May 2005 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

differences are settled, it will be difficult for the United States and 

its major European allies to formulate a serious common strategy or 

to act in unison in crises.

Perhaps the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General will succeed in organizing a deep dialogue from which 

an agreed strategy will emerge. But even in the absence of a new 

grand accord, NATO can accomplish work of grand importance. The 

focus should be on developing a comprehensive, common framework 

for NATO defense capabilities and then proceeding programmatically 

to put real flesh on that framework. The logic is straightforward: 

■ Capabilities for common action are needed, even though this action 

may not always be chosen (for non–Article V contingencies).

■ If and when a common strategy emerges, NATO must have the capabilities to execute it.

■ The United States and its European allies must be able to agree on 

necessary capabilities, even while unable to agree on grand strategy or on 

when and where those capabilities should be used.

This paper proposes a new defense framework for NATO combat forces and other defense capabilities as a guide to force planning, priority-setting, and cooperative programs. The framework 

covers the full spectrum of dangers that Americans and Europeans 

agree exist and the capabilities needed by the Alliance to meet these 

dangers. The framework is capabilities-based, not threat-based, 

meaning that it is predicated on what NATO members think their 

alliance should be able to do, not on predictions of who their enemies might be. The framework has structural integrity in that each 

piece fits with the others, making the whole stronger than the sum 

of the parts. Within this framework, we suggest specific capabilities—some existing, some agreed, and some new. Finally, this article 

suggests how the NATO defense framework should match up with 

the new U.S. military presence in Europe and growing European 

Union (EU) defense efforts.

To some, this agenda may seem overly ambitious for NATO and 

seem to ask too much of the European allies. This is not the case. 

The entire framework includes only about 10 percent of Europe’s 

active military personnel. It mainly involves reorienting forces for 

Overview

Although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on 

political strategies in the Middle East, they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces for future operations 

in that region and elsewhere. If adequate military capabilities are 

lacking, the Alliance will not be able to act even when its political 

leaders agree on the need to do so. But if it creates such capabilities, it will be able to act either ad hoc or across the board if a 

common political strategy eventually were to emerge.

This article proposes a new and comprehensive military 

framework to help guide NATO improvements in the years ahead. 

This framework envisions a pyramid-like structure of future 

NATO forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO 

Special Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and 

assets for defense sector development. The United States would 

provide one-third of the necessary forces, and Europe would be 

responsible for the other two-thirds. For the Europeans, creating 

these forces and capabilities is a viable proposition because they 

require commitment of only 10 percent of their active military 

manpower, plus investments in such affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, 

and other enablers. If NATO succeeds in creating these forces for 

power projection and expeditionary missions, it will possess a 

broad portfolio of assets for a full spectrum of operations against 

such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, and cross-border aggression.

Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic are seeking to overcome 

the discord over the invasion of Iraq and to close ranks to meet a 

daunting set of shared security challenges, from defeating radical 

Islamic terrorism to controlling Iran’s nuclear activities to building 

a free Iraq to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Yet there 

remain deep differences over more basic issues: reliance on the use 

of force, the legitimacy of preemptive war, and whether to foment 

sweeping political change throughout the Middle East. Until these 

A New Military Framework 

for NATO

by Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

M A Y 2 0 0 5

Number 48

Horizons
2 Defense Horizons May 2005

new missions, making them more deployable, network-centric, and 

interoperable—goals that NATO has already embraced. The framework need not be filled out at once; a period of 5 years or more will 

suffice. Thus, it is affordable, practical, and politically feasible, even 

with continuing differences over grand strategy.

A Capabilities-Based Alliance

Since NATO began responding to security dangers outside member 

territory and its traditional area, first in the Balkans and then beyond, 

it has changed from an alliance of commitment to one of choice. During 

the Cold War, the Article V obligation to act in common defense was 

the starting point, and the capabilities to do so followed. Now, the 

main dangers lie outside Europe to the southeast, and members are 

unlikely to be attacked directly. Because of differences in strategic 

outlook and political goals, moreover, there may be not only no obligation

to act together, but also no inclination to do so.

Observers can debate whether current differences reflect a natural, 

structural post–Cold War loosening of U.S.-European solidarity or a 

serious but situational disagreement over the invasion of Iraq. Whichever

the case, if NATO does not build and maintain adequate capabilities, 

it will be able to mount only improvised responses to crises when its 

members choose to act—a recipe for military weakness, indecision, 

and lack of credibility at moments when strength, decisiveness, and 

credibility are most needed. Failure 

to have a complete set of capabilities could invite challenges. Rather 

than neglect capabilities because 

of disunity of purpose, NATO must 

build capabilities to enable action 

when unity exists.

The United States and its 

European allies had a single mode 

for collective action during the Cold 

War. Now, they have several. One is 

formation of an ad hoc coalition for 

an operation that is not ordered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 

and not carried out by the integrated command. Another is an operation that is ordered by the NAC and directed by the integrated command but with forces provided by just a few members. The third is an 

operation ordered by the NAC, directed by the integrated command, 

and composed of forces from many members. The past years have seen 

all three modes employed in such diverse contingencies as Kuwait, 

Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Having all three options provides valuable flexibility; each one is worth having, and each can work, 

but only if it can draw upon well-prepared capabilities.

A strong capabilities-based alliance is possible because of the 

similarity of U.S. and European views on key challenges of the global 

security era, despite disagreement over how to respond to them. 

From these similar views, it is possible to derive the contents of a 

warehouse of defense capabilities. Those we prescribe are:

■ NATO Special Operations Force

■ NATO Response Force

■ NATO High Readiness Forces for major combat operations

■ NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

■ NATO capacity for Defense and Security Sector Development 

for countries in transition.

The Value of Military Accord

Prior to the NATO Istanbul Summit in mid-2004, German 

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urged the Alliance to write a new 

Harmel Report, aimed at finding common ground on Middle East 

policy and strategy.1 Others echoed this idea and called for such a 

report to become the basis for a new NATO strategic concept that 

would reflect agreed principles for action outside Europe, including the Middle East. Meanwhile, despite U.S.–EU and intra-EU 

disagreements over the use of force and policy toward Iraq, the 

European Union issued its own global security assessment, which 

was strikingly similar to that of the United States. Yet because of the 

disagreements, the Istanbul Summit took no important initiatives 

and reached no agreement to forge 

a common strategy for the Middle 

East or set standards for the use of 

military force.2

The United States and 

Europe are not at odds across the 

board. They share many interests 

and goals in the world at large. 

For instance, they have similar 

views on the democratization of 

the former Soviet Union, as their 

united stance on Ukraine’s elections shows. Nor are they wholly polarized on the Middle East, where 

they agree on the need for a democratic Palestinian state and on 

the criticality of secure oil supplies. Approaches to Iran are being 

harmonized. NATO leaders are cooperating in many aspects of the 

war on terrorism and policy toward Afghanistan.

Perhaps the future will produce greater strategic and political 

harmony between the United States and those European countries that 

disagree with its policies on the use of force and in the Middle East. A 

dramatic coming-together could occur, for example, in response to an 

al Qaeda attack on Europe, defeat of the insurgency in Iraq, an IsraeliPalestinian settlement, or success in preventing Iranian production 

of nuclear weapons. A safer assumption is that the United States and 

major European states will continue to agree on some policies and 

crises while disagreeing on others. But again, this condition neither 

precludes nor makes less crucial U.S.-European agreement on the 

capabilities their alliance should possess. The persistence of strategic 

discord need not and ought not block agreement on capabilities.

There is precedent for agreement on capabilities despite disagreement over purpose and policy. In the 1960s, NATO experienced 

strategic divergence and political discord over what to do about the 

Dr. Hans Binnendijk (binnendijkh@ndu.edu) is Director of the Center for the 

Study of Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). Dr. Richard L. Kugler 

(kuglerr@ndu.edu) and Dr. David C. Gompert (gompertd@ndu.edu) are CTNSP 

Distinguished Research Professors.

NATO must 

build capabilities to enable 

action when unity exists
May 2005 Defense Horizons 3

Soviet Union’s nuclear buildup. Whereas the Europeans wanted to 

cling to a strategy of nuclear deterrence, the Americans wanted to 

bolster NATO conventional defenses to lessen reliance on escalation. 

The debate between them raged for years, even after NATO agreed 

in 1967 on the need to be capable of both “forward defense” and 

“flexible response.” What finally softened the debate was progress in 

strengthening military cooperation. As a result, NATO conventional 

forces improved while nuclear capabilities were maintained. The 

Americans became satisfied that the Europeans were truly committed to a better conventional defense, and the Europeans became 

satisfied that the Americans were still committed to a strong nuclear 

deterrent. From this practical agenda of enhanced military cooperation came greater political harmony and strategic coherence, as the 

Alliance pursued a dual agenda of strong defense and arms control.

Again, in the 1980s, the United States and Europe were at loggerheads over how to respond to the Soviet Union’s conventional and 

nuclear military buildup, as well as its invasion of Afghanistan. 

Whereas Washington was calling for a NATO strategy of force buildup 

and counter-pressure, many Europeans favored arms control and 

détente. Without resolving this tension, the Americans and Europeans were able to agree to reconfigure NATO defenses in Central 

Europe for nonlinear combat and to deploy improved nuclear 

missiles in Europe while also pursuing arms control negotiations 

aimed at banishing such nuclear missiles on both sides. As the 1980s 

unfolded, this agenda helped restore Alliance unity and contributed 

to convincing the Soviet Union to end the Cold War.

Today, notwithstanding political debates that have raged across 

the Atlantic, a roughly common view on required NATO capabilities 

has quietly emerged. This is evident in NATO pursuit of the Prague 

Capability Commitment and the NATO Response Force, both of 

which were adopted at the Prague Summit of 2002 and reaffirmed at 

Istanbul in 2004. Despite public impressions that the United States 

has lost interest in the Alliance, Washington led the way toward 

adoption of the Prague and Istanbul defense programs. Moreover, 

many European countries that disagree with U.S. policy on Iraq 

do agree on defense requirements. France is among the leaders in 

European military transformation, and Germany is now pursuing a 

parallel effort. Although the European Union is trying to create its 

own military forces, it is not proposing to reduce its reliance upon 

NATO for most warfighting missions and is eager for cooperation 

with NATO defense planners.

Alliance agreement on a 

comprehensive framework of 

needed capabilities could contribute to convergence on strategy 

and restoration of mutual confidence. Success at building better European military forces for such a framework will alter the 

conditions for determining military responses to crises. European 

governments will not be averse to military action just because they 

lack the capability to act. The United States will have an incentive 

to seek multilateral action rather than to act unilaterally because 

its European allies lack usable capabilities.

NATO Military Progress and Shortfalls

News media have focused on intramural Alliance political 

disputes and largely overlooked the military progress of the past 2 

years. The Prague Summit decisions to reorganize the NATO military 

command, to create a new “Allied Transformation Command,” and to 

field the NATO Response Force were critical because they opened 

new avenues for military preparedness and multilateral cooperation. 

These have not been the only important steps. During 2003–2004, 

the Alliance:

■ reformed its force-planning process to enable creation of adequate 

capabilities for new missions

■ conducted exercises that have helped its military forces prepare for 

new missions

■ launched a program to improve communications through use of Italian, French, and British satellite constellations

■ initiated studies to create defenses against missile threats to Europe

■ endorsed a “Program of Work for Defense against Terrorism,” which 

comprises eight high-priority armaments directives in such areas as protecting harbors, detecting use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), enhancing intelligence, and performing consequence management

■ completed creating the “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Defense Battalion”

■ signed a long-delayed contract to buy a new air-to-ground surveillance system

■ improved its strategic sealift by creating a Sealift Coordination Center 

and signing an agreement to gain commitment of several roll-on/roll-off 

(RO/RO) cargo ships from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway.3

Meanwhile, NATO also expanded its military operations outside 

its new borders. While it has completed its original stability mission 

in Bosnia and transferred main responsibility for peacekeeping to 

the EU, it retains a military headquarters in Sarajevo to assist the 

country with defense reform and to support the European Union 

Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It continues to perform major 

peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, the fate of which remains unsettled. After initially being embarrassed by its inability to act decisively 

in Afghanistan, NATO subsequently agreed to take command of 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there, and to 

deploy Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams to the western countryside; 

ISAF today stands at about 8,000 

troops. In Iraq, NATO has agreed 

to an expanded role in training 

Iraqi forces.

Thus, recent defense measures show that NATO is capable 

of step-by-step progress toward 

upgrading its forces for new missions, and recent operations show 

that NATO is willing to use its forces ad hoc. Still, there are two significant discrepancies. First, there is no agreed framework covering 

the entirety of needed capabilities—a gap this article aims to fill. 

Second, the European allies need to prioritize their defense expenditures—an effort this article may help to illuminate.

recent defense measures 

show that NATO is capable 

of step-by-step progress
4 Defense Horizons May 2005

Critics complain about the inability of European militaries to 

produce more personnel for missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, 

and Iraq. These limitations reflect the extent to which many European military forces remain largely tailored for continental defense 

missions, even though the saliency of these missions has largely 

vanished. To protect Europe, NATO still needs forces in such areas 

as air and maritime defense, missile defense, and counterterrorism. 

But it no longer needs large numbers of ground and air forces configured for campaigns against massive invasion. While some progress 

has been made, most European militaries still lack the capacity to 

project sizable forces rapidly outside the continent. In a fast-breaking emergency, they could draw upon Britain and France to deploy, 

at most, 60,000 troops, far fewer than the United States can project. 

In slower-moving situations, they can perform better; some 56,000 

European troops are stationed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 

Even then, however, their manpower policies limit the size of their 

rotational base, which constrains the number of troops that can be 

kept abroad for long periods. As a result, European militaries claim 

that they cannot handle far bigger deployments than now, even 

though they have about 2.4 million active-duty troops, which is far 

more than the U.S. total of 1.4 million troops, 340,000 of which are 

stationed abroad, including in Iraq. A fair estimate is that, whereas 

the United States could deploy overseas about 700,000 service 

personnel from all branches over a period of 3 to 6 months, Europe 

could deploy at most 150,000.

Despite the deterioration in security conditions, especially in and 

arising from the Middle East, most European defense budgets have 

not grown, and investment budgets have been starved. Yet as NATO 

military authorities have argued, retiring many excess forces no longer 

needed for border defense could liberate substantial funds. These 

funds could be plowed into investments to create network-centric 

forces for expeditionary missions and for operating with U.S. forces. 

Simply put, ample resources exist to meet comprehensive NATO capabilities requirements, if those resources are properly allocated.

Challenges and Dangers of the Early 21st Century

The allocation of defense resources should, of course, reflect 

the assessment of the security environment. For all their differences over policies on the use of force and Middle East strategy, the 

Atlantic democracies more or less agree on the nature of the main 

security dangers in the current era. Broadly stated, there is a common view that, from Africa to South Asia, many states are plagued by 

poor development prospects, illegitimate governments, lack of connectivity to the world economy, religious radicalism and strife, and 

unfriendly neighbors. Further, Alliance members agree that these 

conditions have given rise to both strategic terrorism and an appetite for weapons of mass destruction. These developments threaten 

the surrounding regions, the dependability of world oil supplies, and 

Western societies. Consequently, most NATO members and partners 

recognize the importance of promoting political-economic transformation in this geographic swath, employing force when necessary to 

safeguard peace and protect vital interests, and setting the conditions for stability and reconstruction when conflict does occur.

Within this generally agreed assessment of security trends in the world 

beyond Europe, there is consensus on certain dangers and challenges:4

■ terrorism that aspires to global reach and harm

■ proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical WMD in the hands of 

countries and terrorist groups willing to use them

■ proliferation of conventional weapons and information technologies 

that, along with WMD, support asymmetric strategies aimed at countering U.S. 

and allied military force operations

■ rogue governments that oppress their own people and are poised to commit aggression against their neighbors and otherwise menace entire regions

■ state-to-state rivalries that produce military competition, threaten to 

erupt into war, and create a climate of fear and distrust throughout their regions

■ ethnic tensions and radical ideologies that foster violence

■ growing potential for state failures, thereby creating domestic turbulence and mass migration

■ failing states that provide sanctuaries for terrorists and organized crime

■ ethnic, sectarian, and separatist instability and violence stretching from 

Africa through the Middle East and into South and Southeast Asia

■ mass killing of civilians, especially in sub-Saharan Africa

■ in parts of Africa and Asia, stalled economic and political development, 

caused in part by exclusion from world markets, producing social anxiety 

in a setting of fast population growth, poverty, urbanization, and ineffective 

governments

■ absence of democratic governance and economic progress in an era of 

global communications, high public awareness, rising standards of expectation, 

and growing frustrations

■ rising demands for fossil fuels, natural gas, and water, coupled with 

growing environmental degradation.

Although there have been and remain U.S.-European differences 

over the role of military power in tackling these problems and the 

conditions in which the use of force is justified, both Europeans and 

Americans realize that power and force have roles to play but cannot 

be predominant. To suggest that the United States regards force as its 

policy instrument of choice is as wrong as to suggest that Europeans will 

not use force under any circumstances. In general, both favor policies 

and efforts aimed at ameliorating hostility and fulfilling aspirations for 

prosperity and freedom, thus reducing reliance on military instruments.

A New Framework for NATO Defense Capacity

In the face of this agreed assessment of dangers, a multidimensional concept of security is both needed and possible. U.S. and 

European forces will need to be fully prepared for major combat 

operations that could cover a wide spectrum of missions and geographic locations. They also have to be prepared for many other 

missions, such as limited intervention, conflict prevention, crisis 

management, consequence management, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, postconflict occupation, stabilization and 

reconstruction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, partnership building, and the creation of democratically accountable and 

capable military establishments. This wide spectrum of new-era 

missions will require military forces of diverse skills and capabilities 
May 2005 Defense Horizons 5

that extend considerably beyond the traditional mission of deterring 

and fighting major wars.

In addition, the very way of thinking about requirements must 

change. The challenges ahead cannot be reduced to a small set of 

predictable contingencies for which U.S. and European forces can be 

optimized. Recognizing this, current U.S. defense strategy calls for 

capabilities-based planning to create a diverse portfolio of military 

assets that are modular and scalable and that provide high degrees 

of flexibility, adaptability, and agility. Increasingly, NATO and European military commanders are coming to the same conclusion.

Likewise, U.S., NATO, and European commanders are adopting similar views on military transformation. Nearly all agree that transformation 

should focus on blending advanced networks, sensors, munitions, modern 

weapons, and new logistic support to create forces attuned to military 

operations of the information age, which are radically different from those 

of the industrial age. They also agree on the need to prevent a big “transformation gap” from emerging between U.S. and European forces that would 

prevent them from operating closely together. While they recognize that 

U.S. forces will remain ahead of many European forces in the transformation process, they aspire to accelerate transformation of European forces 

so they will be capable of working alongside U.S. forces, with common 

information networks, in future operations across the entire spectrum.

Finally, military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic agree on the 

nature of military operations. Although U.S. forces are already prepared 

for many expeditionary missions, European forces must increasingly 

acquire the assets for power-projection and force operations that are 

needed to perform these and other missions. If they strive to do so, the 

consequence might be European forces that may be smaller but that are 

tailored to perform many missions in partnership with U.S. forces. Transatlantic agreement on these important matters provides a solid foundation for a new strategic framework for NATO-wide force improvements.

To help guide NATO defense planning, this paper proposes an integrated, five-tiered defense pyramid of forces, capabilities, and assets for 

new-era missions (figure 1). In each category, NATO will need to establish appropriate goals for forces and capabilities, assess existing assets 

against these goals, and design programs to achieve them. This pyramid is 

a useful tool to help NATO see the whole as well as constituent parts and 

their relationships. Its key point is that being prepared for future missions 

requires a broad portfolio of multiple, different assets, not a one-dimensional military configured for a single type of warfare.

Each tier of the pyramid identifies military assets required for 

specific types of new-era missions. At the top of the pyramid are 

relatively small forces for sudden, demanding, quick-response operations. They include a new NATO Special Operations Force (NSOF) 

and the NATO Response Force (NRF), already in train. In the middle 

of the pyramid is the largest component, the NATO High Readiness 

Forces (HRF) for sustained major combat operations. Improvements 

to these forces should focus on a limited set of divisions and brigades, 

fighter wings, and naval strike groups, provided with the information 

networks, joint warfighting assets, logistic support, and transport 

needed for expeditionary missions against significant opponents. 

One tier down is a new NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force 

(NSRF) for the mission of occupying territory, stabilizing postconflict 

settings, and helping begin the task of reconstructing countries with 

functioning governments and economies. At the bottom of the pyramid 

are assets—largely human and institutional—for the mission of NATO 

Defense and Security Sector Development (NDSSD), helping foreign 

militaries and other security institutions modernize, democratize, 

and improve their performance. 

Today NATO has formally assigned assets in only two of these 

five categories, the NRF and HRF. In our view, NATO will be sufficiently endowed for future missions only if it has adequate forces 

and capabilities in all five areas. NATO forces, for example, could 

be used sequentially. A crisis intervention could begin with use of 

the NSOF for targeting enemy positions, as occurred in the early 

stages of the invasion of Afghanistan. Next, NATO could deploy 

the brigade-size NRF to establish a foothold, defeat access-denial 

threats, and conduct initial strikes. Then, NATO could deploy the 

larger HRF to conduct major combat operations aimed at winning 

the contest in this key stage of warfighting. Afterward, NATO could 

deploy the NSRF, which would work alongside the HRF to stabilize 

the situation and begin reconstruction until peace is restored and 

civilian assets can be deployed to complete the reconstruction 

phase. At this juncture, NATO assets for the NDSSD could begin 

helping the new government to preserve safety and security while 

building democracy.

Such a sequential process is not the only or even most likely 

way that these NATO forces and capabilities could be employed. 

Instead, they could be used individually or in a combination suited 

to the situation. For example, some situations might require only 

the NSOF, or NSOF forces and the NRF, followed by commitment 

of the NSRF. Other combinations are equally possible. Moreover, 

peacetime relationships with many foreign countries might involve 

only the use of NATO assets for defense sector development, in a 

manner reflecting how the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) has 

 Figure 1. A NATO Framework of Future Forces and 

 Capabilities for Expeditionary Missions
6 Defense Horizons May 2005

been carried out with many European countries. For this reason, 

the pyramid of forces and capabilities must be modular and scalable. NATO must be capable of tailoring packages to meet the 

unique requirements of each situation. A NATO defense pyramid of 

such assets, which cover a wide spectrum and are capable of being 

combined in many ways, will provide the flexibility and adaptability 

needed for a wide range of possible futures. This pyramid will ensure 

that when NATO political leaders decide to act collectively, they will 

have the full set of forces and capabilities at their disposal.

Building the Pyramid

As the ancient Egyptians could attest, it is one thing to draw a 

pyramid and quite another to build one. To be prepared for all five 

types of missions, NATO will need to be able to draw upon both U.S. 

and European forces. As a general rule, the United States might provide one-third of the military commitments and Europe two-thirds. 

In order to make progress in the 

coming years on building a wellstocked military warehouse, European NATO members will need 

to focus their limited investment 

funds on program priorities that 

can yield high-leverage returns 

in the form of enhanced, usable 

forces and capabilities. All five of 

these areas are appropriate for investment as well as other forceimprovement efforts, such as developing new doctrines, creating 

new structures, and establishing new employment practices. The 

necessary steps are modest and will not unduly strain the NATO and 

European capacity to pursue them. The following discussion moves 

from the top of this pyramid to the base.5

NATO Special Operations Force6

National special operations forces (SOF) have proven their high 

value because of their many uses. SOF can be used to conduct surgical 

attacks on terrorist camps, help train foreign militaries in counterterrorist operations, free hostages, destroy obstacles and threats, and 

conduct surveillance behind enemy lines. As fighting in Afghanistan 

and Iraq shows, they can use lasers and global positioning system 

devices to spot enemy targets, and then transmit the information to air 

forces to achieve precision strikes. Special operations forces are light, 

lethal, small, mobile, well trained, and superbly conditioned. Because 

they are easily networked with other forces, they can be powerful force 

multipliers. In addition, SOF are highly flexible and adaptable.

Some years ago, the United States took the step of creating 

a new Special Operations Command for SOF, with a formal headquarters and staff, forces assigned from all services, and a separate 

budgeting program aimed at funding their unique requirements. 

This step has yielded strategic dividends, particularly in combating 

terrorism. Pressures are mounting to enlarge SOF assets because of 

their capacity to perform so many important missions and to work 

closely with other forces, including large ground and air forces conducting major combat operations. NATO and Europe would be well 

served by a similar capability.

Most European militaries grasp the value of SOF, and many 

have well-trained SOF units in their ranks, such as the fabled British 

Special Air Service. But these national units are not organized into 

a multilateral entity that could operate under NATO command. A 

new SOF command could be built upon existing U.S.-UK-French SOF 

units imbedded in Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and on SOF 

units operating in Afghanistan.

There is much to be gained by sharing know-how through multilateral training and exercises. Beyond this, most contingencies in 

which NATO allies may operate together will require SOF. While such 

forces often operate in small groups and in isolation, much can be 

gained by improving their interoperability in such areas as communications and networking, doctrine, tactics, weapons, and logistics. 

British and French SOF, for example, should be able to work together 

using information networking to guide precision strikes of American, 

German, and Italian aircraft.

What steps should NATO 

take to capitalize on this opportunity? An attractive possibility is 

to create an NSOF command with 

responsibility for the coordination 

of Alliance-wide SOF goals and collaborative programs. This would 

require multinational agreements 

on intelligence sharing and other 

matters. Despite national sensitivities, such agreements can be forged. The actual NSOF should 

have a small inner core and a larger outer network. The inner 

core could be as small as 300 troops, with specialized technology, 

including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), focused on one or two 

vital missions, such as counterterrorism and counter-WMD. This 

inner core would be formally assigned to NATO, highly integrated, 

stationed at one location, and composed of rotating national SOF 

units. It would have uniform equipment and procedures and be 

ready to deploy within 72 hours.

Surrounding this inner core would be a larger, looser outer 

network of SOF assets from many nations that would perform such 

other missions as fire support, infiltration, intelligence gathering, 

hostage rescue, peacetime advising of new partners, civil affairs, 

and psychological operations. The SOF assets of this outer network 

need not be collocated, but they would form a networked posture, 

and they must meet NATO standards and be available for commitment when the need arises.

The entire posture of inner core and outer network likely would 

include no more than 1,000 troops, which could be one-third U.S. 

forces and two-thirds European. Although an NSOF would not be a big 

consumer of logistic support and airlift, it must have assets that enable 

it to move quickly and sustain itself at long distances. In addition, it 

would need UAVs, some gunships, and other specialized assets. 

Such a two-part NSOF offers the potential to add significantly 

to the NATO warehouse of usable capabilities. Ample national 

SOF already exist, so additional forces do not have to be created, 

nor do individual skills have to be greatly improved. The cost of 

an NSOF headquarters, training facilities, new equipment, and 

exercises would be modest, and certainly much less than the NRF. 

a NATO defense pyramid will 

provide the flexibility and 

adaptability for a wide range 

of possible futures
May 2005 Defense Horizons 7

This proposal could be adopted at a NATO ministerial session and 

implemented in a few years. Within a short time, NATO would have a 

superbly trained NSOF that could operate independently or with the 

NRF and other NATO forces. Alliance capacity to handle situations 

demanding swift application of small amounts of SOF power would 

be greatly enhanced.

NATO Response Force

Approved at the Prague Summit in 2002, the NRF speedily 

reached initial operational capability in fall 2004, and is now 

undergoing tests and exercises to develop its capabilities. It will 

reach full operational capability in 2006, well ahead of its original 

schedule. Currently, it is composed of about 17,000 troops; by 2006, 

it will have its full complement of ground forces and reach its target 

of about 20,000 troops. The NRF is an elite, joint force configured 

for high-tech strike operations. 

It will be available within 5 to 

30 days and will have 1 month of 

staying power before replenishment is needed. It can be used on 

its own, or it can be a spearhead 

for larger NATO forces. It is to be 

composed of one ground brigade, 

plus commensurate air and naval 

forces, and backed by the mobility forces and logistic support 

assets needed to operate far beyond European borders.7

The NRF is a rotating force drawn from NATO’s High Readiness Forces. At any time, one contingent of 20,000 troops will be on 

duty, in high readiness status for 6 months; another will be standing 

down from recent duty; and another will be preparing for future 

duty. Membership in the NRF is open to all NATO members. Multiple countries, including France, are participating enthusiastically. 

For example, in late 2004, the NRF consisted of naval units from 

the United Kingdom, plus ground and air forces from the southern 

region. The rotational nature of the NRF means that a dozen or more 

nations can participate significantly over a 2-year period. Over a 

longer period, all NATO members will be able to participate if their 

forces and assets meet NRF standards. High-level command of the 

NRF is being rotated among the NATO Joint Force Commands in 

Brunssum and Naples and its Joint Headquarters in Lisbon. In a 

contingency, the NRF is to be led by a Deployable Joint Task Force. 

During 2003–2004, NRF 1 and 2 were activated as prototypes and test 

beds. Certification and evaluation are taking place during NRF 3 and 

4 (2004–2005.) Full operational capability will be reached during 

NRF 5 and NRF 6 (2005–2006.)

For all of its progress, full NRF development cannot be taken 

for granted. Indeed, senior NATO officials must carefully monitor 

its evolution to ensure that it does not fall short of its promise. Part 

of the challenge comes from meeting its dual-purpose agenda. The 

NRF was intended not only to be an operationally ready strike force, 

but also to be at the cutting edge of NATO transformation in ways 

that send ripple effects to other European forces. For this purpose, 

it needs not only modern weapons but also advanced information 

networks, sensors and munitions, joint doctrine and training, and 

mobility assets. Fulfilling both agendas does not come naturally. 

The demands of operational readiness can discourage experimentation with new weapons, doctrines, and structures. Many of these 

transformational purposes can be accomplished before assigned 

units combine to form the NRF and during the 6-month period when 

they are undergoing training for duty. Even so, a careful balancing 

act will be needed to ensure that neither operational readiness nor 

transformation is neglected.

Equally important, the NRF cannot be “a force for all seasons.” 

While it was originally intended to be a high-tech strike force for use 

in combat, the natural tendency (already evident in official NATO 

documents) is to use it for other purposes, including peacekeeping, hostage rescue, noncombatant evacuation, embargo operations, 

security for events such as the Olympics, counterterrorist operations, and stabilization and reconstruction missions. Here, too, a 

balancing act will be necessary. 

If the NRF tries to be capable of 

performing all of these missions, it 

is likely to be proficient at none of 

them, including crisis response and 

high-tech strike missions. If NATO 

needs additional quick-response 

forces for a wider spectrum of missions, it should create them (for 

example, the NSOF) and allow the 

NRF to focus on its main purpose.

Finally, the NRF was intended to be mainly a European force, 

but it cannot be exclusively European. Initially, the United States 

played a low-profile role because it wanted the Europeans to take 

the lead in creating the NRF. Now that this goal has been accomplished, the United States must make regular contributions to NRF 

rotating combat forces. U.S. contributions are expected to increase 

during prototypes NRF 5 and 6, and thereafter. The United States 

must also provide help in such areas as advanced command, control, 

comunications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) networks, airlift, and logistic support until the 

Europeans become self-sufficient in these areas. Initially, some 

Europeans criticized the United States for not participating enough 

in the NRF, but this problem appears headed toward solution.

NATO High Readiness Forces

Analyses of defense priorities for new-era missions often gloss 

over NATO main combat formations, the HRF for major deployment for defense under Article V or crisis response operations. 

The reason normally is a set of erroneous assumptions: that HRF 

forces for major combat operations are irrelevant for expeditionary missions outside Europe, or already are adequate for the task, 

or are too hard and expensive to reform. Ignoring these forces 

would be shortsighted because they may well be called upon for 

expeditionary missions that cannot be handled by the NRF. NATO 

concepts call for a brigade-size NRF deployment to be reinforced 

by a corps-size CJTF when operations expand in terms of opposition or geographic scope. The HRF is also intended to provide for 

rotational depth for long-term operations. Indeed, they were used 

in the Kosovo war, and today are being used in the Balkans and 

a two-part NSOF offers the 

potential to add significantly 

to the NATO warehouse of 

usable capabilities
8 Defense Horizons May 2005

Afghanistan for peace enforcement. At present, much of the HRF 

is not adequately capable of projecting power swiftly and performing major combat operation missions in distant areas. Reforming 

these forces is not beyond reach. The NATO Defense Capability 

Initiative did not achieve this worthy goal because it was scattered 

across too many forces and measures, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment evidently is encountering similar troubles. But 

NATO can succeed if it focuses on a small set of HRF units that 

are earmarked for overseas deployment, and improves them with 

high-leverage, affordable programs. Once again, the United States 

should provide about one-third of the troops for HRF for major 

combat operations outside Europe.

NATO today suffers from no lack of European HRF for major 

combat operation missions. HRF have a readiness status that calls 

upon them to be available within 90 days of call-up. Other NATO 

forces are Forces of Lower Readiness, available within 90 to 180 days, 

and Long-Term Buildup Forces, available after 365 days. Current 

HRF troops can be divided into two categories: many are “in-place 

forces” for local use, but some are “deployable forces” that ostensibly 

can be used for operations beyond their immediate locales. (See 

table 1.) The ground forces and command structures that fall into 

the latter category are products of history and strategic logic. In the 

early 1990s, NATO created a single 

corps headquarters for ground 

missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which was designed to 

command three to four divisions. 

Later, it designated five additional 

corps headquarters as operationally ready commands to provide 

for concurrent contingencies and 

rotational duties: the GermanDutch Corps, the Eurocorps, and 

one corps each from Italy, Turkey, and Spain. Today, if one or more 

of these corps headquarters is called upon to deploy outside Europe 

for major combat operations as the land component of a NATO CJTF, 

in theory they could draw upon an estimated pool of 12 active divisions (or the equivalent in brigades) provided by multiple countries. 

Joining these ground forces are fighter wings that provide about 500 

to 600 combat aircraft, and about 100 combat ships in NATO Task 

Groups. By any measure, this is a sizable pool of joint forces that 

totals 400,000 to 500,000 military personnel.8 The problem is that 

while most of these ground forces can operate on the European continent, they lack the logistic support and lift needed to deploy outside 

Europe quickly. As a practical matter, the Europeans today could 

rapidly deploy only one or two of these divisions to long distances.

How many of these forces does NATO really need to be well 

prepared for expeditionary missions outside Europe? NATO military 

commanders contend that they must be capable of responding 

to multiple concurrent contingencies (for example, two major 

combat operation missions and a peacekeeping mission). While 

this requires three NATO CJTF headquarters, it no longer requires 

the massive combat forces of the past. In current less-demanding 

contingencies and information networking for joint operations, 

relatively small forces can perform most missions. NATO will be 

adequately prepared if, in addition to units assigned to the NRF, it 

has a rapidly deployable European force of 5 to 6 divisions (15–18 

brigades), 275 to 325 combat aircraft, and 50 to 60 naval combatants. These European forces will join with still-substantial U.S. 

military commitments of one to two divisions, plus air and naval 

assets (discussed below), to create a powerful NATO capacity for 

expeditionary warfare. Such a posture might not meet all plausible 

requirements in the eyes of NATO military commanders, but it 

would roughly triple European capacity for power projection, and 

it would put Europe into the ballpark of being able to work closely 

with the United States in expeditionary missions.

NATO can easily field this 

number of European forces by 

drawing upon one-half of its existing pool of “deployable” HRF units. 

Most of the forces in this pool, 

however, are not truly deployable 

outside Europe. Their problems 

are threefold: they cannot travel 

swiftly to long distances, sustain 

themselves for long periods, or 

achieve adequate interoperability 

with U.S. forces. While these problems especially apply to ground 

forces, they also are serious impediments to many air and naval 

forces. Fixing these problems should be a main NATO agenda. The 

task does not promise to be prohibitively expensive—that is, if NATO 

focuses only on this limited set of forces, rather than squandering 

resources on other forces and priorities. These HRF units are already 

fully manned and regularly train and exercise at proper levels for 

proficiency in combat. As a general rule, they also are well armed, 

with modern weapons systems and a growing number of smart munitions and sensors. Some new acquisition programs will be needed, 

but not enough to bankrupt European defense budgets, if savings are 

found elsewhere or parliaments begin funding annual real increases 

in spending. Some NATO members will be better able to contribute 

because their forces are generally well armed and modern, but other 

countries can participate by contributing combat units or support 

assets in niche areas.

A NATO improvement program should begin with information 

networks, which are vital to carrying out joint operations that blend 

ground, naval, and air forces. Fortunately, the Europeans are already 

well along in this enterprise as a result of recent decisions to acquire 

a set of tactical and strategic systems for intelligence, wide-bandwidth communications, and management of operations. The Europemuch of the HRF 

is not adequately capable of 

projecting power swiftly

 Table 1. European Divisions Available to NATO*

Total Divisions 57

HRF Divisions 25 

“Deployable” HRF Divisions 12**

* Unofficial estimates by authors drawing on open sources, including The Military Balance 2003–2004

 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003). 

**Total is 36 brigades, or 12 division-equivalents.
May 2005 Defense Horizons 9

ans are not aspiring to the U.S. standard of network-centric warfare, 

but they are aiming for “network-enabled warfare” or a similar 

concept, with networks that are fairly sophisticated and, above all, 

that can plug into U.S. networks to permit combined U.S.-European 

operations. The Europeans likely will achieve this standard in a few 

years, but NATO will need to ensure that new national networks can 

be integrated to form multinational networks and that European and 

U.S. networks are fully interoperable.

In addition, a NATO improvement program should focus on 

creating new structures for deployable High Readiness Forces. Modern ground operations are transitioning from their earlier emphasis 

on divisions to a growing emphasis on brigades. In the U.S. Army, 

for example, many combat and support assets formerly assigned to 

the division commander are being dispersed to his three brigades. 

The goal is to create brigade combat teams with the full set of 

assets needed to operate independently on the battlefield, miles 

from each other, and without looking to higher echelons for help. 

Because such brigades will be highly modular and adaptable, different combinations of light, medium, and heavy units can be quickly 

packaged to handle a spectrum of situations. Air forces are undergoing similar changes. In the U.S. Air Force, the emphasis is on the 

packaging of fighter aircraft, bombers, airborne warning and control 

systems, joint surveillance target 

attack radar systems, electronic 

warfare aircraft, and other support 

aircraft to create self-contained 

units for expeditionary warfare. 

The same practice of force packaging applies to naval warfare, where 

the U.S. Navy has blended carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, submarines, and 

support ships to create formations 

for expeditionary operations.

NATO and European militaries should carefully study these 

changes being pursued by the U.S. military, not because they are 

“made in America,” but because they make operational sense on the 

modern battlefield. Indeed, some European militaries are already 

pursuing them by creating independent brigades. European HRF 

need not mimic U.S. forces in the particulars. If they adopt similar 

concepts, they will go a long way toward making the transition from 

old-style continental operations, in which force components fought 

separately, to new-style expeditionary missions, in which all components are not only well structured but can also fight jointly.

If new European force structures are to be capable of fighting alongside U.S. forces, they must be equipped with the array of 

assets needed for major combat operations in the information age, 

which are complex and fast-paced. Rather than bludgeon the enemy 

through battlefield-wide attrition, they endeavor to fracture enemy 

cohesion through rapid maneuver and precise delivery of firepower. 

They require forces to operate simultaneously rather than sequentially, and to disperse widely rather than mass at central locations. 

European forces possess some of the assets needed for such operations, but not yet all of them. Acquiring the rest must be a goal of procurement plans that focus, first and foremost, on equipping the limited set of forces being prepared for expeditionary warfare. Equally 

important, the Europeans will need to strengthen all three components of ground, naval, and air forces, rather than emphasizing one 

to the exclusion of the others. This especially holds true for integrating ground and air forces so that they can work closely together; thus 

far, Europeans have devoted less effort than Americans to employing 

air forces to contribute to ground battles. Many European countries 

do not have large navies, but such countries as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have modern navies that are blue-water capable and 

can be used for joint expeditionary missions.

An emphasis on all three components of ground, naval, and air 

forces is necessary because they play important roles in expeditionary warfare, interact considerably in joint operations, and depend 

on each other. In order to conduct expeditionary warfare and joint 

operations, modular and adaptable European ground forces should 

field a mixture of heavy, medium, and light units that are equipped 

with a combination of weapon systems for direct fires, indirect fires, 

and standoff fires at long distances. Emphasis is shifting from heavy 

armor to lightweight armor, but all vehicles must have the firepower, 

survivability, and tactical mobility to defeat well-armed opponents. 

Because of growing ground-air interactions, European air forces 

must be capable of not only defending their airspace but also contributing to land battles by fielding assets for all-weather/day-night 

operations, precision strikes, and 

close air support. Modern aircraft 

are necessary, but so are sensors, 

munitions, and support assets. 

European naval forces must be 

capable of both defending the seas 

and carrying out littoral operations and launching cruise missiles 

as part of the joint campaign in 

support of ground and air forces. European warships typically are 

smaller and less well armed than U.S. counterparts, but they often 

possess important capabilities in such areas as countermine warfare 

and littoral patrolling. Britain’s plan to acquire larger aircraft carriers is an example of efforts that can help transform European navies 

for expeditionary warfare.

For all three components, NATO needs to determine the 

European forces and capabilities that will be needed for new-era 

missions. It should next assess existing European assets and make 

judgments about where additional capabilities are needed to close 

existing gaps, and then communicate appropriate force goals and 

priorities to European members for the crafting of appropriate 

programs and budgets under NATO guidance. Keeping a tight 

focus on critical High Readiness Forces, capability requirements, 

and program priorities will be essential. What must be avoided is 

the past tendency to scatter improvement efforts across the entire 

European force posture, including stationary units that are not 

intended for deployment missions. Indeed, the Europeans could 

save money for investments in deployable HRF by disbanding sizable numbers of other forces or moving them into reserve status. At 

a minimum, stationary forces should not be targets for expensive 

modernization any time soon.

a NATO improvement 

program should begin with 

information networks
10 Defense Horizons May 2005

Finally, a NATO improvement program must remedy shortfalls 

in mobility assets and logistic support. NATO has been working on 

these two problems for several years, but much remains to be done. 

For example, the recent agreement to secure commitment of 10 

RO/RO ships from various nations is helpful, but movement of a 

single division could require 20 cargo ships. An inexpensive solution 

is access to more cargo ships and wide-bodied air transports from 

Ukraine or the commercial sector. Likewise, NATO combat forces 

need multinational logistic support that is tailored to the unique 

demands of expeditionary warfare. Logistic support is critical for 

expeditionary operations because combat forces must be self-sustainable: they cannot draw upon their European economies or local 

economies in underdeveloped countries. The solution is not to create ponderous support structures composed of many truck transport, 

supply, and maintenance units coupled with huge stocks of war 

reserves. Instead, the solution is to take advantage of such new-era 

concepts as just-in-time and sense-and-respond logistics to create 

lean support structures that can deploy quickly and get the job done 

proficiently. The practice of fielding multinational logistic structures, rather than purely national structures, has many attractions. 

It will enable countries to specialize in niche areas of comparative 

advantage and permit efficient use 

of resources, thereby reducing the 

size and weight of logistic support 

assets and increasing their speed 

of deployment. Multinational logistic systems can reduce by one-half 

the manpower and stocks that otherwise would have to be deployed 

for logistic support.

In summary, creating better 

HRF units for expeditionary missions and major combat operations is not only important, but also 

a realistic proposition as long as NATO focuses on a small set of 

forces—an approach that has worked for the NRF and can work for 

the HRF. This agenda cannot be accomplished overnight. But over 

the course of a few years, a great deal can be done to transform 

Europe into a serious participant in power projection and major 

expeditionary warfare by 2010. The tasks of acquiring modern information networks, creating new force structures, fielding a diverse 

array of assets, securing sealift and airlift support from the commercial sector, and creating streamlined logistic support may be 

complex, but they do not require huge spending of scarce investment 

funds. While some new acquisition programs will be needed, this 

agenda mainly requires organized effort, multilateral cooperation, 

and a capacity to innovate. Thus far, the Europeans have not shown 

the necessary willpower to overcome barriers, but in recent years, 

they have been making encouraging progress. If they are willing to 

pursue the remaining measures, NATO can provide a forum for them 

to succeed in a relatively short period.

NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq make clear that 

expeditionary operations often do not end once major combat is 

concluded. When long occupation or presence follows, the task 

becomes one of stabilization and reconstruction, which helps 

guide the transition from battlefield victory to enduring peace. 

Stabilization refers to the process of ending the resistance of 

enemy forces, insurgents, terrorists, rebellious political activists, 

and common criminals. Reconstruction refers to the process of 

restoring a functioning government, society, and economy. The 

stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) process is intended to 

lay a solid foundation for a longer-term effort aimed at building 

democratic governments, civil societies, and functioning market 

economies. S&R missions often are anything but easy; they can 

involve prolonged low-intensity fighting against insurgents even 

as efforts are under way to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and to 

create new governmental institutions. Nor is success guaranteed: 

as of this writing, Afghanistan seems headed toward a favorable 

outcome, but the fate of Iraq is hanging in the balance. The enduring lesson is that much depends upon the effectiveness of the S&R 

operation, including its strategy and implementation.9

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States and its 

European allies tried to perform S&R missions by re-roling their 

military forces—that is, they endeavored to switch their forces 

from combat operations to S&R 

tasks. This transition has proven 

to be difficult because combat 

forces lack a full measure of the 

unique assets needed for reconstruction—military police, civilmilitary affairs, civil administrators, medical aid, civil engineers, 

construction teams, psychological 

operations, and specialists capable of speedily processing contracts with commercial businesses. For example, a combat engineer battalion will possess the assets needed to create defensive 

positions, keep roads open, and clear battlefields of mines. But it 

may lack the S&R assets needed to repair damaged office buildings, reconnect electrical power grids, and restore sewage and 

water systems. The same applies to medical care. While military 

units will have the capacity to care for troops wounded in battle, 

they may lack a comparable ability to contain infectious diseases 

among large populations, to distribute drugs and other supplies 

across a large countryside, and to run civilian hospitals in damaged urban areas. For these reasons, even combat service support 

units cannot always be re-roled to perform S&R missions.

Because re-roling has proven to be a shaky practice for 

reconstruction missions, a major implication is that the U.S. 

military should organize special assets for quickly performing S&R 

missions even as major combat is giving way to fighting against 

insurgents. Equally important, NATO and the European militaries 

should be prepared for S&R missions too. Senior NATO military 

authorities are aware of this need, and some European countries, 

such as Italy and Germany, are beginning to reshape their forces 

for S&R missions. But not enough countries are doing so, and even 

if robust national efforts were under way, they would need to be 

brought together into multilateral formations to forge their capaexpeditionary operations 

often do not end once major 

combat is concluded
May 2005 Defense Horizons 11

bilities into a cohesive whole. While many details must be studied 

carefully, NATO should perform this integrating function.

In some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, concern exists 

that the act of creating S&R capabilities will draw the Europeans away from paying proper attention to the NRF and HRF for 

major combat operations. A close look suggests that this fear is 

unfounded. As shown in table 2, the entire combination of NSOF, 

NRF, HRF, and S&R assets would consume about 242,000 to 272,000 

military personnel. This is only about 10 percent of Europe’s total 

of 2.4 million active military personnel, and about 16 to 18 percent of Europe’s active ground manpower, which totals 1.5 million 

troops. The Europeans can readily meet this requirement without 

drawing manpower from other missions, including continental 

defense. Britain and France aside, several European countries 

could reduce their military manpower by sizable amounts and 

still easily meet these requirements. Creating S&R forces does not 

require large diversions of funds for equipment acquisition and 

modernization. The main task is one of reorganizing manpower, 

units, and forces that already exist in European combat support 

and combat service support structures.

NATO should create a special S&R command staff for 

establishing coordinated force goals for member countries and 

organizing S&R forces into multinational formations capable of 

prompt deployment into occupied countries. A command staff, 

for example, could quickly assemble forces and assets for contingencies such as Afghanistan, where laborious efforts were 

needed to bring together the few helicopters and infantry units 

needed to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams. How many 

European-manned S&R forces 

are needed? An initial estimate 

is that two division-size formations, composed of independent 

S&R brigades plus light infantry 

units, would be adequate. Such a 

posture would provide the necessary mix of S&R assets, as well as 

the flexibility and modularity to 

respond to a range of contingencies. For example, this posture 

would enable NATO to deploy 

fully six S&R brigades to a single large contingency, or to sustain 

indefinitely two brigades in a single smaller operation. If the 

United States also creates similar formations, between them 

enough S&R assets should be available for most situations.

Some European countries understandably will be reluctant 

to create special S&R units. Examples are Britain and France, 

whose scarce military manpower is needed to populate combat 

forces that will be critical to NATO warfighting strategy in expeditionary missions. But other countries that provide fewer combat 

units may find opportunities in contributing S&R assets to NATO. 

Italy and Germany are examples, as are Poland and other new 

members from Central Europe. Southern region countries such 

as Spain, Greece, and Turkey also have the manpower to permit 

specialization in S&R functions. In addition, the Europeans need 

to consider how civilian assets can be mobilized for reconstruction 

missions that will not be performed by military forces. If Europe 

rises to the challenge, it should have little difficulty creating the 

necessary assets in a few years.

NATO Defense and Security Sector Development

Once the S&R mission is ongoing or has been effectively performed, there remains an additional requirement that is as crucial 

to long-term security: political and economic transformation to 

a viable, democratic, stable nation with accountable and competent governance. This requirement, which can take years or even 

decades, must include the creation of clean, lean, and able defense 

and security forces and institutions. Clean means forces and institutions that respond to governmental direction, respect democratic 

values, enforce the law fairly, and are free from internal corruption. 

Lean refers to the need for these 

forces and institutions to operate 

efficiently, free from bloating that 

can consume too many resources 

and strangle economic recovery. 

Able refers to their ability to perform their jobs of military security 

and law enforcement.10

The need for NATO to help 

perform defense and security sector development is not confined 

to postwar situations. Indeed, it 

commonly arises in peacetime, when NATO endeavors to build 

partnership relations with countries that are trying to leave the 

past behind. As NATO considers its objectives and policies toward 

other regions, it may want to increase its involvement in this enterprise, and the opportunities may grow as well. After all, much of 

the world has yet to go through the democratic transformation that 

has occurred in Eastern Europe over the past two decades. There 

is now overwhelming evidence—from places as diverse as the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and Southeast 

Asia—that failure to overhaul defense and security establishments 

can retard, if not derail, broader political-economic transformation 

to democracy and market economies.

NDSSD is a complex enterprise that requires an adroit blending 

of carrots and sticks. Fortunately, NATO and some of its individual 

members have considerable experience in this arena. The bulk 

NATO should 

create a special S & R 

command staff

 Table 2. Proposed European Ground Forces for 

 Expeditionary Missions*

 Brigades Ground Manpower

 NSOF 1 2,000

 NRF 3 30,000

 HRF for MCO 15–18 150,000–180,000

 S&R 6 60,000 

 Total 25–28 242,000–272,000

 * Proposed by authors.
12 Defense Horizons May 2005

of this experience comes from the PFP effort to help the former 

communist nations of Eastern Europe and former republics of the 

Soviet Union develop capable, professional, accountable, and affordable defense establishments and military forces. Currently, NATO 

includes countries with experience in both giving and receiving 

this type of PFP support. In addition, the United Kingdom, relying 

on interministerial collaboration under its “global fund” program, 

has accumulated valuable experience in providing comprehensive 

security sector reform in a number of developing countries, such as 

Uganda, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. The same can be said for France, 

which has longstanding ties to numerous countries in North Africa 

and sub-Saharan Africa. The United States, of course, has been in 

this business on a global basis for many years and brings the benefits 

of its successful experiences in Asia, where it has helped guide several militaries into the modern era.

One example of how an NDSSD capability might be used is 

in conjunction with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), an 

offer to establish military partnership relations with interested 

countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Persian Gulf. 

The ICI is meant to be different from the NATO Partnership for 

Peace, which has been operating successfully in Eastern Europe 

and adjoining regions for nearly 

a decade. For many participants, 

PFP became a process of preparing for entrance into NATO: all 

10 new members participated in 

ways aimed at enhancing their 

ability to meet requirements for 

admission. By contrast, the ICI 

is not aimed at preparing Middle 

Eastern countries for admission 

to NATO. Instead, it is aimed 

at helping their military establishments carry out modernizing 

reforms and acquire legitimate capabilities in areas of mutual 

interest. For example, the ICI might help these establishments 

learn techniques for planning and budgeting, training and exercising, protecting borders, safeguarding against terrorism, carrying out hostage rescue, and performing disaster relief. Although 

the ICI is new and untested, it can provide a framework for 

interested countries to work closely with NATO members under 

Alliance auspices.

Even in peacetime settings, the difficulty of this enterprise 

should not be underestimated. In many countries, defense and 

security institutions may be change-resistant—indeed, more 

resistant than other sectors of their governments and societies. 

But unless military and other security institutions can be fundamentally transformed, efforts to train and educate individuals 

or small groups may be inadequate to prevent old cultures and 

practices from surviving. Large carrots and sticks may be needed 

to induce institutional reform, including leadership changes.

Whether as part of a wider political transformation or simply 

to develop more competent military and security institutions, 

NATO members must be capable of offering assistance in this 

arena. NATO can determine how and where to offer such efforts 

only on a case-by-case basis. To ensure that NATO performs effectively when called upon, it needs enduring capacity and options. 

NATO should concentrate on what it knows best, defense and 

military transformation, and leave reform of police and other 

security institutions to other agencies. NATO likely will need 

to expand upon its PFP staffs by creating assets to perform this 

function in regions outside Europe. It should begin by taking an 

inventory of its members to determine their relevant experiences, 

activities, and capabilities. (Some of the best talent and experience may well come from new members, having just gone through 

similar defense and security transformations themselves.) NATO 

then should make decisions about how capabilities should be 

organized collectively, how national capabilities can contribute, 

where NATO can make valuable contributions, and how improvements can be made.

Matching the NATO Defense Framework 

with U.S. and EU Efforts

As the United States and Europe seek to revitalize their partnership through defense collaboration, they should not focus on NATO 

military preparedness in isolation from the larger setting. They also 

will need to take stock of two other key issues: how the future U.S. 

military commitment to NATO and 

Europe can take shape in ways that 

contribute to NATO preparedness, 

and how emerging EU defense 

efforts can be channeled toward 

enhancing NATO military strength 

and cohesion. The goal should be to 

forge collaborative relations among 

NATO, the U.S. military, and the 

European Union so that all three 

not only perform healthy roles individually but also create a unified whole that is greater than the 

sum of its parts. Because achieving this goal will not be easy, it will 

require sound planning and hard work by all participants.

The three-pyramid architecture illustrated in figure 2 provides a 

conceptual framework for orchestrating this complex enterprise. If the 

defense preparedness efforts in the NATO pyramid, discussed above, 

and the U.S. and EU pyramids focus on creating similar types of forces, 

capabilities, and improvement priorities, the outcome can be a triangular relationship that works to the advantage of all three participants.

Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe

The United States maintains military forces in Europe both 

for national purposes and to meet NATO commitments and to 

help influence how NATO military forces undergo transformation. 

Careful attention must be paid to the future U.S. military commitment—not only U.S. forces in Europe but also NATO-committed 

forces stationed in the United States—because of the changes that 

will be taking place during the coming years. Since the early 1990s, 

the United States has deployed about 109,000 troops in Europe in 

multiple headquarters staffs, 4 heavy Army brigades and an airborne contingent in Italy, and over 2 U.S. Air Force fighter wings 

and support aircraft at various bases, plus Navy bases, mostly in 

the Mediterranean, to support regular deployment of a carrier batNATO should concentrate on 

what it knows best, defense 

and military transformation, 

and leave reform of 

police to other agencies
May 2005 Defense Horizons 13

 Figure 2. Three-Pyramid Architecture for Transatlantic Defense Collaboration

tlegroup and an amphibious ready group. The purpose of this large, 

multifaceted military presence has been threefold: to help defend 

an expanded NATO in a period 

of uncertain change; to provide 

U.S. force contributions to NATO 

operations on Europe’s periphery 

(for example, in the Kosovo war 

of 1999); and to provide forwarddeployed forces for purely U.S. 

military missions, or for coalition missions outside NATO, in 

regions adjoining Europe, including part of the Middle East. 

While this U.S. presence has served remarkably well over the 

past decade, it is about to undergo important changes. In fall 2004, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) announced the results of a review 

aimed at better aligning overseas deployments with future missions 

and priorities. Total U.S. military manpower in Europe will decline 

to 50,000 to 65,000 troops, although regular training and exercises 

by forces in the continental United States (CONUS) occasionally 

will raise the total temporarily. Headquarters staffs will be trimmed 

and consolidated. The four Army heavy brigades will be replaced 

by a single Army Stryker Brigade, plus an airborne contingent in 

Italy. The Air Force presence will also be trimmed, but details are 

unclear, and some units may periodically deploy to Poland, Bulgaria, 

Romania, and other new NATO members. Naval bases in the Mediterranean may also be consolidated, but the Navy will continue to 

maintain regular peacetime deployments of warships there.

The new presence will be smaller and distributed differently. 

While the U.S. military will retain main operating bases at traditional locations in Europe, it will develop new forward operating 

locations and cooperative security locations in Eastern Europe 

and the Balkans in order to enhance the capacity of the American 

military to train and exercise with new NATO members and to 

provide additional jump-off sites for power projection operations 

outside Europe. Although the United States will not permanently 

station large forces in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, small units 

might reside there, and increased training and exercises in Poland 

and other countries will result in 

temporary surges. As a result, the 

U.S. military center of gravity will 

shift from its Cold War locations 

in Western Europe toward the east 

and southeast, reflecting growing 

U.S. relations with multiple countries there.

Will this plan (actually, still a 

concept) properly support a parallel effort, partly led by the U.S. 

Government, to improve NATO and European military forces and 

capabilities for new-era expeditionary missions? If it does not, modification is likely as it undergoes further study and review.

The new U.S. military presence in Europe should be anchored 

in a coherent strategic concept that squares with ongoing NATO 

preparedness efforts and fosters close U.S.-European military ties. 

Accordingly, future U.S. forces in Europe should be designed to 

create a strike force similar to the NRF, when they are not part 

of the NRF. That is, they should contribute to the NRF in normal 

rotations, but they also should field a separate, joint, brigadesize strike force so that NATO would have two quick response 

strike forces—the NRF (in which U.S. forces participate some 

of the time) and a separate similar U.S. strike force assigned for 

NATO missions—that would double its options and flexibility in 

a crisis. In peacetime, these two forces could train and exercise 

together, thereby benefiting the transformation of both. Whether 

the DOD plan provides the ingredients for such a strike force can 

be determined only when details become available. The question 

arises whether a single Army Stryker Brigade in Germany, plus 

airborne troops in Italy, is the best choice. Perhaps a better plan 

would be two composite brigade combat teams: a heavier brigade 

in Germany and a lighter brigade in Italy. Both brigades would be 

equipped with a mixture of assets for close combat, indirect fires, 

U.S. forces in Europe 

should be designed to 

create a strike force 

similar to the NRF
14 Defense Horizons May 2005

and long-range standoff fires. Such a revised U.S. ground presence 

might be better able to work closely with the NRF.

As the pyramid architecture of figure 2 suggests, the future U.S. 

commitment to NATO should not be viewed solely through the lens of 

peacetime presence. Additional commitments of CONUS-based forces 

should also be tailored to help support NATO defense preparedness 

efforts and priorities. CONUS-based forces will continue to be assigned 

to NATO war plans and provide reinforcements that can take part in 

NATO expeditionary operations. A regular program that deploys forces 

to Europe for training and exercises every year, as often occurred 

during the Cold War, can promote 

interoperability with European 

forces. Likewise, European forces 

could come to the United States 

more often for training and exercises, not only with NATO-assigned 

U.S. forces, but also with other 

forces. In the coming years, European forces may work closely with 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces that perform missions 

in the Persian Gulf and surrounding regions. A closer European/NATO 

relationship with CENTCOM has begun to emerge recently and should 

grow in the coming years.

A formal U.S. commitment to NATO of two to three Army divisions (or Marine units), plus four to five fighter wings, and one to 

two carrier strike groups and amphibious strike groups would combine with strengthened European forces to give NATO a solid portfolio of diverse capabilities for expeditionary warfare, crisis response, 

and other operations. In addition, the U.S. military in CONUS should 

develop S&R forces that match those fielded by Europe to meet U.S. 

national needs while also giving NATO a sufficient portfolio of flexible assets for this important mission. Beyond this, the United States 

should develop civilian S&R assets and improved counterterrorism 

capabilities. For example, the proposed Lugar-Biden bill aspires to 

create a permanent S&R agency within the State Department. 

Finally, the U.S. counterpart of the NATO Defense and Security 

Sector Development consists of a set of capacities and activities 

associated with political-economic-institutional development. 

These functions are performed by the State Department, including the Agency for International Development, and the DOD (for 

example, the Marshall Center in Germany and other international 

schools and institutions). In addition to building some multilateral capacity in this domain, NATO could provide tighter linkage 

between U.S. and European efforts.

Such a set of capabilities would enable the United States to meet 

its future commitments to NATO despite its smaller peacetime presence in Europe. It also would place the U.S. military in a strong position to help encourage European military transformation so that U.S. 

and European forces can work together to carry out future expeditionary missions with both sides making substantial contributions. A key 

point is that while Europeans must do their part in bolstering NATO 

for expeditionary missions, the United States must do its part as well, 

rather than focusing so exclusively on its own purposes and priorities 

that it loses sight of its still-important role as a leader of NATO.

EU Forces and Capabilities 

The EU plans to create military forces and capabilities should 

not be seen in isolation but judged in terms of the implications for 

NATO defense preparedness and the health of the Alliance. During 

the 1990s, the United States and many NATO officials mainly focused 

on ensuring that EU military efforts not impede, dilute, duplicate, or 

divert attention from NATO preparedness. This philosophy of damage avoidance offered no vision of how EU–NATO relations were to 

become collaborative. A positive step forward came when the “Berlin Plus” accord, initially forged in 

1996, was finalized in 2002. Berlin 

Plus is a NATO–EU agreement that 

allows the European Union to draw 

upon NATO assets and capabilities, 

under the command of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, 

Europe (a European officer), for 

EU-led crisis operations that NATO 

declines to undertake. EU forces, 

of course, can also be deployed 

without drawing upon NATO assets, by employing the “lead nation” 

concept that has already been used for some operations.

The initial EU foray into force development came in 1999, when 

its Helsinki Headline Goal envisioned creation of a European Rapid 

Reaction Force (ERRF) for the so-called Petersberg Tasks. The 

ERRF, declared operational in June 2003, is a corps-size ground force 

with supporting air and naval units that is to be available within 60 

days and could sustain operations for a full year. In 2001, the EU 

Council approved a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) that 

called upon members to improve their military capabilities for crisis 

response by remedying shortfalls in such areas as airlift, logistics, 

precision strike, rescue helicopters, and C4ISR. In 2004, the EU 

Council approved a new 2010 Headline Goal that called for efforts to 

acquire still-missing capabilities in many areas originally earmarked 

by ECAP. In addition, the EU Council also called for creation of a 

European Defense Agency to harmonize armaments acquisition, a 

European Airlift Command, an on-call military operations center 

for crisis management, and a number of small, deployable “Battle 

Groups” to be fielded by 2007. In addition, it called for an aircraft 

carrier to be made available to the ERRF by 2008, improved communications systems, and benchmarks for measuring progress toward 

the 2010 Headline Goal.

Although these declarations suggest the European Union is 

building a fully integrated military command and force posture, most 

of them have not yet been translated into reality. However, the EU 

is already engaging in overseas security operations: Operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003, Operation Artemis in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo in 2003, Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

to replace NATO forces in 2004, and the Rule of Law Mission to Georgia in 2004. While the EU has a considerable distance to travel before 

it reaches its ambitious goals, it can be expected to make progress 

slowly in the coming years. The central issue is determining the type 

of military forces and capabilities that it should acquire and how 

they should relate to NATO.

the future U.S. commitment 

to NATO should not be 

viewed solely through the 

lens of peacetime presence
May 2005 Defense Horizons 15

beyond Petersberg Tasks to acquire greater combat capabilities, its 

portfolio of potential missions will widen.

At present, the EU is not focused on creating military forces 

and capabilities for S&R missions. But several EU members, such as 

France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, have good national 

police forces that can be used for constabulary missions. These five 

countries have developed a training program in Italy for constabulary 

forces that might be used in future EU or NATO stabilization and 

reconstruction missions. There are multiple other S&R endeavors 

where the EU would seem to possess the potential to make major 

contributions. Beyond this, the EU could harness its civilian agencies 

and those of its members to perform important security functions that 

lie outside the realm of defense preparedness. For example, it could 

create civilian assets for S&R missions, defense and security sector 

development, counterterrorism, and counterorganized crime—all 

areas in which transatlantic collaboration will be important in the 

years ahead and in which the United States needs to do more.

Whether in S&R or in defense and security sector development, 

the European Union can tap into and shape immense European 

talent and capacity. In turn, EU–NATO links could ensure that 

EU contributions in this area are used in synergy with other NATO 

(including American) contributions. Thus, when it comes to helping in transforming and rebuilding countries that need and want 

Western help—creating security conditions that lower the likelihood 

of conflict and terrorism—the EU is every bit as important as the 

United States in Alliance efforts.

This brief survey thus suggests that current EU endeavors 

make military sense and that there are additional areas of capability that the European Union might 

be encouraged to pursue and even 

lead. Although its current military endeavors may be fledgling, 

the EU seems destined to grow 

in importance as Europeans continue their drive to unity and integration. Much will depend on how 

the European Union evolves, and 

whether it ultimately becomes a 

loose body of sovereign nations, a 

confederation, or a federation. In the interim, the EU can be a source 

of military integration that helps lessen Europe’s principal weakness: 

the inability of its countries to cooperate closely to create multinational forces and to make efficient use of scarce defense funds. If the 

European Union acquires a capacity to perform some military operations independently of NATO, this may take pressure off the United 

States and NATO to meet all plausible requirements in the coming 

years. If NATO and the EU can arrange a sensible division of labor 

that advances the interests of the United States and Europe, this step 

could be pursued. Beyond this, the European Union might be able to 

contribute directly to NATO military preparedness. There is no reason 

why future EU forces cannot be assigned important NATO missions, if 

they are properly prepared to do so. The Eurocorps has followed this 

path. It began as a separate endeavor but in recent years has been 

made available to NATO for certain missions. In theory, EU forces 

could follow the same path.

To avoid a potential problem of force availability during crises, European forces assigned to an upcoming NRF rotation and 

other top-priority missions should not simultaneously be assigned 

to EU units. If deconfliction measures are instituted, NATO preparedness and EU preparedness need not be at odds. Indeed, the 

expeditionary force enhancement measures contemplated here 

will expand the spectrum of usable European military capabilities 

greatly, thereby providing a larger pool of assets for both NATO and 

the EU to draw upon. Likewise, savings realized by retiring unnecessary forces, and channeling of these savings into investments 

in new-era forces, will reduce the risk that NATO and the EU will 

compete for scarce funds. 

In an effort to help determine whether and how the EU can 

potentially contribute to NATO preparedness, our pyramid starts 

at the top with the new Battle Groups. Each of these formations is 

to be battalion-size, with about 1,500 combat and support troops. 

The EU plan calls for 13 of them to be fielded, some as national 

units and others as multinational units. These Battle Groups are 

intended to be light infantry and easily deployable, ready to move 

within 5 to 10 days. The EU aspires to be able to deploy two Battle 

Groups at a time, perhaps under a United Nations mandate. Their 

mission is to perform limited crisis interventions in such places as 

sub-Saharan Africa to restore order to chaotic situations, prevent 

genocide, and protect European citizens and economic interests. 

Initial operational capability for some units is to be achieved in 

2005, and full operational capability in 2007, with the entire force 

fielded by 2010 or thereafter. In their emphasis on swift reaction 

with small forces, these Battle Groups bear a resemblance to the 

NATO Response Force, but as yet, 

they are not being configured with 

the sophisticated networks, joint 

forces, and advanced weaponry 

to match the NRF. Even so, they 

could help contribute to NATO 

forces and capabilities for operations demanding a lesser response 

than the NRF. Regardless of 

whether they are made available 

to NATO, they will provide a useful addition to Europe’s warehouse of new-era capabilities. 

Below the Battle Groups on the EU pyramid is the ERRF, which is 

intended to be a joint force, with a ground corps of 60,000 troops, plus 

air and naval assets that raise the total to 100,000. In a crisis, this force 

is to be assembled by drawing upon a large pool of forces made available by EU members; none of these forces are placed under EU command in peacetime. As originally conceived, the ERRF was intended to 

perform Petersberg Tasks of humanitarian assistance, rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peacemaking. These tasks fall short 

of major combat operations in wartime. But ERRF forces configured 

for Petersberg Tasks could perform NATO missions that fall within the 

realm of their core competencies. This is an area where NATO has not 

specialized, and the Europeans have an opportunity to make useful 

contributions. The European focus appears to have shifted from the 

ERRF to the smaller Battle Groups, but the ERRF could again become 

the focus once Battle Groups are assembled. If the ERRF broadens 

forces assigned to an 

upcoming NRF rotation and 

other top-priority missions 

should not simultaneously 

be assigned to EU units
16 Defense Horizons May 2005

Notes

1

In the mid-1960s, a group of NATO-appointed “wise men” drafted the Harmel 

Report to bridge transatlantic differences over policies toward deterrence and 

détente. 

2The existing NATO strategic concept was issued at the Washington Summit of 

1999. For an appraisal of the need for a new strategic concept and associated issues, 

see Michael Ruhle, NATO at the Crossroads (McLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, 

March 2004). 

3See relevant NATO press releases in these areas for this period at 

<www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm>. 

4See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, September 2002). See also European Union Security 

Strategy (Brussels: European Union, 2003), which cites the following threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 

organized crime. It calls for a close working relationship between the European Union 

and the United States. 

5For views of NATO Strategic Commanders, see Supreme Allied Commander, 

Europe, General J.L. Jones, USMC, and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, 

Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, USN, Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge (ACO and 

ACT Headquarters, 2004). For analysis of NATO military transformation, see Arthur 

K. Cebrowski et al., NATO Transformation: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: 

The Atlantic Council, April 2004). 

6The authors wish to thank RADM Raymond Smith, USN (Ret.), former deputy 

commander, U.S. Southern Command, for his contributions to this idea. 

7For more detail, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, “Transforming 

European Forces,” Survival (Autumn 2002), 117–132; and Hans Binnendijk, “A 

European Spearhead Force Would Bridge the Gap,” International Herald Tribune, 

February 16, 2002. 

8For details on European and NATO military forces, see The Military Balance 

2004–2005 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004). 

9For more detail, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, “Needed—A 

NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force,” Defense Horizons 45 (Washington, DC: 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2004). 

10For more detail on this mission, see David C. Gompert et al., Clean, Lean, 

and Able: A Strategy for Defense Development, RAND Occasional Paper OP–101–RC 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 2004). 

11For an appraisal of European defense integration, see Julian Lindley-French 

and Franco Algieri, A European Defence Strategy (Guetersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, May 2004). For a critical view of future EU–NATO relations, see 

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, “Saving NATO from Europe,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (NovemberDecember 2004), 111–120. 

12These are primarily peacekeeping operation tasks. 

13For analysis, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Europäische ‘Battle Groups’–ein neuer 

Schub für die ESVP?” (“European Battle Groups: A New Stimulus for the European Security and Defense Policy”), Analysen und Argumente aus der KonradAdenaur-Stiftung 2004, no. 15, December 15, 2004, at <http://www.kas.de/publikationen/2004/5827_dokument.html>.

Conclusion

Like others, we have long argued for a “more equal, more 

global” U.S.–EU partnership, of which NATO would be the military 

arm. In such a true, new partnership, the Atlantic democracies 

would forge a strategy to induce orderly change in troubled 

regions and to use Atlantic power judiciously but, when necessary, 

decisively. The dangers of the post-9/11 world and intensifying 

strategic concern about the Middle East strengthen the case for 

such a partnership, such an Alliance, and such a strategy. However, 

despite a marked improvement in U.S.-European relations, there 

remain major impediments to realizing this vision. Moreover, neither the United States nor Europe has shown a willingness to do 

what is necessary to create such a partnership—the latter being 

reluctant to take on global burdens and risks, and the former 

being unsure of the value of limiting its freedom of action. 

This does not mean that the Allies will fail to agree more 

often than not on when and how to use the array of capabilities at 

their disposal. For all the discord of late, publics and leaders on 

both sides of the Atlantic still applaud common action and success and are saddened by division and inaction. Therefore, it is 

imperative that NATO has a full range of options to act in union. 

Options require capabilities, not just thrown together in the event 

but “baked” together with common requirements, plans, programs, 

and training. To think that NATO can assemble whatever it needs 

when it needs it is to condemn the Alliance to ineffectiveness, in 

which case grand strategy will mean little.

NATO capabilities must be comprehensive, in the sense of 

leaving no major requirements unaddressed. Where there are 

gaps—as there are today in Special Operations Forces and Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces—they must be identifiable 

so that concrete initiatives can be taken to fill them. There must 

be accountability of members as well to do what their allies are 

expecting them to do. And they must be able to explain to their 

publics how their resources are being used to meet present dangers. For all these reasons, a clear, agreed, and comprehensive 

defense capabilities framework is needed, with or without a new 

strategic concept.

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director