The Praetorian STARShip

The Untold Story of the Combat Talon

J ERRY L. THIGPEN

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not

necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Thigpen, Jerry L., 1946–

 The Praetorian STARShip : the untold story of the Combat Talon / Jerry L. Thigpen.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 1-58566-103-1

 1. Hercules (Turboprop transports)—History. 4. Search and rescue operations—United States—History.

5. Airdrop—History. I. Title.

358.41‘35‘0973—dc21

ii
This book is dedicated to all

Special Operators,

both living and dead.

All men dream: but not equally. Those who

Dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds

Wake in the day to find that it was vanity; but the

Dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they

May act their dream with open eyes, to make it

Possible. This I did.

—T. E. Lawrence, 

The Seven Pillars of Wisdom 
Definitions

Praetor: A high elected magistrate of the Roman Republic, ranking below the consulate

and functioning for one year as a high judge and for the next year as the chief administra -

tor of a province.

Praetorian Guard : The elite guard of the Roman emperors, usually numbering about

5,000 men. Originally the bodyguard of a praetor under the Roman Republic.

STARS : Acronym for the surface-to-air recovery system (or Fulton Recovery System).

The Praetorian STARShip: A unique unconventional warfare aircraft designed to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate elite US Army Special Forces, US Navy SEALs, and US Air

Force Air Commando personnel into denied areas utilizing both clandestine and covert

operational procedures—more commonly known as Combat Talon.

Note: At the request of the author, some first names are omitted after chapter 7.

v
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

A WORD FROM THE COMMANDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix

 1 Establishment of Combat Talon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

 2 The Combat Talon Weapons System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

 3 Combat Knife (The Pope Air Force Base Years: 1965–74) . . . . . . . . 59

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

 4 Combat Spear (The Vietnam War Years: 1966–74) . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

 5 Combat Arrow (Europe: 1968–74) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

 6 The Son Tay Prisoner of War Raid (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

 7 Between the Wars (1975–79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

 8 The Iranian Rescue Mission (1979–80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

 9 Project Honey Badger and Credible Sport (1980–81) . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

10 From Desert One to Point Salines (1981–83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

11 Road to Combat Talon II (1984–89) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

12 Operation Just Cause (1989–90) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

vii
Chapter Page

13 Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990–91) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

14 Mount Pinatubo to Operation Joint Endeavor (1991–95) . . . . . . . . . 369

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416

15 Operation Assured Response to the

New Millennium (1996–2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461

Appendices

A Live Fulton STARS Made by Combat Talon Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 467

B Partial Summary of Upgrades, MOD-90 Combat Talon I . . . . . . . . . 473

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Servicing Diagram for C-130E(I), circa 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 2 C-130A/B Fulton Skyhook Installation (External View) . . . . . . . . . . 31

 3 C-130A/B Fulton Skyhook Installation (Internal View) . . . . . . . . . . 32

 4 Miscellaneous Recovery Equipment for STARS-Equipped C-130E . . . . 34

 5 Typical Recovery Sequence

a . Aircraft Approaches Lift Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

b. Aircraft Engages Lift Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

c. Lift Line Engaged by Parahook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

d. Snatch Block Attached to Lift Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

e. Anchor Clamp Attached to Lift Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

f. Snatch Block and Parahook Removed from Lift Line . . . . . . . . . 36

g. Lift Line Released from Sky Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

h. Lift Line Attached to Primary Winch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

j. Package Retrieved and Stopped at Davit Pulley . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

k. Package Brought Aboard Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 6 Monopulse Resolution Improvement Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

 7 Antenna Scan Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

 8 Zero Command Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

 9 Template Shift Due to Gross Weight Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

10 Template Shift Due to an Increase in Flight Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

11 Template Shift Due to an Increase in Negative Flight Vector . . . . . . . 42

12 Template Shift Due to an Increase in Tailwind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

viii
Figure Page

13 Template Shift Due to a Change in Set Clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

14 Radar Blanking Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

15 Obstacle Warning Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

16 Terrain-Avoidance Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

17 Terrain-Following Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

18 Cross-Scan Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

19 Fail Light Maintenance Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

20 Components of the Sling Ejection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

21 SEDS Plan View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

22 Forward Fuselage—Upper Structure with UARRSI Opening . . . . . . 53

23 UARRSI Installed on Combat Talon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

24 Typical Point-Parallel Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

25 First Resupply Mission into North Vietnam,

17 January 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

26 Route of Flight, Crew S-01, 28/29 December 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

27 Map of North Vietnam with Son Tay POW Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

28 Aircraft Participating in Son Tay POW Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

29 Route of Flight into North Vietnam, Son Tay POW Raid . . . . . . . . . 153

30 The First Plan Developed by SOD, 16 November 1979 . . . . . . . . . . 186

31 C-130 Formation Plan and Actual Formation Flown . . . . . . . . . . . 220

32 Desert One, Fixed-Wing Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

33 Desert One, Rotary-Wing Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

34 Desert One, Bluebeard 3 Collides with Republic 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

35 Grenada and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

36 Map of Grenada Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

37 Map of Grenada with Urgent Fury Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

38 Map of Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

39 H-Hour Deployments, Operation Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

40 Schematic of Rio Hato AB, Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

41 Map of Panama with Operation Just Cause Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 334

42 Map of the Philippine Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

43 Map of Southwest Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

ix
Figure Page

44 AFSOC Deployed Locations during

Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

45 Batman Depicted in Eastern Turkey,

North of Turkish/Iranian Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

46 BLU-82B Drop Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

47 Map of Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

48 Map of the Philippines Depicting Mount Pinatubo

and Clark AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

49 7th SOS Operating Locations in the Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

50 Operation Assured Response Objective Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421

51 Map of Palau, Located in the South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428

52 Route of Whisk 05, 1997 MacKay Trophy Winner . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

53 Route of Flight, Operation High Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

54 Route of Flight, 7th SOS Crew Shark 01,

1998 Tunner Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442

55 Map of Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444

Photographs

Carpetbagger B-24, circa 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

581st ARCW B-29 over North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARS C-119 in French Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Heavy Hook C-123 with Outboard Jets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

C-130E(I) Aircraft 64-0523 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Robert Fulton’s Stinson Aircraft with V Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Intermountain Aviation B-17 Modified with Skyhook . . . . . . . . . . . 29

US Army C-7 Caribou Equipped with

Fulton Recovery System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

SEDS Sling Assembly, Ramp Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

SEDS Sling Assembly, Ramp Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

HSLLADS Ramp Air Deflectors Installed on Combat Talon . . . . . . . 52

Aircraft 65-0566, Pope AFB, N.C., circa 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

First Two-Man STAR by an Operational Talon Crew,

24 August 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Official Patch, 318th SOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Combat Talon at Hurlburt Field, Fla., circa 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

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Page

Col Don Britton, First Commander of Stray Goose . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

SSgt Gerald R. Paulsen, Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, 1966 . . . . . . . . . 77

Official Patch, MACVSOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

The Anh Hoa Hotel, Nha Trang City, Vietnam, 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Enlisted Quarters, Nha Trang AB, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Aircraft 64-0561 with Left Main Landing Gear Hanging . . . . . . . . . 79

Aircraft 64-0561 Unloads Supplies

at Hue-Phu Bai, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Combat Spear at Ban Me Thuot AB, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Sample Leaflets Dropped by Combat Spear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Aircraft 64-0561 Off-loading Ammunition,

Hue-Phu Bai, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

SG-5 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Transload of SOG Team, Nakhom Phanom,

Thailand, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Aircraft 64-0563, Nha Trang AB, Vietnam,

25 November 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Damage to US Facilities, 1968 Tet Offensive,

Nha Trang City, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Combat Spear Ramp with Revetments,

Nha Trang AB, Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Enlisted Flight Crew Quarters, Nha Trang AB, Vietnam . . . . . . . . 105

Len Butler Fends First Pickup of Don James,

6 February 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

SG-21 Crew on the Beach, May 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Original “Hole-in-the-Wall” Gang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Combat Spear Rigged for Leaflet Drop, Tempo Surge . . . . . . . . . . 115

Aircraft 64-0551 at Ramstein AB, Germany,

circa 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

7th SOS Aircraft 64-0572 HALO Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Presentation Ceremony, 7th SOS and Greek

Hellenic Raiding Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

7th SOS Crew Plans Flintlock III Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

7th SOS Son Tay Rescue Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

7th SOS Receives CINCUSAFE Most Outstanding

Support Squadron Trophy, 25 June 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

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Page

Combat Talon and HH-3/HH-53s Prepare for

Son Tay POW Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Combat Talon Leading US Army UH-1 and Two HH-53s . . . . . . . . . 146

Combat Talon Leading A-1 Skyraiders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Irl L. Franklin and John Gargus, Son Tay Reunion,

November 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

IR Landing Light Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Fuel Blivet Rigged on Combat Talon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Fuel Blivets on K-Loader Ready to be Rigged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Overhead Photo of Twin Otter Landing Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Hangar at Wadi Kena, Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Tent City at Masirah Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Mission Aircraft Deployed to Masirah Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Dragon 1 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Dragon 2 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Republic 4 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Republic 5 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Republic 6 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Night Two Lead Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Motto “The Guts to Try” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Benson Fuel Tank System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

Front View, Credible Sport Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Mark 56 Rocket Motor Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Shrike Rocket Mounting Pylon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

ASROC Mounting Pylon, Aft Beavertail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Horsal and Dorsal Fin Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Double-Slotted Flap Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Modified Tailhook Installed on Credible Sport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Aircraft 74-1683 Rocket-Assisted Takeoff,

29 October 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Aircraft 74-1683 Begins Rocket-Assisted

Landing Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Lower ASROC Rockets Are Fired Manually

from the Cockpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

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Aircraft 74-1683 Crashes onto Runway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Aircraft 74-1683 Wreckage on Runway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Aircraft 74-1686 during Credible Sport II Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Combat Talon 63-7785 Mired in Sand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Rear View of Aircraft 63-7785 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Foxtrot 33 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Foxtrot 34 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Foxtrot 35 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Foxtrot 40 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Foxtrot 41 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

November 10 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Combat Talon 63-7785 after Hit by Small-Arms Fire,

22 May 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

Combat Talon II on the Ramp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Aircraft 64-0551 Nose Section Modified for Project 46 . . . . . . . . . . 305

Aircraft 64-0551 APU Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Aircraft 64-0551 Hydraulic Control Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Project 46 Nose Strain Static Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Aircraft 64-0551 Intercepts Six-Man Lift Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

Failed Radome after 1,500-Pound Pickup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Author with Maj Skip Davenport, Edwards AFB, Calif. . . . . . . . . . 314

Project 46 Test Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

Rio Hato AB, Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

Crew 1, Operation Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Crew 2, Operation Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Crew 3, Operation Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

Tent City, KFIA, Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

Construction of Underground Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Life at Arar AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Crew 1, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

Crew 2, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

Crew 3, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

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Crew 4, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

Crew 5, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Crew 6, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Crew 7, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

Crew 8, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

Crew 9, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Crew 10, Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

BLU-82B Rigged for Airdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

BLU-82B Detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

Pilot and Copilot Display, Combat Talon II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

Nav/EWO Panel, Combat Talon II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

Combat Talon 64-0565—First MOD-90 Modification . . . . . . . . . . . 385

Ramp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during

Operation Uphold Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401

Aircraft 64-0561 at Pap, Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401

MC-130Es and HC-130P/Ns at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401

Gen Wayne Downing Visits Troops

Deployed to Guantanamo Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

MH-53J at US Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422

Combat Talon II Departs Dakar, Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

Evacuees Transload to Combat Talon II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

Skyanchor Removal from Nose Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

15th SOS Multiple-Ship Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454

Combat Talon II En Route to Balkan Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456

Tech Sergeant Beck Prepares for High-Altitude Leaflet Drop . . . . . . . 456

Leaflet Drop during Operation Allied Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456

14 April 1999 Leaflet Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

1 June 1999 Leaflet Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

1 June 1999 Leaflet Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

3 June 1999 Leaflet Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458

4 June 1999 Leaflet Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458

xiv
Foreword

As a young lieutenant flying tactical C-130s at Langley Air Force Base (AFB),

Virginia, in the spring of 1967, I heard one Friday night in the Officers’ Club that

Tactical Air Command (our parent command) was looking for four C-130 copilots

to transfer to Pope AFB, North Carolina, for training in a Top Secret C-130

squadron designated Combat Knife. That had to be more exciting than hauling

trash, I thought. The following Monday I volunteered, and within a few months I

was on my way to Pope AFB. This led to an exciting Air Force career flying the

most versatile C-130 ever produced—the Combat Talon.

Jerry Thigpen’s study on the history of the Combat Talon is the first effort to

tell the story of this wonderfully capable machine. This weapons system has

performed virtually every imaginable tactical event in the spectrum of conflict

and by any measure is the most versatile C-130 derivative ever produced. First

modified and sent to Southeast Asia (SEA) in 1966 to replace theater unconven -

tional warfare (UW) assets that were limited in both lift capability and speed, the

Talon I quickly adapted to theater UW tasking, including infiltration and resupply and psychological warfare operations into North Vietnam. After spending four

years in SEA and maturing into a highly respected UW weapons system, the Joint

Chief of Staff (JCS) chose the Combat Talon to lead the night, low-level raid on

the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay. Despite the outcome of the opera -

tion, the Talon I cemented its reputation as the weapons system of choice for

long-range, clandestine operations.

In the period following the Vietnam War, United States Air Force (USAF)

special operations gradually lost its political and financial support, which was

graphically demonstrated in the failed Desert One mission into Iran. Thanks to

congressional supporters like Earl Hutto of Florida and Dan Daniel of Virginia,

funds for aircraft upgrades and military construction projects materialized to

meet the ever-increasing threat to our nation. Under the leadership of such com -

mitted, hard-driven officers as Brenci, Uttaro, Ferkes, Meller, and Thigpen, the

crew force became the most disciplined in our Air Force. It was capable of penetrating hostile airspace at night, in a low-level mountainous environment, covertly to execute any number of unconventional warfare missions.

The highly trained, disciplined Talon I crews led the invasions of Grenada in

October 1983 and Panama in December 1989. The long-range “pathfinder” capa -

bility of the Talon Is made them the indispensable choice for these classic airfield

seizure operations. In Desert Storm the Talon Is reverted to their Vietnam psy -

chological warfare role by dropping millions of leaflets over Iraq and Kuwait.

Additionally, they dropped eleven 15,000-pound BLU-82B bombs. Today the Talon

I largely fulfills the penetrating tanker role, which includes the low-level penetra -

tion of hostile airspace and electronic countermeasures (ECM) protection for com -

bat search and rescue rotary-wing forces.

The Talon I has earned its place in history as the forerunner of modern Air

Force Special Operations. Today both the Talon I and Talon II continue to infil -

trate, exfiltrate, and resupply friendly forces around the world. The Talon I has

recovered packages and people with the Fulton Recovery System in virtually

every theater, and both aircraft have dropped every conceivable object off their

xv
ramps, from motorcycles to 15,000-pound bombs. Because of the capabilities of the

versatile MC-130, and the extraordinary men and women who unselfishly support

its mission of vital national importance, the future of Air Force Special Operations

is secure.

JAMES L. HOBSON JR.

Major General, USAF, Retired

xvi
About the Author

Col Jerry L. Thigpen, USAF, retired, was commissioned in 1969 and served

more than 30 years on active duty, the last 21 of which were in special operations

units. He fought in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War and logged more than

1,000 hours of combat time over northern Laos. During preparation for the rescue

of American hostages from Iran in 1980, Colonel Thigpen was a member of the

team that pioneered fixed-wing night-vision goggle (NVG) airland operations. He

was a member of the crew selected to lead the rescue force into Manzariyeh, Iran,

during the Night Two exfiltration mission. He was the air mission commander

and Combat Talon formation leader of a five-ship formation that landed under

fire at Rio Hato Air Base, Panama, in 1989 during Operation Just Cause.

During his distinguished Air Force career, Colonel Thigpen held a variety of

operational and staff positions to include the J3-Air and chief of the Africa Region

for Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), commander of the 8th Special Operations Squadron, deputy commander of the 1st Special Operations

Group, commander of the 353d Special Operations Group, director of safety for

Air Force Special Operations Command, deputy commander of Special Operations

Command-Korea (SOC-K), and director of research and analysis for Air Force

Special Operations Command. He is a command pilot, certified instructor, and

flight evaluator with more than 5,500 flying hours, 4,000 of which are in the

MC-130E Combat Talon I.

Colonel Thigpen received his Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics from

North Texas State University in 1969 and later earned his master’s degree in

liberal arts from Texas Christian University. He completed the National Defense

University (National Security Management) course by correspondence and the Air

War College by seminar. In 1991 he graduated from the US Army War College

resident program at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. His publications include

AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command, published by the US Army War College.

He also served as the publisher of FOCUS, The AFSOC Commando Safety Journ al,

from 1995 to 1997, during which time he authored numerous articles for the

quarterly major command publication. He currently resides with his family in

Shalimar, Florida.

USAF Photo

xvii
Preface

In the spring of 1997, while assigned to Headquarters Air Force Special Opera -

tions Command, an idea materialized that would ultimately dominate my life for

the next three years. As I reflected over 19 years in special operations, I realized

just how little I actually knew about the Combat Talon aircraft in which I had

spent most of my active duty career. I could cite line and page number from

complex technical orders, and I had been qualified as a flight examiner and in -

structor pilot, but I did not have a clue about the origins of Combat Talon, what

operations the aircraft were involved in, or the people who flew and maintained

them. Life in a special operations squadron was secretive, where only those with

an official “need to know” were read into limited access programs. With the com -

partmentalization of information within the squadron, personnel working side by

side were often not aware of what other members of the unit were doing. I was

convinced that it was the right time to document the untold story of the Combat

Talon.

The commander of Air Force Special Operations Command was Maj Gen Jim

Hobson at the time. As a young lieutenant, he had been assigned to the 15th SOS

at Nha Trang Air Base, Vietnam. I felt that if the project were explained to

General Hobson, I stood a good chance of getting his approval. In March of 1997 I

prepared a staff summary package outlining the Combat Talon Project and forwarded it to Herb Mason, the Headquarters AFSOC command historian. I provided four reasons the Combat Talon Project should be approved. First, I noted

that much of the documented history of the weapons system was fragmented and

could only be found in the files of private contractors, including Lockheed Air

Service (LAS) Ontario and the Robert Fulton Company. LAS Ontario was no

longer involved in the Combat Talon program and was scheduled to cease opera -

tion in the spring of 1998. The remaining LAS Ontario projects were scheduled to

move to Palmdale, California, and join the highly classified Skunk Works program. The company did not plan to move most of its Combat Talon files, preferring to destroy them in place rather than store them at its new location. With the

pending decision to terminate the Fulton recovery system for the Combat Talon I,

the Robert Fulton Company no longer would provide equipment to the Air Force.

Fulton was 88 years young, and his keen mind held a vast treasure of information

about early development of the system. His comprehensive files also contained

documentation on the Fulton system that was not available anywhere else. These

key resources would not be available to future historians.

The second factor that I cited centered around recent Air Force reorganizations.

Many commands either were combined or redesignated (e.g., Air Force Logistics

Command [AFLC] had become the Air Force Materiel Command [AFMC], and

whole divisions had been eliminated in the process). At Wright-Patterson AFB,

Ohio, the home of AFMC, the old Air Force Logistics Command Directorate, which

managed the Combat Talon program for the Air Force, had disbanded. Most of its

records either had been destroyed or placed in long-term storage. The Air Force

reorganization was across the board, and a tremendous amount of classified files

was being eliminated. Prompt approval of the project would allow access to some

of the remaining files, and copies could be made for future research.

xix
The third factor driving approval of the project was the age of Vietnam-era

veterans. Many who flew the Combat Talon during the 1960s were in their six -

ties, and some had already reached their seventies. Because of sketchy written

documentation created by compartmentalization, it was imperative that these

senior special operators be contacted and oral history interviews be conducted

before it was too late. The last point made in the staff summary package was

closely related to the previous one. Much of the operational history of the aircraft,

including photographs and documentation of specific events, could only be found

in the personal files of former Combat Talon operators. It was absolutely impera -

tive that these files be sourced while they were still available.

With the staff summary package in hand, Mason took the ball and set out to

gain approval. During 1997 the USAF celebrated its 50th anniversary as a sepa -

rate service. Herb Mason proposed that the Combat Talon project be included as

part of the yearlong event. Discussing the project with him and with his deputy,

Clay T. McKutchen, the consensus was that the project would take at least two

years to complete. AFSOC would celebrate its 10th anniversary as a separate Air

Force command during calendar year 2000, and we agreed that the book would

make an excellent commemorative of the important year. Thanks to the diligence

of Mason, the Combat Talon project received approval by General Hobson on 31

March 1997.

The project consisted of three parts. The first was the publication of an unclassified monograph, titled “The Praetorian STARShip: The Untold Story of the Com -

bat Talon.” A companion book, not available to the general public and containing

both classified and unclassified information, would be provided to AFSOC/HO.

The third part of the project included the creation of a Combat Talon archive conta ining source material used in compiling the book. Included in the archive were

unit histories, extracts of key documents important to Combat Talon history, oral

history interviews, videotapes of the Combat Talon in operation, technical manu -

als, and so forth. The Combat Talon archive would be delivered to AFSOC/HO at

the completion of the project and then maintained either at Hurlburt Field or at

the Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Research for the Combat Talon Project was set to begin in June of 1997, but

due to operational requirements, it was delayed until August. In the interim

General Hobson relinquished command of AFSOC to Maj Gen Charles R. Holland.

A project briefing was conducted in late August, at which time General Holland

endorsed the project. Over the next two years, I worked continuously on the

project, except during periods when operational necessity required that I fill critical manning requirements elsewhere. By the fall of 1999, I had been able to

complete only 19 months of the 24-month project, having been tasked to fill opera -

tional commitments away from Hurlburt Field for over five months during the

two-year period. With the limited time remaining before my retirement, I could

not finish the project. Again, Mason stepped in and campaigned to have me to

continue the project under civilian contract. Lt Gen Clay Bailey assumed com -

mand of AFSOC when General Holland left for duty in Europe in the summer of

1999. He reviewed the status of the Combat Talon Project and supported Mason’s

initiative to have the book completed under contract.

After retiring from the Air Force on 1 December 1999, I returned to my desk at

the USAF Special Operations School in early January under contract with Madison Research Corporation. The project continued through early summer, at which

time I delivered a smooth draft to Dr. Richard Bailey, my editor at Air University

xx
Press. Although frustrating at times, the satisfaction of bringing the project to a

successful conclusion is the crowning achievement of my professional career. After

over four years and the review of literally thousands of documents, the product

you are about to read still only scratches the surface of the Combat Talon story.

My hope is that this book will provide a framework from which others far superior

to me will be able to piece together the rest of the story. Until then, I must put

down my pen and find peace in that I gave it my best shot. I pray that you will

find I have done an acceptable job.

xxi
A Word from the Commander

We in Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are blessed with a rich

heritage that can be traced back to World War II and the Air Commandos of the

China-Burma-India theater in the Far East. Because the special operations mis -

sion has been historically one of low visibility and little publicity, many times

significant contributions to our nation’s defense go unrecorded for general public

release. Most often operational missions are classified and compartmented to

protect the tactics used, assistance provided by friendly nations, and the special

operators themselves.

I have tasked AFSOC’s command historian with the responsibility to review

past accomplishments systematically and to recommend subject areas, which warrant possible release to the public. The declassification process is a long and

deliberate one and is coordinated through Air Staff, but our past efforts have been

successful in getting information released that would not harm our national secu -

rity. Over the past five years, AFSOC has commissioned several major works and

has made them available for your reading. The first publication in the series was

a study by SSgt Randy Bergeron, titled AFSOC in the Gulf War. The next effort

was a book by USAF Col Michael E. Haas, retired, titled Air Commando!

1950–1975: Twenty-five Years at the Tip of the Spear. We followed up this second

effort with a more in-depth work, also by Mike Haas, titled Apollo’s Warriors: US

Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War. In 1999 AFSOC commissioned

Maj Forest L. Marion to document the impact of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo

on our special operations forces stationed at Clark Air Base, Philippines. Ash

Warriors: The Relocation of the 353d Special Operations Wing, June–December

1991 provides unique insight into both the human and physical tragedy caused by

the event.

The latest AFSOC effort, commissioned in 1997 and titled The Praetorian

STARShip: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon, documents the exploits of the

Combat Talon weapons system from original manufacture through the present

day and tells the story of the men and women who support them. This is the most

comprehensive and complete work to date and will be mandatory reading for all

special operators. A future work will be a monograph of USAF special operations

rotary-wing aircraft beginning with the Air Commandos of World War II and

ending with the retirement of the last MH-53J/M. We also plan to publish a

comprehensive work that documents the history of USAF Special Tactics. Additionally, plans are being developed to commission an AC-130H/U gunship monograph that covers the period from 1972 to the present.

As you can see AFSOC’s publication program is an ambitious one, with the

ultimate goal of publishing a book on each of our major weapons systems similar to

The Praetorian STARShip. I am confident that you will enjoy this latest book by Col

Jerry Thigpen, USAF, retired. We will continue to provide you with comprehensive

histories that tell the USAF special operations story.

MAXWELL C. BAILEY

Lieutenant General, USAF

xxiii
Acknowledgments

I have saved this section until last, and I must tell you that it is by far the

hardest to write. To express my gratitude to all of you who have contributed so

much to this project, both directly and indirectly, somehow doesn’t seem enough.

But, with the full knowledge that I will inadvertently overlook someone, I will try.

For over 20 years, I have had the privilege to work in special operations and fly

the amazing MC-130E Combat Talon. Throughout the entire time, I was blessed

with great commanders, a challenging mission, and the total support of my wife,

Mary, and my two children, Robert Allen and Stacy Diane. It was not all a bed of

roses, however. The intensity and constant stress that those in the special opera -

tions community faced over the years took its toll. Fine marriages and great

friendships had to take a back seat to the special operations mission. Although

the devastating loss of those at Desert One proved to be the salvation of special

operations, I miss those who died still today. We all owe a great debt to their

personal sacrifice.

Over the years, several individuals have had a profound affect on my life. I

would like to thank Col Gordy Ettenson for his friendship and counsel that saw

me through many trying times. I would also like to thank Col Dave Schantz,

retired, who is the hardest working and most dedicated officer I have ever

known—you should have been a general officer. To Lee Hess, thanks for your

passion and enthusiasm for Combat Talon. Your Stray Goose International organization is remarkable. To Col Bernie Moore, thank you for your help and

friendship. I know that I have written the book you always wanted to write. To Lt

Col Bob Meller, retired, a personal friend and mentor, you are the best Combat

Talon pilot that I have ever had the privilege to fly with. To Col Bob Brenci,

retired, you are the finest combat commander under which I have ever served.

Thanks for seeing something in me and saving me in my time of need. Without

your help, I would have left the Air Force in 1981. Thanks to all of you and to

many others whose names have paled with the passing of time.

My years in Europe assigned to the 7th SOS and to Special Operations Com -

mand Europe (SOCEUR) taught me the importance of the special operations mis -

sion. My assignment to SOCEUR introduced me to my all-time personal hero, US

Army Col John P. Gritz, retired, affectionately known as the “old gray-haired,

pot-bellied ranger.” You always had faith in me, and you provided superior leadership during four hard years fighting terrorists across Europe, North Africa, and

the Middle East. I will forever be in your debt. When I completed my SOCEUR

tour, Maj Gen Robert B. Patterson, retired, reached out and selected me to be the

commander of the 8th SOS. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to give

something back to the special operations community. Thanks to the leadership of

Brig Gen George W. Gray, retired, 1st SOW/CC, I thoroughly enjoyed my time at

Hurlburt Field in squadron command. Thank you for believing in me.

My experiences while attending the US Army War College in 1991 established

the foundation upon which I would rely to write The Praetorian STARShip. There

is simply no way that you can stand on the rain-swept battlefields of Gettysburg

on a chilly November day and not be moved by the awesome finality of history. I

had always been a casual student of history, but from that day at Gettysburg, I

xxv
was changed forever. The US Army War College gave me the opportunity to make my

first sojourn into recording history. I was pleased with my Military Studies Program

publication, entitled AFSOC: Air Force’s Newest Command. Although it does not

compare in scope to The Praetorian STARShip, it represents my first major writ -

ing effort.

My thanks to Lt Gen Bruce L. Fister, retired, who gave me the opportunity to

command the 353d Special Operations Group at Kadena Air Base, Japan. The 26

months spent in group command was by far the most demanding assignment of

my career, and it was the most rewarding. To have the opportunity to be the

senior Air Force Special Operations commander in WestPac was a thrill I will

never forget. To the men and women of the 353d SOG, I must say that you earned

your superior reputation every day that I had the privilege to command. I will

never forget the experience. While assigned to Headquarters AFSOC as the director of safety, my staff was professional and supportive, and taught me the impor -

tance of doing the right thing the first time. What I thought would be a dull and

tedious assignment turned out to be challenging and rewarding. The safety

awards that AFSOC earned during my tenure in safety was indicative of the fine

work of everyone in the command. As my time as the director of safety (and,

indeed, my Air Force career) neared its end, my long-held desire to write the

Combat Talon story surfaced as my top priority. I approached Herb Mason, Headquarters AFSOC/HO, with an outline of the project, and he was interested in

presenting it to the command staff. I will forever be grateful to him and to Maj

Gen James L. Hobson, retired, for approving the effort.

Although I had little experience in undertaking such a colossal project, Clay T.

McCutchan, Headquarters AFSOC staff historian, soon introduced me to Joseph

D. Caver and Essie G. Roberts of the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AF -

HRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Over the next three years, I fear that

I wore my welcome thin, but Joe and Essie did everything humanly possible to

provide what I needed to complete my research. Other members of the AFHRA

staff who were helpful included Archangelo DiFante and Dr. Forest Marion. I

could not have written the book without their patience and help. The documents

housed in AFHRA are truly a national treasure that would not be available with -

out the dedication of the professionals working there.

When the project was still in its infancy, I received a telephone call from John

Gargus, a Combat Talon operator from the 1960s and 1970s era. His help in

guiding me through the early years of Combat Talon was critical in telling that

portion of the Talon story. As the months passed, others came forward to help.

When I needed illustrations and photographs to include in the book, I was introduced to John R. Lewis, now retired from Lockheed Air Service. His continual

help over the course of the project has been of untold value. His contributions

have helped make the book come alive with images from the past. I had the

privilege of spending a week with Robert E. Fulton Jr. and his lovely wife, Ann.

Thank you both so very much for your help with the project.

As my administrative requirements grew, the USAF Special Operations School

provided essential support to keep the project on track. From computers to paper

clips, the school provided everything that I needed. Col Brian Maher, retired, was

extremely supportive of my effort, and Joyce A. Weber never failed me when I

needed supplies to keep the project moving. When Herb Mason sent out a call for

help on the project to the historians assigned to AFSOC, MSgt Daniel Wheaton of

the 353d SOG immediately responded with a copy of all 1st SOS unit histories.

xxvi
His quick reaction helped to jump start the project and saved me countless additional days TDY to AFHRA. The 16th SOW History Office, under the leadership of

Dr. John Dabrowski, was also extremely helpful in providing information on

wing-assigned Talon units.

I have enjoyed the support of successive AFSOC commanders, including Lt Gen

Charles C. Holland and Lt Gen Maxwell C. Bailey. Their support allowed me to

see the project through to completion. As the project comes to fruition, I look back

on my life and realize just how fortunate I have been to spend almost my entire

career in special operations. As Gen Jimmy Doolittle once said, “I could never be

so lucky again.” To the men and women of Air Force Special Operations Com -

mand, to those of the US Army Special Forces, and to those of the US Navy

SEALs, I stand in awe of your accomplishments. Without a doubt, your sacrifice

and devotion to duty is no less than that of the Praetorian Guard of ancient Rome.

To associate with the best and brightest of today’s military has made me a better

man. Thank you all for the experience.

xxvii
Introduction

Welcome to the world of Combat Talon! The book you are about to read represents more than four years of research and writing dedicated almost exclusively

to the Combat Talon project. It traces the colorful history of the Combat Talon

weapons system from its predecessors of World War II and Korea up through the

present day.

The first chapter establishes the historical foundation that leads to the requirement for Combat Talon in the mid-1960s. During late 1943 and early 1944, the

US Army Air Force (USAAF) established two units to support forces assigned to the

Office of Strategic Intelligence (OSS) operating in central Europe. Flying out of

England and North Africa, B-17 and B-24 aircraft executed long-range, low-level

penetration missions into central France to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate

friendly forces. From a humble beginning of three B-17s assigned to OSS/Algiers

in 1943, USAAF-committed forces increased to 76 B-24s, four C-47s, and three

B-17s by the summer of 1944. During daring operations over France, 13 B-24s

were lost in combat by the Carpetbaggers, and another three aircraft were destroyed in noncombat accidents. Immediately after the end of World War II, the

OSS was disbanded, and the special operations units that had supported it were

decommissioned. The long-range, low-level mission into hostile territory first em -

ployed by these early pioneers formed the basis for Combat Talon.

Five years after the end of World War II, at the outbreak of the Korean War,

the USAF had no unconventional warfare (UW) assets trained and equipped to

support emerging UW requirements. The Central Intelligence Agency, a civilian

organization with quasi-military responsibilities, was created in 1947. By 1950

there had not been a clear differentiation of duties and responsibilities between it

and the three military services. Gen Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the

Far East Command, was responsible for the defense of South Korea. He quickly

sought to create an organization that would centralize control of all UW activities

and develop a UW plan to employ against Soviet- and Chinese-backed invaders.

The new organization was known as the Covert, Clandestine, and Related ActivitiesKorea (CCRACK), and it was partially staffed with former OSS officers familiar with

the low-level, clandestine mission. To facilitate air support for CCRACK, the

USAF established Unit 4, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, in late July 1950 at

Taegu Air Base (AB), Korea. Two months later Unit 4-assigned C-47s were flying

the first low-level missions behind enemy lines. On 1 April 1952 B Flight of the

6167th Operations Squadron was established at Seoul City AB. It was assigned a

combination of B-26 medium bombers and C-46/C-47 transport aircraft. Both B

Flight and Unit 4 aircraft supported CCRACK low-level UW operations through

1953.

When the USAF was established in 1947, the greatest threat to our nation’s

survival came from the Soviet Union and its growing nuclear arsenal. Early

USAF development was greatly influenced by this threat, which eventually became known as the cold war. One of the programs developed by the Air Staff to

counter Soviet aggression was in the area of psychological operations. In 1948 the

Air Staff established the Psychological Warfare (PW) Division. By 1950 the Air

Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) had been established, and under

the new service, three Air Resupply and Communications Wings (ARCW) were

xxix
stood up, two of which were operational by 1952. There would eventually be three

ARCWs—one based at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, a second based at Clark AB,

Philippines, and a third based at Wheelus AFB, Libya—supporting worldwide PSYWAR tasking. The Clark AB unit flew long-range leaflet missions into northern Korea

in black-painted B-29 aircraft heavily modified for the PSYWAR mission. Also, during

this period ARCW-assigned C-119 transports operating out of Clark AB supported the

French in Southeast Asia (SEA). The SEA mission continued the tradition established

in World War II of Air Force assets supporting non-Department of Defense agencies in

covert resupply operations. After the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, the ARCS

continued to operate around the world and continued to fly the traditional long-range,

low-level mission. By the mid-1950s, however, the Air Force had redirected its priorities away from psychological operations, opting instead to invest heavily in strategic

bombers, nuclear missiles, and tactical fighters. As a result the last ARC unit was

deactivated on 25 October 1956. Again, as had been the case after World War II, the

Air Force was without any UW capability. The low-level penetration mission, how -

ever, would be revived a few years later in SEA.

The French, even with extensive air support from the United States, were defeated at Dien Ben Phu in May 1954, and from that time forward, USAF requirements to support American objectives in SEA steadily increased. In February 1962

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was established in Saigon to

manage the large increase in US personnel arriving in South Vietnam. Over the

next three years, MACV grew in size and importance as the American commitment

to SEA increased. President John F. Kennedy made a commitment to build a special

operations force to support UW requirements around the world, and in the coming

years, US Army Special Forces and US Air Force Air Commandos were trained and

deployed to SEA and to Europe. The United States did not have a joint organization

established to manage the diverse UW mission, so an organization was created to

pull together Army, Navy, Air Force, and non-Department of Defense assets under

an umbrella organization tasked with the UW mission. On 24 January 1964 MACV

stood up a new UW organization similar to the earlier CCRACK unit in Korea and

identified it as the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). USAF support for the

new organization consisted of six specially modified C-123 aircraft equipped with

electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment, radar detection, and enhanced navigation. The unit, named Heavy Hook, was stationed at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam.

The unit received the first C-123 aircraft on 25 June 1964, and it flew its first

low-level combat mission into North Vietnam on 16 December. With its air requirements rapidly escalating, SOG requested additional air support. During the same

period the USAF was developing the Fulton surface-to-air recovery system (STARS),

which was designed to recover downed crew members from deep inside North Vietnam. As a result of the two requirements, Air Staff directed that 14 HC-130 aircraft

(on the assembly line at Lockheed-Georgia) be modified into the UW configuration.

The aircraft were identified as the C-130E(I) (later redesignated the MC-130E) and

named the Combat Talon. Early aircraft were camouflaged with a combination of

black and dark green paint, and they were commonly referred to as “Blackbirds.”

The second chapter is provided to familiarize the reader with the basic C-130

aircraft and to describe major UW modifications made to the 14 HC-130 aircraft.

The Fulton STARS is discussed in-depth, with emphasis placed on early system

development. To allow the new aircraft to fly its low-level mission and avoid enemy

threats, terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar was developed. Chapter 2 describes the theory and operation of the special radar. The chapter concludes with a

description of the other major modifications to the weapons system, including ECM

and the high-speed low-level aerial delivery system. After review of the basic weapons

xxx
system, the following three chapters cover the first 10 years of Combat Talon, from

1965 to 1974. During this period the Combat Talon community grew into three distinct

units—Combat Knife in the continental United States, Combat Spear in the Pacific,

and Combat Arrow in Europe. Chapter 3 tells the story of the Combat Talon unit

(Combat Knife) established at Pope AFB, North Carolina. The Combat Knife unit

was attached to the 779th Troop Carrier Squadron and was tasked with the initial

organization and training of aircrews to man the complex weapons system. The

Combat Knife unit later became the 318th Special Operations Squadron, and it

moved to Hurlburt Field, Florida, in 1974 as the 8th SOS.

Chapter 4 documents the early years of Combat Spear. In the fall of 1966, four

aircraft and six crews deployed from Pope AFB to SEA as Combat Spear and were

assigned to the 314th Troop Carrier Wing at Ching Chang Kuang (CCK) AB, Taiwan. The final beddown location of the Combat Spear unit was Nha Trang AB,

Vietnam, where it was colocated with its sister squadron, Heavy Hook. By the end

of the year, Combat Spear aircraft were flying SOG-tasked missions into North

Vietnam. Low-level infiltration and resupply drops, along with high-altitude leaflet

drops, made up the majority of the combat missions flown. The legacy of the World

War II Carpetbaggers and the ARCWs of the early 1950s was revived. During 1967

Combat Spear lost two of its assigned aircraft, one over North Vietnam and a

second on the ground during a mortar attack. In 1968 the unit’s name changed to

the 15th Special Operations Squadron, and it continued to support SOG requirements until 1972 when it relocated to Kadena AB, Okinawa, as the 90th SOS. Six

months later the squadron’s name again changed to the 1st SOS.

The third Combat Talon unit, also made up of four aircraft and six crews and

identified as Combat Arrow, deployed to Ramstein AB, Germany, in 1968 and became part of the 7th SOS. Chapter 5 traces the early years of the 7th SOS as it

transitioned from C-123, C-47, and UH-1 helicopters to the new Combat Arrow.

September 1968 marked the beginning of a long and successful exercise series in

Europe when the 7th SOS participated in Flintlock I. The exercise series continued

over the next 22 years during some of the most tense periods of the cold war. In

March 1973 the 7th SOS moved from Ramstein AB to Rhein Main AB, Germany,

where it remained for the next 19 years.

Chapter 6 presents a detailed account of the Son Tay prisoner-of-war (POW) raid

as told through the eyes of the Combat Talon crews that participated in the heroic

event. Mission preparation and rehearsal in the Florida Panhandle before deploy -

ment to SEA is covered in detail. Because of limited numbers of Combat Talon

aircraft and crews worldwide, one crew and aircraft were sourced from the 318th

SOS, one crew from the 7th SOS, and one aircraft from the 15th SOS. By spreading

the tasking throughout the Talon community, no one unit was adversely affected,

and the Top Secret operation could be better protected from compromise. The mis -

sion was a team effort from the start, with Combat Talon providing lead pathfinder

duties for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing formations. Although the POWs were

moved from Son Tay Prison before the raid, the planning and execution of the

mission were almost flawless. Had the POWs been there, the rescue force would

have undoubtedly been successful.

By the mid-1970s the United States had departed Vietnam, and a period of

military drawdown and consolidation had begun. Chapter 7 covers the period from

1974 to 1979. During this period USAF conventional and unconventional warfare

forces were reduced significantly. For Combat Talon the 14-aircraft fleet was main -

tained, but funding for spare parts and base infrastructure to support them was

xxxi
greatly reduced. By the end of 1975, the entire Air Force SOF capability had been cut

to one undermanned wing (the 1st SOW) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, with three squadrons assigned (the 8th, 16th, and 20th SOSs), and two Talon squadrons stationed

overseas (the 1st and 7th SOSs). Barely 3,000 personnel remained in SOF during the

late 1970s.

The watershed event for modern special operations—the Iranian rescue mission —

occurred in 1980 and is covered in detail in chapter 8. After a brief discussion of the

events leading up to the taking of the US Embassy in Tehran, the author traces the

development of special tactics and unique equipment to allow the Combat Talon to

do its tasked mission. In a manner similar to chapter 6, this chapter emphasizes Air

Force preparations and rehearsals leading up to the actual mission. When the

mission failed at Desert One, the Combat Talon community only paused briefly

before it resumed preparations to return to Iran. The next chapter, chapter 9,

documents post–Desert One developments under the Honey Badger program. Ad -

vancements in equipment and technology are discussed. By late summer 1980 a

companion program, separate from Honey Badger, was begun. Known as Credible

Sport the objective of the developmental program was to create a C-130 aircraft

capable of landing and taking off in a 100-yard distance. From the beginning of

planning for the rescue of the hostages, the most difficult task (from an Air Force

standpoint) was getting rotary-wing aircraft into and out of the embassy area

safely. Across the street from the American embassy was a soccer stadium. If the

United States could develop a C-130 aircraft that could land, onload its precious

cargo, and then take off in the distance of the soccer field, the entire rotary-wing

problem could be eliminated. Early requirements for the Credible Sport aircraft

included the capability to land on an aircraft carrier with the aid of an arresting

hook. The carrier-landing requirement originated from the need to quickly move

potentially critically wounded personnel to a trauma center for medical care. From

concept to partial modification of the first aircraft, Credible Sport was flying three

weeks after the program began. Within 60 days a fully modified aircraft had been

delivered to the test crews. During a test mission on 29 October 1980, the aircraft

crashed and was destroyed during a maximum effort short-field landing test.

Shortly afterwards a new president was elected, and talks with the Iranians accelerated. The crisis was resolved in January 1981 when the hostages were released

immediately after President Ronald Reagan was sworn into office. The hostage

release brought to an end the initial Credible Sport program, but Honey Badger

continued on into 1981. The tactics and equipment developed under Honey Badger

formed the foundation for modern-day SOF. Fallout from Desert One resulted in the

relocation of the 1st SOS from Okinawa to Clark AB, Philippines, in early 1981.

After the Desert One mission, the Holloway Commission was formed by the

Department of Defense to investigate why the mission failed. The commission found

that the mission was well planned and that it would have probably succeeded

except for circumstances beyond the control of the participants. It made several

recommendations, many of which were incorporated into the Department of Defense

structure. Chapter 10 discusses the period after the release of the hostages, including the initial requirement for the Combat Talon II weapons system. The Combat

Talon II program first utilized the remaining Credible Sport aircraft, and the effort

was identified as Credible Sport II. The Credible Sport II program validated many

of the advancements incorporated into the Combat Talon II, but the extensive horsal, dorsal, and retro-rocket modifications developed for the unique Credible Sport

mission were not included in the production aircraft. In 1983 all Air Force special

operations aircraft were transferred from Tactical Air Command to the Military

Airlift Command (MAC), including the two overseas Combat Talon squadrons. The

xxxii
move was partially driven by the Air Staff’s desire to consolidate all special operations

assets under one command and thus eliminate redundancy and standardize the

fleet. Only a few months after moving to MAC, Combat Talon was tasked to support

US operations in Grenada. The chapter ends with an in-depth look at Combat Talon

support for Operation Urgent Fury. During the air assault on Point Salines, Grenada, Lt Col Jim Hobson earned the MacKay Trophy for the most prestigious flight

of 1983.

By 1984 Congress had grown impatient with the three services regarding the

slow improvement of SOF and expressed its dissatisfaction over the next two years.

Chapter 11 follows the changes in SOF organization through 1989. At the heart of

Congress’s concern was the Combat Talon II. Since 1982 Congress had included

funding for the new weapons system in the annual budget, but each year the Air

Force redirected the funds to other, more important conventional priorities. In 1984

the Air Force developed its own plan to fix special operations, which included divesting itself of all rotary-wing SOF assets. Known as Initiative 17, the agreement

between the chiefs of staff of the US Air Force and US Army called for transfer of

the SOF rotary-wing mission to the US Army. The agreement infuriated many

members of Congress, who looked upon the initiative as a first step by the Air Force

to rid itself of the entire special operations mission. Two years later Congress

passed the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

which was the landmark legislation that established modern-day SOF. The act

created the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and, for the first time

ever, Congress earmarked a major force program to fund SOF requirements. Thus,

USSOCOM was given the responsibility to manage SOF appropriations separate

from service funding. The Combat Talon program was included in the new organiza -

tion. In 1988 the Combat Talon II faced a major program crisis due to cost overruns

and delivery delays linked to the poor performance of the radar, forcing the restructuring of the entire program to save it from cancellation. Chapter 11 ends in 1989

on the eve of Operation Just Cause—the US invasion of Panama.

The following two chapters discuss Combat Talon participation in contingency

operations in both Panama and Southwest Asia. Chapter 12 begins in December

1989 when the 8th SOS was alerted to deploy to Panama for Operation Just Cause.

Crews of the 8th SOS landed at Rio Hato AB, Panama, only minutes after the

initiation of hostilities, delivering vital equipment and personnel. In the following

days Combat Talon crews supported special operations throughout the country, and

on 3 January 1990, an 8th SOS Combat Talon exfiltrated Manuel Noriega from

Panama to the United States. Chapter 13 describes Combat Talon operations in

Southwest Asia during 1990 and 1991. Seven months after Just Cause, the 8th SOS

deployed four aircraft and six crews to Saudi Arabia within days of the start of

Operation Desert Shield. The deployment continued for the next eight months, with

most of the squadron’s energy directed towards that theater. During Desert Storm

the 8th SOS dropped millions of leaflets in a highly successful psychological warfare

campaign and delivered 11 BLU-82B 15,000-pound bombs in support of coalition

objectives. The 7th SOS also deployed two Combat Talons to Turkey in mid-January

1991 to support the joint search-and-rescue mission. Chapter 13 ends with both

units returning to their home stations.

The catastrophic explosion of Mount Pinatubo near Clark AB, Philippines, forms

the backdrop for the beginning of Chapter 14. Many heroic actions were performed

by members of the 353d SOW and the 1st SOS as the Pacific Talons were forced

from their Pacific island base. For the next year the squadron remained in limbo,

with the decision delayed until 1992 to base all Pacific SOF fixed-wing assets at

xxxiii
Kadena AB and all rotary-wing assets at Osan AB, Korea. Also, during 1992 the 15th

SOS was activated at Hurlburt Field and became the first operational squadron assigned the Combat Talon II. Later in the year the 7th SOS moved to Royal Air Force

Alconbury, United Kingdom, and converted to the Combat Talon II weapons system. At

year’s end the 1st and 8th SOSs operated the Combat Talon I aircraft, with the 7th and

15th SOSs assigned the new Combat Talon II. At Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, three

Combat Talon II aircraft were assigned to the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing,

and all formal Talon II training was shifted from Hurlburt Field to that location over

the following year. During 1995, as a result of Commando Vision, the 1st SOS con -

verted to Combat Talon II, and their Combat Talon I aircraft were subsequently

transferred to the 711th SOS at Duke Field, Florida. By the end of 1995, the 8th

SOS was the only active duty squadron flying the older Combat Talon I, with the

1st, 7th, 15th, and 550th SOSs flying the new Combat Talon II. The 711th SOS at

Duke Field, assigned to the Air Force Reserve Component (AFRC), operated the

remainder of the older Combat Talon Is. Chapter 14 closes with a description of the

7th SOS’s participation in Operation Joint Endeavor.

The final chapter covers Combat Talon operations from 1996 to 2000. Contin -

gency operations in Africa and the Balkans, along with the extended commitment to

Southwest Asia, characterized the period. During the late 1990s the Combat Talon

II weapons system was brought to maturity, and the sophisticated weapons system

trainer became operational at Kirtland AFB. In 1997 a 7th SOS crew won the

MacKay Trophy for its heroic actions during contingency operations in Africa. It

was the second time that the award was won while operating a Combat Talon

aircraft. In 1998 the 8th SOS flew the remains of one of its fallen comrades, 1st Lt

Michael Blassie, from Arlington National Cemetery to his home in St. Louis, Missouri.

Lieutenant Blassie had been shot down in Vietnam in 1972, and his remains had been

honored in the Tomb of the Unknowns since 1984. The 7th SOS was heavily involved in

Operation Assured Response during the spring of 1999. The European Talon II squadron dropped millions of leaflets as it contributed to the most concentrated air operation

since World War II. The highly successful psychological operations campaign contrib -

uted significantly to the early cessation of hostilities by warring Serb forces. As the

year 2000 began, the 8th SOS moved to Duke Field and colocated with the 711th SOS,

becoming the first Air Force active associate squadron. Under the new arrangement all

14 Combat Talon I aircraft were transferred to AFRC, with both active duty and

Reserve component crews operating them .

The future of Combat Talon is discussed in the epilogue, with a look at the

impact of the new CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft on Talon force structure. The Combat

Talon of the future is also presented with a discussion of the MCX concept aircraft,

which is a stealthy special operations delivery aircraft still on the drawing board.

The future of Combat Talon is bright. As long as there is a need for a long-range,

low-level aircraft capable of penetrating hostile airspace to deliver men, materiel, or

leaflets anywhere in the world, the Combat Talon will remain the centerpiece of

contemporary SOF.

* * * * * *

I hope that you find this story as interesting and exciting to read as it was for me

to put down on paper. In the end, however, history isn’t always interesting or

exciting. The Praetorian STARShip was written as a smorgasbord of facts and events

that covers over 50 years of Combat Talon history. Partake of the feast as much as you

like, then saddle up and take a ride with Combat Talon.

xxxiv
Chapter 1

Establishment of Combat Talon

And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for

your country.

—John F. Kennedy

It was November 1979 on a return flight from

Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina, when

Lt Col Bob Brenci first mentioned the possible involvement of our unit, the Eighth Special Opera -

tions Squadron, in an attempt to rescue American

hostages in Iran. As the sun dipped below the horizon, I thought of what this might mean in the

forthcoming months. Our idle speculation soon

turned into reality a few days later as tasking

flowed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS ). The

effort expended over the following 12 months by

the special operations community would ultimately set a course that would result in the rebirth

and resurrection of special operations. For those of

us intimately involved in special operations at the

time, we could not see how our nation could allow

such a unique capability to fade away. Yet, since

Vietnam special operation forces (SOF) assets had

steadily declined. Perhaps a successful rescue

could save our cherished mission.

I had checked out in the MC-130E Combat

Talon weapons system in November 1978 and had

been upgraded to instructor pilot the following

fall. I had little knowledge of the heritage and tra -

ditions of the former Combat Talon units. Indeed,

the whole talon program had been cloaked in secrecy, with little more than barroom war stories

ever told of early exploits. I had gone to Southeast

Asia (SEA) as a second lieutenant in 1971 to fly

the EC-130E and had gazed with envy at the Com -

bat Spear and Heavy Chain aircraft that would

occasionally transit the Air America ramp at

Udorn Royal Thai AFB, Udorn Thani, Thailand. I

vowed to be a part of this exciting special operations program one day. As the purple sky grew

dark over Georgia, I had little concept of what

Colonel Brenci’s words would mean to me person -

ally, but I was soon to feel the pain, as did the

whole SOF community, of the greatest adventure

of my life.

But the story of Combat Talon didn’t begin here,

nor did it begin in SEA. Rather, it began some

40-odd years before, over the skies of occupied

France. Nazi Germany had extended its iron fist

over the continent of Europe, and all that remained

of French resistance was small bands of partisa

operating throughout their occupied nation.

To support and build a viable partisan forc

Allied planners developed the concept of low-lev

infiltration, resupply, and, in some cases, exfiltr

tion of Allied forces sent to help the partisa

bands. Although aircraft have changed dramat

cally since the early beginnings, the mission ha

remained virtually the same. To understand ho

the modern MC-130E/H Combat Talon weapo

systems have evolved into what they are today, w

must make a brief sojourn back into history.

World War II: The Office of Strategi

Services and the US Army Air Force

The modern-day Combat Talon mission can b

traced to World War (WW) II and the Frenc

campaign in Central Europe from 1944 to 194

The long-range, low-level mission was also em

ployed by the 1st Air Commando Group in th

China-Burma-India theater in the Far Eas

When Nazi Germany overran France early in th

war, the venue was set for the long-range, low

level penetration mission to infiltrate, resuppl

and exfiltrate friendly forces operating behin

enemy lines. Throughout France, partisan ban

organized to resist the brutal occupation of the

homeland by Nazi Germany. The key to partisa

success lay in their ability to receive Allied su

port, thus providing them the capability to co

tinue their struggle. The Office of Strategic Ser

ices (OSS) headed by William J. “Wild Bil

Donovan was tasked to support these behind-th

lines operations. Although some operations cou

be done by way of land or sea infiltration, the va

majority of OSS requirements relied on air fo

support. Royal Air Force (RAF) special duti

squadrons supported their own special operatio

forces, but they did not possess air assets in suff

cient quantities to service OSS needs. Gener

Donovan organized his European OSS operatio

to best support the French area of operations. H

established two primary operating locations— on

just outside London, known as OSS/London, an

one in North Africa, known as OSS /Algiers. Th

1
OSS had no dedicated aircraft to support its air

requirements, but instead it relied on theater op -

erational commanders for support. Because of the

high demand placed on the United States Army

Air Force (USAAF) in Europe at the time, and

because of the specialized nature of the mission,

support was not forthcoming. In the fall of 1942,

General Donovan set about to acquire a commitment from the JCS for dedicated air support of his

operations in France.

In December 1942 the OSS presented a detailed operations plan (OPLAN), JCS OPLAN

170/1, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. The document outlined requirements for

OSS clandestine activities in the western Mediterranean, including the requirement for three

bom ber-type aircraft for each moonlit night of the

month. Sourcing of these aircraft was left to the

discretion of the theater commander. The plan

was endorsed by the JCS on 18 December 1942

and forwarded to Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower in

Algiers for his approval. On 7 February 1943 General Eisenhower gave his approval in principle to

the OSS plan. Aircraft assigned to the region be -

longed to the Northwest African Air Forces

(NAAF ) under the leadership of Lt Gen Carl A.

“Tooey” Spaatz. Citing higher priorities for con -

ventional air operations, General Spaatz deferred

NAAF support for the OSS plan.

Without dedicated air assets, the OSS had to

compete with conventional forces for support. The

heavy requirements generated by high-altitude

daylight bombing of Germany did not leave any

heavy bomber assets available to support OSS operations. The OSS considered the situation intolerable. In Washington, General Donovan submitted a letter to the JCS on 13 June 1943 outlining

the need for dedicated special air units for his

overseas OSS bases. He requested that JCS approve six bomber-type aircraft for OSS /Algiers

and one squadron of 12 aircraft for OSS /London.

The JCS disapproved Donovan’s request, again

deferring sourcing of air assets to the overseas

combat theater commanders. JCS reasoned that if

the mission was important to theater commanders, then they should be willing to provide air

assets out of hide. In August 1943 General Spaatz

finally approved assignment of three NAAF B-17s

to OSS /Algiers.1

The assignment of the three B-17s to OSS /

Algiers gave the OSS a meager air capability

in North Africa for the first time. The aircraft

and crews were sourced from the 2d, 99th, and

301st Bomb Groups. On 26 September 1943 three

aircraft and three crews were officially assigned to

the new Special Flight Section of OSS/Algiers. The

Special Flight Section set up operations at Massicault Airfield, Tunisia, where the 2d Bombardment Group was also located. Being an ad hoc organization with no maintenance of its own,

OSS/Algiers aircraft were maintained by 2d Group

personnel.2

The B-17 training program began with daylight, low-level, cross-country flights across Tunisia and Algeria. Aircraft flew as low as 400 feet

above the ground, and aircrews soon transitioned

to night low-level training flights as navigational

skills improved. Unlike their modern-day C-130

Talon cousins, the B-17s were extremely limited

when it came to night low-level operations, having to rely on visual cues for both terrain avoid -

ance and navigation. The first operational mission

flown by an assigned OSS/Algiers B-17 occurred

on 20 October 1943. A lone B-17F of the Special

Flight Section departed Blida Airfield near Algiers and headed north towards the southern

coastline of France. After low-altitude penetration

into southern France, the aircraft continued low

level to its drop zone (DZ) near the Swiss border

and a ir-dropped 10 containers of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to a group of French

Maquisards under the supervision of a British

agent. During the return leg of the mission, the

aircraft was hit and badly damaged by enemy ant iaircraft fire, forcing shutdown of two of the aircraft’s four engines. The crew nursed the aircraft

back to Algeria, where it made an emergency

landing. Although suffering combat damage to the

aircraft, the first OSS /Algiers resupply mission

was an operational success.3

With success came additional support in late

October 1943. Three B-25 medium bombers, followed a short time later by an additional three,

were assigned to OSS /Algiers by Twelfth Air Force

(AF) to be used for personnel infiltration missions.

Employment of the B-25s proved unsatisfactory

for OSS operations into France—they were

deemed too fast for personnel drops, and they had

neither the range nor the payload to reach France

from North Africa. With six aircraft assigned, the

Special Flight Section was reorganized into two

units—the 122d Liaison Squadron and the 68th

Reconnaissance Group. In late December 1943 the

122d and the 68th redeployed to Manduria, Italy,

where the B-25s could be better utilized. The B17s were left in North Africa and moved to Blida

Air Base (AB), Algeria, which was located some 20

miles from OSS/Algiers headquarters and was

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

2
colocated with the British RAF’s Halifax-equipped

Special Duties Flight.4

As OSS/Algiers acquired its meager allotment

of B-17s and B-25s, OSS/London continued to refine its requirements and seek USAAF support.

On 6 February 1943 OSS/London dispatched a

message to OSS/Washington, establishing its requirement for “at least 12 specially modified B-24

Liberators.” In Washington, as he had done since

the previous fall, General Donovan continued to

work, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince the JCS to

dedicate aircraft for OSS/London (and also increase aircraft allocations for OSS/Algiers). 5

Not until the fall of 1943 did the OSS break the

logjam, and only then by a quirk of fate. The War

Department and the Navy Department agreed

that the Navy would be the sole service respon -

s ible for airborne antisubmarine warfare. The 9

July 1943 agreement released the USAAF from

the antisubmarine mission, which was being performed in Europe by Eighth Air Force’s 479th Antisubmarine Group with four squadrons of B-24

Liberators. Navy aircraft were scheduled to arrive

in Europe to replace the 479th in October 1943.

The USAAF antisubmarine B-24s had been heavily

modified for their naval warfare role and were

unusable as conventional bombers. In addition,

479th aircrews were not trained in high-altitude

precision bombing.6

Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker, the Eighth AF commander, quickly worked out a plan to employ the

479th B-24s and their crews for OSS support.

With JCS approval of OSS /London’s operational

plan arriving on 17 September 1943, General

Eaker directed Eighth AF to implement the air

portion of the OSS plan. The initiative was designated the Carpetbagger Project. In November two

new special operations squadrons were activated

as the 36th and 406th Bombardment Squadrons

(Special) and were stationed at Royal Air Force

(RAF) Alconbury.7

Through the remainder of the year, aircrews

from the disbanded 479th Group were trained for

their new low-level mission by RAF special duty

crews. Thirty-two B-24s were concurrently modified at Eighth AF maintenance depots, and by the

first of January 1944, initial aircrews and aircraft

were certified combat ready.8

Modifications to the aircraft included measures

to improve their night-flying capabilities and

modifications to allow personnel to parachute

from the aircraft. Engine exhaust flame dampers,

muzzle flash suppressers for defensive guns, and

blackout curtains throughout the aircraft were all

designed to reduce the possibility of visual dete

tion by the enemy. For personnel airdrops, th

ball turret and its supporting structure were r

moved from the floor of the aircraft, thus leavin

a large circular hole through which agent dro

could be made by parachute. Many other mino

modifications were also made: OSS/Algiers B-

and B-25 aircraft were painted black under th

wings and under the fuselage, while the Carpe

bagger B-24s were painted solid black.9

The first Carpetbagger mission was flown in

France on 4 January 1944, followed by 16 oth

missions throughout the month. In February an

again in March, the Carpetbaggers moved loc

tions, finally settling at their permanent locatio

of Harrington Airdrome. The Carpetbaggers fle

56 missions in February and 69 in March. By th

end of March, all 32 B-24s were modified an

combat ready, resulting in 99 missions bein

flown in April. In May the number of missio

jumped to 200.

10

As missions increased and OSS/London’s a

operations matured into a first-rate forc

OSS/Algiers continued its operations with i

three original B-17s and six B-25s assigned du

ing the previous fall. While the B-25s supporte

operations in Italy and the Balkans, the B-1

made up the higher priority OSS /Algiers commi

ment to France. From October 1943 throug

January 1944, however, the three B-17s ha

flown 26 missions, with only 11 resulting in su

cessful airdrops.1 1

General Eaker was promoted to lieutena

gen eral in January 1944 and was transferred 

the Mediterranean as commander, Mediterranea

Allied Air Forces (MAAF). His success with th

Carpetbagger B-24s motivated him to seek sim

lar capabilities for OSS/Algiers. For the nex

Carpetbagger B-24, circa 1945.

USAF Photo

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

3
three months, Eaker lobbied Washington for support. On 9 March 1944 the War Department

authorized Eaker to designate one squadron to be

organized for OSS operations. The 122d Liaison

Squadron was inactivated, and men and equip -

ment throughout MAAF were redirected to form

the new unit.1 2

General Eaker used the three-plane B-17 ele -

ment at Blida to form the nucleus of the new

squadron. Fifteenth Air Force was directed to detach 12 B-24 Liberators from its bomber force to

be utilized by the special operations unit. The aircraft were sent to a maintenance depot in Tunis

for modifications and painting during March and

April, and aircrews were trained in low-level op -

erations. In February the unit flew five missions;

in March and April, 35 were flown. In May, well

before all crews were trained and aircraft modified, 88 missions were completed. On 10 April

1944 the new unit was officially activated as the

122d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), and on 15

June 1944, it was redesignated the 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special), with three

B-17s and 12 B-24s assigned.1 3

On 2 May 1944 General Eisenhower directed

General Spaatz to provide an additional 25 aircraft for the Carpetbagger Project. On 10 May the

788th and 850th Bombardment Squadrons were

assigned to the Carpetbaggers, thus bringing the

total aircraft strength to 64 Liberators assigned to

the 801st Bomb Group.14

Throughout the spring, OSS/London and

OSS/Algiers accelerated combat operations into

France in preparation for Operation Overlord, the

invasion of France by way of Normandy, and Op -

eration Anvil, the invasion of southern France.

Before D day, special operations missions concentrated on the delivery of weapons and ammunition to resistance groups operating in occupied

France.1 5 To a lesser degree, agents and agent

teams were infiltrated to assist in organizing

French resistance forces. After the Normandy and

southern France invasions, the air effort shifted

to personnel airdrops, as hundreds of Allied

teams were inserted into the French interior. As

ammunition and supplies were expended, resupply drops were flown to keep those forces opera -

tionally sound.16 Special Operations B-17s and B24s flew their low-level missions at 1,000 feet

above the ground, at approximately 150 knots in -

dicated air speed (KIAS). Once near the drop zone,

the aircraft descended to 800 feet for personnel

drops or to 400 feet for resupply drops, then

slowed to 120 KIAS. Resupply DZs were usually

marked by flashlights or small fires placed there

by the reception team. For personnel infiltrations,

many teams were dropped into unmanned and

unmarked drop zones.1 7 From January 1944 until

the end of the Normandy campaign nine months

later, OSS-tasked B-17s and B-24s flew into

France on virtually every moonlit night to execute

covert operations. OSS/Algiers aircraft also flew a

few missions into Italy and the Balkans, and

OSS/London Carpetbaggers flew occasionally into

Denmark and Norway. The primary objective,

however, was always France.18

Support for OSS covert operations did not come

without a price. At its peak in the summer of 1944,

the USAAF committed 83 aircraft to the covert

low-level infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of

OSS-sponsored agents (three B-17s, 76 B-24s, and

four C-47s). Of these, the Carpetbaggers lost 13

B-24s and 219 personnel over France, while the

122d/885th did not lose a plane operating out of

North Africa. One 122d B-17 and two Carpet -

bagger B-24s were also lost in noncombat accidents.

By September 1944 German presence in France

had all but ceased. Only small pockets of German

resistance in fortified enclaves could be found. On

12 September the 885th Bomb Squadron flew its

last sorties into France, and on 17 September the

Carpetbaggers ceased operations there.1 9

After a successful French campaign, the Carpetbaggers continued operations into Norway, Denmark, and over Germany itself. Operating from

southern Italy, the 885th flew missions into

northern Italy, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe.

The units continued to provide critical support to

the Allied war effort throughout the remainder of

the war. Like many other units at war’s end, special

operations units completely disappeared from the

USAAF , and the OSS itself ceased to exist. It would

take another war, which occurred halfway around

the globe in a place called Korea, before special op -

erations aircraft would fly again the low-level mission around which Combat Talon was designed.

Post–World War II—The Cold War,

Korea, and the Road to Vietnam

World War II ended in the Pacific in August

1945, and a nation weary of a half-decade of war

eagerly transitioned to the role of an emerging

superpower. Europe and Japan lay devastated

from the war, yet America was virtually untouched. The huge demands of rebuilding the

world’s economy placed the United States at the

forefront of this massive undertaking and thrust

it into an economic boom unparalleled in history.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

4
Two days before the surrender of the Japanese

in the Pacific, the Soviet Union declared war on

Japan and marched into Manchuria and northern

Korea. The Soviet Union took the United States

by surprise with its swift action; therefore, the

United States hastily proposed that Soviet forces

accept surrender of the Japanese north of the

38th parallel, saying that the United States

would accept surrender south of that point. US

leaders reasoned that elections would be held in

the near future to determine the makeup of

post–World War II Asia, including Korea. The Soviets readily accepted the proposal, but free elections never were held, thus setting the stage for a

future conflict on the Korean peninsula.

Throughout the remainder of 1945 and into

1946, the United States demobilized its air, land,

and naval forces that had fought and won World

War II. The United States had not historically

maintained a large standing military during

peacetime. With demands placed on the United

States to rebuild Europe and Japan, US demobilization seemed the right course of action. The

one miscalculation made by the United States

was the Soviet Union’s dogged determination to

expand communism through world dominance.

The resultant cold war was not recognized in its

early stages for what it actually was—a war. Not

until the summer of 1950, when the North Korean

Peoples Army (NKPA)—trained and equipped by

the Soviet Union and communist China—invaded

South Korea, did this miscalculation come to

light.

With the disbanding of the OSS in 1945, the

National Security Council (NSC) was tasked with

covert and clandestine operations and established

infrastructure and organizational responsibility

for carrying out those operations. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Secu -

rity Council and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) as independent agencies responsible for collecting intelligence affecting the national security

of the United States. During peacetime the CIA

was designated the primary agency for conducting

covert and clandestine actions. In times of war, the

Department of Defense (DOD) had primary responsibility, but there was a great deal of unde -

fined areas, which would inevitably cause conflict

between the two civilian and military organiza -

tions. From 1947 to 1954, NSC directives outlined

when either DOD or the CIA was responsible for

these actions.2 0

When the NKPA invaded Korea on 25 June

1950, DOD and CIA relationships were still in

their infancy. As a result, military, CIA, an

South Korean unconventional warfare (UW) e

forts in Korea were uncoordinated and disjoint

from the outset. The initial organization set up 

manage UW efforts in Korea was known as th

Far East Command (FECOM) “Liaison Group,” o

FEC/LG. This staff organization was FECOM

link to intelligence and partisan organizations co

trolled by DOD and CIA case officers. The CI

was an independent civilian organization and, 

such, guarded its independence from the milita

establishment. The reluctance to cooperate b

tween these two organizations doomed FEC/LG

By late fall the FECOM commander, Gen Dougl

MacArthur, sought to create an organization task

to centralize control of all UW activities and to d

velop a UW-coordinated plan. The classified title fo

the new organization was Covert, Clandestine, an

Related Activities—Korea (CCRACK) and was l

cated in downtown Seoul. Its unclassified tit

was the “Combined Command for Reconnaissanc

Activities—Korea.” CCRAK (pronounced se

crack) was a joint organization made up of bo

military and CIA personnel. The CIA division o

CCRAK was entitled the “Joint Activities Com

mission, Korea (JACK).” The director of CCRA

was a military officer who was appointed by F

COM; the deputy director was a civilian CIA off

cer who was also the director of JACK. As was th

case for FEC/LG, cooperation between the milita

and CIA civilians was voluntary within the organ

zation. The CIA would not relinquish its ind

pendence to a military boss. As the war pr

gressed, this ad hoc organizational structu

would impact CCRAK’s ability to accomplish i

mission in an effective and efficient manner.2 1

FEC/LG, and later CCRAK, required air su

port to infiltrate its agents behind the lines just 

the OSS had required during World War II. T

facilitate airborne infiltration of these agents, Un

4 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (TCS) w

established at Taegu Airfield (K-2) in souther

Korea in late July 1950. On 26 September 195

two C-47s from Unit 4 accomplished the first 

many infiltration missions by air-dropping nin

agents behind the retreating NKPA. All land

safely and were later exfiltrated by foot to repo

NKPA movements.22 After the United Nation (UN

breakout from the Pusan perimeter and the lan

ing of General MacArthur’s forces at Inchon, Un

4 moved forward to Kimpo Airfield (K-14), locat

just outside Seoul. For the next three month

CCRAK missions were flown deep into northe

Korea from K-14. Chinese forces invaded Kore

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

5
across the Yalu River in November 1950 and

steadily pushed UN forces back toward Seoul.

Pressure from the invading Chinese forced Unit 4

to redeploy to K-2 by February 1951.

23

As Unit 4 reconstituted itself at K-2, it received

orders from its parent wing, the 374th Troop Carrier Wing (TCW), to establish a Special Air Missions

detachment. Subsequently, on 20 February 1951

Unit 4 was deactivated, and the Special Air Missions detachment stood up to provide VIP air support in addition to its CCRAK commitment. The

Special Air Missions detachment was tasked to provide additional air support to the US ambassador to

Korea, president of the Republic of South Korea,

commander in chief (CINC) FECOM (now Gen

Matthew Ridgway), and to 8th US Army (USA)

staff. The Special Air Missions detachment was

also tasked to fly psychological warfare (PSYWAR) missions as requested by 8th Army. This

new tasking placed a tremendous burden on the

small Special Air Missions unit. By day attached

Fifth AF crews flew VIP missions throughout the

theater in a converted VB-17 bomber and a VC-47

transport. By night 8th Army PSYWAR missions

were flown by Special Air Missions aircrews in

two C-47 speaker-equipped aircraft, and covert

CCRAK infiltrations were made by three additional C-47s formerly owned by Unit 4. Although

modifications to the latter aircraft were requested

by CCRAK, the only modification made was the

addition of the SCR-300 radio.24 Throughout 1951

Special Air Missions C-47s executed CCRAK lowlevel infiltration missions into northern Korea.

Special Air Missions aircrews were literally flying around the clock to support all mission taskings.

CCRAK requirements soon exceeded the Special Air

Missions detachment’s capabilities. As a result, on 1

April 1952 B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron,

was activated at Seoul City AB (K-16) to increase

FECOM’s special operations capabilities. B Flight

was equipped with B-26 medium bombers and C-46/

C-47 transports. The B-26 aircraft were modified to

accommodate up to six jumpers who would parachute from the aircraft through the open bomb bay.

All B Flight aircraft were painted black to reduce

detection during nighttime operations.25

The primary mission of B Flight was the infiltration and resupply of agents or teams operating

behind enemy lines whose purpose was to gather

intelligence and to perform other covert activities,

including the rescue of downed aircrew. B Flight

also had a psychological operations (PSYOPS)

mission that included leaflet drops and speaker

broadcast. More conventional in nature, B Flight

crews were also trained in night flare operations.

Other operations included personnel snatch utiliz -

ing transport-type aircraft.*26

On 29 December 1952 a Fifth AF letter outlined a new capability for retrieving downed aircrew or agents from enemy-held territory. The

system was known as the Personnel Pickup

Ground Station and was more com monly referred

to by aircrew as “the snatch system.” The system

was similar to banner-towing aircraft pickups

whereby a wire was suspended between two

poles, with a second wire attached to the object

(or person) to be picked up. An aircraft equipped

with a tailhook (usually a C-47 transport) would

fly low just above the horizontal wire and hook

the line with the tailhook. The aircraft would then

perform a rapid climb to altitude while the pack -

age was retrieved into the pickup aircraft.**27

On two occasions during 1953, B Flight was

tasked to perform a snatch mission. The first attempt ended unsuccessfully when the downed airman was captured before the aircraft arrived in the

pickup area. The second attempt had to be aborted

after the pickup aircraft received heavy fire and severe damage during its run-in for pickup.28 Like the

Special Air Missions detachment, B Flight con -

tinued to operate and fly CCRACK missions until

the signing of the Korean War Armistice in 1953.

Air Resupply and

Communications Service

By 1948 it became apparent to US leadership

that the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin could

not be appeased, persuaded, or otherwise con -

vinced to respect the territorial rights of its neigh -

bor nations. The US Air Force (USAF) and the

CIA had been created by the National Security

Act of 1947 and activated a short time later. Visionaries in the Pentagon reasoned that the next war

would be fought and won (or lost) in the minds

of those fighting it. Subsequently, the Psychological Warfare Division was established at the

Air Staff in February 1948. By definition psychological warfare in 1948 was synonymous with special operations as defined during World War II.

The new PSYWAR (also known as PW) division

__________

 *Vietnam-era C-130E(I) Combat Talons would execute virtually identical missions for Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Spec ial Operations Group (MACVSOG).

 **The Fulton Surface-to-Air Recovery System (STARS ) was developed by Robert Edison Fulton Jr. during the 1960s and was a vast improvement

over the older “snatch” system. STARS was installed on the 14 C-130E (I) Combat Talons and was deployed to SEA in the mid-1960s.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

6
immediately set about to develop plans to fight

this “new” type of warfare, which came to be

known as psychological warfare, or PSYWAR for

short.29

In 1950 Air Staff/PW created two special opera -

tions wings devoted to the PSYWAR mission and

scheduled them to be activated in 1952. The plan

called for three additional wings to be activated in

1953, with future growth programmed to seven

wings. On 5 January 1951 the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was tasked to organize,

train, and equip these new wings. For security

purposes, the special operations wings were designated “air resupply and communications wings.”

A new service was established to provide oversight for this new capability and was designated

the Air Resupply and Communications Service

(ARCS). 30

Activated on 23 February 1951 at Andrews

AFB, Maryland, the ARCS represented the most

ambitious commitment to special operations since

World War II and was responsible for oversight of

the PSYWAR mission of the US Air Force. The

catalyst for this new capability was the requirement by the CIA for long-range air transport of

guerrilla warfare agents and supplies into Sovietoccupied Europe and Northwest Asia. ARCS was

responsible for USAF unconventional warfare

(guerrilla warfare), direct action (commando-type

r aids), strategic reconnaissance (intelligence gathering), and PSYWAR operations.3 1

The 580th Air Resupply and Communications

Wing (ARCW) was activated at Mountain Home

AFB, Idaho, in April 1951, with a second wing,

the 581st ARCW, following in July. A third wing,

designated the 582d ARCW, was activated in

1952. The three wings were organized and

equipped in a similar manner, with the exception

that the 581st ARCW was the only wing having

rotary-wing aircraft. First-year activities for the

580th and 581st were devoted to training aircrew

and support personnel in their new PSYWAR

mission and in rebuilding Mountain Home AFB,

which had fallen into disrepair since the end of

World War II. In early 1952 the 581st received

orders to forward deploy to Clark AB, Philippines,

and to be assigned to Thirteenth AF. The first to

deploy overseas, the composite wing arrived at

Clark AB in July 1952 with six squadrons specifically tailored to perform the PSYWAR mission.3 2

Of the six squadrons assigned to the wing, the

581st Air Resupply Squadron (ARS) was the lone

squadron devoted to flying operations. Assigned

to the 581st ARS were 12 specially modified B-29

heavy bombers, four C-119 heavy transports, fou

SA-16 amphibians, and four H-19A helicopter

(The 580th/582d ARS were equipped with the sam

number of fixed-wing aircraft.) All aircraft we

new, except for the B-29s, which had been pull

from USAF storage at Warner Robins AFB, Geo

gia. The mission of the 581st ARS was the infiltr

tion, resupply, and exfiltration of guerrilla-type pe

sonnel, and the aerial delivery of PSYWAR materi

(leaflets and other similar materiels). The other fiv

squadrons supported the 581st ARS by providin

maintenance, cargo airdrop rigging, long-rang

communications, and PSYWAR/leaflet productio

One unique squadron was devoted to preparin

guerrilla-type personnel for insertion into enem

occupied territory.

3 3

The 581st ARCW proved to be a very flexib

wing, and its initial theater deployment plan, ou

lined in FECOM Operations Plan (OPLAN) 3-5

capitalized on this flexibility. The OPLAN esta

lished a concept of operations for theater forward d

ployment of assigned 581st ARCW assets. Four 

29s and associated support personnel were placed o

a 60-day rotation schedule to Yokota AB, Japan, to b

colocated with the 91st Strategic Reconnaissan

Squadron, which also flew the B-29. The four C-1

and support personnel were placed on a 90-day rot

tion schedule, with the commander, 315th Air Div

sion (AD), to determine where the aircraft would b

deployed. Two SA-16s were sent to K-16 in Korea 

augment B Flight of the 6167th Air Base Grou

The four H-19A helicopters were also forward d

ployed to K-16 in support of the 2157th Air Resc

Squadron (in fact, they were colocated with t

2157th but actually supported B Flight, as did t

two SA-16s).3 4 CCRAK maintained Operation

Control (OPCON) of these forces and employ

them into northern Korea along with B Flight an

Special Air Missions detachment aircraft.

Extensive modifications were required for the B

29 Superfortress to enable it to perform the spe ci

B-29s from the 581st ARCW supported long-range psych

logical leaflet operations into northern Korea .

Photo courtesy of Apollo’s Warriors

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

7
operations mission. All turrets, except the tail turret, were removed from the aircraft, leaving the

aircraft unarmed and incapable of self-defense. A

parachutist’s exit was made where the belly gun

turret was originally located. Resupply bundles

were mounted on bomb racks inside the bomb bay,

thus allowing the bundles to be dropped like

bombs over the drop zone. Aircraft were painted

black, and a crude HTR-13 obstruction-warning

radar was installed to warn the crew of approach -

ing terrain. Later Combat Talon aircraft would be

equipped with a highly sophisticated radar allow -

ing low-level, adverse weather terrain-following

operations. The major flaw in the B-29 employed

in the special operations role, however, was that it

had been designed for high-altitude precision

bombing, not low-level airdrop. Over the drop zone

at drop airspeed, the aircraft was near its stall

speed and was difficult to maneuver.35

A B-29 assigned to the 580th ARCW conducted

trials at Eglin AFB, Florida, during the summer of

1951 to determine if the aircraft could be used to

extract personnel utilizing the prototype Personnel

Pickup Ground Station extraction system. The test

aircraft was modified with a 48-inch diameter

opening in place of the aft-belly turret and with an

elongated tailhook at the rear of the aircraft. The

system was similar to the one adopted in 1952 by

Fifth AF for the C-47s of the Special Air Missions

detachment in Korea. The tests proved technically

feasible, but the project was dropped for the B-29

aircraft due to aircraft size and safety considera -

tions of flying it so close to the ground.36

The solid black B-29s flew long-range leafletdrop missions over northern Korea. PSYWAR

“leaflet bombs” were loaded with various forms of

PSYWAR materiel and then airdropped from high

altitude. An altitude-sensitive fuse opened the

container at a predetermined set altitude, depend -

ent on premission forecast winds and desired dispersal patterns. On 15 January 1953 a 581st ARS

B-29, with the wing commander on board, was shot

down 12 miles south of the Yalu River in far

northern Korea on a leaflet-drop mission. Radarcontrolled searchlights illuminated the unarmed

Superfortress, and “day only” MiG-15s shot the

aircraft down. Surviving crew members were imprisoned by Chinese communist forces and were

put on trial in October 1954. Not until 4 August

1955, two years after the Korean War Armistice,

were the surviving crew members released from

Chinese prison.3 7

At the direction of the 315th Air Division commander, the 581st ARS C-119s provided limited

airlift support to FECOM’s Korean operations

throughout 1952. Beginning in 1953, however,

the C-119s were employed in Southeast Asia in

support of French operations in Indochina. Supplies, including ammunition, vehicles, and barbed

wire, were delivered to Haiphong Airfield in everincreasing quantities. When US presence in Indochina could not be publicly escalated, plans were

developed to utilize 581st personnel in a discrete

support role. Refurbished C-119s, under French

markings, were flown into Indochina by 581st

crews, and French C-119s were flown out for depot repair at Clark AB. Instructors from the 581st

were also tasked to train CIA-employed Civil Air

Transport (CAT) civilian aircrews in the C-119.

American support for the French only prolonged

the inevitable fall of the former colonial power. In

May 1954, the French were defeated at Dien Bien

Phu, thus ending 100 years of French colonial

rule in Indochina.3 8

In October 1954, after being downsized to a

group in September 1953, the 581st was relocated

from Clark AB, Philippines, to Kadena AB, Japan, where it continued reduced operations out of

that location for the next two years. In September

1956, the group was officially deactivated, thus

closing a chapter in special operations history in

the Pacific. 39

* * * * * *

In July and September 1952 the 580th ARCW,

which had been stationed at Mountain Home AFB

since its activation, embarked its support person -

nel by way of ship to North Africa for its initial

deployment overseas. Assigned B-29s flew out of

Westover AFB, Massachusetts, with a planned refueling and overnight crew rest stop in the Azores

en route to Wheelus AB, Libya. The C-119s and

SA-16s, with a much shorter range than the B29s, took a northern route through Iceland, England, and Italy before arriving in Libya.4 0

Picture depicts ARS C-119 in French markings. Squadron supported US interest in SEA during the early

1950s.

Photo courtesy of Apollo’s Warriors

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

8
Life at Wheelus AB for the 580th was Spartan, at

best, for the first six months of operations. Personnel lived and worked in tents enduring the sweltering summer heat of North Africa. Low-level training

was emphasized for the aircrews. The B-29s and

C-119s flew low over the Mediterranean Sea, and

flew 500 feet above the Libyan desert. In January

1954 a B-29 was lost during a low-level training

mission when it failed to clear a ridgeline.41

A primary customer for the 580th was the 10th

Special Forces Group (Airborne) [(10th SFG) (A)],

which was garrisoned at Bad Töelz, Germany, in

the Bavarian Alps. Tenth Group personnel would

deploy to Libya for parachute and desert survival

training. Dropping at 1,000 feet above the ground,

B-29 navigators utilized the Nordon bombsight

developed during World War II to determine the

release point. The bombsight proved to be equally

as accurate at 1,000 feet as it had been dropping

bombs at high altitude during WWII.

4 2

Assigned SA-16s were tasked to fly classified

courier missions throughout the Mediterranean,

Middle East, and southern Europe. The amphibian

aircraft proved to be versatile and on several occa -

sions was tasked to fly extremely sensitive missions, including ones into the Balkans behind the

so-called iron curtain and into southern Russia.

Operating out of Tehran, Iran, in March 1956, an

SA-16 penetrated Soviet airspace at low-level altitude en route to a night amphibious exfiltration

from the Caspian Sea. The mission went as

planned, resulting in the successful exfiltration of

a man, woman, and two children. The family was

flown directly to a water rendezvous in the Mediterranean Sea and from there transferred to an

awaiting ship.4 3

During the summer of 1952, while the 580th was

deploying to Wheelus AB, the Air Staff announced

its decision to reduce the number of ARC wings

from seven to four. Only three wings were eventually activated, however (the 580th, 581st, and

582d).4 4 The primary reason for this reduction was

funding. The Air Force was essentially operating a

national-level special operations program for an

agency outside the DOD (the CIA) with dollars

needed for higher priority strategic forces. With the

rapid buildup of the Strategic Air Command to

counter Soviet cold war aggression and the resulting funding requirements, the lesser priority PSYWAR mission was curtailed. In April 1953 the Air

Staff directed ARCS to limit operations to Air Forceonly projects, thus ending support for such outside

agencies as the CIA. Nine months later Department

of the Air Force Letter 322 and Military Air

Transport Service General Order 174 deactivat

ARCS, effective 1 January 1954.45

In September 1953, after the Korean Armistic

was signed that ended active conflict on the K

rean peninsula and three months before deactiv

tion of the ARCS, the three active wings were r

duced to air resupply groups. The downsize

groups were approximately one-half the size of th

former wings and consisted of two squadrons—o

flying squadron and one support squadron—

compared to six squadrons in each wing before th

reorganization.46

* * * * * *

The third and last ARC wing, the 582d, w

activated at Mountain Home AFB on 24 Septem

ber 1952, to coincide with the deployment of th

580th to Libya. As the previous two wings ha

done, the 582d spent its first year at Mounta

Home AFB training and preparing assigned pe

sonnel for its PSYWAR mission. Having bee

newly redesignated the 582d Air Resupply Grou

it deployed from Mountain Home AFB to RA

Molesworth, United Kingdom (UK), and set u

operations in Europe in February 1954.47

The 582d was assigned to Third Air Force an

provided the bulk of its air support to the 10th SF

(A), which had been transferred in total from Fo

Bragg, North Carolina, to Bad Töelz, Germany, b

this time. For the next two and one-half years, t

582d worked closely with the 10th Group providin

airdrop, resupply, and airland support with its a

signed B-29 and C-119 aircraft. The versatile SA-1

was utilized for amphibious missions, includin

night water-infiltration/exfiltration operations.48

By 1956 USAF interest in the unconvention

warfare mission had run its course. General Ord

37, Headquarters Seventeenth Air Force, dated 1

October 1956, deactivated the 580th ARG in pla

in Libya. Third Air Force General Order 86, dat

18 October 1956, deactivated the 582d ARS, effe

tive 25 October 1956. With the deactivation of t

581st at Kadena AB in September 1956, the USA

closed the book on the long-range unconvention

warfare mission around which the ARCS and i

associated wings were based.49 The book would ope

again eight years later when the United State

found itself in a hot war in SEA.

Early American

Assistance to Vietnam

As the tide of battle changed in favor of th

Allies near the end of WWII, agents of the Unite

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

9
States began working with resistance groups op -

posed to the Japanese occupation of Indochina.

The OSS played the predominant role in these

early operations. Ho Chi Minh guerrillas were actively resisting Japanese occupation, and as a result, OSS agents were approved by President

Franklin D. Roosevelt in early 1945 to train the

Viet Minh and help lead them in their efforts

against the Japanese. The war in Europe was

reaching its climax, and France had been liberated

from Nazi occupation. The OSS had the capacity

to redirect much of its attention to the war in the

Pacific. During this early period of US involve -

ment in Indochina, Ho Chi Minh had not declared

himself a communist. What has come to be an

ironic twist of fate, the first American aid to SEA

was to the Viet Minh guerrillas fighting against

Japanese occupation. These guerrillas would be -

come America’s enemy during the Second Indochina War. 5 0

The United States opposed the return of the

French to Indochina after Japan’s defeat in 1945,

but with the death of President Roosevelt in

April, there was little formal opposition. In the

view of President Harry S. Truman the United

States had more important commitments elsewhere in the postwar world than in Indochina.

The United States also needed French support in

Europe against the Soviet Union and consequently backed off from its opposition of the

French claiming their colonies in SEA. Thus, a

near-total withdrawal of US aid was coupled with

a concurrent French buildup in their former colony. Ho Chi Minh did not favor the return of the

French; rather, he viewed their return as an extension of the century-old occupation of Indochina

by foreigners. Ho Chi Minh moved to the countryside and continued his resistance to foreign occu -

pation that he had begun against the Japanese.

With no Western aid available, he turned to the

Chinese communists for support. With the defeat

of the Nationalist Chinese by Communist forces

in 1949, the United States reevaluated how it

looked at the French-Viet Minh conflict. With the

onset of the cold war and the resultant containment policy of the United States, America began

to associate the Indochina conflict as an East ve rsus

West one—communism versus the Free World.

North Korea, with the support of both Chinese

and Stalinist communists, invaded South Korea

on 24 June 1950. The United States established

the Military Assistance and Advisory Group

(MAAG ) in Saigon in August 1950. From that

time until the defeat of the French at Dien Bien

Phu in May 1954, America provided 80 percent of

the logistical costs of French activities in Indochina.5 1

During the 1954–55 period, the United States

was negotiating in Paris and in Saigon to gain

permission to train the South Vietnamese Army.

On 10 May 1955 (one year after Dien Bien Phu),

the White House announced that the United

States had undertaken responsibility for the

training of Vietnamese armed forces upon the request of the government of Vietnam and with the

agreement of the government of France. Ten days

later, French military forces evacuated Saigon,

thus ending their government’s official participa -

tion in the affairs of its former colony.5 2

From the very onset of US training of Vietnamese

forces, America suffered from the so-called Korean syndrome; that is, America concentrated on

building a conventional army to fight a conventional enemy that would attack the South over

the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two

countries. A strong conventional army was viewed

as the key to stopping communist aggression.

There were some individuals in Washington, how -

ever, who did not view the Vietnamese conflict

solely in conventional terms. As a result, the most

knowledgeable unconventional warfare expert in

the US military was sent to Saigon to establish an

unconventional warfare capability—Col Edward

F. Lansdale of the US Air Force. 5 3

Colonel Lansdale had gained recognition for his

work in the Philippines during the Communist

Hukbalahap’s (Philippine People’s Anti-Japanes e

Army) Huck rebellion of the late 1940s. With

Lansdale’s assistance, Philippine president Ramón

Magsaysay had executed an unconventional warfare campaign that proved to be the most successful campaign of its kind up to that time.

Some in Washington saw similarities in Vietnam

that existed during the early years of the Huck

rebellion , and they felt that experience gained

there could be applied by Colonel Lansdale to the

Vietnamese conflict.

In June 1954 Colonel Lansdale arrived in

Saigon to become the chief of the Saigon Military

Mission (SMM). His charter included the establishment of an organization for clandestine and

covert actions against North Vietnam (NVN).

These actions were to discredit “an active and intelligent enemy who made full use of legal rights

to screen his activities in establishing his staybehind organization south of the 17th parallel.”5 4

Two months after Lansdale’s arrival, NSC issued

Directive 5412, which defined covert operations

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

10
conducted by the United States. Several previous

directives addressing covert operations were also

rescinded at the same time. A follow-on NSC Directive, 5412/2, provided the national authority for

UW operations as conducted in SEA, namely,

propaganda, political action-economic warfare, pre -

ventive direct action, including sabotage , antisabotage, and demolition; escape, evasion, and

evacuation measures; subversion against hostile

states or groups, including resistance movements

and guerrilla or refugee liberation groups; support

of indigenous and anticommunist elements in

threatened countries of the Free World; and decep -

tion plans and operations.55 NSC 5412/2 further

stated that such operations did not include armed

conflict by recognized military forces, espionage,

and counterespionage, nor cover and deception for

military operations.56 The most significant outcome of Directive 5412/2 was the establishment of

Special Group (5412), which was the highest na -

tional authority to grant approval and disapproval

of covert operations.5 7

By August 1954 Colonel Lansdale’s SMM was

adequately staffed, and armed with the just issued NSC Directive 5412, he commenced opera -

tions against the North. Paramilitary teams were

established in Hanoi, Haiphong, and south of the

17th parallel. Initial efforts centered on propa -

ganda campaigns utilizing leaflets distributed by

these teams designed to cast doubt on individual

ownership of property under the communists, on

money reform, and on individual freedoms. Sabotage of key war-fighting materiel, such as con -

tamination of oil stocks, was an example of dire ctaction-type missions these teams performed.

Perhaps the most important mission assigned to

the paramilitary teams by SMM was the recruiting and training of stay-behind indigenous forces

to be employed after the two countries were divided. Another important mission was the caching

of supplies for use by these stay-behind forces. By

1955 Ho Chi Minh had assumed complete control

of the North, and an unofficial report reviewed

the accomplishments of the SMM up to that time:

“It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work

to beat the Geneva deadline—to locate, select, exfiltrate, and equip the men of these (indigenous)

teams and have them in place, ready for actions

required against the enemy.”58

In 1955 the US government put its support be -

hind Ngo Dinh Diem, a member of the Christian

minority in a predominately Buddhist South Vietnam. Diem’s early successes to consolidate power

in the South was perceived in a positive light in

Washington and more aid was provided to h

government. The truth behind his early succe

was, in fact, that Communist forces were conce

trating on consolidating power in the North an

had not yet begun large-scale, organized efforts 

the South. Just as SMM had equipped and traine

indigenous stay-behind forces in the North, Vi

Minh guerrillas (later known by Americans 

Vietcong) were organized and equipped in th

South to challenge the South Vietnamese gover

ment. Beginning in 1957 the Viet Minh began e

calating armed attacks against Diem’s forces b

cause of actions taken by Diem that affecte

Vietcong objectives in the South. These actio

included Diem’s cancellation of elections pr

scribed by the Geneva Accord in 1956, his inten

fied campaign to eliminate the Viet Minh in Sou

Vietnam by military force, and his close economi

military, and political ties with America. Throug

out the remainder of the 1950s and through 196

the communist insurgency intensified and e

panded throughout South Vietnam. In Septembe

1960 the US ambassador to Saigon advised Pre

dent John F. Kennedy that “it may become nece

sary for the US government to begin consider

tion of alternative courses of action and leaders.”

US-Soviet relations in early 1961 strengthene

America’s resolve to defend freedom in Southea

Asia. In his now-famous speech of January 196

Nikita S. Khrushchev announced Moscow’s inte

tion to back “wars of national liberation” aroun

the world. In April of 1961 President Kenned

suffered the humiliation of the Bay of Pigs fiasc

which set off alarms in Washington that wou

quickly be heard in Vietnam. On 20 April 196

the day after the attempted Bay of Pigs invasio

of Cuba, President Kennedy asked the secreta

of defense to apprise him of the Vietnam situatio

and to recommend a course of action that wou

prevent communist victory in Indochina . The r

sultant plan submitted to President Kennedy a

ticulated a greater emphasis on covert and par

military operations as well as deployment 

additional military and CIA personnel to Sou

Vietnam. With the president’s approval and e

dorsement by the secretary of state and the secr

tary of defense, the plan marked the beginning 

a commitment to SEA that would continu

throughout the 1960s and ultimately cost mor

than 50,000 American lives and nearly fractur

the very foundation of American society.60

The plan approved by President Kennedy a

vanced the following authorities:

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

11
authority to expand positive and counter intelligence

operations against communist forces in South Vietnam

and the use of civilian aircrews of Americans and other

nationalities, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese

in operations against North Vietnam. The US would

assist the RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Air Force] to

increase border patrol and insurgency suppression ca -

pabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence system, by instituting regular aerial surveillance

over the entire frontier area, and by applying modern

technological area-denial techniques to close the roads

and trails along the border.6 1

Almost immediately after the plan was approved,

in May 1961, the first US Special Forces teams

arrived in South Vietnam.

In June 1961 President Kennedy clarified his

support of unconventional warfare operations and

his faith in the military’s ability to conduct covert

and paramilitary operations when National Secu -

rity Action Memorandums (NSAM) 55, 56, and 57

were published.

NSAM 55 stated that the advice of the JCS, in cold war

as well as declared war, was to come to the President

unfiltered and direct. NSAM 56 expressed the President’s interest in using unconventional warfare operations to meet future requirements, and requested DOD

and CIA inventory all paramilitary assets in the US

Armed Forces and consider where indigenous paramilitary forces could be employed. NSAM 57 provided the

basis for assignment of covert and paramilitary operations against North Vietnam. It also defined paramilitary operations (PM) as “those operations in which tactics, requirements in military-type personnel,

equipment and training approximate those in conven -

tional military operations.”*62

Before publication of NSAMs 55, 56, and 57,

the secretary of defense had restructured the

DOD to streamline how to plan, coordinate, and

conduct covert and clandestine activities. In Feb -

ruary 1961 Brigadier General Lansdale (formerly

stationed in Saigon as the SMM chief) was appointed the assistant to the secretary of defense

(ASTD) to handle functions related to (1) Special

Group (5412)/303 Committee matters, (2) special

defense activities as approved by the secretary of

defense, and (3) CIA-DOD relationships of special

interest to the secretary of defense.63 Also in February the deputy secretary of defense requested

that a small, secure staff element be established

on the Joint Staff to serve as a point of contact

between General Lansdale and the JCS. The purpose of the new office was to facilitate coordination

between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and

various agencies on the Joint Staff and overseas

commands. This staff element, designated the

Special Operations Division (SOD), had responsibilities to ASTD for (1) special logistical support,

such as military equipment, airlift, and realty fa -

cilities, and (2) planning in connection with support requirements for special operations of an in -

terdepartmental nature. 64

The SOD arrangement remained unchanged

throughout 1961, but in early 1962 it was transferred from under the director of plans and policy

to directly under the director of the Joint Staff.

SOD was also redesignated as the Office of the

Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (OSACSA).6 5

The reorganization of OSACSA followed

closely on the heels of the establishment of the

Special Group (Counterinsurgency [CI]), a top

echelon decision-making body with authority

similar to that of the Special Group (5412); how -

ever, its purview covered overt and declared military actions. Through the NSAM of 18 January

1962, which activated the Special Group (CI),

came two lines of authority for prosecuting the

war in Southeast Asia from Washington: Special

Group (5412)/303 Committee monitored covert

actions and Special Group (CI) monitored conventional (counterinsurgency) operations.6 6

As the conflict in Vietnam began to accelerate

in 1961, US personnel assigned to the theater

began to increase dramatically. In a letter from

President Diem to President Kennedy released

on 15 December 1961, Diem states, “For, if we

lose this war, our people will be swallowed by

the Communist Block, all our proud heritage

will be blotted out by the ‘Socialist Society’ and

Vietnam will leave the pages of history. We will

lose our national soul.” President Kennedy responded to this plea with, “We (the United States)

shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort.”6 7

To manage the large increase in personnel, the

MAAG was replaced by the Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam in February 1962.68 Throughout 1962 both conventional and unconventional

warfare throughout Vietnam grew. By 1963 it

was apparent that America’s efforts had not diminished the threat from North Vietnam. In fact,

the position of the South Vietnamese was even

less tenable than in previous years. Various

meetings throughout 1963 resulted in the conclusion that counterinsurgency efforts and uncon -

ventional warfare actions should be escalated.

From these meetings emerged OPLAN 34A.69

__________

 *NSAM 57 envisioned the establishment of the Strategic Resources Group as the decision-making body for determination of responsibility for

operations; however, the Special Group (5412) retained its status. Special Group (5412) was renamed later as the 303 Committee.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

12
Precursor to OPLAN 34A

The American program of covert and clandes -

tine operations in Laos and North Vietnam began

in late 1960 and early 1961. The earlier CIA/SMM

effort to establish a viable stay-behind organiza -

tion in North Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements of 1954 had been largely unsuccessful.7 0 By

the time Lansdale and the SMM began the pr ogram to recruit and train indigenous forces in the

North in the summer of 1954, the Viet Minh had

already established considerable power over the

people there. Although a courageous effort, the program by Lansdale and the SMM was an example of

too little, too late.

Their program centered on establishing an indigenous force in North Vietnam and Laos to provide intelligence concerning North Vietnam military movements towards the South. From 1961 to

1964 the program underwent several disruptive

changes that impacted upon its effectiveness.

From an initial mission of intelligence collection,

the principle mission migrated to sabotage and

harassment operations, with intelligence collection becoming a secondary task. These mission

changes, plus the Geneva Accord addressing the

neutrality of Laos in 1962, severely undermined

US unconventional warfare efforts.71

The two primary means of CIA/SMM infiltra tion

were by air and by sea. Twenty-three of 33 agent

team infiltrations were accomplished by way of airdrop. Acquisition of five C-123 aircraft, sp ecially

configured with electronic countermeasure (ECM)

equipment and manned by non-US crews, consid -

erably enhanced the delivery capability of agent

teams into North Vietnam. Operations in Laos

and North Vietnam required minimal USAF support; however, the Air Force provided logistics,

weather forecasting, and aerial reconnaissance

support for the C-123 crews.72

OPLAN 34A—The Combined

Task Force

Throughout 1963 there emerged a more active

role for the DOD in conducting special operations

in SEA. By the end of the year, the US administra -

tion had made the decision to expand the covert

and clandestine program against North Vietnam.

During November meetings were held by various

divisions within the US government, and OPLAN

34A emerged as the combined US plan. The

OPLAN specified five types of operations: intelligence collection, psychological operations, political

pressure, resistance operations, and physical d

struction (hit-and-run and aerial attacks). 73

In December 1963 the plan was presented 

President Lyndon B. Johnson , who established 

committee to select from the plan those missio

offering the greatest return with minimal ris

Maj Gen Victor H. Krulak, the chief of OSACSA

chaired the committee. (The ASTD, former

headed by Lansdale, had been disbanded earli

in the year and was replaced by OSACSA.) Th

committee was less than enthusiastic, but it co

sidered the advantages of proposed operations 

outweigh the risks. A joint MACV task force w

to implement OPLAN 34A. Operational contr

rested with commander, US Military Assistanc

Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV); overall p

litical control rested with the US ambassador 

Vietnam. On 24 January 1964 the task force stoo

up as the Military Assistance Command, Vietna

Special Operations Group, but was soon change

to MACV Studies and Observations Group for s

curity purposes.7 4 The organization came to b

known by its shortened acronym—SOG. Just 

OSS/London, OSS /Algiers, and CCRACK ha

done during previous conflicts, SOG was tasked 

execute special operations missions assigned b

the theater commander.

In preparation for execution of the plan, th

secretary of defense had deployed equipment an

personnel to Saigon to begin initial operation

The principal requirement levied on the A

Force called for six specially modified C-123 ai

craft equipped with ECM, radar detection, an

enhanced navigation equipment. The aircra

were modified under the Duck Hook progra

during the first half of 1964 and were delivere

to the USAF at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, durin

the third quarter.7 5 The now well-defined low-lev

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

The Heavy Hook C-123 was modified for the low-lev

penetration mission. Note the outboard jets added 

the late 1960s to improve the aircraft’s performance.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

13
infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration mission re -

fined over the previous 20 years was the primary

mission of the new C-123 outfit.

The formation of SOG marked the beginning of

a graduated US campaign of covert and clandestine activities against North Vietnam. The objective of the campaign was to convince North Vietnamese leaders to cease waging war against

South Vietnam. This goal was not achieved during the one-year charter of the organization. SOG

continued to conduct covert and clandestine missions in Southeast Asia until it ceased operations

in 1972. The establishment of SOG under the op -

erational control of COMUSMACV on 24 January

1964 did not effect a complete transfer of all UW

activities to MACV. Within SOG itself, non-DOD

personnel continued to handle some functions, including supervision of air operations through previously established channels.7 6

On 14 October 1964 the DOD assumed all re -

sponsibility, including non-DOD operations, for

obtaining appropriate clearances for the conduct

of air operations over North Vietnam. The process

began with a monthly operat ions schedule, submitted by COMUSMACV approximately 10 days

before the period began. This schedule, incorporating

commander in chief’s, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)

comments, went to the JCS. OSACSA, the action

agency for such matters, obtained approval through

coordination with the deputy secretary of defense [a member of the Special Group (5412)/

303 Committee], and the deputy secretary of

state. Approval of the operations schedule represented final Washington authority for executing

scheduled missions. Twenty-four hours before

execution of each mission, however, COMUSMACV obtained political clearance from the US

ambassador in Vietnam. Concurrently, a notice of

intent was sent to JCS, who in turn informed the

secretary of defense and the secretary of state. The

24-hour requirement was later reduced to 12

hours, and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) was charged with the responsibility

for electronically transmitting notices of intent to

the appropriate offices. Once the mission was

launched, MACV continued to submit launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports, usually by forcelevel-alerting-system precedence. After completion

of a mission, a post-mission report provided aircrew debriefing comments. 77

The above procedures pertained to missions

with an already approved mission concept. In

early 1966 the JCS delegated to CINCPAC the

authority to approve and execute specific OPLAN

34A air missions whose mission concepts had already been approved by Washington. For a mission that fell outside an already approved concept,

Washington retained the authority to approve it

prior to execution. Once a precedent was firmly

established, however, CINCPAC received approval authority for that type of mission. Tight

Washington control hampered the conduct of op -

erations, especially impeding timeliness. There

was also a need for a more integrated organization in Washington since SOG conducted operations near other US force s.78

Oversight at the highest levels of government

placed a heavy burden on the rapidly expanding

SOG operations. From an initial contingent of six

officers and two enlisted men to over 400 by

1969, SOG was beset with some problems, especially in the early stages of buildup. The chief of

SOG Air Operations alluded to the shortcomings

of his new personnel, observing that the “initial

selection (of personnel) was based on availability

of people with retainability in the theater and

with the proper rank—a major problem was the

total ignorance of everyone concerned in this type

of operation.”79

As personnel increased, SOG organizational

structure proliferated. By the end of 1964, there

were five major branches under the commander

(an Army colonel) and the deputy commander, including administration, intelligence, operations,

logistics, and communications. Additionally, four

command elements came under the operational

control of the SOG commander: SOG Flight De -

tachment at Nha Trang, Psychological Operations

Group, Long Thanh Training Detachment, and

Maritime Operations Group. In 1965 the deputy

commander was redesignated the special assistant to the commander, and the 1st Flight De -

tachment at Nha Trang was renamed the Air Op -

erations Group.80

Programs and Operations

Under the charter of OPLAN 34A, SOG initiated four types of UW operations against North

Vietnam under the Footboy program: Maritime

Operations (Parboil), Psychological Warfare Op -

erations (Humidor), Airborne Operations (Timberwork), and Air Operations (Midriff). 8 1 There were

requirements for air support for all four types of

UW operations; however, some operations required greater air support than others. Air support for Maritime Operations was negligible;

nonetheless, USAF assets provided high- and

medium-level sea surveillance and occasionally

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

14
were on call to assist in case of an emergency at

sea.82 Psychological Warfare Operations was the

most successful program against North Vietnam.

One of the primary means of delivery of propa -

ganda, including the delivery of leaflets, gift kits,

and portable radios, was accomplished through

air assets. The rapid expansion of the Humidor

program was reflected by statistics showing the

number of leaflets dispersed over North Vietnam:

67 million leaflets were dropped in 1965, 142 million during 1966, and 171 million during 1967.8 3

The Humidor program was integrated with Air

Operations, since aerial delivery was the principal

means for delivering leaflets.84

The Timberwork program encountered immense difficulties under SOG direction. Evaluations of these operations revealed that they

were largely ineffective and were, in fact, the

least successful of the Footboy subprograms.85 In

1964 SOG inserted one team and conducted 13

reinforcement/resupply missions.8 6 In 1965 SOG

infiltrated two more teams and successfully completed 22 reinforcement and resupply missions.

Teams continued to conduct harassment, destruction, and temporary interdiction missions;

however, greater emphasis was placed on intelligence collection and development once overt

bombing of North Vietnam by the United States

was initiated. Additionally, the need to determine how much aid North Vietnam was receiving

from China and from the Soviet Union reduced

the requirement for direct-action missions.8 7

The Heavy Hook Project

In 1963 the secretary of defense directed that

six C-123 aircraft be modified with special navigational and ECM equipment for use in an unconventional warfare role against North Viet -

nam. The project name was originally Duck

Hook, but was later changed to Heavy Hook .

8 8

The aircraft were located at Nha Trang AB,

South Vietnam, under the organizational title of

1st Flight Detachment. The detachment was

originally dedicated to an earlier program, but

with the implementation of OPLAN 34A, it was

placed under the operational control of the chief,

SOG, who assumed responsibility for the supervision of Heavy Hook in 1964. The first Heavy

Hook aircraft arrived on 25 June 1964, and the

detachment flew its first mission on 16 December.89 First-year activities concentrated on negotiating contracts, organizing the unit, and develop -

ing operating procedures. 90

From the onset of activities, 1st Flight Detac

ment suffered from a lack of specific guidelin

and directives covering its formation and its o

erations. In the haste to organize to meet OPLA

34A requirements, individual service componen

were not tasked to support SOG; hence, SOG exp

rienced difficulty in acquiring qualified personn

spare parts, and equipment necessary to sustain 

flying organization. The situation was similar 

the one faced by OSS/Algiers with its three B-1

and the ad hoc support organization cobbled t

gether by a reluctant USAAF leadership to su

port them. OPLAN 34A did not address air oper

tions in detail; rather, it stated only broa

requirements for training aircrews in mine layin

and for installing special equipment on the six 

123 aircraft. The plan did not specify flying hou

nor sortie requirements or related matters, whic

would prove critical during subsequent attemp

to validate a six-aircraft requirement.91

Compounding the organizational problems 

1st Flight was SOG’s lack of personnel expe

enced in UW operations initially assigned to i

air operations branch. An Air Force officer r

lated the problem, remarking that “none of th

original Air Force personnel assigned to MACSO

had any previous background in UW operation

This was despite the fact that at Hurlburt Fie

the Air Force had a group of personnel trained an

experienced in such operations. The result: MAC 

SOG merely continued to do what had been pr

viously done (prior to its formation) without an

real change in direction, scope, or effort of the pr

gram itself.”9 2

As previously noted, service components we

not tasked to support SOG air activities. From th

very beginning of air operations at Nha Tran

maintenance support for 1st Flight aircraft b

came a controversial issue. An agreement was f

nally reached in November 1964 whereby re

echelon maintenance would be conducted in T

wan, and USAF maintainers would suppo

flight-line maintenance at Nha Trang. 9 3

Even before 1st Flight stood up with its Heav

Hook C-123 aircraft, SOG questioned its suitabili

for the mission. Although the aircraft possess

equipment enabling it to perform low-level, lon

range combat missions over hostile and mountai

ous territory, SOG requested a replacement ai

craft, presumably the C-130, by the close of 196

SOG’s 1964 command history related dissatisfactio

with the C-123, “The C-123 load capacity, operatin

range, and inability to fly in adverse weathe

greatly hampered airborne operations.”94 A lett

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

15
from SOG’s airbor ne operations section, dated 30

December 1964, further alluded to navigational

and delivery limitations of the C-123 . The letter

stated that “reports from in-place teams indicate

that resupply bundles are landing too far from

drop zones. Distances involved range from 1,000

to 3,000 meters. Teams spend anywhere from two

to seven days locating bundles because of the rugged terrain and dense vegetation surrounding the

drop zones.”9 5

One explanation behind SOG’s displeasure

with the C-123’s performance during its first year

of operation could be contributed to the proficiency

of the non-USAF aircrews. When first assigned to

1st Flight, the aircrews were not experienced in

the C-123. The aircraft did not begin arriving until

June 1964, with the mission crews arriving the

following October. The first mission was flown in

December, only two months later. Aircrew proficiency rose dramatically during 1965 and subsequent years; however, mission effectiveness was

impacted early on in the program. Another expla -

nation of SOG’s insistence on the C-130 aircraft

was that the C-130 was the latest, most modern

transport aircraft available to the US military.

Lessons learned in Europe during WWII with

converted B-24s and those of the 1950s operating

B-29s a t low level, drove the development of a

UW-specific aircraft—a modified C-130. Regardless of the underlying reasons, SOG was determined to acquire C-130s for its air operations, and

the C-130E(I) Combat Talon was the weapons system designed from the ground up to perform this

unique mission.

During this period, OPLAN 34A missions could

not be flown by USAF aircrews. As a result third

country nationals were trained in the demanding

low-level mission. Normally, four crews were onstation at Nha Trang, and two crews were on rotation at Hsin-Chu AB, Taiwan. In October 1965 1st

Flight received its first full US aircrew comple -

ment.96 To maintain a qualified crew force, SOG

drafted a plan to train six Vietnamese Air Force

(VNAF) crews in the Heavy Hook mission. Initial

results of the VNAF training program were somewhat successful, but “the Vietnamese were difficult

to control. They were very independent, and seemed

to feel that they were doing us (the United States) a

favor when they flew a mission. They did not see

the mission from a nationalistic point of view.”97

The problem with the VNAF aircrews may

have been as much political in nature as it was

psychological. The VNAF officers selected for C123 training were former A-1 pilots belonging to

Air Comdr Nguyen Cao Ky’s exclusive squadron. The requirement to remain proficient in the

A-1 aircraft complicated matters. They irked

some of their American counterparts by requests for special compensation for their services to 1st Flight. Despite these problems,

three VNAF C-123 aircrews completed training

in 1965. Success was short-lived: one crew was

lost operationally (hit a mountain outside Da

Nang), another was considered “politically un -

stable” and withdrawn from the program, and a

third was ineffective because of a copilot va -

cancy.

9 8

By 1966 the problems with the VNAF training

program had become such a hardship that the

SOG deputy chief of the operations branch dis -

qualified the one remaining aircrew and canceled

plans for sending additional VNAF crews to the

United States for training. Stopping the program

had minimal impact on operations since the third

country national aircrews had attained a high degree of proficiency by that time.9 9

The Combat Talon Aircraft

In 1965 the Air Force directed that 14 C-130E

aircraft be modified on the production line to an UW

configuration. These aircraft were assigned to the

Special Operations Forces element under the project name Stray Goose, which was later renamed

Combat Talon .*100

USAF Photo

C-130E(I) aircraft 64-0523 was delivered to the Air

Force on 4 August 1965 and received the STARS modifi -

cation beginning 3 December 1965. The aircraft was

painted black and green camouflage in August 1966.

__________

 *In 1966 four of these aircraft were deployed to the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR): the code name of this component was

Combat Spear. 

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

16
SOG had asked for more suitable aircraft to re -

place the C-123 as early as 1964, and it reem pha -

sized its requirement after the loss of two Heavy

Hook aircraft in late 1964 (one on 1 November and

one on 10 December). At that time JCS deferred

decision on the SOG request for several reasons:

(1) modified C-130 aircraft would not be available

before mid-1965; (2) only US crews were considered capable of operating the sophisticated C-130,

and US aircrews flying OPLAN 34A missions were

not a viable concept under the existing UW program; and (3) higher authorities imposed restrictions on employment of the C-130 in a UW role at

that time. 101

In March 1965, with the 14 C-130E(I) aircraft

already under construction, CINCPAC reopened

the subject by requesting MACV to furnish additional justification for acquisition of the UWmodified aircraft. Again, the JCS rejected the

MACV proposal. Later during the year, how -

ever, CINCPAC, providing additional justifica -

tion, supported a MACV proposal to use C-130

aircraft for OPLAN 34A operations as outlined

in the “C-130E Sky Hook Study” completed 27

September 1965. The JCS concurred, and on 31

March 1966, it notified CINCPAC of approval o

the request and directed the Air Force to deplo

four UW-modified C-130 aircraft to PACOM. 102

* * * * * *

The Combat Talon had finally come of age. A

ter 20 years, from North Africa, Central Europ

and Northeast Asia to Vietnam, lessons learne

flying B-17s, B-24s, B-29s, C-47s, and a host 

other aircraft were finally incorporated into a sp

cial purpose platform designed specifically for t

highly specialized low-level mission. The aircra

was officially designated the C-130E (I) and w

later redesignated the MC-130E . Twenty-five yea

later, a vastly updated version of the Comb

Talon was fielded under the designation MC

130H. The C-130E(I) aircraft was deployed to th

European theater under the project name Comb

Arrow and to the Pacific theater under Comb

Spear. US-based aircraft would operate under th

project name Combat Knife , having both a worl

wide operational commitment and responsibili

for all stateside Combat Talon formal trainin

The adventure had begun.

Notes

1. Bernard V. Moore II, The Secret Air War Over France:

USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of

1944 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), 10–11.

2. Ibid., 12.

3. Ibid., 12–13.

4. Ibid., 13–14.

5. Ibid., 14–15.

6. Ibid., 15–16.

7. Ibid., 16.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 29.

10. Ibid., 16–17.

11. Ibid., 17.

12. Ibid., 22.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 23.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 25.

17. Ibid., 29.

18. Ibid., 31.

19. Ibid., 35.

20. Project CHECO Report, The Role of the USAF in Sup -

port of Special Activities in SEA, 1 July 1976, prepared by

Tom G. Abbey, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Research

Agency (HRA), 4.

21. Michael E. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors: US Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1997), 17–18.

22. Ibid., 22–23.

23. Ibid., 33.

24. Ibid., 34–35.

25. Ibid., 40.

26. Ibid., 42.

27. Ibid., 50.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 78.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 96–98.

32. Ibid., 79.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 80–81.

35. Ibid., 100, 117.

36. Ibid., 36.

37. Ibid., 83.

38. Ibid., 90–92.

39. Ibid., 92–93.

40. Ibid., 115.

41. Ibid., 117.

42. Ibid., 119.

43. Ibid., 119–22.

44. Ibid., 107.

45. Ibid., 108.

46. Ibid., 124.

47. Ibid., 125.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., 124–25.

50. Project CHECO Report, 5–6.

51. Ibid., 6.

52. Ibid., 8.

53. Ibid., 9.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., 4–5.

56. Ibid., 5.

57. Ibid.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALO

17
58. Moore, 10.

59. Project CHECO Report, 11–12.

60. Ibid., 12–13.

61. Ibid., 13.

62. Ibid., 14.

63. Ibid., 15.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 15–16.

66. Ibid., 16.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 16–17.

69. Ibid., 17.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 18.

72. Ibid., 18–19.

73. Ibid., 20–21.

74. Ibid., 23.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., 25–27.

77. Ibid., 119–20.

78. Ibid., 120.

79. Ibid., 27.

80. Ibid., 28.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 30.

83. Moore, 30–31.

84. Project CHECO Report, 31.

85. Ibid., 32.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., 54.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., 55.

92. Ibid., 55–56.

93. Ibid., 56–57.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., 57.

96. Ibid., 61.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., 61–62.

99. Ibid., 62.

100. Ibid., 68.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., 69.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

18
Chapter 2

The Combat Talon Weapons System

Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.

—Theodore Roosevelt 

From Duck Hook to Stray Goose

The requirement for Combat Talon was deeply

rooted in SEA, but actually resulted from the failed

Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. After the failure,

NSAM 57 was issued in June of that year. In accordance with NSAM 57, the DOD was charged

with the responsibility for conducting both overt

and covert paramilitary operations that required

significant numbers of military trained personnel

and/or large numbers of military-type equipment.

President Kennedy directed a worldwide review of

ongoing covert operations in 1962 to determine if

any of them fit into the category defined in NSAM

57. The American program, begun in 1955 and directed towards North Vietnam under the supervision of then-Col Edward Landsdale, fit into the

NSAM guidelines for transfer to the DOD. When

SOG was established in January 1964, responsibility for air operations in support of the program

was officially assigned to the new organization, although it lacked any organic air capability of its

own.1 As discussed in chapter 1, to support SOG’s

fixed-wing requirements, six C-123B aircraft were

modified by Lockheed Air Service (LAS) Ontario under the program titled Project Duck Hook . The first

aircraft began modification in February 1964, one

month after the formation of SOG. The last aircraft

was delivered to the USAF in June of that year. The

project included the installation of special receivers,

ECM transmitters, a Doppler Navigation System,

and a special seven-color camouflage paint scheme. 2

Its mission was code named Heavy Hook. On 14

October 1964 SOG assumed full responsibility fo

unconventional air operations into North Vie

nam, with the six C-123B aircraft as its prima

air asset.

3

In addition to Duck Hook , LAS Ontario w

tasked in September 1964, under the USAF B

Safari program, to conduct a study to determi

what capabilities were needed to support other no

DOD classified operations. From the study a ne

program emerged and was identified as Thin Slic

This program resulted in a contract to modify tw

C-130Es (aircraft 64-0506 and 64-0507) that wou

eventually become Combat Talons 62-1843 and 6

7785.* Modifications to the two Thin Slice aircra

included the addition of a terrain-following rad

(the SPR-3—later upgraded to the AN/APQ-115), 

surveillance capability (the AN/APR 25/26), and a

electronic warfare (EW) suite for self-protection.4 A

part of the original modifications, the two aircra

were sanitized of all identifying markings, includin

original aircraft serial numbers. As the aircra

were further modified to support unique missio

requirements, they were redesignated Rivet Yard 

in August 1966, and the Thin Slice project was off

cially terminated.

5

In 1965 the US Army Special Forces (SF) e

tablished the requirement for a long-range ai

craft capable of supporting its worldwide low-lev

infiltration/exfiltration mission. Many early SF o

ficers had served during WWII in the OSS, and 

few had served in special operations units in Kore

in the 1950s. The legacy of units like the Ca rpe

baggers served as the basis for their requiremen

__________

 *Aircraft 64-0506 and 64-0507 were produced by Lockheed in September 1964, and three months later, in December 1964, they were remov

from any published inventory. The author could find no further record of these two aircraft. Through interviews with both LAS Ontario and form

Combat Talon personnel, confidential conversations revealed that aircraft 64-0506 and 64-0507 were those originally modified under the Thin Sli

program, which later became Project Heavy Chain . Because of the sensitive (and still classified) nature of Heavy Chain operations, the two aircr

were sanitized, and all serial numbers were removed from the aircraft. While operating in th e Heavy Chain program, they remained “ghost ship

without numbers that could connect them to their controlling organization. In 1972, when the Heavy Chain program was terminated, the t

aircraft were renumbered and brought back into the USAF inventory as Combat Talons 62-1843 and 63-7785. These two aircraft had actually be

destroyed during the Vietnam War, and official records were altered to show that they had been repaired and placed back into service as Comb

Talons. According to the US Navy Center for Naval Analysis, which published an official report on aircraft losses and damage in SEA beginning 

1962, aircraft 62-1863 was destroyed near Tuy Hoa AB, Vietnam, on 20 December 1965. The crew w as on temporary duty from Dyess AFB, Tex

en route to a permanent change of station to CCK AB, Taiwan, and were operating out of Naha AB, Okinawa. The actual mission was genera

from Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, and the crash occurred when the aircraft overflew the runway at Tu y Hoa and impacted a hillside well past t

airfield. Aircraft 63-7785 was a US Navy aircraft that was lost on 17 June 1966 in the South China Sea. The aircraft departed Cam Ranh B

Vietnam, en route to Kadena AB, Okinawa, on an operational airlift support mission. About 30 minutes into the flight, with the aircraft 43 mi

northeast of Nha Trang AB, the crew of a naval gunboat cruising off the coast of South Vietnam observed the aircraft explode and crash into t

South China Sea. No hostile fire was observed, and the exact cause of the crash could not be determined, although sabotage was suspect

Information on the loss of aircraft 62-1843 and 63-7785 was provided by Bob Daley of Dallas, Texas.

19
During 1965 Heavy Hook C-123B aircraft in Vietnam were again validating the unique low-level

mission required to support unconventional warfare operations. SOG was, however, not totally

pleased with the C-123B airframe and was build -

ing a case in the joint arena for acquisition of the

C-130E . Shortly after their arrival in SEA in late

1964, two of the six Heavy Hook aircraft were lost,

thus putting into question whether the C-123 was

the right aircraft for the mission. In response to

the newly established USA Special Forces’s validated requirement and supported by SOG’s needs

in SEA, 14 USAF C-130E aircraft were modified

beginning in 1965 for the long-range infiltration,

resupply, and exfiltration mission. The original

program was named Stray Goose, and the aircraft

were assigned the identification C-130E(I).

When the aircraft were delivered to the USAF

beginning in the late summer of 1965, they were

production model HC-130s with no specialized

equipment. The Fulton Aerial Recovery System*

was added at the Lockheed-Marietta Georgia fa -

cility beginning in December 1965. In March 1966

the first four STARS-equipped C-130E (I)s were

flown to the LAS Ontario facility in California to

receive the Rivet Clamp modification. Four additional aircraft were modified beginning in July

1966, with the final four beginning modification

in January 1967 (fig. 1). 6

In August 1966 the Thin Slice program was

terminated when aircraft 64-0506 and 64-0507

(later renumbered 62-1843 and 63-7785) received

the Rivet Yard I modification. Concurrently, the

classified Thin Slice program was renamed

Heavy Chain , and the program’s requirements

were increased from two to four aircraft. C-130E(I)

aircraft (64-0564 and 64-0565—both with Fulton

STARS installed) were pulled from the Stray

Goose program and modified under project Rivet

Yard II in September 1966 and assigned to the

Heavy Chain program. The four Rivet Yard aircraft flew missions under the code name Combat

Sam until the program closed in late 1972.7

Throughout its existence, Heavy Chain aircraft

served as the test bed for modifications that

would eventually appear on the Combat Talon

fleet. These modifications included, in part, the

forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) system,

the high-speed low-level aerial delivery system

(HSLLADS), and numerous EW modifications.

The 12 remaining Stray Goose aircraft received

the Rivet Clamp modification at LAS Ontario be -

ginning in March 1966. With the Fulton STARS

installed, the aircraft had a unique appearance,

__________

 *The Aerial Recovery System was renamed the Fulton Surface-to-Air Recovery System (STARS) in the mid-1980s. For clarity throughout the text,

the author calls the system the Fulton STARS when referring to the system designed by Robert E . Fulton Jr. and installed on USAF-designated

aircraft. 

Figure 1. Servicing Diagram for C-130E(I), circa 1967 (Source: T.O. 1C-130(I)-1, 25 March 1967, provided by James W. Thomas.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

20
although the early Fulton modification was identical to the rescue HC-130s of the period. What

made the Stray Goose aircraft unique was the

installation of a multimode terrain-following/

terrain-avoidance (TF/TA) radar and a defensive

EW suite. In the fall of 1967, two of the original 12

Combat Talons (64-0547 and 64-0563) were lost in

Vietnam, thus leaving a fleet of 10 operational

aircraft. To compensate for the loss, the USAF

pulled two additional C-130E aircraft from opera -

tional units (aircraft 64-0571 and 64-0572) in

March 1968, and contracted with LAS Ontario to

modify them to the Rivet Clamp configuration.

These two aircraft were identical to the original

12 Rivet Clamp Combat Talons with the exception that they did not have the Fulton STARS

installed.8 Thus, by late 1968 the 12 Combat Talons were identified as “Clamp” aircraft, with 10

(64-0523, 64-0551, 64-0555, 64-0558, 64-0559, 64-

0561, 64-0562, 64-0566, 64-0567, and 64-0568)

having the Fulton capability and two (64-0571

and 64-0572) not having it. The four Heavy Chain

aircraft (62-1843, 63-7785, 64-0564, and 64-0565)

were identified as “Yard” aircraft.*

The production C-130E aircraft was the foundation upon which Combat Talon was built. Ma -

jor modifications to the E model aircraft included

installation of the Fulton Skyhook recovery system, AN/APQ-115 TF/TA radar system, and defensive countermeasure equipment. A review of

the production E model and these major modifi -

cations provide a basic understanding of the

Combat Talon .

The Basic C-130E Aircraft

The C-130 Hercules was first flown on 28 Au -

gust 1954, with the first production model designated the C-1 30A. There were 233 A models produced before the next generation C-130B was put

into service. During the B model production run,

there were 230 B models built, with the last aircraft delivered in 1962. From 1962 to 1975, 491

C-130E models were produced.9 Eighteen E models

eventually became Combat Talons—the 14 Stray

Goose aircraft modified in 1965, the two replace -

ment aircraft brought into the program in 1968,

and the two original Thin Slice/Heavy Chainmodified aircraft.

General Description

The Lockheed C-130E aircraft was an all-meta

high-wing, long-range, land-based monoplane d

signed to provide transportation for cargo an

personnel. The aircraft was multipurpose an

could be used in various roles including airdro

airland, and air ambulance, along with man

other applications. Designed with a short-field c

pability, it could operate from minimally im

proved airfields in forward areas. With the Fulto

STARS installed, the overall length was increase

from 97 feet 9 inches to 98 feet 9 inches. A mod

fied radome and recovery yokes accounted for th

additional length. With the yokes extended, th

overall length of the aircraft increased to 106 fe

4 inches. Other principal dimensions included th

following:

Wing Span . . . . . . . . . . 132 feet 7 inches

Height . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 feet 6 inches

Stabilizer Span . . . . . . . 52 feet 8 inches

Cargo Compartment

 Length . . . . . . . . . . . 41 feet 

 Width (Minimum) . . . . . 10 feet 3 inches

 Height (Minimum) . . . . . 9 feet 

Maximum Gross Weight . . 175,000 pounds

Engines and Propellers

The aircraft was powered by four Allison T-5

A-7 engines. The static standard-day, sea level, tak

off rating of each engine at 100 percent rotations p

minute (RPM) (13,820) was 3,755 propeller sha

horsepower (SHP). The maximum allowable torqu

meter-indicated power was 19,600 inch-pounds. Th

was equivalent to 4,200 SHP in addition to 100 SH

allowance for gearbox and accessory losses, or 

tot al of 4,300 SHP.10 Each engine was equipped wi

a Hamilton Standard, four-blade, electrohydromati

full-fe athering, reversible-pitch propeller. The pr

peller operated as a controllable-pitch propeller f

throttle settings below flight idle and as a constan

speed propeller for throttle settings of flight idle 

above.

11

Assisted Takeoff

Provisions were made for the external moun

ing of eight solid fuel-assisted take-off (ATO

units of 1,000 pounds thrust each, which supplie

__________

 *In 1972, when Heavy Chain deactivated, the four aircraft assigned to that program were transferred to Combat Talon , modified specifically 

PACAF employment, and designated “Yank” aircraft. At that time aircraft 64-0571 and 64-0572 were declared excess to the Combat Talon progr

and were transferred out of special operations. All of their ECM equipment and the TF/TA portion of their radars were removed. They we

assigned to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and Hill AFB, Utah, respectively, within Air Force Systems Command, and were designated as “Sw

aircraft. When 64-0558 was lost in late 1972, 64-0572 was returned to the Combat Talon fleet as a “Clamp” aircraft. When aircraft 64-0564 was lo

in 1981, aircraft 64-0571 was returned and modified as a “Yank” aircraft assigned to the Pacific.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

21
additional thrust when it was desired to shorten

takeoff distance. The system was electrically con -

trolled and operated from the ATO control panel

mounted on the flight control pedestal. The units

were fired simultaneously and gave thrust until

the propellant was exhausted. After firing, the expended ATO units could be jettisoned to reduce

airplane weight and drag. 12 The system was similar to the space shuttle auxiliary boosters that

powered the space shuttle into orbit. It is important to note that once the system was ignited,

there were no means to turn it off—the boosters

would burn until the propellant was consumed.

The Fuel System

The fuel system was a modified manifold flowtype, incorporating a fuel cross-feed system, a singlepoint refueling and defueling system, and a fuel

dump system. The system provided fuel supply

for the four engines and the gas turbine compressor. Each engine could be supplied fuel either directly from its respective main fuel tank or through

the cross-feed manifold system from any tank.

Wing and external tanks could be refueled or defueled from a single-point ground refueling and defueling receptacle located in the right aft landing

gear fairing. Fuel was routed from the single-point

receptacle through the refuelin g manifold. As an

alternate method of refueling the aircraft, tanks

could be fueled separately through a filler opening

in the top of each tank.13

The Electrical System

All internal electrical power for the aircraft

came from five alternating current (AC) generators

or from the battery. Each engine supplied power

to operate its own 40-kilovolt ampere (KVA) AC

generator, and the air turbine motor operated an

additional 20-KVA AC generator. These AC generators provided electrical power for airplane use:

28-volt direct current (DC); 200/115-volt, 400-

cycle, three-phase primary AC; and 115-volt, 400-

cycle, single-phase, secondary and primary AC.

The four engine-driven AC generators were con -

nected through a series of relays to four AC buses;

left-hand AC bus, essential AC bus, main AC bus,

and right-hand AC bus. The relay system operated so that any combination of two or more of the

engine-driven AC generators would power all four

of the buses. With one generator operating, the generator would power only the essential AC bus and

the main AC bus. The air turbine motor-driven

AC generator powered only the essential AC bus

at any time. 14

Both DC and AC external power receptacles

were located on the left side of the fuselage, just

aft of the battery compartment. DC power from

the external source was supplied through two current limiters to the main DC bus. Any electrically

operated equipment on the airplane, except equip -

ment connected to the battery bus, could be supplied from an external DC source. When an external AC power source was connected to the

airplane, it supplied power to all AC buses, to the

DC buses through transformer-rectifier units, and

to the battery bus to charge the battery when the

DC power switch was in the battery position.1 5

The Hydraulic System

A booster hydraulic system, utility hydraulic

system, and auxiliary hydraulic system made up

the power supply sources for all hydraulic components on the aircraft. The booster system provided hydraulic power to a portion of the surface

control boost system only. The utility system normally operated the landing gear, wing flaps,

brakes, nose wheel steering, and a portion of the

surface control boost system. The auxiliary system normally operated the ramp system and provided emergency pressure for brake operation. It

also provided pressure for emergency extension of

the nose landing gear.16

The Flight Control System

The flight control system included the aileron,

rudder and elevator systems, and a tab control

system. The main surfaces were controlled by mechanical systems, consisting of cables, pushrods,

bellcranks, and torque tubes. Hydraulically driven

booster units provided most of the force required

to move the surfaces. The booster units were

driven by hydraulic pressure supplied simulta -

neously by the booster and the utility hydraulic

systems, each of which served to power one portion

of the booster units. System operation was such

that failure or malfunction of any component of

either system in any booster unit would allow normal function of the other system powering the same

unit. A loss of hydraulic pressure in either hydraulic system resulted in a corresponding loss in the

booster unit, and a proportionate loss of power to

operate the unit. The airplane could be controlled

with complete loss of booster unit power through

trim tabs and engine power, along with coordinated increased efforts by the pilot and copilot. The

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

22
trim tabs were controlled electrically and operated independently of the hydraulic system.17

The Flap System

The airplane was equipped with four flaps, con -

sisting of an inboard and an outboard flap on each

wing. The flaps were of the Lockheed-Fowler,

high-lift type in which the flap motion was a combination of an aft movement to increase wing area

and a downward tilting movement to alter the

airfoil section to increase lift and drag. The time

required for full extension or retraction of the

flaps was between 10 and 13 seconds. When 100

percent extended, the flaps formed an angle of

approximately 35 degrees with the wings. The

flaps were operated by a reversible hydraulic motor, cam-actuated microswitch follow-up mecha -

nism, torque tubes, gearbox, and drive screw assemblies. The hydraulic motor operated the

torque shaft section extending outboard to the

gearbox, which rotated ball bearing drive screws

for actuation of the flaps. Utility hydraulic system

pressure operated the flap system. The flaps could

also be operated manually with a handcrank.18

The Main Landing Gear

The main landing gear system consisted of four

wheels, two mounted in tandem on each side of

the fuselage. Each wheel had a separate strut.

The landing gear actuation system was normally

supplied hydraulic fluid under pressure by the

utility system. Fluid from the utility system

flowed through a landing gear control valve to

each of the two main landing gear motors. Each

pair of struts was raised and lowered in vertical

tracks by screw jacks driven by torque shafts pow -

ered by a hydraulic motor through a gearbox. A

flow control regulator in the down line controlled

the raising time of the gear by regulating the flow

of return fluid. A controllable restrictor valve was

located in the up line between the flow regulator

and the hydraulic motor. It was mechanically actuated at a point approximately one inch from the

fully retracted position by a bracket located in the

top of the front strut of each main landing gear.

The gearbox contained a main landing gear

spring-loaded brake assembly, which held the

gear in the up position until released by hydraulic

pressure or by mechanical means. With the main

gear down and the airplane on the ground, friction washers on the screw jack assemblies served

as down locks. Mechanical linkage between the

aft main landing gear struts and the doors caused

the doors to open and close as the main landin

gear was extended or retracted. Six pressur

sealed doors, three on each wheel well bul

head, were provided to permit access to ma

functioning main landing gear componen

while in flight. Glass panels, two on each whe

well bulkhead, permitted visual inspection o

the main landing gear.19

The Nose Landing Gear

The nose landing gear was a swinging-typ

gear. Extending down and aft, it was actuated b

a hydraulic cylinder and secured in the up an

down positions by locks. The gear was normal

supplied with hydraulic fluid under pressure b

the utility supply system; however, during a

emergency, the nose gear could be extended wi

the auxiliary hydraulic system. Hydraulic flu

either from the up or down side of the landin

gear control valve flowed to the nose landing ge

uplocks and downlocks and to the nose landin

gear actuating cylinder. A manual release hand

at the flight station provided a mechanical mea

of unlocking the nose gear uplock should norm

extension of the nose gear become impossible. 

manual hand pump could be used to unlock th

nose gear uplock; it was also used to pump th

gear into the down-and-locked position. The no

gear could be visually checked through a no

gear inspection window on the aft bulkhead of th

nose wheel well under the flight deck.20

The Brake System

A hydraulically operated, disk-type multip

puck brake was installed on each of the four ma

landing gear wheels. The nose gear wheels did n

have brakes. The brakes normally operated fro

utility hydraulic system pressure with an alte

nate supply available through the auxiliary h

draulic system. If electrical power were unava

able, both systems supplied pressure to opera

the brakes. If both utility and auxiliary hydraul

pressure were not available, hydraulic pressur

could be supplied by the auxiliary system han

pump to provide one continuous brake applicatio

to stop the aircraft.21

The Navigational System

The aircraft was fully instrumented and w

all-weather capable. Two individual C-12 compa

systems were installed in the aircraft and pr

vided an accurate heading reference to aid i

navigation, regardless of the latitude position 

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

23
the aircraft. In addition to providing a visual

heading reference, each C-12 compass furnished

heading information to other aircraft navigational

systems. Operating controls for the number 1 and

number 2 compass systems were located on the

digital controller for each system. The digital con -

trollers were located on the navigator’s instrument panel. Each system was capable of operating in one or two modes. In the magnetic heading

mode, used in latitudes where no distortion of

earth’s magnetic field was encountered, the directional gyro in the system was slaved to earth’s

magnetic field and the indicators displayed magnetic heading of the aircraft. In the directional

gyro mode, used in latitudes where the magnetic

meridian was distorted or weak, the system gyro

acted as a directional gyro and maintained the

position manually selected by the navigator. The

indicators displayed the manually established

heading.22

Instrumentation on the pilot and copilot instrument panels included an attitude direction indica -

tor (ADI), horizontal situation indicator (HSI),

bearing-distance-heading indicator (BDHI), and

radio magnetic indicator (RMI). The aircraft was

also equipped with both a pressure altimeter and

a radar altimeter. Radios included two ultrahigh

frequency (UHF), one very high frequency (HF),

two high frequency, and two automatic direction

finding sets.2 3 The system was considered the

state of the art when it was introduced in 1962.

There were many additional systems that

made up the complex C-130E Lockheed Hercules

aircraft. The company continued to improve the

airplane through follow-on models, but most of

the basic C-130 systems found on the early E

aircraft continued in production over the next

three decades.

The C-130E(I)

Combat Talon Aircraft

On 22 July 1965 the USAF took delivery of the

first two C-130E aircraft that were slated to be

modified into Combat Talons. Aircraft 64-0551

and 64-0555 were assigned to the 464th Troop

Carrier Wing at Pope AFB, North Carolina. The

remaining 12 aircraft were delivered to the

USAF during the following five months, with

the last aircraft (64-0568) being temporarily assigned to the 4442d Combat Crew Training

Wing on 17 December 1965. Earlier in the

month, on 3 December, aircraft 64-0523 became

the first aircraft to enter STARS modification at

the Lockheed-Georgia facility.24 The Fulton

STARS was the most visible of the Combat

Talon modifications, and the capability would

become the centerpiece for most of the Combat

Talon community for the next 30 years.

The Fulton Surface-to-Air

Recovery System

During the 1920s, a mail pickup system was

invented by Lytle S. Brown and was employed to

retrieve outgoing mail in remote areas where

overland pickup was impractical. Using Brown’s

invention, All American Aviation developed a

modified pickup system in the 1930s that con -

sisted of two steel poles, set 54 feet apart, with a

transfer line swung between them. A pickup aircraft would approach the cable at 90 miles per

hour, with a 50-foot steel pickup cable trailing

behind. Just before impact with the transfer ca ble,

the pickup pilot would pull the nose of the aircraft

up and engage the transfer cable with a fourpronged grapple anchored to the end of the pickup

cable. A flight mechanic stationed in the fuselage

of the aircraft then used a winch to reel the pack -

age on board.25 The system was operational by

1941 at the outbreak of World War II.

The All American System—

Forerunner to STARS

As the war progressed and the Allies prepared

for the eventual invasion of Europe, it became apparent that a capability was needed to extract personnel who had previously parachuted behind enemy lines. Literally thousands of paratroopers were

dropped by Carpetbagger B-24 and B-17 aircraft,

along with RAF Halifaxes, in the months before and

immediately after the Normandy invasion. The primary option for their recovery was a risky overland

trek through enemy-held territory followed by an

equally risky linkup with Allied forces in the field.

Hoping to find their exfiltration solution in the All

American Aviation system, the British began testing the capability early in the war.2 6

In July 1943 the USAAF validated the need for

the extraction of downed airmen from behind enemy

lines and began an operational test of the All American Aviation system. Initial test produced unsatisfactory results for personnel pickups, with instrumentation recording more than 17 g’s (acceleration

of gravity) at initial contact with the pickup line.

Modifications were made in the parachute harness and the transfer line, thus reducing the initial force on the pick-up package to 7 g’s. On 5

September 1943, the first volunteer paratrooper,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

24
Lt Alex Doster, was picked up by a Stinson aircraft utilizing the All American Aviation system.2 7

The USAAF continued to improve the capability, and by early 1944 it had developed an airdrop

kit containing telescoping poles, a transfer line,

and a parachute harness to be worn by the person

being extracted. In February 1944 the first opera -

tional use of the system came when a C-47 extracted a glider from a remote location in Burma

and returned it to a base in India. For the remainder of the war, the USAAF refrained from using

the All American Aviation system for extraction of

personnel, but records indicate that the British

did use it for that purpose. 28

After the war further development of the retrieval system was discontinued. Not until the

Korean War was interest revived. In the summer

of 1951 a B-29 of the 580th ARCW conducted trials

at Eglin AFB, Florida, to determine if a large aircraft could be used for pickups. Although proven

technically feasible, safety considerations of flying

such a large aircraft close to the ground resulted

in the program being dropped for the B-29.

2 9

In early 1952 the CIA renewed its interest in

the All American Aviation system. The agency was

attempting to establish a resistance network in

Manchuria with its proprietary airline CAT drop -

ping agents and supplies into Kirin Province by

way of C-47 transports. The rugged terrain found

in Manchuria favored an extraction system such

as the All American Aviation system over airland

exfiltration by way of an unprepared runway. By

the fall of 1952, CAT C-47 pilots were making

static pickups in Japan and successfully retrieved

aircraft mechanic Ronald E. Lewis during a train -

ing pickup. With the system tested and operation -

ally ready, a CAT C-47 aircraft equipped with the

All American Aviation system departed Seoul City

Airport (K-16) on the evening of 29 November

1952 for a scheduled pickup of team members previously inserted into Manchuria. Along with two

pilots there were two CIA officers on board—John

T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau. A double

agent had compromised the team, and Chinese

gunners were waiting to ambush the CIA crew. On

initial approach in preparation for extraction of

the team, the C-47 was shot down, resulting in the

death of the two pilots and capture of the two CIA

officers by the Chinese. After two decades of imprisonment, the two officers were eventually released from Chinese prison—Fecteau in December

1971 and Downey in March 1973.30

The All American Aviation system was adapted

by the USAF for C-47 use late in 1952. Building

on knowledge gained from the B-29 test the pr

vious year, B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadro

operating out of K-16 near Seoul, Korea, was a

signed the extraction mission by Fifth AF. On tw

occasions in 1953, B Flight attempted to perfor

extractions utilizing the system. The first attem

was aborted when the downed airman was captur

before the aircraft arrived in the pickup area. T

second attempt resulted in heavy damage to th

C-47 aircraft during the run-in for pickup. The mi

sion had to be canceled, and the aircraft limp

back to its home station without the survivor.3 1

The system proved to be an operational failur

for pickup of downed airmen in a hostile enviro

ment. All American Aviation did develop a su

cessful engagement system, however, in the la

1960s. The follow-on system enabled C-13

equipped aircraft to snag satellite packages i

midair as they parachuted to earth from orbit.

Robert Edison Fulton Jr. 

During a demonstration of the All America

Aviation system in London after World War II, 

young inventor named Robert Edison Fulton Jr. o

served the process and undoubtedly thought that 

could develop a better system. During the war Fu

ton had developed a first-generation flight simul

tor, but was unsuccessful in marketing the devic

to the US military. There was little interest i

flight simulators at the time, with the consens

that aviators could only gain necessary flyin

skills in an actual airplane. Not to be dissuade

by initial rejection, Fulton converted his flig

simulator to an aerial gunnery trainer, which h

called the Aerostructure. The device used film 

simulate aerial combat and provided instant fee

back when the operator successfully hit the ta

get. Fulton demonstrated the device in May 194

to Comdr Luis de Florez, who was in the proce

of establishing a special training division for th

US Navy. With de Florez’ support, Fulton w

provided developmental funds, and the Nav

eventually ordered 500 trainers at a cost of $

million. In addition to the trainer, Fulton deve

oped a complete training system that he woul

later acknowledge as his greatest contribution 

the war effort. The US Navy documented a qua

tum improvement in air-to-air gunnery perform

ance by its new pilots as the Aerostructure b

came the primary gunnery simulator for the Nav

utilizing Fulton’s training system.32

With the success of the gunnery trainer, Fu

ton was recognized within the US Navy as a ma

who could identify a need and apply his uniqu

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

25
analytical skills in developing a solution. His early

childhood and growth into a young adult prepared

him for this “out-of-the-box” thinking. Fulton was

a product of an affluent early twentieth-century

America. A distant relative of Robert Fulton, the

steamship and submarine inventor, and having a

middle name the same as another famous inventor (although the name itself was an old family

one), he was destined to become a world-class inventor himself. With his father the president of

Mack Truck Company, Fulton was blessed with

enough wealth and privilege to be given the op -

portunity to develop and grow into whatever his

abilities allowed. His mother encouraged him to

become an architect, so he enrolled in the University of Vienna’s prestigious school of architecture,

renowned as one of the preeminent architectural

schools of the day. As he neared graduation in

1932, Fulton received a letter from his father encouraging him to return to New York by way of

the Orient so that he could experience the variety

of architectural forms and life styles found

throughout the East. Of course, his father envisioned a conventional mode of transportation (rail

or ship) for the journey. As it turned out, young

Fulton made a deal with an English motorcycle

company to ride around the world on one of its

motorcycles and document the event through photography.

In July 1932 Fulton set out on his Douglas

twin-cylinder motorcycle from England and

headed east. Over the next year and a half, his

adventure resulted in experiences that would affect and shape the rest of his life. On 24 December

1933, Fulton drove into the courtyard of his parents’ home in New York City, having traveled

over 40,000 miles during his 18-month odyssey.

After his around-the-world trip, Fulton’s passion for photography guided him through the next

phase of his life. He worked for Pan American

Airlines (PanAm) as a photographer tasked to

document the airline’s expansion around the

world. Throughout the late 1930s, PanAm built

runways, hangars, terminals, and other facilities

required to support its worldwide operations. Particularly challenging was PanAm’s Pacific island

locations that had to be built from the ground up.

Fulton was there to photograph PanAm’s progress. In 1939 Fulton left PanAm to develop the

flight simulator that he later converted to the aerial

gunnery trainer purchased by the Navy during

World War II.

As Fulton first observed the All American Avia -

tion system in 1946, he was also heavily involved

in developing an aircraft capable of being con -

verted to an automobile for ground transporta -

tion. Fulton had traveled extensively in his Stinson airplane during the war to support his

gunnery trainer contract and was constantly con -

fronted with the problem of ground transportation

after he arrived at each destination. The Airphibian was his solution. Fulton purchased 15

acres adjacent to the Danbury Municipal Airport

and set up his production facilities. He built and

tested eight versions of the aircraft at Danbury.

Because the aircraft was also an automobile, the

long process of certification was nearly doubled to

meet both ground and air specifications. Also, the

Airphibian was the first of its type, and federal

regulators were unsure of what requirements

needed to be met. After a lengthy four-year process, with his personal funds nearly exhausted,

Fulton was forced to sell the controlling interest

in his company to outsiders to raise enough cash

to finish the certification process. Just as the aircraft design was finally being certified, the new

owners decided that producing the aircraft would

not be profitable, and they canceled production

and went in a different direction with the company. Fulton was heartbroken. He had managed

to get the only convertible airplane-automobile in

history certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, yet it would not be produced for sale to

the public. What he had worked on so hard for

nearly five years was now gone.

Through disappointment sometimes comes op -

portunity. While flying over isolated areas of the

globe, Fulton wondered how he would be rescued if

he had the misfortune to crash land. He remembered the All American Aviation demonstration he

had observed in London back in 1946. He decided

to begin work on an improved system that was

designed specifically to extract downed airmen.

Early Skyhook Development

Fulton began his experiments in 1950 using a

weather balloon, nylon lift line, and weights of 10

to 15 pounds each. His concept was a simple one.

Instead of poles supporting a transfer cable as the

All American Aviation system had done, Fulton

wanted to raise the lift line into the air by way of

a helium-filled balloon. Instead of a grapple hook

attached to the end of a pickup cable, he designed

a fork, or V, which was mounted on the nose of

the aircraft. Early experimental designs placed

the fork on the left wing of the aircraft, with knots

tied in the lift line at intervals near the lift balloon. When the lift line was engaged by the forks

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

26
as the aircraft struck the line, the lift line would

pass through the fork until a knot was encountered. This process took only a fraction of a second

because of the speed of the aircraft. A long pole

was used to snag the lift line behind the fork, and

the line was then pulled into the fuselage of the

pickup aircraft by an auxiliary crew member. After retrieval the end of the lift line was attached

to a winch, and the weighted package was retrieved into the aircraft.

Using his own Stinson aircraft, Fulton made

numerous pickups, testing his ideas and develop -

ing reliable recovery procedures. After experiencing some degree of success and convinced the idea

was sound, Fulton had his son film the entire process. Fulton then took the film to then-Adm Luis

de Florez, who had supported him 10 years earlier

when Fulton brought the aerial gunnery trainer to

the Navy during World War II. Admiral de Florez

had become the director of technical research at

the CIA. Believing the idea had merit, de Florez

put Fulton in touch with the Office of Naval Re -

search (ONR) with the belief that the system could

be better developed by the military. Because of de

Florez’ support, Fulton was awarded a develop -

mental contract from ONR to refine his recovery

system and to produce a working prototype. 33 Fulton named his pickup system Skyhook .

Throughout the 1950s Fulton continued to develop both ground and air equipment necessary to

support the Skyhook system. ONR provided a US

Navy P2V Neptune aircraft for Fulton’s research.

Operating out of El Centro, California, Fulton

gradually increased the weight of the pickup

package until his original line began to break. He

solved this problem by developing a braided nylon

line with a test strength of 4,000 pounds. The

most difficult piece of equipment to perfect was

the locking anchor, called the sky anchor, which

was placed in the apex of the fork. Fulton found

that knots in the lift line significantly decreased

its strength. Additionally, once engaged, the knots

could not be easily disengaged from the fork for

subsequent pickups. The sky anchor solved the

problem by wrapping the lift line around a spool,

thus locking the line over itself when the sky anchor was actuated upon contact with the lift line.

After the line was secured in the aft of the aircraft, the sky anchor could then be unwound by

the pickup crew and the lift line pulled through to

clear it for another pickup. By 1958 all major components of the retrieval system had taken final

shape. 34 Along with the sky anchor, Fulton created an upgraded winch system for the back of

the aircraft, and he modified the original weath

balloon to a more stable dirigible shape.

The P2V was modified with a tubular steel 

protruding from the nose of the aircraft, 30-fe

long, and spreading at a 70-degree angle. The li

line was 500-feet long and was made of hig

strength, braided nylon. The aircraft flew at 42

feet above ground level (AGL) and impacted th

line near a Mylar marker placed there to provid

the pilot with a discernible aim point. As the ai

craft hit the line, the balloon was released b

way of a quick disconnect mechanism, and th

sky anchor secured the line to the nose of th

aircraft. As the line streamed back under the ai

craft, the pickup crew snagged the line with 

hook, attached it to the winch, and retrieved th

pickup package into the rear of the aircraft. Fu

ton used instrumented dummies to measure 

forces during the pickup. He also used a pig an

a monkey to validate their survivability whe

picked up by the system. The first human reco

ery took place on 12 August 1958, when SS

Levi W. Woods, US Marine Corps, was succes

fully extracted by the P2V. The entire recove

sequence took approximately six minutes.3 5

The next major milestone in Skyhook develo

ment occurred in August 1960, when a Skyhoo

equipped P2V flew to Point Barrow, Alaska, an

picked up mail and an assundry of items from th

Floating Ice Island T-3. The mission also involve

retrieving prehistoric artifacts from an archeolog

cal party and geological samples from Peters Lak

Camp. The climax of the mission came when th

P2V dropped a recovery kit near the icebreak

USS Burton Island. The recovery package was r

trieved by one of the ship’s boats, and a recove

Photo courtesy of Robert E. Fulton

Robert Fulton modified his Stinson aircraft with a 

fork on the left wing to test the feasibility of his aeri

recovery idea.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

27
was made from the ship’s deck. The Alaskan trials

were the last step in certifying the system for op -

erational use.36

Operation Coldfeet—

The First Operational Use of Skyhook

After the 1960 Alaskan trials, the US Navy

continued to refine the Fulton Skyhook system.

Although contracted to provide lift lines and balloons to the Navy, Fulton’s developmental con -

tract had ended. In May 1961 what would become

the first operational use of the Skyhook system

began as Operation Coldfeet. The Soviet Union ,

along with the United States, operated a series of

drift stations deep in the Arctic for research purposes. As nuclear-powered submarines made

transit of the North Pole feasible, both super

powers turned their efforts to detecting them as

they traveled beneath the polar region. A naval

aircraft flying an aeromagnetic survey over the

Arctic Ocean reported sighting an abandoned Soviet drift station. Soon afterwards, the Soviets announced that they had abandoned Station NP 9

because of a crack in the ice runway that supported its operations. ONR, with its recently developed Skyhook recovery system, was interested

in seeing what secrets the station might possess.

The station was too far north and out of conventional helicopter range. The Skyhook system provided a means to reach the ice station and retrieve equipment or documents the Soviets might

have left behind.37

After preliminary approval by the chief of naval

operations, the mission was tentatively set for

September 1961, when the weather would be fa -

vorable and the station would be within 600 miles

of Thule AB, Greenland. ONR selected two highly

qualified individuals to parachute into the ice sta -

tion and investigate its secrets. USAF Maj James

Smith was an experienced jumper and Russian

linguist who had served on two US drift stations.

Lt Leonard A. LeSchack, US Navy Reserve, was a

geop hysicist who had been involved with the

setup of surveillance equipment on drift station

T-3 in 1960. During the summer of 1961, in

preparation for the mission scheduled for September, the two men trained on the Fulton Sky -

hook system at the Naval Air Test Center,

Patuxent River, Maryland. Although not previously jump-qualified, LeSchack soon became

proficient in required parachuting skills.38

As training continued, top Navy brass became

increasingly skeptical over the whole operation.

Some experts felt that the operation was risky

and that loss of life was inevitable. Regardless, the

mission received final approval in late September

1961. Other delays were experienced when spe -

cialized equipment designed for the mission failed

cold-weather testing at Eglin AFB’s climatic hangar in Florida. By the time the equipment was

certified and everything was ready to go, winter

had set in and the weather had deteriorated to a

point that mission success was highly doubtful.

The mission was subsequently postponed until the

next spring. In March 1962, with the mission still

on hold, naval intelligence learned that a second

ice station, designated NP 8, had been abandoned

in haste by the Soviets because of another ice

breakup near the unit. Being a much newer fa -

cility than NP 9, attention was shifted to the new

target. The US government received permission

from Canada to operate out of the Royal Canadian

AFB at Resolute Bay, which was located 600 miles

from the abandoned ice station NP 8.39

The Skyhook-equipped P2V, accompanied by a

C-130 support aircraft, departed Patuxent River

in mid-April en route to Resolute Bay. The hunt

for NP 8 began in clear weather with unrestricted

visibility. The C-130 flew to the station’s lastknown coordinates and began a 10-mile box

search pattern. After hours of searching and with

fuel running low, the aircraft was forced to return

to base. The next day, the C-130 decreased its box

pattern to five-mile intervals but was still unable

to locate the elusive ice station. With allocated

flight hours exhausted after four additional days

of searching, the mission commander reluctantly

canceled the mission.4 0

Not long after the expedition returned to

Patuxent River, a US reconnaissance flight spot -

ted NP 8 well to the east of the position searched

by the C-130 . ONR was out of funds, and the

modified P2V had been deployed to Antarctica, so

ONR turned to the intelligence community for

support. Fulton was working with the CIA to develop a Skyhook capability for the agency when

the ONR contacted him regarding the NP 8 mis -

sion. In October 1961 Intermountain Aviation, a

CIA proprietary airline specializing in aerial delivery techniques, had equipped a B-17 with the

Fulton Skyhook system. For nearly six months,

CIA-contract pilots Connie W. Seigrist and

Douglas Price had practiced the mission and had

perfected equipment needed to extract agents

from the field. Fulton approached Intermountain

Aviation with ONR’s request. The Defense Intelligence Agency made available $30,000 for the

project, and the proprietary agreed to fly the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

28
mission with the Fulton-equipped B-17 and a support C-46 cargo aircraft.41 An additional $30,000

was eventually provided to Intermountain Avia -

tion to offset the expense of the mission.

On 26 May 1962 Intermountain Aviation

launched the two aircraft to Point Barrow, Alaska,

to begin the next phase of Operation Coldfeet. On

27 May Seigrist and Price launched north from

Point Barrow to the last-known position of NP 8,

but after 13 hours of flying, they were unable to

find the elusive ice station. Weather was poor

with decreased visibility. The next day, with the

assistance of a more sophisticated P2V out of Kodiak Island, the crew located its target. Smith and

LeSchack parachuted out of the “Joe hole” in the

belly of the B-17 just as OSS operatives had done

during World War II. After dropping supplies to

the two men on the ice and completing a radio

check, the crew departed for Point Barrow.42

While the two investigators probed the abandoned ice station, Intermountain Aviation mechanics installed the tubular steel pickup boom on

the nose of the B-17 at Point Barrow. A test flight

was conducted on 30 May, and all equipment was

determined ready for the following day’s mission.

By 31 May, 72 hours had elapsed since the B-17

had dropped the two men on to the ice station.

They had completed their investigative mission

and were ready for extraction. The B-17 pickup

aircraft launched with Robert Fulton aboard,

along with a full complement of flight and pickup

crew members. Weather had deteriorated since

the initial drop, and the aircraft was unable to

locate the station. A dense fog had formed due to

heating of the ice. The crew reluctantly returned

to Point Barrow for an attempt the following day.

After another unsuccessful search on 1 June, the

mission commander again called in the P2V for

assistance in locating the target. On 2 June the

P2V took off two and one-half hours before the

B-17 to give it time to find the ice station. The

P2V quickly located NP 8 with its more sophisticated navigational equipment.43

When the B-17 arrived over NP 8, the weather

was marginal at best for a pickup. The surface

wind was blowing at 30 knots, and the horizon

was barely discernible to the flight crew. The first

pickup was made by Seigrist and consisted of a

150-pound bundle of exposed film, documents,

and sensitive equipment. After the package was

successfully brought on board, Price moved to the

left seat for the next pickup. LeSchack was the

next package scheduled to be retrieved. The wind

had increased in intensity, and when the balloon

began to rise after the two men had inflated 

LeSchack tore loose from the grasp of Smith an

was dragged some 300 feet across the ice. He f

nally managed to stop sliding when his body h

an ice block. At almost the same time that he h

the ice block, Price hit the lift line and LeSchac

disappeared from Smith’s view through the fo

Price and Seigrist changed seats again, and th

crew set up for the last recovery. Back on the ic

Smith held on to a tractor as he inflated the h

lium balloon. As had LeSchack a few minutes b

fore, he was unable to remain stationary whe

the balloon rose to altitude, and he began to slid

across the ice. He managed to find a surface crac

in the ice, and he planted the heels of his boo

firmly in it. As Smith lay on his back on the ic

with his heels wedged in the crack, Seigrist h

the lift line. Minutes later, Smith was aboar

th e B-17 and on his way back to Point Barro

with his fellow investigator.44

Operation Coldfeet was an operational succes

The intelligence value gained from the materi

extracted from NP 8 showed that Soviet researc

in polar meteorology and oceanography was sup

rior to that of the United States. Additionally, 

was learned that the ice station was configured 

allow extended periods of low-noise operatio

confirming the importance the Soviets placed o

acoustical work. But beyond the intelligence valu

of the mission, Coldfeet had validated the oper

tional use of the Fulton recovery system.45 Wi

winds outside the designed operational capabili

of the system, the flight crew still had managed 

make three successful recoveries. The system w

ready for expanded application in both the U

Army and the US Air Force.

Photo courtesy of Robert E. Fulton

Intermountain Aviation modified a B-17 with the F

ton Skyhook system (later identified as STARS). A

craft was used during Operation Coldfeet.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

29
Expansion of the Skyhook System

With the success of Operation Coldfeet, interest in Fulton’s invention gained momentum

throughout the US military. US Army Special

Forces needed a reliable exfiltration method for

its expanding Green Beret program. The Green

Beret’s mission often took them deep behind enemy

lines and often involved parachute operations

into the objective area. Just as OSS troops of

World War II had needed a means to return to

friendly territory when the mission was com -

plete, so did the special forces. In 1962 the US

Army operated a growing fleet of fixed-wing C-7

Caribou aircraft. The Fulton Skyhook system

was adapted for this aircraft. Installation on the

Caribou was similar to that of the Navy P2V and

Intermountain Aviation’s B-17. A large tubular

steel V was mounted on the nose of the aircraft,

and the sky anchor was installed at its apex. The

winch system was modified and installed in the

cargo compartment of the aircraft. An opera -

tional test and evaluation was flown in the Caribou during the fall, culminating in the Army’s

first live pickup of Capt James Skinner on 15

October 1962. Six additional live pickups were

successfully completed in the C-7 during October

and November training flights. 4 6

The US Navy was also interested in expanding

its Skyhook capability. On 3 April 1963 a US Navy

S2F Tracker performed a live recovery of US Marine Corps sergeant Paul Mayer at its Patuxent

River facility. Navy S2Fs and Army C-7s continued

to perform live pickups during training throughout

1963 and 1964 to refine their respective programs.

The US Air Force performed its first live Skyhook

recovery on 27 November 1964, when Capt Nelson

Gough was picked up by a modified C-123H aircraft

at Eglin AFB, Florida. During 1965 another 22 live

pickups were accomplished on Army C-7 and Navy

S2F aircraft. Of the first recorded 98 Skyhook pickups, 52 were performed by Army C-7 Caribous, 32

by Navy S2F Trackers, 11 by Navy P2V Neptunes,

two by Intermountain Aviation’s B-17 during Op -

eration Coldfeet, and one by USAF’s C-123H.

47

All but one of the 98 live pickups was successful. In April 1963, during an S2F Tracker recovery, the pickup volunteer experienced vertigo and

disorientation as he was brought into the aircraft.

An inexperienced recovery crew inadvertently disconnected the lift line before fastening a safety

line to the individual. With no restraining line attached, the individual stumbled and fell through

the open hatch of the aircraft to his death. No

other fatality was attributed to the system for the

next two decade s.48

The USAF C-130A/B

Skyhook Modification

With minimum change, the proven Fulton Skyhook system was adapted by Lockheed engineers

to the C-130A and C-130B aircraft. The basic difference between the P2V and the C-130 installa -

tion was found in the retrieval procedures. On the

P2V the pickup package was brought on board the

aircraft through a hatch in the lower fuselage. On

the C-130 the package came aboard through the

rear cargo ramp and door.4 9

The V yoke and supporting truss was mounted

on the nose of the C-130 and designed in such a

way as to allow installation or removal in approximately two hours. The yoke forks had a spread of

24 feet from tip to tip, thus allowing ample tolerance when maneuvering the aircraft for engage -

ment of the lift line. The fixed-position yoke

guided the lift line into the sky anchor, which

automatically secured the line to the nose of the

aircraft. A propeller guard cable was connected

from the yoke ends to the left and right wing tip

of the aircraft. The purpose of the guard cable was

to deflect the pickup line away from the propellers

in the event the pilot missed the line with the

yoke. A retrieving line deflector cable, attached to

the right yoke tip and to the left yoke base, prevented the lift line from hanging up on the nose

radome (fig. 2). 50

Recovery equipment mounted on a pallet in the

cargo compartment included a hydraulic winch,

hoist with operator controls, safety fence mounted

on the ramp, cable-retrieving hook, and snatchpole. A pallet was secured to the ramp floor by

US Army C-7 Caribou equipped with the Fulton recov -

ery system, early 1960s.

Photo courtesy of Robert E. Fulton

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

30
standard tie-down rings located in the recesses of

the floor. The winch consisted of two cantileversuspended drums mounted to the winch gearbox

and powered by a hydraulic motor. An emergency

manually operated level-wind roller was also provided in the event of primary winch failure (fig. 3).51

The Skyhook components, comprising the

pickup equipment on the nose of the aircraft and

the retrieval equipment on the cargo ramp, were

designed as a package unit capable of being stored

as a kit. The Skyhook system could be installed on

aircraft tasked to fly a recovery mission with th

following minor structural and system adapt

tions completed:

1. Minor beef-up of the upper windowsill longeron

where the nose pickup truss attached to the aircraft.

2. Hydraulic system pressure and return lines adapted

to allow for pallet power source tie-in by installation

of tubing fittings, quick-disconnect fittings, and

dust covers.

3. Electrical system adapted for the Skyhook power

source tie-in by the installation of an AC quick disconnect plug-in type junction box.

Figure 2. C-130A/B Fulton Skyhook Installation (External View) (Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, ER-4112, 8 February 1960.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

31
4. Communication system control panel added in the

cargo compartment near the pallet operator’s

workstation.52

USAF was interested in the Fulton recovery

capability and conducted a formal operational test

and evaluation of the system mounted on the C130 during 1962 and 1963. No recorded live pick -

ups were made during the test phase. In 1964

USAF made the decision to install a permanent

Skyhook system on specially modified C-130E aircraft in response to the growing requirement to

rescue airmen shot down in Vietnam.

Skyhook and Combat Talon

The C-130E was the newest model aircraft in

the C-130 series and marked a significant increase in capability over the earlier C-130A and

C-130B. The removable tubular V yoke tested on

the earlier model aircraft was redesigned by Lock -

heed engineers and transformed into a fully retractable, hydraulically operated unit mounted

permanently on the nose of the aircraft. The con -

figuration required redesign of the nose radome,

resulting in the characteristic nose found on early

Combat Talons. Fulton equipment located in the

cargo compartment was removable and installed

on the aircraft dependent on mission tasking.

More than 75 USAF C-130 aircraft, including the

14 original E model Combat Talons, were eventually modified with the Fulton system.

The Combat Talon Fulton system consisted of a

yoke assembly, sky anchor, davit assembly, manual

davit winch, two hydraulically operated winches,

ramp air deflectors, ramp guards, parahooks, miscellaneous recovery equipment, recovery kits, control panels, and fending lines. The yoke assembly

was designed to fold back along the fuselage of the

aircraft when not required for Fulton operations.

The sky anchor, located at the apex of the yoke, was

mounted internally in the upper nose section of the

aircraft. This configuration helped protect it from

the harsh environment experienced by units pre -

viously mounted in an exposed configuration. The

internal mount of the sky anchor also resulted in a

more aerodynamically clean nose, thus decreasing

drag when the aircraft was in flight.53

Figure 3. C-130A/B Fulton Skyhook Installation (Internal View) (Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, ER-4112, 8 February 1960.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

32
The davit assembly was a V-shaped boom

mounted on the cargo ramp floor; it provided a

means of raising the retrieved package over the aft

end of the ramp and lowering it to the ramp. Two

hydraulically operated winches were included in

the Talon configuration, an improvement over the

earlier winch that had two spools but only one set

of gears. The winches were mounted, one above

the other, on the cargo compartment floor just forward of the ramp hinge and were designed to retrieve the lift line after the sky anchor secured it

to the nose of the aircraft. The top winch was the

primary winch, and the bottom winch was the

standby. To decrease windblast around the ramp

area during recovery operations with the ramp

lowered, a buffer board was mounted on each side

of the cargo ramp. The fence system designed for

the earlier C-130A/B configuration was eliminated.

Three protective guards were attached to the aft

end of the ramp to provide protection for the lift

line during recovery. The yoke was controlled from

the yoke panel at the pilot’s station. The sky anchor was controlled from the sky anchor control

box just forward of the left paratroop door. The

winches were operated by control handles on the

winch platform (fig. 4). 54

To retrieve the line, a torpedo-shaped para -

hook was provided. The parahook, which closely

resembled a conventional iron bomb, had a hook

on each side and was used to hook and retrieve

the lift line. The parahook was attached to a

recovery line, which passed through a portable

pulley assembly mounted above the ramp in the

cargo compartment of the aircraft. After passing

through the pulley assembly, the recovery line

was attached to the standby winch. The para -

hook and recovery line were deployed to retrieve

the lift-line trajectory beneath the airplane and

had to be maneuvered until the lift line was

hooked. Airspeed of the aircraft directly affected

the trajectory of the parahook, with higher airspeeds and heavier packages requiring a heavier

parahook. One 30-pound and one 75-pound

parahook were provided for lift-line recovery.

When not in use, the parahooks were stowed in

the retrieval equipment stowage box located on

the aircraft.55

Miscellaneous recovery equipment included in

the Fulton recovery kit consisted of a cleat bar,

portable pulley assembly, snatch blocks, pilot’s

hooks, anchor clamp, and personnel restraint harnesses. All the miscellaneous recovery equipment

was stowed in the retrieval equipment storage box

in the forward cargo compartment. One pilot’s

hook was stowed on brackets on the flight-statio

aft bulkhead. The cleat bar, which mounted o

the aft right side of the ramp floor, contained tw

cleats. The cleats were used to secure the lift lin

when removing the snatch block from the lin

The portable pulley hooked into the overhea

structure above the aft center of the ramp. Th

pulley was used to raise the davit assembly whe

the recovery package reached the ramp. Th

snatch block was used to pull enough slack in th

lift line to enable the lift line to be secured to th

cleat bar. The pilot’s hook was used in the cockp

to pull the lift line into the airplane, where th

line could be cut to release the balloon connecto

end. Personnel restraint harnesses were used b

personnel working on the ramp during recove

when the ramp was lowered. 56

Building on the lessons learned from Operatio

Coldfeet, a ground anchor kit was provided for u

both on land and on ice. The anchor kit consist

of ground anchor stakes, anchor tie-lines, shovel

sledgehammers, and operating instructions fo

the use of the ground anchor equipment. Tw

types of ground anchor stakes were provided 

the kit: one, with movable spades, was used fo

normal, compacted soil; the other, a shorter stak

with a sharp spike, was used for ice and froze

ground. The ground anchor components we

placed in the drop kit when forecast surface win

were more than approximately 20 knots and wer

air-dropped with the recovery kit to personnel o

the ground.57

Two propeller guard cables, known as fendin

lines, were provided to protect the lift line fro

striking the propellers head-on in the event th

pilot missed the line with the yoke. The fendin

lines also protected the pickup package fro

movement in the event of a miss. Early fendin

lines did not have cutter knives installe

rather, they relied on the aircraft’s propeller 

cut the line in case of a miss. These early fen

ing lines placed the lift line in an optimum pos

tion so that it could be properly cut by the pr

peller without danger of having the lin

ingested into the engine. A later modificatio

installed cutter knives on the fending line to c

the pickup line automatically if missed by th

yoke. The fending lines were attached to th

outboard end of each wing tip and to a poi

just aft of the sky anchor and were stowed 

the cargo compartment when the airplane w

not configured for recovery operation s.5 8

An aerial sight was provided for the pilot 

align the airplane with the lift line during lift-lin

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

33
engagement. The intercept sight was a portable

optical instrument that attached to a mount located over the pilot’s forward windshield. The

sight contained a two-position toggle switch and

a rheostat that controlled the brilliance of the

reticle projected on the reflector plate. When the

sight was not in use, it was stowed behind the

pilot’s seat.59

Normal System Operation

The recovery operation began with the airdrop

of the recovery kit. The kit was configured either

for water or for land use and was delivered at

130 KIAS. Following recovery kit deployment,

the ramp crew installed the necessary recovery

equipment (such as the overhead pulley, snatch

block, and anchor clamp), set the sky anchor to its

ready position, turned on the hydraulic pressure

switch to the two winches, donned safety harnesses, and prepared to lower the parahook. The

forward escape hatch was removed, and the pilot’s

hook was removed from its stowed position. The

aircraft was slowed to recovery airspeed, the yoke

extended, the ramp and door opened, and the aircraft was flown upwind into the lift line between

the upper and lower markers (fig. 5a ).6 0

Upon contact with the yoke, the lift line was

guided into the sky anchor, where it was locked to

the airplane. At that time the balloon broke free,

the upper part of the lift line flowed aft over the

upper fuselage, and the lower part trailed in an

arc under the fuselage (fig. 5b). The ramp crew

Figure 4. Miscellaneous Recovery Equipment for STARS-Equipped C-130E (Source: Lockheed Technical Manual (LTM)

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

34
hooked the lift line using the parahook. At th

forward flight station, the upper part of the li

line was drawn into the aircraft through the ove

head escape hatch using the pilot’s hook, and e

cess line was cut off. The end attached to the sk

anchor was held until the sky anchor was r

leased. At the ramp the parahook was raised b

the primary winch and the overhead pulley, th

drawing the lift line aboard the ramp (fig. 5c an

fig. 5d).

A snatch block, attached at one end to th

standby winch, was connected to the lift line b

low the parahook, and the winch was reeled 

until the snatch block neared the winch (fig. 5e

An anchor clamp, attached at one end to a ti

down just forward of the winch platform, w

then clamped to the lift line as far back as po

sible, and the standby winch was reeled out unt

Figure 5a. Typical Recovery Sequence, Aircraft Approaches

Lift Line (Source: LTM 1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat

Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5b. Aircraft Engages Lift Line (Source: LTM

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5c. Lift Line Engaged by Parahook (Source: LTM

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5d. Snatch Block Attached to Lift Line (Source: LT

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, H

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5e. Anchor Clamp Attached to Lift Line (Source: LT

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, H

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

35
the anchor clamp and tie-down line assumed the

lift-line load. When enough slack in the lift line

was available, the lift line was tied to the cleat

bar. The parahook, overhead pulley, primary

winch drum, and the snatch block were removed

and carried forward past the ramp hinge to clear

the working area on the ramp. An empty drum

was then installed on the primary winch (fig. 5f).

With the lift line positively locked to the aircraft

by the cleat bar and the anchor clamp, the sky

anchor was released.61 When the sky anchor had

been released, the lift line was pulled through

the sky anchor from the ramp (fig. 5g). Once the

loose end of the lift line was retrieved by the

ramp crew, a knot was tied in the end of the lift

line, and it was inserted into the detent on the

primary winch drum. The slack lift line was

then fed on to the drum. Just before the primary winch assumed the load, the lift line was

untied from the cleat bar. The primary winch

continued to reel in until the anchor clamp

could be removed from the lift line (fig. 5h).

After the anchor clamp had been removed, the

lift line was reeled in at maximum speed until

the davit was ready to be installed, at which time

the reel in was stopped. The davit was moved

under the lift line, and the pip pin was installed

over the line. The davit was locked to the ramp

floor, and the lift line was forced under the forward davit roller.6 2

After the davit was installed and the lift line

was forced under the roller, the primary winch

was reengaged and operated at maximum speed

until the package approached the ramp. Concurrently, the davit rotation line was attached to the

standby winch. As the package neared the ramp,

the primary winch was slowed gradually and was

stopped when the package harness reached the

davit roller (fig. 5j).

The standby winch was then reeled in to rotate

the davit, and the ramp crew stabilized the pack -

age and attached the retention line to the D ring

on the package harness. The primary winch was

then reeled out, allowing the package to descend

to the ramp with excess slack in the lift line. The

package was then moved forward of the ramp

hinge line where it could be safely detached from

the lift line and retention line (fig. 5k).

After retrieval, if no other recoveries were

planned, the davit was removed, the cargo ramp

and door were closed, all recovery equipment

was stowed, and hydraulic pressure was shut off

to the winches. 6 3 For multiple recoveries, the

sky anchor was reset to the ready position, an

empty spool was installed on the primary winch,

and the aircraft was left in the recovery configu -

ration with the yoke extended and the ramp and

door open. If additional recoveries were scheduled

later in the mission, the yoke was retracted, the

ramp and door were closed to enable the aircraft

to accelerate to en route airspeed, and the Fulton

gear was left in place on the ramp. The entire

recovery operation took approximately six min -

utes, depending on factors including ramp crew

proficiency, turbulence, day or night operations,

and normal operation of all equipment. Detailed

emergency procedures were available in the event

any component of the system failed to operate

properly.

Figure 5f. Snatch Block and Parahook Removed from Lift Line

(Source: LTM 1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5g. Lift Line Released from Sky Anchor (Source: LTM

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

36
Skyhook/STARS Live Recoveries

A measure of confidence in the Fulton recove

system was found in the willingness of the com

mand controlling the Combat Talon to perfor

live pickups. A live pickup was defined as a reco

ery that involved a human being, whether i

training or during a contingency operation. Whe

the USAF made the first live recovery in the 

130 aircraft on 3 May 1966, there had alread

been 98 live attempts, with only one of those b

ing unsuccessful. The system was a proven on

yet confidence in its capability could only b

maintained by continued live pickups. (A vie

held by some, but not all, in the Special Oper

tions community.)

There were two major schools of thought co

cerning live pickups. The first school encom 

passed commanders who felt that since the sy

tem was man-rated by the USAF, live personn

pickups were no more risky than any other cap

bility designed into the aircraft. As an exampl

the aircraft was designed to fly low-level terra

following with its AN/APN-115 radar. The sy

tem was a day-night, adverse-weather one. 

was undoubtedly more risky to fly at night in th

weather than in day visual-flight rules, yet th

aircraft was operated in all modes, up to d

signed system limitations. Why not the Fulto

recovery system, too? This school of thought a

sessed that if the system were not regularly use

for live pickups during exercises and training, 

would not be considered a viable option when 

combat or contingency tasking was received. Th

US military trained the way it fought; so, if th

system was unsafe for training, it was unsafe fo

actual operations.

The second school of thought held that liv

pickups presented an unacceptable risk to th

individual and that training value received fro

an actual live pickup could be gained through 

pickup utilizing a training dummy. This scho

theorized, for example, that since the US mil

tary did not engage in actual combat durin

training, with the resultant loss of life and lim

it was unnecessary to perform actual live pic

ups that put an individual’s life in danger fo

the sake of training.

Throughout the history of USAF’s involveme

with the Fulton system, the two schools clashe

over the live versus dummy issue. During th

early years of Fulton employment on the Comb

Talon , the live school dominated the Comb

Talon community in the Pacific. Six live reco

eries were performed between May and Augu

Figure 5j. Package Retrieved and Stopped at Davit Pulley

(Source: LTM 1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure 5k. Package Brought Aboard Aircraft (Source: LTM

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Figure. 5h. Lift Line Attached to Primary Winch (Source: LTM

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

37
1966 when the system was new and being certified for operational use. As the Combat Spear

contingent deployed to SEA, Combat Talon live

recoveries continued there during 1967 and

1968. By 30 September 1968 Combat Spear

crews had performed 29 additional live recov -

eries, and the unit continued live pickups until

30 August 1971.64 No malfunctions were recorded that resulted in injury or loss of life. After August 1971 Combat Spear did not make

any more recorded live pickups. In 1973 Combat

Spear converted to non-Fulton-capable “Yank”

aircraft and closed the book forever on the recovery capability in the Pacific.

After Combat Spear deployed to SEA in 1966,

the Combat Knife unit at Pope AFB was tasked

with training additional crews for the Combat Arrow unit in Europe and training replacement

crews for the 1968 SEA rotation. Available records

indicate that after the initial six live recoveries

were made in 1966, no other live pickups were

performed by the stateside-based Combat Knife

unit. The school of “no live recoveries for training”

was firmly in control at Tactical Air Command

(TAC) headquarters. Similarly, the European

Combat Arrow unit did not perform live recoveries

after its 1968 deployment to Ramstein AB, Fed -

eral Republic of Germany (FRG). Ironically, it

would be the European unit that championed the

utility of the Fulton system and displayed it as a

primary capability for long-range extraction of

friendly forces from behind enemy lines. It did not,

however, record any live pickups during training

until the late 1970s, when the system again was

utilized for live training recoveries.

In 1978 US Army colonel William H. Tyler,

commander, Special Operations Task Force,

Europe, initiated a request to US Air Force,

Europe (USAFE) for resumption of limited live

pickups for training. Capt John Harbison and

TSgt Buff Underwood, both assigned to the 7th

Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at that time,

put together a presentation for the USAFE/de puty

commander of operations, Maj Gen Robert W. Cle -

ments, and briefed him on the system. At the con -

clusion of the briefing, Colonel Tyler asked for

approval to do a live surface-to-air recovery and

was promptly told “no.” Not being one to take no

for an answer, Colonel Tyler postponed any further requests and vowed privately to do a live

surface-to-air recovery during the next Flin tlock

exercise, when he would have operational con trol

of the 7th SOS. True to his word, Colonel Tyler

authorized the 7th SOS to perform a live surfaceto-air recovery, and on 23 April 1979 he became

the first person extracted by the 7th SOS utilizing

the Fulton recovery system. A few days later, Capt

Skip Davenport made a second live pickup, extracting Air Force Capt Bruce Weigel during

Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd in southern Germany. For the next three years, live surface-to-air

recoveries were accomplished during the annual

Flintlock exercise by 7th and 8th SOS personnel.

The last live surface-to-air recovery attempt occurred on 26 April 1982 at Canadian forces base,

Lahr, in southern Germany. A system malfunction

resulted in the release of the person being picked

up, and he did not survive his injuries.

Combat Talon crews assigned to the 7th and

8th SOS continued to maintain proficiency in the

system after a thorough refurbishment was con -

ducted in the 1985 period. The “no live recoveries

for training” idea persisted, however, and no live

surface-to-air recoveries were ever again accomplished. In November 1998 the Fulton STARS

was removed from the remaining Combat Talon

Clamp aircraft, and the capability was no longer

available. The STARS had been an integral part

of the weapons system since its inception in

1965. (See appendix A for a list of persons picked

up by the Fulton STARS.)

The Terrain-Following/

Terrain-Avoidance Radar System

Although not as visually overt as the Fulton

STARS modification, the ability of Combat Talon to

fly low level in the TF/TA mode was at the heart of

its unique capability. By 1965 Texas Instruments

(TI) had produced an operational TF/TA radar for

the RF-4 Phantom, which it identified as the

AN/APQ-99. When Project Heavy Chain aircraft

were modified beginning in late 1964, the AN/

APQ-99 was adapted for the C-130E as the SPR-3

and installed in the two assigned aircraft. When

Project Stray Goose kicked off in the spring of

1966, the SPR-3 was further modified by TI to

the AN/APQ-115 configuration and installed by

LAS Ontario on the 14 Combat Talon aircraft.

The original C-130E production radar (the AN/

APN-59B) was removed from the aircraft at that

time.

The AN/APQ-115 remained the primary radar

system on the Combat Talon throughout th e 1960s,

but it suffered from a low mean-time-between failure (MTBF) rate. A low MTBF rate equated to

increased downtime for the radar, with additional

maintenance and parts required to keep the system operationally ready. The more often a piece of

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

38
equipment malfunctioned, the more time, dollars,

and manpower were required to repair it. Many

times during the early years of Combat Talon ,

aircraft were flown on missions with an inopera -

tive radar because the radar could not be kept in

commission. Along with the MTBF problem, the

AN/APQ-115 suffered from inaccurate references

(poor stabilization and Doppler inputs) that degraded its performance. In 1968 LAS Ontario be -

gan a study into a possible replacement radar

that would be more reliable and require less

maintenance between flights. The USAF was in

the procurement stage for a new radar to improve

its adverse-weather air-dropping capability. The

new radar system was designated the Adverse

Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS). The

AWADS radar was further identified as the

AN/APQ-122(V)1, and it had the basic characteristics required for the Combat Talon mission,

except that it did not have a TF/TA capability. TI

engineers, in conjunction with LAS Ontario, developed the AN/APQ-122(V)8 radar for the Combat Talon and incorporated the TF/TA function

into its operation. To help eliminate the reference

problems found in the AN/APQ-115, the new ra -

dar was coupled with the Litton LN-15J inertial

navigation system (INS) that was tied to the Dop -

pler and the Loran C. The new INS provided

track, heading, and stabilization information that

was far superior to anything available earlier.*

After extensive testing, the USAF initially procured the AN/APQ-122(V)8 for the four Heavy

Chain aircraft, and from 1970 to 1972, the radar

was also procured and installed in the 12 Combat

Talons. The AN/APQ-122 radar was part of a

sweeping modernization initiative for Combat

Talon that was identified as the MOD-70 program.

Many other system improvements were part of

this upgrade, including the dual navigator’s sta -

tion on the flight deck and an upgraded electronic

warfare/radio operator console in the cargo compartment. To accommodate the dual-radar antenna and the Fulton sky anchor, a new radome

was developed that had an elongated chin in the

lower front portion of the unit. The new radome

made the 12 Clamp Combat Talons unique and

physically different from all other C-130 aircraft.

The standard round nose found on the basic C-130

remained on the Heavy Chain non-Fulton aircraft

and on aircraft 64-0571 and 64-0572, which did

not have Fulton STARS installed. The distinctive

nose radome adopted for the new radar durin

the MOD-70 program remained on the Clam

surface-to-air recovery aircraft from that tim

forward.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the AN/APQ

122(V)8 radar remained virtually unchanged. M

nor system improvements were incorporated in

the radar, but no major modifications were mad

By the late 1980s the radar had aged nearly 2

years, and many of its subsystems were on th

verge of becoming nonsupportable. In the mo

extensive follow-on upgrade to the Combat Talo

since 1970, the MOD-90 program was develope

and an extensive radar upgrade was incorporat

into it. Beginning in the late 1980s, aircraft 64-056

was dedicated to the MOD-90 program and w

designated the first Special Operations Force

Improved (SOF-I) aircraft. The SOF-I designatio

was the interim identification for Combat Talo

having undergone the first phase of the MOD-9

conversion. SOF-I Phase I focused on upgrading t

navigational suite, but it also included installatio

of the WJ-1840 (APR-46A) panoramic ECM r

ceiver. The aircraft went through perhaps the mo

extensive test program ever developed for an a

ready operational system going through modific

tion. For more than two years, the 8th SOS pr

vided flight crews and support personnel dedicat

to the test effort. By the time Operation Just Cau

commenced in December 1989, aircraft 64-0567 h

completed its SOF-I operational test and evaluatio

(OT&E), and the squadron commander chose it 

lead the airland assault into Rio Hato AB, Panam

The long and often frustrating test program h

paid off. The next phase of the SOF-I program f

cused on ECM upgrades, including the ALQ-17

ALQ-196, and AAR-44. Aircraft 64-0565 was t

first full-up MOD-90 aircraft. So thorough was t

testing on 64-0567 that the first production aircra

had few setbacks and was brought up to operation

status in minimal time.

* * * * * *

Back in 1965 TF/TA theory was little unde

stood by technicians outside the TI communit

Having received the contract to modify the fo

Heavy Chain aircraft with the SPR-3 radar, LA

Ontario set about building its own TF/TA expe

tise. By 1966, when the company began modifyin

Combat Talons with the AN/APQ-115 radar, the

technicians had advanced to a point that rivale

__________

 *Harry Pannill, Mike Connaughton, Rethel Jones, and John Gargus, along with eight Heavy Chain pilots and navigators, were the first cr

members to be trained on the new INS by Litton Industries at Menlow Park, California. The capabilities found in the LN-15J were “pure magic” 

the crew members and represented the most significant operational improvement for the Combat Talon since its creation in 1965.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

39
any other in the world on TF/TA operations. Educating USAF operators and maintainers on the

new system proved more challenging. The basic

problem with USAF personnel was that the ra -

dar was classified and that operational information about it was not readily accessible. Flight

crews and maintainers could not easily refer to

the technical orders, thus hindering their ability

to attain vital systems knowledge. In the flying

squadrons, electronic warfare officers kept radar

manuals in their EW safe and signed them out to

pilots and navigators when requested. Because

they were all classified, the manuals could not be

removed from the squadron building, thus preventing self-study during off-duty periods. An unclassified article, published by the McDonnellDouglas Aircraft Corporation in 1965, discussed

the AN/APQ-99 TF/TA radar installed in the RF4 aircraft. The article was reproduced and dis -

tributed to pilots and navigators while they were

attending initial Talon training at Pope AFB. As

late as 1968, when the 7th SOS received its four

Combat Talons, the RF-4 article was still con -

s idered the best unclassified document available

on the TF/TA system.

Efforts to declassify the radar and to provide

better information to the Combat Talon community was realized in 1971, when the annual Combat Talon Management Review Conference adopted

the first unclassified Lockheed Technical Manual

(LTM) that contained detailed information describing the TF/TA radar system. The description

of radar operations contained in the first LTM

was improved over the years and included in subsequent LTMs produced for the Combat Talon .

Terrain-Following Radar System Theory*

To appreciate the low-level adverse-weather ca -

pability of the Combat Talon weapons system, one

must understand the basic operation of the TF/TA

radar. Conventional airborne search radar provided range and azimuth data of sufficient accu -

racy for normal high-level aircraft navigation. The

beams generated by these radar, however, did not

possess the vertical angular resolution necessary to

provide the precision required for terrain-following

and terrain-avoidance flight.

Terrain-avoidance radar required good horizontal antenna stabilization and a radar-beam

pattern that, besides detecting targets in range

and azimuth, could distinguish between obstacles

located at or above the true horizontal plane of the

aircraft and those located below it. In addition

terrain-following radar (TFR) required a good horizontal reference for its antenna. Its beam had to accurately measure the angular aircraft-to-o bstacle

relationship in the vertical plane and feed this infor -

mation to a computer, which, in turn, could furnish

necessary climb and dive commands for maintaining desired vertical-terrain clearances.

The TFR employed either the aircraft’s Doppler

system or its inertial navigation system for its antenna’s primary vertical and horizontal reference.

For the AN/APQ-122(V)B radar, the stabilization

reference could be manually or automatically

switched to the MD-1 gyros if the LN-15J became

unreliable or inoperative. If the Doppler failed

while utilizing the AN/APQ-115, however, the ra -

dar would display a fail indication, and TF opera -

tion normally would be discontinued. The required

radar beam angular resolution and precision for

terrain following and terrain avoidance was attained by the monopulse resolution improvement

(MRI) technique (fig. 6).

The AN/APQ-115 radar had a single contoured,

spoiled parabola face antenna for its operation. On

the AN/APQ-122, a special flat-face antenna and a

separate X band receiver were used to generate

the MRI video. During the transmit cycle the radio

frequency energy was first split into two parts that

had an equal amplitude and phase relationship.

Then, the radio frequency energy was radiated

through a grid circular polarizer screen from the

Figure 6. Monopulse Resolution Improvement Technique

(Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

__________

 *The following description was extracted from the USAF Combat Talon Formal School publication, AN/APQ-122(V)8 Terrain-Following Radar

Handout, 1 January 1979. Information in this handout was later updated and included in the 1st SOW-C entral Training Flight (CTF) Combat

Talon Formal School publication, Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991. Information regarding the AN/APQ-99 and the

AN/APQ-115 was extracted from the publication titled McDonnell Aircraft Field Support Digest, Fourth Quarter, 1965.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

40
top and bottom halves of the antenna. This radia -

tion produced two overlapping, equal strength

pencil beams that were circularly polarized to improve weather penetration. During the receive cycle

the patterns of both were vectorally added and

subtracted to produce sum and difference patterns. Through this process, a phase difference be -

tween above and below boresight targets was generated. The return echoes of both patterns were

further phase shifted and fed into a phase detector, which identified echoes that were above antenna boresight. Output of the detector went to the

video processor, which produced the MRI above

boresight video.

The MRI video had a distinct, sharply defined

vertical boresight edge. Consequently, when the

antenna was properly referenced to the aircraft’s

true horizon, the sharp (video) edge could trace the

aircraft’s true horizontal plane during its lateral

(TA) sweep and measure the angular aircraft-toobstacle relationship during its vertical (TF) sweep

(fig. 7).

The TA mode was the simpler of the two. Given

a reliable horizontal reference, the MRI video

would display those targets that were at the aircraft’s true horizontal plane or above it. With TA

targets displayed on the radarscope, the pilot

could fly the aircraft around obstacles maintaining either constant altitude or a climb. A dive or a

descent could result in impact with the ground,

since the radar could only detect terrain at the

boresight of the aircraft or above it. To ensure

safe flight, the antenna also had to be oriented to

the aircraft’s projected track instead of its true

heading. For this reason, the radar was interfaced

with the aircraft’s primary drift reference so the

antenna was provided with the proper azimuth

stabilization. For the AN/APQ-115 the primary

drift reference was the Doppler, and for the

AN/APQ-122, it was the INS.

Terrain-following flight was more complicate

than terrain-avoidance flight. Horizontal an

drift references were required as in TA; howeve

the MRI beam scanned along a vertical plan

down the projected aircraft’s track. The scan pa

tern was a narrow rectangle that, when traced b

the beam, outlined a rectangular search cone 7

degrees wide—spanning from +8 degrees abov

to –17 degrees below the aircraft’s boresight fo

the AN/APQ-122—and 5.0 degrees, +7 degree

and –18 degrees, respectively, for the AN/APQ

115. Targets inside the cone were processed an

analyzed by the computer and then displayed o

the pilot’s indicator. The computer compared r

flected echoes against a variable template (gat

that was the radar’s reference line for climb an

dive commands.

The command template and the effective rad

scan search cone could be likened to a sightle

man ’s cane. A walking man using his cane woul

trace a definite pattern in front of him. This w

comparable to the TF scan pattern. The length 

his cane was the front and bottom side of th

template, which was displayed as a 0-degre

command line on the pilot’s radar indicator. A

the sightless man hastened his steps, he found 

necessary to scan farther out and stretch out h

arm. As the aircraft’s ground speed increase

the front face of the template also moved out fa

ther ahead of the aircraft, thus paralleling i

original slope (fig. 8).

An elderly man, or one carrying a load on h

back, would concern himself with the incline 

the terrain ahead. The heavier his load, the gentl

the slope he would seek by tracing his cane clos

to the ground. In the case of the aircraft, i

climb performance varied with its gross weigh

therefore, the reference template steepened fo

lighter and shallowed for heavier gross weigh

(fig. 9).

Figure 8. Zero Command Line (Source: 1st SOW, CTF Stude

Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 7. Antenna Scan Patterns (Source: 1st SOW, CTF

Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

41
When a sightless man walked up an incline, he

slowed down some, and his scan pattern altered.

He searched more carefully farther out and also

closer in, actually touching the surface of the terrain or obstacle. If an incline became too steep or

an obstacle too great, he would seek another path.

Keeping in mind that the template was his cane,

that his cane touched, not penetrated, the ground

and that this touch caused an alteration in his

cane motion, it could be deduced that the template

accomplished the same result. The template could

not be penetrated by a target (obstacle) as long as

the aircraft responded properly to the pitch bar

command issued to it by the computer. As the aircraft’s pitch increased, the front face of the template would shift closer to the aircraft as if the

obstacle was pushing on it. It would continue its

parallel shifting with each increase in the aircraft’s pitch until the proper flight vector was attained (the antenna scan pattern would remain

unchanged and boresighted to the horizon).

Parallel shifting of the front face would be accomplished by a proportional angular shifting (up

tilting) of the bottom face. For each degree of

flight vector increase, the bottom face would tilt

up .7 degrees. This flight-vector template shift

would be quite noticeable on the pilot’s indicator

(fig. 10).

The reverse would be true when the aircraft

was descending, and the flight vector was nega -

tive. The front face would parallel shift away from

the aircraft, and the bottom face would down tilt

1.1 degrees for every one degree of flight vector

(fig. 11).

The aircraft’s climb performance was related

to its true airspeed. An aircraft heading toward a

hill at 240 knots ground speed and 200 knots

true airspeed would approach the hill at the

same rate as one flying at 240 knots true airspeed with 0 knots tailwind. The latter aircraft

would negotiate the climb with greater ease,

however, because of its greater momentum (kinetic energy) through the air mass. Therefore,

the front-face template of the aircraft had to be

lowered when an aircraft experienced a tailwind

condition. This action caused the aircraft to begin

its climb a greater distance from the obstacle and

thus compensate for its relatively slower airspeed. The front-face template was automatically

adjusted for up to 40 knots of tailwind at a calibrated rate of approximately .2 degree per 10

knots (fig. 12).

Finally, the TF template could be altered

manually by selecting different desired terrain

clearances. Set clearance altitude was the vertical

distance in feet from the radar to a point directly

under it. The template’s bottom face, even though

Figure 11. Template Shift Due to an Increase in Negative

Flight Vector (Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 12. Template Shift Due to an Increase in Tailwind

(Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 9. Template Shift Due to Gross Weight Changes

(Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 10. Template Shift Due to an Increase in Flight Vector

(Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

42
it did not extend all the way to it, pivoted around

that point. The AN/APQ-115 had provisions for

three set clearances—250, 500, and 1,000 feet. Its

computer allowed any altitude to be selected be -

tween the preset clearances by rotating the clearance select knob. For the AN/APQ-122 radar, four

set clearances were available—250, 500, 750, and

1,000 feet. On the APQ-122 radar, clearances

other than the four preset ones were not available

to the flight crew (fig. 13).

Two additional zones were incorporated into

the TF template and played a significant role

during TF operations. A blanking zone, which

extended in front of the aircraft 750 feet to

1,000 feet, had a two-fold purpose. First, it gave

the radar the necessary recovery time between

transmissions; and second, it cut out close-in

side lobe targets, which could cause erroneous

climb commands. A second zone, the obstaclewarning zone, was an area within the template

that, when penetrated by an obstacle, triggered

a visual and an audible obstacle warning (figs.

14 and 15).

Terrain-Following Radar Operation

The pilot was the primary controller of the terrai

following radar. He was the only one who cou

select the terrain-following or terrain-avoidanc

modes, thus overriding selections made by th

right navigator. With the pilot’s selector switc

in the MAP mode, the right navigator controlle

operating modes on all three indicators. By mo

ing his selector switch from MAP to TA, TF, o

cross scan (CS), the pilot routed X band radio fr

quency energy to the TF antenna and, on pr

MOD-90 aircraft, controlled the modes of his an

the left navigator’s indicators, with only one e

ception. The E squared presentation of the T

mode was not available to the left navigato

Therefore, whenever the pilot was in this mod

the left navigator’s indicator displayed the K

band precision ground mapping (PGM) mod

provided that the mode was selected by the rig

navigator. The right navigator could not displ

TF, TA, and CS modes on his indicator and w

limited to the KA band’s PGM as long as the 

band was being controlled by the pilot. As part 

the MOD-90 upgrade in the late 1980s, both th

left and right navigators were given increased c

pability to view the selected TFR presentatio

concurrently with the pilot. During TF fligh

both frequency bands could be employed, eac

transmitting from a different antenna. The pil

would normally monitor the E squared present

tion* on his indicator, the left navigator wou

monitor TA presentation, and the right navigato

would provide navigational information from th

precision ground mapping display (fig. 16).

Figure 13. Template Shift Due to A Change in Set Clearance

(Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 14. Radar Blanking Zone (Source: 1st SOW, CTF

Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

Figure 15. Obstacle Warning Template (Source: 1st SOW, CT

Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

__________

 *In radar terminology, the E scan represents the vertical sweep of the antenna (up and down), and the left and right sweep is the range. F

Combat Talon application, the range was originally “exponential,” thus the E squared designation. Later modifications to the radar included digi

scanner converter (DSC) TF display, which was actually an E scan, but the range was logarithmic.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

43
The TA mode was selected when the crew desired to minimize aircraft exposure to enemy

threats by flying around mountain peaks and

ridgelines instead of flying over them. The mode

had inherent limitations and had to be employed

with a great degree of caution and skill. The TA

mode did not generate climb or dive commands

and did not display terrain that was below the

aircraft’s true horizon. Therefore, this mode could

not be relied upon during descents, especially

when flying over unfamiliar terrain. TA opera -

tion was very carefully planned, and the naviga -

tors kept close track of the aircraft’s geographical

position by continuously monitoring terrain ele -

vation, pressure altitude, and terrain clearances

measured by the radio and radar altimeters. The

TA mode could also be utilized quite effectively

during weather penetrations even though the X

band weather mode was designed specifically for

that purpose. By occasionally switching to the TA

mode, the pilot and the left navigator could positively identify terrain that was at or above the

aircraft’s flight level.

In the TA mode the antenna sweep was 45 de -

grees left and right, and the indicators normally

displayed a 90-degree offset sector sweep with the

aircraft’s track at the top of the scope. A variablerange control was available for expanding or compressing the radar display. A fixed, dotted range

marker at 17 nautical miles (NM) served as the

TA video test pulse on the AN/APQ-122 radar.

On the AN/APQ-115, a test pulse dot was visible

in the upper right-hand corner of the radar

screen. In the TA mode both radar operated as

forward-looking radar; therefore, it was essen -

tial that their antenna scans were drift oriented. Mechanical mounting permitted the an -

tenna to compensate for only plus or minus 10

degrees of drift (+ or –25 degrees in CS). If

these limits were exceeded, the TF ANT-FAIL

light would illuminate on the radar control

panel, and the top of the screen displayed the

aircraft’s true heading (fig. 17).

The TF mode of operation could be used for

manual or automatic low-level flights at altitudes

ranging from 250 to 1,000 feet, dependent upon

whether using the AN/APQ-115 or the AN/APQ122. In the TF mode the antenna scanned a very

narrow vertical, rectangular box pattern. This

scan pattern was drift oriented so that it covered

only the terrain along the aircraft’s projected

track. Radar target data obtained from the scan

was processed with various aircraft performance

outputs in the TF computer, thus generating appropriate pitch bar climb or dive commands necessary

to maintain desired AGL altitudes. In addition to

the pitch bar commands, the radar produced E

squared video depicting a vertical cross section of

terrain and programmed command line parameters.

Scope depiction on the AN/APQ-115 differed from

that of the AN/APQ-122. On the AN/APQ-115

scope, one mile was halfway from the left edge

to the right edge (halfway across the scope),

and two miles was halfway from one mile to the

right edge or three-fourths of the wa y across

the display. Three miles was halfway from two

miles to the right edge. The net effect was to

squeeze t he range presentation down past three

miles out to the limit of the radar. For the

AN/APQ-122, almost 13 miles of range was dis -

played on an exponential scale with vertical range

markers at one, two, three, and four miles. The

Figure 16. Terrain-Avoidance Mode (Source: 1st SOW, CTF

Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

44
vertical range markers were displayed across the

face of the scope, and the distance between each

was exponential and resembled the older AN/

APQ-115 display. The zero command line (or TF

template) was nearly identical for both radars,

varying its shape with different in-flight conditions. A thorough understanding of the zero command line and its relationship to the video display

was essential for the pilot to analyze TFR performance.

Over level terrain, video—commonly called

grass—would hug the bottom face of the comman d line up to the break point. On hill climbs

the front face of the template would make the

initial engagement with the obstacle. As the pilo

responded to the resultant climb command, th

zero command line would appear to resist vid

penetration and, as a soft flexible spaghetti, wou

push back in the direction of the aircraft and bulg

up and round out toward the upper left-hand co

ner of the E squared display. The bulging an

shifting would continue with pitch increases unt

the aircraft attained the necessary flight vector fo

clearing the obstacle at the desired set clearanc

Optimum climb flight vectors were related to ai

craft gross weights. For this reason, a differe

front-face command line sloping was programm

for each gross-weight setting. Since the front fac

Figure 17. Terrain-Following Mode (Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

45
of the command line receded and the bottom face

increased its slope angle (bulges on the E

square), the optimum flight vector could be ex -

ceeded without causing target penetration of the

command line. Thus, a heavy aircraft, one weighing 135,000 pounds and whose optimum flight

vector was 3.8 degrees, would receive, if neces -

sary, a pitch command that could double the optimum flight vector.

In a dive the command line would react in the

opposite direction. The front-face bulge would literally drop out and down toward the bottom of the

E squared as if it were eager to meet new video.

Because the display was exponentially scaled, the

grass accelerated as it slid along the zero command line toward the aircraft.

A satisfactory TFR would maintain terrain

clearances within + or – (10 percent of set clearance + 50 feet) over level terrain and at or above

70 percent of set clearance over hilly terrain.

Clearances were checked by radar altimeters, and

substandard performance could normally be identified visually on the E squared presentation.

Over level terrain the grass would hug the bottom

face of the command line. Grass penetration of

the command line normally occurred during

lower-than-desired terrain clearances, whereas

grass/command line separation was indicative of

higher-than-programmed altitudes. The most

common cause of terrain clearance problems was

found in antenna stabilization. For this reason a

“dual-angle indicator” mounted on the navigator’s

panel was frequently monitored during level portions of flight to determine the most reliable pitch

angle input.

Occasionally, the aircraft might encounter an

obstacle that it could not clear safely. For that

reason a distinct obstacle warning (OW) zone was

built into the TF template. Any obstacle that

penetrated its parameters would trigger a full fly

up and sound a beeping warning horn. This

would rarely occur on a well-planned route with

the aircraft flying a constant heading. The pilot,

who was monitoring his E squared presentation,

could see the obstacle penetrating the zero command line prior to its reaching the OW zone.

Most frequent OW alarms were sounded by

other aircraft flying through the OW portion of

the TF scan or by hilly terrain that entered the

OW area sideways during turning maneuvers or

on-course corrections. Whenever an unplanned

OW occurred, an immediate climb command

was displayed on the ADI, and an immediate

corrective evasive action was initiated. Evasive

action included application of maximum climb

power, initiation of a climb, and a turn in the

direction of lower terrain or in the direction provided by the navigator.

On occasions, TF flight was conducted over

water, snow, sand, and other surfaces that did

not reflect radio frequency energy, including

very smooth and level terrain. Under these con -

ditions radar echoes were of insufficient strength

to produce video and generate necessary climb

commands. To avoid a disastrous dive command

into earth’s surface, the system was programmed

to switch to radar altimeter operation whenever

the TFR commanded a dive below desired clearance altitude, and there was no visible grass in

the two well-defined altimeter override inhibit

zones located within the template. While operating on altimeter override, the system’s performance tolerances were the same as for level

terrain.

The cross-scan mode of operation combined the

features of TA and TF and was the mode most

frequently employed during terrain-following

flights. In this mode the antenna alternated between horizontal and vertical scans, providing

either TF or TA video to the pilot’s indicator

and TA video to the left navigator’s indicator.

Because of alternating scans, there was a pause

in the TF display during the TA antenna sweep

and visa versa. This video pause did not affect

continuous command input to the pitch bar. To

keep the time interval between successive TF

sweeps at a minimum, the horizontal-scan azimuth was reduced to + or –20 degrees. Even

though this TA azimuth reduced the coverage of

the normal TA mode by more than one-half, the

compromise gave the left navigator sufficient

sector scan to monitor above flight-level obstacles

during terrain-following operations. TA monitoring was also available to the pilot who could

select either E squared or TA video by flipping a

toggle switch (fig. 18).

During all TF turns, the scan pattern provided climb and dive commands based on terrain that passed laterally across the aircraft’s

nose. Those commands could change rapidly,

with changing terrain profile, from climb to dive

and back again until the aircraft was firmly established on its new course. For this reason descending turns were never made during terrain

following. A turn was made either level or

climbing, provided the pitch bar commanded a

climb. A dive command on the pitch ba r would be

ignored even when flying over water on altimeter

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

46
override. During maxi mum bank angle turns, ra -

dar altimeters were likely to indicate greaterthan-actual altitudes and command a dive.

The AN/APQ-122 had a sophisticated fail-safe

circuitry that monitored the system’s performance and warned its operators when dangerous

(safety of flight) or substandard operating conditions developed. The logic of the fail system was

such that fail signals were displayed in front of

the operator who was most concerned. Thus,

most fail indicators were presented on the pilot’s

indicator. Somewhat fewer fails were indicated

on the left navigator’s indicator and none on the

right navigator’s indicator. The right navigator,

however, could monitor the fail displays of the

KA band, X band, and antenna controls. All fail

monitoring lights were duplicated on the maintenance panel, which was monitored by the left

navigator (fig. 19).

Throughout Combat Talon’s existence, the TF

performed well. It provided a capability that e

abled the crew to accomplish its low-level missio

during adverse weather conditions and allowe

the aircraft to fly beneath the lethal range of mo

known threats. Two aircraft losses—on e in 196

and one in 1981—were partially attributed 

either TFR design or to operator error. In bo

instances, however, all flight deck crew membe

perished in the resultant crash, thus leaving it 

accident investigators to determine the caus

The 1967 crash occurred in North Vietnam du

ing the SEA war and was never investigated 

determine its exact cause. The 1981 crash w

over open water and limited aircraft wreckag

was recovered. Investigators suspected that 

malfunction occurred in the radar altimeter ove

ride system. Operators continue to rely on th

TFR for their worldwide low-level mission an

express confidence in the system’s reliability.

Figure 18. Cross-Scan Mode (Source: 1st SOW, CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 23 June 1991.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

47
The Electronic

Countermeasure Suite

The primary defensive tactic for Combat Talon

was to fly beneath radar coverage and under the

lethal range of enemy threat. The original Combat Talon was equipped with the AN/APQ-115

TF/TA radar, which allowed the aircraft to fly as

low as 250 feet above the ground. At this altitude

enemy systems faced in the 1960s and 1970s did

not pose a great threat to the aircraft. But the

aircraft could not always operate at 250 feet. Although the system was designed to operate in adverse weather conditions, the radar was limited to

the amount of precipitation it could penetrate be -

fore commanding a fly up on the pitch bar. Once a

fly up was displayed, the pilot had no choice but

to climb to an altitude that would ensure terrain

clearance, thus putting the aircraft into a higher

threat envelope. Also, the TF/TA radar dampened

out climbs and dives and thus varied the actual

altitude above the ground. The system would fly a

set clearance over level terrain, but in mountains

the radar would command a climb prior to reach -

ing an obstacle and would maintain an altitude

above set clearance from that point until clearing

the mountain or ridgeline. Similarly, in descents

the aircraft would descend at a rate slightly less

than that of the terrain, thus resulting in an altitude higher than the detent selected.

Various airdrops also required altitudes above

the minimum set clearance for TF flight. For example, static line personnel drops required an altitude ranging from 800 to 1,500 feet above the

ground, depending on the type of parachute used

by the jumpers. High-altitude low-opening (HALO)

and PSYOP/leaflet drops were conducted up to

25,000 feet and higher. The Fulton STARS was

typically conducted at 425 feet altitude. Thus, to

perform the air-drop mission, the aircraft often

exceeded its minimum TF altitude when it was

threatened by enemy missiles, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and airborne interceptor aircraft.

To combat the threat, ECM equipment was installed on the Combat Talon to enable the crew to

detect the threat and to take appropriate action to

evade it. ECM equipment was operated by a spe -

cially trained navigator designated as the electronic warfare officer (EWO). In addition to the

capacity to detect a threat to the aircraft, the EWO

had a limited capacity to confuse, decoy, or otherwise neutralize whatever threat his warning receivers identified.

Early Combat Talons were equipped with firstgeneration equipment that was marginally effective in detecting and neutralizing enemy threats.

When aircraft 62-1843 and 63-7785 were modified

under the Thin Slice program (beginning in Sep -

tember 1964), ECM equipment was included in

the basic modification. The AN/APR-25/26 provided radar warning to the crew, and the Buster-41

and Buster-61 systems provided repeater/jammer

capability. The ALE-27 chaff dispenser was in -

stalled to provide the EWO the ability to decoy certain enemy threats.6 5 When Project Stray Goose

began in 1965, the ECM suite designed for the

Thin Slice aircraft was improved and installed on

the 14 new aircraft.

For Combat Talon , the Buster-41 repeater/

jammer was improved and redesignated the System 50, while the Buster-61 was also improved and

redesignated the System 60. Both the APR-25/26

r adar-warning receiver and the ALE-27 chaffdispenser system were also installed on Combat

Talon . The EWO, sitting beside the radio operator

(RO), employed the EW systems from a workstation

located in the cargo compartment of the aircraft.

When the aircraft were modified under the MOD-70

program, the EWO/RO crew station was expanded

into a full console that remained a part of the aircraft from that time forward. With the addition of

the ECM suite on Combat Talon, the overall classification of the aircraft was raised to Secret. So

closely held was the EW capability on early Talons that the EWO was not listed as a separate

crew position. Rather, the EWO was referred to as

the third navigator on the crew.

The MOD-70 update provided some increased

ECM capability for the early Combat Talons. Systems 50/60 were replaced by the TRIM 7 and

TRIM 9 systems, which were modified for Combat

Talon from existing aircraft programs. The TRIM

7 and TRIM 9 were redesignated System 55 and

System 65, respectively, and were installed on the

Figure 19. Fail Light Maintenance Panel (Source: 1st SOW,

CTF Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23 June 1991.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

48
Yank aircraft operating in the Pacific. For the remaining 10 Clamp aircraft, System 65 and System 66 were installed. Later modifications added

the System 66 to the four Yank aircraft along with

the System 56 self-protection system.* The ALE-27

chaff dispenser was retained for the Combat Talon

fleet. Pacific Combat Spear aircraft faced a different array of threats from those in Europe, thus

requiring a different ECM suite. US-based aircraft

assigned to TAC, although tasked to support both

theaters, were generally configured the same as

the European Combat Talons. Thus, over time,

two distinct aircraft developed—four Combat

Spear aircraft configured for the Pacific and the

remaining 10 Combat Arrow /Combat Knife aircraft primarily configured for Europe. In 1978 the

four European Combat Arrow Talons were further

modified with the European EW configuration, effectively creating three distinct sets of aircraft

(four Pacific Yanks, six US-based Clamps, and

four European E-modified Clamps). The differences in US- and overseas-modified aircraft complicated the training of new EWOs, since the Combat Talon School flew aircraft different from the

ones found in the two overseas units.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, improve -

ments were made in the basic EW systems, but no

major advancements were seen until 1978, when

the four European Clamp-configured aircraft received the E modification. For this update the

older System 65 was replaced with the ALQ-117,

and a panoramic receiver (the WJ-1840) was

added. An additional system that greatly increased the aircraft’s stand-off jammer capability

was provided with the installation of the ALQ155. The added jamming equipment came at a

considerable cost to the overall performance of

the aircraft, adding more than 5,000 pounds to

an already heavy aircraft and limiting the aircraft’s ability to operate on unimproved runways

due to the large bathtub installed in the belly of

the aircraft to protect the system’s transmit/receive

antennas.** When USAF procured the Compass

Call weapons system in the late 1980s, the standoff jamming capability provided by the Combat

Arrow aircraft equipped with the ALQ-155 system was no longer required. MOD-90 r emoved the

equipment and standardized the Combat Talo

fleet.

In the late 1980s Combat Talons began anoth

modification program that was identified as MOD

90. Phase I of the MOD-90 program concentrate

on improved navigation and radar performanc

and was known as SOF-I. Later phases of MOD-9

saw extensive upgrades to the EW suite. Becau

of MOD-90, the following standardized EW sui

was installed on all 14 Combat Talon aircraft, th

bringing the weapons system to the age of mode

electronic warfare. The following is a list of MOD

90 electronic warfare equipment:

APR-46A WJ-1840 Panoramic Receiver (to allow

EWO to monitor the threat environment)

QRC-84-05 Radar Warning Receiver

ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver

ALQ-172 Repeater/Jammer

ALQ-196 Repeater/Jammer

QRC 84-02A IRCM (infrared countermeasures) Pods

ALE-40 Flare and Chaff dispensers,

30 rounds each

AAR-44 Infrared Missile Alert Warning System6 6

The Combat Talon of the 1990s proved to b

an extremely capable weapons system with th

addition of the sophisticated MOD-90 EC

suite. The best defense employed by the Comb

Talon , however, remained the same as in ear

days—avoid the threat by planning around i

but if the mission required the aircraft to f

through the threat, fly low and use terrai

avoidance/terrain-masking techniques to defe

the threat. The crew relied on the EWO and th

EW system for protection if detected by an enem

threat. The EWO remained the primary cre

member around which the EW system was bui

and was the key crew position responsible fo

the aircraft’s defense.

Major Follow-On

Modifications to Combat Talon

The Combat Talon weapons system, from i

initial concept to the present day, was a syste

in transition. As a new capability was fielde

other, more sophisticated systems were being d

veloped to improve the overall capability of th

aircraft. Three major modifications were made 

__________

 *The System 56 was a multimode ECM system that was geographically oriented towards Pacifi c threats. It covered lobe-on-receiver-on

(LORO), conical-rotating-threat-antenna (CONSCAN), and track-while-scan (TWS) radar, with a low-frequency band for known AAA thre

System 66 was added to all Combat Talons to cover threats with swept-tracking frequencies, such as the US-made Hawk surface-to-air missi

(The Hawk had been sold to Iran and to other overseas customers.)

 **The E requirement for the European Combat Talon was established by USAFE and was procured in lieu of the universal aerial refuel

receptacle/slipway installation (UARRSI) in-flight refueling (IFR) modification, which was installed on both PACAF and TAC Combat Talons. T

inability to refuel the European Talons, coupled with their increased weight and decreased short-field landing capabilities, resulted in the 7th SO

(that operated the aircraft in Europe) being eliminated from the 1980 Iranian rescue mission.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

49
the original Combat Talon aircraft that signifi -

cantly increased its capability—high-speed lowlevel aerial delivery system for airdrops up to 250

knots indicated airspeed, the universal aerial refueling receptacle/slipway installation that allowed the aircraft to be refueled while airborne,

and the helicopter aerial refueling installation

that gave the Combat Talon the capability to refuel helicopters while airborne.

High-Speed Low-Level

Aerial Delivery System

From the days of the Carpetbaggers of World

War II, unconventional warfare forces identified

a need to deliver supplies to friendly forces

without the requirement to decrease speed for

the airdrop. Low-level routes in the C-130 were

normally flown between 230 to 240 knots

ground speed, with their ramp and door opening

limited to 150 knots. Thus, for those missions

requiring opening of the ramp or main cargo

door, a slowdown was required to get below the

150-knot limit. In sophisticated radar environ -

ments employed after WWII, the slowdown maneuver could be detected, thus compromising

the drop zone and perhaps the team on the

ground. By the late 1960s a high-speed drop

system for the C-130 had been developed that

allowed ramp and door opening at airspeeds up

to 250 knots.

The new system was designated the HSLLAD S.

Structural modifications to the C-130 aft-area

fuselage, cargo door, and ramp were required to

prevent twisting of the empennage section and

to protect the aft door during its operation. In

addition, a second cargo door hydraulic actuating cylinder and uplock were added along with

electrical circuitry modifications to the door and

ramp systems. The electrical change allowed

the ramp to open approximately 19 inches before any movement of the door. The ramp thus

deflected airflow away from the cargo door as its

locks were released, thus allowing the door to

smoothly transition to the up and locked position. Ramp air deflectors, or buffer boards,

which were developed for the Fulton STARS,

were installed on the ramp to reduce air turbu -

lence in the aft ramp area.67

HSLLADS was first flight-tested in 1967 by the

Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) under project

directive no. 67-116. During the test, fiv e para -

chute systems were evaluated utilizing parachuteextracted loads varying from 250 to 2,200 pounds and

at airspeeds up to 250 knots. Satisfactory results

were obtained; however, further testing was recommended to develop an ejection system that

would provide a consistent load trajectory and

eliminate the need for an extraction parachute.

The parachute-extraction method of load deliv -

ery resulted in somewhat erratic drop scores

due to varying load exit times. In conjunction

with the initial testing of the system, a gravitystabilized optical-sighting device was also developed to determine the timing distance for visual

releases.68

The four Heavy Chain aircraft (62-1843, 63-

7785, 64-0564, and 64-0565), flown by the 1198th

Operational Evaluation and Training Squadron,

were the first aircraft to be modified with

HSLLADS (May–December 1968). To eliminate

the inconsistency experienced by the AFFTC utilizing parachute extracted drops, the squadron developed the sling ejection system (SEDS) (fig. 20).

The SEDS was a load-ejection system designed to

rapidly and consistently release loads up to a

maximum weight of 2,200 pounds.6 9

The SEDS was composed of a bungee sling

a ttached to the airframe and an MA-4A bombr elea se mechanism wired through the aircraft

aerial delivery system (fig. 21). The sighting device developed during the test center’s initial test

was equipped with a recticle that was set at a

fixed depression angle of 18.45 degrees. This allowed the absolute altitude in feet to be expressed

directly as a timing distance in yards from the

point of impact. The sight was stabilized by a

weight and ball joint and was mounted in the copilot or pilot’s C-4 light mount.70

Figure 20. Components of the Sling Ejection System

(Source: Operational Test and Evaluation Final Report, March

1974.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

50
The 1198th experienced excellent results with

the SEDS and successfully employed the system

operationally until the unit was disbanded in 1972.

When plans were fin alized for the Combat Talon

MOD-70 program, HSLLADS was incorporated into

the modification. From 1970 to 1972 the 12 C130E(I) Combat Talons underwent MOD-70 upgrade, which included HSLLADS, as they cycled

through LAS Ontario for their scheduled programmed depot maintenance (PDM). The

HSLLADS, utilizing parachute extracted loads, was

employed by Combat Talon units through 1973. Be -

cause the SEDS was never formally tested,

USAF/XOOSO, in a 15 June 1973 letter to Tactical

Air Command (TAC), directed a second OT&E be

conducted on the HSLLADS utilizing the SEDS

ejection system. The second OT&E was conducted

by the USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center (TAWC)

at Eglin AFB, Florida, under TAC Project Order

73A-079T. The project manager was Lt Col Irl L.

Franklin, who was assigned to TAWC/TEL. The inclusive dates of the test were from 10 August to 25

October 1973.7 1

The new test expanded the earlier OT&E con -

ducted by the AFFTC. The stated purpose of the

second test was to determine the operational suitability and capability of the HSLLADS to satisfy

Combat Talon unconventional warfare requirements. The TAC project included the evaluation of

standard parachutes, containers, and the gravitystabilized optical sight. The HSLLADS was evaluated on the Combat Talon at airspeeds up to 250

knots with the ramp and door open and with load

weights from 250 to 2,200 pounds utilizing t

SEDS. During the course of the OT&E, 217 bundl

were air-dropped. The parachutes evaluated we

the T-10, G-14, G-12D, 15-foot ring slot, 22-foot ri

slot, 28-foot ring slot, and 68-inch pilot parachute

The containers evaluated included the A-7A, A-2

and A-22.72

The HSLLADS demonstrated satisfactory o

erational suitability to air-drop two A-22 (1,00

pounds each) or six A-21 (250 pounds each) co

tainers and single containers weighing from 25

to 2,200 pounds each at 250 knots indicated ai

speed. Unacceptable damage occurred to the T-1

G-14, and 68-inch pilot parachutes and to the A

7A container. Consequently, these items we

deemed unacceptable for HSLLADS use. Eac

load weight was air-dropped at various altitude

and a minimum effective altitude was establishe

for each: 250- and 500-pound loads at 250 fee

1,000- and 1,500-pound loads at 500 feet; an

2,000- and 2,200-pound loads at 750 feet. Durin

the course of the test, aircrew and rigging proc

dures were developed, and existing procedur

were refined for the HSLLADS. The gravity st

bilized optical sight was found to be an acceptab

backup air-droppable method for HSLLADS, pr

vided visual contact with the drop zone was mai

tained. The 15-foot ring slot, 22-foot ring slot, 2

foot ring slot, and G-12D parachute used with th

A-21 and A-22 containers were recommended fo

use with HSLLADS.73

The second OT&E validated the use of th

SEDS with HSLLADS for Combat Talon and pr

vided recommendations to improve the syste

further. During the course of the OT&E, a shor

fall in measuring the tension of the bungee, an

SEDS sling assembly, ramp up. SEDS sling assemb

rigged on Combat Talon aircraft.

Photo courtesy of TAC Project

Figure 21. SEDS Plan View (Source: TAC Project 73A-079T,

March 1974.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

51
subsequently adjusting the tension to a predetermined setting, was identified. As a result the formal test report recommended that provisions be

made to correct the shortfall. Also, the final report

recommended that an aerodynamically stable con -

tainer and a stronger parachute be developed to

improve the system. As a result of the test, the

SEDS-augmented HSLLADS was formally

adopted for Combat Talon , and the procedures and

parachute ballistics developed during the test were

incorporated into Combat Talon manuals.7 4 The

system proved so successful that when Combat

Talon II began development in the early 1980s,

HSLLADS was a baseline system requirement for

the new aircraft.

The Universal Aerial Refueling

Receptacle/Slipway Installation

Low-visibility, long-range operations were the

centerpiece capability for Combat Talon from its inception. By the mid-1970s, with the rise of terrorism

throughout the world, operations requiring an intermediate stop for fuel became increasingly more difficult. The reluctance of world governments to directly assist the United States during a covert or

low-visibility mission increased as states supporting

international terrorism gained the capability to

strike at those governments assisting the United

States. The C-130 aircraft carried enough fuel for

approximately 10 hours of continuous flight. For a

mission requiring ingress to and egress from an objective area, this range equated to approximately

1,250 miles each way. Many potential trouble spots

around the world were outside the 1,250-mile range

of US territory, thus requiring either in-flight refu -

eling or an intermediate refueling stop in another

country to reach them. For operational missions,

even friendly nations were sometimes reluctant to

provide direct assistance for fear of reprisals. Additionally, the Combat Spear unit, operating out of

Kadena AB, Okinawa, had long sought the aerial

refueling capability due to the distances involved in

operating in the Pacific. As a result, Pacific Air

Forces (PACAF) took the lead in establishing the

requirement for in-flight refueling capability for its

four assigned Combat Talon aircraft. TAC was also

interested in the capability since its stateside Com -

bat Knife unit, the 8th SOS, had augmentation re -

sponsibilities for the Pacific Combat Spear unit and

had a growing role in combating world terrorism.

Since 1973 all four Combat Spear-assigned aircraft

had previously been in the Heavy Chain program

and had the more powerful Allison T-56-A-15 engines installed. The 8th SOS aircraft, however,

along with those of the 7th SOS in Europe, were

fitted with the standard C-130E T-56-A-7 engine.

The cost to convert the four PACAF aircraft already

equipped with the Dash-15 engines was considerably less than those requiring upgrade from the less

powerful Dash-7s.

On 4 August 1976 the US Air Force placed LAS

Ontario on contract to develop an in-flight refueling

capability for the Combat Talon . The project re -

quired the design and installation of a covert (as

viewed during ground operations) refueling capa -

bility that was compatible with the KC-135 boom

refueling system.75 LAS Ontario engineers designed

the universal aerial refueling receptacle/slipway

installation and first installed it on Combat Talon

aircraft 64-0564 in late 1976 (fig. 22).

SEDS sling assembly, ramp down. With ramp in open

position, SEDS sling assembly is armed with tension on

the bungee cord.

Photo courtesy of TAC Project

Air deflectors were installed on the ramp to reduce turbulent airflow during HSLLADS operations.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

52
The UARRSI unit was flush mounted in the

aircraft’s fuselage above the flight deck, with

the front edge located at fuselage station 165

(fig. 23). It was installed in a pressure box to

separate it from the crew compartment. The

system also included the following components:

a fuel line, running from the UARRSI aft to the

refueling manifold; specially designed fuel tank

shutoff valves; changes in the SPR system; and

an in-flight refueling control panel installed on

the aft face of the overhead control panel. To

refuel the Combat Talon while airborne, a boomconfigured tanker aircraft pumped fuel through

the UARRSI by way of the fuel line, through a

surge control and aerial refuel valve, to the

wing spar area. From the spar area, fuel flowed

into the dump/refuel manifold by way of a fit -

ting located in the center dry bay. Once fuel

was introduced into the single-point refueling

(SPR) system, it flowed into the tanks the same

as when refueling the aircraft while on the

ground. Tank shutoff valves were installed in

each wing that allowed the tanks to receive a

full fuel load before automatic shutoff. The

added valves were necessary because the outboard portion of the wings were at a higher altitude during flight than when on the ground.

Without them, the tanks could not be filled to

capaci ty.7 6

The UARRSI door-control handle was located

aft of the in-flight refueling control panel. The

T-handle was used to open and close the rece

tacle slipway door. Hydraulic pressure was r

quired to close the door but not to open it, th

ensuring access to the refueling line located in th

rear of the UARRSI unit even without hydraul

pressure. The door provided a slipway for th

boom when opened, and position indicators no

fied the crew of door status. Line and sump dra

pumps were installed in the refueling line. Th

line drain pumped residual fuel from the SP

manifold into the no. 3 tank, which took approx

mately eight to 10 minutes. The sump drai

pumped any remaining trace fuel overboard, th

clearing the lines of all fu el.77

With the initial UARRSI modification com

plete on aircraft 64-0564, a formal evaluation o

the new system was conducted between 22 an

28 January 1977. A total of six flights was com 

pleted at Edwards AFB, California, and w

supported by LAS Ontario technicians and cre

members from the 1st SOS. The AFFTC w

responsible for the overall conduct of the evalu

tion. AFFTC provided the test pilots, Maj Pa

R. Stephen and Maj Bruce J. Hinds Jr., and th

navigator, Maj James C. Freeman, to fly th

Combat Talon during the evaluation. In add

tion to AFFTC test crew members, the 1st SO

provided a fully qualified Combat Talon crew 

assist test personnel and to gain training on th

new capability.

The six flights consisted of five day missio

and one night mission. The first two day mi

sions concentrated on rendezvous procedure

with the KC-135 tanker, C-130 handling qualiti

from precontact to contact, the aerial refuelin

disconnect envelope, fuel transfer, and surg

pressure evaluation. The second flight also in 

cluded emergency boom latching and stiff-boo

Figure 22. Forward Fuselage—Upper Structure with UARRSI

Opening (Source: Illustration provided by Detachment 4, 645th

MAS, Palmdale, Calif.)

Figure 23. UARRSI Installed on Combat Talon (Source: LT

1MC-130E-1, 1 October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, H

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

53
refueling. The third flight evaluated the Combat

Talon during engine-out operations and tested

the pilot’s ability to remain in the contact position without the KC-135 flying on autopilot.

During the fourth flight, heavy KC-135 and

Combat Talon operations were evaluated along

with toboggan procedures. (Toboggan was a maneuver whereby the KC-135 established a shallow descent while the Combat Talon refueled.

The maneuver provided the Combat Talon the

ability to remain in the contact position onloading fuel up to its maximum gross weight.) The

fifth flight concentrated on night refueling procedures and the sixth on 60,000-pound top-off

capability. For the fourth, fifth, and sixth

flights, PACAF and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) crew members assigned to On -

tario, California, received training on in-flight

refueling procedures.78

The UARRSI system performed exception -

ally well throughout the evaluation. Primary

crew members submitted comment worksheets

to the test director after each flight. The pilot

noted excellent visibility during all portions of

the ren dezvous and aerial refueling operation.

Aer ial refueling director lights were in full

view day or night. For the approach to precon -

tact, precontact to contact, and the contact position, flying qualities of the C-130E (I) were

good. Power response was noted as adequate,

but aircra ft separation was immediate when

power was reduced. The breakaway maneuver

was excellent in that the aircraft stayed be -

hind and below the tanker, and the copilot or

flight engineer could remain in visible contact

with the tanker through the upper windows.

No abnormal noise levels were noted in the

cockpit. The position of the pilot’s aerial refueling status lights was noted as satisfactory, but

the original lighting scheme (black lenses with

transparent letters) was deemed unsatisfactory because the pilot was required to move

his head to see the lights. This practice could

cause disorientation during night or marginal

weather refueling operations. Lenses were replaced with transparent ones that were more

easily seen by the pilot. Some pilots believed

that the autopilot/aerial-refueling disconnect

switch located on the yoke was too short, and

they occasionally fumbled to find the switch. A

section of the guard closest to the pilot was recommended to be removed to expose more of the

switch. The overall pilot evaluation concluded

that the Combat Talon had satisfactory flying

qualities as a receiver during aerial refuelin g operations with the KC-135 . The pilot workload

was judged to be less than that of a B-52, C-5,

or receiver C-135 aircr aft.79

During the tests the flight engineer con -

cluded that the aerial-refueling control panel

functioned well throughout all phases of opera -

tion. Labeling and switchology were excellent.

The controls allowed for operation of the aerialrefueling system for refueling, fuel transfer (using the dump-pump switches located on the

overhead panel), and manifold drain operation.

The controls provided the capability for using

main-tank dump pumps to supply fuel for en -

gine operation in the event of a main-tank

pump failu re. 80

Navigator comments centered mainly around

rendezvous procedures developed to enable the

tanker and receiver aircraft to join up for the

refueling operation. The maneuver was identified as a point parallel rendezvous with the

tanker at an altitude from 12,000 to 14,000 feet

and the Combat Talon 1,000 feet below the

tanker. The two aircraft approached each other

head on, with the tanker maintaining an airspeed of 255 KIAS, and the receiver maintain -

ing 250 KIAS with 1,000-feet altitude separa -

tion. The tanker would fly an offset of 4.5 NMs

and would begin the turn 12 NMs from the receiver. Using the point-parallel procedure, the

tanker would roll out approximately three miles

in front of the receiver, 1,000 feet above the receiver’s altitude, and at an airspeed of 210 KIAS

(fig. 24). The Combat Talon would then depart

its assigned altitude and overtake the tanker,

stabilizing at the precontact position.81 With the

system validated, all that remained was to fly

an operational mission utilizing the in-flight refueling capability.

What came to be known as the Special Opera -

tions Aerial Refueling and Sea, Air, Land

(SEAL) support mission launched from Edwards

AFB for Clark AB, Philippines, with three refu -

elings scheduled and an airdrop of 17 SEAL personnel on Luzon prior to mission termination.

The mission took 27.8 hours, which at the time

was by far the longest C-130 flight yet recorded.

The first two refuelings provided full main

tanks in the Combat Talon before the KC-135

pumps shut off; however, the external tanks

would only fill to within 1,500 pounds of capacity.

The totalizer for all tanks together indicated

slightly above 56,000 pounds. Only after slow -

ing to 160 KIAS could the flight engineer transfer

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

54
fuel from the main tanks into the externals to get

a full external tank indication. Because of the

inability to fuel the external tanks fully while

connected to the tanker, operators were advised

to plan for a total fuel quantity of 56,000 pounds

after refueling. The point-parallel rendezvous

procedure was used during two rejoins using the

briefed 12 NM turn range and approximately 4.5

NM offset. The procedure worked perfectly, and

it was recommended for use throughout the Combat Talon community. The 1st SOS crew that

flew the long-range mission included Steve

Gardella, AC/SQ CC; Bob Meller, FP; Jerry

Nichols, FP; Jack Holbein, NAV; Joe McBride,

NAV; Paul Whetzel, NAV; Rueben Cole, FE;

“Rat” Moretz, FE; Chuck Javens, RO; John Mink,

RO; Ray Doyle, LM; and John Stumpf, LM.

To fly anywhere in the world without relying

on ground-based aerial refueling was a reality.

No longer did the United States have to rely on

other nations to provide refueling support facilities that were subject to political pressures. The

modern-day Combat Talon weapons system was

nearly complete.

The Helicopter Aerial-Refueling

Modification

By the mid-1980s the number of military hel

copters with in-flight refueling capability had i

creased significantly over the previous decad

The medium-lift special operations helicopte

the MH-53 Pave Low, formed the backbone of th

USAF SOF rotary-wing capability. A smalle

light-lift helicopter, the MH-60G Pave Haw

also provided specialized SOF rotary-wing su

port. With Congress’s passing of the Goldwate

Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

Act of 1986, renewed emphasis was placed o

America’s SOF forces. As part of the SOF avi

tion modernization program that was develope

after the act, both USAF and USA aircraft we

provided increased capabilities, including aeri

refueling for USA Chinook helicopters ded

cated to SOF support. Just as planners a decad

before had recognized the need to install i

flight aerial refueling receiver capability on th

Combat Talon , SOF rotary-wing assets wer

modified, or designed from the ground up, wi

the capabilit y to receive fuel while airborne. Th

Figure 24. Typical Point-Parallel Procedure (Source: TO 1-1C-1-29, “Flight Crew Air Refueling Procedures with KC-135 a

KC-10,” 1 February 1977.)

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

55
increase in aerial refuelable helicopters created

the need for additional SOF tanker aircraft, especially those that could penetrate hostile territory

and refuel over denied area s.

The Combat Talon was designed as a longrange, low-level penetrator aircraft. With the addition of helicopter refueling pods under its wings,

it could provide fuel to helicopters anywhere the

helicopter could fly. Helicopter refueling tech -

nology already had been developed, and wing

pods had been installed on USAF HC-130N/P

rescue aircraft and on US Marine Corp (USMC)

KC-130s. The modification allowed helicopters

to refuel from the tanker aircraft. The first six

Talons modified with the helicopter refueling

pod system were the Clamp aircraft assigned to

Hurlburt Field. The modification was accom -

plished concurrently with SOF-I Phase I. The

remainder of the Combat Talon fleet received

the wing pod refueling as part of the MOD-90

program. By the late 1980s, funds had been allocated to modify all Clamp-configured Combat

Talons. By 1995 all 14 Combat Talons had been

modified with the helicopter aerial-refueling

system.

The aerial refueling system provided the

Combat Talon with the capability to transfer

fuel through the modified fuel-dump manifold.

Two aerial-refuelable-equipped helicopters, either

individually or simultaneously, could refuel

through refueling hoses trailed from pods located beneath the outer wing area. An auxiliary

control panel was located overhead at the flight

engineer’s station. When installed, the components formed an integral part of the fuel system.

For refueling operations, a drogue and hose

trailed behind the pod for engagement with the

receiver helicopter. A self-seal reception couplin g

prevented flow of fuel until the hose was en -

gaged. A fuel range of 56 to 76 feet was marked

on the forward end of the refueling hose with

two five-foot white bands. In addition to the fueling range bands, the hoses were marked with

one-foot wide white bands 10 feet apart. The

hose reel responded automatically to receiver

engagement and movements of the receiver airplane by reeling in or out to take up slack or

extend as necessary. The reel operated on hydraulic pressure, but in the event of utility hydraulic system failure, the hose could be mechanically released and trailed behind the pod.

The hose could then be cut loose by a guillotine

device located in the pod.8 2

The two aerial refueling pods contained a hydraulic system for reel operation, associated

plumbing, and three status indicator lights. The

status lights were located on the aft end of the

pod, were visible to the receiver, and indicated

tanker ready (yellow light), fuel flowing (green

light), and hydraulic pressure off (red light).

The hydraulic system provided power for exten -

sion, retraction, and locking of the air refueling

hose. Controls for the air refueling system were

located on the auxiliary fuel control panel and

the main fuel control panel.

The aerial refueling capability on the Combat

Talon provided a quantum increase in SOF capa -

bility. When Combat Talon II was designed, helicopter aerial refueling was not included in the

baseline aircraft. Throughout the 1990s requirements continued to expand for penetrating tankers. A palletized centerline aerial refueling system was tested in the mid-1990s for Combat

Talon II but did not perform to expectations.

Funds were allocated in 1998 for the modification

of the Combat Talon II with a permanently

mounted improved aerial refueling system similar to the one on the Combat Talon I. The modifi -

cation was programmed for installation in the

2001–5 period. Combat Talon had matured to the

point that it could receive fuel while airborne and

deliver it to helicopters in denied areas. No other

aircraft possessed similar versatility.

Summary of Combat

Talon Modifications

In addition to the major modifications made

to the basic C-130E aircraft covered in the previous pages, literally hundreds of other upgrades and improvements have been made to

the Combat Talon over the past three decades.

The modern-day Combat Talon I has changed so

dramatically that it barely resembles the original aircraft that came off the Lockheed assem -

bly line in 1965. Not an upgrade per se, but

perhaps the most structurally sound improvement to the aircraft was the installation of new

wings in the early 1990s. Since the majority of

Combat Talon flying hours historically are

flown at low-level altitudes, the aircraft aged at

approximately five times the rate of standard

C-130s. For this reason, critical aircraft components, including the center-wing box and outerwing sections, have been changed to ensure the

structural integrity of the airframe. (See appen -

dix B for a partial listing of Combat Talon modifications.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

56
Notes

1. Project CHECO Report, The Role of the USAF in Sup -

port of Special Activities in SEA, 1 July 1976, prepared by

Tom G. Abbey, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF HRA, 23.

2. Pamphlet, 12 October 1990, provided to the author by

John R. Lewis from his personal files, Combat Talon Ar -

chive, Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command

historian (hereafter cited as HQ AFSOC/HO), Hurlburt Field,

Fla., 5.

3. Project CHECO Report, 25.

4. Big Safari Reunion, 6, on file, Combat Talon Archive,

HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 12 October 1990.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 8.

7. Ibid., 7.

8. Ibid., 7–8.

9. Lars Olausson, Lockheed Hercules Production List,

1954–1995, 12th ed., privately published by author, February

1994, 90–92.

10. Flight Manual (FM), USAF Series C-130E , Technical

Order (TO) 1C-130E-1, 15 March 1966, Combat Talon Archive,

HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 1-4.

11. Ibid., 1-26.

12. Ibid., 1-31.

13. Ibid., 1-37.

14. Ibid., 1-50.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 1-71.

17. Ibid., 1-78.

18. Ibid., 1-84.

19. Ibid., 1-87.

20. Ibid., 1-91.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 4-103.

23. Ibid., 1-98.

24. AFTO Form 95s, aircraft 64-0523, 64-0551, 64-0555,

and 64-0568 records, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

25. William M. Leary, Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet; on-line, Internet, n.d. available from

http://www.terrorism.net/Pubs/csi/Lea/html.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Michael E. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors: US Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1997), 103.

30. Leary.

31. Haas, 50.

32. Leary.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Official Report, List of Persons Picked Up by the Fult

Skyhook Aerial Recovery System, Robert E. Fulton Jr., 6 Jan

ary 1964, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlbu

Field, Fla.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Official Report, ER-4112, C-130 Fulton Skyhook Aer

Recovery System , Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 8 February 196

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fl

1.

50. Ibid., 3.

51. Ibid., 3–4.

52. Ibid., 4–5.

53. FM, Partial Flight Manual, C-130E Skyhook , TO 1

130E(I)-1, 23 March 1967, Combat Talon Archive, HQ A

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 4-18–4-19.

54. Ibid., 4-18.

55. Ibid., 4-25.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 2-26.

61. Ibid., 4-26.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. History, 15th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., K-SQ-

CMDO-15-HI, 10–11.

65. Big Safari Reunion, 6–7.

66. 19th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), MC-130

Combat Talon Pilot Student Study Guide, Hurlburt Fiel

Fla., 30 December 1998.

67. FM, USAF Series MC-130E , TO LTM 1MC-130E-1

October 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 4-315.

68. Technical Report, High Speed Low Level Aerial D

livery System (HSLLADS), OT&E Final Report, March 197

prepared by Irl L. Franklin, Combat Talon Archive, HQ A

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 1.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 1–2.

71. Ibid., iii.

72. Ibid., v.

73. Ibid., v–vi.

74. Ibid., vi.

75. Big Safari Reunion, 22.

76. Maj Robert L. Berry, ed., 1st SOW Pilot/Navigat

Textbook, n.d., Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 4-2.

77. Ibid.

78. Capt Raymond L. Harris, USAF, and Edward I. Set

C-130 Aerial Refueling Evaluation, April 1977, Final Repo

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fl

38.

79. Ibid., 23.

80. Ibid., 25.

81. Ibid., 17.

82. FM, USAF Series MC-130E, 4-359.

THE COMBAT TALON WEAPONS SYSTE

57
Chapter 3

Combat Knife

(The Pope Air Force Base Years: 1965–74)

On the three types of individuals who play the game: “First, there are those who are winners and

know they are winners. Then there are the losers who know they are losers. Then there are those

who are not winners but don’t know it. They’re the ones for me. They never quit trying. They’re the

soul of our game.”

—Paul “Bear” Bryant

In the Beginning There Was Pope

Fourteen C-130E aircraft that would later become

known as Combat Talons came off the LockheedMarietta assembly line and were accepted by the

USAF beginning in July 1965. They were production aircraft and were not equipped with the Fulton STARS modification, the AN/APQ-115 TF/TA

radar, or any ECM equipment. The 464th Troop

Carrier Wing, Pope AFB, North Carolina, was

designated the stateside unit to receive the first

Combat Talon aircraft. Ramp space at Pope was

extremely limited in the summer of 1965 due to

the massive buildup for the war in Vietnam. As a

result, the new C-130E aircraft were temporarily

stored at Sewart AFB, Tennessee, until adequate

facilities became available and maintenance personnel were trained at Pope AFB. Personnel from

Pope AFB traveled on temporary duty to Sewart

AFB to gain experience in the aircraft. While

awaiting the initial STARS modification, aircrews

ferried the aircraft to Greenville, South Carolina,

where Ling-Tempco-Vaught Electrosystems painted

them in the low-radar reflective black and green

paint scheme from which they would come to be

called Blackbirds. A heavy, porous paint, it added

370 pounds to the aircraft’s basic weight. Starting

in December 1965, three aircraft each month were

sent to Lockheed-Georgia, where the Fulton

STARS modification was completed. Aircraft 64-

0565 and 64-0568 were temporarily assigned to

the 4442d Combat Crew Training Wing while

awaiting modifications. By May 1966 all 14 Combat Talon aircraft had been modified with the

Fulton STARS . As each aircraft completed the

Fulton modification, it was sent to LAS Ontario

for installation of the AN/APQ-115 TF/TA radar

and the ECM suite.

The 779th Troop Carrier Squadron, com -

manded by Lt Col Rodney H. Newbold, 464th

Troop Carrier Wing, was identified as the squadron to operate the new C-130E (I) aircraft under

the code name Project Skyhook . In March 1966

the 779th sent a C-130 instructor crew to E

wards AFB, California, for initial checkout in th

Fulton system. The checkout took a month 

complete, with each pilot accomplishing 15 reco

eries. Enlisted crew members returned to Pop

AFB on 14 April 1966 and organized the Skyhoo

ground school. Officer crew members received a 

ditional instruction on the AN/APQ-115 rad

and returned to Pope AFB on 30 April. The initi

instructor crew formed the nucleus of the Sk

hook program for Tactical Air Command.1

Between 1 May and 30 June, six addition

crews were qualified by 779th instructors in th

Skyhook system and were identified to deploy 

SEA under the code name Project Stray Goos

Initial training stressed operations utilizing th

AN/APQ-115 TF/TA radar and the Fulton STAR

Low-level training was conducted at 1,000 fe

AGL at night and 500 feet during the day. Th

ground-school portion of training included rad

and Fulton mock-ups to familiarize studen

with those unique capabilities before beginnin

the flying phase. Lt Col Donald J. Britton, fo

merly assigned to the operations plans branc

of the 464th TCW, was designated the Str

Goose detachment commander (see chap. 4)

Photo courtesy of Richard H. Sell

Aircraft 64-0566 on the ramp at Pope AFB, North Car

lina, spring of 1966.

59
Once the Stray Goose detachment completed

training, 779th instructors concentrated on the

checkout of additional crews to fill their own

training requirements. The 779th continued its

primary mission of tactical airlift, with Project

Skyhook personnel forming up F Flight within

the squadron.

The basic Combat Talon crew consisted of 11

personnel—three pilots, two navigators, one electronic warfare officer, two flight engineers (originally designated as flight mechanics), one radio op -

erator, and two loadmasters. In contrast, a slick

C-130 had a crew of six personnel—two pilots, one

navigator, one flight engineer, and two loadmasters. The third pilot on the Combat Talon performed safety duties during Fulton recovery op -

erations and assisted in map reading while flying

low level. The second navigator was responsible

for map reading and terrain avoidance during

low-level maneuvers. The EWO was a trained

navigator who had additional training in operating the sophisticated ECM equipment installed on

the Combat Talon . It was his job to detect enemy

threats and to defend the aircraft electronically

until the crew could maneuver to safety. The second flight engineer operated the Fulton winch

during recovery operations and assisted the primary flight engineer during systems operations.

The radio operator was responsible for external

communications between the aircraft and the

agency controlling the mission. In addition to

their normal C-130 loadmaster duties, Combat

Talon loadmasters were responsible for completing the Fulton recovery from the ramp of the aircraft once the lift line had been intercepted by the

pilot. Because of the large crew and varied duties

of each assigned crew member, the aircraft commander was often challenged to the maximum of

his abilities to manage the crew safely and efficiently. To increase crew proficiency, and thus its

survivability in combat, most Combat Talon crews

flew as hard crews (i.e., the same crew members

flew together to maximize mission success). The

779th instructors, however, could not fly as hard

crews when instructing students in the aircraft.

Although the Fulton STARS had been utilized

for live pickups since August 1958, no recorded

live pickups had been made by USAF C-130 aircraft by the spring of 1966. On 3 May 1966 the

first live Fulton recovery in a USAF C-130 aircraft was made at Edwards AFB, California. Test

pilot Carl A. Hughes piloted the aircraft, picking up Capt Gerald E. Lyvere in a single live

pickup. Later in the day a two-man pickup was

also performed by Hughes. Col Allison C. Brooks

and A/3dC Ronald L. Doll were successfully retrieved utilizing the two-man system.3

 By August

of 1966 the 779th TCS had refined its Fulton

STARS capability and was approved to perform a

live recovery by Headquarters TAC. Maj George

G. Hellier and his Combat Talon crew performed

both a one-man and a two-man live surface-to-air

recovery at Pope AFB on 24 August 1966. TSgt

Jacob C. Legrand was the first to be recovered,

followed by Capt Straun L. Paddon and SSgt

Frederick L. Thrower. The three personnel were

all active duty Air Force members. The two successful recoveries marked the first live surface-toair recoveries made by an operational Air Force

crew and ushered in an era of live pickups that

would last for the next 16 years.4

The Project Stray Goose contingent departed

for SEA on 8 September 1966. The initial deployment consisted of four Combat Talon aircraft (64-

0547, 64-0561, 64-0562, and 64-0563), six Combat

Talon qualified aircrews (66 personnel), and 190

maintenance and support personnel. Upon arrival

USAF Photo

Capt Straun L. Paddon and SSgt Frederick. L. Thrower,

24 August 1966—the first two-man surface-to-air recov -

ery by an operational Talon crew.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

60
at Ching Chang Kuang AB, Taiwan, the unit was

organized as Detachment 1, 314th Troop Carrier

Wing, and was assigned permanently to PACAF.5

The successful training of Project Stray Goose

crew members marked a significant achievement

for the 779th Skyhook unit. By year’s end the

779th was well along in training its own contingent of aircrew and maintenance personnel. Con -

sidering the challenges the unit faced bringing

the new weapons system on line during its first

full year of operations, unit accomplishments

were nothing short of outstanding. The next year

would prove to be equally challenging. The six

Stray Goose crews deployed to SEA would have to

be replaced at the end of their 12-month tours,

and the 779th would have to mature its own instructor cadre.

1967: Combat Talon Expands

Operations continued at a hectic pace at Pope

AFB throughout January and February 1967.

Along with its Combat Talon -unique skills, Combat Knife (the Skyhook unit at Pope AFB was

later renamed Combat Knife) crews of the 779th

maintained other skills found in tactical C-130

units. On 16 January 1967 aircraft 64-0567 was

damaged during a ramp personnel airdrop at Pope

AFB. The MC-1 strap used to retrieve parachute

static lines broke and caused rips and tears to the

underside of the aft section of the horizontal stabilizer. During March aircraft 64-0551 suffered damage to its HF antenna during Fulton recovery op -

erations. Experience over the years in STARS

would show that HF antennas and pilot windscreens were often casualties during Fulton recoveries, with the windscreens being especially vulnerable at night. (Night lift lines had lights woven

into them, and if the light hit the front windscreen, breakage of the glass windscreen was

sometimes the result.) Eventually, most of these

problems were minimized by relocating the HF antennae and by improving the design of the Fulton

night lift line.

In the spring of 1967, the Air Force went

through a major reorganization. As a result, units

at Pope AFB received new designations. The

464th TCW became the 464th Tactical Airlift

Wing (TAW), and the 779th TCS became the

779th Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS). Other

units throughout tactical airlift were similarly renamed.6

 In May the second big push began to

train the next contingent of Stray Goose crews

bound for SEA. The Taiwan-based Combat Spear

unit had moved to Nha Trang, Vietnam, late in

1966 and had been renamed Detachment 1, 314

TAW, effective 1 August 1967. Six crews we

trained throughout the summer, along with mai

tenance personnel, to replace personnel who ha

deployed the previous year.

On 26 July 1967, during a low-level trainin

mission out of Pope AFB, aircraft 64-0551 expe

enced the loss of the right fending line, which r

sulted in damage to the number three an

number four propellers. The line was chopped 

bits upon contact, and pieces of the line puncture

a hole in the number three propeller cowlin

scratching and denting both number three an

number four propellers. The propellers were r

placed after an uneventful landing at Pope AF

with approximately 20 feet of fending line trailin

from the nose of the aircraft.7

Lt Col Dow A. Rogers Jr., the commander de

ignate of Detachment 1, 314th TAW, led the se

ond contingent to SEA along with his operatio

officer, Lt Col Thomas F. Hines. Combat Knif

instructors in the 779th did an outstanding jo

preparing the new crews, who finished training 

pairs and departed by way of military air fro

July through September. The staggered reportin

dates were designed to lessen the impact of th

100 percent turnover of personnel for a unit th

was engaged in combat over North Vietnam dail

The 779th spent the remainder of 1967 preparin

crews to deploy to the 7th Air Commando Squa

ron (ACS) in Germany, which was scheduled fo

conversion to Combat Talons in the spring 

1968. As was the case for the Combat Spear un

in the Pacific, the European Combat Arro

squadron had six crews and four Combat Talo

aircraft assigned along with maintenance an

support personnel (see chap. 5).

On 25 November 1967 Nha Trang AB, Vie

nam, came under mortar attack, and aircraft 6

0563 was destroyed. This was the first aircraft 

the original 14 to be lost, and USAF quick

moved to replace it with another aircraft. On 

December 1967 aircraft 64-0571 was assigned 

the 779th as a slick C-130E . It was used for tact

cal airlift until it was sent to LAS Ontario on 

April 1968. It received Combat Talon radar an

ECM modifications but not the Fulton recove

system. The Air Staff determined that the r

maining Combat Talons equipped with Fulto

STARS were adequate to meet projected taskin

On 30 August 1968 aircraft 64-0571 returned 

Pope AFB as the first Talon without the Fulto

recovery system installed.8

COMBAT KNIF

61
1968: The Establishment

of Detachment 2,

1st Special Operations Wing

On 29 December 1967 the SEA Combat Spear

unit lost Crew S-01 and Combat Talon 64-0547

over North Vietnam. This was the second of the

original 14 aircraft to be lost. As a result the

heavy student load already placed on the 779th to

train Combat Arrow aircrews for Europe was increased so that a replacement crew for the Pacific

could be trained. Schedules were adjusted with

student crews destined for SEA accelerated by

two months to enable the unit to reconstitute its

sixth crew as soon as possible. The 779th did an

outstanding job meeting this challenge. To maintain a 14-aircraft fleet of Combat Talons, aircraft

64-0572 was designated by Air Staff to replace

aircraft 64-0547.

Along with the training provided to the Combat

Spear replacement crew, early 1968 was marked

by final preparation to deploy Combat Arrow

trained crews and maintenance personnel to the

7th Air Commando Squadron. (Note: After August

1968 all squadrons previously designated Air

Commando Squadrons became Special Operations

Squadrons.) The first Combat Talon and crew deployed to Ramstein AB, Federal Republic of Germany, on 24 February 1968. An additional crew

and aircraft arrived in Germany on 3 March, with

the third aircraft and crew arriving on the 28th of

June 1968 (see chap. 5).

For more than two years, the 779th had provided trained personnel to fill Combat Talon requirements, first in the Pacific and then later in

Europe. By the spring of 1968, the Air Force was

consolidating its US-assigned special operations

units in the Florida Panhandle at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field No. 9, which was also known as

Hurlburt Field. On 7 April 1968 the Combat

Talon training mission performed by the 779th

within TAC was transferred, along with its personnel and equipment, to Detachment 3, 319th

Air Commando Squadron, Tactical Airlift. On 1

May 1968 the name of the new organization be -

came Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing

(SOW), which was located at Hurlburt Field.9 The

new detachment remained at Pope AFB as a tenant unit but reported to the 1st SOW in Florida.

With Combat Talon assets deployed worldwide,

Combat Knife concentrated on developing its op -

erational mission. To this time almost all unit

resources were dedicated to the training mission.

In addition to operating the Combat Talon

schoolhouse, Detachment 2 was assigned the op -

erational mission of supporting unconventional

warfare plans of commander in chief, European

Command (CINCEUR); CINCPAC; commander in

chief, Southern Command (CINCSO); and commander in chief, Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE) for both limited and general war. Specific tasks in support of this primary mission

included delivery of personnel and cargo by airdrop or airland methods to designated points in

enemy territory; resupply of clandestine opera -

tions conducted by US Army Special Forces and

other US government agencies; exfiltration of personnel, equipment, cargo, and intelligence data

from the ground or water; dissemination of psychological warfare materiel; pickup of escapee or

evadee personnel from designated safe areas

within enemy territory; and training of both aircrew and maintenance personnel to support

worldwide Combat Talon requirements.1 0

On 8 July 1968 Lt Col Pierce M. Meyers Jr.

became the new commander of Detachment 2.

Under Myers’s leadership the unit stabilized with

an authorized strength of 42 officers and 161 airmen.1 1 There was another big push in the summer

of 1968 to replace Combat Spear personnel rotating from SEA. As had been the case the previous

year, many personnel returned to Pope AFB after

their Vietnam tour, or they elected to PCS to the

7th SOS in Germany. Combat Talon had become

somewhat of a closed system and was composed of

experienced personnel who rotated among the

three squadrons. Detachment 2 benefited as experienced personnel brought valuable combat skills

back to the unit.

In the haste to field the original Combat Talon

weapons system in 1966, which was driven by

SEA operational requirements, special Stray

Goose equipment installed on the aircraft had

never been through an OT&E to determine system effectiveness. In May of 1968, during a De -

tachment 2 Combat Talon capabilities briefing to

the Special Air Warfare Center staff at Eglin

AFB, Florida, and to the staff of the 1st SOW, Maj

Cecil Clark identified the need for a formal

OT&E. In September Lt Col Howard Hartley, the

Combat Knife project officer for SOF on the TAC

staff, requested Maj George Hellier and Major

Clark brief him on Combat Knife capabilities and

limitations. Upon completion of the briefing and

armed with the knowledge of the need for a formal OT&E, Colonel Hartley took the briefers with

him to the Air Staff to brief the shortfall and to

obtain support.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

62
During meetings with Air Staff personnel,

Colonel Black (AFXSME) discovered that there

was no fiscal 1970 funding for Combat Talon . Discussions further revealed that the TAC-assigned

Combat Knife unit lacked specific mission respon -

sibility, which prevented identification of future

funding. Without specific mission responsibility,

neither future modifications nor additional equip -

ment could be justified. Because of the meeting a

plan of action was developed to bring the Combat

Talon program into line to qualify the weapons

system for future funding. The plan included the

following recommendations: develop a concept of

employment; brief the SOF commander on Combat Knife capabilities and limitations; brief the

TAC/DO and TAC/DPL on Combat Knife capabilities and limitations; brief commander in chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and CINCSTRIKE

on Combat Knife with the objective of including

the weapons system in their respective war plans;

and request TAC support a worldwide Combat

Talon conference to identify equipment and modification requirements.12

In October Gen Robert Gardenas, the com -

mander of TAC, was briefed and the following recommendations were approved: (1) give a similar

briefing to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE; (2)

send a request to Air Staff (AFXOSO) to convene

a worldwide Combat Talon conference; and (3) request Air Staff authorize a formal OT&E be con -

ducted on the Combat Talon weapons system. On

3 December 1968 Major Hellier and Major Clark

briefed CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE planners

at Langley AFB, Virginia, and obtained tentative

agreement from both commands to review their

respective war plans for possible inclusion of

Combat Talon .

1 3

Six months had passed since Major Clark had

first briefed the OT&E shortfall, but the effort

paid off. The Air Staff approved a formal OT&E

for the Combat Talon weapons system. Addition -

ally, Air Staff began organizing the first Combat

Talon Management Review (CTMR) conference

and tentatively set a conference date for midMarch 1968. And finally, staff actions were begun

between TAC and the Air Staff to determine the

extent Combat Knife could support CINCLANT

and CINCSTRIKE.14 The initial OT&E shortfall

identified by Major Clark in May 1968 had ultimately saved the entire Combat Talon program.

While the briefing process was going on during

the fall, Detachment 2 was able to get sufficiently

ahead of schoolhouse requirements to begin participating in joint exercises. During November

Detachment 2 participated in two joint exe

cises—one with the USA 7th Special Force

Group and another with the 3d Special Forc

Group. Successful personnel and Fulton kit dro

were accomplished during these exercises, alon

with Fulton STARS intercepts utilizing a trai

ing dummy. During the last half of the yea

along with its limited exercise participation, D

tachment 2 accomplished 200 day STARS, 8

night STARS, 86 day equipment drops, 86 nig

equipment drops, 40 personnel drops, 11 Fulto

kit drops, 42 short-look maneuvers, and 510 ai

borne intercepts with fighter aircraft and flew 3

hours engaged with RBS ground radar sites co

ducting EWO training. 15 Although 1968 had bee

a busy year, unit personnel looked forward 

1969 and upcoming opportunities flying the Com

bat Talon .

1969: First Combat Talon

Management Review and the

Development of Operational

and Training Manuals

Detachment 2 personnel had enjoyed a qui

holiday season and were ready to fly when Jan

ary arrived. On 16 January 1969 all was norm

as Maj James H. Browning and his crew pr

pared a night training mission to be flown fro

Pope AFB round-robin through the mountains 

western North Carolina. As aircraft 64-0558 a

proached Brown Mountain, just east of Ashevill

for an unknown reason, the aircraft clipped 

ridgeline while in a shallow right turn. The ai

craft impacted trees with its right wing and s

verely damaged the number four propeller, th

causing the crew to shut down the engine imm

diately. Tree debris also penetrated the rig

wing fuel tank and the underbelly of the aircra

just forward of the main landing gear. Thanks 

outstanding crew coordination and flying skill

the crew maintained aircraft control with multipl

engine shutdowns and made an emergency lan

ing at the Hickory Municipal Airport, Hickor

North Carolina. 1 6 No one was injured in the acc

dent, but the aircraft required major repair. I

itial fieldwork was done at Hickory to enable th

aircraft to be flown back to depot for permane

repair.

Postflight investigation could not determin

the cause of the accident, although 779th perso

nel were convinced that the AN/APQ-115 rad

had somehow malfunctioned and allowed the ai

craft to descend to a point where it impacted th

COMBAT KNIF

63
ridgeline. John R. Lewis, a technical repre -

sentative from Texas Instruments (the prime con -

tractor for the AN/APQ-115) was called in as part

of a depot-level technical team to examine the ra -

dar. The team conducted preliminary interviews

of flight-crew personnel and performed an opera -

tional evaluation of the integrated system while

the aircraft remained at Hickory. The main components of the AN/APQ-115 were then removed

from the aircraft and returned to Pope AFB for

evaluation by Air Force technicians. The investigation concluded that the radar was working

within parameters when it was checked after the

accident.1 7 Why the aircraft struck the trees

would remain a mystery. The aircraft was repaired and returned to Detachment 2 on 24 June

1969. Its near brush with destruction would forebode its future. After participating as one of two

Combat Talons in the Son Tay POW Raid in 1970,

the aircraft was destroyed in a midair collision

with an F-102 interceptor on 5 December 1972,

with the loss of everyone aboard.

The CTMR conference, which had been proposed the previous fall, was hosted by AFLC/LO

at LAS Ontario from 11 to 13 March 1969. This

was the first of the yearly conferences that

brought together US and overseas Combat Talon

units, representatives from their respective commands, and contractor personnel from industry

to discuss the Combat Talon weapons system and

its future development. The objectives for the

first conference were ambitious and reflected the

importance of future meetings of this type. Con -

ference objectives included the following:

1. Review and validate the basic concept of operations

in light of combat experience gained since initial

employment.

2. Validate established mobility criteria upon which

applicable tables of allowance were based.

3. Review the published aircrew training syllabus for

comprehensiveness and applicability in terms of

tactics and procedures used in weapons system em -

ployment.

4. Review the published weapons system security

guide.

5. Review the proposed FY-70 modification program.

6. Identify operational requirements, which formed

the basis for future system modifications.

7. Discuss Combat Talon logistics procedures established for peculiar equipment.

8. Review the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)

IRAN schedule and work package.

9. Resolve or initiate action on any problems associated with personnel, materiel and operational re -

quirements.18

The conference was chaired by Maj Benjamin

N. Kraljev, Air Staff AFXOSO. In addition to the

published agenda, conference attendees agreed to

discuss the Lockheed Technical Manual, which

had been designed to provide aircrew and maintenance personnel with the appropriate procedures

for those peculiar systems not covered by standard Air Force publications. The existing LTM was

classified Secret because of sections dealing with

ECM equipment installed on the aircraft. Certain

other parts of the document described the AN/

APQ-115 terrain-following radar and was classified Confidential. The majority of the document,

however, contained unclassified information.

With an overall classification of Secret, proper

utilization of the technical order was difficult for

both maintenance and operations personnel alike.

Conference attendees agreed to delete operational

procedures and tactics from the LTM and to include them in an appropriate 55-series procedures

manual. Also, those portions of the LTM describ -

ing the AN/APQ-115 radar (except its operational

limitations) would be declassified. The ECM portion of the LTM would be published as a classified

appendix to the basic LTM, thus leaving the majority of the document as a stand-alone unclassifi ed

tech manual that could be more easily used in daily

operations.19

Lt Col P. M. Meyers, Headquarters TAC, submitted a draft concept of employment for the

Combat Talon that contained detailed information required to properly plan a Combat Talon

mission. After review by conference attendees, the

document was adopted for use by all three Combat Talon squadrons. Other discussions revolved

around the Fulton STARS and perceived opera -

tional shortfalls. Long-range exfiltration of a US

Army A-Team could not be accomplished without

airlanding a Combat Talon . Airlanding in enemy

territory made the option risky. USAFE/7th SOS

concluded that a STARS capable of extracting up

to 4,000 pounds should be explored and agreed to

review the requirement further. If additional

study warranted, USAFE agreed to submit a required operational capability to Air Staff. Attendees also confirmed the requirement for a highspeed (250 knots) air-drop capability that would

eliminate drop zone compromise during the slow -

down maneuver. The high-speed modification was

in the prototype phase of development and had

already proven its feasibility in the Heavy Chain

program. Air Staff (AFXOSO) agreed to include

the capability in future Combat Talon modernization proposals.20

A whole host of additional topics was discussed

and actions agreed upon. At the conclusion of the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

64
conference, attendees felt that the format and

content of the conference was about right and

they were very enthusiastic about attending fu -

ture annual meetings. The conference adjourned

at 1500 on 13 March 1969 after having addressed

critical Combat Talon issues that had not been

consolidated or reviewed during the previous four

years.21 The CTMR conference would remain an

annual meeting until the Combat Talon program

was transferred from LAS Ontario to Warner

Robins, Georgia, in 1995.

Effective 19 May 1969, Lt Col Robert W. Folts

assumed command of Detachment 2. His initial

assessment of his unit’s effectiveness contained

in official Air Force documents reflected his con -

cern over the impact of operational requirements

on the detachment. While maintaining fully

qualified combat crews, Detachment 2 also fulfilled the combat crew training function by training six 11-man crews annually for SEA and replacement crews for itself and the 7th SOS in

Europe. The 7th SOS had been organized the

year prior, with most of its personnel on threeyear overseas tours. To meet experience levels for

Combat Spear, Detachment 2 instructors (both

maintenance and aircrew alike) were assigned to

SEA duty, resulting in a 70 percent annual turnover rate. New personnel assigned to Detach -

ment 2 remained just long enough to gain the

required experience to qualify for overseas duty.

Colonel Folts campaigned hard for a three-year

stabilized tour for his assigned instructors.22 Not

until Nha Trang AB closed in 1972, however, and

Combat Spear moved to Kadena AB, Japan, did

Detachment 2 get much relief from the constant

turnover.

Because of TAC and Air Staff initiatives from

the previous year, a Combat Knife mission statement was developed and published by TAC for the

first time in the fall of 1969. The mission of Combat Knife was articulated

to provide a global unconventional warfare C-130 force

(Combat Talon ) to support unconventional warfare plans

of CINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCLANT for both lim -

ited and general war; secondary mission is the pickup of

escapee and evadee personnel from designated ‘safe

a r eas’ within enemy territory; correlative mission is the

initial qualification training of replacement aircrew personnel and the initial training of certain select aircraft

maintenance personnel assigned to all Combat Talon

units.2 3

Specific tasks were developed within TAC to

support the successful execution of the above mission by Combat Knife assets. Detachment 2 was

tasked to maintain trained crews and com batready aircraft equipped to penetrate enemy ai

space for long distances, accomplish an airdro

surface-to-air recovery, or airlanding; and the

safely return to friendly territory. Combat Knif

also had to be prepared to resupply US Army Sp

cial Forces and other US government agency pe

sonnel engaged in clandestine operations. Exf

tration capabilities included extraction from bo

land and water. Another task specifically a

signed to Combat Knife was the dissemination 

psychological warfare materiel.2 4

On 12 November 1969, Lt Col Peyton E. Coo

assumed command of Detachment 2. Lt Col A

bert P. “Friday” Blosch was appointed his oper

tions officer.2 5 In October Blosch attended a TA

directed AFM 51-130, Flying Training, C-13

Aircrew Training Manual, conference at Hurlbu

Field, Florida. The purpose of the conference w

to revise AFM 51-130. Detachment 2 was taske

to write chapter 6, which for the first time i

cluded the Combat Talon weapons system. Col

nel Hellier was the recognized expert for Comb

Talon training, and his input to Blosch was th

key to creating a meaningful document that cou

be used in the field.26 Since the creation of Com

bat Talon in 1966, little had been published fo

use in the Pope AFB schoolhouse due to conce

over security classifications. Maj John Garg

authored the main text for the AFM 51-130 u

date, while Blosch concentrated on tactical chec

lists. The combined effort of the three officers r

sulted in a superior Combat Talon trainin

document.

The long anticipated OT&E for the Stray Goo

modifications to the aircraft was begun in Augu

1969 with TAC as the office of primary respon

bility. TAC Test Plan 69-416, dated August 196

was the test directive under which the OT&E w

flown. In accordance with the directive, TAW

and SOF were designated joint test agencies. Th

program was divided into four phases, with ai

craft and personnel from Detachment 2 suppor

ing all four phases. From October to Decemb

1969, Phase I and all but one flight of Phase 

were completed.27

1970: Combat Knife Participates

in the Son Tay Raid

Combat Knife continued to improve and striv

for excellence. As a geographically separated un

from its parent wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida, 

faced unique challenges at Pope AFB. In Febr

ary 1970 the 464th TAW selected Detachment 

as the best large support squadron. Considerin

COMBAT KNIF

65
that it was a tenant unit of the host wing, the

selection marked a milestone in its maturity.2 8 In

April Col Robert W. Gates (1st SOW/CC) presented Detachment 2 with the TAC Unit Achieve -

ment Award for the period 17 January 1969–16

January 1970. The unit had gained recognition as

one of the best organizations in TAC. 29

The second CTMR conference was held at LAS

Ontario from 27 to 30 January 1970. Its major

goal was to finalize LTM changes recommended

the previous year and to coordinate a draft of the

new Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 55-130, Aircrew Operations Manual. Other major items discussed included the Combat Talon training program for 1971 and the fiscal year 1971 aircraft

modification program. As had been the case the

previous year, representatives from each major

command and each unit operating the Combat

Talon aircraft attended the conference.30 As a follow-up to the CTMR conference, Major Gargus

traveled to Headquarters TAC (DOSOS) on 16

March to coordinate MCM 55-130 changes agreed

to at the CTMR conference. A follow-up tasking for

Detachment 2 personnel was a comprehensive review of all tactical checklists. The checklists were

then included in the final MCM 55-130.31

From 24 March to 1 April, Detachment 2 participated with two aircraft in a joint capabilities

demonstration for foreign dignitaries, senior service personnel, and selected groups. The demon -

strations were held on the Fort Bragg ranges and

consisted of personnel drops and Fulton STARS

operations. Twelve sorties were flown, with 72

personnel air-dropped and six recoveries performed utilizing a training dummy. The objective

of the demonstrations was to educate personnel in

key US and allied government positions about the

capabilities of the Combat Talon and other US

weapons systems.3 2

In early summer (9–14 June) Detachment 2 participated in joint Exercise Gobbler Woods. Six US

Army Special Forces A Teams were infiltrated into

the objective area and were resupplied five days

later. Primary drop zones were lighted, and all

events were successfully accomplished on these

lighted drop zones.3 3 The exercise again demon -

strated the ability of Detachment 2 to support its

Special Forces customers while concurrently operating the schoolhouse and training replacement aircrews for worldwide Combat Talon assignment.

A Syllabi and Phase Training Conference was

also held in June 1970. The purpose of the conference was to evaluate existing syllabi and manuals

and to institute changes to promote better and

more efficient training goals and procedures. The

result of this conference was the ratification of the

new 75-flying-hour Combat Talon Syllabus. The

previous syllabus had required 90 flying hours.

Additionally, correction of all phase manuals was

accomplished with emphasis on mission sequence,

time changes, applicability of subject material,

format, and administrative cleanup.34 While overseas Talon units concentrated on operational

commitments to their theater commanders, De -

tachment 2 was methodically upgrading and improving the Combat Talon training system so that

personnel could be trained more efficiently and a

more proficient graduate be produced by the formal school.

July was highlighted by participation in another joint exercise named Gobi Springs I. De -

tachment 2 participated along with A Company,

6th Special Forces Group, and operated out of

Pope AFB. The exercise proved to be the most

realistic of the year, with 111 personnel and more

than 5,000 pounds of cargo air-dropped. A scheduled Fulton STARS was canceled the day before

the event by the participating Special Forces commander. Other than this one cancellation, other

events were flown as planned. The scenario allowed schoolhouse students bound for SEA the

opportunity to fly some of the exercise missions

and thus gain valuable experience training in a

realistic operational environment.3 5

In August 1970 Detachment 2 was tasked to

provide an aircraft and crew to begin preparation

for Operation Ivory Coast, which was the attempt

to free American prisoners of war from Son Tay

Prison in North Vietnam. Colonel Blosch and his

crew, flying aircraft 64-0558, departed Pope AFB

for Eglin AFB, Florida, and began a three-month

training period that culminated in the November

1970 raid deep into North Vietnam (see chap. 6).

This was the first combat mission flown by De -

tachment 2, although many of the unit’s personnel

had served in SEA before being assigned to Combat Knife . Blosch was a member of the original

Stray Goose contingent that deployed to SEA in

1966 and was the operations officer of Detachment

2 in the summer of 1970. The 7th SOS also provided a crew for the raid, and the 15th SOS provided a second Combat Talon —aircraft 64-0523.

The year ended on a positive note. Detach -

ment 2 won the 1st SOW Best Squadron Man -

agement Award for 1970 because the unit dem -

onstrated outstanding management of assigned

resources. The hard work by dedicated squadron

personnel had resulted in many administrative

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

66
and operational achievements throughout the

year. With the unit separated from its parent

wing, recognition such as this was even more

noteworthy.3 6

1971: MOD-70 Combat Talon and

the Activation of the 318th SOS

In February 1971 two significant events took

place. The third annual CTMR conference at LAS

Ontario was conducted from 16 to 19 February,

and the TAC inspector general gave the unit an

operational readiness inspection (ORI) from 18 to

20 February. The CTMR conference was very productive, with attendance similar to previous

years. Detachment 2 earned a satisfactory rating

for the ORI. The unit also made progress in the

facilities area. Building 718 at Pope AFB was tentatively committed to Detachment 2 with projected occupancy scheduled for 1 May 1971.37

From March through June 1971, Detachment 2

graduated three student classes. Class 71-4 began

training on 1 March and graduated on 16 April. It

consisted of six pilots, three navigators, two

EWOs, one flight engineer, and one loadmaster.

Class 71-5 began on 19 April and graduated on 4

June. It consisted of six pilots, four navigators,

two EWOs, one flight engineer, and two loadmasters. These crew members were replacements for

the 90th SOS at Nha Trang AB. (The 15th SOS

had been redesignated as the 90th SOS on 1 November 1970.) Class 71-6 started training on 7

June and graduated on 24 July.3 8

Effective 1 August 1971 Colonel Hellier assumed command of Detachment 2.39 One of Colonel Hellier’s greatest challenges was preparing

his unit for the new MOD-70 Combat Talon aircraft. Since its introduction into the USAF inventory in 1965, the C-130E (I) Combat Talon aircraft

had experienced certain equipment performance

limitations, the most serious of which was the

low MTBF of the AN/APQ-115 terrain-following

radar. The AN/APQ-115 was a modified Texas Instruments AN/APQ-99 radar designed for the F-4

Phantom. Even after numerous improvements,

the MTBF remained at approximately 19 hours.

In 1968 LAS Ontario began design studies to

correct the deficiencies in the radar. USAF approve d LAS Ontario’s proposals in the fall of 1969

and obligated $35 million for the improved radar

system. Heavy Chain aircraft 64-0564 and 64-

0565 were first to receive the new upgrade in 1970.

The first Combat Talon to receive the new radar

(64-0562) entered the modification phase in

March 1971. The updated aircraft was designated

MOD-70, with aircraft 64-0562 being the first 

be modified. It arrived at Pope AFB on 29 Se

tember 1971 for Category III testing.40

The MOD-70 upgrade was extensive an

marked the first time major modifications we

done since introduction of the Talons in 196

The heart of the modification centered on th

terrain-following radar and an upgraded ine

tial navigation system. The new radar was desi

nated the AN/APQ-122(V)8 and carried the prom

ise of a much longer MTBF with much mor

potential than the older AN/APQ-115. Oth

systems included in the MOD-70 program wer

the installation of the Litton LN-15J inerti

navigation system, the addition of an autopilo

pitch monitor, an improved Doppler, an im 

proved Loran C, and modification of the fus

lage of the aircraft for HSLLADS. The latt

modification allowed the ramp and door 

open at a maximum airspeed of 250 KIAS, th

eliminating the need for slowdown when ai

dropping supplies. The package of improv

ments greatly increased the operational cap

bility of the weapons system.4 1

The new radar provided day and night low

level capability in the 250, 500, 750, and 1,00

foot modes. In addition, the system had the cap

bility to penetrate light-to-medium rain if e

countered along the low-level route. The rad

could also be operated in the beacon, weather, pr

cision ground mapping, and automatic navigatio

updating modes. The theoretical MTBF of the r

dar was 350 hours, but AF technicians felt th

around 190 hours was more realistic, a figur

that was still 10 times better than the old

AN/APQ-115.4 2

The LN-15J inertial navigation system pr

vided a considerable increase in accuracy ov

the Doppler system installed in the origin

Talon. It provided a much improved pitch an

roll stabilization input for the radar and su

plied fully automatic steering from takeoff 

landing with 20 preset way points. Accurac

was maintained within one-half NM per hou

The system also included an automatic compute

aerial release point (CARP) function that coul

steer the aircraft to a drop point 50 yards wid

by 50 yards long and as low as 250 feet abov

the ground. The auto CARP function could b

employed at airspeeds ranging from 125 to 25

KIAS.43

Another improvement provided by MOD-7

was the autopilot pitch monitor, which was d

signed as a safety measure while flying low-lev

COMBAT KNIF

67
terrain following utilizing the autopilot. Experience in SEA and in Europe established the requirement to fly long and physically demanding

missions at low altitude. The ability to engage the

autopilot while in the terrain-following mode was

designed to give the pilot a break from the con -

tinuous demands of manual low-level flight. The

autopilot pitch monitor disengaged the autopilot

when it sensed a rapid climb or dive command

with the autopilot engaged. The system was designed to prevent an autopilot-induced hard-over

driving the aircraft into the ground due to autopilot or other system failures.44

To eliminate the slowdown requirement for resupply drops, the HSLLADS was installed on the

MOD-70 aircraft. This modification consisted of

strengthening the fuselage of the aircraft and installing a second hydraulic cylinder to augment

the opening and closing of the rear aircraft door.4 5

Since the days of the Carpetbaggers in World War

II, special operators had looked for a way to perform airdrops without the slowdown maneuver. If

the aircraft was being tracked by radar or by

other electronic means, a slowdown could compromise the drop zone and thus reveal to the enemy

the location of the airdrop. Early tactics developed

to confuse the enemy included making multiple

slowdowns to mask the actual drop zone. Although somewhat effective, multiple slowdowns

put the aircraft at a slow airspeed close to the

ground in enemy territory, thus increasing its vulnerability and the likelihood of the aircraft being

hit by enemy fire. Multiple slowdowns also complicated navigational timing because a constant

ground speed could not be maintained, thus making it more difficult to make exact times as flight

planned on subsequent legs of the route. The

HSLLADS was designed for resupply drops since

physical limitations of the human body would not

permit personnel drops outside the established

airspeeds of 125–150 KIAS.

Aircraft 64-0566 departed Detachment 2 for

the 7th SOS on 5 September, thus beginning a

two-year period of exchanging aircraft among the

three Combat Talon units to accommodate the

MOD-70 output schedule. As the schoolhouse for

the Combat Spear and Combat Arrow units, Combat Knife was tasked to train aircrews in both the

pre-MOD-70 aircraft and in the new system. As

MOD-70 aircraft were assigned to the overseas

units, training on the older system was discontinued, and only MOD-70 training was provided for

new crew members.

Detachment 2, 1st SOW Becomes

the 318th SOS

Special Order G-267, dated 3 November 1971,

activated the 318th Special Operations Squadron,

effective 15 November 1971, and assigned the

new squadron to the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field,

Florida. In conjunction with its activation, De -

tachment 2, 1st SOW, was inactivated. All personnel and equipment formally assigned to De -

tachment 2 was reassigned to the 318th SOS.4 6

Colonel Hellier remained as the squadron commander until 1 December, when Lt Col Valintino

Bagnani Jr. assumed command.4 7

The 318th SOS had a long history in special

operations. Originally activated on 1 May 1944

as the 318th Troop Carrier Squadron (Com -

mando), the 318th was assigned to the 3d Air

Commando Group and operated in the Pacific

theater flying C-47s. Originally located at Camp

MacCall, North Carolina, the unit deployed to

Nadzab, New Guinea, on 26 October 1944. It dis -

tinguished itself during the campaigns of the

Western Pacific, Leyte Gulf, and Luzon. It was

deactivated on 25 March 1946 after the end of

the war.48 Its proud heritage was displayed in the

pride shown by Detachment 2 personnel toward

the new designation.

When Combat Talon 64-0562 arrived from LAS

Ontario in late September after completion of

MOD-70, unit personnel had been identified to fly

the Category III flight tests. Majors John M. Con -

naughton and Harry L. Pannill had been selected

as the two pilots, and Majors John Gargus and

Rethel H. Jones were the two navigators. Gargus

was the primary instructor for the AN/APQ122(V)8 multimode radar, and Jones taught the

LN-15J inertial navigation system. All four flyers

had spent much of the previous summer on temporary duty to LAS Ontario learning the systems.

The first unit terrain-following flight on aircraft

64-0562 occurred on 8 November and was followed by numerous additional flights that tested

all phases of the new system. On 18 November

the first night terrain-following flight was flown.

On 22 December the second MOD-70 aircraft (64-

0561) was delivered to the 318th.49 By late De -

cember, three 318th crews had been trained on

the MOD-70 system.5 0

When the original 14 C-130E aircraft were

modified to the Combat Talon configuration in

1965, the designation given to the new unconventional warfare aircraft had been the C-130E(I),

which identified the aircraft as being Fultonintercept capable. When the aircraft were modified

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

68
under the MOD-70 program, the designation was

changed to C-130E(CT) to signify that they had

been modified to the Clamp configuration, which

was the name assigned to the suite of modifica -

tions done on the Fulton STARS aircraft. Aircraft

64-0571 and 64-0572 did not have the Fulton system installed because they were replacement aircraft for Vietnam combat losses during 1967. The

decision was made at the time that 12 Fultoncapable Combat Talons were sufficient to satisfy

worldwide requirements. Other than the Fulton

STARS, these two aircraft were Clamp configured

just as the other 12 Combat Talons and were also

given the new C-130E (CT) designation. Combat

Talons 64-0564 and 64-0565 had been transferred

to the Heavy Chain program in 1966 and received

their modifications under the Rivet Yard program.

Those two aircraft would be modified in 1970 under the MOD-70 program, but would remain Yard

configured along with 62-1843 and 63-7785. The

four Heavy Chain aircraft would be modified in

1973 under the Combat Talon program and be

designated C-130E(Y), which signified that they

were equipped with the Yank ECM suite of modifications. Yank aircraft would be assigned exclu -

sively to the Pacific area of responsibility and op -

erated by the Combat Spear unit there.

By the end of February 1972, MOD-70 instructors and students had flown more than 450 hours

in aircraft 64-0561 and 64-0562. The new radar

performed well during the test period, especially

considering the availability of spare parts and the

experience of maintenance personnel. The Texas

Instruments technical representative, Niel Staub,

along with dedicated Air Force maintenance tech -

nicians assigned to Detachment 4, were responsible for much of this early success. Through the

entire test period, the radar did not once perform

below designed system tolerances while in the

terrain-following mode. Pilots liked the new radar,

although numerous fail indications frequently interrupted low-level radar operations. In most

cases the left-seat pilot switched the mode-sele ctor

control rapidly between selected outputs (called

mode toggling) and usually cleared the malfunction indication. Another aircrew concern was that

the ground-mapping mode was severely degraded

during operations in poor weather. The effective

range of the KA band radar was reduced to

three to five miles when flying in visible precipitation. The most severe problem experienced by

the aircrew was illumination of the radar air-fail

light during high-level operations. Wh en climbing

to altitude, radar cooling was insufficient above

16,000 feet, thus rendering the radar inoper

tive above that point. High-altitude low-openin

drops were routinely made up to 25,000 fee

This deficiency was noted as unacceptable b

the test crew. 5 1

Throughout the test phase the LN-15J inerti

navigation system was the primary navigation

mode used by the crew. The aircraft seldo

strayed more than one-half NM off track. Whe

the Loran C and Doppler were used as the pr

mary navigational modes, their performances we 

closely monitored by the navigators to ensure a

curate system operation. Early flights determin

that the position of the aircraft remained with

one-fourth NM of the flight-plan track when int

grated navigation modes were utilized.52

The MOD-70 aircraft proved to be a major a

vancement in the capabilities of Combat Talo

Beginning in the fall of 1971, as aircraft we

modified by LAS Ontario, deficiencies found by t

318th test crew and squadron permanent-party i

structors were corrected by the contractor and i

corporated into the MOD-70 design. The secon

MOD-70 aircraft, 64-0561, was delivered to th

318th on 22 December 1971. At the close of th

year, the 318th had three permanent-party crew

trained in the MOD-70 weapons system and po

sessed three aircraft—MOD-70 aircraft 64-056

64-0562, and nonmodified aircraft 64-0571—wi

aircraft 64-0558 in MOD-70 upgrade at LAS O

tario.5 3 In summary, 1971 had been a watershe

year for Combat Knife. The unit that had begun 

a flight of the 779th TCS had grown to Detac

ment 2 of the 1st SOW, thence to a fully mann

special operations squadron—the 318th SOS.

1972: Combat Talon 64-0558

Is Lost Over South Carolina

As 1972 began MOD-70 testing was in fu

swing. The squadron was awarded the TAC Un

Achievement Award for accident-free operatio

during the period 17 January 1971–16 Janua

1972. The squadron also participated in Exerci

Gallant Hand 72 with one aircraft and crew. Th

mission aircraft launched out of Pope AFB for 

Special Forces A-Team airborne infiltration in

the Fort Hood, Texas, area. The air-dropped tea

conducted reconnaissance operations and pr

pared a landing site for a subsequent air-mobi

assault. The crew recovered at Canon AFB, Ne

Mexico, after the drop and flew a second missio

the next day. After departing Canon AFB the ai

crew flew a diversionary penetration into the Fo

Hood area with F-4C fighter interceptors schedule

COMBAT KNIF

69
to intercept the aircraft. The fighters were a noshow, but all other facets of the sortie were executed as planned. Other than not having suffi -

cient time for mission planning, the exercise

was deemed a success with the aircrew getting

realistic training while supporting US Army

Special Forces.5 4

The TAC ORI team visited the 318th from 3

to 6 April and administered an ORI to the

squadron. The rating given to the squadron by

the ORI team was an overall satisfactory. Col

Daniel J. Gibson, the ORI team chief, however,

stated that the 318th SOS had performed in an

excellent manner and that the ORI was one of

the best he had seen.55

As MOD-70 aircraft continued to come off the

line at LAS Ontario, aircraft were shuffled between the three operational squadrons. By the

end of June 1972, the 318th SOS had four aircraft assigned and three possessed—64-0558,

64-0559, 64-0568, and 64-0572 (at LAS Ontario

for modifications). 5 6 Throughout the period, the

squadron continued a heavy training load that

included Fulton STARS intercepts. During the

first three months of 1972 alone, the 318th performed 103 day and 126 night surface-to-air recoveries.5 7 With the large number of intercepts

accomplished, squadron personnel maintained a

high degree of proficiency in the system. Fulton

intercepts, utilizing a training dummy or a can -

vas sandbag, were routinely included in exercises in which the squadron participated. TAC

leadership did not feel that the risks associated

with a live surface-to-air recovery were justified

during training. The system was, however, fully

man-certified and capable of performing a live

pickup at any time. On 24 July the 318th dem -

onstrated the Fulton system to members of the

10th Special Forces Group at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, during the closing day of Exercise

Rocky Rival. During the period 21–22 August,

four Fulton STARS were flown in support of Exercise Cabot Sound VI at Union, South Carolina. Between 30 August and 5 September, the

squadron performed five surface-to-air recoveries

at the Canadian International Air Show,

Toronto, Canada. From 19 to 22 September, the

318th made two additional STARS intercepts at

the Eglin AFB Open House in Florida.5 8 Th e purpose of these demonstrations was to familiarize

potential customers with the Fulton capability

and to publicize special operations. (Funding was

tenuous for special operations as the Vietnam

War wound down, and public relations events

were deemed essential by TAC to spread the

word about SOF.)

During the month of October, the 318th deployed one aircraft and crew plus a support

package to RAF Sculthorpe, United Kingdom,

and participated in field training exercise (FTX)

Flintlock V. Flying in Europe was a new experience for most of the aircrew as they received

some of the most realistic training of the year.

November found squadron personnel deployed

to Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, to brief the staff of

the Alaskan Command on capabilities of the

Combat Talon . A Fulton STARS demonstration

was made during the visit. There were three

other exercises that the squadron participated

in during the fall, including Brave Shield III,

Gobi Springs VIII, and Brass Key I. 5 9 The fall

period was extremely busy with the squadron

committed to numerous JCS exercises after a

spring and summer that required much of the

unit’s effort be expended on training replace -

ment crews for SEA.

As the year ended tragedy struck the squadron.

On 5 December 1972, while on a continua tion

training mission near Conway, South Carolina,

Combat Talon 64-0558 collided with an F-102

aircraft assigned to the South Carolina Air Na -

tional Guard during airborne intercept training

maneuvers. The F-102 impacted the Talon in

the area of the right external fuel tank, result -

ing in the loss of both aircraft and all souls on

board.*60

The crash of Combat Talon 64-0558 marked

the loss of the third aircraft of the original 14

modified in 1965. The year 1973, however,

would prove to be the largest growth period for

Combat Talon since its inception even though

aircraft 64-0558 was not replaced by another

production aircraft. Project Heavy Chain ceased

operations in 1973, and the four aircraft assigned to that program were transferred to

Combat Talon. Aircraft assigned to Heavy

Chain and subsequently transferred to Combat

Talon included 62-1843 (originally 64-0506), 63-

7785 (originally 64-0507), and two of the original 14 Combat Talons that had been transferred

__________

 *The 318th SOS Combat Talon crew lost in the accident included Capt Douglas S. Peterson, pilot; Lt Col Donald E. Martin, instructor pilot; 2d

Lt Douglas L. Thierer, cadet pilot; Capt John R. Cole, navigator; Maj Keith L. Van Note, naviga tor; Capt Marshall J. Dickerson, EWO; Capt Louis

R. Sert, instructor EWO; SSgt Billy M. Warr, flight engineer; TSgt Claude L. Abbott, flight engineer; TSgt Robert E. Doyle, instructor flight

engineer; SSgt Gilmore A. Mikley Jr., radio operator; and A1C Gerald K. Faust, loadmaster.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

70
to Heavy Chain in 1966—64-0564 and 64-0565.*6 1

At the close of 1972, however, the 318th SOS possessed only two Combat Talons—64-0559 and 64-

0568.6 2

1973: HSLLADS Capability

Comes to Combat Talon

The New Year was a tough one for the 318th.

The loss of aircraft 64-0558 and its crew was a

severe blow to squadron morale. But there was

little time to reflect on the loss as taskings

mounted during the first three months of the

year. The squadron was assigned aircraft 64-

0562 to replace 64-0558 and had three possessed by the end of the quarter—64-0559, 64-

0562, and 64-0568.6 3 In addition to a heavy Air

Force training load, the schoolhouse produced

four pilots and two navigators for the 1115th

Marine Air Support Squadron, US Marine

Corps. The Marine crew was trained in all

phases of Combat Talon operations, except the

Fulton STARS capability. (The Air Force was

the sole military service operating the Fulton

system.) On 8 February one C-130E (CT) Combat Talon flew an employment training mission

in support of the US Navy SEAL special opera -

tions forces. The mission consisted of the airdrop of eight SEALs into a designated water

drop zone on Chesapeake Bay and marked the

first such support for the squadron. The event

opened a new chapter in joint-service operations

between the 318th and US Navy SEALs that

would become a permanent mission for Talon

crews worldwide .

64

Also in February 1973, the 318th adopted a

new squadron emblem in a ceremony at Pope

AFB. The new emblem was unveiled by the

squadron commander, Colonel Bagnani and the

squadron operations officer, Colonel Hellier. The

emblem was symbolic of the unit and the Air

Force, with ultramarine blue and golden yellow

used in the design. The primary feature of the

new emblem was a stylized bird prominently positioned in the center of the patch. The upper twothirds portion of the bird was black and the lower

one-third was white, signifying the proportion of

the flying mission spent during darkness and daylight. The lower white portion of the emblem depicted the general shape of a hook and represented the unit’s unique Skyhook aerial recovery

capability.65 The new emblem was an immediate

success and served the 318th until it moved 

Hurlburt Field, the following year. When the 8

SOS was established at Hurlburt Field and a

sorbed the 318th’s aircraft, personnel, and equi

ment, the emblem was incorrectly adopted by th

newly designated squadron. The emblem r

mained unchanged until the mid-1990s, when th

CSAF directed a review of all unit emblems. As 

result of the review, the 8th SOS (the second ol

est continuously active squadron in the Air Forc

was authorized to adopt a new emblem. The effo

resulted in an official patch that resembled th

original 318th Blackbird emblem.

The operation’s tempo remained very hig

through the spring of 1973. In June the 318th w

given its annual ORI, which was accompanied by 

management effectiveness inspection. From 6 to 

June all facets of operational readiness we

evaluated by the TAC inspector general and h

team. At the completion of the combined inspe

tion, the squadron was awarded an overall sati

factory rating.6 6

The most significant event for the 318th SO

for 1973 was the OT&E of the HSLLADS. Th

test began on 10 August 1973 and continued fo

the next two months, ending on 25 October. L

Col Irl L. Franklin, who had recently returne

from duty with the 7th SOS in Germany an

After squadron members submitted designs during 

contest to create a new unit patch, the winning entr

was unveiled during a squadron ceremony in Februar

1973.

USAF Photo

__________

 *Before MOD-70 aircraft 64-0564 and 64-0565 had the Skyhook radome removed and a standard C-130E round nose installed. Aircraft 64-05

was lost in the Philippines in 1981, and hydraulic plumbing and electrical wiring for the Fu lton recovery system were removed from aircr

64-0565 during MOD-90.

COMBAT KNIF

71
assigned to the USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center

at Eglin AFB, Florida, was the project director. The

318th project officer was Maj J. J. Clary. Project

loadmasters assigned to validate rigging and airdrop procedures for the new system were CMSgt

Jesse R. Goddard and TSgt Charles E. Glentz, both

assigned to the TAWC at Eglin AFB along with

Franklin. The HSLLADS test was conducted under

TAC Project Order 73A-079T. The remainder of the

aircrew and the test aircraft was sourced from the

318th SOS (see chap. 2 for test results).6 7

As the HSLLADS test continued at Eglin

AFB, the 318th continued its heavy exercise and

formal school schedule. From 10 to 23 August,

the squadron deployed one aircraft and support

personnel to Alaska to participate in Exercise

Ember Dawn V/Punch Bowl XIX. Squadron participation in the exercise was a follow-on to the

briefings and demonstrations given by unit personnel the previous November at Elmendorf

AFB. The primary objective of the deployment

was to provide initial orientation and training

for the Alaskan Command in the employment of

the Combat Talon weapons system. Before this

exercise the Alaskan Command had no experience with Combat Talon and had no knowledge

of the proper employment of the weapons system during a contingency. The aircraft actually

supported aggressor forces during the exercise,

but its tactical application in a combat scenario

was highlighted to the Alaskan Command staff.

The deployment was the first in an annual series to Alaska.68 One systemic problem identified during the Alaskan deployment was the

need for a ground-based radio station to support

aircraft operations. The Combat Talon had an

extensive radio package on board and a highly

trained airborne radio operator; yet, there was

no way to communicate back to the controlling

agency responsible for the mission. The aircraft

could communicate with air traffic control facilities and to personnel on the drop zone but not

back to its higher headquarters. In SEA Combat

Spear maintained a small ground-based radio

station at Nha Trang AB, but SOG was respon -

sible for providing communications links during

operational missions. Combat Spear aircraft

usually operated from its home base; therefore,

deployable communications equipment was

rarely required. The 7th SOS, on the other hand,

spent a large amount of its time deployed and was

the pioneer in developing a deployable aircr aft war

reserve spares kit (WRSK) and a communications

package for support while on the road. Because of

the Alaskan deployment, the 318th recommended

that TAC commission a study to determine the

feasibility of adding ground radio equipment to

the mobility package for the squadron.6 9

From 25 August to 23 September, the 318th

deployed an aircrew to Flintlock VI and flew

with the 7th SOS during the course of the exercise. As in the previous year, personnel were

challenged with realistic mission scenarios that

included the special operations mission plan -

ning process and a realistic near-wartime foot -

ing of participants.70 To help offset the many

flying requirements placed on the unit, on 27

August the 318th was assigned Combat Talon

64-0566 as a nonoperational training asset. The

aircraft had been stationed in the Pacific Com -

bat Spear unit after a brief stay with the 7th

SOS in Europe. The assignment of aircraft 64-

0566 increased the number of 318th Combat

Talons to four, with one committed to the

TAWC HSLLADS test through October.7 1

On 1 December 1973 Colonel Bagnani relin -

quished command of the 318th to Lt Col Peter

K. Nikonovich.7 2 Colonel Nikonovich would have

his hands full during 1974 with the move of his

squadron from Pope AFB to Hurlburt Field,

Florida. The HSLLADS test had been completed

in October, and actions were under way to

source materials needed to assemble the SEDS

and associated HSLLADS equipment. The

squadron was back to having four aircraft assigned, closing out the year with Combat Talons

64-0559, 64-0562, 64-0566, and 64-0568. The

year 1973 had been a good one for the Popebased Combat Knife unit after the loss of aircraft 64-0558 the previous year.

USAF Photo

Combat Talon aircraft on the Hurlburt Field ramp,

circa 1973. Note the black and green camouflage paint

that masks the aircraft identification numbers.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

72
1974: The 8th SOS Is

Established in Florida

January saw a continuation of 318th support to

the SEALs, which had begun the previous year.

FTX Snatch Block 74 was scheduled from 15

January to 15 February and consisted of three

missions flown out of Pope AFB. The mission profile included on loading SEAL team platoons out

of Langley AFB, Virginia, and air-dropping them

into the Atlantic Ocean south of Moorehead City,

North Carolina. The missions were plagued with

delays due to severe weather and high seas off the

eastern coast, and only one of the three scheduled

missions went as planned. The one successful

mission marked the first time a Combat Knife 

crew air-dropped a SEAL team into the open

ocean followed by a team linkup with a US Navy

support ship.73 The exercise was similar to one

accomplished by the 7th SOS off the coast of

Greece the previous year.

The 318th participated in a second Alaskan

Command exercise from 14 to 27 February

named Ace Card VII/ Punch Card XX. One Combat Talon and crew, along with 24 support personnel, departed Pope AFB on 14 February and

flew to McChord AFB, Washington, by way of

Dyess AFB, Texas. After a minimum crew rest

period at McChord AFB, the aircraft continued

on to Eielson AFB, Alaska, where it remained

for the exercise. Ace Card exercises were con -

ducted during the coldest part of the winter to

test participants’ ability to operate in severe

cold weather. Twenty-one Air Force units, three

Army units, and one SEAL team participated

along with Canadian and Norwegian forces. The

Combat Talon flew resupply, Fulton STARS,

and infiltration/exfiltration missions. The tem -

perature was cold, with the average tempera -

ture during the deployment at –30 degrees

Fahrenheit and with lows often dipping to –65

degrees. After flying 14 employment sorties, in -

cluding two Fulton recoveries, personnel returned to Pope AFB on 27 February. The crew

made a refueling stop at K. I. Sawyer AFB,

Michigan, during the return trip.7 4 In the after

action report to TAC, Nikonovich again reiterated the need for a ground-based radio station.

He envisioned an HF secure net that was com -

patible with other systems deployed worldwide.

Nikonovich noted that Combat Spear in the Pacific and Combat Arrow in Europe already had

the capability. 7 5

As mentioned earlier, the personnel and equip -

ment of the 318th SOS relocated to Hurlburt

Field during the first half of 1974 and were a

signed to the 8th SOS. As part of the relocatio

process, the squadron was renamed the 8

SOS. Nikonovich and his staff worked tireless

to make the move a smooth one. On 1 Marc

1974 the 8th SOS (which was in a caretak

status) was officially reassigned from Thi

teenth Air Force, Clark AB, Philippines, to th

1st SOW at Hurlburt Field, Florida, by Hea

quarters TAC Special Order GA-2, dated 2

January 1974 and amended by TAC Special O

der GA-6, dated 8 March 1974. The unit w

moved without equipment or personnel in a

cordance with PACAF Movement Order 2, date

15 February 1974.76

While preparing for its move, the 318th accom

plished another first when it deployed a cre

(sans aircraft) to the Pacific on 8 March to partic

pate in Foal Eagle 74 in Korea. From 14 to 2

March the 318th crew flew six exercise missio

and logged 17.9 hours in Combat Spear aircraft. 

significant achievement for the 318th crew was i

checkout in the Combat Spear aircraft, which w

equipped with the more powerful Dash-15 e

gines.77 All four Combat Spear aircraft, equippe

with the larger engines and having no Fulto

STARS capability, had been transferred from Pr

ject Heavy Chain to the 1st SOS the previous fal

Through the transfer, the 318th received aircra

64-0567. The squadron was manned and equippe

for only four operational aircraft, with Comb

Talon 64-0566 remaining assigned to the 318th 

a nonoperational fifth asset.

As April arrived preparations accelerated fo

the pending move to Florida. On 15 April a

advance party from the 318th moved from Pop

AFB to Hurlburt Field. The advance party w

tasked with making preparations for the unit

move, which was to be completed by the end o

June. On 8 May the first 318th load of nonm

bility cargo was moved to Hurlburt Field, fo

lowed by a second load on 15 May. On 20 M

one-half of the assigned squadron personn

moved to Hurlburt Field. From 22 to 29 M

two additional loads of nonmobility cargo we

moved. On 31 May, three of the 318th’s Comb

Talons were loaded at Pope AFB for an ear

morning departure to Florida the next day. On 

June 1974 the three 318th aircraft flew 

Hurlburt Field, where the squadron was off

cially inactivated. The aircraft and personn

became part of the 8th SOS on that date. On 

June the two remaining Combat Talons still 

Pope AFB flew five loads to Hurlburt Fiel

COMBAT KNIF

73
making multiple sorties to accomplish the task in

one day. On 4 and 5 June three TAC C-130 aircraft moved multiple loads from Pope AFB to

Hurlburt Field, and on 6 June the last load was

moved by a unit-assigned Combat Talon . The unit

move was officially complete with the 318th SOS

deactivated and the 8th SOS operational as part

of the 1st SOW.7 8 The five aircraft transferred and

assigned to the 8th SOS in June of 1974 were

64-0559, 64-0562, 64-0566, 64-0567, and 64-0568.

The squadron would operate its Combat Talons

out of Hurlburt Field for the next 25 years. In

addition to fulfilling its operational commitments

in the Pacific, Europe, and South America, the 8th

SOS would staff the formal Combat Talon School

as had its predecessor at Pope. Many victories,

and some failures, would be realized by the squadron. In the summer of 1974, however, as everyone

settled into assigned facilities at Hurlburt Field,

life was good in the Florida Panhandle.

Notes

1. History, 464th TAC, 1 January–30 June 1966, USAF

HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 24–25.

2. Ibid., 25.

3. Technical Report, List of Persons Picked Up by the Fulton Skyhook Aerial Recovery System , Robert Fulton personal

file number 11AA, Newtown, Conn.

4. History, 464th TAC, 1 July–31 December 1966, 26.

5. Ibid., 22.

6. History, 464th TAC, 1 January–30 June 1967, document

11.

7. History, 464th TAC, 1 July–31 December 1967, attach. C.

8. AFTO Form 95, aircraft 64-0571 record, Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

9. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–31

December 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 1, sup -

porting document 14.

10. Ibid., 1.

11. Ibid., 2–3.

12. Ibid., 10–11.

13. Ibid., 11.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 6.

16. “Plane Makes Emergency Landing Here,” Hickory

Daily Record, 17 January 1969, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

17. John R. Lewis to Walt Sonksen, letter, subject: Trip

Report to Pope AFB, N.C., 5 February 1969, Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

18. History, Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing

(TAC), 1 January–30 June 1969, 16th Special Operations

Wing historian files, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 9.

19. Ibid., document 1, 1–2.

20. Ibid., 2–3.

21. Ibid., 11.

22. Ibid., 2.

23. History, Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing

(TAC), 1 July–31 December 1969, 3.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 4.

26. Ibid., 18.

27. Ibid.

28. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1970, 63.

29. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–30

June 1970, 67.

30. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1970, 65.

31. Ibid., 66.

32. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–30

June 1970, pt. 2, chap. 5, 5.

33. Ibid., pt. 2, chap. 4, 5.

34. Ibid., pt. 2, chap. 6, 8.

35. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–30

September 1970, 58.

36. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1970, 42.

37. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1971, vol. 2, 7.

38. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–30

June 1971, vol. 1, 42.

39. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–30

September 1971, vol. 1, 38.

40. Ibid., vol. 2, attach. 2, 1.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 2.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1971, vol. 2, supporting document 17.

47. Ibid., supporting document 16, 7.

48. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1972, vol. 1, 63.

49. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1971, vol. 2, supporting document 16, 7.

50. John Gargus, “Summary of 318th SOS’s Experiences

with the MOD-70 Aircraft,” Combat Talon Archive, HQ AF -

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1971, vol. 2, supporting document 16, 3, 7.

54. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 Janu -

ary–31 March 1972, vol. 1.

55. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–30

June 1972, vol. 1, 65.

56. Ibid., vol. 2, supporting document 17, 3.

57. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1972, vol. 1, 66.

58. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–30

September 1972, vol. 1, supporting document 48, xviii–xx.

59. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1972, vol. 2, supporting document 47, 7.

60. Ibid., vol. 1, 30.

61. John R. Lewis, “Program Family Tree,” Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

62. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 October–

31 December 1972, vol. 2, supporting document 47, 3.

63. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 January–

31 March 1973, vol. 2, attach. 1, 2.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

74
64. Ibid., vol. 1, 29.

65. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–30

June 1973, vol. 1, 42.

66. Ibid., vol. 2, supporting document 48.

67. Technical Report, High-Speed Low-Level Aerial Delivery

System (HSLLADS) OT&E Final Report, March 1974, prepared

by Irl L. Franklin, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., iii.

68. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–30

September 1973, vol. 1, 46.

69. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–30

September 1973, vol. 2, supporting document 16, 2.

70. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 July–

September 1973, vol. 1, xvi.

71. Ibid., 45.

72. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 Octobe

31 December 1973, vol. 1, 40.

73. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 Januar

31 March 1974, supporting document 18, 1.

74. Ibid., 25–26.

75. Ibid., supporting document 14.

76. Ibid., 8.

77. Ibid., 27.

78. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (TAC), 1 April–

June 1974, supporting document 35, 16.

COMBAT KNIF

75
Chapter 4

Combat Spear

(The Vietnam War Years: 1966–74)

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon behind them

 Volleyed and thundered;

Stormed at with shot and shell,

While horse and hero fell,

They that had fought so well

Came through the jaws of Death,

Back from the mouth of Hell,

All that was left of them,

 Left of six hundred.

—Alfred Lord Tennyson 

The Charge of the Light Brigade 

Stray Goose Deploys to Vietnam

By the summer of 1966, four aircraft and six

aircrews, along with associated maintenance and

support personnel, were ready for deployment to

SEA under the code name Combat Spear (Pacificbased, PACOM-assigned). Remaining Combat Talons were designated Combat Arrow (Europeanbased European command [EUCOM]-assigned)

and Combat Knife (US-based, TAC-assigned).

Special Order G-225, dated 22 July 1966, established Detachment 1, Headquarters 314th Troop

Carrier Wing, at Ching Chang Kuang AB, Taiwan,

effective 1 September 1966. Aircraft and crews arrived at CCK on 12 September 1966 and began

operations.

1

The final beddown location of Detachment 1

was Nha Trang AB, Republic of Vietnam, but due

to nonavailability of facilities there in Septemb

1966, further forward deployment of the unit w

delayed. The 14th Air Commando Wing (later th

14th Special Operations Wing) was located 

Nha Trang AB and served as the host wing fo

the deployed Combat Talon aircraft. The win

had neither ramp space for the aircraft nor bille

ing space for personnel due to other program

tentatively scheduled for the base. The origin

deployment schedule called for two aircraft an

associated support personnel to be in place at Nh

Trang AB by 15 September; however, only a sma

number of personnel were at Nha Trang AB b

that date. 2 Throughout the fall of 1966, Seven

Col Don Britton, first commander of Stray Goose De -

tachment 1, 314th TCW, in the cockpit of a Combat

Spear aircraft.

Photo courtesy of Gerald R. Paulsen

Photo courtesy of Gerald R. Paulsen

When Combat Spear deployed to Nha Trang AB in t

fall of 1966, there were no aircraft revetments on t

ramp to protect the aircraft. A year later, one aircra

would be lost and another seriously damaged during 

mortar attack on the base. SSgt Gerald R. Paulsen is 

front of a Combat Talon, Nha Trang AB, 1966.

77
AF, the numbered air force designated to provide

support to the Combat Spear unit, prioritized basing options at Nha Trang AB, and by the end of

the year, Detachment 1, 314th TCW was settled

and in full operation.

The chain of command was not explained to

squadron members until after they arrived intheater. In fact, com mand lines were never for -

mally laid out for all squadron members, but senior

leadership in the unit was briefed. Operational con -

trol of the unit was exercised by Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation

Group (MACVSOG, or more commonly shortened to

SOG), located in Saigon. Administrative command

(ADCOM) was originally exercised through the

314th TCW to Seventh AF, but by 1967 it had been

transferred from the 314th to the 14th Air Com -

mando Wing (ACW). PACAF was the Major Com -

mand (MAJCOM) to which Seventh AF reported,

and PACOM was the Unified Command responsible for the Pacific theater. OPCON of the Combat

Talons meant that Studies and Observation Group

(a joint headquarters commanded by a US Army

colonel) had mission-tasking authority over the

unit, but all support requirements were the respon -

sibility of Seventh AF. From the beginning distrust

and misunderstandings arose between Seventh AF

and SOG over who “owned” the Talons. The flying

unit was often at odds with both headquarters. The

basic concern of Seventh AF was the proper utilization (as defined by Seventh AF) of critical Air Force

assets. It was not until the summer of 1969 that the

issue came to the forefront. From 1966 until the

stand-down of SOG in 1972, however, the Combat

Talons operated under less-than-ideal conditions

due to this misunderstood chain of command.

When the unit moved to Nha Trang AB from

CCK in the fall of 1966, commanding officers were

allowed to live downtown in government-funded

USAF Photo

From the time of its initial deployment to SEA in 1966

until it relocated to Kadena AB, Okinawa, in 1972, Com -

bat Spear operated under operational control of SOG.

Combat Talon and Heavy Hook provided fixed-wing

support, while the 20th SOS provided rotary-wing lift.

Pictured is the official patch of MACVSOG.

Photo courtesy of Harold E. Tuttle

The Anh Hoa Hotel was leased by Stray Goose-assigned

officers in downtown Nha Trang City and served as the

unit’s bachelor officers quarters (BOQ) until September

1969.

Photo courtesy of George Powell

Exterior view of the enlisted quarters on Nha Trang AB.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

78
quarters and were provided their own transporta -

tion. Colonel Britton was authorized a 1958

Chevrolet four-door sedan. Stray Goose officers

were also allowed to live downtown at their own

expense and were provided an open-air World

War II-era command pickup, which became the

responsibility of the copilot of crew SG-01. The

Anh Hoa Hotel, located in downtown Nha Trang

City, was leased by the Stray Goose officers and

became an unofficial bachelor officer’s quarters.

With heavy maintenance done at CCK, personnel

were frequently given the opportunity to travel

back and forth and acquire items in short supply

in Vietnam, including soap, fans, bicycles, motorcycles, and water heaters. Additional duties were

assigned at the Anh Hoa Hotel to keep it running

smoothly—mess officer, club manager, and hotel

manager were key duties that required many

hours of additional commitment. Within six

months the facility was the envy of everyone and

was the only one of its type in SEA. Enlisted personnel were required to live in the barracks on

Nha Trang AB, but they too set about improving

their quarters, as did the officers.3

With its own transportation assigned, Detach -

ment 1 personnel handled their transportation

needs internally both on and off base. As a result,

the unit was able to isolate itself from the rest of

the base population, which was important due to

the sensitive nature of its SOG mission. Although

the host wing performed some maintenance functions, heavy maintenance was done in Taiwan.

Approximately every six weeks, an aircrew would

take a Talon to CCK and remain there for three to

four days while the scheduled maintenance was

being accomplished.4

Two major problems associated with Detach -

ment 1 during this period were training deficiencies for the aircrews and lack of test equipment

and spare parts for unique electronic gear on the

aircraft. Accelerated training was performed during November and December in Taiwan and in

the Philippines to correct training deficiencies.

(It took most of September and all of October for

the unit to set up routes and begin quality lowlevel training.) Electronic equipment repair con -

tinued to be a problem during the early Talon

deployment to SEA because of the long lead time

from the supplier to the field and because of limited

spares. 5

During a pilot proficiency sortie flown out of

CCK on 24 September 1966, aircraft 64-0561 experienced a potentially catastrophic main landinggear malfunction. Maj Albert P. Blosch was giving

Capt Samuel R. Rose an instructor up grade rid

when the malfunction occurred. The crew ha

completed 36 touch-and-go landings when th

control tower called advising them that the le

main landing gear was hanging below the ai

craft. A similar malfunction on a slick C-130 ha

resulted in aircraft destruction and loss of th

crew while landing at Ton Son Nut AB in Vie

nam. Recognizing the severity of the situatio

Blosch requested foam be laid down on the ru

way. Due to a previous C-130 crash at Ton So

Nut, the aircraft was diverted to Kadena AB, J

pan, where foam was available, and the politic

repercussions of an aircraft crash was less than 

Taiwan. It was 1600 local time when the malfun

tion occurred at CCK; therefore, a night landin

at Kadena AB was required. Blosch was a high

experienced C-130 aircraft commander, havin

logged more than 2,000 flying hours in the C-13

aircraft and 1,500 hours in civilian crop-duste

sprayer-type airplanes. He had also completed 

previous combat tour in Vietnam before being a

signed to Combat Talon . He was the right man 

have at the controls of the Combat Talon durin

the emergency.

Blosch requested 5,000 feet of foam be laid o

the diagonal runway at Kadena AB. The flyin

safety officer at Kadena AB demanded that fo

security reasons all airfield lights be extinguishe

until after the emergency. There were thunde

storms moving into the Kadena AB area, thus a

lowing time for only 4,500 feet of foam to be lai

With the airfield in total darkness, the Comb

Talon crew had to locate the approach end of th

runway by utilizing the lights of a “follow-m

jeep that was positioned with its headlights at th

beginning of the runway. Blosch shot the a

proach so that the predominant crosswind cam

USAF Photo

Aircraft 64-0561 with left main landing gear hangi

from the aircraft. The aircraft was flown from CCK A

Taiwan, to Kadena AB, Japan, where Lt Col Albert 

Blosch made a perfect landing on the foamed runway.

COMBAT SPEA

79
from the aircraft’s right, thus requiring a rightwing low approach. With the right-wing low approach compensating for the crosswind, the left

main gear was held off the runway until the last

moment as the airspeed decreased. Once on the

runway, Blosch used inboard differential power

and nose-wheel steering to maintain aircraft con -

trol, and he directed shutdown of the outboard

engines as the aircraft slowed to prevent contact

of the number one propeller with the runway if

the aircraft settled on its left side. As the aircraft

slowed, the left main gear seated itself under the

fuselage of the aircraft, and the aircraft came to a

stop in a wings-level position. The landing used

every foot of available foam, with the nose gear

ending up on the runway and the main gear resting in the foam. The aircraft suffered only minor

damage requiring minimal costs to repair. After a

wash job and on-scene repairs, the Talon was

flown back to CCK. Due to security considera -

tions, Colonel Britton determined that he could

not submit the crew for any formal recognition,

and the landing itself was recorded as a normal

landing. Maintenance did determine the cause of

the malfunction, and action was taken to rectify

the problem fleetwide.6

As Detachment 1 refined its war-fighting skills

in Taiwan and in the Philippines, SOG air opera -

tions continued to expand. First Flight Detach -

ment, also located at Nha Trang AB with its C-123

Heavy Hook aircraft, flew infiltration and resupply missions into North Vietnam. With combat

missions over North Vietnam being flown by 1st

Flight, the immediate concern of SOG planners

when Combat Talon arrived in country was the

tremendous logistics backlog of SOG equipment

throughout Vietnam. The greater load carrying

capability of the C-130 aircraft made it the aircraft of choice over the C-123 to reduce this back -

log. An SOG officer related the situation in the

following interview:

There was a tremendous backlog of logistic supplies to

be moved. Most of the cargo could be airlifted by 7AF

outfits. However, because of the classification of some of

the cargo, it was very difficult to have the [logistics]

people at that point in time to make a complete switch

into the 7AF system. As a result, MACSOG hauled tre -

mendous tonnage with MACSOG available aircraft. . . .

(After) the C-130s arrived and helped reduce the back -

log, we were able to identify cargo that was to be handled strictly by 7AF. However, all special cargo contin -

ued to be handled with C-123 and C-130 SOG aircraft

(and a civilian C-45 and C-47 on contract).7

The first logistics support mission was flown in

support of Shining Brass by Combat Talon a ircraft

of Detachment 1 on 20 October 1966; the first

PSYOPS leaflet-drop mission was flown on 3 November; and the first OPLAN 34A resupply and

agent delivery mission was flown on Christmas

Day 1966.8 (Project Shining Brass was the forerunner of Project Fire, which involved the infiltra -

tion and resupply of a specially recruited force of

Nungs into Laos.) The UW-modified C-123 aircraft of 1st Flight was the primary workhorse for

SOG air operations during 1966, although Combat Talon and high-performance aircraft, such as

the F-4 and the A-1, were used to support both

airborne and psychological operations. Heavy

Hook aircraft, along with the contract C-45 and

C-47, transported 4,891,228 pounds of cargo and

13,893 passengers during the year.9

Because of the security classification of each

mission, Talon aircrews knew little information

outside the mission itself. A typical in-country

mission was flown in support of SOG moving

Photo courtesy of Richard H. Sell

Combat Spear and Heavy Hook aircraft moved SOG

supplies throughout South Vietnam supporting joint re -

quirements. Here, aircraft 64-0561 unloads supplies at

Hue-Phu Bai.

Photo courtesy of Obie Hill

Combat Spear aircraft delivering supplies destined for

the Central Highlands, Ban Me Thuot AB, Vietnam.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

80
Leaflets courtesy of M. O. Becnel

Leaflets were produced by US Army PSYOPS personnel and were provided to Combat Spear crews for delive

into North Vietnam. These leaflets were dropped during the 1966–67 period.

COMBAT SPEA

81
cargo and personnel from one location to another.

Cargo was manifested by code word, and crew

members did not always know what they were

airlifting. Emphasis was placed on proper cargo

manifesting, including weights and cubes. Most

Special Forces camps that Combat Talon supported were serviced by austere dirt strips, thus

demanding a high degree of proficiency by the aircrew for short-field landings.1 0

The 11-man Combat Talon crew formed the

baseline for crew manning for tasked missions.

Crew members would be added or deleted, depending on the mission being flown. For in-cou ntry

logistics support missions, usually two pilots and

one navigator would fly, along with one flight engineer, the radio operator, and two loadmasters,

for a total of seven. For PSYOPS/leaflet-drop

combat missions, additional Army or Air Force

personnel would sometimes fly as kickers (in WW

II they were called dispatchers) and would assist

in deploying leaflets from the ramp of the aircraft. A crew could expect to fly just over 400

hours during a 12-month tour in SE A.

11

All cross-border missions flown in Laos, North

Vietnam, or the southwestern portion of South Vietnam were flown radio silent except for HF radio.

The crew monitored a pre-established HF signal

and would abort the mission at the direction of

the controlling agency. The crew also would transmit short preplanned Morse code messages at

critical phases of flight (i.e., penetration of hostile

airspace, completion of airdrop, mission abort, inflight emergency, etc.).1 2

A typical PSYOPS combat mission entailed

dropping leaflets from an altitude of 18,000 to

30,000 feet. A Combat Talon aircraft would

penetrate North Vietnam by way of low-altitude,

terrain-following flight, at approximately 1,000

feet AGL. At a precomputed point on the low-level

route, the aircrew would accelerate to maximum

indicated airspeed with throttles at full power.

The pilot would then raise the nose of the aircraft and perform a maximum effort climb to

drop altitude. The aircraft would climb to the

computed drop altitude or until the predeparture, computed wind vector was reached, which -

ever came first. The computed wind vector was

sometimes found at an altitude below tha t planned

for the drop. Wind vector was more important to

a successful leaflet drop than the altitude from

which the leaflet left the aircraft because drift

of the leaflet determined where it would reach

the ground. Once the drop was complete, the

aircraft descended swiftly back into low-level

terrain-following flight to minimize exposure to

enemy threats. If a threat were encountered during the pop-up maneuver that had the potential to

destroy the aircraft, the aircrew would execute an

escape maneuver. The escape maneuver was performed by reducing power to flight idle on all four

engines, retracting the flaps, closing the ramp

and door if open, lowering the nose, and banking

up to 60 degrees left or right. Maximum descent

would occur at approximately 320 KIAS when descending from 20,000 feet. The critical part of the

maximum effort descent was keeping the aircraft’s relative position established with the

ground. The navigator determined where the

air craft was positioned in relation to the terrain

beneath the aircraft, and the pilot flying the aircraft

would maneuver left and right up to the 60 degree

limit of bank to break radar lock during the descent. The aircraft would descend to emergency

safe altitude and, once cleared by the navigator,

would descend further to minimum safe altitude

(MSA), where the aircraft would then pick up its

low-level route and descend to 1,000-feet terrainfollowing altitude on the preplanned escape

route. 13

Combat Spear versus

Heavy Hook Capabilities

The C-123 was a proven combat veteran by

1965, whereas the C-130E was the newest transport aircraft in the Air Force inventory. There had

never been a comparison of the two aircraft with

emphasis on their UW capabilities. In 1965

MACV commissioned a comparative analysis of

the two weapons systems in a study titled the

“C-130E Sky Hook Study.”

Photo courtesy of Richard H. Sell

Combat Spear C-130s were ideally suited for hauling

large, heavy loads. A huge load of ammunition is offloaded from aircraft 64-0561 at Hue-Phu Bai in 1967.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

82
The study cited the following advantages of the

Combat Talon C-130 over the Heavy Hook C-123:

1. Of the two aircraft, only the C-130 aircraft had the

growth potential to meet future payload require -

ments. Using the 463L aerial delivery system

(ADS), it could deliver three 12-foot platforms of

8,000 pounds each as opposed to approximately one

for the C-123 .

2. The C-130’s higher altitude envelope considerably

increased the psyop delivery capability. The longer

periods of drift of psyops material permitted drop

points in relatively undefended areas for targets in

heavily defended areas, which were inaccessible to

C-123 aircraft.

3. The C-130 was capable of significantly higher

speed, decreasing the exposure time in hostile territory.

4. The C-130’s radar and terrain avoidance equipment

enabled a contour low-level profile rather than

merely a low altitude mission capability. It could be

operated in valleys out of line of sight of early warning (EW) radar and fire control systems. The C-130

had the capacity for expansion of ECM equipment

to cope with the improving air defenses in North

Vietnam. The C-123 had exhausted its stretch-out

capability due to limited payload capacity. 1 4

The Combat Talon’s improved load capacity

also enhanced combat missions over North Viet -

nam by eliminating the need to stage or refuel at

Thai bases, as was the case for the C-123. Furthermore, several PSYOPS leaflet drops could be

accomplished on one C-130 sortie, thus eliminating the need for multiple aircraft sorties to service the same target area. The Combat Talon

could dispense approximately five million leaflets

on one mission, whereas Heavy Hook could dis -

pense only one-half that amount.15

Although a distinction of capabilities was made

to justify acquisition of the C-130, the difference

of capabilities between the C-123 and the C-130

was not normally a primary consideration in the

selection of an aircraft to support a particular

mission. An equitable allocation of flying hours to

both the Combat Spear and Heavy Hook units by

SOG, along with user preference, was more common criteria that determined aircraft selection.

After the development of HALO insertion methods in 1967, however, the higher-altitude capabilities of the Combat Talon became a valid consid -

eration in the selection of an aircraft to support a

HALO mission.1 6

Heavy Hook and Combat Talon aircraft performed three principal types of missions: insertion

and resupply/reinforcement of agent teams, delivery of PSYOPS mat erial, and logistics airlift. To a

lesser degree, these aircraft were also flown in

support of aircrew proficiency and reconnaissance

team training.1 7

Air Operations—1966

As 1966 came to a close, Combat Talon ha

settled into its Nha Trang AB facilities. The co

centrated training program continued througho

the fall, and coupled with experience gained 

tactical airlift of SOG assets, the new crews se

soned quickly. There were three team insertio

and 28 reinforcement and resupply missio

flown by the two weapons systems. Helicopter

high-performance aircraft, and the Combat Talo

enhanced SOG’s resupply capability, but a

evaluation of the success of aerial delivery at th

end of 1966 resulted in the development of ne

airborne concepts.1 8

As the air war over North Vietnam and SE

escalated throughout 1966, increasing numbers 

Americans were falling into the hands of enem

forces or were being listed as missing in actio

(MIA). To assist in the recovery of these personn

MACVJ-5, in coordination with Thirteenth A

was tasked to establish an organization dedicate

to the recovery of these downed personnel. Su

sequently, on 17 September 1966, commander, U

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMU

MACV) officially activated the Joint Personnel R

covery Center (JPRC) under the command of C

Harry “Heinie” Aderholt. The JPRC was al

known as the recovery studies element and w

placed within the SOG organizational structure.1

With the Fulton STARS modification, th

Combat Talon became the most capable aircra

in SEA designed specifically for the JPRC mi

sion. Although STARS saw limited operation

employment during 1966 and subsequent year

it allowed Talon crews to become proficient 

recovery operations. The capability allowed SO

to penetrate deep into North Vietnam well b

yond the range of helicopters and to extra

downed crew members. To maintain crew prof

ciency in this highly specialized capability, dem

onstration recoveries were made througho

South Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailan

Although actual combat recoveries were planne

available records indicate that the system nev

was used in actual combat.20

1967: Year of Living Dangerously

As 1967 began, Combat Talon had matured to 

point whereby its aircrew could perform the fu

array of demanding missions tasked by SOG

Growing pains had been intense at Nha Tran

AB, but with excellent billeting and good aircra

facilities, little stood in the way of a successf

COMBAT SPEA

83
year. By the close of 1967, however, Detachment 1

would have lost two of its four assigned Combat

Talons, and 11 crew members would disappear

over North Vietnam, not to be heard from for the

next 25 years.

The First Combat Talon Resupply

Mission into North Vietnam*

The first resupply mission flown in a C-130 aircraft over North Vietnam was tasked to Detach -

ment 1, 314th TCW, for the night of 16 January

1967. Using the established unit rotation schedule

for combat missions, crew SG-5, under the command of Maj Howard Reeve, was tasked to plan

and fly the mission. An SOG OPLAN 34A road

watch team had been inserted into North Vietnam

four months earlier, and the team was running

low on food and supplies. The team had been

monitoring North Vietnamese forces moving down

the Ho Chi Minh Trail towards South Vietnam.

After receiving its initial mission briefing, the

crew began its mission planning by plotting allknown enemy threats along its ingress route. The

low-level route was planned at 500 feet above the

ground, with the drop itself set for 1,200 feet. The

crew utilized the Doppler radar to provide course

and ground speed and the Loran C for navigation.

There was only one Loran C station in SEA in

early 1967, and there were no means to get a

cross-fix to determine the aircraft’s exact location.

Consequently, the crew relied heavily on map

reading to maintain orientation with known landmarks on the ground.

To identify prominent terrain features, the

crew was limited to a minimum of 50 percent

moon illumination and 10 to 15 miles flight visibility. The weather forecast predicted marginal

visibility for the primary mission night. Being the

dry season, farmers across SEA were burning

their fields, and the smoke remained suspended

in the atmosphere without sufficient air currents

to dissipate it. Other than the marginal en route

visibility, everything else looked good for the mission. Knowing that they would have to rely almost exclusively on the Doppler radar to maintain

course, the crew made the decision to fly the mission as planned on 16 January due to the need to

resupply the team on the ground.

The drop zone was located 90 miles southwest

of Hanoi, surrounded by dense jungles and situated behind a low ridgeline. The crew was given a

time over target (TOT) of 0100 local, with a drop

signal consisting of five lighted flare pots arranged in a cross. The drop zone would be lighted

30 seconds either side of the TOT.

For the mission the crew planned to depart

Nha Trang AB (fig. 25) and climb to its en route

altitude. The aircraft would fly north along the

coast to Da Nang AB, then turn due west and fly

over Laos until reaching Udorn Royal Thai Air

Force Base (RTAFB), Thailand. At Udorn RTAFB

the aircraft would fly an instrument approach to

the airfield and then enter low level after executing a low approach. The Combat Talon would proceed north into Laos and continue low level until

reaching the drop zone. The return leg basically

retraced the route of flight back to Nha Trang AB.

On the night of 16 January, the crew launched

in aircraft 64-0563 and flew the first half of the

inbound route as planned. Visibility was marginal

at best (just as forecasters had predicted), thus

requiring the crew to rely on its Doppler radar as

the primary means to maintain course. About halfway through the first half of the mission, the Dop -

pler radar failed. Without a means to maintain

course, the crew had no choice but to abort the

mission. A disappointed crew reversed course and

returned to Nha Trang AB. SOG subsequently

slipped the mission 24 hours, and the crew entered

crew rest for the mission the following night.

The night of 17 January 1967 was clear, with

15 miles of visibility and a bright moon. A weak

cool front had moved through the area during the

day and had cleared the smoke from the air. All

systems on Combat Talon 64-0563 were working

perfectly as the crew entered low level at Udorn

RTAFB. As the crew flew across the Plain of Jars

in northern Laos at 500-feet altitude, there were

numerous AAA bursts above their altitude. Enemy

forces on the ground were firing at the sound of

the Combat Talon as the aircraft passed near their

positions, but the gunners could not see the

blacked-out aircraft in time to get an accurate shot.

Two minutes before the drop, the crew slowed to

115 knots, opened the rear cargo ramp and door,

and pre pared the five-bundle load for airdrop.**

__________

 *The following account was extracted from an unpublished article titled “STRAY GOOSE: Memoirs of a C-130 Special Operations Pilot,” dated

22 April 1999. The author of the article, Richard H. Sell, was one of the pilots assigned to cr ew SG-5. He also flew onboard the Combat Talon for the

mission.

 **A slowdown below 150 knots was required since the HSLLADS had not been developed at that time. Enemy response to the airdrop indicated

that Hanoi could track the aircraft when it climbed to 1,200 feet and slowed to drop speed. Had the HSLLADS been available, the Combat Talon

could have remained at 500 feet and dropped its resupply load at 250 knots, thus eliminating th e dangerous exposure of the aircraft and crew to

enemy fire.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

84
One m inute out, the aircraft climbed to 1,200-feet

altitude and stabilized on its preplanned run-in

heading. At about 30 seconds from their TOT, the

front-end crew acquired the lighted cross, and Ma -

jor Reeve maneuvered the aircraft to properly

align it with the marking. At green light, the load

exited the aircraft and impacted the drop zone

within 15 seconds of the planned TOT.

With the load clear, the left navigator called red

light, and the aircraft began a left descending turn

to reverse course and to escape the area. While

still descending and closing the ramp and door, th

sky lit up with tracers and AAA bursts from 2

and 37 mm shells. After several seconds of chin

ing and dodging, the aircraft was safely egressin

the area at 500 feet above the ground and heade

to Nha Trang AB. After landing, the aircraft w

inspected and no damage was found. The pos

mission report from the team on the ground ind

cated that four of the five bundles landed in th

middle of the drop zone, with the fifth bund

landing 100 meters to the left of centerline.

Figure 25. First Resupply Mission into North Vietnam, 17 January 1967 (Source: Map

provided by Richard H. Sell, Miami, Fla.)

COMBAT SPEA

85
Several days after the mission, the crew received a personal letter of congratulations from

Gen William Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, commending them for their outstanding accomplishment. For the mission, the entire crew (six officers

and five enlisted) of Stray Goose-5 was awarded

the Distinguished Flying Cross by Special Order

G-1467, dated 21 September 1967. The crew that

flew the first Combat Talon resupply drop into

North Vietnam on 17 January 1967 included Maj

Howard Reeve, Capt Marion O. Becnel, Capt

Dean A. Leverenz, Capt Paul Lukavic, Capt Rich -

ard H. Sell, Capt James L. C. Smith, SSgt Weldon

G. Cameron, SSgt Harold W. Ferguson, SSgt

Glenn L. Patton, SSgt Gerald R. Paulsen, and

A1C Melvin B. D. Gibson.

Into the Tiger’s Mouth

As new crews came into the unit in 1967, an

organized checkout program was established to

ensure thorough theater orientation. In-country

checkout included an actual combat mission

over North Vietnam. The pilot and navigator of

a new crew would fly as auxiliary crew members

on a combat mission. Their job was to look, lis -

ten, and ask questions during the post-mission

briefing. The new crew flew as a hard crew,

with substitutions made only for duty not in -

cluding flying (DNIF) or when a crew member

was unavailable due to rest and relaxation or

previous commitments (aircraft delivery for in -

spect and repair as necessary [IRAN] in Taiwan,

for example). It was essential to fly as a hard crew

in combat because the large Talon crew of 11 required their continual working together to reach

its maximum capability.21

In the early months after deployment to Nha

Trang AB, tasking flowed directly to Detachment

1 from SOG. Later organizational changes created

the deputy commander for special operations

within the 14th SOW, and this position served as

the intermediate staff agent between SOG and

the operational unit. Once a mission tasking

(known as a fragmentary, or frag, order) was received at Nha Trang AB, the unit commander and

his staff would break out the frag and assign a

mission number and crew. Throughout 1967 and

1968, Talon crews would average one combat mission every five to seven days. Aircrews would be

assigned against the mission on a rotational basis.

When tasking for a new mission arrived, the next

crew in line would be alerted, and the planning

process would begin. An entire 11-man crew would

fly the mission, unless someone was DNIF or othe rwise not available. A minimum of 24 hours was

required to plan a combat mission. If all vital in -

formation was not available at the beginning of

the process, SOG would forward what was initially

available and would then send additional data

when received. The final flight plan was sent to

SOG for approval once all planning was complete.

All missions were approved by SOG and PACOM

and by the National Command Authority by exception (dependent upon type of mission). 22

In addition to logistics missions within South

Vietnam, Combat Talon flew in support of Army

Special Forces teams scheduled for insertion

into Laos. On these missions, the aircraft would

pick up a team at Da Nang AB or Long Bien,

then transport the team to Nakhon Phanom (NKP)

RTAFB, Thailand. Once at NKP, the team would be

covertly off-loaded into covered vehicles and taken

to the Special Forces’ compound nearby. The

compound was run by Special Forces personnel—

two officers and 13 enlisted personnel—on a permanently assigned basis. The teams were known

as road watch teams and consisted of two Americans and from six to 10 indigenous personnel.2 3

The special isolation facility provided the teams

with support requirements until inserted by way

of rotary-wing aircraft into Laos. On many occa -

sions, Combat Talon would pick up a team that

had been exfiltrated and was being moved back

to South Vietnam. On these occasions, the aircrew

was provided a rest area in the compound so that

Crew SG-5 that flew the 16 January 1967 resupply mission into North Vietnam. Back row, left to right: Capt

Richard H. Sell, Capt M. O. Becnel, Capt Paul Lukavic,

Maj Howard Reeve, SSgt Weldon Cameron, and SSgt

Glenn Patton. First row, left to right: A1C Melvin Gibson, SSgt Harold Ferguson, Capt Dean Leverenz, and

SSgt Gerald Paulsen. Not pictured is Capt James L. C.

Smith.

Photo courtesy of Richard H. Sell

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

86
proper crew rest could be maintained while

awaiting arrival of the team from the field.24

Combat Talon also flew in-country infiltration

missions, where cargo and/or personnel would be

air-dropped after flying a low-level route to the

drop zone. Strict security was always maintained,

with only the loadmasters actually seeing airlifted

personnel. The procedure was used to protect both

the team and the crew in case of shootdown and

capture by the enemy.

When a crew was alerted for a combat mission,

the unit navigator began the planning process by

scheduling the next crew in line for a mission

briefing. The navigator and the intelligence officer

were the primary mission briefers. A typical combat mission included low- and high-level flight op -

erations. The key to mission success was to avoid

known enemy threats and to react appropriately

to mobile or unplanned threats during the course

of the mission. The aircraft was restricted to

1,000 feet AGL for night terrain following because

of radar limitations but could fly as low as 250

feet AGL if the enemy threat warranted the lower

altitude. Terrain masking at low level, avoiding

known enemy threats, and flying during periods

of darkness were the best defenses for the Talon.

Navigation during low-level flight was accomplished by a combination of pilot/navigator map

reading and by radar ground-mapping techniques. Each complemented the other and relied

heavily on first identifying prominent terrain fea -

tures, then locating the feature on available

maps. The initial point (IP) was usually a prominent terrain feature (river bend, mountaintop,

etc.) from which final coordinates could be verified

and then updated in the drop computer. The IP to

drop zone run-in was the most critical phase of

the airdrop, since mission success depended on

airdrop accuracy.25

Before mission execution, a no-go point was es -

tablished in the event of loss of navigation or communication capability. During the course of the

mission, a communication link was maintained by

way of HF radio with a site near Clark AB, Philippines. If a crew could not establish communica -

tion with Clark AB, or if they experienced naviga -

tional equipment failure before the no-go point,

the mission would be aborted.26

The same aircrew that planned the mission

would fly it, with the exception of the unit staff

navigator. In some instances, if a mission was postponed, a different crew could fly the mission, but

this was rarely the case. Only the crew flying the

mission, the operations officer, and the com mander,

along with the staff navigator and intel offic

responsible for planning assistance to the crew

knew the details of a particular mission. All mi

sions over North Vietnam were classified Top S

cret (TS), limited distribution (LIMDIS), with sp

cial category (SPECAT) access required to prote

both the Talon crew and the personnel being inf

trated or resupplied. 27

The TS-LIMDIS-SPECAT classification cr

ated unique problems for mission deconflictio

through friendly airspace. Many times, lowe

echelon operators were not informed when 

Talon transitioned through their airspace, resul

ing in inadvertent tracking by friendly radar. D

confliction was especially difficult with naval a

sets off the coast of North Vietnam. Invariabl

on those missions requiring coastal penetratio

into North Vietnam, the Talon was detected b

friendly ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Radar oper

tors on board these ships routinely were not not

fied of Talon operations in their area. The

never was a recorded incident where a Talon w

fired upon by friendly forces, but many nigh

were spent by the aircrew worrying about th

possibility of fratricid e.28

In May 1967, under the code name Dani

Boone, limited ground reconnaissance operatio

in Cambodia were approved by JCS, with th

use of rotary-wing aircraft for emergency extra

tions only. Later revised operating procedures 

lowed for rotary-wing insertion and exfiltratio

and the use of forward air control (FAC) aircraft 

visually recon an insertion/extraction area. Th

program was renamed Salem House in 1969.2 9 (B

1970 Combat Talon was flying Salem House r

supply missions into Cambodia in support of th

Special Forces teams employed there.)

May also marked the first actual combat reco

ery attempt using the Fulton STARS. The missio

Photo courtesy of Gerald. R. Paulsen

Combat Spear transloading an SOG team to a waiti

Air America C-7 Caribou, Nakhom Phanom, Thailan

1966.

COMBAT SPEA

87
involved the recovery of two downed crew members located deep inside North Vietnam. Opera -

tion Gambler, the code name for the recovery op -

eration, began on 21 May 1967, when F-4 aircraft

dropped recovery kits near the two downed airmen. Unfortunately, the recovery kits landed

some distance from the survivors and North Viet -

namese security elements recovered the pack -

ages, thus forcing the Combat Talon aircraft to

abort its pick-up mission. Because of this attempt, SOG expressed the following limitations

of the Fulton system .

The Fulton Recovery System [STARS] has proven to be

of doubtful use in the recovery of aircrews downed in

hostile environments. If SAR forces are unable to recover downed airmen due to the presence of hostile

troops, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft artillery, etc.,

it is extremely unlikely that the use of the Fulton system will succeed where others failed. The drop of a

Fulton kit to a downed aircrew may give away their

position, and the amount of time required to retrieve

and activate the kit gives hostile forces ample time to

locate and capture the aircrew, or prepare an ambush

for the Combat Talon C-130 making the pickup.3 0

The Combat Spear unit continued to maintain its

high level of proficiency in the STARS, but without support from SOG, there was little chance

that the system would be used operationally.

On 1 August 1967 Detachment 1, 314th Troop

Carrier Wing, changed to Detachment 1, 314th

Tactical Airlift Wing, when its parent wing

changed designation. The detachment’s relation -

ship with the 14th ACW did not change at that

time. The 14th ACW continued to function as the

host wing for Detachment 1, a tenant unit, and

SOG continued to exercise OPCON of assigned

Combat Spear assets.

Throughout 1967 Combat Spear and Heavy

Hook aircraft flew PSYOPS/leaflet drops over

North Vietnam in support of the Fact Sheet program. An average of 60 million leaflets each

month was delivered to North Vietnam targets. In

addition to Talon and Heavy Hook aircraft, F-4s

also dropped leaflets over the North. Only 10 percent of all leaflets reached the Red River delta,

however, an area that was considered by PSYOPS

planners as the key target for a successful

PSYOPS campaign. An expanded PSYOPS program, code-named Frantic Goat, was proposed to

Lt Gen William M. Momyer, Seventh AF/CC, by

his director of operations. The goal of the Frantic

Goat program was to increase leaflet delivery to

100 million leaflets each month, with 60 million

reaching targets in the Red River delta area. The

new program permitted Combat Talon to operate

in North Vietnam to 20 degrees north latitude.

Entry into North Vietnam was by way of the

western border, and aircraft were restricted to no

closer than 20 NM from the eastern coast. General Momyer expressed concern over Talon opera -

tions so close to the coast due to the threat located

there, and in his 10 November 1967 approval of

the program, he directed his staff to “feel our way

into this area.”31

The issue of command and control of AF assets

committed to SOG operations continued to fester,

and by late 1967 relations between SOG and Seventh AF were near the breaking point. Since 1965

the level of both special and conventional opera -

tions had risen dramatically throughout SEA. Increasing numbers and types of USAF aircraft supported SOG operations. Intense competition

among different activities for a limited number of

air assets became evident. The lack of defined coordination channels and responsibilities between

Seventh AF and SOG led to distrust and a

strained relationship between the two organiza -

tions.32 SOG was a joint unit, and its commander

was a US Army Special Forces 06 (Col Richard

Singlaub at the time Combat Spear deployed to

SEA) who was extremely security conscious and

objected to having to explain and justify to Seventh AF each individual aircraft support request.

On the other hand, Seventh AF suspected that

Combat Talon and 1st Flight aircraft assigned to

support SOG were being misused and that proper

Air Force supervision was not being provided for

critical flight operations, including tactics, flying

safety, and crew protection.33

The rapid escalation of operations and competition for air resources was only part of the reasons

for the Seventh AF-SOG rift. The extreme sensitivity of SOG activities added another complica -

tion. SOG’s requests for air support to Seventh

AF encountered difficulties because few Seventh

AF personnel were SOG-briefed. From the Seventh

AF standpoint, compartmentalization and secrecy

created concern for the proper and efficient use of

AF assets under the OPCON of SOG. 34

Although specific command and control proce -

dures before 1968 were not documented in official

correspondence, various interviews and official

evaluations indicated where responsibilities rested

and problems existed. A senior Marine officer assigned to SOG in 1966 and 1967 made the follow -

ing statement:

Early in MACSOG’s operations, the execution of air

missions was controlled almost exclusively by MACSOG. Later we learned that our messages concerning

air operations were not being disseminated to the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

88
proper people. Moreover, some of our maritime operations were being interfered with by friendly aircraft.

Finally, Seventh AF insisted on coordinating all flying

activities, including those of MACSOG. This improved

coordination and control of missions.35

An AF officer assigned to SOG during the same

period further related difficulties in command and

control and specifically cited problems in the rela -

tionship between SOG and Seventh AF:

We had communications difficulties from our facility in

Saigon in handling air operations, which originated

from bases removed from the Saigon complex. Because

of security requirements and the lack of hot line facilities, in many cases our hands were tied in coordinating

air operations plans. This resulted in our recommenda -

tion to have an air operations command post, which

would have hot line communications direct to air facilities and the base camps from which forces would

launch. From an AF standpoint, command relations

were rather tenuous for a while. [Complex] missions

were laid on with very short notice. This caused us a

great deal of anxiety in attempting to get support from

Seventh AF. On many occasions, the Seventh AF frag

for the next day’s combat operations was already cut.

Seventh AF would have to divert air assets from laid-on

strikes. . . . As might be expected, Seventh AF was

constantly badgering us for better advanced planning. 36

To rectify this unsatisfactory situation, a series

of meetings were held between SOG and Seventh

AF, and a memorandum of understanding (MOU)

was signed on 26 October 1967. The MOU was

signed by the chief of staff, Air Force (CSAF), Seventh AF, and the chief, SOG, and established the

Office of Deputy Commander for Special Opera -

tions (DCSO) under the commander, 14th SOW.

In SOG terminology, the DCSO was designated

the commander, Air Studies Group (later changed

to Air Operations Group). Nha Trang-based C130E(I) Combat Talons and 1st Flight UWC-123

Heavy Hook aircraft were OPCON to the DCSO.

In addition, the 20th SOS UH-1 gunships were

under tactical control (TACON) to the DCSO for

SOG special operations missions.3 7 The underlying concept of this structure was to bring the

unique operations performed by the three units

under one authority.

As a result of this MOU, OPCON of Combat

Talon and Heavy Hook flowed from SOG through

the DCSO directly to the units themselves, effectively placing an intermediate organization be -

tween SOG and the unit commanders. Through

the 14th SOW, the DCSO was also responsible for

all administration and supervision of assigned

personnel, including (1) flying safety, (2) adherence to AF regulations, directives, and policy, and

(3) performance of such other functions normally

associated with service responsibility. The DCSO

had two 04s (special operations staff officer

and one airman (administrative supervisor) 

assist him in performing assigned duties, an

he was rated by the 14th SOW commander. 

letter of performance was provided by the SO

commanding officer for inclusion in the DCSO

evaluation report.3 8 The first DCSO was C

David C. Collins, who was previously statione

at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langle 

AFB, Virgi nia.39

25 November 1967—Loss of Aircraft 64-0563

In November 1967 the first loss of a Comb

Talon aircraft occurred. Lt Col Thomas F. Hin

was the squadron operations officer and had 

policy of flying with all assigned crews at least o

one combat mission over North Vietnam. On 2

November he was scheduled to fly a combat mi

sion with one of his crews on aircraft 64-0563. H

and the crew had arrived at the aircraft and ha

begun the preflight when he was notified by o

erations that the mission had been canceled. B

this time the crew had completed the outside po

tion of the preflight and was preparing to sta

the cockpit checklist. Hines picked up his helm

and flight gear and departed the flight line in th

vehicle that had brought the mission cancellatio

orders. He wanted to confirm that SOG had ca

celed the mission and tried to determine why. Th

remaining crew members, along with maint

nance personnel, buttoned-up the aircraft and d

parted the flight-line area. Since this was the on

mission scheduled that night, the flight line w

deserted in just a few minutes. As Hines entere

the operations center of 1st Flight Detachme

USAF Photo

Wreckage of aircraft 64-0563 after the mortar attack 

Nha Trang AB, 25 November 1967. Note the absence 

revetments in the parking area.

COMBAT SPEA

89
about a mile from where 64-0563 was parked, he

heard an explosion and turned to see the glow of

fire on the flight line from where he had just

come. He hastily made his way back to discover

that 64-0563 had taken a direct hit from an enem y

mortar shell and was totally engulfed in flames.

Had the mission gone as planned, the entire crew

would have been in their seats with engines running. In addition, maintenance and launch personnel would have been around the aircraft in

preparation for taxi. There was no doubt in Hine’s

mind that many lives would have been lost had

the mission not been canceled.4 0

Fire trucks had responded and were pouring

foam on to the burning remains of the aircraft.

There were three Talons parked nearby and all

sustained damage, one seriously, from the ex -

ploding mortar shell. The most seriously damaged aircraft required a month to complete tem -

porary repairs before being flown back to the

United States for further work. In the haste to

move another Talon parked beside 64-0563, personnel entered the aircraft and started all four

engines without resetting the engine oil circuit

breakers. The procedure for maintenance at the

time was to pull the engine oil circuit breakers

after post-flight inspections were complete. The

circuit breakers were not reset before engine

start, resulting in all four engines being destroyed by lack of oil during taxi.41 The heroic

effort to move the aircraft, however, undoubtedly

saved them from destruction .*

The potential loss of all four Combat Talons

stationed at Nha Trang AB was a soberin g thought.

Future ramp improvements included revetments

for the aircraft, but little could be done to guard

against a direct hit. When the Tet offensive

kicked off the following January, Combat Talon

operations were temporarily moved to Taiwan,

thus taking the aircraft out of harm’s way. The

loss of aircraft 64-0563 would prove to be the only

combat loss due to ground fire in the history of

the program.

29 December 1967—Loss of

Aircraft 64-0547 and Crew S-01

Maj John Gargus was a navigator planner in

Detachment 1 during the fall of 1967. In this ca -

pacity he was responsible for briefing aircrews

and providing assistance to them during the mission planning process. On 25 December he was

notified that a combination PSYOPS/r esupply

combat mission had been tasked by SOG for

launch on 28 December and was returning to Nha

Trang AB early on the 29th. The mission was

planned and launched without incident, and the

first portion was flown as planned. After an op -

erations normal HF-radio call at 0430L on 29 De -

cember 1967, not a trace was seen or heard of the

aircraft or aircrew. The aircraft did not return to

Nha Trang AB as scheduled. The loss of the aircraft would remain a mystery for the next 25

years. The following account of the alert, planning, and execution of the mission by Combat

Talon Crew S-01, flying aircraft 64-0547, was provided by Col John Gargus, retired, USAF.

* * * * * *

This is the story of Combat Talon C-130E(I), tail

number 64-0547, which was lost with its 11 crew

members on December 29, 1967, while conducting

a SOG mission over North Vietnam. After many

years of silence, Maj John Plaster authored a book,

SOG—The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos

in Vietnam, in which he described exploits of com -

mandos who lost their lives on missions that had

not been brought to public attention for numerous

security reasons. The loss of this aircraft fits into

that mold. It was, according to Major Plaster, our

largest single aircraft loss over North Vietnam. I

hope that this story will honor the eleven lost crew

members and acknowledge the role of all men who

served in the Combat Talon unit, which was first

named as Detachment 1 of the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing, then the 15th Air Commando Squadron/Special Operations Squadron and finally the

90th Special Operations Squadro n.

At the time of this incident, Detachment 1, 314th

TAW was based at Nha Trang Air Base, Republic

of Vietnam, with six–eleven member crews and

four MC-130E Combat Talon I aircraft. These aircraft were equipped with terrain-following radar,

the Fulton Recovery System, and an array of passive electronic countermeasures. They were painted

with special dark green paint, which significantly

reduced their reflected radar energy, and because

of their overall appearance, they were affectionately called the “Blackbirds.” They provided Military Advisory Command Vietnam-Studies and

Observations Group (MACVSOG, or more com -

monly abbreviated to SOG) with dedicated airlift

during daytime and conducted highly classified,

clandestine missions at night. These night missions were called “combat missions” even though

__________

 *A later modification prevented engine start if the engine’s oil circuit breakers were out.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

90
we never intended to engage in what would certainly be a one-sided battle with the enemy. The

only arms we carried were our survival .38 caliber

pistols. We relied on our low-level terrain-following

capability, the element of surprise, and experienced airmanship to fly wherever tasked over

North Vietnam.

Our “combat missions” were generated at SOG

headquarters in Saigon. They ranged from quite

ordinary to some bizarre air-drop operations.

Thus, we would drop teams of infiltrators behind

enemy lines and then resupply them periodically.

At times we would drop specially rigged personnel

parachutes without infiltrators and imaginatively

assembled resupply loads to convince the enemy

that we had teams operating in this or that area.

Sometimes our air-dropped loads were rigged to

fall apart in the air or be booby trapped for the

NVA soldiers on the ground. There were also psychological operations consisting of high-altitude

leaflet drops and low-altitude drops of pretuned

radios or gift packages to fishermen in the Gulf of

Tonkin. This was interesting and rewardin g work.

It made us feel that we were making a very significant contribution to the overall war effort by

creating considerable confusion inside the enemy’s

own territory.

To be effective in our clandestine air operations,

we had to maintain a very low profile and avoid

shoptalk with airmen of other units. Our geographical separation from SOG headquarters in

Saigon helped us in not being visibly tied to their

operations. Only a few of us (key command officials and mission planners) were permitted to visit

SOG headquarters. We were told only operational

data for which we had a need to know. We understood the need for this arrangement and loyally

carried out our role as dedicated airlifters for this

important player in the war.

As we acquired more experience in performing

our assigned tasks, we became aware that there

were problems with some of the teams we supported in the North. We had to make some pecu -

liar drops with very specific instructions and, at

times, execute them under the supervision of tightlipped SOG jumpmasters who were assigned to fly

with us on some missions. This led us to believe

that we were dealing with probable double agents

and some questionable characters. As mission

planners we did not share these concerns with our

crews, but some details had to be disclosed when

astonished loadmasters reported to the cockpit

that our SOG jumpmasters halted the paradrop

after the first man went out and that they made

the rest of the team sit down without offerin

any explanation. Then after landing, just as th

aircraft came to a halt in its parking area, a va

would appear, and the remaining jumpe

would smartly pile into it without any commen

to the crew. Events like that and cargo loa

that were purposely rigged to foul up or break u

upon hitting the air stream had to be explaine

to the crew involved.

Because the success of our missions depende

on secrecy, we were naturally apprehensive abo

dealing with complete strangers who would no

speak to us. In time, we learned that some of t

teams were compromised and feared that our ai

craft could become an easy target over a drop zon

In mission planning, we dreaded the possibili

that one day we could be directed to recover 

questionable agent or a package from North Vie

nam using our Fulton Recovery System. We we

known to the enemy for delivering booby-trappe

resupply bundles. A recovery of an agent or a pac

age would be an opportune time to return the favo

and bring down a Blackbird.

There was also considerable internal secrecy 

our work. Crews were not allowed to discuss the

combat missions with other crews. Locations 

drop zones and types of delivery payloads cou

not be shared with others. One could not be e

posed to too many details of our clandestine oper

tions. There was always a possibility of bein

forced down and captured behind enemy lines. Fo

this reason, Major Thompson, a C-130 navigato

who was not a Combat-Talon-qualified crew mem 

ber, was assigned to our unit as a mission pla

ner. As such, he knew about the locations of infi

trated teams and about the type of airdrops w

were conducting. He did not have a crew positio

and was not allowed to fly “combat missions

This arrangement lasted only for the duration 

his one-year tour. It also gave me, Major Joh

Gargus, navigator, and 1st Lt John Lewis, ele

tronic warfare officer (EWO), both from the S-0

crew, the opportunity to succeed him when he r

tated to his next duty station. By that time it didn

matter any more that two crew members from t

same crew would become his replacements an

continue flying combat missions. We began our o

the-job training by helping him to plan this fatef

mission. Roy Thompson, who retired as a colone

agreed to collaborate on putting this story t

gether. Unfortunately his contribution was lo

forever. He passed away on 25 July 1997 before 

could join me and John Lewis in sharing h

memories of almost 30 years ago.

COMBAT SPEA

91
The frag order for this fateful mission came

from SOG on Christmas Day. Our whole detach -

ment celebrated Christmas in the courtyard of

Nha Trang’s Roman Catholic Cathedral with

Christian Boy and Girl Scouts and their parents.

When we returned to our hotel after the festivities,

Roy Thompson, the dedicated mission planner for

the unit, came by to tell me that 1st Flight Detachment operations section had a classified message tasking us with our next combat mission. He

wanted to know if I was interested in going with

him to review it. I was eager to see what it was all

about, so we hopped into our jeep and drove to the

Vietnamese side of the base where we shared our

secure mission planning and communications facilities with our sister unit. First Flight was another SOG air asset flying C-123s with some very

interesting crew members. Their cargo specialists

assembled all our air-drop packages, rigged all

our parachutes, and even loaded the cargo for our

combat missions. We were to trust their methods

and procedures no matter how weird or foreign

the resulting drop configurations looked to our

loadmasters.

The frag order called for an unusual combat

mission. It directed us to execute two airdrops deep

inside North Vietnam. The first one was to be a

high-altitude leaflet drop on an NNE heading just

west of the Red River and the second one a lowlevel resupply drop on a southerly heading just

west of the Black River. We positioned ourselves in

front of a large-scale classified wall chart with numerous circles of various diameters and colors that

depicted locations of known enemy defenses. We

traced a probable inbound and outbound route

with our fingers and concluded that the mission

was a feasible one. The only possible threat to our

aircraft would come during the leaflet drop when

the Blackbird would be in proximity to the Yen

Bai Air Base and its MiG interceptors or from any

other Hanoi area base that had MiGs on night

alert. Otherwise, everything else looked good. We

would be able to lay out a flight path that would

be clear of lethal ranges of all known surface-toair missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery

(AAA).

With this accomplished, we returned to the

Anh Hoa Hotel to brief our detachment com -

mander, Lt Col Dow Rogers, and our operations

officer, Lt Col Tom Hines, on the forthcoming

combat mission. The mission was scheduled for

the night of the 28th and early morning of the

29th of December.

At the Anh Hoa Hotel, things were in a festive

mood. Maj Charlie Claxton, who had performed

the role of Santa Claus, was now busy in the

kitchen making sure that everything was on sched -

ule for our big evening meal. We were hosting the

American officers of 1st Flight and borrowed their

gourmet cook to assist our own very capable Chinese kitchen staff. Capt Gerald Van Buren, our

officers’ open mess steward, had already done his

job. He made sure that all needed kitchen supplies

either were procured in the Saigon commissary or

that they were obtained from his various contacts

at special forces operating locations. We would

trade with the special forces outposts on almost

every visit to their remote sites. San Miguel beer,

obtained on our visits to Taiwan or to the Philip -

pines, was traded for crates of fresh vegetables

grown in their neighboring montagnard villages.

Charlie Claxton was aspiring to replace Gerald

Van Buren as the mess steward when Gerald com -

pleted his one-year tour in Vietnam.

That evening we had what must have been the

best feast of our Vietnam tour. We all complimented our kitchen staff, Charlie Claxton and

Gerald Van Buren for their superb performance.

Our rooftop bar activity that night was somewhat

subdued. Most of us retreated to our rooms early to

make audiotapes for our families. We all owed special thanks to our wives for making our Vietnamese

Christmas as good as it could have been. All the

sweets, toys, and clothing for the cathedral party

and gift dispensing visits to several local orphanages were sent to us by our well-organized wives.

They enlisted support of their local chambers of

commerce for donations of clothing, candy, and

gifts and arranged with the USAF for shipments of

assembled goods by opportune C-130 airlift. We

were proud of them for their contributions to this

civic action effort. Sorting of donated clothing became a major undertaking, which took us several

days to complete. We sized and sorted the clothing

in the hot, unventilated upstairs storage rooms of

our operations building. Sgt Jim Williams spent

countless hours helping me in my capacity as the

unit’s civic action officer. He took charge in keeping

the effort going when some other volunteers gave up

because of uncomfortable heat and troublesome

clothing lint and dust in our improvised Santa’s

workshop. Sergeant Williams recruited SSgt Ed

Darcy to help until the clothing was finally sorted,

boxed, and labeled for distribution. During the festivities in the cathedral courtyard, both of these

young men displayed great enthusiasm in playing

games with the scouts. We all had a great time.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

92
Christmas spirit and joy overcame all language

and age barriers.

Early the next morning Roy Thompson, John

Lewis, and I settled down in our secure planning

room where we drew out the route and prepared

master charts for the crew that was going to fly the

mission. Our master charts would be used the next

day by the mission crew members who would

study them and customize them for their personal

use.

The entire flight would take about eight hours.

It would follow our often-repeated, high-level route

from Nha Trang AB to the skyline beacon in Laos.

There the Blackbird would descend to a terrainfollowing altitude and fly a short, zigzagging route

toward the first leaflet drop area. Then, after a

“short look” (rapid climb to high altitude, quick

drop, and rapid descent), the aircraft would resum e

terrain following through the low-level resupply

drop and return to the skyline beacon. From that

point the aircraft would continue back home at

normal cruising altitude.

In planning our terrain-following routes, we always tried to stay away from populated areas, selecting prominent radar return targets for turning

points and navigational instrument updates. A

unique feature of our terrain-following flights was

that we flew at controlled ground speeds rather

than constant airspeeds. Our aircraft was equipped

with the APN-115 terrain-following radar, which

used the aircraft’s speed over the ground in its

computations for maintaining desired altitude

above the ground. Typically, we flew at 500 feet

above the ground during daytime and at 1,000 feet

at night. Flights over uneven terrain required con -

tinuous throttle adjustments to maintain our

standard 230-knot ground speed (265 miles per

hour). The pilots had a Doppler ground speed indicator, which they monitored continuously. The

pilot (left seat) had an APN-115 screen, which in

one display mode traced the terrain directly ahead

of the aircraft and in another (cross-scan mode)

painted the terrain 20 degrees left and right of the

projected ground track. The radar navigator had a

third-mode option for map reading. This one gave

him a 45 degree left and right view of the aircraft’s

projected track, but when the radar was in this

mode, the terrain-following input used by the pilot

was disabled. Flying in the pilot’s left seat was

very strenuous. For all practical purposes it was

like flying a sustained instrument landing system

(ILS) approach for hours at a time. Blackbird pilots

had to fly the altitude director indicator’s (ADI) pitch

bar, which received commands based on radar

terrain returns and Doppler ground speed. The

had to monitor their radar scope for visual terra

signals and manipulate engine throttles to mai

tain the desired ground speed. During daytim

well-placed cockpit windows allowed the pilot 

verify approaching terrain, but on a dark nigh

this was impossible. One could not fix his eyes 

the outside through the ever-present glare of t

cockpit’s amber lights and not lose focus on t

instruments by which he had to fly. For that re

son it became our standard practice to have t

first pilot fly in the left seat and have the aircra

commander sit in the right. This was the only wa

he could command his 11-member crew. He cou

not take time away from the instruments to foc

on even a routine in-flight problem.

Terrain following, combined with special nav

gational and flying techniques, would get us 

where we needed to go, but our ultimate surviv

bility over North Vietnam depended on the skil

of our EWO. At that time, North Vietnam had th

most formidable air defense system in the histor

of air warfare. It is true that their radars we

not the state of the art, but they were effective

used by operators who had gained considerab

skills with them. The same could be said about th

AAA and SAM crews. Their tours of duty were n 

lim ited to one year like ours. They were at hom

defending their country against a sophisticated a

lied war machine for as long as their war laste

So these Soviet-made radars, which were first i

troduced in Eastern Europe, were now being com 

bat tested.

Our knowledge of the locations of these radar

combined with our low-level tactics, would get 

into most target areas without detection. Once d

tected, however, it became the EWO’s job to analy

the threats these radars posed. If all radars were 

the locations we plotted on our charts, we would b

able to fly through their scanning ranges and st

away from the effective ranges of missiles or art

lery they controlled. During mission planning, t

EWO would prepare a scenario that would tell hi

at which point of flight and from which directio

each radar’s scan would illuminate our aircraft. 

he detected radar not plotted on his chart and t

received signal strength was stronger, indicating 

closer proximity to our flight track, he would ha

to direct the pilots to change course. By monitorin

his state-of-the-art instruments, he could te

whether the enemy radars were in routine mode o

were focused on his aircraft. In a concentrated r

dar signal area, such as our aircraft would ente

upon its climb-to-drop altitude, the EWO wou

COMBAT SPEA

93
receive welcomed assistance from the crew radio

operator who shared his instrument console and

sat on his left. All our radio operators became adept

EWO assistants.

Blackbird EWOs also had the capability to detect and disrupt an attack by a MiG interceptor.

Using passive electronic techniques, they could

confuse a MiG long enough to enable their aircraft

to escape into hilly terrain where the interceptor’s

radar was ineffective and the pursuing pilot risked

flying into the ground.

In addition, Blackbird EWOs could dispense

highly reflective chaff, which would instantly paint

a brighter and larger target than the aircraft. With

all that equipment and our special training, we

had what we needed to conduct challenging, but

safe, operations in the hostile skies of North Vietnam. No one expected a large, slow, and unarmed

transport aircraft to operate in the same North Vietnamese air space that was so challenging to the

most advanced high-performance aircraft in the

US inventory.

Our success rate over the enemy territory was

commendable. Many of our low-level missions

through North Vietnamese air space went undetected. Some were tracked during portions of their

flight, but always succeeded in avoiding AAA fire.

A few had to abort their high-altitude leaflet drops

when a missile-control radar locked onto them.

They always managed to break their radar lock on

during a rapid roller-coaster dive down to the

minimum safe altitude. Fewer still experienced a

MiG chase with an airborne radar lock on. Our

EWOs always saved the night for us. Consequently, it didn’t take long for a Blackbird crew to

develop a due respect for the skills of its EWO.

Two months before, in mid-October, our S-05

crew’s EWO, John Lewis, defeated three passes of

an interceptor that jumped us just off the coast of

NVN near the Haiphong harbor. We were drop -

ping pretuned radios to the local fishermen. Pursued, we flew as low and as fast as we could,

shaking and bouncing on the air currents our aircraft stirred off the otherwise calm sea. When

John called “break left,” we had to pop up a few

feet to avoid dipping the left wing into the water.

Our operations officer, Lt Col Tom Hines, flew

with us that night. It was daylight when we

landed at Nha Trang AB. The wings and the fuselage of our Blackbird were white with salt. John

Lewis may still hold the Combat Talon record for

besting a pursuing fighter pilot three times on a

single “combat mission.”

Our first problem on the 29 December mission

would be the early warning radar at Na San. We

had to stay as low and as far south of its range as

possible to avoid detection while crossing into North

Vietnam. Once inside North Vietnam, we had to get

to the east side of the central mountains and stay out

of range of well-placed AAA and SAM sites along the

Red River valley. We tried to avoid getting picked up

and tracked by the multitude of radar associated

with those antiaircraft weapons. These radars by

themselves could not hurt us but would alert AAA

and SAM crews for possible action if we came within

range of their weapons. Our best scenario was to

have no radar track us until we began our rapid

climb to 30,000+ feet for the leaflet drop. We knew

that once our aircraft got to 9,000– 10,000 feet, all

available radar would come up and keep our EWO

extremely busy. If the enemy did not respond with a

launch of interceptors, the leaflet drop would be com -

pleted, and the aircraft would resume low-level terrain following and proceed westward just south of

the China border along the 22d parallel until reaching the Black River valley. There a southbound turn

would be made. Staying in the mountains along

the west side of the river, the second airdrop would

be executed NW of the Na San early warning ra -

dar (fig. 26).

Our avoidance of the Na San radar was not our

concern at this point in the flight. By this time a

warning would have been issued from the Hanoi

side of the mountains that a leaflet dropping intruder was moving westward toward Dien Bien

Phu. Consequently, this early warning radar would

be scanning in a NW direction, expecting the emergence of our Blackbird. Na San’s detection of our

flight at this time could actually assist in the accom -

plishment of the second portion of our mission. Our

resupply drop was what we called a “notional” drop,

or a diversionary drop. There was no friendly team

to receive the two resupply bundles. These bundles

were carefully planned by imaginative minds at

SOG to confuse the enemy and to have him expend

considerable resources searching for infiltrators who

did not exist. So the resupply bundles were meant to

be captured by the enemy. Na San’s detection of our

aircraft’s slowdown could assist the enemy in locating the bogus cargo.

By the time we finished with our planning, we

learned that an augmented S-01 crew would fly the

mission. It was S-01’s turn to take the next mission,

but there were some questions about the possibility

of having this crew skip its turn. Maj Dick Day,

S-01’s aircraft commander, and one of the crew’s

loadmasters, were on duty not including flying. His

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

94
senior navigator, Lt Col Don Fisher, was not yet

back from his R&R (rest and recreation) in Hawaii. His earliest expected return was on that

day, 26th December. Earlier on this day, the

other crew loadmaster departed with S-03 crew

on that crew’s flight to our parent 314th Wing

in Taiwan. He had made arrangements with SSgt

Ed Darcy from S-03 crew to switch places. Ed

Darcy, a quiet, conscientious young man, planned

to save some money by staying in Nha Trang

City. He did not want to spend his money on 

three to five day stay in Taiwan while the ferrie

Blackbird went through its scheduled IRAN 

a maintenance facility that was equipped to han 

dle C-130 aircraft. The crews looked forward 

their turn to ferry a Blackbird for an IRAN 

Taiwan. It was a most welcomed vacatio

break from the wartime conditions in Vietnam

So Darcy became a volunteer replacement fo

one S-01 loadmaster. Sgt James Williams agree

Figure 26. Route of Flight, Crew S-01, 28/29 December 1967 (Source: Provided by John

Gargus.)

COMBAT SPEA

95
to take the place of the other loadmaster, who was

also DNIF.

This mission provided an opportunity for Capt

E dwin Osborne to take command of the S-01 crew

and for Captain Van Buren to move up to the first

pilot’s position. The second pilot’s slot was filled

by Major Claxton from my S-05 crew. He had

missed an earlier combat mission when he was

DNIF, so this would become a makeup mission

for him. I made up my mind that I would take

Colonel Fisher’s place if he did not return in time

from Hawaii. I would have been the logical replacement in any case because I already knew the

route and mission details and could be used to

step in to replace him up to the last minute.

Later on that evening I heard that Don Fisher

was back. I went to see him and found him in a

most jovial mood. He had just returned from a

memorable R&R in Hawaii with his whole family.

He had just had the greatest of Christmases and

repeated to me and to others that he was “in love

with the whole world.” He was ready to fly combat.

Edwin Osborne was also ready to fly as an aircraft commander of a combat mission. All our first

pilots were highly experienced as C-130 airlift aircraft commanders before being qualified in the

Combat Talon Blackbird. Many felt that to become

a highly qualified copilot in the Combat Talon

program was somewhat of a career regression even

though they understood the need for such demanding pilot qualifications. As experienced pilots, they

were simply outranked by others with more impressive pilot credentials who became Combat

Talon aircraft commanders. Osborne was clearly a

pilot who should not be taking a back seat to anyone. He was an excellent pilot qualified as an instructor in the Blackbird.

The next day, 27 December, John Lewis and I

rode with the S-01 officer crew to the mission planning room. Van Buren drove the crew van. He normally drove whenever his crew went to fly. I was

told that as our commissary officer he even drove

through Saigon on his crew’s periodic commissary

runs when his crew’s Blackbird got extra ground

time at Tan Son Nhut to accommodate his grocery

shopping. Since Claxton was destined to inherit

that duty from him, it meant that my S-05 crew

would get the long ground time on some future

transits through Saigon.

On the way to our secure mission planning

room, I sat across from Capt Frank Parker, a tall

blond young man who was the crew’s EWO. He

was telling several of us how fortunate we were in

having missions where we could sneak in and

sneak out without stirring up a hornet’s nest. He

had recently returned from Thailand where he ran

into several of his EWO classmates who were fly -

ing the RB-66. Their mission was to deliberately

challenge the enemy’s electronic detection systems

and deadly retaliation in their efforts to pinpoint

locations of enemy radar. He used the term we

sometimes applied to those situations when one

would prefer to be on the ground rather than in

the air. He said that his friends were “eating their

livers” on their RB-66 missions.

Thompson had everything ready for us when

we arrived. All the charts we prepared the day

before either were posted on easels or laid out on

worktables. Fresh, unmarked charts, flight plan

logs, and other necessary mission forms were

placed on ta bles where the crew members could

use them. Thompson gave a brief overview of

what the mission entailed. About the only un -

usual thing that he noted was that TOTs were

not prescribed because neither drop zone had a

reception team. The PSYOPS (leaflet) drop had

a fixed-drop leg at an altitude of 30,000 feet or

more, depending on the wind velocity and direction. Weaker winds would require a higher altitude. The heart of Hanoi would be from 65 to 70

miles away, and it was hoped that some of the

leaflets would make it that far before sunrise.

Lack of TOTs also explained to them why their

flight plan was not completed with time of arrival at turning points. They were to calculate

these by themselves, planning on a 260–265 true

air speed at high altitudes and a standard 230

knots ground speed at terrain-following levels.

Once Thompson was finished with his mission

introduction, I joined Fisher and Gordie Wenaas,

the two crew navigators, to work on the flight

planned route. Lewis and Parker got together to

work on the enemy’s defenses. Thompson joined

the three pilots. Our en listed crew members—two

flight engineers, two loadmasters, and one radio

operator—normally did not participate in this

phase of mission planning.

Wenaas thought the mission would be a “piece

of cake.” He quickly noted that there were practically no threat circles anywhere near our track.

Then he started crunching out flight plan times

between turning points. Fisher and I went over

each low-level turning point, examining the terrain in its vicinity. Practically all were river bends

or rivers that would show up well on radar. Some

turning points had been used on previous mission s and were reported to be good ones. The selected drop zone for the second drop was a location

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

96
with good radar targets. Fisher was satisfied with

everything and began to prepare his own naviga -

tional chart. In this task, Wenaas was way ahead

of him.

Wenaas was a man who undertook every single

task meticulously. I remember his going around

our hotel taking care of chores whenever his S-01

crew was scheduled to be the hotel’s duty crew.

Each crew was regularly scheduled for hotel crew

duty by operations scheduling as if it were a flight

assignment. These duties consisted of servicing our

two electrical generators, bringing in fresh p otable

water from the air base, taking care of mail, stock -

ing the rooftop bar, and performing whatever

maintenance chores were needed at the hotel.

Wenaas was conspicuous by keeping himself occu -

pied with these chores. He showed me how to start

up and switch our two noisy generators.

I was then drawn into a conversation with the

pilots. Osborne liked the route and had only one

concern. It was the interval between the end of the

first drop and the start of the second one. Would

his two loadmasters have enough time to move the

cargo to the ramp for this drop? How many bundles

would there be? How much would they weigh?

And, of course, What is this notional stuff? The

answer to this question could only be provided by

our cargo rigger, a warrant officer from 1st Flight.

Van Buren was dispatched to go next door to get

him. Van Buren returned alone, but he had the

information we needed. He also succeeded in mak -

ing arrangements for the loadmasters and the

flight engineers to be at the aircraft the next morn -

ing to witness cargo loading. He commented that

the warrant officer reminded him that no one was

to mess with the cargo and question its rigging.

Everything would be set up by the 1st Flight loadmaster just the way it should be dropped. Anything nonstandard or out of place should be ignored. Our job was to fly it there and drop it just

as it was configured.

Osborne showed much interest in the terrainfollowing portion of flight. So the pilots gathered

around Fisher who had already drawn his chart.

He walked through every leg of flight and ex -

plained each turning point. Claxton had the

weight of the aircraft calculated at the point of

acceleration and climb to high altitude. There

were questions about how much of the area west of

Hanoi the crew would be able to see. The aircraft’s

track was over the eastern slopes of the central

highlands. Numerous peaks with elevations of up

to 9,000 feet were immediately to the left and the

sprawling Red River valley with level terrain west

of Hanoi to the right. It was to be a dark nig

with a new moon beginning on 30 Decembe

There would be total darkness. Some lights wou

no doubt be burning towards Hanoi. Our prio

flights noted that North Vietnam did not have 

complete blackout. The night would be perfect fo

the two map readers—Wenaas on the right an

Claxton on the left—to use the somewhat cumbe

some starlight scope to monitor the terrain below

The scope was of little use at terrain-followin

levels because it had excessive tunnel vision. Th

made the terrain fly by so fast that it caused t

images to blur. But at drop altitude, where t

Blackbird would seem to be at a standstill in rel

tion to the ground below, the scope would give i

user a fascinating view of terrain otherwise hidde

in total darkness. Very little cloud coverage wa

predicted for that night.

We pointed out the location of Yen Bai Air Ba

that would be at the aircraft’s 1 to 2 o’clock pos

tion during the drop. If there were any MiGs o

night alert, Yen Bai AB would pose the greate

threat. This would also be Parker’s greatest cha

lenge that night. He would have to defend again

possible interceptors.

Osborne examined the terrain into which t

aircraft would have to descend after the leafl

drop. He was concerned about the rapidly a

proaching ground during their maximum rate 

descent when radar stabilization was habitual

temporarily lost, and the Doppler computer wou

revert to “memory” because it’s limits were als

exceeded. I pointed out that a rapid descent shou

not be executed unless the aircraft was in jeopard

due to SAM or interceptor attack. All crews seeme

to have the same training mindset, which they a

quired at Pope AFB. During our training ther

each short look was followed by a maximum ra

descent, a maneuver that put a lot of stress on t

aircraft. This was practiced at every opportunit

In real life, however, if a threat to our aircraft d

not materialize, there was no need to put 

through such a stressful maneuver where the cre

experienced weightlessness and everything not tie

down floated about. Then, at the point of levelin

off, the tremendous G-load would force the stan

ing crew members down to their knees. On th

mission there would be additional cargo just b

hind the EWO and the radio operator compar

ment. We did not want any of it to break loo

during such a stressful maneuver.

Osborne was concerned with the time remainin

before the second drop. His loadmasters and t

second flight engineer would have to move th

COMBAT SPEA

97
cargo to the back of the aircraft and get it set for

the drop. Normally, the cargo would be all set

from the point of takeoff. But not this time. The

back of the aircraft would have to be cleared of any

remaining restraining straps from the leaflet drop.

Then the resupply bundles would have to be moved

into place. Normally this would not be that difficult because the palletized bundles were on rollers.

Being on rollers in straight and level flight is one

thing, however, but being on rollers during aggressive terrain-following flight is quite another. Great

care was needed to avoid injury or have the cargo

slip off the rollers at an angle where the pallet

would jam. This would no doubt be a new experience for these loadmasters. Osborne noted with

some satisfaction that the terrain-following leg going westbound along the 22d parallel was rela -

tively level because we were taking advantage of

the break between 10,000-feet high peaks on the

right and 9,000-feet ones on the left.

At a prominent turning point over the Black

River, the mission would turn south. The Black -

bird would fly almost due south hiding behind the

high terrain west of the river. This would keep it

west of the valley’s populated areas. Ahead at the

aircraft’s 10-to-11-o’clock position would be the Na

San early warning radar. This radar would be

looking for the reappearance of the intruder, which

was sure to excite the radar on the Hanoi side of

the mountains in the Red River valley. This radar

was not capable of directing MiG interceptors, and

none were expected to come west out of the Red

River valley.

Our drop zone was in an isolated area in the

vicinity of Highway 6. It was a logical place for a

drop zone. This would no doubt add to the credibility of the nonexistent team’s presence. The deceptive nature of this drop was explained by

Thompson. There would be no ground markings or

signals. The drop would occur on Fisher’s green

light command when his Doppler distance to go

read zero. After the drop the crew would continue

terrain following into Laos where the high-altitude

route home would resume at the skyline beacon.

At some point during this low-level route review

we were joined by Parker and Lewis, who had con -

cluded their study of the enemy’s electronic air

order of battle. They pointed out correctly that once

the aircraft crossed into the Black River region, the

enemy defenses were such that a return home at

any altitude would be safe. That was a good

thought in case of any in-flight problems, such as

navigational, mechanical, or outside visibility degradation due to weather.

The whole group then gathered around Parker’s

chart. His chart differed from those of Fisher and

the map readers, Claxton and Wenaas. Theirs had

smaller threat circles along the flight-planned

track. They represented lethal ranges of SAMs and

AAA. Parker’s chart had the mission flying

through much larger circles, which outlined scan

ranges of various radar. His chart showed that the

aircraft would be exposed to many radars through -

out the northbound portion of the flight along the

Red River. He estimated that even before the aircraft would reach its drop altitude of 30,000+ feet,

all available radars would be alerted to their presence and that he would be saturated with a tremendous amount of visual and aural signals from

his sensors. He acknowledged that he would have

to rely on some able assistance from Gean Clapper,

the crew radio operator, who would be sharing his

console behind the cargo compartment curtain.

Clapper was a true professional in his field. He

had many years of experience as a HAM radio

operator. As such he had contacts with colleagues

throughout the world. On flights over international waters, where it was permissible, he would

raise his contacts and relay personal greetings and

messages to families back home. He was also very

good at electronic warfare. He could positively recognize the chirping of various radars. This would

be a great asset on a flight such as this one where

many audible returns from threat radars would

keep Parker extremely busy.

Parker concluded that with Clapper’s help he

should be able to detect anything out of the ordinary and call for evasive action before any harm

could come to the Blackbird. It would be Fisher’s

task to find a safe evasive flight path through the

mountains on the left.

After the final mission review, each crew mem -

ber went on his own, putting finishing touches on

all paperwork he had produced. We three mission

planners assisted them with anything they needed

and ensured that all mission documents they produced were properly stamped Top Secret. None of

the documents could leave with the crew. They

were collected by us and locked in 1st Flight’s

safe. They would not be released to the crew until

the next night before the predeparture mission

briefing.

The next day’s mission briefing (28 December)

was a whole crew affair attended by our com -

mander, Lt Col Dow Rogers, and our operations

officer, Lt Col Tom Hines. This would be the first

time the enlisted crew members learned about the

target area. All five, the two flight engineers, the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

98
two loadmasters, and the radio operator, were present when 1st Flight’s cargo handlers loaded the

aircraft. Flight engineer TSgt Jack McCrary gave

us a thumbs up on the condition of the aircraft. He

was a very meticulous crew member, well regarded,

not just by Osborne, but also by his flight engineer

peers. I wondered how much sleep he had gotten

during the day. His eyes looked red as if he had not

slept at all. But we all knew that his nickname was

“Red Eye.” He had an eye condition that made his

eyes look red and bloodshot all the time. His second, SSgt Wayne Eckley, was an engineer of lesser

experience, but not short on enthusiasm. His nick -

name was “Bones.” The jungle fatigue uniforms

(designed as one size fits all) exaggerated his lean

and bony body.

The mission briefing started with Thompson

who stood in front of several chart-filled easels

placed in the front of the briefing room. He briefed

the weather. It was going to be favorable for this

flight with few clouds on the east side of the mountains in North Vietnam and strong favorable

WNW winds at drop altitude. Low-level pressure

was moving southeast from China, bringing some

cloudiness into the target area in the Black River

valley late in the morning.

Next, the mission briefing was turned over to

Fisher who briefed the route and the drop sequences. He was followed by Parker, who covered

the enemy order of battle. He presented the latest

SOG intelligence, which included known types

and numbers of different MiG interceptors available to North Vietnamese defenses. As always, he

mentioned the standard radio silence precautions.

Minimum chatter on the intercom! He was going

to run every one of his sophisticated tape recorders, which registered all electronic signals,

generated by enemy radar and which also captured the crew’s intercom transmissions. This was

going to be a special night for him to gather electronic intelligence signals for our future use. We

would end up with a sizable amount of signals

from all types of radar. These tapes would then be

used by other crew EWOs interested in sharpening

their listening and signal interpretation skills.

Parker’s briefing was followed by the aircraft

commander, Osborne. He briefed the crew assignments that had been previously reviewed by Colonel

Hines. Osborne would fly the entire mission in the

right seat. Van Buren would be in the left seat f rom

the takeoff through the low-level, terrain-following

part of the flight. Claxton would map read from

behind Van Buren during terrain following and

then take the left seat at high altitude on the way

home. Fisher would ride the radar navigator’s se

with the curtain drawn during terrain followin

and the leaflet drop. Wenaas would stand behin

Osborne’s right seat and map read from ther

McCrary would fly the engineer’s seat during te

rain following. Eckley would spend his time in t

back playing the safety observer role and provi

assistance to the loadmasters. Parker and Clappe

were to man their consoles behind the bulkhea

curtain, and the two substitute loadmasters, Wi

liams and Darcy, were to make sure they kept the

restraining harnesses on during the drops. A

crew members were to go on demand regulato

oxygen upon entering North Vietnam and then o

100 percent oxygen during the leaflet d rop.

There were a few standard questions from Colone

Rogers and Hines about everyone’s fitness and em 

phasis on safety. Finally, the crew was wished goo

luck. After this the crew was sanitized. All person

effects, identifications, family photographs, an

even jewelry were placed into plastic bags an

saved for the crew’s return. Each crew memb

had only his dog tags and Geneva Conventio

card as identifying documents. That was th

standard procedure for all combat missions.

Because the mission planners had to secure a

the classified mission documents and the crew

personal effects, the crew members were alread

in their assigned positions running their pred

parture checklists when we rejoined them at th

aircraft. We witnessed an orderly engine sta

and watched the Blackbird taxi out to the end o

the runway. From our vantage point we sa

them take off and disappear into the darkne

over the South China Sea.

About three hours later, I returned with Thompso

to our operations office to monitor the North Vie

namese portion of the mission. We had one of o

radio operators monitor a special HF radio fr

quency over which Clapper transmitted coded mi

sion progress reports every 30 to 40 minutes—whe

the aircraft reached a significant in-flight turnin

point. A radio station in an unknown locatio

would broadcast continuous one-letter Morse Co

at regular intervals. Our airborne operator wou

monitor the same frequency and at proper momen

would insert a two-letter Morse Code signal th

would let us know which point of the route wa

reached and gave us the status of the mission

progress. This was such a short burst of transmitte

energy that our enemy, who was sure to monito

the same frequency, would not have enough time 

zero in his direction finders to locate the position 

our aircraft. These transmissions were the on

COMBAT SPEA

99
breaks in radio silence allowed during our combat

missions.

Upon checking with our radio operator, we

learned that the flight was already over North Vietnam and right on time. We did not have any mission documents with us other than the radio op era -

tor’s log with numbered points and corresponding

estimated times of arrival over them, but we had

a good mental picture of what must have been

happening in the cockpit. As we sat there, sipping

on some strong coffee that the radio operator prepared, we made occasional comments on what

the crew must have been going through.

For the leaflet drop, all the cockpit lights were at

their dimmest and the radar navigator and EWO/

radio operator compartment curtains were drawn

to prevent any outside light to affect the night vision of the rest of the crew. All were on oxygen and

their intercom voices were muffled by the oxygenmask microphones that registered and exaggerated

the sound of every breath they took. The aircraft

began its acceleration prior to the rapid climb.

Maximum aircraft acceleration to 932-degree turbine inlet temperature was attained in relatively

short-level flight with the aircraft shaking as if its

four turbojets were ready to tear loose and leave the

bulky aircraft carcass behind.

Then as the aircraft began its rapid climb,

Parker’s console surely began to light up. At first

he would pick up a number of AAA and SAM ra -

dars, which would routinely scan their assigned

areas. As they detected the Blackbird, they would

focus their scan on their just-discovered target and

activate their height finders to establish the aircraft’s altitude. They would pass their acquired

target data through their established notification

channels. This would cause even more radar to

come up and focus on this rapidly rising, but now

slow moving, target. The crew would hear Parker

reporting the inevitable. Two or three AAA radars

were tracking them, but from a safe distance. Of

greater concern would be the SAM radars. These

had longer reach, but were expected to be out of

range. He would certainly be calling these to Osborne’s attention. Then the level off and the start of

the drop. Each man could tell when each card -

board box exited the aircraft. There was a whoosh

sound to each exit as the departing load created an

added vacuum in the rare atmosphere of the cargo

compartment. The aircraft would seem to stand

still, just hanging in the thin air, being as high as

it could climb on the thin cushion of available air.

And as Parker watched for the emergence of a GCI

radar and its tracking pattern to determine if

there was an intent to launch a MiG, Wenaas

must have struggled with the night-vision scope

looking for Yen Bai AB some 30 miles away. This

was the place from which the nearest MiGs would

come. His night-vision scope would certainly pick

up the heat of an interceptor at takeoff. He would

have to be pointed in the right direction. Others

in the cockpit were getting the answer to whether

they could see the lights of distant Hanoi now at

their three o’clock position. Fisher must have had

his face buried in the hood of his radar as he

carefully traced every mile of ground covered by

the aircraft. He had to know exactly where he

w as in case Parker reported a radar or interceptor

lock on that would demand an immediate descent

to a safe terrain between the mountain peaks on

the left.

We did not hear any interruptions to the monotonous V sound on the radio, so we assumed

that all was okay. All the leaflets were delivered.

The aircraft was on its way down and proceeding

westward to its turning point over the Black

River. The next report came just as expected. All

was still okay. The aircraft was now southbound

running its checklist for the bundle drop near

Highway 6.

Thompson and I planned to return to the hotel

right after the next report and get a couple of

hours of sleep before coming back to greet the returning crew. But as we waited, nothing happened. There were no further reports from the aircraft. Our first assumption was that something

went wrong with Clapper’s radio. We would

surely hear something once the aircraft emerged

from its radio silence over the skyline beacon.

That is when the aircraft would report a small

problem like that to our radar sites in Thailand.

Once again, there was nothing. With that we returned to the hotel and reported our concerns to

Dow Rogers and Tom Hines.

There were anxious moments as the aircraft’s return time approached. Calls were made to find out if

any lan dings were made in Thailand or at Da

Nang AB. Then the command at SOG was notified. The SOG took over all search and rescue efforts. Several F-4 Phantoms were launched to survey the area south of the last known reported

position. The weather turned bad. The front

moved in as expected, and the F-4s could not see a

thing on the ground. They monitored radios for

signals from the aircraft’s crash position indicator

and from any crew member survival radios. They

heard nothing. After several attempts, the search

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

100
was given up. The crew of 11 was declared as

missing in action (MIA) on 29 January 1968.

There were many guesses and opinions as to

what might have happened. A loss to enemy action

was discounted. The aircraft was proceeding normally on its assigned mission after the leaflet

drop, which was the most hazardous part of the

flight. Enemy attack on the aircraft would have

been reported. The enemy had a chance to detect

our aircraft by Na San radar, which must have

been alerted about our aircraft’s escape toward

Dien Bien Phu. Had this happened, there might

have been some forces in the vicinity of the drop

zone capable of bringing down a low-flying aircraft with small-arms fire. But such an act would

have been heralded as a great victory by North

Vietnam. The enemy should have learned of our

aircraft’s fate almost immediately. Even with our

low profile, the failure of our aircraft to return to

Nha Trang AB could not be concealed for long.

The enemy would have concluded that it was the

aircraft that had dropped several million leaflets

west of Hanoi. They did not take credit for its disappearance during this mission. But some thought

of a more sinister scenario. The enemy had the

aircraft and perhaps some members of the crew,

and they would use them for propaganda purposes. However, as time went on, this probability

dissipated. It became clearer and clearer that our

aircraft must have impacted a mountain in an isolated area sometime after making its last position

report. The return of our POWs in 1973 confirmed

that the names of the crew members were not

known by any of the returning POWs.

The location of Blackbird 64-0547 continued to

be a mystery for 25 years. In 1991, when the villagers of Phu Nung heard that the United States

was search ing for remains of American airmen,

various individuals reported that they knew of a

crash site in their vicinity. In November 1992 a

joint US–Vietnam team was led to a very isolated

location at coordinates 21-39-80N 103-31-20E (grid

48QUJ 4744596161) where they found few remaining parts of an aircraft that turned out to be our

Blackbird.

The crash site is located in a rugged mountainous terrain of Lai Chau province, some 32 miles

northeast of Dien Bien Phu. It lies just a few miles

east of the route that many of our crews flew in the

opposite direction toward the same prominent

bend in the river over which the last aircraft position report was made. This river bend had a very

distinct radar return, and we used it on those missions that required our undetected entry into areas

between Hanoi and the China border. Since I wa

unable to retrieve the flight plan for this mission, 

do not have the exact location of the initial poi

for the drop or for the drop zone. I must rely on

on my memory and conclude that the aircra

either was on its planned route to the initial poi

or making a course correction to it. Distance wis

the crash occurred seven and a half minutes from

the reporting point at the river bend. Descriptio

of the aircraft’s impact point reveals that it wa

heading directly toward the Na San radar sit

which was about 45 NM away.

The US recovery team pinpointed the crash l

cation on the best available 1:50,000 scale char

This chart shows it to be at 4,780 feet on a stee

60-degree slope of a NNW facing crescent shape

mountain. The crest of this mountain goes only u

to 4,870 feet. The main peak of this karst-studde

mountain, known as Nam Bo, rises to 5,174 fee

and it is one mile due west of the crash site. T

crash site is small. Its measurements establishe

by the recovery team are given as 105 feet by 

feet. This is a small area for an aircraft as large a

a C-130. Since all the crew remains were recovere

from this small location, it can be safely conclude

that the aircraft did not bounce and break u

along its track before coming to a stop. Its cras

heading must have been perpendicular to the fa

of the mountain. With that, the destruction of th

aircraft was instantaneous.

At the time of the crash, the crew was gettin

ready for the second drop. Eckley, Darcy, and Wi

liams were in the cargo compartment making su

that the load was properly positioned for the dro

They were moving about and did not yet have the

restraining harnesses hooked up. Claxton an

Wenaas were the other two crew members wh

were not fastened to any seats. Their map readin

duties called for them to stand behind the pilo

and peer outside through the side windows.

The first person on the scene of the crash was 

12-year-old boy. He reported that the aircraft w

in many pieces and that it was still burning. H

did not find any survivors.

The recovery team found little at the crash sit

The villagers had pilfered the site within days a

ter the crash and over the years carted away a

aircraft parts they could use. In 1991, when the

learned about the US search for remains of ai

men, they returned to the site and removed a

human remains they could locate. They turne

them over to the proper authorities. When the tea

returned to the site in 1993, they found only a fe

fragments of human remains, and the team leade

COMBAT SPEA

101
recommended that any further attempts at recov ery

should be abandoned. All recovered remains were

sent to Hawaii for proper identification.

Why did the site go so long without being reported? The team’s investigation revealed that the

crash site was reported to the village authorities

immediately. It may be that the village leaders

were so isolated from the governmental authorities

that they didn’t know what to do. Or, on the other

hand, they were astute enough to realize what

kind of fate would descend upon them for pilfering

the crash site and keeping the crew weapons, as

well as those that must have been packaged in the

air-drop cargo. Consequently, keeping the news of

the crash a village secret had some benefits for the

isolated indigenous population. Once the American rewards for locating aircraft crash sites became known and profitable, the village secret was

revealed.

Our own information channels were also

flawed. Personnel associated with Combat Talon

were never officially informed about the crash site

discovery. In mid-1997 plans were put in motion

at Hurlburt Field to erect a memorial for the 11

lost crew members whose status had bee n changed

from MIA to KIA in 1978. As an individual who

was closely tied to this unfortunate mission, I

agreed to write this story so that the families of

the lost airmen would learn about the work their

loved ones did in Vietnam and so that those who

flew the Blackbirds in that war would recall and

share their mission recollections with others. I finished the first draft of this story in July 1997,

hoping that John Lewis’s and my recollections of

the route and events of 30 years ago would help

someone to locate the missing aircraft. The title of

this first draft was “Missing Combat Talon C130E.” The word of my writing went out, and in

August I received a surprise phone call from a

man who had been looking for information about

his friend who flew on that mission. It was Gene

Kremin, a radio operator buddy of Clapper. He

informed me that the aircraft had been located

almost five years before and that his information

about the crash site came from the Library of

Congress in Washington, D.C.

Air Operations—1967

With the expansion of Shining Brass and the commencement of Daniel Boone operations, logistics

airlift increased rapidly during 1967. As a result,

by the end of the year, most combat resupply missions into North Vietnam were moved to highperformance aircraft, thus freeing up larger

transport aircraft to move sensitive cargo. During

1967 Heavy Hook, Combat Talon, and contract

aircraft moved 10,738,580 pounds of cargo and

25,016 passengers. SOG was allocated 75 hours

each month, or 900 hours each year, for each

Combat Talon aircraft assigned, and actually employed the aircraft for an average of 938 hours

each during 1967. One unique requirement levied

on SOG air operations during the year was to

develop a free-fall aerial delivery method to drop

rice to Cambodian troops. From an altitude of

1,000 feet, the aircraft dropped triple-bagged rice,

of which fully 97 percent was recoverable.42

During 1967 Combat Talons accomplished 12

out of 30 scheduled resupply missions, while

Heavy Hook flew eight of 32. The number of

PSYOPS missions during the year grew substantially. Detachment 1 accomplished 44 out of 67

scheduled PSYOPS/leaflet drop missions.43

1968: Year of Transition

and Rebuilding

After the loss of two of the four assigned Combat Talons in the closing months of 1967, the New

Year brought a heavy dose of reality for Combat

Spear personnel. Missions over NVN had proven

to be extremely dangerous. Even life at Nha

Trang AB had changed after the November attack

on the airfield. As January passed, aircraft tasked

to search for crew S-01 were diverted to other

priority missions. There was no trace of the lost

crew. Weather across western NVN had remained

overcast with low ceilings throughout the month.

On 29 January the search was terminated, and

the crew was officially listed as MIA.

At 12:35 A.M. on Tuesday, 30 January, the Tet

offensive of 1968 kicked off in South Vietnam on

the outskirts of Nha Trang City. The initial attack was on the Vietnamese Naval Training Center, but due to confusion by the attackers, an allout push to capture the city did not occur until

four hours later. Fourteen hours of fighting ensued, during which time Combat Spear personnel

manned firing positions on top of the Anh Hoa

Hotel. Within 28 hours of the initial attack, Viet -

cong enemy forces had been beaten, and the city

was declared clear by South Vietnamese security

forces. The attempt to capture Nha Trang was a

costly one for the Vietcong. According to official

South Vietnamese records, of an initial force of

800 soldiers attacking the city, 377 were killed,

77 were captured, and one surrendered. Eightyeight South Vietnamese troops were killed, and

220 were wounded in action, 32 civilians were

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102
killed, and 187 were wounded with 600 homes

destroyed.44 Other than a few bullet holes, the

Anh Hoa Hotel escaped unscathed, as did the air

base. Combat Talon aircraft parked there were

unharmed. The Tet offensive of 1968 would prove

to be the watershed event defining the course by

which the United States would pursue the Vietnam War. There was little immediate impact on

the Talon mission, but the resultant bombing halt

nine months later would eliminate all combat op -

erations into NVN.

On 15 March 1968 Detachment 1, 314th TAW

was redesignated the 15th ACS and was assigned

to the 14th SOW by PACAF Special Order G-43,

dated 23 February 1968. Existing OPCON arrangements continued in effect, with the transfer

of four aircraft, 39 officers, and 122 airmen to the

14th ACW. Colonel Rogers, a P-47 combat vet -

eran of 38 missions during WW II and the incumbent Detachment 1, 314th TAW commander, was

designated the first commander of the 15th

ACS.45 The following mission statement of the

squadron reflected the unit’s unconventional

warfare nature.

The mission of the 15th ACS is to conduct tactical airlift operations in support of selected US and South Viet -

namese counterinsurgency forces in Southeast Asia; to

conduct rescue and recovery operations as directed by

the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, using the Fulton

Recovery System; and to carry out a program of uncon -

ventional warfare operations assigned under 7AF

OPORD 460-68, “Combat Spear,” classified Top Secr et.46

On 29 April 1968 Rogers passed command of the

15th ACS to his operations officer, Colonel Hines.

Hines continued in command until 4 September,

when he returned to the United States after passing command to Lt Col Russell A. Bunn.

During the spring and summer of 1968, the

15th ACS experienced a near 100 percent turnover of assigned aircrew and support personnel.

Crew S-01, which was lost the previous December, was replaced by crew S-07 in March; Crew

S-02 rotated to the United States in May and its

replacement, S-08, was certified crew ready in

June. Crews S-03 through S-06 rotated in

July/August and were replaced by Crews S-09

through S-11, respectively. The net result of these

rotations was a reduction of six to five crews, for a

manning ratio of 1.33 crews per assigned aircraft.

A sixth crew, crew S-12, was formed of mixed crew

members and was combat qualified during the

summer transition period. Crew S-12 lacked two

pilots; therefore, the squadron commander and the

operations officer, along with pilots from other

formed crews, augmented these two pos itions.4 7

Manning was actually based on 1.5 aircrew p

assigned aircraft for six crews. With crew S-1

the squadron effectively maintained six crew

even though S-12 was out of hide. By Octob

additional crew members were assigned, an

the unit stabilized again with six assigne

crews. Consolidation of the squadron unde

14th SOW also resulted in 68 maintenanc

personnel being transferred to the 14th Fiel

Maintenance Squadron, thus leaving 39 off

cers and 54 enlisted personnel in the unit

The shor tage of aircrew and the transfer o

maintenance personnel had little impact on th

unit’s ability to perform its tasked SOG missio

Of four C-130E(I) Combat Talons assigned, th

unit possessed an average of three througho

Photo courtesy of Robert Zura

Some US facilities located in Nha Trang City we

heavily damaged during intense fighting on 30/31 Jan

ary 1968 at the onset of the Tet offensive. Pictured 

the MAC Civil Operations District Office (CORDS). T

Anh Hoa Hotel and Nha Trang AB escaped attac

thanks to the effort of both US and South Vietname

personnel.

Photo courtesy of George Powell

After the 1968 Tet offensive, revetments were added 

the Combat Spear ramp.

COMBAT SPEA

103
1968, with the fourth at LAS Ontario undergoing

modifications and phase inspections.4 9

The most difficult challenge for the Combat

Spear unit was in the continuation training area.

To meet the requirement to replace all assigned

crews in such a short period, Detachment 2 at

Pope AFB had to accelerate by two months those

aircrews scheduled for SEA duty. The resultant

Combat Knife output ensured that the Vietnambased Combat Spear Talons would continue to be

manned by fully qualified crews on a timely ba -

sis.50 After initial checkout at Pope AFB, aircrews

arriving in South Vietnam had to continually practice their special qualifications to maintain proficiency. The Fulton STARS capability required a

heavy continuation training commitment. A STARS

training site established at Cam Ranh Bay in June

1967 was put to near-continual use during the

summer of 1968. In July the squadron activated

an extensive STARS demonstration program

whereby a Combat Talon aircraft would perform

recoveries at bases throughout SEA, including

Thailand and the Philippines. This demonstration

program ensured that the unit would have con -

tinuous training opportunities, while at the same

time introducing the capability to potential customers from all services.51 An added benefit to the

demonstrations was to further validate the system and refine its components to improve the ca -

pability. One such improvement was identified

for the recovery-kit parachute. With ground

winds over 15 knots, the kit was dragged a con -

siderable distance before it could be retrieved by

ground-party personnel. Through US sourcing,

this problem was eliminated with the develop -

ment of the ring-slot parachute.5 2 Use of this

parachute was later adopted by the other two

Combat Talon squadrons.

Training in low-level terrain following was con -

ducted in the Philippines and Thailand. Combat

Talon aircraft conducted airborne interceptor

training, code-named Black Baron, with the 405th

Fighter Interceptor Wing and with ground-control

intercept controllers at Clark AB, Philippines. A

similar program was conducted in Thailand with

interceptor aircraft based at Udorn RTAFB and

other air bases throughout Thailand under the

same Black Baron program.5 3

August brought about another organizational

change in the 15th ACS. On 1 August the 15th

ACS was redesignated the 15th Special Opera -

tions Squadron by Special Order G-147, Headquarters PACAF, dated 11 July 1968. The squadron remained under the 14th SOW, with no

changes in organizational structure. The only major change was found in the unit detail listing,

dated 31 July 1968. The personnel assigned to 1st

Flight Detachment were added to the 15th SOS.

Since the two units were not colocated at the

time, this change created problems in the administrative and training areas. Additionally, the

15th SOS commander had no direct control over

1st Flight since both unit commanders reported

directly to the 14th SOW DCSO.54 Later facility

upgrades and command agreements brought the

two units both physically and administratively

together, thus minimizing personnel account -

ability problems .

From 1 July to 30 September, the 15th SOS

performed nine live Fulton STARS recoveries utilizing personnel from units where the system was

being demonstrated. On 2 August the 15th SOS

commander, Colonel Hines, was recovered utiliz -

ing the system at Nha Trang AB. By 30 September the unit had performed 29 live recovery demonstrations since its deployment to SEA in 1966.

In conjunction with these demonstrations, unit

personnel would sometimes prepare high-speed

delivery kits for F-4 fighter airdrop. The overall

package was quite impressive and succeeded in

publicizing the capability while providing the op -

portunity for Combat Spear aircrews to practice

the event. The unit maintained the capability to

conduct Fulton combat recovery operations in accordance with MACV OPLAN 37F-67.55

On 12 October 1968 President Lyndon B.

Johnson proclaimed a bombing halt and restricted

flight operations into North Vietnam. SOG opera -

tions in NVN were directed to cease, and the remainder of the month was spent recovering agent

teams. By the first of November, all agent teams

either had been exfiltrated or abandoned if they

were identified as being double agents. The cessa -

tion of operations into North Vietnam had a de -

moralizing affect on the 15th SOS. Virtually all

combat missions assigned to the squadron were

eliminated. The taskings most affected were those

supporting UW operations and the potential tactical use of the Fulton STARS.56 There was little

likelihood of utilizing the recovery system in South

Vietnam, since in-country-based, rotary-wing assets were tasked to perform the rescue mission.

Three additional surface-to-air recovery demonstrations were conducted in October and November by Talon crews, two of which were two-man

pickups. The second dual pickup was conducted at

Cubi Point Naval Air Station (NAS) and was complicated by an uncontrollable spinning of the two

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

104
volunteers shortly after they became airborne.

The spinning lasted approximately four minutes.

After the spinning stopped, the recovery continued uneventfully. Because of the incident, twoman demonstration recoveries were suspended,

and a hazard report was submitted to Seventh

AF.5 7 (No additional two-man live surface-to-air

recoveries were attempted until a 7th SOS crew,

commanded by Capt J. W. Bates, extracted two

personnel from the waters off the coast of RAF

Macrihanish, UK, on 2 December 1981.)

With no combat missions being flown into

North Vietnam in November and December, SOG

tasked the squadron to fly combat support missions throughout the area of responsibility. Unilateral training sorties were also flown, and personnel focused on improving facilities at Nha

Trang AB when not in the air. With already one

of the best enlisted quarters in SEA, personnel

continued to improve their barracks during their

off-duty time. Each enlisted six-man aircrew

shared an air-conditioned room on the top floor of

the barracks. Each room was well insulated and

removed from the normal distractions of a

crowded barracks. By housing each crew in its

own room, crew integrity and proper crew rest

were maintained. Nonaircrew squadron personnel

were billeted on the ground floor, which was also

divided into a reading/game room and a room for

recreational activities. Squadron personnel were

responsible for the design, fabrication, painting,

and continued cleanliness of the barracks facilit y.5 8 The 15th SOS won the 14th SOW/CC

Outstanding Unit Trophy in November 1968.

During the period officers and assigned civilian

contractors continued to reside downtown in the

Anh Hoa Hotel.

Command and Control

Throughout 1968 relations between SOG and

Seventh AF were strained, even after the signing

of the MOU in the fall of 1967. The basic problem

with the MOU was that it was general in nature

and did not specifically address command relation -

ships. The MOU had created, however, the 14th

SOW DCSO position, and the first incumbent to

fill that position arrived at Nha Trang AB on 2

March 1968. In his end of tour report the following

year, he documented the state of affairs at that

time (as he perceived them).

Both Seventh AF and MACSOG were delighted with

the results after the DCSO office was activated. Problems that previously had been hashed and rehashed in

conferences were bucked to me for solution. Being located

a considerable distance from Saigon [Nha Trang], I had

no personality problems with either 7AF or MACSOG.

Consequently, each problem could be examined in light

of facts and mission requirements. Fortunately, most

problems were relatively minor in nature and when isolated from an atmosphere of mutual hostility, the solu -

tion was fairly obvious. MACSOG was well satisfied

with the air support they received, and all mission re -

quirements were fulfilled. Seventh Air Force was de -

lighted because minor problems that had previously

consumed an enormous number of man-hours were now

being handled by my office, and they gradually with -

drew from close supervision of MACSOG activities.5 9

Thus, according to the first DCSO, the new a

rangement proved to be satisfactory. Subseque

appraisal by Seventh AF headquarters, howeve

indicated that it was still not highly satisfied wi

the working relationship between itself and MAC 

SOG. A Seventh AF staff study conducted in Ju

1968 pointed out several problem areas. Th

study specifically criticized the 1967 MOU insof

as it addressed only administrative matters an

not the broad spectrum of Seventh AF support 

MACSOG activities. It further noted that Seven

AF/MACSOG problems frequently could not be r

solved in the absence of mutually agreed upo

directives. As a result of the continued frictio

between the two headquarters, MACV was aske

to arbitrate. MACV consequently directed th

Seventh AF, in conjunction with MACSOG, pr

pare an MOU to formalize new procedures and 

assure systematic and effective support of SO

missions.6 0 The resultant document was identifie

as OPORD 460-68, and it greatly expanded an

clarified the earlier MOU.

Photo courtesy of Obie Hill

Six-man enlisted flight crew quarters located on Nh

Trang AB. Note TV monitor in center of rear wall an

air conditioner in right rear corner of room. Speci

operations crews were authorized air conditioning b

cause they flew at night and slept during the day.

COMBAT SPEA

105
Air Operations—1968

Figures on aircraft utilization in 1968 reflected

reduced combat operations over North Vietnam

compared to those of 1967. Combat Talon aircraft

successfully executed five of 21 resupply missions.

On the other hand, the percentage of flight time

committed to logistical airlift increased from 65 to

85 percent of total hours flown. Combined cargo

tonnage of Heavy Hook and Combat Spear opera -

tions totaled over 8 million pounds, and more

than 34,000 personnel were transported by the

two units.61

1969: Tasking Outside

North Vietnam

Colonel Bunn succeeded Colonel Hines as the

second commander of the 15th SOS on 4 September 1968. He remained in command until 27

March 1969, when Lt Col John R. Kummer replaced him. At that time Bunn became the 14th

SOW/DCSO after the incumbent DCSO was killed

in an aircraft accident.62 The problems experienced during the last half of 1968 in personnel

accountability for 1st Flight Detachment was

solved when both 1st Flight and the 15th SOS

moved into their joint operations building during

the week of 13 January 1969. The colocated facility

brought the two units into a closer relationship

than was possible with separate facilities.6 3

Relationships between Seventh AF and SOG did

not improve, even after OPORD 460-68 was finalized. By the first of February 1969, in an apparent

effort to exert its authority over SOG-dedicated assets, Seventh AF made the decision to task 15th

SOS aircraft to fly missions when not otherwise

employed by SOG. From 3 through 11 February,

Seventh AF tasked the 15th SOS to fly seven

flare-illumination missions, although the aircrew

had neither flare training nor any flare dispersal

equipment aboard the Combat Talon. In 1973, Lt

Col Marlon Banks, then retired, recalled his crew

checkout to drop flares and his first flare mission.

We went out one afternoon and got an hour of training

from an EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] type on how

to set your time delay and everything, and launch a

flare and hook it up so it would pop the string and light.

We put some 200 odd flares on board. Our mission that

night was strictly a delaying tactic. We were to illuminate a [road] intersection for eight hours. . . . We didn’t

have any FACs with us normally if we saw anything to

call strikes on. We were briefed on the [AAA] threat—

how high the 37 mm and 57 mm could go. Well, it [the

threat] ran me up to 14,000 feet. You couldn’t work

without oxygen. . . . That was probably one of the worst

missions I’ve ever been on. I’ve never seen so much

firepower. It was all there, AAA, and I’m sure none of it

was radar controlled or we wouldn’t be here today. . . .

We would vary our altitude every pass two to three

thousand feet.

It [AAA] would go up above us, sometimes below us. . . . I

would say they had 6 to 9 installations—batteries—and

they would sometimes all fire at the same time, some -

times three or four at the same time. We used up a lot of

their ammo that night for them. After six hours, we were

out of flares, thank goodness, and left.64

The continued debate over who had OPCON of

the 15th SOS Talons was temporarily resolved

when Seventh AF discontinued tasking the Com -

bat Talon for flare missions after the 11 February mission. SOG adopted the tactic of tasking

the 15th SOS, with its higher-mission priority,

every time Seventh AF tasked the unit. After 11

February the situation was not resolved, but

rather an uneasy truce went into effect. OPORD

460-68 had proven to be inadequate because it

still did not specifically address command rela -

tionships between SOG and Seventh A F .

As was the case in 1968, meetings were again

held throughout 1969 to further resolve com -

mand relationships. On 1 November 1969 an updated OPORD 460-70 was signed. The stated

purpose of this OPORD was to establish proce -

dures for command, control, and support of forces

designated to support COMUSMACV Footboy air

operations.65 It tasked Headquarters Seventh AF,

14th SOW, 314th TAW (CCK, Taiwan), and the

15th SOS at Nha Trang AB. Mission capabilities

of the 15th SOS were allocated in support of SOG

operations. It placed the 15th SOS under the op -

erational control of the commander, Seventh AF,

administered through DCSO, 14th SOW. 66 The

OPORD established Seventh AF/Director of Op -

erations as the action agency responsible for

monitoring the SOG Mission Fragmentary Order.

As such, Seventh AF/DO was tasked to keep

abreast of all Combat Spear activities and to

maintain timely coordination with SOG 32 (Air

Studies Branch) on all matters.

The OPORD went on to delineate specific responsibilities of the 14th SOW/DCSO. The DCSO

was tasked to exercise operational control of the

15th SOS for the commander, Seventh AF, during

all missions operating within Seventh AF’s area

of responsibility. The DCSO was also responsible

for Seventh AF Frag Orders and for direct tasking by SOG for USAF assets under his control.

He continually informed Seventh AF/DOCO,

314th TAW, and SOG of technical and scheduling

details in support of Footboy air operations and

SOG combat airlift requirements. Mission details

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

106
were provided to SOG by the DCSO, with Seventh AF an information addressee on all message traffic. 6 7

The OPORD also outlined the following respon -

sibilities of SOG.

1. Establish mission priorities for air support furnished by USAF assets.

2. Provide direct tasking to the 14th SOW/DCSO for

air support furnished by 15th SOS.

3. Provide adequate, secure office space for Combat

Spear operations at Nha Trang.

4. Designate MACSOG 32 as the agency responsible

for the execution and flight monitoring of scheduled

Combat Spear missions. This responsibility in -

cluded:

a. Reviewing the scheduled mission profile,

weather, route, and times as a basis for rendering the go/no go decision.

b. Passing mission execution or cancellation decisions to the 15th SOS.

c. Monitoring mission launch times, flight follow -

ing of missions, and mission down times.

d. Keeping abreast of all Seventh AF/MACSOG

activities and maintaining timely coordination

with Seventh AF/DOCO on all matters con -

cerning the fragging and preplanned changes

to Combat Spear missions and with Seventh

AF TACC/DOCC on the execution of these missions.6 8

The general instructions of the OPORD stated

that the 15th SOS would not be used to support

operations other than unconventional warfare

missions without the specific approval of the commander in chief, Pacific Air Forces. The commander, Seventh AF, was given ultimate command of the 15th SOS Combat Talon assets while

they were operating in his area of responsibility.6 9

The OPORD also identified force requirements

needed to support the Combat Talon mission. The

unit equipment for the 15th SOS was listed as

four C-130E(I) aircraft. All aircraft were to be

Combat Spear configured. Monthly flying time allocated for each aircraft was 75 hours, and the

aircraft were manned with a crew ratio of 1.5 to

1.7 0 OPORD 460-70 finally satisfied Seventh AF

by detailing command and control relationships

between its headquarters and SOG.

With the bombing halt of the previous October

still in effect, Combat Talon unconventional warfare activities outside of South Vietnam re -

mained limited during 1969.7 1 Two additional

live surfa ce-to-air recovery demonstrations were

flown on 20 January and 26 February at Cubi

Point NAS, Philippines. SOG canceled one other

demonstration because of a conflict with a higherpriority mission.72 For February, as in each month

of 1969, SOG was allocated 300 hours of flyin g time

for the four-assigned 15th SOS Combat Ta lons. Due

to heavy combat support mission requiremen

the squadron overflew this allocation by 138

hours during the month. At the same time exper

enced 14th SOW maintenance personnel were r

tating back to the United States and being r

placed by three-level technicians. Aircraft par

also became more difficult to source and transpo

to Nha Trang AB. Available maintenance perso

nel were required to work 70 hours per week du

ing this period. As a result of all these factors, th

operational-ready rates plummeted during t

month of March.7 3

By May the summer rotation schedule was i

full swing. Three of the six assigned crews rotate

back to the United States by 1 July. For a bri

period the unit dropped below authorized ma

ning in certain crew positions; however, the r

duced manning did not prevent the 15th SO

from completing its assigned mission.74 On 21 Ju

the 15th SOS commander was picked up at Nh

Trang AB utilizing the Fulton STARS by Lt C

John F. Newell, the squadron operations officer.7

In June planning was begun for the reintegr

tion of field maintenance specialists back into th

15th SOS. This planning was necessitated by th

decision to move the 14th SOW from Nha Tran

AB to Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam. With Pre

dent Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnamization polic

coming to fruition, the majority of Nha Trang A

was scheduled to be turned over to the South V

etnamese Air Force. The 15th SOS and its sist

unit, 1st Flight Detachment, remained at Nh

Trang AB as the only two operational USAF uni

there. 7 6

On 5 August Colonel Newell assumed com 

mand of the 15th SOS from Colonel Kumme

Later in the month one Combat Talon aircra

was returned to the United States for modific

tions that would take approximately five mont

to complete. Three aircraft remained at Nh

Trang AB throughout the fall. On 8 Septemb

the 15th SOS performed a live surface-to-air reco

ery at Koke Kathiem, Thailand, for the king an

queen of Thailand.77

Fourth quarter 1969 was marked by the mov

of the 14th SOW from Nha Trang AB to Pha

Rang AB. Although major portions of Nha Tran

AB were turned over to the Vietnamese Air Forc

barracks were retained for remaining US perso

nel stationed there, along with the base officer

club. All AF personnel living off base were d

rected to move to base quarters. Until 20 Septem

ber 15th SOS officers and civilian technical repr

sentatives continued to live downtown in the An

COMBAT SPEA

107
Hoa Hotel. The move from the Anh Hoa Hotel to

on-base quarters began on 12 September and was

completed on the 20th. Several more days were

required to move government equipment from the

hotel to storage facilities on base. Each officer was

provided a one-man room that was supplied with

a refrigerator and an air-conditioner. Although

not as desirable as living downtown, base quarters were considered very adequate.78

The turmoil associated with the 14th SOW’s

departure from Nha Trang AB threw the 15th

SOS supply section into a tailspin. Several factors

contributed to decreased efficiency of the supply

unit. In August the supply section experienced a

100 percent turnover in personnel. In September

the move from the Anh Hoa Hotel created a large

requirement to account for and store government

assets located there. All excess equipment was

turned in, with the remainder either being stored

or installed in the Nha Trang Officers’ Club. The

biggest impact on 15th SOS supply, however, was

the transfer of the base supply function to the 12th

Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Cam Ranh Bay.7 9

Being separated from its primary support unit,

the 15th SOS would soon feel the strain of a system geographically detached and unresponsive to

its operational needs.

As 1969 came to a close, squadron members

looked back on the year with mixed emotions. No

aircraft had been lost to the enemy, yet the bombing halt remained in effect, thus preventing Talons from executing their primary UW mission

into North Vietnam. The Anh Hoa Hotel had been

returned to its Vietnamese owners, and most of

Nha Trang AB had been turned over to the Vietnamese Air Force. Officers and civilian technical

representatives were living on base in quarters

formerly occupied by 14th SOW personnel. Several popular leisure activities that were located at

the Anh Hoa Hotel were moved to the officers’

club, including the shuffleboard and nightly movies.

The unit looked forward to 1970 and, hopefully, an

increase in combat tasking.

Air Operations—1969

During 1969 the 15th SOS continued its aircrew proficiency training program. Training missions, however, were only a small percentage of the

overall flying effort, as logistics support require -

ments placed great demands on the unit. A breakdown of Combat Talon flight time, for example, revealed that 79 percent of the total flying hours

were devoted to logistics support, 10 percent to

combat support missions, and 4 percent to maintenance flights.8 0

Mission figures for 1969 showed that Combat

Talon aircraft flew 12 combat missions. They

transported 7,681,460 pounds of cargo and 42,590

passengers. Combat Spear crews conducted 18

Black Baron training sessions, but the number of

Red Baron missions could not be determined,

since the crews conducted this training in con -

junction with routine logistics missions. Combat

Talon aircrews practiced low-level terrain-following

flight and demonstrated the Fulton recovery system on six occasions throughout the year. Several

factors adversely affected aircraft utilization. Aircraft availability rates for the C-130E(I) decreased because of modification programs as the

aircraft began rotating back to the United States

in August.81

1970: Redeployment Efforts

Beginning in 1970 and extending into 1971,

the Air Force began a series of initiatives, outlined by two memorandums from the chief of

staff, Air Force to JCS in May and September of

1970, to withdraw the Combat Talon from South

Vietnam. The thrust of the Air Force position

was that Combat Talon aircraft were not being

used sufficiently in a combat role to justify their

retention in South Vietnam and that most SOG

logistics requirements could be satisfied by the

Common User Airlift System. MACV, however,

with CINCPAC’s backing, insisted that these assets remain in South Vietnam. Countering the

Air Force rationale, MACV cited the “maintain in

readiness” doctrine postulated by the JCS after

the bombing halt in 1968 and contended that security considerations precluded the use of Common User Airlift System to transport SOG’s sensitive cargo and passengers. 82

Although no formal proposals to relocate the

unit actually surfaced until 1970, Air Force planners had expressed concern over the utilization of

the Combat Spear aircraft as early as the summer of 1969. A commander in chief, PACAF

(CINCPACAF) message, dated 12 August 1969,

revealed that the use of Combat Talon aircraft

had come under close examination from October

1968 to July 1969. PACAF analysis showed that

81 percent of 15th SOS flying time was devoted

to combat support (logistics) missions, whereas

only 7 percent was committed to combat missions

and about 8 percent to training missions.83

The 1970 SOG history stated that Seventh AF

proposed relocation of the Combat Spear unit as

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

108
early as January 1970. The earliest firsthand

documentation, however, was a 17 April 1970 letter from the commander, Seventh AF to COMUS -

MACV, which made the following statement.

Examination of this unit (15th SOS), in terms of its

essentiality as an element of MACV strength, leads to

the conclusion that, in the present and likely future

context of limitations on US force structure in SEA, it is

marginally productive:

a. It is special mission, contingency-oriented as op -

posed to the multipurpose, firepower orientation of

tactical units subject to withdrawal now and in the

future.

b. It requires space and supporting personnel and fa -

cilities at Nha Trang which will impede expansion of

the VNAF under the I&M (Improvement and Mod -

ernization) program.

c. Relocation in-country (i.e., to Cam Ranh Bay) re -

quires extraordinary preparation and investment.

d. For the last eight months, the hours flown were less

than one [sic] percent combat, 20 percent mission

peculiar (sensitive combat support), with the remainder being routine logistic support, which can be

accomplished by the MACV in-country airlift system

or dedicated off-shore support.

In my view, there is insufficient justification to main -

tain this unit at Nha Trang or to move it elsewhere in

SEA. I question the essentiality of its contingency mission in competition with other units in an austere force

structure; however, retention and relocation offshore

(Taiwan) may be warranted.84

The commander, Seventh AF, concluded the discussion with the recommendation that COMUSMACV concur on one of two proposals. The first

proposal was, as a minimum, to relocate the 15th

SOS to an offshore location. The second proposal

called for the deactivation of the unit if further

joint examination warranted. COMUSMACV did

not agree to either proposal.8 5

With COMUSMACV’s nonconcurrence to the

commander, Seventh AF proposals merely shifted

discussions to higher echelons of command.

CINCPACAF dispatched a message on 15 May

1970 stating that the time might be right for the

CSAF to intercede with the JCS on this matter.

On 21 May 1970 a CSAF memo was presented to

the JCS. It contained a brief historical sketch of

the Combat Talon aircraft and presented statistics

similar to those contained in the earlier PACAF

analysis.86 The CSAF memo went on to recommend

that Combat Talon support to SOG be provided on a

temporary basis from an offshore location. This

would provide SOG with the unique capabilities of

the Combat Talon aircraft when mission require -

ments dictated and would provide CINCPACAF

with greater flexibility in satisfying CINCPAC theater-wide special operations requirements. Specific

benefits of an offshore-based unit were noted 

the memo that follows:

a. Protecting the weapons system for future employ -

ment in its primary UW mission.

b. Permitting tactical training to sustain proficiency for

deep penetration into hostile environments.

c. Providing CINCPAC flexibility by being able to operate from any forward base in PACOM.

d. Providing CINCPAC a responsive force to conduct

on-going [sic] Psyops throughout PACOM.

e. Affording a substantial saving by basing the C-130s

with like aircraft while permitting rapid deployment

to forward operating bases.

f. In keeping with present national policy of withdrawing forces from the RVN [Republic of Vietnam].8 7

Because of the joint/combined service implic

tions of the CSAF proposal, the JCS solicite

CINCPAC and MACV for comment. CINCPAC r

sponses on 12 June and 4 July, supported by 

COMUSMACV message on 1 July, strongly o

posed the CSAF position. CINCPAC, in additio

to advancing the same argument that COMU

MACV used against the Seventh AF proposa

stated that deployment of the Combat Talon unit 

an offshore location would include an addition

cost and that the split operation would degra

SOG’s capabilities to support emerging mission r

quirements throughout SEA. CINCPAC furth

noted that the Vietnamese Air Force was incapab

of furnishing the necessary air support and d

rectly contested statistics perta ining to Comb

Talon flying time provided by Seventh AF. He al

stated that the aircraft were being “fully used 

combat or sensitive combat support missions.” T

JCS agreed with CINCPAC and denied the CSA

request.88

Despite unfavorable consideration by the JC

on the first CSAF memorandum, a CSAF trip r

port on a July visit to SEA indicated that sta

action should continue to relocate the Comb

Talon unit. Preliminary Air Force actions ce

tered on attempts to acquire more manageme

information on all aspects of air support to SOG

These unilateral efforts to obtain more definitiv

operational statistics were, by themselves, to n

avail; for in the final analysis, the Air Force ha

to convince the Joint Staff. After some headw

was made, the CSAF again asserted his desire 

relocate the 15th SOS. The proposal appeared 

have been ill timed. A “personal for” message (co

respondence that receives special handling by th

message center to ensure that only the person 

whom it is addressed receives and reads the me

sage), dated 12 October 1970 from CINCPAC 

the chairman, JCS, requested an abrupt stop 

any attempts to change the location of the 15

COMBAT SPEA

109
SOS.89 The message effectively stopped all pending relocation actions for Combat Spear.

The Combat Talon unit remained at Nha Trang

AB until 1972, closing out its operation shortly

before the deactivation of SOG. Although earlier

attempts by the Air Force to withdraw the unit

from South Vietnam were unsuccessful, these attempts did focus high-level attention on the unit

and thus enabled the Air Force to acquire more

comprehensive management information on the

unit’s activities.

90

Business as Usual at Nha Trang Air Base

Colonel Newell continued in command of the

15th SOS until 23 February 1970, when he relinquished command to Lt Col Leo W. Tubay. Training requirements continued to be a high-emphasis

item for the squadron. Three additional surfaceto-air recovery demonstrations were performed—

two on 25 February (one at Lop Buri, Thailand,

and a second at Nha Trang AB) and one on 14

March at Clark AB, Philippines. The Nha Trang

AB demonstration was for Maj Gen Wilburn

Dolvin, chief of staff, MACV. The Lop Buri pickup

was for approximately 50 delegates to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The pickup at

Clark was in support of the Pacific Jungle Survival School.91

The year 1970 started with a record few combat missions being flown. Aircrews and support

personnel were kept busy, however, performing

logistical and training missions. President Nixon’s

Vietnamization policy continued to reduce US

forces stationed in SEA. The bombing halt continued in effect, thus eliminating any combat opera -

tions into North Vietnam. The Fulton system, designed to extract downed crew members from

deep behind enemy lines, was not the system of

choice for recoveries where rotary-wing aircraft

could be employed. Therefore, the Fulton recovery

mission was virtually eliminated as an option for

tactical employment. Relocation options for the

squadron would be a major point of discussion

until October 1970, when CINCPAC successfully

killed all relocation initiatives.92

During the spring quarter, the 15th SOS sustained moderate battle damage from ground fire

on aircraft 64-0568. One loadmaster crew member

(John C. Stumpf) suffered a bullet wound to his

left arm. The aircraft was flown to CCK, Taiwan,

for repairs that could not be accomplished at Nha

Trang AB. 93 Another live surface-to-air recovery

demonstration was performed for the Pacific Jungle Survival School on 23 May.94

When the 14th SOW moved from Nha Trang

AB to Phan Rang AB in mid-1969, responsibility

for managing maintenance personnel assignments shifted to the 483d Tactical Support Group

at Cam Ranh Bay. Resultant manning support

proved to be unacceptable for the 15th SOS due to

a large decline in skill levels and in shortages of

assigned personnel. To correct this situation, effective 1 January 1970, Seventh AF/DP began

managing all personnel assignments for the 15th

SOS. Resultant improvements in maintenance

personnel manning were considerable. This policy

was changed, however, effective in September

1970, when the 483d again assumed manning responsibility for the 15th SOS. After this time the

Seventh AF retained manning responsibility for

enlisted aircrew manning, including AFSC’s

A293X2E, A431X1A, A435X0A, and A607X0.95

On 10 September another live surface-to-air re -

covery was performed at Clark AB. The demonstration was delayed for an approaching typhoon and

later for aircraft maintenance. As in previous dem -

onstrations for the survival school, students and

faculty alike were appreciative of the support.

96

Late summer brought about a reapportionment

of billets previously occupied by 15th SOS officers

at Nha Trang AB. USA personnel had been assigned to the base when the 14th SOW relocated

to Phan Rang AB the previous fall. A new agreement between the USAF and USA assigned 50

percent of available air-conditioned rooms to Army

personnel. Room assignments were made based

upon crew duty status and on date of rank. The

two 15th SOS technical representatives also lived

in the air-conditioned quarters shared by USAF

and USA officers. Officer morale remained high,

with movies and shuffleboard in the officers’ club,

and tennis courts, the library, and a stereo taperecording center all within one block of their assigned quarters. A close social relationship sprang

up between Air Force and Army officers sharing

the barracks’ facilities. Enlisted personnel spent

many man-hours participating in self-help projects designed to improve the quality of their

quarters. These projects included remodeling the

hallway on the lower floor, laying tile in all rooms

and in the hallway, and converting the lounge

area into a small movie theater.97

As was the case during the previous two summers, there was a near 100 percent turnover of assigned squadron personnel during the summer of

1970. July witnessed the heaviest turnove r. With

many replacement crew members not arrivin g unt il

August, a serious degradation of combat-ready

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

110
r esources resulted. Available combat-ready crews

dropped from six to three during this period. By

September the number of combat crews had again

reached five and continued to increase to six

throughout the fall.98

The future of the 15th SOS continued to be

tenuous, with rumors reaching the squadron of

attempts either to disband the unit or to relocate

it to an offshore location. There was strong pressure from Seventh AF and PACAF to move the

squadron and just as much pressure to maintain

the unit at Nha Trang AB from SOG. As October

arrived a new initiative was revealed—the 15th

SOS was to be renamed the 90th SOS. 9 9

Department of the Air Force Movement Order

Number 27, dated 23 October 1970, directed the

commander, Seventh AF, to take necessary action

to move the 90th Attack Squadron from Bien Hoa

AB, South Vietnam, to Nha Trang AB, without

personnel and equipment.100 Once at Nha Trang

AB, the 90th was assigned to the 14th SOW and

renamed the 90th SOS. Personnel and equipment

of the 15th SOS were transferred in place to the

90th SOS, and the 15th SOS designation was retired from active service. Colonel Tubay became

the first commander of the 90th SOS, effective 1

November 1970. Air Force leadership made the

decision to retain the 90th designation on active

duty due to its long and colorful heritage dating

back to World War I. Nonetheless, there was some

reluctance to give up the old 15th SOS designa -

tion.101 It would be nearly 25 years before the 15th

SOS flag would be raised again at Hurlburt Field,

Florida, with the unit operating the MC-130H

Combat Talon II.

Live surface-to-air recovery demonstrations

continued during the last three months of 1970.

Three demonstrations were performed at Clark

AB (10 October, 14 November, and 5 December),

one at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, on 30 October,

and one at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, on 31 October. Live demonstrations continued as a point of

pride within the squadron and helped to build

confidence in the system by prospective customers. As in previous years, however, the Fulton recovery system was not employed operationally for

an actual combat recovery.102

By year’s end an effort to consolidate 90th SOS

officers into the two-building complex of building

1538 and building 1532 was realized. The year

1970 had been marked by numerous changes, including the renaming of the squadron. As the war

in SEA continued to wind down for American

forces stationed there, the 90th SOS looked toward

1971 with expectations of increased employme

into Cambodia.103

Air Operations—1970

In 1970 the number of combat support missio

flown by the 15th SOS increased significantl

Combat Talon aircraft executed 18 of 21 sche

uled combat missions within SEA. No missio

were flown into North Vietnam. Logistic airli

also increased because of higher “in-commissio

and availability of aircraft rates. Combat Talo

carried 4,874,600 pounds of cargo and 23,515 pa

sengers.104

Existing logistics airlift commitments and 

lack of interceptor aircraft participation limite

aircrew proficiency training during the year. Th

15th SOS accomplished nine Black Baron event

Combat Talon crews accomplished Red Baro

training during in-country airlift missions. I

a ddition to ECM training, crews practiced low

level, terrain-following flights in the Philippin

about every three months. Fulton recovery pickup

(both live and utilizing sandbags) continued to co

stitute a part of Combat Talon training through 

out the ye ar. 105

1971: Cambodia and

the PSYOPS Campaign

The long-awaited increase in combat missio

tasking came to fruition during the first thre

months of 1971. SOG tasked the squadron to co

duct strategic PSYOPS leaflet drops on to Camb

dia. Five combat missions were flown each wee

in addition to continuing combat support mi

sions. The increased workload was readily a

cepted by the squadron, and morale soared 

heights not seen since the bombing halt of 1968.

Lt Col Ernest L. Howell assumed command of th

90th SOS on 1 February 1971 from Colon

Tubay. Two live surface-to-air recoveries we

made at Clark AB on 24 January and 6 Februa

in support of the squadron’s commitment to th

Pacific Jungle Survival School.107 During the se

ond quarter of 1971, three more live surface-to-a

recoveries were made for the school—two on 

May and one on 14 June.108

The self-help program for the enlisted barrac

was recognized during an inspector general (IG

inspection of Nha Trang AB. The team recognize

the 90th SOS enlisted barracks as the best it ha

seen in South Vietnam. The team chief went on 

speculate that the barracks were probably th

best in all of SEA.109

COMBAT SPEA

111
Since the move of the 14th SOW from Nha

Trang AB, aircraft parts for the Combat Talon

had become increasingly more difficult to source.

The 90th SOS supply section was a satellite of the

483d TAW located at Cam Ranh Bay, and being a

SOF unit assigned to the 14th SOW, it did not

have a high priority when aircraft parts were

needed. To fix the parts-sourcing problem, a C130 war readiness spares kit was approved by

PACAF for the 90th SOS in May 1971. The kit

was located at Nha Trang AB and greatly simplified sourcing of parts for the Combat Talon. Up to

that time, supply personnel at Nha Trang AB

were dependent upon a forward supply point

stocked from Cam Ranh Bay. Due to many factors, the forward supply point had never operated

satisfactorily. The WRSK proved to be a vital

source of spare parts for the squadron.110

As SEA continued to draw down for US forces

stationed there, facilities previously maintained

and supported by the 14th SOW were reduced

at Nha Trang AB. When the 14th relocated to

Phan Rang AB, the 327th Combat Support

Group was formed at Nha Trang AB to coordinate base support requirements with Cam Ranh

Bay. As part of the Vietnamization pr ocess, the

327th was later deactivated, and Nha Trang AB

was transferred to Vietnamese control. As the

major USAF unit remaining at Nha Trang AB

after the transfer, the 90th fell heir to the remaining base functions still needed to support

the troops stationed there. (A medical aid station,

the security police force, and remaining supply

personnel were attached to the squadron.) The

deactivation of the 327th had a huge impact on

the quality of life for remaining personnel, but

the 90th stepped up and did its best to maintain

services at an acceptable level. 111

There were other closures on Nha Trang AB

due to the base transfer. The combined officer/

NCO club was transferred to the Vietnamese Air

Force and was unavailable to US personnel.

Other base services that closed included the base

exchange, snack bar, library, tape center, and

dining hall. Personnel were no longer able to ob -

tain meals on Nha Trang AB. The 90th SOS set

up bus transportation to the nearest dining facility, which was located three miles away at the

US Army’s Camp McDermott.112 The beach area

continued to be a place where personnel could go

and relax when off duty.

The 90th SOS joined with other units remaining at Nha Trang AB to form a community reactions committee with the sole purpose of identifying problems in the support area and then

formulating possible solutions to those common

problems. Such subjects as linen exchange, supplies for BOQ, trash removal, and Civil Engineering support were addressed. Several working subcommittees were established to address specific

areas of concern. The community reactions committee became the single representative body that

instituted plans and policies that affected all

units, thus eliminating inconsistencies and annoyances and improving maintenance and appearance of the base.113

To offset the closure of the combined club, both

officers and noncommissioned officers constructed

their own separate club facilities. By year’s end

the new clubs were operating as the social centers

of the base. The new officers’ club facility was burglarized, and the sound system, movie projector,

and bar stock were stolen. Vietnamese Air Force

authorities denied the squadron’s request to hire

a security guard, so other measures were taken to

improve physical security. The noncommissioned

officers set about building bunkers around their

club from discarded sandbags found around the

base, while officers relied on better locks to protect their assets.114

The squadron had operated throughout the

year with four Combat Talon aircraft. On 1 July

aircraft 64-0568 left Nha Trang AB for CCK, and

on 10 July it was transferred to TAC and returned to the United States. For the remainder of

the year, the 90th SOS possessed three aircraft—

64-0523, 64-0555, and 64-0567.115 Two additional

Photo courtesy of Len Butler

On 6 February 1971, Capt Len Butler successfully extracted Maj Don James utilizing the Fulton STARS.

Picture shows the first unsuccessful attempt. Butler

“fended” the line on the first try due to severe

crosswinds and balloon layover of 35°. On the second

try, everything worked as advertised. Butler did not

miss again throughout his long career in Combat Talon.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

112
live surface-to-air pickups were made during the

summer for the Pacific Jungle Survival School.

One was made on 12 July and a second on 30

August. On 25 August one Combat Talon received

minor battle damage from ground fire while flying

a support mission in South Vietnam. The aircraft

was repaired and returned to operational status

the same d ay.116

September marked another milestone. On 1 Sep -

tember the 90th SOS and 1st Flight Detachment

were transferred from the 14th SOW at Phan Rang

AB to the 483d TAW at Cam Ranh Bay due to the

pending closure of the 14th SOW. On 10 September

a formal deactivation ceremony was held at Phan

Rang AB for the 14th SOW, and the wing was officially deactivated on 30 September 1971.117 In October Lt Col Robert N. Pinard arrived at Nha Trang

AB as the squadron commander-des ignate. Having

just completed Combat Talon training at Pope AFB,

he had observed two incidents of sky anchor failure

during STARS training, a condition that resulted in

the pickup package being dropped by the aircraft.

He surmised that if the sandbag had been an actual

live pickup, the individual could have died. He advised Howell of the sky anchor failures, and after

weighing the pros and cons of continued live pick -

ups during training, Howell decided to suspend

temporarily live recoveries during training missions. He continued to support recoveries for actual

operational missions. On 5 November Pinard assumed command from Howell and made the “no live

recoveries for training” policy permanent.118 The USbased Combat Knife unit at Pope AFB and the Com -

bat Arrow unit in Europe were not performing live

recoveries when the policy went into effect. With the

Combat Spear unit no longer performing live recoveries, none were made for the next eight years.

As 1971 came to a close, 90th SOS personnel

were authorized to wear the bush hat with their

utility uniform. The colorful bush hat’s origins

could be traced to World War II, the ChinaBurma-India theater, and the 1st Air Commando

Group. Although the hat was quite popular among

squadron personnel, leadership in the 483d TAW

did not appreciate its origins and promptly banned

wearing the hat at Cam Ranh Bay. Wearing the

bush hat was tenuous at best, but 90th SOS personnel wore it at Nha Trang AB while performing

official duties in their field uniforms.119

Air Operations—1971

In 1971 the 90th SOS increased its unit flying

time, primarily as a result of expanded PSYOPS

missions into Cambodia. On 25 January the 90th

assumed responsibility for the aerial delivery 

leaflets under the program names of Frant

Goat, Fountain Pen, and Brown Stallion. In al

the 90th SOS successfully completed 226 comb

missions (including PSYOPS missions) of 28

scheduled. Mission figures for 1971 included a

increase in the number of infiltration and resu

ply missions. Overall logistics airlift during th

year reflected a de crease in tonnage, due prima

ily to greater reliance on 834th Air Division a

sets. Training statistics for 1971 were doc

mented using total flying hours rather tha

numbers of missions; therefore, a comparison 

previous years was not possible. 120

1972: Relocation from SEA

With the deactivation of the 14th SOW and th

transfer of Nha Trang AB to Vietnamese A

Photo courtesy of Len Butler

The beach area was a popular meeting place for the 90

SOS. Pictured in May 1971 is crew SG-21. Standing, le

to right: John Murphy, Len Butler, Ray Doyle, Tim T

rell, Dave Haynes, Cliff Steger, and unknown. Kneelin

Bill Laughlin, Charlie Jones, and Bob Cepeck.

Photo courtesy of Len Butler

The original “Hole-in-the-Wall” gang. Note “Big Red” 

the back wall. Pictured left to right: Don James, Denz

Greene, Len Butler, and Wayne Mathias.

COMBAT SPEA

113
Force control the previous fall, it was apparent

that the 90th SOS’s days in SEA were numbered.

The driving force keeping the unit in South Vietnam was SOG, and SOG was in its last four

months of existence. Air Force leadership was still

convinced that the mission could be performed

from an offshore location. Throughout South Vietnam, the US military was withdrawing and turn -

ing over facilities to its Vietnamese counterparts.

On 3 January 1972, with three of four authorized aircraft possessed, the 90th SOS sent aircraft

64-0567 for IRAN at CCK and subsequently on to

the 7th SOS in Germany. In exchange the 90th

received aircraft 64-0551. From January to March

1972, the 90th flew 164 MACSOG-tasked missions, the majority being PSYOPS leaflet drops

into Cambodia.121

At the squadron level, rumors continued to

abound regarding the relocation of the squadron.

During the latter part of the quarter, the squadron was notified that it would move to Kadena

AB, Okinawa, by mid-April. Colonel Pinard and

his staff set about planning the details of the

move. It soon became apparent that there was

insufficient airlift to move the squadron expeditiously, so squadron loadmasters developed load

plans to move everything by way of organic airlift.

Concurrently, all SOG missions were supported

during the April move. By the end of April, all

90th SOS personnel and equipment had been relocated to Kadena AB. Although the unit continued to support SEA operations for another two

years, relocation outside South Vietnam closed a

colorful chapter in Combat Talon history. On 15

May 1972 SOG was deactivated and was redesignated the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team.122

Six years of Combat Talon support to SOG

achieved mixed results, primarily due to various

obstacles endemic to SEA operations. The follow -

ing factors were the major limitations to overall

mission success.

 1. North Vietnam, under a strong totalitarian regime,

was a closed society with efficient antisubversion

machinery.

 2. High echelon control and mission approval/disapproval procedures impeded the planning and execu -

tion of operations.

 3. Diplomatic restrictions, such as the initial limitation on overflights of Laotian territory and on the

use of Thai facilities, restricted flexible planning of

missions.

 4. Terrain features and climatic conditions imposed

severe difficulties in achieving accurate aerial de -

livery of personnel and supplies.

 5. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong apparently

had a good intelligence collection system near Long

Thanh training facility and possibly had secured

information sources in the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate.

 6. There was not full cooperation between the American Embassy, Vientiane, and MACSOG.

 7. The air defense system of North Vietnam prevented

operations in the vicinity of population centers for

both the C-123 Heavy Hook and the C-130 Combat

Talon.

 8. A shortage of air assets limited the number of com -

bat operations and training exercises.

 9. Navigational aids on SOG fixed-wing aircraft did

not enable pinpoint delivery accuracy in aerial

drops over obscured drop zones.

10. Heavy cloud cover and other missions of higher priority sometimes denied SOG the necessary aerial

photography for mission planning.123

The full extent of USAF’s contribution to the

SOG UW program cannot be measured. Statistics

relate only part of the story and do not capture

the color of the SOG mission and the people who

executed it. USAF members participating in SOG

operations were highly dedicated, well trained,

and operated sophisticated aircraft to support unusual missions. The organization itself was unusual. It was flexible and divorced from standard

command and control channels. Stringent secu -

rity procedures wrapped it in a mantle of secrecy.124 Combat Talon crews continued to support

US operations in SEA operating from Kadena AB

and from its forward operating location (FOL) in

Thailand.

Redesignation as the 1st SOS

With transfer of the 90th SOS to Kadena AB,

Okinawa, in March 1972, the squadron’s chain of

command also changed. The unit consisted of 38

officers and 44 enlisted men and was assigned to

the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB.

The 18th TFW reported to the 313th Air Division, also located at Kadena AB, and the 313th

AD reported to Fifth AF at Yakota AB, Japan.

Above Fifth AF was PACAF at Hickham AFB,

Hawaii, and Headquarters United States Air Force,

at the Pentagon.125 When the unit deployed to its

FOL location in Thailand, OPCON was exercised

by Thirteenth AF, which was the numbered air

force responsible for all Air Force operations originating from that country. With the reorganization

of SOG and the end of US combat forces stationed

in Vietnam, both SOG and Seventh AF were no

longer in the 90th SOS’s chain of command.

During the months following relocation, Colonel Pinard and his staff stayed busy with beddown requirements at Kadena AB. Building 3433

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

114
served as the squadron’s administrative and op -

erations headquarters, while building 874 housed

the loadmaster section and stored the Fulton

STARS equipment. Squadron life support was located in one-third of building 3432 along with individual aircrew lockers used to store aircrew flight

gear. The fourth facility assigned to the 90th SOS

was a quonset hut (building T-829), which provided storage for infrequently used equipment

items. 126 Unaccompanied billeting was a problem

from the beginning at Kadena AB, with enlisted

members being housed in Barracks 713, which

was a substandard, nonair-conditioned facility.

Although the unit’s days at Nha Trang AB had

ended, the squadron continued to fulfill an opera -

tional commitment to SEA. The squadron established an FOL at Nakom Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, and maintained one aircraft and one crew

there, with a small support staff and a maintenance package, to fly leaflet missions targeted primarily at North Vietnam. On 10 November 1972

the squadron was notified that its four Clampmodified Talons would be replaced with four Yank

aircraft equipped with more powerful Allison T56-

A-15 engines (see chap. 2).*127

On 20 November the squadron was alerted for

deployment of a second aircraft and crew to NKP

in preparation for an expanded PSYOPS campaign designed to coincide with the peace talks

taking place in Paris. The operation was designated Tempo Surge, and Pinard put two aircrews

on 24-hour alert status. On 10 December, with

peace talks at a critical phase, the 90th SOS sent

a second aircraft and two crews to NKP. Pinard

deployed forward to supervise arrangements associated with the expanded operation. For the

first week, the 90th SOS, supported by 18th TFW

maintenance personnel, flew multiple sorties

daily while living in hot, open-bay barracks. Because of the overcrowding at NKP, Pinard and

his staff began to look for a better base of opera -

tions, one capable of accommodating the expanded taskin g.128

Before deploying for Tempo Surge, word arrived

at Kadena AB that the squadron would be redesignated the 1st SOS. PACAF Movement Order

Number 15, dated 5 De cember 1972, directed th

commanders, Thirteenth Air Force and Fifth A

Force, to take whatever actions necessary to rel

cate the 1st SOS and the 90th SOS, without pe

sonnel and equipment, from NKP, Thailand, an

Kadena AB, Okinawa, to Kadena AB and Clar

AB, respectively, effective 15 December 197

Upon arrival of the 1st SOS flag at Kadena AB

the squadron was reassigned to the 18th TF

and assumed the assets of the 90th SOS. In tur

the 90th SOS moved to Clark AB and was a

signed to the 405th Fighter Wing awaiting pe

sonnel and equipment.**129

On 13 December the first Yank aircraft, ta

number 63-7785, arrived at Kadena AB. The fir

training flight in the new aircraft was conducte

on 14 December, and by the end of the mont

most personnel had been trained. With Temp

Surge operations in full swing, fully one-half 

the newly designated 1st SOS was deployed to i

FOL in Thailand. On 15 December aircraft 6

0561 was sent to Ramstein AB, Germany, as pa

of the aircraft redistribution program, and w

permanently assigned to the 7th SOS. 130 A secon

Yank aircraft (62-1843) arrived at Kadena fro

LAS Ontario on 6 February 1973.

__________

 *The four aircraft—62-1843, 63-7785, 64-0564, and 64-0565—had formerly been Yard-configured and were assigned to the Heavy Cha

program. When Heavy Chain was terminated earlier in the year, the four aircraft were modified into the Yank configuration and were assigned 

Combat Spear in the Pacific. The more powerful engines allowed higher operating altitudes critical to the high-altitude delivery of PSYO

material.

 **The 1st SOS had been stationed at NKP RTAFB, Thailand, flying A-1E Skyraiders from December 1967 to November 1972. The squadron fl

its last mission in the A-1 Skyraider on 7 November 1972. Unit aircraft and equipment were transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force and oth

friendly countries in the region, and its personnel were reassigned to units throughout the Air Force. The 90th SOS had been a fighter squadr

when its flag was transferred to Nha Trang AB without personnel or equipment, to absorb the de activated 15th SOS. The 90th was retained 

active duty, and the 15th SOS flag was retired at that time. With the move of the 90th’s flag to Clark AB, Philippines, it became once agai

fighter squadron flying the F-4 Phantom.

Photo courtesy of Steve Cromer

Combat Spear rigged for leaflet drop during Temp

Surge. Note the flare pistol held by the loadmaste

Steve Cromer. It gave new meaning to the old phra

“unarmed and unafraid.”

COMBAT SPEA

115
Tempo Surge was having its affect on the enemy.

Radio Hanoi and other communist-oriented radio

stations in SEA devoted hours of broadcast time

trying to negate the effects of the campaign. Instructions were broadcast directing the populace

to immediately destroy individual leaflets before reading them, and campaigns were begun

to collect large quantities of leaflets for ceremonial burning. The leaflets covered a myriad of

subjects, including Henry Kissinger’s secret

peace talks in Paris, messages from President

Nixon and other US officials, and conditions of

North Vietnamese troops on the battlefield.131

One special mission tasked to the 1st SOS during Tempo Surge was the dropping of packages

containing small transistor radios with batteries.

The radios were pretuned to stations that broadcast information and music prepared by the Asian

version of Radio Free Europe. The mission was

effective in reaching North Vietnamese farmers,

soldiers, and peasants who could not read.132

Concurrent with increased temporary duty assignments to SEA, training requirements continued at an accelerated pace. Two crews deployed to

Clark AB, Philippines, for week-long, low-level

training in the rugged mountains there. Each de -

ployment accomplished more than 20 training sorties, with low-level operations being emphasized.

Because Kadena AB was located on the island of

Okinawa, only minimal training could be accomplished at home station. Limited airdrop, surfaceto-air recovery, and assault landing operations

could be completed at the training area at Ie

Shima. With the arrival of the two Yank aircraft,

which were not Fulton-equipped, recovery training requirements were reduced to two STARSqualified aircrews.133 The 1st SOS maintained the

STARS capability until August 1973, when the

last Fulton-equipped aircraft (64-0566) was transferred to the 318th SOS at Pope AFB.

1973: Cease-Fire in Vietnam

As the New Year began, the 1st SOS continued

to support Tempo Surge. During the first 28 days

of January, the squadron flew 46 PSYOPS/leaflet

missions, often changing targets and/or routings

just before takeoff to accommodate the rapidly

changing battlefield environment in Vietnam. The

tactical situation was changing each hour due in

part to the volatile political situation leading up

to the cease-fire agreement. At 0000Z on 28 January 1973, the cease-fire agreement was signed,

thus bringing to a close direct American military

involvement in Vietnam. The 1st SOS’s role in

Tempo Surge was brought to an end with the

signing of the cease-fire.134

The PSYOPS campaign had its affect on the

cease-fire process. The North Vietnamese became

so enraged at some of the leaflets that they began

naming individual leaflets delivered by the 1st

SOS in their retaliatory propaganda broadcasts.

Several messages were received from higher

headquarters congratulating the squadron on its

superior performance, the most notable of which

came from Kissinger himself. In a 7 February

1973 letter, Kissinger stated:

The President greatly appreciated the very effective

manner in which the Department of Defense supported

the [US] Government’s psychological warfare campaign

against North Vietnam. Among the many tasks under -

taken with great dedication and professionalism, that of

creating a variety of specialized leaflets and dropping

them in the hundreds of millions, was a noteworthy

accomplishment. These efforts contributed markedly to

the success of the program designed to help bring an

end to hostilities.135

When the cease-fire was established for Vietnam, 1st SOS tasking was shifted to Cambodia.

Although the intensity of activities lessened, the

squadron continued to fly daily sorties into Cambodian airspace with one aircraft and crew assigned to its FOL. On 17 February the 1st SOS

moved its FOL from NKP to Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, where better facilities were available with

less crowding. Unit aircraft were utilized to move

assets from NKP to Takhli RTAFB. During the

move, the squadron continued to fly tasked missions into Cambodia, not canceling a single sortie.136

While high-level combat operations were being

flown out of the FOL in Thailand, low-level training requirements continued to challenge squadron members back at Kadena AB. In its 14 March

1973 message, Thirteenth AF notified the 1st

SOS that a ll low-level flights were canceled over

the Phili ppine island of Luzon. The message cited

political reasons for the termination of low-level op -

erations.137 As a result of the loss of training, on 22

March the squadron began flying low-level route

surveys in South Korea. Up to that time, the squadron depended almost exclusively on the Philippines

for low-level proficiency training. The mountainous

terrain found in South Korea proved to be even more

challenging than the routes flown in the Philippines.138 Required agreements were finalized during

April, and the routes were operational in May. The

1st SOS was authorized to conduct low-level operations at night, three times a week, by the 314th AD

(located at Osan AB, Republic of Korea) and by the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

116
Korean government.139 To ensure that the squadron would not be caught again with a sole source for

low-level training, the 1st SOS began preparing additional training routes in Taiwan.140

Throughout the spring of 1973, the 1st SOS

was assigned five aircraft—three Yank and two

Clamp (62-1843, 63-7785, 64-0564, 64-0566, and

64-0567). Yank aircraft 64-0564 arrived in April,

with Clamp aircraft 64-0567 being retained by

the unit until 10 August. During the summer the

PSYOPS campaign continued to target Cambodia. North Vietnam had invaded that country,

and the US government attempted to turn the

tide of battle in favor of the provisional Cambodian army. Captured North Vietnamese soldiers

indicated that PSYOPS leaflets dropped by 1st

SOS aircraft were definitely having an effect on

both soldiers and civilians on the ground. A

North Vietnamese company commander surrendered to a South Vietnamese unit and indicated

that he had personally seen the effects of leaflets,

radios, and counterfeit bank notes during the

past year. He further stated that all were quite

effective and were a deciding factor in influencing him to surren der.141

In March the squadron received the SA-1800CCAN/UNH airborne speaker system, project codenamed Big Mouth, to augment its PSYOPS capabilities. On 9 May the system was tested over the Ie

Shima training range, and optimum operational altitudes were established. By 25 June the results of

the tests had been tabulated, and aircrew checklists

were sent to PACAF for approval and incorporation

into MCM 55-130, volume 2. The speaker system

provided either a microphone or tape input capa -

bility that was amplified and then transmitted outside the aircraft through the left paratroop door.

Although not immediately employed in SEA, the

new system promised to improve PSYOPS capabilities for the squadron.142

On 23 August 1973 the 1st SOS ferried aircraft

64-0566 to the 318th SOS at Pope AFB. With its

departure the Fulton STARS capability was no

longer deployed to the Pacific region. Remaining

Fulton equipment was sent back to Pope AFB.

Unit personnel remained current in the capability

until the end of the year, although no additional

recoveries were made from August onward. The

system had proved to be a unique capability, but

the cost associated with maintaining proficiency

and keeping the system operational by maintenance personnel proved to be an expensive undertaking. The 318th SOS maintained a STARS commitment to PACAF, and it could be tasked to

forward deploy if the capability was needed i

theater.143

With its requirement to fly low-level trainin

missions in South Korea, the 1st SOS sought 

become more involved in Korean exercises. T

squadron was not earmarked for Korean emplo

ment in time of war, and unless it participated 

the joint/combined exercise program there, its a

proval to train in country would eventually be r

scinded by the Korean government. Exercise Fo

Eagle was sponsored by the JCS and included pa

ticipation by US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, an

Republic of Korea forces. The 1st SOS was succes

ful in getting itself force listed for Foal Eagle 7

which was scheduled for the February–March 197

period. In preparation for its participation, th

squadron began expanding its low-level route stru

ture during the fall of 1973. Also in preparation fo

the exercise, 1st SOS crews began dropping U

Navy SEALs into water drop zones off the coast 

South Korea. The water drops marked the first tim

the squadron had dropped SEALs into open wat

drop zones. As its Korean commitment expande

the FOL at Takhli RTAFB continued in operatio

with one aircraft stationed there on a continuo

basis. Daily combat missions were flown over Cam

bodia in support of the PSYOPS campaign.

On 29 October 1973 the 1st SOS received i

fourth Yank aircraft (64-0565) from LAS Ontari

This aircraft was the first Talon equipped with th

S3-A FLIR system and the new System 56 EC

suite. A basic requirement of the installation 

the equipment was that it had to be covert an

could not be identified from outside the aircra

while on the ground. To accommodate this requir

ment, the FLIR ball was mounted in a retractab

turret located behind the nose landing gear. Insi

the FLIR ball was an infrared lens that differen

ated between objects by determin ing their relativ

temperatures. A display screen, resembling 

television screen, was mounted at the navigatio

console on the flight deck. The remainder of t

FLIR system was mounted in the cargo compar

ment. FLIR allowed the navigator to view u

marked and unlit drop zones, and it also provide

the capability to display terrain during low-lev

operations. Such major areas as airfields, river

and lakes could be seen on the screen, which di

played a picture similar to a black and white tel

vision. In operation the navigator could zoom in o

a particular target by way of the FLIR’s telepho

system, thus providing the navigator with an e

panded close-up view of the target. The system w

developed by Texas Instruments and was designe

COMBAT SPEA

117
to complement the other sophisticated navigation

equipment found on the Combat Talon.144

Also in October PACAF tasked the 1st SOS to

evaluate the Combat Talon’s capability to accu -

rately airdrop supplies utilizing the container delivery system (CDS) from altitudes up to 11,000

feet. Aircrews were not current in the CDS and

required training in the basic procedure before

moving on to high-altitude airdrops. The 1st SOS

project officer, Lt Col Joseph J. Neff, contacted

the 374th TAW at CCK, Taiwan, for assistance.

The 374th TAW sent standardization/evaluation

personnel to Kadena AB to supervise the 1st SOS

checkout. The evaluation consisted of 10 airdrops

and commenced on 17 October. For the drops, 1st

SOS crews recorded a circular error average of 17

yards from the desired point of impact from

11,000 feet above the ground. After two days of

multiple airdrops, all 1st SOS crews were qualified, and the 374th TAW personnel returned to

Taiwan. To facilitate safe CDS operations by the

Combat Talon, system improvements were developed. A new forward restraint assembly was designed by TSgt John C. Stumpf to accommodate

the expected larger loads associated with CDS

drops. MSgt Jimmie O. Riggs and TSgt Ray C.

Doyle undertook the project of researching and

writing the checklists for the new-type drop. The

draft checklists were forwarded to Headquarters

PACAF for inclusion in MCM 55-130, volume 2.145

Within the next four months, the newly acquired

capability was employed in SEA operations.

The worldwide fuel shortage brought on by the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ oil

embargo had a severe impact on military opera -

tions around the world in the late fall of 1973. The

1st SOS was the only unit assigned to the 18th

TFW/Fifth AF to have a combat mission in SEA.

As a result the decision was made to reduce the

Cambodian operation from 150 flying hours each

month to 130 hours. At home station the unit was

reduced from 150 flying hours each month to 37

hours, thus resulting in a total reduction of 167

hours each month for the squadron. The reduction

in flying hours effectively decreased unit training

sorties by 79 percent. Although flying time available to the unit was temporarily reduced, additional training opportunities were realized in November when the Philippine government approv ed

resumption of low-level flying. The low-level

routes were surveyed in November, and the squadron flew its first training flight in December.146

Tasking for the 1st SOS at Takhli RTAFB, although reduced by 20 hours each month flying time,

continued with daily sorties into Cambodia. To

save valuable flight time, PSYOPS materials

were condensed into loads that maximized the

aircraft’s cargo compartment during each mission.

Mission profiles were also altered to maximize

fuel efficiency. Squadron support vehicles, including trucks, forklifts, and other general purpose

vehicles, either were parked or turned over to the

base motor pool. Conservation efforts resulted in

significant reductions in total MO-GAS and JP-4

consumption.147

The Psychological Operations Campaign in

SEA ended in December 1973. The final campaign

had begun in January 1971, when the 90th SOS

was still stationed at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam.

During the four months prior to the January 1973

Vietnam cease-fire, when the sortie rate was increased from three each day to six, the 1st SOS

flew 145 sorties and dropped more than 1.5 billion

leaflets. For the entire campaign, the 1st SOS

dropped more than 9.5 billion leaflets with many

different themes and psychological messages directed at North Vietnam and Cambodia. 148 With

the end of the PYSOPS campaign, the FOL at

Takhli RTAFB was shut down, and the aircraft,

equipment, and personnel were redeployed to

Kadena AB. The success of the overall campaign

could be directly attributed to the hard work and

dedication of the men and women of the 1st SOS

and its predecessor, the 90th SOS.

1974: High-Altitude Airdrops into

Cambodia and the End of Hostilities

It was not long before combat operations in SEA

were once again the focal point of the 1st SOS. As

a result of its newly acquired CDS capability, the

squadron was tasked on 23 February 1974 to deploy within 24 hours to U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, for high-altitude CDS drops into Cambodia.

During the period 24–27 February, one aircraft

and crew flew seven combat sorties and delivered

70 tons of needed ammunition to ground combat

forces under enemy fire in Cambodia. All 16 loads

were dropped on target from an altitude of 11,000

feet. The combination of a highly accurate naviga -

tion system and an upgraded System 56 ECM

suite made the Combat Talon ideal for the highaltitude CDS mission.149

During March 1974 the squadron participated

in its first Foal Eagle exercise in Korea. The lowlevel routes that had been surveyed the previous

fall were utilized. Just as the Flintlock exercise

series in Europe became the centerpiece special

operations exercise for the 7th SOS, Foal Eagle 74

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

118
marked the beginning of a continuous commitment by the 1st SOS to Foal Eagle through the

reminader of the century. The 1st SOS established an Air Force operating base at Taegu AB,

Republic of Korea, and deployed additional staff

personnel to the exercise headquarters located

near Seoul, Korea. The 1st SOS was responsible

for the air support of Army and Navy forces participating in the exercise, scheduling and supervising US C-130 and HH-3 operations, and coordinating Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF)

C-46 operations. Airdrops included land and

water drop zones.150 The exercise proved to be

extremely valuable in providing a challenging

training environment that increased aircrew proficiency in hard-to-maintain, low-level flying

skills. It also firmly connected the 1st SOS with

South Korea and ensured its access to challenging Korean training routes.

Not long after its return from Foal Eagle 74,

the squadron was tasked to deploy two aircraft

and four crews again to U-Tapao RTAFB. A few

days later, an additional aircraft and crew were

also deployed. The 374th TAW had been flying

the high-altitude CDS mission into Cambodia,

but because of long supply lines and an unusually high-breakage rate of its AWADS equip -

ment, the wing was unable to maintain the sortie

rate needed to resupply the Cambodians. During

the period 3–23 April 1974, 1st SOS crews flew

64 single-ship sorties, dropping 531 tons of much

needed rice and ammunition to beleaguered

Cambodian ground forces. Because the troops

were under constant ground fire from the invading Vietnamese army, many drop times had to be

changed because of air strikes in the drop area,

or they had to be adjusted to allow the ground

forces to take cover from incoming artillery fire.

In addition to the single-ship sorties flown by the

1st SOS, the squadron flew 47 sorties as the lead

aircraft for the 374th TAW C-130 aircraft. With

the 1st SOS Combat Talon aircraft in the lead,

the 374th dropped 648 tons of supplies. As the

374th TAW maintenance status improved toward

the end of April, the 1st SOS was withdrawn and

redeployed to Kadena AB.151

Since its relocation to Kadena AB from Nha

Trang AB in 1973, squadron enlisted personnel had

been billeted in Barracks 713. The facility was substandard due to its overall poor condition, including

plumbing and outdated electrical wiring. Because

of the wiring, air conditioning was prohibited.

Squadron flight personnel were constantly having

their crew rest interrupted by various work shifts,

alerts, and recalls of wing personnel living in th

barracks. With its commitment to SEA comb

operations, 1st SOS personnel needed adequa

quarters to relax and rest when they were 

home station. The rigors of combat took its toll o

the overall health and welfare of the squadro

Although he had been unsuccessful in gettin

adequate quarters for his personnel in the pas

Colonel Pinard seized the opportunity to plea

once again his case with his 18th TFW host. Th

time his efforts were successful. He was able 

obtain air-conditioned quarters in the security p

lice complex, and his men volunteered to pai

and refurbish the quarters. Although these qua

ters were a step up from those in Barracks 71

Colonel Pinard pushed for an entire wing of ai

conditioned rooms equipped with adequate furn

ture and carpet for his personnel. CMSgt Joe K

Jackson, the squadron senior airman advisor, c

ordinated with several groups on base and ob 

tained a full wing of 12 air-conditioned room

with washer and dryer facilities, privacy, and 

low-noise level, which was important for prop

crew rest.152 Personnel continued to improv

their assigned areas and eventually receive

best-on-base recognition by the 313th Air Div

sion commander.153 With barracks’ life improve

at home station, the squadron was able to bett

support the SEA war.

In June the 1st SOS was called upon again 

augment 374th TAW CDS operations in Camb

dia. From 2 to 17 June 1974, flying out of U-Tap

RTAFB the squadron flew 36 sorties and dropp

an additional 350 tons of rice and ammunition. T

offset the additional hours expended in combat op 

erations, Fifth AF allocated additional flyin

hours so that the unit could complete its trainin

upgrade, and theater indoctrination requir

ments. 154 A fourth deployment to U-Tapao RTAF

was accomplished from 24 July to 12 Augu

1974. Outposts on the ground in Cambodia we

constantly under fire, and many times load

dropped only a few meters from friendly troo

could not be recovered. During the deployme

the 1st SOS dropped 115 tons of ammunition an

food to the Cambodians.155

The high-altitude CDS drops in Cambodia du

ing the spring and summer of 1974 marked th

end to the 1st SOS’s participation in combat o

erations in SEA. The Cambodian operation ha

resulted in more than 425 flight hours and 15

sorties, with 1,600 tons of cargo dropped eith

single ship or in formation with the 374th TAW

From the fall of 1966 until August of 1974, th

COMBAT SPEA

119
unit, along with its predecessors—the 15th SOS

and the 90th SOS—performed its wartime duties

in an exemplary manner. After 10 years of fighting in SEA, America was tired of the war and

wanted to put Vietnam in its past. Little did the

public realize (or for that matter, did the military)

that the next war was soon to begin—the war of

international terrorism. The 1st SOS, along with

its sister squadrons in the United States and in

Europe, was destined to play a pivotal role in this

new kind of war.

Notes

1. History, 314th Troop Carrier Wing (PACAF), 1 July–31

December 1966, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol.1, 11.

2. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1 July–30

September 1966, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol.1, 10.

3. Personal notes of Lt Col Albert P. Blosch, Retired, provided to the author, 3 November 1998, Combat Talon Archive,

Headquarters AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

4. Lt Col Marlon Banks, USAF, Retired, interview by Lt

Col V. H. Gallacher and Maj Lyr R. Officer, 6 February 1973,

USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 12.

5. History, 314th Troop Carrier Wing (PACAF), 1 July–31

December 1966, vol.1, 14.

6. Personal notes of Lt Col Albert P. Blosch.

7. Project CHECO Report, The Role of the USAF In Support

of Special Activities In SEA (U), USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., 1 July 1976, 70.

8. Ibid., 69.

9. Ibid.

10. Banks interview, 4.

11. Ibid., 9.

12. Ibid., 18.

13. Ibid., 18–19.

14. Project CHECO Report, 70.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 71.

17. Ibid., 74.

18. Ibid., 33.

19. Ibid., 47–48.

20. Ibid., 49.

21. Banks interview, 10.

22. Ibid., 22.

23. Col Daniel J. Gibson, Air National Guard, interview by

Cindi L. Noel, 9–10 May 1989, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., 3 April 1974, 24–25.

24. Banks interview, 5.

25. Ibid., 5–6.

26. Ibid., 7.

27. Ibid., 8.

28. Ibid., 9.

29. Project CHECO Report, 44–46.

30. Ibid., 49–50.

31. Staff Summary Sheet, Seventh AF/DOOT, Lt Gen William W. Momyer, subject: Frantic Goat Psyop Program, 4 November 1967, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 3, 1–2.

32. Project CHECO Report, 122.

33. End of Tour Report, Col David C. Collins, USAF, deputy

commander, Special Operations, 14th SOW, n.d., USAF HRA,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1.

34. Project CHECO Report, 123.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Collins, 1.

38. Ibid.

39. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1 Janu -

ary 1968–31 March 1968, vol. 1, 7.

40. Col Thomas F. Hines, Retired, interview by author,

College Station, Tex., 13 June 1998. Recorded on 8 mm videotape, not transcribed, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

41. Ibid.

42. Project CHECO Report, 175.

43. Ibid., 35, 75.

44. Don Oberdorfer, Tet!, published by Don Oberdorfer,

1971, 124–25.

45. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1 January–

31 March 1968, vol. 1, 6.

46. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

April–30 June 1968, vol. 2, 1.

47. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

July–30 September 1968, vol. 1, 6.

48. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

April–30 June 1968, vol. 2, 9.

49. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1 October–

31 December 1968, vol. 1, 35.

50. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

July–30 September 1968, vol. 1, 3.

51. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

April–30 June 1968, vol. 2, 7–8.

52. History, 14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF), 1

July–30 September 1968, vol. 1, 11.

53. Ibid., 9.

54. Ibid., 1–2.

55. Ibid., 10–11.

56. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1968, vol. 1, 6.

57. Ibid., 9.

58. Ibid., 11.

59. Project CHECO Report, 125.

60. Ibid., 125–26.

61. Ibid., 75.

62. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1969, 51.

63. Ibid.

64. Banks interview, 23–26.

65. Official AF Order, Operations Order no. 460-70, Seventh Air Force, subject: Combat Spear, 1 November 1969,

USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 12, cover.

66. Ibid., 1.

67. Ibid., 3.

68. Ibid., 4.

69. Ibid., 5.

70. Ibid., A-1.

71. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1969, 53.

72. Ibid., 54.

73. Ibid., 55.

74. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 April

1969–30 June 1969, 3.

75. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 September 1969, 8.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

120
76. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30

June 1969, 10.

77. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 Sep -

tember 1969, 3, 7, 25.

78. Ibid., 12.

79. Ibid., 9.

80. Project CHECO Report, 77.

81. Ibid., 77–78.

82. Ibid., 81.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., 81–82.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., 83.

87. Ibid., 83–84.

88. Ibid., 84.

89. Ibid., 84–85.

90. Ibid., 85.

91. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1970, 6.

92. Ibid., 13.

93. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30

June 1970, 4.

94. Ibid., 6–8.

95. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 Sep -

tember 1970, 2.

96. Ibid., 7.

97. Ibid., 11–12.

98. Ibid., 14.

99. Ibid., 14–15.

100. Ibid.

101. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1970.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Project CHECO Report, 78.

105. Ibid., 78–79.

106. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1971, 18.

107. Ibid., 7.

108. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30

June 1971, 5.

109. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1971, 11.

110. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30

June 1971, 8.

111. Ibid., 10.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. History, 90th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October

1971–31 December 1971, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AF -

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

115. History, 483d Tactical Airlift Wing/90th Special Op -

erations Squadron, 1 July 1971–30 September 1971, USAF

HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 2, 5.

116. History, 90th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

31 August 1971, 4.

117. History, 14th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30

September 1971, 13.

118. Lt Col Robert N. Pinard, Retired, interview by auth

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 7 July 1998. Recorded on 8 mm videotap

not transcribed, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

119. History, 90th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Oc

ber–31 December 1971.

120. Project CHECO Report, 79–80.

121. History, 90th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Januar

31 March 1972.

122. Project CHECO Report, 41.

123. Ibid., 35.

124. Ibid., 53.

125. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Octobe

31 December 1972, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 4.

126. Ibid., appendix, 4.

127. Ibid., iv.

128. Ibid., 7.

129. Ibid., appendix, 7.

130. Ibid., iv.

131. Ibid., 8.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., 10.

134. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Januar

31 March 1973, 7.

135. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1973, appendix. 1.

136. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Januar

31 March 1973, 8.

137. Ibid., 10.

138. Ibid., 8.

139. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1973, 14.

140. Ibid., 15.

141. Ibid., 10–11.

142. Ibid., 11.

143. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1973, 8.

144. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Octobe

31 December 1973, 14.

145. Ibid., 15–16.

146. Ibid., 16–17.

147. Ibid., 17.

148. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Januar

31 March 1974, 12–13.

149. Ibid., 10.

150. Ibid., 14.

151. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1974, 9.

152. Ibid., A-6.

153. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1974, A-5.

154. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1974, 9.

155. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1974, 10–11.

COMBAT SPEA

121
Chapter 5

Combat Arrow (Europe: 1968–74)

Associate yourself with men of good quality if you esteem your reputation, for ’tis better to be

alone than in bad company.

—George Washington

Project Skyhook

The initial Stray Goose deployment to SEA was

completed in the early fall of 1966. By January 1967

Detachment 1, 314th TCW, was flying SOG-tasked

missions out of Nha Trang AB deep into North Vietnam. Deployment to Europe was the next major

milestone for the new weapons system. In March

1964 Detachment 4, 1st SOW, had deployed from

Hurlburt Field, Florida, to Sembach AB, FRG, on

temporary duty to US Air Force, Europe (USAFE).

On 1 July 1964 Detachment 4 was stood up as the

7th Air Commando Squadron (Composite)

(USAFE). Authorized with 265 personnel, the new

squadron was equipped with four C-123s, six C-47s,

and two U-10 aircraft. The unit was the only spe -

cial operations squadron assigned to USAFE.1 In

February 1967 the 7th ACS was designated the unit

to receive the C-130E(I) Combat Talon .

The 603d Air Base Wing (ABW), the host wing

for the 7th ACS at Sembach AB, published Programming Plan 507-67, Skyhook , dated 25 February

1967, outlining the reception and support of four

C-130E (I) aircraft to be assigned to the 7th ACS.

These aircraft were to replace the four C-123s

that were assigned to the unit. Code name for the

deployment was Project Skyhook. Initial prepara -

tions were made by the 603d ABW, but in April

1967 Seventeenth AF, the numbered air force responsible for the 603d ABW, sent a message to

the wing stating that the C-130s had been deleted

from USAFE programming documents and further directed the wing to discontinue preparation

for Project Skyhook pending additional guidance.2

As late as June 1967, no further action was taken

in preparation for the deployment.

USAFE was notified in late June that Project

Skyhook was reactivated and that the code name

for the deployment had been changed to Combat

Arrow. Headquarters USAFE made the decision to

base the Combat Arrow aircraft at Ramstein AB,

FRG, with tentative arrival date set as 15 March

1968. Two C-47 aircraft and the main body of the

7th ACS would move to Ramstein AB from Sembach AB on 1 July 1968. The C-123s would return

to Hurlburt Field, and the four additional C-47s,

along with the two U-10s, would move to Otis AF

Massachusetts, and form Detachment 1, 7th ACS

Throughout the summer and fall of 1967, prepar

tions were made at Sembach AB and at Ramste

AB for the arrival of the Combat Talon aircraft.

1968: Establishment of

Combat Talon in Europe

The first C-130E (I) Combat Talon aircraft, ta

number 64-0551, arrived at Ramstein AB on 2

February 1968, with the next two aircraft (64-055

and 64-0561) arriving on 3 March and 28 Jun

respectively. On 30 April the first C-123B aircra

was returned to the 4410th Combat Crew Trainin

Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida.4 The composi

squadron, with its mix of Combat Talon and C-4

aircraft, was authorized 62 officers and 203 e

listed personnel and was commanded by Col W

liam A. McLaughlin.5 The Combat Arrow aircra

were configured the same as Combat Spear an

Combat Knife —the AN/APQ-115 TF/TA radar, th

Fulton STARS, and an ECM suite designed to e

hance aircraft survivability.6 From February 

June the new aircraft flew 202.6 hours, almost a

of which were dedicated to unit training and the

ter familiarization.7

USAFE Movement Order 4, dated 25 Marc

1968, directed the movement of the 7th ACS fro

USAF Photo

Combat Arrow aircraft 64-0551 on the ramp at Ram 

stein AB, Germany, circa 1968. This was the first 

130E(I) assigned to the 7th SOS.

123
Sembach AB to Ramstein AB, effective 15 July

1968. USAFE Special Order G-62, dated 2 July

1968, redesignated the 7th ACS as the 7th Special Operations Squadron, which was also effective on 15 July.8

 During the period from 5 to 18

July, the four C-47s, the remaining C-123s, and

the two U-10s were returned to the United

States. Colonel McLaughlin, the commander of

the 7th ACS and commander-designate for the

new 7th SOS, was the ideal choice to head the

newly designated squadron. A combat veteran

from World War II, he had flown the B-17 for

more than 300 combat hours over central Europe

from July 1944 until the end of the war in

Europe. During the Korean War, he flew C-124s

based at McChord AFB, Washington, thus gaining valuable airlift experience throughout the Pacific. In the summer of 1965, after assignments to

USAFE and to the Military Air Transport Service , he completed C-123 training at Hurlburt

Field and was assigned as the commander of the

310th Air Commando Squadron at Nha Trang

AB. Upon returning from SEA in September

1966, Colonel McLaughlin transferred to Europe

and was assigned as the commander of the 7th

ACS at Sembach AB.9

During and immediately after the move to

Ramstein AB, the redesignated 7th SOS was

faced with a host of problems, most of which were

attributed to the move itself and to the massive

turnover of personnel caused by the reconfigura -

tion of unit-assigned aircraft. USAFE made the

decision to move the squadron from Sembach AB

to Ramstein AB because European bases were

consolidating under the Crested Cap program,

and Sembach AB operations were being reduced.

At Ramstein AB, however, there was not adequate administrative space, nor was there adequate ramp space for assigned aircraft. After the

arrival of 64-0551 in February, the squadron had

split operations between the two bases for the

next six months. By the end of the year, however,

most of these problems had been resolved or acceptable work-arounds had been established.

Unit personnel concentrated on training in the

new weapons system (both aircrew and maintenance) and on meeting the continuing commit -

ments of the squadron .1 0

As the 7th SOS settled into its quarters at

Ramstein AB, squadron aircrew personnel continued to train throughout the theater. Aircraft 64-

0559 deployed to the United States on 14 July

1968 for further modifications, thus leaving 64-

0551 and 64-0561 available in-theater. From 13 to

26 July one Combat Talon deployed to Zaragoza

AB, Spain, for HALO training with the 10th Special Forces Group. The deployment marked the

beginning of a long series of training initiatives in

Spain. Three hundred and eighteen personnel

were dropped from an altitude of 25,000 feet during 29 sorties and 36.2 hours of flying.11

September 1968 marked the beginning of a long

and successful Flintlock exercise series. Joint/

combined Exercise Flintlock I was conducted in

the fall of 1968 and consisted of four subexercises—

Grune Krupfalz in Germany, Zeus 68 in Greece,

El Sarrio III in Spain, and Sallow in Denmark.1 2

In support of Subexercise Zeus 68, one Combat

Talon aircraft deployed to Souda Bay, Crete, in

September and flew infiltration and resupply missions. Another Combat Talon deployed to Moron

AB, Spain, for El Sarrio III. Long-range, low-level

exercise missions in Spain were subsequently

cancelled by the Spanish government, thus making the deployment of marginal benefit to the

squadron. Being based in central Europe, Combat

Talon aircrews could not accomplish all of their

training requirements without deploying to other

locations. The Flintlock exercise series became

the key to introducing the squadron to new training areas and opening the door to many of these

countries. It would prove to be a valuable means

to introduce Combat Talon to unconventional

warfare units throughout Europe.

An area in which the 7th SOS pioneered was

the deployment of maintenance and spare parts to

support Combat Talon while away from home

station. US-based Talons and those in SEA operated from their home bases. Early on, the 7th

SOS had to deploy maintenance technicians, test

equipment, and spare parts to keep its Talons

operating while away from home station for ex -

tended periods of time. In a period before WRSKs

were created for SOF units, the squadron had

great success operating the extremely complex

Combat Talon system while on the road.1 3

When Combat Talon deployed to Europe, aircraft ECM equipment could not be operated for

training purposes due to host nation constraints

and due to US restrictions on US peacetime op -

eration. In October 1968 permission was received

to operate the electronic countermeasures equip -

ment on board Combat Talon in certain restricted

training modes. All 7th SOS electronic warfare

officers had gone noncurrent for airborne intercepts and for ground radar events during the previous eight months, so a concerted effort was put

forth to get them current and proficient. The first

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

124
ECM mission was flown in Spain on 2 October

1968 with the 496th Fighter Interceptor Squadron under the code name Creek Picador. Six sorties of two hours each were flown at low level,

with 146 air-to-air intercepts accomplished. An -

other Creek Picador mission was flown the third

week of October with the 32d Fighter Interceptor

Squadron (FIS) and a third with the 526th

Fighter Interceptor Squadron FIS during the

first week of December with similar success. At

the completion of this training series in Spain, all

assigned EWOs were proficient in airborne intercepts. As a result of this training, and under

USAFE sponsorship, a formal airborne intercept

training program, code-named Creek Baron, was

established in Germany. Creek Baron provided

continuous opportunities for the 7th SOS to train

with Allied fighter aircraft.14 It was similar to the

Black Baron program flown by the Combat Spear

unit in SEA. Ground radar training, which required access to a radar bomb scoring (RBS) site,

was not included in the agreement. Permission to

use the additional Talon ECM equipment outside

the United States was required before RBS training could be approve d.

By the end of 1968, Combat Arrow had logged

1,362.4 hours of both unit and joint/combined

training. 15 Four aircrews acquired training and

proficiency in unique Combat Talon skills. The

coming year would expand training opportunities

and result in six combat trained crews operating

throughout the European AOR.

1969: Expansion of

Training Opportunities

The period of the late sixties was one of mod -

ernization and change throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The cold war

conflict between the East and West focused on

Central Europe, as America fought a hot war on

the battlefields of SEA. The C-130 was the aircraft of choice for tactical airlift in Europe, but by

1969 only a few European countries had purchased it and had crews trained and tactics developed to maximize its effectiveness. Great Britain,

Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Greece, and Turkey would eventually have

the aircraft in their air forces, but they would

need US assistance to develop their own capabilities. The C-130E (I) Combat Talon was a relatively

new aircraft in 1969, and it was heavily modified

for the unconventional warfare/special operations

role. Combat Spear aircraft operating in SEA had

gained almost a mystical reputation with their

work with MACVSOG over North Vietnam. It w

an excellent opportunity for the 7th SOS to cap

talize on this reputation and to expand its ow

training throughout Europe. The unit did so b

supporting the US Army Special Forces unit a

signed to Europe—the 10th Special Forces Grou

(Airborne) [(10th SFG(A)]—and the special oper

tions forces of NATO countries.

The year 1969 began with a no-notice ORI a

ministered by the USAFE inspector general. Th

squadron received its evaluation from the 6th 

the 11th of January during the worst weather 

the year. Both Combat Talon and C-47 aircrew

and maintenance personnel performed well. Th

aggressive training schedule of the previous fa

paid off in an overall grade of satisfactory.1 6 Th

Creek Baron program continued to expan

throughout 1969. During the month of Janua

alone, the 7th SOS scheduled 22 Creek Baro

missions in the FRG and 20 in Spain. Of thos

eight were flown in Germany and five were flow

in Spain. The no-notice ORI caused the cancell

tion of 16 sorties, with the remainder cancele

either for weather or by the participating fight

organization.17 Airborne intercept training w

the focus of the Creek Baron program, althoug

access to RBS sites were also required to train 7

SOS EWOs.

To gain access to high-quality, low-level trai

ing routes, the squadron provided continuou

training opportunities for Allied special warfa

units, including the Danish Jaegerkorpset, Gree

Hellenic Raiding Forces, British Special Air Se

vice (SAS), and the Norwegian Parachute Schoo

The primary US participant was the 10t

SFG(A)’s Special Forces Detachment (A) Europ

located at Bad Töelz, FRG.18

As a follow-on to the highly successful Zeus 6

exercise, unit planners developed an in-dep

training plan in Greece that combined the nee

of the Greek Hellenic Raiding Forces, the 10

SFG(A), and the 7th SOS. Beginning in 1969 an

continuing throughout the 1970s, the squadro

kept a Combat Talon deployed almost contin

ously to Greece. The February 1969 deployme

was typical of the monthly trainers. From 22 Fe

ruary to 18 March, a Combat Talon , along wi

aircrew and maintenance personnel, supporte

the Hellenic Forces Parachute School, Phase I

HALO training, with 10th SFG(A) providin

HALO instructors. A Combat Talon was based 

Athenae International Airport (IAP) and stage

out of Elefsis AB, Greece. Drops were conducte

daily from 5,800 feet to 25,000 feet, with th

COMBAT ARRO

125
Combat Talon departing Athenae IAP early each

morning, landing at Elefsis AB to onload jumpers, and then taking off and climbing to alt itude

for multiple jumps. Most drops utilized a higha ltitude release point (HARP), which was computed by th e flightcrew. HARP-computed drops

averaged 550-meters circular error, while jumpmasterspotted drops averaged 650 meters. A total of 528

paratroopers were dropped during the deployment. At the completion of each day’s drop events,

the crew flew a low-level route through the mountainous northern region of Greece, then returned

to the Athens area for mission termination. During the month-long deployment, the Combat

Talon flew 66 sorties and 87.6 hours.19 A follow-on

HALO trainer to Greece in July dropped 1,044

paratroopers while completing 96 sorties. The

7th SOS became the primary jump platform for

the jump school at a time when the Greek air

force had no aircraft capable of performing HALO

opera tions.2 0

On 3 April 1969 the squadron experienced the

loss of one of its two C-47 aircraft and its crew.

Maj Paul C. Jones was the instructor pilot, Capt

Randolph S. Crammer was the copilot, and SSgt

Donald J. Bissell was the flight engineer. The aircraft was on an instrument training flight and

had departed Sembach AB for Ramstein AB when

the accident occurred. From eyewitness accounts,

the plane entered a steep nose low spin at approximately 1,700 feet and impacted the ground.

Post-crash investigation revealed that the vertical

sta bilizer on the C-47 had collapsed, thus putting the aircraft into a condition from which the

crew could not recover. Combat Talon aircraft also

experienced five incidents during this period,

which resulted in minor damage to the aircraft—

four damaged HF antennas and one cracked

windscreen—all of which were attributed to con -

tact with the Fulton STARS lift line during recovery operation s.21

In June 1969 the 7th SOS participated in Exercise Market Garden, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the invasion of Holland by British and

American forces. The exercise was a reenactment

of the 1944 Allied invasion and received world -

wide coverage.2 2 Throughout the spring and early

summer, the 7th SOS plans section prepared for

Flintlock II. The flying portion of the exercise

wa s flown from 1 to 23 September, but exercise

personnel began deploying on 12 August to prepare each operating location. Two subexercises in

Germany were supported out of Ramstein AB and

staged through RAF Upper Heyford, UK, where

jumpers were onloaded for airdrop back into the

exercise area. Exercise Rote Erde was conducted

in north-central Germany in the Dusseldorf area

and involved US Army Special Forces and German Armed Forces District Command (WBK III)

personnel. Fifteen sorties and 29.5 hours were

flown during infiltration, resupply, and exfiltra -

tion missions. Walhalla was conducted in southeast Germany in the Schwandorf area and involved British SAS, German Border Guard Forces,

and US Army Special Forces. Eight sorties, staged

out of Ramstein AB through RAF Upper Heyford,

were flown utilizing 28.4 hours. A Combat Talon

also supported a long-range personnel infiltration

mission from RAF Upper Heyford to the exercise

area in the Middle East. The aircraft flew a total

of 17.5 hours in support of the subexercise, with

the long-range infiltration mission lasting more

than nine hours.2 3 The 7th Special Operations

Flight, located at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, also

forward deployed its four C-47s in support of the

exercise. This marked the first time the 7th

SOS was reconstituted since its split the previous year. Flintlock II proved to be a challenging

exercise, with unit personnel gaining a high state

of proficiency.

After return from Flintlock II, Talon crews

spent the first two weeks of October flying local

training missions and reconstituting after an aggressive month of flying. On 12 October the

squadron flew its first Berlin corridor mission in

one of its C-47 aircraft. USAFE made the decision

not to fly the highly classified Combat Talon on

these missions. As a result Talon crews were not

qualified to fly into Berlin.24 Unit C-130E(I)s were

in great demand throughout the theater, however,

so the denial of the corridor mission had little

impact on Talon tasking.

With a year of successful training in Greece

completed, Colonel McLaughlin and three of his

plans officers deployed to Athens during the second week of December to attend a Special Opera -

tions Task Force Europe (SOTFE)-sponsored con -

ference with the objective of establishing a formal

training plan for calendar year (CY) 70.*

__________

 *When SOCEUR was originally formed, its title was Special Operations Center Europe. During OPLAN 4102 activation, it formed Special

Operations Task Force Europe, or SOTFE. For day-to-day peacetime operations, the small headquarters staff, located at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart,

Germany, was referred to as SOTFE. In 1983 the term SOTFE was retired, and the center became a subunified command of US European

Command (EUCOM), thus becoming the Special Operations Command Europe, or SOCEUR. (From 1983 onward, SOCEUR has been the recognized acronym for Special Operations Command Europe, whether referring to the unit during peacetime or in war.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

126
On 10 December a meeting was held at Joint

United States Military Assistance Group (JUS -

MAG) Greece with the Embassy Army Section,

the Greek Hellenic Raiding Forces, SOTFE, Special Forces Detachment-Europe, the US air attaché to Greece, and Colonel McLaughlin and his

staff. A comprehensive training plan was developed that outlined 12 deployments to Greece during CY 70. Some months had two deployments

scheduled, while the fall Flintlock period had

none. Mission profiles approved included support

for the Hellenic Parachute School and day/night

visual flight rule (VFR) low-level operations utilizing the Combat Talon . Low-level approval was

not contingent upon Greek air-drop support but

rather was approved for both combined and unilateral training. Selected Greek airfields were

made available, day or night, to service the Combat Talon aircraft. Agreement was also reached to

allow the 7th SOS to perform Fulton STARS op -

erations, as well as short-field landings, day or

night. In short, Greece became the primary training location for the squadron, and the 7th SOS

became the principal air-drop platform for the

Greek Hellenic Raiding Forces.25

1970: The 7th SOS

and the Son Tay Raid

With training access to Greece assured, the 7th

SOS looked north for additional training opportunities. With SOTFE sponsorship, the squadron

signed an agreement with the Danish Jaegerkorpset entitled the Tactical Air Command Denmark

Operation Instruction No. 18, which outlined combined air-drop training between the two units. In

a similar agreement to the one in Greece, the 7th

SOS committed its C-47 and C-130 aircraft to airborne support for the Jaegerkorpset in return for

low-level operations in Denmark. Missions were

normally staged out of Aalborg Royal Danish Air

Force Station and consisted of infiltration and exfiltration operations. Because of the restricted

size of the country, however, and the often poor

weather associated with its geographical location,

benefits to the 7th SOS did not compare with

those of Greece. 2 6 From 24 to 27 January the 7th

SOS participated in a planning conference with

MAAG-Norway, SOTFE, and Norwegian military

representatives to negotiate a training plan there.

The finalized plan supported Norwegian military

requirements and established low-level routes in

Norway for 7th SOS training. The rugged mountains found in Norway were the most challenging

of all low-level routes in the theater.2 7

On 30 January the squadron flew its secon

C-47 Berlin corridor flight and qualified a secon

instructor pilot to fly the mission.28 The 13th an

27th of February marked the third and fourth co

ridor missions, thus qualifying four 7th SOS ai

craft commanders in the Berlin Corridor mi

sion.29 Beginning on 16 February the USAFE I

kicked off its second no-notice ORI of the 7th SO

with a unit alert and recall. The 17th and 18

were devoted to operational tasks associated wi

the squadron mission statement. These tasks i

cluded low-level navigation, personnel and equi

ment airdrops, airland assault operations, reco

naissance and loudspeaker operations, an EC

exercise, and a Fulton STARS. Aircraft and sp

cial operations-qualified crews from the 322d an

the 513th Tactical Airlift Wings were integrate

into 7th SOS operations and were tasked as pa

of the squadron. Tenth SFG(A) personnel fro

Bad Töelz, FRG, also participated in the ORI. E

tremely poor weather, with snow, low ceiling

and reduced visibility, required some missions 

be rescheduled and flown later in the exercise. A

in the previous year’s ORI, the unit earned a sa

isfactory grade from the inspector general.30

From 2 through 6 March, the squadron partic

pated in an evaluation of its psychological oper

tions capabilities. In SEA the primary mission 

the 15th SOS had become the delivery of leafle

and other PSYWAR material. In Europe, howeve

the 7th SOS had not developed this capabilit

Four leaflet drops were scheduled for the eval

ation, but only two were flown due to poor weath

in the mission area. Participating in the eval

ation was the USA 5th Psychological Operatio

Battalion. The results of the two successful mi

sions were excellent, but the evaluation was p

on hold indefinitely until weather improved, an

the evaluation was never completed. Europea

SOF never developed a leaflet-drop capability ne

that of the one employed in SEA. PSYOPS r

mained a secondary mission for the 7th SOS an

was rarely exercised.31

In April an agreement was reached with th

Belgium ministry of defense for the 7th SOS 

train with Belgium army paratroopers. A join

combined HALO training mission was su

sequently flown in Belgium in June, utilizing 42

flying hours and 24 sorties. Maintenance prob 

lems a nd adverse weather in Belgium caused th

cancellation of six sorties, but overall the effo

was a resounding su ccess. Belgium paratroope

and USA SF personnel were dropped from an al

tude of 20,000 feet.32

COMBAT ARRO

127
June also saw the most complex mission yet

flown in Greece. The 7th SOS deployed on 15

June with one aircraft and made an operations

stop at Neubiberg AB to onload 22 US Army SF

personnel and their equipment. Late receipt of

country clearance from the Greek government

forced the flight to airland at Athenae IAP and

off-load its personnel rather than completing its

long-r ange infiltration mission into the drop

zone. After arrival the 7th SOS spent the next

two days planning with Greek Hellenic Raiding

Forces personnel. Many drop zone changes were

made by Greek participants, but by 18 June all

problems were resolved, and scheduled missions

were flown. On 20 June eight resupply drops were

scheduled on one sortie for teams operating in the

field. During the mission the aircraft’s Doppler

equipment was completely inoperative, and the

TF/TA radar indicated an REC/COM FAIL for approximately 75 percent of the flight. The mission

was continued utilizing the E2 presentation. Numerous thunderstorms were encountered en

route, requiring deviation from the planned route.

Northern Greece was completely covered with

clouds, which resulted in the completion of six

drops and the air abort of the last two. The crew

picked up an instrument clearance and returned

to Athenae IAP. On 21 June seven additional resupply drops were flown, with all aircraft equip -

ment working perfectly. Six drops were successful,

with the seventh drop being canceled for lack of a

team on the drop zone. (The 7th SOS maintenance

section had worked throughout the night of 20

June to get the Doppler and the terrain-followin g

radar operational.) On 23 June, 85 personnel were

air-dropped during two early morning sorties. On

the 24th the aircrew redeployed back to home sta -

tion with an airdrop of US Army Special Forces

personnel on to Karen drop zone in Germany and

mission termination at Ramstein AB. 33 Some of

the low-level missions into northern Greece had

been seven hours long. The amount of training

and the experience gained by the crew on challenging missions of this duration could not be duplicated anywhere else in the European area. Future deployments to Greece included two aircraft,

when possible, to capitalize on the excellent training environment found there.34

The next month, July, marked another mile -

stone in the expansion of 7th SOS training opportunities with the deployment to Pau, France, in

support of the French army’s 11th Airborne Division. The deployment marked the first time a US

military organization had been asked to participate in combined training since the French had

withdrawn military support for NATO in the mid1960s. The deployment consisted of familiarizing

members of the French 11th Airborne Division

and associated French units with US parachute

operations, US equipment, and C-130 aircraft op -

erations. Between 26 July and 1 August, 231

French paratroopers were given familiarization

flights and were air-dropped on Wright drop zone

near Pau. The deployment was so successful that

the commander, 11th Airborne Division, French

Parachute School, requested that the 7th SOS return to Pau for additional combined training with

his division.35

Combat Talons assigned to the 7th SOS, along

with those in the United States and in the Pacific, continued to receive upgrades as they cycled

through PDM. Aircraft 64-0551 returned from

PDM on 15 July, and aircraft 64-0572 departed

USAF Photo

7th SOS HALO drop from aircraft 64-0572.

USAF Photo

At the conclusion of the Greek trainer, Colonel

McLaughlin presented a 7th SOS momento to Maj Gen

Lambros Sirmos, commanding general, Greek Hellenic

Raiding Forces.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

128
for LAS Ontario two days later. Col Richard C.

Reeder assumed command of the squadron on 7

August, when Colonel McLaughlin returned to

the United States. 36 On 8 August aircraft 64-0561

was heavily damaged by fire while completing a

taxi check in accordance with Time Compliance

Technical Order 1C-130-778. The entire left

wheel-well area was destroyed. The fire was attributed to a brake failure in the left main landing gear, with brake fluid being ignited by hot

brakes. Over 3,350 man-hours were required to

repair the aircraft, which took the next nine

months to complete. A team from Warner Robins

Air Material Area (WRAMA) deployed to Ramstein

AB and performed the necessary repairs. With

aircraft 64-0572 already in PDM in the United

States, the loss of aircraft 64-0561 left only two

operational aircraft for European em ployment—

64-0551 and 64-0559.37

Between 10 August and 2 October 1970, the

7th SOS participated in Flintlock III. The FTX

was expanded over the previous year and con -

sisted of five subexercises located in the UK, Norway, the FRG, Italy, and Greece. Unlike the previous year Flintlock III required almost the entire

squadron to deploy from Ramstein AB to RAF

Greenham Commons, UK, and set up its opera -

tion there. Within 36 hours of notification, the

squadron had deployed its forces and was in place

ready for tasking. Unit aircraft and C-130s from

the 513th Tactical Airlift Wing based at RAF

Mildenhall, UK, transported squadron personnel

and equipment to the deployed location. During

the course of the exercise, the 7th SOS flew 137

sorties and 364 hours throughout the theater. The

10th SFG(A) had 256 personnel air-dropped from

7th SOS aircraft, and 235 foreign troops were also

air-dropped during subexercises in their countries. Some 776 personnel and 50 tons of cargo

were airlanded.3 8 As in Flintlock II, C-47 aircraft

and personnel deployed from Otis AFB to participate in the exercise.

While deployed to RAF Greenham Commons,

UK, for FTX Flintlock III, Colonel Reeder received a message from SOTFE that contained a

request for a combat-ready crew to deploy back to

CONUS for mobility training. The message was a

by-name request for individual crew members,

but compliance would require breaking up several

of his formed crews. After informal coordination

with SOTFE, Colonel Reeder agreed to provide

the requested aircraft commander, Maj Irl L.

Franklin, and one of his six 7th SOS-formed combat crews.3 9

Major Franklin’s crew departed Europe th

next day and arrived at Eglin AFB, Florida, on 2

August. Brig Gen Leroy Manor, the air comp

nent commander for the operation, informed th

crew of its selection for a very dangerous missio

that only volunteers would be allowed to fly. Th

general also indicated that no additional inform

tion regarding the purpose of the mission wou

be provided until those with a strict need to kno

were briefed. All 7th SOS crew members volu

teered for the mission without actually knowin

what they were volunteering for. In time the cre

was briefed that its mission was to rescue America

USAF Photo

A 7th SOS crew plans a Flintlock III mission. From le

to right: Unknown, J. K. Taylor, Bob Metsker, Bill Bus

Darrel Grapes, Bill Hawkins, and Bruce Ehly.

USAF Photo

7th SOS crew that flew the Son Tay Raid. Picture

standing left to right: Robert Renner, William Kenned

James Shepard, Leslie Tolman, Kenneth Lightle, an

Earl Parks. Kneeling, left to right: Thomas Mosle

James McKenzie, Thomas Stiles, Thomas Eckart, W

liam Guenon, Randal Custard, and Irl Franklin.

COMBAT ARRO

129
prisoners of war held captive at Son Tay Prison,

North Vietnam.4 0 Major Franklin’s crew flew

Combat Talon 64-0523 (assigned to the 15th SOS

at the time) during preparation and execution of

the raid.

During the month of September, the 7th SOS

crew, along with a crew from Detachment 1, 1st

SOW, developed procedures to fly dissimilar formation with both helicopters and with A-1 fixedwing aircraft. Procedures and techniques for airdropping ordnance never before carried by a

C-130 aircraft were developed. Near the end of

September, a complete mission profile was flown

with the entire raiding force to validate the plan.

One Combat Talon led the helicopter assault

force, and the second Combat Talon led the A-1

strike force. On 10 November the force began deploying to SEA, arriving at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, on 15 November. During the final prepara -

tion phase at Takhli RTAFB, Major Franklin and

his crew learned that they would lead the assault

force of helicopters during the raid. On the night

of 20 November, the force launched from several

bases in Thailand en route to Son Tay. Although

no prisoners were found there, the Combat Talon

portion of the operation went off without a hitch.

All mission aircraft and personnel returned safely

to Thailand for mission debriefing.41 The 7th SOS

crew flew aircraft 64-0523 back to Norton AFB,

California, and turned it over to LAS Ontario

technicians. The crew returned to Ramstein AB,

while Franklin flew to Eglin AFB to participate in

the after action review. The crew had been on

temporary duty for more than three months and

returned to its squadron as combat warriors.

(Chapter 6 provides a detailed account of the Son

Tay POW raid.)

1971: The Commander

in Chief’s Trophy

As 1970 ended squadron morale was at an alltime high. Participation in the Son Tay POW raid

by one of the squadron’s crews brought great satisfaction. For 1971 the squadron continued with a

full plate of exercises and unilateral training

events designed to maintain its high state of

readiness. In each of the first six months of 1971,

7th SOS Combat Talons deployed to Greece and

flew low-level training missions in conjunction

with air-drop support to the Greek Hellenic Raid -

ing Forces. The USAFE IG administered its third

ORI to the squadron in March. Weather was

improved over the previous two years, with Combat Talons flying six sorties and 17.9 hours. IG

task ing included low-level navigation, personnel

and equipment airdrops, infiltration and exfiltra -

tion of personnel, assault landings, photorecon -

naissance, airborne speaker operations, electronic

countermeasures (RBS and airborne intercepts),

and an airborne rescue demonstration using the

Fulton STARS.

42 The overall rating was again

satisfactory.

The WRAMA team continued to work on repairs to aircraft 64-0561. The original estimated

time in commission (ETIC) date was 15 March,

but unforeseen delays required extension of the

ETIC to 5 April. The aircraft was finally turned

over to flight-line maintenance on 15 April. Four

days later the aircraft was put into phase inspection after numerous minor write-ups were cleared

by maintenance personnel. On 2 May the aircraft

successfully completed its functional check flight

(FCF) and was certified airworthy.4 3 On 19 May

the aircraft was flown back to the United States

for PDM and for other major modifications at LAS

Ontario.4 4 While at LAS Ontario the aircraft received the MOD-70 upgrade, which included the

new AN/APQ-122(V)8 multimode radar.

Since its formation in 1964, the 7th SOS had

been a composite squadron made up of different

aircraft with a variety of capabilities. On 10 May

1971 the squadron added two UH-1N helicopters

to complement the two C-47 and four C-130E (I)

aircraft already assigned. Two additional UH-1N

helicopters were received in October while the

unit was deployed to Flintlock IV. They were assembled after personnel returned from the exercise, and they flew their initial FCFs in November. One major problem the squadron faced with

the new aircraft was the lack of qualified maintenance personnel. Even by the end of the year,

assigned maintenance personnel could support

only a two-aircraft operation.45

As one of the busiest units in USAFE, the 7th

SOS was engaged in activities from Norway to

North Africa and from Turkey to Spain. With the

Son Tay POW raid the previous fall, the unit had

also contributed directly to America’s effort in the

Vietnam War. On 22 May 1972, in a ceremon y

conducted by Maj Gen Dale S. Sweat, commander,

Seventeenth AF, members of Major Franklin’s

crew were awarded the Silver Star for their actions during the Son Tay raid. On 25 June Gen

Joseph R. Holzapple, CINCUSAFE, presented

the commander in chief’s trophy to the 7th SOS

for being the most outstanding support squadron in USAFE for 1970.4 6 The squadron had excelled and continually improved as it expanded

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

130
its operations in Europe. For the Combat Talon ,

mission tasking had been accomplished with only

two aircraft on-station for half of 1970 and most

of 1971. Through all this the squadron had risen

to the top of its class.

There was little time during the summer of

1971 to reflect on the squadron’s accomplishments

of the previous year. During the month of July,

the squadron concentrated on local training in

Germany in preparation for Flintlock IV, which

had expanded from the previous year with a total

involvement of 14,000 personnel in five different

countries. For Flintlock IV there were five subexercises supported by special operations forces

from Germany, Greece, Norway, Turkey, UK,

Canada, and France. On 10 August the squadron

deployed to three exercise operating locations—

the Combat Talons to RAF Greenham Commons,

UK; the C-47s to the Athenae IAP, Greece; and

the UH-1Ns to Sembach AB, Germany.47

The most significant mission for Combat Talon

during Flintlock IV occurred on 25 August during a long-range infiltration into Subexercise Zeus

71. The 7th SOS never had dropped personnel

into a water drop zone for subsequent linkup

with a surface vessel and an over-the-shore infiltration into the objective area. The 25 August

mission involved onloading an eight-man SEAL

team at RAF Greenham Commons and flying a

high-altitudes low profile to a point off the coast

of Greece, where the team was dropped in proximity to an awaiting friendly ship. Rendezvous tech -

niques were coordinated with the US Navy an

included the display of a vertical light pattern o

the ship and authentication utilizing the groun

airborne radar beacon. The aircraft flew over th

ship at 1,000-feet altitude and dropped the SEA

team 150 meters to starboard. The team rende

voused with the ship, then accomplished a ma

time beach landing and executed a preplanned d

rect action mission. The mission was so successf

that EUCOM later requested additional trainin

be conducted with the objective of incorporatin

the technique into appropriate service tactic

manuals. Another highly demanding mission i

cluded in Flintlock IV was a long-range infiltr

tion into an objective area in the Middle Eas

Two US Army Special Forces A Teams were o

loaded at RAF Greenham Commons and we

flown nonstop to the drop zones. The flight too

more than nine hours to complete with both dro

on the drop zone and within seconds of th

planned time over target.4 8

Throughout the Flintlock exercise, Comb

Talon aircraft experienced continual problem

with the AN/APQ-115 radar. All missions we

flown, however, to successful completion althoug

many crews did not have an operational radar fo

the low-level portion of the route. Because of u

usually good weather, VFR tactics were employe

and the aircrews dropped utilizing visual proc

dures. Within the next year the AN/APQ-115 r

dar would be replaced by the AN/APQ-122(V

during the MOD-70 upgrade, and many problem

associated with the older radar would be resolve

The squadron’s other two types of aircraft, th

C-47 and the UH-1N, experienced a much high

operational ready rate than did the Talons. As i

the three previous Flintlocks, the best training 

the year was accomplished during the exercise

Nowhere else in the Talon community was suc

complex training accomplished. Distances flow

and types of missions completed reflected tho

found in OPLAN 4102 wartime tasking.

The squadron returned to Ramstein AB aft

the 60-day exercise and soon commenced furth

development of tactics and procedures first trie

during Flintlock IV. One Combat Talon deploy

to Souda Bay, Greece, in October to refine air/s

rendezvous procedures with US Navy SEALs. S

sorties were flown (8.9 hours) to refine procedur

for both radar and nonradar-equipped aircra

Onboard radar, Doppler, and FM radio homin

were found to be the most valuable aids in com

pleting the drops successfully.50 The plans sectio

also remained busy evaluating exercise resul

USAF Photo

On 25 June 1971, Gen Joseph R. Holzapple, CINCUSAFE,

presented Colonel Reeder (7th SOS commander) with

the CINCUSAFE trophy for the Most Outstanding Support Squadron in the command. Note the bush hat and

fatigues worn by Colonel Reeder (the standard uniform

for the 7th SOS).

COMBAT ARRO

131
and presenting briefings to USAFE and to EUCOM. Unit OPLAN and operations orders were

updated with the most current information.51

Twelve aircrews completed Combat Mission

Planning, which was conducted by the squadron

intelligence (IN) section throughout the year. IN

utilized actual orders of battle found in the

OPLAN 4102 tasking. Many of the crews trained

were not assigned to the 7th SOS but were apportioned to the squadron in time of conflict. For

most it was their first exposure to planning mis -

sions into enemy territory while avoiding known

enemy threats.5 2 As a testimony to how good the

IN section had become, TSgt James M. Burns

was selected as the 17AF Non-Commissioned Officer of the Year for 1971. Sergeant Burns distinguished himself through outstanding performance

as Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of the IN

section and contributed immensely to the Combat

Mission Planning effort.53 The section was also

recognized as the most outstanding IN section in

the Seventeenth AF.

In September, while deployed to Flintlock IV,

the 7th SOS received aircraft 64-0566 from De -

tachment 2, 1st SOW, Pope AFB, North Carolina.

The aircraft was part of a restructuring of Combat

Talon aircraft worldwide. On 18 September 1971,

aircraft 64-0566 flew its first mission as a 7th SOS

aircraft.54 In exchange for the aircraft, the 7th SOS

sent aircraft 64-0551 to the 90th SOS at Nha

Trang AB. A 7th SOS crew departed Ramstein AB

the day after Christmas en route to SEA and arrived at Nha Trang AB on 1 January 1972, logging

55.8 hours during the deployment.5 5 As 1972 be -

gan, the 7th SOS had three C-130E (I) aircraft assigned—64-0561 (which was at LAS Ontario for

PDM), 64-0566, and 64-0572.

1972: The MOD-70 

Combat Talon Comes to Europe

When the 7th SOS was stood up at Ramstein

AB in the summer of 1968, Seventeenth AF was

designated as the squadron’s higher headquarters.

From this initial period until March of 1972, the

squadron remained directly under Seventeenth

AF. Special Order GB-23, dated 16 March 1972,

relieved the squadron from assignment to Seventeenth AF and placed it under the 26th Tactical

Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), also located at Ramstein AB, effective on 17 March. The new arrange -

ment integrated the squadron’s standardization/

evaluation section and its maintenance section

into the 26th TRW. Operational control was retained by Headquarters USAFE.56 Under OPLAN

4102 activation during times of increased hostilities, the 7th SOS transferred from USAFE to

SOTFE and received its wartime tasking from

that joint headquarters. In peacetime, however,

the 7th SOS received its daily tasking and support from USAFE through Seventeenth AF and

the 26th TRW. During the annual Flintlock exercise, OPLAN 4102 command and control arrange -

ments were exercised, which included the exercise

of operational control by SOTFE.

On 28 April 1972 the 7th SOS was assigned its

fourth Combat Talon (64-0555), which was the replacement for aircraft 64-0551 sent to SEA in

January 1972. The squadron sent a crew to Nha

Trang AB to pick up the aircraft and fly it back to

Ramstein AB. The aircraft flew its first local

training sortie in the 7th SOS on 8 May and departed off-station on the 10th.57 Affectionately

known as Triple Nickel, the aircraft would be -

come a mainstay of 7th SOS operations and one of

the most dependable Talons in its fleet.

Access to low-level training routes continued to

be a major problem for 7th SOS aircrews, even

after agreements were finalized with Greece. The

7th SOS had routes in Norway and in Denmark,

as well as Germany, but training manuals required 18 hours of terrain following per crew for

each six-month period. The hours could only be

logged in minimum one-hour uninterrupted

blocks and were extremely difficult for crews to

complete. By 1972 the squadron had six combat

crews requiring low-level continuation training

and had additional crew members who were required to maintain their tactical qualifications

(the squadron commander, operations officer, and

staff). To augment existing training routes, the

squadron had long sought a low-level training

area in Spain. The country had the required combination of airspace, terrain, and good weather to

provide a fertile training environment. After

months of concentrated negotiation between the

7th SOS plans section and the JUSMAG Spain,

limited low-level operations were approved by the

Spanish government. On 12 June 1972 one Combat Talon aircraft deployed to Madrid for the first

low-level training mission to that country. Torrejon AB, near Madrid, was selected as the staging

base for this training due to availability of C-130

support and because it offered adequate on-base

quarters. For the initial deployment, four lowlevel missions were authorized by the Spanish air

ministry. Low-level routes were planned from Ma -

drid to the San Javier area of southern Spain. At

San Javier the aircrew supported the Spanish

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

132
Parachute Brigade’s air-drop requirements.

HALO drops were accomplished up to 25,000 feet,

with static line drops at 1,000 feet. Four low-level

routes were successfully flown with excellent

training received by all crew members.5 8 This

combined exercise established the precedent for

future deployments to Spain that included lowlevel operations. The 7th SOS was the only C-130

unit in Europe regularly permitted to fly low level

in Spain, but this unique status proved to be a

tenuous one over the years.

From August to October the 7th SOS partici -

pated in Flintlock V and deployed to RAF

Sculthorpe, to support subexercises in Greece,

Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Italy. Aircraft

from Hurlburt Field, including four C-123Ks and

two UH-1Ns, along with three Air National Guard

C-119s from other US locations, deployed to England to augment the 7th SOS. Upon closure of

assigned forces at RAF Sculthorpe, the 7th SOS

expanded to 25 aircraft and 537 personnel. The

commander of the 7th SOS served as the exercise

air component commander for USAF-committed

forces. The squadron flew 432 sorties in direct support of the exercise with no maintenance cancella -

tions. Throughout the exercise, the squadron

maintained a 93 percent mission accomplishment

rate. 59 Flintlock V proved to be a challenging and

diverse exercise that demanded the utmost from

both aircrew and support personnel alike.

During the month of September, while deployed for Flintlock V, the 7th SOS was notified

by USAFE that it would leave Ramstein AB the

following March and move to Rhein Main AB near

Frankfurt, Germany. At Rhein Main AB, the

squadron would be assigned to the 322d TAW and

would have four Combat Talon aircraft and associated personnel assigned. The C-47s and UH-1s

would remain at Ramstein AB and form a detach -

ment of the 7th SOS until June of 1973, when

they would transfer back to the United States.

The target date for having the squadron moved

and operationally ready was 15 March 1973.60

The first MOD-70 aircraft was received in Au -

gust 1972, just as the squadron was deploying to

Flintlock V. Personnel from the 318th SOS (formerly Detachment 1, 1st SOW), Pope AFB, North

Carolina, delivered the aircraft to Ramstein AB.

Maj John Gargus, an instructor navigator and

Son Tay raider who had been instrumental in the

operational test and evaluation of the MOD-70

aircraft while assigned to the 318th SOS, arrived

at the 7th SOS in June 1972. He was given the

task of overseeing the checkout program for 7th

SOS aircrews along with Maj William A. Guerno

Jr., an instructor pilot who had also flown on th

Son Tay raid with Major Gargus. Throughout th

summer and fall, 7th SOS crew members a

tended MOD-70 ground school conducted by th

two instructors. In November a second MOD-7

aircraft was delivered to the squadron. Most 

November and December were spent deployed 

Greece and Spain for MOD-70 upgrade trainin

Aircraft 64-0551 and 64-0571 were the first tw

MOD-70 assigned to Europe. On 8 November ai

craft 64-0571—with Gargus, Guernon, and tw

crews—deployed to Greece for a week-long MOD

70 unilateral training exercise. After a normal d

parture from Ramstein AB, the aircraft had 

return for maintenance support. After some del

the mission departed without incident and lande

at Athenae IAP after a 7.4-hour flight. The 9 N

vember flight was a combination minimum-saf

altitude and terrain-following mission for 5

hours. All systems performed well enough for 

successful mission. Some problems were note

with inertial navigation steering, but most wer

attributed to aircrew unfamiliarity with the ne

system. During the 10 November flight of 6

hours, the navigators utilized the relative CAR

solution for the first time during a terrain-followin

day mission. As the week progressed, the cre

became increasingly familiar with the AN/APQ

122(V)8 radar and the operation of the new inerti

navigation system. When the aircraft redeployed 

home station on 14 November, the first two crew

had been certified in the MOD-70 aircraft. A sim

lar deployment of aircraft 64-0551 to Greece on 

December resulted in the checkout of two add

tional crews. Ten hours were expended supportin

the Hellenic Raiders Parachute School, with th

remaining time spent on conversion training fo

the MOD-70. Majors Gargus and Guernon fle

every day while deployed, with each crew flyin

every other day. The pace was demanding, but th

excellent training environment made the effo

worthwhile. Both day and night TF missions we

successfully completed, with the crews becomin

proficient on the MOD-70 aircraft by the end of th

deployment. On 15 December the aircraft red

ployed to Torrejon AB, Spain, for additional low

level training.6 1 On 3 and 28 December, respe

tively, aircraft 64-0566 and 64-0572 we

reassigned to the 318th SOS, and on Christm

Eve 1972 aircraft 64-0561 returned as a full-u

MOD-70. By the spring of 1973, all assigned ai

crews had been trained on the new system.6 2

COMBAT ARRO

133
1973: Combat Talon Moves

to Rhein Main Air Base

The first three months of 1973 were extremely

busy, with the squadron meeting all commitments

while preparing for the move to Rhein Main AB.

Hard work by the plans section the previous fall

paid off with the deployment to Spain in January

in support of Spanish airborne forces. During the

deployment of the 31 sorties flown in Spain, 17

were flown low level for a total of 43.3 hours. The

excellent weather in January and the challenging

terrain provided valuable TF training on the

MOD-70 aircraft. The deployment was based out

of Torrejon AB, from where 235 Spanish and

American paratroopers were dropped.63

Effective 31 January 1973, the 7th SOS was

reassigned to the 86th TFW until the squadron

relocated to Rhein Main AB on 15 March. At that

time, the squadron was reassigned to the 322d

Tactical Airlift Wing. One Combat Talon deployed

to Greece during February and flew 16 sorties

and 34.7 hours supporting the Greek Hellenic

Raiding Forces. Also during the Greek deployment, all remaining crew members completed

MOD-70 conversion training.64

Movement Order 23, dated 5 December 1972,

directed that the 7th SOS move to Rhein Main AB

and to be in place there no later than 15 March.

On 12 and 13 March the squadron moved its

equipment and personnel, and by 15 March it was

operationally ready at its new location.65 On 20

March Colonel Reeder relinquished command to

the acting commander, Lt Col Lincoln A. Perry,

who remained as the acting commander until Col

Ralph W. Haymaker arrived in May.66 The 7th

SOS closed out a significant part of its history

with its move to Rhein Main AB. Both the C-47

and UH-1N flights remained at Ramstein AB and

were assigned to the squadron as a flight detach -

ment. By the summer of 1973, however, only the

Combat Talons (64-0523, 64-0551, 64-0555, and

64-0566) stationed at Rhein Main AB remained in

Europe. All other SOF assets had been either de -

commissioned or returned to the United States.

Rhein Main Air Base and the 322d TAW

With the reassignment of the C-47 and UH-1N

flights and their associated administrative support,

the squadron that moved to Rhein Main AB was

far different from the one that had operated out of

Ramstein AB. Although the squadron continued

to maintain its operational status in the Combat

Talon, the unit faced the immediate challenge of

an ORI from the USAFE/IG. The 322d TAW was

due an ORI in the April–May time frame. Due to

the turmoil associated with the move and the major reorganization of the squadron, Colonel Perry

wasted no time in documenting the unit’s shortfalls and requesting postponement of the ORI until the July period. In his 11 April letter to the

322d TAW/commander, Colonel Perry noted that

unit plans and regulations had to be rewritten to

align them with the 322d TAW. He also noted

that the unit was committed to Alpine Friendship

in southern Germany and would have to be restructured internally immediately after the exercise. He pointed out that the combat control team

and the loadmaster, flight engineer, and rigging

and life support sections were still in the process

of moving to Rhein Main AB. More than 45 families still lived at Ramstein AB, and squadron personnel returned there during weekends, thus

making regular off-duty time normally used for

ORI preparation unavailable to squadron leadership. Colonel Perry proposed an alternate date of

15 July, which would allow the squadron time to

settle into its new location and give the new commander time to get his feet on the ground after

his June arrival. The USAFE/IG approved Colonel Perry’s request on 18 April, and the new date

was set for sometime after 15 July.67 With the

ORI postponed by USAFE, the 322d TAW set

about to “fix” the squadron’s shortfalls outlined in

Colonel Perry’s letter.

The first “help” that the squadron received

was a combined 322d TAW operations/safety inspection, which was conducted from 15 to 18

May. Without the proper time and opportunity to

organize and prepare for the inspection, the final

result was just as Colonel Perry predicted. Training and standardization/evaluation were rated

unsatisfactory. Virtually every area of the squadron that was inspected either received an unsatisfactory or a marginal rating. 68 Effective 1 June

1973, Colonel Haymaker assumed command of

the squadron and vowed to correct the documented deficiencies. As Colonel Haymaker’s op -

erations officer, Colonel Perry was quite familiar

with squadron operations, so the two formed a

team and went immediately to work. In the next

45 days, the squadron was reorganized, and defi -

ciencies identified in the May visit were corrected. By mid-July the squadron was somewhat

ready for the pending ORI.

On 16 July the USAFE/IG hit the base, with

the 322d TAW, from the commander on down, predicting another disaster for the special operations

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

134
squadron. To the amazement of the wing, and

perhaps the 7th SOS itself, the 7th SOS passed

the ORI successfully. It was the best performance

in 7th SOS history. There were no functional pass/

fail areas rated less than satisfactory, and the only

two items that received a marginal rating were

wing/base support functions. With the successful

completion of the ORI, the move to Rhein Main AB

was officially termed a success.69 The reorganization

of the squadron under Colonels Haymaker and

Perry’s guidance had successfully molded the varied functions of the most diverse squadron in

USAFE into an operationally sound unit. The

squadron was almost self-sufficient, having been

assigned its own flight surgeon and medical

team, photography section, life-support section,

combat control team, communications section, intelligence, avionics, plans, safety, standardization/

evaluation, and other operational and support

functions.7 0 The squadron had earned respect

from the wing and from USAFE.

As had been the case in previous years, the 7th

SOS participated in the annual Flintlock exercise.

Deployment to RAF Sculthorpe went without a

hitch, and four subexercises were supported in

the August time frame. On 1 September the

squadron deployed two Combat Talons and 58

personnel to a location in Southwest Asia, and

two days later two USAFE C-130s deployed additional 7th SOS maintenance and support person -

nel. The squadron established an Air Force Special Operations Facility and flew unconventional

warfare missions for the duration of the exercise.

In total, 16 sorties and 46 hours were flown,

which included one-hour, low-level routes that

terminated in airborne infiltrations, resupplies,

and a Fulton STARS.7 1 Suitable tactical landing

zones were not available within the exercise area,

thus eliminating any airland exfiltration sorties.

Although the exercise was a success for a firsttime-ever event, tasking was not sufficient for the

two Combat Talons. Host nation C-130s also supported the exercise, and several missions originally planned for the 7th SOS were actually flown

by them. By the end of September, the squadron

had redeployed to Rhein Main AB, where the

process of supporting 322d TAW activities continued to be a high priority.

Brig Gen Thomas M. Sadler, the 322d TAW com -

mander, requested permission from the USAFE

vice commander, Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, to organize the 7th SOS under the 322d TAW director

of operations. With the reorganization, General

Sadler proposed that the squadron commander be

reduced in grade from a full colonel to a lieute

ant colonel, which was in-line with other squa

ron commanders assigned to his wing. Colon

Haymaker, ci ting Air Force Manual 26-2, Organ

zation, Policy, and Guidance, agreed with Gener

Sadler and noted that the reorganization wou

streamline the span of control of the wing com

mander. The requirement to have a colonel 

commander of the 7th SOS stemmed from t

unit’s wartime tasking. EUCOM OPLAN 4102 an

SOTFE’s Supporting Plan 4304 tasked the 7

SOS to form a Special Operations Wing, desi

nated the 7575th SOW and to assume command 

an Air Force Joint Unconventional Warfare Tas

Force. The wartime tasking required a full colone

yet normal peacetime duties could be perform

by a lieutenant colonel. During exercises and co

tingencies, the colonel position was required to fu

fill the commander’s role. General Wilson felt th

General Sadler’s proposal had merit, but the sou r

ing of the wartime commander for the 7575

SOW was a contentious issue. General Sadler b

lieved that his assistant director of operatio

could fulfill this role, but the requirement to hav

special operations experience could not be guara

teed under that arrangement.72 The reorganizatio

was ultimately tabled, and operations continue

with the squadron assigned under the wing com

mander with a full colonel squadron command

authorized. Colonel Haymaker remained th

squadron commander until 12 February 197

when he relinquished command to Colonel Per

and moved up to be the 322d TAW vice wing com

mander. Although the 7th SOS commander h

been reduced to an 05 because of this move, th

colonel authorization remained valid and w

later filled by a full colonel when Colonel Per

left the squadron in 1975.

73

1974: Low-Level Training

in Spain Canceled

To maintain proficiency in the Combat Talon 

the squadron continued to deploy to Allied cou

tries throughout Europe, including Denmark, UK

Italy, Greece, and Spain. Since the introduction 

the weapons system in 1968, however, there w

not a flight simulator available for 7th SOS us

As a result the simulator requirement for pilo

and navigators had been waived for the Europea

assigned squadron. Tactical Air Command r

quired 12 hours each year in the simulator, an

allied nations, including the UK, required up 

48 hours for its pilots. As the pilot force ente

ing the Combat Talon became younger and le

COMBAT ARRO

135
experienced with the Vietnam War ending, the

need for access to a simulator for USAFE-assigned

C-130E(I) pilots became even more acute. The

only C-130 simulators in Europe belonged to the

RAF, and after initial contact with them, tenta -

tive agreement was reached whereby some simulator time would be provided to 7th SOS crew

members. The fuel crisis of 1973 brought a reduction in available hours for the UK simulator, and

the initial agreement was scrapped. Additional coordination was accomplished, with the 7th SOS

requesting 12 hours each month in the simulator.

The RAF responded that it could only support

four hours each quarter, with the possibility of

four hours every six weeks. A compromise was

reached whereby the RAF would provide two, fourhour training blocks on consecutive days each

quarter. The arrangement would allow the 7th

SOS to accomplish critically needed upgrade and

emergency procedures training. On 1 April 1974 the

7th SOS sent its first crew to RAF Lyneham, UK,

for the first two-day simulator session. During the

two days emergency procedures, engine runs,

aborted takeoffs, and engine-out landings were

practiced.74 The arrangement was good for the

squadron because it provided access to a simula -

tor on a regular basis.

As the simulator program got under way, the

7th SOS faced another challenge with the loss of

its low-level routes in Spain. Although the squadron supported the Spanish Parachute Brigade on

a regular basis and was well received by the

Spanish military, the general populace objected to

low-level aircraft flights due to the noise that it

created. As a result, the Spanish government established a policy that no low-level training would

be made available to any foreign forces after 31

December 1974. To compensate for the lost training, the squadron proposed to shift its training to

Portugal since the terrain there was rugged, and

rural areas were sparsely populated. 75 Although

sporadic approval to fly in Portugal was eventually given in conjunction with the Flintlock exercise series, there were many restrictions imposed

by the Portuguese that effectively eliminated the

area as a training site. During Flintlock 74, which

operated out of Rhein Main AB and consisted of

two subexercises, low-level training was accomplished in Norway and in southern Germany.

Thus, the impact of the loss of routes in Spain at

year’s end was minimized.76

By the fall of 1974, the 7th SOS had operated

the Combat Talon in Europe for more than six

years. During that period the unit had decreased

in size to four assigned Combat Talon aircraft,

and it had moved from Ramstein AB to Rhein

Main AB. The afterglow of the Son Tay raid had

long since faded in the minds of the squadron’s

USAFE bosses. The squadron was different from

fighter squadrons of the command, and USAFE

leadership was unsure of how to manage the specialized SOF asset. The cold war was the central

focus in Europe, with tensions remaining high

between East and West. With training areas

dwindling, the future looked bleak for European

SOF. The secret to success for any organization,

however, lay in its ability to adapt to the changing environment. For the 7th SOS to survive, it

had to bring to the table a capability needed by

its USAFE war-fighter boss. The requirement for

a standoff jammer platform to provide an opera -

tional capability until the EF-111 was fielded in

the early 1980s was the capability that would

keep the squadron viable in the minds of USAFE

leadership. The decision in the mid-1970s to

equip 7th SOS aircraft with an upgraded ECM

capability in lieu of the IFR modification would

ensure the unit remained an integral part of

USAFE’s war plan, but it eliminated the 7th SOS

from participation in the 1980 Iranian rescue

mission.

Notes

1. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 25 Septem -

ber–31 December 1966, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., A3–18.

2. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 1 January–30

June 1967, A-1–5.

3. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 1 July–31 De -

cember 1967, C-I-15–16.

4. History, 7th Air Commando Squadron (Composite), 1

January–30 June 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., iv–vi.

5. Ibid., vii–viii.

6. Ibid., 1.

7. Ibid., 9.

8. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2.

9. History, 7th Air Commando Squadron (Composite), 1

January–30 June 1968, 13–14.

10. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1968, 3.

11. Ibid., encl. 9, 1.

12. Ibid., 4.

13. Ibid., 8.

14. Ibid., 7.

15. Ibid., 9.

16. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–30 June

1969, 3.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

136
17. Ibid., encl. 3, 2.

18. Ibid., 3.

19. Ibid., encl. 5, 1.

20. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 July–30 September

1969, 3.

21. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–30 June

1969, 7.

22. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 July–30 September

1969, 4.

23. Ibid., Flintlock II AAR, 4–9.

24. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 October–31 De -

cember 1969, 4.

25. Ibid., document 4.

26. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1970, 4.

27. Ibid., 1.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 5.

31. Ibid., 6.

32. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 April–30 June

1970.

33. Ibid., 1–2.

34. Ibid., 4.

35. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 July–30 Septem -

ber 1970, 2–3.

36. Ibid., 14.

37. Ibid., 3.

38. Ibid., 3–4.

39. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 October–31 De -

cember 1970, 1.

40. Ibid., 2.

41. Ibid., 2–3.

42. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1971, 3.

43. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 April–30 June

1971, 4.

44. Ibid., 3.

45. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 October–31 De -

cember 1971, 9.

46. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 April–30 June

1971, 1–2.

47. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 July–30 September

1971, 4.

48. Ibid., 5.

49. Ibid., 12.

50. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 October–31 D

cember 1971, 4.

51. Ibid., 7.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 6.

55. Ibid., 7.

56. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–

March 1972, 8.

57. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 April–30 Ju

1972, 7.

58. Ibid., 11.

59. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 July–31 Dece

ber 1972, 8.

60. Ibid., 9.

61. Col John Gargus, Retired, interview by author, Colle

Station, Tex., 13 June 1998. Recorded on 8 mm videotape, n

transcribed, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlbu

Field, Fla.

62. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

December 1972, 2.

63. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–

March 1973, 4.

64. Ibid., 5–8.

65. Ibid., 1.

66. Ibid., 4.

67. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 April–30 Se

tember 1973, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 17–18.

68. Ibid., 18–19.

69. Ibid., 20–22.

70. Ibid., 41.

71. Ibid., 46.

72. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 October–31 D

cember 1973, 13–14.

73. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 January–

June 1974, vol. 2, 3.

74. Ibid., vol. 1, 16–17.

75. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 July–30 Septe

ber 1974, vol. 1, 7.

76. Ibid., 8.

COMBAT ARRO

137
Chapter 6

The Son Tay Prisoner of War Raid (1970)

Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what

you can be, what you will be.

—Douglas MacArthur

Operation Polar Circle

By 1970 America’s war in SEA had dragged on

for nearly a decade. Even before the Tet offensive

of January 1968, the American public and many

US politicians had distanced themselves from the

war. Throughout 1969 and into 1970, demonstra -

tions and antiwar protests increased. President

Richard M. Nixon made the decision to expand the

war into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, and the

nation exploded into violence. During the first

week of May 1970, four students were shot and

killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University. With a campaign promise to bring American soldiers home from Vietnam and to end the

war, the president appeared to be expanding the

war rather than ending it. US intelligence revealed that American POWs, some of them held

for more than six years in the worst of conditions,

were in bad shape and were dying from years of

captivity and torture. Their state of health was no

longer simply declining but was, rather, in a process of rapid deterioration.1

 America’s POWs were

the one issue upon which all agreed—something

had to be done.

Combat Talon had matured into a highly respected special purpose weapons system after

four years in SEA and its deployment to Europe.

Four aircraft were assigned to Detachment 2, 1st

SOW, Pope AFB, North Carolina, and supported

initial aircrew training. The 15th SOS had four

Talons assigned and continued to fly SOG-tasked

missions out of Nha Trang AB, Vietnam. The 7th

SOS, also with four aircraft assigned, was supporting European special operations out of Ramstein AB, Germany. The Combat Talon fleet, consisting of 12 total aircraft, was undergoing

various modifications at LAS Ontario, California,

thus leaving the operational units with an average of three aircraft on the ramp at each location.

The US intelligence community had as one of

its top priorities the identification of POW camps

in SEA. On 9 May 1970 two personnel from the

USAF 1127th Special Activities Squadron (SAS)

(Headquarters Command), Fort Belvoir, Virginia,

identified a possible POW prison compound 23

miles west of Hanoi in a small township calle

Son Tay (fig. 27). Col George J. Iles and C

Rudolph C. Koller, both assigned to the 1127

SAS, took the information to USAF Gener

James R. Allen, director of plans and polic

Headquarters USAF. General Allen validated th

1127th SAS discovery, and on 25 May 1970, h

briefed US Army brigadier general Donald D

Blackburn, the special assistant for counterinsu

gency and special activities (SACSA) on the Joi

Staff. 2 General Blackburn was intimately famili

with the plight of American POWs. He had serve

in Laos under the White Star program in 1961 an

had been the first commander of SOG from 196

to 1966. After receiving the initial briefing from

General Allen, General Blackburn wasted no tim

He immediately contacted the chairman of th

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Earle G. Wheeler, an

arranged to brief him on the newly discovered in 

formation. General Wheeler gave approval fo

SACSA to develop a recommendation on how 

proceed. On 26 May 1970 SACSA transmitted 

message calling for a select group of personne

sourced from all services, to deploy to the Pent

gon to form a special study group under SACSA

The small group of 12 personnel convened on th

first Monday of June 1970 to begin planning Op 

eration Polar Circle .

3

Working virtually around the clock, the sma

study group developed options to rescue th

American POWs thought to be held at Son Ta

The study group also looked at a second site, ide

tified as Ap Lo, but soon determined that Son Ta

was the compound most likely to contain Amer

can prisoners. On 5 June 1970 General Blackbur

and US Army colonel E. E. Mayer, chief, Speci

Operations Division, SACSA, briefed the speci

study group’s findings to the Joint Chiefs of Sta

in the tank, and recommended that an in-dept

feasibility study be conducted. The JCS agree

with the preliminary recommendations of the sp

cial study group, and on 10 June SACSA con 

vened an expanded 15-man feasibility stud

group. For the remainder of the month and in

July, the feasibility study group, chaired by USA

colonel Norman H. Frisbie, Air Force Plans an

139
Policy Directorate, the Pentagon, looked at op -

tions on how to proceed.4

The objective of the feasibility study group was

to develop an outline of a workable plan to rescue

the hostages. Various options were developed. One

option included a HALO drop some distance from

Son Tay, with the HALO team moving to the

prison by way of the Song Con River that ran close

to its outside walls. At a predetermined time, the

HALO team would blow an opening in the prison

wall and additional troops arriving by way of helo

or static line drop would assault the prison

through the opening. The static-line-drop option

was quickly eliminated due to the necessity of having to rapidly assemble and apply maximum firepower during the assault. (Troop marshaling after

an airdrop historically required several minutes,

and the jumpers usually suffered injuries.) An -

other option considered was to land helicopters

some distance from the prison, travel overland by

way of jeeps equipped with battering rams, and

penetrate the prison gates in a coordinated assault. This option also considered landing a C-130

aircraft on one of the many crushed limestone

roads leading into Son Tay, abandoning the aircraft after the assault and exfiltrating by way of

helicopter.5

As the feasibility study group explored options,

it became clear that any successful rescue attempt would have to commence from inside the

prison walls and expand outward from that point.

The prison walls could serve to the raiders’ advantage if they were on the inside of the prison at

the onset of the assault. By the third day of planning, the feasibility study group knew that the

only way to get inside the compound quickly was

through helicopter insertion. The area inside the

compound was not large enough to make a con -

ventional helicopter landing, so consideration was

made to rapidly land a helicopter inside the compound, with the assumption that damage would

render the aircraft nonflyable. The disabled helicopter would then be destroyed using an explosive

charge as the raiders and the rescued prisoners

departed the area. 6

Figure 27. Map of North Vietnam with Son Tay POW Prison (Source: Air University Library,

Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

140
Once the basic idea of crash landing a helicop -

ter inside the compound was accepted, a whole

set of additional challenges faced the study

group. Where could additional helicopters be

landed outside the walls to assist the assault

force inside? How would the helicopters find the

prison and land nearby simultaneously? Being

only 21 miles from Hanoi, what kind of response

should the raiders expect from the enemy?

Within five miles of Son Tay prison, there were

12,000 North Vietnamese troops stationed in

various locations. There were two major SAM installations nearby. How would these enemy

forces react to the raiders?7

General Blackburn was familiar with Combat

Talon capabilities. As chief of SOG in the mid1960s, he had employed both Combat Talon and

Heavy Hook aircraft on long-range, low-level mis -

sions into North Vietnam. Although the helicopter

held the key to penetrating the walls of Son Tay

and successfully delivering the assault force

there, it would take the Combat Talon to provide

precise low-level navigation to get the force to the

prison. With the threat in the immediate area,

Combat Talon would also play an important role

in deceiving enemy defenders while the assault

force executed the rescue. The Combat Talon aircraft was capable of single-ship, low-level flight in

the weather, but aircrews had not flown forma -

tion with helicopters using the terrain-following

system. Although IFR capable, Combat Talon aircrews preferred VFR conditions along its route to

update and ensure accuracy of its electronic navigation equipment. Many hours would be spent

during the training phase on dissimilar fixed- and

rotary-wing formation techniques and procedures.

Moon illumination and favorable weather were

essential considerations for a successful raid. If a

force consisting of several helicopters and attack

aircraft were to assault the prison simultaneously,

formation procedures would have to be utilized.

In addition, to attain precise navigation, prominent features on the ground had to be identified

by aircrews that were otherwise dependent on

outdated charts and limited equipment. The fea -

sibility study group determined that a quarter

moon would be the most desirable, with 15–45

degrees above the horizon as ideal. With the

large concentration of enemy forces in and

around Son Tay, the group determined that the

raid should commence between midnight and

dawn at 10 minutes past the hour, to take advantage of the enemy’s sleep and shift-change cycles.

Favorable weather periods were also researched,

and a determination was made that Septembe

October, and November were the most favorabl

mon ths for low-level flying. Since it was alread

June, the month of September was ruled o

because a force could not be organized an

trained by that time. Ideal moon illuminatio

and azimuth positioning would occur betwee

18 and 25 October and again during the sam

period the following month. The feasibili

study group, therefore, recommended the Oct

ber dates as the primary mission window, wi

November as the back up.8

Using all-source intelligence, the Defense I

telligence Agency (DIA) determined that 61 pri

oners were being held at Son Tay. On 10 Jul

1970 General Blackburn, Colonel Mayer, an

Colonel Frisbie briefed the Joint Chiefs of Sta

on the feasibility study group’s findings. Th

group determined that Son Tay could be succes

fully assaulted and Americans being held ther

could be rescued and returned to friendly terr

tory with minimum loss. A joint task force con 

sisting of helicopters, C-130E (I) Combat Talon

and A-1 attack aircraft would launch from base

in Thailand, fly low-level across Laos into Nor

Vietnam, assault Son Tay Prison utilizing a coo

dinated attack plan, rescue the prisoners, an

then retrace their route back through Laos to r

cover at bases in Thailand. The JCS approve

the concept and directed that more detailed pla

ning be conducted and an update briefing b

given in early August. Dependent on the Augu

briefing, a determination would be made whethe

to form a joint contingency task group (JCTG) o

to cease planning the operation and shelve th

whole idea.9 The August briefing would include 

detailed operations plan and a training plan. 

the mission still seemed feasible, then the secr

tary of defense would be briefed on the conce

before the formation of the joint task fo rce.10

Detailed Planning and

Selection of Commanders

The feasibility study group recommended 

the JCS that the overall JCTG commander be a

Air Force brigadier general because of the com

plexities of sourcing and coordinating aircraft an

support requirements across several command

Tactical Air Command owned all US-based A-

and Combat Talons; Military Airlift Comman

owned both the helicopters needed for the assau

and the strategic airlift assets required to mov

the task force to its theater forward operating l

cation; Strategic Air Command owned the SR-7

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

141
and other reconnaissance assets; PACAF owned

additional fixed- and rotary-wing assets needed

(including Talons, A-1s, and helicopters) for the

operation; and USAFE owned a contingent of

Combat Talons and crews from which to draw additional support.1 1

With a green light from the JCS, the already

hectic planning tempo accelerated. The next major milestone was the selection of a mission commander. On 10 July USAF brigadier general

Leroy Manor received a telephone call from the

Pentagon shortly after SACSA briefed the mission

to the JCS. He was told that he had been selected

to command a special mission for the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. He was instructed to fly to Washington

the next day and to make an operation’s stop at

Pope AFB, North Carolina, to pick up a US Army

colonel named Arthur D. Simons. General Manor

was, at the time, the commander, USAF SOF, located at Eglin AFB, Florida, and was responsible

for training Air Force Special Operations Forces

supporting worldwide tasking, including Combat

Talon operations in SEA and in Europe. He was a

highly respected Air Force general officer and

combat veteran, having flown 345 missions in

World War II and in Vietnam. He was the former

wing commander of the 37th Tactical Fighter

Wing stationed at Phu Cat, South Vietnam.1 2

General Manor thought it strange that he was

directed to stop and pick up an Army colonel at

Pope AFB. Although they had never met, General

Manor would soon come to appreciate the abilities

of Colonel Simons, who, as it turned out, had been

designated the ground force commander. Colonel

Simons’s nickname was “Bull,” and he had earned

his reputation through three decades of soldiering. He had entered the Army in 1941 as a second

lieutenant fresh out of Reserve Officer Training

Corps. After his light artillery unit was disbanded

while in New Guinea, his unit was absorbed into

the Sixth Rangers. He commanded B Company of

the Sixth Rangers during the invasion of the Philippines. In the early 1960s he worked with General Blackburn preparing Special Forces’s soldiers

for White Star team operations in Laos. His mission there was to help establish a Laotian army

and to instruct it in basic military skills. Bull Simons joined SOG when General Blackburn was

its commander in 1965; he enjoyed General Black -

burn’s complete trust.13

General Manor and Colonel Simons reviewed

the operational plan that General Blackburn and

his staff had briefed to the JCS. Both concurred

with the feasibility study group that the mission

was, indeed, possible. Meetings were held with

DIA, CIA, and National Security Agency representatives where the two men were pledged complete support from each agency. With a window of

18–25 October only three months away, much

work needed to be done to establish the JCTG and

bring it up to mission-ready status. A rough timetable was worked out to ensure the raiding force

was trained and ready. The two commanders

would return to their respective locations and immediately begin selection of the nucleus of their

force. On 8 August they would return to Washington with their deputies for a five-day detailed

planning session. A training site would be selected

during the planning session, and a detailed train -

ing plan would be prepared and ready by 20 Au -

gust. The OPLAN would be completed by 28 Au -

gust, with actual training commencing by 9

September. Support missions, including SR-71

and unmanned drone reconnaissance flights over

North Vietnam, would be laid on during this period. Cover stories would be developed by a special security section in SACSA, and measures to

prevent information leaks would be put into

place. The raiding force would be fully trained

and ready to deploy by 10 October to meet the

first mission window.1 4

General Manor and Colonel Simons used sepa -

rate approaches to find and recruit volunteers for

the mission. At Fort Bragg Colonel Simons selected his key deputies and then discreetly put

out the word that he was looking for volunteers

for a “moderately hazardous” mission, instructing

all who were interested to form up in the base

theater at an appointed time. Through an extensive process whereby Colonel Simons personally

interviewed every volunteer, just over 100 men

were selected from the 500 who answered the call.

This group would be reduced later to a raiding

force of 56 men.15

General Manor used a different approach. He

called in men whom he was sure would volunteer

and told them only that he had a highly classified

mission and asked if they would like to participate

with him. He explained that there were some risks

and that it was a good project, but he did not disclose the actual objective of the mission. He offered

to excuse anyone who did not want to participate.1 6

The Air Force contingent consisted of aircrews

and support personnel for two Combat Talons,

five A-1E Skyraiders, one HH-3, and five HH-53

helicopters.17 One Combat Talon crew was sourced

from Detachment 2, 1st SOW, Pope AFB and was

commanded by Colonel Blosch. The second Talon

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

142
crew was sourced from the 7th SOS, Ramstein AB

and was commanded by Major Franklin. The two

Talon crews, along with spare personnel, remained with the task group throughout the train -

ing phase, deployed to Takhli RTAFB, Thailand,

for the mission, and then redeployed to the

United States and to Europe after mission completion.1 8 The two augmented Combat Talon crews

that were selected in August 1970 for the Son Tay

Prison raid were as follows:

1 9

Operation Ivory Coast

On 8 August 1970, after the update briefing by

General Manor and Colonel Simons, Adm Thomas

H. Moorer, the new JCS chairman sent a message

to all unified and specified commands announcing

the formation of the JCTG under General Manor

and Colonel Simons’s command. The operation

was identified as Ivory Coast, but no details were

given concerning the purpose of the new organiza -

tion. The new designation replaced the name Op -

eration Polar Circle that had been used during

the initial planning phase. The following Monday,

10 August, an expanded group of 27 personnel,

designated the Ivory Coast Planning Group, con -

vened in the Pentagon to refine the feasibility

study group’s plan.20

As the Ivory Coast Planning Group met, one of

the first items on its agenda was to identify a

training area. A small advanced party was dispatched to Eglin AFB, Florida, and soon identified

Eglin Auxiliary Field No. 3 (Duke Field) as the

ideal location to house the raiding force. Air asse

would remain nearby at Eglin AFB and at Egli

Auxiliary Field No. 9 (Hurlburt Field), whe

many were permanently stationed. Planners rea 

soned that less notice would be made if the aircra

remained at their home stations rather than d

ploying a few miles north to Duke Field.21

As aircrew and support personnel were brough

on board, they were briefed that the mission 

the new force was to develop the capability to fre

American hostages from anywhere in the worl

but not specifically Son Tay. Selected crew mem

bers and planners from each weapons system

were briefed on the actual Son Tay mission 

facilitate mission planning. Combat Talon person 

nel initially briefed by General Manor and h

staff at Eglin AFB included Thomas L. Stile

John Gargus, Cecil M. Clark, Albert P. Blosc

and Irl L. Franklin. They were sworn to secrec

and did not divulge details of the mission unt

the mass briefings held in Thailand just befor

mission execution. In the interim, real-worl

events provided plenty of fodder for speculatio

There was considerable turmoil throughout th

world at the time and particularly in the Middl

East, where two airliners had been hijacked an

the mainly American passengers removed to a

undisclosed location. American diplomats ha

been kidnapped and held hostage. Cuba was als

on everyone’s mind, and many volunteers fe

sure that Castro was the target. All this deflecte

attention from the group’s real objective in SEA.

As he had done for his other helicopter an

fixed-wing assets, General Manor sourced h

Combat Talons from different units to reduce th

possibility of compromise. Being fully committe

to the SOG mission in SEA, the 15th SOS w

not tasked to provide any personnel, but one 

its aircraft (64-0523) was diverted from LAS O

tario to General Manor’s JCTG. It had just com

pleted modifications at the California facilit

The other Combat Talon (64-0558) was source

from Detachment 2, 1st SOW.

General Manor planned for redundancy in eac

weapons system. For the Combat Talon , h

needed one aircraft to provide low-level navigatio

escort for the helicopter force, but he needed 

spare in case the first Talon had to abort anytim

during the mission. The number 2 Talon wa

tasked to provide escort for the A-1s, and a spa

was to be ready to escort the helos if number 

dropped out. With 12 Combat Talons in existenc

and nine available, a two-aircraft package over 

prolonged period was a significant commitment 

Cherry 1

(Talon 64-0523)

(7th SOS)

Cherry 2

(Talon 64-0558)

(Detachment 2, 1st SOW)

Maj Irl L. Franklin Lt Col Albert P. Blosch

Maj Thomas L. Mosley *Lt Col Cecil M. Clark

Capt Randal D. Custard Maj John Gargus

Capt Thomas K. Eckhart Maj Harry L. Pannill

Capt William A. Guenon Jr. Capt John M. Connaughton

Capt James F. McKenzie Jr. *Capt Ronald L. Jones

Capt Thomas L. Stiles Capt David M. Kender

MSgt Leslie G. Tolman Capt Norman C. Mazurek

TSgt William A. Kennedy Capt William D. Stripling

TSgt Kenneth C. Lightle TSgt Billy J. Elliston

TSgt James M. Shepard *TSgt Failus Potts

SSgt Earl D. Parks TSgt Jimmie O. Riggs

SSgt Robert L. Renner TSgt Paul E. Stierwalt

*SSgt William T. Brown

TSgt Dallas R. Criner

SSgt Melvin B. D. Gibson

*Alternate crew members who did not fly on the mission.

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

143
the force. By sourcing one aircraft from PACAF,

one aircraft from TAC, and one aircrew each from

TAC and USAFE, no single unit was overtaxed.

Ongoing programs were not negatively affected.23

As detailed planning continued during the second week of August, several capabilities not found

on the Combat Talon were identified as being essential for mission success. One such requirement

was the FLIR. There was no FLIR capability on

the Combat Talon at the time, but an FLIR system was in use on similar Heavy Chain C-130E

aircraft. Arrangements were made to borrow two

FL-2B FLIR systems from Heavy Chain and to

mount them on the two Combat Talons with a

temporary ext ernal pod configuration. The two aircraft were modified during the late August period

and returned to Eglin AFB in time to participate

in the September training phase. FLIR was con -

sidered essential to the helicopter escort mission

because most of the turn points during the lowlevel route were river crossings or lakes, and the

early generation FLIR did a good job of identify -

ing the contrast between land and water.24 Another innovation to assist the Combat Talon in

acquiring the helicopter after inadvertent formation breakup was the installation of the ground

acquisition responder/interrogator (GAR/I) be acon

on the helicopter. The GAR/I was designed to

identify a signal transmitted from a drop zone to

the aircraft to help assist the navigator during

blacked-out airdrops. For the raid, a GAR/I bea -

con was installed on each helicopter, and the

Combat Talon successfully read their positions

when interrogated. 2 5

An additional requirement for Combat Talon

was the capability to drop napalm to create a

ground marker for the A-1 attack aircraft. Planners needed a ground marker that would burn for

an extended period, thus providing the A-1s a

point of reference from which to orbit in proximity

to the ground attack. In the event the ground

force commander needed assistance, the A-1s

could respond in minimal time from their holding

locations. Conventional delivery of the BLU-27/B

napalm canister by fighter aircraft resulted in a

large area of flame that burned for only a short

period. For Son Tay the BLU-27/B was modified to

function as a visual ground marker that required

special rigging and palletizing for C-130 delivery.

A developmental and test program was conducted

on the Eglin AFB ranges that produced all proce -

dures and checklists necessary for handling, loading, and delivering the munitions. Drag chutes

from old B-47 drop tanks were available through

supply channels, and these chutes were acquired

and attached to the BLU-27/B napalm canisters.

The palletized canisters were then dropped on the

Eglin AFB range. Napalm delivered in this vertical manner tended to pool in a concentrated area

and burned for nearly an hour. Duration of the

assault was planned for 30 minutes. With General Manor’s 100 percent redundancy requirement, the extended burn time was certified as

a cceptable.26

Another requirement identified by the Ivory

Coast planners was the dropping of firefight

simulators to confuse any enemy troops in the

area and to delay their response to the prison

assault. The simulators were actually firecrackers

encased in a plastic sleeve that were dropped utilizing a pallet system from the Combat Talon and,

once on the ground, sounded as if an actual firefight was under way.2 7 Flares were also needed to

illuminate the Son Tay Prison compound. The

conventional flare utilized in SEA was the Mark

24, but it was a high-altitude flare that could not

be dropped at low level. The maximum altitude

over Son Tay was 1,500 feet, based upon the SAM

and AAA threat in the immediate area. The Mark

24 was unacceptable even at this altitude. The

Mark 6, or MK-6 log flare, was similar to a railroad flare and could be delivered manually at low

altitude from the rear of the aircraft. (There was

no aircraft delivery system designed for this type

flare.) A supply of MK-6s was procured for Combat Talon use and was tested over the Eglin AFB

range. Testing proved quite successful. The longburning flare created acceptable light and had the

added advantage of creating confusion on the

ground when it started small fires amongst enemy

forces.2 8

With modifications under way and personnel

selected to participate in the raid, flight training

commenced on 20 August 1970. The next 60 days

would prove to be demanding yet rewarding for

the entire force.

Training in Northwest Florida

In August of 1970 Colonel Blosch and Major

Franklin were recognized as two of the most experienced Combat Talon aircraft commanders then

flying the sophisticated weapons system. Colonel

Blosch had been one of two pilots in the Air Force

who was qualified to fly the slot position on a fourship C-130 demonstration team known as the

Hercules Horseman while stationed in PACAF’s

315th Air Division.2 9 Both men were part of the

initial cadre Stray Goose deployment to Nha

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

144
Trang AB, Vietnam, in 1966. Ten of the 29 crew

members chosen for the Son Tay mission were

part of the initial SEA deployment. While in Vietnam, Colonel Blosch commanded crew SG-04, and

Major Franklin commanded SG-06. They had com -

pleted their tours and had continued in the Talon

program—Colonel Blosch at the schoolhouse at

Pope AF B and Major Franklin at Ramstein AB.3 0

Lt Col Benjamin N. Kraljev, a member of the

Ivory Coast Planning Group assigned to the Air

Staff, was familiar with Combat Talon from his

days assigned to Pope AFB. With General Manor’s

approval Colonel Kraljev contacted Colonel

Blosch, who was the operations officer and acting

squadron commander of Detachment 2, 1st SOW,

and arranged for a demonstration flight for a select group of Pentagon staffers. Colonel Blosch

flew a Talon to Andrews AFB that same evening

and provided the requested demonstration. He

was told of his selection for the mission the next

morning.31

Early in August Major Franklin had deployed

to RAF Greenham Commons, as part of the 7th

SOS contingent for Flintlock III. He received a

message from Headquarters USAFE through his

squadron commander directing him and his crew

to report to Eglin AFB and to await further instructions. Major Franklin had upgraded to squadron

standardization and evaluation officer while assigned to Pope AFB, and when he moved to Ramstein AFB with Combat Arrow, he was assigned to

the squadron’s standardization/evaluation section

without a crew. The message from USAFE requested each crew member by name, but the requested crew members were dispersed throughout

the six assigned crews. To prevent affecting several crews in the midst of a major exercise, the

squadron commander negotiated with USAFE to

provide his most capable hard crew and to provide

Major Franklin as its aircraft commander. Crew

members were not told anything about the mission until their arrival at Eglin AFB on 28 Au -

gust. Both Colonel Blosch and Major Franklin

were highly qualified in the long-range, low-level,

single-ship Talon mission. Son Tay, however,

would require dissimilar formation skills not resident anywhere in the Air Force, and the two aircraft commanders would quickly be immersed in

developing these skills.

The primary mission of the Combat Talon for

the Son Tay raid was to escort the helicopter assault force and to provide it with precision naviga -

tion across Laos and into North Vietnam. Talons

were not capable of helicopter air refueling, so a

third C-130—an HC-130P—was tasked to refu

the helicopters over Laos, then hand off the fo

mation to the Combat Talon for the ingress po

tion of the mission. The HC-130P did not hav

adequate navigational or ECM equipment r

quired to penetrate North Vietnamese air defense

and to reach Son Tay.

Formation flying with rotary-wing aircraft wa

a new experience for Talon crews. Both Colon

Blosch and Major Franklin quickly realized ju

how difficult it would be to lead a dissimilar fo

mation into combat. Planners had chosen 

smaller aircraft (either the HH-3 or the UH-1) 

land inside the prison compound. A major prob 

lem arose over the maximum cruise airspeed 

the two aircraft. Their maximum cruise airspee

was less than the minimum computed en rou

airspeed for the Combat Talon .

Stall speed for the Combat Talon in the clea

configuration was approximately 12 knots abov

the maximum cruise speed for the HH-3/UH-

Simply put, the Talon could not fly as slow as th

maximum capable speed of the two smaller hel

copters. Through testing and experimentatio

however, aircrews found that the slower helicop 

ters could draft in a position eight to 13 feet b

hind and above the left wing of the Combat Talo

and increase their maximum cruise speed to 10

KIAS, which was an increase of 18 knots. At 10

KIAS and with 70 percent flaps extended, th

Combat Talon was five knots above its power-o

stall speed in straight and level flight and wa

well within the flight envelope of the larger HH

53s. The two aircraft commanders also found th

by using the two inboard engines at high-powe

settings with the outboards at reduced power, th

Combat Talon could fly at a lower airspeed tha

the computed stall speed. As long as symmetric

power was maintained, the two commanders we

confident that planned airspeeds of 105 KIAS we

safe and posed little threat of the aircraft stallin

Throttle technique was the key to slow-spee

flight, which was a skill the pilots developed du

ing the training phase. As fuel was burned durin

the mission, the weight and stall speed of th

Talon would decrease, resulting in an even greate

margin of safety between the aircraft’s stall spee

and its en route airspeed. Mountain ranges i

eastern Laos and western North Vietnam wou

require continuous turns and changes in altitud

and would present a challenging obstacle for th

slow-moving helicopter formation.32

Aircrews were ready to start initial training b

late August 1970. Mission aircraft 64-0523 an

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

145
64-0558 were sent to LAS Ontario for installation

of the FL-2B FLIR. A slick C-130 was furnished

by TAC for initial formation training while the

Talons were at LAS Ontario. Initial flights were

over the Gulf of Mexico in the Eglin AFB water

ranges at 1,000 feet AGL, an altitude that would

allow successful recovery if the C-130 approached

a stall. Because none existed at the time, Talon

aircrews were faced with the challenge of develop -

ing unorthodox formation procedures compatible

with the C-130, HH-53, HH-3, UH-1, and A-1.

The two Combat Talon crews swapped out helicopter and A-1 lead responsibilities on alternate

nights during training. This enabled the two

crews to become proficient in both missions. Formation procedures for the Combat Talon and the

A-1 were not extremely difficult to resolve due to

more compatible en route airspeeds—the A-1

cruised at 140 KIAS, which was well within the

Talon’s flight-performance envelope. At 105 KIAS,

however, the Combat Talon was limited in its

ability to maneuver with the helicopters in tow. In

the event of engine loss, the Combat Talon’s only

option was to accelerate by increasing power on the

remaining good engines, pushing the nose over

and descending while accelerating to its engineout controllable airspeed. The altitude from which

the recovery was initiated would determine the

success of the maneuver. At Takhli, RTAFB the

day before mission execution on 19 November,

helicopter lead would be assigned to Major Franklin’s crew and A-1 lead to Colonel Blosch.33

Once the aircrew felt proficient in daylight dis -

similar formation procedures, training shifted to

night overland routes. Procedures were developed for inadvertent weather penetration, loss of

visual contact with lead, and formation rejoin if

the slower helicopter fell out of its draft position.

Mission duration increased from two to four

hours and external lighting was systematically

reduced to near blacked-out levels. Night after

night the raiding force honed its low-level formation skills over the rugged terrain of northern

Alabama and the mountains of Tennessee. Cock -

pit lighting was dimmed to the lowest settings

possible to allow aircrews to see critical instruments, and external navigational lighting was

turned off. Low-light binoculars were tested by

the aircrew, but even low instrument light set -

tings did not allow vision past the windscreen.

Night-vision goggles (NVG) had not been perfected in 1970, so aircrews had to rely upon their

own vision using ambient light to see in the dark.

Radio-out procedures were also utilized during

Combat Talon in formation with an HH-3 and two HH53s during training for the Son Tay mission. Note the

HH-3 in “draft” position behind the Combat Talon.

Photo taken over north end of runway 18 at Hurlburt

Field, Fla.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

Combat Talon leading a US Army UH-1 and two HH-53s.

Planners were unsure if an operational HH-3 would be

available in SEA, so a backup plan utilizing the UH-1

was rehearsed.

USAF Photo

Combat Talon leading A-1 Skyraider formation during

workup for the Son Tay POW raid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

146
all phases of flight, including formation rejoins

after an inadvertent weather penetration. During

the training phase, mission aircraft logged 1,017

hours during 368 sorties without a single flyingrelated incident. By the second week of September, scarcely three weeks after beginning training, aircrews were ready to begin joint training

with the ground component force.3 4

Because of the need for redundancy, both

crews had to be proficient in each other’s flight

profile, including helicopter formation flying and

napalm/flare drop operations. The A-1 formation

flew a higher airspeed than did the helicopters.

Therefore, the faster formation’s route of flight

was planned to coincide roughly with that of the

slower one, but with timing dog legs built into

the low-level route to compensate for the slower

helicopters. If helo lead had to abort the mission

after launch, the two Combat Talons would con -

duct a rotate maneuver. Helo lead would transmit “rotate, rotate” followed by either “can do” or

“cannot do.” If helo lead transmitted “can do,” A-1

lead would take over as helo lead, and helo lead

would assume A-1 lead. If helo lead transmitted

“cannot do,” he would transfer the helicopter formation to A-1 lead and return to home base. In

the latter case, the A-1s would be on their own to

navigate to Son Tay without a lead Combat

Talon aircraft.3 5

Flight plan timing for the low-level portion of

the flight and the arrival in the objective area had

to be carefully planned for several reasons. First

of all, the inbound routes of the two formations

had to be planned close to each other with numerous crossing points to permit an expeditious lead

change should it become necessary. Consequently,

once the helicopter formation (lead call sign

Cherry 1) was formed after refueling with the

tanker aircraft, all timing to the target area be -

came relative to the rotary-wing formation. At

the completion of its refueling operation, the

fixed-wing formation (lead call sign Cherry 2)

planned to be 10 minutes behind the helicopters.

To ensure that the strike formation knew how

the progress of the assault formation was going,

Cherry 1 had to make timing calls at points 4, 7,

and 10 along the route, giving only its estimated

“ahead” or “behind” times in minutes for upcoming points 7, 10, and the IP, respectively. The

time separation between the two formations at the

IP was to decrease to not less than two minutes.

The two-m inute separation at the IP was also

critical b ecause it was needed to assure sufficient

time, altitude, and track separation between var

ous aircraft, which were also maneuvering in th

Son Tay area. Cherry 1 and Cherry 2 were to dro

flares, markers, and battle simulators on nearl

head-on tracks. After dropping its four illumina

ing flares over Son Tay Prison, Cherry 1 had 

make a right-hand teardrop turn to the sout

dropping markers and battle simulators for th

next three minutes before exiting the area to th

west. As Cherry 1 completed its drops, the he

copters remained at low level and landed, di

charged their troops, and moved back to their pr

designated holding area. Cherry 2, arriving at th

IP two minutes after Cherry 1, was to split from

its five A-1s. The A-1s then had to climb to the

attack altitudes and establish their orbit pattern

based on the napalm ground markers dropped b

the Talons for their reference points. The pla

assumed that the A-1s would not be needed unt

after the ground forces had engaged the enem

An early arrival of the A-1s could interfere wi

the helicopters and the departing Cherry 1. Afte

formation breakup, Cherry 2 had to climb to i

drop altitude, slow to 130 KIAS, and drop its a

sortment of napalm and flare markers with battl

simulators on a track that turned to the sout

four miles short of Son Tay. After its drop

Cherry 2 reversed course and headed west to i

holding area.*

For the raid to be successful, the raiding forc

would have to penetrate North Vietnam’s form

dable air defenses. General Manor zeroed in o

the enemy’s SAM, AAA, and MiG aircraft th

could threaten the force. There were eight SAM

sites located northeast, east, and southeast of th

POW camp. Another SAM site, located only thre

and one-half kilometers from Son Tay, was bein

utilized as a SAM training facility but cou ld po

sibly respond in case of an attack. Intelligenc

revealed that AAA posed no threat to the raidin

force, except near the SAM sites, and that a

SAM sites could be avoided, except the one ne

Son Tay itself. This site had an 85 mm AAA ba

tery associated with it that had an effective rang

above 3,000 feet. To minimize the effect of th

battery, the raiding force would limit its max

mum altitude to 3,000 feet, thus flying under th

effective range of the AAA.3 6 There were MiG ai

craft at Phuc Yen AB, which was 10 miles nort

of Hanoi, but the MiGs were primarily dayligh

only fighters that needed a ground control inte

cept (GCI) controller to direct their air-to-air i

tercepts. General Manor reasoned that a diversio

__________

 *Expansion of timing procedures provided by John Gargus.

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

147
launched from US Navy aircraft carriers over the

Gulf of Tonkin would hold their attention. He

also had a backup capability aboard the Talons

that would seriously degrade the GCI controllers

if any MiGs launched. For the mission to be a

total success, however, surprise was essential for

both the ground force and for its supporting aircraft.

Range C-2 and Barbara

By the time Colonel Simons arrived at Duke

Field on 3 September 1970, Colonel Blosch and

Major Franklin were well on their way to having

their dissimilar formation procedures refined and

ready for the joint phase of training. There was a

lot going on at Duke Field at the time, so the

addition of the raiding party and the coming and

going of mission aircraft went virtually unnoticed.

Other special forces personnel and air commandos from Hurlburt Field were transiting Duke

Field and were working with soldiers from the

nearby US Army ranger camp. To the casual ob -

server, the raiding party was just another group

exercising on the vast Eglin AFB range. Weeks of

preparation already had been expended getting

the force selected and ready for the training

phase. For Colonel Simons and his men, it was

time to get down to business.

37

Early in the planning process, General Black -

burn’s feasibility study group had recommended

construction of a full-scale mock-up of the Son

Tay Prison compound. The mock-up would be

used by Colonel Simons’s assault force during rehearsals and would replicate terrain features

found in the North Vietnamese prison camp. Colonel Simons wanted a realistic replica built, but

counterintelligence personnel cautioned against

such construction. A detailed structure inadvertently could reveal the actual objective to members of the raider force, or a casual observer could

possibly draw the correct conclusion and figure

out what was going on. A remote site on the Eglin

AFB range, site C-2, was chosen as the ground

force training area. Controlled access to the site

eliminated the casual observer threat, but overhead Soviet satellite imagery could not be eliminated. A Soviet satellite passed over C-2 twice

each day, and often there were two such satellites

in orbit. A permanent, detailed mock-up could not

be constructed, yet Colonel Simons could not rehearse his assault plan without one. 38

Mission planners and Colonel Simons agreed to

construct a mock-up that could be dismantled

when the Soviet satellites were overhead. Target

cloth and 2-by-4 studs were used to replicate

walls of buildings. Doors, windows, and gates

either were painted on or cut into the cloth. The

2-by-4s were mounted into holes in the ground,

and when the structure was removed and rolled

up, covers were placed over the holes to eliminate

the outline of the structure. Large trees were dug

up and replanted to conform exactly to those

found at Son Tay. Thus, when the helicopters flew

into the mock-up, the pilots’ view was the same as

it would be for the actual operation. When set up,

the mock-up replicated the prison itself, right

down to the foliage pattern found there.3 9

To provide even greater detail for the assault

force, a model of Son Tay Prison, code-named Barbara, was constructed by the CIA. Barbara was

built to exact scale based on reconnaissance photographs taken by US satellites and SR-71 aircraft.

It was tabletop size and replicated the terrain,

fauna, flora, and the prison itself. An optical platform device was used to view any part of the

model. The device could be placed anywhere in

the model and, through a series of mirrors, would

reflect a horizontal view as though the viewer was

actually standing on the ground inside the compound itself. Barbara provided an early version of

what later would be called virtual reality. Ground

forces spent countless hours on the model and

were able to memorize every detail of the prison,

including locations of the prison cells, North Vietnamese Army officers’ quarters, and the main

gate (in daylight or darkness).4 0 A second model of

the bridge and surrounding terrain near Son Tay

Prison was also built that had similar characteristics as Barbara.

On 9 September Colonel Simons and his men

began their training on the mock-up. By 17 September night training was in full swing, including operations with the assault force helicopters.

On Monday, 28 September, full-scale joint training began, using all parts of the mission previously practiced separately—low-speed, lowlevel helicopter/Combat Talon formation, FLIR

operations, napalm and flare drop, and ground

force assault on the mock-up. Three objective

area rehearsals were made each day, followed by

three more each night. On Tuesday, 6 October, a

full-scale dress rehearsal was held at C-2. The

rehearsal included a 687-mile low-level flight

over the southeastern United States, which mirrored the route to be flown in SEA. Exact times

were flown, and the assault force employed live

munitions on the Eglin AFB range. General

Blackburn and Colonel Mayer flew down from

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

148
the Pentagon and view ed the full-dress rehearsal

as Manor and Simons’s assault force performed

flawlessly. In six short weeks, the raiding force

had come from concept to mission-ready status. All

that remained was in-theater coordination and

mission-execution approval.41

The Mission Approval Process

Approval to plan and execute the mission was

received incrementally throughout the sevenmonth planning cycle. When SACSA first con -

tacted chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on

25 May, SACSA was given the tentative go-ahead

to develop a recommendation on how to proceed.

SACSA formed a special study group, which recommended to the JCS on 5 June that an in-depth

feasibility study should be conducted. The JCS

concurred and the special study group was expanded into a larger feasibility study group. On

10 July the feasibility study group briefed the

JCS that Son Tay could be successfully assaulted

and that Americans held there could be rescued

with minimum US casualties. The JCS approved

further detailed planning and directed that an update briefing be given on 8 August. The update

briefing was given on that date, resulting in a

CJCS message to all unified and specified commands worldwide, which announced the establishment of a Joint Chiefs Task Group under the

command of General Manor and Colonel Simons.4 2

When the JCTG was officially formed, the JCS

had approved only detailed planning and training for the Son Tay mission. General Manor was

instructed to report to the JCS when he felt the

concept was tested, proven feasible, and training

was nearly complete. From General Manor’s report, the JCS would determine whether to seek

approval from higher civilian authority.4 3 Training progressed rapidly at Eglin AFB once the

main force was selected and deployed there. By

mid-September the two commanders were ready

to report to the JCS .

On 16 September they briefed the JCS that the

concept had been tested and proven feasible and

that the JCTG would be ready to deploy to SEA

on 10 October. The two commanders also recommended that in-theater coordination and deployment be accomplished in time to facilitate mission

execution between 20 and 25 October, with 21 October designated as the primary mission execu -

tion date. The JCS again concurred, and on 24

September General Manor and Colonel Simons

briefed the secretary of defense, Melvin L. Laird,

and the director of the CIA, Richard M. Helm

recommending approval of the mission and th

October dates.4 4

Secretary Laird deferred approval pending c

ordination with higher authority but authorize

General Manor to brief CINCPAC, Adm Joh

McCain, who was in Washington at the time o

other business. Admiral McCain was briefed th

following day, 25 September. General Manor ha

been concerned that Admiral McCain, whose so

was a POW being held in North Vietnam but no

at Son Tay, might be less supportive since ther

was a possibility that prisoners left behind woul

face even harsher treatment. As it turned ou

however, Admiral McCain was supportive and o

fered any assistance the JCTG needed. 45

It was 8 October before General Manor an

Colonel Simons could get on the White Hous

briefing schedule. At this briefing Dr. Henr

Kissinger and Gen Alexander M. Haig were pr

sent, but President Nixon did not attend. D

Kissinger liked the plan and saw no reason 

would not work. General Haig had little to sa

during the meeting. At the conclusion of the brie

ing, Dr. Kissinger asked when approval of th

mission was needed to make the October date

General Manor replied that he needed approv

by the next day, to which Dr. Kissinger expresse

grave doubts that a decision could be reached b

that time. President Nixon was out of town, an

he would need to be briefed to determine the me

its of the proposal. Dr. Kissinger directed that th

JCTG continue training but to plan on the N

vember dates. 46 A new date for the operation wa

then set as 21 November 1970.

On 27 October CJCS Admiral Moorer approve

deployment of the JCTG in-theater coordinatio

staff, starting on 1 November, and deployment 

the main body beginning on 10 November. On 

November General Blackburn, General Mano

and Colonel Simons departed by commercial a

for Southeast Asia by way of Hawaii. Once in H

waii the team updated Admiral McCain on th

status of the rescue attempt. From Hawaii 

Saigon, Ad miral McCain provided his comman

aircraft for the briefing team’s use. Admir

Moorer sent a message to Gen Creighton Gener

Abrams, COMUSMACV, announcing the arrival 

the briefing team and asked him to listen to the

briefing. In addition to COMUSMACV, the Se

enth AF commander also attended.4 7 At the con 

clusion of the briefing, General Abrams had on

one question—Who did the JCTG work for? Whe

told that the task group would be working direct

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

149
for the CJCS through CINCPAC, General Abrams

pledged his support with all the resources under

his command, including those of Seventh AF.48

The next key player to be briefed was the commander of Carrier Task Force 77.0, Adm Frederic

A. Bradshar. His carrier task force would be responsible for providing the diversionary air attack

over Haiphong Harbor and the Gulf of Tonkin.

General Blackburn, General Manor, and Colonel

Simons flew out to the flagship and briefed Admiral Bradshar on the operation. Admiral Bradshar

agreed to mount a diversionary attack on mission

night and offered his forces for any objective area

assistance needed by the JCTG. General Manor

thanked him for his offer but explained that the

JCTG had finalized its plans for the objective area

assault. The night of 21 November was still the

primary launch date.4 9

Starting on 5 November, JCTG staff officers

visited each wing, squadron, or facility com -

mander supporting the operation. A letter of instruction was delivered that contained necessary

information each commander would need to support the operation. Senior officers at Seventh AF

established the bona fidis for the JCTG staff officers before their arrival, and all commanders enthusiastically endorsed the operation and pledged

their support.5 0

On 10 November Colonel Blosch and Major

Franklin, with their aircrew and support person -

nel, departed Eglin AFB in Combat Talons 64-

0523 and 64-0558, respectively, en route to SEA.

The two aircraft deployed through Norton AFB,

California, to Hickham AFB, Hawaii, then

through Wake Island to Kadena AB, Okinawa.

From Kadena AB the two crews flew on to Takhli

RTAFB, Thailand. The deployment used Project

Heavy Chain as a cover, with message traffic to

CINCPACAF and US Defense Attaché Office,

Bangkok, requesting routine aircraft servicing

and personnel billeting during en route stops.

Diplomatic clearance into Thailand was also requested at the same time. The call signs for the

two deploying Combat Talons were Daw 43 and

Thumb 66.51 Between the 11th and 14th of November, four C-141s departed the United States

loaded with the raiding force, their equipment,

and the US Army UH-1 helicopter.* On 14 November the two Talons arrived at Takhli RTAFB,

and by 17 November the remaining raiding force

had also closed there. 5 2 At Takhli RTAFB General Manor received final execution authority for

Operation Kingpin (the code name given to the

execution phase of the mission) by way of Red

Rocket message from the JCS on 18 November.

From that date forward, he was delegated the

authority by CJCS to make whatever decisions

necessary to successfully complete the mission

and was given OPCON of forces supporting the

operation.53

From initial approval to develop a recommenda -

tion on 25 May to final execution authority on 18

November, nearly six months had elapsed. During

that time, a raiding force had been selected and

trained, a detailed plan had been created and refined, and complex weapons systems had been

modified to suit mission needs. New capabilities

had been acquired for mission aircraft, and combat

tactics had been developed. The force was in place

in Thailand, and all that was needed was decent

weather and a bit of good luck .

Operation Kingpin

After all forces had arrived at Takhli RTAFB

on 17 November, mission personnel assembled in

the base theater for a joint mission briefing for

Operation Kingpin . General Manor covered the

air plan and Colonel Simons the ground attack

plan. For security purposes objective area names

and geographical locations were omitted from the

briefing. When the mission briefing concluded, Air

Force crews continued to work on mission charts

and flimsies. Colonel Blosch and Major Franklin

had been at Takhli RTAFB since 14 November,

and most of their work was complete. The mission

briefing had provided additional altitude, communication, and en route procedures. On 19 November another briefing was held that covered command and control, intelligence, search and rescue,

and evasion and escape (E&E).5 4 All looked good,

except for the weather forecast.

About once every 10 years, SEA experienced a

major typhoon. On 18 November Typhoon Patsy

hit the Philippines and headed west toward

Hanoi. At the same time, a large weather system,

consisting of a cold front with associated poor

weather, began slowly moving southeast out of

southern China. Weather forecasters determined

the two systems would meet somewhere near Son

Tay on the night of 21 November, which was D

day for the raid.55

General Manor had two excellent weather forecasters from the 1st Weather Wing, and he arranged a T-39 shuttle from Saigon to Takhli

__________

 *Although the decision had been made to use the HH-3, General Manor wanted to deploy with the UH-1 in the event an operational HH-3 was

not available in-theater. The HH-3 was in the process of being withdrawn from SEA and was bein g replaced by the larger HH-53.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

150
RTAFB for them to obtain the latest weather information. (Takhli RTABF was in the process of

closing, and its weather gear had been previously

removed.) Although weather in the objective area

was a major concern for General Manor, en route

weather for the two Talon formations and high

seas and reduced visibility in the Gulf of Tonkin

for Task Force 77.0 could also severely affect mission success. The two weather forecasters were

very knowledgeable in SEA weather patterns.

They had previously observed phenomena whereby

clear weather preceded an advancing cold front.

Conditions were right, they concluded, for clear

weather to occur in the objective area 24 hours

before the cold front arrived. General Manor was

faced with a difficult decision—should he launch

24 hours early into marginal en route weather

with a chance of clear weather over the objective

area, or should he stick to the plan and almost

certainly have to postpone the operation for at

least a week or more. 56 With the forecast eye of

Typhoon Patsy less than 100 miles off the North

Vietnamese coast by the night of 21 November,

Task Force 77.0 would be unable to launch its

diversionary strike. Winds at Da Nang would be

marginal, with crosswinds gusting to 30 knots.

Extensive clouds, poor visibility, and high winds

would cover North Vietnam. The cold front would

converge with the typhoon in the Red River valley

region and would continue widespread poor

weather for another week. The night of 20 November was the only night that offered even marginally acceptable weather.5 7

A moon illumination of 25 percent to 75 percent, 15 degrees to 45 degrees above the eastern

horizon, was desired for precise navigation to the

objective area. Aircraft could launch under instrument flight conditions, but good visibility clear of

clouds was required during and after formation

join-up. Only light turbulence could be tolerated

during blacked-out aerial-refueling operations. In

the Red River valley, there could be no more than

scattered low and middle clouds to permit adequate moon illumination. The A-1s needed no

more than scattered clouds below 3,500 feet for

optimum employment.5 8

On the afternoon of 20 November, General

Manor tasked an RF-4 aircraft from Seventh AF,

with a weather observer on board, to fly a

weather reconnaissance mission across Laos to

the North Vietnamese western border. The aircraft landed back at Takhli RTAFB, and the ob -

server verified that weather conditions ahead of

the cold front were dry and clearing. The RF-4

mission also confirmed that en route weathe

across Laos consisted of scattered to broke

clouds, with bases at 5,000 feet and tops at 8,00

feet, and broken to overcast clouds over the mou

tains of North Vietnam. Weather in the Son Ta

objective area was expected to be good with exce

lent visibility. With these factors taken into con 

sideration, General Manor made the decision 

move the mission up 24 hours and launch late o

20 November, with H hour early on the 21st.59 

precise H hour was not identified; rather, the op 

eration was based on timing from the momen

Major Franklin’s Combat Talon dropped its ill

mination flares over Son Tay Prison.

At noon on 20 November, while the RF-4 wa

flying its weather reconnaissance mission ove

Laos, General Manor had not yet announced th

he had received the Red Rocket message authori

ing mission launch nor that he was considerin

moving the mission forward by 24 hours. Groun

force personnel were issued sleeping pills and o

dered by Colonel Simons to sleep from 1200 

1700 hours. During the rest period, with inform

tion back from the RF-4 flight, General Mano

issued the launch order at 1556 in the afternoo

Following the evening meal, the force was a

sembled in the Takhli RTAFB base theater for 

route briefing, which included the target, its ge

graphical location, and its proximity to Hanoi

Maj Frederic M. Donahue, aircraft commander 

the gunship-configured HH-53, recalled Gener

Manor’s words: “This evening at 2300, you wi

take off and fly into the most heavily defende

valley in history. You will deliver the Green Ber

troops to the Son Tay Prison Camp, and they wi

free all of the American POWs held there. The

you will return the POWs and the Special Force

to friendly hands. Son Tay is located 21 mile

from downtown Hanoi.” General Manor pause

and the silent and stunned men broke into spon 

taneous applause that lasted for a full five mi

utes. The pent-up feelings and emotions of th

past few months were released, and the air wa

electrified. Only the United States could develop 

capacity to fly to the outskirts of Hanoi and the

free its prisoners.6 1

With the launch order issued, 116 aircraft, ope

ating from seven bases and three aircraft carrier

had to be prepared for combat. Royal Thai Air Forc

bases at Takhli, Udorn, and Nakhon Phano

served as forward operating bases for primary mi

sion aircraft (see fig. 28).6 2 At Udorn RTAFB HH-53

and HH-3s were permanently assigned to the re

cue unit there, along with HC-130P tanker a ircra

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

151
At NKP, A-1 Sandy attack aircraft were permanently assigned. At U-Tapao RTAFB Seventh AF

had positioned three C-130s and placed them on

alert for JCTG use. One of the C-130s moved aircrew and support personnel from Takhli RTAFB to

Udorn and Nakhon Phanom RTAFBs to rendezvous

with their respective aircraft. Fear of not having an

HH-3 mission-capable aircraft in-theater did not

materialize. A Udorn RTAFB HH-3, along with a

spare aircraft, was mission ready. Once the aircrews were in position, mission aircraft were pre -

flighted and prepared for a late-night launch. A

second Seventh AF C-130 from U-Tapao RTAFB

moved the assault ground force from Takhli RTAFB

to Udorn RTAFB and transloaded them to the waiting helicopters.

As the plan swung into motion, Major Franklin

had problems with Combat Talon 64-0523 at Takhli RTAFB. He could not get the number 3 engine

started. General Manor and his command staff

had deployed to COMUSMACV’s command post

at Monkey Mountain near Saigon, where he had

Figure 28. Aircraft Participating in Son Tay POW Raid (Source: Official Report, The Son Tay

Prisoner of War Rescue, pt. 1, 18 December 1970, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

152
secure communications with his airborne mission

commander, Colonel Frisbie, as well as with General Blackburn and the National Command Author -

ity back in Washington. When Major Franklin’s

launch time of 1555Z passed, General Manor queried his launch element in Thailand for an explanation. When informed that Major Franklin could not

start one of his engines, General Manor immediately turned to Colonel Kraljev, his Combat Talon

staff expert, for options. Quick calculations determined that the Talon could operate on three engines but would have to perform the rotate maneuver and exchange helicopter formation lead with

Colonel Blosch. If Major Franklin lost the number 4

engine after takeoff, however, he would have serious problems remaining airborne. General Manor

thought the mission warranted the risk. As his staff

prepared to transmit approval for a three-engine

takeoff, word came from Thailand that Major

Franklin was airborne at 1618Z and was on his way

to rendezvous with the helicopter formation over

Laos after completion of their planned aerial refueling. He was 23 minutes late, but he would make up

the time without any mission impact.6 3 Major

Franklin had called for maintenance to check out

the number 3 engine. They determined that the engine-bleed air valve was stuck closed and could not

be opened by standard operating procedures. Re -

membering an emergency demonstration in the

simulator the previous year, Major Franklin had

maintenance button up number 3, and he performed a simultaneous start on number 3 and

number 4 engines. It worked, and both engines

came on-speed at the same time.

At 1618Z, just as Major Franklin broke ground

at Takhli RTAFB, the HH-53s and HH-3, along

with the HC-130Ps, launched from Udorn

RTAFB. All aircraft taxied, took off blacked out,

and maintained strict radio silence. Takeoff clearance was given by the control tower by way of a

green light. If the aircrew had not received a

green light by 30 seconds after scheduled takeoff,

the crew was instructed to takeoff without clearance. After single-ship departure, the aircraft

joined in formation with the HC-130Ps for the

first leg of their journey to the refueling track in

central Laos.64 Shortly after helicopter launch,

the A-1s launched from NKP and orbited in the

area to join up with Colonel Blosch’s number 2

Combat Talon . Colonel Blosch had launched without incident at 1528Z from Takhli RTAFB but

was unable to locate the A-1s over NKP. The A-1s

proceeded toward Vientiane, Laos, and turned

north after passing that location. Colonel Blosch

overtook the A-1 flight and joined en route prio

to the helicopter refueling track.65

Out of Udorn RTAFB the helicopter formatio

lead by Maj William J. Kornitzer Jr. in an HC-130

flew north into Laos. En route to the refuelin

track, the formation encountered clouds at 2,00

feet. The formation climbed to 7,000 feet an

maintained VFR on top conditions until after r

fueling with the HC-130Ps. The tankers remaine

in orbit over central Laos as Major Franklin’

Combat Talon assumed formation lead an

headed northeast toward North Vietnam direct 

the rendezvous point. Major Franklin had r

gained the lost 23 minutes by flying higher-tha

planned airspeeds direct to the rendezvous poin

As Major Franklin proceeded down track with h

helicopter formation, Colonel Blosch had his A

formation in tow and shadowed Major Franklin’

route (fig. 29). The only visible external lightin

from the Talons was three blue formation ligh

on top of each wing. The two formations were in

tially in the clear but entered a cloud layer whil

still in eastern Laos. After approximately 10 mi

utes in the clouds, the two formations broke ou

and had clear sailing until reaching the Nort

Vietnamese border. Not long after penetratin

North Vietnamese airspace, however, broke

clouds were again encountered in the mountain

near the western border. The formations r emaine

Figure 29. Route of Flight into North Vietnam, Son Tay PO

Raid (Source: Route constructed by author from official Air For

records; map provided by Air University Library, Maps and Cha

Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

153
intact, with each aircraft spreading out and maintaining course. The same maneuver had been

practiced many times across the southern United

States while in training, so it came as no surprise

that each aircraft was exactly where it was supposed to be when the formations broke out of the

clouds.6 6 As the formations cleared the ridgeline

to the southwest of Son Tay at 500-feet AGL, the

Red River valley opened before them. Hanoi was

plainly visible on the horizon, and the objective

area was clear.67

As the two formations penetrated North Vietnamese airspace from the west, Carrier Task

Force 77.0 began its diversionary attack east of

Haiphong with a force of 59 aircraft (mainly A-6s

and A-7s). The Navy diversionary aircraft were

not armed with bombs but rather with flares and

electronic devices to simulate an actual attack.

Air-to-air configured F-4s, however, were armed

and ready to neutralize any MiGs that might

launch against the force. The diversion provided a

twofold benefit. The most obvious was that it fo -

cused North Vietnamese defenses to the east

away from the raiders’ ingress. Mission planners

calculated that North Vietnamese defense systems would detect the low-flying formations 11

minutes before they reached Son Tay. With the

Navy diversion, those defenses were turned eastward, and the raiding force flew undetected to the

objective area.6 8 A second benefit of the diversionary strike was that it saturated the Chinese/

North Vietnamese Crosstell System, thus making

a coordinated response to the attack nearly impossible.69

Major Franklin’s helicopter formation arrived

at the IP, which was a small lake just west of the

Black River, two minutes ahead of Colonel

Blosch’s A-1 formation and 12 minutes from Son

Tay Prison. The helicopter formation was one

minute behind the flight-plan true airspeed time

at the IP.70 Major Franklin’s formation consisted

of his Combat Talon and six helicopters—five

HH-53s and one HH-3. Two HH-53s were spread

out above one wing, three were spread out above

the other wing, and the HH-3 was tucked up

close above the left wingtip, drafting on the Talon

to maintain the en route airspeed of 105 KIAS.

At the IP Major Franklin passed to his formation

the heading of 072 degrees to Son Tay and began

a climb to 1,500 feet. Numbers 4 and 5 HH-53

(call signs Apple 4 and Apple 5) followed Major

Franklin’s Talon in the climb. Apple 4 was the

backup aircraft for the flare drop over Son Tay

Prison in the event the Talon could not drop its

flares. The HH-3 (call sign Banana 1) and the

three remaining HH-53s descended to 200 feet.

Number 3 HH-53 (call sign Apple 3) accelerated

ahead of the other three helos to set up a gun pass

on the prison guard towers. At precisely 1,500 feet

over Son Tay, Major Franklin’s Talon (call sign

Cherry 1) dropped four flares that immediately

illuminated the prison area, and Apple 3 began its

gun pass to neutralize the guard towers. Cherry 1

then made an immediate descending right turn to

500 feet and dropped two battlefield simulators

southeast and south of the city of Son Tay, both

on target. At the release point for the first BLU27/B napalm ground marker, the weapon armed

but did not exit the aircraft. A second BLU-27/B

was dropped on its planned target. The first firebomb was subsequently jettisoned over a lake

west of the objective area, and Cherry 1 departed

the area heading for its planned orbit point in

Laos.71 After Apple 3 successfully completed its

gun pass using side firing miniguns, the aircraft

departed to the west to await further instructions

from the ground force commander. Banana 1, now

inbound with Apple 1 and Apple 2 slightly behind,

maneuvered over the courtyard of the prison and

executed a controlled crash landing, as planned,

inside the prison walls. The raiding force on Ba -

nana 1 immediately engaged the enemy at point

blank range.

7 2

During the run-in Apple 1, with Colonel Simons on board, strayed slightly right of course

and mistakenly landed 400 meters short of the

Photo courtesy of Col Jerry Thigpen

Irl L. Franklin (left), aircraft commander of Cherry 1,

and John Gargus, lead navigator of Cherry 2, at Son

Tay Raider Reunion, Dallas, Texas, November 1997.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

154
objective area at a compound previously identified

as a secondary school. Unaware that he had

landed short of Son Tay, Colonel Simons and his

raiding force deplaned and immediately engaged

enemy forces. Apple 2, realizing that Apple 1 was

at the wrong location, corrected back to course

and executed an alternate attack plan that eliminated Apple 1 from the assault. Colonel Simons,

in the meantime, realized that he was not at Son

Tay and quickly called Apple 1 back for extraction. Nine minutes elapsed before Colonel Simons

could disengage the enemy and get his force to

Son Tay Prison aboard Apple 1.73

Colonel Blosch’s Talon, call sign Cherry 2, arrived at the IP at almost the desired time separa -

tion from Cherry 1, disengaged from its flight formation, climbed, slowed down, and dropped two

BLU-27/B napalm ground markers. Cherry 2 then

dropped its pallets of battle simulators and MK-6

log flares as planned. After its airdrops Colonel

Blosch entered a holding pattern 15 NM west of

Son Tay. With Major Franklin’s mission a success, Colonel Blosch was now tasked to remain in

orbit on call to provide any assistance Colonel Simons needed during the course of the attack. At

approximately H+ 13 minutes, Cherry 2 detected

unexpected AAA activity near its holding pattern.

Evasive action was taken, and the aircraft sought

protection in the hills northwest of Mount Ba Vi

(a prominent peak in the immediate area) and

established its preplanned alternate holding orbit.

The remainder of Colonel Blosch’s orbit time was

spent below 1,000-feet AGL, with almost continuous SAM radar activity being received by his

EWO.74 Numerous SAMs were sighted by the

crew over the Son Tay area. As many as eight

impacted into the hills west of the Red River

where Cherry 2 was orbiting. None were directed

at the Combat Talon . They were missiles that

missed their high-altitude F-4 and F-105 targets

and exploded in the darkened hills as they fell

back to earth. Colonel Blosch was scheduled to be

the last aircraft out of the objective area. In the

event anyone else was shot down, he would direct

SAR forces during any ensuing rescue operation.7 5

He also had three Fulton recovery kits on board,

and the aircraft had been configured for recovery

operations in the event a surface-to-air recovery

extraction was required. He had two other alternate missions—jamming enemy communications

and providing an HF secure communication link

between General Manor at Monkey Mountain

and Colonel Simons at Son Tay. While in orbit,

Colonel Blosch’s crew performed the two alterna

missions.7 6

When Cherry 1 completed its airdrops, Majo

Franklin accelerated and headed west out o

North Vietnam. En route to its holding poin

Cherry 1 detected prelaunch emissions from 

SAM site and descended to 1,000-feet AGL. Th

signal disappeared, and the aircraft climbed bac

to its flight-plan altitude. At this time a missil

launch was detected, and the aircraft descende

back to 1,000-feet AGL. The crew observed a mi

sile exploding several miles east of the aircraft

Once in Laos Major Franklin activated a homin

beacon on his Combat Talon to assist the remai

ing forces as they departed the objective area, an

Cherry 1 orbited for 49 minutes at the planne

holding point. Back at Son Tay, the operation wa

going like clockwork. Apples 4 and 5 loggered o

an island in a finger lake some seven miles we

of the prison. Their mission was to extract th

American prisoners once Colonel Simons calle

them into Son Tay.78 Apple 3, the gunship ai

craft, loggered about 1,000 yards west of Son Ta

with Apple 1 and Apple 2. The three aircraft wer

set to extract the raiding force and provide add

tional firepower if Colonel Simons called.

As the operation was unfolding, Carrier Tas

Force 77.0 continued its diversionary attack to th

east of Hanoi. High overhead the prison, F-

Phantoms and F-105G Wild Weasels prowled th

skies in search of enemy MiGs and SAMs. Th

Wild Weasels had their hands full with SA-2

Sixteen SAMs were fired at the F-105s, and the

retaliated with eight Shrike antiradiation mi

siles. During the fight two F-105s were hit by enem

SAMs, with one aircraft sustaining significan

damage. As the two aircraft turned towards th

west and the relative safety of Laos, the pilot 

the more severely damaged aircraft detected 

rapid loss of fuel. The SAM had punctured one 

the aircraft’s fuel cells. Although a standby KC

135 tanker aircraft rushed toward the disable

fighter, the aircraft ran out of fuel before it coul

make contact. The two-man crew ejected safe

over Laos while the other F-105 returned to i

base in Thailand and landed without incident

MiG activity was absent. There were only tw

night interceptors at Phuc Yen on alert th

night. They were reported by subsequent intell

gence to have been ready to launch at the end 

the runway but never took off. Their inability 

launch might have been due to the effectivene

of the jamming packages aboard Cherry 2 and th

US Navy aircraft. While holding west of Son Ta

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

155
Cherry 2’s EWO actively jammed North Vietnamese GCI controller frequencies as did the Navy

A-6s over Haiphong. Consequently, MiG pilots

could not receive instructions from their controllers to complete their air-to-air intercepts.80

At H+ 10 minutes the assault force commander

advised “negative items [POWs] at this time.” Immediately after this call, Colonel Simons advised

his force to “prepare to withdraw for LZ extraction.” There were no prisoners at Son Tay. Apple

1 was called in from its logger location at H+ 14

minutes, and Apple 2 at H+ 22 minutes. As Apple

2 arrived, Colonel Simons directed demolition of

the disabled HH-3 (Banana 1). At H+ 27 minutes

Apple 2 departed Son Tay with all remaining

forces on board.8 1

As the assault force headed west, single-ship

Cherry 2 remained in orbit near Mount Ba Vi

jamming GCI controller frequencies. Apples 3, 4,

and 5 departed to the west, followed by the A-1s

and the overhead F-4s and remaining F-105s. As

the force cleared the objective area, Cherry 2 departed westward following them. Over the Plain

of Jars in northeastern Laos, two survival bea -

cons were picked up from the downed F-105 crew.

Colonel Blosch proceeded to the area at 8,500 feet

and established an orbit while running his Fulton

STARS checklist. He reasoned that there was a

possibility that the two crew members might need

immediate extraction, so he was prepared to get

them. Concurrently, Apple 4 and Apple 5 refueled

from the HC-130P over Laos and established an

orbit over the downed crew members. At first

light, with Colonel Blosch’s Talon orbiting near

the downed crew members, Apple 4 picked up the

front-seat pilot, and Apple 5 picked up the backseat EWO. The two HH-53s, along with Colonel

Blosch’s Combat Talon, then returned to Udorn

RTAFB and landed without further incident.8 2

At Udorn RTAFB Major Franklin and the entire raiding force had landed by the time Colonel

Blosch and the two HH-53s arrived. General

Manor had flown by way of T-39 from Da Nang

AB to meet Colonel Simons and his troops when

they landed. Although everyone was exhausted, a

formal mission debriefing was held, and a detailed “summary of operations” message was prepared by General Manor and Colonel Simons for

transmission back to the Pentagon. The message

was transmitted at 0915Z, but for unexplained

reasons it was never received by JCS. The two

commanders were ordered to fly back to Washington immediately, and by late morning they were

on their way. At 1500Z on 23 November, they

landed at Andrews AFB, Maryland, aboard an Air

Force KC-135 Looking Glass aircraft.83 As it turned

out, their immediate return had been directed by

President Nixon, who wanted to personally decorate

the two in a special White House ceremon y.

After the hot wash at Udorn RTAFB, the Talon

crews returned to Takhli RTAFB for much needed

rest. Redeployment to the United States retraced

their deployment route earlier in the month with

departure from Takhli RTAFB on 22 November

and arrival at Norton AFB on 25 November. At

Norton AFB the two Talons were turned over to

LAS Ontario on 26 November for removal of the

FLIR. Aircrew and en route support items were

returned to Pope AFB by way of TAC C-130 on 26

November.84 Colonel Blosch and Major Franklin

flew on to Eglin AFB to assist in writing the after

action report. Over 90 days had passed since they

had reported to Eglin AFB for training the previous summer.

Aftermath

After the rescue attempt at Son Tay, the North

Vietnamese consolidated the American prisoner s

in the Hanoi area and closely held secret their

exact locations. Although there was some plan -

ning for a follow-on operation, consolidation of

the prisoners in Hanoi effectively eliminated an -

other rescue attempt. The consolidation, how -

ever, had a positive effect on the overall condition

of the prisoners. Before the raid many prisoners

had been held in remote rural areas, unde r primitive conditions. Most had been kept in solitary

confinement for years, with no contact with others. Immediately before the raid, several had died

after years of torture and captivity. Bringing

them all to the Hanoi area caused an overcrowding of existing facilities. To house all the prison -

ers, North Vietnamese authorities had no choice

but to put them in common cells. The American

prisoners were finally able to talk openly with

each other, and they met friends from their old

units. Those in bad shape were nursed back to

health by their fellow prisoners. Morale soared

as word trickled in that the United States had

attempted to rescue some of them from Son

Tay. 8 5 US fears that the remaining prisoners

would suffer because of the raid did not materialize. Rather, their overall condition improved

dramatically over time.

There was much speculation by the media regarding why the prisoners were not at Son Tay.

The failure was blamed by most media reports on

poor intelligence and, perhaps, even a breach of

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

156
security. General Manor vehemently denied both.

He pointed out that every US intelligence agency

had contributed to the mission, including the CIA

and DIA. Although some reports indicated the

CIA had not been consulted (and the CIA did little to refute this claim), the CIA had been supportive of the operation from the start. The American

prisoners were probably moved because of summer flooding of the Black River that ran just outside the walls of Son Tay Prison. Brig Gen John

P. Flynn, Retired, a former POW released by

North Vietnam in 1973, contends that the prison -

ers had been moved from Son Tay because North

Vietnam had begun to upgrade the prison—it had

not originally been built as a prison and had serious security shortfalls. The Soviet Union and

China had provided grant money, and some of

this money had been used to repair and modify

POW facilities. During the upgrade at Son Tay,

prisoners were moved to an alternate location. Activity detected by US spy satellites was actually

the construction crew working on the compound.

Since American prisoners and the construction

workers dressed the same in black pajama-like

clothing, the fact that the prisoners had been

moved went undetected.8 6 As to the notion that

the raid had been compromised by a breach of

security, General Manor pointed out that the op -

eration was a complete surprise to North Vietnam. Had they known the raid was coming, General Manor surmised, they would have ambushed

the raiders and used the failure for propaganda

purposes.

John Gargus, lead navigator on Cherry 2, recalled that when the raiders landed back at

Udorn RTAFB after the raid, they were disappointed in not having rescued the Americans but

felt good about the raid and were satisfied with

the effort they had made. Out of the entire opera -

tion, one US Army soldier was grazed by a bullet

on the inside of his thigh, and a USAF helicopter

crew chief suffered a broken ankle during the con -

trolled crash of Banana 1. Every aspect of the raid

had been executed as planned.87 The plan had

worked perfectly. The raiders had penetrated

North Vietnamese defenses, landed, and deploye

troops, and the troops had secured the area an

searched every building. Everyone was recovere

and the area was safely egressed. There was n

loss of American life, but no Americans wer

freed.88 As the weeks passed after the raid, how 

ever, the US press labeled the entire operation 

failure and accused the raiders of bringing add

tional hardship on the prisoners. For many raid 

ers, years of self-incrimination and doubt ensue

It was not until the 25th anniversary of the r

turn of the American prisoners of war in 1998 di

Major Gargus finally accept the raid as the singl

most positive event of the POWs’ long captivi

and that, indeed, it was a success.89

Thanks to the pioneering work of Colon

Blosch and Major Franklin, and their crews, th

Talon community made great strides because 

the raid, both in equipment and in combat tactic

Before the raid the Talon fleet was scheduled fo

extensive modification and upgrades, which wer

later designated as MOD-70. The FLIR system

that was temporarily installed on the Talons wa

the most notable addition. It had proven to be e

fective in assisting the aircrew during low-lev

precision navigation. Jamming of GCI controlle

frequencies was also proven quite effective. A

though MOD-70 did not include a standoff jam

ming capability, European-assigned Talons did r

ceive this capability in the late 1970s.90

For the Combat Talon community, Son Tay w

a resounding success. Lessons learned would be a

plied for years to come. The prestige of the enti

Combat Talon community was enhanced by bein

part of such a noble endeavor. Ten years later, at 

place called Desert One in Iran, America wou

once again question its ability and commitmen

to execute another rescue mission—the rescue 

Americans held hostage in Tehran. As it was at So

Tay, Combat Talon would be an integral part of th

Iranian operation. In failure, however, Desert On

would prove to be the salvation of Combat Talo

and would provide the catalyst for the rebirth 

modern special operations.

Notes

1. USAF oral history interview with Lt Col Keith R. Grimes,

10 September 1992, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2.

2. W. J. McQuillen, USAFSOF historian, “Son Tay POW

Rescue Attempt Operation,” monograph, Eglin AFB, Fla., 25

February 1971, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1.

3. Grimes, 2.

4. McQuillen, 2.

5. Grimes, 4–5.

6. Ibid., 6–7.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 15–16.

9. Ibid., 14–16.

10. Ibid., 24.

11. Ibid., 32.

12. Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harp

& Row, 1976), 67–68.

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAI

157
13. Ibid., 64–66.

14. Ibid., 69.

15. Ibid., 73–74.

16. Grimes, 35.

17. McQuillen, 3.

18. Ibid., 5.

19. Official Report, The Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue

Operation, pt. 1, 18 December 1970, USAF HRA, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., vol. 1, attach. 4, A-5–A-6.

20. Schemmer, 74–75.

21. Ibid., 75.

22. Hugh N. Ahman, Lt Col David Mets, Julie Massoni,

and Donald D. Little, transcript of oral history interview with

Lt Gen Leroy J. Manor, Eglin AFB, Fla., 26–27 January and 9

May 1988, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 106–7.

23. Ibid., 110–11.

24. Ibid., 118.

25. The Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation , pt. 2,

E-50.

26. Ahman, Mets, Massoni, and Little interview, 119.

27. Ibid., 119–20.

28. Brig Gen Leroy J. Manor, “Transcript of Oral Account,

Son Tay Search and Rescue Mission,” presented to HQ USAF -

SOF, Eglin AFB, Fla., 31 December 1970, USAF HRA, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., 7.

29. Personal notes of Lt Col Albert P. Blosch, Retired, 3

November 1998, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

30. Scrapbook, History of Stray Goose International (SGI),

maintained by Col Leon E. Hess, Retired, Shalimar, Fla., for

the SGI organization.

31. Blosch personal notes.

32. Grimes, 40.

33. Col John Gargus, Retired, interview by author, College

Station, Tex., 13 June 1998. Recorded on 8 mm videotape, not

transcribed, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt

Field, Fla.

34. Schemmer, 89–90.

35. Grimes, 43–44.

36. Manor, 3.

37. Grimes, 37–38.

38. Schemmer, 75–76.

39. Ibid., 75–77.

40. Lt Col Judd Katz, transcript of oral history interview

with CMSgt Wayne L. Fisk, 31 August 1988, Gunter AF Station, Ala., USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 94–95.

41. Schemmer, 91–93.

42. Ibid., 74.

43. McQuillen, 12.

44. Ibid.

45. Ahman, Mets, Massoni, and Little interview, 128.

46. Ibid., 127–28.

47. Ibid., 129–30.

48. Ibid., 130.

49. Ibid., 132.

50. McQuillen, 14.

51. Draft messages, 1198th Operational, Evaluation, and

Training (OE&T) Squadron to Hickham AFB, Hawaii, and US

Defense Attaché Office (DAO) Bangkok from personal records,

Col Irl L. Franklin, Retired, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AF -

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

52. Manor, 10.

53. Ibid., 5.

54. McQuillen, 18–19.

55. Grimes, 135.

56. Manor, 11.

57. McQuillen, 20.

58. Ibid., 19–20.

59. Ibid., 22–23.

60. Ibid., 19, 23.

61. Col Frederic M. Donohue, “Mission of Mercy,” Air War

College no. 4560, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

62. McQuillen, vi.

63. Ibid., 25.

64. Grimes, 95.

65. Schemmer, 160–61.

66. Donohue.

67. Grimes, 97.

68. Ahman, Mets, Massoni, and Little interview, 138.

69. Grimes, 198.

70. Ibid., 99.

71. The Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation, pt. 1,

65.

72. Grimes, 100.

73. Ibid., 100–102.

74. The Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation, pt. 1,

66.

75. Ahman, Mets, Massoni, and Little interview, 144.

76. Blosch personal notes.

77. The Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation, pt. 1,

73.

78. McQuillen, 25.

79. Manor, 14.

80. Gargus interview.

81. McQuillen, 33.

82. Gargus interview.

83. Schemmer, 183–84.

84. Franklin messages.

85. Lt Col Arthur W. McCants Jr. and Dr. James C. Hasdorff, transcript of oral history interview with Gen John W.

Vogt, Annapolis, Md., 8–9 August 1978, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 205–6.

86. Lecture, Brig Gen John P. Flynn, Air Command and

Staff College, 24 June 1974, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 35.

87. Gargus interview.

88. Donohue.

89. Gargus interview.

90. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

158
Chapter 7

Between the Wars

(1975–79)

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

—Thomas Jefferson 

For more than 10 years, the United States had

overtly supported its allies in SEA. The long

struggle against communist aggression had

sapped the will of the American people to con -

tinue the war. By the fall of 1974, only a short

time remained before all American combat forces,

which were primarily those of the US Air Force by

that time, would be withdrawn from the theater.

Combat Talon Fights for Survival

High-altitude CDS airdrops into Cambodia by

the 1st SOS during the summer of 1974 were the

last Combat Talon activity there. Unconventional

warfare and special operations were tied to the

SEA theater of operations, so it was predictable

that the USAF looked hard at SOF when force

reductions were considered.

1st and 7th SOS Narrowly

Escape Deactivation

In the Office of the Chief of Staff, Air Force,

message dated 030023Z December 1974, the 1st

SOS was identified for inactivation during the

fourth quarter of 1975. Subsequent message traffic

changed the deactivation date to the first quarter

of 1976 and included the 7th SOS, which was still

located at Rhein Main AB, FRG. The Air Staff

plan consisted of the transfer of the eight Combat

Talons assigned to the two overseas units to the

8th SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida, thus forming a

TAC-assigned 12 aircraft Combat Talon unit. Be -

cause of NATO’s European troop commitments,

the 8th SOS would be required to maintain a fouraircraft detachment in Europe until force level

questions could be resolved.1 There would be no

Combat Talons left in the Pacific under the reorganization plan. Air Staff gave PACAF and

USAFE the opportunity to respond to the planned

action.

In its 270650Z December 1974 response, Fifth

AF (the numbered Air Force unit to which the 1st

SOS was assigned) expressed its concern to PACAF

over the loss of the unique Combat Talon capability

in the Pacific. It pointed out that the 1st SOS

was the only unconventional warfare asset 

PACAF and that its inactivation would reduc

UW assets to zero. Familiarity with potential o

erating locations throughout the Pacific theat

gained by theater presence would be lost. It note

that re sponse time for contingencies would b

greatly increased, and the ability to support d

ployed forces would be reduced due to the lack 

ava ilable parts in-theater. Perhaps the greate

argument for retention of the weapons system i

PACAF was the emerging Republic of Korea r

quirement for the maritime surveillance of i

coastal waters.

 Initial sea surveillance tests were conducte

by the 1st SOS in August of 1974 at Subic Ba

Philippines, at 10,000 feet altitude using th

FLIR as a television monitor.2 On 13 Septemb

1974, the 314th AD, located at Osan AB, ROK

working in concert with the Republic of Korea A

Force, identified the need for night surveillance 

the ROK’s offshore islands to inhibit North K

rean infiltration operations. At the direction 

CINCPACAF, the 314th AD provided a concept 

operation (CONOP) for utilizing the Comb

Talon in the infiltration detection mission. Upo

review of the 314th AD’s proposed concept, Hea

quarters PACAF pronounced it sound on 25 Oct

ber and forwarded it to the CSAF.3

A second series of tests were run on 6 and 

December at 1,000 feet altitude using profession

photographers. During this test, one photograp

was taken of the FLIR picture and a second of th

actual target. Analysis of the two pictures co

firmed that the FLIR presentation was accura

and that recognition of the target could be easi

made from the photograph. The FLIR had the c

pability to be tied directly to a video recorde

thus enabling the operator to acquire the targe

analyze and evaluate it, and record the image o

videotape or photograph it from the FLIR scop

without additional assistance. 4

Although the CONOP for the sea surveillanc

mission was still being developed, Fifth AF fe

it was too soon to scrap the promising capabili

by deactivating the squadron. Also citing th

159
squadron’s role as formation lead for station-keeping

equipment (SKE) equipped C-130s, which it dem -

onstrated in Cambodia, Fifth AF argued that the

1st SOS would be the only unit in PACAF capable

of performing the AWADS mission once the 374th

TAW was transferred from CCK. In summary, Fifth

AF felt that the loss of the 1st SOS would have a

far-ranging impact by eliminating many unique

capabilities available in-theater and thus degrading

the CINC’s war-fighting and contingency response

options.

5

USAFE was not as convinced as PACAF of

the need to continue the forward stationing of

Combat Talons in Europe because it faced a different challenge than did PACAF. With Talons

available at Hurlburt Field, the weapons system

could be forward deployed to Europe within 36

hours of notification, a response time that in -

cluded a 15-hour flight across the Atlantic. (The

earliest that Talons could arrive in the Western

Pacific was 72 hours after notification, based on

flight time and unit mobilization requirements.)

US-based forces routinely focused on the European theater and spent a portion of their train -

ing time participating in exercises based around

a European war scenario. With PACAF/Fifth AF

strongly supporting retention of the 1st SOS in

the Pacific, however, USAFE/Seventeenth AF

came onboard supporting the continued presence of the 7th SOS in Europe.

As the Air Staff proposal to deactivate the two

squadrons was being staffed, Colonel Pinard, the

1st SOS squadron commander, developed a plan

to reduce the authorized unit detail listing (UDL)

by 12 aircrew positions for the squadron, thus

decreasing its operating costs. The UDL decrease

was made possible by the squadron’s loss of the

Fulton STARS capability the previous year. The

C-130E (Clamp) Fulton-equipped Combat Talon

required an 11-man crew, including two flight engineers and three pilots, whereas the C-130E

(Yank) required only nine. Pinard’s proposal

eliminated the second flight engineer and the

third pilot on each of the six assigned crews. An -

nual savings under the proposal were more than

$190,000.6 Although not a large decrease in assigned personnel, the reduction was viewed by

Air Staff as a good-faith effort to minimize the

costs of keeping the squadron on active duty and

deployed to the Pacific. Eventually, the initiative

to deactivate the overseas Talon squadrons was

canceled.

The 1st SOW Is Reduced to

Three Flying Squadrons

The 8th SOS had been established at Hurlburt

Field under the 1st SOW in the late spring of

1974 with personnel and equipment of the deactivated 318th SOS. As the squadron settled into life

at Hurlburt Field, the 1st SOW was being systematically dismantled. Just as the 1st SOS had been

committed to SEA, so had US-based SOF. Four

units of the 1st SOW were deactivated during the

April to June 1974 period alone, and on 1 July the

1st SOW was redesignated the 834th TCW, a

move that was seen as an attempt by the US Air

Force to distance itself from special operations

and its Vietnam legacy. The wing would be further reduced to three flying squadrons in the coming year—the 8th SOS flying the Combat Talon ,

the 16th SOS flying the AC-130H gunship, and

the 20th SOS operating all remaining special op -

erations rotary-wing aircraft. Although the wing

was concerned about Combat Talon force restructuring, it was faced with the very real prospect of

not surviving the post–Vietnam drawdown.

1975: Turmoil and Change

As the New Year began in the Pacific, the

314th AD CONOP for sea surveillance of the

coastal waters of the ROK began to develop rapidly. A major challenge for the defense of the ROK

was North Korean high-speed boats that staged

from uninhabited islands off the coast of South

Korea and infiltrated special agents at night into

the south. During daylight hours the boats would

hide under camouflaged netting to escape detection from the air. The large number of islands

made surface search a hit-and-miss proposition

and required a large commitment of manpower

not available to the ROK at that time. 7

Sea Surveillance Mission Emerges

for the 1st SOS

Headquarters PACAF reviewed the 314th AD

requirement and concluded that the RF-4 was not

the ideal choice for the emerging mission. PACAF

determined that the Kadena-based 1st SOS, flying the FLIR-equipped Combat Talon C-130E (Y)

aircraft, was the most capable asset for conducting the mission.8

 The PACAF staff also sketched a

concept of employment for the Combat Talon in

the counterinfiltration role envisioned by the

314th AD. After arriving at Osan AB, ROK, the

crew would be briefed for surveillance missions by

the 314th AD staff per the concept of employment.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

160
Tentatively, the primary area for the surveillance

was the islands and ocean between 36 degrees 00

minutes north and 37 degrees 00 minutes north

latitudes and between 125 degrees 00 minutes

east and 126 degrees 00 minutes east longitudes.

Search emphasis would be placed on the uninhabited islands identified by ROK Air Force intelligence. (This area was later altered for a number

of policy reasons.)9

After takeoff from Osan, the Talon would be

monitored by the Korean Tactical Air Control System while flying at an altitude that would provide

continuous ultrahigh frequency radio contact and

positive radar monitoring. The 1st SOS mission

was planned to be flown during hours of darkness

because most previous detections of sea infiltra -

tions had occurred during those times and be -

cause of the AAA threat posed by the North Korean high-speed boats. CINCPACAF further

noted that the normal nighttime activities and

signature previously established by the Combat

Talon in Korea would further cloak evidence of

US involvement in counterinfiltration operations.

When the PACAF plan was presented to US

Forces, Korea (USFK), the operational area was

moved south of 35 degrees north latitude, and

flights were restricted to the territorial limits of

the ROK. USFK briefed the American embassy in

Seoul on the proposed operation and received no

objections to the operation as long as the restrictions imposed by USFK were followed.10

Headquarters PACAF proposed that a series of

test missions be flown to validate the CONOP including seven missions during two flying periods.

Subsequently, three night missions of three sorties each were planned during the first week of

February 1975 in an area bounded by 34 degrees

north and 35 degrees north latitudes and 125 degrees east and 127 degrees east longitudes. The

search altitude was to vary from 1,000 feet to

12,000 feet above the ground, with the aircraft

remaining under GCI control, to determine the

parameters to be used in actual operations. When

below 4,000 feet, the Combat Talon had to maintain a minimum of one NM slant range from all

watercraft. The primary effort would be to locate

an d identify small craft (identified in counter -

intelligence operations as “skunk” boats) by means

of the FLIR. Videotape recordings would be made

of all sightings, with scope photography as a

backup. Additional restrictions during the test included a minimum number of passes to identify a

craft, and the crew could not drop any objects (including flares) from the aircraft.11

The three-part Combat Talon test program a

tually began on 8 March 1975 in accordance wi

the newly published 314th AD OPORD 75-2

with the mission lasting 4.9 hours. The secon

and third sorties were flown on 10 and 11 Marc

which completed the first phase of the test pr

gram. Although problems were encountered i

communicating with the HF and UHF radios o

the first two missions, the problems were ove

come by the third sortie. Numerous watercra

were sighted and were identified with the FLIR

The crews began to adjust quickly to evaluatin

the numerous targets and determining whethe

they were friend or foe. Individual island search

also produced numerous IR returns. The thir

sortie, flown on 11 March 1975, detected a po

sible infiltration craft at 0310 hours, local time. Th

boat appeared to be the size of previously ca

tured skunk boats (40 feet) and was under way 

a higher rate of speed than other sightings. Th

high speed of the boat was further evidenced b

the large wake created as it sped through th

water. IR returns indicated a larger-than-norm

engine, and IR emissions were detected from th

front of the boat that had not been seen befor

The boat was also without lights and was not r

flected on the KA band radar of the Talon . Th

sighting was recorded on videotape, and phot

graphs were made from the video playback. Sinc

the surveillance aircraft was prohibited by 314

AD OPORD 75-27 from taking tracking actio

the destination of the suspected infiltration cra

could not be determined within the short period 

time the boat was observed on the FLIR.12

In response to the 11 March sighting, Headqua

ters PACAF instructed 314th AD on 31 March 

amend OPORD 75-27 to allow Combat Talon ai

craft to track suspected infiltration craft for the pu

pose of acquiring additional information. PACA

requested that 314th AD define procedures th

would protect the Combat Talon from direct i

volvement if ROK forces decided to intercept an

capture the skunk boat with the information pr

vided by 314th AD. The 314th AD was caution

to ensure that the Combat Talon aircraft remaine

passive in its surveillance and tracking and th

the classified systems on the aircraft were pr

tected from unauthorized disclosure. 13

The second phase of the test, consisting of fo

additional sorties, were flown by the 1st SOS 

early April, with the last sortie of the secon

phase flown on 21 April 1975. The results we

similar to the first phase sorties flown in Marc

with a general improvement in communicatio

BETWEEN THE WAR

161
equipment aboard the aircraft. Numerous boats

were sighted, and crews practiced and improved

methods for identifying them. The second-phase

testing was followed by an interim analysis of the

counterinfiltration operation by the 314th AD,

since the division felt that it had enough data to

complete the Combat Talon test. Three more test

flights were conducted in May 1975, but the later

flights did not change the findings of the interim

314th AD analysis.14

On 24 April the 314th AD reported to Fifth AF

that the test program, identified as Commando

Talon, was successfully completed on 12 April and

forwarded its conclusion that permanent opera -

tions should be established. The summary, prepared by USAF Korea’s headquarters, included

comments on limitations discovered during the

test as well as recommendations for making future

operations more effective. The flight tests revealed

that the FLIR system provided high-resolution imagery “approaching visual photography,” which

was capable of providing not only real-time identification of vessels detected during open water surveillance but was also capable of permitting island

survey operations for detecting agent staging

bases. The practical consequences of the testing

confirmed the validity of surveillance techniques

and provided the means for making observations,

which would reveal the nature of North Korean

operations.15

On the assumption that Commando Talon operations would continue, the 314th AD expanded

its earlier concept of operations around which

employment plans were drawn. Inbound infiltra -

tion boats would continue to be reported to the

314th AD command advisory function, tracked to

their destinations if possible, tied to specific loca -

tions, and passed to the ROK for appropriate action. If an outbound boat was detected, the 314th

AD believed that the C-130E(Y) Combat Talon

should follow it out to sea (as far as possible

without violating sensitive area rules) to determine the operational methodology of North Korean employment.1 6

Two operating limitations were identified during the test program. First, the system’s operator

found that weather conditions seriously degraded

the FLIR imagery. Clouds, moisture, or dust rendered the FLIR imagery virtually unusable. Second, the narrow field of view of the FLIR system

placed restrictions on the method of searching a

large area. Although a large area could be

searched in a three-hour period (the test missions

covered 1,800 square miles), one aircraft could not

scrutinize an area 60 miles in length and 30

miles in breadth in a short time. As a result, an

infiltration craft could penetrate ROK territorial

waters in one portion of a search area while the

Combat Talon examined another. This limitation

could be overcome by using more than one aircraft in a search area with appropriate altitude

or sector separation.1 7 The 314th AD provided a

number of recommendations for improving subsequent operations:

1. Commando Talon surveillance missions

should not become a part of the peacetime

aerial reconnaissance program.

2. The current 314th AD OPORD 75-27 should

be used for continued operations until a new

one could be written and coordinated.

3. The PACAF daily mission summary, required of all sorties, should be simplified.

For routine sightings of surface craft, the

mission summary should be brief, while

those for suspicious sightings should be reported as currently required.

4. The surveillance mission should be fragged

to operate in the area south of 37 degrees

north latitude within the territorial seas of

the Republic of Korea. When operating be -

low 35 degrees north latitude, the sea

boundaries should be expanded to the Korean air defense identification zone (ADIZ),

as a minimum.

5. The utility of using two C-130E (Y) aircraft

simultaneously should be considered.

6. Since an analysis of the multiple videotape

coverage of islands could not be accom -

plished by the 314th AD for the survey and

mapping objectives outlined for the second

phase of the test, the 18th TFW should be

tasked to obtain aerial photography of the

islands covered and to make a comparison of

the photo and FLIR coverage.

7. The limited capability of the 314th AD to

perform a preliminary analysis of videotapes

should be recognized and accepted, at least

for the short term, because of the restrictions imposed upon the procurement of video

equipment.

8. The development of close coordination be -

tween US and Republic of Korea Navy, Air

Force, and other interested elements for utilizing the Commando Talon FLIR capability

should be studied.

If the operations were to be continued, the

314th AD recommended that at least five missions

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

162
be undertaken in May, beginning on 5 May 1975.

While adding observations of its own, Fifth AF

concurred with all eight 314th AD recommenda -

tions and supported the conclusion that Com -

mando Talon be made permanent in its 2 May

1975 message to CINCPACAF. Because of

CINCPAC guidance and JCS policy, however,

Fifth AF considered it unlikely that Commando

Talon operations could be conducted between 35

and 37 degrees north latitude. 18

On 3 May 1975 CINCPACAF authorized three

more test flights to be flown by Combat Talon

aircraft in its 032128Z May 1975 message to

Fifth AF/DO. Headquarters PACAF reasoned

that since commander, US Forces, Korea’s

(COMUSFK) position on the establishment of a

permanent Commando Talon operation had not

been received, it would be appropriate to call the

5–10 May sorties, proposed by both 314th AD

and Fifth AF, additional test missions for acquiring more data. Of the original 10 missions

authorized during phase 1 and phase 2, three

had been canceled due to weather. The May missions would make up for the ones lost the month

before. The PACAF staff again emphasized to its

subordinate headquarters the need for develop -

ing procedures to prevent the Combat Talon from

becoming involved in the reaction of the ROK to

identified infiltration boats. Three additional

flights were flown on the nights of 6/7 May, 7/8

May, and 10 May 1975. They were flown in the

same area off the coast of the ROK as in the

previous missions, using Taegu AB as the primary staging base in Korea. Although fishing

boats, freighters, and other small boats were

identified, no suspected infiltration craft were

sighted.19

With its summer rotation of personnel, USFK

did not respond to the test results until August.

In its 221019Z August 1975 message to

CINCPAC/J3, USFK provided its appraisal of

Commando Talon operations conducted the previous spring. USFK concurred with both the

314th AD and Fifth AF recommendations provided to PACAF on 2 May. Since seaborne infiltrations by North Korean agents had been a longstanding concern of the ROK, COMUSFK

strongly recommended that Commando Talon operations be established in certain key areas to

contend with the peninsula-wide threat. The

USFK staff recommended that the Commando

Talon program be established for six months “to

determine the feasibility of upgrading gathered

intelligence from passive to active” collection. For

the operator in Korea, real-time information co

veyed quickly to an operational unit “would me

the criteria of timely intelligence.” The passiv

collection methodology, outlined in earlier 314

AD message traffic and advocated by USAF pla

ners, was clearly not acceptable to COMUSFK.20

The issue of active versus passive collection pr

cedures and the transfer of data to the ROK we

staffed throughout the fall of 1975. The PACA

staff did not consider the 314th AD OPORD 75-2

adequate for coastal surveillance operations b

the C-130E(Y) aircraft in an active collectio

mode or for operations north of 35 degrees. It i

structed Fifth AF to review and update i

CONOP for gathering intelligence data and 

prepare the details of how the evaluation was 

be performed and how gathered intelligence w

to be routed into ROK channels. In effect, PACA

requested Fifth AF to be prepared to revi

OPORD 75-27 as well as to compile an approp

ate set of rules of engagement.21

In a message from 314th AD on 15 Septemb

1975, the 1st SOS was asked to begin Command

Talon operations as an interim capability unt

ROK Air Force FLIR-equipped AC-123 aircra

were modified and made available to perform th

mission. Operations below 35 degrees north la

tude were authorized, with operations approve

on both the east and west coast of the Republic 

Korea.22 Not comfortable that the capability w

ready to employ operationally, Fifth AF restricte

the 314th AD request to radar tracking and rad

hand-off involving US forces only for the initi

missions.2 3 The PACAF staff recommended, in th

meantime, that two additional Commando Talo

test missions be flown to develop workable secu

communications between friendly forces and 

improve ground-based radar vector procedures 

an intercepted agent boat. The additional te

missions were flown on 28 October and 28 N

vember 1975 but did not appreciably alter the ea

lier evaluations of the Combat Talon’s capability 

detect and identify infiltration boats in Korea

waters.2 4 It would be 1976 before Command

Talon missions would be flown operationally.

The Commando Talon program effectively tie

the 1st SOS to the Korean peninsula and ensure

that the squadron would not be deactivated. I

addition to the Korean sea surveillance missio

the squadron continued to exercise and trai

throughout the theater during 1975. Foal Eag

75 was flown out of Taegu AB in the spring 

1975, further tying the squadron to the Korea

area of operations. Since its relocation from Nh

BETWEEN THE WAR

163
Trang AB in 1972, Lt Col Bob Pinard had commanded the squadron. On 1 July 1975 Lt Col

Stephen G. Gardella Jr. assumed command of the

squadron, with Maj Don James becoming the

squadron operations officer and Capt Leon E.

Hess assuming the assistant operations officer position.25 Having commanded the 90th SOS/1st

SOS longer than any previous commander and

having successfully moved the squadron from

SEA to Kadena AB, Colonel Pinard believed his

lasting legacy was his successful campaign to

keep the unit from being deactivated and con -

tinue as the only SOF unit in PACAF.

To further enhance its ECM training, the

squadron participated in a fighter intercept program code-named Commando Lark. Beginning on

21 January 1975 and continuing monthly through -

out the year, 1st SOS C-130E(Y) Combat Talons

flew fighter intercept training missions with the

Chinese Air Force (CAF) based out of Taiwan. The

mission profile included launch of the Combat

Talon from Kadena AB and penetration of the Taiwan ADIZ to test Taiwan’s ability to respond to an

intruder. With the Combat Talon playing the aggressor role, Taiwanese GCI radar would vector

fighter aircraft into its ADIZ to intercept the penetrating Talon. The objective of the exercise was to

evaluate the GCI radar operator’s ability to maneuver his fighter into a position to allow the pilot

to shoot down the penetrating aircraft. The exercise proved to be extremely realistic and provided

outstanding training for both the CAF and Combat Talon crews.26

A sign of permanency for the 1st SOS in PACAF

was seen when the squadron moved into the former 345th TAS operations building on 11 and 12

September 1975. The new building effectively con -

solidated the squadron into one facility instead of

the four buildings it previously occupied. The new

facility was located along the flight line next to the

squadron’s aircraft. Without disrupting its flying

schedule, the entire move was accomplished by using only 1st SOS personnel.27 By the end of the

year, the 1st SOS was stabilized at Kadena AB in

its new facilities, with future deactivation plans

for the squadron put on indefinite hold.

Reorganization in Europe Impacts 7th SOS

As the situation in the Pacific began to stabilize, European SOF was entering a period of turmoil and change. Effective 31 December 1974 the

7th SOS’s low-level routes in Spain were canceled

by the Spanish government. The squadron suffered another blow in early 1975 when Greece

temporarily denied the squadron use of its lowlevel routes. The long association between the

squadron and the Hellenic Raiding Force was

brought to an end due to rising political tension

between the Greek government and the United

States. In March 1975 the 7th SOS deployed an

aircraft to Aviano AB, Italy, to conduct low-level

route surveys and accomplish Fulton STARS

training. Unseasonably poor weather allowed

only one day of surface-to-air recovery opera -

tions at Aviano AB, but the facilities available

there, along with the rugged terrain found in

Italy, made the area an ideal training site. The

squadron began to focus its efforts on Italy to

solve its dwindling training opportunities across

Europe. 28 As had been the case in other coun -

tries, Flintlock would provide the avenue for approval of low-level operations in Ita ly.

To help offset the effects of lost training and to

provide a training venue that complemented the

early fall Flintlock exercise, the squadron participated annually in a joint exercise in Germany

known as Alpine Friendship. From 21 April to 16

May 1975, the 7th SOS deployed three Combat

Talons to southern Germany and flew missions in

support of the US Army Special Forces stationed

at Bad Töelz. Missions flown included nine

paradrop infiltrations, nine resupply airdrops, one

STARS mission, and five airland exfiltrations. In

addition to its main operating location, the unit

deployed a communications team to Bad Töelz.

The 7th SOS Combat Control Team also was infiltrated by way of airland and set up beacons on

three drop zones in preparation for resupply airdrops. In total, the squadron flew 134.1 hours and

62 sorties in which 112 personnel and 2,500

pounds of cargo were air-dropped. In addition, 60

personnel and 4,300 pounds of cargo were airlanded through the course of the exercise. The

major problem encountered was the lack of proper

DZ markings, which resulted in several resupply

drops being canceled and later rescheduled.

Nonadherence to established procedures outlined

in the Joint Unconventional Warfare Standard

Operating Procedures publication was identified

as the cause. 29

The summer of 1975 brought about another

change in the 7th SOS’s command relationship

with USAFE. On 1 July the 322d TAW was inactivated at Rhein Main AB, and the 7th SOS was

reassigned to Seventeenth AF at Sembach AB,

Germany, by Special Order GB-20, dated 27 June

1975. Rhein Main AB was also reassigned to the

Military Airlift Command, and the 435th TAW

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

164
was established as the base host wing. On 22 Au -

gust Colonel Perry relinquished command of the

squadron to Col Jerry A. Crist and retired from

the Air Force. The unit’s assignment to Seventeenth AF was short-lived. On 16 October the

squadron was again reassigned by Special Order

GB-6, dated 6 October 1975, to the 601st TCW

located at Wiesbaden AB, Germany. 30 For the

next two years, the 7th SOS’s chain of command

passed through the 601st TCW to Seventeenth AF

at Sembach and thence on to USAFE. Throughout

the turmoil created by these many changes, the

squadron continued to focus on its wartime mission and the training required to successfully accomplish it.

The 8th SOS Becomes Interim

Gunship Squadron

At Hurlburt Field the year 1975 also brought

about many changes for the 8th SOS. On 7

March Lt Col Donald W. Burger assumed command of the squadron, replacing Col Peter K.

Nikonovich. As the year progressed, the 834th

TCW (formerly the 1st SOW) continued to decrease in size. On 30 June 1975 the 415th Special

Operations Training Squadron (SOTS), with two

assigned AC-130H gunships, was deactivated,

and its personnel and equipment were assigned

to the 8th SOS, effective 1 July. The 8th SOS had

continued to operate the formal Combat Talon

School, which provided trained crews to the two

overseas squadrons. With the absorption of the

415th SOTS into the 8th SOS, the Combat Talon

squadron also became responsible for all gunship

training for the active Air For ce.31

The long-range gunship plan was to relocate

the SEA-based 16th SOS from Korat RTAFB,

Thailand, to Hurlburt Field and to then transfer

all former 415th SOTS assets to the gunship

squadron. The plan was executed on 12 December

1975 when the eight Thailand-based AC-130H

gunships were reassigned to Hurlburt Field. Because of the move, Hurlburt Field gained the only

operational active duty gunship squadron in the

Air Force, and the 8th SOS lost its gunship mission when the two AC-130H aircraft were transferred to the 16th SOS.32

To increase the efficiency of Fulton STARS

training, a ground-training platform was built

by 8th SOS loadmasters for use in both the formal school and to fulfill continuation-training requirements of the squadron. An initiative proposed to TAC by the 834th TCW to save money

was the elimination of Fulton STARS training in

the formal school. Since its creation in 1966, t

Combat Knife unit had provided surface-to-air r

covery training for all crew members during initi

qualification. The wing’s proposal noted that on

a small number of crews actually maintained cu

rency in the system once assigned to their oper

tional squadrons and that by training all new cre

members, valuable training time and scarce do

lars were wasted. The elimination of the recove

training would result in savings of $27,105 fo

each crew and would cut five days off the length 

the course.33 Crew members that needed qualifica 

tion training in the Fulton system would b

trained in their own units. TAC subsequently a

proved the proposal, and Class 76-03 became th

first class without Fulton training. 34 In th

post–Vietnam Air Force, dollars were extreme

scarce, and budget cuts were the norm of the da

As 1975 ended for the 8th SOS, however, the pe

manency of the overseas squadrons ensured th

its primary role as the formal Combat Talo

schoolhouse was secure.

1976: Combat Talon

Testing Receives Priority

The operations tempo in the Pacific remaine

steady, yet manageable, throughout 1976. Th

flurry of activity seen the previous fall over th

Korean sea-surveillance mission had subside

For the first half of the year, USFK, PACAF, PA

COM, and the Joint Staff weighed the pros an

cons of utilizing the Combat Talon in that mi

sion. From 11 March to 4 April, the 1st SOS pa

ticipated in Foal Eagle 76, committing two of i

aircraft and 50 personnel to the exercise. Th

squadron flew 41 sorties and 134.6 hours durin

the three-week exercise, air-dropping 580 perso

nel and 8,400 pounds of cargo. The Command

Lark missions into Taiwan continued on 

monthly basis, with outstanding airborne inte

cept training received by both the 1st SOS an

the CAF.3 5

Commando Talon Operations

Begin for 1st SOS

Weeklong trainers to Clark AB, Philippine

were flown almost monthly by 1st SOS crew

Previous restrictions stemming from political di

agreements between the US government and th

Philippine government had been resolved. Occ

sional weeklong trainers were flown out of Kore

but it was in the Philippines that the squadro

accomplished most of its quality low level. By th

BETWEEN THE WAR

165
fall of 1976, unit aircrews were being qualified on

the HSLLADS airdrop capability. The system had

been tested and certified in 1973, but budget reductions throughout SOF and the additional requirement for US Army certification had prevented earlier employment of the system

throughout the Talon community.3 6

The long-anticipated tasking for Commando

Talon operations came in October, and the

squadron deployed to Osan AB during three

weeklong periods beginning on 16 October 1975.

The 1st SOS flew successful missions nightly

from 16 to 22 October, 16 to 23 November, and

10 to 17 December.3 7 By year’s end the 1st SOS

had become an active participant in the defense

of the ROK .

The squadron also participated in Specwarex

1-77 from 4 to 14 November in the Philippines.

During the exercise several small-unit counterterrorism field problems were executed, with the

climax of the exercise designed around a hostage

rescue mission on 12 November. For this mission

participants included USA Special Forces sol -

diers, USAF Combat Control Team (CCT) members, and an aggressor force made up of US Navy

SEALs. The 1st SOS began the exercise by on -

loading 11 Special Forces, seven CCT personnel,

and one jeep with a driver and a gunner, and

then departing the airfield for a two-hour lowlevel infiltration route. The scenario called for

airdrop of the paratroopers, who were tasked with

freeing the hostages and securing the landing/

extraction zone. Within 10 minutes of the drop,

CCT had marked the landing zone, and the Special Forces team had moved into position to free

the hostages. The Combat Talon landed and offloaded the gun jeep, which was used to assist in

the hostage rescue operation. After 11 minutes

on the ground, 35 “hostages” were successfully

freed from their captors, and the aircraft departed the airfield with everyone on board. The

total elapsed time from airdrop to final departure was 20 minutes. The operation was considered a success, but additional procedures were

needed to decrease ground time for the aircraft.38 Although this rescue operation was rudimentary compared to later exercises, it marked

the first time that a hostage rescue scenario

was included in an SOF exercise with Combat

Talon participation. With the coming storm of interna tional terrorism, it certainly would not be

the last.

The 8th SOS Becomes

a Talon Test Squadron

At the 8th SOS 1976 marked an upsurge in

Combat Talon system testing by the squadron.

Early in the year, from 18 to 19 February, an

HSLLADS orientation conference was held at

Hurlburt Field that was hosted by the TAWC and

attended by Aeronautical System Division (ASD)

representatives and members of the joint community that would employ the system. The conference was to standardize rigging and loading procedures and to resolve any questions potential

users might have of ASD. At the conclusion of the

conference, a forward restraint system was identified as a system deficiency, and TAWC agreed to

provide preliminary engineering studies to ASD

for action. The conference was a success, resulting

in an improved HSLLADS capability.3 9

On 28 February one aircraft and crew deployed

to Nellis AFB, Nevada, to participate in TAC Project 75T-902, code-named Seabear. The test project was to evaluate the Combat Talon terrainfollowing and mapping radar systems in a

simulated combat environment. Sorties were

flown on 2, 3, and 4 March, with redeployment to

Hurlburt Field on 5 March 1976. During the test,

a problem with the AN/APQ-122(V)8 radar was

noted. The 4 March flight was planned to fly over

a sand dune ridge located in the Nellis AFB

range. The area had been identified by F-111 pilots as hazardous because their radar did not

“paint” the dunes and provide a command to fly

over them. When the Talon passed over the

dunes, its TF/TA radar did not provide a climb

command either, thus bringing the crew to the

conclusion that the system might not detect some

terrain in arid, sandy environments. 40 A warning

was later placed in the Lockheed Technical Manual to alert operators to the hazard of flying in the

TF mode over deep sand or snow.

The primary purpose of the Seabear test was to

determine if certain enemy ECM equipment affected the Talon radar. Also, chaff and radar decoys were tested against the radar to determine if

there was any interference. The test determined

that the chaff had little effect on the KA band

mapping radar, but it did create interference

when operating in the terrain-following mode.

The radar decoys had no effect on the Talon’s ra -

dar. Two enemy jamming systems were also

tested against the AN/APQ-122(V)8, with mixed

results. In general there was some degradation of

the Talon radar, but the system continued to

function while in the low-level mode. 41

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

166
From 28 March to 1 April, another Combat

Talon aircraft deployed to Nellis AFB for TAC Project 74T-902T, which was part of an ongoing effort

to determine the effectiveness of the Rivet Clamp

ECM modification installed on the aircraft during

the MOD-70 update. The first test flight in the

series had been flown on 2 September 1974. The

series of tests were designed to develop optimum

defensive tactics for the Combat Talon when faced

with certain Soviet threats. Rivet Clamp equip -

ment tested included the AN/ALR-46(V) radar

warning receiver, the TRIM 7 and TRIM 9 decep -

tion repeater jammers, and internal fuselage

AN/ALE-27 chaff dispensers. Four Soviet radar

threat systems were evaluated. The test determined that the Soviet-made systems posed a

threat to the Combat Talon , even with all defensive systems operating within design parameters.

Tactics developed included an escape maneuver

whereby the aircraft would turn away from the

threat and descend while jinking. At the same

time the TRIM 7/9 would be operated in its maximum ja mming mode. The test also determined

that chaff should not be used during the escape

maneuver because it had little effect other than to

draw attention to the aircraft.42

TAC Project 76A-022T was conducted by the

8th SOS in waters near Hurlburt Field from 13 to

22 April. The test objective was to develop a

means to air-drop one or two inflatable boats to be

used as raiding craft by US Navy SEAL teams.

The British Royal Air Force had previously developed an air-drop system for its inflatable boats,

and this test evaluated the British system as

modified for US Air Force aircraft. The boat used

in the test was 16 feet long and was dropped by

way of a parachute from the Combat Talon . A 40

horsepower outboard motor, fuel tank, and various supplies were packed inside the boat. The

unit was mounted on a plywood platform that had

sandbags attached to it that would sink the platform after the boat landed in the water. Under

operational conditions, the boat was dropped from

1,250 feet altitude, with the SEAL team exiting

the aircraft two to four seconds after the boat.43

During the course of the test, a problem was

discovered with the deployment of the boat’s

main parachute. On drops 1, 3, and 7, the vacuum created above the free-falling platform

caused a delay in the opening of the pilot chute.

In the first drop, the package fell from 1,250 feet

to 700 feet above the water before the main chute

opened. On the third drop, also from 1,250 feet,

the main chute did not open until the platform

was between 300 and 400 feet above the wate

On the seventh drop, a slight delay in the mai

chute opening was experienced. The SEA

jumpmaster used the opening of the main par

chute as the cue for the team to exit the aircraf

With delayed opening of the main chute, th

jumpers landed too far from the boat to link u

with it successfully. A solution was found by u

ing pilot chute openings as the cue for the jum

ers to exit the aircraft. This procedure proved sa

isfactory, though under contingency operations, 

slight possibility existed that the main chu

would malfunction, thus causing the boat to b

destroyed when it impacted the water.4 4 The te

resulted in the development of drop procedur

for the combat-rubber-raiding-craft (CRRC

which were later employed throughout the Com

bat Talon community.

The 8th SOS also participated in a test of th

AAQ-8 infrared ECM system, which was co

ducted from 2 to 11 June. One aircraft departe

Hurlburt Field on 2 June en route to LAS O

tario. Once there, two AAQ-8 pods were temp

rarily installed on the aircraft. (The AAQ-8 sy

tem had not been part of the MOD-70 progra

but was a follow-on modernization effort that ha

not been thoroughly evaluated.) On 5 June th

aircraft departed LAS Ontario, with test perso

nel and equipment bound for McConnell AFB

Kansas, where the actual test was to be co nducte

On the 7th and 8th of June, engine-runnin

ground tests of the pods were conducted. On th

9th and 10th, the flight phase of the test w

conducted. After completion of the test, the ai

craft returned to LAS Ontario for removal of th

pods from the aircraft.45

A new camera mount for the Combat Talo

was also tested during the spring of 1976. CMS

Clarence E. Sibley and SSgt Francisco C. Sabla

had developed the mount locally at Hurlbu

Field. It was used successfully for the first tim

on 14 April during Exercise Solid Shield 76 . 

modification was made to the mount on 26 Apr

to prevent the camera from being damaged whe

the aircraft ramp was opened or closed. On 3

April the camera mount was approved as a Cla

1B modification, thus allowing the 1st SOW 

meet one of its assigned tasks—that of limite

aerial photography. The two inventors of the cam

era mount received the Air Force Inventio

Award for 1976 for their effort.46

On 12 December 1976 aircraft 64-0523 d

ployed to LAS Ontario for a flight test of the Sy

tem 66 ECM suite. At LAS Ontario the aircra

BETWEEN THE WAR

167
was modified with test equipment on 13 and 14

December. On 15 December the aircraft departed

LAS Ontario and flew a test mission in the China

Lake restricted area. The mission profile included

multiple passes at 10,000 feet and 3,000 feet above

the ground and two passes at 250 feet. All test

objectives were met, and the mission was terminated by midafternoon. The aircraft returned to

LAS, where test equipment was removed, and the

aircraft returned to Hurlburt Field on 17 December, just in time for the Christmas holidays.47 For

the 8th SOS, 1976 had been filled with schoolhouse and test-oriented missions.

1977: Combat Talon

Redesignated as the MC-130E

Early in 1977 the most significant event in recent Talon history occurred when aircraft 64-0564

deployed from the United States to the western

Pacific utilizing two in-flight refuelings and flying

27.8 nonstop hours. The aircraft had been the

first to be modified with the UARRSI. Crew members from the 1st SOS were among the first to be

trained on the new system during the last week of

January 1977. The mission profile began with the

onload of US Navy SEAL personnel at Coronado

Naval Air Station, California, on 10 February.

With the 17-man SEAL team onboard, the Combat Talon was refueled twice during its transit of

the Pacific en route to the Philippines. The first air

refueling was completed over Hawaii and the second near Guam. After the second refueling the

Combat Talon proceeded on to the Philippines,

where it dropped the SEAL team at Subic Bay.4 8

To deploy over long distances and air-drop special

operations personnel anywhere in the world dra -

matically improved the capability of the Combat

Talon (see chap. 2).

Another significant event in Combat Talon history occurred during early 1977. The Combat

Talon was redesignated by Headquarters USAF

as the MC-130E to reflect its multirole status.

Combat Talon had been originally given the des -

ignation C-130E(I), which denoted its special

status as a Fulton STARS-equipped, or interceptcapable, aircraft. After MOD-70 the Combat

Talon carried three designations—C-130E(C), or

Clamp configuration for STARS-equipped aircraft; C-130E (Y), or Yank configuration for Pacific non-Fulton aircraft; and C-130E(S), or Swap

configuration for the two non-Fulton-equipped

aircraft (64-0571/64-0572) that were occasionally

loaned to other organizations outside of SOF. The

MC-130E became the one designation for all

Combat Talons in early 1977, regardless of equip -

ment installed on the aircraft.49

1st SOS Excels during ORI

The spring of 1977 was a busy time for the 1st

SOS. The annual Foal Eagle exercise was combined with Exercise Team Spirit 77 during March

and April. During the exercise the first of three

limited operational readiness inspections (LORI)

were held. The next month, during Cope Thunder

in the Philippines, units of the 18th TFW flew a

second LORI. These two LORIs, along with one

flown earlier in the year, composed the wing’s

ORI. The 1st SOS scored an excellent overall rating and was the highest rated squadron in the

18th TFW.50 Along with the LORIs, the 1st SOS

flew three additional Commando Talon missions.

On 17 June 1977 Lt Col Richard E. Clinton assumed command of the squadron from Lieutenant

Colonel Gardella. A formal change of command

ceremony, presided over by Brig Gen Walter H.

Baxter III, the 18th TFW commander, was held

on 20 June. 51

Deployments to the Philippines and to Korea

were conducted throughout the summer and fall

of 1977. To expand the unique capabilities of the

weapons system, a 1st SOS MC-130E aircraft, en

route to programmed depot maintenance at LAS

Ontario, participated in Project Mauna Loa in

Hawaii. The mission consisted of evaluating the

ability of the aircraft’s FLIR system to detect

lava tubes of the volcano Mauna Loa. The idea

was to use FLIR information to help track lava

flow. Results of the mission were highly encouraging, and data collected was provided to Headquarters PACAF .

52

The 7th SOS Identified to

Receive European ECM MOD

In Europe the summer of 1977 brought about

another major change in the 7th SOS’s chain of

command. USAFE Special Order GB-19, dated 14

June 1977, formally activated the 7575th Opera -

tions Group (OG) at Rhein Main AB, FRG, effective 1 July, and assigned the new OG directly

under Seventeenth AF. Along with the 7th SOS,

the 7405th Operations Squadron, also located at

Rhein Main AB and known informally as the

“Berlin for Lunch Bunch,” was placed under the

7575th. The changes were designed to give Seventeenth AF a better span of control over its highly

specialized C-130 units.5 3

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

168
The 7575th OG exercised OPCON of the 7th

SOS and directed all local and training flights.

Operational flying missions continued to be

tasked by SOTFE, which continued to operate from

Patch Barracks, Germany. Liaison with Seventeenth AF was maintained by Seventeenth

AF/DOSO and with USAFE through USAFE/

DOUO. The 7th SOS maintained its Operating

Location Alpha at Bad Töelz, Germany, which

was responsible for coordinating all air support

requirements for elements of the 10th Special

Forces Group (Airborne) located there. Maintenance support for the 7th SOS was provided by

the 435th TAW, the Military Airlift Wing respon -

sible for Rhein Main AB. The squadron remained

a USAFE-assigned tenant unit on the Military

Airlift Command base. With the creation of the

7575th OG, however, greater emphasis was placed

on support of 7th SOS aircraft, including daily

maintenance activities and spare parts.54

The annual Combat Talon Management Review

Conference was held from 12 to 14 July 1977, and

the newly established 7575th OG sent its commander, Col L. D. Chetelat, to the meeting, along

with representatives from the 7th SOS and

USAFE. Colonel Chetelat stressed to conference

attendees USAFE’s assessment that the Clamp

Combat Talon was not capable of operating in

some areas required by existing war plans. The

7th SOS representatives further expanded on

shortfalls of the ECM equipment installed on their

aircraft. New wartime targets had been assigned

to the squadron that had previously been consid -

ered as denied. To improve the ECM systems in -

stalled on the aircraft, the squadron had submitted

a required operational capability (ROC) to USAFE.

The ROC identified the requirement for improved

ECM equipment to enable the Combat Talon to

reach the new areas. In addition to equipment requirements identified by the 7th SOS, USAFE also

identified a requirement to equip Combat Arrow

aircraft with an interim standoff jamming capability because the EF-111 initial operational capability had slipped. USAFE wanted its Combat Talons

to have a standoff jamming capability until the

EF-111s were operational in Europe.5 5 To satisfy

both requirements identified by USAF at the

CTMR, a highly sophisticated and much more ca -

pable ECM suite was developed for European Talons and was installed on them beginning in 1978.

Combat Talon 64-0561 was the first of the European ECM-modified aircraft, with 64-0523, 64-

0555, and 64-0566 eventually receiving the updated ECM equipment. While 64-0561 was

undergoing initial modification and testing, ai

craft 64-0567 was loaned to the 7th SOS so th

four aircraft could be maintained in Europe.

Throughout 1977 maintenance for Combat Ta

ons assigned to Rhein Main AB was particular

challenging. The decision had been made to pe

manently assign the 37th TAS to Rhein Mai

and throughout the year, actions necessary 

stand up the new squadron were completed. B

fore the 37th TAS’s permanent assignment 

Germany, temporary duty personnel from stat

side C-130 units deployed to Europe to fulfill 

130 requirements. The deployed maintaine

serviced the Combat Talons along with their ow

assigned aircraft. With the permanent change 

station of the 37th TAS, C-130 maintenance b

came a permanent part of the 435th TAW. Mai

tenance experience level was low for those i

itially assigned to the wing to support the 37

TAS, and there was a shortage of personnel 

critical maintenance career fields for some tim

Maintenance for the 7th SOS suffered from th

low-experience level. Once newly assigned perso

nel arrived in sufficient quantities and attaine

proficiency, Combat Talon maintenance reliabili

improved significantly.56

Continuation Training

Keeps 8th SOS Occupied

While the 7th SOS was undergoing organiz

tional changes in Europe, the 8th SOS continue

to train newly assigned Combat Talon crew mem

bers and continued testing various Combat Talo

subsystems. The US Army required that all ne

air-drop capabilities be tested and certified usin

Army equipment. The HSLLADS test conducte

in 1973 had not included US Army participatio

thus resulting in an approved system for the U

Air Force but one that could not be used for U

Army airdrops. Consequently, TAC publishe

Project 77F-062T for the dual purpose of gainin

certification of HSLLADS by the Army and fo

certifying multiple container drops for the Com

bat Talon. One MC-130E (64-0567) deployed 

Pope AFB on 20 July and conducted tests o

21–22 July. During the test the Combat Talo

flew four sorties and dropped 20 500-pound bu

dles at a speed of 250 knots and an altitude of 25

feet. High-speed cameras in the aircraft and o

the ground recorded the results. After film anal

sis, an additional 10 drops were added to the te

to determine the cause of a recurring parachu

malfunction. Aircraft maintenance problem

forced the cancellation of the remaining drop

BETWEEN THE WAR

169
and on 23 July the aircraft redeployed to

Hurlburt Field. The test was resumed the follow -

ing month when aircraft 64-0568 deployed to the

Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona. From 22 Au -

gust to 2 September, 51.8 hours were flown during 36 scheduled sorties. Ninety airdrops were

completed, of which 78 were successful. Although

experiencing some inconsistency, the test determined that either the 22- or the 28-foot ring-slot

parachute should be used with the HSLLADS.

The mission commander, Maj John M. Logan, recommended that the test be extended and that approximately 25 additional drops be accomplished

using only new parachutes.5 7 A third deployment

was accomplished from 8 to 17 November to Pope

AFB, and the project was successfully completed,

resulting in US Army certification of the

HSLLADS. The certification cleared the way for

Combat Talon units worldwide to use the system

when supporting US Army parachute operations.

The squadron finished out the year under the

command of Lt Col Hugh L. Hunter.

1978: Combat Arrow Wins the

USAFE Commander in Chief Trophy

One of the challenges for the Combat Talon

community was to remain engaged throughout its

area of operations so that, when tasked to execute

a mission on short notice, the unit could deploy

without undue attention. Nowhere was it more

difficult to maintain theater familiarity than in

the Pacific. Huge distances created a challenge

that was not easily overcome. The 1st SOS was

stationed on the island of Okinawa and regularly

exercised in Korea and in the Philippines. The

squadron had little experience in other countries

of the area.

1st SOS Begins the Pacific

Area Trainer Program

In January 1978 the 1st SOS began a program

known as the Pacific Area Trainer (PAT); it was

designed to expose the Combat Talon to areas

that might be needed during a deployment for a

crisis. The first PAT was flown from 23 to 27

January 1978. The main objectives of the PAT

were to operate the MC-130E aircraft outside the

normal operations/training areas and to build a

presence for future PACOM-tasked operations; to

build aircrew experience and familiarization of

PACOM areas that could be used for possible fu -

ture deployments; to gather data on facilities and

locations for possible future use; to accomplish

MCM 51-130 flying training requirements; to collect electronic intelligence along the route of flight

within the capabilities of Combat Talon equip -

ment; and to analyze the 1st SOS HF command

and control radio network.5 8

A second PAT was flown from 20 to 30 May; it

transited Agana NAS, Guam; Whenuapai Royal

New Zealand AFB, New Zealand; Ohakea Royal

New Zealand AFB, New Zealand; Brisbane International Airport, Australia; Port Moresby International Airport, Papua, New Guinea; and Cubi

Point NAS, Philippines. During the 48.3-hour deployment, the crew executed a long-range in-flight

refueling leg utilizing its in-flight refueling capa -

bility and a USAF KC-135 tanker. It was the second time that a 1st SOS crew had performed a

long-range refueling mission.59

In conjunction with the PAT 002 deployment,

1st SOS personnel attended the preliminary planning conference for Exercise Gonfalon . Designed

as a joint/combined u nconventional warfare exercise, Gonfalon was hosted by the Royal New Zea -

land Special Air Services (RNZSAS) and was

scheduled for the following September. Participants included the RNZSAS, the Australian Special Air Service, the British Special Air Service,

the Royal Marine Small Boat Squadron, US Army

Special Forces, US Navy SEALs, and the 1st SOS.

From 18 September to 21 October, one Combat

Talon deployed to New Zealand in support of Gon -

falon. The first aircraft departed Kadena AB on

13 September, with a second one departing on 27

September. The exercise was the first attempt by

members of the Australia, New Zealand, and US

Treaty to exercise their special operations forces

in an exercise designed around an unconventional

warfare scenario. The general consensus expressed by participating commanders at the con -

clusion of the exercise was that it was too long

and too rigid in its training cycles, which resulted

in groups being locked into one phase of training

and not being able to participate or observe others. Recommendations resulting from the exercise

included holding the exercise every other year,

with a symposium in the off year to discuss tech -

niques and advancements in each country’s special operations program. The 1st SOS was welcomed by all participants and received quality

training throughout the exercise. Weather was a

factor, however, and resulted in the cancellation

of the scheduled HALO school and the CRRC airdrops. Including deployment and redeployment,

166.2 hours were flown during 59 sorties over the

33-day exercise.60

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

170
The last half of the year saw two additional

PATs flown by 1st SOS crews. PAT 003 departed

Kadena on 25 July en route to Misawa AB, Japan, where the crew remained for two days of

airborne intercept training with Japanese Defense Force interceptors. The mission continued

north on 29 July, with a refueling stop at Shemya AFB, Alaska, with a final destination of Elmendorf AFB. During the following five days of

operations out of Elmendorf AFB, airborne intercept training, low-level terrain following, and a

coastal penetration were accomplished. Some of

the best training of the year was completed during PAT 003. On 2 August the aircraft departed

Alaska and returned to Kadena AB by way of a

refueling and overnight stop at Adak NAS,

Alaska. During the final leg to home station, the

aircraft was air refueled by a Kadena-based KC135 tanker. All objectives of the PAT were accomplished, including familiarization with northern

Japan and Alaska, tactical and proficiency training, long-range fuel planning and navigation, and

aerial-refueling operations.61

The final PAT of the year was flown between

26 November and 5 December; it was scheduled to

support Exercise Midlink, a combined Iran-Pakistan

exercise with US, British, and host-nation naval

forces participating. The 1st SOS flew to Clark AB,

Philippines, on 26 November, and onloaded SEAL

Team One the following day at Cubi Point NAS.

En route stops during the deployment included

Seletar Airfield, Singapore, and Diego Garcia. Sri

Lanka was originally scheduled in lieu of Diego

Garcia, but a fuel shortage there required that the

flight be rescheduled. The 1st SOS also transited

Halim P. International Airport, Indonesia, en route

back to Cubi Point to off-load the SEAL team after

the completion of the exercise. During the course of

the employment, the 1st SOS contingent was

based at Drigh Road AB, Karachi, Pakistan. Due

to miscommunications between PACAF and

USAFE (Pakistan was assigned to USAFE at the

time), the host government would not approve 1st

SOS tactical operations scheduled for the exercise,

including a CRRC airdrop in the Bay of Bengal.

After several frustrating days in Pakistan, the

crew departed as scheduled for its return to Kadena

AB. Although Midlink objectives were not met, PAT

004 was productive. Information and experience

gained by transiting international and territorial

airspace, load limitations, and other planning factors were beneficial to the squadron’s future deployments throughout the Pacific. Discussions with US

Embassy officials clarified transit procedures for the

countries visited and allowed discussions wi

them on political considerations that could affe

future operational missions. PAT 004 provide

the 1st SOS with a solid database for plannin

future missions into the Indian Ocean area.6 2

The 7th SOS Returns to Iran

for JCS Exercise Aresh 78

In an ongoing program similar to PACAF

PATs, the 7th SOS continued to deploy throug

out its area of responsibility. During 1975 Greec

and the United States were at odds over the Tu

key situation, and the 7th SOS suffered by bein

restricted from flying in Greece. By 1976, how 

ever, the squadron began limited operations, p

marily supporting the Hellenic Raider’s HAL

School and occasionally being approved for low

level operations. Agreement was reached in 197

between USAFE and the Hellenic Air Force 

allow the 7th SOS to provide continual low-lev

orientation flights to Hellenic Air Force pilots an

navigators in exchange for unilateral low-level o

erations. A typical profile for a Greek trainer 

1978 was to base out of Hellinikon AB, fly 

Elefsis AB (located near Athens) to onload Gree

observers from the Royal Hellenic Air Force

356th Tactical Airlift Squadron, and then fly 

four-hour low-level route up the length of th

country. A stop was made to off-load the observe

at Elefsis at the completion of the low-level po

tion of the mission, and the aircraft would the

return to Hellenikon.63

In addition to the Greek trainers, the 7th SO

renewed its airborne intercept-training program

beginning in November 1977, with the 401

Tactical Fighter Wing’s F-4s stationed at Torr

jon AB, Spain. The squadron also supported th

Spanish HALO School during its deployment

Although still conservative when approving low

level requests, the Spanish government slow

eased its restrictions and occasionally approv

low-level operations for the 7th SOS. All oper

tions, however, had to be in direct support of th

Spanish military to get approval to fly in Spain.6 4

On 30 March 1978 Lt Col (select) Thomas 

Bradley assumed command of the squadron from

Lt Col Charles A. Caven, who had been the com

mander since 13 July 1976. Colonel Bradle

brought a wealth of experience to his new job. H

had served a combat tour in Vietnam as an i

structor pilot in the C-130 and had completed a

exchange officer assignment to the Royal Austr

lian Air Force. He had also served as the cour

director, Military Science Division, at the A

BETWEEN THE WAR

171
Force Academy, and had over 5,800 flying hours

when he assumed command of the squadron.65

In the April-to-May period, the entire squadron

deployed to RAF Sculthorpe, UK, and participated in its annual major exercise—Flintlock 78.

The 7575th OG/7th SOS, augmented by MAC

maintenance and USAFE support personnel,

formed the 7575th SOW and established an Air

Force Special Operations base to provide command and control of air assets dedicated to the

exercise. The 7575th OG commander, Col Robert

L. Biggs, became the 7575th SOW commander for

the exercise and was the overall Air Force uncon ventional warfare forces commander. Elements of the

7th SOS, 8th SOS, 435th TAW, and 71st Avia tion

Squadron participated in various subexe rcises.

Missions flown included infiltration, exfiltration,

resupply, STARS operations, and logistics support. A 7th SOS communications team deployed

to Karup, Denmark, and formed the nucleus of

the forward operating base located there. One aircraft and associated personnel were sent to Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran, Iran, to participate in Aresh 78. Another aircraft and

associated personnel were deployed to Bizerte

Airport, Tunisia, for Subexercise Sahel 78.6 6

Aresh 78 was the second time a Flintlock

subexercise had been held in Iran. The purpose of

the exercise was to demonstrate and improve the

readiness posture of participating special opera -

tions forces that could be called upon to form a

combined force for military action. Operational

missions included in the exercise centered on land

and sea infiltrations of combined US/Iranian directaction teams. Sahel 78 centered around a scenario

that included a simulated aggressor force invading Tunisia from the west and the southeast. After establishing a base of operations at Bizerte,

US forces supported the Tunisian military to defeat the notional aggressor force.6 7

For the 60-day Flintlock 78 exercise, 387.3

hours were flown during 141 sorties, and 471 personnel were air-dropped along with 4,700 pounds

of cargo. Support to the exercise also included the

airlanding of 167,100 pounds of additional cargo.

Flintlock 78 was by far the largest in the exercise

series to date and provided some of the best training of the year for both 7th SOS and 8th SOS

aircrew and support personnel.68 The exposure to

other countries that the Flintlock series provided

to the 7th and 8th SOS was invaluable in preparing the squadrons for future contingency opera -

tions. No other special operations-oriented exercise could rival Flintlock in scope or in complexity.

On 25 August 1978 Gen John W. Pauly, commander in chief, USAFE, presented the USAFE

commander in chief’s trophy to the 7th SOS for

the most outstanding flying support squadron in

USAFE for the year 1977. The award marked another significant accomplishment for the squadron. The citation noted that the squadron was the

only unconventional warfare unit in USAFE and,

as such, was charged with the support of US

Army Special Forces, US Navy SEALs, and all

allied special operations forces located in the

theater. While executing an aggressive exercise

program, the squadron had flown 2,200 accidentfree flying hours during 1977, most of which were

flown at low level in a tactical environment.6 9

With its selection for the award, the 7th SOS had

firmly placed itself at the forefront of the Combat

Talon community.

It’s Sleepy Hollow at Hurlburt Field

The 8th SOS had a quiet year during 1978. It

continued to participate in both joint and combined exercises, but TAC seemed to grow tired of

the UW mission and showed little desire to maintain the capabilities found at Hurlburt Field. Rumors flourished that the 16th SOS would be deactivated after fiscal year 1979 and that the only

mission keeping the 8th SOS active was the formal school requirements that were driven by the

overseas Combat Talon units. Above the wing

only one staff position existed at Ninth AF, which

was the numbered Air Force responsible for the

special operations mission in TAC. There were no

positions specifically identified as SOF on the

TAC staff. On the Joint Staff there was a small

contingent responsible for Air Force support for

US Army Special Forces and US Navy SEALs. At

Hurlburt Field long-time Combat Talon operators

were passed over for promotion at a much higher

rate than across the regular Air Force, and a veil

of gloom permeated the wing. When personnel

from the 1st SOS and 7th SOS finished their

tours, the Air Force Military Personnel Center did

not recognize TAC as their losing command, thus

resulting in many experienced Combat Talon personnel being assigned to slick C-130 units outside

of special operations. By December 1978 the comment around the 8th SOS was for “the last one

out to turn out the lights.”

Individual 8th SOS squadron members contin -

ued to develop tactics that would improve the Com -

bat Talon weapons system. A very low-altitude

(VLA) tactic was developed by squadron members

to enhance the survivability of the aircraft. Twice

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

172
during 1978 the squadron deployed an aircraft to

Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, and

qualified selected crew members in the VLA procedure. The northern Michigan peninsula had the

only approved VLA route published for US military aircraft in the United States. The VLA ma -

neuver consisted of an altitude step-down from

1,000 feet to 250 feet on the terrain-following ra -

dar, then flying at 100-feet altitude utilizing outside visual references to maintain altitude. Radar

altimeters were set at 90 feet as designated crew

members monitored them and advised pilots if

their altitude decreased below that setting. The

maneuver was primarily designed to be used for

coastal penetration but could be used if a mission

were delayed over hostile territory, and the aircraft had to egress during daylight hours.

By December 1978 many of the highly experienced pilots assigned to the 8th SOS had left the

Air Force for more lucrative careers with civilian

airlines or had been passed over for promotion.

Events of 1980 and the aftermath of the failed

rescue mission in Iran would provide unprece -

dented opportunities for replacement pilots who

entered Combat Talon in the 1978 period. In two

back-to-back classes in June and August, six pilots received their initial training in Combat

Talon. Five of the six eventually would be promoted to full colonel and would spend their ca -

reers in special operations. As 1979 began, how -

ever, there was little optimism at the 8th SOS

that any improvement would come for Combat

Talon during the New Year.

1979: The Year Before the Fall

By 1979 the C-130E aircraft was getting old,

and many of its systems needed to be upgraded or

replaced with new equipment. On 11 December

1978 all USAF C-130s were grounded for inspection and repair of engine throttle-control cables.

The grounding included the Combat Talon fleet.

It was early 1979 before all Talons were repaired

and recertified as combat ready. The grounding of

the fleet had the immediate impact of lost training

for its aircrews, and since it came at the end of the

training year, many crew members did not complete

their required annual training events and thus re -

quired waivers to continue flying.

1st SOS Expands Its PAT Program

At Kadena AB the 1st SOS experienced severe

problems with its terrain-following radar system.

The squadron had seen a large turnover of both

maintenance and aircrew personnel. To identif

and fix the radar problems, LAS Ontario sent i

top expert on the AN/APQ-122(V)8 radar system

John R. Lewis, to Kadena AB from 7 to 28 Marc

1979. Lewis provided his expertise to maintenanc

personnel and to functional check flight aircrew

alike. When not working on the flight line i

structing maintenance personnel on the repair 

the radar, he conducted seminars with 1st SO

pilots and navigators to discuss TF theory and th

radar’s interface with the aircraft’s navigation

systems. His contribution to the 1st SOS was i

valuable in getting the squadron’s Combat Talo

back to mission-ready status.7 0

From 23 to 27 April the 1st SOS received an OR

from the PACAF/IG. The squadron deployed thr

aircraft and four mission-ready crews, along wi

18th TFW-assigned maintenance personnel, 

Clark AB, Philippines. Nine night-combat profi

missions were flown; they included electronic wa

fare, air refueling, airdrops, and short-field oper

tions. Seven of the nine takeoffs were within o

minute of the scheduled takeoff time. The max

mum course deviation on low-level routes was on

half mile, and seven of eight TOTs were within 1

seconds of the briefed times. ECM maneuvers em 

ployed against F-4 aircraft, GCI sites, and the Cro

Valley range complex provided effective counte

measures to these realistic threats. An addition

graded event was an exfiltration mission design

around a rescue scenario. The mission briefing w

highly professional, reflected thorough plannin

and provided an in-depth intelligence analysis 

present and anticipated threats. The 1st SOS’

overall rating for the ORI was excellent, a gra

that reflected the professionalism and dedication 

all 1st SOS personnel.7 1

A fifth PAT was flown from 9 to 19 October an

again focused on Indian Ocean operations. On

Combat Talon launched from Kadena AB on 

October and stopped at Clark AB en route 

Diego Garcia. The original routing took the ai

craft as far west as Djibouti, but political unre

in the region forced the mission to stop short 

Diego Garcia. While at Diego Garcia, the 1st SO

mission briefing was given to the commander 

Naval Support Activities there, and many que

tions concerning support for the Combat Talo

were addressed. Other locations visited durin

PAT 005 included Tengah Airfield, Singapor

and Penang International Airport, Malaysia. PA

005 provided excellent orientation for the cre

and provided experience operating in the India

Ocean area.7 2 It also created a presence in th

BETWEEN THE WAR

173
region that would soon be needed when the

squadron deployed in support of the 1980 Iranian

rescue mission.

On 19 October 1979 Lt Col Raymond Turczyn -

ski Jr. assumed command of the 1st SOS from Lt

Col Darryl Grapes. A formal change of command

ceremony was held at the 18th TFW headquarters

with Brig Gen James Brown officiating.73 (Colonel

Turczynski would command the squadron during

the Iranian rescue train up and execution period

and would fly to Desert One as the senior 1st SOS

member participating in the mission.)

Two months after Colonel Turczynski assumed

command, PAT 006 was flown, again to the Indian Ocean region, but this time the mission went

all the way to Africa. After departure from

Kadena AB on 9 December, the aircraft spent an

overnight at Clark AB and then continued on to

Don Muang AB, Thailand. On 12 December the

aircraft departed Thailand and proceeded to Diego Garcia for another overnight’s stay. On the

13th of December, the aircraft arrived at Eastle igh

AB, Kenya. After a two-day stay in Kenya and

briefing the US Embassy staff there, the crew departed Eastleigh AB bound again for Diego Garcia. PAT 006 terminated on 18 December after

another stop at Clark AB. 7 4 Throughout the deployment, at every stop, embassy personnel questioned the crew about its ability to support a rescue operation should their facility come under

siege. Embassy officials were no doubt reacting to

the 4 November 1979 takeover of the US Embassy

in Iran.

Live STARS Operations

Resumed by 7th SOS

In Europe the 7th SOS deployed to RAF Lyneham, UK, and participated in the first-ever Exercise Stalwart Friend from 2 to 12 February 1979.

The exercise was designed as an exchange program between the 7th SOS and the 47th Squ adron/

RAF. There were five training objectives established for the exercise, including low-level terrainfollowing flight; infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration operations; and fighter interceptor/radar

bomb site (RBS) training. Squadron crews utilized

the day/night low-fly areas in Wales and Scotland

and observed map reading of the 200-foot Doppler

low-level routes flown by the 47th Squadron. Ad -

ditionally, members of the UK SAS and the 7th

SOS CCT were infiltrated into the tactical training area utilizing static line and HALO air-drop

procedures. Further 7th SOS support to the exercise included HSLLADS and equipment resupply

sorties. Assault landing operations on marked

landing strips (both paved and unpaved) were

conducted during exfiltration operations. Day and

night low-level intercept training was scheduled

with 11th Group/RAF F-4 Phantoms. RBS act ivity with the Spadeadam EW range was also

an integral part of the exercise. Aircraft 64-0555

and 64-0561 participated in the exercise along

with three aircrews, CCT, and maintenance personnel. For three days the two aircraft further

deployed to RAF Leuchars, UK, as part of the

exercise.7 5

For the 10-day deployment, the 7th SOS flew a

total of 47.0 hours and accomplished a vast array

of tactical events, including 19 HSLLADS, 13 combat profiles, 38 night-assault takeoffs and landings, nine day-assault takeoffs and landings, and

33 airborne intercepts. Exercise Stalwart Friend

proved invaluable in providing hard-to-find aircrew training and in establishing a meaningful exchange of information on doctrine and flying tech -

niques between US and UK SOF. All training

objectives were met and exceeded, and bonds of

goodwill and friendship were firmly established.7 6

Post-exercise analysis confirmed that the lowfly system in the UK, coupled with the availability of drop zones and landing zones, presented

the most cost-effective training found anywhere in

Europe. The entire spectrum of Combat Talon operations could be practiced, with weather and aircraft maintenance being the limiting factors. UK

low-level routes were suitable for greatly expanded night operations, and the introduction of

low-level evasive tactics greatly improved aircrew

proficiency. An additional spin-off of the exercise

was the introduction of low-level RBS training at

Spadeadam. All 7th SOS training requirements

could be accomplished in the UK, and future efforts to develop quality training scenarios would

focus there.7 7 Stalwart Friend would become a

continuing exchange between the 7th SOS and

the 47th Squadron/RAF. It would prove to be one

of the lasting and most successful programs of the

squadron.

The annual Flintlock exercise was held from 27

March to 31 May, with the majority of the 7th

SOS committed to the exercise. Due to exercise

funding limitations, central European missions

were flown out of Rhein Main AB, with aircrews

flying to the United Kingdom to onload personnel,

then returning to the southern Germany exercise

area to drop on small, unmarked drop zones. Ad -

ditional subexercises were again flown in Tunisia

and Norway, and the exercise was expanded into

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

174
Italy for the first time. The long-awaited approval

for low-level operations in Italian airspace became

a reality during Flintlock 79.7 8 Throughout the exercise, the 7th and 8th SOS employed an MC-130E

crossfly concept that was new to EUCOM. The

concept permitted the aircrews from each squadron to fly the other unit’s aircraft. The capability

proved to be successful by increasing scheduling

flexibility and by demonstrating a significant de -

gree of interoperability.7 9

A real-world intelligence scenario was used for

the first time during Flintlock 79. The scenario

was based on a notional NATO-Warsaw Pact order of battle and provided realism that had been

absent from previous Flintlocks. The 8th SOS

aircraft that deployed to the exercise from

Hurlburt Field was capable of in-flight refueling,

but no tankers were scheduled since the 7th SOS

did not utilize that capability. Long-range deployment from the United States, similar to the missions flown earlier by the 1st SOS in the Pacific,

was scheduled for future Flintlock exercises.8 0

On 23 April in conjunction with Subexercise

Schwarzes-Pferd in Southern Germany, Capt

Terrance Janke and his Combat Talon crew successfully completed the first live Fulton STARS

since 30 August 1971. The commander of SOTFE,

Col Bill Tyler, USA, had volunteered and was

picked up after he had personally campaigned to

have live surface-to-air recoveries resumed. Colonel Tyler felt that it was important to do live

surface-to-air recoveries during training so that

confidence in the system could be restored. (Few

personnel on active duty had ever seen a live

pickup by this time.) These 7th SOS personnel

made up the crew that accomplished the first live

recoveries in Europe: Lt Col Tom Bradley, mission commander; Captain Janke, aircraft com -

mander; Maj Bob Tyndall, first pilot; Capt Dennis Paul, mission navigator; Capt Wayne Owens,

mission navigator; Capt Steve Bacon, EWO; 1st

Lt Dave Stone, safety pilot; TSgt Buff Underwood, winch operator; TSgt Don Folley, flight engineer; SSgt Jim Kowalik, radio operator; SSgt

Mike Martinez, loadmaster; and SSgt Bill

Fowler, loadmaster.81

Capt Skip Davenport and his Crew 2 accomplished a second live recovery later in the exercise. Capt Bruce Weigle, assigned to the 7th SOS

CCT, was the volunteer extracted from the southern Germany exercise area. The two live recoveries marked the beginning of a three-year period

highlighted by a dozen live recoveries. Colonels

Tyler and Bradley had succe ssfully implemente

the “live STARS for training” policy in Europe.

The summer of 1979 saw the 7th SOS focuse

on the Mediterranean for continuation trainin

activities. During the months of June and Jul

three weeklong Greek trainers supporting th

Hellenic Raiding Forces HALO School were flow

In July and August two Italian tactical trainin

deployments were accomplished out of Aviano AB

Italy. Both deployments were weeklong traine

that included low-level and air-drop sorties.8 2

From 1 to 10 November the 7th SOS deployed 

Spain for Crisex 79, which was a joint/combine

exercise that included both US and Spanis

forces. Along with the 7th SOS, personnel fro

the 10th Special Forces Group, the Spanish Br

gada Paracaidista, US Navy SEALs, Spanish a

force F-1s and F-4s, elements of the Spanis

navy, US Navy surface combatants from CTF-6

(including the USS Nimitz, the USS Texas, an

the USS California ), and F-4s from the 401

TFW participated in the exercise. Airborne inte

cepts with both carrier-based US Navy F-14s an

USAF/Spanish F-4s were accomplished durin

the exercise. ECM training with CTF-60 surfac

combatants was also a high point. Combine

US/Spanish HALO, static line, and resupp

drops were also part of the exercise. One of th

most visible events of the exercise was a live Fu

ton STARS performed by Capt Mark Tuck and h

Crew 1. In a demonstration for King Juan Carlo

of Spain, Crew 1 successfully extracted th

SOTFE/J3, Lt Col Ray Ouijano, USA, during a c

pabilities demonstration attended by a larg

crowd of dignitaries.83 The recovery was the thir

live one conducted during the year. The 7th SO

flew 144.5 hours, successfully air-dropping 84 pe

sonnel and 3,545 pounds of equipment. Thirt

two percent of the squadron’s semiannual trai

ing requirements were completed during Crise

79. Particularly hard-to-get events, including ai

borne intercepts and ECM training against su

face combatants, were the most significant accom

plishments during the exercise. In conjunctio

with support for the Spanish Paracaidista, th

squadron was allowed to fly low level in Spai

thus fulfilling one of its long-term training goals

An Era Comes to an End for the 8th SOS

The 8th SOS remained busy throughout th

first half of 1979, participating in three major e

ercises, including Jack Frost 79 in Alaska, Flin

lock 79 in Europe, and Solid Shield 79 in the eas

ern United States. The first major exercise of th

BETWEEN THE WAR

175
year was Jack Frost 79, which was held in Alaska

from 10 January to 15 February. There were five

phases of the exercise, with the 8th SOS partici -

pating in phases II, III, and IV. One Combat

Talon deployed on 17 January from Hurlburt

Field en route to Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. During

the exercise both infiltration and resupply mis -

sions were flown in support of US Army Special

Forces and US Navy SEAL exercise participants.

One CRRC drop was accomplished for a SEAL

direct-action mission. A scheduled recovery mis -

sion and two coastal ADIZ penetration missions

were canceled due to severe weather. In total the

8th SOS flew 23 sorties and 61.9 hours during

the exercise. Redeployment began on 5 February

when the Combat Talon departed Elmendorf

AFB for its return flight to Hurlburt Field. Al -

though the exercise was not specifically dedicated

to unconventional warfare, the squadron received

valuable training in cold weather operations.85

Flintlock 79 was conducted from 22 March to 1

June, with an 8th SOS Combat Talon deployed to

Rhein Main AB, FRG, from 11 April to 8 May.

Unlike Jack Frost, the Flintlock exercise series

revolved around a UW scenario, with conventional forces such as USAF FB-111 bombers participating as part of the overall scenario. The 8th

SOS crew flew 21 sorties and 59.7 hours during

the employment phase of the exercise. In total

the 8th SOS logged 96.9 hours during the threeweek deployment.8 6

Solid Shield 79 began as a command post exercise on 12 February and continued through May

when forces deployed during the field-training exercise phase. The 8th SOS, along with additional wing

assets, deployed to Pope AFB and was operational

beginning 4 May. During the unconventional warfare phase of the exercise, which was conducted

just before the major conventional ground-assault

exercise, 8th SOS crews infiltrated US Army and

US Navy SEAL personnel into the exercise area

to carry out sabotage, gather intelligence, and attack the opposition force’s offensive and defensive

capabilities. The final phase of the exercise was

flown in support of SOF units that had been

tasked to support conventional ground forces.8 7

The Combat Talon flew 18 sorties and 42.7 hours

during the exercise. The after action exercise review revealed that there was a lack of planning by

higher headquarters regarding SOF play. The

shortfall could be directly attributed to the lack of

SOF-experienced personnel assigned to the

headquarter’s staff. 88 Virtually all SOF experience

was resident at Hurlburt Field and in the overseas

Talon units, and many times decisions were made

at planning conferences where there were no

planners present with SOF expertise. The results

were predictable.

For the last half of 1979, the 8th SOS was

scheduled to participate in three additional major

exercises—Bold Eagle 79 , Red Flag 80-1, and Foal

Eagle 79. After a tremendous amount of planning

and pre-exercise preparation, 8th SOS activity

was canceled for Red Flag, and Exercise Foal

Eagle 79 was canceled due to civil unrest in the

ROK. Bold Eagle , conducted during October 1979,

was a JCS-coordinated, US Readiness Commandsponsored exercise that centered on the Eglin

AFB range in the Florida Panhandle.8 9 Exercisededicated forces were located at Eglin AFB,

Hurlburt Field, Tyndall AFB, and MacDill AFB,

Florida. Committed forces included a joint task

force formed from the 82d Airborne Division, the

equivalent of five tactical fighter squadrons, unconventional warfare forces of the 1st SOW (including the 8th SOS), and combat support and

combat service support forces. Opposition forces

consisted of the 197th Infantry Brigade, the

equivalent of four tactical fighter squadrons, and

combat and combat service support units.90

In total Bold Eagle 80 involved approximately

20,000 US Army, US Navy, and US Air Force

personnel. The Air Force alone provided more

than 100 aircraft and more than 4,600 personnel.

In addition to the 1st SOW’s MC-130E , AC-130H,

CH-3E, and UH-1N aircraft, other aircraft types

involved in the exercise included the F-15, F-4,

F-111, A-7, A-10, C-130, EC-130, F-105, F-106,

EB-57, A-37, O-2, C-123, C-7 , and C-141.

91 The

Bold Eagle Air Force Special Operations base was

operational at Hurlburt Field on 12 October with

two MC-130E Combat Talons and their crews

committed to the exercise, along with other 1st

SOW rotary- and fixed-wing assets. During the

exercise the Combat Talons conducted electronic

warfare training against Integrated Air Defense

System (IADS) sites. In addition to its IADS activities, the 8th SOS accomplished all of its exercise objectives, including employment of the

HSLLADS for resupply missions, dropping four

CRRCs, successfully accomplishing three Fulton

STARS utilizing a training dummy, executing

fuel-bladder airdrops, and performing night shortfield exfiltration operations. Good weather

throughout the exercise precluded the need to airdrop utilizing instrument procedures.92

One of the three recoveries was a first for the

8th SOS. After parachuting into a water DZ, a 1st

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

176
SOW CCT member linked up with the USS

McCard, a US Navy destroyer, and set up Fulton equipment on its deck. The Combat Talon

made a successful recovery from the destroyer,

extracting a simulated package of sensitive

equipment. The 8th SOS also conducted an actual psychological operations leaflet drop and a

tactical deception drop of dummy paratroopers.

One HALO infiltration, considered highly successful, dropped a Special Forces team into a

small drop zone under simulated combat conditions. The fuel-bladder drop consisted of a

3,000-pound fuel bladder dropped to provide a

forward-area refueling point for helicopter refueling. The capability greatly expanded the em -

ployment flexibility of rotary-wing assets.9 3 For

the exercise the two Combat Talons flew 36 sorties and logged 69.6 hours in direct support of

Bold Eagle 80.

94

* * * * * *

As Bold Eagle came to a close, the final cha

ter of the first two decades of Combat Talon w

also ending. On 4 November 1979 student radica

stormed the walls of the US Embassy in Tehra

Iran. No one knew at the time, and especially n

the personnel assigned to Combat Talon , th

SOF changed forever on that day. Beginning 

November and culminating with the release of th

hostages in January 1981, Sleepy Hollow, a

Hurlburt Field had affectionately come to be know

would awaken to find itself in the full glare of t

international media. It would take another deca

of modernization and improvements to the Comb

Talon to make it truly survivable on the modern-d

battlefield. In the decade of the 1980s, the Comb

Talon fleet would increase from 14 aircraft to 3

with the introduction of Combat Talon II, a high

sophisticated version of the venerable Vietnam–e

MC-130E . The next great adventure for Comb

Talon was about to begin.

Notes

1. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1974, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., A-7.

2. Ibid., 9.

3. History, Pacific Air Forces, 1 July–31 December 1975,

USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 1, 748.

4. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1974, 9.

5. Ibid., append., 8.

6. Ibid., 5.

7. History, Pacific Air Forces, 1 July–31 December 1975,

vol. 1, 749.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 450.

10. Ibid., 750–53.

11. Ibid., 753–57.

12. Ibid., 757–58.

13. Ibid., 759.

14. Ibid., 759–60.

15. Ibid., 760.

16. Ibid., 761.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 762–64.

19. Ibid., 764–65.

20. Ibid., 767.

21. Ibid., 768–69.

22. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–30

September 1975, 12.

23. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1975, 12.

24. History, Pacific Air Forces, 1 July–31 December 1975,

vol. 1, 772.

25. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–31

June 1975, 6.

26. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1975, 8.

27. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1975, 7–8.

28. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 January–

March 1975, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 1, 9.

29. History, 322d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 April–30 Ju

1975, vol. 1, 7–8.

30. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

October 1975, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23.

31. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (formerly 834

Tactical Composite Wing), 1 July–30 September 1975, 16

Special Operations Wing historian files, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 

32. Ibid., 9–11.

33. Ibid., 11.

34. History, 1st Special Operations Wing (formerly 834

Tactical Composite Wing), 1 October–31 December 1975, 35

35. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–

March 1976, 12 .

36. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1976, 10.

37. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

December 1976, iv.

38. Ibid., A-4.

39. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–

March 1976, 36.

40. Ibid., 39.

41. Ibid., 39–40.

42. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October–

December 1976, 9.

43. Ibid., 10.

44. Ibid., 11.

45. Ibid., 12.

46. Ibid., 13.

47. Ibid., supporting document 11, 13.

48. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–

March 1977, 10 .

BETWEEN THE WAR

177
49. History, 313th Air Division and 18th Tactical Fighter

Wing, 1 April–30 June 1977, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

vol. 1, 25.

50. Ibid., 26.

51. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1977, 6.

52. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1977, 10.

53. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1977, 9.

54. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–30

September 1977, 3.

55. Ibid., 5.

56. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1977, 13.

57. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 September 1977, 14–16.

58. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1978, 10.

59. Ibid., 11.

60. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1978, supporting document D 6.

61. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–30

September 1978, supporting document 8, 2–7.

62. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1978, document 8 .

63. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1978, 8.

64. Ibid., 8–9.

65. Ibid., 14.

66. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1978, supporting document 9.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–30

September 1978, 11.

70. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1979, 12 .

71. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1979, 10.

72. History, 313th Air Division and 18th Tactical Fighter

Wing, 1 October–31 December 1979, vol. 1, 71.

73. Ibid., supporting document 2.

74. Ibid., 72–73.

75. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–31

March 1979, 7.

76. Ibid., 8.

77. Ibid.

78. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

September 1979, 6.

79. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1979, vol. 1, 28.

80. Ibid., 30–32.

81. Capt Robert A. Gualtieri, “7th SOS Performs ‘Live’ Exercise with Army,” Gateway, Rhein Main AB newspaper, 18

May 1979, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt

Field, Fla.

82. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

September 1979, vi.

83. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1979, 8.

84. Ibid.

85. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1979, vol. 1, 17–22.

86. Ibid., 24–29.

87. Ibid., 33–35.

88. Ibid., 37–38.

89. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1979, vol. 1, 16.

90. Ibid., 18.

91. Ibid., 21–22.

92. Ibid., 24–25.

93. Ibid., 26.

94. Ibid., 28.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

178
Chapter 8

The Iranian Rescue Mission (1979–80)

The credit belongs to the man who is

Actually in the arena; whose face is marred

By dust and sweat and blood; who strives

Valiantly; who errs and comes short again

And again; who knows the great enthusiasms,

The great devotions, and spends himself in a

Worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of

High achievement; and

Who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while

Daring greatly.

—Theodore Roosevelt 

When aircraft 64-0551 landed in the early evening of 20 November 1979 on a return flight from

Pope AFB, North Carolina, the question of a rescue mission to Iran hung heavily in the air of the

crowded cockpit. Colonel Brenci’s comment that

the 8th Special Operations Squadron could become involved in a rescue attempt was tantalizing,

but no one knew (except perhaps Brenci himself)

what effort it would take to make the mission a

success. The 8th SOS had historically been the

Combat Talon training squadron that provided

aircrews for the two overseas squadrons. The 1st

SOS, stationed at Kadena AB, Japan, had a long

and colorful heritage centered on SEA and the ex -

ploits of the early Stray Goose operators. In recent

years, however, the 7th SOS had enjoyed the bulk

of funding and modernization initiatives as the

cold war in Europe continued, and by late 1979

many considered it as the premier Combat Talon

unit. Throughout the 1970s, the 8th SOS had been

relegated to augmenting these two “operational”

units. As crew members finished their paperwork

after the flight and headed home to their families,

a quick check of the weekly schedule showed no

local flights at Hurlburt Field over the upcoming

Thanksgiving holiday. It would prove to be the

last real break for the 8th SOS over the next 12-

month period.

The next day was Wednesday, 21 November

1979, and Brenci was in the squadron early, as

were several crew members from the previous

night’s mission. Brenci was the chief pilot and assistant operations officer and was filling in for Lt

Col Less Smith, who had been called away to

Washington, D.C., a few days earlier. Captain

Thigpen, who had flown with Brenci as an instructor pilot on the flight the evening before, was also

in the squadron. He was working behind the opera -

tions desk finalizing the following week’s schedu

when Brenci called him into his office and close

the door. Brenci had received a call from Smith 

Washington directing him to begin preparatio

for conducting blacked-out NVG landings in t

Combat Talon . The only unit in the 1st SOW th

possessed the relatively rare NVG equipment w

the 20th Special Operations Squadron, which wa

the rotary-wing unit assigned to the wing. Bren

sent Thigpen to the 20th SOS to sign out 10 PVS-

NVGs so that the squadron could become familia

with their operation.

Within the hour Thigpen had signed out th

goggles and was back in the squadron. Two thing

impressed him regarding the transaction—firs

his hand receipt totaled over $200,000 for th

NVGs, a sizable sum for a captain to be respo

sible for, and second, the insistence by 20th SO

pilots who had said that fixed-wing aircraft cou

not be safely landed on NVGs due to the lack 

depth perception and a limited field of view. Se

eral crew members, including Brenci and Thigpe

spent the afternoon familiarizing themselves wi

proper goggle operation. By utilizing a darkene

room, basic functions of the NVGs, such as tur

ing them on and off and focusing them both nea

and far, were reviewed. A night sortie was sche

uled for the following Monday on TAB-6, a loc

auxiliary airfield located just north of Hurlbu

Field on the Eglin AFB range. Since the followin

week’s range schedule already had been finalize

Thigpen had to spend several “green stamps” wi

the Eglin AFB range schedulers to get the landin

zone. He was successful, and, with everything s

for the NVG operation on Monday night, the NVG

were secured in the squadron, and everyone we

home for Thanksgiving.

179
On Monday, 26 November 1979, the first NVG

mission was flown by the 8th SOS. Combat Talon

64-0567 flew 4.6 hours, with Brenci, Major Meller,

Major Uttaro, and Thigpen sharing pilot duties.

Meller was a highly experienced Combat Talon

flight evaluator assigned to the 1st SOW, and Uttaro was the squadron standardization-evaluation

pilot. Since Thigpen was an instructor pilot and

had set up the mission on short notice the prior

week, he had included himself on the initial mission. Because there were no procedures written for

airland NVG operations, the crew started its NVG

work utilizing established airborne radar approach (ARA) procedures. Each ARA was flown

utilizing heading and altitude calls provided by

the left navigator. Meller and Brenci took turns in

the left seat, and Uttaro and Thigpen swapped

right-seat duties. Partially because of the rotarywing pilots’ insistence that fixed-wing aircraft

could not land on NVGs, the first several approaches were flown on “eyeballs” by the left-seat

pilot. During the approach the right-seat pilot

turned out all of his cockpit lights and focused his

goggles on his instrument panel as the left-seat

navigator called out headings and altitudes. The

idea was to darken the cockpit enough to allow the

left-seat pilot, the standing third (or safety) pilot,

and the flight engineer to see outside the aircraft

and not be blinded by the glare of lights coming

from within the cockpit.

As the right-seat pilot flew the approach, the

left-seat pilot and the safety pilot, utilizing their

NVGs, assisted the navigators during alignment

for each approach. In addition, the third pilot,

standing behind the left pilot’s seat, also backed

up the flight engineer in such critical areas as

landing gear and flap configuration. The rightseat pilot flew the aircraft down to ARA minimums, 300 feet above the ground. When the leftseat pilot had the runway environment within

view and the runway was confirmed by both the

third pilot and the flight engineer, he took control

of the aircraft from the right-seat pilot and landed

the aircraft. Without any lights on the runway or

on the aircraft, landing the Combat Talon proved

to be quite challenging. As soon as the aircraft

touched down, the right-seat pilot focused his

goggles outside the aircraft and assisted the leftseat pilot as the aircraft slowed to taxi speed. After

several “bone-crushing” touchdowns, it was apparent that the left-seat pilot needed more help than

his own eyes could give him. Depth-perception

problems or not, the left-seat pilot actually had

to land while wearing NVGs. From this first effort, the squadron made great strides in perfecting blacked-out NVG airland procedures. Within

the next three weeks, NVG airland procedures

were developed and refined, and those procedures formed the basis for a capability that

would radically change Combat Talon airland

tactics forever. When the first Combat Talon

NVG landing was made, it had been 23 days

since the 4 November 1979 takeover of the US

Embassy in Tehran.

Prelude to 4 November 1979

The United States had enjoyed a long association

with Iran and with its ruler, the shah, Mohammed

Reza Pahlavi. Military-to-military cooperation,

by both conventional and unconventional forces,

had developed to a point by the late 1970s that

frequent exercises and exchanges we re common -

place. The 7th SOS had exercised in Iran, first

during Flintlock V in 1972 (Subexercise Aresh

72) and later in the decade during Aresh 78. For

Aresh 72, two Combat Talons deployed to Shiraz,

Iran, supported US and Royal Iranian Special

Forces, and worked with the Royal Iranian Air

Force. Although somewhat restricted to the local

exercise area, the two-ship deployment did accomplish most of its exercise goals. No airland opera -

tions outside Shiraz were scheduled or flown,

however. During Aresh 78, the 7th SOS operated

from Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran,

and flew similar missions as those accomplished

during the 1972 exercise. During the 1978 exercise, long-range missions were flown into the

province of Baluchistan, located in the extreme

southeastern corner of Iran adjacent to Pakistan.

ECM training was also conducted on the Anarak

range 300 miles southeast of Tehran. The 7th

SOS Talons landed on the 3,000-foot dirt strip

associated with the range.* 1

Although military-to-military relations continued to be strong, by 1978 political turmoil inside

Iran created a near-breaking point between the

governments of Iran and the United States. During

that year an internal fundamentalist revolution

engineered by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

against the shah threatened the stability of the

entire Middle East. Either through oversight or

miscalculation, the Carter admin istration did not

assess the severity of the shah’s situation. The

__________

 *An isolated landing location to refuel the helicopters during the rescue attempt in 1980 would become one of the greatest challenges for mission

planners.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

180
shah had embarked on a program to modernize

and to westernize Iran earlier in the decade, and

the resultant “trappings” of the West, from

women’s attire to US weaponry, were identified

by Khomeini and his followers as the source of

evil that was at the root cause of the nation’s

problems.

With political control of Iran diminished due to

the near-disintegration of his military, the shah

fled Iran on 16 January 1979, and two weeks

later, on 1 February, Khomeini returned from exile in France to a throng of cheering supporters.

Khomeini and his followers portrayed the United

States as the Great Satan. When the Ayatollah

returned to Iran, Americans stationed and living

there were advised to leave immediately. In the

coming weeks 45,000 Americans, most of whom

were employees of American firms doing business

in the country, were evacuated. With mobs roaming the streets of Tehran chanting “death to

Americans,” the US government still believed

that Tehran would eventually stabilize and establish normal diplomatic relations. In anticipation

of future normalization of relations with the

Khomeini government, 75 foreign-service person -

nel were retained by the US government at their

embassy posts while the remainder were returned

to the United States. 2

As Iran slipped into anarchy, rumors spread

that the United States was harboring SAVAK officers (Iranian secret police loyal to the shah) inside the US Embassy, and on 14 February 1979 a

large band of revolutionaries overpowered embassy guards and took some 70 US personnel hostage. Two US Marines were wounded, and one

Iranian citizen was killed during the rioting. The

group demanded that the United States return

the shah to Iran to face Islamic justice and punishment for his crimes against the people. The

Khomeini government, under Prime Minister

Shahpour Bakhtiar, quickly persuaded the revolutionaries to release the Americans and to leave

the embassy. Over the next two months, Khomeini

continued to focus his anger on the United States

and to demand that the shah be returned to Iran

for trial. In April 1979 Khomeini accused the

United States of meddling in Iranian internal affairs by setting into motion satanic plans to overthrow the newly created Islamic Republic. In May

1979 more than 150,000 people marched on the

US Embassy shouting “death to Carter.” Again,

the US government underestimated the seriousness of the situation but did urge some 2,000

Americans still living in Iran to leave the country.3

All but approximately 200 took the advice. Fo

the remainder of 1979, tensions remained high, 

Khomeini continued to focus on the United Stat

and its relationship with the shah. The Unite

States maintained a skeletal workforce at its em

bassy in Tehran with fewer than 70 personn

assigned.

As the year progressed, unknown to the Unite

States, the shah’s medical condition steadily d

clined. He was suffering from lymphatic canc

and had only a short time to live. Disregardin

predictions from the US Embassy in Tehran th

anti-US violence would erupt across the country 

the shah entered the United States, Preside

Carter allowed the shah to come to the Unite

States on 20 October 1979 to seek medical trea

ment at the Cornell (University) Medical Cent

in New York. No other country would allow th

shah entry due to the tense political situation i

Iran. The US government had been assured b

high-ranking Iranian officials that US interest i

Iran would be protected while the shah unde

went medical treatment. While at Cornell, th

shah had a gall bladder operation and had h

cancer treated with radiation therapy. 4

By the time the shah came to the United Stat

in October 1979, the US Embassy staff in Tehra

had been reduced substantially, yet basic em 

bassy functions continued. President Carter fe

that by leaving the embassy open, the actio

would help shore up Bakhtiar’s government an

would eventually promote better US-Iran rel

tions. Embassy security had been increased to 

point that the State Department felt the US M

rine guards stationed there could hold out for se

eral hours against an attack, and by that time th

Iranian military would respond and quell any di

turbance. As had been the case throughout th

demise of the shah and the rise of the Ayatolla

the United States underestimated the deep anti-U

sentiment prevalent in the Islamic fundamentalis

inspired revolution.5 On 4 November 1979 a mo

of rabid anti-American rioters scaled the wall 

the US Embassy in Tehran, and thus began th

444-day hostage crisis that resulted in the fall 

an American president and the death of eig

American special operators at Desert One.

Operation Rice Bowl

From the outset of the crisis, few argue

against a military option, except Secretary 

State Cyrus Vance . Vance felt that Khomeini w

using the hostages to consolidate his power ov

the Iranian people and that to harm them woul

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

181
negatively impact that plan. Also, Vance felt that

military action would result in casualties and the

death of some of the hostages, some of the Irania n

guards, and perhaps some number of US military

personnel carrying out the rescue. A military op -

eration against Iran would also result, he argued,

in a backlash against the United States by other

Islamic countries, with the United States being

the big loser on the international stage. As the

administration pondered what course of action to

take, the American public was being bombarded

with street scenes of thousands of Iranians demanding the return of the shah while expounding anti-US rhetoric. With pressure mounting to

do something to free the hostages, events began

to move forward. On 6 November 1979 Dr. Zbig -

niew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security advisor, contacted Defense Secretary

Harold Brown on behalf of the president and

instructed him to develop a plan to rescue the

American hostages.6

Secretary Brown summoned the chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen David C. Jones,

USAF, and tasked him to develop the plan. There

was not a counterterrorism division on the Joint

Staff, so almost by default, General Jones turned

to his J-3 SOD and tasked SOD to organize and

plan the rescue effort.* Since its Vietnam days,

SOD had been the focal point for unconventional

warfare and special operations activities on the

Joint Staff. At the outset of the planning effort,

SOD was commanded by US Army colonel King, a

Vietnam veteran and former Special Forces battalion commander who also wore the prestigious

US Army ranger tab. He was well versed in joint

special operations activities and was well suited

for the challenge at hand. On his staff was USAF

Lt Bob Horton, who was SOD’s expert on C-130

operations. Another key member of Colonel King’s

staff was USAF Maj Lee Hess, who was assigned

to USAF/XOOS and detailed to SOG for the rescue operation. Hess had come to the Pentagon after tours with PACAF in Hawaii and with the 1st

SOS at Kadena AB, Japan, flying Combat Talons.

Hess was well known in the Pacific, and he was a

personal friend of Lt Col Ray Turczynski, the

commander of the 1st SOS at Kadena AB. On 7

November, in anticipation of the Combat Talon

being selected for the rescue mission, Hess called

Turczynski and asked him to begin practicing nolight landings in the Combat Talon . That night,

Turczynski had six pilots landing without using

their aircraft landing or taxi lights at NAS Cubi

Point, Philippines, with the runway lights on. For

the next month, the 1st SOS crews practiced landing without the use of overt aircraft lights.7

If a rescue mission proved to be impossible,

Jones needed other options to direct against the

Iranians to cause them to release the hostages. To

develop these other options, Jones established an

ad hoc planning group and selected Major General Taylor, who was assigned to the Air Staff as

the USAF/XOO. Taylor chaired the ad hoc group

known as the Operations Planning Group (OPG)

and began looking at military options that might

be used against Iran to resolve the crisis.8

As planning got under way, one of the initial

requirements for SOD was to name an air mission

commander. One name immediately came to

mind—Col James H. Kyle, who had a long history

in special operations, having flown AC-130 gunships during the Vietnam War. Almost as important as his special operations background was his

relationship with General Taylor. Kyle, along

with Hess, had worked for Taylor when they had

both been on the PACAF staff. Kyle was well respected by Taylor for his keen mind and his ana -

lytical approach to problem solving. On 11 November Hess was directed to contact Kyle, who

had recently been assigned to Kirtland AFB, New

Mexico.9 Within 24 hours, Kyle was at the Penta -

gon being briefed on the status of initial planning.

As Kyle was en route to Washington, the overall

joint task force (JTF) commander, Maj Gen James

B. Vaught, and the elite Delta Force counterterrorism unit commander, Col Charles A. Beck -

with, were also inbound to assume their JTF duties. Thus, by 12 November 1979, the nucleus of

JTF had been formed.

Initial briefings were given by SOD on 12 November to the US Army chief of staff, Gen Edward C. Meyer, and to Vaught. The initial recommendation from SOD was a direct assault on the

embassy to be conducted by Delta Force, the US

Army counterterrorist unit created specifically for

just such a crisis. The initial plan also envisioned

US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters staging from

a base in eastern Turkey and transporting Delta

Force to Tehran. Even using Turkey as a staging

base, however, a refueling stop was still required

somewhere inside Iran. No refueling site was

identified at this early stage of planning. There

__________

 *Through internal reorganization of the Joint Staff during the 1970s, the organization formerly known as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities was renamed the Special Operations Division and was placed under the Operations Directorate (J-3). Just as SACSA

had been responsible for oversight of the Son Tay POW rescue, J-3 SOD was assigned the respon sibility for planning Operation Rice Bowl.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

182
were other courses of action briefed to Ge neral

Meyer that included operations from Kuwait,

Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, but all of these options,

including Turkey, were ruled out for both security

and political reasons. As other options were proposed during the ensuing days, Egypt and Diego

Garcia emerged as the only two staging bases acceptable to Jones and the Joint Staff. These two

staging bases were 5,000–7,000 miles from Tehran

and required a 24-hour round-trip flight by way of

C-130 aircraft with two to three air refuelings en

route. To get Delta Force to an undetected position near the embassy, and then to extract the

force with the hostages in tow, required rotarywing aircraft. The process of identifying the

proper helicopter for the operation would prove to

be challenging for mission planners. One concession that Jones offered to planners was the utilization of Saudi Arabian airspace during either ingress or egress, thus reducing flight time from

Egypt to Tehran to approximately 12 hours. For

planning purposes, Turkish airspace was also approved for egress after the hostages had been rescued. To avoid transiting Saudi airspace twice on

successive nights, which could compromise the

mission, the long 24-hour flight around the kingdom was still facing planners for the ingress

route. With these restrictions foremost in mind,

SOD set about to identify forces that were capable

of accomplishing the mission. To get Delta Force

into Iran over such vast distances was clearly in

the USAF’s area of responsibility.

* * * * * *

It was surprising that the United States had

not developed a joint counterterrorist capability

by late 1979. Three years before the embassy

takeover in Iran, on 3 and 4 July 1976, Israeli

commandos had conducted a raid on Entebbe International Airport in Kampala, Uganda, to rescu e

105 Israelis taken when an Air France jet liner

was hijacked. The terrorists were sym pathetic to

the Palestine Liberation Organization and had

threatened to kill the hostages if Israel failed to

meet their demands. Operation Jonathan, the

code name for the rescue, relied upon a highly

specialized commando force supported by Israeli

air force C-130 aircrews. During the operation,

six terrorists were killed while the Israelis lost

two commandos and four civilian hostages. The

following year, on 18 October 1977, West German

GSG-9 counterterrorist forces killed four Arab

terrorists when they stormed a hijacked

Lufthansa airliner at the airport at Mogadis hu,

Somalia.10 Each rescue was considered a tactic

success.

As international terrorism increased, visionari

in the US Army realized that it was only a matte

of time before the United States would become 

terrorist target. Accordingly, on 19 Novemb

1977, with chief of staff of the Army (CSA) Ge

Bernard W. Rogers’s support, Delta Force was a

tivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The activ

tion order described the unit’s mission, its bas

structure, and its high priority for obtainin

equipment and personnel to bring it to missio

ready status. The man chosen to head the ne

unit was Colonel Beckwith, a seasoned Vietna

veteran who had also completed an exchange to

with the British Special Air Service. 11 From th

time of activation and throughout its first tw

years of operation, Beckwith and Delta Forc

fought an uphill battle for funds and personne

even though the activation order clearly provide

US Army priority in both areas. By the summer 

1978, Delta Force was still only partially missio

capable. At the direction of General Meyer, th

US Army deputy chief of staff for operations 

the time, and with the support of General Roger

an initial evaluation and validation of the un

was conducted. Although Beckwith and his me

passed the limited evaluation, those closely ass

ciated with Delta Force at that time felt that man

areas of the evaluation were unfair and did not ad

quately measure Delta Force’s capabilitie s.

Throughout the remainder of 1978, Delta Forc

continued to field special equipment and recru

top personnel for the unit. By 1979 the unit bega

to do some advanced training activities outsid

the United States. A typical European trainin

mission would include deploying a Delta Forc

member to West Germany, who would be met b

a member of the 10th Special Forces Group an

then briefed on a notional mission involving a te

rorist attack on a US citizen. The Delta Forc

operator would have a strict timetable to comple

his mission, which usually involved in-depth ta

get research and reconnaissance of the notion

target and development of a course of action 

free the hostage. Once the mission was complet

the operator returned to Fort Bragg, where h

was debriefed and evaluated regarding the mi

sion.

In addition to these overseas deployments fo

training, Delta Force began an exchange progra

in 1979 with the British Special Air Service. Re

resentatives from the Special Air Service visite

Delta Force at Fort Bragg and provided training 

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

183
such special military skills as constructing booby

traps. Other international counterterrorism units

also visited Delta Force, including the German

GSG-9, the French Groupe d’Internvention de la

Gendarmerie Nationale, and the Israelis. By late

1979 Delta Force had become a viable, albeit untested, member of the international counterterrorist community.12

With over two years dedicated to establishing

and then commanding Delta Force, Beckwith was

told by General Meyer, the new CSA after Rogers’s

departure in June of 1979, that he would leave

Delta Force sometime in late October or early November to command Special Operations TAOK

Force, Europe (SOTFE). General Rogers had departed the CSA job to become the Supreme Allied

commander, Europe and had requested that Beck -

with take over the special operations unit located

at Patch Barracks, Germany, to bring his counterterrorist skills to the European theater. Before

departing Delta Force, Beckwith was tasked by

Meyer for a second evaluation to validate newly

established tasks, conditions, and standards for

the elite unit.13 It had been a year since Delta

Force’s last evaluation. For its second evaluation,

Delta Force received high marks from the exercise

director on down, with all involved agreeing that

the second evaluation was much more effective in

measuring the actual capability of Delta Force.

One criticism from a participating British Special

Air Service observer was that many key players

(the president, the secretary of state, etc.) had not

participated, as would have been the case in his

own country. All agreed, however, that Delta

Force was ready and was fully mission capable

(FMC). As Beckwith and his Delta Force returned

to their quarters after debriefing the exercise, th ey

were ready for some much needed rest. Beckwith

had shipped his household goods to Germany the

previous week, and he was ready to leave with his

family for his new assignment to Europe. The

date was 4 November 1979.14

* * * * * *

Since Vietnam, as service budgets were cut,

USAF Special Operations Forces had steadily

declined from nearly 10,000 personnel and 550

aircraft in the 1960s to a skeletal force by the late

1970s. By November 1979 there were scarcely

3,000 personnel assigned to the 1st SOW at

Hurlburt Field, Florida, operating 10 AC-130H

Spectre gunships, six MC-130E (Clamp) Combat

Talons, and a mixture of HH-3 and UH-1 helicopters.15 In the Pacific the 1st SOS, with 100

personnel assigned, operated four MC-130E

(Yank) Combat Talons, and in Europe, the 7th

SOS was similarly equipped with four European

Clamp Combat Talons and 150 personnel. Of the

14 Combat Talons available to planners, seven

had received the in-flight refueling modifica -

tion—the four PACAF-assigned aircraft (62-1863,

63-7785, 64-0564, and 64-0565) and three of six

8th SOS Talons (64-0562, 64-0567, and 64-0572).

The four Talons in Europe (64-0523, 64-0555, 64-

0561, and 64-0566) had undergone extensive

ECM upgrades in lieu of the IFR modification and

weighed some 5,000 pounds more than the other

10 aircraft. As SOD planners began to refine their

fixed-wing requirements for the rescue attempt,

the IFR capability was identified as essential for

the 24-hour flight. Thus, from the start of planning, the 7th SOS and its nonair-refuelable Combat Talons were deemed unacceptable for the mission. Likewise, USAF and USMC HC-130 tanker

aircraft capable of refueling helicopters in flight

were discounted because they, too, did not have

the IFR capability.

With Kyle in place as the air mission commander on 12 November, USAF participation in

the planning process accelerated. SOD continued

to look at options and began to refine its force

structure to meet known mission requirements.

Meanwhile, General Taylor and his OPG were developing alternate plans in case the primary rescue plan developed by SOD was not activated. On

13 November, under the cover of increased Far

Eastern tension, the 1st SOW deployed four AC130H gunships from Hurlburt Field to Guam with

a total force of 185 personnel. The OPG had developed a retaliatory option against Iran and centered it around the AC-130H gunship. The four

aircraft departed Hurlburt Field within two minutes of each other at an approximate gross weight

of 165,000 pounds and flew the 7,219 NM trip

utilizing four aerial refuelings from KC-135 tankers. The deployment was flown at 10,000 feet be -

cause the gunship could not be pressurized. The

mission was the longest nonstop flight ever by a

C-130 aircraft, surpassing the 1st SOS’s flight

the previous year by more than two hours. The

average sortie length was 29.5 hours, with the

longest being 29.7 and the shortest 29.3. Person -

nel who did not deploy on the gunships, along

with 6.5 tons of support equipment, were moved

to Guam between 13 and 16 November by way of

C-141 cargo aircraft. The gunship move to Guam

was the first operational commitment of USAF

combat aircraft dedicated to the Iranian crisis.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

184
The 1st SOW maintained the four gunship detachment on Guam for the next four months, redeploying to Hurlburt Field on 3 March 1980.16

The gunship mission envisioned by OPG involved a punitive strike against a coastal target in

Iran. After deploying from Guam to Diego Garcia,

the gunship force would fly a 21-hour round-trip

mission from there to its target along Iran’s coast.

Navy carrier-based fighter aircraft and SAC KC135 tankers would support the strike. Retaliatory

strikes were planned by OPG in the event that

Khomeini’s terrorists in the embassy began killing the hostages, a threat that had been made

early in the crisis. Two other OPG scenarios included the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz at the

entrance to the Persian Gulf and the seizure of Iran’s

Kharg Island oil refinery complex. If retaliatory

strikes were executed, SOD’s rescue option would

no longer be viable.17

Combat Talon Is Selected

for the Rescue Mission

The distances from Diego Garcia and Egypt

were enormous. Kyle and his small SOD staff

looked at possible weapons systems that could do

the job. There was only one aircraft capable of

in-flight refueling, covert penetration of hostile

airspace, and precision navigation to some point

in the heart of Iran, and that aircraft was the

MC-130E Combat Talon . Kyle briefed Vaught on

his Talon requirements, and on 14 November

Vaught approved Kyle’s request to bring three

planners familiar with the weapons system to

Washington. The next stop for Kyle was Lee Hess,

who recommended Lt Col Les Smith (the opera -

tions officer of the 8th SOS), Maj Doug Ulery (a

highly experienced Combat Talon navigator and

mission planner), and Maj Paul Gorsky (a highly

experienced navigator assigned to TAC headquarters). Hess reasoned that Smith could return

t o Hurlburt Field to put the Combat Talon pack -

age together after initial planning and would

transition to be the JTF’s point of contact for the

squadron. Ulery was well known by both Kyle and

Hess, all three having worked together on Korean

issues while they were assigned to the Pacific.

Gorsky had been previously assigned to the

Heavy Chain program (1198th OT&E Squadron)

and participated in the initial flight tests and verifi -

cation of the MOD-70 upgrade. He would act as

the JTF liaison officer to TAC as the preparation for

the mission progressed.18 Hess also connected Kyle

with Turczynski. During a 15 November secur

telephone call, Kyle asked Turczynski to continu

the no-light landings that the squadron had begu 

on 7 November.* Kyle also authorized Turczyns

to brief the 18th TFW/DO on the mission an

gave him Col Bob Pinard’s name as the 1st SOW

point of contact at Hurlburt Field.

The three Combat Talon planners arrived i

Washington on 16 November. Kyle and Hess im

mediately briefed them, and they began lookin

at possible ingress and egress routes. The SO

plan had evolved into a two-night operation th

included both USAF Combat Talons and US Nav

RH-53D helicopters. Night One would utilize a

isolated airfield in southern Egypt, known 

Wadi Kena (also identified as location Alpha

from which Combat Talons and KC-135 tanke

would launch. From Wadi Kena, the force wou

fly down the Red Sea clear of Saudi Arabian ai

space and refuel over international waters abea

South Yemen. The force would continue eastwar

along the coast of Saudi Arabia and turn nor

near Masirah Island over the Gulf of Oman. Th

Combat Talons would cross the Gulf of Oman an

fly east of the Strait of Hormuz at low level, pen

trating Iranian airspace at a point where intel

gence indicated a gap in radar coverage. Onc

over land, options to either drop fuel or airlan

were still to be worked out. Planners were i

structed to build their low-level route to a poi

300–400 NM from Tehran. Further refinement 

the overland portion of the mission would be don

after helicopter rendezvous and refueling optio

were finalized.1 9 A different egress route would b

flown after refueling the helicopters, with a

Combat Talons landing back at Wadi Kena after 

second air refueling (fig. 30).

Utilizing Saudi Arabian airspace, Night Tw

would depart Wadi Kena and cross Saudi Arab

north of Riyadh, where an aerial refueling wou

take place with KC-135 tankers. After refuelin

the Combat Talons would continue on to the Pe

sian Gulf, enter low level, and penetrate Irania

airspace east of Kuwait. Available intelligenc

had not pinpointed any gaps in Iranian coast

defenses in the northern Persian Gulf area, s

from the penetration point onward, the route w

initially left unplanned. In the event Egypt d

nied use of Wadi Kena, an alternate plan w

developed that called for launch and recove

from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, then low

level penetration of the Iranian coast near th

same point as planned from Egypt.20

__________

 *Kyle and Turczynski both served on the PACAF staff and trusted each other’s judgment.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

185
By November of 1979 there were seven Combat Talon aircraft modified for in-flight refueling. Four of those seven were assigned to the

1st SOS at Kadena AB. Accordingly, Kyle in -

structed the three planners to develop a deploy -

ment route for the 1st SOS aircraft across the

western Pacific and the Indian Ocean to Diego

Garcia. The 8th SOS Combat Talons would deploy to Wadi Kena by way of the Atlantic, thus

reducing the signature of so many specialized

aircraft converging on the objective area from

the same direction. By including the 1st SOS in

the operation, however, Kyle had created a colossal training challenge, with forces literally located half a globe apart. He had no choice because the seven IFR-modified Combat Talons

were the only aircraft capable of accomplishing

the mission as envisioned during initial plan -

ning, and Kyle needed them all to succeed.21

Smith and his Combat Talon planners had a

formidable task, yet they knew that the mission

was possible after initial distances, loads, and fuel

requirements were computed. Although helicopter

refueling options were far from complete, Smith

was anxious to start developing what he knew

would be the most difficult scenario at the objective area—performing blacked-out landings on an

unimproved airstrip to refuel the helicopters from

the ground. As planning developed Smith received permission to contact Brenci at Hurlburt

Field and task him to begin developing a blackedout landing capability. Six days later, after borrowing NVGs from the 20th SOS, Brenci and his

crew, in aircraft 64-0567, were at TAB-6 develop -

ing those procedures.

Training Begins for Combat Talon

Smith initially tasked Brenci to train two

crews in the blacked-out landing procedure. After

training began on 26 November, additional crews

were handpicked by Brenci and Smith to develop

procedures and to become proficient in NVG landings. The initial two crews that began training in

late November were as follows:22

Figure 30. The First Plan Developed by SOD, 16 November 1979 (Source: Created by Daniel Armstrong, Air University Press,

Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

186
Initial training determined that the C-130 could

be landed utilizing NVGs, but first-generation

PVS-5s required ambient light to allow its image

intensifiers to operate properly. On nights with

little or no moon, the pilot landing the aircraft

needed illumination from an outside source to see

the runway and to determine such critical flight

parameters as sink rate and runway alignment.

Taxi lights were used for safety purposes on the

darkest of nights, but the overt taxi light could be

seen by the naked eye. Any illumination from the

aircraft was unacceptable since hostile forces could

see the aircraft and shoot it down during landing.

The lighting requirement was transmitted back to

Smith and the mission planners in Washington.

Kyle and Hess swung into action.

Since the creation of Combat Talon in 1965,

LAS Ontario had been heavily involved in the

modification and upkeep of the specialized Combat Talon fleet. Each year, at the CTMR conference, issues were addressed that affected the

health and modernization of the fleet. At the 1979

CTMR Hess had met the new commander of

USAF’s Detachment 4, 2762d Logistics Squadron

(Special), Lt Col Kenneth D. Oliver. Detachment

4 served as the liaison between the USAF and

LAS Ontario. On 27 November 1979 Hess placed

a call to Oliver and introduced him to Kyle. The

heart of the conversation was centered around

two requirements. First, Kyle asked Oliver if he

could help put the aging Combat Talon fleet into

tip-top shape. Second, he relayed to Oliver that he

might need some help developing new capabilities

for the aircraft. Within two hours, Oliver had secured approval from his boss at Air Force Systems

Command (AFSC) to provide any assistance Kyle

needed, with systems command to work out funding details later.23 A quick call from Oliver to Kyle

placed into motion perhaps the most important

and far-reaching developmental program in Combat Talon history.

With Brenci and his crews requiring extern

covert illumination for safe blacked-out lan

ings, it didn’t take Kyle long to contact Oliv

again with a request for IR filters that we

compatible with the PVS-5 NVGs. Oliver an

his staff were asked to develop IR landing an

taxi lights, as well as an upper-rotating beaco

mounted on the top of the vertical fin of th

aircraft. The rotating-beacon modification w

to be used during low-level formation to he

identify each aircraft. With virtually no exper

ence with NVGs, Detachment 4 searched for 

solution to Kyle’s problem. Oliver borrowed 

set of goggles from the 1st SOW and began r

searching possible sources for an IR filter. H

located a supply of IR paper that was manufa

tured by Polaroid and bought up the last thre

rolls that the company had in its inventory. B

cause of the scarcity of NVGs, the 8th SO

needed every pair it could get its hands on. S

Oliver put in an emergency request for two ne

sets and had them delivered from the manufa

turer to Detachment 4 within four days. H

then returned the borrowed set to the 1

SOW.2 4

Oliver was on a roll. He selected CMSgt Bu

E. Kindle as his deputy and put together a sma

developmental team of Detachment 4 personnel 

address the following concerns:

1. What was the best IR material available?

2. What optical characteristics must it posses

3. How fast could the material be fielded?

4. How could the filters be attached to the ai

craft?

5. Once these questions were answered, va

date the IR filter under actual blacked-o

conditions.

Working through Polaroid, the team obtained th

basic characteristics of the IR filter paper. Th

team found a US company that manufactured I

glass and ordered several test pieces to dete

mine which glass worked best with the PVS-

Both IR illumination and visibility to the nake

eye were evaluated, and the RG-850 filter gla

was determined to be the best glass for the PV

5 application. With funding assured by AFSC

Oliver placed a large order for landing-lig

lenses, taxi-light lenses, and a separate filter fo

the rotating beacon. At $250/$450 each for th

taxi/landing light filters, the large order did n

come cheap.25

With the IR glass ordered, Oliver’s develo

mental team began designing a way to attach th

Crew 1 Crew 2

Brenci Uttaro

Meller Diggins

Thigpen Lewis

Chapman Galloway

Holbein Bakke

Almanzar Newberry

Chitwood Gingerich

Sanchez Doyle

McClain Thomas

Wiley Chesser

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

187
lenses to the aircraft. The IR paper purchased by

Oliver could not be attached to the existing aircraft lighting system. The team designed a doublering attachment that consisted of fastening two

retaining rings together, one normally used to

mount the aircraft-landing light itself and the second one to hold the IR filter. The IR lens, which

mounted inside the outer ring, consisted of two

pieces of tempered glass with the IR filter paper

sandwiched between them. A spacer was installed

between the lens and the light to keep the glass

from touching the hot surface. The lens, along

with its spacer, was the same size as the permanent IR glass that Oliver had ordered, thus allow -

ing for a one-for-one substitution when the permanent IR lenses became available from the

manufacturer. (The whole design process for the

IR-lens assembly had taken only two weeks to

develop and produce, and it was later permanently adopted for the entire Talon I and Talon II

fleet.)2 6 By mid-December, when Oliver’s effort

came to fruition, Brenci and his Talon crews desperately needed the IR-lighting capability.

For the rescue mission to be a success, the

Kadena-based 1st SOS had to attain proficiency

in the same blacked-out landing skills as the

crews from Hurlburt Field. Turczynski’s job was

infinitely more difficult than was Brenci’s at

Hurlburt Field. The 1st SOS was assigned to the

18th TFW and relied on the wing for support. The

primary mission of the 18th was to provide fighter

aircraft in support of a war in Korea. It had no

special operations experience outside the person -

nel assigned to the 1st SOS and had little “need to

know” about the rescue mission. Turczynski found

himself many times at odds with the wing and

was constrained by not being able to explain why

he needed certain support. The sheer magnitude

of preparing his squadron for the mission and the

exceptional manner in which he conducted the

squadron’s preparation attests to his outstanding

abilities. Interestingly, the crews from the two

squadrons developed NVG procedures half a globe

apart, with the resulting procedures having major

differences. (It would take another year before the

procedures were standardized and incorporated

into the appropriate training manuals.) By late

December 1979, however, two NVG blacked-out

airland procedures had been developed and be -

came a reality. Each squadron would use its own

procedures for the rescue mission.

From Hurlburt Field Brenci deployed with his

crew to Pope AFB in late November to test a fuelbladder air-drop procedure in the Combat Talon .

The bladder, commonly referred to as a fuel

blivet, weighed 5,000 pounds and resembled a

USAF Photo

IR landing light modification. The double retaining

ring is on the right, and the IR lens is on the left.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

Up to five 5,000-pound fuel blivets could be dropped at one time.

Blivets on K-loader in preparation for rigging for airdrop.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

188
large rubber doughnut mounted on a 463L pallet.

All associated hoses, pumps, and related equip -

ment were dropped along with the blivet by utiliz -

ing CDS procedures. One option being developed

by JTF planners called for the simultaneous airdrop of five fuel blivets, which was the maximum

number of blivets that could be carried by the

Combat Talon . The concept was to drop the

blivets so that they landed near each other and

then parachute a small US Army ranger team

into the DZ. The ranger team would then prepare

the blivets for follow-on helicopter refueling. Due

to equipment availability, only one blivet was

dropped at Pope AFB during the initial test.

Brenci’s airdrop marked the first time a Combat

Talon utilizing CDS procedures dropped the

5,000-pound blivet.2 7

The ability to air-drop fuel to the helicopters

was only half of the fuel challenge for Talon planners. The other requirement was to develop

blacked-out, communications-out procedures for

night in-flight refueling operations between the

Combat Talon and the KC-135 tanker. Begin -

ning in December 1979 a KC-135 was deployed

almost continuously to either Hurlburt Field or

Eglin AFB and was dedicated to training with

Combat Talon and gunship aircraft. Before this

time, routine tanker support for the 1st SOW

was extremely limited, with only a few pilots

and navigators being checked out at any given

time. The standard IFR procedure, known as

the point-parallel rendezvous, was modified so

that all radio calls were eliminated. The proce -

dures were developed during the AC-130H gun -

ship deployment to Guam. Also, all lights were

turned off on the Combat Talon (except slip-way

lights), and most tanker lights were reduced

significantly. The communications-out rendezvous came to be known as the overtaking rejoin,

a maneuver that consisted of the tanker flying

over the Combat Talon 1,000 feet above it and

then stabilizing approximately three miles in

front of the receiver at 210 knots indicated airspeed. The Talon would accelerate to 250 KIAS

and climb the 1,000 feet as it closed on the

tanker. Utilizing position lights on the belly of

the tanker, the Talon would be cleared into position for the onloading of fuel. Formation (cell)

procedures were also established for refueling

from multiple tankers with multiple receivers.

To provide training for the 1st SOS crews and

the AC-130H gunship crews deployed to Guam,

special KC-135 operating locations were established at Guam, Diego Garcia, and Wadi Kena.

The 1st SOS sent pilots and navigators on temp

rary duty to Guam to fly with gunship crew

since they were the most experienced in this typ

of refueling operation.2 8

As each JTF component worked on its ow

part of the rescue plan, General Vaught moved 

bring the various air and ground elements t

gether for a joint training exercise based on th

Night One air-drop scenario. For this first even

two Talons and one gunship were used for a lim

ited run-through of the plan. Six US Navy RH

53Ds were used for the rotary-wing portion of th

exercise. Beckwith and his Delta Force were d

ployed from their Camp Smokey training facili

in North Carolina and relocated to specially pr

pared facilities at the US Army’s Yuma Provin

Grounds in Arizona. Objectives for the Yuma e

ercise included an assessment of helicopter trai

ing, set up of a drop zone, airborne delivery 

fuel blivets near the helicopters already in plac

near the drop zone, refueling the helicopters fro

the fuel blivets, and demonstra ting the accurac

of the gunship to participants.29

On 3 December Brenci and Uttaro deploye

with their crews on Combat Talons 64-0562 an

64-0567, respectively, from Hurlburt Field 

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The cover story fo

the deployment was that the Air Force special op 

erations aircraft were participating in a US Arm

evaluation, a regularly scheduled event that th

8th SOS had been involved with in the past. Not

ing was out of the ordinary for the crews an

maintenance personnel as they prepared for the

nightly missions. Instead of a single blivet dro

like the one at Pope AFB a few days earlier, how 

ever, tasking for the Yuma exercise included ai

drop of five fuel blivets by each aircra ft.30

Talon crews had never dropped five fuel blive

in the past, nor were they proficient in CDS pr

cedures. What the Talon community did have w

a group of highly experienced loadmasters wh

had grown up in special operations and had 

“nose” for what was right and what was wron

regarding air-drop procedures. Duke Wiley, R

Doyle, Taco Sanchez, Dave Chesser, Ji

McClain, and Ron Thomas were six of the be

loadmasters in the entire C-130 communit

When the blivets were delivered to the MC-13

at Davis-Monthan AFB, the loadmasters p

their heads together to make sense of the riggin

instructions provided by US Army personnel a

companying the loads. It didn’t pass their “smel

test. Their concern was that, once the load bega

to exit the aircraft, the blivets would accelera

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

189
and fall on top of each other, thus causing failure

of the parachute system and the destruction of

the blivets. Some of the loadmasters had been in

Talons since the Vietnam era and were familiar

with MACVSOG’s “no questions asked” policy for

their loads. After many debates, and some reservations, the blivets were accepted by the loadmasters and were rigged according to US Army

specifications, then readied for the nighttime

mission.31

The night was clear and crisp, with nearly 100

percent moon illumination, when Brenci and Uttaro departed Davis-Monthan AFB. A route was

planned that mirrored the one to be flown into

Iran to give the crew experience in low-level op -

erations flying one minute in trail with another

Combat Talon . The Talon had been designed as a

single-ship penetrator aircraft, so low-level formation in the terrain-following mode was not a normal procedure. The 8th SOS crews flew many sorties to develop procedures and skills to perform

this maneuver. As the Talons traveled low over

the desert floor, their shadows on the ground from

the bright moon were clearly visible to the crew.

Everyone on board was aware of the importance

of the drop but was a bit apprehensive about the

heavy 25,000-pound load and its unproven rigging

procedures. About six minutes out from the drop,

pilots from Benci’s crew wearing NVGs spotted

light patterns on the ground resembling the

Yuma DZ. After quickly determining the position

of the aircraft, the left navigator assured the crew

that the aircraft was still a significant distance

from the DZ, so the crew continued to press on.

Later debriefing by the crew determined that the

lights were probably small campfires not visible

to the naked eye, yet easily seen by the NVGs.

The crew was thankful that they had not con -

vinced themselves that the lights were on the DZ

and dropped the load on unsuspecting campers.

As the two aircraft lined up for the drop, the

combat controller on the DZ called to confirm the

run-in heading—a strange call since the whole op -

eration was scheduled to be conducted radio-out.

There had apparently been a question concerning

the orientation of the helicopters in relation to the

Talon’s inbound drop heading. With the question

answered, the formation continued towards the

DZ. Brenci was in the lead with Uttaro one

minute in trail, and everything looked good for a

successful drop. As the left navigator called

“green light,” the blivets began to move. From

the cockpit the shadows of the blivets were easily

visible on the ground as they exited the aircraft.

So, too, were the RH-53D helicopters lined up on

the right side of the DZ. As the last blivet left the

aircraft, the loadmaster called the load clear but

relayed that a malfunction had occurred. Just as

the Talon loadmasters had predicted, all five

blivets accelerated out the aft end of the aircraft

and literally fell on top of each other. As they left

the aircraft, the force exerted on the aft anchorcable assembly caused it to fail and tear loose

from the aft bulkhead. The cable shot forward

and nearly beheaded Brenci’s radio operator,

MSgt Andy Chitwood, who was untouched but

shaken by the near miss. The incident reinforced

the need for everyone in the cargo compartment

to wear a helmet when air-dropping loads with

static lines attached to the anchor cables.

With the cable torn loose, the five blivets from

Brenci’s aircraft streamed into the DZ, destroying

them when they hit the ground. Uttaro was one

minute behind Brenci and was not notified to

abort his drop before two of his five blivets had

pancaked onto the DZ. His aircraft experienced

less damage than had Brenci’s, but seven of the

10 blivets dropped were destroyed on the DZ. The

short flight back to Davis-Monthan AFB was sobering to all, especially for Chitwood.

Inspection of the anchor cables revealed that

the damage could be repaired, and by the next

afternoon, the two aircraft were again mission

ready for another attempt at the multiple CDS

airdrop. The Combat Talon loadmasters devised

a gate system whereby each blivet, as it moved

towards the ramp of the aircraft by means of

gravity, would cut the restraining cord for the

following blivet. Thus, all five blivets would exit

the aircraft with adequate spacing to allow each

parachute to open without interfering with the

one behind it. The two aircraft took off and flew

their low-level routes as they had done the previous night. The airdrop went flawlessly, with all

10 blivets safely landing on the DZ. By utilizing

the gate system, however, the dispersion pattern

on the ground was not as concentrated as was

hoped, and efforts to move the blivets into position on the ground to refuel the helicopters took

more time than was planned.

Beckwith and his Delta Force had moved by

way of the RH-53D helicopters to the DZ and

had witnessed both nights’ operations along

with Vaught and Kyle and the JTF planning

staff. With the failure of the blivet drop on the

first night, and the dispersion pattern of the

second night’s drop, the consensus was that a

better way had to be found to get fuel to the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

190
helicopters. The exercise did validate that the

JTF had a viable in-extremist means to get fuel to

the helicopters. After the airdrop, the AC-130H

gunship put on a dazzling show for the JTF that

demonstrated the aircraft’s ability to provide sustained and accurate fire in support of the ground

force commander. From that time forward, the

gunship became an integral part of the force pack -

age that Beckwith would require to ensure protection during the embassy takedown.3 2

The afternoon after the second airdrop, unknown and unplanned by Kyle, a C-141 landed at

Davis-Monthan AFB and unloaded a Vietnam-era

fuel bladder designed to be carried by the C-130

aircraft. The 3,000-gallon bladder could hold

20,000 pounds of fuel, but it was not capable of

being air-dropped. It resembled a huge rubber

water bed that was strapped inside the fuselage of

the aircraft and covered almost the entire cargo

floor. Kyle soon learned that J-3 SOD had sent

the bladder out to be evaluated by the JTF. The

8th SOS loadmasters were again consulted by

Kyle, and in short order the bladder system was

loaded on to an aircraft, and a fuel truck was

called. After several refueling pauses to tighten

fittings that had worked loose over the years, the

bladder was filled, and a short flight was con -

ducted to test its airworthiness. The flight was

uneventful, with the aircraft landing back at

Davis-Monthan AFB. Since the bladder could not

be air-dropped, an airlanding somewhere in Iran

would be required if the system were to be used,

and hoses and pumps were needed to connect the

bladder to the helicopters. As the Combat Talons

deployed back to their home station on 9 December, there seemed to be more questions about

Night One than there were before the exercise.

Beckwith was convinced that air-dropping blivets

posed too many variables that could delay or prevent helicopter refueling. One thing was for

sure—to utilize the bladder system, a site would

have to be found in Iran that allowed the heavy

C-130 to land and refuel the helicopters.3 3

By the second week in December, JTF planning

for the rescue attempt was moving at a frantic

pace. Six RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters had

been slipped aboard the USS Kitty Hawk as it

steamed past Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

(The aircraft were later transferred to the USS

Nimitz .) The plan had not been finalized, but

everyone agreed that whatever operation was

undertaken to free the hostages would include

helicopters.34 At Hurlburt Field the arrange -

ment between Brenci and Smith was becoming

unworkable. As a primary crew member on th

Talon rescue force, Brenci was flying at night an

in crew rest during the day and at times was o

temporary duty away from Hurlburt Field. Cri

cal coordination had to take place during perio

when Brenci was not available. An awkward situ

tion also had developed in the 8th SOS sinc

Brenci had been selected to be the squadron poi

of contact—Lt Col Roland Guidry, the squadro

commander of the 8th SOS, had not been rea

into the operation! Thus, as the two Comb

Talon crews developed NVG blacked-out proc

dures and began CDS delivery of the fuel blivet

Guidry did not have a “need to know” about th

operation and was “officially” unaware of h

squadron’s training initiatives.

Guidry was new to the Combat Talon in N

vember 1979, having taken command of th

squadron the previous summer. He had no

flown operationally for the previous eight yea

and was required to complete the formal Com 

bat Talon School before being certified in th

aircraft. He was not entirely new to special o

erations, however. His assignment before com 

ing to the 8th SOS had been to the Tactical A

Warfare Center at Eglin AFB. There he was r

sponsible, among his other duties, for the te

and evaluation of the CRRC, a project that th

8th SOS had completed in 1978. As the test d

rector, Guidry had worked with 8th SOS an

1st SOW personnel and had a working know

edge of the wing. When Ninth AF looked for 

new commander AS the incumbent (Colon

Hunter) neared the end of his time in comman

Guidry was chosen to lead the squadron. In la

November 1979 Guidry was still in Comb

Talon School and was not certified in the MC

130E. For these reasons, Les Smith went 

Brenci as his point of contact for the squadro

As chief pilot, Brenci was in a position to asse

his pilots’ abilities as he selected crews for th

mission.

By 9 December, with the Yuma blivet dro

completed, it was apparent that the number 

personnel at Hurlburt Field read into the pla

had to be increased. Kyle was aware of the situ

tion with Guidry and elected to meet with hi

personally and brief him on the mission . Aft

talking with Guidry and assessing his ability to su

cessfully coordinate mission preparations 

Hurlburt Field, Kyle put him in charge of th

Hurlburt MC-130E operation.3 5 Guidry proved 

be a highly skilled technician who meticulous

prepared the squadron for every event leading u

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

191
to the actual mission. As a manager and coordina -

tor, skills that he developed as a flight-test program manager were brought to bear on the challenge before the squadron. Guidry proved to be

the right person to perform this vital function,

and his inclusion in the operation freed Brenci to

concentrate on aircrew and operational issues.

Another key player responsible for getting

Hurlburt Field’s aircraft ready for the mission

was Col Bob Pinard, who had been the squadron

commander of the 1st SOS at Kadena AB, Japan,

in the early 1970s. A pilot by trade, Pinard had

also commanded the 90th SOS when it was sta -

tioned at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, and had

moved the squadron to Kadena AB in 1972. When

the 90th SOS was redesignated as the 1st SOS,

Pinard remained in command of the unit and con -

tinued in that position until 1975. In all, he commanded the Pacific Combat Talon squadron for

more than four years, the longest tenure of any

squadron commander in the unit’s history. He

knew what special operations was all about. In

the fall of 1979, Pinard was the deputy com -

mander for maintenance for the 1st SOW and

was responsible for aircraft maintenance and

support. Like Guidry, Pinard was the right person to contribute his unique skills in preparing

1st SOW aircraft for the rescue mission. As the

mission grew more complex, Pinard was called on

by Kyle to provide increased support. On the

south side of Eason Hangar at Hurlburt Field,

high above the hangar floor, Pinard provided office space and secure work areas for wing planners and JTF personnel deployed to Hurlburt

Field.36 Communications were established so that

Kyle could keep in touch with Vaught by way of

secure telephone and radio. The work area was

so isolated that few even knew that it existed. As

maintenance crews worked busily on aircraft inside the hangar, Kyle, Guidry, and a small staff

(mainly radio operators) settled in to what would

become a four-month marathon focused on preparing the force for the rescue mission.

It was apparent that the JTF needed more

Combat Talon crews to fly the complicated mis -

sion. Kyle authorized Brenci to increase the aircrew pool from two to three crews, and by midDecember the new crew alignment was firmed.

This was done primarily by moving highly skilled

crew members from the two existing crews to

form the nucleus of the third crew. (Guidry was

qualified as an NVG safety pilot and rotated between the crews, usually flying on Meller’s crew.

Also, some crew members moved among the

crews during different training missions. Most

safety pilots were also qualified as right-seat

NVG first pilots and rotated into that position to

maintain their proficiency.) The three crews cr eated by Brenci in mid-December 1979 included

the following personnel:

The early December Yuma exercise had been a

limited run-through of the first night’s scenario

utilizing the option of air-dropping fuel blivets to

refuel the helicopters. With so many questions

arising from the exercise, JTF planners temporarily

put the Night One operation aside and concentrated on the Night Two scenario. Vaught rea -

soned that they had an in extremis plan (dropping

the blivets) if a mission execute order was issued

in the short term. Work continued on the fuelbladder/airland option.

During the third week of December, the crews

of Uttaro, Meller, and Brenci, (the latter commanded by Major Diggins) deployed to Savannah,

Georgia, and commenced training with the USA

ranger battalion stationed there. Colonel Williford

commanded the ranger battalion, and his troops

were tasked to seize and hold Manzariyeh, an airfield located southwest of Tehran selected by JTF

planners for the Night Two extraction of the hostages, Delta Force, and the RH-53D helicopter

crews. Most of the initial airfield seizure training

was conducted at Wright Field, Georgia, where

the three Combat Talons deployed to rehearse

with the rangers. The seizure and follow-on extraction proved to be a complicated undertaking.3 7

An airfield seizure had to proceed like clock -

work to be successful. After landing blacked out

on NVGs, the first aircraft to land would roll out

to the end of the runway. A ranger force would

exit the aircraft in a machine-gun mounted jeep.

Immediately after the jeep, four off-road motorcycles would exit the Talon and rapidly close on

preassigned targets in the landing area (usu ally

buildings, guard outposts, communications areas,

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3

Brenci Uttaro Meller

Tharp Diggins Thigpen

Ferkes Lewis McIntosh

Holbein Bakke McBride

Galloway Chapman Smith

Gamble Yagher Robb

Almanzar Newberry Daigenault

Chitwood Gingerich Mink

Wiley Doyle Chesser

Sanchez McClain Thomas

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

192
or barracks). Also on board the lead Talon were

some 50 rangers who were responsible for aircraft

defense and for any required mopping-up action.

The second and third Talons also carried similar

numbers of soldiers and vehicles that were assigned to neutralize remote areas of the airfield.

The number two Talon would land and turn off

midway down the runway and taxi back to the

approach end for download. The number three

aircraft would stop midway down the runway and

offload its assault package. With minimum spacing between aircraft, a three-ship package could

be on the ground within one minute of the landing

of the first aircraft. With practice, the rangers reduced their exit time to 10 seconds, a feat that

was somewhat remarkable considering the fact

that the entire operation was conducted without

lights.38 Also complicating the operation was that

not all participants had access to NVGs. The

three pilots and the flight engineer, along with

the two loadmasters, each had a set of the PVS5s. The rangers were limited to providing NVGs

to the jeep drivers, motorcycle drivers, and about

one in 10 of the foot soldiers. There simply were

not enough NVGs for everyone to have a pair. For

the aircrews, the problem of external IR lighting

for NVG blacked-out landings had still not been

solved, resulting in several hard landings during

training operations.

The fuel bladder that had been test-flown at

Davis-Monthan AFB in early December had

been transported back to Hurlburt Field, and

8th SOS loadmasters and flight engineers had

worked to develop a system that could be used

to refuel the helicopters. The problem with the

bladder was that it lacked pumps and hoses to

connect it to the helicopters at a safe distance

from the C-130 aircraft. To partially eliminate

this problem, the bladder system was rigged

through the aircraft refueling system, and by

utilizing the aircraft’s fuel pumps, fuel could be

transferred through a hose to the helicopter.

With this Rube Goldberg setup, the bladder

proved that it could do the job.

39

During a midmonth visit to Hurlburt Field to

see how the Combat Talon crews were progressing in their training, Vaught viewed a demonstra -

tion of the bladder system that the 8th SOS had

been working on. A Talon successfully pumped

fuel to a 20th SOS helicopter, and Vaught was

somewhat pleased with the results. He authorized

a full-blown effort to locate and manufacture the

correct pumps, hoses, and fittings necessary for

the system to work at its optimum. Effort was

also initiated to find fuel-trained airmen to ope

ate the system. Vaught also ordered another joi

exercise to be conducted at Yuma. New helicopt

crews had been selected after the blivet drops ea

lier in the month, and Vaught wanted to see them

in action.40

On 15 December the 8th SOS deployed i

three NVG crews to Norton AFB, California, 

preparation for the upcoming Yuma exercise. Ky

had a new observer for the exercise—Turczyns

from the 1st SOS. Blacked-out NVG landing

were still sometimes rough, with the external I

illumination problem not fixed. During the fir

night’s operation from Norton AFB, the Comb

Talons flew to NAS Fallon to practice blacked-o

landings. The moon was partially full, and th

landings went well. With Kyle observing the o

eration from the control tower, one of Vaught

special assignment guys delivered to him a roll 

black IR paper that Vaught had sourced from CI

stocks. It turned out to be the same IR paper th

Oliver had purchased from Polaroid a few day

earlier. Kyle wasted no time in contacting Detac

ment 4 and was pleasantly surprised to learn th

Oliver was nearly finished with the landing ligh

ring modification.41

At Yuma Vaught wanted another blivet drop 

further validate the capability. For this event, fiv

blivets were dropped, along with a tractor (calle

a mule), which was used to move the blivets 

their refueling location near the helicopters. Th

drop went perfectly, with Beckwith and his me

helping to round up the blivets in the dark. Th

whole operation was still time-consuming and t

dious work, and Beckwith did not like it.4 2

When the Talon arrived back at Norton AFB

Kyle called Detachment 4, and Oliver and Kind

deployed in short order. It wasn’t long before th

dual-ring attachment mechanism that Oliver

team had been working on was attached to th

aircraft along with a sandwiched piece of IR p

per. The following evening, the new lenses we

tested with NVGs, and they worked perfectl

Kyle found, however, that the IR paper was su

ceptible to heat from the landing light, burnin

through the thin paper in about a minute. Th

glass was also prone to break. Tempered gla

would eventually be used to eliminate the glas

breakage problem. The IR-modified aircraft d

parted Norton AFB and headed for Yuma fo

blacked-out landing practice. When the landin

lights were turned on, it was like landing in da

light on the NVGs. Yet, the light could not be see

by the naked eye. As soon as the aircraft touche

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

193
down and began slowing to taxi speed, the lights

were turned off to prevent burn through. On that

night, 17 December 1979, safe blacked-out landings on NVGs became a reality for fixed-wing aircraft. The IR paper first located by Oliver and

then by Vaught’s JTF staff, and the lenses developed by Oliver’s team at Detachment 4, revolutionized Combat Talon airland capabilities.4 3

The First Night One/Night Two

Combined Exercise Is Flown

On the nights of 18 and 19 December, the first

two-night joint exercise was flown in the deserts

of southern California and western Arizona.

Vaught had seen pieces of the two-night opera -

tion, but he wanted to put them together for a run

through to see where additional work was needed.

Air Force objectives for the exercise were threefold: to refine NVG blacked-out landing tactics

(utilizing the newly acquired IR paper lenses), to

test helicopter refueling procedures from the

3,000-gallon bladder system installed on one of

the Combat Talons, and to evaluate the AC130H’s ability to covertly illuminate the MC-130E

landing zone. Night One refueling operations

would take place at Twenty-Nine Palms Marine

Corps Expeditionary Airfield, California, while

the Night Two exfiltration would utilize Holtsville

Airport, California. Norton AFB and Laguna

Army Airfield (AAF) at Yuma, Arizona, were used

as staging and onload locations.44

While the 8th SOS was refining its NVG proce -

dures, Turczynski and his 1st SOS crews had con -

tinued their no-light practice landings. From 19 to

23 December, Turczynski was scheduled to attend

the PACAF Commander’s Conference in Hawaii.

Soon after his arrival in Hawaii, Kyle contacted

Turczynski and told him to proceed to Norton

AFB and link up with Brenci. Turczynski flew as

an extra crew member on Brenci’s aircraft during

the combined exercise, took notes, and observed

blacked-out NVG approaches and landings.

For the Night One operation, Brenci’s Combat

Talon onloaded the ranger security force at

Laguna AAF and departed low level en route to

Twenty-Nine Palms. Concurrently, six Navy RH53Ds lifted off from Laguna AAF with Beckwith

and his Delta Force onboard. At Norton AFB the

number two Talon , commanded by Uttaro, was

loaded with the 3,000-gallon fuel bladder, while

the number three aircraft, commanded by Meller,

simulated carrying a bladder the same as the

number two aircraft (there was only one fuel bladder system available at the time). The launch of

the number two and number three Talons from

Norton AFB was timed to allow the two aircraft to

fall in behind Brenci’s aircraft as the three made

their approach to Twenty-Nine Palms. After a

two-hour low-level route, Brenci lined up on the

totally blacked-out airfield for his approach and

landing. On short final he extended the IR-covered

landing lights and made a textbook touchdown

on the aluminum-clad runway. It was a moonless

night, and those viewing the landing with the

na ked eye could not see the aircraft as it rolled

out to its preplanned off-load location.4 5

As Brenci’s aircraft came to a stop, Williford’s

rangers exploded from the back of the aircraft and

dispersed across the airfield. Part of Brenci’s assault force, which was made up of CCT personnel

from Hurlburt Field, raced to mark the runway in

a newly developed light pattern known as the

“box four and one.” The lights were covered with

the same IR paper used for the Talons landing

lights and provided additional landing cues for

the follow-on aircraft. Just as Brenci had done,

Uttaro and Meller made flawless landings utiliz -

ing the IR-covered landing lights. The two Talon

tankers moved to their preplanned positions, and

Uttaro’s crew set up hoses to refuel the soon-toarrive helicopters. After some delay four of the

original six helicopters landed at Twenty-Nine

Palms and were marshaled by the CCT to Uttaro’s location. (Two of the helicopters had

aborted en route, thus leaving only four aircraft to

participate in the refueling operation.)46

Helicopter refueling from Uttaro’s Talon was

an awkward operation. The hoses were not long

enough to permit safe operations, and the loadmaster’s intercom cord was too short, thus requiring hand signals between the loadmaster and the

refueling crew while wearing NVGs. Uttaro had

to back his aircraft into position dangerously close

to the helicopters for the hose to reach. Marshaling helicopters and the Talon was extremely difficult with no illumination whatsoever and with

everyone on NVGs. The refueling operation was a

limited success, but it was apparent to Vaught

and to Kyle that more work was required to make

ground operations on NVGs safe. After receiving

their fuel, the four helicopters departed TwentyNine Palms with Delta Force on board, and the

three Combat Talons departed with the rangers.

After an operation’s stop at Laguna AAF to offload rangers, Brenci and the other two Talons returned to Norton AFB for crew rest in anticipa -

tion of Night Two. 47

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

194
Since the Talons began training with the rangers at Wright AAF, the rangers’ ability to rapidly

exit the aircraft without any lighting had been a

problem. The standard configuration for a C-130

carrying a maximum load of troops included centerisle seats and sidewall seats, all of which could be

folded to allow the troops to exit the aircraft. The

center-isle/sidewall seat configuration, however,

made it difficult for the rangers to rapidly exit the

aircraft while maintaining unit integrity. For the

Night Two operation at Holtsville Airport, the

center-isle/sidewall seats were removed and, for

the first time, sponge-rubber mattresses were

laid on the floor of the aircraft, thus allowing the

rangers to lay on the mattresses during the long

low-level flight. On landing the rangers could

then stand and exit the aircraft in organized

units. The configuration came to be known as

the “Sealy configuration” for obvious reasons

and wa s adopted for the operation.48 Future development of restraining devices that snapped

into the floor of the aircraft made the Sealy con -

figuration a standardized means of carrying large

numbers of troops that required rapid off-load at

the objective area.

The three Combat Talons departed Norton

AFB and headed for Laguna AAF during the

early evening hours of 19 December. After onload,

the Talons flew a low-level route to the Holtsville

Airport, timing their landings to coincide with

Delta Force’s takedown of a simulated embassy

hostage site. Within 15 minutes of landing, the

rangers had secured the airfield, and the force

was ready for the arrival of Delta Force and the

helicopters. Again, the transfer operation was

rough, with accountability problems between the

rangers and Delta Force . Vaught had made it

crystal clear that no one would be left in Iran, so

elaborate accounting procedures were developed

to ensure that everyone was accounted for and

loaded aboard waiting fixed-wing aircraft.4 9 It was

again apparent that the procedures had to be refined if Vaught’s directions were to be realized.

After departure and with another operation’s stop

at Laguna AAF to discharge the rangers and

Delta Force, the Talons continued on to Hurlburt

Field for a much needed rest.

At the exercise debrief attended by Kyle and

selected exercise participants, Vaught observed

that the helicopter piece of the operation was not

up to standards, and he directed that the bladderrefueling system be improved with the longer

hoses and correct fittings to make it work prop -

erly. He also stated that the blivet drop was the

primary means of getting fuel to the helicopte

until the bladder-refueling system was perfecte

In Vaught’s closing remarks at the hot wash, h

released all participants to their respective com

manders and directed that the JTF stand-dow

for the Christmas holiday. Training would resum

on 2 January 1980 after the Christmas break.50 A

Hurlburt Field the Christmas stand-down w

greeted with mixed feelings. Everyone was grat

ful for the break and the opportunity to spend th

holidays with friends and family, but the sudde

halt in training cast doubt in many minds 

whether the rescue mission was being serious

considered in Washington. How could the missio

be so important yet the entire JTF could stan

down for two weeks? Even with the lingerin

doubts, all went home to their families for th

holidays.

Turczynski departed California and heade

back to Hawaii on 22 December, linking up wi

Capt Nichols, who was the PACAF SOF liaiso

officer at Hickham AFB. Nichols borrowed 25 se

of PVS-5 NVGs from the 25th Infantry Divisio

and signed them over to Turczynski on a han

receipt. PACAF provided a KC-135 for the retur

flight of its commanders to WestPac, so Turczy

ski was able to hand carry the NVGs with him

He arrived at Kadena AB on 24 December 198

armed with his newly acquired NVGs and a boo

full of notes on NVG procedures. While Hurlbu

Field enjoyed the holidays, Turczynski began 

squadron recall on Christmas Eve.

Rice Bowl Expands Throughout

the Combat Talon Community

As the stateside-based operational units r

laxed over the Christmas holidays, the JTF w

not completely idle. The Combat Talon , with i

distinctive Fulton nose and black-paint schem

was visibly different from standard C-130s. Pla

ners feared that the Talon’s presence at Wa

Kena, Egypt, would create suspicion among th

local military members stationed there and p e

haps even the Russians, whose satellites flew ov

the area daily. Also, Egyptian Air Traffic Contr

(ATC) was responsible for aircraft movement 

a nd out of Egypt in a manner similar to th

United States. A large influx of aircraft conver

ing on Wadi Kena at the same time would u

doubtedly raise questions. The 7th SOS wa

s tationed at Rhein Main AB and operated th

Combat Talon Clamp-configured MC-130E , whic

to the casual observer was identical to the 8

SOS aircraft. The European Talons were no

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

195
equipped with in -flight refueling, and their updated ECM equipment made them heavier and

less capable of landing on unimproved airstrips.

For these reasons the 7th SOS was ruled out for

participation in the mission itself, but planners

reasoned that their aircraft could be used to establish a signature at Wadi Kena.

On 1 January Col Tom Bradley, the com -

mander of the 7th SOS, was alerted through his

intelligence flight of a pending tasking to begin

operations from Rhein Main AB to Wadi Kena,

Egypt. Beginning on 2 January 1980, 7th SOS

aircraft commenced flight operations into the remote base. Bradley received permission to brief

his operations officer, Maj Ron Jones, and his aircraft commanders that the purpose of the new

mission was to support a possible rescue attempt

of the hostages in Iran. Not even Bradley, how -

ever, was briefed on details of the emerging

res cue mission. Operating under a MAC call sign,

7th SOS Combat Talons departed Rhein Main AB

and flew under normal ATC procedures to

Sigonella AB, Italy, where the aircraft landed and

refueled. Bradley deployed a liaison officer, Capt

Dave Blum, to Sigonella AB to coordinate opera -

tions from there onward to Egypt. From Sigonella

AB the Combat Talon crews filed a classified

flight plan or flew “due regard” along the flight

boundary between Greece, Libya, and Egypt, remaining in international airspace until turning

south toward Cairo. Bradley deployed Capt Art

Rohling to Cairo to serve as the ATC liaison with

the Egyptian ATC facility there. From the time

the Talons penetrated Egyptian airspace until

a rrival at Wadi Kena, the Talons received special

handling by Egyptian ATC. The cover for the entire operation was that of a combined US-Egyptian

exercise.51

Once at Wadi Kena, 7th SOS personnel established liaison with local Egyptian air force person nel. An exercise program was initiated with

the Egyptian air force that included airborne intercept training between the Combat Talon and

Egyptian air force MiG-21 aircraft. Missions were

also flown against Egyptian surface-to-air missile

batteries. Additional flights were conducted over

the Red Sea along with low-level training sorties

over the southern desert area of Egypt. As the

Combat Talons flew from central Europe to Wadi

Kena, cargo and equipment to be used by the rescue force were also moved. Sensitive cargo, including ammunition for the AC-130H gunship, was

discreetly moved to Wadi Kena and stored there.5 2

On the first of April, Bradley was alerted for a

surface-to-air recovery mission, and he quickly redeployed his two Talons from Wadi Kena to Rhein

Main AB to reconfigure them for the mission. On

2 April the two Combat Talons, along with associated Fulton recovery equipment, were in place

back at Wadi Kena. On 3 April a CIA twin Otter,

carrying two pilots and Maj John Carney (a USAF

combat controller), flew its mission deep into Iran

to install the covert landing lights that were later

used to guide Brenci and his rescue force of Talons and EC-130E aircraft to Desert One. In the

event that the Otter could not depart its landing

site or had to set down somewhere else in Iran,

Bradley’s Combat Talon was tasked to extract the

three men by way of the STARS . Bradley deployed one of his two Talons from Wadi Kena to

Oman International Airport, with Major Janke as

the aircraft commander. Bradley was the first pilot, and Jones was the third pilot. Landing after

dark the Talon parked on the military side of the

airfield among other C-130s and shut down while

awaiting a call if Carney’s mission ran into

trouble. The twin Otter performed flawlessly and

flew the round-trip mission without a hitch. Before daylight Bradley and his crew departed

Oman and returned to Wadi Kena without having

to perform the recovery.53

The 7th SOS remained at Wadi Kena through

the 8th of April, redeploying just in time to participate in Flintlock 80. The 7th SOS’s participa -

tion in the annual joint/combined exercise contin -

ued as planned so that there would be no suspicion

of anything else going on with the squadron. When

8th SOS aircraft deployed to Wadi Kena through

Rhein Main AB, the JCS exercise continued to provide cover for the rescue mission. During the Wadi

Kena operation, the 7th SOS deployed two aircraft

and over 100 support personnel for 93 days. Ap -

proximately 95 percent of the squadron deployed

there at one time or another, with 60 percent of

the squadron physically on temporary duty to

Egypt at any given time. As for Bradley, he spent

89 days out of the 93 deployed to Egypt.54 By establishing a signature early in the year, the 7th

SOS enabled the rescue force to deploy to Wadi

Kena virtually undetected. No one outside the op -

eration was even remotely aware of the true na -

ture of the Talon mission.

From the beginnings of Operation Rice Bowl,

the 1st SOS was an integral part of the rescue

mission. All four of its aircraft previously had

received the in-flight refueling modification, a ca -

pability that the JTF planners felt essential to

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

196
executing the mission. Kyle had just come from

PACAF headquarters in Hawaii and was famil -

iar with the 1st SOS and its unique aircraft.

When Turczynski initiated his selected squadron recall on Christmas Eve, his crews had been

landing without aircraft lights for more than a

month but had not used NVGs for blacked-out

operations. He briefed his crews on the new

NVG requirement but did not divulge the rea -

son behind it. Squadron personnel assumed that

it was a new capability that had resulted from

the commander’s conference that Turczynski

had just attended. Four crews began training in

the new blacked-out procedure. Unit schedulers

managed to coordinate a short-notice deploy -

ment to Yachon, Korea, on 26 December. Yach on

was located approximately 50 miles northwest

of Taegu AB and offered an isolated 10,000-footlong runway that was ideal for NVG operations.

Mitchell, the 314th AD SOF liaison officer at

Osan AB, Korea, coordinated with the Republic

of Korea Air Force to have the runway lights

turned off. The Combat Talon flew a tactical aid

to navigation (TACAN) approach to a full-stop

landing using normal instrument procedures

and runway lights. Once on the runway the

crew transmitted a code word to the tower, and

all airfield lighting was turned off. For the next

three hours, the Combat Talon flew multip le

blacked-out approaches and landings. When

Turczynski called for departure clearance back

to Kadena AB, the Yachon tower turned the airfield lights back on. The whole operation went

exactly as planned. As with the 8th SOS, NVG

blacked-out landings were new to the 1st SOS,

and the crews had to develop their own proce -

dures as they became proficient with the gog -

gles. Turczynski decided that the capability

could not be limited to four crews, so early on

all crew members in the squadron began train -

ing with the devices. As the rest of the JTF

rested over Christmas, the 1st SOS developed

its new skills. By the first of the year, the

squadron had advanced to a point whereby the

crews felt confident landing with NVGs.5 5

In early January Turczynski was tasked to deploy one Combat Talon and crew to Hurlburt Field

for the next joint rehearsal. He reviewed the progress that his flyers had made over the previous

weeks, and selected two NVG crews.* The tw

crews included the following personnel:56

Jubelt’s crew was the first to deploy to th

United States. The JTF had decided that it w

time to mesh the 1st SOS with the combined trai

ing program being conducted by its sister squa

ron. There was little time to adjust to the trainin

schedule. The JTF was again in a maximum-effo

mode preparing for the next full-blown two-nig

rehearsal.

The New Year Brings New Challenges

As training progressed, additional requiremen

were identified as essential to the mission. Oliv

and his developmental team at Detachment 

were kept busy fulfilling those requirements. B

fore 1980 the Talon’s terrain-following radar

maximum gross weight setting was 135,00

pounds. With the heavy fuel and equipment load

required for the mission, an increase of 30,00

pounds to this maximum gross weight was require

The increased weight capability would enable the T

computer to properly compute climb and dive com 

mands and keep the aircraft at it s proper set clea

ance. Oliver contacted John R. Lewis, the Lockhe

radar specialist for the APQ-122(V)8 radar. Lew

in coordination with LAS Ontario engineers, d

veloped a “plus 30,000-pound weight chip” for t

TF computer, which allowed the aircraft to terra

follow at a maximum gross weight of 165,00

pounds. The heavy-weight chip fixed the problem

and Oliver coordinated its installation in t

Hurlburt Field Combat Talons. The next majo

challenge was to improve the communications ca 

pability of the aircraft .

__________

 *Thom Beres would move to the 8th SOS in March 1981, and Les Smith would move from the 8th SOS to t he 1st SOS as the operations offic

Beres and Smith would exchange crew positions in their respective squadrons. Osborne would later take leave with his family to Taiwan and 

temporarily replaced by Steve Fleming as aircraft commander. Paul Rumple was added to the crew as the safety pilot. Two days after Osborne we

on leave, the crew deployed back to the United States for another round of exercises. Osborne did not return to the crew after his leave due to t

accelerated pace of training. Art Schwall moved up to first-pilot duties, and Rumple assumed permanent duties as the safety pilot.

Crew 1 Crew 2

Jubelt Osborne

Nimmo Fleming

Turczynski Schwall

Sumida Peppers

Beres Townsend

Prator Novy

Tafoya Felton

Diehl Devine

Frederickson Hickman

Joy Huff

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

197
Vaught had been frustrated with the lack of de -

pendable communications between the JTF and the

rescue force and had tasked his communications

experts to develop a way to improve overall secure

communications. Satellite communications (SATCOM) proved to be a reliable means of long-range

secure-voice communications. There was no provision, however, to mount the SATCOM antenna on

the C-130. Oliver was given the task to develop a

way to quickly mount an antenna. The mounting

had to be portable, since there were not enough

SATCOM sets to put on every aircraft. The antenna to be mounted was a Dorn Margollin dishtype unit that was about 18 inches in diameter

and mounted on a center pedestal. The develop -

mental team selected the forward escape hatch on

the top of the C-130 as the best location for the

antenna. Oliver had a unit flown to Ontario from

the manufacturer, and he used his top-priority

status to acquire a forward overhead escape hatch

from the assembly line at Lockheed-Martin,

Marietta, Georgia. After two quick days of design

and assembly, the antenna was flight-tested on an

MC-130E that was at LAS Ontario for periodic

maintenance. Two days later the antenna was

shipped to Kyle and the JTF. Almost immediately

another request came to Oliver for a similar

mounting for a C-141, and within another four-day

period, he had the C-141 antenna completed.5 7

The next problem area for Oliver was the Combat Talon FLIR system. The FLIR was nearly 10

years old by 1980 and had been adapted from the

US Navy P-3 program for use during the Son Tay

rescue mission. The original specification required that the FLIR be covert and not visible

from the exterior of the aircraft. This requirement placed the set behind the nose landing gear,

with the FLIR door covered by the aft nose landing gear door when the aircraft was on the

ground. The installation required a pressure box

to isolate the FLIR from the pressurized fuselage,

a worm gear extension and retraction system, and

a relatively sophisticated door to close up the

whole system when not in use. The primary function of the FLIR was to provide an aid to naviga -

tion during terrain following. Before lowering the

aircraft landing gear, the FLIR had to be retracted and was thus unusable to the crew for

landing. Over the years, as funding for SOF decreased after the end of the Vietnam War, available FLIR assets were transferred to the 1st SOS

and were employed for the Korean sea surveillance mission. None of the 7th or 8th SOS aircraft

had the FLIR installed, and their crews were not

proficient in FLIR operations.

As the airland option for both Night One and

Night Two developed, the need for a “gear-down,

FLIR down” capability emerged. Oliver was

tasked to find a solution. He removed an aft nose

landing-gear door from a C-130 at LAS Ontario

and had a semicircular opening cut in the door to

allow the FLIR turret to be extended through it

with the nose gear down. LAS engineers also designed a cover for the opening that could be installed when the capability was not required.

There were also wiring changes needed to allow

the FLIR to be down with the gear extended.

With the modified door in the back of a Combat

Talon, Oliver deployed to Hurlburt Field to test it

on an 8th SOS aircraft.5 8

Oliver arranged for an acoustical engineer to

meet him at Hurlburt Field and to install sensors

on the test bird to determine noise and vibration

levels inside the aircraft. With the nose gear door

installed, Meller’s crew flew a test mission out of

Hurlburt Field to determine if Oliver’s brainchild

provided a workable solution. With the cutout just

below the flight deck, the noise and vibration

proved totally unacceptable. The fix that Oliver’s

team came up with proved to be one of its few

failures.59 Tactics used for the rescue mission

were subsequently modified to allow for a gear-up

“FLIR pass” by a Combat Talon down the runway

to determine if the runway was clear of obstacles.

The FLIR bird would then maneuver to land at

the end of the aircraft flow. (When the Combat

Talon II and the AC-130U gunship were developed and fielded in the late 1980s, the FLIR prob -

lem was finally solved by installing the FLIR ball

in front of the nose gear. This arrangement allowed FLIR operation with the landing gear

down. The requirement for a covert installation

was no longer a factor, since many aircraft were

equipped with FLIR by that time.)

* * * * * *

January 1980 would prove to be the most demanding month during the preparation for the

mission. Kyle had continued to work with his

planners and had settled on a plan that required

six Combat Talons for Night One—Brenci’s lead

aircraft would carry the ran ger airfield security

force, Jubelt’s and Osborne’s aircraft would carry

Delta Force , and Uttaro and Meller’s aircraft

would be configured as bladder birds to refuel

the helicopters. Four Combat Talons originally

had been planned for the mission, but with the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

198
addition of two more aircraft, the number of

crews also had to be increased. With three 8th

SOS crews and two 1st SOS crews trained in

NVG operations by the first of January, an additional crew would be needed when three bladder

systems became available.

It was during this period that Kyle thought

about the EC-130E airborne battlefield command,

control, and communications (ABCCC) aircraft

that were stationed at Keesler AFB, Mississippi.

The aircraft were equipped with the in-flight refu -

eling modification and had been modified to accommodate a large capsule that could be removed

during aircraft maintenance. With the capsule removed the ABCCC aircraft, with their Dash 15

engines and relatively lightweight, seemed ideal

to Kyle for the bladder-bird mission. Unlike the

Combat Talon , the ABCCC aircraft did not have a

permanent console mounted in the cargo compartment and could accommodate two of the 3,000-

pound fuel bladders as compared to one for the

Combat Talon. Intelligence indicated that en route

altitudes to the objective area significantly above

Combat Talon terrain-following clearances were

adequate for the Night One mission. Utilizing the

ABCCC aircraft as bladder birds, 10 helicopters

could be refueled by three aircraft, with associated hoses, pumps, and filters carried on the

cargo ramp. The number of helicopters required

for the mission was still up in the air in early

January, so Kyle delayed sourcing the ABCCC

aircraft for security reasons. He theorized that he

could always get the Keesler AFB aircraft if he

needed them. In the meantime Vaught was pushing for another combined exercise that included

the 1st SOS.60

From 3 to 5 January, Meller’s crew deployed to

Pope AFB for fuel-cell testing. Brenci’s crew also

deployed to Pope AFB from 8 to 10 January for

testing of chemical lights (chem-light sticks) for

runway marking. Meller and Uttaro joined Brenci

for fuel-blivet drops at Pope AFB from 9 to 10

January. Thirty fuel blivets were air-dropped from

the three Talons without a single failure. The dispersion pattern on the ground proved to be acceptable.

Both at Hurlburt Field and at Pope AFB, almost

every night saw some form of mission-related

training being conducted. By midmonth Jubelt’s

crew had arrived from Kadena AB, and Turczynsk i

was busy getting himself and his crew up to speed

for the next combined exercise. 61 During the de -

ployment from Kadena AB, Kyle had directed that

Jubelt stop at LAS Ontario. On a Sunday afternoon the 1st SOS crew landed and was met by

Oliver and his team. The aircraft remained ove

night as Lockheed technicians proofed the new

developed “+ 30,000-pound” chip for the TF r

dar. The following morning Beres flew wi

Oliver and the Detachment 4 crew to flight che

the installation. Aircraft 64-0565 passed su cces

fully and became the first heavyweight-modifie

Combat Talon . Later in the day Jubelt and th

remainder of the crew took off and headed t

wards Hurlburt Field. Also aboard the aircra

was the prototype Benson tank system th

Oliver had been developing for the refuelin

operation. As the aircraft leveled off at altitud

fuel fumes began venting from the tank, forcin

the crew to return to Ontario for repairs. Th

problem was solved that evening, and the cre

made an uneventful flight to Florida the followin

morning.

The mid-January exercise was planned to repl

cate the complete 48-hour, two-day mission cycl

Four Combat Talons staged out of Hurlburt Fie

and onloaded both Delta Force and the rangers 

TAB-6 in the Eglin AFB range complex. Night o

was planned for Desert Rock, a small auxilia

airfield located in the Nellis AFB range comple

and night two was planned for Indian Springs Ai

field, Nevada. Brenci, in Combat Talon 64-056

had his “Rat Patrol” ranger assault force on boa

and was the first aircraft scheduled to land 

Desert Rock. Talon 64-0572 with Meller’s crew w

the number two aircraft and Talon 64-0565 wi

Jubelt’s crew was the number three aircraft. The

aircraft featured the Sealy configuration and h

Delta Force on board. Uttaro’s aircraft (64-056

was the number four Combat Talon that w

configured as a bladder bird. (There was still on

one operational bladder system.) Uttaro’s aircra

configuration was designated Exxon to deno

the aircraft’s fuel tanker status. Jubelt was al

scheduled to make an initial FLIR pass down th

Desert Rock runway to determine if the runw

was clear of obstacles and suitable for Brenci

initial landing.62

All four aircraft departed TAB-6 with the

scheduled loads and proceeded high level to the

refueling track over north Texas. Unknown to th

task force, one of the KC-135 tankers scheduled 

refuel the Talons had aborted for a landing ge

malfunction, and its wingman also had “symp

thetically” aborted, thus leaving no tanker su

port for the Night One mission. By the time Ky

learned of the situation, it was too late to scramb

a backup tanker. As the extended four-ship fo

mation approached the Dallas, Texas, area, AT

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

199
was asked to coordinate a 180-degree course reversal back to northwest Florida. Several minutes

of pandemonium with ATC resulted, but the formation managed to reverse itself and proceed

back to TAB-6 to return the rescue force to their

isolation facility. Night One had been a bust.63 It

was the one and only time that a rehearsal had to

abort for lack of tanker support. By the time

Vaught and Kyle finished rearranging SAC’s priorities, everyone was on the same sheet of music.

Night Two operations were more successful.

The rangers were onloaded at TAB-6 in a blinding rainstorm, and the four-ship formation, all

rigged in the Sealy configuration, departed for

Indian Springs with an air refueling again scheduled over north Texas. The refueling operation

went smoothly, and the formation proceeded to

its objective area. Clouds over the mountains ob -

scured the terrain during the ARA, but all aircraft made it safely down for their NVG landing.

Jubelt’s aircraft was the first across the airfield,

confirming that the runway was clear with his

FLIR. Brenci was one minute behind him for

landing. On short final, while relying on the pres -

sure altimeter for height reference, Brenci’s crew

came dangerously close to the desert floor short

of the runway and had to execute a go-around.

Procedures developed over the previous six

weeks had relied on the pressure altimeter as the

primary altitude reference during the approach

to landing. The pressure altimeter required an

accurate local altimeter setting to give correct information. With a weather system moving through

the area, barometric pressure had changed, and

without a source for the correct setting, Brenci’s

altimeter read higher than the aircraft’s actual

altitude. Because of the incident, procedures

were modified so that from that time forward

crews used the radar altimeter for primary

height reference during NVG approaches to uncontrolled airfiel ds.64

With Brenci executing a go-around, the following three aircraft landed in sequence with -

out a security force on the airfield. Brenci

landed last. Another valuable lesson w as learned—

if the landing sequence were disrupted for any

reason, plans had to include options for the follow-on aircraft flow so that the proper element

was on the ground in proper order (a lesson that

was forgotten in Grenada three years later).

Once on the ground, aircraft movement was

again confused with aircrews and rangers not

communicating with each other, partially because of nonstandard hand signals. Because of

the confusion, USAF CCT personnel later were

assigned the sole responsibility for marshaling

aircraft while on the grou nd.65

After the airfield seizure operation, all aircraft

departed Indian Springs en route back to TAB-6

and Hurlburt Field. A second IFR was accomplished without incident between Tucumcari,

New Mexico, and Childress, Texas. The entire

flight logged an average of 14.6 hours for each

aircraft and a total of 79.9 hours. Although long

and exhausting, the routes and times closely replicated the ones required to ingress and egress

Iran. Kyle was somewhat pleased with the exercise, but the lessons learned about the pressure

altimeter and the aircraft ground-marshaling

plan had to be quickly incorporated into standard

operating procedures. There was no time to

waste—another practice was scheduled from 28

January to 4 February.

Four Combat Talon crews had participated in

the midmonth Indian Springs exercise. Kyle’s vision was to use six Combat Talons for the Night

One mission or to use a combination of Combat

Talons and ABCCC aircraft. It was time to in -

crease the number of crews from four to five for

the next exercise. Jubelt and his crew had performed well during their first exercise; a testimony

to the preparation that Turczynski had made in

getting his squadron ready. Kyle called on the 1st

SOS for the fifth crew, and in short order Capt Bill

Osborne and his crew was headed east in Combat

Talon 64-0564 from Kadena AB to Hurlburt Field,

with an en route stop in Hawaii for fuel and crew

rest. East of Guam, Osborne rendezvoused with a

KC-135 tanker and spent the next hour dodging

thunderstorms and combating turbulence as he

onloaded 30,000 pounds of fuel. With a full fuel

load, the aircraft proceeded towards Hawaii.

About an hour later the engine fire warning light

illuminated for the number four engine, indicating

an engine fire. After shutting the engine down, the

firelight remained illuminated, and one of two fire

bottles was discharged. The fire indication went

out, and the flight engineer, along with the loadmasters, scanned the engine for any further sign

of fire. All was well with the crew adjusting its

altitude and en route airspeed for three-engine op -

erations. To the surprise of Osborne and his crew,

Col Dick Dunwoody came up on the flight deck

during the emergency. As the commander of the

1st SOW, he had been deployed to Guam with the

four gunships. He had hitched a ride on the Talon,

but the crew did not know his identity until the

emergency. Osborne continued on to Hawaii,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

200
where he landed without further incident. It took

another two days to repair the aircraft and once

again get moving towards Hurlburt Field. Dunwoody arranged a commercial flight out of Hawaii

and continued to Hurlburt Field immediately after Osborne landed.6 6

Before departing from Hawaii, Osborne called

back to the squadron at Kadena AB and was instructed to make an operation’s stop at LAS Ontario en route to Hurlburt Field. To make the

scheduled landing time at Hurlburt Field, Osborne had to land at LAS Ontario at 0200 Pacific

standard time. The crew thought it strange that

LAS Ontario would be open at that hour of the

night, but pressed on to California anyway. On

landing, the aircraft taxied to the controlled ramp

at LAS Ontario just as Jubelt had done earlier in

the month, and the security gate opened to allow

the aircraft to enter. On shutdown Oliver appeared on the flight deck, along with Buie Kindle

and their maintenance crew. The aircraft had

been diverted to LAS Ontario for installation of

the 30,000-pound heavyweight chip for the TF ra -

dar. Within two hours Oliver and his team had

Osborne airborne and on its way for the final leg

to Hurlburt Field. Just as planned the 1st SOS

crew landed at Hurlburt Field and was met by

Turczynski, Captain Lewis, and Captain Bakke.

For the next two hours, Osborne’s crew was inbriefed by Turczynski’s team, and the details of

the upcoming exercise were laid out for the crew

to digest. Turczynski’s second crew was now in

the thick of the operation.6 7

The last 10 days of January 1980 was an extremely busy period. Each day marked another

milestone that would enhance the Talon crews’

ability to accomplish their mission. Formation inflight refueling utilizing the new communicationsout procedure was practiced during the nights of

23 and 24 January. Jubelt’s crew also worked on

its FLIR procedures, while Osborne’s crew flew in

the Eglin AFB range to familiarize itself with

multiship operations.6 8

On 28 January Jubelt and Osborne deployed to

Pope AFB to preposition their aircraft for the next

exercise. Turczynski was the element commander

responsible for getting the aircraft and crews settled down for the overnight stay at Pope AFB. He

also coordinated aircraft servicing and the launch

schedule for the following day. The weather forecast was not good, but with a little luck, all would

go well for the exercise scheduled to begin on 29

January. The two Talons were parked on the Yellow Ramp away from the main C-130 operating

area, and the crews were billeted in Eisenhow

Hall at Fort Bragg, the US Army base adjacent 

Pope AFB. When the crews awoke the next mor

ing, there were easily six inches of snow coverin

the ground. Turczynski was in crew rest with th

two crews, and when he arrived at Pope AFB 

the early afternoon, he was confronted with h

maintainer’s request for support. Pope AFB w

in the midst of a heavy local-training day ai

dropping the 18th Airborne Corps and would n

send fuel trucks or aircraft deicing equipment 

the remote area where the Talons were parke

Faced with mission delay or possible cancellatio

Turczynski swung into action. For the remaind

of the afternoon, he did everything humanly po

sible to get the Pope AFB wing to support h

early evening launch but to no avail. He even vi

ited the wing commander and asked for his su

port but was shackled by security restrictions th

prevented him from divulging the nature of h

mission. He found that a mere lieutenant colon

with two special operations MC-130s had abs

lutely no priority at Pope AFB. Turczynski relu

tantly found a secure telephone at the base com

mand post and called Kyle. The East Coa

snowstorm had also delayed other aircraft partic

pating in the rehearsal along with the two Talon

There was nothing left for Vaught to do but 

cancel the night’s rehearsal and reschedule it fo

the following evening, 30 January.6 9

The entire rehearsal was postponed for 2

hours. The next day, when Turczynski and h

crews arrived at the Yellow Ramp, it was literal

alive with support personnel. From the wing com

mander on down, every colonel on Pope AFB wh

had even a remote responsibility for supportin

an aircraft launch was present. Fuel trucks, d

icing trucks, and trucks to refuel the deicing truck 

were all standing by. Kyle had made a couple 

telephone calls, and Pope AFB’s priorities were r

arranged.7 0 There would be no delays ever again 

Pope AFB due to nonsupport of the operation.

For this rehearsal Desert Rock, Nevada, w

again used for Night One operations, and India

Springs was used for Night Two. Jubelt and O

borne carried Delta Force , and Brenci carried th

rangers, with all three aircraft rigged in th

Sealy configuration. Uttaro and Meller were bo

Exxon configured, with a complete fuel-bladd

system installed on both aircraft for the fir

time. Jubelt, in aircraft 64-0565, was the fir

aircraft to take off from Pope AFB, followed fiv

minutes later by Osborne in aircraft 64-056

Brenci departed Hurlburt Field 25 minutes lat

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

201
and headed west in aircraft 64-0562. Forty-five

minutes after Brenci’s takeoff, Uttaro and Meller

departed Hurlburt Field with five-minute spacing. Again, a refueling track was established over

north Texas, and Jubelt, Brenci, and Osborne successfully onloaded 25,000 pounds of fuel each during a communications-out cell refueling. During

the refueling operation an air traffic controller

questioned why so many C-130s were heading

west at the same time. He openly speculated that

it must be a practice for a possible rescue attempt

of the hostages in Iran. Although he had no

knowledge of the actual mission, he had guessed

exactly what was going on. Later procedures that

did not rely on verbal transmissions to air traffic

control were developed that reduced the possibility of a lucky guess. One hour after the first

two aircraft had finished refueling, Uttaro and

Meller hit the track and also onloaded 25,000

pounds of fuel. When the second element departed the tanker track, Jubelt was still three

hours out of Desert Rock.71

Jubelt’s FLIR approach to Desert Rock went

flawlessly, and he made a planned go-around to

maneuver for landing behind Uttaro. Brenci was

the first to land, touching down on the blackedout runway exactly one minute after Jubelt’s

FLIR pass. Williford’s rangers departed Brenci’s

aircraft and set about securing the airfield. By

this time, the rangers had acquired enough NVGs

for every soldier to be issued a set. The gun jeep

and the CCT motorcycles also had IR paper lenses

installed over their headlights. The seizure went

like clockwork. Twenty minutes after Brenci’s

landing, Osborne was on the ground with Delta

Force , and five minutes later Jubelt was down

with the rest of Beckwith’s men. With their personnel downloaded, Jubelt, Brenci, and Osborne

departed the airfield to make room for the two

Exxon aircraft and the RH-53Ds. Ten minutes after Brenci departed, Uttaro and Meller landed in

five-minute trail formation. The two aircraft taxied into their planned refueling positions and

waited for the RH-53Ds to arrive. When the helicopters landed later than planned, the two Combat Talons backed up using reverse propeller

thrust to reach the static helicopters (planners had

determined that it was safer to back up the Talon

than to taxi the large helicopters near the C-130

and risk contact with the main rotors). Some prob -

lems were encountered during the refueling opera -

tion that were attributed to determining the exact

distance from the helicopters to the Combat Talon

aircraft. Delta Force loaded on to the RH-53Ds

after the refueling operation was completed, and

the rangers collapsed their perimeter defenses and

departed the airfield onboard the two Talons. Inflight refueling went flawlessly during the return

leg, and all aircraft landed back at Hurlburt Field,

logging an average of 14.5 hours each.7 2

Ten hours after Meller’s Talon landed at

Hurlburt Field, the five crews were assembled for

the mission brief for Night Two. All five Combat

Talons were Sealy configured, with a landing sequence of Meller, Brenci, Uttaro, Osborne, and

Jubelt. As was the case during Night One,

Jubelt’s crew would make an initial FLIR pass

over Indian Springs to determine if the runway

was clear. Meller would be the first to land on the

blacked-out runway. Jubelt was the first to depart

Hurlburt Field, followed three minutes later by

Meller, and then the rest of the formation five

minutes in trail. The in-bound refueling operation

with the KC-135 went as planned. Seven and onehalf hours after takeoff, Jubelt was making his

FLIR pass over Indian Springs. One minute later

Meller was on the ground, with Brenci landing

one minute after him. Five minutes after Brenci’s

landing, Uttaro landed, followed two minutes

later by Osborne, then Jubelt.

Prior to the arrival of the Talons at Indian

Springs, Delta Force assaulted a simulated embassy compound that was 30 miles from the airfield. The helicopter formation that was to extract

Delta Force from the embassy compound was late

arriving, thus causing a delay in transporting

Delta Force to its exfiltration point at Indian

Springs. The helicopters showed up over two hours

late at Indian Springs, and Delta Force , along with

the role-playing hostages, boarded the Talons and

departed the airfield.7 3 For both nights’ rehearsals,

the fixed-wing portion of the plan had gone almost

flawlessly. The late arrival of the helicopters on

both nights, however, created some doubt in the

minds of the Talon crews of the helicopter crews’

ability to execute the actual mission on the

planned time line.

As the simulated embassy takedown and exfiltration operation was taking place, an AC-130H

gunship orbited over Indian Springs to provide

on-call fire support. The entire two-night rehearsal was considered a huge success by senior

leadership. For the first time since training began

in November, the JTF could savor the satisfaction

of having a workable plan on the shelf. There we re

a lot of moving parts, and they all had to mesh.

Weather also had to cooperate to ensure mission

success. A feeling of accomplishment permeated

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

202
the rescue force (except perhaps the helicopters).

Vaught quickly relayed the news to the CJCS

and the Joint Staff that the JTF had a workable

plan. He had a private meeting with the chairman and came away from it a bit deflated—the

administration was getting cold feet regarding a

military option. The political climate in Iran

seemed to be swaying back towards a release of

the hostages. The roller-coaster ride that the JTF

had been on for three months had just taken a

nosedive. 74

At Hurlburt Field the Talon crews were ecstatic. Two solid months of intense training had

paid off. Throughout the history of special opera -

tions, those who operated Combat Talon prized

individualism and personal abilities. The nature

of a lone Combat Talon penetrating hostile airspace at low level for hours on end bred a sense of

independence and individualism in those who

flew them. But the successful rehearsal brought

out new feelings among the special operations

participants—the feeling of teamwork and the realization that the sum of the parts for mission

success was greater than the effort of a single

crew. The rehearsal had been a success because of

teamwork and because every individual involved

did his best. Everyone was exhausted after the

two-day practice, and an early beer at the club

was a welcomed relief. The mission was doable,

and the Combat Talon community was going to

put the JTF on its back and make it happen.

* * * * * *

With Washington again in a wait-and-see

mode, the intensity of JTF operations ratcheted

down several notches during the early days of

February. Part of the more relaxed climate was a

direct result of the successful rehearsal conducted

at Desert Rock and at Indian Springs. Turczynski

took his two aircraft and crews back to Kadena

AB, and the 8th SOS caught its breath as it con -

centrated on continuation-training requirements

for the squadron. The general feeling at Hurlburt

Field was that Washington had decided to pursue

a political solution to the hostage crisis and that

the mission was no longer high on President Carter’s list of options. Les Smith departed the 8th

SOS and headed for Kadena AB as Turczynski’s

new operations officer, and Brenci moved up to

become the operations officer of the 8th SOS under Guidry.

At J3-SOD Hess continued to coordinate a

tions of the JTF with Taylor’s OPG. Althoug

much had been done by the JTF to develop th

rescue option, the OPG had continued to look 

other possibilities designed to punish Tehran 

the hostages were harmed. The punitive-strik

option by the four gunships stationed at Gua

continued to be one such possibility. At the 8

SOS a fifth Combat Talon crew was formed 

early January under the command of Capt Joh

Arnold. His crew flew initial missions from 9 to 2

January 1980 testing the feasibility of new tec

nology that was designed to seriously degrad

Tehran’s ability to produce and transport electric

power through its grid network. The program w

code-named Project Elbow Rub and continue

throughout 1980 in anticipation of employme

against Iran. In early April Arnold and his p

mary loadmaster, Rudy Blazek, deployed to th

Pacific with the capability, and two 1st SOS Com

bat Talons (aircraft 62-1843 and 63-7785) we

modified to deliver it. A third 1st SOS crew, com

manded by John Pearson, was trained for the E

bow Rub mission. Turczynski was selected b

PACOM as the mission commander should th

mission be employed. When Turczynski deploy

to Diego Garcia in mid-April, Arnold and Blaze

moved the Elbow Rub equipment by way of C-14

to Diego Garcia to provide Turczynski the cap

bility to use it should the situation dictate. A

though neither the gunship strike nor the capabi

ity developed by Arnold and his crew was ev

used against Iran, the OPG had both option

ready in case they were needed.*

February 1980: The Relentless

Pursuit of Excellence

Although the hectic pace had subsided a bit 

Hurlburt Field, the February lull provided Bren

and his 8th SOS crews time to refine and perfe

their newly acquired NVG, air-drop, and comm

nications skills. Both Kyle and Hess went o

much needed leaves after finishing postexerci

requirements. The antenna that Oliver’s develo

ment team had manufactured was installed on 

Combat Talon , and on 15 and 16 February, th

SATCOM system was tested for its suitability 

the MC-130E . The test validated the installatio

giving commanders, from the president on dow

the ability to communicate with the aircraft—

flight or on the grou nd—nearly anywhere in th

__________

 *Project Elbow Rub remained highly classified throughout the 1990s. The exact nature of the capability developed during 1980 remained on t

cutting edge of military technology. John Arnold continued to be associated with Special Operations and became known for his intellect and ke

ability to grasp difficult concepts and then apply them to unique military requirements.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

203
world. Before acquiring the SATCOM Combat

Talon had relied on the HF radio for long-range

communications, with scrambling and decod -

ing devices required if communications were

kept secu re. 75

From 20 to 24 February, refurbished FLIR systems were installed and tested on the three 8th

SOS aircraft. Most Hurlburt Field aircrews had

never seen an FLIR since they had not been installed in TAC MC-130s over most of the previous

10 years. Only the 1st SOS had maintained the

FLIR capability throughout the 1970s for its sea

surveillance mission. Hurlburt Field crews soon

mastered the system and incorporated the FLIR

into their low-level mission profile. It was none too

soon—Vaught was getting nervous about the relaxed pace of the JTF. He was also uneasy about

the helicopters—they had yet to show that they

could accurately navigate to the rendezvous site on

time. He and his JTF staff wanted another fullscale rehearsal, but the CJCS denied his request.

A political solution was being vigorously pursued

by the Carter administration, and Jones did not

want to risk affecting that process. Towards the

end of February, Jones reluctantly approved a

limited joint training exercise for a portion of the

JTF. It so happened that both Kyle and Hess

were still on leave when the planning began for

the late February rehearsal. Through oversight of

the JTF planners, Turczynski was not notified in

time to bring his two crews back from Kadena AB

to participate in the rehearsal. The 8th SOS crews

interpreted their absence as another indication

that President Carter was not seriously considering a military option.

On 25 February Uttaro prepositioned his Combat Talon (aircraft 64-0572) to Pope AFB in prepa -

ration for a 26 February launch. The limited rehearsal was scheduled to use Twenty-Nine Palms

for Night One and Laguna AAF for Night Two,

with both scenarios compressed into the same

night. Only three Combat Talons were available

for this practice, with Brenci flying 64-0562 and

Meller flying 64-0567. One nonair-refuelable AC130H, commanded by Dunwoody, also participated

in the exercise. (Dunwoody would land at DavisMonthan AFB to refuel.) Uttaro’s and Brenci’s aircraft were both in the Sealy configuration, with

Uttaro carrying Delta Force and Brenci carrying a

reduced ranger airfield seizure package. Meller’s

aircraft was in the Exxon configuration and for the

first time had internal pallet-mounted twin Benson tanks installed instead of the rubber fuel bladder. (Oliver’s team had come through again with a

prototype twin-tank, roll-on, roll-off assembly.)

The now-standard sequence of events began on 26

February, when Uttaro departed Pope AFB with

his Delta Force on board. Brenci was next, taking

off from Hurlburt Field one hour after Uttaro left

Pope AFB. One hour after Brenci, Meller was airborne from Hurlburt Field. Uttaro and Brenci

joined up en route and refueled in cell formation

with a KC-135 tanker and then proceeded towards

Twenty-Nine Palms. Meller followed the other two

aircraft with a single-ship refueling and continued

on his flight-planned route. 76

Uttaro flew the FLIR clearing pass over

Twenty-Nine Palms with the newly installed

FLIR system, and Brenci landed on the blackedout runway one minute later with his ranger

airfield-seizure package. Fifteen minutes after

Brenci’s landing, Uttaro was down with Delta

Force . A short time later, Brenci was airborne,

with Uttaro following him 15 minutes later. Meller

was the last to land at Twenty-Nine Palms, and he

taxied into position and began to set up for the

scheduled helicopter refueling. Weather in the

high-desert country of southern California had

been marginal durin g the operation, but all three

Talons were able to make their scheduled landings

as planned. The helicopters, however, could not

make it through the mountain passes to the airfield and had to return to Laguna AAF. With the

helicopters canceled due to weather, Meller’s crew

loaded up the rangers and departed Twenty-Nine

Palms. With the three Talons airborne, Vaught de -

cided to rehearse the ground helicopter refueling

operation at Laguna AAF. The short one-hour

flight was uneventful, and Meller was the first to

land at Laguna AAF, followed by Brenci and Uttaro. After another hour on the ground waiting for

the helicopters, the three Talons departed for a

short flight to Davis-Monthan AFB, where they

went into crew rest for their return flight to Florid a

the following day. Late in the evening on 28 Feb -

ruary, the three aircraft arrived back at Hurlburt

Field.77

The limited rehearsal had not gone as well as

Vaught and Kyle had expected, primarily due to

bad weather and its impact on the helicopters.

The Combat Talon portion of the exercise was

perfect, with even Vaught commenting to Kyle on

how well he thought the Talon crews performed.

The weather had been a problem for the helicop -

ters but not for the fixed-wing aircraft.

By March 1980 only about 11 hours of darkness were available for the rescue force to complete its Night One operation. The helicopters

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

204
required eight and one-half hours of darkness to

penetrate into the center of Iran, refuel, and fly

on to their hide site before first light. If all went

according to plan, the helicopters had an hour

and a half to spare. The last Combat Talon had

to be clear of Iranian airspace no later than nine

hours after darkness. Figuring a 30-minute pad

for the Talons and one hour for the helicopters, 1

May was the last night with nine and one-half

hours of darkness. The mission had to go on or

before that da te. 78

Life at Kadena AB had settled down a bit after

Jubelt and Osborne returned from the early Feb -

ruary exercise. The squadron had continued to refine its blacked-out NVG procedures and had increased its formed crews from two to three. Heavy

equipment drops, including the 5,000-pound

blivet, were not practiced because of the lack of

equipment and rigging support in the Pacific.

Communications-out IFR and low-level formation

procedures were practiced. The month of February passed quickly as the Pacific Combat Talon

crews maintained their flight proficiency, and

March began with no indication of increased JTF

activity. Osborne reluctantly went on a long

leave with his family to Taiwan. Two days after

his departure, Turczynski got a call to deploy two

aircraft and two crews back to the United States.

With Osborne off the island, Fleming moved up

to aircraft commander, and Rumple was added to

the second crew as the safety pilot. Turczynski’s

three crews included the following personnel:*

Deployment to Hurlburt Field went smoothly

for Jubelt and Fleming. They arrived back in

Florida to find the 8th SOS preparing for another

full-blown dress rehearsal. The next exercise was

scheduled for 25–27 March.

* * * * * *

From the early stages of Operation Rice Bow

JTF planners had selected Manzariyeh as th

Night Two exfiltration location. Night One ha

remained up in the air as various options wer

considered. The first option developed by the JT

was to air-drop fuel blivets in an isolated locatio

in the interior of Iran, and then refuel the helico

ters from these blivets. Beckwith did not like th

option because there were too many variables 

the plan. What if the blivets landed in a ravin

and couldn’t be moved? Or, what if the helicopte

could not find the blivets after they were ai

dropped? What if the pa rachute-delivery syste

failed? Beckwith’s unanswered list of questio

was a long one. The second option, and the on

most exercised during the training phase leadin

up to the March rehearsal, was airlanding th

fixed-wing aircraft on a small, disused airfie

somewhere in central Iran and seizing it for follo

on refueling operations. This option left th

ranger security force on the airfield for 24 hou

while Delta Force, aboard the helicopters, move

to the Tehran area for the rescue. The range

would be exfiltrated the following night at th

same time that Delta Force and the hostages wer

being extracted. Planners felt this option w

somewhat “iffy” because of the extended time r

quired on the ground in Iran. The third optio

considered by JTF planners called for a landing 

a remote desert-landing site and refueling th

helicopters from the C-130s. After completion 

the refueling operation, the C-130s would depa

Iran before first light, and the helicopters wou

proceed to a laager site to await Night Two.

The challenge for the third option was finding 

suitable landing site that could support heavy 

130 aircraft. By February the JTF intelligenc

section had located a site that promised to fulfi

the Night One airland requirement. The locatio

was a large, flat area of compacted sand locate

approximately 530 miles from the southwest coa

of Iran and about 220 miles from the desert hid

site selected for the overnight layover of the helicop 

ters. Using those distances, the helicopters cou

reach the location from their carrier launch poin

refuel, fly to the hide site, and still have enoug

fuel to make it to Tehran to pick up the hostag

and then fly on to Manzariyeh. There was on

drawback to the location—a dirt road ran dow

the center of the area being considered for th

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3

Jubelt Fleming Pearson

Nimmo Schwall Osborne

Turczynski Rumple Wilson

Sumida Peppers Ozlins

Smith Townsend Ross

Prater Novy Perkumas

Tafoya Felton Banks

Diehl Devine Farrell

Frederickson Hickman Kirby

Joy Huff Baker

 – – – – Hamilton

__________

 *Crew 3 was the primary Elbow Rub crew and the spare crew for the rescue mission. Had Elbow Ru b launched, Pearson’s crew would have be

augmented by Arnold, Blazek, and Turczynski, the mission commander.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

205
landing zone. The road appeared to be similar to

rural dirt roads in America and connected the

two small towns of Yazd and Tabas. How much

traffic traveled the road at night was a question

that could not yet be answered.79 By March the

desert landing location had been identified as

Desert One, with the helicopter overnight hide

site called Desert Two. Kyle was adamant about

one thing before landing a C-130 in the desert—

there had to be a site survey done to determine

if the subsurface could support the heavyweight

aircraft.

From aerial photos Desert One appeared to

offer a suitable landing area. With the dirt road

on one side, there were approximately 4,000 feet

of hard sand that could be used for a runway.

North of the road also appeared to be usable.

Tracks of vehicles cutting across the area indicated that the sand there was also compacted

and could at least support heavy trucks. For the

site to accommodate six C-130s and eight helicopters, an area 800 feet wide was needed near

the end of each runway. To ensure that the site

could handle C-130 aircraft and to put into

place some means for the C-130 crews to determine the beginning of the landing zone, a survey mission had to be flown to the site before

commencement of the operation.80

With the sourcing of a second bladder system,

it was time to expand the 8th SOS crew pool from

three to four. The prototype Benson tank used

by Meller’s crew during the previous dress rehearsal was still under development, and it

would take Detachment 4 and LAS Ontario

some time to field the production version. The

JTF decided to proceed with the rubber fuel

bladders since they were on the shelf and available. Brenci realigned his existing three crews

and created a forth crew commanded by Capt

Hal Lewis. Some new personnel were brought

on board, with the four formed 8th SOS crews

consisting of the following personnel:

Hurlburt Field had been scheduled for major

runway resurfacing and repair during fiscal year

80, and the contractor had been continually postponed in starting the work. Since Hurlburt Field

had only one runway, the repair would close the

airfield for an extended period. Therefore, on 14

March all Combat Talons were moved to Eglin

AFB, and the gunships were relocated to Duke

Field. Future operations would stage out of Eglin

AFB, with aircrews and maintenance personnel

being shuttled from Hurlburt Field for each flight.

The 1st SOS aircraft also staged out of Eglin AFB

when they returned for the next exercise.

By March Kyle was ready to source one EC130E (ABCCC) aircraft from Keesler AFB, Mis -

sissippi. His security concerns had been minimized when Pinard’s maintenance deputy, Colonel

Robertson, was transferred from Hurlburt Field

to Keesler AFB to become the chief of maintenance for the ABCCC outfit. Darden and a basic

Combat Talon crew picked up ABCCC aircraft

62-1857 in mid-March, and training began to develop low-level formation procedures with the

Combat Talon . The EC-130E did not have the

sophisticated radar and navigational equipment

found on the Combat Talon . For the next two

weeks, formation flights were conducted to allow

crews to become proficient in the ABCCC aircraft. With the large communications capsule removed, there was a full cargo compartment that

could handle two of the rubber fuel bladders.

With the in-flight refueling modification already

installed on the aircraft, it was nearly ideal for

the bladder-refueling mission.

Preparation for the 25 to 27 March rehearsals

intensified as the JTF fixed-wing aircraft operated out of Eglin AFB. Still uneasy about refueling the helicopters on the ground, Kyle had

asked Guidry to look at the possibility of refueling the helicopters in flight using the Combat

Talon . Without refueling pods installed, Guidry

looked at the possibility of extending a refueling

hose out the ramp of the Talon to allow the helicopter to refuel immediately behind the aircraft.

A test mission was flown on 18 March with a

20th SOS helicopter, and Guidry determined

that turbulence immediately behind the Talon

was too great to allow safe operation of a centerline hose system. Guidry reported back to Kyle

that the only way to refuel the helicopters was

to have the wing refueling pods installed on the

Talons. Oliver was working a solution at LAS

Ontario, but the lead time was too long for the

capability to be in place for the rescue attempt.81

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4

Brenci Uttaro Meller Lewis

Tharp Diggins Thigpen McIntosh

Ferkes Bagby Williamson Harrison

Chapman Beres Launder Bakke

Galloway Weaver McBride McMillan

Gamble Yagher Robb Drohan

Almanzar Newberry Daigenault Mayo

Chitwood Gingerich Mink Beyers

Wiley Doyle Chesser McClain

Sanchez Metherell Thomas Bancroft

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

206
The prototype Benson tank was operating well in

aircraft 64-0572, but it could only be used for

ground refueling of the helicopters or to replenish

the aircraft’s own fuel suppl y.

The next dress rehearsal began on 24 March

when Jubelt, in aircraft 64-0565, and Fleming, in

aircraft 64-0568 (nonair-refuelable), departed Eglin AFB for Pope AFB.* With their now-standard

Sealy configuration, they would transport Delta

Force the following night to Twenty-Nine Palms

for the Night One transload to the helicopters.

Indian Springs would serve as the night two rehearsal site. On 25 March Jubelt was the first to

take off out of Pope AFB, with Brenci in aircraft

64-0551 (nonair-refuelable) and his ranger force

the next to get airborne at Eglin AFB. At Pope

AFB Fleming was the third aircraft in the flow to

take off, followed by Uttaro (64-0572), Lewis (64-

0567), and Meller (64-0562) in two-minute trail

formation out of Eglin AFB. Lewis and Meller

were both delayed slightly but made up the lost

time en route to the tanker track. Uttaro’s aircraft had the Benson tank installed, with Lewis

and Meller in the standard Exxon configuration

with a rubber fuel bladder in each aircraft. Jubelt

refueled over Abilene, Texas, as Brenci and

Fleming pressed on to their low-level entry

points. Uttaro, Lewis, and Meller also refueled

from a KC-135 tanke r.82

At Twenty-Nine Palms the airfield assault

went like clockwork, with each Talon executing

its approach and landing exactly as planned. Lewis’s crew, participating as a formed crew in a

joint exercise for the first time, performed like old

heads. Even the helicopters arrived as planned

and were refueled without incident. After departure from Twenty-Nine Palms, both Brenci and

Fleming stopped for fuel before returning to Eglin

AFB. The other four aircraft refueled over Texas

during their return leg. 83

For the Night Two rehearsal, four Combat Talons and one C-141 were used. Meller had trained

a C-141 crew in NVG operations at Hurlburt

Field back in February, and the crew had been

working on its own aircraft-specific procedures

since that time. As Beckwith’s Delta Force team

expanded to 120 personnel to execute the complex hostage-rescue plan, JTF planners turned to

the larger and faster C-141 aircraft to accommodate the increased load. The C-141 could also deliver any wounded personnel to a medical facility

almost twice as fast a s could the C-130. Like th

ABCCC aircraft, however, it had limited low-lev

navigational capability, and it required addition

navigational aids on the airfield to make a su

cessful approach and landin g.84

Four Combat Talons, one C-141, and one A

130H gunship were used for the Night Two r

hearsal. All aircraft, except the C-141 , originate

from Eglin AFB, with Gallagher in the AC-130

being the first to depart. The four Combat Talo

were in the Sealy configuration with rangers o

board and were commanded by Jubelt, Meller, U

taro, and Lewis. All four Talon aircraft refueled 

cell with two KC-135 tankers three hours afte

takeoff. After an extended low-level route, Jube

again made a FLIR pass at Indian Springs, wi

Meller landing one minute later. Uttaro followe

Meller 60 seconds later, with Lewis two minut

behind Uttaro. Jubelt landed last, two minut

after Lewis touched down.85

As the aircraft were landing at Indian Spring

Gallagher’s AC-130 was orbiting some 20 mil

from the airfield. Beckwith transmitted the cod

word Ornament over secure radio, signaling th

Delta Force was going over the embassy wall 

rescue the hostages. The call came just befo

Jubelt’s FLIR pass. Indian Springs was secu

within 20 minutes of Meller’s landing, and th

C-141 was cleared for its approach. The CCT ha

installed a portable TACAN near the approac

end of the runway and portable landing ligh

down the runway to help the larger aircraft 

land. As the C-141 crew approached the airfiel

the pilot initiated a go around and made a lo

approach. The aircraft flew a second approac

with the same results. After several tries, an

with the helicopters landing, Vaught called tim

out and had the regular airfield runway ligh

turned on for safety purposes. With the C-14

finally down, the transload operation was com

pleted. The remainder of the rehearsal we

smoothly. One of the helicopters had gotten lo

en route to the embassy objective area and ha

impacted Beckwith’s timing. The helicopte

were again late to arrive at the airfield fo

transload of personnel to the C-141 and to th

Combat Talons.

86

All aircraft departed Indian Springs 

planned, with the four Combat Talons and th

gunship refueling for a second time en rou

back to Eglin AFB. The C-141 returned Delt

__________

 *Turczynski did not participate in the 24–25 March dress rehearsal. He was tasked to remain at Kadena AB and be prepared to launch the Elb

Rub mission if that option was selected. Kyle was not read into the Elbow Rub mission and was quite perturbed when he found out that Turczyn

could not return to the United States for the final rehearsal. The next time Turczynski would join the JTF would be at Masirah Island, Om

during the execution phase of the rescue mission.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

207
Force and the JTF staff to Pope AFB. With the

exception of the C-141 low approaches and the

late helicopters, the rehearsal had been another

success. Postexercise review determined that the

C-141 problem could be eliminated for the actual

mission into Manzariyeh by turning on the runway lights after the assault force had secured the

airfield. The element of surprise would no longer

be needed since, by that time, Beckwith would

have already freed the hostages from the em -

bassy compound.87 As it turned out the March

rehearsal was the last full-scale exercise before

the April mission.

The Pieces of the Puzzle Fall into Place

The JTF intelligence folks had continued to

study the Desert One landing site identified back

in February, and by the end of March, they were

convinced that the site was the answer to the

landing problem. By 1 April Kyle had considered

the desert landing site almost a dead issue since

little additional information had been passed to

him during the workup for the March full-dress

rehearsal. Kyle’s insistence on a landing-zone survey of Desert One, however, paid off. Unknown to

Kyle in a 22 March 1980 meeting at Camp David,

President Carter approved a reconnaissance mission to the proposed Desert One landing location.

The president had received his first full-mission

briefing from Jones at that time and thought

enough of the plan to approve the flight.88

Maj John Carney, a USAF CCT member attached to the JTF, was selected to fly with two

CIA pilots in a Twin Otter aircraft across Iran to

the landing site. The mission was set for 3 April

1980. Tom Bradley was alerted at Wadi Kena,

and he quickly redeployed his two 7th SOS Combat Talons from Egypt to Germany for installa -

tion of Fulton STARS equipment. Bradley then

returned to Wadi Kena with the two aircraft in

time to provide an emergency means of extracting

the three Americans from Iran in the event the

CIA aircraft experienced a mechanical problem

and was unable to depart the country.

The survey mission went as planned, with no

aircraft mechanical problems. Bradley’s STARS

backup capability was not needed. After landing

at Desert One, Carney unloaded a small motor cycle

and headed north to survey the area. The plan

had been to land to the south of the dirt road that

ran through the landing zone. Carney soon realized that the aircraft had actually landed north of

the dirt road, so he backtracked to his starting

location and set off to the south on the motorcycle.

He tested the consistency of the hard-packed sand

and determined that it would support the heavy

C-130 aircraft. It took Carney about an hour to

finish the survey and to bury the landing lights

that had been developed by the CIA specifically

for the rescue mission. While Carney was burying

the lights, four vehicles passed him on the dirt

road.8 9 When Carney’s survey was finished, the

three men took off from Desert One and retraced

their ingress route out of Iran. For several days

the intelligence community closely monitored all

available sources to determine if the flight had

been detected. When there was no reaction from

the Iranians, it was clear that the mission had

gone without their knowledge. Another piece of

the puzzle had fallen into place.

With the knowledge that Desert One was C130 capable, Kyle shifted training emphasis at

Hurlburt Field to short-field operations into a

dirt strip. (Before their departure back to

Kadena AB, the 1st SOS crews had trained on a

seldom-used dirt strip in the Eglin AFB range

complex named landing zone (LZ) East. By the

time Carney’s mission was completed on 3

April, Turczynski and his two crews were already back at Kadena AB.) LZ East was located

in the eastern part of the Eglin AFB range, just

a few air miles northeast of Duke Field. The LZ

consisted of hard-packed red clay and was 3,500-

feet long and 60-feet wide. Approach to the dirt

strip was restricted to landing to the southwest

to avoid Duke Field’s landing pattern. The approach put the aircraft just north of Defuniak

Springs, Florida, as the crew maneuvered for its

Photo courtesy of Roland Guidry

The Twin Otter planned to land to the south of the dirt

road. When John Carney deplaned and headed north to

find the road, he realized that he was, in fact, on the

north side. He retraced his route and crossed the road

near the bend in the road. He buried the landing lights

in the desert floor to help guide the lead Combat Talon

to a successful landing.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

208
NVG lan dings. Because of the short runway, cov -

ert IR lights were set up in the box-four-and-one

pattern, which was the same light pattern that

Carney had buried at Desert One. Large pine

trees surrounded LZ East, further making it a

challenging landing for the Talon crews. A dirt

road ran down the south side of the strip and had

to be closed when operations were conducted. In

short order the 8th SOS mission crews honed

their skills on the LZ and refined their profi -

ciency in dirt short-field landings.

* * * * * *

The two-night plan developed over the past three

months had conformed to Chairman Jones’s direction that no location other than Egypt or Diego

Garcia be used for the operation. Both nights were

planned to originate from Wadi Kena, Egypt. Night

one was by far the longest mission, with mission

aircraft flying down the Red Sea, around Saudi Arabia, refueling south of Yemen, and then penetrating

Iranian airspace low level to the landing location.

After takeoff from Desert One, the aircraft would

retrace their route of flight, refueling again on the

return leg, and landing back at Wadi Kena. The

18-hour mission was executable, but a closer launch

location would improve the probability of mission

success. At about the same time that Carney’s CIA

aircraft was penetrating Iranian airspace, Vaught

received word that Masirah Island, just off the

southwest coast of Oman, had been approved for

staging the Night One mission. British pilots and

support personnel were stationed at the airfield and

supported the sultan of Oman’s air force. The approval for a suitable staging location was another

critical piece of the complicated puzzle. With approval to use Masirah Island, Doug Ulery was rede -

ployed from Hurlburt Field to Washington, D.C., to

plan the flight from there to Desert One. The rollercoaster ride had peaked again—in a short week’s

time since the March rehearsal, it appeared that

Carter was headed toward a military option for

solving the hostage crisis.90 With concentrated dirtlanding training under way at Hurlburt Field,

Vaught decided that one more limited rehearsal

was needed to validate the desert refueling operation. Vaught’s final limited rehearsal would utilize

one Combat Talon , one EC-130E, and four RH-53D

helicopters and was scheduled from 10 to 16 April.

The Last Rehearsal

Brenci’s crews had been busy at Hurlburt Fie

and on the Eglin AFB range. In the previous fiv

months, Brenci had formed four crews that we

proficient in NVG landings, in-flight refuelin

blivet drops, bladder-bird operations, and low

level formation procedures. The two-night pla

that was finalized during the first few days 

April called for five mission crews from the 8

SOS and three crews from the 1st SOS (one of th

1st SOS crews was to serve as a spare). Bren

again used many personnel who had been i

volved in the previous dress rehearsals and cr

ated a fifth and final crew. Brenci’s five crew

that would execute the two-night Iranian rescu

mission included the following personnel:

Turczynski’s contingent remained intact 

Kadena AB, with Jubelt and Fleming being de

ignated primary mission crews and Pearson

crew serving as the primary Elbow Rub crew an

a spare mission crew. There was not enough tim

to bring the 1st SOS crews back from Kadena A

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3

Brenci Uttaro *Meller

Ferkes Diggins Thigpen

Guidry Bagby Williamson

Chapman Beres Launder

Galloway Weaver McBride

Gamble **Yagher Robb

Almanzar Newberry Diagenault

Chitwood Gingerich Mink

Wiley Doyle Chesser

Sanchez Metherell Thomas

 – – ***Cole Chamness

Crew 4 Crew 5

Lewis Tharp

McIntosh Darden

Harrison Burke

Bakke Logan

McMillan Poole

**Drohan Garrett

Mayo Latona

Beyers Messer

McClain Thomas

Bancrost Chesser

***Witherspoon – –

__________

 *Meller’s crew did not fly on the Night One mission to Desert One. His crew was designated the lead crew into Manzariyeh for Night Two.

 **Yagher and Drohan did not fly on the Night One mission. The EC-130Es that Uttaro and Lewis flew to Desert One did not have ECM equipm

that required an EWO.

 ***The following personnel were designated spare crew members in case of DNIF: Rhode, Ulery, Mosley, Cole (flew with Uttaro’s crew to Des

One), Javens, Presson, and Witherspoon (flew with Lewis’s crew to Desert One).

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

209
to participate in the mid-April final rehearsal.

Carter had decided on the night of 24 April as the

execute date for Night One. Turczynski’s three 1st

SOS crews included the following personnel:

From 10 to 16 April, two aircraft deployed

from Hurlburt Field to the desert southwest, and

21 training sorties were flown in direct support of

Operation Rice Bowl. Desert airdrops of Delta

Force were accomplished, along with desert landings in both the MC-130E and the EC-130E. The

training culminated with a mission rehearsal

during the night of 14 April. Meller’s crew (in

Combat Talon 64-0562) and Tharp’s crew (EC130E aircraft 62-1857) participated in an NVG

airland operation on the dry lake bed at Edwards

AFB, California. The plan was for Meller to land

first in his Combat Talon , followed by Tharp in

the bladder-configured EC-130E. Fifteen minutes

after Tharp landed, four RH-53D helicopters

would arrive and refuel from Tharp’s aircraft.

Kyle and the JTF planners felt that this limited

rehearsal would test everything they needed to

validate refueling the helicopters from a desert

location. Most of the operation already had been

rehearsed in previous exercises.91

Exactly on cue Meller touched down on the

covertly lighted desert LZ, but Tharp, who was

following Meller in trail, executed a go-around.

Tharp then maneuvered the less-capable EC130E for another approach and landing. Five

minutes after Meller’s landing, Tharp touched

down and was marshaled to his ground-refueling

location. Tharp’s crew set up the hoses and

pumps and was ready to refuel the helicopters

when the four helicopters arrived 15 minutes

later. Within 30 minutes, the helicopters had

been refueled and were on their way to the simulated hide site.92 After the helicopters departed

the area, Meller and Tharp rolled up their opera -

tion and departed the desert LZ.

Some problems were encountered during the

limited rehearsal that had to be resolved before

mission execution. Tharp’s aircraft had been

parked on a slight downhill slope on the dry lake

bed, with the nose slightly lower than the tail. As

a result, some 2,000 pounds of fuel could not be

pumped from the bladder. There also were some

minor problems with marshaling the helicopters,

but the operation went smoothly. During the lowlevel route with the MC-130E leading the EC130E, no major problems were encountered. Utilizing NVGs the covertly lighted Combat Talon

was easily seen by Tharp’s crew up to five miles

in trail. Because there was no moon illumination,

however, Tharp was required to fly 1,000 feet

above Meller’s altitude to ensure terrain clearance. With two fuel bladders installed, the EC130E was much heavier than the Combat Talon ,

which resulted in a higher final-approach speed

that caused spacing problems when the Talon

slowed down to lower its gear. Tharp’s closure on

lead was the reason he executed the go-around

after Meller executed his landing. A recommendation resulting from the limited rehearsal was

that the EC-130E and the MC-130E practice lowlevel formation procedures, with emphasis on the

slowdown for landing maneuver.93 (At Hurlburt

Field the formation slowdown maneuver was

practiced on 16 and 17 April, and all crews

gained proficiency.) Vaught was convinced—of

the three options being considered for getting

fuel to the helicopters (blivet airdrop, seizure of a

disused airfield, or a desert landing)—the desertlanding and refueling option provided the best

possibility for mission succe ss.

The Plan

With the use of Masirah Island a reality, the

two-night plan was rapidly finalized. Doug Ulery

plotted the low-level route from Masirah Island

to Desert One, and the electronic order of battle

was plotted to ensure that the aircraft could not

be detected. The Night Two route was finalized,

with Manzariyeh planned as the transload loca -

tion. Three mission aircraft of the 8th SOS, along

with three ABCCC EC-130Es crewed by 8th SOS

personnel, would depart the Florida Panhandle

and proceed to Wadi Kena, Egypt. The three 1st

SOS MC-130Es would deploy from Kadena AB,

Japan, to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. From

Diego Garcia, Turczynski’s aircraft would fly to

Masirah Island, Oman, and establish a forwardoperating base two days before arrival of the rest

of the force. Once established at Masirah Island,

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3

Jubelt Fleming Pearson

Nimmo Schwall Osborne

Turczynski Rumple Wilson

Sumida Peppers Ozlins

Smith Townsend Ross

Prator Novy Perkumas

Tafoya Felton Banks

Diehl Devine Farrell

Frederickson Hickman Kirby

Joy Huff Baker

 – – – – Hamilton

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

210
the 1st SOS crews would fly sea surveillance mis -

sions over the Gulf of Oman to provide a cover for

the actual mission. From Wadi Kena one MC130E and the three EC-130E aircraft would further deploy to Masirah Island. Thus, there would

be four MC-130Es and three EC-130Es at

Masirah Island, with one of the 1st SOS Talons

serving as a spare for the mission.

On Night One, three MC-130Es would depart

Masirah Island loaded with Delta Force and a

ranger roadblock team tasked to secure the dirt

road that ran through the landing zone. The

Talons would carry Farsi-speaking translators,

a special assault team to take down the minis -

try of foreign affairs where Bruce Langen and

three others were being held, and a team of

combat controllers. In all there would be 139

personnel on the three aircraft. Just before sun -

set the first MC-130E would launch from

Masirah Island, followed one hour later by the

two Talons and the three EC-130Es. The Talons

would lead two separate formations with the

EC-130Es and would be responsible for navigating to Desert One.

94

Concurrently, with the launch of the fixedwing aircraft from Masirah Island, eight RH53D helicopters would depart the USS Nimitz,

which would be in a position approximately 50

miles off the coast of Iran in the Gulf of Oman.

The timing was such that the first MC-130E

would arrive at Desert One well ahead of the

rest of the force and would survey the area utilizing the aircraft’s FLIR equipment. The lights

that Carney had buried in the desert would be

remotely activated by the first Combat Talon ,

and the aircraft would then land. Once on the

ground, the roadblock team would secure strategic approaches to the site, and the CCT would

set up a second LZ across the dirt road and parallel to the original runway. The CCT also

would set up a portable TACAN that would aid

the RH-53Ds in finding the landing area. An

hour after the first Talon touched down, the

numbers two and three Talons would land with

the remainder of Delta Force.

95

After the third Talon was on the ground, two

E C-130Es would land three and six minutes

later, respectively, and the first two Talons

would then take off and return to Masirah Island. After the first two Talons departed Desert

One, the third EC-130E would land, thus leaving four aircraft on the ground—two EC-130Es

on the north side of the dirt road and one MC130E and the third EC-130E on the south side.

The remaining MC-130E was loaded with thre

500-gallon fuel blivets in the event one of th

EC-130Es had problems either getting to Dese

One or pumping fuel once there. With the four

aircraft on the ground, the eight helicopte

would arrive 15 minutes after the last fixed

wing aircraft landed and refuel from the thre

EC-130Es. As the refueling operation was ta

ing place, Delta Force would board the helico

ters in preparation for the two-hour flight to th

hide site. The three EC-130Es could car

18,000 gallons of fuel and could refuel 10 hel

copters. With the MC-130E fuel blivets in r

serve, there would be plenty of fuel for the eig

mission helicop ters.9 6

The ground helicopter-refueling operatio

was scheduled to take 40 minutes. Once com 

plete the helicopters would depart Desert On

and proceed to a point some 50 miles southea

of Tehran. There Dick Meadows and his rece

tion committee would meet Delta Force and is

late them until time for the Night Two embas

assault. Meanwhile, the MC-130E and the thre

EC-130Es at Desert One would depart the are

and exit Iran by way of a route different fro

the one they flew during their ingress. At a loc

tion 120 miles south of the Iranian coastline 

the Gulf of Oman, KC-135 tankers would refu

the four aircraft, and they would return 

Masirah Islan d.97

At Masirah Island, after the Desert One mi

sion was complete, three MC-130E crews wou

board a C-130 support aircraft and fly as passe

gers back to Wadi Kena, Egypt, sleeping en rou

with the aide of flight-surgeon-administere

sleeping pills. The flight from Masirah Islan

t o Wadi Kena was approximately eight hou

long, which put the three crews in Egypt ju

in time to brief and launch for the Night Tw

mission. For Night Two, four MC-130Es wou

launch from Wadi Kena with a 100-man rang

airfield seizure force on board. Inbound to Ira

and over Saudi Arabia, the four Talons woul

refuel from KC-135 tankers. Shortly after th

Talons departed Wadi Kena, four AC-130H gu

ships would also depart and refuel after th

four Combat Talons. One gunship was taske

to support Beckwith’s embassy assault, with 

second tasked to suppress fighter activity 

Mehrabad Airport. The third gunship supporte

the airfield seizure operation at Manzariye

and the fourth aircraft served as an airborn

spare.9 8

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

211
Two C-141s would be prepositioned at Dha -

hran, Saudi Arabia, and would depart there to

land at Manzariyeh 10 minutes after the airfield

was secured. One of the C-141s was configured as

a flying hospital and was tasked to receive any

wounded personnel and administer to their medical needs while returning to Europe from the

Middle East. The second C-141 was configured

with airline-type seats and was tasked to carry

Delta Force , the helicopter crews, and the uninjured hostages. From the time Beckwith went

over the embassy wall, it would take up to 45

minutes to free all of the hostages. Once freed,

Delta Force would move the hostages across the

main street in front of the embassy and into a

nearby soccer stadium. At the soccer stadium, the

helicopters would land and extract Delta Force

and the hostages. The helicopters would then fly

to Manzariyeh, where the hostages and rescue

personnel would board the two C-141s and depart

Iran. The helicopters would be disabled and left at

Manzariyeh, and the four Combat Talons would

onload all remaining personnel and depart the

airfield for Wadi Kena. Once the force had been

recovered in Egypt, the JTF would move out of

the Middle East over the next several days.9 9 The

plan was well thought out and rehearsed but had

many moving parts. To have the force in place for

Night One, the plan required 10 days lead time to

get everyone in position. Practice was over—it was

time to lock and load.

Operation Eagle Claw Swings into Action

The plan had been finalized, but much remained to be done to position the mission aircraft

for the 24–25 April mission. KC-135 tankers, C141 cargo aircraft, and the whole JTF contingent

had to be picked up and moved from the United

States to the Middle East undetected. Kyle called

Turczynski during the early morning hours of 13

April and told him that the rescue mission had

been approved for 24 April. Turczynski was to

deploy three Combat Talons to Diego Garcia with

as much support equipment as they could carry,

including avionics spares, tents, rations for two

weeks, and a full water buffalo. Kyle cleared Turczynski to proceed only as far as Diego Garcia,

where he was to wait until cleared onward to

Masirah Island. To ensure that everything was

ready for Night One, forces began to move on 14

April. As Meller and Tharp were validating desert helicopter-refueling tactics at Edwards AFB,

Turczynski’s crews began processing for the 18th

TFW ORI at Kadena AB, which had begun on 14

April. The ORI was used as the cover for the 1st

SOS aircraft. On Tuesday night, 15 April, three

Kadena-based Combat Talons (62-1843, 63-7785,

and 64-0564) took off in one-hour increments

bound for the Indian Ocean. Their flight plans

showed them landing at Clark AB, Philippines,

but they overflew the airfield as they headed for

their tanker track southwest of Thailand. Colonel

Miller, the 18th TFW/DO, quietly removed the

three Combat Talons from the command post

tracking board at Kadena AB. The Combat Talon s

were lost in the fighter wing’s huge deployment.

As Jubelt, Fleming, and Pearson closed in on Diego Garcia after a second air refueling and 16

hours of flying, 15 MAC C-141s departed Charleston AFB, South Carolina, en route to Wadi

Kena.100 The execution phase of Operation Rice

Bowl, code-named Operation Eagle Claw, was

under w ay.

On 17 April the RH-53D helicopter crews were

moved from Andrews AFB, Maryland, by way of

C-141 westward toward the Indian Ocean. With

an operations stop in Hawaii to brief CINCPAC,

the aircraft continued on to the west, refueling at

Guam, the Philippines, Diego Garcia, and finally

arriving in Oman. From Oman the helicopter

crews, along with a JTF liaison package, was

shuttled aboard the USS Nimitz by Navy helicopters. The crews spent the next several days preparing the eight mission helicopters that had

been placed aboard the aircraft carrier four

months prior.101

At Diego Garcia Turczynski’s crews flew sea

surveillance missions for two days to reinforce

their cover story. Kyle had instructed Turczynski

not to reveal to his crews the actual destination

of Masirah Island until cleared to proceed from

Diego Garcia. On 18 April Turczynski received a

secure call from the Pentagon directing him to

proceed on to Masirah Island. He put his crews

in crew rest for the seven-hour flight, which he

scheduled for the following day—19 April.102

At Hurlburt Field the maintenance package

for the Talons, gunships, and the EC-130Es departed for Wadi Kena. In all some 124 support

personnel and their equipment moved to Egypt

by way of five C-141s and were in place ready to

receive the C-130s by midnight on 18 April.

Along with maintenance and support personnel,

spare parts and aircraft generation equipment

needed to launch the JTF force for mission night

also were delivered.103 The activity at Wadi Kena

over the past several months made the arrival

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

212
of the C-141s appear to be just another USEgyptian exercise.

When the 1st SOS returned to Kadena AB after the March rehearsal, aircraft 64-0565, with

its operational FLIR, was retained by the JTF at

Hurlburt Field. Along with the 1st SOS Talon,

the three in-flight refuelable 8th SOS mission

Talons (64-0562, 64-0567, and 64-0572) needed to

be flown to Wadi Kena. On 14 April the second

and third EC-130Es (62-1809 and 62-1818) were

picked up from Keesler AFB and flown to Eglin

AFB. All total there were seven mission aircraft

at Hurlburt Field and Eglin AFB requiring crews

to fly them to Egypt (four Talons and three EC130Es), but Brenci had only five mission crews.

Using spare crew members and third pilots from

the five crews, Brenci formed a sixth crew commanded by Capt George Ferkes. The members of

crew six were Ferkes, Diggins, Weaver, Cole, Beyers, and Thomas.

Kyle dipped into his bag of tricks to provide

the seventh crew. Since the beginning of the op -

eration, Ken Oliver and his team from Detach -

ment 4 at LAS Ontario had supported every request from the JTF. Kyle picked up the telephone

and asked Oliver if he could provide a basic crew

for a few days training at Hurlburt Field. Within

24-hours Oliver was on his way to northwest

Florida. By 18 April Brenci had seven crews to

fly the four Combat Talons and three EC-130Es

to Wadi Kena .

When Oliver received the call from Kyle, all

Kyle told him was that he needed a Talon crew

for a few days to support the ongoing operation.

Detachment 4 was scheduled to deliver a Talon 

Hurlburt Field on 17 April, so Oliver quick

picked his crew. For his copilot he chose Wes We

ling, a highly experienced instructor who ha

been the program engineer for the in-flight refue

ing modification on the Combat Talon . Oliv

chose Dennis Ray, a quiet but highly experience

flight engineer who had been in the Comb

Talon community for years, as his flight eng

neer. For the loadmaster position, Oliver cho

Kindle, who had been on Oliver’s development

team from the beginning of Operation Rice Bow

For avionics support Oliver selected John Gerke

who would prove to be a key individual 

Masirah Island when aircraft 64-0565 returne

damaged from Desert One. Oliver arrived 

Hurlburt Field late on 17 April, and his crew w

put into crew rest for the following day’s launc

It wasn’t until the 1600 briefing on 18 April th

Oliver learned that he would be taking a Talon 

Egypt.104 For a small organization that had give

everything it had in support of the rescue mi

sion for the past four and one-half months, sele

tion to fly an operational mission was an hono

for the crew. Augmented by 8th SOS personne

members of Crew 7 included Oliver, Werling, Guidr

Launder, Ulery, Ray, Kindle, Latona, Gerkey, an

Messer.

All the pieces of the complex deployment pu

zle were now in place. After the 1600 briefing o

18 April, the 8th SOS aircraft began to mov

toward Wadi Kena. Ferkes was the first to d

part in aircraft 64-0567 at 2030 local time on 1

April. Using the call sign of Imber 71, his rou

of flight took him over the Atlantic, with i

flight refueling en route, to Rhein Main AB

Germany. Tharp and Lewis were the next tw

To provide maximum security and isolation from the

rest of the base, mission crew members were housed in

hangars at Wadi Kena. Cots were set up for sleeping,

and the crews were bussed to an “exercise chow hall”

where hot meals were served. For those who wanted it,

two cold beers a day were provided.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

A small tent city was constructed at Masirah Island 

mission crews and support personnel arrived.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

213
to depart in EC-130E aircraft 62-1857 and 62-

1809. Their formation flights (call signs Imber

38/39) refueled just east of Bermuda and con -

tinued on to Lajes Field, Azores. Uttaro and Bre nci

(call signs Imber 52/53) departed Hurlburt

Field in EC-130E aircraft 62-1818 and Combat

Talon 64-0565, respectively, and headed for

the Bermuda refueling track en route to Lajes

Field.

Oliver’s crew was assigned Combat Talon 64-

0562 and departed Hurlburt Field the next eve -

ning at 2100 local time. Using call sign Quaff 45,

Oliver refueled just east of Newfoundland and

proceeded on to Rhein Main AB, where Ferkes

had landed earlier the previous day. Twenty-four

hours after Oliver departed Hurlburt Field, the

last crew to depart northwest Florida was Meller’s crew, flying Combat Talon 64-0572 under

the call sign Mossy 17. Meller was bound for

Rhein Main AB on the same routing as Ferkes

and Oliver. Aboard Meller’s aircraft was Pinard.

Thus, three Combat Talons transited Germany,

while the three EC-130Es and one Combat Talon

passed through the Azores. 105 The objective was

to converge on Wadi Kena and Masirah Island

from diverse locations to avoid arousing suspicion.

Mid-April marked the kickoff of the annual

Flintlock special operations exercise held in

Europe. Bradley and his two 7th SOS Combat

Talons had redeployed from Wadi Kena on 8

April and were scheduled to participate in the

Flintlock exercise. When the three 8th SOS Talons passed through Rhein Main AB, Bradley’s

squadron was already deploying to the United

Kingdom, so the additional aircraft did not raise

any questions. Ron Jones, the 7th SOS director

of operations and a participant in the Son Tay

POW raid, met each plane as it arrived and took

care of billeting and aircraft servicing. Observant

7th SOS flight-line personnel did notice that more

Combat Talons were on the ramp than were assigned to the squadron, but they knew from experience not to speculate or openly comment to

others.

With Turczynski having the green light to proceed from Diego Garcia to Masirah Island, on 19

April Jubelt’s crew departed the base for the

seven-hour flight. Upon landing at Masirah Island the aircraft was directed by the control

tower to an isolated location adjacent to a dirt

strip on the east side of the airfield. A JTF liaison officer had arrived the day prior and had

made the necessary arrangements to beddown

the aircraft. After shutdown Turczynski found

two large wooden crates filled with cots for his

men. Turczynski’s men set about constructing

the first portion of the tent city that the rescue

force would use for the next several days. The

wooden tent stakes could not be driven into the

rock-hard ground, so the JTF liaison officer procured steel stakes from the base. With much effort and hard work, the dark green canvas was

raised on the tent poles. The tents had been designed for the moist, cool climate of central

Europe. In the hot, arid climate of Masirah Island, the temperature inside the tents soared.

The following day, 20 April, the other two 1st

SOS aircraft, commanded by Fleming and Pearson, flew from Diego Garcia to Masirah Island.

Also on 20 May Turczynski launched Jubelt’s

crew on a diversionary sea surveillance mission

just as he had done at Diego Garcia. A daily rou -

tine of flying sea surveillance missions was es -

tablished that continued for the next three days

leading up to mission launch.106

From both Lajes Field and Rhein Main AB, 8th

SOS mission aircraft flew nonstop to Sigonella

AB, Italy, where each crew was met by Blum (the

liaison officer provided by the 7th SOS to brief

mission crews and to arrange servicing for their

aircraft). From Sigonella AB the seven aircraft

flew the identical routes that Bradley’s 7th SOS

aircraft had been flying for the past three months.

To an observer the aircraft were part of the ongoing

exercise that had been taking place in southern

Egypt. Tharp and Lewis were in the first mission

aircraft to land at Wadi Kena on 20 April, with

Uttaro and Brenci following one hour behind

them. Vaught, Kyle, and the rest of the JTF also

arrived at Wadi Kena on 20 April. To reduce radio

Mission aircraft deployed to Masirah Island. Combat

Talon 64-0565 is in the foreground, with the three EC130s and the three additional MC-130s parked in line.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

214
transmissions, no calls were made after the aircraft passed Cairo and were handed off to military

controllers. The ATC liaison in Cairo worked his

magic with the Egyptians. Even the landings at

Wadi Kena were cleared by way of light signals

from the tower instead of using the radio. Ferkes

was the fifth aircraft to arrive four hours after

Brenci, with Oliver’s crew 24 hours behind him on

21 April. On 22 April Meller’s Combat Talon was

the last to land at Wadi Ken a .107

On 21 April the four AC-130H gunships

launched from Hurlburt Field and flew nonstop to

Wadi Kena, utilizing four in-flight refuelings. Because the gunship was so distinct, with its guns

protruding from the left side of the aircraft, Kyle

feared that they would draw unwanted attention

if they landed anywhere en route. Also on the

21st, three C-141s carrying Beckwith and his

Delta Force departed Pope AFB and headed to

Rhein Main AB en route to Wadi Kena. They arrived in Egypt on 22 April and immediately went

into isolation at the airfield.108

By 22 April Brenci had been at Wadi Kena for

36 hours, and it was time for him to move forward to Masirah Island. The crews that had ferried the seven mission aircraft from Hurlburt

Field to Egypt were reconstituted into the five

hard crews for the mission. Brenci, flying the 1st

SOS-assigned Combat Talon 64-0565, followed by

Tharp, Lewis, and Uttaro in the three EC-130Es,

departed Wadi Kena on 22 April. Meller’s crew,

which arrived at Wadi Kena three hours after

Brenci’s departure, remained in Egypt to con -

tinue refining the Night Two plan. Kyle determined that the expertise found in Oliver’s men

might be essential in launching the aircraft on

mission night, so he authorized them to move on

to Masirah Island with the mission crews. On

board Brenci’s Talon were additional tents and

bare-base gear to make their stay tolerable for

the short period of time they would be there. On

board each EC-130E were two fuel bladders with

a total of 6,000 gallons of fuel. Fully loaded, the

Talon weighed just over 175,000 pounds, and the

EC-130Es grossed over 185,000 pounds.109 Takeoffs at that heavy gross weight and at highambient temperatures challenged the aircraft

and their crews.

After nine hours flying time, the four aircraft

arrived at Masirah Island. Brenci and the three

EC-130Es had flown down the Red Sea and over

the Gulf of Aden just off the coast of Saudi Ara -

bia in radio silence. Upon landing, all aircraft

scheduled to participate in the Night One desert

landing operation were in place, with a spa

Talon in case one aborted for mechanical reaso

(the 1st SOS Talon would spare the other Talo

and the EC-130E bladder bird, if required). T

anyone who wondered, the aircraft were joinin

the 1st SOS already at Masirah Island for th

sea-surveillance exercise.110 It was 22 April 198

and the stage was nearly set for Desert One.

By 23 April, in addition to the seven C-130

positioned at Masirah Island, six KC-135s we

at Diego Garcia ready to refuel them. At Wadi Ken

19 mission aircraft were cocked and ready, i nclu

ing KC-135 tankers, C-141 cargo aircraft, A

130H gunships, and the Combat Talons.

111 Ear

in the morning of 23 April, Thigpen, Daigenau

and Robb went to the already scorch ing flight li

and began installing the IR landing-light lens

and the IR covers for the upper-rot ating beaco

on the Combat Talons. The IR lenses and cove

had not been installed before that time so th

the aircraft could use its normal lights durin

t he long deployment from the states. At Masira

Island McIntosh, along with Oliver, spearheade

the IR lens installation on the mission aircra

there. Ferkes had been put in charge of th

NVGs for the 8th SOS, and he had distribute

them to each crew before departing fro

Hurlburt Field. Also at Masirah Island crew

used black paint to cover the belly and the ye llow

highlighted emergency exits on the exterior sk

of the EC-130Es. Their propellers were als

painted black to reduce the probability of dete

tion while on the ground at Desert One. By la

afternoon on 23 April, all mission aircraft we

operationally ready and cocked for the 24 Apr

launch.

Kyle had moved forward to Masirah Islan

with Brenci and the three EC-130Es. By 1000 o

24 April, he had organized a crew of maintenanc

personnel and had begun erecting tentage fo

Delta Force , set to arrive at Masirah Island b

mid-afternoon. At 1400 Vaught received the fin

aircraft status report at his headquarters 

Wadi Kena—the seven C-130s at Masirah Islan

and the eight helicopters aboard the USS Nimi

were operationally ready and prepared fo

launch. At 1445 the first of two C-141s carryin

General Gast and part of Delta Force arrived 

Masirah Island and moved to the newly erecte

tentage by way of covered truck. A second C-14

arrived at 1530 with Beckwith and the rest 

Delta Force . With the arrival of Delta Forc

there were now 132 assault-force members 

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

215
Masirah Island—120 Delta Force and 12 ranger

roadblock person nel.112

Throughout the afternoon the three Talons

were loaded with equipment needed for the mis -

sion. On Brenci’s aircraft (64-0565) a gun-jeep for

the roadblock team and five motorcycles were put

on board. Three of the motorcycles were to be

used by the rangers to provide mobility for the

roadblock force and two by Carney’s CCT to mark

the second parallel runway. A portable TACAN

was also put on board the aircraft to be used to

help the helicopters find Desert One. Two large

sheets of aluminum planking also were carried in

case the aircraft became mired in the desert

sand. Jubelt’s and Fleming’s aircraft were loaded

with camouflage nets for the hide site, support

systems, and Red Eye heat-seeking missiles that

would be transferred to the helicopters at Desert

One. Fleming’s aircraft also carried three 500-

gallon fuel blivets to be used by the helicopters if

they had any problems getting all the fuel they

needed from the EC-130E s.113

At 1630 mission crews received their final

mission briefing. Weather for the next 48 hours

was forecast to be ideal, and there was no

change in the Iranian radar status. Intelligence

confirmed that there were no Russian trawlers

under the aircraft’s ingress flight path. After

the formal briefing, the crews reviewed the lowlevel route and went over terrain features and

any threats the aircraft might face. Everything

looked good, and by 1700 all crews had been

briefed. All that remained was the launch decision that would come from Vaught back at Wadi

Kena. Gast and Kyle went to the communica -

tions tent and waited for the launch order while

the crews prepared their aircraft.114 They did

not have long to wait.

At Wadi Kena General Vaught received his fi -

nal weather briefing at 1700. The weather was as

good as it would ever be, according to an Iranian

advisor to Vaught who had spent 20 years flying

in Iran. After reviewing the satellite photos and

the weather charts one last time, Vaught announced that the mission was a “go.” At 1720

local time the execute order was transmitted to

Gast and Kyle at Masirah Island.115 Five and

one-half months of backbreaking effort had come

down to this moment—the JTF rescue force was

cleared to launch into Iran to free the American

hostages after 173 days of captivity.

Six mission crews and a spare Combat Talon

crew had been briefed, and their aircraft were

readied for launch from Masirah Island. The six

primary crews, their aircraft tail numbers, and

their call signs included the following:

With less than one hour left before scheduled

takeoff, Beckwith boarded Brenci’s aircraft with 56

of his soldiers. In addition to Delta Force , two

Ir anian general-officer advisors, 12 ranger roadblock soldiers, six Iranian truck drivers, and seven

Farsi-speaking American driver monitors also

boarded the aircraft. Carney and his CCT, along

with Wicker and Kyle, finished out the load.

Literally every square inch of the cargo compartment was taken by either personnel or equipm ent. At 1750 Brenci began his taxi to the north

runway, followed by Pearson in the engineru nning spare Talon. The plan included rapid move -

ment from Brenci’s aircraft to Pearson’s if the

Dragon 1

(Talon 64-0565)

Dragon 2

(Talon 64-0564)

Dragon 3

(Talon 63-7785)

Brenci Jubelt Fleming

Ferkes Nimmo Schwall

Guidry Turczynski Rumple

Chapman Sumida Peppers

Galloway Smith Townsend

Gamble Prator Novy

Almanzar Tafoya Felton

Chitwood Diehl Devine

Wiley Frederickson Hickman

Sanchez Joy Huff

*Wicker – – – –

**Kyle – – – –

Republic 4

(EC 62-1809)

Republic 5

(EC 62-1857)

Republic 6

(EC 62-1818)

Spare Crew

(Talon 62-1843)

***Lewis Tharp Uttaro Pearson

***McIntosh Darden Diggins Osborne

Harrison Burke Bagby Wilson

***Bakke Logan Beres Ozlins

***McMillan Poole Weaver Ross

 – – – – – – Perkumas

***Mayo Garrett Newberry Banks

Beyers Latona Gingerich Farrell

McClain Messer Doyle Kirby

Bancroft Thomas Metherell Baker

Witherspoon Chesser Cole Hamilton

Dryer Moore Neckar – –

Tuttle Benstra DeLong – –

Marine Jerome Franks

Walton Rowe Houghton

__________

 *1st SOW mission commander

 **JTF air mission commander

***Indicates crew members killed at Desert One when an RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter crashed into their aircraft after refueling. EC-130E

aircraft 62-1809 was destroyed in the resultant fire.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

216
Dragon 1 Crew. Standing left to right: Galloway, Chapman, Gamble, Ferkes, Al -

manzar, Sanchez, Brenci, Wiley, Guidry, and Chitwood.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

Dragon 2 Crew. Standing left to right: Frederickson, Turczynski, Prator, Tafoya,

Sumida, Diehl, Nimmo, Smith, Joy, and Jubelt.

 Author’s note: Photo not available for Dragon 3 crew. Rick Bakke took the picture, and the film was in

his camera when the accident occurred at Desert One.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

217
Republic 4 Crew. Standing left to right: Bakke, Bancroft, Mayo, McIntosh, Lewis,

McMillan, Beyers, Harrison. Kneeling left to right: Dryer, McClain, Witherspoon,

Tuttle, Marine, and Walton.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

Republic 5 Crew. Standing left to right: Moore, Garrett, Burke, Tharp, Poole,

Thomas, Darden. Kneeling left to right: Messer, Benstra, Jerome, Chesser, Rowe,

Latona, and Logan.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

218
primary aircraft aborted for any reason. Kyle

estimated that a transfer could be made in 15

minutes, a time that could be made up en route.

At precisely 1805 local Masirah Island time,

Brenci (Dragon 1) lifted off the 8,200-foot run -

way and headed out over the Gulf of Oman for

Desert One.

116

Along with the cargo already loaded on Jube lt’s

aircraft, an additional 50 Delta Force soldiers

came on board just before engine start. Fleming

had the remaining 32 Delta Force soldiers on his

aircraft, and he carried three Marine fuels personnel to operate the fuel blivets if the helicop -

ters needed additional fuel. On Lewis’s, Tharp’s,

and Uttaro’s EC-130E tankers, four fuels person -

nel who were responsible for operating the rubber fuel-bladder system were also loaded onto

each aircraft .117

By 1830 Brenci was far out over the Gulf of

Oman at 500 feet above the water. On the USS

Nimitz, the eight RH-53D helicopters began their

engine runs to check out their systems, and 35 min -

utes later they lifted off and headed for the southern Iranian coastline. About 100 miles northeast of

Masirah Island, Brenci passed over several large

ships steaming towards the Strait of Hormuz. With

Brenci’s early launch time from Masirah Island, it

was still daylight, and the Combat Talon was

clearly visible. At Kyle’s direction Brenci climbed to

3,000 feet altitude to reduce the possibility o

detection. At 140 miles northeast of Masirah I

land and clear of shipping, Brenci began his d

scent to 250 feet above the water for his coast

penetration.118

On the ground at Masirah Island, Jube

(Dragon 2) taxied his Talon into position on t

runway and prepared for takeoff. There were 

radio transmissions authorized from any of th

aircraft, and it was nearly dark on the blacked-o

airfield. Tharp (Republic 5) mistakenly began h

taxi ahead of Lewis (Republic 4), which place

Lewis out of position to take off behind Jube

Because of the restricted taxi area, Lewis cou

not get ahead of Tharp. To reach the takeoff po

tion, all aircraft had to taxi down the active ru

way to the hammerhead at the approach end 

the runway. With a takeoff time scheduled fo

1910 and no way readily available to unsnarl th

two formations, Jubelt elected to take off and so

out his formation. After Jubelt departed the ne

takeoff was Fleming (Dragon 3) in his Comb

Talon. When Fleming departed, Uttaro thought 

was Tharp’s aircraft, and he began his back ta

down the active runway to the hammerhead pos

tion. With his exterior lights illuminated, Utta

met Lewis head-on on the runway as Lewis was o

his takeoff roll. To avoid a collision Uttaro d

parted the runway on to the hard-packed san

Republic 6 Crew. Standing left to right: Beres, Bagby, Diggins, Uttaro, Weaver,

Cole. Kneeling left to right: Unknown, Gingerich, Neckar, DeLong, Franks, Doyle,

Newberry, Metherell, and Houghton.

Photo courtesy of Rick Bakke

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

219
and Lewis stopped his aircraft on the runway. After the flight engineers quickly inspected the two

aircraft, both Uttaro and Lewis taxied back to the

approach end of the runway. Tharp was the next

to take off, with Lewis and Uttaro following him

without further incident.*

After Fleming departed Masirah Island, the

three EC-130Es followed him in trail. All aircraft

were extremely heavy, and it quickly became apparent that Lewis could not accelerate to the speed

required to join up with Jubelt. His only choice

was to remain with Fleming’s formation as a

fourth aircraft. Uttaro was the last to take off from

Masirah Island and was also having difficulty join -

ing up with Fleming. Sensing that he would be left

behind and unable to find Desert One, Uttaro

made a brief radio call to Fleming to advise him of

his situation. Fleming continued across the Gulf of

Oman at a reduced airspeed so that Uttaro and

the other two ABCCC aircraft could join up with

him. The modified formation that Fleming would

lead to the heart of Iran thus became a four-ship

diamond, with Tharp on his right wing, Lewis on

his left wing, and Uttaro in trail. The four aircraft

were behind schedule, but they were all together.

After determining that Lewis could not join up

with his aircraft, Jubelt accelerated to his en

route speed and pressed on into the darkness of

the Gulf of Oman. Jubelt continued on to Desert

One single ship while Fleming led the four-ship

tanker force (fig. 31). 119

At 1925 Brenci penetrated Iranian airspace at

250 feet above the ground and perpendicular to

the southern coastline. He continued at 250 feet

until reaching the first plateau, which rose 4,000

feet above sea level. At that point Brenci climbed

to 6,000 feet. From then until reaching Desert

One, he would fly at altitudes between 1,000 feet

and 3,000 feet above the ground. Premission planning had determined that the higher altitudes

would keep the aircraft clear of known Iranian

threats. The higher altitudes also conserved fuel

and reduced the possibility of being detected by

ground-based outposts.120 The helicopter formation

apparently did not receive the same intelligence

briefing on the USS Nimitz that the fixed-wing

aircraft had received at Masirah Island—the helicopters elected to fly as low as possible to ensure

that they were not detected by enemy radar. Their

decision to fly low level across Iran impacted significantly their ability to find Desert One and to

keep their aircraft operational.

Figure 31. C-130 Formation Plan and Actual Formation Flown (Source: USAF Special

Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

__________

 *Narrative of the takeoff events at Masirah Island provided by Uttaro.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

220
Fleming had slowly climbed to 10,000 feet as

he led his formation across the gulf. At 100 miles

south of the Ira nian coastline, Fleming began his

descent to 1,000 feet above the water. Novy,

Fleming’s EWO, called an “all clear” from his EW

indicators. Because the coastal-penetration point

had been planned into a gap between radars, no

early warning signals were received. After 40

minutes and a further descent to 250 feet, the

coastline appeared on Townsend’s radarscope.

As Townsend updated his position with the radar

cursor, he determined that the INS had drifted

only about a half mile since takeoff. With everything considered, the system was performing well

within tolerances. The navigation system corrected to the preplanned route, and Fleming corrected his formation back to course. 121

As Fleming’s formation penetrated the Iranian

coastline, Brenci was already 210 miles ahead,

and the eight-ship helicopter formation was 90

miles inland. Once over land Fleming flew be -

tween 500- and 1,000-feet altitude until reaching

the 4,000-foot plateau. From that point he flew

roughly the same altitudes and headings as Brenci

in Dragon 1.122 Brenci had run into a problem

ahead of Fleming’s formation. Guidry was standing on the flight deck of the Talon and was scanning outside with his NVGs when the aircraft entered a thin haze layer that blocked out most of

the moon’s illumination. After conferring with

Kyle, the crew determined that the condition was

not severe enough to break radio silence and pass

back to Fleming’s formation or to the helicopters.

In a few minutes Brenci popped out of the haze

into clear air again and continued on course. At

about 320 miles inland, Brenci’s aircraft again entered a haze layer, this time much thicker, with

flight visibility reduced to an estimated one mile.

Kyle was worried. He asked Wicker to work up a

message and transmit it back to the other aircraft

to advise them of the weather. His intent was to

give them a heads up of what was coming. Carney

came up on the flight deck and quickly informed

the crew that the restriction to visibility was called

a “haboob,” a weather condition that he and the

CIA pilots had been briefed on for the earlier r econnaissance flight to Desert One. The condition was

caused by distant thunderstorms that stirred up

fine sand from the desert floor and propelled it up

into the air. The uplifting effect of air currents

associated with thunderstorms could carry t he dust

to an altitude of 10,000 feet, and the dust could

remain suspended in the air for hours after the

storm had dissipated. There had been no mention of

a haboob by the JTF weatherman, and its existen

came as a total surprise to Kyle and the crew.

123

Kyle estimated that the second, thicker haboo

was about 100 miles across. When Brenci brok

out of the dust, he was 30 minutes from Dese

One, and the air was crystal clear. Wicker cam

back up on the flight deck shortly after Bren

cleared the second haboob and informed Kyle th

he had been unable to encrypt a message to sen

to the other aircraft. Although the SATCOM rad

provided secure communications, Kyle had bee

instructed to encrypt everything that went o

over it just in case the Russians were able to i

tercept and decipher the message. In the blacke

out cargo compartment, Wicker had been unab

to construct the message from the codebook th

the SATCOM radio operator provided. As a resu

the helicopters were already in the dust, alon

with Fleming and his four-ship formation. Ky

silently prayed that the helicopters had misse

the dust since their route of flight was 30 miles 

the east.124 His prayer was not to be answered.

When Fleming hit the haboob, he slowed dow

and began a slight climb so that his three win

men could stay in position. He hoped that h

could climb above the dust, but he soon realize

that he was not able to do so. Meanwhile, Tow

send was having trouble updating his INS—ther

were no radar targets, and the dust had obscure

any hope of visual updates. The flight plan showe

an Iranian VHF omnidirectional radio (VOR) l

cated 10 miles east of an Iranian airfield, so Tow

send asked Nimmo to turn on the VOR and dial 

the frequency. The idea was to fly over the VOR (

known point) and update the navigation system

As the formation proceeded toward the VOR, th

dust thinned slightly, and the crew observed a

airfield’s runway and taxiways clearly visible b

low them. The airfield was located in a differe

position from what the charts had indicated! The

was no possibility to avoid the airfield, so Flemin

pressed on over it. Townsend got his update ov

the VOR moments later as the formation broke o

of the dust. This was the first haboob that Bren

had encountered, but it had intensified ov

Fleming’s route. About an hour later the formatio

entered another haboob, but it was not as seve

as the first one.125 Just as Brenci had don

Fleming broke out of the second haboob about 3

minutes before Desert One.

With skies clear and visibility unrestricte

Brenci was bearing down on Desert One. Bren

was in the left seat on NVGs, Ferkes was in th

right, Guidry was standing behind Brenci in th

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

221
safety pilot’s position on NVGs, and Carney (also

on NVGs) was behind Ferkes to assist in acquiring the runway environment. Almanzar was in

the flight engineer’s seat on NVGs also scanning

for the runway. Kyle was on the flight deck along

with Wicker and Mitch Bryan, one of Carney’s

CCT members who was tasked to send the signal

to remotely activate the landing lights that

Carney had buried there on 3 April. At five miles

out, Bryan sent the activation signal as everyone

peered out into the darkness. Galloway and Chapman were scanning the area with the FLIR.

Carney was the first to see the lights, which were

off to the right of the aircraft. With a 30-degree

course correction and a descent to 1,000 feet,

Brenci brought the aircraft down the “box four

and one” lighted runway for a planned low approach. As the aircraft passed over the landing

area, Galloway spotted a truck moving down the

road with the FLIR and immediately called for a

turn to the north. The aircraft passed well behind

the truck, and Brenci maneuvered back to the

landing zone in a wide circle.126

During the second pass Carney noticed that the

lights at the approach end of the runway were too

close to the shoulder of the dirt road. He advised

Brenci to land to the right of the lights and aim

for the light at the far end of the LZ. The second

pass determined that the road and LZ were clear,

and Brenci went around and began his traffic pattern to align the aircraft for landing. Flying a box

pattern to final approach, Brenci rolled out on

short final but was too close for a safe landing. He

went around for a third time. On the fourth approach, Brenci lined up on final and continued the

approach as the navigator called out airspeeds

and altitudes. The landing proved to be extremely

difficult—on short final, with the aircraft weigh -

ing nearly 150,000 pounds, the aircraft’s sink rate

increased to a point that Brenci did not have

enough airspeed to break his descent before

touchdown. As the aircraft impacted the desert

LZ, it bounced back into the air before landing a

second time. In the cargo compartment, Beckwith

and his men were pitched about, but no one was

injured. It was 2245 as Brenci slowed to taxi

speed and proceeded to his off-load location.127

Twenty minutes out of Desert One, Fleming’s

crew began configuring for landing. Lewis, Tharp,

and Uttaro took spacing, with the second and third

aircraft scheduled to land in three-minute increments behind Fleming. Ten minutes out from

landing, Townsend saw the landing environment

on radar—he had studied the area around the LZ

and knew every contour within 10 NM of Desert

One. Fleming did not have any problem finding

the LZ—there was a huge fire burning where he

had to land!128 His first thought was that Brenci

had crashed, yet he had heard the landing call

from Brenci’s radio operator, and he could see

Jubelt ahead of him in Talon 64-0564. But there it

was, like a beacon showing him the way to his

objective.

As Brenci stopped at his off-load location, Beck -

with’s Delta Force, the roadblock team, and the

remaining personnel in the cargo compartment de -

parted the rear of the aircraft. As Kyle walked

down the ramp, to his right he saw a bus traveling

down the dirt road just north of the aircraft. The

vehicle was quickly stopped, and the passengers

were removed to a location clear of the operation.

A few minutes later, a large explosion occurred

west of the runway area, and a large fireball lit up

the night. The roadblock team had encountered a

gasoline truck and, after it would not halt, fired an

antitank round into its cab. The round went

through the cab and penetrated the fuel tank and

ignited the gasoline. The driver managed to escape

the truck and fled the scene in a small pickup that

was following the tanker. In less than 10 minutes,

two significant deviations from the ground plan

had occurred. Kyle discussed the situation with

Beckwith and determined that the fuel truck was

probably driven by bandits since an escort vehicle

had accompanied it. The pickup gave the truck

driver the opportunity to escape in the event that

local police stopped the vehicle. The two theorized

that the escaped driver would not contact local police to report the incident. Beckwith also suggested

that the bus be run into the burning tanker to

make it appear that the two had collided head-on.

The passengers would be flown out of Iran on

Brenci’s Talon and deposited back at Manzariyen

on Night Two. Both the air and ground mission

commanders concluded that the mission had not

been compromised and that the operation was still

on track.129

As things settled down on the ground at Desert

One, Jubelt maneuvered his number two Combat

Talon for landing. The fuel truck was burning fu -

riously, and the resulting illumination rendered

the crew’s NVGs practically useless. On Jubelt’s

first approach, he did not pick up the runway

lights in time to correct his inbound course and

land. The fire had washed out his NVGs. Jubelt

went around and maneuvered his aircraft for a

second approach. In less than 10 minutes, Jubelt

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

222
had landed on his second approach and had offloaded his passengers.130

Three minutes after Jubelt landed on the north

runway, Fleming landed on the south side.

(Carney’s CCT had set up a second runway on the

north side of the dirt road and had repositioned

the remote landing lights on the south runway

after arriving aboard Brenci’s aircraft.) Fleming’s

touchdown was also firm but resulted in no damage to the aircraft. As Fleming landed on the

south runway, Lewis (in Republic 4) touched

down on the north runway and taxied to his helicopter refueling location.131 Tharp, in Republic 5,

was the next to land on the south runway and

was marshaled to his refueling location. Meanwhile, the blivet refueling system aboard Fleming’s

Combat Talon was rolled off his aircraft, and a n

alternate helicopter-refueling location was established. There were now five aircraft on the ground

at Desert One, with the helicopters inbound and

due to land shortly. Kyle needed to launch Brenci

and Jubelt to make room for Uttaro’s tanker and

the inbound helicopters. It was time to move the

bus passengers to Brenci’s aircraft for transport

out of Iran. Kyle learned at that time that one

of the Iranian generals had lost a loaded pistol

perhaps while aboard Brenci’s aircraft. After a

prolonged search of the cargo compartment, the

weapon could not be found. Kyle made the decision to move the passengers to Fleming’s number three Talon to make sure that the pistol did

not fall into the hands of one of the Iranian prisoners.132

Carney’s CCT marshaled Brenci into position

on the south runway for takeoff, and he departed

Desert One for Masirah Island as soon as the

dust settled from Tharp’s landing. Jubelt was

then cleared for takeoff, and he departed the

north runway behind Brenci. There were now

three aircraft on the ground at Desert One, with

Uttaro (Republic 6) orbiting near the LZ. With

Brenci and Jubelt airborne, Uttaro was cleared to

land on the north runway. The fuel truck was

still burning as Uttaro passed over it on his approach, and he was forced to make a go around.

After a second attempt to land that resulted in a

second go around, Republic 6 touched down

uneventfully on its third approach and was marshaled to its refueling position next to Lewis’s

tanker on the north runway. The four aircraft at

Desert One were aligned with Lewis and Uttaro

on the northeast end of the north runway and

Tharp and Fleming roughly at the same position

on the south runway. Fleming’s aircraft was

turned 180 degrees from the other three, facin

down the runway to the southwest (fig. 32). It w

2315 a t Desert One, and the helicopters were n

in sight.133

The helicopter formation (call signs Bluebea

1 through 8) was having a terrible time making 

to Desert One. Their departure from the US

Nimitz and the initial leg of their low-level rou

went as planned. Shortly after takeoff, howeve

Bluebeard 5 experienced TACAN radio failu

and began to experience some yaw problem

brought on by a malfunctioning automatic fligh

control system. Although not 100 percent c

pable, the aircraft was still flyable and able 

complete its mission.134 About 140 miles inlan

the next helicopter maintenance problem o

curred. Bluebeard 6 experienced a blade inspe

tion method (BIM) warning light on his RH-53D

a condition that indicated possible loss of th

main rotor blade’s internal-nitrogen pressure du

to a crack in the blade. The aircraft command

landed his aircraft and shut down his engines 

inspect the BIM visually. Meanwhile, Bluebear

8 landed to assist the downed aircraft. The cre

of Bluebeard 6 determined that the aircraft w

not airworthy and elected to abandon their ai

craft and board Bluebeard 8. There were no

seven RH-53D helicopters en route to Dese

One.

135 The helicopters were operating radio s

lent, and the lead helicopter did not know th

status of Bluebeard 6 or Bluebeard 8. With bo

crews on board, Bluebeard 8 was 15 minutes b

hind the other six helicopters.

The helicopter formation was flying at 200 fe

above the ground when it entered the fir

haboob. What had been only a mild nuisance 

Brenci and the fixed-wing aircraft was near

catastrophic for the helicopters. Barely able 

see the ground, Bluebeard 1 pressed on, hopin

to pop out on the other side. Visibility decrease

from a mile to a quarter of a mile, but the form

tion managed to stay together. Visibility im

proved as the formation departed the fir

haboob. After a few minutes in the clear, the fo

mation entered the second, denser haboob, an

had extreme difficulty seeing each other in th

thick dust. When Bluebeard 1 could no longer se

the ground and could only occasionally see Blu

beard 2, he elected to turn his formation aroun

and attempt to exit the dust storm on a rever

heading. Upon exiting the haboob, Bluebeard 

landed in the desert with Bluebeard 2 in trai

The remainder of the formation did not see Blu

beard 1 make the U-turn and had continued o

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

223
its original heading. After approximately 20 minutes on the ground, Bluebeard 1 determined that

the rest of his formation was still on its way to

Desert One. He decided to proceed on towards

Desert One in formation with Bluebeard 2 at a

reduced airspeed and at an altitude between 500

and 1,000 feet above the ground. He was hoping

that the dust would subside and allow his formation to make it to its destination.136

At 2250 local time the helicopter formation

was well into the second haboob. Bluebeard 3

was now lead, with Bluebeards 4, 5, and 7 in tow.

Bluebeard 8, with the crew of Bluebeard 6 on

board, was 15 minutes behind the formation, and

Bluebeards 1 and 2 were 20 minutes behind

Bluebeard 8. As Bluebeards 1 and 2 entered the

second haboob, Bluebeard 2 lost its second-stage

hydraulics, which powered the number one automatic flight-control system and a portion of the

primary flight controls. Other than in wartime,

the condition warranted immediate landing and

shutdown. The crew decided to continue in forma -

tion with Bluebeard 1 to Desert One in the hope

that the aircraft could somehow be fixed once it

arrived there. Meanwhile, Bluebeard 5 was experiencing additional instrument problems. As the

dust got thicker, visibility was reduced to zero, and

when Bluebeard 5 could no longer see either the

ground or his lead aircraft, he elected to turn away

from lead and descend to 50 feet above the ground

to ensure spacing. The aircraft’s primary flight in -

struments had failed, and the secondary system

was sticking in turns. Without those instruments,

it was nearly impossible to fly the aircraft without

Figure 32. Desert One, Fixed-Wing Arrival (Source: Jim Kyle, The Guts to Try, New York:

Orion Books, 1990.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

224
outside references. Facing a 9,800-foot mountain

range and unsure that he could make it back to

the USS Nimitz before running out of fuel, Bluebeard 5 elected to abort his mission and try to

make it back to the Gulf of Oman where the carrier’s rescue force could pick up the crew from the

water. The crew had come to within 145 miles of

Desert One when it elected to turn back. There

were now six helicopters inbound to Desert One—

Bluebeard 3 in the lead, followed by Bluebeard 4

and Bluebeard 7; 10 minutes behind was Bluebeard 8, and Bluebeards 1 and 2 were 35 minutes

behind the leader. Bluebeard 2, however, was

nursing a sick aircraft that was suffering from severe hydraulic system problems .137

* * * * * *

Kyle and the four fixed-wing aircraft were

waiting for the helicopters at Desert One. Nearly

an hour and a half had passed since Uttaro had

landed and set up his refueling point. Fuel for the

C-130s was becoming a problem. Lee Hess was at

Wadi Kena with Ulery and the JTF planning

staff. A quick calculation of fuel required to make

it to the tanker track off the coast of Iran showed

that the Desert One aircraft had to be airborne

within the hour. Hess knew that, with the helicopters still en route to Desert One, there was no

way that the refueling operation would be completed within that time. After a second reminder

to King, Hess was able to convince King to launch

the standby tankers. At 0020 local two KC-135s

were scrambled at Wadi Kena, launched into the

night, and headed southeast towards the Iranian

coastline. 138 At the same time Bluebeards 3 and 4

landed at Desert One.

Following the marshaling plan for eight helicopters (Kyle did not know how many helicopters

were still inbound to his location), CCT marshaled the first two aircraft to Hal Lewis’s tanker.

Because of the loose sand on the LZ, the helicop -

ters could not ground taxi but rather used a leapfrog tactic, or held the nose gear off the ground

while moving forward on the main landing gear.

Both maneuvers kicked up a large amount of

dust. When Bluebeard 7 arrived at 0035, he was

marshaled to Republic 5’s location for refueling.

(Bluebeard 7 had turned around when he lost

sight of Bluebeard 5. When he could not find his

wingman in the haboob, Bluebeard 7 assumed

that Bluebeard 5 had crashed in the desert. He

did not know that Bluebeard 5 was en route back

to the carrier. Bluebeard 7 turned around once

again and proceeded to Desert One and was 15

minutes behind the first two helicopters.) Whe

Bluebeard 8 arrived with the crew of Bluebeard 

onboard, CCT marshaled it to Republic 4. By 010

Bluebeards 1 and 2 had landed, with Bluebeard 

marshaled to Republic 6 (Uttaro) and Bluebeard 

marshaled to Republic 5 (Tharp). There were no

six helicopters at Desert One, which was th

minimum number required for the mission to co

tinue as planned. Time was still critical. With a

other hour needed to refuel all six helicopters an

a two-hour flight to Delta Force’s drop-off site, th

helicopters could make it to their laager site 4

minutes before sunrise (fig. 33). 139

As Kyle and Beckwith went between the hel

copters to determine their exact status, Bluebear

2 shutdown behind Tharp’s tanker. The proble

with the second-stage hydraulic system could n

be fixed, and the aircraft was grounded on th

spot. With only five flyable helicopters now ava

able at Desert One, the mission fell into an abo

status. Kyle went to Beckwith to see if Del

Force could be reduced, but he was told that 

could not be done. With only five helicopters le

Kyle had no other choice but to abort the missio

Beckwith headed for the other helicopters to g

his men off and back on to the fixed-wing aircra

Kyle headed for the SATCOM radio to infor

General Vaught of his abort recommendation.140

With Kyle’s recommendation sent to Vaught 

Wadi Kena, cleanup action at Desert One got u

der way. In about 20 minutes Vaught radioe

back approving the abort recommendation and d

rected that the number two helicopter be d

stroyed in place. The bus passengers were to b

released, and the five flyable helicopters would b

returned to the USS Nimitz. Vaught could hav

ordered Bluebeard 2 to continue the mission, b

he respected the crew’s decision and the recom

mendation from Kyle.141

By the time the abort decision had been fina

ized, the fixed-wing aircraft had been on th

ground two and one-half hours. The addition

ground time had cut into their fuel reserve

When Kyle knew for sure that only six helicopte

were going to make it to Desert One, he autho

ized the C-130s to pump 1,000 gallons of fuel fro

their bladders to their main fuel tanks. Lewis a

ready had refueled three helicopters, and his fu

bladder was empty. Thus, he needed to depa

Desert One as soon as possible, or he would n

make it out of Iran before running out of fue

Bluebeards 3 and 4 were parked behind Lewis

aircraft and had to be moved before Lewis cou

taxi for take-off. Otherwise, the dust kicked up b

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

225
the turning C-130 propellers would destroy the

helicopters. Bluebeard 4 also needed more fuel be -

fore it departed Desert One, so Kyle coordinated

additional fuel to be provided by Republic 5 after

Lewis was airborne. Bluebeard 3 had a nose landing gear problem, having deflated the nose-gear

tire upon his initial landing. To move the aircraft

the helicopter had to be air-taxied to a position

north of Lewis’s aircraft. With a CCT marshaller

monitoring the operation, Bluebeard 3 lifted off in

a heavy cloud of dust at 0248 hours and proceeded

to the north and to the left of the parked tanker.

Once airborne the pilot became disoriented and

allowed the aircraft to drift back to the right. With

insufficient altitude to clear the vertical stabilizer

of Republic 4, the main rotor blades slammed into

the EC-130E, exploding as it plummeted on top of

the parked tanker. The RH-53D impacted the EC130E along the wing route and slid forward on top

of the fuselage, coming to rest just above the C130 cockpit with its nose facing forward in the

same direction as the tanker. Fire erupted immediately, and the two aircraft were engulfed in

flames. Aboard Republic 4 were 14 crew members

(including fu els personnel) and a portion of Delta

Force that already had boarded the aircraft and

were lying on the empty fuel bladders. The bladders had become time bombs waiting to explode

when the flames got to them (fig. 34).142

As the two aircraft burned, Witherspoon, one

of Lewis’s loadmasters, managed to get the right

paratroop door open, and Delta Force personnel

began bailing out the door and rolling in the sand

to extinguish their flaming clothing. McClain

Figure 33. Desert One, Rotary-Wing Arrival (Source: Jim Kyle, The Guts to Try, New York:

Orion Books, 1990.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

226
partially opened the left paratroop door, but

quickly closed it when flames shot through the

opening. Bancroft, the third loadmaster on Republic 4, tried to keep the soldiers from bunching up

at the door opening. On the flight deck Harrison

escaped past the galley and r aced to the paratroop

door with only minor injuries. Byers, the radio

operator of Republic 4, was also on the flight deck

and was engulfed in flames. Suffering severe

burns to his hands and arms, Beyers could not

make it through the burning aircraft. Two Delta

Force team members raced back into the burning

inferno and pulled Beyers to safety.143 Beyers had

suffered severe burns on his hands and arms, but

he had made it out of the aircraft alive.

Uttaro, in aircraft 62-1818, was parked next to

the now burning and exploding wreckage that

only moments before had been aircraft 62-180

and Bluebeard 3. With missiles, bullets, and gr

nades exploding around him, Uttaro powered u

his engines and began taxiing away from th

burning wreckage, dragging the still-connecte

fuel hoses behind his aircraft. Gingerich, Uttaro

radio operator aboard Republic 6, deplaned an

moved to the front of Lewis’s aircraft. There h

found the pilot and copilot of Bluebeard 3 tryin

to escape the wreckage. Gingerich had seen th

pilots exit the burning helicopter and slide dow

the nose of the C-130. He helped the two to safet

avoiding the still-turning propellers of the tanke

Three additional helicopter crew members did no

escape from the rear of the helicopter and r

mained in the wreckage. In the EC-130E Lew

McIntosh, Bakke, McMillan, and Mayo were al

Figure 34. Desert One, Bluebeard 3 Collides with Republic 4 (Source: Jim Kyle, The Guts

to Try, New York: Orion Books, 1990.)

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

227
trapped in the inferno. In a matter of seconds, the

organized withdrawal from Desert One had

turned to tragedy. The three helicopters near the

accident were abandoned by their crews and were

ripped apart by the exploding ordnance. With

Bluebeard 2 already grounded behind Tharp’s Re -

public 5, only Bluebeard 7 remained flyable on the

south runway. Kyle passed the word that nobody

would leave until he could sort out the casualty

situation and organize the withdrawal.144 He made

the decision that all helicopters would be left at

Desert One.

Kyle directed that a thorough search of the

area be made to ensure that everyone was aboard

one of the three remaining C-130s. Carney and

his CCT were Kyle’s primary means for ensuring

that no one was left. Three roadblock team members came out of the darkness and were loaded on

to one of the C-130s. The CCT picked up the remotely activated landing lights and replaced them

with chem-lite sticks (a decision that would

nearly cause the loss of two airplanes on takeoff).

The bus passengers that had been loaded on

Fleming’s aircraft were moved back to their bus

and released. Tharp, in Republic 5, was the first

aircraft to be cleared to depart Desert One. As

Tharp’s aircraft accelerated down the dirt runway

and neared the 3,000-foot point, the aircraft hit

the berm of the dirt road and catapulted over it on

to the other side. There was a large cloud of dirt

kicked up by the impact, but the aircraft continued to accelerate. Tharp managed to get the aircraft airborne, and he struggled for altitude. With

the aircraft slowly accelerating, Tharp had made

it. The second to take off was Steve Fleming in

Dragon 3, also on the south runway. Just as

Tharp had done, Fleming ploughed through the

dirt berm and continued his takeoff. Dragon 3

struggled for altitude, became airborne, and then

slowly climbed into the night sky en route back to

Masirah Island. When the CCT removed the runway lights and replaced them with chem-lites,

they did not realize that the pilots could not see

the dimmer chemlites that outlined the runway.

After Tharp successfully departed, Fleming lined

up on the tire ruts made by Tharp’s aircraft and

followed them down the runway.145 A catastrophe

was avoided thanks to the durability of the tough

C-130 aircraft and the superior flying skills of

their crews.

Kyle and Carney were the last to board Uttaro’s

aircraft for departure from Desert One. Uttaro

made a perfect takeoff from the north runway, and

in minutes the aircraft was flying smoothly over

the dark Iranian desert miles from Desert One.

Over four hours had passed since Brenci had first

landed in the Iranian Desert. Tharp had shut

down an engine after takeoff due to loss of engine

oil pressure and was proceeding to Masirah Island on three engines. Uttaro soon passed him,

with Kyle electing to continue on to Masirah Island and monitor Tharp’s progress by way of

SATCOM radio. (Uttaro’s aircraft had burn victims on board, and Kyle wanted to get them to

Masirah Island so that their medical needs could

be better attended.) By 0500 Uttaro had cleared

Iranian airspace and was one hour out of Masirah

Island.146 None of the aircraft returning from De -

sert One needed fuel from the KC-135 tankers

scrambled by Hess from Wadi Kena. The additional fuel taken from the fuel bladders allowed

the two EC-130Es to complete the return leg

without refueling. Fleming’s aircraft showed less

than 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining when he

touched down at Masirah Island.

Tharp was the last to land back at Masirah

Island. The burn victims from Uttaro’s aircraft

were transferred to a waiting C-141, and Delta

Force boarded a second C-141 for the five-hour

flight back to Wadi Kena. General Gast organized

a head count of all Air Force personnel to determine exactly who did not return from Desert One.

The count verified that Hal Lewis and four of

his crew members aboard Republic 4 had been

killed in the accident (along with three Marine

crew members). The full impact of what had

hap pened only hours before began to sink in. A

noble effort to free American hostages in Iran

ha d ended in tragedy. The Combat Talon force,

however, flying both MC-130Es and EC-130Es,

had performed exceptionally well and had adjusted their plan when operational requirements

changed. Operation Eagle Claw had come to an

unfortunate end.

* * * * * *

At Wadi Kena Pinard brought the news of the

Desert One disaster to Meller’s crew. Pinard had

been up throughout the night and had monitored

the mission at Vaught’s JTF headquarters. Meller’s crew had been in crew rest for the Night

Two portion of the operation after being extremely busy since its arrival at Wadi Kena. On

24 April Thigpen and Williamson had configured

the Night Two mission aircraft (64-0562, 64-

0567, and 64-0572) with IR lenses and rotatingbeacon covers, a challenging feat without an op -

erational “cherry picker” to reach the tip of the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

228
vertical stabilizer. Daigenault, Meller’s flight en -

gineer, had stayed busy preflighting the aircraft

and coordinating with maintenance actions required for the Night Two launch. McBride and

Launder, the two crew navigators, had finetuned the low-level route to Manzariyeh and

had created mission folders for each crew. Drohan, Yagher, and Robb (EW officers from Lewis’s,

Uttaro’s, and Meller’s crews, respectively) had

analyzed each route segment and had “shadowed” each one with known enemy threats so

that the crews could easily determine when the

aircraft would be detected by Iranian radar.

They also coordinated with Meller’s two naviga -

tors to adjust the low-level route if there was

any time that the aircraft entered a lethalthreat ring. Mink, Meller’s radio operator, spent

his time working with the JTF communications

element refining the execution checklist and

checking out the aircraft’s radios. Chesser and

Thomas, the two primary loadmasters on Meller’s crew, had flown with Tharp on Republic 5

to Desert One and were not at Wadi Kena. The

third loadmaster on Meller’s crew, Chamness,

was new to Combat Talon , but he was already

highly respected for his knowledge. He inspected

each aircraft and ensured that their cargo compar

ments were properly configured for the Night Tw

mission.

Meller coordinated his crew’s effort. He kne

that there would be little time for Brenci, Uttar

and Lewis to prepare for the Manzariyeh missio

so he and Thigpen prepared an in-depth briefin

that covered all phases of the flight. His plan w

to brief the Night One crews on the Night Tw

mission immediately after their arrival back 

Wadi Kena and provide them the mission folde

containing essential mission details. There w

just enough time to answer questions before tak

off. Daigenault and Chamness had the aircra

preflighted and ready to go. The pilots reviewe

every bit of data for the Night Two mission—fro

weight and balance forms to the EWO’s thre

assessment to the navigator’s low-level route. B

the time Pinard arrived with the news of the D

sert One disaster, Meller and his crew had th

Night Two mission finalized and were ready 

brief the mission.

With Delta Force and the injured soldiers an

airmen gone from Masirah Island, General Ga

Kyle, the communications crew, the CCT, and th

five Combat Talon crews were all that remaine

Night Two Lead Crew. Left to right: Mink, *Chesser, Thigpen, Launder,

Daigenault, Meller, *Thomas, McBride, Williamson, and Robb. Not pictured:

Chamness.

__________

 *Also flew during 24 April Desert One mission.

Photo courtesy of J. V. O. Weaver

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

229
Everyone was mentally and physically drained.

Two British personnel assigned to the sultan of

Oman’s air force pulled up in a jeep and deposited

two cases of beer. Written on the cardboard case

was the phrase that has since become the motto of

the 8th SOS: “To you all, from us all, for having

the guts to try.” The beer was a welcomed respite

from the previous night’s tragedy. As everyone

settled down for a much needed rest, maintenance

crews were busy inspecting the aircraft.

Combat Talon 64-0565 was in bad shape.

Brenci had turned the aircraft over to maintenance, and Oliver swung into action. Kyle asked

Oliver to inspect the aircraft to determine if it

was safe to fly. The large radome on the belly of

the aircraft, which housed ECM equipment, had

the front half torn off, and the rear of the radome

was filled with Iranian sand. There were skin

cracks in areas identified as “secondary structure,” including the wing-fairing skin. Buie Kindle

inspected the landing gear, expecting to find damage there due to the forces exerted during the

impact with the desert floor. Visual inspection revealed no damage, but Oliver ordered a nondestructive inspection (NDI) performed to determine

if there was damage not detectable to the naked

eye. On 26 April an NDI technician arrived by

way of a support C-130, and he set about inspecting the aircraft. To Oliver’s surprise the landing

gear checked out fine. The NDI also showed minor

cracks in the wing areas, but Oliver determined

that the aircraft was safe to fly with a reduced

fuel load.147

On 28 April Oliver and his Detachment 4 crew

departed Masirah Island in 64-0565 for Wadi

Kena with the NDI technician and Kyle on board.

Kyle was subsequently ordered back to Washington, D.C., and departed Wadi Kena by way of a

C-141 bound for Europe and the United States.

After an overnight stay in Egypt, Oliver flew on to

Rhein Main AB by way of a refueling stop at

Sigonella AB. He requested an Air Force structural engineer meet the aircraft in Germany. After another day of inspections by the engineer, the

aircraft was certified as airworthy, and Oliver departed Germany for Keflavik, Iceland. With stops

in Greenland and Goose Bay, Labrador, Oliver

flew on to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he

stopped to brief the Air Force Logistics Command

vice commander on his participation in Eagle

Claw. The last leg of the flight terminated at LAS

Ontario. Aircraft 64-0565 had made it home.

Later inspections revealed that the leading- and

trailing-edge wing spars were severely cracked,

and the “rainbow” fittings, which provided the

means to attach the wings to the fuselage of the

aircraft, were also cracked. In short the aircraft

was in terrible shape. 148 The Talon would be dismantled and rebuilt from the ground up. After

only nine months at LAS Ontario, Combat Talon

64-0565 was returned to the fleet and resumed its

distinguished service. Ironically, Turczynski was

the aircraft commander who accepted the aircraft

in February 1981. Lockheed technicians at LAS

Ontario had corrected every discrepancy in the

aircraft’s forms. The aircraft was on an “initial”

with no delayed discrepancies in the form K. It

was the only time in his career that Turczynski

flew a Talon with no write-ups.

The Holloway Commission Report

Over the next 10 days, the Talon crews made

their way back to their home bases. Turczynski

departed Masirah Island on 28 April and was the

last to leave. He retraced his route of flight

through Diego Garcia, where his crews again

spent the night. The next day his aircraft refueled

twice en route nonstop to Kadena AB. The

Hurlburt Field crews retraced their deployment

routes back through either Rhein Main AB or La -

jes Field. Uttaro and other designated crew members stayed in Germany and provided an escort

for the remains of Lewis and his fallen airmen

after their release by the Iranians. Meller’s crew

also stayed in Germany for several days awaiting

Photo courtesy of Roland Guidry

The inscription on the cardboard beer case was later

adopted by the 8th SOS as its squadron’s motto—The

Guts to Try. The box top hangs on the wall of the 8th

SOS at Duke Field.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

230
a decision whether his Combat Talon would be

used for the return of the aircrew remains to the

United States. Meller was eventually released,

and on 2 May 1980 his crew arrived back at

Hurlburt Field, Florida, in Combat Talon 64-

0572, the last to return home from the mission.

The month of May revolved around honoring

the fallen airmen and marines, with memorial

services held at Hurlburt Field and in Washington, D.C., and funeral services conducted at the

Air Force Academy and in Valdosta, Georgia. On

9 May 1980 President Carter presided over a memorial service at Arlington National Cemetery for

the eight men lost at Desert One. As the special

operations community buried its dead, the inevitable investigations began to determine what happened at Desert One and who was to blame for

the failure.

The Senate Armed Services Committee con -

vened on 7 May 1980 to investigate the failed mission. Chaired by Sen. John Stennis, the committee was limited to asking questions regarding the

rescue mission from the time of its inception up to

its failure at Desert One. There was to be no

speculation on any planning for a follow-up attempt. Vaught, Gast, Kyle, Beckwith, and the Ma -

rine helicopter formation commander, Lt Col Ed

Seiffert, testified before the senators. The hearing

opened with Stennis reading a statement that

everyone on the committee had pride in their

military and that the purpose of the hearing was

to learn the facts behind the failed mission. Sen.

Barry Goldwater, who had supported the president in his decision to execute the mission, insisted that no person be admonished or demoted

because of the failure. Sen. Strom Thurmond expressed concern over command and control issues.

As the hearing progressed, Sen. Sam Nunn cut to

the heart of the matter when he asked two important questions: What had we learned from the

failure? and What could be done to make the system better for the future?149 Both questions

needed answering, and Beckwith provided an answer to the second one—establish a permanent

task force responsible for the counterterrorism

mission. The seeds were planted during the hearings that would eventually grow into the establishment of the US Special Operations Command

a few years later. (Senators Nunn and Cohen

later coauthored the text of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1986 that established the new US

Special Operations Command.)

The House Armed Services Committee con -

ducted hearings during May, and the principle

commanders were again called to testify. Guid

also testified before the House committee. Hou

representatives seemed fixed on determining wh

the RH-53D helicopter was selected for th

mission over perhaps other, more capable aircra

(the USAF MH-53 Pave Low, for example). Aft

two weeks of testimony on Capitol Hill, Congre

decided to drop its investigation and turn th

task over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congre

apparently decided that the Joint Chiefs coul

better investigate itself to determine what we

wrong. Towards the end of May 1980, the Depar

ment of Defense established the Special Oper

tions Review Group, which came to be know

a s the Holloway Commission and was chaire

by Adm James L. Holloway III, former chief o

nava l operations. The commission was cha

tered to conduct a forward-looking, no-hold

barred assessment of the attempted rescue mi

sion. The purpose of the commission was 

provide an independent appraisal of the rescu

attempt so the commission could recommend im

provements in planning, organizing, coordinatin

directing, and controlling any similar operation 

the future.150

The commission was made up of six flag an

general officers representing all four services. I

addition to its chairman (Admiral Holloway

members of the commission included Lt Ge

S amuel V. Wilson, Retired, USA; Lt Gen Leroy 

Manor, Retired, USAF; Maj Gen James C. Smit

USA; Maj Gen John L. Piotrowski, USAF; an

Maj Gen Alfred M. Gray, USMC.151 The group r

viewed all pertinent written documentation, i

cluding planning documents, training report

mission debriefs, congressional testimony, med

clips, press releases, technical analyses, and th

after action report. All principals involved in th

operation were also interviewed. The commissio

traveled to Fort Bragg and to Hurlburt Field an

received detailed briefings on each participatin

unit’s capabilities. At Hurlburt Field an airfie

seizure demonstration was conducted with Brenci

and Meller’s crews performing blacked-out lan

ings at Holley Field, a small airfield located in th

Florida Panhandle. The short runways and co

fined taxiways challenged the participants, b

the demonstration went off without a hitch. Tw

HH-53 Pave Low helicopters from the 20th SO

and one AC-130H gunship from the 16th SOS al

participated in the demonstration. In addition 

viewing actual demonstrations and receiving mi

sion briefings, the commission also conducte

roundtable discussions with mission personnel 

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

231
all grades, from commanders to airmen, to determine individual skill levels, motivations, and levels

of proficiency to perform the special operations

mission. Because the commission was chartered

by the JCS, most of the commission’s discussions

were with military personnel and their organiza -

tions within the National Military Command System. The majority of the commission’s findings

and recommendations, therefore, dealt with matters internal to the Department of Defense. 152

By August 1980 the Holloway Commission had

completed its investigation and had presented its

findings to the JCS. The commission identified 23

issues, which it felt deserved full analyses but

provided a note of caution. The commission unan imously concluded that no one action or lack of

action caused the rescue attempt to fail and that

no one alternative or all alternatives could have

guaranteed its success. The mission was high risk

and involved the possibility of failure. From the

23 issues the commission drew the following 10

specific conclusions:

 1. The concept of a small clandestine operation was

valid and consistent with national policy objectives.

 2. The operation was feasible and probably represented the plan with the best chance of success at

the time the mission was launched.

 3. The rescue mission was a high-risk operation.

 4. The first realistic capability to successfully accom -

plish the rescue of the hostages was reached at the

end of March.

 5. OPSEC was an overriding requirement for a successful operation.

 6. Command and control was excellent at the upper

echelons but became more tenuous and fragile at

the intermediate levels.

 7. External resources adequately supported the JTF

and were not a limiting factor.

 8. Planning was adequate, except for the number of

backup helicopters and the provisions for weather

contingencies.

 9. Two factors combined to directly cause the mission

abort: unexpected helicopter failure rate and lowvisibility flight conditions en route to Desert One.

10. The citing of Desert One near a road probably rep -

resented a higher risk than indicated by the JTF

assessment.153

In addition to the 10 specific conclusions, the commission also identified two general conclusions

that emerged as fundamental concerns that were

related to most of the 23 major issues. The two

general conclusions were as follows:

1. The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning

was related to most of the major issues and im -

pacted the commission’s conclusions. By not having

an existing JTF organization, the JCS had to start

from the beginning to establish a JTF, find a com -

mander, create an organization, provide a staff, de -

velop a plan, select the units, and train the forces

before attaining even the most rudimentary degree

of mission readiness.

2. Operations security impacted on the JTF’s ability

to do many actions that would have enhanced mission success. A carefully structured JTF organization would have inherently provided an OPSEC en -

vironment within which a selective process could

have allowed a wider initial disclosure policy based

on selective disclosure rather than minimum disclosure.154

At the conclusion of the three-month investiga -

tion, the Holloway Commission made two recommendations to the JCS. It recommended that a

Counterterrorist Joint Task Force be established

as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with

permanently assigned staff personnel and certain

assigned forces. It also recommended that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to

the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel, composed of a group of carefully selected high-ranking officers (active and/or retired) who had career backgrounds in special

operations or who had served at the CINC or JCS

levels and who had maintained a current interest

in special operations or defense policy matters.155

With the conclusion of the commission’s investigation, the final chapter closed on Operation

Eagle Claw.

* * * * * *

May had been a time of mourning and reconstitution for special operators at Hurlburt Field and

at Kadena AB. With the House and Senate Armed

Services Committees finished with Operation

Eagle Claw and the Holloway Commission investigation under way, Talon aircrews were con -

vinced that any opportunity to free the hostages

had passed. As June arrived, however, another

plan was being formulated in Washington, D.C.,

that centered on Combat Talon . There had been

many innovations and new tactics developed over

the previous months that had brought the Combat Talon weapons system light years ahead of

where it had been in late 1979. As the National

Command Authorities pondered the next move,

Brenci and Turczynski wasted no time. They were

going back to Iran.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

232
Notes

1. Col Thomas P. Bradley, Retired, former commander,

7th Special Operations Squadron, interview by author, 12 May

1999, Hurlburt Fie ld, Fla. Cassette tape on file, Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

2. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 7.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 8.

5. Ibid., 8–9.

6. Ibid., 11–12.

7. James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try (New York: Orion

Books, 1990), 16–17.

8. Ibid.

9. Ryan, 12.

10. Ibid., 42.

11. Charles A. Beckwith, Delta Force (New York: Ha rcourt–

Brace–Jovanovich, 1983), 118.

12. Ibid., 171.

13. Ibid., 180.

14. Ibid., 186.

15. Ryan, 20.

16. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1979, on file 16th SOW historian file, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., vol. 1, 48–49.

17. Ryan, 65–66.

18. Ibid., 43.

19. Ibid., 50.

20. Ibid., 50–51.

21. Ibid., 52.

22. Aircrew names were taken from original scheduling

documents created at the time by the 8th SOS scheduling

section. The author harvested the documents from destruction

in 1982 when the 1980 files were being purged from the section. Some names may have changed, or have been omitted by

the respective section scheduler, before an actual flight took

place. By providing the names of the aircrews, the author

communicates to the reader the dynamics of the evolution of

the crews as training matured in preparation for the rescue

attempt. The author expresses regret if the crew lists provided

are not 100 percent accurate. See History, Daily, Weekly, and

Monthly Schedule, 8th SOS, 1 December 1979–30 May 1980,

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

23. Kenneth D. Oliver, “They Called It Peanut Field,”

1996, extract on file, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 195.

24. Ibid., 196.

25. Ibid., 197.

26. Ibid., 197–98.

27. Kyle, 77.

28. Ibid., 78–79.

29. Ibid., 86–87.

30. Ibid., 93.

31. Ibid., 94.

32. Ibid., 96–97.

33. Ibid., 98–99.

34. Ibid., 80.

35. Ibid., 99.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 101.

38. Ibid., 100–101.

39. Ibid., 102.

40. Ibid., 103.

41. Ibid., 107.

42. Ibid., 108.

43. Ibid., 108–9.

44. Personal notes, Col Roland D. Guidry, Retired, form

commander, 8th Special Operations Squadron, extract on fi

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla

45. Kyle, 113–14.

46. Ibid., 114.

47. Ibid., 114–15.

48. Ibid., 116.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 117–18.

51. Bradley interview.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. John Townsend, “A View from Behind the Curtain,” 

December 1997, memoir, Combat Talon Archive, HQ A

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 6.

56. Bradley interview, 14.

57. Oliver, 198–99.

58. Ibid., 200–201.

59. Ibid., 201.

60. Kyle, 131–32.

61. Guidry personal notes.

62. Ibid.

63. Kyle, 132.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 132–33.

66. Townsend, 7–8.

67. Ibid., 8–9.

68. Guidry personal notes.

69. Townsend, 10–11.

70. Ibid., 11.

71. Guidry personal notes.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Kyle, 136.

75. Guidry personal notes.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Kyle, 139.

79. Ibid., 134.

80. Ibid., 144.

81. Ibid., 158.

82. Guidry personal notes.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Kyle, 164.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., 167.

89. Ibid., 173.

90. Ibid., 172.

91. Ibid., 189.

92. Ibid., 190.

93. Guidry personal notes.

94. Kyle, 178.

95. Ibid., 178–79.

96. Ibid., 179–80.

97. Ibid., 181.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., 183–84.

100. Ibid., 205–6.

101. Ibid., 206–7.

102. Ibid., 207.

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIO

233
103. Ibid., 208.

104. Oliver, 202–3.

105. Guidry personal notes.

106. Townsend, 17.

107. Guidry personal notes.

108. Kyle, 210–11.

109. Ibid., 211.

110. Ibid., 212.

111. Ibid., 213.

112. Ibid., 226–28.

113. Ibid., 229.

114. Ibid., 231.

115. Ibid., 234.

116. Ibid., 236–37.

117. Ibid., 236.

118. Ibid., 238–39.

119. Townsend, 19.

120. Kyle, 242–43.

121. Townsend, 19–20.

122. Kyle, 244–45.

123. Ibid., 248–49.

124. Ibid., 250–51.

125. Townsend, 20.

126. Kyle, 257.

127. Ibid., 258.

128. Townsend, 20.

129. Kyle, 261–63.

130. Ibid., 272–73.

131. Ibid., 273.

132. Ibid., 274–75.

133. Ibid., 275.

134. Ibid., 243.

135. Ibid., 249–50.

136. Ibid., 253–55.

137. Ibid., 267–69.

138. Ibid., 278.

139. Ibid., 285.

140. Ibid., 288–89.

141. Ibid., 292–93.

142. Ibid., 295–96.

143. Ibid., 296–97.

144. Ibid., 299.

145. Ibid., 304–5.

146. Ibid., 306.

147. Oliver, 211.

148. Ibid., 211–12.

149. Kyle, 318–19.

150. J. L. Holloway III, “Holloway Rescue Mission Report,”

August 1980, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 1.

151. Ibid., 1–2.

152. Ibid., 2–4.

153. Ibid., 57–60.

154. Ibid., 60.

155. Ibid., 61.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

234
Chapter 9

Project Honey Badger and

Credible Sport (1980–81)

All the king’s horses and all the king’s men, couldn’t put Humpty together again.

It had been nearly six months since planning

for the Iranian rescue mission kicked off in the

fall of 1979. For the Combat Talon community,

the period would come to be recognized as the

greatest period of Combat Talon system advancement in its history. The tragedy at Desert

One relegated the rescue attempt to one of failure, but the tactics developed and hardware

procured during preparation for the mission

formed the foundation of Combat Talon capa -

bilities for the next two decades.

NVG Blacked-Out Landing

The greatest development during the period

was blacked-out landing operations. Before Desert One Combat Talon crews were trained in

short-field landing operations to austere landing zones, but they required overt lights to

mark the runway during hours of darkness.

Several portable lighting systems were used,

including smoke pots filled with kerosene and

battery-powered “bean bag” lights that provided

marginal overt illumination of the runway. The

major drawback of these lights was twofold:

first, they were hard to see by the pilot flying

the approach, and second, unfriendly forces on

the ground could see them. General Vaught had

tasked Kyle early in the planning phase to develop a capability to land the Combat Talon

without any external overt lighting, including

lights on the aircraft or lights on the runway.

To fulfill this tasking, NVGs were acquired and

employed for the first time by fixed-wing crews.

When the 8th SOS first began to develop its

NVG procedures, the copilot (or right-seat pilot)

wore NVGs that were focused on infinity, and

he searched outside the aircraft for the runway

environment. A five-light pattern was developed

to provide the pilots a visual reference for the

runway. In the early stages of NVG airland development, these five lights were overt and

could be seen by the naked eye. As the capa -

bility matured IR filters were developed so that

the lights could be seen only by NVGs. One pair

of lights was placed on each shoulder of the

runway 500 feet down from the approach en

and a second pair was placed 1,000 feet fro

the first set of lights. At the far end of the ru

way, a single light was placed on the left side o

the runway. The visual effect was similar 

sighting a hunting rifle with manual sights

the distant light was centered between the fou

closer lights, resulting in the aircraft bein

lined up properly down the runway.

Approach guidance was provided to the pilo

by the left navigator, who constructed a stan

ard 2.5-degree airborne radar-approach glid

slope for the aircraft’s landing. As the left nav

gator called out headings and altitudes, the lef

seat pilot, who initially was not on NVGs, fle

the approach according to the navigator’s in 

structions. When the right-seat pilot acquire

the landing light pattern or the runway environ 

ment on NVGs, he notified the left-seat pilo

and started flying the ailerons to assist in align 

ing the aircraft with the runway. When the lef

seat pilot acquired the runway with his nake

eyes, he took control of the aircraft and lande

using a controlled sink rate and visual refe

ences to the portable lights. Both the aircraft

landing and taxi lights remained off during th

approach and landing. Although the procedu

proved to be reliable, several hard landings o

curred when the left-seat pilot misjudged th

aircraft’s actual sink rate.

After 17 December 1979 when IR filter pap

was attached to the landing and taxi lights 

provide covert illumination during blacked-o

landings, procedures were changed so that th

left-seat pilot landed the aircraft while usin

NVGs. The IR filter paper was sandwiched b

tween two pieces of tempered glass and a

tached to both the landing and taxi lights b

using modified brackets developed by Oliv

and his developmental team. During the a

proach to landing, the landing lights were e

tended, but not turned on, until one to tw

miles out on final. At that time the left-seat p

lot called for lights, and the flight engine

turned them on to illuminate the approach en

of the runway. The later NVG procedure require

235
that everyone in front of the navigator’s curtain

use NVGs. The right-seat pilot flew the approach

with panel lights turned out, while the flight engineer monitored the engine instruments and the

right-seat pilot’s approach. Both the right-seat pilot and the flight engineer focused their NVGs

inside the cockpit. To prevent any light bleeding

forward from the navigators’ station, heavy black -

out curtains were installed in place of the thin

dividing curtain used on standard C-130 aircraft.

All lights forward of the curtain were either

turned off or taped to prevent illuminating the

interior of the cockpit. Throughout the approach

the left-seat pilot and the third pilot (safety pilot)

focused their NVGs outside the aircraft and

scanned for the runway environment. At one to

four miles out from landing, the left-seat pilot acquired the landing lights, the safety pilot con -

firmed them, and the left-seat pilot began flying

the aircraft. Airspeed, absolute altitude, and

vertical-velocity information were read to the leftseat pilot by the right-seat pilot and the left navigator until the aircraft touched down on the runway. If no lights were on the runway, the left-seat

pilot usually acquired the runway within a mile of

the approach end, depending on moon illumina -

tion and the brightness of the runway striping. As

the aircraft decelerated through 40 knots after

landing, the landing lights were turned off, and

the aircraft rolled out to its predetermined offload location. Covert taxi lights were used sparingly and usually only during turns or in con -

gested areas.1

For NVG takeoffs the left-seat pilot maintained

runway alignment with visual reference to the

runway centerline while still using NVGs. The

right-seat pilot read off the airspeeds as the aircraft accelerated. On rotation the right-seat pilot

provided the left-seat pilot with the number of

degrees nose-up attitude and the aircraft’s airspeed on climb out. With the introduction of the

IR filters for the aircraft lights and for the portable runway lights, Vaught’s requirement for total blacked-out landings (to the naked eye) was

achieved.2

Fuel-Cell (Blivet) Airdrop

The 8th SOS had initially identified the need

to air-drop fuel to helicopters during the October

1979 Red Flag exercise held at Nellis AFB, Nevada. When the requirement to refuel helicopters

arose in late November, JTF planners turned to

the air-drop method as their first solution to the

refueling problem. The initial blivet drop was

conducted using rigging similar to the CRRC,

with two G-12D parachutes to support a rigged

weight of 3,500 pounds (500 gallons of fuel). As

the number of helicopters were expanded to six,

then later to eight, the number of blivets to be

dropped by each C-130 increased to five. Between

December 1979 and February 1980, the blivet

drop was refined to include all equipment required to position the blivets and then to pump

fuel to the waiting helicopters. Thus, the standard five-blivet airdrop included two petroleum,

oil, and lubricant pumps (A-22s) and a small

tractor, called a mule, to move the blivets into

position. The total weight of the load was approximately 20,000 pounds.3

Testing was done on the five blivet loads at

Fort Bragg and at Yuma, Arizona, in December

and in early 1980. Testing confirmed that CDS

procedures provided were the most accurate and

effective means to deliver the heavy load. The following modifications were made to the Combat

Talon to allow for successful CDS air-drops:

1. Additional intermediate rails were installed.

2. A dual CDS gate (strap with cutter blade)

was developed.

3. Retractable VanZelm ratchets were installe d.

4. Individual gates were used for each blivet.

Although the fuel blivet air-drop procedure

was not used for the actual mission, the air-drop

option remained the JTF’s first choice until

shortly before mission execution. A secondary

airland method of delivering the blivets also was

developed. Called the blivet combat off-load, it

included modification of the ground-loading

ramps with skate wheels to allow the aircraft to

taxi with the loading ramps deployed. After the

aircraft had landed and taxied to its off-load loca -

tion, each blivet would be released from its restraints one at a time as the aircraft taxied forward. After the first blivet was downloaded, the

aircraft would stop, the loadmaster would cut the

second blivet loose, and the aircraft would

resume taxi while the blivet exited the rear of the

aircraft. The procedure was repeated until all

blivets were unloaded. At Desert One Fleming’s

crew downloaded three fuel blivets using the

combat off-load procedure.4

Fuel-Bladder Refueling System

Although airdrop of the fuel blivets proved to

be a viable delivery technique, the Delta Force

commander, Col Charlie Beckwith, did not like

the idea of having to depend on air-dropped

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

236
blivets to fuel the helicopters. He reasoned that

too many things could go wrong—drop malfunctions, unlevel ground that could prevent move -

ment of the blivets to the helicopters, inability of

the helicopters to find the refueling site—for him

to have confidence in the capability. A rubber

fuel-bladder system was developed to allow

ground refueling of the helicopters from the C-130

aircraft, thus eliminating the need to air-drop the

blivets. Two bladder configurations were developed, one for the Combat Talon and the other for

the EC-130E aircraft. The Combat Talon configuration utilized a single 3,000-gallon rubber-bladder

system with associated hoses, filters, and pumps.

Only 2,700 gallons of this fuel could be downloaded from the bladder due to fuel trapped in

the filters, pumps, and hoses and because of residual fuel in the bottom of the rubber bla dder.5

As the number of helicopters increased to

eight, the amount of fuel required to refuel them

also increased. The MC-130E had an electronic

warfare console in the cargo compartment of the

aircraft, thus leaving 27 feet of available cargo

space. A standard C-130 had a full cargo compartment measuring 41 feet and could accommodate two fuel bladders. The EC-130E was selected for the bladder mission because it had a

full cargo compartment (with the ABCCC capsule

removed) that would accommodate two fuel bladders and because it was capable of in-flight refueling. In the dual-bladder configuration, 6,000

gallons of fuel could be loaded aboard the aircraft, 5,400 gallons of which was usable fuel.

Each bladder was fitted with two pumps, four

hoses, and two filter assemblies. With two fuel

bladders installed, takeoff gross weight for the

EC-130Es flown to Desert One ranged between

185,000 to 187,000 pounds with 60,000 pounds of

internal aircraft fuel and 6,000 gallons in the fuel

bladders.

To employ the system, ground helicopter refueling procedures had to be developed. One

early concern of the aircrews was how to determine the distance between the C-130 and the

H-53 helicopter. The solution found was to extend the standard 50-foot long loadmaster’s

communications cord to 200 feet, which was the

same length as the refueling hoses. Whether the

ground-taxi plan required the C-130 to back up

to the static helicopters or the helicopters to

taxi to the C-130 , the distance between the two

aircraft always could be determined by the loadmaster with his communications cord. CCT per sonnel would marshal the aircraft into the refueling

position, and the refueling specialists would e

gage the hoses and the ground wire. A loadmast

then would either transfer the fuel utilizing th

aircraft’s fuel control panel, or he would supe

vise the fuel specialists as they operated th

pumps associated with the fuel bladder. The e

tire operation was safe and efficient, and it pr

vided the helicopters a means of refueling from 

remote airfield.6

Oliver and his team, along with LAS On 

tario engineers, developed a removable, dua

tank, 3,600-gallon fuel system (commonly r

ferred to as a Benson tank) that could be use

in lieu of the bladder system. The Benson tan

could be connected to the aircraft’s fuel sy

t em, and fuel could be pumped to the helicop 

ters utilizing the aircraft’s dump pumps throug

the single-point refueling panel. No addition

pumps or filters were required. The bladd

system took approximately 40 minutes 

pump 1,500 gallons of fuel, whereas the Benso

tank, with its higher-manifold pressure, too

about 20 minutes to transfer the same amoun

The Benson tank had many advantages ove

the bladder system, including the eliminatio

of leaks and fumes normally found with th

bladders, increased fuel capacity (two tan

with 1,800 pounds in each tank, for a total o

3,600 pounds), and the use of fuel from th

Benson tank while airborne. The major draw

back to the system was that it required a dua

rail system installed in each aircraft, whic

the EC-130Es did not have. Procurement lea

time also was such that only one system coul

be manufactured be fore the execution of Dese

One.

USAF Photo

The Benson fuel tank system pictured was develop

by Ken Oliver’s team and LAS Ontario engineers. T

configuration allowed the tanks to be removed wh

not required for a mission.

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

237
Additional Modifications to Combat Talon

Other modifications were made to Combat

Talon to enable the weapons system to execute

the Desert One mission. Those modifications included the following:

1. Modified the terrain-following computer to accom -

modate 165,000 pounds maximum aircraft gross

weight (previous limit was 135,000 pounds).

2. Modified the right side 463L rail locking mechanism.

3. Modified the rollers to accommodate the blivet drop

system.

4. Modified the forward escape hatch to accommodate

the PSC-1 SATCOM antenna.

5. Modified the top rotating beacon with a filter for an

IR flasher.

6. Installed heavy-duty blackout curtains between the

pilots’ and navigators’ crew stations.

7. Modified an Army IR tank searchlight for use as an

illuminator.

8. Installed over-the-counter “fuzz busters” to detect

certain types of radar threats.7

To utilize the new capabilities, tactics and procedures were developed and refined by Combat

Talon crew members. The point-parallel IFR procedure, which required radio communications to

coordinate both tanker and receiver aircraft, was

modified to a communications-out, overtaking rendezvous procedure. In addition, both the tanker

and the receiver lights were reduced to a minimum level to decrease the visual signature of the

aircraft. The FLIR was installed on 8th SOS aircraft for the first time in nearly 10 years, and the

aircrews were trained in its operation. The tactic

of flying a Combat Talon down the runway with

the FLIR extended to determine the runway’s

status was refined. Rapid onload and off-load procedures for jeeps, bikes, and personnel were also

developed. Prior to Desert One, the Combat Talon

did not fly in formation; rather, it used single-ship

employment tactics during operational missions.

Low-level formation procedures with both the EC130E and other Combat Talons were developed

utilizing the terrain-following radar. To fly lowlevel formation, a whole new set of procedures had

to be developed since the radar system was de -

signed for single-ship operation, and limitations

such as wing-tip clearances and aircraft climb

rates had to be determined. Procedures were also

developed for station keeping between a string of

MC-130Es using existing equipment (radar, the

SST-181 beacon, and air-to-air TACAN).8

By May 1980 a second plan to rescue the hostages was well under way. At no time in history

was the Combat Talons force more capable and

better prepared to do its job. With the Holloway

Commission still investigating the Desert One

mission, it was time to put the new hardware,

tactics, and procedures together and develop a

new plan to free the hostages.

Project Honey Badger

Within two weeks of the failed Desert One mission, a second hostage rescue planning effort was

moving forward in the Pentagon. JCS-J3/SOD

continued to provide the cover and physical working space for the JTF, but another organization,

named the Joint Test Directorate (JTD), was established to assist the JTF planners. The mission

of JTD was to coordinate the development of new

capabilities and strengths that the JTF could

draw upon when developing its plans.9 As JTF

planners developed various options to resolve the

hostage situation, the JTD analyzed them and developed capabilities to make the options viable.

When the April rescue mission failed, the Iranians dispersed the hostages to various locations

outside Tehran, thus making any follow-on effort

extremely difficult and more complex. There were

also emerging requirements, many of which were

still unknown, that faced JTF planners. It was

the JTD’s responsibility to catalogue and retain

new capabilities so that JTF planners could

source them when mission requirements were

identified. Thus, no capability was “lost” as the

planners developed their various options. The

JTD effort was code-named Honey Badger, with

the training and testing costs funded from US

Army and US Air Force sources.10

The Honey Badger program developed capabilities without regard to a specific rescue scenario.

The JTD then compiled a robust list of Honey

Badger-tested and -validated capabilities from

which the JTF planners could develop options. Actual mission responsibilities remained the same

as the original rescue attempt: Delta Force focused on the embassy and other high-value targets, the rangers were responsible for airfield seizure operations, and the 1st SOW provided

aviation planning. A new US Army aviation organization was also in the process of being formed

and was given aviation planning responsibilities

along with the 1st SOW. On 3 June 1980 General

Vaught briefed the JCS on the status of JTF planning and outlined force requirements that had been

identified. For the Air Force, a new nine-aircraft,

HH-53 Pave Low, squadron was established at

Hurlburt Field, with the aircraft being assigned

to the 20th SOS. The HH-53 had been developed

after Vietnam by the Military Airlift Command for

night rescue operations and had a terrain-following

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

238
radar system similar to the Combat Talon . With

the aircraft scheduled to become operational in

July 1980 and assigned to McClellan AFB, California, the Air Staff took action to redirect the

weapon system to Hurlburt Field and to assign

them to TAC. The unsatisfactory performance of

the US Navy RH-53Ds at Desert One had con -

vinced planners that an improved rotary-wing ca -

pability was needed if the mission was to be a

success. Along with the nine Air Force aircraft,

Vaught identified the need for 30 US Army UH60 Blackhawks and more than a dozen CH-47

Chinooks.11 For the Combat Talon , Honey Badger

improvements centered on tactics development

rather than hardware improvements. One MC130E undergoing IFR modification at LAS Ontario, however, was accelerated and completed

ahead of schedule, thus increasing the number of

IFR-capable Combat Talon aircraft assigned to

Hurlburt Field from three to four.

As the JTD developed capabilities under the

Honey Badger program, the relatively small force

that was tasked during the Desert One rescue attempt was expanded to include many new players. By the summer of 1980, the JTD had trained

a wide spectrum of forces dedicated to executing

the various options developed by JTF planners.

The forces numbered 2,377 personnel and 136 aircraft, and most of them were employed during

July in the first large-scale exercise since Desert

One.

12 The Combat Talon was still a critical part

of the rescue plan, but its role was much smaller

compared to the overall aviation force dedicated

to the new effort.

The Summer of 1980

Kyle and Guidry had spent much of May

either preparing for or testifying before Congress,

as had the other primary commanders in the

failed raid. As Operation Eagle Claw slipped farther into history, however, the reality of the present took hold. The hostages were still prisoners

in Tehran, and the prospects of getting them

back to the United States were slim. After the

failed rescue, the hostages were dispersed

throughout Tehran, with some being moved out

of the city to remote areas. The problem of locating them and rescuing them unharmed was

much more difficult than had been the case in

April. In any case President Carter needed an

executable rescue plan should the Iranians begi

to carry out their threat to kill the Americans. 

second attempt would undoubtedly suffer mor

casualties, but the president needed a military o

tion just in case it was required.

The Holloway Commission visited Hurlbu

Field during the second week of June, and a

airfield seizure demonstration was flown durin

the night of 10 June. The purpose of the demo

stration was to show commission members th

new capabilities that the Air Force had develope

for Desert One. Brenci, flying aircraft 64-056

flew the lead aircraft into a small airfield ju

t o the west of Hurlburt Field known as Holle

Field. At 2230 local time he made a blind airdro

of 20 US Army ranger personnel on to the ai

field and then departed the area on a short low

level route. Thirty minutes later Meller was i

bound to the field and made a blacked-o

landing on the 3,600-foot landing strip. Mell

had additional airfield security personnel an

CCT aboard and downloaded them at the d

parture end of t he runway. Brenci landed thre

minutes later at 2303 with the remainder of th

security force. At 2320 two HH-53 Pave Low hel

copters from the 20th SOS landed and wer

marshaled behind th e two Talons to transf

their passengers to the fixed-wing aircraft. A

2340 the two Talons departed two minutes i

trail and flew a terrain-following leg back 

Hurlburt Field. Commission members boarde

the two HH-53s and flew back to Hurlburt Fiel

where the mission was debriefed and commissio

members’ questions answer ed.1 3

During the course of the airfield seizure, a

AC-130H orbited overhead and provided notion

cover for the raiding force. Commission membe

were quite complimentary of the operation, ha

ing seen firsthand what a coordinated airfield se

zure effort looked like. The exercise marked th

first time the 20th SOS had participated in a

airfield seizure operation.*

Oro Grande Marine Corps Station

and Exercise Rusty Badger

After the completion of the Holloway Commi

sion’s visit, Hurlburt Field turned its full atte

tion towards the next major exercise code-name

Rusty Badger. The JTD had been busy developin

capabilities to support JTF rescue options an

__________

 *After the Desert One failure, the Air Staff transferred nine HH-53 Pave Low helicopters from the Military Airlift Command’s Air Rescue Serv

to the 1st SOW. As had the Combat Talon squadrons, USAF rotary-wing special operations capabilities had been allowed to decay to a point t

only a few obsolete HH-3s and UH-1Ns remained in the special operations inventory by 1979. Along with the nine HH-53H Pave Lows, the 

SOW also received two HH-53Bs and three HH-53Cs, for a total of 14 aircraft.

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

239
was ready to rehearse and validate them. The

March rehearsal for Desert One had been the

last time that both Hurlburt Field and the

Kadena-based Combat Talon crews had flown together. Turczynski had spent the time expanding

his crew force and training additional crew members in NVG blacked-out operations. For Rusty

Badger, he brought back to the United States

three aircraft—62-1843, 63-7785, and 64-0564—

and three crews under the command of Fleming,

Pearson, and Rumple. Brenci had to replace Hal

Lewis’s crew and at the same time expand his

crew force as Combat Talon requirements continued to increase. Ferkes and Thigpen were identified to become aircraft commanders of their own

crews, both having been involved in the prepara -

tion for the Desert One mission from its early

days. For the July exercise the 8th SOS provided

four aircraft—64-0562, 64-0567, 64-0568, and 64-

0572—along with four Combat Talon crews commanded by Brenci, Uttaro, Tharp, and Meller.

On 29 June pre-exercise training began, with one

C-130 transporting 25 passengers and their

equipment from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to

Condron Army Airfield near White Sands, New

Mexico.14

Six days later the entire 1st SOS/8th SOS con -

tingent was settled into Oro Grande, a small US

Marine Corps facility near Condron AAF. Person -

nel were transported between Condron AAF and

Oro Grande when their duties required them to

be at the aircraft. A central chow hall provided

messing for all personnel, and open-bay barracks

provided sleeping accommodations. From 6 to 8

July, squadron loadmasters worked with Army

rangers performing static onload and off-load

training during the day, while the remainder of

the crew flew night low-level missions to shortfield dirt landings in the area. On 9 July the airdrop of a 25,000-pound bulldozer was accomplished along with a combat off-load of a fuel

blivet by two Combat Talons. The bulldozer drop

was one of the new capabilities developed by the

JTD to satisfy JTF planner requirements to clear

a runway rapidly should it be blocked during an

airfield seizure operation.1 5

During the night of 10/11 July, three iterations

of the same exercise were flown between 2115 and

0600 the following morning. Each iteration con -

sisted of a bulldozer drop followed by ranger and

CCT static-line drops to a blacked-out runway/drop

zone. Forty minutes after the dozer drop, three

MC-130s landed with the remainder of the airfield

clearing team. After completion of each iteration,

CCT and ranger personnel were extracted to

White Sands, and another iteration would begin

with a different ranger battalion. In all, three

ranger companies were trained in the airfield seizure operation, and all seven Combat Talon crews

gained experience in delivering the airfield seizure

package. 16

During the night of 13 July, General Vaught

visited Condron AAF and Oro Grande and ob -

served an AC-130H live-fire demonstration and

an airfield seizure operation. At the completion of

the Condron AAF seizure, Vaught and most of his

party flew on to Michaels AAF, Utah, on an MC130E . After departing Michaels AAF on its return

leg to White Sands, the Combat Talon performed

a blacked-out, communications-out air refueling

with a KC-135 before its final landing. With the

training period complete, the deployed force was

now ready for a full-scale rehearsal. During the

night of 15 July, forces originating from Condron

AAF hit two objective areas simultaneously.

Fleming and Brenci, flying aircraft 64-0564 and

64-0572, departed Condron AAF en route to Tona -

pah, a small airfield in the Nellis AFB range complex. Fleming flew a FLIR runway clearing pass,

and Brenci landed one minute later. On Brenci’s

aircraft were two jeeps and 50 rangers who were

tasked to secure the southern portion of the airfield. Five minutes after Brenci landed, Fleming

landed with one jeep, two motorcycles, 50 rangers,

and CCT personnel. The rangers’ objective was to

secure the northwest portion of the airfield, and

the CCT’s objective was to mark the runway for

follow-on aircraft.17

While the first two Combat Talons were assaulting Tonapah, the other four aircraft were

committed to a similar operation at Fallon NAS,

California. After all four aircraft refueled en

route, Paul Rumple, flying aircraft 62-1843, began

the airfield seizure operation when he dropped a

bulldozer and seven jumpers on to the runway.

Five minutes later Tharp, in Combat Talon 64-

0567, dropped 17 additional jumpers. Uttaro, in

aircraft 64-0562, was the first to land at Fallon

NAS some 45 minutes after the bulldozer drop.

Pearson, Tharp, and Rumple landed behind Uttaro in three-minute increments. After approximately 30 minutes on the ground, the airfield had

been secured, and the four aircraft were cleared to

depart back to Condron AAF. Both the Tonapah

and Fallon NAS exercises went off without a

hitch, with all exercise objectives being either met

or exceeded.18

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

240
The final major event during the July deployment was a Trainex conducted on 20 July that

flew into Reese AFB, Texas. All seven Talon

crews flew during the exercise, with Thigpen commanding Meller’s crew for the first time. A new

tactic, employing dual-runway procedures, was

validated. This tactic included flying in formation

to the objective area, then simultaneously landing

on parallel runways to seize the airfield. Tharp

and Uttaro flew EC-130E aircraft 62-1818 and 62-

1825, and each carried a small helicopter known

as a light observation and command helicopter

(LOACH). After the two EC-130s landed and

parked in their designated locations, the small

helicopters were rapidly off-loaded, and their rotor blades were attached. In a matter of minutes,

the LOACHs were launched on their assigned

mission.19 As had been the case for the earlier

exercises, the Trainex validated important capa -

bilities (including dual-runway operations, bulldozer airdrops, and helicopter delivery by way of

C-130 aircraft), which the JTD retained in its

“bag of tricks” until the JTF planners needed

them. By the end of July, Brenci’s Talon crews

were redeployed to northwest Florida and the

relative tranquility of everyday home-station op -

erations. Turczynski and his personnel returned

to Kadena AB by way of commercial air. The

three 1st SOS Combat Talons remained at

Hurlburt Field. July had been a busy month for

the two Talon squadrons. The tempo would not

slack up for another four months. The 1st SOS

crews returned to Hurlburt Field in August and

remained there supporting Honey Badger opera -

tions until they were released in October.

Credible Sport

As the Talon crews worked to perfect their airfield seizure packages and to develop a capability

to rapidly off-load and assemble the LOACH aircraft from the EC-130E, the JTD was working on

an even more radical capability. The requirement

to extract Delta Force and the hostages from the

embassy area in Tehran had always driven planners towards such large, heavy-lift helicopters as

the HH-53. The helicopter had proven to be the

weak link in the Desert One mission and had, in

the end, caused its failure. Planners desired to

eliminate the helicopter requirement but to do so

required the development of a large, fixed-wing

aircraft capable of landing in a small area. Across

the street from the American embassy in Tehran

was the Amjadien soccer stadium, which had a

standard soccer playing field that was surrounded

by bleachers. The stadium had been designated 

the rallying point for Delta Force, the freed ho

tages, and the RH-53Ds after the planned Apr

embassy takedown. If a C-130 could be modifi

to land within the confines of the soccer stadium

onload the rescue force and the freed hostage

and be able to take off in a distance of approx

mately 100 yards, the logistics of getting the he

copters to Tehran would be eliminated. As a resu

of this ultrashort-field requirement, USAF ask

Lockheed-Martin in early July to conduct a fea

bility study and to develop a technical concept

Although the C-130 was designed to take off an

land on short, unimproved airfields, crews rare

landed on runways less than 3,000 feet in lengt

The developmental program that the USAF an

Lockheed undertook was named Credible Sport.

JTF planners envisioned a mission that woul

originate from the United States and fly nonsto

to Tehran, performing five IFRs en route an

then flying low level across Iran to avoid th

country’s air defense system. After departing th

soccer stadium with Delta Force and the hostage

the aircraft would exit Iranian airspace overwat

and land on a US Navy aircraft carrier to dow

load its personnel. Planners estimated that ther

could be up to 50 wounded Americans aboard th

aircraft, and the carrier landing was necessary 

get them medical help in the shortest time. To b

capable of performing the mission, a C-130 wou

have to be extensively modified to take off an

land in the 100-yard distance, and it would hav

to be capable of landing on an aircraft carrier ut

izing the ship’s arresting cable system.

The Air Force Systems Command put togeth

a team of specialists to investigate the possibili

of modifying an aircraft to perform the missio

The team consisted of civilian experts from Loc

heed-Marietta and LAS Ontario, along with rock

propulsion experts from the US Navy. USAF sp

cial operations crews and avionics system eng

neers also worked with the combined team, an

within three weeks the effort had developed 

technical concept, a production approach, an int

gration scheme, and a test program. The capabili

required the installation of rockets on the aircra

to assist during the takeoff phase, to decelera

during the landing phase, and to stabilize the ai

craft during transition-to-flight periods. A packag

was approved by USAF and a contract was sign

on 19 August 1980 authorizing production of tw

Credible Sport-modified aircraft. In all there we

some 20 US Navy, 50 US Air Force, and ov

1,000 civilians committed to the project.2 1

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

241
Three Combat Talon crews were formed to fly

the Credible Sport aircraft—one each from the

1st SOS, 7th SOS, and 8th SOS. Uttaro and

Fleming had their own crews and were heavily

involved in the Honey Badger program. Having

just returned from the Oro Grande deployment in

July, Brenci called both of the aircraft commanders into his office at Hurlburt Field and told them

that they had been selected for a special assignment and to report to the Pentagon in two days.

Hess had the details of the program and was responsible for briefing the two pilots. Neither offi -

cer wanted to give up his crew and a second

chance to return to Iran, but each had no choice

in his selection for the special assignment. After

two days of briefings in Washington, Uttaro and

Fleming returned to Hurlburt Field, and each requested by name additional flyers to fill out their

crews. Uttaro worked through Brenci, and Fleming

through his squadron commander, Turczynski.

The 7th SOS crew was selected in a similar manner, with Jones designated as the third aircraft

commander for the project. The three Combat

Talon crews selected in early August 1983 for the

Credible Sport project were made up of the fol -

lowing individuals:2 2

Three C-130H aircraft were sourced from the 463d

Tactical Airlift Wing—tail numbers 74-1683, 74-

1686, and 74-2065. The aircraft were identified as

the XFC-130H Super STOL (short-field takeoff

and landing), and modifications were begun in late

August. The contract called for two aircraft to be

fully modified to the Credible Sport configuration

within 90 days or fewer. The third aircraft (74-

2065) was designated as a test bed and was used

to test various combinations of rockets and control

modifications as the two primary aircraft were be -

ing modified. Five sets of rocket motors were required to create the super-STOL capability. Thirty

rockets were mounted on the airframe, including

eight antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) motors

mounted on the fuselage and pointed forward to

stop the aircraft during landing and eight AGM-45

Shrike rocket motors mounted above the wheel

wells and pointed downward to break the aircraft’s

descent rate. In addition, for takeoff, eight Mark56 rocket motors were mounted on the aft rearfuselage area on pylons and were pointed toward

the rear of the aircraft and downward at approximately a 45-degree angle. To stabilize the aircraft

during transition from takeoff, two sets of Shrike

rocket motors were mounted on each wing pylon.

To prevent overrotation during the takeoff phase,

two additional ASROC rocket motors were mou nted

on pylons in the rear fuselage area in front of the

beavertail. An onboard computer that had a manual backup should the computer fail controlled the

rockets.23

Other external modifications included installa -

tion of horsal fins forward of the horizontal stabilizer and a dorsal fin running from near the base

of the vertical stabilizer forward on the upper

spine of the aircraft. The flaps were modified into

a double-slotted configuration, and the ailerons

were extended to improve their effectiveness during

low-speed flight. To provide a means to stop the

USAF Photo

Front view of Credible Sport aircraft with eight ASROC

rockets extended.

USAF Photo

Eight Mark 56 rocket motors (four on each side) were

mounted on the aft rear fuselage area and were pointed

rearward at a 45-degree angle.

1st SOS 7th SOS 8th SOS

Fleming Jones Uttaro

Schott Tuck Hermanson

Ozlins Roberts Galloway

Armstrong Saier Poole

Tafoya Moody Almanzar

Hickman – – Doyle

Fredrickson – – Bancroft

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

242
aircraft on the aircraft carrier, a modified tailhook

was installed forward of the ramp hinge on the

underbelly of the aircraft. To eliminate the nose

landing gear/FLIR problem found on the MC130E engineers mounted a DC-130 radome on the

front of the aircraft and installed a FLIR turret

forward of the nose-wheel assembly. The FLIR’s

laser-ran ge system was integrated into the onboard

computer and provided inputs to fire the forwardfacing ASROC engines when the aircraft was 20

feet above the ground during the landing phase. To

provide in-flight refueling capability, an externally

mounted refueling system was installed on the top

of the fuselage, similar to the system found on the

C-141B aircraft. A Texas Instruments TF/TA radar

was installed to enable the aircraft to fly low level,

and a Canadian Marconi Doppler, along with 

Global Positioning System (GPS), was tied in

the aircraft’s dual inertial navigation system 

improve overall system accuracy. To protect t

aircraft from electronic threats, a basic ECM sui

was installed on the aircraft.2 4

Aircraft 74-2065 was partially modified an

was ready to begin flight-tests three weeks aft

the program began. The three Credible Sport ai

craft were transferred to Lockheed as governmen

furnished equipment for the project, and on 

September a Lockheed flight-test crew flew th

first flight on the test-bed aircraft. Two days lat

the aircraft began a series of trials that tested th

forward-mounted ASROC rockets in increment

tests that lasted for the next three weeks. Th

flight-tests determined that the aircraft had to b

physically on the ground prior to firing the low

set of rockets, but the upper set could be fire

USAF Photo

Two sets of Shrike rockets were mounted on an external pylon to stabilize the

aircraft during takeoff.

Two ASROC rockets were mounted near the aft beavertail and prevented over rotation during takeoff.

USAF Photo Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

Horsal and dorsal fins were installed on Credible Spo

to improve stability during low-speed flight.

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

243
while the aircraft was still in the air. While the

initial flight-test was being conducted by the

Lockheed crew, the three USAF flight crews cy -

cled through a specially designed engineering

simulator located at Lockheed-Marietta that ex -

posed them to the critical landing phase of the

operation. The aircrews flew more than 400

hours in the simulator-like device, gaining valuable experience in the operation of the advanced

FLIR, the updated avionics system, and the on -

board computer that controlled the rocket-firing

sequence. The training device was primarily an

engineering tool and did not have motion simula -

tion, as would normally have been the case for a

flight simulator. It was used to replicate the

landing phase of flight from one-half mile out on

final to touchdown.

The first fully modified XFC-130H Super

STOL Credible Sport aircraft (74-1683) was delivered on 17 October. During its first flight, it

experienced aileron flutter problems attributed to

the increased size of the ailerons. Within two

days a fix was made to the system, and the aircraft was flown to TAB 1, a disused airfield located in the Eglin AFB range complex in the

Florida Panhandle.

25

From the time aircraft 74-1683 arrived at

TAB 1, it was subjected to rigorous flight-testing

of the experimental systems on board the aircraft. The first test profile included firing only

two of the Mark 56 booster rockets. Subsequent

test flights evaluated the wing-mounted yawcorrecting Shrike rockets. During the 10 days

between 19 and 29 October, multiple sorties

were flown by the Lockheed test crew and by

the Combat Talon crews dedicated to the program. The crews found that the new flap system, along with the horsal and dorsal fins, allowed the aircraft to be flown at an airspeed of

85 KIAS on final, with an eight-degree glide

slope. Everything worked flawlessly during the

initial tests, and on 29 October a complete test

profile, which included firing all rockets for both

the takeoff and landing phases, was scheduled to

be conducted by the Lockheed flight-test crew. Before the flight, test engineers determined that the

aircraft’s onboard computer needed additional

calibration to fully integrate the landing rocketfiring sequence during the landing phase. The

Lockheed flight crew elected to fly the mission

using manual inputs to fire the ASROC rocket

motors, relying on the experience gained from the

engineering simulator and from their previous

flights. During the 29 October test, aircraft 74-

1683 set several STOL records. The nose gear

lifted six feet off the ground after 10 feet of takeoff roll with all eight Mark 56s employed, and the

aircraft was airborne within 150 feet of brake release. Within the length of a soccer field, it had

reached an altitude of 30 feet and an airspeed of

115 kn ots.

2 6

Everything continued to go as planned after

takeoff, and the aircraft turned on to final for

its rocket-assisted short-field landing. When the

upper deceleration rockets fired at approx imately

12-feet altitude, the aircraft slowed rapidly. The

flight engineer, blinded by the forward rocket

blast in front of the cockpit, thought the aircraft

was on the runway and manually fired the remaining lower rockets. The resultant drop in altitude caused the right wing to break off on impact with the runway, and a fire ignited as the

wing trailed behind the aircraft during rollout.

Within eight seconds of the aircraft coming to a

stop, emergency crews had the fire extinguished,

and the flight crew successfully exited the

wreckage. No one was injured in the crash, but

aircraft 74-1683 was destroyed. Most of the

USAF Photo

Double-slotted flap configuration used on Credible Sport.

USAF Photo

Modified tailhook installed on Credible Sport.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

244
unique Credible Sport equipment was salvage

from the aircraft.*27

The second Credible Sport aircraft (74-168

was ne aring completion of its modifications whe

the 29 October accident occurred. Events in Ira

and the results of the November presidential ele

tions spelled the end of the program. On 31 Oct

ber Tehran announced an Algerian-brokered pla

to release the hostages. On 2 November the Ir

nian Parliament endorsed the plan but stipulate

that certain conditions had to be met before th

release of the hostages. With the election 

Ronald Reagan and the pending release of th

USAF Photo

Credible Sport aircraft 74-1683 performs a rocketassisted short-field takeoff on 29 October 1980. From

brake release to liftoff, the aircraft traveled 150 feet.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

The lower four ASROC rockets have been fired manu -

ally from the cockpit. Note the altitude of the aircraft

above the runway.

Aircraft 74-1683 begins its rocket-assisted maximume ffort landing. The top four reverse-mounted ASROC

rockets have fired to slow the aircraft’s forward flight

vector.

With all eight ASROC rockets fired, the aircraft’s fo

ward flight vector was reduced to near zero, resulti

in rapid descent to the runway. The right wing bro

between the number three and number four engine

The aircraft is traveling down the runway just aft

impact.

The Credible Sport aircraft comes to a stop still on t

runway. Within eight seconds, crash response team

were on the scene to extinguish the fire. Most of t

program-unique systems were salvaged from the a

craft prior to its complete destruction.

__________

 *For security reasons, the hulk was demolished by US Navy SEALs, and the remains were buried on the Eglin AFB range complex so that t

existence of the unique capability would not be revealed to anyone outside the tightly controlled Credible Sport program.

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

245
hostages, the Credible Sport program was terminated.28 The capability to land in a soccer field

across the street from the American embassy in

Tehran would not become a reality.*

Preparations Continue

for a Return to Iran

As the Credible Sport program got under way in

late July, the 1st and 8th SOS were completing

their Oro Grande deployments. On 23 August

1980, the Holloway Commission released its findings and recommendations on the Desert One mission. Within 30 days of the release, the secretary

of defense began action to have the chairman of

the JCS task the three military services to fund,

equip, and man a standing counterterrorism task

force. The new organization was to be based at

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The new command’s

charter included assuming responsibility for all

mission planning and operational matters that

were currently assigned to Vaught’s JTF 1-79. As

the new command was being established at Fort

Bragg, Vaught’s JTF/JTD team continued to explore rescue options and test capabilities that

might be needed for another rescue attempt.

The next major training exercise involving

Combat Talon was scheduled for 13 September at

Moody AFB, Georgia. Turczynski and three of his

crews (commanded by Jubelt, Pearson, and Wilson) returned from Kadena AB to Hurlburt Field

to participate in the Trainex. Brenci now had five

crews fully qualified in blacked-out NVG opera -

tions (Brenci, Ferkes, Meller, Tharp, and Thigpen). Uttaro had been drafted into the Credible

Sport program and was no longer involved with

Honey Badger. The Moody Trainex included a

dual-runway airfield seizure operation, with Meller and Thigpen landing on parallel runways simultaneously at 2200 local time. Pearson and

Jubelt landed 30 seconds later, thus resulting in

four aircraft being on the ground within the first

minute of the operation. Brenci landed two min -

utes behind Jubelt, followed by Wilson six minutes

later. Ferkes and Tharp flew the last two aircraft

scheduled to land, both EC-130E aircraft. During

the departure phase of the exercise, as Jubelt

pulled out on the runway in aircraft 64-0551, the

nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to a halt

with its nose resting on the runway. The exercise

was terminated and, upon inspection, maintenance determined that damage was minimal and

consisted mainly of a crushed nose-gear door.

Once temporary repairs were made, the aircraft

was returned to Hurlburt Field.

Events in Iran were still driving preparations for

a second rescue mission. On 22 September Iraq invaded Iran to seize the strategically important Shat

al Arab waterway at the confluence of the Tigris

and Euphrates Rivers. Charging that the United

States was behind the invasion, Iran suspended all

talks on the release of the hostages. At the same

time, news came to the JTF that the hostages were

being moved back into Tehran for their safety, with

some reports indicating that all were back in the

American embassy.29 On 1 October 1980, Roland

Guidry departed the 8th SOS for assignment to

Fort Bragg, and Bob Brenci moved up to be the

squadron commander. Lt Col James L. Hobson, who

had arrived in the squadron the previous April, took

Brenci’s place as the operations officer.

The situation in Iran seemed to be driving a

second rescue attempt. From 9 to 16 October, another combined exercise was held that included

Delta Force , the rangers, USAF CCT, and both

rotary- and fixed-wing assets. What proved to be

the final JTF exercise, code-named Storm Cloud,

was conducted during the last week in November

1980. The majority of the JTF forces were involved

in this large and complex operation. The exercise

was executed during the night of 23–24 November

without deviation from the operational plan and

without any injuries or aircraft incidents. With the

exercise hotwash conducted the next day at the

Pentagon, Vaught was about ready to turn over

his responsibilities to the newly created joint command.3 0 The election of Ronald Reagan and the

subsequent softening of Iran’s position towards the

hostages indicated that another rescue mission

would not be required.

Beginning in November General Vaught directed that all JTF/JTD capabilities developed

during the previous 12 months be compiled into a

document that would be available to all services

for future reference. His motivation was to ensure

that the lessons learned and the capabilities developed during workup for Desert One and Honey

Badger would not be lost but instead would be

passed on to those in the special operations community. The resultant document, titled JTF Force

__________

*The second Credible Sport aircraft (74-1686) would later become the test bed for Combat Talon II. Many of the STOL features of Credible Sport

were considered for Combat Talon II, but in the end funding limitations eliminated the modifications from the final CT II aircraft. Credible Sport

aircraft 74-1686 eventually would be donated to the Warner Robins Aircraft Museum and would n ever return to operational status. The third aircraft

(74-2065) would be converted back to its original airlift configuration and returned to the USAF C-130H tactical transport fleet. No additional flights

were conducted utilizing the rocket system after the 29 October 1980 accident.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

246
Capabilities Review, was published on 11 May

1981 and contained pertinent information on

more than 200 initiatives resulting from the

Honey Badger program.

31

At the 1st SOW, the wing established an organization known as the Special Operations Mission

Planning Division under the director of operations

(1st SOW/DOS). The new division was established

as the “sole coordinating and planning agency for

the wing’s special tasking.” Headquarters TAC provided 11 manpower authorizations for the division,

and personnel already assigned to the wing, including Combat Talon planners who had participated in

the Desert One mission, filled them. The Mission

Planning Division served as the wing focal point

and communications channel for interface with the

new command at Fort Bragg and for coordinating

with other Air Force, Army, and Navy special op -

erations units. The division provided personnel for

concept planning, exercise training, and contin -

gency operations. The division also provided the nucleus of an organization to manage “intense levels of

activity when directed by the 1st SOW Wing Com -

mander.” When operating in that capacity, the

chief, special mission planning staff, became the 1st

SOW chief of staff for special operations.32 The division matured into a highly effective organization

that provided excellent support for the wing’s spe -

cial tasking, and it continued as an integral part of

the wing from that point forward.

The new joint command assumed mission responsibility from JTF 1-79 on 22 December 1980,

and on that date Vaught’s JTF was officially deactivated. For the next 45 days, select elements of

JTF 1-79 remained in the Pentagon and served as

liaisons during the critical transition of the new

administration. At 12:03 P.M. on 20 January 1981,

as President Ronald Reagan was being administered his presidential oath, two Algerian transports carrying the American hostages were

cleared for takeoff from Tehran. A few minutes

later they were airborne and headed out of the

country to freedom.33 After 444 days of captivity,

the hostages were finally free. There would not be

a second rescue attempt.

Fallout in the Pacific over Desert One

The 1st SOS had moved from Nha Trang AB,

Vietnam, to Kadena AB, Okinawa, in the spring

of 1972. The island location did not offer adequate

training facilities for Combat Talon crews. Being

a relatively small island, insufficient space was

available for aircrews to train in their challenging

low-level terrain-following mission. The unit was

placed at Kadena AB because the facilities the

were among the best in the Pacific and because t

location offered a central point in WestPac fro

which the squadron could support contingency op 

erations. Training initiatives to gain permission f

the squadron to fly low level in Korea, Taiwan, an

the Philippines were begun when the squadron a

rived at Kadena AB. All three countries were l

cated within two to three hours from Okinawa an

offered the potential for outstanding training. T

unit had flown in the Philippines when it was l

cated in Vietnam. After relocation to Kadena AB 

1972, at least one of these three areas was mai

tained for low-level training, thus enabling assign

aircrews to maintain proficiency. A fourth majo

training area available to the squadron was Alask

but it was eight hours to the north and requir

either a tanker or a fuel stop along the way. A

though regular Alaskan deployments were accom 

plished, each required a significant commitment b

the squadron in both time away from home statio

(usually a minimum of a week for each deploymen

and in personnel to support the aircraft. Squadro

leadership had long determined that the relative

unrestricted training environment found in th

Philippines was ideal for squadron trainin g.

The Japanese government, and particularly th

Okinawans, were never keen on basing a speci

operations unit on their soil but had little inclin

tion to block the move in 1972. By 1980, howev

opposition to basing large numbers of America

troops on Okinawa had grown to a point that the

were occasional demonstrations and protests d

manding the removal of at least some of the U

forces. When the Iranian rescue mission failed, litt

publicity regarding the extent of 1st SOS particip

tion surfaced, but it was generally thought by t

Japanese that the squadron had played a role. Th

Okinawans who opposed American basing the

seized upon the rescue and labeled it an act of a

gression toward another sovereign nation initiat

from Japanese soil. By the summer of 1980, it w

clear to military leaders that moving the squadro

was in the best interest of both the unit and th

Okinawans. Consequently, on 12 August 1980, t

Air Staff directed that the 1st SOS initiate action 

relocate its aircraft, personnel, and associate

equipment from Kadena AB, Japan, to Clark A

Philippines, with the transfer to be completed du

ing the second quarter of FY 81. All actions nece

sary to effect the move were published in Progra

Action Directive 80-8, with the move to be com

pleted by 15 January 1981. Turczynski and h

aircrews continued to be heavily committed 

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

247
Project Honey Badger throughout the fall, so actual movement of unit assets did not begin until

close to the first of the year. The squadron was

authorized to stand down from training missions

during the preparation and move period, but all

Honey Badger requirements had to be met. As

part of the movement plan, the unit was required

to resume normal training activities no later than

seven days after the move was complete. 34

Throughout the late fall, 1st SOS aircraft de -

ployed from Kadena AB to Clark AB for unit train -

ing, and each carried a full load of unit equipment

from home station. Critical items that were one of

a kind, or those critical to the Combat Talon , were

moved beginning on 8 January. From 8 to 15

January 1981, shuttles were flown between the

two locations, and the remainder of the squadron’s

equipment and personnel were relocated to Clark

AB. On 15 January Brig Gen James R. Brown,

18th Tactical Fighter Wing commander, conducted

a departure ceremony on the Kadena AB flight

line, and Turczynski boarded the last Combat

Talon and led a three-ship Talon formation to

Clark AB. Upon arrival he was met by the commander of the 3d TFW, Col Thomas G. McInerny,

who welcomed the squadron to the Philippines.

With the arrival of the three Combat Talons, the

squadron completed its unit move to Clark AB,

and it resumed local training the following day.3 5

Special Warfare Exercise 81 and

the Loss of Aircraft 64-0564

Since the mid-1970s the 1st SOS had participated in an annual joint and combined exercise in

the Philippines known as Special Warfare Exercise (Specwarex). The exercise was hosted by US

Navy SEALs and had gradually expanded to in -

clude forces from the Philippine Navy Special

Warfare Brigade and the Australian and New Zea -

land Special Air Services. Shortly after arriving at

Clark AB, the squadron deployed aircraft 62-1843

and 64-0564, along with 55 personnel, to Cubi

Point NAS, Philippines, for Specwarex 81. From 9

to 27 February, two aircrews, one commanded by

Fleming and the other by Jim Kirk, flew a full array

of missions supporting the exercise. The objectives

were (1) to test and evaluate joint/com bined planning, coordination, and command and control of

special warfare operations; (2) to conduct special

warfare training while exchanging operational

techniques and expertise; (3) to conduct combined

and unilateral operations; and (4) to promote common defense efforts through the mutual exchange

of operational concepts. To meet these objectives,

the exercise was designed around two phases. The

first phase was dedicated to unit cross training

and the exchange of operational techniques. The

second phase was a series of continuous field

training exercises that were supported by the two

Combat Talons and by helicopters, surface ships,

submarines, and other designated craft. The 1st

SOS established an Air Force Special Operations

Base (AFSOB) at Cubi Point NAS and was responsible for all fixed-wing aircraft support for

the exercise. Low-level terrain-following routes

were flown that terminated in CRRC airdrops,

high-speed low-level aerial delivery system airdrops, static line drops, and psychological warfare

operations. Short-field takeoffs and landings were

also accomplished in conjunction with infiltration

and exfiltration mission s.3 6

During the three-week period, the crews flew a

combination of daytime and nighttime missions

but gradually transitioned to night-only operations

toward the end of the exercise. During the 16-day

period from 10 to 26 February, Kirk’s crew was

scheduled to fly 12 missions. Each mission was

scheduled for a duration of five hours, with a total

of 60 hours scheduled for each crew. Throughout

the exercise the missions went as planned, with

only minor deviations due to aircraft maintenance

and weather in the objective area. On 25 February

Kirk’s crew was tasked to fly to Clark AB to pick

up an engine for aircraft 62-1843 after completing

its tactical mission in support of Specwarex. The

administrative airlift mission landed back at Cubi

Point NAS at noon after a 12-hour crew day that

had begun the previous midnight. The crew was

scheduled for their last mission of the exercise

early the following morning. Due to their extended

crew day on the 25th, their scheduled takeoff time

on the 26th of February was slipped from 0105 to

0430 local. The length of the mission was also

shortened, with the landing and mission termina -

tion changed to 0546.3 7

The aircrew departed their quarters at 0200 on

26 February and arrived at the AFSOB at 0205.

The crew was familiar with the low-level route,

having flown it several times during the exercise.

The mission profile included a nontactical departure followed by a tactical landing at Cubi Point

NAS 30 minutes later. Upon landing exercise personnel would rapidly onload the aircraft, and the

aircraft would then make a tactical departure with

the nine-man crew and 15 additional exercise

personnel on board. After reviewing the mission

profile, the crew briefed and filed their flight plan

by 0235. The aircraft departed Cubi Point NAS at

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

248
0428 local, made its tactical landing at Cubi Point

NAS at 0506, onloaded its personnel, and d eparted

at 0508. The AFSOB ground radio station received

an operational normal call at 0514 local. The last

transmission received from the aircraft was at 0521

and did not indicate that the crew was having any

problems. At 0523, 15 minutes after the second

takeoff, local fishermen near Capones Island, located northwest of Cubi Point NAS, observed the

aircraft impact the water and explode. After approximately 10 minutes, the wreckage sank in 240

feet of water. Twenty-three people were killed on

impact, with Lieutenant Blohm, the electronic warfare officer and lone survivor, being thrown from

the aircraft and rescued by local fishermen.38

Postaccident investigation could not determine

the exact cause of the crash, but the most probable

explanation was thought to be fatigue brought on by

the stress of the previous year’s activities. The op -

eration’s tempo during preparations for the Iranian

rescue mission coupled with the recent move to

Clark AB had taken its toll on the squadron. The

administrative flight on the 25th of February also

had interrupted the crew’s circadian rhythm cycle,

thus resulting in degraded crew rest before the mission. A second possible cause of the accident was a

malfunctioning terrain-following radar system. The

system was designed to convert to a “radar override” condition when the aircraft was over water,

and there were no returns from the water’s surface.

Engineers theorized that if the system did not enter

the override mode, the radar could fly the aircraft

into the water without any radar reference available to determine the aircraft’s altitude.* One of

several modifications made to the Combat Talon

stemming from the accident provided a warning

light that told the crew when the aircraft was in

radar override. Personnel from the 1st SOS killed in

the 26 February 1981 crash of aircraft 64-0564 were

Maj James M. Kirk, Capt Norman L. Martel, Capt

Thomas D. Patterson, Capt Gregory S. Peppers, TSgt

Stephen A. Blyler, TSgt Barry R. Chumbley, TSgt

Gary W. Logan, and SSgt John T. Felton.3 9**

Post–Desert One

Advancements for Combat Talon

Since the failed Desert One rescue attempt, the

special operations community had made huge advancements in both hardware procurement and

tactics development. During Honey Badger both

USAF and US Army rotary-wing capabilities

received the most attention, thus resulting in 

much superior helicopter capability than the U

military had in November 1979. For Combat Talo

the advancements made before Desert One conti

ued during Honey Badger, and important tactic

were developed and refined to allow the weapo

system to better accomplish the difficult cou

terterrorism mission .

The tactic of determining if a runway were cle

using the Combat Talon FLIR was perfected ear

in the Desert One training period, but the abili

to clear the runway if something heavy we

blocking it still needed to be solved. A solution w

found by developing drop procedures to deliv

either a 15,000-pound or 25,000-pound bulldoz

to be used to remove any runway obstruction. 

the FLIR pass determined that the runway we

blocked, a Combat Talon could air-drop the bu

dozer and a combined team of US Army range

and USAF CCT personnel. The rangers would u

the bulldozer to clear runway obstructions. Onc

the runway was clear, the CCT would provide a

traffic control for follow-on aircraft to la nd.40

Another challenge for planners was to airland 

many aircraft as quickly as possible on an airfie

so that the maximum number of soldiers could b

inserted in the shortest time. A tactic known 

dual-runway operations was developed that fulfill

this requirement.41 Flying in formation the Comb

Talon lined up on the primary runway in pairs an

at a preplanned point, would spread apart so th

the wingman was aligned with the parallel runwa

Both aircraft would touch down on each runway 

the same time. Follow-on aircraft would employ t

same tactic, with a 30-second spacing between lan

ings on the same runway. Thus, within a 60-secon

span as many as six aircraft could land on two pa

allel runways. To arrive in formation at the pr

scribed time and with the proper spacing, proc

dures were refined that allowed the aircraft to u

its air-to-air TACAN and the SST-181 beacon 

maintain spacing, whether in weather or in th

clear. Complex procedures were also developed 

allow for lead change and formation breakup/rejo

should the situation arise.

A unique tactic that was also developed durin

Honey Badger was the transport of a small he

copter that was off-loaded from the Combat Talo

assembled, and flown away to support the groun

force tactical plan. Six OH-58s were original

modified with short struts to allow rotor-hea

__________

 *The theory was confirmed two years later when an LAS Ontario test crew observed a continual fly-down command by the TF radar while fly

over water. The test was terminated when the aircraft descended to 100 feet.

 **Peppers and Felton flew to Desert One on 24 April 1980.

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPOR

249
clearance inside the C-130. The OH-6 later replaced

the OH-58. Both helicopters required removal of

their main rotor blades before loading on to the

aircraft. After landing and removal of the helicop -

ter from the Combat Talon , the rotor blades were

again attached, and the helicopter was flown

away. The whole operation took only a few minutes from the time the helicopter was rolled off

the C-130 until it was airborne.

Another shortfall identified during preparation

for Desert One was the number of in-flight refuelable Combat Talons. Only seven of 14 Talons

were IFR capable in November 1979. The four

aircraft assigned to the 1st SOS and three of the

six aircraft assigned to the 8th SOS had been

modified. None of the four aircraft assigned to the

7th SOS had IFR capability. During the spring of

1980, a fourth 8th SOS Talon was modified for

IFR and became available to the JTF by late summer. The remainder of the Combat Talon fleet

also was scheduled to receive the IFR modifica -

tion, including those in USAFE, as a result of the

identified shortfall.

The Combat Talon underwent upgrades to its

ECM suite. The ALE-40 chaff and flare dispenser

and the ALR-69 threat receiver were adapted for

the Combat Talon . Many other ECM modifications

were fielded in the years following Desert One.

The threats faced in the 1980s were much more

sophisticated than those of the Vietnam era, thus

requiring more capable systems to protect the aircraft. Honey Badger and its follow-on programs

brought the Combat Talon’s ECM equipment decades ahead of its pre-Desert One configuration .

* * * * * *

The period from November 1979 to early 1981

was a unique time in Combat Talon history. Hardware procured and tactics developed during that

period changed Combat Talon forever. For the personnel in special operations, the days of neglect

and decay were coming to an end, although it

would take a number of years before the community actually saw any increase in aircraft to support the mission. Credible Sport laid the founda -

tion for the next generation Talon—the MC-130H

Combat Talon II. In 1982 Credible Sport would fly

again as the test bed for the new aircraft. Procurement for Combat Talon II would begin in 1984 and

continue throughout the 1980s. It would be the

early 1990s before (more than 10 years after De -

sert One) Talon II would be declared operationally

ready. In the interim, it would be the old

warhorse, the MC-130E , that would carry the fight

to the adversary’s doorstep.

Notes

1. Personal Notes, Col Roland D. Guidry, Retired, former

commander, 8th Special Operations Squadron, extract on file,

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Col Rod Lenahan, Retired, Crippled Eagle (Charleston,

S.C.: Narwhal Press, 1998), 157.

10. Ibid., 160.

11. Ibid., 161.

12. Ibid., 167.

13. Guidry personal notes.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Lenahan, 180.

21. Ibid., 181.

22. Personal notes, Col Jerry Uttaro, Retired, answers to

questions submitted by author, hard copy on file, Combat

Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

23. Lenahan, 181.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 182.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 182–83.

29. Ibid., 173–74.

30. Ibid., 183.

31. Ibid., 195.

32. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1980, 16th SOW historian file, Hurlburt Field, Fla.,

vol. 10, 28–29.

33. Lenahan, 188.

34. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1980, 10.

35. Ibid., 10–11.

36. Ibid., 11–12.

37. Ibid., 12.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Guidry personal notes.

41. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

250
Chapter 10

From Desert One to Point Salines

(1981–83)

History does not teach fatalism. These are the moments when the will of a handful of free men

breaks through determinism and opens up new roads. People get the history they deserve.

—Charles de Gaulle

Tom Bradley and his 7th SOS aircraft had departed Wadi Kena only a few days before the arrival of the force that went to Desert One. The

7th SOS’s role in the rescue attempt had been

one of support—to establish a signature at Wadi

Kena for the Combat Talon aircraft so that undue attention would not be aroused when the

mission aircraft deployed from there for the rescue mission. A secondary role for the squadron

was to provide cover for the Combat Talon deployment through Rhein Main AB, Germany, as

the 7th SOS deployed for Flintlock 80. The

squadron’s efforts were flawless, with the rescue

force deploying all the way to Masirah Island

without detection .

The personnel of the 7th SOS were disappointed at not being able to participate in the

actual mission, but their contributions were, nevertheless, significant. Part of the continued deception was to execute Flintlock 80 as if nothing else

was happening in the European theater. As the

8th SOS crews transited Rhein Main AB en route

to Egypt, 7th SOS aircraft were deploying to the

United Kingdom. Special Operations Task Force

Europe established its headquarters at RAF

West Raynham, UK, and the 7575th Special Op -

erations Wing (made up primarily of the 7th

SOS) was established at RAF Weathersfield, UK.

Along with the four 7th SOS Combat Talons, the

8th SOS deployed one aircraft and crew com -

manded by Capt Tom Hermanson. Other forces

supported the large unconventional warfare exercise, including USAFE F-111s, Military Airlift

Command C-130s and C-141s, Strategic Air Command B-52s, and British RAF C-130s. Ground

forces included US Army Special Forces and US

Navy SEALs, along with troops from six different

countries.1 For the Combat Talons, the highlight

of the exercise was two live STARS recoveries,

one accomplished by the 7th SOS and another by

Hermanson’s crew from the 8th SOS. The live

recovery for the 8th SOS was accomplished during Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd in southern

Germany on 5 May 1980. It was the first such

event for the squadron since the mid-1960s, whe

the unit was stationed at Pope AFB as the 779

Troop Carrier Squadron .

Throughout the months of April and May 198

virtually the entire 7th SOS remained deploye

for the large unconventional warfare exercise. B

the time June arrived, most personnel were bac

at Rhein Main AB, and the 8th SOS Talon ha

returned to Hurlburt Field. A second live recove

for the year was conducted on 5 June 1980 b

Crew 1, commanded by Maj Mark Tuck in aircra

64-0555. The recovery was made at Algero, Ital

in support of SOTFE requirements. On 6 June, b

USAFE Special Order G-3, Lt Col Walter K

Schmidt assumed command of the 7th SOS from

Tom Bradley.2 The previous six months had bee

grueling on the squadron, with an operation

tempo that brought the squadron to near exhau

tion. June provided a brief break in the hect

pace, and squadron personnel used the time 

become reacquainted with their families. July b

gan another busy cycle, with deployments to th

United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, and Greece. B

ginning in August the last subexercise of the 198

Flintlock series—Zeus 80—was flown from 30 A

gust to 17 September.3 The squadron deploye

two aircraft and three crews, along with assoc

ated maintenance and support personnel, to He

lenikon AB, Greece. As had been the case in Ze

78, the staging base was excellent, and the flyin

was outstanding. The major critique of the exe

cise was its lack of sufficient mission tasking fo

the Combat Talons, which resulted in the retur

of one aircraft to Rhein Main AB earlier tha

originally planned. With the US Navy SEALs an

US Army Special Forces dispersed to different l

cations throughout Greece, communications b

tween them and the 7th SOS at Hellenikon A

were difficult. The lack of reliable communic

tions was partly to blame for the low-utilizatio

rate of the deployed Combat Talon s.

4

The remainder of the year saw portions of th

squadron deployed to the United Kingdom, No

way, Greece, and Italy. The biggest problem th

251
the 7th SOS faced during this period was a shortfall of qualified aircrews. The unit possessed all

four of its authorized aircraft but only four of its

six authorized crews. The aircrew shortfall was

due in part to the loss of Lewis’s crew the previous April and the domino effect that the loss

caused throughout the Talon community. Several

crew members, who were scheduled to move from

the 8th SOS to Rhein Main AB, were extended at

Hurlburt Field and were unavailable to the

USAFE unit. Although new personnel were selected and brought into the pipeline, it was not

until mid-1981 that the Combat Talon school at

Hurlburt Field trained enough personnel to make

up for the loss.* 5

At the 8th SOS Honey Badger initiatives con -

tinued to be the focus, even as the possibility of a

second rescue attempt dimmed. On 10 October

1980 8th SOS personnel and one Combat Talon

aircraft deployed to Yuma, Arizona, to test the

feasibility of high-speed personnel and cargo

parachute airdrops. The deployment was the first

of a three-phase test to determine if personnel

could survive an airdrop at airspeeds up to 250

knots. The existing speed for personnel airdrops

was 125 knots, with 150 knots the maximum acceptable. Cargo drops were normally made at 130

knots. With an en route airspeed of 250 knots

maximum, the Combat Talon had to decrease its

speed for personnel and cargo drops. This slow -

down could be detected by enemy radar, and it

placed the aircraft in a vulnerable situation close

to the ground for an extended time. The

HSLLADS had been perfected in the early 1970s

and provided the capability to drop at airspeeds

up to 250 knots, but the system was not designed

to drop personnel, nor could it drop cargo that

exceeded certain size and weight limitations. Both

the USAF and USA wanted a system that would

eliminate the need for a slowdown. A high-speed

sled was developed for personnel drops, which included special rigging and cushioning to reduce

the shock of parachute opening and the resultant

impact of the load with the ground. Specially instrumented dummies were used to measure the

forces exerted on the load during the drop sequence. From 8 to 15 December, the second phase

of the test was conducted.6 After experiencing system failures, which would have resulted in fatal

injuries to personnel and the destruction of the

cargo, testing was suspended indefinitely, awaiting additional engineering.

1981: Combat Talon II

Testing Begins

The operations tempo for the 7th SOS continued at a high rate as 1981 began. The squadron

trained for its wartime mission of unconventional

warfare operations as outlined in commander in

chief, US Air Forces Europe, Operations Plan

4102 and COMSOTFE Operations Plan 4304. To

fulfill its tasking under the two war plans, the

squadron was given specific responsibilities. It

maintained liaison with United States Army

Europe (USAREUR) Special Forces units and

conducted joint training in unconventional warfare operations. The squadron was prepared to

deploy all or part of the unit to a forward-operating base and provide support as required by

SOTFE. The 7th SOS was also tasked to train

other special operations supporting units, including MAC special operations low-level (SOLL)

crews. Once deployed, the 7th SOS provided the

bulk of the command element for the 7575th

SOW and provided mission control of assigned

air resources. To fulfill its responsibilities, the

squadron maintained a Special Operations Com -

bat Control Team (SOCCT) and a ground communications flight equipped with radios and communications gear capable of communicating with the

Combat Talon aircraft during mission execution.

Each crew was required to plan and brief a realworld mission annually using actual wartime targets and threats. The squadron maintained an

intelligence section that was assigned respon -

sibility (along with contingency response) for

the mission planning exercises. Deployments

throughout the year were designed to provide

training opportunities so that the squadron could

maintain proficiency in its various wartime

skills.7

The annual Combat Talon Management Review Conference was held at LAS Ontario from 10

to 13 February 1981. Headquarters personnel

from PACAF, USAFE, and TAC attended the con -

ference along with representatives from each

Combat Talon squadron. The conference addressed personnel, equipment, and other opera -

tional and maintenance issues facing the Combat

__________

 *When Kirk’s crew was lost in February 1981, a similar situation arose in the 1st SOS. Two unprogrammed crew losses within a year severely

strained the schoolhouse at Hurlburt Field. An additional problem faced by the 1st SOS was the lack of available aircraft. With 64-0564 lost and

64-0565 at LAS Ontario, only two aircraft were available to the 1st SOS, and one of those two dep arted for PDM in the spring of 1981. In July 1981

Clamp aircraft 64-0572 was transferred from the 8th SOS to the Pacific until 64-0571 could be recalled from Air Force Systems Command and

modified as a Yank aircraft.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

252
Talon community.8

 The IFR modification for the

Combat Talon fleet was discussed, along with the

upcoming Talon II test program. A schedule was

developed that allowed aircraft upgrades to be

made by LAS Ontario without creating an undue

hardship on any one squadron.

The annual Flintlock exercise in Europe was

the best opportunity for the 7th and 8th SOS to

train with other special operations forces and

practice their wartime mission. From 16 April to

23 May 1981, the 7th SOS again deployed to RAF

Weathersfield and established an Air Force Special Operations Base for Flintlock 81. Subexercises were conducted in Jordan, Tunisia, Italy,

Germany, Kenya, Norway, and the Netherlands.

Two live STARS were accomplished during the

German Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd, the first

on 4 May 1981 by Major Tuck from the 7th SOS

and the second on 8 May by Maj Bob Meller from

the 8th SOS. During the exercise a 7th SOS aircraft deployed to Kenya for Subexercise Black

Rock 81 under the command of Major Muggenborg. When the aircraft landed on an unimproved

dirt runway for its first mission, the Combat

Talon broke through the runway’s outer crust

and became mired in mud up to its belly. All

subsequent Black Rock missions were canceled,

as maintenance and aircrew personnel spent the

next several days recovering the aircraft. Unnecessary equipment was removed, and ramps were

built to allow the main gear tires to slowly rise

out of the mud as the aircraft was pulled forward

by a large tractor. A basic crew eventually flew

the aircraft to Nairobi, where minimal repairs

were made to several antennas on the aircraft’s

underbelly.*9

* * * * * *

The 8th SOS deployed one Combat Talon to

Flintlock 81, with Meller as the aircraft com -

mander of 64-0567. Meller proceeded to RAF

Weathersfield, UK, and two 20th SOS HH-53H

Pave Low helicopters were deployed to Pisa AB,

Italy, by way of C-5 aircraft. The original exercise

requirement called for two Combat Talons from

the 8th SOS, but higher headquarters tasking

and maintenance problems at Hurlburt Field precluded deploying the second aircraft. The original

deployment included a nonstop flight from

Hurlburt Field to RAF Weathersfield, with two

IFRs across the Atlantic. Bad weather on the first

tanker track forced the cancellation of the refueling, and Meller was forced to divert to Lajes Field,

Azores. As the crew was preparing to depart Laj

Field on 25 April, they discovered a fuel lea

which grounded the aircraft. Fuel-cell repair w

not available at Lajes Field, thus forcing Meller 

request assistance from home station. Most of th

Talon crew was sent ahead to the UK on a C-14

while Meller, with a basic crew, remained at L

jes Field until maintenance support could reac

them. On 28 April a fuel-cell technician arrive

and began working the fuel leak. Repairs wer

made, and the aircraft departed Lajes Field an

arrived at RAF Weathersfield on 2 May. Betwee

4 and 18 May, Meller and his crew flew five exe

cise missions but had three others canceled by th

Army after the crew had planned them and w

ready for launch. On 8 May Meller successful

completed a live Fulton STARS when he exf

trated a US Army Special Forces officer from th

Schwarzes-Pferd subexercise area. The live reco

ery was the first for Meller and was the secon

one completed by an 8th SOS crew. Due to high

priorities, Meller was recalled from the exerci

early and returned nonstop to Hurlburt Field o

19 May. After a 21-hour crew day and one IFR

the aircraft arrived back at its home station i

Florida .

1 0

* * * * * *

When the Iranian rescue mission kicked off fo

the 1st SOS in December 1979, the squadron ha

recently begun its PAT program, which was d

signed to expose squadron members to seldom

traveled areas of the Pacific. Contacts made an

information gathered on airfield operatio

proved essential during the long deployment 

Oman through the Indian Ocean. The progra

laid dormant throughout 1980 due to higher p r

ority Honey Badger tasking, but in June of 198

Turczynski resurrected the program, and h

planners coordinated an eight-day, one-aircra

deployment (PAT 007) to Thailand from 21 to 2

June. During the deployment a FLIR and NV

demonstration was given to RTAF officials, and 

briefing was given to the Joint US Military Adv

sory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) outlinin

the capabilities of the Combat Talon weapons sy

tem. In addition to the demonstration and th

briefing, the squadron reintroduced the MC-130

to Thailand and, in the process, exposed the cou

try to the Combat Talon and its unique chara

teristics. A secondary purpose of the deployme

was to reintroduce joint special operations forc

to Thailand. A contingent of US Army Speci

__________

 *A Combat Talon basic crew consists of two pilots, one navigator, one flight engineer, one radio operator, and one loadmaster.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

253
Forces, US Navy SEALs, and USAF CCT members accompanied the aircraft. During the deployment Turczynski’s crew operated out of Don

Muang AB, Thailand, which was located near the

capital city of Bangkok. Airborne operations were

conducted at Koke-Kathiem AB in central Thailand. Airfields formerly used by USAF aircraft

during the Vietnam War were also visited for the

first time since the end of the war. During the

weeklong deployment, the Talon flew approaches

into and landed at Udorn, Ubon, and Korat

RTAFBs. The squadron determined that all three

airfields were much as the United States had left

them in 1975. The 1st SOS assessed the three

airfields as operational and capable of supporting

US aircraft during contingency operations. Although an approach was flown to Nakhon

Phanom RTAFB, a low approach was executed

due to the deteriorated runway and uncontrolled

status of the airfield. It was considered not usable

for US aircraft. On 29 June the aircraft redeployed to Kadena AB, having accomplished all of

its predeparture objectives.11 The new era of PAT

programs for the 1st SOS had begun with a

highly successful deployment to SEA.

The loss of aircraft 64-0564 had been a severe

blow to the 1st SOS. The exact cause of the crash

could not be determined, but investigators theorized that the AN/APQ-122(V)8 radar could have

malfunctioned and could have given an erroneous

fly-down command to the crew. As a result a con -

ference was held at LAS Ontario between 4 and 5

June 1981 to discuss the radar and possible malfunctions that might have caused the accident.

Technicians determined that there was a possibility for the radar altimeter override logic to

command an erroneous fly down without the

crew readily detecting the condition. A safety

supplement was subsequently issued to the field

that modified crew procedures to compensate for

the possible TF radar deficiency.1 2 Engineers at

LAS Ontario began development of a permanent

fix to the altimeter override problem. Part of the

fix included the installation of an altimeter override light on the top of the pilot’s instrument

panel. The light was designed to illuminate

whenever the radar was operating in the altim eter override mode. During the next two years,

the modification was flight tested and installed

on all Combat Talon s.

Throughout the spring and early summer, the

1st SOS had operated with only two aircraft after

the loss of aircraft 64-0564 and the extended PDM

of 63-7785. At times there was only one aircraft

on the ramp, with the second aircraft undergoing

some phase of maintenance repair. On 6 July

Combat Talon 64-0572 was officially transferred

from the 8th SOS to the 1st SOS. On 26 Septem -

ber aircraft 63-7785 returned to Clark AB, thus

giving the squadron its first full complement of

aircraft since the February accident. Aircraft 63-

7785 was the first Pacific MC-130E to bear the

new European One paint scheme. 13 The previous

velvet black camouflage paint that had been on

the Combat Talons since their creation in 1965

had been phased out after the 3M Company dis -

continued its production.

July also saw a change of command for the 1st

SOS. On the 15th, Lt Col John S. Prater assumed

command from Ray Turczynski by Thirteenth AF

Special Order G-19. Wilson moved up as the interim operations officer for the squadron. The 3d

Tactical Fighter Wing commander presided over

the ceremony held in front of base operations

with two Combat Talons parked behind the troop

formation. The change of command marked the

end of the most demanding period of 1st SOS

history with Ray Turczynski at the helm.

1 4

Colonel Prater continued the PAT program,

and from 21 to 29 September, PAT 009 deployed

to Jakarta, Indonesia, and to Takhli, Thailand.

The PAT’s primary objective was to introduce the

Combat Talon to Indonesia and to follow up on

PAT 007 initiatives in Thailand. The squadron

deployed one aircraft and crew, a basic maintenance capability, and a command representative

to coordinate in-country activities. A secret-level

briefing covering the Combat Talon weapons system was given to US Embassy personnel in

Jakarta, and an unclassified version of the same

briefing was later presented to Indonesian air

force officials in conjunction with a static display.

In Thailand a joint US-Thai air-drop operation

was conducted at Takhli RTAFB, followed by a

second friendship drop near the town of Phetch -

abun, Thailand. PAT 009 was a resounding success, with overall US-Indonesian and US-Thai

military-to-military relations benefiting from the

deployment.1 5 Just as the 7th SOS deployed

throughout Europe during the Flintlock exercise

series to open new areas for training, the PAT

program in the Pacific accomplished the same ob -

jective for the 1st SOS.

As life settled down for the new commander, the

PACAF inspector general conducted an ORI of the

3d TFW from 2 to 14 October. The 1st SOS had

received a grade of excellent during the pre vious

August’s standardization and evaluation visit,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

254
and it repeated the feat during the ORI. The lifesupport program and the intelligence section were

specifically noted for their improved performance.16 The ORI served as a warm-up for Foal

Eagle 81, which was held the following month in

Korea. From 4 to 6 November, the 1st SOS deployed three Combat Talons and four crews to

Teagu AB, Korea, and established a Combined

Air Force Special Operations Base (CAFSOB). For

the first time, all air assets were consolidated under the control of the CAFSOB, including three

C-130Es and six crews from the 374th TAW and

six ROKAF C-123s based at Seoul City AB, Korea. The CAFSOB also provided air liaison officers to the Hardened Tactical Air Control Center

at Osan AB and to the Special Warfare Center at

Songnam. Throughout the 10-day exercise, air assets achieved a 79 percent mission success rate,

which exceeded the exercise goal. As a direct result of bringing the ROKAF C-123s and MAC

SOLL assets together in the CAFSOB, it was possible to conduct several airfield assault opera -

tions. These were multiaircraft events involving

elements from each CAFSOB component. Face-toface planning for these events was done at the

CAFSOB and included the ROKAF for the first

time. The biggest problem faced by the unit planners was the size of the exercise. With limited

overhead staff the CAFSOB managed 305 sepa -

rate events supporting US Army, US Navy, and

ROK Army Special Operations Forces. Although

the pace of the exercise taxed everyone involved,

the combined operations marked another first for

unconventional warfare training in Korea.1 7

Just after the conclusion of Foal Eagle 81, the

1st SOS deployed one MC-130E and an augmented crew to Auckland, New Zealand, for Exercise Gonfalon 81. As had been the case in previous

years, the New Zealand SAS hosted the exercise.

The 1st SOS established an AFSOB and, along with

a 374th TAW C-130, supported the two-phased unconventional warfare exercise. Phase I consisted of

cross-training among the participants, and Phase II

was a UW field-training exercise. Of the 133 events

scheduled during Phase I, the AFSOB successfully

completed 86 of them, with the remaining events

canceled due to bad weather. During the Phase II

FTX, all events were successfully completed.1 8

The FTX began on 3 December, continued until

14 December, and included 15 separate directaction missions, 12 of which required AFSOB support. In total 23 sorties were scheduled to meet exercise requirements. Mis sions included low-level

terrain-following, high-a ltitude high-opening

(HAHO)/HALO personnel drops, static line an

CRRC infiltration airdrops, and minimally lighte

short-field landing operations. The final event 

the exercise was a free-play hostage snatch an

clandestine airfield assault, which was planne

and executed by the exercise Combined Speci

Operations Task Group (CSOTG). The AFSO

did not have personnel assigned to the CSOT

(its higher headquarters for the exercise), so th

final planning and coordination of the event w

extremely difficult. Regardless, the mission was 

success, with the two-aircraft assault packag

delivering its direct-action package as planned

A highlight for the 1st SOS was the maintenanc

reliability of its Combat Talon aircraft, whic

deployed from home station with minimal par

and maintenance personnel yet met all exerci

tasking.

In-flight Refueling for the 7th SOS

Throughout 1981 7th SOS aircraft were mod

fied for IFR at LAS Ontario. Aircraft 64-0555 an

64-0523 were modified during the year, and 6

0561 was sent to LAS Ontario in December

Along with the IFR capability, the squadron al

began training in NVG blacked-out landing oper

tions but did not send an aircraft or crew to any 

the stateside quarterly exercises until 1982. From

21 to 31 October, the squadron deployed one ai

craft with support equipment to Wadi Ken

Egypt, for low-level and fighter-interceptor trai

ing with the Egyptian air force. While deployed 

Egypt, intelligence reports indicated that Libya

president Muammar Qadhafi had sent agents 

the area armed with shoulder-fired SAMs. Th

agents were to attack the E-3A airborne warnin

and control system (AWACS) aircraft that ha

been operating out of Wadi Kena since the assa

sination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. CINC

USAFE directed the 7th SOS to fly SAM searc

missions before each AWACS takeoff and landin

The Combat Talon used its ECM equipment 

electronically detect (in theory) any missil

launch. Sweeps were made off the approach an

departure ends of the runway out to 15 miles 

an altitude of 500–1,000 feet above the groun

Observers wearing restraining harnesses scanne

out the open ramp and door for visual detection 

any SAM launches. During the employment p

riod no threats were detected, and the AWAC

continued to operate without incident.2 1 Th

threat never materialized into any known actio

on the part of the Libyans.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

255
From 4 to 14 November, the squadron was

placed on alert to support the forced recovery, if

required, of the first space shuttle and crew in the

event of a malfunction during its return from

space. With the growing terrorism threat, there

was concern that the shuttle could fall into the

hands of some unfriendly nation should it be

forced to land outside the United States during its

reentry. Talon crews were selected, and plans

were made for rapid deployment of a Combat

Talon aircraft anywhere in the European Command area of responsibility. No sorties were flown

as the shuttle safely returned to its recovery base

at Edwards AFB, California.2 2

The highlight of 1981 for the 7th SOS came on

2 December, when the unit’s first two-man live

STAR was accomplished off the coast of Scotland

near RAF Machrihanish, UK. SSgt Gus Rhinehart, USAF, and Cmdr Rich Kuhn, USN, were

safely recovered by Capt Jim Bates and his crew.

During the recovery the crew experienced mechanical difficulties with the sky anchor but were

able to safely complete the recovery mission.2 3

Bate’s ramp crew was awarded an Air Force Commendation Medal for its professionalism during

the difficult retrieval of the two-person package.

The previous two-man recovery had been accomplished on 22 November 1968 by the 15th SOS at

Cubi Point NAS, Philippines.*

* * * * * *

Representatives from the 8th SOS attended a

Headquarters USAF-hosted Combat Talon II

planning meeting held at the Pentagon on 15 May

1981. The meeting was to present preliminary

concepts for Combat Talon II. Lieutenant Colonel

Hilten, the Air Staff Big Safari project officer,

chaired the meeting. Maj Dave Pearson, Air Force

Logistics Command (AFLC/ AZ), presented a firstcut-concept briefing for Combat Talon II. Most

equipment being considered, except for the ECM

suite and the radar, was scheduled for testing the

following summer by Air Force Systems Command, Special Projects Office (AFSC/DRA). The

Combat Talon II briefing presented three possible

equipment configurations, but none of them included a radio operator crew member. Because of

8th SOS’s objections to the elimination of the ra -

dio operator crew pos ition, the requirement was

left open and was scheduled to be evaluated in the

initial testing of the system’s equipment.24

Also in May the 8th SOS deployed to Fort

Campbell, Kentucky, for Exercise Caliber Excellence .

For the initial portion of the exercise, from 12 to 22

May, one MC-130E conducted daily companys ize missions from Fort Campbell and from Fort

Benning, Georgia. During the night of 27 May, a

battalion-size rehearsal was flown, followed by a

joint command evaluation exercise on 28 May.

The entire Eglin AFB range was utilized during

the two-night event, with two MC-130E Combat

Talons, two AC-130H gunships, and two HH-53H

Pave Lows participating. With the successful completion of the exercise, ground forces committed

to the new joint command increased from one to

two battalions, and they were fully qualified in

unique mission-specific special operations

task s .2 5

Since Desert One there had been increased

pride in the squadron and in the facilities that it

occupied at Hurlburt Field. The 8th SOS squadron operations facility had been built in the early

sixties during the Vietnam War buildup. Over

the years the building had deteriorated, and the

squadron had acquired new requirements (such

as secure storage for NVG goggles) that needed

additional space. To improve the 8th SOS facility,

an extensive self-help program was initiated

early in 1981 to upgrade both the exterior and

the interior of the building. TAC had no money

budgeted for new facilities at Hurlburt Field but

was supportive of providing funds out of its op -

erations and maintenance account if the squadron furnished the labor. Captain Poole and Senior Master Sergeant Messer headed a squadron

self-help team that provided the necessary volunteer labor: the front lawn was leveled, and grass

was planted; shrubbery was removed, and more

attractive plants were planted; wooden borders

were built around the main lawn area, and

gravel was placed between the sidewalks and the

building’s external walls; a new squadron logo

was painted on the front of the building; and the

front entryway was upgraded. Inside the build -

ing, a nonoperational six-stall concrete shower

was demolished, and a new current operations

section was created in its place. The entire opera -

tions section was paneled, and the publications

library was upgraded within the operations section. The squadron briefing room was upgraded

with audiovisual equipment, and the windows

were enclosed to increase the room’s security.

The aggressive self-help program reflected the

commitment that 8th SOS personnel had for their

__________

 *Live STARSs had been performed on a routine basis during the early years of Combat Talon , but they were discontinued in the early 1970s.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

256
squadron and to the improvement of their assigned facilities.2 6

Credible Sport II

During the summer of 1981, the Combat Talon

II program began to pick up momentum. To

save funds and to capitalize on work done in the

Credible Sport program the previous year, the

remaining Credible Sport aircraft was considered an option to serve as the test bed for Com -

bat Talon II. Credible Sport had been conducted

from August to November 1980 and resulted in

the modification of two C-130H aircraft into a

super STOL configuration (chap. 9). A third aircraft had been partly modified and had served

as the Credible Sport test-bed aircraft while the

other two were undergoing modifications at

Lockheed-Marietta. Credible Sport aircraft 74-

1683 crashed during testing on 29 October 1980

and was destroyed, and the partly modified testbed aircraft (74-2065) was later demodified and

returned to the Air Force inventory. The third

aircraft (74-1686) remained at Warner Robins

AFB, Georgia, with the rocket motors removed

but with other STOL modifications operational.

The initial requirement for Combat Talon II included the STOL capability—without augment -

ing rockets to assist during the takeoff and

landing phase of flight. After review of various

options, Headquarters TAC made the decision

to use aircraft 74-1686 as the test bed for the

new Combat Talon , and it designated the 8th

SOS as its representative for the Credible

Sport/Combat Talon II developmental program.

The effort was designated Credible Sport II, and

an initial planning conference was conducted

from 21 to 26 July 1981 at the Credible Sport

Program Office in Atlanta, Georgia.2 7

The Credible Sport II program had two phase

Phase I incorporated minor modifications to im

prove aerodynamics and safety of flight, whi

Phase II incorporated modifications to enhanc

mission capability and to align more closely th

Credible Sport experimental vehicle configuratio

with Combat Talon II configuration requirement

Major Uttaro, who had participated in the Dese

One rescue mission and the original Credib

Sport program in 1980, was designated by TAC 

the deputy, Combined Test Force for the Credib

Sport Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE

which the program was officially called. The Com

bined Test Force included personnel from A

Force Systems Command, Test and Engineerin

Division, Edwards AFB, California; Lockhee

Marietta contractor personnel; and 8th SOS cre

members who together were designated as th

OUE Team. The 8th SOS crew was made up 

two pilots, two navigator/electronic warfare off

cers, and one flight engineer. At the conclusion 

the conference, a Test and Evaluation Mast

Plan (TEMP) was drafted, and the test locatio

was narrowed to either Duke Field or Hurlbu

Field, both located in the Florida Panhandle.2 8

The 8th SOS Earns the

Joseph B. Duckworth Award

The 8th SOS was recognized in August for i

contributions to instrument flight by earning th

1980 USAF Joseph B. Duckworth instrume

award. The Duckworth award was presented a

nually to the unit or individual considered to hav

made the most significant contribution to the a

or science of instrument flight. The squadron w

selected because of its innovative precision ai

borne radar approach (PARA) procedure that r

quired only airborne equipment already installe

in the aircraft for approach and landing durin

daylight or darkness and in all weather cond

tions. The PARA combined the efforts of the thre

pilots, the two navigators, and the flight engine

into a highly cohesive system. The squadron w

also recognized for introducing NVGs to th

PARA procedure, which allowed the crew to f

the PARA in a darkened cockpit and land th

aircraft without overt air craft or runway light

The new PARA had been developed to a poi

that it was taught to the crews from USAFE an

PACAF Combat Talon sister squadrons and 

MAC SOLL C-130, C-141, and C-5 units. 29

As the summer of 1981 progressed, the 8

SOS continued to participate in JCS and qua

terly special operations exercises. In August th

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

Aircraft 74-1686 during Credible Sport II testing. The

aircraft served as the test bed for Combat Talon II.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

257
squadron flew two MC-130Es in support of JCS

Exercise Ocean Venture 81. One Combat Talon onloaded a CRRC and a US Navy SEAL team at

Norfolk, Virginia, and a second aircraft did the

same at Pope AFB, North Carolina. After the two

aircraft completed their IFRs en route to the exercise area in the Caribbean, they successfully

air-dropped their loads near Vieques Island on

Salinas water DZ. The two aircraft then airlanded additional personnel and equipment at

Roosevelt Roads AB, Puerto Rico. The successful SEAL-infiltration mission was flown during

the night of 6 August and turned out to be the

only Combat Talon mission of the exercise. The

remainder of Ocean Venture was canceled due

to an approaching hurricane.

30

Since the fall of 1980, joint requirements for

the 1st SOW and for Combat Talon had continued

to grow. A large-scale special operations exercise,

named Marvel Exodus, was planned from 13 to 26

September 1981, with aircraft and personnel deployed to Fort Lewis, Washington, for the initial

phase of the exercise. The 1st SOW deployed

three MC-130Es, two AC-130Hs, six HH-53Hs,

and 271 aircrew and support personnel. The advanced party of the 1st SOW, with 1st SOW/DOS

personnel forming its nucleus, arrived at Fort

Lewis on 9 September and spent the next four

days preparing for the arrival of the main body.

The three Combat Talons arrived on schedule on

13 September, and the crews began their missionplanning process. From 14 to 17 September, 1st

SOW assets participated in Phase I training

events, with one MC-130E scheduled to air-drop

fuel blivets and heavy equipment, while the other

two aircraft practiced airfield seizure events with

US Army ranger personnel. The blivet and heavy

equipment drops had to be canceled on the 14th

because of a lack of rigging material, but the

drops were rescheduled and successfully accomplished on the 16th. The airfield seizure training

events went according to plan. Also scheduled

during Phase I were IFR operations between a

KC-135 tanker and the Combat Talons, HALO

airdrops, static-line personnel airdrops, and NVG

airland operations. On the 17th of September,

scheduled forward area refueling point (FARP)

operations between an MC-130E and the HH53Hs were canceled due to bad weather in the

Fort Lewis area. The following day 1st SOW assets moved from Fort Lewis to Fairchild AFB,

Washington, and planning was begun for Phase

II. The FARP training that was canceled on the

17th was completed at Fairchild AFB without incident.

The next major event of Marvel Exodus was a

full-scale airfield seizure operation at Indian

Springs, Nevada. Along with Hurlburt Field

forces, additional aircraft and personnel deployed

to Fairchild AFB from across the United States,

including forces from Fort Bragg and Pope AFB,

North Carolina; Dyess AFB, Texas; Charleston

AFB, South Carolina; Grissom AFB, Indiana;

Plattsburg AFB, New York; McClellan AFB, California; and Eglin AFB, Florida. Phase II had two

major airfield seizure events, with the first scheduled for 20 September and the second for the

24th. The MC-130E Combat Talons and MAC

SOLL C-130s were to airland at Indian Springs

in a complex scenario that included HH-53H

FARP operations with the Combat Talons and

transload of personnel to a C-141 for rapid exfiltration from the exercise area. The Combat Talons and the MAC SOLL C-130s carried mixed

loads, with the Combat Talons carrying both an

airfield assault package and FARP equipment.

Just as he had done at Desert One, Brenci flew

the lead Combat Talon into Indian Springs, followed by the other two Combat Talons and three

SOLL C-130s. Thigpen commanded one of the

other two Talons, which was configured with Benson tanks and FARP personnel. Brenci landed

first as planned, but the number two SOLL C-130

went around. The number three SOLL C-130

landed as planned, followed by the number four

Combat Talon commanded by Thigpen. The

number five aircraft, a SOLL C-130 aircraft from

Dyess AFB, scheduled to land after Thigpen,

ha d taxied off the runway en route to his FARP

location. During the approach the SOLL aircraft

entered a high sink rate on short final, which resulted in the aircraft impacting the ground short

of the runway. The impact severely damaged the

aircraft, and a fire broke out as it came to a stop

in the airfield overrun. It was almost midnight at

Indian Springs when the accident occurred. The

aircrew managed to escape the burning wreckage,

but seven personnel in the cargo compartment

were killed. The exercise was immediately

stopped, and forces already on the ground were

redirected to respond to the accident. Medical personnel aboard Thigpen’s Combat Talon deplaned

and assisted the base crash response team in

tending to the survivors. Brenci moved to Thigpen’s Talon and coordinated exercise aircraft

movements along with the Indian Springs tower.

Once initial crash response actions were com pleted,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

258
exercise aircraft on the ground were released to

return to home station, except for Thigpen’s aircraft. It was well past 6:00 A.M. when Thigpen and

his crew took off with Brenci on board and proceeded back to Fairchild AFB.* The remainder of

the exercise was subsequently canceled, and assets returned to their home stations between 22

and 23 September. The loss of the SOLL C-130

was the first fixed-wing accident since Desert One

the previous year. As for the 1st SOW, it flew 79

sorties and 353.2 hours during Marvel Exodus,

with the three Combat Talons flying 20 sorties

and 103.4 hours of that total.3 1

With forces redeployed to Hurlburt Field, the

1st SOW prepared for US Readiness Command

(USREDCOM) Exercise Bold Eagle 82, which was

flown out of home station beginning on 13 October

and lasting throughout the month. Due to heavy

tasking for quarterly training exercises the previous year, Bold Eagle 82 was the first opportunity in over 18 months for the 1st SOW to concentrate a significant portion of its assets on joint

training with USREDCOM forces.32 Wing assets

included the 8th SOS Combat Talons, 16th SOS

AC-130H gunships, and 20th SOS HH-53H Pave

Lows. The first Combat Talon sorties were longrange infiltrations of SEAL platoons from Norfolk

NAS, Virginia, which included CRRC drops, IFR,

and low-level TF. Other missions were flown from

Pope AFB and from Hunter AAF, Georgia, to both

land and water DZs throughout the Eglin AFB

range complex. All airdrops were made to blind

DZs without any markings on the ground. The

Combat Talons also performed three resupply

missions utilizing door bundles when the users

could not prepare them for HSLLADS delivery.

One HSLLADS airdrop was later accomplished on

23 October. Two Fulton STARS (utilizing training

sandbags) and two blacked-out NVG landings also

were successfully completed.33 Because of a shortage of exercise airlift, the 8th SOS was tasked to

fly logistics support missions from Pope and MacDill AFBs. Throughout the exercise the 8th SOS

dedicated two aircraft and flew 71.3 hours during

29 sorties.34

The wing had hardly caught its breath from

Bold Eagle participation when the next major joint

exercise, named Certain Tribute 82, began at four

locations in the eastern United States. The exercise was held from 6 to 16 November at Campbell

AAF, Kentucky; Redstone AAF, Alabama; and Volk

AAF and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The thrust of

the exercise was to train US Army rangers in ai

field seizure and hostage rescue techniques. Initi

training was devoted to company-size events fro

6 to 12 November with load training at Campbe

AAF and airfield seizure practice at Redsto

AAF. A battalion-size operation launched from

Campbell AAF on the night of 14 November e

route to Volk AAF, with a rescue and live fi

scheduled at Fort McCoy. At Volk AAF blacke

out landings utilizing NVGs were employed in th

now-standard airfield seizure operation. For Ce

tain Tribute 82, a first-ever formal joint searc

and rescue (SAR) plan was developed. For the e

ercise two 8th SOS MC-130E aircraft participate

flying 11 sorties and 44.2 hours.35

Credible Sport II, Phase I

After the initial planning conference held 

July, Uttaro and his Credible Sport OUE tea

began its test activities on 24 August and conti

ued through the fall until 11 November. The OU

test team was composed of the following 8th SO

crew members: Uttaro, Schwartz, Galloway, Arm

strong, and Almanzar.3 6

The purpose of Credible Sport II, Phase I, w

to satisfy prototype test requirements for Comb

Talon II and to identify margins of safety for th

STOL configuration and associated avionic

During the initial tests, 25 sorties and 60.5 flig

hours were flown. Volumes of test data were co

lected concerning STOL performance, handlin

qualities, margins of safety, and avionics cap

bilities. The Phase I program also identified m

jor design deficiencies in the airframe and in i

avionics suite, and the test established the fa

that the Credible Sport I aircraft had been d

signed for a specific, limited mission and did n

possess the normal margins of safety required fo

peacetime operations. A major effort that wou

prove to be expensive and time consuming w

identified to bring the aircraft up to productio

standards.37

During Phase I testing issues surfaced th

had to be resolved before proceeding to Phase I

These issues included the configuration of im

proved flight controls, the preparation of flig

director/autopilot control laws, the installation 

a stall warning system, improved stability au

mentation, and proof testing of the STOL flap

Lockheed-Marietta, as the prime contractor su

porting the test, was required to expand the ce

ter of gravity envelope and provide improved ro

__________

 *Description of events at Indian Springs is provided from the author’s recollections. Exact landing sequence and timing of events may not 

totally accurate since no notes were taken at the time.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

259
control, rudder installation, and yaw stability to

satisfy the issues raised by the OUE team. The

radar system installed on the Credible Sport aircraft was also deemed inadequate, and the team

felt that it could affect the avionics evaluation

scheduled for Phase II. Cockpit configuration

needed improvement, and with the emphasis on

terminal approach avionics during Phase I, the

air-drop mode of operation was not evaluated.

The many problems and issues identified during

Phase I required resolution before the program

could move to Phase II. 3 8

* * * * * *

As the 8th SOS wound down operations in

Certain Tribute, preparations were being finalized for the squadron’s participation in Bright

Star 82 scheduled to be held in Sudan from 22

November to 12 December. On 30 November two

MC-130Es departed Hurlburt Field en route to

the exercise. One aircraft, commanded by Brenci,

with Hobson as his first pilot, flew a nonstop,

long-range infiltration mission into Wadi Seidna,

Sudan, utilizing three IFRs and 27 hours flying

time. The second Talon proceeded to Lajes Field,

Azores, with one IFR and then flew on to Sudan

the following day.39 Local training and exercise

sorties were flown by exercise participants begin -

ning on 30 November. Bright Star 82 provided excellent desert training in low-level terrain follow -

ing and very low altitude operations along with

NVG blacked-out landings.40 During the first MC130E flight after arriving in Sudan, one of the Talons experienced a flap-brake failure. After attempts to install a locally procured flap brake

from a different manufacturer failed, maintenance was able to source the correct part from

Cairo West and finally solved the problem. The

second Talon required a propeller change during

the initial phase of the exercise, but it was replaced without the loss of any exercise missions.4 1

Both MC-130Es redeployed from Wadi Seidna on

10 December and stopped at Rhein Main AB and

Lajes Field during their return trip. The last leg

of the redeployment included IFR over Bermuda,

with the aircraft arriving back in Florida on 14

December after logging 54 sorties and 201 total

hours during the 15-day deployment.42

1982: Joint Tasking

Challenges the 1st SOW

On 1 January 1982, Colonel Hess assumed the

position of operations officer of the 1st SOS from

Wilson. Hess used the first three months of 1982

to concentrate on unit training in the Philippines.

Since relocating to Clark AB the prior year, the

squadron had developed extensive low-level

routes throughout Luzon and had benefited from

the rich training environment found there. From

8 to 26 February, the squadron supported

Specwarex 82 from Clark AB, setting up an AF -

SOB there and dedicating two aircraft and three

crews to the US Navy SEAL exercise. The exercise provided excellent training for the squadron,

including hard-to-get rapid onload and off-load

events.43 By mid-March the squadron was back in

Korea for Team Spirit 82. From 16 March to 5

April, two 1st SOS MC-130Es, four ROKAF C123s, and two 374th TAW C-130E SOLL aircraft

formed the CAFSOB at Kimhae AB, Korea, and

supported the exercise. Unlike Foal Eagle, Team

Spirit was a conventional exercise with unconventional warfare units serving as opposition forces

for large-scale maneuvers around which the exercise was centered. The CAFSOB was tasked to

support both “blue” and “orange” forces, thus creating confusion within the special operations

headquarters. The exercise was unrealistic for

CAFSOB participants, but some excellent training events were accomplished.4 4

At Hurlburt Field the New Year promised to

be a busy one for the 8th SOS. Since Desert One

squadron tasking had steadily increased, with

new joint requirements added to the squadron’s

traditional exercise schedule. Throughout 1981

the operations tempo had been so intense that

the squadron could not support all requests. The

Special Mission Plans Division (DOS) continued

to plan and coordinate 1st SOW support for special tasking. The 1st SOW, and in particular the

8th SOS, worked with the US Army’s Task Force

160 (TF-160) of the 101st Aviation Group and the

75th Ranger Regiment. The wing also supported

US Navy SEALs and worked with specifically

identified SAC, MAC, and Aerospace Rescue and

Recovery Service (ARRS) units that were qualified in certain special operations capabilities.

From 8 to 17 January, one MC-130E deployed to

Gray AAF, Fort Lewis, Washington, for Exercise

Gossamer Wings. Both low-level operations and

HALO drops were accomplished during the exercise. The primary thrust of the deployment was

to obtain load training for the Combat Talon

crews and for the ranger battalion stationed at

Fort Lewis. The exercise identified US Army

loading procedures that were not compatible with

those of the USAF. Because of the exercise,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

260
standard operating procedures for combat loading

were drafted for later review and approval by

standardization personnel.4 5

The new joint command at Fort Bragg con -

ducted a no-notice exercise named Vagabond

Warrior from 30 January to 7 February 1982. The

1st SOW deployed 49 officers and 117 enlisted

personnel, along with two Combat Talons, two

AC-130H gunships, and two HH-53H Pave Low

helicopters to Barking Sands, Hawaii. The exercise alert order arrived at the 1st SOW on the

morning of 28 January, and the deployment order

arrived shortly before midnight. The two Combat

Talons departed Hurlburt Field on 30 January

and completed two IFRs during their 17-hour

flight, landing at Barking Sands on the 31st. The

employment phase of the exercise was scheduled

to begin on 2 February with a mission rehearsal,

but it had to be postponed for 24 hours due to

severe weather in the objective area. The rehearsal

went as planned on 3 February on the island of

Oahu near Barber’s Point NAS. As Combat Talon

64-0551 returned to Barking Sands, it experienced a right main-gear problem that grounded

the aircraft upon landing. High winds precluded

jacking the aircraft at Barking Sands, so a onetime waiver to fly the aircraft to Hickam AFB was

approved. Hangar space was available at Hickam

AFB, but the part to fix the aircraft could not be

located, thus necessitating a waiver to fly the aircraft back to the West Coast for repairs. The

night-two scenario of Vagabond Warrior was completed without the grounded Combat Talon , and

all exercise objectives were met. On 6 February,

while preparing to redeploy to the continental

United States, the second Combat Talon , aircraft

64-0568, developed a propeller problem that required a propeller change. After transiting

through McClellan AFB, California, the last

Talon arrived back at Hurlburt Field on 12 February. During the exercise the two MC-130E aircraft flew 12 sorties and 76.2 hours. The exercise

demonstrated the ability of the 1st SOW to deploy

quickly on short notice and move long distances in

support of JCS tasking. The 1st SOW and the 8th

SOS considered Vagabond Warrior a success.46

Exercise Kindle Liberty 82 in Panama was supported by the 1st SOW during the January to

February time frame. On 9 February an 8th SOS

MC-130E flew a long-range infiltration mission

into the Canal Zone and landed at Howard AFB

to off-load additional cargo and personnel. After

spending the night at Howard AFB, the aircra

returned to Hurlburt Field on 11 February. A

unplanned logistics flight was flown fro

Hurlburt Field to Howard AFB on 14 February 

deliver parts for the gunships deployed for th

exercise. In total the 8th SOS flew 26.6 hours 

support of Kindle Liberty 82 .

4 7

Live STARS Suspended

The spring once again found the 1st SOW an

the 8th SOS in Europe for the annual Flintloc

exercise. Flintlock 82 covered the period from 1

April to 21 May, with the first Combat Talon ai

craft departing Hurlburt Field for Pisa AB, Ital

on 14 April. The aircraft deployed through Laj

Field, logging 16.5 hours during the two-day d

ployment. Upon landing at Pisa AB, maintenanc

found a main fuel tank leak, which required a on

time flight to Rhein Main AB for repair. On 2

April the 8th SOS crew proceeded on to RA

Weathersfield, UK, and joined the main body 

the exercise. Ferkes’s crew deployed fro

Hurlburt Field to RAF Weathersfield from 22 

24 April and arrived in the UK at the same tim

as the first aircraft. During the exercise 7th SO

and 8th SOS crews flew each other’s aircraft 

maximize both aircraft and aircrew utilizatio

Thirty-seven hours were flown by 7th SOS crew

on 1st SOW Combat Talons, and the two 8th SO

crews flew 23.6 hours on 7th SOS aircraft. Durin

the course of the exercise, the 8th SOS flew 156

hours and 29 sorties. No Fulton STARS operatio

were accomplished by 8th SOS personnel durin

the exercise.*48

A two-man land STARS had been successful

completed by Davenport and 7th SOS Crew 2 

Monrovia, Liberia, early in the exercise. A secon

one-man STARS was scheduled for 26 April 

Canadian Forces AB, Lahr, in southern German

The recovery was in conjunction with Subexerci

Schwarzes-Pferd. The 7th SOS Crew 1, wi

Bates commanding and flying Combat Talon 6

0523, departed RAF Weathersfield early on Sa

urday morning, 26 April, and proceeded to th

exercise area. The aircraft lined up for the reco

ery and engaged the lift line normally. The sk

anchor did not secure the lift line properly, how 

ever, thus resulting in the line slipping throug

the mechanism a few seconds after engagemen

SFC Cliff Strickland, a US Army Special Forc

soldier, was being picked up at the time, and h

fell back to the ground just outside the runw

__________

 *TAC had previously restricted the squadron from performing live recoveries, and the STARS events scheduled for Flintlock 82 all involved li

pickups.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

261
area. He suffered a punctured lung and a broken

hip. En route to the hospital aboard a medical

evacuation helicopter, US Army medics performed an unsuccessful tracheotomy that resulted

in the death of SFC Strickland. His death was

eventually classified as an Army accident, with

the USAF identified as a contributing factor.49 Because of the fatality, all live Fulton STARS were

suspended, and the system was restricted to the

recovery of training bundles and equipment only.

(There were no additional live pickups performed

after the Flintlock 82 accident. In 1997 the last

Fulton training mission was flown, and the system was retired from operational use.)

While the 7th and 8th SOS were deployed to

Flintlock 82, the 1st SOS was participating in

Team Spirit 82. After return from the exercise,

the squadron spent the remainder of the spring

maintaining aircrew proficiency and improving

the unit’s facilities at Clark AB. In April and

again in June, the squadron participated in a local operational readiness exercise conducted by

the 3d TFW. During June and July, the squadron

deployed to SEA twice for exchange training in

Thailand. The rich training environment found in

Thailand had become a valued addition to the

unit’s local training program. Ulchi Focus Lens

and Foal Eagle 82, both held in Korea during the

late summer and fall, finished out a busy year for

the squadron. For Foal Eagle the 1st SOW deployed one MC-130E from the 8th SOS and two

Pave Low helicopters from the 20th SOS. The 1st

SOW deployment to Korea was the first since Desert

One and marked the wing’s return to Northeast

Asia.50 The 8th SOS Combat Talon island-hopped

across the Pacific, making stops in Hawaii, Kwa -

jalein Island, and Guam en route to Korea. All

missions were designed around an unconventional warfare scenario and involved low-level

flight operations, infiltrations, exfiltrations, personnel and resupply airdrops, and in-flight refueling operations with KC-135 tankers. During exfiltration missions NVGs were used to land on

blacked-out and minimally lighted runways.5 1

In the Caribbean, Exercise Ocean Venture 82

was held from 26 April to 17 May and included

one 8th SOS Combat Talon operating out of

Hurlburt Field under the operational control of

the Air Force Forces Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic (AFFORJUWTFA).

Twelve sorties out of 13 scheduled were flown,

including infiltrations, resupplies, exfiltrations,

and one photoreconnaissance mission. In all 32.9

hours were dedicated to the exercise.52 The Ocean

Venture exercise was deemed highly successful by

Colonel Drohan, the commander of AFFORJUWTFA, since most exercise objectives were met

while his staff gained excellent training in managing the joint operation.5 3

* * * * * *

By 1982 the new joint command at Fort Bragg

had matured into an efficient organization dedicated to combating the growing terrorist threat.

Tactics and capabilities developed during the

preparation for Desert One and during Honey

Badger were maintained by the new command.

The quarterly exercises were dedicated to main -

taining these unique capabilities. From 4 to 23

June, a 7th SOS Combat Talon , along with an

augmented crew, deployed from Rhein Main AB to

Hunter AAF, Georgia, to participate for the first

time in a quarterly exercise (Castle Tower). Utiliz -

ing IFR for a long-range, nonstop deployment from

Europe, the 7th SOS arrived in Georgia on sched -

ule. Once at Hunter AAF, the crew flew low-level

missions and practiced communications-out refueling procedures. Precision airborne radar approaches and heavy-equipment drops not available

in Germany were also accomplished. During the

three-week deployment, the crew flew 63.8 hours,

dropped 60 personnel, and airlanded 314 others.

The squadron also dropped 1,000 pounds of cargo

and airlanded another 154,000 pounds.54 The exercise was beneficial to the 7th SOS and enabled the

squadron to increase its proficiency in new capa -

bilities that had been developed by the other two

Combat Talon units since Desert One.

On 8 July 1982, Lt Col William E. Hudspeth

assumed command of the 7th SOS from Walt

Schmidt. The following month the squadron deployed two aircraft, three crews, and a support

element to Hellenikon AB, Greece, for Zeus 82,

which was the Greek subexercise of Flintlock 82.

An Air Force Special Operations Facility (AF -

SOF) was activated at Hellenikon AB, and a 7th

SOS communications team established connectiv -

ity between the AFSOF and SOTFE’s Unconventional Warfare Task Force located at Rendina,

Greece. From 27 August to 17 September, mis -

sions were flown in support of US Army Special

Forces and US Navy SEALs. A few days into the

exercise, all USAF C-130E aircraft were placed

on flight restrictions for weight and stress due to

cracks found in the wings of some aircraft. For

Combat Talon , the restrictions eliminated lowlevel operations for the exercise. The Combat

Talon worldwide fleet remained on restrictions

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

262
until after the first of the year. For Zeus 82 all

missions were supported by the two deployed aircraft, but they flew from Hellenikon AB to the

exercise area at altitudes ranging from 4,000 to

6,000 feet.5 5 The remainder of the year was spent

operating with the restrictions while supporting

7th SOS customers throughout the theater.

On 26 July 1982, Lt Col James L. Hobson assumed command of the 8th SOS from Brenci.

Hobson had been the operations officer since 1

May 1980, and Colonel Sims was selected to move

up to Hobson’s old position. When the USAF directed the inspection of all 1964 and earlier C-130s

for suspected structural deficiencies in September, terrain-following operations were suspended

for all three Combat Talon squadrons, and limita -

tions were imposed on aircraft speed, maneuvering, and fuel/cargo combinations. At Hurlburt

Field Combat Talon 64-0568 was initially

grounded for wing cracks after being inspected

but was subsequently cleared for a one-time flight

to Warner Robins for repair. Aircraft 64-0551, 64-

0559, and 64-0562 passed the Level I inspection,

but they remained restricted from low-level flight

and certain maneuvers until a more in-depth

follow-on inspection for wing cracks could be completed. Combat Talon School low-level training

was canceled, thus severely impacting the school’s

ability to graduate its students. 56 Hobson had his

hands full keeping his crews proficient and the

school in operation.

* * * * * *

After a low-visibility recall and departure

from Rhein Main AB, the 7th SOS deployed one

MC-130E and 24 personnel to the United States

from 25 October to 17 November to participate

in the next quarterly exercise—Roughen Turf.

As had been the case in June, the initial portion

of the deployment concentrated on airdrop and

unilateral training. Operating out of Pope AFB,

the crew dropped fuel blivets and heavy equipment provided by the US Army Airborne Board.

The next several days were spent on precision

airborne radar approaches and NVG blackedout landings. On 29 October the crew practiced

rapid onload and off-load procedures with US

Army rangers at North Field, South Carolina,

and on 30 October the crew deployed on to

Hurlburt Field. From 1 to 8 November additional

airdrops and unilateral training were accomplished. During the night of 9 November, a full

dress rehearsal utilizing the Roughen Turf scenario was conducted, including NVG blacked-out

landings, rapid onload and off-load, and an ai

field seizure operation. The actual Roughen Tu

mission was flown during the night of 10 Novem

ber. Exercise participants included two 8th SO

Combat Talons from Hurlburt Field, Delta Forc

from Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and US Arm

rangers from Hunter AAF, Georgia. Three Com

bat Talons—two 8th SOS and one 7

SOS—launched from Hurlburt Field to the Nell

AFB range area with an IFR en route. India

Springs, Nevada, was the primary airland loc

tion, with other portions of the exercise being co

ducted at Pahute Air Field, Nevada, and at oth

sites in the Nellis AFB test range. The 7th SO

crew performed a blacked-out NVG landing at I

dian Springs and later departed there for Nell

AFB, where all three Talon crews entered cre

rest for the night. On 11 November maintenanc

determined that the 7th SOS aircraft needed a

engine change, thus requiring the crew to remai

at Nellis AFB for the next two days while th

aircraft was being repaired. After returning 

Hurlburt Field on 15 November, the crew d

parted for Lajes Field the following day. The ai

craft arrived back at Rhein Main AB on 17 N

vember after flying 95 hours during th

deployment. Over 100 takeoffs and landings an

45 precision airborne radar approaches to NV

blacked-out landings also were completed.57 N

where in Europe could this type training b

found.

Credible Sport II, Phase II

A Credible Sport II, Phase II, plan was deve

oped by Major Uttaro and his OUE team durin

the first quarter of 1982. The plan detailed th

Phase II test program and was presented to th

Credible Sport II program manager. The OU

plan was enthusiastically received, and a Phase 

flight-test start date of 15 June 1982 was esta

lished. During the interim period, aircraft 7

1686 received additional modifications to corre

deficiencies identified during Phase I testing.58

The Credible Sport OUE continued throug

the fall of 1982. Jerry Uttaro, after four years i

the 8th SOS, was reassigned to the Pentago

Washington, D.C., and Maj Norty Schwartz too

over as the director of the OUE test team. I

November the team published the final OUE te

report after it had determined that all “prot

type” objectives and requirements of the Credib

Sport II, Phase II program had been met. Th

final report determined that the Credible Sport 

aircraft design, in its final configuration, w

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

263
ready for production as the new Combat Talon II

aircraft. During Phase II testing, significant

changes made by Lockheed-Marietta after Phase I

had resulted in significant improvements in the

areas of avionics, equipment, and aircraft design.

From 4 to 6 November the OUE team attended

the Combat Talon II configuration conference.

The conference centered on Credible Sport II

OUE findings and the application of those findings to Combat Talon II.

59

With Phase II completed and the final report

published, action was required to determine the

final disposition of the Credible Sport aircraft (74-

1686). Uttaro had pursued assignment of the aircraft to the 1st SOW earlier in the year, but in a

June 1982 message to Air Staff, TAC declined to

support the initiative. Subsequently, Air Staff

made the decision to return the aircraft to MAC

when Credible Sport II, Phase II, testing was

completed. With the announcement in the fall of

1982 that MAC would absorb all USAF special

operations assets the following spring, action was

renewed within the 1st SOW to have aircraft 74-

1686 assigned to Hurlburt Field. In November

Schwartz submitted a staff package to MAC

through the 1st SOW wing commander, Col Hugh

L. Cox III, with rationale and justification for retaining the aircraft in the wing. Combat Talon II

designated aircraft were just beginning their initial construction phase at Lockheed and would

not be modified into Combat Talon IIs for another

three years. The 1st SOW felt that the Credible

Sport aircraft could provide an interim capability

until the new aircraft became available.6 0 The

proposal also outlined an initiative to exchange

one of the new C-130H aircraft earmarked for the

Combat Talon II program for the Credible Sport

aircraft. In the end, however, MAC agreed with

TAC and did not support assignment of aircraft

74-1686 to the 1st SOW. The aircraft was destined to remain at Warner Robins and never fly

again as an airlifter—the cost to demodify the aircraft to its original configuration exceeded its

value to the Air Force. The aircraft would eventually be transferred to the Warner Robins Aircraft

Museum, where it remained from that time forward. Special operations was denied a valuable

asset that would have undoubtedly improved its

airland infiltration/exfiltration capability.

TAC and MAC Strike a Deal

Since the failed rescue attempt in 1980, special

operations had been scrutinized at all levels to

determine how available resources could be better

organized and trained. During 1982 the Air Force

inspector general conducted a functional manage -

ment inspection (FMI) of Air Force special opera -

tions forces and determined that SOF should be

consolidated under one command to enhance

available resources. The 1982 Defense Guidance

and the Air Force 2000 study identified the lower

end of the conflict spectrum as the most likely

area of involvement of US forces over the next 20

years. The net result was an increase in SOF requirements. To address those requirements, Air

Force/XO hosted an SOF working group from 13

to 22 July 1982, which reviewed existing capabilities and presented a series of recommendations to

the Air Force Council on 31 August.6 1

Because of these actions, TAC and MAC con -

vened a study group in the fall of 1982 to respond

to the SOF study group recommendations and to

the IG’s FMI report. The study group developed a

proposal that consolidated special operations and

combat rescue under MAC. The group recom -

mended that the consolidation take effect on 1

April 1983, with minimal disruption in basing

and force distribution. Special operations forces

and combat rescue would retain their unique

identities, with the overseas CINCs having opera -

tional control over the forces stationed in their

respective theaters. On 7 December 1982, the Air

Force formally announced the decision to consolidate SOF under MAC. For the first time, the

Combat Talon community would reside under one

command, which would eventually result in

standardization of equipment and an increase in

assignment opportunities for SOF personnel.62 In

December 1982, however, there was little enthusiasm for the consolidation plan in the three Combat Talon units.

1983: Combat Talon Moves to MAC

The New Year saw the 1st SOS as busy as

ever. On 1 March 1983 MAC assumed command

of all USAF special operations forces, including

the 1st SOS in the Pacific. At Clark AB the 1st

SOS became a tenant unit to the 3d TFW along

with the 374th TAW, which was also a MAC unit

located at Clark. The 374th was assigned maintenance responsibility for the 1st SOS Combat Talons, since both were MAC units. Operational con -

trol of the 1st SOS was retained by Headquarters

PACAF, while command of the unit passed to the

newly created MAC-assigned 2d Air Division at

Hurlburt Field. The first commander of the 2d AD

was Col Hugh Cox, who was the former commander of the 1st SOW. The 2d AD was assigned

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

264
to MAC’s newly formed Twenty-Third Air Force,

which was responsible for all special operations

and SAR forces. The Twenty-Third Air Force was

located at Scott AFB, Illinois, and was made up

primarily of rescue personnel that had been assigned to the deactivated Air Rescue Service.*

The immediate result of the reorganization for the

1st SOS was felt in the maintenance area. Since

coming to Clark AB as part of the 3d TFW, the

squadron had developed an excellent and dedicated maintenance capability for Combat Talon

unique systems. When the squadron was transferred to MAC, the 3d TFW retained many of the

squadron’s specialized maintenance personnel in

its wing, with the remainder transferred to the

374th TAW. The 374th TAW then assigned the

specialists throughout its maintenance shops,

thus resulting in a huge decrease in maintenance

capability for the 1st SOS.6 3 The decreased maintenance capability would affect the squadron for

the remainder of the year.

A few days after the reorganization, the 1st

SOS deployed two aircraft and a CAFSOB support package to Korea for Team Spirit 83 and

operated out of Kimhae AB from 5 to 22 March.

Some of the former 3d TFW dedicated maintenance personnel already had been committed to

the exercise before the conversion to MAC, resulting in smooth maintenance operations during

the exercise. Aircraft and personnel from the

374th TAW and the 317th TAW (located at Pope

AFB) also deployed for the exercise, each with a

“MAC mission commander” designated to command its respective element. The resulting confu -

sion had an impact on the exercise, with CAF -

SOB planners from the 1st SOS questioned by

other MAC-committed units as to command and

control arrangements. During the exercise 66

missions were successfully completed out of a

tasked 95, with weather being responsible for 16

cancellations. Overall, the exercise was a success

due to the commitment of all exercise partici -

pants. 64

Concerned with decreasing maintenance indicators since the transfer to MAC, Colonel Cox visited Clark AB and the 1st SOS from 18 to 20

April. What Cox saw so concerned him that he

sent an immediate message to the commander of

Twenty-Third Air Force, relaying the problems

faced by the squadron. Since consolidation und

MAC, 1st SOS aircraft had deteriorated to a poi

that the specialized subsystems installed on th

aircraft were marginally operational. One a

signed aircraft had 67 delayed discrepancies, an

the aircraft suffered from low-maintenance prio

ity within the 374th TAW. Documents reveale

that the host wing did not work the Combat Ta

ons until they appeared on the flying schedule—

and only then were systems critical for flight r

paired. The sophisticated radar and ECM equi

ment were rarely in fully mission-capable statu

With the reorganization the 374th TAW had n

maintained the capability to repair the radar, th

inertial navigation system, the electronic counte

measures system, or the aerial refueling system

installed on the Combat Talon . After returning 

Hurlburt Field, Cox sent a report to Twenty-Thir

Air Force outlining the problems he found 

Clark AB.65 Some improvements were seen local

for the squadron after Cox’s visit, but little i

crease in maintenance capability was seen unt

after the end of the calendar year.

* * * * * *

The year of 1982 had been extremely busy fo

the 8th SOS, and 1983 promised to be the sam

with traditional exercises scheduled along wi

quarterly joint events. In addition, weekly trai

ing was scheduled to keep joint components read

to respond to the growing worldwide terrori

threat to the United States.

Throughout the latter part of January, 1

SOW forces participated in the Alaskan Exerci

Brim Frost 83, with the 8th SOS deploying on

aircraft and crew. Hobson was designated the AF 

SOB commander for the exercise. The Comb

Talon flew two air defense exercises on 24 and 2

January as a slow-moving airborne penetrato

On 31 January the 8th SOS flew an infiltratio

mission and, on 1 February, exfiltrated two Sp

cial Forces teams from Fort Wainwright. Th

Combat Talon flew nine sorties and 50.5 hou

during the exercise. 66

Beginning on 1 February, the 1st SOW w

alerted for a no-notice quarterly exercise name

Prairie Runner. For the next 48 hours, the win

mobilized and prepared to launch forces to Pa

rick AFB, Florida. On 4 February one Comb

__________

 *When Air Rescue Service was deactivated, the facilities that it occupied at Scott AFB, along with most of its personnel, were transferred to t

newly established Twenty-Third Air Force. The primary emphasis of the headquarters (as perceived by Combat Talon operators) heavily lean

towards improving combat rescue capabilities rather than those of special operations. Ove r succeeding years resentment grew between the t

factions, with career special operations personnel being forced into assignments at Scott AFB when volunteers were not available. Promotio

suffered for SOF personnel assigned to the headquarters, as MAC and Twenty-Third Air Force looked out for their career officers who had grow

up in the MAC system, or at least that was the perception within the Combat Talon community.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

265
Talon—along with two AC-130Hs, three HH53Hs, and four C-141s filled with personnel and

equipment—were deployed. Twenty-four hours

later a second Talon from the 8th SOS and one

from the 7th SOS also arrived at Patrick AFB.

For the next two weeks, deployed forces planned,

rehearsed, and executed a series of complex op -

erations originating from northeast Florida and

terminating in the exercise area in east Texas.

Airfield seizure rehearsal operations were con -

ducted, and during the night of 11 February, the

centerpiece airfield seizure event was successfully

completed at Orange County Airport north of the

Houston metroplex. Overcoming severe weather

over the Gulf of Mexico en route to the objective

area, all aircraft successfully landed as planned at

Orange County. In total, 52 hours were flown by

8th SOS Talons during Prairie Runner.

6 7

During the months of April and May, Flintlock

83 was held, and it resembled recent exercises in

the series. The 7th SOS deployed to RAF

Sculthorpe and established the AFSOB. From the

UK unconventional warfare subexercises were

conducted in core NATO countries, with additional subexercises flown in Tunisia, Morocco, and

Jordan. Just before the deployment for Flintlock

83, command of the 7th SOS was transferred to

MAC as had been the case for the other two Combat Talon squadrons. The 7th SOS was no longer

assigned to USAFE. This reorganization created

some changes for the squadron at Rhein Main AB,

but had little impact on Flintlock 83. The 7th SOS

was transferred from USAFE’s 7575th OG and

was assigned to the 2d AD at Hurlburt Field. It

remained stationed at Rhein Main AB. The 2d AD

exercised command of the 7th SOS and controlled

all local and training operations. USAFE retained

operational control of the squadron, while SOTFE

assumed OPCON from USAFE under certain

wartime conditions.68 One immediate change seen

by the squadron was that efficiency reports went

to the 2d AD instead of to USAFE. In addition,

when personnel rotated back to the United States

after completion of their tours of duty, they returned to MAC, which was their designated losing

command.*

The squadron remained a tenant organization

at Rhein Main AB, with the 435th TAW provid -

ing maintenance support similar to the arrange -

ment at Clark AB. Both units were assigned to

MAC, but the 7th SOS remained separate from

the host wing. To provide specialized avionics

and electronic countermeasures maintenance for

the squadron, an avionics maintenance shop was

created and attached to the 7th SOS.6 9

At the 8th SOS the transition from TAC to

MAC was completed effective 1 March 1983. The

change in major commands had some impact on

the squadron’s daily operations. The training section was tasked to write a new training manual,

which was designated as MAC Regulation 51-130.

The projected implementation date was set for 1

January 1984, and it replaced MACR 51-1 and

TAC Manual 51-60. The new manual encom -

passed all training requirements and was the sin gle

training regulation for MAC-assigned units. With

the change to MAC, there was also a greater emphasis on ground-training events, including systems refresher, security, and buffer zone orient a -

tion. Some pilots and navigators were given the

opportunity to attend the Combat Aircrew Training School at Nellis AFB which was a three-week

school designed to familiarize crew members with

tactics developed for employment in a hostile environment.7 0

As special operations transitioned to MAC, 8th

SOS Combat Talon tasking reached a critical

stage during April and May of 1983. Both JCS

Exercise Flintlock 83 and Exercise Solid Shield 83

were scheduled during this period, with each exercise tasking the 8th SOS for two Combat Talon

aircraft. During the same period, special mission

requirements continued for two Combat Talons.

The Combat Talon School also required one aircraft for its training program. There were only

three aircraft available to fill requirements for

seven aircraft, with aircraft 64-0572 loaned to the

1st SOS and aircraft 64-0567 at LAS Ontario for

scheduled maintenance.

Beginning in the fall of 1982, the 1st SOW had

asked for relief from some of its Combat Talon

tasking scheduled for the following spring. None

was forthcoming, so on 17 January Col Hugh L.

Hunter, the new commander of the 1st SOW, formally requested that the two Combat Talons be

eliminated from Exercise Solid Shield 83 and that

the Combat Talon requirement for Flintlock 83 be

reduced to one aircraft. An agreement was eventually reached to support Solid Shield with one Combat Talon operating from Hurlburt Field, with no

more than eight sorties dedicated to the exercise.

For Flintlock , the tasking was reduced to one

Combat Talon , with MAC agreeing to provide an

additional MAC SOLL C-130 in the place of the

__________

 *Before the consolidation personnel had no losing command, since TAC did not claim USAFE and PACAF SOF returnees.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

266
second Talon .

71 With the limited number of aircraft available during the period, the reduction in

Combat Talon commitments was still not enough

to allow remaining requirements to be met. The

brunt of the shortfall was absorbed by the Combat

Talon School and by the virtual elimination of local training sorties. All other requirements were

met. The level of tasking for Combat Talon during

this period was somewhat typical of the operations

tempo that the squadron had maintained since

Desert One.

For its Flintlock 83 participation, the 8th SOS’s

Combat Talon witnessed the implementation of a

new tactic. Early infiltration of committed special

operations forces always had been a key objective

for European planners, but the number of Combat

Talons available in Europe limited employment of

this tactic. The tactic of flying a combination deployment/employment mission, which originated

from the United States and culminated with the

infiltration of a special forces team directly into

the combat area, could help eliminate the shortfall. On 22 April an 8th SOS Combat Talon departed Hurlburt Field en route to Westover AFB,

Massachusetts, to link up with a US Army Special

Forces team. After face-to-face briefings with the

team and crew rest for the crew, the mission

launched on 24 April with a successful IFR being

accomplished near Iceland from a KC-135. The

Combat Talon made a low approach at RAF

Sculthorpe without making a landing. Upon de -

parting the traffic pattern and contacting departure control, the crew requested clearance onward

to southern Germany and the Schwarzes-Pferd

subexercise area. A new flight plan had been filed

by exercise planners at RAF Sculthorpe with a

new call sign and the route of flight. The crew

proceeded on to Germany and entered low level

near Frankfurt. The seven-man team was dropped

on a blacked-out DZ exactly on time and on target.

The aircraft proceeded back to the UK after climb -

ing to altitude and obtaining an instrument clearance from ATC. Upon landing at RAF Sculthorpe,

the mission terminated with 18.4 hours being

logged.7 2 The aircraft remained in the UK and supported subexercises in Belgium, Luxembourg, and

Germany. The exercise had expanded again from

the previous year, with the operations tempo

greatly increased for the Combat Talons. Approximately twice as many missions were flown during

the 1983 exercise than were flown in 1982, with

MC-130E sortie generation exceeding the projected wartime utilization rate.7 3 For the 8th SOS,

however, its crew flew six employment missions,

including the initial United States to German

infiltration, and logged 48.6 hours. An addition

15 hours were logged during the redeployment 

Hurlburt Field in mid-May. The two Comb

Talon squadrons again flew each other’s aircra

which created a problem with the electronic wa

fare officer, as had been the case the year prio

The exercise highlighted the potential problem

that could arise if the three Combat Talon squa

rons were ever employed together during th

same contingency—all three squadrons had di

ferent ECM systems installed on their aircra

that precluded the universal exchange of cre

members. 7 4 Because of the problems surfaced du

ing the Flintlock interfly program, MAC’s initi

tive to standardize the Combat Talon fleet gaine

momentum .

Between 21 April and 6 May, an 8th SO

MC-130E participated in Exercise Solid Shiel

83. No major problems arose during the execu 

tion of the exercise. The Combat Talon operate

out of Hurlburt Field and flew 42.7 hours whi

successfully completing six tasked mission

Standard infiltration, exfiltration, and resupp

missions were flown.75 As May passed, and th

two large JCS exercises came to an end, the 8

SOS prepared for June and another period o

heavy tasking. Exercise Universal Trek 83, uti

izing the Caribbean region as the exercise are

was flown between 2 and 6 June and began wi

a long-range infiltration. In addition to the in 

itial long-range infiltration mission, 8th SO

Talons flew three employment sorties fro

Roosevelt Roads AB, Puerto Rico, and a lon

range exfiltration from Puerto Rico to Pope AF

at the end of the exercis e.76

A few days later the squadron provided one Com 

bat Talon for Exercise Casino Dancer, which w

held from 11 to 23 June. Hobson deployed as the 1

SOW mission commander to Harrisburg IAP, Pen

sylvania, and commanded wing-committed forc

for the duration of the exercise. Infiltration an

exfiltration operations with committed groun

forces kept the Combat Talon busy. Perhaps du

to the operations tempo during the previous tw

months, the aircraft was grounded for maint

nance problems for a good portion of the exe

cise. 77 The remainder of June and most of Ju

was spent catching up on local training and fl

ing Combat Talon School sorties. From 26 Ju

t o 4 August, another quarterly exercise (Nig

Venture) was conducted with one MC-130E

Mountain low-level terrain following and U

Army Special Forces personnel airdrops we

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

267
a ccomplished by a Combat Talon crew. As it

turned out, Night Venture was the last joint special operations exercise involving the Combat

Talon before Operation Urgent Fury the following

October in Grenada.

April and May had been dedicated to Flintlock

83 for the 7th SOS, but the pace did not decrease

after the unit returned to Rhein Main AB. Local

proficiency sorties were flown in June, with emphasis on flying staff personnel who had worked

in the AFSOB and could not fly during the twomonth-long exercise. From 7 to 15 July, the

squadron participated in Black Baron I, which

was a US-based exercise involving one MC-130E

and an augmented crew. The aircraft departed

Rhein Main AB with a US Army Special Forces A

Team (SFODA) and flew nonstop to the Fort

Bragg range area. The crew refueled over the Atlantic twice and terminated the tactical portion of

its mission with an airdrop of the SFODA on

Saint Mere DZ near Pope AFB. The crew then

landed at Pope, logging 16.3 hours of flying time

during the nonstop mission. Heavy equipment

and blivet drops were successfully executed during the following week along with airborne intercept training with the New Jersey Air National

Guard’s F-106s.78

In the Pacific one 1st SOS MC-130E aircraft

deployed to Utapao Royal Thai Naval Base from

19 to 31 July for JCS Exercise Cobra Gold 83. The

exercise had been greatly expanded over previous

years, with the 1st SOS programmed to fly 58.2

hours. The squadron was scheduled to participate

in a variety of events, including personnel drops,

CRRC drops, HSLLADS resupply drops to Special

Forces teams deployed in the field, and airland

exfiltrations of combined SEAL platoons.79 Flying

activities were severely curtailed due to recurring

maintenance problems associated with the Combat Talon . During the first three days of the employment phase of the exercise, all missions were

air aborted due to a master fire warning light

indication, which required the shutdown of the

number 2 engine. The problem was finally resolved on 24 July when a broken wire was found

in the fire detection system. On 26 July, while

flying a unilateral night short-field landing sortie

at Utapao, the left outboard elevator trim tab flexdrive assembly failed, resulting in the loss of the

elevator trim tab motor. The aircraft landed without further incident. Replacement parts arrived

late on 29 July, and the aircraft was cleared to fly

the following afternoon. The maintenance downtime caused the loss of four personnel drops, two

CRRC drops, two HSLLADS drops, and one airland exfiltration of two combined SEAL platoons

from Hat Yai Airfield in southern Thailand. Only

29.9 hours were actually flown during the exercise.8 0 The 1st SOS element redeployed to Clark AB

on 31 July without accomplishing its pre-exercise

goals.

At Hurlburt Field the early part of August was

spent finalizing preparations for Bright Star 83,

which had one 8th SOS and one 7th SOS Combat

Talon committed. The 8th SOS MC-130E departed Hurlburt Field on 9 August en route to

Cairo West, Egypt. After arriving on 11 August,

the crew began planning employment missions,

which were scheduled to commence two days

later. Exercise participants were housed in a tent

city at Cairo West, with field latrines used for

sanitation. Many personnel became ill from unsanitary living conditions and the proximity of the

field latrine. The 8th SOS Combat Talon flew

eight infiltration missions, three resupply missions, and one low-level airborne intercept mission.81

On 10 August, one day before the arrival of the

8th SOS, one 7th SOS MC-130E and 36 personnel

arrived at Cairo West. The squadron flew missions in Egypt and in three subexercises during

the following two weeks. A 12-man SFODA was

infiltrated into the Somalia subexercise on 15 Au -

gust. After departure from Cairo West, the crew

flew a high-level profile over the Red Sea and refueled from a KC-10 tanker. The refueling was

the first for the squadron from the new jumbo

tanker. After completion of the refueling opera -

tion, the aircraft entered low level and flew a twohour route to its DZ. During the low-level portion

of the mission, the number 3 engine was shut

down for fluctuating gearbox oil pressure, but the

crew elected to continue the mission. Operating

under emergency conditions, the aircraft was positioned over the DZ within 10 seconds of its TOT

when the ground party called a no-drop for excessive ground winds. The Combat Talon proceeded

to Mogadishu, Somalia, where the team was airlanded. Total mission time was 9.8 hours. On 20

August the 7th SOS MC-130E departed Cairo

West on a combined infiltration and resupply mission destined for Sudan. A nighttime IFR from a

KC-10 was accomplished, and the crew continued

on for another three hours to successfully drop the

SFODA and to resupply another team that was

already in the field.8 2 Bright Star 83 demonstrated that the 7th SOS had come a long way

since Desert One in developing its IFR, airdrop,

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

268
and NVG skills. The unit could deploy and perform along side its sister squadrons with equal

capabilities.

Problems were encountered with Egyptian Air

Traffic Control when exercise planners could not

provide 72-hour notice for all flights. In addition,

at a preplanning conference that squadron representatives had not been allowed to attend, MAC

had agreed to daylight only airlift operations.

Special operations was not an airlift-specific mission, but it was included with other MAC support.83 Night operations for special operations

were essential. The situation was somewhat rectified during the exercise after many long sessions

with Egyptian exercise support personnel. After

nearly a month in Egypt, the 8th SOS Talon a rrived back at Hurlburt Field on 7 September

while the 7th SOS returned to Rhein Main AB.

A second low-visibility mission, code-named

Black Baron II, was flown by the 7th SOS between

13 and 21 August. One 7th SOS-augmented crew

deployed to Zaragosa, Spain, after picking up a

US Navy SEAL platoon at RAF Machrihanish,

UK. A second Combat Talon also deployed to

Zaragosa as a spare for the primary mission aircraft. On mission night the primary aircraft departed Zaragosa AB en route to a point off the

coast of Lebanon. After refueling from a KC-135

tanker, the Combat Talon air-dropped the SEAL

platoon and a CRRC approximately 50 miles off

the Lebanese coast near Beirut. The entire opera -

tion was executed at night, with the Combat

Talon returning to Rhein Main AB nonstop after

a second IFR. The spare Combat Talon remained

at Zaragosa and returned to Rhein Main AB on 21

August.84

During Reforger 83 the 7th SOS participated in

Subexercise Carson Woods, flying out of Rhein

Main AB and successfully completing 12 missions.

Infiltration and exfiltration missions were accomplished in support of both European-based active

duty and US-based reserve US Army Special

Forces units. Missions were flown into southern

Germany and into Belgium. Squadron-assigned

SOCCT personnel were also infiltrated along with

the special forces teams to assist in locating and

surveying DZs and helicopter landing zones. Once

in the field, SOCCT personnel also instructed spe -

cial forces teams on the Fulton STARS, with emphasis on equipment setup and operation in

preparation for a Fulton recove ry.85

* * * * * *

The 1st SOS’s performance during Cobra Go

83 had been disappointing, but squadron leade

ship was committed to improving the unit’s ove

all maintenance status. On 1 August 1983, He

assumed command of the squadron from Prate

and Major Jahnke was appointed as his new o

erations officer. From 9 September to 12 Octobe

the squadron deployed two Combat Talons 

Port Hedland, Western Australia, for the trie

nial Exercise Westwind/Kangaroo 83. With 3

personnel and two aircraft deployed, the 1

SOS made up 50 percent of the USAF commi

ment for the exercise. The squadron set up 

CAFSOB at Port Hedland and operated und

field conditions. Tactical events coordinated b

the CAFSOB included a full range of special o

erations capabilities. During the month-long e

ercise, tactical events accomplished by dedicate

USAF aircraft included short-field day/nig

takeoffs and landings with infiltration or exfi

tration of long-range patrol vehicles and person 

nel, coastal penetration missions workin

against picket ship radar and airborne interce

tors, day and night HALO and HAHO infiltr

tions, and CRRC drops.

During one of the short-field landings, Comb

Talon 63-7785 became mired in sand after t

main landing gear broke through the dirt runw

surface. After downloading fuel and removin

everything possible from the aircraft, a combin

US/Australian recovery team freed the aircra

with only minor damage. The aircraft and cre

returned to the exercise with minimal impact 

planned operations. CAFSOB assets also com

pleted resupply airdrops to teams in the field, i

cluding blacked-out and IR night landing-zone op 

erations, and participated in desert aircre

survival training. The 1st SOS flew 15 sorti

while air-dropping 86 personnel and airlandin

106.

Although improved over Cobra Gold, maint

nance support for the 1st SOS aircraft still did n

meet the squadron’s needs. Most of the unit

problems revolved around the lack of spare par

and aircraft support equipment. No exercis

funds were made available to deploy spare par

or aerospace ground equipment. All equipme

and supplies needed to support the month-lon

bare-base deployment, including personne

ground equipment, and supplies, were deploye

on the 1st SOS Talons. Critically needed par

could not be deployed because of supply shortfal

at Clark AB and a lack of additional air transpo

tation to Australia. As a work around, exerci

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

269
aircraft made resupply flights to Royal Australian

Air Force (RAAF) Pearce and to RAAF Darwin

and coordinated short-notice diplomatic clearances for unprogrammed resupply flights from

home station. The RAAF C-130 base at Rich -

mond, Australia, was also utilized for aircraft

parts but was 2,000 miles from Port Hedland. The

situation caused extended down times for the Talons and severely affected the exercise.8 6 (Colonel

Cox again visited the 1st SOS from 29 November

to 1 December to evaluate how the squadron was

progressing under MAC support. Cox’s visit was

followed by General Ryan, commander in chief,

MAC, on 5 December. General Ryan was accompanied by General Brown (MAC/DO) and General

Watts (MAC/XP). The high-level interest was

generated in part by Cox’s previous correspon -

dence to the Twenty-Third Air Force commander

earlier in the year and the continued poor maintenance status of the squadron.)8 7

The Australian deployment terminated on 12

October with the return of the two Combat Talons to Clark AB. Two weeks later the 1st SOS

was deployed again to Foal Eagle 83. The Korean

exercise was similar to those of previous years,

with the CAFSOB established at Kimhae AB.

The squadron deployed two aircraft as part of

a USAF eight C-130 aircraft commitment to

the exercise. The ROKAF committed six C-123

aircraft and formed an exercise-dedicated detachment at K-16. External events negatively

affected the exercise by degrading the squadron’s ability to successfully execute planned

missions. Real-world events, including the Soviet shootdown of Korean Airline’s flight 007

and the attempted assassination of the president of Burma, eliminated 26 ROK Army team s

from the exercise, when those teams were nee ded

for national security duty. Coupled with those

two events, the North Koreans stepped up

their number of attempted border infiltrations

into South Korea. President Reagan visited

South Korea in November, and the exercise was

shortened so that some participants could conduct

their real-world security duties. Also in October

1983, the United States executed Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, and 2d AD forces com -

mitted to the exercise, including 8th SOS Com -

bat Talons, were canceled just before the

exercise. In total, 50 percent of the projected

MC-130E missions were lost.8 8

* * * * * *

During the months of September and October,

7th SOS aircraft deployed to Aviano AB, Italy;

Kenitra AB, Morocco; and Hellenikon AB, Greece;

in support of US Army Special Forces and US

Navy SEALs. On 22 October the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, were blown up by terrorists, and EUCOM forces were put on increased

alert. The 7th SOS had a week-long Greek trainer

scheduled to deploy the following day. Additional

preparations were made to protect the aircraft and

personnel should the terrorist assault spill over to

Greece. Almost unnoticed by 7th SOS personnel

were recent events on the tiny Caribbean island of

Grenada. With the tragedy unfolding in the Middle

East, little thought was given to the developing

crisis across the Atlantic.

Thigpen and his crew reported to the 7th SOS

squadron operations building at 0500 on Sun -

day, 23 October, to prepare for the deployment

to Hellenikon AB. Preflight planning was proceeding normally, and the mission briefing was

completed by 0615 local. Just before Thigpen

departed for base operations to file the flight

Photo courtesy of Sam Garrett

Combat Talon 63-7785 mired in sand.

Photo courtesy of Sam Garrett

Rear view of aircraft 63-7785.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

270
plan, Colonel Hudspeth arrived in the squadron

and pulled Thigpen aside. Hudspeth was en

route to the Rhein Main AB Command Post,

where he had a secure telephone call waiting for

him. Both officers assumed the call was related

to the Beirut disaster. Hudspeth directed Thigpen to continue on to base operations and file his

flight plan but to delay departure until released

by him personally. With the flight plan filed, the

pilots and navigators proceeded to aircraft 64-

0561 and began their preflight duties. The crew

was waiting in their seats ready for engine start

when Hudspeth returned in his staff car. The secure telephone call had been from Twenty-Third

Air Force, and Hudspeth directed that the crew

return to the squadron and prepare for an alternate mission. In short order, crew members were

released to return to their quarters and pack for

a 30-day deployment. No other details were

given. On returning to the squadron, the crew

was instructed to plan a flight from Rhein Main

AB to Hurlburt Field, Florida. Hudspeth explained that there would be no tanker support,

thus requiring the crew to stop at Keflavic, Ice -

land, and Goose Bay, Labrador, for fuel and servicing. Thigpen was instructed to contact Colonel

Dutton, the Twenty-Third Air Force director of

operations, en route for additional guidance. Just

after 1000 local on 23 October, the aircraft departed Rhein Main AB en route to Keflavic. 8 9

Hudspeth had given Thigpen a sealed envelope to

be opened only after takeoff, and when cockpit

duties settled down, Thigpen opened the letter

and read aloud the commander’s remarks. Hudspeth emphasized the importance of the mission

and assured the crew that it was for real but did

not elaborate on its purpose. He closed by wishing the crew the best of luck and Godspeed. The

crew still had no idea that the deployment was in

support of Operation Urgent Fury.

The first leg of the flight was uneventful, and,

as the day turned into night, the aircraft was

bearing down on Goose Bay, Labrador, after refueling in Iceland. Nearing its 16-hour crew day, the

radio operator contacted the MAC command post

at Scott AFB, Illinois, by way of phone patch, and

Thigpen talked with Dutton. The crew’s duty day

was extended by two hours, and Thigpen was instructed to press on toward Hurlburt Field until

told to do otherwise. Every two hours the crew

contacted Dutton, and the answer was always

the same—continue on to Hurlburt Field. Groun

time at Goose Bay was minimal, and the aircra

was back in the air within two hours of landin

All aircraft systems were operating normally 

the crew flew down the East Coast of the Unite

States. Twenty-six hours into crew day, the ai

craft overflew Hunter AAF, Georgia, en route 

Florida. Little did the crew know that Operatio

Urgent Fury preparations were already und

way beneath them.

The aircraft touched down at Hurlburt Fiel

just before dawn on 24 October, and the crew w

met by 1st SOW/DOS personnel. The mission ha

taken 18.2 hours to complete over a 27.5-ho

crew day. It was perhaps the only time a C-13

aircraft had transited the Atlantic witho

tanker support during one continuous crew da

Although exhausted, the crew was ready 

quickly reconstitute to whatever mission mig

be forthcoming. The Hurlburt Field receptio

party shed little light on the reason for the sho

notice deployment, but the crew already ha

guessed that it must be connected to Grenada. B

0600 local the 7th SOS crew had settled into bi

leting at Hurlburt Field and entered crew res

Meanwhile, the 1st SOW was alerted, and th

wing began final preparations for Operation U

gent Fury. Later that day the 7th SOS Comb

Talon (64-0561) was flown to Hunter AAF by 

8th SOS crew and served as a spare for the o

eration. That night, with the 7th SOS crew sti

at Hurlburt Field, the operation kicked off. Th

7th SOS crew had missed participating in th

operation by 24 hours.*

Operation Urgent Fury :

A Rescue Mission in Grenada

With a population of approximately 100,00

people, the island nation of Grenada has a lon

history of colonial rule. In 1763, by the Treaty 

Paris, the island was ceded by France to Gre

Britain and remained under British colonial ru

from 1833 until 1967, when it attained home-ru

status. In 1974 Grenada became fully ind

pendent but remained a member of Great Bri

ain’s Commonwealth of Nations. Five years lat

the fledgling nation faced economic hardship

and its people had grown disenchanted with th

government of Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy. I

a bloodless coup in 1979, led by Marxist Mauric

Bishop, a communist government, friendly 

__________

 *The above narrative was provided from the memory of the author. Although events described occurred as indicated, exact takeoff and landi

times, along with the names of other 7th SOS crew members, have faded with time. The story was included to illustrate how the 7th SO

contributed to Operation Urgent Fury.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

271
Cuba and the Soviet Union, assumed total power.

From 1979 to 1983, the Marxist’s regime replaced

democratic institutions with communist ones and

placed severe limitations on the British governorgeneral, Sir Paul Scoon (fig. 35). 90

The centerpiece project of Bishop’s regime was

a 9,000-foot runway located at Point Salines.

Bishop claimed the runway was essential to the

island’s tourism industry and to economic growth.

Leaders in the United States did not believe the

new airport was designed for tourism, noting that

one large commercial airliner could hold more

than 300 people and that there were fewer than

300 hotel rooms on the entire island.9 1 Military

analysts believed that the runway was actually

designed for military aircraft, with Cuba, the Soviet Union , and communist Eastern bloc countries its most likely customers. Fidel Castro provided 600 men to assist the Grenadians in

constructing the facility. Once complete the airfield could support Cuban MiG-23s, which would

extend their operating range throughout the Caribbean basin. Cuba also was heavily involved in

Angola with more than 50,000 men, and Grenada

was 1,600 miles closer to Africa. Additionally, the

facility could provide a transition point for Libya

and Soviet bloc nations bent on intrigue in Cen -

tral and South America. 9 2 But perhaps the area

of most concern for the United States was the

proximity of Grenada to vital sea lanes that carried a large portion of the oil used by the United

States. A base of operations for the Cubans and

for the Soviet Union that could threaten that oil

supply was a daunting thought for strategic plan -

ners .

Bishop had maintained an anti-US position

since seizing power and had developed strong ties

with Cuba. By 1983, however, Fidel Castro was

encouraging Bishop to tone down his rhetoric

against the United States. In an unofficial visit to

Washington, Bishop met with low-level government officials and indicated that he sought to reconcile differences between the two countries.

Bishop’s brand of communism allowed 60 percent

of the country’s economy to remain in private

hands. Hardliners serving on the party’s Central

Committee did not like this soft approach to communism and looked past Bishop for another

leader who would accelerate rather that slow

down the nation’s conversion to a total Marxist

state. Serving in Bishop’s cabinet was Deputy

Prime Minister Bernard Coard, who, along with

others in the regime, did not believe that

Bishop’s actions were in the best interest of

their Marxist revolution. Unaware of his tenu -

ous position, Bishop left the country in late September for an official visit to Czechoslovakia

and Romania. In his absence the Central Com -

mittee instituted a col lective leadership scheme

that called for shared power between Bishop and

Coard. When Bishop returned from his western

European trip and learned of his new status as

coleader, he confronted his former deputy. Coard

denied that any change had been made in the

government and resigned his position.93

Figure 35. Grenada and the Caribbean (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division,

Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

272
At midnight on 12 October 1983, with the assistance of Gen Hudson Austin, commander in chief

of the Grenada armed forces, Coard placed Bishop

under house arrest. During the ensuing week, followers of the popular Bishop staged rallies in St.

George’s, the capital city of the island nation, and

demanded that he be released and reinstated to

his former position. The crowds continued to grow,

reaching an estimated 25,000 loyalists by 19 October. In a move designed to free Bishop, several

thousand supporters surrounded his residence and

demanded that the guards release him and his

education minister, Jacqueline Creft, who was living in the same residence with Bishop. After ignoring verbal warnings and gunshots fired over their

heads by military guards, the large crowd stormed

the gates and freed both Bishop and Creft. Carrying Bishop on their shoulders, the crowd proceeded to the center of St. George’s, where an impromptu rally was held. From there, Bishop led

the crowd to Fort Rupert, a Grenadian army compound near the city harbor .

9 4

Once at the fort, Bishop pleaded with the

guards to put down their weapons and to join him.

The soldiers initially complied, and Bishop, accompanied by some of the crowd, entered the courtyard of the fort. Bishop ordered that the cantina be

opened and that cold drinks be served to his followers. A Soviet-built armored personnel carrier

(APC) appeared in the courtyard, armed with a

machine gun mounted on its gun turret. The APC

opened fire on the crowd as some of Bishop’s followers tried to flee over the fort’s walls. Although

exact figures were not available, about 140 people

were killed in the massacre. Bishop was out of the

line of fire and was not hit by the APC during the

initial assault. He was, however, subsequently arrested along with Creft (who with Bishop had a

four-year-old son), two other cabinet members,

and two union leaders loyal to Bishop. The six

were taken further into Fort Rupert and were exe -

cuted on the spot with single pistol shots to the

head.95 Before she was murdered, Creft was severely beaten by her captor s.

After the massacre General Austin went on Ra -

dio Free Grenada to announce that he now led a

16-member Revolutionary Military Council

(RMC) that was in charge of running the government. In his broadcast Austin announced a fourday, around-the-clock curfew that would be enforced by the military, with violators being shot

on sight. The exact status of Coard was unknown,

with speculation that he was either still running

the government from behind the scenes or that he

had left the island, leaving Austin in total com

mand.96 Along with the curfew, Austin closed th

Pearls Airport, effectively prohibiting anyon

wishing to leave the island from doing so. Th

restrictions caused special hardships on 600 st

dents attending St. George’s School of Medicin

To obtain food and water, the students we

forced to violate the curfew.9 7 Keeping a close ey

on events in Grenada, the Reagan administratio

could not afford to allow the situation to deteri

rate into a hostage crisis similar to the one face

by Carter three years earlier. Within 24 hours 

the massacre of Bishop and his followers, th

United States took the first steps toward inte

vention in the crisis. Of prime concern were th

medical students who could be singled out b

Austin and the RMC as a way to hold the Unite

States hostage to their demands. 98 Along wi

concern for the students, the construction of th

airfield at Point Salines also worried the admin

stration. The control of the airfield by Marxi

radicals posed the threat of future communist e

pansion throughout the Caribbean.

Subsequently, a Joint Chiefs of Staff warnin

order was sent to US commander in chief, Atla

tic Command, Adm Wesley L. McDonald. The o

der called for courses of action for a three- 

five-day noncombatant evacuation operation 

American citizens and others wishing to leav

the island. The warning order designated U

commander in chief, Readiness Command, an

US commander in chief, Military Airlift Com

mand, as supporting commanders. Preparatio

were set in motion for the 25 October US incu

sion into Grenada, code-named Operation Urge

Fury, to rescue Americans living there.9 9

The United States Responds

When Bishop was placed under house arrest o

12 October, there was increased concern in Was

ington for the safety of Americans living on t

island. On 14 October Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, t

Latin American desk officer on the National Sec

rity Council, contacted the Joint Operations Div

sion, Operations Directorate (J3, JOD), and ask

about forces available in the Caribbean that cou

be used on short notice to evacuate America

from Grenada. Lt Gen Richard L. Prillaman, USA

the director of operations (J3), was told of t

query, upon which he activated a response ce

in the National Military Command Center to a

sess the crisis and to formulate possible r

sponses. The unified command responsible fo

operations in the Caribbean was the US Atlant

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

273
Command (USLANTCOM), and on the after -

noon of 14 October, the JCS response cell con -

tacted the USLANTCOM operations center. The

JCS response cell asked for a list of options that

ranged from a show of force to noncombatant

evacuation operations. As the next several days

passed and tensions increased in Grenada, informants there warned of the growing danger to

the US medical students. Because of these reports, a meeting was held on 17 October, when

the State Department asked the JCS to begin

contingency planning for military operations to

rescue the students. On 18 October the JCS con -

sulted Admiral McDonald on options for evacuating the medical stu dents. Options ranged from

permissive or peaceful operations to armed resis -

tance by Austin’s military.100 One unknown ele -

ment was the 600 Cubans who were on the island

and who were working on the airfield at Point Sa -

lines. On 19 October, after the murder of Bishop

and his followers at Fort Rupert, the JCS warning

order was issued.

When the JCS warning order arrived at

USLANTCOM, CINCLANT’s staff reviewed con -

tingency plans for the Caribbean, including non -

combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and

show-of-force options. Along with naval forces,

the plans required forces from the US Army’s

18th Airborne Corps, located at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, and forces from the Tactical Air

Command located at bases throughout the

United States.101 Without adequate intelligence

data, the USLANTCOM staff developed several

courses of action that included both permissive

(friendly) and hostile operations. (As had been

the case three years earlier in Iran, the United

States did not have an adequate human intelligence network established at the onset of the crisis. The lack of this capability again demonstrated

the importance of maintaining a somewhat robust

capability in peacetime to respond on short notice

to a crisis or contingency.) For a permissive NEO,

the staff recommended that the State Depart -

ment negotiate with the government of Grenada

for approval of commercial aircraft to land at

Pearls Airport and evacuate US citizens. In the

event of a nonpermissive or hostile NEO, the

staff recommended that a forced entry into Grenada be made by the Marine Amphibious Ready

Group (MARG) 1-84, which was currently en

route from Morehead City, North Carolina, to

Lebanon. To support the MARG during the op -

eration, the USS Independence Carrier Battle

Group (CBG), which was in transit from Hampton

Roads, Virginia, to the Mediterranean, could

also participate in the operation. One or more

airborne battalions from USREDCOM would

be needed to secure a second evacuation loca -

tion. Coordination for the NEO would be handled

by a team from US Forces, Caribbean, located

in Key West, Florida.102

The JCS received the USCINCLANT plan

early on 20 October, and the chairman of the

JCS, Gen John W. Vessey Jr., USA, directed the

J3, J5, and CIA to assess the impact of the proposed courses of action. Before noon that same

day, Vessey gave the assessment to the Crisis

Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) of the National Security Council. Upon review of the assessment,

the CPPG agreed that the JCS should continue

planning for a possible military operation. The

CPPG also recommended that the Special Situation Group (SSG), which was the highest crisis

management committee of the NSC, convene immediately to review USCINCLANT’s plan and

the JCS’s assessment. The SSG was made up of

the vice president as its chairman, and its chief

members included the secretary of state, secretary of defense, director of Central Intelligence,

counselor to the president, chief of staff to the

president, deputy chief of staff to the president,

assistant to the president for national security

affairs, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Since there had been no decision made for a military operation, the crisis was still a diplomatic

one, with the State Department responsible for

its management. In an afternoon session of the

SSG, Secretary George P. Schultz briefed the

committee on the advantages and disadvantages

of amphibious and airborne military operations

to support an NEO. Schultz supported disarmament of the Grenadian military as part of any

evacuation.103

After Schultz finished his presentation, General Vessey briefed the SSG on the possibilities of

a third country intervening militarily on behalf of

Grenada if the United States took action. Al -

though the Grenadian People’s Revolutionary

Army (PRA) would resist, the Defense Intelligence Agency felt that neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union were likely to intervene militarily.

Cuba’s navy was too weak to be of any consequence, and the Soviet Union was incapable of

mounting any resistance in the Caribbean. Further discussions centered around the impact of a

military operation in Grenada on US forces based

in Europe and in the Middle East. With the diversion of the USS Independence CBG and

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

274
MARG 1-84 to Grenada, MARG 2-83 and the CBG

currently located in either the Mediterranean Sea

or in the Indian Ocean would have to be extended

on station until the operation terminated. The annual JCS exercise in Spain, Crisex 83, also would

have to be severely curtailed or canceled without

naval support, thus creating unknown repercussions with the Spanish government.104

Memory of the Iranian hostage situation still

was fresh in everyone’s mind. Given the fact that

danger to the US medical students likely would

continue to increase, the SSG decided that the

president probably would order intervention

sometime in the near future. With the probability

of armed resistance almost certain, the SSG supported continued contingency planning by the

JCS and began drafting a National Security Deci -

sion Directive that expanded the original mission

to include neutralization of enemy forces and the

political reconstruction of Grenada. The USS Independence CBG had just departed the East

Coast of the United States en route to Lebanon

along with a force of some 1,900 Marines in

MARG 1-84. To provide adequate forces for the

expanded operation, the JCS directed the diversion of MARG 1-84 to a location east of Puerto

Rico and the USS Independence CBG to the vicinity

of Dominica. Both positions were within striking

distance of Grenada. Late in the evening of 20

October, both units altered course to move to

their contingency response positions.

105

The following day General Vessey called Admiral McDonald to advise him that the NEO opera -

tion had been expanded to include the neutraliza -

tion of Grenadian and Cuban military forces

located on the island. Vessey also told McDonald

that military forces to be considered should include both battalions of the US Army rangers and

a follow-on peacekeeping force made up of the 82d

Airborne Division.106 With the inclusion of special

operations forces in the possible assault, the Joint

Special Operations Command (JSOC) became the

third supporting command. At 1700 on 21 October, the CPPG met again to review intelligence

reports of possible armed Cuban soldiers arriving

in Grenada. Earlier in the month, on 6 October,

the Cuban naval vessel Vietnam Heroica had arrived in St. George’s and might have carried as

many as 240 Cuban combat troops. Other intelligence reports indicated that there were some 50

Soviet citizens living in Grenada. The possible involvement of Cuban troops increased the prob -

ability that a military operation would be needed

to protect the medical students during the NEO

and to disarm hostile forces located elsewhere o

the isla nd. 107

Immediately after the CPPG adjourned, Vesse

sent a message with new guidance to USLANTCOM

MAC, USREDCOM, and JSOC. The JCS directe

that USCINCLANT plan for the most demandin

contingency, which included rescue of the medic

students under fire and/or the mounting of 

small invasion with the purpose of disarming th

Grenadian and Cuban forces. To position forc

for either eventuality, USCINCLANT was 

move the USS Independence CBG and MARG 

84 closer to Grenada, while CINCMAC looked 

ways to reduce the airlift time required to deliv

special operations forces to the objective area. T

execute the follow-on neutralization mission, tw

or more battalions of the 82d Airborne Divisio

would require airlift to the island. Intelligenc

estimates placed 1,000–1,200 soldiers in th

PRA, 2,000–5,000 in the militia, and about 25

armed Cubans on the island. As events unfolde

on 25 October, these figures would prove to b

much lower than the actual number of forces o

the island.108

Acting on Vessey’s message, special operatio

planners arrived at USLANTCOM headquarte

in Norfolk, Virginia, on 21 October to begin th

planning phase of the operation. Liaison perso

nel from the 82d Airborne Division arrived th

next day. USLANTCOM planners, along wi

liaison officers from MAC, sat down with th

Army planners to develop a preliminary conce

of operation. As the planning session got und

way, political events began to accelerate in th

Caribbean. Members of the Organization of Eas

ern Caribbean States (OECS) voted to ask Ba

bados, Jamaica, and the United States to joi

them in sending a multinational peacekeepin

force to Grenada. Early on 22 October the Britis

governor-general of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoo

asked the OECS to free his country from th

radical RMC that was led by Austin. At 0430 o

the morning of 22 October, the SSG contacte

Secretary Schultz and advised him of the two r

quests for intervention. Schultz contacted th

president, and a teleconference with members 

the SSG was set for 0900. With the addition 

the president, the SSG became the National S

curity Planning Group (NSPG), which stood 

the highest level in the NSC system.109

With two requests for intervention a realit

the NSPG discarded the permissive NEO optio

and tasked the JCS to plan a military operatio

with the objective of seizing control of the islan

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

275
from local military forces. Having anticipated

such a tasking, the JCS had developed two force

packages, one consisting of two ranger battalions

augmented with JSOC elements and a second

made up of a Marine battalion landing team with

SEALs totaling about 1,800 men. New intelligence was received on 22 October that revealed

that the Grenadian army was mobilizing about

2,000 reservists to augment the estimated 1,500-

man regular army. There were also approximately 600 Cubans located on the island, most of

whom were thought to be construction workers at

Point Salines. Facing a force of over 4,000 troops,

the JCS concluded that neither force package alone

was enough to ensure mission success. As a result,

the NSPG directed the JCS to send an execute or -

der to CINCLANT authorizing him to employ a

joint force composed of JSOC, rangers, marines, and

airborne troops into Grenada, commenc-ing on 25

October 1983.110

As the execute order was being sent by the

JCS, DIA provided a revised estimate of Grenadian army capabilities. With a 1,500-man regu -

lar army and 3,000 reservists, DIA assessed that

Grenadian forces would put up a sustained resistance should the United States mount a military

operation against the country. Equipment possessed by the Grenadian army included six Soviet

APCs (BTR 60s) and four Soviet 23 mm antiaircraft

guns (ZSU-23s), most of which were cited around

the airfield at Point Salines. There were also 50

Cuban military advisors and 600 construction

workers at Point Salines, but DIA assessed a low

probability that they would put up any resistance.111 This assumption would prove to be invalid

when the Combat Talon force appeared above

Point Salines .

On 23 October the US State Department con -

tinued its negotiations for the evacuation of

Americans and other foreign nationals. Austin

and his RMC vehemently denied that there was

any reason for an evacuation and further stated

that anyone desiring to leave the island could do

so by commercial air. However, all commercial air

service had been suspended after the massacre on

19 October, and the Pearls Airport remained

closed with the strict curfew still in effect. The noevacuation position enforced by Austin effectively

prohibited any foreign nationals from leaving

the country.112 As the rescue plan came together,

little hope remained for a peaceful resolution of

the crisis.

The 8th SOS Gets the Call

Hobson and the 8th SOS had participated in

the quarterly joint exercises and had maintained

a rigorous exercise schedule throughout the fall

of 1983. The quarterly exercises had been challenging, with a complex airfield seizure operation

the climax of each exercise. The squadron flew in

Exercise Night Venture from 26 July to 4 August

but without another opportunity to work with

large numbers of joint forces since that time.

Bright Star 83 had consumed the remainder of

August, and September was spent completing the

squadron’s quarterly training requirements. The

concept of operations that the special operations

planners worked out at USLANTCOM headquarters (beginning on 21 October) called for five

MC-130E Combat Talons to airland a combina -

tion of USA rangers and other special operations

forces at Point Salines during the early morning

darkness of 25 October. In the event the runway

was blocked, an alternate plan was developed to

air-drop the force. Historically, such complex

contingency operations as Son Tay and Desert

One took six months to plan and to rehearse

before execution. When Hobson received the call

on 22 October to be prepared to launch into Grenada, he had less than 72 hours to select his

crews, plan the operation from an Air Force perspective, get his Talons mission ready and his

crews rested, position his force at the onload

location, and then execute the mission. He had

no time to waste.

Since Desert One the Combat Talon force had

been in a state of rebuilding. The loss of two

crews within a 10-month period had taxed the

community’s ability to train and season new replacements. At the same time, personnel who

had been in special operations and who were

highly experienced were in demand throughout

the Air Force. At MAC headquarters, staff positions were created along with positions at

Twenty-Third Air Force. At the Pentagon special operations-experienced personnel were also

highly prized. Many Combat Talon “old timers”

had filled these career-enhancing assignments

by late 1983. With MAC charged with the responsibility for Air Force special operations and

with the overseas Talon units also part of MAC,

returning personnel remained in special opera -

tions and were not lost to the community. Former crew members from the 1st SOS and the

7th SOS had rotated back to the 8th SOS and

formed the highly experienced core from which

Hobson chose his crews. To support JSOC task ing

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

276
for five Combat Talons, Hobson and his staff

formed the following five mission crews, plus one

additional spare crew.* 113

With Hobson finalizing the selection of his

mission crews, 1st SOW/DOS deployed planners

to Fort Bragg to refine the contingency plan. De -

tails of the operation had to be worked out be -

tween 1st SOW planners, rangers, and other special operations forces. It quickly became apparent

to the 1st SOW/DOS planners that there were

many more questions than answers. The most

pressing question regarded the defenses at Point

Salines. Current and accurate intelligence available on the airfield was extremely sketchy and

was totally inadequate to plan a combat mission.

Working on an assumption that the Cubans were

actually construction workers and that the Grenadian army had little capability to mount an air

defense at the airfield, planning proceeded at a

torrid pace.

The Plan

By 23 October Admiral McDonald’s staff ha

revised USLANTCOM’s concept of operations an

had expanded it to satisfy CJCS Vessey’s gui

ance. McDonald flew to Washington to brief th

JCS on the new concept, titled “Evacuation of U

Citizens from Grenada.” The operational conce

had four phases. Phase I was titled “Transit,” an

in this phase the USS Independence CBG wou

close to a position 55 miles northwest of Grenad

while MARG 1-84 closed to a position 40 mil

due north of the island. At H minus six hours, fiv

Combat Talons would launch from Hunter AA

Georgia, loaded with rangers and, concurrentl

seven SOLL C-130s would launch from Pope AFB

North Carolina, with JSOC and 82d Airborne so

diers. One hour later 10 additional C-130 aircra

would launch from Pope AFB loaded with add

tional 82d Airborne soldiers.114

Phase II of the plan was titled “Insertion” an

began with helicopter and seaborne infiltration 

special operations forces several hours before th

main force arrived over the island. The objectiv

of the early infiltration missions was to colle

intelligence at Point Salines and Pearls airfiel

and to conduct direct-action missions aimed 

the Grenadian police and other military install

tions in St. George’s. An additional mission a

signed to the initial infiltration teams was 

move to Governor-General Scoon’s residence an

protect him from harm. At H hour (scheduled fo

0400 local time on 25 October), the five MC-130

Combat Talons and seven SOLL C-130s wou

begin airlanding rangers at Point Salines, wi

an airdrop planned as a backup if the runw

was blocked. At precisely the same time, Marin

from MARG 1-84 would assault and secur

Pearls airfields. AC-130H gunships would be 

position over the two airfields to provide on-ca

fire support. If the assault force encountered r

sistance from the Grenadian army or from th

Cubans, it was to take whatever action necessa

to neutralize them and secure the island. As 

reserve force, the 82d Airborne Division at Fo

Bragg would go on full alert at H minus thre

hours and would be available to reinforce the i

itial assault, if tasked.

115

After the initial assault had secured the tw

airfields and other key military and governme

installations, Phase III, titled “Stabilizatio

__________

 *Only five 8th SOS Combat Talons were available for the operation. Aircraft 64-0561 was flown from Rhein Main AB to Hurlburt Field for t

operation, arriving at 0500 on the morning of 24 October. To provide a spare aircraft for t he mission, the 7th SOS Talon was flown to Hunter AAF 

few hours later by an 8th SOS crew. The aircraft was not required for the operation and was subsequently returned to the 7th SOS crew waiting 

Hurlburt Field. A few days after the commencement of Operation Urgent Fury, the 7th SOS crew flew the Talon back to Europe.

Crew 1

(Talon 64-0562)

Foxtrot 33

Crew 2

(Talon 64-0572)

Foxtrot 34

Crew 3

(Talon 64-0568)

Foxtrot 35

Crew 4

(Talon 64-0567)

Foxtrot 40

Tindall Bach Hobson Miles

Marshall Baker Helm Thompson

McMath Stephenson Hale McManus

DeMocko Owens Sharkany Hill

McBride Honaker James Schwartz

Smith Mosley Dredla Gentry

Hess Thommen Garrett Newberry

Plitt Gingerich Davis Rinehart

Beattie Fowler Doyle Blazek

Painter Metherell McClain Strollo

Crew 5

(Talon 64-0551)

Foxtrot 41

Spare Crew

(Talon 64-0561)

Davenport Dill

Warr Moon

Barragy Sammons

Dykes Weiler

Kelly Rohling

Fiel Nolan

Folley Sanchez

Latona

Duffie

Holloman

Stephenson

Katz

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

277
USAF Photo

USAF Photo

Foxtrot 33 Crew. Standing left to right: Tindall, Beattie, Plitt, Hess, Smith,

McBride, DeMocko. Kneeling left to right: Painter, Marshall, and McMath.

Foxtrot 34 Crew. Left to right: Gingerich, Thommen, Stephenson, Metherell,

Bach, Mosley, Baker, Fowler, and Owens. Not pictured: Honaker.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

278
USAF Photo

USAF Photo

Foxtrot 35 Crew. Standing left to right: Garrett, Doyle, Dredla, Hobson, and

Helm. Kneeling left to right: McClain, Hale, Sharkany, Davis, and James.

Foxtrot 40 Crew. Left to right: Newberry, Rinehart, Blazek, Gentry, Miles, Hill,

Thompson, and McManus. Not pictured: Schwartz and Strollo.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

279
Evacuation,” would begin. In Phase III military

forces would locate and protect US citizens, foreigners (including those from the Soviet Union and

Eastern bloc communist countries), and GovernorGeneral Scoon. Phase IV would begin with the

evacuation of civilians from the island, including

the 600 American medical students. The final

phase would continue until an interim government was established in Grenada and the country

was back on the road to political and economic

recovery.

116

To execute the plan, Admiral McDonald proposed to establish a combined joint task force

(CJTF), which he identified as CJTF-120. He

chose Adm Joseph Metcalf III, USN, who was the

standing commander of the US Second Fleet, to

command the CJTF. The CJTF would be made up

of four separate task forces identified as TF-121,

TF-123, TF-124, and TF-126. TF-121 represented

the major conventional force for the operation and

was composed of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

82d Airborne Division along with supporting 82d

Airborne units. TF-123 was the special operations

task force and was made up of JSOC-assigned

forces, US Army rangers, US Air Force Combat

Talons and SOLL C-130s, and US Navy SEALs.

TF-124 consisted of the USS Independence CBG

and MARG 1-84. TF-126 included Air Force E-3s,

F-15 fighters from the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing

at Eglin AFB, Florida; and airborne command,

control, and communications EC-130Es from

Keesler AFB, Mississippi. Metcalf would command the CJTF from his flagship, the USS Guam,

off the coast of Grenada. Additional SAC and MAC

forces supporting the operation would remain under the command of their parent organizations

and would not come under Metcalf’s CJTF .

117

The JCS did not agree with portions of the command arrangement proposed by McDonald, but after several adjustments that included inserting

US Army general H. Norman Schwarzkopf as an

advisor assigned to Metcalf, the plan was approved. With the approval McDonald formally activated CJTF-120 with a CINCLANT operations

order on 23 October. The OPORD summarized the

revised concept of operations and added significant

intelligence information regarding enemy defenses

on the island.118 The command and control arrangement was also delineated.

The Operation Begins

Since planning for the operation had begun on

19 October, intelligence information regarding the

Foxtrot 41 Crew. Standing left to right: Stephenson (flight surgeon), Holloman,

Folley, Dykes, Davenport, Warr, and Kelly. Kneeling left to right: Katz, Latona,

Duffie, Barragy, and Fiel.

USAF Photo

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

280
defenses at Point Salines and Pearls airfields had

been virtually nonexistent. To provide the information necessary to plan the initial assault, JCS

ordered TF-123 to insert reconnaissance teams

into the objective area before H hour. Consequently, 24 hours before commencement of Opera -

tion Urgent Fury—before dawn on 24 October—

two TF-123 C-130 SOLL aircraft each dropped a

four-man SEAL element and a Boston Whaler

boat off the coast of Grenada near Point Salines

and Pearls. Along with the two airfields, the

SEALs were tasked to reconnoiter the beaches

that landing forces planned to use during the assault. The Pearls element determined that beach

conditions did not favor the amphibious assault

planned for the Marine battalion landing team

and recommended instead a helicopter airborne

assault on the airfield. The second SEAL element

was to rendezvous with the USS Clifton Sprague

near Point Salines after it reconnoitered the area,

but it did not make the rendezvous. The four

SEALs, along with their support boat, had vanished in unusually rough seas without reporting

to their headquarters. 119

A few hours later Admiral McDonald conducted

a preinvasion commander’s conference at his

headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, attended by his

TF commanders, including Gen Richard A.

Scholtes, USA, who was the commander of TF123. Scholtes relayed to McDonald and the other

TF commanders the loss of the four-man SEAL

element off Point Salines earlier that morning.

Without adequate intelligence of the defenses at

the airfield, the TF commanders considered postponing the operation by 24 hours to insert another element to get the required information.

Representatives from the State Department attending the conference were opposed to any delay

in the invasion plans, noting that the fragile Ca rib -

bean Peacekeeping Force, made up of regional island nations, might become nervous and cause

the peacekeeping force to dissolve, thus leaving

the United States in a vulnerable diplomatic position. Admiral McDonald also was opposed to any

delay in the D-day schedule, but he did agree to

postpone H hour from 0400 to 0500 hours to allow

TF-123 forces time to attempt a second look at

Point Salines. Moving H hour back an hour,

meant the assault force would attack Point Sa -

lines at dawn instead of in the dark as originally

planned.120 The change would put the Combat

Talons and the SOLL C-130s in a vulnerable position the following morning.

The 1st SOW Is Alerted and

the 8th SOS Moves Out

At 0900 on the morning of 24 October, 1

SOW/DOS alerted Hobson and the 8th SOS Com

bat Talons to move forward to Hunter AAF, Geo

gia, for the positioning phase of Operation U

gent Fury. Hobson’s crews had been in crew re

since the previous night in anticipation of th

upcoming 24-hour operation. The five 8th SO

Combat Talons and the single 7th SOS Talo

spare departed Hurlburt Field at noon en rou

to Hunter AAF. Once there, the remainder of th

afternoon and evening was spent coordinating f

nal plans with the seven C-130 SOLL aircra

from the 317th TAW and loading the aircraft b

fore launch. Still without adequate intelligenc

regarding the threat at Point Salines, planne

turned to the three AC-130H gunships to provid

cover for the assault force.121

The assault at Point Salines was planned fo

three waves of MC-130Es and SOLL C-130

along with other C-130 tactical aircraft. The fir

wave, first element, was made up of two MC-130

Combat Talons (64-0562 and 64-0572) com 

manded by Tindall and Bach, respectively. Th

primary means of delivery was to airland th

rangers directly on to the airfield, with an airdro

scheduled as a backup should the runway be u

usable. The appropriate option would be selecte

based upon reports received from a TF-123 CC

that was scheduled to be inserted into the wate

off Point Salines just before the operation com

menced. (The CCT unit was required after th

original four-man SEAL element was lost on 2

October.) If the CCT was unable to report the ru

way status, an AC-130H gunship orbiting abov

the airfield would provide the information. Th

first wave, second element, was to be led by Ji

Hobson in MC-130E aircraft 64-0568. Along wi

Hobson in the second element were four SOL

C-130s. The five-aircraft package was to airlan

its headquarters and communications element 3

minutes after Tindall and Bach completed the

initial infiltration. A second wave consisting 

two MC-130Es (64-0567 and 64-0551), com 

manded by Miles and Davenport, and three SOL

C-130s, would airland additional rangers seve

minutes after Hobson’s arrival. A third wave of 

C-130s with elements of the 82d Airborne Div

sion would airland approximately three hours a

ter the initial assault, depending upon the tactic

situation on the airfield when they arrived in th

Point Salines objective area.122

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

281
The planned run-in heading was 090 degrees,

which was oriented down the center of the 9,000-

foot-long runway. If the airland option was not

feasible, an airdrop would be made. The standard

drop altitude of 1,000 feet above the ground was

planned, with an altitude as low as 500 feet possible, dependent on the threat. Planners felt that

the major hazard facing the paratroopers in the

event of an airdrop was the water on either side of

the runway. Each crew was briefed to be over the

airfield before releasing jumpers. A drop into the

rough seas off either side of the runway would be

fatal to the heavily armed rangers. H-hour assault operations had been slipped from 0400 to

0500 so that the CCT would have time to recon -

noiter the airfield. The new time coincided with

the Marine assault on Pearls. 123

Six hours before the scheduled landings at Grenada, Tindall departed Hunter AAF with Bach

close behind. The two Combat Talons (call signs

Foxtrot 33 and Foxtrot 34) made up the first

wave, first element, and were to proceed to their

initial point west of Grenada. Bach would close to

30 seconds in trail behind Tindall. Thirty minutes

after the first two Combat Talons were airborne,

Hobson (Foxtrot 35) departed Hunter AAF with

four SOLL C-130s. The five-ship formation made

up the first wave, second element, and was to

proceed to a holding point 70 miles to the west of

Grenada. Seven minutes after Hobson’s departure,

Dave Miles (Foxtrot 40) was airborne, with Skip

Davenport (Foxtrot 41) and three additional

SOLL C-130s making up the third wave. 124 With

the assault force airborne and unknown to the

flight crews, the US State Department contacted

Havana and advised Cuba that a strike was im -

minent, assuring Castro that it was not aimed at

his Cuban workers in Grenada. The tip-off invariably gave the defenders at Point Salines knowledge of the assault and allowed them time to prepare their defenses to repel the force.125

As the formations neared the objective area,

weather in the southern Caribbean steadily deteriorated. Due to extreme sea states, the CCT was

unable to get ashore at Point Salines to determine

the runway status. At 0400 an AC-130H gunship

was directed by the air mission commander

aboard the ABCCC EC-130 to make a reconnaissance flight over Point Salines. The gunship determined that the runway was blocked by heavy

construction equipment and barricades but could

not determine if any antiaircraft defenses were in

place around the airfield. Thirty minutes before

his scheduled TOT, Tindall was notified to scrub

his airland option and plan for an airdrop of

his rangers. Loadmasters on the Combat Talons

and the SOLL II aircraft reconfigured for an airdrop, while the rangers hastily rigged their para -

chutes and prepared for the jump. Having to

dodge thunderstorms and work their wa y through

rain showers, Tindall’s two-ship formation was on

time as it approached the IP. Twenty miles west

of Grenada, at 500 feet above the water and in the

clouds, Tindall’s LN-15J inertial navigation system malfunctioned along with his AN/APQ122(V)8 radar. In total darkness and in the

weather, Tindall had no choice but to abort his

run in. The air mission commander notified Tindall to hold in place and directed Bach to join

behind Hobson’s aircraft 30 seconds in trail. With

Hobson 30 minutes behind Tindall, the new TOT

was slipped to 0530.126 With MARG 1-84’s assault

on Pearls still set for 0500, there would be no

possibility of a surprise attack by the special op -

erations force.

Bach successfully maneuvered his aircraft and

joined Hobson’s formation as directed. The new

landing sequence had Hobson as the lead aircraft,

Bach 30 seconds in trail behind him, and four

SOLL C-130s behind Bach. The original landing

sequence had combat troops aboard the first two

Combat Talons. Hobson’s load consisted of the

ranger command and control element, but he had

no assault troops. With weather still threatening

and dawn approaching, there was not sufficient

time to resequence the formation. Bach was 30

seconds behind Hobson, and his assault troops

would be on the ground only seconds after the

command element. The ground mission com -

mander made the decision to continue the approach in the new sequence. With the antiaircraft

threat unknown and with the threat of ground

fire to his troops, Lt Col Wesley B. Taylor,

USA—commanding the 1st Ranger Battalion and

onboard Hobson’s aircraft—decided to jump at

500 feet above the ground instead of the standard 1,000 feet. The lower altitude would protect

the aircraft better from AAA, and the rangers

would reduce their time of descent and their

vulnerability to ground fire. The Talon crews

wore NVGs to assist them during the drop. Ap -

proximately six miles out from Point Salines,

Hobson’s crew picked up the outline of the airfield, but shortly afterwards a bright spotlight

illuminated the aircraft and washed out the

crew’s NVGs. As the aircraft passed the coastline, it slowed to 125 KIAS and opened the

ramp and door. At green light time (0536 local),

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

282
as the rangers began exiting the aircraft, Hob -

son’s loadmasters spotted AAA tracers coming toward the aircraft from positions around the airfield. The fire was so intense that Hobson relayed

to the rest of his formation to break off the approach. Bach was only 30 seconds behind Hob -

son’s aircraft and immediately began to turn

away from the airfield. His aircraft took three hits

from small-arms ground fire as he maneuvered to

escape the trap.127 When the last jumper cleared

Hobson’s aircraft, he put the Combat Talon in a

dive and executed a maximum performance

turn away from the AAA and towards the water.

His aircraft was not hit, and later he would be

recognized for saving the aircraft and crew with

his immediate action. As soon as the range

landed on the runway, they were engaged by ho

tile forces. With Bach forced to abort his drop, th

command element on the ground was now vulne

able and exposed. The success of the assault 

Point Salines hung in the balance (fig. 36). 128

With the ranger command and control eleme

pinned down by small-arms fire, AC-130H gu

ship 69-6573 (call sign Lima 58), commanded b

Major Twiford, went to work. Twiford’s gunsh

was on station above Point Salines airfield whe

Hobson made his airdrop, and the gunship cre

observed the orange tracers tracking the Comb

Talon . Experience told the gunship crew that th

tracers were from 23 mm AAA, and the gunshi

Figure 36. Map of Grenada Area (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

283
engaged the positions as soon as Hobson’s aircraft

cleared the immediate area. As the gunship fired

on the AAA locations, the rangers already on the

ground tried to get a fix on the small-arms loca -

tions that had them pinned down. Twiford experienced minor gun problems and pulled off the target temporarily to work them. A second AC-130H

(Lima 56), commanded by Maj Michael J. Couvillon, rolled in on the target and continued to attack both AAA and small-arms positions. With

the AAA silenced, Bach and the SOLL C-130s

were called back in by the air mission commander

to air-drop their assault troops and relieve the

command and control element on the ground.129

The five C-130s were in holding to the west

when they were given the green light to continue

their airdrops. By this time it was bright daylight

at the airfield. Bach made his approach and

dropped his troops at 500-feet altitude, followed

by the other C-130s. As the formation was making its drops, Lt Col Dave Sims (commander of

the 16th SOS and the former operations officer of

the 8th SOS) moved into position over the airfield in gunship 69-6574 (call sign Lima 57) and

continued to engage enemy positions. With the

airdrops from the first wave complete, Miles and

Davenport, along with their three SOLL II C130s, were cleared into Point Salines and completed their airdrops. On the ground, a company

of rangers assembled on each end of the airfield.

Hot wiring a bulldozer and using it to clear ob -

stacles from the runway, the rangers simultaneously attacked the Cuban and Grenadian army

defenders. Once the rangers had cleared the runway and neutralized the small-arms threat, CCT

personnel who had jumped with the rangers began clearing the remaining aircraft for landing.

Both Miles and Davenport had additional equip -

ment aboard their aircraft that was needed on

the ground, so they were subsequently cleared to

land and off-load. Tindall had been in holding to

the west of the airfield and was cleared to land.

With improved weather and daylight conditions,

he was able to find the airfield and safely deliver

his load of rangers. 130

Within two hours of the initial assault, the

rangers had surrounded and captured 250 Cubans at Point Salines. At 0900 hours they rescued

138 American medical students from one of the

university’s campuses located adjacent to the airfield. The resistance encountered at Point Salines

was in sharp contrast to the marine assault on

Pearls. With virtually no resistance, the marines

secured the Pearls area within two hours of their

initial infiltration. The Cuban construction workers at Point Salines had turned out to be Cuban

soldiers, many of whom were veterans who had

fought in Ethiopia and Angola.131 The two ZSU23s that had been reported by intelligence had

also multiplied into nearly a dozen.

As the rangers faced heavy resistance at Point

Sa lines, McDonald asked for reinforcements from

Vessey. In response to the request, Vessey

authorized the launch of the 82d Airborne strategic reserve force, which consisted of 1,500 sol -

diers at Fort Bragg. The division had been on full

alert, and by 1000 hours they were loaded and

were headed south to join the fight. Meanwhile,

the rangers began to move north from the Point

Salines area to mount an assault on military em -

placements at St. George’s, which included the

residence of Governor-General Scoon. From the

beaches north of St. George’s, a Navy SEAL pla -

toon was also making its way to the Scoon’s residence. The rangers continued to encounter stiff

resistance from Grenadian army soldiers equipped

with APCs, and their progress north was slow.

The SEALs, however, reached Scoon’s residence

and were able to overpower the guards and res -

cue the governor-general. Again, Grenadian

APCs engaged the SEALs with heavy fire and

threatened to overrun their position. Lacking

a ntitank weapons the SEALs fought a delaying

action with hand grenades and automatic weapons and waited for the rangers. Vice Admiral

Metcalf, from his flagship USS Guam, ordered

Navy and Marine Cobra helicopters to fly support missions over the residence. Heavy antiaircraft fire from Fort Frederick and Fort Rupert

in St. George’s downed two of the Cobras and

prevented others from reaching the governorgeneral’s residence. Consequently, US Navy A-7

Corsairs from the CBG attacked the AAA positions (fig. 37). 132

While the battle progressed across the island

on the 25th, it became apparent that most defenses were concentrated in the southern part of

the island, between Point Salines and St. George’s.

A second medical school campus was also found at

Grand Anse. At noon Metcalf and Schwarzkopf

met to reassess the ground tactical plan. The marines at Pearls had completed their operation,

prompting Schwarzkopf to recommend to Metcalf

that they move around the island and land at

Grand Mal Bay just north of St. George’s. The

maneuver would open a second front behind the

defending Grenadian army that had the rangers

and SEALs engaged with their APCs. Metcalf

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

284
concurred, and by 1900 hours 250 marines, five

tanks, and 13 amphibious vehicles had landed at

Grand Mal Bay and began to move towards the

governor-general’s residence.133

The marines moved toward the residence

throughout the night and engaged the APCs there

at 0712 local on 26 October. Within three hours

the SEALs had been relieved, and GovernorGeneral Scoon and his family, along with nine

other civilians and the SEALs, were airlifted by

Marine helicopter to the USS Guam . At Point Sa -

lines TF-121 deployed forward to Grand Anse to

search for more American medical students. Encountering stiff resistance en route, elements of

TF-121 reached Grand Anse and found it also

heavily defended. Maj Gen Edward Trobaug

USA, the commanding general of TF-121, aske

for help from Metcalf. Trobaugh’s TF-121 did n

have helicopter support, so Schwarzkopf red

rected six Marine Sea Knight helicopters to su

port him. At 1600 on 26 October, rangers fro

TF-121, aboard the Marine helicopters, assaulte

Grand Anse. After a 30-minute firefight, four 

the helicopters evacuated 224 additional medic

students. Again, as had been the case the day b

fore, Trobaugh learned that there was yet anothe

campus that held more American medical st

dents. The third campus was located at Lance au

Epines, which was a peninsula on Prickly B

east of Point Salines. 134

Figure 37. Map of Grenada with Urgent Fury Objectives (Source: AU Library, Maps and

Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

285
The unexpected heavy resistance throughout

25 and 26 October at Point Salines, Grand Mal,

Grand Anse, and Fort Frederick had taken its

toll on the assault force. Consequently, late on 26

October, McDonald asked for two more battalions

from the 82d Airborne Division. By 2117 local the

battalions and a brigade headquarters had been

moved from Pope AFB to Point Salines. The total

airborne troops on the island thus increased from

2,000 to about 5,000. With fresh reserves in

place, TF-121 methodically advanced on Lance

aux Epines on the 27th and 28th. On 28 October

it secured another 202 medical students at the

Lance aux Epines campus. These were the last

students to be rescued. The number of American

medical students rescued during the operation

totaled 564. With the students freed, the next

several days were devoted to cleanup operations

and re-establishment of a viable civilian government. By 29 October US forces had rescued 599

US citizens and 121 foreigners and had defeated

the Cuban and Grenadian army forces defending

the island.135

After the initial assault at Point Salines on 25

October, the five Combat Talons recovered to

Roosevelt Roads AB, Puerto Rico, where the aircraft were inspected for battle damage. Bach’s aircraft (Talon 64-0572) had taken three small-arms

rounds, but the remainder of the Combat Talons

escaped without a scratch. The crews entered

crew rest as maintenance personnel continued to

inspect the aircraft. The Point Salines assault

was the only major action that the Combat Talons faced during Operation Urgent Fury. One additional mission was flown by Bach’s crew on 31

October. Under the call sign November 10, Bach

dropped leaflets in support of Operation Duke,

which was the last offensive action of the Gr enada

operation. Before the commencement of Opera -

tion Duke , the crew dropped leaflets over Carriacou,

where a suspected Cuba n guerrilla-training base

was located. At 0530 on 1 November, a Marine

assault force landed unopposed and within three

hours had occupied all objectives. No Cubans

were found, although the marines did capture 17

Grenadian army soldiers and a cache of military

equipment including rifles, radios, explosives,

ammunition, jeeps, a truck, and other assorted

items. The crew that flew the leaflet-drop mis -

sion included Crew 7 (Talon 64-0572) members

Bach, Spicer, Lary, Armstrong, Dowd, Moore,

Long, Elder, Caldwell, and Winnie:136 With the

safe return of Bach’s crew from the 31 October

mission, Combat Talon participation in Operation

Urgent Fury ended. Combat operations on the island officially ended on 2 November after Phase I

USAF Photo

November 10 Crew. Left to right: Bach, Lary, Dowd, Spicer, Winnie, Caldwell,

and Moore. Not pictured: Armstrong, Long, and Elder.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

286
through Phase III objectives had been met. Phase

IV, which included the establishment of a civilian

government in Grenada, would continue throughout the remainder of the year.

Lessons Learned

Operation Urgent Fury was a success, having

attained its military objectives during the period

from 25 October to 2 November. For special op -

erations and the entire military community, how -

ever, weaknesses in command and control were

highlighted. CJTF-120 was made up of four sepa -

rate task forces, and these task forces were not

colocated and could not readily communicate

among each other nor with CJTF-120. Airlift and

tanker forces were not OPCON to the CJTF but

rather responded to tasking through JCS. Each

TF had aircraft committed to it, but no single air

manager was designated. The CJTF arrangement

resulted in piecemeal control of forces and uncertainties as to specific areas of responsibility. From

an Air Force perspective, the constant flux in

force composition caused significant difficulties

for air planners in determining requirements and

assessing employment capabilities and options.

Operation Urgent Fury also did not use an existing plan as the basis of the operation. If it had

used an existing plan, it might have avoided some

of the confusion. A contingency plan was in existence, which covered the type of operation faced in

Grenada, and it had been practiced in joint exercises before Operation Urgent Fury. The decision

was made not to use the plan, which effectively

meant that the operation started from a no-plan

status. Command difficulties also were experienced on the ground, with General Schwarzkopf

acting in an advisory role during the first two

days of the operation. He eventually was designated as Vice Admiral Metcalf’s deputy com -

mander, which cleared up some confusion in th

chain of command.

The short notice of the operation did not allo

Combat Talon sufficient time to plan and “what i

the plan before execution. Because of the need 

react quickly and decisively to the threat, a r

hearsal of the airfield seizure operation was no

possible. Had a rehearsal been conducted, wea

nesses in the plan (i.e., an abort en route or sy

tems failure that precluded planned drop sequen

ing) could have been more thoroughly address

and provisions made for rapid adjustments. The

were also not enough Combat Talons to perfor

the mission. Only five aircraft were available 

Hurlburt Field from the 8th SOS, and all five we

committed to the Point Salines airfield assault. 

sixth Combat Talon was hastily deployed fro

Europe to serve as a spare for the mission. Add

tional SOLL II C-130s were used in combinatio

with the Talons so that adequate numbers of sp

cial operations forces could be infiltrated on to t

airfield. In all, five Combat Talons and seve

SOLL II C-130s transported rangers into Point S

lines. Had there been sufficient numbers of Talo

to support the mission, there would not have bee

a requirement for SOLL II augmentation. As h

been the case three years earlier at Desert On

the weather played a major part in the success 

the assault. Postmission analysis pointed to th

fact that the ability to forecast accurate weath

information was critical to mission success.

The weaknesses in executing a joint operatio

did not go unnoticed by Congress. Within thr

years, in the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorgan

zation Act of 1986, Congress created the US Speci

Operations Command (USSOCOM), which w

tasked to organize and train a special operatio

force made up of soldiers, airmen, and sailors fro

the three services. USSOCOM would trace its roo

back to the OSS of World War II, and Combat Talo

would become a key player in the new command.

Notes

1. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1980, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., supporting docu -

ment 11, 5.

2. Ibid ., 3.

3. Ibid., iv.

4. Ibid., 8.

5. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1980, 18.

6. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31

December 1980, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

7. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1981, 1–2.

8. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Januar

31 March 1981.

9. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1981, 13, 21.

10. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 Ju

1981, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file, Hurlbu

Field, Fla., vol. 1, II-37 to II-39.

11. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–

June 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlbu

Field, Fla., supporting document 4, D4-3 to D4-5.

12. Ibid., 11.

13. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–

September 1981, 11.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

287
14. Ibid., supporting document D1, D1-1.

15. Ibid., 11.

16. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1981, 7.

17. Ibid., 11.

18. Ibid., 11–12.

19. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–

31 March 1982, supporting document D2, 3.

20. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1981, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 4.

21. Ibid., 9.

22. Ibid., 10.

23. Ibid.

24. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1981.

25. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 June

1981, vol. 3, 700–701.

26. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–

31 March 1981.

27. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 September 1981, vol. 3, 444.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 447.

30. Ibid., vol. 1, II-37.

31. Ibid., 51–52.

32. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1981, vol. 1, II-43.

33. Ibid., II-29.

34. Ibid., II-38.

35. Ibid., II-57, II-58, II-60.

36. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 July–30 September 1981, vol. 3, 638.

37. Ibid., vol. 1, II-66 to II-67.

38. Ibid., II-67.

39. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October–31

December 1981, vol. 1, II-48.

40. Ibid., II-49.

41. Ibid., II-51.

42. Ibid., II-55.

43. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1982, supporting document D1.

44. Ibid., supporting document D2.

45. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1982, vol. 1, II-54 to II-55.

46. Ibid., II-59 to II-63.

47. Ibid., II-37.

48. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 June

1982, II-40 to II-43.

49. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1982, 10.

50. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1982, supporting document D2, 2.

51. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October

1982–28 February 1983, II-39 to II-40.

52. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 June

1982, II-51.

53. Ibid., II-49.

54. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30

June 1982, 9.

55. Ibid., 2, 6, 9.

56. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 June

1982, vol. 3, 880.

57. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1982, supporting document 8.

58. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

March 1982, vol. 3, 476.

59. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October

1982–28 February 1983, 747.

60. Ibid., 773.

61. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–

31 December 1982, 11.

62. Ibid.

63. History, 2d Air Division, 1 March–30 June 1983,

USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 2, II-140 to II-141.

64. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 March–30

June 1982, supporting document D1, D1-2.

65. History, 2d Air Division, 1 March–30 June 1983, II143–44.

66. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 October

1982–28 February 1983, vol. 3, II-44 to II-45.

67. Ibid., II-82 to II-84.

68. History, 2d Air Division, 1 March–30 June 1983, vol.

3, 2.

69. Ibid., 3.

70. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 March–30

June 1983, vol. 3, 1963.

71. History, 2d Air Division, 1 July–31 December 1983,

vol. 1, III-214.

72. Ibid., III-234.

73. Ibid., III-241.

74. Ibid., III-262.

75. Ibid., III-221 to III-222.

76. Ibid., III-270.

77. “Grenada: Special Report,” Airman Magazine, February 1984, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1964.

78. History, 2d Air Division, 1 July–31 December 1983,

vol. 2, 9.

79. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1983, 10.

80. Ibid., supporting document D1.

81. “Now To Make It Work,” Time, 14 November 1983,

USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., II-36.

82. History, 2d Air Division, 1 July–31 December 1983,

vol. 2, 9–10.

83. “Now To Make It Work.” 

84. History, 2d Air Division, 1 July–31 December 1983,

vol. 2, 9.

85. Ibid.

86. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1983, supporting document D2.

87. Ibid., iv.

88. Ibid., supporting document D3, 1–4.

89. History, 2d Air Division, 1 July–31 December 1983,

vol. 2, 7.

90. Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning

and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2

November, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), copy located in Combat Talon

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 9.

91. “A Strange Peace After A Strange War,” U.S. News

and World Report, 28 November 1983, USAF HRA, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., 35.

92. Cole, 10.

93. “A Crisis in the Caribbean,” Newsweek , 31 October

1983, 21.

94. Ibid.

95. “Now To Make It Work,” 21.

96. “A Crisis in the Caribbean,” 21.

97. Cole, 11.

98. “Spice Island Power Play,” Time, 31 October 1983, 78.

99. Cole, 14.

100. Ibid., 12–13.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

288
101. Ibid., 14.

102. Ibid., 16.

103. Ibid., 16–17.

104. Ibid., 17–18.

105. Ibid., 18.

106. Ibid., 19.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., 20–21.

109. Ibid., 22.

110. Ibid., 23, 26.

111. Ibid., 27.

112. Briefing, subject: Operation Urgent Fury, Combat

Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

113. Official Document, query, subject: Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury, 8 April 1985, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt

Field, Fla.

114. Cole, 28–29.

115. Ibid., 29.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., 30.

118. Ibid., 32.

119. Ibid., 34–35.

120. Ibid., 35.

121. Briefing, Operation Urgent Fury.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. “Now To Make It Work,” 23.

126. Briefing, Operation Urgent Fury.

127. Ibid.

128. “Grenada: Special Report,” 37.

129. Briefing, Operation Urgent Fury.

130. Ibid.

131. Cole, 42–43.

132. Ibid., 44.

133. Ibid., 45.

134. Ibid., 49.

135. Ibid., 57, 60.

136. Query, Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury.

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINE

289
Chapter 11

Road to Combat Talon II (1984–89)

I will prepare and some day my chance will come.

—Abraham Lincoln 

By 1984 nearly four years had passed since the

failed Iranian rescue mission, yet in that time, the

Combat Talon force had actually decreased from

14 to 13 aircraft. Talon 64-0571 had been returned

to Hurlburt Field from the 4950th Test Wing,

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, on 27 October 1981

after the loss of aircraft 64-0564 the previous Feb -

ruary. The aircraft had been designated as a Swap

aircraft since the early 1970s when Heavy Chain

closed, and the four aircraft assigned to that program were transferred to Combat Talon . It had

been partially demodified, with the KA-band portion of its radar and its ECM equipment removed.

The aircraft had not undergone modifications that

had been made to the rest of the Combat Talon

fleet, including in-flight refueling and Honey

Badger upgrades. Additionally, the ECM equip -

ment removed in 1973 had been consumed by the

Talon fleet over the years and was no longer

available to reinstall in the aircraft. The out-ofproduction equipment was not available in 1982,

thus requiring it to be manufactured under special

contract with Lockheed. The aircraft was delivered

to LAS Ontario on 28 September 1982, after having served almost a year in the 1st SOW as a basic

“pilot-proficiency” aircraft not capable of performing the complex Combat Talon mission. Aircraft

64-0571 remained at LAS Ontario undergoing

modification to the Combat Talon Yank configura -

tion until being delivered to the 1st SOS at Clark

AB, Philippines, on 14 April 1984.1

As Combat Talon growth remained static, efforts to procure the new Combat Talon II took

shape after Desert One. The initial purchase of

new Combat Talon IIs was set at 12 aircraft by

Air Staff, although documented requirements of

the war-fighting CINCs reflected a need for more

than 100 airframes. Beginning in 1982 the 12

Combat Talon II aircraft program competed in the

yearly budget cycle, but it had not made the funding cut by 1984. Simply stated Combat Talon did

not compete with other Air Force programs be -

cause the conventional Air Force was not interested in funding special operations. Historically,

SOF had experienced a roller-coaster ride throughout its existence, with funding for vital SOF airlift

programs reduced to near zero after World War 

and Vietnam. After each buildup SOF was dec

mated and receded into the background (or cease

to exist altogether) while national security co

cerns focused on deterring major conventional o

nuclear war.2

After Desert One the Holloway Commissio

Report was published and contained two recom

mendations to improve SOF throughout the D

partment of Defense. The first recommendatio

was to establish a counterterrorist joint task forc

(CTJTF) as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs 

Staff with permanently assigned staff personn

and certain assigned forces. The second recom

mendation focused on the establishment of a Sp

cial Operations Advisory Panel composed of 

group of carefully selected high-ranking office

(both active duty and retired) who were eith

experienced in special operations activities or wh

had served at the CINC level. Both recommend

tions were approved and implemented by DOD

The Joint Special Operations Command was e

tablished as the CTJTF and became operation

in December of 1980. The Special Operations A

visory Panel also was created in the fall of 198

and it eventually became the Special Operatio

Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG). There was litt

pressure from Congress in 1980 to reorganize sp

cial operations, but events over the next five yea

would convince key members of Congress th

SOF was broken and needed a major overhau

Much of the dissatisfaction centered on the pr

curement of the Combat Talon II (or, to be mo

precise, the lack of procurement of the new wea

ons system).

1984: The Air Force Develops

a Plan to Fix Special Operations

When MAC gained control of special operatio

on 1 March 1983, the command concentrated o

short-term fixes to the Combat Talon airlift shor

fall. To satisfy the growing requirements of th

Joint Special Operations Command MAC deve

oped the Special Operations Low Level II cap

bility. SOLL II crews were trained to land wi

NVGs on covertly lighted runways utilizing th

291
five-light system developed for Desert One. The

aircraft were standard AWADS C-130E aircraft

modified with NVG-compatible cockpit lighting.

They were not capable of terrain following, nor

did they have the sophisticated ECM equipment

that was found on the Talons. MAC maintained

six C-130E aircraft and nine SOLL II crews at

Pope AFB for the specialized airland mission. In

addition to the Pope-based SOLL II capability,

MAC developed a similar program for the C-141

and the C-5, all of which supported the counterterrorism mission. With most of the near-term

modernization initiatives being expended for upgrade of other MAC aircraft, the MC-130E Combat Talons received little attention. When Opera -

tion Urgent Fury kicked off in October 1983, there

were only five 8th SOS Combat Talon aircraft

available to participate in the assault on Point

Salines. Twelve Talons were needed for the contingency operation. Consequently, seven less-c apable

SOLL II C-130Es from Pope AFB augmented the

five Talons for the operation.

Long before Urgent Fury the Air Force looked

at itself to determine what direction it should

take to improve its special operations capability.

In 1981 the Air Force inspector general and the

deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and

readiness (XO) directed a full-scale review of

USAF SOF. The review, known as a functional

management inspection, was conducted from November 1981 to July 1982. The FMI team gathered data, identified problems, and made recommendations to improve SOF’s ability to meet

national security objectives. The team identified

three critical areas: (1) a lack of essential mission

elements (SOF roles and missions, operational

doctrine, and tactics); (2) an inadequate force

structure; and (3) force readiness. The team determined that “the Air Force is not currently capable

of fully supporting JCS/unified command special

operations.” Because of the FMI, the USAF chief

of staff decided in December 1982 to transfer SOF

forces (which included the worldwide Combat

Talon fleet) from TAC to MAC. The Twenty-Third

Air Force was created under MAC to manage

SOF. Of the nearly 10,500 personnel initially assigned to the Twenty-Third AF, SOF forces totaled

3,500. The mission of the Twenty-Third AF included combat rescue, peacetime search and rescue, weather reconnaissance, high-altitude atmospheric sampling, missile site support, aeromedical

evacuation, operational support airlift (VIP transport), and SOF.4

 To manage special operations

forces assigned to the Twenty-Third AF, the 2d

AD was established at Hurlburt Field. From the

onset many felt that SOF was relegated to a secondary mission within the new numbered AF.

Career SOF personnel looked upon the consolidation under MAC as a hostile takeover by a

much larger bureaucracy that had little concern

for SOF revitalization but rather was focused on

gaining control of SOF assets to upgrade its res cue

forces. With the Twenty-Third AF headquarters

made up almost entirely of rescue personnel, resentment quickly grew over the fact that SOF

was commanded by a headquarters with virtually

no SOF experience. MAC’s effort to assign experienced Special operations personnel to the TwentyThird AF staff met with great resistance from the

SOF community because the assignment was

looked upon as a career-ending move. When sev -

eral SOF officers were forcibly assigned to the

headquarters, they did not fare well during fu -

ture promotion cycles. The consolidation under

MAC was not all negative, however, for Combat

Talon personnel. Before the consolidation, three

separate commands (TAC, PACAF, and USAFE)

had Combat Talon personnel assigned. All three

commands were fighter oriented, with key

higher-headquarters assignments and early promotions going to the fighter community. When

Combat Talon officers left TAC for assignment to

one of the two overseas commands, they were

“lost” to the stateside Talon community. TAC did

not consider them as a TAC resource upon returning to the United States after completion of

their tours. Personnel returning from the 1st and

7th SOS many times would be assigned to nonSOF conventional duty in lieu of special opera -

tions positions at Hurlburt Field. The flow between commands resulted in a lower promotion

rate than that experienced by non-SOF officers.

With MAC gaining responsibility for all SOF units,

assignments were controlled by Headquarters

MAC, and placement outside SOF was made only

after requirements were met within the SOF

community.5 By 1985 promotion rates had improved for SOF, with the opportunity for advance -

ment within the MAC system being realized.

In October of 1983 Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul Thayer authored a memorandum that reiterated National Command Authorities emphasis

on the US military’s special operations capabilit y.

The 3 October memorandum was sent to the

service secretaries and other high-ranking De -

partment of Defense personnel and addressed

special operations forces. The memorandum ob -

served that “US national security requires the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

292
maintenance of special operations forces capable

of conducting the full range of special operations

on a worldwide basis, and the revitalization of

those forces must be pursued as a matter of na -

tional urgency.”6

Secretary Thayer directed that force structure

expansion be implemented quickly and completed

by the end of fiscal year 1990, including improve -

ments in command and control, personnel, training, and equipment. The memo further stated

that “each Service [sic] will assign SOF and r elated

activities sufficient resource allocation priority

and will establish appropriate intensive manage -

ment mechanisms to ensure that these objectives

are met.” In addition to the above guidance, Secretary Thayer directed that once resources had

been committed to SOF and revitalization decisions had been made, they would not be changed

unless coordinated with the principle deputy assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs and with the OSD comptroller, and

then approved by the secretary of defense. By 1

March 1984 Secretary Thayer wanted a timephased master plan for reaching the goals in his

memorandum.7

In response to Secretary Thayer’s memorandum, Air Force Chief of Staff general Charles A.

Gabriel and Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr

directed that an Air Force master plan be developed for SOF. The master plan would respond to

the memorandum and provide a time-phased

schedule for the improvement of Air Force SOF.

Existing joint guidance and service agreements

charged the Air Force with the mission of supporting joint special operations with rapid response

and quick employment of long-range, low-level aircraft capable of penetrating hostile airspace and

operating in austere locations with minimal support. Special operations was essentially an offensive capability carried out by both rotary- and

fixed-wing aircraft. With all Air Force SOF under

the command of CINCMAC, the responsibility for

developing the SOF Master Plan was assigned to

MAC. The plan identified the 14 MC-130E Combat

Talons, along with the AC-130H gunships and the

HH-53H Pave Low helicopters, as core SOF assets.8

 It also established the requirement for 19

primary aircraft assigned (PAA) and two backup

aircraft inventory (BAI) MC-130H Combat Talon

IIs, which were to be procured beginning in FY 83.

The standard production C-130H aircraft would be

modified into the Combat Talon II configuration

after delivery to the Air Force, with the first modified aircraft available in FY 87. The Combat Talon

II would have similar capabilities as the older M

130Es, including a highly accurate navigation sy

tem, a self-contained precision instrument a

proach system, defensive ECM/IRCM (infrare

countermeasures), IFR, HSLLADS, and NVG

compatible internal and external lighting. The initi

operational capability (IOC) was set for the thi

quarter of FY 87, with all aircraft delivered b

1991.9

MAC also established the requirement for th

procurement of 24 HH-60D Nighthawk helico

ters for its combat SAR mission and tied the ne

Combat Talon’s avionics suite to the developme

of the HH-60 to reduce overall acquisition costs

For the MC-130E Combat Talon (now redesi

nated as the Combat Talon I), improvements i

cluded the installation of the helicopter aeri

r efueling system to allow the aircraft to opera

as a long-range penetrating tanker. The Talo

assigned to the 8th SOS at Hurlburt Field woul

get the helicopter aerial-refueling modification b

FY 4/85.1 1

To improve the SOF airlift capability in th

short term while awaiting the delivery of th

Combat Talon II, MAC proposed to increase U

assigned SOLL II crews from nine to 11 and 

upgrade the overseas SOLL I crews to SOLL 

status by the second quarter of FY 85. Pacif

Command and European Command would eac

have six SOLL II crews available for employme

in their respective areas of operation.12 The SOL

II capability would be in addition to the unit

primary conventional airlift mission.

General Gabriel signed the SOF Master Pla

on 19 March 1984, and Secretary Orr followed o

4 April. Contained in the plan were provisions fo

an annual review by the Air Staff Board before i

consideration of the yearly program objectiv

memorandum (POM). In addition, to ensure th

it was kept current and reflected the latest deve

opments, the SOF Master Plan was to be revise

every two years. MAJCOM supporting pla

were required to be submitted to Headquarte

AF/XOXP by 1 October 1984. When the mast

plan was forwarded to Secretary Thayer, bo

General Gabriel and Secretary Orr advised hi

that money and research and development lea

times would prevent the Air Force from achievin

completion of improvements outlined in the pla

by FY 90 (as required by Secretary Thayer’s 

original memo).13

Following close on the heals of the SOF Mast

Plan was an agreement between the US Army an

the US Air Force addressing the improvement 

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

293
the total force and its war-fighting capabilities.

With increased emphasis on joint operations at all

levels, General Gabriel and the chief of staff of the

Army, Gen John A. Wickham, signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on 22 May 1984. Attached to the MOA were 31 initiatives that articu -

lated concerns of both services. Initiative 17

addressed special operations and would have a

far-reaching impact on the Air Force’s ability to

improve its SOF capability. Initiative 17, Rotary

Wing Lift Support for Special Operations Forces,

stated that “the Air Force will transfer the responsibility for providing rotary-wing lift support

for SOF to the Army. A detailed implementation

plan will be jointly developed.”1 4

With the stroke of a pen, General Gabriel had

given away the rotary-wing SOF mission to the

USA and by so doing had put the entire SOF revitalization program, as outlined in the SOF Master

Plan, in jeopardy. Without the rotary-wing SOF

mission, funding for MAC’s 24 HH-60D Nighthawks and the avionics development program

that was shared with Combat Talon II was tenuous. CINCMAC strongly disagreed with the initiative, but at the Corona Fall 84 conference held

from 3 to 6 October 1984, all attending 0–10 general officers voted against retaining the verticallift mission. Not only did Initiative 17 impact the

Talon II program, but it also had implications for

the emerging tilt-rotor joint vertical lift airlift

(JVX) mission. An argument could be made that

the JVX should transfer to the Army along with

other Air Force rotary-wing assets, although the

initiative did not specifically address the tilt-rotor

mission.15 Initiative 17 had opened a veritable

Pandora’s box for the Air Force that affected much

more than its relatively small SOF mission area.

* * * * * *

The first C-130H aircraft (83-1212) was delivered to the Air Force on 8 June 1984 and wa s the

first aircraft delivered of the original 12 MC130H Combat Talon II (CT II) purchase. The

aircraft was a production H model Hercules and

did not have the specialized equipment necessary

to accomplish the difficult Combat Talon mission.

The original concept of buying off-the-shelf equip -

ment for the new Talon had not materialized, especially for the sophisticated radar. With the Air

Force’s decision not to buy the Talon I APQ122(V)8 for CT II, there was no other radar in

existence that could provide the features required to accomplish the mission. Consequently,

the first aircraft was put into short-term storage

until decisions could be made regarding the ra -

dar and ECM suite to be installed. On 19 November 1984 the aircraft was flown to LAS On -

tario to have the HSLLADS installed. The

following May the aircraft was delivered to ESystems in Greenville, Texas, to begin the extensive CT II modification without a final decision being made on the radar/ECM suite.

Aircraft 84-1212 was the first to be modified un -

der the CT II progra m .16

In some ways the CT II was designed with less

capability than the older MC-130E Talon I. It did

not get the Fulton STARS nor helicopter aerialrefueling pods, but it did get an updated ECM

suite that was superior to the CT I. The specifica -

tions for the new CT II radar were somewhat

vague but required that it “meet or exceed” the

capabilities found in the CT I AN/APQ-122(V)8

radar. The development of the new radar would

result in years of delay and would cause the cost

of the aircraft to skyrocket by the time it was

ready for operational use. The glass cockpit envisioned for the HH-60D Nighthawk helicopter was

reduced in scope and was installed on the Talon

II. Although not a total glass cockpit, the effort

resulted in most of the complicated navigation,

radar, and FLIR displays being presented on the

aircraft’s cockpit screens. The analogue dials for

the four engines were reduced in size and installed in a similar configuration as the Talon I.

Another advantage found in the CT II was that it

had the entire cargo compartment available,

whereas in the CT I a console for the radio opera -

tor and the electronic warfare officer took up an

entire pallet position. The crew for the Talon II

was also smaller than the CT I, having only one

navigator and no radio operator authorized. The

CT II also required only two pilots for the NVG

airland mission. (The CT I required a third pilot

to act as a safety during the demanding blackedout landing procedure.) As the CT II developed

during the next eight years, it would become a

highly capable asset on which special operators

would rely for the long-range, low-level mission.

But in 1984 aircraft 84-1212 did not resemble

what it would eventually become.

Congress Reacts to the Air Force Plan

Congress had been concerned about SOF since

the failed Iranian rescue attempt in 1980. The

cycle of neglect for special operations by the con -

ventional Air Force was apparent when looking at

funding levels before Desert One. Air Force special operations AC-130H gunships were scheduled

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

294
for deactivation or transfer from the active to the

Reserve force in the late 1970s and were not

funded in the Air Force budget after 1979. The

MC-130E Combat Talon was old and had not been

significantly improved since the MOD-70 upgrade

in the early 1970s. SOF rotary-wing capabilities

had decreased to a point of near extinction by

1980. After Desert One Air Staff transferred the

HH-53H Pave Low helicopter to SOF, although it

was developed as a combat SAR asset by MAC.

The HH-53 was the only rotary-wing developmental program for the Air Force throughout the

1970s. Congress had authorized the purchase of 12

Combat Talon II aircraft in 1981, and it was the

funding of these 12 aircraft that became especially

frustrating. From 1981 to 1984 Congress authorized funding for the new aircraft, and each year

Air Force programmers redirected those funds to

other higher-priority conventional programs. With

the creation of the Special Operations Panel under

the House Armed Services Committee in 1983,

congressional interest in SOF and low-intensity

conflict (LIC) intensified. Speaking on the Senate

floor, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) expressed his frustration with the Air Force, saying:

For about three years, we have been waiting on the

five-year defense plan to reflect the needs of the spe -

cial operations forces. . . . We had the Iranian hostage

rescue mission and a woeful inadequacy of transporta -

tion for the forces at that stage. Senator Goldwater

and I had written letters, done everything we could to

try to focus on the need for transportation for special

operations forces. The regular forces were not interested. . . . So we mandated that they include transpor -

tation for special operations forces in the five-year de -

fense plan. In addition, we held up certain aircraft

programs until they did. Guess what happened? They

finally decided they needed the aircraft so they . . .

put the special operations forces in the plan. What

happened then? They came back and now they have

taken those special operations aircraft out of the plan.

This is a sad commentary. 1 7

When the Air Force signed the MOA with the

Army that included Initiative 17, the action apparently took Congress by surprise. Rep. Dan

Daniel of Virginia, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Readiness, and Rep. Earl Hutto of

Florida, chairman of the Readiness Committee’s

Special Operations Panel, got involved. Hurlburt

Field was in Representative Hutto’s congressional

district, and he and his staff made numerous visits to the base to determine the impact of the

initiative on Air Force SOF. Representative Daniel

also visited Hurlburt Field and, along with Representative Hutto, voiced serious reservations about

the initiative. Deputy Secretary of Defense William

Taft IV also was publicly not pleased with th

helicopter transfer to the Army.18

Secretary Taft was briefed on the initiative o

26 November and was reported to have remarke

that the services needed a better case for Initi

tive 17 before he would approve it. After the brie

ing Taft wrote to Chairman Daniel on 29 Novem

ber stating that no final decision had been mad

and suggested a meeting with Generals Gabrie

and Wickham. Secretary Taft added a hand-writte

note to the letter to Chairman Daniel stating th

if the chairman still did not agree with the initi

tive after discussing it with the two generals, Se

retary Taft would not pursue the transfer ov

Chairman Daniel’s objections. On 3 Decemb

Congressmen Daniel and Hutto and the tw

chiefs had breakfast, followed by a briefing in th

afternoon by a combined Army/Air Force team

The briefing failed to convince the two congres

men. After the briefing Congressman Hutto se

a strongly worded letter to Gabriel in which h

expressed his concern that Initiative 17 was th

beginning of a plan by the Air Force to dive

itself of the special operations mission.1 9 Durin

the next week Taft’s staff worked tirelessly to d

termine the best course of action, relying heavi

on the SOF community for input as to the overa

impact the initiative would have on USAF speci

operations. The initiative was not an isolated, di

connected decision that affected only Air Forc

rotary-wing assets, but rather it influenced th

entire SOF community, especially the develo

ment of the new Combat Talon II. On 13 Decem

ber 1984 Secretary Taft wrote to the chairman 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advising that he had d

cided to “defer” implementation of the Army/A

Force rotary-wing pla n.20

After Secretary Taft’s deferment of Initiativ

17, Congressmen Daniel and Hutto continued 

voice their concerns that the transfer of the SO

rotary-wing mission to the Army was “hastily co

ceived and inadequately staffed.” Indeed, speci

operations personnel on the Air Staff had not pa

ticipated in the drafting of the initiative and wer

not asked for comments before the final Air Forc

decision. The process had been flawed from th

start, the congressmen maintained, and the r

sults were predictably invalid. In April 1985 Se

retary Thomas E. Cooper, USAF assistant secr

tary for research, development, and acquisitio

announced that Initiative 17 was dead. The

would be no transfer of rotary-wing SOF from th

Air Force to the Army. With strong congression

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

295
interest the conventional Air Force had backed

away from the controversial issue. 21

The year of 1984 had been a pivotal one for Air

Force SOF. From a position of high-level AFSOF

support (the SOF Master Plan) to an attempt to

divest itself of rotary-wing SOF (Initiative 17),

the Air Force had emerged in 1985 committed to

rebuilding its SOF capability. Support at the con -

gressional level undoubtedly turned the tide in

favor of special operations, but the roller-coaster

ride that had occurred during 1984 convinced

many in Congress (both in the House and Senate)

that special operations throughout the three services was broken. Visionaries in Congress worked

over the next two years to fix the problem. For

Combat Talon II, the first aircraft was delivered

during 1984 without an operational radar, and

five more aircraft were scheduled to be delivered

during 1985. The coming year would be a frustrating one for the Twenty-Third AF and for the

Combat Talon community.

New MAC-Sponsored SOF

Modernization Programs

Throughout 1984 MAC had been listening and

reacting to developments in Washington. The

command had strongly opposed Initiative 17, with

CINCMAC the only dissenting four-star at the

Corona fall commanders conference. Working on

the assumption that Initiative 17 would be eventually turned around by Congress, the Headquarters

MAC staff, working in concert with the TwentyThird AF, developed its five-year POM for fiscal

years 1986–90 that recommended funding of

seven new SOF programs. Upon review the Air

Staff later added three additional programs based

on the SOF Master Plan. The 10 SOF programs

and the fiscal year proposed for funding them in -

cluded the following:

 1. Night Vision Goggles: Procure 1,015 AN/AVS-6

Night Vision Goggles (FYs 87–90)

 2. AC-130H Sensor Improvement: Provide improve -

ments needed to maintain gunship capability to

support JCS tasking, including ECM, moving-target

indicator, and low-light level TV (FYs 87–90)

 3. AC/MC-130 Defensive System: Provide ECM up -

grade to the MC-130E , and ECM and navigation

equipment upgrade on the AC-130A (FYs 87–90)

 4. Probe Refueling: Procure high-speed drogues and

“snap-top” probes for modifying SOF fixed-wing

aircraft (FYs 87–90)

 5. HH-53 Conversion: Transfer and modify aircraft

from the 6594th Test Group to the AFSOF (FYs

87–90)

 6. Pacific Build-up: Place six HH-53s and two HC-130

tankers from the 6594th in the Pacific (FYs 87–90)

 7. CAMPS Maintenance: Fund hardware and maintenance for four computer-aided mission planning

systems (CAMPS) (FYs 87–90)

 8. Flying Hour Increase: Increase flying hours available for JCS taskings (FYs 86–90)

 9. Manpower: Provide manning at Pope and Charleston AFBs to support MAC SOLL activities (FYs

87–90)

10. Combat Control Team Manpower: Fund 22 additional CCT personnel in direct support of the Joint

Special Operations Command (JSOC) (FYs

87–90)2 2

The Combat Talon II requirement had been in -

creased from the original 12 aircraft to 19 PAA/2

BAI (total of 21 aircraft) based on the SOF Master

Plan. A deputy secretary of defense memorandum

of 23 August 1984 included one additional Combat

Talon II aircraft in fiscal years 1988, 1989, and

1990 (for a total of 24 aircraft), and the Budget

Estimate Submission for 1985 included the additional three aircraft. The Air Force Council also approved a 90-aircraft HH-60A program to replace obsolete AF rescue helicopters but did not support

funding of the 24 combat rescue HH-60Ds.23 Without the HH-60D program, the sophisticated glass

cockpit and integrated avionics systems earmarked

for Combat Talon II would not be developed. The

decision would result in a delay in the fielding of the

new Talons at a much higher cost per aircraft.

Along with the new programs, Headquarters

MAC also supported an aggressive Special Opera -

tions Forces-Improvements program designed to

enhance existing SOF weapons systems. The

SOF-I program included $103.7 million in the fiscal years 1984–88 period and included improve -

ments in the MC-130E and AC-130H fleets. The

SOF-I program included the following:

1. A highly accurate inertial navigation system,

an infrared warning receiver (AAR-44), ra -

dar detection (WJ-1840), and digital burst

message communications.

2. A radar jammer (the ALQ-117 Pave Mint)

for six of the 14 MC-130Es.

3. Additional AAQ-10 FLIR sensors for the

Combat Talon .

4. Gunport covers for the AC-130H to allow aircraft pressurization at high altitude.

5. An improved fire control system for the AC130H.

The SOF-I program also funded 23 AAQ-4 IR jammers for the HH-53B/C/H helicopters.2 4

The Air Force POM included additional improvements not included in the proposed MAC

SOF-I program. Combat Talons would get radar

jammers for the remaining eight MC-130Es and

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

296
also would get improved chaff and flare dispensers along with improved radar warning receivers

(RWR).2 5 The MAC SOF-I package, as augmented

by Air Staff, represented the most sweeping advancement in the Combat Talon weapons system

since MOD-70 15 years earlier. The new system

would ensure that the MC-130E would remain a

viable combat asset for the remainder of the

twentieth century.

The State of Affairs in

the Talon Squadrons

At Clark AB Lee Hess had his hands full trying

to get his MC-130Es mission ready. The 374th

TAW continued to be responsible for Talon maintenance, but the wing could not maintain the sophisticated equipment installed on the aircraft.

Both the 374th TAW and the 1st SOS were assigned to MAC, but the 1st SOS was a tenant unit

at Clark AB reporting to the 2d AD at Hurlburt

Field. In June of 1984 Hess reported to 2d AD

that he had not had a fully mission-capable

(FMC) aircraft available to fly in more than a

year. The major problem continued to be the ra -

dar, INS, and ECM equipment.2 6

At Rhein Main AB the 7th SOS was in the

same status as the 1st SOS at Clark AB—it was a

tenant unit of the 435th TAW and also assigned to

the 2d AD at Hurlburt Field. The major difference

for the 7th SOS was that it possessed an aircraft

maintenance section (AMS) that was made up of

maintenance specialists trained to maintain Combat Talon -unique avionics systems. Because it had

its own specialized maintenance, the 7th SOS enjoyed a better FMC rate than did the 1st SOS at

Clark, but parts availability kept the European

Talon FMC rate below MAC standards. The 2d AD

worked through the Twenty-Third AF to solve the

problems of the overseas units. Despite its best

efforts, it took another year for the 2d AD to obtain

approval for specialized maintenance for the Pacific

Talons. For FY 86 more than 100 maintenance

personnel were programmed to join the 1st SOS to

enable the unit to establish its own organic main -

tenance capability.27

On 26 June 1984 Colonel Bortner succeeded

Hudspeth as the squadron commander of the 7th

SOS. At Hurlburt Field the following month,

Colonel Miles assumed command of the 8th SOS

from Hobson when Hobson moved on to the Pentagon to work special operations programs and

resources. Talons from the three squadrons con -

tinued to participate in JCS exercises as they had

done in previous years, including Team Spirit and

Foal Eagle in the Pacific and Flintlock in Europ

The Joint Special Operations Command al

tasked the Talon units to participate in its qua

terly joint readiness training (JRT) exercises. A

MAC moved to improve its SOF capabilities du

ing 1984, tragedy struck the 20th SOS with th

loss of a UH-1N and two HH-53H Pave Lows. Th

UH-1N went down on 9 January 1984 while pa

ticipating in Operation Bat, a counterdrug oper

tion in the Caribbean. The first Pave Low crashe

during Exercise Cope Thunder in the Philippin

on 17 October 1984, and the second was lost on 

November while on a training mission in th

United States. 28

Hobson, who had commanded the lead Comb

Talon (64-0568) over Point Salines, Grenada, du

ing Operation Urgent Fury, was awarded th

prestigious Mackay Trophy for the most merito

ous flight of 1983. The defenders at Point Salin

obviously knew that the rescue force was comin

as Hobson’s Talon approached the airfield for i

personnel drop. On Hobson’s inbound leg, his ai

craft was illuminated by a searchlight located o

the airfield. As the Talon was dropping at 500 fe

and with only half of Hobson’s rangers clear of th

aircraft, enemy AAA opened fire on the Talo

Holding his course steady until all jumpers wer

clear, Hobson then banked hard to his right, d

scending at the same time towards the surface 

the ocean. Maj Gen William J. Mall, command

of the Twenty-Third AF, was aboard Hobson

Talon and credited him with saving the aircraf

In a ceremony held in November 1984 at Hurlbu

Field, additional Talon personnel who had partic

pated in Operation Urgent Fury were also dec

rated. They were recognized for their contributio

to the success of the overall operation.2 9

1985: Life in the Trenches

The three Combat Talon squadrons face

heavy tasking throughout 1985. As Air Force an

Congress continued their dialogue on the future 

SOF, life in the trenches was brutal. The Comb

Talon operations tempo had never been highe

with more work for the squadrons than could po

sibly be done with the limited number of aircra

available. From three to six aircraft were at LA

Ontario throughout the year for major maint

nance, thus leaving the squadrons with only tw

thirds of their assigned aircraft. Although th

year would be challenging, there would be no m

jor contingency operations.

On 13 February 1985 the 1st SOS narrowly e

caped disaster while participating in a joint speci

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

297
operations exercise in the Pacific. The squadron

had deployed two Combat Talons to Andersen

AFB, Guam, and had worked with USA Special

Forces and US Navy SEALs during the course of

the exercise. The 8th SOS also had deployed two

Combat Talons from Hurlburt Field. An airfield

seizure operation was scheduled for the night of

13 February on Tinian Island and involved both

Air Force and Army aircraft. Captain Sharpe was

in command of Combat Talon 63-7785 and was on

final approach for landing at Tinian Island. With

Gilbert flying the aircraft, Sharpe was scanning

outside on NVGs looking for the runway environ -

ment. As the Talon approached the LZ at approximately 30 feet above the ground, Sharpe suddenly

saw a blacked-out helicopter’s rotor blades in his

NVGs. Sharpe immediately took control of the

Combat Talon , pulled back hard on the yoke and

applied maximum power to break his descent.

The rotor blades of the Army UH-60 helicopter

sliced through the main landing gear tires of

Sharpe’s aircraft as the Talon passed over the

helicopter. The force of the impact destroyed the

helicopter’s main rotor blades and caused the

Blackhawk to crash on the runway, seriously injuring those on board but resulting in no fatalities.

Sharpe managed to keep his aircraft airborne after touching down momentarily on the runway.

Nimmo’s crew (in another 1st SOS Talon) checked

out Sharpe’s aircraft, and the damaged Talon proceeded back to Andersen AFB for an emergency

landing. After two hours in holding and successfully dumping excess fuel, Sharpe made a perfect

no-flap landing. Post-flight inspection revealed

that one-half of the right wing flap had been torn

off by a piece of the helicopter’s rotor blades.

There was no other significant damage to the aircraft other than the slashed main landing gear

tires and minimal damage to radio antennas on

the belly of the aircraft. For his quick decisions

and his expert airmanship, Sharpe was awarded

the Air Medal in a ceremony later in the year.3 0

Other members of Sharpe’s crew were Gilbert (p ilot), Washer (pilot), Calvert (navigator), Slepetz

(EWO), Frederickson (loadmaster), and Whorles

(flight engineer).*

A second incident involving Combat Talon 63-

7785 occurred on 22 May 1985 when Fleming and

his crew were flying a training mission over

northern Luzon in the Philippines. The aircraft

was struck by small-arms ground fire from a

rebel faction known as the New Peoples’ Army.

The rounds ignited a fire and caused damage to

the number 4 engine, thus requiring it to be shut

down. With three operating engines, the crew battled the in-flight fire for more than 20 minutes

while returning to Clark AB. The fire was con -

tained in the single-point refueling manifold

a rea, and no crew members were injured. Along

with Fleming the entire crew was awarded the

Air Medal for its actions. Other members of

Fleming’s crew were Master Sergeant Fleming,

Captain Hockley, First Lieutenant Knight, Staff

Sergeant Monroe, Captain Payne, Master Sergeant Rode, Staff Sergeant Tappan, Captain

Washer, and First Lieutenant Wernette. 31 A repair team was later dispatched to Clark AB to

repair the aircraft.

Having had nearly two years at the helm, Hess

relinquished command of the 1st SOS to Colonel

Jahnke on 31 May 1985. Jahnke had been Hess’s

operations officer before assuming command of

the squadron. It was not until 10 August that his

new operations officer—Col T. J. Doherty—arrive d

to help him run the diverse squadron operations

section.3 2 The maintenance problems that had

plagued Hess continued with little improvement

for the remainder of the year.

At the 8th SOS Miles spent much of his time

supporting joint special operations requirements.

__________

 *Details of the mission were provided by Sharpe during a telephone interview conducted on 23 August 1999. The timing for Sharpe’s arrival at Tinian

Island had been moved up 10 minutes by the air mission commander on board an EC-130E ABCCC aircraft. The UH-60 pilot had acknowledged the

change. Probably due to task saturation at the time, the Blackhawk crew did not clear the approach end of the runway in time for Sharpe to land. With

the helicopter being totally blacked out, the Talon crew could not see the Blackhawk in time to avoid the collision.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

Damage to aircraft 63-7785 after the aircraft was hit by

small-arms fire on 22 May 1985. Area pictured is just aft

of the right main landing gear. The resultant in-flight

fire caused most of the damage.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

298
After the February exercise in Guam, two 8th

SOS aircraft deployed to Hunter AAF, Georgia,

and participated in sustainment training in support of the USA rangers stationed there. From 17

March to 4 April, one MC-130E deployed to Amman, Jordan, for a JCS-directed exercise. During

the two-week deployment, the crew planned and

flew mission profiles designed to help the Jorda -

nian military evaluate its air defense network,

while at the same time providing hard-to-get

threat training for the Talon crew. Additional

ECM training was accomplished when airborne

intercept missions were successfully flown against

Royal Jordanian Air Force fighter aircraft.33 From

27 July to 25 August, the squadron participated

in Bright Star 85 , flying exercise missions into

Jordan, Oman, and Somalia while basing out of

Cairo West, Egypt. In September Miles took two

of his Talons to Gowen AAF, Boise, Idaho, for the

1st SOW’s ORE. The ORE, named Casino Gambit, tasked the Talon crews to fly missions that

included night mountain terrain following, personnel airdrop of USA Special Forces, in-flight refueling, helicopter air refueling, and ECM training. Casino Gambit was designed to prepare the

squadron and the wing for their upcoming ORI.

34

From 2 to 10 December the squadron deployed

to Biggs AAF, Texas, for the 1st SOW’s ORI,

which was named Purple Duck. Four MC-130Es,

six crews, and a Combat Talon planning staff participated in the evaluation along with other wing

assets. Included in the employment phase were

HALO personnel drops of CCT and leaflet drops

supporting the psychological warfare scenario of

the exercise. 35 Throughout the evaluation discon -

nects and misunderstandings occurred between

the MAC evaluators and the special operations

participants, primarily because of unclear grading

criteria. Although the Talon crews performed satisfactorily, the ORI was halted on 10 December,

and the wing was redeployed to Hurlburt Field.

In the coming year, much effort would be expended to develop criteria that applied to SOF employment so that a fair and impartial ORI could be

administered.

* * * * * *

As the three Talon squadrons struggled to satisfy the increasing demands on their scarce resources, terrorist acts against the United States

accelerated around the world during 1985. In April

a bomb exploded in a restaurant frequented by

American service members near Torrejon AB,

Spain. Eighteen Spaniards were killed, and 82

others were injured, including 15 Americans. I

June 1985 TWA Flight 847 was hijacked over th

Mediterranean, thus beginning a two-week ho

tage drama that saw the murder of one America

as the aircraft flew to different Arab countri

around the region. Non-American hostages we

released at various times during the ordeal. Th

remaining 39 mostly American passengers we

eventually released in Damascus, Syria, after b

ing held in Beirut, Lebanon. In El Salvador (al

in June) four US marines and two American bus

nessmen were killed along with 13 others durin

a machine-gun attack on a street-side cafe in th

capital city of San Salvador. In August a large c

bomb exploded at Rhein Main AB, Germany, ne

the 435th TAW headquarters and one block fro

the 7th SOS operations building, killing two ai

men and injuring 20 others. The following d

German police found the body of a US soldie

who was apparently murdered for his identifica 

tion (ID) card. The stolen ID had been used by th

terrorists to gain access to the air base.

In October 1985 four Palestinian terrorists h

jacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro alon

with 400 passengers and crew off the coast 

Egypt. The terrorists killed a disabled America

tourist, 69-year-old Leon Klinghoffer, and thre

his body and his wheelchair overboard. The te

rorists demanded the release of 50 Palestinia

prisoners being held in Israeli jails. After a tw

day drama, the terrorists surrendered in e

change for safe passage back to the Middle Eas

An Egyptian airliner attempted to fly the terro

ists to freedom, but US Navy F-14 fighters inte

cepted the airliner and forced it to land in Sicil

Italian authorities took the terrorists into custod

as US Navy SEAL Team Six and US Army Del

Force soldiers prepared to assault the Egyptia

aircraft. The following month another Egyptia

airliner was hijacked by terrorists, and on

American on board was murdered. In a scenar

similar to the TWA hijacking the previous Jun

the hijackers made demands as the aircraft w

flown to airports around the Mediterranean. Th

episode ended in a bloodbath with the loss of 6

lives, when Egyptian commandos stormed the ai

craft while it was on the ground in Malta. Th

volatile year ended in December with Arab su

cide bombers simultaneously striking US an

Italian check-in counters at the Rome and Vienn

airports. In the two attacks, 20 people were kille

including four terrorists who carried out the acts

The ability of the United States to respond 

terrorist attacks had improved since 1980, b

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

299
forces in being in 1985 were not adequate to cope

with the worldwide threat to US citizens. Con -

gress looked for ways to improve the capability of

America’s counterterrorism. In August of 1985

Representative Daniel, still not convinced that

the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force)

were serious about building a robust special op -

erations capability to fight the terrorist threat,

published an article in Armed Forces Journal advocating the creation of a sixth service dedicated

to special operations and low-intensity conflict.

Many felt at the time that the true objective of

Daniel’s article was to stimulate controversy

within the services and in Congress so that action

would be taken to improve SOF. Daniel was con -

vinced that service SOF initiatives up to that time

had treated the symptoms of the disease rather

than the causes. He felt that although SOF was

organizationally part of the three services, SOF

had never been truly institutionally part of those

services. He argued that SOF did not “fit” into the

conventional military and concluded that the system didn’t work because the individual services

held SOF to be peripheral to the interests, missions, goals, and traditions that the services

viewed essential. Listing seven key reasons a

sixth service was needed, Daniel believed that

anything less would result in continued poor performance by SOF because the services ultimately

would determine the health of SOF by controlling

forces and dollars committed to it.3 6

In October 1985 a two-year Senate Armed

Services Committee staff study, “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” was published. The

staff study was headed by James Locher and included a detailed look at the Department of De -

fense and the national command structure. Locher and his staff looked at a number of special

operations as part of their research, including

those in Vietnam, Iran, and Grenada, and con -

cluded that America did not have a good record of

accomplishments in successfully completing unconventional operations. Historical analysis dating back to the American Revolution provided the

basis of a series of recommendations contained in

the study. His staff report concluded that a new

command structure was essentially needed when

it proposed a “strong . . . multifunctional, organiza -

tional focus for low-intensity warfare and special

operations.” Many in Congress took Locher’s staff

study seriously and throughout 1986 worked to see

that the recommendations were implemented. The

October 1985 staff study formed the foundation

for the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, which revolutionized SOF and the

Combat Talon force.3 7

In the Air Force the fiasco of 1984’s Initiative

17 had faded into the past, but the service’s commitment to SOF still was questioned by many.

Five additional C-130H aircraft (84-0475, 84-

0476, 85-0011, 85-0012, and 86-1699) were delivered to the Air Force during calendar year 1985

as part of the CT II program, but the radar prob -

lem had not been solved. Because the radar had

been envisioned as an off-the-shelf acquisition,

Air Force program managers had made the decision not to remanufacture the older CT I radar

because of its cost—it was estimated that the

APQ-122(V)8 would cost between $8 and 10 million each, and the conventional Air Force wanted

a cheaper radar for the CT II. All five aircraft

received the HSLLADS modification at LAS Ontario before being delivered to E-Systems in 1986.

Air Force contracted with IBM to develop a new

TF/TA-capable radar for the CT II, but the company subcontracted the effort to Emerson Electronics. The resultant poor performance of the

Emerson radar nearly resulted in the cancellation

of the entire CT II program. Congressional interest in CT II development had continued, thus

leaving the Air Force little choice but to continue

to work with the contractor to bring the radar up

to operational status. In the end the AN/APQ-170

radar emerged as the radar for the new Talon at a

cost of nearly $20 million each, and the delivery of

the first operational aircraft to the 8th SOS was

delayed until 1991.3 8

In September 1985 Maj Gen Robert B. Patterson assumed command of the Twenty-Third AF

and quickly set about to develop a road map for

future SOF expansion within the Air Force. Look ing

USAF Photo

The new Combat Talon II has an extended radome and

chin-mounted FLIR turret. The large radome is re -

quired to accommodate both the FLIR and the AN/APQ170 radar.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

300
at current and anticipated growth, Patterson’s

staff projected an increase of 120 aircraft and

3,000 personnel by 1999 (based on the SOF

Master Plan) but conceded that the existing organizational structure could not support even

1985 requirements. With the C-130H CT II aircraft already being delivered, a detailed plan had

to be developed. On 31 October 1985 Patterson

was ready with his vision of the future when his

Twenty-Third AF staff presented his Forward

Look briefing to the MAC staff. The Twenty-Third

AF briefing cited examples of programs that had

been directed from top down rather than being

initiated by the Twenty-Third AF or MAC, including the acquisition of the MC-130H Combat Talon

II. The briefing also noted the less-than-adequate

support for the MAC-generated SOF Master Plan.

Even after the Master Plan was approved by the

Air Force chief of staff and the secretary of the Air

Force, the plan received low priority and low-level

attention. Earlier in 1985 the Air Force also had

canceled the HH-60D combat SAR helicopter with

apparently little concern of its impact on the

Combat Talon II program. The Forward Look

briefing also addressed perceptions held by Con -

gress and the majority of the conventional Air

Force regarding SOF capabilities.

The Twenty-Third AF proposed taking actions

that demonstrated both philosophical and organiza -

tional changes. The major change involved focusing on capabilities rather than on the mission

(i.e., Twenty-Third AF personnel would not be

trained just for combat rescue or for special opera -

tions, but would instead be trained so that they

could employ whatever mission was tasked). The

complex system of squadrons and detachments

dedicated to peacetime search and rescue in the

United States and abroad was recommended

either to be consolidated and converted to SOF

units, or to be disbanded altogether. Most peace -

time SAR units had obsolete equipment and suffered from years of neglect by the conventional

Air Force. Outside the United States, host nations

or local governments were fulfilling rescue requirements. No longer was there a need for many

of the rescue units. A second objective of the reorganization was to streamline command and con -

trol to provide more responsive theater forces.

The basic concept of Forward Look was the establishment of four special air warfare (SAW) wings

under the Twenty-Third AF that would includ

both special operations and rescue forces. In th

view of the Twenty-Third AF, the wings coul

develop multimission capabilities that include

special air operations, counterterrorism, comb

rescue, and some reconnaissance capability und

the blanket title of special air warfare. The fo

wings would be designated as SAW wings to be

ter represent their combined capabilities.39

The four wings identified in the Forward Loo

concept consisted of one wing each in the Pacif

and in Europe and one wing each on the We

Coast and East Coast of the United States. Th

overseas wings would include the 1st and 7

SOS, and the East Coast wing, located 

Hurlburt Field, would include the 8th SOS. Th

West Coast wing would be built around the 41

Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing 

McClellan AFB, California, and the 1st SOW

would form the nucleus of the East Coast wing 

Hurlburt Field.* 40

The Twenty-Third AF viewed the long-rang

future of the East Coast wing (1st SOW) as on

of significant growth. The 1st SOW, in line wi

the overall reorganization, would be redesi

nated a SAW wing. The proposed wing buildu

included an eight-aircraft tanker squadron th

resulted from the consolidation of the 41st an

55th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squa

rons. The existing 20th SOS would grow to 1

MH-53Hs and two MH-53B/C aircraft, while th

8th SOS would convert to Combat Talon IIs 

and grow to an 11-aircraft MC-130H squadro

The 1st and 7th SOSs would absorb most of th

8th’s MC-130Es. To support operations at Fo

Bragg, a 15 CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft squadro

would be stationed at Pope AFB as part of th

East Coast wing. These actions would be com

pleted by 1999. The reorganization included th

deactivation of the 2d AD in 1987.41

On 30 December 1985 CINCMAC approved th

reorganization of special operations and comb

rescue forces largely in line with General Patte

son’s Forward Look proposal. Throughout th

coming year, Forward Look was staffed at th

highest levels of the USAF as Congress moved 

create its own vision of SOF.

__________

 *In 1989 MAC made the decision to revitalize the Air Rescue Service and to divest the Twent y-Third AF of both peacetime and combat SA

responsibilities. The West Coast wing, located at McClellan AFB, California, was assigned to the new ARS . Hurlburt Field would continue as t

only active duty SOF base in the United States. In the early 1990s, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, wou ld become the training center, under A

Education Training Command (AETC), for all SOF rotary-wing and Combat Talon II training. The formal Combat Talon I School remained 

Hurlburt Field as part of the 1st SOW.

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

301
1986: The Goldwater–Nichols

Defense Reorganization Act

Representative Daniel’s article had accom -

plished its primary goal—it created dialogue

within Congress and the Department of Defense

on ways to improve special operations. In January

1986 Sen. William Cohen, in an article published

in Armed Forces Journal International, “A Defense Special Operations Agency: Fix for a SOF

Capability That Is Most Assuredly Broken,”

called for a national special operations agency. He

outlined an organization that he named the De -

fense Special Operations Agency (DSOA), which

would be made up of two major components—an

agency staff and a subordinate joint command.

The DSOA mission would be to prepare and con -

duct joint special operations. He envisioned the

DSOA reporting directly to the secretary of defense. Command and control would be exercised

through the subordinate joint command.4 2

Under Cohen’s vision, all Army, Navy, and Air

Force SOF assets would be assigned to the new

joint command, which would maintain liaison

elements within each of the unified commands.

During periods of conflict the joint command

would forward deploy to the wartime theater and

serve as that CINC’s special operations com -

mand. On the civilian side an assistant secretary

of defense for special operations would provide

the civilian control necessary to conduct politically sensitive special operations.43 As Senator

Cohen and Representative Daniel developed

their proposals during the first half of 1986, Patterson’s Forward Look proposal had worked its

way through the Air St aff.

Gen Duane H. Cassidy, CINCMAC, approved

most of Patterson’s Forward Look concept on 30

December 1985. Planning had proceeded at MAC

headquarters during early 1986 on the reorganization of the Twenty-Third AF, and on 13 March

General Cassidy wrote to the Air Force vice chief

of staff providing details of Forward Look. In his

executive summary, CINCMAC reviewed the organizational history of the Twenty-Third AF. He

noted that when the new numbered air force was

activated, the ARRS was assigned to it to oversee

all rescue assets, and 2d AD was established as a

parallel umbrella organization over Air Force special operations forces. On 1 October 1983, how -

ever, ARRS flying squadrons began reporting directly to the Twenty-Third AF, thus leaving only

the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center reporting to ARRS. This change eliminated the need, in

the opinion of MAC and the Twenty-Third AF, for

an intermediate level of command between SOF

and the Twenty-Third AF. General Cassidy con -

cluded that the time had come to deactivate 2d

AD and merge the capabilities of both combat rescue and SOF into one cohesive command.44

In an attachment to CINCMAC’s letter, a proposal was made to integrate special operations

and combat rescue forces to provide a force multiplier and an organizational structure for SOF

paralleling that of the CINCs they supported.

Four CINCs had formed special operations subunified commands—Special Operations Commands

Europe, Pacific, Central, and Atlantic (SOCEUR,

SOCPAC, SOCCENT, and SOCLANT)—while

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had established a Joint Special Operations Task Force

(JSOTF) until it could establish a subunified

command. General Cassidy supported having the

1st SOW tasked against SOCCENT, SOCLANT,

SOUTHCOM’s JSOTF, and the commander,

JSOC requirements. The overseas wings would

support SOCPAC and SOCEUR. In his letter

General Cassidy also deleted the SAW designa -

tion for the four-wing Forward Look plan, preferring to retain the traditional SOW designation .

45

Although the details of Forward Look were be -

coming known in the SOF community, the official

position taken by MAC was to keep the plan

closemouthed and to brief only selected commanders and their staffs. On 17 June 1986 the TwentyThird AF advised 2d AD, the 1st SOW, and the

39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing (the

European-designated SOF wing) that Headqua rters

MAC had agreed to allow the Twenty-Third AF to

brief selected personnel in their commands on

Forward Look. Only senior 2d AD personnel and

wing staff officers, along with squadron commanders and their operations officers, would be

briefed. The briefing was given to Hurlburt Field

units on 19 June and to the 39th ARRW the next

day. The Forward Look briefing went into consid -

erable detail on the reorganization, its goals, aircraft reassignments, and organizational changes.

It emphasized combat capability based on integrated missions by multimission aircraft, respon -

sive theater structures, organization that could

accommodate future growth, and the TwentyThird AF mission. By the fourth quarter of 1988,

the Twenty-Third AF hoped to have the new organization up and operating. 46

Concurrent with the 39th ARRW briefing at

Eglin AFB on 20 June, Headquarters MAC advised the Twenty-Third AF that the Air Force

Council had concurred with the reorganization

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

302
proposal. The details of the reorganization plan

were not officially released until August 1986. At

that time General Patterson signed out a letter

with an attachment titled, “The Basis of Forward

Look, Reorganizing the Twenty-Third AF.” Although Patterson’s letter served as the official announcement, it did not provide details of the timetable for implementation.4 7 For the three Combat

Talon squadrons, the reorganization provided the

possibility of greater support (especially in the

overseas units), with emphasis on command and

control and the maintenance area.

While MAC and the Twenty-Third AF developed Forward Look, Congress continued to debate

the reorganization of SOF. By May 1986 Senator

Cohen, with cosponsorship by Sen. Sam Nunn,

introduced Senate bill S. 2453, and the following

month Daniel introduced House bill H. R. 5109.

Many of the key provisions of those two bills later

would form the basis for the defense authoriza -

tion bill that was signed into law on 14 October

1986. The final bill passed in October directed the

formation of a unified command for SOF (the US

Special Operations Command), created the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and established a coordinating board for low-intensity con -

flict within the National Security Council.

48

Perhaps the most far-reaching provision of the

October legislation was the creation of Major

Force Program (MFP) 11. Before this legislation,

there were only 10 MFPs, and SOF funding was

provided by the services from those funds. All

three services had a poor record of accomplishment for funding SOF. The acquisition of the

Combat Talon II was an example of how the Air

Force ignored an SOF program that was desire d by

Congress while funding conventional core requirements instead. Representative Daniel had made

his case for separate SOF funding in his article

the previous August proposing a sixth service. In

defense of the services, SOF programs were

funded throughout each service’s POM, and the

relatively small expenditures for SOF had often

been lumped with larger programs within each

service. It was extremely difficult for the services

to manage SOF funding with this disjointed (for

SOF) system in place. Consolidation under MFP

11 made funds visible to both Congress and to the

services, and it provided a measure of protection

against spending SOF dollars for non-SOF items.

With the passage of the defense authorization bill,

Congress passed into law the requirement to reorganize SOF. It would take another two years,

however, before the new US Special Operatio

Command would be established and operation

at MacDill AFB, Florida.4 9

With congressional action directing SOF reo

ganization signed into law, MAC’s Forward Loo

initiative put the command on track to fulfill Co

gress’s mandate within the Air Force. A Hea

quarters MAC/XPP point paper, dated 31 Decem

ber 1986, reviewed the reorganization and liste

the reasons MAC supported the initiative. Fo

ward Look would reduce command layers belo

the Twenty-Third AF by inactivating the 2d A

at Hurlburt Field, and it would establish in-the

ter wings in Europe and in the Pacific. It wou

also align combat units by location rather than b

mission and by region where they were expecte

to be employed. The paper concluded that Fo

ward Look created a command structure th

could absorb future growth, including the Comb

Talon II. In early January 1987 final Air Staff a

proval of Forward Look was received, and a publ

announcement was made shortly afterwards. O

20 January 1987 Special Order GA-49 was pu

lished, thus putting Forward Look into motio

The 2d AD was inactivated, the USAF Special O

erations School was reassigned from 2d AD to t

Twenty-Third AF, the 1st SOS was reassigne

from 2d AD to the Twenty-Third AF, the 7th SO

was reassigned from 2d AD to the 39th ARRW 

Eglin AFB, and the 1st SOW (including the 8

SOS) was reassigned from 2d AD to the Twent

Third AF; all effective on 1 February 1987.50

Included in the January announcement wer

plans to move the Headquarters Twenty-Thir

AF, from Scott AFB, Illinois, to Hurlburt Fie

and to colocate with the 1st SOW. The headqua

ters would transfer 177 military and 29 civilia

positions. On 1 April 1987 USSOCOM was ac

vated at MacDill AFB, Florida, with Gener

Lindsay, USA, commander in chief. On 30 Ju

1987 General Patterson issued a statement co

cerning his understanding of the new relatio

ships among MAC, USSOCOM, the other unifie

commands, and Headquarters, Twenty-Third A

In the statement Patterson unofficially desi

nated the Twenty-Third AF as the Air Force Sp

cial Operations Command and recognized i

status as the air component of USSOCOM. On 

August 1987 the Twenty-Third AF official

moved to Hurlburt Field, and a flag-raising cer

mony was held marking the establishment of th

new organization in the heart of USAF speci

operations.51

* * * * * *

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

303
With rumors swirling throughout 1985 of possible reorganization options and how those op -

tions would affect the Combat Talon force, the three

Combat Talon squadrons found it difficult to focus

on their primary mission. World events, however,

continued to underscore the importance of their

role in providing SOF airlift. The 7th SOS had

deployed Talons during 1985 in response to the

hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and in response to

the Achille Lauro crisis. In March 1986 a terrorist

bomb exploded in a West Berlin disco that was

frequented by US service members. Two people

were killed, and more than 200 were injured. German and US investigators uncovered a connection

between the bombing and the Libyan leader,

Muammar Qadhafi. Libya had previously declared the Gulf of Sidra, off its northern coast, as

a no-fly zone and had drawn a line across its

mouth that it labeled the line of death for any

intruders. US Navy fighters routinely had penetrated the illegally imposed no-fly zone and had

clashed with Libyan jets. In April 1986 the 7th

SOS had deployed for the annual Flintlock exercise when President Reagan responded to the Berlin bombing. Although the 7th SOS Talons did not

take part in Operation Eldorado Canyon, more

than 100 other aircraft did, with USAFE FB-111

fighter-bombers striking key locations around the

Libyan capital of Tripoli. The strike successfully

reduced the level of Libyan sponsorship of international terrorism, but the perceived threat to

Americans abroad increased after the skirmish.

As part of the ongoing modernization of the

Combat Talon fleet, three of the 7th SOS aircraft

(64-0523, 64-0555, and 64-0561) received the

“+30” or “heavyweight” chip modification during

the spring of 1986, thus allowing the aircraft to

terrain follow with gross weights up to 165,000

pounds. The capability had been developed during preparation for the Iranian rescue mission in

1980, with the Combat Talons from the 1st SOS

and 8th SOS being modified at that time. The

fourth 7th SOS Talon, aircraft 64-0566, received

its heavyweight modification while at LAS Ontario undergoing its scheduled PDM.5 2 The fiveyear delay in getting the modification funded and

installed on the four European Talons was another indicator to career SOF personnel that the

Air Force had not been serious in its effort to

modernize the existing Combat Talon fleet. On

18 September 1986 Colonel Casteel assumed

command of the 7th SOS from Bortner, who had

commanded the squadron since 26 June 1984.

Colonel Ferkes filled the position of operations

officer under Casteel, having come to the squadron

from the Joint Special Operations Command at

Fort Bragg.53

Project 46

At the 8th SOS long-standing limitations of

the Fulton STARS were addressed early in 1986

with commencement of the testing of a new and

improved recovery system. Since the fatality in

April 1982, the STARS had undergone intense

scrutiny, and many maintenance procedures

either were modified or created so that system

reliability could be maintained. By 1985 a refurbishment program for the Talon’s sky anchor had

been finalized, and the recovery yokes located on

the nose of the aircraft had been scheduled for

upgrade. Live Fulton recoveries had not been reinstated, however, although the system was

cleared for operational use in the event of a realworld contingency requirement. The system had

been originally designed to pick up as many as

two persons or 500 pounds but was not capable of

handling larger loads. Both USA Special Forces

and US Navy SEAL teams operated under a

team concept in units composed as many as 12

people. Most employment missions involved the

insertion of a four- or six-man team into enemy

territory for performing either direct action or

strategic reconnaissance missions. When the mis -

sion was complete, and the team was ready for

exfiltration, the two-man recovery system on the

Combat Talon was not capable of rapidly extracting the entire team with one pickup. Develop -

ment began in 1985 to determine if it was feasible

to extract four to six personnel at the same time

(up to 1,500 pounds total weight) with the Fulton

recovery system. With the increased capability,

one aircraft could extract up to a six-man team

on one pass, thus decreasing the exposure time

for the Combat Talon crew and subsequently providing a greater probability of a successful recovery of the team. The four-to-six-man requirement came to be known as Project 46. Warner

Robins Air Logistics Center was designated as

the STARS item manager for Project 46 , with

LAS Ontario serving as the prime and solesource contractor tasked to engineer and modify

a test-bed aircraft. The Robert Fulton Company,

builder of the original Fulton recovery system,

was a subcontractor through Warner Robins and

LAS Ontario.5 4

Project 46 consisted of three phases, with

Phase I concentrating on the design of a new

STARS kit and the production of a prototype.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

304
Project 46 STARS equipment had to be much

heavier to enable the successful recovery of

1,500-pound loads and required the redesign of

the entire kit. The new kit consisted of larger

and heavier fending lines, a larger recovery balloon to lift the heavy pickup line, pickup suits,

goggles, new davit assembly, new heavy-duty sky

anchor, heavy-duty recovery winch, and a large

parabomb to retrieve the lift line. Phase II called

for the manufacture of the STARS kits, modifica -

tion of a test aircraft, and flight tests to validate

the new system. During Phase III the system

would be certified for live pickups, a process that

required the successful pickup of a full array of

package weights and personnel combinations.

Phase I began in 1985 and continued into 198

The initial design phase was plagued with unfor

seen problems and malfunctions of the new equi

ment, but by the summer of 1986, the 8th SO

was ready to begin limited flight tests. Fro

February to May 1986, Combat Talon 64-055

was modified to accommodate the Project 46 sy

tem with a much larger hydraulic system an

with the installation of an auxiliary power unit 

provide power to operate the winch and davit a

sembly. Maj David L. “Skip” Davenport was s

lected to command the 8th SOS Talon crew fo

Project 46 . The crew deployed to LAS Ontario an

flew its test missions over the dry lake beds 

Edwards AFB. Phase II flight-testing began 

August of 1986.

A fending line test consisting of two one-ma

three two-man, three four-man, and one six-ma

recoveries was flown on 6 August. The one-, two

and four-man recoveries went well. The six-ma

test was accomplished by using a 50-foot sectio

of the heavy six-man line woven on to a two-ma

pickup line. Instead of cutting the pickup lin

with the aircraft’s fending line, the number 4 pr

peller cut it. A modification was made in th

knives embedded in the fending lines, and on 

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

The nose section of Combat Talon 64-0551 was rein -

forced by unidentified LAS Ontario workers to accom -

modate up to 34,000 pounds of stress.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

The C-130H APU replaced the standard GTC on aircraft

64-0551. The modification was required to provide suffi -

cient electrical capacity for Project 46 equipment.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

A 30-gallons-per-minute hydraulic control panel was i

stalled on aircraft 64-0551 just forward of the left par

chute door.

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

305
August four successful fends were completed using the new six-man line and the larger P-46 balloons. On the four test runs, the knives on the

aircraft’s fending lines cut the pickup line on a

single run, but the propellers made a second cut

that caused minor sheet-metal damage to the

left helicopter refueling pod. Additional test

missions were flown during the remainder of

August. During September tow tests of two-,

four-, and six-man packages were successfully

completed. The packages were stable, the lift

line could be reached to engage the parabomb,

and bringing the packages into the aircraft

posed no problems.55

With the fending line and tow test complete,

the test engineers were ready for actual lift-line

engagements by the sky anchor. During the

week of 28 September to 4 October, three Project 46 sorties were completed. During the first

sortie the attempt to retrieve a six-man package

failed due to the inability of the sky-anchor cup

to rotate enough turns to lock in the lift line. On

the second sortie a standard two-man line could

not be picked up by the Project 46 sky anchor.

Before the third sortie, the sky anchor was replaced, and the new sky anchor successfully retrieved a standard two-man package. When a

heavier load was engaged, however, the sky an -

chor failed again. A Fulton Company engineer

determined that the spring tension in the sky

anchor was not sufficient to overcome the force

exerted on the lift line at engagement and subsequently decided to increase the spring tension

by 80 percent with a new spring. The new

spring was designated the 2 X.56

With the new spring manufactured and installed in the sky anchor, three more Project 46

sorties were flown in November on the 15th, 22d,

and 23d. The 15 November sortie was terminated

early due to a nacelle overheat indication on one

engine. Heavy rains made the normally dry, hard

lake bed at Edwards AFB wet and soft, thus causing a week’s delay before operations could resume.

During the last two sorties, 15 intercepts were attempted, with one being fended after the pilot

missed the line with the Fulton yokes. Of the remaining 14 pickups, 11 were successful and three

were failures. The Fulton Company representative

determined from the test that, although the 2X

spring handled most sky-anchor engagements, a

heavier 4X spring was needed to ensure consistently successful results. The 2X spring turned

only once in the first one-half second after engage -

ment, whereas the system required one and onehalf turns in that time. The 4X spring was ordered, and a January 1987 delivery date was

established to continue the tests. During the

course of the fall test, periodic meetings were held

at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and at Detach -

ment 4, LAS Ontario, to keep track of progress

made in the Project 46 tests. As 1986 came to a

close, the test team felt that the effort was on

track and looked forward to completing the tests

in early 1987.57

* * * * * *

Jahnke had moved mountains to keep his Com -

bat Talons operational in the Pacific. As had been

the case for the other two Talon squadrons, his

operations tempo had been extremely high, having participated in annual SOF training events

and exercises in Korea, Thailand, the Philippines,

and throughout the Pacific area. To correct the

long-standing maintenance deficiencies experienced since relocating to Clark AB, the squadron

was assigned an in-house maintenance organiza -

tion by midyear. Some of the personnel transferred from the 374th Operational Maintenance

Squadron located at Clark AB, but the majority

came to the squadron from stateside locations. By

27 June personnel had arrived to form the nucleus of the squadron’s dedicated maintenance

flight, and by year’s end 140 maintenance specialists had been assigned to the special operations

squadron.58

During most of 1986 the 1st SOS was plagued

with a lack of airframes, especially during the

third quarter of the year. Aircraft 62-1843 and

63-7785 were both in PDM at LAS Ontario, and

Project 46 nose strain static test for a 15,000-pound

static load.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

306
aircraft 64-0571 was transferred back to the 8th

SOS at Hurlburt Field to await a scheduled wing

modification, having been restricted from lowlevel flight due to wing cracks. To compensate for

the loss of the three aircraft, the 8th SOS loaned

aircraft 64-0572 to the 1st SOS. Along with assigned aircraft 64-0565, the squadron struggled to

fulfill all its commitments and at the same time

keep its crews current in the many Combat Talon

events. By year’s end, however, 62-1843 and 63-

7785 were back at Clark AB, and the aircraft

shortage crisis temporarily eased.59

1987: Forward Look

Becomes a Reality

With the public announcement by the TwentyThird AF of the implementation of Forward Look

in January 1987, the New Year promised to be

one of transition for the three Combat Talon

squadrons. By year’s end the Twenty-Third AF

would consist of six wings with 14,500 personnel

and 320 aircraft assigned worldwide. At the 1st

SOS the squadron expanded by 70 maintenance

personnel as it stood up its specialized maintenance capability. It would be another two years

before the Pacific wing, which was designated as

the 353d SOW, would become operational, and in

the interim period, the Twenty-Third AF was determined to make things better for the often is olated

squadron. Jahnke began to see improvements in

his maintenance reliability, but his aircraft availability remained a problem. Since Desert One and

the renewed emphasis on upgrading the Combat

Talon, the squadron had operated with two to

three aircraft, with its remaining assets either in

PDM or in some phase of modification at LAS On -

tario. The first half of the year once again saw the

squadron in SEA, participating in exercises in

Thailand and in Malaysia. The annual JCS exercises in Korea (Team Spirit and Foal Eagle ) were

also supported with all available squadron assets.

On 5 June Colonel Doherty, who had been the

squadron operations officer, assumed command of

the unit from Jahnke. General Hargrove, vice

commander of the Twenty-Third AF, officiated at

the ceremony. Col Terry Silvester became Doherty’s new operations officer. Under the new

leadership, the operations tempo continued high

throughout the year, with the squadron deploying

nine times to Thailand and eight times to Korea.6 0

* * * * * *

When 2d AD deactivated on 1 February 198

the 7th SOS at Rhein Main AB, Germany, w

reassigned to the 39th ARRW at Eglin AFB. Col

nel Hobson, a former commander of the 8th SO

was the incumbent 39th commander.61 Later i

the year the 39th ARRW was redesignated th

39th SOW in line with Patterson’s Forward Loo

plan. In Europe Casteel led the 7th SOS in d

ployments to Morocco, Spain, Denmark, and th

United Kingdom. The squadron also deployed 

Toulouse, France, for a joint/combined exchang

training (JCET) event. The deployment to Franc

marked the first time in several years that th

squadron had exercised in that country with hos

nation forces. Training accomplishments include

low-level operations, HALO and static-line pe

sonnel airdrops, ECM training, pilot proficienc

sorties, and the interfly of a 7th SOS pilot in 

French C-160 aircraft. The squadron also d

ployed one aircraft and crew to the Central Afr

can nation of Zaire for another JCET even

During the seven-day deployment, 615 personn

were either static-line or HALO air-dropped fro

the Combat Talon .

6 2 Professional relationships d

veloped with France during the earlier Toulou

deployment helped the Talon crew satisfy exerci

requirements in Zaire.

During its theater deployments, aircraft mai

tenance requirements continued to challenge th

squadron. Unlike its sister squadron in the P

cific, the 7th SOS had maintained an Avionic

Flight that was responsible for keeping the sp

cialized ECM equipment operational. It ha

faired better than the 1st SOS, but the squadro

still relied on the 435th TAW for other maint

nance support, and its aircraft were assigned 

the host wing. On 25 May 1987 the squadron b

gan to assume more control of its maintenanc

when one of its aircraft and the aircraft’s cre

chief were transferred from the 435th TAW to th

7th SOS. Over the next two weeks, the squadro

took control of the two remaining Talons an

their crew chiefs. The squadron’s fourth Comb

Talon was in PDM at LAS Ontario and was tran

ferred to the 7th SOS when it returned to Rhe

Main AB later in the year. On 15 June the squa

ron began receiving personnel from various sp

cialist shops (instruments, hydraulics, engine

etc.), and by 1 July it was responsible for all ai

craft maintenance functions except sheet-metal r

pair, isochronal inspections, aircraft refurbis

ment, fuel-cell and shop-level maintenance, all 

which remained the responsibility of the 435

TAW.63 The squadron was basically responsible fo

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

307
all on-aircraft maintenance, and the personnel required to perform that function was assigned to it.

Aircraft improvements continued to be a highemphasis item. Aircraft 64-0566 received the

heavyweight chip during its PDM at LAS Ontario

and returned to Rhein Main AB in the spring.

With its arrival in Europe all Combat Talons in

the fleet could fly up to 165,000 pounds utilizing TF radar. Combat Talon 64-0523 became the

first Talon to be modified with the improved Fulton two-man STARS, thus making it the first

a ircraft to be certified for live pickups since the

1982 fatality.64 In the following three years,

the remaining eight Fulton Clamp aircraft

would be modified, but no live Fulton recoveries

would be performed during the remaining life

of the system .

At the 8th SOS aircraft 64-0567 was delivered

to LAS Ontario on 12 November 1986 for its

scheduled PDM and was subsequently designated

as the first Combat Talon aircraft to receive the

SOF-I modification. Throughout 1987 the aircraft

remained at LAS Ontario, thus reducing the

number of aircraft available at Hurlburt Field. In

1987 and for the next several years, almost half of

the Combat Talon fleet remained at LAS Ontario

undergoing either PDM or other system upgrades.

Twenty-year-old systems on the Combat Talon

were replaced with technology designed to protect

the aircraft for the remainder of the century. The

short-term result of the aggressive upgrade program was that few Combat Talons were available

for operational use.65 The 8th SOS struggled to

fulfill its operational requirements with a maximum of four aircraft available, one of which was

dedicated to the formal Combat Talon School.

(The overseas units averaged two aircraft on the

ramp during the late 1980s and early 1990s.)

During 1987 the 8th SOS stayed busy supporting the many JCS exercises and deploying in support of joint special operations taskings. The

squadron deployed to Honduras, Jordan, and

Egypt and also supported JCS exercises Flintlock

in Europe and Foal Eagle in Korea. As had been

the case in previous years, some exercises overlapped each other and prevented the squadron

from supporting all taskings with the limited

number of aircraft possessed. One Combat Talon

deployed to Jordan for an exercise in the March–

April period and then joined the Flintlock exercise

at Moron AB, Spain, after leaving the Middle

East. Immediately following Flintlock, one Talon

participated in Solid Shield, operating out of home

station and flying missions into Central America.

The Talon flew four Solid Shield missions, one of

which was a long-range HSLLADS resupply into

Honduras. 66

From 24 June to 11 July, the squadron deployed one MC-130E to Nellis AFB, Nevada, and

participated in Red Flag 87-04. The challenging

exercise concentrated on electronic warfare opera -

tions and pitted the Combat Talon crew against

both ground-based threats and interceptor aircraft. The major limitation of the exercise was that

it was daylight only, which put the Talon crew at a

distinct disadvantage against the threats. The after action report included a request for a nighttime Red Flag exercise dedicated to SOF. In

July the squadron deployed one MC-130E to

Cairo, Egypt, for Bright Star 87 . The long exercise was plagued by problems identified during

previous exercises, including inadequate billeting and messing facilities. The Hurlburt Field

contingent did not return to home station until

early Septembe r.6 7

Beginning in March 1987 the 8th SOS deployed

in support of USA ranger sustainment training in

seven- to 10-day blocks spaced throughout the

year. Additional tasking included participation in

a joint capabilities exercise (Capex) at Pope AFB

in September, and a large-scale readiness exercise

named Casino Gambit, which lasted three weeks

in October and November at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Bilateral training with other joint forces

was conducted for one-week periods in November

and December.68 The varied events and level of

tasking during these training periods could not be

found anywhere else in the SOF community. By

regularly exercising with joint special operations

forces, the squadron maintained the high level of

proficiency required to execute the challenging

joint mission.

Along with its other taskings, the 8th SOS was

preparing for the arrival of the Combat Talon II.

During 1987 five more C-130H aircraft (87-0023,

87-0024, 87-0125, 87-0126, and 87-0127) were accepted by the Air Force and sent to LAS Ontario

for HSLLADS and IFR modifications.6 9 The first

operational CT II aircraft was scheduled to arrive

at Hurlburt Field in August 1988 after its modification by E-Systems and flight testing at Edwards AFB. As 1987 passed, however, continuing

delays with the CT II radar threatened the new

aircraft’s delivery schedule.

Patterson’s Forward Look initiative moved

ahead during 1987 with many existing Air Force

rescue units being either deactivated or converted

to special operations squadrons. USSOCOM had

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

308
been activated on 1 June at MacDill AFB, Florida,

followed by the move of the Twenty-Third AF to

Hurlburt Field, effective 1 August. On the surface

it appeared that the previous year’s legislation directing the reorganization of special operations

forces was on track. The issue of establishing the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

(ASD/SOLIC) was another issue altogether. The

Defense Department interpreted the 1986 legisla -

tion directing the establishment of ASD/SOLIC as

authorization for another ASD, while Congress

meant for the new position to come from within

resources already authorized. After much debate

Congress agreed to authorize the additional civilian

billet. Even with the new billet, DOD was not eager

to fill the position. Many SOF programs (including

Army, Navy, and Air Force) were being managed by

existing ASDs, and there was a great reluctance by

them to give up highly visible SOF responsibilities.

As the year passed, little progress was made in

identifying a candidate for the ASD/SOLIC position

that was acceptable to both the Department of De -

fense and to Congress.7 0 Convinced that DOD was

not yet serious about SOF reorganization, Congress

enacted another piece of binding legislation on 4

December 1987. Section 1211, P. L. 100-180, was a

piece of “follow-up” legislation designed to clarify

Congress’s intent regarding its desire for DOD SOF

reorganization. The new law designated the

ASD/SOLIC as the principal civilian adviser to the

secretary of defense on special operations and lowintensity conflict matters. It directed the secretary

of defense to publish a charter for the ASD/SOLIC.

It also designated the secretary of the Army as the

acting ASD/SOLIC until the office was formally

filled for the first time. Finally, the law gave USCINCSOC head of agency authority to facilitate the

development and procurement of special operations

peculiar hardware. 71

1988: The Combat Talon II

Program Crisis

Despite the passage of the binding legislation

in 1986 and 1987 that was designed to force the

three services to properly fund and modernize

SOF, programming and budgeting problems con -

tinued throughout 1988. To clarify segments of the

two previous laws, Congress passed a third piece

of legislation on 29 September 1988. The 1988 legislation (P. L. 100-456) required that CINCSOC

prepare and submit a POM that included all SOF

program recommendations and budget proposals.

CINCSOC was to exercise authority, direction,

and control over expenditures of funds for a

forces under his command, including those forc

assigned to its air component (the Twenty-Thi

AF) that were designated SOF. The authority al

included forces assigned to theater-unified com

mands (SOCEUR and SOCPAC for Combat Talo

I).7 2 With the three pieces of legislation enacte

Congress had completed its quest to direct th

services to fix SOF. Over the coming years, pr

grams begun by MAC and managed by the Twent

Third AF would result in a far superior Comb

Talon force than the one that MAC inherited 

1983. A huge price would be paid, however, as t

Talon Is went through extended periods in modif

cation, and the Combat Talon II initial operation

capability slipped into the 1990s.

* * * * * *

In the Pacific the 1st SOS established its ow

dedicated maintenance section during 1987. To va

date the new capability, the Headquarters MA

IG team administered a maintenance eva luatio

(MSET) to the squadron from 24 February to 

March 1988. The squadron received an overall e

cellent rating, and during the out briefing, the 1

SOS maintenance section was lauded for havin

the “best small maintenance Job Control [that th

team had] ever seen.” The MSET team also reco

nized the squadron for having the “cleanest, be

looking C-130s in the Pacific.” The esprit de cor

of the Combat Talon unit was apparent. Doher

had finally turned around the 1st SOS’s most s

vere problem, thanks to the assignment of h

own maintenance capability.73

Before the MSET the squadron deployed on

aircraft and two crews to Lawson AAF, Georgi

to participate in a quarterly joint training exe

cise. From 4 January to 3 February, the squadro

worked closely with exercise participants, refinin

their NVG skills and introducing its crews to th

difficult counterterrorist mission. The deployme

marked the first time in several years that th

squadron was able to participate in a US-base

exercise due to aircraft availability and the lev

of tasking in the Pacific. During the deployme

the squadron flew 95 hours, which included bo

the deployment and redeployment flying tim

from Clark AB to the United States.7 4

After the MSET the squadron deployed on

Combat Talon to Wewak International Airpor

Papua, New Guinea, and flew joint training mi

sions with USA Special Forces soldiers. The d

ployment provided valuable experience flying 

the austere environment of the island natio

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

309
During the following months, the 1st SOS deployed to Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea for both

bilateral and JCS exercise tasking. 75 From 16 to

21 August, two aircraft and three crews deployed

to Guam for Exercise Vector Hawk . The no-notice

exercise was based out of Andersen AFB and provided the squadron the opportunity to work with

some of the same units that it had participated

with in the quarterly exercise the preceding

January.7 6

During Foal Eagle 88 the 1st SOS was administered an ORI by the MAC IG. From 23 October to

17 November, the squadron deployed to Korea and

flew its traditional low-level infiltration, resupply,

and exfiltration missions. The 1st SOS received

grades of excellent or outstanding on all graded

events and received an overall excellent for its

composite grade. After returning to Clark AB, the

IG administered a unit evaluation inspection

(UEI) to measure the administrative abilities of

the squadron. Having been deployed to Korea for

an entire month before the evaluation, the UEI

proved to be taxing on squadron personnel. Numerous administrative functions were lauded by

the IG during the out briefing, including the

squadron ECM shop, maintenance job control, and

the squadron Crisis Action Team. For the UEI the

squadron received an overall satisfactory rating.

The two evaluations, along with the MSET earlier

in the year, validated the unit’s ability to perform

both its peacetime and wartime missions.77

In Europe the 7th SOS continued to support an

expanded SOCEUR JCET program. Early in 1988

the squadron deployed to Kenitra AB, Morocco,

and air-dropped Moroccan paratroopers based at

Rabat. More than 275 personnel were air-dropped

using static-line and HALO procedures. In-flight

refueling, night mountain terrain following in the

rugged Atlas mountains, cargo drops, and NVG

airland operations also were completed. In addition to Morocco, the squadron deployed to Norway, Italy, and the United Kingdom for JCETs

and completed valuable training events not available in Central Europe. 78 During April and May

the entire squadron deployed to RAF Sculthorpe,

UK, for Flintlock 88. For the first time one MC130E and 70 personnel deployed to Zaire for a

20-day subexercise named Mbote. While in the

Central African nation, the Talon crew flew 25

missions, including 20 infiltrations, four exfiltra -

tions, and one resupply. The large scope and level

of activity during the Flintlock exercise challenged the squadron and provided the best training of the year.79

After the squadron returned to Germany from

Flintlock , a 7th SOS crew (flying aircraft 64-0523)

experienced a collapsed nose gear during a pilot

proficiency sortie at Niederstetten German Air

Force Base (GAFB), Germany. The accident resulted in extensive damage to the aircraft. A

USAF aircraft recovery team successfully removed the aircraft from the runway, and a repair

team from Warner Robins AFB, Georgia, was dispatched to make needed repairs. For the next four

months, the Talon underwent repair of the underbelly and replacement of the failed nose gear assembly. The aircraft was returned to the squadron in late fall of 1988.80

On 1 August 1988 Col George Ferkes assumed

command of the squadron from Casteel. Ferkes

had participated in the 1980 Iranian rescue mission, flying with Brenci in the first Talon to land

at Desert One. Colonel Dickenson served as

Ferkes’s operations officer until the arrival of

Norm McCaslin later in the year.8 1

At the 8th SOS the major challenge for 1988

revolved around aircraft availability. Along with

its formal Combat Talon School commitment, the

squadron supported test programs that were essential to Talon modernization. Talon 64-0567

had been modified into the Phase I, SOF-I con -

figuration and was dedicated to the SOF-I test

program. As such it was not available to the

squadron for extended periods. When the test profile did allow occasional operational use, only the

few personnel qualified in the new SOF-I system

were authorized to fly the aircraft. Combat Talon

64-0551 had been modified for the Project 46 test

program and was involved in periodic testing of

that new system. From 23 May to 22 June, Da venport and the Project 46 crew deployed to LAS Ontario for continued Phase III testing. Another on -

going program that required a dedicated aircraft

and crew was Volant Knight, which focused on

ECM improvements for the Combat Talon . On 6

July 1988 Colonel Thigpen assumed command

from Colonel Harbison, who had been the commander since 1986. Like Ferkes at the 7th SOS,

Thigpen had come to the squadron after completing a joint tour (at SOCEUR) and being certified

as a joint service officer (JSO). With the emphasis

on jointness brought on by congressional legisla -

tion over the previous three years, JSO status for

potential SOF commanders had become extremely

important.

Just before the 8th SOS change of command,

Air Staff announced that the Combat Talon II

projected initial operational capability had been

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310
slipped indefinitely due to continuing unsatisfactory progress of the aircraft’s radar. The USAF

conducted a thorough program review during the

latter half of 1988, which resulted in the program

being restructured and having a more realistic

IOC date established. During 1988 five more C130H aircraft were delivered—88-0191, 88-0192,

88-0193, 88-0194, and 88-0264—thus bringing the

number of CT II identified airframes delivered to

the USAF to 16 aircraft. The five aircraft were

cycled through LAS Ontario’s Chino facility for

initial modifications then put in long-term storage

at Lockheed-Georgia, and at Rickenbacker AFB,

Ohio, awaiting further modification at E-Systems.

Flight testing at Edwards AFB and CT II modifi -

cations at Greenville continued on the first 11 aircraft. For the 8th SOS the full impact of the slip

of the Combat Talon II IOC date began to unfold

during the fall of 1988.

After assuming command and settling into the

job, Thigpen focused on the number of aircraft

available to the squadron for operational use.

The Talon I test programs, along with PDM and

modification schedules, steadily reduced the

number of available aircraft to the 8th SOS

throughout the fall of 1988, with an all-time low

of one Talon I aircraft projected to be available in

the spring of 1989. Without the Combat Talon II

aircraft to offset the loss of the Talon Is, the

squadron could not fulfill its commitments. With

responsibility for the formal Combat Talon

School and facing an ORI in January, the situation had to change. At the annual Combat Talon

Management Review conference held at LAS Ontario in the fall of 1988, the problem was surfaced, and possible solutions were discussed. During

follow-up actions spearheaded by the Twenty-Third

AF, the modification schedule wa s adjusted by slipping several input dates. Agreements also were

reached with SOCPAC and SOCEUR that essentially assured that the 8th SOS would not fall

below four aircraft being assigned at any time.

Four aircraft available at Hurlburt Field were

the minimum required to keep the Combat Talon

School functioning, keep assigned crews profi -

cient, and support joint requirements with a twoaircraft package. The agreement would leave the

1st and 7th SOS with only two Combat Talons

much of the time, but each squadron was augmented with an assigned slick C-130E to provide

additional pilot- and navigator-proficient sorties.

The 8th SOS also was assigned a C-130E for basicproficiency flying.

With a plan developed to ensure Talon I avai

ability, the 8th SOS prepared for its upcomin

ORI scheduled for January 1989. The 1st SOW

had not been given an ORI since the Decemb

1985 Purple Duck evaluation at Biggs AAF. Sinc

that time MAC had completely rewritten ORI cr

teria by which the wing would be evaluated. U

ing a building-block approach, the wing conducte

limited recall and mobilization exercises and the

put the parts together during a local ORE. B

December a second ORE had been completed, an

wing leadership felt that they were ready for th

following month’s evaluation.

1989: Project 46 Is Terminated

Although Forward Look was still in the impl

mentation phase in January 1989, the ORI of th

1st SOW would be the first test of the Twent

Third AF’s reorganization. With only one SO

wing in the numbered air force, the 1st SOW re

resented the majority of USAF’s SOF capabilit

The 1st SOW ORI, named Jaguar Bite, was co

ducted from 9 January to 17 February 1989. Th

US Special Operations Command sponsored th

exercise. It was the first JCS-coordinated, USSO

COM-sponsored exercise and had the largest pa

ticipation of Air Force SOF assets in the history 

Air Force SOF. Along with four Combat Talo

from the 8th SOS, the 1st SOW deployed MH

53H Pave Low helicopters and AC-130H gunshi

to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, when alerted by th

MAC IG team. Weather was a significant facto

during the exercise, with wind-chill factors r

corded at minus 70 degrees Fahrenheit in th

Montana exercise area and minus 50 degrees i

Michigan.8 2 Elements of the USA’s 1st Special O

erations Command provided most of the groun

forces for the ORI. The 39th SOW at Eglin AF

also participated with its assigned HC-130 an

MH-60 aircraft, but they were not part of the 1

SOW’s evaluation.

The exercise was unprecedented in scope an

duration, taking place over a 40-day period an

encompassing operations based out of Hurlbu

Field, Pope AFB, and Fort Campbell. Rotar

wing operations were conducted as far north 

the upper peninsula of Michigan. The weste

exercise area centered on Helena, Montana, an

primarily involved the 8th SOS Combat Talon

Despite the weather and the extreme distance

flown, the most grueling evaluation in SOF hi

tory resulted in an overall rating of excellent b

the MAC IG. Some problems surfaced in com

mand and control and in joint coordination, b

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

311
the ORI overwhelmingly endorsed Forward Look

initiatives.83 The 8th SOS was evaluated on every

Combat Talon operational capability that it possessed, including a Fulton STARS recovery completed during a driving rainstorm towards the

end of the evaluation.

As USSOCOM matured General Lindsay, commander in chief, Special Operations Command

(CINCSOC), determined that the effort being expended by the small Twenty-Third AF staff on

non-SOF related matters was unacceptable. He

requested Headquarters USAF (over the objections of General Patterson) to divest his air component of all non-SOF units. The Air Staff officially took General Lindsay’s request under

consideration. Partially in response to General

Lindsay’s request and with the ORI complete,

CINCMAC announced on 25 February 1989 his

decision to redesignate the ARRS the Air Rescue

Service and to reorganize, rebuild, and reassign

rescue-oriented units from the Twenty-Third AF

to the newly created ARS . CINCMAC established

a target date of 1 August 1989 for the transfer of

rescue forces.8 4

The Pacific-based special operations wing was

designated the 353d SOW under Forward Look

and was activated at Clark AB, Philippines, on 6

April 1989. Plans to move the 39th SOW from

Eglin AFB to Rhein Main AB, Germany, were

also finalized. On 8 May 1989 the 39th SOW

raised its flag in Germany, thus putting into

place the two overseas wings envisioned in Forward Look. As announced earlier in the year, on

1 August 1989 Headquarters ARRS was redesig -

nated Headquarters ARS and was formally es -

tablished at McClellan AFB, California. Remaining rescue-oriented units were transferred from

the Twenty-Third AF to the new ARS. Thus, the

vision of an all-SOF command formulated in De -

cember 1985 by General Patterson finally became

a reality. On 7 September 1989 General Eggers

succeeded Patterson as the commander of the

Twenty-Third AF .8 5

At Clark AB January 1989 brought about a

change of command for the 1st SOS. On 27 January Col Terry Silvester assumed command of the

squadron from Doherty. Silvester’s immediate

task was to prepare a suitable beddown for the

new Pacific wing, the 353d SOW. Effective 6 April

1989, the 1st SOS was assigned to the 353d SOW,

which was established at Clark AB that same

day. Throughout the year, the new wing grew and

expanded its capabilities as personnel arrived.

Traditional wing functions that had been assigned

to the 1st SOS were transferred to the 353d SOW,

including the squadron’s maintenance section, its

life-support section, and the squadron’s communications element.86

With the new wing gradually absorbing the administrative workload of the squadron, Silvester

was able to concentrate on his heavy exercise and

bilateral training program. During 1989 the 1st

SOS deployed five times to Thailand (one week

each), three times to Korea (Team Spirit, Ulchi

Focus Lens, and Foal Eagle), twice to Australia,

and once to Malaysia.87 From 20 to 24 August the

squadron also deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam,

for a no-notice contingency exercise. Skills developed during the previous quarterly training exercise in the United States were put to the test, and

the squadron did exceptionally well. The exercise

validated the squadron’s ability to operate in the

demanding joint arena.8 8 With Foal Eagle in Korea during the fall, the 1st SOS completed an ambitious year filled with challenges and successes.

At Rhein Main AB the 7th SOS experienced a

marked improvement in its launch reliability and

in-commission rate, which was primarily due to

the maturing of its maintenance section. It had

assumed control of its assigned aircraft from the

435th TAW the previous year and had developed

an outstanding relationship between assigned op -

erations and maintenance personnel. For most of

the year, the 7th SOS possessed three Combat

Talon aircraft and one slick C-130E. Along with

its traditional training locations, the squadron deployed for the first time to Cameroon, Africa, during the spring of 1989. As had been the case in

the Pacific, some assigned squadron functions

were transferred to the 39th SOW when the wing

raised its flag at Rhein Main AB on 8 May, but

the transition was a seamless one. The squadron

had been assigned to the 39th SOW during the

previous year and was familiar with the command

arrangement. Modernization initiatives continued

to become reality as the European Talons received

an NVG-compatible cockpit lighting panel and a

cargo compartment NVG lighting kit. The modifications enhanced the aircrew’s ability to operate

without any overt lighting while utilizing NVGs.89

Since 1967 the 7th SOS had participated in the

annual JCS-directed Flintlock exercise series during the April and May period. For 1989 the exercise was restructured and divided into three

phases. Phase I was combined with a major NATO

command post exercise known as Wintex/Cimex.

During Phase I the 7th SOS deployed personnel to

various exercise locations for the 14-day exercise.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

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Phase II consisted of three subexercises (Moscus,

Muflone, and Mbote) that resembled the traditional Flintlock FTX. Moscus was a 13-day exercise conducted out of Rhein Main AB, with employment missions flown into Norway. Muflone

in Italy and Mbote in Central Africa were both

three weeks in duration and consisted of deployments of 7th SOS aircraft and personnel.9 0 Phase

III of Flintlock 89 was a no-notice, contingencyresponse exercise conducted from 1 to 7 September. The 7th SOS, operating under the OPCON of

SOCEUR, conducted infiltrations that supported

a follow-on mass airdrop of paratroopers. The

scenario included the transload of personnel from

an MH-53H Pave Low helicopter to a 7th SOS

Combat Talon during the exfiltration portion of

the exercise. The entire no-notice exercise was

flown without any late takeoffs or delays. All

training objectives were met, as the European

SOF unit again validated its ability to perform

the demanding joint mission.9 1

In preparation for Flintlock Phase III, the 7th

SOS deployed one Combat Talon and an augmented crew to the United States to participate

in JRT 89-3 from 16 July to 3 August 1989.

Working with other joint forces, the squadron

flew low-level terrain-following, NVG airland,

IFR, and combat onload/off-load training events.

The quality and amount of training received during the two-week exercise far exceeded that

which could be found in Central Europe. By participating in the quarterly joint exercise program,

the 7th SOS was able to maintain the skills required to support contingency operations. Later

in the year, from 6 through 18 December, the

squadron also participated in JRT 90-1. 92 As the

aircraft was redeploying to Rhein Main AB on 18

December, events in Panama escalated, and on

the following day, Operation Just Cause kicked

off. As had been the case six years earlier during

Operation Urgent Fury, the 7th SOS crew just

missed participating in the contingency.93

Daily operations settled down a bit at the 8th

SOS after Jaguar Bite. The grueling ORI had

taken its toll on the entire wing. With four aircraft committed to the exercise, the 8th SOS flew

325 hours during late January and early February 1989.94 The long missions and harsh weather

completely drained both aircrew and support personnel. After a short rest at home station, the

daily grind resumed without another pause for

the remainder of the year. The SOF-I Phase I test

on aircraft 64-0567 was completed during the first

half of the year, with the system upgrades being

certified for the entire Combat Talon I fleet. Th

major improvement that Phase I SOF-I gave 

the Combat Talon was a much improved navig

tion capability. The CMA-880 Doppler comput

and the old LN-15J inertial navigation syste

were replaced by two inertial navigation system

that were tied together by two mission compute

using a 23-stage Kalman filter. The resulting a

curacy and system reliability vastly improved th

Combat Talon’s ability to execute its long-rang

low-level mission in remote areas of the world

The 8th SOS Combat Talons were the first sche

uled for the SOF-I modification, with all squa

ron aircraft to be modified by early 1990.

For the third consecutive year, the squadro

deployed to Jordan for a JCS-coordinated exe

cise. On 1 June Combat Talon 64-0572 departe

Hurlburt Field for a nonstop flight to the Midd

East. In-flight refuelings were successfully com

pleted near Newfoundland, off the coast of Spai

east of Italy, and just south of Greek-controlle

airspace. Entering low level near Al Aqabah, Jo

dan, the crew flew a one-hour route to an airdro

on Gahtos DZ near Azrak, Jordan. The crew the

landed at Azrak and joined the exercise in pr

gress. In all, the long-range infiltration missio

took 24.6 hours to complete and was the longe

Combat Talon flight since the early 1980s. Du

ing the course of the exercise, two multishi

highway landings were conducted, with tran

load of personnel being accomplished betwee

the Combat Talon and Jordanian rotary-win

a ir craft. A desert landing also was made in th

vall ey of Wadi Rum, where exercise groun

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

Aircraft 64-0551 intercepts a six-man lift line duri

Project 46 system testing.

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

313
forces participating in a cross-training exercise

were resupplied.9 6

Aircraft 64-0551 was deployed to LAS Ontario

for a Project 46 Phase III test from 8 August to 15

September. Over the previous two years, the test

effort had faced several de lays, including one after

the failure of the aircraft’s nose radome during a

heavyweight recovery. The radome was redesigned, strengthened, and installed on aircraft 64-

0551 for the 1989 test. The objective of Phase III

was to man-rate the Project 46 recovery system,

thus allowing live pickups under operational con -

ditions. Skip Davenport continued as the Project

46 aircraft commander and successfully picked

up a variety of packages over the course of the

test. With two-thirds of the test successfully completed, a 1,500-pound heavyweight recovery was

attempted. During the initial stage of the recov -

ery, the sky anchor engaged the heavy lift line,

and the package came off the ground normally.

Moments later the sky anchor failed, and the

weight of the package stripped the line back

through the sky anchor. The package fell to the

hard surface of the Edwards AFB dry lake bed.

Investigation revealed that the sky anchor had

failed internally, thus allowing the mechanism to

release the lift line. After the sky anchor failure,

the program was suspended, and no additional

Project 46 recoveries were attempted. The crew

returned to Hurlburt Field while the program’s

status was determined.

A thorough review of the Project 46 program

was conducted by Twenty-Third AF, USSOCOM,

and LAS Ontario test engineers during the fall of

1989. With an improved MH-53H Pave Low helicopter capability and the programmed fielding of

the tilt-rotor JVX, USSOCOM decided to cancel

Project 46. Aircraft 64-0551 was eventually demodified from the Project 46 configuration during a

scheduled PDM at LAS Ontario, and the capability

to extract four to six men, or up to 1,500 pounds of

equipment, passed into history. Project 46 marked

the last major effort by the Air Force to develop an

improved Fulton recovery capability.9 7

Combat Talon II-designated aircraft 88-0195

and 88-1803 also were delivered to the Air Force

during 1989, thus bringing the number of deliv -

ered C-130H aircraft to 18. As 1989 closed the

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

The radome on aircraft 64-0551 failed after a 1,500-

pound pickup. The program was suspended for a year

while a new, stronger radome was developed.

Photo courtesy of author

Author (left) with Maj Skip Davenport, Edwards AFB

dry lake bed, the day prior to the sky anchor failure

that led to the cancellation of the program. Detachment

4 had painted the shark’s mouth on the radome for the

test. The radar had been removed in the event of another radome failure.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

314
new aircraft were in various states of modifica -

tion, flight testing, or long-term storage.9 8 The

available CT I fleet would be tested in late De -

cember when Manuel Noriega created a crisis in

Panama that required US intervention to protect

American lives. For the third time during the de

ade of the 1980s, the Combat Talon would b

called upon to deliver special operations forc

into combat to defend vital US interests abroad

Notes

1. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 64-0571,

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

2. Official Paper, “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Com -

mand,” Lt Col Jerry L. Thigpen, USAF, US Army War College

Military Studies Program (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War

College, 1991), 37.

3. Col William G. Boykin, USA, “The Origins of the United

States Special Operations Command,” n.d., originally published

as a US Army War College Military Studies Program pa per,

“Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation:

Why It Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?” (Carlisle

Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1991), 2.

4. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 38–39.

5. Ibid., 40.

6. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December 1984,

16th Special Operations Wing historian file, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., vol. 1, I-32 to I-33.

7. Ibid., I-32.

8. Ibid., I-33 to I-34.

9. Ibid., I-57.

10. Ibid., I-46.

11. Ibid., I-50.

12. Ibid., I-49.

13. Ibid., I-33.

14. Ibid., I-85.

15. Ibid., I-86 to I-88.

16. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 83-1212.

17. Boykin, 8.

18. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 Decemb

1984, vol. 1, I-93.

19. Ibid., I-93 to I-94.

20. Ibid., I-95.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., I-66 to I-67.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., I-67 to I-68.

25. Ibid., I-68.

26. Ibid., I-14.

27. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 Decemb

1985, vol. 1, 1225.

The test team that brought Project 46 to the threshold of success in 1989. Standing left to right: Witherspoon, James Avant, Larry Beattie, Mike Duffie, Bill

Fowler, Gene Koppe, Dave Payne, Tony Walton, Ann Fulton, John Plasko, Russ

Tharp, Dave Tarpley, Frank Sharkany, Bob Underwood, and Bob Almanzar.

Kneeling left to right: Jim Hobbs, John R. Lewis, Tim Kerns, Bob Neal, Don

Nicholson, Denis Freizvee, Robert Fulton, Dee Newberry, Larry Edwards, and

George Adams.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

ROAD TO COMBAT TALON 

315
28. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1984, vol. 1, II-189, II-211, II-291.

29. Ibid., II-305.

30. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1985, vol. 2, II-149.

31. Ibid., vol. 8, 1217.

32. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1988, 1212.

33. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1985, vol. 2, II-185.

34. Ibid., II-188.

35. Ibid., II-189.

36. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 43–44.

37. Boykin, 5.

38. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 84-0475, 84-

0476, 85-0011, 85-0012, and 86-1699.

39. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 1, I-6 to I-7.

40. Ibid., I-7.

41. Ibid.

42. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 44.

43. Ibid.

44. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 1, I-9.

45. Ibid., I-9 to I-10.

46. Ibid., I-10.

47. Ibid., I-17 to I-18.

48. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 45.

49. Ibid.

50. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 1, I-19 to I-20.

51. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 45–46.

52. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 8, 267.

53. Ibid., 2.

54. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 1, I-37 to I-38.

55. Ibid., I-42 to I-43.

56. Ibid., I-43.

57. Ibid., I-43 to I-44.

58. History, 2d Air Division, 1 January–31 December

1986, vol. 8, 814.

59. Ibid.

60. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1987, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 8.

61. History, 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, 1

January–30 June 1987, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 2.

62. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1987, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 13–14.

63. Ibid., 3.

64. Ibid., 8.

65. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 64-0567.

66. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1987, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 8, 677–79.

67. Ibid., 679.

68. Ibid.

69. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 87-0023, 87-

0024, 87-0125, 87-0126, and 87-0127.

70. Boykin, 16–17.

71. Col Rod Lenahan, Retired, Crippled Eagle (Charleston:

Narwahl Press, 1998), 212–13.

72. Ibid., 213.

73. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1988, 4.

74. Ibid., 7.

75. Ibid.

76. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1988, 18.

77. Ibid., 4.

78. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1988, 11.

79. Ibid., 13.

80. Ibid., 7.

81. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1989, 2.

82. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1989, vol. 1, II-73.

83. “AFSOC: The Air Force’s Newest Command,” 54.

84. Ibid., 54–55.

85. Ibid., 55.

86. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1989, 9.

87. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1989, 9.

88. Ibid.

89. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1989, 8.

90. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Janu -

ary–30 June 1989, 12.

91. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1989, 15.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1989, vol. 1, II-75.

95. Ibid., 1 January–30 June 1989, vol. 7, 368.

96. Ibid., 1 January–30 June 1989, vol. 1, II-77 to II-78.

97. Ibid., 1 January–30 June 1989, vol. 8, 261.

98. Aircraft Records, AFTO Form 95, aircraft 88-0195 and

88-1803.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

316
Chapter 12

Operation Just Cause (1989–90)

I firmly believe that any man’s finest hour—his greatest fulfillment to all he holds dear—is that

moment when he has worked his heart out in a good cause and lies exhausted on the field of

battle—victorious.

—Vince Lombardi

On 17 December 1989 the 8th SOS learned that

an operation in Panama was imminent. The

squadron had just completed a series of demanding training exercises that culminated in an airfield seizure operation conducted at Choctaw Auxiliary Airfield just west of the Eglin AFB range

complex. It was Sunday evening, and most assigned personnel and their spouses were attending

the annual 8th SOS Squadron Christmas party

being held at Liollio’s restaurant in downtown

Fort Walton Beach. Honored guests had begun to

arrive, with about 150 people already at the restaurant, when the 1st SOW commander, Col

George Gray, came in. An easygoing and likable

professional, Gray showed no outward sign that

something was brewing. After greeting several

members of the squadron, Gray found an opportune time to speak privately with the 8th SOS

squadron commander, Colonel Thigpen, and con -

fide in him the developing situation. Tensions had

increased in Panama over the past several days,

and Manuel Noriega, the strongman who had con -

trolled the country since the early 1980s, had declared war on the United States. Gray directed

Thigpen to put together four crews and to place

them in crew rest in anticipation of a noon Mon -

day launch from Hurlburt Field.

Not to arouse suspicion, Colonel Gray remained

at the Christmas party through the dinner meal,

but during the break at 2030, Thigpen made an

announcement to the group. The squadron had

just completed JRT 90-1 the previous Friday, and

Thigpen relayed to the guests that another itera -

tion of the exercise had been scheduled for the fol -

lowing week. All 8th SOS assigned personnel were

told to continue to enjoy the social event but to stop

consuming alcohol by 2100. The party resumed,

although somewhat subdued, with entertainment

and other scheduled activities. Although nothing

further was said about the unplanned tasking,

spouses and squadron members alike (many of

whom had been in special operations for most of

their professional lives) sensed that something

more than an exercise was imminent. Earlier in

the evening, Thigpen had talked with Colonel

O’Reilly, his operations officer, and had directe

him to quietly leave the party after dinner, procee

to the squadron, and put together four Comb

Talon augmented crews. O’Reilly was to use t

same crews that had participated in the rece

JRT, where possible. Some crew members, how 

ever, had departed on Saturday, 16 December, fo

Christmas leave and were not available. (The o

adage that you never, never go on leave while a

signed to a special operations unit rang tru

again!) Thigpen remained at the party until 223

when it began to break up, and the attendees le

for home. He went straight to the squadron oper

tions center at Hurlburt Field, where O’Reilly ha

assembled a cadre of schedulers and aircrew pe

sonnel. With only minor adjustments, Thigpen a

proved the four crews and directed O’Reilly to p

them in crew rest for a Monday morning (18 D

cember) launch. With notifications made, everyo

left for a brief night’s sleep. Before noon the ne

day, the largest air operation since the Vietna

War was under way, and the 8th SOS Comba

Talons were in the thick of it.

Events Leading Up to

Operation Just Cause

Panama had a long history of association wi

the United States going back to the turn of th

century. In 1903 a revolutionary junta, under th

protection of the United States, carried out a su

cessful rebellion against Columbia. As a resu

Columbia granted the United States the territo

for a canal under the Isthmian Canal Conventio

(the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903) and cede

to the revolutionary junta the territory that b

came the independent country of Panama. From

1903 through the Second World War, politic

power in Panama was concentrated in the han

of a few upper-class families. They built an oliga

chy that traced its roots to the early Spaniard

After World War II, the situation continued 

change. Since 1904 the National Police Force ha

been Panama’s only official armed service. B

1947 Jose Antonio Remon had risen through th

317
ranks to become commandant of the police. Remon began to convert the national police to a na -

tional guard that was trained in military skills.

As Remon became more powerful, so did his police

force. By 1952 he had been elected president of

the country and had nearly completed the conversion of the National Police Force to the National

Guard. Remon’s presidency was notorious for

graft and corruption, and in 1955 he was assassinated. The old oligarchy returned to power and

ruled the country for the following 13 years. During that period the National Guard that Remon

had created grew in power and influence, until it

was in a position to again directly influence the

conduct of the government (fig. 38).1

A political crisis developed in 1968 that resulted in the election of Arnulfo Arias as the

country’s new president. Assuming office he immediately announced sweeping changes in the

leadership of the National Guard. Having become extremely powerful over the past decade,

the National Guard promptly removed Arias

from office, established a provisional military

junta, and disbanded the National Assembly

along with all political parties. Throughout the

following year, members of the military junta

maneuvered to gain control of the country.

Omar Torrijos, who was the commander of the

National Guard at the time, was able to consolidate his power and gain control of the govern -

ment after he defeated a coup in 1969. Once in

control Torrijos expanded his political base by

continuing to increase the size of the National

Guard and by preventing the formation of political parties. He replaced the country’s National

Assembly in 1972 with a National Assembly of

Community Representatives, whose members

were selected by the Torrijos-controlled govern -

ment and not by popular v ote. 2

Under the guise of reforming the 1972 constitution, political parties were legalized in 1978, and

Torrijos gave up his position as president. The

perceived softening of Torrijos toward a civilian

government was actually a result of ongoing negotiations with the Carter administration over the

return of the Panama Canal to the country of

Panama. Torrijos knew that the US Congress

would not ratify a treaty with a Panamanian government that was not at least outwardly democratic. The National Assembly elected Aristides

Royo as president, but political power remained in

the hands of Torrijos. Presidential elections were

set for 1984, and Torrijos established his own political party—the Democratic Revolutionary Party

(PDR)—to prepare for them.3

Torrijos was killed in an airplane crash on 31

July 1981, and Panama was plunged into a series

of crises over the next two years. Most of the turmoil came from within the National Guard, with

the recently formed political parties too weak to

exert much influence. Out of the internal National

Guard power struggle, Manuel Noriega emerged

as dictator of Panama. Noriega had been a longtime protégé of Torrijos and relied upon corruption, repression, and the National Guard to remain in power. Noriega continued to expand the

National Guard, and he created the Panamanian

Defense Force (PDF), a combination of National

Figure 38. Map of Panama (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

318
Guard, Panamanian air force, Panamanian navy,

Canal Defense Force, local police force, Traffic De -

partment, Department of Investigation, and Immigration Department. By 1987 the PDF had expanded to nearly 15,000 personnel. To control the

PDF Noriega placed it within a network of his

most trusted and loyal followers.4

By the 1984 presidential elections, it was apparent that Noriega and the PDF were firmly in

control of the government. The PDF presidential

candidate, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, easily defeated three-time president Arnulfo Arias in an

election fraught with blatant irregularities. Less

than a year later, Noriega had Barletta removed

from office, and he installed Vice President Eric

Arturo Delvalle as the new president of Panama.

To maintain control Noriega and the PDF became even more repressive during the following

four years. Special elements within the PDF

were used to squash public opposition to Noriega’s iron-fisted rule. Noriega also created local

militias, known as dignity battalions, to frighten

and harass political opposit ion.5

Throughout 1987 allegations continued to arise

over the illegal activities of Noriega . Col Roberto

Diaz Herrera, a former PDF chief of staff who

Noriega forced out of the National Guard in 1984,

charged that Noriega was heavily involved in narcotics trafficking and money laundering for

Columbian-based drug cartels. Herrera also claimed

that Noriega had rigged the 1984 presidential election and that he had ordered the brutal murder of

an outspoken critic of the regime, Dr. Hugo Spada -

fora. In February 1988 two US federal grand ju -

ries indicted Noriega on drug trafficking charges,

thus formally pitting the Reagan administration

against the Panamanian dictator. On 25 February

1988, under pressure from the US government,

President Delvalle attempted to fire Noriega as

commander of the PDF . Noriega reacted by removing Delvalle from office, thus initiating a period of

anti-US demonstrations and increased harassment of US military forces assigned to Panama.

Relationships continued to worsen between the

United States and Noriega throughout 1988, with

the United States putting increased economic

pressure on the government of Panama. 6

The next major confrontation between Noriega 

and the United States resulted from the national

elections held on 7 May 1989. The Civil Democratic Opposition Alliance of Guillermo Endara,

Ricardo Arias Calderon, and Guillermo Ford were

in the lead when Noriega abruptly stepped in and

annulled the election with the help of the PDF.

During the ensuing demonstrations, the PDF br

tally crushed the opposition.7 Former US Pres

dent Jimmy Carter, in Panama to monitor th

elections, declared the Opposition Alliance victo

by a three-to-one margin and denounced the mi

tary dictatorship of Noriega and his actions to tak

the election by fraud. When the Opposition Al

ance candidates led a protest march through th

streets of Panama City, they were attacked b

thugs of the dignity battalions. Beaten and cow

into submission, the opposition retreated from an

further direct confrontation with Noriega .

8

 Th

United States reacted by imposing additional ec

nomic sanctions, a move that placed considerab

strain on Panama’s already depressed economy.

As 1989 passed Noriega’s position steadi

weakened due to international condemnation 

his actions and due to US economic sanctions. O

3 October 1989 a respected Panamanian office

Maj Moises Giroldi Vega, attempted to overthro

Noriega. Giroldi was the chief of security at No

ega’s headquarters, the La Comandancia, whic

was located in downtown Panama City, and w

one of only a few who were allowed to be armed 

the presence of Noriega. On the morning of 3 Oct

ber, Giroldi and a small number of soldiers too

control of La Comandancia and captured Norieg

Noriega refused to resign and leave the country, 

Giroldi contacted US officials to arrange a han

over of Noriega to US military forces stationed 

Panama. Noriega was the godfather to Giroldi

children, and he did not want Noriega to be take

out of Panama for trial in the United States. Whi

Giroldi negotiated with the United States, doze

of heavily armed Battalion 2000 soldiers loyal 

Noriega assaulted Giroldi’s positions and reca

tured the La Comandancia.9

Giroldi was captured by the Battalion 2000 a

sault force, and Noriega was subsequently r

leased. During the night of 3 October, Giroldi w

murdered after being tortured by several of No

ega’s leading officers. In the following days, No

ega had over 70 soldiers shot, with another 60

arrested and put in prison. The events of 3 Octob

had so shaken Noriega that he began moving fro

place to place, never sleeping in the same pla

twice. The 1988 US indictments made his depa

ture from Panama impossible, and his long-ter

survival in the country was doubtful.1 0

Tensions continued to increase between th

United States and Panama throughout the r

mainder of October. On 3 November US marin

on Galeta Island exchanged fire with unident

fied attackers. Throughout November Norieg

OPERATION JUST CAUS

319
continued to verbally attack the United States

and to poison relations between the two countries.

His verbal attacks reached a climax on 15 December, when he “declared war” on the United States.

On 16 December a US Marine officer was killed

by Panamanian troops, and another officer was

beaten by PDF soldiers at a checkpoint in Panama

City. With no diplomatic solution feasible and with

rising attacks against Americans in Panama,

President George Bush decided to execute Opera -

tion Just Cause on 17 December 1989. The follow -

ing day the Just Cause execute order was issued,

with H hour established as 0100 on 20 December

(D day). 11

Development of the

Blue Spoon Operations Order

The planning process for possible US intervention in Panama officially began with the issuance

of a JCS planning order on 28 February

1988—after Noriega was indicted by a US grand

jury for drug trafficking. From that time until

the December 1989 invasion, a series of plans

were developed under the umbrella title of Op -

eration Elaborate Maze. During the 22-month

process, the name was changed to Operation

Prayer Book . Under the contingency plans, two

separate categories of operations emerged—one

focused on military force and the other on post–

Noriega restoration. The military force option

was titled Operation Blue Spoon and would later

emerge as Operation Just Cause. The post–Noriega

plans had three successive names—Operations

Krystal Ball, Blind Logic, and Promote Liberty.

Throughout most of 1988 the post–Noriega plans

received the most attention, but by 1989, with

rising hostilities towards the US military sta -

tioned in Panama, the military force option came

to the forefront.1 2

In August of 1989, Gen Maxwell R. Thurman

was designated the new USCINCSO, Quarry

Heights, Panama, and he focused most of his energy on Blue Spoon. The plan had been under

intense revision since June 1989. Thurman later

would state that he did not spend five minutes on

the post–Noriega option. He was intent on developing the campaign plan for what would become

Operation Just Cause.

1 3 The original Blue Spoon

OPORD did not address the capture of Noriega

but only the neutralization of the PDF as an in -

stitution. This would change as Noriega stepped

up his anti-US attacks. Over the summer of

1989, changes were made in the strategic objectives of the plan. The planners made the basic

assumption that the simultaneous elimination of

all PDF areas by “overwhelming force” would be

required to ensure a successful operation and to

keep casualties at an absolute minimum. The

overwhelming force requirement resulted in the

addition of a brigade task force under the command of Lt Gen Carl Stiner, USA, who was the

commander of the 18th Airborne Corps located at

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The plan called for

the brigade task force to be introduced into Panama by way of airborne assault at Torrijos/Tocu -

men International Airport. General Stiner was

designated commander, JTF-South, and his headquarters was assigned the responsibility to exe -

cute the Blue Spoon OPORD.1 4 All special opera -

tions forces, including the 8th SOS Combat

Talons, were assigned to a JSOTF under the command of Maj Gen Wayne Downing, USA. The

JSOTF was a subordinate command of JTFSouth, and General Downing reported directly to

General Stiner. After the plan was finalized in

early October, it was briefed to the JCS and was

approved for execution at the direction of the

president of the United States.

With Operation Blue Spoon finalized and approved by JCS, a detailed rehearsal schedule was

developed to validate the plan. The conventional

airborne forces of JTF-South rehearsed their assigned portion of the OPORD on 6 December, and

the JSOTF-assigned special operations forces did

the same during a quarterly joint exercise (JRT

90-1) from 6 to 18 December. During the night of

14 December, a full-scale airfield seizure and target engagement dress rehearsal was executed,

thus validating the special operations portion of

the plan. While the JSOTF forces were redeploying back to their home stations on 15 December

(the 8th SOS had participated in the JRT from

Hurlburt Field), the Panamanian National Assembly, which was appointed by Noriega and con -

trolled by the PDF , declared Noriega head of the

Panamanian state. Noriega promptly delivered

his “state of war” message. Events rapidly esca -

lated over the next 48 hours, culminating in the

issuance of the Operation Just Cause execute order on 18 December.1 5

The Plan

The JCS-approved Blue Spoon OPORD called

for simultaneous attacks by conventional and special operations forces on critical command and

control nodes and key transportation nodes, and

simultaneous defensive operations to protect US

citizens and the Panama Canal infrastructure.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

320
The mission was, in short, to neutralize the PDF

while minimizing loss of life on both sides. The

campaign objectives included the removal of

Noriega, restructure of Panamanian security

forces, and realignment of Panama’s civil-m ilitary

relations that had become convoluted over the

years with dictatorial rule. General Stiner served

as the overall war-fighting commander, with the

7th Infantry Division, one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, one mechanized battalion from

the 5th Mechanized Division, a battalion-size task

force of Marines, and assets of the in-place 193d

Light Infantry Brigade (located at Howard AB)

committed to his task force. Air transportation for

the conventional forces included C-141s a nd C130s from MAC and assets of the 24th Compos -

ite Wing stationed at Howard AB. JSOTF forces

included the 75th Ranger Regiment, SEAL ele -

ments from the Naval Special Warfare Group,

3d and 7th Special Forces Groups, and the 1st SOW.

In all, including support- and combat-su pportdesignated forces, more than 27,000 soldiers,

sailors, airmen, and marines were assigned to

the operation.1 6

To accomplish the objectives of the operation,

assigned forces were organized into various task

forces and committed to specific targets within

Panama. Organized as Task Force Bayonet, the

193d Brigade was to seize and secure the CurunduAncon Hill-Balboa areas by ground attack and

was to conduct an air assault against the PDF ’s

5th Company, which was garrisoned at Fort

Amador. As a part of Task Force Bayonet, Task

Force Gator was task organized around the 4th of

the 6th Infantry (Mechanized) and was committed

to attacking Torrijos/Tocumen International Airport at H hour. Included in Task Force Bayonet’s

tasking was the isolation and reduction of Noriega’s headquarters, La Comandancia, located in

downtown Panama City. Task Force Red Tango,

consisting of one battalion of the 75th Ranger

Regiment, simultaneously would conduct an air

assault on the international airport as Task Force

Gator attacked from the ground. (H hour had

been selected early in the planning process as

0100 hours based primarily on the density of

traffic flow into Torrijos/Tocumen International

Airport.) The Marine battalion, reinforced with

one engineer battalion, formed Task Force Semper

Fi, and it was tasked to block the western approaches to Panama City and to secure the strategic Bridge of the Americas. Task Force Atlantic,

made up of the 4th of the 17th Infantry (Light)

a nd the 3d of the 504th Infantry (Assault), was to

isolate the city of Colon on the Atlantic seaboar

neutralize the PDF ’s 8th Company and its nav

company stationed there, protect Madden Dam

and free a number of political prisoners at th

Renacer Prison located at Gamboa, midway acro

the Isthus of Panama. 17

The remaining two battalions of the 75

Ranger Regiment made up Task Force Red R

meo and was committed to a parachute assau

on Rio Hato AB located to the west of Panam

City. The parachute assault would commence 

H hour, with a five-ship airlanding 35 minut

later to infiltrate additional personnel and equi

ment. (The five-ship airland formation was mad

up of three MC-130E Combat Talons of the 8

SOS and two SOLL II C-130Es of the 317

TAW.) At Rio Hato AB, the PDF 6th and 7

Infantry Companies were garrisoned in a ba

racks complex to the southwest of the airfiel

The base also was located near Noriega’s coast

vacation villa, a location that many US intell

gence sources considered Noriega’s preferred hi

ing place. Other JSOTF units, organized as Tas

Force Black, Task Force White, and Task Forc

Blue, were tasked to attack other key targets 

H hour. JSOTF targets included a PDF patr

craft in Balboa Harbor, a TV tower at Cerro Azu

and neutralization of Paitilla Airfield, whe

Noriega maintained a Lear Jet capable of takin

him to safety outside of Panama. An addition

on-call mission for the JSOTF was to mount o

erations to capture Noriega or to rescue Amer

can hostages, as required.18

Forty-five minutes after Task Force Re

Tango’s drop on Torrijos/Tocumen Internation

Airport, a brigade task force from the 82d Ai

borne Division, organized as Task Force Pacifi

would parachute on to the airfield. From there th

brigade would conduct helicopter air-assault o

erations to neutralize Noriega’s Battalion 200

which was garrisoned at Fort Cimarron, attack th

1st Heavy Weapons Infantry Company at Tinajita

and engage the calvary squadron and special forc

elements located at Panama Viejo. Follow-on oper

tions called for occupation of Panama City to r

store law and order, then movement to the interio

of Panama to neutralize PDF elements locat

there. 19

Thus, when the hatred that was directed again

the United States by Noriega boiled over on the 16

of December, a comprehensive plan was on the she

and rehearsals had been conducted to validate it. U

like Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, there had bee

sufficient time to complete the deliberate plannin

OPERATION JUST CAUS

321
process. Events beginning just after midnight on

20 December 1989 would provide the proof that

US special operations forces, working closely with

a large conventional force, had matured significantly since Desert One. The Blue Spoon OPORD

was renamed Operation Just Cause for the execution phase of the plan.

The 8th SOS Deploys

to Lawson AAF, Georgia

The 1st SOW was a blur of activity by Monday

morning, 18 December, when the 8th SOS crews

were alerted and reported to the squadron. By

0900 there were five crews ready to brief in the

8th SOS squadron briefing room. (During the previous night, the requirement for a fifth crew materialized, and it was put in crew rest for the

Monday morning show.) The 20th SOS, along

with US Army MH-47s, was in the process of deploying to Panama. The 9th SOS at Eglin AFB

was tasked to refuel the helicopters and to provide SAR support over the Gulf of Mexico during

the helicopter deployment. The 8th SOS was

tasked to provide backup tanker support if the

9th SOS experienced an aircraft abort. Two 8th

SOS Talons were placed on alert for the backup

helicopter refueling mission. Two other MC130Es, along with the three Just Cause mission

crews, departed for Lawson AAF, Georgia, at 1100

local. The 9th SOS successfully completed the helicopter refueling mission, and the two alert Combat

Talons were subsequently released to join the first

two Combat Talons in Georgia. They departed

Hurlburt Field and arrived at Lawson AAF during

the late afternoon on 18 December. At 1500, a mass

aircrew briefing was held at Fort Benning, Georgia,

which was adjacent to Lawson AAF and the home

of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The crews were given

as much information as was available on the objective area and on possible threats to the aircraft. At

the briefing the 8th SOS crews learned that their

objective was Rio Hato Airfield and that their mission was to airland elements of Task Force Red Romeo utilizing NVG airland procedures. With information in hand, the planners and crews sat down

to put together the assault package plan. An intelligence update and an in-progress review were

scheduled for 2100 that evening, leaving no time

to spare. 20

Most of the crew members from the 8th SOS

had participated in the recently completed JRT 90-

1 and were familiar with the task. Throughout the

evening additional SOLL I and SOLL II C-130

crews arrived from Pope, Dyess, and Little Rock

AFBs. Most of them also had participated in the

JRT. At the 2100 briefing, there were 20 SOLL

crews and five Combat Talon crews in attendance.

A mission planner began the briefing by announcing that the US president had signed the execute

order for Operation Just Cause, which signified

to all attendees that the mission was a go. The

Rio Hato air assault force was divided into two

packages—a 15-ship C-130 air-drop package that

was scheduled to drop at H hour and a five-ship

NVG airland package that was made up of the

three 8th SOS Combat Talons and two Popea ssigned C-130 SOLL II aircraft. The airlanding

was scheduled 35 minutes after the parachute assault. After the 2100 briefing, planners and crew

members assigned to the two packages continued

to refine their mission plans. The five-ship airland

package was ready to brief back its mission by

0200 on 19 December. With some questions still

not answered by planners during the brief back,

the crews went into crew rest at 030 0.2 1

Four MC-130Es and five Combat Talon crews

deployed to Lawson AAF for Operation Just

Cause. After final mission planning, only three

Combat Talons (plus a spare aircraft) and three

augmented crews were required. Thigpen and

O’Reilly had the difficult task of deciding the final

makeup of the three mission crews. Because of the

anticipated extended crew duty day for the mission (more than 24 hours), additional crew members were moved from Ted Korver’s crew to the

three mission crews. The following 8th SOS augmented crews were finalized during the mission

planning phase on 18 December. (Crews 1, 2, and

3 flew the Rio Hato AB assault mission on 19/20

December 1989. Ted Korver deployed to Howard

Crew 1

(Talon

64-0567)

Crew 2

(Talon

64-0562)

Crew 3

(Talon

64-0572)

Spare Crew

Thigpen Davenport Gallagher Korver

Gregor O’Reilly Batts English

Abbott Prior Harstad – –

Ross Cochran Strang – –

Weiler Franco Reynolds Kersh

Ammons McCabe Inkel Aldridge

Bouressa Crisafi Tagert Pearson

Alaniz Bonn Vonsik DeBoe

Gorczynski Long Tremblay Fleming

Pies Dunn Gillian – –

Bonck Boulware Balok – –

Harris Ballerstadt Foster – –

Wilcox Crayne Joy Corlew

Brackett Hickman Clark Bohannon

Doyle – – – – Gallo

Fox – – Linder Gobbi

Cribbs Sobell – – – –

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

322
AB on 23 December to participate in follow-on

operations in Panama. Additional 8th SOS crews

flew in country until 4 January 1990, when all

hostilities ceased with the capture of Manuel

Noriega and his delivery to the United States

aboard Skip Davenport’s Combat Talon.)

While the 8th SOS crews were in crew rest, a

cold front swept through Georgia and onward to

the East Coast, bringing with it low clouds, rain,

and near-freezing temperatures. At Pope AFB,

where the 18th Airborne Corps was scheduled to

depart for its insertion into Panama, a severe ice

storm threatened to cancel the launch. Weather,

which had played a pivotal role in both Desert

One and in Operation Urgent Fury, was again

giving the invasion force fits. At Lawson AAF the

biggest problems faced by the force were the low

clouds and generally miserable weather associated with the light, cold rain. The Combat Talon

crews arrived at their aircraft at 1500 on the afternoon of 19 December. Through a scheduling

snafu between Air Force and Army planners, the

ranger force had arrived hours earlier and was

huddled behind the mission aircraft waiting for

the aircrews. The troops were dressed for the hot,

tropical environment of Panama and were chilled

to the bone. The crew chiefs quickly opened the

locked aircraft and started the gas turbine compressors so that the aircraft heaters could be ope

ated. With the soldiers on board, the three ai

craft were warmed up as maintenance and ai

crew personnel initiated their preflight duties. B

1700 personnel and cargo were loaded, and a

was ready for launch.22

The three Combat Talons were heavy. Th

first two aircraft had nearly identical load

which consisted of two US Army gun-jeeps and on

USAF Special Tactics Squadron (STS) all-terra

vehicle (basically, a four-wheel-drive combat amb

lance). In addition, there were two motor cycle

4,000 pounds of Class A explosives, a forward-are

refueling-and-rearming-point (FARRP) syste

with two USAF fuels technicians, and 45 ranger

plus the aircrew. T. J. Gallagher’s aircraft did n

carry a special tactics vehicle, Class A explosive

or FARRP equipment, but was loaded to capaci

with additional rangers. Each aircraft carrie

58,000 pounds of fuel, with the first two Talo

grossing out at approximately 180,000 pound

The number three Combat Talon weighe

slightly less.23

There were approximately 25 C-130s at Lawso

AAF—15 primary C-130s for the air assault, thre

MC-130E Combat Talons, and two SOLL II C-13

for the NVG airland, and an assortment of spar

aircraft should any primary aircraft abort durin

Rio Hato AB, Panama, looking north from the Pacific Ocean. The 8th SOS Com -

bat Talons landed to the south just past the Pan American Highway, which

bisected the runway at its midpoint. The FARRP location is identified at right

center of picture.

USAF Photo

OPERATION JUST CAUS

323
launch. By 1730 the entire flight line was on the

move. The proverbial walk of the elephants was

under way, with the C-130s loaded and maneuvering to their takeoff positions. The Combat

Talon crews had an excellent view of the specta -

cle, being parked on a side taxiway just 100 yards

from where the larger formation would begin its

takeoff roll. At precisely 1802, Eastern Standard

Time, the first C-130 began its takeoff roll, followed every 15 seconds by another aircraft. The

weather had remained marginal throughout the

afternoon, and the ceiling was 300 feet overcast

with one-mile visibility as the C-130s lifted off

into the near darkness of the approaching night.

One by one the aircraft disappeared into the overcast. Not one aircraft failed to make its scheduled

departure time. By 1807 local the C-130 formation had departed, leaving behind the enginerunning spare aircraft and the five-ship airland

formation. There were only a few minutes left for

the Talon crews to reflect on the night’s events

before it was time for them to make their own

departure (fig. 39). 24

Assault on Rio Hato, Panama

After a short taxi to the runway, Thigpen lined

up the lead aircraft (64-0567) for its takeoff roll.

At 1844 local, the lead Combat Talon began to roll,

with the other two Talons following at two-minute

intervals at 1846 and 1848. The two SOLL II aircraft, which were not capable of in-flight refu eling,

and were lighter and faster than the Talons, followed the last Talon 15 minutes later at 1903. As

the heavy Combat Talons lifted into the now

darkened night, they entered a solid overcast as

they passed the departure end of the runway. The

cold temperature helped create badly needed

thrust for the turboprop engines, but the aircraft

could climb only at about 300 feet per minute t o a

cruise ceiling of 14,000 feet. Eventually, as the

air craft burned off fuel, the formation continued

its climb to 18,000 feet. After the two SOLL II

aircraft departed Lawson AAF, one experienced a

maintenance problem and had to return to the

airfield for repairs. Thanks to a superior maintenance effort, the problem was fixed, and the aircraft was able to launch and to make its landing

time at Rio Hato.25

As the three Combat Talons flew south towards

Panama, the early portion of the mission went

according to plan. After passing the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, the three Talons were scheduled

for an IFR from two KC-135 at 10,000-feet altitude. At the air refueling control point, there were

no tankers in sight. High overhead the Talon crews

could see an armada of aircraft heading south on

the same track as their formation, but none were

slowing to refuel the MC-130Es . Eventually, one

KC-135 rendez voused with the Talon formation,

and Davenport was first to receive his on load of

fuel. With only one tanker, the three Talons

could not take their preplanned fuel load. The

crew navigators quickly calculated the minimum

Figure 39. H-Hour Deployments, Operation Just Cause

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

324
USAF Photo

Crew 1, Operation Just Cause. Standing left to right: Alaniz, Ross, Weiler, Gre -

gor, Thigpen, Ammons, Wilcox, and Gorczynski. Kneeling left to right: Bouressa,

Harris, Bonck, Abbott, and Brackett. Not pictured: Pies, Doyle, Fox, and Cribbs.

USAF Photo

Crew 2, Operation Just Cause. Standing left to right: Long, Ballerstadt, Franco,

O’Reilly, Davenport, Prior, Cochran, McCabe, and Crisafi. Kneeling left to right:

Crayne, Boulware, and Dunn. Not pictured: Bonn, Hickman, and Sobell.

OPERATION JUST CAUS

325
amount of fuel each Talon had to take to complete

its primary airland mission, depart Rio Hato, and

either land at Howard AB for additional fuel or

refuel with another tanker en route back to

Hurlburt Field. Gallagher was second on the

boom, and he received his computed minimum

fuel. Thigpen was the last to hook up to the sin gle

tanker. He knew that his secondary mission, after airlanding his rangers and STS personnel,

was to set up a ground FARRP at Rio Hato to

service helicopter gunships supporting the ranger

assault. Consequently, he elected to onload all

remaining fuel available from the tanker, which

was about 5,000 pounds more than his planned

on load. Thus, number two and number three

Talons received slightly less than their planned

on load while number one onloaded 5,000 pounds

more fuel than was originally planned. If all went

according to the premission timetable, and Thig -

pen landed at his scheduled time, he would have

to dump the excess fuel before landing to stop in

the available runway. During the recent Blue

Spoon JRT, however, the ranger air-assault op -

eration had taken more time than planned, and

the follow-on airland mission was delayed until

the runway was cleared. There was a good

chance, Thigpen reasoned, that the formation

would have to hold and wait for the runway clear

call. The extra fuel would allow the lead Talon to

hold for an additional hour and then still be able

to deliver the planned fuel to the helicopter gunships. The IFR operation was extremely challenging for the three Combat Talon crews, being in

and out of the weather throughout the entire op -

eration. Visual contact was lost several times be -

tween the formation aircraft, but the operation

was successfully completed. Departing the tanker

refueling track, the three Talons began their

climb back to 18,000 feet and continued south.

The two SOLL II C-130s had closed slightly on

the three Talons during the refueling operation.

The number five aircraft, which had to return to

Lawson AAF for repair, was still behind schedule

but was catching up to the rest of the formation

as it flew south.2 6

As the formation neared the northern coast of

Panama, the three Talons began their descent to

500 feet above the water in the terrain-following

mode. The two SOLL II C-130s descended to approximately 1,000 feet above the water and flew

modified contours once over land. Coastal penetration was near Point Mauseto, Panama, wit h

three low-level legs planned before the initial

poi nt for Rio Hato. From the time the formation

descended to its low-level altitude, it was in and out

of the weather until landing. When the lead Talon

passed the Panamanian coastline, for som e unknown reason, the ALE-40 flare system activated,

USAF Photo

Crew 3, Operation Just Cause. Standing left to right: Vonsik, Reynolds, Gallagher, Balok, Linder, Foster, and Joy. Kneeling left to right: Inkel, Tremblay,

Harstad, and Clark. Not pictured: Batts, Strang, Tagert, and Gillian.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

326
and three defensive flares were launched from

the aircraft. Any possibility of aircrew compla -

cency was quickly forgotten, as the crew scrambled

to determine the source of the flare activation.

The crew could not determine why the three

flares were expended, but there was little time to

worry about it. The second turn point was rapidly

approaching.2 7

As the three Talons approached the second

turn point at 500 feet, a C-141 formation passed

overhead on a northerly heading out of Panama.

They had air dropped Task Force Red Tango at

Torrijos/Tocumen International Airport at H

hour. The large, blacked-out jets passed about

500 feet above the three blacked-out Combat Talons. The next critical decision point for the Rio

Hato formation was a runway clear call expected

at 0130, as the lead aircraft approached the in itial

point for landing. No call was received, so the

three Talons entered holding at that point. The

lead Combat Talon held at 500 feet, number two

climbed to 1,000 feet, and number three climbed

to 1,500 feet. The two SOLL II C-130s held at

the preinitial point at approximately 2,000 feet.

Holding was flown in a fan pattern, with each

aircraft passing over the holding point each time

it made a complete circuit. The formation avoided

flying the same ground track to minimize the

possibility of drawing fire from hostile forces. The

three Talons were in the clouds for most of the

holding pattern, which increased the risk to the

formation of a midair collision or impact with the

ground. They utilized their terrain-following ra -

dar to remain clear of the terrain and altitude

separation to remain clear of each other. Each

time one of the aircraft passed through the radar

signals of one of the other two aircraft, the system would sound an alarm and direct an immediate fly up. With coordinated crew effort, the fly

ups were systematically analyzed to make sure

that there was not a clearance problem with the

ground and were then overridden by the naviga -

tor. As the minutes passed, it became apparent

that the lead Talon would need the additional

fuel it had taken from the tanker a few hours

earlier.28

While the formation held short of Rio Hato, the

crews monitored the progress of the action on the

airfield by way of the aircraft’s radios. At H hour

two F-117A aircraft had each dropped a 2,000-

pound bomb near the PDF barracks southwest of

the airfield. As the bombs fell, the C-130 formation that had departed Lawson AAF just before

the Talons began its airdrop. Fifteen aircraft

dropped personnel and equipment of Task Forc

Red Romeo and then escaped to the north upo

completion of the airdrop. The PDF defende

were waiting for the formation, having bee

alerted 15 minutes earlier when the initial attac

kicked off in Panama City. Several aircraft su

fered battle damage during the drop and had 

recover at Howard AB for combat repairs. Alon

with the rangers, USAF special tactics personn

also parachuted into Rio Hato. Bernie Oder, th

senior special tactics team member on the ai

field, had become separated from his six-ma

team and from the ranger ground force com 

mander during the airdrop. The PDF continue

to put up a determined defense on the airfield 

Oder made his way down the runway to the de

ignated rendezvous point with the ranger com

mand element. Oder observed that the runw

was blocked by two large trucks that had the

tires deflated to make them more difficult 

move. Once linked up with the ground force com

mander, Oder monitored the unfolding situatio

as the rangers moved to secure the airfield. B

cause of the stubborn resistance by the PDF , 

took the assault force approximately 90 minut

to clear the runway of obstructions. Overhea

two AC-130 gunships from the 1st SOW we

pounding PDF strongholds around the airfiel

From Howard AB a contingent of US Army OH

gunship helicopters deployed in direct support 

the rangers. As the battle raged, the helicopte

began to run low on both fuel and ammunitio

The FARRP equipment dropped by one of the 

130s could not be made operational, thus leavin

the helicopters with no means of refueling. Th

FARRP equipment aboard the two Combat Ta

ons became critical to the helicopter gunship o

eration. By 0215 the helicopters had begun 

land on the beaches to the east of Rio Hato 

await fuel and ammunition. By 0230 the range

had pushed the PDF off the main airfield an

had removed the two vehicles from the runwa

The airfield was ready for the five-ship airlan

formation. Using the ABCCC aircraft as a rela

the radio operator on board the lead Comb

Talon received Oder’s call clearing the form

tion to land. With clearance received, the lea

Talon’s navigator quickly computed the aircraft

landing time and passed it to the other four a

craft in the formation. Thigpen ’s landin g tim

was established as 0253 local, with Davenpo

landing at 0256, and Gallagher at 0259. The r

maining two SOLL II C-130s would land 10 mi 

utes after the last Combat Talon , with five minute

OPERATION JUST CAUS

327
spacin g between the aircraft. With the battle still

raging around the perimeter of the airfield, Thig -

pen departed holding inbound to Rio Hato.2 9

Aircraft 64-0567 was the only SOF-I-modified

aircraft of the 14 Combat Talons. Its navigational

equipment was far superior to that found on the

less-capable MOD-70 Talon. Thigpen had chosen

the aircraft to lead the formation specifically be -

cause of its improved accuracy and reliability. The

extended holding period had degraded the MOD70 navigation system on Davenport’s aircraft, but

Thigpen’s system was “tight” and was performing

at peak efficiency. As the aircraft neared the fourmile point on final, tracers from the approach end

of the runway were seen by the crew as they

arched up into the dark sky. Knowing that he had

the gun-jeeps and the critical FARRP system on

board, Thigpen decided to continue the approach.

Meanwhile, Davenport, in the number two Talon,

was having problems with his MOD-70 navigation

system and was approaching the airfield well to

the west of his planned track. Gallagher, in Talon

64-0572, was still in holding and was maneuvering to begin his approach .

3 0

When the number one Talon touched down on

the 4,300-foot runway, it weighed 145,000 pounds,

which was exactly its premission computed

weight. The SOF-I system had brought the aircraft

down the middle of the runway perfectly aligned

for landing. As the aircraft slowed to taxi speed,

Thigpen made a 180-degree turn on the runway

and taxied back to the perpendicular taxiway located 2,000 feet down from the approach end. As

the first Talon cleared the active, Davenport was

maneuvering for his landing. The MOD-70 system

had taken the aircraft to the west of Rio Hato.

Scanning outside the aircraft with NVGs, the crew

had realized the system error and had made a

hard left turn, followed by a right turn to final for

landing. With the number one Talon clear of the

runway, Davenport landed and rolled out as

planned. Meanwhile, Thigpen had down loaded his

gun-jeeps, the STS vehicle, and the ranger force on

the parallel taxiway, and had begun to back the

aircraft 300 yards down the parallel taxiway to a

point abeam the approach end of the runway. As

Thigpen began his reverse-taxi maneuver, Davenport cleared the active runway on the perpendicu -

lar taxiway. The number one aircraft had to stop

his back-taxi maneuver on a call from his loadmaster, Brackett. There was a tree growing too close to

the taxiway, blocking the aircraft’s path. Thigpen

authorized Brackett to deplane and cu t down the

tree with the aircraft’s crash ax. Meanwhile, being

unable to taxi to his planned offload position be -

cause of the position of the number one aircraft,

Davenport’s loadmasters briefed their ranger personnel of their new position, and downloaded

them on the perpendicular taxiway. As Davenport

completed his download, Brackett had the tree cut

down, and Thigpen continued his reverse taxi

down the parallel. A second call to stop reverse

taxiing came from Wilcox, and Thigpen again

cleared Brackett out for a second time to chop

down another tree. With the removal of the second

tree, Thigpen was able to continue reverse taxiing

to his preplanned FARRP location (fig. 4 0).31

While the first two aircraft were maneuvering

to their final positions on the parallel taxiway,

Gallagher landed at 0259, made a 180-degree

turn on the runway, and taxied back to the approach end to download his assault force. Within

five minutes of touchdown, Gallagher was again

airborne in aircraft 64-0572 and headed back to

Hurlburt Field. Ten minutes after Gallagher departed, the number four SOLL II C-130E landed,

made a 180-degree turn, and taxied back to the

approach end of the runway. Once in position on

the northern perpendicular taxiway, the number

four aircraft offloaded its personnel and cargo.

The number five SOLL II aircraft was on short

final when tracers appeared from west of the airfield. The crew initiated a low approach and took

the aircraft around. Once number five was clear

of the runway, number four taxied into position

and departed the airfield to the south. Approximately 10 minutes later, number five landed

without further incident and taxied to the northern perpendicular taxiway. Once its personnel

and cargo were offloaded, the number five C-130

reconfigured internally to a medevac configura -

tion and remained in position ready to extract

wounded personnel from the airfie ld.

3 2

At the southern end of the airfield, Davenport

had reverse taxied down the parallel taxiway and

had stopped in front of Thigpen’s Talon. He had

an identical FARRP system onboard his aircraft

and was prepared to carry out the FARRP tasking

in the event Thigpen’s Talon was not able to do

so. The lead Talon already had deployed a fuel

hose and had set up a fuel pumping system that

was connected to the aircraft’s single-point refueling manifold. All ava ilable crew members were

cleared off headsets to assist the two ranger munitions specialists in transporting the 180-pound

rocket containers approximately 100 yards to the

helicopter refueling and rearming point. As soon

as the FARRP was operational (approximately 15

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

328
minutes), OH-6 helicopter gunships began arriving for fuel and ammo servicing. For the next two

hours, aircraft 64-0567 remained in its position

and serviced the OH-6 gunship helicopters. 3 3

As the two Talons sat on the parallel taxiway,

the battle between the rangers and the PDF

raged about them. While ground forces engaged

the PDF, the two AC-130 gunships hammered

away at the enemy’s defensive positions. Tracers filled the night sky, as friendly forces moved

to the west and to the south, where most of the

heavy concentration of PDF were located. At the

north end of the airfield was the Pan America

Highway, and just to the north of it, sporadic fir

fights erupted. After approximately one hour o

the ground, Davenport reached “bingo” fuel stat

and prepared to maneuver for departure. (He ha

not been able to take on as much fuel as th

number one Talon because only one of two sche

uled tankers had made it to the refueling track.)

During premission planning, Talon crews ha

studied the airfield environment, including th

taxiways to the east of the single runway. Availab

photographs did not show the full extent of th

Figure 40. Schematic of Rio Hato AB, Panama (Source: USAF Special Operations School,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

OPERATION JUST CAUS

329
vegetation growing on the airfield. The photographs indicated that the taxiways were 60 feet

wide, with cleared areas on each side well past

the wingtips of the C-130 aircraft. In actuality,

vegetation had grown past the edges of the taxiways, leaving only about 35 feet of clear asphalt

down the center. On either side of the taxiways,

“elephant grass” grew to a height of approximately eight feet, which totally obscured any ob -

stacles that might be lying within the wingtips of

the C-130. Because of the airdrop earlier in the

evening, the tall grass was covered with para -

chute canopies, further obscuring the area below

the top of the grass. With the PDF still waging

stiff resistance to the west of the runway, Davenport called for clearance to taxi up the eastern

parallel taxiway en route to the northern end of

the runway. From premission study, the Talon

should have had no problem with this taxi route.

Davenport was cleared to taxi, and he began to

move north on the parallel. Approximately 2,000

feet up the parallel, the right side of the aircraft

suddenly began vibrating violently as the aircraft

taxied between what was once an interior fence

line. The number three engine was shut down as

the Talon came to a stop, but the vibration persisted. The number four engine was then shut

down, and the vibration stopped. Davenport con -

tinued his taxi utilizing the number one and

number two engines until he reached the northern perpendicular taxiway. Here, he deplaned a

flight engineer and his loadmasters to look for

possible damage to the number four propeller.

Upon examination, one propeller blade was found

to be bent, probably due to striking a hard object

on the ground. The engine could not be restarted

with the bent propeller tip. After consulting with

his crew and conferring with the JSOTF air component commander (Colonel Gray) at Howard AB,

Davenport was cleared to restart number three

engine and make a three-engine NVG takeoff. All

but essential crew members were downloaded on

the northern taxiway to reduce the number of personnel on the aircraft during the risky takeoff.

The crew members who deplaned from Davenport’s aircraft moved south down the east taxiway

and boarded Thigpen’s Talon, which was still con -

ducting FARRP operations on the southern end of

the airfield. Davenport was cleared on to the active runway, and he back-taxied north across the

Pan American Highway so that he could have as

much available runway as possible for the threeengine takeoff. (The Pan American Highway

crossed the Rio Hato runway approximately at its

halfway point. A fence, including its fence posts,

had been removed by the ranger assault force as

it moved north in pursuit of PDF defenders. Of

the original 8,000-foot-long runway, Davenport

was able to use approximately 6,000 feet after his

back-taxi maneuver. Davenport was later

awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his

heroism.) Davenport, along with John O’Reilly as

first pilot, Vinny Franco as navigator, Harvey

Long as flight engineer, and Gary Crayne as loadmaster, successfully made the first-ever three-engine NVG takeoff under combat conditions in

Talon history. With only minor deviations, the

aircraft performed as predicted, and the crew was

airborne on its way to Howard AB. As the aircraft

cleared the runway and struggled for altitude,

tracers from PDF emplacements to the west of the

runway were fired in its general direction. No

rounds hit the aircraft, however, as the crew

safely departed the area. 3 5

At the FARRP location, business was booming.

The helicopters came and went, as they needed

fuel or ammo. They quickly expended their ordnance and returned to reload. About every third

trip into the FARRP site, the helicopters topped

off with fuel. As time passed, with all four engines

running, the Combat Talon approached its bingo

fuel level. For the aircraft to depart the airfield

and make it to the tanker track north of Panama,

the navigators had computed required fuel at

14,000 pounds. To go directly from Rio Hato to

Howard AB would take 8,000 pounds of fuel. The

other determining factor for departure was the

approaching daylight. The entire airland opera -

tion had been completed in total blacked-out con -

ditions. With daylight approaching the Combat

Talon would be a sitting duck for PDF mortars

that could be directed at it once the aircraft could

be seen by the naked eye. With the helicopters

needing fuel and rearming every few minutes,

however, it was imperative that the FARRP be

maintained as long as possible. As the Talon’s

fuel decreased below 14,000 pounds, the naviga -

tors recomputed the fuel reserves and determined

that 12,000 pounds out of Rio Hato would allow

one try at the tanker then a divert back to

Howard AB if fuel was not received. From the

tanker track to Howard AB required 8,000 pounds

of fuel to land with 4,000 pounds of fuel remaining. (In the C-130E aircraft, fuel gauges are not

considered reliable with less than 1,000 pounds of

fuel remaining in each of the four main fuel tanks.

When the fuel gauges showed 4,000 pounds of fuel

remaining, the crew had to assume that the tanks

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

330
were empty. Therefore, all missions were planned

to land with a minimum of 4,000 pounds of fuel

remaining, plus the required fuel reserves.) With

13,000 pounds remaining and within 30 minutes

of daylight, the FARRP operation was discontinued reluctantly, and the aircraft was readied for

takeoff. The heavy fuel hose was disconnected

from the SPR manifold and left at the FARRP site

along with additional ammo from Davenport’s

Talon. With takeoff clearance received, Thigpen

taxied north on the active runway and made a

180-degree turn at the Pan American Highway

intersection. The number five SOLL II C-130E

had onloaded casualties earlier and already had

departed the airfield. As Thigpen’s Talon lifted off

approximately 2,000 feet down the runway, enemy

tracers were seen off the nose of the aircraft. The

crew transitioned immediately to the 250-foot

terrain-following mode to minimize exposure to

the small-arms threat. Within seconds, the Talon

was out over the dark Pacific and away from enemy fire. The aircraft made a slow right turn to

the north en route to the northern coastline and

to the “white” tanker track. There were 11,000

pounds of fuel remaining at that time.36

Before departing Rio Hato, Thigpen’s radio operator (Bonck) had coordinated IFR requirements

with the ABCCC aircraft controlling the opera -

tions at Rio Hato. Thigpen was to refuel at 13,000

feet and onload 35,000 pounds of fuel, which was

enough to fly nonstop to Hurlburt Field. As the

Talon approached the white tanker track, at least

10 fighter aircraft were on the same refueling frequency and also on guard channel, and all were

looking for a tanker. The radio chatter was similar to the Vietnam War years when there were

continual tanker anchors established over Laos

and out over the Gulf of Tonkin. Ross had replaced Thigpen in the left seat of the Combat

Talon , and Abbott was in the right seat. As the

Talon continued north, the fuel gauges showed

10,000 pounds remaining. There was no tanker in

sight, and soon the aircraft would have to divert

to Howard AB for fuel. Scanning outside the aircraft, the crew visually acquired a tanker below

and slightly to the left of its track. The tanker

was at approximately the same airspeed as the

Combat Talon but at about 6,000-feet altitude.

The navigator made several calls on guard channel after the tanker did not answer on the designated refueling frequency. Descending in an S

turn, Ross maneuvered the Combat Talon to join

with the tanker. As the Talon approached the KC135 from the aft quadrant, it was visually appa rent

that the tanker was prepared to deliver fuel 

200 KIAS. In precontact another call was made o

guard, but the tanker still did not answer. Pe

haps due to radio failure on the tanker aircraf

the two crews could not communicate with eac

other. The boom operator gave Ross a forwar

light, indicating that he was ready to refuel. Ro

smoothly moved into the contact position and o

loaded 35,000 pounds of fuel before disconnectin

Without any verbal contact with the tanker, th

Talon crew had gotten its gas and was on its wa

back to Hurlburt Field. The remainder of th

flight home was uneventful, although everyone o

board was exhausted from the previous night

operation.37

Upon landing at Hurlburt Field, Maj Ge

Tomas Eggers and Brig Gen Jim Hobson met th

aircraft as it parked in front of the 8th SOS oper

tions building. It was 1000 local on 20 Decemb

1989. Gallagher and his crew had landed hou

before and had already departed the area for 

much needed rest. Davenport and a portion of h

crew were at Howard AB in crew rest with th

aircraft undergoing a number four propell

change. The squadron had performed well durin

the operation and would be called upon again 

the following days to support JSOTF operatio

in Panama. 38

H-Hour Operations across Panama

As the Combat Talon formation was bearin

down on the Panamanian coastline, combat o

erations in Panama already were under wa

Sporadic firing started near Albrook Air Statio

well before the established H hour. To preserv

tactical surprise, CINCSO (General Thurma

ordered the JTF-South commander (Gener

Stiner) to move H hour up to 0045 for tho

forces stationed in Panama. Just before the ne

H hour, the legally elected Panamanian pres

dent (Guillermo Endara) and his two vice pres

dents (Arias Calderon and Billy Ford) wer

sworn into office. Initial combat operations 

Just Cause were begun by forces assigned to th

JSOTF under General Downing. Task Forc

Black fast-roped into Cerro Azul and removed 

critical component of Panamanian TV Channel 2

transmission facility, thus disabling the pro

Noriega station. Task Force Black was also taske

with surveillance of the Pacora River Bridge an

interdicting movement across it. The bridge w

situated between the Torrijos/Tocumen Intern

tional Airport and Fort Cimarron, where th

Panamanian Battalion 2000 force was located. A

OPERATION JUST CAUS

331
Task Force Black forces moved into their blocking

positions near the bridge, they spotted a PDF convoy approaching from Fort Cimarron. With help

from USAF AC-130 gunships and attached special

tactics personnel, Task Force Black held its position with minimal casualties, while the PDF suffered the loss of six of their vehicles in the battle.

With the Pacora River Bridge blocked, PDF reinforcements could not reach the Torrijos/Tocumen

International Airport.3 9

Before the commencement of Just Cause, four

Sheridan tanks had been covertly infiltrated into

Panama under the cover of darkness. Before H

hour on 19 December, the tanks deployed with

their armored vehicle support element and assumed a position on Ancon Hill. The tanks were

part of JTF-South’s Task Force Gator, which had

the primary objective of isolating Noriega’s headquarters in downtown Panama City. At 0045 two

AC-130H gunships of the 1st SOW moved into

position over Noriega’s headquarters (La Comandancia) and began a relentless attack with their

heavy 105 mm canons. At the same time, Task

Force Gator moved on the ground through Barrio

Chorillo en route to the PDF headquarters build -

ing. One of the task force’s lead armored personnel

carriers was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, resulting in the track commander being killed by

PDF small-arms fire during the resulting firefight.

The PDF set fire to Barrio Chorillo to obscure La

Comandancia from the air and to slow down the

advancing ground force. Task Force Gator was

able to penetrate the dense smoke and establish

its blocking positions around the headquarters

building. As the task force fought the PDF on the

ground, the AC-130H gunships continued to pulverize the concrete headquarters from the air.4 0

Task Force Bayonet, a brigade-sized element,

was tasked with securing portions of the old Canal

Zone. Attacking out of Fort Clayton and across

Albrook Airfield, Task Force Bayonet initially secured the US housing areas at Curundu and Curundu Heights. With a large portion of Task Force

Bayonet (including Task Force Gator) engaged at

La Comandancia and the Curundu-Ancon areas,

remaining elements conducted an air assault on

Fort Amador, which was home to a PDF infantry

battalion and housed a large number of US military families. After notifying family members of

the pending operation, the attacking force hit the

PDF barracks buildings and commenced a roomby-room clearing operation. After stiff resistance

the PDF barracks area was neutralized. Task

Force Bayonet also was tasked to establish military

control throughout the Balboa area, which was

where the Panama Canal’s Pacific terminal was

located. With the objective of limiting collateral

damage and undue civilian casualties, the task

force faced tough resistance as it completed its

mission.41

Task Force Semper Fi, which had been in

place on the west bank of the Panama Canal for

the past 18 months, quickly moved to block the

western approaches to Panama City. It was Task

Force Semper Fi’s job to block both ends of the

Bridge of the Americas and to provide “outside

the wire” security for Howard AB. During the

previous October’s coupe, PDF forces stationed at

Rio Hato had responded to the crisis and had

passed through the western positions now assigned to Task Force Semper Fi. Any PDF forces

escaping Task Force Red Romeo’s attack on Rio

Hato would face the marines before entering

Panama Cit y.4 2

On the eastern side of Panama City, an AC-130

gunship opened fire at H hour on the PDF compound located on Torrijos/Tocumen International

Airport. Three minutes later four companies of

rangers, who made up Task Force Red Tango,

parachuted from 500 feet on to the tarmac. Once

on the ground, the soldiers assembled quickly and

assumed their assigned positions to defend the

airfield in the event that the mechanized Battalion 2000 force was able to break through Task

Force Black’s position at the Pacora River Bridge.

Task Force Red Tango also was tasked with securing the airfield for the scheduled airdrop of

Task Force Pacific 45 minutes later. The assault

on Torrijos/Tocumen was a success, with Task

Force Red Tango narrowly missing capturing

Noriega himself during the operation. Noriega

had spent the night with a call girl at the Ceremi

PDF recreation center, located near the entrance

to the military side of the airport. Noriega was

forced to flee Ceremi, leaving behind his briefcase,

wallet, and uniform.43

US Navy SEALs, under command of the

JSOTF, made up Task Force White and were assigned the mission of neutralizing Paitilla Airfield

in downtown Panama City. Paitilla Airfield was

situated on the coast and was most easily accessible from the water. At approximately H hour

minus two (2300 local time on 19 December),

three platoons of SEAL Team Four embarked in

patrol boats of Special Boat Unit 26 of the Pana -

manian navy. The patrol boats transported the

SEALs out into the open Pacific Ocean where

they transferred to CRRCs for the return assault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

332
on Paitilla Airfield. The objective of the operation

was to quietly slip on to the airfield and block the

runway with a disabled aircraft or vehicle. Noriega kept a jet aircraft at Paitilla Airfield that

planners felt could be his primary means of escaping the country. While the CRRCs were inbound

to their objective area, General Thurmond moved

up H hour to 0045. The SEAL team could not

reach Paitilla Airfield before its original time of

0100 due to the distance left to travel across the

water. When the SEALs reached the airfield, the

enemy force there was already alerted by Task

Force Bayonet’s assault on Fort Amador and on

La Comandancia 15 minutes earlier. The enemy

engaged the SEALs as they moved down the runway, resulting in the loss of four team members.

Task Force White fought on across Paitilla Airfield and was able to complete its mission when it

disabled Noriega’s jet aircraft and blocked the

runway. A second mission assigned to Task Force

White was the disabling of PDF patrol boats anchored in Balboa Harbor. Two demolition teams of

two men each conducted an underwater scuba assault on two patrol boats and placed limpet mines

on their drive shafts. At precisely 0100 the mines

detonated and rendered both boats inoperable.4 4

As operations got under way on the Pacific side

of Panama, Task Force Atlantic swung into opera -

tion in the northern Colon area. The task force

was charged with three missions: (1) securing the

vital Gatun Locks on the Atlantic end of the Panama Canal, (2) isolating the Colon area and neutralizing a 100-man naval infantry company at

Coco Solo, and (3) securing the Madden Dam. In

addition to its primary mission, Task Force Atlantic was given the task of rescuing political prison -

ers being held in Renacer Prison. Within hours of

beginning its operations, Task Force Atlantic had

accomplished its objectives, including liberating

64 persons from Renacer Prison.45

At Rio Hato the attack began at H hour with

two F-117s from Nellis AFB, Nevada, each delivering two 2,000-pound bombs near the PDF barracks

located southwest of the main airfield. Three min -

utes later, Task Force Red Romeo, made up of

rangers and USAF CCT personnel, began exiting

their C-130 aircraft over Rio Hato. The defending

PDF soldiers had been alerted and were waiting

on the airfield for the airborne assault to begin.

The rangers began taking on small-arms fire

even before they exited the aircraft. At least one

ranger was severely injured while standing in

the door of one of the aircraft, and several C-130s

sustained battle damage when small-arms fire

ripped through their fuselages. The C-130 form

tion held a steady course despite AAA trace

coming up to meet them. Once on the ground, th

rangers attacked the PDF garrison area. Oth

ranger elements established an airhead an

moved to the southeast to seize the beach hou

often used by Noriega . There were two larg

trucks disabled on the single runway, and it too

90 minutes to drive the PDF defenders off th

immediate area and remove the trucks so th

the follow-on Combat Talon SOLL II formatio

could land. At approximately 0230 local time, th

special tactics units cleared the five-ship form

tion to land at Rio Hato. Ground combat oper

tions continued as the MC-130Es and the SOL

II aircraft landed and downloaded their assau

troops and motorized vehicles. Supporting th

ranger assault were OH-6 helicopter gunship

which were refueled and rearmed by the lea

Combat Talon by way of a FARRP on the ea

taxiway. Hostilities continued in and around R

Hato until well after daylight, at which time th

PDF defenders were finally routed from their p

sitions.

46

Task Force Pacific, made up of the 82d Ai

borne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolin

was scheduled to air-drop into Torrijos/Tocume

at 0145 local after Task Force Red Tango ha

prepared the airfield for its arrival. The col

front that had swept through central Georgi

early on 19 December had created havoc when 

turned into a severe ice storm across Nor

Carolina. It was the most severe ice storm see

in the area in years, and the deicing equipme

at Pope AFB was inadequate to service the C

141 aircraft scheduled to conduct the airdro

CINCMAC mobilized his entire CONUS force 

move deicing equipment and trained techn

cians to Pope AFB from as far away as McChor

AFB in Washington State. Reservists living 

the Pope AFB area reported for duty witho

being officially activated. With a Herculean e

fort by everyone involved, lead elements of Tas

Force Pacific dropped on schedule in Panam

By 0400 local Panama time, the entire force ha

arrived. Once on the ground, the brigade pr

pared to conduct air assault operations to ne

tralize PDF forces at Fort Cimarron, Tinajita

and Panama Viejo. Throughout the mornin

hours of 20 December, Task Force Pacific move

to occupy key positions on the eastern side o

Panama City to restore order in the heavi

populated area. 4 7

OPERATION JUST CAUS

333
JTF-South forces, including those of the

JSOTF, continued mopping up actions across

Panama after the initial H-hour objectives were

met. The one objective that was not accomplished

during the initial assault was the capture of

Manuel Noriega . Over the next two weeks, Noriega sought the protection of the Vatican Embassy, but in the end he would be taken into custody and returned to the United States to stand

trial for his illegal drug-trafficking activities.

Follow-On Combat Talon Operations

In the days immediately following the H-hour

assault on Rio Hato, 8th SOS Combat Talons and

their crews continued to support Operation Just

Cause. Davenport had departed Rio Hato with

his number four engine shutdown and had proceeded on to Howard AB for repairs. The C-130

formation that had dropped Task Force Red Romeo also had recovered at Howard AB. Many of

the C-130s had sustained battle damage during

their airdrop and required repair. After arranging for a propeller change, Davenport and his

crew went into crew rest in preparation for their

return flight to Hurlburt Field. During the evening of 20 December, Davenport departed

Howard AB and recovered at Hurlburt Field

without incident. All 8th SOS Combat Talons

were back at home station at that time (fig. 41).

On 23 December the squadron was alerted to

deploy two Combat Talons to Howard AB in support of follow-on JSOTF operations. Korver and

Ross commanded their respective crews and were

in Panama in position and on alert status by

Christmas Eve. The following morning, Christmas

Day, Ross’s crew was alerted for an in-country

mission to David AB, Panama, to exfiltrate Pana -

manian colonel DelCid, who had been captured by

JSOTF forces in the western sector of Panama.

Within 30 minutes of notification, the crew had

their engines running and were ready for takeoff.

On board the Combat Talon was the JSOTF commander, General Downing, and flying in the left

seat of the aircraft was Colonel Gray. Flying lowlevel across Panama and avoiding suspected enemy

positions, the mission went according to plan. As

the aircraft approached David AB, the special tactics units controlling the airfield advised the Talon

crew that the runway was damaged and that only

3,000 feet was available for landing. With Colonel

Gray at the controls, the crew made a flawless

approach followed by an assault landing, avoiding

the large craters as the aircraft rolled out on the

runway. Colonel DelCid, along with a special

forces security team, was quickly onloaded with

engines running. A short-field takeoff was accomplished, and the aircraft headed back to Howard

AB. At Howard AB the Talon crew downloaded

DelCid to a waiting C-130 aircraft for return to the

United States to face drug-trafficking charges. For

the remainder of Christmas Day, Ross’s crew

moved cargo and supplies between Howard AB,

Torrijos/Tocumen International Airport, Rio Hato

AB, and David AB. The final sortie of the day

moved Panamanian POWs from David AB to

Figure 41. Map of Panama with Operation Just Cause Objectives (Source: USAF Special

Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

334
Howard AB. Although the crew flew a long and

demanding day, some of the cargo delivered on

Christmas Day included turkey dinners for troops

holding the various objective areas. The crew went

back into alert status on 26 December after com -

pleting crew-rest requirements. The crew that flew

the 25 December David AB exfiltration mission included Ross, Gray, Gregor, Harstad, Ammons,

Knight, Mellinger, Alaniz, Long, Fabbro, Ballerstadt, Boulware, Clark, Wilcox, and Thigpen .

48

The squadron continued to maintain two aircraft in alert status at Howard AB for the remainder of December and shuttled fresh crews

from Hurlburt Field. Noriega took refuge in the

Nunciatura (the Vatican Embassy) on 24 December, and US forces established a constant vigil at

the compound. On 3 January 1990, Noriega 

walked out of the Nunciatura and was immediately arrested by US marshals. As Noriega was

being onloaded to an awaiting helicopter, Davenport and his Combat Talon crew were alerted to

transport Noriega from Panama to the United

States. In less than 12 minutes, the crew was at

the aircraft and had engines running. When

Noriega arrived at the aircraft, he was escorted

by an entourage of US marshals, Drug Enforce -

ment Agency personnel, photographers, and doctors. Using minimum lighting on the Combat

Talon , the aircraft departed Howard AB with the

party on board. En route to Homestead AFB,

Florida, the crew flew VFR with minimum radio

communications outside the aircraft. Several

lines of thunderstorms were avoided to remain

clear of the clouds. At approximately 150 miles

west of its destination and approaching the US

Air Defense Identification Zone, the crew picked

up an instrument clearance and proceeded IFR to

Homestead AFB. Upon landing Noriega was

quickly off-loaded along with the rest of the party.

The crew departed Homestead AFB for Hurlbu

Field and the completion of the last Comb

Talon operational mission of Operation Ju

Cause. The crew that flew the Noriega exfiltr

tion mission included Davenport, Stone, Cochra

Bell, Franco, Schwab, Bonn, Gorczynski, Minto

Mitchell, Thorpe, and F ox.49

After Davenport’s 3 January mission, 8th SO

assets were released by the JSOTF to redeploy 

home station. On 4 January Prior and Philli

commanded their Combat Talon crews and d

parted Panama for Hurlburt Field. English’s cre

deployed from Hurlburt Field to Howard AB on 

January to onload additional Talon equipment an

personnel still in Panama. On 6 January English

crew returned to Hurlburt Field with all remainin

Combat Talon assets, and the 8th SOS’s particip

tion in Operation Just Cause officially ended.

* * * * * *

Special operations had made tremendous a

vancements in the 10 years since Desert On

From a position of near extinction, the MC-130

Combat Talon force had rebounded with new u

grades that had increased its capabilities beyon

any other C-130 aircraft. The MC-130H Comb

Talon II was still in its test phase at Edwar

AFB, California, when the decade ended. Th

1990s would prove to be even more challengin

than the previous 10 years, with brushfire wa

and peacekeeping requirements tasking the Com

bat Talon community to the maximum. As the 8

SOS slowed down in early January 1990 and i

personnel celebrated a delayed Christmas seaso

with their families, seven months remained be fo

the next major test—Operation Desert Shiel

Desert Storm.

Notes

1. Dr. Richard H. Shultz Jr., The Aftermath of War: US

Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama

Following Just Cause (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1993), 5–6.

2. Ibid., 7.

3. Ibid., 8.

4. Ibid., 9.

5. Ibid., 10.

6. Ibid., 15.

7. Ibid.

8. Official paper, Dr. Edward Mark, “JUST CAUSE, The

United States Air Force in Panama,” Washington, D.C., Cen -

ter for Air Force History, 1993, 10.

9. Shultz, 11–12.

10. Mark, 13.

11. Case Study, “Operation JUST CAUSE,” Department 

Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, Course 3, C

lisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, November 1990, 10.

12. Shultz, 16.

13. Ibid.

14. Case Study, 43.

15. Ibid., 44.

16. Ibid., 45.

17. Shultz, 45.

18. Case Study, 45–46.

19. Ibid., 46.

20. Lt Col Jerry L. Thigpen, commander, 8th Special O

erations Squadron, interview by Don Little, 8 February 199

Hurlburt Field, Fla., draft manuscript on file, Combat Tal

Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

OPERATION JUST CAUS

335
21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Case Study, 46.

40. Ibid., 47.

41. Ibid., 48.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 49.

45. Ibid., 49–50.

46. Ibid., 50.

47. Ibid., 51–52.

48. Official Document, award submission for the crew of

Maj David L. Davenport, Air Force Commendation Medal,

n.d., on file, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt

Field, Fla.

49. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

336
Chapter 13

Desert Shield /Desert Storm (1990–91)

We, and all others who believe in freedom as deeply as we do, would rather die on our feet than live

on our knees.

—Franklin D. Roosevelt

The decade of the 1980s began with Combat

Talon crews attempting to rescue American hostages from Iran. Because the attempt failed, Con -

gress forced the services to revitalize SOF and to

build a capability that would deter the rising terrorist threat to US citizens around the world. In

1983, in response to threats to US medical students in Grenada, Combat Talons led the initial

assault on Point Salines. In 1989 Combat Talons

lead the airland assault on Rio Hato AB during

Operation Just Cause. During most of the decade,

the new Combat Talon II was under development

and was within a year of initial delivery by 1990.

As the 1990s began to unfold, USSOCOM moved

to formally establish Twenty-Third AF as the Air

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and

on 22 May 1990, AFSOC was officially established.

The new command would serve as the air component for USSOCOM and would be designated as a

major command within the USAF. It would no

longer be a part of MAC, but rather it would be a

separate stand-alone command. The 1980s had

been one of revitalization for SOF and one spent

fighting terrorism around the globe. The 1990s

would be characterized as a period of SOF employment in “operations other than war.” But, in the

summer of 1990, a conventional conflict in the

Middle East would test the mettle of the new AF -

SOC and see Combat Talon once again at war in

service to its country.

The Calm before the Storm

Operation Just Cause validated the many improvements made by SOF during the 1980s. For

Combat Talon and the entire special operations

community, capabilities had been developed that

brought the services from a Vietnam War-era posture to a viable SOF presence for the 1990s. The

8th SOS had been heavily involved in Operation

Just Cause, and the lessons learned and tactics

employed by the squadron were incorporated into

all three Talon squadrons. At Clark AB, as the 8th

SOS prepared for Just Cause, Silvester led the 1st

SOS through a transition period as the 353d SOW

matured and gained its full complement of assigned

personnel. After Foal Eagle was completed in N

vember 1989, the squadron returned to Clark A

to prepare for the coming year. During the fir

six months of 1990, the 1st SOS deployed to Th

land and Singapore for JCS exercises and for join

combined exchange training events. To ensure th

the squadron maintained the perishable skills r

quired for the demanding joint mission, th

squadron deployed one Combat Talon to Sout

east Asia in February for a one-week, no-notic

JCS/PACOM contingency exercise known 

Fringe Keeper 90 . The exercise was unique 

that the crew was alerted and deployed to its fo

ward operating location and was then isolate

with other participating SOF forces during mi

sion preparation. The execution phase of the exe

cise went without a hitch, again demonstratin

the unit’s ability to perform at a high level 

proficiency in the most difficult mission assigne

to Combat Talon.

1

From 15 to 23 April, the Headquarters MAC Ai

crew Standardization/Evaluation Team (ASET) i

spected the 1st SOS during local training oper

tions in the Philippines. The 353d SOW received a

overall outstanding rating for the evaluation, whi

the 1st SOS was graded a perfect Q-1 on 34 flig

evaluations. The aircrew written portion of th

evaluation was equally impressive for the squa

ron, with all 66 exams receiving a passing scor

The grades reflected the high standards and qua li

personnel found in the Pacific Talon unit.2

To improve working conditions for assigne

personnel, construction on a new squadron oper

tions building began in 1989. In May 1990 buil

ing 7288 was completed, and the squadron bega

moving into the facility the following mont

Problems surfaced with telephone lines and fir

detection systems and delayed the full occupatio

of the building until September.3 Regardless, t

facility was the best squadron operations buildin

on the base and reflected the level of commitment 

SOF from MAC and PACAF.

On 11 July 1990, Lieutenant Colonel Dougl

assumed command of the 1st SOS from Silveste

Colonel Nance, commander of the 353d SOW, off

ciated at the ceremony held at Clark AB in th

337
Cope Thunder Wind Tunnel. As Douglas settled

in as the new commander, the strongest earthquake to hit the Philippines in 14 years shook the

island of Luzon on 16 July. It measured 7.7 on the

Richter scale and was classified as a major earthquake. The town of Cabanatuan, located 47 miles

northeast of Clark AB, was at the earthquake’s

epicenter. Lasting only two minutes, the quake’s

severity proved disastrous to most areas within

80 miles. The death toll was in the thousands,

with Baguio City being one of the hardest hit.

Landslides blocked the roads leading to Baguio,

and poor visibility and damage to the city’s

Loakan Airport initially closed the runway to all

air traffic (fig. 42 ).4

At the 1st SOS five crews were immediately

put into crew rest, and two Combat Talons were

prepared to respond to the disaster. All five

crews were ready for employment by 0700 local

on 17 July. The initial tasking for the squadron

included a massive airlift of relief supplies into

the hardest hit areas. Since Loakan Airport was

still closed, all supplies had to be flown into San

F ernando Airport located at Wallace Air Station.

From Wallace Air Station, helicopters shuttled

the cargo 15 minutes to Camp John Hay. The first

Talon airlifted medical technicians, cots, rations,

meals ready to eat (MRE), blankets, and rain

gear. On the return leg, 55 people were evacuated

to Clark AB. 5

As relief supplies were moved into the disaster

area, a fuel crisis developed that threatened to

shut down relief efforts. Consequently, the 1st

SOS was tasked to establish a FARP in support of

the operation. On Wednesday, 18 July, an MC130E established the FARP operation at San Fernando Airport. Talon crews pumped more than

23,900 pounds of fuel to relief aircraft during the

first day of operation. The ramp at the small and

usually quiet San Fernando Airport was a virtual

beehive of activity throughout the early days of

the disaster, with two Combat Talons, one HC130, multiple HH-3 helicopters, and scores of

Philippine air force fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

transiting the ramp. At its peak the small ramp

had five C-130s and 25 other fixed- and rotarywing aircraft on the ground at one time. Through -

out the first week of operations, the 1st SOS MC130Es and the 17th SOS HC-130P/Ns (which

were stationed at Kadena AB, Okinawa) continued to shuttle fuel to San Fernando and to pump

it to both US Marine and Philippine air force helicopters. In a single day, 111,450 pounds of fuel

were delivered.6

Figure 42. Map of the Philippine Islands (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division,

Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

338
For a two-week period (from 16 July to 3 Au -

gust), the squadron focused on the FARP opera -

tion at San Fernando Airport. The final mission of

the 1st SOS came on 7 August when it airdropped supplies to US personnel stranded on

Mount Kabuyao. After two drops the crew proceeded to Loakan Airport, which had reopened to

air traffic, and airlifted to Clark AB the remains

of two US citizens killed in the earthquake. The

effort put forth by the squadron and the entire

353d SOW showed great determination and a

willingness to help others during a time of need.

During the entire operation, the combined 1st and

17th SOS effort resulted in 377,000 pounds of fuel

being pumped through multiple FARPs. In addition, aircrews dropped 1,500 pounds of cargo to

earthquake victims throughout the region.7

As the Baguio City earthquake relief wound

down, the squadron prepared for the arrival of the

new SOF-I-modified aircraft. All of the 8th SOSassigned Combat Talons had received the SOF-I

modification, and the 1st SOS was scheduled to

begin receiving its assigned aircraft in July 1990.

In preparation for the first SOF-I aircraft, the

squadron sent an augmented crew to LAS Ontario

for training in the new system. The schedule

called for the first SOF-I aircraft to be flown to

Clark AB by the 1st SOS crew at the end of July,

but the date was slipped when the aircraft did not

complete its flight tests as scheduled. During the

first week of August, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and

Operation Desert Shield began a few days later.

Due to Desert Shield priorities, the 1st SOS aircraft was delayed indefinitely at LAS Ontario,

and the crew returned to Clark AB by way of

commercial air. The coming months would see a

heavy burden placed on the squadron when the

Combat Talon formal school closed due to a lack

of aircraft at home station. Three pilots and two

navigators were sent directly to Clark AB unqualified, which resulted in the commitment of

limited 1st SOS resources to train its new crew

members.8 The protracted conflict in the gulf would

have other, far reaching impacts on the Pacificbased Talons.

In Europe, after the 7th SOS crew returned

from JRT 90-1 in December and just as Operation

Just Cause kicked off, the squadron relaxed in

Germany over the snowy Christmas holidays.

Early January saw a Combat Talon deployed to

RAF Woodbridge, UK, for FARP training with

21st SOS MH-53 helicopters. The five-day deployment also included low-level operations in the

Scottish Highlands, IFR, and NVG blacked-out

landings. One Combat Talon deployed to RA

Machrehanish, Scotland, for a recovery trainin

mission supporting the US Navy SEAL team st

tioned there. Additional deployments were com

pleted to Gardemoen, Norway; Moron AB, Spai

and Royal Danish Air Force, Aalborg, Denmar

as the squadron prepared for the annual Flin

lock exercise in the April and May time frame.9

Joint Combined Readiness Exercise (JCRX

Flintlock 90 was conducted concurrently with th

39th SOW’s ORI. It was the first time that th

European SOF wing had been evaluated, a

though it had deployed HC-130s and MH-60 hel

copters to the 1st SOW’s ORI while still statione

at Eglin AFB, Florida. The 39th SOW, includin

the 7th SOS, deployed under the operational co

trol of SOCEUR and conducted infiltration, r

supply, and exfiltration missions. Flintlock 9

was similar to previous exercises in the serie

with the MAC IG evaluating the wing’s particip

tion on a noninterference basis. Although most 

the missions had been preplanned and coord

nated by “trusted agent” mission planners befo

the start of the exercise, unit participants we

not briefed on their missions until each w

tasked by SOCEUR during the course of the e

ercise. The 7th SOS flew 53 sorties in eight cou

tries, completing 18 infiltration, 19 resupply, an

16 exfiltration missions. Aircraft generation an

initial deployment were graded outstanding, wi

the 39th SOW receiving an overall excellent fo

the ORI.

10 With the squadron redeployed to Rhe

Main AB after the ORI, the squadron once agai

took a short breather before resuming its vigo

ous exercise and training schedule. Later in th

summer, on 1 August 1990, Lt Col Nor

McCaslin assumed command of the 7th SOS fro

Ferkes. With successful completion of the 39

SOW’s ORI in Europe and the outstanding Ai

crew Standardization/Evaluation Team rating fo

the 353d SOW in the Pacific, General Patterson

Forward Look vision was nearly complete.

At the 8th SOS, the 4 January 1990 missio

bringing Manuel Noriega to the United States 

stand trial on drug-trafficking charges marke

the climax of the unit’s participation in Oper

tion Just Cause. The following day, 5 Janua

1990, the squadron completed its first-ever a

refueling of USA MH-47 helicopters, as the 8

SOS led three other fixed-wing tankers an

seven helicopters (five MH-53s and two MH-47

from Panama to the United States. Later in th

month, the squadron deployed Combat Talons 

Nellis AFB, Nevada, for Black Flag, which w

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

339
the first night that Red Flag dedicated training to

SOF aircraft. The deployment resulted in excellent training for participating aircrews.1 1

Throughout the spring of 1990, the squadron

maintained a heavy exercise schedule, participating in JRT 90-2 Phase I and Phase II in March

and April, JCS Exercise Ocean Venture from 23

April to 6 May, and JCRX Flintlock 90 from 29

April to 20 May. For the fourth consecutive year,

the squadron deployed one Combat Talon and

two crews to the Middle East from 22 May to 20

June for JCS Exercise Eastern Desert 90 . The

remainder of June was filled with bilateral training events, including one deployment to Panama.

On 2 July 1990, Lt Col Tom Beres assumed command of the squadron from Colonel Thigpen, who

departed Hurlburt Field for the US Army War

College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Two

weeks later the squadron deployed to Hill AFB,

Utah, for mountain training and while there,

dropped the BLU-82B 15,000-pound bomb during

a training mission.*1 2

As August began the squadron was operating

smoothly as it prepared for its fall exercise schedule and for the arrival of the first Combat Talon II

aircraft. Before dawn on 2 August 1990, Saddam

Hussein’s Iraqi army invaded Kuwait and quickly

occupied the small, oil-rich country. Beres and the

men and women of the 8th SOS would soon be

faced with the grim reality of war.

Prelude to 2 August 1990

Modern-day Iraq was created out of the ancient

region known as Mesopotamia, after centuries of

conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims and be -

tween ancient nations that would eventually be -

come the twentieth-century countries of Iran,

Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. The bitter con -

flict between the Sunnis and Shias could be

traced to the Battle of Karbala, which took place

in 680 A.D. The Shias were defeated in the otherwise insignificant battle, but it set the stage for

perpetual conflict between the two factions. In

1258, after disastrous floods throughout the

country, the Mongols captured Baghdad, burning

the city and butchering its citizens. The caliph

was also executed, and the country’s economy

was ruined for the next several centuries. By

1405 Turkish tribes from Anatolia controlled

the region. In 1534 Iraq was conquered by the

Ottoman Empire, and the resultant peace brought

prosperity to the otherwise volatile region. Except

during brief periods of Shia rule by Persia (modernday Iran), Iraq remained a part of the Ottoman

Empire until World War I.

13

In 1914 the British invaded southern Iraq as

part of the Allied plan to defeat the Axis powers

aligned with the Ottoman Empire. After a prolonged campaign that included most of the Middle

East, Baghdad was captured by the British in

1917. On 23 August 1921 Prince Faisal of Hijaz

(modern-day southwestern Saudi Arabia) won a

popular vote, taking 96 percent of the electorate,

and was declared king of Iraq. As King Faisal

began his rule, unrest in the region escalated

when the Kurds in the north and the Shias in the

south fought for their independence. Other regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, also worked to destabilize Iraq. British forces

remained in Iraq at the request of King Faisal.

On 10 October 1922 the new king signed an alliance with Great Britain, thus tying the fledgling

nation to the British Empire. In 1923 the borders

between Iraq and Kuwait were drawn, and a neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was

established.1 4 In a 1930 treaty between the two

nations, Great Britain agreed to give Iraq its independence but retained control over Kuwait. On

3 October 1932 Iraq was declared an independent

nation and was admitted to the League of Na -

tions. A year later, in 1933, King Faisal died of

natural causes, and his son, Ghazi, succeeded

him and reigned as king for the next six years.

With King Ghazi on the throne, oil was discov -

ered in 1938. In 1939 King Ghazi died, thus

throwing the nation into turmoil on the eve of

World War II. As had been the case during World

War I, Iraq aligned itself with the Axis powers.

In 1941, after four weeks of war with Great Brit -

ain, Iraq was again occupied, and a pro-British

government was formed. A puppet state of Great

Britain, Iraq formally declared war on Adolf

Hitler’s Germany in 1943. For the remainder of

the war, Iraq remained aligned with Great Brit -

ain and the Allies. Immediately after the war,

Kurdish unrest in northern Iraq, which many

thought was instigated by the Soviet Union ,

brought on another crisis. A parliamentary election was conducted in 1953, and King Faisal II,

__________

 * At Hill AFB the Air Force maintained two BLU-82B bombs, which had a shelf life of one year each and were ready for employment. The 8th

SOS dropped one of these two bombs every six months to maintain proficiency. When the Gulf War broke out and General Schwarzkopf looked for a

weapon to neutralize Iraqi minefields, Beres developed a proposal to employ the weapon. Along with PSYOPS leaflet drops, the employment of the

BLU-82B was the major 8th SOS contribution to the Gulf War. The proficiency maintained by 8th SOS crews enabled them to employ the large

bomb when called upon in early 1991.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

340
who was three years old when his father died in

1933, was elected to the throne. The new government was somewhat independent of Great Britain,

but King Faisal II remained allied with the British

Empire to ensure stability within the country. On

14 July 1958 a military coup, led by Gen Karim

Kassem, overthrew the elected government, and

King Faisal, his son (the crown prince), and the

prime minister were assassinated.

1 5

On 19 June 1961 British protection of Kuwait

was terminated, and Kuwait entered the Arab

League as an independent nation under the

strong objections of Iraq. Two years later, on 8

February 1963, Kassem was overthrown by a

group of Iraqi officers who were aligned with the

Ba’ath political party. Abdul Salam Arif became

the new president, and 10 months later, he

agreed to give up Iraq’s claim to Kuwait. President Arif died three years later of natural causes

and was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Rahman

Arif. During the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of

1967, Iraq aligned itself against Israel and further distanced itself from the West. On 17 July

1968 President Arif was overthrown, and Ahmed

Hassan al-Bakr became the new president. Under Bakr Iraq aligned itself with the Soviet Union and made concessions to the Kurds in the

northern part of the country to bring about sta -

bility. Following 10 years of Kurdish unrest,

President Bakr agreed to establish an autonomous Kurdish region in 1970 and to let the

Kurds have representation in the Iraqi cabinet.

Over the next several years, however, the rela -

tionship between the Iraqi government and the

Kurds did not improve, primarily because the

Kurds accepted aid from Iran, the archenemy of

Bagdad. Iran and Iraq did not agree to a common

border until 1975, when a formal agreement was

signed. Iran agreed to stop supporting the Kurds

in northern Iraq for certain concessions regarding the common border. After the agreement was

put into effect, the Iraqi army quickly defeated

the Kurds. 1 6

Bakr continued as president of Iraq until June

1979, when he was removed from power and

placed under house arrest by Saddam Hussein.

Appointing himself as president, Hussein moved

to consolidate his power by ruthlessly eliminating

those who opposed his authority. In August 1979

he had 400 members of the ruling Ba’ath Party

executed and established his rule based on fear

and intimidation. The Islamic Revolution experienced in Iran during 1979 formed the catalyst for

renewed fighting by the Kurds in northern Iraq.

On 17 September 1980 Hussein declared th

Iraqi/Iranian border agreement of 1975 null an

void, and he laid claim to the entire oil-rich an

strategically important Shatt el-Arab region. O

22 September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran and quick

gained control over a large piece of Iranian ter

tory. Two years later, after much suffering an

loss of life, Iran mounted a counteroffensive an

drove Iraq out of most of its occupied territor

Fighting continued for the next six years, until th

two countries agreed to a cease-fire on 20 Augu

1988. With the cease-fire in effect, Hussein aga

unleashed his military on the Kurds. Using po

son gas, the Iraqi army killed thousands as it a

tempted to wipe out the Kurdish insurrectio

Once the Kurdish situation stabilized, Sadda

Hussein turned his attention south towards K

wait and the long-held position that Kuwait was 

province of Iraq.17 On 17 July 1990 Hussein accus

Kuwait of overproduction and theft of oil from t

Rumailia oil field located astride the Iraqi/Kuwa

border. One week later, on 25 July, the US amba

sador to Iraq, April Glaspie, told Hussein that th

Iraqi/Kuwaiti dispute was an Arab matter and on

that did not concern the United States. One wee

later Saddam Hussein made his move.

With 100,000 troops attacking across the bo

der on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait an

quickly overran the small country’s meager d

fenses. The emir of Kuwait fled to the Unite

States as Iraqi troops entered Kuwait City. On 

August Iraq officially annexed Kuwait under th

condemnation of the Arab League and the Unite

Nations.1 8 The stage was thus set for Operatio

Desert Shield , which culminated five mont

later with Operation Desert Storm (fig. 43).

United States Reacts to the Invasion

Immediately after the invasion President Bus

froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti bank accounts in th

United States. The United Nations condemne

the invasion and called for an immediate wit

drawal. On 6 August economic sanctions were im

posed, and on the following day, Secretary of D

fense Dick Cheney visited Saudi Arabia. With 

formal request for assistance from the Saudi go

ernment in hand, Secretary Cheney authorize

the initial deployment of the 82d Airborne Div

sion and several fighter squadrons. At Hurlbu

Field, Headquarters AFSOC was alerted by U

SOCOM to be prepared to provide forces as r

quired to support Special Operations Comman

Central, the subunified special operations hea

quarters assigned to US Central Comman

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

341
Within days of notification, the 1st SOW was on

the move to Southwest Asia.

* * * * * *

It was Thursday, 7 August 1990, when Colonel

Weaver, 1st SOW/Directorate of Operational

Plans, received a secure telephone call from Colonel Gray, the 1st SOW commander. Weaver’s

peacetime job was to manage the wing’s exercise

program and, as the chief, Current Operations Division, he had frequently deployed around the

world for both contingencies and exercises. He had

flown with Uttaro and Beres on the number six

EC-130E into Desert One a decade earlier and was

considered an “old head” in the close-knit Combat

Talon community. Before coming to work that

day, he had reflected on the possibility of the 1st

SOW becom ing involved in the unfolding crisis in

Southwest Asia. The conflict was shaping up as a

conventional one, he reasoned, and he concluded

that there was little possibility that special opera -

tions forces would be involved. With Colonel Gray

on the other end of the telephone, however,

Weaver was surprised when Gray told him to

pack his bags and get to MacDill AFB to link up

with SOCCENT personnel preparing to depart for

Southwest Asia. Weaver had four hours to hurry

home, pack his bags, and get on a flight to Tampa.

Along with Weaver two logistics specialists from

Headquarters AFSOC, a CCT member, and a pararescueman (PJ) made up the initial five-person advanced cadre (ADVON) team.1 9

At MacDill Weaver and his team joined with a

40-man SOCCENT ADVON party and departed

Figure 43. Map of Southwest Asia (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell

AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

342
the next day (8 August) for Riyadh, Saudi Ara -

bia. While the ADVON team was en route, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq had annexed

Kuwait. The AFSOC ADVON team’s mission

was to find a suitable airfield that would accom -

modate SOF aircraft and then determine what

was needed to support SOF operations. On the

ground at Riyadh, Weaver went to US Central

Command (CENTCOM) headquarters and con -

tacted the US Air Forces, Central Command

(CENTAF) representative responsible for airfield allocations. Weaver ran into Maj Gen Tom

Olson, who was the vice commander of CENTAF. Both officers had been assigned to

CINCPAC in Hawaii a few years earlier, and

Weaver had served under General Olson while

stationed there. During the course of the con -

versation, General Olson mentioned that there

was a base under construction near Dhahran

and recommended that Weaver take a look to

see if it was close enough to completion to serve

SOF needs. The general also asked Weaver to

look at the possibility of placing an A-10 wing at

the same airfield. Procuring two cars for their

use, Weaver and his five-man team departed

Riyadh for Dhahran. Once in Dhahran the team

linked up with US Embassy personnel, who coordinated permission to visit the new airport.

Northwest of Dhahran was King Fahd Interna -

tional Airport (KFIA), and from the first time

that the ADVON team laid eyes on the facility,

they knew that it was the place to beddown

SOF. It had dual runways that could accommodate both A-10 and SOF rotary- and fixed-wing

aircraft. A couple of days before the ADVON

team’s arrival at KFIA, the last concrete slabs

had been poured for the runways, but the run -

way lights had not yet been installed. KFIA had

partially constructed terminals for passengers

and their king and an unfinished control tower,

runways, and parking ramps. About 5,000 con -

struction workers were employed across the

sprawling complex. As the ADVON party en -

tered the airport area, about 1,000 construction

workers were walking out the front gate and

making their way to Dhahran for departure

from the country.* 2 0

The ADVON team met with the manager of

Bectal Corporation (the general contractor respon -

sible for the airport’s construction) and discussed

beddown requirements. A tour was hastily arranged, and the team was shown around the facility. The first area visited was the control tower,

which was not finished but had running wate

electricity, and ample room in the building at i

base. The control tower itself did not have an

equipment installed and was completely gutte

but the CCT representative felt that it could b

made operational within hours by installing por

able radios for communications. The next stop o

the tour was the MABCO compound, which co

sisted of 16 trailers that had been occupied b

some of the departing construction worker

There were air-conditioned bed spaces for a

proximately 400 personnel and ample room fo

additional tentage adjacent to the trailers. Th

Bectal general manager was cooperative and o

fered all of his facilities at KFIA if approved b

the Saudi government. Satisfied that KFIA w

the place to be, the team drove back to Riyadh 

confer with General Olson and with the SOC

CENT commander, Colonel Johnson. Olson gav

tentative approval for the use of KFIA, with th

USAF A-10s using the east ramp and SOF ai

craft using the west ramp. Conferring with Col

nel Johnson, Weaver recommended that SOC 

CENT colocate with AFSOC forces at KFIA, an

plans were made for the joint headquarters to b

gin moving forward the following day.21 Almost 

an afterthought, General Olson mentioned th

the 1st SOW initial echelon had arrived in-theat

and were, he thought, already in Dhahran. Sayin

a quick good-bye, the ADVON team hit the roa

again for the five-hour drive to Dhahran to lin

up with the 1st SOW element.

At Hurlburt Field Gray had been extreme

busy since his telephone call to Weaver. The win

had mobilized and had processed its initial el

ments for deployment to Southwest Asia. In th

first several days after alert, there was much co

fusion as CENTCOM prioritized forces needed 

defeat an invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq. Ge

eral Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, Centr

Command, anticipated a fierce fight with consi

erable US combat air losses. Consequently, he i

cluded SOF elements in the initial deployment 

serve in the combat search and rescue role. Th

MH-53H Pave Low, MC-130E Combat Talon , an

HC-130P/N were, thus, part of the initial SO

cadre. Thom Beres and the 8th SOS were alerte

and four Combat Talon aircraft and five crew

were prepared for departure. The MC/HC-13

package would self-deploy from the United Stat

to Southwest Asia by way of Europe, while th

Pave Low helicopters would be shipped by way 

C-5 aircraft. With initial actions completed, 1

__________

 *The Iraqi army was poised a few hundred miles to the north and was threatening to invade Saudi Arabia at any time.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

343
SOW forces leaned forward to await a deployment

order.*

On 11 August Colonel Hassell (1st SOW/assis -

tant director of operations) was notified that he

was to deploy that evening with the advanced

cadre Pave Low package. With approximately 30

personnel and eight pallets of equipment and

supplies, he departed Hurlburt Field on the first

of two C-141B aircraft bound for Riyadh. The C141s were followed by a C-5 aircraft with two

Pave Low helicopters onboard. The route of flight

went through Goose Bay, Labrador, and on to

Rhein Main AB, Germany, where Hassell met

with Col Byron R. Hooten, the 39th SOW commander. With just over two hours on the ground

at Rhein Main AB, Hassell briefed Hooten and

his director of operations on the situation and the

anticipated level of involvement of the 1st SOW.

After the C-141 was refueled and serviced,

Hassell and his team departed for the final leg to

Riyadh. At 0400 local time on 13 August, the first

C-141 touched down at Riyadh and taxied into

parking. With aircraft arriving and departing

continuously from Riyadh, it was important to

unload as fast as possible to make room on the

ramp for the next aircraft. Quickly unloading,

Hassell found a vacant corner in a nearby aircraft hangar and had his team begin unpacking

and setting up their SATCOM radios. He found a

telephone and called back to the 1st SOW to talk

with Colonel Gray. Hassell learned from Gray

that the plan had changed en route and that he

was to proceed on to Dhahran. As Hassell headed

back to the hangar to stop the unpacking process,

the C-141 that had brought him to Riyadh took

off, thus leaving part of the 1st SOW element

without air transportation. Although exhausted

from the long flight, everyone quickly began to

pack up and prepare to move. On the ramp the

second C-141 was on the ground and was beginning the unloading process. As Hassell moved to

the C-141, he saw the C-5 taxiing in loaded with

the two Pave Low helicopters and additional support personnel. Coordinating with the MAC air lift

control element (ALCE) team, he quickly told the

C-5 crew to stand by and await further instructions. Moving to the C-141, he told them to stop

unloading. A meeting was held behind the C-141

with the two aircraft commanders, the ALCE

chief, and Colonel Hassell. They agreed to load as

much of the cargo from the hangar as possible and

fly on to Dhahran. In short order all but three

pallets were loaded on to the C-5 and the C-141,

and they were off again for their next destination.

At 0900 local time the two aircraft taxied into

parking at Dhahra n.2 2

Al Hassell had three priorities: first, to get

the Pave Low helicopters downloaded and to get

them assembled; second, to get his personnel off

the hot tarmac and into an adequate facility so

they could get some rest and be prepared to fly;

and third, to contact either SOCCENT or CENTAF for further instructions. As the helicopters

were being unloaded, the temperature on the

flight line already exceeded 112 degrees Fahren -

heit, so Hassell moved his troops not involved in

the download operation to a nearby empty C-12

hangar to get them out of the direct heat. With

no fans or any circulation inside the hangar, the

heat was stifling. Attached to the hangar was a

set of offices that supported US Embassy opera -

tions at Dhahran. The facility was air-conditioned,

so Hassell moved his troops into the hallways

for some air-conditioned rest. It was at this

time that Weaver and his ADVON team arrived

from Riyadh. Weaver discussed with Hassell the

facilities at KFIA, and the two agreed that in itial

operations should be established at Dhahran

until King Fahd was ready for flight opera -

tions. It was critical that the two Pave Low

helicopters be assembled, flight-checked, and

put on alert with crew-rested flight crews as

soon as possible if the planned Iraqi invasion

materialized.2 3

Down the hallway where Hassell’s troops

were resting was the ADVON party of the 1st

Fighter Wing (FW) out of Langley AFB, Virginia. They had arrived as part of the first wave

of forces three days earlier. Both the 1st FW

commander and the Langley base commander

__________

 *In 1989 CINCMAC had reestablished Air Rescue Service at McClellan AFB, California, and had assigned all rescue-designated forces from

Twenty-Third AF to ARS. When AFSOC was formally established as the air component of USSOCOM on 22 May 1990, a secondary mission of SOF

was to be prepared to conduct “combat rescue” operations, as required. ARS was in the initial stages of upgrading its assigned forces with HH-60

Blackhawk helicopters, but did not possess an adequate force structure to execute the demanding combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission by

1990. When CINCCENT looked for a standing CSAR force that could immediately deploy to Southwest Asia, his only choice was SOF. Throughout

the entire Desert Shield buildup and preparation phase, AFSOC’s assigned mission was to support CSAR operations. In Vietnam CSAR missions

were flown into North Vietnam and Laos and consisted of both helicopter and fixed-wing (Sandy) support aircraft. The A-10s stationed at KFIA

would prove to be the modern-day equivalent to the A-1 Skyraider of the Vietnam War era. Much work was needed, however, to develop a viable

force of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft capable of penetrating Iraqi defenses and rescuing downed crew members. As Desert Storm drew near,

however, the 8th SOS Combat Talons assumed additional roles as a leaflet (PSYOPS) platform and as the delivery system for the BLU-82B

15,000-pound bomb.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

344
were there. Col David L. Peebles (the Langley

base commander) had been designated the mayor

of Dhahran AB by CENTAF, and he agreed to

provide any support that he could for Hassell

and his troops.* Weaver relayed to Hassell that

SOCCENT was not yet operational and recom -

mended that he operate autonomously until the

SOF higher headquarters was ready. Later in

the afternoon, Peebles learned there was an airconditioned school on Dhahran airport that

might be available to US forces. The school was

not in session for the summer and was vacant.

Peebles took Hassell to the school and quickly

arranged with the school custodian for the 1st

SOW contingent to move in. The custodian was

glad to provide the school to the Americans.

Thus, Hassell became the “slum lord” of the

school, and over the next week, the number of

personnel housed in the facility swelled to over

750 (175 SOF- and 600 CENTAF-assigned personnel). Col Ben Orrell (1st SOW/DO) arrived at

Riyadh on 14 August with additional SOF staff

personnel, and he proceeded to SOCCENT headquarters at KFIA to assume duties as the senior

AFSOC officer in-theater. This was to be the

last SOF flow for the next two weeks—CINCCENT had decided that the probability of an

Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia had lessened, and

the need for SOF/CSAR forces early in the deployment flow was no longer a high priority.

Hassell was forced to operate his small con tin -

gent with the equipment brought in on the two

C-141s and the two C-5s. Meanwhile, the break

in the flow allowed Orrell and Weaver to get a

breather at KFIA.2 4

As the initial 1st SOW ADVON was deploying

from Hurlburt Field on 11 August, Thom Beres

and the 8th SOS Combat Talon contingent departed the United States en route to Southwest

Asia. With four aircraft (64-0559, 64-0562, 64-

0567, and 64-0568) and six crews, the squadron

was cleared to forward deploy to RAF Wood -

bridge, UK, and to remain there awaiting additional instructions. Arriving in the UK on 13

August, Beres learned of the new CENTCOM

priorities and was directed to remain at RAF

Woodbridge for the next nine days awaiting

onward-movement authorization. Personnel from

the 8th SOS, who made up the initial deploy -

ment package to Southwest Asia, consisted of 38

officers and 22 enlisted personnel including the

following:

At KFIA Weaver had staked out his claim to 

portion of the airfield, and SOCCENT had move

from Riyadh to colocate with the AFSOC eleme

in the tower building. Other units were beginnin

to arrive and settle into KFIA, including th

USA’s 101st Airborne Division and its aviatio

battalions. The 101st Airborne Division wante

the tower facility and the MABCO compound fo

its operations, and demanded much of the ram

space that Weaver had portioned for SOF aircraf

With the help of General Olson and Colon

Johnson, Orrell and Weaver were able to retai

most of the real estate that they needed. The AD 

VON team posted an armed guard at the MABC

compound and claimed the tower area for com

bined AFSOC/SOCCENT use. To prepare the ai

field for flight operations, the airfields large fu

tanks were cleaned, and a source for JP-4 fu

was found. Fuel trucks to refuel the aircraft we

brought in by CENTAF planners. In a short p

riod, the airfield was brought up to minimal o

erational standards, but it would take anothe

two months before it was fully operational.2 5

At Dhahran Hassell had apportioned the thre

wings of the school to the 20th SOS, 8th SOS, an

9th SOS. The latter two squadrons were waitin

to be called forward from RAF Woodbridge, UK

and Hassell was pressured into opening up th

school to other CENTAF personnel. With an im

prest fund of $100,000 and a contracting officer 

obligate it, Hassell had procured hundreds of ma

tresses from the local economy by the second d

in the school. By the fifth day life at the scho

__________

 *Peebles had been the 435th TAW deputy wing commander at Rhein Main AB, Germany, and was familiar with SOF and the 7th SOS.

 **Denotes personnel assigned to other units and attached to the 8th SOS for flying.

Pilots Navs EWOs Flt Eng ROs

Phillips Calvert Anderson Gorczynski Minton

Close Saier Smith Garvey Dent

Davenport Bell Lawler Fleming Foster

Cochran Thomas Pearson Dunn Bonck

Harstad Lorenz Burnett

Palmer Tagert **DeBoe

Henry Pulmano **Bynum

Biermacher **Crisafi

Prior Bouressa Loads Others

O’Reilly Richard Crayne Beres

Hinck **Tardiff Bohannon Meller

Boitano **Cooper Corlew Schomme

**Linder Eskind Pearson Livesay

**Mohylski Franco Gobbi Baylor

**Stephenson Roberson Phillips

Kelly

Carroll

Gallo

**Sausedo

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

345
was “not bad.” On the flight line buildup of the

first two MH-53s had begun shortly after their

arrival. On 15 August the second two helicopters

were delivered aboard a C-5 aircraft. The limiting

factor for Hassell was the lack of maintenance

personnel (only 26 maintainers were included in

the original deployment package) and war readiness spares kit parts to assemble and operate the

sophisticated machines. 26 Borrowing tools and

miscellaneous equipment from British contractors and a crane from the 82d Airborne Division,

the maintainers were able to assemble the four

helicopters by 17 August. There were not enough

spare parts to keep all four helicopters opera -

tional, so Hassell made the decision to use the

fourth aircraft as a cannibalization bird to keep

the other three helicopters flying. With functional check flights complete, AFSOC finally had

an operational presence in-theater.2 7

Although Hassell had four helicopters and

175 personnel, he had no guns or ammunition to

arm the helicopters. If tasked to fly a CSAR

mission, the slow-moving helicopters would

have no means of self-defense. Lt Col Rich

Comer, the commander of the 20th SOS, had

deployed to Dhahran on the first C-5 . He and

Hassell kept pressure on the 1st SOW back at

Hurlburt Field for help in resolving the shortfall. Because of their efforts, the first shipment

of guns and ammunition arrived on 20 August

by way of the 1st SOW’s HC-130 aircraft that

had been delayed at RAF Woodbridge. Headquarters AFSOC coordinated with the 39th

SOW to transfer the equipment to the 20th SOS

until the 1st SOW’s own equipment resumed its

flow into Saudi Arabia. The HC-130s also

brought additional spare parts to keep the heli -

copters operational. A regular shuttle was established between RAF Woodbridge and Dha -

hran every four days until the SOF flow

resumed. The last four MH-53s did not arrive in

Southwest Asia until 4 September, and the

WRSK did not reach 100 percent fill until 20

Septembe r. 28

With airfield conditions improving at KFIA,

Orrell decided to move the Dhahran helicopter

operation forward to its final beddown location.

From 20 August to 3 September, personnel and

equipment moved from Dhahran to KFIA. With

SOF personnel gone from the school, Hassell

turned over the administrative responsibilities to

CENTAF and graciously bowed out of his farreaching commitments at Dhahran. He returned to

Hurlbu rt Field and remained there throughout the

r emainder of the conflict, running the operations

directorate in the absence of Ben Orrell. At RAF

Woodbridge Beres received orders to proceed onward to KFIA. On 22 August 1990 the four Combat Talons arrived in Saudi Arabia, thus beginning a Combat Talon commitment that would

last for the next eight months. On 28 August two

EC-130E aircraft of the 193d SOG Air National

Guard arrived, and three days later Colonel Gray

moved forward from Hurlburt Field to assume

command of Air Force Special Operations Command Central (AFSOCCENT). Thus, within

three weeks of notification, AFSOCCENT was es -

tablished and operational in the desert of Saudi

Arabia. By 8 September four AC-130H gunships

had closed at KFIA, and four days later the fifth

and final gunship arrived.2 9 With SOCCENT also

colocated at KFIA, Weaver’s vision of a consolidated SOF presence in Southwest Asia became a

reality.

Training in the Desert

Along with the other squadron commanders,

Beres had his hands full during the initial month

after arriving at KFIA. The MABCO compound wa s

overflowing with personnel, and air-conditioned

“temper tents” were erected as the population of

the airfield grew. AFSOCCENT was able to keep

just ahead of the buildup with everyone pitching

in. Officers and enlisted personnel alike con -

structed tents. One of the 8th SOS aircrews got so

proficient that they could put up a temper tent in

20 minutes—from the start of breaking down its

packing box to having it completely erected. By 1

September there were almost 20,000 troops living

Tent City, KFIA, Saudi Arabia. Maintenance and support crews stayed just ahead of arriving AFSOC forces

at King Fahd International Airport.

USAF Photo

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

346
at KFIA. The 354th TFW from Myrtle Beach,

North Carolina, was designated by CENTAF as

the host wing for KFIA, having approximately

3,000 personnel and 48 A-10 aircraft assigned.

The 23d TFW from England AFB, Louisiana, also

had a contingent of A-10 aircraft and associated

personnel assigned to the base. Under the arrangement, AFSOCCENT had to coordinate its

requirements through the host 374th TFW base

commander, a situation that became strained as

AFSOCCENT requirements expanded and went

unfilled. Equipment and supplies specifically earmarked for AFSOC were redirected by the host

wing to fill its own requirements. The USA’s

101st Airborne Division, with 600 helicopters assigned, was also a large presence at the airfield

and further taxed the host wing’s ability to support its tenants. Gray had to fall back on the informal relationship, established by Weaver and

Orrell, with General Olson at CENTAF headquarters to finally get the situation resolved. After

much turmoil and hard feelings between major

tenant units and the host wing, the operation be -

gan to smooth out in mid-October.30

With SOF crews deployed to Saudi Arabia,

continuation training requirements became a prior -

ity. All AFSOC crews were fully trained and mission

ready when they arrived in country, but unique

SOF skills were perishable and needed to be practiced on a regular basis to maintain profi ciency.

Training flights in the traffic pattern at KFIA and

resupply sorties for SOCCENT-assigned forces

stationed up and down the northern border of Saudi

Arabia were flown, but no real tactical training

missions occurred until early October. The Royal

Saudi Air Force controlled all airspace, and it was

restrictive when giving permission for US aircraft to

fly low level either during the day or night. Eventually, as Saudi Arabia came to the realization that

Saddam Hussein was not going to give up Kuwait

and stop threatening Riyadh, airspace approval was

granted, and SOF aircraft wer e allowed to train for

their wartime mission. On 9 October an MC-130E

Combat Talon flew its first low-level training mission that included heli copter aerial refueling and

reception light committee (RLC) landings at KFIA.

The crew was also able to fly NVG approaches to

blacked-out landings after RLC training was com -

pleted. Two days later a similar Combat Talon

trainin g mission was flown, with rapid off-loads

at KFIA added to the profile. In the following

weeks Combat Talons performed IFR operations

with KC-135 tankers, executed ground FARP op -

eration s, and completed HSLLADS and bundle

airdrops. On 6 November an MC-130E partic

pated in a full-sca le CSAR exercise (CSAREX

refueling both MH-60 and MH-53 helicopte

a nd receiving fuel from a KC-135. The CSARE

incorporated A-10 fighters as “Sandy” support ai

craft in a rescue scenario that included recovery 

a downed pilot from hostile territory.31 Unlike th

primary mission of long-range, low-level infiltr

tion and exfiltration of personnel and equipme

from denied areas, the CSAR mission had not bee

rehearsed by SOF aircrews and convention

fighter forces since Vietnam. Tactics and proc

dures had to be developed to ensure that th

mission could be safely conducted in a combat e

vironment.

As the fall months passed, negotiations wi

Saddam Hussein reached an impasse. In anticip

tion of the commencement of hostilities, AFSOC

CENT deployed from KFIA on 2–3 October 199

an ADVON team headed by Weaver. The tea

was tasked to look for possible locations whe

helicopters and tankers could maintain groun

CSAR alert closer to the southern Iraqi borde

The team included doctors, logisticians, CCT, an

PJs who were authorized to make commitmen

for AFSOCCENT. The search resulted in identif

ing Arar and Rafhá Airfields, which were locat

near the Iraqi border, as forward staging bases fo

rotary-wing alert. The two airfields were too clo

to the border for sustained operations, so the tea

continued to look for a forward operating locatio

that would support the two smaller airfields. O

28 November Weaver’s team identified Al Jouf A

as an ideal FOL. Al Jouf was far enough from th

border that both rotary- and fixed-wing aircra

could stage from there, and Arar and Rafhá Ai

fields were close to the border and made ideal fo

ward ground alert locations. Flight time from th

latter two airfields into Iraq was approximately 1

minutes (fig. 4 4).32

Earlier in the month, on 8 November, Pres

dent Bush had authorized the additional deploy 

ment of US forces to Southwest Asia to giv

CENTCOM an “offensive capability,” a move th

effectively doubled the number of US forces in th

region. For AFSOCCENT forces deployed 

Southwest Asia, the buildup signified a long-ter

commitment to the region. Beginning in mi

November, many of the original SOF personne

who had deployed to Saudi Arabia in August an

September, were replaced by new personnel fro

Hurlburt Field. Colonel Gray made the decision 

swap-out personnel so that the impact of a pr

longed deployment (already over 90 days fo

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

347
many) could be spread among more special opera -

tors. On 29 November the UN Security Council

authorized the use of force if Iraq did not with -

draw from Kuwait by midnight, Eastern Standard

Time, on 15 January 1991. With the main base at

KFIA operating smoothly and its forward bases

secured, AFSOCCENT was ready for the onset of

war.

By December of 1990 SOCCENT’s Coalition warfare mission had progressed to a point that an exercise to validate the capability was finalized. Exercise Desert Alliance was conducted from 18 to 23

December, with AFSOCCENT aircraft flying 20

sorties supporting SOCCENT’s Coalition units, including Kuwaiti, French, Egyptian, Saudi, British,

and American forces. The exercise placed demands

on both aircrew and maintenance perso nnel by increasing the operations tempo to wartime levels.

Figure 44. AFSOC Deployed Locations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Source: USAF

Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Fla.)

Photo details construction of underground bunker used

during Desert Storm.

USAF Photo

Life at Arar AB was basic at best. Mike Lavengood pictured on the steps of an underground command bun -

ker. Note the two MH-60s on strip alert in the background.

Photo courtesy of Mike Lavengood

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

348
Three Combat Talons flew night low-level, NVG

landings, IFR, and rapid exfiltration of exercise

forces. All AFSOCCENT aircrews, inclu ding those of

the MC-130E, MH-53H, MH-60G, HC-130P/N , and

AC-130H, performed in an exemplary manner.33 The

week of 9–12 January 1991 was the last week of

training before the beginning of the air war over Iraq.

Combat Talons flew training sorties every night during

that final week. In total Combat Talon aircraft flew 49

training sorties during Desert Shield. When Desert

Storm began on 16 January 1991, the squadron w

ready.

From the initial buildup in August, and co

tinuing on well past the end of the ground war i

February, the 8th SOS deployed 13 crews. Som

personnel moved from one crew to another and r

main ed in Saudi Arabia when the November rot

tion was completed. The 13 crews from the 8th SO

that supported Operation Desert Shield /Dese

Storm are listed below:*

__________

 *Crews 1, 4, and 5 returned to Hurlburt Field during the November 1990 swap out. Some crew members from these three crews augmented t

six formed crews remaining at KFIA and awaiting the start of the war. Crews 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 flew leaflet and BLU-82B missions during t

January/February Desert Storm period. Crews 10, 11, 12, and 14 deployed to Saudi Arabia after the termination of the ground war in l

February. Some members of the latter four crews had flown during Desert Storm and remained in place at KFIA after cessation of the ground w

No crew photos are available for crews 11, 12, and 14, and no crew was designated Crew 13. Crew members flew on different crews during t

prolonged deployment to Southwest Asia. Not all crew members were available for each crew pict ure.

Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4 Crew 5 Crew 6 Crew 7 Crew 8

Phillips Davenport Henry Collins O’Reilly Barragy Abbott Black

Close Cochran Close Zack Hinck Linder McCoy Barragy

Stone Palmer English Meller Harstad Boitano Batts Gabreski

Reynolds Beres Bell Pulmano Crisafi Tagert Inkel Booz

Chapman Saier Thomas Kersh Franco Weiler Clites Traudt

Anderson Smith Filer Pearson Bonn Shin Henderson Clayton

Pies Gorczynski Tremblay Fleming Dunn Rother Fabbro Singletary

Burton Bonck Ballerstadt Dent Boulware Westby Westby Harris

Mulcahy Crayne Corlew Gobbi Kelly Kelly Scott Hartke

Baker Lutman Pearson Roberson Tavarez Carroll Martin Klink

Manley Martin Restifo Prior Carroll Fleming Lutman Scott

Bohannon Santiago Lorenz Clark Kersh Clites

Calvert Biermacher Linder Burnett Packard

Packard Chapman Boitano Vonsik Klink

Boulware Lawler Mitchell Foster

Ballerstadt Garvey Cox

Long Minton

Crew 9 Crew 10 Crew 11 Crew 12 Crew 14

Murdock Cox Michenfelder Gabreski Cochran

English Boitano Rowe Larson Settergren

Weiler Cody Reynolds Howell Reynolds

Gantert Franco Lindhorst Acosta Hilliard

Alaniz Bonn Messer Knight Vanderley

Long Ferguson Sager Packard Lowery

Sanders Kyle Everett Boulware Keelan

Rodriguez Livingston Durbin Rodriguez Burton

Mitchell Pickering Rodriguez Tavarez Grover

Santiago Kenney Fillen Ward

Makela Harris Shin

Massey Hinck

Turner

Beres

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

349
Crew 1, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Manley, Anderson,

Stone, Burton, Reynolds, Close, Phillips, and Chapman. Kneeling left to right:

Mulcahy, Baker, and Pies.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

Crew 2, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Davenport, Bohannon,

Gorczynski, Saier, Calvert, Ballerstadt, and Boulware. Kneeling left to right:

Crayne, Cochran, Smith, Long, and Palmer. Not pictured: Beres, Bonck, Lutman,

Martin, and Packard.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

350
Crew 3, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Thomas, Biermacher, Henry, Close, Ballerstadt, and Tremblay. Kneeling left to right: Bell,

Lawler, Corlew, and Restifo. Not pictured: English, Filer, Pearson, Santiago,

Chatman, Garvey, and Minton.

Crew 4, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Left to right: Dent, Lorenz, Boitano, Linder,

Fleming, Mitchell, Prior, Cox, Kersh, and Gobbi. Not pictured: Collins, Zack,

Meller, Pulmono, Pearson, and Roberson.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

351
Crew 6, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Weiler, Boitano,

Westby, Linder, Barragy, and Rother. Kneeling left to right: Kelly, Tagert,

Fleming, and Shin. Not pictured: Carroll.

Crew 5, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: O’Reilly, Franco,

Hinck, Carroll, Crisafi, and Dunn. Kneeling left to right: Kelly, Harstad, and

Tavarez. Not pictured: Bonn, Boulware, Clark, Burnett, Vonsik, and Foster.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

352
Crew 7, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Martin, Packard,

Batts, Westby, McCoy, Kersh, Abbott, and Inkel. Kneeling left to right: Klink,

Lutman, Scott, Fabbro, and Henderson. Not pictured: Clites.

Crew 8, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Black, Barragy, Singletary, Clayton, Traudt, Hartke, and Scott. Kneeling left to right: Clites,

Fleming, Klink, Booz, Gabreski, and Harris.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

353
Crew 9, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Standing left to right: Alaniz, Murdock,

Massey, Rodriguez, Makela, Sanders, and Mitchell. Kneeling left to right: Beres

(squadron commander), Weiler, Gantert, and English. Not pictured: Long, Santiago, and Turner.

Crew 10, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Left to right: Livingston, Ferguson, Kenney, Cox, Boitano, Bonn, and Pickering. Not pictured: Cody, Franco, Kyle, and

Harris.

USAF Photo

USAF Photo

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

354
Combat Talon 

Wartime Tasking Expand

The deployment to Southwest Asia had taken

the US military and the 1st SOW by surprise.

Before deployment to the desert, the wing had

participated in a heavy exercise schedule. Within

each exercise specific scenarios were rehearsed so

that participating units could practice operations

that they were not normally exposed to during

local unilateral training. One capability employed

during selected JCS exercises was the delivery

of airborne leaflets in support of an exercise

PSYOPS campaign plan. With environmental

considerations taken into account, however, leaflet missions were usually limited to one or two

for each exercise, with a minimum number of

leaflets actually dropped. From the time of initial deployment to Desert Shield, the primary

tasking for AFSOCCENT was CSAR, and most

of the training during the fall of 1990 revolved

around developing that capability. The Combat

Talon was the only “penetrating tanker” available to SOCCENT (i.e., it was the only weapons

system that had a sophisticated defensive ECM

suite that allowed the aircraft to refuel helicop -

ters at low altitude in denied territory). The

HC-130P/N had the primary mission of helicop -

ter refueling, but it did not have the ECM suite

found on the Combat Talon . As the New Year

approached, however, a theater-wide PSYOPS

campaign began to materialize that consisted of

a combination of airborne radio and television

broadcasts and the airborne delivery of PSYOPS

material. On 22 November 1990 the 193d SOG

from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard (at -

tached to AFSOCCENT at KFIA) began airborne broadcasts of Voice of America programs

to Iraqi troops. Around 1 January 1991, the

USA’s 4th PSYOPS Group liaison officer, who

was stationed at KFIA with the 193d SOG, con -

tacted the 8th SOS and inquired about the

squadron supporting leaflet dissemination mis -

sions. With a long history of PSYOPS leaflet

support dating back to the Vietnam War and

with its sophisticated ECM suite, the 8th SOS

was the obvious choice for the mission. The

squadron had sufficient assets in country (four

Combat Talons and six crews) to support the

emerging PSYOPS mission and still maintain

CSAR alert. Within days tasking began to flow

from Riyadh to the 8th SOS for leaflet support.*

A second capability maintained by the 8th SO

was the delivery of the BLU-82B bomb. At 15,00

pounds total weight, the BLU-82B was the large

conventional bomb in the USAF inventory. It ha

been used in Vietnam to clear helicopter LZs 

dense tropical jungle. There were no jungles 

Southwest Asia, but the BLU-82B would prove 

be a valuable addition to CENTCOM’s capabili

when its forces faced the entrenched Iraqi div

sions occupying Kuwait and southern Iraq.

Development of

the BLU-82B

On 20 November 1967 MACV requested assi

tance from the Southeast Asia mobile explosiv

ordnance disposal team at Tan Son Nhut AB, R

public of Vietnam, to design a method to cle

helicopter LZs in dense areas. The EOD tea

first looked at an M118 3,000-pound bomb, and o

9 December 1967, it transported a specially rigge

M118 to Dak To for test detonation. The bom

cleared an area 150-feet wide and detonated a

booby traps installed for the test. Because of th

test, MACV tasked Seventh Air Force to develop 

capability to deliver specialized ordnance em 

ployed in a jungle clearing operation. As Seven

AF began its test program in Vietnam after th

first of the year, the Armament Development an

Test Center at Eglin AFB conducted a series 

tests from 29 April to 31 July 1968. Eglin AFB

test centered on a 1,000-pound BLU-1B/B fir

bomb casing filled with either DBL-22L expl

sives or Astrolite A-1-5. Eglin AFB’s test co

firmed that the 1,000-pound bomb filled wi

either of the two explosives failed to clear a fore

area suitable for helicopter landings. It becam

obvious that if an instant helicopter LZ was to b

created, a far heavier munitions would have to b

developed.3 4

At Fort Benning, Georgia, the USA began tes

of the M121 10,000-pound bomb, a device th

had been developed in the 1940s for employme

by the B-36 strategic bomber. The large bomb ha

been in storage and out of production since th

B-36 was decommissioned in the 1950s, and on

a limited number was available. For the LZ clea

ing operation, the M121 was modified and rede

igned with two independent fuzing systems, on

forward and one aft, as well as a stabilizatio

parachute. By the end of the year, airborne ri

ging and delivery techniques had been develope

for the C-130 aircraft, and the munitions wer

__________

*In combination with the airborne television broadcast, the PSYOPS leaflet program became one of the most successful operations of Desert Storm

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

355
ready for testing in Southeast Asia. From 12 to 20

December 1968, the 834th Air Division,

headquartered at Tan Son Nhut AB, conducted a

10-weapon operational test of the M121 in South

Vietnam under the code name Commando Trap

(which was later changed to Commando Vault).3 5

The average miss distance from the desired point

of impact during the test was 103 meters, although the greatest miss distances were recorded

on the first four drops. The M121 test was a tech -

nical success, but the bomb did not satisfy the

MACV requirement to clear a helicopter zone ca -

pable of landing five helicopters at one time. 36

Between November 1968 and February 1969,

discussions were conducted to determine if the

M121 should be brought back into production, or

if an entirely new, super heavy (up to 35,000

pounds) munitions should be developed. The chief

of staff of the Air Force favored resumption of the

production of the M121, since the existing inventory was extremely low. As a result, early efforts

by the Air Force turned to adapting the M121 to

the new jungle clearing role. After considerable

testing and analysis, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory’s Special Appli cations Branch, located at

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, concluded that it

would be advantageous to try a new explosive,

designated DBA-22M, and load it into a larger

bomb casing. The Air Force subsequently requested Sandia Laboratory, through the Albuquerque Operations Office of the Atomic Energy

Commission, to design and develop a possible

follow-on bomb to the M121, weighing 15,000

pounds and filled with the gelled slurry explosive

DBA-22M.*37

Comparing the two bombs gained a perspective of each one’s destructive power. The M121

was approximately 91/2 feet long, nearly 4 feet in

diameter, and weighed 10,800 pounds. The explosive agent Tritonal accounted for 8,050 of the

10,800 pounds. The BLU-82B measured 11/2 feet

in length (without a fuze extender) and 41/2 feet

in width. Its filled weight was 15,000 pounds,

with the explosive agent being 12,600 pounds of

ammonium nitrate powdered aluminum (DBA22M) slurry. Tritonal was composed of 80 percent

TNT and 20 percent powdered aluminum and

was loaded into the bomb casing by the manufacturer. DBA-22M was a powerful explosive made

up, in part, of particulate aluminum, ammonium

nitrate, water, thickeners, and stabilizers. The

two main components of the slurry, which were

inert before being combined, were designed to be

shipped separately and mixed in the field. This

capability made the BLU-82B potentially easier

and safer to handle during shipment.38

The first live, full-scale test drop of the BLU82B took place on 1 April 1969 at the Tonopah

test range in Nevada. The rigged bomb was

loaded on to a C-130 aircraft at Hill AFB, Utah,

and was flown to the Nellis range in Nevada,

where it was dropped. The large bomb impacted

one of the dry lake-bed targets at the Tonopah

range. The design and development program

lasted throughout most of 1969 and culminated in

the initial fabrication of 225-prototype 15,000-

pound BLU-82B bomb casings. Management of

the program was then transferred from Kirtland

AFB to the Armament Development and Test

Center at Eglin AFB.3 9

As part of the test and development program,

a number of experimental BLU-82s (identified as

CD-1s) was shipped to SEA for operational evaluation. On 11 May 1969 two CD-1s and two M121s

were dropped so that their effectiveness could be

compared. Although the CD-1 did not clear a fivehelicopter landing zone, it did clear an area approximately two and one-half times greater than

the smaller M121. After reviewing results of the

operational test, the commander, Seventh AF,

recommended that the Air Force concentrate on

development of the CD-1/BLU-82B in lieu of resuming production of the M121. An added advantage in deciding on the BLU-82B was that it

could be available in SEA by early 1970, whereas

the long lead time to resume production of the

M121 delayed its availability by nearly one

year.40

Although the explosive force of the BLU-82B

did not fulfill MACV requirements, several benefits were confirmed during the operational tests.

Employed over proper terrain, the bomb provided

at least a one-ship (and almost always a two-ship)

landing zone. Flash from the explosion burned

tree foliage and brush out to about double the

radius of the useable zone itself. The shock wave

from the blast incapacitated enemy troops out to

600 meters from ground zero, leaving them

shocked and dazed for up to 18 hours. Helicopters

landing on the cleared zones were assured of two

vital conditions: first, the area immediately in or

around the zone would be completely cleared of

__________

 * USAF interest in DBA-22M originated in Sandia Laboratory’s need for a conventional high explosive that could be used as a test device capable

of producing a simulated nuclear cloud for the exercise of RB-57 sampler aircraft under Project Cloudmaker. The simulated nuclear test device was

to weigh 45,000 pounds (for comparison, the largest World War II conventional bomb weighed 23,000 pounds). The sampler program was scrapped

before the large test device was operational, but the DBA-22M slurry developed for it was later used in the BLU-82B bomb.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

356
booby traps; and second, there would normally be

no effective enemy forces within half a kilometer

of the drop zone, blast pressure having incapacitated or killed them. Assault forces would usually

be unopposed as they secured the LZ area.41

With these results, Air Staff concurred with

the production of the BLU-82B, and the first op -

erational bombs began arriving in Vietnam in

February 1970. The first drop of the production

model took place on 23 March 1970. Both the

BLU-82B and the remaining inventory of the

M121s were dropped at a rate of approximately

20 per month throughout 1970. By October 1970,

323 bombs had been used to clear helicopter LZs

or to create clearings for fire bases (a total of 216

M121s and 107 BLU-82Bs). The last M121 was

dropped on 8 August 1970, thus exhausting the

inventory of those munitions.42 For the remainder of US involvement in SEA, the BLU-82B was

employed in support of US troops in the field.

When the war ended, residual BLU-82B casings

were put into storage at Hill AFB, Utah, await -

ing future requirements, and filled bombs were

stored in the Philippines and in depots in the

United States.

One limitation of the DBA-22M slurry, and one

that was apparently forgotten after the Vietnam

War, was that it became unstable after a time.

Approximately 12 months after mixing the slurry

and loading it into a BLU-82B bomb casing, the

slurry became unstable, and after an extended

time, the mixture could spontaneously detonate.

On 7 September 1978 10 Vietnam War–era BLU82Bs, stored at the Sierra Army Ammunition De -

pot, spontaneously detonated (one probably set off

the other nine). Post-accident investigation revealed that the unfuzed bombs had been loaded

almost seven years earlier—du ring the Vietnam

War era. Remaining bombs stored in bomb dumps

around the world were inspected, and their slurry

analyses confirmed that they were also unstable.4 3

The existing inventory of premixed bombs was destroyed, with the residual inventory of bomb casings remaining in storage at Hill AFB.

After the 1978 accident two BLU-82B bombs

were kept loaded and in storage for a short-notice

contingency requirement. The two bombs were

loaded in six-month intervals, thus requiring destruction of one bomb every 180 days. The destruction process was originally carried out by

bomb disposal technicians, but beginning in the

mid-1980s, the 8th SOS began dropping the

BLU-82Bs scheduled to be destroyed. Thus, every

six months an 8th SOS Combat Talon would deploy

to Hill AFB and drop a BLU-82B on nearb

ranges. The arrangement allowed 8th SOS cre

members to maintain proficiency in BLU-82B o

erations, while at the same time disposing of th

six-month-old bomb before it became unstabl

When the squadron deployed to KFIA in Augu

1990, one of its crews had dropped a BLU-82

during the previous month. Knowing that the tw

bombs were filled and ready for employmen

Beres prepared a concept for the employment 

the BLU-82B in Southwest Asia.

The 7th SOS Deploys in

Support of CTF Proven Force

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, th

UN response was quick and decisive, with tho

sands of US troops deploying to Saudi Arabia an

other Persian Gulf countries over the followin

weeks. To the north, Iraq shared its border wi

Turkey, a NATO country with strong ties to th

United States. Iraq and Turkey were tradin

partners before the invasion, with a large oil pip

line passing from Iraq through Turkey to oil te

minals in the Mediterranean. When the Unite

States approached the Turkish government fo

approval to station combat forces in Turkey fo

use against Iraq, the Turks were reluctant to pr

vide facilities for fear of economic and politic

repercussions. Consequently, UN forces were d

nied basing privileges through the fall of 199

The 39th SOW at Rhein Main AB was alerted 

deploy to Turkey several times from September 

December, but each time the deployment was ca

celed at the last minute.4 4

As the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal fro

Kuwait approached, the 39th SOW was alerted o

10 January 1991 for deployment to Incirlik AB

Turkey. The wing was to support CTF Prove

Force, the US Central Command task force esta

lished in Turkey for Operation Desert Storm. Th

wing was to function as the SOF air component 

the JSOTF, which consisted of all SOF statione

in Turkey and committed to the northern portio

of Iraq. SOCEUR, as the SOF component of CT

Proven Force, established the JSOTF (identifie

as JSOTF Elusive Concept) under the comman

of Brig Gen Richard K. Potter. On 13 January tw

MC-130E Combat Talons of the 7th SOS deploye

to Incirlick AB and were followed the next day b

four HC-130s of the 67th SOS. The wing’s Pav

Low helicopters were prepared for shipment b

way of C-5 but were delayed in the United Kin

dom awaiting available airlift. They did not arriv

in Turkey until 17 January, the day after th

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

357
start of the air war. The 7th SOS remained at

Incirlick AB for the duration of the war, but the

rotary-wing aircraft deployed forward to Batman,

a small airfield in eastern Turkey. At Batman the

MH-53s maintained SAR alert for missions into

northern Iraq (fig. 45). 45

As was the case for 1st SOW forces at KFIA, the

39th SOW was assigned the CSAR mission, but

because of sensitivities to the word combat by the

Turkish government, the mission title was

changed to joint search and rescue (JSAR).4 6 When

Col Ben Josey and his MH-53 ADVON party arrived at Batman to begin preparations for the arrival of the main-body helicopter force, they found

conditions at the airfield austere. Batman was located just 72 miles from the Iraqi border in the

mountains of eastern Turkey. In freezing rain the

ADVON party found itself in mud up to its calves

and with no Gortex rain gear for protection from

the miserably cold and wet weather. There were

two Turkish military munitions storage areas at

Batman, one of which was filled with bombs. The

second above-ground facility was empty, and the

local Turkish military provided it to the ADVON

team for its use. In 22-degree weather and with

freezing rain falling outside, the ADVON team

moved into the bomb storage facility and began

preparations for the arrival of its aircraft. Living

on MREs and bottled water, the ADVON team

worked around the clock.47 On 20 January 1991

the four helicopters arrived at Batman and assumed alert duties for JSAR four days after the

war began. By 24 January there were more than

200 personnel living at Batman. The two 7th SOS

Combat Talons stood alert at Incirlick AB in support of the Batman JSAR mission.4 8

Final Preparations for

Operation Desert Storm

It had been five months since the 1st SOW was

alerted and had deployed to Southwest Asia. As

1991 arrived AFSOCCENT had its aircraft on

alert and its crews trained and ready for the

CSAR mission. The 20th SOS also had worked

with USA Apache helicopter crews during the

previous three months and had perfected a firststrike attack against Iraqi radar positions in

preparation for the start of the air war. A fullscale rehearsal had been conducted in early January, with everything going exactly as planned. For

the 8th SOS, tasking for prewar PSYOPS leaflet

operations began to flow in early January. Just as

their Stray Goose predecessors of the Vietnam

War had d one, the squadron would fly night leaflet

missions ta rgeted at key enemy positions. A typical leaflet mission profile included takeoff from

KFIA and then flying on an easterly heading until

reaching the Persian Gulf coastline. At the coast

the Combat Talon would turn north until just

south of the Kuwaiti/Saudi border. At that point

the aircraft would turn west while staying within

Saudi airspace. Dependent upon the target loca -

tion and the prevailing winds, the aircraft would

climb to its drop altitude and release its leaflets

over a predetermined point. Prewar leaflet drops

targeted both Kuwait City and Iraqi troop concentrations within the southeastern corner of Kuwa it.

After 16 January Combat Talons occasionally entered Iraqi airspace to deliver leaflets targeted at

specific Republican Guard units occupying positions in northern and western Kuwait. Leaflet

missions usually departed KFIA after midnight,

when the evening bombing raids had concluded.

Each mission was timed so that the leaflets would

reach their intended targets between two and five

o’clock in the morning.4 9

Leaflet delivery was not a precise science but

rather an art based on both known and unknown

factors. The weight of the leaflet paper and how

it was folded had a great impact on the accuracy

of the drop. Ideally, a properly constructed leaflet

would rotate about its longitudinal axis and

would fall at a constant rate based on gravity.

Thus, in a no-wind condition, Combat Talon navigators could determine exactly where a leaflet

would impact the ground—a leaflet dropped at

20,000 feet, for example, would travel 20,000 feet

horizontally from its release point before reach -

ing the ground. Cardboard boxes of leaflets were

loaded on board the aircraft in reverse order from

their scheduled delivery. The containers were designed to break apart when they hit the aircraft’s

slipstream during the drop. The static line was

rigged in such a way as to jerk the bottom out of

the cardboard box and, thus, release the leaflets.

The key to successful leaflet delivery was in the

application of variables (primarily wind velocity)

to the leaflet’s constant rate of fall.5 0 During premission planning weather forecasters would provide their best guesses as to wind speed and direction, and from the forecast Combat Talon

navigators would compute the premission release

point. Once airborne the navigators would compare the actual flight winds with the forecast

winds as the aircraft climbed to drop altitude.

The release point was then adjusted, as required,

before releasing the leaflets, ensuring that they

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

358
had the best opportunity of reaching their assigned target.

Before the start of the air war on 16 January,

Coalition aircraft were prohibited from flying near

the Kuwaiti border. The 8th SOS Combat Talons

were exempted from that policy for the delivery of

PSYOPS material. The first officially acknow -

ledged leaflet mission of the war was flown by the

8th SOS during the night of 11/12 January. Iraqi

troops occupying the Kuwait City area were the

specific target. A secondary objective of the mission was to reassure the Kuwaiti resistance fighters, who were active in the Kuwait City area, that

Coalition forces would soon liberate their country.

Dropping from 20,000 feet and with favorable

winds, the leaflets scored a direct hit on Kuwait

City, which was 60 miles from the border.5 1

On the morning of 12 January, Kuwaiti resi

tance fighters relayed to Coalition forces in Sau

Arabia that the leaflets had found their target

Portions of the city were saturated with leaflet

During the next two nights, Combat Talons co

tinued to deliver leaflets targeted at Kuwait Ci

and its suburbs. On the eve of the air war (th

night of 15/16 January), the 8th SOS flew its la

prewar leaflet mission, which was targeted 

frontline Iraqi troops within southeastern K

wait.52 Thus, when the air war began on 16 Jan

ary, the 8th SOS already had flown four PSYOP

leaflet missions with superb results.

As the 8th SOS made its initial leaflet drop o

12 January, AFSOCCENT received orders fro

SOCCENT to move forward to its FOLs and 

man its wartime battle stations. Four days earlie

Figure 45. Batman Depicted in Eastern Turkey, North of Turkish/Iranian Border (Source:

AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

359
Orrell had deployed forward to Al Jouf with an

ADVON team to make final preparations for the

anticipated move. From 12 to 14 January, both

rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft prepared to depart

KFIA and move forward. On 14 January eight

MH-53s and four MH-60s, along with two HC130s, made the six-hour flight to Al Jouf and

closed at the FOL. The four Combat Talons remained at KFIA, flew PSYOPS leaflet missions,

and pulled ground alert for CSAR. Just before the

start of the air war, Combat Talons not tasked to

fly leaflet missions were dispersed to Thumrait

AB, Oman, to reduce their vulnerability to attack

by Iraqi missiles at KFIA. AFSOC-assigned units

dropped more than 18 million leaflets during the

course of the campaign.

Initial AFSOCCENT CSAR Tasking

At 0800 on 16 January 1991, the UN deadline

for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait

passed without any movement by Saddam

Hussein’s forces. Colonel Gray, the AFSOCCENT

commander, received word shortly afterwards

that H hour had been established by General

Schwarzkopf as 0300 on 17 January. At 1400

Gray called Al Jouf to speak to Orrell, who was

the FOL commander there. The H-hour time was

relayed, and Orrell was advised to prepare his

forces for the initial mission of the war. During

the 1930 local changeover briefing at KFIA, Gray

gave the order for all personnel to begin taking

their P pills (medication designed to lessen the

effects of chemical agents) should the base come

under chemical attack by the Iraqis.53

At Al Jouf, Orrell and Comer established a mission briefing time of 2230 local and a takeoff time

of 0100 local to meet a TOT of 0238. The TOT was

established 22 minutes before H hour so that the

assigned radar targets could be destroyed before

the launch of the initial wave of Coalition aircraft

into Iraq. Four MH-53H Pave Lows of the 20th

SOS were to lead a formation of eight USA

Apache helicopters into Iraq to destroy Sovietbuilt early warning radars that could detect the

approach of Coalition aircraft. The radar systems

included the Spoon Rest mobile early warning ra -

dar, the Flat Face early warning and target acquisition radar, and the Squat Eye search and target

acquisition radar.54

At the 2130 briefing the combined Pave Low/

Apache team reviewed the mission and the sequence of events for each aircraft. The formation

was identified as Task Force Normandy and was

charged with creating a break in radar coverage

along the southern Iraqi border. At 0212 local

Task Force Normandy crossed the border into

Iraq after an on-time takeoff. There were two primary targets, each consisting of early warning ra -

dar vans and communications equipment, which

tied the sites into the overall Iraqi defense network. Two Pave Lows led each formation through

southern Iraq, flying at a maximum altitude of 50

feet and maneuvering around numerous Bedouin

camps to avoid detection. At precisely 0238 the

Apaches struck the two targets, destroying them

with their AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles

and Hydra 70 rockets. Minutes later hundreds of

Coalition aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace undetected through the gap created by the attack and

dropped thousands of bombs on Bagdad before the

Iraqis could react.5 5

Two of the Pave Low helicopters returned to

Arar and maintained CSAR alert during the remainder of the first night’s air strikes. Although

planners estimated a 2 percent loss rate, only one

British aircraft was lost during the first 24 hours

of the war. The other two helicopters refueled

from HC-130 tankers of the 9th SOS and returned

to Al Jouf. As the Coalition aircraft recovered to

their launch bases, the 8th SOS flew its first leaflet mission of Desert Storm, dropping two million

leaflets on Iraqi troops positioned in southern Kuwait. The leaflets became known as the original

surrender card, encouraging the Iraqis to put

down their arms and surrender to Coalition

forces. Many of those leaflets were found on Iraqi

soldiers when they surrendered a month later at

the end of the ground war.

In the weeks that followed, AFSOCCENT con -

tinued to provide a CSAR alert force forward deployed to Al Jouf, with helicopters shuttled to

Arar and Rafhá each night to sit ground alert. On

19 January AFSOCCENT responded to its first

CSAR call by launching two MH-53H Pave Lows

out of Rafhá into an area just west of Talil Airfield in central Iraq. After 30 minutes of search -

ing, the F-16 pilot could not be located, and the

CSAR force had to return to Rafhá empty-handed.

On the following day, a second daylight CSAR

was attempted that included an A-10 escort pack -

age and F-15 fighter coverage. Upon arrival at the

downed pilot’s location, no radio contact could be

established. After 30 minutes of searching in the

area, the two Pave Lows returned to Al Jouf. 56

Although extremely disappointing to the AF -

SOCCENT crews, the initial two unsuccessful re -

coveries did not dampen the enthusiasm for the

CSAR mission. On 21 January the first successful

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

360
recovery was completed. The AFSOCCENT Rescue Coordination Center at KFIA received word

from Riyadh that two good parachutes were spotted after a US Navy F-14 Tomcat was shot down

130 miles inside Iraq. An A-10 pilot was in radio

contact with the downed crew. AFSOCCENT

quickly contacted Jerry Garlington (FOL commander) at Arar, where a Pave Low helicopter

was still on alert from the previous night. Captain

Trask, an MH-53 aircraft commander, was

alerted, and his crew launched at 0805 into a

dense fog. With two F-15s providing cover, the

helicopter proceeded north in broad daylight to a

position 50 miles north of Mudaysis Airfield and

60 miles northwest of Baghdad. Reaching the coor -

dinates given by the A-10 pilot, Trask and his for -

mation searched the area for the next 25 minutes,

but there was no trace of a survivor. With fuel running low, AFSOCCENT ordered Trask’s formation

to return to Arar. After landing at Arar and begin -

ning the refueling process, Trask received word that

one of the A-10s had made visual contact with one

of the survivors. After refueling, the two MH-53s

launched at 1220 and headed back north into Iraq.

At 1340 Trask was relayed the probable location of

the survivor, but to reach the position the Pave

Lows had to cross a major four-lane highway

clogged with Iraqi military vehicles. Finding a gap

in the traffic, Trask’s formation was able to cross

the highway at a 90-degree angle and at approximately 10-feet altitude. Fifteen minutes later Slate

46, the call sign of the downed pilot, called on his

survival radio after spotting the two Pave Lows.

The pilot was in a position 25 miles to the north of

where Trask thought he would be. As the Pave

Lows turned north, Trask’s crew observed a truck

making a beeline toward Slade 46’s position. The

truck obviously had picked up the downed airman’s

radio signal and had homed in on the survival radio. An escort A-10 quickly destroyed the truck, and

Trask flew directly toward the burning hulk. Not

150 yards away US Navy lieutenant Devon Jones

popped up out of his foxhole and signaled to the

helicopters. Landing on the sandy desert, CCT

and PJ personnel on board Trask’s Pave Low

quickly retrieved Jones, and the air craft departed the area with the first AFSOCCENT save

of the w ar.

57

The first CSAR attempt by the 39th SOW al

began on 21 January, just one day after the 21

SOS arrived at Batman. The mission was delaye

24 hours when permission to launch the rescu

force was delayed by the Turkish government

As a result of the delay, the mission was po

poned until 22 January when permission was f

nally received from Turkey, and a large strik

package was launched into northern Iraq. Th

JSAR force consisted of two HC-130P/Ns of th

67th SOS, one MC-130E of the 7th SOS, and tw

MH-53Hs from the 21st SOS. Fighter support w

provided by a combined F-15 and F-16 esco

package. After launch the two helicopters refuele

from the HC-130P/Ns while still over Turkis

territory and then proceeded into Iraq with th

Combat Talon serving as the command and co

trol aircraft for the recovery operation. Th

downed airmen’s last-known positions were l

cated in a high-threat area near Baghdad. To pr

vide a diversion designed to deflect Iraqi attentio

away from the downed flyers, the fighter esco

aircraft initiated a diversionary air strike again

the Iraqi defenders. When the two Pave Low

went in, they attempted to contact the downe

pilots (call sign Corvette 03) by way of radio an

immediately began taking AAA fire. It was appa

ent that the Americans had been captured an

that there was a trap set for the rescuers. 58 Th

JSAR force departed the Baghdad area and r

turned to Turkey without rescuing either of th

two American flyers.

AFSOCCENT forces, augmented by JSOT

Elusive Concept forces in Turkey, continued 

pull CSAR alert duties for the remainder of th

war. The Corvette 03 rescue attempt was th

only mission flown by the 7th SOS out of Tu

key. For the 8th SOS their PSYOPS leaflet mi

sion was soon to expand with the addition o

BLU-82B tasking.

8th SOS PSYOPS/Leaflet

Missions during Desert Storm

When the air war began on 16 January, the 8

SOS already had completed four prewar PSYOP

leaflet missions. Those missions had been directe

toward Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait City an

the extreme southeastern portion of Kuwait. Aft

__________

 *Although the Turkish government was sympathetic to US requirements, the issue of trade and lost revenues with the shutdown of the Iraqi 

pipeline made overt assistance by Turkey against Iraq especially perilous. Turkey also shared with Iraq the common problem of the Kurds. Just 

the Kurds had demanded autonomy in Iraq, they had also conducted years of guerrilla warfare aga inst Turkey to gain independence of the easte

portion of the country. Flight approval and host-nation restrictions had not been thoroughly delineated since the 39th SOW had deployed 

Batman only one day before the 21 January mission. As the war progressed, and the 39th SOW’s pr esence solidified at both Incirlick AB and 

Batman, more streamlined procedures were developed that eased some of the friction between US forces stationed there and the Turkish military

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

361
16 January the PSYOPS campaign shifted to a

coordinated effort that included B-52 air strikes,

BLU-82B delivery, EC-130E Volant Solo airborne

radio and television broadcasts, and leaflets delivered by various means (including artillery

shells and balloons). During the course of Opera -

tion Desert Storm, more than 29 million leaflets

were delivered, with the 8th and 9th SOS drop -

ping 16.5 million of that total. The 8th SOS completed 13 leaflet missions, and the 9th SOS completed two. 5 9

Each leaflet mission consisted of several phases

and oftentimes required multiple sorties. A typical profile began with an early morning (between

0200 and 0500) airdrop of leaflets by an 8th SOS

Combat Talon on a specific target. The leaflets

would promise that B-52s would soon bombard

the position and would graphically depict injury

to the Iraqi soldier. Just before dawn an EC-103E

Volant Solo aircraft would begin radio broadcasting the same message that was printed on the

leaflets. The Volant Solo transmitted the mes -

sage of a pending B-52 air strike over known

Iraqi military and civilian frequencies. Early the

following evening, a B-52 air strike of three or

more aircraft would service the target, thus fulfilling the warning contained in the leaflets and

in the radio broadcasts. In the early hours follow -

ing the air strike, the 8th SOS would drop a second set of leaflets that warned of another B-52

strike and encouraged the Iraqis to lay down their

arms and surrender to Coalition forces. An EC130E Volant Solo would then arrive in the area

and broadcast the same message. A secon d B-52

air strike would then be flown early in the day to

complete the cycle. Once this leaflet-broadcaststrike-leaflet-broadcast-strike profile was completed, the PSYOPS package would move on to

another targe t.6 0

The profile was modified for BLU-82B missions.

The 8th SOS dropped the bomb from an altitude of

16,000 to 21,000 feet, which was within the SAM

and heavy AAA kill zone of the Iraqi defenders.

Beres felt that the first leaflet mission (announcing

that a BLU-82B was on its way) would put the

bomb delivery crew in danger—the Iraqis could set

a trap and shoot down the relatively low-flying

Combat Talon . Therefore, the BLU-82B mission

profile began with the dropping of two bombs followed by the EC-130E Volant Solo radio broadcasts.

The next night another set of leaflets were dropped,

promising another BLU-82B strike in the general

area. Instead of dropping the second set of bombs on

the same target, the next set of bombs would be

dropped just to the east of the previous drop but

well within ear and eyesight of the troops in the

vicinity of the previous drop. During the course of

the war, the 8th SOS worked from west to east

along the Saudi-Iraqi and Saudi-Kuwaiti borders

dropping the bombs. When the ground war began,

virtually every Iraqi soldier along the front lines

had seen a BLU-82B drop and had read one or

more of the leaflets delivered by the squadron .

61

The fifth leaflet mission for the 8th SOS (and

the first after commencement of the air war) was

flown during the night of 16/17 January 1991.

More than two million leaflets were dropped on

Iraqi troops positioned in southern Kuwait. The

mission delivered the original surrender card,

which encouraged Iraqi troops to lay down their

arms and surrender to Coalition forces. The subsequent mission (flown on 19/20 January) targeted

the Iraqi 16th Infantry Division and contained the

Geneva Convention card leaflet, a leaflet that reassured the Iraqi soldier that he would be treated

humanely if he surren dered. All subsequent leaflet missions contained both the surrender card

and the Geneva Convention card in addition to

leaflets targeted at specific combat units.62

The seventh leaflet mission was flown over a

two-night period during the nights of 20/21 and

21/22 January, and it again targeted the Iraqi

16th Infantry Division. The leaflet-broadcastbomb-leaflet-broadcast-bomb cycle was utilized on

frontline troops, with B-52 strikes and Volant Solo

broadcasts being employed. Mission number eight

was flown during the nights of 27/28 and 30/31

January and employed the standard PSYOPS cycle.

The target for this mission was general frontline

troop concentrations in the south central region of

Kuwait. Mission number nine, flown on 9/10 Feb -

ruary, again targeted general troop concentrations

in south central Kuwait. Mission number 10 in -

cluded 8th SOS BLU-82B drops, with four sorties

being flown between the nights of 6/7 and 16/17

February. Because of the Iraqi threat, the initial

leaflet drop promising delivery of the bomb was

not flown, but the postbomb leaflet drop was

made. A massive three BLU-82B drop targeted at

Faylaka Island on 18 February was not supported

by any leaflet drops.

63

Mission number 11 was flown on 14/15 February and targeted frontline troops in the westernmost portion of the triborder region. As a prelude

to the coming ground war, mission number 12

delivered leaflets with comprehensive surrender

instructions for individual Iraqi soldiers. The leaflets also offered medical care and safety to anyone

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

362
who surrendered. The last leaflet mission for the

8th SOS was mission number 15, which was

flown on 26/27 February. (Leaflet mission numbers 13 and 14 were flown by the 9th SOS during

the nights of 17/18 and 21/22 February. Mission

number 13 serviced the Iraqi 7th Infantry Division with a follow-up B-52 leaflet. Mission

number 14 serviced the Iraqi 28th Infantry Division after a B-52 strike and was the last leaflet

mission before commencement of the ground war.

The 9th SOS flew the two missions when the 8th

SOS Combat Talons were tasked to drop the three

BLU-82B bombs on Faylaka Island.) Leaflet mission number 15 was the last leaflet drop of the

war. The target area was the northernmost regions of Kuwait and was directed at selected airfields and elite Republican Guard units.64

BLU-82B Operations

Not long after he arrived at KFIA, Beres had

approached Gray and had proposed using the BLU82B bomb against Iraqi targets. Colonel Gray had

floated the proposal up the chain of command, but

USCENTCOM declined to approve its use at that

time. When President Bush approved the doubling

of US troops committed to Desert Shield in Novem -

ber 1990, Beres again raised the question of BLU82B employment. This time there was more interest

in the bomb, but the decision to use it against Iraq

was postponed to a later date. As the air war progressed after 16 January, intelligence estimates

identified massive troop concentrations, all of which

were defended by elaborate minefields. US planners

feared that combat losses would be high, as Coalition forces attacked across the Iraqi border into Ku -

wait and southern Iraq.

On 20 January 1991 Beres again proposed u sing

the BLU-82B but this time as a psychologicalwarfare weapon against Iraqi troops. The proposal

was staffed through the AFSOCCENT and SOC

CENT headquarters, and on 28 January Colon

Gray briefed the proposal to General Schwarzko

himself. The CINC was familiar with the weapo

from his days in Vietnam, and he saw its applic

tion in clearing minefields ahead of attackin

ground troops. The BLU-82B had never been us

or tested against minefields, and its effectivene

was unknown. Because of the 28 January briefin

however, General Schwarzkopf approved the drop 

ping of the first two BLU-82Bs on minefields and o

troop concentrations located in southern Kuwait.

6 5

On 3 February the two preloaded BLU-82Bs a

rived at KFIA from Hill AFB. In the days that fo

lowed, 16 additional bombs were delivered to KFI

(18 total bombs) by MAC airlift and were stored 

the nearby bomb dump. The standard tactic fo

dropping the large bomb was to release it at a

altitude of 6,000 feet above the ground, but th

altitude put the Combat Talon in the threat env

lope of Iraqi AAA and SAMs. To reduce the thre

to the aircraft, squadron planners increased th

drop altitude to a range between 16,000 and 21,00

feet. To increase the psychological effects of t

weapon and to take advantage of tactical surpris

AFSOCCENT elected to drop multiple bombs o

each mission. To protect the aircraft during the

bombing runs, USAF EF-111 Ravens, F-4 Wi

Weasels, and EC-130 Compass Calls were tasked 

support the drops. During the night of 6/7 Februar

the first BLU-82B mission was flown. Davenport

crew was assigned the mission of dropping the fir

bomb on a minefield in the southwestern corner 

Kuwait, while Henry’s crew simultaneously dropp

on a troop concentration in the same area. Dave

port’s BLU-82B blasted a large gap in the Iraqi min

field across the border from US Marine positions 

A BLU-82B rigged for airdrop. The extended nose fuse

has not been installed.

The BLU-82B dropped by the 8th SOS in conjunctio

with leaflets proved to be the ultimate psychologic

warfare tool. Note the mushroom cloud and shock wa

created by the explosion.

Photo courtesy of Gary Crayne

USAF Photo

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

363
Saudi Arabia. Henry’s bomb, which was targeted

at an Iraqi battalion headquarters, resulted in the

battalion commander and several of his officers

defecting across the border and surrendering to

US forces. They cited the effects of the BLU-82B

as the deciding factor in this surrende r.66

In addition to the destruction caused by the

two blasts, there was also a secondary effect. The

explosion looked like an atomic bomb when it

detonated, and the shock wave and sound from

the detonation traveled for miles across the flat

desert floor. The blast caused so much confusion

that many Iraqis interpreted it as the beginning

of the ground war. As a result they activated

many of their radars that had not been turned on

before that time. US intelligence was able to pinpoint some of the radars by tracking their transmissions, and the next night Coalition aircraft attacked the newly identified radars.6 7 With the

success of the first two missions, CENTCOM approved continued use of the weapon.

The second BLU-82B mission was flown in the

triborder area of southern Kuwait on 14 February.

Two BLU-82Bs were dropped on troop concentrations across the Saudi border, resulting in significant casualties. With the success of the first four

bombs, both USA and US Marine Corps command -

ers were convinced that the BLU-82B was the

weapon of choice to support their upcoming ground

assault. As G day approached (the start of the

ground war), both Army and Marine commanders

submitted requests for BLU-82B employment. The

Marines wanted a BLU-82B dropped in front of

each division’s ingress route to Kuwait, but many of

their nominated targets could not be serviced due to

the high threat to the Combat Talon.

68

The third BLU-82B mission flown consisted of

three bombs and was targeted at Faylaka Island in

the Persian Gulf. Throughout the air war, Coalition

forces had indicated to the Iraqis that the invasion

of Kuwait would come from the Persian Gulf. The

Faylaka Island mission was designed to neutralize

Iraqi forces occupying the island and to reinforce

the Gulf invasion scenario. MARCENT (the US Marine component of USCENTCOM) put in a request

to have three BLU-82Bs dropped on the western

two square miles of Faylaka Island. On 16 February

CENTCOM tasked SOCCENT for the mission. Faylaka Island was a 10-square-mile area located in the

Persian Gulf 10 NM northeast of Kuwait City. The

mission was planned to have the three bombs

impact on the western edge of the island. The de -

sired result of the mission was to upset the morale

of the Iraqi troops on the island by causing heavy

casualties and destroying their will to fight. Iraqi

ground troops, guarding the beaches of Kuwait 10

miles away, also would see and hear the effects of

the large bombs, thus encouraging them to lay

down their arms and surrender. Another objective

of the drop was to destroy any obstacles that the

Marines might face when they assaulted the island

from the western beaches.69

To increase the psychological effect of the BLU82B, the battleship USS Wisconsin would begin

shelling the island with 2,000-pound projectiles

throughout the day and night before the drop. One

hour before the 8th SOS’s TOT, the USS Wisconsin

would stop its shelling, thus giving the Iraqi troops

the false sense that the barrage had ended. After

delivery of the three bombs, the USS Wisconsin

would then resume shelling for the remainder of the

night. The entire operation would have a tremendous affect on the Iraqi troops on Faylaka Island

and on those stationed on the nearby Kuwaiti

shoreline. 70 (Fewer than 48 hours after the dropping

of the three BLU-82B bombs, two Iraqi divisions

were moved to the Kuwait beach area in anticipation of a seaborne invasion by Coalition forces.)

To plan the Faylaka Island mission, Davenport’s,

Henry’s, and Barragy’s crews were alerted at 1900

on 16 February and briefed on the operation. Over

the next five hours, detailed mission planning was

conducted, and by 2330 the plan was complete. Sup -

port requirements for the mission included US

Navy E-2C Hawkeyes and EA-6B Prowlers that

would provide electronic protection during the drop.

Combat Talon systems identified as critical to mission success included the aircraft’s ground-mapping

radar and the inertial navigation system. The two

systems were required to ensure a pinpoint drop. To

reduce aircraft signature in the target area, all

three aircraft used the same preinitial point, then

altered course so that each arrived over its release

point simultaneously. The drop was planned at

17,000-feet mean-sea-level, which kept the Combat

Talons above Iraqi light and medium AAA emplace -

ments located on the island. With planning com -

plete late on 16 February, all was set for the 17/18

February mission .

7 1

On 17 February, beginning at 1700 local, the

three mission aircraft were towed to the hot-cargo

loading area at KFIA. Each aircraft was loaded

with a BLU-82B bomb, fuzed, and then rigged for

airdrop. After the joint air-drop inspection was

complete, the aircraft were towed again to clear

the hot-cargo area. At 2000 local the three Talon

crews reported for their weather, intelligence,

and final mission briefings. The crews arrived at

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

364
their aircraft at 2330 local and made final prepa -

rations for the mission. The lead Combat Talon ,

manned by Davenport’s crew (call sign Mamba

31), departed KFIA at 0059 local on 18 February.

In 30-second intervals, Henry (Mamba 32) and

Barragy (Mamba 33) followed the lead Talon .

The TOT for the multiship drop was 0213 local,

with a planned 0425 recovery at KFIA. At 0203

the formation split at the preinitial point, slowed

to 190 KIAS and turned toward the target area.

Davenport flew a northwesterly heading, while

Henry and Barragy headed due north.72

At 10 NM out from the drop, the aircraft

slowed to 140 knots, and the navigators updated

the inertial navigation system with their precision ground-mapping radar. At one minute from

the drop, the loadmasters spotted AAA coming

from the target area, but because of the slow airspeed and the high altitude, the aircraft could not

maneuver. The AAA proved to be inaccurate, and

no parts of the aircraft were hit. At approximately

1 NM from the target, the navigator called green

light, and the three BLU-82Bs exited the Combat

Talons almost simultaneously. All three bombs

impacted within 200 meters of their intended targets and detonated within four seconds of each

other. At red light, two Talons escaped to the

southeast and the third to the northeast. Davenport and Barragy rejoined in formation and proceeded back to KFIA for an uneventful landing.

Henry’s Talon suffered minor damage to its aft

anchor cable when the BLU-82B exited the aircraft. The crew proceeded back to KFIA at a

slower airspeed and made an uneventful landin

The highest visibility mission for Combat Talo

had been completed exactly as planned.7 3

The fourth BLU-82B mission was directe

against two Iraqi logistics points and was flown o

20 February. The two-bomb package was dropp

from 21,000 feet due to thunderstorms over the ta

get area. Both Combat Talons penetrated viole

thunderstorms to complete the mission. One of t

BLU-82Bs was dropped on a mine-strewn Wadi i

side Kuwait. Due to the severe weather, post-missio

battle damage assessment was not available, b

when British troops reached the target area a fe

days later, many Iraqi troops were found dead, st

in their foxhol es.7 4

The fifth BLU-82B drop was scheduled for 2

February, the day before G day. The two-bom

mission targeted Marine objectives in southe

Kuwait. To make the mission appear more like 

leaflet drop (and, thus, less threatening to t

Iraqis), the bombs were dropped two hours apa

During the first drop, the Combat Talon came u

der radar threat, but the Iraqis did not launch an

AAA or SAMs at the aircraft. Both bombs were o

target and proved to be the last BLU-82B drops 

the war (fig. 46). When Coalition forces moved in

southern Iraq and southeastern Kuwait, the ba

tlefield remained dynamic, making it difficult 

pinpoint friendly forces. The 8th SOS receive

four requests for BLU-82B drops within 24 hou

after the ground war began, but each time the tas

ing was canceled prior to launch due to a dynam

battlefield. Upon cessation of hostilities, EO

Figure 46. BLU-82B Drop Locations (Source: USAF Special Operations School, Hurlburt

Field, Fla.)

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

365
experts destroyed the seven remaining BLU-82Bs

that were in storage at KFIA. 7 5 The 8th SOS support for the BLU-82B mission had come to a

close.

The Ground War

As the air war continued through February, political discussions between UN representatives

and Iraqi officials were unproductive, and a final

Iraqi withdrawal date from Kuwait was unilaterally established by the UN as 23 February 1991.

When Iraq did not comply with the UN mandate,

President Bush authorized the ground war to be -

gin. On 23 February Coalition ground troops

pushed forward into southern Iraq and southeastern Kuwait in a coupe-de-main designed to

quickly defeat the Iraqi defenders. During the

first day of the ground war, a record 1,200 sorties

were flown by Coalition aircraft against Iraqi emplacements in Kuwait. More than a dozen of those

sorties were flown by AFSOCCENT aircraft, including USAF MH-53s and USA CH-47s/UH-60s

flying infiltration/exfiltration missions and three

USAF AC-130Hs flying air base ground-defense

sorties. Two additional HC-130P/N air-refueling

missions and two AC-130H gunship missions

were flown on 24 February. On 26 February five

more missions were flown (AC-130H, HC-130P/N,

and HH-3 MEDEVAC). The final day of the

ground war saw 13 AFSOCCENT missions completed, including the final 8th SOS leaflet mission

into northern Kuwait.76

By the evening of 27 February, Iraq agreed to

Coalition terms for a cease-fire, and President

Bush stopped the ground war. Exactly 100 hours

had passed since the ground war had begun on 23

February. Thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered

without a fight, or with only token resistance. The

PSYOPS campaign, which included both leaflet

and BLU-82B drops by the 8th SOS, was credited

with heavily influencing Iraqi soldiers to lay down

their arms and to surrender. The PSYOPS campaign was one of the most successful achieve -

ments of the Gulf War.

Return to Home Station

During Desert Storm the 8th SOS flew 134.9

combat hours and 49 combat sorties. For AFSOCCENT Operation Desert Storm resulted in nearly

3,500 combat hours being logged on 1,300 combat

sorties. In combination with Operation Desert

Shield, AFSOCCENT flew a total of 10,000 hours

and more than 5,000 sorties. Once Iraq agreed to

the cease-fire on 27 February, AFSOCCENT personnel began to redeploy from KFIA to their stateside locations.7 7 The US effort had been tremendous, and the special operations forces committed

to the war effort had made a huge impact on its

outcome. The last of the 39th SOW’s deployed

forces, including those of the 7th SOS, returned to

their home stations by 18 March 1991. However,

the European SOF wing would be only three

weeks from the termination of Operation Proven

Force when it would be back in Turkey for Opera -

tion Provide Comfort. Saddam Hussein unleashed

his army on the Kurds of northern Iraq, and the

7th SOS was tasked to drop food and supplies to

them for their survival. Meanwhile, Beres and the

men and women of the 8th SOS returned to

Hurlburt Field as heroes, and the venerable MC130E Combat Talon I was hailed as one of the

workhorses of the Gulf War. For the remainder of

the decade, SOF commitment to Southwest Asia

would prove to be a long and costly one.

Notes

1. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–30 June 1990, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 9.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 5.

4. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31

December 1990.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–

30 June 1990, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 13.

10. Ibid., 14.

11. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1990, III-58.

12. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1990, supporting document 89, 386–88.

13. Tore Kjeilen, Encyclopedia of the Orient, on-line, In -

ternet, 1996, available from http://i-cias.com/e.o/iraq_5.htm.

14. Kjeilen, Encyclopedia of the Orient, on-line, Internet,

1996, available from http://i-cias.com/e.o/kuwait_5.htm.

15. Kjeilen, Encyclopedia of the Orient, on-line, Internet,

1996, available from http://i-cias.com/e.o/iraq_5.htm.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Kjeilen, Encyclopedia of the Orient, on-line, Internet,

1996, available from http://i-cias.com/e.o/kuwait_5.htm.

19. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1991, 16th SOW historian files, Hurlburt Field,

Fla., vol. 3, supporting document 52.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

366
22. Ibid., supporting document 53.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., supporting document 52.

26. TSgt Randy G. Bergeron, USAF, HQ AFSOC/HO, “Desert

Shield/Desert Storm—Air Force Special Operations Command

in the Gulf War,” January 1997, 13.

27. Ibid., 15.

28. Ibid., 16.

29. Ibid., 29–31.

30. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1991, vol. 3, supporting document 52.

31. Gulf War Air Power Survey, “A Statistical Compen -

dium and Chronology” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), vol. 5, table 62, 201–16.

32. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1991, vol. 3, supporting document 52, 16–17.

33. Bergeron, 50.

34. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Commando

Vault, 12 October 1970, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1–2.

35. Ibid., 3.

36. Ibid., 6.

37. Ibid., 4–5.

38. Ibid., 12.

39. Ibid., 4–5.

40. Ibid., 7–8.

41. Ibid., 16.

42. Ibid., 8.

43. Newsletter, Loader Jam!, April 1999, HQ AFSOC/

DOXT, vol. 99-2.

44. Bergeron, 35.

45. History, 39th Special Operations Wing, 1 July 1990–31

December 1991, extract on file, Combat Talon Archive, HQ

AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 23–24.

46. Ibid., 24.

47. Bergeron, 37.

48. Ibid., 40.

49. Richard D. Johnson, Seeds of Victory (Atglen, P

Schiffer Publishing Ltd.), November 1997, 138.

50. Ibid., 139.

51. Ibid., 140–41.

52. Ibid., 141.

53. Bergeron, 78.

54. Ibid., 84–86.

55. Ibid., 88–90.

56. Ibid., 91–92.

57. Ibid., 96–98.

58. Ibid., 93.

59. Johnson, 138.

60. Ibid., 145–46.

61. Ibid., 146.

62. Ibid., 159.

63. Ibid., 159–60.

64. Ibid., 160.

65. Bergeron, 101.

66. Ibid., 101–2.

67. Ibid., 102.

68. Ibid.

69. Briefing, subject: 8th SOS Faylaka Island BLU-82

Briefing, n.d., text on file, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSO

HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Bergeron, 103.

75. Ibid., 104.

76. Ibid., 113–14.

77. Ibid., 115.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STOR

367
Chapter 14

Mount Pinatubo to Operation Joint Endeavor 

(1991–95)

Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of

the future to run over him.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

1991: Mount Pinatubo

Explodes into the Pacific

Early January 1991 found the bulk of the Combat Talon force deployed to Southwest Asia and

preparing for the rapidly approaching UN deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. In the Pacific the 353d SOW had not been

tasked to provide Talon crews for Operation De -

sert Storm due to the threat posed by the North

Koreans in Northeast Asia. The wing had been

alerted several times to be prepared to augment

AFSOC forces in Saudi Arabia, but each time the

tasking was postponed.

1st SOS: Operation Sea Angel

On 8 February 1991, as the air war raged over

Iraq, Colonel Mallon assumed command of the 1st

SOS from Colonel Douglas. Mallon had been the

operations officer for the squadron and was highly

experienced in the MC-130E Combat Talon .

1

His immediate challenge was to support the

heavy exercise and JCET tasking scheduled

throughout the spring. Deployments to Thailand

and to Korea, along with exercises in the Philip -

pines, taxed the squadron’s resources. In addition

to the heavy exercise schedule, the squadron soon

became involved in a large-scale disaster relief op -

eration. During the early morning hours of 30

April 1991, a super typhoon with 225-knot winds

slammed into the southeastern coast of Bangla -

desh. The associated tidal surge and heavy rains

resulted in heavy loss of life and property. Tens of

thousands were killed, and literally hundreds of

thousands were left homeless. International relief

organizations were overwhelmed, thus prompting

a request by the US ambassador to Bangladesh

for US aid. The 353d SOW was subsequently

tasked by SOCPAC to support the US relief effort,

which was identified as Operation Sea Angel. On

11 May the 1st SOS deployed its C-130 slick aircraft, and the 17th SOS sent two of its HC-130s to

provide disaster relief. The three aircraft transported international relief organizations’ material

and supplies to Chittagong, Bangladesh, wher

the supplies was transloaded to USA helicopte

and moved further inland (fig. 47). 2 For the nex

week the two special operations squadrons fle

missions in support of Operation Sea Angel. O

15 May the 1st SOS redeployed to Clark AB

while the 17th SOS remained in country for se

eral more days flying personnel and supplies 

hard hit areas. By early June 1991 all 353d SOW

assets were back at home station at either Clar

or Kadena ABs.

The 353d SOW had celebrated its second ann

versary in April, and the outlook was bright fo

its continued presence at Clark AB. Base negoti

tions continued, and it appeared that both Clar

AB and Subic Bay would remain US bases for 

least another seven years. One of the more impo

tant points of the base negotiations was a pr

posal for the “joint use” of Clark AB by the U

and Philippine Air Forces. Fighter aircraft of th

3d TFW were to relocate from the base by Octob

1991, and studies were under way to determin

the best use of the existing facilities. The 17

SOS was still located at Kadena AB, Okinaw

but was scheduled to move to Clark AB later 

the year.3 Colonel Hess, the 353d SOW com 

mander, had his wing operating at peak eff

ciency. Events triggered by the eruption of Mou

Pinatubo, beginning on 9 June 1991, would fo

ever change the posture of SOF in the Pacific.

Mount Pinatubo and the Loss of Clark AB

On 2 April 1991 local Filipinos awoke to see 

1.5 kilometer-long line of vents high on the slop

of Mount Pinatubo after a series of small expl

sions during the previous night. The explosio

formed a line of new craters, destroyed vegetatio

in the immediate area, deposited soil debr

around the vents, and dusted villages to th

southwest with a fine volcanic powder. By th

next day the line of craters had extended to th

southwest of the summit. Evacuations began fo

about 5,000 people living in the immediate are

Although Clark AB was 8.2 miles to the east 

369
Mount Pinatubo, it was not immediately affected

by the initial evacuation order (fig. 48). Volcanologists from the Philippine Institute of Vol -

canology and Seismology (PHILVOLCS) teamed

with colleagues from the US Geological Survey to

install several portable seismographs near the

northwest foot of the volcano and began recording earthquake data. The joint team set up op -

erations on Clark AB and established the Pinatubo Volcano Observatory (PVO). A network of

high-speed personal computers was set up at the

PVO to analyze data as it arrived from the vol -

cano monitoring locations.4

For the remainder of April and May, the PVO

monitored the volcano. On 1 June, as 353d SOW

aircraft conducted local training operations, a

second cluster of earthquakes began to develop

approximately one kilometer to the northwest of

the volcano’s summit. A small explosion early on

3 June signaled the beginning of increased activit y

near the summit that included minor ash emis -

sions and increased seismicity beneath the vents.

In response to the increased activity, PHILVOLCS

issued an alert level 3 announcement on 5 June

warning of a major pyroclastic eruption within

the next two weeks.5

On Thursday morning, 6 June, the 353d SOW

leadership called all 1st SOS personnel and dependents to gather in the squadron briefing

room. Colonel Stankovich, the 353d SOW vice

wing commander, began the briefing by describ -

ing volcanic characteristics. He described Mount

Figure 47. Map of Bangladesh (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell

AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

370
Pinatubo as an explosive-type volcano similar to

Mount Saint Helens in California, as opposed to

the lava-flow-type volcano found in Hawaii. When

Mount Saint Helens erupted, it had created a pyroclastic flow of 3,000-degree ash that rapidly

traveled down the mountainside and destroyed

everything in its path. Mallon followed Stankovich and reviewed the base volcano evacuation

plan, including levels of alert. Dependents’ off-base

addresses were confirmed, and everyone was re -

leased to make final preparations in the event the

situation worsened.6

As the 353d SOW ran its emergency checklists,

an electronic tiltmeter installed by PHILVOLCS

on Mount Pinatubo began to show a gradually

increasing outward tilt on 6 June. The outward

tilt, along with the volcano’s seismicity, continued

to increase over the next 24 hours, culminating in

an explosion that generated a column of steam

and ash seven to eight kilometers high. Because

of the event PHILVOLCS announced an increase

to alert level 4—eruption possible within 24

hours. The next five-day period was marked by

continued weak ash emission and episodic harmonic tremor. On 9 June PHILVOLCS increased

the alert level to 5—eruption in progress. The ra -

dius of evacuation was increased to 20 kilometers,

and an additional 25,000 personnel were ordered

to evacuate.7

By midafternoon on 9 June, Mallon knew th

it was time to assemble squadron aircrews and 

brief them on what he perceived as an inevitab

evacuation order. Later that afternoon Gener

Studer, the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing commande

and Colonel Hess (353d SOW/CC) decided 

evacuate all base aircraft from Clark AB. Th

353d SOW assets included two MC-130Es, one 

130E slick, and four MH-53J helicopters. NA

Cubi Point was identified as the evacuation loc

tion. One MH-53J had been torn down for inspe

tion and had to be reassembled before fligh

There was also an airlift C-130H aircraft fro

Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, which was undergoin

major isochronal inspection in the 353d SOW

hangar facility. It had to be put back togeth

before it could be flown to safety. On 10 Jun

these last two aircraft were flown to Cubi Poin

and the crews then returned to Clark AB 

evacuate their own families.8

Also on 10 June General Studer initiated th

Clark AB mandatory evacuation plan, and 15,00

US military personnel and their dependents d

parted the base in a mass motorcade bound fo

Subic Bay Naval Base. The bumper-to-bumpe

procession averaged six hours en route, a distanc

that normally took little more than an hour. Upo

reaching Subic Bay, the evacuees met another c

lossal traffic jam trying to get through the ma

Figure 48. Map of the Philippines Depicting Mount Pinatubo and Clark AB (Source: AU

Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

371
gate. Processing and assignment to quarters

was a long and tedious ordeal that rivaled the

trip from Clark AB.* Of Clark AB’s total base

population, about 1,500 military personnel remained behind to provide security and basic in -

frastructure maintenance. A 14-member 353d

SOW stay-behin d team, headed by Stankovich,

also remained at Clark AB to look after wing

assets. Hess moved to Subic Bay to provide sen -

ior leadership for 353d SOW personnel located

there. The PVO team of volcanologists remained

at Clark AB and continued to monitor the volcano around the clock.9

The first major explosive eruption began at

0851 local on 12 June, generating a column of ash

and steam that rapidly rose to 60,000 feet. At

Cubi Point Mallon was preparing to conduct an

officer’s call at the Cubi Point Bachelor Officer’s

Quarters. He wanted to pass on the latest information to his personnel and to determine how

many crews he could put together in the event his

aircraft had to be evacuated from Cubi Point. As

the officer’s call began, a huge mushroom cloud

could be seen rising to the north. There was no

doubt in anyone’s mind that Mount Pinatubo had

finally exploded. Sensing that evacuation of the

aircraft from Cubi Point was imminent, Mallon

dispersed his aviators to their quarters so that

they could get their flight gear—no small task for

many who lived up to 45 minutes away in Barrio

Barreta and with little transportation available.

When the 1st SOS aircrews returned to the flight

line, activity was at a feverish pace. The initial

plan was to start engines as soon as a minimum

crew complement arrived and then to wait for further instructions. As Mallon moved amongst his

Combat Talons, he could feel the awesome power

of the eruption and could see the ash cloud rising

high into the clear sky. There was no rush of air,

no sound, or even any ash fall from his location.1 0

At Clark AB, 600 of the remaining 1,500 military

personnel were ordered to evacuate the base, and

the mandatory evacuation area was increased to

39 kilometers from Mount Pinatubo. The action

increased the number of evacuees to at least

58,000. Stankovich and his team remained at

Clark AB.

With Mount Pinatubo erupting Hess order ed the

wing’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft dispersed

from Cubi Point. Within one hour and 17 minutes

of the 12 June eruption, all four 353d SOW C130s (including the C-130H from Elmendorf AFB)

were airborne and headed towards Villamor AB, a

Philippine air force base colocated with Ninoy

Aquino International Airport in Manila. Colonel

Miles, the 353d SOW deputy commander for Op -

erations and former commander of the 8th SOS,

led the evacuation of the aircraft. By 1500 local

that afternoon, little ash had fallen at NAS Cubi

Point, and the prevailing winds held steady carrying the ash out to sea. With conditions at Cubi

Point unaffected by the latest explosion, Hess

elected to recall all wing assets to Cubi Point, and

within the next hour they had completed the

short return flight.11

At 2252 that evening (12 June), Mount Pinatubo exploded for a second time, and personnel

from the 353d SOW again scrambled to get their

aircraft airborne and away from the ash fallout.

The flight line was again a beehive of activity, but

this time it was dark as maintenance crews hurried through preflights, removing dust covers

from engine intakes and pulling safety pins. Mallon pulled aside a pilot and a navigator and

tasked them to build a mass holding pattern near

Cubi Point that wing aircraft could hold in until it

could be determined where the ash would fall.

Both C-130s and MH-53s were to use the same

holding pattern, and they used altitude separation

to deconflict their flight paths. As crew members

arrived, engines were started, and the aircraft were

readied for departure even before a minimum crew

complement could be found. Mallon issued an order

that no aircraft was to depart until a minimum

crew complement (two pilots, one navigator, one

flight engineer, and one loadmaster) could be

formed. He had to rescind the order for one aircrew

when a flight engineer and a loadmaster were not

available (a crew chief served as the flight engineer). One hour and 11 minutes after initial notification, all 353d SOW aircraft were airborne and

headed for the holding pattern.1 2

There was a large thunderstorm over the

planned holding pattern area, forcing the crews to

move to the east of Clark AB to stay clear of the

weather. The Elmendorf AFB C-130H aircraft de -

veloped a propeller malfunction at 0200 local that

required an engine shutdown. The 1st SOS crew

flew the aircraft back to Cubi Point and landed

without incident at 0230 on 13 June. The prevailing wind continued to push the ash fallout away

from Cubi Point, and the remainder of the aircraft

returned from the holding pattern during the early

morning darkness. At 0841 on 13 June, a third

__________

 *The evacuees were told to pack for three to four days’ stay and that they would return to Clark AB after the immediate threat subsided. Most

never saw their homes or their personal belongings again.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

372
major eruption occurred. Seismographs on the

mountain were now recording approximately 300

tremors each day, which indicated a growing instability inside the mountain. Hess brought his

staff together and reviewed possible options.

Wing leadership had the difficult decision of

separating military members from their families

if the aircraft were evacuated. The 353d SOW

was unique in that most of its personnel were on

accompanied tours, and its military members had

their families with them (most other military

personnel in the Philippines were on 12-to-24

month unaccompanied tours). After the third

eruption on the morning of 13 June, it appeared

almost certain that the 353d SOW aircraft would

have to be evacuated further from the volcano.

Aircrews had flown throughout the previous

night and were not in shape for another launch

at that time. Hess decided to put all of his fixedwing crews in crew rest, and he arranged to have

the MH-53J helicopters hangared at Cubi Poin t.13

In the early morning hours of 14 June, a brief

period of clear weather offered a good look at the

mountain. Although long-period earthquakes had

intensified throughout the preceding 24 hours,

there was little visible ash and plume being emitted from the summit at that time. During the afternoon of 14 June, after 28 hours without a major

eruption, activity picked up and continued to accelerate throughout the evening hours and on into

the early hours of 15 June. With an additional

threat posed by Typhoon Yunda, Hess ordered the

evacuation of the two MC-130E Combat Talons,

the C-130E slick, and the C-130H aircraft to

Kadena AB. By late evening on 14 June, all fixedwing aircraft had departed the Philippines, with

the MH-53s remaining hangared at Cubi Point.

Mount Pinatubo continued to increase its activity,

and evidence mounted that there were eruption

clouds venting from two different locations on the

mountain.* 14

At dawn on 15 June, PVO volcanologists were

able to observe a huge ash cloud as Mount Pinatubo

exploded for the fourth time at 0555 local. Unlike

the tall narrow columns of ash formed during the

12 and 13 June eruptions, the 15 June eruption

produced a relatively low ash cloud that spread

out laterally rather than vertically from the volcano. This development raised concern that the

volcano’s summit could collapse, thus causing lateral blast and pyroclastic flow during future eruptions. The lateral blast could be directed toward

Clark AB. Consequently, most remaining perso

nel at Clark AB were directed to evacuate an

seek safety further to the east.1 5

Until 15 June Cubi Point had escaped any s

rious affects from the volcano due to favorab

winds carrying ash to the west over the Sou

China Sea. Luck was about to change, howeve

as Typhoon Yunda continued to build off th

eastern coast of Luzon. The storm moved relen

lessly to the west, and by 0930 local on 15 Jun

its eye was directly over Subic Bay. Typhoo

Yunda was producing 40 to 50 kilometer win

and heavy rains. The most devastating effect 

the typhoon, however, was its northwest win

that carried ash from Mount Pinatubo towar

Subic Bay and Cubi Point and then on towar

Clark AB, by 1000 local the sky was complete

dark. Mallon described the darkness as th

found in a “sealed closet,” with exploding ele

t rical transformers the only light in the blac

ness. The continuous earthquakes struck fe

into everyone, compelling some to seek safety ou

side in the event of building collapse. But outsid

blizzard-like ash and a surreal electrical stor

created by the exploding transformers were mo

frightening than the danger of collapsing buil

ings.1 6

Throughout the remainder of the morning an

into the early afternoon, volcanic activity conti

ued to increase. By 1430 all but one of the PV

seismometers were inoperative, which was prob 

ably due to pyroclastic flow. Ash, with large pum

ice fragments, was falling on Clark AB. In a

probability the climatic eruption was under w

by this time, but the volcano could not be ob 

served visually due to total obscuration of th

mountain, nor could it be monitored electronical

due to the loss of the seismometers. At that tim

all remaining personnel evacuated Clark AB, i

cluding Stankovich’s team, and moved to Pam

panga Agricultural College—about 38 kilomete

east of Mount Pinatubo.1 7

The events of 15 June were a living hell fo

anyone caught in the maelstrom created by th

typhoon and the exploding volcano. Many of th

1st SOS dependents left behind after the 14 Jun

aircraft evacuation were housed in the Marmo

Hotel off base, and by 2100 three nearby buil

ings had collapsed. Throughout the area mor

than 200 buildings collapsed during the night d

to the tremendous weight of the rain-soaked as

Sergeant Kay, the 1st SOS first sergeant, an

__________

 *PVO geologists north of the volcano saw two or more ash sources during increased activity on the afternoon of 14 June. At Clark AB 

thermal-infrared scanner recorded possible multiple vents during a 2320 eruption on 14 June.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

373
others from the squadron established a field hospital in the lobby of the Marmont Hotel. Some

squadron members gathered children together

and tried to soothe their fears, while many wives

teetered on the edge of hysteria, having had virtually no rest during the previous 48 hours. Work

crews were organized to shovel accumulated ash

from the roof to keep the building from collapsing.

Despite their best efforts, the fourth floor collapsed in the early hours of 16 June. Kay and

several others risked their lives going door to door

in dark hallways to get everyone out.* Once free

of the hotel structure, the dependents walked

down ash-filled streets toward the nearby Sea

Breeze Hotel, becoming drenched in wet, gritty

ash in the process. As morning approached there

were 200 353d SOW dependents stranded at the

Sea Breeze Hotel. They had spent most of the

night in the hotel lobby or outside in the ash and

rain. Dawn brought sunlight again, and everyone’s spirits rose with the feeling that the worst

was over. Eventually, several buses made their

way through the heavy ash, picked up the dependents, and transported them to base shelters.

Most of the 1st SOS dependents were moved to

the jet engine shop and were issued cots and

MREs. Although living conditions were austere,

life there improved over the next several days.18

By 16 June the total evacuation of Clark AB

had been completed without a single loss of any

353d SOW personnel. The challenge of finding

sufficient food and water for those evacuated to

Subic Bay Naval Base became top priority. There

was neither water nor electricity, no telephones,

and only a limited stock of food. The only solution

to the developing crisis was a mass evacuation

from the Philippines. Over the next several days,

the ordeal of processing dependents for return to

the United States was undertaken.1 9 The evacu -

ation began with more than 3,000 Air Force and

Navy dependents boarding the aircraft carriers

USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Midway. The

carrier support ships were also filled with evacu -

ees. Their destination was a temporary airhead

established at Mactan AB, which was located 360

miles south of Subic Bay. From Mactan AB the

dependents boarded MAC aircraft for their trip to

Guam and then on to the West Coast of the

United States. By 18 June almost all 353d SOW

dependents and nonessential personnel had departed Subic Bay. 2 0 Some 800 353d SOW military

personnel remained behind in the Philippines for

clean-up operations.

On 17 June Stankovich’s stay-behind team re -

turned to Clark AB to establish command and control and to make an initial assessment of damage to

353d SOW facilities. Mount Pinatubo erupted

throughout the day, but PVO had re-e stablished

seismological monitoring devices on the mountain

and had determined that the major eruption on

15 June was, indeed, the big one. There was little

danger of renewed pyroclastic flow, so the team

remained at Clark AB during the eruptions. 21

On 21 June Hess led a team back to Clark AB

to make a more in-depth assessment of 353d SOW

facilities. Mallon was part of Hess’s team, and he

focused on the 1st SOS squadron operations

building to salvage important records and unit

heraldry. The facility had been completed only

nine months earlier, but it was almost totally destroyed. Thousands of gallons of water had leaked

through the roof, and the interior of the building

was flooded. New computers were water-soaked,

and complete libraries of technical publications

were ruined. Clark AB was a barren wasteland

covered under layers of volcanic ash.22

Between 22 and 24 June, water and electricity

were periodically restored to some areas of Clark

AB, and food service was established at one of the

base chow halls. Back at Subic Bay an assault strip

5,000-feet long was cleared by Navy Seabees to accommodate C-130 aircraft. Hess forward deployed

Stankovich to Kadena AB as the senior 353d

SOW officer. At Kadena AB a temporary beddown

location for the wing was established, thanks to

the hard work of Colonel Stankovich and Colonel

Maher, the 17th SOS commander. Both had

worked closely with the 313th Air Division commander, General Hurd, to make the beddown

happen. The Combat Talons and the HC-130s

were colocated on the west ramp of the sprawling

military complex. The four MH-53J helicopters

were still hangared at Subic Bay, but Hess began

coordination to have them moved to Okinawa. By

the end of June, three of the four Pave Lows had

arrived in Okinawa by way of the USS Midway.

The fourth helicopter was flown there on 2 July

by way of C-5 aircraft. Space was not readily

available at Kadena AB for the large helicopters,

but Stankovich was able to negotiate temporary

beddown of the helicopters at Futenma Marine

Corps Air Station (MCAS), which was located five

miles from Kadena AB. 23

Conditions at Clark AB continued to improve

as long-distance telephone service and limited

mail service were re-established. Although austere,

__________

 *Sergeant Kay was awarded the Airmen’s Medal for his heroic actions.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

374
life at Clark AB was slowly returning to normal.

Throughout June and early July, 353d SOW personnel worked on the assumption that the wing

would return to Clark AB when the base infra -

structure was rebuilt. A decision that rocked the

wing occurred in mid-July when the Philippine

government refused to renew the US lease. The

decision put the 353d SOW in limbo and resulted

in a period of more than six months of uncertainty

for its assigned personnel and their families.

Early efforts to find an alternate beddown loca -

tion for the wing focused on Andersen AFB,

Guam, for the wing’s fixed-wing assets and an

FOL at NAS Cubi Point for the helicopters. As the

year progressed, however, other locations were

considered, including Korea, Thailand, Hawaii,

Alaska, and the West Coast of the United States.

For various reasons, all of those locations were

unsuitable. The “unknown” status of the 353d

SOW became the greatest concern for senior leadership because no new personnel could be assigned until an official beddown location was established.2 4 As personnel departed the wing

during the fall of 1991, manning soon became

critical.

As efforts continued to find a beddown location

for the 353d SOW, the 1st SOS settled into its

temporary facilities at Kadena AB. The temporary squadron operations building consisted of an

800-square-foot building located on the east side

of the runways near the MAC terminal. The small

building (two small offices and one large room)

functioned as the operations center, life support,

administration, and aircrew briefing facility, and

it housed up to 80 personnel. The unit was

cramped, with people literally tripping over each

other. Regardless of the cramped quarters, the

squadron continued to fly operational missions

from Kadena AB and continued to fulfill its exercise commitments.25

A major effort was expended by the wing to

recover 353d SOW equipment left at Clark AB.

The 1st SOS flew two to three shuttles a week to

NAS Cubi Point to onload salvaged equipment.

While the aircraft were being loaded at Cubi

Point, additional squadron personnel would travel

to Clark AB to check on their household goods.

Personal belongings were packed for storage until

a beddown location was announced. The 1st SOS

also focused on salvaging squadron records from

its flooded building. The water-soaked acoustical

ceiling tile had disintegrated into a gooey, wet

mass of pulp, which coated desks, computers, furniture, and papers. Anything not stored inside

desks or file cabinets was basically rendered us

less. Thousands of dollars of mobility gear, com

puters, copy machines, wooden office furnitur

and memorabilia were damaged beyond repair.2 6

During August and September, Mallon led a

effort to retrieve all classified materials that ha

been locked in the squadron’s vault, destroy no

critical documents, and prepare the remainder fo

air shipment to Kadena AB. He and his tea

spent weeks sorting through the wet, mildewe

mess to account for all classified material. By th

end of October, all of the squadron’s supplies, fu

niture, and equipment worth keeping had bee

loaded into SeaLand containers and transporte

to Subic Bay, where they awaited a decision o

the beddown of the wing.2 7

Personnel began departing the squadron b

way of permanent change of station (PCS) b

tween July and October, with no replacements a

signed to the 1st SOS or to the wing. The squa

ron was officially on temporary duty from Cla

AB to Kadena AB, and PCS assignments 

Kadena AB were not possible. By the Novembe

December time frame, outbound assignments i

creased dramatically as squadron membe

elected to return to the United States and joi

their families who had evacuated from Clark A

the previous June. The continued uncertainty 

to where the 353d SOW and the 1st SOS would b

permanently located had a negative effect on a

signed personnel. By the end of November, th

squadron was manned at only 50 percent. To of

set the loss of personnel, both 7th and 8th SO

personnel augmented the squadron beginning i

September. With two aircraft possessed (64-057

and 64-0572), the 1st SOS maintained two crew

and its sister squadrons maintained a third cre

so previous commitments could be kept. For 

brief period in December, there were four crew

available to the 1st SOS, including its two crew

one crew from the 7th SOS, and one crew fro

the 8th SOS. 28

On 3 September 1991 Hess flew his final flig

as the 353d SOW commander in a 1st SOS Com

bat Talon (64-0571). The following day Hess reli

quished command of the 353d SOW to Stankovic

Colonel Jahnke, a former commander of the 1

SOS, replaced Stankovich as the new vice win

commander. The 1st SOS continued to fly shutt

missions to Cubi Point, and by the end of th

year, had logged 44 sorties and 287.2 hours brin

ing critical equipment and supplies to Kaden

AB. 29 On 26 November 1991 the 353d SOW fl

was lowered at Clark AB by Stankovich and h

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

375
senior enlisted advisor, Chief Master Sergeant

Showalter, in a solemn ceremony attended by

General Studer. The small ceremony marked an

end to the 10-year SOF adventure in the Philip -

pines that had begun after Desert One in 1980. At

year’s end the nightmare of Mount Pinatubo was

six months in the past, but it would be another

year before the 1st SOS and the 353d SOW would

attain a permanent beddown location.3 0

The 7th SOS and Operation

Provide Comfort

In Europe the 7th SOS had redeployed from

Operation Proven Force on 18 March 1991 after

the end of Desert Storm. At 0200Z on 6 April,

scarcely three weeks later, the squadron received

an execute order from SOCEUR to return to Turkey for Operation Provide Comfort. The new op -

eration was in support of the Iraqi Kurds who had

supported Coalition forces against Saddam

Hussein during the Gulf War. With the majority of

American forces back at their home stations in the

United States and in Europe, Hussein moved to

increase pressure on the Kurds, with the objective

of eliminating them from Iraq once and for all.3 1

The first crew from the 7th SOS, led by Major

Evans, took off from Rhein Main AB at 1842Z on

6 April, only 16.5 hours after the wing received

the execute order. Colonel Hooten, the 39th SOW

commander, flew on the first Talon. The next two

MC-130Es, piloted by Captain Henneberry and

Major Weart, departed at 2102Z. These two aircraft carried eight containers of relief supplies.

Two HC-130s from the 67th SOS also departed for

Turkey during the first day’s deployment.3 2

Evans’s Combat Talon arrived at Incirlick AB

at 0145Z on 7 April, followed by Henneberry and

Weart at 0345Z. In total the 7th SOS deployed

three MC-130E Combat Talons and 51 personnel

for the operation. Eight hours after arrival in Turkey, the crews received an updated intelligence

briefing and coordinated their mission with

fighter pilots tasked to escort them into and out of

Iraqi airspace. With their aircraft loaded and mission planning complete, two MC-130Es departed

Incirlick AB at 0919Z on 7 April and headed for

their DZ in northern Iraq. At their preplanned

TOT of 1100Z, the Combat Talons dropped their

eight-ton load utilizing the container release system. After a total of two hours and 45 minutes,

the two aircraft arrived back at Incirlick AB after

the successful resupply mission.33

During the following weeks 7th SOS Combat

Talons employed their unique systems in a variety of roles in support of the relief effort, including flying additional resupply missions. The communications package installed on the aircraft

made it capable of acting as an airborne radio

relay platform, thus providing a communications

link between ground parties, airlift forces, and E3 Sentry aircraft. The FLIR provided the means

to look for groups of refugees moving towards Turkey and also provided the capability to videotape

the size and location of refugee camps. Refugee

movement information was important to relief

providers because they tailored their efforts based

on where the refugees were located. The 39th

SOW Intelligence Section also acquired a tactical

information broadcast system (TIBS) suite that

was installed on the Combat Talon . The TIBS allowed the crews to collect signal intelligence as

they flew over the northern Iraqi mission area.34

As Operation Provide Comfort continued, resupply efforts shifted to ground transportation,

and the need for the 7th SOS’s unique capabilities

was not as acute. Rescue teams on the ground

established temporary refugee camps and organized a system to supply them over land. With decreased need for the Combat Talon , SOCEUR released the 7th SOS Talons from the operation,

and they returned to Rhein Main AB on 14 May

1991. The Talons had dropped a total of 785,000

pounds of relief supplies during the deployment,

flying 93 sorties and 413 hours.3 5 By 10 June 1991

the remainder of the 39th SOW forces had been

released and was back at home station.

On 23 July the 39th SOW was again alerted

and deployed four MH-53s and two HC-130s to

Incirlick AB for SAR support for what became

known as Operation Provide Comfort II. The deployment package did not include the 7th SOS

Combat Talons.

36 The new tasking would continue

throughout the remainder of 1991 and on into

1992. For the 7th SOS its major tasking for the

last half of 1991 was in support of the 39th SOW’s

JCET program. It was the only flying unit in the

wing not tasked to support Provide Comfort II,

and the lion’s share of all remaining wing exercises fell to the squadron. Countries that the 7th

SOS deployed to included Denmark, France, Italy,

Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. By

year’s end the wing was stressed with its continued commitment to Turkey, but the 7th SOS was

able to pick up the load for tasking outside Opera -

tion Provide Comfort II. During the third quarter

of FY 91, the squadron was notified that it would

move to RAF Alconbury, along with the rest of the

39th SOW, a move that would have the squadron

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

376
relocated out of Germany for the first time since

its establishment in the mid-1960s. The 7th SOS

would also convert to the Combat Talon II during

1992, thus ending the era of MC-130Es in Europe.

As 1991 came to a close, the 7th SOS had four

Combat Talon Is assigned—64-0523, 64-0555, 64-

0561, and 64-0566—and one slick C-130E, 63-

7814. The year 1992 would see the most changes

for the squadron in its history.

The 8th SOS Prepares for

Combat Talon II

At Hurlburt Field the spring of 1991 found the

Combat Talons of the 8th SOS still in Southwest

Asia. During Operation Desert Storm, the squadron had conducted both psychological warfare and

helicopter air refueling operations. On 17 March

two of its Combat Talons redeployed from KFIA

to Hurlburt Field, thus leaving two aircraft and

four crews in-place in Saudi Arabia. The two aircraft Combat Talon package remained at KFIA

until 22 May, when one aircraft was released and

returned to Hurlburt Field. 37 By early summer all

8th SOS Combat Talons and most of its personnel

were back at home station.

When Beres took command of the squadron

in the summer of 1990, one of his major challenges was to prepare the squadron for the arrival of the new Combat Talon II. The events in

Southwest Asia had focused the majority of his

attention on Iraq, but he had detailed other personnel not deployed to work CT II beddown is -

sues. The CT II had been scheduled for delivery

to the 8th SOS several times during the late

1980s, but it had been delayed when the radar

could not successfully complete its test profile.

In mid-1988 Headquarters AFSOC decided to

delay delivery of the CT II until its radar and

supporting subsystems met design specifica -

tions. As a result of this decision, the 1988 delivery date to the 8th SOS was slipped to 1990,

and this date was subsequently slipped further

to 1991. As the weapons system went through

its test cycle, personnel to maintain and fly

them were also being identified and trained. For

aircrew personnel the Air Force Personnel Cen -

ter manned the 8th SOS with additional flight

crews beginning in 1990. With a manning

authorization of 79 officers and 82 enlisted personnel, the squadron grew to 93 officers assigned (plus 19 attached) and 96 enlisted assigned personnel (plus 17 attached) by June

1991.3 8

Combat Talon formal training and beddown 

the CT II continued to be contentious issu

through 1991. Since the creation of the Comb

Talon in 1966, all formal training had been a

complished by the US-based operational Talo

squadron (the 779th TCS or the 318th/8th SOS

With only 14 aircraft in the fleet, the communi

could not afford to man four squadrons, with on

dedicated solely to formal training. Historicall

during periods of heavy operational commitment

including Desert One and Just Cause, the schoo

house function took a back seat. The same aircra

and instructor crew members that manned th

formal school also had operational commitmen

to fulfill. During Operations Desert Shield /Dese

Storm, formal training at Hurlburt Field was su

pended, and the school ceased operations for 

most a year because 8th SOS crews and aircra

were deployed to Southwest Asia. During the p

riod the 1st and 7th SOS had to accept unqua

fied crew members and train them with the

scarce theater-committed aircraft.

Air Mobility Command (AMC) provided form

training for its conventional airlift forces, an

with 24 CT II aircraft available, a formal trainin

squadron could be maintained. The earlier dec

sion to establish a four-aircraft squadron at Kir

land AFB, New Mexico (beginning in July 199

was reaffirmed by Air Staff, and a new delive

date was established as March 1992. Along wi

the CT II decision, Air Staff also announced th

transfer of CT I formal training from the 8th SO

to Kirtland AFB by 1 January 1994. Both wea

ons systems would be assigned to the 542d Cre

Training Wing (CTW). The first CT II class

would be conducted by initial cadre instructo

assigned to both the 8th SOS and to the 542

CTW during 1991 and 1992.

The 17th SOS in the Pacific and the 7th SOS 

Europe were scheduled to convert to the CT 

during the summer and fall of 1992. The 7th SO

CT I aircraft would be transferred to the 542

CTW at Kirtland AFB. The 1st and 8th SO

would remain the only two active duty oper

tional squadrons flying the older CT I aircraf

Along with the 7th SOS, a new operational squa

ron, designated as the 15th SOS and assigned 

Hurlburt Field, would operate the CT II. As 199

and 1992 passed, the basing plan would change 

accommodate support equipment and spare

availability, but by mid-1991 the game plan fo

CT II had been established and a formal shift 

CT I training to Kirkland AFB finalized.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

377
Combat Talon II Is Delivered

to Hurlburt Field

Throughout the spring of 1991, test crews assigned to Edwards AFB, California, continued the

long and tedious process of certifying the Combat

Talon II radar for operational use. In February

1991, while the air war was in full swing in

Southwest Asia, the advanced systems of the CT

II were field tested during a deployment to

Alaska. Low-level operations, down to 250 feet in

the rugged Alaskan mountains, were accom -

plished with F-15 fighter aircraft attempting to

intercept the Combat Talon II. The ECM suite

designed to evade the fighter aircraft’s weapons

systems and the terrain-following radar worked

as designed. Along with the flight-test profile, another objective of the Alaskan deployment was to

test the aircraft’s systems in cold weather. With

only minor deficiencies, the aircraft passed with

excellence. In March 1991 test crews deployed to

Eglin AFB and conducted additional tests on the

AN/APQ-170 radar. Following that series of tests,

a CT II deployed to Clark AB, for its tropical

evaluation. The steaming heat and moisture of

Southeast Asia provided a challenge to both aircraft and maintenance crews alike, but again the

aircraft passed with only minor deficiencies.3 9 Although testing would continue at Edwards AFB

over the next several years, the weapons system

had performed at an acceptable level and was

ready for delivery to the 8th SOS.

The first operational MC-130H CT II (87-0024)

was delivered to the 8th SOS on 29 June 1991,

with three additional aircraft (87-0023, 85-0012,

and 84-0476) being delivered over the next four

months. On 17 October 1991 an AFSOC acceptance ceremony was held at Hurlburt Field, and

the initial cadre of MC-130H CT IIs were offi -

cially placed in the USAF inventory. Although

the mission of the CT II was similar to its older

cousin, it lacked two major capabilities found on

the CT I—it was not capable of air refueling helicopters, and it did not have the Fulton STARS

modification. Requirements for these two capa -

bilities had not been established for CT II and

were not included in the basic design of the new

weapons system. The CT II did have, however, a

greater cargo capacity than the CT I, since the

radio operator/electronic warfare officer console

(located in the cargo compartment of the CT I)

was not required for the CT II. The console was

not required because the radio operator and the

second navigator crew positions were eliminated

for the CT II, thus reducing the crew to two pilots,

one navigator, one EW officer, one flight engineer,

and two loadmasters (total of seven for the CT II

as opposed to nine for the CT I). The EW officer

crew position was moved to the flight deck where

the second navigator position was located on the

CT I. With a clean cargo compartment, the CT II

could carry six pallets of cargo as compared to five

for CT I.

40 By 31 December 1991 the 8th SOS was

assigned a combination of six CT Is and six CT

IIs. CT Is possessed by the squadron included aircraft 64-0551, 64-0559, 64-0562, 64-0567, 64-

0568, and 64-0565. Squadron CT II aircraft tail

numbers included 84-0476, 85-0011, 85-0012, 86-

1699, 87-0023, and 87-0024. In addition to the 12

Combat Talons, the squadron was also assigned

one slick C-130E, thus making the Hurlburt Field

unit the largest Talon squadron in AFSOC. 41

During the following year CT II aircraft were

delivered to operational units in AFSOC and in

ATC. The 542d Combat Training Wing (ATC) at

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, received its first CT

II (87-0126) in March 1992, followed in June by

aircraft 87-0125. Kirtland AFB’s third CT II (85-

0012) was transferred from the 1st SOW in July

1992, and aircraft 88-0191 was delivered in October 1992. The 7th SOS received its first aircraft

(86-1699) from the 1st SOW in September 1992,

followed by aircraft 85-0012, which was transferred from Kirtland AFB in November 1992. The

7th SOS’s third aircraft (84-0476) was delivered

to the squadron in December 1992.42 The 17th

SOS was also scheduled to receive its initial CT

IIs during the fourth quarter CY 92, but the CT II

program manager at Warner Robins determined

that a fourth operating location was not supportable at that time due to the availability of test

equipment and spares. As a result the conversion

of the 17th SOS to the CT II was postponed for

two years, until the summer of 1995.

The Air Force Objective Wing

As the 8th SOS began accepting the new CT II

aircraft during the fall of 1991, the CSAF, Gen

Merrill McPeak, outlined his vision of a restructured Air Force during a speech titled “Organize,

Train, and Equip” made at the Air Force Associa -

tion annual meeting in September 1991. The primary focus of his presentation was the reorganization of the Air Force to make it more efficient

in a period of decreased funding and reduced

manpower. Earlier in the year McPeak had initiated actions to reform the Air Staff, and he had

eliminated air divisions while severely reducing

the size and functions of numbered Air Force

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

378
headquarters. For AFSOC McPeak’s vision would

directly impact the organization of the 1st SOW

by restructuring it into an objective wing, and for

the overseas wings, it would mark the systematic

dismantling of their wing structure and result in

their downgrade from wings to groups.4 3 For the

three Combat Talon squadrons, the restructuring

would result in the transfer of on-aircraft maintenance to each operational squadron. With imple -

mentation of the objective wing concept, the

Combat Talon squadrons would more than double

in size.

In response to an August 1991 CSAF tasking

message and a letter from Headquarters AFSOC,

Colonel Johnson, vice wing commander of the 1st

SOW, presented four options on 17 September for

possible reorganization of the wing into the objective wing structure. Johnson’s proposal was based

around the establishment of two groups within

the wing—an operations group and a logistics

group. Since AFSOC did not own Hurlburt Field,

the 1st SOW would not have a support group as

part of its structure.* Likewise the Hurlburt Field

clinic was a satellite facility belonging to Eglin

AFB, thus eliminating the requirement for a

medical group within the wing.44

With inputs from across the Air Force, the

CSAF convened an objective wing conference on

27 September 1991. Major command representatives were briefed by Air Staff deputy chiefs

of staff (DCS) and directors on where each wing

function should be located. A Headquarters

USAF vice chief of staff message, dated 3 October

1991, summarized the results of the conference

and was transmitted to the field. Although the

conference was a first-step effort towards attaining an objective wing structure across the Air

Force, major commands generally had more questions than answers. As 1991 neared its end, both

AFSOC and the 1st SOW worked long, hard

hours to develop an operational structure that

was both acceptable to CSAF and that would provide a logical and efficient means to reorganize

SOF. To meet the implementation schedule, the

Headquarters AFSOC staff developed a study

that outlined the establishment of the objective

wing in AFSOC, and the study was briefed at the

November 1991 AFSOC Commander’s Confe

ence. With AFSOC commander inputs a compr

hensive briefing schedule was finalized. USSO

COM was scheduled to be briefed in Decemb

and Headquarters USAF briefed after the first 

the year.45 USAF reorganization into the objectiv

wing structure would become the focus of AFSO

and the 1st SOW throughout 1992.

1992: The 15th SOS Is Activated

and Assigned Combat Talon II

As 1992 began AFSOC was working hard 

refine its objective wing structure. A Headqua

ters USAF Air Staff briefing was scheduled fo

18 February 1992. The February briefing ou

lined the “two group” option for the 1st SO

and proposed retaining the overseas wings. 

also provided an outline for combining the o

erations squadrons with on-aircraft maint

nance. An implementation date of 1 Octob

1992 was proposed.

The Objective Wing Is

Implemented within AFSOC

Because of feedback from the Air Staff at th

February briefing, AFSOC amended its present

tion before briefing General McPeak to include 

recommendation to downgrade the two overse

wings (the 39th SOW and the 353d SOW) to sp

cial operations groups. The one base, one win

one boss guidance from CSAF was the prima

reason behind Air Staff nonconcurrence of A

SOC’s desire to retain the two overseas wing

The downsized SOGs would consist of one rotar

wing and two fixed-wing squadrons, and a speci

tactics, maintenance, and operational suppo

squadron along with a reduced headquarte

staff. The briefing proposed retaining the 1

SOW designation, changing the 39th SOW i

Europe to the 352d SOG to claim the historic

lineage of the 2d Air Commando Group, and r

designating the 353d SOW in the Pacific as th

353d SOG to retain the lineage of the 3d Air Com

mando Group.46 The 1st SOS would be assigned 

the 353d SOG and the 7th SOS to the 352d SOG

__________

 *Hurlburt Field remained a Military Airlift Command base after the formation of AFSOC in 1990. To manage the base and to provide suppo

functions to the 1st SOW, MAC established the 834th Air Base Wing. When Johnson was tasked to develop an objective wing structure for the 

SOW, the “one wing, one base, one boss” guidance from McPeak could not be followed. Headquarters AFSOC did not own any bases; therefo

before assuming base support responsibilities, it had to create a base management function on its headquarters staff. When the 1st SOW stood 

as an objective wing on 1 October 1992, USAF recognized it as a Phase I stand-up and that the base would transfer to AFSOC as soon as comma

oversight could be established. Over the next two years, the base would be transferred to AFSOC along with the Hurlburt Field Clinic. With t

completion of those two actions, the 1st SOW stood up its support group and its medical group, thus becoming a true four-group objective wing 

envisioned by CSAF in 1991.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

379
The 8th SOS would continue to be assigned to the

1st SOW.

On 3 April 1992 Headquarters AFSOC sent a

message to PACAF and USAFE announcing that

the CSAF and CINCSOC had approved AFSOC’s

objective wing structure in principle. In the message General Fister, the commander of AFSOC,

stated, “Our theater CINCs can expect and will

receive the same high level of support as in the

past. While all AFSOC units will reorganize, they

will remain independent, tenant units at bases

around the world.” General Fister also announced

the new designations for the overseas groups and

established effective dates of 1 October 1992 for

the 1st SOW and 1 December 1992 for the overseas groups.4 7

With the basic structure of the AFSOC objective wing approved, the difficult task of determining the implementing details fell to the 1st SOW.

On 8 May Johnson convened the first of a series of

steering group meetings, and he appointed Colonel Clark (a former 7th SOS MC-130E pilot and

plans officer) to head the effort. Johnson stressed

to the steering group the need for the full support

by all involved and directed that a phased approach be followed during the conversion. He

called for early agreement on wing staff manning,

for early stand-up of the operations and logistics

group structures, and a step-by-step move of the

on-aircraft maintenance function into the opera -

tional squadrons. The 20th SOS was designated

the first squadron to transition to the new structure, with the fixed-wing squadrons following soon

afterwards. Over the next four months, the steering group would establish milestones and meet

regularly to review the wing’s progress towards

attaining the objective wing structure. On 15 July

the 20th SOS assumed control of its maintenance

function, followed by the 16th SOS on 15 August.

On 9 September Headquarters USAF advised

Headquarters AFSOC by letter that its 17 April

reorganization plan was approved and cleared the

1st SOW to fully implement its objective wing

structure effective 1 October 1992. Five days later

the 8th SOS assumed its on-aircraft maintenance

responsibilities.48

Actions identified by Clark AB’s steering committee contin ued to take place during September,

and by the 22d of the month, the wing was function -

ing as an objective wing. On 1 October a formal

low-key ceremony was conducted, with Headquarters AFSOC publishing Special Order GA-014, effective on that date. The special order identified the

actions taken as a first stage objective wing. The 1st

SOG and the 1st Special Operations Logistics

Group (SOLG) were activated and assigned to the

1st SOW.49 Colonel Schwartz (formerly assigned to

the 8th SOS and the incumbent director of operations under the old organizational structure) be -

came the 1st SOG commander, while Colonel Gross

(the incumbent director of maintenance) became the

commander of the SOLG.

The 8th SOS Establishes

CT I and CT II Flights

As the 1st SOW worked through the develop -

ment of its objective wing structure, Beres and his

8th SOS staff were busy training aircrews for CT

II and preparing the squadron for the assignment

of maintenance personnel. With 13 aircraft assigned, the squadron had doubled in size from the

summer of 1991 to the summer of 1992. On 29

May 1992 Colonel Murdock was appointed the

new squadron commander to succeed Beres, who

departed the squadron to attend the National

War College in Washington, D.C. Murdock had

served as the squadron operations officer under

Beres during Operation Desert Storm and had

been a flight examiner and instructor pilot in the

squadron during the mid-1980s. The difficult task

of completing the squadron reorganization process

and supporting the stand-up of the new CT II unit

would fall on Murdock’s shoulders.50 In June the

8th SOS celebrated its 75th birthday and was recognized as the second oldest continuously active

duty squadron in the Air Force.

After the end of the ground war in Southwest

Asia, the 8th SOS had returned to Hurlburt Field

to prepare for the arrival of the CT II. During

1992 the squadron remained at home station, supporting local training missions and participating

in JRT events at Hunter and Lawson Army Air

Fields in Georgia. The squadron also deployed to

Pope AFB for a large-scale Capex and provided

one aircraft and crew for JCS Exercise Ocean Venture 92.

51 The workload associated with dividing

the squadron into independent CT I and CT II

units, while at the same time developing a maintenance capability for both squadrons, took up most of

the squ adron leadership’s time. Assisting Murdock

in this undertaking were two exceptional officers

(Colonels Poole and Saier) who served as Murdock’s CT I and CT II operations officers. When

the 8th SOS was assigned its own maintainers on

15 September, the transition went relatively

smooth with few problems. Two weeks later the

15th SOS was officially activated with its own

maintainers assigned. The two events marked the

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

380
culmination of years of hard work by programmers, planners, operators, and maintainers.

Activation of the 15th SOS

On 13 April 1992 a Headquarters USAF/MO

letter to AFSOC/CC formally announced the activation of the 15th SOS, effective on or about 16

October 1992, with its assignment to AFSOC.

The letter noted that the squadron had been previously inactivated on 31 October 1970, and it

directed AFSOC to issue a G-series order in accordance with applicable Air Force regulations.

Headquarters AFSOC subsequently issued Special Order GA-011 on 1 June 1992, which activated the 15th SOS, effective 1 October 1992, and

further assigned the squadron to the 1st SOW.

With the G-series orders issued, Saier (the CT II

operations officer of the 8th SOS and commanderdesignate of the new squadron) had a target date

to get his personnel and equipment ready. His

focus was on CT II preparations, while his counterpart in the 8th SOS, Poole, concentrated on

the CT I and the issue of absorbing maintenance

into the CT I squadron. By September all was

ready to divide personnel and equipment assigned to the 8th SOS and to stand up the new

CT II unit. Special Order GB-014, issued by

Headquarters AFSOC and dated 1 October 1992,

formally designated Saier as the new commander

of the 15th SOS.52

On 1 October, in a formal ceremony held on the

Hurlburt Field flight line, Saier assumed command of the 15th SOS with Colonel Schwartz officiating. The squadron’s history dated back to 5

February 1942 when it was initially activated as

the 18th Observation Squadron. Nine months

later it was redesignated the 15th Antisubmarine

Squadron (Heavy) (H) and was assigned to the

26th Antisubmarine Wing, Miami, Florida. The

unit flew the B-24 Liberator until 1944, when it

converted to the B-29 and was redesignated the

15th Bomb Squadron (BS) (Very Heavy) (VH). It

soon deployed to the Pacific theater and participated in the Allied offensive against mainland Japan. During the Japanese surrender ceremony on -

board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, 15th BS

(VH) aircraft provided a formation fly-over to

honor Allied lives lost during the defeat of Japan.

The unit was inactivated after WWII, but was

formed again as the 15th Air Commando Squadron at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, on 15 March

1968.* Five months after activation (on 1 August

1968) the unit was renamed the 15th Special O

erations Squadron.53

For the next two years, the 15th SOS disti

guished itself in Southeast Asia as the prima

air component of MACVSOG, flying the MC-130

Combat Talon on both psychological operatio

and personnel infiltration/resupply missions in

North Vietnam and Laos. On 31 October 1970 th

15th SOS was inactivated, and the squadron w

redesignated the 90th SOS. From 31 Octob

1970 until 1 October 1992, the 15th SOS r

mained in an inactive status. Thus, when Saie

took the flag from Schwartz during the form

activation and assumption of command ceremon

one of the most decorated Combat Talon squa

rons from the past was again active. With th

assignment of the CT II weapons system, the 15

SOS was once again an operational Combat Talo

squadron molded in the proud tradition of i

Vietnam–era Stray Goose ancestors.5 4

Although the new MC-130H CT II performe

the same mission as the MC-130E CT I, it inco

porated a highly automated control and displ

system that was designed to reduce cockpit wor

load while providing on-line information to th

flight crew. The entire cockpit and cargo compar

ment were compatible with NVGs, thus elimina

ing the need to reduce light levels or to tape cri

cal warning lights that were required in the CT 

The cockpit configuration was designed aroun

the pilot and copilot displays on the cockpit i

strument panel, and the navigator/EWO display

which were mounted in a two-position console l

cated in the right rear area of the cockpit. Althoug

not a complete “glass” cockpit, each crew statio

had two video displays and a data-entry keyboar

One of the two EWO video displays was dedicate

to electronic warfare data, while the t wo navig

tor videos displayed navigational infor mation. I

tegral to each video display was a switch that con 

tained 21 variable-function, software-controlle

switches. Key legends were shown on the vide

display next to each switch to indicate the curre

switch function. The five switches in the top ro

were used for the primary display mode selectio

while the eight switches on each side provide

controls appropriate to the selected primary di

play mode.5 5

The primary pilot and copilot display forma

included basic flight instrumentation and sit

ational data. There were several varieties of ver

cal display formats for control of the aircraft an

__________

 *Personnel and aircraft making up the 15th Air Commando Squadron had deployed to Southeast Asia in 1966 as the original Stray Goo

detachment from Pope AFB, North Carolina.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

381
presentation of flight guidance information. Horizontal display formats presented tactical information and radio navigation information. The display formats were available with symbology alone

or symbology overlaid with sensor video. The

navigator used ground map displays, forwardlooking infrared displays, tabular mission management displays, and equipment status presentation. The EWO displays were used for EW data

display and to supplement the navigator in certain critical phases of flight. With the two pilots,

navigator, EWO, and flight engineer crew stations

all located on the flight deck, only the two loadmaster crew stations were located in the cargo

compartment. The configuration promoted crew

coordination and efficiency during the difficult

and often demanding low-level phases of flight.56

By the fourth quarter of CY 92, both the 15th

SOS at Hurlburt Field and the 542d CTW at

Kirtland AFB were operational with the CT II.

On 1 December 1992 the 7th SOS officially con -

verted to the CT II, and their CT I aircraft were

transferred back to the United States. The issue

of relocating CT I training to Kirtland AFB was

readdressed in December 1992 by the 1st

SOG/CC, Colonel Schwartz. In his 14 December

1992 letter to the AFSOC/DO, Colonel Schwartz

expressed his concern over the January 1994 target date to move the formal CT I school to Albuquerque. Although he supported the move, he

cited several issues, including aircraft avail -

ability and lack of a flight simulator and other

facilities at Kirtland AFB to accommodate CT I

as issues needing to be resolved before moving

training from Hurlburt Field. Of the three CT Is

scheduled for Kirtland AFB (64-0523, 64-0555,

and 64-0561), only 64-0523 would be available

in January 1994, with the two other aircraft

still at LAS Ontario undergoing MOD-90 upgrade. With only three fully modified MOD-90

aircraft scheduled to be on the ramp at Hurlburt

Field in January 1994, Colonel Schwartz felt it

unrealistic to expect the 1st SOG to loan a MOD90 CT I to Kirtland AFB due to projected opera -

tional commitments.57

Also cited in Colonel Schwartz’s letter was the

lack of facilities at Kirtland AFB. The establishment of the CT II schoolhouse had placed

classroom and office space at a premium. If con -

struction projects under way at Kirtland AFB

were delayed for any reason, sufficient space to

conduct classes alongside existing fixed- and rotarywing classes would not exist. Colonel Schwartz

ended his letter with the observation that the distinct possibility existed that, due to shortages of

aircraft and facilities at Kirtland AFB, problems

faced at Hurlburt Field would only be shifted and

exacerbated if CT I training was shifted. He felt

that the timing of the move was ill advised and

that the 1st SOG could be forced to continue the

formal CT I training after scarce manpower and

training resources had been transferred to Kirtland AFB. He requested that the 1 January 1994

target date be delayed until resources were inplace and more CT Is were available for the train -

ing squadron.*5 8

__________

 *Colonel Schwartz’s concerns were considered by AFSOC, and the January 1994 target date was eventually postponed to FY 96 by Air Staff.

Kirtland AFB experienced unprogrammed challenges as it matured the CT II and the MH-53J Pave Low formal schools. (AETC had assumed all

formal training requirements for AFSOC along with the CT II.) After years of delays, the Air Staff decided to retain the CT I formal school at

Hurlburt Field and to stand up a training squadron (the 19th SOS) dedicated to its operation.

USAF Photo

Pilot and copilot display, Combat Talon.

USAF Photo

Nav/EWO panel on right side of Combat Talon II flight

deck.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

382
At the end of 1992 the 8th SOS possessed three

MOD-90 aircraft with a new communications system, improved electronic warfare systems, and

the ALQ-172 SPJ. In addition, the CT Is had been

fitted with an integrated GPS, improved IR capa -

bility, and the ALE-40 system for decoying IR

guided missiles. For STARS missions the 8th SOS

was the only squadron that maintained airframes

capable of performing Fulton recoveries. Plans

called for a reduction from nine to three STARScapable CT Is to reduce the cost of maintaining

the expensive system.59 Except for the Pacific Talons, all CT Is either were at Hurlburt Field assigned to the 8th SOS or at LAS Ontario undergoing MOD-90 upgrade.

Kirtland AFB Receives the

Combat Talon II

Kirtland AFB had been preparing to receive

the Combat Talon II since the late 1980s. When

AFSOC was formed as a separate command in

May 1990, the decision to base SOF training at

Albuquerque was reviewed. Senior leadership felt

that AFSOC was too small a command to be able

to absorb its own training program, while at the

same time supporting real-world contingency

tasking. The decision to base Combat Talon II

training at Kirtland AFB was validated, however,

and preparations for the arrival of the weapons

system continued at the New Mexico base. With

its first CT II scheduled for delivery in July 1991,

the first class was tentatively scheduled for the

following November. In anticipation of these

events, work on the Talon II pilot and navigator

courseware was completed in January 1991. Work

on the CT II flight engineer and loadmaster

courseware was completed in May. Plans to validate the CT II courseware before the first students arrived at Kirtland AFB was also finalized.

An interim schoolhouse was planned at Hurlburt

Field beginning in March 1991, lasting for two to

three months and utilizing both Kirtland AFB instructors and those from the 8th SOS. The interim schoolhouse would allow the courseware to

be tested and validated before the first students

arrived at Kirtland AFB. 60

Design work was finished for an MC-130H

Combat Talon II flight simulator building in May

1990, followed closely by the design of a new avionics maintenance facility. The wing included the

two projects in its FY 90 military construction program, and on 22 October a contract for the con -

struction of the simulator building was awarded.

The wing held a groundbreaking ceremony on 12

November, and construction began on 20 Novem

ber. The projected cost to build the new facili

was $5 million, and the contractor expected 

have it finished by December 1991. A contract 

build the avionics maintenance facility w

awarded on 30 November 1990 for $3.6 millio

and the formal ground breaking ceremony w

held on 28 December. The two projects repr

sented two of the more costly construction pr

jects required to beddown the Combat Talon II

As 1990 came to a close, Kirtland AFB was o

track to receive its initial Combat Talon II wea

ons system.

The Combat Talon II radar continued to dela

the delivery of the new aircraft, and the 1 Ju

1991 delivery of the first aircraft to Kirtland AF

was slipped to the following spring. Kirtland AF

received its first Combat Talon II in March 199

but had the official roll out ceremony in Jun

Three more Combat Talon IIs were delivered b

tween 15 September and 10 November 1992. I

October 1991 the wing sent its initial cadre 

Combat Talon II instructors to Hurlburt Field 

help the 8th SOS teach the first two MC-130

formal classes. The first class started on 21 Oct

ber 1991 and finished on 7 February 1992; th

second class began on 20 January 1992 and fi

ished on 24 April. The Kirtland AFB instructo

returned to their home bases and taught the fir

class there beginning on 7 July 1992. Kirtlan

AFB and Hurlburt Field jointly taught form

classes during the following six months. All fo

mal CT II classes after 11 December 1992, how 

ever, were taught only at Kirtland AFB. The ne

formal school planned to train approximately 

Combat Talon II crews the first year and 12 crew

annually thereafter.62

As the new Combat Talons began arriving 

Kirtland AFB in the spring and summer of 199

the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing (CCTW

(the host wing for Combat Talon ) was goin

through a tumultuous period in its own histor

On 19 February 1976 the 1550th Aircrew Trainin

and Test Wing (ATTW) moved from Hill AF

Utah, to Kirtland AFB. On 1 October 1983 th

1550th ATTW joined Twenty-Third AF as a MA

unit assigned to Scott AFB, Illinois. On 15 M

1984 it was redesignated the 1550th CCTW an

continued to train HC-130P/N and USAF rotar

wing crew members.6 3 To provide base support fo

the 1550th CCTW, the 1606th Air Base Win

(ABW) was established as a second MAC wing l

cated at Kirtland AFB, and it served as the ho

wing for all base-assigned units. On 1 Octob

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

383
1991 the 1550th CCTW merged with the 1606th

ABW to form the 542d CTW. General Higham

assumed command of the 542d CTW, and a former Combat Talon I operator, Colonel Vycital

(previously the commander of the 1550th CCTW),

was appointed vice commander of the 542d. Manpower and resources were transferred to the 542d

CTW, and all former unit designations of the

1606th were inactivated.64

The merging of the two wings was only temporary. At the Corona Fall 92 commander’s conference, plans were unveiled by CSAF (General

McPeak) to transfer Kirtland AFB from MAC

(now Air Mobility Command) to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) because the latter held the

preponderance of forces assigned to the base. The

transfer of the base became effective on 1 January

1993. The impact of the base transfer resulted in

the establishment of a new AFMC host base wing

using support units from the 542d CTW. In late

December 1992 approval from Air Staff was received to activate the 377th ABW as Kirtland

AFB’s new host base wing.65

The 542d CTW remained a separate crew train -

ing wing assigned to AMC and a tenant unit at

Kirtland AFB throughout its operational life. It

was solely responsible for the aircrew training

mission. The pattern of constant change continued

through 1993, when on 1 July, the 542d CTW was

transferred to AETC located at Randolph AFB,

Texas. The move to AETC was brought on by

CSAF initiatives associated with USAF reorganization and alignment. The constant change and

turmoil had their impact on the new Combat

Talon II training program, but thanks to dedicated

individuals committed to making the effort a success, the schedule was not impacted to a point

where student training was impeded.

66

Decision Made to Base

Pacific Units at Kadena AB

The year 1992 found the 353d SOW still in

limbo after Mount Pinatubo, with forces located

at Kadena AB and Futenma MCAS on Okinawa.

Since evacuating Clark AB on 11 June 1991, and

with the subsequent denial of the government of

the Philippines to continue the lease there, Headquarters AFSOC had continued to look for a suitable beddown location. As the months passed and

personnel returned to the United States, much of

the wing’s functions were performed by temporary

duty augmentees provided by the 1st SOW at

Hurlburt Field. As the wing approached its 180-

day temporary duty limit, AFSOC was forced to

redesignate the wing so that it could continue to

operate in the Pacific. On 31 December 1991 the

353d SOW was redesignated the Special Opera -

tions Wing Provisional, 353d. Operating under

provisional status allowed the wing to continue its

mission until a basing decision was made. From

31 December 1991 to 5 February 1992, the wing

functioned with a handful of people permanently

assigned, while most other personnel were attached to the provisional wing in TDY status under a program known as Scimitar Sweep. During

this period AFSOC kept the provisional wing

manned at approximately 55 percent—297 personnel, excluding 177 assigned to the 17th SOS

already at Kadena AB (total of 474). 67 On 17

January 1992 the American embassy in Tokyo informed the government of Japan of the proposed

interim relocation of the 353d SOW to Kadena

AB. General Hurd, who had taken over as the

18th Wing commander, softened the impact on

Okinawa by privately informing Governor Ota be -

fore the public announcement. Headquarters AF -

SOC publicly announced the decision on 11 Feb -

ruary. Surprisingly, there was no public outcry,

and Headquarters PACAF quietly issued orders

officially moving the 353d SOW from Clark AB to

Kadena AB, effective 5 February 1992.6 8

Following the beddown decision, agreements between Air Force and base level personnel managers allowed a steady increase in the wing’s manning by about 75 personnel each month as new

permanent party members began arriving and

Scimitar Sweep augmentees departed. By the end

of September 1992, all TDY manning for the 353d

SOW had ended, while the 31st SOS (which had

moved to Osan AB, ROK, from Futenma MCAS)

maintained a few TDY personnel through December. With the 353d SOW reconstituted, Headquarters AFSOC deactivated the Special Operations

Wing Provisional, 353d, on 28 February 1993.6 9

No formal public announcement was made on

the decision to relocate the 31st SOS from

Futenma MCAS to Osan AB, ROK, and the decision was kept classified until 1 April 1993. Even

after declassification, no public announcement

was made at the request of the Republic of Korea.

South Korea was in peace negotiations with

North Korea and did not want the new special

operations unit to become entangled in that process. Although the beddown decision had been

made, one stipulation in the wording of the decision continued to affect the permanent status of

the 353d SOW and its assigned squadrons—the

decision to locate the wing in Okinawa and in

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

384
Korea was identified as an interim decision,

which implied that the decision would be reviewed sometime in the future. This caveat made

the basing issue more acceptable to both Japan

and South Korea, but it made facilities improve -

ments and new construction extremely difficult

for the wing.70

On 23 February 1992 Colonel Reinholz assumed command of the 1st SOS from Mallon, who

was reassigned to the Joint US Military Group in

Manila, Republic of the Philippines. With the announcement of the beddown of the wing at

Kadena AB and at Osan AB, agreements had to

be made between the 353d SOW and the 18th

Wing, which was the host unit at Kadena AB, and

with the 51st Wing at Osan AB. On 14 May

Stankovich signed a facilities agreement with

General Hurd at Kadena AB, and on 4 June he

signed an MOU with the 51st Wing at Osan AB.

These two agreements were followed in September with the awarding of a contract for $4.5 million for refurbishment of facilities at Kadena AB,

and a $1.5 million contract for Osan AB.71

During the summer of 1992, the 1st SOS received its first two MOD-90 MC-130E Combat Talons (63-7785 and 64-0565). The third MOD-90 aircraft (62-1843) arrived in January 1993. Additional

modifications to replace the center wing and 

add helicopter refueling capability to the Pacif

Talons were scheduled for 1993. In addition to th

two MC-130Es, the 1st SOS continued to posse

one C-130E slick, which it had used extensively 

move 353d SOW equipment from Clark AB 

Kadena AB. The C-130E slick also provided a p

lot proficiency platform that enabled the squadro

to train and season new crew members as the

were assigned to the squadron.72

To minimize the impact of the unplanned rel

cation of the squadron from Clark AB, Reinho

and the 1st SOS maintained an aggressive exe

cise schedule. Many of the training areas fr

quented by the squadron had taken years to d

velop, and the island location of Kadena A

made those training areas even more importan

The squadron kept its assigned aircraft on th

road supporting both JCS exercise commitmen

and smaller, yet equally important, JCET event

Deployments included those to Australia, Kore

mainland Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and th

Philippines. The squadron also supported JC

Exercise Tandem Thrust in the western Unite

States and unilateral training in Hawaii. A

though the schedule was sometimes hectic an

challenged the squadron to execute as planne

Combat Talon 64-0565 was the first aircraft to receive the complete MOD-90

modification. Pictured is part of the MOD-90 production team. Note the rising

Phoenix and the motto “The Guts to Try” nose art. The aircraft had been heavily

damaged at Desert One. First row left to right: Rich Ryan, Mike Rosenbaum,

Frank Sharkany, and Guy Washburn. Second row left to right: Darwin Nicely,

Don Henderson, Tom Jozwiak, Tom Willis, Jim Schaeffer, Bob Lewis, John Waddington, and Jeff Hurst.

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

385
all commitments were fulfilled, and the 1st SOS

maintained its training areas throughout the

transition period .

During 1992 the Air Force went through the

most sweeping reorganization in its history. For

the 353d SOW it was reorganized and redesignated the 353d SOG, effective 1 December 1992.7 3

The reorganization impacted the 1st SOS Talon

squadron by placing on-aircraft maintenance in

the squadron, thus resulting in the doubling of

the number of 1st SOS-assigned personnel. Both

the 352d SOG (formerly the 39th SOW) and the

353d retained their wing-like status, with duties

and responsibilities normally found in a wing

(public affairs, finance, manpower, historian,

etc.). As the newly designated 353d SOG closed

out 1992, a feeling of permanence had grown in

the special operations group. The New Year

would prove as challenging as the old, with the

group facing its first ORI in the fall of 1993 during Foal Eagle .

The 7th SOS Moves to

RAF Alconbury with CT II

As 1992 began for the European Talons, the

39th SOW was completing final preparations for

its relocation to RAF Alconbury, UK. On 15 January the 39th SOW headquarters began the move.

The 7th SOS remained at Rhein Main AB at that

time, but it was scheduled to move later in the

year. At the squadron level most of the coming

year revolved around preparations for Combat

Talon II, preparing for the move, and in supporting contingency operations tasked by SOCEUR.

From 3 to 7 February, the first Combat Talon II

site activation task force (SATAF) was conducted

at RAF Alconbury, and 7th SOS personnel played

a key role in the process.7 4 A schedule to send

crews to Kirtland AFB for conversion training

was finalized, and a schedule for the return of the

Combat Talon I to the US was completed.

During the first three months of 1992, the 7th

SOS conversion to Combat Talon II had not yet

begun, thus enabling the squadron to send an argumentation crew to the 1st SOS. The Pacific

squadron was struggling to meet its theater commitments after Mount Pinatubo, and the augmentation helped the 1st SOS until additional permanent party personnel arrived in late spring. By April,

however, McCaslin (7th SOS/CC) wrote a r equest for

US-based Combat Talon crew augmentation for

the 7th SOS during the period from August to

October 1992. He based his request on two major factors: (1) no CT I inbounds were being

assigned to the squadron because of the con -

version to CT II; and (2) some of his current

CT I crews were scheduled to attend CT II con -

version training and would not be available to

the squadron.*75

The spring exercise schedule began with a wing

deployment to Teamwork 92, which was held in

Norway from 5 to 22 March. A total of 170 wing

personnel participated in the exercise, and the

7th SOS deployed one MC-130E Combat Talon

between 13 and 22 March to support exercise

tasking. Missions flown during the exercise included personnel and resupply air drops, infiltra -

tion of personnel and equipment by way of sea

and land, and assault landings in the exercise

area that stretched from Evenes, Norway, to

north of Bardufoss. Severe arctic weather challenged the deployed force throughout the exercise,

but 7th SOS crews managed to fly 27.5 hours supporting the operation.76

Not long after returning from Teamwork 92,

wing assets were tasked to support a contingency

operation in Sierra Leone. SOCEUR issued a

warning order on 29 April 1992 tasking the 39th

SOW for two MC-130Es from the 7th SOS and two

HC-130P/Ns from the 67th SOS for Operation Silver Anvil. The following day SOCEUR published

the Silver Anvil Operations order and transmitted

it to the tasked units. The OPORD listed a fivephase plan for the evacuation of approximately 80

US Army medical team members from the city of

Freetown, Sierra Leone. Phase I consisted of the

deployment of the 7th and 67th SOS aircraft, two

of which were tasked to fly to Stuttgart, Germany,

and onload 71 USA Special Forces personnel.

Phases II through V included deployment of main -

tenance and support personnel along with a con -

tingent of 21st SOS MH-53Js and crews. On 30

April the four fixed-wing aircraft launched, then

refueled at NAS Rota, Spain, as they continued on

to Dakar, Senegal, where the 39th SOW established its base of operation.77

Two days after their arrival in Senegal, the

JCS issued an execute order for the extraction of

the medical team, but also included an NEO for

American citizens, third country nationals wishing to leave the country, and any local nationals

as directed by the US ambassador in Sierra

Leone. Also on 2 May a 7th SOS Combat Talon

__________

 *As a result of McCaslin’s request, the 8th SOS began augmenting the 7th SOS in September so there would be a continuous combat capability in

Europe during the conversion to CT II.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

386
flew a SOCEUR assessment team into Freetown.

The NEO actually began on 3 May when the 7th

SOS flew four missions and evacuated 129 personnel, while the 67th SOS flew an additional

four missions and extracted 84 personnel. The 7th

SOS also inserted a 64-man security team into

Freetown upon its initial landing. On 4 May one

of the 7th SOS crews extracted the security team

while a second crew evacuated an additional 40

people. The 4 May flights marked the last two

sorties for the 7th SOS Combat Talons during Op -

eration Silver Anvil.

7 8

The two fixed-wing squadrons remained in

Senegal two additional days awaiting further

tasking from SOCEUR. When none was received,

they were released and departed Senegal for their

home stations on 6 May. For the 39th SOW, assigned assets remained on alert at home station

through 15 May, at which time SOCEUR terminated the operation.79

From 7 to 10 May the second Combat Talon II

SATAF was held at RAF Alconbury. Progress was

being made for the beddown of the new weapons

system, but the issue of combat capability in

Europe was still unresolved. The first Combat

Talon II was scheduled to arrive in-theater in

September, with the second one due in November.

The remaining Combat Talon Is were scheduled

for transfer to the United States in October. Colonel Ronsick, the 39th SOW commander, proposed

that the CT I transfer be delayed for thre e months

until the CT IIs were operational in sufficient numbers to assure Talon commitments were met. On 30

July 1992 USSOCOM approved Ronsick’s request,

and the MC-130Es were retained at Rhein Main AB

for an additional three months. McCaslin’s request

for aircrew augmentation was also approved, and

the 8th SOS sent crew members to Germany in

the early fall. With agreements finalized, the 7th

SOS was able to maintain a Combat Talon capa -

bility throughout the transition period.8 0

On 2 September Combat Talon 64-0566 was

transferred to the 8th SOS, becoming the first 7th

SOS CT I to permanently leave the squadron.

Seven days later, on 9 September 1992, the first

Combat Talon II was accepted by the 7th SOS at

RAF Alconbury.* The following day, the wing was

notified that it would be reorganized in accordance

with Air Force directives under the objective wing

concept. Because of the reorganization, the 39th

SOW stood up two provisional groups identifie

as the operations group and the logistics grou

effective on 1 October 1992. As part of this reo

ganization, on-aircraft maintenance transferre

from the wing to the operational squadrons. Th

7th SOS assumed control of its own Combat Talo

maintainers effective 1 October.81

Just as the new organization was coming t

gether, Air Staff made another reorganization d

cision. On 5 October Air Force Special Operatio

Command announced that the 39th SOW woul

be deactivated effective 1 December 1992 an

would be replaced by the 352d SOG. The Pacif

wing was also redesignated as a group. The 352

SOG would basically mirror its sister group in th

Pacific, with a downsized headquarters respon 

sible for administrative and command matter

three flying squadrons, a special tactics squadro

a special operations support squadron, and 

maintenance squadron responsible for off-aircra

maintenance. 82

Unrest in western Africa again impacted th

7th SOS when, on 21 October, SOCEUR alerte

the 39th SOW for Operation Silver Compas

Warring factors in Monrovia, Liberia, posed 

serious threat to the safety of US citizens livin

there. The 7th SOS was recalled and prepare

to support Operation Silver Compass. After se

eral days of planning and preparation, the cris

subsided, and SOCEUR released the wing fro

further tasking before any actual deployme

could take place. On 1 November the 7th SOS w

alerted for another African contingency, whic

was identified as Operation Silver Gauntlet . Th

contingency tasking included deployment 

Luanda, Angola, with a US Navy SEAL team, wi

follow-on operations as directed by SOCEUR. A

had been the case the previous month, SOCEU

canceled the pending tasking on 4 November b

fore deployment of forces after the crisis in Ango

diminished.8 3

Starting on 5 November elements of the 7th SO

began the move from Rhein Main AB to RAF Alco

bury. The date marked the official move of th

squadron, but remaining CT I crews and maint

nance personnel continued to operate out of Ge

many. Detachment 7, 39th SOW, was established 

Rhein Main AB, effective 5 November, to provi

oversight for the CT I element. The next day, o

6 November 1992, Colonel Lauderdale assume

__________

 *The 7th SOS was still physically located at Rhein Main AB, Germany, when the first CT II was delivered to the 39th SOW at RAF Alconbury. 

CT II aircrew and maintenance personnel completed training in the United States, they reported to RAF Alconbury for their duty assignment vi

to Rhein Main AB. No CT II aircraft or personnel were assigned to the unit at Rhein Main AB. When the 7th SOS moved to RAF Alconbury 

November 1992, a CT I contingent was established as Detachment 7, 39th SOW, at Rhein Main AB and continued to ope rate the CT Is there un

they departed the theater.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

387
command of the squadron from McCaslin, thus

ushering in a new Combat Talon II era in Europe.

Three weeks later the 39th SOW was officially

inactivated, and the 352d SOG was activated in

its place at RAF Alconbury. The year 1992 had

been one of change and reorganization. As European SOF approached the New Year, the 7th SOS

was operational with the Combat Talon II, with

the older CT Is being transferred back to the

United States. During the entire process there

was never a lapse in theater combat capability.

1993: Year of Change

throughout AFSOC

A Combat Talon II SATAF visited Kadena AB

in January to evaluate the suitability of Kadena

AB for CT II beddown during 1993, and it rated

the site unsatisfactory. The SATAF determined

that the support equipment and spares requirements for the new aircraft could not be met in the

Pacific theater, thus making maintenance of the

new aircraft impossible. A shortage of spare parts

for the CT II at the already established CT II

locations would only be made worse by the long

supply chain from the United States to Okinawa. 84 Also, the lack of a second C-130–capable

hangar was identified as a shortfall that had to be

rectified before arrival of the new aircraft.

As a result of the SATAF findings, Headquarters AFSOC completed an internal study and determined that the programmed delivery of the

Pacific CT IIs had to be changed. A working

group convened at Hurlburt Field in March and

proposed several possible courses of action. From

these, Headquarters AFSOC agreed to change the

beddown of the five Kadena-bound CT IIs as

follows—15th SOS (three PAA and one BAI) and

the 550th FTS (Kirtland AFB) (one PAT); extend

the five PAA/one BAI HC-130s at Kadena AB

through FY 4-95; and continue growth of the 1st

SOS to four PAA/one BAI MC-130Es but maximize beddown of helo-refuelable Talons at the 8th

SOS to accommodate US-based aerial refueling requirements. Headquarters AFSOC recommended

delaying fielding of the CT II in the Pacific until

1995 and forwarded a program change request to

USCINCSOC in June. The new schedule had the

353d SOG receiving a total of four CT II aircraft

by the end of 1995, with the 17th SOS receiving

its new CT IIs during FY 4-95.8 5

Pacific-Based Talons Rebuild

As the CT II beddown issue was being debated,

the 353d SOG and the 1st SOS concentrated on

their rebuilding program in the wake of the decision to beddown the group at Kadena AB. In addition to the beddown initiatives, the thrust of the

group’s activities focused on improving readiness

in preparation for its first ORI, which was scheduled for the following November. For most of Feb -

ruary and March, the group deployed aircraft to

Thailand in support of Exercise Balance Torch .

The 1st SOS Combat Talons, and aircraft from its

sister squadrons in the group, participated in the

unconventional warfare exercise. In the midst of

executing the exercise, AFSOC was hit with an

18.5 percent reduction in flying hours (and associated funding), and Headquarters AFSOC subsequently reduced the 353d SOG’s allocation proportionately. From Kadena AB, Stankovich

quickly notified the squadrons of the situation,

halted all purchases from supply, and canceled all

nonessential TDYs. For Balance Torch all flying

not directly in support of exercise-tasked missions

was canceled. The 17th SOS suspended flying for

10 days due to the crisis. Combat Talon missions

that had been planned for five to six hours were

cut to two hours, which was just enough time to

deliver the troops to their exercise areas and then

return to base. On 2 March AFSOC was able to

give the group an additional 75 hours to complete

Balance Torch . By the end of March the USSO -

COM had reinstated funding for AFSOC, and the

previously lost flying hours were restored to the

353d SOG.8 6

In another step towards stability, Headquarters

PACAF issued orders on 29 March permanently

assigning the 31st SOS to Osan AB, Korea. For

the remainder of the group, Kadena AB continued

as its interim beddown location.87 In May Admiral

Larson, CINCPAC, issued his commander’s intent

statement for FY 94. He reiterated the PACOM

strategy of cooperative engagement an d empha -

sized his goals of cementing US military ties

with Northeast Asian nations and furthering relationships with Australia, Thailand, and the

Philippines. Japan and Korea continued to be

the two most important alliances in the Pacific

region. For the 1st SOS the squadron actively

supported the CINC’s cooperative engagement

strategy through its participation in the

SOCPAC JCET program. Reinholz’s diligence

the previous year in supporting all JCET and

JCS exercise commitments did not go unnoticed

throughout the region.88

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

388
Early in the spring of 1993, all three flying

squadrons had their unit mission statements updated to reflect their new operational capabilities.

Changes made included adding helicopter refueling for the 1st SOS and deleting its sea surveillance mission. The addition of the helicopter refu eling mission was required after the 1st SOS received

its first Combat Talon aircraft modified with aerial

refueling pods. With the 1st SOS acquiring the

helicopter refueling modification, the 17th SOS

was scheduled to receive the new Combat Talon II

aircraft and return its assigned HC-130s to other

units in the United States. The 1st SOS had

maintained the capability to perform sea surveillance since the early 1970s, but it had not been

tasked to perform the mission for the past several

years.89 Training required to maintain the sea

surveillance capability was eliminated.

The first six months of 1993 also saw an acute

manning shortfall for the 1st SOS. The squadron

experienced a shortage of navigators and loadmasters. It also suffered from a lack of aircrew

experience as it rebuilt following the complete

turnover of personnel in 1992. The squadron was

often assigned crew members fresh from initial

flight training or crew members from bomber,

fighter, or transport units. The rapid growth of

the Combat Talon II crew force in the United

States and in Europe had drained the experienced

CT I aircrew and maintenance pool.9 0 Inexperienced crew members required additional training

sorties, but they were enthusiastic about the

Combat Talon mission and worked hard to gain

experience in the shortest amount of time.

On 25 June 1993 Stankovich relinquished com -

mand of the 353d SOG to Colonel Thigpen, who ha d

been the deputy commander, 1st SOG, before coming to Kadena AB. The ceremony was officiated by

General Fister and was attended by General

Rokosz, the commander of SOCPAC. Stankovich

had made great strides in acquiring fa cilities for

the emergency beddown of the group at both

Kadena and Osan ABs. It would fall to Thigp en

to continue the aggressive facilities renovation/

construction program already under way and to

prepare the group for its ORI that was scheduled

during Exercise Foal Eagle in the fall.9 1

When Thigpen assumed command in June, the

353d SOG had 21 facilities projects in the con -

struction phase at Kadena AB and three more in

the design stage. At Osan AB 19 projects were 

the works for the 31st SOS. Some of the Kaden

AB projects called for major renovations to buil

ings, thus requiring relocation of the group

squadrons during the construction phase. For th

1st SOS the squadron had to move to two room

in building 3524 during the renovation of its o

erations facility, a building that had been fo

merly occupied by an SR-71 squadron. The grou

was scattered across the sprawling Kadena A

complex in 12 different buildings, sharing som

facilities with 18th Wing units. Although the fa 

cilities met minimum requirements, they did n

meet planned future growth requirements or a

dress organizational changes under the new ob 

jective force restructuring directed by Gener

McPeak. Additionally, the wide dispersal of 353

SOG buildings was not conducive to unity of com

mand. As a result of these shortcomings, Colon

Thigpen called for a “comprehensive review of f

cilities requirements” in late June. He establishe

a facilities working group to assess the group

long-term needs.9 2

Over the course of the summer, the workin

group reassessed the 353d SOG’s building r

quirements with an eye towards future grow

and consolidation. The working group developed 

list of objectives that included group consolid

tion, adequate (as opposed to minimum) space fo

its assigned units, maintaining unit integrity, an

providing a quality environment in which to wor

The recent CT II SATAF had identified the nee

for a second hangar for the group, and the wor

ing group developed further justification for th

facility. In addition to the CT II requiremen

maintenance needed an additional hangar 

minimize aircraft downtime, perform corrosion co

trol, and to operate a fuel cell facility.* Sufficie

storage space for the group’s Readiness Spar

Package, its Benson tanks, and its aircraft mai

tenance supplies generated additional facility r

quirements. A strategic facilities plan was deve

oped by the working group that identified eac

group requirement and how it could be met. Th

plan was finalized in September 1993.93

The decision to permanently beddown the 353

SOG at Kadena AB came on 24 September 199

when US Forces Japan (USFJ) released an offici

statement announcing the group’s new status. 

had been nearly two and one-half years sinc

__________

 *Aircraft assigned to the 1st and 17th SOS routinely waited days to get into the 18th Wing fuel cell facility due to higher priority for Kadena-assign

F-15 aircraft. The group was given fuel cell priority from 1800 on Friday until 0800 on Monday. Both the MC-130E and the HC-130P/N were old

aircraft that required fuel cell repair on a more frequent basis than the newer C-130H model. The situation was unfair to group maintenance personn

because it compelled them to work weekends to repair their aircraft after the aircraft sat du ring the week. The addition of a second-group-assign

hangar where fuel cell repair could be accomplished became a high priority for the facilities’ working group.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

389
leaving the Philippines just before the cata -

strophic explosion of Mount Pinatubo. The USFJ

announcement coincided with the removal of

seven C-12 aircraft from Kadena AB and the inactivation of the 39th Rescue Squadron at Misawa

AB, Japan. The announcement spurred a brief period of protest from the Okinawan public, mostly

over the issue of noise pollution, night operations,

and airdrop accidents. By year’s end, however,

Okinawan protest aimed at the 353d SOG had subsided and had taken on a tone of overall antibase

sentiments with the objective of closing Kadena

AB and removing all US military forces from the

island.9 4

With the interim status removed and with a

detailed strategic facilities plan in hand, the 353d

SOG commander wasted no time in contacting

key leadership in the 18th Wing. Thigpen’s two

major goals were to secure a second hangar for the

CT II and to secure a facility large enough to con -

solidate both the support squadron and group

headquarters. In informal discussions with Colonel Bingham, the 18th Operations Group commander, agreement was struck to exchange four

soon-to-be-renovated 353d SOG buildings for a

much larger facility (building 3524), which was occupied by the 18th Operations Support Squadron.*

The four buildings were located in the heart of

Bingham’s Operations Group on the eastside of

the runway. His support squadron was located on

the west side of Kadena AB in a large, 36,000-

square-foot facility that had been originally built

for the Strategic Air Command in 1967. The build -

ing was across the street from the 1st SOS, adja -

cent to the 320th STS building, and in proximity

to the 353d maintenance complex.

The two colonels informally agreed to swap

buildings 3381, 872, 874, and 876 for building

3524. The only stipulation was that the 18th Wing

would retain the use of the central command post

facility in the event an alternate loc ation was re -

quired during exercises or natural disasters. In October the 18th Wing’s Space Review and Alloca tion Panel met and approved the facilities

swa p that had been worked out by the two group

commanders. 95

The 353d SOG then focused on the issue of a

second hangar. Across from building 3524 was a

large and seldom-used hangar (building 3559) referred to as the Hush House. It had been designed and built as a noise abatement facility by

the government of Japan for the KC-135 aircraft.

The original engines on the KC-135 were ex -

tremely noisy, and the Hush House had internal

baffles and thick insulation installed to smother

the sound during maximum-power engine runs.

Newer fan jets had been installed on the KC-135s

in the early 1990s, and they were much quieter

than the older jet engines. The baffles in the

Hush House would not connect to the newer fan

jets, thus making the facility unusable for engine

runs. The hangar was used during typhoon

evacuations when a KC-135 could not be flown off

the island and when an aircraft required jacking

for maintenance action. Installed in the Hush

House was an elaborate fire suppression system

in the event an aircraft caught fire while performing an engine run. The fire suppression system would allow fuel cell work to be done inside

the hangar. The facility was near perfect for the

353d SOG. By the end of the year, the 353d SOG

had made agreements with the 18th Wing that

effectively assigned the hangar to the group (effective in January 1994), thus fulfilling the twohangar requirement identified by the CT II SATAF in January 1993.

With beddown issues coming together in the

fall of 1993, the next major challenge for 353d

SOG leadership was the pending ORI. The group

had been scheduled for its first ORI during Foal

Eagle 91, but the evacuation from Clark AB had

postponed the inspection indefinitely. Beginning

on 19 October with the AFSOC/IG initial warning order, the group began its first-ever comprehensive evaluation of its combat capability. The

AFSOC/IG evaluated the group in five major area s:

initial response, overall unit employment, combat

support, deployed mission support, and augmenting mission support. The IG team rated the

group’s initial response as outstanding, noting

that the 353d SOG’s performance was “indicative

of a well-thought-out, clearly defined, sufficiently

practiced, and operationally flexible deployment

machine.” The team judged the overall unit employment phase as excellent, citing numerous ex -

amples of superior performance. Aircraft maintenance earned an outstanding for its support

during the employment phase. In the area of

combat support, the group was rated as excellent.

Deployed mission support received an overall ex -

cellent, while the augmenting mission support

area was rated as outstanding. All three flying

__________

 *When the 353d SOW relocated from Clark AB, the only buildings available for its headquarters and support squadron had been previously condemned

and were awaiting destruction. Clark AB relocation funds were used to bring the four buildings up to acceptable standards, but their combined 18,000

square footage and their location on the east side of Kadena AB, separated from most of the grou p’s squadrons, made the complex barely acceptable.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

390
squadrons earned excellent evaluations, as did

the 320th STS. In all the IG team identified 27

people as professional performers.

An overall rating of excellent was awarded to

the group, a rating that validated the combat

status of the entire organization. The ORI was

significant to not only the group, but also to Headquarters AFSOC and to PACOM. The inspection

had validated finally that the group was opera -

tionally sound after Mount Pinatubo and was a

viable combat asset in the Pacific. By the close of

1993, the 353d SOG was operating near the level

of proficiency it had under Hess before the Mount

Pinatubo eruption. The coming year would see

further maturity in the group and increased SOF

capability in the Pacific.

The First Operational Commitment

for Combat Talon II

Elements of the newly designated 352d SOG

were still in the process of moving to RAF Alcon -

bury when the New Year arrived. On 15 December 1992 the last two MC-130E Combat Talon Is

had departed Rhein Main AB for the United

States. Detachment 7, 352d SOG, continued to op -

erate until 27 January. The detachment was officially inactivated on 30 April 1994.96 Lauderdale

and the rest of the 7th SOS had settled into life at

RAF Alconbury with the first two MC-130H Combat Talon IIs and throughout January and early

February concentrated on training events designed to increase the proficiency of aircrew and

maintenance personnel. Conversion training was

still under way for some of the 7th SOS-assigned

crews, and the 15th SOS provided an augmenting

crew to assist the 7th SOS from December 1992

through the early part of February. As the Talon

Is departed the theater, the new Talon IIs were

prepared to take over the mission.9 7

On 22 February 1993 General Kellogg, commander of SOCEUR, alerted the 352d SOG of a

pending deployment for Operation Provide Promise

II, a humanitarian relief effort in the Balkans. The

group was in the process of deploying to Nor way

for Exercise Battle Griffin 93 and its scheduled

ORI. Personnel quickly regrouped and redirected

assigned forces for the real-world deployment. The

ORI was subsequently postponed. SOCEUR’s

warning order, issued on 23 February, stated that

the group’s personnel would work in conjunction

with USA Special Forces and US Navy SEAL teams

to provide SAR and personnel recovery (PR) coverage for the forces conducting air drops to besieged

pockets of personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For

the 7th SOS it deployed one MC-130H to Rhe

Main AB after the initial notification by SOCEU

on 22 February. The deployment marked th

first operational commitment for the Comb

Talon II.

9 8

Once the crew arrived it commenced plannin

for leaflet and resupply drops as tasked, but p

litical sensitivities prevented employment of th

7th SOS crew. A second 7th SOS Talon arrived 

Rhein Main AB on 25 February, followed th

next day by a third aircraft. The last aircraft 

deploy had just arrived at RAF Alconbury fro

the United States, and maintenance had com 

pleted the acceptance inspection and launche

the aircraft within 17 hours of its arrival in th

United Kingdom. Planners feared that a wron

signal could be sent to the population of Bosni

Herzegovina if the Combat Talons executed low

level flights over the country, so they opted fo

the midlevel delivery of relief supplies by conve

tional C-130 aircraft.99 The Combat Talon II

therefore, were not tasked to fly any operation

missions.

The majority of the 352d SOG deployed 

Brindisi, Italy, where the main SOF operatin

base was established for Operation Provide Prom

ise II. Group-assigned MH-53Js and HC-130

along with members of the 320th STS, esta

lished an SAR/PR alert. At Rhein Main AB th

7th SOS contingent received several mission tas

ings, but each time the tasking was canceled b

the JTF headquarters before execution. Loa

m a sters from the squadron flew on other NAT

aircraft during resupply missions and observe

their airdrop procedures. A major problem su

faced during the resupply effort that affecte

the safety of refugee personnel on the ground. 

a resupply bundle landed on someone, the im

pact could kill or seriously injure that perso

Four personnel from the 352d SOG set about 

develop a delivery system that would not pose suc

a threat. Captain Ash (7th SOS), Senior Mast

Sergeant Regi (352d SOG), and Master Sergean

Duffie (7th SOS) and Heflin (352d Special Oper

tions Support Squadron) created a system th

came to be known as the triwall aerial delive

system (TRIADS). The basic concept was base

on the Halverson (the Berlin airlift candy bombe

delivery method whereby a large load could b

dropped in individual units with the resultant im

pact on the ground (or on personnel) minimized.

100

The primary food being delivered to Bosni

Herzegovina was US–government-supplied MRE

The four-person team theorized that if allowed 

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

391
fall separately from the aircraft, the MREs would

flutter to the ground, much like Halverson’s

candy during the Berlin relief operation. Delivery

of individual MREs had two advantages—a wider

distribution of food and increased safety for civilians on the ground. The four-man team altered

procedures already used for leaflet airdrops by

substituting a slightly larger box filled with individual MREs. Thus, the delivery was virtually the

same for the aircrews as leaflet drops, with minimal additional aircrew training required. The

team cut cardboard boxes, taped and strapped

them back together, and placed individual MREs

in them. On 7 March 1993 members of the 7th

SOS completed a test of the system and determined that it worked as planned. The following

day, Colonel Scott, the 7th SOS Operations officer, traveled to Ramstein AB to brief the Joint

Force Air Component commander for Operation

Provide Promise II on the new system.101

Seven days later the first TRIADS drop was

completed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by tasked C-130

crews out of Rhein Main AB, and it was a resounding success. More drops were requested, and personnel from the 352d SOG were tasked to train

37th TAS personnel on the rigging and delivery of

the TRIADS. The 7th SOS stood ready to employ

the new system, but the mid-level drop by conventional C-130s proved to be the method of choice for

JTF planners. The TRIADS was effective and be -

came the primary delivery method in BosniaHerzegovina. With no tasking received for the 7th

SOS, the three Combat Talon IIs were redeployed

to RAF Alconbury on 22 March 1993, thus ending

their initial support to Operation Provide Promise

II.

102 The SAR/PR mission at Brindisi continued

throughout the remainder of the year.

The 7th SOS and the

352d SOG JCET Program

With the majority of the 352d SOG committed

to Operation Provide Promise II in Italy and Provide Comfort II in Turkey, most other group commitments fell to the 7th SOS. Along with supporting these commitments, the squadron became

heavily involved in planning for another unit

move after USAFE made the decision to close

RAF Alconbury. From 13 to 19 March, the first

project task force (PROTAF) was conducted at

RAF Mildenhall to consider requirements to relocate the 352d SOG to that location. On 7 May

1993 Headquarters USAFE announced that the

352d SOG would move to RAF Mildenhall during

FY 94, a move necessitated by the USAFE deci -

sion to close RAF Alconbury. For an organization

almost totally committed to contingency opera -

tions, a second move was almost more than the

group could bear.103

May marked the first major exercise for the

352d SOG since the New Year. From 10 to 20

May the group participated in Exercise Carthage

Express. Crews of the 7th SOS carried their own

support personnel and deployed one aircraft to

Brindisi, Italy, with an operations stop in Stuttgart

to onload additional personnel from SOCEUR. The

Italian base was used as the forward staging base

for the exercise. The scenario for Carthage Express centered on the recovery of three American

citizens held captive by a notional terrorist organization on the Tunisian island of Zembra. The op -

erational portion of the exercise began on 16 May

when the 7th SOS Combat Talon II inserted a

SEAL team by way of a CRRC water drop 20 miles

from the island. The SEALs navigated to shore

and maneuvered overland to the notional terrorist’s location. Three MH-53Js, supported by two

HC-130s, departed Brindisi during the night of 18

May and inserted a direct action team to conduct

the recovery operation. After successfully engaging

the notional terrorists, the rescue force, along with

the three American hostages, were exfiltrated by

the MH-53Js and transported to Sidi Ahmed Airfield, Tunisia, where they were transloaded on to

the waiting MC-130H CT II. The 7th SOS crew

then flew back to Brindisi, where the exercise terminated. Although coordination problems detracted from the realism of the operation, the exercise was a success, with 352d SOG forces receiving

overall excellent training.104

On 24 May Colonel Orrell (the 352d SOG commander) sent a request to Headquarters AFSOC

for help in meeting the ongoing tasking for his

group. As a result of this initiative, Headquarters

AFSOC relieved the 352d SOG of its commit -

ments to Provide Comfort II in Turkey, effective

13 July 1993. Elements of the 20th SOS, the 55th

SOS, and the 9th SOS, all assigned to the 16th

SOW at Hurlburt Field, assumed responsibility

for the Turkish mission.*105 With the reduced commitment the 352d SOG was able to continue plans

for the upcoming move to RAF Mildenhall and

support the heavy commitment to Operation Provide Promise II at Brindisi. Early August found

the 7th SOS in Africa supporting Exercise Roa ring Lion. The scenario for the exercise centered on

__________

 *The 1st SOW had been redesignated the 16th SOW in conjunction with CSAF reorganization directives.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

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the evacuation of British civilians from former

British colonies in Africa.106 Additional countries

that the 7th SOS exercised with during the late

summer and fall of 1993 included France, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Morocco. From 16 Au -

gust to 3 September, a 7th SOS crew also deployed to Biggs AAF, Texas, and participated in a

JRT exercise.107

Perhaps the most interesting mission for the

7th SOS during the late fall of 1993 was its support of the European Survey and Assessment

Team (ESAT). With the fall of the Soviet Union ,

newly independent states called on the US government to establish embassies in their countries

so that there could be closer relationships with

America. The establishment of these new embassies created an influx of Americans. SOCEUR

was tasked with providing an ESAT that would

survey each embassy area and then develop an

NEO plan in event an evacuation was needed.

The 7th SOS was tasked by SOCEUR to provide

transportation for the team, and the 352d SOG

provided personnel to assist in the evaluation of

airfields and potential evacuation location s.108

A 7th SOS Combat Talon II supported the

ESAT from 4 to 18 November. The capital cities of

four countries were visited, including Ashkhabad,

Turkmenistan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Dushanbe,

Tajikistan; and Bishkek, Krygyzstan. Each stop

included a briefing to the US ambassador and his

staff followed by two days of site surveys in the

region to determine the best NEO locations. Main -

tenance personnel serviced the aircraft at night

and kept the Combat Talon operational through -

out the deployment.109 The squadron finished out

the year by transporting medical supplies and

clothing to Ravino, Ukraine, as part of Operation

Silver Hope . The year had been a grueling one for

the 7th SOS and for the 352d SOG.

* * * * * *

Since the end of the Desert Storm ground war

in February 1991, special operations forces had

remained in Saudi Arabia supporting CSAR requirements of USCENTCOM. The 8th SOS Combat Talons had all returned to Hurlburt Field by

June 1991, but the 20th SOS, with its MH-53J

Pave Low III helicopters and the 9th SOS with its

HC-130P/N Combat Shadow tankers, had contin -

ued to pull CSAR alert. The 55th SOS also stood

alert duties during much of the period. On 5 Feb -

ruary 1993 all remaining 1st SOW forces departed

Southwest Asia and turned over the CSAR alert

commitment to HH-60s assigned to the Air Combat Command. In an 18 February message, th

AFSOC commander, General Fister, expresse

his thanks to the men and women who had su

ported the US effort to contain Iraqi aggressio

He noted that AFSOC aircraft were among th

first to deploy to the region and had established 

CSAR alert effective 19 August 1990. For the ne

two and one-half years, AFSOC forces maintaine

a CSAR alert, making it the longest continuous

serving force in the area. General Fister noted th

difficult conditions under which the deploye

forces operated in the desert. Those conditions i

cluded extreme heat, lack of moon illuminatio

due to poor visibility, blinding dust stirred up b

wind and helicopter rotor blades, and movin

sand dunes, which were encountered unexpec

edly. The congratulatory message concluded wi

the general’s observation that “I am proud of th

contributions you made to our nation’s commi

ments in Southwest Asia the past two and on

half years. I appreciate the sacrifices of you an

your families. This was a job well done.”110 Th

8th SOS, 9th SOS, 20th SOS, and 55th SOS ha

all performed the CSAR alert mission in an ou

standing manner.

The Objective Wing

Matures at Hurlburt Field

The objective wing reorganization initiatives b

gan in AFSOC the previous year continued i

1993. The two-group structure of the 1st SOW h

matured and was working reasonably well, wi

base support functions still being provided b

MAC’s 834th ABW. Headquarters AFSOC had e

tablished its base management oversight cap

bility by early February 1993 in anticipation 

having Hurlburt Field transferred from MAC 

AFSOC. Consequently, on 25 February AFSO

announced that the 1st SOW would absorb ba

support functions and would have assigned to it 

third group identified as the 1st Special Oper

tions Support Group (SOSPTG). The 1st SOSPT

received the newly activated civil engineerin

mission support, security police and services, an

morale, welfare, and recreation squadrons. Tran

portation, supply, and contracting squadrons we

assigned to the 1st SOW Logistics Group. The a

tions were to be effective on 1 March 1993, but th

date was later slipped to 24 March. At that tim

the 834th ABW was deactivated, and Hurlbu

Field became the only base assigned to AFSO

For the 8th SOS daily operations did not chang

significantly except that deployment processin

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

393
was greatly simplified with the 1st SOW having

the mobility function assigned to it.

During the first half of 1993, the 8th SOS and

15th SOS participated in local exercises and proficiency training events. Both squadrons concentrated on fine-tuning their organizations after the

many changes of the previous fall. The 15th SOS

CT IIs maintained a mission capable (MC) rate of

less than 50 percent for its assigned aircraft,

while the 8th SOS CT Is averaged more than 80

percent. The low MC rate for the CT II was at -

tr ibuted to the fielding of the new weapons system and the problems associated with getting the

aircraft’s subsystems fully up to speed. Events in

Mogadishu, Somalia, required the 1st SOW to deploy a large four-ship gunship package to Djibouti on 7 June, but there was no requirement for

the Combat Talon . While the gunships supported

UN actions against Gen Mohamed Farrah

Aideed and his followers, the Talons remained at

Hurlburt Field. 111 The 15th SOS off-station task -

ing was held to a minimum throughout 1993 so

that the aircraft’s support infrastructure could

mature, and the squadron’s aircrews could season

in the highly sophisticated aircraft. Late summer

and fall saw the 8th SOS deployed to JCS exercises in Honduras, Egypt, and South Korea.

On 1 October 1993 the 1st SOW’s designation

was changed to the 16th SOW at Air Staff direction, a move that infuriated Air Commando vet -

erans of World War II and Vietnam. The change

was directed after an extensive review of the

heritage and honors of all active duty Air Force

wings. As part of the new Air Force structure

created by General McPeak, no two wings could

have the same numerical designation. The 1st

Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, was assigned the 1st designation, while the “1st” SOW

was changed to the 16th SOW. The wing did,

however, retain all the lineage and honors of the

1st Air Commando Group of World War II and

the 1st Air Commando Wing/Special Operations

Wing of the Vietnam War. Although the change

was a highly emotional one, the newly designated

16th SOW, commanded by Gen Maxwell C.

Bailey, continued to perform its highly demanding special operations mission without any loss of

combat capabilit y.112

The MC-130H Weapons System Trainer

By 1993 all Combat Talon II formal training

was being taught at Kirtland AFB. The 550th

Flight Training Squadron (FTS) was responsible

for fixed-wing training, including the HC-130P/N

and the MC-130H Combat Talon II. From 2 to 13

February 1993, the 550th FTS participated in a

bilateral exercise named Onset Thunder, which

was the first exercise in which the squadron’s

MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft were em -

ployed. The crews flew six missions that involved

US Army rangers from Fort Lewis, Washington.

The squadron employed NVG blacked-out airdrop

and airland operations to deliver more than

120,000 pounds of cargo and personnel. The

squadron also participated in the locally generated Exercise Chile Flag from 8 to 12 March 1993.

Missions flown in the Combat Talon II included

IFR, airdrops, and airland operations. The Chile

Flag exercise series had begun four years earlier,

but the March iteration was the first to include

the Combat Talon II. The regularly scheduled exercise was coordinated through USSOCOM and

usually had one special operations unit either

from the Army or the Navy as its primary customer. During the course of the exercise, both permanent party instructors and formal school students received invaluable training, while the joint

customer benefited from the use of the aircraft to

complete their required training events.113

In FY 90 USSOCOM funded four projects at

Kirkland AFB valued at $13.7 million with MFP

11 resources. During 1992 three of the projects

were completed, including the Combat Talon II

simulator building. The building was originally

designed and funded to house the MC-130H Combat Talon II and the MC-130E Combat Talon I 

weapons system trainer (WST), but when both

WST delivery dates slipped, the facility was occu -

pied by an MH-53J, TH-53A, and MH-60G WST.

The delivery of the MC-130H/E WSTs was slipped

until FY 94 and FY 96, respectively. The annual

simulator requirement for permanently assigned

Talon II crew members was satisfied by sending

them to Dyess AFB, Texas, where a conventional

C-130H simulator was located.114

On 1 July 1993 the 542d CTW was transferred

to AETC, Randolph AFB, Texas, including the

four Combat Talon II aircraft flown by the 550th

FTS. The wing reported directly to Nineteenth Air

Force, which was also located at Randolph AFB.

Throughout the remainder of the year, the wing

prepared to receive the MC-130E Combat Talon I

weapons system. Four CT I aircraft were scheduled to transfer to Kirtland AFB on 1 January

1994. As previously noted, Colonel Schwartz, the

1st Special Operations Group commander at

Hurlburt Field, had sent a letter to Headquarters

AFSOC requesting to delay the transfer due to

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

394
limited aircraft availability. AFSOC and Air Staff

concurred with the request, and slipped the Talon

I move to the first quarter of 1996.115 With the

Talon I move postponed two years, the 542d CTW

could concentrate on the Combat Talon II and resolve the WST facility issue.

On 18 October 1993 Headquarters AETC notified the 542d CTW commander, Colonel Jeffreys,

of yet another name change under direction of the

CSAF organizational review. On 1 April 1994 the

542d CTW would be inactivated, and the 58th

SOW would be stood up in its place. The 550th

and 551st FTSs were also to be redesignated special operations squadrons, and several other realignments and inactivations throughout the wing

were announced.116 As 1993 came to a close, Kirtland AFB was poised to become only the second

base to host a special operations wing in the continental United States.

1994: Contingency Operations

and Reorganization

The year was rocked by the announcement

that Commando Vision would be implemented

throughout AFSOC, thus bringing the command

in further compliance with CSAF directives. A

crisis would develop in the Caribbean and bring

the United States to the brink of conflict during

Operation Uphold Democracy. At Kirkland AFB

the 542d would become the 58th SOW. As tension escalated in the Balkans and in Africa, Combat Talon would continue to execute its mission

around the world .

The Last Talon IIs Are Delivered

During 1994 the last four CT II aircraft (89-

0282, 89-0283, 90-0161, and 90-0162) were scheduled for delivery to AFSOC. In February the CT II

development systems manager, Colonel Craw, responded to a letter from General Bailey expressing the 16th SOW’s concern over the lack of critical line replaceable units (LRU) for the last four

aircraft. Colonel Craw noted that in 1985, when

production began on the new Combat Talons, 24

sets of the LRUs were purchased.

After production began, several of those LRUs

were used to fill other critical fielding requirements (bench test sets, spares, etc.), with the assurance from the field that they would be replaced later. With the pending delivery of the last

four CT IIs, Colonel Craw could not deliver fully

operational aircraft with the LRUs still being utilized in the field. Aircraft 89-0282 did not have an

AN/APQ-170 radar X band receiver/transmitter o

the servo power supply to operate it, nor w

there a SATCOM receiver available to install 

the aircraft. All SATCOM receiver assets ha

been previously issued to AFSOC, thus leavin

the CT II program short three sets. In addition 

the LRU shortages, Colonel Craw projected deli

ery of aircraft 89-0283 and 90-0161 missing i

infrared detection system (IDS) receivers. Th

IDS shortfall resulted because the CT II Fie

Support Team shipped all IDS receivers to AF 

SOC earlier in the production cycle, and the

were no additional units procured. Colonel Cra

assured General Bailey that his Field Suppo

Team would advise the 16th SOW if the final pr

duction CT II aircraft (90-0162) would be deli

ered with a full-up set of LRUs.117 As AFSO

worked to replace the LRUs for the last produ

tion aircraft, the 7th SOS and the 15th SOS co

tinued to mature their new CT IIs. Because of i

operational commitments to SOCEUR, the 7

SOS received priority on scarce spare parts, i

cluding any repaired LRUs, with the 15th SO

being forced to cannibalize parts from its larg

aircraft fleet.

Both commanders of the Hurlburt-based Com

bat Talon squadrons changed during the fir

half of 1994. Colonel Poole, who had former

served as the 8th SOS CT I operations office

assumed command of the squadron from Mu

dock on 18 April. Poole had been in Combat Ta

ons since the late 1970s and had been assigned 

the Talon squadron several times before assum

ing command. Saier relinquished command of th

15th SOS to Colonel Lovett on 30 June when h

departed Hurlburt Field for senior service schoo

Like Poole, Lovett had been in special operatio

for most of his career, having served in the A

130H gunship before completing a tour on the A

Staff.

118

Commando Vision

In the late 1980s General Patterson develope

his Forward Look strategy that resulted in th

establishment of the 39th SOW (later redesi

nated the 352d SOG) in Europe and the 353

SOW (later the 353d SOG) in the Pacific. Gener

McPeak’s Air Force reorganization resulted in th

downgrade of the two overseas wings to speci

operations groups in the early 1990s. The chang

in status was perceived by theater CINCs as 

reduction in SOF commitment to their theate

war plans. Beginning in 1991 the long-awaite

arrival of CT II became a reality, and by the clo

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

395
of 1994, all 24 aircraft had been delivered to

AFSOC. Late in 1994 the first AC-130U gunship

was delivered to the 16th SOW, with the remaining 12 aircraft scheduled for delivery over the

next 24 months. As the new aircraft were deliv -

ered to Hurlburt Field, the need for a second US

base intensified. While AFSOC experienced sig -

nificant growth as a command, gunship and

Combat Talon support to the war-fighting CINCs

actually declined during the same period. This

decline was due, in part, to the heavy modifica -

tion schedule for the MC-130E CT I and due to

the loss of two AC-130H gunships. From 1985 to

1994 from four to six CT Is were at LAS Ontario

undergoing extensive modifications (SOF-I,

MOD-90, center-wing replacement, etc.) at any

given time. With an average of eight aircraft

available, the 1st and 7th SOS averaged two aircraft each on-station, while the 8th SOS averaged four CT Is to fulfill its operational and formal school training commitments.

With only eight gunships available for the

latter part of the period, 16th SOS aircrew and

maintenance personnel were tasked at an extremely high rate to fill contingency requirements in overseas locations including Panama,

Southwest Asia, Somalia, and Bosnia. The original basing plan for the AC-130U had the older

AC-130H aircraft transferring to the Air Force

Reserves at Duke Field (an airfield located in

the Eglin AFB range complex) and the aging

AC-130A gunships being retired. With continu -

ing commitments to Southwest Asia across the

Air Force, the number of days that Air Force

personnel were away from home station on tem -

porary duty became a major concern. Consequently, Air Staff established the standard for

maximum annual TDY as 120 days, a number

that was not attainable in the gunship commu -

nity. To help reduce the active duty gunship

TDY rate, AFSOC readdressed the decision to

put the AC-130H in the Air Force Reserve.*

General Fister had tasked his plans division in

1993 to develop the Commando Vision strategy.

Throughout early 1994 the plan was refined, and

by early summer it was ready to be briefed to the

SOF community. General Hobson assumed command of AFSOC on 22 July 1994, and it fell to

him the difficult task of gaining theater support

for the plan. On 25 August 1994 senior leadership

in the 16th SOW was briefed on Commando Vision. For the remainder of the fall, the AFSOC

staff briefed senior leaders both in the United

States and abroad on the proposal.

In the formal briefing Commando Vision was

identified as a plan for the future to efficiently

posture the active forces and to make the best

use of assets assigned to the Air Force Reserve

and Air National Guard. Demands for SOF had

continued to increase over the years, and future

projections confirmed that the trend would con -

tinue. To better support the theater CINCs, Com -

mando Vision would first require a reduction in

the overseas units and a repositioning of some of

the US force. The war-fighting CINCs would all

benefit from Commando Vision through enhanced gunship availability, by a more potent

mix of assets overseas, and from enhanced flexibility in projecting power. Commando Vision

would also posture Air Force SOF for future

growth. Although the concept had been staffed by

Headquarters AFSOC, critical issues such as the

location of a second SOF wing in the United

States and improvements required at Duke Field

to support the CT I were not known by the close

of the year. Commando Vision promised better

support to theater CINCs, but AFSOC faced a

difficult challenge convincing them to embrace

the plan and to gain their approva l.119

At Hurlburt Field the rapid expansion of SOF

in the early 1990s quickly outstripped the existing base infrastructure, thus requiring a massive military construction program that ran into

the hundreds of millions of dollars. Even with

the new construction, space to expand was limited due to wetlands surrounding the main

base. The need for a second operating base in

the United States was apparent. When Forward

Look was finalized in the late 1980s, it included

a West Coast wing located at McClellan AFB,

California. When CINCMAC made the decision

to divest AFSOC of rescue forces, the California

base was assigned to the newly created Air Rescue Service. Commando Vision called for the establishment of a SOF West Coast wing that

would be oriented towards the Pacific but would

also support SOUTHCOM and JSOC. The existing East Coast wing (the 16th SOW) would con -

tinue to be oriented towards the remaining

theater CINCs and would also support the na -

tional JSOC mission.

__________

 *The decision was ultimately made to keep both the AC-130H and the AC-130U weapons systems on active duty, and to transfer eight MC-130E

Combat Talon I aircraft and five HC-130P/N Shadows to the 919th SOW at Duke Field. Thus, establishment of a second US-based SOF wing, active

duty/Reserve force structure changes, and war-fighting CINC support were all addressed in 1994 when Headquarters AFSOC unveiled its plan for

the future—Commando Vision.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

396
A key element of Commando Vision was the

conversion of the 919th SOW, located at Duke

Field, Florida, from nine AC-130A gunships to

four HC-130P/Ns and eight MC-130Es. The Combat Talons would be assigned to the 711th SOS,

which had operated the AC-130A since the Vietnam era. The AC-130H gunships of the 16th SOS,

which had been scheduled by Air Staff to be transferred to the reserve unit at Duke Field, would be

retained on active duty and would remain at

Hurlburt Field. The new AC-130U, which began

arriving at Hurlburt Field in the fall of 1994,

would be assigned to the new West Coast wing

(location to be determined) along with a cadre of

CT IIs and MH-53J Pave Low IIIs. The plan effectively doubled the number of gunships on active

duty and transferred more than half of the CT Is

to the reserves. The 24 new CTs would all be assigned to active duty squadrons (including the 1st

SOS in the Pacific), thus reducing the critical CT

shortfall identified in theater war plans.120

To establish the West Coast wing, the two overseas SOGs would have to be significantly reduced

and their manpower authorizations reallocated. The

Pacific SOG would change to an FOL of approximately 19 personnel, with aircraft and maintenance

rotating from the West Coast wing. The FOL would

maintain the capability to conduct deliberate planning and to provide an initial response to OPLAN

tasking. It would also maintain the capability to

respond to contingency plan (CONPLAN) tasking

and would support JCET planning. Units that

would be inactivated under Commando Vision included the 7th SOS, 67th SOS, 352d Maintenance

Squadron, and the 31st SOS. Units relocating and

forming the West Coast wing under the plan in -

cluded the 353d SOW (formerly the 353d SOG) from

Kadena AB, the 4th SOS (AC-130U gunships) from

Hurlburt Field, and the 21st SOS from RAF Mildenhall. Numerous unit realignments were also

planned, including the 352d SOG moving to

Hurlburt Field and becoming part of the 16th SOW.

The FOL at Kadena AB would be assigned to the

West Coast wing and would be designated the 53d

OG. On a rotational basis the 53d OG would possess

six MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters and a mixture

of MC-130H CT IIs and HC-130P/N Shadows. The

FOL would expand during periods of increased hostilities with augmentation of aircraft and personnel

from the West Coast win g.121

In Europe the end of the cold war marked a massive reduction in the number of troops committed to

the region. When Commando Vision was briefed to

senior leadership there, concurrence was received

for the plan, with the understanding that the

ter war plans would be supported from Hurlbu

Field. The deployment time from the East Coa

to Central Europe was about 15 hours, thus e

suring that Hurlburt-based forces would arriv

in-theater within 24 hours of tasking. In the P

cific, however, it was an entirely different sit u

tion. Deployment time from the West Coast 

Kadena AB was approximately 24 hours, wi

onward deployment to Diego Garcia in the In 

dian Ocean taking another 15 hours. The 353

SOG maintained an aggressive JCET progra

under USPACOM’s cooperative engageme

strategy and was continuously deployed to loc

tions throughout the Pacific. In Northeast Asi

commitments to US Forces Korea were signif

cant. As North Korea increased its threat to th

Republic of Korea during the mid-1990s, U

leadership in the region came to refer to a p

tential conflict there as a come-as-you-are wa

That is, if open hostilities began, there would b

little advanced warning, and those forces base

in the region, including those at Kadena AB

would have to repel the initial invasion. A two

day deployment timetable from the Unite

States to Northeast Asia would not meet th

theater CINC’s requirements. From the fall o

1994 through 1995, USPACOM/SOCPAC pos

poned a decision on Commando Vision an

never agreed to the reorganization plan. In th

spring of 1995, the US ambassador to Japan a

vised the State Department that Commando V

sion should be put on hold until 1998, thus r

moving US political support for the initiativ

In the end USPACOM simply could not take th

risk of a conflict in Northeast Asia without SO

in-place in WestPac, nor could it agree to a

inevitable decrease in JCET support across th

Pacific.

After two years of planning, the US-based tw

wing reorganization that was the centerpiece 

Commando Vision was deleted from the plan. Fo

Combat Talon , however, portions of Commando V

sion did come to fruition. The plan to transfer eig

MC-130E CT I aircraft to the Air Force Reserve

919th SOW at Duke Field became a reality, an

both the AC-130H and the AC-130U gunships we

retained on active duty at Hurlburt Field. Throug

out the entire process Headquarters AFSOC co

centrated on ways to better support the theat

CINCs, and in so doing helped reestablish Air For

SOF as an indispensable component ready to ex

cute its portion of the CINC’s war plans.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

397
Operation Uphold Democracy

The fall of 1994 saw a crisis develop in the

Caribbean nation of Haiti. The United States had

a long history of involvement in that country, having exercised military control over the island from

1915 until 1935. From 1935 until 1957 a succession of weak governments ruled the country, with

each ending in a military coup. In 1957 Francois

“Papa Doc” Duvalier won a convincing election.

Papa Doc remained in power until his death in

1971, at which time he was succeeded by his son,

Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Baby Doc ruled

the island nation for the next 15 years. Corruption was rampant during the dictatorship of the

two Duvaliers, and by the mid-1980s, a military

junta had had enough. Baby Doc was forced into

exile in France, and a five-year period began that

was characterized by weak leadership and corruption. From 1985 to 1990 a succession of five different governments ruled. On 16 December 1990,

with 67 percent of the popular vote, Jean-Bertra n d

Aristide was democratically elected as the new

president of Haiti, and he took office on 7 February 1991. It was hoped that the election would

mark the beginning of an era of democratic, social, and economic progress. Seven months later,

however, President Aristide was overthrown in a

coup d’etat and forced into exile by Gen Raoul

Cedras, who had been chief of the nation’s armed

forces.122

The violent and unlawful actions of the Haitian military during and immediately following

the coup were quickly condemned by the interna -

tional community. Within hours of the coup

d’etat, the permanent council of the Organization

of American States (OAS) condemned the action.

The council further demanded adherence to the

Haitian constitution, the physical safety of the

elected president, and the rights of the Haitian

people. Meeting on 2 October 1991, the OAS ministers of foreign affairs drafted a resolution demanding the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide and released the resolution the

following day. The ministers recommended the

diplomatic, economic, and financial isolation of

the de facto authorities and the suspension of

any aid except that provided for humanitarian

purposes. On 3 October President Aristide addressed the UN Security Council, after which

time the president of the council issued a statement condemning the coup and calling for the

return of Aristide to his presidency. On 11 October the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 46/7, which condemned the illegal

replacement of the president of Haiti, the use of

violence and military coercion, and the violation

of human rights in Haiti. The resolution also affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from

the overthrow and demanded the immediate res -

toration of the legitimate government of President

Aristide.123

For nearly eight months following the October

resolution, little progress was made towards getting President Aristide reinstated as the legal

head of Haiti. Finally, on 21 June 1993, General

Cedras responded to the UN special envoy’s invitation to travel to New York and meet with Aristide to resolve the crisis. After almost a week of

talks, on 3 July 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras signed an agreement on Governor’s

Island, New York, that paved the way for a satisfactory solution to the crisis. The agreement specifically requested the presence of UN personnel

in Haiti to assist in modernizing the armed forces

and establishing a new police force.124

To implement the Governor’s Island agreement, the UN passed Resolution 862, which created an advanced team that would prepare Haiti

for the follow-on deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. In accordance with the resolution, an

advanced team of military and police personnel

deployed to Port-au-Prince during September and

October 1993. On 23 September 1993 UN Resolution 867 was passed authorizing the establishment

and immediate deployment of a peacekeeping

force. The peacekeeping force embarked on the

US Navy ship Harlan County and arrived off

Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993. Armed civilians in the seaport area created disturbances and

prevented the ship from docking. Journalists and

diplomats who were to meet the UN force were

also threatened, and the ship departed Haiti

without successfully off-loading.125 In the follow -

ing days the UN advanced party left Haiti, and

the UN Security Council issued statements deploring the 11 October incident.

Over the next year General Cedras continued

to defy the United Nations and refused to imple -

ment the Governor’s Island agreement. By the

summer of 1994, it was apparent that Cedras and

his corrupt cronies had no intention of returning

the nation to its democratically elected president.

In July the 193d SOG, assigned to the Pennsylva -

nia Air National Guard and a component unit of

AFSOC, deployed to the Caribbean and began ra -

dio broadcasts directed at Haiti. A psychological

warfare campaign plan was developed by the US

Army’s 4th PSYOPS Group that was similar to

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

398
the one used during Desert Storm. From July to

September daily radio broadcasts from the 193d

SOG Commando Solo aircraft were conducted to

unsettle Cedras and his followers and to cause

them to peacefully transfer control of the government back to President Aristide . In early September the Combat Talons of the 8th SOS were

tasked to begin leaflet drops over the island.

Poole had been the commander of the 8th SOS

since the spring of 1994, and his Talon crews

were highly experienced in delivering leaflets after their combat experiences in Desert Storm.

The squadron’s first leaflet drop was targeted at

the capital city of Port-au-Prince during the night

of 9/10 September 1994. Departing Hurlburt

Field the crew first flew to Pope AFB, where the

leaflets were onloaded along with mission support personnel from the 4th PSYOPS Group. The

leaflets were to be dropped from an altitude of

5,000 feet, making drop ballistics critical in ensuring that the leaflets fell on the target area as

planned. Poole was one of the two crew naviga -

tors responsible for determining the CARP, and

he queried the Army PSYOPS personnel regarding the weight and fold of the leaflets. He was

told that the leaflets were printed on 50-pound

paper stock and were folded for autorotation during descent. Using this information the 8th SOS

crew computed the release point and finalized

mission details before departing Pope AFB en

route to its first KC-135 IFR. After receiving its

programmed fuel, the Talon proceeded on to the

objective area and maneuvered to its planned

CARP location over Port-au-Prince. After drop -

ping the leaflets the crew accomplished a second

IFR and recovered back at Hurlburt Field. Postdrop assessment revealed that most of the leaflets had missed the target and had landed in the

water near the city. To determine why the leaflets missed, the crew reviewed the entire drop

sequence and the calculations used to determine

the release point. During this process planners

discovered two contributing causes for the missed

drop—the leaflets were not configured in the

autorotating mode as told to the crew prior to

departing Pope AFB, and secondly, the crew discovered that there was a continuous wind shear

near the surface that blew the leaflets wide of

their mark. The low-level wind shear was characteristic of the objective area and was unknown to

the crew before the drop. The fold of the leaflets

and the wind shear combined to degrade drop

accuracy.

126

First Contingency Employment

of Combat Talon II

On 13 September the 15th SOS was tasked fo

its first leaflet drop into Haiti, which was th

first combat mission flown by the squadron sinc

its missions into North Vietnam during the la

1960s. It was also the first contingency taskin

for the CT II weapons system. Lovett* cho

Crew 1, commanded by Major White, to plan an

fly the mission. Members of Crew 1 were Majo

White, Colonel Lovett, Captain Kellogg, Majo

Gantert, Captain VanDerHoven, Captain Faller

Sergeant Clevenger, Sergeant Sloan, Chief Ma

ter Sergeant Sanchez, Sergeant Fredricksen, Se

geant Fine, and Sergeant Ochoa.127

White’s crew planned the mission on 14 Se

tember for execution the following night. Wi

knowledge of the previous 5,000-foot leaflet dro

by the 8th SOS crew, the 15th SOS looked at th

possibility of a nonstandard low-altitude leafl

drop. Review of the threat (including AAA an

small-arms fire) convinced the crew that a dro

from 500 feet above the ground was feasible. T

ensure accurate wind data and to minimize war

ing to the Haitian defenses, the ingress w

planned over the Gulf of Gonave at an altitud

that varied from 50 to 200 feet above the wate

Two passes over Port-au-Prince were planned 

500 feet. The first pass would begin with a coast

penetration just east of the Haitian naval ba

located on the southwest edge of the city. Aft

coast-in, the aircraft would make a sweeping tu

to the northeast, dispensing leaflets over the eas

ern and southern portions of the city. The secon

pass would begin after completing a wide tur

to a westerly heading in the valley northeast o

th e city.128

With the mission planned White’s crew entere

crew rest for the next evening’s mission. On 

September, at 2121Z, the CT II departe

Hurlburt Field en route to Pope AFB to onloa

the leaflets and 4th PSYOPS Group personne

The profile was similar to the previous 8th SO

mission, with two KC-135 tankers required to r

fuel the Talon II. Just before takeoff fro

Hurlburt Field, White learned that a 40 mm AA

gun had been moved to a ridgeline overlookin

Port-au-Prince. The planned coastal penetratio

point was in range of the AAA. Quickly figurin

the depressed angle of the gun barrels, the crew

EWO (Fallert) determined that the gun could n

accurately fire on the aircraft until it was out 

__________

 *Lovett was the 15th SOS/CC and was also designated as the airborne mission commander for the mission.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

399
range. The crew determined that the mission was

still executable as planned.129

At Pope AFB the leaflets and Army PSYOPS

personnel were onloaded, and the aircraft departed at 0107Z on 16 September. The route of

flight was by way of airways to an IFR point

north of Cuba. After the refueling the crew canceled IFR south of Great Inagua before flying the

standard Guantanamo Bay approach. White flew

the approach down to 100 feet, which was below

Cuban radar coverage, and then turned easterly

toward Haiti. South of Gonave Island the CT II

descended to 50 feet above the water, with the

navigator recording the winds so that the drop

release point could be refined. As the CT II flew

low over the water, Lovett called for an immediate climb, having seen a large three-masted

schooner directly in the path of the aircraft. Once

past the schooner the Talon descended back to its

preplanned altitude and continued its terrainfollowing profile. As the aircraft flew over the

coastline at 500 feet, the first set of leaflets were

released over the Haitian naval base. Late information given to the crew had changed the first

target area to the naval base because intelligence

sources thought that Cedras might be spending

the night at the base. PSYOPS planners felt that

a direct hit where Cedras was staying would be

effective in convincing him that the UN was serious about demanding he leave the country. After

the first drop the planned profile was flown, with

the aircraft dispensing leaflets over designated

areas of the city. When the second pass was complete, the aircraft exited the objective area on a

westerly heading. The TOT was slightly less than

10 minutes, although to the crew it seemed like

an hour. No hostile fire was taken, and no evasive

action was required. After the second refueling,

the crew recovered back at Hurlburt Field at

1026Z on the morning of 16 September after an

11.4-hour flight. Post-drop analysis revealed that

the drop was successful, with the leaflets saturating the target area.130

As the 15th SOS completed its mission, the 8th

SOS was preparing for the third (and final) leaflet

drop over Haiti. The squadron was tasked to fly a

similar profile as the one flown by the 15th SOS.

The 8th SOS drop was accomplished during the

night of 16/17 September and also utilized lowlevel drop procedures. It was the first low-level

leaflet drop completed by the squadron. As had

been the case for the 15th SOS, the leaflets were

right on target.131

With the PSYOPS campaign ongoing, D day

was established as Sunday, 17 September, with

SOF forces prepositioned in the southern United

States and in the western Caribbean before H

hour. AFSOC deployed significant forces from the

16th SOW in support of the operation, including

14 MH-53J Pave Low IIIs, five HC-130P/N Combat Shadows, four AC-130H gunships, and three

MC-130E Combat Talon Is. An additional five

AC-130A gunships were deployed from the 919th

SOW at Duke Field, and a contingent of AFSOC

MH-60G Pave Hawks from the 55th SOS were

deployed along with USA helicopters for the op -

eration.132 The EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft

continued to fly missions out of Key West, Florida, and out of Puerto Rico. The 15th SOS remained on alert at Hurlburt Field for follow-on

tasking.

By the evening of 17 September, additional

AFSOC forces were in place and prepared to exe -

cute their portion of the operation. President

Clinton, in a final effort to resolve the crisis, sent

a peace delegation to Haiti that was headed by

former president Jimmy Carter. Other mem -

bers of Carter’s delegation included the former

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin

Powell, and Sen. Sam Nunn, chairman of the

Senate Armed Services Committee. On Sunday,

17 September, the delegation met with Cedras

and his top officials. Little apparent progress was

made, and by Sunday evening the invasion force

was poised to strike. At MacDill AFB 28 C-130

aircraft loaded with Army rangers and their

equipment departed the air base en route to

Por t-au-Prince. At approximately the same time,

Carter’s delegation announced from Haiti that

a n agreement had been reached. Thirty minutes

after takeoff the C-130s were recalled, and they

returned to MacDill AFB to await further instruction s.133

At Guantanamo Bay the 8th SOS Combat Talons were on alert to refuel the 20th SOS helicop -

ters, which were on call for emerging mission

tasking. With the operation put on hold, no additional combat missions were tasked to the squadron. In the coming weeks the AFSOC commit -

ment solidified into one of providing SAR alert.

For the next two months, the three 8th SOS CT

Is remained at Guantanamo Bay on SAR alert.

As airlift requirements mushroomed after 17

September, the squadron volunteered to shuttle

personnel and supplies into Haiti. Numerous sorties were flown in support of the peacekeeping

operation. Just before Christmas 1994 the 8th

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

400
SOS contingent was released and redeployed back

to Hurlburt Field, thus bringing to a close its

support for Operation Uphold Democracy.

134 For

the 15th SOS the squadron deployed two CT IIs

to Shaw AFB and was prepared to execute postinvasion operations in Haiti. With the operation

canceled the squadron’s CT IIs were not needed

for the ensuing peacekeeping operation, and the

aircraft were subsequently redeployed back to

home station without flying any additional sorties into Hait i.

As part of the agreement brokered by former

president Carter’s peace commission, Cedras and

his key leaders were allowed to depart Haiti in

exile, and President Aristide returned to claim

once again the office to which he was democratically elected. A great amount of effort had been

expended to return him to Haiti, and additional

bloodshed had been avoided by the peace agreement. For AFSOC, Operation Uphold Democracy

once again demonstrated the unique capabilities

of SOF and the impact its forces could have when

employed in a coordinated theater campaign

plan. For the CT II the operation marked the

first actual contingency employment for the new

weapons system.

The 1st SOS Identified to

Receive Combat Talon II

By January 1994 Commando Vision had been

briefed in the Pacific, and the permanent status of

the 353d SOG was once again an uncertainty. Vision had two phases, the first of which centered

on aircraft force structure. Under Commando Vision the MC-130E CT Is of the 1st SOS would

transfer to the 919th SOW (USAFR) at Duke

Field, Florida, and the squadron would be assigned the CT II. The 17th SOS, which had been

previously identified to receive the CT II, would

retain its HC-130s. Phase II of Commando Vision

called for the relocation of the 353d SOG to the

United States, deactivation of the 31st SOS at

Osan AB, Korea, and the re-establishment of the

353d SOW at a West Coast location. Throughout

the year Commando Vision was debated by senior

leadership both in the Pacific and in the United

States. The 353d SOG, in the meantime, retained

its permanent status and continued to posture for

a long-term stay at Kadena AB. 135

One of the shortfalls of basing at Kadena AB

was the lack of EW ranges for the 1st SOS. While

at Clark AB the squadron had direct access to the

sophisticated Crow Valley ECM range, but the

only available facility near Kadena AB was the

Combat Talons 64-0561, 64-0555, and 64-0562 on t

ramp at Guantanamo Bay during Operation Uphold D

mocracy. HC-130s from the 9th SOS are also seen in t

background.

Photo courtesy of Robert Jingst

Aircraft 64-0561 on the ramp at Pap, Haiti.

Photo courtesy of Robert Jingst

Ramp at Guantanamo Bay. On the left are MC-130E

from the 8th SOS and HC-130P/Ns from the 9th SOS. O

the right are AC-130As from Duke Airfield.

Photo courtesy of Robert Jingst

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

401
Pilsung range in Korea. Pilsung range was an ob -

solete facility that did not have the threat array

required to challenge the Combat Talon , and it

was a joint-use facility shared with the Korean air

force. It was also open only one night a week, and

with the 1st SOS flying almost exclusively at

night, there was not enough opportunity to schedule the range to keep assigned crews proficient.

To improve access to ECM ranges, the 1st SOS

turned to Australia and to Alaska. Building on

previous JCET events in Australia, the 353d SOG

participated in several combined exercises with

Australia’s Special Air Service and US Army Special Forces. In conjunction with the combined exercises, airborne intercept training with Royal

Australian Air Force F/A-18s was conducted. At

Darwin, Australia, an ECM range was available

for Royal Australian Air Force use, and the 353d’s

long-term goal was to gain permission for the 1st

SOS to fly on the range. In Alaska 1st SOS crews

participated in several joint and unilateral exercises that emphasized air intercept and ECM

training. Australian and Alaskan deployments

gave the 1st SOS access to vast and unrestricted

flying areas and effectively filled the critical ECM

training shortfall.136

From 18 to 29 April the group passed another

milestone when it received an ASET visit from

Headquarters AFSOC. The team evaluated flight

operations and training by conducting flight checks,

aircrew testing, and inspections of documentation

to measure compliance with directives. The ASET

administered 92 aircrew check rides, 88 of which

were graded as fully qualified (Q-1), three were

conditionally qualified (Q-2), and only one was

categorized as unqualified (Q-3). The team also

conducted 166 written evaluations. An overall rating of excellent was earned by the group, with a

score of 95.2 percent being awarded by the team.

The ASET was another indicator of how far the

group had come since relocating to Kadena AB. 137

To assess Kadena AB’s ability to support the

CT II, another SATAF was held from 6 to 8 June

1994. As had been the case the previous year, the

SATAF pronounced Kadena AB as unsatisfactory

based on its assessment of spare parts availability,

including AN/APQ-170 radar spares and C-130

common parts. The SATAF also determined that

facilities planning, although vastly improved from

the previous year, was still marginal. The facilities

rating was a result of the close time line for modifying building 3306 as a radar maintenance shop.

Lack of mobility storage space, joint use of the ba se

fuel cell and corrosion control faci lities, and the

high-risk work for building 3306 were all reasons

for the overall unsatisfactory rating.138

The new CT II beddown schedule had the 1st

SOS receiving its first CT II aircraft during July

1995. Another four aircraft would arrive from Au -

gust through December 1995. The 1st SOS would

lose one MC-130E in December 1994 and then

lose one each month during August through November 1995. The graduated phase-in of the CT II

was designed to minimize the impact of loosing

the CT I in-theater and was critically important

Photo courtesy of Robert Jingst

Gen Wayne Downing (CINCSOC) visited the troops while they were deployed to

Guantanamo Bay. General Downing is pictured fourth from the left.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

402
to the success of the new Combat Talon in the

Pacific.

139

On 20 June 1994 Colonel Williamson assumed

command of the 1st SOS from Reinholz, who departed Kadena AB for the National War College.

Williamson had arrived at Kadena AB the previous January and had served as the squadron’s

operations officer until assuming command. Colonel Barwick became the new squadron operations

officer.140 Williamson would have to focus much of

his time over the next year on personnel issues

generated by the conversion of the squadron to

Talon IIs. Barwick would concentrate on train -

ing his Talon I crews on the new helicopter aeria l

refueling system and on maintaining CT I combat capability during the transition.

The decision to convert the 1st SOS to the CT

II prompted several concerns for the squadron.

Chief among those concerns were personnel issues stemming from the lack of career opportunities for CT I personnel. By transferring most of

the CT I fleet to the Air Force Reserve, little

opportunity was left for active duty CT I crew

members to remain in the weapons system. The

decision also placed some 1st SOS crew members

at risk of having to cross train into a third weapons system within three years. To cope with the

anticipated personnel turbulence, the 1st SOS

identified aircrew members wishing to convert to

the CT II and sought to find those wanting to

remain at Kadena AB positions either within the

353d OSS or in the 17th SOS.* 141

On 8 July 1994 attention focused on North Korea when Kim Il Sung died at the age of 82. He

had maintained his dictatorial position as the

Great Leader of the Hermit Kingdom since the

late 1940s. Possible instability resulting from his

death resulted in US forces in the Northeast

Asian region increasing their level of vigilance.

South Korean military forces went on alert in anticipation of a possible attack from North Korea.

At the 353d SOG appropriate plans were reviewed, and each squadron’s tasking under the

plans was assessed. Tension on the Korean peninsula had remained high between the United

States and North Korea over the north’s refusal to

halt development of its nuclear capability. Only

after former president Jimmy Carter brokered a

deal in June 1994 did the tension slightly subside.

The death of Sung put the agreement at risk. After additional negotiations, however, a new agre

ment was signed in November even though a su

cessor to the late communist leader had not bee

publicly announced.142

Through the fall of 1994, the 353d SOG conti

ued to make progress on improving its facilities 

both Kadena AB and at Osan AB. Two K-Spa

hangars were completed at Osan AB, and a co

tract for renovating building 3524 was finalized 

Kadena AB. Headquarters AFSOC went to th

Air Staff and secured $1.3 million for the exte

sive renovation project. In late September th

18th Wing finalized a renovation contract fo

$800,000, which was the low bid for the projec

The remainder of the Air Staff designated fun

was used for other 18th Wing projects.143

Exercise Foal Eagle absorbed most of th

group’s resources during November, with a majori

of the group’s assets deployed to Korea for th

exercise. By the close of 1994, the group ha

many accomplishments to its credit. Perhaps th

most gratifying award came when the group w

recognized as having the Outstanding Safety Pr

gram of the Year for AFSOC. The group had al

made great strides in implementing quality a

force initiatives, having completed a Unit Self A

sessment over a grueling two-month period in A

gust and September. For 1995 the group w

ready for the scheduled Quality Air Force Asses

ment (QAFA) and was zeroing in on final prepar

tions for CT II.

The 7th SOS Deploys for

Operation Support Hope

After the previous hectic year for the 7th SO

1994 promised to be a bit more normal, with th

squadron concentrating on training in the Comb

Talon II and supporting the 352d SOG exerci

program. During a touch-and-go landing at RA

Macrihanish, Scotland, on 23 February, the cre

experienced complete radar failure on its AN/AP

170 radar. The crew returned to the base to dete

mine if the radar could be repaired and the missio

continued. Upon inspection maintenance found 

two-foot by four-foot by 10-inch deep impressio

in the nose radome that had caused severe dam

age to both radar antennas and to other assoc

ated radar equipment. A bird strike was di

counted, and later investigation revealed that th

__________

 *Late in 1994 Air Force Personnel Center and Headquarters AFSOC dispatched a combined personnel team to Kadena AB to recruit aircr

personnel for the new AC-130U model gunship and to assist crew members in attaining assignm ents of their choice. The personnel team arrang

assignments for 80 1st SOS personnel, including 17 who would retrain into CT II, 14 who would remain with the MC-130E CT I and later trans

to the 8th SOS at Hurlburt Field, five to transfer to the HC-130P/N , and the remaining personnel either transferring to the AC-130U gunship 

remaining at Kadena AB in a nonflying staff position.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

403
radome had experienced structural failure. Inspection of the Combat Talon II fleet identified

several other radomes with cracks and soft spots

that severely impacted the operational readiness

of the weapons system.144

The following month one 7th SOS Combat

Talon deployed to Norway for Exercise Arctic Express. The squadron provided almost all of the personnel for the exercise since most of the 352d SOG

was still heavily committed in Brindisi, Italy.

Colonel Scott served as the Joint Special Opera -

tions Air Component Command (JSOACC) commander and established his base of operations at

Bardufoss, Norway. In addition to the 7th SOS

Combat Talon II, the 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment from Fort Campbell, Kentucky,

deployed a contingent of CH-47D aircraft for the

duration of the exercise. The exercise consisted of

insertion, extraction, and resupply of special forces

ground units. While on the ground the units exe -

cuted special reconnaissance of strategic points

(beach heads, fjord inlets, airports, and transportation routes), and direct action missions and were

prepared to execute personnel recovery missions

as required. Although the Combat Talon was ham -

pered by the loss of a transformer rectifier early in

the exercise, most exercise objectives were accomplished by the squadron.145

The 352d had not received an ORI for several

years, and one was scheduled in the spring of

1994. Continued tasking for Operation Provide

Promise II/Deny Flight had prevented an earlier

inspection. To allow the group the opportunity to

complete its ORI, Headquarters AFSOC agreed to

assume the Brindisi commitment with other a ssigned forces and temporarily to release the 352d

SOG. Elements from the 16th SOW, including two

8th SOS Combat Talon Is, assumed the SAR alert

duty on 1 March. The last of the 352d SOGs personnel departed Brindisi on 4 April. The 16th

SOW remained at Brindisi until 17 June, when

the 352d returned to assume the alert duties. 146

During March and April the group conducted

two operational readiness exercises (ORE) to help

prepare for the ORI scheduled for May. The AFSOC IG team originally wanted the group to deploy to Italy for the inspection, but when Italian

officials denied permission due to the saturated

airspace caused by the Balkan operation, they

had to look elsewhere. Locations in Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom were considered,

but in the end the only viable location turned out

to be home station. The scenario for the exercise

included a terrorist event in a Middle Eastern

country controlled by religious fundamentalists.

For the 7th SOS the unit committed all three of

its Combat Talon IIs to the ORE. Five days after

completion of the second ORE, SOCEUR issued

an exercise warning order to the group, which put

into motion Phase I of the ORI. On 27 April a

SOCEUR exercise execute order was issued, and

the initial deployment phase of the inspection be -

gan. After marshaling cargo and generating all

participating aircraft, the deployment phase was

complete after 36 hours. On 4 May Phase I employment operations began and continued until 11

May. During Phase I of the ORI, crews completed

100 percent of tasked missions, flying 44 sorties

and 145.4 hours. After completion of the first

phase, the group stood down for 48 hours to reconstitute before Phase II. Between 18 and 24

May, group assets deployed to RAF Macrihanish

and executed a complex exercise scenario, with

two 7th SOS Combat Talon IIs participating. At

the completion of Phase II, the deployed assets

returned to RAF Alconbury for ORI termination.

Overall, the group received a grade of excellent,

having received an outstanding for initial response, a satisfactory for unit employment, and

an excellent for combat support. The manner in

which the group and the 7th SOS performed validated its combat capability.147

With the ORI successfully behind them, group

personnel redeployed to Brindisi to assume once

again SAR alert duties in support of Operation

Provide Promise/Deny Flight. By midmonth ele -

ments of the 21st SOS, 67th SOS, and the 321st

STS were in position at Brindisi. For the 7th SOS

preparations were under way for a change of command for the squadron. On 1 July 1994 Colonel

Scott assumed command of the squadron from

Lauderdale. Scott had been the operations officer

before taking command, and he continued to emphasize training and support of the group’s exercise and JCET program.

Throughout the spring and summer, a civil

war had raged in the Central African country of

Rwanda. By July the situation had deteriorated

to such a degree that the US government publicly

committed itself to providing humanitarian relief

to the besieged people living there. As a result of

this commitment, SOCEUR was tasked by

USEUCOM to provide air and ground support,

and on 22 July it issued a warning order for the

352d SOG to be prepared to deploy all available

7th SOS Combat Talon IIs in support of Opera -

tion Support Hope . Four hours later the group

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

404
received a verbal execute order to commence relief

operations in Rwanda by 24 July.148

Scott immediately swung into action. He recalled one MC-130H that was deployed for a

training exercise and his staff began working logistics and mission planning requirements.

Throughout the day preparations continued. At

1630 local, just 10 hours after initial notification,

three 7th SOS crews entered crew rest, and one

hour later the recalled Talon landed at RAF Alconbury. Its crew entered crew rest as maintenance prepared the three Combat Talons for the

long flight to Central Africa.149

At 0630 local on 23 July, less than 24 hours

after receiving the initial call, the first 7th SOS

crew (call sign Perm 45) departed the United

Kingdom for Stuttgart, Germany, to onload the

SOCEUR command element that would make up

JSOTF3. A half-hour later the second and third

Talons departed with elements of the 321st STS,

352d OSS, 352d MS, and Headquarters 352d

SOG. The three aircraft were to rendezvous off the

coast of Sicily for the first of two IFRs, but loading

delays in Stuttgart prevented the first Combat

Talon from joining the other two until over Egypt.

The three Combat Talons refueled from KC-135

tankers over the Red Sea and proceeded on to Entebbe, Uganda, which served as the task force op -

erating base. While still en route the Talon crews

received coordinates from SOCEUR for the first

airdrops scheduled for the following day. Naviga -

tors aboard the three Talons began planning the

next day’s mission as the formation closed on Entebbe. At 0015 local on 24 July, after a 4,300 mile,

16-hour flight, the Talons landed in Uganda.150

With postflight duties complete, the crews traveled the treacherous 30-minute route to their

quarters in Kampala. By 0300 local the crews had

settled into their quarters as maintenance and

support personnel continued to prepare the aircraft for the afternoon mission. At 1000 local the

duty crew, additional maintainers, and the

JSOTF3 staff arrived at the airport to complete

aircraft preparations and mission coordination. A

C-5 transport was parked in the same area as the

Combat Talon IIs, thus creating an extremely

congested parking area. The Talons had to be taxied one at a time to the refueling area, then

loaded one pallet at a time by an all-terrain forklift. The process was slow and time consuming.

Mission planners had little to work with, but did

their best to plan a route to the DZ. The TOT was

established at 1730 local, based on the anticipated

launch time from Entebbe. The new TOT was one

hour later than requested by the relief workers o

the DZ and was caused by difficulties experience

in loading and servicing the aircraft. For u

known reasons the UN leaders at the drop loc

tion denied the later drop time, and at 1500 loca

JSOTF3 notified the 7th SOS that it had to mak

the original TOT of 1630 local.151

The crews were prepared to drop the relief su

plies by way of CDS airdrop procedures, but su

gested that TRIADS be utilized. The UN leade

rejected TRIADS in lieu of a conventional CD

drop. In addition the UN demanded that the ai

drop be made in formation, a tactic that th

squadron had not practiced and was not proficie

in. When it became apparent that the UN repr

sentatives were not going to adjust their taskin

Colonel Helms, the mission commander, electe

to fly the mission as requested. Through extr

ordinary effort, the three crews managed to mak

an early takeoff and proceeded to the objectiv

area in three-ship trail formation. As the crew

approached the DZ, they observed thunderstorm

three to four miles southwest of the area and a

justed their escape heading to avoid them. At fo

miles out the crews obtained the DZ visual

through a broken overcast, and at three mil

confirmed the DZ with orange marker panels di

played. Although the crew could hear the comb

controller on the ground, the controller could n

copy the aircraft’s transmissions. With positiv

identification of the DZ, a marked point of impa

for the load, and no cancellation call from th

combat controller, the lead Combat Talon droppe

its CDS bundles at 1624 local. The second an

third aircraft followed with their bundles, and a

loads landed on the DZ. The crews estimated th

the loads landed 150 to 200 yards at the one 

two o’clock position. The formation executed 

hard right turn to avoid the thunderstorm an

returned to Entebbe for landing.152

The initial 7th SOS mission proved to be th

squadron’s only airdrop of the operation, with U

ground personnel opting for a much slower ove

land resupply method to get food to the starvin

natives. The squadron did fly, however, other su

port missions for the JSOTF3 commander. On 2

July one crew flew an ALCE assessment tea

and a State Department official to Kigali, Rwand

The aircraft and crew remained in Kigali for th

next four days, at which time it departed with th

same personnel it had brought earlier. On 29 Ju

another Combat Talon flew an airland missio

into Goma, Zaire, with two water bladders an

associated equipment, and seven members of th

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

405
international news media. Two days later, on 31

July, two additional missions were flown. The

first consisted of transporting the US secretary of

defense, the supreme allied commander Europe,

the JTF commander, a US congressman, and 36

other dignitaries from Kigali to view refugee

camps from the air. The original 7th SOS resupply DZ was also overflown. The second mission on

31 July consisted of transporting a vehicle, water,

food, 10 ALCE personnel, and three members of

the Organization of African States. The final two

missions were flown on 1 and 2 August, with the

Combat Talon IIs transporting vehicles, food supplies, and personnel to Kigali and to Goma. On 3

August, after conventional C-130 units arrived to

take over the mission, USEUCOM relieved the

squadron from further tasking. On 4 August the

three Combat Talons and other 352d SOG person -

nel returned to RAF Alconbury.153

Operation Support Hope proved to be the last

contingency operation for the 7th SOS during the

year. From 28 September to 17 October, one

Combat Talon II deployed to the United States

and participated in Red Flag 95-1 , period 1.154

The remainder of the fall was spent on prepara -

tions for the unit move to RAF Mildenhall. Members of the squadron also concentrated on training initiatives designed to season the young 7th

SOS crew. Additional deployments from Norway

to Africa, and to former Warsaw Pact countries,

provided the unit with unique challenges through

the New Year.

The 542d CTW Becomes the 58th SOW

On 1 April 1994 the Air Force moved the 56th

FW, the USAF’s fifth most prestigious wing (as

determined by General McPeak) from MacDill

AFB, Florida, to Luke AFB, Arizona. The 56th

replaced the 58th FW (ranked 22d under the

same system) at Luke AFB. The Air Force then

reassigned the 58th FW to Kirtland AFB, effective 1 April, and redesignated it the 58th SOW.

The 58th SOW replaced the 542d CTW, which

was inactivated. The move to Kirtland AFB meant

major organizational changes for the new special

operations wing. The 550th FTS and 551st FTS

were redesignated the 550th SOS and 551st SOS,

respectively. Other squadrons in the wing were

renamed similarly.155

Even though the 58th SOW moved to Kirtland

AFB without personnel or equipment, it brought a

long and distinguished history with it that dated

back to 15 January 1941. The wing traced its lineage to the 58th Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field,

Michigan, which trained fighter pilots destined to

fight in World War II. The pursuit group went on

to serve in the Pacific theater during the latter

part of the war. The wing then served in the Korean War flying combat missions in the F-84

Thunder Jet, after which time it was inactivated.

In 1969 the wing was reactivated at Luke AFB to

train fighter pilots once again. Its decorations in -

cluded two Distinguished Unit Citations, the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, the Republic of

Korea Presidential Unit Citation, and six Air

Force Outstanding Unit Awards.156

Special Order G-37, dated 30 March 1994, redesignated the 550th FTS as the 550th SOS and

assigned it to the 58th SOW, effective the follow -

ing day. The squadron continued to fly the HC130P/N and the MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft. Along with its heavy student load, the

squadron participated in the quarterly Chile Flag

exercises. From 11 to 22 July, the 550th SOS supported US Navy SEALs from North Island NAS,

California, in Chile Flag 94-04. Aircrews conducted

training in night low level and airdrop/r ecovery of

SEAL team personnel. The exercise again provided a venue whereby both permanent party and

student crews could participate in a demanding

joint exercise.157 In a Headquarters AETC message dated 192047Z May 94 to the 58th SOW,

AETC/XOT proposed that the wing periodically

participate in AFSOC joint exercises. The message stipulated that only permanent party personnel could participate in the program and that

a 58th SOW aircraft could occasionally deploy.

The initiative ensured that the instructors at the

schoolhouse would be kept abreast of current tactics and procedures employed by the operational

units.158

In June 1994 the Air Staff made the decision to

cancel the move of the MC-130E Combat Talon I

and the CT I WST to Kirtland AFB as originally

planned. Headquarters AFSOC wanted to consolidate CT I and CT II training at the New Mexico

base, but initiatives driven by Commando Vision

necessitated the change. Under Commando Vision

the CT Is programmed for Kirtland AFB would be

transferred instead to Duke Field and be assigned

to the 919th SOW, USAF Reserve Component.

The CT I WST would be located at Hurlburt Field

and would be centrally located for use by the two

remaining CT I squadrons. The decision did not

affect the planned installation of the CT II WST,

which was scheduled for October 1995.159 As 1994

ended operations in the 58th SOW had finally

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

406
settled down, and the Combat Talon II formal

school was operating smoothly.

1995: War in the Balkans Expands

Although portions of Commando Vision were tabled, Combat Talon I transfer to the USAF Reserve

went on as planned. In the Pacific, the 1st SOS

received its initial Combat Talon IIs, and Kirkland

AFB survived a closure scare from the Base Re -

alignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. The

7th SOS moved to RAF Mildenhall as the 352d

SOG struggled to fulfill its tasking in the Balkans.

The Objective Wing Is Refined in AFSOC

As Haiti and Operation Uphold Democracy

faded into the past for AFSOC, General Hobson

initiated a request to Air Staff for a variance

from the objective wing structure. Hobson felt

that the operational flying squadrons had grown

too large for their squadron commanders to effectivel y supervise the complex operations and maintenance functions.

The two Hurlburt-based Combat Talon squadrons had tripled in size since absorbing their

maintenance function, while the 1st SOS at

Kadena AB had doubled. The 8th SOS had grown

to 381 personnel assigned, while the 15th SOS

had topped out at 414 assigned by late December

1994.160 As a general rule the flying squadron

commanders had little maintenance experience

and had to rely on relatively junior officers to advise them on maintenance issues. There were

times when flying requirements took precedence

over maintenance actions, thus having the longterm effect of decreased capability as maintenance actions were regularly postponed. Hobson

felt that on-aircraft maintenance should be supervised by maintenance professionals and not by

rated operational commanders. The variance that

he requested would create separate maintenance

squadrons and leave the operations squadrons to

concentrate on their flying activities. On 11 Au -

gust 1995 Hobson’s requested variance was approved by Air Staff. Both fixed- and rotary-wing

maintenance squadrons were subsequently established, and they were activated effective 2 October 1995. The action resulted in the 8th SOS decreasing in size to 142 assigned personnel and the

15th SOS to 132. 161 The two overseas Talon

squadrons (the 1st SOS and the 7th SOS) were

not affected by the change at Hurlburt Field at

that time. Maintenance remained assigned to

those two squadrons for another year.

The 8th SOS Supports Operation

Joint Endeavor

In December 1994 the 8th SOS was tasked 

deploy two MC-130Es to Italy in support of th

ongoing Bosnian operation. Later, in the sprin

of 1995, the 8th SOS aircraft returned t o Hurlbu

Field when the 9th SOS relieved them. On 1

August 1995 the 8th SOS received a no-notic

tasking to redeploy to San Vito in support o

Operation Deliberate Force /Joint Endeavo

Dodging two Atlantic hurricanes en route, th

aircraft were in-place at San Vito 14 hours befo

the JCS deadline. The deployment was in su

port of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovin

and involved providing CSAR alert to refuel hel

copters if the need materialized. On 30 Augu

Serbian gunners shot down a French Mirag

fighter (call sign Ebro 33) near the town of Pa

with two crew members onboard. During the fo

lowing days, intense mission planning was co

ducted to determine if the French officers cou

be rescued. On 6 September a flight of US Nav

SH-60 helicopters from the USS Roosevelt a

tempted a recovery but was turned back due 

bad weather and intense small-arms fire. On 

September the JSOTF at Brindisi, launched 

second rescue attempt. The 8th SOS MC-130E

were part of the Ebro 33 task force and w

tasked to refuel the helicopters performing th

rescue. The SAR force was unable to locate th

crew members, and it was learned that they ha

been captured. The French pilots were later r

leased unharmed in December as part of th

Paris peace agreement. In all the 8th SOS pa

ticipated in three CSAR missions during Oper

tion Deliberate Force before the peace agreeme

took effe ct.162

Less than 24 hours after the signing of th

peace agreement in Paris, AFSOC crews, inclu

ing those of the 8th SOS, were carrying US Arm

Special Forces teams into Sarajevo in support 

Operation Joint Endeavor. The MC-130Es of th

8th SOS were tasked to support special forc

troop movements into both Sarajevo and Tuzl

which were the two main hubs for air operation

With dense fog blanketing the city, an 8th SO

Combat Talon was the first aircraft to land i

Sarajevo after the agreement was signed. Throug

out the early stages of Joint Endeavor, th

weather played havoc with aircraft movements i

both Bosnia and in Italy. The Combat Talon w

the only fixed-wing aircraft that could consi

tently fly a precision airborne radar a pproach to 

successful landing in the fog and drizzle of centr

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

407
Bosnia. In Italy maintenance personnel battled

the continuous rain and cold to produce missionready aircraft, even though working conditions on

the flight line were miserable. After the initial

peacekeeping force was delivered to its assigned

areas, the 8th SOS mission reverted to CSAR

alert. At year’s end Poole and his Combat Talons

were still deployed to Italy in support of Operation

Joint Endeavor.

163

Back at Hurlburt Field the 8th SOS participated in the third annual Operation Christmas

Wish by delivering more than $40,000 in medical

supplies, food, books, bicycles, and toys to the

needy orphans and poor children of Honduras. In

1992 the squadron had unofficially adopted the

La Cieba orphanage, located just outside the

Golosan Honduran AB. Since that time the

squadron had provided the 235 children there

with toys and other essentials donated by the

local Fort Walton Beach community during the

Christmas season. The amount delivered in

1995 was characteristic of the generosity of con -

cerned citizens for the welfare of the children of

Honduras. The year 1995 had been a busy and

rewarding one. At year’s end the squadron had

142 personnel assigned and possessed five MC130E aircraft, including 64-0551, 64-0559, 64-

0562, 64-0566, and 64-0568.

164

The 15th SOS Completes Its

First Full Year of Tasking

For the 15th SOS, 1995 marked the first full

year that the squadron was subjected to both exercise and contingency taskings. The squadron

had used 1993 and most of 1994 to season its

young crew force and to mature its maintenance

capability. With Operation Uphold Democracy in

the fall of 1994, the squadron validated its mission capable status and soon increased its participation in the JCS exercise program. In the last

half of 1995, the 15th SOS participated in an average of seven exercises each month. These events

included joint readiness exercises (JRX), joint

readiness training center activities, multiple bilateral training exercise, and higher headquarters

tasked static displays and crew proficiency training. Along with participation in the rigorous exercise program, the unit also upgraded the MC130H terrain-following radar system, integrated

the GPS into the onboard navigation system, and

incorporated mission computer high-altitude release point calculations into the system.165

From 29 November to 15 December, the squadron was a key player in JRX 95-5 (Javelin Steel).

The exercise called for six MC-130H Combat Talons to fly in night low-level formation to a person -

nel drop. Three of the Talons then proceeded inbound to a nearby airfield and executed

blacked-out landings to infiltrate the remaining

personnel and equipment. As soon as the assault

force was off-loaded, the CT IIs departed the airfield and established a holding pattern until

called back to extract the ground force. After receiving the call to return to the airfield, the three

Combat Talons again made blacked-out landings

and successfully extracted all exercise personnel.

Throughout the exercise the 15th SOS made all of

its TOTs with split second accuracy and with all

paratroopers landing on the DZ. At the close of

1995, the squadron had 132 personnel assigned

along with 10 CT II aircraft, 83-1212, 84-0475,

85-0012, 87-0024, 89-0280, 89-0281, 89-0282, 89-

0283, 90-0161, and 90-0162. Aircraft 85-0011 was

loaned to Kirtland AFB on 12 October 1995.166

Combat Talon I Moves to the

Air Force Reserves at Duke Field

Efforts by Headquarters AFSOC to gain approval of Commando Vision during the last half of

1994 and the first half of 1995 had not been met

with total success. Opposition to the drastic reduction in the size of the overseas special opera -

tions groups, especially the 353d SOG in the Pacific, had proved too great a challenge. By

mid-1995 the concept of a West Coast wing had

been shelved and was all but abandoned. The effort to retain the AC-130H gunship on active

duty, however, had continued. The 711th SOS, a

USAF Reserve unit located at Duke Field, Florida,

and assigned to the 919th SOW, had flown the

AC-130A since the Vietnam War era. The preCommando Vision plan was to transfer the AC130H to the 711th SOS when the squadron’s A-model

gunships were retired from service. Commando Vision retained the AC-130H on active duty at Hurlburt Field and transferred eight Combat Talon Is

to the 711th SOS. Throughout 1995 the 711th

SOS prepared for the Combat Talon I, and on 28

September the squadron’s gunship mission was

officially terminated. On 6 October Combat Talons 64-0571 and 64-0572 arrived at Duke Field

from the 1st SOS at Kadena AB, and the era of

Combat Talons in the 711th SOS began. On 8

November Combat Talon 63-7785 was transferred

from Hurlburt Field and became the third aircraft

to be assigned to the unit.167

Aircrews trained for months in preparation for

the arrival of the first aircraft. By year’s end two

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

408
fully mission ready crews were nearing certifica -

tion, with additional crews following soon afterwards. Major Norris was the first mission ready

Talon pilot assigned to the squadron. The new

Talon I squadron was commanded by Colonel

Hanson, who had assumed command of the 711th

SOS on 5 December 1994. Much of the early success of the squadron could be attributed to his

effort to bring the weapons system smoothly online. The conversion did not come without a price,

however. Growing pains with the Combat Talon I 

at Duke Field and unseasonably poor weather reduced the sortie completion rate, resulting in the

standard 22-week training schedule having to be

extended to 32 weeks. Several lessons were

learned from the initial cadre that were imple -

mented for future classes. Phase A (ground training) was separated from Phase B (flying training),

thus allowing a better match to traditional reservist availability. Training was also later transferred to Duke Field and was accomplished on

unit-assigned aircraft rather than the operation -

ally committed aircraft of the 8th SOS.168 By the

end of 1995, the 711th was well positioned to complete its transition to Combat Talon I during the

following year.

Combat Talon II Delivered to the 1st SOS

The New Year began for the 353d SOG with the

Headquarters AFSOC IG-administered QAFA.

The group had prepared for the inspection the

previous fall when it completed an in-depth unit

self assessment. Although the whole quality process was still new to the group, the IG assessment was designed to gauge the group’s progress

in applying quality principles to improve mission

accomplishment. The assessment focused on

three areas: direct mission accomplishment, stra -

tegic plan support, and compliance with Air

Force special interest items. Inspectors used

Headquarters AFSOC’s quality criteria on a

curved rating scale designed to implement a 60

percent grading scale for the 1995 QAFA, an 80

percent scale for the next QAFA in 1997, and a

100 percent scale for 1999 and each out-year after that time. Inspectors found the group in com -

pliance with the two special interest items and

recognized the group’s safety program as outstanding. The operations and security and intelligence oversight programs received an excellent

rating. QAFA inspectors also lauded senior leadership for successfully incorporating quality prin -

ciples into most areas of 353d SOG operations. The

QAFA reinforced the concept that quality was a

journey and that AFSOC units had only begu

their journey in achieving a quality oriented o

ganization.169

Also in early January Colonel Stevens visite

the 353d SOG to get inputs from group leade

ship regarding theater reservations about Com 

mando Vision. Armed with briefing papers an

data provided by the group staff, Stevens r

turned to Hurlburt Field and briefed Headqua

ters AFSOC. From 3 to 7 March 1995, Headqua

ters AFSOC convened the Commando Visio

Conference, and General Hobson tasked the a

tendees to “put the meat on the bones” of Com

mando Vision, with a promise that AFSOC wou

take the finalized plan to the overseas CINCs 

gain their approval. A great amount of work a

ready had been accomplished and the conferenc

built upon that previous work. Colonel Dredl

commander of the 353d OSS and a Combat Talo

EWO, led a five-person 353d SOG team to th

conference. AFSOC created a multidisciplined t

ger team to focus on issues surfaced during th

conference with the goal of better defining Com

mando Vision.170

Dredla presented a group white paper summ

rizing the unit’s proposed concept of operations 

the Pacific under Commando Vision. The prima

purpose of the paper was threefold: (a) to provid

an AFSOF capability that the group believe

would be acceptable to COMSOCPAC, (b) to pr

vide AFSOC functional managers a baseline 

mission needs against which they could proje

resources, and (c) to give AFSOC programmers 

baseline of requirements against which Com 

mando Vision could be constructed. The mai

theme put forth by Colonel Dredla highlighted th

capability that had to be available both durin

and after Commando Vision. After discussing se

eral assumptions made by Commando Visio

planners, Dredla closed his presentation by poin

ing out two key flaws in the Commando Visio

concept that made it untenable—the West Coa

wing structure was not sufficiently robust to su

ply rotational personnel to the Pacific while at th

same time supporting the national mission an

SOUTHCOM requirements, and Commando V

sion failed to take into account the qualitative c

pability brought to USPACOM by having perm

nently based forces assigned to the theater. 

PACOM had become comfortable with its SO

a ssigned forces and was not readily willing to giv

up its in-place capability for an unproven Com

mando Vision.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

409
Soon after the conference AFSOC sent a wrap-up

message to its field units declaring that Com mando

Vision “is our best course of action to develop experience and maintain readiness.” When Walter

Mondale, the US ambassador to Japan, informed

Washington later in the spring that it would be

wise to halt Commando Vision implementation

until 1998, Commando Vision was subsequently

put on indefinite hold, and Phase II was never

implemented.172

From 27 February to 2 March, the 353d SOG

hosted another CT II SATAF. It was the fifth

SATAF since the 353d SOG was programmed to

receive the new aircraft. The SATAF executive

committee assessed the 353d SOG site activa -

tion again as unsatisfactory, based on a shortage of AN/APQ-170 radar spares, aircraft nose

radomes, and AP-102 spares needed for the CT

II. The group expected to receive those spares

by November 1995. The committee deemed the

group’s facility planning as marginal due to the

ongoing modifications to building 3306, a facility

designed to house the CT II radar test station.*

Plans continued to assign the group’s first CT IIs to

the 1st SOS in the summer of 1995.173

May marked the first deployment of the CT II

to the Pacific theater during JCS Exercise Cobra

Gold in Thailand. From 1 to 28 May, two MC130H CT IIs from the 15th SOS flew missions in

support of the exercise. Talon II aircrew and

maintenance personnel interfaced with 1st SOS

personnel during the exercise, providing hands-on

experience for Pacific-assigned personnel. Follow -

ing Cobra Gold the two CT IIs returned to

Kadena AB and remained there through August.

Newly trained 1st SOS crews and maintenance

personnel were able to fly and maintain the aircraft during this transition period. The first-ever

deployment to Thailand for the CT II did high -

light to 353d planners the need for additional support equipment before the group operated the CT

IIs extensively. The hot, humid conditions of

Kadena AB and Southeast Asia required that the

large air-conditioning units designed for the aircraft’s electronic equipment had to be in place for

the CT II to operate properly.174

On 11 July 1995 the first CT II (88-0195) was

delivered to the 1st SOS. Over the next three

months, the remaining four aircraft arrived at

Kadena AB and were accepted by the squadron.

From 24 to 26 July, the sixth and final CT II

SATAF was held at Kadena AB. The previous SATAF in February had rated Kadena AB as unsatisfactory, but this rating was upgraded to marginal during the final meeting. Major areas of

improvement included facilities planning, which

was assessed as fully capable after completion of

the radar facility in June 1995. Maintenance

training remained at fully capable, as did manpower and personnel issues. The issues that drove

the marginal rating were those over which the

353d had no control—the continued shortage of

AN/APQ-170 radar and aircraft nose radome

spares. The SATAF assessed that the 1st SOS

should have no problem meeting its future mile -

stones in bringing the weapons system on-line.175

August saw a change of command for the 353d

SOG. On 8 August Colonel Thigpen relinquished

command to Colonel Beres, who became the fifth

commander of the 353d SOG since it was activated as the 353d SOW on 6 April 1989. General

Hobson officiated at the cer emony, which was held

in the newly acquired Commando West hangar

(formerly the Hush House). Beres was a highly

experienced Combat Talon commander who had

participated in both Desert One and in Desert

Shield/Desert Storm. He had followed Thigpen as

the commander of the 8th SOS in 1990 and had

spent a tour assigned to the Joint Staff, J-3 Directorate, the Pentagon, before coming to the 353d.176

With the death of Kim Il Sung, Beres’s immediate concern focused on the Korean peninsula and

on improving the group’s ability to support special

operations there if open hostilities resumed. During Thigpen’s time as group commander, much of

the organization’s energy had been spent on acquiring facilities and modifying them to meet the

group’s needs, but for Beres, Korea would be his

central issue. CINCPAC’s Cooperative Engage -

ment strategy was also viewed by Beres as a key

operational commitment. For the group to con -

tinue to succeed, Beres had to continue to support

Cooperative Engagement, but he also had to increase the group’s commitment to Korea. During

the latter half of 1995, Beres sought to establish

Taegu AB, Korea, as a periodic SOF training base

for US Army Special Forces and for assigned

group assets. The plan included deploying one to

two aircraft, with associated support personnel, for

two to three days a week. The 1st Battalion, 1st

Special Forces Group, based at Tori Station, Okinawa, was the primary Army unit in cluded in the

__________

 *The renovations to building 3306 were completed on 24 June 1995, and the building was available before the arrival of the first permanently

assigned CT II. A huge amount of work was required by both Headquarters AFSOC/CE and the PACAF/CE staff to qu ickly get the building on-line.

Without the facility the CT II radar could not have been bench tested, and the sophisticated aircraft could not have been main tained in a mission

ready status.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

410
concept. The group planned to begin exercising at

Taegu AB under the JCET program, with deployments to Korea identified as Gryphon Knife in

early 1996.177

For the first time since World War II, the

USAF participated in a military-to-military exercise with the Indian Air Force in India under the

JCET program. Teak Iroquois 95-4, a stand-alone

JCET conducted at Agra Air Station, India, was

not related to any other exercise that the 353d

SOG had previously flown. Teak Iroquois 95-4 included 40 members of the 353d SOG and one aircraft from the 17th SOS (the 1st SOS was in transition to the new CT II and could not participate).

The first-time event was another example of how

the 353d SOG supported the CINC’s Cooperative

Engagement strategy with expanded deployments

in the Pacific region.178

After the arrival of the first CT II in July, the

1st SOS received its additional aircraft in the Au -

gust to October time frame. On 16 August aircraft

88-0264 was delivered, followed by aircraft 88-

1803 on 25 September. The last CT IIs were delivered on 11 October (88-0191) and 15 October (88-

0192). As the new aircraft came on-line, the

remaining CT Is were returned to the United

States. Aircraft 64-1843 had been previously reassigned from the 1st SOS in December 1994, and

on 1 August 1995, aircraft 64-0565 was transferred to Duke Field. The last two CT Is (64-0571

and 64-0572) departed Kadena AB on 2 October

1995 in conjunction with the 1st SOS change of

command ceremony. Aircraft 63-7785 was at LAS

Ontario undergoing modification and was transferred directly to the 919th SOW when its PDM

was completed.179

Colonel Barwick assumed command of the 1st

SOS from Williamson on 2 October. At the conclu -

sion of the ceremony, Williamson boarded an

awaiting CT I and led the two-ship formation back

to the United States. The last two CT Is were

subsequently transferred to the 919th SOW at

Duke Field. Williamson returned to Kadena AB as

the 353d SOG assistant deputy commander.180

In November the group deployed to Korea for

the annual Foal Eagle exercise. For the 1st SOS it

marked the first major deployment of its new CT

II aircraft. Throughout the 30-day exercise, the

group maintained a 99 percent mission effective -

ness rate, the best ever for any Foal Eagle . The

Combat Talon IIs performed near flawlessly, accomplishing every mission tasked to them.181 By

year’s end the entire group was back at Kadena

AB, and the 1st SOS was settling in with its ne

weapons system.

The 7th SOS Moves to RAF Mildenhall

In Europe the 7th SOS was the first 352d SO

unit to move from RAF Alconbury to RAF Milde

hall. On 12 January 1995 squadron members ra

the unit’s guideon overland to the new beddow

location. The Combat Talon IIs were flown ov

later that day by aircrew personnel. Five day

later the 352d SOG Headquarters’ staff move

and by 1 April the entire group had relocated 

RAF Mildenhall. To help facilitate the 67th SO

move, the 8th SOS deployed from Hurlburt Fie

to Brindisi from 15 February to 15 April with i

Combat Talon I aircraft, thus releasing th

tanker unit to return to home station and com

plete its move. The whole process proved to b

easier than the one two years earlier. Colon

Connelly, who had taken command of the grou

from Orrell, immediately set about to integra

group activities into those of the 100th Air Refue

ing Wing (ARW), which was the host wing at RA

Mildenhall. In a short period Connelly had mad

great strides in achieving his goal. The bigge

impact on morale for 352d SOG personnel was th

lack of housing. There was not enough milita

family housing on base or economy housing of

base to satisfy group needs. Many families r

mained at RAF Alconbury, and the military mem

bers commuted the hour each way to RA

Mildenhall. Another problem that delayed some 

the unit’s relocation was the lack of facilities. Th

21st SOS was especially affected when a new ha

gar was not completed in time for its move. Mo

of the other problems were associated with no

mal growing pains as the group settled into life 

RAF Mildenhall.182

The first major deployment for the 7th SO

during 1995 was to the Middle East for Exerci

Noble Rose. Two 7th SOS MC-130H Comb

Talon IIs and two HC-130P/N Combat Shadow

from the 67th SOS supported US Army Speci

Forces and US Navy SEAL forces from 15 Marc

to 4 April. The objective of the exercise was 

recover personnel and equipment that had notio

ally fallen into the hands of forces unfriendly 

the United States. Training rehearsals were co

ducted during the first portion of Noble Rose. F

the exercise itself 7th SOS crews flew speci

forces personnel to a forward staging base (FSB

where they were transloaded to US Army MH

47Es and then transported on to the target are

While the helicopters were en route to the targ

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

411
area, the SEALs were infiltrated over land by US

Army MH-60s that were refueled by the Combat

Shadow tandems. Simultaneous attacks on the

target area resulted in the successful recovery of

exercise personnel and the equipment they carried. The special forces soldiers and the freed hostages were exfiltrated by way of the MH-47Es and

flown back to the FSB, while the SEALs conducted

an egress by sea. At the FSB all personnel were

transloaded on to the waiting Combat Talons for

movement to the intermediate staging base. The

operation went smoothly, with all exercise objectives met. The 352d SOG assets redeployed to

RAF Mildenhall at exercise termination, and the

other forces returned to the United States.183

After returning to the United Kingdom, the

majority of the 7th SOS was once again at home

station. For the next month local training sorties

were emphasized. On 31 May 1995 two MC130Hs, along with a large contingent of 352d SOG

assets from the 21st SOS, the 67th SOS, and the

321st STS, deployed to Thessalonica AB, Greece,

for Exercise Alpine Festung. Pre-exercise opera -

tions included low-level route surveys and airdrops in support of US Army and Greek Army

requirements. As the exercise progressed, sorties

included aerial refueling, HALO paradrops, resupply drops, CRRC drops, infiltrations, extractions, and transload operations. The excellent

low-level routes provided outstanding training,

and the many additional events proved to be invaluable in improving aircrew proficiency. On 12

June the majority of 352d SOG forces redeployed

to home station after two weeks of challenging

training in the mountains of Greece.184

On 1 July 1995 Colonel Helm assumed command of the 7th SOS from Scott. For the remainder of the summer until early fall, the squadron

supported the group’s JCET program and continued to fly local training sorties in the Scottish

Highlands low-level area. Members of the squadron also participated in training conferences, attended academic and flight upgrade courses, and

hosted instructors from the 550th SOS. The 550th

visit allowed its Combat Talon II instructors to fly

with operational crews of the 7th SOS and to gain

valuable European theater experience that they

could use to better train new crew members. 185

From 13 to 25 September, two 7th SOS Combat Talon IIs deployed to Hunter AAF in Savan -

nah, Georgia, for Exercise Knotted Whip. This

marked a continuing commitment by the squadron

to participate in the large quarterly stateside exercises. During the deployment crews flew assault

landings, airdrops, resupply drops, infiltration,

exfiltration, SAR, and casualty evacuation missions. The aircrews also practiced forward area

rearming and refueling operations and low-level

terrain-following flights. The training was outstanding, and the deployed personnel were able to

refine skills that could not be practiced in the

more restrictive European environment.186 This

deployment marked the last major commitment

for the 7th SOS before the situation in the Balkan’s required 7th SOS support.

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Recommends Realignment of Kirtland AFB

On 28 February 1995 members of the 58th

SOW were surprised by the announcement of the

proposed realignment of Kirtland AFB. The De -

fense Department’s BRAC commission made the

recommendation, which included moving the

58th SOW to Holloman AFB, New Mexico. If approved the realignment would close most facilities at Kirtland AFB except for the Sandia and

Phillips Laboratories, the Department of Energy

facilities, and a munitions squadron. The Air

Force projected the cost of realignment to be

$277.5 million, with a savings of $464.5 million

over a 20-year period.187

Shortly after the BRAC commission’s announcement, the 58th SOW began compiling the moving

costs, facilities, and requirements needed to set

up operations at Holloman AFB. From 13 to 17

March 1995, a team of 16 members from AETC

visited the 58th SOW to conduct a site survey of

the wing’s space requirements. On 20 March an

11-member 58th SOW team visited Holloman

AFB to make a quick assessment of the base’s

facilities. From 3 to 7 April the wing sent a sixperson survey team to Holloman AFB to analyze

the facilities available as opposed to the established 58th SOW requirements. The objective was

to calculate the costs to bring Holloman AFB up

to a level that could adequately support the special operations wing. From the site visit, team

members estimated that construction costs alone

could run as high as $226 million. There were

also huge hidden costs for environmental assessments for new low-level routes, helicopter and C130 DZs, and pararescue training areas. The survey team estimated the total cost of moving to

Holloman AFB to be about $231 million.188

It became increasingly clear to the 58th SOW

that huge construction costs at Holloman AFB

were making it a nonsupportable option. Air Staff

had already notified the wing to keep construction

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

412
costs at Holloman AFB under $110 million or to

select an alternate site at Beale AFB, California.

By 4 May plans were being made by AETC to conduct a site survey at both Beale and Hill AFBs.

Site surveys were conducted at the two bases by

teams from AETC, Air Combat Command, AFSOC,

and the 58th SOW from 7 through 13 May. The

58th SOW team estimated the cost of moving t o

Beale or Hill AFBs to be about $149.8 million and

$114.43 million, respectively. After reviewing

both bases the wing considered Beale AFB its

first choice for relocation because its facilities

were centrally located on the flight line and

were designed for operational and maintenance

functions. They were built in the 1960s, making

them much newer than Hill AFB’s World War

II-vintage buildings. 189

On 9 June 1995 Defense Secretary William

Perry, in a letter to the BRAC commission chairman, stated that the realignment of Kirtland AFB

no longer represented a financially or operation -

ally sound scenario. Secretary of the Air Force

Sheila Widnall and other top Air Force officials

testified at the BRAC commission hearing on 14

June 1995 that they no longer supported the Kirtland AFB realignment because it would not be

cost-effective. On 22 June the commission voted

unanimously to drop Kirtland AFB from its list of

bases. The decision came as a relief to the 58th

SOW. The special operations wing wanted to remain at Kirtland AFB, and the decision was met

with approval by its senior leadership.190

Throughout the entire BRAC commission process, Combat Talon II operations at Kirtland AFB

continued unabated. Along with training new

CT II crews, the 550th SOS supported other op -

erational requirements. An MC-130H Combat

Talon II from the 550th SOS participated in experimental airdrops at Yuma Proving Grounds

a t Yuma, Arizona, from 13 to 17 March 1995. The

10-member crew tested two experimental air-drop

systems for the Department of the Army—the

Early Entry and Lethality Battle Laboratories—

and on behalf of the USAF Air Mobility Warfare

Center. The test resulted in two world records be -

ing set—one for the heaviest payload suspended

by a parafoil (27,000 pounds) and a second for

the largest parafoil dropped (7,200 square feet).

The USAF Air Mobility Warfare Center requested

the 58th SOW perform the tests due to the wing’s

highly experienced MC-130H instructor force and

the need to guarantee mission success.191

With the BRAC commission’s decision to drop

Kirtland AFB from its realignment list, the 58th

SOW continued with its facilities program to su

port the CT II. The original simulator buildin

constructed in 1992 was being used by existin

flight simulators assigned to the wing, and the

was no room for the CT II WST. In August 199

construction began on a new simulator facility an

an academic training facility, at a cost of $9.6 m

lion. When finished the simulator facility wou

house the CT II WST, the C-130 Air Refuelin

Part Task Trainer, the HC-130 WST, the HH-60

Operational Flight Trainer, the MH-53J Part Tas

Trainer, and the UH-1N Operational Flig

Trainer.192 Loral Defense Systems was schedul

to ship the CT II WST to Kirtland AFB in la

October 1995, but without a suitable facility 

house the complex system, the date had to b

slipped. Loral was also having problems durin

its final phase of testing the WST. Consequentl

the delivery date of the WST was slipped to 199

The WST problems experienced by Loral we

primarily related to the contractor’s effort to in 

tegra te off-the-shelf systems to keep the cos

within budget. More specifically, technicia

were having trouble resolving software glitch

that prevented subsystems from working togethe

To compensate for the late arrival of the WS

Headquarters AFSOC agreed to keep four fully op 

erational CT II aircraft at Kirtland AFB at a

times, with the fourth aircraft being employed as 

CT II Part Task Trainer.193 As 1995 ended, th

long-awaited arrival of the CT II WST was st

months away.

The 7th SOS and Operation

Joint Endeavor

In early 1993 allied leaders decided to send a

to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina because 

the suffering of the civilian population brought o

by the continuing civil war. The first unit to d

ploy from the 352d SOG was the 7th SOS, whic

established an operating location at Rhein Ma

AB, Germany. Political concerns prevented th

squadron from flying low-level resupply missio

into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the squadron eve

tually redeployed to RAF Alconbury a few wee

later. Members of the 352d SOG and the 7th SO

did make, however, a significant contribution 

the operation when they developed the TRIAD

for the delivery of MREs to the starving civilian

The TRIADS became the primary delive

method for the allied resupply effort and was co

sidered a resounding success. When the 7th SO

deployed to Germany, additional 352d SOG asse

deployed to Brindisi, and they remained ther

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

413
supporting Bosnia-Herzegovina relief efforts and

providing a SAR capability.194

Throughout 1994 and 1995 the 7th SOS supported the group’s JCET program and rarely deployed to Brindisi. On 21 November 1995 a peace

agreement was signed by the warring factors at

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, that was known as

the Dayton Peace Accords. Following announcement of the agreement, on 2 December 1995, the

JCS issued an execute order which committed

SOF and conventional forces to Operation Joint

Endeavor.195 The 352d SOG was tasked to support

the Special Operations Command Implementa -

tion Forces (SOCIFOR), which was made up primarily of members from SOCEUR, the group’s

theater SOC headquarters.

With the commencement of Operation Joint

Endeavor, the mission of the 352d SOG expanded

significantly over Operation Provide Promise.

From a mission primarily centered on SAR alert,

the group transitioned to providing the primary

source of air support for SOCIFOR movements

into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The severe flying weather

in the Balkans during the winter months made

the Combat Talon weapons system the ideal

choice by planners to support the expanded SOCIFOR mission.196

On 4 December 1995, after receiving a deployment order from SOCEUR, two 7th SOS Combat

Talon IIs departed RAF Mildenhall for Stuttgart,

Germany, to onload the SOCEUR ADVON party

and to proceed forward to Brindisi. The SOCEUR

ADVON was the initial element that would form

SOCIFOR. After downloading personnel and

equipment, including a small 7th SOS ADVON

party, the two aircraft returned to RAF Mildenhall. On 5 December the next CT II mission was

flown utilizing the same mission profile as the one

on 2 December. Three days later, two more CT II

missions were flown that moved the remainder of

SOCEUR’s equipment and personnel to Italy. On 9

December the last deployment supporting SOCEUR requirements was flown.197

After a down day on 10 December, the squadron deployed two MC-130H aircraft to Brindisi

on 11 December. A third Combat Talon was positioned there on 12 December. A local orientation

flight was completed on 13 December by one MC130H , with crew members from each of the deploying hard crews receiving valuable exposure

to local operating procedures. On 14 December

two MC-130H Combat Talon IIs assumed alert

duties and were prepared to launch as required

in su pport of SOCIFOR tasking. Flying into BosniaHerzegovina during the winter was extremely

hazardous, with ground navigational equipment

marginally operational due to the prolonged civil

war. The mountainous terrain posed a huge

threat to the safe operation of the aircraft. Unique

systems aboard the Combat Talon allowed its

crews to complete missions that could not be done

by any other asset. The ability to fly self-contained

instrument approaches to near zero-to-zero conditions was utilized by the crews to safely find the

runway and land. To fly under such extreme con -

ditions required exceptional crew coordination,

and hard crews were deployed from home station

to ensure that the coordination process was optimized. The 7th SOS had five hard crews that deployed to Brindisi for the operation. The five

crews that supported SOCIFOR mission tasking

during Operation Joint Endeavor were:198

The first Combat Talon mission supporting Op -

eration Joint Endeavor was flown from Brindisi to

Sarajevo by an 8th SOS crew in a Combat Talon I

aircraft on 15 December 1995 (fig. 49). Later in

the day, two 7th SOS MC-130H Combat Talon IIs

delivered SOCIFOR personnel to the same loca -

tion. The next day two additional missions were

tasked to the 7th SOS, with the first one including pickup of personnel at Aviano AB, Italy, and

delivering them to Sarajevo. The second mission

included two sorties from Aviano AB to Sarajevo.

The first sortie of the second mission went as

planned, but the second sortie was unable to land

due to zero visibility from fog and blowing snow at

Sarajevo. Severe weather conditions that even the

Combat Talons could not overcome continued to

plague the operation on 17 December, with one

Crew 1

(Dawg Pound)

Crew 2

(Night

Rider)

Crew 3

(Dominator)

Crew 4

(Merlin’s

Magic)

Crew 5

(Hacker

Baby)

Walker Corallo Lockhart Joss Willard

Powell Scoggins White Saunders Pannell

Chinlund Wessberg Nielsen Freeman McMullen

Partain Koury Ramsey Snippen Butter

Brown Tremblay Soja Linnevers Biggs

Filer Gray Grimes Lewis Smith

Garret Carson Casey Jones Higgins

Jones Overman

Metheny Simmons

Colpitts Welch

Cunningham Moon

Thorpe

Notes: Floaters not assigned to a crew included Helm, Kisner, Michenfelder, Burford,

Blackington, Horton, and Baker.

 Every crew member assigned to the 7th SOS flew missions in support of Operation

Joint Endeavor, thus gaining valuable contingency experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

414
sortie scheduled for Tuzla diverting to Sarajevo. A

second mission on 17 December, which was also

scheduled for Tuzla, diverted to Zagreb. By the

next day (18 December 1995), weather had improved enough to allow three Combat Talon IIs to

complete two sorties into Sarajevo and two into

Tuzla. On 19 December the squadron again

launched all three of its deployed aircraft, with

two flying sorties into Sarajevo and one into

Tuzla. The next two days were a repeat of the 19

December missions, with three aircraft flying missions into both Sarajevo and Tuzla. On 21 December the last SOCIFOR infiltration missions were

completed into Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 22 De -

cember the last SOCIFOR resupply mission flown

by the 7th SOS was completed, and the unit prepared to redeploy to RAF Mildenhall.199

By late 23 December, all three Combat Talon

IIs had returned to home station, but the squadron continued to maintain a two-aircraft alert in

the event that SOCIFOR required additional support. During December, the 7th SOS flew 215.8

hours and 77 sorties supporting Operation Joi

Endeavor. No aircraft losses or damages were i

curred during the month-long operation, yet th

threat from freedom fighters on the ground, an

the severe weather restricting flight visibility, h

posed a real threat to the safety of the crews.

The training that the crews had received sinc

converting to the CT II had paid off. As 199

ended the 7th SOS members were again hom

with their families for the holiday season.

* * * * * *

The first half of the decade of the nineties prove

to be one of change and reorganization. By th

close of 1995, the 1st SOW had been reorganize

and redesignated as the 16th SOW, and the 39

and 353d SOWs had been redesignated as win

like groups. The 39th SOW had also been r

named the 352d SOG. Two operational Talo

units had converted to the Combat Talon II (1

SOS and 7th SOS), and the 15th SOS had bee

activated for the first time since the Vietna

Figure 49. 7th SOS Operating Locations in the Balkans (Source: AU Library, Maps and

Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

415
War. A training squadron had been established at

Kirtland AFB (550th SOS) that was responsible

for the formal Combat Talon II School. The 711th

had converted to Combat Talon Is at Duke Field,

and eight Combat Talon Is had been assigned to

the AF Reserve unit. As 1996 approached AFSOC

had completed the major reorganization and basing challenge brought on by the eruption of Mount

Pinatubo, objective wing directives, and relocation

actions required in Europe after the end of the

cold war. The latter half of the decade of the

1990s promised more stability as Air Force SOF

prepared for the Commando Vision-22 and the

twenty-first century.

Notes

1. History, 353d Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1991, vol. 1, 353d SOG historian file, Kadena AB, Japan,

vi.

2. Ibid., 5-3.1.

3. Ibid., iv.

4. Edward W. Wolfe, REPORT: The 1991 Eruptions of

Mount Pinatubo, Philippines ; on-line, Internet, n.d., available:

http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Volcanoes/Pinatubo/Publications/

Wolfe/wolfe_report.html, 1–2.

5. Ibid., 3.

6. Ibid., 2.

7. Ibid., 4.

8. Terry Mallon, “If They Sacrificed Pigs, This Might Not

Have Happened . . .,” Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 3.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 3–4.

11. Ibid., 4.

12. Ibid., 5.

13. Ibid.

14. Wolfe, 4–5.

15. Ibid., 5.

16. Mallon, 6.

17. Wolfe, 5.

18. Mallon, 6–7.

19. Ibid., 7.

20. Maj Forrest L. Marion, “Ash Warriors: The Relocation

of the 353d Special Operations Wing, June–December 1991,”

HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

21. Ibid.

22. Mallon, 9.

23. Marion.

24. Ibid.

25. History, 353d Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1991, vol. 1, 1st SOS History.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 1.

31. History, 39th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1991, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 1, xiii.

32. Ibid., 27.

33. Ibid., 40.

34. Ibid., 40–41.

35. Ibid., 41.

36. Ibid., 43.

37. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1991, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 1, 63.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 77.

40. Ibid., 76.

41. Ibid., 62.

42. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 4, supporting document 79.

43. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 1, 9.

44. Ibid., 14.

45. Ibid., 14–19.

46. Ibid., 19–21.

47. Ibid., 21.

48. Ibid., 24–29.

49. Ibid., 33.

50. Ibid., 3.

51. Ibid., 173.

52. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 2, supporting document 7.

53. Ibid., supporting document 8.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 4, supporting document 78.

58. Ibid.

59. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 1, 195.

60. History, 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 1 January–

30 June 1990, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 1, 21.

61. History, 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 1

July–31 December 1990, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1

July–31 December 1990, vol. 1, 50.

62. History, 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 1

July–30 September 1991; and 542d Crew Training Wing, 1

October 1991–31 December 1992, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., vol. 1, 30.

63. History, 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 1

July–30 September 1991, vol. 2, 4–5.

64. Ibid., xx.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., xx–xxi.

67. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–31

December 1992, vol. 1, 19.

68. Ibid., 30.

69. Ibid., 19.

70. Ibid., 30.

71. Ibid., xii.

72. Ibid., 41.

73. Ibid., xiii.

74. History, 39th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–1

December 1992, vol. 1, xi.

75. Ibid., 26.

76. Ibid., 75–76.

77. Ibid., 69–70.

78. Ibid., 70–71.

79. Ibid., 72.

80. Ibid., 90–91.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

416
81. Ibid., xiv–xv.

82. Ibid., xv.

83. Ibid., 72–74.

84. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1993, vol. 1, 68.

85. Ibid., 69.

86. Ibid., 60–61.

87. Ibid., viii–x.

88. Ibid., 7.

89. Ibid., 9.

90. Ibid., 56.

91. Ibid., 4.

92. Ibid., 64.

93. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1993, vol. 1, 46.

94. Ibid., 15–16.

95. Ibid., 47–48.

96. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 December

1992–31 December 1993, vol. 1, xv, xviii.

97. Ibid., 26.

98. Ibid., 54.

99. Ibid., 57.

100. Ibid., 70–71.

101. Ibid., 71.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., xviii.

104. Ibid., 97.

105. Ibid., xix.

106. Ibid., 101.

107. Ibid., 112.

108. Ibid., 101.

109. Ibid., 101–2.

110. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1993, vol. 1, 14–15.

111. Ibid., xvii–xviii.

112. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1993, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 1, 99.

113. History, 542d Crew Training Wing, 1 January–30

June 1993, vol. 1, 26–27.

114. Ibid., 22–23.

115. Ibid., 5.

116. History, 542d Crew Training Wing, 1 January–31

March 1994, vol. 1, 1–2.

117. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1994, vol. 1, 88–89.

118. Ibid., xiii–xiv.

119. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1994, vol. 1, 37–38.

120. Ibid., 40.

121. Ibid., 1 January–31 December 1994, vol. 4, support -

ing document I-185.

122. The United Nations and the Situation In Haiti (30 November 1994), on-line, Internet, n.d. available: http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/43a/131.html, 1.

123. Ibid., 1–2.

124. Ibid., 6–7.

125. Ibid., 9.

126. Col Ken Poole, interview by author, 4 November

1999, no transcript available.

127. David G. White, “Mission to Haiti,” n.d., Combat

Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 D

cember 1994, vol. 3, supporting document II-35.

133. Paul De La Garza, “United States Special Operatio

Command Public Affairs After Action Report, News Clippin

Supplement, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,” and “28 Cargo Plan

Crews Stand-by at MacDill AFB,” St. Petersburg Times, 

September 1994, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

134. Poole interview.

135. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January

June 1994, vol. 3, 11–12.

136. Ibid., 22.

137. Ibid., 32.

138. Ibid., 59.

139. Ibid., 60.

140. Ibid., 2.

141. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January

June 1994, vol. 1, Japan, 22.

142. Ibid., x.

143. Ibid., xiii.

144. Ibid., 1 January–30 June 1994, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 1, 89–90.

145. Ibid., 75.

146. Ibid., 28.

147. Ibid., 66–69.

148. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1994, HQ AFSOC/H

Hurlburt Field, Fla., vol. 1, 27–28.

149. Ibid., 28.

150. Ibid., 29.

151. Ibid., 30–31.

152. Ibid., 31–32.

153. Ibid., 33–34.

154. Ibid., 36.

155. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 April–

December 1994, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., vol. 1, 1.

156. Ibid., 1–2.

157. Ibid., 22.

158. Ibid., vol. 2, supporting document 20.

159. Ibid., vol. 2, 28–29.

160. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1994, vol. 1, 134.

161. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1995, vol. 1, xv–xvii.

162. Ibid., 83–84.

163. Ibid., 84.

164. Ibid., 84–85.

165. Ibid., 97.

166. Ibid., 98.

167. History, 919th Special Operations Wing, 1 Januar

31 December 1995, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla., v

1, 20.

168. Ibid., 21–22.

169. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 Januar

30 June 1995, vol. 1, 16–19.

170. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1994, vol. 1, 11–12.

171. Ibid., 1 January–30 June 1995, vol. 1, 11–14.

172. Ibid., 14.

173. Ibid., 57–58.

174. Ibid., 38.

175. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 July–

December 1995, vol. 1, 67.

176. Ibid., 21–22.

177. Ibid., 51.

178. Ibid., 37.

179. Ibid., 70.

180. Ibid., 23.

181. Ibid., 44.

182. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 Januar

31 December 1995, vol. 1, 201.

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVO

417
183. Ibid., 37–38.

184. Ibid., 39–40.

185. Ibid., 47.

186. Ibid., 44.

187. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1995, vol. 1, 1.

188. Ibid., 2–4.

189. Ibid., 4–5.

190. Ibid., 5.

191. Ibid., 25.

192. Ibid., 1 July–31 December 1995, vol. 1, 9.

193. Ibid., 22.

194. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–

31 December 1995, vol. 1, 73.

195. Ibid., 75.

196. Ibid.

197. Briefing, subject: Joint Endeavor/Decisive Edge—7th

SOS Operations in Support of SOCIFOR, 27 December 1995,

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid.

200. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

418
Chapter 15

Operation Assured Response to the New Millennium

(1996–2000)

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow

and of the man who leads that gains the victory.

—George S. Patton

1996: Operations Other Than War

The operations tempo experienced in 1995 con -

tinued unabated throughout 1996. Beginning on

14 December 1995, Operation Joint Endeavor in

Bosnia-Herzegovina consumed much of AFSOC’s

time. Special Operations Command Europe had

been tasked by USEUCOM in February 1993 to

establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force

(identified as JSOTF2) at San Vito AS, Brindisi,

Italy, and to provide CSAR, fire support, and airdrop capabilities for employment in the area formerly known as Yugoslavia. From the time of its

establishment, AFSOC provided SOF air assets to

support SOCEUR’s mission. Throughout 1996

AFSOC personnel and aircraft from the 4th SOS

(AC-130U), 8th SOS (MC-130E), 7th SOS and

15th SOS (MC-130H), 16th SOS (AC-130H), 20th

SOS and 21st SOS (MH-53J), and associated

maintenance squadrons continually deployed to San

Vito AS and executed a variety of missions, from

CSAR alert to air-drop/airland missions in Bosnia .

Operation Joint Endeavor officially ended on 20 December 1996, with the Combat Talons of AFSOC

playing a significant role during its execution.1

The 7th SOS—Balkan Tasking

and the JCET Program

Although the 7th SOS had returned to RAF

Mildenhall and was no longer deployed to Brindisi, the squadron was tasked occasionally to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina operation. Tasking

for the 7th SOS usually resulted from SOF-unique

airlift requirements that could only be fulfilled by

the MC-130H. On 8 January 1996, while two MC130H Combat Talons were flying an approach

into Sarajevo, numerous fires on the ground activated the Combat Talon IIs infrared detection

system, thus automatically causing the ejection of

flares from the aircraft. Once parked on the ramp,

crew members could see tracers off the approach

end of the runway. After unloading their supplies

both aircraft departed, with one returning to

Brindisi and the second flying on to Stuttgart,

Germany. During the through-flight inspection 

Stuttgart, crew members discovered a one-inc

hole in the right horizontal stabilizer that ha

been made by a 7.62 mm round. The aircraft ha

most likely received the hit during its approach 

Sarajevo. No additional damage was found.2

The following month, on 20 February, SOCEU

alerted the 7th SOS of a possible deployment 

one MC-130H to the Republic of Macedonia for 

JCET from 13 to 14 March. The actual deplo

ment occurred on 12/13 March and included mem

bers of the US Army’s 10th SFG(A) and Mac

donian army parachutists. The deployment w

significant because it was the first JCET co

ducted in Macedonia, and it gave the 7th SO

crew a unique opportunity to gain experience 

the area.3

Later in the month the squadron deployed on

Combat Talon II to Norway for a long-range inf

tration training mission into Greenland. Two No

wegian marine Jagers were infiltrated by par

chute into Greenland on 29 March and began the

attempt to break the world record for the faste

trans-Greenland crossing time without the aid 

animals or motorized vehicles. Before the infiltr

tion mission began, the deployed Talon crew fle

low-level training flights in Norway and complet

self-contained instrument approaches at their d

ployed location. To reduce the flight time to t

air-drop location in Greenland, the Danish gover

ment allowed the crew to land at Narssarssua

Greenland, to clear customs. The crew returned 

RAF Mildenhall after completion of the missio

and the Jagers achieved their world record goal o

22 June 1996.4 Meanwhile, in western Africa te

sion was building between rival factors, and 

April began the largest commitment for Comb

Talon in recent history began to unfold.

Operation Assured Response

Tension in the West African nation of Liber

reached the boiling point in April 1996. Factio

there had been maneuvering for power for sever

years, and the crisis was brought on by the actio

419
of Charles Taylor, a representative on the sixmember ruling council. On 3 April Taylor moved

to have a fellow councilman and rival faction leader,

Roosevelt Johnson, arrested and jailed. The action immediately plunged the country into civil

war. Rival gangs roaming the streets of Monrovia

threatened anyone caught outside, and the situation intensified during the first week of April. On

8 April the US ambassador to Liberia requested

an emergency assessment team be sent to Mon -

rovia to determine the threat to US personnel living there. The 352d SOG, which included the 7th

SOS, received a deployment order from SOCEUR

that same day. Within hours of the ambassador’s

request, USEUCOM forces and those assigned to

the 16th SOW at Hurlburt Field were placed on

alert.5

The 7th SOS initial tasking was vague, but it

included a water insertion of an 18-man SEAL

team off the coast of Liberia and the forward deployment of additional assets to Freetown, Sierra

Leone. The SEAL team was to move over water to

the US Embassy, which was located on the coast,

and then join up with embassy security personnel

to defend the embassy should it come under attack. Additional forces were to deploy to the area

and stand by for a possible NEO. AFSOC forces

identified by CJCS for the operation included five

MH-53J helicopters from the 21st SOS, two MC130Ps* from the 67th SOS, four MC-130Hs from

the 7th SOS, two MC-130Es from the 8th SOS,

and two AC-130Hs from the 16th SOS. Including

non-SOF assets, the number of aircraft committed

to the operation was 31. Planners quickly realized

that the selected intermediate staging base of

Freetown, could not support such a large contingency. Consequently, agreement was made with

Senegal to base all fixed-wing aircraft at Dakar,

with all rotary-wing aircraft being based at Freetown.6

Even before the deployment order was issued,

MC-130Hs from the 7th SOS were positioning in

anticipation of the start of the operation. Captain

Willard’s augmented crew was deployed to Brindisi, in support of recovery operations for Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and his party.**

The crew had flown a 30-hour crew day just prior

to completing its tasking in Dubrovnik. On 7

April Willard was tasked by General Canavan,

commander, SOCEUR, to move his staff from

Dubrovnik to Stuttgart, Germany. Willard’s instructions were to land at Stuttgart, off-load the

SOCEUR commander and his staff, and then

stand by for further instructions. After landing, as

the Combat Talon taxied to parking, the crew ob -

served a second Talon in the process of loading

while parked in the ramp area. The second aircraft was commanded by Captain Walker, and it

had arrived from RAF Mildenhall to onload the

SEAL team for the initial insertion into Liberia.

The airborne mission commander and squadron

commander of the 7th SOS, Colonel Helms, was

one of the crew members on Walker’s Talon.

Helms directed Willard to put his crew in crew

rest and be prepared for additional tasking.

Emerging SOCEUR transportation requirements,

however, created the need for a second Talon to

proceed on to Liberia, so Willard’s crew quick

turned its aircraft and prepared to move forward

with Walker’s Talon. After filing flight plans and

loading personnel and equipment, the two Talon

IIs departed Germany at 2206Z and 2236Z, respectively, on 7 April. Operation Assured Response was under way. 7

 Willard and his crew

faced another 30-hour duty day.

The route of flight took the two aircraft out

over the Atlantic to a point off the coast of Portugal, where the first of two IFRs was completed. A

second refueling was accomplished near the Ca -

nary Islands. During the long flight Captain

Walker, in the lead Talon, received a cancellation

order for the SEAL insertion and was directed to

airland the team instead at Freetown. The decision to cancel the drop came after the situation in

Monrovia somewhat stabilized. Political leaders

in the United States also became concerned over

the perception that the drop might create in the

minds of the American public. The cancellation of

the drop allowed the second aircraft, commanded

by Captain Willard, to land first in Freetown. Willard landed at 1018Z, followed at 1026Z by

Walker and his Combat Talon crew (fig. 50).8

Fifteen hours after official notification of task -

ing, the first USAF C-5 Galaxy, with two MH53Js on board, was airborne and headed for Freetown. On 9 April the 7th SOS deployed a third

Combat Talon II from RAF Mildenhall to Dakar

under the command of Captain Corallo, and he

refueled en route from a KC-135 tanker flown by

the 100th ARW. On 10 April the CJCS issued its

execution order for Operation Assured Response,

which included associated military operations in

__________

 *AFSOC HC-130P/N aircraft were redesignated MC-130P to denote their special operations as rescue status.

 **Secretary Ron Brown and his official party were killed, along with the Air Force crew, when his airplane crashed while on approach to

Dubrovnik.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

420
support of a noncombatant evacuation operation.

A fourth 7th SOS aircraft landed at Dakar two

days later. Two 8th SOS MC-130Es arrived at

Dakar on 13 April and prepared to support helicopter refueling operations in conjunction with

the MC-130Ps of the 67th SOS.9

After their arrival at Freetown, the first two

7th SOS Talon II crews entered crew rest in anticipation of follow-on tasking. On 8 April Captain Walker’s crew was tasked to fly to Dakar

and onload a special tactics team and return it to

Freetown. The team was then tasked to look for

possible FARP sites that the helicopters could

use after they completed their transload opera -

tion. The US Embassy in Monrovia had estimated that as many as 15,000 personnel could

require NEO support, and the FARP location

would be critical in rapidly refueling and turning

the helicopters after landing. The second Talon,

commanded by Willard, departed Freetown and

conducted an aerial reconnaissance of a site near

the Sierra Leone/Liberian border and then proceeded to Roberts Airfield, which was located

south of Monrovia. Willard’s mission was to identify possible alternate NEO locations in the event

the embassy location became overwhelmed with

refugees. For the flyover at Roberts Airfield, the

crew lowered the cargo ramp, and a combat con -

troller positioned himself on one side and one of

the crew loadmasters positioned himself on the

other. As the aircraft flew down the runway, the

two took pictures of the runway and taxiway

a reas. Willard was concerned with possible SA-7

missiles that had been reported in the area, but 

the crew made the low pass, they observed peop

coming out of buildings on to the airfield and wa

ing in a friendly manner. The crew completed th

mission and returned to Freetown after 2.3 hou

of flight time. When Willard landed at Freetow

the first MH-53J was completing its FCF and SO 

CEUR personnel were preparing for the first NE

flight into the embassy compou nd.10

After completing the MH-53J FCF, Majo

Webb and his crew from the 21st SOS onloade

the SEAL team, additional US Army Speci

Forces personnel, and USAF combat controlle

for transport to Monrovia. The hot and heavy co

ditions resulted in a sluggish performance by th

MH-53J, but Webb lifted off without incident an

flew a direct route to the embassy landing are

The aircraft approached the capital city ov

water approximately 10 miles off the coast. Th

helicopter then turned towards the embassy an

descended to 50 feet above the water. The rece

tion party on the LZ, made up of US Marin

assigned to the embassy, popped green smoke 

the helicopter approached the landing area. Th

LZ was approximately 50 feet above the wate

thus the helicopter’s approach was shielded b

buildings and trees along the shore. Webb lande

in the LZ, but quickly determined that it was to

restricted for safe operations. As the SEALs d

parted the aircraft, he asked them to coordina

removal of several light poles, tall trees, and larg

flower baskets located near the touchdown poin

With those obstacles removed, Webb felt that th

Figure 50. Operation Assured Response Objective Areas (Source: AU Library, Maps and

Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

421
LZ was suitable for continued operations. As soon

as all personnel off-loaded, the first contingent of

evacuees was led to the aircraft and loaded

aboard. In less than 10 minutes, Webb was back

in the air and headed north to Freetown with the

first of what would be a large NEO. At Freetown

Webb landed, and the evacuees departed the

helicopter with engines running. Webb taxied to

the FARP site, refueled, and then onloaded General Canavan and additional personnel for a return flight to Monrovia. Willard onloaded the

first evacuees on to his Talon and took off for

Dakar, where the evacuees were met by other

personnel responsible for their safety. Willard returned to Freetown and onloaded the second set

of evacuees flown out of Monrovia on the second

MH-53J flight.1 1

The NEO continued through 11 April, with aircrews operating on extended 18-hour crew days to

maximize available assets. During one approach to

the embassy LZ, Colonel Dryer’s MH-53J crew ob -

served two splashes in the water near his aircraft.

The splashes were later confirmed as RPGs that

had been aimed at Dryer’s Pave Low. General Ca -

navan subsequently suspended the NEO to allow

the fighting around the embassy to subside. The

incident led Colonel Connelly, the JSOAC commander and commander of the 352d SOG, to request a mission to flush out the party responsible

for the attack. By this time four MH-53Js were

operational at Freetown after two 20th SOS helicopters arrived from Hurlburt Field, Florida. With

General Canavan’s approval, a four-ship MH-53J

package launched and proceeded to Monrovia. Flying 15 minutes in trail, the aircraft flew a circular

pattern around the embassy, but encountered no

resistance. With fuel running low, the aircraft returned to Freetown. After an additional delay of

several hours, General Canavan made the decision to resume the NEO.12 He reasoned that the

RPG firing was an isolated incident and not part

of a campaign to prevent his forces from completing the operation.

Evacuation flights increased at a rapid rate.

Over the next two days (12–13 April), crews eva cuated 1,070 men, women, and children from Mon -

rovia and flew 276 hours. As the 8th SOS and 67th

SOS arrived and began operations, a helicopter

air-refueling anchor was established off the coast

of Liberia that gave the MH-53Js the capability of

refueling in flight and foregoing the ground refu -

eling operation. Thus, the aircraft’s turn-around

ground time at Freetown was greatly reduced.

Crews from the 7th SOS and other conventional

Air Force units continued to transload evacuees

and transport them from Freetown to Dakar for

onward movement.1 3 By the evening of 13 April,

personnel desiring evacuation stabilized at a

greatly reduced rate, and General Canavan directed that the US effort shift from one of evacu -

ation to sustainment. Special forces and SEAL

personnel were replaced by conventional soldiers,

who assumed the security role for the embassy.

Support flights continued through 17 April, when

there were virtually no personnel remaining in

Monrovia desiring evacuation.14

On 17 April USEUCOM released the four MH53Js and the US Army Special Forces and US

Navy SEAL team personnel. A Marine Expeditionary Unit was tasked by USEUCOM to take

over the operation and was scheduled to arrive in

the area by 20 April. The Combat Talons, AC130H gunships, and KC-135 tankers remained

committed to Operation Assured Response until

the Marine Expeditionary Unit was in place and

operational. The four 7th SOS Combat Talon IIs

were released on 21 April and returned to RAF

Mildenhall over the next two days. The two Combat Talon Is of the 8th SOS were released on 22

April and began their return trip to Hurlburt

Field. The 7th SOS CT IIs flew 173.3 hours, while

the 8th SOS Talon Is flew 67.4. During the course

of the eight-day evacuation operation, 2,122 personnel were airlifted out of Monrovia, including

436 American citizens. Fifty-five rotary-wing

evacuation sorties were flown from Monrovia to

Freetown, with 35 fixed-wing sorties flown from

Freetown to Dakar. By 2 May 1996 the last support aircraft had departed Sierra Leone, and Op -

eration Assured Response was terminated. Com -

bat Talons participating in the op eration included

8th SOS MC-130E aircraft 64-0551 and 64-0568

USAF Photo

Evacuees prepare to board an MH-53J flown by a 21st

SOS crew at the US Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. Note

the downed trees to the left of the landing zone.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

422
and 7th SOS MC-130H aircraft 84-0476, 87-0023,

88-0193, and 88-0194.1 5 The operation once again

demonstrated the flexibility of SOFs to react to a

developing crisis, deploy halfway around the

world, and then accomplish the tasked mission

within a short period. Operation Assured Response was a resounding success.

As the 7th SOS settled back into the local rou -

tine at RAF Mildenhall, the 352d SOG JCET program again took center stage. Throughout the

summer and fall of 1996, the squadron deployed

to France, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Tunisia

while completing nine JCETs. Scenarios ranged

from unilateral infiltration missions to complex,

multiple events that included low-level opera -

tions, airborne intercepts, and airland events.

Squadron members used the deployments to gain

valuable experience in operating away from

home station, working with foreign forces, and

observing different cultures throughout Europe

and Africa. Another benefit of the JCET program

was that it allowed the squadron to deploy to

southern locations where more nighttime hours

were available in the summer and fall than were

available in Central Europe and points north.

Flight restrictions and limitations on night op -

erations were generally less restrictive than in

the United Kingdom .1 6

In early September JSOTF2 at Brindisi received an initial notification of pending tasking

to support a presidential delegation (PRESDEL)

into Bosnia-Herzegovina during the upcoming

national elections in that country. On 8 September SOCEUR issued an operations order to

JSOTF2 that included tasking for two 7th SOS

Combat Talon II aircraft. Planning began both at

RAF Mildenhall and at Brindisi, and by 9 September forces were identified, and a rehearsal

plan was developed. MH-53J crews flew site su

veys throughout the Sarajevo area, and on 1

September they were joined by the two 7th SO

aircraft. Emphasis was placed on flying actu

routes to the various locations that the PRE

DEL needed to visit, then flying the publishe

approaches to landings. Crews made multiple i

strument and self-contained approaches to b

come thoroughly familiar with each location. A

PRESDEL support aircraft stood down on 1

September in preparation for the actual missio

the following day. On 14 September the MH-53

and the two MC-130Hs flew to Sarajevo and o

loaded members of the PRESDEL. The 7th SO

crews took members of the delegation to Banj

Luka and to Mostar, while the 21st SOS helico

ters traveled to Tuzla with their passengers. A

ter the Combat Talon off-loaded its PRESDEL 

Banja Luka, it flew on to Mostar and joined u

with the other CT II aircraft to await the extra

tion call. Once the PRESDEL personnel com 

pleted their mission, the Talons and the MH

53Js transported them back to Sarajevo. Durin

the course of the workup and execution of th

mission, crews flew 46 sorties and logged 95

hours of flying time. On 15 September, the d

after completion of the mission, the two Comb

USAF Photo

Evacuees of many nationalities await loading on 

MC-130H at Freetown, Sierra Leone, before their mov

ment on to Dakar, Senegal.

USAF Photo

A 7th Special Operations Squadron crew departs

Dakar, Senegal, for another transload operation at

Freetown, Sierra Leone.

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

423
Talons returned to home station, and the MH53Js resumed their SAR alert at Brindisi. 17

From 3 to 15 November, elements of all three

352d SOG-assigned squadrons deployed to San

Javier AB, Spain, for Exercise Popex 96. This

marked the first time that all three squadrons

had deployed together since Exercise Noble Rose

in 1994. The exercise consisted of supporting

Spanish special forces utilizing a variety of insertion methods for personnel, cargo, and equipment,

and both day and night tactical scenarios. At the

peak of the exercise, 128 members from the group

deployed to Spain, and assets included three 7th

SOS CT IIs, one 67th SOS MC-130P, and two 21st

SOS MH-53Js. A major glitch occurred when deploying airlift was redirected to support a realworld contingency operation. This caused the loss

of a number of exercise events because of the lack

of spare parts and equipment to repair the deployed aircraft. High winds and marginal weather

also impacted several days of training. Overall,

however, the exercise was a success, with deployed crews, maintenance personnel, and support personnel alike gaining valuable experience

working together as a team.1 8

In November the situation in Central Africa,

which resulted from the 1994 Hutu and Tutsi civil

war, again intensified. On 5 November, while Exercise Popex was getting under way in Spain,

news of a mass exodus of refugees from Zaire to

Rwanda reached USEUCOM. Planning began for

a humanitarian aid mission, named Operation

Guardian Assistance , that would help deliver food

and supplies to the affected refugees. It was not

until 13 November, after the employment of a

USEUCOM survey team, that a statement of requirement emerged. Initial requirements included

352d SOG MH-53Js, MC-130Ps, and two 16th

SOW-assigned AC-130Hs. The 7th SOS was not

included in the initial tasking. On 29 November

one AC-130U gunship deployed to Entebbe,

Uganda, to provide reconnaissance support for

the operation. Because of limited billeting, ra -

tions, and support at Entebbe , the 7th SOS received tasking to airlift needed supplies there. On

29 November the squadron deployed one MC130H from RAF Mildenhall. After an overnight

stop at Brindisi, the Talon II continued on to Entebbe on 30 November. The crew delivered a full

load of supplies and remained at Entebbe until 2

December, when it was released and returned to

Brindisi.19

The AC-130U flew reconnaissance missions

during the early part of December and collected

enough data to convince EUCOM and national

leaders that the majority of the refugees had returned to Rwanda of their own free will. The

number of refugees proved to be much lower than

initially projected. Consequently, international relief agencies determined that Rwanda had the ca -

pacity, and the will, to take care of the refugees.

On 11 December EUCOM issued a redeployment

order, and on 14 December the AC-130U returned

to Brindisi. Remaining units of the 352d SOG

were relieved of tasking, and Operation Guardian

Assistance was terminated.2 0 The mission to Central Africa marked the last significant event for

the 7th SOS for 1996.

Fulton STARS Operations Terminated

The year 1996 began at Hurlburt Field with a

change-of-command ceremony for the 8th SOS.

Colonel Moore assumed command of the squadron from Poole on 5 January 1996. Four months

later on 24 May 1996, Colonel Glausier assumed

command of the 15th SOS from Ron Lovett.2 1

Both new commanders had grown up in Combat

Talons, having served previous tours with the

USAF Photo

The Skyanchor is removed from the nose section as the

STARS is officially retired from the Air Force.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

424
7th SOS in Europe and with the 8th SOS at

Hurlburt Field.

The 16th SOW received an operational readiness inspection from 15 April to 29 May 1996. For

the inspection three 8th SOS MC-130Es and four

15th SOS MC-130Hs deployed to Cecil Field,

Florid a, along with other wing assets. The 45-day

evaluation was extremely demanding on all participants, but in the end the 16th SOW received

an overall excellent rating, as did the 8th SOS.

The 15th SOS was given a satisfactory rating,

which validated for the first time its combat capa -

bility in the still-new CT II weapons system.22 The

CT II had come a long way since the program was

nearly canceled in the late 1980s.

The 8th SOS continued periodically to rotate

aircraft and crews to Brindisi, Italy, and the

unit maintained a vigorous exercise schedule

from home station. In September 1996 Saddam

Hussein once again caused tensions in the Middle East to escalate when he refused to allow

the UN special commission inspection team access to key facilities thought to house weapons

of mass destruction. In response to the crisis,

the commanding general of Special Operations

Command, Central (COMSOCCENT) requested

additional forces be deployed to the region to

augment the existing CSAR force. The 8th SOS

was tasked to provide two MC-130Es, and on 10

October they departed Hurlburt Field bound for

the Middle East. With four IFRs en route, the

deployment was planned as a nonstop flight to

Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia. Within 36

hours of tasking, the 8th SOS Combat Talons

had arrived at their beddown location.2 3

Although the region did not erupt into an allout shooting war, the expanded Southern Watch

operation resulted in the approval for UN fighter

aircraft to strike back at Iraqi military targets

when those targets challenged the enforcement of

the no-fly zone. For the remainder of the year, the

8th SOS maintained two Combat Talons in Saudi

Arabia, with at least one aircraft on continuous

CSAR alert in the event of a friendly aircraft

shoot down by the Iraqis.

As the 8th SOS deployed to the Middle East in

September, another significant event occurred for

the squadron. Since its inception in 1965, the Fulton surface-to-air recovery system had been an

integral part of the MC-130E weapons system. Although several combat missions were planned

during the Vietnam War era, no actual combat

recoveries were made with the system. By the

1990s SOF rotary-wing aircraft had been modified

with IFR capability that allowed them to refu

from C-130 tanker aircraft. This capability e

tended the range of the helicopter, thus elimina

ing most of the need for STARS. The acquisitio

of the CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, with its extende

range and ability to land and pick up survivor

finally eliminated the requirement for STARS a

together. Headquarters AFSOC determined th

STARS was too expensive to continue to mainta

and moved to cancel the program when it sent 

request to USSOCOM asking relief from the r

quirement. Sporadic training continued on th

system for the next 12 months. 24 In its 031722

September 1997 message, Headquarters AFSO

announced that USCINCSOC had finally a

proved the termination of the Fulton mission. Th

message directed both the 16th SOW at Hurlbu

Field (the 8th SOS) and the 919th SOW at Duk

Field (the 711th SOS) to terminate all trainin

maintenance, and equipment acquisition assoc

ated with STARS.25 Subsequent to the 3 Septem

ber message, the last STARS training missio

was flown out of Hurlburt Field, with sever

long-time Talon crew members on the flight fo

the historic event. With the retirement of the Fu

ton system, a long and colorful chapter in Comb

Talon history ended.

The 15th SOS supported numerous exercise

and training events out of Hurlburt Field fo

the remainder of 1996. With 10 aircraft a

signed, it was by far the largest of the Comb

Talon units, and its personnel had gained valu 

able experience flying the complex aircraft ov

the past three years.

The 711th SOS Employs

the Combat Talon I

At Duke Field 1996 was a year of training an

growth for the 711th SOS. As the New Year b

gan, the squadron had three Combat Talon I ai

craft assigned and was in the process of certifyin

its second combat crew. On 13 February th

fourth Combat Talon (62-1843) was assigned 

the 919th SOW, followed by 64-0561 on 6 Marc

and 64-0565 on 8 March. For most of the remai

der of the year, the squadron operated with seve

aircraft, with the eighth aircraft (64-0551) bein

assigned on 6 December 1996.2 6 The squadro

was tasked to establish a minimal Talon I comb

capability by the end of CY 96, and it focused i

efforts on attaining that goal. As the squadro

established its Talon I crew, it drew on a combin

tion of former squadron members from the AC-130

gunship and from Talon I personnel separatin

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

425
from the active Air Force. Its new aircrew was

made up of 64 percent former gunship personnel,

16 percent highly experienced Talon I crew members fresh off active duty, and 20 percent from

other weapons systems. The mixture of seasoned

and inexperienced crew members was able to

make great strides throughout the yea r.2 7

The Combat Talon II Weapons System

Trainer Is Delivered to Kirtland AFB

The long-planned MC-130H Combat Talon II

WST was delivered to Kirtland AFB on 1 April

1996, and Loral Defense Systems contractors set

about to install and bring the complex system online. The Combat Talon II WST was designated as

a six-degree freedom-of-motion-based flight simulator. It provided a platform for MC-130H special

operations training and mission rehearsal. The

WST crew positions included a pilot, copilot, flight

engineer, navigator, and EWO. The WST fully duplicated all MC-130H aircraft functions to allow

training in cockpit procedures, instrument flight,

and integrated sensor operations, including the

multimode radar, the infrared detection system,

and the integrated inertial navigation system/

global positioning system navigation suite.2 8 For

the remainder of the year, technicians worked to

get the simulator operational.

At the 550th SOS the first half of the year was

spent training many students for the CT II. By

summer the squadron was able to participate in

the next Chile Flag exercise. From 10 June to 2

August, 58th SOW assets participated in Chile

Flag 96-05. The primary joint customer for the

exercise was SEAL Team 5 from North Island

NAS, California. On 23 July a 550th SOS crew

flew to North Island NAS, picked up a 12-man

SEAL team and their equipment, and then transported them back to Kirtland AFB. During the

following two-week exercise, 58th SOW assets, including the MC-130H CT II, supported the SEAL

team with personnel airdrops, alternate insertion

extraction, and live fire range support. The sce -

nario was designed to test participating crews’

ability to insert and recover personnel from a

high-threat environment. On 2 August a 550th

SOS CT II flew the SEALs back to California,

thus ending a highly successful Chile Flag.29 The

550th SOS participated in two additional Chile

Flag exercises during the fall—97-01 in September and 97-02 in October. The scenario for the

follow-on exercises was similar to the July event,

with all participants benefiting from the close association of the joint units.

The new simulator building was completed on

19 October 1996, with the academic training facility

also completed the same day. The two projects

(costing $7.52 million) were the last two major projects required for the beddown of the Combat

Talon II at Kirtland AFB. Along with the MC130H WST, the simulator housed other weapons

systems part-task trainers and the HC-130P

WST.

30

JCET Tasking Dominates Pacific SOF

In early January 1996, 71 members of the 353d

SOG deployed to the Philippines for JCET Balance

Piston 96-1. After the successful deployment the

previous November to Foal Eagle , Barwick felt it

was time to put the new Combat Talon II weapons

system on the road. Balance Piston 96-1 was held

6–22 January at Subic Bay and Clark AB and had

as its primary objective the furthering of bilateral

relations between the 353d SOG and the Armed

Forces of the Philippines. The 1st SOS contingent

included two MC-130H CT II aircraft that provided airlift and exercise support for both US

Army and Philippine participating forces. During

the exercise the 1st SOS accomplished an assortment of training events, including NVG low-level,

personnel and resupply airdrops, assault landings,

and tactical infiltrations and exfiltrations. Members of the Philippine air force flew on the Combat

Talons and observed their capabilities. For the exercise the 1st SOS flew 75 hours and completed 15

of 16 scheduled sorties.

31

Beres’s initiative to use Taegu AB as a SOF

training area came to fruition in early 1996 when

the 353d SOG made its first JCET deployment

there 13–15 February. The primary objective of

the deployment was to validate the group’s

Gryphon Knife checklist. Fifteen members of the

17th SOS and one MC-130P supported the deployment. At the completion of the event, Beres relayed to SOCPAC and AFSOC that his Korean

training initiative was on track. He planned to in -

crease future use of Taegu AB by incorporating all

three of the group’s flying squadron s.

3 2

One 1st SOS Combat Talon II deployed to AbdulRachman AB in Malang, Indonesia, for JCET Balance Iron 96-3 from 4 to 12 April 1996. The new

Combat Talon performed well, although the In -

donesian military made several changes th at

negatively impacted the training value of the exercise. Major problems centered on the country’s na -

tional air show that was scheduled for the same

period. The squadron was forced to relocate from

its original base, only to find that there was no

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

426
fuel available at the new location because it had been

diverted for the air show. The aircrew had to fly 30

minutes to another airfield to obtain fuel and then fly

two more hours to onload the US Army Special

Forces team and host-nation exercise participants.

The squadron did not receive the expected training

value, although aircrew and maintainers alike

learned more about operating the sophisticated MC130H in an austere environment.33

Also in April the 353d SOG underwent another major reorganization when the on-aircraft

maintenance function was moved from the fixedwing squadrons (the 1st SOS and 17th SOS) to

the 353d Maintenance Squadron. The move reduced each flying squadron by 50 personnel and

eliminated the first sergeant position in both

squadrons. The action created turmoil once again

in the 353d SOG, a state that had become almost

normal since Mount Pinatubo. Beres vehemently

objected to the reorganization, communicating

back to General Hobson that his unit organiza -

tion was not broken and that the reorganization

would create undue stress and turmoil in his

group. He particularly objected to the loss of the

two first sergeant positions. Over the next several months, he continued to work with AFSOC

manpower and eventually received one authorization for a first sergeant. The position was assigned to the group headquarters with responsibility for the welfare of enlisted personnel in both

the 1st SOS and 17th SOS.

34

From 12 April to 6 May, the 1st SOS participated in JCET Vector Flash Action 96-2 with

two MC-130H aircraft and more than 100 group

personnel. Along with th e 353d SOG-assigned

units, US Navy SEALs and the Au stralian Spe -

cial Air Service Regiment participated in the largest JCET in recent history. Exercise participants

were based out of Swanborne, Keanie College,

Royal Australian Air Force, Pearce AB (Perth)

and Bidoon, Western Australia. The 1st SOS’s

primary training objectives centered on low-level

flight operations, including NVG low-level and

airborne intercept training with the Royal Austra -

lian Air Force. The exercise proved to be the best

yet for the 1st SOS, with all pre-exercise objectives being met. The CT II again performed near

flawlessly.3 5

In May the 1st SOS participated in JCS Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand. The squadron flew

59.1 hours and completed eight tasked missions

during the exercise. Throughout the first six

months of 1996, the CT II continued to perform in

an excellent manner. The only problem with th

new aircraft was a continued shortage of rad

spares that regularly impacted its operation

status. Aircraft 88-1803 also experienced a “pu

ing to the left” during taxi operations, but after 

depot maintenance team inspected the aircraft 

Kadena AB, no defective part could be found. T

team recommended switching the number 1 an

number 4 propellers, which maintenance did, an

the problem was eliminated. The other four aircra

had no major problems. The transition of the 1

SOS to the CT II had been a smooth one, and t

squadron was operating the aircraft throughout th

Western Pacific.

36

The 1st SOS deployed two Combat Talons 

the Philippines from 16 July to 4 August for th

second Balance Piston (93-3) JCET of the yea

This exercise staged out of Subic Internation

Airport, Clark International Airport, and Macta

AB (Cebu).* Although the exercise was planned 

accommodate both US and Philippine military ob 

jectives, misunderstandings on low-level approv

and unseasonably severe weather reduced t

training value for the event. During the course 

the exercise, more than 35 inches of rain w

dumped on the exercise area by two typhoon

Eight missions were canceled due to the b

weather. The CT II aircraft did, however, perfor

well, given the bad weather experienced throug

out the exercis e.37

Colonel Garlington led a Headquarters AFSO

ASET visit to the 353d SOG from 22 July to 

August. As had been the case the previous yea

the group did well on the evaluation. Garlingto

lauded the group and its squadrons for makin

significant progress in all deficient areas iden

fied in the February 1995 visit. Tech Sergea

Eubanks of the 1st SOS was recognized for h

widely acclaimed MC-130H flight engineer new

letter, which provided vital information on th

new weapons system to crew members in th

squadron.38

On 25 September the Koror Babelthaup Bridg

in the Palau Islands (located southeast of the Ph

ippines and just north of New Guinea) collapse

The 257-yard long two-lane concrete structu

linked vital utilities and the local airport, locat

on the main island of Babelthaup, to the popul

tion and business center of Koror. Two people we

killed, and the water lifeline for 10,000 residen

was severed. Five days later the 353d SOG w

tasked by COMSOCPAC to provide airlift su

port to deliver water purification equipment an

__________

 *NAS Cubi Point had been renamed Subic International Airport, and Clark AB had been renamed C lark International Airport earlier in the year

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

427
supplies from Andersen AFB, Guam, to the island

republic. Two aircrews and two MC-130H CT IIs

of the 1st SOS responded on 1 October with more

than 70,000 pounds of relief supplies and desalina -

tion equipment. The squadron transported five

r everse-osmosis water-purification units, three highpressure pumps, six water bladders, and seven Air

Force and two Navy personnel to operate the

equipment. The quick response helped Palau recover from the disaster by providing fresh water

for many of its residents (fig. 51).

3 9

In November the group deployed 428 person -

nel to Korea for Foal Eagle 96 and received its

second ORI during the course of the exercise. For

the 1st SOS it deployed four MC-130H CT II aircraft. Harsh Korean weather caused the cancella -

tion of 11 group-tasked missions, which resulted

in an overall mission effectiveness rate of 94 percent. The 1st SOS Combat Talon crews flew 46

sorties and logged 95.2 hours as they successfully

completed infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply

missions. During the deployment phase of the

evaluation, all three group-assigned flying squadrons received a grade of excellent. After a diffi -

cult and challenging month of flying, the group

was awarded an overall satisfactory rating by the

AFSOC IG.

4 0

After the squadron returned to Kadena AB in

December, the 1st SOS deployed one MC-130H CT

II to Guam in support of the US Navy SEALs stationed there. During the course of the exercise, on 8

December, the crew was asked to join in the

search for a missing family (husband, wife, and

son) who had not returned from a boating trip. After

the initial search proved fruitless by civilian

authorities, the Combat Talon crew joined the effort. Five hours into the flight, Captain Bauernfeind’s crew spotted the family on an atoll about 600

miles southeast of Guam. The crew loadmasters

(Staff Sergeant Corlew, Staff Sergeant Schwinghamer, and Tech Sergeant Faulkner) rigged an airdrop package, consisting of a life raft and radio, for

the family. The drop was significant because the

crew was not trained for the SAR mission and did

not have life rafts rigged for airdrop. On the second

pass the loadmasters tossed in-flight meals and a

first-aid kit to the survivors. The family advised the

crew through the survival radio that they were extremely dehydrated and needed water. A third pass

was quickly made, and water was dropped to them.

As a result of the actions of the CT II crew, the lives

of the three individuals were saved.41 The year

closed with the crew back at Kadena AB with the

rest of the 1st SOS.

1997: African and Asian Operations

Dominate Combat Talon

The 1996 ORI had validated the combat capa -

bility of the 1st SOS Combat Talon IIs. With the

inspection complete the squadron could look forward to expanding the capability throughout the

Pacific. In January 1997 alone the squadron deployed aircraft to Australia, Guam, and Thailand

Figure 51. Map of Palau Located in the South Pacific (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts

Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

428
for JCET events. In February one MC-130H and

32 personnel deployed to Hussein Sastranegara

AB in Bandung, Indonesia, for JCET Balance Iron

97-2. Along with the 1st SOS, elements of the Indonesian army, USAF Special Tactics personnel,

and US Army Special Forces from the 3d Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, participated in the

two-week-long exercise. The primary objective of

the JCET was to promote interoperability and cooperation between the United States and Indonesian armed forces and to improve bilateral rela -

tionships in support of USCINCPAC’s Cooperative

Engagement strategy. The 1st SOS had several

specific objectives for the deployment: conducting

resupply and personnel airdrops in support of US

and Indonesian JCET participants, executing lowlevel and NVG operations, and providing specialized airlift support for US Army participants.4 2

During the course of the event, 37.2 hours were

flown in the process of accomplishing exercise ob -

jectives. Personnel drops included both static-line

and HALO infiltration events. From 24 January

to 8 February, the deployed crews flew eight days

and accomplished all of their pre-exercise objectives. An important lesson learned from the deployment was that future events in Indonesia

should be planned during the dry season. The period from December through April was the mon -

soon season, and several missions were canceled

because of torrential rains. The squadron also deployed a qualified Indonesian linguist whose presence greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the exercise. When the contingent redeployed on 8

February, military-to-military relationships had

been greatly improved.43

The end of February saw a 1st SOS-assigned

Combat Talon II deployed to Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, for Teak Torch 97-5. The primary thrust of

the JCET was to conduct airborne intercept train -

ing with Thai F-16 aircraft and to fly training missions against Thai coastal defense batteries to test

the crew’s ability to avoid the threats. The 121st

Air Refueling Wing, Ohio National Guard, deployed

a KC-135 tanker for the exercise, and both Thai

F-16s and 1st SOS Combat Talons received valuable in-flight refueling training. Low-level t errainfollowing operations and NVG landings were also

completed. The 1st SOS crews flew 42.5 hours be -

tween 23 February and 3 March and accomplished

all of their objectives .4 4

The squadron deployed one Combat Talon to

McChord AFB, Washington, from 11 to 28 March

to participate in Gryphon Mariner. While there

the crews were able to accomplish events not

available in the Pacific. Also in March one Com

bat Talon deployed to Guam and supported th

US Navy SEAL detachment located there. Th

two-week JCET, named Gryphon Globe, conce

trated on CRRC drops and on NVG night-landin

operation s.45

Progress continued throughout the year to e

tablish a regular deployment to Taegu AB, Kore

During the first half of 1997, aircraft from the 1

SOS and 17th SOS deployed weekly for one- 

two-day events. Typically, the aircraft would shu

tle US Army Special Forces personnel and USA

STS team members from Kadena AB to Kore

then support them during each short exercis

Beres focused his group on the North Korea

threat and had the group maintain a high state 

preparedness in the event the volatile situatio

intensified into open conflict. Along with the reg

larly scheduled overnight missions, almost dai

out-and-backs were flown from Kadena AB. 

typical out-and-back profile began with a hig

a ltitude leg, then a descent into low-level aft

crossing the South Korean coastline. A lowlev

profile would then be flown, terminating in an ai

drop near Taegu AB. If a tanker was available, th

crew would climb to altitude, accomplish an IF

and then proceed back to Kadena AB for missio

termination. If a tanker was not available, th

crew would land at Kunsan AB, Korea, and refue

After refueling the crew would then return 

Kadena AB for mission termination. The enti

flight was usually seven-to-nine hours in duratio

Although demanding the profile offered the be

training opportunity available from home station

On 3 June 1997 Colonel Herrera assumed com

mand of the 1st SOS from Barwick, who had bee

either the operations officer or commander of th

squadron for the past five years. Barwick r

turned to Hurlburt Field to become the depu

commandant of the USAF Special Operation

School. Herrera had been in Talons for most of h

flying career, having served a tour in the 7th SO

in Europe before coming to the Pacific. 46

Operation Bevel Edge

In the summer of 1997 tensions increased in t

Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh after factio

loyal to the country’s two rival leaders, First Prim

Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Secon

Prime Minister Hun Sen, clashed in the streets 

the city. The two leaders had been partners in 

coalition government following the UN-monitor

elections in 1993 but had grappled for powe

throughout 1996 and 1997. Bloody skirmish

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

429
had occurred frequently, with the resultant

deaths of both civilian and military personnel.

On 5 July 1997, as Hun Sen forces gained control

of Phnom Penh, his troops sacked the city, loot -

ing and plundering everything that they could

get their hands on. During the battle for the capital, government officials estimated that more

than 150 personnel either were killed or wounded.

As Hun Sen consolidated his power, fighting

spread to northwestern Cambodia, and Ranariddh

and his followers fled the country for asylum in

France. On 10 July the US government ordered

all but 20 of its diplomats out of Cambodia and

advised the more than 1,000 Americans living in

the country to leave.47

With the government in limbo and the country

disintegrating into anarchy, COMSOCPAC issued

an alert/deployment order on 8 July, and 12 hours

later the first Combat Talon from the 1st SOS

was airborne and headed to Thailand. 48 The 353d

SOG was tasked to support a USPACOM JTF under the command of Brig Gen Norton A.

Schwartz. Group-assigned deploying forces included three MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft,

three MC-130Ps, three MH-53Js, and 340 person -

nel. The JTF, identified as JTF Bevel Edge, was

tasked to assess the Cambodian situation and be

prepared to execute a noncombatant evacuation

order if required. The deployment from Kadena

AB to Utapao, Thailand, was supported by C-5 ,

C-17, C-141, and KC-135 aircraft.49

The situation stabilized in Phnom Penh over

the next several days, and the new government

allowed non-Cambodian citizens to depart the

country by way of commercial air if they chose to

do so. JTF Bevel Edge remained in place until 22

July, at which time forces redeployed to home sta -

tion. Although an NEO was not required, the

group learned valuable lessons about short-notice

deployments and demonstrated its ability to react

rapidly to a real-world crisis. The 1st SOS deployed aircraft 88-0195, 88-0191, and 88-1803 and

flew 72 hours supporting JTF Bevel Edge.50

The following three months saw the 1st SOS

continue to support both JCS-sponsored exercises

and theater JCET events. As the JTF Bevel Edge

tasking ended, the 1st SOS deployed two Combat

Talons to Udorn RTAFB for JCET Balance Torch

97-4. More than 100 personnel deployed for the

training event. Because of other commitments a

KC-135 previously committed to Balance Torch

was withdrawn, and the resultant loss of IFR

training for the RTAF severely impacted the remainder of the exercise. The RTAF canceled

scheduled airborne intercept training and was

generally uncooperative. As a result the training

value of the deployment was greatly reduced. In

August elements of the 1st SOS deployed along

with other members of the 353d SOG to Korea for

JCS-directed Exercise Valid Response. Two Combat Talons, one Combat Shadow, and three Pave

Low III helicopters took part in the exercise. During the last part of August, the group participated

in the annual JCS Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 97,

which was sponsored by the United States and

the Republic of Korea. By the first of September

the majority of group personnel was back at

Kadena AB. 51

On 2 September 1997 Colonel Folkerts assumed

command of the 353d SOG from Beres in a ceremony conducted in the group’s Commando West

hangar. The ceremony was presided over by Maj

Gen Charles R. Holland, who had recently become

the AFSOC commander. Like Beres, Folkerts’s

number one goal was to enhance the group’s combat readiness. His second priority, and closely

linked to the first, was to continue 353d SOG efforts to refine Korean War plans that included

group assets in its force structure.5 2 For the opera -

tional squadrons there was little impact as the

new commander smoothly transitioned into his

role as the senior Air Force SOF commander in

WestPac.

A second Indonesian JCET was conducted by

1st SOS personnel from 5 to 22 September and

was named Teak Iron 97-4. The JCET again operated out of Bandung, Indonesia, and only USAF

and IAF personnel participated. This was the first

time that an Air Force–only JCET event had been

conducted in that country. Previous events revolved around a ground scenario driven by the Indonesian army. The primary thrust of Teak Iron

97-4 was HALO operations from both US and IAF

aircraft. A problem developed when it was discovered that IAF oxygen procedures were significantly different from those of the United States.

As a result USAF STS personnel jumping from

IAF aircraft were restricted to a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet. The 1st SOS aircraft dropped

from altitudes up to 25,000 feet. Constantly changing winds on the DZ and in the surrounding mountains restricted the number of actual drops, but an

adequate number of HALO events was completed

to make the training a success .5 3

The annual Foal Eagle exercise kicked off in October and continued into November. The 353d SOG

deployed more than 300 personnel, all four MC130H Combat Talons, three MC-130P (previously

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

430
HC-130P) Combat Shadows, and three MH-53J

Pave Low III helicopters to Taegu AB and flew

missions in support of the combined unconventional warfare task force. The group established a

combined Air Force Special Operations Component (CAFSOC) and provided the command and

control structure to manage the large special op -

erations contingent. During the exercise 747 hours

were flown during 223 tasked missions, and an

additional 1,000 hours were flown during unilateral training not specifically tasked by the exercise. Colonel Folkerts served as the CAFSOC commander and employed additional forces from the

1st SOW and US Army aviation during the course

of the exercise. Foal Eagle 97 continued to provide

the best training of any exercise for the grou p.5 4

By 6 November Foal Eagle had come to a successful close, and all forces had redeployed to their

home stations. The 1st SOS later deployed a Combat Talon to Guam during the last half of the

month to support the SEALs stationed there. On

17 November the crew was again requested to fly

a SAR mission out of Guam. The US Coast Guard,

Marianas Section, requested the crew search for a

missing 18-foot skiff with four persons on board.

The vessel (named Chico) had been missing for

three days. The crew launched early the next

morning with the daunting task of finding a small

boat in a 2,500-square-mile search area. The crew

was commanded by Captain Roller, with additional maintenance personnel on board to help

scan for possible survivors. It was almost an impossible task, but within one hour of commencing

the search, the boat was spotted. The crew radioed

back to the Coast Guard the location of the Chico

and was informed that the location could not be

reached until the following day. The aircrew de -

vised a means to drop supplies to the four survivors, with the two loadmasters using flotation de -

vices, duct tape, and garbage bags to create

packages containing bottled water and food. The

crew also dropped a survival radio and then

headed for Truk Islands to refuel. The Coast Guard

was able to coordinate with a Micronesian ship

operating in the area to pick up the Chico crew.

The Combat Talon returned from Truk Islands to

assist the Micronesian vessel in finding the small

craft. The aircraft orbited overhead and guided the

ship to the survivors; all four personnel were rescued and returned home safely.5 5 The crew that

flew the mission was Captain Roller, Captain Hastert, Captain Ziener, Captain Scudder, Tech Sergeant Dampier, Tech Sergeant Demchenko, and

Tech Sergeant Paul. The dramatic rescue was th

last major action for the 1st SOS during 1997.

An 8th SOS Crew Helps Locate

Downed Pilot in Utah

An 8th SOS MC-130E and crew deployed to Hi

AFB, Utah, in early February as part of the squa

ron’s mountain training program. On 4 Februa

1997, while the aircraft was flying a mountai

terrain-following mission, Hill AFB called and r

quested its assistance in locating a downed F-1

crew. The F-16D was assigned to the 419

Fighter Wing, which was also located at Hill AF

Proceeding to the aircraft’s last known positio

the Combat Talon maneuvered through the ru

ged mountains utilizing its terrain-following rad

system and was able to locate the crash site on th

side of a steep mountain range. The crew record

the position of the wreckage with its sophisticat

navigation system and relayed the coordinates to 

US Army HH-60 Blackhawk helicopter that w

assisting in the search. As the HH-60 neared th

wreckage site, the Combat Talon crew dropp

flares over the area to help guide the helicopte

The Blackhawk crew was able to locate the downe

crew members and extract them from the snow

covered terrain. The downed airmen were tran

ported back to Hill AFB for medical checkups an

later released from the base hospital. For both th

Combat Talon crew and the Blackhawk crew, 

was a job well don e.5 6

Throughout 1997 the 8th SOS continued to fi

both contingency and exercise taskings. Fro

April to July the unit once again deployed 

Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southe

Watch . Aircrew, intelligence, and support perso

nel from the 8th SOS, the 711th SOS, and mai

tenance personnel from the 16th Logistics Grou

deployed to Prince Sultan AB, Al Kharj, Sau

Arabia. Two crews and support personnel fro

the 8th SOS and one crew from the 711th SO

flew two MC-130E Combat Talon Is on a 26.

hour nonstop flight, arriving in Saudi Arabia o

the evening of 11 April. The Combat Talon crew

assumed alert duty, beginning on 15 April, after 

brief transition period with the HC-130 crew

from the 71st Rescue Squadron out of Patric

AFB, Florida. On 17 July, following their 90-d

tour at Prince Sultan AB, members of the 8

SOS returned to Hurlburt Field, thus completin

the squadron’s second deployment to Southwe

Asia in support of Operation Southern Watc

since the fall of 1996.

57

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

431
The squadron also maintained a vigorous

JCET deployment schedule to Southern Com -

mand. On four separate occasions the unit deployed one MC-130E to countries in Central and

South America, including Panama, Ecuador, and

Venezuela.5 8 Excellent training was accomplished

by the Talon crews as they worked with hostnation and US Army Special Forces personnel. On

18 July 1997 Colonel Alderfer assumed command

of the 8th SOS from Moore. Aldefer had been previously assigned to the 15th SOS and was the

first Combat Talon II experienced officer to command a Talon I squadron.5 9

A 15th SOS Crew Is Awarded Venezuela’s

Highest Medal of Gallantry

The 15th SOS also maintained a rigorous

schedule throughout the year. On 15 February

1997 the squadron received a deployment order

for one MC-130H and crew to deploy to South

America to conduct combined aviation training

with elements of the US Army’s 7th and 20th Special Forces Groups and with soldiers from the

host nation visited. The training included highspeed, low-level aerial delivery system airdrops,

low-level terrain following, and personnel airborne operations. The aircraft and crew performed in an exceptional manner and successfully

completed all exercise objectives. On 27 February

the 15th SOS crew returned to Hurlburt Field

after a successful deployment.6 0

Perhaps the most significant event for the 15th

SOS during 1997 occurred while deployed to Venezuela during a JCET event. On 10 July Venezuela

experienced a 6.9-magnitude earthquake, and the

squadron subsequently was tasked to support relief

operations. During the ensuing effort the 15th SOS

provided relief to more than 15,000 earthquake victims by delivering 175,000 pounds of supplies during the presidential-directed relief operation. The

aircrew was recognized for its support by receiving

Venezuela’s highest medal of gallantry, the Order

of Jose Antonio Anzoategui. The squadron also

deployed an MC-130H aircraft and a crew three

additional times throughout the year for JCET

events in South America. It closed out the year de -

ployed to Cherry Point (MCAS), North Carolina, for

JRX 98-1.61

The 711th SOS Deploys to

Operation Southern Watch

At Duke Field the 711th SOS was ready to

move on to greater challenges as a Combat Talon I

operational squadron. On 1 March 1997 the

squadron became operational, and by so doing, be -

came available for worldwide tasking through

Headquarters AFSOC. 62 The squadron’s first op -

erational deployment was to Operation Southern

Watch . From 10 April to 15 May 1997, 711th SOS

crew members augmented the 8th SOS at Prince

Sultan AB, Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia. The deployment provided much needed relief for the 71st

Rescue Squadron, which had been heavily tasked

to support the operation. The 8th SOS provided

two of its assigned MC-130Es, and the two squadrons pooled their crew resources to make up three

crews. Once in Saudi Arabia personnel were billeted in a tent city that had most of the amenities

of home station. The work schedule consisted of a

two-day CSAR alert followed by a training flight,

then two days as the duty crew, followed by another training flight. The six-day cycle would then

be repeated.63 Throughout the 35-day deployment,

711th SOS personnel worked seamlessly with

their active duty counterparts.

During March and April the squadron participated in air-drop operations out of Biggs AAF, El

Paso, Texas, and deployed to Green Flag 97-3 supporting the 3d and 7th Special Forces Groups.6 4

On 3 August the 711th was involved in a dramatic

sea rescue while supporting a joint exercise out of

home station. A 711th SOS Talon I had completed

the first portion of an infiltration/exfiltration mission for a US Army ranger company and had de -

parted the DZ, flying south over the Gulf of Mexico. A crew member on board the Talon spotted a

debris field about 10 miles off the coast. The debris

included a cooler, a gray fiberglass panel, and possibly a ship’s mast. There was no sign of life, but

the crew contacted the US Coast Guard to report

the sighting. There were no missing vessels reported in the area, but the Coast Guard responded

in case there had been a sinking. Later in the

mission, after landing and refueling, the 711th

crew returned to the last known position of the

debris field but could not find any trace of survivors even with the use of NVGs and the aircraft’s

FLIR system. The Coast Guard later found a

man and his son floating in a life raft near the

position that the crew had relayed. The alert action of the crew undoubtedly saved the lives of

the two individuals.6 5

On 1 October 1997 the flying training portion

of the formal Combat Talon I School was moved to

Duke Field. At that time the 711th SOS too k on

the added responsibility of flight training all USAF

active and reserve crew members in the Talon I

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

432
aircraft. The 19th SOS at Hurlburt Field retained

overall responsibility for the formal school and

continued to conduct Phase I ground training, in -

cluding instruction in the Talon I simulator. Under the new concept students reported to the 711th

SOS at Duke Field for the flying phase.6 6 The

711th SOS created nine instructor positions to

conduct the training and a chief of training position to supervise the program. The new positions

were all air reserve technicians, and they had a

dual chain of command. When flying in support of

the formal school, the instructors reported directly

to the 19th SOS at Hurlburt Field. When not flying schoolhouse lines, the instructors reported to

the 711th commander, and they were responsible

for all ground training, flight training, and sched -

uling for the 711th SOS. The dual reporting organization allowed the 919th SOW to meet its goal

of providing effective, efficient flight training while

producing mission-qualified active duty and reserve aircrew members for AFSOC and the Air

Force Reserve Component (AFRC). 67 The arrange -

ment further cemented the close relationship be -

tween the active and reserve Talon I force. As the

year ended the 711th SOS had attained its place

as an operational Talon I squadron.

The 550th SOS Expands Its

Participation in Bilateral Exercises

The Headquarters AETC initiative to include

the 58th SOW in AFSOC joint exercises came to

fruition in early 1997. During March and April the

550th SOS participated in five bilateral exercises.

The first exercise kicked off on 4 March and lasted

through 13 March. The exercise began with the

550th SOS deploying to Patrick AFB, Florida, to

conduct continuation training events, which in -

cluded personnel and resupply airdrops. During

the deployment the squadron flew 30 hours in support of joint exercise participants. On 13 March

the crew returned to Kirtland AFB after comple -

tion of a successful exercis e.6 8

On 8 March a second CT II deployed to Fort

Campbell AAF, Kentucky, to participate in the

second bilateral exercise of the month. The Talon

II crew onloaded 160th SOAR and US Army

ranger personnel and then continued on to Biggs

AAF, Texas, which was the site of the exercise.

Although maintenance problems forced the rescheduling of several sorties, the Kirtland AFB

crew managed to support the exercise and get

excellent training themselves. On 11 March the

Talon II returned the 160th SOAR team to Kentucky and later returned to Kirtland AFB. 69

The next bilateral exercise took place on 27 an

28 March. On 27 March the squadron deploye

one CT II to Gila Bend, Arizona, to onload 

passengers and two Humvee tactical vehicles an

then transported them to Libby AAF. A secon

sortie was flown back to Gila Bend to pick u

five additional passengers, one Humvee, and 

trailer. Once the exercise participants were 

place at Libby AAF, the CT II crew began th

air-drop portion of the exercise. The 550th ai

dropped 26 troops and one A-21 bundle durin

the two-day exercise. On 28 March the aircra

returned to Kirtland AFB, thus completing th

third bilateral exercise during March.7 0

Another bilateral exercise was conducted from 

to 11 April and included one Combat Talon II an

elements of the 22d Special Tactics Squadron, th

15th SOS, the 1st Special Forces Group, and th

446th Air Evacuation Squadron. On 7 April th

550th SOS flew a deployment sortie from Kirtlan

AFB to McChord AFB, Washington. During th

following five days, the crew flew 16.8 hours an

completed personnel airdrops, additional unila

eral tactical training, and Rapid on/off-load even

The 550th SOS crew, along with one from the 15

SOS, completed 80 percent of its planned trainin

events for the five-day exercise. During the retu

flight to home station on 11 April, the 550th cre

conducted one additional personnel airdrop durin

the 5.1-hour sortie. A second bilateral exercise w

conducted from 12 to 19 April and staged out 

Portland, Oregon. A 550th SOS MC-130P partic

pated in this exercise, thus giving the squadron

Combat Talon IIs a break from their rigorous d

ployment schedule.71

By the end of June 1997, the Combat Talon 

WST had been integrated into the intersimulato

network with other local and/or off-site simulator

Although technical problems still plagued the com

pletion of the pilot, navigator, and flight engine

regular and refresher simulator courses, the WS

offered the EWO simulator refresher course an

the loadmaster refresher course. More than 10

crew members completed the latter two simulato

courses during the first half of 1997.

7 2

The 550th SOS continued to train Combat Talo

II crew members throughout 1997. From 1 July 

31 December 1997, students attended 11 Comb

Talon II specific courses. The course of instructio

was extremely demanding for the students. By t

end of September, 83 MC-130H students ha

graduated either as new or upgraded Combat Talo

II crew members. The high gradu ation rate cou

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

433
be directly attributed to the dedicated, professional instructors of the 550th SOS.73

The squadron’s bilateral exercise schedule con -

tinued to challenge the unit through the fall and

winter of 1997. Bilateral training events were con -

ducted from 11 to 16 September, 20 to 30 October,

and 16 to 19 December. The September exercise

focused on airborne intercept training. On 11 Sep -

tember one 550th SOS Combat Talon deployed to

Hanscom Field, Massachusetts. During the deployment leg the MC-130H crew completed airborne intercept training with four F-15 fighters

assigned to the 131st FW. Once settled at Hanscom

Field, the crew members flew daily sorties that

tested their ability to conduct low-level operations

while evading an airborne threat. During each sortie the crew was challenged by two F-16 aircraft

assigned to the 158th Fighter Grou p.74

After completing their airborne intercept work

out of Hanscom Field, the crew members successfully completed assault landings at Pope AFB and

proceeded on to Shaw AFB, South Carolina. After

completing pilot proficiency training sorties out of

Shaw, the crew returned to Kirtland AFB on 16

September. During the redeployment to home sta -

tion, the crew flew against the Poinsett EW range

and logged a midlevel ground radar event. The

crew also completed two instructor qualification

check rides, additional continuation training

events, and multiple training events for the electronic warfare officer.75

On 20 October the 550th deployed one MC130H to Peterson AFB, Colorado, and picked up

soldiers assigned to the 2d Battalion, 10th Special

Forces Group, and one pallet of their equipment.

The aircraft proceeded on to Burris DZ and completed a static-line drop. For the next six days, the

crew conducted HALO and static-line drops in

support of the Special Forces team. On 30 October

the Combat Talon II redeployed to Colorado and

made one last combination HALO and static-line

drop, then airlanded the remaining personnel and

supplies at Peterson Field. The crew continued on

to Kirtland AFB, logging 36 hours during the 10-

day exercis e.76

The last bilateral exercise of the year was flown

out of Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, from 16 to 19

December. The thrust of this exercise was again

airborne intercept training. For three days the

550th crew conducted airborne intercept training

with the 389th Fighter Squadron’s assigned F-15

and F-16 aircraft. In addition to flying against

the fighters, the crew also completed low-level

training events and flew multiple self-contained

a pproaches. Only one intercept event had to be

canceled on the first day of training due to poor

weather. The last training mission was flown on

19 December after the crew completed six sorties

and logged 13.2 flying hours. The mission commander, Captain Bauernfeind, commented, “The

trip to Mountain Home provided some of the best

airborne intercept training that the 550th SOS

had ever received. It is highly recommended that

the 550th SOS continues to return to Mountain

Home for this hard to find training.”77 The Idaho

deployment was the last off-station event of the

squadron for 1997.

The 1997 MacKay Trophy Is

Awarded to a 7th SOS Crew

Elements of the 7th SOS had redeployed from

Central Africa to home station in mid-December

1996 and had spent the holiday season with their

families. As 1997 began, other units of the 352d

SOG were heavily committed to operations in the

Balkans. Operation Joint Endeavor had changed

to Operation Joint Guard on 20 December 1996,

but the group’s tasking for CSAR alert, which in -

cluded MH-53Js and MC-130Ps, remained in

place. The 7th SOS continued to execute group

tasking under the USEUCOM JCET program.7 8

The group was scheduled for a Headquarters AF -

SOC/IG-administered operational readiness inspection in October, and the 7th SOS would facilitate the group’s preparation for it during JCET

events throughout the year.

The first deployment of the year for the 352d

SOG was to Evenes AB, Norway, from 7 to 16

January and included one MC-130H, two MC130Ps, and 60 aircrew and support personnel. Participating personnel were processed for the JCET

through the RAF Mildenhall mobility processing

system, with cargo being marshaled and inspected, aircraft loaded, and then launched utiliz -

ing ORI criteria. Once at Evenes AB the deployed

force was faced with severe cold and extreme

weather conditions that affected airborne opera -

tions. Airborne intercept events scheduled for the

7th SOS were canceled, but squadron personnel

accomplished most of the other objectives for the

exercise. One benefit derived from the deployment

was that unit personnel were able to evaluate fa -

cilities at Evenes AB in the event the location

were used for the actual ORI in October.79 The

JCET was an excellent first step towards getting

the group up to speed for the fall evaluation.

February marked the first time that the 7th SOS

deployed to Hungary. From 19 to 27 February, one

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

434
MC-130H aircraft, crew, and support personnel exe -

cuted missions that primarily revolved around an

airborne threat scenario during the USEUCOMsponsored JCET event. Hungarian Air Force MiG

aircraft, along with surface-to-air-missile systems, challenged the 7th SOS crew as it flew tactical profiles. The training was realistic, with both

sides gaining valuable experience flying against

each military’s weapons systems. The JCET was

highly successful and helped to promote a positive

military-to-military relationship between Hungary and the United States. 80

The second ORI rehearsal was conducted from

1 to 12 March during Exercise Adventure Express. The 352d SOG deployed one 7th SOS MC130H Combat Talon II and a robust A staff to

replicate the one to be used during the ORI. An

AFSOD was established at the deployed location,

and it reported to JTF Norway during the course

of the exercise. To challenge the staff and to provide valuable tracking experience, the AFSOD not

only reported the daily status of the MC-130H but

also reported on the remainder of group aircraft

located back at home station. The flying portion of

the exercise was challenging, with high winds associated with fronts passing through the exercise

area canceling several sorties. The high winds

created moderate to severe turbulence in the

mountains and impacted the parachutists’ ability

to safely land on the DZ. The two-week exercise

was an excellent second step in the group’s prepa -

ration for the fall inspection.81

During the next three months, the 7th SOS op -

erated primarily out of home station flying train -

ing lines and supporting short-duration tasking.

Unrest in Central Africa caused SOCEUR to put

elements of the 352d SOG on alert during the

March time frame, including the four MC-130H

Combat Talons of the 7th SOS. Tasking was eventually eliminated for the 7th SOS aircraft, but on

24 March the 352d SOG deployed a package con -

sisting of MC-130Ps and MH-53Js to support Op -

eration Guardian Retrieval. After completion of

tasking, all group assets returned to RAF Mildenhall on 10 April.82 Tensions remained high in Central and Western Africa, and by May the group

was again on alert. After several days of intense

planning, USEUCOM deleted the 352d SOG from

its deployment alert status.

83

On Saturday, 7 June 1997, the 352d SOG re -

ceived verbal tasking for Operation Firm Response,

a possible NEO in the Central African country of

the Republic of the Congo. The 7th SOS placed two

aircrews in crew rest for possible deployment in

response to the deteriorating situation. Stabili

continued to decrease in the capital city of Bra

zaville, and on 8 June the two 7th SOS MC-130

Combat Talon IIs launched and headed 

Stuttgart, Germany, to link up with SOCEUR pe

sonnel at Patch Barracks. The first Talon arrived 

Stuttgart at 0245Z on Monday, 9 June, and th

crew immediately entered crew rest for possible o

ward movement to Central Africa. The secon

Talon experienced a short maintenance delay befo

departure from RAF Mildenhall and did not arriv

in Stuttgart until 0601Z on 9 June. The second cre

also went into crew rest for the pending missio

Members of Crew One (call sign Whisk 05, Talo

86-1699) included Captain Foster, Captain Bake

Captain Walker, Captain Ramsey, Staff Sergea

Hoyt, Master Sergeant Scott, Tech Sergeant Bake

and Colonel Kisner. Members of Crew Two (ca

sign Whisk 21, 87-0023) were Captain Corall

Captain Garstka, Captain Toth, Captain Burfor

Tech Sergeant Colpitts, Tech Sergeant Riddel

and Staff Sergeant Grimes. Upon arrival at Stu

gart the mission commander, Colonel Kisne

was met by Captain Simmons (also of the 7

SOS) and taken to SOCEUR Headquarters for a

updated mission briefin g.84

The SOCEUR planning staff had develope

various courses of action (COA) for the operatio

The COAs ranged from the insertion of a robu

security force into the American embassy com

pound in Brazzaville to the insertion of a 12-ma

ESAT. The ESAT was composed primarily of U

Army and Navy special operators equipped with 

communications package that gave CINCEUR a

eyes-on-target assessment of the situation in an

around the embassy. With the ESAT recommend

tions in-hand, SOCEUR and EUCOM planne

could then tailor any additional response, 

needed. The larger security team was designed 

augment the US Marine security force at the em

bassy and provide additional firepower should th

embassy come under direct attack.85

Throughout the day planning continued, but th

situation seemed to stabilize somewhat as em

bassy reports filtered into SOCEUR Headqua

ters. Reports were so favorable that SOCEUR r

leased its planning staff for a much needed rest 

1830Z on 9 June. However, sporadic reports fro

the embassy indicated that the situation w

worsening, and by 1930Z EUCOM made the dec

sion to launch both Combat Talons with a robu

ESAT composed of both the assessment team and 

beefed-up security element. Both crews we

alerted, and they departed Panzer Kassern fo

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

435
Stuttgart AAF at 2045Z. When the crews arrived

at the airfield, they learned that the plan had

changed once again. Instead of the two-ship package, the force had been trimmed back to fit into

one Combat Talon. The 12-man ESAT was

equipped with two Humvees to provide it mobility

on the ground in Brazzaville. The Combat Talon

contingent consisted of the seven-man Whisk 05

crew, and a special tactics team led by Captain Collins. Other USAF personnel making up the deployment package included Staff Sergeant McAlister,

dedicated crew chief; Senior Airman Zdancewicz,

turbo prop specialist; Airman First Class Burghardt, security police (force protection); Airman

First Class Evans, security police (force protection);

and Captain Jones, 352d SOG logistics plann er.8 6

The combined package included 30 personnel,

their gear, and the two Humvees. Each Humvee

was loaded with additional water, ammunition,

and rations needed for an extended operation. In

total more than 22,000 pounds of equipment was

loaded on board the one Combat Talon . For the

mission the crew had to use the emergency war

planning weight of 175,000 pounds. Three IFRs

were scheduled to allow the Combat Talon to

make the long flight nonstop. On Tuesday, 10

June 1997, at 0100Z, aircraft 86-1699, call sign

Whisk 05, departed Stuttgart and headed south

towards the Mediterranean and into Algerian airspace. The second Combat Talon crew, in aircraft

87-0023, went back into crew rest and was placed

in alert status at Stuttgart for follow-on tasking.87

Whisk 05 rendezvoused with two KC-135 tankers over Algeria four hours and 45 minutes after

takeoff and began the first of three IFRs. Although

Algerian overflight had been approved to reduce

the deployment time, the lack of suitable alternate

airfields over the vast Sahara Desert required the

crew to refuel up to 175,000 pounds during each

refueling. Because of the high outside temperature

and the aircraft’s heavy gross weight, the last

10,000 pounds of fuel had to be onloaded during a

descent (or toboggan) maneuver. Rising terrain

and extended time on the boom taxed the Talon

crew, but after two hours and 30 minutes of taking

fuel during the three refuelings, the Talon departed the southern end of the refueling track and

headed into Niger. Brazzaville was still six hours

away, and the Combat Talon had to fly over Niger,

Nigeria, and Cameroon to get to its destination

(fig. 52). At approximately four hours out from

landing, Whisk 05 was informed by way of secure

satellite radio to expect evacuees when they arrived.

Two hours out from landing, crew loadmasters

handed out flak jackets and prepared their weapons, and maintenance personnel assisted in positioning Kevlar mats to be used to protect the

evacuees during departure.

8 8

At approximately 15 miles north of Brazzaville,

the EUCOM Command Center informed the crew

that a firefight was occurring near the control

tower. The crew was directed to hold north of the

airfield and was asked how long could it hold be -

fore having to divert. With only 20 minutes of fuel

reserve remaining, Whisk 05 requested permission

from EUCOM to land if the French forces controlling the airfield cleared the aircraft for landing.

EUCOM responded with permission to continue

but stated that the crew assumed the risk associated with its action. The Talon was subsequently

cleared for the approach by a French controller in

the tower, and the crew flew a self-contained approach to runway 06. The crew made a textbook

approach, turning tightly around mountains north

of the airfield and avoiding built-up areas to the

west. In broad daylight and with the firefight

barely contained, the Talon crew touched down at

1521Z after a 14.4-hour flight from Stuttgart. The

aircraft was instructed to remain on the runway

and to taxi to the departure end. Once there the

loadmasters began a rapid off-load of the ESAT

and its two Humvees. The Kevlar bulletproof mats

were installed on the aircraft floor, and within five

minutes of the initial landing, the aircraft was

fully prepared to accept its passengers.

8 9

A cordon of French forces established a perimeter

around the tall grass on either side of the Combat

Talon, and additional French soldiers escorted the

evacuees from the aero club hangar to the awaiting aircraft. In total 56 scared, confused, and shellshocked noncombatants were rapidly loaded on to

the Combat Talon . The ESAT team came under

fire as it waited for the aircraft to finish the loading process. At 1544Z, just 23 minutes after landing, Whisk 05 was again airborne and headed for

its next destination of Libreville, Gabon. After another 2.4 hours of flying time, the aircraft landed

with 30 Americans and 26 nationals from 11 different countries and 9,000 pounds of fuel remaining. In total the crew logged 16.8 hours and flew a

grueling 21-hour crew duty day.*90

__________

 *The 7th SOS crew was awarded the 1997 MacKay Trophy for the “most meritorious flight for the year by either an Air Force military member or

an aircrew.” The award also recognized the crew for “gallantry, intrepidity, unusual initiative, resourcefulness, and achievement of outstanding

results.” Personnel receiving the prestigious award were Lieutenant Colonel Kisner, Majo r (Dr.) Michaelson, Captain Baker, Captain Foster,

Captain Ramsey, Captain Toth, Master Sergeant Scott, Tech Sergeant Baker, Staff Sergeant Hens dill, and Staff Sergeant Hoyt.91

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

436
At Brazzaville the ESAT proceeded to the

American embassy overland and commenced its

assessment of the situation. Over the next eight

days, Whisk 05 remained on alert at Libreville in

the event it became necessary to extract the US

ambassador, his staff, and the ESAT. At Stuttgart

Whisk 21 was released from alert on 14 June and

proceeded back to RAF Mildenhall, arriving back

at home station at 1042Z. On 17 June a cease-fire

between the warring factions went into place, and

a charter aircraft was arranged for the following

day for the US ambassador. Whisk 05 was tasked

to exfiltrate the ESAT after the departure of the

ambassador and his staff. On 18 June Whisk 05

departed Libreville at 0558Z and landed at Brazzaville at 0801Z. The aircraft was on the ground

25 minutes and departed at 0826Z with the ESAT

and one passenger. Two hours later the Comb

Talon landed at Libreville, off-loaded the passe

ger, and then onloaded the STS and maintenanc

personnel for a five-hour flight to Ascension I

land in the South Atlantic. Once there the cre

waited for the arrival of a liquid oxygen (LOX

converter for the aircraft. On 22 June a new LO

converter was installed, and the aircraft departe

Ascension Island en route to Dakar, Senegal, whe

it refueled and proceeded on to Rota AB, Spain. A

Rota AB the crew spent the night and rested aft

a long day of flying. On 23 June the crew made a

operations stop at Stuttgart to deliver the ESA

then proceeded on to RAF Mildenhall. For the e

tire mission the crew logged 47.4 hours.92 The tw

week mission in support of Operation Firm R

sponse had been a resounding success.

Figure 52. Route of Whisk 05, 1997 MacKay Trophy Winner (Source: AU Library, Maps and

Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

437
With the Central African crisis behind it, the 7th

SOS concentrated on preparations for the upcoming

ORI. The squadron deployed one MC-130H CT II to

Aalborg, Denmark, for a JCET event with the Danish Jaggerkorpset during the first week of July.

From 8 to 14 August, a large 352d SOG contingent

deployed to RAF Macrihanish, Scotland, for ORE

Hadrian’s Wall. Unlike the previous small-scale

JCET events, Hadrian’s Wall included all three

flying squadrons, along with a robust headquarters staff, maintenance, and support personnel. A

full range of special operations missions was con -

ducted, with the 7th SOS crews performing in an

excellent manner. Many lessons were learned,

and the experience gained by the staff and the

flying squadrons left the group well prepared as it

entered the final 60-day countdown to its ORI in

October.9 3

With the ORE behind it, the 7th SOS concen -

trated on correcting deficiencies identified during

the exercise and soon was on the road again sup -

porting the group’s JCET program. Single-ship de -

ployments were made to Norway and Morocco during September, and the group was tasked for a

no-notice contingency-oriented exercise named Ellipse Bravo in Italy. Scheduled operations were

soon overcome by another real-world event off the

coast of Namibia in Southern Africa.

Operation High Flight

On 14 September a USAF C-141B Starlifter

departed Windhoek, Namibia, bound for Ascension Island in the South Atlantic. At 0900Z on 15

September, Headquarters Air Mobility Command

relayed to US Atlantic Command and to USEUCOM that the aircraft was overdue and was

missing. At the same time a German Luftwaffe

TU-154 that was on a training flight in the area

was also reported missing. At approximately

1200Z Colonel Planert, the 352d SOG commander, received a call from the commander,

Special Operations Command Europe, General

Lambert, who queried him on the availability of

crews and aircraft for possible support of a SAR

mission. By late afternoon Planert had been

tasked to put together a SAR package available

for deployment in the event EUCOM directed

SOCEUR to do so. Both 7th SOS and 67th SOS

personnel were put in crew-rest status, and

maintenance personnel prepared unit aircraft for

the long flight to Namibia. Group assets tasked

to support the SAR, which was named Operation

High Flight, included one MC-130H Combat

Talon II and one MC-130P Combat Shadow as

primary aircraft, and three MH-53J Pave Low III

helicopters on standby alert. With a USEUCOM

execute order in hand, 352d SOG forces quickly

began to move out. At 0755Z the first aircraft, a

67th SOS MC-130P, departed RAF Mildenhall

with a special tactics team, zodiac inflatable boat,

and Colonel Barnett on board as the mission comm ander. Two hours later the MC-130H departed

at 0954Z with Colonel Arnold as the aircraft commander. Each crew also transported elements of

an A staff, security forces, direct-support opera -

tors, contractor, and medical personnel. The

package totaled 77 airmen, including crew members flying the two aircraft.9 4

The route of flight took them over Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Zaire, and

finally Namibia (fig. 53). The first IFR was completed in Algerian airspace, followed by a second

one over Gabon. As the two aircraft were transiting south, the search operation got under way off

the coast of Namibia with a South African air

force C-130 and Boeing 707. A German Dassault

Atlantique antisubmarine aircraft was also part

of the search team. Two South African helicopters

would join the search in short order. After nearly

18 hours in the air, the MC-130P landed at Windhoek at 0143Z on 16 September, and the 7th SOS

MC-130H landed at 0416Z. The crews immediately entered crew rest so that they could commence the search operation as soon as possible.

The A staff set up communications gear, and

Barnett contacted his coalition counterparts to be -

gin integrating his operation into the search.9 5

The first SAR mission for the 7th SOS was con -

ducted during the night of 16 September. The

Talon II departed Windhoek at 2043Z and employed its sophisticated radar and FLIR systems.

The radar had the capability to detect wreckage

on the surface of the ocean, and the FLIR could

detect any heat sources (survivors). On board the

Combat Talon were one special tactics combat controller and two pararescuemen equipped with a

zodiac boat and an MA-1 sea rescue package (two

seven-man rafts and supplies) that was rigged for

airdrop should survivors be found. The crew flew

at 1,000 feet above the water at 180 KIAS. On the

first mission nothing was found, and the crew returned to Windhoek. Before landing the crew experienced problems with the number 2 engine and

shut it down. The aircraft required an engine

change, and it was not until 18 September that a

new one could be shipped and installed.96

Over the next week both aircraft flew daily

sorties, but only a small amount of wreckage and

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

438
an oil slick was located. Enough wreckage was

found to determine that the C-141 and the TU154 had collided over the South Atlantic. On 25

September the recovery operation shifted unofficially from SAR to search and salvage after it was

determined that there was no possibility of finding survivors. The last SAR mission flown by the

7th SOS was on 26 September, after which time

the effort was officially classified as a search and

salvage.97 The Combat Talon departed Namibia

on 27 September, followed by the MC-130P the

next day. Both aircraft stayed overnight at Rota

AB, Spain, and by 29 September the 352d SOG

contingent had recovered to RAF Mildenhall. Although no survivors were found, General Lambert

and USEUCOM praised the professionalism of

everyone participating in the operation.98

The long anticipated ORI kicked off in Octob

and was named Operation Nordic Retrieval. Th

first organic aircraft to deploy was a 7th SOS M

130H on 9 October carrying the group’s advanc

team to Andoya AS, Norway. Personnel arrived 

2115 local and immediately commenced prepar

tions for the arrival of the remaining aircraft an

personnel. Over the next five days, personne

equipment, and aircraft continued to arrive at A

doya AS and formed the AFSOC. The deploy

AFSOC included three MH-53Js, four MC-130

Combat Talon IIs, and two MC-130Ps. On 14 Oct

ber all 352d SOG forces had closed on Andoya A

and SOCEUR tasked the group to form a Com

bined Joint Special Operations Task Forc

(CJSOTF), with Colonel Planert as the Task Forc

commander. Low-level route surveys, LZ survey

Figure 53. Route of Flight, Operation High Flight (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts

Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

439
and initial leaflet drops in support of the exercise

scenario were accomplished during the next two

days. Throughout the following week a full array

of missions was flown, and the CJSOTF was

given the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to

survive and operate during a chemical warfare

attack on its main operating base. By 24 October

the exercise scenario had provided the Headquarters AFSOC/IG with enough opportunities to complete its evaluation. Beginning on 24 October assets

began redeploying to RAF Mildenhall. Overall the

352d SOG earned an excellent rating for the ORI,

with the 7th SOS receiving an outstanding rating

during the critical “employment phase” of the in -

spection. The months of preparation, coupled with

real-world deployments, had prepared the group

for the challenging exercis e.99

For the final two months of the year, the 7th SOS

continued to fly local training sorties and deployed

for a JCET in Italy just after Thanksgivin g. As

1997 ended the squadron had time to reflect on its

many accomplishments throughout the year.

From the cold of Andoya AS to the steaming heat

of Namibia, the crews and aircraft of the squadron had performed admirably. Everyone looked

forward with anticipation to 1998.

1998: First Lieutenant Blassie

of the 8th SOS Comes Home

The year 1998 was marked by expanded employment of Combat Talon II to remote areas of

the world and to previously denied areas of Eastern Europe. For the 8th SOS the remains of a lost

pilot from the Vietnam War were identified and

laid to rest. The 7th SOS continued its history of

excellence by winning the 1998 Tunner Award.

For the Combat Talon community, the year would

be another memorable one.

The 7th SOS Returns to Africa

Both the JCET and JCS exercise programs con -

tinued to be the primary emphasis of the 7th SOS

during the first half of 1998. Two MC-130H aircraft and crews participated in Red Flag 98-2

from 26 January to 6 February at Nellis AFB,

Nevada. The 7th SOS contingent joined special

operations crews from the 1st SOS and the 8th

SOS during the two-week exercise.

For the 7th SOS, deployment began on 21

January wh en a two-aircraft Talon II package de -

parted RAF Mildenhall bound for Halifax, Nova

Scotia. After spending the night at Halifax, the

two crews flew on to Peterson AFB, Colorado,

where they remained for the next two days. The

crews arrived at Nellis AFB on 24 January and

settled into their working areas, and the Combat

Talons were prepared for the scheduled missions.

On 26 January both crews conducted familiariza -

tion flights to orientate themselves with the local

area. The primary mission for the 7th SOS during

Red Flag included flying in an intensive EW environment while conducting airdrops and participating in infiltration and exfiltration scenarios.100

Beginning 27 January the first 7th SOS mission was flown into the Nellis range and consisted

of a container airdrop followed by NVG landings

at a remote assault strip. For the duration of the

exercise, the two crews alternated flying every

other day, gaining valuable experience working

with crews from the other two Talon squadrons.

Inclement weather caused the cancellation of several sorties, but the crews were successful in attaining most of their exercise goals.101

The squadron experienced another first in Feb -

ruary when it deployed one MC-130H aircraft and

two crews to Riga, Latvia, for a JCET working

with the Latvian Special Forces and Naval Special

Warfare Unit Two. Although the initial deployment could be characterized as somewhat uncoordinated, the Latvians were eager to work with US

forces and were excellent hosts. The two major disconnects during the JCET were misunderstandings over the requirement for DZ surveys and outside commitments that tended to distract the

crews from their flying mission. For future deployments the mission commander recommended that

a field grade officer deploy to take care of the official functions not associated with the actual JCET.

Also recommended was that CCT personnel accomplish DZ surveys during predeployment planning. Overall the experience was a positive one for

US participants, and members of both militaries

departed with a better understanding of each

other’s capabilities and limitations.102

Members of the 352d SOG deployed to Hungary

for a second JCET, this time from 17 to 27 March.

Both the 7th SOS and 67th SOS deployed an aircraft and augmented crew, plus support personnel.

Besides dropping Hungarian paratroopers the

crews flew air-intercept training sorties against

MiG-21s and MiG-29s of the Hungarian air force

and flew EW training sorties against SAM sites.

The training was rated by the crews as the best

ever accomplished. The training was enhanced be -

cause the Hungarian system operators were

highly trained in their particular weapons system,

thus providing realistic and challenging threats to

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

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the Combat Talon II crews. The Hungarians were

cooperative in answering all questions posed and

provided visits to their air defense sites. Some

training could have been improved, however. The

7th SOS desired more night sorties utilizing

NVGs, and the Hungarians wanted more air intercept sorties and more parachute operations. Future planning would incorporate those recommendations into the training plan.103

For the next three months, the 7th SOS deployed on a JCET each month, including JCETs

in Gibraltar, Souda Bay, Crete, and Kenitra, Morocco. By early summer the squadron had completed six JCETs and two exercises that reached

from North Africa to Norway and from the continental United States to Eastern Europe. The

training schedule was interrupted on 9 June 1998

when another crisis developed in western Africa.

Within hours of tasking, the 7th SOS was en

route for another NEO identified as Operation

Shepherd Venture.

The president of Guinea-Bissau, a small country in western Africa, fired his chief of staff for

smuggling weapons in late 1977 and governed without a repla cement throughout the first half of

1998. Tension continued to mount within the

government, with the fired chief of staff threatening to retaliate if the president did not reinstate

him. On 7 June 1998 the president appointed a

replacement, and the former chief of staff immediately launched a coup. Intense fighting broke

out in the capital city of Bissau, located on the

coast. The fighting resulted in many third-country

nationals seeking refuge in the US Embassy. Security for these people and US citizens living in

the country became a concern of the US ambassa -

dor. As time passed the fighting increased and

further threatened the embassy compound. On 9

June the US ambassador to Guinea-Bissau formally requested an NEO.104

At the 352d SOG verbal tasking flowed from

SOCEUR, and crews from both the 7th SOS and

67th SOS were put into crew rest for possible

launch later in the day. The following morning two

MC-130Ps launched from RAF Mildenhall and

proceeded to Stuttgart to onload a security team and

its associated equipment. By late afternoon they

were ready to depart. USEUCOM selected Dakar,

Senegal, as the intermediate staging base, and at

1809 local the two MC-130Ps departed Stuttgart.

Thirty minutes later one MC-130H from the 7th

SOS departed RAF Mildenhall with maintenance

and support equipment aboard. At 0323Z on 11

June, the two MC-130Ps landed at Dakar, and 36

minutes later the Combat Talon arrived. Commun

cations personnel went to work setting up the

equipment, support personnel occupied facilitie

and began to set up their work areas, and maintai

ers began preparing the aircraft for future mission

Later in the day a second CT II arrived after rel

cating from a JCET in Morocco. After only tw

hours on the ground, the second Combat Talon w

directed by SOCEUR to return to Stuttgart and 

stand by for additional tasking. US Navy capta

Schoultz, SOCEUR chief of staff, was designated 

the deployed JTF Commander for Operation She

herd Venture. Upon his arrival he immediately e

tered into talks with the US ambassador to Seneg

and with French and Portuguese authorities on th

status of the Guinea-Bissau situation.105

As planning continued through 11 June for 

possible NEO, a Portuguese bulk freighter docke

in Bissau, and the decision was made to use th

ship for the NEO instead of relying on an airborn

operation. Approximately 1,000 French, 70 Port

guese, and 50 Americans subsequently boarde

the ship to escape the fighting. By 13 June a

remaining personnel desiring to leave Guine

Bissau had departed by other means, and th

need for an NEO was eliminated. The 7th SO

maintained an alert crew through 14 June, 

which time it was released from its commitmen

On 15 June the 7th SOS Talon II departed Dak

for home station. Although an NEO was not a

complished, the 352d SOG once again demo

strated its ability to respond to real-world taskin

in minimal tim e.

106

A 7th SOS Combat Talon II Crew

Wins the 1998 Tunner Award

At 1600Z on 19 September, the 7th SOS w

alerted and began planning for another mission 

western Africa. Tensions had again increased 

Liberia, and USCINCEUR was considering o

tions to insert an ESAT team into the US Em

bassy. The crisis was brought on earlier when tw

embassy personnel were wounded during a fir

fight between Liberian security forces and su

porters of faction leader Roosevelt Johnson. Th

ESAT would provide intelligence information fo

USCINCEUR, and it would provide increase

manning for the small embassy security force. 107

An augmented 7th SOS crew was placed o

minimum crew rest status, while additional crew

preflighted and sealed Combat Talon 87-002

Contingency planners from 7th SOS/DOX deve

oped a route of flight and coordinated in-flight an

ground refueling requirements. Group intelligenc

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

441
officers and NCOs assembled navigational charts

and imagery, while the mobility staff secured

weapons, MREs, bottled water, and protective

equipment for the operational crew. The result

was a total group and squadron effort.108

At 0030Z on 20 September, the crew was

alerted for an immediate launch and delivery of

the ESAT to Freetown, Sierra Leone. Immediate

launch was required because the situation in Liberia had worsened over night. The small security

force at the embassy was in danger of being overwhelmed by rogue warriors loyal to President

Taylor. The rogue warriors were roaming the

streets and challenging personnel loyal to

Roosevelt Johnson . At 0355Z on 20 September,

just three hours and 25 minutes after notification,

Shark 01 departed RAF Mildenhall en route to

Stuttgart AAF for the first leg of Operation

Shadow Express.

109

At 0545Z on 20 September, MC-130H aircraft

87-0023 touched down at Stuttgart AAF and

quickly uploaded the 14-man ESAT. Along with

the team members, equipment included weapons,

ammunition, and provisions required to sustain

the team for the next several weeks. Crew members finalized arrival procedures at Freetown

with the ESAT chief. At 0708Z, one hour and 23

minutes after landing, the crew and ESAT personnel launched from Stuttgart. A KC-135 from

the 100th Air Refueling Wing rendezvoused with

Shark 01 over water, and a successful IFR was

completed (fig. 54). 110

There were no US-approved instrument precision

approaches into Dakar, Senegal. Consequently, the

Figure 54. Route of Flight, 7th SOS Crew Shark 01, 1998 Tunner Award (Source: AU

Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

442
crew navigator used information from imagery provided prior to the mission and the aircraft’s onboard

computers to generate a fully self-contained, dual

INS/GPS straight-in approach for landing. At

1720Z, 10 hours and two minutes after departing

Germany, Shark 01 landed at Dakar and completed a second ground refueling. The crew was

now into a 17-hour crew day as it awaited clearance from Stuttgart to continue the mission. After

assessing the crew’s condition for safe flight, and

with the situation continuing to deteriorate in

Monrovia, clearance was given to continue the

mission. At 1926Z the crew departed Dakar in -

bound to the designated transload location at Sierra Leone. Weather conditions deteriorated as

the crew approached its destination, causing the

aircraft to divert 50 miles to the west of its desired

inbound route of flight to circumnavigate buildups

and thunderstorms. At 2130Z on 20 September,

the Talon II landed at Freetown well ahead of

the scheduled transload and forward movement

of th e team to Monrovia. As the aircraft landed,

Roosevelt Johnson and 23 of his supporters sought

refuge inside the US Embassy as President Taylor’s forces closed in on them .111

With the ESAT delivered, the 7th SOS crew

returned to Senegal and awaited further tasking.

At 2149Z Shark 01 departed Freetown for Dakar

in anticipation of tasking for an NEO. The weather

experienced on the inbound leg had worsened,

and the crew was forced to dodge large thunderstorms off the coast of western Africa. While on

final approach to Dakar, and nearly 22 hours into

its crew day, the crew noticed the number 4 engine becoming erratic and had to shut it down.

The procedure went smoothly, and the aircraft

landed without further incident.112

For the next 20 days, Shark 01 maintained a

24-hour alert posture in the event that an NEO

was required. An additional mission that the

crew was prepared to execute if tasked was to

deliver MREs and water to the embassy com -

pound. During the period additional forces joined

the 7th SOS crew at Dakar in anticipation of further action. Negotiations for the safe departure of

Johnson and his supporters were finally con -

cluded, and on 9 October 1998, President Taylor

approved the negotiated settlement, and

Roosevelt Johnson departed Liberia for asylum

in another West African country. Shark 01 flew

14.1 hours to redeploy the ESAT and Naval Special Warfare Unit forces to Stuttgart after refueling stops in Dakar and Rota AB. The crew returned to RAF Mildenhall on 10 October 1998

and reconstituted for future contingency respons

The crew was awarded the 1998 Tunner Awar

for the most outstanding strategic airlift missio

of the year.

The 1st SOS Deploys to Mongolia

for Balance Magic 98-1

The 1st SOS had returned to Kadena AB in la

November 1998 after completing a challengin

Foal Eagle 97 exercise. Although providing th

best training of any exercise that the squadro

regularly participated in, Foal Eagle did not i

clude an active EW scenario. Missions we

planned and flown against notional threats, b

the crews did not get the opportunity to react 

threat indications displayed on the aircraft’s d

fensive systems during flight. In late January th

1st SOS deployed two MC-130H Combat Talons 

Nellis AFB to participate in Red Flag 98-1 (R

98-01). The RF exercise showcased a robust thre

scenario that challenged the crew during th

course of each mission. Both the 7th SOS and 8

SOS deployed aircraft and crews for the exercis

During the two-week period, the 1st SOS fle

131.6 hours, with the majority of the time logg

during the deployment and redeployment fligh

from the western Pacific. RF 98-1 proved to be a

excellent training environment for all three Talo

squadrons. It provided the opportunity for the 1

SOS crews to perform air-drop and airland mi

sions in a high-threat environment. While succes

fully completing their airdrops and airlands, th

crews experienced intensive ECM and air inte

cept training. On 10 February the two 1st SO

Talons departed Nellis AFB and arrived back 

Kadena AB the following day. The entire RF exp

rience had been a good one, and the crews gain

valuable hands-on experience when faced with a

tive real-world threat scenarios.113

The next major JCET for the squadron w

Vector Flash Action 98-1 (VFA 98-1) in Austral

from 25 February to 28 March. SOCPAC speci

operations units and the Australian Special A

Service Regiment conducted train-up exercis

prior to the arrival of the 353d SOG contingen

The group deployed one MC-130H Combat Talo

II and one MC-130P on 11 March to Royal Austr

lian Air Force Base, Pearce, which was located o

the outskirts of Perth, Australia. Mission profil

flown included NVG infiltrations and exfiltration

static-line personnel airdrops, HALO personn

airdrops, and CRRC water insertions. Prior 

joining other exercise participants, the two aircra

flew training missions that included low-lev

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

443
route surveys and airland operations into austere

landing strips.114

The actual FTX began on 21 March and was

based on a full-scale joint/combined mission profile. Events rehearsed during the work-up phase

were employed in a tactical scenario during the

FTX. VFA 98-1 was an excellent JCET for the

353d SOG and for the Australian and US special

operations participants. The opportunity to exe -

cute multiple mission essential tasks with potential customers provided outstanding preparation

for possible future contingencies. The 1st SOS

Combat Talon (88-0195) flew 57.8 hours during

the JCET and flew 12 out of the 20 days deployed.

The crew arrived back at Kadena AB on 30

March.115

The squadron returned to Thailand during

the March–April time period for Exercise Balance Torch 98-2. The JCET was based out of

Phitsanulok RTAB, Thailand, and was con -

ducted from 19 March to 9 April. The 1st SOS

deployed two MC-130H Combat Talons nonstop

from Kadena AB, with the first aircraft arriving

on 16 March with members of 1st Battalion, 1st

Special Forces Group, which was also stationed

on Okinawa. The second Combat Talon deployed on 20 March. The primary objective of

the JCET was to support a military free fall

level-one certification course for the Thai army,

but additional drops and air intercept training

were also accomplished during the course of the

exercise. During the military free fall certification

course, 550 personnel were dropped from the

Combat Talons. Aircraft 88-0192 flew the bulk of

the missions because aircraft 88-1803 needed an

engine. The exercise was an excellent training

opportunity for all participants.116

Perhaps the most interesting JCET of the year

was conducted in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, from 25

March through 17 April and was named Balance

Magic 98-1 (BM 98-1). US special operations personnel participated with 30 members of the Mon -

golian Civil Defense Force in training events that

focused on enhancing Mongolian foreign internal

defense and the country’s disaster relief capabilities. For the 1st SOS JCET support was broken

down into two periods, the first coming at the

start of the exercise and the second during a oneweek period at exercise conclusion. The first Combat Talon deployed to Ulaanbaatar on 25 March,

and the crew participated in opening ceremonies

the following day. On 27 March the aircraft returned to Kadena AB. A second Combat Talon

deployed on 10 April and remained in Mongolia

flying exercise sorties until 18 April. BM 98-1

marked the first deployment of 353d SOG assets

to Mongolia, and the Combat Talon was well received by host-nation participants. Although some

disconnects were inevitable, the JCET was an

overall success (fig. 55).117

Figure 55. Map of Mongolia (Source: AU Library, Maps and Charts Division, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

444
Early summer found the 1st SOS deployed to

Korea for JCET Teak Knife 98-04 (TK 98-04) with

three Combat Talon II aircraft. From 5 to 17

June, the aircraft operated from Osan AB and fo -

cused on combined training with the 255th SOS

(ROKAF) and with ROK Army Special Warfare

Center Special Forces. The original concept included operating out of Taegu AB, but when it

became unavailable, the JCET was moved to

Osan AB. Both ROKAF and 353d SOG forces performed personnel and equipment airdrops, HALO

airdrops, and engine running off-loads and on -

loads. The large 353d contingent included the

MC-130H Combat Talons, two MC-130P Combat

Shadows, and three MH-53J Pave Lows. The

JCET served as a workup for the group’s ORI

scheduled later in the year during JCS Exercise

Foal Eagle 98. In total the group deployed 178

personnel to Korea for TK 98-04. The JCET was a

rewarding and challenging exercise that enhanced the ability of the 353d SOG and ROK Special Warfare Center to operate together in a complex joint/combined scenario. 118

The following month much of the group’s assets

were deployed for a no-notice contingency response exercise named Bantam Runner. Follow -

ing alert and deployment orders from SOCPAC,

the 353d SOG deployed two MC-130H Combat

Talons, two MC-130P Combat Shadows, and

three MH-53J Pave Lows to Kaneohe Bay MCAS,

Hawaii, from 6 to 19 July. The exercise was designed to test the SOCPAC commander’s ability

to respond and resolve a crisis. More than 240

personnel from the 353d SOG participated in the

exercise along with 300 US Army, Navy, and Ma -

rine Corps soldiers and sailors. Exercise objectives included a personnel recovery operation, a

CSAR event, coordination with the Department of

Justice, operations from a barebase, and integra -

tion of sister-service reconnaissance capabilities

(US Navy submarine and P-3 aircraft) into the

operation. For the 353d SOG Bantam Runner was

an extremely successful test of the group’s ability

to deploy on short notice in support of contingency

operations. Group aircraft flew 260.4 hours while

supporting the joint operation and demonstrated

their ability to operate from a barebase thousands

of miles from home station.119

From 21 July to 10 August, the 1st SOS deployed two Combat Talon II aircraft to Perth,

Australia, for Exercise Tourniquet Mile . The

JCET was similar to the one flown earlier in the

year, except that US-based special operations

forces made up the bulk of US-committed forces.

The 1st SOS also supported a second JCET 

Thailand, Balance Torch 98-3, with one Comb

Talon II from 24 July to 7 August. As had bee

the case earlier in the year, HALO training w

the primary focus of the Thailand JCET. In ear

fall, from 15 September to 5 October, two Comb

Talons were deployed to Elmendorf AFB, Alask

for JCET Gryphon Ale 98-1. After landing at E

mendorf AFB, deployed maintenance was directe

by home station to perform a one-time inspectio

for corrosion, and they found extensive corrosio

under the numbers 2 and 3 engine heat shields o

Talon 88-0191. The corrosion grounded the ai

craft for the duration of the exercise. The secon

Talon (88-0192) had to take up the slack, an

thanks to outstanding maintenance, was able 

support pre-exercise scheduled sorties. Aircra

88-0191 was repaired and flown back to Kaden

AB at the completion of the event.120

The annual JCS Exercise Foal Eagle 98 pr

vided the venue for the 353d SOG’s ORI, whic

was flown from 13 October to 2 November 199

The exercise involved nearly 35,000 US an

500,000 ROK troops, thus making it the large

joint/combined exercise in the world. From 13 

22 October, Headquarters AFSOC/IG examine

the group’s initial response and mission suppo

activities at both Kadena and Osan ABs. Durin

initial response the 353d SOG was evaluated o

its ability to shift from a peacetime posture to 

wartime posture. The group was also evaluate

on how well it mobilized and interfaced with th

18th Fighter Wing at Kadena AB and the 51

Fighter Wing at Osan AB. During the initial pha

of the ORI, Typhoon Zeb threatened Okinawa, for

ing the aircraft to be evacuated to Guam from 15 

18 October. After returning from Guam all fixe

wing aircraft were generated and ready for OR

tasking within 23 hours of their arrival.121

On 21 October the 353d SOG deployed 476 pe

sonnel and 165 short tons of equipment to Taeg

AB and commenced the employment phase of th

ORI. The 1st SOS performed in a superb mann

throughout all phases of the evaluation but d

exceptionally well during the employment phas

Typical mission profiles included terrain-followin

radar operations, threat avoidance, infiltratio

exfiltration, and resupply. The 1st SOS crews al

performed PSYOPS, IFR, FARP operations, an

NVG low-level navigation missions during the e

ercise. The squadron flew 13 graded tactical so

ties totaling 34 hours of flight time. Foal Eagle 9

was a highly successful exercise, with the 353

SOG receiving an overall grade of excellent fo

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

445
the ORI. The group once again demonstrated its

ability to contribute to the defense of the Republic

of Korea.122

During the remainder of the year, the 1st SOS

deployed to Australia and Korea for JCETs Foreconex 99-1 and Teak Knife 99-02, respectively.

The final JCET of the year was Teak Piston,

which was flown out of Mactan AB, Philippines,

from 1 to 13 December. One MC-130H and a

small maintenance support package supported

US Navy SEALs and Philippine Naval Special

Warfare Unit Five while working closely with the

Philippine Air Force (PAF) during the drop phase

of the exercise. The PAF had recently obtained

two B-model C-130s from the United States and

was interested in developing an air-drop capability

to assist in disaster relief operations within the

Republic of the Philippines. The JCET was a success, with relationships developed during the

course of the exercise promising to open the door

for future operations between the 353d SOG and

the PAF.123 The year had been a good one for the

1st SOS, with unit proficiency reaching a new

level as the squadron executed JCET and exercise

events from Hawaii to Mongolia. The coming year

would be more of the same.

The 8th SOS Returns to Southwest Asia

Early in 1998 the 8th SOS deployed to Southwest Asia for another contingency operation. Aldefer, the squadron commander, led 31 squadron

personnel on a two-ship deployment to Kuwait.

Combat Talon Is 64-0559 and 64-0566, three

crews, and a small planning staff made up the 8th

SOS contingent. While deployed two Talon I

crews flew to Qatar in support of JCS Exercise

Eastern Viper. The exercise deployment helped to

reinforce military-to-military relationships between host-nation forces and the US military.

Events completed during the exercise included

both static-line and HALO personnel airdrops. After completion of Eastern Viper, the aircraft and

crews returned to Kuwait.124

The squadron continued to excel throughout

the remainder of the year, supporting contingency operations and a robust exercise program.

Two members of the squadron were recognized

by Headquarters AFSOC for their superior performances. For 1998 Captain Wormley was

awarded the AFSOC Electronic Warfare Officer

of the Year, and Captain Anderson was recog -

nized as the AFSOC Navigator of the Year. Captain Anderson was also awarded the 1998 AF -

SOC Aircrew Member of the Year. The high

caliber of people assigned to the squadron made

the 8th SOS one of the premier special operations

squadrons in the command.125

First Lieutenant Blassie, the Tomb of

the Unknown Soldier, and the 8th SOS

On 11 May 1972 Lieutenant Blassie’s A-37

Dragonfly, assigned to the 8th SOS and stationed

in South Vietnam, was shot down near An Loc.

His body was not recovered at the time. Later that

same year remains were found in wreckage near

his last known position, but positive identification

could not be made, and the remains were classified

as unknown. On Memorial Day, 1984, the unknown remains were entombed in Arlington Na -

tional Cemetery’s Tomb of the Unknowns, where

for the next 14 years, the remains were honored.

After a recommendation by the Department of De -

fense working group charged with identifying remains of the Vietnam unknowns, the tomb was

opened, and the remains were removed in May

1998 to undergo DNA testin g.126

On 30 June 1998 Secretary Cohen announced

that the remains had been identified with “99.9

percent degree of certainty” as those of Blassie.

The confirmation set into motion efforts to return

Blassie’s remains to his family and home near St.

Louis. When Alderfer discovered that Blassie was

a former member of the 8th SOS, he offered to

conduct a flyover at Blassie’s memorial service.

During the course of gaining Air Force approval

for the flyover, the squadron was asked to transport Blassie’s remains from Washington, D.C., to

his home. On 9 July 1998 Combat Talon 64-0566

departed Hurlburt Field en route to Dover AFB,

Delaware, where the crew picked up Blassie’s remains and transported them to Scott AFB, Illinois. On 10 July the Combat Talon took off for St.

Louis, using call sign Hawk 02, which was Blassie’s call sign when he was shot down in 1972.

The crew of Combat Talon 64-0566 attended the

memorial service on 11 July and was personally

thanked by the acting secretary of the Air Force,

F. Whitten Peters, for its part in bringing Blassie’s remains home.127 After the memorial service,

the crew returned to Hurlburt Field.

The 15th SOS in Europe and

Southwest Asia

The 15th SOS continued to support a robust

JCET program in 1998. One crew deployed to Barcelona, Venezuela, from 29 April to 11 May 1998,

in support of JCET 8339. The crew’s mission was

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

446
to conduct airborne training with elements of the

US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group. Six missions were flown, which included static-line personnel drops and low-level terrain following.

From 17 to 27 May, elements of the 15th SOS

deployed to Ecuador for another JCET. While

there the crew flew three humanitarian relief sorties for flood victims ravaged by unseasonably

heavy monsoon rains. Supplies delivered included

more than 25 tons of water, water-purification

equipment, rice, bananas, and medicine. For the

exercise the Talon flew 20 sorties in support of

one of the largest JCETs to ever take place in

SOUTHCOM. In all, more than 1,000 personnel

were committed to the exercise. Both airland and

air-drop missions were completed, and 240 Ecua -

dorian paratroopers earned their US parachutist

badges by jumping from the Talon II.128

From 29 May to 18 June, the squadron deployed two aircraft and crews to Jordan for JCS

Exercise Early Victor. The aircraft operated out

of Markka International Airport, Amman, Jordan. Personnel airdrops of host-nation forces

were completed, and infiltration and exfiltration

missions involving US Army Special Forces and

US Navy SEALs were flown in southern Jordan.

Airland missions were flown to a highway landing strip near Qatranah, Jordan, with the crew

utilizing its on-board precision navigation system

to fly the approach. Additional airdrops over the

water south of Aquaba were completed in support

of the SEALs. Psychological operations in the

form of leaflet drops were conducted over the Jordanian desert, and airborne intercept training

with Royal Jordanian Air Force fighters was also

completed.129

During the return trip to the United States

from Early Victor , the two crews stopped at RAF

Mildenhall for intersquadron training with the

7th SOS. The 15th SOS crews flew several training sorties, including low-level flights in the Scottish Highlands. A two-ship close interval forma -

tion flight was also flown with one crew and

aircraft from each squadron. The formation flight

gave both squadrons an opportunity for the valuable exchange of tactics and techniques.130

On 17 July 1998 Colonel Wert assumed command of the 15th SOS from Colonel Glausier in a

ceremony on the Hurlburt Field flight line. Wert

had been the operations officer of the squadron

before assuming command. Additional JCETs

were flown by the squadron in South America

during the second half of the year. Deployments

into SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility included

those to Puerto Rico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Exp

rience gained by the crews and by maintenanc

personnel was invaluable in seasoning the 15

SOS CT II weapons system.131

Kirtland AFB Operations Are Refined

At Kirtland AFB the MC-130H WST was oper

tional throughout 1998, with earlier problems 

software compatibility resolved. With full-motio

and graphical video feedback, the WST came clo

to replicating the actual aircraft throughout a

flight scenarios. The WST provided a virtual-reali

presentation that challenged both students an

permanent party instructors alike. One hundre

students completed the MC-130H simulator cour

during the first six months of the year. The Com

bat Talon II program saw 38 pilots, two navig

tors, 20 flight engineers, and 40 loadmasters com

plete their training in the WST.132 During the la

half of the year, 56 students received trainin

with 15 of those graduating by year’s end. T

remainder were carried over to the following yea

as they continued their formal training program

For the second straight year, no students we

eliminated from the Combat Talon II program.

133

The 58th SOW’s bilateral exercise progra

continued to expand throughout the first half 

1998. The first two bilaterals scheduled for th

550th SOS in January and February, howeve

were canceled at the last minute due either 

aircraft availability or lack of DZ surveys. Th

third bilateral exercise that a 550th SOS’s M

130H was scheduled to participate in was from 

to 13 February. On 11 February one MC-130

departed Kirtland AFB for Isleta DZ. The cre

performed dry passes and then flew a low-lev

route in the Utah Test and Training Range, r

ceiving ECM training during the low-level even

The crew then proceeded to Michael AAF, Uta

for self-contained practice approaches and the

flew a midlevel route to Monterey, Californi

where it remained overnight. On 12 February th

crew gave the students of the Naval Postgrad

ate School an orientation flight, followed by 

static display. On the last day of the deploymen

the crew flew a low-level route in the Utah Te

and Training Range for another ECM trainin

event. The low-level route terminated at Micha

AAF, where the crew again flew multiple sel

contained approaches. The crew returned to Kir

land AFB by way of a low-level route throug

Utah, terminating at home station with tw

simulated HSLLADS and two simulated CR

drops on Isleta DZ. For the three-day trip, th

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

447
crew logged 15.3 flying hours and accomplished

multiple continuation training events. 134

From 27 February to 1 March, the 550th SOS

deployed one MC-130H to Peterson AFB. The

crew supported soldiers from the 10th SFG(A)

with static-line and HALO drops planned in con -

junction with practice self-contained approaches

for aircrew proficiency. The first exercise mission

was flown on 28 February and included a lowlevel route, ECM training for the EWO, and multiple self-contained approaches. Bad weather set

in the following day, with heavy snow and high

winds canceling the scheduled personnel drops.

On 28 February the crew departed Peterson AFB

and flew multiple personnel drops on Walker DZ,

then returned to its staging base. The crew completed an engine running onload of 2d Battalion

jumpers, then headed back to Walker DZ. The

final sortie of the day saw the crew land at Camp

Guernsey and offload equipment before returning

to Peterson AFB for mission termination. On Sunday, 1 March, the crew flew a 5.2-hour sortie, successfully completing nine personnel static-line

airdrops and three HALO drops on Walker DZ.

An additional sortie was flown from Peterson

AFB, with a final landing at Camp Guernsey, to

deliver the day’s air items. After finishing their

exercise work, the crew members returned to Peterson AFB, onloaded its crew chiefs and maintenance equipment, and returned to Kirtland AFB

for mission termination .135

The 550th SOS continued to support the 58th

SOW’s bilateral exercise program throughout the

remainder of the spring. One aircraft deployed

from 23 April to 11 May to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to work with the 1st Battalion, 5th Special

Forces Group. From 30 April to 3 May, one MC130H deployed to Hurlburt Field and flew airborne intercept missions with the Texas Air Na -

tional Guard. On 4 and 5 May, one Talon II

supported the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion,

USMC, out of Camp Pendleton, California. Two

additional bilaterals were completed in May, in -

cluding deployments to Kelly AFB, Texas, and

Fort Collins, Colorado.136 Six more bilaterals

were completed from June to December. The aggressive bilateral program helped to mature the

young 550th SOS instructor force and provided

excellent training for the formal Combat Talon II

student crew members.

The last Chile Flag exercise of the year (99-01)

was conducted out of Kirtland AFB from 26 October to 6 November, and the 550th SOS participated in it along with other assets assigned to the

58th SOW. Although bad weather and coordina -

tion problems plagued the exercise, the event provided good training for wing participants and for

US Army Special Forces soldiers. As 1998 ended

the 550th SOS was highly proficient in all aspects

of the CT II mission.137 As a testament to how far

the 550th SOS had come since initially receiving

the CT II, squadron members were recognized by

AETC for their superior abilities. The Nineteenth

Air Force Special Operations Instructor Pilot of

the Year was awarded to Captain Bauernfeind of

the 550th SOS, and Captain Lum, also assigned

to the 550th SOS, was recognized as the Nineteenth Air Force Electronic Warfare Officer Instructor of the Year.138

MC-130H Full Operational Capability

On 30 June 1993 the 15th SOS-assigned MC130H Combat Talon II weapons system reached

initial operational capability. At that time full op -

erational capability (FOC) was projected to occur

when the entire fleet of 24 aircraft had been delivered. After initial operational capability three deficiencies were identified that would affect FOC

status. Those deficiencies included (1) reliability

of the AN/APQ-170(V)1 radar, (2) performance of

the nose radome anti-icing system, and (3) the

structural reliability of the nose radome.139

The AN/APQ-170(V)1-432 radar never reached

its specified 191-hour mean-time-between-failure

(MTBF) rate. Studies showed that while improve -

ments were possible, the 191-hour specification

was an unrealistic threshold. Consequently, the

threshold was changed to a 75-hour MTBF fig -

ure. Engineers determined that this threshold

could be achieved with the completion of the –425

radar upgrade.140

During the initial qualification testing of the

radome anti-icing system, it was determined that

the system did not provide adequate warm air to

keep the nose radome free of ice. The prime con -

tractor had been working on a solution to this

problem for the past five years. It appeared that

the contractor was finally approaching an acceptable solution that would keep ice off critical portions of the radome. Implementation of repair to

the anti-icing system uncovered a structural prob -

lem with many of the existing radomes. This

problem significantly impacted on spares availability. Until a final solution was found and implemented, AFSOC remained concerned about the

number of operational radomes available.141

Headquarters AFSOC established the following

conditions for declaring FOC: (1) completion of

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

448
the –425 u pgrade to the AN/APQ-170(V)1 radar,

including required spares, (2) completion of the

radome anti-icing upgrade, and (3) sufficient

numbers of operationally suitable radomes to support contingency and peacetime training requirements. AFSOC estimated that all requirements

for FOC would not be met until October 2000, at

which time FOC would be declared.142

The 711th SOS Deploys to Brindisi

On 7 February 1998, Colonel Wilson replaced

Colonel Hanson as the commander of the 711th

SOS. Hanson became the 919th SOW vice commander on 4 April when the incumbent moved to

another position outside the wing. Later in the

spring Headquarters AFSOC and Headquarters

AFRC announced plans for a new Reverse Associ -

ate Program Concept that the Air Force projected

for the 919th SOW. Under the concept all 14

Combat Talon I aircraft would be transferred to

the AFRC under the 919th SOW at Duke Field.

The 8th SOS, which was the only remaining active duty Combat Talon I squadron, would relocate to Duke Field and continue to fly the reserveassigned Talon Is. The concept was unique

because, for the first time, an active duty flying

unit would be associated with a Reserve unit and

would fly reserve-assigned aircraft, instead of the

traditional active duty-assigned aircraft being

flown by Reserve crews. A site survey was con -

ducted at Duke Field from 3 to 5 August to lay

the foundation for actions required to make the

Reverse Associate Program Concept a reality.

The projected implementation date was established as 1 January 200 0.143

Members of the 919th SOW began deploying to

Brindisi, Italy, in support of the ongoing Balkan

operation in mid-August 1998. From August to

mid-October, more than 150 personnel deployed

to Italy in five different rotations, with 711th

SOS’s CT Is covering the first four and the 5th

SOS picking up the last and final rotation. Squadron crews flew missions into Sarajevo and Tuzla

in the Republic of Bosnia and refueled special op -

erations helicopters committed to the operation.

Deployed maintenance personnel spent long days

and many additional hours keeping the aging

Combat Talons mission ready. When unit person -

nel returned to Duke Field in the fall, they had

made a significant contribution to the allied effort

in the Balkan region.144 As 1998 came to an end,

the New Year promised to see the Reverse Associate Program Concept become a reality.

1999: Operation Allied Force 

Brings Peace to the Balkans

The last year of the decade saw the Comb

Talon force deployed around the globe. In the Ba

kans the 7th SOS went to war as part of the lar

est air campaign since World War II. Prepar

tions were finalized to transfer 14 CT Is 

USAFRC, and the 8th SOS prepared to move 

Duke Field. By year’s end the Combat Talo

would have written another colorful chapter in i

long and distinguished history.

The 1st SOS Returns to Mongolia

The 1st SOS began the New Year by deployin

two MC-130H Combat Talons to Nellis AFB fo

Red Flag 99-2 (RF 99-2), Period 1. Forty-nine pe

sonnel from the 1st SOS and 353d Maintenanc

Squadron deployed on 6 January 1999 to partic

pate in the intensive exercise from 10 to 22 Jan

ary. This was the second consecutive participatio

in the RF series by the 1st SOS.

On 17 January the 17th SOS deployed one M

130P for the second period of the exercise. Bo

squadrons used NVG/terrain-following system

air-drop/airland resupply procedures, and low

level profiles to support Blue forces participatin

in the exercise. As the scenario progressed to 

high-threat environment, the two special oper

tions squadrons transitioned to CSAR support.14

Red Flag 99-2 provided an excellent trainin

environment for the MC-130H aircrews. The mi

sion commander, Colonel Buterbaugh, chara

terized the exercise as “the most intensive tactic

combat training the squadron received” to date. 

gave the 1st SOS an opportunity to use speci

tactics while integrating into diverse missio

packages and operating in a medium-to-hig

threat environment. Few training exercises o

fered profiles with such extensive ECMs as tho

encountered on the Nellis range. While participa

ing in RF 99-2, the two squadrons flew 38 sorti

and 125.1 flying hours.146

The following month the squadron participate

in JCET BM 99-1 and for the second time d

ployed a Combat Talon to Mongolia in support 

host-nation and US Army Special Forces perso

nel. The initial planning conference for BM 99

had been conducted the previous November i

Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, after completion of th

initial JCET to that country. During the confe

ence the US ambassador to Mongolia, the Ho

Alphonse F. La Porta, expressed his support fo

training between US SOF and Mongolian defen

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

449
forces. Five mission essential training events

were prioritized by the ambassador for the 1999

JCET event: cold weather survival techniques, a

medical civic-action project, search and rescue op -

erations, personnel air-drop operations, and aerial

resupply operations. The ambassador emphasized

the need to demystify US military involvement in

Mongolia and suggested the Foreign Affairs Office

inform the Russian and Chinese defense attachés

about BM 99-1 and to invite them to observe op -

erations. Brig Gen Jack R. Holbein Jr., the

SOCPAC commander, approved the request for a

foreign military observation flight.147

Due to political sensitivities, the ambassador

outlined other general guidelines for the JCET

event. He asked that participating aircraft stay

clear of international borders. The deputy director

general of Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) directed

that MC-130H aircrews participating in the JCET

have an English/Mongolian speaker on board and

remain in contact with air traffic control for all

missions. Representatives from the 353d SOG

agreed to establish a 50-kilometer buffer zone

from all international borders to prevent any incidents. In addition the 353d SOG agreed to provide

the crew flight logs and low-level charts to the

CAA for coordination purposes.148

On 19 February 1999 the 1st SOS airlifted

members of 2d Battalion, 1st SFG(A), to Dzuunbayan, Mongolia, to prepare for the medical capa -

bilities exercise, survival training, SAR training,

and aerial resupply operations. The following day

the 1st SOS Talon II supported friendship para -

chute jumps involving both Mongolian and US

special forces personnel. The aircrew also demon -

strated the aerial resupply capability of the Combat Talon at a Soviet-built airfield five kilometers

from the training site at Dzuunbayan. When the

day’s activities ended, the crew planned to fly a

low-level route survey on its return flight to

Ulaanbaatar. Mongolian CAA officials, however,

denied approval, thus compelling the crew to fly

back at 3,000 feet altitude. The Talon returned to

Kadena AB on 21 February as Phase I of BM

99-1 concluded.149

The 1st SOS deployed a second Talon II on 5

March for Phase II of BM 99-1. Due to extremely

cold temperatures at Ulaanbaatar International

Airport, the aircraft diverted to Osan AB. On 6

March the Combat Talon (88-1803) continued its

deployment flight and touched down at Ulaanbaatar and began preparations to support JCET

operations at Dzuunbayan. In addition to supporting JCET airborne events, the 1st SOS

planned to conduct unilateral training events to

include SAR, low-level navigation, short-field

landings, and NVG operations. Due to the extreme cold, aircraft 88-1803 experienced several

maintenance problems that grounded the aircraft

and prevented it from flying preplanned missions

7–12 March. The 1st SOS deployed a second Combat Talon II to Ulaanbaatar with repair parts,

and the second aircraft attempted to support

scheduled JCET activities. Resupply of food and

water to the Dzuunbayan exercise area was denie d

by CAA, and the transport of USSF personnel

from there back to Ulaanbaatar was also denied.

The problem arose because of poor communication

and misunderstandings between the CAA and

other divisions within the Mongolian government.

Although the Mongolian CAA had agreed to lowlevel and night operations at the November planning conference, it repeatedly denied permission

during the exercise. Some training objectives were

not met by the 1st SOS, but the challenge of operating in Mongolia made the JCET beneficial to

the squadron and to the group. Aircraft 88-1803

was repaired and departed Mongolia on 17 March

1999, thus ending 1st SOS participation in Balance Magic 99-1.150

Also in February the 1st SOS returned to Australia for Vector Balance Action 99-1 (VBA 99-1).

One MC-130H Combat Talon II (88-0264) participated in the 1999 Australian International Air

Show at Avalon Airfield in Geelong, Australia,

from 19 to 21 February. The aircraft then repositioned to RAAF Pearce on 22 February to participate in VBA 99-1. On 28 February the squadron

deployed a second aircraft (88-0191) to the same

location, and it joined the exercise in progress.

The primary 1st SOS customer for the JCET was

the Australian Special Air Services Regiment 2d

Squadron, whose personnel conducted HALO and

HAHO airdrops, infiltration/exfiltration training,

and CRRC water drops. In addition aircraft 88-

0264 staged out of RAAF Tindal (near Darwin)

during four days of ECM and air intercept training with F/A-18s assigned to the RAAF 75th

Squadron. Throughout the exercise the two MC130H Talons flew 54 sorties and logged over 96

hours supporting exercise participants. VBA 99-1

was an excellent training exercise. 151

The 1st SOS continued to execute a vigorous

exercise and JCET schedule throughout the

spring. On 18 March, with the 1st SOS under the

command of Colonel Prior, the 353d SOG deployed 121 personnel, one MC-130H Combat

Talon II, and two MC-130P Combat Shadows to

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

450
Guam for JCS Exercise Tandem Thrust 99. In addition the group deployed 98 personnel and two

MH-53J helicopters from the 31st SOS based at

Osan AB, Korea. During the exercise 353d SOG

aircrews employed NVG/terrain-following systems,

performed air-drop and airland missions, and accomplished low-level profiles during the course of

the exercise. Combined, the Combat Talon and

Combat Shadow aircraft flew 47 sorties and logged

83.5 flying hours. Also in March the 1st SOS de -

ployed to Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, for JCET Balance Torch 99-4. The 15th SOS also deployed one

MC-130H from Hurlburt Field to participate in the

two-week long event. En route maintenance prob -

lems delayed the arrival of the Hurlburt Field

Talon by eight days, putting a strain on the 1st

SOS crew to accomplish scheduled exercise sorties.

The JCET was a success due to the exceptional

work by deployed maintenance specialists. Even

with the delay of the 15th SOS Talon, the JCET

enjoyed a 100 percent launch rate and a 93 percent mission effectiveness rate.

152

The squadron returned to Korea in May for

Teak Knife 99-6 with two CT IIs. Emphasis was

placed on working with the ROKAF 255th SOS

and its C-130H aircraft. Mission rehearsals were

executed from 12 to 18 May, and the exercise culminated on 19 May with a full-blown tactical

event. The JCET was the sixth of the year in Korea for the 353d SOG. In July the squadron deployed one Combat Talon II to Singapore for Merlynx 99-1, which was a JCET designed around a

naval scenario with US Navy SEALs and a royal

Singapore naval diving unit as the primary customers. Airborne intercept training was also accomplished between the 1st SOS Combat Talon

and F-15 fighters from the 497th Fighter Squadron, which was also based in Singapore. The

JCET staged out of Paya Lebar AB, and shortfield landings were completed at Sudong Island

airstrip. The Singapore 122d Fighter Squadron

also participated in airborne intercept training

during the exercise. 153

The squadron accomplished another first in

July when it deployed one MC-130H to Antananarivo International Airport in Madagascar to

participate in Balance Mist 99-1. On 22 July the

1st SOS transported 12 members of the 2d Battalion, 1st SFG(A), to Madagascar, and remained in

country until returning to Kadena AB on 25 July.

Although no tactical sorties were flown in the host

country, the crew received valuable experience as

it transited locations in the Indian Ocean. The

crew stopped at Diego Garcia, Kuala Lumpur, and

Hong Kong before landing back at Kadena A

The landing in Hong Kong was significant b

cause it was the first time a US military aircra

had been allowed to land there since the accide

tal bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrad

Yugoslavia, by NATO forces on 7 May 1999. O

26 August, as Balance Mist drew to a close, a 17

SOS Combat Shadow retraced the Talon’s route 

flight, and picked up the US team and returned 

to Kadena AB on 3 September.154

The fall period was spent supporting Korea

exercises, including Ulchi Focus Lens and Fo

Eagle 99. In November the 1st SOS had the o

portunity to participate in a humanitarian reli

operation in Vietnam. As a result of damag

caused by severe flooding in six provinces and 

the provincial capital of Hue, the US ambassado

there determined that the situation was of suc

magnitude that the US government should ste

in and assist the Vietnamese government. On

MC-130H and one MC-130P launched fro

Kadena AB and proceeded to Andersen AFB

Guam, where the two aircraft onloaded 10 palle

of general relief supplies from the Office of Fo

eign Disaster Relief storage warehouse locate

there. On 11 November the two aircraft flew fro

Guam to Hue, and delivered 22,000 pounds 

plastic sheeting, 3,600 blankets, and 5,000 wat

containers. The aircraft shutdown near the co

trol tower after taxiing past farmers using th

taxiways to dry their yellow rice. With no K-loade

or specialized equipment to off-load the aircra

volunteers stepped in to unload the supplies b

hand. Working side by side 353d SOG personne

members of the Vietnamese military, and civilia

laborers swiftly removed the supplies from th

aircraft. The two aircraft departed the same da

and returned to Kadena AB. Although the effo

was a small one, it demonstrated to the people 

central Vietnam that the US government w

ready to help in time of need.155

The year 1999 ended as it had begun with th

1st SOS deployed throughout the Pacific. Th

Combat Talon II was a mature weapons system

that had demonstrated its ability to go anywher

in the theater and accomplish its mission.

The 8th SOS to Become

First Active Associate Squadron

Operations at Hurlburt Field continued at 

high pace during 1999 for the two Talon squa

rons stationed there. For the 8th SOS the Ne

Year began with a deployment to Red Flag 99-

The squadron deployed two MC-130E Comb

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

451
Talon Is from 10 to 23 January, with both crews

and maintenance personnel consolidating with

the 1st SOS and 7th SOS. Although the 8th SOS

was the only Talon I unit in the exercise, the older

Talon shared similar tactics and procedures with

the newer Talon II. The squadron deployed two

additional Combat Talon Is to Desert Fox beginning in the January period.156

On 5 March 1999 the Air Force officially announced changes in force structure that would

have a direct impact on the 8th SOS. The changes

were made to prepare Hurlburt Field for the introduction of the CV-22 Osprey in the early twentyfirst century. For the Talon I squadron, the force

structure that had been under review since the

spring of 1998 was finalized. The Reverse Associate Program Concept was to become a reality, with

the 8th SOS moving to Duke Field and becoming

an active associate squadron. All 14 Talon I aircraft would be transferred to the USAF Reserve

Component (USAFRC), with the 8th SOS itself remaining as a USAF active duty unit. Squadron

crews would fly the USAFRC-assigned aircraft.

The implementation date was confirmed as 1

January 2000, with the final move of the squadron

to be completed no later than 1 April 2000.157

Once at Duke Field the 8th SOS would colocate

with the 711th SOS, its USAFRC sister squadron,

and would share the same support facilities. Of

the 14 Talon I aircraft, 10 would remain primaryassigned aircraft, two would be designated as

trainers, and two would be backup inventory aircraft. Thus, the Talon I force would be manned

with a combination of 15 active duty and Reserve

crews, with two additional instructor crews author -

ized for the formal Combat Talon I School.158

* * * * * *

Early in 1999 General Toney, COMSOCCENT,

requested the 8th SOS by name to provide fixedwing support to the Joint Special Operations Task

Force-Southwest Asia (JSOTF-SWA). The squadron deployed immediately, sending two aircraft,

three aircrews, and additional support personnel

to augment a JSOAC staff located in Kuwait.

JSOTF-SWA provided a unique capability to Joint

Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), which

was tasked with enforcing the UN sanctions that

established the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.

The 8th SOS joined elements of the 720th Special

Tactics Group, the 2d Battalion of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the 5th

Special Forces Group (Airborne), plus support

elements of the 16th SOW, to form JSOTF-SWA.

Within 72 hours of arrival in Kuwait, the 8th SOS

was tasked to support a no-notice, NCA-directed

mission. The squadron, under the command of

Colonel Chapman, launched both aircraft within

two hours of notification and met their time on

target over the Persian Gulf. 159

Later in the year personnel of the 8th SOS

were called upon to support the US European

Command Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in BosniaHerzegovina with staff augmentation from June

to August 1999. Major Higgins served as special

operations advisor to Gen Wesley Clark, supreme

allied commander, Europe, coordinating all USAF

and NATO special operations air missions. Captain Stallings led a forward-deployed staff of air

planners to Sarajevo that coordinated all air missions in support of NATO SFOR in Bosnia, Croa -

tia, and Serbia. Captain Stallings’s team planned

and executed the movement of eight heads of

state, including President Bill Clinton to and from

the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo. 160

In late July 1999 and in response to USCINCSOUTH mission tasking, the 16th SOW directed

the deployment of a two-ship 8th SOS CT I force

package to Bogota, Colombia. The deployment

was tasked with supporting personnel recovery

operations following the crash of a US Army RC-7

aircraft in the rugged Andes Mountains. From 29

July to 10 August, the two Combat Talon Is flew

18 sorties totaling 76.1 flying hours. During these

sorties the Talon airlifted 27 recovery personnel,

28 tons of recovery equipment, and 44 tons of

aviation fuel to Tres Esquinas AB, Colombia,

where recovery operations had been established.

The air base had no navigational aids and only

4,200 feet of usable runway due to recent damage

by heavy rains. To overcome the limitations found

at Tres Esquinas, the aircrew employed instrument meteorological condition self-contained radar

approach procedures. The crews utilized onboard

infrared sensors, terrain-following radar, precision ground mapping radar, and highly accurate

navigational computers to fly numerous airland

sorties into the air base despite low visibility, low

ceilings, and no base instrumentation. An additional challenge for the crews was the elevation of

the airfield at Bogota, which sat at 8,361 feet

above sea level. The high elevation limited the

Combat Talons to a maximum gross takeoff

weight of 147,000 pounds. This restriction represented a 15 percent reduction in normal cargo ca -

pacity, thus increasing the number of sorties required to move equipment forward.161

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

452
In addition to moving personnel and cargo to

Tres Esquinas AB, the 8th SOS crews established

a FARP at the Colombian air base and conducted

multiple hot refuelings for helicopters assigned to

the operation. The high operations tempo required to complete the mission in the time allotted by the Colombian government was sustained

thanks to the efforts of the 8th SOS. The Combat

Talon Is also airlifted human remains and vital

equipment, including the mishap aircraft’s flight

data recorder, out of the recovery area. When a

mission MH-60 helicopter was grounded for lack

of parts, a Talon brought the needed parts directly to the forward operating base. By the con -

clusion of the operation, the Colombian JTF had

accomplished all of its objectives with the help of

the 8th SOS Combat Talon Is. A tired but successful 8th SOS contingent redeployed to Hurlburt

Field at the completion of the operation.162

The squadron remained active in the SOUTH -

COM JCET program during 1999. Crews deployed to both Bolivia and Uruguay during the

year, logging more than 250 flying hours in support of CINCSOUTH objectives in these two countries. The primary objective of the South American JCETs was to conduct basic jump schools to

develop a static-line personnel infiltration capa -

bility for the host nations. While deployed to Bolivia the squadron was called upon to assist the

Bolivian government to map out-of-control forest

fires that were devastating the countryside. With

guidance from the US Embassy, the deployed

crews flew fire reconnaissance missions in nearzero visibility caused by the dense smoke in the

objective area. The FLIR system and the GPS

were invaluable in accurately plotting the loca -

tions of more than 60 fires burning in a 1,400-

square-mile area. The information provided by

the Combat Talon I crew was vital to Bolivia’s

effort to fight the fires that threatened vast forest

areas and the town of Ascension de Guarayos.163

Since Desert Storm the squadron had maintained proficiency in dropping the 15,000-pound

BLU-82B conventional bomb. During October

1999 the squadron deployed one Combat Talon I

and 55 personnel to Hill AFB, Utah, to drop one

of the bombs on the nearby range complex. The

weapon was dropped from an altitude of 6,000

feet above the ground, and it impacted 27 yards

from its intended target. The accuracy demon -

strated by the crew in delivering the largest con -

ventional area weapon in the USAF inventory

showed, in fact, such delivery could be a precise

operation.164

For the seventh consecutive year, the squadro

sponsored Operation Christmas Wish , which w

a volunteer effort to support the SOS orphanag

in La Ceiba, Honduras. Squadron members co

lected bicycles, toys, clothing, medical supplie

and necessities, and then delivered them to th

orphanage. Captain Piel, the 8th SOS project off

cer, worked with representatives of the Air Com

mando Association and the Threshold Foundatio

of Fort Walton Beach to collect 15,000 pounds 

donations. He coordinated with SOUTHCOM

SOCSOUTH, and the Department of State to a

complish the mission. In addition to providin

toys for the children, the 1999 effort also raise

enough funds to purchase two washers and tw

dryers for the orphanage, eliminating washing b

hand. The project provided members of the 8

SOS, along with other members of the 16th SOW

and the local community, the opportunity to he

needy children in an economically depressed Ce

tral American country.165 By the time Operatio

Christmas Wish ended in mid-December, th

squadron was making final preparations for i

move to Duke Field and colocating with its sist

unit. The year 1999 had been a good one an

would be the last year that the squadron would b

assigned to Hurlburt Field.

The 15th SOS Supports

 SOUTHCOM Tasking

The 15th SOS remained busy supporting bo

JCET events, major exercises, and real-world co

tingency operations throughout the first half 

1999. From 11 to 19 January, the squadron d

ployed two MC-130H Combat Talons to Elme

dorf AFB, Alaska, for Gryphon Ale 99-01. Durin

the JCET the crews participated in mountaino

terrain-following training as well as conductin

air-intercept sorties against F-15C and F-15E ai

craft from the 3d Fighter Wing. The crews al

flew against realistic AAA and surface-to-a

simulators located in the ECM range near the ci

of Fairbanks. After the completion of the JCET

the two Talons redeployed to McChord AFB

Washington, from 20 to 25 January and su

ported the US Army’s 2d Battalion, 75th Rang

Regiment, stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington.

The following month, from 5 to 28 Februar

two MC-130H aircraft deployed to Santa Cru

Bolivia, to provide air-drop support to the U

Army’s 7th Special Forces Group. During the d

ployment phase, the crews delivered critical med

cal supplies to the capital city of La Paz. Oper

tions were based out of Viru International Airpo

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

453
and flights were flown daily in support of the Bolivian Airborne School and for unilateral training.

Personnel airdrops were conducted near Cochabamba in the Bolivian interior. With the 15th

SOS’s help the 7th SFG(A) was able to requalify

more than 400 Bolivian airborne troopers and

jumpmasters.167

The Andes mountains provided a unique venue

for the crews’ training. While deployed one crew

flew the US ambassador to Bolivia, the Hon. Donna

Jean Hrinak, on an orientation flight so that she

could observe firsthand the quality of training received by both militaries. The two Talon crews

had the opportunity to fly into La Paz, where the

runway was 13,300 feet above sea level. The approach required the Talon crew to be on oxygen

throughout the maneuver.168

From the heart of South America, the 15th SOS

next deployed to SEA for JCET Balance Torch 99-

4 from 12 March to 14 April. Based out of Ubon

RTAFB, Thailand, one aircraft and two crews supported Royal Thai armed forces and US military

personnel in a full array of training events. Once

in Thailand the 15th SOS contingent came under

the operational control of the 353d SOG and accomplished training events to include IFR, HALO

and HAHO airdrops, personnel static-line airdrops, equipment drops, and night mountain-TF

events. During the month-long deployment, the

lone Combat Talon flew 44 sorties and logged 78.5

hours.169

With the Thailand deployment still under way,

the 15th SOS deployed five aircraft to Alexandria,

Louisiana, and participated in Joint Readiness Exercise 2-99. The crews, along with staff and support personnel, operated out of the Joint Readiness Training Center compound. Although the

event was extremely complex and challenged

maintenance and aircrews alike, the squadron enjoyed a 100 percent mission accomplishment rate

throughout the intense exercise. The joint scenario

included infiltrations, exfiltrations, hot refuelings,

and air-drop operations. In addition to the JRX,

the squadron continued to participate in bilateral

exercises at Lawson and Hunter AAFs, Georgia;

Harrisburg IAP, Pennsylvania; and Tonopah Test

Range in Nevada. The 15th SOS’s primary customer was the 75th Ranger Regiment, but it also

supported other special operations units assigned

to USSOCOM.170

The squadron kicked off the second half of 1999

by supporting the 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort

Benning, Georgia. Unit aircraft and personnel

conducted a regimental airdrop of more than

1,500 soldiers during the event. Colonel Wert, the

15th SOS squadron commander, was the air mission commander for the large airdrop. In August

the squadron deployed one aircraft to Andrews

AFB, Maryland, to provide a familiarization ride

for the new secretary of the Air Force. During the

orientation ride to Pope AFB, the secretary made

a tandem HALO jump into the sprawling Fort

Bragg range. The mission went off flawlessly,

USAF Photo

Support for large-scale personnel airdrops required the 15th SOS to develop multipleship formation tactics. Pictured are three Combat Talon IIs joining on lead.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

454
with the secretary appreciative of the skill of the

Combat Talon II crew.171

Towards the latter part of August, the squadron deployed six crews to Boise, Idaho, for an

airfield seizure exercise with 75th Ranger Regiment personnel stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington. While deployed to the Northwest, the

crews flew ECM sorties in the Sailor Creek

range. Two months later two crews deployed to

the Middle East to participate in JCS Exercises

Eastern Viper and Inherent Fury. Based out of

Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait, the two crews flew

nine of 11 days and successfully executed exercise missions in Qatar and Bahrain. Many of the

missions included the airdrop of host-nation personnel. During the deployment the squadron flew

sorties into Oman, which was the first into that

country in a number of years. The squadron finished out the year with a JRX out of Cape Ca -

naveral, Florida. The four crews executed tasked

missions in an exceptional manner. As the year

came to a close, most of the 15th SOS was back

at Hurlburt Field.

172

The 550th SOS Wins the 1999 AETC

Maintenance Effectiveness Award

At Kirtland AFB the 550th SOS continued to

train new CT II crew members in the formal

school, with the WST operational. Air refueling

missions with both KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft

were completed in conjunction with the formal

school and for continuation training. The Chile

Flag exercise series continued to provide squadron exposure to the demanding joint arena, with

tactical airdrops accomplished for both US Army

Special Forces and US Navy SEALs. During the

58th SOW’s ORI, the 550th SOS was the only

squadron to receive an outstanding rating by the

Headquarters AETC/IG. The squadron also excelled during a Nineteenth Air Force Standardization and Evaluation Visit, again receiving

the highest rating of the entire wing.

While conducting an off-station night training

mission, a Combat Talon II crew responded to an

aircraft crash in its operating area. After locating

the crash site, the aircraft landed on a nearby

runway, and three crew members deplaned to assess the situation and to determine if the pilot

had survived the crash. The crew members found

that the pilot was still alive but was trapped in

the mangled wreckage. While two crew members

provided fire protection with aircraft fire extinguishers, Tech Sergeant Belsches crawled into

the crushed inverted wreckage and managed to

free the trapped pilot. For his heroism Belsch

was awarded the USAF Airman’s Medal.

The squadron finished out the year by bein

awarded the prestigious 1999 AETC Maintenanc

Effectiveness Award for the best medium-aircra

category squadron in the command. The squadro

was poised to enter the new millennium as one 

the top units in AETC.

The 7th SOS Goes to War in the

Balkans: Operation Allied Force

On 3 January 1999 the holiday season cam

to an abrupt end when three 7th SOS Comb

Talon II aircraft and crews were tasked to fly 

mission in support of Operation Joint Forge 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within two hours of initi

notification, the three Combat Talons were ai

borne and headed for Stuttgart, Germany, 

pick up key staff personnel and then to mov

them forward to the Balkans. Weather in th

target area had dropped to minimums, and 

was questionable as to whether even the Com 

bat Talon , with its sophisticated navigation an

instrumentation systems, could complete th

mission. The aircrew flew self-contained a

proaches down to minimums and was able 

see the runway environment and land at Tuzl

AB. No other weapons system could have lande

in such foggy condition s.

173

On 24 March 1999 NATO launched Operatio

Allied Force , a US-led air operation direct

against Serbia and its leader, Slobodan Milosevi

The conflict was caused when Milosevic refused 

accept a diplomatic settlement to the Kosovo cr

sis that involved withdrawing Serbian troop

from Kosovo, accepting a force of internation

peacekeepers, and agreeing to a plan for Kosov

autonomy. On 19 March 1999, a week before th

actual beginning of air strikes, a planning ord

was issued by the CJCS to USCINCEUR outli

ing possible forces to be used in support of NAT

operations in Kosovo.174

The planning order requested that U

CINCEUR identify both strategic and tactic

targets that, if eliminated, would impede th

movement of the Yugoslav army and police forc

into and out of Kosovo. Also on 19 March Secr

tary of Defense William Cohen issued a deplo

ment order for support of Operation Noble Anv

the phased air operation portion of Allied Forc

Portions of the 16th SOW (including AC-130 gu

ships and MH-53s) and the entire 352d SO

were tasked to support the operation. Force

were alerted at both locations, and each taske

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

455
unit made preparations to deploy to Brindisi,

Italy, where JSOTF-Noble Anvil was established

as the headquarters for SOF.175

On 23 March the 7th SOS deployed four Combat Talon IIs to Brindisi to deliver key staff personnel and equipment to San Vito AS in prepara -

tion for the NATO air war. These prepositioned

forces served as the nucleus for all special opera -

tions activities in-theater, including combat

search and rescue and AC-130 gunship employ -

ment. For the 7th SOS Combat Talons, tasking

revolved primarily around leaflet missions flown

in support of the Joint Psychological Operations

Task Force.

The PSYOPS leaflet campaign was the largest

since World War II. Because of the low-altitude

AAA and SAM t hreats, Combat Talon crews flew

at 30,000-feet altitude, unpressurized, and during daylight hours to accomplish their mission.

On 3 April 1999 the first of 52 combat mission

sorties was flown by a 7th SOS Combat Talon .

For the next 79 days, the CT II squadron maintained a 24-hour cycle of planning, executing,

and recovering missions flown over the Republic

of Yugoslavia.176

The 7th SOS dropped more than 101.7 million

leaflets on 81 separate targets. 177 Drop accuracy

was confirmed daily as international news media

broadcast the arrival of each leaflet type as it

landed on its intended targets. The phenomenal

success enjoyed by NATO forces throughout the

campaign could be partially attributed to the ex -

cellent work done by the deployed Combat Talon

crews. Milosevic was forced to accept the desires

of the people of Kosovo and to agree to the terms

demanded by NATO to protect its welfare. Combat operations were terminated for the squadron

on 8 June 1999 after the last leaflet mission was

completed.

Throughout the remainder of the year, the

7th SOS pulled alert duties at RAF Mildenhall

in anticipation of follow-on tasking in the Balkans and actually launched on several occa -

sions. The penetration capabilities of the aircraft were far superior to anything else in the

theater. In addition to supporting combat opera -

tions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 7th SOS participated in five of the 352d SOG’s JCETs, two JCS

exercises, and 15 SOF training deployments. The

squadron deployed to Romania for the first time

ever and participated with Romanian forces in

NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. A CT II

crew flew night terrain-following missions in marginal weather through the Romanian mountains

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Combat Talon II en route to a high-altitude leaflet drop

over the Republic of Yugoslavia.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

High-altitude leaflet drops required supplemental oxy -

gen for aircrew personnel. Pictured is Tech Sergeant

Beck during a PSYOPS mission.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Leaflets departing a 7th SOS Combat Talon II during

Operation Allied Force.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

456
and flew airborne intercept training missions

against MiG-21s and MiG-29s. The aircraft also

flew against SA-2 , SA-3, and SA-6 SAM systems,

using its ECM equipment to identify the threats.

The training value of the JCET was exponentially increased due to the experience of the former Warsaw Pact-trained soldiers and the variety of equipment employed against the Combat

Talon .

178 The squadron finished out 1999 with

highly experienced combat crews that were prepared for the new century.

* * * * * *

Operation Allied Force was the last major con -

tingency tasked to Combat Talon during the

twentieth century. From 1965 to 2000 the wea

ons system was involved in virtually every majo

conflict or contingency, including the Vietna

War and Operation Desert Storm. By 2000 th

early 1960s-era Combat Talon I airframe w

nearing its service life limitations, and most 

the newer Combat Talon IIs were already 1

years old. If the capability were to remain viabl

major upgrade and modernization programs ha

to be undertaken. The first 10 years of the ne

millennium would determine the fate of the Pra

torian STARShip.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Crew that flew the 14 April 1999 leaflet Operation Al -

lied Force mission. Standing left to right: Moran, Kre -

mer, Garstka, Bruckner, Gray, McDaniel, Arnold,

McJunkins, Sanchez, and Mischke. Kneeling left to

right: Montalvo, Hammer, and Sammons.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Crew that flew the 1 June 1999 Operation Allied For

leaflet mission. Standing left to right: Kisner, Mora

Hubberd, Ballard, Courtney, Kremer, Garstka, McJun

ins, and Hegedusich. Kneeling left to right: McDani

Mischke, Sanchez, Lacharite, and Humphrey.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Crew that flew the 1 June 1999 Operation Allied Force mission. Back row, left to

right: Montalvo, Grover, Bruckner, Stucki, Feltner, and Lucus. Front row: Lockhart, Sammons, Rife, Diehl, Bohannon, Melton, and Gard.

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

457
Notes

1. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1996, vol. 1, 16th Special Operations Wing historian

file, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 79.

2. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1996, vol. 1, HQ AFSOC/HO historian file, Hurlburt

Field, Fla., 68.

3. Ibid., 39–40.

4. Ibid., 40.

5. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1996, 107.

6. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1996, vol. 1, 138–39.

7. Ibid., 144–45.

8. Ibid.

9. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1996, 107.

Crew that flew the 3 June 1999 Operation Allied Force mission. Standing, left to

right: Thurber, Bourque, Weiss, Ballard, Spencer, Arnold, Stucki, Bruckner, Mon -

talvo, and Humphrey. Kneeling, left to right: Keyes, Lightner, and Grover.

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Photo courtesy of David Sammons

Crew that flew the 4 June 1999 Operation Allied Force mission. Left to right:

Foster, Hammer, Gard, Gray, Wendel, Diehl, Boguslawski, Kasten, Beck, and

Wright.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

458
10. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1996, 149–50.

11. Ibid., 151–52.

12. Ibid., 155.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 156–57.

15. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1996, 111–12.

16. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1996, 38.

17. Ibid., 65–67.

18. Ibid., 28–29.

19. Ibid., 25.

20. Ibid., 26.

21. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1996, 20.

22. Ibid., 157–58.

23. Ibid., vol. 8, Supporting Document I-309.

24. Ibid., vol. 1, 16th Special Operations Wing historian

file, 59.

25. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1997, vol. 4, Supporting Document SD-153.

26. History, 919th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

September 1996, vol. 1, HQ AFSOC/HO historian file,

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 53.

27. Ibid., 4–5.

28. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1996, vol. 1, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 26–27.

29. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 July 1996–30

June 1997, 28–29.

30. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1996, 26.

31. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1996, vol. 1, 353d SOG historian file, Kadena AB, Japan,

30–31.

32. Ibid., 63–64.

33. Ibid., 42–45.

34. Ibid., 15.

35. Ibid., 45–47.

36. Ibid., 82.

37. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1996, 10–11.

38. Ibid., 59–62.

39. Ibid., 44–45.

40. Ibid., 32.

41. Ibid., 47–48.

42. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–30

June 1998, vol. 1, 8.

43. Ibid., 9–10.

44. Ibid., 11–12.

45. Ibid., 122.

46. Ibid., 4.

47. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1998, 30.

48. Ibid., 32.

49. Ibid., 31.

50. Ibid., 33.

51. Ibid., 16–17.

52. Ibid., 9–11.

53. Ibid., 19–22.

54. Ibid., 22–24.

55. Ibid., 37–38.

56. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–31

December 1997, 27.

57. Ibid., 41–42.

58. Ibid., 31.

59. Ibid., vi.

60. Ibid., 32.

61. Ibid., 32–33.

62. History, 919th Special Operations Wing, 1 Octob

1996–30 September 1997, vol. 1, 2.

63. Ibid., 13–14.

64. Ibid., 14.

65. Ibid., 18.

66. History, 919th Special Operations Wing, 1 Octob

1997–30 September 1998, 18.

67. Ibid., 10–11.

68. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 July 1996–

June 1997, vol. 1, 35.

69. Ibid., 36–37.

70. Ibid., 37–38.

71. Ibid., 38–39.

72. Ibid., 25.

73. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 D

cember 1997, 29.

74. Ibid., 48.

75. Ibid., 49.

76. Ibid., 51–52.

77. Ibid., 53–54.

78. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 D

cember 1996, vol. 1, 50.

79. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–

June 1997, 32.

80. Ibid., 34.

81. Ibid., 20.

82. Ibid., 95.

83. Ibid., 104.

84. Lt Col Frank Kisner, 7th SOS/CC, memorandum 

SOCEUR/J3, subject: Narrative of 7th SOS Response to No

combatant Evacuation of Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, 

June 1997, 12 April 1998, Combat Talon Archive, HQ A

SOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Message, DTG 070800ZMay98, HQ AFSOC/CC to 35

SOG/CC, subject: 1997 Air Force MacKay Trophy Winn

Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, Fla

92. Kisner memorandum.

93. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31 D

cember 1997, 56.

94. Ibid., 23–24.

95. Ibid., 25.

96. Ibid., 29–30.

97. Ibid., 32.

98. Ibid., 34.

99. Ibid., 66–78.

100. History, 352d Special Operations Group, 1 January–

June 1998, 38–39.

101. Ibid., 39.

102. Ibid., 70.

103. Ibid., 46–47.

104. Ibid., 28.

105. Ibid., 30–31.

106. Ibid., 33.

107. Narrative of 1998 Tunner Award submission 

USAF, n.d., Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlbu

Field, Fla.

108. Ibid.

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE TO THE NEW MILLENNIU

459
109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 January–

30 June 1998, vol. 1, 21–23.

114. Ibid., 24–25.

115. Ibid., 26–27.

116. Ibid., 28–29.

117. Ibid., 30–33.

118. Ibid., 38–41.

119. History, 353d Special Operations Group, 1 July–31

December 1998, 22–23.

120. Ibid., 34–35.

121. Ibid., 36.

122. Ibid., 37–38.

123. Ibid., 50–51.

124. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1998, 26.

125. Eighth Special Operations Squadron, nomination

package, “1999 AFSOC Squadron of the Year Award Nomination Package,” n.d., to 16th SOW, Combat Talon Archive,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

126. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1998, vol. 1, 18.

127. Ibid., 18–19.

128. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1998, 28.

129. Ibid., 28–29.

130. Ibid., 29.

131. Ibid.

132. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1998, 41.

133. Ibid., vol. 4, 59.

134. Ibid., vol. 1, 47–48.

135. Ibid., 50–51.

136. Ibid., 62.

137. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1998, vol. 1, 85.

138. History, 58th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1998, vol. 4, Supporting Document 103.

139. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 July–31 De -

cember 1998, 22–23.

140. Ibid., 23.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid., 23–24.

143. History, 919th Special Operations Wing, 1 October

1997–30 September 1998, vol. 1, 3.

144. Ibid., 23.

145. History, 353d Special Operations Group, draft, 1

January–30 June 1999.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1999, vol. 1, 73.

157. Ibid., 5.

158. Ibid.

159. Eighth Special Operations Squadron, nomination

package.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1999, vol. 1, 13.

167. Ibid., 14.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid., 15.

170. Memorandum, subject: 15th SOS Semi-Annual History Update, to 16th SOW/HO, 27 July 1999, Combat Talon

Archive, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

171. Ibid., 19 January 2000, Combat Talon Archive,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

172. Ibid.

173. Seventh Special Operations Squadron, nomination

package, “AFSOC Outstanding Special Operations Squadron

of the Year, 1999,” n.d., to 352d SOG, Combat Talon Archive,

Hurlburt Field, Fla.

174. History, 16th Special Operations Wing, 1 January–30

June 1999, vol. 1, 25.

175. Ibid.

176. Seventh Special Operations Squadron, nomination

package.

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP

460
Epilogue

2000 and Beyond: A Combat Talon Journey

As the new millennium dawned, Combat Talon maintained its position as a key element in

AFSOC’s arsenal. The move of the 8th SOS went as planned, with the squadron flag being

carried by unit runners from Hurlburt Field to Duke Field on 5 February 2000. The last

Combat Talon I was flown to Duke on 9 February, thus completing the transfer of all Combat

Talon I aircraft to the USAFR. For the first time since 1974, there were no Combat Talon Is

stationed at Hurlburt Field. All Combat Talon Is were transferred to the 711th SOS, with the

8th SOS flying the Reserve aircraft as an Active Associate Unit. Both Talon I squadrons

supported the national special operations mission and were prepared to support theater task -

ing worldwide. The 14 Combat Talons assigned to the 711th SOS were as follows:

62-1843 64-0562

63-7785 64-0565

64-0523 64-0566

64-0551 64-0567

64-0555 64-0568

64-0559 64-0571

64-0561 64-0572

The Combat Talon II continued to support theater tasking in the Pacific and in Europe.

The two stateside-based units were responsible for the national special operations mission,

support to Central and South America, and all formal Talon II training. The 15th SOS was

also tasked to augment the two overseas squadrons if required. The aircraft had proven

itself in combat and contingency operations around the world during the last decade of the

twentieth century, and the lion’s share of Talon tasking in the new century would fall to it.

The 24 Combat Talon IIs were assigned to the following units:

1st SOS 7th SOS 15th SOS 58th SOW

88-0191 84-0476 83-1212 87-0125

88-0192 86-1699 84-0475 87-0126

88-0195 87-0023 85-0011 87-0127

88-0264 88-0193 85-0012

88-1803 88-0194 87-0024

89-0280

89-0281

89-0282

89-0283

90-0161

90-0162

Future Direction*

For Combat Talon to remain a viable weapons system, upgrades will be required in the

near term. For Combat Talon I a Directed Infrared Countermeasures System has been

developed and will be installed on all 14 aircraft by 2003. The system will improve the

aircraft’s defensive capability so that it can continue to survive in the ever-increasing

twenty-first century threat environment. To improve the aircraft’s communications capa -

bility, an improved SATCOM has been developed, and a new HF long-range radio will be

installed to round out the Talon I’s communications suite. The Combat Talon II will also

receive the Directed Infrared Countermeasures System. NVG compatible lighting will be

__________

 *The following narrative was extracted from the “AFSOC Mission Area Plans, Final Report,” dated December 1999, presented by Lt Col Jo

Geis, Headquarters AFSOC/XPPX, during the AFSOF 2027 Symposium, Hurlburt Field, Florida.

461
installed in the Talon IIs cargo compartment, and the aircraft’s communication and naviga -

tion systems will be upgraded.

The most significant improvement scheduled for Combat Talon II is the installation

of an aerial refueling system capable of refueling both helicopter and tilt-rotor aircraft.

The refueling system installed on the Combat Talon I utilizes a refueling pod designed in

the late 1950s that requires aircraft electrical power, hydraulics, and aircraft fuel pumps

for proper operation. Although maintenance on the older pods is not complex, meantime

between failures is low, thus requiring excessive maintenance actions to keep the pods

operational. Fuel output rate is also dependent on fuel pressure generated by the aircraft’s

dump pumps. To overcome the shortfalls of the Talon I pods, AFSOC began testing the MK

32B-902E pod on a Hurlburt-based Talon II aircraft in 1999. The new pod has a “ram air

turbine” that powers an internal fuel pump, thus eliminating the need to use the aircraft’s

dump pumps. Also, the pod has a DC motor that operates the hose-reel assembly. The hose

is retrieved by use of a hose-reel tensator spring, thus eliminating the need for aircraft

hydraulic pressure. The new pod will be capable of supporting all refueling operations from

105 knots to over 180 knots without having to land and change drogues. Because of its

augmenting fuel pump, the pod will be capable of simultaneously passing over 150 gallons

per minute of fuel to two receivers. The increased off-load rate will significantly reduce the

time a receiver aircraft has to spend “on the hose” refueling. The programmed completion

date for the modification is 2007 for the Talon II fleet.

At its current utilization rate, the Combat Talon I will require a service life extension

program (SLEP) to be initiated by 2007. At the present time, SLEP is not funded for

Combat Talon I, which will mean that the older Talons will reach the end of their service

life by 2015. With the SLEP, the aircraft will remain serviceable through 2025.

The CV-22

To augment the current Talon fleet, AFSOC has developed two initiatives that will provide

flexibility and improved delivery capability. The first initiative is the CV-22. It is currently

undergoing testing by a joint AFSOC/Marine Corps team, with the first four CV-22s scheduled

for delivery to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, in 2003. The revolutionary tilt-rotor aircraft will

provide fixed-wing en route speed with the landing capability of a rotary-wing aircraft. It

fulfills a long-standing USSOCOM requirement to be able to accomplish a long-range infiltration/exfiltration mission during one period of darkness. The extended range of the CV-22 (as

compared to conventional rotary-wing aircraft) reduces its dependency on penetrating tankers.

Its design also improves its survivability and reduces maintenance downtime. An added benefit is that the aircraft is self-deployable—it will fly to the fight instead of relying on sca rce

airlift for transport as does the current rotary-wing fleet.

The CV-22 has a terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar capability similar to the

Combat Talon. It also has an ECM suite that will protect it from enemy threats in hostile

areas. Approximately 90 percent of the CV-22’s airframe and equipment is common to the

Marine Corps’s MV-22, thus reducing the costs of future maintenance and improving the

availability of parts. The CV-22’s performance is similar to the Combat Talon, with en

route speeds of 230 knots and a service ceiling of 25,000 feet. It can carry 25,000 pounds of

cargo, compared to 51,000 for the Combat Talon, with an unrefueled combat radius of 500

miles compared to the Combat Talon’s 1,000 miles. Current planning does not have the

CV-22 replacing any Talons, but rather it replaces the current AFSOC rotary-wing fleet

(the MH-53 Pave Low and the MH-60 Pave Hawk). A total of 50 tilt-rotor aircraft have

been funded, with the last four being delivered in 2009.

The MC-X

The twenty-first century provides many challenges for special operations aircraft, foremost among them is the growing threat by hostile forces. By 2015 most of the world’s

462
surface will be covered by layers of threats that cannot be defeated by today’s technology.

To survive in this nonpermissive environment, AFSOC’s second major initiative focuses on

the development of a reduced signature aircraft identified as the MC-X. With the service

life expiring on many of its current C-130 aircraft (including the Combat Talon I), AFSOC

is developing a mixed fleet of delivery vehicles that are not all based on the C-130 airframe.

This mix will give SOF planners more flexibility to meet mission tasking.

The MC-X, although still in the conceptual stage, will be smaller than the C-130, with

three pallet positions available for cargo and personnel. It will be made of low-observable

materials and will utilize stealth technology to mask it from enemy threats. The aircraft

will be jet powered to increase its en route speed and reduce its visibility, and it will have

longer range and greater maneuverability than current aircraft. The estimated cost of each

new MC-X is $250 million, with 50 to 75 aircraft being fielded by 2025. The Air Force has

identified $7 billion for MC-X development and fielding through 2019, with additional

funds provided in the out years as AFSOC ramps up the new MC-X fleet.

Future Outlook for Combat Talon

The crown jewel that represents the very essence of Combat Talon capability is the

people who fly, maintain, and support the weapons system. Unlike their predecessors of

World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, today’s special operators are not faced with wholesale

elimination of their special operations mission. Instead, special operators are highly respected throughout the Air Force and sought after by the defense establishment. They are

highly motivated, thoroughly trained, and adequately equipped to carry out their mission.

Senior leadership has recognized the continued need for special operations forces in a

volatile, unpredictable new world. With USSOCOM charged with nurturing this national

asset, the future looks bright.

The long-range mission to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate friendly forces into denied

areas of the world will undoubtedly continue as long as there is conflict. The question remains

as to what airframe will conduct the mission. The Combat Talon I fleet will move out of the Air

Force inventory by 2015 if the aircraft do not receive the SLEP, and the Combat Talon II will

be 25–30 years old at that time. The CV-22 will absorb a portion of the Talon mission, but its

reduced payload and range will limit its ability to perform all current Talon tasking. The

50-aircraft CV-22 fleet will require penetrating tankers to increase its range, a mission currently performed by Talon I and scheduled for Talon II by 2007.

Future battlefields will be increasingly hostile, so much so that both the C-130 and the

CV-22 may not be able to survive. To ensure that AFSOC assets remain viable in a

high-threat environment, the MC-X will be fielded. Although it is extremely difficult to

predict what the future will bring, it is safe to say that there will be a continual need for

two kinds of forces—those designed for low-end conflict (the MC-130E/H and CV-22) and

those designed for the high-end spectrum of war (the MC-X). Actions taken during the first

10 years of the twenty-first century will determine if AFSOC can continue to execute the

vital Combat Talon mission.

463
Appendix A
Live Fulton STARS Made by Combat Talon Aircraft

The following list may not be all-inclusive; rather, it represents all live Fulton STARS operatio

documented by the author. No records were available for recoveries made between 25 August 19 66 to 

July 1968.

Person Date Location Recovery Pilot Remarks

Recovered Unit

 1. Jacob C. 24 Aug 1966 Pope AFB, George G. First operational one-man STAR

 Legrand (USAF) NC Hellier (Training)

 2. Straun L. 24 Aug 1966 Pope AFB, George G. First operational two-man STAR

 Paddon NC Hellier (Training)

 and 779th TCS

 3. Frederick L.

 Thrower

4 through 23—No Records Available

24. R. W. Thornbury 2 Jul 1968 Korat RTAFB, Walter Pine Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th ACS

25. D. E. Hornbeck 6 Jul 1968 Ubon RTAFB, P. Lansier Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th ACS

26. G. G. Davis Jr. 11 Jul 1968 Udorn RTAFB, R. Bunn Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th ACS

27. R. R. Pratt Jr. 15 Jul 1968 Cubi Point, G. Smith Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th ACS

28. A. E. Williams 24 Jul 1968 NKP RTAFB, R. Jones Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th ACS

29. S. Michaels 20 Jul 1968 Takhli RTAFB, H. Kempe Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th ACS

30. Tom Hines 2 Aug 1968 Nha Trang, R. Bunn Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Vietnam 15th SOS Pickup of Sq/CC

31. R. Roberts 4 Sep 1968 Bien Hoa AB, R. Franzen Demonstration (Training)

Vietnam 15th SOS

32. D. McNabb 11 Sep 1968 Cam Ranh Bay, J. Kummer Demonstration (Training)

Vietnam 15th SOS

33. D. Nunnally Jr. 4 Oct 1968 Phan Rang AB, J. Kummer Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Vietnam 15th SOS

34. D. Prentece 29 Oct 1968 Cubi Point, K. Hilchey Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th SOS 2-man STAR

 and

35. R. Henry

 (USMC)

36. W. Haley 22 Nov 1968 Cubi Point, D. Martin Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th SOS Uncontrollable spinning during

 and pickup. 2-man STAR suspended

37. J. Mitchell

 (USAF)

38. J. W. Hall 20 Jan 1969 Cubi Point, M. Banks Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th SOS

39. J. T. Distad 26 Feb 1969 Cubi Point, G. Smith Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th SOS

40. D. E. S. Horne 23 May 1969 Koke Kathiem, K. Hilchey Demonstration (Training)

 (USA) Thailand 15th SOS

41. J. R. Kummer 21 Jul 1969 Nha Trang AB, J. Newell Jr. Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Vietnam 15th SOS Pickup of Sq/CC

42. R. G. Lundy 8 Sep 1969 Koke Kathiem, F. Rast Demonstration (Training)

 (USA) Thailand 15th SOS for king and queen of Thailand

467
Person Date Location Recovery Pilot Remarks

Recovered Unit

43. H. H. Stevens 3 Dec 1969 Lop Buri, B. Jefferies Demonstration (Training)

 (USA) Thailand 15th SOS

44. G. Booth 25 Feb 1970 Nha Trang AB, R. Popejoy Demonstration (Training)

 (USMC) Vietnam 15th SOS Viewed by MACV chief of staff

Maj Gen Wilburn Dolvin

45. Unknown 25 Feb 1970 Lop Buri, J. Reynolds Demonstration (Training)

Thailand 15th SOS Viewed by members of Southeast

Asia Treaty Organization

46. C. W. Arnold 14 Mar 1970 Clark AB, K. Henderson Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 15th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

47. R. Earle 23 May 1970 Clark AB, G. Dentz Demonstration (Training)

 (USN) Philippines 15th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

48. F. Hopewell 10 Sep 1970 Clark AB, J. Nelson Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 15th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

49. F. Hopewell 10 Oct 1970 Clark AB, R. Hite Jr. Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 15th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

50. R. Hite Jr. 30 Oct 1970 Udorn RTAFB, R. Clinton Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Thailand 15th SOS

51. R. L. Hughes 31 Oct 1970 Ubon RTAFB, R. Clinton Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Thailand 15th SOS

52. C. J. Kraft 14 Nov 1970 Clark AB, D. Green Demonstration (Training)

 (USA) Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

53. J. E. Evermann 5 Dec 1970 Clark AB, C. McClellan Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

54. T. H. Terrell 24 Jan 1971 Clark AB, C. Buntgens Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

55. D. James 6 Feb 1971 Clark AB, L. Butler Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

56. L. Butler 15 May 1971 Clark AB, B. McGough Demonstration (Training)

 (USAF) Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

57. Baucknight 15 May 1971 Clark AB, B. McGough Demonstration (Training)

Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

58. R. Uteguard 14 Jun 1971 Clark AB, A. Rowe Demonstration (Training)

Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

59. Unknown 12 Jul 1971 Clark AB, A. Rowe Demonstration (Training)

Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

60. Unknown 30 Aug 1971 Clark AB, W. Kornemann II Demonstration (Training)

Philippines 90th SOS Pacific Jungle Survival School

The 90th SOS/CC suspended live STAR operations for training in November 1971. No additional live

STARS were flown until April 1979.

61. W. Tyler 23 Apr 1979 Germany T. Jahnke One-man land in conjunction with

 COMSOTFE 7th SOS (ICW) Flintlock 79 (first live STAR

since 1971 Subexercise

Schwarzes-Pferd)

62. Taylor Apr 1979 Germany D. Davenport One-man land ICW Flintlock 79

 (USA) 7th SOS Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd

63. Quijano Nov 1979 Almeria, W. Tuck One-man land ICW Crisex 79

 (USA) Spain 7th SOS Viewed by King Juan Carlos

64. B. Weigel 5 May 1980 Germany T. Hermanson One-man land ICW Flintlock 80

 (USAF) 8th SOS 8th SOS crew attached to 7th SOS

65. Unknown 5 June 1980 Germany W. Tuck One-man land ICW Flintlock 80

7th SOS Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd

468
Person Date Location Recovery Pilot Remarks

Recovered Unit

66. Unknown 4 May 1981 Germany W. Tuck One-man land ICW Flintlock 81

7th SOS Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd

67. T. Powell 8 May 1981 Oberkessack, R. Meller One-man land ICW Flintlock 81

Germany 8th SOS 8th SOS crew attached to 7th SOS

Subexercise Schwarzes-Pferd

68. Unknown Apr 1981 Germany D. Davenport One-man land ICW Flintlock 81

7th SOS

69. R. Kuhn 2 Dec 1981 Macrihanish, J. Bates Two-man water for training.

 (USN) UK 7th SOS Sky anchor failure procedures

 and required. Ramp crew awarded

AF Achievement Medal.

70. L. Rhinehart First two-man live recovery since

 (USAF) November 1968.

71. Unknown Apr 1982 Monrovia, D. Davenport Two-man land ICW Flintlock 82

 (USA) Liberia 7th SOS Subexercise Palm 82

 and

72. C. Ebling

 (USAF)

73. C. Strickland 26 Apr 1982 CFB Lahr, J. Bates One-man land ICW Flintlock 82

Germany 7th SOS Fatality—last attempted live

STAR

469
Appendix B
Partial Summary of Upgrades, MOD-90 Combat Talon I

 1. Wings: New outer wings were installed on Combat Talon aircraft in the late 1980s.

New center-wing boxes and vertical beams (for the landing gear) were installed in

the 1990s.

 2. Dash-15 Engines: Provides increased power for in-flight refueling operations.

 3. Battery Compartment: Contains an additional aircraft battery to provide backup

power for inertial navigation units and mission computers.

 4. Radome: Houses two antennas assemblies and associated radar components. Fulton

aircraft have the distinctive drooped nose, while non-Fulton have the standard C130E configuration.

 5. Fulton Yokes: Guides the lift line to the Sky anchor. (Note: The Fulton yokes were

removed and placed in storage in 1998.)

 6. Sky anchor: Secures the lift line to the aircraft. (Note: The Sky anchor was removed

and placed in storage in 1998.)

 7. Fending Lines: Guides the lift line away from the props and cuts the line to prevent

inadvertent package pickup in the event the pilot misses the lift line with the yoke.

(Note: Fending lines have been removed and placed in storage along with other

Fulton STARS equipment.)

 8. Free Air Temp Bulbs: Interfaced with the mission computers.

 9. Rosemount Probe: Provides outside air temperature data to the air-data computer.

10. Angle of Attack Probe: On leading edge of vertical stabilizer. (Note: The first production Stray Goose aircraft had the probe mounted on the wing tip.)

11. SST-181X Antenna: Aerial refueling beacon transmitter.

12. Antennas: Various antennas located around the aircraft that provide input to the

Doppler, radar altimeters, communications equipment, and ECM transmitters/receivers.

13. FLIR System: AAQ-18 located behind the nose landing gear in a retractable pressure

box. (Note: The FLIR was installed in this location because original specifications

required that the modification be covert and not identifiable from outside the aircraft while on the ground. The original FLIR was identified as the S3-A and was

later replaced by the AAQ-10. The current FLIR is the AAQ-18. The FLIR is not

usable with the landing gear in the down position.)

14. Universal Aerial-Refueling Receptacle/Slipway Installation: Located on top of the

fuselage at flight station 162, it provides ability to refuel from any boom-equipped

tanker aircraft.

15. Beaver Tail: Provides protection for ECM antennas oriented to the rear quadrant of

the aircraft.

16. High-Speed Ramp: Structural modification of the empennage to allow operation of

the cargo ramp and door at speeds up to 250 KIAS. Support has been added along

the lower-aft section of the fuselage.

17. Paint: Two-tone low-gloss gray.

18. Infrared Defensive Pods: QRC-84-02A is mounted under the external fuel tanks.

19. Chaff/Flare Dispensers: ALE-40 system consisting of 20 dispensers with 30 rounds

each.

473
20. Horizontal Stabilizer Strengthening: An extra layer of skin was added to the leading

edge of the horizontal stabilizer of the empennage for extra strength to prevent

damage from ALE-27 chaff-bundle strikes. (Note: Probably not necessary for the

current ALE-40s.)

21. Exterior Lighting Changes:

—Covert taxi and landing lights.

—Covert rotating beacon on vertical stabilizer.

—Relocated overt upper rotating beacon or strobe.

—Lower rotating beacon or strobe lights.

—Aerial refueling fuselage, area and slipway lights.

—Helo aerial refueling pod and hose illumination and formation lights.

—Additional formation lights: Electroluminescent lights aft of each paratroop door

and aft end of each wing tip forward of the dump mast.

22. Helo Aerial Refueling Pods: Mounted under outside wing area outboard of the external fuel tanks.

23. Underbelly Protection System: Protects lower ECM antenna from damage when

operating on unimproved runways.

24. Inside the Nose Wheel-Well Area:

—Radome Anti-Ice System.

—Electronic Control Amplifier.

—Inertial Navigation Unit (INU) Battery Access Panel.

—KA Band Receiver/Transmitter: On Fulton-modified aircraft.

—X Band Receiver/Transmitter: On non–Fulton-modified aircraft.

Non-Fulton Aircraft Exterior Differences

 1. No Fulton Yokes or Fending Lines.

 2. Standard C-130E Radome.

 3. KA Band Receiver/Transmitter: Located in aircraft nose section.

 4. X Band Receiver/Transmitter: Located in aircraft nose section.

Interior Differences

 1. Flight Deck:

—Bunks removed and equipment rack installed.

—Dual navigator station installed on right side of flight deck. Provide work area for two

navigators. Displays radar, INS, and other associated navigation systems.

—Pilot and copilot flight instruments rearranged to add radar and additional equip -

ment panels. Added NVG-compatible lighting panels, additional radio control panels, and Fulton yoke control panel. Relocated flap position indicator and landing/taxi light control panel.

—Overhead control panel has aux landing lights, in-flight refueling control panel, air

refueling control panel, dump mast valve switches, ALE-40 flare/chaff release

switch, generator disconnect switches, and generator bearing failure lights.

—Modified dual navigation station with computer-aided navigation system.

—Improved flight deck air conditioning by addition of H-Plus Pack air-conditioning

unit.

 2. Cargo Compartment:

—Safe: For storage of classified documents.

—FLIR Sensor Turret Installation.

—Freon Pressurization System: Provides pressure for the KA band radar.

474
—X Band Receiver/Transmitter: On Fulton aircraft.

—EWO/RO Console: Located in the cargo compartment and provides location for

communications and EW equipment.

—Electronic Equipment Racks: Located in the cargo compartment and supports

NAV, ECM, and communication equipment.

—Added Lighting above EWO/RO Console: Provides additional lighting for maintenance and preflight duties.

—NVG Compatible Cargo Lighting: Reostat controlled overhead lighting that can be

used with NVGs.

—Remote Aerial Delivery System (ADS) Control Box.

—Secondary ADS Arming Box Assembly: Located on the right side of the aircraft on

the right anchor cable.

—Modified Dual Rails: Accommodates palletized cargo in five pallet positions. Rails

allow for the EWO/RO console installation.

—Nitrogen Pressurization: Pressurizes ECM wave guides.

—ALE-40 Switches: Red guarded switches located aft of the left wheel area.

—Cargo Door and Ramp: Modified for HSLLADS with two cargo door uplocks, two

cargo door actuators, 19-inch sequencing microswitch, buffer boards, and ADS

arms.

—Fulton STARS Connections: Located in the left rear area of the cargo compartment

aft of the left main landing gear.

—Hydraulic Reservoirs: Capacity increased for utility system to 7.0 gallons, auxiliary system to 6.22 gallons.

—Troop Doors: Large rectangular window installed for helicopter aerial refueling.

—Flare/Chaff Launcher Switches and Remote Releases for the ALE-40 System: Located by each paratroop door.

—Cargo Capability:

—Pax 47 (61 with wheel-well seats)

—Paratroopers 38

—Litters 30

—Pallets 5

—Benson Tanks: Provisions are made for palletized internal fuel tanks providing

22,780 pounds of additional fuel.

 3. Aircraft Gross Weight: Basic weight increased up to 96,000 pounds, with lightest

aircraft weighing 92,000 pounds. (There is a 4,000-pound difference in basic weight,

dependent on aircraft.)

Emergency Equipment

 1. Oxygen System:

—Six portable oxygen bottles.

—Thirteen oxygen regulators.

—Smoke masks and quick-don masks.

—Four oxygen-filler hoses.

 2. Five Halon Fire Extinguishers.

 3. Twelve First Aid Kits.

 4. Four Emergency Escape Breathing Devices.

 5. Master Fire Warning Light: Added to copilot’s instrument panel.

 6. Paratroop Retrieval Bar and Towed Paratroop Retrieval System: Used for troop door

parachutists retrieval.

 7. Chopping Locations: Marked above each paratroop door.

475
Electronic Warfare Equipment (see chap. 2)

Personnel Protective Armor: Separate personnel protective seat armor is provided for

all crew positions. There is also floor armor available for all crew positions except the

loadmaster and flight engineer. The lower side windows on the flight deck have acrylic

shields, and the liquid oxygen bottle is armored.

Blackout Curtains: Blackout curtains are provided to isolate the EWO/RO console from

the cargo compartment. Blackout covers are provided for all cargo compartment windows.

Blackout curtains are provided to isolate the light from the navigator station from the pilot

and flight engineer stations.

476
Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AAF Army Airfield

ABCCC airborne battlefield command, control, and communications

ABW Air Base Wing

ACS Air Commando Squadron

AD Air Division

ADCOM administrative command

ADI altitude direction indicator

ADIZ air defense identification zone

ADS aerial delivery system

ADVON advanced party

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFFORJUWTFA Air Force Forces Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic

AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AFRC Air Force Reserve Component

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

AFSOB Air Force Special Operations Base

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOCCENT Air Force Special Operations Command Central

AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces

AGL above ground level

AIE alternate insertion extraction 

ALCE airlift control element

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMS Aircraft Maintenance Section

AOR area of responsibility

APC armored personnel carrier

ARA airborne radar approach

ARCS Air Resupply and Communications Service

ARCW Air Resupply and Communications Wing

ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadrons

ARS Aerial Recovery System

Air Rescue Service

Air Resupply Squadron

ARW Air Refueling Wing

ASD Aeronautical System Division

ASD/SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict and Special Activities

ASET Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Team

ASROC antisubmarine rocket

ASTD assistant to the secretary of defense

ATC Air Traffic Control

Air Training Command

ATO assisted takeoff

ATTW Aircrew Training and Test Wing

AWACS airborne warning and control system

477
AWADS adverse weather aerial delivery system

BAI backup aircraft inventory

BDHI bearing-distance-heading indicator

BH Bosnia-Herzegovina

BIM blade inspection method

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BS Bomb Squadron

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CAF Chinese Air Force

CAFSOB combined AFSO base

CAFSOC Combined Air Force Special Operations Component

CAMPS computer-aided mission planning systems

CARP computed aerial release point

CAT Civil Air Transport

CCRAK Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities—Korea

CCT Combat Control Team

CCTW Combat Crew Training Wing

CDS container delivering system

CENTAF US Air Forces, Central Command

CENTCOM US Central Command

CI counterinsurgency

CINC commander in chief

CINCEUR commander in chief, European Command

CINCLANT commander in chief, Atlantic Command

CINCMAC commander in chief, Military Airlift Command

CINCPAC commander in chief, Pacific Command

CINCPACAF commander in chief, Pacific Air Force

CINCSO commander in chief, Southern Command

CINCSOC commander in chief, Special Operations Command

CINCSTRIKE commander in chief, Strike Command

CJCS chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJSOTF combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

COA courses of action

COMSOCCENT commanding general of Special Operations Command, Central

COMSOTFE commander, Support Operations Task Force, Europe

COMUSFK commander, US Forces, Korea

COMUSMACV commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

CONOP concept of operation

CONSCAN conical-rotating threat antenna

CPPG Crisis Pre-Planning Group

CRB Carrier Battle Group

CRRC combat-rubber-raiding craft

CS cross scan

CSA chief of staff, Army

CSAF chief of staff, Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

CSAREX CSAR exercise

CSTOG combined Special Operations Task Group

CT II Combat Talon II

CTF Carrier Task Force

Central Training Force

478
CTJTF Counterterrorist Joint Task Force

CTMR Combat Talon Management Review

CTW Crew Training Wing

CV Commando Vision

DCS deputy chief of staff

DCSO deputy commander for Special Operations

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMZ demilitarized zone

DNIF duty not including flying

DSOA Defense Special Operations Agency

DZ drop zone

ECM electronic countermeasure

ESAT European Survey and Assessment Team

ETIC estimated time in commission

EUCOM European Command

E W electronic warfare

EWO electronic warfare officer

FAC forward air control

FARP forward-area-refueling point

FARRP forward-area-refueling-and-rearming point

FCF functional check flight

FECOM Far East Command

FIS Fighter Interceptor Squadron

FLIR forward looking infrared radar

FMC fully mission capable

FMI functional management inspection

FOC full operational capability

FOL forward operating location

FSB forward staging base

FTS Flight Training Squadron

FTX field training exercise

FW Fighter Wing

GAR/I ground acquisition responder/interrogator

GCI ground controlled intercept

GPS Global Positioning System

H heavy

HAHO high-altitude high-opening

HALO high-altitude low-opening

HARP high-altitude release point

HF high frequency

HSI horizontal situation indicator

HSLLADS high-speed low-level aerial delivery system

IADS Integrated Air Defense System

IAF Indonesian Air Force

IAP international airport

IDS Infrared Detection System

IFR in-flight refueling

IG inspector general

479
IN intelligence

INS inertial navigation system

IOC initial operational capability

IP initial point

IR infrared

IRAN inspect and repair as necessary

IRCM infrared countermeasures

J3, JOD Joint Operations Division, Operations Directorate

JACK Joint Activities Commission, Korea

JCET joint/combined exchange training

JCRX joint combined readiness exercise

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCTG joint contingency task group

JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Center

JRT joint readiness training

JRX joint readiness exercises

JSAR joint search and rescue

JSO joint service officer

JSOAC Joint Special Operations Air Component

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JSOTF-SWA Joint Special Operations Task Force-Southwest Asia

JTD Joint Test Directorate

JTF Joint Task Force

JUSMAG Joint US Military Assistance Group

JUSMAGTHI Joint US Military Assistance Group, Thailand

JVX joint visual lift airlift

K-2 Taegu Airfield

K-14 Kimpo Airfield

K-16 Seoul City Airport

KFIA King Fahd International Airport

KIAS knots indicated airspeed

KVA kilovolt ampere

LAS Lockheed Air Service

LIC low-intensity conflict

LOACH light observation and command helicopter

LORI limited operational readiness inspections

LORO lobe-on-receiver only

LOX liquid oxygen

LRU line replaceable units

LTM Lockheed Technical Manual 

MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

MAAG Military Assistance and Advisory Group

MAC Military Airlift Command

MACSOG Military Airlift Command Special Operations Group

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MACVSOG Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Special Operations Group

MAJCOM major command

MARCENT US Marine Corp Component of USCENTCOM

MARG Marine Amphibious Ready Group

480
MATS Military Air Transport Service

MC mission capable

MCAS Marine Corps Air Station

MCM Multicommand Manual

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MFF military free fall

MFP Major Force Program

MIA missing in action

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOU memorandum of understanding

MRE meals ready to eat

MRI monopulse resolution improvement

MSA minimum safe altitude

MSET maintenance evaluation

MTBF mean-time-between failure

NAAF Northwest African Air Forces

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDI nondestructive inspection

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NKP Nakhon Phanom

NKPA North Korean Peoples Army

NSAM National Security Action Memorandum

NSC National Security Council

NSPG National Security Planning Group

NVA North Vietnamese Army

NVG night-vision goggle

NVN North Vietnam

OAS Organization of American States

OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

OG Operations Group

ONR Office of Naval Research

OPCON operational control

OPG Operations Planning Group

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operations Order

ORE operational readiness exercises

ORI operational readiness inspection

OSACSA Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency

and Special Activities

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSS Office of Strategic Services

OT&E operational test and evaluation

OUE operational utility evaluation

OW obstacle warning

PAA primary aircraft assigned

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PACOM Pacific Command

PAF Philippine Air Force

PARA precision air radar approach

PAT Pacific Area Trainer

PCS permanent change of station

481
PDF Panamanian Defense Force

PDM programmed depot maintenance

PDR Democratic Revolutionary Party

PGM precision ground mapping

PHILVOLCS Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology

P J pararescuemen

POM program objective memorandum

PR personnel recovery

PRA People’s Revolutionary Army

PRESDEL presidential delegation

PROTAF project task force

PSYOPS psychological operations

PSYWAR psychological warfare

PVO Pinatubo Volcano Observatory

PW PSYWAR

QAFA Quality Air Force Assessment

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAF Royal Air Force

RBS radar bomb scoring

RLC reception light committee

RMC revolutionary military control

RMI radio magnetic indicator

RNZSAS Royal New Zealand Special Air Services

RO radio operator

ROC required operational capability

ROK Republic of Korea

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

RTAF Royal Thailand Air Force

RTAFB Royal Thailand Air Force Base

RWR radar warning receiver

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SACSA special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities

SAM Special Air Missions

surface-to-air missile

SAR search and rescue

SAS search and salvage

Special Air Service

SASR Special Air Services Regiment

SATAF Site Activation Task Force

SATCOM satellite communications

SAVAK Iranian secret police loyal to the shah

SAW Special Air Warfare

SEA Southeast Asia

SEAL sea-air-land

SEDS sling ejection system

SF Special Forces

SFG Special Forces Group

SFODA US Army Special Forces A Team

SFOR Stabilization Forces

SGI Stray Goose International

SHP shaft horsepower

482
SKE station-keeping equipment

SLOG Special Operations Logistics Group

SMM Saigon Military Mission

SOAR Special Operations Aerial Refueling

SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central

SOCCT Special Operations Combat Control Team

SOCEUR Special Operations Command Europe

SOCIFOR Special Operations Command Implementation Forces

SOCLANT Special Operations Command Atlantic

SOCPAC Special Operations Command Pacific

SOD Special Operations Division

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOF-I Special Operations Forces-Improved

SOG Special Operations Group

Studies and Observations Group

SOLL special operations low level

SOPAG Special Operations Policy Advisory Group

SOS Special Operations Squadron

SOSPTG Special Operations Support Group

SOTFE Special Operations Task Force Europe

SOTS Special Operations Training Squadron

SOUTHCOM Southern Command

SOW Special Operations Wing

SPR single-point refueling

SSG Special Situation Group

STAR surface-to-air recovery

STARS Surface-to-Air Recovery System

STOL short-field takeoff and landing

TA terrain avoidance

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACAN tactical aid to navigation

TAS Tactical Airlift Squadron

TAW Tactical Airlift Wing

TAWC Tactical Air Warfare Center

TCS Troop Carrier Squadron

TCW Troop Carrier Wing

TDY temporary duty

TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan

TF terrain following

TF/TA terrain-following/terrain-avoidance

TFR terrain-following radar

TFW Tactical Fighter Wing

TI Texas Instruments

TIBS Tactical Information Broadcast System

TO technical order

TOT time over target

TRIADS Tri-wall Aerial Delivery System

TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

TWS track while scan

UARRSI universal aerial refueling receptacle/slipway installation

UDL unit detail listing

UEI unit evaluation inspection

483
UHF ultrahigh frequency

USAAF US Army Air Forces

USAF US Air Force

USAFE US Air Force Europe

USAFRC USAF Reserve Component

USECOM US European Command

USFJ US Forces Japan

USFK US Forces, Korea

USGS US Geological Survey

USLANTCOM US Atlantic Command

USREDCOM US Readiness Command

USSOCOM US Southern Command

UTTR Utah Test and Training Range

UW unconventional warfare

UWO unconventional warfare officer

VFR visual flight miles

VH very heavy

VLA very low altitude

VNAF Vietnamese Air Force

VOR VHF omnidirectional radio

WBKII German Armed Forces District Command

WRAMA Warner Robins Air Materiel Area

WRSK war readiness spares kit

WST weapons system trainer

484
Index

Aircraft

B-17: 2–4, 15, 17, 24, 28–30, 124

B-17F: 2

B-24: 3–4, 17, 24, 381

B-25: 2–3

B-26: 6

B-29: 7–9, 16–17, 25, 381

B-36: 355

B-47: 144

B-52: 54, 251, 362–63

C-5: 54, 257, 292, 343–46, 357, 374, 405, 420, 430

C-7: 30, 176

C-12: 23–24, 344, 390

C-17: 430

C-45: 80

C-46: 6, 29

C-47: 4–6, 8, 17, 25, 68, 80, 123, 125–27, 129–31, 133–34

C-119: 7–9, 133

C-123: 13–17, 20, 80, 82–83, 123–24, 176, 255, 270

C-123B: 19–20, 123

C-123H: 30

C-124: 124

C-130: 2, 15–17, 21, 24–25, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 50, 52–54,

56, 59–61, 65, 74, 79–80, 83–84, 88, 101, 123, 125,

127–30, 132–33, 135, 140, 144, 146, 152, 156, 160,

168–69, 171–72, 182–84, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195–96,

198, 201–2, 205–8, 211–12, 215, 226–28, 230, 236–37,

240–41, 250–51, 255, 257–58, 263, 266, 270–71, 277,

280–82, 284, 287, 309, 321–24, 326–28, 330, 333–35,

338, 355–56, 369, 372, 374, 385, 388, 391–92, 400,

402, 406, 412–13, 425, 438, 446

C-130A: 21, 30, 32–33

C-130B: 21, 30, 32–33

C-130E: 6, 16–17, 19–21, 24, 32, 38, 51–52, 54, 56, 59,

61, 67–69, 71, 82, 123, 125–26, 130, 132, 141, 144,

160, 162–64, 168, 255, 260, 262, 292, 311, 321, 328,

331, 371, 373, 377–78, 385

C-130H: 242, 246, 257, 264, 293–94, 300–301, 308, 311,

314, 371–73, 389, 394, 451

C-135: 54

C-141: 150, 176, 184, 191, 198, 203, 207–8, 212–13, 215,

228, 230, 251, 253, 257–58, 266, 292, 321, 327, 333,

344–45, 430, 439

C-141B: 243, 344, 438

C-160: 307

EC-130E: 298, 400

HC-130: 20–21, 296, 311, 338–39, 343, 346, 357, 360,

374, 376, 388–89, 391–92, 431

HC-130P: 145, 151, 153, 156, 426, 431

HC-130P/N: 338, 343, 349, 355, 361, 366, 383, 386, 389,

393–94, 396–97, 400, 403, 406

HH-3: 154

HH-53: 156

K-16: 270

KC-10: 268, 455

KC-130: 56

KC-135: 52–54, 155–56, 170–71, 184–85, 189, 195,

199–200, 202, 204, 207, 211–12, 215, 225, 228, 258,

262, 267, 269, 324, 331, 347, 390, 399, 405, 420, 422,

429, 430, 436, 442, 455

MC-130: 189, 201, 204, 240, 296

MC-130E: 1, 17, 168–70, 175–77, 184–85, 191, 194–95,

198, 203, 210–11, 228, 237–39, 240, 243, 250, 253–56

258–63, 267–68, 270, 276–77, 281, 292–97, 299, 301,

308, 310, 321–24, 333, 335, 338, 343, 347, 349, 357,

361, 366, 369, 371, 373, 376–77, 380–81, 385–89, 391

394, 396–97, 400–403, 406–8, 419–22, 425, 431–32,

451

MC-130H: 1, 17, 250, 293–94, 301, 335, 378, 381, 383,

391–92, 394, 405–6, 408, 410–14, 419–20, 423–30,

432–35, 438–45, 447–51, 453

MC-130P: 420–21, 424, 426, 430, 433–35, 438–39, 441,

443, 445, 449–51

MH-53: 55, 231

MH-53H: 349

MH-53J: 419–20, 422–24, 430–31, 434–35, 439, 451

MH-60: 311, 431, 453

MH-60G: 55, 349

RB-57: 356

U-10: 123

VB-17: 6

VC-47: 6

Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC): 50–51, 53

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): 296–97,

302–3, 337

Air Force Special Operations Command Central (AFSOCCENT): 341, 346

Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF): 1, 71, 125, 131

142, 170, 172, 253, 264, 267, 275–77, 287, 342

Air Staff: 6, 7, 9, 61–64, 145, 159–60, 182, 239, 247, 256,

264, 291, 293, 295–97, 302–3, 310, 312, 357, 377–79, 382

384, 387, 394–97, 403, 406–7, 412

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand: 398–99, 401

Bay of Pigs: 11, 19

Brown, Harold: 182

Brzezinski, Zbigniew: 182

Bush, George: 341, 347, 363, 366

Carpetbagger: 3–4, 19, 24, 50, 68

Carter, Jimmy: 180–82, 203–4, 208–9, 231, 239, 318–19,

400–401, 403

Civil Air Transport (CAT): 8, 25

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 5–9, 11–13, 25, 27–28,

142, 148–49, 157, 193, 196, 208–9, 221, 274

Cheney, Richard “Dick”: 341

Clinton, William “Bill”: 400, 452

Combat Arrow: 17, 38, 49, 61–62, 68, 73, 77, 123, 125, 145,

169–70

Combat Knife: 17, 38, 49, 52, 61–63, 65–66, 68–69, 72–73,

77, 123, 165

Combat Shadow: 393, 400, 411–12, 430–31, 438, 445, 450–

Combat Spear: 1, 17, 38, 49, 52, 61–62, 65, 68–69, 72–73,

77–78, 82–83, 88, 123, 125

Combat Talon (CT): 1–2, 6, 8, 16–17, 19–21, 24, 32–33, 37–

40, 43, 47–56, 59–74, 77–80, 82–84, 86–88, 90, 123–28,

130–36, 139, 141–48, 150–52, 154–57, 159–70, 172–77,

485
179–80, 182, 184–200, 202–16, 219, 221–23, 228–32,

235–42, 244, 246–47, 249–62, 264–71, 276–77, 280–83,

286–87, 291–300, 303–5, 307–13, 315, 317, 320–24,

326–31, 333–35, 337–40, 342–47, 349, 355, 357–65, 369,

372–79, 381, 383, 385–89, 391, 393–97, 399–400, 402–10,

414–15, 419–20, 422–32, 434–41, 444–46, 449–57

Combat Talon (CT) I: 56, 188, 293–94, 300–301, 309, 313,

315, 366, 377–78, 380–84, 386–89, 394–97, 400, 406–9,

411, 414, 416, 422, 425–26, 432–33, 449, 452–53, 457

Combat Talon (CT) II: 52, 56, 177, 188, 246, 250, 252, 256–

57, 259, 264, 291, 293–96, 300–301, 303, 308–11, 314,

335, 337, 340, 377–79, 380–84, 386–95, 399–416, 419–20,

423, 425–30, 432–33, 435, 438, 440–41, 443, 445, 447–48,

450–52, 455–57

Commando Talon: 162–63, 165–66

Commando Trap: 356

Commando Vault: 356

Credible Sport: 235, 241–46, 250, 257, 259–60, 263–64

Credible Sport I: 259

Credible Sport II: 257, 259, 263–64

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 28, 141–42, 157, 274, 276

Delta Force: 182–84, 189–90, 192, 194–95, 198–99, 201–2,

204–5, 207, 211–12, 215–16, 219, 222, 225–29, 236, 238,

241, 246, 263, 299

demilitarized zone (DMZ): 10

Department of Defense (DOD): 5, 9, 12–14, 19, 291–92, 300,

302, 309, 446

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: 55

Desert One: 157, 181, 196, 206, 208–9, 211, 215–16, 219–26,

228–29, 231–32, 235, 237–40, 246–47, 249–51, 256–60,

262, 267–68, 276, 291–92, 294–95, 307, 310, 322–23, 335,

342, 376–77, 410

Desert Shield: 337, 339, 341, 344, 349, 355, 363, 366, 377, 410

Desert Storm: 335, 337, 341, 349, 355, 357–58, 360–62, 366,

369, 376–77, 380, 393, 399, 410, 453, 457

Desert Two: 206

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 11

Dien Bien Phu: 8, 10, 94, 101

Donovan, William J.: 1–2

Duck Hook: 13, 15, 19

Duvalier, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc”: 398

Eaker, Ira L.: 3–4

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 2, 4

Entebbe: 424

Exercises

Ace Card: 73

Adventure Express: 435

Arctic Express: 404

Balance Torch: 388

Bantam Runner: 445

Battle Griffin 93: 391

Black Flag: 339

Bold Eagle: 176–77, 259

Bold Eagle 82: 259

Bright Star 85: 299

Bright Star 87: 308

Brim Frost: 265

Caliber Excellence: 256

Carthage Express: 392

Casino Dancer: 267

Castle Tower: 262

Certain Tribute: 260

Certain Tribute 82: 259

Chile Flag: 394, 426, 455

Cobra Gold: 268, 410, 427

Cope Thunder: 297

Desert Alliance: 348

Early Victor: 447

Eastern Desert 90: 340

Eastern Viper: 446, 455

Ember Dawn V: 72

Flintlock: 38, 70, 124, 126–27, 129, 131–33, 135–36, 145,

164, 172, 175–76, 196, 214, 251, 253–54, 261–62, 266–

68, 297, 304, 308, 310, 312–13, 339

Flintlock 88: 310

Flintlock 90: 339–40

Flintlock II: 126

Flintlock IV: 130–32

Flintlock V: 133

Foal Eagle: 73, 163, 165, 176, 255, 260, 262, 270, 297,

307–8, 312, 337, 386, 389, 403, 411, 426, 430–31, 443

Foal Eagle 88: 310

Foal Eagle 91: 390

Foal Eagle 96: 428

Foal Eagle 97: 443

Foal Eagle 98: 445

Foal Eagle 99: 451

Fringe Keeper 90: 337

Gallant Hand: 69

Gonfalon: 170, 255

Gossamer Wings: 260

Honey Badger: 235, 238–39, 241–42, 246–50, 252–53,

262, 291

Inherent Fury: 455

Jack Frost: 176

Jack Frost 79: 176

Javelin Steel: 408

Kindle Liberty 82: 261

Market Garden: 126

Marvel Exodus: 258–59

Night Venture: 276

Noble Rose: 411, 424

Ocean Venture: 262, 340

Ocean Venture 92: 380

Onset Thunder: 394

Popex 96: 424

Prairie Runner: 265–66

Punch Bowl: 72

Punch Card: 73

Red Flag: 176, 236, 308, 340, 440, 449

Red Flag 95-1: 406

Red Flag 98-1: 443

Red Flag 98-2: 440

Red Flag 99-2: 451

Roaring Lion: 392

Roughen Turf: 263

Rusty Badger: 239–40

Solid Shield: 266–67

Solid Shield 76: 167

Solid Shield 79: 175–76

Stalwart Friend: 174

Storm Cloud: 246

Tandem Thrust: 385, 451

Team Spirit 77: 168

Tourniquet Mile: 445

Ulchi Focus Lens: 97, 262, 312, 430, 451

Universal Trek: 267

Vagabond Warrior: 261

Valid Response: 430

Vector Hawk: 310

486
Far East Command (FECOM): 5–8

Fulton Company: 304

Fulton, Jr., Robert Edison: 25

Fulton STARS: 294, 304, 308, 314, 378

Gabriel, Charles A.: 293–95

Geneva Accord: 11, 13

Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986:

287

Gulf War: 340, 366, 376

Heavy Chain: 1, 19–21, 38–39, 50, 52, 64, 67, 69–71, 73,

144, 150, 185, 291

Heavy Hook: 15–17, 19, 20, 80, 82–83, 88, 141

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 84

Holloway Commission: 230–32, 238–39, 246, 291

Huck rebellion: 10

Hussein, Saddam: 341, 347, 360, 366, 369, 376, 425

Indochina: 8, 10–11

Islamic Revolution: 341

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 13

Johnson, Roosevelt: 442–43

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 1–2, 142, 231–32, 246, 273–74,

291, 295, 400

Joint Combat Talon II: 296

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC): 291

JTF Force Capabilities Review: 247

Kennedy, John F.: 11–12, 19

Khrushchev, Nikita S.: 11

Korean War: 6, 8, 124, 406

MacArthur, Douglas: 5

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF): 3–4

Military Air Transport Service (MATS): 7, 9, 124

Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG): 10

Minh, Ho Chi: 10–11

Missiles

SA-2: 155, 457

SA-3: 457

SA-6: 457

SA-7: 421

SA-16: 7–9

MOD-70: 39, 48, 51, 67–71, 130–34, 157, 167–68, 185, 295,

297, 328

MOD-90: 39, 43, 49, 56, 71, 382–83, 385, 396

National Security Act of 1947: 5–6

National Security Council (NSC): 5, 10–11, 273–74, 303

Nixon, Richard M.: 139, 149, 156

Noriega, Manuel: 315, 317–21, 323, 332–35, 339

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 125

North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA): 5

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF): 2

Office of Strategic Services (OSS): 1–5, 10, 13, 15, 19, 29–30,

287, 403, 405, 409

Operations

Allied Force: 455, 457

Anvil: 4

Assured Response: 419–20, 422–23

Balance Torch: 388

Bat: 297

Bevel Edge: 429

Blind Logic: 320

Blue Spoon: 320

Chile Flag: 406

Chile Flag 94-04: 406

Christmas Wish: 408, 453

Coldfeet: 28–30, 33

Deliberate Force: 407

Deny Flight: 404

Duke: 286

Eagle Claw: 212, 228, 230, 232, 239

Elaborate Maze: 320

Eldorado Canyon: 304

Firm Response: 435, 437

Gambler: 88

Guardian Assistance: 424

Guardian Retrieval: 435

High Flight: 438

Ivory Coast: 66, 143

Joint Endeavor: 407–8, 413–15, 419, 434

Joint Forge: 455

Joint Guard: 434

Jonathan: 183

Just Cause: 39, 313, 317, 320, 322, 334–35, 337, 339

Kingpin: 150

Krystal Ball: 320

Noble Anvil: 455

Nordic Retrieval: 439

Overlord: 4

Polar Circle: 139, 143

Prayer Book: 320

Promote Liberty: 320

Proven Force: 366, 376

Provide Comfort: 366, 376

Provide Comfort II: 376

Provide Promise: 404, 414

Provide Promise II: 391–92, 404

Rice Bowl: 181–82, 196, 205, 210, 212–13

Sea Angel: 369

Shadow Express: 442

Shepherd Venture: 441

Silver Anvil: 386–87

Silver Compass: 387

Silver Gauntlet: 387

Silver Hope: 393

Southern Watch: 431–32

Support Hope: 403–4, 406

Uphold Democracy: 395, 398, 401, 407–8

Urgent Fury: 268, 270–71, 273, 277, 281, 286–87, 292,

297, 313, 321, 323

operations plan (OPLAN): 2, 12–17, 84, 126, 131–32, 135,

141–42, 397

OPLAN 34A: 80

operational readiness inspection (ORI): 67, 70–71, 125, 127

134–35, 168, 173, 212, 254–55, 299, 310–13, 339, 386,

388–91, 404, 425, 428, 434–35, 438–40, 445, 455

Orr, Verne: 293

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 183

Panamanian Defense Force (PDF): 318–21, 327, 329–30,

332–33

Powell, Colin: 400

Project 46: 304–6, 310–11, 314

psychological operations: 82–83, 88

psychological warfare (PSYWAR): 6–9, 62, 65, 248, 299

Reagan, Ronald: 245–46, 270, 273, 304, 319

487
Republican Guard: 358

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 10

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: 280, 284, 340, 343, 360, 363

Ships

Abraham Lincoln: 374

California: 175

Clifton Sprague: 281

Guam: 280, 285

Independence: 274–75, 277, 280

Kitty Hawk: 191

Midway: 374

Missouri: 381

Nimitz: 175, 215, 211–12, 219–20, 223, 225

Roosevelt: 407

Texas: 175

Wisconsin: 364

Six-Day War: 341

Skyhook: 21, 26–28, 30–32, 37, 59–61, 71, 123

Son Tay Prison Raid: 64–65, 127, 136, 143, 145, 198

Southeast Asia (SEA): 1, 6, 10–11, 13, 19–20, 38, 47, 59–62,

65–66, 68, 70, 72, 77, 79, 82–84, 88, 123–25, 127, 130,

132, 139, 142–45, 148–51, 159–60, 164–65, 254, 262, 307,

356–57, 454

Soviet Union: 5–6, 10, 15, 28, 157, 272, 274, 280, 340–41, 393

Spaatz, Carl A.: 2, 4

Special Operations: 309

Stalin, Joseph: 6

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 9, 251

Stray Goose: 16, 19–21, 38, 48, 59–62, 65–66, 77, 79, 86,

123, 144, 358, 381

Sung, Kim Il: 403, 410

Surface-to-Air Recovery System (STARS): 6, 20–21, 24,

38–39, 48, 50, 59–61, 63–64, 83, 87–88, 123, 130, 196,

259, 262, 304, 312

Team Spirit: 265, 297, 307, 312

Thayer, Paul: 292–93

Thigpen, Jerry: 179–80, 187, 192, 209, 228–29, 240, 246, 258–

59, 270–71, 310–11, 317, 322, 324, 326–28, 330–31, 340,

389–90, 410

Timberwork: 15

Truman, Harry S.: 10

United States Army Air Force (USAAF): 2, 4, 15, 24–25

US Army Special Forces: 125–26, 128, 131, 164, 170, 172, 176,

251, 253–54, 261–62, 267–68, 270

Vance, Cyrus: 181

Viet Minh: 10–11, 13

Vietnam War: 70, 130, 136, 182, 198, 254, 256, 317, 337,

344, 355, 357–58, 394, 408, 416, 440

Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF): 16

Vietnamese Army: 10

World War I: 340

World War (WW) II: 1, 4–7, 9, 16, 24–27, 29–30, 50, 68, 79, 82,

124, 142, 287, 291, 317, 340, 356, 381, 394, 406, 411, 413,

449

488