FILED

June 12, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

RONDA GALE WILDER, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Warren Circuit

) No. 8680

VS. )

) Appeal No.

LLOYD CLINTON RAINS, ) 01A01-9709-CV-00519

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR WARREN COUNTY

AT McMINNVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE CHARLES D. HASTON, JUDGE

For Plaintiff/Appellant: For Defendant/Appellee:

Bernard K. Smith B. Timothy Pirtle

H. Thomas Parsons McMinnville, Tennessee

Parsons, Nichols & Johnson

Manchester, Tennessee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b) provides that

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when

a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by

memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall

not be published, and shall not be cited or relied upon for any reason in a subsequent

unrelated case. 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arose from a collision on a two-lane rural road in which a vehicle

traveling in one lane struck a vehicle that was turning left. The driver of the

oncoming vehicle sued the driver of the turning vehicle in the Circuit Court for

Warren County. After a jury returned a verdict allocating fault equally between the

two drivers, the trial court entered a judgment awarding nothing to the plaintiff driver.

On this appeal, the plaintiff driver asserts that the evidence does not support the

jury’s verdict. We have determined that the record contains material evidence to

support the jury’s verdict and, therefore, affirm the judgment in accordance with

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

I.

Ronda Gale Wilder was driving to work on the morning of April 29, 1992 on

Old Wells Road, a two-lane rural road in Warren County. At the same time, Lloyd

Clinton Rains was driving in the opposite direction along Old Wells Road following

an early morning of hunting. Mr. Rains was in the process of turning left across Ms.

Wilder’s lane of travel when Ms. Wilder breached the crest of a hill and struck the

front half of the passenger’s side of Mr. Rains’s truck.

Mr. Rains testified at trial that he had stopped and had checked for oncoming

traffic before he began his turn and that he did not see Ms. Wilder’s automobile when

he started his turn. For her part, Ms. Wilder stated that she was driving at a safe

speed and that Mr. Rains simply turned into the path of her automobile. A jury

returned a verdict apportioning fifty percent of the fault to Ms. Wilder and fifty

percent to Mr. Rains. In accordance with Tennessee’s modified comparative fault
2

See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff may

recover only if his or her negligence either does not exceed or is less than the defendant’s

negligence).

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system,2

 the trial court entered a judgment awarding Ms. Wilder nothing. The trial

court later denied Ms. Wilder’s motion for a new trial. Ms. Wilder has perfected this

appeal and insists that the record contains no material evidence to support the verdict.

II.

We do not reweigh the evidence or re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses

when we are called upon to review the evidentiary foundation of a jury verdict. See

Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tenn. 1994); Witter v.

Nesbit, 878 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). It is irrelevant where the weight

or the preponderance of the evidence lies. See Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Norris, 108

Tenn. 632, 634, 69 S.W. 325, 326 (1902); Bynum v. Hollowell, 656 S.W.2d 400, 402

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Our task is to review the record to determine whether it

contains material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d);

Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d at 823. Accordingly, we take the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence supporting the verdict, see Electric Power

Bd. v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tenn. 1985),

and will set aside a jury verdict only if there is no material evidence to support it. See

Whitaker v. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,

we conclude that there is material evidence to support the jury’s equal allocation of

fault between Ms. Wilder and Mr. Rains. The accident occurred near the crest of a

hill, and the photographic evidence depicts a limited sight distance. Taking into

consideration Mr. Rains’s testimony that the road was clear before he began his left

turn, the point of impact on Mr. Rains’s truck, and the damage to both vehicles, the

jury could have determined that Ms. Wilder was not driving at a safe speed given her

limited sight distance. Both parties presented the jury with little more than their own

self-serving accounts of the accident. The jury heard the parties’ testimony, observed

the parties as they testified, and determined that they were equally at fault. We have

no basis for concluding that the record does not contain material evidence supporting

the verdict.
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III.

We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for whatever

further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this appeal to Ronda Gale

Wilder and her surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue. 

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION 

__________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE