CASE STUDY N O. 10

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Road to Good Intentions: 

British Nation-building in Aden

Scott Smitson

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of 

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including 

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive 

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental 

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community 

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different 

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. 

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives 

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development 

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States 

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the 

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought 

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the 

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the 

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed 

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need. 

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships 

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the 

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the 

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

Produced 2010. Material in this case study may be used without permission.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 10

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Road to Good Intentions: 

British Nation-building in Aden

Scott Smitson

Our period of occupation did the country little permanent good, for all the selfless work of many devoted Englishmen and so many good intentions. Whatever 

the rights and wrongs of the way we left, whatever was to come after us, the time 

for us to be there was over. And if we were to go, it was better not to linger on.

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, last high commissioner of the 

Federation of South Arabia

The weathered, ancient heart of the Middle Eastern city had been a center of 

trade, bazaars, and merchant activity for centuries. Throughout its history, 

this urban district had witnessed countless influences from traders from 

across the Middle East region, bringing with them unique cultural and social 

contributions to a vibrant, cosmopolitan crossroads of religions, empires, 

and cultures. But on this day, the neighborhood would be the scene of a violent clash between insurgents, western troops, and local police authorities, 

who, though trained and nominally allied with the western forces, turned 

their weapons on their supposed allies. Starting with an ambush of a supply 

convoy, this battle would evolve into a violent episode of urban conflict, 

punctuated by sniper fire, grenade barrages, and machine gun exchanges. 

Unable to differentiate friendly forces from enemies, the foreign troops were 

surrounded by a lethal enemy that blended in with the civilian population 

that used schools, homes, and mosques as cover. Many of the western forces 

were killed by some of the very security forces they had spent years training, 

mobilizing, and equipping. By the evening of the battle, insurgent forces had 

taken control of the heart of the city, violently expelling the western presence amid the disorienting alleys and courtyards of the district. But while 

this story may seem to have come from recent headlines in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is instead a glimpse into an event known as the “Battle of Crater,” 

fought between British and Aden insurgents in June 1967. 

INTRODUCTION

The British colonial experience in Aden came to a swift end in November 

1967, shortly after the events of the Aden mutiny, and with the complete 

dissolution of the federal government Britain had spent decades trying to 

create in South Arabia. After 130 years of colonial presence, and a concerted 
2 POST-WORLD WAR II AND ADEN Scott Smitson

effort at “nation-building” throughout the post-World War II era, the British 

strategy had failed. This case explores why the strategy failed and what lessons can be learned from the British experience for modern-day nationbuilding.

Historical Background: Why the British Were in Aden

Situated at the choke point between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, 

Aden lies at the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula.1 Aden has a 

deep natural harbor and sheltered inlets that make it an ideal location for 

trade as well as for control of key shipping lanes.2 Recognizing the strategic 

importance of Aden, the British seized control of the battlements and harbor 

of Aden in a quick and decisive engagement on January 19, 1839, providing 

the British East India Company a major presence in the Middle East and 

effectively establishing British control over Aden for decades to come.3

Long-standing rivalries with the French and the Russian empires were 

heightened by these empires’ extensive forays into North Africa and the 

Middle East later in the nineteenth century, making Aden a strategic outpost 

for the British Empire.

Moreover, the building of the Suez Canal, which opened to shipping in 

1869, only increased the importance of Aden, as control of Aden’s port 

enabled the British to control all seaborne shipping passing in and out of the 

Red Sea. The discovery of oil in the Middle East, coupled with the decision 

of the Royal Navy to switch from coal to oil, made the maintenance of Aden 

as a colonial outpost and lynchpin of the British Empire all the more important, to include the prosecution of the Allied war effort during World War II. 

POST-WORLD WAR II AND ADEN

Despite coming out on the winning side of the war against the Axis powers, 

the British Empire after the war was anything but dominant. The cost of two 

global wars in the first part of the twentieth century had effectively bankrupted the empire, leading to what an advisor of the Labour government 

referred to as a “financial Dunkirk.” In essence, the British had two options: 

either withdraw from its numerous overseas obligations or face a greatly 

reduced standard of living at home. 

With this stark choice at hand, the Labour government began to craft 

policies for their overseas possessions. The Colonial Office published a document in 1948 stating that the “central purpose of the British colonial policy 

is simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people 

conquered both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression in any 

quarter.”4

One of the leaders of the post-World War II Labour Party (and eventual 

prime minister), Clement Attlee, noted that when considering postwar 
The Road to Good Intentions 3

colonial policy, “the colonial problem will not be solved by a combination of 

an eye to business and humanitarian sentiment. Nor on the other hand will 

it be solved by looking backwards and reimagining that we can recreate the 

conditions of a past age. Britain must . . . set aside sentimental imperialism 

and take a realist view of our problems.” More specifically, when considering 

the colonies “East of Suez,” Attlee maintained that the colonies consisted of 

“a group of people on the way towards self-government requiring tutelage 

for many years yet and susceptible to much economic development which 

should be directed primarily to the welfare of the indigenous populations 

and to the general service of the world.”5

Additionally, the colonial policies drafted in the post-World War II years 

sought to create some process of constitutional reform; development of the 

political, social, and economic sectors; the creation of a strong, self-sustaining government; and the eventual independence of the colony. In the Aden 

context, policy ideas for decolonization and the creation of political institutions came from career diplomats and colonial officers in the form of something called the “Forward Policy.” This policy was seen by its creators as a 

“prelude to an attenuated form of self-government . . . [because] the region 

required a period of formal British tutelage prior to independence. After the 

demission of authority, Britain’s impact would still be evident in the form of 

the institutions and ideology which had been implanted.”6

One coauthor of the “Forward Policy,” Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, who 

would become advisor for the West Aden Protectorate in 1951, commented 

that the policy’s main task was “to construct ‘states’ out of the loosest and 

most fluid tribal considerations imaginable.” But despite his enthusiasm and 

belief that the “Forward Policy” could be successful in achieving the colonial 

policy outcomes set forth by the British government, Trevaskis knew that 

“state building” would in no way be easy in the South Arabian context. He 

asserted that “there was so much that was unusual or anomalous to comprehend—the distinction between states with advisory treaties and those without; between rulers who ruled and those that did not; the differing degrees 

in which advice and control were employed in different states; the intricate 

web of feuds and rivalries in which every state, tribe, or clan seemed to be 

enmeshed; and, brooding over the whole battlefield of conflict and confusion, the dark continuing shadow of the Yemen’s claim to South Arabia.”7

But as John T. Ducker, a career civil servant with extensive experience in 

the Aden Protectorate during the 1960s, explains, the difficulty was that 

decolonization policies “were all based on the premise that there would have 

to be a degree of consent [from the indigenous population] and that the 

state involved would have to be viable, implying both reasonable competent 

government and economic viability at an attainable level.” Ducker was 

rather pessimistic about the prospects of a successful decolonization: 

“[C]onsent implied electoral systems, with an agreed franchise, then almost 

totally absent, and normally implied the transfer of power from traditional 

rulers or authorities to elected ones, which was bound to be disputatious. 

Competent government implied a level and depth of education, which was 
4 NASSER, SUEZ, AND THE COLD WAR Scott Smitson

not present in most colonies, despite considerable advances. Economic viability gave rise to questions and answers, which differed from territory to territory according to the resources of each. Some economies were primitive, 

including, it has to be said, much of the Aden Protectorate.”8

NASSER, SUEZ, AND THE COLD WAR

At the time when the British were struggling with how best to plan, control, 

and execute decolonization in line with their stated aims, the Cold War 

moved into full swing and Arab nationalism took over much of the Middle 

East. As the successful leader of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Gamel 

Abdul Nasser became Egypt’s second president in 1956, heralding a new 

period of modernization and socialist reform and advancing the idea of panArab nationalism, including a short-lived union with Syria.9

Nasser was revered throughout the Middle East, as he was the first 

native-born Egyptian leader in 150 years, had forced British troops out of 

their respective Suez Canal bases, obtained arms and aid from the Soviet 

Union, and actively sought to promote Egyptian leadership in the Arab 

world and expunge any and all influence of the West, to include the colonial 

interests of the British, from the Middle East.10 As a result, in 1957 Nasser 

nationalized the Suez Canal and successfully withstood a combined AngloFrench attempt to seize it back militarily. In 1962, in an attempt to expand 

his influence on the Arabian Peninsula, Nasser intervened in the Yemen civil 

war, placing tens of thousands of troops in a state that shared a border with 

the Aden Protectorate. 

The Conservative Party and Imperial Concerns

Meanwhile, the Suez crisis significantly impacted domestic politics in the 

United Kingdom, bringing about the removal from power of the Labour 

Party and the selection of new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a member 

of the Conservative Party. Shortly after taking office, Macmillan initiated a 

thorough review of the British Empire, specifically focused on the ongoing 

constitutional and political developments in the colonies. This review 

argued for the need to retain Aden as a strategic asset but recognized the 

need for continued assistance and political development (see textbox 1).11

The Conservatives feared that the rising Arab nationalism increasingly 

championed by Nasser could provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to 

gain traction in the region, reinforcing the new government’s conviction of 

the central importance of retaining British colonial outposts in the Middle 

East, especially Aden.12

The Characteristics of Aden, the West Aden Protectorate (WAP), 

and the East Aden Protectorate (EAP)

Although all under the auspices of the British Colonial Office, the region, 

known as “Southern Arabia” was divided into three separate protectorates, 
The Road to Good Intentions 5

each with different social, economic, and political challenges and responsibilities:

1. Aden itself was a cosmopolitan, commerce-dependent seaport that at 

one point was the world’s third busiest port, serving as a major provider of oil to passing ships that readily took advantage of the nearby 

Suez Canal. Most of the citizens of Aden Colony were highly educated and served in many professional positions within the colonial 

bureaucracy. The colony already had some level of political institutions, as it had an elected municipal government and a Legislative 

Assembly. Aden also was home to many transient Yemenis who were 

not granted outright political rights in the existing political framework. This sizeable minority within the seaport would serve as a 

major roadblock in developing a lasting constitution as efforts to create an independent Aden moved forward. 

2. The West Aden Protectorate was made up of twenty states with few 

existing structures of law and order that could provide any framework for a future constitutional order.13 The WAP states were 

located between Aden Colony and Yemen, which served as the 

Textbox 1. Findings of the Conservative Party’s Review of Aden, 1957

(i) Taking strategic, diplomatic, and economic considerations together, Her Majesty’s Government has a strong interest in retaining control of the Colony of Aden, 

which could by progressive stages attain a high degree of internal self-government, 

but Her Majesty’s Government cannot in the foreseeable future consider the grant 

of self-determination.

(ii) From the point of view of Her Majesty’s Government’s interests, the Protected 

States have mainly to be considered in relation to the protection which they afford 

the Colony; in this sense, the only policies which must be absolutely rejected are 

any which would be likely to lead to the absorption of these States by the Yemen 

and Saudi Arabia.

(iii) Her Majesty’s Government has, however, because of its treaties, and for general 

historical reasons, strong obligations towards these Protected States, which equally 

lead to the impossibility of allowing them to be absorbed by the Yemen or Saudi 

Arabia, and make it the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to continue to develop 

them economically and socially so that they may eventually be able to maintain 

their independence vis-à-vis the Yemen and Saudi Arabia without outside support.

Source: as quoted in Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 17.
6 NASSER, SUEZ, AND THE COLD WAR Scott Smitson

staging ground for thousands of Egyptian troops fighting in the 

Yemen civil war. In addition, for many previous decades, an imamate 

in neighboring Yemen had laid claim to Aden Colony, a claim that 

continually threatened the entire British nation-building enterprise. 

3. The East Aden Protectorate was much more independent and politically and economically self-sufficient than Aden in its governing 

structures, as a sultan presided over six separate governorships, maintained a peace accord between the urban centers of the EAP and the 

rural tribes that could at times threaten overland commerce, 

enforced law and order within the EAP, and utilized existing social 

structures to provide a tangible governing framework. 

Given these significant differences between the three protectorates, it 

proved extremely difficult to reach a political consensus between British and 

Protectorate powerbrokers for creating and implementing an enduring constitutional and governing framework.14

The Trevaskis Plan

Under the guidance of Kennedy Trevaskis, advisor for the WAP, a plan was 

initiated that sought to create a federation in combining states from both the 

East and West Aden Protectorates; this federation would be headed by the 

governor of Aden and would, in function, be a quasi-independent form of 

government that would set the conditions for eventual British withdrawal 

(but would not include Aden Colony). But Trevaskis’ plan was widely 

denounced. The South Arabian League (SAL), a collection of nationalists, 

elites, and intellectuals that sought a unified South Arabia, rejected the plan 

because it ran contrary to its own goal of creating a single, unified South Arabian state that would include Aden and both the East and West Aden Protectorates. Nevertheless, the organization still wanted to participate in the 

dialogue of constitution-building. However, engagement with the SAL from 

the Colonial Office was decreased following the inability of the British government to reach a consensus on how best to incorporate the varying entities of Aden, the EAP states, and the WAP states. Increasingly marginalized 

in subsequent negotiations, the SAL turned to Yemen and Egypt for support. Trevaskis bluntly stated that the SAL had “lost faith in our intentions.”15

In addition, “at almost the same time as Cairo Radio began to speak the 

tones of revolutionary Arab nationalism, the development of cheap, transportable transistor radios created a mass audience among the poor and the 

remote. Men who had long lived in isolation now found a common political 

language and a breathtaking, liberating community of sentiment with multitudes in their own land and across the Arab world . . . Aden’s government 

had to try to meet this challenge but it was ill equipped to do so.”16
The Road to Good Intentions 7

Moreover, forces within Yemen began to funnel arms and supplies into 

the West Aden Protectorate to local tribesmen to incite violence and further 

aggravate security in the WAP.17

One observer noted the difficult position the leaders of the Protectorate 

states found themselves in when assessing the Trevaskis plan, stating that 

“the initial response from the rulers was favourable.” However, the scheme 

did not get off the ground. The proposed federation implied considerable 

loss of autonomy by the rulers in favor of the federal institutions, for which 

some of them were not ready. 

In the EAP, there was difficulty in balancing the separate interests of the 

smaller states with the much larger Quaiti State. 

In the WAP, some rulers also feared it might be a subterfuge to detach 

the Protectorate from Aden, which was not to be included at that stage. 

Some wondered if Britain would stand by them if they took a step they knew 

would incur the wrath of Yemen and Cairo Radio. The imam of Yemen 

attacked the scheme, perhaps because he feared it might extinguish forever 

his claims to territory in the WAP. Egypt opposed the scheme because of the 

British sponsorship.18

Finally, the British government continued to debate the “Aden question” endlessly, throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, with the Conservative Party 

reinforcing the needs of retaining Aden for strategic flexibility “East of 

Suez,” while the Labour Party continually argued for the immediate relinquishment of Aden to the indigenous population. The theme of Labour’s 

feelings of limited military presence is epitomized by the following quote 

from a leading member of Labour during the period: 

“The first of these limitations is that we should not seek to maintain military 

facilities in an independent country against its will. The second is that we 

should not accept commitments to give military support to a country unless 

that country provides us with the facilities we require to make our support effective in time. The third is that we should not attempt to maintain a capability for 

carrying out major military operations entirely alone and without allies. I do not 

believe that, even if it were economically or militarily possible for us to avoid 

accepting these limitations, it would be politically wise for us to seek to do so. In 

particular, to seek to maintain military facilities in an independent country 

against its will can mean tying down so many troops in protecting one’s base 

that one has none left to use from it. The base then becomes a heavy commitment in itself and loses all its military value.”19

While Labour’s views were tied to economic concerns, the Conservatives continued to espouse the importance of Aden in a geostrategic context:

“We have in Aden today—for we have it still—the third most important port in 

the world. . . . There is a major airfield, an important refinery, . . excellent training grounds and, above all, a major stockpile which enables us to pack a heavy 

punch, if we should need to, anywhere in the western part of the Indian Ocean.
8 NASSER, SUEZ, AND THE COLD WAR Scott Smitson

 The value of the base has been proved more than once. We based our operations in Muscat on it. We organised the safety of Kuwait from it. We prevented 

the expansion of the three East African mutinies from it. The Secretary of State 

for Defence said yesterday that we did not need that base to carry out our commitments outside South Arabia. I wonder whether he is right. I do not know 

how without Aden he will be able to go to the help of our numerous Commonwealth partners in East and Central Africa. I am not quite clear how in a real 

emergency he will be able to help the Persian Gulf.”20

Seeing the vigorous rejection of the Trevaskis plan by foreign elements 

within and outside of the Protectorate, coupled with the deadlocked views 

of the way forward with decolonization of Aden in the British parliament, 

the British government had to review its policies on the direction of political 

development in Aden. Reappraising British policies in Southern Arabia, the 

prime minister’s cabinet Colonial Policy Committee recommended the following in March 1956:

• The colony of Aden could progressively attain a high degree of internal self-government though not, in the foreseeable future, self-determination on account of Aden’s strategic military importance;

• Any policy that might lead to the absorption of the protected states 

by Yemen or Saudi Arabia must be absolutely rejected;

• Her Majesty’s Government had a strong obligation to continue to 

develop the protected states;

• The future independence of those states would very likely need some 

form of closer association;

• The governor should continue discussions with the rulers about such 

forms of closer association, which should also address the questions 

of management of any future oil revenues.21

While this colonial governing policy document demonstrated the British 

government’s logic for decreasing the pace of the decolonization process 

(though decolonization was still a stated objective), the British military 

drafted new, strategic planning documents in 1958 that increased the importance of Aden to the overall strategic framework of the empire. The 1958 

Defense White Paper moved the general headquarters of the British Middle 

East Command from Suez and Cyprus to Aden; Aden was now the command location for all the British air and land forces in the “Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and British Somaliland”; the Defence White Paper 

also implemented the concept of “commando carrier” groups that would 

provide strategic flexibility throughout the Indian Ocean, with one “commando carrier group” based in Singapore, the other in Aden. 
The Road to Good Intentions 9

Sir William Luce’s Warnings

That same year, Sir William Luce, the governor of Aden, began signaling 

that all was not well in Southern Arabia, and in fact the policy direction in 

Aden and the Protectorates should be reversed, not necessarily accelerated. 

First, in April 1958, Luce warned that “we now have on our doorstep two 

powerful influences—both hostile; and we must assume that both Russia 

and Egypt will support and exploit the long-standing ambition of the Imam 

to secure Yemeni domination of both the Aden Protectorate and Colony.”22

Given these challenges, Luce saw three options:

1. Remain indefinitely.

2. Withdraw early.

3. Disengage gradually.

Luce recommended the third option, but he felt that it would take nearly 

a decade to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula in a manner that supported Aden Colony and the Protectorates so that they could remain a viable political entity after the British colonial and military presence had 

ended.23 He suggested that the British should withdraw completely from the 

Middle East, more closely align themselves with representatives of the Arab 

nationalist movement, and thereby set the conditions for favorable relations 

with Arab countries in the future. 

Luce argued that the only suitable “end game” in the disengagement 

from the Arabian Peninsula was the establishment and implementation of 

some sort of comprehensive governing structure that included both Protectorates, as well as the Aden Colony. Doing so would require a significant 

investment in British fiscal, military, and diplomatic capital as well as a recognition that any continued British military presence in Aden Colony had to 

come solely at the discretion of Aden political elites.24

The Conservative Reaction to Luce

The withdrawal recommendation sent shock waves through the Conservative Party. The Colonial Policy Committee decided Aden was too important 

in the existing British strategy to give up; Aden was essential to the British 

military’s role in maintaining a presence in the Middle East and the Indian 

Ocean to counter the threat of Soviet influence. 

To reinforce this policy in the Middle East, a communiqué was sent 

from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the various heads of missions of British embassies throughout the region (see textbox 2), outlining 

the strategic objectives of the British government, which at the time was still 

controlled by the Conservative Party:25
10 THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA Scott Smitson

• Stability in the Persian Gulf to facilitate the production, refining, and 

flow of oil into international markets;

• Support for the large, British commercial interests in the oil industry;

• Continued access through the Suez Canal and through over-flying 

rights to facilitate trade and the deployment of the armed forces in the 

Indian Ocean region, including South East Asia;

• In concert with the USA, minimization of Soviet influence exercised 

mainly through relations with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.26

It was apparent that British strategy heavily relied upon the continued 

use and presence of overseas basing of their military forces in the Middle 

East. While diplomats in Aden continued to work toward an eventual handover of control from the Colonial Office to the Aden citizenry, the British 

military significantly increased its footprint in the colony, so much so that 

troops were shifted from traditional basing areas such as West Germany to 

Aden to be utilized in operations in East Africa and Kuwait.

For the Tories, no merger of Aden Colony in the Protectorates was politically feasible for the foreseeable future; any proposed “Aden Federation” 

had to come from the Protectorate states themselves. The colonial secretary 

at the time, Alan Lennox-Boyd, argued that the British government had to 

“secure Aden Colony as a military base for as long as possible . . . and . . . 

could not allow the merger of the Colony [Aden] and the Protectorate/Federation at that time. . . . Time would be needed to accomplish a merger given 

the different stages of development of the parties . . . although Aden politicians and Protectorate rulers wanted to merge Aden into the Federation, 

they did so for very different reasons and they totally underestimated the 

difficulties which would arise.” 

Comparing sentiment in the government with sentiment in the field, it 

became quickly apparent that “there was a basic incompatibility between 

Her Majesty’s Government’s desire for the military facilities in South Arabia 

and the policy of creating a viable state to hand over at independence.”27

THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA

The British government’s decision to continue its drive toward a federation 

of states in the Aden Protectorate, absent Aden Colony itself, was boosted 

when on February 11, 1959, six West Aden Protectorate states joined the 

Federation of Arab Emirates of the South (Federation of South Arabia) and 

adopted a constitution giving each state legislative and executive representation. Additionally, the Federation of South Arabia and Britain signed a 

“Treaty of Friendship and Protection,” which laid out plans for British financial and military assistance in an effort to help the Federation achieve full 

independence; coupled with this development agreement was a promise by 
The Road to Good Intentions 11

the British to protect the Federation from both foreign and domestic 

threats.28

Structural Issues of the Federation Constitution

Nevertheless, Trevaskis criticized that “the Federation existed only in agreement on a constitution. There was no federal government and no federal 

civil service. The Federation had no officers and owned neither a table nor 

chair. . . . What they [the Federalists] had in mind was something in the 

nature of the Arab League and based on the principle of the absolute equality of all states in everything; . . . what emerged out of months of argument 

was a cross between our two concepts: an unattractive hybrid, but something which was a good deal better than nothing and which, one hoped, 

would be later improved.”29

Textbox 2. Policy Guidance from the Secretary of State for 

Foreign Affairs for Middle East Policy

First, we believe that each country in the Middle East should be left to choose its 

own road to salvation, free from outside interference. Our object is to work with 

whatever governments are in power, or come to power, on the basis of such common interests as exist between us, and to help them within the limits of our means.

Second, we should accordingly abstain from any interference in the internal affairs 

of Arab states and from Arab quarrels, except to the extent to which our special 

responsibilities may make it, exceptionally, necessary.

Third, we must make it clear that where we have special responsibilities and so long 

as we have them we intend to carry them out. Our action should be prompt and 

effective, and the minimum necessary to achieve our purpose.

Fourth, we must accept Arab nationalism and ‘Nasserism,’ which is one manifestation of it, as a fact of life. We must take account of it and adopt as sympathetic an 

attitude as is compatible with British interests.

Fifth, we must avoid any general anti-nationalist, anti-Nasser, or anti-revolutionary 

posture, both because it would provide Arab nationalists, even though they may be 

working against us, with a convenient target against which to rally other Arabs 

against the West and to inflict greater harm on our interests.

Sixth, we must continue to keep in close touch with the United States Government 

and ensure that our policies are coordinated and each properly understood by each 

other.

Source: Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, pp. 340–341.
12 ADEN INTO THE FEDERATION Scott Smitson

Trevaskis stated that “the Constitution provided for a Legislature, called 

the Federal Council, in which each state would be represented . . . and a 

Cabinet of ministers or Supreme Council on which each state would be represented by one minister. . . . There was to be no President or Prime Minster. . . . Reliance on the collective leadership of ministers, representing 

separate states, the appointment of ministers on the basis of states and representation in the Federal Council on the principle of equality were regrettable but unavoidable weaknesses, which I hoped would fall away with time.”30

The Federation construct had other weaknesses as well: First, it 

entrenched the power of existing political elites (i.e., sheiks, tribal leaders, 

and sultans) without specifying how to reconcile power allocations between 

the elected and the traditional leadership.31 Second, it relegated the authority and responsibilities of British political officers from “state building” to 

“state repairing” by placing the focus on overcoming the weaknesses in existing government forms in the Protectorate states rather than guiding the creation of a completely new political institution. 

One observer noted that “administration had given away to politics and 

in this field the colonial officials were limited by their inability to make any 

mass ideological appeal which could compete with that of their nationalist 

opponents. Federal rule consisted of an amalgam of autocratic commands 

through British-created administrative structures, and political manipulation of traditionally-determined social mechanisms.”32

Another observer concluded that “the Federation never assumed an 

effective political identity. It remained what it had been at the start, an aggregation of interested individuals and groups, united not so much by a positive 

feeling as by fear of common enemies.”33

ADEN INTO THE FEDERATION

As negotiations commenced, it became clear that these disjointed British 

policies created new challenges. Aden Colony was, in every aspect, vastly 

different than the Protectorate states in the West Aden and East Aden Protectorates. First, British colonial elements had to find a way to convince 

Aden’s indigenous political elite to join the Federation of South Arabia. Second, it had to be determined what level of representation Aden Colony, as 

the most significant member of the Federation, given its population size, 

economic might, and advanced levels of governing institutions, would have 

in both the executive and legislative councils of the Federation.34

Structural Compromises for Aden’s Inclusion

To address the first issue, the number of representatives to Aden Colony’s 

Legislative Council was increased and their term extended from four to five 

years. In addition, a position of “chief minister” was created, and the established Executive Council was renamed the “Council of Ministers.”35
The Road to Good Intentions 13

The second issue, determining who would be eligible to vote in Aden 

Colony elections, proved to be a major hurdle. Although British records 

estimated that Aden Colony’s population was quickly approaching the 

250,000 mark, the right of suffrage was only extended to those who were 

born in Aden, British subjects, or protected subjects who had lived in the 

colony for at least seven of the previous ten years. In the end, only 21,500 

people out of 180,000 were eligible to vote, and only 6,000 of those eligible 

cast a vote at all. One group left out of the political process was large numbers of migrant workers of Yemeni descent who had lived in Aden Colony 

for years, and in some instances decades, for fear that these immigrant 

groups could become influenced by the anti-British forces in Yemen and 

retard British efforts in the colony.36

Complicating issues further was the fact that the bulk of the labor that 

worked in the key industries of Aden Colony were Yemenis who were highly 

organized and heavily opposed to the inclusion of Aden Colony into the 

Federation of South Arabia. Leading the dissent of the workers were the 

trade unions, specifically the Aden Trade Union Congress, and its political 

wing, the People’s Socialist Party. 

The period between 1959 and 1963 saw a marked increase in political 

demonstrations, mass protests, and highly effective and debilitating strikes 

organized by the Aden Trade Union Congress. One such strike in 1963 

nearly collapsed operations on the British military base in Aden, as striking 

workers shut down the supply distribution operations.37

Opposition to the inclusion of Aden Colony into the Federation of 

South Arabia continued to come from the British Labour Party, which 

increasingly voiced its dissent and disapproval with the myriad of initiatives 

undertaken by the Conservatives due to the persistent Labour claims that 

the British government needed to remove itself militarily and colonially 

“East of Suez.” One Labour spokesman stated that “the major problem for 

the next Labour Government is going to be to decide whether there are any 

real interests overseas which it is going to be both politically and militarily 

possible to protect by force. That is going to entail a total revision of our 

defense policy.”38

It was no surprise that after recapturing control of parliament in 1964, 

Labour should suspend or reverse many of the Conservative Party policies 

in Aden. When violence from the Yemen civil war began to spread over the 

borders into some states in the West Aden Protectorate (now, the Federation of South Arabia) in February 1963, the British military resorted to air 

raids and artillery shelling to honor their security guarantees with the Federation states that bordered Yemen. Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) 

was called in to review the incidents and eventually became critical of the 

security and governance initiatives being undertaken by the British government. The UN Security Council went so far as to vote for UN Resolution 

1949 that declared that “the maintenance of the military base in Aden is 

prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal is therefore 

desirable . . . calls upon the administrating power [implied to mean the 
14 FROM POLITICAL TO ARMED CONFLICT Scott Smitson

British government] to repeal all laws which restrict public freedoms; to 

release all political prisoners and detainees and those that have been sentenced following actions of political significance; to allow the return of those 

people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because 

of political activities; to cease forthwith with all repressive actions against 

the people of the territory, in particular military expeditions and the bombing of villages.”39

What had been to that point contentious, though nonviolent, disagreements about the future of the southwest Arabian Peninsula would soon 

transform into an increasingly violent and bloody crisis. 

FROM POLITICAL TO ARMED CONFLICT

For some elements of the Aden political community, dialogue was no longer 

the currency to achieve independence. In the summer of 1963, radical activists, no longer patient with the negotiation methods used by organizations 

such as the South Arabian League, started the National Liberation Front 

(NLF), openly calling for armed struggle against the Federation of South 

Arabia. In its initial charter, the NLF stated its basic rationale as making “the 

South Yemeni population rise against British imperialism and the ‘forged 

federal unity’ [the British-constructed Federation of South Arabia] which 

only signified separation and reaction.” Founders of the NLF sought to create “a nationalist movement of liberation . . . progressive, organized for a 

struggle with a revolutionary ideology . . . which would be based on Arab 

nationalist noble targets.” Outside of its ideological directive, the NLF 

sought to unite existing nationalist and insurgent groups in their efforts for 

liberation and develop a clearly defined “programme for the struggle of independence.” The NLF sought to lead, violently if necessary, the contemporary movements against the British and the Federation and lay sole claim to 

the future political direction of South Arabia.40

The NLF demonstrated its lethal capability in a grenade attack on Sir 

Kennedy Trevaskis, high commissioner in Aden, in December 1963. This 

attack, which Trevaskis survived, signaled the beginning of a bloody terrorist 

campaign in the urban centers of Aden Colony and throughout the Protectorate states. By December 1963, the NLF had already been heavily 

involved in funneling arms and creating unrest in the rural, hinterland areas 

of the West Aden Protectorate. This unrest eventually required a massive 

effort of British forces to successfully prosecute a campaign in the Radfan 

mountains.41

Besides the NLF, which was very much a “homegrown” organization, 

the Federation and the British government also had to contend with the 

Front for the Liberation of South Yemen. The Front was heavily influenced 

and controlled by Egypt, and despite its aversion to the British and the Federation of South Arabia, viewed itself as a rival to the NLF, so much so that 
The Road to Good Intentions 15

the two groups were eventually at war not only with the British and the Federation but also with each other.42

What had started out as isolated instances of violence quickly became a 

civil war, as the number of armed incidents in Aden Colony alone saw dramatic increases in security incidents and casualties. For example, in 1964, 

there were thirty-six recorded incidents of violence in Aden Colony, with 

the deaths of two British military forces and twenty-five wounded. By the 

peak of the “Aden Emergency,” as the insurgency period was called, there 

were at least 2,980 recorded incidents of violence in Aden Colony in 1967, 

as well as 44 British military forces killed and 325 wounded; local civilian 

deaths and Federation troop casualties figures mirrored this upward progression in deaths from 1964 to 1967.43

As the violence in Aden increased, dissent of a less violent but still significantly important degree was taking shape in the heart of the British political 

system: the victory of the Labour Party in the British general election of 

October 1964.

THE LABOUR PARTY’S APPROACH

Firmly in control of Whitehall and parliament, the new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, selected individuals for his cabinet who would faithfully execute 

the policies of the Labour Government: Denis Healy to head the Ministry of 

Defense, and Anthony Greenwood as the Colonial Secretary. The Labour 

Party Manifesto stated that the new government would seek to reinvigorate 

the powers of the United Nations and conduct a thorough reappraisal of the 

defense establishment, especially within the context of budgeting and funding. More specifically, the manifesto argued that “the first responsibility of 

the British Government is still to the Commonwealth . . . in foreign affairs 

the most important effort would be to revive the morale and increase the 

powers of the United Nations . . . in defense, a Labour Government would 

see to it that the nation gets value for money on its overseas expenditures 

and as a first step would submit the whole area of weapons supply to a 

searching re-examination in order to ensure that the limited sums available 

are spent on those weapons best designed to carry out our policies and fulfill 

our obligations.”44

Denis Healy, Minister of Defense, recalled that at the beginning of the 

Labour government in 1964, when appraising the British role “East of Suez,” 

there was no general role for Aden, but rather “it was related to responsibilities in particular territories which we tried to get rid of as soon as we 

decently could” and was “intent on getting out of Aden ‘from the word 

go’.”45

Almost immediately, Greenwood began to break any ties the British government had with “feudal rulers,” the sheiks, tribal leaders, and chiefs who 

had been integral to the formation of the Federation of South Arabia, and 

instead engaged with elements in Aden who had been hostile to British 
16 THE LABOUR PARTY’S APPROACH Scott Smitson

efforts in Aden Colony, namely Abd Allah al-Asnag, leader of the Aden 

Trade Union Congress. Next, Greenwood immediately replaced the governor of Aden, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, with Sir Richard Turnbull, an appointee with experience in creating independent political institutions in British 

colonial East Africa. Greenwood, in what appeared to be a nod to the recommendations of Luce a decade earlier, sought to break ongoing constitutional 

impasses by championing a “unitary state” solution and advocated the 

immediate withdrawal of British forces from Aden. 

As violence in Aden increased, the chief minister of Aden, Abd al-Qawi 

Makkawi, supported the NLF and refused to denounce terrorism. Sir Richard Turnbull was forced to invoke his emergency powers as governor and 

suspended all constitutional processes in September 1965. Aden was now 

under the direct rule of the British Colonial Office, seemingly as far removed 

from a sovereign, democratic-based governing structure as it had been a 

decade earlier.46

Aden Policy and the Defense White Paper of 1966

Following close on the heels of the decision to invoke direct rule over Aden 

Colony was the publication of the Labour Government’s Defense White 

Paper of 1966, the goal of which was “to reduce the proportion of government expenditure allocated for defense in favor of domestic expenditure. 

This fundamental decision forced the British government to consider reductions in commitments around the world. This determination was accompanied by an ideological, almost visceral feeling among some Labour 

backbenchers and politicians that the day of colonies and military bases was 

over.”47

The Defense White Paper specified that:

To relax the strain imposed on the British economy . . . and to shape a new 

defense posture . . . 

– There would be a 6 percent reduction in Defence, nearly 100 million 

pounds . . . 

– Defence must be the servant of foreign policy, not its master . . .

– Although we have important economic interests in the Middle East, Asia, 

and elsewhere, military force is not the most suitable means of protecting 

them . . . 

– Even small British Forces can prevent large scale catastrophes [but] outside 

Europe we can act 

 (1) only with Allies 

 (2) only with facilities 
The Road to Good Intentions 17

 (3) no maintenance of bases in independence countries against their 

desires . . . South Arabia is due to become independent by 1968, and 

we do not think it appropriate that we should maintain defense facilities there after that happens. We therefore intend to withdraw our 

forces from the Aden base at that time, and we have so informed the 

Federal Government.48 We shall be able to fulfill our remaining obligations . . . by making a small increase in our forces stationed in the 

Persian Gulf.49

Not surprisingly, publication of the White Paper produced widespread 

dissent within the British parliamentary system, as well as from high-ranking 

civil servants who had spent years working in Aden Colony and the Protectorate during the Conservative government years. Despite vigorous debate 

in parliament, the Conservatives could not stop the vote for withdrawal 

from Aden from passing in the House of Commons in March 1966. 

The announcement of a concrete withdrawal date reenergized the 

efforts of regional actors, especially Nasser, who soon contended that “there 

was an announcement that Britain has decided to grant independence in 

1968. Well then, we shall stay there [in Yemen] until 1968.” 

The leadership in the Federation was now faced with the stark reality 

that there would be no protection from Britain, diplomatically or militarily, 

against the rising forces of nationalism and insurgency within Aden Colony 

and the Protectorate. Those linked with the Federation now had the choice 

of siding with the anti-Federation forces increasingly gaining control of the 

territory, or maintaining allegiance to a governing structure that had little 

caché amongst the population and had no means, militarily, diplomatically, 

or otherwise, to stem the tide of civil war and insurgency consuming the 

Southwest Arabian Peninsula.50

ENDNOTES

1. See Map appendix for further clarification of Aden’s geographic position in the 

Indian Ocean, Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula.

2. Harvey Sicherman, Aden and British Strategy: 1839–1968 (Philadelphia, PA: 

Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1972), p. 3. 

3. R. J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule: 1839–1967 (London, UK: C. Hurst & Co, 

Ltd., 1975), p. 1.

4. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 130, 162.

5. Ibid., pp. 94–95.

6. Spencer Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955–67: Last 

Outpost of a Middle East Empire (Abingdon, UK: Routledge Press, 2005), pp. 6–7. 

7. Kennedy Trevaskis, Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode (London, UK: 

Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1968), pp. 32–33.

8. Peter Hinchcliffe, John T. Ducker, and Maria Holt, Without Glory in Arabia: 

The British Retreat from Aden (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2006), p. 8. 

9. Early in the twentieth century, Arab nationalism began to develop as a political 
18 ENDNOTES Scott Smitson

force within the Middle East; according to the Arab nationalist view, the borders of twentieth century states in the Middle East, drawn up by the western powers after the Treaty of 

Versailles, divided a monolithic Arab identity and culture that spanned the whole of the region. Implicit in the idea of Arab nationalism was an antiimperialist position toward the 

western powers, as well as a deep disregard for any existing political institutions within 

Middle Eastern states that could be viewed as complicit reactionaries (kings, shahs, landowners, etc.) to the colonial powers; in essence, Arab nationalism quickly became fused 

with the idea of revolutionary socialism. See Tore T. Petersen, The Decline of the AngloAmerican Middle East: 1961–1969 (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), p. 7.

10. Ibid., pp. 17–18. 

11. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 17. 

12. See Map 1, British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility.

13. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 8–13. 

14. Ibid.

15. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 14–15.

16. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, p. 333.

17. Karl Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia (New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 1991), p. 25.

18. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 14–15.

19. Hansard, March 7, 1966, pp. 1781–1782.

20. Ibid., pp. 1961–1962.

21. As quoted in Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 15–16.

22. Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia, pp. 26–27.

23. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 18–20.

24. Ibid., pp. 19–20.

25. Memorandum dated April 17, 1963, from the secretary of State for Foreign 

Affairs to all heads of British missions in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, setting out 

Her Majesty’s Government’s approach to foreign policy in the region.

26. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 61.

27. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

28. Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia, pp. 26–27.

29. Trevaskis, Shades of Amber, pp. 143–144.

30. Ibid.

31. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 25.

32. The observer quoted above also noted that “[t]hey had to make do with older 

methods of political management, concentrating on the particular rather than the general, 

winning over traditionally distinct individuals and groups by bribes and administrative 

favors. . . . Broadcasting, education, and general social integration cut into and rendered 

otiose the chiefs’ traditional functions of interpreting a wider world to their parochial 

followers.”

33. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, pp. 340–341.

34. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 25.

35. Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia, pp. 38–39.

36. Ibid., p. 42. 

37. Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia, pp. 31, 42–45.

38. Ibid., p. 51.

39. UN Resolution No. 1949, “The Question of Aden,” 1277th Plenary Meeting, 

December 11, 1963.

40. Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen, pp. 53–55.

41. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, pp. 345–346.

42. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, pp. 44–45.

43. Julian Paget, Last Post Aden (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1969), as 

referenced in Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 36.

44. Pieragostini, Britain, Aden, and South Arabia, p. 91.
The Road to Good Intentions 19

45. Ibid., p. 114.

46. Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, pp. 355–357.

47. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 204.

48. The Defense White Paper is referring to the Federation of South Arabia when it 

mentions “the Federal Government.”

49. Defense White Paper of 1966 excerpt, as referenced in Sicherman, Aden and 

British Strategy: 1839–1968, pp. 34–36.

50. Ibid., pp. 35–38.

TIMELINE

January 19, 1839

British seize Aden port

1945

End of World War II

1948

British government outlines decolonialization policies

1952

Formation of South Arabian League political organization in Aden

1954

Gamel Abdul Nasser seizes power in Egypt; British leave 

Suez military base

1956

Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal

Formation of the Aden Trade Union Congress

1957

Suez crisis, failed Anglo-French attempt to take back the Suez Canal 

from Egypt

Harold Macmillan (Conservative Party) appointed as 

British prime minister

1958

Publication of British Defense White Paper outlining reasons for 

strategic importance of Aden

January 1958

Egypt, Syria, and Yemen form the United Arab Republic

March 1958

Sir William Luce authors letters to British government stressing 

importance of British withdrawal from Aden

1959

Creation of the Federation of South Arabia

British government (Conservative Party) decides to ignore policy 

recommendations of Sir William Luce

1962

Nasser intervenes in Yemeni civil war
20 TIMELINE Scott Smitson

Formation of the People’s Socialist Party in Aden

1963

British begin protecting Federation states from incursions from 

Yemen

Major strikes by Yemeni laborers and unions in Aden negatively 

impact British military operations and supply

October 1963

Formation of the National Liberation Front 

Aden Election Commission formed; creates restrictive suffrage 

requirements for 1963 election

December 1963

Grenade attack on Aden High Commissioner Sir Kennedy Trevaskis

January 1964

Beginning of the Radfan Mountain campaign

June 1964

Constitutional conference held in London concerning Aden and the 

Federation of South Arabia

October 1964

British Labour Party takes control of parliament; Harold Wilson 

selected as prime minister

December 1964

Aden Council of Ministers issues declaration of support to form unitary state of South Arabia, to include Aden and both East and 

West Aden Protectorate

Armed attacks begin on British military in Aden

September 1965

Beginning of Aden Emergency; British direct rule of Aden reinstated

March 1966

Publication of 1966 Defense White Paper; outlines British intent to 

leave Aden by 1968

May 1967

Beginning of evacuation of service families from Aden to the United 

Kingdom

June 1967

Israel defeats neighboring Arab States in Six-Day War; closure of the 

Suez Canal

July 1967

Battle of Crater and the “Aden Mutiny”

November 27, 1967

British withdrawal from Aden
The Road to Good Intentions 21

APPENDIX: MAPS

1. British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility (post-WWII)

2. Middle Easst and North Africa (circa 1963)

3. Yemen, Aden Port, and the East and West Aden Protectorates 

(circa 1963)
22 Map 1. British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility (post-WWII) Scott Smitson

Map 1.British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility 

(post-WWII)

Source: Base map obtained from U.S. Geological Survey. http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulletin/neic_pcc3_l.html. Labels for Suez Canal, Aden, and Singapore work by author.
The Road to Good Intentions 23

Map 2.Middle Easst and North Africa (circa 1963)

Source: Base map obtained from Arizona Geographic Alliance. http://alliance.la.asu.edu/

maps/mideast.pdf. Labels of maps and demarcation of Yemen/Aden, Egypt, and South 

Arabia work by author.
24 Map 3. Yemen, Aden Port, and the East and West Aden Protectorates (circa 1963) Scott Smitson

Map 3.Yemen, Aden Port, and the East and West Aden Protectorates 

(circa 1963)

Source: Base map obtained from U.S. Army (Open Domain). Labels of Aden Port, West 

Aden Protectorate, and East Aden Protectorate work by author. 
25

CASE STUDY N O. 10, TEACHING NOTES

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Road to Good Intentions: 

British Nation-building in Aden

Scott Smitson

ABSTRACT

Despite well over a century of colonial influence in South Arabia, the British 

government failed to create a lasting and effective constitutional construct 

that addressed the myriad issues inherent when trying to introduce democratic institutions in an area that had little to no experience with democratic 

norms and ideas concurrent with western perceptions of modern states. 

Culminating in the Aden Emergency of 1964–1967, the British efforts to 

disengage from its former colonial territory in a preplanned manner transformed into a complex operation that faced considerable obstacles: the Cold 

War, Pan-Arabism, and midcentury decolonialization. The Aden Emergency was the denouement of a decades-long British endeavor to combine 

diplomatic efforts, military training, and economic development in an 

attempt to create a stable country for eventual inclusion in the British Commonwealth. During this time period, the British had to contend with two 

competing insurgency forces, the Egyptian-supported National Liberation 

Front, as well as the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. 

Despite tactical and operational success in the Aden Emergency, British 

military forces were never able completely to defeat the insurgency and the 

British-trained Aden Army eventually mutinied against the British. The British government soon left Aden earlier than the planned withdrawal date of 

1968, instead leaving in 1967, failing to establish a sustainable, democratic 

political regime, or create lasting political institutions, in the colony of Aden 

and the Aden Protectorate. 

PURPOSE OF THE CASE

The purpose of this case is to expose students to the numerous issues related 

to the concept of nation-building as a complex operation. This case is presented from numerous perspectives and is written in a manner that provides 

the student with excerpts of many of the policy documents used to devise 
26 CASE TEACHING PROCESS Scott Smitson

and execute British strategy in the Aden context in the 1950s and 1960s. 

The learning objectives of this case study may include the following:

• Educating students about the difficulty of implementing constitutionbased governance in non-western states;

• Placing stability operations (in this case, the transfer of power from a 

foreign entity to a domestic polity) within the context of systemic and 

regional conflict; and

• Demonstrating the relationship between domestic politics and the 

assistance and/or hindrance to foreign policy objectives

This case study could be applicable for students interested in foreign 

policy decision-making, international relations, stability operations/nationbuilding, Middle East politics, and public management/public policy.

CASE TEACHING PROCESS

This case could be used for an extensive series of lectures, employing the 

numerated steps below as a focus for each class. Or the instructor can focus 

one class on the foreign policy debate (referred to as “Step #4” below) as a 

standalone practical exercise that highlights many of the themes and dilemmas in the case. An extensive teaching of the case could contain the following:

Step #1: Geography of the Case

The intent of this case is to force students into the role of the decisionmakers formulating policy in Aden. Maximizing the utility of this case is heavily 

dependent on the students’ knowledge of geography and the strategic 

importance of Aden. Instructors should have on hand a brief series of maps 

to illustrate how Aden fit into the broader picture of the British Empire. It is 

recommended that the following maps be used to geographically “frame the 

case” for the students:

• A map of the British Empire’s “East of Suez” zone of responsibility in 

the immediate aftermath of World War II (Map 1);

• A map of the Middle East and North Africa, circa 1963 (Map 2); and

• A map of Southwest Arabia that reflects Aden Colony, the West Aden 

Protectorate, the East Aden Protectorate, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, 

prior to the withdrawal of the British in 1967 (Map 3).
The Declarations of Independence 27

Students could be preassigned the responsibility of briefing the class 

about why the strategic location of Aden is important to the case, as 

opposed to the instructor giving a lecture.

Step #2: Systemic and Regional Factors

It is important that the students embed their interpretation of the case 

within the context of systemic and regional trends that in many ways influenced the direction of British nation-building efforts. The major trends that 

should be identified and discussed in this step include the following:

• The Cold War: Students should have a basic grasp of what the Cold 

War was and why it is relevant in this case. The instructor can ask very 

basic questions to ensure the class has an understanding of this topic:

– What was the Cold War? What was it about?

– Who were the relevant actors? Where did the British sit on the 

issue?

– How was the Cold War playing out in the Middle East?

• Arab Nationalism: Students should possess a basic understanding of 

what Arab nationalism was and why it is relevant to the case. The 

instructor could ask general questions, to include:

– What was Arab nationalism? What were its main political connotations?

– Who in the Arab world viewed himself as the leader of the Arab 

nationalist movement? 

• Decolonialization: Following World War II, many European powers 

began to lose their control of various colonies, voluntarily in some 

instances, by force in others. Students need to understand what this 

decolonialization process meant and why it was relevant to these 

states, chiefly Britain. Students could be asked:

– What is decolonialization? 

– What were the major factors determining this process?

Step #3: Identifying the Actors

Following a discussion of the significant trends that frame the British efforts 

in Aden, the instructor should ask the students to identify the major stakeholders/actors, and state what the respective actors’ preferred “end state” in 

Aden was/should be (NOTE: This should include the views of non-British 
28 CASE TEACHING PROCESS Scott Smitson

actors as well, such as the United Nations, Nasser, competing insurgency 

groups, etc.). The class should, at a minimum, identify the following as relevant actors and their views:

Step #4: Debate and Policy Rationalizations

This step should represent the core of the case study discussion. The 

instructor should split the class in half and assign each group into either the 

“Conservative Party” or the “Labour Party.” Each group will be asked to 

Actor Preferred Outcome in Case

British Conservative Party Some level of political autonomy for Aden 

Colony; continued use of Aden as military 

staging area for strategic operations

British Labour Party Complete withdrawal from Aden; closure of 

Aden base and complete withdrawal of all British military forces “East of Suez”

Gamel Abdul Nasser British withdrawal from Aden; addition of 

Aden into larger Egyptian sphere of influence 

in Middle East/North Africa

National Liberation Front Complete defeat and withdrawal of British 

forces from Aden and the Protectorates; defeat 

of the Federation of South Arabia; defeat of 

competing insurgency groups; imposition of a 

Marxist-based government for all of Aden and 

the Protectorates

Front for the Liberation of 

Occupied South Yemen

Complete defeat and withdrawal of British 

forces from Aden and the Protectorates; defeat 

of the Federation of South Arabia; defeat of 

competing insurgency groups

South Arabian League Independent “Aden State” that includes the 

Aden Colony and both the East and West 

Aden Protectorates; complete British withdrawal from Aden Colony and the Protectorates

Sir William Luce Independent “Aden State” that includes the 

Aden Colony and both the East and West 

Aden Protectorates; complete British withdrawal from Aden Colony and the Protectorates

Yemeni minority Inclusion in governing institution; eventual 

union of Aden and Yemen
The Declarations of Independence 29

consider the three options proposed by Sir William Luce, the governor of 

Aden in 1956. Then they should select and defend the option they feel is 

best, outline their major policy planning concerns, and justify their respective position on the nation-building enterprise in Aden. As stated in the case, 

Luce’s recommended options were as follows:

• Retain Aden Colony indefinitely.

• Withdraw early from Aden.

• Disengage gradually from Southwest Arabia.

The purpose of this debate is to allow the students to see the relationship 

between domestic politics and foreign policy and to demonstrate that there 

was no “right answer” in the British experience in Aden. 

Step #5: Analysis of Dilemmas and Conclusion

Following the debate, the instructor should ask the groups what they would 

view as any other options the British government could have taken with 

respect to Aden. Discussing these options should inform the groups’ ability 

to draw out the following dilemmas from the case study:

• How does a western power create lasting political institutions while 

strategically disengaging from the theater of operations?

• How are electoral systems developed for states that have no experience with democracy?

• How do governments balance the financial needs of maintaining 

global strategic forces while at the same time funding costly domestic 

social programs?

• How does the government reconcile the basic incompatibility 

between the desire for military facilities in South Arabia and the policy of creating a viable state to hand over to at independence?

• How can tribal orientations be reconciled with conceptualizations of 

centralized governments?

• How is a chain of command clearly defined that includes diplomatic, 

colonial, and military organizations?

Students should come away from the case study with the following take 

aways/implications:
30 SUGGESTED REFERENCE MATERIALS Scott Smitson

• Failure of incorporating allied regional actors in the stability process 

leads to capacity-building failures in states with weak institutions. 

• Tying the end of transition operations to announced withdrawal 

dates, as opposed to solid, tangible governance gains, empowers 

oppositional forces to consolidate and “wait out” foreign and central 

government forces during a counterinsurgency campaign, or, is this a 

necessary risk?

• State capacity-building can be undermined when local political interests are not included or adequately addressed in the constitutional 

drafting process.

• Domestic political realities may prevent potentially successful outcomes of complex operations if there is a strategic disconnect 

between upper-level elected officials and career civil service professionals.

• Having discussed the British experience in Aden, write a two-page 

paper applying the dilemmas in step 6 to a present-day situation.

SUGGESTED REFERENCE MATERIALS

Instructors utilizing this case could assign students readings from the following works to augment their understanding of the case study:

• Hyam, Ronald. 2006. Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. This book 

provides readers with a detailed history of all the major and minor 

events in the British decolonization process, to include Aden. This 

book would provide students with a detailed insight into the domestic 

political machinations occurring within the British government and 

the interplays between the competing Labour and Conservative parties.

• Hinchcliffe, Peter, John T. Ducker, and Maria Holt. 2006. Without 

Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden. New York: Tauris & 

Co Ltd. The authors of this book do an admirable job of framing the 

story of Aden from varying levels of analysis in the first few chapters 

and then spend the remainder of the book cataloguing the oral histories of many of the various players in the case study. The first two 

chapters serve as an excellent primer for students unfamiliar with the 

historical and strategic context.

• Gavin, R. J. 1975. Aden Under British Rule: 1839–1967. London, UK: 
The Declarations of Independence 31

C. Hurst & Co, Ltd. Excellent historical work that provides very 

detailed information about the British efforts in Aden.

• Petersen, Tore T. 2006. The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle 

East: 1961–1969. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press. The book 

provides readers with the larger Cold War backdrop that frames 

much of the Aden case study. This book demonstrated the difficulties 

the British and the Americans had in formulating and implementing a 

coherent strategy in the Middle East to deter Soviet influence and 

maintain strategic flexibility in the region.

• Pieragostini, Karl. 1991. Britain, Aden, and South Arabia. New York: 

St. Martin’s Press. Easily readable book that looks at the British experience in Aden from differing perspectives.

• Jones, Clive. 2004. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965. 

Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. For students who are interested in Britain’s involvement in the Yemen civil war, this book is an 

excellent resource. 

In addition to the aforementioned books, the following films and documentaries may be of use while utilizing this case:

• Mad Mitch and the Last Battle of the British Empire. BBC Documentary, November 2007. This documentary examines the controversial 

counterinsurgency methods used by Lt. Col. Colin Mitchell, commander of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders during the Battle of 

Crater in Aden in 1967. While tactically successful, the methods used 

by “Mad Mitch” have been a controversial topic for decades. Instructors could use this documentary to demonstrate many of the dilemmas western militaries face while conducting counterinsurgency 

operations.

• A History of Britain: Episode XIV, The Empire of Good Intentions. BBC 

Documentary, 2000. While not commenting on Aden, this episode of 

the series examines many of the colonization dilemmas faced by the 

British government during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

• Lord Mountbatten: The Last Viceroy, 1986. Six-part mini-series that 

demonstrates the challenges faced by the last viceroy of the British 

Raj, prior to the independence of India and the partition of the Raj 

into India and Pakistan. While this series does not comment on Aden, 

it does illustrate many of the challenges faced during a decolonization 

experience.
32 EPILOGUE Scott Smitson

EPILOGUE

Once the Labour government signaled its unwillingness to support the 

nation-building efforts in Aden Colony and the Protectorates, the security 

situation began to deteriorate at a frightening pace. 

While the war between the NLF and the Front for the Liberation of 

South Yemen killed and maimed thousands, the conflict between the British 

forces, the NLF and the Front continued to escalate. Soon, elements of the 

Federation Army began to side with the NLF, philosophically at first, violently later; this trend manifested itself in the mutiny of July 1967, in which 

Federation Army and police forces turned on their British trainers and former allies. What began as an internal power struggle in the Federation officer corps between those senior officers who favored the Federation and 

those who did not evolved into a series of mutinies within camps of the Federation Army, eventually escalating to deliberate attacks and ambushes on 

British patrols and convoys operating in the Crater district of Aden. A patrol 

that was sent into the city to rescue forces under fire was repelled and, seeing 

that civilian casualties would be high in any counterattack against the NLFled forces in the dense, urban areas of Crater, British forces elected to 

remain outside the city.51

Seeking to recapture Crater from the NLF, British forces led by Lt. Col 

Colin “Mad Mitch” Mitchell conducted a ground and air offensive and, facing little resistance, reinstituted a strong military presence in Crater, overturning the tactical victory of the NLF in one day. However, the manner in 

which “Mad Mitch” maintained control of Crater was, as he called it, 

“extremely firm and extremely mean.” His strong-arm tactics of house-tohouse searches, summary executions of suspected insurgents, and enforcement of curfews, known collectively as “Argyll Law,”52 did impose order and 

discipline in Crater in the short term but did nothing to gain the trust and 

allegiance of the indigenous population in the long term.53

Taking stock of the upheaval in Aden, the Labour government decided 

that the date of withdrawal from Aden would be moved up from 1968 to late 

1967, leading George Brown, then head of the Foreign Office, to articulate 

that “there is no evidence that we could achieve anything useful, to Arabs or 

ourselves, by staying longer . . . the problem is no longer one in which outside powers should remain to play a part. So we should as soon as possible 

leave the Arabs to sort out their own problems without the complication of 

our military presence.”54

By the time the British government had decided upon November 29, 

1967, as its ultimate withdrawal date, the NLF had proven victorious over 

the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, and was well on its way in 

establishing the lone Marxist state in the Middle East. Whatever elements of 

the Federation of South Arabia remained had either fled abroad, joined the 

NLF, or had been assassinated in the tumultuous last few months of British 

presence in Aden. 
The Declarations of Independence 33

As the evacuation of the British colonial staff was concluded, more than 

130 years of British presence in Aden came to an abrupt end. Perhaps it was 

only fitting that the Royal Marine band marked the end of the evacuation 

not with the standard National Anthem or some form of “Rule Britannia,” 

but with the contemporary song, “Things ain’t what they used to be.”55 Britain’s stature in the Middle East, and the future of Aden, would never be the 

same again.

ENDNOTES

51. Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen, p. 156.

52. In fact, the imposition of “Argyll Law” cost Lt. Col. Mitchell his career, after he 

admitted that in order to effectively put down the mutiny in Crater, “as much smoke and 

subterfuge and haze [had] to be directed at the people behind me as in front,” implying a 

continued effort to conceal his tactics from the Colonial Office and Defense ministry.

53. Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 2010), pp. 86–87.

54. Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, pp. 359–360.

55. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 2.

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