Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military 

in the Interagency Process 

Written By 

Lisa Witzig Davidson 

Margaret Daly Hayes 

James J. Landon 

NDU Press Book 

December 1996 
Table of Contents 

Acknowledgments................................................................................................................ i 

Foreword............................................................................................................................. ii 

Chapter 1: Purpose of the Workshop.................................................................................. 1 

Chapter 2: The Complex Process of Responding to Crisis................................................. 4 

Chapter 3: Successful Aspects of the NGO/Military Interface......................................... 14 

Chapter 4: Difficult Aspects of the NGO/Military Interface...........................................19s 

Chapter 5: Possibilities for Enhancement......................................................................... 27 

Appendix A: Civil-Military Relations in Complex Humanitarian Emergency 

Response: Progress and Problems .................................................................................... 33 

Appendix B: The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief............... 46 

Appendix C: OFDA Role in Disaster Relief..................................................................... 53 
i 

Acknowledgments 

This workshop report is the result of contributions from many individuals. Most 

important were the contributions of those representatives of the NGO community, the 

military, and the U.S. Government who participated in the National Defense University, 

ACTIS workshop, Humanitarian and Peace Operations: The NGO/Interagency Interface 

in April 1996. Many of the NGO and U.S. Government representatives have offered 

subsequent comments and explanations to enhance the clarity of this report. 

The authors are particularly grateful to Ambassador Robert Oakley of NDU/INSS, both 

for his active participation in the workshop and for his careful review of the final 

manuscript. Mr. Dayton Maxwell of World Vision also read the manuscript and offered 

many useful comments. Ms. Elizabeth Lukasavich and Ms. Susan Walker of OFDA and 

Mr. George Devendorf of InterAction were also generous in their support for this project. 

At Evidence Based Research, Ms. Lydia Candland edited and prepared the manuscript for 

publication. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of each of these 

individuals while assuming responsibility for any errors of omission or commission in 

drafting the final report. 
ii 

Foreword 

This report documents the latest in a series of workshops and roundtables organized by 

the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) 

Directorate for Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS). 

These meetings bring together operators, planners, researchers, and analysts to identify 

and examine selected aspects of command and control in contemporary Military 

Coalition Operations and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and to advance the 

process of developing one or more Mission Capability Packages (MCPs) to support 

combined and coalition operations. 

ACTIS seeks to improve the state of the art and practice of command and control by 

undertaking selected research and analysis initiatives and by serving as a bridge among 

the operational, technical, analytical, and educational communities. The Directorate 

focuses on emerging requirements and mission areas where new concepts are needed. 

One of the problem areas identified in ACTIS workshops on peace operations has been 

that of interagency and civilian-military coordination. In response to this issue, ACTIS 

held a workshop on 18-19 April 1996 that focused on the interface between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the U.S. Government--particularly the military--

in humanitarian and peace operations. 

One of the key findings from the workshop was the recognition by both the NGOs and 

civilian and military officials that communication needs to be improved between the 

NGO and U.S. Government communities, especially with the military. As follow-up, 

ACTIS is supporting a research effort to develop an information system that is low-cost, 

user-friendly, responsive to the information needs of the Government and the NGO 

community, and compatible with the needs of the military. NGO representatives have 

been invited to participate in identifying some of the parameters of this system. 

Individuals interested in participating in this initiative or other ACTIS-sponsored 

activities are invited to contact me at (202) 685-2262. 

David S. Alberts, Ph.D. 

Director, ACTIS 
1 

Chapter 1: Purpose of the Workshop 

Background 

The workshop on Humanitarian and Peace Operations: The NGO/Interagency Interface 

was held at the National Defense University on 18-19 April 1996, the seventh in a series 

that explores advanced command relationships. The workshops are sponsored by the 

Directorate for Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS), 

which has a charter from The Joint Staff to develop Mission Capability Packages (MCPs) 

that will support improved joint and combined command and control (C2) for Operations 

Other Than War (OOTW), including coalition peace operations. In addition to 

developing MCPs, ACTIS serves as the bridge between the defense-related technical and 

operational communities, creating opportunities for communication between the two 

groups. 

ACTIS workshops are designed to focus on command and control issues by bringing 

together select groups of senior analysts and operators to explore a particular issue, 

operation, or problem.1 A primary goal is to analyze and improve the linkages between 

the military operational and technical communities. In the past, participants have 

included the activities' sponsors (The Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence [C3I]), the individual military 

services, representatives of the U.S. Unified Commands, other relevant U.S. Government 

agencies, academics, and private organizations. All ACTIS workshops are conducted on a 

non-attribution basis and work toward consensus on major issues. Evidence Based 

Research, Inc. (EBR) acts as rapporteur for the discussions. 

During a previous workshop that explored the interfaces of civilian-military 

communication and planning during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, ACTIS 

determined that the U.S. Government interface with private voluntary organizations 

(PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) needed to be studied in greater 

depth. ACTIS convened the seventh workshop in the series to explore the dynamics of 

the NGO/interagency interface, particularly as it relates to the military, and to search for 

ways to improve necessary communication between these two very different groups. 

Discussions in virtually all the prior coalition and peace operations workshops 

highlighted the key role of NGOs and PVOs. Relations with these organizations are 

clearly an important determinant of mission accomplishment in many OOTW scenarios. 

In recognition of the importance of this interface, ACTIS is sponsoring development of a 

prototype system to exchange information with NGOs and PVOs. This system would 

facilitate closer coordination by allowing government and NGO participants to exchange 

information over a global computer network. 

The NGO/Interagency workshop was structured to examine and discuss three areas 

critical to the NGO/U.S. Government interface during humanitarian and peace 

operations: 

• Pre-deployment planning. 
2 

• Effective coordination in-country. 

• Problems of transition. 

The participants were asked to identify situations in which the two communities worked 

well together and situations in which working together was difficult for each of these 

topic areas. 

Organizing the discussion around these critical operational areas helped to reveal broad 

and significant differences among the NGO community, U.S. Government agencies, and 

the military. Cultural barriers, vast differences in resources, capabilities, and in-country 

experience, and divergent viewpoints on coordination and the use of technology were 

quickly identified as obstacles to effective NGO/Interagency interface. 

Workshop participants also identified a number of areas where they might cooperate and 

develop plans and programs to improve their relations and interactions. These ideas and 

suggestions are discussed in Chapter 5. One of the significant ideas emphasized the need 

to develop procedures whereby NGOs and U.S. Government entities can train together to 

improve their understanding of each other. A second theme focused on improving 

communications between the two communities and within the NGO community itself by 

developing a networking mechanism to share information, possibly using computer 

technology. The workshop also touched briefly on the difficult problems of transition and 

exit strategies. 
3 

Overview 

This report summarizes the workshop's free-flowing discussion. It does not offer 

solutions to problems with the NGO/Interagency interface independently of ideas 

expressed by workshop participants. The rapporteurs have adhered closely to the 

discussion and observations of workshop participants. The report does seek to reflect 

individual insights into the specific problems of NGO/military interfaces during 

humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Chapter 2 explores the composition and traits 

of the NGO community in an effort to place NGO participants' comments in context and 

to identify underlying causes of the apparent divergence between U.S. Government 

agencies, the military, and the NGO community. Chapter 3 identifies aspects of the 

interface that have worked well in the past and that serve as the foundation for future 

improvements. Chapter 4 focuses on the problems confronting NGOs, U.S. Government 

agencies, and the military when trying to improve their working relationship. Chapter 5 

reports the suggestions generated by the workshop participants to enhance 

communication between the communities and to create systems to foster better 

coordination, planning, training, and use of technology. 
4 

Chapter 2: The Complex Process of Responding to Crisis 

When crisis--whether a natural or technological disaster or a complex humanitarian 

emergency--strikes, the international community increasingly responds with large-scale 

assistance and, often, military support. This response augments and sometimes 

temporarily substitutes for an ongoing international effort to promote development and 

improve the well-being of individuals and societies in developing regions. Both the 

ongoing development assistance process and disaster relief involve a myriad of national 

government and international organizations and entities from around the world. In 

addition, hundreds of NGOs serve as the implementing agents of official organizations or 

pursue their own independent development missions in-country. During a period of crisis 

many of these organizations, particularly the development organizations, will reduce their 

presence or shift their emphasis, while relief organizations will increase their level of 

activity. 

The complex lines of responsibility and overlapping and diverging missions of these 

many organizations make coordinating the international response particularly difficult. 

Nevertheless, that is precisely what responding nations, the United Nations, and the 

NGO/PVO community are called upon to do in order to alleviate the crisis as quickly as 

possible, save lives, and return to stability. In principal, coordination of disaster response 

occurs through the local government, but during a crisis, or if the government is weak or 

failing, international agencies will bolster or substitute for local authority. Figure 1 

depicts the process of shifting priorities and changing actors that occurs as a disaster 

response evolves. 
5 

Prior to the crisis and as it unfolds (Figure 1, Time A), some level of national and 

international development activities involving both international agencies and NGOs is 

very likely taking place. As the political, economic, or security situation deteriorates and 

long-term development activities become more difficult or impossible to pursue, some of 

these organizations withdraw or reduce their presence (Time B). Others shift their 

emphasis to relief efforts. The situation may deteriorate further until generating a demand 

for emergency international response. When the local government requests assistance or 

the international community, usually acting through the United Nations, decides to 

respond to the crisis, a massive, focused, and temporary international response, backed by 

military logistic and security support, takes place (Time C to D). The international 

community's goal in disaster response is to ameliorate the crisis and stabilize the situation 

as quickly as possible (Time D) so that development efforts can continue (Time E). The 

actual transition process may take months or years, a fact that is often not contemplated 

in contingency planning. 
6 

The NGO Community: Global, Diverse, Multifaceted 

From the outset of the workshop, it was clear that the NGO community is quite diverse. 

The differences among NGOs themselves are so vast that attempts to group them together 

as one community are nearly impossible. Differences include organizational structures, 

size and origin of resources, national ties, focus of activities, as well as access to and use 

of technology. 

Organizational Structures. The International Humanitarian Assistance community can be 

divided into roughly four components: UN agencies and other public international 

organizations, private international organizations, donor agencies, and individual NGOs. 

• UN Agencies and Other Public and International Organizations. The UN 

emergency/management apparatus, reorganized and streamlined in 1992, has 

humanitarian, development, political, and security components. On the 

humanitarian side, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) is 

responsible for mobilizing and coordinating the collective efforts of the 

international community (particularly the UN System) to meet human needs in 

disasters and emergencies in a coherent and timely manner and to facilitate the 

smooth transition from relief to development. Other UN humanitarian agencies 

include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food 

Program (WFP). These agencies respond to specific emergencies at the direction 

of the Security Council and member countries. The UN International Children's 

Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the 

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are the UN's development 

organizations, dealing with long-term humanitarian issues, but generally not relief 
7 

efforts. All of these programs work both with their own staff and with individual 

NGOs that implement UN programs in the field. The UN Department of Political 

Affairs (UNDPA) follows political developments worldwide, so as to provide 

early warning of impending conflicts and analyze possibilities for preventive 

action by the UN. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) 

was greatly expanded in 1992 to include monitoring, planning, and support of 

operations. It also serves as the Secretary General's military staff. UNDPKO is 

responsible for the military, civilian police, and electoral components of a 

complex mission. Other public international organizations in this category include 

a number of regional government organizations such as the Organization of 

African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), or subregional groups like the Economic Community of West African States 

(ECOWAS), which today is active in Liberia. Like the UN agencies, these 

international organizations are characterized by their special status as legal 

entities under some tenets of international law. 

• Private International Organizations. Private international organizations include 

worldwide and regional institutions involved in humanitarian missions such as the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the League of Red Cross, and 

Red Crescent Societies. These organizations operate around the world 

independently of any government, and also enjoy special status as legal entities 

under international law. 

• Donor Agencies. Donor agencies are primarily national government funding 

organizations that provide official resources for development and relief. The 

principal donor agencies represent national governments directly or indirectly and 

include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Canada's 

International Development Agency (CIDA), Japan's International Cooperation 

Agency (JICA), the U.K.'s Overseas Development Agency (ODA), and the 

European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO), which coordinates the 

efforts of several European Community government agencies. The World Bank 

and regional development banks are also counted among the donor agencies 

responding to the guidance of their multiple members. While the banks do not 

play a role in relief efforts, they are increasingly seeking ways to be responsive 

during reconstruction. 

• Individual NGOs. There are thousands of NGOs operating around the world. 

Some, like the International Rescue Committee (IRC), World Vision, Cooperative 

for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Christian Children's Fund, Save the 

Children, and Catholic Relief Services, are registered in the United States and 

conduct their missions overseas. Others, like Oxford Famine Relief (OXFAM) 

and Medicin sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), operate out of other 

developed countries and have activities around the world. Still other NGOs are 

indigenous to the countries where relief and development needs exist. NGOs 

differ in size, resources base, thematic and geographic focus of activities, and 

access to and use of technology, among other things. 
8 

Resources. In addition to the national and international dimensions of NGOs, 

organizations vary by the size of their resource bases. Some NGOs are quite large (e.g., 

CARE's total support and revenue top $450 million), while many others have operating 

budgets of less than $10,000. The origin of funding can vary greatly from NGO to NGO, 

but is comprised of: 

Public Resources--grants and contracts from donor government agencies and 

international organizations; and 

Private Resources--contributions from individuals, religious groups, communities, 

foundations, and businesses, in the form of money or gifts-in-kind. 

Most NGOs depend on a combination of public and private funding. However, some 

NGOs decline to accept funding from government agencies so as not to be compromised 

by specific government policy interests. Like their budgets, NGO personnel rosters vary 

according to budgets and mission. Larger NGOs have a greater ability to respond to 

unexpected contingencies because of their resource base. 

Focus of Activities. NGOs also vary by mission. Individual NGOs typically have very 

focused purposes. They may seek to promote sustainable economic development through 

projects in agriculture, trade, small business development and so forth, or foster improved 

infant and maternal health, control disease, provide food, or expand access to education. 

A number of NGOs focus on human rights, election monitoring, and conflict resolution. 

NGOs generally are committed to building the capacities of their indigenous partners in 

the field, and often work at the grassroots level rather than with central government 

agencies. Their programs usually emphasize the need to enable people to assume 
9 

responsibility for their own affairs. Many NGOs have worked on projects in individual 

countries for many years. In several workshops, NGO representatives have emphasized 

that others--the U.S. Government and the military--must understand that they are "there 

for the long term...," before the crisis and after. 

Technology. According to NGO representatives at the workshop, the level of technology 

employed by an NGO is dependent upon the size of the organization and its operating 

situation. Because these largely voluntary organizations operate on small budgets and 

seek to expend the bulk of their resources on in-country programs, little money is 

budgeted for technology. As such, many of the NGOs--especially the smaller ones--use 

older generation computers, communication devices, and software, and lack the up-todate technologies common to most American business or government offices. Some of 

the larger NGOs, however, possess modern systems and can afford upgrades in 

technology. 

Workshop participants pointed out that their mission frequently is not enhanced (and can 

sometimes be impeded) by technology. When conflict is raging in the areas in which the 

NGOs are operating, computers and other items of value - four-wheel drive vehicles, 

satellite dishes, etc.- are frequently stolen or may make NGO personnel vulnerable to 

attack. In addition, in the remote areas of NGO operations, such as the interior of Zaire, 

establishing communication links or accessing a reliable source of electricity is often 

impossible. Consequently, NGOs are reluctant to look toward technological "quick 

fixes." Moreover, because of the grassroots nature of NGO work, these organizations 

need to blend with the local community, which is typically "low- or no-tech." Several 

NGO representatives also commented that their use of sophisticated communications 

technology could raise concerns within the host government, particularly if that 

government did not have similar access to technology or if it involves communications 

with the U.S. military. 

Common Characteristics: Sharing the Same Goals 

Despite extreme differences in funding and organization, NGOs share a common culture. 

InterAction, a coalition of more than 150 NGOs engaged in humanitarian efforts, 

characterizes this culture as: 

• Independent. NGOs are focused on their mission and, working with their donors, 

will figure out the best way to achieve their goals. They tend to develop their 

plans and programs independently of other organizations, tailoring their efforts to 

their resource constraints and the needs identified in-country. 

• Decentralized. NGOs are usually not organized along hierarchical lines. NGOs 

place greater emphasis on a large number of workers, not managers. Authority is 

delegated downward, giving maximum flexibility to individuals operating in the 

field. 

• Committed. NGOs believe in making a long-term commitment to a situation. 

Their goal is to achieve an end-state, not an exit strategy. As such, they focus on 
10 

programs that deal with problems and issues that are difficult to tackle, take time 

(perhaps decades), and whose progress may be all but impossible to measure in 

the short term. 

• "Hands-On." NGOs value field experience for their personnel. Because of 

pressing needs and time constraints, training frequently occurs "on-the-job" as 

make-shift remedies addressing immediate needs are created on-site. 

Additionally, NGOs seldom use field manuals to guide their work - field 

experience is seen as the greater teacher. (InterAction's complete brief on the 

characteristics of the NGO community is included in Appendix A.) 

The workshop participants emphasized that, because of their commitment to a long-term 

relationship in-country, NGOs are very concerned about maintaining neutrality, including 

the appearance of neutrality. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief, which 

provides guidance on standards of behavior for NGOs, illustrates the commitment NGOs 

have toward operating independently of any government:6 

• NGOs are "agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore 

formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to 

implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our 

own independent policy." 

• NGOs will "never knowingly--or through negligence--allow ourselves, or our 

employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military, or 

economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve 

purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as 

instruments of foreign policy of donor governments." 

• "Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 

Humanitarian aid will be given according to the needs of individuals, families, 

and communities." (See Appendix B for the full text of the Code of Conduct.) 

NGOs believe that their neutrality and independence from government policies enables 

them to better perform their missions. Moreover, their ability to carry out their programs 

in-country ultimately depends upon the willingness of the host country or different parties 

to a conflict to allow them to do so. Consequently, any perceptions that an NGO is 

violating its neutral stance could jeopardize its programs. 

Despite the NGO community's staunch independent nature, NGOs are learning to work 

more closely together to achieve common goals. NGOs established an NGO coordinating 

committee for the first time in Thailand during the Cambodia refugee crisis.7

 The model 

was copied in Northern Iraq, where the community point of contact proved critical for 

coordination with both civilian and military organizations. NGOs have gradually begun 

to coordinate their efforts more closely in subsequent emergencies. 
11 

Interagency Interface in Disaster Response 

As international community responses to complex humanitarian emergencies have grown 

more frequent, and the number of official agencies and NGOs responding to crises have 

burgeoned, the organizational complexity of the response process has grown 

geometrically. This trend has tremendous implications for command and control and 

interagency interface on the ground. Figure 2 is an effort to capture the dynamic 

complexity of organizational relations in disaster response and also to depict the intricate 

lines of communication and reporting responsibilities of both the civilian and military 

communities. 

To understand the complexities captured in the figure, one needs to view the situation by 

examining "organizational slices of the pie." As a starting point, the host nation --the 

central focus of relief activities--will possess some government capability that affects the 

relief process in most cases. Where government is effective, most NGOs operating in the 

host nation are authorized to be there by the host government and will seek to retain a 

positive relationship with that government. The host government also works closely with 

international actors in coordinating the relief response. 

Although most practitioners in complex humanitarian emergencies refer to the NGO 

community as if it were a monolith, each NGO remains committed to its particular 

mission. Figure 2 illustrates the diversity of the NGOs--their differing sizes, mission 

orientations, and resource capabilities--by depicting them with contrasting sized, shaped, 

and shaded figures in the NGO arenas. Clearly, communication among these differing 

entities becomes complex. Because most NGOs depend on donor funding for their 
12 

activities, they must be responsive to their own headquarters, the host country, and to the 

external funding agencies. The situation is complicated further by the fact that the 

donor(s) may be a national government, an international organization or agency, or both. 

These donor agencies --particularly national government agencies--may have different 

political reasons for their involvement in development or relief efforts. Donors 

collaborate with each other, but do not always share information or achieve consensus on 

their full range of activities. Also, donors may cooperate well at the national government 

level, but have greater difficulty collaborating in the field. Both governments and NGOs 

sometimes complain that donors should "keep better tabs" on those NGOs using donor 

resources or operating under a donor's national flag. 

International organizations present yet another layer of complexity because they 

operate under a different set of rules than do national organizations. UN organizations 

function with relative autonomy, particularly in non-crisis periods, but are subject to the 

constraints of the collective mandate of the Security Council during a crisis and are very 

sensitive to host country preferences. Within a host nation, a UN Special Representative, 

who reports to the UN Secretary General, will be the chief point of contact for all UN 

organizations responding to the crisis and will be the focal point for UN communications, 

however, he will not have the authority to command the various organizations. In 

addition to the UN, regional government organizations, like the OAU or the OAS, may 

station individuals or operate programs in-country. Their reporting responsibilities flow 

back to the regional organization's headquarters and from there to country members. 

One of the principal actors in any disaster, the Red Cross Community, maintains a wholly 

independent set of relationships with the host nation and other NGOs. Like other 

international organizations, the unique capabilities and linkages this group of 

organizations already has established in-country allows it to respond quickly and 

effectively in many cases. It frequently strives to maintain good communications with the 

other actors involved in disaster situations. 

In responding to disaster, the military, supporting national and international 

peacekeeping or relief efforts, often gets involved in a crisis after many of the other 

actors are already present and active in the relief process. Operations to protect Kurds in 

Northern Iraq, where the military arrived first, were an exception to the general 

experience. Other recent crises, such as Somalia or Rwanda, have presented unique 

challenges, and both civilian and military authorities have had to improvise to respond 

appropriately. Lessons learned have been incorporated into subsequent planning efforts, 

but the unique circumstances of each situation inevitably present unforeseen challenges 

to planning, coordination, communication, and implementation of the strategy. 

The military's primary missions in disaster response are to establish security and 

make it possible for relief organizations to operate. Carrying out these missions may 

require the military to first establish a secure environment, then to provide transportation, 

communication, and/or security for the NGOs as well as for the military force itself. A 

secondary mission is to assist in creating conditions that will permit the host nation to 

return to normalcy. This mission is often more controversial than the first, given that it 

requires the military to perform duties outside of its primary responsibility of ensuring a 
13 

secure environment. Primary and secondary missions are often blurred in complex 

emergencies such as Somalia or Bosnia. In several NDU workshops, NGOs have 

observed that it is important for the military to consult with NGOs and donors already on 

the ground before undertaking action so as not to disrupt ongoing activities. At the same 

time, NGOs seek to remain independent and neutral in their dealings with the military. 

The NGOs' ongoing relationship with local grassroots organizations and their 

commitment to their unique missions make it difficult to create and apply a single set of 

rules to govern NGO relations with military organizations and government 

representatives. This is the heart of the dilemma confronting both civilian and military 

organizations as they seek to develop a more coordinated and cooperative approach for 

responding to complex humanitarian emergencies. This process is described in detail in 

The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, for which the author 

interviewed many of the actors in NGOs, Government, and military, in recent complex 

humanitarian emergencies.8 
14 

Chapter 3: Successful Aspects of the NGO/Military Interface 

As U.S. Government agencies, especially the military, have become more involved in 

complex humanitarian emergencies, the need to interact with NGOs has grown. 

Operation Provide Comfort, the 1991 operation to provide humanitarian relief to Kurds 

in northern Iraq, was a watershed in NGO/Interagency cooperation. It marked the first 

time that government agencies, NGOs and the military, despite different methods and 

motivations, worked so closely together in pursuit of a common goal. Since the 

experience in Iraq, there have been complex humanitarian emergency responses in 

Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Zaire, and Bosnia. NGOs, many of which have 

traditionally been involved in long-term development work, are placing increased 

emphasis on emergency relief, especially in complex humanitarian emergencies. For 

example, during the Kurdish crisis in 1991, 28 NGOs were involved in providing 

humanitarian aid. In Somalia, the number grew to 78. In Rwanda, 170 NGOs were 

involved, while in Haiti, over 400 NGOs--including local or indigenous organizations--

were on the ground when the U.S. troops landed. In the ongoing conflict in Bosnia, the 

workshop participants estimated that more than 400 NGOs--large and small, international 

and indigenous--are active. As the scope, frequency, and size of complex humanitarian 

emergencies increase, the body of knowledge on how to make these operations successful 

has increased as well. The following discussion highlights those areas of cooperation 

where significant gains were reported by workshop participants. 

Planning 

Workshop participants considered Haiti's Operation Uphold Democracy a model of 

effective planning. The Haiti operation marked the first time the U.S. Government 

organized to develop an interagency political-military plan of operations prior to 

undertaking a crisis response.9 OFDA, and through it, the NGO community, was brought 

into the Government's and the military's planning process at a relatively early stage. The 

interagency political-military planning effort reflected lessons learned in previous 

disaster responses, beginning with Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. While 

this represents considerable progress in interagency coordination, as one participant 

observed, "it was a long time coming!" 

Coordination 

The experiences in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda have proven that closer 

coordination among NGOs and the military can more effectively serve the goal of 

delivering humanitarian assistance in complex humanitarian emergencies. A variety of 

organizations now serve as coordinating mechanisms between government/international 

organization representatives, the military, and NGOs, among NGOs themselves, and 

between NGOs and the military. Most of these organizations originated from the 

experiences of Operation Provide Comfort, and were later built upon in the early stages 

of humanitarian relief to Somalia ( Operation Provide Relief ). 
15 

Figure 3 depicts the general pattern of coordination among the UN agencies, donor 

agencies, NGOs, and the military that has evolved in recent experience. The UN is 

generally the principal agency coordinating the international community's response, and 

as such assumes a preeminent role in integrating the activities of different donors, NGOs 

working in-country, the UN's own agencies and other donors, and the military supporting 

the operation. A variety of structures have evolved to facilitate coordination across these 

national, organizational, and cultural boundaries. They may have different names and 

may be more or less physically separate depending on the operation, but they fulfill the 

essential task of providing a coordination venue for donors, NGOs, and the UN on the 

one hand, and the military and the various civilian agencies on the other. 

In Figure 3, the mechanism for coordinating between "official" entities (national 

governments and UN agencies) and the NGO community is the Humanitarian Operations 

Center (HOC), which first appeared in Somalia. The same function was performed by the 

On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in Rwanda and a Humanitarian 

Affairs Center (HAC) in Haiti. In these past operations, the HOC/OSOCC organizations 

have been run by the relief operation's Humanitarian Coordinators (civilian UN staff 

members representing the designated lead agency), and they have coordinated the entire 

relief effort. As an interface coordinating the requirements of the host nations, NGOs, 

military, government agencies, UN agencies, and international organizations, 

HOC/OSOCC functions have included: 

• Developing and overseeing the overall humanitarian assistance strategy. 

• Coordinating logistics support for the various relief agencies. 
16 

• Arranging U.S. and coalition military support. 

• Monitoring the delivery of humanitarian assistance assets through various NGO, 

UN agencies, and IOs. 

As emergency responses have become more frequent and more complex, the NGO 

community has increasingly found it necessary to coordinate among itself and to provide 

a point of contact or points of contact to official entities. NGOs first organized their own 

intracommunity coordination center in northern Iraq. Confronted with overwhelming 

difficulties and absent strong international organization leadership, coordination and 

communication among the usually independent NGOs became a necessity. The NGO 

Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI) was established, and subsequently 

became the prime interface for NGOs with the official community and the military. 

The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) also had its origins in Operation Provide 

Comfort. After an initial reluctance to work together and overcoming "cultural" biases, 

the NGO and military communities began to recognize the comparative advantages 

offered by the other, and an informal, amorphous relationship emerged in which 

"information was the currency of exchange." 10 Through coordination, the military gained 

efficiency and economy of effort from the NGOs, and the NGOs received logistical 

support, security, and information from the military and from other NGOs. In Operation 

Restore Hope, a CMOC was collocated with the UN's HOC, and worked very well.11

Since Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Relief, the CMOC concept--providing a 

vehicle for the military and NGO community to interface--has been developed into 

doctrine by the U.S. military. A CMOC provides the primary interface between U.S. 

military forces and the various agencies involved in a humanitarian relief operation. It is 

a military organization that functions to: (1) monitor military support throughout the area 

of operations, and (2) respond to UN, NGO, and IO logistic, security, and/or technical 

support requirements as tasked to the military in the mission/mandate for each specific 

operation. 

Although they share many characteristics, each humanitarian relief operation is unique, 

and the CMOC structure will be tailored for each situation. Currently, multinational 

activities supporting Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia work through CIMIC Centers--

Civil-Military Cooperation Centers--to accomplish the same type of objectives as the 

U.S.-developed CMOC. Specific CMOC/CIMIC Center functions may include: 

• Screening, validating, and coordinating NGO, UN, and IO requests for military 

support. This is accomplished in conjunction with the DART, if it is activated. 

• Explaining military policies to NGOs, UN, and IO agencies, and conversely, 

explaining NGO, UN, and IO policies to the military force established to 

coordinate the emergency response. Explicit discussion of what the military will 

and will not do is the most crucial of these explanations, according to workshop 

participants. 
17 

• Convening mission planning groups when complex military support or numerous 

military units and NGOs, UN agencies, and IOs are involved. 

• Providing security information to and responding to emergency requests from 

NGOs, UN agencies, and IOs. 

The CMOC also serves as the military representation in the HOC/OSOCC. In this 

capacity, the CMOC provides liaison and coordination between the military capabilities 

and the needs of the relief agencies, validates NGO requests for military assistance to the 

military hierarchy, and provides a conduit for information flow - all serving to further 

consensus building for the mission. NGO workshop participants mentioned certain 

services coordinated by the CMOC as particularly useful, including: 

• Daily security briefings provided by the military; 

• Security for convoys; 

• General security and safety, including emergency response; 

• Sector planning, coordination, and classification of different participants' 

mandates; 

• Technical assistance, including communications and small machine repair; and 

• Access to critical facilities under military control, such as ports and airfields. 

In sum, this requirement was of greatest importance when the response to the crisis was 

multinational or was sponsored under a UN mandate but was important in U.S.-only 

operations like Haiti, as well. CMOCs have been viewed by both the military and NGO 

communities as "helpful in furthering operational level coordination and 

communication." Workshop participants from the NGO community also emphasized the 

importance of the above organizations operating "outside the wire" (the military security 

perimeter), and highlighted the critical role that OFDA has played in facilitating 

communications both between NGOs and the U.S. military. 

Finally, while the CMOC provides the vehicle for the military to support NGO and 

government agency responses to a complex humanitarian emergency, all workshop 

participants emphasized that mission success or failure depends on the character of the 

political as well as the military commitment to the enterprise. Successful resolution of 

the crisis requires collaboration across the political and military spectrum. 

Communication 

All the workshop participants recognized the important role of communication between 

NGOs, Government agencies, and the military during complex humanitarian 

emergencies, particularly the importance of a liaison or designated point of contact within 

the communities. NGO participants expressed high praise for OFDA and its role in 
18 

disaster relief. They see OFDA as critical to effective communication between NGOs and 

the U.S. Government, as well as among NGOs themselves. One military participant, 

having experienced great frustration with the difficulty of distributing information to the 

myriad of NGOs, found that InterAction--a loose coalition of more than 150 NGOs 

engaged in humanitarian efforts around the world--was an "effective conduit for 

funneling information to the appropriate NGOs." OFDA has established an umbrella 

agreement with InterAction to include information sharing. OFDA also has a 

representative assigned to the CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief Pacific) staff who, 

according to one participant, has made a significant contribution by helping the military 

understand the idiosyncrasies of interactions with both U.S. and non-U.S. NGOs. Several 

NGOs supported the notion that OFDA be designated as the official U.S. Government 

point of contact with the NGO community. On the international level, the Geneva-based 

International Committee of Voluntary Organizations (ICVO) provides coordination 

among NGOs on a global basis. 

Training 

Workshop participants identified several initiatives in the training area that have helped 

foster better relations between NGOs and U.S. Government civilian and military 

agencies. Both types of organizations must deal with complications created by personnel 

changes and the need to keep training requirements current. Several participants cited the 

Army's Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, Georgia, which conducts training 

exercises in OOTW for the forces. As part of this training, the Center incorporates 

information about working with the NGO community into its program. In addition, the 

Center has included members of the NGO community in its field exercises. This ongoing 

effort was established approximately 5 years ago. 

The American Red Cross has been active in training with the military for years, 

building on the special relationship that it maintains with the U.S. armed forces. The Red 

Cross has signed Statements of Understanding with both the Department of Defense and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These agreements delineate each 

organization's responsibilities in disaster preparedness planning and in operations in the 

event of a national emergency or disaster. They also outline areas of mutual support and 

cooperation, and pave the way for similar cooperative agreements in the future. 

Currently, the Red Cross is conducting a course in collaboration with the University of 

Hawaii, Tripler Army Medical Center on behalf of the U.S. Pacific Command. This 

course addresses international disaster management and humanitarian assistance 

requiring civil-military operations. On a global scale, the ICRC works with OFDA on 

developing training programs. 
19 

Chapter 4: Difficult Aspects of the NGO/Military Interface 

While the comments captured in Chapter 3 highlight the advances made in developing 

NGO/military interfaces, many observations by workshop participants indicated that 

those efforts are only a beginning. Considerable work still needs to be done in all of the 

areas cited in previous chapters--planning, coordination, communication, and training--in 

order that civilian organizations, the military, and NGOs can work more effectively 

together. This chapter focuses on the problems identified by the workshop participants. 

Same Country--Different Worlds 

The vastly different objectives and perspectives the NGO and military/government 

communities bring to a complex humanitarian emergency are among the most pervasive 

problems confronting both communities. As Figure 1 in Chapter 2 illustrated, the NGO 

community has usually been involved in relief and development activities in the given 

country long before that country's internal condition gains the attention of the 

international community. The evolving crisis prevents the NGOs from carrying out their 

mission. As the situation deteriorates and the international community contemplates 

response, the military commences planning its response. When political authority 

determines to deploy military force to stabilize and provide security for humanitarian 

operations, it usually provides the armed forces with a limited mission and, often, limited 

time frame in which to complete the mission. Once in the field, the military mission--

provide security to the overall operation--and the NGO mission--to carry out specific 

relief activities and return to normalcy--may clash. Both communities have a common 

goal in their response to the complex humanitarian emergency: stabilization of the 

situation and a return to normalcy, but have different perspectives on how the goal is to 

be achieved and how long it will take. 

Figure 4 compares the different perspectives of the military and the NGO community as 

they approach the complex humanitarian emergency response. The figure roughly tracks 

the time periods of evolution of the crisis that were described in Figure 1. At Time B, as 

the situation deteriorates, the international community's political leaders monitor events 

and, increasingly, are called on to respond, providing assistance and security so that relief 

can be administered. The NGO community sees its efforts increasingly impeded by lack 

of stability/security and often joins in the call for international response. At Time C, 

military forces are deployed with a specific mission to provide a secure environment so 

that the NGO community and other responding agencies can continue operations and 

resume their individual organization missions. At this point, military and NGO goals are 

similar, but the means by which the common ends are achieved often put the two groups 

at odds. The military's first priority is stabilization and security. This often requires (and 

the military must be prepared for) use of decisive force. As it moves in, the military 

concentrates on establishing its own forces in secure areas and does not begin to extend 

its security umbrella to others until that has been accomplished. Moreover, following the 

tragic loss of life in Somalia, force protection has been a major concern to the military 

commander. In contrast, the NGOs' first priorities are to renew the humanitarian and 

development activities halted by the chaos and violence. NGOs want the security 
20 

provided by the military force, but chafe at the accompanying constraints on their own 

movements. NGO expectations regarding the military's role in providing security for their 

operations may not be realistic if they do not fully understand or appreciate the military's 

mission, doctrine, or approach to the use of force. In some situations, NGOs at the 

workshop felt that the security provided by the military constrained their movements incountry and their ability to accomplish their mission. In addition, the NGO's focus on a 

desired end-state and the military's emphasis on a limited mission and successful exit 

strategy provide further opportunities for misunderstanding. 

Despite the divergent focus of efforts, understanding of each community's "division of 

labor" has been realized in past operations. With a secure environment created by the 

military, the NGOs are able to resume limited operations (Time D). These efforts often 

take advantage of unique military capabilities and assets (excess defense articles, 

transport and heavy equipment availability) and serve to re-build the infrastructure within 

the country. As the overall situation continues to improve, the military deployment is no 

longer required and the forces withdraw (Time E), leaving the NGOs to resume their 

operations under close to pre-crisis conditions. 

Planning 

One of the weaknesses of the NGO/military interface involves planning. In some cases, 

NGO workshop representatives complained that U.S. Government or UN objectives are 

unclear, hampering planning efforts. They cited as examples the U.S. participation in 

Liberia and in the relief efforts following the Rwanda crisis. Complaints were levied at 

the UN as well. One participant noted that the UN Security Council does not always spell 

out its objectives, leading to confusing responses by both governments and NGOs 
21 

working with it. An experienced ambassador pointed out that, because of unique 

domestic political considerations, member states sometimes prefer that the UN not be too 

definitive when identifying its objectives. This allows each country to tailor its response 

to a situation. This lack of clarity, however, complicates the planning process for all 

involved, including NGOs. 

Generally speaking, the U.S. Ambassador in-country is the focal point for getting the 

process going. The government of the country where disaster occurs will request 

assistance from the United States. Once the Ambassador declares the situation a disaster, 

the U.S. embassy sets the process in motion with a cable to Washington (see Figure 5). 

The lead agency in disaster response is USAID/OFDA. OFDA will assess the situation 

and determine the most appropriate response from the U.S. Government, including 

providing relief commodities, deploying regional advisors, or a DART team and, finally, 

funding NGOs to conduct disaster relief in situations where they are needed. OFDA also 

works with the military in determining how U.S. forces can best support the effort. But 

real planning among civilian and military agencies remains weak. 

Many NGO participants raised questions about the process by which the U.S. 

Government gets involved in disaster relief operations. While some of the participants--

both government and NGOs--were exceptionally well versed in the bureaucratic 

trappings of crisis/disaster response, others were less well informed. Moreover, despite 

the straightforward description given at the workshop, many of the participants stated that 

in their experience, the process was often muddled and the system did not always 

function smoothly. 
22 

NGOs are principally concerned about planning for participation in humanitarian relief 

aspects of the emergency response, and not with military planning. Until Operation 

Uphold Democracy, the two planning processes were distinct and compartmented. 

One participant summed up the root of many problems: "The biggest problem I see is 

with communication. The NGOs are not consulted about an operation until after the 

decisions have already been made by the military." Many of the NGO participants 

expressed similar feelings about the planning, coordination, and communication 

processes. 

The discussion on planning revealed a number of sub-issues that require further 

development. According to one participant, the planning process is too closed and 

relevant NGOs "cannot get in the door to participate." Some NGO participants were 

critical of current U.S. guidance on Government involvement in humanitarian 

emergencies, as stated in Presidential Decision Directive 25. This was "skewed during 

the drafting process," they observed, and NGOs did not have an opportunity to provide 

adequate input to the directive. A new PDD which will address these issues is being 

contemplated. 

Another concern was that NGOs often are asked too late and too infrequently to 

participate in the planning process, affecting the accurate assessment of root causes and 

conditions contributing to conflict within a country. One participant maintained that both 

NGOs and governments need to perform on-the-ground assessments using information 

from people who live there. "Planning won't work unless you correctly assess the 

situation." In any case, failure to plan in advance at senior levels of government leaves 

greater responsibility to the HOC and CMOC coordination efforts on the ground, once all 

parties are in the field. 

Many comments regarding the lack of NGO participation in the government planning 

process reflected concerns about disruption of established relations by a military 

presence, particularly by a force whose mission focuses on stability rather than other 

elements of the crisis. One NGO observed that once the military was involved, the 

potential for disrupting informal--albeit effective--channels of communication among 

NGOs in-country was considerable. Participants agreed that it is particularly important 

that military units that have not had civil affairs training be exposed to these concerns. 

Because of the more diffuse NGO approach to their mission, the military participants in 

the workshop expressed a need for "more complete information on the NGOs" to execute 

proper planning. Yet, given the independent nature of NGOs and the sheer size of the 

NGO community--for example, more than 400 NGOs are operating now in Haiti--"there 

are just too many moving parts--there cannot be much of a coordinated effort. Once you 

start to try to integrate numerous actors, it gets very complicated," according to another 

participant. As one NGO representative recognized, the "commander's intent" is critical 

to any military planning. "If you can't identify the commander--and you can't on the NGO 

side--this will be a problem." On the other hand, an experienced disaster assistance 

official observed that "the crisis response challenge is great enough to require everyone's 

effort. The job is to channel the efforts efficiently." 
23 

Coordination 

The problem of accurately assessing a situation and its short- and long-term needs was 

raised in other contexts, as well. The different tasking of relief and development agencies 

within the U.S. Government was noted, as well as the fact that many NGOs are oriented 

primarily toward development and not emergency relief. These organizations need to 

"retool" to carry out a disaster relief role. Other international organizations and NGOs 

focus principally on relief missions. Several participants observed that accurately 

assessing the needs of a population in an emergency situation is critical to identifying the 

most appropriate NGOs to respond to an emergency. Along with making better 

assessments of a situation, it is necessary to accurately identify NGO capabilities and 

resources. Both of these tasks fall under the purview of OFDA and the DART team, not 

the military. 

Workshop participants also discussed the idea of developing "score cards" to help make 

better long-term assessments. One participant identified a NATO program that seeks to 

identify "normality indicators" to serve as a guidepost for assessing the effectiveness of 

NATO initiatives in restoring the peace in Bosnia. Some participants felt that such 

indicators are irrelevant at best and misleading at worst, particularly as the forces 

responding to a crisis have a profound impact on local conditions. One workshop 

participant noted that, because local procurement contracts tend to inflate normality 

indicators, the military's very presence would skew its own indicators and mask real 

development problems. Several NGOs recognized that the NGO presence also affects 

local "normality" indicators, though perhaps on a different scale. 

On the other hand, some participants indicated that many NGOs are already using 

indicators of measurements of effectiveness. One participant thought that NGOs take a 

"more realistic" approach by focusing on tangible indicators, such as tons of food 

delivered or number of meals served. Another participant suggested that indicators are 

really more useful at the development end of the relief-development spectrum: "It is 

premature to develop (indicators) in the early response to a crisis or disaster because it 

usually takes years for a real impact to be noticeable." These comments reflect the NGOs' 

long-term commitment to the situation and their philosophy that almost any action is a 

positive step toward long-term goals. 

NGO workshop participants added that, in addition to trying to coordinate among the 

various U.S. NGOs, it is necessary to coordinate with the local government and local 

NGOs. The complexity of the situation on the ground--with many government 

organizations and NGOs of different nationalities as well as indigenous NGOs--is not 

readily apparent to planners in Washington. NGO representatives felt that not enough 

effort is made to coordinate with and support local, indigenous NGOs who are already on 

the ground and working effectively. 

Despite the call for common structures for planning, communication, and 

implementation, many of the participants recognized that cultural barriers impede 

coordination. Many NGOs do not favor the military's standardized way of approaching a 

problem, believing that it diminishes flexibility, which NGOs view as their strength. 
24 

Participants generally agreed that even if a logical structure for coordination and planning 

could be developed, the "NGOs do not necessarily want a planning structure imposed on 

them," and thus their desire for early and meaningful involvement in the planning 

process. 

Problems of coordination with diffuse authority are not confined to the NGO community. 

Many participants--NGO, military, and U.S. Government--commented on the conflicts 

among U.S. Government agencies involved in humanitarian and peace operations. 

• One participant alluded to the internal "turf" battles during the crisis in Rwanda, 

referring to jockeying for position between different bureaus of the State 

Department, USAID, and the NSC, and asked rhetorically, "How does this 

confusion affect the NGOs?" 

• Another participant observed that military commanders may talk with each other 

(e.g., in video teleconferences), but may not coordinate with their staffs, who are 

the primary interface with the NGOs. If this happens, communication can break 

down, or appear to break down, within the military system. 

• Several participants pointed to the competition among the NATO CIMIC Centers 

in Bosnia as increasing the confusion among NGOs as to who is in charge of 

what. For example, there appears to be overlap among the CIMIC Centers located 

in the individual French, U.K., and U.S. sectors and the two Sarajevo-based 

Centers established at IFOR (the Implementation Force for the Dayton Peace 

Agreement) and ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) 

headquarters. 

• Despite efforts within Washington to coordinate among all the agencies, one 

participant stated that "the interagency process breaks down at the Unified 

Command level. The Unified Commands are too inwardly focused." 

Organizational conflicts are not limited to the U.S. Government. Participants stated that 

turf battles occur among UNDP, UNHCR, and other international bodies as well. 

According to one participant, command and control arrangements among these 

organizations are "impossible." 

Trust among these different organizational cultures was an important concern for both 

military and NGOs, but especially for the latter. According to a participant, the 

breakdown of trust is a result of "tensions between the NGOs and the military because 

they have different objectives." A military peace-enforcement operation may conflict 

with the humanitarian goals of an NGO. Many NGO participants raised a concern about 

being too closely associated with the military because of the NGOs' desire to stay neutral 

in a conflict. They made the point that the local population's or local government's view 

of the U.S. military or coalition forces greatly affect the success of an operation and 

accordingly, an NGO's willingness to be associated with the military. In Bangladesh, the 

local populace had a positive view of the U.S. military role, greatly enhancing the 

chances of operational success and ensuring a positive NGO response to cooperating with 
25 

the military. Clearly, trust will be situation dependent, as well as dependent upon 

individual NGOs' outlooks. 

Communication 

Another problem within the NGO/military interface involves the degree of 

communication. Some NGO participants stated that there exist situations during which an 

NGO will be reluctant to communicate its plans to the military. The NGOs expressed 

concern that in the process of sharing their plans with the military, they would be 

broadcasting their intentions to indigenous armed groups. For example, if the NGOs were 

preparing to transport supplies in a conflict-torn area, they would want to keep this 

information tightly held to avoid ambushes and looting. 

There also are situations when it is physically impossible for NGOs and the military to 

communicate. Several participants cited problems of communication interoperability 

between the communities. Most NGOs operate under the consent of the host government, 

which allocates communication frequencies. In the case of the Red Cross, frequencies are 

assigned by the International Telecommunications Union. The UN currently does not 

share its frequencies with NGOs. Some NGO participants "beg, borrow, and steal" their 

equipment, which means that their communications "network" is a system patched 

together with whatever they can find. Another participant commented on the lack of 

interoperability among U.S. Government agencies. In Haiti, for example, members of the 

HAC could not contact the CMOC except through satellite communication equipment 

provided by OFDA. 

Communications capability also affects the host government perspective on the NGOmilitary interface. During discussion of the desirability of communications 

interoperability, one participant voiced his perception that "the host government gets very 

suspicious when there is too much interoperability [among the international community 

or with the military]. NGOs must strictly ensure their neutrality at all times." 

Problems of communication are exacerbated by the varying levels of technologies 

available to different organizations. As mentioned before, the need for and use of 

technology enhancements vary considerably between the NGO and military communities 

and within the NGO community itself. Access to technology is affected by resource 

constraints. Large NGOs, by virtue of their resource base, will be better equipped and 

have more recent technology than the smaller ones. In contrast to the military's high-tech 

approach, one participant described much of the NGO community as "very low-tech." 

"We work in an austere environment. We use old, donated equipment and man it with 

locals." Another participant added, "The problem with computers is that they get ripped 

off; there are not many of them; they are in poor repair; and there exist linguistic 

problems." 

Training 

Both the NGO and government participants agreed that joint training was a worthy goal 

that should be addressed, but all the participants acknowledged that shortages of time and 
26 

money constrain efforts in this area. According to one participant, "There is not a lack of 

desire to train...it is simply a lack of resources." Similarly, as evidenced by the debate on 

planning, both NGOs and the military need to think about how they can incorporate the 

other community into their training. For example, one participant stated that the military 

needs to understand the real time and resource constraints under which NGOs operate if it 

is to effectively incorporate NGOs into its training mission. NGOs cannot afford to send 

key personnel to extended training exercises like those often carried out in the military. 
27 

Chapter 5: Possibilities for Enhancement 

"Both sides need to see the situation as 'win-win.' But how do you 

change the current paradigm that does not track with a win-win 

approach? Everyone is trying to win, but collectively, you fail." 

- Workshop Participant 

Crises of all kinds--natural, technological, and complex humanitarian--will continue 

unabated in the near future. Over the past 10 years, events identified as disasters by 

USAID/OFDA have averaged about 45 per year and ranged from as few as 33 to as many 

as 64 in 1996. Moreover, the trends indicate that complex emergencies may actually 

increase in number in the future. In 1986, OFDA classified three situations as complex 

emergencies; by 1995, the number had risen to 26. The implications are clear--NGOs, 

Government agencies, and the military must enhance efforts to coordinate responses to 

the growing needs created by these events. 

But how do you achieve a "win-win" situation when participant goals, missions, and 

cultures vary greatly? Although workshop attendees expressed many different viewpoints 

on how to enhance the NGO/Interagency interface, three junctures in the process 

emerged as critical focal points for further investigation: 

• Planning among NGOs and Government agencies in Washington. 

• Coordinating operations in the host country. 

• Communicating across organizations and distances. 

Enhancing the Planning Interface 

Workshop participants made numerous suggestions for enhancing joint planning. One 

participant suggested organizing the most "senior" NGOs into a coordinating committee 

and having them work out a plan, probably in coordination with the military. This idea 

addresses the need for NGOs to develop their own plans, as opposed to having the 

military or government agencies impose a plan on them, while at the same time cutting 

through the problem of dealing with hundreds of independent NGOs. According to one 

participant, "You cannot regulate or enforce the NGOs to follow a plan. They must see 

the clear-cut advantage to following it." By having the NGOs create the plan themselves, 

the assumption is that the process would be closer to achieving this goal. Another 

participant added that the coordinating committee could include or be solely comprised of 

the donor organizations. Because there are far fewer donor agencies than NGOs, it might 

be simpler to get donors involved in a planning committee. 

In the planning process, several NGO participants encouraged the U.S. Government 

participants to expand their thinking about NGOs and not include just the large, wellknown NGOs. The government planning process needs to expand to include the small 
28 

NGOs as well. One way to accomplish this task was seen as better education of 

government planners about the NGO community. 

Enhancing Coordination In-Country 

Workshop suggestions to enhance in-country coordination ranged from very specific to 

very broad. What follows is a condensed description of these suggestions. 

One of the key points stressed by NGO participants was to make better use of CMOCs, 

HOCs, and DARTs during a complex emergency. The NGOs encouraged the military to 

use the DARTs to identify NGO assets and foster communication with the NGO and 

donor communities. The NGO participants also urged the U.S. Government participants--

civilian and military--to make use of the situation reports published by InterAction for its 

members. These reports describe what the NGOs are doing on the ground, including 

where they are operating and in what sectors, and provide the names and phone numbers 

of key contact personnel. 

The participants repeatedly stressed the need for fostering closer working relations 

between HOCs and CMOCs, particularly "outside the wire." For the NGOs, it is 

important that the military and OFDA work with the NGOs in the HOC and not operate 

solely out of secure facilities, such as airfields. 

Addressing the need to cut down on confusion among U.S. Government agencies, one 

individual suggested that the CMOCs and the NATO CIMIC Centers use secure video 

teleconferencing between and among CMOCs or CIMIC Centers in situations where 

multiple centers are located and used by the U.S. military, the UN, NATO, or other 

foreign militaries. This would enhance communication by providing a real-time 

information exchange and forcing a tete-a-tete among the various organizations. 

Enhancing Communication Across Organizations 

The area of improving communications across organizations and distances encompasses 

many possibilities, ranging from defining actions and terms to increasing common 

understanding, to using technology to physically enhance the communication process. 

All of the U.S. Government participants expressed a desire to find out more about the 

NGO community and to develop a central location for information about NGOs. The U.S. 

Government participants were almost unanimous in their desire to see the NGOs establish 

a central point of contact within the U.S. Government, for both the U.S. Government 

agencies and the NGO community to use. OFDA was mentioned as the logical 

government agency. This suggestion was carried further by some participants urging both 

the NGO and U.S. Government communities to explore the use of the Internet to 

facilitate communication.12

In a similar vein, many NGOs expressed a desire for the U.S. Government and the 

military to establish a central point of contact to facilitate communication. It was unclear 

whether this point of contact would be military or civilian. Some of the participants 
29 

suggested that OFDA should be formally designated to fulfill this responsibility. Another 

suggestion was to publish point of contact information--identifying key players--and 

distribute it throughout both communities. 

One individual pointed to the DoD publication that defines commonly used terms within 

the defense community. This participant suggested that such a dictionary ensures that all 

the actors in an operation speak the same organizational "language" in difficult areas, 

such as peace operations. The suggestion was made that the NGO community develop a 

similar dictionary of common terms used by NGOs in disaster situations. By sharing such 

publications, both the NGOs and the military could speak a common language when 

communicating during disaster situations. 

Use of technology was viewed as an issue area where differences between the two 

communities were great, but the potential payoff in cooperating was just as great. Many 

NGOs were interested in finding new ways to use current, low-cost technologies to 

facilitate communication and planning. Almost all of the participants wanted to see the 

development of a system--relatively unsophisticated and unquestionably inexpensive--to 

get real-time information from the U.S. Government to the NGOs and vice versa. Despite 

agreement on developing such a system, the types of inputs were not resolved, nor were 

questions surrounding collection of the inputs. Other issues, such as system vulnerability 

and verification of data, were also raised. 

Both NGOs and representatives from government organizations recognized that 

continuing to meet in workshops such as the one held at NDU would foster productive 

communication between the communities. Many of the participants agreed that meeting 

face-to-face and discussing differing perspectives helped to increase their understanding 

of the other community. Specific suggestions for enhancing planning, coordination, and 

communication emerged in these discussions. 

Identifying transition and exit strategies, some participants emphasized the need for both 

the NGO and government communities to deal more seriously and concretely with the 

issue of identifying and working toward an "end-state." As part of this planning effort, 

both NGOs and the military need to start preparing for a role in conflict resolution, 

particularly given the increased need for complex humanitarian emergency responses. 

Along similar lines, there is a need to analyze and deal more effectively with the 

requirements along the relief-development continuum necessary for both communities. 

This is particularly true as the military formulates its own transition and exit strategies. 

Following on the discussion of conflict resolution, one participant suggested establishing 

a database on NGOs who are currently mitigating entities in conflict situations. Lessons 

learned by these NGOs could be passed along, particularly as they relate to the 

difficulties associated with conflict resolution and operating in environments where the 

"rule of law" no longer exists. Another participant suggested that the military could learn 

more from NGO "capacity-building" efforts. This individual stated that these NGOs have 

learned how to use local materials for indigenous reconstruction while minimizing the 

adverse effect on the local economy. The military could be made aware of these efforts to 

effectively integrate the local economy in rebuilding communities. 
30 

Next Steps 

The workshop discussion generated numerous ideas from both NGO and Government 

participants on ways to enhance joint efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies, but 

the feasibility of these ideas still must be evaluated. Many of the workshop suggestions 

were commendable, but difficult to implement at this point in time either because of 

resource constraints or deep differences among organizations. Other suggestions were 

within the realm of possibility, but the potential payoff may not justify the effort. 

Nevertheless, there was general agreement on the part of both NGO and U.S. 

Government attendees that various forms of joint training could help achieve progress in 

familiarizing the two communities with each other. In addition, all of the participants 

wanted to enhance communication and coordination, although their suggestions as to how 

to do this differed considerably. One method on which there was agreement was to 

develop an information tool that could serve as the conduit for knowledge, facts, and 

news among organizations involved in complex humanitarian emergencies. 

Training--Fertile Ground for Development. Workshop participants agreed that the 

training area was one where their interests clearly coincided. One participant suggested 

that the military create a "traveling road show" that would explain how the military 

operates in humanitarian and peace operations and would perform outreach training to the 

NGOs. One individual suggested that the training provided by the military cover how 

NGOs can gain access to DoD excess property and other detailed issues. The NGOs 

emphasized that it is important that the military understand the serious time constraints 

that NGO personnel face in committing to training. In response to this, one participant 

recommended that the military develop educational videos. These videos, which would 

cover the same topics as a formal training program, would be a "low-tech" approach that 

could accommodate the NGOs' need for flexibility in training. Self-learning texts, used 

alone or in conjunction with the videos, could also accomplish the same goals of 

fostering understanding among communities while conserving on time. 

Another participant suggested that representatives from the military join the annual 

training events and conferences that InterAction provides to its member NGOs. Others 

wanted to see the successful joint training at Ft. Polk continue and perhaps be expanded. 

This would assist the military in developing their understanding of the NGO community 

and would help bridge cultural gaps between the communities. One participant observed 

that training in the military should not be restricted to the officer corps. Enlisted 

personnel need to be educated about NGOs as they are very likely to be the first to 

encounter NGOs when deployed in the field. 

Using Technology to Further Communication. Like training, enhancing communication 

through technology is a potentially productive approach that could yield high payoffs. 

Almost all of the workshop participants expressed an interest in seeing the development 

of an information tool that would allow effective, timely, and efficient communication 

between communities. As mentioned earlier, ACTIS has funded a pilot project in this 

area to develop a real-time communication system that can incorporate information 

relevant to both the NGO community and the military. 
31 

Researchers from the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) 

presented a first version of its Coalition Forces C2 Decision-Aids Storyboard for review 

by participants at the workshop. The storyboard is the product of CECOM work on a set 

of tools to support the exchange of information and the creation of a common perception 

of the situation among NGOs and U.S. and coalition military forces. In general, the 

workshop participants saw utility in the system, and many agreed to work with ACTIS to 

help tailor the next version, particularly in those aspects related to NGO information 

requirements. Participants described the desired system as one that 

• Is easy to use and accommodates the range of computer sophistication within the 

NGO community. 

• Can support detailed and precise data that is validated by people on the ground 

during the crisis. One participant commented, "Where are the mines in the mine 

field? That is the precision we need." 

• Can interact with both state-of-the-art and obsolete computers. 

• Does not rely on an open system like the Internet, to which many NGOs do not 

have access and over which they do not believe they could communicate securely 

with the military. 

Building on these ideas, ACTIS will work with CECOM and the NGO community to 

identify useful data fields and presentation modes. Once an enhanced version of the 

prototype is developed, ACTIS will review and analyze the efficiency, effectiveness, and 

simplicity of the system, testing it in user sessions with NGOs and others. ACTIS will 

also consider the compatibility of the design with military and coalition forces' needs. It 

is anticipated that this iterative process will be completed by the end of 1996. 

In the final analysis, both communities have identifiable obligations to fulfill in order to 

improve the NGO/Interagency interface. The U.S. Government (especially the military) 

needs to develop a better understanding of the NGO community--to include NGOs of all 

sizes and national origins. The military needs to ensure that its programs for supporting 

NGOs in the field are known to that entire community. The NGO community needs to 

develop a better understanding of the process by which the U.S. Government gets 

involved in a disaster response situation and the scope of the roles that the military will 

play in that process. The ACTIS workshop demonstrated a willingness among all parties 

to work to resolve obstacles to coordination. 

Participation Encouraged. ACTIS invites those individuals and organizations who would 

like to participate in the endeavor to enhance the NGO/Interagency interface to contact 

Dr. David S. Alberts, Director of ACTIS, at (202) 685-2262. 

End Notes 

1 Each ACTIS workshop to date has built upon the lessons learned from previous 

sessions. The first workshop focused on identifying unique command and control 
32 

requirements and essential functions of coalition peace operations. The second dealt with 

designing ideal command arrangements for peace operations involving a U.S. combined 

joint task force, and the third expanded this perspective to include the experience of other 

Western Hemisphere nations. While the first two workshops looked at the issues from the 

U.S. perspective only, the third validated concepts and added new insights from an 

experienced group of senior operators from seven other countries in the Western 

Hemisphere. The fourth workshop examined OOTW issues and related technologies. 

Another area identified in the previous workshops that warranted additional study was 

interagency, civilian, and military organization communication. Hence, the fifth 

workshop explored interagency relations within the context of Operation Restore Democracy

in Haiti. Publications from all of these workshops are available from NDU Press, or from 

ACTIS. 

2

 Frederick M. Burkle, Jr. "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Concepts and 

Participants," in Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-March 1995), 55-

63. 

3

 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. 

4

 U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office 

of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, The AID-PVO Partnership (Washington, D.C., 1992), 

5. 

5

 For a full description of AID's interface with the NGO community, see U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Private and 

Voluntary Cooperation, The AID-PVO Partnership (Washington, D.C., 1992). 

6 The Code of Conduct was sponsored by Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, 

the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International 

Save the Children Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, and the World 

Council of Churches, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross. 

7

 Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Peacekeeping 

Institute, 1966), 47. 

8

 Chris Seiple, op cit. 

9

 Interagency planning problems associated with Operation Uphold Democracy, as detailed in 

the ACTIS book, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti ~ A Case 

Study. 

10 See Chris Seiple, 41. 

11 Seiple, op cit. Chapter Four. 

12 InterAction has created a Web site - www.interaction.org - to facilitate communication. 
33 

Appendix A: Civil-Military Relations in Complex 

Humanitarian Emergency Response: Progress and Problems 

Briefing by InterAction 

The following slides were presented by George Devendorf, InterAction, at the 18-19 

April 1996 workshop on Humanitarian and Peace Operations: The NGO/Interagency 

Interface. This workshop, which was held at the National Defense University (NDU), 

was sponsored by NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Center for 

Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS). InterAction is a 

coalition of more than 150 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) engaged in 

humanitarian efforts. Commentary has been added by the authors of the workshop report. 

Slide 1. Title Slide 
34 

Slide 2. Defining the Players 

Complex humanitarian emergencies involve multiple actors at many levels. In most 

cases, the host government authority takes the lead in guiding donor, NGO, IO, and UN 

representatives and activities. 
35 

Slide 3. Defining the Players, Slide II 

Like the civilian side, military involvement in humanitarian operations is 

multidimensional. Depending on the situation, the military presence could be 

multinational, multiservice, regional, or involve multiple parties to a conflict. As the 

number of actors increases, the situation is further complicated by trying to communicate 

across different units, interpreting different military insignia, etc. 
36 

Slide 4. Perceptions of Authority 

Because of the diffuse nature of the NGO community, the military often is confused 

when trying to figure out who is in charge, what organizational structure is present incountry, or how the civilian chain-of-command--if one exists--functions. 
37 

Slide 5. Perceptions of Transparency 

Although the military knows the mission and understands the rules of engagement 

(ROEs) in peacekeeping operations, its interagency partners also need to be informed 

about the mission, any change in mission, and the ROEs. For example, U.S. Pacific 

Command uses a full-time humanitarian affairs advisor assigned to the staff to facilitate 

the CINC's understanding of the civilian side and to facilitate communication between 

the military and its interagency partners. In the area of peacekeeping operations, both the 

military and the civilian side question who is supposed to be supporting whom. 
38 

Slide 6. Perceptions of Communication 

The military, civilian agencies, and the NGOs all recognize the importance of 

communication among organizations, but recognize that problems abound. The lack of 

compatible communications hardware hinders effective communication and even the 

various branches of the military experience problems communicating with each other. 

The need for secure communications further complicates the situation. While not 

everyone needs to be fully wired into a communications network, there needs to be one 

point of contact that has access to all of the communications nets, such as a liaison officer 

in UN headquarters or a civilian assigned to a military office. Because frequency 

allocation is a critical problem, it needs to be resolved early in a crisis by working with 

the host government, who controls the allocation of frequencies. All parties need to 

ensure that NGOs have access to communications frequencies and that the division of 

these allocations is consistently enforced. One potential solution to these 

communications-related issues is to establish a centralized Information Management 

Center. 
39 

Slide 7. Perceptions of Communication, Part II 

Part of effective communications between the military and the NGO community is 

ensuring that each understands what the other is saying. One approach is to collocate civil 

affairs personnel with the Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) and OFDA 

personnel with various military commands. Also as part of an effort to "speak the same 

language," it would be very useful to develop standardized formats for the reports 

generated by the military, UN, NGOs, etc., in the field so everyone involved in a crisis 

can correctly interpret the information coming in from the field. A tension exists, 

however, as to how information is used. The military views NGOs as a wealth of 

information, but the NGOs are wary of being the conduit of such information lest it be 

used as intelligence information. 
40 

Slide 8. Communicating In-Country 

The UN and the NGO community recognize the importance of civil-military coordination 

structures in complex humanitarian disasters. In order to be most effective, these 

structures must be accessible to the NGO community, support NGO requests for 

assistance, and work at the local level. In order to achieve this last goal, a situation may 

require multiple CMOCs or CIMICs. If the structures are located outside the wire--that is, 

close to where the NGOs operate and not within the military's security perimeter--this can 

create communication problems with the associated military headquarters. By working at 

the local level, however, these structures can be very effective in meeting operational 

needs, such as food distribution and perimeter security. 
41 

Slide 9. Communicating In-Country, Part II 

Coordination within the NGO community is as complex as coordination across NGOs 

and government agencies. Typically, the UN leads in-country humanitarian coordination, 

using structures such as the HOC (Humanitarian Operations Center) and the OSOCC 

(On-Site Operation Coordination Center), as well as working through host government 

ministries and sectoral working groups that address specific problem areas. In some 

situations, parallel structures of coordination are established--some are UN, some are 

military--which complicates coordination. 
42 

Slide 10. Understanding Each Other 

Differing missions and needs lead to vastly different perceptions of priorities in-country 

among all the actors. It is important that all the actors understand each other's priorities 

and needs in order to effectively deal with one another. For example, force protection is a 

top priority for the military. The humanitarian community does not always understand 

this priority and hence, may believe that military logistics during the deployment phase 

should be tailored toward delivering needed supplies to the field and not toward 

establishing force protection. In all the cases listed in Slides 10 and 11, both the military 

and civilians need to make clear what is expected of the other and what each is prepared 

to do and what they will not do. 
43 

Slide 11. Understanding Each Other, Continued 

Like Slide 10, Slide 11 continues to address problems in understanding other 

organizations' perceptions and priorities. For example, if the military is deciding who 

should receive certain assets, how does it tell the "good apples from the bad?" In order to 

prioritize NGO requests and requirements, the military needs to contact the responsible 

UN agency for its assessments, talk with reliable NGOs, and coordinate with the DART 

team. This way, it can give support to capable, enduring NGOs and avoid mistakes by 

supporting "weekend" NGOs--small, fly-by-night operations with limited resources, 

goals, and effectiveness. Finally, both NGOs and government agencies must recognize 

that certain organizations--be they NGOs, the military, UN agencies, etc.--may bring 

unique capabilities to a complex emergency and should perform those functions without 

undue interference by others operating in the theater. 
44 

Slide 12. Transitioning Between A Complex Humanitarian Emergency and 

Ongoing Humanitarian Operations 

Many issues affect the success of an effective transition during which the military exits a 

situation and turns over responsibility for certain tasks to the civilian sector. The 

transition issues listed above need to be considered in the planning stages of an operation 

before the military ever becomes involved. The types and degree of humanitarian 

involvement need to be assessed early on and potential disruptions to the local economy 

considered and minimized. If possible, the humanitarian effort needs to engage in local 

capacity building, hire and buy locally, and leave indigenous capabilities behind. At 

times, training of forces (e.g., UN) that will replace the current (U.S.) forces needs to 

occur. 
45 

Slide 13. Emerging Trends in Civilian-Military Cooperation 

Positive trends to facilitate better communications, planning, and assessments between 

NGOs and government agencies are emerging. For example, joint training is occurring 

more frequently. Moreover, the U.S. Government increasingly recognizes the need to get 

civilian agencies involved early in planning and assessing situations, including efforts to 

develop measurable objectives and MCDA (Military Civil Defense Assets) lists. 
46 

Appendix B: The Code of Conduct for the International Red 

Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental 

Organizations in Disaster Relief 

Sponsored by Caritas lnternationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the International 

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The international Save the Children 

Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches 

(members of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response), together with the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 

Purpose 

This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about 

operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refugee 

camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and 

impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement aspire. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of organisations 

accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code. 

In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and 

applied in conformity with international humanitarian law. 

The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes, describing the 

working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor 

Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective 

delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

Definitions 

NGOs: NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) refers here to organisations, both 

national and international, which are constituted separate from the government of the 

country in which they are founded. 

NGHAs: For the purpose of this text, the term Non-Governmental Humanitarian 

Agencies (NGHAs) has been coined to encompass the components of the International 

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement--the International Committee of the Red Cross, 

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member 

National Societies--and the NGOs as defined above. This code refers specifically to those 

NGHAs which are involved in disaster response. 

IGOs: IGOs (Intergovernmental Organisations) refers to organisations constituted by two 

or more governments. It thus includes all United Nations agencies and regional 

organisations. 

Disasters: A disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering 

and distress, and large-scale material damage. 
47 

The Code of Conduct 

Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 

NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes 

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first 

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental 

humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As 

members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide 

humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to 

affected populations, which is of fundamental importance in exercising that 

responsibility. 

The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst 

those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. 

When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be 

viewed as such. 

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 

adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone 

Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of 

the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those 

needs. 

Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. 

Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of 

a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it 

seeks to alleviate. 

In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in 

disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by 

our aid programmes. 

The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy can only be 

effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such 

equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims. 

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint 

Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and 

communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or 

religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of 

the recipients to those opinions. 
48 

We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or 

acceptance of a particular political or religious creed. 

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy 

NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate 

our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy 

of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. 

We will never knowingly--or through negligence--allow ourselves, or our employees, to 

be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for 

governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly 

humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. 

We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not 

be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political 

interest of any particular donor. 

We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned 

individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by 

such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid 

dependence upon a single funding source. 

5. We shall respect culture and custom 

We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and 

countries we are working in. 

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities 

All people and communities--even in disaster--possess capacities as well as 

vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local 

staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we 

will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and 

cooperate with local government structures where appropriate. 

We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. 

This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the 

relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies. 

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief 

aid 

Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective 

relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are 

involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. 

We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation 

programmes. 
49 

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting 

basic needs 

All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a 

negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which 

actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create 

sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the 

design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavor to minimise the 

negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary 

dependence upon external aid. 

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom 

we accept resources 

We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist 

and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable 

to both constituencies. 

All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and 

transparency. 

We recognise the need to report on our activities, from both a financial perspective and 

the perspective of effectiveness. 

We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to 

carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. 

We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the 

factors limiting or enhancing that impact. 

Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in 

order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources. 

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster 

victims as dignified human beings, not objects of pity 

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our 

public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the 

capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their 

vulnerabilities and fears. 

While we will cooperate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not 

allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of 

maximising overall relief assistance. 

We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in 

situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the 

beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries. 
50 

The Working Environment 

Having agreed unilaterally to strive to abide by the Code laid out above, we present 

below some indicative guidelines which describe the working environment we would like 

to see created by donor governments, host governments and the intergovernmental 

organisations--principally the agencies of the United Nations--in order to facilitate the 

effective participation of NGHAs in disaster response. 

These guidelines are presented for guidance. They are not legally binding, nor do we 

expect governments and IGOs to indicate their acceptance of the guidelines through the 

signature of any document, although this may be a goal to work towards in the future. 

They are presented in a spirit of openness and co-operation so that our partners will 

become aware of the ideal relationship we would seek with them. 

Annex 1: Recommendations to the governments of disaster-affected countries 

1. Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and 

impartial actions of NGHAs 

NGHAs are independent bodies. This independence and impartiality should be respected 

by host governments. 

2. Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for NGHAs 

If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should be 

granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims for the purpose of delivering 

humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising of 

sovereign responsibility, not to block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and 

apolitical action of NGHAs. 

Host governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by waiving 

requirements for transit, entry and exit visas, or arranging for these to be rapidly granted. 

Governments should grant over-flight permission and landing rights for aircraft 

transporting international relief supplies and personnel, for the duration of the emergency 

relief phase. 

3. Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during 

disasters 

Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of 

alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should 

normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to 

requirements for consular certificates or origin of invoices, import and/or export licenses 

or other restrictions, or to import taxes, landing fees or port charges. 

The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light 

aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host 
51 

government through the temporary waiving of licensing or registration requirements. 

Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end 

of a relief operation. 

To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate 

certain radio frequencies, which relief organisations may use in-country and for 

international communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make 

such frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster. They 

should authorise relief personnel to utilise all means of communication required for their 

relief operations. 

4. Governments should seek to provide a coordinated disaster information and planning 

service 

The overall planning and co-ordination of relief efforts is ultimately the responsibility of 

the host government. Planning and co-ordination can be greatly enhanced if NGHAs are 

provided with information on relief needs and government systems for planning and 

implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks they may 

encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs. 

To facilitate effective co-ordination and the efficient utilisation of relief efforts, host 

governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point of contact for 

incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities. 

5. Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict 

In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of 

international humanitarian law. 

Annex II: Recommendations to donor governments 

1. Donor governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and 

impartial actions of NGHAs 

NGHAs are independent bodies whose independence and impartiality should be 

respected by donor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs to further 

any political or ideological aim. 

2. Donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational 

independence 

NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same 

spirit as they render it to disaster victims: a spirit of humanity and independence of 

action. The implementation of relief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHA 

and will be carried out according to the policies of that NGHA. 

3. Donor governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining access 

to disaster victims 
52 

Donor governments should recognise the importance of accepting a degree of 

responsibility for the security and freedom of access of NGHA staff to disaster sites. 

They should be prepared to exercise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if 

necessary. 

Annex III: Recommendations to intergovernmental organisations 

1. IGOs should recognise NGHAs, local and foreign, as valuable partners 

NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other intergovernmental agencies to effect 

better disaster response. They do so in a spirit of partnership which respects the integrity 

and independence of all partners. Intergovernmental agencies must respect the 

independence and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN 

agencies in the preparation of relief plans. 

2. IGOs should assist host governments in providing an overall coordinating framework 

for international and local disaster relief 

NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall coordinating framework 

for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls to the host 

government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to provide this 

service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected State and the national and 

international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should make every effort 

to ensure the effective co-ordination of their own services. 

3. IGOs should extend security protection provided for UN agencies to NGHAs 

Where security services are provided for intergovernmental organisations, this service 

should be extended to their operational NGHA partners on request. 

4. IGOs should provide NGHAs with the same access to relevant information as is 

granted to UN agencies 

IGOs are urged to share all information pertinent to the implementation of effective 

disaster response with their operational NGHA partners. 

Registration form 

Non-governmental organisations which would like to register their support for this Code 

and their willingness to incorporate its principles into their work should fill in the form 

below and return it to 

Disaster Policy Department, 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 

PO Box 372, 

1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. 

Tel +41 (022) 7304222 

Fax +41 (022) 7330395 
53 

Appendix C: OFDA Role in Disaster Relief 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59