NIST GCR 16-002

Case Studies of Community 

Resilience Policy 

Nayanee Gupta

Christopher T. Clavin

Zoe E. Petropoulos

Austin B. Mudd

Rashida Nek

Sally S. Tinkle

IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.GCR.16-002
NIST GCR 16-002

Case Studies of Community 

Resilience Policy 

Prepared for

U.S. Department of Commerce

Engineering Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899 

By

Nayanee Gupta 

Christopher T. Clavin 

Zoe E. Petropoulos 

Austin B. Mudd 

Rashida Nek

Sally S. Tinkle 

IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute 

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.GCR.16-002 

May 2016 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director 
i

Executive Summary

As part of its Community Disaster Resilience Program, the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) is examining approaches that various communities have 

employed that establish or support community resilience policy in municipal or regional 

government. NIST tasked the IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute to examine 

how communities develop economic development and hazard mitigation plans and to 

understand the barriers that exist that prevent resilience from being incorporated into 

economic development plans, including governance, organizational, and management 

processes. Part I presents readily available metrics for characterizing communities with

varying population sizes (small, medium, large), demographics, and infrastructure systems

for readily available data. The series of metrics was applied to 14 communities that are 

geographically dispersed around the US and exposed to a range of hazards (e.g., hurricane, 

tornado, earthquake, tsunami, and flood). The metrics were further developed for seven (7) 

of the communities with recent efforts related to community resilience. In Part II, three of 

these communities were examined in more detail to provide insight to specific resilience 

policy issues and decisions. The case studies include a summary of current policies and

practice for community resilience and observations of practices that encourage resilience 

as a part of economic development planning. 

For Part I, literature on community characteristics was reviewed to identify existing

indicators of community resilience and available information on community demographics 

and infrastructure systems was gathered from publicly available data sets. This information 

was used to identify an initial set of candidates to be considered for case study. Available 

data to characterize communities was sufficient to ensure a diverse set of candidate case 

study communities. These data provided context on the candidate case study communities, 

but additional study and information is necessary to understand the relationship between 

these contextual factors and resilience planning and policy outcomes. 

The community case studies in Part II provide insights of ongoing resilience efforts 

in three communities that illustrates how communities with different challenges address 

resilience, and how resilience-focused efforts are undertaken by their local governments. 

The three communities examined are: Los Angeles, California; Flagstaff, Arizona; and 

Norfolk, Virginia. Major resilience initiatives in each city are as follows:

• Los Angeles, California

– Resilience by Design, a city report issued in December 2014, established a

strategic resilience policy statement and provided specific recommended
ii

actions in three priority areas for resilience investments: structural integrity 

of buildings, public water infrastructure integrity, and telecommunications 

infrastructure reliability. The report recommends the city council adopt two 

mandatory building codes, and building rating standards. The report marked 

the culmination of years of work by members of the city mayor’s office, the 

city’s water and power departments, and other city agencies in collaboration 

with the United States Geological Survey.

• Flagstaff, Arizona

– The city adopted the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) code, which 

prescribes the use of fire-resistant building materials and requires clearing 

defensible space around structures in the WUI. The code is mandatory for 

all new construction in the WUI. Extensive community outreach helped 

form the coalition necessary to gain public support. 

– The Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project was motivated by the 2010 

Schultz Fire, which demonstrated Flagstaff’s vulnerability to wildland fire 

and subsequent debris flows from post-fire thunderstorms. The city 

manager’s office led a community outreach initiative to seek public support 

for bond sales to fund a watershed protection program, which would employ 

fuels-reduction activities on city-managed and National Forest lands, via a 

memorandum of understanding signed with the U.S. Forest Service. The 

Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project is being implemented by staff from 

city, state, and federal organizations as well as Northern Arizona University.

• Norfolk, Virginia

– The City of Norfolk’s near-term resilience efforts focus on three areas: 

coastal resilience, neighborhood development, and economic planning. A 

proposed long-term initiative is captured in the strategic document Vision 

2100. This strategic initiative will identify the goals and vision for the 

community’s development by the year 2100. The nearly 100-year time 

horizon was selected to reduce concerns about current property ownership 

and land use.

– Neighborhood Asset Mapping is an initiative being implemented that 

collects input from individuals about their neighborhoods and the value of 

services that are provided by public infrastructure, including the built 

environment.
iii

Findings

This study considered outcomes of resilience-focused initiatives, highlighting 

multiple policy-related outcomes. They include enhancing the city’s awareness of risk, 

facilitating engagement with city stakeholders, collaboration between entities that have 

historically operated in distinctly separate jurisdictions, providing community policy 

decision makers with objective information, identifying budgetary sources for resilience 

and risk reduction measures, and capitalizing on favorable opportunities to implement 

policy. These actions are also seen as examples of success in efforts of local officials to 

make their communities more resilient, and are highlighted as such in the case studies.

Findings from this study are as follows:

• Resilience policy development in the communities studied was most often 

observed to be a collection of outcomes from multiple initiatives across the 

government. These observed outcomes originate from multiple efforts across 

government rather than a standing resilience function of the local government. 

Specific initiatives were being planned and implemented within the context of 

their long-standing hazard mitigation efforts and within existing government 

policy planning functions (e.g., land use planning).

• Resilience initiatives are often driven from the highest levels of municipal 

leadership. Staff within municipal agencies demonstrated interest in addressing 

risks posed by hazards, however the top-level strategic policy guidance from 

leadership was necessary to establish initiatives and actions. Staff supporting 

resilience efforts were either elected officials or acting within their normal job 

descriptions for their positions in the mayor’s office, the city manager’s office, 

and other city offices. 

• Scientific and technical support, generally from an unbiased, trusted, source, is 

critical to maintaining credibility in discussions of policy proposals and 

associated trade-offs. 

• Collaboration across departments, stakeholder groups, and jurisdictions is seen 

as a key differentiator between traditional emergency management and longterm community-focused resilience activities. While regional coordination of 

resilience and hazard mitigation programs has worked well in some 

communities, in others it has run into obstacles arising from differing priorities 

and differing perceptions of risk. 

• All three case study communities identified outreach, education, and 

communication tools as critical to providing support for their leadership and 

decision makers’ ability to adopt resilience policies and programs. 
iv

• Long-term economic impacts of disasters, beyond the loss of life and property, 

combined with community priorities for economic redevelopment were cited as 

major motivating factors for resilience and hazard mitigation policy 

development.

• Resilience policy design processes differ from traditional hazard mitigation 

policy design processes due to long-term planning horizons and a holistic 

planning approach required across departments and infrastructure types.

• Design and implementation of resilience initiatives are influenced by external 

factors. Successful implementation depends on leadership recognizing the need 

to influence multiple factors, stakeholder groups to achieve expressed public 

support, and identification of windows of opportunity to push for 

implementation (e.g., recent disaster events, unexpected availability of funding).
v

Contents

Introduction..........................................................................................................................1

Part 1: Data and Analysis for Characterizing Communities for a 

Resilience Policy Case Study ....................................................................................3

1. Identifying Community Characteristics and Indicators of Resilience.........................5

A. Major Themes Identified in Literature Review...................................................6

B. Identifying Indicators for Population and Governance .....................................10

C. Identifying Indicators for Built Environment, Social Dimensions, 

and Economics ..................................................................................................10

D. Community Characteristics and Resilience Indicators......................................11

2. Identifying Candidate Communities..........................................................................13

A. Hazard Profile Development for All U.S. Cities...............................................13

1. Locate Most Hazardous Counties................................................................14

2. Create Hazard Region Maps........................................................................16

3. Locate Metropolitan and Smaller Communities in Each 

Hazard Region.............................................................................................20

4. Identify the MSAs with Highest Frequencies of Damaging Hazards.........22

B. Social Vulnerability and Economic Profile.......................................................22

C. Identifying Initial Candidate Case Study Communities....................................23

3. Resilience-Relevant Attributes as a Basis for Selecting Candidate 

Case Study Communities ..........................................................................................27

A. Los Angeles, California.....................................................................................27

B. Flagstaff, Arizona..............................................................................................28

C. Norfolk, Virginia ...............................................................................................29

D. Galveston, Texas...............................................................................................29

E. Providence, Rhode Island..................................................................................30

F. Huntsville, Alabama..........................................................................................31

G. Ames, Iowa........................................................................................................31

4. Summary of Findings for Part 1 ................................................................................33

Part 2: Case Studies of Community Resilience Policy and Planning Activities.........35

5. Case Study of the City of Los Angeles .....................................................................37

A. Natural Hazard Experience ...............................................................................37

B. Resilience Policy Development.........................................................................38

1. Resilience Policy Planning Team Structure ................................................39

2. Soft-Story and Non-ductile Concrete Structure Mandatory Retrofits.........40

3. Water Infrastructure Retrofits .....................................................................42

C. Observations......................................................................................................47
vi

6. Case Study of the City of Flagstaff ...........................................................................49

A. Natural Hazard Experience ...............................................................................49

B. Resilience Policy Development.........................................................................50

1. Proactive Forest Management.....................................................................50

2. Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project.......................................................55

C. Observations......................................................................................................58

7. Case Study of the City of Norfolk.............................................................................61

A. Natural Hazard Experience ...............................................................................61

B. Resilience Policy Development.........................................................................62

1. Initial Coastal Flooding Focus ....................................................................62

2. Outcomes.....................................................................................................63

3. Norfolk’s Expansion of Policy to Address Economic and 

Neighborhood Resilience ............................................................................64

4. Integrated Resilience Policy Proposal: Vision 2100 ...................................65

5. Resilience Decision Making Structure ........................................................66

6. Proposed Approaches for Implementing Resilience Policy........................66

C. Observations......................................................................................................68

8. Summary and Analysis for Part 2..............................................................................69

A. Major Resilience Initiatives...............................................................................69

B. Los Angeles.......................................................................................................69

C. Flagstaff.............................................................................................................69

D. Norfolk ..............................................................................................................70

E. Summary of Observations.................................................................................70

F. Overarching Findings........................................................................................71

Appendix A. National-Level Data on Community Characteristics and 

Resilience Indicators .............................................................................................. A-1

Appendix B. Collection and Processing of Hazards Data and MSAs within 

Regional Hazard Zones ...........................................................................................B-1

Appendix C. Indicator Data for Seven Case Study Community Candidates...................C-1

Appendix D. Discussion Topics ..................................................................................... D-1

Appendix E. Community Contacts..................................................................................E-1

References........................................................................................................................F-1

Abbreviations.................................................................................................................. G-1
1

Introduction

Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, and Presidential Policy 

Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, establish the Federal 

Government’s policy definition of resilience as “the ability to adapt to changing conditions 

and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies” that include

“deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” At the national 

level, federal policies, programs, and initiatives support state- and community-scale 

decisions on how to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster events. At the 

community level, resilience planning involves tangible tradeoffs and resource decisions on 

disaster preparedness, risk awareness, and recovery planning.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Community Disaster 

Resilience Program is a multi-faceted approach to convening community stakeholders, 

subject matter experts, resilience and disaster preparedness practitioners, and state and 

federal stakeholders to develop tools that support community resilience and assist decision 

makers. NIST’s approach to resilience planning includes the identification of a 

community’s social needs as a basis for understanding the types of service that the built 

environment should provide, including recovery from disruptive events. 

NIST’s “Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure 

Systems” (NIST 2015) provides a community planning process that can be employed by 

municipal or regional governments to determine long-term resilience goals, develop plans, 

and identify approaches and actions to improve built environment performance and 

community resilience. Building upon both traditional hazard mitigation, response, and 

recovery efforts and traditional risk assessment methodologies, this guide considers

organizational influences, service and performance expectations, and social dependencies 

upon the built environment. 

The guide has a 6-step process for structuring the organizational, social, planning, and 

technical aspects of community resilience planning and implementation. It is wellrecognized that communities face a diversity of hazards, and social, economic, and built 

environment challenges, and need to address these challenges in a manner tailored to each 

community. 

The approaches used by communities to translate resilience planning processes and 

documents into programs, rules, ordinances, or other measures that aim to establish 

resilience policy in municipal or regional government can further inform community 

resilience guidance. NIST tasked the IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI)
2

to examine the governance, organizational, management, and policy-making processes 

involved in creating resilience policy, from establishing policy proposals to codified 

resilience policies. Commonalities and differences were identified among communities in 

their approaches to designing and implementing resilience policies. A case study approach

was employed, examining three communities from a larger pool of candidate communities 

that reflect a diversity of hazard, social, and economic community profiles. 

This report has two parts. The first part describes research to identify the 14 candidate 

communities considered for the case study. That research included a literature review on 

community characteristics and indicators of community resilience and an examination of 

publicly available federal data sets. The second part of the report describes examination of 

resilience policy making in the three communities selected for closer examination, Los 

Angeles, California; Flagstaff, Arizona; and Norfolk, Virginia. 

The authors acknowledge the intellectual contributions of NIST staff, in particular,

Therese McAllister, Erica Kuligowski, Stephan Cauffman, and Nancy McNabb.
3

Part 1: Data and Analysis for Characterizing 

Communities for a Resilience Policy Case Study

This part of the report describes the process of identifying candidate communities for 

potential case study examination. 

Chapter 1 provides the outcome of a literature review of various models for 

identifying community characteristics that are indicators of resilience. Dimensions of 

community characteristics and resilience indicators formed the basis for data collection to 

support community selection in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 describes the analysis of national-level data to identify an initial set of 14

candidate communities for resilience policy and planning case study. Data identified in this 

chapter describe exogenous hazard exposure and endogenous characteristics that 

contribute to the communities’ vulnerability. 

Chapter 3 describes the application of additional selection criteria to narrow the 14

candidate case study communities to 7. An overview of each of the 7 final candidates is

presented. The selection of 3 of these communities and detailed case studies of their 

resilience policies and planning are described in Part 2 of the report.

5

1. Identifying Community Characteristics and 

Indicators of Resilience

This chapter describes the result of a literature review aimed at identifying a series of 

indicators, community characteristics, and dimensions of resilience that form the basis for 

further data collection and selection of candidate communities for case study analysis.

According to a National Research Council (NRC) report, federal expenditures on 

natural disasters have been growing steadily over the past nearly 60 years from a total of 

$20.9 million in 1953 to $1.4 billion in 2009 (NRC 2012). These numbers do not include 

economic damages and other losses incurred by cities, industries, and communities as a 

result of natural disasters. This data supports the argument that there is an urgent need to 

increase the resilience of our communities and the Nation. Ongoing efforts include:

• Resilience is being incorporated into community planning through such 

programs as the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Challenge and the 

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Financial Initiative’s Principles 

for Sustainable Insurance (UNEP 2015). The Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 

Resilient Cities Challenge program has made recent notable investments in 

communities. To date, it has funded resilience initiatives in 65 cities, of which 

12 are in the United States. The objective is to provide resources for resilience 

implementation through (1) financial support of a new chief resilience officer 

position in the city government, (2) technical support for the city to develop a 

resilience strategy, (3) networking support with relevant stakeholders to 

implement said strategy, and (4) connections with the other involved cities for 

support and best practices.

• Resilience standards and measures, such as the Social Vulnerability Index

(Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute 2015) or the Fire Protection 

Research Foundation’s Disaster Resiliency and National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards (NFPA 2015) are being developed 

and used.

• Technical reports by RAND (Chandra et al. 2011), International Federation of 

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2012), American Planning Association

(2010), National Research Council (NRC 2012), and others are being published. 

Resilience efforts can also encompass public health, as is the case with the Los 

Angeles County Community Disaster Resilience Project (Los Angeles County Community 
6

Disaster Resilience 2015, or national security, such as a National Academies workshop on 

resilience to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive events (NRC 2014). 

Our study focuses only on community resilience efforts related to natural disasters.

A. Major Themes Identified in Literature Review

Within a socio-ecological context, resilience has been defined as a system’s capacity 

to absorb disturbance and re-organize into a fully functioning system. Norris et al. (2008)

propose the following definition: “a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive 

trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance.”

Within hazards research, resilience is defined as the ability to cope with a disaster 

with minimum impact and damage. In this context, resilience is considered an outcome, 

and incorporates the capacity to reduce or avoid losses, withstand the hazard, and recover 

with minimal social disruptions.

In their 2008 paper, Cutter et al. identify the shortcomings of commonly cited 

vulnerability models (such as failure to consider the root causes of social vulnerability and 

failure to consider the temporal dimension of vulnerability), as well as weaknesses in the 

commonly cited social resilience models (such as the absence of local level social factors 

and exclusion of vulnerability to the natural environment). To overcome such shortcomings 

in existing resilience models, and to provide a new conceptualization of natural disaster 

resilience, Cutter et al. proposed the Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model, a 

framework for measuring disaster resilience at the local and community levels. This model 

is designed to characterize the relationship between vulnerability and resilience. The 

DROP model was considered as a starting point for developing a conceptual framework 

for this analysis for three primary reasons. First, the model considers rapid-onset hazards 

(natural or otherwise) that demand a certain type of preparation and response both pre- and 

post-event. This is in contrast to the slower time horizons of events like global temperature 

variations, sea-level rise, or drought, where the planning horizon is different, and the 

adaptive capacity of the community is a factor to be considered in addition to resilience.

Second, the focus of the model is the social resilience of places; thus, indicators of social 

resilience, which include demographic characteristics and access to resources, are 

considered as input to the analysis of community resilience. Third, the DROP model 

focuses on social resilience at the community level. This distinguishes it from models 

developed to assess resilience at the regional or global levels. Community resilience 

indicatorsrecommended in the DROP model are listed in Table 1. The variables are divided 

into six dimensions: ecological, social, economic, institutional, infrastructure, and 

community competence. 
7

Table 1. Community Resilience Indicators from the DROP Model

Source: Cutter et al. (2008, 604).

Norris et al. (2008) present a framework in which community resilience emerges 

through a set of interlinked adaptive capacities. In this context, community capacity is 

defined as “(1) the characteristics of communities that affect their ability to identify, 

mobilize, and address social and public health problems, and (2) the cultivation and use of 

transferable knowledge, skills, systems and resources that affect individual level changes 

consistent with public health goals and objectives.” In this model, community capacity 

resides in four sets of networked resources—Economic Development, Social Capital, 

Information and Communication Systems, and Community Competence. 

These frameworks and indicators provided initial concepts for measuring or 

monitoring resilience at the community level. Starting with the comprehensive set of 

indicators proposed by the conceptual models from the literature review, a first step was to 

determine what data was available for each of the candidate indicators. Potential data 

sources included information available at the national level (e.g., such as the Census

Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, among others) and at a level of granularity 
8

suitable to characterize communities of all sizes (i.e., data at the metropolitan statistical 

area [MSA] level or higher could not be used to characterize smaller cities). While data for 

social and economic variables were readily available, national data at the desired 

granularity for built environment was more difficult to obtain. In particular, transportation 

and energy data are mostly aggregated at the state level, as described in subsequent

sections.

Drawing from the work of Cutter et al. and Norris et al., community resilience 

dimensions and variables were identified. The initial categories, and indicators were 

refined to into four dimensions:

• Population and governance

• Economic development

• Built environment

• Social Dimensions

Taken together, these four dimensions comprehensively describe the attributes of a 

community, including aspects of the built environment and how it supports community 

social functions. The four dimensions and the variables associated with each are shown in 

Table 2 and are described in more detail in the following sections.
9

Table 2. Initial Set of Indicators Considered for the STPI Analysis, Based on Availability of Data at the National Level

Population & Governance Economics Built Environment Social Dimensions

• Population Size, Density

• Municipal Government 

Jurisdiction

• Budget & Funding 

Authorities

• GDP per Capita

• Personal Income Per Capita

• Employment, by Industry

• Property Values

• Energy

– Power

– Natural Gas

– Liquid Fuels

• Water

• Wastewater

• Transportation

– Road, Bridges, Tunnels

– Public Transit

– Air Transport

– Maritime

• Communications

• Housing

– Year Built

– Occupant Status

• Health Care Infrastructure

– Hospitals

– Hospital Capacity

• Vulnerable Populations

– Population < Age18 and > Age 65

– Language Used at Home

– Foreign Born

– Disability Status

– Single Parent Households

– Senior Citizens Living Alone

– Uninsured

– Unemployment Rate

• Social cohesion

– Religion 

– Violent Crime Rate

– Voter Turnout

– Food Environment

• Other statistics 

– Education Attainment

– Personal Income per Capita
10

B. Identifying Indicators for Population and Governance 

At a conceptual level, governance is related to “the processes of interaction and 

decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the 

creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions” (Hufty 2011, 

405). The jurisdiction and governance dimension attempts to capture relevant 

characteristics of the level of authority (city, district, county, state, etc.) at which resources 

are allocated and services are provided and accessed. The authority to allocate funds and 

personnel is considered a proxy for decision-making authority.

To better understand how communities organize for resilience, we analyzed the 

emergency management of five city governments. The examples chosen were—one major 

metropolitan county (Miami-Dade County, Florida), two medium-sized cities (Tucson, 

Arizona, and Iowa City, Iowa) and two small cities (Fairfax, Virginia, and Hialeah, 

Florida). The emergency management comparison indicates that governance structures for 

emergency management were strongly community and context dependent. Thus, defining 

standard structure or set of indicators or metrics would likely fail to characterize the 

resilience capacity attributed to governance structures of local governments. Recognizing 

the need for an examination of the roles of governance in supporting resilience policy 

planning, identification of management and governance roles and policies are addressed in 

the case studies. Indicators for population size and density are available, and are included 

in Appendix A.

C. Identifying Indicators for Built Environment, Social Dimensions, 

and Economics 

Built environment, social dimensions, and economic development can be considered 

static phenomena for measurement purposes, representing the current conditions on which

resilience planning and implementation depends. 

Built environment resilience includes both the physical infrastructure systems 

themselves, such as housing stock, miles of roadway and pipelines, and energy and 

transportation hub structures, and the interdependence of those systems, which impact their 

ability to become functionally operational after a disaster event.

Community resilience depends on citizen participation and the functional needs of the 

community. Consequently, the social dimensions of this framework attempts to 

characterize the vulnerable population of the community (i.e., those that most need postdisaster support and services but might have the most difficulty accessing them). Citizen 

participation is characterized by community engagement in formal organizations and 

processes such as religious groups and electoral processes. Research indicates that three 

interconnected areas of citizen participation—who participates and why, how 

organizations and other engagement avenues affect participation, and the effects of 
11

participation on community conditions—explain the nature and extent of grass-roots 

participation in hazard mitigation and resilience efforts (Norris et al. 2008). The variables 

listed under social dimensions attempt to capture—directly or as proxies—these attributes 

of a community.

The economic development component of community resilience encompasses 

economic growth, stability of livelihoods, and equitable distribution of income and assets 

within populations. Research has shown that community resilience depends on the volume 

of economic resources accessible to a community as well as the diversity and distribution 

of these resources (Norris et al. 2008). Dependence on a narrow range of natural resources 

can increase variance in incomes and decrease social resilience. In addition, poor 

communities are often not only at greater risk for disaster-related damage, but also less 

successful in mobilizing support and recovering from disasters.

D. Community Characteristics and Resilience Indicators

Appendix A provides a list of characteristics and indicators associated with the four 

dimensions in the conceptual framework—population (but not governance), economics,

built environment, and social dimensions—for which data were available in a form that 

could be used to characterize a community. 

13

2. Identifying Candidate Communities

Using national data sources, a preliminary set of 14 candidate communities were 

identified for characterizing through the selected dimensions and indicators. The selection 

criteria were intended to aid in the selection of communities with geographic, hazard, 

social, and economic diversity.

The goal of Part I of the study was to identify data originating from publicly available 

federal data sources to provide quantitative data for the four dimensions of resilience. For 

example, communities that share similar hazard profiles, geographic region, population 

scale, economic profile, or demographic profile could be considered categories for 

potential study. 

A. Hazard Profile Development for All U.S. Cities

Comprehensive national data sources were used to characterize hazard occurrences in 

the United States. In particular, spatially resolved data sets needed to include the hazard 

type, date of occurrence, magnitude, and damage to life and property. Hazards included in 

this component of the study are sudden onset events that have the potential to become 

rapidly catastrophic. Long-term and slowly evolving events, such as drought and climate 

change, are not considered for hazard profile development. This criteria is specified to 

ensure for well-defined mitigation, response, and recovery phases of an event, such that 

community officials have the ability design and implement policy planning measures for 

all phases of an event.

Based on these criteria, the following hazard types were considered for the study:

• Coastal flooding

• Riverine flooding

• Tornadoes 

• Tropical cyclones

• Wildfires

• Earthquakes 
14

The primary data sources used to extract spatially resolved data for occurrence of these 

hazards were:

• NOAA National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) Storm Event Database (NOAA 

NDCD 2015),

• United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service’s Spatial 

Wildfire Occurrence Data for the United States (Short 2013), and

• Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey (USGS) Advanced 

National Seismic System Comprehensive Catalog for Earthquake Events (USGS 

2015b).

The spatially resolved hazard data was used to develop an across-hazard profile of 

regions, and subsequently communities, that experience the most frequent occurrences of 

the hazard types selected for this study. The steps in the data analysis are described in the 

subsections that follow. Appendix B provides data extraction and processing details.

1. Locate Most Hazardous Counties

Data was extracted for the top 50 counties that most frequently experienced a 

damaging hazard event over the past 22 years (in the time period 1992–20141

). A hazard 

was considered damaging if it caused injury, death, or damage to life or property. 

Earthquakes of magnitude 5.0 or higher, and wildfires of Class D or higher, were 

considered damaging. This approach provided a rigorous, analytical method (subject to 

limitations of the data sources) for identification of locations with the most relevant hazard 

history. Figure 1 shows the historical hazard map corresponding to the top 50 counties that 

most frequently experienced damaging riverine (including flash flooding) or coastal 

flooding over the past 22 years (NOAA NCDC 2015). Figure 2 shows the historical hazard 

map corresponding to the top 50 counties that most frequently experienced damaging 

earthquakes over the past 22 years. Similar maps were created for the remaining four

hazards.

 1 This timeframe corresponds to NOAA’s Storm Center Database, which was used to reconcile historical 

coverage across multiple data sets.
15

Figure 2. Historical Hazard Map of the Top 50 U.S. Counties with the Most Frequent 

Occurrences of Damaging Riverine (including Flash Flooding) and Coastal Flooding, 

1992–2014
16

Figure 2. Historical Hazard Map of the Top 50 U.S. Counties with the Most Frequent 

Occurrences of Damaging Earthquakes, 1992–2014

2. Create Hazard Region Maps

Since the selection of communities for this study is intended to be representative 

rather than comprehensive, the locations of the top 50 counties for each hazard were used

to create hazard region maps. The hazard region maps guided the community selection 

process, and compensated for limitations of the data sets used. Figures 3–8 show the hazard 

maps developed for the six hazard types. This step provided a basis for selecting 

representative communities for determining community characteristics in Part I and 

identifying communities for the case studies in Part II.
17

Note: Regions include the east coast, gulf coast, and Great Lakes regions.

Figure 3. Hazard Region Map for Coastal Flooding

Note: Regions include the Southwest, Iowa, a diagonal strip from Vermont to Texas, and a diagonal strip 

from Alabama to Texas.

Figure 4. Hazard Region Map for Riverine Flooding
18

Note: Regions include the gulf coast and tornado valley 

Figure 5. Hazard Region Map for Tornadoes

Note: Regions include the gulf and Atlantic coasts.

Figure 6. Hazard Region Map for Tropical Cyclones
19

Note: Regions include the west coast, the Southwest, Yellowstone National Park, and Alaska

Figure 7. Hazard Region Map for Earthquakes
20

Note: Regions include the west coast, Southwest, Oklahoma, Florida, parts of West Virginia through

Kentucky, and Alaska.

Figure 8. Hazard Region Map for Wildfires

3. Locate Metropolitan and Smaller Communities in Each Hazard Region

Hazard region maps developed in step 2 were overlaid onto a template map of 

metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas (collectively referred to as MSAs in this 

report)2 from the U.S. Census Bureau. This overlay enabled identification of the 

metropolitan communities in the hazard regions, and provides a regionally diverse, acrosshazard selection of metropolitan and smaller communities that have most frequently 

experienced a damaging hazard in the past 22 years. Figure 9 shows the map of MSAs in 

the United States. Figures 10 and 11 show example overlay maps for tropical cyclones and 

tornadoes.

 2 MSAs are delineated by the Office of Management and Budget for use by federal statistical agencies in 

collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics. The Census Bureau states that “metro area 

contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population, and a micro area contains an urban core of at 

least 10,000 (but less than 50,000) population.”
21

Note: MSAs were deemed to be best suited for a community-level analysis since block-level data collected 

by Census, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and other sources on community social dimensions, 

economic characteristics, and housing are typically at the level of metro and micro areas.

Figure 9. Map of MSAs in the United States

Figure 10. Overlay of Tropical Cyclone Hazard Map with Map of MSAs in the United States 
22

Figure 11. Overlay of Tornado Hazard Map with Map of MSAs in the United States

4. Identify the MSAs with Highest Frequencies of Damaging Hazards

Using the information derived from the overlay maps created in step 3, a list of MSAs

across the United States was developed for communities that most frequently experienced 

a damaging hazard in the past 22 years. The process is described in Appendix B. 

B. Social Vulnerability and Economic Profile

We obtained national-scale community population and demographic indicators from 

U.S. Census data, including data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and 

regional economic data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In addition,

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry’s Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) were used (Agency for Toxic 

Substances and Disease Registry 2015). See Appendix A for a list of national-level data 

identified from federal statistical agencies. The SVI uses U.S. Census data to characterize 

four categories of social vulnerability: socioeconomic, household composition/disability, 

minority status/language, and housing/transportation. The SVI indicates if a county or 

location had underlying vulnerability parameters that have values greater than the 90th

percentile of the national distribution. A higher SVI indicates higher level of social 

vulnerability. The SVI provides a convenient national-scale index that captures broader 

social vulnerability across multiple factors without transforming or weighting specific 

categories of social vulnerability.
23

C. Identifying Initial Candidate Case Study Communities

The hazard-specific regions previously described provide a selection of U.S.

communities that most frequently experienced a damaging hazard of one or more types (of 

the six hazard types selected) in the past 22 years. These communities represent a diversity 

of hazard/disaster histories and geographic regions. Six potential hazards were examined:

riverine flooding, coastal flooding, tornados, tropical cyclones, earthquakes, and wildfires 

(Figures 3–8). 

Fourteen communities were selected from among these hazard-region 

combinations—at least two for each hazard-region—with the aim of identifying a diverse 

set of communities across population, demographic, economic, and social indicators(Table 

3). National-scale population, demographic, economic, and social vulnerability data were

identified for these communities.

3 This group of representative communities was used to 

select seven communities for more detailed characterization, as described in the next 

chapter.

 3 Data were collected from U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Agency for Toxic 

Substances and Disease Registry’s SVI, National Center for Education Statistics, EPA Safe Drinking 

Water Information System, International Building Code Council, and city-level building permit 

information from city officials. 
24

Table 3. Initial Communities Identified for Case Study

Primary 

Hazard Community

Geographic 

Location Population 

Social Vulnerabilities (from CDC Social 

Vulnerability Index)a Major Industriesb

Coastal 

Flooding

Galveston, TX Gulf coast 48,733 High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units)

1. Mining (including oil extraction), 

2. Manufacturing, 3. Professional 

and business services and Finance, 

insurance, real estate

Norfolk, VA Mid-Atlantic 

coast

246,139 High proportion of single parent households

High proportion minority population

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), and persons living in 

institutional group quarters

1. Finance, insurance, real estate, 

2. Manufacturing, 3. Professional 

and business services

Providence, RI Northeast 1,601,208 High proportion of population with limited 

English proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), households with no 

vehicle available

1. Finance, insurance, real estate, 

2. Government, 3.Education, health 

care, and social assistance

Earthquake Los Angeles, CA West coast 12,778,598 High proportion minority population, 

proportion of population with limited English 

proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), crowded housing

1. Finance, insurance, real estate, 

2. Professional and business 

services, 3. Information technology

Portland, OR West coast 2,203,055 High proportion of population with limited 

English proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), households with no 

vehicle available

1. Manufacturing, 2. Finance, 

insurance, real estate, 3. 

Professional and business services
25

Primary 

Hazard Community

Geographic 

Location Population 

Social Vulnerabilities (from CDC Social 

Vulnerability Index)a Major Industriesb

Riverine 

Flooding

Ames, IA Midwest 61,792 High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), proportion of persons 

living in institutional group quarters

1. Government, 2. Manufacturing, 3. 

Finance, insurance, real estate

Memphis, TN Southeast 1,325,160 High proportion of single parent households

High proportion minority population, 

proportion of population with limited English 

proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), crowded housing

1. Manufacturing, 2. Government, 3. 

Professional and business services

Tornado Huntsville, AL Southeast 425,109 No categories indicated in SVI 1. Government, 2. Professional and 

business services, 3. Manufacturing

Moore, OK South central 58,414 No categories indicated in SVI 1. Government, 2. Finance, 

insurance, real estate, 3. 

Professional and business services

Tropical 

Cyclones

Houston, TX Gulf coast 5,730,624 High proportion of persons 17 years or 

younger

High proportion minority population, 

proportion of population with limited English 

proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), crowded housing

1. Mining (including oil extraction), 

2. Manufacturing, 3. Professional 

and business services and Finance, 

insurance, real estate

Mobile, AL Gulf coast 413,432 High proportion of single parent households 1. Manufacturing, 2. Finance, 

insurance, real estate, 3. 

Government

Miami, FL Atlantic coast 5,504,663 High proportion minority population, 

proportion of population with limited English 

proficiency

High proportion of multi-family housing 

structures (10+ units), crowded housing, 

households with no vehicle available 

1. Finance, insurance, real estate, 

2. Professional and business 

services, 3. Government
26

Primary 

Hazard Community

Geographic 

Location Population 

Social Vulnerabilities (from CDC Social 

Vulnerability Index)a Major Industriesb

Wildfire Flagstaff, AZ Southwest 128,575 High proportion of crowded housing 1. Government, 2. Manufacturing, 3. 

Education

Provo, UT Mountain west 540,458 High proportion of persons 17 years or 

younger

High proportion of crowded housing

1. Manufacturing, 2. Finance, 

insurance, real estate, 3. 

Professional and business services, 

and Education, health care and 

social assistance 

a CDC Social Vulnerability Index provides an index that represents the relative vulnerability of U.S. Census tracts or counties. The SVI provides 

information on 14 different social factors, based upon 4 themes of socioeconomic variables, household composition variables, minority status/language 

variables, and housing/transportation variables.

b Major industries represented by 2013 Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP within the metropolitan statistical area.
27

3. Resilience-Relevant Attributes as a Basis for 

Selecting Candidate Case Study Communities

The 14 candidate communities were evaluated for each community’s experiences 

with hazard events and designing and implementing resilience policy measure. Selection 

criteria for the following communities were as follows:

• Primary criteria: candidate communities should be representative of multiple 

U.S. geographic regions and hazards, and the four dimensions.

• Secondary criteria: candidate communities should have a unique or recent 

hazard event or history, economic composition (such as sector-specific 

concentration of economic activity), social vulnerability, or notable efforts or 

activities that aim to increase community resilience.

Based on these, the following seven communities were identified as candidates for 

further characterization: Los Angeles, California; Norfolk, Virginia; Flagstaff, Arizona;

Galveston, Texas; Huntsville, Alabama; Providence, Rhode Island; and Ames, Iowa. This

section provides an overview of each of these seven communities. Appendix C contains 

tables of indicators and SVI ratings. A description of each community is provided to 

supplement the information given in Table 3 and Appendix C.

A. Los Angeles, California

Los Angeles has a population of nearly 3.9 million people. Los Angeles’s SVI value

is 4, representing potential social vulnerabilities due to a large minority population, high 

proportion of households where English is not the primary language, a high proportion of 

multi-family housing, and a high proportion of housing with more people than rooms 

available. The Los Angeles regional economy is the second largest in the country ($827

billion GDP), and the city maintains an annual $8.1 billion budget. The City of Los Angeles 

and the Greater Los Angeles region may experience earthquakes, wildfires, flooding, 

mudslides, and tsunamis. Notable events include the 1994 Northridge earthquake (6.7 

magnitude) and major wildfires such as the 2009 Station Fire (161,000 acres, 209 

structures, and 2 deaths) and the 2006 Day Fire (163,000 acres, 11 structures).

The city has taken several notable actions to increase community resilience. In 

December 2014, the mayor issued Resilience by Design, which identifies resilience policy 

gaps and actions to address them. The city engaged the United States Geological Survey 

(USGS) to provide a scientific basis to address the report issued by the mayor. The Los 
28

Angeles County Department of Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Program, in coordination with RAND, University of California at Los Angeles, and the 

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, designed and implemented a study that examined 16 

communities within Los Angeles county that were assigned to an experimental resilience 

training group or a control group. The report provides outcome indicators to measure 

changes in community resilience due to experimental interventions (Eisenman et al 2014).

B. Flagstaff, Arizona

Flagstaff is a rural-suburban community with a population of nearly 69,000 residents. 

This population is well-educated with nearly 91% and 42% of the population attaining high 

school level education and bachelor’s degrees, respectively. The city has a SVI index of 1, 

representing potential vulnerabilities related to a high proportion of housing with more 

people than rooms available. Commercial and residential building stock is relatively new, 

with only 8% of the housing constructed before 1960, and current permit data suggesting 

little new development (2013–14 saw a 9% reduction in permits issued). The City of 

Flagstaff and surrounding region have a $5.2 billion GDP, of which 28% is government 

services. Manufacturing; finance/real estate; education and health care; and arts, recreation 

and tourism each represent 11–14% of economic activity. The annual city budget is $238

million. 

The city is located in a mountainous and forested region of Arizona, and is surrounded 

by Coconino National Forest. Due to the dry local climate and forested environment, 

Flagstaff’s primary hazard is wildfires with periodic flash flooding. The Slide Fire in 2014 

(21,000 acres, cut off road between Flagstaff and Sedona) and Schultz Fire in 2010 (15,000 

acres, near Flagstaff in Coconino National Forest) are recent fires in proximity to Flagstaff 

that presented significant risks to the city, but ultimately did not result in major losses in 

the urban and suburban developed area. 

Flagstaff resilience planning is based on their primary hazard (wildfire) and the 

diversity of land owners and managers in the region. The city land is managed by private 

owners and municipal government. Forested areas outside the city are generally managed 

by the U.S. Forest Service (Coconino National Forest), the National Park Service manages 

two national monuments in the greater Flagstaff region (Walnut Canyon and Sunset 

Crater), the Arizona State Land Department manages nearby State trust lands, and tribal 

government manages the land of the Navajo Nation Reservation northeast of the city. The 

diverse set of stakeholders and land managers in the greater Flagstaff region presents a 

unique challenge for designing and implementing land use policies to support community 

resilience goals. 

The City of Flagstaff has taken steps to address resilience in the city. Notable actions 

include a city resilience and preparedness study (City of Flagstaff 2012), which includes 

information on regional climate change impacts, issuing local bonds to fund wildfire 
29

mitigation activities on local and federal lands (Vock 2014), and partnerships with local 

fire authorities and community associations for joint wildfire mitigation planning. (e.g.,

Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership and Ponderosa Fire Advisory Council 2005).

C. Norfolk, Virginia

Norfolk has a mid-sized urban city population of approximately 246,000. Norfolk’s 

SVI value is 5, which indicates potential for social vulnerability due to a high proportion 

of single-parent households, a large minority population, and a high proportion of 

apartment-style housing, a low proportion of the population with vehicle access, and a high 

proportion of individuals living in institutionalized quarters. Building stock in Norfolk is 

relatively old with nearly half of buildings constructed before 1959 and few structures 

replaced on an annual basis (800–900 new starts per year in 2013–14). Norfolk is a major 

military city and is home to Naval Station Norfolk, which is a major employment center 

and land manager for Norfolk’s coastal lands. With a GDP of $88.6 billion in the MSA, 

government services represent nearly a third of the region’s economic activity. The city 

government’s annual budget is $1.1 billion.

Norfolk primarily faces coastal and riverine flooding hazards that can be associated 

with tropical cyclone hazards. Hurricane Isabel (2003, $1.9 billion damage) resulted in the 

State of Virginia issuing mandatory evacuation orders, the U.S. Navy moving ships to sea 

to avoid potential damage, and coastal flooding throughout coastal Virginia (including

Norfolk), and riverine flooding throughout the state. Norfolk is projected to be exposed to 

significant sea-level rise through the combination of sea-level rise with local land 

subsidence. (Eggleston and Pope 2013; Sallenger, Doran, and Howd 2012). Low-lying 

assets, including many military installations and assets, are expected to be directly affected 

without mitigating actions.

The City of Norfolk is taking several steps to address these risks. Norfolk is taking 

into consideration climate change impacts such as sea-level rise in the update to the city’s

general plan (NRDC 2011). The city also plans to conduct a coastal flooding study that 

identifies mitigation opportunities (City of Norfolk, Virginia 2015b).

D. Galveston, Texas

The City of Galveston has a population of nearly 49,000, whereas neighboring 

Houston has a population of 2.2 million. A case study of Galveston would also consider 

the regional influences of the City of Houston and economic activity within the greater 

Houston area. Galveston has a SVI value of 1, representing potential vulnerabilities related 

to a high proportion of housing with more people than rooms available. The city is part of 

the Houston metropolitan area, which maintains a $517 billion GDP, primarily from

mining, oil, gas (23%), and manufacturing (22%). The City of Galveston’s economic 

activity is based on wholesale and retail trade (50%), health care services (24%) and hotels 
30

and accommodation (9%) (Resilient Rhode Island Act of 2014 2015). The city maintains 

an annual budget of $108 million.

Galveston is subject to hurricane and other tropical cyclone hazard events, due to its 

location as a barrier island. The September 1900 Galveston hurricane is recognized as the 

deadliest disaster in U.S. history. The category 4 hurricane resulted in 6,000–12,000 deaths 

and the destruction of over 3,600 structures (NOAA National Ocean Service 2015). More 

recently in 2008, Hurricane Ike and the associated storm surge, coastal inundation, and 

flooding, especially on the bay side of the island, caused significant property damage and 

an estimated 17 deaths (Zane et al. 2011). A review of public materials by the City of 

Galveston did not identify resilience activities. Recent efforts include a U.S. Global Change 

Research Program workshop on climate change preparedness and resilience held in 

October 2014 (Islam, Merrell, and Seitz 2010).

E. Providence, Rhode Island

The City of Providence contains approximately 178,000 people, while the combined 

city and county contains approximately 800,000 people. Providence County’s SVI value is 

3, which represents potential vulnerabilities originating from the number of households 

where English is not the primary language, multi-family housing, and households with 

limited vehicle access. The economic activity of the region is dispersed across a large 

metropolitan area, which includes nearly all of Rhode Island and parts of southern 

Massachusetts (Bristol County). The Providence metropolitan statistical area maintains a 

GDP of $58 billion, which is primarily financial and real estate, government, and education 

and health care activity. The City of Providence maintains an annual budget of $678

million. 

Providence is vulnerable to flooding and coastal inundation. A notable historical 

hazard mitigation effort was the construction of a hurricane flood barrier spanning the 

Providence River in 1966 to protect the city from storm surge and coastal flooding during 

hurricane events (Joukowsky Institute for Archaeology and the Ancient World 2015). The 

construction of the Fox Point Hurricane Barrier was included in the Flood Control Act of 

1958, with the Federal Government contributing 70% of the cost, and state and local 

government contributing the remaining 30%. (City of Providence Rhode Island 2015a).

More recently, the city of Providence’s Emergency Management Agency is working with 

the Northeast Disaster Recovery Information X-Change to develop the Rhode Island 

Business Alliance (City of Providence Rhode Island 2015b). The alliance is focused on 

promoting best business practices and identifying public-private collaboration 

opportunities to support local business disaster preparedness. At the state level, the Rhode 

Island State Legislature passed the Resilient Rhode Island Act of 2014 (2015). This act 

describes the state’s policy for climate change mitigation, vulnerability assessments to 

support local climate change resilience, designates the Department of Administration’s
31

Division of Statewide Planning as the coordination agency responsible for adaptation 

measures, and creates a state scientific advisory council to review climate change 

mitigation and adaptation programs.

F. Huntsville, Alabama

Huntsville has a population of roughly 180,000. Huntsville’s SVI value is 0, 

indicating minimal social vulnerability. The Huntsville metropolitan area’s GDP ($22.9

billion) is dominated by government services ($6.0 billion), professional and business 

services ($4.8 billion), and manufacturing ($3.3 billion). Huntsville is home to NASA’s

Marshall Space Flight Center, which employs over 2,400 civil service employees and 

supports thousands more as NASA contractors (U.S. Office of Personnel Management 

2015). The city’s FY 2015 budget ($514 million) and tax revenue for the same year ($197

million) both fall around the median for the selected communities.

In April 2011, northern and central Alabama experienced an outbreak of severe 

tornado events over the course of 4 days. On one of these days (April 27), the National 

Weather Service reported 39 tornadoes in the Huntsville Forecast Area, including EF4 and

EF5 tornadoes (on the Enhanced Fujita [EF] scale) and peak winds of 210 mph. The entire 

outbreak, dubbed the Super Dixie Outbreak, resulted in 354 deaths (including 72 deaths 

from the EF5 tornado that hit Madison County, Alabama) and over $1 billion in damage 

throughout the southeastern United States (NOAA NWS 2015). The Huntsville-Madison 

County Emergency Management Agency lists thunderstorms, hazardous materials

incidents, floods, and heat waves as other hazards of concern based on probability and 

impact (Madison County Emergency Management Agency 2015).

Following the 2011 tornado outbreak, the City of Huntsville has taken steps to prepare 

for future events relating to multiple hazards. The Cyber Huntsville Initiative and the 

Energy Huntsville Initiative state are intended to increase the resilience of Huntsville’s 

cyber infrastructure and energy infrastructure (Robertson 2011).One of the motivations for 

these initiatives is the extensive power outages that Huntsville experienced during the 2011 

tornado outbreak. The City of Huntsville has also been proactive in reducing floodplain 

risks through the relocation of houses, the development of watershed models, and the 

acquisition and protection of flood prone areas (City of Huntsville, Alabama, 2015). 

G. Ames, Iowa

Ames has a population of about 61,000 people. It is predominantly a university town 

with the Iowa State University being the main employer, and that affects many of Ames’ 

social and demographic characteristics, such as young median age of 23.8 years. Ames has 

a higher than average literacy rate, and over 97% of adults attain high school graduation or 

higher. Ames has a low level of social vulnerability with an SVI value of 2, representing 

potential vulnerabilities due to housing and transportation. Ames residential building stock 
32

is relatively new with 80% of residential buildings constructed after 1960. Ames also has 

a high proportion of housing structures with 10+ units and a high proportion of

institutionalized quarters. Ames is one of the top ten cities in the country where the highest 

percentage of residents walk to work, indicating the possibility of low vehicle ownership

rates. 

The City of Ames operates on a budget of $190 million. Ames is home of Iowa State 

University of Science and Technology, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National 

Animal Disease Center, Ames National Laboratory (which specializes in research related 

to materials, energy, and environment), and the main offices of the Iowa Department of 

Transportation. State and Federal Government institutions are the largest employers in 

Ames.

The primary natural hazards facing the city of Ames are riverine flooding and 

tornadoes, and flooding historically has been the more damaging event. The topography of 

the city and the surrounding area combine to create a floodplain in the center of the city. 

The regional hydrology concentrates precipitation in large, single rainfall events. In August 

2010, 14 inches of rainfall over the course of 4 days led to one of the most costly natural 

disasters experienced by Ames. Iowa State University estimated the university experienced 

about $40–50 million in damage (Haas 2010). In response, the City of Ames commissioned 

a Flood Mitigation Study in 2011 and, with community input and participation, has 

implemented floodplain zoning restrictions and other mitigation strategies recommended 

by the study report (City of Ames 2014a; 2014b). The Climate Science program at Iowa 

State University has also conducted research into Climate Change Adaptation and 

Resilience using Ames as a case study (Anderson 2011).
33

4. Summary of Findings for Part 1

Four dimensions of community resilience-population and governance, economic 

development, built environment, and social dimensions-were used to evaluate and select 

communities with available data. Natural hazard exposure was treated as an exogenous 

factor that influences policy and investment decision-making within a community. The 

combination of exogenous natural hazard exposure with the endogenous community 

characteristics collectively describe the exposure and vulnerability, respectively, 

representing the risks posed by hazards to a community. 

We next used the community resilience characteristics in combination with publicly 

available national-level data to identify patterns of community resilience characteristics 

that would support the selection of candidate communities for further study. This process 

aimed to select a diverse set of communities that represent diversity across hazard profile, 

social and economic characteristics, and built environment characteristics. 

Data to characterize communities was lacking in some areas, but the available data 

was used to identify a diverse set of candidate case study communities. Community 

indicator data provided context on the candidate case study communities, however 

additional examination of governance, management and policy design processes is 

required to understand the connection between contextual factors and resilience planning 

and policy outcomes. Information from NOAA’s National Climactic Data Center, USGS’s

Advanced National Seismic System Comprehensive Catalog for Earthquake Events, and 

U.S. Forest Service’s spatial hazard data for wildland fire hazards were used to identify of 

historical hazard events. Social and economic indicators were obtained from the U.S.

Census Bureau and BEA, and integrated social vulnerability data was obtained from the 

CDC’s Social Vulnerability Index product. Data to support characterization of the built 

environment in communities was difficult to obtain. Most built environment data was 

owned and maintained by municipal governments and not readily available. Due to this 

challenge, data for all infrastructure and building types was not acquired. These data were

sufficient to identify a preliminary set of communities that were diverse across hazard,

social, and economic profiles. Additional examination of governance characteristics and

resilience policies and programs is necessary to further refine the preliminary set of 

candidate case study communities. This examination is discussed in further detail in part 2 

of the report.

35

Part 2: Case Studies of Community Resilience 

Policy and Planning Activities

The community case studies provide insights of ongoing resilience policy design and 

planning activities in three communities to illustrate how communities with different 

challenges are addressing resilience: Los Angeles, California; Flagstaff, Arizona; and 

Norfolk, Virginia. These three communities were selected from candidate communities 

identified in part 1 of the report, to address differences in hazards and community profiles. 

The community case studies describe the community resilience policy planning processes 

and implement approaches and programs to improve resilience. Observations, based on

discussions with city officials, are presented here to set the stage for the case studies that 

follow.

Resilience efforts were seen to be relatively new for the three cities, and the case 

studies illustrate this. For example, Norfolk’s approach to resilience planning is in nascent 

stages, and provides examples of how a community is currently attempting to adapt best 

practices in community resilience to its own specific local challenges (such as the need for 

economic diversification to counter the long-term effect of sea-level rise). 

At this point in time, the communities’ resilience initiatives are largely being planned 

and implemented as part of their hazard mitigation efforts. For example, the city of 

Flagstaff’s collaboration with the U.S. Forest Service in proactive forest management to 

reduce the risk of wildfire (the biggest natural hazard faced by the community and 

surrounding areas) is the community’s primary resilience focus; this initiative comprises 

actions taken by the city towards proactive forest health management to protect the 

community from long-term impacts of wildland fires.

Each case study provides a description of the role of the municipal departments 

involved. City staff supporting resilience planning and program implementation were 

observed to be incorporating resilience as a concept in existing job functions and 

responsibilities. Staff involved in resilience activities were located in the mayor’s office, 

the city manager’s office, and other city offices, or were elected officials. Norfolk is the 

only city currently with a new full-time resilience-focused position occupied by the city’s 

Chief Resilience Officer. However, in all cases, strong executive leadership or a champion 

was identified as the main motivation behind the community’s development or 

implementation of resilience plans. 

Examples of programmatic efforts that have led to community-scale or regional 

hazard risk reduction are given. For example, Los Angeles’s work to reduce building 
36

vulnerabilities to seismic hazards through mandatory retrofit policies is described in some 

detail to highlight the local policymaking process involved, and the ultimate decision to 

make certain building upgrades mandatory while opting to make other upgrades voluntary.

The case studies in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 identify municipal resilience planning and 

implementation of the three communities. The case studies are based on discussions with 

city officials and other stakeholders who had a role in planning and implementing resilience 

initiatives. Discussions included a broad perspective of outcomes of resilience-focused 

initiatives, aiming to highlight multiple policy-related outcomes including development 

and implementation of codes and standards. Other resilience outcomes considered include 

enhancing risk awareness, facilitating engagement with city stakeholders, enabling 

collaboration between entities that have historically operated in distinctly separate 

jurisdictions, providing community policy decision makers with objective information, and 

identifying budgetary support for resilience initiatives. The discussion topics are provided 

in Appendix D, and a list of contacts is provided in Appendix E. Discussions were 

supplemented with a review of the relevant literature and planning documents developed 

by the communities. Chapter 8 summarizes the potential best practices derived from the 

individual community analyses and presents overarching findings.
37

5. Case Study of the City of Los Angeles 

The city of Los Angeles is unique in terms of its population and budget. It is the 

second largest city in the United States (3.8 million) (U.S. Census Bureau 2014), and the 

metropolitan area represents the second largest economy in terms of GDP ($820 billion)

(U.S. BEA 2014). Los Angeles also has a foreign-born population of approximately 1.5 

million, and the number of individuals who do not speak English at home is approximately 

2.2 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Housing in Los Angeles is very dense; 28 percent 

of all housing units are in structures that contain 20 or more units (U.S. Census Bureau 

2013). 

A. Natural Hazard Experience

Due to its location on active faults, its distinctively warm climate, and its proximity 

to the Angeles National Forest, Los Angeles is prone to earthquakes, landslides, floods, 

and wildland fires. In February 1978, the La Crescenta community of Los Angeles County 

experienced 9 inches of rain resulting in flooding and mudslides that led to 20 fatalities

(County of Los Angeles Hazards and Threats 2012). In October 1993, Southern California, 

including Los Angeles County, experienced a series of wildfires that resulted in 4 fatalities 

and $1 billion in damages (California Office of Emergency Services n.d).

The last major disaster experienced by the city of Los Angeles was the Northridge 

earthquake in 1994, which registered at a magnitude of 6.7. Sixty fatalities, more than 7,000 

injuries (U.S. Geological Survey 2015a), and over $20 billion in insured losses were 

sustained—greater than any other earthquake in U.S. history (Daniell et al. 2012). The city 

also experienced an outbreak of valley fever (coccidioidomycosis) following the 

earthquake, which was most likely caused by exposure to spore-contaminated clouds of 

dust created by the earthquake-induced landslides (Schneider, Hajjeh, and Spiegel 1997). 

Dozens of hospitals experienced considerable damage in the earthquake, resulting in 

amendments to strengthen the Alfred E. Alquist Hospital Facilities Seismic Safety Act of 

1973, which dictates seismic requirements for hospitals and deadlines for compliance

(Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 2005). The significant financial 

impact on the insurance industry resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of 

homeowners’ policies that were issued because California law mandates that insurance 

companies must offer earthquake insurance if they sell homeowners’ insurance. In 1996, 

the State of California formed the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) to issue 

earthquake policies through participating insurance companies that cover only basic 

structural losses (Wiley 2000).
38

B. Resilience Policy Development

The damage inflicted by the Northridge earthquake highlighted the vulnerability of 

the city’s soft story structures, non-ductile (brittle) concrete structures and water 

infrastructure to seismic events that are prone to sudden failure and possible collapse. The 

risks presented by the vulnerability of these types of structures in Northridge earthquake

also occurred in international disasters such as the 2011 Christchurch earthquake where 

two non-ductile concrete structures collapsed, and in the 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake,

where many deaths were attributed to failing concrete structures.

Although major earthquake events are fairly infrequent, the region’s population is 

fairly risk-aware due to regular annual exercises, such as the annual Great ShakeOut 

earthquake drill. The drill presents a scenario where a 7.8-magnitude earthquake strikes the 

Los Angeles region. City government leaders estimate that without mitigation actions to 

improve structural integrity of the built environment and critical infrastructure, a 7.8-

magnitude event would lead to an estimated 1,800 deaths, and $213 billion in economic 

losses ($47.7 billion from shaking damage, $65 billion from fire damage, $96.2 billion

from business interruption, and $4.3 billion from traffic delays). 

The city’s current mayor, Eric Garcetti, has focused on the persistent risks posed to 

the city’s population by vulnerabilities in the built environment. Much of the resilience 

activity in Los Angeles has been initiated through leadership from the mayor’s office. The 

Resilience by Design report (City of Los Angeles, Office of the Mayor 2014) represents 

years of stakeholder outreach, technical analysis, and policy formulation by multiple city 

agencies and input from federal scientists. 

Resilience by Design outlines four areas of seismic vulnerability in which the city 

should invest resources in improving its resilience: soft-first-story buildings, non-ductile 

reinforced concrete buildings, the water system infrastructure, and the telecommunications 

infrastructure. Under each of these four areas, the report outlines recommended initiatives 

to achieve their overarching resilience goals. Highlights of those recommendations follow:

• Buildings (“Strengthen Our Buildings”)

– Mandatory retrofit of soft-first-story buildings

– Mandatory retrofit of non-ductile concrete buildings

– Adopt a “Back to Business” Program to supplement building inspection 

workforce

– Voluntary rating of buildings based upon U.S. Resiliency Council system

• Water Infrastructure (“Fortify Our Water System”)

– Protect water infrastructure (aqueducts) importing water to Los Angeles

– Develop alternate water sources for firefighting
39

– Protect and develop local water storage

• Telecommunications (“Enhance Reliable Telecommunications”)

– Enhance telecommunication coverage in a disaster via partnerships with 

cellular service providers

– Strengthen cellular towers

– Protect electrical infrastructure at fault crossings to prevent cascading 

failures

– Advance and implement earthquake early warning technology

1. Resilience Policy Planning Team Structure

Resilience policy and initiative planning originates from priorities set by the mayor 

and initiatives are driven by leadership from the mayor’s office. The Deputy Mayor for 

Public Safety and Law Enforcement was charged with coordination and implementation of 

the city’s overall resilience plan, while the mayor maintained final executive authority over 

policies recommended in the Resilience by Design report. In addition to establishing this 

charge to the deputy mayor, the mayor appointed a Science Advisor for Seismic Safety. 

Dr. Lucy Jones of U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) was appointed to this position through 

a Technical Assistance Agreement with USGS. The Science Advisor for Seismic Safety 

directly advised the mayor and participated in outreach efforts for resilience policy 

recommendations put forward by the mayor’s office. Profiles of these and other key 

stakeholders follow:

• Mayor Eric Garcetti has played a critical role in initiating and championing the 

Resilience by Design process. He was instrumental in appointing Dr. Jones as 

the science advisor for seismic safety for the city. The mayor also made some 

final decisions about the implementation, such as whether retrofitting of 

buildings is mandatory or voluntary.

• Dr. Lucy Jones, a seismologist at USGS, was appointed as the independent 

science advisor for seismic safety to the City of Los Angeles. She was crucial in 

communicating the scientific data from previous earthquakes and forecasting the 

impacts of future earthquakes. She was involved in the developing Resilience by 

Design, and its implementation.

• Deputy Mayor Eileen Decker coordinated the implementation of the Resilience 

by Design recommendations. Ms. Decker was responsible for assembling the 

interagency team, departmental recommendations, and coordinating all 

municipal efforts resulting in the resilience policy recommendations considered 

by the mayor.
40

The deputy mayor formed the Mayoral Seismic Task Force to develop 

recommendations for the Mayor’s Resilience by Design report. Through the deputy 

mayor’s direction, multiple city government agencies developed policy proposals. 

Agencies included the Mayor’s office, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the 

Department of Public Works (Bureau of Sanitation and Bureau of Engineering), the Los 

Angeles Fire Department, the Department of General Services (Office of Public Safety), 

the Department of City Planning, the Housing and Community Investment Department, 

and groups external to city government such as telecommunications infrastructure owners 

and operators, and USGS. 

2. Soft-Story and Non-ductile Concrete Structure Mandatory Retrofits

a. Motivation and Goal

Non-ductile concrete structures contain structural components, such as columns and 

frame connectors, that are brittle and prone to sudden failure in strong shaking events, and 

buildings constructed before 1980 are at risk of damage and potential collapse in seismic 

events. These types of buildings were designed prior to the enactment of the 1976 Uniform 

Building code that meets the Basic Safety Objective in ASCE 41. The Northridge 

earthquake also demonstrated weakness in soft-story structures, particularly residential 

structures. Several non-ductile structures failed to various degrees as well (i.e., hospital, 

high school, hotel, and office building). International earthquake events since the 

Northridge earthquake, notably the 2011 Christchurch 6.3 magnitude earthquake, have 

experienced non-ductile concrete structure failures, which have led to significant loss of 

life. The mayor’s office believes that in future earthquakes, even if soft-story and nonductile concrete structures do not fail catastrophically, many structures will be damaged 

and need to be demolished and rebuilt.

In 1933, a 6.3-magnitude earthquake struck Long Beach, California, causing major 

damage to unreinforced masonry structures. In 1981, the City of Los Angeles passed a firstever mandatory retrofit ordinance for all unreinforced masonry buildings (Federal 

Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] 2009; California Seismic Safety Commission 

2004; McMilla 1991). The State of California followed with a state-level requirement in 

1986.

b. Policy Design and Implementation Process

The Mayoral Seismic Task Force used collapse data from the Northridge earthquake 

to determine which buildings were the most vulnerable. The analysis indicated that 

approximately 12,000 soft-story buildings and 1,500 non-ductile concrete structures 

needed to be retrofit to address these seismic vulnerabilities. The study also found that 

many of the soft-story buildings were affordable housing units, which introduced a 
41

significant barrier to recovery for Los Angeles’s vulnerable populations. The potential 

adverse impact on vulnerable populations was of particular importance for city officials.

The science advisor and deputy mayor engaged in months of stakeholder outreach by 

meeting with business associations to discuss these structural vulnerabilities, consequences 

of building failure, and actions required to address these risks. Technical input and realistic 

disaster scenarios were critical elements of the outreach process. Using the existing Great 

ShakeOut scenario, stakeholder outreach focused on translating technical information on 

the seismic risks into potential life, safety, and economic consequences for each specific 

stakeholder group the city was engaging. Realistic, non-catastrophic scenarios presented 

feasible and economic tradeoffs that could be discussed with stakeholder groups. 

Discussions focused on communicating the technical requirements for addressing 

vulnerabilities in structural design, understanding tradeoffs in economic performance of 

these resilience investments, and identifying policy design accommodations that could be 

made to address concerns raised by multiple stakeholder groups (e.g., return on investment, 

principal-agent conflicts in cost recovery for retrofits, and timing of retrofit upgrades with 

existing upgrade schedule).

c. Outcomes

All outcomes from this initiative are reflected in the Mayor’s resilience policy 

recommendations in Resilience by Design. Three major structural mitigation 

recommendations and a recovery recommendation resulted from this initiative:

• Adopt ordinance requiring mandatory soft-story building retrofits: The 

mayor recommended that the city council adopt a mandatory retrofit ordinance 

for soft-story buildings. The recommended ordinance requires retrofit of all softfirst-story buildings except for single-family homes or multi-unit structures with 

3 or fewer units. The recommended ordinance provides a 5-year compliance 

period. A draft ordinance is presented in Resilience by Design. The ordinance 

was adopted by the City Council and Mayor on October 9, 2015.

• Adopt ordinance requiring mandatory non-ductile concrete structure 

retrofit: The mayor recommended that the city council adopt a mandatory 

retrofit ordinance for concrete buildings. The recommended ordinance requires 

mandatory retrofitting for all concrete buildings designed to a building code 

prior to the 1976 Uniform Building Code, and requires a minimum standard 

specified in the Basic Safety Objective in ASCE 41. Building owners are 

required to perform a structural engineering evaluation within 5 year of the 

enactment of the ordinance, and then have 25 years to complete the retrofit. A 

draft ordinance is presented in Resilience by Design. The ordinance was adopted 

by the City Council and Mayor on October 9, 2015.
42

• Adopt voluntary building rating system: The mayor’s office recommended

the voluntary adoption of the U.S. Resiliency Council’s rating system for 

building seismic resilience. As part of this policy recommendation, the Mayor’s 

Office directed the city government to adopt the rating system for city-owned 

buildings and to identify how dissemination of the building ratings could be 

used to inform the public.

• Supplement the city’s building inspection capacity for major earthquake 

events: The mayor’s office proposed the development of a “Back to Business 

Program” that aims to provide additional private-sector emergency inspectors to 

supplement public building inspectors to accelerate building safety inspections 

after an event. This effort build on a model program developed by the city of 

Glendale. The recommendation aims to reduce business interruption due to a 

backlog of inspections required after an event.

3. Water Infrastructure Retrofits

a. Motivation and Goal

The mayor’s office requested that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 

(LADWP) develop a program to ensure the resilience of water infrastructure to seismic 

hazards. In coordination with the mayor’s office, LADWP developed the Seismic 

Resilience and Sustainability Program in April 2014. The program’s efforts focused on 

defining the characteristics of a seismically resilient water infrastructure for Los Angeles, 

identifying current resilience status of the water infrastructure, and identifying actions to 

improve water infrastructure seismic resilience.

b. Policy Design and Implementation Process

The LADWP Seismic Resilience and Sustainability Program was tasked with 

providing recommendations to the mayor’s office by September 2014 in four specific 

areas: (1) water supply infrastructure, (2) resilient piping networks, (3) firefighting water 

supply, and (4) local water supply sources. The program was staffed with 20 managers 

from across the LADWP organization that could develop holistic recommendations outside 

of traditional organizational and management boundaries. These managers met multiple 

times each month, holding leadership meetings and convening smaller technical working 

sessions. Program leadership required mandatory attendance from each of LADPW’s 

divisions and offices in each meeting. 

Resilience by Design defined a near-term goal of September 2014 for the LADWP 

program, but staff indicated that the organizational mechanism created by this mayoral 

initiative could also support other improvements to the resilience of the Los Angeles Water 

System. The program focused on seismic resilience, but the management team anticipates 
43

that it will evolve to incorporate additional hazards. The long-term and organizationally 

integrative perspective informed many of the program’s recommendations for activities to 

address ongoing risks to the city’s water infrastructure.

c. Overview of Program Summary Report

A September 2014 summary report on the program, Water System Seismic Resilience 

and Sustainability Program, outlined the recommendations to enhance water system 

resilience. A copy of the report was provided to STPI for use in this study. The 

recommendations informed the water infrastructure chapter of the mayor’s Resilience by 

Design policy report (City of Los Angeles, California, Office of the Mayor 2014). The 

Seismic Resilience and Sustainability Program estimated that $12–15 billion in funding 

over two decades would be required to upgrade water system infrastructure to address 

seismic hazards.

1) Task and Goal

LADWP was asked to focus efforts on three tasks: (1) defining characteristics of a 

seismically resilient Los Angeles Water System, (2) identifying the current status of the 

water system seismic resilience, and (3) recognizing aspects which may improve water 

system seismic resilience (City of Los Angeles, California, Office of the Mayor 2014). 

The program defined seismic resilience and sustainability as achieved when the water 

system “has the systematic ability to provide water services in a manner allowing the 

community to effectively respond to earthquake events, recover quickly from them, and 

adapt to changing conditions, while also taking measures to reduce future seismic risks” 

and “is prepared to manage all threatening seismic hazards in a manner that minimizes and 

contains the hazard impacts while continuing a comprehensive approach to natural resource 

conservation and maintaining environmental quality.” According to the report, the program 

measured resilience as the extent of economic loss and the time lapse between a hazard 

event and recovery of water system functions. An event that requires several years from 

which to recover was termed a disaster. 

A service-based model was developed for understanding how seismic hazards and 

events affect the ability of LADWP and city water infrastructure to deliver water to various 

customers. The report divides recovery into five water-related services that may be affected 

by a hazard event: water delivery, water quality, water quantity, water for firefighting, and 

system functionality. Infrastructure performance and functionality before and after a 

seismic event are measures of system resilience used by the organization. The goal of a 

resilient system, as defined by the program, is to reduce both the number of services lost 

in an event and the time it takes to restore any lost services to the population. 
44

2) Analytical Findings

The program used a service-based model to analyze various restoration, service 

interruption, and infrastructure upgrade scenarios. The program first used the service-based 

model to understand the performance of water infrastructure in the 1994 Northridge 

earthquake in Los Angeles (Figure 12). Water delivery, which was restored first, was lost 

to 22% of Los Angeles customers following the earthquake. Water quality was lost to 100% 

of customers immediately following the earthquake because of a city-wide notice to boil 

water before consumption. Restoration was incremental. Functionality service dropped to 

34% immediately after the event and was restored to 60% with repairs immediately after 

the event. Full restoration of functionality was achieved with the completion of the Granada 

Trunk Line Relocation. 

Source: LADWP (2014). 

Figure 12. Los Angeles Water System Service Restorations Following the 1994 Northridge 

Earthquake (magnitude = 6.7)

The program concluded that the water system was considered highly resilient to an 

event like the Northridge earthquake because the city was able to restore functionality

within a matter of days. The report notes, however, that performance of the water system 

is based on severity of the earthquake and its proximity to network vulnerabilities.
45

To examine how an event greater in scale than the Northridge earthquake would 

impact water infrastructure, the program used the 2008 Great ShakeOut scenario (Figure 

13). As a result of damage to the Los Angeles Aqueduct, the Colorado River Aqueduct, 

and the California Aqueduct, the program projected that a Great ShakeOut scenario would 

result in a loss of imported water to Los Angeles and could take up to a year to restore, 

resulting in a loss of water system functionality. It would take several weeks to restore 

water delivery, water quality, and water for firefighting, and water rationing would be in 

place for approximately 15 months. The program estimated that full restoration of physical 

systems would take decades.

The report also outlines the economic impact of the estimated service losses. In the 

event of a San Andreas earthquake, the program estimated $53 billion in direct and indirect 

economic losses as a result of water losses, approximately one quarter of total economic 

losses ($213 billion). The report indicates that economic losses attributed to reduction or 

loss of water services would have the greatest impact of all effects considered in the Great 

ShakeOut scenario. Acceptable service losses, target restoration times, and implementation 

strategies still need to be determined.

Source: From LADWP (2014), based on analysis presented by Davis and O’Rourke (2011).

Figure 13. Service Restoration for the Los Angeles Water System Following the Proposed 

Great ShakeOut Scenario Earthquake (magnitude = 7.8)
46

d. Resilience by Design Outcomes

The Resilience by Design report recommends six major strategic and organizational 

changes as necessary to achieve a seismically resilient water system: (1) Establish an ongoing task force within LADWP to oversee progress and provide staff resource, (2) prepare 

a Program implementation plan, (3) conduct seismic hazard evaluation and monitoring 

along the LA Aqueducts, (4) develop a seismically resilient pipe network, (5) increase 

water storage and supply reliability by improving San Andreas fault infrastructure 

crossings, evaluating dam safety, identifying alternative firefighting water supplies, and 

developing local supply sources, and (6) enhancing LADWP’s emergency response 

capabilities (LADWP 2014).

The mayor’s office established the following actions and decisions to improve the 

city’s water infrastructure:

1. Develop an alternative water system for firefighting, such as using reclaimed 

water or pressurized seawater, and building seismically resilient pipes

2. Fortify the Los Angeles Aqueduct, upon which Los Angeles is dependent, by 

developing alternatives for crossing the San Andreas Fault

3. Fortify other aqueducts by creating a task force with outside entities that are 

responsible for the other aqueducts on which Los Angeles relies

4. Fortify water storage by maintaining the Los Angeles DWP dams at an adequate 

level

5. Increase local water sources through activities such as storm water capture, 

water conservation, water recycling, and contamination remediation projects 

6. Create a seismic resilient pipeline network by using seismic resilient pipes 

across the city, beginning with pipes that serve essential facilities and services

7. Implement a Resilience by Design Program at DWP that will focus on both 

power and water systems and will maintain the institutional emphasis on 

seismic resilience

8. Develop a statewide seismic resilience bond measure that can be used for 

fortification of the water infrastructure by working with state, local, and 

regional partners (City of Los Angeles, California, Office of the Mayor 2014)

9. Document lessons learned from case study community applicable to other 

locations
47

C. Observations

• Leadership: The City of Los Angeles has a strong top-down leadership structure, 

where the Mayor’s office drives the planning, design, publication, and 

implementation of resilience initiatives. 

• Characterize community: Independent, scientifically-informed risk 

communication was the basis for establishing credibility of city officials, leading 

to successful community outreach across stakeholder groups. 

– The city signed a memorandum of understanding with USGS to detail Lucy 

Jones to the City of Los Angeles as Science Adviser for Seismic Safety. 

– The major resilience initiatives being implemented in LA are based on the 

recommendations provided in Resilience by Design, which was finalized 

after months of stakeholder meetings and technical expert review. This 

report was spearheaded by the mayor’s office while drawing upon scientific 

expertise provided by Dr. Lucy Jones at USGS. Dr. Jones has been on detail 

from the USGS to the city of LA since 2014 and holds the position of 

Science Adviser for Seismic Safety. The direction, support and credibility 

provided by the ongoing involvement and active role of an independent 

scientific advisor working closely with the mayor’s office is widely 

considered by city officials to have been crucial for the success of the 

resilience measures.

– The Mayor chose to only support voluntary building vulnerability rating 

standards due to lack of agreement among the engineering community on a 

common, cohesive standard.

• Outreach: Outreach to community groups focused on discussing realistic 

potential earthquake scenarios. Outreach was focused on describing potential 

immediate and projected long-term economic losses that would be expected 

from these events without buildings and infrastructure risk mitigation. The 

scenario-based planning used expected to extreme events, but not catastrophic, 

in order to provide the basis for tangible discussion of policy proposal tradeoffs.

• Implementation: Code adoption for mandatory soft-story building retrofits 

required broad stakeholder agreement prior to Mayor’s decision to push for city 

council approval. The Mayor’s decision relied upon key stakeholder support 

(e.g., building owners, engineering groups, tenant advocacy groups), flexible 

compliance, and understanding consequences with and without the retrofits to 

various community populations (e.g., loss of low-income affordable housing).

49

6. Case Study of the City of Flagstaff 

Flagstaff, Arizona, is located about 120 miles north of Phoenix and is surrounded by 

the 1.86-million acre Coconino National Forest, which is home not only to the largest 

contiguous ponderosa pine stand in the world, but also to landscapes as diverse as the Red 

Rocks of Sedona, flatlands, alpine tundra, and ancient volcanic peaks (U.S. Forest Service 

2015). The forest surrounds the cities of Flagstaff and Sedona and borders four other 

national forests: the Kaibab National Forest to the west and northwest, the Prescott 

National Forest to the southwest, the Tonto National Forest to the south, and the ApacheSitgreaves National Forest to the southeast (Wikipedia 2015).

Flagstaff is located at a 7,000-foot elevation, at the base of the 12,000-foot San 

Francisco Peaks. Wildfire is the primary threat to the greater Flagstaff community, which 

experiences roughly 300 ignitions per year, split nearly evenly between lightning and 

human causes. 

A. Natural Hazard Experience

Most widely known for wildfires, Flagstaff has faced multiple types of natural 

disasters, including tornadoes, earthquakes, flash flooding, and drought. Since 2010, the 

Flagstaff area has been hit by several major fires followed by intense rains and flash 

flooding. The Schultz Fire in June 2010 burned 15,000 acres in Coconino National Forest 

and 50 homes northeast of Flagstaff, resulting in a cost of between $130 million and $140 

million from the fire and following floods. Although located approximately 130 miles away 

from Flagstaff, the widely publicized Yarnell Hill Fire destroyed over 8,000 acres and 

killed 19 firefighters, making it the sixth deadliest firefighter disaster in American history. 

More recently, the Slide Fire in May 2014 burned over 22,000 acres with a cost of $10.1 

million and cut off a main road between Flagstaff and Sedona. The impact of these 

devastating fires, however, has been multiplied by the following monsoon season, which 

begins in early July. The burnt land from the wildfires and the torrential rain combine to 

cause “debris flows, significant erosion, and substantial flooding ... [which can cause] 

extensive damage to homes, property and infrastructure.” In particular, the dry and burnt 

ground is unable to absorb the rain, and the resulting runoff and flash flooding pile on to 

the areas already suffering from the previous wildfire. In addition to wildfires and flooding, 

Flagstaff has seen an array of natural disasters:

• On October 6, 2010, eight tornados hit Coconino County and the surrounding 

area, one of which was classified as an EF3 on the Enhanced Fujita (EF) scale. 
50

• In December 2014, a 4.7-magnitude earthquake occurred 16 miles from 

Flagstaff. 

• Flagstaff has been facing a long-term drought for the past 17 years. 

From the perspective of Flagstaff city officials, improving community resilience 

means working proactively to mitigate the risk of hazards as well as the ability to bounce

back from an event.

B. Resilience Policy Development

The City of Flagstaff’s character and economy are intimately tied to the surrounding 

forest, and so are its community resilience efforts. Proactive forest management is seen as 

key to protecting the community; therefore, working in partnership with the U.S. Forest 

Service and state and county officials to mitigate the risk of wildland fires and manage 

forest health is the primary focus of resilience efforts in the greater Flagstaff area. 

1. Proactive Forest Management 

a. Background 

Forest management has been practiced in and around Flagstaff for nearly 130 years. 

The ponderosa pine forest ecosystem has historically been treated with low-intensity 

surface fires, which kept the stands in open, park-like structures. But thinning treatments 

have not kept pace with tree growth and fuel deposition. Decades of fire suppression 

treatments, in conjunction with grazing and timber management practices have resulted in 

overcrowded forestlands, with high levels of biomass and ground fuels. Ponderosa pine 

forests are understood to be well adapted to, and dependent on, frequent low-intensity fires, 

but highly vulnerable to high-intensity fire. Given the unnatural fuel accumulations, both 

the size and severity of wildfires has been increasing in recent years (Table 4). In addition 

to ecosystem damage, a large-scale wildfire moving into the city can cause catastrophic 

damage to life and property and long-term losses to the local economy.
51

Table 4. Notable Fires in Arizona in the Past 40 Years

Name Year County

Acres 

Destroyed

Radio Fire 1977 Coconino 4,600

Dude Fire 1990 Coconino 28,000

Rio Fire 1995 Maricopa 23,000

Lone Fire 1996 Maricopa 61,300

Hochderffer Fire 1996 Coconino 16,680

Rodeo-Chedeski Fire 2002 Coconino/Navajo/Gila 468,638

Aspen Fire 2003 Pima/Pinal 84,750

Willow Fire 2004 Gila 119,500

Cave Creek Complex 2005 Maricopa/Yavapai 243,950

Schultz Fire 2010 Coconino 15,075

Horseshoe Fire 2011 Cochise 222,954

Wallow Fire 2011 Apache/Graham/Greenlee/Navajo 538,050

Note: Acreage destroyed has increased over the years.

b. Fire Management Program and Partnerships

A severe fire season in the Coconino National Forest in 1995 and 1996 (including the 

human-caused Lone Fire in 1996, the state’s largest fire in 25 years, and the Rio Fire in 

1995, which occurred near a large housing development) highlighted the growing cost of 

no mitigating hazards. In 1996, Flagstaff city leadership decided to institute a forest 

management program within the Flagstaff Fire Department. This was a conscious decision 

taken by the city to gain greater control of the risks of wildfires, despite that the City of 

Flagstaff is located at the edge of the forested land to be treated under the restoration 

program. Strong leadership from the fire department chief and the Coconino National 

Forest supervisor over the past two decades has been integral in building partnerships 

between the City of Flagstaff forest management office and the U.S. Forest Service as well 

as state and county authorities. City officials attest to support from the city council and the 

mayor who have the final say in all resilience undertakings which involve the city. U.S.

Forest Service supervisors have the final approval and funding authority on treatment 

efforts. Efforts to date have focused on selective tree removal and prescribed fires to clear 

the undergrowth and create more open areas.

c. Bringing Wildland Fire Resilience to the Community

Flagstaff’s goals for resilience to wildfire risk, as developed by the city manager’s 

office, are (City of Flagstaff, Arizona. 2012):

• To minimize fire and flood risks to neighborhoods and businesses
52

• To reduce the vulnerability of Flagstaff’s municipal water supplies

• To protect public safety and economic vitality

The city addresses these goals under two focus areas: fire-adapted communities, 

focusing on activities within the city limits, and restoring landscapes, focusing on forest 

restoration efforts outside city limits. The city adopted these focus areas from the National 

Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Forests and Rangelands 2105). The city’s 

efforts in these areas are described below.

d. Fire-Adapted Communities

Over a decade of outreach and effort has gone into raising awareness and increasing

community resilience to fire risk. Some of the efforts by the Flagstaff Wildland Fire 

Management Program within the community follow:

• Education and outreach: Partnerships with community groups and citizens were 

initiated, including the city’s Community Development department, resulting in 

hazard mitigation activities becoming a requirement on all properties prior to 

development. City officials state that collaboration and public education have 

been the key to success in every resilience initiative. For example, to get 

community buy-in for the Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project, the city 

manager did no less than 50–60 presentations to the community to gather

support for funding the project (more details later in this section). Engaging city 

council members and taking them on field trips to view firsthand the impact of 

hazards have also been instrumental in shifting the dialogue from a positionbased to an issue-based discussion.

• Establishing credibility: The Wildland Fire Management Program works in 

collaboration with the Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership4 and the Northern 

Arizona University’s Ecological Restoration Institute. To lend credibility to its

work on forested lands, the fire department hired professional foresters, thus 

grounding their efforts in science-based ecological restoration. Additional 

expertise is sought from the Northern Arizona University Ecological Restoration 

Institute.

• Preparedness: Protecting lives and property through intervention and avoidance 

includes enforcement of the Wildland-Urban Interface Code (see “Adoption of 

the Wildland-Urban Interface [WUI] Code: Resilience Drives Land-Use 

Planning in Flagstaff” in the box on the next page) and building fire-adapted 

communities. The NFPA’s Firewise Communities Program, an important 

 4 This alliance of environmental, governmental, and business organizations supports research and 

demonstration of approaches for ecosystem restoration in the ponderosa pine forests (Greater Flagstaff 

Forests Partnership 2015).
53

component of building fire-adapted communities, encourages grassroots-level 

fire safety by enabling homeowners to take individual responsibility for 

equipping their homes to deal with the risk of wildfire (Firewise Communities 

Program 2015). Firewise construction elements include limiting combustible 

siding, using closed eaves and wire mesh screens over all vents, and thinning the 

property.

These efforts helped shape public perception over a decade and gather support from the 

City of Flagstaff’s community and elected officials. This broad base of support was 

instrumental in the treatment of 10,000 acres of the Coconino National Forest between 

1996 and 2007 and in the success of resilience-based land-use planning in the City of 

Flagstaff, as demonstrated by the adoption of the Wildlife-Urban Interface Code in 2008.

Adoption of the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Code:

Resilience Drives Land-Use Planning in Flagstaff

The Flagstaff WUI encompasses several jurisdictions and ownerships and includes substantial public 

land. In 2008, the city adopted the WUI Code in tandem with the 2006 International Fire Code (replacing 

the Uniform Fire Code) prescribing regulations targeted to fire and explosion hazards. The codes call for 

the use of fire-resistant building materials, give specific building specifications, such as for chimneys and 

flues, and provide criteria for creating a “defensible space” around structures. Adoption of the codes 

allowed the fire department to legally enforce the restrictions, which are then mandatory for all new 

construction starts.

The adoption of the WUI codes occurred over a period of 18 months during which the Fire Management 

group did extensive outreach with Homebuilders associations, Real Estate and Insurance groups, 

developers, engineering firms, community leaders and others. Once the public was on board, members 

of the city council unanimously approved the move to the adapted code. The adoption of the WUI codes 

was seen as a big win for the city of Flagstaff; proposals for similar code adoption by neighboring cities,

such as Hellsgate, have been unsuccessful because builders and homeowners fear that it will restrict 

landscaping on their properties. 

As in others efforts, key enablers for success in this effort were the extensive public outreach and support 

across a broad spectrum of stakeholders. In addition, many of the preventive measures that were 

introduced as modifications in the WUI code had already been in practice in the city for almost a decade. 

Thus, the idea was not new, although adopting the code now made it enforceable.

__________

Source: Flagstaff Fire Department (2015a).

e. Restoring Forest Health

Partnering with the U.S. Forest Service for proactive forest management is seen as 

vital to the city’s economic resilience by city officials. Flagstaff’s location at the wildlandurban interface exposes it to such effects of fire as flooding, smoke, and so forth. For 

example, the Schultz fire of 2010, which did not enter the city limits, nonetheless resulted 

in extensive damage to infrastructure systems from post-fire flooding and runoff from the 

steep slopes. According to city officials, had the fire occurred on the other side of the 

mountain, all the impacts would have been inside the city, including significant damage to 

the city’s water supply. The city manager’s office sees a clear business case for the city to 
54

participate in forest restoration efforts as it mitigates direct economic loss from fire and 

averts high suppression costs.

A second and equally important motivation is maintaining Flagstaff’s economy that 

is based predominantly on tourism. The Coconino National Forest receives 3.9 million 

visitors per year (as a point of comparison the Grand Canyon gets 4.5 million visitors 

annually). While the long-term economic impacts of wildfires have typically been difficult 

to study (Zybach, et al. 2009; Western Forestry Leadership Coalition 2010), fire impact 

studies were cited by city officials to demonstrate credible risk to the economy.

For example, the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski Fire, Arizona’s second largest wildfire, 

burned 463,000 acres and cost $40 million to suppress. Recovery costs, including property 

values, local economic activity generated sales tax revenue and infrastructure costs are 

estimated to be between $300 and $400 million. A 2010 study by the Western Forestry 

Leadership Coalition shows the true cost of wildfires to be between 2 and 30 times the cost 

of suppression (which are the typically reported costs).

5

The Slide Fire in 2014, between Flagstaff and Sedona, did not impact the city of 

Flagstaff directly except for hazy conditions created by the smoke from the fire (Dave, 

2014). However, loss of tourism resulted in a tax loss of $200 million over the 3 months

after the fire.

f. Partnering with State and Federal Officials for Forest Health Maintenance

Thus, despite jurisdictional issues, local government officials in Flagstaff see 

themselves as being on the frontlines of forest health management and partnering with 

federal and state government in ways that add value to existing forest health initiatives and 

increase the city’s long-term economic resilience. The city has been involved in efforts 

such as selective tree removal and prescribed fires that would clear debris and accumulated 

fuel and create more open stands. In particular, Flagstaff fire management officials have 

directed their efforts on areas that have not been treated in decades because of insufficient 

availability of federal funds, or because the forested areas are too steep or difficult to 

access. In these areas, the city’s involvement has accelerated the treatment of high risk 

parcels of land. All this is enabled by a high level of awareness in the community of both 

the threat and the need to prioritize forest initiatives.

For example, the Woody Fire of 2006 showed the effectiveness of thinning dense 

stands and using prescribed fires to treat fuel accumulation. The fire started in an untreated 

area of the forest, became a crown fire, and moved quickly in the direction of Flagstaff 

 5 Other examples include the Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico in 2000, where the cost of suppression 

was 3% of the total cost of the fire, which included damage to the Los Alamos National Laboratory and 

equipment therein. The Hayman fire in 2002 cost $307/acre to suppress, but a Colorado State 

University study that an additional $1,358/acre of losses had accrued within the first year. 
55

until it reached areas treated with forest thinning. The more open stands allowed 

firefighters to more effectively control and fight the fire, thus preventing its march towards 

the developed city areas (Flagstaff Fire Department 2015b).

In a similar instance, the nearly 300-acre Hardy fire of 2010 grew quickly, forcing 

evacuations in the city of Flagstaff. A previously treated area in the approach path of the 

fire served as a buffer area, allowing firefighters to burn out forest fuels. As a result, the 

fire dropped to the ground and lost strength (Flagstaff Fire Department 2015b).

In the case of the Schultz Fire in 2010, the fire was successfully contained at the edge 

of the city, but post-fire flooding swept debris up to 7 miles, destroying infrastructure and 

flooding homes in the city. Recognizing that an untreated watershed could cause significant 

damage within city limits, the city issued municipal bonds to fund watershed treatment on 

the Rio de Flag and Upper Lake Mary watersheds in the greater Flagstaff area. The bond, 

which was passed by a 73% voter approval, will finance up to $10 million for a watershed 

services project (the Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project) on 14,446 acres of U.S. Forest 

Service and state lands primarily outside Flagstaff city limits.

The City of Flagstaff has also funded accelerated treatments in underfunded, steep or 

hard-to-reach areas covered by the Four Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI),

6 a joint effort 

by four national forests in the State of Arizona and funded by the U.S. Forest Service.

2. Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project

a. Background

b. Motivation

The Schultz Fire of 2010 demonstrated Flagstaff’s vulnerability to damage caused by 

heavy rains following a major fire. Near-record monsoons occurred that year, in addition 

to forest fires in the San Francisco Peaks near Flagstaff. In June 2010, the Schultz Fire, 

which burned over 15,000 acres, resulted in the evacuation of over a thousand residents, 

but did not spread into the city of Flagstaff or cause direct infrastructure damage. Heavy 

rains following the fire resulted in significant debris flows and substantial flooding of the 

residential areas below. Watersheds in moderate- to high-severity burn areas are prone to 

much greater runoff, which increases hillslope and channel erosion and results in sedimentladen flood flows. In the case of the Schultz Fire, intense monsoons prior to the fire that 

otherwise might not have produced much runoff, resulted in severe ash-laden flooding

 6 4FRI is designed to restore fire-adapted ecosystems in four national forests in the Southwestern 

region—the Kaibab, the Coconino, the Apache-Sitgreaves and the Tonto. Started in 2009, the four 

forests are actively engaged in collaborative, landscape restoration initiatives that will cover 2.4 million 

acres over a 10-year period. The 4FRI is funded by the USDA’s Collaborative Forest Landscape 

Restoration Program. 
56

several times, causing extensive damage to homes, property, and infrastructure up to 4

miles from the fire (Youberg, Koestner, and Neary 2011). In addition, one of the city’s 

main water lines was destroyed in the flooding, and there was a short window to repair the 

lines ahead of the next monsoon season. The total cost of damage from the fire was $15 

million for suppression and approximately $133–140 million in post-fire impacts. 

c. Initial Action and Leadership

In the fall of 2010 (in the aftermath of the Schultz fire), officials from the City of 

Flagstaff and the U.S. Forest Service convened under the leadership of the City Manager 

and the County Forest Service supervisor to discuss mitigation options for the post-fire 

flooding impacts. While proactive forest management has always been seen as a key 

component of community resilience in the region, the Schultz Fire expanded the scope of 

the discussion to include the economic and social impacts of post-fire floods.

d. Conveying a credible risk to the city and economy

From the initial stages, the discussion was informed by risk assessment studies of fire 

and subsequent flooding. While flooding from the Schultz Fire primarily affected 

unincorporated areas at the edge of the city of Flagstaff, projections showed that extensive,

severe and repeated flooding could result from a high-intensity fire within the city limits. 

A cost avoidance study conducted by the Northern Arizona University’s Arizona Rural 

Policy Institute estimated that the flooding-related costs in such a situation could 

potentially amount to between $573 million and $1.2 billion (Cowan 2014). Also, erosion 

and debris flooding down the slopes could render the city’s water supply unusable. Loss of 

tourism would also have an impact.

In addition, an eco-restoration study by the researchers at the Northern Arizona 

Institute looking at long-term projections in runoff from forest thinning showed an 

increasingly worsening situation, with cumulative increases in runoff ranging from 20 to 

26% over a span of 15 years.

e. Technical Expertise Sought in Developing Solutions

Since 2008, the city manager has led a Sustainable Communities cabinet that brings 

together the environmental, economic development, social development and U.S. Forest 

Service/wildfire communities to discuss issues related to sustainable solutions to forest 

management and climate change in the region.

This forum was used in the aftermath of the Schultz Fire to discuss a way forward on 

watershed protection services. Risk assessment and economic analyses were presented to 

stakeholders, and the U.S. Forest Service, the Grand Canyon Trust, the water commission, 

and the sustainability commission were among the groups who presented a case (Coconino 
57

County, Arizona, 2011) for the need for watershed protection in the Rio de Flag (Dry Lake 

Hills) and Upper Lake Mary watershed areas surrounding Flagstaff. 

The dialogue on risk management options led to a weeklong ‘Ridgeline to Rio’ 

summit in fall 2010, hosted by the Coconino National Forest and Coconino County 

(USDA, Forest Service, 2010). Over 50 technical experts, including hydrologists, soil 

scientists, engineers, and members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the academic 

community, were invited, in addition to representatives from Coconino County, U.S. Forest 

Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, City of Flagstaff, Northern Arizona 

University, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Arizona Department of 

Transportation, and private engineering firms. The goal was to analyze the effects of 

flooding due to the Schultz Fire and determine mitigation steps, including drainage 

solutions and burned area restoration. Long-time area residents were invited to provide 

historical knowledge of typical rainfall and water flow patterns. 

Participants were asked to “think outside the box” without being limited by budgets 

(within reason), existing policies, or untested treatment methods. The consensus among 

participants was that the first order of business was to understand and quantify the 

watershed response in the future (since the post-burn, post-flood watershed is significantly 

different than the pre-burn watershed), and use that as a basis for designing a 

comprehensive drainage system minimizing the hazard from post-fire flooding. The 

solution would also include input from environmental studies, policy and regulatory 

processes, regulatory constraints, private and public land issues, and multiple agency 

involvement.

f. Funding

At the time these discussions were held, a proposal was made by the city manager to 

issue a bond directed towards financing a watershed protection plan. According to 

discussion with city officials, a steering committee with representation from local, county, 

state, and Federal Government at all levels of leadership was convened by the city manager, 

and an extensive public campaign (principally driven by nonprofit organizations, such as 

the Grand Canyon Trust and the Friends of the Rio de Flag) was launched to garner support 

for the bond issuance. Public messaging was aimed at making this an issue-driven rather 

than position-driven dialogue, to get political leadership on board.

In November 2012, a $10 million municipal bond was approved with a 73% voter 

approval by the residents of Flagstaff, Arizona, to support forest restoration work within 

key watersheds on the Coconino National Forest and the State of Arizona lands. The 

approval of the city council and the mayor was the final step in the process. The Flagstaff 

Water Protection Project is one of a handful of examples of forest restoration work being 

funded by a municipality, and the only known example of such an effort being funded by 

municipal bonds.
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g. Initial Implementation Steps: Approval for Proposed Treatment Plans

Because of the unique funding aspects of this project and multiple jurisdictional 

authorities involved, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the city of 

Flagstaff and the U.S. Forest Service, outlining roles and expectations for both parties, and 

allowing bond monies to be allocated toward the planning and implementation of the task 

(City of Flagstaff, Arizona, and Flagstaff Ranger District, Coconino National Forest 2012). 

The full-scale implementation of the Flagstaff Watershed Protection Plan (FWPP) 

involves project staff from the city, the U.S. Forest Service, the State of Arizona, Coconino 

County, Greater Flagstaff Forest Partnership, and the Northern Arizona University’s 

Ecological Restoration Institute. The public works department has the lead on the re-design 

of the drainage system and diverting the flood waters away from the bottom of the 

watershed where it had pooled. 

The FWPP is expected to restore to a more manageable state approximately 15,000 

acres in two areas of the forest, Rio de Flag and Upper Lake Mary. Some of these areas 

have been approved by previous National Environmental Policy Act decisions and come 

under the ongoing Four Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI); however, the difference is that 

the FWPP will thin out steeper, more difficult terrain, while the 4FRI is expected to cover 

more ground (Mindock 2013).The U.S. Forest Service has proposed four alternative 

treatment methods, to include mechanical thinning, helicopter logging and prescribed 

burns. Since affected areas included federal forest lands, a National Environmental Policy 

Act process—opening up the process to the public to discuss options and alternatives—

was warranted as part of the overall process. A draft environmental impact statement was 

released for public comment in 2014, and the bulk of the forest treatment is expected to 

commence in fall 2015.

C. Observations

• Outreach: A strong culture of community-led non-governmental organizations 

advocating for forest management exists in the region; forest land management 

is common practice for those living in areas prone to wildfire. 

− An existing culture of forest management was crucial in getting large-scale 

community buy-in for resilience efforts (as opposed to building from the 

ground up). Community buy-in was essential for the FWPP’s success, 

which led to eventual voter approval of bond sales to fund the program. 

− Close collaboration with the state and federal forest services for proactive 

forest management is considered vital to the success of resilience efforts by 

city officials.
59

− All of Flagstaff’s resilience initiatives required collaboration across 

jurisdictions, and across all levels of leadership. The city partnered with the 

Grand Canyon Trust and other nonprofit organizations. 

− Alignment of players was also important to success. Consistent 

engagement of city leadership in community outreach that communicates 

the economic and safety value of mitigation activities leads to higher 

likelihood of community approving financing of mitigation activities. 

− Leadership from city and forest service officials is seen as crucial for 

initiatives to get visibility at a scale that can have an impact. A 

communications group led by U.S. Forest Service personnel attended every 

public meeting to maximize outreach efforts, and effort was taken for the 

messaging to be consistent, non-partisan, and based on scientific analysis.

− The ability to convey a real risk using a recent event, and support the 

argument with science-based analysis was a key element for building 

community buy-in. Convening credible technical experts with 

representative community stakeholder groups can reconcile diverging risk 

tolerance and management priorities among land managers. 

• Implementation: 

− City officials’ ability to identify innovative funding opportunities—redirecting an expiring municipal debt towards watershed protection—

allowed the city to raise funds without increasing taxes.

− Initial funding from emergency funds was provided. A Presidential 

declaration following the Schultz Fire gave the Natural Resource 

Conservation Service access to Emergency Watershed Protection Plan 

funds. 

− The seed funding made a small amount of repair work possible, and opened 

the dialogue towards Watershed Protection as a process rather than a onetime repair.

− Cost-benefit analysis of economic losses associated with large wildfires, 

primarily due to loss of business, natural resource damage, and loss of 

recreation opportunities, provided compelling reasons for resilience 

actions.

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7. Case Study of the City of Norfolk

A. Natural Hazard Experience

Over the past 15 to 20 years, Norfolk has regularly experienced hurricanes and floods. 

In 1999, the eye of Hurricane Floyd passed directly over Norfolk with nearby Yorktown 

receiving over 18 inches of rain from the storm (U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA, 

2000). Four years later, Hurricane Isabel caused $76 million in damages in Norfolk

(Applegate 2011) and at least three deaths in the city were attributed to the storm (Payne 

2003). Nor’Ida, a Nor’easter that impacted on the city in 2009, and Hurricane Irene in 2011 

caused $20 million and $9.2 million in damages in Norfolk, respectively (Applegate 2011). 

In addition, both events resulted in a combined tide and surge of over 7.5 feet, causing 

widespread flooding and flash flooding (Forster 2011). These events resulted in the State 

of Virginia issuing mandatory evacuation orders and the U.S. Navy moving ships to sea to 

avoid potential damage. Flooding from hurricanes is not the only source of concern. 

According to a Hampton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC) report, Norfolk 

received more than 12 inches of rain from a single storm in late September 2010 that 

resulted in flash flooding and the road closures (HRPDC 2011). In addition to hazard

events, an increase in sea-level rise combined with local land subsidence has exacerbated 

the effects of flooding, with the tide height having increased over 14 inches since 1930, the 

fastest measured rate of sea-level rise on the East Coast (U.S. Department of Interior, 

USGS 2013). It is projected that by 2100, sea-level rise will increase by up to 5 feet, a 

significant challenge for most of the city that is at an elevation of less than 20 feet above 

sea level (NRDC 2011). 

Over the next 30 years, the number of flood events per year in Norfolk is expected to 

increase from the current rate of less than nine floods per year to over 180 floods per year 

by 2045 (Spanger-Siegfried, Fitzpatrick, and Dahl 2014). Low lying assets, including many 

military installations, are expected to be directly affected, and the Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development ranks the Norfolk area in tenth place for “the 

value of assets exposed to increase flooding from sea-level rise” (NRDC 2011). With the 

increased prevalence of these hazard events, many of which were thought to occur only 

once in a lifetime, and the growing threat of sea-level rise, the City of Norfolk decided to 

take action and improve its resilience.
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B. Resilience Policy Development

Initial mitigation efforts addressed hurricanes, flood hazards and sea-level rise. These 

efforts included a series of risk assessment studies on coastal flooding in 2007 and 2008, 

with the results being released in 2012. The findings projected a $1 billion price tag for 

coastal flooding mitigation efforts in Norfolk. Because of the substantial investment 

needed, Norfolk city leaders have explored external avenues to provide solutions to address 

a changing long-term hazard profile.

The City of Norfolk’s resilience efforts were initiated through participation in 

initiatives such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge 

(100RC) and the RE.invest Initiative. Norfolk’s resilience initiatives center on achieving 

coastal resilience (flood mitigation), neighborhood cohesiveness, and economic vitality as 

the core components of their city-wide resilience policy. Flood mitigation is a clear 

requirement identified in the city’s risk assessment. Neighborhood cohesiveness, focused 

on fortification of significant assets in a community, has been identified as a significant 

component and predictor of a community’s ability to “bounce back” following a disruptive 

event. Economic vitality addresses a lack of economic diversity and the reliance upon 

Federal Government support through Naval Station Norfolk. 

The following sections describe key activities or actions that have led to the city’s 

current resilience policy approach.

1. Initial Coastal Flooding Focus

a. Analysis by Furgo Atlantic and the Timmons Group 

The first step in the Norfolk’s development of coastal resilience was to undertake a 

risk assessment and prioritization process for hazard mitigation. In 2007 and 2008, Norfolk 

contracted Furgo Atlantic and the Timmons Group, two engineering consulting firms, to 

assess the city’s capabilities and the threat of coastal flooding and sea-level rise (Smith 

2012; Spring 2013). Furgo Atlantic, which studied the city’s vulnerability to high tides and 

storm surges, recommended floodwalls, tide gates, elevated roads, and powerful water 

pumping stations at several areas at an estimated cost of $300 million. The Timmons 

Group, recognizing the increased frequency of extreme events and the aging storm water 

drain, recommended upgrading storm water pipes at a cost of up to $775 million (Fears 

2012). 

b. Norfolk Leadership

Concurrently, a Flood Executive Committee was created by the city of Norfolk, an 

inter-departmental team that met weekly and included representatives from the 

Departments of Finance, Intergovernmental Relations, Planning, Public Works, and 
63

Utilities as well as the City Manager. Led by the Deputy City Manager, beginning in 2011 

this committee developed a four-pronged approach to plan, prepare, mitigate, and 

communicate (Norfolk Flooding Strategy Update 2012), which was described further in 

the resulting 2012 Coastal Resilience Strategy. Highlighting a variety of areas in Norfolk 

that are in need of work, this strategy document provides an open framework for future 

flood mitigation and related coastal efforts (City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015a). According 

to city officials, a citizen advisory committee and an expert advisory committee were also 

set up to support the strategy development process. Most of Norfolk’s work on coastal 

resilience has since primarily fallen under the purview of the Flood Executive Committee.

c. RE.invest Initiative 

Insufficient city funds led Norfolk city officials to seek out and apply for the 

RE.invest Initiative and the 100 Resilient Cities (100RC), both Rockefeller Foundation 

programs. In May 2013, Norfolk was selected as one of eight cities to be part of the 

Rockefeller Foundation’s RE.invest Initiative. Established in the aftermath of Hurricane 

Sandy, the RE.invest Initiative is a 2-year program aimed to “help develop resilient urban 

[storm water] infrastructure systems” and to help Norfolk and the other cities “rethink the 

way they design, plan, implement and finance urban infrastructure.” With technical 

assistance from Bechtel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, and Wall Street Without 

Walls, the goal is for the eight cities in the RE.invest Initiative is to promote mutually 

beneficial cooperation with the private sector in order to enhance sustainable storm water 

infrastructure.7 For example, for a broadband company looking to install underground lines 

(which requires construction and repaving of roads), RE.invest would work with the cities 

and private sector partners to better integrate the planning and implementation at both ends 

for improved infrastructure resilience. In the situation described, RE.invest would explore 

the viability of burying the power lines when the road is under repairs or construction and 

make sure the road is repaved with more absorbent asphalt to reduce water runoff during 

future storms” (Rockefeller Foundation 2013).

2. Outcomes

Much of the identified work by Fugro Atlantic, the Timmons Group, and RE.invest 

has not yet been initiated, as the city is focusing on raising the necessary capital from 

Federal Government, state government, and other sources (Vegh 2011; Montgomery 

2014). Although it cannot be determined if these efforts were directly derived from 

previous work, the 2014 version of the Coastal Resilience Strategy (City of Norfolk, 

Virginia, 2015a) provides example outcomes, including a $2.4 million project in 2013 and 

 7 The other seven cities selected by the RE.invest Initiative were El Paso, Texas; Hoboken, New Jersey; 

Honolulu, Hawaii; Miami Beach, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; New Orleans, Louisiana; and San 

Francisco, California.
64

2014 to raise a road to decrease flooding frequency and improve access to the nearby 

medical center during floods (Keifer 2012) and a 2014 building code requirement that “the 

lowest floor of a building to be built no lower than three feet above the predicted level that 

water will rise in a flood” (City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015a).

3. Norfolk’s Expansion of Policy to Address Economic and Neighborhood 

Resilience

a. 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge

After a successful application to the Rockefeller Foundation’s RE.invest Initiative, 

Norfolk applied to a second Rockefeller initiative, the 100RC program. The initial 

motivation from Norfolk was to supplement the coastal resilience needs, but this 

application expanded Norfolk’s vision to resilience outside of coastal flood mitigation.

100RC, centers around three support mechanisms for each member city: (1) a network of 

cities to share knowledge and best practices, foster connections, and support one another 

in resilience activities; (2) financial support to hire a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) in 

each city that will fill the role of promoting and coordinating resilience in the city 

government; and (3) support to create a resilience plan for the city and the resources needed 

for implementation (Rodin 2013). 

b. Application Process

The drive to apply to the 100RC program was led by the City Manager’s office and

the Environmental Protection Programs. The Rockefeller 100RC application focused on 

hazard mitigation, such as coastal flooding in the case of Norfolk, and on resilience in 

vulnerable populations. In this, the city’s thinking is aligned with Rockefeller’s definition 

of resilience as “the capacity of individuals, communities, and systems to survive, adapt, 

and grow in the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when conditions require it”

(City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015d).

c. Evolving Resilience Focus

The 100RC kickoff meeting in February 2014 was attended by the city mayor (Salkin 

2014) and brought together approximately 200 local stakeholders from all sectors of the 

community. Working with elected officials, the stakeholders examined resilience in terms 

of “flooding and coastal storms,” “economic diversity and vibrancy,” and “issues arising 

from income inequality.” From this input, the City of Norfolk has since unified its 

resilience efforts into coastal, economic, and neighborhood resilience (City of Norfolk, 

Virginia, 2015d). In the 2016 city budget, Norfolk termed these three themes as “living in 

a rising water environment, ensuring economic opportunity for all residents, and supporting 

neighborhood vitality” (City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015e).
65

d. First Chief Resilience Officer

In line with Norfolk’s new three-part approach to resilience, the newly created 

position of Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) was created and filled in June 2014 (Applegate 

2014). As a member of Norfolk’s Senior Executive Team, the CRO reports directly to the 

city manager.

8 This implementation of the CRO position allows the incumbent to develop 

strategy and work across departments. 

Focused on the subjects of coastal, economic, and neighborhood resilience, the CRO 

is currently working to foster cooperation, strengthen systems and interactions, and 

promote resilience throughout the community. To this end, the CRO is promoting a 

discussion about how the city government and other stakeholders can help individuals in 

the community to improve their quality of life and can build resilience through 

neighborhoods, faith communities, and other local networks. 

e. Outcomes

The creation of a CRO position, as required by Rockefeller, was a significant outcome 

of the 100RC application. Rockefeller also requires the creation of a resilience plan; 

according to city officials, this plan is in development and will tentatively be released in 

fall 2015. 

4. Integrated Resilience Policy Proposal: Vision 2100

In addition to the 100RC resilience strategy, Norfolk’s Department of City Planning 

is developing Vision 2100, which is a long-term strategy for the future of Norfolk through 

the year 2100. This project was initiated by the Director of the Department of City Planning 

with the goal of rewriting the city’s zoning ordinances, which were first adopted in 1992

(City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015c). As Norfolk has transitioned from a suburban to an urban 

environment over the past 20 years, significant revisions to zoning ordinances are needed. 

In proposing new ordinances, one primary goal was to integrate resilience. 

To integrate resilience into these ordinances, Norfolk reached out to the Rockefeller 

Foundation to learn about existing best practices. In the process, they found out that they 

were the first city to suggest integrating resilience into zoning ordinances. Tying in with 

similar efforts in Boulder, New Orleans, New York City, and Norfolk, the four cities 

discussed the integration of resilience into comprehensive plans of each city. For Norfolk, 

a central focus was how to incorporate resilience into zoning ordinances. With technical 

expertise from the American Institute of Architects, American Planning Association, and 

Urban Land Institute, Vision 2100 was launched.

 8 The CRO and the head of Norfolk’s Emergency Management Department report directly to the city 

manager. Other departments in the city government typically report to the deputy city manager.
66

a. The Vision’s Focus

According to city officials, the primary idea behind Vision 2100 is for Norfolk to shift 

its focus from areas of the city that would be inundated due to sea-level rise to areas of the 

city that have the greatest likelihood of remaining dry. A large area of high-elevation land

in Norfolk termed “the corridor of opportunity” has seen social dislocation, is a poor 

economic performer, and has significant opportunity for redevelopment. This idea of 

adaptive management, or learning to live with water, is a reversal of philosophy from the 

mantra of mitigating or reversing sea-level encroachment.

The choice of the year 2100 was of particular importance for this vision. First, data 

from the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VMIS) predicts significant sea-level rise 

and flooding through the year 2100 (VIMS 2014). Moreover, 2100 is far enough in the 

future that most current residents in the city will no longer be in the city, a potentially 

solution to present short-term fears, resistance, and attachments to property of the present 

population. Thus, the longer time frame of the plan is essential to its success. Transfer of 

value from the coastal areas of the city to the corridor of opportunity will be a long-term 

task. City officials noted that transferring development rights and creating regulation to 

alter development must be occur gradually and in a non-disruptive manner to prevent the 

market from negatively responding. In addition, realizing that much of the tax base comes 

from coastal property that will eventually be inundated by sea-level rise, officials believe 

that Norfolk will need to explore other streams of revenue.

b. Outcomes

The initial idea of Vision 2100 occurred in spring 2015. As such, the vision is early 

in the development process, and interviewees did not specify when the plan would be 

released or when specific actions would be taken.

5. Resilience Decision Making Structure

Funding for resilience projects and plans are approved through the annual budget 

process, which is presented by the city manager and approved by the city council. The city 

council membership includes the mayor and vice mayor. The CRO supports a key role of 

integrating the input and planning across multiple relevant municipal agencies, such as the 

Department of Neighborhood Development and Department of Emergency Preparedness 

and Response.

6. Proposed Approaches for Implementing Resilience Policy

The City of Norfolk’s current resilience policy approach focuses on coastal resilience, 

neighborhood cohesiveness, and economic vitality. Implementation approaches associated 

with these core components are discussed in the following subsections. For most of these 
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efforts, implementation measures have only recently been initiated and outcomes are not 

yet apparent. 

a. Economic Vitality

Norfolk was hit hard by the financial crisis in 2008 and, while economic growth over 

the past few years has slowly improved, the slow pace of economic recovery still puts 

Norfolk below its historical average. In addition, there is concern within Norfolk that the 

local economy is too heavily dependent on Federal Government spending, which accounts

for 46% of the region’s economic output (Frost 2011). A decrease in federal investment 

due to sequestration could also impact the local economy (O’Neal 2015). These 

considerations have led to a desire for economic diversification in the region. According 

to interviewees, economic resilience in Norfolk must focus on economic diversification. 

One potential idea from city officials is to establish new economies in the region, such as 

creating a research and development center for water infrastructure technologies, similar 

to a proposal by RE.invest (City of Norfolk, Virginia, 2015f). Additional opportunities for 

economic development center on addressing poverty and unemployment. These actions 

include increasing mixed-use development, fostering engagement with citizens’ efforts 

through the Neighbors for Neighborhoods program (City of Norfolk, Virginia, Mayor’s 

Commission on Poverty Reduction 2014) and promoting growth in the Vision 2100 

corridor of opportunity.

b. Neighborhood Asset Mapping

The Department of Neighborhood Development was established in fiscal year 2014 

and acts as a liaison between the city and neighborhoods. The goals of the new department

are to “[monitor] the pulse of the community... [Serve] as a facilitator to respond to 

neighborhood issues and concerns... [and promote] neighborhood ownership by 

maintaining quality standards.” In particular, the department’s mentality is “to think about 

neighborhoods in a new way, not as problems to be solved, but as assets to celebrate and 

grow” (Rogers 2014). In the spirit of this approach, one of the activities within the 

department relating to resilience is asset mapping. The goal is for Neighborhood 

Development Specialists within the department to go into each neighborhood to identify 

important assets and understand what elements of the neighborhood are most important to 

residents. Norfolk officials described core neighborhood assets as built environment 

components, such as community recreation centers, that foster a sense of community in the 

neighborhood. Once assets have been identified, city resources can be prioritized to 

strengthen and protect city-owned or operated assets from disruption, following the notion 

that these assets will enable the neighborhood to better survive and recover.
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C. Observations

• Characterize communities: “Neighborhood Asset Mapping” is a practice that 

allows individuals and neighborhood members an opportunity to articulate the 

value of services provided by public infrastructure, including components of the 

built environment.

• Solutions: Focusing on economic development, including diversifying economic 

activity beyond the current federal government concentration, and neighborhood 

development are core elements of long-term resilience and will lead to broader 

community resilience, including resilience to natural hazards.

• Implementation: Long-term horizon for strategic resilience planning removes 

the hurdles posed by having to consider the limitations of established land-use 

patterns—existing budgetary considerations, current infrastructural weaknesses, 

and similar factors—and allows planners to adopt a more visionary approach to 

comprehensive resilience planning.
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8. Summary and Analysis for Part 2

In this chapter, the major resilience initiatives observed in the three case study 

communities are summarized and examples of best practices observed in the design, 

planning, and implementation of these initiatives are provided. Finally, overarching 

findings from the study are presented.

A. Major Resilience Initiatives

B. Los Angeles

Resilience by Design, a report issued by the city in December 2014, represented the 

culmination of multiple years of work by the mayor’s office, the USGS, and multiple city 

agencies, including the Departments of Water and Power. This report defines the mayor’s 

strategic perspective for areas of high priority for resilience investments: structural 

integrity of buildings, public water infrastructure and telecommunications infrastructure 

reliability. In addition to establishing a strategic resilience policy, the report provides 

specific recommended actions in the three priority areas.

Resilience by Design recommends the adoption of two mandatory building standards

for soft-story buildings and a non-ductile reinforced concrete retrofit requirement (City of 

Los Angeles, Office of the Mayor, 2014). These building standards were adopted by the 

City Council and Mayor in October 2015.

C. Flagstaff

The adoption of a Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Code by the City of Flagstaff was 

a major success in achieving resilience-driven land-use planning. The code prescribes the 

use of fire-resistant building materials and requires clearing defensible space around 

structures in the WUI. The code adopted by the city is mandatory for all new construction 

starts in the WUI. The adopted code built upon existing voluntary preventative measures 

and practices widely deployed for over a decade. Extensive community outreach to 

stakeholders such as homebuilders associations, real estate groups, insurance groups, 

engineering firms, and forest protection and environmental non-governmental 

organizations, formed the coalition necessary to demonstrate public support. 

The Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project was motivated by the 2010 Schultz Fire, 

which demonstrated Flagstaff’s vulnerability to wildland fire and resulting debris flows 

during post-fire thunderstorms. Much of the lands posing the risk to the city are within 
70

Coconino National Forest and are managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The city manager’s 

office led a community outreach initiative to seek public support for bond sales to fund a 

watershed protection program, which would employ fuels-reduction activities on citymanaged and National Forest lands, via a memorandum of understanding signed with U.S. 

Forest Service. The resulting implementation of the Flagstaff Watershed Protection Project

involves staff from the City of Flagstaff, U.S. Forest Service, State of Arizona, Coconino 

County, Greater Flagstaff Forest Partnership, and Northern Arizona University.

D. Norfolk

The City of Norfolk’s near-term resilience efforts focus on 3 areas: coastal resilience, 

neighborhood development, and economic planning. A long-term, proposed plan is to be 

captured in a vision, strategy document titled “Vision 2100.” This document aims to 

capture the goals and vision for the community’s development in the year 2100, in order 

to understand policy changes, including city ordinances, codes, and standards would be 

necessary to achieve this vision. The 100 year time horizon was selected to reduce concerns 

that plans could affect current property ownership and land use.

The “Neighborhood Asset Mapping”, currently being implemented, is an initiative 

that allows individuals and neighborhood members an opportunity to articulate the value 

of services provided by public infrastructure, including components of the built 

environment. 

E. Summary of Observations

Resilience policy design differs from traditional hazard mitigation policy design 

processes due to long-term planning horizons and a holistic planning approach required 

across departments and infrastructure types. Choosing a long-term horizon for strategic 

resilience planning, as seen in the “Vision 2100” effort, removes the hurdles posed by 

having to consider the limitations of established land-use patterns, existing budgetary 

considerations, current infrastructural weaknesses and similar factors, and allows planners

to adopt a more visionary approach to comprehensive resilience planning.

The use of technical expertise in designing solutions to resilience initiatives is 

instrumental in getting broad-based support from city officials and community 

stakeholders by moving the discussion from a position-based to an issues-based dialogue.

Incorporating unbiased scientific and technical leadership into a community-based effort

lends credibility to policy proposals and community outreach efforts.

Additionally, a focus on the long-term economic consequences of a hazard, years to 

decades after the event, can convey a powerful message about the possible consequences 

of inaction.
71

Consistent engagement of city leadership in outreach activities increases the 

likelihood of community buy-in for mitigation activities.

F. Overarching Findings

Resilience-relevant policy development in the communities studied is observed to be 

an outcome of specific initiatives that address each community’s risks and vulnerabilities 

through leadership by the local government. Case study communities have incorporated 

resilience as a concept that encourages interagency coordination, extensive outreach to 

stakeholder groups, and augments existing hazard mitigation efforts. Initiatives were 

staffed by individuals from various parts of the city government including the Mayor or 

city manager’s office, public utilities department, fire management department and others. 

In fact, bringing together interdepartmental and interdisciplinary teams, including 

individuals with roles and responsibilities not commonly associated with hazard 

mitigation, was an effective and necessary part of the resilience planning process.

Resilience initiatives were often observed to be driven from the highest levels of 

municipal leadership. Staff within agencies demonstrated interest in addressing risks posed 

by hazards, however the top-level strategic policy guidance from leadership was necessary 

to establish initiatives and actions.

Scientific and technical support, generally from an unbiased, trusted, source, is critical 

to maintaining credibility in discussions of policy proposals and associated trade-offs. For 

example, the City of Los Angeles’s partnership with the Federal Government via the USGS 

to provide independent, trusted, and scientifically-informed hazard and disaster 

information to multiple stakeholders is seen by city officials as crucial to the success of 

their resilience initiatives. A scientific advisor who is able to effectively communicate risk,

and is trusted by a broad majority of community stakeholders, can move the dialogue from 

a position-based to an issue-based discussion. 

Collaboration – across departments, stakeholder groups and jurisdictions – is seen as 

a key differentiator between traditional emergency management and long-term 

community-focused resilience activities. However, while regional coordination of 

resilience and hazard mitigation programs has worked well in some communities, in others 

it has run into obstacles arising from differing priorities and differing perceptions of risk. 

Outreach, education, and communication were key tools that all three case study 

communities highlighted as critical to providing support for their leadership and decision 

makers’ ability to adopt resilience policies and programs. City officials interviewed for 

each of the case study communities described their interactions with community 

stakeholders as instrumental to the success of resilience initiatives. These interactions were 

enabled through existing relationships and established community outreach processes. 

However, the actual design and implementation of policy, where it has taken place, was 
72

solely a governmental function. With the exception of the Rockefeller Foundation, city 

officials did not consider NGOs and private sector entities to be partners within their policy 

making process.

Long-term economic impacts of disasters, beyond the loss of life and property, 

combined with community priorities for economic redevelopment were cited as major 

motivating factors for resilience and hazard mitigation policy development.

Resilience policy design differs from traditional hazard mitigation policy design 

processes due to long-term planning horizons and a holistic planning approach required 

across departments and infrastructure types.

Design and implementation of resilience initiatives are influenced by external factors. 

Successful implementation is dependent upon leadership recognizing the need to influence 

multiple factors, stakeholder groups to achieve expressed public support, and identification 

of windows of opportunity to push for implementation (e.g., recent disaster events, 

unexpected availability of funding).
A-1

Appendix A.

National-Level Data on Community 

Characteristics and Resilience Indicators

Table A-1 lists all social and economic indicators for which data could be found along 

with sources.
A-2

Table A-1. Indicators of Resilience for Size, Built Environment, Social Dimensions, and Economic Development at the National

Level

Dimension Data Source Indicator Source

Population Dept. of Commerce, 

Census Bureau

Population size https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Population density https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Built Environment U.S. Environmental

Information Administration

Location of Power Plants http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/index.html

Location of Natural Gas 

Plants

http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/

Electric Transmission 

Lines and Natural Gas 

Pipelines

http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline

/index.html

Petroleum refinery 

capacity

http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/

Environmental Working 

Group

Water quality http://www.ewg.org/tap-water/rating-big-city-water.php

Environmental Protection 

Agency, Safe Drinking 

Water Information System

Water system serving city 

population

http://water.epa.gov/scitech/datait/databases/drink/sdwisfed/index.cfm 

City government website Wastewater Multiple websites

Dept. of Transportation, 

Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics

Highway characteristics http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/data_and_statistics/index.html

State transport statistics http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/data_and_statistics/index.html

Air transport http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/data_and_statistics/index.html

Maritime http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/data_and_statistics/index.html

Dept. of Transportation, 

Federal Highway 

Administration

Bridges http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi.cfm

State websites, no 

database

Tunnels Multiple websites

City transit authority 

website

Public transit Multiple websites

Dept. of Commerce, 

Census Bureau

Housing – year built https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Housing – occupant 

status

https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Hospitals http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/
A-3

Dimension Data Source Indicator Source

Dartmouth Atlas of Health 

Care

Hospital capacity http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/

Dept. of Education, 

National Center for 

Education Statistics

Schools http://nces.ed.gov/globallocator/

Social Dimensions Dept. of Commerce, 

Census Bureau

Population < 18 and > 65 https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Language use at home https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Foreign born https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Disability status https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Single parent households https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Senior citizens living 

alone

https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Uninsured https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Unemployment rate https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

Education attainment https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/

County health 

rankings/National Archive 

of Criminal Justice Data

Violent crime rate http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/

County health 

rankings/U.S. Dept. of 

Agriculture, Food 

Environment Atlas

Food environment index http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/

State government website Voter turnout Multiple websites

Economic 

Development

Dept. of Commerce, 

Bureau of Economic 

Analysis, Regional 

Economic Accounts

GDP per capita http://www.bea.gov/regional/

Personal income per 

capita

http://www.bea.gov/regional/

Dept. of Labor, Bureau of 

Labor Statistics

Employment, by industry http://www.bls.gov/bls/proghome.htm

Dept. of Commerce, 

Census Bureau 

Property values https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/
B-1

Appendix B.

Collection and Processing of Hazards Data and

MSAs within Regional Hazard Zones

Coastal Flooding, Riverine Flooding, Tornadoes, and Tropical

Cyclones Data

The full data set for coastal flooding, riverine flooding, tornadoes, and tropical 

cyclones over the time period of 1992 to 2014 was downloaded on 11/20/2014 from 

NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) Storm Events Database (NOAA NCDC 

2015). For the years 1992 to 2010, the data was version 1.0 and last updated on 8/24/2014. 

For the years 2011 and 2012, the data was version 1.0 and last updated on 9/30/2014. For 

the years 2013 and 2014, the data was version 1.0 and last updated on 10/22/2014. The 

most recent disaster event in the data set occurred on 7/31/2014. Evaluation of the data set 

revealed that a single event, such as Hurricane Katrina, was listed multiple times for 

different days and times, locations, and event types.

From the data set, the following fields were selected and used in the analysis: 

state_fips, year, event_type, cz_fips, injuries_direct, injuries_indirect, deaths_direct, 

deaths_indirect, damage_property, and damage_crops.9 The FIPS number for the event 

was calculated by merging the state and county FIPS values (state_fips and cz_fips). The 

event types coastal flooding, riverine flooding, tornadoes, and tropical cyclones were 

classified by merging several listed event types (event_type): coastal flooding consists of 

coastal flood and storm surge/tide; riverine flooding consists of flash flood, flood, and 

lakeshore flood; tornadoes consists of tornado and tornadoes/thunderstorms/hail; and 

tropical cyclones consists of hurricane, hurricane (typhoon), tropical depression, and 

tropical storm. To remove the not damaging events, all disaster events were categorized as 

either damaging or not damaging, with the definition of a damaging event having a nonzero death count, injury count, or cost to property or crops (injuries_direct, 

injuries_indirect, deaths_direct, deaths_indirect, damage_property, and damage_crops). 

As such, a not damaging event had a value of zero for all six categories.

After down-selection to only damaging events, a chart was made for each year 

comparing the FIPS code with the event type. The data from each year was merged to 

calculate the total number of damaging events by type over the time period of 1992 to 2014

 9 Field definitions are available online from NOAA NCDC at

ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/swdi/stormevents/csvfiles/Storm-Data-Export-Format.docx.
B-2

for each FIPS code.10 From this, the data was arrayed largest to smallest for each event 

type. The corresponding top 50 FIPS codes were recorded for each event type along with 

the total number of events. For FIPS codes that had the same number of events in this 

listing of the top 50, the FIPS codes were arranged largest to smallest values by numerical 

value.

Earthquake Data

The data set for earthquakes was downloaded on 12/2/2014 from the USGS 

Earthquakes Archive (USGS 2015b). The criteria used in the selection of the data set was 

the following: start date and time (UTC) of 01/01/1992 00:00:00; end date and time (UTC) 

of 07/31/2014 23:59:59; minimum magnitude of 5; maximum magnitude of 10; and within 

a geographic region circle centered on 44.966667, – 103.76666711 with a radius of 

4,700 km. 

From the data set, the following fields were selected and used in the analysis: time, 

latitude, and longitude. The year was extracted from the time field by isolating the first 

four characters in the field. The longitude and latitude fields were converted into FIPS 

codes using the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Census Block Conversions 

API (FCC 2015). If the longitude and latitude for an earthquake did not convert to a FIPS 

code, the earthquake event was removed from the data set, which eliminates all earthquakes 

with epicenters in the ocean or foreign territories. The data set was limited to earthquakes 

with a magnitude of five or greater, and since no estimates of death count, injury count, or 

cost to property or crops were listed in the data set, all events were classified as damaging.

A chart was made comparing the FIPS codes with the number of earthquakes events 

over the time period of 1992 to 2014. From this, the data was arrayed largest to smallest 

and the corresponding top 50 FIPS codes were recorded along with the total number of 

events. For FIPS codes that had the same number of events in this listing of the top 50, the 

FIPS codes were arranged largest to smallest values by numerical value.

Wildfires Data

The full data set for wildfires was downloaded on 12/4/2014 from the USDA Forest 

Service Data Catalog, product RDS-2013-0009.2 (Short 2013). The data was version 2.0 

and last updated on 4/28/2014. The data set covers wildfires over the time period of 1992 

to 2012.

 10 The 1999 data was unusable in the downloaded form, as the data were not properly organized and could 

not be readily fixed.

11 This latitude and longitude corresponds to the approximate geographic center of the United States, 

which is located 32 km north of Belle Fourche, South Dakota (Center for Land Use Interpretation

2015).
B-3

From the data set, the following fields were selected and used in the analysis: 

fire_year, fire_size_class, latitude, and longitude. The longitude and latitude fields were 

converted into FIPS codes using the FCC Census Block Conversions API. Since no 

estimates of death count, injury count, or cost to property or crops were listed in the data 

set, all events categorized as class D, E, F, or G in the fire_size_class field were designated 

as damaging. For reference, class D wildfires have a final perimeter size between 100 and 

299 acres, class E between 300 and 999 acres, class F between 1,000 and 4,999 acres, and 

class G of 5,000 or more acres.12

After down-selection to only damaging events, a chart was made comparing the FIPS 

codes with the number of earthquakes events over the time period of 1992 to 2012. From 

this, the data was arrayed largest to smallest and the corresponding top 50 FIPS codes were 

recorded along with the total number of events. For FIPS codes that had the same number 

of events in this listing of the top 50, the FIPS codes were arranged largest to smallest 

values by numerical value.

 12 Field definitions are available from the U.S. Forest Service (Short 2013). 
C-1

Appendix C.

Indicator Data for Seven Case Study

Community Candidates 

This appendix provides summary-level indicators across three dimensions for the 

seven candidate case study communities (Tables C-1 through C-7). Social Vulnerability 

Index (SVI) flags for the communities are also explained (Table C-8).
C-2

Table C-1. Summary of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions Indicators for Los Angeles, California

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $27,829 City

Median household income, 2009–13 $49,497 City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $8,122,942,937 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $5,138,290,071 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $827 B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($191,518 M)

MSA

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Professional and business 

services ($105,222 M); 

MSA

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Information 

($100,107 M)

MSA

4th industrial sector, 2013 Manufacturing ($78,257 M) MSA

5th industrial sector, 2013 Government 

($76,473 M)

MSA
C-3

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 20.6 City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 49.1 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 133,575 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 126,000 City

Year-over-year change in permits issued 6.01% City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 20 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.14 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.2 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.65 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.91 City

Education institutions per square mile 1.78 City

Water Systems Water system name Los Angeles City, Department 

of Water and Power

City

Population served 3,894,439 City

Primary water source type Surface water City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 3,852,816 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 8,221 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: high school 

graduate or higher

74.80% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 2 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 2 County

Total SVI flags 4 County
C-4

Table C-2. Summary of Indicators of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions for Flagstaff, Arizona

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $24,455 City

Median household income, 2009–13 $49,771 City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $238,184,402 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $40,698,916 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $5.2 B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Government ($1,399 M) MSA

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Manufacturing ($692 M) MSA

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Educational services, health 

care, and social assistance 

($641 M)

MSA

4th industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($586 M)

MSA

5th industrial sector, 2013 Arts, entertainment, 

recreation, accommodation, 

and food services ($577 M)

MSA
C-5

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 2.6 City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 9.6 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 199 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 221 City

Year-over-year change in permits issued –9.95% City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 1 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.5 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.55 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.55 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.78 City

Education institutions per square mile 0.64 City

Water Systems Water system name City of Flagstaff City

Population served 67,000 City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 67,418 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 1,055 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: High school 

graduate or higher

90.50% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 0 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 1 County

Total SVI flags 1 County
C-6

Table C-3. Summary of Indicators of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions for Norfolk, Virginia

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $24,659 City

Median household income, 2009–13 $44,747 City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $1,108,082,603 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $412,006,000 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $88.6B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Government ($25,823 M) MSA

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 14.9 City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 48.2 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 905 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 866 City

Year-over-year change in permits issued 4.50% City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 4 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.24 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.35 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 1.16 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 1.74 City

Education institutions per square mile 1.83 City

Water Systems Water system name City of Norfolk City

Population served 234,220 City

Primary water source type Surface water City
C-7

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 236,071 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 4,372 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: high school 

graduate or higher

86.4% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 1 County

SV3 - Minority status 1 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 3 County

Total SVI flags 5 County
C-8

Table C-4. Summary of Indicators of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions for Galveston, Texas

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $26,410 City

Median household income, 2009–13 $38,998 City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $108,356,651 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $43,346,578 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $517 B MSA, Houston

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Mining ($102,685 M) MSA, Houston

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Manufacturing ($96,754 M) MSA, Houston

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Professional and business 

services ($59,045 M)

MSA, Houston

4th industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($57,987 M)

MSA, Houston)

5th industrial sector, 2013 Government ($29,653 M) MSA, Houston
C-9

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 19.4 City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 34.6 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 N/R City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 N/R City

Year-over-year change in permits issued N/R City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 1 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.39 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.48 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.05 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.48 City

Education institutions per square mile 0.63 City

Water Systems Water System Name City of Galveston City

Population Served 56,200 City

Primary Water Source Type Surface water purchased City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size 48,237 City

Population density - individuals per square mile 1,046 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: high school 

graduate or higher

82.3% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 0 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 1 County

Total SVI flags 1 County

N/R = No response received from city officials as of 2/12/15.
C-10

Table C-5. Summary of Indicators of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions for Providence, Rhode Island

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $21,676 ($21,719, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Median household income, 2009–13 $32,632 ($32,697, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $678,409,978 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $330,357,507 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $5.9B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($15,016 M)

MSA

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Government ($10,562 M) MSA

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Educational services, health 

care, and social assistance 

($9,564 M)

MSA

4th industrial sector, 2013 Professional and business 

services ($8,261 M)

MSA

5th industrial sector, 2013 Retail trade ($4,373 M) MSA
C-11

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 34.7% City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 69.7% City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 No data City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 No data City

Year-over-year change in permits issued No data City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 6 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.36 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.54 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 1.59 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.38 City

Education institutions per square mile 5.76 City

Water Systems Water system name City of Providence City

Population served 295,700 City

Primary water source type Surface water City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 178,139 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 9,629 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: High school 

graduate or higher

73.3%% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 1 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 2 County

Total SVI flags 3 County
C-12

Table C-6. Summary of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions Indicators for Huntsville, Alabama

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $30,916 ($33,862, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Median household income, 2009-2013 $48,881 ($53,539, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $514,058,875 City

Tax revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $196,530,000 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $21.9 B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Government ($5,950 M) MSA

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Professional and business 

services ($4,838 M)

MSA

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Manufacturing ($3,264 M) MSA

4th industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($2,721 M)

MSA

5th industrial sector, 2013 Retail trade ($1,394 M) MSA
C-13

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 3.30% City

year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 18.0% City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 3,017 City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 2,811 City

Year-over-year change in permits issued 7.33% City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 2 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.3 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.48 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 1.4 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 2.23 City

Education institutions per square mile 0.46 City

Water Systems Water system name Huntsville Utilities City

Population served 219,168 City

Primary water source type Surface water City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 183,702 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 876.4 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: high school 

graduate or higher

90.1% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 0 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 0 County

Total SVI flags 0 County
C-14

Table C-7. Summary of Economic Development, Built Environment, and Social Dimensions Indicators for Ames, Iowa

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Economic Development

Income Personal money income per capita, 2009–13 $23,713 ($26,734, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Median household income, 2009–13 $42,714 ($48,156, adjusted to 

U.S. avg. regional price parity)

City

Budget City budget, FY 2015 anticipated $190,988,241 City

Tax Revenue, FY 2015 anticipated $33,958,624 City

Economic Activity Total GDP in MSA, 2013 $4.7 B MSA

Primary industrial sector, 2013 Government ($1,403 M) MSA

2nd industrial sector, 2013 Manufacturing ($1,283 M) MSA

3rd industrial sector, 2013 Finance, insurance, real 

estate, rental, and leasing 

($649 M)

MSA

4th industrial sector, 2013 Professional and business 

services ($275 M)

MSA

5th industrial sector, 2013 Educational services, health 

care, and social assistance 

($238 M)

MSA
C-15

Data Subset by 

Community Characteristic Value Region

Built Environment

Housing Year built - % of structures built in 1939 or earlier 11.1% City

Year built - % of structures built in 1959 or earlier 20.1% City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2014 No data City

Building permits issued for new starts, 2013 No data City

Year-over-year change in permits issued No data City

Hospitals Number of major hospital facilities within city limits 1 City

School information Public schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.13 City

Total schools per 1,000 population (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.16 City

Public schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 0.99 City

Total schools per 1,000 minors (day care, elementary, middle, high) 1.24 City

Education institutions per square mile 0.5 City

Water Systems Water System Name Ames Water Treatment Plant City

Population served 50,029 City

Primary water source type Ground water City

Social Dimensions

Overall Total population size, 2013, 3-year estimate 61,035 City

Population density - individuals per square mile, 2013, 3-year estimate 2,521.1 City

Educational attainment for population 25 and older: high school 

graduate or higher

97.1% City

Social Vulnerability Index 

(SVI)

SV1 - Socio-economic 0 County

SV2 - Household composition 0 County

SV3 - Minority status 0 County

SV4 - Housing and transportation 2 County

Total SVI flags 2 County
C-16

Table C-8. Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) Flags for Seven Candidate Case Study Communities (2010 Data)

Flags (Percentile of all U.S. Jurisdictions)

City SVI Jurisdiction

SocioeconomicHousehold 

Composition

Minority Status/

Language

Housing/

Transportation

Total No.

of Flags

Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles County N/A N/A Proportion of population that 

is minority (0.9754)

Proportion of population with 

limited English (0.991)

Proportion of housing structures 

with 10+ units (0.9907)

Proportion of households with 

more people than rooms 

(0.9907)

4

Galveston, TX Galveston County N/A N/A N/A Proportion of housing structures 

with 10+ units (0.9325)

1

Norfolk, VA Norfolk City N/A Proportion of households 

with single-parent (0.9388)

Proportion of population that 

is minority (0.9201)

Proportion of housing structures 

with 10+ units (0.9675)

Proportion of households with 

no vehicle available (0.9373)

Proportion of persons in 

institutionalized quarters 

(0.9649)

5

Flagstaff, AZ Coconino County N/A N/A N/A Proportion of households with 

more people than rooms 

(0.9716)

1

Providence, RI Providence County N/A N/A Proportion of population with 

limited English (0.9532)

Proportion of housing structures 

with 10+ units (0.9353)

Proportion of households with 

no vehicle available (0.9436)

3

Huntsville, AL Madison County N/A N/A N/A N/A 0

Ames, IA Story County N/A N/A N/A Proportion of housing structures 

with 10+ units (0.9875)

Proportion of persons in 

institutionalized quarters 

(0.9223)

2
D-1

Appendix D.

Discussion Topics

Resilience within City Government

1. How would you define resilience? 

2. Who in city government is responsible for designing resilience measures? 

Implementing? Funding, budgeting? 

3. What activities have been undertaken by the city prior to the development or 

implementation of “resilience” measures? What are new initiatives being 

developed or implemented after incorporating “resilience” principles or 

measures?

4. What are the city’s resilience goals in the next 5 years? 10 years? 30 years?

a. How does the city intend to accomplish these measures?

b. Is there a resilience strategy, disaster preparedness plan that lays out these 

goals and approaches to address them?

5. What is the city’s experience with disasters?

a. How have previous events tested the city’s preparedness?

b. What are some lessons learned for ensuring that multiple systems (e.g. 

buildings, infrastructure, social support, economic support) are maintained or 

restored during and after a disaster?

Resilience with Stakeholders and Partner Governmental Agencies

1. How does the city work with its counterpart city and county governments to 

cooperate and jointly implement mitigation, response and recovery activities?

2. What are the roles for the city vs. other cities, NGOs, private businesses in 

planning for disasters? Mitigation, response, recovery?

3. What is the city’s perspective on the state and Federal Government’s roles?

4. Are there regional agencies involved with resilience planning, focus on economic 

development planning and land use planning? 

5. Are there specific NGOs that are involved in resilience, disaster preparedness 

planning? Are these NGOs static during disaster events? 

Resilience in economic development planning

1. How is the city currently implementing plans to mitigate losses from disasters to 

businesses? What sectors are currently involved?
D-2

2. In the recovery period after an event, what is the city responsible for to help 

businesses recover to normal operations?

a. Are these efforts prioritized?

b. Are there specific sector-based priorities? 

3. Who is the city working with to address mitigation, response, recovery related 

business issues?

4. What is a typical disaster preparedness activity undertaken by the city? What is a 

resilience activity undertaken by the city? What are the differences between 

existing on-going activities and resilience actions?

Resilience in land use planning, including standards adoption

1. How does the city reduce vulnerabilities to common hazards? 

2. What measures are currently in place to address disaster hazards, and mitigate 

damage, loss of property, loss of life?

a. What was the process of implementing these measures?

b. Who was involved? What time period did these activities take place? Who 

was the ultimate decision maker that directed this policy? 

3. What agencies are responsible for designing and implementing standards for the 

built environment (e.g. residential, commercial, industrial buildings, parks, 

schools, hospitals)? 

4. Does the city have a role of the city in setting, adopting infrastructure standards?

5. What is a typical disaster preparedness activity undertaken by the city? What is a 

resilience activity undertaken by the city? What are the differences between 

existing on-going activities and resilience actions?

Local Policy Making, Decision Making

1. Who are the different decision-makers involved in establishing disaster 

preparedness/resilience within economic development policy, land use and zoning 

policy, and building and infrastructure standards policy?

2. What motivates these decision makers to take actions around reducing 

vulnerabilities, or hardening systems to hazards?

Lessons Learned

1. What advice would you give to other cities beginning to consider resilience and 

disaster preparedness planning?

2. What are some events, activities, or initiatives that worked well in your city that 

could be adopted by other cities?

3. Which agencies or individuals should we speak with to learn more?
E-1

Appendix E.

Community Contacts

Table E-1. Interviewees by Location

City Name Position

Flagstaff Earl Stewart Forest Supervisor, Coconino National Forest

Flagstaff Kevin Burke Former City Manager, now Town Manager in Paradise Valley

Flagstaff Lena Fowler District 5 Supervisor (on County Board of Supervisors)

Flagstaff Mark Brehl FWPP Operations Specialist, Flagstaff Fire Department

Flagstaff Nicole Woodman Sustainability Manager, Sustainability & Environmental Mgmt. 

Section/SEMS

Flagstaff Robert Rowley Emergency Manager, Coconino County

Los Angeles Ashley Atkinson Mayor's Office of Economic Development

Los Angeles Craig Davis, PhD Manager of Geotechnical Services, LADWP

Los Angeles Eileen Decker Deputy Mayor for Public Safety

Los Angeles Jim Featherstone LA City Emergency Management General Manager

Los Angeles Leslie Luke Deputy Director at Los Angeles County Office of Emergency 

Management

Norfolk Ben McFarlane Hampton Roads Planning District Commission

Norfolk Christine Morris Chief Resilience Officer

Norfolk Denise Thompson Manager of Environmental Protection Programs

Norfolk George Homewood Director of City Planning

Norfolk Greg Grootendorst Hampton Roads Planning District Commission

Norfolk Jim Redick Director of Emergency Preparedness and Response

Norfolk Joseph Formato Capital Improvements Business Line Coordinator and Chief 

Engineer at Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

Norfolk Ray Toll Director of Coastal Resilience Research, Old Dominion 

University

Norfolk Ron Williams Deputy City Manager
F-1

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Abbreviations

100RC 100 Resilient Cities

4FRI Four Forest Restoration Initiative

ACS American Community Survey

BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis

CEA California Earthquake Authority

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CRO Chief Resilience Officer

DROP Disaster Resilience of Place

EF Enhanced Fujita

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GDP gross domestic product

HRPDC Hampton Roads Planning District Commission

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses

MSA metropolitan statistical area 

NCDC National Climatic Data Center

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

STPI Science and Technology Policy Institute

SVI Social Vulnerability Index

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USGS United States Geological Survey

WUI Wildland-Urban Interface