ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 1 

I

n the past few months, China has announced a series of major reforms 

to the organizational structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): 

the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been revamped, the four 

general departments dissolved, new service headquarters created, and five 

new theater commands established in place of the seven military regions 

(MRs). These changes are part of a sweeping transformation of PLA institutions, force structure, and policy that will be ongoing through 2020. In 

pursuing these reforms, China’s leaders hope both to tighten central political control over a force that was seen as increasingly corrupt and to build 

the PLA into a credible joint warfighting entity. Yet important obstacles 

remain, and it may be years before the implications of these reforms come 

into full view.

Major Organizational Reforms

Prior to the reforms, the PLA’s organization was based on a model imported 

from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.1 Its three main pillars included the 

following: (1) three services (army, navy, and air force) and the Second Artillery Force (SAF), an independent branch responsible for China’s conventional 

and nuclear missiles; (2) four general departments—General Staff Department 

(GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department 

(GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD); and (3) seven geographic MRs, listed in protocol order: Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, 

Chengdu, and Lanzhou, with subsidiary units drawn from the services. The 

CMC stood atop these pillars and exercised the highest command authority in 

the PLA.2

 This structure is depicted in figure 1.

China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

Assessing PLA Organizational 

Reforms

by Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Authors

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of 

the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs (CSCMA), Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University. Dr. Joel 

Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in 

CSCMA.

Key Points

◆ The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) is undertaking its most 

significant restructuring since 

1949, including changes to all of 

the PLA’s main organizational pillars—the Central Military Commission, services, and theaters.

◆ The reforms are modeled partly 

on the U.S. military structure, 

where combatant commanders 

lead operations and the services 

train and equip troops. However, 

the PLA remains a Leninist military 

responsible for defending Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) rule.

◆ The reforms aim to tighten CCP 

supervision over a force seen as 

corrupt and unaccountable and 

to enhance the PLA’s ability to 

conduct joint operations across 

multiple domains.

◆ Theater commanders will be able 

to develop force packages drawn 

from all the services, and a new 

Strategic Support Force will provide C4ISR support.

◆ The reforms will create a shortterm organizational disruption, 

but may enable more effective 

joint warfighting over the long 

term. The PLA will have to overcome significant obstacles such as 

continued ground force dominance 

and inter-service rivalry to make 

the reforms succeed.

April 2016

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 294 ndupress.ndu.edu

Over the years, the PLA made only incremental 

changes to this system. Past reforms revised the MR system (most recently in 1985), created new general departments (the GAD in 1998), and added an independent 

branch (the SAF in 1966).3

 Yet due in part to bureaucratic resistance to more comprehensive changes, the 

PLA remained a fundamentally ground force–centric 

organization that lent itself to single-service operations. 

A key weakness was an outdated command and control 

(C2) structure in which the services, rather than theater 

commanders, possessed operational authority during 

peacetime. This hindered the development of a force capable of conducting modern joint operations.

In late 2015 and early 2016, CMC chairman and 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi 

Jinping announced the most wide-ranging restructuring 

of the PLA since 1949. The reforms included the following changes to the PLA’s three main organizational 

pillars (see figure 2):4

Service Reforms. On December 31, 2015, Xi announced three changes to the services: (1) establishment 

of national- and theater-level headquarters for the ground 

forces, which previously had been collectively led and administered by the general departments; (2) elevation of 

the SAF to the status of a full-fledged service renamed 

the PLA Rocket Force; and (3) establishment of a new 

Strategic Support Force (SSF), whose missions likely include operations in the “information domain,” including 

space, cyber, and electronic warfare activities.5 The SSF is 

not a service per se, but rather an independent force along 

the same lines as the former SAF.6

CMC Reforms. On January 11, 2016, Xi revealed 

that the general departments had been replaced by a 

new CMC structure composed of 15 departments, offices, and commissions. The GSD’s extensive portfolio 

was dispersed among several new CMC departments. 

Its core C2 function was transferred to a new Joint Staff 

Department ( JSD), while its sub-departments responsible for training, mobilization, and strategic planning 

each became first-level departments directly under the 

CMC. The GPD, GLD, and GAD became the CMC 

Political Work, Logistics Support, and Equipment 

Figure 1. PLA Structure Prior to Reforms

Ministry of 

National Defense

Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members)

CMC Subsidiary Organs

General Oce

Discipline Inspection Commission

Audit Bureau

General Sta

Department

CCP Politburo State Council

General Political

Department

General Logistics

Department

General Armaments

Department

PLA Navy

Headquarters

PLA Air Force

Headquarters

PLA Second Artillery

Headquarters

Military Regions

Shenyang

Beijing

Lanzhou

Jinan

Nanjing

Guangzhou

Chengdu

Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 3 

Development departments, respectively. The GPD’s 

law enforcement functions were transferred to a new 

CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, while 

its oversight of Party discipline in the PLA moved to 

a strengthened CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. The GAD’s Science and Technology Commission, 

responsible for defense innovation, was placed under 

direct CMC oversight.7

Theater Reforms. On February 1, 2016, Xi announced that the MRs had been replaced by five new 

theater commands (战区)

8

, listed in protocol order: the 

Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central theaters.9

 These commands are headquartered in Nanjing, 

Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Beijing, respectively.10 The theaters are aligned against land and, where 

applicable, maritime security challenges in their respective geographic areas; for instance, the Eastern Theater 

Command covers the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, 

while the Southern Theater Command covers the South 

China Sea.11 As with the MRs, theaters have subordinate 

units drawn from the individual services.

China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

The reforms affected not only individual organizations but also the lines of authority connecting the 

PLA’s major components. Chinese sources describe 

the revised division of labor with the following formula: the CMC and its subsidiary departments will 

provide overall management, the theaters will focus on 

operations, and the services will manage force building

(军委管总、战区主战、军种主建).12 In effect, the 

PLA will have two distinct chains of command: an operational chain passing from the CMC to the theaters to 

the troops, and an administrative chain flowing from the 

CMC to the service headquarters to the troops.13

The nature of the reforms suggests that the PLA is 

moving toward a more modular, U.S.-style C2 arrangement in which operational commanders develop force 

packages from units that are trained and equipped by the 

services. In particular, the PLA restructuring has drawn 

comparisons to the U.S. military following the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986.14 This act resulted in a C2 structure for the U.S. 

Figure 2. PLA Structure after Reforms

Ministry of 

National Defense

Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members)

General Oce

Joint Sta Dept.

Political Work Dept.

Logistics Support Dept.

Equipment Development Dept.

Training Management Dept.

Nat’l Def. Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection Commission

CCP Politburo State Council

Strategic Support

Force

PLA Navy

Headquarters

PLA Air Force

Headquarters

PLA Rocket Force

Headquarters

Theater 

Commands

Eastern

Southern

Western

Northern

Central

Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces

PLA Army

Headquarters

CMC Subsidiary Organs

Political & Legal A. Commission

Science & Tech. Commission

Strategic Planning Oce

Reform & Organization Oce

Int. Military Cooperation Oce

Audit Bureau

Organ Aairs Gen. Management

 Bureau Support to Theater Commands

Nuclear forces still

report directly to CMC

Service Headquarters:

Administrative but not

Operational Control
4 SF No. 294 ndupress.ndu.edu

military in which authority flows from the President and 

Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the regional 

unified combatant commands, who lead joint forces within their respective theaters.15 Service chiefs were given an 

advisory role, with responsibilities to “organize, train, and 

equip” troops. This bifurcation of authority appears similar to the evolving PLA distinction between operational 

and administrative chains of command.16

Nevertheless, the new PLA C2 system has some 

key differences with the U.S. system. First, unlike the 

U.S. combatant commands, which span the globe, the 

theaters cover territory only within China. Operations 

far beyond China’s borders (such as those in the Middle 

East or the Indian Ocean) will apparently be centrally 

directed by the JSD in Beijing.17 Second, the PLA retains the CMC as its highest decisionmaking body and 

does not have a U.S.-style commander in chief equivalent. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the reforms have 

strengthened Xi Jinping’s role within the CMC (under 

what is being labeled a “CMC chairman responsibility 

Reform Area (English) Reform Area (Chinese) Topics Target Date

Leadership 

Management System

领导管理体制 Reform Central Military Committee 

departments, military services, 

logistics system, equipment 

development system

2015*

Joint Command and 

Control System

联合作战指挥体制 Establish two-level joint command 

system, reform joint training, 

establish theater commands

2015†

Military Scale Structure 军队规模结构 Reduce force size by 300,000, 

reducing noncombat personnel, 

reduce officer billets, phase out old 

equipment

2016‡

Force Composition 部队编成 Adjust force structure, optimize 

reserve force, reduce militias

2016

Cultivating New-Type 

Military Talent

新型军事人才培养 Enhance professional military 

education

2016

People’s Armed Police 

command and control 

system and force 

composition

武装警察部队指挥管理

体制和力量结构

Adjust People’s Armed Police 

command and control and force 

structure

2016

Policy System 政策制度 Reform personnel system, budget 

management and procurement system, salary and welfare system

2017–2020

Developing CivilMilitary Integration

军民融合发展 Enhance management of civilianmilitary integration

2017–2020

Military Legal System 军事法治体系 Reform military regulations and military justice systemNo Date 

Provided

*

Although the “Opinions” states that changes to the leadership management system were completed in 2015, the Central Military Commission (CMC) reforms were not announced until the second week in January 2016. See “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and 

Military Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

†

Reforms to the two-tiered joint command system, composed of the CMC and theater commands, were not announced until January and 

February 2016, respectively.

‡

Although the CMC reform outline lists 2016 as the completion date for the downsizing, a People’s Liberation Army spokesman has stated 

that it would be complete by the end of 2017. See “China to Cut 300,000 Troops by 2017,” Xinhua, September 4, 2015, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2015-09/04/c_134588862.htm>.

Table. PLA Reform Agenda, 2015–2020
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 5 

system”). Third, the PLA remains a Leninist military 

whose primary responsibility is defending CCP rule. 

Unlike the U.S. military, where unit commanders exercise sole authority, the PLA retains political commissars 

and Party committees that are supposed to play a role in 

all key decisions. Given these differences, the new PLA 

C2 structure might best be described as GoldwaterNichols with Chinese characteristics.

The Broader Military Reform 

Agenda

The PLA’s organizational restructuring is only one 

piece of a broader transformation of the PLA being 

pursued under Xi Jinping. The current round of PLA 

reforms was launched at the Third Plenum of the 18th

Party Congress in November 2013, in which the party 

elite adopted a sweeping program of national reform.18 

Military reforms were discussed as an integral part of 

the overall reform program, with advocates arguing that 

China could not achieve prosperity without a strong military. However, building a strong military would require 

several fundamental changes, including to the PLA’s size, 

structure, human resource policies, professional military 

education (PME) system, budgeting processes, and defense industrial base. In short, the party decided that the 

PLA’s “software” needed to be updated.

After the Third Plenum, the PLA set about crafting 

a specific reform plan. This process was led by a CMC 

military reform leading small group chaired by Xi Jinping. Intellectually, PLA analysts from organizations 

such as the Academy of Military Sciences and National 

Defense University studied lessons from Chinese history and assessed how foreign militaries, especially the 

U.S. and Russian armed forces, are organized for modern 

warfare.19 Politically, the PLA carried out a major propaganda offensive to cultivate a reform mindset among 

rank-and-file PLA personnel.20 An anti-corruption 

campaign was also under way within the PLA, targeting 

both senior and more junior officers (known colloquially 

as “tigers” and “flies”). This latter effort served to put the 

PLA on notice that resistance to reform would not be 

tolerated.

A reform plan was ultimately agreed on at a CMC 

reform work meeting in November 2015 and codified in 

a CMC document published on January 1, 2016, titled 

“CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and 

Military Reforms.”21 The document makes clear that the 

PLA’s organizational changes are only the first steps in a 

5-year reform agenda. The next step is a downsizing (announced in September 2015) that will reduce the force 

from 2.3 million to 2 million members. This will likely disproportionately affect the ground forces and noncombat 

personnel.22 Changes will also be made to the active duty, 

reserve, militia, and People’s Armed Police force structure. 

Other changes will involve PME reforms, new personnel 

policies, and new military laws, rules, and regulations.23

The reforms are slated for completion in 2020. The table 

on page 4 reproduces the PLA’s reform agenda.

Reasons for Reform

The PLA restructuring can be understood as the 

product of two basic considerations: the need to tighten 

political control over the PLA, and the imperative to 

enhance the military’s ability to carry out modern joint 

operations.

Tightening Political Control. The main political 

drivers of the reforms are the desire to tighten civilian 

political control over the PLA and the need to deal with 

rampant corruption inside the military, including in the 

promotion system. These reflect Xi’s general tendency 

toward centralizing authority and his use of the anticorruption campaign as both a means of rebuilding the 

party’s image and a weapon against opponents. Since 

the new PLA command and control 

structure might best be described 

as Goldwater-Nichols with Chinese 

characteristics
6 SF No. 294 ndupress.ndu.edu

Xi assumed office, there has been a drumbeat of stories stressing the need for the party to exercise “absolute 

leadership” over the military; this was a major theme at 

the October 2014 PLA Political Work Conference at 

Gutian.24 Reiteration of this principle suggests continued leadership concerns about control over the military. 

The anti-corruption campaign within the PLA has implicated a number of senior officers, including former 

CMC vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, 

both of whom were expelled from the party. Stories have 

circulated from Chinese military sources indicating that 

Hu Jintao was a “figurehead” who never succeeded in 

establishing full authority over the military, and that Xu 

and Guo had used their positions to isolate Hu from 

decisions and to accept massive bribes in exchange for 

promotions.25

The need to strengthen party control and tackle corruption in the PLA is clear, but the means of rectifying these problems depend on the diagnosis of their root 

causes. One problem was inadequate supervision of the 

PLA by top party leaders, with Jiang Zemin to blame for 

elevating corrupt officers such as Xu and Guo to their 

positions as CMC vice chairmen and Hu at fault for his 

inability to exercise control over them as CMC chairman.26 A second concern is that PLA political work has 

been inadequate and party organs within the PLA were 

ineffective in exercising party control. A third problem 

is that senior PLA officers at the CMC, the general departments, and the military regions had too much power 

and were not always responsive to orders from the center. 

Fourth, the institutional mechanisms of supervising the 

PLA were either corrupted (in the case of the promotion 

system and auditors) or ineffective (party committees 

and military courts).

This diagnosis of root causes explains a number of 

political aspects of the reforms. Xi has a more assertive 

leadership style than Hu and appears to be much more 

successful in exercising authority over the PLA.27 But as 

in other aspects of governance, he has emphasized the 

need for centralizing authority. The first “basic principle” 

in the “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense 

and Military Reforms” is:

to consolidate and perfect the basic principles and 

system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the 

military, . . . comprehensively implement the 

Central Military Commission chairmanship 

responsibility system, and ensure that the supreme 

leadership right and command right of the military 

are concentrated in the [Communist Party of 

China] Central Committee and in the Central 

Military Commission.28

The “CMC chairmanship responsibility system” 

is distinguished from the so-called CMC vice chairman responsibility system allegedly practiced under 

Jiang and Hu, where many routine duties were handled by the CMC vice chairmen.29 In contrast, “all significant issues in national defense and army building 

[are] planned and decided by the CMC chairman,” 

and “once the decision has been made, the chairman 

conducts ‘concentrated unified leadership’ and ‘efficient 

command’ of the entire military.”30

A second element in the reforms is to eliminate the 

general departments and move most of their functions 

to the CMC. This change is intended to reduce the autonomy of the heads of the departments and make them 

directly accountable to the CMC chairman.

A third element in the reforms is to move a number of supervision mechanisms such as auditing and 

discipline inspection to the CMC level, where they can 

be more independent of potential “command influence” 

and thus more effective. Until November 2014, the Audit Bureau was under the GLD, which was responsible 

Xi has a more assertive leadership 

style than Hu and appears to be 

much more successful in exercising 

authority over the PLA
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 7 

for most PLA expenditure (and was one of the most 

corrupt parts of the system).31 The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission will enforce party discipline by 

sending investigation teams to party units throughout 

the PLA. The commission should have greater independence and authority since it will now be a CMC 

commission rather than part of the GPD. In a speech 

introducing the reforms, Xi stressed the importance 

of regulating power within the military, stating that 

“decision-making, enforcement, and supervision powers should be separate and distributed in a manner that 

ensures they serve as checks and balances on each other 

but also run in parallel.”32 A PLA expert argued that the 

new arrangement would “better safeguard the authority 

of discipline inspection and auditing departments and 

ensure that they can independently and fairly exercise 

their supervision duties.”33

Another element of the reforms is to increase the 

reliance on formal laws and regulations that specify how 

military leaders should carry out their work. This is described as a shift toward more standardized and systematic work methods that reduce a commander’s autonomy 

(and the resulting potential for arbitrary or corrupt decisions) and produce “administration according to the law.” 

This effort will be supported by the establishment of a 

Political and Legal Affairs Commission at the CMC 

level, which will promulgate regulations and oversee the 

military court system.34

Enhancing Joint Operations. A second consideration 

driving the reforms is the desire to increase the PLA’s 

ability to carry out joint operations on a modern, hightech battlefield. This has long been a goal for Chinese 

military planners, who were inspired initially by the U.S. 

military’s successful joint operations during the first Gulf 

War.35 The PLA subsequently developed joint campaign 

doctrine, created a joint logistics system, and conducted 

an increasing number of cross-service exercises.36 However, PLA analysts contend that the absence of a permanent joint C2 mechanism, combined with the continuing dominance of the ground forces, has stunted progress 

toward achieving a true joint warfighting capability.37 Xi 

Jinping himself noted, in 2013, that establishing a joint 

C2 system should be given “primary importance,” explaining that “we have given much consideration to joint 

C2, but fundamental problems remain . . . establishing a 

CMC and theater command joint C2 system requires 

urgency and should not be delayed.”38

Changes in the PLA’s assessment of the operational and strategic environment strengthened the case for 

greater jointness. China’s 2015 defense white paper, titled 

China’s Military Strategy, noted that the PLA needs to be 

able to fight and win “informationized local wars” (信息

化局部战争), referring to the evolving nature of modern warfare featuring, among other things, a greater emphasis on cyber and space operations, and on long-range 

precision-strike systems. The white paper also described 

growing external security challenges from the United 

States and regional antagonists, such as Japan, Vietnam, 

and the Philippines, especially along China’s maritime 

periphery. These developments meant that China would 

need to improve its ability to conduct high-end joint operations in multiple domains, including by establishing a 

permanent joint C2 mechanism.39

The organizational reforms promote joint warfighting 

in several ways. First is by establishing a “two-level joint 

operational command system” with decisionmaking nodes 

at the CMC and theater levels.40 This C2 system will operate in both peacetime and wartime, giving China an ability to quickly transition to a “war footing” when needed.41

One innovation is the creation of joint operations command centers both in Beijing (managed by the JSD) and 

within each of the five theaters. These centers have several 

roles, including developing operational plans, carrying out 

24/7 watch functions, maintaining situational awareness, 

the reforms are intended to increase 

the PLA’s ability to carry out joint 

operations on a modern, high-tech 

battlefield
8 SF No. 294 ndupress.ndu.edu

managing joint exercises, and providing a communications hub linking theater commanders with service component commanders and combat units.42

Second, the reforms enhance joint operations by 

creating separate national- and theater-level ground 

force headquarters. This means that CMC departments 

and theaters—divested of responsibility for army affairs—are fully “joint” organizations, staffed by what in 

the U.S. system would be considered as “purple-hatted” officers. Chinese media sources note, for instance, 

that the PLA’s new joint operations command centers 

are staffed by personnel drawn from all the services.43

Nevertheless, in the near term, the dominance of the 

ground forces is likely to remain as senior CMC and 

theater command positions remain filled by army officers.44 A test of China’s ability to move toward a more 

effective joint system will be its ability to rotate navy, 

air force, and rocket force officers into joint command 

positions.

Third, the reforms facilitate joint warfighting by 

placing forces from all the services at the disposal of 

theater commanders. Previously, service headquarters 

exercised peacetime operational control over naval fleets 

and MR air forces (which, in theory, would have been 

transferred to joint commanders during wartime). This 

authority now rests with the theaters. In addition, conventional missile forces under the Rocket Force—which 

were previously centrally controlled by the CMC—are 

now under the authority of the theaters.45 This allows 

theater commanders to integrate conventional precision-strike missiles into joint operations, such as islandlanding campaigns or counter-intervention operations. 

Commanders will also likely be able to draw on SSF 

units responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare 

operations.

Implications and Obstacles

In the near term, the reforms are bound to create 

some degree of organizational disruption, as new operational and administrative relationships are established, 

new commanders assume responsibility, and PLA personnel seek to understand where they fit in the new 

structure and what their duties will be. A further complication will be implementation of the force reduction, 

which will require the Chinese government to find new 

employment for more than 10 percent of current service 

members.46 Although the PLA will have to continue to 

respond to perceived security threats, it may spend the 

next few years focused inward, putting the reforms into 

practice. If this is the case, we might expect to see less 

appetite within the PLA for outward-focused, risk-acceptant behavior.

Over the longer term, however, the PLA reforms 

could result in a leaner, more effective warfighting organization. The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure, in addition to other changes—such as more realistic, combat-oriented training, tighter control of PLA 

finances, stronger PME, a dedicated SSF responsible for 

electronic warfare and operations in the space and cyber 

domains, a force structure that places more emphasis on 

naval and aerospace forces, and anticipated advances in 

long-range precision strike and other capabilities—could 

all give the PLA more confidence and capacity to execute joint operations in multiple domains. This could 

create new and more complex challenges for U.S. and 

allied forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region. 

However, there are also several reasons to question 

the positive impact of the reforms on PLA operational 

effectiveness, especially in terms of promoting joint warfighting. Potential obstacles could include the following:

◆ Ground force dominance. As noted above, nominally joint billets (and the CMC) will be initially filled 

predominantly by ground force officers. This introduces 

over the longer term, the PLA 

reforms could result in a leaner, 

more effective warfighting 

organization
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 9 

the problem that army perspectives, interests, and biases 

may continue to frustrate efforts to build a genuinely 

joint force. Much will depend on the PLA’s ability to 

foster jointness in the force through means such as joint 

PME, joint billets, and rotational assignments between 

the services.

◆ Interservice rivalry. As with any modern joint 

force, competition for resources and influence might 

constrain effective cooperation between the different 

services.47 This is especially likely as China’s economic 

growth continues to slow, placing a premium on access 

to scarce budgetary resources.

◆ Lack of combat experience. China has taken several necessary steps toward a credible joint warfighting 

capability, including developing joint doctrine, conducting joint exercises, and establishing a joint C2 structure. 

However, lack of experience in undertaking real-world 

joint combat operations could hamper the PLA’s ability 

to field a strong joint force.48

◆ Leninist features. The PLA retains features designed to maintain Party control over the military such 

as the CMC (which is technically an organ of the CCP 

Central Committee), political commissars, and Party 

committees. Indeed, the reforms have emphasized the 

need to strengthen the “absolute leadership” of the Party. 

The need for Party consultation and unity could reduce 

the flexibility and autonomy of commanders, especially 

at the operational level.

Given the potential obstacles, as well as significant 

lingering uncertainties about the reforms, it is far too 

soon to make any conclusive judgment about the likely 

impact of the reorganization on PLA operational effectiveness. Moreover, as David Finkelstein argues, the 

ultimate effects of the reforms may not be known until 

far beyond the formal completion date of 2020.49 This 

should not be surprising, as the U.S. military has been 

continually improving its ability to conduct joint operations in the three decades following Goldwater-Nichols. 

Current PLA reforms are likewise part of a long-term 

generational process that has no real end point. 

Notes 1 For a discussion, see: David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s 

Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 2002), chapter 4.

2 For an overview, see Kenneth W. Allen, “Introduction to the 

PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: 

Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 12–78.

3 For a discussion, see Kenneth W. Allen, “Introduction to the 

PLA’s Administrative and Operational Structure,” in The PLA as Organization, Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew 

N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 1–44.

4For excellent initial analysis of the reforms, see David M. 

Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the 

PLA (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2015), available at 

<www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-012560-Final.pdf>; and 

Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The 

PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, 

and Speculation (Part 1),” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February 4, 2016), 

available at <www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45069&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&c

Hash=99759e945776c89e45d3416a25ad4e39#.VrnlPPnR_RY>.

5 “Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force a Key to Win Wars,” 

PLA Daily, January 6, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.

com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/06/content_6846500.htm>.

6Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, Jr.

7 “China Reshuffles Military Headquarters,” Xinhua, January 

11, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-

01/11/c_134998692.htm>.

8The Chinese term zhanqu (战区) has several possible Englishlanguage translations, including battle zones, war zones, and strategic 

regions. This paper adopts the term theater commands to follow the terminology used in authoritative People’s Republic of China Englishlanguage media.

9 “China’s Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, February 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm>.

10 “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five 

Theater Commands,” PLA Daily, February 4, 2016, available at 

<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>.

11 “Experts: The Five PLA Theater Commands Have Clear 

Goals, With the Southeast Coastal Front Being the Key Link of 

Future Military Operations” [专家:五大战区目标清晰 东南沿海

是作战重点], Global Times [环球时报], February 2, 2016, available at 

<http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-02/8489177.html>. 

12 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, 

The authors thank Kenneth Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, 

David F. Helvey, Dr. T.X. Hammes, and Dr. Frank 

G. Hoffman for helpful comments on previous 

drafts of this paper.
10 SF No. 294 ndupress.ndu.edu

January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

13 “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five 

Theater Commands,” PLA Daily, February 4, 2016, available at 

<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>.

14Finkelstein, 18. For a discussion of the contents and impact of 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the U.S. military, see James R. Locher 

III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Force Quarterly 13 

(Fall 1996), 10–16; and James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: 

The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas 

A&M University, 2002).

15 For the formal delineation of responsibilities, see Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), available at <www.dtic.

mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>. See especially II-9, which defines 

the operational and administrative command relationships in the 

U.S. military.

16 Indeed, PLA researchers explicitly cite both the U.S. and 

Russian joint command systems in discussing needed changes to 

China’s C2 structure. See, for example, Xu Sanfei, “Seizing Opportunities to Speed the Pace of Reforms Affects the Development 

and Future of Army Building” [抓住时机加快改革步伐关系军队

发展和未来], PLA Daily [解放军报], May 28, 2014, available at 

<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0528/c83083-25075239.html>. 

This article consists of an interview with PLA Academy of Military 

Sciences president General Liu Chengjun. See also Wang Xiaohui, 

“What Strategic Preparations Must the PLA Take in a Period of 

Transition” [转型期中国军队要做哪些战略准备], National Defense 

Reference [国防参考], October 27, 2015, available at <www.81.cn/

jmywyl/2015-10/27/content_6741609.htm>. Senior Colonel Wang is 

deputy director of the PLA National Defense University’s Strategic 

Research Department.

17 “PLA Sets Up Overseas Operations Office To Strengthen 

Overseas Rapid Reaction,” PLA Daily, March 25, 2015, available at 

<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-03/25/content_6977517.htm>.

18For an overview of the Third Plenum decision, see “Xi 

Explains China’s Reform Plan,” Xinhua, November 15, 2013, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-

11/15/c_132891949.htm>.

19 For details, see David Liebenberg and Joel Wuthnow, 

“Navigating the Dangerous Shoals: An Overview of the new Period 

of China’s Military Reform,” paper presented at the 2014 CAPSRAND-NDU PLA conference, Arlington, VA, November 22, 2014.

20 For instance, in August 2014, the PLA released a circular to all 

personnel encouraging support for reforms. See “Resolutely Support 

Reform, Proactively Reinforce Reform, and Consciously Dedicate 

Oneself to Reform” [坚决拥护改革积极支持改革自觉投身改革], 

PLA Daily [解放军报], August 11, 2014, available at <www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/2015-11/29/content_130601.htm>.

21 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.”

22 For a discussion of previous force reductions in the PLA, see 

Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 34.

23 In PLA jargon, this is known as a process of “regularization” (

正规化). For an overview, see Thomas A. Bickford, “Regularization 

and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Asian Survey 40, no 3 

(May–June 2000), 456–474.

24 “Xi Stresses CPC’s Absolute Leadership Over Army,” Xinhua, 

November 1, 2014, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-11/01/c_133759418.htm>. Also see James Mulvenon, 

“Hotel Gutian: We Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Since 1929,” China 

Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (Winter 2015), available at <www.hoover.

org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46jm.pdf>. 

25 Cheng Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High 

Turnover in the PLA Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 

48 (Fall 2015), available at <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm48cl.pdf>; Minnie Chan, “Hu Jintao’s Weak Grip on 

China’s Army Inspired President Xi Jinping’s Military Shake-Up,” 

South China Morning Post, March 11, 2015, available at <www.scmp.

com/news/china/article/1734663/hu-jintaos-weak-grip-chinasarmy-inspired-president-xi-jinpings-military>; “Major General 

Broke the News: Xu Caihou Went Over the Head of Hu Jintao to 

Sell a Military Region Command for Twenty Million” [少將爆料:

架空胡錦濤 徐才厚標價賣官 大軍區司令兩千萬], Singtao Ribao 

[星島日報], March 10, 2015, available at <http://news.singtao.ca/

toronto/2015-03-10/world1425970399d5474726.html>.

26 In addition to the stories cited above, Chinese press reports 

claimed that Hu Jintao rarely visited his CMC office, in contrast to Xi 

Jinping, who reportedly spends a half-day working on military issues 

every week.

27Nan Li, “The Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles 

of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security 

Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2015), 120–140.

28 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.”

29 Sun Chiaye [孫嘉業], “Who Is Responsible on the Central 

Military Commission?” [中央軍委誰負責?], Ming Pao [明報], 

January 29, 2015, cited in James Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here: 

Xi Jinping and the ‘CMC Chairman Responsibility System,’” China 

Leadership Monitor, no. 47 (Summer 2015), available at <www.hoover.

org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47jm.pdf>. 

30Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here.”

31Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Shifts Control of PLA Audit Office to Military’s Top Decision-making Body,” South China Morning 

Post, November 7, 2014, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/

article/1633802/xi-jinping-shifts-control-pla-audit-office-militarystop-decision-making>.

32 “Xi Urges Breakthrough in Military Structural Reform,” 

Xinhua, November 26, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm>. 

33 “Military Experts Interpret National Defense and Military 

Reforms” [军事专家解读国防和军队改革], Xinhua, November 

27, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-

11/27/c_1117287443.htm>.

34 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.”

35 Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in 

Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David 

Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2011), 153–200.

36 See, for example, Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional 

Changes of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002); Dean 

Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” in China’s Revolution in 

Doctrinal Affairs, ed. James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein 

(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2005); and Mark 

Cozad, “PLA Joint Training and Implications for Future Expeditionary Capabilities,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016, available at <www.

rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT451/

RAND_CT451.pdf

37 The 2013 edition of the Academy of Military Science’s doctrinal teaching volume Science of Military Strategy states that collective 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 11 

administration of the ground forces by the four general departments 

was increasingly “unconducive” to establishing a joint C2 structure. 

See Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 201.

38 “Xi Jinping: Build a Modern Military Power System with 

Chinese Characteristics” [习近平: 构建中国特色现代军事力量体

系], People’s Daily [人民日报], August 31, 2014, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/31/c_1112295195_2.htm>. The 

article provides quotes from Xi’s remarks on military reform, made on 

December 27, 2013.

39China’s Military Strategy [中国军事战略], PRC State Council 

Information Office, May 2015, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2015-05/26/content_4588132.htm>.

40 Ibid.

41 “Zhang Junshe: Creating New Theaters Better Protects National Sovereignty” [张军社: 重新划设战区可更好维护国家主权], 

China National Radio, February 4, 2016, available at <http://military.

cnr.cn/gz/20160201/t20160201_521303310.html>. Senior Captain 

Zhang is vice president of the PLA Naval Research Institute.

42 “Starting with a New Style Under Fluttering Red Combat 

Banners—Observing the New Theater Commands” [开局新风起 猎

猎战旗红—东南西北中五战区成立伊始见闻新华网], Xinhua, February 2, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-

02/02/c_1117973365.htm>.

43 Ibid.

44 “China’s Military Regrouped Into Five PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, February 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm >. 

45 Nuclear forces appear to remain under direct CMC supervision.

46To be sure, the Chinese government has sought to minimize 

the turmoil associated with the downsizing by requiring state-owned 

enterprises to provide employment for ex-PLA personnel. “StateOwned Enterprises Not Allowed to Refuse Veterans,” PLA Daily, 

December 29, 2015, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2015-12/29/content_6835935.

htm>. However, this requirement will conflict with efforts to run most 

state-owned enterprises on a commercial basis, and is likely to be 

resisted.

47For a seminal treatment, see Samuel P. Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 

American Political Science Review 55, no. 1 (March 1961), 40–52.

48 See Phillip C. Saunders, “The PLA and Contingency Planning in China,” in The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency 

Planning in China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, 2015), 1–4.

49Finkelstein, 18.

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