14-1258

United States v. Taleek Brooks

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

4 on the 28 day of May, two thousand fifteen. th

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

8 PETER W. HALL,

9 Circuit Judges.

10

11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

13 Appellee,

14

15 -v.- 14-1258

16

17 TALEEK BROOKS, 

18 Defendant-Appellant.

19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

20

21 FOR APPELLANT: Thomas F.X. Dunn, New York, New

22 York.

23

24 FOR APPELLEE: Robert T. Polemeni (with David

25 C. James, on the brief), for

26 Kelly T. Currie, Acting United

27 States Attorney for the Eastern

1
1 District of New York, Brooklyn,

2 New York.

3

4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

5 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Mauskopf, J.).

6

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

8 AND DECREED that the appeal be DISMISSED. 

9

10 Taleek Brooks appeals from the judgment of the United

11 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

12 (Mauskopf, J.), sentencing him to 50 years’ imprisonment

13 followed by a life term of supervised release, after he pled

14 guilty to sexual exploitation of a child and distribution of

15 child pornography. We assume the parties’ familiarity with

16 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues

17 presented for review. 

18

19 In brief, Brooks: possessed thousands of videos and

20 images depicting violent child pornography, made those

21 videos and images available for others to download over the

22 internet throughout a seven-year period, produced grotesque

23 child pornography in a classroom of the public elementary

24 school where he worked as a teacher’s aide, and repeatedly

25 sexually assaulted a ten-year-old boy who attended that

26 elementary school.

27

28 A 2012 grand jury indictment charged Brooks with seven

29 counts of sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18

30 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); four counts of distribution of

31 child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2);

32 and one count of possession of child pornography, in

33 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). In February 2013,

34 Brooks pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one

35 exploitation count and one distribution count. The plea

36 agreement recited the government’s estimation that “the

37 effective Guidelines range is 15 - 50 years,” and

38 acknowledged the statutory maximum sentence for each count

39 to which Brooks was pleading: 30 years’ imprisonment for the

40 exploitation count, and 20 years’ imprisonment for the

41 distribution count. The plea agreement also included an

42 appeal waiver “in the event the Court imposes a term of

43 imprisonment of 50 years or less.” 

44

45 After pleading guilty and before sentencing, Brooks

46 filed a pro se letter explaining to the district court that

47 he had pled guilty only because he lacked confidence in his

2
1 counsel. In response to Brooks’s letter, the district court

2 relieved defense counsel in July 2013, appointed a new

3 attorney, and adjourned the sentencing date so that Brooks

4 and his new attorney could discuss whether to move to

5 withdraw the plea. The new attorney informed the court in

6 November 2013 that Brooks had decided against moving to

7 withdraw his guilty plea, and in December the district court

8 accepted the guilty plea.

9

10 At Brooks’s sentencing, the district court found that

11 the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines advisory range was 30 to 50

12 years’ imprisonment, and sentenced Brooks to 50 years’

13 imprisonment, which was the statutory maximum.

14

15 On appeal, Brooks argues that: (1) he should be

16 released from the appeal waiver in his plea agreement

17 because his counsel was ineffective in advising him to enter

18 the plea agreement, and (2) his sentence is substantively

19 unreasonable. 

20

21 “When faced with a claim for ineffective assistance of

22 counsel on direct appeal, we may: (1) decline to hear the

23 claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part

24 of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

25 to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district

26 court for necessary factfinding; or (3) decide the claim on

27 the record before us.” United States v. Adams, 768 F.3d

28 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Tarbell,

29 728 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2013)). Mindful that the first

30 option is generally preferred, see United States v.

31 Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2006), we dismiss that

32 claim without prejudice to Brooks’s right to advance it in a

33 collateral proceeding under 

34 § 2255, or otherwise.

35

36 Under such circumstance, we will provisionally enforce

37 the appeal waiver “unless and until [the defendant] prevails

38 (by a habeas petition) in proving that his appeal waiver

39 should be voided because he received ineffective assistance

40 of counsel.” Oladimeji, 463 F.3d at 155; see also United

41 States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2004). Because the

42 waiver remains intact for the purposes of this appeal, we

43 need not reach Brooks’s challenge to the substantive

44 reasonableness of his sentence. 

45

46 Even if the waiver is otherwise unenforceable, see

47 United States v. Goodman, 165 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1999),

3
1 Brooks would not be entitled to relief because his

2 sentencing challenge fails on the merits. “The district

3 courts have discretion to select an appropriate sentence,

4 and in doing so are statutorily bound to consider the

5 factors listed in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), including the

6 advisory Guidelines range.” United States v. Cavera, 550

7 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). “[O]ur substantive review of

8 a sentence is akin to review under an abuse-of-discretion

9 standard,” whereby a district court abuses its discretion if

10 its sentence is “based on an erroneous view of the law or on

11 a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or a

12 decision that cannot be located within the range of

13 permissible decisions.” United States v. Park, 758 F.3d

14 193, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and

15 alteration omitted). Here, the district court did not abuse

16 its discretion by imposing a 50-year sentence, at the top of

17 the effective Guidelines range. After carefully considering

18 the Section 3553(a) factors, the district court determined

19 that such a term of imprisonment was sufficient, but not

20 greater than necessary to serve the purposes of sentencing. 

21 See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.

22 2010). 

23

24 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in

25 Brooks’s other arguments, we hereby DISMISS the appeal.

26

27 FOR THE COURT:

28 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

29

4