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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

In re FORFEITURE OF BAIL BOND (PEOPLE V 

COVINGTON) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 28, 2015 

v No. 320108 

Isabella Circuit Court 

BLINDA ANN COVINGTON, LC No. 2010-000916-FH 

 Defendant, 

and 

LEO’S BAIL BONDS AGENCY COMPANY, 

 Surety-Appellant. 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and RIORDAN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Appellant, Leo’s Bail Bonds Agency Company, appeals as of right the trial court order 

denying its motion to set aside a judgment of forfeiture and discharge it from its bond 

undertaking. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture 

pursuant to MCL 765.28 and MCL 765.26(2), but remand for the trial court to consider if 

equitable relief is warranted pursuant to MCL 600.4835. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Appellant is a bail bonds agency. It provided a surety bond on behalf of defendant, 

Blinda Covington, who was charged with uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249, and false 

pretenses, MCL 750.218(4)(a). 

Despite her conviction, Covington did not appear for her sentencing hearing. 

Consequently, the court issued a warrant for her arrest, and ordered appellant to pay the bond 

amount. The court eventually entered a judgment against appellant for $12,500. Defendant was 
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apprehended, although the parties dispute the precise role appellant played in her apprehension. 

Subsequently, appellant moved the court to set aside the bond forfeiture. The trial court denied 

appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment of forfeiture and discharge the bond. Appellant now 

appeals. 

II. MCL 765.26 & MCL 765.28 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review a trial court’s decision regarding setting aside a forfeiture bond for an abuse 

of discretion. In re Forfeiture of Surety Bond, 208 Mich App 369, 375; 529 NW2d 312 (1995). 

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable 

and principled outcomes.” Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 526; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). We 

review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 

304, 309; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 The “primary goal” of statutory interpretation “is to discern the intent of the Legislature 

by first examining the plain language of the statute.” Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 246-247; 

802 NW2d 311 (2011). A statutory provision must be read in the context of the entire act, and 

“every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.” Krohn v 

Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). When the language is clear 

and unambiguous, “no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must 

be enforced as written.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 

(2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This case involves a defendant who failed to appear at her sentencing hearing and the 

court’s resulting bench warrant and order forfeiting the bond. In such a situation, MCL 765.28 

applies, which provides: 

 (1) If default is made in any recognizance in a court of record, the default 

shall be entered on the record by the clerk of the court. After the default is 

entered, the court shall give each surety immediate notice not to exceed 7 days 

after the date of the failure to appear. The notice shall be served upon each surety 

in person or left at the surety's last known business address. Each surety shall be 

given an opportunity to appear before the court on a day certain and show cause 

why judgment should not be entered against the surety for the full amount of the 

bail or surety bond. If good cause is not shown for the defendant's failure to 

appear, the court shall enter judgment against the surety on the recognizance for 

an amount determined appropriate by the court but not more than the full amount 

of the bail, or if a surety bond has been posted the full amount of the surety bond. 

If the amount of a forfeited surety bond is less than the full amount of the bail, the 

defendant shall continue to be liable to the court for the difference, unless 

otherwise ordered by the court. Execution shall be awarded and executed upon the 

judgment in the manner provided for in personal actions. 
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 (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the court shall set aside the 

forfeiture and discharge the bail or surety bond within 1 year from the date of 

forfeiture judgment if the defendant has been apprehended, the ends of justice 

have not been thwarted, and the county has been repaid its costs for apprehending 

the person. If the bond or bail is discharged, the court shall enter an order to that 

effect with a statement of the amount to be returned to the surety. 

 (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the defendant was apprehended more 

than 56 days after the bail or bond was ordered forfeited and judgment entered 

and the surety did not fully pay the forfeiture judgment within that 56-day period. 

[MCL 765.28.] 

As discernible from the language of MCL 765.28, it expressly applies to this case, where 

a default has occurred and more than 56 days passed before defendant was apprehended and the 

surety did not fully pay the bond within that period. MCL 765.28(2) and (3). According to the 

plain statutory language, appellant would not be entitled to setting aside the bond forfeiture 

because it did not apprehend defendant within 56 days or fully pay the bond within that period. 

MCL 765.28(2) and (3). On appeal, appellant does not even attempt to argue that it is entitled to 

relief pursuant to MCL 765.28(2). 

Instead, appellant relies on MCL 765.26 to conclude that the trial court erred in failing to 

set aside the bond forfeiture. That section provides: 

 (1) In all criminal cases where a person has entered into any recognizance 

for the personal appearance of another and such bail and surety afterwards desires 

to be relieved from responsibility, he or she may, with or without assistance, 

arrest or detain the accused and deliver him or her to any jail or to the sheriff of 

any county. In making the arrest or detainment, he or she is entitled to the 

assistance of any peace officer. 

 (2) The sheriff or keeper of any jail is authorized to receive the principal 

and detain him or her in jail until he or she is discharged. Upon delivery of his or 

her principal at the jail by the surety or his or her agent or any officer, the surety 

shall be released from the conditions of his or her recognizance. 

 (3) Whenever the prosecuting attorney of a county is satisfied that a 

person who has been recognized to appear for trial has absconded, or is about to 

abscond, and that his or her sureties or either of them have become worthless, or 

are about to dispose or have disposed of their property for the purpose of evading 

the payment or the obligation of such bond or recognizance or with intent to 

defraud their creditors, and that prosecuting attorney makes a satisfactory 

showing to this effect to the court having jurisdiction of that person, the court or 

judge shall promptly grant a mittimus to the sheriff or any peace officer of that 

county, commanding him or her forthwith to arrest the person so recognized and 

bring him or her before the officer issuing the mittimus and on the return of that 

mittimus may, after a hearing on the merits, order him or her to be recommitted to 
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the county jail until such time as he or she gives additional and satisfactory 

sureties, or is otherwise discharged. 

 Appellant contends that because it surrendered Covington on or around November 13, 

2013, it should be released from all conditions of its recognizance. Appellant highlights the 

language in subsection (2) that states, “Upon delivery of his or her principal at the jail by the 

surety or his or her agent or any officer, the surety shall be released from the conditions of his or 

her recognizance.” MCL 765.26(2). 

 However, MCL 765.26 applies to situations when a surety wishes to be relieved of 

responsibility for defendant, and it can arrest and deliver defendant in order to be released from 

its obligations. In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich 320, 331; 852 NW2d 747 (2014). The 

facts of this case do not involve appellant deciding it no longer wanted to be responsible for 

defendant. Rather, the events that precipitated the bond forfeiture are that defendant failed to 

show up at sentencing, thereby causing the court to issue a warrant for her arrest and an order 

forfeiting bond. 

In essence, appellant attempts to evade the 56-day deadline to apprehend defendant in 

MCL 765.28, by reading the language of MCL 765.26 to allow the surety to arrest and deliver 

defendant even when a default is in place. This proposed reading of the statute violates the longstanding principle that “in the interpretation of statutes, effect must be given, if possible, to every 

word, sentence and section and, to that end, the entire act must be read to be an harmonious and 

consistent enactment as a whole.” Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co, 449 Mich 293, 303; 536 

NW2d 530 (1995). If appellant was able to set aside the bond forfeiture simply because 

defendant was apprehended at any point in time, then the language in MCL 765.28(3)—

specifically limiting the surety to 56 days in which to secure defendant’s apprehension—

becomes nugatory. As the Michigan Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned, we must avoid 

interpretation of statutes that renders any part surplusage or nugatory. Klapp v United Ins Group 

Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 468; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). Accordingly, the trial court properly 

found that appellant was not entitled to relief pursuant to MCL 765.26 or MCL 765.28.1

III. MCL 600.4835 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 

1

 Although appellant relies on Matter of Int’l Fidelity Ins Co, 88 Mich App 341; 276 NW2d 607 

(1979), that case is inapposite. The defendant and the surety in that case entered into a contract 

that the “bond was to remain in full force and effect for a period of one year.” Id. at 342. The 

defendant failed to appear, but the surety argued it was no longer liable because the one year had 

expired. Id. at 342-343. This Court found that the surety was liable because “any bail bond 

provision which calls for the surety’s discharge absent delivery of the principal to be null and 

void.” Id. at 343-344. It did not address the issue in this case, and is not binding on us. MCR 

7.215(J)(1). Nor does People v Havey, 382 Mich 58; 167 NW2d 308 (1969), pertain to the issue 

before us. 
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 Appellant also asserts that it is entitled to relief pursuant to MCL 600.4835. We review a 

trial court’s decision regarding setting aside a forfeiture bond for an abuse of discretion. In re 

Forfeiture of Surety Bond, 208 Mich App at 375. We review unpreserved issues for plain error 

affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 MCL 600.4835 provides: 

 The circuit court for the county in which such court was held, or in which 

such recognizance was taken, may, upon good cause shown, remit any penalty, or 

any part thereof, upon such terms as appear just and equitable to the court. But 

this section does not authorize such court to remit any fine imposed by any court 

upon a conviction for any criminal offense, nor any fine imposed by any court for 

an actual contempt of such court, or for disobedience of its orders or process.[2

] 

“Under the statute, a forfeited recognizance bond may be remitted as it appears just and equitable 

and it is a matter that is within the discretion of the court.” People v Munley, 175 Mich App 399, 

403; 438 NW2d 292 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). 

In its written motion, appellant did not raise MCL 600.4835 as a basis for relief. 

Nevertheless, appellant referenced equitable remitter during the motion hearing and argued that 

paying the bond only to then bring an independent action for remitter would be a waste of 

resources. The trial court did not rely on MCL 600.4835 or purport to analyze the statute and 

equitable factors. 

In a similar bond forfeiture case, the appellant ostensibly failed to assert entitlement to 

relief under MCL 765.28 or MCL 600.4835 adequately. People v Bray, 481 Mich 888; 749 

NW2d 741 (2008).3 Although this Court held that the appellant was therefore precluded from 

seeking relief, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated that opinion and remanded the case for the 

trial court to consider the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture pursuant to MCL 765.28(2) and 

MCL 600.4835. Id. 

 In accordance with the Supreme Court’s order in Bray, we remand for the trial court to 

consider whether setting aside the bond forfeiture was warranted pursuant to MCL 600.4835. 

We agree with appellee that the trial court is not obligated to grant relief under MCL 600.4835. 

Munley, 175 Mich App at 403. However, the court must at least consider and weigh relevant 

equitable considerations under MCL 600.4835. Bray, 481 Mich at 888. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 

2

 “For purposes of this statute, the term ‘penalty’ includes forfeited recognizances.” People v 

Evans, 434 Mich 314, 332; 454 NW2d 105 (1990). 

3

 See also this Court’s opinion, People v Bray, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued November 29, 2007 (Docket No. 271042). 
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 The trial court in the instant case considered and correctly rejected the applicability of 

MCL 765.26 and MCL 765.28. However, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Bray, we vacate the circuit court’s order denying appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment of 

forfeiture and remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the motion under MCL 

600.4835. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan