United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 27, 2021*

Decided January 27, 2021 

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20–2601 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WALTER R. BURNLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 06-cr-141-bbc

Barbara B. Crabb, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Walter Burnley, a federal inmate convicted of crimes involving threats to kill, 

moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 based on the risk that 

COVID-19 poses to his compromised immune system. Stipulating that Burnley had 

shown health conditions that qualify him for early release, the district court nonetheless 

denied his request. After considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it explained 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20–2601 Page 2 

that Burnley remains a danger to the community. Because the court reasonably weighed 

the relevant considerations of public safety, we affirm. 

In 2006, Burnley committed four unarmed robberies of Milwaukee-area banks, 

taking a total of $10,000. After a trial, he was convicted of four counts of bank robbery 

by intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). In his direct appeal, we observed that, 

although “[t]hese were not violent robberies,” United States v. Burnley, 533 F.3d 901, 903 

(7th Cir. 2008), Burnley had threatened violence. He threatened to kill one of the bank 

tellers, held a knife to the throat of a recruited accomplice, and later threatened to have 

someone kill this accomplice after learning that she had spoken to the police. At 

sentencing, Burnley was designated a career offender: He had two shooting convictions 

(at ages 15 and 23) and two convictions involving violent threats. He received a 

within-guidelines prison sentence of 262 months (over 21 years), has served 14 years of 

that sentence at MCI-Oxford in Wisconsin, and is scheduled for release in 2025.

Burnley moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) after he 

received a preliminary diagnosis of lymphoma in April 2020. Before filing his motion, 

he asked the warden of MCI-Oxford for release, but the warden denied his request. The 

government initially objected to the motion on the ground that, without a final 

diagnosis, the motion was premature. Two months later, Burnley received a final 

diagnosis—grade 3B follicular lymphoma (a chronic and incurable cancer of the 

immune system). He revived his motion and submitted to the court a plan, approved by 

the probation office, to live with his family and undergo chemotherapy in 

Milwaukee. The government waived any defense of failure to exhaust, declining to 

assert a “technical argument of necessary exhaustion.” It also conceded that Burnley’s

health makes him eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A). But it opposed Burnley’s 

release based on his history of intimidating victims with threats of violence, his failure 

to accept responsibility for his crime of conviction, and his misconduct in prison.

The district court denied Burnley’s request in August 2020 after weighing the

§ 3553(a) factors. It explained that, although Burnley’s health qualified him for early 

release under § 3582, he still posed a danger to the public. The court observed that even 

though he had no guns during his offense of conviction, he still inflicted harm by 

threatening to kill one of the bank tellers, deploying a knife on his accomplice, and later 

threatening to have someone kill her. The court also noted that, in prison, he was twice

disciplined for fights. From this behavior and his lack of contrition for his crime of 

conviction, the court ruled that even though Burnley is physically weakened, his history

of threatening violence means that he remains a danger to the public. 
No. 20–2601 Page 3 

To address this appeal, we must pause briefly to discuss mootness. After Burnley 

appealed, he was transferred from the federal prison in Wisconsin to a federal prison in 

North Carolina to receive chemotherapy treatment. That raises the question of whether 

his request for release from the Wisconsin prison is moot. Around the time of his 

transfer, the receiving prison in North Carolina had about 26 confirmed cases of 

COVID-19 among inmates and staff. Burnley tells us that he seeks release from any 

federal prison based on the risk of contracting COVID-19, arguing that the risk to him is 

system-wide. Accordingly, even though he is at a different federal prison, his case

remains live. See Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2004). 

On the merits, Burnley argues that the district court abused its discretion because 

it denied his request without a “reasoned basis.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 

1959, 1966 (2018) (citation omitted). Specifically, Burnley argues that the district court 

weighed his criminal and disciplinary history too heavily and gave insufficient weight 

to his medical condition, thereby unreasonably concluding that he remained a danger to 

the public.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant an inmate’s request for 

early release based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” after considering the 

factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include the dangerousness of the 

inmate.See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020). We review the

decision for an abuse of discretion, asking whether the court’s “reasoning process and 

[the] result” were reasonable. United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Before evaluating the district court’s reasoning, we note a procedural point. In

denying Burnley’s motion, the district court cited a policy statement of the Sentencing 

Guidelines that requires a finding that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of 

any other person” as a precondition for release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). 

We have since ruled that this policy statement does not apply to petitions under the 

First Step Act, like Burnley’s, initiated by an inmate rather than the Director of the 

Bureau of Prisons. See Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1179–80. But the mistake is inconsequential 

because the standard the court relied on matches the standard under § 3553(a)(2)(C), 

which the district court also referenced.

The district court’s decision to deny release was reasonable. The task of the court

was to weigh the competing considerations of Burnley’s poor physical health and his 

ongoing danger to the public; it did so. The court reasonably found that, despite 
No. 20–2601 Page 4 

Burnley’s “various physical ailments,” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007), he 

remained a danger to public safety because his past behavior of making threats showed 

that he needs no great physical strength to cause harm. He committed four unarmed 

bank robberies by issuing threats, and he attempted to silence his accomplice with 

threats to arrange to have her killed. Burnley’s cancer diagnosis does not disable him 

from continuing to make threats, or asking others to carry out his violent threats, 

despite his weakened physical condition. Moreover, because he has not shown remorse

for his crimes and was also twice disciplined for fights while incarcerated, the district 

court did not unreasonably overstate his present-day capability of harm. The district 

court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

AFFIRMED