TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

Classified By: 2381928 

Derived From: ODNI COL T-12 

Reason: 

Declassify On: 20391231 

TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Statistical Transparency Report Regarding use of 

National Security Authorities

Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2013

Declassified by DNI Clapper 06/23/2014
TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

Statistical Transparency Report Regarding use of National Security Authorities

June 26, 2014

Introduction.

In June 2013, President Obama directed the Intelligence Community to declassify and make 

public as much information as possible about certain sensitive U.S. Government surveillance 

programs while protecting sensitive classified intelligence and national security information. 

Over the past year, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has declassified and authorized 

the public release of thousands of pages of documents relating to the use of critical national 

security authorities. Today, and consistent with the DNI’s directive on August 29, 2013, we are

releasing information related to the use of these important tools, and will do so in the future on 

an annual basis. Accordingly, the DNI has declassified and directed the release of the following 

information for calendar year 2013.

Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2013 Regarding Use of Certain National Security Legal 

Authorities.

Titles I, III, IV, and VII of FISA.

Legal Authority Annual Number 

of Orders

Estimated Number of Targets

Affected 

FISA Orders based on probable cause 

(Title I and III of FISA, Sections 703 

and 704 of FISA)

1,767 orders 1,144

Section 702 of FISA 1 order 89,138

FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace 

(Title IV of FISA)

131 orders 319

It is important to provide some additional context to the above statistics. 

• Targets. Within the Intelligence Community, the term “target” has multiple meanings. 

For example, “target” could be an individual person, a group, or an organization 

composed of multiple individuals or a foreign power that possesses or is likely to 

communicate foreign intelligence information that the U.S. government is authorized to 

acquire by the above-referenced laws. Some laws require that the government obtain a 

Court order specifying the communications facilities used by a “target” to be subject to 

intelligence collection. Although the government may have legal authority to conduct 

intelligence collection against multiple communications facilities used by the target, the 

user of the facilities - the “target” - is only counted once in the above figures. 

Declassified by DNI Clapper 06/23/2014
TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

• 702 Targets. In addition to the explanation of target above, in the context of Section 

702 the term “target” is generally used to refer to the act of intentionally directing 

intelligence collection at a particular person, a group, or organization. For example, the 

statutory provisions of Section 702 state that the Government “may not intentionally 

target any person known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United 

States” (emphasis added), among other express limitations. Under Section 702, the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approves Certifications as opposed to 

individualized orders. Thus, the number of 702 “targets” reflects an estimate of the 

number of known users of particular facilities (sometimes referred to as selectors) 

subject to intelligence collection under those Certifications. This estimate is based on 

the information readily available to the Intelligence Community to identify unique 

targets – users, whose identity may be unknown, but who are reasonably believed to 

use the particular facility from outside the United States and who are reasonably 

believed to be non-United States persons. For example, foreign intelligence targets 

often communicate using several different email accounts. Unless the Intelligence 

Community has information that multiple email accounts are used by the same target, 

each of those accounts would be counted separately in these figures. On the other 

hand, if the Intelligence Community is aware that the accounts are all used by the same 

target, as defined above, they would be counted as one target.

• Relationship of Orders to Targets. In some cases, one order can by its terms affect 

multiple targets (as with Section 702). Alternatively, a target may be the subject of 

multiple orders, as noted below. 

• Amendments and Renewals. The FISC may amend an order one or more times after it 

has been issued. For example, an order may be amended to add a newly discovered 

account used by the target. To avoid redundant counting, these statistics do not count 

such amendments separately. Moreover, some orders may be renewed multiple times 

during the calendar year (for example, the FISA statute provides that a Section 704 FISA 

Order against a U.S. person target may last no longer than 90 days but permits the order 

to be renewed). The statistics count each such renewal as a separate order. 

Title V of FISA (Business Records). 

We are reporting information about the Government’s use of the FISA Business Records 

provision (Title V) separately because this authority has been used in two distinct ways – 

collection of business records to obtain information about a specific subject and collection of 

business records in bulk. Accordingly, in the interest of transparency, we have decided to 

clarify the extent to which individuals are affected by each use. In addition, instead of reporting 

on the number of Business Record orders, the government is reporting on the number of 

applications submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court because the FISC may 

issue several orders to different recipients based upon a particular application. 

Declassified by DNI Clapper 06/23/2014
TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

Legal Authority Annual Number of 

Applications Estimated Number Affected

FISA Business Records (Title V 

of FISA)

178 172: The number of 

individuals, entities, or foreign 

powers subject to a business 

records application to obtain 

information about a specific 

subject

423: The number of selectors

approved to be queried under 

the NSA telephony metadata 

program

248: The number of known or 

presumed U.S. persons who 

were the subject of queries of 

information collected in bulk or 

who were subject to a business 

records application. 

National Security Letters.

Finally, we are reporting information on the Government’s use of National Security Letters 

(NSLs). On April 30, 2014, the Department of Justice released its Annual Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act Report to Congress. That report, which is available here reports on the number 

of requests made for certain information concerning different United States persons pursuant 

to NSL authorities during calendar year 2013. In addition to those figures, today we are 

reporting (1) the total number of NSLs issued for all persons, and (2) the total number of

requests for information contained within those NSLs. For example, one NSL seeking subscriber 

information from one provider may identify three e-mail addresses, all of which are relevant to 

the same pending investigation and each is considered a “request.” 

We are reporting the annual number of requests rather than “targets” for multiple reasons. 

First, the FBI’s systems are configured to comply with Congressional reporting requirements, 

which do not require the FBI to track the number of individuals or organizations that are the 

subject of an NSL. Even if the FBI systems were configured differently, it would still be difficult 

to identify the number of specific individuals or organizations that are the subjects of NSLs. 

One reason for this is that the subscriber information returned to the FBI in response to an NSL

may identify, for example, one subscriber for three accounts or it may identify different 

subscribers for each account. In some cases this occurs because the identification information 

provided by the subscriber to the provider may not be true. For example, a subscriber may use 

a fictitious name or alias when creating the account. Thus, in many instances, the FBI never 

identifies the actual subscriber of a facility. In other cases this occurs because individual 

Declassified by DNI Clapper 06/23/2014
TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

TOP SECRET//NOFORN 

subscribers may identify themselves differently for each account, e.g., inclusion of middle 

name, middle initial, etc., when creating an account. 

We also note that the actual number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an 

NSL is different than the number of NSL requests. The FBI often issues NSLs under different 

legal authorities, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for the same individual or organization. The FBI may also serve multiple 

NSLs for an individual for multiple facilities, e.g., multiple e-mail accounts, landline telephone 

numbers, cellular phone numbers, etc. The number of requests, consequently, is significantly 

larger than the number of individuals or organizations that are the subjects of the NSLs. 

Legal Authority Annual Number of 

NSLs Issued

Annual Number of 

Requests for 

Information

National Security Letters issued 

pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 

U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709

19,212 38,832 

This information will be available at the website of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI); and ODNI’s public website dedicated to fostering greater public visibility 

into the intelligence activities of the Government, ICOntheRecord.tumblr.com. 

Declassified by DNI Clapper 06/23/2014