Decision Analysis Model for

Passenger-Aircraft Fire Safety

With Application to Fire-Blocking

of Seats

U S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

National Engineering Laboratory

Center for Fire Research

Washington, DC 20234

March 1984

Sponsored by:

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Atlantic City, New Jersey 08405

100

. U56

34-2317

1934

NBSIR 84-2817

DECISION ANALYSIS MODEL FOR

PASSENGER-AIRCRAFT FIRE SAFETY

WITH APPLICATION TO FIRE-BLOCKING

OF SEATS

John R. Hall, Jr. S. Wayne Stiefel

U S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

National Engineering Laboratory

Center for Fire Research

Washington, DC 20234

March 1984

Sponsored by:

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Atlantic City, New Jersey 08405

National bureau

or standards

library

QC

/(jo

2 4 i

\ $ 4

"

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler. Director
.
N.".TIO: :/'.L BUREAU

STA. DAB 03 LlEUAry

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

List of Figures v

List of Tables vi

Executive Summary viii

Abstract I

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. GENERIC MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR AIRCRAFT-FIRE DECISION ANALYSIS 1

2.1 Overview of the Parts of the Modeling Framework 3

2.1.1 Aircraf t/Activity/Occupant Characteristics and

Fire Scenarios 3

2.1.2 Decision Model 4

2.1.3 Ignition-Initiation Model 5

2.1.4 Post-Ignition Model 5 2.1.5 Loss Evaluation Model 7 2.1.6 Cost Model 8

2.1.7 Cost-Benefit Comparison Model 9

2.1.8 Summary of Models to be Discussed in Greater Detail <>.... 9

2.2 Models to Estimate Losses and Savings 9

2.2.1 Identifying the Historical Data Base 10

2.2.2 Activity Forecasts Needed to Model Expected Loss 13

2.2.3 Estimating Expected Losses with an Alternative 14

2.3 Loss Evaluation Model 16

2.4 Cost Models 16

2.4.1 Forecasts Used in the Cost Models 17

2.4.2 Model of Installation and Maintenance Costs 17

2.4.3 Model of Operating Costs 19

2.5 Cost-Benefit Comparison Model 22

3. REVIEW OF RELATED PROJECTS AND LITERATURE 23

4. SAMPLE APPLICATION: FIRE-BLOCKING OF SEATS 24

4.1 Expected Losses and Savings with Seat Blocking 26

4.2 Expected Costs for Seat Blocking 27

4.3 Cost-Benefit Comparisons for Seat Blocking 27

5. CONCLUSIONS 27

6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 31

-iii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

Appendix A. Sources and Rationales for Estimated Fire Fatalities - Total and Estimated Saveable by Seat Blocking A-l

Appendix B. Historical Accidents Involving Fires and Fatalities But

No Fire-Related Fatalities, 1965-82 B-l

Appendix C. Historical Major Aircraft-Fire Property Damage Preventable

by Alternatives Operating in the Aircraft Interior C-l

Appendix D. Historical Passenger-Exposure Calculations D-l

Appendix E. Forecasts Used in the Cost Models E-l

Appendix F. Annotated Listing of Literature Reviewed F-l

Appendix G. Data Sources and Calculations for Sample Application of

Models to Fire-Blocking of Aircraft Seats G-l

Appendix H. Formulas for Additional Sensitivity Analysis H-l

-iv-
LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1. Generic Modeling Framework for Aircraft-Fire Decision

Analysis 2

Figure 2. Compact Post-Ignition Display Format for PassengerAircraft Fire Fatalities 6

Figure E-l. Sensitivity of Incremental Fuel Consumption to Increased

Weight, 1985-2000 E-9

-v-
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82, U.S. Airlines 11

Table 2. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82, Non-U. S. Airlines

Using U.S. -Built Aircraft 12

Table 3. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82, Non-U. S. Airlines

Using Non-U. S. -Built Aircraft 13

Table 4. Forecast Passenger-Miles as Percentages of Base-Year

Figures, Scheduled and Non-Scheduled , Jet and Turboprop,

1983-1997 15

Table 5. Summary of Characteristics of Seat-Blocking Materials 25

Table 6. Summary of Annualized Costs and Benefits for Seat-Blocking

Alternatives 28

Table 7. Net Annualized Benefits Over Costs for Seat-Blocking

Alternatives 30

Table C-l. Historical Major Aircraft Fire Losses Preventable by

Alternatives Operating in the Aircraft Cabin C-2

Table C-2. Summary Estimates of Preventable Property Damage in

Aircraft Fires C-3

Table C-3. Bases for Estimating Values of Property Damage to

Aircraft C-4

Table D-l. Historical Passenger-Miles (in Billions) for Scheduled

and Non-Scheduled Passenger Flights D-2

Table D-2. Estimated Percentage of Passenger-Miles on Piston Aircraft.. D-3

Table D-3. Estimated Percentage of World-Airline, Turbine-Aircraft

Traffic in Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. -Built

Aircraft D-4

Table D-4. Total Estimated Passenger-Miles (in Billions), Scheduled

and Non-Scheduled, Jet and Turboprop Only, 1965-1982 D-5

Table D-5. Assumed Typical Number of Seats Carried on Passenger

Flights, by Aircraft Type D-6

Table E-l. Passenger Aircraft by Generic Class E-2

Table E-2. Historical Projected Passenger-Miles and Available

Seat-Miles, 1982-1997 E-3

-vi-
LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Page

Table E-3. Inventory, Activity and Descriptive Statistics by Aircraft

Model Class, U.S. Airlines Only E-4

Table E-4. Inventory, Activity and Descriptive Statistics by Aircraft

Model Class, World Airlines E-6

Table E-5. Fuel Cost Factors Related to Weight Penalties E-8

Table G-l. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking,

1965-82, U.S. Airlines G-3

Table G-2. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking,

1965-82, Non-U. S. Airlines Using U.S. -Built Aircraft G-4

Table G-3. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking,

1965-82, Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. -Bui It Aircraft G-5

Table G-4. Total Estimated Fatalities Preventable by Seat Blocking

in Historical Period G-6

Table G-5. Estimated Annual Savings From Seat Blocking Given 1982

Exposure Levels G-7

Table G-6. Estimated Annual Savings Given Five Values of Added Escape

Time and 1982 Exposure Levels G-8

Table G-7. Additions to or Reductions in Savings at Limits of Expected

Values of Added Escape Time G-9

Table G-8. Design Characteristics of Seat Blocking Alternatives G-10

Table G-9. Seat Back and Bottom Cushion Incremental Cost and Weight

Data G-l

l

Table G-10. High, Middle and Low Cost and Weight per Seat Estimates for

Blocking Materials G-12

Table G-ll. Schedule of Seats Blocked for U.S. Fleet Using a Three-Year

Refurbishment Cycle G-12

Table G-12. Schedule of Seats Blocked for World Fleet Using a Three-Year

Refurbishment Cycle G-13

Table G-13. Schedule of Seats Blocked for U.S. Fleet Using a Three-Year

Phase-In and Six-Year Reblocking Cycle G-13

-vii-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fire-risk assessment and decision analysis methodologies were developed

for the case of major aircraft fires. A generic model has been developed

covering fatal passenger-flight fires and fires involving major fire damage.

That model has then been applied to the risk-reduction strategy of seat

blocking. The model permits not only assessment of the costs (initial and

operating) and benefits (lives saved and damage averted) of currently

established blocking materials but also rapid calculation of the impact of

changes in cost on performance in the face of rapid innovation. Evidence on the sensitivity of overall benefit/cost calculations to changes in one area versus another can be useful in developing priorities for safety research.

The benefits models are organized around a data base of historical

fires. Tests and deterministic models are used to assess likely exit speeds,

relative contributions of various fire-involved materials to fatalities,

projects performance of risk-reduction alternatives, and other factors used in

assessing which victims could have been saved by an alternative. Significant

uncertainties still remain in these estimates because of uncertainties in some

of the models (e.g., models on the role of cyanide in causing fatalities) and even more because of uncertainties in the detail available on circumstances of some accidents. At least in the first sample application, however, these

uncertainties did not preclude use of the models to produce useful

conclusions

.

The cost models use aircraft manufacturers' estimates and forecasts for

the project phase-in of new aircraft, operation and efficiency of the aircraft

fleet and fuel costs over the next 15 years, and seat manufacturers' estimates

to produce estimated costs for installing the alternative and operating with

it. Significant uncertainties exist because these estimates nearly all

involve forecasting based on the state of the economy or for products with

which manufacturers have very limited experience, but as with benefits models,

these uncertainties do not preclude the use of the models to produce useful

conclusions

.

In the sample application, for example, many key assumptions that were checked for sensitivity proved not to be critical in the assessment of net

benefits over costs. Benefits proved less sensitive in general than costs.

The relative insensitivity of benefits emphasizes the importance of reducing

costs. For the seat-blocking material with the lowest cost and least weight,

costs and benefits were closely matched, which meant that conclusions on whether benefits exceed costs or vice versa were sensitive to many of the

assumptions used in the analysis. If costs could be reduced even further,

sensitivity to these assumptions would be reduced, and the net benefits of

seat blocking would be clearly established. Appendix H presents formulas that can be used for quick analysis of the impact of changes in fuel prices, weight

penalty per seat, or incremental changes in the costs of fabricating and

installing seat blockers.

While no analysis was done on the effects of varying either the discount

rate or the speed or timing of the phase-in of seat blocking, it is probably

safe to assume that neither would dramatically affect the results. The

sizeable contribution of operating costs and the short time between seat

ref urbishments mean that benefits are incurred at about the same rate as costs

.

viii
Abstract

This report develops a generic model for analysis of the costs and

benefits of fire-risk reducing strategies related to passenger airlines. The

model calculates incremental costs for installing and operating these

options. It also calculates estimated lives saved and property damage

avoided, and it provides rules for combining costs and benefits into a single

measure of attractiveness for an alternative. This model is then applied to

the strategy of fire-blocking seats on passenger airlines, either on U.S.

airlines or on all world airlines.

Key words: aircraft accidents; airlines safety; decision analysis; fire

risk; fire statistics; risk analysis.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is concerned about the costs

and benefits associated with risk-reduction strategies affecting aircraft

accidents, including fires; the National Bureau of Standards' Center for Fire

Research (CFR) has an interest in the development of techniques for assessing

costs and benefits of fire-risk-reduction strategies. This commonality of

interest formed the basis for a project to develop analytic models to assess

costs and benefits of candidate risk-reduction strategies targeted at aircraft

fire scenarios. This report presents the results of the first year's effort

in which the generic model framework was developed and applied in detail to^a

leading candidate risk-reduction strategy - the use of fire-blocking layers

on passenger-aircraft seats.

The generic model framework and the particular models used in developing

estimates of costs and benefits. for risk-reduction strategies are presented in

section 2. Section 3 provides a brief discussion of the technical literature

reviewed for this project, including sources of models, key assumptions and

data; Appendix F contains an annotated listing of that literature. Section 4

contains a sample application of the detailed modeling framework to several

versions of the seat-blocking strategy.

2. GENERIC MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR AIRCRAFT-FIRE DECISION ANALYSIS

Figure l provides an overview of the generic modeling framework. The

initial step establishes a structure for the fires to be studied. The analyst

identifies aircraft types, activity types, occupant characteristics and fire

types of interest, and uses this structure in deciding what data are needed

for the other models in the framework. These data are used in parallel by

three models: (1) the Ignition- Initiation Model, which provides estimated

probabilities of ignition; (2) the Post-Ignition Model, which provides

estimated losses (e.g., deaths, injuries and property damage) given ignition;

and (3) the Cost Model. The first two models provide the probabilities of

accidents and the severities of those accidents, respectively. Together, the

measured probabilities and severities give the level of risk, while the third

model - the Cost Model - gives the corresponding cost.

This involves the introduction of a layer of material - bonded to, sewn onto

or sprayed onto the urethane core - underneath the seat cover in order to

delay or prevent involvement of the seats in fire spread.

1
Aircraft/

Activity/

Occupant

characteristics

and

frequencies

and

fire-scenario

structure

(Includes

Decision

Model)

2

Figure

1.

Generic

Modeling

Framework

for

Aircraft-Fire

Detection

Analysis
For ease of computation, each of these models is set up to measure risks

and costs relative to a base case, which is usually defined as the status quo

(and will be so defined in this study). The measured risk, derived from the

Ignition- Initiation Model and the Post-Ignition Model, is passed to a Loss

Evaluation Model, which converts different types of losses (deaths, injuries,

property damage) to a common scale. Finally, a Cost-Benefit Comparison Model

is used to convert costs and losses into a measure of attractiveness for the

alternative.

2.1 Overview of the Parts of the Modeling Framework

2.1.1 Aircraft/ Activity/ Occupant Characteristics and Fire Scenarios

The specification of aircraft/activity/occupant characteristics and fire

scenarios is intended to (a) bound the problem by excluding flights or fires

that are not of interest to the analyst or that would not be affected by the

alternative being studied, (b) take account of characteristics that significantly affect either the cost of adopting the alternative or its likely

effect, and (c) provide a basis for extrapolating likely future loss and cost

experience.

Bounding the aircraft fire problem involved several exclusions. First,

flights and accidents involving piston engine or rotary blade aircraft or occurring prior to 1965 were excluded. Jet aircraft dominate air activity

today, and 1965 is roughly the start of that period of dominance. Turboprop

aircraft are included but constitute a small part of the total. Piston engine

and rotary blade aircraft account for a very small share (less than one percent) of commercial passenger flight activity, so they can be safely excluded.

Second, flights other than passenger flights are excluded because this

study was directed at alternatives that improve life safety on passenger

flights. Cargo flights, training flights, repositioning flights, and flights

by military aircraft or privately owned aircraft were excluded from the

analysis, even though some of them could be affected by some alternatives.

These types of flights would add considerably to the uncertainty in the

analysis because data is much less available for such flights. Scheduled and

non-scheduled service were both included.

Third, the analysis focused on U.S. airlines, which are FAA's

responsibility, but a separate analysis of world airlines (excluding those of

the Soviet bloc countries, where data is particularly scarce and U.S.

influence is slightest) also was done. One reason is that most non-U. S.

airlines use U.S. aircraft, and any change in U.S. airline fleets probably

will have ripple effects worldwide. An initial examination of the effect of

excluding non-U. S. -built aircraft flown by non-U. S. airlines is briefly

discussed in the sample application. The results were so close to those for

the world-airline case, however, that there seemed to be little value in

pursuing a separate analysis.

To account for effects on either the cost or the likely impact of the

alternative, occupant characteristics and fire scenarios had to be specified.

Occupants were characterized on a fatality-by-fatality basis in terms of both

the ability of the alternative to help them (by preventing, moderating or delaying the conditions that killed them) and the victim's own ability to use

3
that help if it were provided. An example of the former would be the

separating out of persons killed by impact trauma in a crash; they would be

unaffected by any measures directed against the post-crash fire. An example

of the latter would be the separating out of persons stunned by the crash;

they would benefit from any measure that stopped the fire but could not have

made use of the extra escape time provided by an alternative that only delayed

the fire. The same might be true of small children and very elderly or infirm

passengers

Fire scenarios were set up on the basis of an initial partitioning into

in-flight fires, post-crash fires and on-ground or ramp fires. An in-flight

fire tends to produce either minor damage or the destruction of the aircraft

and everyone aboard. In such fires, alternatives exert a fairly sharp eitheror effect on both the lives lost and the property damage. Post-crash fires

frequently kill some but not all of the occupants, and their contribution to

property damage may be large or small, depending on the severity of the crash.

Alternatives can have incremental effects on lives lost and property damaged

in such fires. Finally, ramp fires generally involve no life risk but can involve serious property damage. In these cases, the problem of unattended

fires arises, where the other two scenarios are more involved with hidden or fast-moving fires. Further sub-divisions of these scenarios are then appropriate for analysis of particular alternatives.

Finally, to provide a basis for extrapolating likely future loss and cost

experience, the measure of exposure that most closely drives risk - number of

flights, aircraft-miles, seat-miles, passenger-miles, hours of flying time,

aircraft-departures, or some other measure had to be identified. In aircraft

analyses, as with building-fire analyses, the choice of a measure requires a compromise - not necessarily the best measure imaginable, but the best measure

obtainable. In home fires, for example, risk is usually assessed relative to

numbers of housing units or numbers of occupants because data is readily

available on both. Even if one could show that fire risk rises and falls more

in relation to square feet of living space than to number of occupants, that

would make little practical difference because data on the former is largely

unavailable

Similar data scarcity considerations precluded the use of a fine

structure using numerous categories of aircraft types, airline types, activity

types, engine types, and fire types. Such a structure would assure that each

category is homogeneous with respect to fire probability, likely fire development, likely people movement, and especially the likely effects of any alternatives under consideration. One is then faced, however, with the prospect

that many of the categories so created will have had no significant historical

fire experience. Instead, this model uses very few categories. Further

development of deterministic models or test results may provide more information on relative risk of different types of aircraft, engines, and the like,

permitting more fine structure in the model. Until then, one must use sensitivity analysis by varying assumptions to see how much the results change.

2.1.2 Decision Model

As noted in figure 1, a special part of the Aircraft/ Activity/ Occupant

Characteristics model is the Decision Model, which addresses characteristics

of the phasing-in, extent of adoption, reliability, and degradation in use of

4
the alternative. One must estimate how many potential users will decide to

buy a given alternative, how many of those will be able to buy it, how many of

those who buy it will obtain a defective product, and so forth. The speed of

introduction of the alternative also is addressed in this model.

The model captures these characteristics through a set of probabilities.

For potential users who do not acquire the alternative, probabilities are calculated expressing their share of the total activity/exposure , and both the

costs and benefits of the alternative are correspondingly reduced. Users who

acquire defective products or products that degrade in use are captured by

other probabilities that reduce benefits but not costs.

2.1.3 Ignition-Initiation Model

The ignition-initiation model computes differences between the historical

baseline probabilities of fire and the probabilities expected if the alternative(s) are present. These differences are calculated per year, given the

aircraf t/activity/occupant characteristics already specified, for each fire

scenario. In other words, the historical probabilities are assumed to

continue unchanged if the alternative( s) is not adopted. If past experience

is not believed to give a reliable projection in the absence of the alternative, then a more sophisticated model must be used to estimate what the baseline should be. In this model, it has been assumed that, in the absence of

specific changes, the probability of ignition will continue to be best estimated by the 1965-82 average probability.

2.1.4 Post-Ignition Model

As with the Ignition- Initiation Model, this model begins with historical

losses per fire, given a fire scenario and aircraf t/activity/occupant

characteristics. Therefore it too assumes a fairly stable status quo. The

Post- Ignition Model is based on a critical-event sequence or tree. A critical

event marks a significant change in the condition of the fire, the status of

fire protective features or systems, fire-related activities, or the conditions of persons exposed to the fire.

For analyses of interest to FAA, a more compact display than a criticalevent tree is possible and desirable. Figure 2 shows a two-by-three partitioning of all fatalities in passenger-aircraft fires. This approach can be

used to provide an initial sorting of fatal fire victims for all alternatives

of interest to FAA, although the actual assignment of victims to one cell versus another will be different for different alternatives. Figure 2 also

shows the kinds of fire and victim characteristics that would be assigned to

each cell.

An examination of the blocks in figure 2 will show how the type of

analysis needed to estimate benefits will vary from block to block. The

Limited/Limited block, for example, requires further analysis to determine

whether the actual escape time provided will exceed the time required. (It is

this block that would create a large number of critical-event branches if a full-critical-event tree were used.) The analysis might involve estimating

how long fatal fire effects would have been delayed by an alternative, then

analyzing how many of the victims in the Limited/Limited cell could have

escaped in that time. For example, test results may show that an alternative

5
Note: Persons killed by impact trauma in a crash preceding the fire are not shown

Extra Escape Time Provided by Alternative

Extra

Escape

Time

Required

by

Victim

None Limited Virtually Unlimited

Limited

Virtually

Unlimited

Fatal fire effects Fatal fire Fatal fire effects

unaffected by effects partially blocked by

alternative, e.g., affected by alternative, e.g..

fire spread alternative, fire suppressed

primarily along e.g. , fire early, prevented

paths not delayed by completely, or covered by alternative. confined to harmalternative; less area for

fatal fire Victim mobile indefinite period

effects not and able to of time.

of a kind escape given

affected by time. Victim mobile and

alternative. able to use extra

escape time but

Victim mobile and does not have to.

able to escape

given time

NONE SAVED SOME SAVED ALL SAVED

Fire effects same Fire effects Fire effects same

as above. same as above. as above.

Victim unable to Victim unable to Victim unable to use escape time, use extra escape use extra escape

e.g., stunned, time. time, but that

trapped by debris. does not matter.

blocked by unuseable

exits, too young,

too sick, etc.

NONE SAVED NONE SAVED | ALL SAVED

Figure 2. Compact Post-Ignition Display Format for PassengerAircraft Fire Fatalities

6
provides 60 extra seconds of escape time. Other tests and data from actual

fires may indicate that people can escape at a rate of one per second, given

the right sizes and number of useable exits. For such an accident, 60 people

could be saved by the alternative. In a particular accident of this type, if

30 victims qualified as Limited/Limited, they would all be saved; if 150

victims fit this description, only 60 would be saved.

The display in figure 2 provides a number of useful insights into the

effects of the alternative and its potential for improvement. If the SAVED

victims are a large proportion of the total victims, then the alternative is

highly effective. If they are not, then one may ask why not. If the SAVED

victims in the Limited/Limited cell are a large proportion of the total

victims in the Limited/Limited cell, then incremental improvements in the

alternative will have little effect. If sizeable numbers of victims fall in

the first column (NONE SAVED), then a whole new approach probably will be

needed to save them.

Thus far the discussion has focused on post-ignition modeling of

fatalities. The procedures for modeling injuries are theoretically the same,

but the historical-fire information on injury characteristics - even whether

an injury was due to fire or impact trauma - is much thinner than the corresponding information on fatalities. Also, as discussed later, a case may be

made that injuries constitute a very small part of the total losses In aircraft fires. For building fires, the lesser severity of injuries as opposed

to fatalities is balanced by the far greater frequency of injuries. In aircraft accidents, however, the frequency of injuries is on the same order of

magnitude as the frequency of fatalities. For these reasons, injuries receive

relatively little attention in our modeling framework.

Property damage also poses modeling difficulties. In post-crash fires,

it is rarely possible to identify the incremental effect of fire on the oftensevere damage already caused by the crash impact. (Crashes caused by inflight fires are easier to model if it can be determined whether the alternative would have permitted a safer landing.) Except for crash incidents

involving relatively light landings, where impact damage was demonstrably

minor, this is a problem. For ramp or ground fires, assessing damage is no longer a problem, but tracking down relevant incidents is. Incidents

involving no life risk are not documented as thoroughly or as consistently as incidents involving life risk. Neither government agencies nor industry

associations, to our knowledge, have developed summaries of incidents

involving only damage to property. Data bases prepared by fire service groups

do not go back far enough or are not complete enough to fill the gap. Consequently, some estimation may be necessary.

2.1.5 Loss Evaluation Model

The results of the Ignition-Initiation and Post-Ignition models can be

combined to produce expected losses per year, by type of loss. The Loss

Evaluation Model can then be used to combine these figures into a single scale

giving expected losses per year. The most common approach is to monetize the

benefits, i.e., convert estimates of lives saved and injuries averted to

equivalent dollar values so they can be combined with the dollar values for

property damage avoided. This is a controversial procedure which many people

object to on several grounds, including the belief that the sanctity of life

7
forbids anyone from being asked to put a price on his or her life. It is

therefore important to understand that people are not being asked to set a price for which they would be willing to die. They are instead being asked

how much they would pay to further reduce their already low risk of dying.

People make such decisions every day, and it is possible for a third party,

like FAA or CFR, to infer from studies of such decisions the typical values

that express people's willingness to pay for reduced risk of death. Over the course of a year, with hundreds of billions of passenger-miles flown, these

small risks translate into an expected number of lives lost or saved. For

convenience sake, these values are expressed in terms of values per life, but

they really reflect an assessments of the value of reduced risk.

2.1.6 Cost Model

If the analysis has been set up to compare a few well-defined alternatives to the status quo, then the Cost Model need only be designed to address

the changes in costs due to the alternative( s) . The following are the principal sources of cost differences:

1. Equipment costs. The costs of producing the materials and

fabricating the products entailed In the alternative( s) need to

be estimated. In many analyses, there will be new products

which may have been produced only on a test basis. Likely

costs under mass-production conditions can be difficult to

estimate but need to be addressed.

2. Installation costs. This may include installation of selfcontained devices (like blocked seats) into an otherwise

unchanged aircraft, or it could mean the change in construction

costs for an aircraft modified in some more fundamental way

(e.g., so as to increase compartmentalization of firesusceptible areas of the aircraft). Since some alternatives do

not add features but rather modify them (e.g., blocked seats),

one needs to estimate the incremental cost of routine installation caused by the modification and the full cost of initial

installation if done out of cycle solely to install the modification. Labor costs may vary considerably from place to place,

which adds to the uncertainty of these calculations.

3. Operating costs. For aircraft, changes in operating costs

arise principally through weight penalties associated with

alternatives. In addition, it is conceivable that, for

example, changes in fuel composition or procedures could affect

operating costs in other ways.

4. Servicing, inspection, testing and maintenance costs. In each

case, the cost of concern is the change in the cost relative to

the costs of these activities under the status quo.

5. Repair and replacement costs. Under an alternative, repairs

may be more or less costly and may be needed more or less

frequently. Replacement cycles may be altered or replacement

costs (already addressed under installation costs) changed.

8
6. Financing costs, salvage value. Implementing the alternative

may be covered by time-payment arrangements, adding interest

costs. The alternative could add to or subtract from resale

value, and it could add to or reduce the likely salvage value

of damaged aircraft.

This list is not exhaustive, but it should provide an indication of the

diverse ways in which alternatives can affect costs. All of these possibilities need to be identified and worked through to produce overall estimates of

cost impacts.

2.1.7 Cost-Benefit Comparison Model

After deciding on a format for handling non-monetary benefits, as discussed under the Loss Evaluation Model, there remains the need to reduce a time stream of projected costs and benefits into manageable single values of

costs and benefits. Discounting is used to reflect opportunity costs and to

compensate for deferring consumption. The U.S. Office of Management and

Budget has an officially recommended discount rate of 10 percent [72].

2.1.8 Summary of Models to be Discussed in Greater Detail

The remainder of section 2 provides additional detail on the major

modeling components of the framework. Section 2.2 describes in greater detail

the models and data bases that produce estimates of expected loss. Section

2.2.1 presents the historical data base of passenger aircraft fires used in

estimating a baseline of expected losses. Section 2.2.2 presents the forecast

of future changes in activity/ exposure levels; this is used to translate the

historical baseline into a projected, status quo baseline of what losses would

be in the absence of any alternatives during the period when those alternatives could have been introduced. Section 2.2.3 describes how the results of

sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are used to estimate expected losses, by type of

loss. Section 2.3 describes the Loss Evaluation model, which translates

expected losses, by type of loss, into a single measure of expected loss.

Section 2.4 describes the elements of the Cost Model. Section 2.4.1 describes

the forecasts needed for the Cost Model, while section 2.4.2 describes the

elements of the model of installation and maintenance costs and section 2.4.3

describes the elements of the model of operating costs. Finally, section 2.5

describes the Cost-Benefit Comparisons model, which combines all the preceding

calculations into a measure of the attractiveness of the alternative.

2.2 Models to Estimate Losses and Savings

In figure l, it was noted that the estimation of expected loss usually is

performed by the use of an Initiation of Ignition Model and a Post-Ignition

Model. Figure 2, however, showed that a more compact form can be used for the

Post- Ignition Model in modeling alternatives of interest to FAA. Note that

the last column of Figure 2 - the Virtually Unlimited extra escape time

column - shows all victims saved. This column also can be expanded to include

all losses avoided through successful prevention of the fire, thereby removing

the need for a separate Initiation of Ignition Model. For most alternatives

of interest to FAA, this simplified format works well, and it will: be used as the basis for modeling expected loss in this report.

e 9
2.2.1 Identifying the Historical Data Base

Table l lists historical fire incidents involving fire fatalities,

1965-1982, scheduled and non-scheduled passenger flights, U.S. airlines only.

Piston-aircraft flights, which accounted for only ten percent of passengermiles in 1965 and no more than two percent from 1970 on, have been excluded

because such aircraft are no longer even a moderate-sized factor in passenger

travel. Table 2 lists similar incidents for non-U. S. airlines using U.S.-

built aircraft, and table 3 lists incidents involving non-U. S. airlines using

non-U. S. -built aircraft. Each list gives identifying information on the

accident, the aircraft and the flight; total passengers on board; total number

killed in the accident; and the estimated number killed by fire or smoke.

Fires marked as in-flight fires might be preventable. The rest are not

preventable short of preventing the crash, which is beyond the scope of FAA's

fire research. The latter fires all fall into the first or second column of

the stratification given in figure 2. Appendix A gives more details on each

incident, including how the number of fire fatalities was calculated. Since

most of those estimates involve some uncertainty, appendix B lists all

incidents in which people died with fire present but without an apparent fire

contribution to any of the deaths. For these cases, all deaths were due to

crash trauma or should be excluded for other reasons. The basis for

concluding that the deaths were due to fire is given for each of these incidents .

Note that the lists of historical fires exclude some classes of in-flight

fires that did not enter storage or passenger-accessible areas. Engine fires

and tire fires that caused loss of control and a subsequent fatal crash without ever putting fire products into the interior are excluded because few if

any of the alternatives of current interest to FAA will affect such fires.

With these fatality figures in hand, it is possible to consider the

effect of fire injuries on total fire loss. The 17 U.S. airline accidents

produced 712 estimated fire fatalities. According to Cominsky [51], the same accidents produced 265 serious injuries, both fire and trauma. Therefore, the

serious fire injuries numbered at most 34 percent of the number of fire

fatalities, and in view of the likelihood of significant crash-trauma

injuries, an upper bound of 20 percent is not unreasonable. According to the

FAA [82] and others, people tend to value a given percentage reduction in

injury risk three to seven percent as much as the same percentage reduction in

the risk of death. Combining these results, it appears that, in equivalent

fire fatalities, the serious fire injuries would add at most three percent to

the total fire fatalities and more likely only one percent. Assuming that an alternative will at best have no greater effect on injuries than it has on deaths and that a case may be made that prevented injuries will be offset by

deaths that are reduced to injuries, then it is reasonable to ignore the

effect of any risk-reduction alternative on passenger airline fire injuries.

This argument for ignoring fire injuries was based on serious fire

injuries in accidents involving some fire fatalities. Taking the full list of

fatal and non-fatal post-crash fires in Cominsky [51] as an example, the nonfatal crashes add very few additional injuries - only 27 serious injuries on U.S. -airline passenger flights and fewer than 100 more on non-U. S. airline

passenger flights. Therefore, it still seems appropriate to conclude that

serious fire-related injuries are considerably less common than fire

10
Table 1. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82

U.S. Airlines

Date Description

On Board

Total

Killed

Estimated

Fire Fatalities

1. 11/8/65 American, B727, Jet

Near Constance, KY

62 58 36

2. 11/11/65 United, B727, Jet

Salt Lake City, UT

91 43 43

3. 4/22/66 American Flyers, L-188,

Turboprop, Ardmore, OK

98 83 15

4. 6/23/67 Mohawk , BAC-1 11, Jet Blossburg, PA (In-Flight)

34 34 34

5. 6/12/68 Pan American, B707, Jet India

63 6 6

6. 11/27/70 Capitol International, DC8,

Jet, Anchorage, AK

229 47 47

7. 12/28/70 Trans-Caribbean, B727, Jet

St. Thomas, Virgin Islands

55 2 2

8. 6/7/71 Allegheny, CV580, Turboprop

New Haven, CT

31 28 27

9. 12/8/72 United, B737, Jet Chicago, IL

63 43 30

10. 12/20/72 North Central, DC9, Jet Chicago, IL

45 10 10

11. 7/22/73 Pan American, B707, Jet Tahiti (In-Flight)

79 79 79

12. 1/30/74 Pan American, B707, Jet Pago Pago, American Samoa

101 96 95

13. 9/11/74 Eastern, DC9, Jet Charlotte, NC

82 72 36

14. 4/27/76 American, B727, Jet

St. Thomas, Virgin Islands

89 37 36

15. 3/27/77 Pan American, B747, Jet Canary Islands

396 335 192

16. 4/4/77 Southern, DC9, Jet

Near New Hope , GA

85 63 20

17. 3/1/78 Continental, DC10, Jet

Los Angeles, CA

202 4 4

11
Table 2. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82

Non-U. S. Airlines Using U.S. -Built Aircraft

Date Description

On Board

Total

Killed

Estimated

Fire Fatalit:

1. 2/16/67 Garuda, L-188, Turboprop

Indonesia

92 22 22

2. 3/5/67 Varig, DC8, Jet Liberia

95 56 45

3. 4/8/68 BOAC, B707, Jet England127 5 5

4. 9/17/69 Pacific Western, CV640,

Turboprop, Canada

15 4 2

5. 7/5/70 Air Canada, DC8, Jet Canada

109 109 109

6. 1/22/73 Royal Jordanian, B707 , Jet Nigeria202 176 176

7. 7/11/73 Varig, B707, Jet France (In-Flight)134 123 123

8. 11/20/74 Lufthansa, B747, Jet Kenya

157 59 35

9. 6/4/76 Air Manila, L-188, Turboprop

Guam

45 45 28

10. 3/27/77 KLM, B747, Jet Canary Islands

248 248 192

11. 9/29/77 Japan Air, DC8, Jet Malaysia79 34 25

12. 12/17/78 Indian Airlines, B737, Jet India

132 1 l

13. 10/7/79 Swissair, DC8, Jet Greece154 14 0-14

14. 11/26/79 Pakistani International,

B707, Jet, Saudi Arabia

(In-Flight)

156 156 156

13. 2/27/80 China Airlines, B707, Jet Phillipines

135 2 2

16. 8/19/80 Saudi Air, L-1011, Jet Saudi Arabia (In-Flight)

301 301 301

17. 11/19/80 Korean Air, B747, Jet Korea

212 14 11

18. 7/27/81 Aeromexico, DC9, Jet Mexico

66 32 0-32

19. 9/13/82 Spantax, DC10, Jet Spain

393 51 51

12
Table 3. Historical Fire Fatalities, 1965-82

o Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. -Built Aircraft

Date Description

On

Board

Total

Killed

Estimated

Fire Fatalities

1 . 2/15/66 Indian Airlines, Caravelle,

Jet, India

80 2 0-2

2. 9/11/68 Air France, Caravelle, Jet

France (In-Flight)

95 95 95

3. 7/26/69 Air Algerie, Caravelle, Jet

Algeria (In-Flight)

37 33 33

4. 5/6/70 Somali, Viscount, Turboprop

Somalia (In-Flight)

30 5 0-5

5. 3/15/74 Sterling, Caravelle, Jet

Iran

96 15 15

fatalities in passenger airline accidents. This means that, for any riskreducing alternative having at least as great an effect on risk of death as on

risk of injury, the benefits achieved through preventing injuries are so completely dwarfed by the benefits achieved through preventing deaths that the

former can be safely ignored in aggregate benefit calculations.

Appendix C describes the identification of property damage due to

aircraft fires and potentially preventable by alternatives of interest to

FAA. That completes the identification of the historical data base with

respect to the direct fire losses of fatalities, injuries and property damage.

Indirect losses of potential interest could include lost revenue from out-ofservice aircraft. This study concentrates on fatalities and destroyed or seriously damaged aircraft. Less serious property damage - such as destroyed

luggage - adds very little to the total consequences of passenger-aircraft

fires.

To analyze a particular alternative, the fire fatalities and property

damage cited in tables 1-3 and appendix C need to be sorted into the categories of relative saveability given by figure 2.

2.2.2 Activity Forecasts Needed to Model Expected Loss

The number of passenger exposures per year can be measured in a number of

ways from the most direct (e.g., passenger-departures, passengers flown,

passenger-miles) to slightly less direct measures (e.g., ton-miles, which are dominated by passengers) to still less direct measures (e.g., seats available

in the fleet inventory). Passenger-departures seem like the most natural

measure of exposure to fatalities since most fatal accidents (even those

13
resulting from in-flight fires) occur at or near take-off or landing. But

passenger-miles is by far the most available statistic and is the only one with sufficient data to permit ready use as a measure of exposure for the

worldwide cases. And, intuitive appeal aside, it is unlikely that the choice

of index would make much difference. For example, worldwide passenger-miles

increased at a rate of 4.9 percent a year, compounded annually (see appendix

D) from 1970 to 1982, while average miles per aircraft - a factor reflecting

the difference between passenger-miles and passenger-departures - was rising

only 0.5 percent a year [41].

Table 4 gives the projected 1983-1997 passenger-miles for U.S. and world

airlines as percentages of the corresponding base-year (1982) figures, which

are calculated in appendix D. These percentages are based on McDonnell

Douglas estimates of year-by-year growth rates for total passenger traffic.

To compute expected losses for a particular future year, one needs three

multiplicative factors: (a) an historical figure, giving historical

fatalities and property damage, (b) the number in table 4 corresponding to the

future year, and (c) a conversion factor to take account of the fact that the

historical losses occurred over an 18-year period, during which the passenger

exposure levels were rising toward their base-year (1982) value. The conversion factor then is given by the passenger exposure level in 1982 divided by

the total passenger exposures during the historical period. These factors are

.080 for U.S. airlines only, .094 for U.S. airlines and/or aircraft, and .093

for world airlines. To summarize, factor (a) gives losses over the historical

period, factor (b) converts those to expected losses in the base year, and

factor (c) converts expected base-year losses to expected losses in the

selected future year. Note that this approach develops the baseline of firedeath risk per passenger-mile flown by combining all years of historical

period, so it does not reflect any consistent trends in risk from the

beginning to the end of that period. The data actually suggest that risk per

passenger-mile was dropping by about five percent a year during the historical

period, but because fatal accidents are rare events, the trend is erratic and

the pattern of falling risk cannot be established with high statistical

confidence. We therefore assumed no downward trend.

2.2.3 Estimating Expected Losses with an Alternative

Section 2.2.2 concluded by identifying three multiplicative factors

needed to calculate expected losses in any future year, assuming no alternative. The same calculation is used to estimate expected losses with an alternative, but first the historical losses are recalculated to show the

effects of that alternative. This process can only be described in general

terms because the details depend on the specific performance characteristics

of the alternative being studied.

The first step is to resort the fatalities and other losses to reflect

those fire effects and scenarios the alternative cannot affect. For example,

explosions are generally considered fire-related, but for most explosions that occur while the plane is still in flight, none of the most common pre-ignition

or post-ignition alternatives would prevent the explosion or save any of the

people killed by it. If the aircraft was broken open by the impact or ground

slide, it is much less likely that fire spread could be contained or avoided

under any alternative than if the fuselage integrity was relatively undamaged

in the crash. If smoke from the burning fuel outside is considered to have

14
Table 4. Forecast Passenger-Miles as Percentages of Base-Year Figures,

Scheduled and Non-Scheduled , Jet and Turboprop, 1983-1997

Year U.S. Airlines World Airlines

1983 106 105

1984 112 111

1985 119 118

1986 125 124

1987 132 132

1988 139 140

1989 144 147

1990 150 155

1991 156 164

1992 162 172

1993 168 182

1994 175 192

1995 182 203

1996 190 214

1997 198 226

Source: Douglas Aircraft Company, 1983-1997 Outlook for Commercial Aircraft , Long Beach, California, July 1983, p. 53.

been the cause of death, or to have surrounded the person so he could not find

a useable exit, then an alternative that operates to contain fire effects

inside would have had no effect, but an alternative that gave that person

supplemental lighting to illuminate the escape path might be effective. If

fatal injuries were incurred outside the aircraft after a successful escape,

then alternatives that operate inside the aircraft would have had no effect.

If the alternative provides detection or suppression protection to a part of

the aircraft (e.g., lavatory, cargo hold), then fires that originate elsewhere

would be unaffected or at least less likely to be affected. All fatalities

occurring under circumstances where the fire was not the kind where the alternative would have an effect are considered unsaveable and should be moved to

the first column of the figure 2 format display.

After this resorting is done, all losses shown in the first column or the

second row of the second column are counted as unaffected by the alternative.

The alternative will prevent all the losses in the third column and some of

the losses in the second column, first row, if it is present and effective.

Therefore, the next step is to calculate what fraction of the losses in the

second column, first row, will be saved. By the definition of these losses,

this calculation compares the extra escape time needed by these victims to the

time provided by the alternative. For any given alternative, this is likely

to be a complex calculation, involving deterministic models and test results,

which must be done separately for each of a number of historical fires, using

the available information on their particular characteristics.

Once this is done, the expected losses under the alternative - and hence

the expected savings due to the alternative - will be known, except for any

loss of savings occurring because the alternative was not present or was not

15
effective when the fire occurred. This is captured by a probability which

includes such considerations as the probability that the aircraft or airline

or airport will not be equipped with the alternative and the probability that

the alternative will be non-operational due to defective construction,

improper installation, poor maintenance or degradation of performance in use. For an alternative that is mandated by regulation, completely reliable,

and not subject to degradation of performance in use, this probability

reflects only the speed of the phasing- in of the alternative, i.e., the proportion of passenger activity/exposures that will occur in alternativeequipped aircraft.

2.3 Loss Evaluation Model

As stated in section 2.1.5, the Loss Evaluation Model monetizes lives

saved and injuries averted in order to permit all benefits to be combined into

one scale. In CFR risk analyses, benefits are usually calculated for a range

of values for a statistical life - $250,000, $500,000, and $1 million. These

values reflect the values implicitly or explicitly developed in most past risk

studies of governmental programs [67]. The middle value of $500,000 is within

10% of the value of $530,000 specifically recommended by Keech for FAA

analyses [82]. The calculations and assumptions used to develop these estimates do not appear highly sensitive to inflation. Therefore, the estimates

do not appear to be sensitive to the fact that our analysis uses 1982 as a base year, while Keech published his figures in 1981. Smith [110] assumes inflation should be added and obtains a value of statistical life, stated in

1983 dollars, of $653,000, still within the range of values considered in this

report

CFR analyses also use a range of $5,000 to $20,000 for the value of an injury averted. Keech [82] tends to show higher values, on the order of

$15,000 for a minor injury and $38,000 for a serious injury. Smith [110]

shows even higher values, since he adds inflation to the values described by

Keech. As already noted, however, injuries can be safely omitted from the

model because they represent a negligible share of fire loss in passenger

aircraft fires.

2.4 Cost Models

A model designed to assess the costs due to the introduction of a fire

risk-reduction alternative need only consider the changes in costs attributable to the alternative. The principal sources of cost difference previously

mentioned included equipment, installation, operation, service, inspection,

testing and maintenance, repair and replacement, and financing. For the case

of most, if not all, FAA alternatives one can combine equipment, installation,

service, maintenance, repair and replacement into one major cost category - the cost of installing and maintaining the alternative. Operation of the

fleet equipped with the alternative accounts for the other major cost category.

To model these costs, one must consider a variety of cost elements which

may be specific to the aircraft model, airline, or type of flight, specific to

the alternative or not specific to either the alternative or the aircraft/

activity/occupant factors. The following are principal examples for these

cost-elements

16
1. Aircraft/airline/flight specific. Cost depends upon the

performance characteristics, configuration and number of aircraft in the fleet. Examples include fuel efficiency, number

of units or quantity of area affected by the fire-risk reduction strategy per aircraft, number of aircraft flying,

predicted new delivery and retirement schedules, and forecast

activity/exposure levels, defined appropriately for the risk

reduction alternative.

2. Fire risk-reduction alternative specific. The characteristics

of the fire risk-reduction alternative determine costs not only

pertinent to the manufacture and installation of the alternative but also relevant to operation and maintenance. Specific

examples include incremental costs of applying the alternative

to aircraft while in production versus incremental costs to

modify aircraft components through retrofit, incremental weight

per component modified or added, and cycles for replacement or refurbishment

.

3. Non-specific economic factors. Costs are also driven by

factors which are not directly related to a specific aircraft

model or mitigation alternative. Economic factors influence the

price of fuel and other resources relevant to the alternative;

their growth rates over time relative to the price of other

commodities; interest, discount and tax rates used in computing

present value of costs; and economic assumptions used in

predicting prices and demand which in turn affect aircraft

activity.

2.4.1 Forecasts Used in the Cost Models

The Cost Models use a number of forecasts of aircraft inventory and

activity, and these forecasts must be compatible with the forecasts used in

the Loss Estimation Models, as described in section 2.2.2. Appendix E

presents all needed forecasts.

2.4.2 Model of Installation and Maintenance Costs

This model requires the following elements: (a) costs per unit for

materials, fabrication and installation costs for the alternative, as an installation in a newly constructed aircraft or as a retrofit in an existing

aircraft, (b) costs per unit for servicing, maintaining, repairing or replacing the alternative once it is in place, (c) the number of units of the

alternative required per aircraft, by aircraft type, (d) the cycle in which

service, maintenance, repair or replacement occurs, and (e) the decision rules

for phasing in the alternative, indicating which new and existing aircraft

will be equipped with the alternative. A unit of the alternative is simply a measure appropriate to that alternative - an aircraft seat, a lavatory, a square foot of cargo hold, a yard of lighting, and so forth. For simplicity's

sake, it is assumed that there is a single cycle for service, maintenance,

repair and replacement. If this is not the case, a more sophisticated model

is needed, but the extension to the more complex case is straightforward and

should be easy to infer from the simpler model used here. It is also assumed

17
here that all aircraft are equipped with the alternative at the end of the

phase-in period. If not, the proportions that will not be equipped need to be

removed from all cost calculations.

Assuming that the aircraft inventory has been subdivided into a set of

classes, with each class requiring the same number of units of the alternative, then the following formulas apply, for each such aircraft class:

Formula 1 . The cost of introducing the alternative to newly constructed

aircraft in any year depends upon the cost per unit of the alternative, the

number of units of the alternative required per aircraft and the number of new

aircraft added.

NeWy new U X Ny

where Newy = cost of introducing the alternative to all newly

constructed aircraft in year Y, where Y equals one in the

first year of phase in and is incremented by one to the

end of the study period.

C„ QrT = cost per unit of alternative for materials, fabrication,

and installation in newly constructed aircraft.

U = units of alternative required per aircraft

Ny = aircraft added during year Y

Formula 2 . The cost of refurbishment in any year depends upon the

refurbishment cost per unit, the units of alternative per aircraft, and

the number of aircraft scheduled for refurbishment in that year. A

different formula is used, depending on (a) whether the year in question

comes before or after phase-in is completed, and (b) whether the year in

question comes before or after the first aircraft fitted with the alternative are due for refurbishment. If the year comes before the end of

the phase-in cycle, then there are refurbishment costs associated with

equipping a portion of the original fleet; otherwise, there are no such

costs. If the year comes after the first aircraft fitted with the

alternative are due for refurbishment, then there are refurbishment

costs associated with refurbishing all the aircraft that were refurbished or newly equipped with the alternative one cycle before. If the

phase-in and refurbishment cycles have equal length, only one or the

other of these costs will apply in a given year. If the cycles have

unequal lengths, then there will be years in which both costs occur or years in which no costs occur, depending on which cycle is longer.

Ref urby = Cmalnt x U x (i - RMy + ARMy), Y < R, P

= Refurby_R

+ x U x (i + Ny_R

- RMy + ARMy)), R < Y < P

= 0, P < Y <_ R

- Refurby_R + (Cmalnt x U x (u

y

_R

- RMy + ARMy)), Y > R, P

18
where Refurby = cost of maintaining, servicing, repairing, or replacing the alternative in all aircraft due for

such refurbishment in year Y

Cmaint = cost Per unit of alternative of performing refurbishment

U = units of alternative per aircraft

I = inventory of aircraft flying at the start of the

phasing-in of the alternative

P = number of years to be used to phase in the alternative at a constant rate

RMy = aircraft removed from service in year Y

Ny = aircraft added during year Y

R = number of years between refurbishraents

ARM^ = a factor that takes account of the fact that, in some years, the number of aircraft removed from service

may exceed the number due for refurbishment; in those

cases, the number due for refurbishment is set equal

to zero and the excess aircraft removed from service

are subtracted from those due for refurbishment in

the following year.

Formula 2 assumes that aircraft are being retired just prior to their due

years for refurbishment. Note that of the four formulas shown in Formula 2,

the second will not apply if R is greater than P, the third will not apply if

P is greater than R, and neither the second nor the third will apply if P is

equal to R.

The values of Ny, RMy, and I are the same for all alternatives and are given in appendix E. The values of Cnew , Cmai nt > P, R and U are specific to

the alternative being analyzed. The values of ARMy depend on R and therefore

are also specific to the analysis of a particular phase-in cycle.

2.4.3 Model of Operating Costs

Most, if not all, alternatives of interest to FAA produce added operating

costs by increasing the weight of the aircraft. Each unit of the alternative

carries a weight penalty, which adds to the fuel costs associated with

operating the aircraft. This model therefore requires the following elements:

(a) cost of fuel, (b) a formula for computing the marginal fuel required to

fly a unit of weight through a unit of distance, (c) weight penalty per unit

of the alternative, (d) number of units of the alternative per aircraft, by

aircraft type, and (e) number of aircraft-miles flown by the aircraft type.

At the outset of this project it appeared that the formula for marginal

fuel would be quite complex. We initially expected these calculations would

have to take account of engine fuel efficiency differences and differences in

19
stage length, which is the distance between landings and is different, for

example, for a two-stop flight compared to a nonstop flight between the same

two points. A preliminary analysis showed it was not necessary to include

these factors in the formula. This preliminary analysis is worthy of a brief

discussion .

The aircraft classes used in the marginal fuel rate analyses were patterned after the Global Aviation Forecast (GAF) model, an aviation forecasting and simulation computer model developed by SRI International. The GAF

model has been used by the FAA for estimating the high altitude atmospheric

emissions due to aviation activity and more recently the potential impact of

noise certification standards. The GAF model outputs from those recent

studies were used because they provided a forecast, by aircraft type, of seatkilometers, stage length frequency and seats per aircraft at five year

intervals for 1985 through 2000 [1].

The preliminary project sought to determine the relationship between

stage length and gallons of fuel per pound of additional weight, for the range

of added weight per aircraft that seemed likely to occur with the FAA alternatives. Combining this information with a forecast of annual aircraft-miles,

distributed by trip lengths, would result in a weighted average of the additional gallons of fuel per year per pound of added weight per aircraft for

each aircraft class for each year in the forecast. Multiplying by the incremental weight per aircraft would yield an estimate of fuel consumption.

In the process of pursuing this approach, it was discovered that a linear

approximation ignoring stage length involved little loss of accuracy. When

marginal fuel burn per pound of added weight was plotted against stage length

for an aircraft (using values derived from the official performance manuals,

assuming normal operation and landing weights characteristic of the stage

lengths) for a minor weight increment, a line drawn through the envelope of curves back to the origin served as a good approximation of the relationship

throughout the range of stage lengths. Therefore, within the accuracy

requirements of this study the slope of the line could be used to relate the

marginal fuel burned per additional weight to the distance flown. Furthermore, this linear relationship was found for each of the aircraft types

investigated and a remarkable similarity in slope was found between aircrafts

of widely varying total weights. Newer aircraft types, however, had a lower

marginal fuel consumption rate consistent with their improved design and

engine efficiency.

The initial plan to incorporate the forecast distributions of stage and

trip lengths into the analysis was not necessary, since for a minor weight

increment a single relationship served as a good approximation regardless of

stage or trip length. The values used for marginal fuel burned per added

weight are dependent upon aircraft efficiency. As the newer aircraft replace

older, less efficient models, this value will continue to improve over time.

To adequately reflect this effect and facilitate computation of fuel consumption, it was necessary to develop marginal fuel-burn values for each of the

aircraft types in the GAF model and weight each value by the proportion of

aircraft-miles predicted each year.

The marginal fuel analysis was performed by Paul Lawrence Hamilton of

Technology, Policy, Systems, Germantown, Maryland.
The net result was to produce a single factor for expected marginal fuel

sensitivity for each year, shown in appendix E.

Fuel cost was the next element of the operating cost model, and the fuel

cost computation included a measure of the expected increase in fuel prices

over prices of other commodities to reflect fuel costs in constant 1983

dollars. Fuel price values for 1983 were taken as $0,913, an average of the

domestic and international fuel prices per gallon for U.S. carriers, as reported to the Civil Aeronautics Board (form 41) from January through July

1983, weighted by the quantity of fuel purchased.

Two of the last three elements of the model were the weight per unit of

the alternative and the number of units of the alternative per aircraft, by

aircraft type. These are both specific to the particular alternative being

analyzed; the latter is given by formulas, shown below, for each aircraft

type. The last model element is the number of aircraft-miles flown, by aircraft type. The data for this calculation are given in appendix E. The

formulas are as follows:

Formula 3 . The number of units of an alternative flying in any year depends

upon the number of units of an alternative per aircraft and the number of

aircraft having the alternative installed. During the phase-in cycle, the

number of aircraft flying and equipped with the alternative in any year equals

the proportion of the initial inventory fitted with the alternative plus the

number of new aircraft added during the phase-in period less the number of

aircraft removed from service during the phase-in period up to the year of

interest. An adjustment is made for one-half of the aircraft either fitted

with the alternative or removed from service during the year of interest

(because on the average only half the aircraft will be fitted with the alternative or removed during the year of interest). After the phase-in cycle, the same formula applies except that all of the initial inventory still flying has

been fitted with the alternative.

UnitSy = U x Y x 1 + l [ Nx

- ] - \ [£+ n

y - RMj), y < p

X=1

= U x ^

I + MNx

- RMj - \

[n

y

- RM^V Y > P

where UnitSy = number of units of the alternative in aircraft flying

in year Y

U = number of units of the alternative per aircraft

I = inventory of aircraft flying at the start of the

phase-in of the alternative

P = number of years to be used to phase in the alternative

at a constant rate

Ny = number of aircraft added during year Y

21
RMy = number of aircraft removed during year Y

NOTE: This formula assumes aircraft added are added at a constant rate during

the year and aircraft removed are removed at a constant rate during the

year.

The formula for the operating cost, then, is as follows:

Formula 4 . For each aircraft model, the operating fuel costs attributable to

weight penalties associated with an alternative depends upon the unit cost of

fuel, the amount of fuel required to fly an aircraft with an additional increment of weight over a unit of distance, the weight increment per unit of the

alternative, the number of units of alternative per aircraft flying and

finally, the distance flown per aircraft flying with the alternative. Summing

over the various aircraft models gives the total operating costs for fuel.

M

0CY

= Fuely x MFy x W x [ J (Units

y ±

) x (mPA^

i )]

where Fuely = cost per gallon of fuel in year Y

MFy = gallons of fuel per added pound per aircraft-mile

flown in year Y

W = weight penalty per unit of the alternative

UnitSy

^ = units of the alternative in all aircraft of model type

i flying in year Y

MPAy ^ = miles flown per aircraft of type i in year Y

M = number of aircraft model types

2.5 Cost-Benefit Comparison Model

This model brings together the time stream of costs, the time stream of

benefits, and the discount rate, which allows the two time streams to be

collapsed into single values for ease of comparison. As noted earlier, the

U.S. Office of Management and Budget recommends use of a discount rate of 10

percent [72].

The values computed in this section are expressed in terms of annualized

costs and benefits. These values are calculated in two steps. First, the

costs and benefits for each year are converted to present values and summed.

After the present values by year have been summed to obtain a total present

value, they are converted to an annualized cost or benefit. This is calculated analogously to a mortgage payment: it produces a flat annual dollar

amount whose present value (again taking account of discounting) is the same

as the present value of the cost or benefit we are examining.

The formula to perform these steps is as follows:

22
Formula 5 . The annualized cost or benefits discounts each year's cost or benefit according to the year it occurs, sums these terras to produce a present

value, then computes a single annual cost or benefit value which would, if

repeated over the same period, produce the same present value.

(Annualized Cost or Benefit)

N

d ci+d

N d+d r - i

N

X l

Y=l

(Cost or Benefit in year Y)

(l+d)

Y

d^O

1 N

= — x 7 (Cost or Benefit in Year Y) , d=0

N Y=1

where d = discount rate (assumed to be 0.10)

N = number of years in study period

3. REVIEW OF RELATED PROJECTS AND LITERATURE

Reports and data sources were examined in such areas as hazard

characterization, fire management and suppression studies, models of fatal

levels of cyanide and carboxyhemoglobin , product performance, human behavior

as it relates to survivability, and cost analysis. A brief description of

major findings and sources used is given below. An annotated list of

references is given in appendix F and provides additional information on the

materials reviewed and their contributions to the structure and data base of

the decision analysis model.

The review of hazard characterization literature centered on the creation

of a workable data base of historical accidents involving fire fatalities and

aircraft destroyed or seriously damaged by fire. The World Airline Accident

Summary [3] provided the principal listing of fatal accidents, with several

previous studies, particularly Cominsky [51], providing information on fire

development, the role of fire versus crash trauma as a cause of fatalities,

exit availability, occupant mobility, escape routes used, and similar key

characteristics of individual incidents. For accidents occurring within U.S.

territory, unpublished reports by the National Transportation Safety Board's

Human Factors Division usually were available as supplements to the published

accident reports.

Several reports, notably Quintiere and Tanaka [102], were examined to

identify physical factors that strongly influence fire development. The one dominant exogenous factor identified in those studies was wind - both speed

and direction. Unfortunately, neither the existing models nor the available

data on historical accidents would have provided adequate information to

support a model capable of examining fire development under different assumptions regarding wind speed and direction. Instead, the effect of wind was addressed implicitly through its historic variations in actual fires.

Incident reports showed that some fires were made worse by wind blowing a separate fire toward the cabin while others, where the wind was not so strong, were less severe.

23
Fire management and suppression studies, beyond those already addressed

as sources of information on hazard characterization, consist chiefly of

studies of possible safety alternatives. Enders and Wood [63], in particular,

provide a consensus of experts on promising technological possibilities and

their likely impacts.

Several studies [30,88,106] cited blood cyanide as a key indicator of the

involvement of interior materials and suggested formulas for assessing the

relative contribution of cyanide and carbon monoxide to a fatality. These were the only toxicity studies examined.

Product performance studies examined dealt primarily with seat blocking,

the particular alternative chosen to demonstrate the decision analysis methodology. Sarkos and Hill [107] provided the estimates of additional escape time

provided by two seat blocking materials.

In addition to the NTSB Human Factors Division reports on individual

accidents, the principal source on human behavior related to survivability was Snow [III]. It provided the basis for estimates of exit speeds as one per

second for main doors, one every two seconds for overwing exits and fuselage

breaks, and something slower than one per second for partially obstructed

exits. The Snow report also provided evidence in support of other modeling

assumptions needed to estimate likely escapes per second of additional escape

time - the forms of occupant immobility (too young, stunned, trapped,

chronically ill, etc.), the propensity to use closer exits even if others

would be faster, and so forth.

Cost analyses included sources addressing the initial costs, maintenance

costs, replacement cycles, and fuel-cost penalties related to added weight for

various seat blocking alternatives [31,56,65,84,115]. Also of interest were

sources suggesting values for the discount rate to use in comparing current

costs with future costs and benefits [72] and for the value of a statistical

life, i.e., a figure reflecting people's willingness to pay to reduce their

risk of death [67,82]. The dollar value attributable to destroyed aircraft

was developed from sources in the literature giving market values of used

aircraft [36,103,104].

Finally, a number of data sources were identified giving past and

projected future activity levels, which could then be related to fire fatality

frequencies. These sources, when combined, permitted the identification of

activity levels by the desired flight types (scheduled and non-scheduled

passenger flights), aircraft types (U.S. or non-U. S. built), airline types

(U.S. or non-U. S.), and engine types (jet and turboprop but not piston).

4. SAMPLE APPLICATION: FIRE-BLOCKING OF SEATS

Fire-blocking of passenger airline seats can be accomplished in many

ways, and recent screening tests by the FAA Technical Center have produced a list of over 100 materials that have passed the proposed test. Table 5 lists

the materials analyzed in the sample application of the decision analytic

modeling framework. Materials 2 and 4 (each of which can be manufactured in

two versions, labeled A and B) are existing materials that have received fullscale testings. Material 3 is an existing material that has received more

limited testing. Materials l, 5 and 6 are hypothetical materials that were analyzed to examine the sensitivity of the results on the existing materials.

24
Table

5.

Summary

of

Characteristics

of

Seat-Blocking

Materials < T3 03 a cn CO •o c CJ c o C 03 03 c (0 0

<2

M CO

O CO 03 03 3 CN 44 < 03 C *H 2 c x: P T3 u < 03 P cn o CO X o 03 03 c 4J CO fa B O •H P •H a CO

03 P CO 0) *H

a »H CO c 03 03 44 03 P P *H 03

a

O 3 44 c 44 03

p *H > 44 03 rH o 4-4 P X3

u 4-1 4-1 03 03 44 •H 03 V-/ 03

U

X 44 03 CO o a 03 O P > CO 03 •H 03 P 03 ** 44 CO 4J -H 03 a 03 S-4 CO P r4 CO CJ CO P c 44 44 03 03 03 44 03 44 44 X •H C p C 03

0) o 03 CO CO o CJ 03 CN c fH CO 0) 03 o H o 3 £ H (4 3 CO co e a 03 03 o Cp > •H 03 H P a 3 03 03 '—

> C o 03 P TJ 03

'XJ •H P c a CO 44 03 •H 03 *H 03 03 > c 03 •H o c X 03 •H 44 a T3 • 44 TJ H co 03 C 03 a; O 03 x P cj C P O c 03 03 3 0 03 > 44 03 03 44 03 03 c o CJ X3 O P u 3 3 03 44 03 44 44 X P • CJ CO H

CO i—4 COx

UX t: 3

44 bO 44 3 C CN 1 CO o 3 03 03 03 44 03 a 03 •H X 44 O 03 H p T3

CJp

a

XQ 44 44 03 bO CJ •H fH P H

XC

•H CO cn 44 c 03 o 03 *H 03

U 03 •H 9 bO CO c 4-4 l CO 03 H4 a 44 e 03 4-4 03 *H 44 44 *H o 1 fH 44 03 •H o -a 5 3 a p 03 1 1 03 H H x c 03 44 CO 03 C P 03 fH c fH c 03 3 bO 03 CO • CO H O CO 03 O u 03 H XJ o P 44 *H H T3 03 P 03 3 >H a 44 03 P X>

03 3 CJ CJ 03 03 CO T3 03 c ^ 03 T3 c •H P 4-1 c z cn 03 P CO fH O 03 •H a •H 44 03 03 • a

03 •H P 3 03 •H fH P P o P P CO B 44 03 •» a co 5 a 0) p 44 O 44 3 p p ** u o 03 C CQ 03 T3 CO 44 44 CO 44 O CO CO 03 x: o 3 0) cn p 0) 44 CO fH 44 eg O 03 o P bo

4-4 4J

p • •H

a •H 3 •H s e U CO P li CJ 3 •H c <u 3 CO CO •* 03 a O o 44 03 a P x: M CO CO 44 p < x c •* p 5 P •H c CO CO CJ c 03 CO 3 cn 44 03 c o o • P o o c CQ • (0 03 44 o 3 o p 03 o 44 P 44 03 •H CJ o f—

44 P O B U 3 co 44 X *H P o Q a 4J 3 CO c 44 »H 3 44 03 03 cn p 03 C c o C

CO CQ

O 03

X 44 03

a b0 o r4

O *H T3 r—* (0 CO 3 CN • 03 •H O a CQ c T3 4-1 tH C t—

e 03 u >> .—

44 P * c p *o <n 03

C c 0) 03 >% 03 3 P 03 3 03 44 o *H x: 03 •H 44 03 03 P a H 3 H 03 O C 44 CO CO 44 3 T3 a CO CO H C CO o CO O 3 c 03 03 03 03 c O C X CJ c C 03 03 03 p >

CO

Q 03 1—

6 2 44

x •H CO 03 cn o •H

XQ P 44 * P p 3 3 a 3

cn 00

X• </> 00o

<J>

<T

X

<r

</> • o

X>cn cn

<r <r

</> •

<t

Xon

co- •

cn cn

<ry • X

X>

<r . 00 S;

</> ‘

COo

cjboc xM b u H QJ (0

<U Cl <U Z2 CO

O

cn

aj 3 a. P (0 OJ P CJ E CO x co -H W X fa H o

X) ov£> o

ao

•H *3 "3 "3 "3 TJ *3 1 *H *H > C C c C C C 3 1 > >

•P 3 3 3 3 3 3 P C •H *i4 P O O O O O O H o P P

*H P P P P P P 44 c •H •H

CO CO 3 3 3 3 3 CO CO C O o c c

03 c c rj

C c rj P p 3 3 • CO 03 5 5 5 s 5 5 CO 3 CO 3 e 03 03 3 3 3 3 TJ 3 e B

03 *H CO CO CO CO CO CO 3 3 3 *H 3 H N P X3 3 N P N P

5^

H

HH

HHH

CC >>

H 03 03 3 3 3 3 3 o o r4 3 rH 3

C0

a *t4 •H 03 *HH 3 *H *H 3 X

X 3 a 3 CC 03 P P P P P P P P P C 3 C 3

03

a 03 03

O 3 3 O 3 3 O

HH 3 a 3 CJ

CO P P CJ P P CJ P P U 3 3 CO co

O 03 03 03 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 *H *H 3 O 3 O 3 p e P e 03 e p 6 3 e P a 3 P P P P P c O C o e O c 3 3 O e C

T3 *H bo

a bO 3 bOO bO 3 bO CJ b0 3 p P CJ 3 *H 3 H

03 c C

X c CX 3 C

X 3 3 3 3

CO CO

H 03

H P H 3 H P H 3 *H

p

a 3 B 3 CO CO CO CO 3 03 -X c -X 03 C 3 C 3 P C 3 3 3 3

bCu c0 CJ P U 3 CJ P U 3 U P bC

O bO 3 bC bC

H c o x: o 3 O

XO 3 O

X o 3 c CJ c x:

H

C

H

C

03 03 fH

p

H

H P fH rH

p

H

H *H P 3 3 3 3 H x: X 03 X -3 X 3 Xl -3 X5 3 X T3 -X 3 3 •H X H X P a P 03 P 3 P 3 CJ C CJ P P CJ P CJ

03a 3 CJ TJ CJ 3 u -a CJ 3 CJ -3 o 3 O 3 3 3 P o •H *H P *H *H P *H •H P H X H P o P o

CO

p P T3 P 3 P -3 P 3 P *3 P 3 x>

p

X 3 3 p 3 p

a

X 03X

p X3 3 X) P X) 3 X)p 3 3 B

B

CO 03 *3 3 3 3 -3 3 3 3 *3 3 3 a P E 3 CO CO rH p 44 P 44 P 44 P 44 P 44 P 44 P 3 3 3 P H p H p

CO •H 03 | 3 1 3 1 o O 3 3 *H 3 •H U 4-1 -o P T3 3 CO P CO 3 CO p CO 3 44 *3 44 P CJ 44 CJ 44 H 03 03 03 03 P CO 3 CO P CO 3 CO P 3 3 •H 3 •H 3 P C N P N •H 3 P 3 *H 3 P 3 *H 3 *3 3 P P C P C

03 03 •H 1 •H 44

H | H 44

H rH 44 c P C | 3

i! 3 3

x:

X c 03 c | bo 3 be 1 bO 3 bC 1 3 3 3 3 XX

X

p

H P H c P P P c P P P c P P P P P P o 4-( e •H e o 3 *H 3 O 3 •H 3 o a 3 Cl H o 44 O 44 a o 3 44 3 c X 44 X c X 44 X c o P O 44 a o a o

>> 3

•HH •H •H 3 3 >s >s fa fa fa fa 2 2 X X 3 CO •H 0) u p 3 CQ H 6

CO *H e p

CO o 3

CO CO p p 3 a) 44 P

a; 3 P 4-1 CJ : cO

4-1 4-1 CO 3

CD

C

CO 3B

a

cn P QJ

co oo o a

CJ 03

25

NOTE:

See

appendix G

for

more

details

on

data

sources

and

calculations

used

in

calculating

costs
4.1 Expected Losses and Savings with Seat Blocking

Appendix G documents the expected lives saved for each of the fatal

accidents cited in tables 1-3 and combines them into overall savings as functions of extra escape time provided by the seat blockers. Expected savings

for the particular values of escape time provided by the alternatives analyzed

are shown in table G-6.

The savings are calculated in terms of high, middle and low estimates,

reflecting the uncertainty involved in many of the reconstructions of the

accidents. The following groups comprise most of the victims who were deemed

unsaveable, even if seat blocking provided several minutes of extra escape

time:

(a) Passengers killed by an in-flight fire that never involved the

seats. (This is also a major source of uncertainty in the

estimates, because of the 1979 accident in Saudi Arabia.)

(b) Passengers killed by a fast-moving, fuel-driven fire with

numerous entry points into the aircraft because of severe crash damage.

(c) Passengers killed by smoke generated by items other than

passenger seats. (This also is a major source of uncertainty

in the estimates.)

The following additional categories accounted for far fewer unsaveable

passengers

:

(d) Passengers stunned by impact, unable to use extra escape time.

(e) Passengers immobile for reasons not related to accident (e.g.,

in wheelchair).

(f) Passengers unable to use extra time because of panic or because all exits were blocked.

(g) Passengers killed by fire outside aircraft.

(h) Passengers unable to find exits because they were lost in

smoke not generated by burning seats.

It is useful to consider what proportion of the total fire fatalities

prevented by seat blocking would have occurred in only a few accidents. For

the low estimate, U.S. airlines only, nearly two-thirds of the maximum

possible total saves come from the 1965 Salt Lake City accident. For the low

estimates, world airlines with or without non-U. S. aircraft, nearly three

fourths of the saves come from the 1980 Saudi Arabia accident. For the middle

estimate, U.S. airlines only, nearly two-thirds of all saves come from the

1974 Pago Pago accident and the 1965 Salt Lake City accident. For the middle

estimates, world airlines with or without non-U. S. aircraft, over half the

total saves came from the two Saudi Arabia accidents, and over two-thirds came from those two accidents plus the 1973 Nigeria accident and the 1982 Spain

accident. Similar concentrations hold for the high estimates.

26
This means that most of the life-saving benefits of seat blocking are likely to come in the one or two accidents per decade where conditions are ideal for seat blocking to have an effect. It also means any estimate of the

likely benefits of seat blocking is very dependent on an assessment of likely

seat-blocking effects in those few accidents. Uncertainties in assessment of

the dozens of other accidents involving fire fatalities are not critical to

the overall conclusions.

As noted in appendix G, further increases in the extra escape time

provided by seat blocking over those available with Material 4 would produce

further reductions in total loss of at most 10-15 percent (if a high estimate

of saves were used) and more likely 2-6 percent. For U.S. airlines only, no improvements in performance are possible except for the high saves estimates.

Reductions in savings as a result of cutting the extra escape time are only

slightly more sensitive; a 53 percent cut in escape time over that provided by

Material 2 yields at most a 21 percent reduction in lives saved and a slightly

smaller reduction in total loss avoided.

4.2 Expected Costs for Seat Blocking

Appendix G also provides the data and calculations used to estimate costs

for the various seat-blocking alternatives.

4.3 Cost-Benefit Comparisons for Seat Blocking

Table 6 summarizes the annualized costs and benefits for Materials 2A-4B.

Table 7 provides a range of cost-benefit estimates, based on different combinations of the high, middle, and low estimates in table 6.

Table 7 indicates that, for most alternatives, the results on whether

benefits exceed costs or vice versa are not sensitive to (a) the use of fireretarded versus non-fire-retarded urethane (A vs. B and C vs. D options,

respectively), or (b) the use of high, middle or low estimates (unless a best

case of low costs and high benefits is assumed). The results also are not

sensitive, in most cases, to the addition or reduction of extra escape time or the use of a higher value for life saved, within the range of $250,000 to

$1 million discussed earlier. All these assumptions can make a difference,

however, for Material 3, where costs and benefits are so closely matched that even small changes can change the difference between them from positive to

negative or vice versa. Material 3 does much better than Materials 2 and 4

for the U. S.-airlines-only case because its costs are significantly lower.

The cost side of the calculation, therefore, appears to offer more room for

improvement than the benefits side.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This report has demonstrated that the fire-risk assessment and decision

analysis methodologies developed by the Center for Fire Research can be

successfully applied to the case of major aircraft fires. A generic model has

been developed covering fatal passenger-flight fires and fires involving major

fire damage. That model has then been applied to the risk-reduction strategy

of seat blocking. The model permits not only assessment of the costs (initial

and operating) and benefits (lives saved and damage averted) of currently

established blocking materials but also rapid calculation of the impact of

27
Table

6.

Summary

of

Annualized

Costs

and

Benefits

for

Seat-Blocking

Alternatives

00 bO b0 bO bO bO b0 c c C bO C C C C

•H *HH c H

H

H

H

4-1 4-1 4-1 *H 4-1 4-1 4-> 4J

CO *H cn 03 rH CO 03 rH 4-1 03 CO

H 03 CO •H CO C0 rH cn CO rH

u aj 4-1 tl c0 4-1

M CO 03 CO *H 4-1

u co 4-1M CO 4-1 >-i CO 4-1 c0

<0 CDu CO 03 4-1 c0 03 4-1 4-1 Ui co co 03 4-1 C0 03 4J C0 03 4J CO 03 4-1 0) a O a) a. o 03 a o C0 03 4-1 03 G. o 03 a o 03 a o 0) a o 3

co o 4-1 CO o 4-1 03 o 4-1 03a o 03

O 4-1 CO o 4J CO o 4-> CO o 4-1

m cn 00 00 o 00 CM cn

C/3 o 4-1 CM cn cn o O' O' CM CM

O' M> M) CM oo ao O'

m 'J 00 O' cn o <r 00 cn oo W—+ • • • • • • • • • CO o • • • • • • • • • • • • O' O' O' O' O' 00 CM • • • CM M3 m O' m 00 <r

CO- </> co- co- —4 CO- </> co- <r r-4 M3 co- CO- CO- co- </> CO- co- .—4 CM co- —4 CM

co- co- CO- co- <J> co- CO- </> CO00 bO b0 bO bO bO bO bo c c d c c c c c

•H •H

H *H

HHH •rH

U 4-1 4-1 4-1 4J 4-1 4—1

C/5 C0 rH CO 03 rH 03 co

H c/d C0 iH 03 03 rH CO CO rH co CO rH cn 03 rH

XJ J-i <0 4-1

u 03 4-1 i-i c0 4-1 l-i CO 4-1

h CO 4-1 S»4 C0 4-1 >-i co 4-1

u c0

01 CCJ 0) XJ CO 03 4-1 CO 03 4-1 C0 03 4-1 <0 03 4-1 03 03 4-1 CO 03 4-1 CO 0) 4J rH o> a o CD Q. o 03 a o 0) a o 03 Q. o 03 a o 03 a o 03 a o

X) CO o 4-1 03

O 4-1 C/D o 4-1 03 o 3-1 03

O 4-1 cn o 4-1 cn o 4-1 cn o 4-1 X)

*H co cn M3 .—4 o 00 CM o OO CM o <T ^-4 O' O' 00 CM O' z 00 O' CM O' M3 O' M3 m cn O' M3 O' M3 m cn O' CM <r ao O'

r—4 O' O' o M) CM O' M> 'O CM O' M3 O' O' 00 O' 00

co- CNI r—CO- CM CO- co- co- </> co- <j> CO- CO- </> </> co- co- CM CO- CM

CO- CO- CO- </> </> CO- CO- co- </>

00 bO bO b0 bO bO bO b0 c d c C C d C C

•H •H •H •H *H

H *H

H

u 4-4 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 CO CO »H 03 <0 rH 03 CO H 03 c0 •H a C0 rH cn co rH 03 CO rH cn C0 rH

4-1

u <0 4-» CO 4-1U c0 4-1 In C0 4-1 tH CO 4-1 l-i cO 4-1

u cO 4-1 3-i co

cfl aj •u CO 03 4-1 co 03 •1—1 co 03 4-1 cO 03 4-1 03 03 4-3 CO Q3 4J c0 0) 4-1 Si 03 a o a) a o a) a o 0) a o 03 a o 03 a o 03 a o 03 a o

be CO o 4-1 00 o 4J 03 o 4-1 03 o 4-1 (0 o 4-3 cn o 4-1 cn o 4-1 cn o 4-1 •HX M3 cn O' o o o CM O' CM <r M3 CM O' CM M3 m O' <3- 00 CM o m O' CM M> O' o o cn cn O' o o cn cn O' <r -3- 00 M3

cO ON v£3 MO O'

m » 4 CM <r r—4 —CM CM <r *“4 —4 CM M3 O' M3 M3 00

m i—4 CO- CM —4 cn- CM •—

CO- —4 co-

—-1 co-

—‘ CO- f—.—

r—

cn cn

c/v CO- CO- CO- <o- CO- co- CO- CO- CO- CO- CO- v> CO- co- <o- co- co03 a> 01 <13 <13 Q3 03 03

CO bO i-i cn 00 r-l

w bO >-1 CO be rH CO bO rH cn bO rH cn bO rH cn bO rH

0) 03 rt (U flj CO Q) flj 03 a> CO <0 a; cO cO 03 CO <0 03 CO <0 03 cO <0 > £ 4J > s 4-3 > e 4-1 > a 4-3 > e 4-3 > S 4-3 > a 4-1 > a 4-1 03 o •H Cfl O •H C0 O H C0 O CO O •H co O •tH <0 o •H c0 o 3

rH 4-1 tH XJ 4-3 rH T3 4-1 rH X) 4-3 rH XJ 4-3 rH

X 4-1 rH

X 4-3 rH

X 4-3 o r^. vO o r>- M3 O r^ M3 o M3 o <1* M3 <r 'O’ M3 <r r-'- M3 o M3 o • • N • 1"-. r-4 • • 1^ O' • 1^- O' • r-- . r-» f—

• • Vj- . • <r • • • • • • <s- . . 'O’ • • • • v— ^—4 —j

cn

—• cn

—• —

Mf

co- co- co- co- co- co- CO- co- C/3- co- co- co- CO- co- CO- co03 03 <13 03 0) 03 03 03

C/D bO rH CO bO rH 0D bO rH to bO rH cn bO rH cn bo rH CO bO rH cn bO rH

0) cO CO <D 03 03 a> cO co 03 co (0 03 03 cO 03 CO cO 0) <0 CO 03 CO cd

03 > a 4-1 > S 4-1 > e 4-1 > e •U > d 4-1 > a 4-3 > a 4-1 > a 4-1 CO rH H c0 O H 03 O H 03 o •H CO o •H cO o •H CO o *H co o •H cd O

4-3

X rH

X 4-1 rH 4-1 rH T3 4-1 rHX 4-1 rH T3 4-1 rHX 4J rH

X 4-3 rH

X 1—1 •H X <4-4 •H VO —

i 4 v£> r—i vO r—

•—

M3 T—^ r—i 00 r—

»—

00 f—

v£> (—4 —4 M>

03 z • CM

O • CM o • CM o • CM o • CM 'sO • CM vO • CM o • CM o c m . • cn • • cn • • cn • • O • • o • • cn • • cn . •

03 •—* CM O' r-^ CM ON ^4 CM ON .

i CM as CM -4 CM t—

CM O' r-

CM ON

CQ <J> <J> CO* CO- co- </> CO- CO- co- co- co- co- CO- CO- CO- <J>

03 0) (1) 03 03 03 03 03 CO bO rH cn bO rH cn bo rH cn b0 rH cn bO rH cn bO rH cn bO rH cn bO *H

<D CO <0 0) <0 CO 0) 03 CO 01 <0 co 03 <0 (0 03 <0 cO 03 <0 CO 03 co cd > a 4-3 > a 4-1 > £3 4-1 > a 4-1 > a 4-3 > a 4-> > a 4-3 > a 4-1 si H CO o tH CO o •H co o •H CO O •H <0 o •H <0 o rH CO O tH cO o

bfl rH

X 4-3H

X 4-1 rH T3 4-1 rH

X 4-3 rH

X 4-3 rH

X 4-1 rH

X 4-3 rH

X 4-1 •HX o r- O «—4 o O O' r- r—4 O' r-'. cn r-'- CM cn P-T CM • 00 O' • 00 On • 00 as . 00 O' . » cn . 00 cn • 00 o • 00 O o • • o • • o • • O • • M3 • . M> • • CM • • CM . • CM cn cn CM cn cn CM cn cn CM cn cn r. cn CM cn CM CM cn u-i CM cn m

co- —4 CO- •—4 CO- *—co- 4 co-

—

co- —4 co- coco- co- CO- CO- co- co- co- <j>

rH

CO fl

l-l •

0) < CO < 0Q o Q oa

4-3 CM CM cn cn cn cn 'O’ -3- 1

28

NOTE:

All

dollar

figures

are

in

millions

of

1983

dollars.

Lives

saved

are

monetized

at

$500,000

per

life
Table

6.

continued

bo bO bO bO C C C C

•H •H •H •H P 4-1 P p

CO Cb rH ca cbr

—

09 cb

w Cb rH

p P cb 4-1 P cb

p

p cd 4J

p cb

Ctj 01 P cb ai 4-i cb ai iJ cd 01 P

ai

a o ai ex o aia o c; EX o 3

co

O P co

O 4-1 CO o 4->

w

O P o

rJ On <r co oo

m co as 'b’ CO o —. ^-r

O 43 r-» 00 O' sO oo co CM r^ 43 CO . . . . . . • • • • . . n in o co oo CO o <r co 00 04

04 04

n 04 04n vO •—4 <r co

co- CO- co- CO- co- co- CO- co- <o- </> co- cobO bO bO bO C C e C

•H •H •H •H

4-1 4-1 P P

co Cb rH CA Cb rH CA cb rHw Cb rH

p

p cb 4-1

p cb

p

p cd 4-J P cb

ai cb 0) 4-1 cb 01 P cb <u cd 01 P

t—

aia o ai

a o ai (O o CD (X o

T5 CO

O

H coO 4-1 CA o u CA

O P

"OH <r oo

m as as 'b- ro ON

—

o s <3- 43 o O' 00 00 co CM m 43 04

to| t . . . • . . . . • • . * o in 43 o co co co o CO 00 04

COo

co 04

m co cm

m 04

n CM -b- O'

co- co- <o- CO- co- co- CO- co- co- </> CO- co- o

bO bO bO bO e C d E3 •H •H •H •H

4-> P p P

co Cb rH CO Cb rH CA cb rH CA Cb rH P s-4 cb 4-1 p cb P P cb 4-J P Cb

cb ai

p cb CD 4-1 cb <u P cd 01 P X 0) a o ai o- o 01 a o <D EX O

bO CO

O P co

O 4-1 CA o p CA

O P

•HX

O -a <r CO

m co

a

Q

Q

Q as <t co

—• 00

v£> 43 04 o--

an co OS so O' . • . • . . Ed Ed Ed Ed • . . • . . 04 m oo CM co m co o co co 00 —

04 43 04 43

H

H

H

H -bn Os <r as

co- co- co- co- co- co- CO- CO- CO- CO- co- co- X Z Z t3

EX EX 04 04 S S S s o o o o

al ai ai al co bO -H co bO rH o u u o CA bO >H CA bO rH

ai cb cb ai cb cb ai cb cb a) cb cb > a h > B 4_i > a p > a p H cb o •H cb o •H cb o •H cb o 3

rH P rH

X 4-1H

H

H

H rH T3

p rH T3p o1 r—

04 f'- 04 r--

O

O

O

O

n 04 OS

n cm as •—

<r • -b- <r « -b- 43 . <r \o

04 . . 04 . . z z Z Z 04 . • 04 . . n <r o m -b- O n <r O n <r o co- co co- co co- co CO- CO

co- co- co- coal al al ol co bO -H co bO X CA bO rH CA bO rH

a) cb cb ai cb cb ai cb cd ai cb cb ai > B h > e 4-i > a u > a p

to r—

•H cb o •H cb o •H cb o •H cb o p T3 rH T3 4-1 rH T> 4-1 rH TJ u rH X P

•H T3

4-1 •H CO as 04 co as 04 SO os

—

s£) as

—

0) . O 04 . O 04 • o ON . o as C <1- . . -b- . . n . • n . .

01 O'

O O' as

O O' as o as

O O'

03

—< m -- in f—4

m —tn

CO- CO- co- co- </> CO- CO01 al 0) 01 co bO rH CO bO rH CA bo rH CA bO rH

ai cb cb ai cb cb ai Cd cd ai cb cb > e h > a 4-1 > a 4J > a p

jC •H cb o •H cb o •H cd o •H cb o

bC rH •a 4-i rH -a

p rH T3 rH

X P

*H

-b" 04 -d" -a o4 <r as CM OS 04 O' . o~ -b- • O' -b- . p". • r~~t p" . . r-' . . 04 • • CM • • o O' —

o O' —1 r— <r •— ^ p"- <r

><

—• O- * —• O' 1—

•—t f—l •—1 p^- co- co- co- co- </> </> 
 <y>

rH

cd •H il

_ i

0) <3 cQ <: DQ o a c CQ

4-J CM 04 CO CO CO CO <r 1

29

NOTE:

All

dollar

figures

are

in

millions

of

1983

dollars.

Lives

saved

are

monetized

at

$500,000

per

life.
Table

7.

Net

Annualized

Benefits

Over

Costs

for

Seat-Blocking

Alternatives

t

vs

,

fit

<UCO

co O' o O' v£> CM O M < O'

CO at O CO uo O' CM «-M CO UO -J- CNI o

o c • • # • • O 0) U CNI —i O' 00 O 00 CNI CO M C/D CNI <NJ 1 1 1 co CO co co vO so x ^ bO 3

•H O X X

o3

i 1 1 1 1 '

1 1

4-1 m

•H

<4-1 0J 00 oo co ON CO O' •3- v£> v£> o c m v£> O' r*. r-H o- o CM •-H o • 0) • • • • • • . • • •

CO M m CO —-H co CNI o o O 00 3 > 1 | 1 1 CM CM CM fH oQ

3

O

i 1 1 1 1 1

sO

•3- CM

uo vD

• • co —

co co

I I

•H

4-1 <4-1 03 0) o c UO O O' rH O' O 00 >3 CO CM O' o cu O' UO r—< O' CO O' ^H co CO CM M • • • • • • • • • • Q a Q Q • •

a) • CM o fH —o O' 00 r-H CO W W

v£> <3

- rH a a) —

1 + 1 i r-H + + w W rH rH X > rH 1 1 1 | 1 | X •o H H H H •H T3 £ •H Q Q Q Q

0-i 0u Oh Oh £ £ £ £

O O C O

u u u U

U

•H

4J <4-1 H H H H

co aj O c O' o O' oc U0 CM 00 o r—

O O O O

u 0) U0 1—1 Nf o UO CNI UO v£> • M • • Z z z z • • -C C/D CM r-H o o o O CO in O' r>. bC > X —H 1 + 1 CM CVJ + + rH rH

•H M I I II II X -H

32

• 4-1 CO *H >

4-1

<4-4 0) cu cn C co 00 00 CO 00 h3 CM fH •3- vO

09 <y u rN O' —00 uo CM 00 r-H 00 O' 00 O M . • • • . • • • • m • • o 4-1 UO >3 v£> -3 sD O' O' O CM O' rH X 03 1 1 + + + + 1 1 CM CM + f—H 3oJ

bC O

•H M

Z w

+ + +

>oco

u

0)

CO £

co

0)c

l““( Ui •H<

COQ

CO

01c

u

•H<

cN<Ncocococo<r<r <CQ<C0UQ<M •o

rH

i-i o3

cN<NicocofOco<r<r <M<MUQ<M

30

NOTE:

All

figures

are

in

millions

of

1983

dollars.

Costs

and

benefits

are

taken

from

table
changes in cost on performance in the face of rapid innovation. Evidence on the sensitivity of overall benefit/cost calculations to changes in one area

versus another can be useful in developing priorities for safety research.

The benefits models are organized around a data base of historical fires.

Tests and deterministic models are used to assess likely exit speeds, relative

contributions of various fire-involved materials to fatalities, projected

performances of risk-reduction alternatives, and other factors used in

assessing which victims could have been saved by an alternative. Significant

uncertainties still remain in these estimates because of uncertainties in some

of the models (e.g., models on the role of cyanide in causing fatalities) and even more because of uncertainties in the detail available on circumstances of some accidents. At least in the first sample application, however, these

uncertainties did not preclude use of the models to produce useful conclusions .

The cost models use manufacturers * estimates and forecasts to produce

estimated costs for installing the alternative and operating with it. Significant uncertainties exist because these estimates nearly all involve forecasting from very limited experience, but as with benefits models, these

uncertainties do not preclude the use of the models to produce useful conclusions.

In the sample application, for example, many key assumptions that were checked for sensitivity proved not to be critical in the assessment of net

benefits over costs. Benefits proved less sensitive in general than costs.

The relative insensitivity of benefits emphasizes the importance of reducing

costs. Appendix H presents formulas that can be used for quick analysis of

the impact of changes in fuel prices, weight penalty per seat, or incremental

changes in the costs of fabricating and installing seat blockers.

While no analysis was done on the effects of varying either the discount

rate or the speed or timing of the phase-in of seat blocking, it is probably

safe to assume that neither would dramatically affect the results. The sizeable contribution of operating costs and the short time between seat refurbishments mean that benefits are incurred at about the same rate as costs.

6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We want to express our appreciation to the many individuals who

contributed to the development of the models and data used in this analysis.

A special note of appreciation is due Constantine Sarkos, Richard Hill, and

Peter Versage of the FAA Technical Center and Alan Gomberg of Firepro, Inc.,

who were instrumental in the initiation of the project and offered suggestions

and critique based on their valuable experience. Other individuals at the FAA

who helped us included Wayne Smoot, Richard Soper, Peter Boyle, Thor Eklund,

Brian Colamasca and Jack Smith. Gerald Walhaut, of the National Transportation Safety Baord, John Enders and Edward Wood of the Flight Safety Foundation

and R.L. Sears of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company helped us with

detailed descriptions of some accidents. Paul Hamilton, a private consultant,

helped with operating cost calculations. John N. Feren of the Douglas Aircraft Company helped with forecasts of aircraft inventory, activity and fuel

burn data. G.W. Morrow of the Aerospace Division of UOP Inc., William Downey,

Jr. of Fairchild Burns Company and Jack Putman of Weber Aircraft Company

provided incremental cost and weight data for fire blocked seats.

31
.
Appendix A

Sources and Rationales for Estimated Fire Fatalities - Total and Estimated Saveable by Seat Blocking

U.S. Airlines

1. 11/8/65 American, B727, near Constance, KY

NTSB reports did not suffice to indicate the split of fire versus crash trauma

fatalities, but seven of the ten passengers checked (70 percent) had carboxyhemoglobin levels over 10%. This 70 percent result was used as an estimate of

the percentage of total fatalities felled by fire, so 70 percent of 58 total

fatalities gives 36 fire fatalities. Because there was a violent explosion

only seconds after the aircraft struck the hill, all fire victims were deemed

unsaveable by seat blocking. Either they were killed by the explosion or they were stunned by it and unable to use extra escape time.

2. 11/11/65 United, B727, Salt Lake City, UT

NTSB reports indicate all fatalities were due to fire. Snow [111] provides an unusually thorough examination of victim conditions and escape activities.

The high estimate of saves assumes that only three passengers - one wheelchair-bound invalid (unable to act) and two persons near the tail who would

not have been able to follow others to useable exits (lost/isolated in

smoke) - would have been killed regardless of the escape time provided by

seat-blocking. The other 40 passengers would escape (including two who

escaped and died later; they probably would not have been fatally injured

before escaping) - nine through window exits near them and 29 through the main

door. Escape rates are estimated at one per second for the main door and one

per two seconds for the window exits. The middle estimate differs from the

high estimate only in the assumption that two more ailing passengers - one with emphysema, one with arthritis - would have been fatally injured regardless of the extra escape time available; they are also classed as unable to

act. The low estimate differs from the middle estimate in assuming that

(1) the two passengers who escaped or were rescued but died later still would

have died, (2) the two small children (aged two and six) would not have been

carried out but would have died, and (3) four of the passengers closest to the

flame-blocked galley door would have been killed trying to escape through that

door rather than turning around and waiting in line to go out the main door.

The children are classed as unable to act and the others as blocked by fire.

3. 4/22/66 American Flyers, L-188, Ardmore, OK

NTSB reports do not suffice to split fatalities as fire versus crash trauma.

All five crew fatalities were caused by crash trauma. Of the 78 passengers

killed, 63 were tested for carboxyheraoglobin levels and 12 had levels over 10

percent. On this basis, Lucha [90] attributed 12 fatalities to fire.

Instead, we prorated these 12 of 63 cases to the full group of 78 passengers

killed and attribute 15 to fire.

A-l
The high- and middle-save estimates assume all of those fire fatalities were mobile and likely to be able to escape within 20 seconds. (There was no information on the conditions of exits.) The low-save estimate assumes all

the fatalities were either stunned by the crash (hence, unable to act) or blocked from the exits, possibly by the fact that most passenger seats

separated during the slide down the mountain and may therefore have been

blocking the aisles and exits.

4. 6/23/67 Mohawk, BAC 111, Blossburg, PA

NTSB reports state that this in-flight fire produced a non-survivable crash.

Since the fire originated in the airframe plenum chamber and did not use the

cabin as an avenue of spread, seat blocking would have had no effect.

5. 6/12/68 Pan American, B707, India

Lucha [90] attributed all six fatalities to fire. Information from Boeing

[86] confirms this and attributes all deaths to smoke from burning fuel outside the aircraft. This meant that no one could have been saved by seat

blocking, and all three estimates therefore assume no one could have been

saved.

6. 11/27/70 Capitol International, DC8, Anchorage, AK

NTSB reports indicate all fatalities were due to fire. The high estimate of saves assumes that all fatalities were felled by cabin material gases and

that, with seat blocking and numerous useable doors and breaks in the fuselage

to escape through, everyone on board could have escaped with an additional 20

seconds. The middle estimate and low estimate assume that only those

fatalities killed by cyanide were killed by burning materials inside the

cabin; hence, only those would have been saved by seat blocking. Tests were

done on 19 of the 47 fatalities. Sarkos [106] estimated cyanide as a factor

in four cases (which prorates to 10 for the full group of fatalities), based

on a cyanide level of 0.55. Kirkham and Lacefield [88] estimate that incapacitation will occur whenever cyanide (as a percentage of 0.75) plus carboxyhemoglobin (as a percentage of 46.5%) equals or exceeds 1.00. There are six

such cases here where removal of the cyanide would change an incapacitating

combination to a non-incapacitating one; these six cases prorate to 15 for the

full group of fatalities. The higher Kirkham-Lacef ield estimate of fatalities

due to cabin materials is used for the middle-save estimate; the lower Sarkos

estimate is used for the low-save estimate.

7. 12/28/70 Trans-Caribbean, B727, Virgin Islands

NTSB reports indicate both fatalities were due to fire and both were unable to use extra escape time - one trapped under debris, the other knocked

unconscious in the crash.

A2
8. 6/7/71 Allegheny, CV580, New Haven, CT

NTSB reports indicated all fatalities but one were due to fire. The high

estimate assumes that all fire fatalities were due to gases or flames attributable in large part to seat involvement. Without seat involvement, and with

no evidence that anyone was unable to act, all passengers could have exited

via the overwing exit (the only useable exit) at a rate of one every two

seconds

.

The middle estimate uses the Kirkham-Lace field formula cited in case #6 to

determine which fire fatalities would have been prevented if cyanide had not

been a factor. (The Sarkos formula gives four killed by cyanide, almost the same .)

The low estimate then takes account of the fact that most people saveable by

seat blocking would have found their paths to the one useable exit blocked by

other fatalities not saveable by seat blocking. Only one person was next to

the only useable exit - the window exit.

The estimate of fire fatalities is based on our review of the causes of death

listed by the coroner in his report attached to the NTSB Human Factors

Division report.

The high and middle saves estimates are based on a Sarkos estimate [106] that seven deaths were due to cyanide, hence avoidable with seat blocking. This is

backed by an Aviation Daily article [30] quoting the Cook County coroner as saying that seven deaths were attributable to cyanide. The low estimate is

based on the assumption that the coroner's analyses, strongly disputed at the

time, were correct in finding that carboxyhemoglobin levels alone were fatal

in all cases; this estimate also assumes that those levels were produced by

smoke from outside, i.e., probably smoke from burning fuel.

NTSB reports indicate all fatalities were due to fire. The high estimate

assumes that all fire fatalities were caused by gases attributable to seat

involvement and that only one invalid (unable to act) would die. The middle

estimate assumes that the invalid and two other passengers who were lost in

smoke in the rear - one in the tail cone and one in a rest room - would die,

the latter because they would not be able to find useable exits even with

extra escape time. Alternatively, there were three fatalities with lethal

carboxyhemoglobin levels alone. It was not possible to tell whether the two

groups of three fatalities overlapped, so it is assumed a total of three would

die. The low estimate assumes that the two people isolated in the rear and

the five who never left their seats (including the invalid) were lost in

smoke, then killed by smoke from the outside.

II. 7/22/73 Pan American, B707, Tahiti

Lucha [90] cites this accident, which began as an in-flight fire outside the

cabin area. There were four in-air explosions which killed everyone on board.

Seat blocking would have had no effect.

9. 12/8/72 United, B737, Chicago, IL

10. 12/20/72 North Central, DC9, Chicago, IL
12. 1/30/74 Pan American, B707, American Samoa

NTSB reports indicate all fatalities but one were killed by fire. The highsave estimate assumes that if seat blocking had been present, then the six

persons who escaped but died later would not have received fatal injuries,

that the one person killed by the fire outside the aircraft still would have

died, and that the other 88 fatalities were killed by gases from seat involvement and would have survived longer with seat blocking and been able to

escape. It is further assumed that the apparent panic, cited in the NTSB

reports, would not have occurred if seat blocking had delayed the spread of

the fire, permitting one of the two unused main doors to be opened and

occupants to escape at a rate of one per second.

The middle-saves estimate assumes that only persons killed by cyanide would be

saved by seat blocking. The Sarkos formula (cited in case it 6) produces a maximum of 47 killed by cyanide and hence saveable; this is the number used

here. (The Kirkham-Lacef ield formula, cited in case #6, produces an estimate

of 50 potential saves, almost the same.) Both estimates are prorated from

blood gas analyses done on 49 of the 95 fire fatalities.

The low estimate assumes that the added escape time failed to prevent the

panic on board. Therefore, neither main door was opened and the useable

overwing exit was not discovered by anyone other than the four passengers who

used it. (The investigators said that even without seat blocking, more passengers should have been able to escape via the overwing exits if they had

been noticed.)

13. 9/11/74 Eastern, DC9, Charlotte, NC

The split of fire versus trauma fatalities is our estimate based on the

partial information provided in the NTSB reports. Using the same information,

Cominsky [51] estimated 39 fire fatalities. Cominsky counted as fire

fatalities all six passengers killed by "combined factors" - fire and crash

trauma; that report also excluded one fatality who died some time after the

accident. Our study counted the fire and smoke fatalities (33) and half the

combined-factors fatalities (3) to get the estimated 36 fire fatalities.

NTSB reports say the effects of fire were fatal before cyanide gas from

interior materials could become a factor. All normal exits appear to have been

jammed or blocked, and the fire appears to have rapidly blocked the holes in

the fuselage. Seat blocking, therefore, probably would have had no effect.

14. 4/27/76 American, B727, Virgin Islands

NTSB reports suggest all fatalities but one died of fire. The fire itself

seems to have been a fast-moving, fuel-driven fire that could have overwhelmed

the passengers through the numerous fuselage breaks even if seat blocking had

been present; this argument underlies the low- and middle-saves estimates. If

not, then the 11 people the NTSB reports say were killed by cyanide could have

escaped through those fuselage breaks and the overwing exits at an estimated

rate of one escape every two seconds; this provides the high-saves estimate.

A4
15. 3/27/77 Pan American, B747, Canary Islands

Cominsky [51] provided the estimated split of fire versus crash trauma

fatalities. Survivors exited primarily through a left-side door and a hole in

the left wall. Evacuation time was limited to about one minute. With the top

of the fuselage torn off and exposed to flame, it is unlikely that seat

blocking would have helped.

16. 4/4/77 Southern, DC9, near New Hope, GA

The estimate of crash trauma versus fire fatalities was based on our review of

the NTSB report material on each fatality. Cominsky [51] counted all 20 fire

fatalities and half the nine combined fire-trauma fatalities. This study

counted only the fire fatalities because the trauma part of the combinedfactor fatalities seemed too severe. Three victims had lethal levels of

cyanide and probably would have been able to escape if seat blocking had

delayed involvement of interior materials. The others had non-incapacitating

levels of gases and were probably killed by burns, since there was a fireball

in the aircraft before it stopped sliding.

17. 3/1/78 Continental, DC 10, Los Angeles, CA

NTSB reports indicate there were four fire fatalities - two succumbing quite a while after the accident and therefore not captured by some overview studies

like Cominsky [51]. All four were killed by fire outside the aircraft and

would not have been helped by seat blocking.

Non-U. S. Airlines Using U.S. -Built Aircraft

1. 2/16/67 Garuda, L-188, Indonesia

The World Airline Accident Summary attributed deaths primarily to fire so this

study estimated all 22 were due to fire. The crew and passengers were unable

to open the forward main entrance door or the rear service door. Many died

near those doors. Survivors went out the right hand forward emergency exit

and cockpit sliding windows. There was no mention of breaks in the fuselage.

Smoke and fumes in the cabin were mentioned only after the aircraft stopped.

The high- and middle-save estimates assume that everyone killed could have

escaped but at a rate of only one every two seconds because of the limited

exits available. The low-estimate assumes that some passengers were killed by

crash trauma or would have continued to attempt to escape through main doors

until overcome by smoke, even after seat-blocking delayed smoke, with the net

effect that no one would have been saved.

2. 3/5/67 Varig, DC8, Liberia

The reports examined estimated 56 total fatalities, while Cominsky [51]

estimated 51 total fatalities. Cominsky’ s estimate of 11 trauma fatalities

was applied to the higher total to give 45 fire fatalities (versus Cominsky ’s estimate of 40).

A5
The aircraft caught fire from a wing fuel spill during ground slide after

crash. Fire entered the fuselage during the slide through an overwing exit.

Fire spread faster toward the rear than the front, and most fatalities were

found in the rear headed back toward the exits. Access to the rear exits was partially obstructed by broken seats, a fallen life raft and other items. The

high- and middle-saves estimates assume everyone could escape, given time, and

the two estimates differ only on the likely speed of escape - one per second versus one every two seconds - in light of the obstructions. The low-save

estimate assumes the obstructions cut escape speed to one every five seconds,

that the crew still would have stopped helping passengers escape at 90 seconds

of extra time (in the actual accident, the crew did stop helping passengers

escape before they had to, according to the investigators), and that

passengers could not have escaped without help from the crew.

3. 4/8/68 BOAC, B707, England

Reports state all fatalities were killed by heat or explosion. All were queued to escape through the rear exit (galley door) when it was blocked by

spreading flames from under the fuselage. Before they could move all the way

forward to another exit, an explosion breached the integrity of the aircraft

and exposed them to the flames. Seat blocking would not have helped, in all

likelihood.

4. 9/17/69 Pacific Western, CV640, Canada

The cockpit area was destroyed in the crash so it is assumed the two crew

fatalities were due to crash trauma and the two passenger fatalities, since

that area remained intact, were due to fire. Survivors escaped through the rear exits before fire consumed the aircraft. The high- and middle-saves

estimates assume the two passenger fatalities simply ran out of time and would

have escaped with seat blocking. The low-save estimate assumes that either

they were unable to act (e.g., stunned) or they were killed by a fire that did

not involve cabin materials.

5. 7/5/70 Air Canada, DC8, Canada

The aircraft's first landing attempt ruptured an engine and pylon, spilling

fuel. Three explosions followed, apparently killing everyone before the

aircraft came to a stop. Seat blocking would not have helped. All fatalities

were due to the explosions, hence were related to fire not crash trauma.

6. 1/22/73 Royal Jordanian, B707, Nigeria

The aircraft landed in an undershoot, fire broke out, and the runway surface

collapsed. According to information from Boeing [86] , the aircraft came to

rest over a drainage ditch so that burning fuel ran under the fuselage.

Flames and smoke entered when the first exit door was opened, but it is not

clear which killed the passengers. Escape was possible through some exits,

but in some cases it required running through the fire. The high-save

estimate assumes all 176 fatalities were killed by fire, hence would have had

extra time with seat blocking, would have been able to act if given extra

escape time, and could have escaped at a rate of one per second. The middlesave estimate assumes that half the fatalities were killed by smoke from

outside or were unable to act and that the other half could escape but only at
a rate of one every two seconds. The low-save estimate assumes everyone was killed by smoke from outside, unable to act, blocked by unuseable exits, or otherwise unable to benefit from seat blocking.

7. 7/11/73 Varig, B707, France

This stemmed from an in-flight fire that began in the rear lavatories during

approach. Fire extinguishers were used but were ineffective because the crew

could not find the start of the fire. At touchdown, fire was still confined

to the rear toilet, according to the reports, but the passengers were already

immobilized. Polyvinyl chloride materials in the lavatory construction were deemed the source of the gases that killed most people. It is unlikely that

seat blocking would have helped because the deaths occurred before the seats

became involved.

8. 11/20/74 Lufthansa, B747, Kenya

The brief descriptions say the aircraft lost height on its takeoff. After the

crash, fire broke out in the left wing and separated tail section. Information from Boeing [86] suggests 35 fatalities were due to fire. All but four

of those were considered stunned by impact and unable to act. Survivors left

through two right-side doors or breaks in the fuselage or were thrown clear,

with the crews assisting evacuation until the fire became too fierce. All

estimates assume the four mobile victims would have been saved by seat

blocking.

9. 6/4/76 Air Manila, L-188, Guam

NTSB reports indicate that 28 of the 45 fatalities were due to fire. The fire

moved rapidly and the occupiable area was compromised r The description

suggests everyone would have been stunned by debris or trapped by a fastmoving, fuel-driven fire with multiple access points to the fuselage, even if

seat blocking had been present.

10. 3/27/77 KLM, B747, Canary Islands

The estimated split between fire and crash-trauma fatalities is taken from

Cominsky [51]. Fire enveloped the aircraft completely and immediately,

presumably blocking all exits. The saves estimates assume seat blocking would

have had no effect on this situation.

11. 9/29/77 Japan Air, DC8, Malaysia

Cominsky [51] attributed 34 of the 45 fatalities to fire, based on an unpublished McDonnell Douglas file report. The aircraft hit some trees and

then a hill. The aft fuselage broke off, and the front section exploded in

flames. Because of the breakup of the aircraft, affording a wide area of access to the cabin for the fire, it is estimated that seat blocking would

have had no effect.

12. 12/17/78 Indian Airlines, B737, India

The one fatality died of burns incurred after evacuating the aircraft. All

estimates assume seat blocking would not have made a difference in the death.

A13. 10/7/79 Swissair, DC8, Greece

The reports say only that fire was present but not whether any fatalities were

due to fire. In the absence of more information, the high-saves estimate

assumes all the fatalities were fire-related and preventable by seat blocking;

the middle-saves estimate assumes half were; and the low-saves estimate

assumes none were.

14. 11/26/79 Pakistani International, B707, Saudi Arabia

The crash was caused by an in-flight cabin fire for which the investigators

never found conclusive evidence of cause. Since seat blocking would either

have controlled the fire, saving everyone, or not controlled it, saving no one, it makes no sense to split the difference for a middle-saves estimate.

Therefore, since the speculations as to cause seem to include more scenarios

that would have been controlled by seat blocking than scenarios that would

not, the middle-saves and high-saves estimates both assume all 156 would have

been saved. The low-saves estimate assumes none of them would have been

saved.

There were two fatalities, both killed by fire. Jack Enders of the Flight

Safety Foundation indicated in a conversation with us that both were killed

outside the aircraft. This means seat blocking would have had no effect.

This crash was caused by an in-flight fire originating in the cargo hold.

With seat blocking, the fire probably would not have established itself in the

cabin but would have cycled in the cargo hold, permitting a safe landing and

evacuation of all on board. All three saves estimates therefore show all 301

passengers being saved.

17. 11/19/80 Korean Air, B747, Korea

Richard Hill of the FAA provided site-observer estimates that all fatalities

but three were probably due to fire and all of those would have been saved

with seat blocking. Therefore, the saves estimates all show ll of the 14

victims saved.

18. 7/27/81 Aeromexico, DC9, Mexico

The aircraft crashed and burst into flames. All or none of the fatalities may

have been due to fire. The saves estimates, with the absence of better information, assume that all, half, and none of the fatalities were saveable.

19. 9/13/82 Spantax, DC10, Spain

All 51 fatalities were due to fire, according to the reports. Richard Hill of

the FAA, who observed the crash site, estimates that all victims were saveable

by seat blocking. Because all doors were useable, it is estimated that all 51

victims could have been saved, even with only 20 extra seconds of escape time.

15. 2/27/80 China Airlines, B707, Phillipines

16. 8/19/80 Saudi Air, L-1011, Saudi Arabia

A8
Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. Aircraft

1. 2/15/66 Indian Airlines, Caravelle, India

The two fatalities died after evacuation. The reports do not indicate whether

the cause was fire or crash trauma. The high-saves estimate assumes both

would have received non-fatal injuries if seat blocking was present; the lowand middle-saves estimates assume no seat blocking effect.

2. 9/11/68 Air France, Caravelle, France

All 95 occupants were killed by a crash caused by an in-flight cabin fire.

The only location fire ever reached, according to those reports, is the rear

of the cabin, presumably behind the last row of seats, and it is therefore

assumed that seat blocking would have had no effect.

3. 7/26/69 Air Algerie, Caravelle, Algeria

The 33 fatalities were killed by a crash caused by an in-flight fire in

electrical components. There is no mention of spread into the cabin, so it is

assumed seat blocking would have had no effect.

4. 5/16/70 Somali, Viscount, Somalia

The five fatalities followed a crash caused by loss of control, which in turn

was caused by an inflight fire of unidentified nature and origin that was seen burning through the floor (from below) near the sixth row of seats. Since the

critical damage apparently occurred in the concealed spaces, seat blocking

would have had no effect.

5. 3/15/74 Sterling, Caravelle, Iran

A heavy fire resulted from a fuel spill after the right landing gear collapsed

causing the right wing to strike the ground. From the description, it appears

that all fatalities probably were due to fire, and it is more likely than not

that seat blocking would have helped. Therefore, the high- and middle-saves

estimates assume everyone saved; the low-saves estimate assumes no one saved.

AAppendix B

Historical Accidents Involving Fires and Fatalities But

No Fire-Related Fatalities, 1965-82

The following list describes historical fatal passenger-flight incidents

in which fire was present but which were estimated to have no fatalities

attributable to the fire.

The list is not comprehensive but concentrates on incidents where there were uncertainties as to whether any fatalities were due to fire. Incidents

involving fire following a clearly non-survivable crash are omitted. The

rationales for excluding these accidents are provided. Al’l descriptions not

otherwise labeled are from the NTSB Aircraft Accident Reports (for U.S.-site

crashes) or the World Airline Accident Summary [3].

On Total

Description Board Killed

1. 4/10/65 Alia, Herald, Turboprop, Syria

Fuselage failed structurally in flight and aircraft crashed

on a mountain slope. The facts that everyone was killed and

that the fuselage failed suggest, in the absence of more

detail, that all fatalities were due to crash trauma. There

were witness reports, unconfirmed by investigation of the

wreckage, that the aircraft had caught fire in flight.

2. 10/27/65 British European, Vanguard, Turboprop,

England

Aircraft crashed in overshoot and fire followed impact. The

report says that everyone was killed due to crash trauma.

3. 3/4/66 Canadian Pacific, DC8, Jet, Japan

The aircraft slid, hit lights, hit seawall, spilled fuel,

and fuel caught fire. Survivors escaped through holes in

fuselage. Reports say only that deaths were due to impact

trauma or fire or both. The aircraft was thrown over and

destroyed, then caught fire. This sounds like a non- survivable crash. Cominsky [51] attributed half of all

fatalities to fire in the absence of more information.

Wayne Smoot of FAA also reviewed this case for the purpose

of creating a fire-fatality data base; he concluded that none of the facalities were due to fire.

4. 11/6/67 TWA, B707, Jet, Erlanger, KY

The only fatality was due to crash trauma. This was cited

in Mniszewski [95].

54 54

36 36

72 64

36 1

B-l
On Total

Description Board Killed

5. 11/20/67 TWA, CV-880, Jet, Constance, KY 82 69

The accounts, including Cominsky [51], agree that this was a high-impact, non-survivable crash in which the survivors

were lucky. All carboxyhemoglobin tests were under 10

percent, consistent with fire not being a cause of death.

6. 2/16/68 Civil Air Transport, B727, Jet, Taiwan 63 21

The aircraft hit a farm house while taking off after an aborted landing. During the ensuing ground slide, the nose

and landing gears collapsed and the tail section, left wing

and three engines separated. This degree of ground-slide

damage tends to mean that all fatalities are due to crash

trauma. Taylor [114] attributes all fatalities to fire, but

that study tends to resolve doubts in favor of fire being

the cause.

7. 4/20/68 South African Airways, B707, Jet,

Southwest Africa 128 123

At impact, the aircraft was descending at a rate of

1500-2000 feet per minute. On impact, the hull and all four

engine pods gouged deep trenches in the ground. The aircraft then began to break up. Two separate fuel fires broke

out. Wreckage and bodies were strewn over an area 1400

meters long and 200 meters wide. This crash severity

suggests that all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

8. 10/25/68 Northeast, FH227, Turboprop, over Hanover, NH 43 32

While NTSB reports are unsure, they say there was "no

indication of fire until after impact and breakup which

caused deaths". All carboxyhemoglobin tests were at or below 7 percent. Cited in Mniszewski [95].

9. 12/27/68 North Central Airways, CV-580, Turboprop,

Chicago, IL 45 27

The NTSB and Human Factors reports both suggest all

fatalities were due to impact, although reports are far from

conclusive. All crew fatalities, at least, were attributed

to impact. The cabin area had extensive impact damage but

"was virtually free of fire damage". Mniszewski [95] attributed all deaths to fire and estimated 16 would be saved by

reducing flammability of interior finish and combustibility

of seating.

B-2
On

Description Board

10. 1/5/69 Ariana, B727, Jet, England 64-65

The two citations - Taylor [114] and the World Airline

Accident Summary [3] - differ on the number of fatalities

and the total number on board. Taylor attributes 41

fatalities to fire, but the World Summary says "crash

destroyed aircraft ... and set the wreckage on fire". In

the absence of more information or a rationale from Taylor,

who tends to resolve doubts in favor of attributing cause to

fire, the World Summary description suggests all fatalities

were due to crash trauma.

11. 9/12/69 PAL, BAC-111, Jet, Phillipines 47

The aircraft struck a hill. The accident description

mentions fire only in saying that the wreckage was consumed

by fire. That, and the fact that nearly everyone died,

suggests that all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

12. 11/20/69 Nigerian, VC-10, Jet, Nigeria 87

The aircraft broke up on impact. That, and the fact that

everyone died, suggests that all fatalities were due to

crash trauma.

13. 1/25/70 Royal Nepal, F27, Turboprop, India 23

The description cites a "localized minor fire", which seems

a less likely cause for the one fatality than the also-cited

"extensive damage by impact".

14. 12/31/70 PIA, F27, Turboprop 35

The only information is that it "crashed and burnt out on landing". With so little information, it is more likely

that the fatalities were due to crash trauma than to fire.

15. 9/4/71 Alaska Airlines, B727, Jet, Near Juneau, AK 111

The NTSB report termed this a non-survivable crash, which

indicates all fatalities were attributable to crash trauma.

16. Pan International, BAC-111, Jet, Germany 121

The aircraft struck a bridge over the autobahn during an emergency landing. Both wings and the tail unit separated,

then fire broke out. The severity of the crash damage

suggests that all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

Total

Killed

48-50

45

87

1

7

111

22

B-3
Description

On Total

Board Killed

17. 6/14/72 Japan Airlines, DC8, Jet, India 87

The aircraft crashed 13 miles short of the airfield, then

caught fire. In the absence of other information and since

almost everyone was killed, it seems most likely that all

fatalities were due to crash trauma.

18. 8/11/72 Indian Airways, F27, Turboprop, India 18

The aircraft collided with the terrain, then caught fire.

In the absence of other information and since everyone was killed, it seems most likely that all fatalities were due to

crash trauma.

19. 11/28/72 Japan Airlines, DC8 , Jet, USSR 76

The left wing and tail touched ground on landing. The

aircraft broke up and caught fire. The aircraft is

described as "rolling", which sounds like a non-survivable

crash, with all fatalities attributed to crash trauma.

20. 12/29/72 Eastern Airlines, L-1011, Jet, Miami, FL 175

Reports are unclear but seem to suggest that all fatalities

were due to impact. There were burns, but the Human Factors

Group report seems to say they were only suffered by

survivors near an open window where flames briefly blew

in. This suggests all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

21. 5/31/73 India, B737, Jet, India 65

The aircraft flew into wires, collided with the terrain,

then crashed in flames. In the absence of other information, this sounds like a severe crash in which all

fatalities would have been due to crash trauma. The government report (cited in [86]) is self-contradictory on the

question of fire involvement in any of the deaths.

22. 7/31/73 Delta, DC9, Jet, Boston, MA 89

The coroner said all fatalities were due to impact.

23. 1/1/74 Itavia, F28, Jet, Italy 42

The aircraft crashed two miles short of the runway and

caught fire. In the absence of other information and since

almost everyone was killed, it is most likely that all

fatalities were due to crash trauma.

82

18

61

99

48

89

38

B-4
Description

On Total

Board Killed

24. 1/26/74 Turkish, F28, Jet, Turkey

The report said the airplane disintegrated and the crash was non-survivable. This indicates all fatalities were due to

crash trauma.

25. 6/27/74 Cambodia Air, B307, Piston, Cambodia

This aircraft was incorrectly listed in the World Summary as

a B707. Boeing [86] says it was a B307, hence not one of

the aircraft types being studied.

26. 6/24/75 Eastern, B727, Jet, Jamaica, NY

While not conclusive, the NTSB and Human Factors Group

reports suggest all fatalities were due to impact. The only

examples were impact fatalities, and the sampled carboxyhemoglobin levels were all under 20%. There was a fastmoving fire, however, that caused serious burns to the

survivors

27. 7/15/75 National, DC10, Jet, enroute to

Jacksonville, FL

The one fatality committed suicide by fire while the aircraft was in flight. The fire had gone out by the time it was discovered. As a suicide, it should not be counted x-jith

other fire fatalities.

28. 11/23/76 Olympic, YS-11, Turboprop, Greece

The report says the aircraft disintegrated. This indicates

all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

29. 11/19/77 TAP, B727, Jet, Spain

The aircraft went off the end of the runway, hit some

lights, plunged over a steep bank, and exploded on impact.

This suggests a non-survivable incident with all fatalities

due to crash trauma.

30. 12/4/77 Garuda, B737, Jet, Malaysia

The aircraft crashed due to an inflight fire, which was hijacking-related and therefore probably caused by a bomb.

For this reason, the fatalities are probably attributable to an explosive device rather than a fire.

73

39

124

71

50

164

100

66

19

114

1

50

131

100

B-5
On

Description Board

31. 3/14/79 Alia, B727, Jet, Qatar 64

The aircraft bounced four times, then hit a building. A

fire began sometime in that sequence, but the crash severity

suggests that all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

32. 5/25/79 American, DCIO, Jet, Chicago, IL 271

The NTSB report says all were killed by impact.

33. 10/31/79 Western, DCIO, Jet, Mexico 88

The aircraft broke into several pieces and the front end hit

a building while traveling at 180 knots, according to

Richard Hill, FAA, who was an official observer at the crash

site. This crash severity suggests that all fatalities were

due to crash trauma.

34. 12/23/79 Turkish, F28, Jet, Turkey 45

The aircraft struck a hill; then there was a post-impact

fire. In the absence of other information and since almost

everyone was killed, it seems likely that all fatalities

were due to crash trauma.

35. 7/20/81 Somali, F27, Turboprop, Somalia 49

The only information is that the aircraft crashed and burnt

out. Since everyone was killed, it seems likely that all

fatalities were due to crash trauma.

36. 3/20/82 Garuda, F28, Jet, Indonesia 28

The aircraft overshot the runway, crashed in a field in

heavy rain, and then burst into flames. In the absence of

other information and since almost everyone was killed, it seems likely that all fatalities were due to crash trauma.

37. 6/8/82 Varig, B727, Jet, Brazil 137

The aircraft crashed into a hillside. There was fire, but

the crash description suggests it was not a factor in the

deaths

.

Total

Killed

44

271

72

41

49

26

137

B-6
Appendix C

Historical Major Aircraft-Fire Property Damage Preventable by

Alternatives Operating in the Aircraft Interior

Table C-l lists seven cases of major property damage attributable to

aircraft fires for which some effective alternatives operating in the aircraft

interior could have prevented all or nearly all damage. The limitation to

alternatives located in the aircraft interior covers most alternatives of

interest to FAA but excludes most large-loss aircraft fires. Accidents during

refueling or servicing of systems like the oxygen system, in-flight engine

fires, and tire fires while landing are among the more common causes of largeloss aircraft fires.

Of the incidents listed in table C-l, //I and 2 involved U.S. airlines,

while the others all involved non-U. S. airlines using U.S. -built aircraft.

Table C-2 provides summary estimates of preventable property damage. The

Middle Estimate given in table C-2 is based on all the incidents in table C-l

and uses the loss figure for #1 that was based on the standardized approach

cited in table C-3.

The Low Estimate in table C-2 includes only incidents #1, 2 and 5 - the

two ramp fires and the Saudi in-flight fire - because they are the three

incidents where the evidence for effect of interior alternatives is strongest.

The others were external fires that might have caused extensive damage without

involving the interior (#4, 6) and fires where very little is known about what

happened (#3, 7). Also the loss figure actually reported ($14.5 million) is

used for the 1974 accident rather than the higher figure based on the

standardized approach.

The High Estimate in table C-2 assumes that the list of incidents in

table C-l represents under-reporting of all relevant incidents. Most citations are based on recollections of experts whose associations with this

problem go back only to 1978. Therefore, it is assumed that the incidents in

table C-l (excluding //l) should be taken as the 1978-82 portion of a true,

longer list of incidents. The estimated total loss is estimated by prorating

the 1978-82 losses over 1965-82, using passenger-miles as the basis for

weighting. (See table D-4 for the passenger-mile figures.) This means the

1978-82 losses in table C-l were estimated to have been 44 percent of the true

total for flights involving U.S. airlines and/or U.S. -built aircraft and for

all world flights. For U.S. airlines only, incident #2 was the only incident

to come after 1977, which would make the High Estimate lower than the Low

Estimate. The High Estimate is therefore calculated so that the Middle

Estimate for U.S. airlines only will be 44 percent of it; this is the same percentage relationship characteristic of the other two rows.
Table C-l

Date

1. 4/19/74

2. 10/26/79

3. 11/26/79

4. 2/27/80

5. 8/19/80

6. 11/19/80

7 . Unknown

Historical Major Aircraft Fire Losses Preventable by Alternatives

Operating in the Aircraft Cabin

Estimated Loss Description (in millions)

TWA, L-1011, Jet $14. 5/$22. 5/519.0

A fire began in the cabin and did not break out until the aircraft was on the ground, parked

and unattended. Some alternatives could have

blocked the growth of the fire to selfsustaining size. The first loss figure is the one cited in [97); it probably reflects a usedaircraft valuation of the aircraft and the

value of salvage. The second loss figure is the "value of aircraft" figure cited in the original article on the accident in (37). The

third loss figure is based on a standardized

approach (see table C-3).

United, B727, Jet $ 3.2

Discarded smoking materials ignited cabin

seats. With some alternatives no selfsustaining fire probably would have occurred.

Accident cited and described in [38].

Pakistani International, B707, Jet $ 1.0 This in-flight fire of undetermined origin also

is listed under fatalities. Richard Hill, FAA,

estimated that of the possible scenarios

leading to the fire, more than half of them

could have been blocked by some alternatives.

The loss value assumes the aircraft was a B707-300 series aircraft because only those

B707s were "disposed of" in 1979, according to the International Civil Aviation Organization's

Fleet and Personnel for 1979. The loss figure

is based on a standardized approach (see

table C-3).

China Airlines, B707, Jet $ 1.0 This post-crash fire, also cited in the list of

fatal fires, involved rapid spread to the seats

and had a similar fire damage pattern to the

Korean Air incident cited below. It is therefore assumed to be susceptable to sharply

reduced loss through some cabin alterantives

The loss figure is based on a standardized

approach (see table C-3).

Saudi Air, L-1011, Jet $19.0

This in-flight fire also was cited in the list

of fatal fires. The loss figure is based on a standardized approach (see table C-3).

Korean Air, B747, Jet $24.0

This post-crash fire involved very little

impact damage to the aircraft, and Richard

Hill, FAA, estimates there would have been only

minor fire damage if some effective alternative

operating in the cabin had been present. The

loss figure is based on a standardized approach

(see table C-3).

Pakistani International, DC10, Jet $16.6

This incident was cited by Richard Hill, FAA,

as an incident in which an effective cabin

alternative would have prevented most damage.

The loss figure is based on a standardized

approach (see table C-3).

C-2
I

Table C-2. Summary Estimates of Preventable Property

Damage in Aircraft Fires

High Estimate Middle Estimate Low Estimate

U.S. Airlines $ 39.0 million $22.2 million $17.7 million

U.S Airlines

and/or Aircraft $147.3 million $83.8 million $36.7 million

World Airlines $147.3 million $83.8 million $36.7 million

C-3
Table 03. Bases for Estimating Values of Property Damage to Aircraft

Used aircraft prices have been surveyed and summarized at several points

during 1970-1980, and the results are summarized below. Prices have proven

extremely volatile so any attempt to use simple inflation or depreciation

indices is likely to produce results quite at variance with the actual costs

faced by the airlines that lost the aircraft. Instead, an attempt has been

made to set damage values at 80 percent of the midpoint of the 1979-80 range

of used aircraft prices. The 80 percent adjustment is used to account for

value received for salvage and damage (impact or fire) that would not have

been prevented by seat blocking. Even with this formula, some of the aircraft

of interest are missing price data from 1979, 1980 or both. After the source

tables are shown, therefore, the method used to calculate a price figure for

each aircraft type of interest is described.

Aircraft type

1970-75 Values

(millions)

1979 Values

(millions)

1980 Values

(millions)

B707-100/200 $0,742 — —

B707-100B $1,921 — —

B707-300 $1,086 — —

B707-320B $3,408 $4. 2-6.0 $2.5

B707-320C $5,515 $7.5+ $3.0

B747-100 — $28.0-30.0 $25.0-35.0

B747-200B,F,C, & SP $45.0+ $27.0-40.0

B747 (not further split) $18,188 — —

L.— 101 1 — 1 — — $19.0

L-1011-100/200 — $22.5+ $25.0

DC10-10 — $21.5 $20.0

DC10-30/40 — $38.0-43.0 $32.0

C-4
Table C-3 (continued)

Incidents #1 and 5 from table C-l are L-lOlls, series not specified. It

is assumed both are part of the 100/200 series. Eighty percent of the 1979

and 1980 used aircraft prices is $18 and $20 million, respectively, so the

midpoint is $19.0 million. (Harris and Thorpe [69] cite much lower prices for

used L-lOlls - $12 to $15 million, probably reflecting the depressant effect

of the 1982-83 recession.)

Incident // 2 is a B727 , series not specified, but the loss figure provided

indicates the damage, while severe, was far from total. Therefore, that loss

figure is used.

Incidents #3 and 4 are B707s, series not specified, but information on

the Pakistani International fleet Indicates its aircraft were from the 300

series so it was assumed both aircraft were from the 300 series. No 1979-80

data were available for 300 series aircraft, but data were available for the

320B and 320C series. The 320B series prices went down about 5% from 1970-76

to the midpoint of 1979-80, while the 320C series went up about 25%. This

suggests the 300 series prices should be estimated as rising about 15% to

$1.25 million. Eighty percent of that price is $1.0 million.

Incident #6 is a B747, series not specified. It is assumed the aircraft

was from series 100, and the midpoint of the 1979-80 price range is $30.0

million. Eighty percent of that is $24.0 million.

Incident #7 is a DC10, series not specified. It is assumed the aircraft

was from series 10. Eighty percent of the midpoint of the 1979-80 price

range, then, is $16.6 million. (Donoghue [57] give a slightly lower price -

$18 million - for used DClOs, probably reflecting the depressant effect of the

1982-83 recession.)

Sources were:

1970-75 data: Avmark, Inc., Used Aircraft: Who They Came From - Where

They Went, Miami, Florida, December 22, 1975.

1979 data: Bron Rek, Would you buy a second-hand jet?. Flight

International, Vol. 115, March 24, 1979.

1980 data: Bron Rek, "Airliner price guide". Flight International , Vol. 116, September 27, 1980.

C-5

Appendix D

Historical Passenger-Exposure Calculations

Table D-l shows historical passenger-miles on scheduled and non-scheduled

passenger flights for U.S. and worldwide airlines. (As with accidents,

"worldwide" excludes flights and aircraft of the U.S.S.R. and China.) Table

D-2 shows adjustment factors to remove passenger flights in piston aircraft.

Table D-3 shows factors to estimate the percentage of passenger airline

activity in non-U. S. airlines using non-U. S. -built aircraft. And table D-4

shows the estimated totals of scheduled and non-scheduled passenger-miles in

turbine aircraft for flights involving any world airlines, for flights

involving U.S. airlines or U.S. -built aircraft or both, and for flights

involving U.S. airlines only.

D-l
Table D-l. Historical Passenger-Miles (in Billions) for Scheduled

and Nonscheduled Passenger Flights

Year U.S. Airlines World Airlines Year U.S. Airlines World Airlines

1965 76 137 1974 188 409

1966 93 172 1975 185 428

1967 118 210 1976 203 466

1968 139 245 1977 220 512

1969 154 270 1978 252 580

1970 160 288 1979 278 643

1971 162 311 1980 267 645

1972 177 355 1981 260 657

1973 189 397 1982 268 678

Sources

1965, 1970-82: Boeing Company, Dimensions

Seattle, WA, March, 1983.

of Airline Growth,

1966-69, World : International Civil Aviation Organization, Annual

Report to the Council , Montreal, Quebec, Canada,

1966-76. The formula used multiplies scheduledflight passenger miles times an adjustment factor

for non-scheduled flights. That non-scheduledflight factor is itself calculated as a percentage

adjustment factor for non-scheduled-f light tonmiles plus a further adjustment for the difference

between passenger-mile and ton-mile adjustment

factors. The difference (4.5 percentage points) is

calculated from 1971-76 data, the only years for

which ICAO estimated both percentages.

1966-69, U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Reports to Congress:

Fiscal Year 197

, Washington, DC, 1971, Table 1.

D-2
Table D-2. Estimated Percentage of Passenger-Miles on Piston Aircraft

Year Percentage

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

10

75

4

3

2

10

1970-72

1973-80

1981-82

Sources: International Civil Aviation Organization, Annual Report to the

Council , Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1965-82

Air Transport Association of America, Air Transport Facts and

Figures , Washington, DC, Vols. 27-30, 1966-69.

Note: Percentages of world air traffic by type of engine were estimated

only through 1969 and only for ton-miles available on scheduled

flights, not for passenger-miles performed on scheduled plus non- scheduled flights. Using these percentages and statistics on aircraft fleet size by engine type, a least-squares model was solved

to provide estimated ton-miles available on scheduled flights per

aircraft for 1965-69. These indices were then applied to 1970-82

data on fleet sizes to give 1970-82 estimates of the desired

percentages of flight activity by engine type. Figures from the

ATAA, covering U.S. passenger-miles in scheduled aircraft, either

available (1967) or performed (1965, 1966, 1968), are almost

identical with the world figures for that period, suggesting the same percentages can be used for both cases.

D-3
Table D-3. Estimated Percentage of World-Airline, Turbine-Aircraft Traffic

in Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. -Built Aircraft

Year

Estimated

Percentage

for Jets

Percentage

of Activity

in Jets *

Estimated

Percentage

for Turboprop

Percentage

of Activity

in Turboprop * Combined

Percentagi

1965 12 77 48 13 17

1966 11 81 48 12 16

1967 10 84 48 11 14

1968 9 87 48 9 13

1969 8 89 48 8 11

1970 7 90 48 8 10

1971 6 90 48 8 9 1972 6 91 48 7 9

1973 6 92 48 7 9

1974-77 6 93 48 6 9

1978-80 6 94 48 •5 .•

, 8

1981 6 95 48 5 8

1982 6 96 48 4

» .

<*

. - . • 8

* These percentages are based on total passenger aircraft activity, including

piston aircraft. so the percentages may not add to 100 in the earlier years

.

Sources: Benchmark percentages of seats available by aircraft engine type were developed for 1966, 1968, 1972, and 1980, using Air Transport

World's annual listing of fleet inventories by airline and estimated

seats per aircraft, based in part on International Civil Aviation

Organization, Fleet and Personnel , Series FP, November 14, 1980.

The actual percentages were smoothed to produce these estimates but

do not differ by more than five percentage points in any of the

years checked. (See table D-5 for assumptions on typical number of

seats per aircraft.)

D-4
Table D-4 . Total Estimated Passenger-Miles (in Billions), Scheduled and

Non-Scheduled, Jet and Turboprop Only, 1965-1982

U.S. Airlines or Year U.S. Airlines Only U.S. -Built Aircraft World Airlines

1965 68 102 123

1966 86 134 160

1967 112 172 200

1968 133 205 235

1969 149 233 262

1970 157 254 282

1971 159 277 305

1972 173 317 348

1973 187 358 393

1974 186 368 405

1975 183 386 424

1976 201 420 461

1977 218 461 507

1978 249 528 574

1979 275 586 637

1980 264 587 639

1981 260 604 657

1982 268 624 678

Total 3,328 6,616 7,290

Average per Year 185 368 405

1982 Figure as Percentage of 145 170 167

Average per Year

Source: calculated from data in tables D-l, D-2

and D-3

D-5
Table D-5. Assumed Typical Number of Seats Carried on Passenger Flights, by Aircraft Type

r of Seats Aircraft Types

20 DHC-6 , EMB 110, Nord 262, Skyvan

40 F27 , FH227 , HS748, Mystere, all

explicitly shown on this list

50 CV580, CV600, CV640

65 F28 , Viscount, YS11

90 BAC 111, Caravelle, DC9, L-188,

explicitly shown on this list

100 Concorde, CV880, CV990

110 B737, Comet 4

125 B727

130 B707 , B720 , VC10

200 DC8

250 Airbus A-300, DC10, L-1011

340 B747

Source: Estimates based primarily on range of figures on reported seats

flown, by aircraft type, in International Civil Aviation

Organization, Fleet and Personnel , Series FP, Montreal, Quebec,

Canada, November 14, 1980.

D-6
Appendix E

. Forecasts Used in the Cost Models

Table E-l lists the aircraft models covered by each of the nine generic

classes used in the Cost Models. Table E-2 lists the 1982-1997 passenger-mile

and available seat-mile projections used in the analysis, for world and U.S.

airlines. Tables E-3 and E-4 list the statistics, by model class and U.S. versus world airlines, that were used with the formulas presented in section

2.4. Specifically, the variable in the cost formulas that corresponds to the

aircraft inventory operating at the initiation of 1984, is given by the

Original Fleet Size figure. The first row gives the aircraft removed from

service each year. The second row gives the aircraft added each year; it

combines figures on aircraft already ordered or optioned, used aircraft

scheduled to be reintroduced, and other aircraft needed to meet projected

demand. The third row of the table gives the available miles projected per

aircraft for that model class in each year. The fourth row gives the seats

per aircraft.

The operating cost formulas presented in section 2.4.3 require year-byyear forecasts of marginal fuel consumption rates. These will change over

time with the gradual introduction of more efficient aircraft. These forecasts were developed and tested so as to incorporate relationships valid for

minor weight increments of the order of 0.5 percent of total landing weight or less. Alternatives involving weight penalties outside this range would

require additional fuel burn analyses and possibly more complicated marginal

fuel consumption formulas.

Figure E-l is a plot from Hamilton's study of the weighted averages of

marginal fuel consumption (pounds of fuel per pound of added weight per

distance flown) at five-year increments from 1985 to 2000. This relationship

was used in table E-5 to estimate appropriate annual values for the study

period from 1984 to 1997.

Table E-5 provides fuel cost factors needed to calculate the effect of

weight penalties on operating costs. These figures can be combined, for each

aircraft model type, with figures on millions of aircraft-miles flown (based

on miles flown per aircraft and aircraft flying, both given or inferable from

tables E-3 and E-4) and added pounds per aircraft (based on an assessment

specific to the alternative being analyzed). The resulting products can then

be summed to give the changes in operating costs.

E-l
Table E-l. Passenger Aircraft by Generic Class

Short-Range 110 Short-Range 160

BA-146-200 B737-300 DC-9-30RC B727 200 BAC-l 11-200 Caravelle 10B DC-9-40 Super 80

BAC-1 11-300 Caravelle 10R DC-9-50 Mercure

BAC-l 11-400 Caravelle 11R F-28-1000 Trident 3B BAC-1 11-475 Caravelle 12B F-28-2000

BAC-l 11-500 Caravelle 3 F-28-3000

B727-100 Caravelle 6N F-28-4000

B727-IOOC Caravelle 6R F-28-6000

B727-100QC DC-9- 10 Trident 1C B737-100 DC-9-10MC Trident IE

B7 37-200 DC-9-10RC Trident 2E B737-200C DC-9- 20 TU-104

B737-200QC DC-9-30

DC-9-30CF

TU-134

Medium-Range 200

A-310-100 B720 DC-8-30

A-3 10-200 B720B DC-8-40

B707-120 B757-200 DC-8-50

B707-120B B767-200 DC-8-50CF

B707-138B Comet 4 DC-8-62

B707-220 Comet 4B DC-8-6 2CF

B707-320 Comet 4C IL-62

B707-320B Concorde Super VC- 10 B707-320C CV-880 TU-154

B707-420 CV-990A

DC-8-20

VC-10

Medium-Range 270 Long-Range 270

A-300B-1 DC- 10- 10 DC-8-63PF A-300B-600 DC- 10- 30 DC-8-6 3PF

A-300B-2 DC-10-10CF DC-8-7 1 B747-SP DC-10-30CF DC-8-73

A-300B-2K DC-10-15 DC-8-7 1CF B747-200CSCD DC-10-30ER DC-8-7 3CF

A-300B-4 DC-10-30CF DC-8-73 B747-200FSCD DC-10-40 IL-86

A-300B-600 DC- 10-30 DC-8-7 3CF B747-200SCD DC-8-63 L-101 1-500

A-300C-4 DC-10-40 L-lOll-1 DC-8-63CF

B747-SP DC-8-61 L-101 1-100

B747-200CSCD DC-8-6 1CF L-101 1-200

B747-200SCD DC-8-63

DC-8-63CF

L-101 1-500

Medium-Range 400

B7 47-100

B747-100RF

B7 47-100SR

B747-200C

B7 47-200

Long-Range 400

B7 47-100

B747-100RF

B747-200

B747-200C

B747-200R

Medium-Range 600 Long-Range 600

B7 47-300

B747-300C

B747-300

B747-300C

Source: Douglas Aircraft Company, 1983-1997 Outlook for Commercial Aircraft , Long Beach, California, July 1983

E-2
1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Sour

Note

Table E-2. Historical and Projected Passenger-Miles

and Available Seat-Miles, 1982-1997

U.S» Airlines Only World Airlines

Passenger- Available Passenger- Available

Miles Seat-Miles Miles Seat-Miles

267.8 448.5 657.9 1,066.5

285.1 470.1 687.7 1,104.5

301.3 488.9 730.9 1,162.1

320.2 507.1 777.2 1,218.5

335.8 525.8 819.6 1 ,275.2

355.3 550.8 871.3 1,343.4

373.7 575.8 923.8 1,414.2

387.7 594.4 971.7 1,483.0

402.5 613.7 1,022.4 1 ,549.7

419.9 635.6 1,079.7 1,627.4

436.4 658.4 1,138.7 1 ,714.0

453.7 681.0 1,201.6 1,803.0

471.9 704.7 1 ,268.5 1,899.8

491.1 730.8 1,339.8 2,003.5

511.3 757.9 1,415.8 2,114.4

533.0 786.2 1,497.2 2,232.1

Adapted from figures appearing in Douglas Aircraft Company, 1983-1997

Outlook for Commercial Aircraft , Long Beach, California, July 1983.

All figures are in billions.

E-3
Table

E-4.

Inventory,

Activity

and

Descriptive

Statistics

by

Aircraft

Model

Class

WC

n)

cn3o

JZH

CO

QJ

C

C -H

T3

•H CO < Uu

•H

U < o

3:

u

<vC4

oo 'd- 00 in NO 'd- sC CM

O P^ v£> in P^

on cn cn •—* ON cn CM sO

m On P^ in

O ON ON 00 —*

ON

O *—«

On CM ON ‘ f

sO O' <r 00

m sO

No vO CM nO

O 00

m v£> 05 m CM p- ON CM vO in ON in o ON ON 00 ON •—< o ON •—*

CM ON

in CM r^mm cn o M3 CMm o CM in

m

ON cn cn 00 ON sOm ON 00 <r o ON

ON 00 ON r-4 o r-rf ON

—-

CM ON

** *""*

J

'd- <r p* 00

m <r cn r^ ON >d* o <r . m <r ON <r cn p-» ON sO cn m ON <r o ON ON 00 •—*

ON

O r-4 ON

—* CM ON

cn ON ON r^ in cn 00 'd- ON cn o <3- p^

m cn

ON v£> <r oc ON in -dm ONm CM o ON

ON 00 ON

O r-- ON r—<

CM ON

J '

CM 00 sO <t CM 00

m ON l—t CM o n

m CM

ON

m 00 ON vO

m r^

m ONm

O On

ON 00 ON «—* O ON CM ON

r—<

*"* , m CM sO 1^ sD 00 r- in

ON CM 00 ON 00 00 sO in ON

m

OO On ON 00 •—4 ON <—• O ON CM ON o o CM in cn o ON 00 o o cn cn in O ON m ON 00 ON 1— sO m ON 'd* ON o ON

ON i—<

00 r-4 ON

—- O r—^ ON o CM On

«—*

ON 00 o cn CM ON

O r^ o ON o CM 00

m ON

00

m >d* ON f—4 oo ON vO

m 00 in

O 00

ON •—* 00 f—*

ON r-< o ON o CM On

r—*

oo , cn so CM 00 On NO o 00 o CM ON in 00

00 cn r^ sO

—4

00 P^ sOm 00 r^*

m o 00 ON CM •—*

oo On

r-4 o r-< ON o CM ON

r—* *—* m ON n . r^. o cn o o <r O ON

m

00 CO s£> oo p>-

m sO in 00 00 cn o 00 ON r—* 00 •—1 ON r—' o f—

ON o CM ON

*“* ”* *“-

sO oon , vO cn o o ON sO

m in so

00 cn cn x> 00 o CM NO >d- 00O o 00

On CM •—4 00

r-4 On •-* o ON o CM On

•—< 1—• —>r-4 -d* 00

r—t

r-4 W-* cn 00 sD

CM

m sO in

O in <r ON

m i^. CM

m cn vO in

oo 00

n 00 00 in cn <1* CO 00 -—i

CM o 00

CA ON CM 00

w ON o •H ON *—* ON CM ON

•H r-<

•H

r—4 CO I—

<U *r4 V 0) N N N 0) *H <r o CM <JN •H <t r^ CM o r*^ C/3 •d- O cn sO N 'd- CO 00 On SO o (/) 00 cn On CM <d 00 —-

ON CM ON •H 00 ON CM 00 —*

ON o 4H ON ONC/3 ON

u *—* U 0) r-rf »—*

0) 0) 0)

U

<v <1> »-H a; rH r—<

PLi a> &u cn cn in ON CZm cn cn cn p^. cn P^ cn >d- rH cn

00 On cn o 00 in ON -d* rH oo o ON 00 Uj 00

rH ON 00 r— rH ON ON r^ cd ON •—- p>- •—*ON

Cd f—t cd c r—•rH r-^

C c *r4 cd •H -H bO c

bO bO •H •H

•H •rH (-1 bO u 4J 4H 4H o 4-1 4J •H o 4-4 M-4 4-4 4^ 44 44 »-> ”0 cd cd TJ cd cd o T3 cd cd o o 0) u u O a) u u o a) u u > -a u o O > TD o o CM > ~o o u o o In 4 —j o 0) H o a) u u o V

bO

a£ T3 3

f-4 C <UbC e2

T3< 3 33

a)bOC s

<2

~o< 3 32 CM

a>

C lH Li

C

u kt t-4 be

”5 4H 4_) <u <1) <2

4-1

U <D 0)

U

u a; a; c

od 4-1 4-1aa 4-1 UH

a

a UH 4H CLa

cd cd cd cd

g cd cd

u

u 4 C/3 0)U

u Ui CO CO 9 Ui Ui CO CO

u

u

a 0)

u

u

a <u 4J •H CJa <D 4J bO

O 4 4t rH cd

O Ui

u rH cd XJ

H rH cd c

in 33 •Hc 2

<D

C/3 x:C/3 5 5

<D

C/3

X 3

•H<

<D

C/3 orJ oooooooo

cn

43

CMm

•O

<u>Os

<2

4-J 44

COUou

32

E-6

Aircraft

Added

000000000000000

Miles

per

Aircraft

936

1006

981

969

870

779

799

812

830

830

830

830

830

830

830

Seats

per

Aircraft

136

157

161

161

162

163

164

165

165

165

165

165

165

165

165
! o n P"* p>* On m 00 'D O'

O' CN CN O'

1—4

sO <3* CN cn vD On —4 m vO ON ON CN CN 0“N ' 1 'TM4 ** m m 00 00 in O' CN m in 'O ON O' CN CN ON

*“4

<T 00

m r- O' m vD ON O' CN CN ON ' '

cn CN

m vC P"* cn O' v£> m cn 'O ON

O' CN CN ON f“* P"“J '“*

CN O' nt 1—4 CN O' <* CN no ON

O' CN CN ON

«—• *—* / N

CO T3 1—4 VsO r—i O P^ r—< C ON cn •—4 nD ON

cd as CN CN O'

CO *—*

1—4 1—4 /-1\ 3

T3

O

tu0

rC

C_i o CN o

ON CN

O vO ON c ON CN CN ON •H c P •H CO 4-> O U-4 ON cn sfr r*- ON

CO 00 —4 <r 00 vO 00

}_l O' 1—4 CN ON

CJ '* l P w •H

d) <3 00 ON

m CN 00

00 cn vO 00 i—! 5-4 on i—i CN ON £> 0) —4 1—4 1—4 cd a H

CO

0)1 n* O' CN P^~ p^

00 cn

n v.

O 00 1^1 - 1 On 1—4 CN ON

•pi s

v£> P^ NO

00 1—4 CN CN vD 00 O' —4 CN ON

*-4 i—’

1—1

r^m po m <r O' vO

n

0) 00 1—4 1—4 00 n£> PO 00

on o CN ON

1—4

1—1 cn f—4

a; iH N

•H <d CO <r m cn r^- 00 N <

00 1—4 CN vT> NO i-i 00

4J a>

O CN C/1 On

0)

—'

1—4 i-^ a) 4-1 r—1

a)

Cz-i a) cn O vO P^* r-H cn

*—1

00 <frn NOb 00

flJ O' o CN ON C 1—4 *“4 rH 1—4 •H to bO c

•H 1-4

i-i 00 o U 4-1 •H

IM 4-1 P o T3 CO CO O

r^ a;

U

u

CSJ > T? CJ

a

O o Q) i-l u r>-

V 0 -o •H 3

CM b0 <y T) < C od < 0) jg u bO

4J XJ 0)

V

C

4-4 4-|

a

a eg 0 cb CO c2 0 M I-I CO CO *H a CJ a 4J oo

-a

p

U r-H CO c

0) S 3

•H< £

0) CO o

hJ

P^ o cn P^ CN o CN ON ON 1-P m n* ON

NO CN O' 00m

cn o _ <r r>. NO ON CN

^4 cn o n- ON —4

m CN ON

CN ON 00

m *mm4 cn o in in 00 , p^

»—4 m 1—4 p^ ON f—4

vO ON On

r^ CN ON r^- cn

1—4

m

vO cn O' P^ 00 00m

m

CN cn CN On 1—4 in NO ON N CN On r-i cn

^“4 cn

vO in CN cn On CN o p"- cn cn CN p^ ON CN NO CN ON

CN On n- cn fTM4 cn o <r ON NO CN o o o CN CN cn p- On cn NO NO o CN On NO <r

cn

<3- On NO p—

m NO 00

m •—4

CN CN P^ ON cn

m p^l o CN On m

cn

n NO

O cn 00 CN ON

CN —4 ON cn cn 00 o CN ON <

—4 cn

<3“ CN . ON

m vO

m CN 1—4 p^ 00 W—t CN m —i

l>- CN ON cn <• cn

O 00 in p^ 00 ON cn NO o i—i cn •—4 p^ 00 CN cn CN CN ON CNcn

ON CN nO P^I 00 ON ON cn

cn CN p^ 00

m CN

CN ON 1—4

1—4 vO f—4

cn PO

in 00 r^ cn NO cn ON

m

CN o r^. •H 00

m CN

p*- CN ON o <f

1—i a>1—4 cn

N

•H

CO

O

NO o in

m »—1 —4 NO 00

CN CN 00 p^ 4-1 00 1-4 00 CN

W

NO CN at ON ON •H

1—1 CD —4 CN

i"l 0) bi N

•H

r^- NO —4 r-l <r o r>- 00 i—<

CO

—4 00 CO 00 cn cn

NO CN

C ON 00 <r XJ

1—) iH I—1 CN 0) bo <D •H iH P Pn CN On p-4 o cn m <3* cn

—4 oo

O cn rH NO CN o ON Ps <3- 03

1—4 o 1—4 CN

C

-o- •H

a; bC •H bo 14

4-J 4-J c U XJ o

4-4 4-4 eg 4-J 4-1 T3 CO CO OS T3 03 03

O

(1)u

U <D

U i-4O > -a o O bO > T3 o u NO O <D u U c O 0) i-i i-i 0

cS

T3< 3 oJ 0£

T3

T3

<J 3 3

<DbOC

l-l i-i

p

p i-i <5 4J 4-J a> 0) o 4J 4J a) <D

4-4 4-4a

a 4-4 4-4

a o03 cO g 03 03 s

i-t J-4

w c/> 3 u

U 05w 9 V O Q4 XJ •H a U a) XJ •H u t-4 CO -o i-i U fH 03 T3 3

•H

<3 5

a; CO 5

•H< s

<D

C/5

r

r^ o v£> n- o —* r>- v£> On in —4 ON CN cn cn ON 00 m On CN in

'~ml CN

NO o <r in . vOO v£>

m cn

ON <3 —4 ON cn cn ON 00 in ON CN m r~~‘ CN m o 00 p^ m o — . s£> ON cn o ON CN <r CN

ON 00

m ON CNm *-4 CN

<3- o <r o <r o CN oc <r

ON CN o ON CN

—p CN

ON 00 in ON CN

m

CN

cn o CN o v£> cn

O CO O'

ON o 00 O' CN o —4 ON 00 ON CN m

CN

CN o CN 00 CN CN o o O 00 ON p^ ON CN n- o

ON p^ ON 1—4

m

*-* CN , o o p^ 0 6 00

ON cn <r ON 1—4 On ON ON —4 >3- —4 CN o o o n- o 0 9 00 ON cn On On n- ON <r On o *"* 1—4 CN

ON o <r ON 0 3 O cn

00 cn <r 00 v£> vO

On <r ON

O ^-4 1—4 CN

00 o o 00 00 0 4 o CN

00 ON CN 00 v£>

m

ON VlO <r ON o <3* «—4 CN o o o <r 0 4 00 m

00 cn CN 00 cn

ON vO <r ON o <*

CN

NO o 00 <r vO 0 3 O 00

00 cn CN 00 o o

ON

m ON o •‘d’ f—

CN

in o 00

m 0 2 cn CN 00 cn CN .

1 00 00 O

ON in ON O' • 1—4 i—i CO —4 1—4 Cfl •H a>o

a)

u

<r o —4 00 <3*

N <r 0 6 ON in

D

00 cn CN i-l 00 cn on

O

On

m to ON O' cn 03 1 u

1—4

i-i 0) O

a; 4-< cn r—4

00 fp cn ON

00 o CNb 00

O cn

ON sO 'd- ON ON cn 1 f—t —4 rH 1—4 —• W Ac 0) iH i-H bO X)

XJ XJ •H XJ 4-i 03 4-1 4-i P 4-4 4-4 4-J T) CCJ CO o T3 03

0) i-4 i-i a)

U

U c > T3 u CJ o > T3 U a o o i-i i-4 o O 0) u i-i 6

0) T3"O

v£> e -v

a) T3

o2 < 3 ^

<D XJ as < 0) O p i-i bO i-i i-< c

JJ 4-J a) a) c *j

p Q) a) XJ

4-1 4-1a

a eg tp

p

a

a o

to 03 t2

r CO CD o p i-4 (0 w P P Cfi 4-4 o u 0) 4-1 bO o a 0J XJ p i-4 iH <0 c p p i—<

03 3

•H< s

a) CO oJ ^ 5

•H (1) C/5

03

C/5 E-7
Table E-5 Fuel Cost Factors Related to Weight Penalties

Sources

Gallons of

Fuel per Fuel

Added Pounds Price

per Aircraft, per

per Million Gallon

Aircraft-Miles in 1983

Year Flown Dollars

1984 12.92 $0,915

1985 12.79 $0,929

1986 12.66 $0,960

1987 12.53 $0,979

1988 12.40 $0,990

1989 12.27 $0,974

1990 12.15 $0,982

1991 12.02 $0,992

1992 11.85 $1,014

1993 11.71 $1,020

1994 11.56 $1,037

1995 11.44 $1,056

1996 11.31 $1,055

1997 11.18 $1,069

The second-column figures are based on figure E-l, with nautical

miles converted to statute miles and pounds of fuel converted to

gallons of fuel. The fuel price is a product of two indexes from

Wharton Econometrics projections [120,121], applied to a 1983 fuel

price per gallon of $0,913, based on Civil Aeronautic Board Form

41.

E-8
POUND

FUEL

PER

ADDED

POUND

PER

10,000

NAUTICAL

MILES

YEAR

Figure E-l. Sensitivity of Incremental Fuel Consumption to

Increased Weight, 1985-2000

E-9

Appendix F

Annotated Listing of Literature Reviewed

[1] Acumenics, Assessment of the Impact of an ICAO Annex 16, Chapter II,

Non-Addition Rule, Study Report to the Federal Aviation Administration,

July 2, 1981, 220 pages.

Source of the Global Aviation Forecast (GAF) Model, used to project

fuel costs for future years.

[2] Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., Aerospace Facts and

Figures 1982/83 , Washington, DC, August 1982, 168 pages.

[3] Air Registry Board, World Airline Accident Summary , Cheltenham,

England, 1965-1982 examined, about 25 pages per year.

Most inclusive accident listing available. Each accident receives from

one line to several paragraphs of description.

[4] Air Transport Association of America, Air Transport Facts and Figures , Washington, DC, Volumes 27-30 published in 1966-69 were examined,

approximately 50 pages per volume.

[5] Aircraft Accident Report: Air Manila, Incorporated, Lockheed L-188A,

Republic of the Philippines Registry RP-C1061, Guam, Marianas Islands,

June 4, 1976 , NTSB-AAR-77-6 , National Transportation Safety Board,

Washington, DC, September 26, 1977, 25 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[6] Aircraft Accident Report: Alaska Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727, N2969G,

Near Juneau, Alaska, September 4, 1971 , Report Nos. NTSB-AAR-7 2-28 and

SA-429, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

October 13, 1972, 86 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[7 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Allison Prop Jet

Convair 340/440, N5832, New Haven, Connecticut, June 7, 1971 , Report

Nos. SA-427 and NTSB-AAR-7 2-20 , National Transporation Safety Board,

Washington, DC, June 1, 1972, 68 pages.

According to other sources, this was really a CV560 turboprop. Also

examined corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division

of NTSB.

[8 ] Aircraft Accident Report: American Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727, N1996, Near

the Greater Cincinnati Airport, Constance, Kentucky, November 8, 1965 , SA-387, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, DC, October 7, 1966, 27 pages

plus attachment.

F-l
[ 9 ] Aircraft Accident Report: American Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727-95, N1963, St.

Thomas, Virgin Islands, April 27, 1976 , Report No. NTSB-AAR-77-1 , National

Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, December 16, 1976, 69 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[10] Aircraft Accident Report: American Airlines, Inc., DC-10-10, N110AA,

Chicago-0 1 Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, May 25, 1979 , Report

No. NTSB-AAR-79-17 , National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

December 21, 1979, 104 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[11] Aircraft Accident Report: American Flyers Airline Corporation, L-188C,

N183H, Near Ardmore Municipal Airport, Ardmore, Oklahoma, April 22, 1966 , Report No. SA-392, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, DC, April 4, 1967, 23

pages plus attachments.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 12 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Capitol International Airways, Inc. DC-8-63F,

N4909C, Anchorage, Alaska, November 27, 1970 , Report No. NTSB-AAR-72-12,

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, March 29, 1972, 47

pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 13 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Continental Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas

DC-10-10, N68043, Los Angeles, California, March 1, 1978 , Report No.

NTSB-AAR-79-1 , National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

January 25, 1979, 51 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 14 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Delta Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-9-31, N975NE,

Boston, Massachusetts, July 31, 1973 , Report Nos. SA-439 and NTSB-AAR-74-3

,

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, March 7, 1974, 80

pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 15 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Eastern Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727-225, N8845E,

John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, June 24, 1975 , Report No. NTSB-AAR-7 6-8, National Transportation Safety Board,

Washington, DC, March 12, 1976, 59 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

F-2
[16] Aircraft Accident Report: Eastern Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-9-31,

N8984E, Charlotte, North Carolina, September 11, 1974 , Report No.

NTSB-AAR-75-9 , National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

May 23, 1975, 40 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 17 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Eastern Airlines, Inc., L-1011, N310EA, Miami,

Florida, December 29, 1972 , Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-14 , National

Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, June 14, 1973, 51 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[18] Aircraft Accident Report: Mohawk Airlines, Inc., BAC1-11, N1116J, Near

Blossburg, Pennsylvania, June 23, 1967 , National Transportation Safety

Board, Washington, DC, 1967, 65 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 19 ] Aircraft Accident Report: North Central Airlines, Inc., Convair 580,

N2045, O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, December 27, 1968 , Report Nos. SA-409 and NTSB-AAR-70-27 , National Transportation Safety

Board, Washington, DC, November 12, 1970, 54 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 20

]

Aircraft Accident Report: North Central Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas

DC-9-31, N954N and Delta Airlines, Inc., Convair CV-880 , N8807E, O’ Hare

International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, December 20, 1972 , Report No.

NTSB-AAR-73-15, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

July 5, 1973, 44 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 21

]

Aircraft Accident Report: Northeast Airlines, Inc., Fairchild Hiller

FH-227C, N380NE, Near Hanover, New Hampshire, October 25, 1968 , Report No.

SA-408, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

April 1, 1970, 63 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[22] Aircraft Accident Report: Pan American World Airways, Inc., Boeing

707-321B, N454PA, Pago Pago, American Samoa, January 30, 1974 , Report No.

NTSB-AAR-7 4- 15, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

November 8, 1974, 32 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 23

]

Aircraft Accident Report: Saudi Arabian Airlines, Lockheed L-1011,

HZ-AHK, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, August 19, 1980 , Presidency of Civil

Aviation, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, January 16, 1982, 188 pages.

F-3
[ 24 ] Aircraft Accident Report: Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., Boeing 727-200,

N8790R, Harry S. Truman Airport, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin

Islands, December 28, 1970 , Report No. NTSB-AAR-72-8 , National

Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, December 29, 1971, 56 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 25

Aircraft Accident Report: Trans World Airlines, Inc., B707, N742TW, The

Greater Cincinnati Airport, Erlanger, Kentucky, November 6, 1967 , Report

No. SA-401, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

September 11, 1968, 56 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[26] Aircraft Accident Report: Trans World Airlines, Inc., Convair 880,

N821TW, Constance, Kentucky, November 20, 1967 , Report No. SA-402,

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, August 27, 1969,

58 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 27

Aircraft Accident Report: United Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727, N7030U, Salt

Lake City, Utah, November 11, 1965 , Report No. SA-388, Civil Aeronautics

Board, Washington, DC, June 7, 1966, 15 pages plus attachments.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[ 28

Aircraft Accident Report: United Airlines, Inc., Boeing 737, N9031U,

Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, December 8, 1972 , Report No.

NTSB-AAR-73-16, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC,

August 29, 1973, 67 pages.

Also corresponding unpublished report from Human Factors Division of NTSB.

[29] Aircraft Fire Safety , AGARD Conference Proceedings, AGARD-CP-166 , Advisory

Group for Aerospace Research and Development, North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, Neuilly sur Seine, France, October 1975, 28 papers.

Includes paper by A. F. Taylor with estimates of accidents involving

fatalities attributable to fire. Also includes paper by W.D. Weatherford,

Jr. and B.R. Wright on research and antimist engine fuels.

[30] Aircraft manufacturers warned of hazard from burning plastic, Aviation

Daily , Vol. 205, No. 17, January 24, 1973, p. 134.

Quotes Cook County coroner as saying cyanide levels were lethal in three

victims of December 20, 1972 accident in Chicago and seven victims of

December 8, 1972 accident in Chicago.

[31] Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report , Vol. XIV, Civil

Aeronautics Board, Washington, DC, July 1980, 130 pages.

F-4
[32] Airport Crash/Fire/Rescue (CFR) Service Cost and Benefit Analysis , NASA-LS-39422 , Vol. 1, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC,

October 1978, 142 pages.

[33] Alia (The Royal Jordanian Airlines), Dart Herald, JY-ACQ, accident on Kanisa Mountain, Syrian Arab Republic, on April 10, 1965, Report (undated)

released by the Directorate of Aviation Safety, Directorate General of

Civil Aviation, Ministry of Defence, Syrian Arab Republic, Airline

Accident Digest , Circular 88-AN/74, No. 17, Vol. 1, International Civil

Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1968, pp. 72-76.

[34] R.L. Alpert, M.K. Mathews and A.T. Modak, Modeling of Ceiling Fire Spread

and Thermal Radiation , Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-81 /70 , Final Report, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, October 1981, 105 pages.

[35] Avmark, Inc., Transport Aircraft Values, 1970-1984 , Miami, FL, 1976,

142 pages.

Forecasts of used aircraft prices. This report was not available to be

examined but includes a formula for prices. Note that actual prices have

been extremely volatile, year-to-year, since the mid-1970's.

[36] Avmark, Inc., Used Aircraft: Who They Came From - Where They Went , Miami, FL, December 22, 1975, 52 pages.

Source of information on used aircraft prices for 1970-75, overall and

by year, by selling airline and by receiving airline, for U.S.

airlines.

[37] Bimonthly fire record, Fire Journal , Vol. 68, November 1974, pp. 63 ff.

[38] Bimonthly fire record, Fire Journal , Vol. 74, March 1980, pp. 17 ff.

[39] H.C. Black, Jet airplanes - a summary of accident experience with

particular reference to crash fires, Paper given to Conference on Transport Category Airplane Post-Crash Fuel Systems Fire and Explosion

Hazard Reduction, Washington, DC, June 13-17, 1977.

Cited in personal communication by Wayne Smoot, Federal Aviation

Administration, as a source of information on fatal accidents with

post-impact fires. It has not been examined in this project.

According to Smoot’s listing of incidents, Black’s report does not add

incidents or information on incidents beyond what was available in the

references examined in this report.

[40] Boeing Company, Current Market Outlook , Boeing Company, Seattle, WA,

March 1983, 30 pages.

[41] Boeing Company, Dimensions of Airline Growth , Boeing Company, Seattle, WA,

March 1983, 76 pages.

Historical and forecast statistics on aircraft usage for jet aircraft

models.

F-5
[42] Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, World Jet Airplane Inventory at

Year-End 1982 , Boeing Company, Seattle, WA, 1983, 76 pages.

Particularly of interest for the tables showing year-end jet airplane

inventories for U.S. versus non-U. S. owners and operators for every

year from 1960 to 1982.

[43] British European Airways, Vanguard, G-APEE, accident at London

(Heathrow) on 27 October 1965, Report (undated) released by the Board

of Trade, United Kingdom, C.A.P. 270, Airline Accident Digest , Circular

88-AN/74, No. 17, Vol. Ill, International Civil Aviation Organization,

Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1969, pp. 77-82.

[44] British Overseas Airways Corporation, Boeing 707-465, G-ARWE, accident

at Heathrow Airport, London, England, on 8 April 1968, Report No.

EW/C/0203 (dated April 1969) released by the Board of Trade, United

Kingdom as C.A.P. 324, Airline Accident Digest , circular 96-AN/79,

No. 18, Vol. II, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal,

Quebec, Canada, 1971, pp. 79-120.

[45] Louis J. Brown, Jr., Cabin Hazards From a Large External Fuel Fire

Adjacent to an Aircraft Fuselage , Final Report No. FAA-RD-79-65

,

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, August 1979, 50 pages.

[46] Louis J. Brown, Jr. and Richard M. Johnson, Correlation of LaboratoryScale Fire Test Methods for Seat Blocking Layer Materials with LargeScale Test Results , Final Report DOT/FAA/CT-83/29 , Federal Aviation

Administration, Atlantic City, NJ , June 1983, 65 pages.

[47] Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd., Douglas DC-8, CF-CPK, accident at Tokyo

International Airport, Tokyo, Japan, on 4 March 1966, Report released

by the Civil Aviation Bureau, Ministry of Transport, Japan on

4 March 1968, Airline Accident Digest , Circular 96-AN/79, No. 18,

Vol. I, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec,

Canada, 1970, pp. 37-50.

[48] Civil Aeronautics Board, Reports to Congress: Fiscal Year 1971 , Washington, DC, 1971, 128 pages.

[49] Civil Air Transport, Boeing 727-92C, B-1018, accident at Linkuo, near Taipei, Taiwan, on 16 February 1968, Report (not dated) released by the

Civil Aeronautics Administration, Republic of China, Airline Accident

Digest , Circular 96-AN/79, No. 18, Vol. II, International Civil

Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, pp. 56-62.

[50] Collision Aeronaves - Boeing 747 PH-BUF de KLM y Boeing N737PA de Pan

Am en los rodeos (Tenerife) el 27 Marzo de 1977, Joint Accident Report

by KLM and Pan American Airways, 12.7.1978.

Description of the two-aircraft accident and fire at the Canary Islands

on March 27, 1977.

F-6
[ 51 ] A. Cominsky et al , Study of Aircraft Crashworthiness for Fire

Protection , NASA CR-166159, prepared by McDonnell Douglas Corporation

for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Long Beach, CA,

January 1981, 121 pages.

A brief overview of crash scenarios and crash fire safety concepts is

joined to the most thorough listing and description of post-crash fires

to this date. This report covers incidents from 1961 through mid-1978

and has the most credible estimates available in overview reports of

the split between fire and crash-trauma fatalities.

[52] Coordinating Research Council, Aviation Fuel Safety - 1975, Report No.

482, Atlanta, GA, November 1975, 129 pages.

Includes numerous analyses of survivability with worldwide data base,

but information on individual incidents generally is limited to one

line each.

[53] Crash Survival Design Guide , USAAMRDL Technical Report 71-22, U.S. Army,

Fort Eustis, VA, October 1971, 373 pages.

[54] M.A. Delichatsios , et al , Computer Modeling of Aircraft Cabin Fire

Phenomena , First Year Report, Factory Mutual Research, Norwood, MA, no date, 68 pages.

[55] James Demaree, Examination of Aircraft Interior Emergency Lighting in a Postcrash Fire Environment , Final Report DOT/FAA/CT-82/55 , Federal

Aviation Administration, Atlantic City, NJ, June 1982, 50 pages.

[56] Development of an Algorithm and Data Gathering tor Aircraft Seats,

Unpublished Final Report to National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

Econ, Inc., San Jose, CA, August 31, 1981, pages not numbered.

[57] J.A. Donoghue, Airframers enter a new arena, buying and selling used

airplanes, Air Transport World , Vol. 20, No. 7, July 1983, pp. 25-28.

Discussion includes reference to the average price of used DC-lOs as $18

million.

[58] Douglas Aircraft Company, 1983-1997 Outlook for Commercial Aircraft , Long

Beach, CA, July 1983, 61 pages.

[59] Won Dukko and Kumar Ramohalli, Application of Thermochemical Modeling to

Aircraft Interior Polymeric Materials , Final Report DOT/FAA/CT-82/83

,

Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City, NJ, June 1982, 64 pages.

[60] Carolyn Edwards, An Analysis of Aviation Safety Information , U.S. Department

of Transportation, Washington, DC, 1975, 41 pages.

Analyses limited to U.S. aircraft and airlines, no information on individual accidents.

F-7
[61] Thor I. Eklund and Joseph A. Wright, Fuel Fire Hazard Penetration into

a Model Fuselage as a Function of Circumferential Door Location and

Fuel Bed Heights , NAFEC Report No. FAA-NA-80-9, Federal Aviation

Administration, Atlantic City, NJ, May 1980, 38 pages.

[62] Howard W. Emmons, The Ingestion of Flames and Fire Gases into a Hole in an Aircraft Cabin for Small Tilt Angles and Low Wind Speeds , Home Fire

Project Technical Report No. 49, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,

October 1981, 19 pages.

[63] J.H. Enders and E.C. Wood, Final Report of the Special Aviation Fire

and Explosion Reduction Advisory Committee , prepared by the SAFER

Advisory Committee for the U.S. Department of Transportation,

Washington, DC, June 26, 1980, 82 pages.

A major consensus document on technical options for improving airline

fire survivability.

[64] FAA Aviation Forecasts - Fiscal Years 1983-1994 , Report No.

FAA-AP0-83-1 , Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC,

February 1983, 72 pages.

[65] Fire Resistant Seat Cushions, Unpublished Final Report by Aerospace

Industries Association of America, Transport Airworthiness Requirements

Committee, Washington, DC, June 14, 1983, 68 pages.

[66] P.N. Garuda Indonesian Airways, Lockheed Electra L-188C, PK-GLB,

accident at Mapanget Airport, Menado , Indonesia, on 16 February 1967,

Report (not dated) released by the Civil Air Transport Board, Ministry

of Communications, Indonesia, Airline Accident Digest , Circular

107-AN/81, No. 19, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal,

Quebec, Canada, 1973, pp. 108-116.

[67] John K. Graham and James W. Vaupel, Value of a life: what difference

does it make?. Risk Analysis , Vol. I, No. 1, March 1981, pp. 89-95.

Overview of values attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to a statistical life saved in a large number of governmental actions.

[68] Lauren Graham, Research into post-crash fires, SAFE Journal , Vol. VII,

No. 4, Winter 1977, pp. 26-29.

[69] Roy J. Harris, Jr. and Norman Thorpe, Commercial-jet makers are trying

to cut big stockpile of used planes. Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCII,

No. 11, July 18, 1983, p. 23.

Cites used aircraft prices of "less than $2 million" for B727s and

$15-20 million for L-lOlls.

[70]

Richard Hill, Paul N. Boris and George R. Johnson, Aircraft Cabin

Compartmentation Concepts for Improving Postcrash Fire Safety , Final

Report FAA-RD-7 6-131 , Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City,

NJ, October 1976, 74 pages.

F-8
[71] Richard G. Hill, George R. Johnson and Constantine P. Sarkos, Postcrash

Fuel Fire Hazard Measurements in a Wide-Body Aircraft Cabin , Final

Report FAA-NA-79-42 , Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City,

NJ, December 1979, 95 pages.

[72] Stefan N. Hoffer, Economic Analysis of Investment and Regulatory

Decisions - A Guide , Report No. FAA-APO-82-1 , Federal Aviation

Administration, January 15, 1982, 139 pages.

Includes formulas for cost-benefit analyses of regulatory decisions,

including references to OPM’ s official discount rate of 10 percent.

[73] Thomas G. Horeff, A Crashworthiness Analysis with Emphasis on the Fire

Hazard: U.S. and Selected Foreign Turbine Aircraft Accidents, 1964-1974 , FAA-RD-75-1 56 , prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation,

Washington, DC, July 1976, 162 pages.

Attributes far more fatalities to fire than the Cominsky report,

principally by attributing one-fourth of all fatalities to fire in all

incidents with poor inf ormation.

[74] Indian Airlines Corporation, Caravelle, VT-DPP, accident at Palam Airport,

India, on 15 February 1966, Report No. 1/7/66-AS, dated 5 October 1967,

released by the Director General of Civil Aviation, India, Airline

Accident Digest , Circular 88-AN/74, No. 17, Vol. II, International Civil

Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1969, pp. 64-74.

[75] International Civil Aviation Organization, Aircraft Accident Digest , Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1965-present examined, Vol. 24 released in 1982

is the latest volume in print, about 200-250 pages per volume.

Digests of national accident reports for selected international aircraft

accidents. See citations for individual accidents examined.

[76] International Civil Aviation Organization, Annual Report to the Council , Montreal, Quebec, Canada, volumes for 1965-1981 examined, about 200 pages

per volume.

One of two major ICAO reports giving summary information on finances,

activities, equipment and personnel of the world’s airlines.

[77] International Civil Aviation Organization, Civil Aviation Statistics of

the World , Document 9180 series, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1st edition

(1975) through 6th edition (1980) examined, 132-164 pages.

One of the two major ICAO reports giving summary information on finances,

activities, equipment and personnel of the world’s airlines.

F-9
[ 78 ] International Civil Aviation Organization, Fleet-Personnel , Series FP,

Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1980 and 1981 editions examined, approximately

200 pages per volume.

Statistics, by country, airline and aircraft type, on fleet inventory,

numbers of seats per aircraft, departures and hours flown. There are numerous missing entries, and individual entries are not always consistent

with totals, but this is the best available source for information on actual numbers of seats used in practice, by aircraft type.

[79] Japan Airlines, DC-8-62, JA-8040, accident at Moskva/ Sheremetievo, USSR,

on 28 November 1972, Report (not dated) released by the Deputy Minister of

Civil Aviation of the USSR, Airline Accident Digest , Circular 132-AN/93,

No. 21, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec,

Canada, 1977, pp. 22-26.

[80] N.B. Johnson and S.H. Robertson, Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide,

Volume V - Aircraft Postcrash Survival , Report No. USARTL-TR-79-22E , Final

Report, U.S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories, Fort Eustis, VA,

January 1980, 224 pages.

An overview of provisions and how they operate.

[81] Jordan A. Greene and Associates, Jordan Greene's Aircraft Marketletter

:

Commercial Jet Transports, Avmark Services, Inc., Miami, FL, July and

August 1983 examined.

Source of current information on market values of used aircraft.

[82] Ward L. Keech, Economic Values for Evaluation of Federal Aviation

Administration Investment and Regulatory Programs , Report No.

FAA-APO-81-3 , Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC,

September 1981, 79 pages.

Includes recommended values for loss of life ($530,000), serious injury

($38,000), minor injury ($15,000), and costs of replacement or restoration

of eight types of turbine powered air carriers. Replacement costs are roughly comparable with used aircraft prices cited by Rek (1979) and Rek

(1980).

[83] KLM, B-747, PH-BUF and Pan Am, B-747, N736, collision at Tenerife Airport,

Spain, on 27 March 1977, Report (dated October 1978) released by the

Subsecretaria de Aviacion Civil, Spain, Airline Accident Digest , Circular

153-AN/56, No. 23, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal,

Quebec, Canada, 1980, pp. 22-68.

[84] D.A. Kourtides et al, Optimization of Aircraft Seat Cushion Fire Blocking

Layers , Final Report DOT/FAA/CT-82-132 , prepared by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration for the U.S. Department of

Transportation, Moffett Field, CA, March 1983, 209 pages.

Cost/weight effectiveness model and algorithm are presented. Several new

results on various blocking materials and configuration also are presented.

F-10
[ 85 ] L.M. Krasner, Study of Hand-Held Fire Extinguishers Aboard Civil Aviation

Aircraft , DOT/FAA/CT--82/42 , prepared by Factory Mutual Research

Corporation for U.S. Department of Transportation, Norwood, MA, June 1982,

57 pages.

[86] Letter to John Hall, Center for Fire Research, National Bureau of

Standards from R.L. Sears, Product Safety, Boeing Commercial Airplane

Company, August 29, 1983, 14 pages.

This letter provided additional information on eight post-crash fire

accidents and cited six previously unknown ramp fires. None of the latter

appeared to be susceptible to prevention by seat blocking.

[87] Letters to Wayne Stiefel, Center for Fire Research, National Bureau of

Standards, from John N. Feren, Manager of Tactical Analysis, Douglas

Aircraft Company, July 18, 1983 and August 18, 1983, 25 and 7 pages.

[88] Letter to William J. Sullivan, Federal Aviation Administration, from

William R. Kirkham and Delbert R. Lacefield, Civil Aeromedical Institute,

November 28, 1977.

Includes their proposed formulas for lethal and incapacitating

combinations of cyanide and carboxyhemoglobin in blood. Since cyanide is

taken as evidence of involvement of interior materials, the formulas can

be used to infer which fatalities had lethal levels that would have been

non-lethal or non-incapacitating if there had been no cyanide.

[89] Simon F. Lister and Gordon Raisbeck, An Approach to the Establishment of

Practical Air Traffic Control Safety Goals , Report No. FAA-RD-7 1-36

,

Interim Report, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC,

May 1971, 64 pages.

Includes a listing of mortality risk levels for selected activities, all

expressed per 10 million exposure hours. Scheduled domestic airline

passenger service is 16.0. The others range from 0.45 (factory worker) to

290.0 (general aviation - passenger and crew).

[90] G.V. Lucha, M.A. Robertson and F.A. Schooley, An Analysis of Aircraft

Accidents Involving Fires , NASA CR-137690, prepared by Stanford Research

Institute for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Stanford,

CA, May 1975, 147 pages.

One of the first efforts to develop a baseline data base on post-crash

fires, this report provides table-entry documentation on individual

incidents from 1963-1974 U.S. airline experience. It also develops

statistics and formulas (now ten years old) for aircraft costs and

depreciation, based primarily on take-off weight, which the authors state

accounted for 96 percent of the variation in cost. Unlike later reports,

this does not present a detailed discussion of risk-reducing systems and

their costs and benefits, but it provides a great deal of information

useful in preparing an initial data base of fire-related losses.

F-ll
[91] Lufthansa, Boeing 747, D-ABYD, accident at Nairobi, Kenya, on

20 November 1974, Report No. CAV/ACC/26/74 (dated July 1976) released by

the Accident Investigation Branch, East African Community, Airline

Accident Digest , Circular 132-AN/93, No. 21, International Civil Aviation

Organization, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1977, pp. 181-194.

[92] Charles D. MacArthur, Dayton Aircraft Cabin Fire Model, Version 3, Volumes

I and II - Physical Description and Program User's Guide and Appendices,

DOT/FAA/CT-81 /69-I and II, Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City,

NJ, June 1982, 52 and 204 pages.

[93] Major Aircraft Fires , Proceedings of a Symposium by the Ministry of

Technology and Fire Officers' Committee Joint Fire Research Organization,

Borehamwood, Herts, United Kingdom, December 9, 1966, Her Majesty's

Stationary Office, London, England, 1967, 101 pages.

[94] Mitre Corporation, Preliminary Analysis of Civil Aviation Accidents,

January 1964 - December 1972 , FAA-AVP-75-2 , prepared for the U.S.

Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, April 1975, 140 pages.

Listings of accidents and analyses are limited to U.S. -site accidents.

Detailed descriptions (1-2 paragraphs) are limited to accidents involving

five or more fatalities.

[95] K.R. Mniszewski et al, Fire Management/ Suppression Systems/Concepts

Relating to Aircraft Cabin Fire Safety , Final Report, prepared by IIT

Research Institute and Gage Babcock & Associates for the U.S. Department

of Transportation, Chicago, IL, July 1982, 134 pages plus appendices.

This report examines a variety of systems for reducing losses occurring in

post-crash, in-flight, and ground fires. Systems are divided into

suppression-oriented, smoke control, thermal hardening and emergency

evacuation. Of particular interest is an assessment of the likely impact

of each system on deaths, injuries and losses, for each accident and

overall. Their historical data base covers 1967 through 1978. The

alternative defined as reduced "flammability of interior finish and

combustibility of seating" was found to have an estimated cost per

fatality prevented of $2.8 million and an overall cost-to-benef it ratio of

5.58. The data base is primarily confined to accidents occurring on or near the territory of the U.S. A. or its possessions, but there are two

exceptions. Their cumulative assessment of the likely impact of seat

blocking on fatalities is roughly equal to our Medium-Save estimates,

although the estimates for individual accidents vary considerably.

[96] National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences, Fire Safety

Aspects of Polymeric Materials: Volume 6: Aircraft; Civil and Military , Report of the Committee on Fire Safety Aspects of Polymeric Materials to

the National Materials Advisory Board, •Commission on Sociotechnical

Systems, Washington, DC, 1977, 257 pages.

Includes listings of fire-related incidents, including one of the more

complete, better documented lists of ground fire incidents.

F-12
[ 97 ] 1974 large-loss fires in the United States, Fire Journal , Vol. 69,

September 1975, pp. 13 ff.

[98] W.J. Parker, An Assessment of Correlations Between Laboratory and Full

Scale Experiments for FAA Aircraft Fire Safety Program, Part 3; ASTM

E 84 , NBSIR 82-2564, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC,

January 1983, 52 pages.

[99] W.J. Parker, An Assessment of Correlations Between Laboratory and FullScale Experiments for the FAA Aircraft Fire Safety Program, Part 6:

Reduced-Scale Modeling of Compartments at Atmospheric Pressure , NBSIR

82-2598, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC, March 1983, 50

pages.

[100] Randall Pozdena, Forecasts of Aircraft Activity by Altitude, World Region

and Aircraft Type , Report No. FAA-AVP-76-18 , Federal Aviation

Administration, Washington, DC, November 1976, 132 pages.

[101] James G. Quintiere, An Assessment of Correlations Between Laboratory and

Full-Scale Experiments for the FAA Aircraft Fire Safety Program: Parts 1 (Smoke), 2 (Rate of Energy Release in Fire) and 4 (Flammability Tests) , NBSIR 82-2508, 82-2536, and 82-2525, National Bureau of Standards,

Washington, DC, July 1982, 53, 24 and 27 pages.

[102] James G. Quintiere and Takeyoshi Tanaka, An Assessment of Correlations

Between Laboratory and Full-Scale Experiments for the FAA Aircraft Fire

Safety Program, Part 5: Some Analyses of the Post Crash , NBSIR 82-2537,

National Bureau of Standards, July 1982, 25 pages.

[103] Bron Rek, Airliner price guide, Flight International , Vol. 118, No. 3725,

September 27, 1980, pp. 1272-1273.

A follow-up survey of new and used aircraft prices for major aircraft

models.

[104] Bron Rek, Would you buy a second-hand jet?, Flight International , Vol. 115, No. 3653, March 24, 1979, pp. 910-912.

Results of a survey of new and used aircraft prices for major aircraft

models.

[105] Safety record of short/medium-haul jets better than wide-bodies, Air

Transport World , Vol. 17, No. 8, August 1980, pp. 57 ff.

[106] Constantine P. Sarkos, Comments on Subgroup 1, Appendix A, Aircraft

Accident/ Incident Fire Experience, T. Horeff Trip Report, May 22-27, 1978,

Memorandum to AFS140, July 10, 1978.

Includes Sarkos’ proposed formula for estimating when interior materials

were involved in a fire fatality, based on blood cyanide levels.

F-13
[107] Constantine P. Sarkos and Richard G. Hill, Effectiveness of Seat Cushion

Blocking Layer Materials Against Cabin Fire, SAE Technical Paper Series

821484, Warrendale, PA, 1982, 9 pages.

Summary descriptions of results of tests on seat blocking materials.

Extra escape times, relative to unprotected cushion, are provided for

Norfab, Vonar and non-combustible foam. Photographs also are included.

[108] Constantine P. Sarkos, Richard G. Hill and Wayne D. Howell, The

Development and Application of a Full-Scale Wide-Body Test Article to

Study the Behavior of Interior Materials During a Post Crash Fuel Fire,

Journal of Fire and Flammability , Vol. 13, July 1982, pp. 172-202.

[109] Constantine P. Sarkos, Richard G. Hill and Wayne D. Howell, The

Development and Application of a Full-Scale Wide-Body Test Article to

Study the Behavior of Interior Materials During a Post Crash Fuel Fire,

Paper reprinted from Lecture Series No. 123 on Aircraft Fire Safety, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and

Development, Neuilly sur Seine, France, June 1982, 21 pages.

A report similar to the Agard paper by Sarkos and Hill but giving more

attention to the test methods as opposed to the system being tested. It

cites an FAA study of 1964-74 accidents that found 39% of fatalities in

survivable accidents were attributable to fire.

[110] John J. Smith, Regulatory Evaluation - Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and

Trade Impact Assessment: Flammability Requirements for Aircraft Seat

Cushions, Unpublished Report, Federal Aviation Administration,

Washington, DC, July 1983, 28 pages.

[111] Clyde C. Snow, John J. Carroll and Mackie A. Allgood, Survival in

Emergency Escape from Passenger Aircraft , AM 70-16, Federal Aviation

Administration, Washington, DC, October 1970, 61 pages.

The most thorough examination found of factors affecting ability to use extra escape time, time required to escape, and related matters, studied

through analysis of three accidents, the 1965 Salt Lake City accident and

two pre-1965 accidents.

[112] R.G. Snyder, Advanced Techniques in Crash Impact Protection and Emergency

Egress from Air Transport Aircraft , AGARD-AG-221 , Advisory Group for

Aerospace Research and Development, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Neuilly sur Seine, France, June 1976, 320 pages.

Analysis of 1964-75 air transport accidents in NATO-member countries; very

limited information on individual accidents.

[113] A Study of U.S Air Carrier Accidents, 1964-1969 , NTSB-AAS-72-5 , National

Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, May 10, 1972, 383 pages.

F-14
[114] A.F. Taylor, Fire, Fuel and Survival: A Study of Transport Aircraft

Accidents, 1955-1974, Aircraft Fire Safety , AGARD Conference Proceedings,

AGARD-CP-166 , Paper #26, Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and

Development, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Neuilly sur Seine,

France, October 1975.

Covers fatal fire incidents through 1974 with little detail listed per

incident and tends to estimate fire fatalities higher than other sources,

such as Cominsky (1981).

[115] Linda Gay Thompson, Seat Cushion Design User’s Manual, Unpublished Report

by Informatics, Inc., Palo Alto, CA, May 22, 1982, pages not numbered.

[116] Turkish Airlines, F-28, TC-JAO, accident at Izrair/Cumaovasi , Turkey, on

26 January 1974, Report No. T-5-199 (not dated) released by the Ministry

of Communications, Turkey, Airline Accident Digest , Circular 132-AN/93,

No. 21, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec,

Canada, 1977, pp. 109-115.

[117] U.S. Air Carrier Accidents Involving Fire, 1965 Through 1974, and Factors

Affecting the Statistics , NTSB Special Study NTSB-AAS-77-1 , National

Transportation Safety Board, 1977, 62 pages.

[118] Varig Airlines, DC-8, PP-PEA, accident at Roberts International Airport,

Charlesville, Marshall Territory, Liberia, on 5 March 1967, Summary of

Aircraft Report dated 13 September 1967, released by the Commission of

Inquiry, Department of Commerce and Industry, Republic of Liberia, Airline

Accident Digest , Circular 88-AN/74, No. 17, Volume II, International Civil

Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1969, pp. 142-150.

[119] Varig, Boeing 707, PP-VJ2 , accident near Paris/Orly, France, on

11 July 1973, Report (dated December 1975) released by Secretariat d'Etat

aux Transports, France, Airline Accident Digest , Circular 132-AN/93,

No. 21, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Quebec,

Canada, 1977, pp. 68-78.

[120] Wharton Econometrics, Extension to the Year 2002 , Philadelphia, PA,

August 1983.

[121] Wharton Econometrics, The Wharton Long-Term Model , Philadelphia, PA,

June 1983.

F-15

Appendix G

Data Sources and Calculations for Sample Application of Models

to Fire-Blocking of Aircraft Seats

Tables G-l through G-3 indicate the expected lives saved as a function of

the extra escape time provided, for each fatal accident listed in tables

1-3. The evidence supporting these functions is contained in the detailed

accident descriptions in appendix A. The savings functions for the individual

accidents are combined together in table G-4, and table G-5 converts these

totals to savings functions appropriate for 1982 exposure levels, using the

conversion factors given in section 2.2.2.

Table G-6 provides actual savings for the escape time values considered

in the analysis. Note that 20 seconds is less than half the lower of the

escape time values obtained in testing and probably is less than the time that

would be provided by any blocking material that would be approved by FAA.

Note that 180 seconds is the upper limit of interest; at that point, everyone

who could have been saved would have been saved. Note that the lives saved

using U.S. airlines and/or U.S. aircraft are consistently within two percent

of the savings for the world airline case, regardless of the actual escape

time provided. The two cases are so similar that it is not useful to pursue

the analysis of the U.S./U.S. case any further. Table G-7 provides further

comparisons of the relative savings for different escape-time values.

Table G-8 describes the design characteristics of the three existing

materials considered in the analysis. Manufacturer B stated that the

cotton/muslin scrim was unnecessary for both materials 2 and 4, permitting

additional cost and weight reduction.

Table G-9 gives the data collected on incremental materials, installation, and fabrication costs and weight penalties. Manufacturers A and B were

asked to assume a high production situation in computing these costs. Table

G-10 converts that data into high, middle and low estimates of the cost per

seat, not including operating costs, and the incremental weight-per-seat

.

These calculations, combined with the formulas given in sections 2.4.2

and 2.4.3, do not yet suffice to produce high, middle and low estimates of

year-by-year costs of creating and maintaining a seat-blocked fleet and of

operating such a fleet. The missing elements are the number of seats per

aircraft, by aircraft type (given in appendix E) and the phase-in and refurbishment cycles. A fixed three-year refurbishment cycle was used, based upon

discussions with seat manufacturers. In practice, refurbishment cycles are determined by marketing considerations and vary from carrier to carrier.

Also, seat backs are less prone to soiling and wear than seat bottoms. A

three-year cycle was used because no information was available to support a more complicated formula.

On the basis of discussions with FAA and seat manufacturers, we assume

that seat blocking would be phased in during a normal three-year refurbishment

cycle and that replacement or refurbishment of the blocker will cost as much

as the initial cost of creating and installing it. Manufacturer A said time

studies might show savings in refurbishment, but until such studies were made

no adequate estimate could be made. Manufacturer B raised the possibility

G-l
that blockers might last through two seat refurbishment cycles. Tables G— 1

and G-12 show the schedules of new seat blocking (initially for new and

existing aircraft, later only for new aircraft) and seat blocker refurbishment

for U.S. and world airlines, respectively, assuming blocker refurbishment will

follow the same schedule as normal seat refurbishment. Table G-13 examines

the effects if blockers are durable enough to last six years between refurbishments. Questions remain concerning the potential for deterioration of

material 2 or its fire blocking properties if it is kept in use through two

refurbishment cycles.

G-2
Table G-l. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking, 1965-82

U.S. Airlines

Note: T is the number of extra seconds of escape time provided by seat blocking.

It is assumed that any version of seat blocking will provide at least 20 extra seconds.

Estimated Estimated Number of Persons Saved

Date Description

Fire

Fatalities

High

Estimate

Middle

Estimate

Low Estimate

1. 11/8/63 American, B727, Jet Near Constance, KY

36 0 0 0

2. 11/11/65 United, B727, Jet

Salt Lake City, UT

43 1 l+T , if T<29

40, if T>29

1 l+T, if T<27

38, if T>_27 7+T , if T<2330, if T>23

3. 4/22/66 American Flyers, L-188,

Turboprop, Ardmore, OK

15 15 15 0

4. 6/23/67 Mohawk, BAC-lll, Jet Blossburg, PA

34 0 0 0

5. 6/12/68 Pan American, B707, Jet India

6 0 0 0

6. 11/27/70 Capitol International,

DC8, Jet, Anchorage, AK

47 47 15 10

7. 12/28/70 Trans-Caribbean, B727,

Jet, St. Thomas, Virgin

Islands

2 0 0 0

8. 6/7/71 Allegheny, CV580, 27 Turboprop, New Haven, CT T/2 , if T<54

27, if T>54

5 1

9. 12/8/72 United, B737, Jet Chicago, IL 30 7 7 0

10. 12/20/72 North Central, DC9,

Jet, Chicago, IL

10 9 7 3

11. 7/22/73 Pan American, B707,

Jet, Tahiti

79 0 0 0

12. 1/30/74 Pan American, B707,

Jet, Pago Pago,

American Samoa

95 6+T, if T<88

94, if T>88

6+T, if T<4

47, if T>41

0

13. 9/11/74 Eastern, DC9 , Jet Charlotte, NC

36 0 0 0

14. 4/27/76 American, B727, Jet

St. Thomas, Virgin

Islands

36 T/2, if T<22

11, if T>22

0 0

13. 3/27/77 Pan American, B747,

Jet, Canary Islands

192 0 0 0

16. 4/4/77 Southern, DC9, Jet Near New Hope, GA

20 3 3 3

17. 3/1/78 Continental, DC10, Jet

Los Angeles, CA

4 0 0 0

G-3
Table G-2. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking, 1965-82

Note

1.

2 .

3.

4.

5.

6 .

7.

8 .

9.

10 .

11 .

12 .

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Non-U. S. Airlines Using U.S. -Built Aircraft

: T is the number of extra seconds of escape time provided by seat blocking.

It is assumed that any version of seat blocking will provide at least 20 extra seconds.

Estimated Estimated Number of Persons Saved

Date Description

Fire

Fatalities

High

Estimate

Middle

Estimate Low

Estimate

2/16/67 Garuda, L-188,

Turboprop, Indonesia

22 T/2, if T<44

22, if T>44

T/2, if T<44

22, if T>44

10

3/5/67 Varig, DC8, Jet Liberia

45 T, if T<45

45, if T>_45 T/2, if T<90

45, if T>90

T/5 , if T<90

18, if 12.90

4/8/68 BOAC, B707 , Jet England

5 0 0 0

9/17/69 Pacific Western, CV640,

Turboprop, Canada

2 2 2 0

7/5/70 Air Canada, DC8, Jet Canada

109 0 0 0

1/22/73 Royal Jordanian, B707,

Jet, Nigeria

176 T, if T<176

176, if TM76

T/2, if T<176

88, if TM76

0

7/11/73 Varig, B707, Jet France

123 0 0 0

1 1/20/74 Lufthansa, B747, Jet Kenya

35 4 4 4

6/4/76 Air Manila, L-188,

Turboprop, Guam

28 0 0 0

3/27/77 KLM , B747, Jet Canary Islands

192 0 0 0

9/29/77 Japan Air, DC8, Jet Malaysia

25 0 0 0

12/17/78 Indian Airlines, B737,

Jet, India

1 0 0 0

10/7/79 Swissair, DC8, Jet Greece

0-14 14 7 0

11/26/79 Pakistani International

B707, Jet, Saudi Arabia

, 156 156 156 0

2/27/80 China Airlines, B707,

Jet, Phillipines

2 0 0 0

8/19/80 Saudi Air, L-1011, Jet Saudi Arabia

301 301 301 301

11/19/80 Korean Air, B747, Jet Korea

11 11 11 11

7/27/81 Aeromexico, DC9, Jet Mexico0-32 32 16 0

9/13/82 Spantax, DC10, Jet 51 51 51 51 Spain

G-4
Table G-3. Estimated Fire Fatalities Prevented by Seat Blocking, 1965-82

Non-U. S. Airlines Using Non-U. S. -Built Aircraft

Note: T is the number of extra seconds of escape time provided by seat blocking.

It is assumed that any version of seat blocking will provide at least 20

extra seconds.

Estimated Estimated Number of Persons Saved

Date Description

Fire

Fatalities

High

Estimate

Middle

Estimate

Low

Estimate

1- 2/15/66 Indian Airlines,

Caravelle, Jet, India

0-2 2 0 0

2. 9/11/68 Air France, Caravelle,

Jet, France

95 0 0 0

3. 7/26/69 Air Algerie, Caravelle

Jet, Algeria

, 33 0 0 0

4. 5/6/70 Somali, Viscount,

Turboprop, Somalia

0-5 0 0 0

5. 3/15/74 Sterling, Caravelle,

Jet, Iran

15 15 15 0
Table G-4. Total Estimated Fatalities Preventable by Seat

Blocking in Historical Period

These tables represent summations of the savings figures in tables G-l,

G-2 and G-3. T is the number of extra seconds of escape time and is assumed

to be at least 20 if seat blocking is present.

Lives Saved by Seat Blocking

Total Fire

Fatalities High Estimate

U.S. Airlines Only

712 98+3T if 200X22

109+2. 5T if 220X29

138+1.5T if 290X54

165+T if 540X88

253 if T>88

U.S. Airlines and/or Aircraft

1,996-2,042 665+5. 5T if 200X22

676+5T if 220X29

705+4T if 290X44

772+2.5T if 450X54

799+2T if 540X88

887+T if 880X176

1,063 if T>176

World Airlines

2,139-2,192 682+5. 5T

693+5T if

722+4T if

789+2. 5T

816+2T if

904+T if

1,080 if

if 200X22

220X29

290X44

if 450X54

540X88

880X176

T>17 6

Middle Estimate

69+ 2T if 200X27

96+T if 270X41

137 if T>41

613+4T if 200X27

640+3T if 27<T<41

681+2T if 410X44

748+0.5T if 450X176

836 if T>176

628+4T if 200X27

655+3T if 270X41

696+2T if 410X44

763+0. 5T if 450X176

851 if T>176

Low Estimate

24+T if 200X23

47 if T>23

401+1.2T if 200X23

424+0. 2T if 230X90 9 442 if T>90

401+1.2T if 200X23

424+0.2T if 230X90

442 if T>90

G-6
Table G-5 . Estimated Annual Savings From Seat Blocking Given 1982 Exposure Levels

High Estimate Middle Estimate Low Estimate

U.S. Airlines Only

Lives Saved 7.90+0.24T if 20<T<22 5.56+0 . 16T if 20<T<27 1.93+0.08T if 20<T<23

8.78+0.20T if 22<T<29 7.73+0.08T if 27<T<41 3.79 if T>23

11.12+0.12T if 29<T<54 11.04 if T>41

13.30+0.08T if 54<T<88

20.39 if T>88

Damage

Avoided $ 3.14 million $1.79 Million $1.43 million

U.S. Airlines and/or Aircraft

Lives Saved 62.80+0.52T if 20<T<22 57.88+0.38T if 20<T<27 37.87+0.11T if 20<T<23

63.83+0.47T if 22<T<29 60.43+0.28T if 27<T<41 40.04+0.02T if 23<T<90

66.57+0.38T if 29<T<44 64.31+0.19T if 41<T<44 41.74 if T>90

72.90+0.24T if 45<T<54 70.63+0.05T if 45<T<176

75.45+0.19T if 54<T<88 78.94 if T>176

83.76+0.09T if 88<T<176

100.38 if TM76

Damage

Avoided $13.91 million $7.87 million $3.47 million

World Airlines

Lives Saved 63.27+0.51T if 20<T<22 58.26+0.37T if 20<T<27 37.20+0.11T if 20<T<23

64.29+0.46T if 22<T<29 60.76+0.28T if 27<T<41 39.33+0 .02T if 23<T<90

66.98+0.37T if 29<T<44 64.56+0.19 if 41<T<44 41.00 if T>90

73.19+0.23T if 45<T<54 70.78+0.05T if 45<T<176

75.70+0.19T if 54<T<88 78.94 if T>176

83.86+0.09T if 88<T<176

100.19 if T>176

Damage

Avoided $13.67 million $7.78 million $3.41 million

NOTE: The World figures are lower than the U.S./U.S. figures for two reasons. First, the

Non-U.

S

. airlines flying Non-U. S. aircraft add much more to passenger-exposures

( about 10 percent, see table D-4) than to saveable fatalities (about two percent,

see table G-4). Second, the 1982 passenger-exposures for World Airlines are a smaller fraction of average 1965-82 passenger-exposures than are the 1982

passenger-exposures for U.S. Airlines and/or U.S. Aircraft (see table D-4). This means the 1982 savings figure for World Airlines uses a smaller fraction of total

U.S. /U.S. saveable fatalities than does the U.S. /U.S. Airlines savings figure. In

essence, the World base assigns a larger share of fatalities to earlier years,

reflecting the more rapid growth in passenger-miles while the U.S. Airlines and/or

U.S. Aircraft assigns a larger share of fatalities to later years, including 1982.

G-7
Table G-6. Estimated Annual Savings Given Five Values of

Added Escape Time and 1982 Exposure Levels

High Estimate Middle Estimate Low Estimate

U.S. Airlines Only

20 seconds 13.70 lives 8.76 lives 3.53 lives

43 seconds 16.28 lives 11.04 lives 3.79 lives

60 seconds 18.10 lives 11.04 lives 3.79 lives

90 seconds 20.39 lives 11.04 lives 3.79 lives

180 seconds 20.39 lives 11.04 lives 3.79 lives

Property damage savings

for all cases $3.14 million $1.79 million $1.43 million

U.S. Airlines and/or Aircraft

20 seconds 73.20 lives 65.48 lives 40.07 lives

43 seconds 82.91 lives 72.48 lives 40.90 lives

60 seconds 86.85 lives 73.63 lives 41.24 lives

90 seconds 91.86 lives 75.13 lives 41.74 lives

180 seconds 100.38 lives 78.94 lives 41.74 lives

Property damage savings

for all cases $13.91 million $7.87 million $3.47 million

World Airlines

20 seconds 73.47 lives 65.66 lives 39.40 lives

43 seconds 82.89 lives 72.73 lives 40.19 lives

60 seconds 87.10 lives 73.78 lives 40.53 lives

90 seconds 91.96 lives 75.28 lives 41.00 lives

180 seconds 100.19 lives 78.94 lives 41.00 lives

Property damage savings

for all cases $13.67 million $7.78 million $3.41 million

G-8
Table G-7 . Additions to or Reductions in Savings at Limits

of Expected Values of Added Escape Time

(All loss values are in millions of dollars)

High Estimate Middle Estimate Low

U.S. Airlines Only

Material 1 (20 secs) vs. Material 2 (43 secs)

Lives saved -2.58 (-16%) -2.28 (-21%) -0

Total savings @ $500 K

per life -1.29 (-11%) -1.14 (-16%) -0

Material 5 (90 secs) vs. Material 4 (60 secs)

Lives saved +2.29 (+13%) 0

Total savings @$500 K

per life +1.15 (+ 9%) 0

Material 6 (180 secs) vs. Material 4 (60 secs)

Lives saved +2.29 (+13%) 0

Total savings @$500 K

per life +1.15 (+ 9%) 0

World Airlines

Material 1 (20 secs) vs. Material 2 (43 secs)

Lives saved -9.42 (-11%) -7.07 (-10%) -0,

Total savings @$500 K

per life -4.71 (- 9%) -3.54 (- 8%) -0,

Material 5 (90 secs) vs. Material 4 (60 secs)

Lives saved +4 .86 (+6%) +1.50 (+2%) +0

,

Total savings @$500 K

per life +2.43 (+4%) +0.75 (+2%) +0

«

Material 6 (180 secs) vs. Material 4 (60 secs)

Lives saved +13.09 (+15%) +5.16 (+7%) +0

,

Total savings @$500 K

per life + 6.55 (+11%) +2.58 (+6%) +0.

Estimate

,26 (-7%)

,13 (-4%)

0

0

0

0

79 (-2%)

40 (-2%)

47 (+1%)

24 (+1%)

47 (+1%)

24 (+1%)

G-9
Table G-8 . Design Characteristics of Seat Blocking Alternatives

Current Design

Design for Material 2

Design for Material 3

Design for Material 4

"Typical" Cushion (similar to below)

Cover - Wool/Nylon

Scrim - Cotton/Muslin

Urethane - Fire-Retarded Urethane

Blocking Material Sewn Around Urethane

Cover - Wool/Nylon

Scrim - Cotton/Muslin

Fire Blocker - Weave Structure lxl Plain,

Aluminized One Side,

25% Noraex, 70% Kevlar, 5% Kynol

Blocking Material Sewn Around Urethane

Cover and Scrim Assumed to be Same as

for Material 2 Fire Blocker - loosely woven fiberglass scrim and

light weight fiberglass paper bonded

with non-halogenated fire-retarded

adhesive system.

Blocking Material Bonded to Urethane

Cover - Wool/Nylon

Scrim - Cotton/Muslin

Fire Blocker - 3/16" Neoprene Foam

NOTE: The blocking materials tested by FAA were as follows:

Version of Material 2 - Norfab 11HT-26-A1 fabric, a registered

trademark of the Norfab Corporation. Version of Material 3 - Insul-Fab, a registered trademark of Facile Technologies, Inc. Version

of Material 4 - Vonar No. 3, a registered trademark of E.I. duPont de

Nemours Company, Inc.

Each material was analyzed in combination with conventional fireretarded urethane and with the less expensive lighter non-fire-retarded

urethane

.
Table G-9 . Seat Back and Bottom Cushion Incremental Cost and Weight Data

Coach First Class

Urethane Urethane

Fire-Retarded Non-Fire-Retarded Fire-Retarded Non-Fire-Retarded

Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer

Blocker A. J5 A _B A. _B A. JB

Material

Cost

Weight

2

(pounds)

$63

1.50

$73-108

1.63

$62

1.50

$72-107

1.39

$85

2.00

$96-132

2.76

$84

2.00

$95-130

2.29

Material

Cost

Weight

3

(pounds)

$31 $39-74

0.45

$30 $38-73

0.21

$46 $45-80

0.77

$45 $44-79

0.29

Material

Cost

Weight

4

( pounds)

$35

3.00

$62-112

3.13

$34

3.00

$61-111

2.94

$46

4.00

$68-118

5.31

$45

4.00

$66-116

4.92

All costs and weights are given as increments over typical current conditions. Material 3

costs were estimated using yards-per-seat and fabrication/ installation costs from Material

2 because no information on these points for Material 3 was available. The cost-per-yard

figures were the only figures changed. Note that the cost numbers are rounded off for

ease of display.

G-ll
Table G-10. High, Middle and Low Cost and Weight per Seat

Estimates for Blocking Materials

Incremental Cost per Seat (1983 Dollars)

Material High Middle Low Incremental Weight (Pounds)

2A 109.92 78.55 64.72 1.63

2B 108.84 77.78 64.22 1.51

3A, 3C 74.20 44.35 31.96 0.48

3B, 3D 73.20 43.60 31.42 0.22

4A 112.48 61.66 35.84 3.20

4B 111.40 60.87 35.34 3.09

Note: The high cost estimates are the upper bounds of manufacturer B's range of

estimates. The middle estimates are averages of manufacturer A's estimates

and the midpoints of manufacturer B's ranges of estimates. The low estimates

are manufacturer A's estimates. The weight estimates are averages of the two

manufacturer's estimates. All estimates assume a fleet mix of 92 percent

coach seats and eight percent first-class seats.

Table G-ll. Schedule of Seats Blocked for U.S. Fleet Using

Three-Year Cycles for Phase-In and Refurbishment

Number of Seats Newly Blocked or Reblocked

Year Added Refurbished Combined

1984 15,622 107,231 122,853

1985 31,954 93,951 125,905

1986 32,260 117,075 149,335

1987 34,242 106,014 140,256

1988 37,585 103,949 141,534

1989 22,831 137,191 160,022

1990 35,291 114,204 149,495

1991 37,201 116,374 153,575

1992 42,524 135,743 178,268

1993 41,056 118,849 159,905

1994 37,547 132,691 170,238

1995 35,326 160,535 195,861

1996 31,118 146,194 177,312

1997 24,389 163,330 187,719

G-12
Table G-12. Schedule of Seats Blocked for World Fleet

Using a Three-Year Refurbishment Cycle

Number of Seats Newly Blocked or Reblocked

Year Added Refurbished Combined

1984 57,556 244,617 302,173

1985 74,334 234,411 308,745

1986 75,127 299,976 375,103

1987 78,839 265,340 344,179

1988 91,863 261,107 352,971

1989 82,480 330,810 413,290

1990 89,210 292,189 381,399

1991 101,709 295,890 397,599

1992 103,147 364,088 467,236

1993 102,891 327,736 430,627

1994 100,376 355,491 455,867

1995 98,391 434,128 532,519

1996 92,238 403,226 495,464

1997 86,851 438,997 525,848

Table G-13. Schedule of Seats Blocked for U.S. Fleet Using a Three-Year Phase-In and Six-Year Reblocking Cycle

Year Added Refurbished Combined

1984 15,622 107,231 122,853

1985 31,954 93,951 117,075

1986 32,260 117,075 149,335

1987 34,242 — 34,242

1988 37,585 — 37,585

1989 22,831 — 22,831

1990 35,291 51,770 87,061

1991 37,201 89,766 126,967

1992 42,524 120,975 163,499

1993 41,056 76,494 117,550

1994 37,547 27,676 65,223

1995 35,326 13,821 49,147

1996 31,118 48,345 79,463

1997 24,389 96,349 120,738

G-13

Appendix H

Formulas for Additional Sensitivity Analyses

In addition to the sensitivity analyses performed in this report, readers

may wish to evaluate the effect of alternative assumptions regarding fuel

price, incremental weight per seat or incremental cost per seat. The tabulated fuel-cost present values for each year have been summed and rearranged

to facilitate the evaluation of these influences on fuel cost. To compute the

annualized cost of fuel to fly a specified incremental weight per seat at a 10

percent discount rate for the 1984 through 1997 study period and a three-year

phase-in, use the following:

U.S. Fleet Annualized

Fuel Cost in Millions

of 1983 Dollars

World Fleet Annualized

Fuel Cost in Millions

of 1983 Dollars

[

Incremental Weight! j 198 3 Price per Gallon

per Seat in Pounds of Fuel in Dollars

17.23 x Incremental Weight 1983 Price per Gallon

per Seat in Pounds of Fuel in Dollars

A similar formulation can be applied to evaluate the effect of changes in

incremental cost per seat on total seat costs. To compute the annualized seat

costs for a specific incremental cost per seat, using a 10 percent discount

rate for the 1984 through 1997 study and a three-year phase-in and reblocking

schedule, use the following:

U.S. Fleet Annualized

Seat Cost in Millions

of 1983 Dollars

World Fleet Annualized

Seat Cost in Millions

of 1983 Dollars

0.1506 x

0.3875 x

[

Incremental Cost per

Seat in Dollars

[

Incremental Cost per

Seat in Dollars

Similar computations for a three-year phase-in and a six-year reblocking

schedule would use the following:

U.S. Fleet Annualized

Seat Cost in Millions

of 1983 Dollars

0.0814 x Incremental Cost per

Seat in Dollars

H-l
NBS-1 14A (REV. 2 -ac) U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET (See instructions)

PUBLICATION OR

REPORT NO.

NBSIR 84-2817

2. Performing Organ. Report No

DOT/FAA/ CT-84/8

3. Publication Date

March 1984

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

DECISION ANALYSIS MODEL FOR PASSENGER-AIRCRAFT FIRE SAFETY WITH APPLICATION

TO FIRE-BLOCKING OF SEATS

5. AUTHOR(S)

John R. Hall, Jr. and S. Wayne Stlefel

6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION (If joint or other than NBS. see instructions) 7. Contract/Grant No. DTFA30-83-A-0034

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

8 . Type of Report & Period Covered

Interim

Nov. 1982-Dec. 1983

9.

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND COMPLETE ADDRESS (Street. City. State. ZIP)

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Technical Center

Atlantic City, New Jersey 08405

10.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

J Document describes a computer program; SF-185, FIPS Software Summary, is attached.

11.

ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here)

This report develops a generic model for analysis of the costs and benefits of

fire-risk reducing strategies related to passenger airlines. The model calculates

incremental costs for installing and operating these options. It also calculates

estimated lives saved and property damage avoided, and it provides rules for

combining costs and benefits into a single measure of attractiveness for an alternative. This model is then applied to the strategy of fire-blocking seats

on passenger airlines, either on U.S. airlines or on all world airlines.

12. KEY WORDS (Six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only proper names; and separate key words by semicolons)

Aircraft accidents; aircraft fires; aircraft safety; decision analysis; fire safety

risk analysis; seats; statistics; upholstery

13. AVAILABILITY 14. NO. OF

Unlimited

| | For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

PRINTED PAGES

103

j j Order From Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

15. Price 20402.

[}£] Order From National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA. 22161 $13.00

USCOMM-DC 6043-P80