ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 1 

This paper examines the Turkish think tank sector as part of a strategy to invest in Turkish democratization in a manner that does not prejudice security cooperation or the broader bilateral relationship. 

The United States for over 60 years has promoted a Turkey that is politically 

stable, economically prosperous, militarily capable, and democratically mature.1

As we head into 2016, the good news is that Turkey has had a party capable 

of ruling and winning elections for 14 years, is a G20 economy, retains one of 

the strongest military and security establishments in the world, and has established civilian authority over the military in a durable manner. The bad news is 

that this substantial progress has not resulted in a more transparent government 

fully committed to Western democratic norms. Instead the result has been a 

frequently unpredictable ally led by an increasingly authoritarian, albeit popular 

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who flouts Western norms with relish and 

deviates from Western strategic consensus with ease. The sustained dialogue, 

mutual understanding, consultation, and compromise that mark good partnerships are noticeably absent—and the formerly substantial American influence 

over Turkish policymaking is greatly diminished. At the same time, the United 

States has an image problem to accompany its influence deficit, having experienced a sustained loss of trust among the Turkish public.2

The inescapable fact is that Turkey is a far less dependent and far less tractable partner for the United States today than at any time during their bilateral 

relationship. The Turks have clearly laid out a more independent foreign policy 

doctrine and done their best to implement it; American audiences have not fully 

appreciated this paradigm shift. Some observers—even long-time Turkey watchers—wrongly attribute divergence of interest or policy to Islamist ideology, or 

Erdoğan’s ego and caprice. Moreover, they fail to appreciate the fundamental 

Supporting Democracy in 

Erdoǧan’s Turkey: The Role of 

Think Tanks

by Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan Schwing

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Authors

Colonel Richard H.M. Outzen, USA, is a 

Senior Military Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National Defense 

University (NDU). Ryan Schwing is a 

Research Assistant for Michael Pillsbury 

and previously interned at NDU.

Key Points

◆ Fifteen years into the era of President 

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. influence 

on his inner circle and support base, 

the new generation of Turkish strategic 

thinkers, and the Turkish public at large 

has diminished rather than improved. 

American Turkey watchers have grown 

frustrated with perceived divergence 

of interests, values, and agendas. A 

growing number consider Erdoğan 

and his inner circle autocratic, difficult, 

ideologically extreme, and dangerous.

◆ U.S. interests would be better served by 

avoiding confrontation and maintaining close military-to-military cooperation while also pressing for democratization in a patient, low-profile manner. 

The emerging Turkish think tank sector 

offers opportunities for doing just that. 

The sector has grown dramatically over 

the past 20 years and offers a window 

for better understanding the revolution 

in Turkish strategic thinking that now 

perplexes many American observers. 

Engaging Turkey’s think tanks would 

support democratization.

◆ The United States should participate 

in Turkish think tank events, invite 

their leaders to the United States, use 

microgrants to strengthen liberal think 

tanks, and collaborate on some studies. 

This would improve understanding 

of Turkish strategic thought, broaden 

Turkish policy debate, and encourage 

democratization.

May 2016

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
2 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

changes in Turkish strategic thinking, which are perhaps 

best exemplified by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 

best-selling 2001 work Strategic Depth.

3

 Davutoğlu argued that Turkey’s longstanding foreign policy identification with the West and aloofness from its neighbors 

badly needed revision and that Turkey could improve 

the impact of its trade, diplomacy, and security efforts by 

pursuing a more independent and multilateral approach. 

That fundamental shift has occurred, and is unlikely to 

revert even when Erdoğan is no longer running the country. U.S. policymakers have three options with Erdoğan’s 

more powerful, less predictable, and imperfectly democratic Turkey: stop treating it as an ally, move to a fully 

transactional relationship, or exercise some patience on 

the reform path while building on common interests.

Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Ally with an important geostrategic position, 

is too important to simply walk away from—on Syria, 

Iraq, the Ukraine, energy corridors, and a host of other 

issues. Europe seems to have chosen the second option, 

by acceding to Erdoğan’s requests for financial support 

and reopening European Union (EU) accession talks in 

exchange for more cooperation on refugees.4

 The United 

States could pursue the third option of building a better partnership based on common interests because it 

has the advantage of robust military-to-military ties 

undergirding the relationship, and new opportunities 

have opened up for engaging Turkish policy actors and 

the broader population. The growing prominence of the 

Turkish think tank sector presents one such opportunity 

to engage with and invest in organizations that produce 

thoughtful and professional analysis, that are insulated 

from the polarizing currents of domestic politics, which 

create friction at the government-to-government level, 

and that are trying to understand and explain the bilateral relationship to Turkish readers in ways that might be 

instructive for American audiences, too.5

Erdoğan Firmly in Control

Turkey’s November 1, 2015, elections mark an important turning point in Turkish politics: for the first time since 

coming to power in 2003, President Erdoğan now has full 

control over the state apparatus that he has reshaped for 

over a decade.6 A variety of checks and balances restrained 

him over the years: a staunchly secular president (Ahmet 

Necdet Sezer) until 2007; antagonists in the military, bureaucracy, and press through 2012; street protests in 2013; 

a challenge from Fethullah Gülen’s hizmet movement in 

2013 and 2014; and finally the threat of a countervailing political coalition in 2015.7

 He has now surmounted 

these obstacles through a combination of patience, strategic bargaining, manipulation of judicial and tax systems, 

an increasingly heavy hand in security matters, diffusion of 

his supporters throughout state institutions, and successful 

populist appeals.8 With a presidential term and parliamentary majority through 2019, he now enjoys a level of authority unprecedented in Turkey since the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, virtually free from internal challenge.

Having a strong leader without serious domestic 

challenges might appeal to Turkish voters in uncertain 

times, and it undoubtedly affords Erdoğan a freer hand 

in shaping economic and security policies.9 It is mixed 

news for Turkey’s partners in Washington, though, since 

the further maturation of Turkey’s democracy remains an 

American interest, and Erdoğan seems most comfortable 

sustaining an illiberal democracy.10 At the same time, regional events have made Turkey’s strategic cooperation 

with the United States more indispensable than ever, 

with the Syrian civil war, counter–Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant campaign, stability in Iraq, refugees in 

Europe, and deterrence of Russia comprising an illustrative short list. The dilemma for American policymakers is 

how to maximize strategic cooperation without ignoring 

or condoning authoritarian tendencies.

Turkey is too important to simply 

walk away from—on Syria, Iraq, the 

Ukraine, energy corridors, and a 

host of other issues
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 3 

It is not an entirely new dilemma. Turkey has been a 

NATO Ally of the United States since 1952, and even in 

the better times bilateral relations were marked by tension and misalignment over Cyprus, the Kurds, human 

rights, and a host of other issues. It only seems worse this 

time because many observers saw Erdoğan and his Adalet 

ve Kalkinma Partisi ( Justice and Development Party, or 

AKP) as a way to end, not update, the endemic tension 

between strategic partnership and democratic deficits.11

Turkey’s increasing regional and global weight in the 21st

century has complicated rather than simplified relations 

with the United States.12 With Erdoğan’s increasingly 

autocratic style exacerbating fundamental differences on 

regional strategy, the U.S.-Turkish relationship has been 

increasingly tense in tone and short on trust, at least beyond the fairly narrow bounds of security cooperation.13

While it is revealing that President Barack Obama went 

from counting Erdoğan among his five closest counterparts in 2012 to barely speaking to him by the middle 

of his second term, it may be even more telling that numerous observers have begun to doubt whether Turkey 

remains or should be an Ally at all.14

There would be significant costs associated with either giving up on Turkey as an ally or giving up hope 

for greater democratization to preserve cooperation. The 

stakes are potentially quite high if the United States seeks 

to sideline Turkey altogether—such a move could weaken NATO, destabilize the region further, and make the 

likelihood of a democratic resurgence even more remote. 

The fact is that Turkey is a G20 economy, still a functioning Muslim-majority democracy, and has the ability 

to partner with or help frustrate the United States and 

its other allies on a host of regional issues. Furthermore, 

some argue that Erdoğan now has a far more secure domestic power base and political clout than his military 

predecessors ever enjoyed, making it even less advisable 

to antagonize him and less feasible to sideline him.15

It is hard to see how high-profile political snubs, 

public censure, positioning the Kurds as our primary regional ally, and other measures likely to disrupt the bilateral relationship might contribute to our goals in the region. On the other hand, it might be possible to conduct 

bilateral relations on a dual track: sustain robust partnership with Turkey on regional security and diplomatic 

matters, while pushing for democratization indirectly by 

expanding outreach to Turkey’s business and civil society 

sectors. By broadening engagement with these sectors, it 

might be possible to lay the groundwork for greater commitment to pluralism in the generation of leaders that 

will follow Erdoğan.

Economic liberalization in the 1980s and political 

reforms in the 1990s opened the door to new players and 

new voices in Turkish society, a liberalization that occurred despite the authoritarian traditions of the political 

and military elites of the day. Late-stage Turkish military 

tutelage allowed civil society to flourish; the Turkish case 

shows that continued engagement and incentives can affect the process. If civil society could emerge as an engine 

of democratic broadening under a watchful military, it 

stands to reason that certain components of that sector 

can develop greater influence and political effectiveness 

under Erdoğan’s evolving illiberalism as well. Turkey’s 

think tank sector has the potential to be the next locus of 

democratic development even during a period of increasing authoritarianism within the organs of state.

Democratizing Under Watchful 

Eyes

Traditionally, political decisionmaking in Turkey 

has been consolidated in the hands of political elites, and 

political participation has remained relatively narrow.16

it is hard to see how high-profile 

political snubs, public censure, 

positioning the Kurds as our primary 

regional ally, and other measures 

likely to disrupt the bilateral 

relationship might contribute to our 

goals in the region
4 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

Deference to centralized authority continued as a main 

theme in Turkish politics well after the advent of competitive elections in 1950 and was long accepted as a necessary 

or natural characteristic of Turkish politics by significant 

portions of the civilian population.17

A fundamental change occurred following the 1980 

coup, after which the military ceded authority to the 

elected government over economic matters and foreign 

policy.18 The economic liberalization during the Turgut 

Özal years (1983–1993) led not only to a greater voice 

in policy matters for influential business leaders but also 

to the rise of a new class of businessmen with a fundamentally different outlook on governance and the nature of the state.19 There followed a restrained struggle 

for power between the military-supported state institutions and the rising “pious” businessmen, a struggle that 

moderated the Islamists while prying reforms out of the 

government gradually.20

The process was accelerated by Turkey’s drive for 

membership in the European Union, which required 

that the military accede to a number of political reforms 

to limit its own power and reform state institutions. The 

reforms ultimately stalled but not before a significant 

number were implemented.21 Before Erdoğan entered 

national-level politics, the military had already agreed 

to measures that significantly scaled back its powers to 

shape national policy. This process demonstrates that authoritarianism in the Turkish context was far from absolute and could be rolled back with the proper incentives 

and manner of engagement.22

The rise of the AKP in 2002 marked a more decisive 

phase in the end to military-led authoritarianism, but 

it depended directly on two key preceding events during the 1997–1999 period. During this period the AKP 

explicitly disavowed Islamic politics in favor of conservative democratic politics and pluralism and began assembling a broader coalition that drew in non-Islamist 

groups—Islamists, pious businessmen, anti-militarist 

liberals, moderate Kurds, and others seeking to end the 

era of military tutelage by working within the electoral 

system as it had been constructed and enforced by the 

Kemalist elites.23 In a sense, the party had been forced 

by the military-imposed restrictions to transform from 

a truly Islamist party such as its immediate predecessors 

(Fazilet Partisi and Refah Partisi) into a more pious version of previous center-right parties (Doğru Yol, Anavatan, Adalet, and Demokrat parties of the 1990s, 1980s, 

1960s–1970s, and 1950s, respectively).24

Under Erdoğan’s leadership, the AKP presided over 

a decade of political reform, economic resurgence, and 

foreign policy dynamism. Some observers believed that 

Turkey was on the road to a permanent democratic consolidation, with Erdoğan destined to be remembered as 

the great democratizer in Turkish history. Then a series 

of events in 2011–2012 changed his approach—some 

might say allowed him to revert to type.25 The war in 

Syria, pressure from Gülen’s movement, and the failure 

of his peace initiative with the Kurdish Partiya Karkeren 

Kurdistan (PKK) all played a role in Erdoğan’s increasing 

intolerance of dissent in the press or in the streets. Skeptics believe that democracy was in any case never more 

than instrumental to Erdoğan and AKP, a way to hegemonize a conservative Muslim order rather than an end 

unto itself.26 After 2012 he made peace with the military, 

consolidated control over the bureaucracy by rooting out 

Gülenists, and turned to the business of transforming 

Turkey in accordance with his vision for the centennial 

of the republic in 2023.27

Turkey’s stop-and-go democratization and Erdoğan’s 

evolution from Islamist to democrat to popular authoritarian have been disappointing. The United States, however, has not been left without options. Democratization 

from the 1990s through 2011 left Turkey with a far more 

democratization from the 1990s 

through 2011 left Turkey with a far 

more robust civil society than during 

previous authoritarian turns or other 

crises in bilateral relations
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 5 

robust civil society than during previous authoritarian 

turns or other crises in bilateral relations. It may be fair 

that critics question whether Turkey is a predictable or 

reliable ally, but it is ahistorical to portray Turkish intractability as unique to the Erdoğan era. Turkey has always 

been a difficult and highly suspicious Ally, albeit one 

worth the investment. For the Turks, the enduring central 

dilemma of their relationship with the United States has 

been how to maintain cooperation in critical areas without becoming dependent or subordinating their own interests to American ones.28

Some observers are making the case that the United 

States should significantly downgrade ties with Erdoğan’s 

Turkey, but the results would be counterproductive.29 We 

have seen how that plays out to the detriment of both 

parties, as it did after the Cyprus arms embargo of the 

1970s. On the other hand, simply continuing business as 

usual with an increasingly autocratic regime, as the United States arguably did after the 1997 “postmodern coup,” 

gives short shrift to American values.30 Our policy options need not be restricted to punish or ignore, however.

Faced with two separate and sometimes conflicting interests—fostering democratization and seamless 

security cooperation—U.S. interests might be better 

served by developing a two-track approach that neither 

antagonizes nor lionizes Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian but increasingly well-entrenched leader. The first 

track is continued close military-to-military cooperation and consultation with Erdoğan and his key advisors, especially National Intelligence Organization (Millî 

İstihbarat Teşkilati) chief Hakan Fidan, Prime Minister 

Davutoğlu, and the military leadership.31 The second 

track is to continue to pressure for democratization in a 

more patient, low-profile manner—that is, through the 

business and civil society sectors.

The Long View on Democratic 

Maturation

There are strong reasons to think that the United 

States will have better luck fostering democratic maturity 

in Turkey through the two-track approach rather than a 

more direct, punitive, or demonstrative approach. One 

reason is economic: stability sustains economic growth, 

and research shows that countries experiencing rapid economic growth under authoritarian leaders tend to experience significant democratization once those leaders pass 

from the scene. Turkey fits this model, and unless Erdoğan 

finds and grooms a successor who equals his blend of personal popularity, political savvy, and timing, the constricting grip on rights and liberties is destined to slip.32

Meanwhile, the period of remarkable economic 

growth Turkey has experienced since 2002 has not been 

reflected in bilateral trade and cooperation with the 

United States. For instance, the American share of Turkish trade dropped from 8.2 percent in 1999 to 5.5 percent in 2010. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has cited 

a number of steps that could improve the scope and quality of U.S.-Turkey trade and investment flows, such as 

a comprehensive trade framework agreement.33 Vesting 

the United States and Turkey in one another’s economic 

success will not only reinforce the virtuous cycle of prosperity and democratization but also offset somewhat the 

weight of policy considerations driven by Turkey’s close 

economic ties with Iran, Russia, and other nondemocratic states. A punishment-oriented response to Erdoğan 

forecloses that possibility.

On the other hand, a long-term perspective on 

Turkey’s democratic evolution would allow the United 

States to take advantage of the growing market for policy analysis that has accompanied Turkey’s economic and 

political liberalization over the past several decades. As 

the bounds of public discourse on regional and security 

matters broadened, Turkish public opinion responded 

more energetically on issues such as the Iraq War and the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, prompting scholars and experts to form organizations focused on policy analysis.34

Islamist intellectuals and other supporters of the AKP 

were particularly active in the expansion of this sector:

The AKP’s ten years in power has created the new 

technocratic elite embracing a realist discourse 

which is best exemplified by the rising status of the 
6 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

foreign policy experts. It is not a coincidence that 

many young Muslims are now driven toward 

such strategic areas as the international relations 

and security studies in tandem with the AKP’s 

increasing search for being a regional power. The 

mushrooming of many think tanks close to the 

government is a recent phenomenon in Turkey 

that exemplifies [the] increasing preponderance 

of an intellectual current that can be referred [to]

as “strategism.” These intellectuals have turned 

[out] to be very crucial in producing significant 

domestic legitimacy for the AKP around a discourse 

emphasizing Turkey’s increasing regional power.35

Turkish think tanks are indicative of these trends in 

Turkish public discourse. They do not currently exercise 

the sort of influence they do in the United States or certain European countries, but they do represent and help 

explain the marketplace of policy and strategy thought 

in Turkey, which is a good starting point for better understanding where the United States could partner with 

voices that would strengthen pluralism in the Turkish 

political environment.

Why Think Tanks? 

Civil society is a crucial aspect of overall democratic development, but think tanks are a uniquely valuable and important type of civil society organization in 

this regard. In modern democracies, think tanks serve 

as an important bridge between academia and the political system. They serve as incubators for both young 

scholars to develop their skills before moving into the 

government or academic spheres and experts leaving 

those establishments to use their skills and experience 

to further think tank research. The idea of a revolving 

door system of experts switching between think tanks, 

academia, and government is now better accepted in 

the United States than movement between private industry and government. Publications produced by think 

tanks convey expert insights without taint of profit motive or the constraints imposed by elected or appointed 

office. This marketplace of ideas frequently informs or 

presages development of policy and strategy within 

government.36

Think tanks are a global and increasingly interconnected phenomenon. By bridging the gaps between 

citizens and governments, and by exercising influence 

in regional and global networks, they have become integral participants in policy processes in virtually every nation.37 There are over 6,000 active think tanks 

in 182 countries as of 2015, and trends indicate they 

will continue to grow both in number and influence. 

That growth makes them an unavoidable dimension 

in understanding and managing bilateral and regional 

relationships in an increasingly complex, informationflooded world.38

In countries with developing democratic systems, think tanks play a somewhat different but still 

important role. They serve as an important indicator 

of democratization, fostering debate and increasing 

public understanding of political developments. The 

independent analysis and policy suggestions of think 

tanks encourage further accountable and pluralistic 

governance, helping keep developing democracies on 

track.39 Think tanks both reflect democratic opening 

and change when they proliferate and help sustain and 

mature democratic culture by stimulating public debate and improving public understanding of national 

political issues. As the National Endowment for the 

Development of Democracy notes, the proliferation 

of think tanks representing a variety of intellectual 

and political viewpoints can play an important role in 

deepening democratic culture.40

The first decade of the 21st century saw a dramatic 

expansion in the size of Turkey’s think tank sector.41 The 

“explosive growth” in the number and productivity of 

Turkish think tanks (düsünce kuruluşları) in the 2000s

reflects growing pluralism.42 As Erdoğan and the AKP 

party have increasingly come to dominate state institutions, and have disarmed the traditional restraining features of the press and military, civil society could be the 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 7 

most formidable check on authoritarianism left in the 

Turkish body politic.43

Strengths and Weaknesses of the 

Turkish Think Tank Sector

The birth and expansion of a Turkish think tank sector have not produced a uniform standard of intellectually rigorous and constructive policy debate, but this is 

not surprising in what amounts to a startup sector for 

Turks. At this stage many Turkish think tanks still serve 

instrumental purposes for competing elites within Turkey’s highly polarized political system rather than generating independent ideas.44 Self-censorship of media 

due to political co-optation of ownership was a factor 

in Freedom House moving Turkey’s press freedom ranking from “Partially Free” to “Not Free” in the past several 

years, and the nascent think tank sector faces a similar 

challenge in terms of separating policy analysis from 

sponsor funding.45 Turkey’s think tanks provide important venues for discussing and debating policy but have 

been used more to provide access to decisionmakers and 

policy shapers rather than centers for the production of 

independent thought.46 Turkey’s think tank sector is a 

potential force for positive democratic development, but 

most organizations struggle with insufficient resources, 

ambivalence from business and government circles, and 

immature publishing and outreach capabilities. That status seems certain to be upgraded in the coming decade.

An early 2013 comment by Prime Minister Erdoğan 

was the first official recognition of the importance of 

think tanks to Turkish foreign policy. He stated that 

government officials should be involved in the creation 

of think tanks with the purpose of promoting Turkish 

policy to the rest of the world.47 It is notable that he 

identifies the purpose of think tanks as support of government policies rather than objective input to the same.

The Turkish think tank community faces common 

startup problems, such as difficulty securing and retaining funding, establishing influence within the political 

environment, and earning the recognition and trust of 

the public. High personnel turnover is another problem; 

most Turkish think tank researchers are not careerists 

and see think tank work as a temporary position after a 

political or military career or as a part-time position for 

academics.48

It is also true that given Turkey’s authoritarian history, society—including academia—has a less well-established tradition of questioning and criticizing authority. This contributes to a perception that think tanks are a 

tool to augment or propagate Turkish policy rather than 

create it.49 There is similarly no strong tradition or precedent for think tanks to offer clear alternative policy ideas 

to government, even less so for them to take those ideas 

to the public in efforts to persuade and influence. Historically, the government has been unreceptive to outside 

ideas. Government information and access to officials are 

usually closed to those outside of the government unless 

they have personal connections.50

Another major problem for the development of 

politically influential think tanks is funding. A number 

of Turkish think tanks, and nearly all the major Turkish 

media outlets, are owned by businessmen with interests 

in other fields. Many of these owners have business interests that benefit from government contracts. When a 

certain contract is open for bids, these owners try to limit 

antigovernment rhetoric of the publications under their 

control. A recent study of Turkish think tanks found few 

that were clearly critical of the established policies, and 

those that were typically did not offer constructive alternatives.51 Sensitivity to funding and political access have 

led some Turkish organizations to blur the line between 

Turkey’s think tanks provide 

important venues for discussing 

and debating policy but have 

been used more to provide access 

to decisionmakers and policy 

shapers rather than centers for the 

production of independent thought
8 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

Turkey’s Think Tanks: Where to Engage

Where the United States should engage is not self-evident. It depends on U.S. goals and an accurate 

understanding of the think tanks. For example, if the United States wanted to explore new areas of military 

cooperation, it might engage ORSAM, or for economic cooperation, TEPAV. If the goal is to plant a seed or gain 

deeper insights on current Turkish government priorities, SAM, SETA, or TASAM would be better choices. If 

the U.S. objective is to reinforce liberalizing trends, it might support TESEV, BILGESAM, or USAK. What follows 

in the table below is a brief summary of the current orientation of some likely contenders for U.S. attention.

Think Tank Founded Affiliation Orientation Status Comment

ASE 2011 Independent Policy Low 

output

EU and governance focus

BILGESAM‡ 2008 Independent Policy Low 

output

Independent, objective, and independent 

is the goal; includes both retired officials 

and professional academics

EDAM† 2008 QuasigovernmentPolicy Major Economic focus

GPoT‡ 2009 University Public 

scholarship

Active Peace/reconciliation focus

LDT‡ 1992 Independent Public 

scholarship

Active Liberal

ORSAM 2009 Independent Public 

scholarship

Active Conducts some joint studies with the 

military’s in-house think tank; centrist; has 

exercised an “early warning function” for 

crises in the Caucasus and Middle East

SAM 1995 Government Public 

scholarship

Active Official think tank established by the 

Foreign Ministry; consistently follows 

line parallel to government; Davutoğlu’s 

influence is heavy

SETA† 2005 Quasigovernment

Public 

scholarship

Major Foreign policy focus; founded shortly after 

the AKP took party in 2002; senior officials 

come to their events both in Turkey and at 

their U.S. office

TASAM† 2003 QuasigovernmentPolicy Major Close to government; follows a moderately 

nationalist line

TEPAV* 2004 Independent Public 

scholarship

Major Tied to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce; 

focuses on economics, foreign policy, 

governance, and Turkey’s neighboring states

TESEV* 1994 Independent Public 

scholarship

Major Liberal inclination; bold commentary on 

current events, and libertarian on the 

Kurdish issue and constitutional reform
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 9 

think tanks, which engage in objective research for public policy, and so-called advocacy tanks, which embrace 

ideological biases in their research subjects and results.52

While this can be a problem in any country, the problem 

in Turkey is exacerbated by the government’s authoritarian bent. 53

Despite their shortcomings, think tanks in Turkey 

matter a great deal more in 2016 than they did 10 or 20 

years ago. The proliferation of think tanks is evidence of 

this, as is the fact that important political players have 

all sought to extend their voices into the think tank 

realm—including the dominant political parties, business organizations, and a wide spectrum of social and 

ideological interests. Increasingly these think tanks are 

able to influence or craft policy, and senior leaders from 

the political class and state bureaucracy have called for 

increased interaction with foreign think tanks and better integration of domestic think tanks in Turkish policymaking.54 One example is the adoption of a “Turkey 

2023” agenda for policy goals that was developed within 

a Turkish think tank and then adopted by the AKP government.55 A second example is the use of think tanks 

as a forum for retired military and diplomatic officials 

to endorse a more conciliatory policy toward Turkey’s 

Kurds, impossible a decade earlier due to both an operative taboo against such policy discussions and a previous 

lack of fora for such discussions.56 While the Turkish bureaucracy, military, and political elites traditionally have 

been closed systems not inclined to incorporate advice 

from external actors, NATO membership and the EU 

accession process have opened these state sectors somewhat to outside advice and expertise. Turkey’s EU accession strategy, for instance, endorses the consultative role 

of think tanks and civil society more generally. Turkey’s 

think tank sector is poised to grow further, in both the 

number of entrants in the sector and the influence they 

exercise over policy and governmental strategies.57

Turkey’s political leaders have a long-term vision 

for mature policy and strategy production that indicates solid commitment to developing the sector over 

time.58 Prime Minister Davutoğlu highlighted the need 

to develop think tanks as a source of new policy ideas 

Key: *Suitable partner for major U.S. think tanks; †High payoff for official engagement; ‡Developmental interest

ASE: Ankara Strateji Enstitüsü (Ankara Strategy Institute)

BILGESAM: Bilgi Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)

EDAM: Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırma Merkezi (Economic and Foreign Policy Research Center) 

GPoT: Global Political Trends Center 

LDT: Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu (Association for Liberal Thinking)

ORSAM: Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Middle East Strategic Studies Center)

SAM: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Strategic Research)

SETA: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research)

TASAM: Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies)

TEPAV: Türk Ekonomi ve Politik Araştirma Vakfı (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey)

TESEV: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)

UKAM: Uluslararasi Kuresel Arastirmalar Merkezi (International Studies Center)

USAK: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (International Strategic Research Organization)

YYTE: Yirmibirinci Yüzyil Türkiye Enstitüsü (21st-Century Turkey Institute) 

Think Tank Founded Affiliation Orientation Status Comment

UKAM‡ 2013 Independent Policy Active Kurdish focus

USAK* 2004 Independent Public 

scholarship

Major Considered moderate, but nationalist 

for most of the past decade; under new 

management; taken a more liberal direction

YYTE‡ 2006 Independent Policy Active Secular nationalist
10 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

and strategic outreach before the AKP’s rise to power in 

2001.59 A broader network of partnerships between U.S. 

think tanks and Turkish counterparts could help move 

the sector in this direction. Even small amounts of funding and expertise from outside would help improve the 

quality of policy analysis and advice, freeing advocacy 

from the narrow confines of patronage politics and putting it at the service of rigorous policy debate.

Survey of Turkish Think Tanks

There are now dozens of think tanks operating in 

Turkey—31 by count of the latest survey of global think 

tanks.60 This could be an underestimate as a review of 

the list indicates omission of some small, marginal, and 

“startup” think tanks focused primarily on a Turkishspeaking audience. Though many Turkish think tanks 

are small, especially by Western standards, some have 

risen to national and even international prominence. In 

many countries it is common for think tanks to close 

or undergo restructuring fairly rapidly, and so it is in 

Turkey. Many think tanks appear to have operated for 

5 years or less and then ceased regular publication and 

activity. However, some that have endured and made 

their mark on policy debate are worthy of note. There 

are clear differences in resources and output between the 

top-tier organizations, such as SETA (Siyaset, Ekonomi 

ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, or Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research), USAK (Uluslararası 

Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, or International Strategic Research Organization), and TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, or Turkish Economic 

and Social Studies Foundation), and most of the smaller 

organizations.

For the sake of comparison, in the United States 

there are over 1,800 think tanks.61 American think tanks 

play several constructive roles in the political process 

in the United States: research, concept development, 

agenda-setting, advocacy and debate, and development 

of policy expertise. The development of the sector in the 

United States in the 20th century can be seen as a milestone in the broadening and maturation of American democracy.62 Clearly Turkish think tanks have not matured 

to the same point, lagging those in neighboring countries 

such as Egypt, Israel, and even Palestine.63

Turkish think tanks can be broken down into several categories based on affiliation, level of productivity, 

primary audience, or ideological/social orientation. Typologies have been suggested based on the affiliation of 

think tanks (corporate, university, independent, and so 

forth) or on their mode of operation (advocacy oriented 

or teaching oriented, for instance).64 The sidebar and table present a simplified typology of the most prominent 

Turkish think tanks, but is hardly exhaustive.

Those listed with an orientation toward public scholarship produce a broad array of publications and events 

addressing a fairly broad audience. Those listed under policy orientation tend to address a narrower audience on a 

narrower spectrum of topics, typically to reinforce or support certain ideological or interest positions. Those under 

low output maintain a Web presence and apparent schedule of activity but have had only irregular events and publications over several months or years. Several of the think 

tanks have been listed on the industry standard list of best 

global and regional think tanks.65 Several have partnered 

with U.S. think tanks and governmental organizations to 

conduct research, publications, and conferences.66

In addition to those organizations listed on the 

chart, others bear mention. One is the DPE (Dişişleri 

Politika Enstitüsü, or Foreign Policy Institute), perhaps 

the earliest think tank, with a founding date of 1974. 

Another is ASAM (Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar 

Merkezi, or Eurasian Strategic Research Center), which 

the development of the sector in 

the United States in the 20th century 

can be seen as a milestone in the 

broadening and maturation of 

American democracy
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 11 

was created in the wake of the 1997 coup as an attempt 

to find common policy ground between the business, 

military, and Kemalist elites. Its funding became scarce 

once the AKP consolidated power. There have been 

nationalist think tanks with intermittent activities and 

production, such as TURKSAM (Türk Uluslararasi 

Ilişkiler ve Stratejik Arastirma Merkezi, or Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis), 

and TURANSAM (Türk Dünyasi Strateji Arastirma 

Merkezi, or Turkish World Strategic Research Center). 

TUSAM (Türk Ulusal Stratejik Arastirma Merkezi, or 

Turkish National Security Strategic Research Center) 

was a leftist-nationalist think tank closely linked with 

the secularist Cumhuriyet Gazetesi newspaper, through 

which it published a weekly “strategy” supplement in 

the late 2000s. TUSAM merits mention for its unusual 

sponsorship; it was financed by the management of the 

Turkish metal workers’ union, Metal-Iş Sendikasi. The 

center was closed after a change of union management 

in 2009. USTAD (Uluslarlarasi Stratejik Arastirmalari 

Derneği, or the International Strategic Research and 

Analysis Center) was founded in 2011 as a pro-AKP 

institute working on outreach toward Turkish Kurds.

One key lesson of the two-decade effervescence in 

Turkey’s think tank sector is that foreign policy analysis and advocacy have long since surpassed the span of 

control of a particular governing elite, secular or Islamist. 

Nonideological, geopolitics-based foreign policy debate 

has appeared among all major political groups since the 

1990s, left, right, and center.67 A second key lesson is that 

this breadth offers Turkey’s international partners an opportunity to engage in and encourage the competition 

of ideas regarding Turkey’s foreign and security policies 

on an academic and analytic level without directly challenging or confronting the AKP in a manner that might 

compromise sensitive regional interests and equities.

Policy Recommendations

Despite Turkey’s many problems—the war in Syria, 

Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic methods, and the lingering PKK insurgency—public support for democratization remains strong. Polling shows a solid majority of 

Turks support further democratization and indeed see 

it as the only way forward.68 For perhaps the first time 

in Turkey’s history, there is a legitimate and realistic 

political alternative to insurgency for Kurds and leftists 

seeking greater rights from the Turkish state.69 While 

it seems clear that Erdoğan has little appetite for more 

democratization, the think tank sector can serve as a key 

pillar of U.S. strategy to maintain momentum toward a 

more stable and open political society. Here are some 

ways the United States could broaden engagement with 

Turkish think tanks and help them contribute in substantive and helpful ways to the bilateral relationship:

◆ Increase direct engagement between the U.S. Government and leading Turkish think tanks. Senior visitors 

from the Departments of Defense and State, as well as 

Congress, should include Turkish think tanks on their 

itineraries during travel to Turkey. This would raise the 

profile and relevance of those think tanks on the Turkish political scene and would give more options for 

floating and exchanging ideas with the Turkish government through its trusted organizations. Visits to SETA, 

TASAM (Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, or 

Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies), and EDAM 

(Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırmalar Merkezi, or Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) would be 

particularly useful in this regard.

◆ Funding for Turkish think tanks is sparse, and 

this is a major obstacle to development of oppositionaligned, smaller think tanks—liberal, secularist, and 

Kurdish. The largest Turkish think tank does only $1 

million of business annually, and the smaller ones generally operate on less than $250,000.70 Micro-grants of 

several hundred thousand dollars, preferably through 

the U.S. Agency for International Development, should 

be used to strengthen think tanks such as BILGESAM (Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 

or Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies), UKAM 

(Uluslararası Kültürel Araştırmalar Merkezi, or International Cultural Research Center), GPoT (Global 
12 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

Political Trends Center), LDT (Liberal Düşünce 

Topluluğu, or Association for Liberal Thinking), and 

YYTE (Yirmibirinci Yüzyil Türkiye Enstitüsü, or 21stCentury Turkey Institute). 

◆ Congress should allocate study monies that specify 

collaboration with Turkish think tanks on a variety of 

topics: Turkey-related, bilateral, regional, or global. This 

could stimulate partnerships between large U.S. think 

tanks and some of the most professional Turkish organizations, such as TEPAV (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikalari 

Araştırma Vakfi, or Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey), TESEV, and USAK.

◆ Engage through visitor programs (such as the State 

Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program) to bring Turkish think tank leaders and scholars to 

the United States to meet with officials and counterparts 

in the U.S. think tank sector.

◆ Support the establishment of American studies 

programs in Turkey and Turkish studies programs in the 

U.S. in conjunction with Turkish think tanks, either those 

affiliated with universities or independent institutes.

These steps would not remove all friction between 

the policies and strategies of the two states given the 

acknowledged, more independent turn in Turkey’s international identity in the 21st century. But they would 

strengthen Turkish policy debate, encourage democratization over the long-term, and open a window for 

the United States on the nuances of evolving Turkish 

strategic thought. There are other areas where we could 

improve bilateral ties: increasing the $19 billion volume 

in annual trade, for instance, which is one of the lowest 

bilateral volumes among G20 nations.71 Nor should we 

neglect the bedrock of the bilateral relationship, security 

cooperation within NATO and in several different regions of the world, which remains strong and active.

Think tanks are one way modern nations develop 

deeper understanding of their circumstances, broaden 

policy options, improve performance, and exercise influence, both at home and abroad. They are another front 

in the ongoing struggle to promote competing political 

visions. Vladimir Putin has targeted foreign and domestic think tanks in Russia as impediments to his absolute 

authority.72 And on occasion U.S. think tanks have been 

vilified in Turkey for being overly critical of the Turks and 

being full of sinister plots against their country.73 But for 

now Erdoğan and his government have not acted on that 

misperception. Instead, and as a matter of stated principle, they have made a commitment to seeing the Turkish think tank sector flourish. That leaves us an important 

opening and a way to gain insights on and strengthen 

pro-Western elements in Turkey’s strategic debates. The 

outcome will be a clearer understanding of our shared interests and concerns and a broader set of options for how 

to ameliorate the areas in which we do not agree. Failure 

to do so risks perpetuation of a frustrating status quo and 

could lead us into sharper conflict with the Turks, conflict that would benefit neither party but would generate 

great satisfaction in Tehran and Moscow.

Notes 1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks by the President at a Dinner 

Given in His Honor by President Bayar,” December 6, 1959, available 

at <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11596>.

2 Jacob Poushter, “The Turkish People Don’t Look Favorably upon the U.S., or Any Other Country, Really,” Pew Research 

Center, October 31, 2014, available at <www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/10/31/the-turkish-people-dont-look-favorably-upon-theu-s-or-any-other-country-really/>.

3 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001). The current author’s forthcoming article on 

Strategic Depth will present a detailed analysis of its descriptive and 

prescriptive approaches for Turkish foreign policy.

4 “Germany Ready to Support Turkey’s EU Accession Process, 

Says Merkel,” DW.com, October 18, 2015, available at <www.dw.com/

think tanks are one way 

modern nations develop 

deeper understanding of their 

circumstances, broaden policy 

options, improve performance, and 

exercise influence, both at home 

and abroad
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 13 

en/germany-ready-to-support-turkeys-eu-accession-process-saysmerkel/a-18789797>.

5 Mehmet Yegin and Eyup Ersoy, Türkiye-ABD Ilişkileri: Çok

Boyutlu Bir Ortaklığa Doğru [Turkey-US Relations: Toward a Multidimensional Relationship], Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu 

Report 13-05, May 2013.

6 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdoğan’s Next Act,” Wall Street Journal (online), November 4, 2015, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/erdogansnext-act-1446668849>.

7 Fetullah Gülen is the founder of a movement that refers to itself 

as hizmet (Service); others call it cemaat (the Community). It links a 

series of schools, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations that 

operate in Turkey and a number of other countries, bound by a moderate, somewhat secretive brand of Islam rooted in the early 20th-century 

writings of Said Nursî. The Erdoğan government was once aligned 

with the Gülenists but came to view the organization as subversive, 

working to establish a “parallel state.”

8 On Erdoğan’s new bargain with the military, see Halil Karaveli, 

“Turkey’s Military Rulers,” New York Times, September 11, 2015, 

available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/opinion/turkeys-militaryrulers.html>; and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 

Coup Case Are Released,” New York Times, June 19, 2014, available 

at <www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/world/europe/turkish-courtorders-release-of-officers-convicted-of-plotting-coup.html?_r=0>. On 

his intimidation and co-optation of the press, see Freedom House, 

Freedom of the Press 2015: Turkey, April 2015, available at <https://

freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/turkey>. Svante E. 

Cornell has discussed Erdoğan’s gradual assertion of control over 

Turkey’s education system. See “The Islamization of Turkey: Erdoğan’s 

Education Reforms,” The Turkey Analyst 8, no. 16 (September 2015), 

available at <www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analystarticles/item/437-the-islamization-of-turkey-erdoğan’s-educationreforms.html>. Others have discussed his control over the judiciary, 

local government, and the police. On his successful populist appeals, 

see Mustafa Akyol, “How the AKP Dominated Yesterday’s Elections 

in Turkey,” al-Monitor.com, November 2, 2015, available at <www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/turkey-elections-akp-unexpected-victory-erdogan.html#>.

9 Avaneesh Pandey, “Turkey Election Victory Gives Erdoğan 

a Chance for Economic Reform, but Fears Linger,” International 

Business Times, November 3, 2015, available at <www.ibtimes.com/

turkey-election-victory-gives-erdogan-chance-economic-reform-fearslinger-2166303>; and Murat Yetkin, “Ankara Ready for Operations on 

Three Fronts,” Radikal.com.tr, November 10, 2015, available at <www.

radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/ankarada-uc-cephede-harekthazirligi-1469409/>.

10 Mustafa Akyol, “Erdoğan’s Path of Illiberal Democracy,” alMonitor.com, July 2, 2014, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2014/07/akyol-erdogan-presidential-elections-akp-latinamerican.html#>.

11 Cenap Cakmak and Gokhan Guneysu, “Turkish-American 

Relations During Obama Era: Unfulfilled Expectations,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 2 ( June 2013), 193–211; and Simon Waldman and Emre 

Caliskan, “Turkey’s Democratic Deficit,” OpenDemocracy.net, June 5, 

2015, available at <www.opendemocracy.net/simon-waldman-emrecaliskan/turkey%E2%80%99s-democratic-deficit>.

12 Soner Cagaptay, The Rise of Turkey (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2014), 6–10, 64–69.

13 Cengiz Candar, “Does the U.S. Trust Turkey?” al-Monitor.com, 

September 4, 2014, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-iraq-syria-west-nato-usa-isis.html#>. Meanwhile 

military-to-military cooperation remains robust, including U.S. deployment to Incirlik and other bases, support for Turkey’s anti-missile concerns, defense industrial cooperation, and coordination between U.S. 

European Command and the Turkish General Staff—as confirmed to 

author by two senior contacts, one Turkish and one American.

14 On Barack Obama and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, see Fareed 

Zakaria, “Inside Obama’s World,” Time, January 19, 2012, available 

at <http://swampland.time.com/2012/01/19/inside-obamas-worldthe-president-talks-to-time-about-the-changing-nature-of-americanpower/>; Scott Peterson, “Why President Obama Stopped Calling 

Turkish Leader Erdoğan,” Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 2014, 

available <www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Under-theRadar/2014/0307/Why-President-Obama-stopped-calling-Turkishleader-Erdogan>; and Jack Moore, “Turkey Prime Minister Recep 

Tayyip Erdoğan: ‘I No Longer Talk to Barack Obama,’” International 

Business Times, July 22, 2014, available at <www.ibtimes.co.uk/

turkey-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-i-no-longer-talk-barackobama-1457837>. On questioning the Alliance, see Eric Edelman and 

Morton Abramowitz, “Turkey: An Increasingly Undependable Ally,” 

Bipartisan Policy Center, April 2015.

15 Halil Karaveli, “Turkey’s Future: If Not a ‘Big Finland,’ Maybe 

a ‘Small China?’” The Turkey Analyst, November 12, 2015, available at 

<http://turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/479-

turkey’s-future-if-not-a-”big-finland”-maybe-a-”small-china>.

16 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 597–600.

17 Ihsan Dagi, “Democracy after Military Tutelage?” TodaysZaman.com, August 11, 2013, available at <www.todayszaman.com/columnists/ihsan-dagi_323267-democracy-after-military-tutelage.html>. 

See also Ilhan Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy,” The 

Turkish Yearbook, vol. 34 (2003), 177–211.

18 The resignation of General Necip Torumtay, chief of the Turkish General Staff, was emblematic of this. See Mehmet Ali Birand and 

Soner Yalçin, The Ozal: Bir Davanin Oykusu (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 

2001), 438–439.

19 Uzgel, 208–211.

20 Ömer Taşpınar, Turkey: The New Model? (Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, April 2012), available at <www.brookings.edu/

research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>.

21 David Capezza, “Turkey’s Military Is a Catalyst for Reform,” 

Middle East Quarterly 16, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 13–23, available at 

<www.meforum.org/2160/turkey-military-catalyst-for-reform>.

22 Nil Satana, “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the 

Path to Democracy,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (April 2008), 

357–388.

23 Ziya Öniş, “Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political 

Economy,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 3 (2009), 50–60. 

24 Ramazan Kilinc, “Critical Junctures, Catalysts, and Democratic 

Consolidation in Turkey,” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (2014), 

293–318.

25 Birol Baskan, “News from the Turkish Front: Erdoğan’s 

Gamble,” AlArabiya.com, June 8, 2012, available at <www.alarabiya.net/

views/2012/06/08/219404.html>. 

26 Yuksel Taskin, “Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy,” 

Turkish Studies 14, no. 2 (2013), 292–310.

27 Günter Seufert, Erdoğan’s “New Turkey”: Restoring Authoritarianism in the Name of Democracy, Stiftung Wirtshaft und Politik (SWP) 

Comments No. 44 (Berlin: SWP, October, 2014), available at <www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C44_srt.pdf>.

28 Ilhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla Iliskiler,” in Turk Dis Politikasi, vol. 2, 1980–2001, ed. Baskin Oran, (Istanbul: Iletisim Kitaplari, 

2001), 320–324.

29 Eric Edeleman and Morton Abramovitz, “Turkey: An Increasingly Unreliable Ally,” Bipartisan Policy Center, April 2015, 29–32, 

available at <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/

BPC-Turkey-Alliance.pdf>.
14 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

30 The Cyprus arms embargo badly damaged bilateral ties and was 

lifted after several years without affecting the Turkish policy in question. See Murat Karagöz, “U.S. Arms Embargo Against Turkey—After 

30 Years an Institutional Approach Toward U.S. Policy Making,” Perceptions (Winter 2004–2005), 107–130, available at <http://sam.gov.tr/

wp-content/uploads/2012/02/MuratKaragoz1.pdf>. The United States 

was silent enough about the postmodern coup of 1997 that some Turks 

believe America was behind it. See Hussein Gulerce, “Cengiz Çandar 

Said That. . . ,” TodaysZaman.com, April 30, 2014, available at <www.

todayszaman.com/columnists_cengiz-candar-said-that_346585.html>.

31 Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, “Turkey’s Spymaster Plots 

Own Course on Syria,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2013, available 

at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230364330

4579107373585228330>.

32 Daniel Treisman, “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover,” 

American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 4 (October 2015), 927–942.

33 Thomas Donohue and Umit Boyner, U.S.-Turkish Economic 

Relations in a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations for a Stronger 

Strategic Partnership (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 

2012).

34 Öniş.

3 Taskin, 300–301.

36 Richard N. Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: 

A Policy Maker’s Perspective,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no 3 

(November 2002), available at <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa_120909/ijpe1102.pdf>.

37 James G. McGann, 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, March 1, 2015), 8.

38 Ibid., 23–28.

39 Democracy Think Tanks in Action: Translating Research into 

Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies (Washington, DC: National 

Endowment for Democracy, June 2013).

40 Christopher Walker, “Democracy Think Tanks in Action: 

Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies,” in Democracy Think Tanks in Action, 1–2.

41 Özge Genç, “Enhancing the Policy Impact of Democracy 

Research: The Case of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies 

Foundation’s Democratization Program,” in Democracy Think Tanks in 

Action, 99–106.

42 Serhat Güvenç, “Think Tanks and the Discipline of International Relations in Turkey,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler [International Relations] 4, no. 13 (Spring 2007), 137–144.

43 Jeffrey Collins, “Troubles in Turkey Magnify Civil Society’s 

Role,” WorldAffairs.org, July 17, 2013, available at <www.worldaffairs.

org/blog/390-troubles-in-turkey-magnify-civil-societys-role>.

44 Ibid., 143.

45 Karin Deutsch Karlekar and Jennifer Dunham, “Press Freedom 

in 2013: Media Freedom Hits Decade Low,” Freedom of the Press 2014

(Washington, DC: Freedom House, May 1, 2014), available at <http://

freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014>.

46 Suat Kiniklioğlu, “Turkey’s Think Tank Scene,” Hurriyet Daily 

News, December 27, 2005, available at <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/

turkeys-think-tank-scene.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkeys-think-tankscene-2005-12-27>.

47 Hasan Kanbolat, “Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Think 

Tanks,” TodaysZaman.com, February 18, 2013, available at <www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=307437>.

48 Mehmet Yegin, review of Rise of Think Tanks: Foreign Policy and 

National Security Culture in Turkey, by Bülent Aras, Şule Toktaş, and 

Ümit Kurt, Insight Turkey 14, no. 3 (2012), 203.

49 Serhat Güvenç, “Seeking Influence in Foreign Policy-Making: 

Turkey’s Experiment with Think-Tanks,” conference paper presented 

at the 21st IPSA World Congress of Political Science, July 16, 2009, 6. 

See also Şule Toktaş, “National Security Culture in Turkey: A Qualitative Study on Think Tanks,” Bilig 61 (Spring 2012), 245–264.

50 Walker, 101–102.

51 Toktaş.

52 Andrew Rich, Think-Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of 

Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

53 Kubilay Arin, “Turkish Think Tanks: The AKP’s Policy Network from Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Ottoman Angles,” Portland State 

University Occasional Papers 4, no. 1, ( June 2015).

54 Hasan Kanbolat, “Turkish Decision-Makers’ Perceptions about 

Think Tanks,” TodaysZaman.com, February 9, 2010, available at <www.

todayszaman.com/columnists_turkish-decision-makers-perceptionsabout-think-tanks_200989.html>.

55 Osman Nuri Aras, “Turkey’s 2023 Goals: From Reality to 

Dream,” TodaysZaman.com, August 21, 2014, available at <www.

todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkeys-2023-goals-from-reality-todream_357254.html>. See also “Turkey’s Vision at its 100th Anniversary,” Tasam.org, October 9, 2008, available at <http://tasam.org/en/

Icerik/3328/turkeys_vision_at_its_100th_anniversary>.

56 “More Cultural Rights for Kurds Argues Think Tank,” Hurriyet 

Daily News, March 6, 2009, available at <www.hurriyet.com.tr/morecultural-rights-for-kurds-argues-think-tank-11146391>.

57 Nur Beler Levy, “A Brief Analysis of Think Tank Sector (Go 

to Think Tank Index Report) and the Turkish Case,” Tusiad.org.tr, 

February 5, 2015.

58 Aydin Nurhan, Strategic Studies in Developing Countries

(Ankara: TASAM, 2014), available at <http://tasam.org/Files/PDF/

Raporlar/STR66_Strategic_Studies_in_Developing_Countries.

pdf_63bcae09-e46f-463b-8083-1d2bf0dd5391.pdf>. 

59 Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, Ahmet Davutoğlu: A New Era in 

Turkey’s Foreign Policy? A Perspective from Cyprus (Larnaca, Cyprus: 

European Rim Policy and Investment Council, July 28, 2009), available 

at <http://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/erato-kozakoumarcoullis-ahmet-davutoglu-a-new-era-in-turkeys-foreign-policy.

pdf>. See also Davutoğlu, 48–50.

60 Yusuf Çinar, “Think Tanks in Turkey: Insights for Success,” 

StrategicOutlook.org, March 3, 2015, available at <www.strategicoutlook.org/philosophy/news-think-tanks-in-turkey-insights-for-succeb-.

html>.

61 McGann, 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, 54.

62 James G. McGann, Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the 

U.S. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 

2005), available at <www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_7042-1522-1-30.

pdf?050810140439>. 

63 Çinar. 

64 McGann, 9–10.

65 “Global Go to Think Tank Rankings,” Think Tanks and Civil 

Societies Program, available at <http://gotothinktank.com/rankings/>.

66 The U.S. Agency for International Development has supported the work of TEPAV (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikalari Araştırma 

Vakfi, or Economic Policy Research Foundation). See, for example, 

Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, Review of Legal Issues between Armenia and 

Turkey (Ankara: TEPAV, 2012), available at <www.tepav.org.tr/upload/

files/1353684848-2.Review_of_Legal_Issues_between_Armenia_and_

Turkey.pdf>. For an example of partnering with U.S. think tanks, see 

Bulent Aliriza and Bulent Aras, U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the 

Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post–Cold War Era (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2012), ii.

67 Pinar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma,” in The Return 

of Geopolitics to Europe, ed. Stefano Guzzini (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2012), 151–173.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 15 

68 Jacob Poushter, “Deep Divisions in Turkey as Elections Near,” 

Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends, October 15, 2015, 

available at <www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-inturkey-as-election-nears/#most-prefer-democracy-but-divisions-overhow-it-is-working>. 

69 Harriet Fildes, “The Rise of the HDP—Elections and Democracy in Turkey,” OpenDemocracy.net, June 3, 2015, available at <www.

opendemocracy.net/harriet-fildes/rise-of-hdp-elections-and-democracy-in-turkey>.

70 Cansu Çamlibel, “They Think, Imagine, and Shape Decisions,” 

Hürriyet Daily News, May 11, 2011.

71 Khush Chosky, “The Commercial Potential,” TheCipherBrief.

com, September 20, 2015, available at <www.thecipherbrief.com/article/

commercial-potential>. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Turkish counterpart have developed a framework concept to provide better 

incentives and incentives to stimulate trade and investment, with the 

ultimate goal of a Free Trade Agreement.

72 Leonid Bershidsky, “Putin Hurts a Think Tank by not Banning 

It,” Bloomberg View, July 29, 2015, available at <www.bloombergview.

com/articles/2015-07-28/how-putin-tarnishes-moscow-carnegiecenter-by-omission>.

73 Soner Çağaptay, “Anti-Americanism in a Poisoned Tank,” Hurriyet Daily News, September 15, 2009.

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16 SF No. 292 ndupress.ndu.edu

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