No. 172, June 2000 Strategic Forum 

provide long-term plans and to guarantee

resources to build military capabilities. Plans

still must be developed, especially in Slovakia and Slovenia, and reliable projections of

resources are sorely needed in Romania. 

Downsizing and restructuring militaries

and integrating general staffs within ministries of defense can create friction in civilmilitary relations; the United States could

help mitigate such problems through retraining aimed at alternate careers and meritbased career development programs.

In moving to all-volunteer forces, CEE

partners will lose an instrument for shaping

the citizens of young democracies (such as

Lithuania) and manpower pools from which

to recruit extended-service volunteers (like

Germany). NATO allies could provide partner

programs focused on conscription to foster

civic virtues and help define training for

specific military roles and missions.

Confusion prevails over the appropriate

length of conscription for each CEE country.

However, terms of 6 or 7 months can only

prepare reserve forces and are not adequate

to meet operational requirements.

accommodate their political objective of Euro

Atlantic integration.

The accompanying chart (see page 3)

illustrates trends in CEE defense establishments

and budgets discussed below.

New NATO Members

The Czech Republic had a defense

establishment of 78,580 in January 1999, only

60 percent of its strength in January 1993. The

government approved the security strategy of

the Czech Republic in February 1999 and the

military strategy in March 1999. Defense was

allocated 1.9 percent of gross domestic product

(GDP) in 1999 and 2.0 percent in 2000. The

“Concept for Development of Forces 2003–

2008” establishes guidelines for future development, under which the military will be cut

roughly 25 percent by 2004. In terms of operational posture, the armed forces are divided

into immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction

forces, and main defense forces, with readiness

times of 10, 20, and 30 days, respectively.

The ratios among officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

will alter significantly. The officer corps will

decrease, while warrant officers and NCOs in

extended active service will increase. The number of 12-month conscripts will decline to

graphics severely limit the number of conscri

available for military service; the cohort of

draft-age males declines from 90,000 in 1998 

50,000 in 2003. This decline is aggravated by 

9-month conscription term, which the govern

ment would like to reduce to 6 months.

Though Hungary approved its “Principl

of Security and Defense Policy” in December

1998, its defense plans must now be reconsid

ered, because the government is unwilling to

provide adequate resources and cannot meet

NATO target goals.

After Hungarian Chief of Staff Ferenc

Vegh resigned over these issues, and over

integrating the general staff into the defense

ministry, his replacement, Fodor Lajos, note

that the forces were short 10 billion forints a

must renegotiate commitments to NATO.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban added that the

government planned to cut the military from

55,000 to roughly 35–40,000. In mid-July, th

cabinet passed a so-called secret resolution t

streamline the armed forces, which purportedly will ease financing bottlenecks and increase professionalism.

In late July 1999, the government announced that it would not meet its predecessor’s commitment to NATO to raise its defens

budget to 1.8 percent of GDP. Instead, it wou
commissioned officers, 40 percent warrant

officers, and 40 percent NCOs.

The Council of Ministers adopted the

“Program for Integrating and Modernizing the

Polish Armed Forces for the Years 1998–2012”

on 15 October 1998. As military reductions

commenced, the retention of officers with

appropriate skills became an issue. During

1997, roughly 4,000 officers left the army;

during 1998, 7,850 regular members departed,

of whom more than half were officers, 400 of

whom had completed English courses. Of

those who left, roughly 85 percent were resignations and less than 2 percent dismissals.

This led Deputy Defense Minister Robert Lipka

to complain that “unfortunately, the wrong

people are leaving.” 

While Poland can meet its force goals, it

shares with other countries many problems

that degrade morale, including social conditions, housing, and pensions. The relatively

healthy economy also draws talent away from

the professional forces.

MAP Partners

Bulgaria in January 1999 had a defense

establishment of 112,000, slightly lower than in

1991. In 2004 this number will decline to

October 1999 and determines the organizational development of the armed forces and

Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Unlike Hungary and the Czech Republic,

Bulgaria enjoys popular support for the military and spends more—roughly 2.1 percent of

GDP in 1998—on defense. Like Hungary and

the Czech Republic, Bulgaria aims to join

NATO and the European Union (EU). To

achieve this, Bulgarian defense planning

includes information planning, developing

immediate and rapid reaction forces, and

international force contributions (e.g., Multinational Peacekeeping Force South Eastern

Europe [MPFSEE], headquartered at Plovdiv).

Bulgaria also plans to develop a Law on Crisis

Management, which will draw on Kosovo

experience, especially relations with NATO 

and neighbors.

Bulgaria’s Plan 2004 is well-conceived,

but did not receive parliamentary support; the

“Military Doctrine” (which assumes no threat)

egy from which to derive defense strategy,

military doctrine, and strategic directives.

Nevertheless, with the assistance of the Unite

Kingdom and United States (Kievenaar Study

a “National Defense Framework Action Plan

(FAP) for 2000–2005 and a “Long Term

Framework” to 2010 have been established

with the objective of joining NATO by 2005 a

the EU by 2010. The plan identified three

military options varying from 87,000, to

112,000, to 140,000. (According to the army

reform, by 2004 the overall defense establish

ment will decline to 140,000.) The 112,000

military variant was a political decision take

because of Romania’s financial limitations. 

Phase one of the FAP (2000–2003) is to

restructure the forces to achieve minimal

operational capability; that is to provide cred

ble defense and NATO interoperability. Phase

two (2004–2007) expects to witness equipme

modernization and achievement of operation

capability. Romania’s conscript cohort of

135,000 is more than adequate to meet its 

2 Strategic Forum No. 172, June 2

Jeffrey Simon is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on European security affairs including NATO

Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Simon can be reached by phone a

(202) 685–2367, by fax at (202) 685–3972, or via e-mail at simonj@ndu.edu.
12-month requirements, which were 67,000 in

1998 and will be reduced to 25,000 after 2000.

The officer corps pyramid is malformed

and needs to be streamlined. Hence, before

2003 the current 30,000-strong Romanian

officer corps must be halved. For example, its

2,300 colonels must be reduced to 630; the

5,618 lieutenant colonels to 1,800; the 7,800

majors to 2,200; and the 9,908 captains to

4,050. At the same time lieutenants should be

increased from 3,051 to 3,750, and second

lieutenants from 2,218 to 2,400. Also generals

will increase from the current 101 to 120.

Restructuring this unbalanced officer corps will

be a difficult and painful process. 

In order to finance the transformation,

the 2000 defense budget of $710 million would

constitute 1.8 percent of GDP, and is planned to

steadily increase to 2.2 percent ($1.2 billion) in

2007. Romania, in contrast to Bulgaria, will

seek parliamentary approval for its plan. Despite a well-conceived plan, if the Romanian

economy does not stabilize, a lower 87,000

variant might result, and further military

personnel reductions could aggravate civilmilitary tensions.

The Slovak Republic had a defense

establishment of roughly 47,000 in January

1995, despite having been built from scratch

after independence in January 1993, As of 1995,

the force consisted of 13,900 professionals

(10,100 officers, 3,400 warrant officers, and

400 NCOs) and 33,000 12-month conscripts.

Slovakia’s “Long-Term Defense Plan” projected

the total force in the year 2000 to be 35,000,

comprising 20,000 professionals (5,000 officers,

10,000 warrant officers, and 5,000 NCOs) and

15,000 conscripts.

The Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) is

the most respected institution in the country,

enjoying more than 70 percent support, compared to 60 percent for the church and constitutional court. But perhaps for that very reason,

ASR found itself in political and fiscal trouble.

Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar increasingly exerted efforts to have his Movement

the annual call-up) for lack of funds. Hence

the projected downsizing of ASR to 35,000 by

the year 2000 became a reality in the fall of

1997. As a result the army had to develop a n

concept entitled “An Integrated Program of

Development in the Army and Slovak Arms

Industry to the Year 2010, with a View to the

Year 2015.” The 1998 defense budget of

Sk14.05 billion represented a 21 percent decrease from 1997 in real terms and had a

dramatic negative impact on troop training

and preparedness. Chief of Staff General Joze

Tuchyna candidly noted that, because the

budget in 1988 was inadequate, he would be

“compelled to reduce some tasks.” 

Defense reform, which has been energiz

since Mikulas Dzurinda took over from Meci

in 1998, faces a significant challenge to und

four years of damage. The new government i

November 1998 overturned the August 1998

appointment of Marian Miklus and named

General Milan Cerovsky as the new ASR Chie

of Staff. Also the new government pursues

NATO integration with greater vigor. In Marc

1999 it announced that it would send a 150-

man engineering unit to SFOR, and significantly bolster its 35-man troop support for th

United Nations on the Golan Heights. But sin

Slovakia’s economy is now a problem, the

No. 172, June 2000 Strategic Forum 

Slovenia 1999 1999 2010

Total NA 8,200-to-9,400 NA NA 1.55% 2.1% 7

* possible reduction to 6

** possible reduction to 9 or 6
4 Strategic Forum No. 172, June 2

12,200 (including 2,000 officers and NCOs) to

23,000, plus 15,000 in the National Volunteer

Defense Force (NVDF) by 2008. Lithuania

committed 1.51 percent of GDP in 1999 (724

million Litas or $180 million), which is to

increase to 2 percent in 2002 and 2.5 percent 

in 2005.

In contrast to the former non-Soviet

Warsaw Pact (NSWP) partners, Lithuania was a

republic in the former Soviet Union. It pursues

a policy and doctrine of total defense, desires

Euro-Atlantic integration, and—as a MAP

partner—seeks NATO membership. The core of

its ground forces is the 3,600-troop, six-battalion “Iron Wolf” motorized rifle brigade. There

also are a Jaeger special forces battalion, engineering and staff battalions, an 850-man air

force, and small navy. The NVDF—composed

of 200 companies organized into battalions in

10 territorial defense formations—numbers

around 10,000, with an additional 1,600 fulltime officers.

As Lithuania builds its officer and NCO

corps, it also plans to increase its 2,300 12-

month conscripts in 1996 to 7,700 in 2001. The

United Kingdom assisted in establishing a

conscript training center that puts an end to

Soviet-style practices and provides health care

and English language training. Lithuania uses

from the number of conscripts (4,000 to

5,500), who serve for 7 months—a term that is

too short for any meaningful activity aside

from basic training for territorial defense.

Constitutional prohibitions prevent the use of

conscripts in peace support operations.

After the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of

Czechoslovakia, the defense ministry became

responsible for territorial defense. Because 

this ministry performs many functions normally found in former NSWP interior ministries, its already low budget—1.55 percent of

GDP in 1999, without pensions—is relatively

even smaller. It should increase to 2.1 percent

in 2010.

Slovenia may be overreaching in its attempts to join NATO. The stated goal of creating a 700-man Peace Support Battalion is

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of the author and do not necessarily represent the view

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Defense, or any other governmental agency.

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officer corps is likely to cause civilmilitary

tensions, Washington might provide retrainin

programs for alternate careers and for develo

ing NCO corps, and merit-based career devel

ment programs. Since the United States has

all-volunteer forces, we need to enlist NATO

allies, such as Germany, to provide partner

programs that focus on using conscription to

foster civic virtues (Innere Führung in the

German experience), providing a recruitmen

pool for extended-service volunteers, and def

ing the length of time necessary to adequatel

train for specific military functions.