NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM JERMAINE FLETCHER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTION; IDAHO COMMISSION 

OF PARDONS AND PAROLE; SANDY 

JONES; KAREN CLIFFORD, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-35128 

D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00267-BLW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2023

Seattle, Washington

Before: BYBEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG,** District Judge.

William Fletcher appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his 

claims for damages against Karen Clifford, a Deputy manager of the Idaho 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge 

for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Department of Correction (IDOC), and Sandy Jones, the Executive Director of the 

Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole (ICPP), alleging that his due process rights 

were violated when he was classified and subjected to supervision and treatment as 

a sex offender. Fletcher also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

for those same defendants on his claim for injunctive relief. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 

F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2017), we affirm. 

1. Injunctive relief claims. “[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the 

attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the subjection of [a] targeted 

inmate to a mandatory treatment program . . . create the kind of deprivations of 

liberty that require procedural protections.” Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1997). In other words, before a state classifies an individual as a sex offender 

and subjects him to sex-offender treatment, the individual must be provided due 

process. Id. at 829–31. 

Fletcher pleaded guilty to felony injury to a child, which is not a sex offense. 

See Idaho Code §§ 18-501, 18-8304. However, Fletcher’s amended information 

detailed the sexual nature of his conduct underlying the charge, and he pleaded guilty 

to the offense as alleged in the amended information.

1 Additionally, under the terms 

1Defendants’ request for judicial notice, D.E. 55, is GRANTED. See Bennet 

v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). However, that judicial 
3 

of his plea agreement, Fletcher agreed to submit to a psychosexual evaluation and 

be amenable to treatment. Thus, his actions during the plea proceedings undermine 

any argument that he did not receive the process that he was due. By knowingly and 

explicitly accepting evaluation and treatment, Fletcher also accepted the attendant 

stigma associated with that evaluation and treatment and affirmatively waived any 

further procedural protections required under Neal. See United States v. NavarroBotello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is not a due process violation for a 

defendant to waive constitutional rights as part of a plea bargain . . . .”).

Accordingly, because the record establishes that Fletcher cannot show he was denied 

due process, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Clifford and Jones on this ground. 

2. Damages claims.2 The district court dismissed Fletcher’s damages 

claims against Clifford and Jones with prejudice because they were asserted against 

these defendants in their official capacity. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & 

Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] claim for damages against 

state officials in their official capacities is plainly barred.”). Pro se plaintiffs are 

entitled to a liberal reading of their complaint, notice of any perceived pleading 

notice of these documents was not requested until the eve of oral argument was of 

great disservice to the court. We caution counsel to provide such judicially 

noticeable documents in a timely manner in the future. 

2Fletcher does not challenge the dismissal of his claims against the IDOC or 

ICPP, only against the individual officials identified herein, Clifford and Jones. 
4 

defects, and an opportunity to amend unless it is clear that amendment would be 

futile. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). While the district court 

failed to instruct Fletcher about his pleading deficiencies and grant him leave to 

amend, we conclude that this was not reversible error. Any amendment would be 

futile given our conclusion that the terms of Fletcher’s plea agreement fatally 

undermine his asserted due-process violation. See Parents for Privacy v. Barr, 949 

F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice is proper 

where it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by 

amendment).

AFFIRMED.