Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept

by Richard L. Kugler

Strategic Forum

T

he phrase “dissuasion of potential

adversaries from pursuing threatening

military competition and ambitions”

initially appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial

Defense Review Report as one of four key

strategic goals abroad; the other three are

assuring allies and friends, deterring threats

and coercion against U.S. interests, and

decisively defeating adversaries who commit

aggression. The term also was endorsed in

the U.S. National Security Strategy, published

in late 2002. Despite this clear articulation,

the Bush administration has yet to clarify

how the concept will be applied to defense

plans and strategy.

Dissuasion can be an effective complement to deterrence. It offers a potent concept

for handling geopolitical situations in which

U.S. relationships with key countries fall

short of overt rivalry but can deteriorate if

strategic and military competition takes hold.

Dissuasion also will have to be integrated

into American diplomacy in sensitive regions

where the goal is to constrain potential rivals

without provoking them into becoming adversaries or forming hostile coalitions.

For the Department of Defense, dissuasion requires adaptation of military missions

and transformation of capabilities. For example, it underscores the need to keep large

U.S. forces in Asia for strategic reasons that

go beyond deterring war on the Korean

Peninsula. There and elsewhere, it may

necessitate adjustments in the U.S. overseas

military presence, power-projection capabilities, defense transformation, and alliance

military relationships. 

Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would

be short sighted. Despite its haziness, the term

goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in

several key regions, including Asia. If the

United States can learn how to dissuade skillfully, its strategic effectiveness in troubled

regions will improve significantly. When the

idea of deterrence first appeared 50 years ago, it

too was ambiguous. During the Cold War,

however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged

strategic theory. The same may hold true for

dissuasion in the early 21st century—but only

if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses

and calculations needed to bring it to life.

During the Cold War, the French often

used the term dissuasion as synonymous with

deterrence. The new U.S. defense strategy,

however, employs the term differently in

broader ways that reflect its usage in the English language. One dictionary defines dissuasion as the “act of advising or urging somebody not to do something: e.g., she dissuaded

him from leaving home.” (In this sense, it is

an antonym of persuasion, which promotes a

course of action.) In strategic terms, dissuasion

can be defined as an effort by the United States

to convince a country or coalition to refrain

from courses of action that would menace our

interests and goals or otherwise endanger world

peace. How, then, does it differ from deterrence?

Complement to

Deterrence

Deterrence is the logic of direct military

coercion applied against a hostile, well-armed

enemy. Deterrence is pursued when the scent of

war is in the air and when an adversary already

possesses both the political intention and

military capability to commit aggression. The

main aim is to deter the adversary from committing aggression by threatening to respond in

ways that will not only rebuff him but also

inflict unacceptable losses on him. Presumably,

the only thing capable of stopping the adversary is realization that the United States will

immediately employ its military forces to defeat

him. During the Cold War, deterrence was

pursued vigorously in Central Europe and

Northeast Asia by deploying large U.S. forces

and building alliance defense postures for

warfighting against surprise attacks.

By contrast, dissuasion arises in a different, less confrontational place along the spectrum from peace to war. It applies to situations

in which the relationship between the United

States and another country has not yet descended into intense political-military rivalry

but has the potential to do so if events take a

wrong turn. Thus, the United States is dealing

not with a full-fledged adversary but with a

country with which it has a mixed relationship

of cool peace, mutual suspicions, and common

incentives to avoid violence. War is not in the

air, but deep trouble could arise if that country

begins misbehaving in ways that threaten U.S.

interests. The United States is mainly concerned

with discouraging that country from embracing

policies and building forces that could produce

political confrontation, military competition,

and war. The United States, therefore, acts not

by threatening direct military retaliation as an

ever-present reality, but by making clear that it

will thwart and frustrate hostile steps through

countervailing measures of its own. Whereas

No. 196

December 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 196, December 2002
deterrence is the logic of military coercion

under dark war clouds, dissuasion is the logic of

peacetime strategic influence in settings marked

by wary maneuvers but with no war clouds on

the horizon.

In short, dissuasion aims at urging potential geopolitical rivals not to become real

rivals by making clear that any sustained

malevolent conduct will be checkmated by the

United States. It involves military pressure

applied with a velvet glove, not crude threats

of war and destruction.

Dissuasion should be seen as a complement to the longstanding policy of deterrence,

not as a component of that policy or a replacement for it. Since these two concepts are separate and distinct, with different roles, they

should be defined in ways that make clear

where one leaves off and the other begins.

Some regions may require that one concept

plays a stronger role than the other; elsewhere, a

balanced mixture of the two may be needed.

Regardless, these two concepts should work

together strategically in ways that are mutually

enabling. To be successful in many regions, the

United States will need to be able both to dissuade and deter—and to do so in a manner

that shifts emphasis between them as the future

unfolds. The United States should develop its

strategic policies and plans accordingly.

If dissuasion is pursued in this important

but integrated way, it may prove more useful

than some anticipate. Beyond question, there is

a clear need for something like it. The United

States cannot afford to act as though deterrence

is its sole concept for handling the gray area of

modern geopolitics: the cavernous zone between friendship and confrontation where

nations are not primed for war but eye each

other warily and often maneuver for advantage. Deterrence is appropriate for situations in

which intense confrontations with adversaries

already exist, but it does not have widespread

applicability in this gray zone. Because dissuasion has considerable relevance there, it is a

new-but-old idea whose time may have come.

It offers a way not only to keep potential adversaries at bay but also to reassure allies and

lessen the extent to which the United States will

be compelled to deter, preempt, and fight wars.

Dissuasion is not easily accomplished, and

it can fail or even backfire. Since it is a politicalmilitary idea that should be seen through the

lens of the information era, it must pursued in

ways that take advantage of, and help shape, the

transformation of U.S. forces, overseas presence,

and defense strategy. Dissuasion also is a multilateral concept. Because it normally requires not

only the trust of key allies and partners but also

their active cooperation as well, it cannot be

carried out unilaterally. Dissuasion must be

embedded, moreover, in a diplomacy aimed

toward promoting regional stability, not used

merely to intimidate countries into fearing U.S.

military prowess. As Theodore Roosevelt said,

“Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

The United States does not have a great

deal of experience with dissuasion because the

Cold War led it to see the world in terms of

friends and foes and to view its strategy choices

in terms of assurance or deterrence. But the

concept has deep historical roots in the era

before the great ideological conflicts of the 20th

century. Indeed, much of the 19th century in

Europe was an exercise in sustained dissuasion

by dominant powers, which regularly employed

peacetime military pressure as one instrument

to underscore preventive diplomacies and sometimes resorted to the threat of war or war itself.

There are still numerous enemies who need

deterring. But elsewhere, traditional geopolitics

may be reemerging in ways that will mandate a

strong reappearance for dissuasion as well. Asia

and China are obvious examples, but far from

the only candidates. If indeed traditional

geopolitics is reemerging, the United States will

need to learn how to practice this time-honored

art, for in a geopolitical setting in which assertive countries are neither friends nor foes, the

responsible exercise of power will entail neither

assurance nor deterrence but instead dissuasion

strategies that are sui generis.

Dissuasion originally appeared in the

American strategic lexicon a few years ago,

mainly as a concept to help guide measures to

strengthen homeland security and build missile defenses. The idea was that if potential

adversaries were confronted with strong U.S.

defenses in these two areas, they would be less

likely to employ terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction strikes against the U.S. homeland

and overseas interests. In the chaotic world

now emerging, dissuasion has the potential to

play a greater role. It can be the missing link

in national security strategy because it can help

cover the large gray zone between assuring

allies and deterring adversaries. If the United

States dissuades successfully, it will both lessen

the extent to which potential adversaries rise to

challenge American interests and help stabilize

the global security system, which otherwise is

prone to generate multipolar rivalries and

could even produce a multiregion coalition

against the United States. Successful dissuasion

can help facilitate the pursuit of other strategic

goals. To the extent that the United States can

dissuade potential adversaries, it will be better

able to reassure allies, and it will be able to do

so at less cost and effort than otherwise. Similarly, successful dissuasion may reduce the

extent to which full-fledged deterrence must be

pursued. It may limit the occasions in which

preventive or preemptive strikes against adversaries must be launched. Beyond this, it may

reduce the number of wars that the Armed

Forces will be called upon to fight.

Dissuasion offers a potent way to help

make U.S. strategy more effective and manageable. But dissuasion is a subtler concept than

deterrence, and pursuing it is less straightforward than reassuring allies. Because it aims

toward influencing the strategic psychology

and political aspirations of potential adversaries, its methods require analyses that go

beyond traditional military calculations of how

forces and technologies interact. The same

judgment holds true for the important tasks of

creating multilateral trust and acceptance of

U.S. strategies for dissuasion and of mobilizing

as much allied help as possible.

2 Strategic Forum No. 196, December 2002

Richard L. Kugler wrote this paper while a distinguished research professor in the Institute for National

Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Currently, Dr. Kugler is a distinguished

research professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at NDU. Please e-mail

questions or comments to Dr. Kugler at kuglerr@ndu.edu.

dissuasion aims at urging

potential geopolitical

rivals not to become 

real rivals by making

clear that any sustained

malevolent conduct will

be checkmated by the

United States
A Geopolitical Tool

A brief review of the historical record will

help set the stage for assessing the pursuit of

dissuasion as a geopolitical tool. Theodore

Roosevelt was the first American President to

practice the peacetime use of military power as

a strategic instrument of influence. Roosevelt

sent his Great White Fleet around the world to

signal America’s emergence as a global power.

He knew, too, that military power must be used

wisely, embedded in a larger diplomatic strategy aimed at creating stable security relationships, not bullying countries for the sake of

intimidation alone. Indeed, Roosevelt won the

Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to settle the

Russo-Japanese War of 1905. He did indeed

carry a big stick, but he also spoke softly, urging moderation and compromise when the

geopolitical situation called for it.

Roosevelt’s opposite was Kaiser Wilhelm of

Germany, whose heavy-handed conduct contributed greatly to the disaster of World War I.

When Wilhelm rose to power in the 1890s, he

inherited a peaceful Europe with a secure

Germany at the pinnacle of a stable balance of

power system. During 1850–1870, Chancellor

Otto von Bismarck had won three wars against

Denmark, Austria-Hungary, and France that

resulted in the unification of Germany as the

continent’s greatest power. But knowing not to

press his advantage too far, Bismarck, after

1870, embarked upon a successful diplomatic

campaign to sign security treaties with Russia

and Austria-Hungary and to befriend England.

The effect was to bind Germany closely to these

three countries, while leaving France isolated

but secure within its borders. Intent on overthrowing this inheritance, the callow Kaiser

Wilhelm fired Bismarck, further bolstered

Germany’s military, and started bullying his

neighbors under the mantle of German nationalism. Over a 20-year period, he tore up his

security treaty with Russia, driving it into the

arms of France. He then launched a dreadnaught naval race with Britain that resulted in

it also aligning with France. Next, he built a

large German army for a two-front offensive

strategy aimed at mobilizing recklessly in order

to crush France before turning to defeat Russia.

He was not interested in dissuasion or other

approaches to stable relations with his neighbors, but instead domination in Europe and an

imperial German domain outside it.

With nationalism and militarism on the

rise, stable Europe steadily mutated into an

unstable bipolar system, primed to explode into

war even in the absence of a serious political

reason for doing so. When World War I broke

out and then deteriorated into a bloody stalemate, Wilhelm rejected a diplomatic settlement, instead pursuing victory through submarine warfare against Britain that brought the

United States into the conflict against Germany. The result was the defeat of Germany

and destruction of Europe in ways that reverberated throughout the 20th century, setting the

stage for Nazism, communism, World War II,

and the Cold War. Wilhelm’s disastrous legacy

goes down as an example of how not to practice geopolitics and dissuasion. Whether World

War I could have been prevented is unclear, but

other European countries may have been partly

at fault for failing to dissuade or deter aggressive German actions at the onset.

World War I gave geopolitics and balance

of power policies a bad name in history textbooks. Yet the preceding century had been an

era of relative peace in Europe precisely because geopolitical diplomacy was practiced

wisely, with a sense of firmness and moderation. In the eyes of many historians, Europe’s

experience from the Congress of Vienna

through the Bismarck era showed that a notoriously violent region could be stabilized if four

conditions were present:

■ common political values or at least agreed

codes of conduct and restraint

■ an equilibrium of legitimate political interests that leaves the major powers satisfied with their

safety and status

■ a stable military balance that hinders aggression, coupled with a capacity for collective

action when aggression occurs

■ a foundation of security, upon which political and economic progress is built, thus reinforcing

peace and removing incentives for war.

Throughout much of the 19th century,

such celebrated diplomats as Metternich, Talleyrand, Palmerston, and Bismarck strove to

create these conditions and turned this form of

geopolitical management into a high art.

Indeed, they were pragmatic men willing to use

military power, pressure, and even war when

necessary. But they also grasped that military

power had to be employed as a servant of

strategic thinking and diplomacy, not the other

way around. They avoided the perils of carrying

nationalism too far. They also realized that

peace rested on more than a mechanical balance of military power—that larger political

considerations were equally important. Their

success in this arena goes a long way toward

explaining Europe’s steady progress during this

century. When World War I erupted, the reason

was not that these geopolitical values were

proven wrong but that they had fallen into

disuse. They were replaced by the kind of selfserving strategies, abusive diplomacies, and

bullying military conduct that polarized Europe, triggered military competition and political maneuvering, and made war inevitable.

Implications for Today

What implications does this history have

for U.S. policy and strategy? Obviously, the oldstyle geopolitics of the 19th century is not

reemerging. But a new-style geopolitics of the

early 21st century is steadily evolving. As globalization accelerates, some countries are gaining

power (China and India), others are losing

power (Russia), and others are adjusting to the

new frustrations and opportunities facing them

(Iran and Turkey). The result is a murky

global setting, full of gray-area relationships

that seemingly have the potential to produce

enhanced stability or great turmoil, depending

upon how these relationships are handled. For

the United States, dealing with these new

geopolitical dynamics may be equally important as containing and deterring enemies who

also will be on the scene. To the extent that the

United States can dissuade key countries,

thereby influencing them to exercise restraint

in their foreign policies and defense preparations, the world will be a safer place and U.S.

interests will be better protected.

The place that geopolitical management

and dissuasion will be most regularly practiced

is along the so-called Southern arc of instability, stretching from the Middle East to the East

Asian littoral. Europe seemingly has resolved its

old-era poisonous geopolitics. Even Russia is

showing signs of adjusting gracefully to its new,

limited role. But the Southern arc is another

No. 196, December 2002 Strategic Forum 3

dissuasion will be most

regularly practiced along

the so-called Southern

arc of instability, stretching from the Middle East

to the East Asian littoral
4 Strategic Forum No. 196, December 2002

matter. At least until the war on terrorism is

won and the “axis of evil” is suppressed, the

United States regularly will be pursuing classical deterrence, intervening in crises, and waging war against a host of adversaries. But in

parallel ways, the United States will be pursuing new-era dissuasion in its dealings with

other countries, most notably with China. Two

kinds of dissuasion policies will be needed in

shifting ways: the harder-edged type that relies

mainly on military intimidation and the softeredged type that adroitly blends military pressure with mature diplomacy sensitive to the

larger political issues at stake. Along with

deterrence, the harder version may be consistently needed in the Middle East and Persian

Gulf. The Korean Peninsula aside, Asia today

will require dissuasion of the sort that blends

military power and diplomacy until the future

becomes better known.

The main attraction of dissuasion is that

while it is not always easy or inexpensive, it can

help inhibit otherwise tough-minded countries

from going over the edge in their foreign

policies and defense strategies. It can help

prevent them not only from competing with the

United States militarily but also from menacing our allies, seeking to dismantle our collective security arrangements, and striving to

impose new geopolitical arrangements that

damage American interests and values. As the

United States seeks these benefits through the

use of military power and other instruments, it

will need to recognize the chief risk of dissuasion: if it is pursued in heavy-handed ways, it

can be counterproductive. It can help intensify

regional polarization and militarization, motivate countries to pursue asymmetric strategies

aimed at negating U.S. strengths, alienate

allies, and trigger the formation of coalitions

against the United States. The disastrous legacy

of Wilhelm must be remembered; his experience is a case study in how a dominant power

can overplay its geopolitical hand and thereby

greatly damage its own security, as well as

cause regional destabilization of the sort that

produces a steady drift toward war.

In pursuing dissuasion, a key challenge

facing the United States will be to strike a

sensible balance between assertiveness and

restraint. This will require not only applying

military power adroitly but also integrating it

with cooperative instruments of foreign policy:

diplomacy, political commitments, economic

aid, trade and investments, information, institution-building, and the spread of democratic

values. Perhaps a combination of dissuasion

and cooperation will work best. Above all, there

will be a need to remember history’s lesson that

while regional peace requires a mechanical

military balance of power, it also requires other

conditions: acceptance of common values and

codes of conduct, an equilibrium of legitimate

interests, and a foundation of security that

gives rise to economic and political progress.

The exact policy mix will vary with the situation at hand, but, as a general rule, the United

States will experience greater success if it

blends its pursuit of dissuasion with parallel

policies aimed at creating these larger conditions for peace.

The need for a mature balance applies

especially to dealing with China—and all of

Asia for that matter. In the coming years, Asia

will require a mix of strategies: deterrence on

the Korean Peninsula, assurance of our closest

allies including Japan, community-building in

Southeast Asia, and an adroit handling of

China. Destined to become a great power in

future years, with growing military strength

and expanding strategic reach, China is in the

process of defining not only its geopolitical

aims around its borders but also its stance

toward the entire Asian security-economic

system and the U.S. role in it. Even as it struggles to create a quasicapitalist economy and to

join the world economy, it remains authoritarian in its politics, shows signs of rising nationalism and resentment of the U.S. leadership

role in Asian security affairs, and strives to

modernize its military forces, including with

assets for power projection.

Clearly, the United States will need to think

in terms of dissuading China from the assertive,

menacing political-military conduct that rising

geopolitical powers often have pursued before.

What the United States does not want is for

China to become in Asia what Germany became

in Europe a century ago: a bullying rogue

elephant. Just as clearly, the United States needs

to encourage China to become a democracy

with a market economy, to pursue its legitimate

interests in moderate ways, and to integrate into

the larger Asian system that we are trying to

build: one anchored in peace and progress. If

these positive goals are achieved, America will

not have to worry about an adversarial China.

Whether China can be integrated into a

stable, pro-democracy Asian system is to be

seen and will be a long-haul proposition. In

the interim, the United States cannot afford to

ignore China’s overreaching behavior, including any efforts to enhance its military strength

and political influence in ways that intimidate

its neighbors and drive the United States out of

Asia. The great risk is that if the United States is

maneuvered into lessening its security guarantees to its allies, Japan will be motivated to

pursue an independent stance. Some analysts

fear that Japan might create its own nuclear

deterrent, but even short of this, it might build

a large military for power projection and start

throwing its weight around as a leading geopolitical actor in Asian security affairs. In this

event, the result could be a highly polarized,

unstable Asia anchored in mounting JapaneseChinese rivalry, with the United States on the

outside looking in.

This worrisome prospect presents the

United States with the need to perform a delicate balancing act that will prevent China from

turning into a menace as its power grows, but

that also keeps the door open for it to become a

constructive contributor to a peaceful Asian

community. This is the sort of demanding

geopolitical agenda that would have challenged Europe’s best diplomats and leaders of

the 19th century. Just as dissuasion had a key

role to play in European policies then, it has a

new role to play in U.S. policies toward Asia

today, for it will be a means not only to constrain China’s assertive, nationalistic policies

but also to assure American allies in ways that

promote stability across the entire region.

Sometimes dissuasion will require the

United States to apply its military power firmly

against China; Taiwan is the obvious example.

But a consistent strategy aimed at treating

China as an adversary and intimidating it

militarily almost inevitably would backfire,

probably in more ways than one. In this event,

the United States might not only turn China

into a permanent enemy but also alarm Japan

and other allies, as well as alienate parts of the

rest of Asia, including Southeast Asia. Barring a

in pursuing dissuasion, a

key challenge facing the

United States will be to

strike a sensible balance

between assertiveness

and restraint
Chinese decision to embark on an imperial

agenda for reasons of its own, the United States

normally will need to pursue a balanced form

of dissuasion, along with a full set of policies

aimed at achieving other goals. The exact U.S.

policy mix will depend upon the evolving

situation, but the best advice is to remember

Roosevelt’s maxim.

Defense Planning

Dissuasion is a product of U.S. military

forces and the overall strategic strengths of the

Nation. Clearly, American democratic values,

economic power, cultural influences, and

diplomatic skills figure prominently in the

equation. Just as clearly, there will continue to

be many situations in which these assets alone

will not be enough to accomplish dissuasion:

the history of the past century shows many

cases of adversaries who stared U.S. strategic

strength in the face and chose to compete and

transgress anyway. In dealing with these situations, the Armed Forces will play a key and

often dominating role. Consequently, care must

be taken to ensure that U.S. military forces are

well prepared to carry out this role and its

associated missions. Maintaining a military

posture that can win all wars likely to be

fought may not, in itself, be enough to ensure

that dissuasion is accomplished.

Even so, dissuasion is not widely used in

the Department of Defense (DOD) today partly

because its implications for defense planning

are unclear and hard to determine. Deterrence

is a more comfortable and shop-worn term

because it is a known commodity. It offers clear

guidelines for defense planning anchored in

tangible military affairs, not abstract political

calculations. But deterrence suffers from a key

liability; it requires existing enemies before it

can be applied in ways that will come across as

credible and attractive to the American people

and our allies. What will happen, though, if

the future produces murky, dangerous geopolitics in key regions, but no implacable enemies

and big warfighting contingencies worthy of

the name? This could happen in Asia if Korea

unifies, thereby depriving U.S. defense strategy

of the key contingency that has anchored

American deterrence strategy, force-sizing

practices, and alliance relationships for many

years. It could also happen in the Middle East

and Persian Gulf if U.S. policy succeeds in

overthrowing the Saddam Husayn regime in

Iraq but is left facing an array of countries that

are worrisome geopolitical actors yet not outright enemies.

In this event, the United States could face

the dilemma of either not having a credible

strategic anchor for its defense planning or

manufacturing enemies in order to create such

an anchor. In theory, the concept of deterrence

could be stretched beyond its normal meaning

to include situations in which potential rivals

are being encountered. This practice, however,

could result in deterrence being watered down

to the point that it is not always regarded as

necessitating fully prepared forces for warfighting. During the Cold War and afterward, DOD

has preferred to apply deterrence only to dangerous situations requiring such full-scale

defense preparations. The risk is that if deterrence is now reinterpreted to cover less-demanding situations, it will not automatically

trigger a proper, galvanized response when

truly dangerous confrontations occur.

Dissuasion offers a viable way out of this

dilemma. It permits credible defense planning

and alliance-preserving diplomacy in a geopolitical setting—a setting that lacks immediate,

fearsome enemies. It thus offers a viable approach for such situations, while allowing

deterrence to remain solely focused on more

dangerous confrontations. For this reason,

among others already mentioned, dissuasion is

a useful defense concept, but only if it is

equipped with a strategic theory that defines

U.S. military requirements and priorities for

pursuing it. Creating such a theory, in turn,

necessitates deep thinking about the causeand-effect relationship regarding how, in this

information era of accelerating globalization,

U.S. military prowess affects the peacetime

geopolitical dynamics of key regions. The need

for such thinking is nothing new; in fact, it has

been an important factor in U.S. strategic

calculations for decades. But unlike earlier

periods, dissuasion now may be rising to claim

equal status with military-anchored deterrence

in some locations. This is a looming reality

that DOD cannot afford to ignore.

If the United States can succeed at dissuasion, it will help preserve its capacity to win

wars decisively, while reducing the costs of

preparing its forces. Success also will allow

DOD to perform key missions with smaller

forces than might otherwise be the case,

thereby enhancing its ability to extract maximum global mileage from its limited, often

overstretched forces. In addition, successful

dissuasion will enhance American ability to

reassure allies and to maintain the cohesion

and effectiveness of alliance relationships.

Allies, after all, tend to be more loyal and

committed if they judge that they are on the

winning side of military competition. The same

can be said of neutral countries that tend to

choose sides depending upon who is likely to

best safeguard them. The strategic benefits of

successful dissuasion thus are amply compelling to justify taking this goal seriously and

working hard on its behalf.

As the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR Report) notes, the pursuit

of dissuasion begins by establishing stable,

favorable force balances in key theaters. Beyond this, the United States will be trying to

establish favorable balances that potential

enemies will not strive to tilt in their favor,

especially in ways that open the door for them

to commit aggression. Critics might say that

the U.S. military is already so superior to adversaries that any special effort to channel their

defense preparations in benign directions is

unnecessary. But even if they are waging an

uphill battle, the governments of such countries can gain prestige in the eyes of their own

people and neighbors by trying to stand up to

alleged U.S. hegemony. Nor is achieving a

measure of success beyond the pale for them,

especially if they pursue asymmetric strategies

focused on areas where they possess exploitable

leverage or where U.S. superiority rests on a

thin, brittle technological edge. They might not

have any serious prospect of defeating U.S.

forces in combat, but they might realistically

aspire to inflict a heavy toll in casualties and

overall difficulty—thereby enhancing their

capacity to deter U.S. intervention in crises.

Countries animated by such motives will not be

dissuaded easily. The United States will need to

be able to convince them that their efforts will

be fruitless, that the costs will far exceed the

benefits, and that they risk spending themselves

into bankruptcy by trying to compete with the

U.S. military.

No. 196, December 2002 Strategic Forum 5

pursuit of dissuasion

begins by establishing

stable, favorable force

balances in key theaters
Successfully dissuading tough-minded

countries, therefore, cannot be taken for

granted, or viewed as a natural byproduct of

normal U.S. defense planning. At times, this

task may be costly and difficult, and if targeted

countries develop countervailing strategies, it

may not always be fully successful. At a minimum, it will require focused efforts and the

conscious tailoring of U.S. forces and programs

so that they exert significant constraining

leverage on the ambitions and prospects of

these countries. Beyond this, DOD and the U.S.

Government should remember that the goal is

not merely to dissuade potential adversaries

from competing militarily with the United

States. An equally important goal is to dissuade

them from pursuing malevolent political and

strategic agendas that might be achievable even

if their military forces remain decidedly inferior

to the United States. If a potential adversary

successfully weakens the resolve and loyalty of

key U.S. allies, it will have achieved a great deal

in political terms irrespective of its technical

standing in the military balance. Foreclosing

such efforts by denying them any chance of

success is a key part of the dissuasion agenda.

How can DOD best array its military

forces and preparedness efforts so that they

effectively perform the dissuasion mission?

While the answer will affect the U.S. military

posture as a whole, it may have an especially

big impact on the U.S. overseas military presence in regions where enemies and wars are

supplemented or replaced altogether by murky

geopolitics. Along the Southern arc of instability, for example, the presence of U.S. military

forces may not alone be enough to produce

peace and progress, but it could have a general

stabilizing effect while providing ready-response options in event of crises. In theory,

space-based information systems and the

capacity to deploy powerful forces swiftly from

the continental United States in a crisis can

combine to lessen the need for a large, permanent overseas presence. But realities suggest

that overseas presence still plays an important

role in peacetime and wartime, even though

its exact contribution is hard to measure.

The events of the past decade or so have

offered insights into this role. In the two regions where the United States deploys large

forces, it has been successful at steering strategic trends in the right direction. In Europe, the

large U.S. military presence and leadership of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

seemingly played a positive role in dissuading

Russia from opposing NATO enlargement into

Eastern Europe. The Russians were not thrilled

by the idea, but they lacked the military power

and associated political leverage to block the

action. Thus, they gracefully acquiesced to it.

In Northeast Asia, the U.S. military presence

has kept North Korea bottled up and has helped

warn China not to invade Taiwan.

Across the vast regions from the Balkans

to the Persian Gulf and South Asia, regions

where the United States does not deploy comparably large forces or lead well-established

alliances, the geopolitical pattern has been

different. Three times the United States has

been compelled to fight regional wars against

adversaries who were not sufficiently impressed

by U.S. military strength to be dissuaded or

deterred. Iraq, Serbia, and al Qaeda in

Afghanistan all discounted American willpower

to oppose their aggressive designs. They were

mistaken, but the United States had to wage

wars in order to rebuff them. All three of these

wars were caused by many factors other than

any disrespect for U.S. military prowess, but,

even so, a stronger and more visible U.S. force

presence may have had a constraining effect.

These experiences suggest that in this new

era, the presence or absence of the Armed

Forces on a permanent basis has a significant

impact on trends toward peace or war. As a

general rule, sizable U.S. forces will remain

needed in troubled regions. But this strategic

principle does not mean that the current presence should remain static or continue to perform its current missions. A period of dynamic

change lies ahead in regional geopolitics, and

the overseas presence must change along with

it or risk sliding into irrelevance. The task will

be one of determining the size and mix of

forces, as well as such activities as security

assistance and outreach efforts, that will be

required in each region to achieve key strategic

goals. Understanding the respective roles of

dissuasion and deterrence will be an important

element of this calculus.

In troubled regions, surface appearances

suggest that requirements for dissuasion will be

less than those for deterrence. While this often

may be the case, it likely will not always hold

true. Requirements for deterrence can be large

when there is a large, well-armed enemy to

ward off and when deterrence takes the form of

a full-fledged defense capability for wartime

contingencies. If enemies are small and not

well armed, however, deterrence can be attained on the cheap, with small forces. As for

dissuasion, it is a proactive concept whose

requirements will depend upon the countries or

coalitions to be influenced and the size of the

region to be covered. In troubled regions, it

often will require the United States to adopt a

visible military profile in ways that clearly

signal its firm intent to several countries. This

goal may not be readily accomplished with

small forces. In some places, the requirements

for dissuasion could be substantial, and they

could match or exceed those for deterrence.

Equally important, the requirements of

dissuasion may be different from those of

deterrence. For example, deterrence may require an overseas presence of 80,000 troops or

more in a region, and dissuasion an equal

number. But the exact mix of joint forces

deployed, and the associated measures that

animate their missions and activities, may

differ significantly between the two concepts. As

an illustration, deterrence may mandate large

ground forces at a single location. By contrast,

dissuasion may require fewer ground forces but

larger air and naval forces that are spread out

over a greater geographic space and that are

used proactively to wield targeted types of

influence. A strategy that combines deterrence

and dissuasion may require a mix of these two

deployment patterns. There is no simple, unchanging formula for calculating force needs

for all occasions. Each region must be addressed individually on its own merits, in ways

that adjust to unfolding geopolitical changes.

In Europe, the United States seems unlikely to station large forces for regional dissuasion alone or for local deterrence and defense.

But it likely will continue stationing such forces

for the purpose of motivating NATO and Europeans to become better at projecting power to

other regions and for working closely with U.S.

forces. Strategic calculations in the Persian Gulf

may be affected by a growing emphasis on

6 Strategic Forum No. 196, December 2002

a period of dynamic

change lies ahead in

regional geopolitics, and

the overseas presence

must change along with

it or risk sliding into

irrelevance
dissuasion, but current military presence is so

small that a posture similar to that of today

may be needed even if Saddam is removed from

power. The region most principally affected will

be Asia, where the current military presence is

both large and anchored in classical deterrence

concepts. A shift away from deterrence toward

dissuasion could have big implications for

Asian overseas presence. The exact impact may

not be easily determined today, but because

defense plans are future oriented, the issue

merits at least preliminary attention.

The pursuit of dissuasion will require U.S.

defense plans to view Asia as a whole, rather

than the current practice of focusing mostly on

Northeast Asia while treating the rest of the

Asian littoral as a backwater. The coming

geopolitical interaction with China and other

countries will take place heavily along this

entire littoral, not just in Northeast Asia and

Taiwan. Key U.S. military missions along this

littoral will include missile defense plus conventional power-projection in ways that are

flexible and adaptable, attuned to the goals of

dissuasion and assurance, while capable of

responding to a wide array of flashpoints,

crises, and potential conflicts. If the Korean

Peninsula standoff is resolved, the United States

likely will no longer need to deploy the same

ground forces (two Army brigades and two

Marine brigades) in Northeast Asia. But missions elsewhere along the vast Asian littoral

could require an equal number of air and

naval forces or even a greater number. The

QDR Report calls for shifting more naval

combatants to Asia and for creating better

bases, facilities, and infrastructure along the

Asian littoral. These are initial measures.

Further steps will require careful analysis.

Dissuasion and

Transformation

As it assesses dissuasion missions and

requirements, DOD will need to ensure that this

effort is interlocked with its transformation

agenda. Transformation involves more than

merely acquiring new information systems and

other technologies for U.S. forces in order to

enhance warfighting capabilities. Importantly, it

involves the design of future forces so that they

can carry out the entire defense strategy. Transformation concepts thus must be applied to

overseas presence and to alliance relationships

because they too will be changing. Dissuasion

particularly requires a clear understanding of

transformation imperatives; whereas deterrence

focuses on existing enemy capabilities, dissuasion aims to influence potential adversaries not

to acquire future capabilities and otherwise to

refrain from competing with U.S. forces.

To pursue this goal, DOD must view

dissuasion not in static terms but in the dynamic, future-oriented terms of transforming

the Armed Forces, so they are capable of defeating enemies in wartime and constraining

military options and geopolitical aims of future

adversaries. As a result, future U.S. overseas

presence must be at the front-end of transformation, which should be tailored not solely to

upgrade its warfighting capabilities but also to

strengthen alliances so that they too constrain

the force-building aspirations of potential

adversaries. What applies to overseas presence

also holds true for transformation of the entire

U.S. military posture as it is gradually but

steadily reconfigured for operations in the

information age.

Whereas U.S. forces will carry out dissuasion in the near term, transformed forces that

are different from today’s posture will pursue it

in the future. Transformation comes in two

forms: mid-term and long-term. Of the two,

mid-term transformation has more important

implications for dissuasion in the foreseeable

future. Mid-term transformation involves

efforts to blend new organizations, operational

concepts, and weapon systems emerging from

the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), and procurement pipelines. If

these efforts are properly tailored, they will

have the capacity to enhance the pursuit of

dissuasion against potential adversaries over

the critical next decade and beyond. Long-term

transformation mostly involves the pursuit of

entirely new technologies and weapon platforms that are now in the early stages of

RDT&E and will not be fielded for many years.

As these new systems come to fruition and enter

the inventory, they will help pursue dissuasion

in the long haul, when potential adversaries

may be different. The goal of dissuasion thus

enhances the premium attached to a skillful

mid-term transformation, while mandating

attentiveness to the long term as well.

As stated in the QDR Report, the DOD

transformation agenda is animated by such

operational goals as defending the homeland

and bases abroad, building interoperable and

effective command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (C4

ISR) systems, forcibly entering crisis zones against area-denial threats and

asymmetric strategies, denying the enemy

sanctuary and engaging its forces rapidly, and

making effective use of space. While the means

to pursue these goals must be heavily influenced by purely military calculations, the

requirements and dynamics of dissuasion

should enter the equation. To the extent that

future U.S. forces fulfill these operational goals,

they will be better able to win wars and to deter

and dissuade. While this obviously will be the

case for U.S. combat forces, acquisition of

modern C4

ISR systems and space systems likely

will have positive effects of their own. Among

other benefits, these assets will help give the

United States better awareness of how potential

adversaries are building their forces, thereby

constraining them from springing surprises on

the United States. Such effects need to be taken

into account in shaping the transformation

roadmaps being pursued by the military services and DOD as a whole.

The potential relationship between the

operational characteristics of transformed

forces and pursuit of dissuasion offers highleverage ways to enhance the effectiveness of

U.S. defense strategy. As noted above, successful

efforts to strengthen homeland security and

build missile defenses can greatly lessen the

incentives for adversaries to pursue terrorism

and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If transformed forces possess the

capacity to enter crisis zones in the face of stiff

opposition, adversaries will have fewer incentives to create access-denial capabilities in the

form of antiship missiles, strike aircraft, and

other similar assets. If U.S. air and missile

forces can perform countersanctuary bombardment and other deep-strike missions, adversaries will have less incentive to build integrated air defenses with double-digit

the potential relationship

between the operational

characteristics of transformed forces and pursuit

of dissuasion offers highleverage ways to enhance

the effectiveness of U.S.

defense strategy

No. 196, December 2002 Strategic Forum 7
surface-to-air missiles. If ground forces can

perform swift maneuvers and strike lethally,

adversaries will have fewer incentives to build

strong forces with armored capabilities for

aggression. Clearly, the act of acquiring such

information-era capabilities through transformation does not guarantee that potential

adversaries will refrain from pursuing threatening military competition and ambitions. But

it will help increase the costs of such efforts

and make them less likely to succeed. In this

important sense, it will enhance dissuasion.

The imperative need for information-era

transformation applies to the European allies

as well. Today, they have large military forces,

but they are unable to project power off the

European continent to long distances. The

Europeans and NATO need to launch a transformation effort to develop better forces and

capabilities for swift power projection, lethal

strike operations, and interoperability with U.S.

forces. The idea of NATO and the Europeans

creating a spearhead response force for such

purposes is a good step in the right direction. If

the Europeans can become better at performing

new missions outside their continent, this will

enhance deterrence and NATO warfighting

capabilities. In commensurate ways, it will

enhance dissuasion as well, for, in the final

analysis, the prospect of the United States and

Europe acting together on behalf of this purpose will have a greater impact than the United

States acting alone.

Conclusion

Is dissuasion an idea whose time has

come? Seemingly so, for the simple reason that

it provides a viable concept for coping adeptly

with new-era geopolitical dynamics—often in

better, more effective ways than such older

concepts as deterrence. This does not necessarily

mean that dissuasion should become the dominating theme of overseas presence and overall

U.S. defense strategy. Moreover, dissuasion may

prove costly in some places and inherently

difficult to achieve. But the emerging global

scene necessitates that dissuasion be given an

appropriate role, along with the other core

strategic goals of the QDR Report and the National Security Strategy. Determining how to do

so is the challenge facing DOD and the U.S.

Government, and it promises to be an interesting one because, like much of today’s world, it

requires fresh thinking and innovative decisions.

8 Strategic Forum No. 196, December 2002

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

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For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

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