There is a growing need for an international paramilitary police force that can fill 

the security gap between the end of military 

combat, peace support, relief operations, and 

the start of restoration of civil authority.

Several governments of the European 

Union, drawing on longstanding paramilitary national police forces, are creating a 

multinational European Gendarmerie Force 

(EGF), which could fill some of the security 

gap. With a permanent headquarters based in 

Italy, the EGF would act as light expeditionary 

forces, configured to serve both as keepers of 

public order (so-called substitution missions) 

and as advisers and trainers of local police 

(strengthening missions).

The United States needs to consider the 

best way to develop these kinds of capabilities, which it does not possess today. While 

the American military should retain its multimission character, the U.S. objective should 

be a mix of capabilities that allow for a seamless shift from ground combat to operations of 

a law enforcement character.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

and the European Union should establish liaison and training relationships that allow for 

regular military forces, constabulary forces, 

and civilian police and law enforcement 

officials to explore techniques, training, and 

procedures for stabilization missions that permit adoption of best practices and facilitate 

coordination, cooperation, and planning.

Since the early 1990s, multinational stabilization efforts in the wake of conflicts or major 

natural disasters have repeatedly encountered 

problems in filling the so-called security gap. In 

places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, outside interveners 

have faced a compelling need to use specialized 

capabilities that can fill the gap between the 

point where military operations—whether for 

combat, peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency—

leave off and community-based policing activities pick up. In particular, ensuring a capacity to 

manage and defuse civil disturbances and other 

threats to public order has become a sine qua 

non for overall mission success.1

A number of European countries—most 

notably France, Italy, and Spain, but also 

Portugal and the Netherlands—have long possessed such capacities via their well-established 

national constabulary services. But the United 

States has not made comparable investments 

in this kind of capability for its own needs and 

consequently has been slow to embrace this 

requirement in overseas venues. Nonetheless, 

pressures are growing to embrace creatively 

the necessary transformational shifts in U.S. 

military organization, doctrine, equipping, and 

training. Among other groups, the prestigious 

U.S. Defense Science Board documented the 

inadequacy of U.S. postconflict capabilities in 

detail in its seminal 2004 study, Transition To 

and From Hostilities.

2

American consideration of European 

capabilities in this area has often been subordinated to policy reservations regarding the 

European Union’s (EU’s) nascent European 

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the quasioperational European Rapid Reaction Force 

(ERRF), and low European defense spending. 

When it comes to avoiding unintended duplication with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such concerns are understandable. Yet it would be unfortunate if Washington 

overlooked a unique and valuable European 

contribution in providing this intermediary 

support to postconflict stabilization—in essence, filling the gap between what are not 

quite combat operations and yet not exactly 

peacekeeping activities as traditionally defined 

by the United Nations.

This essay explores the factors that give 

rise to the need for constabulary capabilities 

in fragile postconflict settings, assesses EU 

efforts to develop greater capacities via the 

newly formed European Gendarmerie Force 

(EGF), discusses the implications of these 

developments for U.S. defense transformation, 

and proposes ways to strengthen Euro-Atlantic 

cooperation in this vital area.

Hammer vs. Scalpel

As military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo 

have demonstrated, postcombat operations 

reflect one of the most complex and challenging phases of the conflict spectrum.3

 Part of the 

reason for recognizing this as a new phase is 

that, although organized hostility has ended, 

order has yet to be restored. The local authorities usually are too weak and unable to govern 

without external support. Judicial and legal 

institutions are broken, nonexistent, or illegitimate. The transition period from warfighting to 

peacekeeping and reconstruction is particularly 

tenuous because it represents the nexus of two 

different axes: the military-civilian axis and the 

external-internal axis.

Along the military-civilian axis, one 

expects to see a changing relationship between 

Strategic Forum

No. 218

November 2005

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 218, November 2005 Strategic Forum 

Constabulary Forces and 

Postconflict Transition: 

The Euro-Atlantic Dimension 

by David T. Armitage, Jr., and Anne M. Moisan
 Strategic Forum	 No. 218, November 2005

military and civilian actors throughout the 

life cycle of a postconflict operation. At more 

advanced stages, civilian agencies should be 

assuming greater responsibility for residual 

law-and-order duties while the military components assume a lower profile. The externalinternal axis refers to the changing relationship between external security actors and 

internal or domestic security actors. Here the 

problem revolves around the inability, at least 

initially, of local authorities in postcombat 

environments to establish law and order, 

provide basic security for the population, and 

govern their own territory. To avoid turning 

failed or recovering states into international 

dependencies, the international community 

recognizes the need to transition effectively 

from externally provided security—whether 

military or constabulary—to security provided 

by local actors once the latter have been 

adequately empowered.

This transition period is the most critical for the conclusion of a successful mission. 

The aftermath of both Kosovo and Bosnia 

highlighted the need for the United States and 

its NATO allies to develop capabilities to cope 

with demanding, high-intensity, yet still localized threats to public order. These tasks are best 

suited for constabulary units than for either 

traditional combat soldiers or community 

police. In the end, all are prerequisites for

successful reconstruction.

In simple terms, military forces are 

trained for war—force-on-force engagements 

against other military or armed adversaries. 

While the military is able to mobilize and 

deploy rapidly in large units, most are uncomfortable with, ill suited to, and not generally 

trained for police tasks that are central to 

postmilitary conflict operations (for example, 

riot control, border control, domestic surveillance, securing/protecting sensitive sites). As 

an analyst has noted, the military is a “blunt 

instrument” that is “capable only of imposing 

a most basic, rigid form of order,” involving 

attempts to “deter and limit loss of life and 

destruction of property, but that is about all.”4

Most U.S. and allied military forces are not 

trained to intervene directly to deal with crime 

or civil violence in postconflict situations. In a 

sensitive period of occupation, one false step 

by a soldier using excessive force can have 

catastrophic consequences.

Recent history has illustrated that an 

effective response to crises along the full 

spectrum of conflict requires at least three 

types of security forces: high-end combat forces 

to neutralize hostile, organized adversaries; 

constabulary or paramilitary forces to handle 

crowd control and lower levels of organized 

violence; and community-based law enforcement organizations (police, judicial, and 

penal authorities) to rebuild legal and judicial 

institutions. So far, the U.S. Armed Forces have 

proven to be best suited to address high-end 

conflict operations. This does not mean infantry and light infantry forces and various U.S. 

reserve units have not done excellent work 

when pressed into service as peacekeepers in 

places such as the Balkans and Sinai. It does

mean that in recent operations, the United 

States, for lack of better options, has routinely 

turned to elite Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

or traditional military police to address stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) tasks.

Using SOF to conduct messy postconflict 

operations and low-end security has overstretched these units and forced a higher than 

desirable operations tempo, jeopardizing other 

priority military missions for which only they are 

trained and equipped. The training that military 

police receive in some of the skills required for 

stabilization is not focused on creating competency in the full range of constabulary skills. 

Rather, police training emphasizes a general 

familiarity with tasks, relying heavily on in-thefield operational training. In addition, both special operations and military police units generally lack the full gamut of specialized equipment 

(lethal and nonlethal) to deal with lower levels 

of stabilization and nationbuilding.

The European gendarme forces have 

evolved beyond their historic role of meeting 

domestic needs. They have conducted numerous constabulary and law enforcement operations in many parts of the world. For example, 

between August 1998 and January 1999, the 

Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in 

Bosnia, headed and staffed largely by Italian 

Carabinieri, was employed in 243 reconnaissance patrols, 87 information-gathering 

missions, and 33 public order interventions.5

The MSU dealt with refugee returns, organized 

crime, and terrorism. The French Gendarmerie 

has been involved in peace operations in Haiti, 

El Salvador, Cambodia, Western Sahara, 

Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and elsewhere.6

Likewise, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish 

forces have been deployed in various operations 

in Africa and the Balkans. Our European allies 

have substantial experience in the use of forces 

with the kind of training, organization, and 

equipment that is directly relevant for future 

law enforcement missions in S&R operations. 

There is much Washington could learn from its 

allies to overcome the temptation that elite SOF, 

military police, or special Army/Marine units 

can do the job alone.

Constabulary Forces

The term constabulary refers to “a force 

organized along military lines, providing basic 

law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully 

stabilized environment.”7 Europeans often 

describe constabulary forces as “police forces 

with a military status.”8 They are trained in 

military skills, but their focus and equipment 

is on minimal/nonlethal use of force and tasks 

normally associated with police functions. Unlike traditional soldiers, the goal of constabulary 

units is to defuse potentially violent situations 

through negotiations and conflict management, rather than to “neutralize” the enemy or 

destroy a target. While constabulary forces vary 

by country, they can provide order and security 

in a postcombat area of operation after military 

forces have been relieved and redeployed but 

before local or law enforcement institutions have 

been restored.9 Often, they wear national police 

uniforms, so as not to be confused with those 

who have just done the fighting, but they are 

armed and ready, if necessary, to use lethal force.

Though serving as police, constabulary 

forces are highly skilled in the tactics and doctrine 

of light infantry, including rapid deployment and 

an ability to sustain themselves logistically. The 

Dr. David T. Armitage, Jr., is a visiting research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

(INSS) at the National Defense University. Colonel Anne M. Moisan, USAF, is Chief of Staff of the 

INSS Research Directorate and a senior fellow. Comments may be directed to: moisana@ndu.edu

most U.S. and allied 

military forces are not 

trained to intervene 

directly to deal with 

crime or civil violence in 

postconflict situations
No. 218, November 2005 Strategic Forum 

Dutch Marechaussee, for example, can deploy a 

50-person detachment as a rapid-response unit 

within 48 hours.10 These forces also are highly 

trained. For example, the Italian Carabinieri, serving as part of Kosovo Force, averaged 10 years of 

specialized training, about twice the time of their 

military counterparts.11 Other training includes 

martial arts, use of firearms and light weapons, 

intelligence-gathering and interrogation techniques, international law, negotiation, social skills, 

use of communications equipment, and foreign 

languages and cultures. Most European constabulary forces also have specialized dog units and 

sniper teams. Their equipment reflects a hybrid 

of police and military gear as well: flak jackets, 

shields, batons, tear gas, and automatic weapons.12

They are able to secure and protect traffic routes, 

facilitate the introduction of civilian rebuilding 

and assistance, set up and manage prisons, and 

establish and train certain types of national police 

and law enforcement institutions.

Constabulary forces serve a vital role 

along the conflict spectrum between warfighting on the high end and local law enforcement 

on the low end. While combat forces are effective in neutralizing hostile forces and providing 

initial stability to the environment, such units 

are typically neither trained nor equipped to 

handle long-term security problems such as 

looting, rioting, crowd control, crime, civilian disturbances, restoring basic services, and 

local law enforcement, all of which require 

increasingly nonlethal countermethods. These 

latter types of critical skills can often make the 

ultimate difference between mission success 

and failure.

Yet, as the Defense Science Board study 

noted, the U.S. military has not yet embraced 

S&R operations as an “explicit mission with 

the same seriousness as combat operations.”13

Planning for these types of activities is often 

considered a requirement that falls outside the 

traditional role (or interest) of the U.S. military. 

While the Armed Forces have considerable latent 

S&R capacity, it is embedded in other mission 

priorities and impeded by the low-density/highdemand problem, resulting in deployments 

without appropriate training or equipment. 

Despite this dawning recognition, the military 

finds itself in a conundrum: the requirement 

for S&R forces is real, yet no tailored S&R force 

or capability exists. Washington has not devoted 

the resources to develop these skills within the 

U.S. military or sought more effective ways to tap 

Europe’s expertise appropriately.

European Capabilities

Since the end of the Cold War, but most 

significantly after the St. Malo declaration in 

December 1998, EU member states have attempted to develop complementary military 

capacities.14 While the lack of tangible improvements in military capabilities or significant increases in defense spending is widely criticized 

by commentators in the United States, less 

noticed—or discussed—have been efforts to 

develop civilian crisis management capacities, 

including tailored and deployable constabulary 

and police units.

What kind of constabulary forces do the 

Europeans possess? Individually, there are 

unique, national capabilities (for example, 

the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie). Beyond the national level, Europeans 

have proven their ability to merge capabilities 

multilaterally, most notably in the MSU in the 

Balkans. In fact, the first EU crisis management operation was in January 2003, when the 

European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina took over from the United 

Nations (UN) International Police Task Force.

Most recently, Europeans have sought to 

develop multinational constabulary capacities 

within a more institutionalized framework. 

On September 17, 2004, the Dutch EU presidency announced that five EU member states 

(France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 

Spain) had agreed to form a European Gendarmerie Force, with a permanent headquarters 

in Vicenza, Italy. Intended to be operational 

by late 2005, the 900-person force would be 

tasked to ensure security and public order, fight 

organized crime, advise and train local police 

forces, as well as fill the postconflict security 

gap as military forces transition to peacekeeping. Other EU member states could participate 

as much as they were willing and able.15

The EGF’s main purposes are substitution 

and strengthening missions.16 Substitution

refers to missions where the local police either 

do not exist or are totally incapable of maintaining public order. Strengthening missions 

involve advising and training local police to 

perform public order duties, such as urban 

operations, crowd control, patrimonial site 

protection, and combating terrorism and organized crime. For example, in Haiti and Côte 

d’Ivoire, French Gendarmes deployed alongside 

military peacekeepers and helped reestablish 

the local police force.17 In Bosnia and Kosovo, 

Italian Carabinieri conducted joint patrols 

with local police. Their presence reassured 

fledgling local police and gave skittish refugees confidence that they could return to their 

homes unharmed. The Carabinieri also used 

their investigative skills (including plainclothes 

covert surveillance, crime mapping, and link 

analysis) to help the NATO Stabilization Force 

in Bosnia counter organized crime.18 

European officials envision the EGF to 

be deployed either along with or immediately 

after a military operation to maintain or establish public order and safety. The advantage 

of the European Gendarmerie Force is that, 

although it is considered a police asset, it can 

be placed under military command. In other 

words, EGF forces have the training, equipment, and background to work in a military 

command environment.

According to the EGF “declaration of 

intent,” its flexibility is the ability to deploy at 

every phase of a conflict:

■ initial phase: along with military forces to 

perform various police tasks

■ transitional phase: either alone or with a 

military force, coordinating and cooperating with 

local or international police units

■ military disengagement phase: facilitate 

the handover from military to civilian authorities, 

whether local or international.

On December 14, 2004, the European 

Union announced that the first EGF commander would be French Brigadier General 

Gérard Deanaz.19 He reports to a High Level Interdepartmental Committee that is responsible 

for strategic management and political control, 

although if the EGF is used for an EU mission, 

the political control would fall under the EU 

Political-Security Committee plan.20

The commander heads a staff of about 

30 planners at the EGF permanent headquarters in Vicenza. Planners are expected to work 

closely with the EU military staff and civilian 

crisis management planning cell in Brussels. 

Among the EGF headquarters’ tasks are monitoring at-risk areas; planning contingency 

and operational maneuvers; arranging and 

the advantage of 

the European 

Gendarmerie Force 

is that it can be placed 

under military command
directing combined exercises; evaluating and 

implementing lessons learned; and, as necessary or if requested, providing guidance to 

strategic decisionmaking. Thus, the goal is 

to incorporate EGF capacities into the ESDP 

so that the European Union eventually will 

be able to respond to the full spectrum of 

crisis situations, from preventive diplomacy to 

postcombat nationbuilding. 

The EU vision of the integrated police unit 

(IPU) allows for Europeans to perform “robust 

police missions” under less stable conditions, 

even if this involves temporarily being placed 

under military command. Since the expected 

area of operation is likely to be characterized 

by the absence of internal authority, the IPU 

concept is a critical part of the larger framework 

linking EGF to EU contributions in building the 

country’s law enforcement and judicial institutions. As illustrated by international experiences 

in the Balkans and East Timor, the deployment 

of police forces alone does not help to create 

stable conditions unless there are other means to 

process criminals and administer justice.21

The British Broadcasting Corporation 

(BBC) has aptly described the EU effort as trying 

to create an intervention force that is “something between the neutrality of traditional UN 

peacekeeping and NATO’s cruise missiles.”22 The 

Dutch stress that the EGF—through its training 

and its pre-organized unit structure—would 

serve as a viable framework in which other 

nations with similar types of police forces may 

choose to participate. Any EU member state possessing “a police force with a military statute” 

may take part in the EGF. Candidates (including 

Turkey) that have such constabulary forces may 

obtain “observer status” and detach a liaison 

officer to the EGF headquarters. For instance, 

the contribution of the roughly 150,000 Turkish

Jandarma may help the European Gendarmerie 

Force eventually solve manpower constraints, as 

well as facilitate EU-Turkish relations in general. 

Because of its unique capabilities, the EGF also 

may be a positive venue for repairing European 

relations with the United States.

Assessing the EGF

The organizing framework of the European Gendarmerie Force is new, so it will take 

time to develop. However, several issues must be 

addressed in three main areas: training/rules of 

engagement, deployment, and links/relationships with other organizations and states.

The gendarmes in the EGF are part of the 

existing pool of personnel committed to civilian crisis management.23 EU members participating in the EGF plan to use the same forces 

as those already pledged in the 2001 Helsinki 

Headline Goal catalogue. Under the police 

category, the European Union aimed to have a 

cadre of 5,000 police officers by 2003, of which 

1,400 would be able to deploy within 30 days. 

In November 2001, at a Police Capabilities 

Conference in Brussels, EU members reached 

(at least on paper) their targets, including 13 

rapidly deployable integrated police units.24 The 

European Union already has two rapidly deployable headquarters at its disposal, one from 

the French Gendarmerie and the other from 

the Italian Carabinieri. The EGF thus seems 

rather similar, although less ambitious than 

just several years ago.

At a civilian capabilities commitment 

conference on November 22, 2004, EU member 

states (including the 10 newest members) 

updated the 2001 catalogue and pledged 

more than 5,700 police for participation in 

crisis management operations. Consequently, 

because the European Gendarmerie Force will 

draw from this same pool rather than raise 

new forces, it creates a potential dilemma with 

respect to deployability.

The EGF initiative stemmed from French 

domestic politics but reflects internal EU 

dynamics and new 21st-century operational 

demands. In 2003, French Defense Minister 

Michèle Alliot-Marie proposed a multinational unit that could be deployed rapidly to 

assist in police duties. At the time, Alliot-Marie 

reportedly was in a bureaucratic battle with 

the French finance and interior ministries. 

By proposing the establishment of such a 

force, the French defense minister might have 

hoped to gain additional budget resources, 

as well as maintain control over the use of 

the Gendarmerie.25

The Italians, meanwhile, who have a great 

deal of overseas experience with their Carabinieri, saw an opportunity to promote their country 

as one of the major powers within the European 

Union. Since Germany (for political and historical reasons) had a strict rule of separating 

military and police functions and Great Britain 

did not possess these unique types of forces, 

Spain also saw an opportunity to raise its profile 

in EU circles. The French, still smarting from EU 

enlargement (primarily to the East), considered 

the EGF as a natural fit to maintain leadership 

of a southern group of member states, perhaps 

entice the new members with these low-end 

specialized capabilities, and tout the embryonic 

ESDP. Knowing that the European Union could 

not compete on high-end military tasks (and 

seeing Washington distinctly uncomfortable 

with nationbuilding and struggling with S&R 

operations in Iraq), the French and other EU 

participants considered the EGF a perfect answer 

to filling a security niche. It also complemented 

other ongoing efforts on the military side of 

ESDP, such as developing battlegroups, taking 

over the NATO mission in Bosnia, and establishing a European Defense Agency to coordinate 

weapons procurement.

 Strategic Forum	 No. 218, November 2005

European Gendarmerie Capabilities

Source: Institute for International Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 2003/04

Country Force Personnel Committed to EGF

Italy Carabinieri 111,800 800

France Gendarmerie 101,399 600

Spain Guardia Civil 73,360 500

Portugal Republican Guard 26,100 160

Netherlands Marechaussee 6,800 100

TOTAL 319,459 2,160

because of its unique 

capabilities, the EGF 

also may be a positive 

venue for repairing 

European relations with 

the United States
The British media immediately lauded 

the September 17, 2004, declaration with such 

hyperbolic headlines as “EU flexes muscles.”26

The BBC noted that the EGF would be sent to 

“places where law and order has deteriorated 

but not completely broken down, or where a 

conflict has subsided and heavily-armed troops 

are no longer needed.”

While the concept is clear and the need 

is compelling, EU members nevertheless face 

real challenges in making this initiative work. 

There is no question the forces that will comprise the EGF are capable. But unanswered 

questions remain: How deployable are the 

units? What will the stress points be? Will EU 

governments find themselves overstretched? 

How long are the deployments? Where will 

units be sent? Whose training standards and 

operating procedures will dominate (French 

Gendarme or Italian Carabinieri)? With the 

demand for these types of forces growing, Europeans need to find answers quickly.

The political-military challenges are not 

dissimilar to those faced by NATO as it develops 

the NATO Response Force. EGF coordination 

and strategic direction belong to the high-level 

interdepartmental committee. However, if the EGF 

is used for an EU mission, the responsibility will 

shift to the EU Political-Security Committee. In 

this committee, all 25 EU members have a voice 

and a potential veto. Since only five EU members 

participate in the EGF, it remains to be seen how 

the other members would pursue the politics 

with respect to a proposed mission. In addition, 

each EU–5 member state retains the right to 

decide whether its units would participate in 

an EGF operation. Such uncertainty places 

additional demands on force planners, since one 

cannot be certain that earmarked units might 

not be withdrawn or not made available for 

political or other reasons.

In the end, national needs, available 

funding and personnel, and prestige will determine the depth and durability of national commitments to the European Gendarmerie Force. 

Since EGF availability and deployability are 

tied to meeting national requirements, there 

may be a gap between the numbers earmarked 

in a database and the actual number available 

for a mission. Not only are the raw numbers of 

forces listed small, but many of these forces are 

also being double-counted for the European 

Union, United Nations, and elsewhere. Consequently, conducting simultaneous operations 

may be out of the question. What happens if 

French gendarmes assigned to a UN mission 

are required for a separate EGF mission? Hard 

political choices would have to be made, and 

European allies might have to think through 

difficult trade-offs with other security priorities.

In 2001, EU governments established a 

small police unit within the Council Secretariat 

(under Common Foreign and Security Policy 

High Representative Javier Solana). The unit 

consists of only about 8 police officers and 

civilians, which is dwarfed by the EU Military 

Staff of over 150. It is not yet clear how the EGF 

headquarters will interact with the Council 

Secretariat’s police unit or the EU Situation 

Center. Presumably, there will be liaison officers to coordinate EU efforts. In late 2003, the 

European Union was working on developing a 

broad civil-military coordination concept that 

would integrate the myriad EU elements both 

in Brussels and in the field, but specific parameters have yet to be worked out.27

Again, the EGF is scheduled to become 

operational late this year. Nevertheless, numerous questions remain that the EU–5 will 

need to address in the coming year. Likewise, 

American operations are driving questions as 

to the ability of current U.S. military forces 

to meet the increasingly diverse challenges of 

the 21st century, and more specifically, questions regarding the disposition and transformation of American forces to meet these 

security gap requirements.

Struggle and Challenge

The likelihood of American or NATO 

involvement in a great power conflict requiring 

massive troop numbers in the next 15 years 

is low. However, weak governments, lagging 

economies, and religious extremism will continue to place increasing demands on Western 

powers for stabilization, reconstruction, and 

nationbuilding operations.28 Despite recognition 

of the growing and critical role constabulary 

forces could play in meeting these demands, 

the U.S. and NATO militaries are reluctant to 

address constructively the need for developing 

such skill sets.29 In documents as recent as the 

newly drafted U.S. Joint Operations Concepts for 

2005, the range of interim operations identified 

in spectrum-of-conflict operations continues to 

reflect the traditional spectrum of tasks.30 Likewise, in the NATO Defense Planning System, 

the emphasis centers on combat forces to the 

exclusion of identifying constabulary requirements or close combat urban warfare.31

Winning wars and winning peace require 

unique and varied capabilities. Since the 1990s, 

U.S. military forces have been reduced overall, 

including the Army, which has been cut by 

40 percent to approximately 485,500 (plus 

355,000 Army National Guard and Reserves), 

while the operational demands (every 18–24 

months) have doubled, as well as the duration 

of operations.32 Similar trends are reflected in 

NATO efforts to reduce, professionalize, and 

deploy its militaries. The belief that the traditional military remains the best institution to 

deal with new world operational requirements 

needs to be challenged seriously. Although the 

military can quickly bring to bear large forces, 

equipment, and organization, the cost—both 

in terms of dollars, as well as scarce and highly 

specialized combat resources—has become 

increasingly high. Operational expenses in 

Afghanistan and Iraq alone exceed $4.5 billion 

a month. The debate over what type of force is 

required to fill the security gap is at the heart 

of the discussion.

The United States cannot expect Europeans to assume responsibility for constabulary 

operations in all the areas where they are presently needed (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). 

While European constabulary forces have the 

training and valuable expertise, current numbers are far too small to provide the extensive 

long-term support that the United States and 

NATO need to cover the growing operational 

security gaps in foreign postconflict operations. 

European governments are also unlikely to 

opt out of combat and peacekeeping missions 

in favor of specializing in overseas constabulary missions. They will continue to strive to 

maintain a balance of capabilities in conflict 

situations. On the American side, the solution 

does not rest in simply increasing the number 

of combat, SOF, or military police forces. It lies 

in better tailoring existing forces within the 

United States to these new security missions in 

postconflict environments.

No. 218, November 2005 Strategic Forum 

the belief that the 

traditional military 

remains the best 

institution to deal with 

new world operational 

requirements needs to 

be challenged
at European training facilities in Italy and 

France. In fact, this is an area where Italy in 

particular—with its rich Carabinieri tradition and historic transformation of its armed 

forces—could take the lead. Washington 

should provide proper incentives for Americans—both civilian and military—to learn 

from the Europeans.

Reaching out multilaterally to civilian 

organizations is also vital. The EGF should establish liaison relationships with the Department 

of State’s Office of Civilian Police and Office of 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

and the Department of Justice’s International 

Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance 

Program, as well as the Department of Defense. 

Such interaction would permit adoption of best 

practices and facilitate coordination, cooperation, and planning.

The United States should take steps to 

promote interoperability. For example, as the 

United States debates its own approach to 

mounting more effective stabilization and 

reconstruction operations,37 it should consider 

permitting and encouraging European constabulary forces to participate in American 

military academies, service schools, and think 

tanks. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation 

and Joint Forces Command can play integral 

roles in facilitating inclusion in both NATO 

and the U.S. training centers. In addition, the 

United States should capitalize on its combat/stabilization/reconstruction experiences 

by creating a cadre of expert military trainers; 

this cadre would be comprised of individuals 

returning from operations in Kosovo, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq who have experience in 

SOF, military police, or civil affairs, but have 

retired from active-duty service or no longer 

meet military worldwide deployability criteria 

due to injuries or inadequate active-duty time 

remaining. Capturing this expertise and focusing it on the transitional skill set requirements 

from combat experiences to constabulary 

skill to local security forces would benefit and 

complement EU expertise.

The United States should encourage 

European constabulary forces to participate in 

the postcombat phase of multinational military 

operations. Ideally, this would mean that EU 

constabulary functions are incorporated into 

U.S. (and NATO) military planning as part of 

an integrated whole. America would assist in 

providing European constabulary forces with 

necessary transport and intelligence support. If 

successful, this collaboration could become the 

The United States is wrestling with its own 

military transformation and force restructuring efforts to be better positioned to respond 

to threats and challenges. The Department of 

Defense defines transformation as “a process 

that shapes the changing nature of military 

competition and cooperation through new 

combinations of concepts, capabilities, peoples, 

and organizations that exploit our nation’s 

advantages and protect against our asymmetric 

vulnerabilities.”33 These efforts were reflected 

in the mid-1990s interest in a “revolution in 

military affairs,” as well as the latest efforts in 

1997 to centerpiece transformation in the first 

Quadrennial Defense Review.34

Despite these efforts, U.S. defense transformation efforts are bound to be flawed if we hold 

to outdated conceptions about war in the 21st

century. The days of a preponderance of conventional force-on-force operations have given 

way to more complex challenges of asymmetric 

warfare, urban counterinsurgency, extensive 

civil affairs/public diplomacy work with the 

state’s publics, stabilization, reconstruction, and 

nationbuilding. Since the end of the Cold War, 

the United States has been regularly engaged in 

one form or another of nationbuilding activity. 

Our greatest enemy is complacency with old 

stereotypes of conventional attrition warfare 

coupled with misplaced faith in advanced, 

technically superior military forces (based on 

concepts of network-centric war, space-based 

battle stations, and long-range precision strike) 

and overwhelming weak, incompetent enemies. 

Despite this mismatch, the new threats are testing 

the Nation’s ability to react to and prevail over 

enemies in the kinds of day-to-day struggles currently faced and to do so at acceptable costs. 

Some analysts in Great Britain and elsewhere argue that forces to fill the security gap 

are central to the military’s responsibility and 

that the military should be duly trained and 

equipped.35 In 2002, the Association of the U.S. 

 Strategic Forum	 No. 218, November 2005

Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies categorized four broad areas 

of tasks to be addressed by security gap forces: 

security, justice and reconciliation, social and 

economic development, and participatory 

governance. If our transformation efforts are 

to succeed, we must develop creative force 

capabilities that better meet these evolving 

operational requirements.36 The Armed Forces 

must be flexible and capable of seamlessly 

shifting focus from combat operations to dealing effectively with the rigors of political, legal, 

economic, and social requirements, establishing security and law and order, and providing 

the prerequisites for successful nationbuilding.

We are not suggesting that the U.S. Army 

be reconfigured to operate exclusively as security 

gap fillers. Conventional war is still a risk, but, 

ideally, this additional capability simply reflects 

yet another step in the Army’s transformation, 

which could be accomplished by tailoring a 

small part of its 51,000 infantry into high-quality/specialized units that possess constabularylike training, organization, and equipment. The 

transformed units would be mobile, have their 

own unique force protection, intelligence, and 

civil affairs, and have adequate firepower (lethal 

and nonlethal) and specialized training and 

skill sets to support police, local security force 

training, and nationbuilding activities. Introducing novel approaches to organization structures, 

realistic training scenarios, directed technology 

(communications, weaponry, personal protective 

gear, and armored vehicles), and modularity are 

indispensable anchors in enabling these new 

units. This transformation would also require 

tailored rules of engagement that allow forces to 

shift seamlessly from a combat role to a standalone capacity to work with local police units.

A Way Ahead

Knowing the new era of operational 

demands and the need for the U.S. military 

and NATO to transform, how can European 

constabulary capabilities both help resolve this 

military shortfall with real capability and also 

provide a concrete step toward rebuilding the 

transatlantic relationship?

Further capacity-building is essential. 

Europeans should—either through NATO, the 

European Union, or bilaterally—establish 

combined training relationships and opportunities for U.S. Armed Forces, civilian police, 

and law enforcement officials. Slots should 

be reserved for Americans to attend courses 

the United States should 

consider permitting and 

encouraging European 

constabulary forces to 

participate in American 

military academies, 

service schools, and 

think tanks
No. 218, November 2005 Strategic Forum 

prototype for a new multinational instrument 

and a firm counterbalance to perceptions of 

American unilateralism and European irrelevance. Such transparency at the planning stage 

would allow the United States (and NATO) 

to focus on comparative advantages, while 

spotlighting European strengths and skills 

in postcombat operations. Consequently, the 

political costs of persuading others to follow a 

U.S. military course of action would be lowered, 

as the European leaders can justify the policy 

to their respective parliaments and publics. 

Europeans and the EU once again can feel 

(and rightfully so) that they are working side 

by side with the United States as equal partners 

capable of successfully meeting the demands of 

crisis operations in the 21st century.

Conclusion

We are at a critical fork in the evolution 

of warfare. Old concepts and organizations 

are no longer adequate in dealing with the 

asymmetric and nontraditional enemies that 

U.S. forces are facing in new-era conflicts. We 

need to develop capacities to respond to the full 

spectrum of conflict, from precrisis diplomacy 

to postconflict peacekeeping and then to nationbuilding. In the face of stabilization and 

reconstruction demands in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, both the United States and the international community must creatively embrace this 

transformational shift in national and multinational military organization and training. 

Despite the overwhelming challenges, America, 

NATO, and the European Union face a unique 

opportunity to cooperate and collaborate as 

equals on addressing the security gap.

Notes

1 The phenomenon of a security gap is well established 

in the literature on postconflict transitions. Michael J. Dziedzic 

has characterized this problem as the byproduct of three gaps: a 

deployment gap (in which intervening forces are mismatched 

to public security requirements); an enforcement gap (in which 

international police elements lack the authority or capacity to 

enforce law and order); and an institutional gap (in which the 

host nation lacks capacity to perform key law and order functions). See Michael J. Dziedzic, “Introduction,” in Policing the 

New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, 

ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 8–16. 2 Defense Science Board 2004, Transition To and From 

Hostilities, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004. 3 The terms postconflict and postcombat are used 

interchangeably. 4 Dziedzic, 8.

5 Robert Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We 

Need Him? (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2004), 161–162. 6 See “Coopération internationale,” available at <www.

defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie>. 7 Erwin A. Schmidl, “Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview,” in Policing the New World 

Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, 22. 8 See European Gendarmerie Force, “Declaration of 

Intent,” September 17, 2004, available at <www.eu2004.nl>.

9 Perito, 34.

10 Ibid., 42.

11 Interview with Italian defense official, January 12, 2005.

12 Perito, 158; interview with Italian defense official.

13 Defense Science Board 2004, vi.

14 For background on ESDP and the holistic EU approach 

to security, see Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and 

Defense: The Ultimate Challenge? Chaillot Paper No. 43 (Paris: 

WEU–ISS, 2000); and Michael J. Brenner, Europe’s New Security 

Vocation, McNair Paper No. 66 (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, 2002). 15 European Gendarmerie Force.

16 Interview with Italian Carabinieri, December 2, 2004.

17 Interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 

2, 2004.18 Perito, 170–171.

19 See “Un general français, chef de la gendarmerie 

européenne,” December 14, 2004, available at <www.defense.

gouv.fr/sites/gendarmerie/actualites_et_dossiers>. 20 The High Level Interdepartmental Committee (HLIC) is 

composed of representatives from the countries’ various ministries. France, Italy, and the Netherlands have representatives 

from their respective defense and foreign ministries. Portugal has 

representatives from its interior and foreign ministries, and Spain 

has representatives from all three (defense, interior, foreign) 

ministries. In addition to managing the politics of the EGF, the 

committee will set the operational standards of the units. The EU 

Political-Security Committee is composed of ambassadors from 

all 25 EU members and charged with advising the Council of the 

European Union on EU foreign and security policies. 21 Based on the Civilian Crisis Capabilities Conference 

in November 2004 that incorporated contributions from the 10 

newest member states, the EU civilian crisis capacity includes 

policing (members have pledged 5,761 police officers); rule of 

law (members have pledged 631 judges, prosecutors, and other 

rule-of-law experts); civilian administration (562 administrative and infrastructure experts have been pledged); and civil 

protection (4,988 specialists in rapid response following natural 

disasters). Ministerial Declaration available at <http://ue.eu.

int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/82760.pdf>.

22 See BBC News, “EU Launches Crisis Police Force,” available at <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3665172.

stm> and Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), “EU 

States Set Up New European Military Police Force” (September 

17, 2004). 23 Interview with Dutch embassy official, November 

15, 2004; interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 

2, 2004. 24 See Caroline R. Earle, “European Capacities for Peace 

Operations: Taking Stock” (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson 

Center, March 2004), available at <www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/

Earle-EuropeanCapacitiesforPeaceOperations-TakingStock.pdf>. 25 Interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 

2, 2004.

26 For example, see BBC News and FBIS.

27 Earle.

28 Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 

Project, Mapping the Global Future, 1–13.

29 At the June 2004 Group of Eight (G–8) Summit at Sea 

Island, Georgia, the G–8 launched an initiative to establish a 

center to train personnel in constabulary operations. Although 

collocated at the EGF headquarters in Vicenza, the Center of 

Excellence for Stability Police Units is distinct from the EGF in 

that it is geared toward training (mostly) Africans to enhance 

African capacities in such operations. 30 The exception is the basket of activities associated with 

homeland security: critical infrastructure protection, consequence management, military assistance for civil disturbances, 

and counternarcotics support. See Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling 

and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: 

Zenith Press, 2004), 225. 31 For example, there are no specific constabulary requirements listed in NATO’s Defense Planning Questionnaire. 32 Karen Sudkamp, “Constabulary Forces Issue Paper,” 

June 2004, 17. 33 Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, “Military Transformation,” December 2004. 34 NATO has parallel efforts transforming its forces, with 

Allied Command Transformation in the lead. 35 See Andy Salmon and Mary Kaldor, Principles for the 

Use of the Military in Support of Law Enforcement Operations, 

First Draft for Berlin Meeting (The Centre for the Studies of 

Global Governance, May 18–19, 2004). 36 See Thomas E. Ricks, “Army Contests Rumsfeld Bid on 

Occupation,” The Washington Post, January 16, 2005. 37 For example, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, 

eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I nstitute for N ationa L S trategic S tudies

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director	 COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press
 Strategic Forum	 No. 218, November 2005

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