In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 21‐1616

JOANNE KAMINSKI,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ELITE STAFFING, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:20‐cv‐06652 — Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED* NOVEMBER 8, 2021 — DECIDED JANUARY 19, 2022

____________________

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.

*We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because

the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 21‐1616

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Joanne Kaminski, a Polish‐Ameri‐

can woman in her fifties, appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit

against her former employer, Elite Staffing, Inc., for unlawful

discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

The district court concluded that Kaminski failed to state a

claim because she did not plead a plausible case of discrimi‐

nation. Having taken our own fresh look at Kaminski’s com‐

plaint, we affirm the district court’s dismissal. In doing so,

though, we sound a concern that the district court may have

articulated a pleading standard beyond that imposed by

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme

Court precedent.  

I

Kaminski’s second amended complaint is far from clear,

and our takeaways are limited. She seems to say that she

worked for Elite Staffing, a temporary employment agency,

for about two‐and‐a‐half years. When assigned to a job, Ka‐

minski traveled to and from the site on a bus equipped with

security cameras. During her time at Elite Staffing, she never

received a disciplinary infraction. Nor, she adds, did anyone

ever reprimand her for poor work or for any other reason.  

In late 2019, Elite Staffing informed Kaminski that the

warehouse where she was working no longer needed her

help. As a result, and based on its policy of terminating any

employee discharged by a host company, Elite Staffing let her

go. At some point following the termination, Kaminski says

she called Elite Staffing’s human resources department to ob‐

tain the names of her former coworkers, but the office de‐

clined to supply the information.  
No. 21‐1616 3

Kaminski responded by suing Elite Staffing for discrimi‐

nation under Title VII and the ADEA. After screening her

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and extending two op‐

portunities to amend, the district court dismissed the case

with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Relying on sum‐

mary judgment case law, including our decision in Barricks v.

Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2007), the district court

determined that Kaminski failed to plead facts supporting a

prima facie case of discrimination under either statute. Ka‐

minski’s complaint fell short, the district court explained, be‐

cause she failed to allege facts showing a connection between

her membership in a protected class and Elite Staffing’s deci‐

sion to terminate her. Nor, the district court observed, did Ka‐

minski’s complaint identify any similarly situated employees

who received more favorable treatment.  

Kaminski now appeals.  

II

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled

“General Rules of Pleading,” outlines what a federal com‐

plaint must contain to state a claim for relief. To survive a mo‐

tion to dismiss, the pleading must contain, among other

things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Interpreting this requirement, the Supreme Court has ex‐

plained that a complaint must “contain sufficient factual mat‐

ter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The “[f]ac‐

tual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To be sure,
4 No. 21‐1616

although a plaintiff “need not plead detailed factual allega‐

tions to survive a motion to dismiss, she still must provide

more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recita‐

tion of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to

be considered adequate.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736,

738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot‐

ing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In the employment discrimination

context, we have said these requirements mean a plaintiff 

must advance plausible allegations that she experienced dis‐

crimination because of her protected characteristics. See Gra‐

ham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021).

Recognizing that Kaminski represents herself, and there‐

fore construing her complaint liberally, we cannot conclude

that her second amended complaint met these standards. At a

high level of generality, all agree Kaminski alleges she lost her

job because of her age, race, and national origin. But Rule 8

requires more. Beyond saying Elite Staffing wrongfully dis‐

charged her, Kaminski includes no factual allegations directly

or indirectly connecting the termination with her national

origin, age, or race. It is not enough for the complaint to ob‐

serve only that federal law prohibits adverse employment ac‐

tions on those grounds. There must be some facts that make

the wrongful discharge contention plausible. See Doe v. Co‐

lumbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2019) (explain‐

ing that a plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim “cannot

rely on ... generalized allegations alone, however, but must

combine them with facts particular to his case to survive a

motion to dismiss”).  

The bulk of Kaminski’s allegations focus on bus security

cameras and phone calls to Elite Staffing’s human resources

department—events unrelated to her termination. The one
No. 21‐1616 5

detail Kaminski does allege about her discharge is that Elite

Staffing fired her pursuant to a company policy. But her com‐

plaint says no more—nothing allowing us to see a link be‐

tween any aspect of that policy and her contention that the

agency discharged her because she is Polish, white, or over

50. Right to it, Kaminski’s complaint allows no inference that

Elite Staffing engaged in discrimination.  

While we have no difficulty reaching this conclusion, we

need to sound a soft note of concern about the approach the

district court seems to have taken in dismissing Kaminski’s

second amended complaint. The district court enumerated

the elements of both a Title VII claim of race discrimination

and an ADEA claim of age discrimination by drawing on our

opinion in Barricks. But Barricks addressed whether a plaintiff 

had presented enough evidence to satisfy the McDonnell

Douglas burden‐shifting framework and avoid summary

judgment. Put differently, Barricks was not about the suffi‐

ciency of a pleading but rather about evidentiary suffi‐

ciency—and, even more specifically, whether the plaintiff had

established a prima facie case of discrimination—under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  

The distinction matters. Satisfying Rule 8 and the accom‐

panying standards articulated by the Supreme Court in

Twombly and Iqbal does not require a plaintiff to plead a prima

facie case of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Graham, 8

F.4th at 627 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)). Put more plainly, a plaintiff  need not allege facts

aligning with her claim’s every element, which she will have

to prove for her claim to survive summary judgment. She cer‐

tainly does not need to identify—as the district court seems to

have suggested—a similarly situated employee who
6 No. 21‐1616

managed to avoid termination. See Carlson v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, alt‐

hough plaintiffs at summary judgment may need to point to

similarly situated comparators, plaintiffs need not identify

comparators in pleadings and often need discovery to iden‐

tify them).  

To survive screening or a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

need only allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference

that the adverse action suffered was connected to her pro‐

tected characteristics. See Graham, 8 F.4th at 627; see also Ta‐

mayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (inter‐

preting Twombly and explaining that, in the employment dis‐

crimination context, avoiding dismissal requires a plaintiff to

“describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant

fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests” and to allege a right to relief above “a speculative level”

(cleaned up)). Kaminski’s second amended complaint did not

meet that standard.  

* * *

The explanation for what transpired here is obvious. Jo‐

anne Kaminski is not trained as a lawyer and, perhaps be‐

cause of resource limitations, was left to litigate this case on

her own. All too often that challenge proves too difficult. And

all we can do is remind litigants, including those who find

themselves having to proceed pro se, that it is not enough for

a complaint to allege labels and conclusions without provid‐

ing facts—some short, plain, and plausible factual narrative

that conveys “a story that holds together.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at

826–27 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–

05 (7th Cir. 2010)). A litigant’s best shot at stating a plausible

employment discrimination claim is to explain, in a few
No. 21‐1616 7

sentences, how she was aggrieved and what facts or circum‐

stances lead her to believe her treatment was because of her

membership in a protected class. It is the because of allegation

that was missing here for Kaminski, so we are left to AFFIRM.