ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 1 

The signing of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) in July 

2015 to address international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program 

has led to bullish predictions about the future of Sino-Iranian relations. Under the deal, Iran is expected to limit its uranium enrichment and make 

other changes to its nuclear program in exchange for the removal of international sanctions.1

 China is expected to be a prime beneficiary of the deal as Chinese 

firms take advantage of greater access to the Iranian market, especially in the 

energy sector. Some U.S. analysts also contend that the two countries could forge 

deeper strategic relations as well, involving coordination designed to weaken 

U.S. influence—or what both states see as U.S. “hegemonism”—in the region.2

Although the JCPOA will facilitate closer relations between Beijing and 

Tehran in some areas, relations between the two will remain constrained by 

several obstacles. These include China’s need to balance its relations with Iran 

against those with the United States and others in the region that are on poor 

terms with Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey; its hedging of geopolitical risk by avoiding overreliance on Iran as an energy partner; and its basic 

desire for a stable and peaceful Middle East, which militates against support 

for a more assertive Iranian foreign policy. Thus, despite the prospects of greater 

China-Iran economic and diplomatic cooperation, the two will likely make only 

limited progress in developing more comprehensive strategic relations.

Yet even a modest expansion of Sino-Iranian ties could have significant 

consequences for the United States. This is most notable in the military arena, 

where China and Iran may seek to revive their once-close cooperation. Chinese 

sales of advanced weapons could improve Iran’s ability to threaten U.S. military 

forces in the Middle East and pose proliferation risks. Washington should address these challenges by enforcing the remaining sanctions on Iran and urging 

Posing Problems Without an 

Alliance: China-Iran Relations 

after the Nuclear Deal

by Joel Wuthnow

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow 

in the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ China is poised to increase economic and diplomatic cooperation 

with Iran as a result of sanctions 

relief under the recent Iran nuclear 

deal, though a close geopolitical 

alignment between the two states 

is unlikely.

◆ Sino-Iranian relations will remain 

limited by several enduring constraints, including China’s desire for 

positive ties with other states, its 

pursuit of energy diversification, 

and its need for regional stability.

◆ Renewed Chinese arms sales to 

Iran could constitute an emerging 

challenge for the United States. 

This could increase Iran’s antiaccess/

area-denial threat to U.S. military 

forces and create proliferation risks.

◆ U.S. officials should press Chinese 

interlocutors to avoid exporting 

advanced weapons, which could 

embolden Iran to conduct a more 

brazen foreign policy that would 

threaten China’s fundamental need 

for regional stability.

February 2016

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

Beijing to limit the scope of its military cooperation with 

Tehran. 

A Limited Partnership

In recent years, China has developed what many 

observers describe as a limited partnership with Iran.3

This has included robust ties in some areas despite growing international concern over Tehran’s nuclear program. 

Iran remains a major source of China’s oil supply, accounting for about 9 percent of Chinese crude oil imports in 2014, despite international sanctions against 

Tehran.4 Chinese firms have also invested in Iran’s oil 

and natural gas sectors and have sold gasoline back to 

Iran, which lacks sufficient refinery capacity of its own. 

Iran has also been a market for Chinese manufactured 

goods, such as consumer electronics, toys, and apparel. 

Total trade between the two countries rose from about 

$29.4 billion to $51.9 billion between 2010 and 2014.5

Political relations have included high-level visits, such as 

recent interactions between the respective heads of state, 

Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani.6 Bilateral military relations have picked up in the last few years, symbolized by 

high-level military exchanges and port visits.7

However, Sino-Iranian relations have faced limitations as well. Despite its continuing oil imports from 

Iran, China has hedged against overreliance by expanding partnerships with other suppliers within and beyond 

the Middle East. Bilateral economic relations have faced 

strains, including energy investment deals that have been 

canceled or delayed.8 China’s advocacy for Iran on the 

international stage has been limited, as evidenced by 

its approval of several rounds of sanctions on Tehran in 

the 2000s.9 Despite some high-level meetings, Chinese 

leaders avoided traveling to Iran between 2002 and early 

2016, when Xi Jinping made his inaugural visit to Tehran. Beijing ended its support for Iran’s nuclear program 

in 1997 and has largely refrained from major military 

sales to Iran over the last decade.10 In some respects, 

China has been more of a “fair-weather” friend to Iran, 

in contrast to its stronger “all-weather” partnerships with 

states such as Pakistan or North Korea.11

A key issue is whether, and how, the nuclear deal 

may affect China’s policies toward Iran. In the absence 

of nuclear-related sanctions, and with a possible diminution of Iran’s status as a pariah state, how might Beijing 

expand its economic, diplomatic, and military relations 

with Tehran? Are the two states poised to develop a more 

consistent and strategically significant partnership? And 

what will be the implications for the United States? The 

answers require an understanding not only of the opportunities that sanctions relief may provide to China, but 

also of the enduring constraints on the relations between 

Beijing and Tehran. 

Sanctions Relief and Growing 

China-Iran Cooperation

The JCPOA will have both direct and indirect effects on China-Iran relations. Most directly, the lifting 

of United Nations (UN) and U.S. nuclear-related sanctions will increase opportunities for Chinese firms to invest in and trade with Iran.12 This is of greatest relevance 

to the energy sector, where Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) previously slowed their advancement 

into the Iranian market in order to avoid U.S. secondary 

sanctions.13 In anticipation of sanctions relief, Chinese 

NOCs such as Sinopec and China National Petroleum 

Corporation (CNPC) are expected to increase production in Iran, contributing to a rise in oil output.14 CNPC 

may also return to the development of the offshore 

South Pars gas field, from which it withdrew in mid2012.15 Nevertheless, as Eurasia Group analyst Erica 

Downs notes, the decline in global crude oil prices could 

mean that Chinese NOCs will be increasingly selective 

in making upstream investments abroad.16 In addition, 

Chinese firms may attempt to compete in other sectors, 

seeking to capture a share of the $100 billion in Iranian 

assets that will be unlocked as part of the nuclear deal.17

Overall, the two states have set the ambitious goal of increasing bilateral trade tenfold, to $600 billion, by 2026.18

China may also expand its infrastructure development assistance to Iran. This could involve increased 

financing through the China-led Asian Infrastructure 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 3 

Investment Bank (AIIB), of which Iran is a founding 

member. Of note, as part of its massive Eurasian development initiative known as “One Belt, One Road,” China 

has proposed a high-speed railway linking western China 

with Iran via Central Asia.19 A Chinese firm is also reportedly slated to build a $2 billion natural gas pipeline 

linking Iran to Pakistan.20 In addition, China and Iran 

have reached a $10 billion deal to construct two nuclear 

plants in southeast Iran and will cooperate in the redesign 

and modernization of Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak.21

In addition, Chinese arms traders could take advantage of an end to the UN arms embargo that was imposed 

on Iran in 2010. China would not be alone in seizing opportunities in this sector. For instance, Russia has promised to move ahead with sales of advanced S-300 surfaceto-air missiles, which also provide some defense against 

ballistic and cruise missiles.22 As part of the nuclear deal, 

sales of some types of major conventional weapons would 

require a waiver from the UN Security Council (UNSC), 

where China sits as a permanent member. Yet even these 

restrictions would expire after eight years, assuming Iran’s 

compliance with the agreement. Importantly, this could 

create opportunities for China to resume sales of advanced systems such as fast attack patrol craft and antiship missiles, both of which China supplied to Iran prior 

to the imposition of UN sanctions.23 The implications of 

closer China-Iran military cooperation for the United 

States are discussed below.

Sanctions relief will also have an indirect effect 

on China-Iran cooperation by diminishing the latter’s 

status as a pariah state. Tehran’s violations of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection requirements 

placed it alongside North Korea, Sudan, Myanmar, and 

Zimbabwe as states operating outside the boundaries of 

international rules and norms. China often limited its 

interactions with these regimes in order to burnish its 

reputation as what former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 

Robert Zoellick called a “responsible stakeholder.”24 Beijing also sought to counter U.S. and European perceptions that its involvement with these states was enabling 

their reckless behavior.25 Regarding Iran, China agreed 

to support a referral of the nuclear case to the UNSC and 

later voted in favor of sanctions.26 China also lowered 

its reliance on Iran as an energy partner, with the latter 

dropping from China’s third-largest to sixth-largest oil 

supplier after UN sanctions were adopted. 

Without the imposition of UN sanctions, China 

faces less stigma in developing its economic and political 

relations with Iran. This is exemplified by Xi Jinping’s 

state visit to Iran in January 2016, which occurred less 

than two weeks after the formal implementation date for 

the JCPOA. Previously, Chinese presidents had avoided 

travelling to Iran, likely due to the desire to avoid the 

perception of overly close relations with Tehran. Xi’s visit, which included meetings with Rouhani and supreme 

leader Ali Khameini, reversed this trend and opened a 

new chapter of high-level exchanges between the two 

states. The visit also resulted in the establishment of a 

China-Iran “comprehensive strategic partnership” (quanmian zhanlüe huoban guanxi, 全面战略伙伴关系).27 This 

is a diplomatic label that China uses to underscore its 

priority relationships, placing Iran in the same category 

as other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia and 

Egypt, as well as others beyond the region, including 

France, Australia, and Spain.28

During his visit, Xi and his counterparts sketched 

the outlines of expanded China-Iran exchanges in several fields. These included the following:

◆ Enhanced economic relations. Xi highlighted the 

growing prospects for cooperation in energy, infrastructure development, and finance, which would be pursued 

under the framework of China’s “One Belt/One Road” 

initiative. The two states also pledged to explore stronger 

cooperation within the AIIB.

◆ Enhanced political relations. An annual foreign 

minister’s meeting between the two countries was established in order to deepen “mutual strategic trust.” China 

also voiced its support for Iran’s bid for full membership 

in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which focuses on improving collective security in Central Asia.
4 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

◆ Enhanced cultural relations. Greater tourism between the two countries was encouraged, symbolized by 

Iran’s opening of three new tourism offices in China.29

To be sure, several qualifications to expanded SinoIranian cooperation under the nuclear deal are worth 

mentioning. First, sanctions could “snap back” if Iran is 

found to be in violation of the agreement. China and 

Russia do not have the ability to veto a re-imposition of 

sanctions.30 This creates a potential risk for any company, 

Chinese or otherwise, seeking to expand its presence in 

Iran. Second, U.S. domestic sanctions on Iran based on 

terrorism and human rights grounds will remain in place, 

in addition to new U.S. sanctions levied on Iran’s ballistic 

missile program.31 Chinese firms could still face punitive action in the United States if they run afoul of those 

measures. Third, Iranian noncompliance with the nuclear 

deal would also complicate progress in China-Iran political relations by requiring Beijing to enforce penalties 

on an erstwhile strategic partner.32 Nevertheless, if Iran 

does abide by the agreement in the coming years, then 

relations between the two states will likely continue to 

develop in the economic, political, and cultural domains. 

Persistent Constraints

Despite opportunities for greater Sino-Iranian cooperation stemming from the nuclear deal, ties between 

China and Iran are likely to remain limited. The reason 

is that the JCPOA will not fundamentally remove several enduring constraints on closer relations between the 

two states. In particular, four key constraints are likely 

to remain.

First are challenges to doing business in Iran. Chinese firms (like those from other nations) have faced 

difficulties operating in Iran due to corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, a beleaguered financial sector, and 

other endemic issues.33 These challenges are expected 

to pose problems for foreign firms even after Iran’s 

economy opens up, though Chinese companies may be 

somewhat less constrained than U.S. firms, which are 

inhibited under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.34

Another problem centers on the worries by some in Iran 

over the influx of cheap, “low-quality” Chinese goods, 

which have a negative impact on Iran’s manufacturing 

sector and have occasionally led to calls to ban certain 

types of Chinese imports.35 These concerns may even 

grow as Iran becomes more open to foreign competition. For instance, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps 

(IRGC), which controls large segments of Iran’s economy, has voiced concern about the impact of economic 

opening on its interests and may oppose greater Chinese involvement in some areas.36 In addition, Chinese 

businesses will face competition from other foreign 

firms, including European companies that have been 

out of the Iranian market only since European Union 

sanctions were imposed in 2012. Russian, Indian, Japanese, and other companies will also be players.37

Second is China’s pursuit of a diversified energy security strategy. Due to limited domestic oil and gas production, China has had to increase reliance on foreign 

energy supplies over the past 20 years. Yet because of the 

need to reduce economic and geopolitical risk, China 

has adopted an energy security strategy that prioritizes 

diversification of supplies. In the oil sector, China imports crude oil from a range of Middle Eastern, African, 

Latin American, and Central Asian partners. As a component of China’s oil imports, Iran has hovered in the 

9–11 percent range in recent years, behind other states 

such as Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Oman.38 China has 

also sought to address the more general risks associated with transporting oil across maritime chokepoints 

such as the Strait of Malacca by working to construct oil 

pipelines with Russia and Kazakhstan.39 This has limited 

Iran’s emergence as a more important energy partner for 

China. The figure shows China’s crude oil suppliers by 

share in 2014.

The nuclear deal will not alter China’s pursuit of a 

diversified energy security strategy. Even if its share of 

crude oil imports from Iran rises modestly, China will 

still continue to hedge against geopolitical risk and supply 

uncertainty by seeking energy supplies from across and 

beyond the Middle East.40 This will include a continued 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 5 

emphasis on pipeline construction as a way to reduce reliance on vulnerable maritime oil shipments, with overland 

supplies projected to rise to about 10 percent of China’s 

oil imports by 2030. Additionally, China will also increasingly pursue nonconventional energy sources, such as 

shale oil and oil and natural gas reserves in the Arctic, and 

will place greater reliance on renewable energy.41 None of 

this presages a drastic increase in Chinese dependency on 

Iranian fossil fuels. 

Third is China’s need to maintain positive diplomatic relations with other states. In his seminal book 

on Sino-Iranian relations, John Garver documents how 

China has attempted to balance relations with Iran with 

its larger goal of improving relations with the United 

States. Notably, this latter imperative resulted in China’s 

decision to end its involvement with Iran’s nuclear program.42 The reason is that the United States has simply 

been a more important economic and diplomatic partner 

for China than Iran. To put things in perspective, ChinaU.S. trade in 2014 was over ten times the value of China’s 

trade with Iran, as was the value of Chinese investments 

in the U.S. economy compared to those in Iran.43 China 

has also forged an important global partnership with 

the United States on issues ranging from counterterrorism to climate change. The nuclear deal will not reduce 

Washington’s importance to Beijing, meaning that the 

latter will have to consider how its evolving ties with Iran 

could affect its relations with the United States.

Of equal or greater importance is China’s need to 

maintain positive relations with other major regional 

states, many of which are on poor terms with Iran.44

These include Arab Gulf states (especially major oil 

suppliers such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United 

Arab Emirates), Israel, and Turkey.45 For instance, Beijing has stronger trade and investment ties with Riyadh 

than it does with Tehran, and it imports nearly twice 

as much oil from Saudi Arabia as it does from Iran.46

China also maintains formal strategic partnerships with 

Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and others in the 

region.47 China has tried to balance its regional commitments by keeping a relatively low diplomatic profile 

and avoiding taking strong positions on issues such as 

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war.48

It is doubtful that Beijing would significantly expand its 

relations with Iran without first considering the implications for its other partnerships.

Fourth is China’s enduring need for stability in the 

Middle East. Despite efforts to diversify its energy imports, China is still fairly reliant on the Middle East, 

which accounted for 52 percent of China’s foreign crude 

oil purchases in 2014. Combined with concerns about 

fuel prices, reliance on the Middle East creates a strong 

incentive for China to oppose the actions of any states 

that would threaten regional stability. Moreover, even if 

China were less reliant on Middle Eastern oil, it would 

still be subject to price shocks that could occur as a result 

of military conflict. Thus, Chinese analysts have frequently raised concerns over Iranian threats to close the Strait 

of Hormuz in a crisis and have also worried about the 

ramifications of Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, 

which could spark Israeli or U.S. military action and/or 

a regional arms race.49 Some in China also worry about 

Iran’s support for terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, 

which may pose risks for the rising numbers of Chinese 

nationals in the Middle East. Beijing would have no incentive to encourage or support a more bellicose Iranian 

Saudi Arabia

16%

Angola

13%

Russia

11%

Oman

10%

Iraq

9%

Venezuela

4%

Iran

9%

United Arab Emirates

4%

Kuwait

3%

Colombia

3%

Congo

2%

Brazil

2%

South Sudan

2%

Kazakhstan

2%

Others

10%

Figure. China’s Crude Oil Suppliers, 2014

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
6 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

foreign policy, even if Tehran is no longer on the road to 

a nuclear weapon.

How Relations Will Remain 

Limited

Since the JCPOA will not remove several enduring 

constraints on Sino-Iranian relations, it is unlikely that 

the two countries will develop a close geopolitical alignment. China will not, for instance, overtly or even tacitly 

support Iran’s desire to build a Shia sphere of influence 

in the Middle East, nor will Beijing side with Tehran in 

the latter’s ongoing political disputes with Riyadh, Tel 

Aviv, or Baghdad.50 China’s continued regional balancing 

act was on display in advance of Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran 

in January 2016, in which Beijing balanced closer ties 

with Tehran with improved relations with Arab states. 

Specific steps included establishing a formal “strategic 

partnership” with Iraq in December 2015; releasing a 

formal policy paper on China-Arab relations;51 upgrading Sino-Saudi relations to a “comprehensive strategic 

partnership,” keeping that relationship on the same diplomatic level as Sino-Iranian ties;52 and including both 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the itinerary for Xi’s visit. In 

addition, China characteristically refused to take sides in 

the intensification of sectarian tensions between Saudi 

Arabia and Iran that followed Riyadh’s execution of a 

Shiite cleric in January 2016.53

China is also unlikely to pursue two other types of 

arrangements with Iran. First, the two will not establish 

a Western-style military alliance. China has long conducted an independent foreign policy that generally eschews alliance commitments, maintaining a formal mutual defense treaty only with North Korea. It does not 

have alliances with states with which Beijing maintains 

closer relations than it does with Iran, such as Pakistan 

and Russia, raising the question of why it would offer 

Tehran security assurances. China has also frequently 

dismissed the notion that it would intervene militarily in 

a Middle East dispute, and it likely does not possess the 

capability to do so even if it had such a desire.54 Instead, 

China would work to avoid the perception of an alliance 

with Iran since it would needlessly complicate its relations with other partners in the region, such as Saudi 

Arabia and Israel. 

Second, China is unlikely to forge a comprehensive 

anti-American political alignment with Iran. To be sure, 

China and Iran are both ideologically inclined to oppose 

what they regard as U.S. hegemonic ambitions and support 

the idea of a more multipolar world order.55 Commitment 

to these principles stretches as far back as the Bandung 

Conference of 1955, in which China and Iran joined dozens of other countries to promote sovereignty and oppose 

the meddling of superpowers in regional affairs. Most recently, Beijing and Tehran called for Asia to be free from 

U.S. interference as part of a regional security summit held 

in Shanghai in 2014.56 The two countries also share grievances over aspects of U.S. foreign policy, such as unilateral 

U.S. sanctions (to which both countries have been subject) 

and criticism of other states’ human rights practices.57

Despite this ideological affinity, China is unlikely 

to work with Iran to undermine U.S. foreign policy in 

the region. One reason is that, as suggested above, China 

simply has more at stake in its relations with the United 

States than it does with Iran. It is unlikely that Beijing 

would jeopardize its significant economic and political 

partnership with Washington for the sake of pursuing 

an anti-U.S. partnership with Iran. Moreover, China has 

no qualms with much of the U.S. diplomatic agenda in 

the Middle East and in fact shares similar goals on many 

issues, such as bringing peace to Syria, opposing al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, safeguarding vital sea lanes, countering nuclear proliferation, 

and, above all, ensuring regional stability. Consequently, 

Beijing would probably find that it has little to gain, and 

much to lose, by coordinating with Tehran to undercut 

U.S. policy in the region. 

A Cause for Concern: Arms Sales

In some respects, a stronger China-Iran partnership would have only minor implications for the United 

States. Economically, U.S. and Chinese firms are unlikely 

to compete since the U.S. embargo on Iran remains intact. 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 7 

An exception may be in the aviation sector, in which the 

JCPOA creates limited openings for U.S. companies to 

sell commercial aircraft and parts to Iran.58 But U.S. companies, such as Boeing, are more likely to compete with 

those from Europe than from China.59 Diplomatically, 

just as it does sometimes with Russia and other states, 

China may work with Iran to oppose U.S. foreign policy 

goals on select issues such as human rights and unilateral 

sanctions, though it is unlikely to form a comprehensive 

anti-American alignment with Tehran. 

A more complex and dangerous challenge for the 

United States could lie in enhanced Sino-Iranian military cooperation.60 In this respect, it is necessary to understand the historical context. In the 1980s and early 

1990s, China and Iran developed significant arms sector 

cooperation, with China supplying Iran with advanced 

fighter aircraft, tanks, radars, cruise missiles, fast attack 

patrol craft, and other weapons. Many of these systems 

were employed by Iran in its 1980–1988 war with Iraq. 

John Garver argues that China was not only driven by 

profit considerations, but also sought to build Iran into 

a capable bulwark against U.S. regional hegemony. This 

was evident in China’s sales of weapons that could target 

U.S. forces, such as anti-ship missiles. However, Garver also notes that China had to balance its arms sales 

against the continued need to maintain positive ties with 

Washington, a factor that limited Chinese assistance in 

the nuclear and ballistic missile fields.61

Chinese military cooperation with Iran declined in 

the 2000s, coinciding with international concern over 

Iran’s evolving nuclear program and the imposition of 

UN sanctions. Resolutions adopted in the UNSC with 

China’s support prohibited cooperation with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile industries and were expanded in 

2010 with a resolution imposing an embargo on exports 

of major conventional weapons to Iran. These included 

tanks, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, 

certain naval ships, and missiles with a maximum range 

of at least 25 kilometers.62 The resolution also imposed 

sanctions on a variety of Iranian military officials, arms 

firms, and financial institutions. This effectively ruled out 

significant Chinese support for the IRGC. High-level 

military interactions, which were held frequently in the 

1980s and 1990s, dissipated in the 2000s but have picked 

up in the last few years.63

The JCPOA would permit a resumption of Chinese 

arms exports to Iran by lifting the UN arms embargo. 

As noted above, UNSC approval would be required for 

the transfer for major conventional weapons for 8 years, 

though China could attempt to secure waivers as a permanent member of the Security Council.64 The table on 

the following page identifies how the nuclear deal would 

affect sales of the systems supplied by China to Iran in 

the decade prior to the imposition of the 2010 sanctions. 

In general, renewed sales of most of these systems would 

require UNSC approval, though provision of shortrange missiles such as the FL-8 would likely be permitted without a waiver. 

China may also provide Iran with more advanced 

weapons. For instance, China could transfer advanced 

cruise missiles or technical expertise that could enable 

Iran to improve its domestic production of anti-ship 

or land attack cruise missiles.65 Chinese media has also 

speculated over potential sales of J-10 Firebird fighter 

aircraft to Iran.66 Another system could be the Houbeiclass fast attack missile boat, which China plans to sell 

to Pakistan.67 This could be a logical choice, given recent positive trends in the development of China-Iran 

navy-to-navy relations.68 China could also enhance its 

cooperation with Iran in areas such as unmanned aircraft 

systems, space or counterspace systems, missile defense 

components, or electronic warfare capabilities. However, 

sales of most, if not all, of these systems would require a 

UNSC waiver for the first 8 years of the JCPOA.

Even a limited resumption of Chinese arms sales 

to Iran could have significant negative implications 

for the United States. In particular, Chinese weapons could exacerbate antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) 

threats posed by Iran. This refers to Tehran’s ability to 

forestall or complicate U.S. military intervention in the 

event of a crisis.69 China would be in a strong position to assist Iran in developing its A2/AD systems, 
8 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

since Beijing has also concentrated on developing the 

capabilities needed to challenge U.S. intervening forces, 

notably in the context of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.70

For instance, more advanced anti-ship cruise missiles or 

fast attack missile boats could allow the IRGC to pose 

greater threats to U.S. naval forces transiting the Strait 

of Hormuz. Stronger capabilities could also encourage 

Iran to carry out more provocative exercises explicitly 

targeting U.S. forces. In February 2015, Iranian forces 

destroyed a mock U.S. aircraft carrier, while in December 2015, Iran test-fired a missile within 1,500 yards of 

the carrier USS Harry S. Truman in the Strait of Hormuz.71 Chinese support could lead to a continuation or 

expansion of such activities.

Iran could also leverage Chinese assistance to produce missiles that could strike more distant U.S. targets, 

such as military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia.72 China has pledged to adhere to Missile Technology 

Control Regime guidelines limiting transfer of components and technologies that can be used in long-range 

ballistic and cruise missiles, but its compliance with its 

commitments has sometimes been problematic.73

Another challenge would lie in the potential proliferation risks associated with greater Iranian access to 

Chinese arms. Tehran could attempt to re-export weapons to other states, especially the Bashar Assad regime in 

Syria, which could in turn employ them against U.S. or 

coalition forces. Iran could also transfer arms to terrorist 

groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in the 

Palestinian territories, which may use them against both 

military and civilian targets.74 Likewise, Tehran could 

provide Chinese-made arms to Shiite militias in Iraq 

that have sought to undermine the pro-American prime 

minister, Haider al-Abadi.75 Any of these outcomes 

could prove to be politically and militarily destabilizing 

for the region. 

To be sure, China’s leaders would face a difficult 

choice in deciding whether, and to what extent, to revive the arms relationship with Iran. On one hand, Chinese foreign ministry officials would likely argue against 

a significant resumption of arms sales, since this could 

needlessly complicate China’s relations with the United 

States and regional states, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, 

and Turkey. On the other hand, the People’s Liberation 

Army and Chinese arms manufacturers could lobby in 

favor of arms sales. As in the past, some Chinese military strategists could see arms exports as a way to enable 

Iran to more effectively counter U.S. “hegemony” in the 

region. For their part, Chinese arms traders could simply 

desire not to lose an important market opportunity, and 

to retain China’s position as one of the world’s top arms 

System Description Range Years of

Deliveries

Sales Under JCPOA

C-802 Anti-ship missile 120 km 1994–2012 Requires UNSC approval for first 8 years; no 

restrictions thereafter

Type-86 APC N/A 1997–2011 Requires UNSC approval for first 8 years; no 

restrictions thereafter

TL-10/FL-8 Anti-ship missile 18 km 2002 Permitted (maximum range under 25 km)

C-704 Anti-ship missile 45 km 2003 Requires UNSC approval for first 8 years; no 

restrictions thereafter

C-801 Anti-ship missile 40 km 2004 Requires UNSC approval for first 8 years; no 

restrictions thereafter

QW-11 Portable surface-toair missile5 km 2005 Requires UNSC approval for first 8 years; no 

restrictions thereafter

Table. Chinese Arms Sales and JCPOA Impact

Sources: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, available at <www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>; Jane’s Online, available 

at <https://janes.ihs.com>.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 9 

exporters.76 Ultimately, the latter arguments could prove 

persuasive to Chinese decisionmakers. 

The United States should actively work to mitigate 

these risks. To start, Washington should work with allies such as Britain and France in the UNSC to deny 

waivers for sales of major conventional weapons to Iran 

in the first 8 years of the nuclear agreement. Second, 

the United States should vigorously enforce remaining 

sanctions on Iran, which could involve penalties against 

Chinese firms found to be in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act.77 Moreover, the United States should 

encourage China to avoid sales of advanced weapons to 

Iran, including those that could allow Iran to increase 

its ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Strait of 

Hormuz. The argument should be that such sales could 

embolden Iran to conduct a more brazen foreign policy, 

which could endanger the reliability of Chinese oil supplies and threaten China’s broader interest in regional 

stability. Washington should also encourage its regional 

partners, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, to 

make similar appeals to Beijing. 

Conclusion 

Despite the nuclear deal, China and Iran are probably destined to remain fair-weather friends, even if 

they have established a formal “comprehensive strategic 

partnership.” China’s economic, political, and strategic 

interests are too complex and self-contradictory to permit a close alignment with Iran. Yet even a limited expansion of Sino-Iranian relations could pose problems 

for the United States, especially in the military domain. 

Iran should remain a key topic in high-level U.S.-China 

discussions, not only in the most obvious sense of scrutinizing Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, but also in 

the more subtle arena of dissuading Beijing from significantly expanding its military relationship with Tehran. 

Failure to do so could precipitate a range of serious challenges for U.S. forces in the region.

Notes 1For details, see Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Washington, 

DC: Department of State, 2015), available at <www.state.gov/e/eb/

tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/>.

2Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango: Why the Nuclear 

Deal is Good for China,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, available at 

<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iraniantango>; Elizabeth Rosenberg and Alexander Sullivan, “Why China 

Likes the Iran Deal,” CNN.com, July 31, 2015, available at <www.

cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/>; 

Brian Spegele, “Oil-Thirsty China a Winner in Iran Deal,” Wall Street 

Journal, July 14, 2015, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/oil-thirstychina-a-winner-in-iran-deal-1436909582>. The notion that China 

is seeking to forge a strategic alignment with Iran to oppose the 

United States is not new. For earlier explications of this argument, 

see John Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial 

World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); and Christina 

Lin, “China, Iran, and North Korea: A Triangular Strategic Alliance,” 

MERIA 14, no. 1 (March 5, 2010), available at <www.rubincenter.

org/2010/03/lin-2010-03-05/>.

3 See, for example, Scott W. Harold, “Opportunistic Cooperation 

Under Constraints: Non-Proliferation, Energy Trade, and the Evolution of Chinese Policy towards Iran,” Chinese Journal of International 

Politics 8, no. 1 (November 2014), 59–88; Scott W. Harold and Alireza 

Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012); Marybeth Davis et al., ChinaIran: A Limited Partnership (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, 2012).

4U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China: 

International Energy Data and Analysis (Washington, DC: EIA, May 

14, 2015), available at <www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.

cfm?iso=CHN>. 

5United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, available at <http://comtrade.un.org/db/>.

6 “Xi Jinping Meets with President Hasan Rouhani of Iran,” 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 

September 29, 2015, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/

zxxx_662805/t1304150.shtml>. 

7 Joel Wuthnow, “China-Iran Military Relations at a Crossroads,” China Brief 15, no. 3, (February 4, 2015), available at <www.

jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_

news%5D=43497&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=eab6f925

192bbcb63ca3ebc4ec16eeef#.VoqhS_nR_RY>.

8Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney, “Getting China to Sanction Iran: The Chinese-Iranian Oil Connection,” Foreign Affairs 90, 

no. 2 (March–April 2011), 15–21.

9 See Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security 

Council (New York: Routledge, 2013), 75–94.

10Wuthnow, “China-Iran Military Relations at a Crossroads.”

11Peter Mackenzie, A Closer Look at China-Iran Relations (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2010), 4.

The author thanks Dr. Phillip C. Saunders and Dr. 

Denise Natali for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
10 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

12European Union (EU) sanctions are also set to be lifted, but 

these only apply to EU persons and firms.

13 One Chinese national oil company, Zhuhai Zhenrong, was 

subjected to U.S. secondary sanctions in 2012 for violating provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act. See “Three Companies Sanctioned 

Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” U.S. State Department 

Fact Sheet, January 12, 2012, available at <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/

fs/2012/180645.htm>.

14 “China State Firms to Start Pumping New Oil in Iran—

Sources,” Reuters, July 31, 2015, available at <www.reuters.com/

article/china-iran-oil-idUSL3N10B29620150731>; “Iran Renews Oil 

Contracts with China, Taps New Buyers,” Reuters, December 3, 2015, 

available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-idUSKBN0T

M0CN20151203#3mUqrcpP3V3fO0wP.97>. 

15 “China-Iran: New Oil Agreements in Sight,” ABO Newsletter, April 9, 2015, available at <www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.

do?contentId=2413807>. 

16Erica Downs, “Looking West: China and Central Asia,” 

testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 18, 2015. In addition, falling global prices have had a 

more general deleterious effect on Chinese trade with Middle Eastern 

partners, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, by shrinking import values. 

China’s minister of commerce blamed oil prices on a 38.2 percent 

decline in Iranian exports to China in the first 11 months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. See “Price Declines Impact China’s 

Trade with Oil Exporters,” Xinhua, January 20, 2016, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/20/c_135028623.htm>. 

17 “Iran May Be Looking to Replace Aging Planes with 

Airbus Purchase,” Bloomberg.com, May 18, 2015, available at <www.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-14/iran-s-airbus-purchase-toherald-re-fleeting-rush-amid-u-s-thaw>. 

18 “China, Iran Agree to Expand Trade to $600 Billion in a Decade,” Bloomberg.com, January 23, 2016, available at <www.bloomberg.

com/news/articles/2016-01-23/china-iran-agree-to-expand-trade-to600-billion-in-a-decade>.

19 “New Rail Route Proposed from Urumqi to Iran,” China 

Daily, November 21, 2015, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2015-11/21/content_22506412.htm>.

20 “China to Build Pipeline from Iran to Pakistan,” Wall Street 

Journal, April 9, 2015, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/china-tobuild-pipeline-from-iran-to-pakistan-1428515277>.

21 “China, Iran Agree to Two Nuclear Power Stations and Trade 

Worth $600Bn,” Global Construction Review.com, January 27, 2016, 

available at <www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/china-iranagree-two-nu7clear-po7wer-stat7ions/>.

22 “Russia Agrees to Deliver S-300 Missile Systems to Iran,” Defense News, November 9, 2015, available at <www.defensenews.com/

story/defense-news/2015/11/09/russia-agrees-deliver-s-300-missilesystems-iran/75453424/>.

23 Garver, 166–200. 

24Robert B. Zoellick, “Whiter China: From Membership to 

Responsibility?” remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China 

Relations, September 21, 2005, available at <http://2001-2009.state.

gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.

25 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s 

New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 ( January–February 2008), 38–56.

26Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 

75–94.

27 “China, Iran Upgrade Ties to Carry Forward Millennia-Old 

Friendship,” Xinhua, January 24, 2016, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/24/c_135039635.htm>. 

28Phillip C. Saunders and Scott Kastner, “Exploring China’s 

Strategic Partnerships: Characteristics, Motivations, and Consequences,” paper presented at the International Studies Association 

Conference, Toronto, 2014.

29 “Iran Plans Three Tourism Offices in China,” Iran Daily, January 24, 2016, available at <www.iran-daily.com/News/135556.html>. 

30Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, The Iran 

Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School 

of Government, 2015).

31Those sanctioned included a Hong Kong–based firm, Anhui 

Land Group Co., which was charged with providing support to Iran’s 

ballistic missile program. See “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved 

in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran,” U.S. Department of the 

Treasury Press Center, January 17, 2016, available at <www.treasury.

gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0322.aspx>. 

32 See, for example, Dennis Ross, “Iran Will Cheat. Then What?” 

Time, July 15, 2015, available at <http://time.com/3960110/iran-willcheat-then-what/>. 

33Belfer Center.

34 “Economic Impact of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Dun & Bradstreet Special Briefing, August 2015.

35 Downs and Maloney.

36 “Iranian Nuclear Deal Set to Make Hardline Revolutionary Guards Richer,” Reuters, July 6, 2015, available at <www.reuters.

com/article/us-iran-nuclear-economy-insight-idUSKCN0PG1XV20150706>; “Impact of Sanctions Relief on Iran,” U.S. Institute 

of Peace, November 6, 2015, available at <http://iranprimer.usip.org/

blog/2015/nov/06/impact-sanctions-relief-iran>.

37 “With Sanctions Lifting, What’s in Store for Iran’s Economy?” 

Wharton School of Business Knowledge@Wharton, October 27, 2015, 

available at <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/with-sanctions-lifting-whats-in-store-for-irans-economy/>.

38EIA.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ole Odgaard and Jorgen Delman, “China’s Energy Security 

and Its Challenges towards 2035,” Energy Policy 71 C (August 2014), 

107–117.

42 Garver.

43United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database; 

American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, available at <www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>. 

44For an overview on China’s broad interests in the Middle East, 

see James Chen, The Emergence of China in the Middle East, Strategic 

Forum 271 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, December 2011), available at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/

SF-271.pdf>. 

45 Of note, China and Iraq established a strategic partnership 

during Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s visit to China in December 

2015. The partnership would include greater high-level engagement, 

counterterrorism cooperation, and mutual support for sovereignty. 

“China, Iraq Establish Strategic Partnership,” Xinhua, December 

22, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-

12/22/c_134942256.htm>. 

46China’s total trade with Saudi Arabia was roughly $69 billion, 

compared to about $52 billion with Iran; United Nations Commodity 

Trade Statistics Database. Meanwhile, China’s investments in Saudi 

Arabia between 2010 and 2015 totaled over $13 billion, compared 

to about $5.6 billion in Iran. American Enterprise Institute, China 

Global Investment Tracker. Oil trade data per EIA.

47These include Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 290 11 

48 However, it is worth noting that Beijing has sometimes 

highlighted its role as a participant in regional mechanisms, including 

the P5+1 talks with Iran, as evidence of its more affirmative approach 

to regional security. See Ilan Goldenberg and Ely Ratner, “China’s 

Middle East Tightrope,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2015, available at 

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/20/china-middle-east-saudiarabia-iran-oil-nuclear-deal/>; Yoram Evron, “China’s Diplomatic 

Initiatives in the Middle East: The Quest for a Great Power Role in 

the Region,” International Relations, December 21, 2015, 1–20.

49 See, for example, Ding Gong, “Iran’s Regional Great Power 

Mentality From the Perspective of the Iran Nuclear Issue” [从伊朗核

问题看伊朗的地区大国意识], Arab World Studies [阿拉伯世界研究], 

no. 4 (2010), 48–49; Yin Gang, “The Essence of the Iran Nuclear Issue 

Is a Question of Iran’s National Status” [伊朗核问题的实质是伊朗的

国家地位问题], Contemporary World [当代世界], no. 5 (2010), 51. For 

an analysis of these and other sources, see Joel Wuthnow, “Pessimism 

without Alarm: Chinese Perceptions of Iran’s Nuclear Program Since 

Mid-2010,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington DC, 2010.

50 See, for example, Frederick W. Kagan et al., Iranian Influence 

in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, 2012).

51The Chinese government’s policy paper on the Arab world 

was released 10 days prior to Xi’s visit to Iran and described China’s 

desire for “strategic cooperative relations” with the Arab world. 

See “Full Text of China’s Arab Policy Paper,” Xinhua, January 13, 

2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-

01/13/c_135006619.htm>. 

52 “China Focus: Xi’s Visit to Highlight China’s Role in Middle 

East Peace,” Xinhua, January 18, 2016, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/18/c_135021120.htm>. 

53 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular 

Press Conference on January 4, 2016,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

the People’s Republic of China, January 4, 2016, available at <www.

fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1329468.

shtml>. The People’s Republic of China government spokesman’s 

reaction to the tensions signaled a desire to maintain positive relations 

with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the spokesman’s words, “Both 

Iran and Saudi Arabia are important and influential countries in the 

Middle East. The Chinese side would like to develop friendly and 

cooperative relations with the two.” 

54 “China Couldn’t Intervene in Syria Even If It Wanted To,” 

Reuters, August 28, 2013, available at <www.businessinsider.com/

china-couldnt-intervene-in-syria-even-if-it-wanted-to-2013-8>. 

55 Garver.

56 Joel Wuthnow, “What to Make of Xi Jinping’s Vision for Asian 

Security?” The Asan Forum, August 11, 2014, available at <www.theasanforum.org/what-to-make-of-xi-jinpings-vision-for-asian-security/>.

57 Indeed, during Xi’s visit to Iran in January 2016, China and 

Iran again pledged to oppose “unjust sanctions against other countries.” See “China, Iran Upgrade Ties to Carry Forward MillenniaOld Friendship,” Xinhua, January 24, 2016, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/24/c_135039635.htm>.

58 “Sanctions Relief Under the P5+1 Agreement with Iran: 

Implications for US, EU and International Business,” Insights, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, and Flom LLP, July 23, 2015, available at 

<www.skadden.com/insights/sanctions-relief-under-p51-agreementiran-implications-us-eu-and-international-business>.

59 “Iran Plans Airbus, Boeing Purchases Under Finance Deals,” 

Agence France-Presse, September 21, 2015, available at <http://

news.yahoo.com/iran-plans-airbus-boeing-purchases-under-financedeals-130647427.html>. 

60 Joel Wuthnow, “Are Chinese Arms About to Flood Into Iran?” 

The National Interest, January 13, 2016, available at <www.nationalinterest.org/feature/are-chinese-arms-about-flood-iran-14887>. 

61 Garver.

62United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UN Register 

of Conventional Arms, available at <www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/>. 

63Wuthnow, “China-Iran Military Relations at a Crossroads.”

64Major conventional weapons are defined by the UN Register 

of Conventional Arms. For details, see <www.un.org/disarmament/

convarms/Register/>. 

65 Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, 

A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 83–85.

66 “Chinese Media: Russia, China to Sell Iran Arms to Challenge U.S.,” People’s Daily Online, August 13, 2015, available at 

<http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0813/c90000-8935125.html>. 

67 “Pakistan Seeks to Energize Naval Modernization,” Defense 

News, June 17, 2015, available at <www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/06/17/pakistan-revive-naval-modernizationshipbuilding-china-frigates-dockyard-ksew/71074464/>. 

68Wuthnow, “China-Iran Military Relations at a Crossroads.”

69 See, for example, Mark Gunzinger, Outside-In: Operating from 

Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011).

70Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing 

Counter-Intervention?” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (Fall 2015), 

143–156. 

71 “Close Encounter Between U.S. Warship and Iranian Rocket,” 

CNN.com, December 30, 2015, available at <www.cnn.com/2015/12/29/

politics/iran-missile-test-uss-harry-truman-aircraft-carrier/>; “Iran 

Blasts Mock U.S. Carrier in War Games,” CNN.com, February 27, 2015, 

available at <www.cnn.com/2015/02/26/world/iran-mock-carrierdestroyed/>. In addition, in January 2016, Iran flew a drone toward the 

USS Harry S. Truman and the French carrier Charles de Gaulle in the 

Persian Gulf. See “Iranian Surveillance Drone Flies Over U.S. Aircraft 

Carrier in Persian Gulf,” CNN.com, January 29, 2015, available at 

<www.cnn.com/2016/01/29/politics/iran-drone-uss-harry-truman/>

72 “Iran May Expand Missile Plan Amid U.S. Threat to Impose 

Fresh Sanctions,” Asia Times, January 2, 2016, available at <http://

atimes.com/2016/01/iran-to-expand-missile-capabilities-in-reactionto-us-hostility/>. 

73Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s 

Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2007), 97–174.

74Farzin Nadimi, How Iran’s Revived Weapons Exports Could 

Boost Its Proxies (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy, August 17, 2015), available at <www.washingtoninstitute.

org/policy-analysis/view/how-irans-revived-weapons-exports-couldboost-its-proxies>.

75 “Power Failure in Iraq as Militias Outgun State,” Reuters, 

October 21, 2015, available at <www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/iraq-abadi/>. 

76 “China Displaces Germany as World’s Third Largest Arms 

Exporter: Report,” Reuters, March 16, 2015, available at <www.

reuters.com/article/us-china-military-exports-idUSKBN0MC0QT20150316>. 

77For details, see Department of State, “Sanctioned Entities 

List,” available at see <www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/entities/>.
12 SF No. 290 ndupress.ndu.edu

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