IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Sheerer, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 232 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: March 10, 2023

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: October 10, 2023

Presently before this Court is the application of Jessica A. Fiscus, 

Esquire (Counsel) for leave to withdraw as counsel for Joseph Sheerer (Parolee). 

Parolee has filed an amended petition for review of the decision of the Pennsylvania 

Parole Board (Board) affirming its prior decision that recommitted him as a 

convicted parole violator (CPV) and denied credit for time that he served at liberty 

on parole. Counsel seeks leave to withdraw on the grounds that Parolee’s amended 

petition for review is without merit. For the following reasons, we grant Counsel’s

application for leave to withdraw as counsel and affirm the Board’s order.

I. Background

Parolee was initially sentenced to a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years’

imprisonment following guilty pleas to four counts of burglary, 18 Pa. C.S. 
2

§3502(a), and two counts of attempted burglary, 18 Pa. C.S. §901(a). Certified 

Record (C.R.) at 1. With an effective date of August 10, 2012, Parolee’s minimum 

sentence date was calculated to be August 10, 2017, and his maximum sentence date 

was set as August 10, 2022. Id. at 3. On June 6, 2018, the Board rendered a decision

granting Parolee parole, and he was released from prison on June 25, 2018. Id. at 7-

10. At the time that he was released, there were 4 years, 1 month, and 16 days (1,057 

days) remaining on Parolee’s sentence. Id. at 98-99.

On January 4, 2019, the Medford Township Police arrested Parolee in 

Burlington County, New Jersey, and he was charged with a number of counts of 

burglary and theft, and one count of possessing or viewing child pornography. C.R.

at 24, 28, 32-87. On January 9, 2019, the Board issued a warrant to commit and 

detain Parolee based on the new charges. Id. at 20. Parolee ultimately pleaded guilty 

to one count each of endangering abuse/neglect of a child by a non-caretaker and 

burglary, graded as third degree felonies; all of the remaining charges were 

dismissed. Id. at 28. On May 10, 2019, Parolee was sentenced to serve three years 

in state prison for his new convictions, with credit from January 5, 2019, to May 9, 

2019 (125 days). Id. at 28, 30. On November 4, 2020, Parolee was returned to the 

Board’s custody. Id. at 104.

By Waiver of Revocation Hearing and Counsel/Admission Form 

executed November 16, 2020, Parolee “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

admit[ted]” his entry of guilty pleas to the two new convictions. C.R. at 22-23. 

Parolee also admitted that he was advised of his right to a parole revocation hearing 

and counsel at that hearing, but “[w]ith full knowledge and understanding of these 

rights,” he waived his “right to a parole revocation hearing and counsel at that 

hearing . . . of [his] own free will, without any promise, threat[,] or coercion.” Id. at 
3

23. Parolee also “underst[ood] and agree[d] that this admission is binding and may 

only be withdrawn if [he] submit[ted] a written withdrawal to [his] supervision agent

within ten (10) calendar days of the date written above.” Id.

In a decision recorded on December 29, 2020, and mailed on January 

22, 2021, the Board revoked Parolee’s parole and recommitted him as a CPV to 

serve 18 months’ backtime. C.R. at 100-01. Additionally, the Board denied Parolee

credit for the time that he spent at liberty on parole because his new conviction was 

“the same or similar to the original offense.” Id. at 101. By adding the 4 years, 1 

month, and 16 days (1,057 days) remaining on Parolee’s original sentence to his 

custody for return date of November 4, 2020, and the backtime imposed, the Board 

calculated a new minimum date for Parolee’s sentence of May 4, 2022, and a new 

maximum sentence date of December 20, 2024. Id. at 98, 102-04.

In an administrative remedies form dated February 18, 2021, and 

received by the Board on March 1, 2021, Parolee asserted that he did not make a 

knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to a revocation hearing 

because he was “misguided” by a parole agent and, as a result, his due process rights 

were violated. C.R. at 108-09. Additionally, Parolee asserted that he did not receive 

a timely revocation hearing as it was not held within 120 days of his new conviction 

in New Jersey. Id. at 109. Finally, Parolee complained that all of his street time was 

taken and “then added to his tail” even though he “sat in state jail for 22 months with 

a detainer on him.” Id. On August 16, 2021, January 3, 2022, and January 14, 2022, 

Parolee submitted additional correspondence seeking relief regarding the Board’s 

revocation of his parole. Id. at 111-22.
4

On February 18, 2022,1the Board mailed Parolee a decision disposing 

of his February 18, 2021 administrative remedies form in which it stated the 

following, in pertinent part:

Before addressing the merits of your administrative 

appeal, the Board also received correspondence from you 

on August 16, 2021, January 3, 2022, and January 14, 

2022. Considering that your 30-day deadline for filing 

administrative relief ended on February 21, 2021, any 

issues raised in the correspondence received after that date 

need not be addressed. 37 Pa. Code §73.1.[2]

1 Three days prior, in a decision recorded on February 15, 2022, within its discretion, the 

Board denied Parolee reparole, and directed that he is “to serve [his] unexpired maximum sentence, 

12/20/2024, due to [his] negative interest in parole.” C.R. at 106-07.

2 Section 73.1(a)(1) and (4), and (b)(1) and (3) of the Board’s regulations states, in relevant 

part:

(a) Appeals.

(1) An interested party, by counsel unless unrepresented, 

may appeal a revocation decision. Appeals shall be received at the 

Board’s Central Office within 30 days of the mailing date of the 

Board’s order . . . .

* * *

(4) Second or subsequent appeals and appeals which are out 

of time under these rules will not be received.

(b) Petitions for administrative review.

(1) A parolee, by counsel unless unrepresented, may petition 

for administrative review under this subsection of determinations 

relating to revocation decisions which are not otherwise appealable 

under subsection (a). Petitions for administrative review shall be 

received at the Board’s Central Office within 30 days of the mailing 

date of the Board’s determination. . . .

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

Next, the record reveals that on November 16, 2020, 

you were presented with a notice of hearing and charges 

indicating that you suffered a new criminal conviction in 

the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County[,] at 

docket number 19-03-00347. On November 16, 2020, you

signed a form waiving your right to a revocation hearing 

and counsel, and admitted to the veracity of the new 

conviction listed on the notice. The waiver/admission 

form you signed indicates that you chose to take said 

action of your own free will, without promise, threat, or 

coercion, and that your waiver/admission was knowing 

and voluntary. The form you signed also gave you ten 

calendar days to withdraw the waiver/admission form. 

There is no indication that you withdrew your 

waiver/admission within the established grace period. As

such, the Board acted within its authority to revoke your 

parole for the offense indicated based on the 

waiver/admission. Moreover, because you waived your

right to a revocation hearing, you[r] claim regarding 

timeliness is also waived.

Next, the decision on whether to grant or deny a 

CPV credit for time at liberty on parole is purely a matter 

of discretion. The Prisons and Parole Code [(Code)]

* * *

(3) Second or subsequent petitions for administrative review 

and petitions for administrative review which are out of time under 

this part will not be received.

37 Pa. Code §73.1(a)(1) and (4), (b)(1) and (3). Accordingly, to the extent that Parolee raises 

claims herein that were not raised in his first February 18, 2021 administrative remedies form, they 

have been waived for purposes of appeal. Id.; see also Mendez v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation 

and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 912 C.D. 2017, filed May 30, 2018), slip op. at 8-9 (holding that an 

issue raised by a parolee in a subsequent untimely petition for administrative review was waived 

under Section 73.1 of the Board’s regulations); Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (“As used in this rule, 

‘non-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an unreported memorandum opinion of the 

Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. Nonprecedential decisions . . . may be cited 

for their persuasive value.”).
6

authorizes the Board to grant or deny credit for time at 

liberty on parole for certain criminal offenses. 61 Pa. C.S. 

§6138(a)(2.1). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Pittman v. P[ennsylvania] B[oard] of Prob[ation] [and]

Parole[, 159 A.3d 466 (Pa. 2017)], the Board must

articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny a CPV 

credit for time spent at liberty on parole. In this case, the 

Board articulated that you were denied such credit because 

you were convicted of a new offense that was [the] same 

or similar to the original offense thereby warranting the 

denial of credit for the time spent at liberty on parole. The 

record reveals that while you were on parole for multiple 

counts of Burglary, your new conviction resulting in your 

revocation was also, in part, for Burglary. Thus, the 

reason provided is supported by the record and the panel 

finds it sufficient to deny credit for the time spent at liberty 

on parole in this case.

C.R. at 124-25. 

On March 15, 2022, Parolee filed a pro se petition for review and 

shortly thereafter, the Public Defender of Erie County was appointed to represent 

him and Counsel entered her appearance. On June 3, 2022, Counsel filed an 

amended petition for review and, on August 15, 2022, Counsel filed the instant 

petition for leave to withdraw along with a no-merit letter based on her belief that 

Parolee’s appeal is without merit. This matter is now before us for disposition. 

II. Application for Leave to Withdraw

Counsel seeking to withdraw as appointed counsel must conduct a 

zealous review of the case and submit a no-merit letter to this Court detailing the 

nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues the 

petitioner seeks to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit, 
7

and requesting permission to withdraw.3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927, 

928 (Pa. 1988); Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d 

19, 24-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009). The no-merit letter must include “‘substantial reasons for concluding that a 

petitioner’s arguments are meritless.’” Zerby, 964 A.2d at 962 (citation omitted). 

In addition, court-appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw 

representation must: (1) notify the petitioner of the request to withdraw; (2) furnish 

the petitioner with a copy of a brief or no-merit letter; and (3) advise the petitioner 

of his right to retain new counsel or raise any new points that he might deem worthy 

of consideration. Turner, 544 A.2d at 928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 22. If counsel 

satisfies these technical requirements, this Court must then conduct an independent 

review of the merits of the case. Turner, 544 A.2d at 928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 25. 

If this Court determines the petitioner’s claims are without merit, counsel will be 

permitted to withdraw, and the petitioner will be denied relief. Turner, 544 A.2d at 

928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 27. 

Upon review, Counsel’s no-merit letter satisfies the technical 

requirements of Turner. Counsel states that she has conducted a review of the 

record, applicable statutes, and case law. She sets forth the issues that Parolee wishes 

to have reviewed in this appeal, specifically: (1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, 

3 Where there is a constitutional right to counsel, court-appointed counsel seeking to

withdraw must submit a brief in accord with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), referred 

to as an Anders brief, that (i) provides a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations 

to the record; (ii) refers to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; 

(iii) sets forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (iv) states counsel’s reasons 

for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 

2009); Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 25-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009). Where, as here, the petitioner has only a statutory, rather than a constitutional, right to 

counsel, appointed counsel may submit a no-merit letter instead of an Anders brief. Hughes, 

977 A.2d at 25-26.
8

and intelligently waive his right to a revocation hearing and to counsel present at 

that hearing; (2) the Board did not afford Parolee a timely revocation hearing within 

120 days of his new conviction; (3) the Board erred in denying Parolee credit for the 

time spent at liberty on parole; and (4) the Board erred when it refused to run 

Parolee’s backtime concurrently with his New Jersey sentence in violation of the 

separation of powers. Counsel provides a thorough analysis as to why these issues 

lack merit, citing the applicable statutes, case law, and the record in support.

First, Counsel explains that the Board correctly found that Parolee

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to a revocation hearing and 

to counsel. Counsel cites well-settled case law explaining that execution of the 

Board’s forms is sufficient to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver. Prebella 

v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 942 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2008). Second, because Parolee had already waived his right to a revocation hearing, 

he cannot later allege a failure to conduct a timely hearing. Fisher v. Pennsylvania 

Board of Probation and Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Third, the 

Board has the discretion to credit a nonviolent CPV with street time, but it is not 

required to do so. Section 6138(a)(2) of the Code, 61 Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(2); Pittman, 

159 A.3d at 473. The Board provided a contemporaneous reason for its decision to 

not award Parolee credit for street time, in compliance with Pittman. Id. Fourth,

Counsel explains that the Board did not err in running the remainder of Parolee’s 

original sentence consecutive with the New Jersey sentence on his new convictions. 

Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 171 A.3d 759, 761 n.7 (Pa. 

2017).4

4 Counsel also notes that Parolee waived his additional claim challenging the Board’s 

alleged failure to conduct a timely detention hearing by failing to raise the issue in his February 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
9

Counsel has reviewed the Board’s recalculation of Parolee’s maximum 

sentence date, verifies that it is not an alteration of a judicially imposed sentence,

and concludes that it was correctly calculated. Counsel further explains that a 

parolee who is convicted of a crime while on parole must be recommitted to serve 

the unserved portion of his original maximum sentence and may be denied credit for 

street time under Section 6138(a)(2) of the Code. The Board has the discretion to 

credit a nonviolent CPV with street time, but it is not required to do so under Pittman, 

159 A.3d at 473.

Based on her review, Counsel concludes that Parolee’s appeal to this 

Court lacks merit, and she requests permission for leave to withdraw. Counsel 

provided Parolee with a copy of the no-merit letter and her request to withdraw. She 

advised Parolee of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se. As we are 

satisfied that Counsel has discharged her responsibility in complying with the 

technical requirements to withdraw from representation, we shall conduct an 

independent review to determine whether Parolee’s petition for review lacks merit.5

III. Independent Review

Parolee first claims that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waive his right to a revocation hearing and to have counsel present at 

that hearing. As this Court has summarized: “In order to effectuate a knowing and 

18, 2021 administrative review request. Section 73.1 of the Board’s regulations; Mesko v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 245 A.3d 1174, 1180-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); see

also supra, note 2.

5 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether the Board’s adjudication was in accordance with law, and whether necessary findings 

were supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 

Pa. C.S. §704; Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 70 n.4 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013).
10

voluntary waiver in Parole Board cases, all that is required is for the Board to show 

that it followed its own regulations and provided the necessary information to the 

offender prior to the offender signing the written waiver form.” Prebella, 942 A.2d 

at 261 (citations omitted). Execution of the Board’s form by a parolee is sufficient

proof. Id. A parolee’s waiver of counsel is deemed informed and voluntary if the 

parolee is informed of right to counsel, is provided the name and address of the 

appropriate public defender, and gives his written statement that he has been fully 

advised of this right and waived it of his own free will. Id. 

Here, on November 16, 2020, Parolee signed a Notice of Charges and 

Hearing for a revocation hearing to be held on November 20, 2020, and this 

document listed his new convictions, the location of the hearing, and provided the 

name and address of the Public Defender in that county. C.R. at 21. That same day, 

Parolee also signed the Waiver of Revocation Hearing and Counsel/Admission Form

“waiv[ing] these rights of [his] own free will, without any promise, threat or 

coercion.” Id. at 22-23. An agent witnessed the signing of each of these documents. 

Id. at 21-23. Parolee did not retract his admission within the ten-day grace period. 

As a result, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Parolee made a 

knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a revocation hearing.

Parolee next claims that he was not afforded a timely revocation hearing 

within 120 days of his new conviction. As indicated, Parolee waived his right to a 

revocation hearing and only later sought to raise this claim in his request for 

administrative review. C.R. at 21-23, 108-09. Based upon the express provisions 

of Section 71.4(1)6 of the Board’s regulations, Parolee waived his right to challenge 

6 Section 71.4(1) of the Board’s regulations states, in pertinent part:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
11

the timeliness of his revocation hearing when he expressly waived his right to have 

a hearing in the first place. See Fisher, 62 A.3d at 1075 (“[O]nce a parolee waives 

his right to a parole revocation hearing, he is precluded from subsequently 

challenging the hearing’s timeliness.”). 

Indeed, as this Court explained in a similar circumstance:

Here, the record indicates that the Board advised [the 

p]etitioner . . . that it intended to conduct a revocation 

hearing. That same day, [the p]etitioner admitted to being 

convicted of the new criminal charges, executed the 

Board’s form, and waived his right to a revocation hearing. 

The form [that the p]etitioner executed expressly stated 

that he chose to take said action of his own free will, 

without promise, threat, or coercion. Therefore, pursuant 

to this Court’s decision in Fisher, [the p]etitioner is 

precluded from challenging the timeliness of his 

revocation hearing because he voluntarily waived his right 

to the same.

Cartegena v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 418 

C.D. 2016, filed January 12, 2017), slip op. at 7. As a result, based on the foregoing, 

Parolee waived his claim regarding the timeliness of his revocation hearing.

Moreover, on the merits, the record in this case demonstrates that 

Parolee’s revocation hearing was held within 120 days after he was returned to 

(1) A revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days from the date 

the Board received official verification of the plea of guilty . . . 

except as follows:

(i) If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of the 

Department of Corrections, such as confinement out-of-State, . . . 

where the parolee has not waived the right to a revocation hearing 

by a panel . . . , the revocation hearing shall be held within 120 

days of the official verification of the return of the parolee to a 

State correctional facility.

37 Pa. Code §71.4(1)(i) (emphasis added).
12

custody in the Commonwealth from the New Jersey authorities. As indicated, 

Parolee’s Custody for Return date was November 4, 2020, and the revocation 

hearing that he waived on November 16, 2020, was scheduled for November 20, 

2020. See C.R. at 21, 23, 104. Accordingly, Parolee’s claim that the Board erred in 

failing to conduct a timely revocation hearing is patently without merit. 

Parolee next claims that the Board erred in denying credit for the time 

that he spent at liberty on parole. Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Code grants the Board 

the discretion to award credit to a CPV recommitted for the reasons stated therein. 

Pittman, 159 A.3d at 473.7 When exercising this discretion, the Board must conduct 

an “individual assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding [a parolee’s] 

parole revocation.” Id. at 474. Further, the Board must “articulate the basis for its 

decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time served at liberty on parole.” Id. 

Although the Board has broad discretion to grant or deny such credit, its decision is 

subject to our review, and must be reversed or vacated as an abuse of discretion, 

where the Board has based its denial of credit on an erroneous premise. Id. at 474-

7 Specifically, Section 6138(a)(2.1) states:

(2.1) The [B]oard may, in its discretion, award credit to an offender 

recommitted under paragraph (2) for the time spent at liberty on 

parole, unless any of the following apply:

(i) The crime committed during the period of parole 

or while delinquent on parole is a crime of violence or a 

crime listed under 42 Pa. C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to 

registration of sexual offenders) or I2 (relating to continued 

registration of sexual offenders).

(ii) The offender was recommitted under [S]ection 

6143 (relating to early parole of offenders subject to Federal 

removal order).

61 Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(2.1).
13

75. Moreover, “the reason the Board gives does not have to be extensive and a single 

sentence explanation is likely sufficient in most instances.” Id. at 475 n.12. Where 

the Board denies credit for the time served at liberty on parole, that time is applied 

to the original maximum sentence date to create a new maximum sentence date. 

Armbruster v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007).

In the instant case, Parolee was not convicted of a crime of violence, 

did not commit a crime requiring sex offender registration, and was not subject to a 

federal removal order. See Section 6138(a)(2.1)(i) and (ii) of the Code. Thus, 

although Parolee qualified for credit under the Code, it was within the Board’s 

discretion to grant or deny him credit for the time that he spent at liberty on parole.

See id.; Pittman, 159 A.3d at 473. The Board chose to deny credit and 

contemporaneously articulated Parolee’s commission of burglary as the crime 

underlying both his original sentence and his recommitment as a CPV as the reason 

for denying credit. C.R. at 101.

The foregoing Board reasoning constitutes a valid basis to deny credit

upon Parolee’s recommitment. See Smoak v. Talaber, 193 A.3d 1160, 1164 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that the Board’s stated reason of “unresolved drug and 

alcohol issues” is a valid basis to deny credit under the Pittman standard); see also 

King v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 875 C.D. 

2019, filed November 10, 2020), slip op. at 7-8 (“[W]e have recognized that the 

Board’s statement that a CPV has a ‘prior history of supervision failures’ is sufficient 

to meet the Pittman standard as long as that statement is supported in the record.”) 

(citations omitted). Because the Board’s stated basis for denying credit is amply 
14

supported by the record herein, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the Board’s 

decision to deny credit for the time that Parolee spent at liberty on parole.

Finally, Parolee asserts that he should receive credit on his original 

sentence for the time that he served on his new convictions in New Jersey. However, 

the New Jersey judgment of sentence merely indicates that the sentences imposed 

on his two new New Jersey convictions are merely to run concurrently with each 

other, and that his presentence period of confinement was credited to his new New 

Jersey sentence. See C.R. at 28, 31.

As this Court has observed:

“The general rule governing the allocation of credit 

for time served awaiting disposition of new criminal 

charge was established by our Supreme Court in Gaito v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation [and] Parole, [412 A.2d 

568 (Pa. 1980)].” Armbruster[, 919 A.2d at 352]. 

Pursuant to Gaito, “this Court consistently held that once 

a parolee is sentenced on a new criminal offense, the 

period of time between arrest and sentencing, when bail is 

not satisfied [on the new criminal charge], must be applied 

toward the new sentence, and not to the original sentence.” 

Armbruster, 919 A.2d at 352.

Stroud v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 196 A.3d 667, 674 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018) (footnotes omitted). The record in this case shows that Parolee 

received credit on the new New Jersey convictions for the 125 days that he was 

confined between his arrest to the date that he entered his guilty pleas on the new 

out-of-state charges. See C.R. at 30. Because Parolee received credit toward his 

new New Jersey sentence from the date of his arrest until his return to Pennsylvania’s 

custody, the Board correctly refused to award this time to his original Pennsylvania 

sentence. See Gaito; see also Stroud, 196 A.3d at 673-74 (holding that the Board 

did not have authority under the Code to retrieve a parolee from federal custody 
15

following his arrest on federal charges to conduct a revocation hearing and to allow 

him to serve backtime on his original sentence while he was still in federal custody).

Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as 

counsel, and we affirm the Board’s February 18, 2022 decision affirming its 

December 29, 2020 recommitment decision.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Sheerer, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 232 C.D. 2022

: 

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of October, 2023, Jessica A. Fiscus, Esquire’s 

application for leave to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED, and the decision of the 

Pennsylvania Parole Board dated February 18, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge