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MAR 1995

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Airhead Operations - Where AMC Delivers: The Linchpin of Rapid

Force Projection

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5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

William C. Sherman

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Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, AL

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cirafici, John L., 1945-

Airhead operations-where AMC delivers : the linchpin ofrapid force projection

/ John L. Cirafici.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 . United States. Air Mobility Command. 2. Airmobile operations (Military

science) 3. Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993.

I . Title.

UD493.C56 1995

356'.166'0973-dc20 95-6191

CIP

ISBN 1-58566-057-4

Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest

of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts . The views

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position

of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for

public release.

11
To my wife

sally

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUTTHE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xu

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xuii

1 AIR MOBILITY IN ANEWERA . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The "Air Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 THEAIR MOBILITY COMMAND STRUCTURE

WITHIN THE THEATER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Air Mobility Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Tanker Airlift Control Element . . . . . . . . . . 12

Combat Control Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Aeromedical Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3 OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (SOMALIA): A

CASE STUDY FORAIRHEAD OPERATIONS . . . . 19

The Background .

. . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Initial Operations: Provide Relief . . . . . . . . . 21

The Crisis Action Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Restore Hope: Operations in the Theater . . . . . 32

The Deployment of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Mogadishu Airhead Operations . . . . . . . . 35

Airhead Operations outside Mogadishu . . . . 40

The Air Mobility Element . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Intratheater Airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

V
Chapter Page

Runway Deterioration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Mission Accomplishment . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4 RESTORE HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . 57

Operational Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Management of Airfield Real Estate . . . . . . 58

Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Ground Security Integration . . . . . . . . . . 62

Sustainment and Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Logistical Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5 WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE? . . . . . . 67

The C-17 Globemaster III . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

The C-17 at the Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Materials Handling Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 79

The KC-10 Self-Contained Loading

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

In-Transit Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

The Remote Consolidated Aerial Port

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Global Reach Laydown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Air Mobility Operations Groups . . . . . . . . . 82

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . 84

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

vi
FYgure Page

Illustrations

1 The Deliberate Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 Crisis Action Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . 6

3 UTC 7E lABO Mob C2 Element, TALCE MOG 6

or Less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 UTC 7E IAGO Mob C2 Air Rep Comm (MARC) . . . . 16

5A Belet Uen Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone

Survey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5B Belet Uen Airfield, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

6A Baidoa Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone Survey) . . 25

6B Baidoa Airfield, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

7A Mogadishu Airport, Somalia (Landing Zone

Survey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

7B Mogadishu Airport, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

8 TheaterAreas of Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . 30

9 Operation Restore Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

10A Bale Dogle Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone

Survey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

10B Bale Dogle Airfield, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

11A Kismayu Airfield, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

11B Kismayu, Somalia (Landing Zone Survey) . . . . . 44

12 Restore Hope : End of Phase 1, 16 December

1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

13 Restore Hope AFFOR Organization . . . . . . . . . 46

14 Mogadishu Embassy Organization . . . . . . . . . 46

15 Mogadishu Airport Organization . . . . . . . . . . 47

Vii
F1lgure Page

16 Lift Requirements Process (JMCC) . . . . . . . . . 49

17 Intratheater Airlift: A STAR Schedule . . . . . . . . 50

18 Air Traffic at Mogadishu Airport . . . . . . . . . . 51

19 Passengers Moved Intertheater-Per Day . . . . . . 52

20 Intertheater AirliftTons Per Day . . . . . . . . . . 53

21 Restore Hope: End of Phase II, 28 December

1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

22 Supply Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

23 Free World Runway Distribution (without the

United States) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

24 C-5 Turning Radius and Ground Clearance . . . . 72

25A C-17 Turnaround . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

25B C-17 Turning Radius and Ground Clearance . . . . 74

26A USAF/McDonnell Douglas C-17A . . . . . . . . . . 75

26B C-17 General Aircraft Dimensions . . . . . . . . . 76

26C C-17 : Small on the Outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

27 ThroughputThe Key to Operational Capability . . 78

Viii
Foreword

Credible force projection has been essential to this country's

national policy because of our geostrategic relationship with

the rest of the world. The ongoing downsizing of US military

forces and their return to the Continental United States

(CONUS) have placed increased emphasis on the structure for

rapidly and effectively moving forces from the United States to

an operational theater.

Lt Col John L. Cirafici's research is timely. Air mobility forces

in the airhead are crucial to the combatant commander's

theater operations . He relies on them to introduce forces to the

theater, to sustain them, to support intratheater movement,

and to redeploy forces to the CONUS.

Colonel Cirafici provides a clear picture of theater air

mobility forces structure, their capabilities, and limitations . He

has identified problem areas, and recommended improve

ments. Colonel Cirafici has looked to the future and examined

how ongoing changes in theater air mobility forces and

equipment will increase the combatant commander's options

in the theater. The greatest value of his study is to create a

clearer understanding of how theater air mobility forces act to

enhance operations and support the battlefield.

ROBERT M. JOHNSTON, Colonel, USAF

Director, Airpower Research Institute

ix

About the

Author

Lt Col John L. Cirafici conducted this study while serving

as the Air Mobility Command-sponsored research fellow for

1993-94 at the the Airpower Research Institute, Air

University College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education (CADRE), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He is

a master navigator with 7,000 hours of flying time in the C-5

Galaxy, C-130 Hercules, and C-141 Starlifter. He is also a

master parachutist.

Colonel Cirafici was born in Brooklyn, New York . He

graduated with honors from City University of New York,

where he received undergraduate and graduate degrees in

European history. Colonel Cirafici is an in-resident graduate of

Squadron Officer School and Air War College.

He has served in the Air Force as an enlisted member and

commissioned officer. His combat experiences stretch from

Khe Sanh to Kuwait and include Vietnam, Somalia, Just

Cause, the Dominican Republic, Bosnia, and Desert Storm.

Colonel Cirafici was an assistant professor and chairman of

the European History Department at the United States Air

Force Academy. He has received a National Endowment for the

Humanities fellowship . Colonel Cirafici is the 1988 recipient of

xi
the Mackay Trophy . In 1989, as team commander, he

established the official world record for an air-dropped load .

Colonel Cirafici is married to the former Sally Ann Paull of

Baltimore, Maryland. They currently live in Milford, Delaware.

xii
Acknowledgment

Rarely does an author express ideas as clearly as possible

without the assistance of others . I was most fortunate to have

superlative individuals who provided support throughout the

process of researching, analyzing, and writing.

Dr James Titus, a long-time friend and fellow historian,

contributed many hours discussing, reviewing, and critiquing

my efforts. His aid was invaluable. Likewise, Dr Lawrence

("Buck") Grinter made valuable comments and provided

needed support. Members of the Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education were generous in sharing

their expertise, especially in the joint staff arena. My fellow

command-sponsored researchers kindly contributed their

time, support, and insight. Dr Richard Bailey provided

invaluable editorial assistance from beginning to end, and I

am grateful for his efforts .

The AMC headquarters staff and especially the historian's

office were enormously helpful. I am most grateful to Col Walt

Evans, Lt Col Jim Donovan, Dr John Leland, Betty Kennedy,

and Kent Beck. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman was most generous

in allowing me to serve as the 1993-94 AMC-sponsored

researcher. I appreciate the time he spent sharing his vision

for the future of global reach.

Most of all I am fortunate to have had the full support and

able assistance of my wife Sally. Her contributions go well

beyond reading and discussing my work. The enormous

amount of time I was away on wide-flung contingencies and

operations was time not spent at home. Consequently, the

experiences used to develop this study came at no small

expense. To her I owe my greatest appreciation .

xifi

Introduction

Airhead operations have been an important feature of

modern warfare since Gen Francisco Franco, in 1936,

air-landed his Moroccan forces in southern Spain during the

opening phase of the Spanish Civil War. The concept gained

currency during World War II, especially as an element of

airborne operations . In that context it denoted an assault

zone(s) employed during vertical envelopment maneuvers. In

current usage airhead is defined in Joint Pub 1-02,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, this way:

1 . A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when

seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and

materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected

operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an

airborne operation. 2 . A designated location in an area of operations

used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. l

Airhead has become a significant part of nearly all

contingency operations. Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause,

Desert Shield/Storm, Restore Hope, among others,

demonstrate the airhead's criticality in almost every phase of

mission execution. It is, therefore, essential for potential

participants in any contingency, be it a low-intensity conflict,

humanitarian, or any other form of force projection, to possess

a conceptual understanding of the airhead, as it applies to air

mobility operations . This study educates and recommends,

where needed, improvements in the conduct of air mobility

airhead operations .

The educational goal responds to a need for users of air

mobility forces in contingency, humanitarian, and other

similar missions to garner the greatest benefit from their

in-theater operations. The goals also respond to a need for users

to fully appreciate the challenges faced by those elements of Air

Mobility Command (AMC) operating in their support within the

airhead environment. No less important, elements within AMC
must more fully appreciate the dynamics of airhead operations

and their effect on the theater operations.

My involvement with airhead operations began in late 1964 as

an Air Force combat control team member. As a combat

controller I participated during 1966 in Operation Power Pack,

the military intervention in the Dominican Republic, and

subsequently served from 1967 to 1968 in the Republic of

Vietnam. There, I operated airheads throughout several corps

areas. I was in Khe Sanh while it endured heavy siege; in the A

Shau Valley during Operation Delaware ; in the central

highlands ; in the Delta; and in the Parrot's Beak region adjoining

Cambodia. Later, as a combat control team commander, I was

responsible for operations in Europe and in much of Africa. A

subsequent tour in an airlift control squadron greatly broadened

my experiences in operating aspects of airhead operations from

the airlift perspective. I commanded operational locations during

Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait. In a second "desert" tour as

director of the theater airlift control center, I was responsible for

locations throughout the United States Central Command

(USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). During Operation

Restore Hope I established and commanded initial operations at

Mogadishu, Somalia, and then, while assigned to the air force

component commander's air mobility element, directed air

mobility support activities at several other Somali airfields. The

key lesson I have learned from these cumulative experiences is

to recognize the vital importance of air mobility airhead

operations to overall mission objectives . My perspective here

results from operational experience at the point of mission

execution and as a member of various theater staffs .

A war-fighting commander depends on the airhead to

introduce combat forces in the shortest time possible and to

sustain them during the initial, and, probably, the most

critical phases of operations . This study describes how the

airheads air mobility forces fit into the overall scheme of force

deployment, reassembly, employment, and sustainment. It

describes and examines the structure and capabilities of

theater mobility support forces . It also discusses areas in need

of improvement, looks at new generation equipment coming

xui
into the inventory, and notes how they will increase flexibility

in a theater and enhance operations.

Notes

1 . JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, 1 December 1989, 17.

xuii

Chapter 1

Air Mobility in a New Era

Air mobility forces play a key role in the force projection

equation . They serve as a demonstrative instrument in the

expression of national policy ; they have acquired, when

Oewed within the context of ongoing worldwide geostrategic

,~hange, a role of growing consequence. Air mobility is a

significant factor in foreign policy decisions . Where a threat

of force is necessary, concerned parties must realize that the

means to project force is as credible as the force itself.

Consequently, air mobility is the centerpiece of the defense

transportation system and the key to effective force

projection.

Two major developments-the emerging post-cold war

world, which is fraught with uncertainties, and the present

restructuring and posturing of the military forces of the

United States-have had an overriding impact on the

importance of air mobility capability.

The collapse of the iron curtain has been heralded as the

precursor of a new era. With the passing of the old order, a

serious challenge to the survival of the United States has

passed . In the absence of a global threat, however, the new

era brings with it a redirected focus on world regional

problems . The National Military Strategy of the United States

states that the American defense posture has "[shifted] from-;

containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet

aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is'

regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to

the challenges of this decade ."' This natural development

reflects traditional international concerns of the United

States .

The refocusing of strategy directs attention to a factor

which has been fundamental to diplomatic and economic

intercourse between the United States and other nations:

the relative physical isolation of the United States from

those regions having significant impact on its economic,

1
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

political, and security interests . This geostrategic determinant

is of key and fundamental importance to the shaping of

America's foreign policy . In this context, where this country's

vital interests are concerned, the necessity for substantial

force projection capability becomes evident . To meet

challenges to these interests, the military instrument (in

support of national policy) should not only maintain credible

military strength in terms of structure and firepower but

must equally possess the means to project this formidable

military power unequivocally and rapidly. Air mobility forces

hold the key to rapid force projection capability, and the

robustness of the air mobility system will determine if

America's forces can be rapidly brought to bear when

national policy requires it .

Since the cold war's conclusion, a second major

development has mandated further reliance on air mobility

for force projection . Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's

1993 Bottom-Up Review advocates major changes in force

structure, basing, and force size . 2 His plan proposes a

significant reduction of each service component to its

essential elements and envisions the posturing of the

majority of remaining military forces on bases within the

continental United States (CONUS) . Because of its

dependence on force projection, the Aspin strategy makes a

compelling argument for maintaining and exercising a fully

prepared and highly capable air mobility system. A number

of considerations will dictate the actual size and capabilities

of air mobility forces . The key factor, however, is the

Review's basic premise that the armed forces will be

structured for nearly simultaneous response to two major

regional conflicts . In the absence of substantial forwardbased forces, the success of a two-layer MRC strategy is

dependent largely on air mobility for rapid projection and as

a force multiplier. The vital importance of a fully capable air

mobility force is strongly endorsed in former Secretary of the

Air Force Donald B. Rice's Global Reach-Global Power: The

Evolving Air Force Contribution to National Security, where he

defines mobility as the "sinew of global reach." 3 Secretary

Rice further states that "our national security strategy calls

on us to be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain

2
AIR MOBILITY IN A NEW ERA

them in parts of the world where prepositioning equipment

may not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be

available, and where there is less-developed industrial base

and infrastructure to support our forces once they have

arrived. "4

Basic aerospace doctrine, expressed in Air Force Manual

1-1, explicitly recognizes the fundamental force enhancement

nature of airlift and states that "airlift's key enhancement of

the campaign is its ability to place properly concentrated

combat forces where and when needed . "5

The crucial importance of air mobility forces to national

military strategy draws attention to limitations which the

force operates under, especially in numbers of airframes,

capacity in terms of ton miles per day, and, where this paper

is concerned, the capabilities of mobility support forces .

These limitations, in turn, strongly suggest a clear need for

both air mobility's customers and its service providers to

employ the asset effectively and efficiently. Thus, to best

utilize vital but finite resources both the customers and the

providers of air mobility must be fully cognizant of how the

overall machinery functions as an operational tool,

especially in support of contingency forces . This study

focuses on a key component of the air mobility process:

airhead operations .

Almost all contingency operations employ air mobility

forces for force deployment, sustainment, intratheater

movement, and redeployment . The airhead plays a

significant role in each of these phases . To fully appreciate

air mobility's dynamic role in contingencies, especially at the

airhead, the mechanism for rapid force projection from home

base to forward location needs to be understood . To see the

airhead in its proper perspective, while surveying the air

mobility system, observers must look at it as one

component, albeit a vital one, of the entire mechanism. To

provide an appropriate model, which simplifies the overall

structure for the purpose of discussion, the air movement of

forces is characterized here as an "air bridge ." To use the air

bridge effectively to move forces and materiel, one must

understand how it operates .

3
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

The "Air Bridge"

The phrase "air bridge" figuratively welds the various

stages in the air mobility process into a seamless conduit.

Beneath its smooth surface, the air bridge is much more

dynamic than a traditional bridge and can be viewed as a

complicated piece of machinery, comprising a number of

moving parts . At its initial point of operation, a processing

mechanism exists to translate customer airlift

requirements into a concrete plan to match airlift and air

refueling aircraft to the mission. Physical components of

the bridge include airfields which anchor either end of it

and, where necessary, along its en route portion. Vital

supporting elements are positioned at key points to

facilitate upload, download, and aircraft servicing . These

elements provide materials handling equipment (MHE); a

command, control, and communications (C3) network;

aircraft support equipment; and, most important of all,

specialists. The air bridge is notionally structured around

the user's airlift requirements and shaped by factors

specific to a contingency's political, military, and

geographic nature .

From the user's perspective, the process commences with

either deliberate (or peacetime) planning, which anticipates

possible future operations, or with short notice, time-sensitive

crisis action planning (CAP). 6 In the case of deliberate

planning, each commander in chief (CINC), when tasked by

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to develop a

contingency plan, formulates a strategic concept. Once the

CJCS approves a CINC's strategic concept, the United States

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) analyzes

transportation movement requirements for units to be moved,

the nature and quantity of cargo and passengers, the

destination(s), and the time constraints anticipated for the

actual movement. USTRANSCOM's analysis of existing lift

results in a realistic plan for movement, which is then

incorporated into the final operational plan. The deliberate

planning process is illustrated in figure 1 .

Crisis action planning moves the process at a greatly accele

rated rate, with USTRANSCOM producing a deployment

4
estimate which corresponds to those courses of action

(COA) the supported CINC has identified . When the

national command authorities (NCA) select a specific COA

from those submitted by the CINC, they develop the COA into

an operation order (OPORD) with complementing supporting

OPORDs. The CAP process is depicted in figure 2 .

In either planning scenario USTRANSCOM, based on the

specific supporting OPORD, will task (when strategic airlift is

specified) its air componentAir Mobility Command-to fulfill

requirements .

5
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

SUMMARY OF TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING PHASES

Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V Phase VI

Situation Crisis Course of Course of Execution Execution

Development Assessment Action Action Planning

Development Selection

Event

" Event occurs " CINC's " CICS " CJCS " CINC " NCAdecide

with possible REPORT/ publishes presents receives to execute

national ASSESSMENT WARNING refined and ALERT OPORD

security received ORDER prioritized ORDER or

implications COAs to NCA PLANNING

ORDER

Action

" Monitor world " Increase " Develop COAs " CJCS gives " Adjust JOPES " CJCS publishes

situation awareness " Evaluate COAs military advice database EXECUTE

" Recognize " Increase " Create, modify to NCA " Identify ORDER by

problem reporting JOPES " CJCS may movement authority and

" Submit CINC's " JCS assess database publish requirements direction of

ASSESSMENT situation " CINC assigns PLANNING " Identify and SECDEF

" JCS advise on tasks to subor- ORDER to assign tasks " CINC executes

possible dinates by eval- begin execution to units OPORD

military action uation request planning before " Convert COA " JOPES

" NCA-CJCS message formal selection into OPORDs database

evaluation " CINC reviews of COA by NCA and supporting maintained

evaluation OPORDs " JPEC reports

response " Resolve execution

messages shortfalls and status

" USTRANSCOM limitations

prepares " Begin SORTS

deployment reporting

estimates " JCS monitors

" JCS reviews OPORD

Commander's development

Estimate

Outcome

" Assess that " NCA/CJCS " CINC publishes " NCA selects " CINC publishes " Crisis resolved

event may decides to Commander's COA OPORD

have national develop Estimate with " CJCS publishes

implications military COA recommended COAselection

" Report the COA by NCA in

event to ALERT ORDER

NCA/CJCS

Source: Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993 (Washington, D.C . :

Government Printing Office, 1993).

Figure 2. Crisis Action Planning Process

6
AIR MOBILITY IN A NEW ERA

When the NCA respond to a crisis with the military option,

the supported CINC will receive an execute order from the

CJCS to implement the approved OPORD. In turn, the CINC

will direct that supporting OPORDs be executed. Thus, forces

and their equipment are assembled, based on the OPORD's

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), and moved

to their designated ports of embarkation. In the specific case of

the air bridge the initial destination will be aerial ports of

embarkation (APOE), which are airfields selected primarily

because of their aircraft handling and supporting

characteristics ; reasonable proximity to the supported forces'

originating bases; and marshalling area availability . The

airfields are the entry points to the air bridge.

The customer of airlift depends upon AMC assets to carry

forces expeditiously to their destination. AMC is equally

dependent on the user's preparedness for the movement to

assure that schedules are met and that the finite resource of

aircraft and their aircrews are employed efficiently. How

quickly and smoothly a deploying force moves through the

APOE is often a function of how well it has been trained under

the Air Mobility Command Affiliation Program (joint combat

airlift training) . 7 This program familiarizes air deployable units

with the planning for and execution of airlift operations . More

specifically, it identifies the supported force's responsibilities

and provides the spectrum of training for cargo and passenger

preparation and handling.

The process at the APOE culminates with uploading of cargo

and/or passengers on board designated aircraft. The period

during, which a particular aircraft is scheduled on the ground

at the APOE, in support of a unit's movement, is a function of

preestablished upload times, aircraft servicing, and aircrew

requirements . The driving factors are, however, the supported

unit's earliest date of departure and its required delivery date

(RDD) at destination (the aerial port of debarkation or APOD).

The RDD is established by the supported CINC .

The actual en route portion of the air bridge, from APOE to

APOD, is determined by a number of factors including

international airway structures, aircraft characteristics, length

of aircrew duty day, en route landings (if unavoidable), air

refueling rendezvous, and, especially, geopolitical considerations .

7
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

The entire air bridge process seeks to deliver the airlifted

forces to its APOD, in the airhead, at the bridge's end point.

The APOD, in striking contrast to the APOE, will likely be

located within a fundamentally different and much more

exacting environment. At the originating airfield, forces and

materiel were assembled under benign and relatively ordered

conditions, enhanced by a fully developed supporting

infrastructure. In most potential scenarios for force projection,

the landing airfield will be situated within a remote airhead,

where austere conditions prevail. The situation there may be

further exacerbated by hostile or threatening forces, unusual

operational limitations, and the virtual nonexistence of

infrastructure . The airhead (in which the APOD is located)

may prove to be, operationally, the most vulnerable phase in

the projection of force, because of inherent and exploitable

weaknesses . Consequently, the theater commander must

maximize efficiency of operations there and conversely

minimize vulnerability . The key units within the airhead which

will optimize support of airlift operations for the theater

commander include the air mobility support forces (MSF) . The

capabilities, requirements, and structure of these forces must

be understood and optimized by the supported forces.

Notes

l . National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C. : The

Pentagon, January 1992), 1 .

2. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New

Era (Washington, D.C . : Department of Defense, 1 September 1993) .

3 . Secretary of the Air Force Donald B . Rice, Global Reach-Global

Power. The Evolving Air Force Contribution to National Security (Washington,

D.C. : Department of the Air Force, December 1992), 2.

4. Ibid.

5. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 1,

March 1992, 13. 6. Air Mobility Command Air Mobility Master Plan, 15 October 1993, v, vii .

The expressed AMC goal by fiscal year 2006 is to achieve a 57 million

ton-miles-per-day (57 MTM/D) capability. A similar goal is expressed by a

former secretary of the Air Force. See Donald B. Rice, Reshaping for the

Future (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, February 1992), 1 .

Here, Rice iterates the Mobility Requirements Study recommendation of a

57 MTM/D capability by the end of the present decade .

7. Military Airlift Command (MAC) Pamphlet 50-13, MAC Affiliation

Program Airlift Planners Course, 23 December 1991 .

8
Chapter 2

The Air Mobility Command Structure

within the Theater

in the vision of global reach-global power, the key role of

AMC is to provide air mobility assets to move forces effectively.

To support that task, the tanker airlift control center (TACO) of

AMC notionally generates and deploys personnel in specially

tailored modules into operational theaters and in support of

joint task forces (JTF) by using unit type codes (UTC) as basic

building blocks . When deployed, these modules comprise

AMC's mobility mission support forces and perform many

functions. These funtions include command and control (C2) ;

theater air movement planning and execution ; aeromedical

evacuation ; airfield security; airfield operations, including

cargo handling; processing and control ; aircraft maintenance ;

communications ; intelligence ; weather information ; and others

as required by mission objectives . Using the AMC perspective

this chapter describes functional areas in-theater and the

manner in which they are operationally wired together. The

structure depicted in this chapter is not absolute. Instead, it

varies and is based on theater-specific situations and

requirements.

When assigned in-theater, air mobility assets are placed,

operationally, under the theater Air Force component commander's

(AFCC) air operations center (AOC) . In humanitarian and

similar contingencies, operations may be conducted without

an AOC. 1 Functionally, most operational elements in support

of AMC's theater mission report to the director of mobility

forces (DIRMOBFOR), the theater air component commander's

primary focal point for the resolution of air mobility issues and

for the management of air mobility operations, theaterwide .

The director "assists the theater staff in planning air mobility

force employment operations for the Air Force Component

Commander.'12 The mechanism for fulfilling the DIRMOBFOR's

responsibilities is the air mobility element (AME) .

9
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Air Mobility Element

The Air Mobility Command maintains an air mobility operations

squadron (AMOS) in each of its numbered air forces. 3 From these

units AMES are constituted, as required. Each squadron includes

a cadre of highly experienced individuals who bring their expertise

to the theater. An AMOS, when tasked, provides the core

resources (approximately 35 percent) of an air mobility element. 4

At the time that an air mobility operations squadron is directed to

form an AME, it receives the necessary augmentation from other

active duty sources and air reserve component (ARC) forces. 5 The

air mobility operations squadron commander normally doubles as

the DIRMOBFORwhile in deployed status.

Primarily, an air mobility element provides its theater with the

means to track, coordinate, and direct air mobility assets .

Secondarily, it assists AMC's tanker airlift control center by

monitoring and reporting US Transportation Command's strategic

air mobility missions into the theater. The AME centralizes

direction of in-theater AMC resources and maintains control over

them. Those resources may include airlift and tanker assets

change of operational control to the theater.

The AME is structured to represent functional areas that

support air mobility operations. Those functions which will be

subsequently described in greater detail include the following:

" Command and control (DOC)

" Airlift operations (DOO)

" Mission monitoring section (DOCC)

" Combat operations (DO)Q

" Tactics (DOXT)

" Combat control team

" Mission support cell (MSC)

" Aerial port control center (APCC)

" Intelligence (IN)

" Theater airlift liaison officers (TALD)

" Logistics operations center (LOC)

" Airspace management element (ASM)

" Ground liaison officer (GLO)

" Communications (SC),

" Tanker operations element (DON)

10
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND STRUCTURE

The command and control element (DOC) "monitors and

manages the execution of all airlift and strategic tanker

operations within or transiting the theater . . . DOC monitors

execution of the daily airlift tasking order, recommends airlift

diversions/reroutes, and disseminates threat advisories .'16

Airlift operations (DOO) "plans the day-to-day use of airlift

resources in-theater. DOO is responsible for recommending

the detailed commitment of airlift resources for conduct of

theater airlift operations . This is accomplished through

preparation of daily tasking orders. " 7

The mission monitoring section (DOCC) executes the

published airlift schedule and its tracking.

Combat operations (DOX) continually assembles, updates,

and disseminates data on theater airfields, assault zones, and

drop zones . Based on its assessment of factors impacting on

theater airlift and tanker operations, DOX suggests tactics for

employment. The combat operations element also monitors the

status of in-theater combat control team assets . DOXT is the

tactics branch of DOX. The combat control team (CCT), also

subordinate to DOX, "monitors, supports, and coordinates

CCT activity within the theater and maintains the assault zone

status record. " 8

The mission support cell coordinates the employment of

in-theater tanker airlift control elements (TALCE) in support of

theater air mobility on-load and off-load locations .

The aerial port control center provides command and control

for the air transportation function . It assures effective

movement of in-theater cargo and passengers and maximizes

utilization of assets .

The intelligence (IN) division's chief, as the AME's senior

theater intelligence staff officer, assesses threats to air

mobility in-theater activities.

Theater airlift liaison officers (TALO) "advise Army users of

airlift capabilities . They assist and coordinate airlift requests

between the Army user and the air mobility element. " 9 The TALO

is normally collocated with the supported Army organization .

The logistics operations center (LOC) provides overall

management within the theater of the logistics function. It is

responsible for "monitoring, controlling, and expediting

movement and/or repair of tanker and airlift mission aircraft."i°

1 1
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

The airspace management element assures "close

coordination and integration with service and theater airspace

managers ."" The DIRMOBFOR, as director of the air mobility

element process, is assisted on a day-to-day basis by the air

mobility element chief.

The AME and the functions described in the previous

paragraphs are usually collocated with the joint task force

headquarters. When requirements warrant the chopping of airlift

assets to the theater, a wing operations center (WOC) will be

deployed with the airlift package. The WOC functions as a

command post and is manned by the organizational commander

and his staff and possesses C2 capability. The AME tasks the

WOC's airlift assets based on theater requirements . A WOC

operates independently in those situations where a joint task

force requires organic airlift support but cannot justify a theater

AME. Operation Provide Relief, as detailed in chapter 3, offers

one example where there was no major flow of forces. A WOC

rather than an AME was subordinated to the joint task force for

daily in-theater airlift requirements.

Two key theater air mobility organizations-the TALCE and the

CCT-while receiving their guidance from the AME, are physically

located on those airfields and assault zones that conduct

operations in direct support of theater forces and strategic air

mobility. The TALCE and the CCT operate where the "rubber

meets the ramp." TALCE and CCT facilitate safe, timely, and

effective movement of aircraft through the airhead. In an austere or

threatened environment, the respective responsibilities of TALCE

and CCT are important to supported forces.

Tanker Airlift Control Element

Like the air mobility element, the tanker airlift control

element is a composite organization, notionally constituted

from its respective cadre unit, the airlift control squadron

(ALCS) or air reserve component airlift control flight (ALCF),

augmented with mission support elements, and comprised of

specialists from both active and air reserve component forces .

The organizational structure of the TALCE roughly "mirrors

that of a typical airlift wing," and, in an operational sense,

12
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND STRUCTURE

possesses the same fundamental capabilities.

12 The TALCE is

to "provide[s] . . . the flexibility to operate where no airlift [and

tanker] support exists . As a critical extension of the [AMC] C2

network, the [T]ALCE cadre provides command leadership and

management of deployed [AMC] Mission Support Forces

(MSF) ." 13 A TALCE provides a spectrum of support to air

mobility forces where AMC operational support is either

nonexistent or inadequate. It includes functional elements for

aircraft maintenance; aerial port operations; crash, fire, rescue

(CFR) ; command, control, and communications (C3) ; weather

observations ; and airfield security. The support equipment of a

TALCE allows it to stand alone in its mission functionally in

most situations . Materials handling equipment for the

uploading, downloading, and handling of airlifted cargo are

part of the TALCE package and may include 25,000- and

40,000-pound handling capability, respectively, for

transporting cargo and equipment, forklifts, aircraft steps, and

wide-bodied aircraft loaders.

In support of the aircraft, the TALCE introduces to the

airfield power generators, air carts, lighting units, suppor

packages for aircraft maintenance (e .g., tire-change kits and

spare components), and CFR vehicles . For command, control,

and communications, the TALCE normally erects its own

mobility air reporting and communications (MARC) module.

The MARC is a collapsible module with controlled environment

that is fully air transportable (C-130 or larger aircraft) . Its

expandable shell contains an array of communications

equipment. It is equipped with a detachable mobilizer

(carriage) for towing during overland movement. The MARC

conducts ground-to-air communications in both the VHF-AM,

UHF-AM, and HF/SSB ranges . It possesses secure SATCOM

(satellite communications) and HIT data-link (GYC-8) . The

MARC module can operate in all but the most extreme

environments.

Like the air mobility element, tanker airlift control elements

are functionally manned by using UTCs as building blocks. ;

Referring to figure 3 as an example, the UTC depicted (i .e., :

7E IABO Mob C2 Element, TALCE MOG 6 or less) is the

command and control element of a TALCE, where the:

operating location will have six or fewer air mobility aircraft

i

1 3

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND STRUCTURE

on the ground at any time . Operations can be conducted 24

hours a day for greater than 30 days at a time. As shown in

figure 4, unit type code 7E IAGO provides the tanker airlift

control element MARC and associated manpower for

equipment maintenance. The mission capabilities statement

included with each UTC identifies additional UTCs to round

out a package. Separate UTCs may be utilized to create an

aircraft maintenance package to match the type of aircraft in

the flow and the maximum (aircraft) on the ground (MOG). The

same utilization holds true for other functional areas needed

to operate an airfield . Where an airfield possesses such

organic assets (as fire-fighting equipment), those associated

UTCs are not tasked . UTCs may be pared down or built up to

meet specfic needs. In the case of operations in an

environment where there exists no organic capability, one

may assemble UTCs for a totally self-contained operation.

In the case where an airfield either lacks competent air traffic

control (ATC) capability or the facility is unable to support the

traffic associated with a contingency's air mobility air flow, an

Air Force combat control team is tasked to perform ATC

duties .

Combat Control Team

Combat control teams are manned by fully qualified air

traffic controllers . They are capable of tactical insertion into

an airfield environment under opposed or unopposed

conditions . These teams are trained parachutists and scuba

divers . Their tactical insertion skills are as broad as those of

the US Army's Special Forces and of the US Navy's SEALS.

They are equipped with a full array of man-portable

communications and navigational aids equipment and can

coordinate and control close air support and AC-130

gunship fire. Their primary mission within the airhead is to

control both fixed-wing and rotary airflow into designated

airfields . In Operation Restore Hope, the combat controllers

established air traffic control at Mogadishu's airport soon

after H-hour and maintained continuous operations until

relieved by a US Marine Corps unit three weeks into the

15

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND STRUCTURE

operation. Combat controllers performed ATC duties throughout the theater with CCT elements positioned on airfields used

by US assets. Their presence assured safe and smooth airflow

in an otherwise chaotic and uncontrolled environment.

Operationally, a combat control team maintains close

liaison with the collocated tanker airlift control element and

coordinates its activities to permit unimpeded flow into and

out of the airfield and the safe and rapid movement and

parking of landed aircraft. TALCEs establish a parking plan

which optimizes the use of available ramp and results in MOG

at any given time . The CCT integrates this parking plan into its

procedures so that aircraft are smoothly sequenced into and

out of parking without conflict or hazard. For the theater

commander of CCT/TALCE operations, the key consequence is

the rapid downloading and reconstituting of forces deployed

into the theater. At the same time it minimizes the time which

crucial air mobility assets are exposed to threats while on the

ground. Another key Air Mobility Command activity on the

airfield is the aeromedical evacuation function.

Aeromedical Evacuation

The theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) function provides

for patient airlift to medical facilities in-theater or, when

in-theater medical support is inadequate, to the rear area. On

a day-to-day basis the aeromedical evacuation control center

(AECC) is the focal point for aeromedical evacuation requests

from the theater components. The requests are validated by the

joint medical regulating authority and tasked through the

AECC. The request is forwarded to the AME as a requirement

for coordinating airlift . When required, the AECC generates an

AE crew and associated life support equipment to assist

patients while in transit between the pickup point and delivery

to a receiving facility.

Conclusion

The air mobility effort in-theater is supported and controlled

by the air mobility element, the tanker airlift control element,

17
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

and combat control teams. Along with the aeromedical

evacuation function, these functional organizations comprise

the Air Mobility Command force structure assigned to the

theater. They respond to the theater commander's requirements

and provide the necessary support to assure timely, effective,

and safe movement of airlifted forces.

Notes

1 . Air Mobility CommandAir Mobility MasterPlan, 15 October 1993, 3-31 .

2. Ibid.

3 . The 701st AMOS is collocated with Twenty-first Air Force at McGuire

AFB, New Jersey, and the 702d AMOS is with Fifteenth Air Force at Travis

AFB, California.

4 . Lt Col Springer, "Position Paper on Air Mobility Element," Air

Mobility Command/ XOOM, 7 July 1993.

5 . Lt Col Springer, "AMMP Operational Task Evaluation: ARC Air

Mobility Element Stand Alone Capability," AMC/DOOCM, 13 July 1993. Air

reserve component forces have the capability to field two AMOSs. The ARC

squadrons would provide the augmentation to flesh out AMEs . 6. Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) Handbook (Scott AFB, Ill . :

Air Mobility School, March 1993), 31 .

7. Idid.

8. Ibid., 32.

9. Ibid., 35.

10. Ibid.

11 . Ibid.

12 . MACR 55-3, MACAirlf Control Elements (ALCE), vol. 4, 21 May 1991, 1 .

13. Ibid.

18
Chapter 3

Operation Restore Hope (Somalia)

A Case Studyfor Airhead Operations

Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, is the largest contingency

operation conducted by the United States since Operation

Desert Shield/Storm. It holds a special significance for Air

Mobility Command as the first major projection of forces by air

mobility assets following command activation on 1 June 1992.

The Background

For the purposes of a case study, Restore Hope is ideal

because it is a microcosm of air mobility contingency

airhead operations under austere conditions in an exacting

environment. The airhead functioned at the end of tenuous

lines of communication (LOC), with a certain degree of threat

always present. Many uncertainties and compounding

difficulties were present in the operating area, and it was a

combined, joint operation requiring flexibility, adaptability,

and a great deal of patience. When concerns which go

beyond strictly operational matters-the problems of

disease, potable water, messing, sanitation, and bedding

down the troops-are brought into the equation, most of the

ingredients of a fully taxing operation are present.

This chapter recapitulates why and how the operation

came about. It examines the situation in-theater, how

problem areas surfaced, and what solutions were applied .

Chapter 3 also explores organizational structure of AMC's

in-theater assets along with the procedures followed in

support of the theater commander's operations . Finally, this

chapter illustrates the interface between air mobility forces

and the supported combatant forces.

Operation Restore Hope began with the television images

of emaciated Somalis, many of them not much more than

walking skeletons, struggling to reach emergency food

19
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

distribution centers before they succumbed to hunger. The

actual causes of the Somali tragedy are rooted, however, in a

civil war which, in the end, caused a country to self-destruct

by precipitating a nearly total collapse of Somali society .

Somalia's disintegration began in 1978 following defeat in

its war with Ethiopia . The Somalis had contested their

neighbor for sovereignty over Ethiopia's Ogaden region, an

area traditionally inhabited by pastoral Somali clans. In the

aftermath of the war, hundreds of thousands of refugees,

from the Somali clans in the Ogaden, poured into Somalia,

overtaxing a nation already exhausted by years of war.

Government favoritism towards some clans at the expense of

others further exacerbated difficult conditions . This condition

led in 1988 to civil war-which amplified the suffering of

civilians, who perished by the thousands-and promoted

nationwide chaos. By January 1991 the government of

Somalia had crumbled, and each of the various rebel factions

began vying for a commanding position in a possible coalition

administration.

Conflicting goals, shortsightedness, greed, and fear acted

against a practical compromise and plunged the factions into

renewed strife . In the midst of fighting, the International

Committee of the Red Cross, Britain's Save the Children

Fund, and France's Doctor's Without Borders assisted the

people of Somalia. The destructive struggle between clans

totally disrupted the country's fragile economy and drove

farmers from their lands . The result was general malnutrition

and the isolation of entire communities from relief supplies .

International organizations-the United Nations (UN), the

Organization for African Unity, the Arab League, and the

Organization of the Islamic Conference-had attempted, with

little success, to implement a cease-fire and the widespread

distribution of humanitarian assistance .' Within a year of

intensified fighting, the thousands who died in battle paled in

comparison to the hundreds of thousands who perished as a

consequence of a famine precipitated not by nature but

through the callous actions of the warring factions . SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali

recognized that only the presence of UN peacekeepers could

protect the aid sent to Somalia from thugs and clan gunmen

20
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

and could assist the humanitarian aid organizations in

delivering food and medicines . In August 1992 the United

Nations took two significant steps towards those goals . It

established an emergency airlift of aid to Somalia and the

deployment of a UN contingent to Mogadishu to protect

supplies in and around the capital.

Initial Operations : Provide Relief

On 14 August President George Bush, in response to an

appeal from the UN secretary-general, directed that the

United States Air Force provide aircraft to assist in the

airlift . Within three days a site survey team, airlifted by a

C-141 from MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, was in

Kenya to prepare the way for C-130s and C-141 s. The relief

effort, code-named Operation Provide Relief, was to operate

out of President Daniel Moi airport in Mombasa, Kenya,

located roughly 200 nautical miles southwest of the Somali

border and approximately two hours' flying time by C-130

transport from Mogadishu's airport. Air Mobility Command's

aircraft, equipment, and personnel began arriving in

Mombasa on the 18th day of August and flew their first relief

mission on the 21st . The initial mission, flown by two

C-130s operated by the 314th Airlift Wing, Little Rock AFB,

Arkansas, delivered humanitarian supplies to Wajir, Kenya.

The community-located close to a military airfield which

maintains a 9,200-foot-long asphalt runway-is situated

conveniently in the vicinity of a Somali refugee center, which

had been established by the Kenyan government. C-141 B

Starlifters joined in the relief airlift to Wajir, delivering 1,567

metric tons and flying 57 missions. 2

United States Central Command, which had responsibility

for conducting the operation, elected to discontinue C-141

operations in early September and to utilize C-130 assets

only. The full complement of C-130s (14) for Operation

Provide Relief were in place by 20 September. Airlift

missions into Somalia began in late August with delivery of

supplies at Belet Uen (figs . 5A-B) . Operations into Somalia

were flown in a completely uncontrolled environment where

21
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

I, LZ NAME Z LOCATION

LANDING Helot Uen aelet Uen, Somalia

ZONE

SURVEY 3 .MAPSERIES ISHEET NUMBER IEDITION IDATE OFMAP

Series 1501 Sheet NB 38-15 Edition 1-GSGS 1971

4. SURVEY APPROVALIDISAPPROVAL DATA

IA. DATE SURVEYED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF SURVEYOR PHONE NUMDER(AUrOVON) UNIT

23 Aug 92 John C . Cummings Maj AV579-4245 720 STG

40, DATE REVIEWED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWER PHONE NUMBER(AUTOVON) SIGNATURE

UNIT AND LOCATION

4C DATE TYPED NAMEANDGRADE OFAPPROVING AUTHORITY PNONENUMBER(AUTOVON) SIGNATURE

APPROVED DISAPPROVED UNIT AND LOCATION

6. COORDINATING ACTIVITIES

LZ CONTROLLING AGENCY OR UNIT PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON)

None N/A

RANGE CONTROL PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON)

None N/A

6. LZ MENTIONS Feet

A. LENGTH BWIDTH CAPPROACHENDOVERRUNLENGTH D DEPARTURE END OVERRUN LENGTH

5700 feet 79 feet Rwy 23 1000ft Rwy 05 100ft

E LEFT CLEAR ZONE F LEFT SHOULDER 0. RIGHT CLEAR ZONE H. RIGHT SHOULDER

35 feet 0 35 ft 0

7. LZ AXIS DATA

A. MAGNETIC BGRID (UTM) C TRUE D. DATE OF VARIATION DATA

045/225

9 . GROUND POINT ELEVATION A APPROACH END B DEPARTURE END GHIGHEST

FOR RUNWAY

556

9. LZ COORDINATES

A . SPHEROID BGRID ZONE C. EASTINO D. NORTHING

UTMCOORDINATES LATITUDE LoNGm1DE(DyAIS)

LZ

LE. f

CENTERPONT 04 .43 .98 N 045.11 .28 E

10. LZ SURFACE DATA

ASURFACE crushed rock and aCBR C.METHODUSEDTODETERMINECBR D.

DEPTH

0111 DNIGS

hard packed sand

11 . LZ CLEARANCE AND GRADIENT DATAFOR RUNWAY

AGLIDE SLOPE RATIO 0. LATERAL SAFTY ZONE SLOPE RATIO LONGITUDINAL RUNWAY ORAOIENT

D. TRANSVERSE SECTION GRADIENTS

LEFT CLEAR ZONE LEFT SHOULDER RUNWAY RIGHT 14OULDER RIGHT CLEAR ZONE

E PENETRATIONS

1 . Numerous 6-10 foot trees/brush penetrate the clear zone for a standard approach to

runway 23 . Recommend displaced threshold 500 feet, no waiver required .

2 . Numerous 6-10 foot trees/brush penetrate the clear area for the first 1500 feet of runway

23 . Nearest trees approximately 60 feet from centerline. Recommend approval of waiver

for day C-130 use.

3 . An 18 foot tall wind sock is located approximately 60 foot from end of runway marker

rwy 23 (approach 05) . The ICRC representative agreed to move this windsock 100 meters west .

If moved, no waiver required .

4 . Trees/brush described in #2 above penetrate lateral safty zone .

Recommend a waiver for day C-130 operations

Source : MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey, 23 August 1992.

Figure 5A. Belet Uen Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone Survey)

22

AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

AMC aircraft operated alongside German Air Force C-160

Transalls, nongovernment organization relief aircraft, and

many small, privately operated aircraft . The last group

provided transportation for those who could afford it to and

from the outlying areas, and provided a conduit for the daily

delivery of fresh qaat . Qaat, a regionally grown plant, is a

popular mild narcotic openly sold and used throughout the

Horn of Africa. While many thousands were dying for want of

food and medicines, the qaat always got through. Belet Uen

airfield, located 160 nautical miles north of Mogadishu, is

typical of Somalia's outlying airstrips . Its 5,700-foot-long

runway is surfaced with hard-packed dirt and is rutted. The

airfield was minimally maintained by the International

Committee of the Red Cross and often had camels and people

wandering along the runway . 3 Whatever its shortcomings,

the airfield was near many famished Somalis, who would

otherwise probably die . This scenario was equally true for

the other airfields used by Provide Relief C- 130s .

Somalis gathered in outlying relief centers collocated with

airstrips, because they were physically unable (hostile clans

blocked their passage) or unwilling to travel to Mogadishu,

where the port's warehouses were being filled with relief

supplies . By 5 September C- 130s began to airland at

Baidoa, where another major relief center was established,

as shown in figures 6A-B .

Baidoa was one of a few hard-surfaced runways built in

the 1970s by Soviet engineers during Somalia's honeymoon

with the Soviet Union. Somali MiGs operating from Baidoa

attacked targets in the nearby Ogaden while Somalia was at

war with Ethiopia . The 6,400-foot-long asphalt runway had

suffered from years of neglect and had begun to show signs

of deterioration soon after the C-130s made regular deliveries

there . The problem of runway breakup increasingly influenced

operations as the emergency airlift continued .

Violence in the port area severely handicapped relief

operations in Mogadishu. Clans vied for control of the relief

supplies, because they were a source of power over rival

clans which were unable to secure foodstuffs for their own

needs. Convoys leaving the port were often attacked and

hijacked . Although the Provide Relief airlift was helping to

24
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

, . LZ NAME 1. LOCATION

LANDING Baidoa Baydhabo, Samalia

ZONE

SURVEY 9 MAP SERIES ISHEET NUMBER IEDITION IDATE OFMAP

Series TFC Sheet L-6D edition 2-GSGS Sept 86

4. SURVEY APPROVAUDISAPPROVAL DATA

4A DATE SURVEYED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF SURVEYOR PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON) UNIT

19 Aug 92 John C . Cummings AV579-4245 720 STG/DO

40 DATE REVIEWED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWER PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON) SIGNATURE

21 Aug 92 Adam M. Mlot AV731-3988

UNIT AND LOCATION

314 AW, Little Rock AFB, Ar

4C DATE TYPEDNAMEAN)ORADEOFAPPROVINOAUTHORITY PHONENUMMR(AUTOVON) 610NATURE

26 Aug 92 George N. Williams, Col 486-4564

APPROVED DISAPPROVED UNITANOLOCATION

r.7 317 AW, Pope AFB, NC

5. COORDINATING ACTIVITIES

LZ CONTROLLING AGENCY OR VNT PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON)

None N/A

RANGE CONTROL PHONE NUMBER (AUTOVON)

None N/A

6. LZ MENTIONS (Feel)

A. LENGTH B WIDTH C. APPROACH END OVERRUN LENGTH D DEPARTURE END OVERRUN LENGTH

10,007 Ft 131 Ft None None

E LEFT CLEAR ZONE F. LEFT SHOULDER G. RIOMT CLEAR ZOlE H RIGHT SMOULDER

None None None None

7. LZ AXIS DATA

A . MAGNETIC G GRID (UTM) C. TRUE D DATE OF VARIATION DATA

0400 /220 0

6. GROUND POINT ELEVATION A. APPROACH END RDEPARTURE END C HIGHEST

FORRUNWAY 1520 Ft

9. LZ COORDINATES

A SPHEROID B. ORB) ZONE C. EASTING D NORTHING

Not available 38N 34 34

E

UTMCOORDINATES LATITUDE PM/S) LONGITUDE(DUS

03 .06 .00 N 43 .39 .00 F DENTErsarlr

10 . LZ SURFACEDATA

A.6URFACE ABphalt/looBe RCeR C.METH0006EDTODE-INECBR D.DEPTHOFIEADIN06

ravel

11 . LZ CLEARANCE AND GRADIENT DATA FOR RUNWAY

A. GLIDE SLOPE RATIO B. LATERAL 6AFTYZONE SLOPE RATIO LONGITUDINAL RUNWAY GRADIENT

D. TRANSVERSE SECTION GRADIENTS

LEFT CLEAR ZONE LEFT SHOULDER RUNWAY RGHTSHOULDER

E . PENETRATIONS

1 .Trees/brush 2-30 feet tall penetrate runway clear zones both directions.

2 .Aircrew should displace landing as required to avoid trees. No waiver

required due to usable runway length .

3 .Trees/brush 2-10 feet tall penetrate lateral safety zones on both sides

of the runway . Recommend waiver for day VFR C-130 landings .

4 .Two 75 foot towers penetrate the runway approach zone for landings on

runway 22 . Recommend waiver approval . (Towers are painted red and white

and are approximately 500-600 feet left of centerline approach .)

Source : MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey, 19 August 1992 .

Figure 6A . Baidoa Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone Survey)

25
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

12. LZ DIAGRAM / 13 . REMARKS

NOTE' : SURYEY COtPLETED

WITH ONLY 36 N49IrTES

ON TUC 6ICOoND AND

RrTTTKiCD moveNfRNT

TDtXADOWN -z-al~

RWY o4 cua.KEb

VIA HI," SP6'EU

VEHICLE ONLY.

SNOuLb BE URZ"LLY

CILMrEb T IbOR To

TOWAI

Q,0

0

o

P

e

1°

QG) '

a0 Q

~ QO p0

o p

OQ

a

0

0~pt 80

OMO

3 op

~4 0

D

`

1

Do

0 ~0 0,

Q Leo

Q 03~

LZ NAME

Baidoa, Somalia

1 . Contact ICRC Call Sign "Bravo India"

on 132 .5 for current situation and

winds prior to landing . Radios are

small hand held bricks w/ limited

range .

2 . Recommend aircraft carry tire

change equipment due to the

probability of tire damage from small

arms shell casings and other foreign

objects on runway .

3 . Asphalt surface is deteriorating .

Surface is cracked/rutted 1000 to

1500 ft from touchdown rwy 22 .

4 . Runway incorrectly marked 03/21 .

5 . Touchdown markers/centerline

partially covered with up to 1-2

inches of loose gravel .

6 . Two 75 foot radio towers left

of final approach to rwy 22 (in

town) . Sot 1/4 mile from runway.

7 . Terrain generally flat for 15NM

around airfield .

8 . Brush/small trees 2-10 ft tall

surround rwy & taxiway. No

shoulders .

9 . Recommend low pass due to the

probability of livestock, camels

and/or people on the runway .

l0 .Recommend runway check

for asphalt damage

after each landing.

11 .Recommend landing 04

due to radio towers,

broken asphalt, & since

offload point in NE

end of airfield .

12 .Prevailing wind 0400

or 2200 .

13 .Turn around area

approx 170 x 117 ea .

end of airfield .

14 .Former Soviet fighter

airfields .

15 . Roofs removed

from all bldgs

on airfield

and in town.

Personnel

16 .should not

enter taxiways

without an

escort .

p

OA Q

I

V-A1dR

INDP)

L -2j Q11 Rutlwll

14. PHOTOGRAPHY AVAILABLE Low LEVEL ROUTES

YES o NO i] NONE AVAILAKE

ROUTE NAMEIDESIGNATOR

Source: MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey, 19 August 1992 .

Figure 613 . Baidoa Airfield, Somalia

26
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

alleviate the hunger, the various relief agencies needed, for

the long term, to bring shiploads of supplies into the ports

and then move them by road into the hinterland .

In August 1992 the United Nations negotiated an

agreement with the warring factions to allow a UN force to

enter Somalia and protect relief supplies . The Pakistani army

battalion selected for the mission in Mogadishu required airlift

for its troops and equipment, including armored personnel

carriers . The airlift, code-named Operation Impressive Lift,

was flown by Air Mobility Command C-5 Galaxys and C-141s

into Mogadishu International Airport, as illustrated in figures

7A-B . Between the 13th and 16th of September and from the

21st through the 29th of September, 974 passengers and

1,168 tons of equipment were airlifted in 94 missions . 4

The Pakistani forces soon proved unable to do much more

than secure the airport and port facilities . They were

practically under siege by Somali clan forces and were unable

to have much impact on the movement of relief supplies . The

death rate for refugees increased to 300 each day, while the

images of their suffering was shown nightly on televisions

around the world. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali

appealed to President Bush to commit protective forces to

Somalia before millions perished of malnutrition.

On 26 November the president ordered up to 30,000 troops in

support of relief operations in Somalia. The UN Security Council,

on 3 December, passed its resolution on Somalia authorizing

military intervention. The resolution stated, in part, that

"Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede

delivery of humanitarian supplies . . . within Somalia, and . . .

reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people

[and] attacks on aircraft and ships . . . welcomes the offer by a

member state [the United States] concerning the establishment

of an operation to create . . . a secure environment. "5

The Crisis Action Process

The troubling developments in Somalia held special interest

to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

because the country is located within its AOR, as portrayed in

27


AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

figure 8. Events there had been under continuous review as

part of the command's. situation monitoring, and

USCENTCOM's concerns were reported to the National

Military Command Center (NMCC) . The difficulties in Somalia

were perceived "[A]s potentially having an adverse impact on

United States national interests and national security ." 6

One of the specific objectives of US national security strategy is

the "global and regional stability which encourages peaceful

change and progress ."? It was within the context of this strategy

that the commitment of military forces and resources were

being considered . As a consequence, phase one (i .e., situation

development) of the Joint Planning and Executive Community's

(JPES) crisis action procedures were initiated early on. 8
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Commander in chief, US Central Command (CINCCENT),

who was the combatant commander if a military operation

were directed, communicated, as a part of the process, his

assessment of the situation to the JCS and included the

COA he was considering. During phase one the CJCS

informed the national command authorities of his

assessment. In the last week of November, crisis assessment

entered phase two. The time-critical planning process was

begun in earnest, and communications between the Joint

Staff and USCENTCOM increased significantly. At this time

the NCA "identified the national interests at stake, the

national objectives related to those interests ; and possible

[o]ptions to achieve the objectives ." 9

On 1 December phase three, the Course of Action

Development phase, was initiated . The CJCS published his

warning order in which he "established command

relationships ; defined tasks, objectives, and constraints ." 10

CINCCENT Gen Joseph P. Hoar was formally tasked to

develop possible courses of action and to submit his

Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The following day

(i .e ., phase four, the Course of Action Selection phase), the

CINC's COA was presented to the NCA and approved. In the

early afternoon, Gen Colin Powell, CJCS, issued his planning

order and tasked CINCCENT to complete his OPORD. 12 Five

hours after issuing his planning order, General Powell

directed initial deployments with a deploy order (with a

date-time group of 022335Z Dec 92).

Execution Planning, phase five of crisis action planning,

was completed late on 4 December, when General Hoar

issued his OPORD (050100Z Dec 92) for Operation Restore

Hope. The final phase, Execution, was completed when the

NCA authorized and CJCS issued an execute order (051823Z

Dec 92) and forces began moving . This phase was the formal

commencement of Operation Restore Hope . General Hoar

designated Lt Gen Robert B. Johnston, United States Marine

Corps, as commander of Joint Task Force Somalia

(Operation Restore Hope) . He was assigned elements of his

own unit, the First Marine Expeditionary Force, based at

Camp Pendleton, California ; units of the 10th Mountain

Division, based at Camp Drum, New York; and the 15th

31
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)-the

15th MEU(SOC) .

Brig Gen Thomas R. Mikolajcik, commander of the 437th

Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, South Carolina, was appointed

as commander, joint task force (CJTF) and commander, Air

Force Forces (COMAFFOR) . General Mikolajcik, who proceeded

on 30 November to General Johnston's headquarters at Camp

Pendleton, was to command AMC personnel deploying to

Somalia and Kenya as members of CJTF Somalia. The 1701st

Mobility Support Squadron, McGuire AFB, New Jerseyredesignated the 701st Air Mobility Operations Squadron on

1 January 1993-was alerted on 1 December for possible

deployment to the Horn of Africa.

Restore Hope:

Operations in the Theater

General Hoar's initial concept of operations for Operation

Restore Hope envisioned four phases (fig. 9) :

Phase 1 : Secure Mogadishu airfield and seaport with afloat

Marine forces and secure Baidoa.

Phase 2 : Deploy United Task Force, Somalia (UNITAF)

forces into Baidoa and expand security operations into central

Somalia.

Phase 3 : Expand security operations to the south to

include Kismayo and Badera.

Phase 4 : Transition from UNITAF to United Nations

Operation, Somalia J1 . 13

Each of the phases required major airhead activity. Aside from

the initial landing from off-shore naval vessels, most of the

forces and a significant amount of equipment would be

airlanded . Gen Thomas Mikolajcik was responsible for

maintaining "reliable airlift in support of US military, United

Nations and nongovernmental humanitarian relief

operations." 14 The 1701st MOBSS and subordinate TALCE

would be the key theater air mobility units in support of this

tasking.

32

AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

The Deployment of Forces

The crisis action planning process, as mentioned

previously, was in phase four on 2 December, when the

deploy order was issued late in the evening. The 1701st

MOBSS, which would form the core of the theater's AME,

needed to be in-theater as early as possible to assure that

the theater-end of the air bridge was operated effectively.

An especially important requirement for the 1701 st's TALCE

cadre was the establishment of airhead operations on

Mogadishu airport in time to cycle inbound aircraft

through quickly and safely.

The deploying elements of 1st Marine Expeditionary

Forces already were being prepared at Camp Pendleton

and would soon be directed to March AFB, California, for

processing and loading on aircraft . In the early hours of 3

December, the 1701 st's advanced party of 57 personnel

and mission-essential equipment was loaded on board two

438th Airlift Wing C-141Bs. They departed McGuire AFB,

New Jersey, at 0600 local and, after nearly 16 hours of

flight and two en route air refuelings, arrived at Mombasa,

Kenya.

Col Walt Evans, the 1701st commander and the theater's

director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), began almost

immediately to prepare for operations in Somalia. Joint Task

Force Provide Relief had been operating out of Mombasa

since August and had amassed data on airfields and

conditions inside Somalia. Colonel Evans, with his chief of

AME operations and TALCE division chief, used available

information to develop a plan of action in support of the

impending airlift . The team then traveled to different

airfields within Somalia to gather firsthand impressions of

the operating environment. From research, onsite

inspections, and intensive planning, Colonel Evans was

prepared to commence operations immediately upon arrival

in Mogadishu. His TALCE division chief mapped out an

inclusive plan for Mogadishu airport. This plan maximized

hard surface utilization, accommodated air mobility support

functions, and identified and anticipated problem areas and

obstacles to safe operations .

34
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Mogadishu Airhead Operations

On 8 December Colonel Evans received confirmation that

his air mobility element would be inserted into Mogadishu the

following morning. The AME's attached combat control team

(CCT) element already had been flown by helicopter out to the

USS Tripoif, an amphibious assault ship carrying 23

helicopters, waiting offshore with the 15th MEU(SOC) on

board. In the early hours of 9 December, the 15th MEU,

commanded by Col Gregory S. Newbold, came ashore to secure

the airport and then control points within the city. The Air

Force CCT element, led by TSgt Pat Moulton of the 624th

Combat Control Squadron, was transported by a US Marine

Corps CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter onto the airport ramp,

where they immediately established air traffic control over the

airfield . Within a few hours the AME, on board the two C-141s

they had first flown to Mombasa, airlanded on Mogadishu

airport.

The two TALCE cadre quickly downloaded the aircraft with

a 10K forklift they had brought in and then cleared wreckage

from the ramp area and knocked down obstacles to taxiing

aircraft . Under normal airport operating procedures, the

obstacles would not have hindered taxiing aircraft. With the

planned maximum use of hard surfaces, however, the

wingtips of C-5s, 747s, and other large aircraft would be

swung out, well over the adjacent dirt surfaces, into an area

blocked by lampposts erected parallel to the ramp edges. SSgt

Joe Santor, the AME's staff combat controller, and the TALCE

officer then ran the length of the runway to check for damage,

debris, and obstacles . Shortly after returning to the ramp the

two marshalled in the first of the French C- 130s arriving with

French Foreign Legionnaires from Djibouti .

Operations at the airport were sorely tested by the presence

of thousands of Somalis, who gathered on the ramp out of

curiosity and the hope that interclan fighting would be

brought to an end. Despite the efforts of the Marine security

forces, Somalis were soon walking across the runway and

every corner of the airport. Later that morning the Somalis

were pushed back to the airport wall, where they would no

longer pose an immediate threat to operations . In the

35
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

afternoon two C-5s arrived from Rhein-Main Air Base,

Germany, with the 362d Airlift Control Squadron's TALCE on

board. They brought with them materiels handling equipment,

aircraft generators, light carts, and a complete and

self-contained command and control module: the MAC Airlift

Control Element Reactions Communications .

Attached to the TALCE were aircraft maintenance personnel

for C-141 s, C-5s, and KC-1 Os . Within a day they had

measured out parking spots and taxi routes and developed

parking plans for a mixture of the various strategic airlift

aircraft and commercial 747s and DC-10s and C-130s. Aerial

port personnel set up a freight yard as a holding area for cargo

removed from aircraft but awaiting pickup. A

passenger-holding area was designated, and procedures for

movement on the ramp were established . When CFR trucks

and crews arrived, they too were integrated into the airfield

operation. Airfield operations were quickly extended to 24

hours, when the combat controllers set a temporary lighting

system for the runway.

While the Rhein-Main TALCE was establishing its operation,

the AME TALCE officer visited with Col Gregory S. Newbold,

Marine forces commander, to address requirements . The air

mobility population was dependent upon the host military

force for replenishment of rations, potable water, and fuels.

The last item was critical to continued airlift support

operations on the airfield . The forklifts and aircraft loaders

each consumed between one and two gallons of diesel fuel per

hour of operation. CFR trucks and ramp vehicles added to the

diesel requirements . Additionally, a few pieces of equipment

consumed gasoline.

Colonel Newbold was primarily concerned, at that point,

with area security. His Marine expeditionary unit, the 15th

MEU(SOC), manned by approximately 1,800 Marines, was

primarily responsible for pushing into Mogadishu, where it

was to seize the former US Embassy compound. The

reinforcements inbound from Camp Pendleton, which were

needed if the operation were to continue unimpeded, were

dependent, however, upon a TALCE operation which rapidly

processed aircraft through the airport. Newbold, focusing

immediately on the importance of keeping the airfield fully

36
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

operational, had his S-4 respond to the TALCE's needs. A less

responsive commander would have soon asked why the

inbound forces were not flowing in on schedule. Gasoline was

not stored on board the support ships. For this requirement he

secured a drum in Mogadishu from one of the local merchants .

The other important issue was coordination for emergency

medical evacuations . There was, incredibly, no formal

mechanism preplanned for evacuating wounded personnel to

facilities outside the theater.

Colonel Newbold had access to in-theater medical facilities

on the USS Tripolf, an amphibious assault ship standing

offshore . He extended his tactical radio net to include Air Force

operations on the airfield so that air mobility personnel would

have rapid access to medical evacuation helicopters and

medics . The only FM-compatible radio available to the air

mobility forces was a PRC-77 possessed by the CCT. Therefore,

wounded or injured air mobility personnel could be

helo-evacuated by Marine CH-46s to the ship, and if marines

needed to be evacuated on an AMC medical evacuation

configured aircraft to full medical facilities outside the theater,

they could coordinate with the TALCE. The offshore facilities,

onboard task force naval vessels, provided valuable support in

one other way.

Two 316A Cochran loaders, a prerequisite to download KC-10

Extender aircraft, arrived in Mogadishu with a bracket missing

from each one. Fortunately, the absent brackets were identical to

others shipped with the equipment. A Marine helicopter crew

chief took the remaining brackets out to the USS T - iPOIL where

perfect copies were fabricated in the ship's machine shop.

The airflow into Somalia, in support of the force deployment,

required substantial runways to accommodate strategic airlift

and commercial aircraft; accessible and sizable hard-surfaced

ramps to facilitate rapid movement and offload; and a degree

of certainty that aircraft could land and depart on or near

scheduled time . Mogadishu airport presented several

challenges to operations . It possessed a single, concrete

runway, 10,335 feet in length and 150 feet in width. Runway,

taxiway, and ramp lighting no longer existed. The airport

commercial ramp, extended just a few years before by an

Italian construction company, was large enough for the low
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

level of commercial jet activity before the Somali civil war. Its

size (roughly 1,300 by 400 feet with structures on one side)

allowed one jumbo-sized aircraft (C-5, 747, or DC-10) to

operate on it at the same time as two C-141 s and a few light

aircraft. It was, however, limited by a single entry and exit

taxiway. Another ramp, on the northeast end of the runway,

was serviced, likewise, by a single taxiway, which had begun

to show signs of deterioration . If an aircraft were unable to

depart a ramp area because of maintenance, or any other

problems, the number of aircraft which could then transit the

airfield would be reduced, thus seriously impacting a tightly

structured flow.

Additional limiting factors acted to handicap the planned

airflow. There were no airport navigational aids to assist the

crews in locating the airfield or in executing the approach . Nor

did an en route air traffic control network exist to separate

aircraft over Somalia. In addition, neither aircraft fuels nor

ground support equipment were available. The dirt surfaces

along the hard surface edges were overgrown in many places

with large, bush-sized vegetation . Just outside the airport,

bands of clan fighters armed with AK-47s and crew-serviced

weapons posed a threat to airfield operations . The initial

strategic airflow into Somalia coincided with the rainy season,

which had a real potential to interfere with aircraft traffic

approaching the airport environment. Activities at the airport,

on the first day of Restore Hope operations, were capped off in

the evening with a torrential downpour, which halted the

airflow.

The austereness of the airfield environment precipitated

another problem area. As units poured into Mogadishu, many,

out of necessity or convenience, established their operations

on the airport proper, closing in around the runway and hard

surface areas . From the perspective of airland operations, air

mobility activities needed to have primacy on the airport. From

the viewpoint of many other organizations the ramp areas and

airport environment offered easy communications with

transiting aircraft and a sense of security. For rotary-wing

aircraft, the hard-surfaced ramps provided a clean

environment and a relatively easy area from which to operate .

Unfortunately, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters do not

38
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

operate together well . The helicopters tend to blow debris

into engine intakes, and jet blast is threatening to helos.

Where space is limited, the fixed-wing aircraft cannot

operate without adequate hard surface but the helicopters

can land, take off, and park on soil. The most sensible

resolution of the helicopter problem was to move them

away from the ramp areas, which was done soon at

Mogadishu.

With so many units establishing operations at the airport,

a single manager of real estate was necessary. Col Charles

Russell-a Headquarters Air Mobility Command logistician

who arrived a few days after commencement of the

operational phase of Operation Restore Hope to

Mogadishu-quickly grasped the mushrooming problem.

General Mikolajcik, who had arrived with General Johnston

on the 10th, already had recognized this same problem and

appointed Colonel Russell, soon after his arrival, to be

"mayor" of Mogadishu airport. Colonel Russell mapped out

land use and then, with a touch of diplomacy and a strong

shove when necessary, began to realize effective use of his

real estate . As other participating nations sent their forces

into Mogadishu, Colonel Russell integrated them into his

plan . He soon had personnel and units from Turkey, Italy,

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Morocco,

Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada,

Pakistan, Botswana, Nigeria, and France making the best

use of a limited asset. Besides the air mobility units, there

were several US Marine support units, one US Navy

construction battalion, and US Army and civilian agencies .

Another area of concern was the billeting of air force

personnel . When the AMC units first arrived on the airfield,

they took shelter in a derelict hangar filled with the debris

of what had been Air Somalia. As the air force community

grew from the first 57 personnel on 9 December to

hundreds within the next two weeks, the acquisition of a

tent city and sanitary facilities became a priority. Colonel

Russell-working with General Mikolajcik-secured

shelters from US Air Forces, Central Command, resources.

Not until nearly Christmas did everyone deployed to the

theater receive reasonable shelter.

39
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Airhead Operations outside Mogadishu

The US Army's 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry

unit, began moving equipment and troops to Griffiss AFB, New

York, from Camp Drum in preparation for their deployment

into airheads at Bale Dogle and Kismayu (figs . l0A-B and

11A-B) . In anticipation of their insertion, US Marine forces

moved overland and by helicopter to Bale Dogle to secure it on

13 December. In the 1970s Bale Dogle served as a Soviet

fighter air base and probably had not been repaired since.

Through deterioration, its 10,500-foot-long asphalt runway

had been reduced to a usable length of 6,000 feet, barely

enough for C-141 operations . 15 Immediately after the airfield

was secured, C-141 s, which had departed Travis AFB,

California, with a 60th Airlift Control Squadron TALCE on

board, airlanded. The TALCE then began operations in

support of C-141s arriving from Griffiss AFB, New York, with

elements of the 10th Mountain Division. On 16 December the

Marine forces continued on to secure Baidoa, another former

Soviet fighter base . As a consequence of the rapid forward

movement of US Marine forces, humanitarian relief sectors

were established, and Phase I of the CINC's concept of

operations was completed (fig. 12) .

In preparation for Phase II, Air Force CCT survey teams

evaluated Belet Uen, Gialalassi, and Oddur airfields. On 17

December the AME TALCE officer inspected Kismayu and

certified it for use by C-5 and C-141 aircraft. Navy Seabees

came ashore with equipment and scraped away the heavy

growth of vegetation, which hugged the runway edges and

taxiways .

The Air Mobility Element

Lt Gen Robert B. Johnston had selected the grounds of the

former US Embassy as the site for his headquarters in

Somalia. The COMAFFOR, General Mikolajcik, would locate

his staff and the AME there as well (fig. 13) . Until the embassy

compound was declared secure, the AME operated out of a

derelict hangar on Mogadishu airport, where they maintained

satellite communications (SATCOM) with AMC's tanker airlift

control center (TALC) at Scott AFB, Illinois .

40
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

I. LZ NAME 2. LOCATION

LANDING Hale Dogle LZ Hale Dogle Airfield, Somalia

ZONE

SURVEY 8. MAP SERES SHEET NUMBER EDITION I DATE OF MAP

TPC, L-6D, 2-GSGS, 1986

4 . SURVEY APPROVALIDISAPPROVAL DATA

4A. DATE SURVEYED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF SURVEYOR PHONE NUMBER (AUrOVON) UNIT

10 Dec 92 Jack King, MSgt 314 CCS

413. DATE REVIEWED TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWER PHONE NUMBGR(AUTOVON) )NATURE

UNIT AND LOCATION

4C. DATE TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF APPROVING AUTHORITY PHONE NUMBER (AIROVON) SIGNATURE

15 Dec 92 Evans, Walter S . Col N/A

APP ED DISAPPROVED UNIT AND LOCATION

1, 0 1701 MOB AM Mogadishu SO

S . COORDINATING ACTIVITIES

LZ CONTROLLING AGENCY OR UNIT PHONE HUMBER(AUTOVON)

None N/A

RANGE CONTROL PHONE NUMBER(AUTOVON)

None N/A

6. LZ MENTIONS (F"1)

A . LENGTH R WIDTH C. APPROACH END OVERRUN LENGTH D. DEPARTURE END OVERRUN LENGTH

6000 , useable 131' 300 , 300'

E LEFT CLEAR ZONE F. LEFT SHOULDER 0. RGHT CLEAR ZONE H . RIGHT SHOULDER

35' 10 , 35' 10

7. LZ AXIS DATA

A MAGNETIC aGRID (UTM) C TRUE D DATE OF VARIATION DATA

040 0 /220 0 N/A 0400/220 0 1989

B. GROUND POINT ELEVATION AAPPROACH END R. DEPARTURE END C.HIGHEST

FORRUNWAY 300' MSL 300' MSL 300 MSL

9 . LZ COORDINATES

A. SPHEROID RGRIDZONE C. D.

International 39N -"4'No NORTH" 2

UTMCOORDINATES LATITUDE (DWS) E .

CFNTERPOINT XT766957 02 0 41' 00" N

r6'

NOTNDE(W+V6)

44 0 47' 00" 9

10. LZ SURFACE DATA

A . SURFACE 0.CBR C. METHOD USED TO DETERMINE CBR D. DEPTH OF READINGS

Asphalt N/A N/A N/A

11 . LZ CLEARANCE AND GRADIENT DATA FOR RUNWAY

A. GLIDE SLOPE RATIO a LATERAL SAFTYZONE SLOPE RATIO LONGITUDINAL RUNWAY GRADIENT

35 :1 7s1 0%

D. TRANSVERSE SECTION ORADIGNTS

LE" CLEAR ZONE LEFT SHOULDER RUNWAY ROHT SHOULDER FIGHT 0.EARZONE

0% Ok 0% 0% 0%

E . PENETRATIONS

Source : MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey, 10 December 1992.

Figure 10A. Bale Dogle Airfield, Somalia (Landing Zone Survey)

41



On 12 December the embassy compound, which had been used

by clan leader Gen Mohommed Farrah Aidid, was declared secure.

The main body of AME personnel, which had arrived by C-5s on

10 December, brought with them a MARC module and

expandable shelters for the AME operations center . The

equipment was towed to the embassy grounds and quickly erected

next to the combined joint task force headquarters . The

organizational arrangement placed Col Walter Evans, as

DIRMOBFOR, directly under the AFFOR (figs. 14 and 15) . Evans'

45

AME controlled air mobility operations for the entire theater.

Among them were the aeromedical evacuation control center; the

aerial port control center; command and control for AMC assets

(and certain attached coalition assets); and aircraft scheduling for

eight USAF and two British C-130s based at Mombasa, Kenya,

and three New ZealandAir Force C-748 Andover aircraft operating

from Mogadishu. Subordinate to Colonel Evans were his division

chiefs for theater combat control activities and TALCE operations

throughout the theater. Assisting Colonel Evans was Col Dayre

Lias, the deputy DIRMOBFOR Other functional areas included

tactics, the ground liaison office, logistics, safety, weather, and

intelligence.

C-130 intratheater airlift heretofore had been scheduled by

JTF Provide Reliefs wing operations center (WOC), located on

Mombasa's Daniel Moi airport. JTF Provide Relief was made

subordinate to CJTF Somalia, and the responsibility for

scheduling and command and control of the aircraft was

47
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

assumed on 14 December, by the AME. On 19 December a

TALCE team, detached from the Mogadishu TALCE,

established operations at Kismayu .

On the 20th, C-5s and C-141 s began arriving with Belgian

commandos and elements of the 10th Mountain Division. As

operations progressed, CCT elements and aerial port forklifts

with operators were sent into Bardera and Baidoa to

facilitate aircraft movement and to download . In a short time

the AME was able to control airfield operations throughout

central and southern Somalia and to support the arrival of

approximately 21,000 US troops and the forces of Belgium,

Botswana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Turkey, and other

participating nations .

As the tempo of operations increased, the demands on

intratheater airlift increased as well. A key purpose of forces

in-theater was to make possible the safe overland transportation

of relief supplies . The transition period between initial force

employment and the eventual realization of reasonably secure

land routes placed heavy demands on the available airlift . The

theater C-130s continued their original mission by delivering

relief supplies and added the transportion of forces to their

taskings. Those who felt that delivering relief supplies took

priority over troop movements were not pleased when aircraft

were tasked to shuttle units to various locations. Pressure from

the different users of intratheater airlift to commit aircraft to their

specific tasks emanated from misunderstandings on how aircraft

are allocated. General Mikolajcik tried, with limited success, to

force users to use properly the CJTF Somalia joint movement

control center (JMCC), which was controlled by the task force's

J-4 (fig. 16) . In theory, components should first validate and

prioritize their requests for airlift internally and then forward

them to the JMCC. The JMCC should then act as the single

agency for collecting, prioritizing, and validating

transportation requests . The result would be assignment of

airlift, where it is necessary, in order of priority . However,

what happened too often was that "organizations submitted

air movement requests with no real validation process ; each

request was validated for air movement even though, from

our perspective [the COMAFFOR] alternate means of

transportation would have been more efficient." 16

48
Intratheater Airlift

To meet the needs of units located near the various airfields,

the AME current operations division designed a shuttle

system . Each day, channel STAR missions would be scheduled

through the different airfields for opportune cargo and/or

passenger movement (fig . 17) . Aircraft were no longer

committed to carrying nonpriority cargo and troops at the

expense of other units' needs-they would be moved on a

first-come, first-serve basis. The result was that the limited

49
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

number of aircraft were utilized more effectively. The system

also encouraged units to move their nonpriority assets more

economically overland. The AME had operational control over

the three New Zealander Andovers, the two British C- 130s,

and the USAF C-130s at Mombasa, Kenya (increased on 16

December to 12 and eventually to a high of 14) . The various

aircraft allowed current operations schedulers a degree of

flexibility in meeting taskings . As the AME solved problems

in one area, however, other problems soon surfaced .

Daily Itinerary

Channel STAR Missions

Load Type : Opportune Cargo or Passengers

REACH 163 MORNING STAR

ETA L/Z FLY ICAO GRND ETD L/Z

HKMO 0301/0001

0500/0200 2+00 HCMM 1+00 0600/0300

0615/0315 0+15 HCIX 0+30 0645/0345

0700/0400 0+15 HCMB 0+30 0730/0430

0800/0500 0+30 HCMM 1+00 0900/0600

1000/0700 1+00 HCMK 0+30 1030/0730

1145/0845 1+15 HKMO TERM

REACH 00340 EVENING STAR

ETA L/Z FLY ICAO GRND ETD L/Z

HKMO 1200/0900

1315/1015 1+15 HCMK 0+30 1345/1045

1445/1145 1+00 HCMM 1+00 1545/1245

1600/1300 0+15 HCIX 0+30 1630/1330

1645/1345 0+15 HCMB 0+30 1715/1415

1745/1445 0+30 HCMM 1+00 1845/1545

2045/1745 2+00 HKMO TERM

Figure 17. Intratheater Airlift: A STAR Schedule

50
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Runway Deterioration

The repeated landings of heavy C-141s at Bale Dogle had a

telling impact on the runway surface . En route C-141 s had to be

redirected into Mogadishu, adding to the taxing flow already

coming into that airfield. The developing situation exacerbated

a problem which was already evident.

Flow Control

Aircraft flowing into the theater from various CONUS bases

and overseas locations were arriving without consideration for

the limited ramp space and the single runway. Through a

Herculean effort, the Mogadishu TALCE was able to turn around

aircraft in incredibly short ground times; occasionally, they had

to direct inbound aircraft on to supporting airfields outside

Somalia because thev could not accommodate them (fiLfs . 18 and
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

19) . Jet fuel was unavailable in late January for aircraft that

ran short while holding above the airport . Thus, the schedule

of inbound aircraft was disrupted further by having aircraft

return from fields outside the theater for a second try at

landing.

In response to the problem, the COMAFFOR brought

together a collective agreement between TACC, AME, and the

en route bases that the AME, with inputs from the Mogadishu

TALCE, would assign arrival slot times . The solution was

timely because 22 December would be the peak day for

intertheater cargo airlift with 923 tons delivered (fig. 20) . The

peak day for passenger delivery occurred nine days later,

when 1,470 troops arrived . In the last weeks of December,

Oddur, Gialalassi, Belet Uen, and Bardera were secured by

ground forces, and Phase II of the CINC's plan was achieved

(fig. 21) .
Mission Accomplishment

With the rapid achievement of the CINC's phases and the

arrival of contingents from coalition nations, General

Johnston began a drawdown of US forces . On 19 January

the first contingent of Marines were airlifted to March AFB

for their return to Camp Pendleton. The number of C- 130s

operating in-theater, which had reached 14 in late

December, were reduced to 10 in late January. By the third

week of February, the number had decreased to six and to

two by the end of the month. The role of the AME decreased

correspondingly as US forces were withdrawn. A majority of

its functions was transferred to the WOC at Mombasa and to

53
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

the Mogadishu TALCE. The Bale Dogle TALCE had returned to

Travis AFB only weeks after coming into theater, and

Mogadishu's TALCE handled airfield operations in the theater.

The TALCE returned to Rhein-Main at the end of March and

were replaced by a much smaller contingent from Charleston

AFB, South Carolina. The air mobility element ceased

operations on 10 March and redeployed to the CONUS.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Notes

1 . The chronology is derived from Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia at War with

Itself," Current History (Africa Issue) 91, no. 565 (May 1992): 230-34.

2. Data provided by Kent Beck, Headquarters AMC/HO, 19 January 1994.

3. MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey for Belet Uen, 23 August 1992.

4. "The Air Mobility Command: Historical Highlights," Headquarters

AMC/HO, 1992 .

5. For the text of the UN Security Council Resolution on Somalia, see New

York 7limes, 4 December 1992, 1, 14.

6. Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's

Guide 1993, 7-9 . Event is defined as that which is reported to the NMCC

and initiates planning procedures.

7. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, January 1993), 3.

8. Briefing, Lt Gen Martin L. Brandtner, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject:

The National Military Command Structure, 15 March 1993, slide 15.

9. AFSC Pub 1, 7-12 .

10. Ibid., 7-17.

11 . Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, 1 December 1989, lists the commander's estimate of the

situation.

12 . Ibid ., CJCS Planning Order and OPORD.

13. Brandtner briefing, slide 22 .

14. Briefing, Col Walter Evans, Air Mobility School, subject: Restore

Hope Somalia, 29 July 1993 ; and Col Walter Evans, "Operation Restore

Hope After Action Report," 7 April 1993 .

15. MAC Form 340, Landing Zone Survey for Bale Dogle, 15 December

1992 .

16 . Evans, "After Action Report," 7 .

55

Chapter 4

Restore Hope: Lessons Learned

Many lessons are learned in a contingency . Their

applications in the planning and execution of subsequent

contingencies should not only preclude repetition but prevent

an otherwise unresolved problem area from precipitating a

larger failure. As Restore Hope has illustrated, contingency

operations are frequently conducted at the end of tenuous

lines of communication. The margin for error is much finer

because resources must be projected great distances with a

degree of difficulty and expense . The limited resources which

are introduced into an otherwise austere environment are

essential to mission success. When problems go unresolved,

they tend to deplete or abuse resources . An example would be

an aircraft flying to a theater airhead but unable to land

because of poor flow control . The consequence of the

scheduling error is that the onboard forces would not flow in

on time to the theater, and the aircraft would not be available

for its next scheduled event in the airlift sequence . The aircraft

is a limited resource, and the forces and materiel on board are,

likewise, limited . In an unchallenged operation, the handicap

of wasted resources may impact mission objectives ; those

same obstacles, left unresolved in a contingency where a

capable enemy possesses the means to exploit weaknesses,

may be costly. For these reasons we must detect, analyze, and

solve them.

Lessons learned in Somalia, from the theater air mobility

forces perspective, tend to contain elements of the following

two areas : (1) operational and (2) sustainment and support

for deployed air mobility forces . The first area includes those

items which have a direct impact on mission objectives :

command and control, management of airfield

infrastructure, aircraft flow control, communications, and

ground security. The second area deals with logistical issues

and quality of life .

57
AIR-HEAD OPERATIONS

Operational Problems

Two important problem areas which appeared in Restore

Hope were the uncertain lines of operational control and the

confusion over how air mobility units in-theater were to

interface. A deploying unit that is unaware of its position in

the theater organizational structure and is unaware of its lines

of operational control (OPCON) is less likely to be effective and

inadvertedly may become obstructive . A deploying unit also

needs to know its formal relationship with other component

forces and the channels through which it is supported and

replenished. I If a unit is "attached for support," it must know

to whom it should turn for logistical support2 Not to know the

answers to these questions may prove annoying to those who

exercise OPCON and frustrating to the subordinate units

which experience difficulty in carrying out their mission. In a

contested environment the confusion may compromise the

mission and prove fatal to the unit.

Command and Control

Bale Dogle stands out as an example in Somalia where a

less-than-adequate understanding in relationships occurred.

The deploying TALCE arrived in-theater, apparently unaware

of its OPCON relationship with the theater air force component

commander and the AME. The unit bypassed the AME and

communicated directly with the TACC (i .e ., outside the

theater) . This predicament left the theater commander's AME

out of the loop, just as a major insertion of troops from Fort

Drum were about to arrive in-theater.

Management of Airfield Real Estate

Airhead administrative control should be addressed prior to

actual deployment of forces into a theater. Once forces enter the

airhead, they adopt an operational focus. Confusion over

utilization of infrastructure and real estate lessen the

effectiveness of forces if it causes a struggle between units and

components. A danger exists, especially during the critical initial

phase of insertion, that disagreements over control of hard

surfaces will hinder strategic airlift into an airhead and the

58
RESTORE HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED

handling of cargo on the ramp . Strategic aircraft occupy

considerable ramp area. Another unit may view control of

ramp use by air mobility forces as an intrusion on its own use

of available hard surface .

Operation Desert Storm provides an example of the difficulties

which arise when a unit managing airfield real estate is not the

organization with the largest operation on the field. In the

Kuwait theater of operations (KTO), the single largest user of the

Kuwait airhead was Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft. A

minor flying organization on the airfield, which had little or no

understanding of MAC requirements and did not possess the

expertise (which the TALCEs do) of airfield operations, asserted

initial control. That unit became an unnecessary "middleman"

while performing no useful function from the perspective of

airfield operations . The controlling unit, which flew helicopters

within the KTO, was reluctant to move its minuscule operation

to another area on the airport where it did not interfere with

jumbo-sized airlifters.

The decision to use Kuwait International Airport existed long

before the actual seizure of the airfield ; therefore, the issue of

control could have been properly resolved before any forces

landed there . At Mogadishu the problem of airfield control was

resolved before the competition for real estate was allowed to

interfere with the conduct of operations. In future operations the

requirement for a single manager of the airfield structure should

be determined as part of the contingency's detailed planning.

Flow Control

The problem of flow into the airhead(s) has been addressed

earlier . In a future contingency, a theater commander's

operational plans may be seriously hindered if the commander

depends on unrealistic flow expectations, which may falter in the

face of what should have been predictable bottlenecks .

Contesting the entry of US forces will cause a transitional

period when the forces inserted have not yet reached the level

necessary to offer a fully capable defense . The theater

commander should pass through that phase quickly . If

inbound aircraft run into a logjam and needed forces are

delayed because the aircraft must depart the theater without

59
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

landing, the impact may be worse than the impact of a slower

and more measured flow. Therefore, a preliminary assessment

of flow into an airfield based on runways), taxiway(s), ramp(s),

and maximum (aircraft) on the ground should be fully

addressed during the planning stage. Airhead operations are a

key component of force projection . The planners who assess

airfields should possess the level of expertise needed to

realistically appraise the potential flow into a theater. Their

assessment will allow the combatant commander to estimate

the risks involved and adjust his course of action. Aircraft held

over an airfield also increase risks to air assets . Aircraft which

must linger in threatened airspace may be lost to hostile

action; aircraft on the ground which exceed the parking MOG

and therefore block taxiways and runways may place forces

and assets at unnecessary risk. In a contingency where there

is no opposing force, an unrealistic flow can cause preventable

delays and possibly exceed the supported commander's

required delivery date. In an austere environment, where

aircraft are operating at the end of long LOC, there is a penalty

for arriving over an airhead which is already operating at its

MOG limit. The time spent in returning the aircraft to a

staging base, servicing it, and placing a fresh crew in the

cockpit is time lost. The aircraft and aircrew are finite

resources. The additional time needed to return the aircraft to

the theater and to complete its original mission is lost for

follow-on missions, causing a loss in airlift capability .

Communications

The theater AME and the TALCEs possess an extraordinary

communications capability . They maintain satellite communications (SATCOM) high frequency (HF) voice and data link,

and very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF)

ground-to-air linkage. They are not, however, equipped with

radios for integration into the ground forces' tactical frequency

modulation (FM) net (described in chapter 3, in the example at

Mogadishu) . For the purpose of ground security linkage, for

accessing ground forces emergency medical support, and for

communicating support requirements in general, the TALCE

needs this capability . The Army and Marine Corps

60
RESTORE HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED

communicate on an FM VHF network (the PRC-77 is an example

of a standard radio which provides this capability) . The Air

Force combat control teams and tactical air control parties

possess radios which operate in that part of the communications spectrum . TALCEs and the AME normally do not. Air

Mobility Command may wish to rectify this shortcoming so

that the TALCEs and other theater air mobility support forces

can more fully integrate with the supported forces .

On the other side of the coin, where the TALCEs and AME

do possess great capability-for example, with SATCOM and

HF-the associated communications networks appear to be

overworked. This may be the product of increased information

flow. It is often, however, the result of substandard radio

discipline and/or an attempt to overcome the confusion

resulting from poor information flow prior to deployment.

Once in-theater, units are often compelled to fill the vacuum

created by an absence of real information through the

communications net . During Operation Restore Hope the

communications networks were saturated . Routine traffic of

marginal value overwhelmed the SATCOM and GYC-8 (HF

data) systems. As a result high-value, time-sensitive messages

were delayed.

Strong command emphasis on timely and focused

information flow to deploying units and disciplined use of the

networks will improve net communications . Unit training

should focus on procedures and clarity of expression. Succinct

and clear transmissions should minimize transmission times

and condense traffic . Thinking about an issue after the

microphone is keyed adds to the problem of unnecessarily

long transmission times . This is true also on the data link .

Messages should have a clear and succinct format. Users get

the best performance from communications if they use voice

nets for time-sensitive, mission-essential communications. Net

saturation results when deployed units attempt to use the net

to acquire a clearer understanding of their mission and theater

OPCON. TACO should access a complete understanding of the

role and OPCON of units that they task to go in-theater and

present them with a comprehensive briefing. The payback will

mean improved performance in the theater.

61
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Ground Security Integration

Theater air mobility forces need to establish seamless

ground security with collocated units. A breakdown in

communications with collocated forces can cause problems . A

TALCE, unaware or uncertain of its relationship to other units,

may not properly integrate into a ground force's defensive

plans. Consequently, the TALCE might react inappropriately

to a penetration of the perimeter, causing confusion or worse.

If a theater commander were to direct an evacuation of an

airhead by airlift, or other means, how would a TALCE quickly

coordinate a common evacuation plan and its execution when

it is operating autonomously? In future airhead operations,

uncertainty may compromise an operation. This problem area

may be corrected easily through an educational process

during unit training and reinforced through periodic exercises.

It can be precluded in future contingencies by flowing

information, prior to deployment, to participating units to

define their relationship with other forces clearly.

Sustainment and Support

Fuel consumption by air mobility ground equipment is a

critical operational factor. After the first day of continuous

TALCE operations on Mogadishu's airfield, the organic fuel

supply was depleting quickly. In response to the situation an

ad hoc arrangement was established by the AME TALCE officer

(who was the acting Mogadishu TALCE commander) with the

Marine landing force (the 15th MEU[SOC]) commander and his

S-4 (battalion logistics staff officer) . Had the 15th MEU(SOC) not

provided the needed fuels, the TALCE would have soon

exhausted its own supply.

Sustainment

Fuel requirements can be estimated and incorporated in a

contingency operation plan. With few exceptions all ground

equipment consumes diesel or diesel equivalent fuels (i .e .,

JP-8 jet fuel) . A typical 40K aircraft loader has a 37-gallon fuel

tank. The loader consumes approximately one gallon of fuel

62
RESTORE HOPE: LESSONS LEARNED

per hour of operation . At that rate the 40K would require

refueling on the second day of continuous operation. A 25K

loader has a 43-gallon tank and also consumes about one

gallon of fuel per hour. A 10K Hyster forklift has a 15-gallon

tank and consumes nearly one gallon of fuel per hour.

Because the consumption rates and fuel capacities are known,

it is possible to anticipate the in-theater fuel requirements

based on type and total number of equipment and planned

periods of operation . These estimates should include CFR and

other ground vehicles. Air mobility forces need not enter the

theater, as they did at Mogadishu, without an established

sustainment schedule. A more refined matrix based on specific

equipment consumption rates should be created and made

available to planners and operators.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System's

(JOPES) automatic data processing application program-the

movement requirements generator (MRG)-computes requirements for resupply. 3 The MRG or a compatible system should

incorporate the matrix described above to accommodate the

needs of deploying air mobility forces during the planning stage.

Fuel requirements for theater air mobility forces need to be

identified in the contingency operation plan, logistics annex. Air

mobility forces need to be appraised of the plan and told which

units are tasked to provide support to them.

Speaking for a moment to a parallel fuel requirement, the

few types of equipment that consume gasoline present an

additional problem. The transport of gasoline is hazardous,

and the fuel is not commonly used by US Army and Marine

forces . If local gas stations are not accessible to air mobility

forces, the requirement for gasoline may not be sustained,

thereby impacting the use of affected equipment . One solution

eliminates gasoline-consuming vehicles and equipment from

the inventory.

Logistical Support

The same TALCE which had command and control problems

at Bale Dogle also experienced difficulties in the area of

sustairunent and support. The TALCE unit nearly exhausted its

organic potable water resources before replenishment channels

were established at Bale Dogle. The problem developed because

63
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

of confusion over interface between units and an unclear

understanding of what unit the TALCE was attached to for

support . The TALCE failed to establish a replenishment

schedule with its collocated ground force (i .e ., elements of the

10th Mountain Division) and fell into a strained relationship

with them. The dimension of the problem became evident

when the TALCE sent an urgent message, by way of the GYC-8

data linkup to the AME, stating that it was down to a few

bottles of water per unit member. At the time that the message

was sent, thousands of gallons of potable water were available

at Bale Dogle for the TALCE to use . The breakdown in

communications would have been more significant if the

events had occurred in a less benign environment, where an

enemy had the capability to challenge the airhead .

US Army and Marine forces use a simple system to request

supplies. Items in the Federal supply system are divided into 10

major classes and several subclasses . Figure 22 illustrates the

classes. Air Force personnel are generally unfamiliar with this

system. When air mobility forces in-theater are attached to US

ground forces for logistical support, they must know this system

to clearly articulate system requirements. Air Force members in

mobility units should learn the classes of supply to expedite

requests and to minimize confusion.

Shelters

The Somalia experience demonstrated that AMC did not

possess the means to shelter its deployed forces . The lack of

tentage and related support equipment made austere

conditions even more difficult for the troops . The impact on

morale and health could affect the mission adversely. TALC

should assure that a bare-base laydown package accompanies

its airhead packages . The troops will have confidence that the

command has their basic needs in mind while they attend to

mission requirements . Air mobility personnel should be

trained to erect the tentage so that its use is not tied to the

availability of civil engineers .

Operation Restore Hope provided a learning experience for

the newly activated Air Mobility Command and its tanker

airlift control center. While the problem areas which surfaced

64

AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

did not seriously jeopardize the mission, they had the

potential to do so . AMC has learned a lot from its experience in

Somalia. Most problems have relatively easy fixes that can be

realized with little difficulty . The payback ensures greater

certainty of mission success.

Notes

1 . Marine Corps Capability Plan (MCP) (Washington, D .C . : United States

Marine Corps, 26 June 1992), 2,11-5-9. Air Force personnel who depend on

collocated Army and USMC units for replenishment should acquaint

themselves with their logistic capabilities. Also, they should be aware of the

days of supply (DOS) possessed by the collocated ground forces . A US

Marine expeditionary unit, for example, initially deploys with 15 DOS.

2 . "Attached for support" indicates the logistical relation between the

attached unit (i .e., an air mobility unit, in the context of this chapter) and

the supporting unit. The supporting unit has logistical responsibilities but

not operational control over the supported unit (i .e ., unless otherwise stated) .

3. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1, TFte Joint Staff Oftcer's Guide 1993

(Washington, D.C . : Government Printing Office, 1993),1-29.

66
Chapter 5

Where Are We Going from Here?

This paper argues that airhead operations provide a critical

element in the force projection equation. Ongoing changes in

US military strategy increasingly have stressed force projection

and the important supporting role of air mobility forces . They

must, however, be organized, equipped, trained, and properly

integrated to excel when the combatant commander needs

them.

Present United States military force structure stresses the

capability to confront opponents in two major regional

conflicts in a manner which concedes advantage to its forces .

To execute plans which are the product of that strategy, the

United States must project substantial military power outside

its borders. It must do so while relying on fewer combat and

support assets than were possessed prior to recent major force

restructuring and downsizing. The leaning out of force

structure practically dictates that the optimum use of forces

available is no longer just a virtue but is a necessity. While the

emerging force structure is presently viewed as sufficient for

its objectives, the overall strategy, to be effective, must rely on

the force multiplying effect of air mobility. The thrust of this

concluding chapter examines from the air mobility airhead

operations perspective how ongoing changes in support forces'

structures and their equipment and the acquisition of the

C-17 Globemaster III will enhance air mobility's effectiveness

as a force multiplier. Additional focus will be placed on areas

still in need of improvement.

The ideal situation for the supported combatant commander

is for his forces to flow into theater airheads timely and be

positioned where they are needed so that units can quickly

and effectively reconstitute in anticipation of employment.

Some significant factors of concern during the insertion of

forces into the theater already have been mentioned. While

arriving forces are insufficent or relatively immobile, they

can be destroyed by an opposing force . The airhead that the

67
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

theater commander relies on for rapid introduction of forces

and equipment is by its nature an area of vulnerability and,

potentially, a bottleneck. Because of its critical importance to

force insertion, sustainment, and extrication, it becomes a

center of gravity. A viable enemy can be expected to respond to

this lucrative target. Success, realized by enemy forces acting

against the airhead, may neutralize any force multiplier

advantage originally garnered and actually force the issue

before the combatant commander is fully prepared to respond.

Air mobility forces, through internal improvements, can

reduce the vulnerability of forces in the airhead . The

introduction of new generation support equipment and aircraft

will accelerate the process at the airhead, thus minimizing

exposure of forces. New capabilities will expand the number of

airfields from which to conduct operations. Consequently,

commanders will benefit directly from improvements in the air

mobility arena. In many cases, those places where air mobility

operations can be improved have come under discussion

because of the Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation

Restore Hope experiences . Those two contingencies, probably

more than others, have served Air Mobility Command well in

highlighting that which has worked well and those areas

which have proved deficient or counterproductive . Careful

analysis of recent experiences has focused on the role of the

C-17 in contingencies, on ground operations support

equipment, the restructuring of MSF, the timely flow of

information, and on the ground environment and its impact on

operations, personnel, and equipment.

The C-17 Globemaster III

The centerpiece of air mobility airhead operations is the

aircraft. The rapid introduction of forces into the theater and

their in-theater air movement is essentially a function of

aircraft capability. Specifically, the number and choice of

airfields ; the throughput of aircraft; and the flexibility of

movement is determined largely by the operational limits of

airlifters . The combatant commander's flexibility on the

battlefield, indeed, may be curtailed by the inability of airlift

68
WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

to place forces where they have the greatest effectiveness or

utility. The C-17 "Globemaster III," now entering into service

with operational flying units, best illustrates what theater

enhancements air mobility will provide.

When the C-17 was originally designed, planners envisioned

its utility primarily in a mature theater, specifically Central

Europe. They wanted the C-17 to act as both an inter- and

intratheater airlifter, with the capability to operate into

airfields not suitable for C-141 s and C-5s but usually

associated with the otherwise less capable C-130. The cold

war has passed, and it is less likely that future operations will

be conducted within a highly developed and sophisticated

environment . The capabilities that the C-17 possesses,

however, make it uniquely capable of enhancing the theater

commander's options in the arenas where future contingencies

more likely will be conducted . Until the arrival of the C-17, the

theater commander had to rely on C-5, C-141, and KC-10

aircraft to introduce forces rapidly into the theater; the

commander used C-130s primarily to conduct intratheater,

small-field airlift . The C-17 has combined the best airlift

qualities of those aircraft into one, highly capable machine .

From the theater operations' perspective, the areas which best

illustrate the strengths of the C-17 are its small-field

capability, its efficient use of airfield ramp, and its impressive

throughput (the amount of cargo which can be delivered in a

given ground time) .

The C-17's ability to operate on short, and relatively narrow

runways for delivery of forces increases the options of the

theater commander. A C-17 is "capable of safe and routine

landings on a 4,000 feet long by 90 feet wide paved runway . . .

with a payload of 160,000 pounds and fuel to [continue on]

500 nautical miles ."' In contrast, the C-5 Galaxy is normally

restricted to runways with a minimum length of 6,000 feet

long by 147 feet wide, and the C-141, to 6,000 feet by 98

feet . 2 Third world runways, in contrast, are commonly 90

feet long by 130 feet wide. The exceptions are the large,

international airports, which are usually 150 feet in width .

Aside from the international airfields, runways are often in

the range of 3,000 to 5,000 feet in length . Figure 23

illustrates runway distribution by length and width. Nations

69
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

with a highly developed infrastructure have many runways

which C-17s can use . The Federal Republic of Germany (West

Germany) was assessed in a 1990 report for suitability of

airfields . The results make a clear point. The number of airfields

suitable for C-5s was 47, while for the C-17 the number

increased to 132 . 3 The less restrictive airfield requirements for

the C-17 will have a measurable impact on operations

anticipated in a major regional conflict.

The increased selection of airfields provides for the

commander greater latitude in placing his forces in-theater.

The larger the number of usable airfields, the greater the air

flow into the theater. Access to smaller airfields will permit the

delivery of forces to sectors previously unaccessible by intertheater airlift, which should lessen in-theater repositioning by

committed theater assets . More airfields mean that forces
WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

can move through and be dispersed from the airheads much

more quickly. Additionally, the increased number of airfields

will complicate denial operations by an opposing force. An

enemy would have to anticipate and be prepared to react to

movement through airfields . The alternative, where few

airfields are usable, are exploitable chokepoints . When the

combatant commander has more airfields to incorporate in his

plans, his options increase, and he may have the luxury to

employ some as part of diversionary tactics .

The C-17 at the Airfield

The C-17's agility increases the usability of small fields,

where constricted maneuver surfaces limit or prohibit their use

by other intertheater airlifters . The Globemaster III can make

180 degree turns within the confines of a 90-foot-wide runway

by using the three-point star maneuver. 4 Because of its aft

main gear castering, a C-5 is also fairly maneuverable on the

ground, but it requires a 150-foot-wide runway to turn around

(fig. 24). The C-17's agility results primarily from its backup

capability (figs . 25A-B and 26A-C) . The aircraft is "capable of

backing up a 1 .5 percent grade on paved surface with [a]

160,000 pound payload and fuel for 1,000 [nautical miles of

follow-on flight] ." 5 The turnaround maneuver means that

aircraft can be taxied on an airfield without having to enter

taxiways already occupied by other aircraft . Thus, as the

usable area at the airfield increases, the number of aircraft

on the ground can be maximized, and departing C-17s can be

back-taxied on the runway proper and positioned for takeoff

without requiring separate taxiways. At the tip of the spear,

this translates to a greater usability of otherwise marginal or

unsuitable airfields and an increased throughput. The latter

advantage emanates from the aircraft's maneuverability.

Throughput

A hypothetical situation, using the airfield ramp at Howard

Air Force Base, Panama, is shown in figure 27. The illustration

considers the Casa 212s and the C-130s normally located at

71







WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

of cargo . The additional benefit of rapid upload and download

allows for reduced exposure of the aircraft, its cargo, and

ground personnel to threats . The advances which the C-17 will

bring to airhead operations parallel the flexibility and

increased capability, which the next generation materials

handling equipment (MHE) promises .

Materials Handling Equipment

Air Mobility Command is in the final stages of selecting for

production the 60K (60,000-pound load capability) large capacity

aircraft loader. The 60K capacity will increase considerably the

cargo handling at the airhead and minimize the amount of MHE

needed. Previous generation MHE (25K and 40K) could handle

a maximum of three pallets and 25,000 pounds (one type is

capable of 36,000 pounds) and five pallets and 40,000 pounds,

respectively.? The 60K will transport a maximum of six pallets

and 60,000 pounds. Additionally, the 60K will support all

cargo-carrying aircraft in the air mobility fleet. This capability

presently is not possible with the MHE. The 60K can download

a C-17's full load of pallets (18) in three passes; a 25K would

require at least six passes (the variable being pallet weight) ;

and a 40K, four passes . Another enhancing characteristic of

the 60K is the relative ease in airlifting it. Unlike other loaders,

the 60K can be placed on board the C-5, C-17, and C-141

aircraft without shoring. Built up sections of sturdy lumber,

shoring kits must be available whenever and wherever

previous generation aircraft loaders are airlifted to decrease

the approach angle of aircraft cargo ramps, to protect the

aircraft floor, and to distribute loading.$ Consequently, the

60K's rapid download and upload, without the need of shoring,

especially in operations where aircraft minimum ground time

is essential or highly desirable, will contribute greatly to

mission success. The 60K can exit its aircraft in the airhead

and immediately support arriving aircraft. In addition to the

60K's enhancement of cargo handling, the KC-10 Extender is

undergoing modification to improve movement of cargo into an

austere environment.

79
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

The KC-10 Self-Contained Loading Platform

Onboard loaders are being installed on KC- 10s, equipping

them with a self-contained loading platform . 9 The KC-10

Extender was limited by its dependence on specialized MHE,

required at each serving airfield to facilitate cargo handling. The

modification permits far greater flexibility to airlift planners,

especially to the theater commander. In the event that inbound

KC- lOs must be diverted for download at a different airfield than

originally planned, a greater confidence will prevail that the

cargo will be deliverable to where it's needed without the need for

specialized equipment. The theater commander's confidence in

placing cargo and troops where they should be is further

enhanced by the in-transit visibility (ITV) concept.

In-Transit Visibility

ITV seeks to provide a high degree of certainty that cargo

and troops in transit can be located at any given moment.

Using the supporting system of ITV, the theater commander

can "reach out and touch" his forces while they are progressing

towards the theater.

The crisis nature of contingencies often compels the

combatant commander to modify plans while forces are in the

deployment process . ITV will not only locate specific in-transit

forces and equipment, it will identify the specific aircraft and

mission number. If plans call for a change in delivery point,

ITV will make it highly possible to redirect affected forces .

The "loss" (the inability to track) of airlifted cargo was a

continual problem in Desert Shield/Storm . The problem

caused some concern for the user and amplified the work load

of air mobility support forces, who expended countless

man-hours tracking down cargo . For a combatant commander,

the loss of essential materiel, especially at a critical juncture

in operations, is untenable. Force downsizing has considerably

reduced or eliminated redundancy in force structure .

Consequently, the importance of and the accountability for

any in-transit materiel increases because it may not be easily

replaced. The systems now on-line-or being introduced

enhance confidence that there will be almost immediate

80
WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

accountability and that forces and materiel moving through

the airbridge will be delivered where and when needed . Those

systems include the remote consolidated aerial port system

(RCAPS) and the aerial port documentation and management

system (ADAM III), and RCAPS 11 . 10

The Remote Consolidated Aerial Port System

RCAPS is used for cargo and passenger manifesting.

Information on passengers and cargo is processed and fed

through long-haul communications into the main Air Mobility

Command computer system . Hence, through USTRANSCOM's

Global Transportation Network (GTN), it is sent to downline

stations, including the US Army's Logistics Intelligence File .

The Military Standard Transportation and Movement

Procedures provides a data base for tracking cargo." The key

elements for tracking in-transit forces are their unit line

numbers (ULN) and transportation control number (TCN). The

ULN identifies each force requirement separately in the timephased force and deployment data, a product of the planning

process . The TCN identifies a particular shipment of cargo.

RCAPS and related systems help to dispel the "fog of war,"

which tends to envelop the early stages of force deployment

and employment. The information flow from the systems

lessens the overall confusion which an already overburdened

commander and supporting staff must sort through. RCAPS

is an integral part of the theater commander's air mobility

support forces' capability. The supporting forces are undergoing restructuring and equipping for improved responsiveness

and capability.

Global Reach Laydown

The experiences of recent contingency operations have

demonstrated that air mobility forces must be deployed with

organic capability if they are to operate in an austere,

bare-base environment. Forces must be tailored and equipped

to conduct effective operations with minimum or no support

from their respective theaters. The concept which responds to

these objectives is Global Reach Laydown (GRL). 12

01
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Global Reach Laydown soon will become the standardized

structural mechanism for erecting an air mobility air bridge .

Consisting of five fundamental force modules-onload,

contingency tanker task force, stage/en route, hub/transload,

and spoke/offload-an actual package will be notionally

generated to fit specific contingency requirements . 13 The last

two modules-hub and spoke-are normally positioned within

a theater and operate out of airheads. Mobility support forces,

previously discussed in chapter 2, will operate, under the GRL

concept (based on specific location requirements) at each

functional location in the air bridge structure and will be

generated from air mobility operations groups (AMOG) and air

mobility support squadrons (AMSS) . The building blocks used

to functionally tailor capability to specific mission needs are

the unit type codes (UTC) .

Air Mobility Operations Groups

Two AMOGs, one on the West Coast and the other on the

East Coast of the United States, will maintain a ready core of

Air Mobility Command mobility forces to provide leadership

and much of the air mobility support assets necessary to

assure rapid, flexible response to contingencies.

14

Under the reorganization of MSFs, the AMOGs will assemble

under one commander the capabilities needed to erect an air

bridge's support structure. The functional areas are divided

among the group's subordinate squadrons . An AMSS, collocated

with its AMOG, possesses command and control, an aerial port

flight (the cadre for cargo and passenger handling operations), a

maintenance flight (providing cadre for en route aircraft

maintenance), a communications flight (providing rapid

response deployable communications capability), and a combat

control flight. Other geographically separated air mobility

support squadrons replicate the same functional capabilities

(except combat control) and are based with immediately

accessible airlift assets . All AMSSs are successors to the airlift

control squadrons, which heretofore have been tasked to provide

the TALCE. The airlift control squadrons will standdown upon

activation of AMSS units . Each AMOG will possess a collocated

82
WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

air mobility operations squadron (AMOS) . The AMOS concept,

described in chapter 2, remains essentially the same under

reorganization. Other AMOG squadrons are geographically

separated units. A combat camera squadron and a combat

control squadron provide combat photography and terminal

air traffic services, respectively.

The end product of reorganization will be able to "project

from [the] CONUS and 'lay down' a tailored en route structure

in response to any contingency." 15 The innovative AMOG

concept will have even greater effectiveness when subjected to

long-term operational demands and if two additional

structural changes are incorporated. First, this positioning will

allow manpower and organic assets assigned under the

present plan to subordinate GSUs and to be consolidated at

one geographic location with their respective group. Second, it

organizes the group's operational elements into a tier structure

for more effective management and utilization . Tier

architecture can take a number of forms. The one suggested

here follows a three-tier organization.

Briefly, three flights are created from the group's mobility

manpower. Each flight has the capability to fulfill tasking

requirements as defined in the unit mission statement. Tier

one is maintained in ready status to respond on short notice to

taskings . Tier-two personnel conduct periodic unit training,

participate in scheduled short-term exercises, and perform

home station duties . Those in tier-three status can take

ordinary leave, arrange such base appointments as periodic

physicals, medical and dental care, testing, meet flight crew

requirements (this could be placed in tier two), and so forth.

Flights are periodically rotated through each tier. Adjustments

to flight manning may be made to maintain a rough balance

among individuals for actual time spent on temporary duty.

The structure is tailored to fit a specific unit's manning,

requirements, and manageability. A tier system restores

predictability to an individual's schedule, thereby enhancing

quality of life. It enables the commander to utilize limited

manpower more effectively and gives the commander

increased confidence in his ability to rapidly and capably

respond to taskings. The tier concept has been described here

to encourage its incorporation in AMOG structuring.

83
AIRHLAU UYr:KNHUN5

Conclusions and Recommendations

The ongoing changes and the introduction of new

capabilities to air mobility forces are much more than a

desirable development; they are necessary if United States'

military strategy, which relies heavily on force projection

capability, is to be credible. Force projection is the motivation

behind national policy; air mobility is the means to make it

feasible; and the airhead is the linchpin, where force confronts

the points of friction.

Advancements made in equipment and force structure will

provide air mobility forces with the wherewithal to fulfill their

role in contingencies, humanitarian relief efforts, or any other

situation requiring the movement of forces, and materiel to

distant places. An important variable in the equation is the

preparedness of personnel. The conditions under which

operations are conducted are frequently far more taxing than

is normally experienced on CONUS air bases . The presence of

threats, an unforgiving environment, and marginal living

conditions tend to magnify the difficulties inherent in almost

all contingencies . Add to that cauldron short notice changes in

taskings, which require nothing less than a total refocusing of

effort. Mission success under those circumstances is best

answered by forces which have been properly prepared. The

forecast for the future is clear. Mobility support forces often will

consume just one part of a theater commander's overall effort.

The commander depends on the full integration of the forces into

theater operations. As battlefields become more fluid and force

sustainment becomes essential to success, MSF must be flexible

and support the theater effort completely.

Past mobility support forces, especially the TALCEs, have

been "orphan children ." They did not train properly for integration into the in-theater mechanism. Instead, they worked

aircraft transiting their location as if in a vacuum and minimized interface with collocated ground forces . They enjoyed their

autonomy and preferred to interact at "arm's length." This

unnatural relationship with theater forces should be rectified

through more realistic training and interactivity emphasized .

Mobility support forces operations officers should become

familiar with US Army and Marine Corps force structure, unit

84
WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE?

capabilities, and functions . Checklists for the conduct of MSF

operations in the airhead or for any joint environment should

include direct, formal communications with collocated ground

forces . Establishment and dissemination of security

procedures, use of force (and, where applicable, rules of

engagement), emergency medical procedures, tasking of CFR

assets, and replenishment procedures (for rations, fuels,

ammunition, and other requirements) should not be left to

chance or to informal channels . Once channels of communications and common operating procedures have been

established between air mobility forces and collocated ground

forces, MSF personnel should be briefed to permit full

compliance. These recommendations may appear to be at the

common sense level, but experience has reflected otherwise.

Future operations may be conducted under hostile or very

difficult conditions. Under those circumstances, events may

amplify any weaknesses in the procedures listed above to the

point where critical operations are compromised. Training and

exercises which promote "jointness" at all operational levels

will enhance the support that mobility support forces provide

to the combatant commander. Training should also emphasize

rapid redeployment of MSF assets, once in the theater .

TALCEs, in particular, should be better prepared to execute

hasty movements from one airfield to another while in a threat

environment. To emphasize, airheads are chokepoints and

make lucrative targets .

Air mobility support forces, overall, have done well in

contingencies and in operations other than war. New equipment

will enhance even more the support which MSF can provide to a

theater or to any type of operation. Mobility support forces

should not rest on their laurels. With force downsizing, a

growing spectrum of threats, and an increasingly challenging

environment in which to conduct operations, mission

accomplishment will require greater effort with limited resources.

Mobility support forces tasked with the airhead mission must

look beyond past successes to gauge more accurately

preparedness for the future . Built on a clear vision of future

operations, training will assure continued success in the

airhead arena.

85
AIRHEAD OPERATIONS

Notes

1 . Maj Peter Fucci, FINAL Operational Requirements Document (Scott

AFB, Ill. : Headquarters AMC/XPOC, 15 September 1993), 6.

2. MACR55-2, C-5 Strategic Airlift Operations (Scott AFB, Ill. : 1 June 1992),

chapter 5, 6. C-5 minimum runway length is waiverable down to 5,000 feet .

3. Multi-Service C-17 Employment Concept (Scott AFB, Ill. : Airlift Concepts

and Requirements Agency, 12 December 1990), 3, 4. Hereafter referred to as

ACRA.

4. Fucci, 7.

5. ACRA, A-1; Fucci, 7; The C-17 in Desert Shield/Desert Storm Update

(Scott AFB, Ill. : Headquarters MAC/Public Affairs, 13 March 1991), 7, 8.

6. Lt Gen Herb Temple, Retired, "C-17 Globemaster III," Officer Review,

January 1994, 3-5; Maj Peter Fucci, subject: C-17 Program Status, (Position

paper, Headquarters AMC/XPQC, 11 February 1994) .

7. MAC Pamphet 50-13, MAC Affiliation Program Airlift Planners Course

(Scott AFB, Ill. : 23 December 1991), 39.

8. Ibid., 49.

9. Report on materials handling equipment, transmitted by Headquarters

AMC/XOP, 28 February 1994. Report is undated and lists no author.

10. Lori Farnsworth, subject: In Transit Visibility (ITS (Point paper, Headquarters AMC/XOST, Scott AFB, Ill., 22 December 1993).

11 . Ibid. ; Tony Fornaster, subject: Remote Consolidated Aerial Port

Subsystems (RCAPS) (Point paper, Headquarters AMC/XOST, Scott AFB, Ill.,

11 January 1994).

12. "Base Plan to AMC Programming Plan (PPLAN) 94-4" (draft), Scott AFB,

Ill., Headquarters AMC (1 April 1994), 2.

13. Air Mobility Command Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.,

Headquarters AMC, 15 October 1993), 3-17.

14 . Ibid. ; Lt Col Denny Alford, subject: Global Reach Laydown Packages

(Concept paper, AMCOS/XPXO, Scott AFB, Ill., 31 December 1992).

15. PPLAN94-4, 1 .

86
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York 7Ynes, Friday, 18 December 1992.

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87
"AME Operation Restore Hope Airfield Summary." CJTF Somalia,

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The White House . National Security Strategy of the United States.

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Air Mobility Command (AMC) . Air Mobility Command Air Mobility

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US Marine Corps . Marine Corps Capability Plan (MCP).

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AMS/DTC, Scott AFB, Ill . : April 1993.

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Joint Pub 1-02. Department ofDefense Dictionary ofMilitary and

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MAC Pamphlet 50-13 . MAC Affiliation Program Airlift Planners

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MACR 55-25. Operations, Airlift Control Element. Scott AFB, Ill . :

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Manpower Force Element Listing, US Air Force, 19 March 1993:

UTC 7E IABO

UTC 7E IACO

UTC 7E IAEO

UTC 7EIAFO

UTC 7E IAGO

UTC 7E lAHO

UTC 7E IAJO

UTC 7E IAKO

89
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United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

(USAITAC) Handbook ATC-RM-1100-065-93 . Restore Hope:

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1993.

90
Index

Aeromedical evacuation control Camp Pendleton, California :

center (AECC) : 17, 47 31-32, 34, 36, 53

Aidid, Mohommed Farrah: 45 Charleston AFB, South Carolina:

Air 32,54

bridge: 3-8, 34, 82 Cold war: 1-2, 69

Force component commander Combat control team (CCT): 10-12,

(AFCC) : 9, 58 15, 17-18, 35, 37, 40, 48, 61

Force Forces, commander Command and control (C2) : 9-13,

(COMAFFOR) : 32, 40, 48, 52 36, 47, 57, 63, 82

reserve component (ARC) forces: Command, control, and communi10 cations (C3) : 4, 13

traffic control (ATC) : 15, 17, 35,

38 Evans, Walter: 34-35, 45, 47

Aircraft (types)

747: 38 First Marine Expeditionary Force :

AC-130: 15 31,34

AK-47: 38 Force projection: 1-3, 8, 60, 67, 84

C-5: 27, 38, 40, 69, 71, 75, 79

C-17: 67-71, 75, 79 Griffiss AFB, New York: 40

C-130: 13, 21, 47, 69

C-141 : 13, 21, 40, 47, 69, 79 Hoar, Joseph P. : 31-32

C-14113 : 21 Howard AFB, Panama: 71

C-160 : 24

CH-46: 24, 35 In-transit visibility: 80-81

Casa 212: 71

DC-10: 38 Johnston, Robert B. : 31-32, 39-40,

J-4: 48 53

KC-10: 37, 69, 79, 80

Airhead operations : 3, 19, 34, 62, Lias, Dayre: 47

67-68, 75, 79 Lines of communication (LOC) :

Airlift control squadron: 12, 36, 40 10-11, 19, 57-60

Air mobility Little Rock AFB, Arkansas : 21

Command (AMC): 5, 7, 9-19, 21,

27,39,61,64,68,79,81-82 MacDill AFB, Florida: 21

element (AME) : 9-12 March AFB, California: 34, 53

forces/system : 2-3, 13, 19, 37, McGuire AFB, New Jersey: 32, 34

57, 62-64, 67, 81, 84 Mikolajcik, Thomas R. : 32, 39-40,

support forces (MSF) : 8, 61, 48

80-82, 84-85 Military Airlift Command (MAC) :

Arab League : 20 36,59

Aspin, Les: 2

Moulton, Pat: 35

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 20, 27 National command authorities

Bush, George : 21, 27 (NCA) : 5, 31

National Military Command Center

Camp Drum, New York: 31, 40 (NMCC) : 30

9 1
lvarlonal IVILULary 0Lraleyy uJ LIEU IcL1IAC1 t1111UL L;UIIUU1

United States, The: 1 center (TACO) : 9-10, 40, 52, 58,

Newbold, Gregory S. : 35-37 61,64

element (TALCE): 11-13, 15,

Operations 17, 32, 34-37, 40, 47-48,

Desert Shield/Storm: 19, 59, 51- 52, 54, 58, 60, 63-64, 82

68,80

Impressive Lift : 27 Unit type code (UTC) : 13, 15, 82 Provide Relief. 12, 21-27, 34, 47

United Nations (UN) : 20-21, 27, 32 Restore Hope : 15, 19, 31- 32,

38-39, 57-58, 61, 64, 68 United States

Organization Air Force: 3, 9, 21, 35, 37,

for African Unity: 20 39-40, 47, 50, 58, 61, 64

of the Islamic Conference: 20 Army: 15, 39-40, 63-64, 81, 84

Central Command: 21, 27,

Powell, Colin: 31 30-31,39

Marine Corps : 15, 31, 35, 60,

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany: 36 84

Russell, Charles: 39 Navy: 15, 39-40

Transportation Command: 4-5,

Santor, Joe: 35 10,81

Scott AFB, Illinois : 40 USS Tripoli: 35, 37

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:2000-533-007/22080

92