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CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW COLONIALISM?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 7, 2018

Serial No. 115–117

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

KAREN BASS, California 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Gordon Chang, author ...................................................................................... 7

Mr. Joshua Meservey, senior policy analyst, Africa and the Middle East, 

The Heritage Foundation .................................................................................... 19

Mr. Scott Morris, senior fellow, Center for Global Development ......................... 35

Anita Plummer, Ph.D., assistant professor, Department of African Studies, 

Howard University ............................................................................................... 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Gordon Chang: Prepared statement ............................................................... 10

Mr. Joshua Meservey: Prepared statement ........................................................... 21

Mr. Scott Morris: Prepared statement ................................................................... 38

Anita Plummer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Prepared statement of Samantha Custer, AidData at the College of William 

& Mary .............................................................................................................. 70

‘‘China-Kenya Relationship: Influence of Money & Growth of Corruption,’’ 

by Rev. Abel Oriri, LPCC-S, NCC, Pastor Heights Fellowship Church, 

Cleveland, OH ................................................................................................... 77

Prepared statement of Daniel Asaah, Ghanaian Politician/Entrepreneur ...... 84

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CHINA IN AFRICA: THE NEW COLONIALISM? 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon to everybody. Thank you for being here. 

Today’s hearing will analyze China’s activity and engagement in 

sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, we will look into what motivates 

China and how Chinese involvement has affected African countries. 

While a number of African nations have welcomed Chinese engagement and investment, it often comes at a very high cost, with 

a focus on extractive industries, entanglement with neomercantilist 

trade policy, and a tendency to adopt the worst practices that prop 

up kleptocrats and autocrats such as DR Congo’s Joseph Kabila, 

while fueling corruption in an effort to win contracts. 

China’s engagement in Africa was once driven by revolutionary 

ideology motivated by competition with the Soviet Union as much 

as it was directed at ‘‘capitalist roaders’’ aligned with the United 

States. 

In Angola, for example, in 1975, Soviet-backed communists 

bested Chinese-backed revolutionary rivals including Jonas 

Savimbi, who was a Maoist before he was reborn in the 1980s as 

an anti-communist freedom fighter. 

Today, China’s one-time Marxist-Leninist-Maoist impulse has 

been softened to the point of almost—but not quite—disappearing, 

with revolution replaced by infrastructure projects, trade missions, 

soft loans, and scholarships for promising African students, all part 

of the ubiquitous Beijing effort at hegemony. 

While on the one hand, Africa needs investment and it needs infrastructure, we see a worrisome trend of African countries sliding 

into indebtedness to China, accumulating burdens that may be beyond their capacity to meet. 

All too often, the roads China builds are meant to allow it access 

to mineral resources that it can extract and ship to China, or are 

a part of the One-Belt, One-Road initiative, which is designed to 

benefit China and, ultimately, help it project power. 

2

Further, as anyone who has been to Africa has observed, these 

grand construction projects often utilize Chinese engineers and 

workers and not Africans. I remember being in the capital of DR 

Congo on one of many trips to Africa and seeing a large number 

of Chinese workers. They looked very happy. I thought they probably were Laogai prisoners who were there working, and they 

didn’t even look up during the hour of observation by myself and 

a member of our Embassy staff. 

As we will hear today, nowhere in Africa is the problem of indebtedness more pronounced than in Djibouti, a strategically important country in the Horn of Africa which sits astride the 

Mandeb Strait and one of only five African countries where Secretary of State Tillerson is visiting on his trip to Africa this week. 

A former French colony, Djibouti hosts a French military base 

and an American one, and Djibouti also hosts, as of last summer, 

China’s only permanent military base outside of China. 

China’s overall foreign aid and financial leverage on the continent has been difficult to quantify—as has demonstrating how 

that translates into influence. 

Yeoman work in this regard has been done by Aid Data at the 

College of William and Mary, which had written testimony to be 

submitted as part of the record, without objection. It demonstrates 

a correlation between how an African country votes at the United 

Nations General Assembly and how much aid it receives from 

China. There is a quid pro quo. 

Another strategically important country with high indebtedness 

to China that the Secretary will visit is Ethiopia. It is also a country where China has most clearly aligned itself with repressive 

forces. 

In addition to assisting the government in controlling information flows, such as jamming the Voice of America and BBC broadcasts, the Chinese Communist Party has engaged with Ethiopia’s 

ruling party in ‘‘training and exchanges.’’ And just recently, we 

held yet another hearing on the brutality by the Ethiopians in this 

subcommittee. 

At the Brookings Institution, as it has documented, cadres from 

the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front were 

‘‘taught’’ comprehensively how to manage their own organizational 

structure, ideological work propaganda system, and cadre education. 

Thus, it seems, ideology still matters with regard to how China 

engages with Africa. It is no coincidence that Ethiopia has become 

one of the most repressive regimes on the continent and the subject 

of a House resolution focused on Ethiopia’s abusive practices that 

Ms. Bass and I have sponsored, H. Res. 128. 

Whereas the U.S. emphasizes good governance, it suits China’s 

interest to train its partners in old-style Leninism. We have also 

received testimony from one of our witnesses on how China projects 

power in the form of Confucius Institutes located in close to 40 African nations, and I would point out parenthetically that as cochairman of the China Commission, I’ve had hearings and requested a GAO report on Confucius Institutes in this country. 

There are well over 100. They have a disproportionate impact. 

Their teachers carry with them the ideology of Beijing, and to the 

3

receiving universities and colleges they are often seen as just another addition—free money, if you will—but with a very, very significant cost because it is a projection of soft power. 

This subcommittee has held hearings on how China has used 

these to push the Sino-centric narrative, again, which aligns with 

Communist Party propaganda, and totally curtails academic freedom. 

In addition to utilizing Confucius Institutes, they train Mandarin 

speakers and indoctrinate students with a pro-China world view. 

China is expanding its media presence in Africa. 

Kenya is the country with the largest penetration of Chinese 

media and the highest level of brand recognition, according to our 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, which overseas the Voice of 

America, and which recently conducted a survey of China’s media 

presence in Africa. 

It should be noted that, of the five major international networks 

in Kenya, China’s news broadcasts were the least—I say again, 

least, trusted. 

There is also a thought for Voice of America and the Broadcasting Board of Governors to consider—add Mandarin programming to the repertoire of languages in which you broadcast in Africa. By broadcasting objective news stories in Mandarin, you will expose not only African students learning Mandarin to more truthful 

media, but you will be able to reach the estimated 1 million or so 

Chinese living or working in Africa with news that they are otherwise unable to access. 

China is also Kenya’s largest bilateral lender. Kenya is one of the 

three highest debtor nations to China in Africa, along with Djibouti 

and Ethiopia. It is also a country where Secretary Tillerson will be 

visiting. 

On his trip he may want to highlight the following anecdote, 

which I believe aptly contrasts China’s African engagement with 

that of the United States. 

Health commodities supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development, including lifesaving antiretrovirals distributed as part of our PEPFAR program and antimalarial commodities, used to be shipped to and stored in a warehouse near Nairobi 

for distribution, not only throughout Kenya, but also neighboring 

East African countries as well. 

Then in July 2013, Kenya’s Parliament proposed a 11⁄2 percent 

levy on all imports to Kenya to help pay for the nearly $4 billion 

railroad from the Port of Mombasa to Nairobi built by the stateowned China Road and Bridge Corporation. 

Donated goods including antiretrovirals for Kenyans living and 

coping with HIV/AIDS were subject to this levy to help pay Kenya’s 

debt to China. 

As a result of this, the flow of lifesaving commodities into Kenya 

and neighboring countries was burdened and slowed. Kenya’s ministry of health offered to step in and pay the levy. But their payments were often delayed by some 2 months. Meanwhile, charges 

attributed to clearance delays continued to accrue and had to be 

paid by the United States taxpayer. 

4

Ultimately, over a year later, Kenya’s Parliament amended the 

legislation to exclude donated goods from the Chinese railway payment levy. But the damage had been done. 

Today, due to this experience and other factors related to logistics and a new USAID implementation partner, USAID no longer 

uses a warehouse in Kenya. Storage and distribution has been 

moved offshore to a location that’s centrally located and, one hopes, 

less prone to disruption. 

I close with a number of questions. How did this warehouse episode, borne out of Kenya’s need to repay debt to China, benefit 

Kenyans suffering from HIV/AIDS? 

How did it affect the ability of Kenya to serve as a regional distribution hub for East Africa with all the collateral economic benefits that accrue from the purely humanitarian initiative paid for by 

the United States taxpayer? 

More broadly, where is China’s PEPFAR or the equivalent of the 

President’s malaria initiative? These are questions and more that 

we on the subcommittee will have for this very, very distinguished 

group of panelists. 

But before going to them, I’d like to yield to my good friend and 

colleague, the ranking member, Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Once again, you are calling an important hearing to examine 

China’s economic and political impact in Africa. The title of this 

hearing raises the question as to whether or not China should be 

viewed as the new colonial power within the continent of Africa. 

I am very much concerned about that as well, especially with regard to labor, given the need for employment on the continent and 

the recurring disputes about wages and the treatment of workers. 

There are also concerns about the extractive nature of China’s 

engagement and what is now being referred to as debt-trap diplomacy. This concept poses the question of whether developing countries are mortgaging their resources and strategic assets to China. 

If there is a drop in commodity prices and countries have difficulties with these loans, they might get caught in a debt trap that 

leaves them vulnerable to China’s influence. These are critical 

issues and that I will expect to be addressed throughout the hearing. 

A recent Atlantic Council report entitled, ‘‘Escaping China’s 

Shadow: Finding America’s Competitive Edge in Africa,’’ argued 

that the presence of Chinese companies does not preclude American business success. 

So I hope that our discussion today will shed light on the fact 

that U.S. companies can and should be doing business in Africa. 

Some people suggest that China shouldn’t be in Africa. 

But instead of going down that road, I would rather say that the 

U.S. should step up our involvement. If we are concerned about the 

Chinese, then where are we? 

There is a major infrastructure deficit across the African continent. African countries need roads, hospitals, school buildings, 

and other vital infrastructure and China is currently filling that 

need. 

5

But the United States can, too. But we should do so in a responsible fashion that benefits African countries and U.S. businesses, 

and African nations want to partner with U.S. businesses. 

In fact, the President of Ghana was just in the United States and 

one of his goals in coming here was to encourage investment and 

partnership in order to develop a relationship with the United 

States that is characterized by increased trade and investment cooperation. 

We should remember that as we seek to promote U.S. trade and 

direct investment in Africa, we are also creating opportunities for 

African growth so that the African middle class can help create societies that are no longer dependent on foreign aid. 

The chairman and I, as well as the full committee chairman, 

Chairman Royce, have worked on a number of initiatives that really begin to reframe how we do foreign aid such as Feed the Future, 

Mr. Chairman, and Electrify Africa, where we are promoting our 

business involvement with the goal of African nations not being dependent on foreign aid. 

I also hope that our discussion today will highlight areas of common interest between the United States and China in Africa that 

could provide the basis for enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly on important conflict mediation priorities 

across the continent. 

So my goal for this hearing, therefore, is to be forward thinking 

in how we view China’s engagement across Africa. We must continue to stay focused on U.S. policy toward Africa by partnering 

with African nations and deepening our engagement with African 

civil society, especially the next generation of leaders because rest 

assured, if the United States loses focus, other countries are more 

than happy to fill any gap left behind by the U.S. 

So I look forward to this hearing, look forward to our distinguished witnesses on how the U.S. can help achieve these objectives. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

We now go to Ambassador Rooney. Any opening comments? 

Mr. ROONEY. I am not on the committee but I’d like to thank 

Chairman Smith for letting me come and learn a little bit more 

about Africa. 

I’ve been in 100 countries and Africa is the one part of the world 

I freely admit I know the least of. So I’ve been reading your material and look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I’d like to now yield to Dr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member, not just for the hearing, but also for your leadership in making 

sure Congress stays interested in the continent of Africa. 

You know, I absolutely look forward to the witness testimony as 

well as getting more information and, you know, when we were 

with Ambassador Green yesterday and just thinking about where 

USAID is going and, you know, given his history in Africa as well, 

I know our aid and development work really is looking at capacity 

building and helping look at the unique resources in the countries 

6

that we are going into and trying to move toward capacity building. 

And I’d be really interested in hearing from the witnesses because 

when I think about China’s involvement and, you know, we welcome that foreign direct investment into the—into Africa and other 

developing countries. 

You know, our worry though is China is—you know, with that 

foreign direct investment, it’s Chinese companies that are building 

a lot of that infrastructure, Chinese workers that are benefitting 

from that as opposed to looking at the workforce in the countries 

that they are developing, helping them develop their own capacity. 

And the chairman and the ranking member have already touched 

on the impact of the loans and the loan repayment and what that 

has in terms of the African countries’ and the recipient countries’ 

ability to, again, care for themselves. 

So, again, thank you for this hearing. I’m looking forward to the 

testimony and, you know, again, perhaps if you all can touch on 

the contrast between U.S. and Western approach to aid and development versus the Chinese approach. 

So thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Bera. 

I’d like to now introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning 

first with Gordon Chang, who I have listened to for years on radio 

and, as a matter of fact, I asked that he be here because I am so 

impressed with his incisiveness, but also much of what he has written. 

He is the author of the ‘‘Coming Collapse of China’’ and ‘‘Nuclear 

Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World’’ and a columnist for 

The Daily Beast. He’s also an expert on China and northeast Asia. 

Mr. Chang lived and worked in China and Hong Kong for almost 

two decades, most recently in Shanghai. 

He has spoken at a number of colleges and universities and given 

briefings to government entities such as the National Intelligence 

Council, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and the 

Pentagon. 

His writings have appeared in news outlets such as The New 

York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Weekly Standard, 

and Mr. Chang has testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee 

and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. So 

we welcome him back to Capitol Hill and look forward to his expert 

analysis on this important topic. 

We will then hear from Mr. Joshua Meservey, who is a senior 

policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation. A former Peace Corps volunteer in Zambia, he specializes 

in counterinsurgency, non-state-armed groups in security development’s nexus. 

Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Meservey worked 

in the Church World Services Refugee Resettlement Operation in 

Kenya as well as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in 

the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He has testified before the 

Senate and is a frequent commentator on African policy issues in 

a range of print and digital media outlets. We welcome him as well. 

We will then hear from Scott Morris, who’s a senior fellow at the 

Center for Global Development and director of the U.S. Development Policy Initiative. Prior to joining the Center for Global DevelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:36 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AGH\030718\28876 SHIRL
7

opment, Mr. Morris served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Development, Finance, and Debt at the U.S. Treasury Department 

during the first term of the Obama administration. 

In that capacity, he has led U.S. engagement with a number of 

international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank. 

He has also represented the U.S. Government in the G-20’s Development Working Group and was the Treasury’s plus-one on the 

board of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

Before his post at the U.S. Treasury, Mr. Morris was a senior 

staff member of the Financial Services Committee of the U.S. 

House where he was responsible for the committee’s international 

policy issues. 

It should be noted that Mr. Morris was asked last minute to fill 

in for the witness, although on his own right we are very, very 

happy to have him. So I thank him for coming at such short notice. 

And then we will hear from Anita Plummer, who’s an assistant 

professor of African studies whose research focuses on African political economy, emerging markets, transnationalism, and Sino-African relations. 

Her current book project, ‘‘Close Encounters: Street-Level Perspective on Kenya and China,’’ examines local, national, and 

transnational narratives in South-South cooperation. 

Before joining the faculty at Howard, Dr. Plummer taught international studies at Spelman College. She was a Mellon post-doctoral fellow in the Cultures and Transnational Perspective program 

and visiting assistant professor of global studies and political 

science at the University of California, Los Angeles. 

She’s also a fellow at the Carter G. Woodson Center, a pre-doctoral fellow at the University of Virginia. Dr. Plummer received her 

Ph.D. from Howard in Washington. 

So if I could now, Gordon Chang, you have the floor. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GORDON CHANG, AUTHOR 

Mr. CHANG. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for this 

opportunity. 

My testimony focuses on China’s views on sub-Saharan Africa, 

especially in relationship to Beijing’s expanding ambitions and I 

also look at this in the context of colonialism. 

I conclude that China is practicing a new form of colonialism and 

that China’s relations with Africa threaten Americans’ interests. 

Beijing looks at Africa as special. For instance, it says that more 

than half of its foreign assistance goes to the continent. 

Now, Beijing, obviously, wants favors in return and, clearly, 

there is this strong connection between what a country will do for 

China and the amount of aid that it receives. 

China needs African support for a number of things but especially because Xi Jinping, the foreign leader, wants to show that he 

is the commanding voice of the developing world. 

At one time, Beijing denied that it provided any sort of model for 

the developing world, but now it brags about it and has even 

branded it, calling it socialism with Chinese characteristics for a 

new era. 

8

Xi Jinping, however, has ambitions beyond just assisting the developing world. There are indications that he believes that not only 

should China’s model be the world’s model but that China’s leader 

be the world’s leader. 

China, in its pronouncements recently, is making the case that 

it should be the world’s only sovereign, a view that Chinese emperors maintained, and that, of course, brings us to China’s relationships with Africa. 

Now, Beijing vehemently denies, as some influential African 

voices say, that China is practicing a form of colonialism, or 

neocolonialism. 

Nonetheless, Beijing’s use of this imperial-era language is inconsistent with the denial of its colonial ambitions. China, if it were 

free to implement its imperial system, would divest all other nations of sovereignty and that, of course, is the essence of colonialism. 

The Chinese leadership, unfortunately, holds views that foster 

colonial mentality in the Chinese capital and there are two of these 

that I’d like to just briefly mention. 

First of all, Chinese leaders have this view of a brutish conception of the world where the strong do what they want and the weak 

must comply. 

Second of all, to make matters worse, Chinese officials give the 

impression that they view African people as inferior to their own. 

This was made painfully obvious during a 14-minute skit last 

month on China’s Central Television at the Spring Gala. 

The skit, which was seen by some 800 million viewers, depicted 

Kenyans as objects of derision and even as subhuman. It is therefore hard to think that China’s leaders see Africans as equals and 

these perceptions of inequality fuel the notion that they must hold 

neocolonial attitudes. 

African nations, at least at first glance, are dealing with China 

freely, and so therefore, China, of course, is not practicing a 19th 

century type of colonialism. 

Yet, of course, in our world, the nature of colonialism is changing, and China, by basing troops on the continent, by corrupting officials, by flooding local markets with Chinese manufactured goods, 

by sending workers to Africa, by straining local economies with 

trade imbalances, as well as by swamping countries in debt, which 

Ranking Member Bass mentioned in her opening remarks, have 

now begun to dominate the continent. 

Once it locks in countries and makes them dependent, Beijing 

gets their support for geopolitical goals and one of these goals is 

undermining democracy. 

Africa is struggling to shake off the rule of the so-called ‘‘big 

men’’ and it doesn’t need any more failing states like China-supported Zimbabwe. 

Now as the Zimbabwe example shows, Beijing is affecting the 

course of African development at a crucial period of its history. 

Some people believe that the United States doesn’t have interests 

in Africa. 

Even if this were true, and it’s not, but even if it were true, Africa gives China the ability to threaten the American homeland. 

9

As Chairman Smith mentioned, the Chinese now have a military 

base in Djibouti, their first overseas one, but they also want one 

at Walvis Bay in the South Atlantic. 

The Chinese leaders have even been thinking about taking over 

an air base in the Azores. From the Azores, China would be able 

to control the mouth of the Mediterranean and their planes would 

be closer to New York than Pearl Harbor is to Los Angeles. 

A belligerent China in Asia is bad enough. A dangerous one close 

to our shores would be far worse. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chang follows:]

10


28876a-1.eps

Statement of 

Gordon G. Chang 

Subcommittee on 

Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

China in Africa: The New Colonialism? 

March 7, 2018 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and distinguished Members of the Committee: 

It is a privilege for me to appear before you today, and I thank you for this opportunity. 

My name is Gordon Guthrie Chang. I am a writer and live in Bedminster, New Jersey. 

I worked as a lawyer in Hong Kong from 1981-1991 and in Shanghai from 1996-2001. 

Between these two periods, 1 frequently traveled to Asia from California. 1 regularly go to 

Asia now. 

I am the author of lhe Coming Collapse of China (Random House, 2001) and Nuclear 

Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World (Random House, 2006). 

1 now write regularly about China, North Korea, and the rest of Asia for The Daily Beast, 

The National1nterest, and other publications. 
11


28876a-2.eps

This testimony looks at how China views Sub-Saharan Africa, especially with regard to 

Beijing's expanding strategic ambitions. T discuss these points in the context of 

colonialism. 

T conclude that Xi Jinping, the Chinese ruler, believes his country should be the world's 

only sovereign state, which is the essence of colonialism, and that today his country's 

relations with Africa resemble a new form of colonialism. 

Moreover, T believe Xi's ambitions for Africa, however one characterizes them, threaten 

America. 

Africa's Special Position in the Chinese World 

Tn official statements, Beijing maintains all nations are equals, and it says China seeks 

friendly relations with all. 

2 

Chinese leaders, however, consider Africa special. That special status is one the continent 

enjoyed from the first years of the People's Republic when Mao Zedong, the founder of 

the regime, looked far afield for support in his various struggles with Moscow for 

leadership of the communist bloc. 

These days, Beijing still keeps ties with the continent warm. It has been, for instance, a 

tradition of China's leaders to go to Africa on their first trips abroad. Xi Jinping visited 

Tanzania, South Africa, and the Republic of the Congo during his initial trip as the 

country's president, in March 2013. There is no year when high-ranking Chinese officials 

do not make high-protile visits to the continent. 

And Beijing does not neglect handouts in maintaining the relationship. Beijing claims 

that more than half of its foreign aid goes to Africa. 

Beijing obviously wants favors in return from African states, and not just them providing 

a reliable supply of raw materials and ready markets for China's manufactures. 

Increasingly, Beijing seeks support for its geopolitical goals. Foreign Minister Wang Yi 

hinted at that last month in Beijing. "Both sides have always thought that China and the 

African Union should speak with a common voice and coordinate a common position on 

the world stage," he said at the seventh round of the China-African Union Strategic 

Dialogue. 1 Elizabeth Manero, writing in the Harvard Political Review, noted that "there 

is a strong correlation between the amount of aid given, and the support for China's 

foreign policy objectives."2 

China needs African support because Xi Jinping wants to show he is the commanding 

voice of the developing world. At one time, Beijing denied it provided a model for others, 

but now China's leader openly boasts about it. 
12


28876a-3.eps

The world heard China promote its model during Xi's 203-minute Work Report, 

delivered at the 19th National Communist Party Congress last October. "It offers a new 

option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while 

preserving their independence," Xi said, referring to his model, branded as "Socialism 

with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era."3 

Xi, however, has ambitions beyond helping the developing world. There are indications 

he in fact believes that not only should China's model be the world's model but also that 

China's leader should be the world's leader. 

3 

Xi suggests the world would be peaceful if Beijing ruled "All Under Heaven." This 

tianxia worldview, which underpinned two millennia of Chinese history under the 

emperors, is increasingly evident in China's pronouncements and imagery and is of 

course fundamentally inconsistent with the existence of a multitude of sovereign states. 

So when Xi speaks about "a community of common destiny," he is most likely thinking 

of China's rich imperial past and suggesting he should hold sway over all domains, near 

and far. 

The notion of China controlling the entire world is breathtaking-not to mention 

ludicrous-but Beijing's house scholars actively study the application of the tianxia 

system to the entire planet and Chinese ot11cials otier it up in public for consideration, as 

Fei-Ling Wang of the Georgia Institute of Technology notes in a new book, 1he China 

Order: Centralia, World ~mpire, and the Nature of Chinese l'ower. 

Xi, for instance, increasingly employs tianxia language in his pronouncements. "The 

Chinese have always held that the world is united and all under heaven are one family," 

he declared in his 2017 New Year's Message 4 

Moreover, Foreign Minister Wang, in Study limes, the Central Party School newspaper, 

last September wrote that Xi Jinping's "thought on diplomacy" "has made innovations on 

and transcended the traditional Western theories of international relations for the past 300 

years " 5 Wang with his time reference is almost certainly pointing to the system of 

sovereign states, which traces its roots to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. 

Wang's use of "transcended," consequently, hints that Xi wants a world without 

sovereign states-or at least no more than one of them. China, in these and other 

pronouncements, is now making the case that it should be the world's only sovereign, the 

view that Chinese emperors maintained. 

The trend of recent comments warns us that China does not want to live within the 

current Westphalian system or even to adjust it. lts leaders, from every indication, are 

thinking of replacing it altogether. Chinese words, therefore, appear ominous, not benign, 

a signal that China will try to do away with what is seen as Westphalia's cacophony with 

tianxia' s orderliness. 
13


28876a-4.eps

And that brings us to China's relationships with African nations. Beijing vehemently 

denies, as some influential Africans charge, that it is practicing colonialism or neocolonialism on the continent. "We absolutely will not take the old path of Western 

colonists, and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa's ecological environment and longterm interests," Wang Yi in 2015 said to Chinese state broadcaster China Central 

Television while visiting Kenya 6 

4 

Nonetheless, Beijing's frequent use oftianxia language is inconsistent with its denials of 

colonial ambitions. China, if it could implement the tianxia system it is promoting, would 

divest all other states, including African ones, of sovereignty. That, of course, would be 

the essence of colonialism. 

Beijing's Views Today 

Xi Jinping's imperial pretentious tell us he wants to be a colonial master, but is he one 

today? 

The Chinese leadership, unfortunately, holds views that foster colonial relations. There 

are two in particular. First, China's current crop ofleaders have a brutish conception of 

the world. 

"China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact," 

said Yang Jiechi in July 2010 7 lfthere is one sentence that sums up how Beijing in fact 

views the international system, Y aug's arrogant assertion, part of an extraordinary halfhour rant, is it. 

Yang, then China's foreign minister, did not have Africa in mind while uttering those 

contemptuous words-he was in Hanoi and glaring at his counterpart ±rom Singapore at 

the time-but China still looks at Africa in the same way it perceives Singapore-less 

powerful than mighty China. 

Second, to make matters worse, Chinese officials surely see African people as inferior to 

their own kind. That was painfully evident last month in the 14-minute skit on China 

Central Television's Spring Festival Gala, the premier television show in China. ln "Let's 

Celebrate Together," a Chinese actress in blackface played the part of a Kenyan mother, 

who had an enormous bosom and ridiculously large buttocks. Worse, her sidekick was a 

human-size monkey8 The skit was intended to praise Xi Jinping's signature One Belt 

One Road initiative. 

Kenyans, not to mention some Chinese viewers, were outraged at the racist and 

derogatory depictions of Africans. ln recent years, there have been many ugly portrayals 

of Africans in Chinese media, and although this was not the worst-by no means was it 

so-this sketch was striking because China Central Television, by airing this to about 800 

million viewers, made it clear Chinese officials think of Africans as objects of derision 

and even subhuman. And because the skit was carried by the state broadcaster, this view 
14


28876a-5.eps

of Africans is apparently shared by the Beijing leadership, which, alarmingly, is making 

more frequent race-based appeals to the Chinese people. 

It is, therefore, hard to think that China's leaders see Africans as equals, and perceptions 

of inequality suggests they also hold neo-colonial attitudes. The skit, after all, showed 

patronizing Chinese helping poor Africans who "loved" China because of all the good 

things it provided Africa. 

5 

As a result of the skit, Africans are talking even more about Chinese racism and 

colonialism. The /Jaily Nation, the leading Nairobi newspaper, quoted a Kenyan student 

asking "whether Kenya is truly a valuable trade partner to China or just another cow they 

are milking."9 

That is the critical question. African nations, at least at first glance, are trading and 

accepting Beijing's investment and aid freely. The relationship is not colonial in the 19th 

century sense of the concept, and African states have retained their sovereignty. 

Yet the nature of colonialism has been changing. So what is the concept today? 

Beijing, perhaps inadvertently, last month revealed a two-part test for colonialism as it 

rebutted comments from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that China was a "new imperial 

power" in Latin America. The Global limes, the tabloid controlled by People's Daily, 

said in an editorial that Latin American countries were trading and doing business with 

China of their own "free will" and "for mutual benefit" and that "China has no military 

bases in the region and has dispatched no troops to any of the Latin American 

countries." 10 

China may not be an imperial power in Latin America, but in Africa it could be according 

to the Global limes formulation. First, some of the dealings between Beijing and African 

states seems to be tainted by both corruption and subtle forms of coercion, thereby 

undercutting African free will. 

Second, China established its first overseas military base last year, in Djibouti. Many 

expect a second one, in Walvis Bay in Namibia, in the not too distant future Beijing has 

sent "peacekeepers"-troops-to South Sudan under the U.N. banner. 

There are, of course, other definitions of colonialism. "Imperialism, for me, inevitably 

involves some form of foreign domination, which results in substantially altering the 

target population or polity; either gradually or suddenly it loses the ability to resist," 

wrote acclaimed journalist Howard French in China's Second Continent: How a Million 

Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Afrir.:a. "ln The Abacus and the Sword, his 

account of Japan's takeover of Korea, which was launched at the end of the nineteenth 

century, Peter Duus wrote that imperialism requires 'an available victim-a weaker, less 

organized, or less advanced society or state unable to defend itself against outside 

intrusion.' " 11 
15


28876a-6.eps

6 

The French-Duus fonnulation, which is as broad as the definition can get and still retain 

meaning, makes China look like a colonial power in Africa. As an initial matter, there are 

the Chinese-created moral hazards. Although Beijing provides "no-strings-attached" and 

low-interest loans-what looks like the apparent opposite of colonization-this easy 

money encourages governments to spend irresponsibly, creating the debt crises of the 

future. "China is co-opting states into its sphere of influence by burying them in debt," 

writes New Delhi-based China watcher Brahm a Chellaney. The title of his article from 

last month says it all: "China Ensnares Vulnerable States in a Debt Trap." 12 At the 

moment, China is trying to renegotiate loans made imprudently to Zambia. 

With the enticement oflow-cost loans, Beijing gets the opportunity to corrupt officials, 

obtain the rights to extract minerals and hydrocarbons, t1ood local markets with 

manufactured goods, send its workers to Africa, and strain local economies with trade 

imbalances. 

Beijing has, in part by happenstance, developed what French calls "a kind of modern-day 

barter system" by which Chinese enterprises build infrastructure with payment in the 

form of natural resources u 

Once it locks in countries and makes them dependent, Beijing gains support for its 

geopolitical goals. One of those goals is the undermining of democracy and the 

consequent fortification of authoritarianism. 

China, in short, is spreading its economic and political model to Africa. In some places 

this Chinese system has benefitted local populations, and in others it has not Africa, 

struggling to shake off the misrule of the so-called "big men," does not need any more 

failing states like China-supported Zimbabwe. 

As the Zimbabwe example shows, Beijing is affecting the course of African development 

at a crucial moment in its history. "This is going to determine Africa's future for the next 

fifty years," Ed Brown, an executive at one of Ghana's think tanks, told French, referring 

to the relationship with China. "The big question is whether African countries are 

dynamic enough to take advantage, or whether they'll end up being the appendage of 

somebody else all over again." 14 

Africa's economy is mostly vibrant as is its demography. Therefore, the region should do 

well as long as politics does not get in the way. The risk is that Africa becomes a Chinese 

appendage and falls back, failing to meet its great potential. 

For some African countries, mid-century will be an inflection point when population 

peaks and natural resources run out. The next three decades, consequently, will be 

crucial. The challenge for these nations will be to take advantage of what Beijing offers 

without being held hostage to Chinese designs for them. 
16


28876a-7.eps

America's Stake 

Some, like William Hawkins, believe America does not have many interests in Africa to 

defend. 15 Even if that is true, the US, with global reach and responsibilities, has a 

general stake in the success of all parts of the world, both from economic and security 

points of view. 

We prosper, despite what many think, when other portions of the planet also do well. 

China, because its relations with Africa are often predatory, can stunt growth there. 

And, whatever one may think, there is one crucial interest all Americans have in Africa. 

Africa gives China the ability to threaten the US. homeland. Beijing wants a military 

base at Walvis Bay, and China's leaders have long looked at raising their red flag over 

the Atlantic otithe African coast. In the Azores, specifically the island ofTerceira, 

Chinese aircraft could control the mouth of the Mediterranean and would be closer to 

New York than Pearl Harbor is to Los Angeles. 16 

7 

Hawkins may or may not be right about a lack of immediate American interests, but there 

is no sense in ignoring the potential implications of Chinese control of Africa. A 

belligerent China in Asia is bad enough. A dangerous China much closer to our shores is 

far worse. 
17


28876a-8.eps

8 

"Wang Yi In the Historic Process of Africa Standing Up, Getting Stronger, China 

Willing to Be Africa's Most Reliable Strategic Partner," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

February 8, 20 18, http://>vww.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t 1533145.shtml. 

Elizabeth Manero, "China's Investment in Africa: The New Colonialism?" 

Harvard Political Review, February 3, 2017, lli\JI.Wl<liY!Jrdpolitigl.corrl/-.ygr!_d/chinasi nvestment -i n-afri ca-the-ncvv-col oni ali sm/. 

Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous 

Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese 

Characteristics for a New Era," 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 

China, October 18, 2017, 

http:i/www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC Nationa 

l_Col~S'Pdf. 

"Chairman Xi Jinping's 2017 New Year's Message," Xinhua News Agency, 

December 31, 2016, lillJ;!//newsJSinh.@DSLCQJM2oliJi<;,~2016-l]/3l/f__lj20227034.hJJn. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Forge Ahead Under the Guidance of General 

Secretary Xi Jinping' s Thought on Diplomacy," September I, 2017, 

h!!J2;!/ww~Jlnprc.Qov.cn/mfa _ em;/z~xx 662805/t 1489143 .shtmj For more, see "China 

Says Xi Transcends West as a Diplomatic 'Pioneer,'" Reuters, September 1, 2017, 

http s: I lv-iViW. r~Jters. com/ arti c 1 e/us-chi n a -congress-din] om acv I china -savs-xi-tran seen dswest -as-a -clip! omatic-pioneer-idUSKCN 1 BC4KQ. 

"China Will Not Take Path of 'Western Colonists' in Africa-Foreign Minister," 

Reuters, January 12, 2015, ~~~~~'2.'±l~~"-!!.i.~.~"-"""'~£:!!~~""~·~~~!..'o'£ 

takc-path-of~western-coloni s!s-in-africa-forei gn-mini stcr-idUSU NOLTR 1 J920 150112. 

Takes a Tougher Tone with China," Washington Post, July 

See James Wilkinson," 'Racist' Chinese Spring Festival Gala TV Show Causes 

Uproar Over 'Blackface' and 'Big Bottoms,'" South (Hong Kong), 

February 16, 2018, =-'"-"-'-'"-'~~="-=="'-=~-""'='-"-'=~~'-"'-'~==c..""-'~""'-

Elvis Ondieki, "Chinese Embassy Denies Racism in 'Blackface' Skit," 

Nation (Nairobi), February 18,2018, ~~~'.'.:'i.'~lQl'.!.!!!,.!o-".~~-"Y-"~J..ll..l.=:::.'2.oc""'~:t::-

10 "Tillerson Shows Disdain for China's Constructive Approach to Latin America," 

editorial, Glohal Times (Beijing), February 3, 2018, 
18


28876a-9.eps

11 Howard W. French, China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are 

Building a New J\mpire in A.fi'ica (New York Vintage Books, 2015), p. 259. 

12 Brahm a Chellaney, "China Ensnares Vulnerable States in a Debt Trap," Nikkei 

Asian Review, February 20, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Brahma-

_<;:hell.m~China-ensnares-vLtlnerable-s1a!es-in-a-dcbt-lrap. 

13 French, China's Second Continent, p. 4. 

14 Ibid, p. 8. 

9 

15 See William R. Hawkins, "A Minor U.S. Role in Africa," Family Security 

Matters, November 17, 2017, http://www.fiunilysecuritvmatters.org/publications/detailiallli nor -us-rol c-in -afi·i ca. 

16 See Gordon G. Chang, "Red Flag Over the Atlantic," National Review, 

November 4, 2012, JJ.ttn,'il[www.nar.ionalreview.com/20 12/11 /red-flag-ovieJ.::JJctlanticgordon-!2-chang/. 
19

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chang. 

I would like to now go to Mr. Meservey. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. MESERVEY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

Thank you as well for highlighting one of the most important 

issues facing Africa and, by extension, U.S. interests in Africa. 

With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MESERVEY. I need to add that the views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing 

any official position of the Heritage Foundation. 

Mr. Chairman, in the last two decades, China has built, by many 

measures, unparalleled influence in Africa. It has done so through 

an array of economic, military, and diplomatic initiatives. 

Beijing wants to secure a stable supply of natural resources and 

make money in Africa. Yet, it is also seeking influence on the continent to support its rise to what it sees as its rightful place as a 

global superpower. 

The U.S. prefers cooperation to competition, but the U.S. and 

Chinese models are fundamentally at odds, and the danger for U.S. 

interests is if the illiberal economic and governance model the Chinese exemplify continues to gain ground in Africa. 

If it does, it would likely mean that U.S. and other countries’ 

firms would be increasingly cut out of some of the growing economic opportunities on the continent, that the U.S.’ longstanding 

foreign policy goal of encouraging the global growth of democracy 

would be turned back in Africa in favor of Beijing’s authoritarian 

model, and that China could supplant the U.S. in strategic areas 

of the continent. 

There are troubling signs that the Chinese model is gaining in 

Africa. Researchers found that as African countries’ trade increases 

with China, they grow more likely to vote with Beijing against 

U.N. resolutions condemning human rights violations. 

Polls show that while the U.S. as a model of national development holds a slight lead over China in Africa, China is even in 

southern and north Africa and leads in central Africa. 

I want now to focus on a few of the ways China is building such 

influence. One part of Beijing’s huge increase in economic activity 

in Africa has been issuing loans, as we have already been discussing this morning. 

In 2015, Chinese loans from the 3 years previous accounted for 

an estimated one-third of all recent debt in sub-Saharan Africa. 

This gives it significant influence with many countries. 

Djibouti, as we have also already been talking about, sits on the 

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a global shipping choke point. It hosts a 

number of military bases, including China’s first permanent overseas base, and the U.S.’ Camp Lemonnier. 

20

China now holds Djiboutian debt worth about 60 percent of that 

country’s GDP, giving it significant leverage over a country critical 

to U.S. military operations on the continent. 

The Chinese base will supposedly serve as a rest and resupply 

depot for its forces participating in anti-piracy patrols and support 

Chinese personnel serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa. 

The number of that personnel has skyrocketed to nearly 2,200 

from only 20 in the ’90s. China has recently enhanced other elements of its longstanding military ties with Africa. 

From 2012 to 2015, Beijing accounted for nearly one-third of the 

value of all arms deliveries to the continent. Today, two-thirds of 

African countries use some Chinese military equipment. In addition, China trains militaries and builds military training centers in 

various African countries. 

Across Africa, Beijing is also establishing Confucius Institutes, 

which are centers devoted to teaching Chinese culture and tradition, as well as pushing Beijing’s narrative on topics such as Tibet 

and Taiwan. 

Senior Chinese officials have described these institutes as important to Beijing’s efforts to promote a positive Chinese global image, 

thereby strengthening Chinese national power. 

In just over 10 years, the Chinese Government has established 

76 Confucius Institutes and classrooms in 38 African countries. 

Beijing is also training in China an increasing number of African 

politicians. These trainings sometimes cover decidedly illiberal topics such as how to control public opinion. 

Other public diplomacy initiatives include Chinese medical teams 

conducting hundreds of African missions since 1963, and a hospital 

ship visiting at least nine African countries since 2010. 

Some of Beijing’s activities can be beneficial, such as filling part 

of Africa’s huge infrastructure gap. Yet the U.S. should vigorously 

expand its own still significant influence in Africa to ensure the 

commitment to the rule of law, individual rights, and the free market is preeminent on the continent. 

To do so, the U.S. should, among other initiatives, reorient its development aid to Africa to focus on enhancing free markets and accountable and competent governance, deepen cooperation with likeminded allies active on the continent such as the U.K., Israel, and 

Japan, swiftly fill the vacant Africa-related positions in the U.S. 

Government, and finally, seek opportunities such as in counterterrorism to cooperate with the Chinese while maintaining an appropriate level of wariness. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]

21


28876b-1.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

China in Africa: The New Colonialism? 

Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations 

United States House of Representatives 

March 7, 2018 

Joshua Meservey 

Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle East 

The Heritage Foundation 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the committee, thank you for 

this opportunity to testify before you. Thank 

you as well for highlighting one of the most 

important issues facing Africa, and by 

extension, U.S. interests on the continent, 

today. With your permission, I would like to 

submit my written testimony into the record. 

My name is Joshua Meservey. I am the Senior 

Policy Analyst for Africa and the Middle East 

at The Heritage Foundation. The views I 

express in this testimony are my own and 

should not be construed as representing any 

official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

China's Historic Engagements in Africa 

and Current Dominance 

Even before many African countries gained 

independence, Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung 

recognized in the mid-1950s the continent's 

potential as a significant source of support 

1U.S. Central Intelllgence Agency, "China's Role in 

Africa: Special Report Weekly Review," Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, February 25,1972, 

for China's ambitions. His primary concern 

was to gain African states' diplomatic help to 

win from the rival Nationalist government 

in Taiwan global recognition as the 

mainland's official government, and to 

position China as the leader of the 

developing world in opposition to 

"imperialist" countries such as the U.S. and 

USSR.1 

It was not until the turn of the 21ST century, 

after President Jiang Zemin called for China 

to "Go Out" to secure the resources and 

diplomatic support it needed to fuel its rise, 

that the pace and scale of Chinese 

engagements with Africa exploded. By many 

measures, China has been so active in going 

out that it is now the most influential foreign 

actor on the continent. 

In 1992, China supplied just 1.8 percent of 

African imports. 2 Today, Chinese trade 

https: / fwww.cia.gov /library freadingroom/ docs(CI 

A-RD P08S02113 R0001 00080001-0.pdf. 

2Lily Kuo, "The best days of selling cheap Chinese 

goods in Africa are over," Quartz, May 3, 2017, 

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE • Washington, DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org 
22


28876b-2.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

volumes with Africa are three times larger 

than the continent's trade with India, its 

second-largest trade partner.3 China is now 

the greatest source of imports for 19 of subSaharan Africa's 48 countries, up from being 

the largest import source for only 1 subSaharan African country in 20014 

Beijing now also supplies Africa with more 

financing than any other country.s Chinese 

lending to the continent is opaque, but one 

of the best estimates is that Chinese 

government, banks, and contractors offered 

around $85 billion in loans to African 

governments and State-Owned Enterprises 

(SOEs) from 2000 to 2014, though only just 

over half were disbursed. 6 These loans are 

concentrated in a handful of countries, with 

five receiving more than half of them.? The 

transportation sector receives the most 

Chinese financing, followed by energy and 

mining and oil projects. 8 Infrastructure 

https://qz.com/950377/the-best-days-of-sellingcheap-chi nese-goods-in-africa -are-over f. 3 lrene Yuan Sun, KartikJayaram, and Omid Kassiri, 

"Dance of the Lions and Dragons," McKinsey & 

Company, https:j jwww.africanewsroom.comjfilesjdownloadjaa9f2979a3dc18e. 

4Daniel F. Runde and Christopher Metzger, "Is the 

United States Prepared for China to be Africa's Main 

Business Partner?," Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, january 31.2018, 

https:((www.csis.org(analysis(united-statesprepared-china-be-africas-main-business-partner. 

5China appears to wish to continue to do so into the 

future. A senior official at the Export-Import Bank of 

China Bank recently estimated that China will 

provide $1 trillion in financing to African countries 

by 2025. Toh Han Shih, "China to Provide Africa with 

US$1tr Financing," South China Morning Post, 

November 8, 2013, 

http: I lwww.scmp.comlbusinesslbankingfinancelarticlel1358902lchina-provide-africaus1tr-financing. 

DJyhjong Hwang, Deborah Brautigam, and Janet Eom, 

"How Chinese Money is Transforming Africa: It's Not 

What You Think," China-Africa Research Initiative at 

johns Hopkins SAIS Policy Brie[No. 11, Apri12016. 

https:(/staticl.squarespace.com(static/5652847de 

development within those sectors is a 

priority, making Beijing the world's leading 

financier of African infrastructure.9 

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 

Africa is similarly difficult to gauge, but by 

one measure it has grown 40 percent 

annually for the last ten years from $1 

billion in 2004 to $34 billion in 2015.10 For 

the year 2016, China was by far the biggest 

foreign direct investor in Africa in terms of 

total dollars spent. China invested about 10 

times what the U.S. did,11 though the U.S.'s 

FDI stocks in Africa remain significantly 

higher than China's. While Chinese FDI 

targets virtually every part of the continent, 

about half of it is concentrated in eight 

countries.12 The mining sector was the most 

popular destination for Chinese FDI in 2015, 

followed by construction and 

manufacturing.13 

4b033 f5 6d2bdc2 9/t/5 7 68ae3b6a49 63a2b8cac9 55/ 

146 64 78245 9 51/ CARI_Policy B rief_11_2 016. pdf. 7 They are Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and D RC: 

Hwang, et al. "How Chinese Money is Transforming 

Africa: It's Not What You Think" 

HDeborah Brautigam and Jyhjong Hwang, "Eastern 

Promises: New Data on Chinese Loans in Africa, 

2000-2014," China-Africa Research Initiative at 

johns Hopkins SAIS, Working PaperNo.4.Apri12016. 

https:((staticl.squarespace.com(static(5652847de 

4b033 f5 6d2 bdc2 9/t/58ac91ede6f2 elf64a2 Odll a/ 

1487704559189 I eastern+promises+v4.pdf. 9Sun, et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

10lbid. 

11"Michael Lalor, et al., "Connectivity redefined," EY's 

Attractiveness Program Africa, May 2017, 

http:((www.ey.com(Publication(vwLUAssets(eyafrica-attractiveness-report($FILE/ey-africaattractiveness-report pdf. 

12Angola, Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, 

South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. Sun, et al., 

"Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

n)anet Eom, et al., "The United States and China in 

Africa: What Does the Data Say?," China-Africa 

Research Initiative at johns Hopkins SAIS Policy 

Brie[No. 18. April 2 017, 

https:(/staticl.squarespace.com(static/5652847de 

2 
23


28876b-3.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Private Chinese companies are increasingly 

important in Africa as well. There may now 

be as many as 10,000 Chinese owned firms 

on the continent, 90 percent of which are 

likely privately-owned. 14 This is in keeping 

with a trend that saw the private sector's 

share of all outward-bound Chinese 

investment rise from less than 10 percent in 

2010 to nearly 50 percent in 2016.15 

In keeping with the "Go Out" philosophy, 

about a third of all Chinese loans in Africa go 

to natural resource projects, 16 and more 

than 80 percent of China's Africa imports are 

of natural resources, including crude oil.17 

Oil-rich Angola is in fact the largest African 

recipient of Chinese loans.1B 

Beijing also targets relatively resource-poor 

but strategically important countries. 

Ethiopia-Africa's second most populous 

country and one of the world's fastest 

growing economies-receives the secondmost Chinese loans to Africa.19 China funds 

4b0 3 3f5 6d2 bdc2 9 ftf58fd32 aS ff7 cS 02a49 3d 18edf 

149 2 988584819 /PB18_ U S+China+ Africa. pdf. 

t4Sun, et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

t5Derel< Scissors, "Record Chinese Outward 

Investment 2016," American Enterprise Institute, 

january 2017. http:/ jwww.aei.orgjwpcontentjuploads/2017/0 1/China-Tracker-january2017.pdf. 

11•"Chinese Loans to Africa Credit Limit," The 

Economist,April30, 2016, 

https:j jwww.economist.comjnewsjfinance-andeco nomics /2169785 6-new-data-s uggest -chinalends-less-africa-commonly-assumed-credit. 

17Clara Sanna, "A Strategic Continent: China vs. 

Africa/The Atlantic Council's J. Peter Pham weighs 

in." World Energy No. 37, December 2017, 

https:jjwww.aboutenergy.com/ en_IT jlliptabloid/oil_37 _EN/index.html#slide24. 

ts Hwang, et al. "How Chinese Money is 

Transforming Africa: It's Not What You Think" 

19Hwang, et al. "How Chinese Money is Transforming 

Africa: It's Not What You Think" 

~oErica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, Patrick deGategno, 

"China's Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The 

Economic and Security Dimensions of China's First 

Overseas Base," CNA China Studies, july 2017, 

about 40 percent of the major infrastructure 

projects in Djibouti, 2o which has few 

resources but is one of the most strategically 

located countries in Africa. It sits on the Bab 

el Mandeb Strait through which about 50 

percent of China's oil imports travel, 21 and 

hosts a number of foreign military bases, 

including the U.S.'s only permanent African 

military base. 

China recognizes the many opportunities to 

make money in Africa as well. Huawei earns 

15 percent of its global revenues on the 

continent, 22 and more than half of Chinese 

firms in a survey reported making back their 

initial investments in Africa in three years or 

less. 23 Beijing's frequent practice of 

providing "tied" loans 24 -resulting in as 

many as 70 percent of contracts for Chinesefinanced projects going to Chinese 

companies 25 -has helped Chinese firms 

earn around $50 billion a year on African 

infrastructure projects alone. 26 These 

projects also help China's massive statehttps:f fwww.cna.org/CNA_filesfPD F fD l M-2017 -U015308- Final2.pdf. 

Andrew Jacobs and Jane Perlez, "U.S. Wary of its 

New Neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base," 

New York Times, February 25,2017, 

https:j jwww.nytimes.comj2017f02f2Sjworldjafri 

cajus-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html. 

22David Pilling, "Chinese investment in Africa: 

Beijing's testing ground," Financial Times,fune 13, 

2017, https:/ jwww.ft.comjcontent/Of534aa4-4549-

11e7 -8519-9f94ee97 d996. 23Sun, et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

:!4Brook Larmer, "Is China the World's New Colonial 

Power?," May 2, 2017, New York Times, 

https:f fwww.nytimes.comf2017/0S/02fmagazinef 

is-china-the-worlds-new-colonial-power.html. 

25Yun Sun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or 

Messiah?," Brookings, February 7, 2014, 

https:/ jwww.brookings.edujopinionsjchinas-aidto-africa-monster-or-messiahj. 

2fiAndrew Jacobs, "Joyous Africans Take to the Rails, 

With China's Help," New York Times, February 7, 

2017, 

https:jjwww.nytimes.comj2017/02/07jworldjafri 

caj africa-china-train.html. 

3 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

owned infrastructure development 

companies offload some of the excess 

capacity they developed while building 

China's own infrastructure. 27 

Not all of Beijing's economic plays on the 

continent are designed to make money. The 

Chinese government is willing to support 

economically risky projects if they advance 

its foreign policy goals, 28 one reason 

Chinese SOEs on average earn lower profits 

than their private counterparts. 29 China's 

first major infrastructure project in Africa 

was the construction of the TanzaniaZambia Railway, completed in 1976 and 

financed with a zero-interest Chinese loan, 

despite China suffering in the throes of the 

Cultural Revolution at the time.3o 

A Great Power's Soft Power 

Current Chinese President Xi jinping's 

"Chinese Dream" strategy envisions his 

27For mention of the excess capacity, see William T. 

Wilson, "Is the Chinese Model Past Its Expiration 

Date?," in2017 Global Agenda for Economic Freedom, 

]ames M. Roberts and William T. Wilson, eds., The 

Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 188, 

https:j jwww.heritage.orgjinternationaleconomies / report/2 017 -global-agenda-economicfreedom. 

20U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "China's Role in 

Africa: Special Report Weekly Review."" 29Sun. et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." and 

Scissors, "Record Chinese Outward Investment 

2016." 

:msun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?" 

" 1Ciaire van den He ever, "Inside Africa's Confucius 

Institutes."" WhoKou, December 4. 2017. 

https:j jwhokou.com/2017 /12/04/inside-africasconfucius-institutesj. 

32 The Chinese government has been explicit about 

using Confucius Institutes to disseminate Chinese 

propaganda. Politburo member Li Changchun in 

2011 said, "TI1e Confucius Institute is an appealing 

brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made 

an important contribution toward improving our 

soft power. The 'Confucius' brand has a natural 

attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese 

language, everything looks reasonable and logical." 

In 2010. Chinese Minister of Propaganda Liu 

country's return to what he sees as its 

rightful place of prominence on the global 

stage. Doing so requires, in addition to 

expanding its economic engagements at 

breakneck speed, enhancing a diverse range 

of public diplomacy initiatives. 

A pillar of this effort has been the Chinese 

government controlled and funded 

Confucius Institutes. First established in 

Seoul. South Korea in 2004, 31 Confucius 

Institutes are designed to build sympathy 

and support for Beijing's geopolitical goals 

by promoting a positive image of China 

through exposure to Chinese culture and 

tradition, especially Mandarin language 

learning.32 The institutes also push Beijing's 

narrative on controversial topics such as 

Tibet and Taiwan. In just over 10 years, the 

Chinese government established 48 

Confucius Institutes and 28 Classrooms in 

38 African countries33 

Yunshan wrote 'With regard to key issues that 

influence our sovereignty and safety, we should 

actively carry out international propaganda battles 

against issuers such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, 

human rights and Falun Gong ... We should do well in 

establishing and operating overseas cultural centers 

and Confucius Institutes." Ethan Epstein, "How 

China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms," Politico Magazine, 

January 16,2018, 

https:j jwww.politico.comjmagazinejstoryj2018j0 

1 I 16 /how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-21632 7. 

National People's Congress member Hu Youqing 

stated, "Promoting the use of Chinese among 

overseas people has gone beyond purely cultural 

issues ... It can help build up our national strength 

and should be taken as a way to develop our 

country's soft power." R.S. Zaharna, Jennifer 

Hubbert. and Falk Hartig. Confucius Institutes and 

the Globalization of China's Soft Power, (Los 

Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, September 2014), 

http: j jus cpu blicdi plomacy.org/ sites/ us cpu blicdiplo 

macy.org/ files jus eru ploads j u2 5 044 jConfuci us%2 0 

Institutes%J20v2 1

Yb2 0%J281 1XJ29.pdf. 

nsome estimate there are institutes in more than 40 

African countries. van den Heever, "Inside Africa's 

Confucius Institutes." For the Chinese government's 

list of Institutes and Classrooms in Africa, see 

"Confucius Institute/Classroom," 

4 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Han ban, a branch of the Chinese Ministry of 

Education and the headquarters for the 

Confucius Institutes, offers scholarships to 

African students to study in China as welL 

Hanban scholarships have contributed to 

the number of African students studying in 

China growing 26 fold in 12 years. There are 

now more African students in China than in 

the U.S.-only France hosts more than China 

does.34 

Echoes of Mao's shrewd practice of building 

influence with rising African leaders and 

political parties 35 remain today in Beijing's 

program for granting young-and 

sometimes senior-African politicians 

scholarships to attend trainings in China. 

Representatives of at least seven ruling 

parties in Africa have participated in the 

program,36 and in 2016, China announced it 

would invite 1,000 more African politicians 

http:// english.hanban.orgjnode_1097l.htm. 

Institutes cater to university students, while 

classrooms are for students in the kindergarten to 

12th grades. 

:;4Victoria Moore and Nathan Breeze, "China Tops US 

and UK as Destination for Anglophone African 

Students," The Conversation June 27, 2017, 

https:jjtheconversation.comjchina-tops-us-and-ukas-destination-for-anglophone-african-students78967. 

::Jr,Mao supported vvith weapons and training a 

nwnber of rebel groups-which later became ruling 

parties-battling for independence, including the 

African National Congress in South Africa, the South 

West African People's Organisation in Namibia, the 

Mozambique Liberation Front in Mozambique, and 

Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union 

in Zimbabwe. 

3&They are the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 

Democratic Front of Ethiopia; the National Congress 

Party of Sudan; Chama Cha Maplnduzl of Tanzania; 

South West African People's Organisation of 

Namibia; Sudan People's Liberation Movement of 

South Sudan; ANC and Communist Party of South 

Africa; and the Jubilee Party of Kenya. 

37Lily Kuo, "Beijing is cultivating the next generation 

of African elites by training them in China. Quartz, 

December 14. 2017. 

to receive training. 37 Such initiatives give 

Beijing significant influence with officials 

who are likely to be part of their country's 

leadership in the future. 

ln 1963, Beijing opened a new soft power 

front in Africa by sending a medical team to 

Algeria. The teams, composed of doctors, 

nurses, and other medical personnel, 38 

deploy for up to two years at a time, and are 

recruited by Chinese provincial-level 

governments. Provinces send teams to the 

same African country, thereby establishing a 

sustained "buddy system." 39 From 2000 to 

2013, Chinese medical teams performed 

189 missions to Africa. 4° China's Peace Ark 

hospital ship complements these efforts, 

and has visited at least nine African 

countries since 2010.41 

Some Chinese firms are even beginning to 

launch the sort of image softening exercises 

https:j /qz.com/1119447/china-is-training-africasnext-generation-of-leaders/. 

::l8Tang Jailei and Xiao Bing, "China Has Medical Aid 

Teams Stationed in 42 African Countries," The China 

Africa Project, August 9, 2013, 

http:/ jwww.chinaafricaproject.comjchina-hasmedical-aid-teams-stationed-in-42-africancountries-translation;. 

::;<JXiaoxiao Jiang Kwete, "Chinese Medical Teams in 

the DRC: A Comparative Case Study," China-Africa 

Research Initiative at johns Hopkins SAIS Policy 

BriefNo. 21, October 2017, 

https:jjstaticl.squarespace.comjstaticj5652847de 

4b033f56d2bdc29/tf5a2 6a4 778165f5f17 490c6 71/ 

15124819112 53jxiaoxiao+v9.pdf. 40Mohon Shajalal, et al.. "China's engagement with 

development assistance for health in Africa," Global 

Health Research and Policy 2:24 (2017), August 9, 

2017, 

https:j /ghrp.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.118 

6/s41256-017-0045-

8?site=ghrp.biomedcentral.com, 1-9. 41 "Chinese hospital ship Peace Arl< set out for 

'Harmonious Mission- 2015'," China Military Online, 

September 25, 2015, 

http:jjenglish.chinamil.com.cnjnewschannelsjchina-military-news/2015-

09/2 5jcontent_6699367.htm. 

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

more commonly associated with Western 

firms. In projects in Namibia and Kenya, 

Chinese firms made concessions to protect 

local wildlife. 42 Huawei is keen to be seen 

training 12,000 students a year in various 

countries, while a Chinese company in 

Namibia took the unprecedented step of 

inviting a labor union to organize at one of 

its mines.43 

Projecting Global Military Force 

Beijing appears to understand that 

achieving its desired status as a true global 

power requires projecting military force 

abroad. It has accordingly significantly 

strengthened its longstanding military ties 

with Africa. From 2012-2015, China 

accounted for more than 32% of the value of 

all arms deliveries to the continent, more 

than double the value of what it supplied 

from 2008 to 2011.44 Today, two-thirds of 

African countries use some Chinese military 

equipment.4s 

China's military efforts in Africa increasingly 

feature boots on the ground as well. In 2017, 

China opened its first permanent overseas 

military base in Djibouti. Beijing claims the 

base will primarily be a rest and resupply 

depot for its forces participating in the 

multinational anti-piracy patrols off the East 

African coast that the Chinese joined in 

4:!David Pi1ling and Emily Feng, "Kenya's $4bn 

Railway Gains Traction from Chinese Policy 

Ambitions," Financial Times, April4, 2017, 

https:j jwww.ftcomjcontentj d0fd50ee-1549-11e7-

80f4-13e067d5072c and Larmer, "Is China the 

World's New Colonial Power?" 

13Larmer. "Is China the World's New Colonial 

Power?" 

11Catherine A. Theohary, "Conventional Anns 

Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015," 

Congressional Research Service, December 19,2016, 

https:j jfas.orgjsgpjcrsjweaponsjR44 716. pdf. 

4SAshley Cowburn, "Two-thirds of African countries 

now using Chinese military equipment, report 

reveals," Independent, March 1. 2016, 

http:/ /www.independentco.uk/newsjworld/africa 

January 2009. The base will also support 

Chinese personnel serving in U.N. 

peacekeeping operations in Africa,46 whose 

numbers have skyrocketed in the last two 

decades. 47 In addition, China is training 

militaries in a number of African countries, 

including Namibia and the Democratic 

Republic of Congo, and recently inaugurated 

a military training center the Chinese army 

built in Tanzania.4s 

Different Kinds of Strings 

China frequently portrays its engagements 

in Africa as "no-strings-attached." It claims it 

does not meddle in the internal affairs of 

African countries, and makes no human 

rights, governance, or other demands. It is 

one of the central narratives it pushes with 

its African partners.49 

The idea that there are no strings attached 

to Chinese engagement is an obvious canard, 

however. Some of the strings are simply 

different from those associated with other 

international partners, and have significant 

long-term costs. 

African countries are increasingly saddling 

themselves with Chinese debt. From 2013 to 

2015, Chinese institutions issued loans 

valuing $5 billion to $6 billion every year to 

African governments, constituting an 

jtwo-thirds-of-african-countries-now-usingchinese-military-equipment-a6905286.html. 

46Jacobs and Perlez, "U.S. Wary of its New Neighbor 

in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base." 

47"Troop and Police Contributors," United Nations 

Peacekeeping, 

https:/ jpeacekeeping.un.orgjenjtroop-and-policecontributors. 

18"Here We Come, New Centre Warns Criminals," 

Daily News, February 7, 2018, 

https:j jwww.dailynews.co.tzjindex.phpjhomenewsj55812-here-we-come-new-centre-warnscriminals. 

49Larmer, "Is China the World's New Colonial 

Power?" 

6 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

estimated one-third of all new debt in subSaharan Africa in 201s.so 

In addition, about one-third of Chin's loans 

to African countries are collateralized with 

natural resources. Sl For some financially 

unstable countries with natural resources, 

commodities backed loans are the only 

option for securing financing-China 

financed the building of parts of its own 

infrastructure using this model. 52 However, 

if countries do not wisely negotiate the 

terms of these loans, a downturn in demand 

can leave them in economic distress. After 

oil prices began slumping in 2014, Angola 

was forced to send an increasing amount of 

oil to China to service its debt, leaving little 

for itself to sell to obtain much-needed 

cash. 53 Since 2004, China has struck at least 

7 such deals with African countries. 54 

A default may even result in a country 

surrendering control or access to strategic 

assets, as happened recently when the Sri 

Lankan government gave up majority 

control of its Hambantota port to Chinese 

firms.ss 

African leaders are ultimately to blame for 

striking disadvantageous deals with the 

sosun. et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

'· 1Brautigam and Hwang, "Eastern Promises: New 

Data on Chinese Loans in Africa, 2000-2014." 

.~~Deborah Brautigam, "China: Eastern Hope in 

Africa," Observe, August 25, 2011, 

http:/ jwww.o bserve-china.comjarticle/5 1. 

53 Libby George. "Growing Chinese Debt Leaves 

Angola with Little Spare Oil," Reuters, March 14, 

2016, https:j jwww.reuters.comjarticlejangola-oilfinancejgrowing-chinese-debt-leaves-angola-withlittle-spare-oil-idUSL5N16H3EV. 

S1Brautigam, "China: Eastern Hope in Africa." 

.~sKiran Stacey, "China signs 99-year lease on Sri 

Lanka's Hambantota Port," Financial Times, 

December 11, 2017, 

https:j jwww.ft.comjcontentje150effic-de37 -11e7-

a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c and Ronak Gopaldas, "Lessons 

from Sri Lanka on China's 'debt-trap diplomacy'," 

Institute for Security Studies. February 21. 2018, 

Chinese. However, Beijing sometimes, to 

gain control of a strategic asset or build 

political leverage, supplies loans to 

financially unstable countries with few 

other financing options.56 It is also plausible 

that some Chinese lenders may offer African 

leaders personal financial inducements to 

borrow on terms favorable to Chinese 

interests. China has offered to cancel some 

African debt, but only small amounts. 57 

There is also the issue of reciprocity. China 

has snapped up African assets and rapidly 

increased its exports to the continent, but 

has been unwilling to fully open its own 

markets.58 

China's extensive engagement in Africa also 

makes African governments and industries 

vulnerable to the sorts of economic, 

diplomatic, and military espionage China 

uses in other parts of the world. Beijing is 

the world's foremost perpetrator of 

economic espionage, and even 

institutionalized the practice in 1986 when 

https:j jissafrica.orgjiss-todayjlessons-from-srilanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy. 

snstacey, "China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka's 

Hambantota Port." 

S7Janet Eom, Jyhjong Hwang, Ying Xia, and Deborah 

Brautigam, "Looking Back and Moving Forward: an 

Analysis of China-Africa Economic Trends and the 

Outcomes of the 2015 Forum on China Africa 

Cooperation," China-Africa Research Initiative at 

johns Hopkins SAIS Policy BriefNo. 09. january 

2016, 

http:/ jstatic1.squarespace.comjstatic/5652847de4 

b033 f5 6d2 bdc2 9 /t/5 6aa3a9 Sa 12 f44 bc3 732 d2 6e/ 1 

45 3 99 69 65 486 /CARI_Po li cyBrief_9 _Jan2 016. 

suscissors, "Record Chinese Outward Investment 

2016." Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta recently 

addressed the problem publicly, warning that "China 

must also open up to Africa." Pilling, "Chinese 

investment in Africa: Beijing's testing ground." 

7 
28


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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

it launched Project 863 to facilitate the theft 

of U.S. trade and technology secrets. 59 

The fact that most Chinese companies 

operating in Africa are private only slightly 

ameliorates the risk, as even truly 

independent private Chinese firms would 

likely have to acquiesce if their government 

demanded they cooperate in some way. 

Some private firms are already significantly 

under the Chinese government's sway. 

There is currently a bill before the U.S. 

congress that would forbid the U.S. 

government from using products from 

Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei 

and ZTE. This follows multiple U.S. 

government reports finding that both 

companies pose a security risk because of 

their close ties to the Chinese government.60 

The risk for African governments is 

significant. Huawei and ZTE have likely built 

more than 40 telecom networks in over 30 

African countries, and national and 

government networks in more than 20 

African countries. 61 According to the former 

head of the American NSA and CIA, Huawei 

shared with Beijing what it knows about 

Huawei-built foreign telecoms networks,62 

so it is likely that the Chinese government 

has already taken advantage of this African 

vulnerability. 

S9"Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 

Cyberspace," Office of the National 

Counterintelligence Executive, October 2011, 

https:j jwww.dni.gov /files; documentsjNewsroomj 

Reports%J2 Oand%J2 0 Pubs /2 01111 03_report_feci e. p 

df. 

60H.R. 4747,115"' Congress 2d Session. U.S. House of 

Representatives, january 9, 2018, 

https:/ jwww.congress.govj115fbillsjhr4747 /BILL 

S-115hr4 7 4 7ih.pdf. 

fi 1Andrea Marsha1l, "China's mighty Telecom 

footprint in Africa," New Security Learning, 

February 14,2011, 

http:/ jwww.newsecuritylearning.comjindex.phpja 

rchivej75-chinas-mighty-telecom-footprint-inafrica. 

A recent high-profile incident illustrates the 

problem. The African Union (AU) allegedly 

discovered that the servers in its Chinesebuilt headquarters in Addis Ababa were 

automatically uploading their contents 

every day to servers in China. A subsequent 

sweep of the building found numerous 

bugging devices. It is a likely sign of how 

strong Chinese influence on the continent 

has grown that the reaction from the AU and 

members states was muted. A number of 

African leaders, including Chairperson of 

the African Union Commission Moussa Faki 

Mahamat, even rejected the bugging reports 

as false. 63 

Part of what makes China so attractive is the 

one stop shop nature of some of their large 

projects, particularly infrastructure. Yet 

these package deals sometimes include anticompetitive requirements that result in 

governments not receiving as much value 

from the project as they should. Uganda's 

recently constructed Entebbe-Kampala 

road, for instance, cost twice as much to 

build per kilometer as did the Addis-Adama 

Expressway in Ethiopia, built by the same 

company. ln order to secure a $350 million 

loan for their road from China's Eximbank, 

Uganda had to agree to single-sourcing,64 a 

common Chinese lending requirement. 

r,z"Former CIA boss says aware of evidence H uawei 

spying for China," Reuters, 

https:j jwww.reuters.comjarticlejus-huaweisecurity jformer-cia-boss-says-aware-of-evidencehuawei-spying-for-china-idUSBRE961 0612 0130719. 

G3Ben Blanchard, "African Union Says Has No Secret 

Dossiers After China Spying Report," Reuters, 

February 8, 2018, 

https:j jwww.reuters.comjarticlejus-chlnaafrican union/ african-union-says-has-no-secretdossiers-after-china-spying-reportidUSKBN1FS19W. 

D4Elias Biryabarema, "Chinese-built expressway 

divides Uganda as debts mount," Reuters, January 

31,2018, https:/ jwww.reuters.comjarticlejus8 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Related to this is the issue of corruption. 

China is 77th of 180 countries ranked in 

Transparency International's most recent 

Corruption Perceptions Index, while subSaharan Africa is the worst performing 

region 65 Unsurprisingly, 60 to 87 percent of 

recently surveyed Chinese firms in 5 African 

countries reported giving bribes to secure a 

license. 66 Just recently, the U.S. Justice 

Department charged an emissary of the 

private Chinese multinational, CEFC China 

Energy Company, with bribing Chadian and 

Ugandan officials in exchange for oil rights.67 

Similarly, Beijing's training program for 

African politicians should worry any African 

who wishes for accountable governance. 

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) 

recent decision to scrap presidential term 

limits is an illustration of the kind of model 

China is exemplifying for its African 

partners. Ethiopia's ruling party has learned 

about the Chinese government's techniques 

for controlling public opinion, including the 

media. 68 Part of the curriculum for South 

uganda-roadjchinese-built-expressway-dividesuganda-as-debts-mount-idUSKBN1FKOVl. 

fN'Corruption Perceptions Index 2 017," 

Transparency International, February 21, 2 018, 

https: llwww.transparency.orgl news I feature I corru 

ption_perceptions_index_2 017#table. 

M•Sun. et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

07 Alexandra Stevenson, "U.S. Bribery Case Sheds 

Light on Mysterious Chinese Company," Financial 

Times, November 21,2017, 

https:llwww.nytimes.coml20171111211businesslc 

hina-energy-cefc.html. 

6UYun Sun, "Political party training: China's 

ideological push in Africa?."" Brookings, july 5, 2016, 

https:llwww.brookings.edulbloglafrica-infocusi2016I07105Ipolitical-party-training-chinasideological-push-in-africa/ 

09 1bid and Stephanie Findlay, "South Africa's Ruling 

ANC Lool<:s to Learn from Chinese Communist 

Party," Time, November 24,2014, 

http:lltime.coml3601968lanc-south-africa-chinacommunist-party1F and jeff Angote, "jubilee looks to 

the Communist Party for lessons," Daily Nation, 

September 18,2016, 

Africa's African National Congress and 

Kenya's Jubilee members concerned how to 

effectively organize and run a political party 

the way the CCP runs its affairs. In the case 

of Kenya, the program will include about 

300 CCP officials traveling to Kenya to 

enhance the training69 

There are also environmental risks 

associated with China's burgeoning 

presence in Africa. Chinese nationals-and, 

allegedly, even Chinese diplomats 70 -are 

frequently important players in the 

poaching rings devastating Africa's 

wildlife. 71 An estimated 48 percent of 

exports of Mozambican timber to China is 

illegal. 72 China's massive, and heavily 

subsidized, fleet of fishing trawlers gets 

most of its distant-sea catch from West 

African waters. As many as two-thirds of 

those Chinese boats fish illegally, rapidly 

depleting fishing stocks and costing West 

Africa an estimated $2 billion a year.73 

http:/ jwww.nation.co.kejnewsjpoliticsjjubileeloo l<s-to-the-Communist- Party-fo r-1 essons /1064-

3385490-yy2x8xlindex.html. 

70 8enjamin Haas, "Under pressure: the story behind 

China's ivory ban."' The Guardian, August 29, 2017, 

https:llwww.theguardian.comlenvironmentl20171 

augl291story-behind-china-ivory-ban. 71 Larmer, "Is China the World's New Colonial 

Power?" and "Vanishing Point: Criminality, 

Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania's 

Elephants," Environmental Investigation Agency, 

November 2014,_https:lleia-international.orglwpcontentj up loads/ E lA-Vanishing-Point -lo-res 1. pdf. 

72"First Class Connections: Log Smuggling. Illegal 

Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique," 

Environmental Investigation Agency, February 

2013, https:j Jeia-international.orgfwpcontent/ u ploadsj E lA- First -Class-Connections. pdf. 73Andrew Jacobs, "China's Appetite Pushes Fisheries 

to the Brink," New York Times, April30, 2017, 

https:j lwww.nytimes.comi2017I04I30/worldlasi 

ajchinas-appetite-pushes-fisheries-to-thebrinkhtml. 

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The Stakes 

There are positive elements to China's 

African engagements. Beijing is helping 

close Africa's huge infrastructure gap that is 

a serious drag on economic growth. China is 

supporting secure maritime shipping, a 

global good, through its participation in 

anti-piracy patrols. Chinese firms supply 

African consumers with affordable 

products. Despite the predatory nature of 

some Chinese loans, responsible African 

countries could benefit from Chinese 

lending as well. 

Africa also has enough economic 

opportunities to go around. The Chinese 

dominate construction and claim a growing 

share of the continent's nascent 

manufacturing sector, but the U.S. has a 

competitive advantage in increasingly 

important sectors such as financial services 

and agribusiness.74 

Yet China's rise in Africa presents a number 

of challenges to the U.S. In many African 

countries, the norms and regulatory 

environments around governance and 

economic activity are still forming. 

Countries like China that are not committed 

to equitable and transparent economic 

competition are influencing those norms, 

disadvantaging U.S. and other countries' 

firms. African countries will also not reap as 

much advantage as they would in a fair 

economic system. 

Furthermore, the U.S. for decades has 

encouraged the global growth of democracy, 

both because it is the political system best 

71Aubrey Hruby, "Escaping China's Shadow: Finding 

America's Competitive Edge in Africa," Atlantic 

Council's Africa Center Issue Brief, September 2017, 

http:/ jwww.atlanticcouncil.orgjpublicationsjissuebriefs j escaping-china-shadow. 

7SAdmiral Harry B. Harris Jr., "U.S. Pacific Command 

Posture," testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 

able to promote human flourishing, and 

because democratic countries are likelier to 

support U.S. foreign policy goals. The 

authoritarian governance model the 

Chinese exemplify for African leaders is 

antagonistic to that objective. 

Finally, there is danger that China will use its 

influence on the continent to supplant 

American influence, as it is seeking to do in 

the Indo-Pacific region. 75 As just one 

example of the potential risks for the U.S., 

Beijing holds Djiboutian debt worth about 

60 percent of the country's gross domestic 

product,76 giving it significant leverage over 

a country critical to U.S. military operations 

in Africa. 

The stakes in this contest are immense. By 

2030, one estimate projects 19 African 

economies will be growing by 5 percent or 

more per year, and that the continent will 

constitute a $3 trillion economy. 77 The 

African Development Bank predicts that 

household expenditures in Africa will grow 

to $3.5 trillion in the following eight years. 

Africa is also home to extraordinary natural 

resource wealth. The continent has 60 

percent of the world's uncultivated arable 

land, approximately 7.5 percent of the 

world's known oil and gas reserves, and an 

estimated 30 percent of the world's mineral 

reserves. Those reserves include 12 of the 

23 minerals the U.S. deems critical to its 

economy and national defense, and for 

February 14, 2 018, 

https: j j armedse rvices.house.gov jlegislationjhearin 

gsjmilitary-and-security-challenges-and-postureindo-pacific-region. 

76Jacobs and Perlez, "U.S. Wary of its New Neighbor 

in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base." 

77Lalor, et al., "Connectivity redefined." 

10 
31


28876b-11.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

which the U.S. is more than 50 percent 

import reliant.78 

The continent is also strategically 

positioned. It touches three of the world's 

eight maritime chokepoints,79 abuts Europe 

and Asia, and has thousands of miles of 

Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastline. 

Recognizing the continent's strategic 

importance, a host of countries are ramping 

up their activities in Africa.80 

African countries as well remain an 

important force in international diplomacy, 

as Mao recognized back in the 1950s. In 

1956, Egypt was the first African country to 

recognize Mao's regime, followed by 14 

others in the next 9 years. 81 In 1971, 26 

African countries helped Beijing win the 

7UThe U.S. is currently significantly dependent on 

China for importation of at least 9 of those 23 

critical mineral commodities. China now dominates 

the global supply chain for cobalt-necessary for 

making lithium-ion batteries which will likely be 

critical to powering self-driving cars, a potentially 

massive industry in the near future-50 percent of 

which is produced in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo. Scott Patterson and Russell Gold, "There's a 

Global Race to Control Batteries-and China Is 

Winning," Wall Street ]aurna/, February 11, 2018, 

https: j jwww. wsj .comj articles j theres-a-globalrace-to-control-batteriesand-china-is-winning1518374815?mod=e2tw. The 12 critical mineral 

commodities foWld in Africa are Antimony, Barite, 

Cobalt, Graphite, Lithium, Manganese, Niobium, 

Platinum, Rare Earths, Tantalum, Tin, and Titanium 

Mineral Concentrate. "Critical mineral resources of 

the United States-Economic and environmental 

geology and prospects for future supply," Klaus j. 

Schulz, et al., eds., U.S. Geological Survey Professional 

Paper 1802, 

https:j jminerals.usgs.gov jmineralsjpubsjmcs/2 01 

7 jmcs2017.pdf and "Mineral Commodity 

Summaries 2017," U.S. Department of the Interior 

and U.S. Geological Survey, 2017, 

https:j jpubs.er.usgs.gov /publication/ pp1802A. 

7YRob Bailey and Laura Wellesley, "Chokepoints and 

Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade," Chatham 

House, june 2017, 

https:j jwww.chathamhouse.orgjsitesjfilesjchatha 

mhousejpublicationsjresearch/2 017-06-2 7-

U.N. seat held by Taiwan at the time.s2 Since 

2005, China has persuaded 5 of the 7 African 

countries that maintained diplomatic 

relations with Taiwan to break them. 83 

African countries also comprise the largest 

geographically based voting bloc in many 

international fora, and frequently vote 

together. 

China appears to be gaining in the battle to 

influence African norms. According to the 

latest polling, the U.S. as a model of national 

developments holds a slight lead over China, 

but the latter is even in Southern and North 

Africa, and leads in Central Africa. 84 Sixtythree percent of polled Africans had a 

mostly positive view of China's influence,ss 

chokepoints-vulnerabilities-global-food-tradebailey-wellesley-final.pdf. 

SOjoshua Meservey, "The Saudi-Qatari Dispute: Why 

the U.S. Must Prevent Spillover into East Africa," The 

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3268, 

https:/ jwww.heritage.org/globalpoliticsjreportjthe-saudi-qatari-dispute-why-theus-must-prevent-spillover-east-africa. 

u1 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "China's Role in 

Africa: Special Report Weekly Review." 

H2Sun, et al., "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

u3Burkina Faso and Swaziland maintain relations 

with Taiwan, despite lavish Chinese offers of aid. 

Pauline Bax, Simon Congo, and Lungile Dlamini, 

"Chinese Billions Fail to Sway Taiwan's Last Two 

Allies in Africa," Bloomberg, january 24, 2017, 

https:j jwww.bloomberg.comjnewsjarticlesj2 017-

01-2 4 f chinese-billions-fail-to-sway-tai wa n-s-lasttwo-allies-in-africa and Raymond W. Copson, Kerry 

Dumbaugh, and Michelle Lau, "China and SubSaharan Africa," Congressional Research Service, 

August 29,2005, 

https:j jwww.everycrsreport.comjfilesj20050829_ 

RL3 3 05 5 _ 8a2 fe be8cfa3 f6 07 5443ada83 8ab5 6 6 7 42 2 

215d2.pdf. 

rw·china's growing presence in Africa wins largely 

positive popular reviews," Afro barometer Dispatch 

No. 122, October 24, 2016, 

http:/ jafrobarometer.orgjsitesjdefaultjfilesjpublic 

ationsjDispatchesjab_r6_dispatchno122_perception 

s_of_china_in_africal.pdf. 

"Ibid. 

11 
32


28876b-12.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

and China's global popularity is greatest in 

Africa.B6 

China Plans a Future in Africa, but There 

Are Challenges 

The U.S. will have to grapple with the reality 

of China as a major force in Africa for the 

foreseeable future. More than 40 percent of 

Chinese firms surveyed in Africa reported 

making long-term investments in the 

continent, and nearly three quarters were 

bullish on future opportunities.87 

Furthermore, while Chinese firms do benefit 

from Beijing's practice of privileging them 

on Chinese-financed projects, they also win 

so much African business because they have 

developing world experience from building 

large infrastructure projects in their own 

country. The Chinese also offer "one stop 

shop" package deals on infrastructure that 

often include financing, construction, and 

maintenance. Chinese firms also are known 

for making quick decisions, and then rapidly 

delivering. Finally, they frequently come in 

at a significantly lower price than 

competitors. 88 These practices will keep 

them competitive in Africa. 

Yet it is unclear how sustainable China's 

habit of giving easy loans to unsuitable 

countries is. Africa's debt problem is so 

severe-more than half of sub-Saharan 

African countries have debt levels greater 

than 50 percent of GDP, up from 11 in 

2013B9-that it is virtually certain that some 

of China's African debtors are going to 

default or have to renegotiate the 

repayment terms. Beijing may have to 

S&Pilling, "Chinese investment in Africa: Beijing's 

testing ground." 

87Sun, et al, "Dance of the Lions and Dragons." 

UUJbid. 

U'1Brahima S. Coulibaly and Christian Golubski, eds., 

"Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 

2018." Brookings, https:/ jwww.brookings.edu/wpreassess whether the influence, or even the 

strategic assets or commodities, it gains 

from such arrangements are worth the 

expense. 

One of China's advantages in Africa is that its 

firms have a higher risk tolerance than most. 

Yet that also means that Beijing will have to 

increasingly grapple with how to respond 

when upheaval strikes some of these 

unstable countries in which Beijing has 

significant interests. The Chinese navy had 

to evacuate thousands of Chinese nationals 

from Libya in 2011, after that country 

descended into civil war. The current tumult 

gripping Ethiopia, a key Chinese partner, 90 

the recent succession struggle in Zimbabwe, 

and the ongoing civil war in South Sudan are 

other examples of tests for the Chinese. This 

is a strain on Beijing's decision makers, and 

any decisive action they take risks 

undermining its important noninterventionist narrative on the continent. 

Furthermore, the Chinese economy has a 

number of long-term challenges, including 

capital flight, unsustainable debt levels, and 

all the inefficiencies associated with planned 

economies.911f the Chinese economy slows, 

Beijing may come under domestic pressure 

to curtail some of its lavish overseas 

spending to concentrate on problems at 

home. 

contentfuploads/2018/01/foresight2 018_full_web_final2.pdf. 

90Ethiopia receives the second most Chinese loans to 

Africa, and more than two-thirds of surveyed 

Chinese firms in the country have made long-term 

investments there. Ibid. 

YlWiJson, "Is the Chinese Model Past Its Expiration 

Date?" 

12 
33


28876b-13.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Finally, some African countries may be 

starting to experience the downsides of 

engaging with China. Kenya is struggling to 

convince importers to use its recently 

constructed, $4.2 billion standard gauge 

railway, 90 percent of which was financed 

by China's Eximbank92 Chinese loans have 

also been hotly debated in countries such as 

Ghana and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo, with opposition parties in particular 

urging renegotiation. 

The Way Ahead 

The U.S. response to China's rising influence 

in Africa should not be to demonize Beijing, 

but rather to coordinate its various 

elements of influence to promote the U.S. 

model as a positive alternative. The U.S. has 

a number of advantages on which to build in 

Africa: it is generally well liked and admired, 

has decades-long military, economic, and 

diplomatic ties with many African countries, 

and gave the continent nearly $10 billion in 

overseas development assistance in 2016 

alone. 

The U.S. should: 

Increase its engagement with Africa, and 

reorient the focus of some existing 

initiatives. Such measures should 

include focusing the U.S.'s overseas 

development assistance on enhancing 

countries' free market systems and 

encouraging accountable and competent 

governance; enhance the efficiency of 

U.S. aid by eliminating "buy American" 

92Macharia Kamau, "State Offers More Incentives to 

Woo Cargo Owners to Use SGR," Standard Digital, 

March 3, 2018, 

https:j jwww.standardmedia.co.l<ejbusinessjarticle 

/2 0012 71779 jstate-offers-more-incentives-to-wooimporters-to-use-sgr and Pilling and Feng, "Kenya's 

$4bn Railway Gains Traction from Chinese Policy 

Ambitions." 

43 Joshua Meservey, "Africa," The Heritage 

Foundation's Solutions 2018,2018. 

provisions and subsidies to U.S. shipping 

companies that deliver aid; boosting 

trade beyond the African Growth and 

Opportunity Act; and making the U.S.-

Africa Leaders Summit a regular event.93 

Confidently advocate for American 

values with the African public and its 

leaders. Most people yearn for 

representative government, rule of law, 

and individual freedom, and the U.S. 

should take every opportunity to 

communicate how its system promotes 

those values. U.S. officials should also 

quietly remind America's African friends 

that Chinese engagement has a number 

of significant costs that do not come with 

a U.S. partnership. 

Prioritize the fight against African 

corruption, not least because it is a 

significant Chinese competitive 

advantage. Ideas for doing so include 

helping countries strengthen their civil 

societies, promoting economic freedom, 

leveraging technology and the power of 

crowds, and elevating the fight against 

graft as part of U.S. development 

assistance. 94 

• Encourage countries borrowing from the 

Chinese to make the process as 

transparent as possible. 

• Swiftly fill the vacant Africa-related 

positions in the U.S. government, 

particularly the Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs position and 

ambassadorial posts in key countries 

such as South Africa. 

https:/ jsolutions.heritage.orgjrestoring-americanleadership(africa(. 

'J1joshua Meservey, "The Impact of Corruption on 

Economic Development in sub-Saharan Africa" in 

2017 Global Agenda for Economic Freedom, James M. 

Roberts and William T. Wilson, eds., The Heritage 

Foundation Special Report No. 188, 

https:((www.heritage.org(internationaleconomies jreport/2 017 -glo bat-agenda-economicfreedom. 

13 
34


28876b-14.eps

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Deepen cooperation with like-minded 

allies operating on the continent. A 

number of American allies, such as 

Israel, Germany, the U.K., and Japan, are 

active on the continent, and their 

interests frequently align with those of 

the U.S. 

Cooperate with China where possible. 

There are areas where the U.S. can 

cooperate with Beijing, such as in 

counterterrorism. As many as 5,000 

Uighurs from China have traveled to 

Syria to fight.95 As China's international 

footprint expands, its people and 

infrastructure will grow increasingly 

vulnerable to attacks, and the U.S. has a 

national interest in fighting terrorism 

wherever it appears. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to any questions 

you may have. 

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy. research, and educational organization recognized as exempt under 

scction501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government 

at any level, nor does it per!Onn any govemment or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2016, it had 

hundreds of thousands of individual. foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 

2016 income came from the l'ollowing sources: 

IndiYiduals 75.3% 

foundations 20.3% 

Corporations 1.8% 

Program revenue and other income 2.6% 

The top five corporate gi-vers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1. 0% of its 20 16 income. The Heritage 

Fmmdation 's books arc audited mmually b~ the national accounting firm ofRSM US. LLP. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their 0"\\11 independent research. The 

views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board 

of trustees. 

-~Gerry Shih, "AP Exclusive: Uighurs fighting in Syria 

take aim at China," Associated Press, December 23, 

2017, 

https:j japnews.comj79d6a42 7b26f4eeab2265719 

5 6dd2 5 6e I AP-Exclusive:-Anger-with-China-drivesUighurs-to-Syria-fighCThis number is disputed. For 

a lower estimate, see Bassem Mroue and Gerry Shih, 

"Chinese jihadis' rise in Syria raises concerns at 

home," Associated Press, April 22, 2017, 

https:j jwww.apnews.comj591f9b238c84477b87cf 

ac68bfe169fc. 

14 
35

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony and I 

look forward to the questions because I do have a number—a few, 

as well. 

I’d like to now yield to Mr. Morris. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MORRIS, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify, even at the last minute. I appreciate 

it very much. 

I’d like to use my time to highlight some new research from me 

and my colleagues at the Center for Global Development, John 

Hurley and Gailyn Portelance, on the question of China’s lending 

practices and their implications for debt distress in developing 

countries. I’ll also offer some of my personal views on the implications of this research for U.S. policy. 

Our new work, which I’ve submitted to the committee along with 

my testimony, specifically looks at the debt implications of China’s 

belt-and-road initiative. 

While much of the initiative falls outside of Africa, we do identify 

a handful of African countries as part of belt-and-road. We also 

look broadly at Chinese practices associated with debt distress, 

which has particular relevance for African countries. 

We find that Chinese lending could lead to debt distress in at 

least eight countries associated with belt-and-road due to the current debt profile of those countries, the volume of Chinese lending 

contemplated under the initiative, and the predominantly commercial terms of that lending. 

Djibouti, which we have already heard a lot about, is one of the 

most vulnerable of these countries. It is the site of China’s only 

overseas military base and has been the recipient of large-scale 

Chinese lending and investment. 

Our analysis suggests that Djibouti’s external debt, already very 

high for a low-income country, could rise to over 90 percent of GDP 

under the belt-and-road lending. 

Equally important, nearly all of this external debt—over 90 percent—will be owed to China. So if Djibouti faces a debt crisis, how 

is China likely to respond? The answer is we don’t know, which 

speaks to why Chinese practice in this area is problematic. 

China’s approach to debt relief isn’t particularly transparent or 

predictable, yet transparency and predictability are critical to managing debt problems in an orderly way. 

This is why the work of the Paris Club of Creditors, which includes the United States along with other major creditor countries, 

rests on well-articulated rules and actions pursued on a collective 

basis. 

China is not a member of the Paris Club and has only participated in the club’s agreements on a very limited basis. 

So what does all this mean for the United States? First, even as 

we highlight Chinese practices that are clearly problematic in the 

developing world, we also should acknowledge that degree to which 

Chinese financing is contributing and helping to spur growth in 

these economies. 

36

Ethiopia is a case where we see a mix of Chinese projects and 

investments, some that may not be sustainable or productive alongside others that are clearly delivering an economic benefit to the 

country. 

So as long as this is the case, as it very well may be in a wide 

range of countries, then dire warnings from the United States are 

unlikely to find a receptive audience in the developing world. 

Instead, we should be specific in our criticism of Chinese lending 

practices and look for specific opportunities to engage the Chinese 

on reform. 

We would do well to continue to press the Chinese on alignment 

with global norms and practices on lending transparency, debt 

management, procurement standards, et cetera. 

Progress is frustratingly slow but it’s not entirely absent. As a 

member of the G-20, China has signed on to important principles 

around sustainable financing which includes commitments to lending transparency. 

U.S. officials should aim to steer these G-20 commitments to 

operational practice. We should also prioritize our own engagement 

in the developing world. This means continuing to exercise leadership in the humanitarian and health sectors as well as beefing up 

our development finance tools. 

On the latter, the proposed U.S. Development Finance Corporation for which there is legislation now would mark a positive step 

forward, I think. 

At the same time, we should be realistic about its utility as an 

answer to China. It is not likely to operate on a scale that rivals 

Chinese development finance institutions, and as private sector 

focus, while important, also limits its role in purely public infrastructure. 

Fortunately, we do have a ready-made set of tools in our toolkit 

when it comes to deploying high-quality development finance 

across Africa and globally. 

U.S. leadership in institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank is of critical value and I worry that current 

policy fails to exploit the full potential of these institutions. 

These banks define best practice in the very areas that concern 

us about Chinese lending, from setting appropriate lending terms 

to ensuring open and transparent procurement rules. 

If we are worried about China’s growing presence in a wide array 

of countries globally, then now is not the time to be shrinking the 

footprint of these institutions. 

So, rather than resisting the World Bank’s call for more capital 

this year, I would suggest that U.S. officials take whatever the 

number that the bank has requested and double it, and then repeat 

this exercise across all of the multilateral development banks. 

This certainly may sound overly ambitious, but would only account for just a few more percentage points of our foreign aid budget. 

Whether or not we can muster this level of ambition it will be 

critical for U.S. policy to be defined by a positive agenda in the developing world. It is a losing proposition to limit ourselves to the 

role of China’s chief critic if we have nothing to offer in the alternative. 

37

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris follows:]

38


28876c-1.eps

Testimony of 

Scott A. Morris 

Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development 

Before the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

Hearing on "China in Africa: The New Colonialism?" 

2:00 p.m., Wednesday, March 7, 2018 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I would like to use my time to highlight some 

new research from me and my colleagues at the Center for Global Development, John Hurley and Gailyn 

Portelance, on the question of China's lending practices and their implications for debt distress in 

developing countries. I will also offer my personal views on the implications of this research for US 

policy. 

Our new work, which I have submitted to the committee along with this testimony, specifically looks at 

the debt implications of China's Belt & Road initiative. While much of the initiative falls outside of Africa, 

we do identify a handful of African countries as part of Belt & Road. We also look broadly at Chinese 

practices associated with debt distress, which has particular relevance for African countries. 

We find that Chinese lending could lead to debt distress in eight countries associated with Belt & Road 

due to the current debt profile of those countries, the volume of Chinese lending contemplated under 

the initiative, and the predominately commercial terms of that lending. 

Djibouti is one of the most vulnerable of these countries. It is the site of China's only overseas military 

base and has been the recipient of large-scale Chinese lending and investment. Our analysis suggests 

that Djibouti's external debt, already very high for a low-income country, could rise to over 90 percent 
39


28876c-2.eps

ofGDP under Belt & Road lending. Equally important, nearly all ofthis external debt (over 90 percent) 

will be owed to China. 

So if Djibouti faces a debt crisis, how is China likely to respond? The answer is we don't know, which 

speaks to why Chinese practice in this area is problematic. China's approach to debt relief isn't 

particularly transparent or predictable. Yet, transparency and predictability are critical to managing debt 

problems in an orderly way. This is why the work of the Paris Club of creditors, which includes the 

United States along with other major creditor countries, rests on well-articulated rules and actions 

pursued on a collective basis. China is not a member of the Paris Club and has only participated in Paris 

Club agreements on a very limited basis. 

So what does all of this mean for the United States? First, even as we highlight Chinese practices that are 

clearly problematic in the developing world, we also should acknowledge the degree to which Chinese 

financing is spurring growth in these economies. Ethiopia is a case where we see a mix of Chinese 

projects and investments-some that may not be sustainable or productive alongside others that are 

clearly delivering an economic benefit to the country. So long as this is the case, as it very well may be in 

a wide range of countries, then dire warnings from the United States are unlikely to find receptive 

audiences in the developing world. 

Instead, we should be specific in our criticism of Chinese lending practices and look for specific 

opportunities to engage the Chinese on reform. We would do well to continue to press the Chinese on 

alignment with global norms and practices on lending transparency, debt management, procurement 

standards, etc. Progress is frustratingly slow, but it's not entirely absent. As a member of the G20, China 

has signed onto important principles around sustainable financing, which include commitments to 

lending transparency. US officials should aim to steer these G20 commitments to operational practice. 
40


28876c-3.eps

We should also prioritize our own engagement in the developing world. This means continuing to 

exercise leadership in the humanitarian and health sectors, as well as beefing up our development 

finance tools. On the latter, the proposed US Development Finance Corporation would mark a positive 

step forward. At the same time, we should be realistic about its utility as an answer to China. It is not 

likely to operate on a scale that rivals the Chinese development finance institutions, and its private 

sector focus1 while important1 also limits its role in purely public infrastructure. 

Fortunately, we do have a ready-made set of tools in our toolkit when it comes to deploying high quality 

development finance across Africa and globally. US leadership in institutions like the World Bank and 

African Development Bank is of critical value, and I worry that current policy fails to exploit the full 

potential of these institutions. These banks define best practice in the very areas that concern us about 

Chinese lending1 from setting appropriate lending terms to ensuring open and transparent procurement 

rules. If we are worried about China's growing presence in a wide array of countries globally1 then now is 

not the time to be shrinking the footprint of these institutions. So, rather than resisting the World Bank's 

call for more capital this year, I would suggest that US officials take whatever the number the bank has 

requested and double it. Then repeat that exercise across all of the multilateral development banks. This 

may sound overly ambitious, but it would account for just a few more percentage points of our foreign 

aid budget. 

Whether or not we can muster that level of ambition, it will be critical for US policy to be defined by a 

positive agenda in the developing world. It is a losing proposition to limit ourselves to the role of China's 

chief critic if we have nothing to offer in the alternative. Thank you. 
41

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony and insights. 

I’d like to now call on our final witness, Dr. Plummer. 

STATEMENT OF ANITA PLUMMER, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY 

Ms. PLUMMER. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member and the honorable members of this committee, Congressman 

Bera. 

It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss China’s engagement with Africa. I want to begin with a note that I think will 

contextualize my remarks. 

Africa is a diverse continent with 54 countries which, except for 

Liberia and Ethiopia, share a legacy of colonialism which has 

shaped political, economic institutions, culture, and its position in 

the global system. 

When discussing China’s engagement with Africa, some generalizations may be appropriate, but to have substantive discussion, we should consider the features of the commitments on a 

case-by-case basis. 

So in the spirit of specificity, I will focus my testimony on Kenya’s ties with China to hopefully illustrate some of the nuances and 

ambiguities of China’s role in Africa. 

In 2008, the Kenyan Government implemented its Vision 2030 

Development Program. The program’s goal is to transform Kenya 

into a newly industrializing middle income country with far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms. 

The government has undertaken a robust agenda that focuses on 

large-scale infrastructure. Coincidentally, China’s belt-and-road initiative, a project aimed at developing overland and maritime trade 

routes connecting Asian, European, and African countries, corresponds with Kenya’s goal to secure its role as a gateway to eastern and central Africa. 

Kenya’s geostrategic position provides much-desired access to 

consumer markets as well as the facilitation of extractive industries in South Sudan, Uganda, and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Infrastructure is the third largest sector that the Chinese are engaged in on the continent of Africa following mining and financial 

services. On the macro level, the rationale is that investments in 

telecommunications, energy, and transport will increase foreign direct investment in the country and region. 

On the micro level, there is an assumption that large-scale capital investments in infrastructure will promote economic growth by 

integrating rural areas with urban business centers. 

For Kenya, investments in transport are viewed as an imperative 

because its landlocked neighbors, such as Tanzania, South Sudan, 

and Uganda rely on its road and rail network along with its ports 

in Mombasa and the one slated to be built in Lamu. 

Conversely, the East Africa region, home to 230 million consumers, is an attractive destination for products, particularly from 

China. 

42

Foreign direct investment by emerging economies such as China 

has been a vital part of Kenya’s growth strategy. Kenyan policy 

makers believe that the delivery of mega transport projects will 

boost their competitiveness in the global market and increase possibilities for high-value production in different sectors. 

However, China’s engagement with Africa has included significant debt finance investments in transport infrastructure. This engagement brings inevitable conflicts between diverse actors from 

China and local Kenyan communities who must contend with the 

ambiguities of China’s role in Africa and its implications for labor 

markets and sites of production. 

Within the Kenyan context where exogenous factors have historically driven development, infrastructure delivery is a political process and in the absence of quality decision making that is 

participatory and transparent, government and business elites 

overlook criticisms of this model. 

These critiques include those that you’re well aware of—debt 

traps, environmental degradation, lack of skills transfer, and so on. 

These projects are primarily financed by Chinese banks or institutions and its financing is tied to Chinese companies being awarded the contracts. African Government value turnkey projects and 

the accompanied funding. 

African leaders applaud China’s responsiveness to requests for 

development projects. The largest one in the country to date is the 

standard gauge railway. 

However, in response to high rates of youth unemployment, particularly in Kenya, youth have protested for jobs, decent wages, 

safe working conditions, and environmental sustainability—all 

promises made by both Kenyan and Chinese Governments when 

the projects were announced. 

Second, infrastructure projects aimed at supporting extractive industries or ensuring Chinese-made goods easily reach African markets is too narrow an approach to economic development. 

It may be convenient to argue that China’s presence is 

neocolonial. But that fails to consider African agency in determining the scope and scale of their relations with China. 

China’s strategy is rooted in its imperative to access resources in 

markets, to appear to be a global responsible power, and to isolate 

Taiwan’s role in Africa. 

Conversely, African leaders want to use China’s presence in their 

nations to boost their political legitimacy both domestically and 

internationally. The issue at hand is how to assess the extent to 

which elites in Africa and China are fostering policies and practices 

that further extract from people’s livelihoods and constrict political 

space. 

A dangerous trend that we do not want to see in African nations 

follows what we have observed in China with Xi Jinping’s efficient 

consolidation of power. Currently, there is a problem with the lack 

of transparency in Sino-African engagements which results in mutually reinforcing practices among African and Chinese elites of 

acting autonomously from their citizens, and this is despite a robust campaign of public diplomacy in Africa by Chinese diplomats 

who frame China as nonpaternalistic and nonhegemonic. 

43

I want to add that there is also discussion in Africa on the implications of China’s role in hindering the democratic project and how 

shifts in U.S. policy may further undermine grassroots efforts to 

promote African democracy. 

For example, in an op-ed published yesterday in one of Kenya’s 

most widely-read papers, the author, Wachira Maina, wrote, 

‘‘China does not have a democracy agenda. Its investments in Africa and its flexible apolitical diplomacy have allowed its clients to 

resist the political terms that the West wants imposed for aid on 

the continent.’’

He goes on to write, ‘‘Fearing that it could lose out if it stuck to 

ethical foreign policy in the face of Chinese incursion, the West has 

changed its posture. Western diplomats now talk stability, not democracy. Elections are okay if they are peaceful rather than free 

and fair. Quiet diplomacy is increasingly favored over visible, public, and the frank approach of the 1990s. With China in the foreground, the West bargains from a weak position.’’

In conclusion, the model of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism is appealing to most African leaders. But African 

publics interpret this model differently. 

The assumption made by elites in China and Africa is that liberal economic frameworks are the most efficient tool for development and their investments in large-scale transport energy infrastructure support that view. 

The other assumption made by the leadership in China and Africa is that institutions built on democratic norms are inefficient and 

antithetical to growth. 

As the U.S. considers its engagement in Africa in an increasingly 

crowded political and business environment, i.e., China, India, and 

Brazil, it may consider shifting attention to supporting development from within. That is supporting efforts to create space for African-based entrepreneurs to flourish and for civil society to continue to push for political pluralism and inclusivity. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Plummer follows:]

44


28876d-1.eps

Anita Plummer, Ph.D 

Assistant Professor, Howard University 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations 

March 7, 2018 

"China in Africa: The New Colonialism?" 

Thank you to Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass and the honorable members of 

this committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss China's engagement with 

Africa. 1 want to begin with a note that 1 think will contextualize my remarks. Mrica is a diverse 

continent with fifty-four countries (except for Liberia and Ethiopia) that share a legacy of 

colonialism which has shaped political and economic institutions, culture and its position in the 

global system. When discussing China's engagement with Africa, some generalizations may be 

appropriate, but to have a substantive discussion, we should consider the features of the 

commitments on a case by case basis. In the spirit of specificity, l will focus my testimony on 

Kenya's ties with China to hopefully illustrate some of the nuances and ambiguities of China's 

role in Africa. 

In 2008, the Kenyan government implemented its Vision 2030 development program. 

The program's goal was to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income country 

with far-reaching political, economic, and social refonns. The Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat, 

the body responsible for administering the development policy, has undertaken a robust agenda 

that focuses on large-scale infrastructure. Simultaneously, China's Belt and Road initiative, a 

project aimed at developing overland and maritime trade routes connecting Asian, European, and 

African countries correspond with Kenya's goal to secure its role as the gateway to Eastern and 

Central Africa. Kenya's geostrategic position provides much-desired access to consumer markets 

as well as the facilitation of extractive industries in South Sudan, Uganda, and eastern 

Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC. Both Vision 2030 and the Belt and Road initiative call for 

substantial investments in Africa's transport sectors. Infrastructure is the third largest sector that 

the Chinese are engaged in on the continent of Africa after mining and financial services. On the 

macro-level, the rationale is that investments in telecommunications, energy, and transport will 

increase foreign direct investment in the country and the region. On the micro-level, there is an 

assumption that large-scale capital investments in infrastructure will promote economic growth 

by integrating rural areas with urban business centers. For Kenya, investments in transport are 

viewed as an imperative, because its landlocked neighbors such as Tanzania, South Sudan, and 

Uganda rely on its road and rail network, along with the ports in Mombasa and the one slated to 

be built in Lamu. Conversely, the East Africa region, home to 230 million consumers, is an 

attractive destination for products, particularly from China. 

Foreign direct investment by emerging economies such as China has been a vital part of 

Kenya's growth strategy. Kenyan policymakers believe that that the delivery of mega transport 

projects will boost their competitiveness on the global market and increase the possibilities for 

high-value production in different sectors. China's engagement with Africa has included 

significant debt-financed investments in transport infrastructure. This engagement brings 

inevitable conflicts between diverse actors from China and local Kenyan communities, who must 

contend with the ambiguities of China's role in Africa and its implications for labor markets and 

production. 
45


28876d-2.eps

Within the Kenyan context, where exogenous factors have historically driven 

development, infrastructure delivery is a political process, and in the absence of quality decisionmaking that is participatory and transparent, government and business elites overlook counterchannels of discourse that provide a nuanced critique of the outcome of exogenously-led 

infrastructure. 

First, these projects are primarily financed by Chinese banks or institutions and financing 

is tied to Chinese companies being awarded the contracts. African governments value turnkey 

projects and the accompanied funding. China's physical presence building roads, railways, dams, 

and pipelines provide a sense of tangible progress. African leaders applaud China's 

responsiveness to requests for development projects. However, in response to high rates of youth 

unemployment, particularly in Kenya, youth have protested for jobs, decent wages, safe working 

conditions, and environmental sustainability-all promises made by both the Kenyan and 

Chinese governments when projects were announced. Second, infrastructure investments aimed 

at supporting extractive industries or ensuring that Chinese-made goods easily reach African 

markets is too narrow an approach to economic development 

It may be convenient to argue that China's presence is neocolonial, but that fails to 

consider African agency in determining the scope and scale of their relations with China. China's 

strategy is rooted in its imperative to access resources and markets and to appear to be a 

responsible global power. Conversely, African leaders want to use China's presence in their 

nations to boost their political legitimacy both domestically and internationally. The issue at 

hand is how to assess the extent to which elites in Africa and China are fostering policies and 

practices that further extract from people's livelihoods and constrict political space. A dangerous 

trend that we do not want to see in African nations follows what we have observed in China with 

the Xi Jiping's efficient consolidation of power. Currently, there is a problem with a lack of 

transparency in Sino-African engagements which results in a mutually reinforcing practice 

among African and Chinese elites of acting autonomously from their citizens. This is despite, a 

robust campaign of public diplomacy in Africa by Chinese diplomats who frame China as a nonpaternalistic and non-hegemonic partner in Africa. 

Tn conclusion, the model of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism is 

appealing to African leaders, but African publics interpret this model differently. The assumption 

made by some elites in China and Africa is that liberal economic frameworks are the most 

efficient tool for development and investments in large-scale infrastructure support that view. 

The other assumption is that institutions built on democratic norms are inefficient and 

antithetical to growth. As the U.S. considers its engagement in Africa in an increasingly crowded 

political and business environment (i e, China, India, Brazil) it may consider shifting attention to 

supporting development from within. That is, supporting efforts to create space for African based 

entrepreneurs to flourish and for civil society to continue to push for political pluralism and 

inclusivity. 
46

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Plummer. 

To begin the questioning, let me begin by asking Mr. Chang and 

any others who would like to jump in on these questions, in your 

testimony—first of all, let me just preface that. 

I do co-chair the China Commission with Marco Rubio. We had 

another hearing just a few days ago on Tibet and the tightening 

noose on the Tibetan people under Xi Jinping, which has been bad, 

but is getting worse. 

He does the same thing with the Christian churches, the Falun 

Gong, religious groups of all kinds, the Uighurs, as well as with 

NGOs, which now have a very much tightened space within which 

to operate, all under Xi Jinping. 

Our annual report, which we put out every year—it’s a bipartisan report—nine members of the House, nine members of the 

Senate, and five of the executive branch—was the most scathing 

we have ever had since the inception of the China Commission, 

again, underscoring that Xi Jinping is truly in a race to the bottom 

with North Korea when it comes to human rights. 

Why is that important, of course? Because their model which 

they are seeking to export, and until recently—until the changes—

hoped for changes in Zimbabwe, you know, they got along very well 

with Robert Mugabe and others like him, but not so with more 

democratically-elected African countries. 

So my first questions would be about this threat to good governance. Do you see it? You’ve all spoken about the debt. 

I remember, when George W. Bush, and Bono, and others in this 

Congress, in a bipartisan way, we all worked to try to help highlyindebted countries get out from under through debt relief, and it 

continued for many, many years. 

But it seems like that may be turning a corner, and as was 

pointed out in testimony today, the connection of those debts or 

those loans, I should say, to extractive industries and the like and 

projects is very, very high. 

So the first question would be, do the Chinese pay a fair price 

to Chinese companies or government companies in China for the 

products that they sell, whether it be minerals, oil, or whatever it 

might be? 

Is there a longer-term cost that’s not immediately apparent? The 

debt-forgiveness—when does that reach a critical mass? 

Is it approaching that in terms of loan sharks—you know, it’s 

over time that it becomes more troubling, and if there are all kinds 

of strings attached and, as was said during today’s testimony by 

Mr. Meservey, the no-strings-attached approach applies to a lot of 

things, especially to human rights and good governance issues—

Tibet, Taiwan. 

Mr. Chang, you made several very, very powerful statements 

that the dealings between Beijing and African states seem to be 

tainted by both corruption and several forms of coercion. 

You might want to elaborate on that, if you would. You also 

pointed out that China is spreading its economic and political 

model to Africa. 

There are some people who thought at the beginning—not me 

and probably not anybody at this table—that it was not a package 

deal—that the bad governance model follows it. And you also made 

47

a point that Xi Jinping’s ambitions are beyond helping the developing world. 

There are indications that he, in fact, wants China’s model to be 

the world’s model, and that the Chinese leader should be the 

world’s leader, and you point out that Xi suggested the world would 

be peaceful should Beijing rule it as an ‘‘all-under-Heaven approach,’’ obviously, using their words. 

They use the word ‘‘Tianxia.’’ Could you explain that further? I’ve 

done a lot of reading about the Japanese. My father fought in New 

Guinea and the Philippines. He was a combat infantryman. 

So that issue of the Japanese—the why of it has always fascinated me, troubled me like it does so many. The Japanese have 

this idea called ‘‘the eight corners of the world under one roof,’’ 

which wasn’t just imperial Japan—it predated that—that they had 

this almost divine right to encircle the Earth with their ideology 

and their governance. It was one of the reasons—maybe the reason—for their aggression against, first, Asia, and then, elsewhere. 

The comparisons, if there are any, with China today may not be 

religiously based. They are not claiming Hirohito to be divine. They 

are not saying Xi Jinping is divine. But they seem to have an ideology that says they are destined to rule the world. 

And I look everywhere, from Europe to Latin America. This subcommittee deals with human rights all over the world, and the Chinese influence is profound. Again, it’s no strings attached. So I 

wonder if you could speak to that possible connection, or are there 

any comparisons there? 

Mr. CHANG. Thank you, Chairman Smith. 

One of the most striking elements of Xi Jinping, in addition to 

the consolidation of power that Dr. Plummer talked about, really 

has been his ambitions for China. 

And in this, he’s been using language recently that indicates that 

he believes that China should be the world’s only sovereign—a 

proposition which sounds ludicrous but nonetheless we have to look 

at what he’s actually been saying. 

So over the course of a decade he’s been using language of ‘‘all 

under Heaven,’’ which is the concept that China’s emperors for two 

millennia used. 

We saw some of these in some of the words that were used during the slogans for the 2008 Summer Olympics. This became very 

clear in his 2017 New Year’s message where he talked about the 

world being all under Heaven, would be happy if we were one family. 

And then, if all of this weren’t clear enough, in September of last 

year, Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China, published an article 

in Study Times, which is the paper of the Communist Party’s Central Party School, and in that article Wang Yi says that Xi Jinping 

Thought—that’s a body of work—the way the Chinese refer to an 

ideology—that Xi Jinping Thought transcends and replaces 300 

years of Western thinking on international relations. 

Well, if you go 300 years back, you’re just about at 1648, which 

is the Treaty of Westphalia, which established the basis of the 

world’s international system today of competing sovereign states. 

So what you can look at in terms of the ‘‘Tianxia’’—the ‘‘all under 

Heaven’’ language that Xi Jinping has been using—and looking at 

48

Wang Yi’s Study Times article, it’s pretty clear the way the Chinese are looking at these things. 

And, indeed, China’s house scholars study this concept. Now, as 

I mentioned, this is breathtaking but this is what they are telling 

us. 

Now, you know, in terms of comparisons with the Japanese, the 

Chinese don’t have this notion of divinity as much as the Japanese 

do in the Shinto religion. 

But nonetheless, you can see the idea that there is one power 

that’s supposed to be in the world that will make the world peaceful and safe and that just happens to be Japan in the 1930s and 

China in our time. 

And so we have to be—of course, there are differences. But when 

you combine this with China’s views of Africans on a personal 

level, this becomes extremely dangerous. 

Now, of course, you know, many African countries have benefitted from certain aspects of what China has done. But what we 

have also seen is China trying to use low-cost loans basically to encourage governments to spend freely, to create the crises of the future—these debt crises. 

We have these in a number of countries that were mentioned so 

far and, indeed, at this very moment Tanzania is trying to restructure its debt and having discussions with Beijing and with multilateral institutions in China—to a certain extent, is undermining 

what those multilateral institutions are trying to do. 

So when you put that together with the low-level corruption, 

sometimes high-level corruption, it’s a very difficult picture for Africa and one which the United States needs to speak out about. 

Mr. SMITH. You did, in your testimony—before we go to any 

other witnesses—talk about how China’s words appear ominous 

and not benign and you used the words ‘‘colonial master.’’

You also pointed out, and as a matter of fact, Mr. Meservey 

pointed out the Confucius Institutes and how troubling they are, 

and the fact that so many African leaders are being brought to 

China for schooling just to train up the next generation of leaders—again, using the bad governance model. 

And as far as I know, and maybe you can correct me if I am 

wrong, we have the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which tries to 

mitigate bribery and the like. Not so with China, as far as I know. 

I’ve never seen anything that would even come close to suggesting they had such a thing. So if you could answer those. Then 

I’ll yield to my good friend, Ms. Bass. 

Mr. CHANG. The colonial master language is really the result of 

China trying to divest other nations of sovereignty because that is 

the essence of colonialism. 

Today, you know, one can argue about the nature of China’s relations with the countries on the continent and, of course, as Dr. 

Plummer has pointed out, those relations differ from country to 

country. 

But we do see certain trends which concern us and we have 

talked about the debt, because through debt, China gains a hold 

over political systems in various countries. 

You know, and we have seen this not just in Africa. This is something that they’ve done, for instance, on our own continent with 

49

Venezuela—something that has a direct effect very close to our 

home—where China is now using the renegotiation process to gain 

advantage in our own continent. Of course, they do that in Africa 

as well. 

One can argue that a country can do whatever it wants to gain 

power. But nonetheless, when we put all of these things together, 

it paints an extremely disturbing picture. 

So we can’t look at just low-cost loans in isolation. We can’t look 

at just Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the Treaty of Westphalia in isolation. We can’t look at the corruption that China has fostered or the 

bad governance that it tends to promote. 

You put all of that together and the picture is one of danger not 

only for Africans but for others as well. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, I’ll address a couple of those questions. 

One is the fair price for resources that you referenced earlier and 

the answer is that we don’t know because so frequently these arrangements are very opaque and that’s one of the criticisms that 

you’ll hear even among the African public or usually opposition 

politicians will make this point. 

No one quite knows what China is paying for access to certain 

resources. But I—and even with some of the large infrastructure 

projects—we mentioned the standard gauge railway in China—in 

Kenya, excuse me—those too are starting to come under scrutiny. 

There is growing concern I think in Kenya that the standard 

gauge railway is a white elephant. There was—there was three 

newspaper articles about this just earlier this week where they 

were concerned—the Kenyan Government trying to compel importers to use the standard gauge railway because they still didn’t 

want to use it. 

And, of course, the specter is looming that they are going to be 

stuck with an extraordinarily expensive piece of infrastructure that 

isn’t going to return on—that isn’t going to produce a return on investments. 

There is also another example in Uganda where a road was built 

by the same Chinese company that built a road in—from Addis to 

Eritrea and the road in Kenya was twice the cost, essentially, than 

the one in Addis—from Addis to Eritrea. 

And as I mentioned, it was built by the same company and part 

of the problem was the contract was—demanded single sourcing so 

meaning a Chinese company, which ended up being this company 

that had been involved in the Ethiopia projects got the contract 

and that’s caused a lot of consternation—why, again, was this road 

in Uganda so much more expensive. So there is starting to be these 

questions asked not just about are African countries getting a fair 

price for their resources but also are they getting good value on 

these massive infrastructure projects. 

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to address one question 

you raised around that forgiveness and you mentioned the heavilyindebted poor country initiative—HIPC—which, I have to say, the 

U.S. Congress really demonstrated tremendous leadership on for 

the international community at the time. 

And I think it is instructive because if you look at what made 

HIPC work at the time, it had a lot to do with who these countries 

owed money to and it was essentially the World Bank, the IMF, 

50

and the G-7 and you had the possibility and the reality of those actors getting together and deciding to act in concert to relieve debt 

in the face of evidence that this was a tremendous burden on these 

poor countries mostly in Africa. 

If you look at the profile of debt—of countries today that we are 

worrying about—again, many in Africa—it looks very different. 

In fact, increasingly it is not the G-7 at all. They are simply not 

there as creditors. It is still the World Bank, the IMF, but it is 

China and then it is a set of other emerging actors. 

And so far, we are not seeing any evidence that these actors and 

primarily the Chinese have an interest in engaging in this kind of 

collective engagement around considering debt relief. 

It’s not that the Chinese have not done debt relief. They do it on 

an ad hoc basis. Some ways—in some ways they do it in a very traditional way that looks like the way that the Paris Club might do 

it. 

But then other times they do things that, frankly, look—let’s call 

it peculiar—in terms of debt for equity swaps, debt for land swaps 

and it’s that set of activities that really, you know, from my perspective, is a cause for concern and does worry me about, you 

know, the potential for wide-scale debt problems and what will the 

international community be able to do this time around, given the 

state of play compared to what it looked like 15 years ago. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

One question I would like for all of you to address in a minute 

is what’s the solution here because, to me, as Mr. Morris said, it’s 

easy to sit here and be real critical of China. But what leverage do 

we have over China to get China to act differently? 

And, you know, Mr. Morris, you were just talking about 15 years 

ago, and the role that the U.S. played, and it seemed as though—

it seems as though maybe we have an opportunity to play that role 

again by mobilizing the international community. 

It might not be that the debt is owed to the IMF and G-7. I believe you said it wasn’t. But maybe the world community has leverage. Because I just don’t understand what the solution is. 

I mean, to me the solution is the U.S., and our stepping up. I 

don’t know if you four have other ideas as to what the solution is. 

But, you know, I could look at how the Chinese could easily say 

several things about our involvement, from the military to youth 

leaders to all of that, which I think our involvement is very positive, especially in terms of training the next generation of leaders. 

But I am concerned about the lack of our involvement and the 

direction that we are going in terms of the cuts to the State Department and all of that. 

But there is the independent private sector that I am hoping, 

and I am sure the chairman is, too, would step up more and be 

more involved in China’s—I mean, in Africa’s infrastructure. 

So maybe each of you could tell me what the solution is that’s 

different than the U.S. stepping up. 

What leverage do we have to tell China to stop acting the way 

it’s acting in the continent of Africa? 

Mr. CHANG. Well, Ranking Member Bass, I think the United 

States has enormous leverage over China. We have a much bigger 

economy. We have a stable economy. 

51

China right now is heading to a debt crisis and there are a number of different ways that we can deal with the Chinese. One of 

them is just a very simple one. We could enforce U.S. law against 

North Korean banks that are laundering—Chinese banks that are 

laundering money through New York on behalf of North Korea. 

I mean, a threat to, for instance, declare the Bank of China a primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act could rock the Chinese financial system. 

Ms. BASS. Can we do that, Mr. Chairman? Sanction the Bank of 

China? 

Mr. CHANG. I think that we can because there is evident proof 

that there is—Bank of China’s involvement in, for instance, devising and operating a money laundering scheme for the North Koreans in Singapore. 

This was in a U.N. panel of experts report for the year 2016. 

There is other evidence that the Bank of China has been involved 

in money laundering for the North Koreans in other locations, and 

the Bank of China, as big as it is, is not the biggest Chinese bank. 

But the point is not so much—you know, this does not relate to 

Africa but we do have——

Ms. BASS. That is what I am referring to. 

Mr. CHANG. Excuse me? 

Ms. BASS. That is what I am referring to. 

Mr. CHANG. Yes. We can do it. We have the authority to do it. 

Matter of fact, we should be doing it because we shouldn’t allow 

anybody, especially Beijing, to use our financial system in ways 

that violate American law. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. CHANG. But to answer your question in terms of Africa, China’s influence in Africa is largely because it’s got these economic 

relationships, not only just extracting minerals but also selling 

goods in China—in Africa. 

And we have a very different system. You know, our companies 

don’t say yes when the President of the United States calls up. 

They very well can say no. But that’s not the Chinese system. 

When you have a big Chinese enterprise or a big Chinese bank, 

they have to do what they are told by the party and——

Ms. BASS. Right. And I am not—and I am not doubting you. You 

know, that’s fine. But my question was—and you answered it in 

part with the Bank of China. I don’t think we are going to do that 

but you answered part of it. 

What is the solution outside of us stepping up? And maybe I’ll 

pass it on to Mr.——

Mr. CHANG. Just quickly. 

Ms. BASS. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. CHANG. You know, I think democracy promotion that was 

very important——

Ms. BASS. That we cut. Go ahead. 

Mr. CHANG. Also, our aid, for instance, is not building these big 

buildings, for instance, like the African Union headquarters, which 

was bugged by the Chinese. 

But our aid has been more people-oriented. You know, it’s developing—in local communities—clean water, vaccines, all the rest of 

it. 

52

Ms. BASS. Yes, and I have a problem with how we do our aid too 

because I don’t think our aid promotes self-sufficiency of African 

countries that I believe have the capacity to do a lot of those things 

themselves. 

Mr. CHANG. And we should be doing more of those things that 

do promote self-sufficiency because they are extremely popular 

among people and this is a struggle for hearts and minds. 

So that’s where I would concentrate our efforts and, of course, I 

think, you know, it’s an all-of-the-above issue where, you know, if 

we should be putting more money into the IMF. Yes, let’s do that. 

Let’s do all of these things. 

But I like the idea of essentially the way we work with countries, 

you know, at the local level because that’s important for people-topeople relationships, and the Peace Corps is a very important initiative in that regard. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. I agree with your fundamental point that 

the best way to approach this challenge is to enhance American activities. 

Ms. BASS. Pull your microphone up a little bit. It’s hard to hear 

you. 

Mr. MESERVEY. Oh, sorry. I agree with your fundamental point 

that the best way to deal with these—this challenge is to enhance 

American activity because we do still have immense influence on 

the continent. 

We give—last year or in 2016, rather, we gave $10 billion in 

overseas development assistance to Africa. So that alone buys us 

immense leverage. 

Now, I don’t think we have used it as well as we should have. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. MESERVEY. But to your—to your—the core of your question 

of what leverage do we have over China, we don’t—so China cares 

deeply about its international image, for instance. 

So I would point to the ivory ban that recently the Chinese Government implemented in China, and I think they became embarrassed about the fact that Chinese demand for ivory had been driving this poaching epidemic across the African continent. And so 

eventually they started to do something. 

Now, whether they are going to continue, whether it is a truly 

good-faith effort, we will see. But at least, in my mind, it was an 

incremental step at the very least. So international image issues—

there is a limit, too. If it—if it conflicts with their core interests 

they don’t care how they look. 

But so there is a limit to that. But that’s something. Prosecuting 

corruption—there was, again, a recent case. The Department of 

Justice laid charges against an emissary from a major multinational Chinese company—a private company that had bribed 

Chadian officials and Ugandan officials, I think, for access to oil 

rights. So seizing those opportunities. 

But, fundamentally, China in Africa is a fact of life and it will 

be for the foreseeable future. So and there are good elements to 

Chinese activity. 

Now there are all these negative things that I think are best 

dealt with by enhancing our own activities, as you said in your 

opening remarks and in your questions, and just burnishing the 

53

attractiveness of the American model, which still has a lot of resonance on the continent. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I would say what’s critical and what I am worried about is that 

we are not maintaining the level of engagement directly with the 

Chinese that helps make progress on these issues and, as I said in 

my testimony, however painfully slow that might be, the absence 

of the engagement isn’t going to—going to do anything positive. 

And I would point to one example. So you have something called 

the Strategic Dialogue. It’s changed names over the years. But it 

was started in the Bush administration, carried forward in the 

Obama administration. 

And over the course of the years, it addressed many different 

issues, one of which was this issue about debt problems in low-income countries and China’s behavior. 

Just a few years ago, the signals were that China was very close 

to joining the Paris Club of Creditors, which I referred to in my testimony as a really important forum for dealing with debt problems 

and doing it in a responsible way. 

What I see now is no evidence that that dialogue is a priority 

anymore for this administration and statements from Treasury officials that it simply isn’t a priority. And, you know, from my perspective we probably lost an opportunity as a result to keep that 

momentum up on questions like responsible lending practices. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Yes? 

Ms. PLUMMER. Very thoughtful questions—one that I’ve been 

grappling with for years in terms of what we can do on our end. 

One, in terms of leverage, the U.S. is still favored over China. So 

opinion polls that have taken place in nearly every sub-Saharan African country by the Pew, Global Attitudes Project, and 

Afrobarometer show that U.S. values are still favored over the values of authoritarian bureaucracy that are heralded from China. 

So when we look at leverage, we have to look at it on the level 

of the elites that we are engaging with but also the masses of people who are impacted by our policies. 

So initiatives, like the YALI initiative, I think are very encouraging to support young entrepreneurs, civil society leaders in developing strategies to be able to bring pressure on their governments 

from below. 

I think we should also look at debt models and consider debt forgiveness. Billions of dollars are leaving the continent every year 

servicing debt——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ms. PLUMMER [continuing]. But also linked to illicit financial 

flows. The U.S. has a very robust system and we can look at where 

African leaders are stashing billions of dollars offshore including in 

banks in the United States. I think——

Ms. BASS. And buying property here. 

Ms. PLUMMER. And buying property here. This is money that belongs to the masses of African people. So in terms of U.S. leverage 

and building on the favorable image that the U.S. already has in 

Africa, I think it will be much welcomed if our policies really consider how the masses would be impacted by our policies. 

54

Finally, I think the Millennium Challenge Corporation had a 

very good model in terms of money going to development projects 

in Africa being given to African companies to carry out the projects. 

So expanding MCC, also considering expanding AGOA and preferential trade treatment. What products are given preferential 

treatment is also a very tangible area that the U.S. can improve 

its policy on. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

And just to wrap up, Mr. Chair, I would agree with you in terms 

of the U.S. being valued over the Chinese because some of the 

roads we are talking about and infrastructure, we know, collapses. 

But, you know, again, I think it falls on us. One of the other 

issues that I don’t believe you raised, or maybe I missed the various panelists, is one of the problems is labor. So, you know, in 

communities in—well, my community, for example—part of my district’s people get upset if there is a major project and no one on 

the project is from the community. I can only imagine what Africans feel who are unemployed and see Chinese labor come in. 

All of those, to me, are reasons why I think we should focus on 

the U.S. and increase our footprint on the continent, and leave our 

viewpoint of the continent—our viewpoint of the continent is from 

a charity perspective—what you watch on late-night TV on Africa 

in terms of the commercials. 

Until we leave that viewpoint and join the rest of the world in 

looking at the continent of Africa from the point of view of partnership and opportunity, and then promote U.S. businesses to do business on the continent. We can sit and complain about China all we 

want. But, to me, it’s a question of us stepping up. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Chairman Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Last month, it was brought to my attention that the tribal rivalry between the Dinka and Nuer people in South Sudan has resurfaced. 

I’ve heard reports that the Chinese Government is directly benefitting from this conflict by extracting resources with virtually no 

benefit for the people who inhabit the land and possibly even using 

enslaved locals for their labor. 

Could any of you speak to this or have you heard of Chinese engaging in similar practices in other parts of Africa? 

Mr. MESERVEY. I’ll take a stab. 

So I follow South Sudan quite closely and yes, the Chinese companies are heavily involved in that country, specifically in the oil 

industry, which is one of the areas of contestation in the country 

because, obviously, it’s lucrative to control the oil fields. 

Again, I don’t know what the specific terms of the contract are 

because they are very rarely ever made public. So it’s very difficult 

to know what are the Chinese paying and things of that nature. 

But I suspect that in this case, given how thoroughly corrupt the 

South Sudanese regime is and how its primary concern is to prosecute the war in South Sudan, that it would happily strike a very 

poor deal with these Chinese companies in order to have some sort 

55

of—in order to earn some money at all because they are under very 

difficult financial strain. 

To the question about slave labor, I haven’t encountered or heard 

of that happening in South Sudan specifically. 

But one of the concerns of Chinese engagement on the continent 

is the standards for labor, and frequently, they are not up to the 

standards that a Western firm would demand or uphold. 

So I—and this has caused conflict in other parts of the continent 

where there have even been deaths when miners have struck, for 

instance, at Chinese mines and then been shot. 

So I wouldn’t at all be surprised if there are serious labor abuses 

in the South Sudanese oil fields as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Would any other panel members want to add anything to that? 

If not, I’ll move to another question. Okay. I’ll go ahead. 

China is notorious for undermining Taiwan every chance it gets. 

I was one of the original founders of the Congressional Taiwan 

Caucus and have been working on Taiwan issues for many years 

now. 

How has Beijing leveraged its influence in Africa against Taiwan? What impact has increasing Chinese influence in Africa had 

on Taiwan’s global standing, for example, pressing countries across 

the globe including in Africa to drop their recognition of Taiwan? 

Would anybody want to address that? 

I saw you nodding, Mr. Meservey. So if you’d like to——

Mr. MESERVEY. Sure. I address this in my written testimony. 

In 2005, there were seven African countries that recognized Taiwan. There are two left now, and that’s the result of a campaign 

by the Chinese on the continent. 

Sao Tome and Principe was the most recent African country to 

cut ties. That was just last year—late last year—and they immediately received very large Chinese loans. 

The Chinese have never given loans to countries that maintain 

ties with Taiwan. There are only two left, as I said—Burkina Faso 

and Swaziland. 

And I suspect—I didn’t go back before 2005 but if you went further back I am sure there were many more African countries with 

ties to Taiwan that have—that have steadily cut them off because 

of Beijing’s inducements. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

And then finally, when China builds good will when it does various projects in Africa but really around the world, it always does 

so with the expectation that its partner will disproportionately 

favor China. 

There is always something in it much more for China. You might 

think you’re getting something out of it and it’s sort of free but it’s 

never free with China. 

I know you’ve all addressed this in your testimony. But to what 

extent will Chinese investment perhaps make various countries in 

Africa less hospitable to Western businesses and organizations because of the way they’ve undermined free and open markets, rule 

of law—the way you’re actually supposed to do things? 

Anybody is—Mr. Chang? 

56

Mr. CHANG. Yes. I mean, that generally has been Beijing’s ultimate intention. 

You know, when Chinese companies first go to a country they 

can’t do that. But what we have seen in Africa and elsewhere that 

when there is this critical mass that Beijing does have the ability 

to use its economic power for what you’ve mentioned—to undermine. 

The whole concept of Beijing undermining good governance in Africa and elsewhere it’s just been so clear and we have seen the effects of it in countries like Zimbabwe. 

So with the big men in Africa, they do have Chinese support and 

that’s sort of an indication where Beijing would go if it indeed had 

more influence. 

Mr. CHABOT. Very good. 

Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a few followup questions or follow up 

on final questions, and thank you again for your very, very incisive 

answers. 

Could any of you shed any light on what the relationship is between the Chinese Government and the African Union? What are 

their goals? What are they trying to influence, if anything, in your 

view, with the AU? 

Ms. PLUMMER. So the Chinese Government built the African 

Union headquarters. So that’s obvious. 

It’s interesting that the Chinese Government prefers not to engage in negotiations with blocs—power blocs. They prefer to negotiate on a bilateral basis, and that’s obvious. 

Any time a group of countries negotiate as a bloc, especially 

countries that aren’t as integrated like in Africa, that will put 

China at a better advantage in terms of negotiating trade deals. 

There are representatives from the Chinese Government at the 

African Union headquarters. Aside from that, I am not sure of how 

the Chinese Government uses the African Union to lobby African 

leadership or what access they have in the African Union because 

they have their Embassies in each country that they have ties 

with. 

And I would imagine that on a bilateral basis within each country the relationships are stronger outside of the AU. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Meservey, you pointed out in your testimony, and I quote, 

‘‘Echoes of Mao’s shrewd practice of building influence with rising 

African leaders and political parties remain today in Beijing’s program for granting young and sometime senior African politicians 

scholarships to attend trainings in China.’’

You point out that in 2016 China announced it would invite 

1,000 more African politicians to receive training. 

Do you, or any of you, have any sense what that training actually 

is? What is the duration of it? You know, is it indoctrination all 

wedded together with what? Do we know? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Like many elements of Chinese engagement with 

Africa, it’s a bit opaque. But there is no doubt that some—and I 

reference this in the written testimony—some of these representatives of African political parties are receiving training on how the 

CCP organizes its own party, for instance. 

57

The EPRDF, which is the ruling coalition in Ethiopia, which in 

your opening remarks you referenced its deeply authoritarian tendencies, has received trainings on how to control public opinion including relations with the media. 

So I think the thrust of a lot of these trainings—and there is 

also—there are objectively benign trainings like around agricultural competencies and such—but the thrust for a lot of the parties—the African parties that are interested and I think there have 

been at least seven ruling African parties that have participated in 

these trainings—is learning how to—to learn how to sort of—learn 

how to dominate the country, frankly, as the CCP does and I think 

it’s deeply worrying when you have parties like the Jubilee Party 

from Kenya. 

Kenya is a democracy, but they are going to receive trainings—

we don’t know the content of all of them but we suspect that they 

are—the CCP is training parties like Jubilee and the EPRDF and 

SWAPO in how to deepen their own and centralize their authority. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I think it’s important that 

we not underestimate the degree to which China is becoming a desirable place to obtain technical knowledge. 

Their increasingly sophisticated economy, investing heavily in 

areas of R and D, and to the degree that they are, you know, actively seeking to attract students from other countries, let’s recognize that’s our model and I do worry that at the moment that feels 

a little vulnerable here and I think it’s one of the ways in which 

we have been so effective in the world is that we have been particularly open to foreign students who come to our universities. 

And so that—you know, as a model that is now growing in China 

we need to recognize its value to us as well. 

Mr. SMITH. But is there any kind of political baggage that goes 

along with that? Because we know for a fact that the Confucius Institutes and many of our colleges and universities who have campuses on mainland China are highly restricted in what they are 

able to do and that there is a political baggage weight that is imposed by having such an institute, for example, on a U.S. campus. 

And we are looking further into it on the China Commission. 

Like I said before, we have asked the GAO to really vigorously 

study what the parameters are—what they are teaching—because, 

like I said in my opening remarks, it’s like a free gift to a university to have what seems to be a value added, but really, in real 

terms, probably is not. It’s soft power. 

Mr. CHANG. Mr. Chairman, just on one aspect, I don’t know the 

nature of the training that the Chinese are offering. 

But the one big drawback that China suffers is that African students and others have been the targets of really ugly racism in 

China and that must have tarred the image. 

And one of the great things about the United States is just the 

openness of it and so that when students come here they generally 

have a very positive view of the United States, and we have to 

work at that, of course. 

But Beijing does suffer from it because it does have the money 

to bring everybody to Beijing but it doesn’t have the ability to 

change Chinese attitudes and those attitudes, I think, are the bigVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:36 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AGH\030718\28876 SHIRL
58

gest impediment to China making actually more inroads into the 

African societies. 

Mr. SMITH. On one trip to the DR Congo I remember meeting 

with a group of lawmakers who told me that the Chinese are very 

adept at making sure that the roads go close to minerals and that 

which they have their eyes on, and often have access to it at a very 

small or negligible price. They also said the roads weren’t that 

good. 

What is your sense in terms of the quality of the goods? We know 

that, in Kenya, a bridge, several months ago, collapsed in 

Kenyatta. I had been there visiting just 2 weeks before it collapsed. 

A couple dozen people were severely injured as a result. What is 

the quality of those goods? 

And finally, just let me ask, if you could—Mr. Chang, in your 

book, ‘‘The Coming Collapse of China,’’ and elsewhere, you have 

questioned the sustainability of China’s debt in the long-term in 

part due to its inefficient lending to state-owned enterprises. 

And I am wondering how the level of indebtedness of African nations, in particular those rated by the Center for Global Development as being potential high risks of distress—namely, Djibouti, 

Ethiopia, Kenya, others—factor into China’s own financial health? 

What would be the effect on China’s lending institutions of a default or a restructuring and how do you think that might rattle 

markets globally? 

Mr. CHANG. You know, Mr. Chairman, we are seeing—and it’s 

not played out in Africa but certainly being played out in Venezuela where there is somewhere between $17 billion to $20 billion 

of debt, and to borrow your term, we just don’t know the full extent 

of that debt. 

But we do know that China is in difficult straits because they 

don’t know how to do this. Part of it is because maybe of a lack 

of experience, but also because they realize that the more money 

they put into Venezuela the more difficult it becomes as a bigger 

problem and, indeed, in the last year or so, they have not been extending additional advances. 

Now, they are going to play this all out in connection with 

Djibouti, as you mentioned, and also with Tanzania right now with 

the debt restructuring. 

You know, Beijing has a lot of money, but it also has a lot of 

commitments and this is the whole concept of imperial overstretch, 

and we see this playing out in China’s relations with countries 

around the world, especially in Africa, where they have gone out 

and made very large commitments, but have not oftentimes been 

able to fulfill them, and that is largely because they’ve got too big 

ambitions. 

They say that they have $3.2 trillion of foreign exchange reserves 

but that money is not unencumbered. They’ve been using a fair 

amount of this money for belt-and-road projects, which are not sustainable. 

I practiced law in Hong Kong at a time where anything that 

could be financed was financed by the private sector. What China 

is doing with belt-and-road right is financing those things that nobody would have ever touched, and they wouldn’t have touched 

them for a good reason. 

59

So Beijing is going to see all of these projects—not all of them 

but many of these projects having to be refinanced on terms that 

are unfavorable to the Chinese largely because these projects are 

just not economic. 

We see this especially in Latin America right now where you’ve 

had two very large Chinese projects crater—the Interoceanic Canal 

at Nicaragua and also the Atlantic to Pacific railroad. 

China hasn’t done, I think, anything as large as that in Africa, 

which have been such spectacular failures. But we have seen 

smaller projects not go forward in similar fashion. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you all for your testimony today. 

Let me ask you all, how much does China use—aside from their 

projects, right, like the ones they are doing in Latin America and 

some of the projects in Africa—what kind of development aid do 

they offer to the countries in the way that United States has 

USAID, for example? 

Mr. MORRIS. I think the common view is that they don’t have an 

aid model. I don’t think that’s entirely correct. They do have what 

we’d consider foreign aid. Official development assistance is the 

terminology. 

It is very small relative to the other types of financing they do. 

It is growing. 

Mr. CASTRO. And why do you think that they haven’t used that—

they haven’t adopted the same model? Is it that they can’t afford 

it or they just don’t believe in it? What’s your best assessment? 

Mr. MORRIS. What I would hear from Chinese counterparts over 

the years consistently is, ‘‘We are not a rich country—we are not 

an aid provider—we ourselves are a poor country.’’

Now, they’ve had to evolve that message, as we——

Mr. CASTRO. It’s the second largest economy in the world. 

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, and both—so the message has evolved but also 

the reality is changing. They are increasing their levels of foreign 

aid. 

On something like the belt-and-road initiative, which is infrastructure oriented, you are seeing an aid component allocated to 

things like technical assistance, project preparation. 

Mr. CASTRO. Let me ask you—I have a question. 

There have been stories recently about cobalt mining in Africa. 

To what extent do Chinese companies comply with international 

standards on child labor when extracting natural resources in African countries, such as cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo? If anybody can address that. 

Mr. MESERVEY. You know, the cobalt issue in Eastern DRC is a 

fascinating one. The Chinese have moved strategically, I would say, 

to dominate the global supply chain for cobalt. 

Cobalt, of course, is a critical mineral in the creation of lithium 

ion batteries, which may well be extraordinarily important even 

more so than now if—particularly if driverless cars becomes as big 

of an industry as many people think it will. 

So as far as child labor standards specifically, I am not sure 

what the Chinese companies that are involved in cobalt mining 

have for those sorts of standards. 

60

As we have mentioned throughout this hearing, though, there is 

no doubt that Chinese companies do not subscribe to the same level 

of labor standards as Western firms do, for instance. 

So whether that translates specifically into using child labor at 

a cobalt mine, I don’t know. I wouldn’t be surprised if the answer 

is yes. 

Mr. CASTRO. Also, China recently opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. What do you expect the purpose of this base 

is and where do you see China’s expanding footprint in the region 

and do you see them expanding militarily in Africa beyond this one 

base? 

Mr. CHANG. Beijing has indicated that it clearly wants to dominate the Indian Ocean and in order to do that it does need 

logistical bases. And so it’s no surprise that their first overseas 

base is essentially to support the People’s Liberation Army Navy 

and it’s no surprise that it’s in the Indian Ocean. 

The thing that I am concerned about is the Chinese have been 

thinking about establishing a base at Walvis Bay in Namibia in the 

southern Atlantic, and what’s even more concerning—and I mentioned this before—is Chinese officials have been looking at the 

Azores. 

The United States Air Force has a base. It’s called Base Number 

4, Lajes, and because of budget cutbacks has been reducing the 

presence there down to what they call a ghost base. 

Then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao—I think it was in 2009 when 

he was going from Santiago, Chile back to Beijing actually didn’t 

fly over the Pacific, as you’d expect. He flew to Lajes and spent a 

couple days on the island looking at not only the air base but also 

looking at the port facilities, and there have been, clearly, a lot of 

discussions between the Chinese and the Portuguese. 

So this is a concern because from Lajes, which was a base that 

would control the mouth of the Atlantic—sorry, the Mediterranean—and also it is closer to Washington, DC, then Pearl Harbor 

is to Los Angeles. 

So it is important for us to make sure that—it’s sometimes difficult to tell the Air Force what to do. But it would seem that reducing our commitment to the Azores at a time when the Chinese 

want to use the Azores doesn’t seem to be wise policy in the long 

term because, clearly, we do not want Chinese planes flying over 

the Atlantic and threatening the American homeland. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. I want to touch on something that my 

colleague, Mr. Castro, spoke to—and I want—and, by the way, I 

am a listener to the John Batchelor program so it’s an honor to get 

to see you in person—and that is Chinese aid versus U.S. aid and 

the aid model. 

And I want you to tell me if I am wrong and I’ll open this up 

to anybody, but I do have a finite amount of time. And that is that 

the Chinese have learned very quickly that it’s easier to give a lot 

of money to a few people than it is to give even more to a large 

number of people. 

61

In other words, I was in an African nation that shall remain 

nameless for a particular reason wherein the Presidential palace 

was a wholly financed function of the Chinese Government. 

It, obviously, endeared itself ultimately to three families. It was 

probably about the size of the Rayburn House Office Building and 

by giving that aid they didn’t need to give aid to the people in that 

country who were living on less than $1 a day. 

Is that about right? The Chinese aid model is to pay off the 

oligarchs because they don’t need to worry about the masses if they 

do that. 

Mr. CHANG. Some people have called it big project diplomacy. 

Build, for instance, as Dr. Plummer has talked about, the headquarters for the African Union. You build a soccer stadium. These 

are high-profile projects. 

The United States does something a little bit different. You 

know, we have a Peace Corps volunteer here, I guess. You know, 

the aid is more on a person-to-person level—you know, vaccines, 

which are important, clean water—these types of things which 

matter day to day—much more important than the headquarters 

for a multilateral organization in Addis Ababa. 

So I think that we are doing the right thing. It’s just a question 

of whether we should be doing more, and let me just close out by 

saying that I am privileged to know John Batchelor. So thank you 

very much. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, I’ve—as a new resident of the district, I have 

evolved into a great appreciation for the depth and subject matter 

expertise that’s present in that venue, and I know I’ve digressed 

beyond the role of the committee today. But I do think I get analysis there I don’t get other places. 

As it relates to sort of the neocolonialist tag, which I candidly 

think is incredibly appropriate—it’s been my observation in a very 

limited period of time and only a couple of different countries in 

the African continent that the reality is that China is on the 

ground in a depth that we as Americans and even as members of 

this body fail to understand as it relates to control of the apparatus 

that make things go—the infrastructure, if you will. 

The cliche that I’ve heard is that ultimately the infrastructure 

provided by the Chinese serves the Chinese at the expense of the 

local population, which looks an awful lot like colonialism to me. 

I would invite you to speak to the cliche that the roads that they 

build run from the resource to the port and whether or not that’s 

the reality or if these—if these projects and ‘‘investments’’ actually 

serve the local populaces, and I would speak to that for perspective, 

for example, to the story that was in Bloomberg 6 days ago with 

regard to the Chinese garment manufacturing endeavors in Ethiopia and then the treatment of the workers therein without even 

digressing into child labor circumstances in China, which they’ve 

told us have changed but we have anecdotal and real evidence that 

indicate they haven’t. 

So the infrastructure investment that the Chinese tout in the developing world is that to serve the developing world or is that to 

serve the Chinese, based on—and again, anybody chime in. 

Again, Mr. Chang, I hold you in extraordinarily high regard. I 

have three other awesome people here, including Dr. Plummer, 

62

who’s got a Woodson fellowship at UVA, which is in my district. So 

you’re awesome. 

So anybody—the Chinese investment in infrastructure—is it 

serving these developing nations or is it serving China? 

Ms. PLUMMER. Well, I think it all depends on the project. So your 

first question when you asked the scope of the infrastructure, who 

does it serve, you mentioned a project—the Presidential palace. 

You find that the Chinese Government tends to be very responsive to what African elites request. So if there is an election year 

and an elite—a representative says, hey, I need a road built between these two towns—it’s an election year—will you be able to 

deliver that project, of course, it’s not free. There is a loan taken 

out. Leaders in China have been praised for being responsive in 

that way. 

So it’s up to the African leadership to make certain requests. 

So——

Mr. GARRETT. Let me interrupt, not by disrespect and not to even 

disagree. 

The autocratic regime is a lot more responsive, right, than a laboriously democratic——

Ms. PLUMMER. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARRETT. But go ahead. 

Ms. PLUMMER. So to answer your question, do the—does the local 

population benefit from the infrastructure—it all depends on the 

quality of leadership and whether the leadership within that country works autonomously from their population or if they work to 

benefit their population. So it all depends. 

In terms of the large-scale transport infrastructure models and, 

to some extent, the power infrastructure models, geographers have 

gone in and mapped out where the roads, the railways, where the 

ports are being situated. 

And yes, you find that it’s a two-way street. They benefit the extractive sectors but also they are intended to get Chinese-made 

products into hard-to-get places within the African interior. 

So it serves that dual purpose. But you also find that some of the 

aid is within the agricultural sector so to teach farmers how to 

build rice paddies. You have medical doctors that have been dispatched. You have teachers that have been dispatched to different 

areas. So it’s a lot broader than just the large-scale infrastructure. 

Mr. GARRETT. I would say this. I mean, the race is a manifest 

to sort of—there is almost a Sino supremacist sort of attitude 

amongst a segment of the Chinese leadership—that they are just 

better than everybody else and that they are doing everybody a 

favor by virtue of gracing them with their presence, which I think 

hearkens back to what we saw coming out of Europe for a couple 

centuries. 

But that’s troubling in a world where I think we should get back 

to the King model of content of character versus color of skin, and 

when it manifests itself in foreign policy—and I think China is not 

the only instance where this happens, but we aren’t talking about 

some other regions right now that some of you all might have some 

expertise in—that becomes worse. 

63

Let me ask you a rhetorical based on essentially my opinion, and 

let me give it to Joshua and Scott, and then conclude, because you 

all have been very indulgent. 

The U.S. model of international aid is the superior model if it is 

in a world where the individuals in receipt of the aid have self-determination. 

In other words, we give aid to the end user—the person who 

might lack a meal. I am a huge champion of McGovern-Dole, of 

educating women, to reduce radicalism, and create economic opportunity. Not because I like women better than men but because we 

see patterns where educated women create greater opportunity, reduce radicalism, and lift the society, right—that if you take 50 percent of your population and disenfranchise them then, ultimately, 

you never get to be as good as you can be. 

So when the end user is self-determinative and our aid goes to 

the end user then our model works. But where there are autocratic 

regimes, where there are dictatorial regimes, the Chinese model 

works because essentially—and you can call them priority projects 

or whatever you want to call them—but it’s buying off the people 

at the top so as to extract benefit from essentially the sweat of the 

people at the bottom. 

Is that an accurate, in your opinion, Joshua and—or Mr. 

Meservey—I am dodging your last name because I don’t want to 

mispronounce it—and Mr. Morris? 

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, I think there is a lot of truth to that. In my 

written testimony, I called corruption a Chinese competitive advantage on the continent. 

We have the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as we have already 

talked about during this hearing, and you will go to prison if you’re 

American and you do the sorts of things that Chinese firms are frequently willing to do on the continent. 

And it’s not just the Chinese, of course, but they are—they are 

prime perpetrators. And I think the more fundamental issue is that 

governance is hugely important, as your question referenced, and 

fundamentally the blame for striking a lot of irresponsible deals 

lies with governments in Africa and they are to blame for signing 

these terrible contracts—for allowing themselves to be bought off in 

some situations. 

So I think our U.S. engagement, the aid model, should focus on 

improving governance on the continent because also even poverty 

has very strong links to governance. The MCC is a really positive 

model because it rewards good governance. 

So I think that’s the direction in which U.S. policy should be 

going on these issues. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Morris. 

Mr. MORRIS. So, Congressman, I would certainly agree with you 

completely on sort of core principles and values that are embodied 

in what we do internationally that look very different from China. 

That said, I would say that if you look at programs like PEPFAR, 

you know, tremendous strides we have made through that program 

in incidence of disease and, frankly, irrespective of—I mean, in a 

lot of different kinds of countries and I think it was really important not to be too restrictive about where we choose to try to make 

progress in an area like that. 

64

And then on the question of infrastructure, I think it is just—

you know, it is a fundamental driver of growth in economies today 

and, again, that’s irrespective of political models. 

I think you’re right, though, that at the end of the day, the political models bear directly on how that goes when you do actually engage. 

But I do think, you know, with our model of leading on global 

health issues, on humanitarian issues, disaster response, it’s critical that we are there when there is a need and find ways to work 

even when governance is challenging. 

Mr. GARRETT. It’s amazing, and I say this as an aside—and I 

thank the chair for his indulgence—but to ask the opinion of 

George W. Bush in Africa versus in America, right, because we did 

stuff that helped human beings and they—and they get it. 

So without advocating on behalf of a particular administration, 

when you help people you help America, and when you empower 

people and create hope, then we reduce radicalization and, as 

McMaster said, we buy fewer bombs. 

Having said that, I served in the military. I want to have a 

strong military. I don’t want to have to use it. We should never aspire to use it. 

Thank you, guys, immensely. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 

Just to conclude, I do have one final question. You know, in my 

own home state of New Jersey, our former U.S. attorney, Christopher Christie, was able, when he looked at corruption within our 

own state, to put about 130 politicians, both Democrats and Republicans, behind bars over an 8-year period as he served as U.S. attorney. 

Remember, there was a book written, called ‘‘The Soprano State,’’ 

that really showed that corruption is in so many places. 

So when we talk about it overseas, we need to look in the mirror. 

It’s here as well. You, Mr. Chang, talked about some of the dealings between Beijing and African states being tainted by corruption. 

I co-chair the Helsinki Commission. In 2000 there was a big conference—we have one every year. It’s an annual conference—in Bucharest. 

The theme of it was that corruption is the hijacker of democracies, and it seems to me that when there is no Foreign Corrupt 

Practices Act to hold the bad players to account and bags of money 

are showing up, it has a coercive and, I think, a totally debilitating 

impact on democracy, which we want every African country—every 

country in the world—to enjoy the benefits of a robust democracy. 

If any of you would like, as we conclude, to speak to that issue. 

And I remember in Bucharest, we were talking a lot of the emerging democracies and some of whom are going the wrong way, 

sadly—Russia being probably chief among them—and, of course, 

the kleptocracy there and the oligarchs have stolen so much, 

robbed the people of so much there, and Putin is walking point on 

that. 

So if you could speak to that issue, because I think on the intermediate, long-term, short-term as well, you know, we want Africa 

to thrive. You can’t thrive when you have corruption. 

65

Mr. CHANG. Mr. Chairman, I thought—what I thought was really 

striking was that in the era of Hu Jintao, the predecessor to Xi 

Jinping, his son was implicated in a bribery scandal in Tanzania 

for the sale of airports scanners, I believe that it was, and this indicates that this is not just some Chinese businessman being 

caught—China bribed an African official. 

This goes to the—this went to the top of the Chinese political 

system, and I think people understood that this was the nature of 

China in Africa, in other places as well. 

And so you see this replicated. You know, as Dr. Plummer said, 

you got to look at it country by country. But nonetheless, this was 

one very glaring example of the son of a Chinese political leader 

bribing officials in Africa and being withdrawn out of Africa to 

avoid embarrassment in Beijing. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Plummer. 

Ms. PLUMMER. Chairman Smith, thank you so much for bringing 

up the corruption issue. 

I just want to reiterate the illicit financial flows. Billions of dollars are leaving Africa every year and they are being held in banks 

in Europe, in the United States, and in the Caribbean, and the 

United States can play a role in helping to recover that money and 

repatriate it back to the continent. 

So I think that’s something that’s very tangible that we can play 

a role because we have robust institutions to be able to investigate 

where this money is going and where it’s being held. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Morris, what role should we play? 

Mr. MORRIS. I just want to agree with Dr. Plummer. I think this 

is—I mean, it’s not what we consider by any means traditional foreign aid but it’s a—it’s a critical function of the U.S. Government 

that, you know, we are providing a good to the global community 

in this regard by acting aggressively in this area. 

Mr. MESERVEY. I’ll give a quick example to supplement what Dr. 

Plummer said. 

The Vice President of Equatorial Guinea is the son of the President there actually, and he has had luxury vehicles and mansions 

seized all over the world now because—in Europe and in the U.S.—

because those governments decided to go after him. 

There is a plethora of opportunities to do that sort of thing. The 

U.S. has particular leverage with dual citizens who populate governments in Somalia and South Sudan. So that’s an obvious—another area. 

And it’s not just China that engages in this activity. Gulf States 

are very bad in this way as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for sharing your insights 

and wisdom with the subcommittee. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(67)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Humcm Rights, and International Organizations 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

March 6, 2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreit,>n Affairs to be held by 

the Subcormnittcc on Africa. Global Hcaltll Global Hmmn Rights. and lntcnmtional OrganiLations in Room 2172 

of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee 'vebsite at 

htto:/ /wv..'\v .F oreignAffairs.house. gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wcdnesdny. March 7. 2018 

2:00 p.lll. 

China in Africa: The Ne\v Colonialism? 

Mr. Gordon Chang 

Author 

Mr. Joshua Meservey 

Senior Policy Analyst 

Africa and the Middle East 

The Heritage Foundation 

Mr. Scott Morris 

Senior Fellow 

Center for Global Development 

Anita Plummer, Ph.D. 

Assistant Professor 

Department of African Studies 

Howard University 

B~' Direction of the Chairman 
69

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

t\1lN{JTES OF SURCOMMITTEE ON Afrlc«, 6:'~!!!._::!!!_~1ulmf Hwmm Rinlus, mut Imrmrdtrmnl orgrmit..nllo~ HEARIN'G 

March 7, 2018 Rnom ___ .::.2.::.lc.:72:_ __ _ 

Starting Time_ ~:j]}f}lll___ F.nding Time _.1 ::Jj]!_n_l _ 

Recesses L ] L_to ___ )L__to __ )( ___ to _ _J(___to_______)(_____to_JL _to ___ ) 

Presiding Mcmber(s) 

Clra;rmnn SmUll 

Check all oftilefollowillg tlwl «PP{I'' 

Open Session 0 

Executive (closed) Session 0 

Tele\•ised 0 

TITLE OF HRARING: 

China in Afl'ica: Tlte New Colonialism? 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Reconlllli..(ta ped) 0 

Stcnogmphic Record l:LI 

Ranking 11fember Bass, Rep. Bem, Rep. Garret~ Rep. Cft>tro 

NON-SUBCOMMITTJ•:E MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark >Pith a11 *if they are not members o!.filll committee) 

Rep. Fmncis Rooney, Rep. Cltabot 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [2J No 0 

(lf "no u, please !is/ below and include title, agency, department:, or organiZation.) 

STATEMENTS FOR TilE UECORD: (List any slatemenrs submilled.for the record) 

-Smith: Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, AidDafa at the College of William & Mmy 

-Smith: "China-Kenya Relationsltip: lnjlaence o.fMmtey & Growth ofCorrttptiou" by Rev. Abel Oriri, 

LPCC-S, NCC~ Pastor Heigltfs Fellowsldp Church, Cleveland, Oftlo 

-Smith: WJ·itlen Statement by Daniel AsaaiJ,Ghanaimt Politielim!Eutrepreneur 

TIMJC SCHIWULED TO UECONVF,NE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNEll ------

&bc<)ri;:mittee Staff Associate 
70

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

and field research - our database captures US$354 billion in Chinese global official 

finance investments between 2000-2014, including detailed information on 4300 

discrete projects. 

Many Western countries ascribe to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development's view of aid as limited to official development assistance - which must 

be primarily intended for development and highly concessional in its terms, including a 

grant element of more than 25 percent. However, emerging donors such as China, 

Brazil, and India argue that this Western notion of "aid" does not fit their approach and 

discounts other official finance contributions that are less concessional or serve a 

mixed purpose of advancing development along with commercial or diplomatic ends. 

These distinctions matter: the US dwarfs China in official development assistance, 

but the two countries have roughly similarly sized overall official finance 

portfolios overall. If we looked at aid alone, we would not be able to accurately gauge 

the full extent of China's global development footprint. For this reason, AidData 

collects information on both types of Chinese overseas investments: (1) official 

development assistance (ODA or "aid"); and (2) other official flows (OOF). 

Globally, China has been steadily increasing its overall official financing invested 

in other countries, exceeding the US since 2009. Nonetheless, Chinese official 

finance is less concessional than that of other large players like the US, since the vast 

majority of China's assistance does not meet the level of concessionality to be 

considered ODA. See Figures 1 and 2 for more information. 

Seven of the top 10 recipients of Chinese "aid" (ODA) were in Africa, but its other 

official flows (OOF) are more geographically dispersed. Cote d'lvoire, Ethiopia, 

Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ghana collectively received US$23.3 

billion in official development assistance from China between 2000 and 2014. Africa is 

less of a priority for China when it comes to its more commercial or diplomatically 

focused other official financing. Angola is the lone African country in the top ten 

recipients of Chinese OOF, receiving $13.4 billion. 

Consistent with its signature effort to set up the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 

China's official financing reveals that it is making big bets in the infrastructure sector. 

The lion's share of China's investments globally between 2000 and 2014 were in 

energy (US$134.1 billion), transportation and storage (US$88.8 billion), 

telecommunications projects (US$16.9 billion) and mining, construction and 

industry (US$ 30.38). 

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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

Figure 1. 

What's Included in China's Official Finance? 

China's official finance is less concessional than that of other large players 

Official Development Assistance {ODA) 

70 

Other Official Flows {OOF) 

represeqca•jonai purpcses 

Vague Official Finant:e {Vague OF) 

oh her OD;:I. or OCY: 

Vague(OF} 

Source: Aid Data. 2017. Global Cllinese Official Finance Dataset. Version 1 .0. Retrieved from http://aiddata.org/china 

Figure 2. 

How Does China Compare Against the United 

States? 

Similar sized portfolios with very different compositions 

aoo 

~ 250 

g :i:OC 

Q 

~ 15_0 __ 

?9 ..... 

OOA OOF Vng~e OF 

O!her Flows: L:;,ss cuic:essicnai 

putfolio 

Source: Aid Data. 2017. Global Ch:nese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1 .0. Retrieved from http://aiddata.org/china 

3 
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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

MOTIVATION: WHAT APPEARS TO BE DRIVING CHINA'S OFFICIAL FINANCE 

INVESTMENTS? 

Turning from the numbers to some of the possible explanations that might be 

driving their investment patterns, China appears to play by different rules when it 

comes to deploying these different flows. In an Aid Data working paper entitled "A_pjJie_s 

<:JQQ_D_r_a_g_oll.[ruits", a team of researchers empirically tested which factors appear to 

drive Chinese official finance investments (see Dreher et al, 2015). Below I highlight a 

few important takeaways from this research to understanding why and how China 

engages with African leaders through its official finance investments. 

In several respects, the evidence busts several popular myths regarding Chinese aid. 

Chinese ODA appears to be more responsible and responsive to need than we 

typically give it credit for in that it is pro-poor, given without strings attached, and 

is regime agnostic. Chinese development assistance tends to go towards poorer 

countries. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it does not appear that China is giving 

aid with strings attached in order to access natural resources or commercial ties. Nor is 

Chinese aid going disproportionately to authoritarian or corrupt regimes (Dreher et al., 

2015). 

However, there is an important exception where China's aid giving appears to 

follow the prevailing narrative of quid pro quo - i:Jl!Yil'lg _ _'I!_Ote~. If African countries 

voted with China in the UN General Assembly an extra 10% of the time, they would get 

an 86% bump in official development assistance on average, according to the Dreher 

et al. (2015) study. In other words, if a country aligned with China's foreign policy 

positions in the United Nations, that opened up the door to substantially more aid than 

if they did not. 

A second AidData working paper, entitled "Aid, China, and Growth", by Dreher et al. 

(2017) illuminates another important point. In its deployment of other official flows, 

China appears to hue more closely to the self-interest narrative. Chinese OOF 

primarily goes to countries that have greater capacity to repay loans, have larger 

natural resource endowments, are more corrupt, and are considered valued 

trading partners. 

What are the downstream effects of this increasing volume of official financing 

investments made by China in Africa? The prognosis is mixed - there are important 

differences between the two types of Chinese assistance, not only in how these flows 

are targeted, but also their effects and effectiveness, according to the Dreher et al. 

(2017) study. On a positive note, Chinese official development assistance, narrowly 

defined, appears to bolster economic growth in African countries and does 

not necessarily undermine the effectiveness of Western assistance. Ironically, 

however, the commercial and diplomatic intentions of China's other official flows, 

does not appear to be translating into greater economic growth on the ground. 

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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

LEVERAGE: TO WHAT EXTENT IS CHINA INFLUENCING POLICY IN OTHER 

COUNTRIES? 

So what do policymakers in Africa make of China's growing development footprint in 

their countries? In addition to following the money, AidData also measures the 

influence of foreign governments and international organizations in shaping the 

domestic policy priorities of public, private, and civil society leaders in low- and 

middle-income countries. To this end, we fielded two su_r\I?Y§ of policymakers in 126 

countries in 2014 and 2017 to understand whom these leaders listen to- and why? 

The 2014 survey results are publicly available via aiddata.org/listening-to-leaders and 

we will be publishing the analysis of the 2017 survey in April2018. 

Nearly 7500 and 3200 leaders responded to AidData's 2014 and 2017 policymaker 

surveys, respectively. These survey respondents assessed the agenda-setting 

influence of over 100 bilateral and multilateral donors on a scale of 0 (less influence) to 

5 (more influence). Analyzing their responses, we can learn a lot about how China's 

charm offensive is perceived vis-a-vis the US among African leaders. While the 2017 

study is not yet published, I will share some preliminary insights we're gleaning from 

the data. 

Popular arguments that China is rapidly eclipsing US interests and influence worldwide 

may be overstated. As of 2017, China still trailed the US in agenda setting influence 

with leaders in low- and middle-income countries (Custer et al., forthcoming). Sixtyfive percent of leaders viewed China as quite or very influential in informing their 

domestic policy priorities compared with over 80 percent for the US in 2017. 

However, another interpretation could be that China is a relatively young donor and is 

just getting started. 

In Africa, the picture is a bit more nuanced: in 2017, the US still had a strong 

influence edge over China with leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, but is falling behind 

in the Middle East and North Africa. The US surpasses China's influence in several 

policy areas: governance, social, environmental policy among them. Meanwhile, China 

was viewed as quite influential among leaders working on economic policy, a 

policy domain in which it is in a virtual dead heat with the US, and it surpassed US 

influence in infrastructure for the first time in 2017. 

These survey results tell us that the substantial investments made by China in the 

infrastructure sector are indeed paying off - in terms of agenda-setting influence 

with world leaders. Finally, in comparing scores from 2014 and 2017, there is a 

clear indication that China is rapidly gaining ground when it comes to agendasetting influence with policymakers in low- and middle-income countries. More on 

this is still to come with AidData's forthcoming publication analyzing the full survey 

results in April2018. 

IMPLICATIONS: HOW SHOULD THE US RESPOND TO CHINA'S GROWING 

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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

FOOTPRINT AND INFLUENCE IN AFRICA? 

1. US development assistance can become more focused and effective, but 

should not cede its "ground game" in cultivating long-term partnerships and 

influence with African leaders 

Money may not tJQYIQy~, but it does give donors a seat at the table with policymakers 

in low- and middle-income countries. On average, donors with deep pockets such as 

the United States, World Bank, and the EU are seen as more influential in shaping the 

policy agenda than less well endowed ones (Custeu;LaL~Q15j. Similarly, we find that 

China appears to hold most sway with leaders from countries that are heavily 

dependent on its grants and loans, perhaps another reason for the US to think 

twice about pulling back on its assistance to African countries. 

The strength of a donor's "g~O[JilcJ_g[lrr]_e" - its local presence and direct interactions 

with host government officials - informs how in-country decision-makers assess its 

influence. US agencies may find it advantageous to take a cue from small bilateral 

donors that have identified a bounded number of priority countries with whom to 

cultivate deeper, long-term relationships. Greater selectivity would enable 

overstretched and under-resourced agencies like USAID to focus on fewer countries 

and provide them with targeted policy advice and assistance. 

However, closing USAID missions to achieve an arbitrary budget reduction target is not 

prioritization, nor does it necessarily indicate a ramping up of efforts in countries where 

the US has a comparative advantage. Instead, Congressional and executive-branch 

leaders should give US agencies the mandate to rebalance their portfolio based 

upon a clear-eyed assessment of three criteria: (i) the potency of its agenda-setting 

influence in a given country; (ii) objective measures of need and opportunity for US 

assistance to make a positive difference; and (iii) strategic relationships and alliances 

that the US must consider when it comes to deploying aid as a foreign policy tool. 

2. Foreign policy tools work better together than apart: the US should continue to 

invest in public diplomacy efforts alongside overseas development 

investments to amplify its influence 

Beyond overseas development investments, there is a clear indication that public 

diplomacy tools can work together with development assistance to amplify influence 

with leaders in African countries. China had substantially more sway in countries 

where leaders have had greater interaction with the Chinese Communist party 

(tested using the number of times a delegation of leaders from a given country visited 

the CCP between 1998-2014). Notably, China had less influence with countries that 

had a greater number of leaders who were educated in the US and Fulbright 

scholars studying in the US (between 1949 and 2004). In addition to the cultural and 

educational exchange programs that target elites, there is also still a place for 

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Written statement prepared by Samantha Custer, Aid Data at the College of William & Mary 

informational diplomacy and outreach with the general public. We find that China had 

the most sway in countries where the general public views its development model 

favorably (tested using Afrobarometer data). 

Congressional and executive-branch leaders should resist the urge to subordinate 

development assistance to diplomacy and defense programs or vice versa. The US 

should strengthen its capacity in all of these areas if it is to maintain and amplify its 

influence in African countries. Instead of pitting US diplomacy and development 

programs against each other in a competition for scarce resources and policymaker 

attention, Congressional leaders should encourage the leadership of USAID, MCC, 

State, and other relevant agencies to cultivate mutually reinforcing linkages 

between all of the foreign policy tools at their disposal. There is good reason to 

believe that such a whole-of-government approach may be more effective than 

disjointed efforts to maintain and amplify US influence in African countries. 

ABOUT AIDDATA 

AidDa_ta, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, tracks over 40 trillion dollars 

in financing for development to understand who is funding, what, where and to what 

effect. It also fields surveys of over 55,000 po/icymakers worldwide to quantify how 

external money and ideas shape domestic reforms in low- and middle-income 

countries. Using rigorous methods, cutting-edge tools, and granular data, AidData 

equips policymakers and practitioners to effectively target, monitor, and evaluate 

development investments. 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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Paper presented to 

THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF CONGRESS SUB COMMITTEE ON AFRICA 

WASHINGTON, DC 

March 6, 2018 

"CHINA-KENYA RELATIONSHIP INFLUENCE OF MONEY & GROWTH OF 

CORRUPTION" 

The Definition ofConuption: 

According to Webster dictionary, corruption is defined as follows: "dishonest or illegal behavior 

especially by powerful people (such as government officials or police officers); inducement to 

wrong by improper or unlawful means (such as bribery)- the corruption of government officials; 

departure from the original or from what is pure or correct- the corruption of a text the 

conuption of computer files." When it comes to dealing with China, the Kenyan government 

has always been making shady arrangements at the very top, often in the president's or deputy 

president's offices. Contracts are believed to be greased with monetary bribes and other 

enticements like expense-paid shopping trips to China and scholarships there for the children of 

the elite. Adding to the opacity, China typically favors its state-owned companies for African 

projects and bypasses open, competitive bidding procedures. 

According to the New York Times, the Chinese money and the growth of corruption have 

peppered the continent with newly built stadiums, airports, hospitals, highways, and dams. But as 

Africans are beginning to fully recognize, these projects have also left many countries saddled 

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with heavy debts and other problems, from environmental conflict to labor strife. Additionally, 

Bright and Hruby (2015) noted there is a perception that within Africa, the Chinese are known 

move quickly with a project once the MOU is signed involving a contract and can be "on the 

ground in a week" to do the feasibility study in days. The truth is that the study itself is not 

comprehensive, but merely analyzes the cost of the project. That is the reason African 

governments say that American firms take so long to do a feasibility study, and the Chinese will 

do it in two months. 

Dr. David Ndii, an Oxford scholar economist, Rhodes scholar and Eisenhower fellow, who is 

considered one of world's most influential economist, has written extensively about governance 

and warned Kenya repeatedly on the dangers of graft, greed, and attractive Chinese money and 

its corrupting influence. This money poses a great danger to the recipient country's economic 

gains. The loans are more expensive for countries such as Kenya to repay because of the terms, 

corruption, and lack of clear planning. The only winner is Chinese government, workers, and 

Chinese banks. 

The US Secretary, Rex Tillerson made the following remarks as he prepared to leave for Africa, 

in his speech at George Mason University. He said, "Chinese investment has the potential to 

address Africa's infrastructure gap, but its approach has led to mounting debt and few if any jobs 

in most countries." Tillerson went on to suggest that Chinese loans are coupled with political and 

fiscal pressure, which endanger the Africa's natural resources and the long-term economic and 

continent's political stability. Dr. Ndii's has been brave enough to expose some of the corrupt, 

unethical deals between Chinese and the Kenyan governments, especially on the contract 

involving mega projects such as SGR that may sound a death trap to Kenya's economy to benefit 

the banks. The Chinese easy money is expensive in the long-run and will cost Kenya's tax payers 

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billions and billions of US Dollars to repay. Dr. Ndii 's has given a detailed account of 

questionable practices between China and Kenya government officials involving the biggest 

Chinese financed project in Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway financed and built by a Chinese 

contractor. The phase one is completed, the constructed railway line connects Mombasa to 

Nairobi at Sh327 billion (USD$ 3 billion), same as the Ethiopian line that was built by the same 

Chinese company almost at the same time, but the Kenya one is more than 100 km shorter. The 

questions that Kenyans are asking are: Has Ethiopia built an inferior line or is Kenya not 

receiving value for money or is our money being stolen through corruption~ These corrupt 

business deals are raising some serious economic, social, ethical, and political issues that 

Chinese and Kenyan government officials must answer. Kenya's love for China is sliding and is 

openly concerned by the level of corruption brought by Chinese money. It is sad to see that 

poverty is growing, yet politicians and government officials are competing to own helicopters 

that have become the mode of transportation for the political class. China plays a big part in 

corrupting leaders to gain business advantages through corruption within Africa, especially in 

Kenya. 

CHINESE INVESTMENT 

The continued growth of Chinese investment in Africa is generally welcomed by Africans, but 

countries such as Kenya are concerned and worried about the long-term consequences to the 

development of Africa. The political tensions are building, amidst plundering of resources by 

few corrupt Kenyans with Chinese government and businesses with no moral campus to guide 

their practices. The objective of this investment is making money with no regards to the 

people's welfare. 1 would like to outline five key areas that Kenyans have identified that are 

associated with Chinese corrupt practices in Kenya: 

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I) Chinese Loans: China is known to give loans to corrupt African government without 

asking any hard questions to these countries and their corrupt leaders. It is a common 

knowledge that loans are given above the project cost and you can guess where the rest goes 

For an example, a project may cost only$ I 0,000,000, but China will approve$ 20,000,000 

as requested by corrupt governments officials. 

2) Loan Repayment: China demands collateral and will insist that their loan money be 

paid first. We have witnessed where they come to the country to demand payment. In the 

case of Sri Lanka, when they could not pay back the loan China took over their Sea Port. 

3) Highest Interest Rate Chinese loans are like the US pay day loans. They tick these African 

countries and burden them with money and interest on the loans they can't pay back. If 

nothing is done, we can see China taking over countries like Kenya! 

4) Questionable Projects: China is moving away from coal, yet financing a coal mining project 

in Lamu, Kenya. The locals are against the project for environmental, economic, and health 

reasons, but sadly the corrupt deals shut out any opposing voice! 

5) Work Permit: Chinese have become preferred group when it comes to work permit. The 

ambassador of India made a formal complaint to Kenyan government because their nationals 

were constantly denied work visa, while Chinese employees were being approved for work 

pennit. The special treatment of Chinese nationals over Indian nationals by Kenyan 

government was raised by the Indian ambassador to Kenya and wanted to know why Indian 

nationals were treated differently from Chinese counterpart. Kenyans are also alanned and 

protest Chinese influence, especially when such close door deals between Kenya government 

officials and Chinese nationals within the Nyayo building, where government offices for 

immigration department are housed. This place is well known for corrupt deals. It is the site 

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where all visas and work penn it and other immigration issues are handled. One leading human 

right advocate told me and l quote, "40 Chinese nationals can walk into Nyayo house and all of 

them would be approved for work permit, while other credible nationalities are denied" 

CONCLUSION 

Because research is scarce on the impact of corruption between China and Africa 

dealings, the effects of corrupt dealing are common knowledge in Africa and requires more 

documentation. The African governments use all their powers to silence any protest. We see 

millionaires and billionaires created overnight with no record of work or business earnings to 

show the sources of their new wealth. These leaders make numerous trips to China each year for 

"official business" while at home they display wealth that no one is aware of their sources, and 

they cannot tell you how they got the wealth. They are not open to democratic practices and no 

one knows how they report their taxes. These leaders and their business associates will do 

anything to stay in power with the assistance of their Chinese collaborators who are willing and 

ready to come to their rescue during election season to finance new projects or relaunch old ones 

to fool the citizens of their worth for reelection. 

Finally, China must do the following: 

a) China must level the playing and follow the golden rule in Africa and not see Africa as a 

place to extract raw materials and leave the people in debt that our children cannot pay. 

b) China must abide by the constitution of Kenya and follow business ethics in their 

engagement with nationals. 

c) China must avoid secret deals that regular Kenyans do not understand and avoid loans that 

the children of Kenya will not even be able to pay back. 

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d) China must stop inflating projects to bribe corrupt government officials to award them 

contracts. 

e) China cannot tum a blind eye to human right abuses and democratic principles and must not 

keep sustain despots and crooks in power to exploit Africa. 

REFERENCE 

Bright, l, & Hruby, A. (2015). The next Aji-ica: An emerging continent becomes a global 

powerhouse. Macmillan. 

http:wledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle/chinas-investments-in-africa-whats-the-real-story/ 

httn:/lwv.:3cili9..S:.9J:ll/;m/natillual/tii1Grson-say,s::YJliD.£::~l@Jrages-de~u.dency-in-il)}jca: 

ap natignall% l e4039b5244fcbe39189f82d'iadf2 

h1!DiJ/\A/)l_~ar!liillhllrrl~"-C/illnLthrc.£liJ~ke_nya-v~-:ethiQl2ia-sgr_-_~Ql11P_are[:th_~!..rrkE:to-the-ft;;'1.15:}~:. 

Ytho-di9::iliiulll38l/ 

ht!ill'iL.\YWW nyt!mescom/2Q_l 4/05; Uiopinio!kipJ.o-a!l·ig,'l:";:binils-wiLd::: 

rush. htmlht tps //www. sde.co.ke/thenairobi an/mti cle/200 1262494/the-ti es-tha t -bind -dr -davidEdii -to-rail a-and::l!b.Y.ill 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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Over the past 50 years, Ghana has received assistance from China in diverse ways ranging from 

employment, education to direct investments. To throw more lights on some supports: 

Just some months ago, the Vice President of Ghana Dr. Mahamadu Bawumia outlined about 20 

solid projects from the Chinese Government to Ghana to the tune of $15billion. In the area of 

development, China has been of immense help to Ghana; 

In a quest to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, President Akufo Addo at a 

meeting with President of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, Peter Thompson 

reiterated government's commitment towards industrial transformation, diversifying 

agriculture for increased productivity and creating a strong social services sector in the country. 

To this end, the President stated that his government had introduced a raft of policy measures 

aimed at creating an enabling environment for the private sector to flourish. These measures, 

he added, would shift the focus of Ghana's economy from taxation to production, and, 

hopefully, make Ghanaian businesses very competitive in West Africa, Africa and beyond. 

On agriculture, the occupational mainstay of the majority of Ghanaians, President Akufo-Addo 

indicated that initiatives such as the programme for Planting for Food and Jobs, and the oneVillage-one-Dam project in the three regions of the North, are the answers to the twin-problem 

of the migration of youth to city centres. He pointed to the fact that the countries that had 

done well, even without natural resources, are the countries that had invested in education and 

skills training. 

Education and skills training, he noted, were the most important source of empowering and 

providing opportunities to the youth to help drive Ghana's development, and in the process 

create jobs. 

China over the years have written off some debts owed her by Ghana. Although debt relief has 

helped Ghana to make savings on interest payments, the savings made are still small in relation 

to the enormous challenges facing the country. 

While debt relief itself does not bring in substantial, new money for development, rich 

countries have also reneged on their pledge to increase their official development assistance 

(ODA) to 0.7% of their gross domestic products, although the UN set such a target some time 

ago in the 1970s and China can still be found in the list of such countries. 

Aside from writing down debt owed to it by Ghana since 1985 by $25 million, China has 

provided much-needed additional loans to assist Ghana to overcome its development 

challenges. Since the 1960s, China has assisted Ghana's development with technical support; 
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grants; and interest-free, interest-subsidized and concessionary loans (buyers' and suppliers' 

credit). China's ODA to Ghana is very significant and an average Ghanaian who knows the ins 

and outs of governance appreciates that. 

Even as back as 1964 and 1970, China extended a total of $43.5 million in assistance, and the 

largest single Chinese loan advanced to Ghana between the 1960s and the 1990s was a buyer's 

credit of $18 million. Since 2001, however, China has become a major development partner for 

Ghana, concentrating its assistance especially on the development of roads, energy and 

telecommunications infrastructure, and on technical cooperation (including raising agricultural 

productivity in Ghana and supplying industrial equipment such as machinery for Ghana's ailing 

textile sector). 

In late 2017 a grant of about RMB100 million for infrastructure development was granted 

Ghana by China. Ghana government intends to use this monies to acquire about 500 vehicles 

for the police, about RMB 50 million for the Ghana Armed Forces, 4 patrol boats for the Ghana 

Navy, Fund construction of 90 bridges across the country, Fund construction of Interchange at 

'Point 7' in Tamale which would be the first ever interchange in northern Ghana, Four 

Interchanges (Sofoline, Oforikrom, PTC Takoradi, Danquah Circle), Ten industrial parks in 10 

regions, Construction of the Eastern, and Central Rail Lines including its extension to Paga in 

the north of the country, the Boankra, Buipe Inland Ports and Pagainland terminal, 910 km of 

road network and to Build a new Accra Psychiatric Hospital. 

Energy crisis has been an enemy for the growth of Ghana as the power outage brought about 

the closure of many companies and inflated the cost of doing business for the very few who 

thrived irrespective. 

The infamous power outages called "Dumsor" saw China again coming to the aid of Ghana with 

a $562 million loan from the China Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) for the construction of 

a $622 million dam at Bui, located strategically between the north and south of the country. 

The Chinese loan was a mixed credit financing arrangement, with 42% being a concessionary 

loan and the rest are a supplier's credit. The concessionary component of the loan is payable 

over 20 years at 2% interest per annum. 

The construction of the dam increased the country's energy supply capacity from the current 

2,000 MW to 6,000 MW in 2015. 

Communication is a vital part of living and it plays a very important part in the growth of every 

country, China has since also been helping Ghana meet its objective of improving 

telecommunication services and integrating ICT into its development in 3 different aspects. 
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First and foremost, Beijing has provided a concessionary loan of $30 million to support the first 

phase of Ghana's National Communication Backbone and E-Government Project. The project is 

expected to link all 10 regional capitals and about 36 towns on the fiber routes to assist the 

implementation of Ghana's ICT for development policy, which has three faces. 

The first is to expand access to ICT facilities and training across the nation through the creation 

of community information centers, which are also expected to assist in the country's 

decentralization program by serving as hubs for government departments in the various 

districts. 

The second aspect of the policy is to develop systems to gather, manage and share information 

among government Ministries, Departments and Agencies to make the public sector more 

efficient. 

The third focus was to leverage the spread of ICT skills to build a knowledge economy to 

diversify the economy and expand its employment-generating capacity. 

In support of these projects, the UN Development Program helped to established and run the 

Information Technology Business Incubator Centre in the capital, Accra which is to provide 

financial, advisory and entrepreneurial training and the necessary business infrastructure to 

young entrepreneurs to start IT-related businesses, while China is assisting with the 

construction of a fibre optic cable from Accra in the south to Tamale in the north of Ghana. In 

addition, China is helping to build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the expansion of ICT 

to rural areas through its support for rural electrification to improve the transmission and 

distribution of electricity to rural Ghana. 

In trade, Chinese - Ghanaian trade is said to follow a classic North-South model, with Ghana 

exporting mainly primary commodities such as cocoa beans; manganese; sawn timber; natural 

rubber and vegetable products; and metal ores, concentrates and scrap, while importing from 

China a wide range of manufactured goods, including textiles and clothing, travelling bags, 

shoes, electronics, machinery and automobiles. 

China use to be the second largest exporter to Ghana behind Nigeria some years ago (which 

supplies Ghana mainly with crude oil), edging out the US and UK. 

In recent times with the discovery of light sweet crude oil in Ghana has changed the narrative, 

China is now becoming Ghana's largest trading partner as many young Ghanaians are eager to 

travel to china to bring in goods to sell. Notwithstanding, Ghanaian traders have on several 
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occasions demonstrated and rabbled against the influx of Chinese imported goods on our 

Ghanaian market. 

In the mining sector which has also being accompanied with some few challenges. It's on record 

that Small-scale mining contributes to about 30% of Ghana's total gold output and provides 

livelihoods to large numbers of people especially those in the rural communities where this 

mining activities take place. The small-scale gold mining industry has been 'reserved for 

Ghanaians' by law, they often use fundamental means of extraction. 

The last decade has seen a large increase in foreign involvement, especially from Chinese 

miners. This introduced a higher level of mechanization and increased the scale of mining with 

consequent degradation of land and water bodies. By 2016, the participation of Chinese citizens 

in informal mining in Ghana had grown and received such adverse media coverage, that the 

Government of Ghana was forced to act. 

According to a report by the Global Financial Integrity, between 2014 and 2017, more than 

1,477 illegal foreign miners were arrested by Ghanaian authorities and more than 3,800 

submitted to deportation voluntarily. In June and July 2014, a total of 4,592 Chinese illegal 

immigrants were deported from Ghana. 

The Government of Ghana as part of measures to eradicate the menace of galamsey deployed a 

team of heavy military personnel on an operation dubbed #OPERATION VANGUARD# to some 

galamsey prone areas to fight the menace. 

The operation led to the arrest of a famous Chinese business woman who had been alleged to 

have been engaged in illegal mining and the sad death of one of the Soldiers, Captain who was 

part of the tax force deployed to end Galamsey. 

The media fraternity in Ghana also launched various campaign programs such as #Media 

Coalition against Galamsey# and Operation End Galamsey Now where it reported cases where 

illegal mining took place. It also educated the public against the dangers associated with the 

act. 

Findings also suggest that there are serious negative impacts intensified by the involvement of 

Chinese miners in Ghana. 

In the sector of education, it's being reported that more than 4,000 Ghanaians have benefited 

from various short and long-term training programs in China since 2000 till date under the 
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sponsorship of the Chinese government. In 2016, 1,200 Ghanaians benefitted from Chinese 

programs, while 912 persons also benefitted in 2017. 

This was made known to the media by the Economic and Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese 

Embassy in Accra, Mr Chai Zhijing, in meeting organized by his office in Accra in December 

2017. 

In addition, there will be the Upgrading of 42 SHSs into model schools, provision of Teaching 

and Learning Materials, 228 Buses and 198 Pickup trucks for schools Irrigation and water 

transmission systems in northern Ghana from the$ 15 billion cash from China. 

China in the infrastructure sector have aided Ghana, they even committed a whopping $2 

billion to support Ghana's one-district, one factory (ODOF) policy. 

China Railway International Group Limited has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 

provide $10 billion to support the components of a massive infrastructure development 

program spanning the mining, industrial and railway fields. 

There will also the 25,000 houses project for the security services, 100,000 social housing units, 

25 district hospitals, Western Regional Hospital, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of 8,286 

collapsing classrooms among others. 

In conclusion, its palpable the interest of China in Africa and Ghana is beyond the exploration of 

natural resources here but stems deep to helping elevate the living conditions and standards of 

the Ghanaian and African. 

Even resource-poor African countries are benefitting from China's economic cooperation with 

Africa. By helping to build productive infrastructure and expand access to new technologies, 

China is helping Ghana combat poverty in ways that humanitarian aid and the distributionconsumption-focused poverty alleviation strategies do not. 

A recent World Bank report notes that technology diffusion helps developing countries reduce 

poverty, but weak basic infrastructure systems impose a major limitation on the domestic 

dissemination of a range of technologies that can be employed in many developing countries 

The Ghanaian government have acknowledged this support and has in the past taken initiatives 

to remove bottle necks that hinder trade between Ghana and china. 
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Moving forward, both parties should put in more efforts to reduce casualties and roadblocks to 

eliminate or mitigate agitations that have been encountered in the past since this bilateral 

relation between these two countries have been to the advantage of both. 

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