Defense

It should produce a future posture dominated by improved legacy

forces but including some ultra-high-tech forces for special missions. If new operational concepts are capable of producing such

forces and capabilities, they may deserve serious consideration. 

Ten new operational concepts have emerged as candidates

for inclusion in transformation and Joint Vision 2020. These concepts focus on building better forces for multiple purposes and

employing these forces in specific ways. If the concepts are

adopted, creating combat and support forces for them will

require programmatic measures. Many of the concepts can be

pursued by reorganizing existing forces, continuing normal modernization, or acquiring new information systems and smart

munitions. Nonetheless, they will require some budget increases

plus a resource strategy that responds to fiscal constraints.

Investing wisely in a full set of new concepts will produce stronger

forces than focusing on a few concepts in ways that deprive others of funds. The combination of new concepts, not any of them

individually, offers promise for the future. Moreover, these concepts, which focus on creating high-tech strike forces, must be

accompanied by capabilities for low-intensity conflict and by

investments in such often-overlooked areas as logistic support,

bases and infrastructure, maintenance, and war reserves.

Pursuing Change and Transformation

Senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials have publicly

stated that creating improved force capabilities for new operational

Overview

A key Department of Defense goal is to build highly capable

forces whose mastery of high-tech warfighting will allow decisive

victories against new threats and well-armed opponents in future

operations. A set of new operational concepts, many of which

have surfaced in the ongoing defense strategy review, may facilitate this goal. They focus on rapid and decisive operations in 

distant theaters rather than on homeland defense. As generic

concepts for future warfighting, they offer valuable insights 

on combat capabilities that should be acquired. Before these

principles can be adopted, they must be scrutinized on their individual merits and integrated to provide balanced guidance to

force development. 

New operational concepts must be embedded in a sensible

transformation strategy that should be carried out in measured,

purposeful ways. The strategy should focus on the mid term, during which new threats may appear but entirely new forces will not

be able to be built. The standard of preparing for two regional

wars should be replaced with one that focuses on capabilities for

the widening spectrum of conflict and operations in new geographic locations. A three-theater standard should be adopted

that readies forces to wage one big war in any single theater

while also having sufficient assets for medium-sized strike missions and traditional operations elsewhere. Transformation

should strive to create adaptable forces that can handle shifting

challenges, unfamiliar missions, and periodic strategic surprises.

November 2001 Defense Horizons 1

Adapting Forces to a New Era:

Ten Transforming Concepts

by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security Policy in June 2001 to study the implications of technological innovation

for U.S. national security policy and military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of current strategic and defense

policy issues. Its major initial areas of focus include: (1) technologies and concepts that encourage and/or enable the transformation of the Armed Forces, 

(2) developments by defense laboratories, (3) investments in research, development, and acquisition and improvements to their processes, (4) relationships among

the Department of Defense, the industrial sector, and academe, and (5) social science techniques that enhance the detection and prevention of conflict. The staff is

led by two senior analysts who will hold the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology and who can call on the

expertise of the university community and colleagues at institutions nationwide. The papers published in the Defense Horizons series present key research and

analysis conducted by the center and its associate members.

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

NOVEMBER 2001

Number 5

Horizons
Hans Binnendijk holds a chair in technology and national security at the

National Defense University. Dr. Binnendijk may be contacted at (202) 685–2557

or via e-mail at binnendijkh@ndu.edu. Richard L. Kugler is a distinguished

research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. He may be contacted at (202) 685–2328 or kuglerr@ndu.edu.

concepts is a key goal of transformation. But what new concepts

should be embraced? How are they to work together to create operationally capable forces for the future? This paper identifies potential candidates that might help answer these questions. The term

operational concept is used in a similar manner to its use in Joint

Vision 2020 (JV2020). An operational concept can be defined as an

idea or construct to help determine how U.S. forces are employed for

warfighting, as opposed to using them for such broader politicalstrategic purposes as reassuring allies and dissuading adversaries.

An integrated family of such concepts can provide guidance for

building improved forces with desired characteristics and for using

them in combat missions to carry out commander-in-chief campaign

plans in the conflicts ahead.

JV2020 puts forth a set of operational concepts, general and

specific, for this purpose. While they remain valid, the recent DOD

defense strategy review and other writings have generated a new set

of 10 candidates for inclusion not only in JV2020 but also in the

Defense Planning Guidance, service plans, operations, and military

support, and other documents.

This paper examines them individually and as a whole. Along with

identifying these concepts, it

endeavors to portray their main

features, to briefly evaluate possible roles in transformation, and to

suggest strengths and weaknesses.

This paper does not provide the indepth treatment needed to make

decisions about these concepts.

But it does call for them to be studied carefully because they may

have an important impact on the course of transformation.

In previous writings about the implications of change and transformation, the authors analyzed how DOD can broaden the two-major

theater war (two-MTW) standard and addressed how it can manage

change by pursuing a balanced combination of capability, adaptability, and transformation. This paper can best begin by briefly recapitulating the three main arguments of these earlier papers, for they offer

a strategic framework for assessing new operational concepts. 

■ DOD should pursue transformation neither slowly nor impulsively,

but in a purposeful and measured way. It should focus on the mid term, when

new threats may appear but entirely new forces will not be able to be built.

A mid-term focus helps bridge the critical gap between near-term plans to

maintain high readiness and long-term efforts to create new platforms and

forces as exotic technologies become available.

■ DOD should adopt a three-theater standard that prepares forces and

capabilities for one large regional war in a variety of places while maintaining one medium-sized cluster for high-tech strike missions and another for

infantry combat, peace enforcement, and similar traditional missions.

■ DOD should strive to build adaptable forces. Instead of focusing on

a few fixed plans, it should create forces that can handle a widening spectrum of contingencies in new geographic locations. Such forces should have

the modularity to combine in different ways, allowing them to adjust to

changes in strategic conditions. 

Enacting transformation carefully and deliberately is more logical than either crawling slowly ahead while clinging to the status

quo or prematurely pursuing technologies whose time has not yet

come. Such a transformation should focus on the mid term of 5 to15

years because newly emerging threats and dangers could take shape

then in ways that existing U.S. military forces might not be able to

handle. Improved operational capabilities will be needed, but exotic

new technologies will not yet be fully available. A mid-term focus

calls for DOD to pursue transformation in ways that blend continuity

and change. It helps empower near-term improvements with more

farsighted vision, and it helps set the stage for determining how longterm transformation can best take shape. By acquiring such new

fighter aircraft as the F–22, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the

F/A–18 E/F, for example, U.S.

forces gain the experience with

emerging weapons that will better

enable them to judge requirements for the following generation

of technologies.

A mid-term focus adds

weight to the case for moving

beyond the two-MTW standard.

This standard served well over the

past decade, but the future seems

destined to present both different wars in unfamiliar places and better-armed threats than those mounted by medium-sized rogue states

in the 1990s. The purpose of a new standard is not to reduce U.S.

forces but to make better use of existing forces. Above all, U.S. forces

cannot be so rigidly committed to two improbable wars that they are

unavailable for other conflicts that could erupt in many places (for

example, along the unstable Southern Belt that stretches from

southeastern Europe, through the greater Middle East/Persian Gulf,

and along the Asia littoral). A new standard that prepares for a single big war in a variety of places and provides two medium-sized

force packages—one high tech, the other traditional—will better

prepare U.S. forces for the wide spectrum of crises ahead without

losing a capability for waging two MTWs if necessary.

Building adaptable forces is a logical accompaniment to broadening defense plans beyond the two-MTW standard. The idea is not

new: JV2020 explicitly endorses a focus on flexible, agile forces for

the future. U.S. combat forces already possess substantial adaptability as a result of their diversity and multiple capabilities. But adequate adaptability in the future should not be taken for granted. The

coming era may require the Armed Forces to handle numerous surprises and to carry out complex operations with a variety of force

packages. Operational plans and service programs must be carefully

prepared to ensure that the combat forces can be swiftly combined

to generate new, responsive joint packages capable of handling each

crisis. Equally important, mobility forces and logistic support forces

must also be prepared with adaptability, modularity, and innovative

responses in mind.

2 Defense Horizons November 2001

the coming era may require 

the Armed Forces to handle

numerous surprises and to

carry out complex operations

with a variety of force packages
A mid-term focus on adaptability likely will produce a future

posture that combines legacy forces and ultra-high-tech forces. For

example, legacy forces might characterize 80 to 90 percent of the

posture. But owing to transformation, they will be restructured and

equipped with new information systems and weapons now emerging

from the research and development pipeline. Ultra-high-tech forces,

equipped with new platforms and exotic systems, might comprise

only 10 to 20 percent of the posture, but they will provide invaluable

niche capabilities for especially important, demanding missions.

Some proponents judge that in the future posture, ultra-high-tech

forces might provide the tip of the spear and improved legacy forces

furnish multiple powerful shafts. If this metaphor illuminates the

future, U.S. defense strategy and forces will be endowed to deal with

strategic challenges in the early 21st century.

New Operational Concepts

If a purposeful transformation is to succeed in changing U.S.

forces wisely, it must be guided by sound operational concepts. The

term operational concept here means a construct for guiding how

U.S. forces should be prepared, deployed, and employed for combat

missions and warfighting. Normally, a

single concept covers one domain of

operations. An integrated family of concepts must therefore be created to craft a

composite strategic theory of force operations covering all services and missions.

If defense transformation remains

anchored in old concepts, it risks perpetuating the status quo even if it alters

forces and weapons. But if transformation is guided by concepts that grapple

with the coming era, it acquires greater promise of producing meaningful changes. Designing and installing new concepts entail risks,

but the adoption of good concepts can unlock the door to continued

U.S. military superiority. 

The critical role of operational concepts can be illuminated by

briefly recalling past transformations. The nuclear transformation of

the 1950s was driven by a single design that proved short-sighted

when nuclear war went out of fashion and conventional war made a

comeback in the 1960s. By contrast, the successful transformation of

the late 1970s and 1980s was not single-minded. Its scattered nature

often suggested a lack of central control, internal consensus, and

clear destinations. But at its core, it was guided by a few key operational concepts that grasped the future.

■ Power projection and rapid reinforcement called for a better

capacity to deploy U.S. forces swiftly to Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

■ Maritime supremacy called for the Navy to switch from defensive

missions to offensive operations aimed at sweeping the seas of enemy bluewater navies.

■ Expeditionary operations encouraged the Marine Corps to evolve

beyond amphibious assault to become a more flexible, multi-purpose force.

■ Multimission air operations led the Air Force to move beyond air

defense to pursue interdiction, close air support, and other contributions to

the land battle.

■ Operational art led the Army to move away from linear defense

toward mobile reserves, maneuver, and powerful counterattacks. Air-land

battle, in turn, provided a concept for coordinating ground and air missions

in attacking enemy forces.

JV2020 currently provides the main intellectual leadership for

defense planning. Focused on joint operations for full-spectrum

dominance, its core strategic concepts call for decisive force, power

projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility. Employing this

strategic architecture, the key operational concepts of JV2020

include information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision

engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics. Within

the armed services, the concepts of rapid decisive operations and

effects-based operations have also gained favor. While JV2020

remains valid, recent defense reviews and other assessments have

produced 10 new operational concepts that are potential candidates

for inclusion. Each of them is significant individually, but seen collectively, their importance grows. To the extent they withstand close

scrutiny, they offer potent ideas for guiding transformation in new

directions that could produce large strategic benefits. 

Virtually all of these concepts focus on keeping U.S. forces

superior to future adversaries; most do so through acquiring new

technologies and systems. They are anchored in the judgment that

future adversary forces will be stronger

than they are now, will have access to

information-era systems, and will employ

asymmetric strategies to help foil U.S.

operations. In particular, these concepts

assume that enemy forces will launch

swiftly unfolding strikes to win quickly

before U.S. forces can converge on the

scene. As a result, these concepts call

upon U.S. forces to deploy swiftly and to

win quickly and decisively, with minimum U.S. and allied casualties. They thus seek to dominate future

wars by controlling them, defeating enemy forces operationally and

destroying them, occupying key territory, and producing favorable

political outcomes. 

The new operational concepts fall into two categories, each of

which has five members. The first category provides concepts primarily for building transformed forces through new technologies and

reengineering of structures. Because of their general characteristics, such forces could be employed in combat in different ways

depending upon commander-in-chief needs. The second category

provides guidance on more specific ways to employ these forces in

crises and wars. These 10 concepts are: 

■ joint response strike forces for early entry operations

■ enhanced information systems and space-based assets for force 

networking

■ accelerated deployment of theater missile defenses for force 

protection

■ realigned overseas presence and better strategic mobility for swift

power projection

■ interoperable allied forces for multilateral operations

■ maritime littoral operations for projecting power ashore

■ standoff targeting and forcible entry for antiaccess/area denial

threats

■ enhanced tactical deep strikes for joint air operations

November 2001 Defense Horizons 3

new concepts entail risks,

but the adoption of good

concepts can unlock 

the door to continued

U.S. military superiority
4 Defense Horizons November 2001

■ decisive close combat operations and deep maneuver for ground

forces

■ deliberate and sustained operations.

Joint response strike forces for early entry operations. This concept is anchored by the premise that U.S. forces must become better

at deploying to a crisis during its critical initial days and weeks. It

calls for configuring a portion of the military posture for rapid deployment as well as the demanding set of defensive and offensive operations that take place in the early stages, often in the face of enemy

surprise attacks aimed at winning before U.S. reinforcements arrive.

The resulting strike forces would be highly capable of counterterrorist operations as well as a wide spectrum of other missions, including

against well-armed opponents. Some proponents argue that this concept could result in the creation of standing joint task forces in the

major theater commands and the continental United States

(CONUS), charged with deploying rapidly and fighting aggressively.

Regardless of command arrangements, this concept calls for joint

forces configured for early entry that are capable of halting the

attack, seizing the initiative by degrading enemy forces, striking such

critical targets as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) systems, and

securing rear areas for reinforcements. To its proponents, the

strength of this concept is that it

could focus defense planning on tipof-the-spear forces. However, it could

result in insufficient attention to follow-on reinforcements that also could

be critical to winning.

Because forces must begin

arriving within 2 to 4 days of a decision to deploy and must complete

deployment within 30 days, they

must be highly ready, capable of moving rapidly, and unencumbered

by ponderous logistics. Limited in size and often outnumbered, these

forces must be equipped with advanced information systems, modernized weapons, and ultra-tech systems that provide high lethality,

survivability, and tactical flexibility. Air forces would require stealthy

interceptors and fighter bombers, supported by airborne warning

and control systems and joint surveillance and target radar attack

systems (JSTARS), and ample stocks of ultra-smart munitions. For

example, 3 to 6 fighter wing equivalents, backed by strategic

bombers, could be needed. Naval forces must have potent littoral

capabilities for initially defending zones of joint operations, supporting troop movements ashore, and bombarding enemy forces from

long distances. A carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group,

and other specialized combatants normally will be needed. Ground

forces must be capable of protecting airbases and seaports, conducting active reconnaissance of enemy forces, and engaging in blocking

actions and limited meeting engagements when necessary. Other

units that probably will be necessary are light mechanized forces—

light enough to deploy swiftly but strong enough for intense combat—or lean armored units, coupled with air assault and deep fire

assets (at least a division and preferably a corps). 

Enhanced information systems and space-based assets for force

networking. While information operations are a staple of JV2020, this

concept calls for accelerated efforts to develop new, high-tech systems that could further enhance combat operations. Its ultimate goal

is to fully network all joint forces so they can work together in conducting high-speed, simultaneous, and decisive operations. This network would bring all forces—across all services and missions, from

top to bottom of the command structure—into close contact in ways

providing high coordination even if the forces themselves are widely

distributed. The concept calls for a network of interlocking information grids that provide dominant battlespace awareness: an intelligence grid, a communications grid, an engagement grid, and a logistic support grid. It also requires strong information warfare assets:

the capacity to defend U.S. networks against enemy attacks and to

degrade enemy networks. 

This concept also envisions greater use of space-based assets.

Modernized satellites for communications, navigation, and intelligence surveillance will be needed, with systems capable of operating

in all weather conditions and linked directly to the deployed forces.

Also envisioned is a global satellite system that provides near-realtime targeting data: a JSTARS in

space. In the short term, weapons in

space likely will be limited to missile

defense systems, but in the distant

future, other strike assets and transport systems might be deployed

there. Greater reliance on space will

necessitate defensive systems for

protecting against enemy interference, coupled with capabilities to

degrade enemy use of space. The

overall strength of this concept is its

capacity to move U.S. forces more boldly into the information age

with technologies that enemies will be hard pressed to match any

time soon. But preoccupation with information systems and space

should not come at the expense of neglecting combat forces and

weapons. Seeing the battlefield better than the enemy sees it does

not itself guarantee victory. 

Accelerated deployment of theater missile defenses for force protection. The recent effort to accelerate deployment of theater missile

defenses is a major departure in U.S. defense strategy and an important part of transformation. Currently, public attention is focused on

national missile defenses (NMD) and other homeland defense measures. The deployment of theater air and missile defenses (TAMD),

nonetheless, may be more important for facilitating overseas military

operations. Whereas NMD will protect U.S. territory, TAMD will protect U.S. forces in war zones from attack by theater ballistic missiles

and cruise missiles armed with WMD or conventional warheads.

TAMD also will help protect allied countries and their forces. Several

systems are presently being developed. Lower-tier systems that provide defense against short-range missiles include the Patriot

Advanced Capability-3 and the Navy Area Defense System. Upper-tier

systems defend large areas against medium- and intermediate-range

missiles; included are theater high altitude area defense, the Navy

Theater Wide system, and airborne lasers. 

the recent effort to accelerate

deployment of theater 

missile defenses is a major

departure in U.S. defense

strategy and an important

part of transformation
Decisions have not yet been made on the exact mix of systems,

but deployment likely will unfold faster for TAMD than for NMD.

The combination of NMD and TAMD defenses will enhance the safe

operation of U.S. forces in an era of accelerating WMD proliferation.

The risks are threefold: missile defenses will not be foolproof even

against limited threats, they will complicate political relations with

allies and other countries, and costly options could result in funding shortfalls for other combat forces. A consideration for future

force operations is that missile defense deployments will not take

place in a strategic vacuum. During

the Cold War, U.S. strategy relied on

several key concepts to integrate its

use of conventional and nuclear

forces: extended deterrence, forward

defense, flexible response, graduated escalation, and massive retaliation. Over the past decade, conventional wars have been waged outside

the old shadow of nuclear escalation.

In the future, conventional wars likely will be waged against enemies possessing WMD systems. A new set of integrated concepts for

determining how to handle escalation will be needed, but unlike the

Cold War, missile defenses will factor into the equation. 

Realigned overseas presence and better strategic mobility for

swift power projection. This concept calls for switching overseas

presence away from lingering Cold War missions toward the new

missions and strategic geography of the future. The U.S. presence in

Europe (currently 100,000 troops) would be refocused from defending NATO borders toward becoming a hub for power projection into

distant areas, not only on Europe’s periphery but also in the greater

Middle East and Persian Gulf. It also would use a reengineered U.S.

presence to help guide allied forces into their own transformation.

As the Korean threat fades, this concept also would launch similar

departures in the Asian posture of nearly 100,000 troops, focusing

on new power-projection missions along the Asian littoral and in

South Asia. The result might be fewer troops in Europe and more in

Asia. More important, however, the forces would be reengineered for

swift deployments to distant areas, and they would be equipped with

information-era structures and assets for new missions, which often

will be mobile and littoral, not stationary and continental. Along

with these changes to forces would come efforts to develop better

access to bases, facilities, and infrastructure along the endangered

Southern Belt. 

This concept also calls for stronger strategic mobility assets to

speed deployment of CONUS-stationed forces and logistic support

assets to crisis zones. It would invest in more prepositioning of

equipment and stocks afloat and ashore, bigger and faster transport

ships, improvements to existing heavy air transports, better offshore

logistic support, and faster offloading abroad in places where access

to big ports and airfields is limited. As new technology becomes

available, super-heavy air transports and ships might also be

acquired. Overall, the combination of a realigned overseas presence

and better mobility for swift power projection offers promise in the

mid term, and this concept can be carried out mostly with existing or

emerging technologies. But altering overseas presence can alarm

countries losing U.S. forces and those gaining them, and while modest increases to strategic mobility forces are affordable, major

improvements could be expensive.

Interoperable allied forces for multilateral operations. This

concept recognizes that most U.S. combat operations will be multilateral, often involving major participation by allies and partners.

Accordingly, it calls for efforts to reengineer and improve allied

forces so they can operate with U.S. forces that are undergoing transformation. The need for allied information systems and networks that

can interoperate with U.S. networks

is emphasized. In the coming era,

interoperability will come mostly

from establishing connectivity

between U.S. and allied information

nets rather than from equipping

troops with identical weapons and

munitions. This concept also envisions allied improvements to provide better expeditionary forces,

power projection assets, long-distance logistic support, modern

weapons, and smart munitions. It aims not for mirror images of U.S.

forces, but instead for allied forces that can participate as team players, often carrying out niche missions of their own.

In Europe, this concept envisions a follow-on to the NATO

Defense Capability Initiative to configure modern allied forces for

new expeditionary and projection missions. Such a plan could be

integrated with European Union efforts to create its own multilateral

forces. In the Persian Gulf, the concept takes advantage of improving

Saudi and Kuwaiti forces and those of other friendly countries to provide better niche assets in such critical areas as initial defense, suppression of enemy antiaccess efforts, and support of U.S. reinforcements. In Asia, it envisions the forces of Japan, South Korea,

Australia, and other countries gradually becoming better at power

projection, new missions, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Overall, the idea of better, interoperable allied and partner forces not only

makes strategic sense but also is vitally necessary if future U.S. military strategy is to succeed and burdens are to be shared fairly. But

this concept faces political constraints. Convincing these countries to

respond with bigger defense budgets and improved forces is easier

said than done. Even when allied and partner forces are militarily

capable, multilateral combat operations can be difficult to carry out.

When allied forces fall short in their missions, U.S. forces must pick

up the slack or risk damaging battlefield setbacks.

Maritime littoral operations for projecting power ashore.

Since the Cold War ended and the Soviet naval threat disappeared,

the U.S. Navy has increasingly focused on littoral operations as a key

raison d’être. In the past decade, the Navy has played important littoral roles in conducting Operation Desert Storm and actions in

Kosovo, peacekeeping in the Balkans, enforcing no-fly zones in the

Persian Gulf, and helping guard against aggression by Iraq and North

Korea. Such missions will continue, but the maritime littoral operations envisioned by this concept are different and more demanding

than those of the recent past. These operations increasingly will

focus not only on controlling littoral waters but also on using the littoral to project naval and marine power ashore in support of joint

November 2001 Defense Horizons 5

the combination of a

realigned overseas presence

and better mobility for 

swift power projection offers

promise in the mid term
that replace these forces. Arguments against relying too heavily on

this concept are severalfold. Abandoning forward commitments in

favor of rearward stationing could unnerve allies and friends that

rely on U.S. security guarantees, while signaling adversaries that the

United States is losing the willpower to resist them. Some analysts

dispute the notion that forward bases will regularly be lacking, and

they assert that future enemy threats can be readily overcome by

counteractions. Relying heavily on standoff targeting could necessitate a big increase in associated forces, perhaps necessitating more

B–2 bombers and cruise missile ships in numbers that divert major

funds from other combat forces. 

Forcible entry asserts that U.S. military strategy should remain

anchored in forward operations but acknowledges that future antiaccess/area denial threats will necessitate a concerted effort to become

better at directly inserting combat forces in the face of concerted

opposition. Supporting this concept is

historical legacy. U.S. forces have

been operating successfully against

such threats since World War II. The

threat posed by Soviet forces during

the Cold War was considerably more

potent than that likely to be mounted

by future rivals any time soon.

Nonetheless, the combination of

enemy ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, submarines and mines,

and WMD systems means that future crisis interventions in the Persian Gulf and Asia will be more difficult than those of the past decade,

when little opposition to U.S. deployments was encountered. 

Forcible entry will require a joint, coordinated effort by all services. The challenge will be to improve the forces in ways that are

effective, balanced, and affordable. Better standoff targeting and

other strike assets will be needed to help suppress enemy defenses.

The Navy will require better networked defenses against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and other threats. The Air Force and Army

will need to become proficient at swiftly deploying stealthy air interceptors and enhanced Patriot batteries. The Army and Marines will

need to be able to deploy light, dispersible forces in the early stages.

Airfields, ports, and other infrastructure will require hardening.

Improved capabilities will be needed for offshore logistics and force

projection into unprepared areas. Often lost in the clamor for expensive programs in this arena is recognition that better allied forces

potentially can carry much of the early defense load, thereby easing

the forcible entry challenge for U.S. forces. 

Enhanced tactical deep strikes for joint air operations. This

concept aims at upgrading the capacity of forward-committed U.S.

forces to conduct lethal air bombardment of enemy formations in

their rear areas, behind the front lines. While strategic bombers and

cruise missiles can help, a deep strike campaign will be carried out

primarily by tactical air forces, multiple launch rocket systems with

Army tactical missile systems, attack helicopters, and long-range

artillery. Major progress has been made recently in strengthening the

Armed Forces in this arena, but further gains are possible. JSTARS

and navigational satellites permit near-real-time targeting, including against mobile ground forces. Such munitions as joint air-to-surface standoff missiles, joint direct attack munitions, joint standoff

campaigns. In the coming years, these naval missions may be conducted against enemies that likely will possess missiles, mines, and

submarines capable of threatening U.S. ships. In addition, naval

forces, supported by joint assets, will be operating along the vast littoral from Southwest Asia to Northeast Asia for the strategic purposes of reassuring allies and friends, protecting critical sealanes

and commerce zones, dissuading China from excess geopolitical

ambitions, and carrying out counterterrorist missions. 

The combination of heightened threats and Asian littoral missions has spawned debate over the Navy’s future. One issue is the size

of the Navy: whether its current number of ships (310) should stay

level, grow, or decline as a result of slow shipbuilding. Another issue

is the nature of future ships: whether big carriers and traditional

combatants should dominate, or if the Navy should procure such platforms as smaller carriers, Streetfighter and other small littoral ships,

the DD–21 destroyer for projecting

power ashore, big surface ships and

submarines with many cruise missiles, and mobile offshore platforms.

A third issue is political: determining

how to employ Asian littoral operations in a manner that advances U.S.

interests and regional stability,

rather than inflaming an already

tense situation. Resolving these issues wisely will be key not only to

charting the course of the Navy but also to carrying out U.S. defense

strategy and foreign policy in an era of accelerating globalization.

Standoff targeting and forcible entry for antiaccess/area

denial threats. This operational concept is focused on overpowering

antiaccess/area denial threats so that U.S. forces can gain decisive

entry into hot crisis zones. Its two components are intended to work

together on behalf of the same strategic purpose. Whereas standoff

targeting helps suppress enemy defenses, forcible entry operations

complete the job and establish U.S. forces at forward locations in

the crisis zone.

Standoff targeting involves using strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and future exotic systems to bombard enemy targets from long

distances in wartime. Using strategic bombers to support theater

campaigns is hardly new: the United States employed B–52s in Vietnam and made significant use of bombers and cruise missiles in

Desert Storm and Kosovo. The idea has gained added prominence

recently for two reasons. Some analysts fear that in future conflicts,

U.S. forces either will lack access to forward bases and infrastructure or will be unable to operate safely against enemy antiaccess/

area denial threats. In addition, the existing force of nearly 200

bombers and ships with cruise missiles can generate up to one-quarter of the military air-delivered firepower. The growing accuracy of

smart munitions is giving them the capacity to carry out lethal bombardment campaigns independently from rear bases and outside

enemy threat envelopes. A key effect can be to help suppress enemy

defenses, thereby allowing other U.S. forces to converge. The time

has arrived to make full use of these increasingly effective assets in

U.S. plans for future theater war.

Standoff targeting clearly has a contributing role to play in

future defense strategy. At issue is whether it should be supplementary to traditional forward-deployed forces or instead central in ways

6 Defense Horizons November 2001

future crisis interventions 

in the Persian Gulf and Asia

will be more difficult than

those of the past decade
creating new combat formations for swift maneuvers and decisive

strikes in joint operations. The Army and Marines are not pursuing

near-term modernization with full suites of new weapons, but they

are pursuing some new systems—for example, the Comanche helicopter, the Crusader artillery tube, the V–22 Osprey, and upgraded

tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Progress in these programs will

be needed as part of any effort to pursue this operational concept. 

Deliberate and sustained operations. The previous nine concepts assume that U.S. forces will swiftly deploy to a crisis and then

launch aggressive operations aimed at rapidly overpowering the

enemy and attaining decisive victory within a few days or weeks.

Afterward, U.S. forces presumably

would withdraw from the scene as

soon as possible. Such short, explosive, high-tech wars may characterize most future efforts, but U.S.

defense strategists should remember

that alternative types of wars may be

waged. Some conflicts may be

marked by deliberate operations aimed at controlling a crisis over a

lengthy period rather than overwhelming enemy forces immediately. Regardless of whether wars are won quickly or deliberately, a

sustained U.S. presence may remain to exert control over the political fallout in the aftermath. This concept calls attention to the

need for U.S. forces to remain prepared for these longer duration

operations, even as they acquire greater capabilities for winning

rapidly and decisively.

Deliberate operations may not be a preferred norm of U.S. military strategy, but they can be necessitated by a host of considerations: crises that build slowly, allies that balk, physical constraints

that prevent U.S. forces from deploying quickly, enemies that refuse

to be beaten, or wars interspersed with periods of diplomacy. Sustained operations can occur as a result not only of wars dragging on

without a conclusion but also of political decisions to occupy the territory of a defeated enemy, perhaps as part of war-termination policies. The current no-fly zones in Iraq are an example of compelled

political settlements that require an enduring postwar presence on

friendly soil. Peacekeeping, of course, is a hallmark of deliberate

sustained operations. Remaining prepared for such operations

requires a focus on special combat forces (such as infantry), logistic

support units, and war reserve stocks that otherwise might lose favor

in a defense strategy focused on winning rapidly and decisively. It

also necessitates remaining aware that modern war may not always

take the form that U.S. plans, forces, and technology want or expect.

Future Directions and Resource Strategy

Provided these 10 concepts are embedded in a sound overall

transformation strategy focused on the mid term for adaptability,

they offer plausible candidates for building highly capable forces for

new era operations over the coming decade and beyond. Their main

thrust is to prepare high-tech forces that can deploy rapidly and

strike lethally against well-armed enemies. Their defensive measures will help protect U.S. forces against new era threats, especially

November 2001 Defense Horizons 7

weapons, sensor-fused weapons/Skeet, and brilliant antiarmor submunitions permit highly accurate, lethal strikes against a wide spectrum of targets, including armored vehicles. The F–22, JSF, and

F/A–18 E/F provide stealthy aircraft for suppressing enemy air

defenses and carrying out major bombardment using the full spectrum of modern munitions. As unmanned aerial vehicles and

unmanned combat aerial vehicles mature, they will be useful complements to these combat aircraft. 

As these systems are acquired, deep strike campaigns will

become an increasingly important part of operational strategy for

keeping enemy forces at bay, destroying them rapidly, and winning

wars decisively. Effects-based targeting can help determine optimal ways

for allocating strikes against enemy

forces, infrastructure, and industry,

thereby further enhancing the effectiveness of deep strikes. Although

deep strikes normally can help defeat

enemy forces, they cannot win wars

on their own. Strong ground combat forces also will be needed, especially if the weather is bad, terrain is difficult, the enemy must be

overpowered in a few days, or territory must be occupied. For deep

strike campaigns to succeed, smart munitions must be available in

adequate quantities, and air forces must have the support assets and

spares needed to generate high sortie rates. Because shortfalls

already exist, buying sufficient stocks of smart munitions is a critical

priority. Modernization with new combat aircraft is important, but

the high cost of buying several thousand new models will necessitate

a resource strategy of phased procurements to ensure affordability.

Decisive close combat operations and deep maneuver for

ground forces. This concept focuses on ways to strengthen Army and

Marine forces for close combat and deep counter-thrusts so that they

can maintain superiority over enemy forces in situations where

crushing, fast-paced ground campaigns are needed, accompanied

perhaps by war-termination efforts that occupy enemy territory. Currently, active Army forces provide four light divisions (infantry, airborne, and air assault) and six heavy divisions (armored and mechanized). In its interim force plan, the Army intends to reconfigure six

brigades with light armored vehicles so they can deploy rapidly,

including aboard tactical air transports. In pursuing its objective

force over the long term, the Army plans to create new fighting vehicles that will replace heavy tanks and artillery tubes with lighter

weapons that have comparable firepower and survivability. This

vision depends heavily on major progress in exploratory research and

development programs that will take years to develop, and even then

it probably will have serious trouble creating new ground weapons

that are light but survivable, powerful, and embedded in protective

systems. Until then, the Army may be well served by anchoring its

plans on interim forces, keeping its tanks and other weapons, and

making better use of prepositioning to deploy faster than it does now.

Heavy forces with prepositioned equipment often can deploy faster

than light forces (with no prepositioning) from CONUS.

Some critics argue that the present focus on technology should

be accompanied by continuing efforts to reorganize and reengineer

Army force structures. Progress in this area could help reduce multiple Army command layers and large logistic support assets while

modern war may not always

take the form that U.S. 

plans, forces, and technology

want or expect
8 Defense Horizons November 2001

through sustained spending increases that permit new ventures.

Absent major reductions in other areas, nonetheless, fiscal constraints will be tight for many years, and priorities must be set. All of

these concepts require investments in new capabilities, some of

which are not highly expensive. They can be carried out adequately

with funding support that is consistent with foreseeable budgets.

The exceptions are missile defense, space assets, and air modernization, all of which carry big price tags if pursued fully. In these and

other costly programs, investment decisions will need to be made

with a focus on high-leverage payoffs and cost-effectiveness in mind.

Otherwise, spending on a few big-ticket concepts could leave the

others starved of funds. If savings must be found, the answer is not

necessarily neglecting these concepts or slashing combat forces,

which consume only one-third of the

DOD budget. Equal or greater savings likely can be found by controlling the spiraling operations and

maintenance budget, trimming manpower across DOD, reengineering

structures, and crafting an affordable plan for procurement of new

tactical combat aircraft.

The appeal of these 10 concepts

lies not in their individual features,

but in their capacity to work together

to create a composite theory of force preparations and operations.

Any effort to pursue only a few concepts, while neglecting others,

could produce an imbalanced force incapable of the full-spectrum

decisive operations required by future strategic challenges. For

example, preoccupation with missile defense, standoff targeting, and

littoral maritime operations could result in inadequate forces for

direct crisis interventions. Likewise, an emphasis on forcible entry

and deep strike, to the exclusion of close combat capabilities, could

result in a lack of strong ground forces. 

The Armed Forces will be served best by investing wisely in a full

set of valid new concepts in affordable, well-planned ways, while

attending to the other aspects of defense preparedness. In the final

analysis, a strong military posture will be marked by the capacity to

perform many missions and operations effectively—rather than a few

superbly and others poorly. This is a central lesson of the past

decades, during which the United States struggled hard to build its

superior forces of today. It likely will prove to be the guiding beacon

for building and using transformed forces for the 21st century.

WMD and antiaccess/area denial threats. Their emphasis on building

more mobile forces and gaining access to a wider network of bases

and facilities, including along the Asian littoral, will help enable U.S.

forces to operate in new geographic locations. The effect will be not

only to create better technical capabilities but also to enhance

adaptability, especially in contingencies at the medium-to-high end

of the spectrum. 

Nonetheless, these and other new operational concepts must be

evaluated carefully to ensure that they make strategic sense, will produce new capabilities required by the Armed Forces, and fit together

to provide a coherent approach to warfighting. If they prove to have

merit, these 10 operational concepts offer a new strategic vision for

building and employing future U.S. forces. In this vision, troops would

be strengthened in multiple ways to

carry out demanding missions

through new era joint operations.

They would need appropriate

weapons, technologies, and other

assets to carry out these new missions

and operations. As a result, the transformation process must be accelerated. Yet this vision does not require a

frantic leap into the future and

uncharted terrain. It can be accomplished through a purposeful and

measured transformation focused on the mid term, one that embodies a mixture of continuity and change through a combination of

upgraded legacy forces and some ultra-tech forces.

This strategic vision has important global political implications

that need to be recognized and handled wisely. Some countries will

welcome the idea that the United States is assembling swift, hightech strike forces backed by theater missile defenses, but the plan

already is triggering apprehension in others, allies and adversaries

alike. The United States will need to use diplomacy to persuade

skeptics that it is behaving responsibly, not like a rogue hyperpower

with a unilateral agenda. Embedding U.S. defense preparations in

multilateral security ties, interoperability with allied forces, and

partnership relations can help reduce this apprehension.

Notwithstanding their many attractive features, these concepts

should not be viewed as a cure-all or as offering a stand-alone

defense strategy. While they mainly focus on wars at the high end of

the spectrum, most do not pay comparable attention to lower end

conflicts in which better forces may also be needed. Preoccupation

with new technologies for strike operations, if carried too far, might

risk overlooking the many other dimensions of warfighting, including

well-trained forces that are ready in many ways. These concepts

must be accompanied by measures in such traditional, often-overlooked areas as logistic support, bases and infrastructure, prepositioning, maintenance, smart munitions, and war reserves. Otherwise,

they could create forces that possess glittering new technologies but

lack the overall wherewithal to fight effectively.

To be successful, pursuit of these concepts must be accompanied by a sound resource strategy aimed at affordability and balanced investments. Adequate defense budgets should be attained

Defense Horizons is produced by the Publication Directorate of the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (INSS) which publishes books, monographs, and reports on national

security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy for the National Defense

University. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/

press/ndup2.html. INSS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/

jfq_pubs/index.htm.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency

of the Federal Government.

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode George C. Maerz

Director of Publications General Editor, NDU Press Supervisory Editor, NDU Press

a strong military posture will

be marked by the capacity 

to perform many missions

and operations effectively—

rather than a few superbly

and others poorly