,he Major

Powers in

Northeast Asian

Security

Ralph A. Cossa
A popular Government,

without popular information or the me

acquiring it,

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Trage

perhaps both.

Knowledge will forever govern ignor

And a people who mean to be their 

Governors,

must arm themselves with the power 

knowledge gives.

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY

August 4,1822
THE MAJOR POWE

IN NORTHEAST

ASIAN SECURITY

RALPH A. COSSA

McNair Paper 51

August 1996

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ISSN 1071-7552
j

Korean Reunification ...................

South-North Dialogue ..................

Role of the Major Powers ................

Increased Multilateralism ................

2. THE MAJOR POWERS IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

The United States .....................

Japan ..............................

People's Republic of China ..............

Russia ..............................

3. MULTILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE ....

The United States .....................

Japan ..............................

People's Republic of China ..............

Russia ..............................

South Korea .........................

North Korea ..........................

Benefits of Multilateralism ...............

Limitations of Multilateralism .............

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Importance of Bilateral Alliances ..........

Need for Korean Confidence-Building Measure

Harmonious U.S.-PRC Relations Essential .

Multilateral Dialogue Helpful ..............

Conclusions ..........................

ABBREVIATIONS ........................

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ...................
NORTHEAST ASIAN

SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The political, economic, and security environment o

Pacific region in the 21st century will be shaped in 

part by the interrelationships among the United Sta

China, and Russia. To the extent these four n

cooperate, a generally benign environment can d

which the challenges sure to develop in the regi

managed. Conversely, tensions and conflict amon

will have a profoundly destabilizing impact region

globally.

This monograph addresses the future roles and i

the four major Asia-Pacific powers and how their po

affect security in Northeast Asia and, more specifica

Korean Peninsula as we enter the 21st century.

Each of these powers is undergoing a transitio

In the case of the United States and possibly 

changes may be more of style than substance, but w

their respective foreign policy outlooks nonethele

case of China and especially Russia, the pot

significant change is much greater. There is a high 

unpredictability regarding the future paths of 

nations as we approach the 21st century.

The future course and behavior of the tw

individually and (at some unpredictable point in t

together, add to the uncertainty. While the four maj

have the ability to influence events on the Korean 

gg

Further complicating the analysis are the 

interrelationships that are created with each set of t

powers. Among the four nations, six sets of 

relationships occur: U.S.-Japan, U.S.-China, U.

Japan-China, Japan-Russia, Russia-China. Worse y

sets of bilateral relationships occur when each of the 

not only with each other, but with the Republic 

(ROK or South Korea) and the Democratic People's 

of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the two K

with one another (figure 1). Changes in any o

relationships will undoubtedly affect several, if n

other sets.
GENERAL OBSERVATION

Before discussing the various sets of bilateral relation

their impact on one another and on regional securit

general observations about the Northeast Asian 

environment appear in order.

BENIGN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For one of the few times in history, relations among 

major Asian powers are generally cordial. Tensions 

the trends are not always favorable, but all four na

currently at peace with one another; the Asia-Pacifi

environment is generally benign. In strategic terms, n

any of the others as posing an imminent threat to 

survival or basic security interests. This situation 

maintained and improved upon.

The return of a regional bipolar struggle pitting a

combination of the four against any of the others wo

no nation's fundamental interests and would disrup

stability and economic progress. Particularly d

would be any effort to brand any one of these natio

future "enemy" or long-term "threat" to regional sta

COMMON OBJECTIVES

Maintaining a generally harmonious relationship is 

only if the states involved focus on shared nationa

interests and objectives. Fortunately, while differenc
gp

common is a desire for stability on the Korean Penin

can be translated into a desire not only to avoid an

between the North and South, but also to avoid 

perhaps violent collapse of the North. All hope 

landing" for the troubled DPRK economy, althoug

can be brought about is anyone's guess—as a genera

landings require experienced pilots and these see

supply in the North at present.

Table 1. Major Power Common Objectives

- Korean Peninsula stability

- A "soft landing" in the North

- Benign security environment

- Continued economic prosperity

- Nuclear-free Peninsula

- Eventual peaceful reunification

All four major Asian powers would prefer to c

on building their own economies and see the main

the currently benign security environment as an 

precondition to sustained economic growth. Conf

Peninsula would directly or indirectly affect all fou

Clearly, South Korea also attaches a high priority to 

economic growth; even the North, I suspect, unders

conflict on the Peninsula would be disastrous fo

economic (and political) survival.
q, wpy 

Korea than have to deal with either a divided Kor

brink of turmoil or a seriously destabilized Peninsul

KOREAN REUNIFICATION

This leads to the larger question of the attitude of 

powers toward Korean reunification. It is difficult t

this topic without hearing the charge, usually but n

from a North or South Korean, that one or more of 

powers is responsible for keeping the Koreas apart. 

little doubt that the major powers were primarily re

(in varying degrees) for the Peninsula's division. H

would argue that the principal factor keeping the tw

apart today is not the actions or desires of the fou

but the actions and attitudes of the Koreans themse

This does not imply that any of the four is eage

about reunification in the near term. They probabl

for the same reasons that many in South Korea se

having second thoughts about immediate reun

uncertainty about how one gets from here to there p

and how much the entire process will cost. Ho

seriously doubt that leaders in any of the four capit

much time worrying about, much less fearing, reunif

are actively working to prevent it. When it comes t

one another at arm's length, the two Koreas need litt

help.

Among the major powers, it is not fea

consequences as much as uncertainty about the p

reunification that generates the greatest amount of 

Realistic scenarios for a genuine, near-term, 

reunification are difficult to envision. And, while all 
a sae bet tat a ee aet systead deocatc 

will prevail. It is doubtful, however, that reunifica

occur before the end of this century—at least not p

Even if the North implodes rather than explodes, the

a high probability of violence, at a minimum directed 

against competing factions, but also against those 

try to "help" or intercede. Should the current reg

North suddenly collapse, there is also no guarant

successor will be any more accommodating or trust

(or trusted by) the South.

The best hope for true reunification lies in 

process, through some type of loose confederatio

permit the South to lay the groundwork and de

inroads and infrastructure (and some level of per

and confidence) necessary to make a peaceful 

possible some time down the road. Whenever 

reunification will be burdensome and expensive.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE

The key to eventual reunification and the best hop

term stability on the Korean Peninsula rest in the ha

Korean people on both sides of the demilitarized zon

This is why direct dialogue between the South and N

essential. While barriers to meaningful direct dialogu

both sides, it is important to note that a basic foun

cooperation has already been laid. Direct dialo

unprecedented; in fact, the two sides engaged in 

meetings up to and including the ministerial level in 

1992 time period.

Of particular significance, the two sides 

groundwork for closer cooperation in December 
groundbreaking bilateral agreements lay out a 

confidence-building measures upon which to bu

cooperation. They also provide proof that the two 

capable of communicating and cooperating with 

when both sides determine that such cooperation i

beneficial.

Table 2. Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean 

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggres

Exchange and Cooperation commits North and Sou

build confidence and improve relations in political, sec

and other areas. Among its provisions:

Reconciliation Measures

• Respect for each other's political and socia

noninterference in each other's internal affairs; ren

propaganda, sabotage, and subversion; and a com

cooperate in the international arena;

• Resolution to transfer the Military Armistice Ag

July 1953 into a "solid state of peace";

• Establishment of a joint reconciliation commi

working-level group to ensure implementation and 

of the agreement.

Nonaggression Measures

• Nonuse of force, peaceful resolution of dis

prevention of accidental armed clashes;

• Establishment of a joint military commission 

confidence- and security-building measures and arm

accords on notification and limitation of military 

peaceful use of the demilitarized zone; exchange
Trade, Exchange, Cultural, and Humanitarian Measur

• Increase trade, economic development, and c

• Increase travel, communication, and educatio

• Family reunions and visits.

The Joint Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean 

includes a range of confidence- building measures 

designed to address the nuclear issue:

• Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, de

nuclear weapons;

• Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing 

enrichment;

• To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful pur

• To verify compliance upon the request of on

agreed to by both;

• To ensure implementation through the establ

regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nucle

Commission.

Source: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, I

December 1995.

ROLE OF THE MAJOR POWERS

The prime objective of the major powers should b

an atmosphere conducive to the meaningful condu

talks between Seoul and Pyongyang. The maj

should encourage—perhaps even pressure—both 

remove the many barriers (psychological, as well 

and political) to direct interaction between South 

However, the formula for reunification must com

Korean people themselves; it cannot be imposed fro
, py , 

agreement once reached.

INCREASED MULTILATERALISM

Emerging multilateral security mechanisms provide 

opportunities for cooperation and constructive dialo

at building confidence and promoting stability in 

Asia. Well-established multilateral mechanisms 

enhancing Asia-Pacific security now exist both at t

and at the nongovernmental or so-called track two 

Foremost among the new official mechanis

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN

Forum (ARF).2 This annual ministerial gathering, fi

1994, provides a clear signal of the growing 

commitment to multilateral security dialogue throu

Asia-Pacific. At the track two level, organization

Council for Security Cooperation in the As

(CSCAP)3 and the Northeast Asian Cooperation 

(NEACD),4 supplement the official talks.

These multilateral security forums hold great p

enhancing regional security, provided their limitatio

as their benefits are fully recognized. All four m

Pacific powers have expressed support for such effo

will be discussed later, the current trend 

multilateralism is generally consistent with the 

strategies of the major regional players.5
NORTHEAST ASIA

The future policies of the major powers and thei

inability) to interact constructively with one a

respond collectively to future challenges and tension

a profound effect on regional security. In this se

briefly look at each of the major powers' current 

relations with the other three, its views regardi

Koreas and reunification, and the future directio

each appears to be heading. I will end with an as

the future role each seems most likely to play in 

Asia as we enter the 21st century.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States remains the principal guarantor 

the Korean Peninsula, by virtue of its long-stand

alliance with the Republic of Korea. This alliance 

broader web of Asian security arrangements wit

Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand as well, with e

doing its part toward ensuring broader regional s

Each security relationship underwrites the 

U.S.-ROK treaty is particularly relevant in this re

it is the only one today that faces a serious externa

A U.S. failure to sustain the alliance or otherwi

security commitment to the ROK would serious

question the validity and credibility of the other al

more broadly, of the U.S. commitment to rema

Pacific power.

1 3

a great deal of concern in Asiaand among Ame

specialists—that there would be a precipitous 

withdrawal from Asia.6 While this concern ha

dissipated, the Clinton administration has ta

important steps to assure its friends and allies 

commitment to remain engaged.

President Clinton, in defining his vision of a "N

Community," identified a continued forward milita

in East Asia as the "bedrock of America's security 

Asia-Pacific region."7 The administration's rec

Asia's importance was further demonstrated duri

Defense Department's 1994 "Bottom-Up Revi

revealed that the number of forward-deployed for

would remain at approximately 100,000 through 

the decade.8

The continued U.S. military commitment wa

in early 1995 when the Pentagon issued an A

document entitled United States Security Strategy f

Asia-Pacific Region (normally referred to as th

Strategy Report or EASR).9 It stresses the perma

of America's vital security interests in Asia and 

keep U.S. military forces forward deployed in 

Japan for as long as they are welcome there. 

case with its predecessors, the EASR strategy i

with, and underwrites, the U.S. Pacific 

"Cooperative Engagement" strategy, which guides 

day activities of U.S. military forces throughou

Pacific region.10 The EASR also signals America's 

multilateral security dialogue mechanisms a

complement to—but not as a replacement for—

relationships. It also further defines the broader U
The EASR discusses the centrality of the U.S. 

alliances with the ROK and Japan while establi

blueprint for increased cooperation with China and Ru

recognizes the importance of building new friendship

maintaining and strengthening existing alliances. 

importantly, it makes no attempt to brand any natio

new "enemy" to replace the Soviet Union, focusing ins

the need to maintain peace and prosperity and to de

challenges to regional stability wherever they occur.

As noted earlier, maintaining a generally harm

multilateral interrelationship requires, first and forem

all bilateral legs of the interrelationship remain harm

While there is great coincidence of views between the 

States and the other three powers regarding the n

peace, stability, and economic progress within the regi

globally), all legs of the relationship have expe

challenges and strains in recent years.

U.S.-Japan Relations. The U.S.-Japan rela

continues to be the "world's most important b

relationship—bar none!"" The end of the Cold War 

reduced its importance. The U.S.-Japan security relati

embodied in a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and S

remains an essential element in the interaction betw

world's two foremost economic powers; it also prov

foundation for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, th

economically vibrant region in the world.12

The Treaty commits both sides not only to the def

Japan but also to the promotion of regional stability. W

significant reduction (but not elimination) of external 

to Japan's security, the alliance's focus today must sh

defense of Japan to the broader regional goal. As Amb
the U.S. and Japan going to do as security partners should 

arise?"13

This is a highly sensitive issue, given Japan's 

discuss "collective security." But refusing to di

case scenarios can only make crises more likely

will add strains to the alliance relationship.

The challenge in the post-Cold War era 

governments to articulate more clearly the continui

behind the alliance and the vital importance of U

deployed forces (in Okinawa and elsewhere in J

Korea) in this equation. The U.S. security um

Japan and the rest of Northeast Asia must be see

and unwavering. This will require a renewed, re

alliance and a continued credible U.S. military p

also requires a greater willingness on the part 

share increasingly in the risks and responsibilities

keep the alliance robust and relevant. Also neede

trust and understanding on the part of Japan's nei

an increased acceptance in Japan and in the regio

active, responsible Japanese security role.

The Joint Declaration issued by President 

Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto d

Tokyo summit meeting in April 1996 was a sign

forward both in informing the general publics 

importance of the security relationship and in pav

for greater defense cooperation. It recognized clo

defense cooperation as a "central element" in 

relationship and went on to say that:

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilate

coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation 
Japanese security specialists and generally e

throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region, th

Declaration has been greeted by a certain degree of ske

and concern among PRC security analysts and offici

are constantly seeking evidence of an evolving U.S. 

China" policy.

U.S.-PRC Relations. In assessing the majo

relationships today, the U.S.-China link is clearly t

troubled. U.S.-China relations appear to be at an 

crossroads. Debates are underway in both capitals as 

much one side can or should trust and cooperate w

other. Should either side conclude the other is its next 

this forecast could easily become a self-fulfilling prop

There appears to be a growing misperception in 

that the United States has already embarked on a cont

policy vis-a-vis China. As one Chinese Communi

pronouncement warns:

Engagement and containment are outwardly antithetical 

identical in reality. America's concept of die term engage

means to participate in some activity so as to develop it acco

to one's own will. It is very important to understand this poi

mat we do not feel completely relaxed when we hear "engagem

or fly into a rage when we hear "containment." Some Amer

call their China strategy "soft containment" which may be 

appropriate.15

The above quotation, while perhaps not represent

the official PRC Foreign Ministry position, clearly rep

one line of official thinking in Beijing and demonstra

far apart the United States and China are on basic m

policy interpretation. The Chinese complain that U.S. 

do not match our words, such as the professed U.S. all
, , p

two aircraft carrier battle groups in response to Ch

rattling during Taiwan's March 1996 presidential 

While the U.S. government continually stress

for a policy of constructive engagement with Ch

points of contention remain. The United Sta

concerned about China's human rights practices, 

enforce intellectual property rights agreemen

apparent support to Pakistan's nuclear weapons d

program. China, in turn, accuses the United 

meddling in China's internal affairs and of attemptin

China's economic growth while impeding its eme

major regional or global power. Disagreements o

further exacerbate and politicize tensions on both 

From a U.S. perspective, the real challenge 

America's traditional commitment to democracy 

rights and its concerns over issues such as nonp

into a broader overall long-term policy that promo

stability and cooperation; one that stresses patienc

term results over instant "compliance" with 

demands or desires. China's sovereignty concern

as regards Taiwan, must also be recognized and d

a more constructive manner.

There is also a great deal that China can and m

example, China could increase the transparency of 

budgets, strategy, and weapons systems acq

development plans. It could promote greater 

military dialogue and other confidence-building m

also needs to seek out opportunities for greater b

multilateral dialogue, to include discussions on secu

as economic issues not only with the United Sta

others throughout the region.18
pg 

ROK President Kirn Young-sam, the two leaders aske

and North Korea to join them in a four-party me

promote peace on the Peninsula.19 While the 

response has been less than enthusiastic, Chinese lead

expressed general support for the proposal while stres

need for both Koreas to take the lead in peace dis

between one another.20

U.S.-Russia Relations. U.S. relations with Ru

primarily focused on promoting internal stability in 

nation and on both reducing and safeguarding Russia's 

nuclear arsenal. These objectives were clearly at th

President Clinton's priority list during his April 1996 

summit meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsi

highest priority appears to center on achieving a 

coincidence of views on such European-centered even

possible expansion of NATO and cooperation to 

renewed conflict in Bosnia.21

Asian issues were scarcely mentioned during t

1996 Clinton-Yeltsin summit, even though Clinton ar

Moscow via South Korea and Japan. The Russ

express mild annoyance at not being included in the 

Kim Young Sam proposal to convene a four-party 

with the DPRK and PRC to discuss peace on the 

Peninsula, and Clinton asked Yeltsin to press Be

joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty later this y

these were clearly side issues.

Another Asia-oriented point of contention in U.S.-

relations (apparently not discussed during the Clinton

summit) involves the United States "taking sides

lingering Russo-Japanese dispute over Moscow's re

return Japan's Northern Territories, a small group o
p

favoring the return of the Northern Territories to J

On the positive side, contacts and cooperation be

Russian and U.S. militaries are on the rise. Thi

military-to-military exchanges between officers (at th

level) from the U.S. Pacific Command and the Ru

East Military District as well as more traditional 

Washington exchanges. Such interaction promot

understanding and builds confidence between tw

adversaries.

Relations with the Koreas. The Korean Pe

many respects remains a Cold War hold-out, even 

currently some cause for cautious optimism. I remai

supporter of the 21 October 1994 Agreed Framewo

between the United States and DPRK. If seen th

fruition, it could represent a significant step forwa

road to peace . . , but only if North Korea lives up 

of the bargain.24

Until true peace is achieved, the U.S.-ROK 

alliance remains essential, both to prevent Nort

miscalculation and to keep pressure on Pyongyang 

good faith. The alliance continues to serve as th

source of deterrence against potential North 

aggression, a role that has been critical for the past f

and remains just as critical today. The security com

of the United States has been the principal ob

Pyongyang's oft-expressed desire to reunite the Pen

force if necessary, under the North's political system

In addition, I would argue that it is only 

umbrella of this alliance that Seoul can feel confide

to pursue meaningful talks with Pyongyang. The U
, y 

would not only result in the aggression being revers

all likelihood, would bring about the complete remo

current regime in the North and the reunificatio

Peninsula under Southern-style democracy. T

however, would be horrendous, both in terms of do

more importantly, in terms of human suffering.

This adds to the critical importance of the U.S. 

primary role in Korea and the rest of Asia: namely

conflict. If, as many (myself included) believe, the 

for hostility on the Korean Peninsula have d

significantly hi recent years, it must in large part be 

realization of the ultimate futility of the North's pur

military option.

The United States has taken on a new role in the 

years, since it started into direct dialogue wi

Korea—an event that, despite close coordination 

Washington and Seoul, continues to make man

Republic of Korea nervous. It has long been susp

North Korea would like to split the United States 

ROK and, through direct negotiations with Wa

somehow cast doubts about the legitimacy of the go

in Seoul. As a result, great care has been taken t

North Korea from using either the direct talks or the 

road toward future diplomatic recognition again

Korea's interests.

The DPRK continues to seek direct military-t

talks with the United States outside the Armistice fr

and has called for a separate peace treaty with th

States to replace the Armistice. The joint anno

issued at the April 1996 Clinton-Kim summit, 

unambiguously asserted that peace negotiati
Peninsula is the task of the Korean people. Both Presidents 

that South and North Korea should take the lead in a re

search for a permanent peace arrangement, and that se

negotiations between the United States and North Ko

peace-related issues cannot be considered, [emphasis ad

Any DPRK attempts to exclude or marginalize 

government should and will be rejected by Wa

Article 4 makes it clear that the road to a lasting pea

Peninsula runs through Seoul; the ROK must be 

partner in any peace agreement. South-North direct 

once again provides the key; this must remain an u

benchmark to be achieved before promised (m

additional) rewards are offered to the North.

Eventually, U.S. recognition of the DPRK will 

occur. After both Koreas joined the United Na

Beijing and Moscow established diplomatic relat

Seoul, the DPRK expected that Washington and Tok

soon follow suit by recognizing the Pyongyang gove

North Korean actions have justifiably delayed 

already occurring but, ultimately, recognition of bo

by each of the four powers seems necessary and ap

Of the four major powers, the United States is 

the most supportive of, and least concerned about, 

reunification, provided it occurs peacefully. To ree

an earlier point, the United States can best show i

for this goal by promoting increased North-South 

and the lowering of barriers to meaningful direc

between the two sides, and by ensuring that its own 

with North Korea does not get out in front of the No

process. Nonetheless, U.S. diplomatic recogniti

DPRK seems a precondition for reunification.
g

feasibility of U.S. bases in a reunified Korea is highl

dependent.

If the two present Korean governments reach an 

some type of confederation that is otherwise acc

even favorable to the ROK, but includes a provis

forces depart the Peninsula, how will Seoul reac

other hand, if the South absorbs a collapsing North

be the rationale for retaining U.S. forces? Will th

able to afford continued host nation support, 

financial burden (estimated in the billions of dol

inherit if the North dies a sudden, even if peaceful

Despite these unknowns, under most plausibl

(and especially under a confederation scenario), my 

is that U.S. forces will have a future role on t

Peninsula after reunification, at least in the near ter

to help ensure a secure environment conducive 

needed demilitarization, if for no other reason

security specialists agree with this view, howe

among military professionals fully committed to 

Korean Peninsula security, there are serious quest

advisability and sustainability of a U.S. military p

the Korean Peninsula post-reunification.

For example, a cross-section of retired and s

duty U.S. military officers were recently polled on 

regarding a continued U.S. presence today, unde

South confederation, and under full reunificat

surprisingly, the overwhelming majority agre

continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Pen

essential today, even if the DPRK continues to hono

Agreed Framework.26 Moreover, most agre
of these still supported a modest U.S. military pr

Japan and elsewhere in Asia post-Korean reunific

hedge against future uncertainty. But survey re

raised serious questions both about the strategic nec

about the probability of political support (in either W

or Seoul) for a continued U.S. military presenc

Korean Peninsula once genuine reunification is ach

Future Directions/Roles

The current, largely benign Asian security environm

a product of many factors, has as its sing

determinant, the American forward military presen

sense of security commitment that this entails. This 

security blanket not only protects the security in

friends and allies, it also protects and promotes U.S

economic, and security interests as well.

It is also cost-effective. History has r

demonstrated that an extra ounce of protection, e

absence of an imminent or predictable threat, is con

cheaper than the pound of cure that would be re

undo a wrong or respond to a crisis we failed to an

deter. A continued American forward military pre

the credible combined defensive capability this ensur

that additional ounce.

For reasons of national self-interest, the 

presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces seem

through the end of this decade, although it appears u

to expect that the 100,000-troop level forecast in 

will be sustainable (or necessary) over the lo

especially if there is a significant cooling of tension

North and South Korea.
demonstrated in a variety of ways and numbers of 

and should be adjusted as threat perceptions c

regional military capabilities (or friends and pote

evolve.

The April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration 

recognize this and lays the groundwork for poss

adjustments in the number of forward-based U.S. fo

Asia-Pacific. Instead of repeating the oft-heard 

retain 100,000 troops "for the foreseeable future

Declaration notes that:

On the basis of a thorough assessment, die United States re

that meeting its commitments in the prevailing 

environment requires the maintenance of its current force 

of about 100,000 forward deployed military personne

region, including about the current level in Japan.27 [e

added]

This declaration clears the way for reassessmen

changes in the security environment (for better or 

Even under the most benign security environment

one can argue that some level of forward-deployed 

remain desirable to promote and protect future 

broader regional interests.

JAPAN

Japan also has an important role to play in term

Peninsula and of broader Asian security, although 

more a support role than a leading role. Neither Ja

neighbors would be comfortable with increased 

assertiveness. Nonetheless, greater Japanese invo

regional security affairs, in a manner that is nonthrea
Japan, given its domestic political turmoil and 

economic difficulties, has been even more inward-loo

usual in recent years. Nonetheless, Japan has ta

cautious steps to become more involved in regiona

affairs, supporting Cambodian peacekeeping opera

encouraging the formation of security-focused 

mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. 

recently, in conjunction with the April 1996 

Hashimoto Tokyo Summit, the two sides completed 

awaited (by the U.S.) acquisition and cross

agreement that permits greater cooperation and 

support between the two militaries during peacetim

such instances, Japan is careful to work within the c

the U.S.-Japan Treaty or the United Nations a

recognized multilateral forums.

The U.S.-Japan Treaty, in particular, provides 

Japanese defense official described as Japan's "pa

international society":

This passport is useful and necessary for Japan to allev

unnecessary fear of Asian countries that Japan might be

military power again, and play an active part in intern

society. Countries in die Asia-Pacific Region can feel sure 

long as US-Japan alliance exists, Japan will continue 

lightly-armed country that carries on democratic polic

embraces the spirit of die peace Constitution.28

Japan remains constitutionally (not to mention p

and psychologically) prohibited from developing an 

or power projection military capability or from partic

potentially-threatening alliances and other types of 

security arrangements or schemes. Nonetheless, 

strives to become a more "normal" nation, voices in
Party. As a result, it seems clear that Japan will c

move, however slowly and cautiously, in the di

greater involvement in regional and global security 

Relations with the Other Powers

Japan's first priority is the maintenance of stron

security ties with the United States. Reality dictate

must be the strongest, thickest link in its interrel

with the major Asian powers. But, the U.S.-Japa

relationship must focus on the promotion of regiona

stability, and prosperity. While clearly providin

defense of Japan, it must not be viewed as aimed at c

or containing either China or Russia.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is also important t

Peninsula security, in addition to being essential 

right. The American presence in Japan, and t

Japanese ports and airfields in support of 

contingencies, adds to the credibility of the U.S. co

to the ROK and thus directly supports deterrence. 

presence in Japan, and especially in Okinawa, can al

as a subtle means of underwriting the U.S. de fact

commitment to Taiwan, although Japan has traditio

hesitant to talk openly about such a contingen

Japanese facilities.

Japan-China Relations. The Japan-China re

appears to be on relatively steady ground toda

centuries of antagonism and suspicion (that still 

slightly beneath the surface). Pragmatic leaders in T

Beijing are aware of the economic and security ben

gained by continued cooperation. However, mu

positive momentum generated in recent years by 

economic cooperation has been undercut by antago
p

has further exacerbated tensions.29 This, combine

strong anti-Japanese tone surrounding Chinese Presi

Zemin's November 1995 visit to Seoul30, has cause

Tokyo to reassess the wisdom of their conciliatory 

to Beijing.

Japan-Russia Relations. Despite the colla

Soviet Union, Russia remains high on the list whe

concerns are chronicled in Japan. Japanese security 

generally agree that the threat of overt militar

between Japan and Russia is negligible today, 

intentions are generally viewed as benign, alt

discussions with the Umited States, the Japanese ar

point out that there is a significant difference betwee

hostile intent" and "evidence of friendly intent," s

that Americans tend to focus on the former while the 

are still awaiting proof of the latter from Moscow.

True rapprochement between Japan and Russ

unlikely in the near term, due to continuing disagree

Russian occupation of Japan's Northern Territor

lingering historic suspicions, and the relatively lo

attached to improving Russo-Japanese relations, esp

the Kremlin. Although the end of the Cold War ha

security concerns on both sides, political sensitivit

high and have actually increased in Russia, making 

term settlement of the Northern Territories iss

unlikely. Nonetheless, the value of increased Russo

direct dialogue is evident and should be encourag

progress is slow.

One positive, if tentative, step in this direction 

when Prime Minister Hashimoto met with President 

Moscow at the Group of Seven (G7) Nuclear Safety 
principle of law and justice and both agreed to reviv

level negotiations aimed at finally concluding a WW

treaty.33

Relations with the Koreas. Japan is atte

improve relations with both Koreas. Tokyo 

recognizes that its primary contribution to stabili

Peninsula is its continuing effort to present a uni

along with the United States and ROK, when it 

dealing with the North. In this regard, it is 

important that Japan not be seen as getting out in fr

undercutting, ROK or U.S. efforts, particularly durin

of sensitive negotiations.

Japanese security specialists express concern abou

developments and attitudes in both South and Nor

It is true that there is little talk emanating from 

channels about the ROK reinstituting an indigenou

weapons program in the face of the potential Nort

challenge. However, talk in Seoul about the prospe

South one day "inheriting" a nuclear weapons capabi

it eventually absorbs the North34 is particularly uns

the Japanese, as it is to anyone favoring 

nonproliferation and a Korean Peninsula free o

weapons.

Japan and the ROK have made steady pr

improving relations, despite occasional flare-ups 

associated with inopportune and inappropriate rema

by Japanese politicians regarding the Japanese occu

Korea or Japan's role in WWII. Of particular not

decision, announced in mid-September 1995, tha

nations would begin holding regular high-level 

consultations. This announcement came during a 

between Japanese Defense Agency chief Seishiro 
regular meetings between the defense chiefs

cooperation is essential to peace and stability in No

On the negative side, lingering territorial dispu

recently over Tok-do/Takeshima Island (a ROK

island claimed by both sides while defining their 

exclusive economic zones), remain a source of 

Also, ROK President Kirn's harsh criticism of Japan 

historic state visit to Seoul of Chinese Presid

Zemin—remarks no doubt encouraged and rein

Jiang—reveal deep animosities which South Korea

leaders seldom resist exploiting,

Some Korean security specialists have also 

concern over the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint D

even though the Seoul government has officially en

accord, with the caveat that it should be implemente

eye toward "contributing to peace and security on th

Peninsula."36 Nonetheless, others in the ROK are 

over what "appropriate roles" the United States will 

to play.

One extreme, but not atypical concern, expre

leading ROK Japan specialist, is that the United S

have "deputized part of its role as policeman in the 

Japan."37 Dr. Song Yong-son went on to say,

Basically, I don't object to the new U.S.-Japan security pac

the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the mo

generated by developments that started with Japan's parti

in the UN peacekeeping operations and will continue w

unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from bec

military power.38
Relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang rem

although there was some improvement following 

shipments of rice to North Korea after the Sep

intense flooding in the DPRK. The North Korea

asked Japan to hold high-level dialogue on the re

normalization talks. These talks, initiated in 

collapsed in November of 1992 and officially rem

as of this writing.39 There have, however, bee

lower level "secret talks" in Beijing, aimed at re

the dialogue.40

Ultimately, Pyongyang hopes for recognition 

(as it does from the U.S.) as the quid pro quo for 

Russia's earlier recognition of the Seoul governm

Tokyo coordinates closely with Seoul and Wash

dealings with the DPRK, many in the ROK rema

wary of any Japanese overtures toward Pyongya

Meanwhile, DPRK paranoia over Japanese in

runs high. The North Korean press frequen

invectives against "Japanese militarism" a

"continuing aggressive ways." For example, 

assessment of the fall 1995 Japan Defense Prog

(which forecast a 25 percent cut in the authorized 

Japan's Self-Defense Forces) identified this docu

aggressive military strategy to realize Japanes

ambition for overseas aggression and expansion.

time, Japan can be expected to play a major role in 

the economic development of the North in order 

the way for the "soft landing" that everyone see

Tokyo's effort must be closely coordinated with 

other major powers and, most importantly, wit

efforts. Japan's leading role in the Korean Penin
, ppy, (

North) who believe that Japan actively oppose

reunification and is working to prevent it from hap

disagree. True, Japanese leaders are not likely t

much effort trying to speed the process along—n

such measures be expected, welcomed, or trusted 

Koreans. But Tokyo understands that there is little 

either to prevent or to promote reunification, or 

adequately prepare Japan for it, other than to attemp

fences with both Seoul and Pyongyang.

This is not to say that Japanese security specialist

apprehensions about a reunified Korea. Simple arithm

us that a reunified Korea, absent any significant p

reductions, would have 1.85 million men under ar

would make it the second or third largest army in t

larger than the U.S. military and more than nine time

of Japan's Self-Defense Force. When one adds up th

of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other items of 

hardware on both sides of the DMZ, the fig

staggering. South-North dialogue must focus, ea

process, on reducing the number of military fo

hardware on both sides, in order to make 

reunification less alarming to Korea's neighbors.

Future Directions/Roles

As is the case with the United States, Japan should a

due course establish diplomatic relations with the DP

all the above caveats still applying. The ROK shoul

threatened by such a move, if properly coordinated, 

clear that progress in Japan-DPRK relations will b

priority than, and will not occur at the expense 

Japan-ROK or Japan-U.S. relations.
pyy pp

especially between Japan and Korea? Will Japan h

its own citizens who may be trapped on the Korean 

amidst the hostilities ... and would the Koreans pe

to do so? Will Japan help protect or rescue Am

other third party nationals? These and other 

geopolitical and strategic questions relating to con

and treaty interpretations must be addressed now, 

test—and ultimately to expand or redefine—the 

Japan's willingness and ability to contribute to 

defense.

In reality, one would anticipate very little in t

direct combat support from Japan in the event of 

contingency, beyond surveillance and sea lane se

defense of U.S. bases and facilities in Japan. 

important, in peacetime, to begin to define these 

develop procedures for overcoming the obs

performing them; a mature relationship requires no

The April 1996 Clinton-Hasimoto Joint Declaratio

opens the door for such discussions.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

When one ponders the future of Northeast Asia, on

looms larger than the others: "Whither China?" As t

most populous nation, with the world's largest m

fastest growing economy, China will play a maj

defining the Northeast Asian security environme

indefinite future.

China has traditionally been a highly xe

nationalistic society and it is becoming more so 

political leaders jockey for future position. It is un
the internal challenges and the international tension

in China's becoming a major power in Asia and the 

large.

Current Policies

China today is clearly a nation in transition. Many 

positive. China's commitment toward economi

appears irreversible and China's leaders recognize 

process requires extensive and positive interac

developed market economies. Therefore, foreign in

is encouraged and technology transfer from the Wes

pursued. Membership in multilateral economic org

such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APE

(which China has joined) and the World Trade Org

(which it wants to join) is deemed highly desirable. 

discussed later, China has been less eager to part

multilateral security discussions, although it is a mem

ASEAN Regional Forum and participates in the In

hosted nongovernmental dialogue involving th

Spratly Island claimants.

Relations with the Other Powers

Driven by its desire for economic cooperation—

recognition that economic development requires 

security environment—China has made a concerted 

improve relations with its Northeast Asian neigh

understands the benefits of improved relations with t

States as well. Nonetheless, competition between 

the other powers appears inevitable, fueled no

emerging economic and political realities, but also b

tensions and suspicions that remain just below the 
Japan and the United States maintain good rela

China; a "zero sum" approach must be avoided b

states. Constructive dialogue on security issues 

three nations (in a trilateral or broader multilateral 

essential, as is close coordination between the Un

and Japan regarding China policy in general.

The generally suspicious (when not openl

Chinese reaction to the April 1996 Clinton-Hasimo

and Joint Declaration reflects growing Chinese co

the potential for the U.S.-Japan alliance to take o

Chinese tone, now that the Kremlin no longer pr

threat upon which to justify the alliance.43 Th

penchant for viewing the world in balance of po

magnifies this worry.

China-Russia Relations. Sino-Russian rela

temporarily set back due to Beijing's barely-disguise

of the 1991 Kremlin coup attempt that was foiled b

be President Boris Yeltsin. Relations have improved 

since then but are still described in terms of "good n

coolness" rather than comradeship.44 Chines

specialists express concern over Russian instability 

their concern does not match that expressed by the 

believe that Russia will eventually regain its "b

mentality" and become a force to be reckoned 

again. This will hold true even if the current wav

nationalism is held in check.

The Russians seem less concerned about the 

Chinese threat and, while somewhat cautious abou

migration into their Far Eastern provinces, we

immediate benefits the Chinese bring. Moscow te

China primarily as a source of much needed inves
Yeltsin has been to Beijing twice, most recently in A

just days after President Clinton called on him in 

During the 1996 Beijing summit, the Russian lea

Russian acknowledgment that Tibet and Taiw

"inseparable" and "inalienable" parts of China fo

endorsement of Russia's efforts to suppress the Chec

("safeguarding [Russian] national unity").46

There are some who see the potential for som

Sino-Russian strategic condominium emerging 

growing rapprochement between Beijing and M

While it is true that at the most recent summit bo

"railed jointly against 'hegemonism, power po

repeated imposition of pressures on other countries

U.S. pushiness, in other words," it is equally true 

warmer atmospherics will not do away with de

differences and suspicions."48 While balance 

practitioners in Beijing and Moscow may attempt 

Russia or China card, the best they can realistically h

a somewhat tentative marriage of convenience, A lo

true strategic partnership does not appear likely.

Relations with the Koreas. China is anothe

important player in terms of Korean Peninsula secur

because it is the only one of the four major pl

currently maintains essentially cordial relations 

South and North Korea. China has tradition

considered the DPRK's closest ally. Howeve

decision to establish diplomatic relations with Sou

and its backing of the entry of both Koreas into t

Nations, have undoubtedly raised some concern in P

over the long-term reliability of the Sino-North Kore

"close as lips to teeth" relationship.
also continues to support direct dialogue between 

Koreas as the best means of achieving a peaceful se

Chinese relations with the Republic of Korea hav

dramatic improvement over the past decade. Bo

benefit politically as well as economically fr

relationship, and it is likely to continue to improve. 

clearly underscored by the visit of Chinese Preside

Zemin to Seoul prior to the 1995 APEC Leader's M

Osaka. In his address before the ROK 

Assembly—the fast ever address by Jiang to a 

parliament—Jiang stressed the growing political, ec

scientific, and cultural ties between the two nation

praising (and promoting) increased ROK financial in

in China.50

While China clearly attaches great importance to i

relations with the ROK, Beijing will avoid moving 

and will be disinclined to make public many of th

assurances it no doubt utters behind closed door

South, in order not to further alienate the North.

Meanwhile, relations with the DPRK have 

strained for a variety of reasons, not the least of 

China's improved relations with the ROK.51 Non

relative to the dismal state of North Korea's relati

virtually everyone else, China remains one of North 

closest and most important friends. The question of j

much leverage China has over North Korea, or ho

Beijing is willing to use whatever leverage it has, is s

debate. Still, it is clear that no other nation in Northe

(and perhaps m the world) has more influence ov

Korea than China.

China maintains a bilateral security treaty wit

Korea, although the Chinese have made it clear 
few believe it would be capable of sustaining 

operations against a combined U.S./ROK forc

considerable outside logistical support. North Kor

longer rely on China providing that support.

China is probably the least eager of the four maj

to see reunification occur, for a variety of reasons. 

desire to maintain a buffer zone. This is especially 

given the presence of U.S. military forces in the RO

fear that an ROK-dominated, unified Korea would 

this presence and perhaps even let it spread n

China's growing suspicion that the United States is 

on a Chinese containment policy, while incorrect, n

feeds the desire to maintain a buffer.

China also places high value on regional stabilit

ofttimes equates (again incorrectly) with maintaining 

quo. Since many reunification scenarios include th

of the North's government and some level of ins

chaos, the Chinese see the risks of reunific

outweighing the gains (especially the gains for them

there is the matter of ideology. While "socialism wi

characteristics" is a far cry from the "Juche 

practiced in the North, political leaders in both n

rely on communist ideology for their legitimacy. T

number of reasons, China is not eager to see the Nor

domino fall.

Over the long run, China no doubt unders

Korean reunification is inevitable. As a result, 

carefully enhancing its ties with both Seoul and P

while positioning itself as a potential replaceme

United States as security guarantor for a united Kor

some Koreans may be enticed by this possibility
What will China be like at the turn of the next centu

it be a prosperous, stable, responsible membe

community of nations, fully committed to political, e

and security cooperation with its neighbors? Or, w

sprawling, amorphous, undisciplined, perhaps even s

fragmented giant, troubling to its neighbors an

challenge to the rest of the world? Or, as is more li

falls somewhere in between, toward which of th

directions will it be heading?

It is, of course, too soon to make specific pre

Those who will be most responsible for charting Chin

course have yet to be fully ordained into power. 

leadership committed to reform will face immense ch

in achieving both economic prosperity and political 

Should economic reform succeed, there is still no g

that a prosperous, stable China will necessari

cooperative or benign one, especially if political liber

does not follow (or if more intense nationalism does

An optimistic (and in my view highly plausibl

scenario painted by one Chinese scholar seem

repeating here:

China is in transition today but is following a course of "eco

reform with political stability" that is supported by the leade

the party, and the people. After Deng, there may be 

continued shifting of players, but basic policy will not change

debate is over the pace, speed, and tactics, not the basic dire

Differences of opinion and occasional leadership changes w

affect this.52

The most important certainty, from the 

perspective, is that China will continue to move forw

become stronger economically every day. 
time, China will develop its own form of democ

Chinese characteristics."

RUSSIA

Russia wants to remain involved in Asian security af

if, realistically speaking, it brings very little to the t

other than the ability to create serious problem

excluded. Russia's economic and political problem

rise of a hostile brand of nationalism, as manifes

political rise of zealots such as Vladimir Zhirinov

concern not only over the prospects for long-term st

over the future of the democratic process in the Kre

resurgence of the Russian Communist Party add

concerns, even though it is doubtful that even a c

victory in the June 1996 presidential elections w

caused a return of Soviet-style rule in the 

Meanwhile, the appointment of the highly nationa

very ambitious) former General Alexander Lebed 

Security Council chief raises new questions abou

future direction, given Mr, Yeltsin's reported ill he

The security of nuclear arsenals and plutonium 

throughout the former Soviet Union, and the 

willingness of some individuals to sell nuclear ma

their own expertise) to the highest bidder, continu

global proliferation-related concerns as well. 

Russia's nuclear arsenal may pose a more immin

today (in terms of probability of use or proliferati

did during the Cold War, given environmental an

problems being experienced as Russia attempts t

stockpiles secure.
Current Policies

President Yeltsin, like Mr. Gorbachev before him

stress that Russia is a Pacific as well as European po

the two-headed eagle on the Russian coat of arms lo

east and west. Nonetheless, for the most part, M

attention lies elsewhere.

To the extent Moscow has an Asia policy it is fo

keeping relations with China secure. Beyond that, 

lesser priority, given Moscow's preoccupation wit

developments and consolidating relations with th

Soviet Union Republics (the "near abroad"). Even 

April 1996 trip to China was done at least in part for 

political reasons: to demonstrate his foreign policy 

while also showing that he was not favoring the We

The selection of a well-known hardliner, 

Primakov, as foreign minister was also aimed i

silencing domestic critics of Yeltsin's foreign policy. P

is an old Asia hand and his appointment is unlikely to 

any significant shift in focus, although he is expec

somewhat less U.S.- or Euro-centric than his prede

Relations with the Koreas

Russia's relations with the other major powers hav

been covered in previous sections of this paper. The

little of additional significance to report regarding 

ROK relations beyond saying that they exist and co

be strengthened. The Russians look at Seoul pri

economic terms. Moscow seeks Korean trade and in

and is hopeful of one day cracking the tight U.S. hold 

arms purchases.54 The ROK, in turn, sees improved 

relations as part of its "zero sum" contest with th
Peninsula on several occasions, most recently by 

displeasure over not being included in the Clinton-K

Sam four-party meeting proposal.56 Earlier, during 

United Nations debate on possible sanctions against 

after its refusal to permit inspections by the Int

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yeltsin insisted t

power conference be held to discuss the crisis b

Security Council vote was taken. Jimmy Carter's in

with Kim II Sung avoided a showdown on this issu

in several other areas). Nonetheless, Mr. Yeltsin w

notice that he wanted a role in Asian affairs. Th

Russia has a veto on the Security Council make

likely he will normally get a seat at the table.

The Kremlin has had a long-standing security 

with North Korea, dating back to 1961 and renew

5 years. Mr. Yeltsin has stated that this treaty, alo

other official agreements signed by the former Sov

is still valid. Moscow, like Beijing, has repeated

however, that it will not come to Pyongyang's aid in 

of North Korea-initiated hostilities.

The current treaty's Article One still requires M

come to Pyongyang's aid if attacked. However, rep

fall of 1995 (both acknowledged and denied b

officials) suggest that Russia plans to replace the t

a new one that contains no provision for Russia

assistance to the DPRK when the old treaty com

renewal in September 1996. A DPRK Foreign 

spokesman, when asked about this development, 

said "we consider [the old treaty] to be insignific

good as nullified after the collapse of the Soviet 

This comment speaks volumes about the DPR
either way. Even if they strongly objected, there is 

Russians could do to prevent an agreement reached 

North and South from being consummated.58

Future Directions/Roles

Russia's greatest future contribution to Northea

stability would be to quietly support U.S. and ROK d

efforts with North Korea. The best venue for 

involvement in Asia in general and Korea in particu

to be in the context of multilateral security mechanism

multilateral forums provide a useful vehicle for R

become involved in security-related matters in A

manner that appears nonthreatening to Japan and ot

may still harbor suspicions about Russian intentions

Greater Russian integration into the region is in e

best interest because it promotes a degree of famil

respectability that also bolsters those in the Krem

committed to reform and international cooperation. 

value, in and of itself, even if there is not much of s

that Russia can offer today.
DIALOGUE

The successful establishment and productive resul

the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the wil

government officials to participate actively (in t

capacities) in such track two organizations as CSC

NEACD, provide ample evidence of regional ac

and at least limited official governmental s

multilateral security dialogue. Such dialog

generally consistent with the national security 

strategies of the United States and the other ma

actors, with several important caveats.

It is important to note that in virtually 

multilateral proponents, at least at the governmen

not see such activity as a substitute f

arrangements—especially not in the near term. 

States and Japan have been most direct in makin

but it is consistent with the views of other majo

well.

Simply put, bilateralism and multilaterali

mutually exclusive, but mutually supportive. Thi

should not, be seen as an "either-or" propositio

solid bilateral relationships, few states woul

confidence to deal with one another in the broa

Conversely, some problems can best, perhaps onl

bilaterally.

45
served to complement and did not seek to replace A

vital bilateral alliances in Asia.

President Clinton underscored this theme in his J

"new Pacific community" speech before the Korean 

Assembly. Clinton identified four priorities for the se

this new community: a continued American 

presence/commitment, stronger efforts to com

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sup

democracy and more open societies, and the promotio

multilateral regional dialogues on the full range of 

security challenges.

This U.S. policy conversion has raised concern

those in Asia who are skeptical regarding America's l

commitment to the region. Even many long-time pr

of multilateralism in Asia, while clearly supportiv

concept and pleased with the change in U.S. attitu

expressed concern that U.S. participation in mu

security mechanisms might serve as a cover or exc

reduced American military presence or commitment

American policy-makers seem attuned to these c

and continually stress that U.S. support for i

regionalism is built upon the premise that such mu

efforts complement or build upon, and should not b

a substitute for, enduring bilateral relationships. 

lingering regional apprehensions, however, it 

incumbent on the United States to stress, and dem

that its involvement in multilateral activities is 

providing additional means of engagement and n

excuse for a significant reduction in America's 

commitment in Asia.
neighboring countries. It is an unfortunate, b

relevant, fact that many of Japan's neighb

uncomfortable about Japan playing a larger secu

Asia. This puts serious limits on Japan's ability 

regional political or security role more commensur

economic clout. Nonetheless, active participa

ARF, CSCAP, NEACD, and similar multilate

provides a means for Japan to cautiously exer

leadership role in this area. Japan's willingness 

evidenced by its co-chairing the ARF Inter-sessio

Group on confidence building and the CSCAP N

Working Group, among other actions. In the 

sphere, Japan did a better than expected job in 

1995 APEC annual ministerial and leaders' meeting

President Clinton's absence notwithstanding.

This is not to suggest that Japan should or m

course independent from its closest security ally, 

States. Japanese regional security efforts, 

nonthreatening to Japan's neighbors, can most ef

accomplished within the framework of the U.S.-Jap

alliance. United Nations multinational pe

operations also provide a useful forum for great

participation in international security-related affai

The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is n

prerequisite to both nations' participation i

multilateral activities but, arguably, is a prerequi

success of such efforts in general. The following 

delivered at a meeting of Japanese and U.S. security 

reviewing bilateral/multilateral options and im

captured one consensus conclusion:
Asia as one can identify. Therefore it is important to realize t

multilateral frameworks in the region are intended to compl

rather than to replace this vital bilateral relationship.

The interconnection is important to understand: the bil

relationship is a precondition for multilateral initia

simultaneously, no multilateral initiative can or shou

undertaken that would weaken the bilateral connection.59

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The PRC was initially reluctant to participate in 

multilateral security forums. Beijing strongly prefer

on a bilateral basis with its neighbors, assuming (ri

that its smaller neighbors in particular would be mu

inclined to yield to PRC persuasion when deali

sensitive or contentious issues on a one-on-one basi

However, with the emergence of the ASEAN R

Forum and the growing solidarity of the ASEAN 

themselves, China has been confronted with a mu

environment that it can no longer ignore. As a result

has decided to participate and is now generally (

perhaps grudgingly) supportive of such efforts.

Chinese attitudes regarding the South China Sea 

an illustrative case. Beijing was initially reluctant to e

multilateral dialogue, even when restricted to th

claimants, insisting that each should deal with 

separately. Today, Beijing participates in the Ind

hosted track two workshops on the Spratlys (althou

have accused Beijing of participating only to delay or 

progress) and has agreed to abide by multilateral pr

such as the UN Convention on the Law of the 

addressing these claims.60
generally refuses to participate in multilateral 

dealing with other "sovereignty issues" such as 

Tibet and avoids even nongovernmental, largel

dialogues if scholars or officials from Taiwan are 

Despite these Chinese caveats, from the perspe

United States and China's more immediate neig

limited PRC participation in multilateral mechanism

a useful vehicle for greater interaction aimed at 

emerging China into the international comm

constructive manner. Active Chinese participation 

range of security-oriented forums could also prom

transparency regarding Chinese military capa

intentions and this would clearly contribute 

stability.

RUSSIA

Multilateral forums provide Russia the same oppo

greater regional integration. For its part, the K

signalled its desire to become more directly 

multilateral security dialogue in Asia. For example

1994 UN Security Council debate over sancti

North Korea, it was Russia that proposed an i

conference of key Asian players, in order to se

defusing the crisis (while assuring Russia a seat a

The earlier referenced complaint about not being 

the Clinton-Kim Young Sam Four-Party Meetin

underscores Russia's desire to be involved in 

multilateral arrangements, as does Moscow's str

entry into APEC.

One could argue that, in Northeast Asia, Ru

verv little to the multilateral table today beyond t
community costs little and also bolsters those in the 

most committed to reform and international coo

Russia is currently a member of the ARF, CSCAP

NEACD. Russia has also volunteered to take the lea

the ARF in developing "norms and principles of sec

stability" for the Asia-Pacific region.

SOUTH KOREA

The Republic of Korea also supports multilateralism 

as it complements existing bilateral relationships. 

ROK official recently noted:

Currently, Asia-Pacific security is sustained primarily by a ne

of bilateral security arrangements, with the United States p

a key role. The United States has been the region's tie 

stabilizer and moderator through these bilateral se

arrangements. A strong U.S. presence will continue to serve 

backbone of security in the region and help to inhib

reemergence of tensions. However, mere is also emerg

genuine need for a framework for security dialogu

cooperation among the countries of the region.61

South Korean security specialists promote a three-

approach to security on the Peninsula.62 The first 

dialogue with the DPRK, based on the 1991 "Agree

Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchang

Cooperation" and "Joint Declaration for a Non

Korean Peninsula" accords worked out between S

North Korea. Another is the application of global agr

on disarmament and arms limitations, such as the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Missile Technology 

Regime, and the Chemical and Biological W

Conventions.
earlier-referenced proposal for a Northeast As

Dialogue at the May 1994 ARF Senior Officials' 

Bangkok. This ROK commitment to multilatera

witnessed by its active participation in the AR

CSCAP, and the NEACD, among other 

mechanisms.

The ROK's approach to multilateralism appea

four working principles:

• Any multilateral security forum in Nor

should not undermine or erode the existin

arrangements in the region.

• Emphasis must be placed on a gradual or st

approach that nurtures habits of consul

cooperation.

• In addition to official or governmental talk

need for unofficial channels of dialogue on se

• Forums should involve all the members o

as much as possible. However, this princip

flexible in practice. In the first stage, foru

established without the participation of certai

that show negative responses.63

The ROK is prepared to participate in multilater

with the DPRK, but is also clearly prepared to eng

forums without the North, even when the Korean P

the focus of attention. While the ROK has 

supportive of DPRK participation in t

efforts—leading the effort to bring the DPRK in

and encouraging their participation in the NEACD

less certain about the desirability of having the D

the ARF at this time.
which immediate participation offers. On the other 

continued frustration over North Korea's refusal to rec

the ROK's legitimacy and resume direct dialogue. At p

both the ROK and United States appear to agree 

resumption of South-North talks should precede 

recognition of the DPRK and its subsequent participa

official forums such as the ARF.

NORTH KOREA

DPRK spokesmen acknowledge Pyongyang's commitm

least in principle, to multilateral security dialogue, w

important caveat mentioned earlier, namely, that the di

not be directed specifically toward (i.e., against) them. 

Korea's resistance to four-plus-two settings also stems f

resentment, if not feeling of betrayal, over the lack of pr

in establishing diplomatic relations with both Japan a

United States.

DPRK spokesmen have made it clear that North Kor

no intention of participating in four-plus-two or other K

Peninsula-oriented dialogues at either the track one o

two levels until all bilateral relationships are in balanc

until the United States and Japan recognize the DPRK.

DPRK specifically rejects the ROK-proposed Northea

Security Dialogue. Instead, DPRK officials maintain th

order to ensure security in the region through mult

negotiations, it is important to create an atmosph

confidence building above all by resolving the comp

issues bilaterally."65

Despite these problems (or perhaps, because of 

multilateral security-oriented mechanisms that are br

based and nongovernmental, such as CSCAP, can 
North Koreans to other opinions and a more real

view in an informal setting where propagand

minimized. It is more difficult to imagine 

multilateral forum serving this purpose, at least not 

progress is made in South-North talks.

BENEFITS OF MULTILATERALISM

Emerging multilateral security mechanisms in A

important vehicles for promoting long-term p

stability. Institutionalized multilateral forums ca

valuable if they serve as confidence-building meas

at avoiding, rather that reacting to, crises or aggr

time, they should also be capable of dea

nontraditional security concerns such as refugee p

pollution and other environmental issues.

Multilateral settings can also facilitate bi

subregional) dialogue among nations and their 

unofficial representatives who, for a variety of reaso

unable or ill-prepared to make arrangements directl

another. The APEC Leaders' Meetings, for exam

made it possible for President Clinton twice to 

direct discussions with Chinese President Jiang Z

bilateral summit meetings would have been 

impossible to otherwise arrange. The 1994 APE

Meeting in Indonesia also produced a three-w

summit" involving the leaders of the ROK, the Uni

and Japan. Likewise, the G7 Nuclear Safety Summ

the first opportunity in 11 years for a Japanese Prim

to visit Moscow.

Multilateral security mechanisms such as the 

CSCAP are, by their mere existence, confidenc
selective, subregional basis. In this, as in many other 

of multilateral dialogue, the process itself is an e

important product, since increased dialogue 

increased understanding which, in turn, hopefully l

reduced risk of conflict.

Multilateral forums also provide a venue for other 

actors to be heard on security issues that affect 

Track two organizations such as CSCAP can provid

cover" for governments to vet new policies and str

a more academic setting before adopting formal pro

the official level. In addition, nations or entities th

find it uncomfortable or politically unacceptable to e

bilateral dialogue can still effectively interact 

multinational level, particularly in nongovernmental 

Finally, briefly recapping points made durin

commentary, multilateral security forums provide a fr

for enhanced U.S. involvement in Asian secu

complements, but does not seek to replace, curren

security commitments. They permit Japan to beco

actively involved in regional security matters in a ma

is nonthreatening to neighboring countries. They als

a useful vehicle for greater interaction between Chi

neighbors while promoting greater transparency r

Chinese capabilities and intentions.

Multilateralism also provides Russia with opportu

greater regional integration while bolstering tho

Kremlin most committed to international cooperation

nongovernmental forums provide a venue for bringi

Korean officials into direct contact with their 

counterparts in a less confrontational atmosphere, w

helping expose them to broader regional realities.
Multilateral security dialogue mechanisms hold many 

for Asia, but have their limits as well. A clear und

of the weaknesses and boundaries—of what multila

neither suited for nor intended to accomplish—ca

false or overly optimistic expectations and allow the 

the region to maximize the benefits to be der

multilateral approaches to regional security.

Broad-based institutionalized multilateral forum

ARF are useful vehicles for discussing potential prob

seem ill-equipped (and not very eager) when it 

resolving crises once they have occurred. Ad hoc 

and more focused problem-oriented groupings ap

useful in solving problems or dealing with actual cris

or elsewhere (witness the Desert Storm coalition ass

deal with Iraqi aggression during 1990/91). A 

NATO-type alliance aimed at defeating or con

specified threat simply does not apply to a post-

Asia—nor, for that matter, was it possible to susta

the height of the Cold War.

Multilateral organizations (governmen

nongovernmental) generally act through consensus 

their agendas and making recommendations. Thi

brake of sorts on how fast these organizations 

forward. For this reason, those promoting m

dialogue and various forms of regional confidenc

realize the continued value and relevance of uni

bilateral measures that not only build trust and con

their own right, but also help lay the foundation fo

based cooperation. Such efforts set useful prece

place pressures on multilateral organizations to mov
q

States and ROK, it seemed most effectively handled 

a bilateral forum. Most importantly, the U.S.-DP

were aimed at setting the stage for the resumption 

South-North dialogue, which (as repeatedly stre

appears essential to reduce tensions, to build confid

eventually to help bring about the peaceful reunificat

Peninsula.
CONCLUSIONS

The prospects for future stability on the Korean Peni

elsewhere in Northeast Asia depend in large measur

the willingness and ability of the four Asian p

cooperate among themselves and with the two Korea

observations and recommendations aimed at incre

prospects for regional stability are offered f

consideration.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL ALLIA

First, despite the positive trends toward enhanced re

and multilateral security dialogue, future stability 

likely continue to be built upon the foundation pr

several key bilateral alliances.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

First priority should be accorded to the continuati

formal U.S.-Japan security alliance. This alliance 

serves the interests of the world's two foremost 

powers, it serves the security interests of t

region—and is generally recognized as doing so. 

clear that, absent firm U.S. security guarantees, Jap

have no option but to develop a stand-alone 

capability. And, given the dangerous neighborhood 

Japan resides—with two declared nuclear powers (C

Russia) and one nuclear aspirant (DPRK) virtu

door—this would in all likelihood mean developin

57
q

This is not to predict that a more militarily powe

would be a threat to Japan's neighbors—Japan 

manpower, resources and, in the wake of World 

devastation, the political will to once again b

aggressor nation. But, regional apprehensions w

nonetheless and potential arms races could follow. 

Japanese "stand alone" military capability serves 

interests—not America's, not China's, not the Korea

region's at large, not even Japan's.

U.S.-ROK Alliance

The importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance has b

documented earlier in this paper. Until such time 

true reunification on the Peninsula, there is no sub

the security guarantees this vital alliance provides. T

a question posed earlier, if the DPRK were to ins

withdrawal of U.S. forces as a prerequisite for agree

kind of loose confederation, this would be a good 

of DPRK ulterior motives. The ROK is more int

assuring its security than in taking a risky first ste

reunification and would reject any such DPRK dem

The future U.S. military role on the Korean P

particularly after reunification, is an issue that 

seriously thought through. Nonetheless, it would n

of character for Pyongyang to make such a 

assurances from interlocutors such as Dr. Selig 

notwithstanding.66 And, there will be some in the R

in the U.S.) who would be inclined to go along wit

offer. As a result, it will require a good measure o

and political courage to make the right decision on 
it is only under the mantle of the U.S.ROK alliance 

feels confident enough to pursue meaningful t

Pyongyang. North Korea may need similar reassuran

it feels safe enough to proceed in a truly meaningfu

Only the Chinese are trusted enough to be able t

such reassurance to Pyongyang.

In this context, China's nuclear capability could 

source of regional stability if Beijing is willing to 

Pyongyang is willing to accept, a Chinese security 

in return both for strict North Korean adherence to th

Framework and for a resumption of the North-South 

(including a mutual commitment to the no-rep

agreement).67 The U.S. and ROK governmen

also encourage Beijing to take more initiative in 

long-term solutions to the challenges emanating 

Korean Peninsula. This is particularly important in 

of political uncertainty in the North. A more dire

Beijing, as envisioned in the Clinton-Kim April 1

Party Meeting proposal, appears crucial to ensur

window of opportunity for dialogue remains open. 

is ripe for Beijing to be more proactive in its ap

security on the Korean Peninsula, while continuing 

thus far seemingly effective "honest broker" role. 

seriously committed to economic growth and dev

and views conflict on the Korean Peninsula as disrup

long-term goals. It is, therefore, in China's vested 

continue to apply pressure on Pyongyang to coop

the United States and ROK.
South, first and foremost, must resume their direct 

But they must do more. They must start taking conc

to overcome decades of hatred and mistrust. The No

to open up, albeit slowly, and the South needs to star

the infrastructure that will help the North eventually 

itself into the ROK (and global) economy.

There is also a pressing need for CBMs aimed a

demilitarizing the Korean Peninsula. Both s

particularly the North (given Seoul's close proxim

DMZ), need to pull forces back from the DMZ, an

into talks aimed at mutual force reductions. Shortly 

death. North Korean President Kim II Sung agreed in 

to discuss reductions during his meeting with for

President Jimmy Carter. Here once again, the P

provide the necessary security assurances to the 

make demilitarization possible. While Beijing may 

uncomfortable with such a move, a stationing 

"tripwire" military forces between the DMZ and P

might provide one means of security assurance for t

HARMONIOUS U.S.-PRC RELATIONS

ESSENTIAL

While all four Asian powers have a role to play, 

analysis leads to the conclusion that the PRC and U

the central players in the Northeast Asia security dra

they interact with the rest of the region in no 

depends on how well they can interact with one an

the final analysis, and assuming the continued viabi

U.S. alliances with Japan and the ROK, the 

determinant of regional stability will be the degree of 
py p

about a U.S.-PRC alliance or strategic condominium

I demeaning the centrality of the U.S.-Japan relati

suggesting that a U.S.-PRC relationship can sub

replace that alliance. What I am talking about i

cooperation and managed competition that does not 

of the fact that China and the United States are each 

and too important for the other to ignore or alienate. 

require Beijing to lower its voice and stop treating e

action as if it were part of some grand cons

containment scheme. It will also require the curre

successor) American administration to take firm

over its foreign policy toward the PRC—and requir

Congress to act a bit more responsibly as well.

The day may come when the United States, in co

with Japan, Korea, and other regional friends and 

forced to conclude that China is determined to 

collision course with the rest of Asia and must be c

But that day has not arrived. The goal today sho

prevent this from occurring. The return of 

confrontation pitting China (and those in Asia th

choose to align themselves with the PRC) against t

States, Japan, and others, would serve no one'

security interests.

MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE HELPFU

Multilateral security dialogue also holds many pro

Asia, although it is important to understand the lim

as the opportunities it presents. Broad-based m

forums are useful vehicles for discussing potential 

They are ill-equipped (and not very eager) when it 

resolving crises or righting wrongs once they have 
y g 

rather than reacting to, crises or aggression.

Despite their limits, emerging multilatera

mechanisms in Asia can be important vehicles for 

long-term peace and stability. They offer a means 

China, and Russia to become more actively in

regional security matters in a manner that does no

their neighbors. They also provide both a mean

guarantee of, continued direct U.S. involvemen

security matters. And finally, they provide a mec

other regional actors to be heard, while contributing 

of regional identity and a spirit of cooperation.

Multilateral dialogue is not likely to produce a 

solution to South-North tensions; this can only c

direct dialogue between the two Koreas. It can

help promote and facilitate that direct dialogu

ultimately endorse or underwrite its results. Nongov

forums also provide a useful means for Koreans on 

of the DMZ to engage one another in broade

discussions that otherwise may be difficult to arra

more difficult to imagine an official multilateral foru

this purpose, at least not until some progress i

South-North talks and the cross-recognition p

completed.

CONCLUSIONS

Future stability in Asia largely rests in the hands o

major Asian powers, the United States, Japan, C

Russia. To the extent they can cooperate with one 

generally benign environment can develop in wh

challenges can most effectively be managed. C

should any one or combination of the four end 
regional security, and major tensions within any o

fifteen bilateral relationships can have a rippling eff

others, it seems clear that the United States and Chi

the central players. Assuming the U.S.-Japan securit

remains solid, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship 

the key variable affecting future regional stability

either the United States or China somehow come to 

other was the "enemy," this would quickly prove to 

fulfilling prophesy. It would force the return of 

struggle that would serve neither country's nation

interests while disrupting regional stability and 

progress. As regards the Korean Peninsula, the Uni

and China, working together, could provide the 

security umbrella for both South and North Kore

toward genuine rapprochement, partial disarmam

eventual reunification. Without U.S. and 

acquiescence, any type of meaningful reunification 

problematic. Even with it, however, success is by 

assured. Ultimately, it is up to the South and 

determine their collective fate. Hopefully, togethe

be able to design a mutually agreed upon framework 

cooperation now, leading to reunification in the 

distant future.

The key to reunification remains direct dialogu

Seoul and Pyongyang. The two sides laid the groun

closer cooperation in December 1991 with two his

South-North agreements: the Agreement on Reco

Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation and 

Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula. 

has arrived for both Koreas to resume their direc

and begin implementing these, and new, agreemen
Measures on the Korean Peninsula which appears in slightly ed

table 2 in this volume. IFANS Review is published by The 

Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

2. The ARF brings together the foreign minister

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, M

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), their dialog

(Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the Un

and the European Community), and other key regional play

Russia, and Vietnam, plus Papua New Guinea, Cambodia and 

nations in all — to discuss regional security issues.

3. CSCAP links regional security-oriented institutes a

them, broad-based member committees comprised of academicia

specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defen

Government (including uniformed military) participants take 

private capacities. CSCAP member committees have been es

Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South and North Korea, Ma

Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, and the U

A European Community consortium and an Indian institute ha

associate members. Vietnam is forming a member comm

expected to become a full member in the near future, as is Mon

4. NEACD is a "four plus two" dialogue (U.S., Japan, Ch

plus both Koreas) that brings together government officials (n

each from the foreign and defense ministries) and private 

(normally noted academicians or security policy specialists) 

country for dialogue on political, security, and economic issue

to all parties. The NEACD has met four times since October 

recently in January 1996 in Beijing. While the DPRK attended a 

meeting in July 1993, it has not participated in any of the four m

to date.

5. Some Asia dialogue mechanisms, particularly in the 

economic arenas, date back to the 1960s and 1970s, as do seve

to-military efforts. However, the most ambitious and potentiall

(like tlie ARF, CSCAP, and NEACD) are of more recent vintag

on political or security-related issues. Even the most prom

economic gatherings, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 

taken on an important political dimension with me introduction, 

of an annual "Leaders' Meeting" which brings together the head
Track?" Vital Speeches of the Day LX, no. 24, October 1, 19

7. See President Clinton's speech to the Korean Nation

in July 1993. The President's comments built upon, and ad

degree of credibility to. Ambassador Winston Lord's April 19

during his confirmation hearings to become Assistant Secretar

East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Lord signalled mat me new A

understood me economic and strategic importance of the reg

noted, 'Today, no region in the world is more important for the U

than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no r

as important."

8. For a more detailed analysis of this author's views o

Administration's then-emerging security policy in this regio

Ralph A. Cossa, "United States Security Posture in the As

Changing Strategy for a Changing World," Asia-Pacific Mili

(Malaysia), Jan 1995, and Ralph A. Cossa, "Good News fo

Bottom-Up Review, "Asia-Pacific Defense Forum 18, no. 4 (S

11-17.

9. Published by the Office of die Assistant Secretary of 

International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region) 

1995 as a follow-on to the Bush Administration's 1990 and 19

Strategy Initiative (EASI) series of reports. EASR has also bee

as the "Nye Report" since it was prepared under the direc

Assistant Secretary Joseph Nye.

10. The Cooperative Engagement strategy is spelled out in 

1993 edition of Asia-Pacific Defense Forum published by die 

Command, and in Admiral Charles R. Larson's April 21, 19

before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Bodi of Larson

as Pacific Command chief. Admirals Richard Mackey and Jos

have endorsed dlis basic strategy, which focuses on maintaini

building friendships, and deterring aggression, while maintainin

to react to and defeat aggression, should deterrence fail.

11. A phrase first coined by dien-U.S. Ambassador to 

Mansfield and since echoed by every U.S. Ambassador to Jap

recently, by President Clinton during his state visit to Japan in 

12. Please see Ralph A. Cossa, The Japan-US. Security 

Security Regimes in East Asia (Washington DC: Center for Nav

January 1995) for additional details on the alliance and its regi
secuty specasts.

14. "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance 

Century," April 17, 1996. For a copy of the complete text, 

Forum CSIS PacNet Newsletter (hereafter cited as PacNet), N

26,1996.

15. Wei Yang, "How China Should Understand and Face 

originally published in the Chinese Communist Party journal Li

subsequently distributed by the British Broadcasting Corpor

December 20,1995 "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts."

16. For commentary on China's over-reaction to Taiwan's el

the U.S.'s over-reaction to China's over-reaction, please see Ralp

"China's Missile Exercises are Likely to Backfire," Internatio

Tribune, March 9-10, 1996, and Christopher Neal, "U

nationalism fuel crisis, analysts say," Honolulu Advertiser, Marc

p. A3.

17. One of the most carefully though-out and well-crafted e

of the need to engage China can be found in U.S. Secretary 

William Perry's October 30, 1995 speech, "U.S. China Pol

Containment Nor Appeasement" presented in Seattle, Washi

PacNet, No. 4, Jan 26,1996, for an abridged version.

18. See Ralph A. Cossa, "China and Northeast Asia: 

Ahead?", Pacific Forum CSIS Policy Report, February 1994, fo

prescriptions for constructive PRC integration into die 

community of nations.

19. Kirn Young Sam and William J. Clinton, "ROK

Announcement Proposal to Hold a Four Party Meeting to Promo

the Korean Peninsula," April 16,1996.

20. See, for example, "Jiang Sends Letter to Kim to Sup

Peace Talks," Korea Times, April 22, 1996, 1. The headl

optimistic than the article gives cause to suggest.

21. The Bosnia effort has achieved some success. Howe

remains strongly opposed to any further expansion of NATO 

Kremlin's former Warsaw Pact allies.

22. The official U.S. position regarding most internation

disputes is to remain neutral while urging all sides to settle their 

peacefully. However, in the case of the Northern Territories, 

strongly and consistently supported Japan's quest for the uncondi

of all the islands.
meeting in Beijing, PRC, January 1996.

25. DPRK expectations were alluded to in So Chank-Sik, 

Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Northeast Reg

Korean Peninsula," distributed at the annual United Nations D

Conference sponsored by the UN Regional Centre for 

Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in Kathmandu, Nepal, 

1996, 3. Mr. So is Chief of the DPRK Ministry of Fore

Disarmament Division. Information in this monograph regar

attitudes and expectations is based in large part upon discussio

So, with Mr. Kim Ryul from the Institute of Disarmament a

Pyongyang, and with Mr. Kim Myong Chol, a Korean free-

residing in Japan who maintains close ties with the DPR

Ministry. I am indebted to them for the insights provided b

responsibility for any misinterpretations of their explanation

positions.

26. Ralph A. Cossa, Korean Peninsula Security in the 

October 1994 Agreed Framework Between the U.S. and DPR

Forum CSIS Special Report, December, 1995. Also summarized 

Peninsula Security: A Survey of U.S. Military Attitudes (Retired 

Duty) Toward Korean Peninsula Issues," PacNet, no. 1, Janua

27. "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration," section 4(b).

28. Norburo Yamaguchi, "Roles of US-Japan Alliance 

Regional Security Framework," in a collection of papers pre

conference on U.S.-Japan Security Relations, Washington, DC, 

1996, 89. Yamaguchi attributes the "passport to internatio

phrase to former-Administrative Vice-Director General Nish

Japan Defense Agency.

29. For more on Japanese attitudes toward China, see Ralp

"The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," 7-10. For details on China'

modest reductions in Japanese aid, also see Hisane Masaki, "C

war reparations to oppose Japanese aid freeze," Japan Tim

International, September 11-17, 1995, 3.

30. For details, see "China, South Korea Blast Japan for V

Issue," Asian Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1996, 12, and 

Criticize Japanese Attitude on Past Wrongdoings," Korea New

no. 46, 6-8.

31. The Japan- U. S. Security A lliance .
pg 

34. Based on my private conversations with Korean coll

and junior military officers and particularly during a series 

discussions in 1994 and 1995 at Yonsei University in Seoul 

graduate students.

35. "ROK, Japan Agree to Expand Military Ties," K

(English version), September 23,1995,1, and Naoaki Usui, "

Koreans Cement Alliance," Defense News, September 25 - Octo

20.

36. Son Key-young, "Seoul Shows Mixed Reactions t

Security Declaration," Korea Times, April 18,1996, 2.

37. Oh Young-Jin, "South Korea Keeps Head Cool As Jap

Regional Military Power," Korea Times, April 23,1996, 3, citi

Yong-son of the Korean Institute of Defense Analyses in Seou

38. Ibid.

39. See "Informal talks eyed with North Korea," Ja

September 24,1995, for background information on Japan-DP

40. Steve Glain, "Japan, North Korea Secretly Resume Ta

to Normalize Relations," Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1996, A

41. "What Japan's 'outline of new defence programme' i

Pyongyang Times, November 4, 1995,8.

42. Again, for more details on China's relations with its nei

both U.S. and Asian perspectives, see Ralph A. Cossa, "China an

Asia: What Lies Ahead?"

43. In the wake of the Clinton-Hasimoto summit, Japan felt 

to send a special envoy to Beijing (and to Seoul) to allay thes

details, see "Stung by China, Korea Critiques, Tokyo Sendin

Explain Policy," Japan Digest, April 22,1996, 1.

44. Ibid., 9.

45. When Lenin proclaimed that "the capitalists will 

communists) the rope we need to hang them with," he cou

foreseen that the capitalists would be in the Kremlin, while th

be the Chinese, who are eagerly buying up as much rope as the 

willing to sell, and at bargain prices to boot. For details on R

sales to China, see Theresa Hitchens, "Industry, Defense N

Russia-China Arms Link," Defense News, February 5-11, 199
in Common," Washington Post, April 24, 1996, A25.

49. Son Key-young, "China Opposes Use of Any Force by 

or South to Settle Korean Problems," The Korea Times, Decemb

2, citing Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan.

50. "Jiang Lauds China-ROK Ties," China Daily, Novemb

4, which reproduces the full text ofJiang's November 14, 199

51. Jiang has yet to make a state visit to Pyongyang.

52. Ralph A. Cossa, "China and Northeast Asia: What L

9.

53. For an assessment of Primakov, see Carol William

Policy Veers to the East," Los Angeles Times World Repor

1996, 1. Also see Marian Leighton, "Prom KGB to MFA

Becomes Russian Foreign Minister," PacNet, no. 11, March 

54. Alexander Sychev, "When Russian Gunsmithes Rem

Job, They Find It At 'Samsung,'" Izvestiya, Oct 10, 1995, 3, as 

in Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report (h

as NAPS Daily Report), November 2, 1995.

55. See "Korea Peace Proposal" section in NAPS Report, M

which summarizes, among other reporting, "South Korea Cou

Talks," Washington Times, May 6, 1996, A 13.

56. The proposal deals specifically with replacing the 19

with a peace treaty. Since Russia was not a signatory to the A

exclusion from this particular initiative should not be seen as s

as an attempt to exclude Moscow from Asian security affairs)

57. See 1995 Kyodo News Service stories entitled "Russi

friendship treaty with North Korea," Moscow, September 7; "R

cancellation of pact with North Korea, Moscow," September 7

Korea mulls new treaty offer from Russia," September 8; plus 

your own,' Russia tells North Korea," Jane's Defense Weekly, 

58. Unlike the Korea case, public opinion in the then-Sovie

very much opposed to German reunification but, even in this ca

little Moscow could do politically to halt mis movement once t

control over East German was loosened.

59. Ralph A. Cossa, The Japan-US. Alliance and Secu

in East Asia, 33.
gp(

Korea Economic Institute of America, 1996), 232. Mr. Chun

for Economic Affairs at the Republic of Korea Embassy in Wash

62. Choi and Lee, 6-11.

63. Seo-Hang Lee, "Korea's Approach to Multilate

Regimes: Four Working Principles," PacNet, no. 34, Novemb

64. So Chank-Sik, "Features of Security Situation in the 

Region, Northeast Region, and the Korean Peninsula," an

discussions in Kathmandu, Nepal.

65. Ibid., p. 3.

66. Harrison reports mat senior DPRK military officials a

"set up the new peace mechanism on the basis of mutual under

the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea will continue inde

that Pyongyang has abandoned its quest for a separate peace tr

U.S. and now envisions "implementing separate military agre

Washington and Seoul" after dissolving the Armistice. ("North 

to Ease Stance on U.S. Troops," Washington Post, Septemb

A22). To date, me DPRK has not made these proposals fo

United States and ROK through established diplomatic channe

67. While Russia has a nuclear arsenal that clearly 

China's, it appears less likely that Pyongyang would turn t

security guarantees or trustingly accept them if offered, given R

abandonment of Marxism.
p

ASEAN Regional Forum

Association of Southeast Asian Nation

confidence-building measure

Council for Security Cooperation

in the Asia Pacific

Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (North Korea)

East Asia Strategy Report

Group of Seven

International Atomic Energy Agency

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

People's Republic of China

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

73
p

a Honolulu-based, policy-oriented Asia-Pacific 

institute affiliated with the Center for Stra

International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. 

Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of the C

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. A politic

affairs specialist and former U.S. Air Force colon

previously been a National Security Affairs Fell

Hoover Institution and the Deputy Director for 

Studies at the National Defense University's In

National Strategic Studies in Washington.

75
million troops, was about to take command of Allied grou

Europe under Elsenhower, when he was killed in combat in No

July 1944.

The/allowing Is a complete listing of published McNair P

information on availability of specific titles, contact the 

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fo

Washington, DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/685

325-4379).

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Fe

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or C

Monarch? October 1989.

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic

1989.

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy i

World, February 1990.

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in So

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Di

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990.

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990.

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense In

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990.

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless N

Nationless States, September 1990.

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, Ju

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Z

1991.

13. Richard J. Dunn HI, From Gettysburg to the Gulf a

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in La

March 1992.

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure a

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993.

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security Af

War, February 1993.
20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas DureU-Young; Jef

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James 

European Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed.. Developing Battlefield Technol

1990s, August 1993.

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993.

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce,

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993.

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, an

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 19

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Fai

January 1994.

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Securit

February 1994.

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculation

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994.

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and C

April 1994.

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirirwvskiy: An Asses

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994.

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm a

December 1994.

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th C

Impossible Dream, January 1995.

34. James H. Brusstar aid Ellen Jones, The Russian Milita

Politics, January 1995.

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia; Tra

Security in Transition, January 1995.

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Ch

Transfers, February 1995.

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency C

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: D
43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Futu

Security Policy, August 1995.

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and T

Assessment, October 1995.

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failu

Israeli Wars? October 1995.

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collect

December 1995.

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim C

January 1996.

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Irani

January 1996.

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble 

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996.

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World W

and Reality, August 1996.
is pleased to announce

a new program of

electronic publication!

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Strategic Forums

McNair Papers

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Selected Books

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%^e €€€ie^ ewe &e€«t^ ei^eUeC evcn

Electronic publications ca

be found on the World Wide 

at the award-winning NDU Hom

http://www.ndu.edu

For direct access to

publications only, use

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