### The HONORABLE JAMES M. ROSENBAUM, United States District * 

### Judge for the District of Mi nnesota, sitting by designation. The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the District of Nebraska. No. 96-1583

United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Mario C. Carrazco, * * Appellant. *

Submitted: June 11, 1996 Filed: July 31, 1996

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, an d ROSENBAUM, District Judge.

*

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. Mario Carrazco pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to dist ribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of hi s rented truck

. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a) (2). The district cour t sentenced Mr. Carrazco to 37 months in prison. We affirm the distric t court ’s denial of the motion to suppress as well as its refusal t o

1 decrease Mr. Carrazco’s base offense level for purposes of sentencing.

### -2- I. Mr. Ca rrazco was stopped for speeding by a trooper near Omaha , Nebraska. Because the trooper’s car was equipped with a stationar y videotape recorder with a clock, and the trooper was wearing a microphone, the district court was able, as we were, to revi ew the entire encounter to determine what occurred and the time that elapse d between relevant events.

Mr. Carra zco apologized for speeding and accompanied the trooper to the patrol car. Imme diately thereafter, the trooper requested a computer check of M r. Carrazco’s license and criminal history and called for a second officer and a drug-detection dog to assis t. As soon as the license check came back, the trooper issued a warning ticket to Mr. Carrazco

. Moments later, the se cond officer and two drug dogs arrived. The trooper then asked Mr. Carraz co if he would allow a drug dog to perform a “sniff” of the exterior of th e truck, and Mr. Carrazco said that he did not mind. The sec ond officer then led one of his dogs around the truck. Thinkin g that his dog was aler ting to the truck, but not being absolutely certain, the officer led his other dog around the truck, and the second dog clearly alerted. The trooper then used bolt cutters to cut the lock on the truck and searched it. Aft er opening one of the boxes in the back of the truck and stating that he s melled marijuana, the trooper arrested Mr. Carrazco. The po lice discovered multiple packages containing over 400 pounds o f marijuana in a subsequent inventory search.

II. Mr. Carrazco challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered after the traffic stop. He concedes that the troop er had probable cause to stop him. He contends, however, tha t there was no legal reason to detain him after the license check and that the subsequent search of his truck, though consensual, was therefore itsel f illegal. We see a

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number of infirmities in this argument, but the most obvious one is that
we do not think that the record can support a finding that Mr. Carrazco wa s being detained illegally when he consented to th e dog sniff. We have held numerous times that p olice officers can detain a person in Mr. Carrazco’s position for a reasonable time for the purpose of checking his driver’ s license, see , e.g. , United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); se e also Ter ry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 30 (1968), and here the troope r asked for permission to conduct the “drug sniff” contemporaneously wit h delivering the warning ticket to Mr. Carrazco. As the trooper hande d Mr. Carrazco the warning ticket, Mr. Carrazco initiated furthe r conversation, and the trooper responded. After a three-second delay, the trooper asked for permission to use the dog. We are unwilling to say that those three seconds between statements were anything other than a normal pause in a single conversation. Since the troop er received Mr. Carrazco’s permission to have a dog sniff the truck at a time when his detention was clearl y permissible, and he never revoked that permission, he canno t complain that the “dog sniff” was illegal.

The s ubsequent search of the interior of Mr. Carrazco’s truck wa s therefore plainly con stitutional. “[T]he police may search an automobile and t he containers within it where they have probable cause to believ e contraband or evidence is contained,” California v. Acevedo , 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), and “[a] dog’s identification of drugs in luggage or in a car provides probable cause that drugs are present.” U.S. v. Bloomfield , 40 F.3d 9 10, 919 (8th Cir. 1994). Hence, after the dogs alerted t o Mr. Carrazco’s truck, the trooper had probable cause to search it. W e therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Carrazco’s motion to suppress.

III. Mr. Carra zco also argues that he should have received a decrease in his base offense level because he was just a “mule.”

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See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. A four-level decrease is warranted if the defendant
was a “minimal participant” in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a)

. A minimal participant is one who is “plainly among the least culpable of tho se involved in the conduct of a group,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, commen t (n.1), su ch as persons who “played no other role in a very large dru g smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or . . . [persons who were] recruited as courier [s] for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n. 2). A two-level decrease in the offense level is warranted if th e defendant was a “mino r participant” in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A “minor participant means any partic ipant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described a s minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n.3). For cases “falling between (a ) and (b),” a three-level decrease is appropriate. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The district court, after hearing Mr. Carrazco's testimony on his role in the offens e, refused to decrease the base offense level, finding tha t Mr. Carrazco had not established his right to a decrease by a preponderanc e of the evidence.
Applying the relevant legal principles to the case at hand, we cannot say that the district court erred in refusing to decrease Mr. Carrazco’s base level. First, Mr. Carrazco had the burden of proving his eligibility for a decrease in the base offense level, see , United States v. Thompson , 60 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1995), and the district court did not have to believe Mr. Carrazco’s testimony that he was just a “mule.” While th e distri ct court did not specifically state that it had rejecte d Mr. Carrazco's self-serving description of his role in the offense, w e believe th at such a rejection is implicit in the court's finding tha t Mr. Carrazco had not carried his burden of proof. Second, even i f Mr. Carrazco was just a “mule,” a downward adjustment would not necessaril y have been warranted: “A defendant’s status as courier

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does not necessarily mean he is less culpable than other participants in a drug operation.” United States v. Williams , 8 90 F.2d 102, 104 (8th Cir. 1989). Although there was evidence to suggest that others may have been paying M r. Carrazco to carry drugs, the record reveals no evidenc e establishing that he was any less culpable than those unidentified actors whose roles were unknown. See id. Third, Mr. C arrazco was apprehended in possession of a very substantial amount of drugs, a circumstance that tend s to suggest that his participation in the criminal enterprise was itsel f very substantial. Since the district court was not obliged to find that Mr. Carrazco was entitled to a two-level decreas e in the offense level, he cannot claim eligibil ity for the others. We therefore detect no error in the district court’s sentence.

IV. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.