Nagasaki Veterans," National Research Council, Medical Follow-Up

Agency, Washington, DC, June 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet: Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Occupation Forces. Washington, DC, 6 August 1980. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Nuclear Test Personnel

Review (NTPR), Washington, DC, April 1984. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Nuclear Test Personnel

Review (NTPR), Washington, DC, January 1989, a. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Radiation Exposure and the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, Washington, DC, January 1989, b.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Veterans' Services and the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, Washington, DC, January 1989, c.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Epidemiology and the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, Washington, DC, January 1989, d.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, Subject: Follow-on Study of Atomic

Veterans Underway, Washington, DC, 16 September 1992. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Version 4 ofATR (Air Transport ofRadiation). Washington, DC,

DNA-3995, January 1976. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, "Guidance for the Determination and Reporting ofNuclear Radiation

Doses for DoD Participants in the Atmospheric Nuclear Test Program," Federal Register.

Vol. 50, No. 203, pp. 42520-42525, 21 October 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, FIIDOS - A Computer Code for the Computation of Fallout Inhalation

and Ingestion Dose to Organs. Washington, DC, DNA-TR-84-375, 12 Dec 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, "Veterans Assistance Program," statistics through July 1991, no date.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Defense Nuclear Agency, Radiation Policy Division, 3 September 1991. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-3
Department of Energy, Screening Criteria for Document Collection, Washington, DC, May 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Energy, Coordination and Information Center, Operated by Reynolds Electrical

and Engineering Co., Inc., Las Vegas, NV, revised 4 March 1991. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department ofJustice, "Claims Under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act," Federal

Register. Vol. 57, No. 70, pp. 12428-12461, 10 April 1992. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, "Adjudication of Claims Based on Exposure to Dioxin or

Ionizing Radiation," Federal Register. Vol. 50, No. 165, pp. 34452-34461, 26 August

1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Veterans Benefits, DVB Circular 21-88-11,

Revised, 3 March 1989, PL 100-321, "Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of

1988," Washington, DC, 3 March 1989. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, "Radiation Information for Veterans

Who Participated in Nuclear Weapons Testing or in the Occupation ofNagasaki and

Hiroshima," Washington, DC, no date. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, "Diseases Subject to Presumptive Service Connection, on

Payment ofthe Special Allowance Under Section 156 of Public Law 97-377," Federal

Register. Vol. 54, No. 118, pp. 26027-26030, 21 June 1989. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, "Claims Based on Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," Federal

Register. Vol. 54, No. 200, pp. 42803-42803, 18 October 1989. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department of Veterans Affairs, "Claims Based on Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," Federal

Register. Vol. 58, No. 57, pp. 16358-16359, 26 March 1993. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Department ofthe Army, U.S. Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group, Health

Physics Program Office, History ofthe Army Nuclear Test Personnel Review

(1984-1987). Washington, DC, 24 September 1987. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Dick, J. L., Maj, USAF and Baker, T. P., 1st Lt, USAF, Operation PLUMBBOB. Test Group 57.

Program 73. Monitoring and Decontamination Techniques for Plutonium Fallout on

Large-Area Surfaces. Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base,

Albuquerque, NM, WT-1512, pp. 5-6, 3 March 1967. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Farrell, T. F., "Memorandum to Major General L. R. Groves: Subject: Report on Overseas

Operations - Atomic Bomb," 27 September 1945, The Secret History ofthe Atomic

Bomb. Edited by Anthony Cave and Charles B. MacDonald, Dial Press/James Wade, pp.

529-539, 1977. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-4
General Accounting Office, Operation CROSSROADS: Personnel Exposure Estimates Should

Be Improved. General Accounting Office, Washington, DC, November 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

General Services Administration, Protecting Federal Records Centers and Archives from Fire.

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, April 1977. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gibbons, William D., Col, USAF, Memorandum for DNA/NTPR (Mr. Boren), Subject: NTPR

Historical Report, Air Force NTPR, Headquarters United States Air Force, Boiling AFB,

Washington, DC, 30 May 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gladeck, Frederick R. and others, Operation HARDTACK 11958. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6038F, 1 December 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gladeck, Frederick R. and others, Operation IVY 1952. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington,

DC, DNA-6036F, 1 December 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gladeck, Frederick R., Telephone conversation with Daniel G. Martinez, JAYCOR, Vienna, VA,

16 August 1993. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gladeck, Frederick R., Telephone conversation with MAJ Joe A. Stinson, USA (Ret),

Albuquerque, NM, JAYCOR, Vienna, VA, 19 August 1993. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Gladeck, Frederick R., Telephone conversation with Martha E. DeMarre, Las Vegas, NV,

JAYCOR, Vienna, VA, 2 September 1993. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J., The Effects ofNuclear Weapons. Third Edition,

Department of Defense and Energy Research and Development Administration,

Washington, DC, 1977. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Goetz, Jerald L. and others, Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR. Shot

SMOKY. Exercise Desert Rock VII-VHI. Operation PLUMBBOB. Defense Nuclear

Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-4747F, 31 May 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Goetz, Jerald L. and others, Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Task Force BIG BANG. Shot

GALILEO. Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII. Operation PLUMBBOB. Defense Nuclear

Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-4772F, 9 Apr 1980. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Goetz, Jerald L. and others, Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers. Exercise

Desert Rock VI. Operation TEAPOT. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC,

DNA-5354F, 15 July 1980. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Goetz, Jerald L. and others, Analysis ofRadiation Exposure for Troop Observers. Exercise

Desert Rock V. Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-5742F, 28 April 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-5
Gravitis, Inara and others, Projects GNOME and SEDAN the PLOWSHARE Program.

Washington, DC, DNA-6029F, 18 March 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Harris, P.S. and others, PLUMBBOB Series 1957. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC,

DNA-6005F, 15 September 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Herman, John, Air Force NTPR Program Summary, Air Force NTPR, Brooks AFB, TX, June

1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hersey, John, Hiroshima. A.A. Knopf, New York, 1946. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Huang, K., Statistical Mechanics. New York, NY, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Isengard, William S., Project Officer, D/F, Subject: Trip Report, Field Command NTPR,

Albuquerque, NM, 8 June 1978. (UNCLASSIFIED)

JAYCOR, Chronological History ofNTPR (Draft notes done annually from 1977 through 1990),

Vienna, VA, no date. (UNCLASSIFIED)

JAYCOR, Monthly Reports to DNA, Vienna, VA, 4 September 1991 through 6 October 1993.

(UNCLASSIFIED).

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of CDR R. Thomas Bell, MSC, USN and LCDR M.P. Grissom,

MSC, USN„ Washington, DC, Scientific Applications International Corporation,

McLean, VA, 2 May 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of Maj Daniel G. Martinez, USMCR, McLean, VA, Science

Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 14 May 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of Maj Daniel G. Martinez, USMCR, Arlington, VA, Science

Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 16 May 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of Capt David Pitts, USAF, and John Herman, San Antonio, TX,

Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 23 May 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of Dr. Ruth A. Dudgeon and Clifford R. Scroger, Germantown,

MD, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 29 May 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of Carlton Chapman, Andrew Nelson, and Teresia Hawkins,

Alexandria, VA, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA,

25 June 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-6
Johnson, Abby A., Interview of VADM R. R. Monroe, USN (Ret), San Francisco, CA, Science

Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 8 July 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of W. Jay Brady, Las Vegas, NV, Science Applications

International Corporation, McLean, VA, 9-10 July 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview of MAJ Joe A. Stinson, USA, (Ret), SSG William Seiler, USA, and

Rhonda Cervantes, Kirtland AFB, NM, Science Applications International Corporation,

McLean, VA, 11 July 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Interview ofR. Polcari and R. McComber, Washington, DC, Science

Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 25 July 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with Paul Boren, Assistant NTPR Program

Manager, Alexandria, VA, Scientific Applications International Corporation, McLean,

VA, 20 December 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with MAJ Joe A. Stinson, USA, (Ret), Science

Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, June 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with Paul Boren, Assistant NTPR Program

Manager, Alexandria, VA, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA,

6 June 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with Edwin T. Still, formerly Assistant to the

Director (Biomedical Effects), Defense Nuclear Agency, Science Applications

International Corporation, McLean, VA, 13 June 1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with Maj Daniel G. Martinez, USMCR, McLean,

VA, Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 10 July 1986.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A., Personal Communication with CDR R. Thomas Bell, USN (Ret). Abby A.

Johnson. Scientific Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 8 July 1986.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Johnson, Abby A. and others, For the Record - A History ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Program.

1978-1986. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, DNA 604IF, 1 August 1986.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Jones, C.B. and others, Operation ARGUS. 1958. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC,

DNA-6039F, 30 April 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-7
Loeffler, William H., CAPT, USN, Memorandum for Director, Research, Development, Test and

Evaluation (OP-098), Subject: Summary Report ofthe Navy Nuclear Test Personnel

Review (OP-981T), Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review Team, Washington, DC, 1

May 84. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Roll 17(2), Red Stripe, Continental and Pacific Historical

Research, Box 43, 1957. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Maag, Carl and others, Operation RANGER Shots ABLE. BAKER. EASY. BAKER-2. FOX 25

January - 6 February 1951. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-6022F, 26

February 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Maag, Carl, and Rohrer, Steve, Project TRINITY 1945-1946. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6028F, 15 December 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Martin, Edwin J. and Rowland, Richard H., CASTLE SERIES 1954 . Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6035F, 1 April 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Martinez, Daniel G., Maj, USMCR, Marine Corps Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program

Summary—Expended and Estimated Costs, as Enclosures 1-6 to a letter to David Auton,

dated 1 April 1985, Marine Corps, Washington, DC, March 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Martinez, Daniel G., Maj, USMCR, Marine Corps Nuclear Test Review Program Summary -

Dose Report, 30 September 1986, an enclosure to a letter to David L. Auton dated 1

October 1986, Marine Corps NTPR, Washington, DC (UNCLASSIFIED)

Masse, Francis X., Chairman, and Lalos, George, Editor, Film Badge Dosimetry in Atmospheric

Nuclear Tests. National Research Council, Washington, DC, 1989. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Massie, Jeannie and others, Shots ENCORE to CLIMAX The Final Four Tests of the

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE Series. 8 May - 4 June 1953. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6018F, 15 January 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Massie, Jeannie and Gravitis, Inara, Safety Experiments. November 1955 - March 1958. Defense

Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-6030F, 2 August 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Mclndoe, Darrell W., Colonel, MC, USA, Director, "Statement for House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Health and the Environment," Armed Forces Radiobiology Research

Institute, Bethesda, MD, 23 January 1978. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Monroe, Robert R., VADM, USN, Director, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force, Subject: DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear

Weapons Testing, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, 13 February 1978.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

F-8
Monroe, Robert R., VADM, USN, Director, Memorandum for the Secretaries ofthe Army,

Navy, and Air Force, Subject: DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear

Weapons Testing, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, 8 June 1978.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Monroe, Robert R, VADM, USN and Starbuck, Dorothy L., Memorandum ofUnderstanding,

On Investigation ofIonizing Radiation Injury Claims from Veteran Atmospheric Nuclear

Weapons Tests Participants, Department of Defense and Veterans Administration,

Washington, DC, 15 June 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Monroe, Robert R., VADM, USN, Director, Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense,

Subject: Expansion ofNuclear Tests Personnel Review Program, Defense Nuclear

Agency, Washington, DC, 3 October 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Monroe, Robert R., VADM, USN, Director, Letter to Senator Pete V. Domenici, Defense

Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, 28 April 1980. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Nagai, Takashi, We ofNagasaki: The Storv ofthe Survivors in an Atomic World. Meredith

Press, New York, NY, 1951. (UNCLASSIFIED)

National Academy of Sciences, "Report of Panel on Feasibility and Desirability of Performing

Epidemiological Studies on U.S. Veterans of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," Washington, DC,

21 August 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Protection Against Neutron

Radiation. Washington, DC, NCRP Report #38, January 1971. (UNCLASSIFIED)

National Geographic Magazine. "Operation CROSSROADS," pp. 519-530, April 1947.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

National Research Council, Committee on the Biological Effects ofIonizing Radiation, Health

Effects of Exposure to Low Levels ofIonizing Radiation BEIR V. National Academy

Press, Washington, DC, 1990. (UNCLASSIFIED)

National Research Council, Committee on Dose Assignment and Reconstruction for Service

Personnel at Nuclear Tests, Review ofthe Methodology Used to Assign Radiation Doses

to Service Personnel at Nuclear Weapons Tests. Washington, DC, 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Neel, J.V., Changing Perspectives on the Genetic Effects of Radiation. Charles C. Thomas,

Springfield, IL, 1963. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Nelson, Andrew G., JAYCOR ANTPR Monthly Progress Report (Period Ending 23 September

1987), JAYCOR, Vienna, VA, 5 October 1987. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-9
Nelson, Andrew G., Memorandum for Clifford Chapman, Subject: Status of DNA Field

Command NTPR Data, JAYCOR, Vienna, VA, 12 June 1989. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Age-Specific Radiation Dose Commitment Factors for a

One-Year Chronic Intake. Washington, DC, NUREG-0172, November 1977. (A06)

PB-275348. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The DOT III Two Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Transport

Code. Oak Ridge, TN, ORNL-TM-4290, September 1973. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The MORSE Monte Carlo Radiation Transport Code System

(In: Radiation Shielding Information Center, RSIC Computer Code Collection, Oak

Ridge, TN, CCC-203), ORNL-4972, February 1975. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Estimates of Internal Dose Equivalent to 22 Target Organs for

Radionuclides Occurring in Routine Releases from Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Facilities. 2

volumes, Oak Ridge, TN, ORNL/NUREG/TM-190, June 1978 and November 1979,

(A14) NUREG/CR-0150 and (A22) NUREG/CR-0150-V-2. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Office of Technology Assessment, Special Projects Office, An Evaluation ofthe Feasibility of

Studying Long-Term Health Effects in Atomic Veterans. Washington, DC, OTA-SM,

July 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Pace, N. and Smith, R.E, Measurement ofthe Residual Radiation Intensity at the Hiroshima and

Nagasaki Bomb Sites. Naval Medical Research Institute - 160A, 16 April 1946.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Pickett, John L., Lt Gen, USAF, Director, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject:

DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, Defense Nuclear

Agency, Washington, DC, 29 September 1986. (UNCLASSIFED)

Pitts, David, Capt, USAF, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: AFNTPR Program

Summary-Personnel Effort Completed and Estimated (in Person-Years), 31 Mar 85, Air

Force NTPR, Brooks AFB, TX, 23 May 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation TEAPOT 1955. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington,

DC, DNA-6009F, 23 November 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 1953. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6014F, 11 January 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1952. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6019F, 14 June 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F- 10
Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation BUSTER-JANGLE 1951. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6023F, 21 June 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation HARDTACK II 1958. Defense Nuclear Agency,

Washington, DC, DNA-6026F, 3 December 1982. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Ponton, Jean A. and others, Operation DOMINIC II Shots LITTLE FELLER II. JOHNIE BOY.

SMALL BOY. LITTLE FELLER I. 7 July -17 July 1962. Washington, DC,

DNA-6027F, 31 January 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co, Inc., DRB Synopsis, Las Vegas, NV, 23 November

1992. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc., A Brief History ofNuclear Weapons Testing

Support by REECo and Affiliated Companies, Manuscript, no date. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Robinette, C. Dennis and others, Mortality ofNuclear Weapons Test Participants. National

Research Council, Medical Follow-Up Agency, Washington, DC, May 1985.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Samiljan, Arthur G. MAJ, MSC, Chief, Health Physics Program Office, NTPR Program

Summary, VA Claims Investigations, as of 30 June 1987, an attachment to Memorandum

for the NTPR Program Manager, Defense Nuclear Agency, Subject: ANTPR Report,

Department ofthe Army, Washington, DC, 8 July 1987. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sanders, J. B., Site Manager, Memorandum, Subject: Radiological Exposure of Personnel,

Atomic Energy Commission, Las Vegas, NV, 30 January 1956. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sanders, J. B., Site Manager, Memorandum, Subject: Radiological Exposure of Personnel,

Atomic Energy Commission, Las Vegas, NV, 6 January 1956. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Schull, William J. and others, "Genetic Effects ofthe Atomic Bombs: A Reappraisal," Science.

Vol. 213, pp. 1220-1227, 11 September 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Smith, James S., M.D., Guidelines for Implementation of Legislation Related to the Provision of

Health Services to Veterans Exposed to Ionizing Radiation as a Result of Detonation of

Nuclear Devices, Veterans Administration, Washington, DC, VA Circular 10-85-83, May

1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Stewart, K., "The Resuspension of Particulate Matter from Surfaces," Proceedings of a

Symposium on Surface Contamination. Pergamon Press, New York, NY, June 1964.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

F- 11
Stinson, Joe A., MAJ, USA, Memorandum for Director, Defense Nuclear Agency (STBE),

Subject: Review of For the Record: A History ofthe Nuclear Test Personnel Review

Program. 1978-1986. 2nd Draft, Field Command NTPR, Kirtland AFB, NM, 3 March

1986. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Stinson, Joe A., MAJ, USA, Reference Book ofNuclear Testing Contractors. 1945-1965.

Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC, DNA-TR-86-12, May 1986.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Toohey, R. E. and others, "Radioactivity Measurements of Former Military Personnel Exposed

to Weapon Debris," Science. Vol. 213, pp. 767-768, 14 August 1981. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Tybout, R. A., Radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic Energy Commission Report WO170, 6 April 1946. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Now: Energy and

Commerce), Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Health Effects of Ionizing

Radiation. 2 Volumes, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 95-179 and 95-180, January and February

1978. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Government Operations, Radiation

Protection. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., April and July 1978. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Review of Federal Studies on Health

Effects of Low-Level Radiation Exposure-An Implementation of PL 97-72. 98th Cong.,

1st sess., 98-20, May 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Subcommittee on Compensation,

Pensions, and Insurance, Pending Legislation and Implementation of Public Law 100-321

Affecting Radiation Exposed Veterans. 102 Cong., 1st sess., 102-26, November 1991.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Governmental Affairs, Radiation

Protection. Part 2: Institutional Issues. 96th Cong., 1st sess., May 1979.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from

Nuclear Weapons Testing. 96th Cong., 1st sess., June 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, Senate, Veterans' and Survivors Benefits Adjustment Act of 1979. 96th Cong.,

1st sess., 96-260, July 1979. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Radiation Exposure

Compensation Act of 1981 (Proposed S. 1483.1), 97th Cong., 1st sess., October 1981.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

F-12
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing

Radiation as a Result of Detonations ofNuclear Devices. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 98-486,

April 1983. (UNCLASSIFIED)

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Oversight on Issues Pertaining to

Veterans' Exposure to Ionizing Radiation. 99th Cong., 1st sess., November and December

1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Union Carbide Corporation, A User's Manual for ANISN. a One-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates

Transport Code with Anisotropie Scattering (In: RSIC Computer Code Collection,

Radiation Shielding Information Center, Oak Ridge, TN, CCC-254), 1967.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Upton, Arthur C, "Health Effects of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation," Physics Today, pp. 34- 39,

August 1991. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Weary, S.E. and others, Operation WIGWAM. Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC,

DNA-6000F, 1 September 1981. (UNCLASSIFED)

Weisskopf, V. and others, Memorandum for George Kistiakowsky, Subject: Measurement of

Blast, Radiation, Heat and Light, and Radioactivity at TRINITY, 5 September 1945.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

White, John P., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics),

Memorandum for the Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Subject: DoD Personnel

Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, Department of Defense,

Washington, DC, 28 January 1978, a. (UNCLASSIFIED)

White, John P., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics),

Memorandum for the Secretaries ofthe Military Departments, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, et. al., Subject: DoD Personnel Participation in Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons

Testing, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 28 January 1978, b.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Wilson, R. H. and others, Operation PLUMBBOB. Nevada Test Site. Mav - October 1957. Test

Group 57. Program 72. Biomedical and Aerosol Studies Associated with a Field Release

of Plutonium. Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, WT-1511, p. 3, 6 February 1961.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Zillig, Carl, Memorandum for the Deputy, Chief ofNaval Operations (Logistics), Subject:

Summary Report ofthe Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review (OP-455), Department of

the Navy, Environmental Protection/Safety and Occupational Health Division,

Washington, DC, 16 April 1985. (UNCLASSIFIED)

F-13
APPENDIX G

SELECTED REFERENCES

CONCERNING RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AT HIROSHIMA/NAGASAKI

Reports of Early Surveys

Cave, Anthony and MacDonald, Charles B., eds, "The Manhattan Project Atomic-Bomb

Investigating Group," 1945. The Secret History ofthe Atomic Bomb. New York,

NY, Dial Press/James Wade, pp. 552-582, 1977.

Japan Science Council, Committee of Publications, Report on Atomic Bomb Casualties and

Damages. Summary. 1951. [Translated and Reproduced by Atomic Bomb Casualty

Commission, 1952.]

Lee, William Daniel, Reconnaissance Soil Survey ofJapan. Hiroshima Area. Natural

Resources Section, Tokyo, 1950.

Pace, N. and Smith, R.E., Measurement ofthe Residual Radiation Intensity at the Hiroshima

and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Sites. Naval Medical Research Institute-160A, 16 April

1946.

Tybout, R.A., Radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic Energy Commission Report

WO-170, 6 April 1946.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. Volume VII, No. 4, (Pacific Report #3), U.S. Government Printing Office,

Washington, DC, 1946.

Subsequent Publications

Arakawa, E.T., "Radiation Dosimetry in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic-Bomb Survivors,"

New England Journal of Medicine. Vol. 263, pp. 448-493, 1960.

Arakawa, E.T., Residual Radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic Bomb Casualty

Commission Report TR 02-62, 1962.

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, Bibliography of Published Papers ofthe Atomic Bomb

Casualty Commission. 1947-1974. Hiroshima, 1974.

Atomic Energy Commission, Symposium of Exposed Survivors Held in Hiroshima on 28

March 1952. Technical Information Service, Oak Ridge, 1953.

Defense Nuclear Agency. Fact Sheet: Hiroshima and Nagasaki Occupation Forces.

Washington, DC, 1980.

G-l
Hashizume, T. and others, "Estimation of Gamma-Ray Dose from Neutron-Induced

Radioactivity in Hiroshima and Nagasaki," Health Physics. Vol. 17, No. 5,

pp. 761-771, 1969.

Hersey, John, Hiroshima. A.A. Knopf, New York, NY, 1946.

Ichimaru, Michito and others, Multiple Myeloma Among Atomic Bomb Survivors.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 1950-76. Radiation Effects Research Foundation Technical

Report 9-79, 1979.

Jablon, Seymour, The Origin and Findings ofthe Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission. U.S.

Bureau of Radiological Health, Rockville, MD, 1973.

Miner, Jane Claypool, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. F. Watts, New York, NY, 1984.

Nagai, Takashi, We ofNagasaki: The Story ofthe Survivors in an Atomic World. Meredith

Press, New York, NY, 1951.

Okajima, S., "Dose Estimation from Residual and Fallout Radioactivity: Fallout in the

Nagasaki-Nishiyama District," Journal of Radiation Research. Special Supplement on

a Review of Thirty Years Study of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors.

Vol. 16, pp. 35-41,1975.

Pace, N. and Smith, R.E., Measurements ofthe Residual Radiation Intensity at the Hiroshima

and Nagasaki Bomb Sites. Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission Report TR 26-59,

1959.

Shinohara, Kenichi and others, "Radioactivity ofthe Ground in Nagasaki City and Vicinity.

Part I. Radioactivity Near the Hypocenter," Collection of Investigation Reports on

Atomic Bomb Disaster. Japan Science Promotion Society, pp. 41-44, 1953.

Takeshita, Kenji, "Fallout and Induced Radioactivity from Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima,"

Proceedings Hiroshima University RINMB. 13, 1972, pp. 1-8, Translated by H.

Kubota, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL-TR-4010, 1975.

Technical Information Center, Reevaluations of Dosimetric Factors. Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Oak Ridge, 1982.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law

and Governmental Relations, Payments to Individuals Suffering from Effects of

Atomic Bomb Explosions. 1978.

G-2
APPENDIX H

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, The Medical Effects ofNuclear Weapons.

Bethesda,MD, 1977.

Atomic Energy Commission, Health Aspects ofNuclear Weapons Testing. Washington, DC,

1964.

Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Terms: A Brief Glossary. Oak Ridge, TN, 1967.

Blatz, H., Introduction to Radiological Health. (McGraw-Hill Book Co.) New York, NY, 1964.

Brodsky, Allen B., Editor, Handbook of Radiation Measurement and Protection. Section A,

Volume 1, "Physical Science and Engineering Data," The CRC Press, Inc., Cleveland,

OH, 1978.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Bureau ofRadiological Health, Radiological

Health Handbook. Revised Edition, Publication No. 2016, Washington, DC, 1970

Cember, Herman, Introduction to Health Phvsics. 2nd Edition, Pergamon Press, New York, NY,

1983.

Clark, G., Editor, Encyclopedia of X-ravs and Gamma Rays. Reinhold Publishing Co., New

York, NY, 1963.

Defense Atomic Support Agency, Field Command, Nuclear Training Directorate, Basic Nuclear

and Radiation Physics. 1967.

Defense Atomic Support Agency, Field Command, Nuclear Training Directorate, Handbook of

Radiation Detection. 1967.

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Office of External Affairs, Announced United

States Nuclear Tests. July 1945 through December 1992, Las Vegas, NV, DOE/NV-209

(Rev. 13), May 1993.

Ehrlich, A., The Medical and Health Sciences World Book. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston,

MA, 1977.

Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J., The Effects ofNuclear Weapons. 3rd Edition,

Department of Defense and Department of Energy, Washington, DC, 1977.

Johns, H. and Cunningham, J., The Phvsics ofRadiology. Charles C. Thomas, Publ., Springfield,

IL., 1974.

H-l
Moe, M. J. and Lasuk, S. R., Radiation Safety Technician Training Course - Part I. Atomic

Energy Commission, Argonne, IL, 1984.

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, A Handbook of Radioactivity

Measurements Procedures. 2nd Edition, Washington, DC, NCRP Report #58, 1985.

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Recommendations on Limits for

Exposure to Ionizing Radiation. Washington, DC: NCRP. NCRP Report #91. 1987.

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Review ofthe Current State of

Radiation Protection Philosophy. Report 43, Washington, DC, 1975.

National Research Council, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, "The

Effects on Populations of Exposures to Low Levels ofIonizing Radiation BEIR III,"

National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1980.

National Research Council, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations

(BEIR V), "Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation," National

Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1990.

National Research Council, Oversight Committee on Radioepidemiologic Tables, Board on

Radiation Effects Research, Assigned Share for Radiation as a Cause of Cancer. National

Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1984.

Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc., Radiological Safety Handbook for the

Nevada Test Site 1957. Camp Mercury, NV, 1957.

Smith, Francis S., Lt Col, USAF, USAF Radiac Equipment. Directorate ofNuclear Safety, Life

Sciences Advisory Group, Kirtland AFB, NM, LSAG 62-1, 1962.

Stroscheir, H. W. and Maeser, P. M., Editors, Health Physics Technician Training Manual.

Atomic Energy Commission, 1966.

Taylor, L., Radiation Protection Standards. The CRC Press, Clevelend, OH, 1971.

Till, John E. and Meyer, H. Robert, Editors, Radiological Assessment. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washingont, DC, NUREG/CR-3332, 1983.

United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and Effects of

Ionizing Radiation. 1988 Report to the General Assembly. New York, NY, 1988.

Wang, Y., Editor, Handbook ofRadioactive Nuclides. The CRC Press, Cleveland, OH, 1969.

H-2
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