10 June 2010

Joint Communications System

Joint Publication 6-0
This publication is the keystone document for communications system support 

to joint operations and provides guidelines to our commanders regarding information 

systems and networks as a part of the Global Information Grid. 

A vast array of information, underpinned by joint doctrine, is utilized to employ 

combat power across the broad range of military operations. The communications 

system provides the means to synchronize joint forces. 

Improved synchronization among joint and multinational forces and with nonDepartment of Defense agencies, with greater reliability and enhanced security —

achieved through sound employment of information technology — is essential for 

effective command and control in the network enabled environment of the 21st century. 

Information systems and networks provide the predominant source from which the 

warfighter generates, receives, shares, and utilizes information. The synthesis of 

advanced communications system capabilities and sound doctrine leads to information 

superiority, which is essential to success in all military operations.

M. G. MULLEN

Admiral, U. S. Navy
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication is the keystone document for the communications system series of 

publications. It provides the doctrinal foundation for communications system support of 

joint operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and 

performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the 

doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in 

multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by 

combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint 

doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed 

Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to 

restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a 

manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment 

of the overall objective.

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components 

of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, 

normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 

provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine.
Preface 

ii JP 6-0 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 6-0 

DATED 20 MARCH 2006 

 Updates the role of United States Strategic Command in operating and 

defending the Global Information Grid (GIG) 

 Updates information on Cyberspace and the role of United States Cyber 

Command

 Updates Network Operations

 Updates the GIG characteristics 

 Discusses the “Aerial Layer” 

 Corrects factual errors due to procedural and organizational changes 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 6-0 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

v 

 PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• Introduction .......................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Command and Control ......................................................................................................... I-1 

• The Role of the Communications System .......................................................................... I-3 

• Communications System Functions .................................................................................... I-7 

• Communications System Principles ................................................................................... I-8 

• Joint Communications System Roles and Responsibilities.............................................. I-12 

CHAPTER II 

THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID

• General ................................................................................................................................. II-1 

• Global Information Grid Characteristics ........................................................................... II-3 

• Global Information Grid Planning ..................................................................................... II-4 

• Global Information Grid Services Supporting Joint Force Operations ............................ II-4 

• Global Information Grid Framework Hierarchy and Structure ...................................... II-16 

• Duties and Responsibilities within the Global Information Grid................................... II-17

CHAPTER III

JOINT FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OPERATIONS PLANNING

AND MANAGEMENT

• Joint Force Communications Planning and Management Organizations ....................... III-1 

• Joint Force Communications Planning and Management Structure............................... III-2 

• Communications Planning and Management................................................................... III-5 

• Communications Planning Methodology ....................................................................... III-20

• Communications Planning Factors ................................................................................. III-25 

• Communications System Employment........................................................................... III-28

CHAPTER IV 

NETWORK OPERATIONS

• Introduction ...................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Network Operations Responsibilities .............................................................................. IV-2 

• Network Operations Operational Construct .................................................................... IV-3 

• Management of the Global Information Grid ................................................................ IV-12 
Table of Contents

vi JP 6-0 

CHAPTER V

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• National Military Command System ................................................................................ V-1 

• Nuclear Command and Control ......................................................................................... V-2 

• Intelligence Community ..................................................................................................... V-2 

• National Communications System..................................................................................... V-3 

APPENDIX

 A Global Information Grid Components ............................................................................ A-1 

 B Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide ................................ B-1 

 C References ........................................................................................................................ C-1 

 D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................................. D-1 

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................... GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions .......................................................................................... GL-6 

FIGURE

 I-1 Information Quality Criteria....................................................................................... I-3 

 I-2 Information Superiority .............................................................................................. I-6 

 I-3 Communications System Functions .......................................................................... I-7 

 I-4 Communications System Principles.......................................................................... I-9 

II-1 Global Information Grid Components ...................................................................... II-2 

 II-2 Defense Information Systems Network Interface .................................................... II-5 

 II-3 Department of Defense Gateway .............................................................................. II-7 

 II-4 Satellite Communications Systems......................................................................... II-11 

 II-5 Military Communications-Electronics Board and Combined 

 Communications-Electronics Board....................................................................... II-19

 III-1 Theater Organizational Relationships....................................................................... III-3 

III-2 Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Use .......................................... III-3 

IV-1 Global Information Grid Situational Reporting Flow.............................................. IV-5 

IV-2 Defense-in-Depth Strategy..................................................................................... IV-10 

IV-3 Theater Joint Tactical Networks Configuration Control Board ............................ IV-13 

V-1 National Security Emergency Preparedness Communications.................................. V-4 

 A-1 Global Information Grid Components Summary ...................................................... A-1 

 A-2 Warrior Component.................................................................................................... A-2 

 A-3 Global Command and Control System – Joint in the 

 Global Applications Component................................................................................ A-3 

 A-4 Computing Component .............................................................................................. A-4 
Table of Contents

vii 

 A-5 Communications Component..................................................................................... A-5 

 A-6 Network Operations Component ............................................................................... A-6 

 A-7 Information Management Component....................................................................... A-7 

 A-8 Foundation Component.............................................................................................. A-8 
Table of Contents

viii JP 6-0 

Intentionally Blank
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

ix

• Provides an Overview of Joint Communications System Objectives, Roles, 

Functions, and Principles

• Describes the Global Information Grid 

• Discusses Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning and 

Management 

• Describes Joint Force Network Operations 

• Describes Communications System Support to the President, Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Intelligence Community

Overview

Effective command and 

control (C2) is necessary for 

proper integration and 

employment of operational 

capabilities. 

The objective of the joint communications system is to 

assist the joint force commander (JFC) in command 

and control (C2) of military operations. While C2 

alone will neither destroy an adversary target nor 

accomplish emergency resupply, no single activity in 

military operations is more important. 

The first element of C2 system is people — people 

who acquire information, make decisions, take action, 

communicate, and collaborate with one another to 

accomplish a common goal. The second element of the 

C2 system taken collectively are the facilities, 

equipment, communications, and procedures

essential to a commander for planning, directing, and 

controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to 

the missions assigned. Although families of hardware 

are often referred to as “systems,” the C2 system is 

more than simply equipment. High-quality equipment 

and advanced technology do not guarantee effective 

C2. Effective C2 starts with well-trained and qualified 

people and an effective guiding philosophy and 

procedures. 

The communications system 

has multiple roles. 

One role of the communications system is to ensure 

connectivity throughout the operational area, thus 

providing JFCs with the capability to effectively plan, 

conduct, and sustain joint operations. A second role is 

to provide JFCs the principal tool with which they 

collect, transport, process, protect, and disseminate 

information. Through the exchange of information, 
Executive Summary

x JP 6-0 

effective C2 integrates joint force components, 

allowing them to function effectively across vast 

distances in austere or complex environments and in all 

weather conditions. The third role of the 

communications system is to provide processes and 

procedures which help ensure information availability

to facilitate joint and multinational operations.

Communications system 

functions.

The communications system supporting US military 

forces must have the capability to rapidly adapt to 

changing demands; to provide information that is 

needed (the right information); where needed (the 

right place); and when needed (the right time), 

protected from interception and exploitation and 

presented in an actionable format. By meeting these 

fundamental objectives, the communications system 

allows joint forces to seize opportunity and meet 

mission objectives. 

A joint force linked and synchronized in time and 

purpose is considered networked. The joint force 

capitalizes on information and near simultaneous 

dissemination to turn information into actions. An 

effective communications system helps the JFC 

conduct distributed operations in a nonlinear 

battlespace. To do this, the communications system 

must be interoperable, agile, trusted, and shared. 

Global Information Grid

The Global Information 

Grid is the globally 

interconnected end-to-end 

set of information 

capabilities, associated 

processes and personnel for 

collecting, processing, 

storing, dissemination and 

managing information on 

demand to joint forces and 

support personnel. 

The Global Information Grid (GIG) is the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD’s) globally interconnected, end-toend set of information capabilities, associated 

processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, 

storing, disseminating, and managing information on 

demand to joint forces and support personnel. The GIG 

includes all owned and leased communications and 

computing systems and services, software (including 

applications), data, security services, and other 

associated services necessary to achieve information 

security. It also includes national security systems as 

defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 

1996. The GIG supports all DOD, national security, 

related intelligence community missions and functions 

(strategic, operational, tactical, and business), in war 

and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all 
Executive Summary

xi

operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, 

facilities, mobile platforms and deployed sites). The 

GIG provides interfaces to multinational and non-DOD 

users and systems. Therefore, from a service-oriented 

perspective, the GIG can be viewed as a set of 

computing platforms, weapons systems, and sensors 

exchanging information through a globally 

interconnected network. DOD’s strategy is to empower 

the joint force with the information needed to achieve 

successful military operations by integrating the seven 

components of the GIG described in this publication. 

GIG components are categorized as warrior, global 

applications, computing, communications, 

foundation, information management, and network 

operations (NETOPS).

Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). The 

DISN is the major element of the GIG. It has three 

segments: sustaining base, long haul, and deployed. It 

is DOD’s worldwide enterprise-level 

telecommunications infrastructure providing end-to-end 

information transfer for supporting military operations. 

For the most part, it is transparent to the joint force. 

The DISN facilitates the management of information 

resources, and is responsive to national security, as well 

as DOD needs. It provides GIG network services to 

DOD installations and deployed forces. Those services 

include voice, data, and video, as well as enterprise 

services such as directories and messaging. DOD 

policy mandates the use of the DISN for wide area and 

metropolitan networks. 

Commander United States Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM) has overall responsibility for 

global network operations and defense in 

coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (CJCS) and the other combatant 

commands. United States Cyber Command 

(USCYBERCOM), a subordinate unified command 

under United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), focuses on military cyberspace 

operations. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) 

coordinate with USSTRATCOM through 

USCYBERCOM to ensure global impacts to the GIG 

are properly considered. The duties previously 
Executive Summary

xii JP 6-0 

assigned to Joint Task Force-Global Network 

Operations (JTF-GNO) under Defense Information 

Systems Agency and Joint Functional Component 

Command for Network Warfare under USSTRATCOM 

are the responsibility of USCYBERCOM. Because the 

GIG represents the entire communications system of 

Department of Defense, there remain many decisions 

regarding planning and design that fall under the 

purview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Networks and Information Integration (ASD[NII]), 

who is also designated DOD’s chief information officer 

(CIO). Many of those decisions involve the insertion 

of new technology as well as other architectural 

standards, which may impact the interoperability of the 

DOD as a whole.

The GIG operates, through cyberspace, as a globally 

interconnected, end-to-end, interoperable network-ofnetworks, that combines the communications system 

capabilities of the DOD components and spans 

traditional boundaries of authority. Operation and 

defense of the GIG is largely a matter of overarching 

common processes, standards, and protocols 

orchestrated by USSTRATCOM. 

ASD(NII), as the DOD CIO, serves as DOD’s principal 

staff assistant for information management (IM), and 

consequently develops and issues the DOD IM strategic 

plan. The DOD CIO is the GIG architect and is 

overall responsible for developing, maintaining, and 

enforcing compliance with the GIG architecture. 

Unless otherwise directed, communications between 

the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

and the combatant commanders (CCDRs) are 

transmitted through CJCS. CJCS exercises operational 

oversight over those portions of the GIG utilized for 

such communications. CJCS is responsible for the 

operation of the National Military Command System 

(NMCS) for SecDef to meet the needs of the President,

SecDef, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); and 

establishes operational policies and procedures for all 

components of the NMCS and ensures their 

implementation. The Director Command, Control, 

Communications, and Computer Systems, (Joint Staff 

J-6) and joint community warfighter CIO provides 
Executive Summary

xiii

advice and recommendations about communications 

system matters to the CJCS.

The Military Communications-Electronics Board

(MCEB) is a decision-making instrument of CJCS and 

SecDef for determining corporate communications 

system strategy to support the joint force. The MCEB 

is chaired by the Joint Staff J-6 and composed of over 

twenty organizations from the Services and DOD 

agencies at the flag officer/Senior Executive Service 

level.

The Combined Communications-Electronics 

Board (CCEB) is a five-nation joint military 

communications organization whose mission is the 

coordination of any military communications system 

matter that is referred to it by a member nation. The 

US representative for the CCEB is the Joint Staff J-6, 

who also chairs the MCEB. 

Combatant commanders oversee and coordinate 

GIG planning and employment within their areas of 

responsibility. They utilize the JTF-GNO, the theater 

network operations center (TNC) hierarchy, as well 

as Service component command TNCs as 

appropriate, and joint control centers. To this end, 

they collaborate with their respective Service 

components, Defense Information Systems Agency, 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and 

USSTRATCOM to create and maintain visibility 

over theater networks.

Military Departments and Services provide an 

interoperable and compatible communications system 

for the effective prosecution of military operations 

and plan for the expansion of the GIG to meet the 

requirements of DOD. 

The JFC, through the communications system 

directorate of a joint staff (J-6), ensures an adequate 

and effective communications system is available to 

support the joint force C2 infrastructure via system 

plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support 

the assigned mission and by providing overall 

management of the communications system 

supporting the JFC. As the forces deploy, the joint 
Executive Summary

xiv JP 6-0 

force J-6 establishes a joint network operations 

control center to establish network control and 

management within the operational area.

DOD agencies, such as DIA, National Security 

Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 

are responsible for ensuring that their information 

systems environment is developed and maintained in a 

manner that is consistent with and reflective of the GIG 

architecture, and that agency-specific programs are 

planned, resourced, acquired, and implemented in 

accordance with the DOD Information Management 

Support Plan and DOD resource priorities. 

Essential elements of the 

communications system are 

driven by the mission and 

determined by the C2 

organization and location of 

forces assigned to the joint 

force commander. 

Communications system planners are responsible for 

ensuring that the organization’s communications 

network can facilitate a rapid, unconstrained flow of 

information from its source through intermediate 

collection and processing nodes to its delivery to the 

user. Communications system planners should clearly 

understand the capabilities and limitations of all 

potentially available strategic, operational, and tactical 

communications systems and equipment, whether they 

are organic to Services and agencies, belong to non-US 

forces, are commercial, or provided by a host nation. 

Building the communications system to support the 

JFC requires knowledge of the joint force organization, 

the commander’s concept of operations, 

communications available, and how they are employed. 

The J-6 is responsible for planning and establishing the 

communications system and the communications 

estimate of supportability during course of action 

development and selection under the crisis action 

planning process. 

Planning considerations. There are several key considerations in 

communications system planning. Important is the 

establishment of computer network defense to achieve 

information assurance. The integration of multinational 

communications system operations, often composed of 

multinational partners with diverse groups of security 

and information sharing domains must be planned and 

managed. Planners must consider that the 

communications system is the primary means through 

which intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

information flows to the joint force and, therefore, 
Executive Summary

xv

planning must be conducted in close coordination with 

the intelligence directorate of a joint staff. Of 

increasing importance to joint operations is effective 

connectivity to non-DOD departments and agencies 

and nongovernmental and intergovernmental 

organizations. Additionally, communications system 

planners and managers must consider the complexities 

of world wide web and public internet access, 

information dissemination management, and joint 

network communications control. Satellite 

communications planning is a critical item. As is 

integration of the aerial layer with the space and 

terrestrial layers. Finally, communications planners 

and managers must optimize the use (access) of 

electromagnetic spectrum for all electromagnetic 

spectrum dependent systems through sound planning 

and adherence to frequency assignment doctrine. 

Communications planning 

focuses on five areas of 

analysis: 

Mission Analysis

Information needs

Interoperability, 

compatibility, and 

supportability 

Capability 

Allocation of 

communications system 

assets. 

Communications planning is divided into five areas: 

mission analysis, information needs analysis, 

interoperability and compatibility analysis, capability 

analysis, and allocation of communications system 

assets. During mission analysis, communications 

system planners develop the communications system 

estimate and specified and implied tasks to be 

performed by operators and communications system 

personnel. Information needs are analyzed by 

working closely with all functional communities to 

develop information exchange requirements, which 

identify products to be transmitted and received, as well 

as the throughput, quantity, and characteristics of those 

products. Planners also identify interoperability, 

compatibility, and supportability requirements and 

assess them against documented capabilities, assessing 

any shortfalls or deficiencies for operational and 

mission impact. Based on these first three areas, 

planners conduct a capability analysis to identify the 

communications equipment and networks that have the 

capability to support the operation plan. This analysis 

is a daily assessment during all phases of the operation. 

Finally, after the template is developed, joint force and 

component planners must examine all available

resources and allocate communications system assets 

to form a tailored communications system.
Executive Summary

xvi JP 6-0 

Among the many important planning factors associated 

with the communications system, three stand out. First, 

the communications system director and staff must be 

involved in the planning process early and must 

understand the concept of operations to provide 

communications advice to the JFC during the planning 

process. Secondly, the plan, as it is being developed, 

must be constantly assessed for feasibility and 

adequacy to satisfy the joint force’s information 

requirements. Finally, although communications 

system planning takes place in coordination with the 

other planning elements of a joint staff, 

communications system planners must anticipate user 

requirements throughout all phases of joint operations. 

Therefore, plans and initial communications system 

support must be incrementally developed, deployed, 

and employed to meet the JFC’s continually evolving 

mission. 

Effective network 

operations culminates in 

assured service to the joint 

force facilitating network 

enabled operations. 

NETOPS provides integrated network visibility and 

end-to-end management of networks, global 

applications, and services across the GIG. Network 

visibility enables commanders to manage their 

networks as they would other combat systems. The 

NETOPS mission is to operate and defend the 

GIG. Unlike many missions that are deemed 

successful at a defined completion date, the NETOPS 

mission is perpetual, requiring continual support to 

be successful. The effectiveness of NETOPS is 

measured in terms of availability and reliability of 

network enabled services, across all areas of interest, 

in adherence to agreed-upon service levels and 

policies. The purpose of NETOPS is assured 

system and network availability, assured information 

protection, and assured information delivery, which 

protect and maintain freedom of action for DOD 

missions within cyberspace. 

As the DOD CIO, the Office of the ASD(NII) is 

responsible for the policy and architecture for 

NETOPS. CJCS maintains operational oversight of 

the GIG through the National Military Command 

Center and USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM has

the Unified Command Plan mission to operate and 

defend the GIG. CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated 

operational and tactical level planning and day-to-
Executive Summary

xvii 

day management of the operations and defense of the 

GIG to USCYBERCOM. 

President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Intelligence 

Community Support

The National Military 

Command System 

communicates warning and 

intelligence to commanders. 

The NMCS is the priority component of the GIG 

designed to support the President, SecDef, and the JCS 

in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS 

provides the means by which the President and SecDef 

can receive warning and intelligence so decisions can 

be made, the resources of the military Services can be 

applied, military missions can be assigned, and 

direction can be communicated to CCDRs or the 

commanders of other commands. 

The joint intelligence systems architecture is an integral 

part of the GIG, and consists of an integrated network 

supporting voice, data, and video-teleconferencing. 

The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 

System, the joint deployable intelligence support 

system, and the distributed common ground system 

currently form the foundation of the sensitive 

compartmented information portion of the GIG. 

The National Communications System (NCS), 

consisting of federal member departments and 

agencies, is responsible for ensuring the availability of 

a viable national security and emergency preparedness

telecommunications infrastructure. The NCS consists 

of the telecommunications assets of the entities 

represented on the NCS Committee of Principals and 

an administrative structure consisting of the executive 

agent, the NCS Committee of Principals, and the 

manager.

CONCLUSION

This keystone publication identifies approved doctrine 

for communications system support to joint operations 

and outlines the responsibilities of Services, agencies, 

and combatant commands with respect to ensuring 

effective communications support to commanders. It 

addresses how communications system support the 

conduct of joint operations, including how systems are 

to be configured, deployed, and employed. Finally, this 
Executive Summary

xviii JP 6-0 

publication provides guidance necessary to plan, 

manage, employ, execute and train for communications 

system support at the operational and tactical level of 

joint operations. 
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I-1 

1. Introduction

The objective of the joint communications system is to assist the joint force 

commander (JFC) in command and control (C2) of military operations. Effective C2 is 

vital for proper integration and employment of operational capabilities. The Department 

of Defense’s (DOD’s) end-to-end communications system supporting the JFC is the 

Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG includes all joint and Service communications 

as well as interfaces to non-DOD and multinational users (see Chapter II, “The Global 

Information Grid”). The GIG unifies DOD’s networks into a single real-time information 

system to provide increased information capabilities to the joint force. It should be 

understood that communications systems are more than electronic boxes, wires, and radio 

signals and the GIG is more than a computer network. The interdependence of the parts, 

as well as the processes, policy, and data on those systems, permeate daily life, and 

preparation for and execution of operations. 

2. Command and Control

a. No single activity in military operations is more important than C2. Alone, C2 

will not destroy a single adversary target or affect a single emergency resupply. Yet, 

none of these essential joint force activities, or any others, would be possible without 

effective C2. A superior communications system helps commanders to maintain the 

unity of effort to apply their forces’ capabilities at the critical times and places to win.

 b. Often, C2 is thought of as a distinct and specialized function — like logistics, 

intelligence, electronic warfare, or administration — with its own peculiar methods, 

considerations, and vocabulary, and occurring independently of other functions. In fact, 

C2 encompasses all military functions and operations, synchronizing them into a 

meaningful whole. C2 is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be 

done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. 

c. Elements of the Command and Control System 

 (1) The first element of a C2 system is people — people who acquire 

information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and collaborate with one another 

to accomplish a common goal. Human beings — from the senior commander framing a 

strategic concept to a junior Service member calling in a situation report — are integral 

components of the C2 system and not merely users. 

“Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from 

fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and 

signals.”

Sun Tzu

The Art of War
Chapter I

I-2 6-0 

 (2) The second element of the C2 system taken collectively are the facilities, 

equipment, communications, and procedures essential to a commander for planning, 

directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. 

Although families of hardware are often referred to as “systems,” the C2 system is more 

than simply equipment. High-quality equipment and advanced technology do not 

guarantee effective C2. Effective C2 starts with well-trained and qualified people and an 

effective guiding philosophy and procedures. 

 d. Quality of Information. In one way or another, C2 is essentially about 

information: getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form, acting on it, and 

sharing it with others. There are two basic uses for information. The first is to help 

create situational awareness (SA) as the basis for a decision. The second is to direct 

and coordinate actions in the execution of the decision. The communications system 

must present information in a form that is both quickly understood and useful to the 

recipient. Many sources of information are imperfect and susceptible to distortion and 

deception. The seven criteria shown in Figure I-1 help characterize information quality. 

Combining pieces of information with context produces ideas or provides knowledge. 

C2 is as much a problem of information management (IM) as it is of carrying out other 

warfighting tasks. Good IM makes accomplishment of other tasks less complex. 

Automation and standardization of communications system processes and procedures 

improve IM and assist the commander’s effectiveness and speed of C2. Today, improved 

technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, and communications continues to reduce 

reaction time, increase the tempo of operations, and generate large amounts of 

information. If information is not well managed the reactions of commanders and 

decisionmakers and ultimately the joint force may be degraded. It is essential that the 

communications system complement human capabilities and reduce or eliminate known 

limitations.

e. A well crafted and coordinated set of integrated, interoperable procedures is 

important to operating in a joint, multinational, and interagency context of current and 

future operations. The value of technology, organization, and strategy is diminished in 

the absence of a professional force to leverage their value. To meet uncertain challenges 

on the horizon, communications system professionals must be fully indoctrinated in 

employment of joint and multinational warfighting capabilities. They must also be 

trained to anticipate and counter the dynamics of an asymmetric adversary. A 

comprehensive and thoroughly rehearsed set of operational procedures is crucial to 

developing that required degree of proficiency. The communications system must be of 

sufficient scale, capacity, reach, and reliability to support evolving operational and 

training missions. Additionally, the communications system must integrate new 

technologies into a robust, standards-based, network enabled environment, to facilitate 

delivery of the right information to the right location at the right time in an actionable 

format.
Introduction 

I-3 

3. The Role of the Communications System 

a. A secure and robust communications system gives the JFC the means to 

assimilate information and to exercise authority and direct forces over large geographic 

areas and a wide range of conditions. A communications system that provides

connectivity throughout the battlespace is vital to planning, conducting, and sustaining 

operations. Tactical operations routinely require long-range, mobile communications. 

ACCURACY

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

 Information that conveys the true situation

RELEVANCE

TIMELINESS

COMPLETENESS

BREVITY

USABILITY

SECURITY

 Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation ahead

 Information that is available in time to make decisions

 All necessary information required by the decisionmaker

 Information that has only the level of detail required

 Information that is understandable and is in commonly 

understood format and displays

 Information that has been afforded adequate protection where 

required

Figure I-1. Information Quality Criteria
Chapter I

I-4 6-0 

The JFC must maintain reliable and secure communications with superior and 

subordinate commanders during all phases of an operation. The communications system 

must be of sufficient scale, accessibility, capacity, reach, and reliability to support 

evolving operational and training missions. Consideration must be made for en route, 

intratheater, and intertheater communications. In addition, the communications system 

must be prepared to interface with governmental and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), local officials, and multinational forces. 

 b. The communications system is the JFC’s principal tool to collect, transport, 

process, protect, and disseminate information. Given the criticality of information, the 

security of the communications system is paramount to ensuring the JFC can trust the 

information it provides. Effective C2, through the exchange of information, integrates 

joint force components, allowing them to function effectively across vast distances in 

austere or complex environments and in all weather conditions. The mission and 

structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and processing requirements. 

The location and information requirements of the joint force drive the specific 

configuration of the JFC’s communications system. The goal is to provide rapid 

information sharing to facilitate a common understanding of the current situation — a 

common operational picture (COP). 

c. Processes and procedures help ensure information availability and access across 

the operational environment, and facilitate: 

 (1) Joint and Multinational Operations and Interagency Coordination. The 

communications system facilitates joint and multinational operations and interagency 

coordination by providing the means to share operational area visualization; manage 

information; and facilitate collaborative planning, rehearsal, execution, and assessment 

with joint and multinational forces and other government agencies (OGAs). 

 (2) Strategic Agility. The communications system supports the rapid 

deployment and employment of task-organized forces anywhere in the world. Rapid 

information sharing around the globe permits simultaneous, interactive planning from 

widely dispersed locations, thereby allowing the use of remote staffs to develop and 

coordinate an operation plan (OPLAN), and execute an operation order (OPORD). It 

provides JFCs the ability to reach back to data repositories, thereby increasing 

deployability, reducing footprint, and enhancing access to global intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. The communications system supports a 

collaborative information environment that assists JFCs in conducting detailed, 

concurrent, and parallel planning. 

 (3) Operational Reach. The communications system supports the 

synchronization of warfighting functions, allowing commanders to locate and identify 

friendly forces in the battlespace and support the conduct of over-the-horizon operations 

with beyond line-of-sight communications and communications on the move. 
Introduction 

I-5 

 (4) Tactical Flexibility. The communications system allows the joint force to 

enhance SA and timely decisionmaking; rapidly and positively identify and engage 

targets; and develop and conduct operations across the range of military operations. The 

communications system supports the development and employment of the commander’s 

intent and planning guidance to foster decentralized execution. Timely delivery of 

information concerning targets, movement of forces, condition of equipment, levels of 

supplies, and disposition of assets — both friendly and adversary — to the joint force 

allows decentralized execution.

 (5) Network Enabled Operations 

 (a) The modern communications system allows the interconnection 

(networking) of geographically separated forces which permits network enabled 

operations. Network enabled operations are military operations that exploit state-of-theart information and networking technology to integrate widely dispersed human 

decisionmakers, situational and targeting sensors, and forces and weapons into a highly 

adaptive, comprehensive system. Network enabled operations exploits the combat power 

derived from the robust networking of well informed, geographically dispersed forces. A 

networked force can increase combat power, achieving greater speed of command 

decisions and increasing the lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of the force. 

 (b) At times, improvements in technology result in leaps in capability. The 

networking of the joint force has brought about such a leap. The communications system 

enables collaborative planning, the COP, control of manned and unmanned tactical 

reconnaissance and attack platforms, increased visibility of logistic assets, and a reduced 

footprint through remote staffing. 

 (6) Information Superiority (IS)

 (a) The communications system facilitates IS. Information and IM lie at 

the core of every military activity. Throughout history, military leaders have recognized 

that a competitive advantage in this aspect of military operations is a key contributor to 

victory in battle. This advantage, or imbalance, in one’s favor within the information 

environment is called IS. However, IS is more than having an edge over an adversary. It 

is more than just sustaining the information needs of our own forces. It also involves 

denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (see Figure I-2).

 (b) The power of superiority in the information environment mandates that 

the United States fights for it as a first priority even before hostilities begin. This 

requires DOD to develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), 

organizational relationships, and technologies to win this fight. The quality of 

information depends upon the accuracy, timeliness, relevance, usability, and 

completeness of information from all sources. A priority responsibility of command is to

ensure access to all relevant information sources within and among all DOD and nonDOD organizations, and in multinational operations with mission partners. The 

continuous sharing of information from a variety of sources facilitates enabling the 
Chapter I

I-6 6-0 

fully networked joint force to achieve shared SA among DOD components, all levels of 

US Government, multinational partners, and the private sector. 

(7) Cyberspace

(a) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment 

consisting of the interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures, 

including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 

processors and controllers. Cyberspace threats are a real and imminent danger to GIG 

operations and information. Information is crucial to the success of joint and 

multinational operations. Information is also a critical instrument of national power, and 

the ability to achieve and maintain an advantage in cyberspace is crucial to national 

security. The GIG through cyberspace provides the valuable service of assured 

information transport, storage, and delivery for the owners and authorized users of the 

information. Networks and network operations (NETOPS) are the means by which DOD 

manages the flow of information over the GIG. Because all DOD components need the 

ability to operate unhindered in cyberspace, this presents a unique challenge. We are not 

the sole users or occupants of cyberspace nor is our participation isolated or without the 

presence of sophisticated adversaries who challenge us daily. Our joint forces, mission 

partners, and first responders demand communications that are not only secure, but also 

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

REQUIRES:









Seamless Architecture and 

Systems Integration

Responsive Information 

Collection, Processing, and 

Dissemination

Prioritized Requirements and 

Assigned Responsibilities

Information Operations 











Enhanced Command and 

Control

Precise Knowledge of Friendly 

Locations

Fused, All-Source Intelligence

Accurate Adversary Locations

Degraded Adversary Command 

and Control

RESULTS IN:

“That degree of dominance in the information 

environment that permits the conduct of operations 

without effective opposition.”

Figure I-2. Information Superiority
Introduction 

I-7 

flexible enough to meet the ever-changing requirements demanded by joint and 

multinational operations. 

4. Communications System Functions 

a. The communications system supporting US military forces must have the 

capability to rapidly adapt to changing demands and to provide information that is 

needed (the right information), where needed (the right place), and when needed (the 

right time), protected from interception and exploitation and presented in a useful 

format. By meeting these fundamental objectives, the communications system allows 

joint forces to seize on opportunity and meet mission objectives. The communications 

system facilitates information sharing and decision support and is an essential building 

block in today’s operational environment. 

 b. Information systems that make up the communications system normally have the 

capabilities of acquisition, processing, storage, transport, control, protection, 

dissemination, and presentation (see Figure I-3).

 (1) Acquisition is the introduction of information into the communications 

system. Information sources include feeds from manned or autonomous sensors, radar 

data streams, video capture, manual input, or any other source that inserts information 

into the communications system.

















Acquisition

Processing

Storage

Transport

Control

Protection

Dissemination

Presentation

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FUNCTIONS

Figure I-3. Communications System Functions
Chapter I

I-8 6-0 

 (2) Processing is a specified sequence of operations performed on well-defined 

inputs to produce a specified output. This activity is typically used for manipulating data, 

information, and/or knowledge into the desired form to support decisionmakers. 

 (3) The storage capability is the retention, organization, and disposition of data, 

information, and/or knowledge to facilitate information sharing and retrieval.

 (4) The communications system normally requires a transport capability to 

support end-to-end information exchange and dissemination in a global environment. 

 (5) The purpose of the control component is to direct, monitor, and regulate 

other communications system functions toward the fulfillment of joint force requirements 

within specified performance parameters. Control activities are more commonly referred 

to as NETOPS, and can be policy or technically oriented. The NETOPS function and the 

subcomponents are further discussed in Chapter II, “The Global Information Grid,” and 

Chapter IV, “Network Operations.” 

 (6) Protection. Ensuring information integrity, secure processing, and 

transmission with access only by authorized personnel. 

 (7) Dissemination. Distributing processed information to the appropriate users 

of the information. 

 (8) Finally, the communications system must interface with the users. This is 

referred to as the presentation function. Telephones, computer terminals, radar screens, 

among others, are the conduits through which the joint forces share information with one 

another. Therefore, the communications system must facilitate presentation of 

information to the user in the method that best facilitates its understanding and use. 

5. Communications System Principles

a. A joint force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose is considered 

networked. The joint force capitalizes on information and near simultaneous 

dissemination to turn information into actions. Networked joint forces increase 

operational effectiveness by allowing dispersed forces to more efficiently communicate, 

maneuver, share a COP, and achieve the desired end state. 

 b. A networked force has the ability to expand its operational reach by allowing 

dispersed elements to use nonorganic information services of other organizations. By 

integrating information from across the breadth of the battlespace, the joint force is able 

to maintain more relevant and complete SA. This integrated picture allows the JFC to 

better employ the right capabilities, in the right place, and at the right time. In order to 

achieve this capability, unity of command is essential. An effective communications 

system helps the JFC conduct distributed operations in a nonlinear battlespace. To do 

this, the communications system must be interoperable, agile, trusted, and shared (see 

Figure I-4).
Introduction 

I-9 

 (1) Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems or components to 

exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged. 

Interoperability is key to the joint force gaining IS in today’s network enabled 

environment. Interoperability facilitates rapid availability of the communications system 

and enables collaboration among joint forces, with OGAs, NGOs, and other mission 

partners. Common policies and standards and to some extent procedures is the preferred 

method of achieving interoperability. Although DOD does not control multinational 

communications standards, the Combined Communications-Electronics Board (CCEB) is 

a multinational organization that focuses entirely on command, control communications 

systems interoperability. Other methods to achieve some degree of interoperability 

include: commonality, compatibility of equipment, and liaison. 

 (a) Equipment and systems are common when they can be operated and 

maintained by personnel trained on any one of the systems without additional specialized 

training and their repair parts and consumable items (components or subassemblies) are 

interchangeable. 

 (b) Compatibility of equipment is the capability of two or more items or 

components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or 

environment without mutual interference. All forms of compatibility, including 

electromagnetic compatibility and frequency supportability, must be considered at the 

earliest conceptual stages and throughout the planning, design, development, testing and 

evaluation, and operational life cycle of all systems. 

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 

PRINCIPLES









Interoperable

Agile

Trusted

Shared

Figure I-4. Communications System Principles
Chapter I

I-10 6-0 

 (c) Standardization. The broad objectives of the National 

Communications System (NCS), the GIG, and the Defense Information Systems Network 

(DISN), coupled with the need for the tactical communications system to interface with 

facilities of the DISN, require the communications system interfaces be standardized as 

much as practical. The objectives of interface standardization are to minimize the 

requirement for ad hoc field patches to compensate for noncompliance with interface 

standards; achieve the maximum economy possible from cross-servicing and crossprocurement; permit emergency supply assistance among Services; facilitate 

interoperability of functionally similar joint and Service communications; and avoid 

unnecessary duplication in research and development of new technology. 

 (d) Liaison. Lastly, gaining interoperability among joint and multinational 

forces as well as interactions with OGAs and NGOs can be aided by liaison. 

 (2) Agile. To support agile forces and operational concepts, the 

communications system must also be agile. The key dimensions of communications 

system agility are:

 (a) Responsiveness — the ability to react to a change in the environment in 

a timely manner.

 (b) Flexibility — the ability to employ multiple ways to succeed and the 

capacity to move seamlessly between them.

 (c) Innovation — the ability to do new things and the ability to do old 

things in new ways. 

 (d) Adaptation — the ability to change work processes and the ability to 

change the organization.

 (3) Trusted. The joint force must have confidence in the capabilities of the 

network and the validity of the information made available by the network. 

 (a) Survivable. The security of information and the communications 

system also involves procedural and technical aspects, integral to the defensive operation. 

These include: 

 1. Physical security of the communications system components and 

facilities.

 2. Personnel security of individuals authorized access to the 

communications system.

 3. Operations security (OPSEC) procedures and techniques 

protecting operational employment of the communications system components. 
Introduction 

I-11 

 4. Denying the adversary information about specific communications 

system configuration, operational employment, and degree of component importance to 

mission accomplishment.

 5.

 

 Low probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability of 

detection (LPD) capabilities and techniques designed to defeat adversary attempts to 

detect and exploit the communications system transmission media.

 6. Emissions control procedures designed to support OPSEC and 

LPI/LPD objectives.

 7. Communications system design and configuration control to 

manage security through control of communications system component design and 

manufacturing, and control of changes made to hardware, software, firmware, 

documentation, and testing throughout the life cycle of the communications system. 

 8. Identifying technological and procedural vulnerability analysis 

and assessment programs.

 9. Robustness — the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range 

of tasks, situations, and conditions. 

 10. Resilience — the ability to rapidly recover from or adjust to 

misfortune, damage, or a destabilizing event in the environment. 

 (b) Protected. The JFC conducts defensive operations to protect assigned 

and attached forces, including communications system assets. Since the communications 

system and associated forces are crucial enablers for joint C2, they present a high-value 

target to the adversary and must be protected to maintain the integrity of the joint force 

C2 system. Information assurance (IA) is employed to ensure the security of information 

and the communications system through information protection, intrusion/attack 

detection and effect isolation, and incident response to restore information and system 

security. The IA construct consists of maintaining network availability, protecting data 

integrity, enforcing confidentiality, authentication and nonrepudiation, or verifiability of 

the trust source. IA measures are taken to protect and defend network and information 

availability and data integrity objectives. IA is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IV, 

“Network Operations.”

 1. Computer Network Defense (CND). Actions taken to protect, 

monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information 

systems and computer networks. CND also employs intelligence, counterintelligence, 

law enforcement, and other military capabilities to defend DOD information and 

computer networks. CND employs IA capabilities to respond to unauthorized activity 

within DOD information systems and computer networks in response to a CND alert or 

threat information. DOD’s CND mission is global and focuses on protection and defense 
Chapter I

I-12 6-0 

of DOD’s interconnected systems and networks. To protect the communications system, 

CND measures are employed with a defense-in-depth strategy.

 2. Communications Security (COMSEC). COMSEC capabilities are 

used to protect information transiting terminal devices and transmission media from 

adversary exploitation to include transmission security capabilities designed to support 

OPSEC and LPI/LPD.

 (c) Sustainable. The communications system must provide continuous 

support during any type and length of operation. This requires economical design and 

employment of the communications system without sacrificing operational capability or 

survivability. The following are some examples that may be used to improve system 

sustainability:

 1. Consolidation of functionally similar facilities which are closely 

located under one command or Service. 

 2. Careful planning, design, and procurement of facilities and systems. 

 3. Efficient management and operating practices and effective 

communications system discipline.

 4. Maximum use of the DISN common-user subsystems. 

 5. Judicious use of commercial services.

 6. Adherence to approved architectures.

 (4) Shared. Information sharing allows for the mutual use of information 

services or capabilities. This ability may cross functional or organizational boundaries. 

Information sharing is facilitated by global authentication, access control, and directory 

services which allows any authorized user, with common and portable identity 

credentials, to have access to, and visibility of, all appropriate operational, business 

support, or intelligence related information, services, and applications related to their 

mission and communities of interest (COIs). 

6. Joint Communications System Roles and Responsibilities

a. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) should be familiar with the guidance in DOD 

Instruction (DODI) 8410.02, NETOPS for the GIG. 

 b. The Director Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems,

(Joint Staff J-6) provides advice and recommendations about communications system 

matters to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In accordance with (IAW) 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 8010.01A, Joint Community 

Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff J-6 also serves as the joint community chief 

information officer (CIO). As chairman of the Military Communications-Electronics 
Introduction 

I-13 

Board (MCEB), the Director, J-6 utilizes the MCEB to coordinate and resolve GIG issues 

among the Services and member agencies. With respect to joint force support, under 

CJCS authority and direction, and subject to the supervision and guidance of the Director, 

Joint Staff (DJS), the Director, J-6 normally has the responsibility to:

 (1) Allocate CJCS-controlled communications system assets for use during realworld operations and assist non-DOD users in gaining access to military satellite 

communications (SATCOM) resources.

 (2) Advise the DJS and the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) on 

combatant commands’ communications system readiness to execute assigned missions 

and, in cases of deficiencies, recommend and facilitate corrective action.

 (3) Evaluate operational feasibility and adequacy of communications system 

support for current joint war plans as well as emergency, contingency, and OPLANs

submitted by DOD agencies, combatant commands, and international treaty 

organizations, and initiate required corrective action. 

 (4) In coordination with United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), evaluate the effectiveness of the 

communications system of the National Military Command System (NMCS) and 

combatant commands. In collaboration with J-3 and Director for Operational Plans and 

Joint Force Development, direct or recommend new procedures, programs, or systems to 

achieve improved capabilities.

 (5) Provide the communications system staff augmentation support for crisis, 

contingency, or emergencies in support of J-3. 

 (6) Review communications system requirements submitted by the CCDRs and 

ensure adequacy and consistency with operational and logistic near- and long-term plans 

in coordination with J-3, logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4), and Joint Staff Plans 

Directorate. 

 (7) In coordination with the J-3, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration (ASD[NII]), ensure that life cycle management of 

joint C2 systems has the capability to support the President, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, DOD agencies, and any 

other entity that may comprise a joint operation. 

 (8) In coordination with J-3, J-4, and the ASD(NII)/DOD CIO, provide 

technical and programmatic oversight of the Global Command and Control System 

(GCCS) family of systems and the Global Combat Support System-Joint (GCSS-J) to 

ensure effective communications system operation for users. 

 (9) Make recommendations about protection of the joint and multinational 

communications system from adversary activities.
Chapter I

I-14 6-0 

 (10) Act as the primary Joint Staff point of contact to provide centralized 

direction and management for the nuclear communications system. 

 (11) Recommend US military positions for North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) command, control, and communications matters (including long-term DOD 

program; rationalization, standardization, and interoperability matters; and C2 

architecture) that affect areas of the communications system. 

 (12) In coordination with the J-3, advocate the implementation of collaborative 

information capabilities and supporting environments to enable information sharing. 

(13) In coordination with the CCDRs, identify NETOPS capabilities needed to 

support joint, multinational, and other operations with mission partners. 

 c. The communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) at the combatant 

command level is generally responsible to: 

 (1) Ensure that communications system personnel, COMSEC, and equipment 

requirements of the JFC are supported. 

 (2) Coordinate communications system activities with CJCS, USSTRATCOM, 

United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA), Services, combatant commands, component forces, and others, as 

appropriate. 

 (3) Prepare communications system policy and guidance to enable subordinate 

forces to operate within the unified command structure. 

 (4) Ensure or facilitate compatibility of subordinate communications system.

 d. JFC Communications System Responsibilities 

 (1) Provide the overall management, compatibility, and protection of the 

communications system that supports assigned forces. 

 (2) Publish plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned 

mission and coordinate plans prepared by subordinate commands. 

 (3) If required by subordinate forces, request CJCS-directed transportable 

communications assets, to include USJFCOM’s joint communications support element 

(JCSE) assets. The Service component commands have the overall responsibility for 

providing communications system support to their own forces unless otherwise directed. 

The JFC may adjudicate or assign subordinate commands the responsibility to provide 

the communications system support based on the situation and/or available 

communications system resources. In the network enabled environment, component 
Introduction 

I-15 

tactical communications system resources are considered for joint use and must be 

responsive to JFC requirements. 

 (4) Share information within the joint force and mission partners, which could 

include multinational forces, government, and nongovernment agencies to the maximum 

extent practical given legal, strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. 

 e. Joint Force J-6 Responsibilities. The joint force J-6 is generally responsible to 

the JFC for:

 (1) Communications system issues and coordinating all procedures used in joint 

communications. This includes the development of communications system architectures 

and plans, as well as policy, guidance, and instructions for the integration and installation 

of an operational communications system. The J-6 exercises staff supervision of all 

communications system assets. This includes CJCS-directed transportable assets, 

automated information systems, collaborative information capabilities and tools and 

supporting environments, COMSEC, and networks necessary to accomplish the overall 

joint force mission.

 (2) Ensuring subordinate component headquarters (HQ) establish network 

management and control centers. The J-6 establishes clear communications and reporting 

obligations between control centers. Each element of the joint force must have clearly 

defined missions and areas of control within the network. 

 (3) Coordinating cross-Service agreements between the joint force HQ, 

component planners, and the joint network operations (NETOPS) control center (JNCC). 

The J-6 establishes and supervises the operations of the JNCC to support top-level 

network control. The JNCC manages the tactical communications system and strategic 

communications connectivity as defined by the joint operational architecture. 

 (4) Reviewing all communications system plans prepared by subordinate 

component commanders. The J-6 facilitates the execution of all communications system 

actions to maximize support to the JFC and adjudicates any conflicts. 

Detailed communications system techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and 

sustain a joint force are contained in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 

(CJCSM) 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications, and annex 

K (communications supplement/instructions) of the JFC’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or 

campaign plans. 

 f. Associated Communications Elements Responsibilities

 (1) The JCSE is a rapidly deployable, joint tactical communications unit 

assigned to USJFCOM that provides contingency and crisis communications to joint 

forces. The JCSE is composed of Active and Reserve Component forces and is equipped 
Chapter I

I-16 6-0 

with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment. The JCSE 

supports time-sensitive operations. 

 (2) Theater Information Management (TIM) Cell. The TIM cell reports to 

the operations community and is responsible for ensuring the commander’s dissemination 

policy (CDP) is implemented as intended by the CCDR. The TIM cell is a full-time 

function collocated within the CCDR’s joint operations center (JOC). TIM cell members 

take the guidance published in the CDP and combine it with late-breaking 

operational/intelligence information and network architecture/communications status 

information. The TIM cell works closely with the theater networks operations 

(NETOPS) control center (TNCC) in coordinating potential changes in either the Global 

Broadcast Service (GBS) schedule or DISN network changes to fulfill late-breaking 

updates in the commander’s information dissemination requirements. 

 (3) The Defense Information Systems Agency-liaison officer (DISA-LO)

serves as the principal interface between the joint force J-6 and DISA HQ. The DISALO assists the J-6 in coordinating, planning, executing, and evaluating the 

communications and computing components of the GIG. DISA supports the employment 

of communications resources at designated gateways and extends the DISN services to 

tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance for the request 

and termination of DISN services in the tactical environment. The appropriate DISA 

regional operational and security center supervises the allocation, routing, and restoration 

of channels and circuits to provide positive DISN support of deployed forces. 

 (4) The regional satellite communications support center liaison officer 

(RSSC-LO) serves as the primary point of contact in coordinating all ground mobile 

forces satellite requirements in support of the joint force. The JFC requests deployment 

of the RSSC-LO when needed.

 (5) A frequency management detachment normally deploys with the joint 

force. The joint spectrum management element (JSME) coordinates, manages, and 

deconflicts frequency allocation and assignments supporting 

intelligence/operations/communications systems, including electronic warfare (EW), with 

the CCDR’s intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), J-3, J-6, and host-nation 

communications authorities.

CJCSM 3320.01A, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, provides a 

detailed description of the JSME, its responsibilities, and reporting requirements. Also 

contains numerous samples of data call messages and planning checklists to assist 

deploying forces.

 (6) A J-6 operations officer is normally assigned to the JFC’s JOC to assist 

with communications matters.

 (7) The J-6 liaison to the information operations (IO) cell coordinates all IA 

aspects of defensive IO. (See Chapter II, “The Global Information Grid,” Chapter III, 
Introduction 

I-17 

“Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning and Management,” and 

Chapter IV, “Network Operations,” for additional responsibilities.) 

CJCSM 6231 series, Manuals for Joint Tactical Communications, provides a detailed 

description of each tactical communication element, its responsibilities, and reporting 

requirements. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, contains 

checklist questions to assist the J-6 in support of a joint force. 

 g. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Deputy Director for Information 

Management provides advice and recommendations about defense intelligence 

communications system matters to CJCS through the J-2. The DIA Deputy Director for 

IM serves as the joint community CIO for the General Defense Intelligence Program, 

which includes the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). 
Chapter I

I-18 6-0 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID

II-1 

1. General

a. The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing 

information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The 

GIG includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, 

software (including applications), data, security services, and other associated services 

necessary to achieve IS. The GIG supports all DOD, national security, and related 

intelligence community (IC) missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and 

business), in war and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all operating 

locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites). 

The GIG provides interfaces to multinational and non-DOD users and systems. 

 b. The GIG is evolving rapidly. This publication focuses on doctrine and the 

general characteristics of the communications system portion of the GIG.

c. The GIG interacts with and provides connections to the national information 

infrastructure and the global information infrastructure. DOD’s strategy is to empower 

joint forces with information needed to achieve successful military operations by 

integrating the seven components of the GIG described in this publication (see Figure II-1).

 d. The GIG supports the JFC throughout the range of military operations. Offensive 

actions to affect an adversary’s information environment must be routinely explored and 

analyzed as a part of the full range of alternatives during the joint operation planning 

process.

e. The GIG is designed to support the joint force and provides interfaces to mission 

partners in order to create a seamless access to information. 

f. The GIG integrates DOD IT resources and considers the use of interagency IT 

resources to support US national interests and strategies. The GIG includes five 

fundamental characteristics: unity of command, common policy and standards, global 

authentication, access control, and directory services, joint infrastructure, and information 

and services. 

“Our information defines our decisions - Our decisions define our success.”

General James E. Cartwright

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2009
Chapter II

II-2 JP 6-0 

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID COMPONENTS

Inform

ati

o

n

M

a

n

a

g

e

m

e

nt

Net

work 

Operations

WARRIOR COMPONENT

GLOBAL APPLICATIONS

COMPUTING

COMMUNICATIONS

FOUNDATION

INFORMATION 

MANAGEMENT

NETOPS

Connects warfighters and their 

combat platforms to the 

network

The set of information 

applications used by the 

warfighter

DOD enterprise hardware, 

software operating systems, 

and hardware/software support, 

shared space/storage for 

data/information access and 

processing

Provide common-user 

information transport and 

processing services to all DOD 

users -- extends from base, 

post, camp, and station, 

through the strategic networks, 

to the first tactical mile

Anchors the enterprise through 

standards, doctrine, policy, 

compliance, architecture, 

testing, spectrum, and host 

nation approval

Controlling and prioritizing of 

information through its life 

cycle -- creation or collection, 

processing, dissemination, 

use, storage, and disposition

Provides the integrated, secure end-toend management of networks and 

applications across the GIG. It also 

includes information assurance and 

content staging/information 

dissemination management (awareness, 

access, and delivery of the right 

information, in the right place, at the 

right time)

Policy

Doctrine

Spectrum

Architecture

Foundation

Standards

Engineering

Governance

Commercial 

Fiber

Communications

Global Applications

Global Combat 

Support System

(GCSS)

Global

Command and 

Control System 

(GCCS)

Business 

Applications

Medical

Software Distribution from 

Central Files

Computing

Warrior Component

Electronic Mail 

Delivery Web Services Megacenter 

Services

Wireless 

Comm

Teleports RF Nets SATCOM

MSS DISN

COMM communications

DISN Defense Information Systems Network

DOD Department of Defense

GIG Global Information Grid

MSS mobile satellite service

NETOPS network operations

RF radio frequency

SATCOM satellite communications

Figure II-1. Global Information Grid Components
The Global Information Grid

II-3 

2. Global Information Grid Characteristics

a. Unity of Command. This characteristic defines the necessary coordination and 

cooperation of supporting and supported commanders in relation to NETOPS of the GIG. 

USSTRATCOM has the mission to direct the operation and defense of the GIG to ensure 

the GIG is protected. The C2 framework embodied by the GIG also recognizes the 

authority JFCs need over cyberspace forces in support of joint operations. 

b. Common Policies and Standards. This characteristic provides effective 

direction for data standards, information service standards, acquisition, certification, and 

enforcement to ensure seamless flow of information between all DOD and mission 

partner users and systems. Common methodologies and standards allow systems to be

developed, tested, certified, and deployed with end-to-end interoperability. 

c. Global Authentication, Access Control, and Directory Services. This 

characteristic describes a system that allows any authorized user with common and 

portable identity credentials to have access to information, services, and applications 

related to their mission and COIs. Additionally, means are put into place to ensure that 

tactically deployed users have alternate means of authentication in the event primary 

means are disrupted due to operations, enemy activity, or other causes. 

d. Information and Services. This characteristic allows joint forces and mission 

partners timely assured access to required data and services in order to fully leverage the 

information advantage. 

e. Joint Infrastructure. This characteristic provides a unified information 

environment that interconnects GIG users securely, reliably, and seamlessly. 

f. Enabling Capabilities. The following enabling capabilities are derived from the 

GIG five fundamental characteristics: 

(1) Improve DOD governance structure for the GIG with emphasis on unity of 

command and common policies and standards. 

(2) Strict, unequivocal enforcement of common policies and standards across 

DOD. 

(3) Availability of secure, interoperable communications and networks for 

DOD with global directory services, authentication, and access control.

(4) Availability of usable and reliable GIG enterprise services in a unified 

environment to all authorized users at all locations worldwide with emphasis on 

improved services to, from, and in the operational area. 

(5) Establishment of a common joint infrastructure that enables information 

sharing across a diverse spectrum of operational requirements. 
Chapter II

II-4 JP 6-0 

(6) Ability to ensure that the DOD primary mission essential functions can be 

completed regardless of the condition of the GIG or information environment through 

means such as enterprise resilience, continuity of operations planning, and network 

diversity initiatives.

(7) Survivability against threats cyberspace and physical. 

3. Global Information Grid Planning

a. The planning of GIG support of the JFC is a fundamental activity in the

contingency and crisis action planning process. Planning has evolved from the traditional 

determination of numbers, types, and locations of communications system elements to a 

more comprehensive determination of the JFC’s information needs. 

 b. The complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of communications 

system resources may require the JFC to adjudicate or assign subordinate command 

responsibilities for extending the GIG’s reach into an operational area. This is normally 

done in an OPLAN. However, in the absence of such a plan, communications are

planned and employed as follows: senior to subordinate, supporting to supported, 

reinforcing to reinforced, left to right, between adjacent units as directed by the first 

common senior, or by the unit gaining an attachment. This order is more common to 

ground forces, but it may have application to space, special operations, naval, and air 

forces as well. These rules are generally followed except when sound military judgment 

dictates otherwise.

4. Global Information Grid Services Supporting Joint Force Operations 

a. Access Services

 (1) Defense Information Systems Network Interface. The DISN is the major 

element of the GIG (see Figure II-2). It has three segments: sustaining base, long haul, 

and deployed. It is DOD’s worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure 

providing end-to-end information transfer for supporting military operations. For the 

most part, it is transparent to the joint force. The DISN facilitates the management of 

information resources, and is responsive to national security, as well as DOD needs. It 

provides GIG network services to DOD installations and deployed forces. Those services 

include voice, data, and video, as well as ancillary enterprise services such as directories 

and messaging. DOD policy mandates the use of the DISN for wide-area network 

(WAN) and metropolitan networks. 

 (2) In concert with military and commercial communication segments that 

support DOD missions, the primary interface point between the sustaining base and 

deployed forces is called the DOD Gateway. The DOD Gateway includes entities 

formerly called the standardized tactical entry point (STEP) and upgrade called the 

Teleport. The DOD Gateway provides robust worldwide ground entry interface to 

SATCOM resources and GIG/DISN services. The DOD Gateway is designed to meet the 
The Global Information Grid

II-5 

requirement of the provisioning of pre-positioned, sustainable DISN services. An equally 

important result of this upgrade to the DISN has been the improvement and 

standardization (facilitating interoperability) of the JFC’s access to the DISN.

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

NETWORK INTERFACE

DISN

Combatant

Commander

1. SUSTAINING 

BASE 2. LONG HAUL 3. DEPLOYED

The Three Segments of the DISN

Garrison 

Commander

Service

JTF Component

POST CAMP & 

STATION

DISN Long Haul provides connectivity between 

deployed and sustaining base elements

Tactical Networks are connected to 

DISN via DOD Gateway sites

FIXED

BACKBONE 

NETWORK

EXTENDING 

DISN INTO 

THEATER

TACTICAL 

NETWORKS

DOD JSOTF

NAVFOR

ARFOR

AFFOR

PENTAGON

PRESIDENT 

& SecDef

POST

BASE

DOD 

AGENCIES

JOINT 

FORCES

MARFOR

AFFOR

ARFOR

JSOTF

DISN

DOD

JTF

MARFOR

NAVFOR

SecDef

STEP

Air Force forces

Army forces

joint special operations task force

Defense Information Systems Network

Department of Defense

joint task force

Marine Corps forces

Navy forces

Secretary of Defense

standardized tactical entry point

Gateway

Figure II-2. Defense Information Systems Network Interface 
Chapter II

II-6 JP 6-0 

 (3) The DOD Gateway program enhances the ability of the DISN to 

respond to the needs of the joint force. Joint and Service-level operational users rely 

on both military and commercial SATCOM systems to support their communications 

requirements. The DOD Gateway provides predefined (tailored) support packages on a 

predefined timeline. This support is extended via common user transports and includes 

voice, data, and video services. These services are extended directly to deployed naval 

forces and to each component of a joint task force (JTF), if employed. Voice services 

include access to the Defense Switched Network (DSN) and the Defense Red Switched 

Network (DRSN). Data will include access to the SECRET Internet Protocol Router 

Network (SIPRNET) and the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). 

Video services include access to DISN Video Services. It will also support the Joint 

Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), a sensitive compartmented 

information (SCI)-level data, voice, and video services network. 

 (4) Although the DOD Gateway is implemented globally under a single 

executive agent, JFCs and their staffs play an important role in DOD Gateway 

employment. Entry point access and procedures are coordinated by the tactical 

communications system planners. DISA plays a major role in the planning process and 

utilizes regional contingency exercise planning branches and USSTRATCOM operated 

Global Network Operations Center (GNC) and DISA’s theater network operations 

(NETOPS) center (TNC) to facilitate that interaction with the joint force. DOD Gateway

(see Figure II-3) has evolved from the STEP to incorporate additional satellite 

connectivity through the Teleport program. This provides greater flexibility in the use of 

DOD and commercial SATCOM resources. Flexibility, in this sense, does not imply 

additional bandwidth for the deployed joint force, however use of quad-band terminals 

provide the joint force with more flexible means of SATCOM support. 

 (5) The DOD Teleport expands upon the STEP access concept (X band) and 

provides commercial and military satellite access at selected STEP sites to improve DISN 

service access to the deployed joint force. 

 b. Voice Services

 (1) DSN. A standard unclassified voice network supporting DOD. 

 (2) DRSN. A classified voice network supporting DOD. 

 (3) Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services (e.g., International Maritime 

Satellite/Iridium Satellite). Commercial, portable satellite systems capable of voice and 

data transmission. 
The Global Information Grid

II-7 

 (4) Tactical Voice. Military specific switching system capable of operating in 

austere areas. 

(5) Voice over internet protocol and voice over secure Internet protocol 

services.

c. Data Services

 (1) The joint data network (JDN) is the network which carries tactical data link 

(TDL) and multi-sensor early warning information in support of joint operations. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GATEWAY

EHF

Advanced 

EHF

CSCI

C

DISN

EHF

Ka

Ku

S

SHF

UHF

X

Commercial Satellite Communications 

Initiative

C-band, 3.7-4.2 Gigahertz ( )

Defense Information Systems Network

Extremely high frequency, 30-300 GHz

Kurtz-above band, 27-40 

GHz

GHz

Kurtz-under band, 12-18 GHz

GHz

S-band, 2-4 GHz

Super-high frequency, 3-30 GHz

Ultrahigh frequency, 300-3000 

Megahertz

X-band, 8-12 

DISN

SERVICES

INFORMATION GATEWAY

TRANSFER 

GATEWAY

JOINT 

GATEWAY FOR 

TACTICAL 

RESOURCES





Junction of 

Space-Based 

and 

Terrestrial 

Networks

Connection 

for Strategic 

(Fixed) and 

Tactical 

(Deployed) 

Users





Provides 

Multiple 

Connection 

Paths 

Between 

Information 

Users and 

Information 

Producers

Enables 

Effective 

Bandwidth 

Management LEGACY 

SYSTEMS

STANDARDIZED

INTERFACE







Modem 

Conversions

Crypto

Switching

UHF

Ku

S-band

C-band

UHF 

X-band

CSCI

Ku-band

SHF

Ka-band

Terminal

Ka

X

C

EHF

Figure II-3. Department of Defense Gateway
Chapter II

II-8 JP 6-0 

Information is generally passed over the JDN in near-real-time. The JDN consists of the 

multi-TDL network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor network along 

with other feeds such as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). 

Effective design and implementation of the multi-TDL network are critical in managing 

the complexities of the electronic battlefield to improve the JFC’s ability to engage 

hostile forces and prevent fratricide.

 (2) NIPRNET. A computer network for unclassified, but sensitive information

supporting DOD. 

 (3) SIPRNET. A computer network for classified information (up to SECRET) 

supporting DOD. 

 

 (4) Coalition/Multinational WAN. A computer network supporting the 

combined/multinational operations that may be unclassified or classified.

 

 (5) JWICS. A computer network for classified information, including SCI, 

supporting DOD. 

d. Applications. The Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J), the 

theater battle management core system (TBMCS), the Army Battle Command System 

(ABCS), the Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) program, and the automated 

message handling system (AMHS) discussed in the following paragraphs are illustrative 

of applications. 

(1) GCCS-J is a command, control, and communications system, consisting of 

hardware, software, procedures, standards, and interfaces to provide worldwide 

connectivity. The system uses DISN and must work over tactical communication 

systems to ensure connectivity with deployed forces in the tactical environment. GCCS-J 

employs an open system client/server architecture that allows a diverse group of 

commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf software packages to operate at 

any GCCS-J location. GCCS-J fuses select C2 systems capabilities into a 

comprehensive, interoperable system by exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of 

forces, and planning information. GCCS-J provides a robust and seamless C2 systems 

capability to the combatant commands, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the National 

Military Command Center (NMCC), JFCs, and Service component commanders. GCCSJ offers vital connectivity to the systems joint forces and authorized mission partners use 

to plan, execute, and manage military operations. In addition to GCCS-J, the GCCS 

family of systems also includes GCCS-Army, GCCS-Maritime, TBMCS, Deliberate and 

Crisis Action Planning and Execution System, and the C2 systems portion of the Joint 

Environmental Toolkit. 

 (2) TBMCS is used by the joint force air component commander and other 

component commanders to collaboratively plan, direct, and control joint air operations in 

support of JFC objectives. This automated system facilitates the development, 
The Global Information Grid

II-9 

deconfliction, dissemination, and execution of the air operations plan, air tasking order, 

airspace control order, and air defense tactical operations data message, and supports 

collaborative target management. The system provides full support to force-level and 

unit-level joint forces throughout all phases of military operations and is interoperable 

with other GIG systems to include GCCS family of systems, and GCSS-J/Command and 

Control Integrated Planning System. TBMCS is used by the US Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps. 

 (3) ABCS is the Army’s approach to automating its tactical C2 systems for 

component and joint operations. It is intended to give commanders from unit of 

employment to brigade/brigade combat team and below a common picture of the 

battlespace and to facilitate synchronization of combat forces in joint environments. 

ABCS consist of several major battlefield functional C2 systems intended to improve 

interoperability among Army, joint, and multinational forces. The subsystems include 

the Maneuver Control System, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, the 

Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control System, the All Source Analysis 

System, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, and the Combat Service 

Support Control System. 

(4) The current DOD tool suite for enterprise collaboration is Defense Connect 

Online (DCO). Fielded through the NCES program, DCO enables combatant commands, 

Services, and agencies with real time virtual collaboration capability using instant 

messaging, low-bandwidth text chat, and web conferencing. Instant messaging and web 

conferencing both include text-based communications, while web conferencing adds 

shared whiteboards, desktop and application sharing, and the ability to invite non-DOD 

personnel into collaboration sessions. 

(5) AMHS is a multilevel secure, high mission assurance system for 

transmission of record message traffic in support of DOD. 

e. Video Services

 (1) Defense Video Teleconferencing (VTC) System – Global. A classified, 

closed video network capable of voice, image, and data exchange supporting C2 

functions of DOD. It utilizes industry standard technology for robust interoperability to 

commercial systems as well as legacy DOD systems.

 (2) SCI-Level VTC. A classified, closed video network capable of voice, 

image, and data exchange supporting intelligence, and C2 functions of DOD. (Note: SCI 

VTC is typically carried over the JWICS network.) 

 (3) Commercial News Feed. Commercial news feeds may be rebroadcast over 

DOD communications systems or received via a commercially leased terminal in support 

of C2 functions. 
Chapter II

II-10 JP 6-0 

f. SATCOM Services

 (1) SATCOM systems normally consist of three segments.

 (a) Space segment (military or leased commercial satellites). 

 (b) Terminal segment (fixed and deployable terminals). 

 (c) Control segment (hardware distributed among control centers, 

satellites and terminals, and software to evaluate the status of the system stations and 

capable of monitoring, operating, and positioning the satellite, near real time allocation of 

satellite power, antenna orientation/nulling, and terminal monitoring and control). 

 (2) The DOD SATCOM architecture is flexible and adaptable (see Figure II-4). 

Current investment strategies attempt to find the right mix between DOD-owned and 

commercially-leased services, while balancing mobility, survivability, capacity, and 

assured access. Emphasis today is focused on using SATCOM to support the 

deployed joint force by providing reachback to the sustaining base portions of the 

GIG. In addition to these needs, SATCOM also supports a broad range of other missions 

and C2 requirements. SATCOM provides instant global reach to widely dispersed small 

and mobile forces; covers polar, open ocean, and remote areas of the world; and has a 

nuclear-survivable component with appreciable capacity. SATCOM supports a wide 

range of narrowband and wideband services for voice, data, video, and paging and is 

especially well suited for netted and broadcast services. SATCOM keeps en route forces 

and support systems supplied with critical information while deploying into an 

operational area. SATCOM can immediately tie sensors to shooters and provide beyond 

line-of-sight control of remote sensors and remote or in-flight weapons. SATCOM is 

also essential to the intelligence and diplomatic communities to provide worldwide 

transmission of critical intelligence data and sensitive diplomatic traffic over 

communications paths that remain under the direct control of the United States, 

especially during times of political tension or crisis. 

 (3) While it is clearly desired that DOD take full advantage (where affordable) 

of the commercial sector’s capabilities and offerings, it is recognized that not all 

communications needs can or should be met by commercial means, especially in an 

unpredictable threat environment. There is broad consensus that there is an enduring 

need for DOD-owned SATCOM because military and commercial communications 

needs and uses are not convergent. There continue to be differences including the 

military need for nuclear survivable communications, plus antijam or covertness, with 

globally assured and immediate access, to including netted voice and data. In some 

cases, commercial SATCOM coverage is not available over the objective area or is not 

available for lease. Additionally, the military need to support rapid deployment of large 

infrastructure contrasts sharply with the relatively static commercial environment. 
The Global Information Grid

II-11 

 (4) However, there is also a genuine need for commercial SATCOM. DOD 

access to advanced capabilities of future commercial systems will provide faster access to 

new technologies or services. Commercial systems also provide additional capacity for 

surge demands. There is little DOD infrastructure needed to build or maintain access to 

commercial systems, which results in reduced acquisition, operations and maintenance, 

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

DISN

DSCS

DSTS-G

E

E/EE

EHF

FLTSAT

INMARSAT

IPS

MTC

MUOS

SATCOM

UFO

UHF

SHF

Defense Information Systems 

Network

Defense Satellite 

Communications System

DISN Satellite Transmission 

Services-Global

enhanced

enhanced extremely high 

frequency

extremely high frequency

fleet satellite

international maritime satellite

Interim Polar System

Managed Transponder Contract

Mobile User Objective System

satellite communications

ultrahigh frequency follow-on

ultrahigh frequency

super-high frequency

SHF

EHF

SHF/UHF

UHF

WIDEBAND

PROTECTED

COMMERCIAL

NARROWBAND









Strategic Communications

Some Tactical

Intelligence DISN

Medium and High Data Rates







Strategic and Tactical

Highly Secure, Jam Resistant

Low and Medium Data Rates









Secured

Pay for Services

Commercial Competition

Commercial C-band and Ku-band 

capabilities





Voice, Data, and Imagery

Warfighter Primary 

Communications-on-the-Move









DSCS

Wideband Global SATCOM

Commercial SATCOM

Global Broadcast Service











Milstar

Polar-EHF

IPS

UFO E

UFO E/EE









INMARSAT

Iridium

MTC

DSTS-G









FLTSAT

UFO

Line-of-Sight

MUOS







 C-band

 Ku-band

 Others as 

needed

Figure II-4. Satellite Communications Systems
Chapter II

II-12 JP 6-0 

and manpower investment. Along with these efficiencies, DOD benefits by only 

acquiring commercial capacity as it is needed.

 (5) SATCOM resources are inherently flexible and well suited to supporting 

mobile and on-the-move operations. They provide the global reach necessary for DOD’s 

global mission. Some of the advantages of the GIG’s SATCOM architecture are the 

inherent ability to share resources over large geographic areas by individual satellites, the 

ability to provide worldwide (non-polar) or global coverage with a few assets, the 

capability to quickly service isolated areas, or rapidly extend new line-of-sight 

communications to mobile platforms. Currently, the three main sub-architectural 

components of the GIG’s SATCOM architecture consist of wideband, protected, 

and narrowband services (see Figure II-4). Commercial services augment military 

wideband and narrowband services. 

 (a) Wideband services providing high-capacity and broadcast 

communications coverage to meet increasing demands for information include militaryowned and commercially-leased satellite systems. Military-owned wideband systems 

include the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), Wideband Global 

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) (WGS), Digital Video Broadcast – Return 

Channel Via Satellite, and the GBS.

 1. DSCS provides a GIG transmission backbone of high capacity C2, 

intelligence and multichannel communications service for the CCDRs, Services, and 

agencies. Although not formally considered part of the architecture’s protected 

communications capabilities, DSCS has a credible antijam capability with sophisticated 

satellite survivability features. The satellites are nuclear-hardened, providing secure 

voice and high data rate, long-haul, worldwide communications. DSCS satellites support 

deployed forces and ships. 

 2. The GBS is a DOD program for wide area broadcast of commonly 

shared information. GBS is capable of providing a wide range of video and/or data 

services on a broadcast-only basis to widely dispersed elements. Critical nodes are 

typically receiving terminals in support of designated C2 operations, but may include intheater injection (transmitting) points if available. GBS provides a high-capacity nearworldwide military-owned SATCOM broadcast capability for dissemination of 

information products. The broadcast signals are transmitted to a large inventory of userreceive units worldwide. This capability makes possible a high data rate bit stream of 

video, data, imagery, and other information from high-powered broadcast satellites to a 

large section of the force structure and numerous warfighting platforms. The broadcast is 

transmitted from a limited number of fixed and deployable injection terminals controlled 

by the CCDRs, and managed by a broadcast management segment in each satellite field 

of view. The information being transmitted is collected from a myriad of sources and 

packaged for broadcast injection by the satellite broadcast manager or theater injection 

points. CCDR theater information managers nominate and monitor CCDR priorities, 

authorize user access, coordinate broadcast schedules, and allocate resources. There are 

three primary injection points operating to support the Pacific, European, and Central 
The Global Information Grid

II-13 

Command theaters, along with numerous receive suites acquired by the Services to 

support operating forces. 

3. WGS has evolved to become the replacement to the DSCS 

constellation. The primary function of the WGS system is to provide high-capacity 

communications services into the wide variety of large, medium, small, and mobile 

deployed force terminals. The system enables intertheater and intratheater

communications for sustaining bases and dispersed users. US forces will use WGS to 

extend the ranges of their high-capacity data-transfer networks to other forces across the 

theater, to the sustaining bases, and to DISN points of presence. 

 4. Commercial wideband services are procured by DISA under such 

contract vehicles as the Managed Transponder Contract and the Defense Information 

Systems Network (DISN) Satellite Transmission Services - Global (DSTS-G). All 

Services and agencies are required to procure their long-haul communications services 

through DISA unless a waiver is granted by OSD. Currently the DSTS-G contract can 

provide: 

 a.

 

 Fixed satellite bandwidth.

 b.

 

 Bandwidth and service management. 

 c.

 

 Leased earth terminal services.

 d.

 

 Purchased earth terminals if approved by Army 

Communications-Electronics Command. 

 e.

 

 Global on-site earth terminal operation and maintenance.

 f.

 

 Commercial teleport services.

 g.

 

 US and foreign bandwidth and terminal licenses and approval. 

 h.

 

 Terrestrial interconnection services to support satellite service.

 i.

 

 Host nation agreement-negotiating support. 

 j.

 

 Systems-engineering support. 

 k.

 

 First right of refusals and guaranteed reservations.

 l.

 

 DISN common-user hub services.

 m. Multiple location turnkey satellite systems. 
Chapter II

II-14 JP 6-0 

 (b) Protected and survivable services providing antijam, nuclearsurvivable and LPD, intercept, and exploitation of communications capabilities including 

polar coverage are provided by military-owned and operated systems. Two of the key 

systems are Milstar and advanced extremely high frequency. A third system is the 

Interim Polar System (IPS).

 1. Milstar is designed to support strategic and tactical missions 

through secure global communications that are jam-resistant and survivable with LPI and

LPD. Milstar supports both single channel and multi-channel communications with low 

data rates from 75 bits per second (bps) up to 2.4 kilobits per second (kbps) (Milstar-I) 

and medium data rates up to 1.544 megabits per second (Milstar-II). Crosslinks between 

the satellites permit worldwide communications without the use of ground stations. Use 

of extremely high frequency (EHF) provides for narrow antenna beams for LPD and 

antijam capability. Additionally, EHF frequencies provide wide bandwidths for nuclear 

effects mitigation, as well as antijam capability. Both wide and narrow spot beam 

satellite antennas provide appropriate power levels for a variety of user terminals. The 

Milstar is the core DOD C2 communications system for US strategic and tactical combat 

forces in hostile environments. Additionally, small-scale EHF payloads are hosted on 

some fleet satellite and ultrahigh frequency follow-on (UFO) satellites to provide a 

contingency/surge capability for strategic and/or tactical users.

 2. IPS provides EHF low data rate (75 bps to 2.4 kbps) 

communications to users above 65 degrees north latitude. A single satellite in a Molniya 

orbit provides 14-hour coverage to the polar region. Due to the nature of Molniya orbits, 

two satellites are required for 24-hour coverage. IPS supports combatant commands and 

NATO missions with C2, DISN, and essential targeting information. 

 (c) Narrowband and mobile services provide phone and data transfer 

capability for netted, mobile, hand-held, paging, and low speed broadcast. Some of the 

GIG’s key systems in this category include military-owned fleet satellite communications 

(FLTSATCOM), UFO, and commercially available mobile satellite service such as 

international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) and Iridium. 

 1.

 

 UFO and FLTSATCOM systems provide low-cost user 

terminals that are small and lightweight, and can be used while on the move, under 

adverse weather conditions and in dense foliage. However, these ultrahigh frequency

(UHF) systems yield low data rates, and are susceptible to both detection and jamming. 

Limited numbers of channel accesses available coupled with limited earth coverage 

satellite beams result in competition for access over wide geographic areas, requiring 

adjudication at the highest levels within DOD.

 2. INMARSAT provides bulk use and pay-per-use alternatives 

that support information transfer requirements during both normal operations and periods 

of contingency or crisis. INMARSAT does not provide the survivability, LPI, or antijam 

capabilities required in tactical applications. It may be subject to electromagnetic 

interference (EMI), jamming, or intrusion. 
The Global Information Grid

II-15 

 3. Iridium (also known as Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services) 

provides secure and non-secure voice and data services to DOD tactical and non-tactical 

users. Although Iridium is a commercial SATCOM service, DOD has procured and 

installed an Iridium gateway which provides direct connection to DSN and NIPRNET 

services. DISA has contracts in place from which DOD and other US Government users 

can obtain service.

 4. The Trojan network is the primary tactical extension of the 

JWICS network. The system consists of secure voice, data, facsimile, video, and 

secondary imagery dissemination capabilities. The system will receive, display, and 

transmit digital imagery, weather and terrain products, templates, graphics, and text 

between the continental United States (CONUS)/outside CONUS bases and deployed 

forces.

 5. Mobile User Objective System is a narrowband military 

SATCOM system that supports a worldwide, multi-Service population of mobile and 

fixed-site terminal users in the UHF band, providing increased communications 

capabilities to smaller terminals while still supporting interoperability to legacy 

terminals.

g. Aerial Layer. The aerial layer provides additional communications capacity by 

using unmanned systems to host communications packages for continuous 

communications coverage of large geographic areas. The aerial layer integrates with the 

space and terrestrial network segments to enable advanced information exchange 

capabilities.

 h. Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

 (1) M&S of the communications system allows planners at all levels to design, 

analyze, and validate communication architectures to measure and assess the flow of 

information throughout various types of networks (data, voice, video, digital, and analog) 

and media (satellite, terrestrial, microwave, wireless, wireline, fiber optic, and others).

 (2) M&S capabilities (such as the Joint Communications Simulation System of 

the DISA Program Management Office) have been developed to enable communications 

system planners and system developers to capitalize on the full potential of this powerful 

technology. These capabilities assist communications planners and analysts in a variety 

of circumstances including annex K (communications supplement/instructions) of the 

OPLAN development, validation, and execution; rapid contingency planning; network 

and configuration management; force-on-force wargaming; and new technology 

acquisitions. Simulation results provide quantifiable outcome predictions on planned or 

future communication networks or modifications to current networks. 
Chapter II

II-16 JP 6-0 

5. Global Information Grid Framework Hierarchy and Structure

a. The attainment of IS requires unity of effort in command, control, and 

management of the GIG. As a practical matter, unity of effort is necessary due to the vast 

number of IT resources required to support worldwide GIG operations. The provisioning 

of GIG IT services includes all geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) areas of 

responsibility (AORs), and all DOD users from anywhere in the world. The GIG 

supports DOD users that are deployed or operate from their home base. The GIG IT 

infrastructure, information services, data, policies, standards, and procedures must 

support the operational forces in all of their assigned missions. The GIG must be flexible 

and tailorable to accommodate changes required by the various CCDR missions. The 

GIG must also be capable of supporting operations at all levels of warfare from strategic 

to tactical operations. To enable the GIG to adequately support the operational 

commanders it needs to be centrally directed and coordinated to ensure all combat 

commanders receive a similar level of service and effectiveness. While centrally 

directed, the GIG will be operated in a decentralized manner.

b. IAW Title 10, United States Code (USC), Commander, United States Strategic 

Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) implements the C2 structure to execute NETOPS 

operational priorities and has overall responsibility for global NETOPS and defense in 

coordination with CJCS and the other combatant commands. For operational 

effectiveness, CDRUSSTRATCOM provides unity of command for the GIG in 

coordination with CCDRs and DOD components. CCDRs will coordinate with 

USSTRATCOM through USCYBERCOM to ensure global impacts to the GIG are 

properly considered. 

c. USCYBERCOM, a subordinate unified command under USSTRATCOM, 

focuses on military cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, 

integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of 

the GIG; prepare to, and when directed, attack adversaries in and through cyberspace in 

order to enable actions in all domains, permit freedom of action in cyberspace, and to 

deny the same to our adversaries. USCYBERCOM is a reorganization of existing DOD 

entities and authorities to improve DOD’s ability to conduct cyberspace operations in an 

efficient and effective manner. The Director, National Security Agency (NSA) is dualhatted as the commander USCYBERCOM. Previously, CDRUSSTRATCOM delegated 

operational and tactical level planning, force execution, and day-to-day management of 

the operations and defense of the GIG to Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations 

(JTF-GNO). The duties previously assigned to JTF-GNO under DISA and Joint 

Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW) under 

USSTRATCOM are the responsibility of USCYBERCOM. JTF-GNO and JFCC NW 

may be disestablished in the near future. 
The Global Information Grid

II-17 

6. Duties and Responsibilities within the Global Information Grid

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense 

 (1) Department of Defense Chief Information Officer

 (a) ASD(NII), as the DOD CIO, serves as the DOD’s principal staff 

assistant for IM, and consequently develops and issues the DOD information resource 

management strategic plan. The DOD CIO is the GIG architect and is overall 

responsible for developing, maintaining, and enforcing compliance with the GIG 

architecture. The DOD CIO provides recommendations to the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council for the development of DOD GIG requirements and direction to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for satisfying non-DOD requirements for GIG services 

validated by SecDef. The CIO will also consult with comparable IC authorities on 

matters of policy, implementation, and operation. Inherent in the CIO’s architecture 

responsibility is the responsibility to enforce interoperability, IA, net-centric data sharing, 

use of enterprise services, and GIG program synchronization. 

 (b) The DOD CIO Executive Board is the principal forum used to advise 

the DOD CIO on the full range of matters pertaining to the GIG. It also coordinates 

implementation of activities under the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and exchanges 

pertinent information and discusses issues regarding the GIG, including DOD IM and IT. 

Chaired by ASD(NII), the board is composed of CIOs and/or senior communicators from 

the Services; the Joint Staff; the IC; USJFCOM; USSTRATCOM; the Director, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation; as well as the DOD Under Secretaries for Intelligence; Policy; 

Personnel and Readiness; Comptroller; and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The 

primary mission of the board is to advance DOD’s goals in the areas of IM, information 

interoperability, and IA between and among DOD components. 

 (2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) serves as the 

principal staff assistant to SecDef on the development and oversight of DOD IO policy 

and integration activities. In this capacity, USD(I), in coordination with ASD(NII), 

establishes specific policies for CND of the GIG.

 b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

 (1) Unless otherwise directed, communications between the President and 

SecDef and the CCDRs are transmitted through CJCS. CJCS exercises operational 

oversight over those portions of the GIG utilized for such communications. 

 (2) CJCS is responsible for the operation of the NMCS for SecDef to meet the 

needs of the President, SecDef, and the JCS; and establishes operational policies and 

procedures for all components of the NMCS and ensures their implementation. 
Chapter II

II-18 JP 6-0 

 (3) CJCS also promulgates instructions and other guidance with regard to joint 

doctrine. These instructions include criteria and standards for assessing and reporting 

readiness of GIG assets.

 (4) The MCEB (Figure II-5) is a decisionmaking instrument of the CJCS

and SecDef for determining corporate communications system strategy to support 

the joint force. The MCEB considers and resolves issues related to the interoperability, 

compatibility, and integration of the GIG vision. The MCEB is chaired by the Joint Staff 

J-6/joint community CIO and composed of over twenty organizations from the Services 

and DOD agencies at the flag officer/Senior Executive Service level. The MCEB 

essentially coordinates GIG matters among DOD components, between DOD and other 

governmental departments and agencies, and between DOD and representatives of 

foreign nations. This includes operational guidance and direction to the CCDRs, 

Services, and agencies. The MCEB utilizes panels, which are functionally-oriented 

bodies with expertise usually in one specific area, to research and prepare issues for 

discussion and/or resolution. 

 (5) The CCEB is a five-nation joint military communications organization 

whose mission is the coordination of any military communications system matter that is 

referred to it by a member nation. The member nations of the CCEB are Australia, 

Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The CCEB consists 

of a senior communications system representative from each of the member nations. The 

US representative for the CCEB is the Joint Staff J-6, who also chairs the MCEB. As the 

only joint combined organization focused entirely on communications system matters, it 

is positioned to provide leadership within the combined and joint environment. The 

CCEB defines an environment that optimizes information sharing and overcomes the

disadvantages of transient coalitions. The CCEB seeks to achieve interoperability not 

just with technical standards and common procedures but also by spanning technologies 

and systems. The CCEB develops and seeks agreement on policies, procedures, and 

standards that enable the exchange of information in the combined environment including 

Allied communications publications (ACPs).

c. Combatant Commanders

 (1) GCCs oversee and coordinate GIG planning and employment within their 

AORs. They exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over GIG 

assets assigned to their commands. They utilize the JTF-GNO, the TNC hierarchy, as 

well as Service component command TNCs as appropriate, and joint control centers. To 

this end, they collaborate with their respective Service components, DISA, DIA, and 

USSTRATCOM to create and maintain visibility over theater networks.

 (2) CCDRs report on the readiness of GIG resources as a part of the Chairman’s 

Readiness Reporting System consisting of the Joint Force Readiness Review, combatant 

command assessments, and plan assessments. The joint combat capabilities assessment 

(JCCA) provides the President, through SecDef and CJCS, a current assessment on the 

military’s ability to execute its assigned mission in support of the national military 
The Global Information Grid

II-19 

strategy. The JCCA assesses all functional areas, including communications system 

theater and strategic GIG infrastructure shortfalls, and limitations affecting the 

communications system.

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS BOARD 

AND COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

BOARD

I

N

T

E

R

N

A

T

I

O

N

A

L

N

A

T

I

O

N

A

L

National 

Staff















Military-Communications 

Procedures and Publications

Information Assurance

Frequency

Data Systems Interoperability

Standards Coordination 

Committee

Interoperability Policy and Test

Network Operations

PANELS (7) 









Frequency Planners

Information Security

Coalition Wide Area Task 

Force

Directory Services

Messaging Task Force

WORKING GROUPS (5)

DOD

CIO

CCEB

Chairman J-6/ Principal

JCCIO

Coordinators Executive Group

Washington Staff

Chairman Military Member

Secretary

MCEB

Spectrum

and CIO

NATO, MIC,

Bi-laterals

CCEB

CIO

DOD

J-6

JCCIO

MCEB

MIC

NATO

Combined CommunicationsElectronics Board

chief information officer

Department of Defense

communications system 

directorate of a joint staff

joint community CIO

Military CommunicationsElectronics Board

Multinational Interoperability 

Council

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure II-5. Military Communications-Electronics Board and Combined 

Communications-Electronics Board
Chapter II

II-20 JP 6-0 

 (3) CCDRs identify, categorize (in terms of mission criticality), and assess risks 

to their mission critical assets (including information assets) via annex C (Operations), 

appendix 16 (Critical Infrastructure Protection) of their OPLANs. 

 (4) CCDRs validate the annex K (communications supplement/instructions) 

portions of their appropriate OPLANs periodically as a part of CJCS-sponsored or 

command-sponsored exercises. These tests will identify unresolved issues, verify 

operational procedures and interoperability, and provide joint training. 

 (5) GCCs identify their multinational interoperability requirements in the 

GCC’s theater campaign plan. These requirements should be tested periodically as part 

of multinational exercises to identify unresolved issues, verify operational procedures and 

interoperability, and provide multinational training. 

 (6) GCCs identify their US OGA, NGO, and intergovernmental organization 

(IGO) coordination and communications system requirements. The operational area may 

have large a number of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. To promote unified action coordination 

may be necessary. Communications support, where needed, should be consistent with 

US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

 d. Military Departments (MILDEPs) and Services. IAW guidelines and direction 

from SecDef, each MILDEP or Service, as appropriate, has the following common 

functions and responsibilities pertaining to joint operations: 

 (1) Provide an interoperable and compatible communications system for the 

effective prosecution of military operations and plan for the expansion of the GIG to meet 

the requirements of DOD. In so doing, they will ensure that component-managed 

portions of all GIG programs are planned, resourced, acquired, and implemented IAW 

the DOD information management support plan (IMSP), the GIG Capstone Requirements 

Document and architecture, and DOD priorities. 

 (2) As GIG network providers, managers, or executive agents, extend GIG 

common services, to include voice, data, and video, to their organizations within the 

sustaining base.

 (3) Ensure that Service-managed portions of the GIG are secure, assured, and 

interoperable, and that all personnel are appropriately trained. 

 (4) Provide frequency engineering and management within their respective 

MILDEPs and to optimize the use of electromagnetic spectrum by ensuring equipment 

use is planned so that sufficient electromagnetic spectrum is available. Operation of the 

equipment will be in compliance with national and international electromagnetic 

spectrum management and supportability programs, doctrine, and regulations. 
The Global Information Grid

II-21 

e. Commander, United States Strategic Command 

 (1) USSTRATCOM has overall responsibility for GIG operations and defense 

in coordination with CJCS and combatant commands. CDRUSSTRATCOM is 

responsible for coordinating and directing DOD-wide CND. USSTRATCOM 

through its USCYBERCOM component executes the DOD mission. At the HQ level, 

USSTRATCOM responsibilities are to advocate for national requirements and standards, 

and in coordination with other CCDRs, assess and report the operational readiness of the 

GIG systems/networks.

 (2) As military lead for CND, CDRUSSTRATCOM through JTF-GNO is 

responsible for the computer network incident reporting and developing coordinated 

response actions for a synchronized defense of DOD computer networks. This includes 

the development of defensive actions to deter or defeat unauthorized activity by 

coordinating release and distribution of IA advisories and alerts, and monitoring 

compliance of issued IA vulnerability alert. In addition, CDRUSSTRATCOM has 

authority to direct minimum-level DOD-wide information operations conditions 

(INFOCON) levels.

 

 (3) CDRUSSTRATCOM has space operations authorities and responsibilities 

tasked by the Unified Command Plan. As the satellite communications (SATCOM) 

operational manager (SOM), CDRUSSTRATCOM centrally manages SATCOM to meet 

combatant command, Service, and agency operational requirements and strategic 

planning to support the SATCOM portion of the GIG. 

For further information, see JP 3-14, Space Operations, and CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite 

Communications. 

 (4) Additionally, CDRUSSTRATCOM develops, coordinates, and executes 

SATCOM policies and procedures, apportionment plans, constellation deployment plans, 

and satellite positioning and repositioning plans. CDRUSSTRATCOM also assesses 

how these various plans impact communications support to current and future operations 

and coordinates action prior to execution. 

 f. Joint Force Commander 

 (1) The JFC ensures an adequate and effective communications system is 

available to support the joint force C2 system. The JFC exercises this responsibility 

through the J-6. 

 (2) The J-6 then: 

 (a) Publishes communications system plans, annexes, and operating 

instructions to support the assigned mission. In so doing, the J-6 directs subordinate 

commands to provide communications system assets required to support the JFC. This 

may include assigning primary responsibility for communications to a subordinate or 
Chapter II

II-22 JP 6-0 

component command. The J-6 also assigns responsibility for lateral communications 

between subordinate commands. 

 (b) Provides overall management of the communications system supporting 

the JFC. As the forces deploy, the J-6 establishes a JNCC to establish network control 

and management within the operational area. 

 (c) Reviews and coordinates communications system plans prepared by 

subordinate commands. 

 (d) Provide for interoperability of the joint communications system.

 g. Joint Command Information Systems Activity (JCISA). The JCISA is a 

theater-specific communications organization under the operational control (OPCON) of 

the United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command, Korea (CFC), and 

United States Forces, Korea (USFK). JCISA consists of active duty military and 

mission-essential contractors supporting the armistice and receives OPCON of all 

communications-computer assets during crisis and hostilities. During armistice and 

hostilities, the organization is organic to the CFC and USFK (C/J-6) and provides 

management, policy, plans, engineering, installation, network operation, maintenance, 

and system administration for Commander UNC/CFC/USFK’s primary joint and 

combined C2 systems. The unit is staffed with personnel from all the US military 

Services; all the Republic of Korea military Services; and when augmented, is equipped 

with a wide range of communications equipment and capabilities. 

 h. Department of Defense Agencies

 (1) Similar to other DOD component responsibilities, DOD agencies are also 

responsible for ensuring that their information systems environment is developed and 

maintained in a manner that is consistent with and reflective of the GIG architecture, and 

that agency-specific programs are planned, resourced, acquired, and implemented IAW 

the DOD IMSP and defense resource priorities. Those defense agencies, which are also 

part of the IC, are also subject to the policies and guidance of the IC CIO. 

 (2) DIA is responsible for the engineering, developing, implementing, and 

managing the Top Secret/SCI portion of the GIG including the configuration of 

information, data, and communications standards for intelligence systems, in 

coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, other agencies, and OSD. Included within 

this is the overall OPCON of the JWICS, a strategic secure, high capacity 

telecommunications network serving the IC with voice, data, and video services. DIA 

establishes defense-wide intelligence priorities for attaining interoperability between 

tactical, theater, and national intelligence related systems and between intelligence related 

systems and tactical, theater, and national elements of the GIG. The DIA exercises 

operational management of JWICS via the JWICS NETOPS center.
The Global Information Grid

II-23 

 (3) The NSA is responsible for developing and prescribing cryptographic 

standards and principles that are technically secure and sound; development and 

executive management of DOD cryptographic hardware and software systems; and 

providing specialized support to the President, SecDef, and operating forces (e.g., 

national intelligence support teams and other special capabilities).

 (4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), as the functional 

manager for geospatial intelligence activities, is responsible for the development and

evolution of the architecture for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG). 

As the functional manager for NSG, NGA actively communicates its architecture to 

members of the geospatial IC and promotes common standards and interoperability 

among NSG segments. The NSG is the technology, policies, capabilities, doctrine, 

activities, people, and community needed to produce geospatial intelligence in an 

integrated multi-intelligence environment. The NSG community consists of members of 

the IC, MILDEPs, combatant commands, and elements of the civil community. NSG 

partners include international entities, industry, academia, and DOD and civil community 

services providers.
Chapter II

II-24 JP 6-0 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III

JOINT FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

OPERATIONS PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

III-1 

1. Joint Force Communications Management Organizations 

Joint communications system management involves the employment and technical 

control of assigned communications systems. Communications system management 

allows the planners to maintain an accurate and detailed status of the network down to the 

modular level. It combines centralized control with decentralized execution and provides 

effective and efficient communications system support for the JFC. Communications 

management policy and procedures are introduced Chapter IV, “Network Operations.”

a. Joint NETOPS Control Center. The joint force J-6 must be prepared to respond 

to the JFC for all automated information system issues required to accomplish the overall 

mission. The JNCC is used to manage all communications systems deployed during 

operations and exercises. The JNCC, through component/Service control facilities, 

exercises control over many deployed communications systems and serves as a control 

agency for the management and operational direction of joint communications networks. 

Functional components and subordinate JFCs may establish a systems control (SYSCON) 

or NETOPS security center (NOSC) to serve as their single point of contact for 

communications system issues. The JNCC performs planning, execution, technical 

direction, and management over all deployed communications systems as discussed in 

detail in the CJCSM 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications. 

 (1) JNCC Management Implementation. When communications system 

networks are activated, planners and operators begin to monitor the status of the systems, 

networks, and nodes. User-detected system problems are reported to the user’s 

immediate chain of command and supporting SYSCON/NOSC. They implement 

corrective actions to restore any outages. The SYSCON/NOSC directs the appropriate 

technical control facility to resolve the problem or coordinates with other technical 

control facilities and the user’s chain of command to resolve the problem. 

 (2) The joint network management system (JNMS) is the system for 

providing enhanced network management capabilities to the JFC. The JNMS provides a 

CCDR and a potential JFC with an automated capability to plan and manage networked 

services, devices, and systems. The JNMS establishes the means by which network 

planning and management may be coordinated across all DOD communications system 

organizations. 

“Clearly, networking a force dramatically improves its capabilities for 

information sharing. This does not mean that all elements of the force are 

sharing information with each other all the time – but rather that all involved 

have the capability to share and access needed information. Sharing 

information is a prerequisite for a force to be able to develop shared 

situational awareness and to yield the warfighting benefits associated with 

enhanced collaboration and synchronization.”

Network Centric Warfare Report to Congress — March 2001
Chapter III

III-2 JP 6-0 

 b. Services Component Management. Components and assigned support 

organizations should designate a single office within their communications staffs to 

coordinate with the joint force J-6. Component communications system organizations 

should formulate and publish plans, orders, and internal operating instructions for the use 

of their communications systems. All components’ technical control facilities perform 

network control and reconfiguration. For example, they change circuit paths, direct 

troubleshooting to resolve problems, and provide status information. Communications 

system management organizations need to account for traffic management in a packetrouted environment and circuit management functions. 

c. The joint information management board (JIMB) serves as the JFC’s principal 

organization to draft the commander’s information dissemination policy and coordinates 

IM functions within the joint force. A JIMB should be convened during the initial 

development of the joint force IM plan and as required thereafter. It is chaired by that 

individual designated the IM officer. The JIMB should be composed of representatives 

from each staff section, component, and supporting agency, and operates under the 

supervision of the chief of staff, or other appropriate staff directorate, as best meets the 

JFC’s mission needs. The commander or a senior representative provides direct input 

into the JIMB by detailing the commander’s view of the operational environment 

management and its impact on information flow and IM. 

2. Joint Force Communications Planning and Management Structure

a. Executive Agent for Communications. The SecDef or Deputy Secretary of 

Defense may designate the head of a component as an executive agent for specific 

responsibilities and authority prescribed at the time of assignment. This is done when no 

existing means to accomplish the DOD objectives exists and DOD resources need to be 

focused on a specific AOR. 

 b. Combatant Command J-6. The CCDR, through the J-6, provides 

communications system guidance and priorities to supporting commands and 

components. The execution of theater guidance and priorities is through the TNCC

or the equivalent organization. To effectively do this, the TNCC must maintain near 

real time SA of critical communications system nodes. The TNCC works closely with 

subordinate JNCCs to ensure accurate, timely, and detailed reporting by subordinate and 

supporting agencies (see Figure III-1). The TNCC is a supporting operations center to 

the GCCs’ JOC and is responsible for AOR-wide SA of NETOPS events and activities. 

It facilitates AOR-wide coordination of processes, such as authorized service 

interruptions and restorals, develops and conveys operational impact assessments of 

planned and unplanned NETOPS activities and events, supports development of courses 

of action (COAs), and ensures implementation of the GCC’s orders and direction.
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-3 

 c. Joint Force J-6 

 (1) The J-6 is responsible to the JFC for providing the communications system 

to support reliable, timely information flow in support of unified action. The 

operational arm of the J-6 is the JNCC. To direct NETOPS and retain SA, the JNCC 

requires timely support from a subordinate command’s communications control center, 

commonly referred to as SYSCON or NOSC. Component, JTF, subunified command 

and agency NOSCs are responsible for assimilating and integrating NETOPS SA data of 

their respective operational areas. Each NOSC installs, maintains, and operates network 

THEATER ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

COMBATANT 

COMMANDER

J-6

TNC TNCC

SUBORDINATE

JFC

COMM 

OFFICER

DOD SYSCON

Gateway

JNCC

JOINT 

FORCE 

J-6

SUBORDINATE

COMPONENT 

COMMANDER

OPCON

LIAISON

REPORTING/GUIDANCE

CONTROL

COMBATANT COMMAND 

(COMMAND AUTHORITY)

COMM

DOD

J-6

JFC

JNCC

SYSCON

TNC

TNCC

communications

Department of Defense

systems control

theater NETOPS center

theater NETOPS control center

communications system directorate of a joint staff

joint force commander

joint NETOPS control center

Figure III-1. Theater Organizational Relationships
Chapter III

III-4 JP 6-0 

management and intrusion detection software and populates a local database to build a 

near real time view of their system.

 (2) The J-6 assists the JFC in all communications system responsibilities. The 

J-6 establishes a JNCC to serve as the single control agency for the management and 

operational direction of the joint communications system. The JFC may task subordinate 

Service or component commanders to provide personnel augmentation to the J-6 to 

ensure the appropriate subject matter expertise exists within the JNCC. CCDRs and 

component commanders should designate a single office within their communications 

staffs to coordinate with the J-6. 

For additional information, see Field Manual (FM) 6-02.85/Marine Corps Reference

Publication (MCRP) 3-40.2A/Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-13.1.16/Air Force 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.22, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management.

 d. Joint NETOPS Control Center. The J-6 establishes a JNCC to manage all 

communications systems deployed during operations and exercises. The JNCC: 

 (1) Exercises OPCON and technical management over communications control 

centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands. 

 (2) Serves as the single control agency for management and operational 

direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure. 

 (3) Performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions. 

 (4) Develops/disseminates standards/procedures and collects/presents 

communications system management statistical data. Functional components and 

subordinate JFCs should designate a single office within their communications staffs to 

coordinate with the JNCC. 

 e. Subordinate Communications Units 

 (1) Subordinate communications units must ensure reliable, timely information 

flow to both the JFC and their own commanders. Functional component communications 

system organizations should formulate and publish plans, orders, and internal operating 

instructions for the use of their communications systems. 

 (2) Normally, there will not be a conflict between support provided to the JFC’s 

joint network and the respective subordinate commander’s network. When there is 

conflict, a subordinate’s SYSCON/NOSC cannot unilaterally decide the priority of 

support. It must coordinate with the JNCC to prioritize its activities. Additionally, it is 

critical that each SYSCON/NOSC provide timely, accurate communications system SA 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-5 

to the JNCC. The SYSCON/NOSC can also coordinate with the JNCC to gain technical 

and/or interoperability assistance.

3. Communications Planning and Management

a. Systems Requirements. Essential elements of the communications system are 

driven by the mission and determined by the C2 organization and location of forces 

assigned to the JFC. Specific command relationships and the organization of units and 

staffs drive the interconnecting communications methods and means. The 

communications system must support and provide for assured flow of information to and 

from commanders at all levels.

 b. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. JOPES applies to the 

development and implementation of OPLANs and OPORDs prepared in response to 

requirements from the President, SecDef, or the Chairman. It specifies the policies, 

procedures, formats, and reporting structures — supported by modern communications 

and computer systems — for planning the mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. JOPES provides for 

orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking in two related but distinct 

categories — contingency planning and crisis-action planning — which differ 

primarily in the amount of available planning time. 

For additional information on JOPES, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and 

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I 

(Planning Policies and Procedures), CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats, and CJCSM 3150.16B, Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP) Volume I. 

 (1) The joint planning and execution community uses contingency planning to 

develop OPLANs for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in 

planning directives. The JOPES process is highly structured to support iterative, 

concurrent, and parallel contingency planning throughout the planning community to 

produce thorough and fully coordinated contingency plans in non-crisis situations when 

time permits. 

 (2) While contingency planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, 

crisis-action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning 

occurs. Within the context of JOPES, crisis-action planning responds to an incident or 

situation involving a threat that typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such 

diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that the President or SecDef 

considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to resolve the situation. 

Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little 

as a few days, a feasible COA must be developed and approved, and timely identification 

of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies 

for movement and employment of US military force. 
Chapter III

III-6 JP 6-0 

c. Communications system planners are responsible for ensuring that the 

organization’s communications network can facilitate a rapid, unconstrained flow of 

information from its source through intermediate collection and processing nodes to its 

delivery to the user. Communications system planners should clearly understand the 

capabilities and limitations of all potentially available strategic, operational, and tactical 

communications systems and equipment, whether they are organic to Services and 

agencies, belong to non-US forces, are commercial, or provided by a host nation. 

Typically, the combined system will provide voice, data, and video communications. 

Building the communications system to support the JFC requires knowledge of the joint 

force organization, the commander’s concept of operations, communications available, 

and how they are employed. 

 d. The J-6 is responsible for planning and establishing the communications system 

and the communications estimate of supportability (see Appendix B, “Joint Force 

Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide”) during COA development and 

selection under the crisis-action planning process. 

e. Plans and Orders. The J-6 is responsible for providing input to orders and plans, 

publishing guidance, coordinating communications system support and services, and 

gaining accreditation of joint force networks. The primary document for publishing 

communications system guidance is the annex K (communications 

supplement/instructions) of the basic order. After the communications system plan is 

developed and approved, the J-6 must ensure all networks receive appropriate 

accreditation. The J-6 may be the designated approving authority (DAA) and is 

responsible for accrediting communications system networks. The DAA will assign a 

certifying authority within each component. For all other networks, the J-6 must 

consolidate accreditation requirements, validate their correctness, and forward a 

consolidated network accreditation package to the next higher joint force J-6. 

For more information on the accreditation process, see DODI 5200.40, DOD 

Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) 

and DOD Directive (DODD) 4630.05, Interoperability and Supportability of Information 

Technology (IT) and National Security Systems.

f. Communications Planning Considerations

 (1) IA. Achieving IA involves the employment of protection, detection, 

response, restoration, and reaction capabilities to shield and preserve information and 

information systems. CND is established to achieve IA and is focused on actions to 

protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity with DOD 

computer networks. Planning for CND to secure information and information systems is 

paramount to the success of the mission. It is a part of the defense-in-depth strategy. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-7 

 (2) Multinational Communications System Operations 

 (a) Multinational communications system operations may be composed 

of allied and/or coalition partners. Coalitions can be composed of diverse groups of 

security and information sharing environments. Multinational forces may have 

differences in their communications system, language, terminology, doctrine, operating 

standards, and willingness to share information that can cause confusion and 

interoperability problems in an operational environment. Once the JFC establishes the 

specific C2 organization for a joint or multinational operation, the information exchange 

requirements (IERs) are established as communications system planning begins. 

Planning considerations include electromagnetic spectrum management; equipment 

compatibility; procedural compatibility; cryptographic and information security 

(INFOSEC); identification friend, or foe; and data link protocols. These and other 

considerations are further amplified below:

 1. Establish Liaison Early. Effective communications system 

interface in joint and multinational operations demands the use of liaison teams. Their 

importance as a source of both formal and informal information exchange cannot be 

overstated. Requirements for liaison should be established early and to the extent 

possible, liaison teams should be trained and maintained for known or anticipated 

requirements.

 2. Early Identification of Communications System Requirements. 

The demand for information often exceeds the capabilities of the communications system 

within joint and multinational commands. It is crucial that the JFC identify early 

communications system requirements that are external to the command or require support 

from national and/or host nation resources (e.g., space-based systems support, CJCScontrolled assets, JCSE, NATO standing communications system equipment pool, and 

electromagnetic spectrum). Multinational communications system planning must include

the early establishment and incorporation of multinational networks. Resources need to 

be identified and planned for accordingly. 

 3. Standardization of Principles. Standardization of principles and 

procedures by multinational partners for multinational communications is essential. As 

US forces introduce new technology and become more network enabled, this area of 

concern is increasingly important. NETOPS, including activities conducted to monitor, 

control, and protect our networks, must be evaluated in the context of multinational 

networks. 

 4. Agreement in Advance of Military Operations. Multinational 

communications agreements should be made in advance of all phases of military 

operations with probable multinational partners. These should cover principles, 

procedures, and overall communications requirements (including standard message text 

formats, standard databases and data formats, electromagnetic spectrum management, 

and procedures for deconflicting frequency problems between multinational and civilian 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 6-0 

organizations). Proposed multinational communications agreements should take into 

account existing treaty obligations as well as applicable status-of-forces agreements 

between the United States and other nations. 

 5. US Interpreters. The United States will provide or acquire its own 

interpreters to ensure US interests are adequately protected. 

 6. Releasability. This planning consideration pertains to US keying 

material and equipment, and multinational connectivity to US networks. The operational 

acceptability and disclosure or release of COMSEC to foreign governments for 

multinational use will be determined and approved by the National Security 

Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee before entering into 

discussions with foreign nationals. Commanders and their staffs should be aware of the 

limitations in sharing classified information with multinational partners, especially 

information from space platforms or other national assets. The JFC must plan for the 

additional time and coordination necessary to ensure compliance with established 

security requirements. The dissemination, disclosure, or release of DOD intelligence 

information to foreign governments for multinational use is approved only by DIA, the 

National Security Council, or the senior intelligence officer in theater, and should not be 

confused with disclosure of US keying material or equipment outlined in the previous 

sentences of this paragraph. 

For more information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. For more detailed guidance on foreign access, connections, and COMSEC 

release see CJCSI 6510.06, Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations, 

CJCSI 6211.02B, Defense Information System Network (DISN): Policy, Responsibilities, 

and Processes, and CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and 

Computer Network Defense (CND). 

 7. Disclosure Policy. Foreign disclosure officers should be appointed, 

trained, and certified early in the planning process at all levels of command directly 

involved in multinational operations. Their primary responsibility is to ensure common 

understanding of information that can be shared with multinational partners. 

 (b) Commanders and planners must consider several factors as they 

establish a multinational communications system architecture.

 1. Rapidly determine what is shared, when, and with whom. Adapting 

a network to meet dynamic information-sharing rules advances modern warfighting 

operations in a multinational environment.

 2. Understand the mission, intent, and concept of operations. Different 

phases of a multinational operation necessitate different and distinct levels of 

communications system support. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-9 

 3. Have a comprehensive knowledge of the multinational structure and 

relationships. 

 (c) Communications system planning must be an integral part of joint force 

planning. Commanders and planners must: 

 1. Understand, expect, anticipate, and be prepared to deal with change. 

 2. Clearly understand the capabilities and limitations of available 

strategic, operational, and tactical communications system resources.

 3. Ensure that communications to facilitate information sharing are 

established with non-US and host nation commanders. 

 4. Identify communications system requirements that exceed the 

capabilities within the joint or multinational force and coordinate (electromagnetic 

spectrum, equipment, or connectivity) any mitigating actions through appropriate 

channels when host nation support is required. 

 5. Ensure communications system capabilities and employment 

procedures for non-US forces are understood. To enhance multinational operations, at 

least three options for communications system assets and interoperability are available.

 a. Use system-to-system compatibility to ensure interoperability. 

The United States may have to provide communications system resources to 

multinational partners to achieve this status.

 b. Establish and manage an interface between incompatible 

communications system through a combination of interface hardware, software, and TTP 

to ensure interoperability. 

 c. Establish basic (voice and/or data) communication links and 

ensure unity of effort through the use of TTP and liaison personnel. 

 d. Although any multinational operation is likely to use a mix of 

these three methods, the wider the participation, the greater will be the reliance on the use 

of voice links and liaison personnel. 

CJCSI 2700.01A, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, 

and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly 

Nations, focuses on enhanced communications system combat capabilities for US 

military forces to communicate and share data and information with multinational forces.

 (d) The CCEB develops ACPs recognizing the importance of 

interoperability with the NATO Alliance. There are approximately 65 ACPs (basic and 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 6-0 

supplements) used by more than 90 nations. The CCEB is the only joint combined 

organization focused entirely on communications system matters. ACPs provide 

communications instructions and procedures essential to the conduct of common military 

operations. ACPs facilitate the use of available communications services and provide a 

basis for detailed procedural and operational publications on communications subjects 

such as frequencies, call signs, address groups, and routing indicators. 

 (3) Support to ISR. The communications system planned by the J-6 is the 

primary means through which ISR information flows to the JFC and throughout the 

operational environment. Communications system planning must be conducted in close 

coordination with the J-2 to identify specialized equipment and dissemination 

requirements for some types of information. Support provided by the communications 

system does not typically cover the collection and production of intelligence. The IC has 

a number of systems that are not part of the GIG. (See Chapter V, “Communications 

System Support to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence 

Community.”) 

(4) Interagency organization, IGO, and NGO Communications. Of 

increasing importance to joint operations is effective connectivity to non-DOD 

departments and agencies and NGOs and IGOs. Presidential Executive Order 13388 of 

October 25, 2005, directs DOD agencies and military Services to share classified and 

unclassified information with the interagency. In some situations, information sharing 

will also occur with multinational partners, intergovernmental agencies and 

nongovernmental agencies. JFCs need to identify interagency IERs and coordinate 

connectivity/access as required. 

(5) Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Communications. The J-6 

needs to plan for local cellular and wireless services, which can be for official use or 

authorized MWR purposes. Because of electromagnetic spectrum considerations and 

security concerns, the J-6 should obtain a threat summary from the J-2 for adversary 

threats to communications networks in theater. Wireless networks in particular must be 

closely managed due to security risks. 

(6) Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS). MARS provides DOD 

sponsored emergency communications on a local, national, and international basis as an 

alternate communications capability. The program consists of licensed amateur radio 

operators who are interested in military communications. MARS has for many years 

provided morale, welfare, and official record and voice communications traffic for 

Armed Forces and authorized US Government civilian personnel stationed throughout the 

world. The combined three Service MARS programs (Army, Air Force, and NavyMarine Corps) volunteer force of over 5,000 dedicated and skilled amateur radio 

operators is the backbone of the MARS program. 

(7) Support to Homeland Security and Defense Communications System 

Planning. The DOD contributes to homeland security through its military missions 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-11 

overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. The disparity of

communications systems, use of allocated bandwidth (both civilian and military), and 

limited interoperable systems hinders the capability of collaborative incident 

management and response in the United States. However, standing JTFs exist that 

provide the C2 interface with federal, state, and local authorities. Interfaces include 

military web portals accessible by non-.mil servers, unclassified defense collaborative 

tool suite or similar commercial collaboration tools, JTF-owned deployable commercial 

voice switching, secure VTC in each governor’s office, radio cross-banding so that land 

mobile radios, tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios, high frequency (HF) radios, and cell 

phones can communicate with each other, and links to national laboratories and other 

subject matter experts. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) units 

include JTF-Civil Support, Joint Force HQ-National Capitol Region, JTF-Alaska, JTFNorth, and USNORTHCOM standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ). US Army North 

will also establish up to two regional task forces, as required. Additionally, each state 

adjutant general is building an SJFHQ with similar communications capabilities. 

 (a) Commanders and communications system planners need to consider the 

detailed planning and analysis to determine US-based communications system 

requirements in support of federal, state, and local agencies. For example, the JTF J-6 

may need to rapidly gather information on the commercial communications infrastructure 

from the National Communication System and/or the National Response Framework 

Emergency Support Function-2 representative.

 (b) The JTF J-6, when required and authorized, must bridge the gap 

between civilian, DOD, and OGAs to develop mission-oriented communications 

solutions. 

For more information on communications system planning for the homeland, see JP 3-

27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

 (8) World Wide Web/Public Internet. Communications planning and 

execution is dependent upon persistent access to the public cyberspace. As the world’s 

population increasingly gets its information from the public Internet, protected access to 

the World Wide Web is imperative for joint force communications, public affairs 

operations, and open source intelligence. This includes media and public perception 

analysis, global media SA, and the operation of public access websites for informing 

critical, worldwide audiences as part of a global information campaign. 

 

 (9) Information Dissemination Management (IDM). IDM balances a 

commander’s information dissemination policy with the fluidity of the battlespace to 

ensure a JFC receives the right information, in the right place, at the right time, and in the 

right format. 

 (10) Joint Network Communications Control. Controlling networks is the art 

of solving communications problems by using logical and methodical procedures. 
Chapter III

III-12 JP 6-0 

Network architecture is normally aligned with the CCDR’s multitiered C2 structure — 

the combatant command J-6, the joint force J-6, and the staff equivalents of the joint 

force components and subordinate commands. This relationship can be easily extended 

to the multinational command elements, their communications control centers, and 

communications capabilities when a multinational force is formed. NETOPS is discussed 

in more detail in Chapter IV, “Network Operations.” 

 (11) SATCOM Planning and Management. The goal of SATCOM planning 

is to ensure users have access to current systems and they are sized, deployed, and 

optimized to meet current and future SATCOM user requirements. SATCOM 

capabilities must be managed, monitored, controlled, and integrated with terrestrial 

capabilities to provide a comprehensive, seamless communications infrastructure. 

Communications planners and providers must have visibility into SATCOM and related 

network resources, for planning, implementing, monitoring, and sustaining 

communications support to forces within their operational area. SATCOM managers 

must have efficient and responsive methods for managing the complexities of multiple 

SATCOM payloads operating in many different frequency bands and network constraints 

or conditions while supporting diverse missions worldwide, as well as insight into threats, 

which would remove or negate those resources. 

 (a) The three levels of the SATCOM operational management 

structure are oversight, system-level staff support, and 24-hour operations centers.

 1. The Joint Staff performs the oversight functions. These functions 

are accomplished primarily via the joint communications satellite center. 

 2. The SOM (USSTRATCOM), and the satellite communications 

(SATCOM) systems experts (SSEs) perform the staff support and management functions. 

 3. The global satellite communications (SATCOM) support center 

(GSSC) and the regional SATCOM support centers (RSSCs) are organized to perform 

24-hour operations. These SATCOM support centers provide the global and regional 

direct support to users and their operations are closely integrated with GNCs and TNCs. 

The USSTRATCOM SATCOM C2 centers are responsible for satellite control and 

payload control execution. 

 (b) The organization with overall responsibility for SATCOM day-to-day 

operations is USSTRATCOM as the SOM. The SOM develops and implements 

standards, policy, and procedures for all SATCOM systems.

 (c) Designated SSEs provide the staff and management support to the 

SATCOM COI as necessary. CDRUSSTRATCOM designates SSEs from within the 

component structure or delegates responsibilities to external agencies via a memorandum 

of agreement.
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-13 

 (d) The SOM, supported by the SSEs, provides the integrated SATCOM 

management infrastructure. In addition, the SOM is responsible for establishing GNCs 

and TNCs, as required, to provide support to combatant commands and other users. 

These centers are incorporated as part of the overall DISN management and control 

system.

 (e) Tasks and Responsibilities 

 1. CJCS. Through the Joint Staff J-6, adjudicates differing resource 

requirements of the combatant commands that cannot be resolved between the CCDR, 

and CDRUSSTRATCOM, per CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications. 

 2. CDRUSSTRATCOM. As the SOM, performs all SATCOM 

apportionment, allocation, and arbitration. The day to day exaction of the tasks is 

delegated to the SATCOM operation managers at the GSSC. 

 3. Commander, USNORTHCOM. Advocate for non-DOD agencies 

conducting homeland security/homeland defense missions. 

 4. Combatant command TNCC or designated office. Validates and 

prioritizes all theater satellite access requests and adjudicates differing resources 

requirements of combatant command units within the AOR that cannot be resolved. 

 5. Joint force J-6. Validates, consolidates, and prioritizes all joint 

force satellite requests and adjudicates differing resource requirements of the joint force 

that cannot be resolved. 

 6. GSSC Functions. The GSSC provides the central operational focus 

for global constellation payload management. The GSSC performs the functions of the 

RSSC, described as follows, for those users not assigned to one of the RSSCs. The 

GSSC provides the central management for SATCOM accesses that require support from 

more than one regional center. The GSSC provides configuration management of the 

communications payload per USSTRATCOM direction as the SOM. 

 7. RSSC Functions. An RSSC follows the operational direction of the 

supported combatant commands and other users by defining requirements and allocating 

SATCOM assets. It analyzes scenarios, provides assessments, and assists CCDRs and 

their forces by translating OPLANs/OPORDs, annex K (communications 

supplement/instruction), and other planning documents into actionable requirements for 

SATCOM. An RSSC can also assist frequency managers and track, coordinate, and 

assist radio frequency interference identification and resolution. 

 (f) Super-High Frequency (SHF) Requirements. Wideband SATCOM 

terminals are a critical component in connecting the joint force into the GIG. These 

terminals extend GIG services to the joint operations area (JOA). The JFC establishes 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 6-0 

SATCOM link priorities based upon mission requirements. If theater requirements 

exceed available resources, access is adjudicated per CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite 

Communications. Naval forces afloat are assigned access by their respective RSSC as 

well and the combatant command TNCC validates and prioritizes these requests for 

access along with all other theater forces. 

 (g) Commercial Satellite Communications. Another method for US 

forces to access DISN services is to use deployable commercial SATCOM terminals, 

typically operating in the C-band, Kurtz-above band (Ka), Kurtz-under band (Ku). DISA 

manages commercial wideband SATCOM access through their commercial SATCOM 

team. Through this program, a user with combatant command validation can lease access 

to a commercial SATCOM transponder plus use of a commercial ground entry point 

(teleport or earth station) and long haul circuits to transport the information from the 

teleport to a DISN point of presence. While significant throughput may be available 

through commercial SATCOM, users need to be aware of commercial SATCOM 

planning considerations: 

 1. Transponder Availability. DOD must compete with the 

commercial sector for use of SATCOM transponders. Contractual limitations and 

flexibility can impact use. Planners must be aware of the current capabilities of 

commercial SATCOM vendors that may be contracted for within potential operational 

areas.

 2. Geographic Coverage. C-band coverage tends to be fairly uniform 

between 76 degrees north and 76 degrees south due to the type of satellite beam used. Ku 

and Ka satellites, however, tend to use spot beams to narrowly focus the signal energy 

into populated (customer-dense) areas. Ku coverage now exists in blue water, but it is 

not global. Ku vendors are able to target coverage to specific areas to meet requirements 

of the customer base.

 3. Approval Process to Operate on Foreign Soil. For a commercial 

SATCOM terminal to legally operate on foreign soil, certain agreements (host nation 

approval, landing rights for each type of terminal, activation fees, and frequency 

clearance) must be coordinated. The amount of time it takes to obtain these clearances 

varies widely on a nation-by-nation basis but typically exceeds six months. The J-6 

consolidates and negotiates the technical issues of these agreements for the JFC. (In 

general, the J-4 is responsible for negotiating host nation agreements.) 

 4. Haul-Away (connection between commercial SATCOM and the 

DISN). If commercial SATCOM is incorporated into the communications system, 

connectivity (haul-away) may be required to connect the commercial services to DISN 

services. Typically, additional terrestrial services must be leased from the ground entry 

point to the nearest DISN point of presence. Because the installation of military-unique 

modems and/or multiplexers may be required at a commercial gateway, contract 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-15 

agreements should specify the amount and type of services expected from the commercial 

gateway station personnel. 

 5. A gateway access request (GAR) and/or site access request (SAR) is 

required to obtain GIG/DISN services at DOD Gateway sites and usually accompanies 

the satellite access request. GARs and SARs are required to obtain services regardless of 

whether the satellite access is military or commercial. DISA provides circuit activation 

directives and DOD Gateway access planning guidance as required to support tactical 

user requirements when interfacing a DOD Gateway site. DISA also ensures that 

terminals and their assigned DOD Gateway sites are fully interoperable and the required 

access control is properly implemented. 

6. DOD Gateways. DOD Gateway sites include STEP and teleport 

sites, commercial SATCOM gateways landing DOD commercial SATCOM leased 

bandwidth, and other gateways landing joint missions. The DOD Gateway provides a 

robust system for accessing SATCOM resources and GIG/DISN services. Joint and 

service-level operational users rely on both military and commercial SATCOM systems 

to support their operational communications requirements. DOD Gateway sites enhance 

access to military and commercial SATCOM resources, improve interoperability of Joint 

communications systems, and support seamless accessibility to the GIG by the JTF, 

deployed HQ, and deployed forces. 

a. DOD Gateway sites are joint assets under the operational 

oversight and management of the JCS and USSTRATCOM respectively. Gateway 

equipment is available to CCDRs, Services, and agencies on a prioritized basis, IAW 

CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications. The Gateway supports warfighting forces 

and their supporting organizations deploying in all phases of a crisis. Access to DISN via 

a Gateway site provides the capability to rapidly extend services from any DOD location 

supported by DISN into the operational area. 

b. The DOD Gateway system provides integration capabilities and 

contingency capacity. The system also provides the capability to connect deployed 

tactical terminals with other deployed tactical terminals in the same theater, including a 

seamless interoperability capability with the DISN backbone. DOD Gateway sites enable 

users in different operational areas to communicate by using one or more Gateway sites 

to “hop” from one operational area to another. Additionally, DOD Gateway sites enable 

customers using different portions of the satellite spectrum to communicate by 

crossbanding between frequencies (e.g., UHF to EHF, X-band to C-band). 

For additional detail on SATCOM, see CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications.

(12) Electromagnetic Spectrum

(a) Critical to success in communications system support to joint operations 

is DOD electromagnetic spectrum management, which is a specialized area that relies 
Chapter III

III-16 JP 6-0 

heavily on systems engineering support and modeling to ensure electromagnetic spectrum 

dependent systems are mission ready and compatible within the intended electromagnetic 

environment. DOD electromagnetic spectrum management is the DOD business area of 

obtaining, controlling, and ensuring the effective and efficient use of electromagnetic 

spectrum through the development of policy, practices, and procedures. Joint 

electromagnetic spectrum operations apply the DOD electromagnetic spectrum 

management functions of electromagnetic spectrum operations, electromagnetic spectrum 

supportability, and strategic management of the electromagnetic spectrum. Each of these 

functional areas must abide by international, national, and military electromagnetic 

spectrum laws, regulations, and policies taking into account other existing and planned 

electromagnetic spectrum dependent systems as well as the environmental attributes of 

the intended operational areas.

(b) Strategic management of the electromagnetic spectrum is long-term 

planning of strategies, policies, practices, and procedures internationally and nationally

for the expressed purpose of obtaining and maintaining necessary access to 

electromagnetic spectrum and capital investments of electromagnetic spectrum dependent 

systems.

(c) Electromagnetic spectrum operations consist of electromagnetic 

spectrum operational planning and frequency management. 

1. Electromagnetic spectrum operational planning is the ability to 

proactively coalesce forces’ electromagnetic spectrum dependent systems in support of 

the commander’s mission, so that the mission can execute free of unintended friendly 

harmful interference.

2. Frequency management is the requesting, recording, deconfliction 

of and issuance of authorization to use frequencies (operate electromagnetic spectrum

dependent systems) coupled with monitoring and interference resolution processes. Both 

national and international regulatory bodies require effective and efficient use of the radio 

frequency (RF) spectrum. US National Spectrum Authority, Title 47, USC, Section 151, 

The Communications Act of 1934, established separate control of federal government 

and non-federal government use of the RF spectrum. Under this Act, the only 

government agencies that assign and control the use of frequencies within the United 

States are the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and 

the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The NTIA assigns and regulates 

frequencies for federal users. The NTIA governs all federal (including military) use of 

the RF spectrum within the United States and its possessions. The FCC assigns and 

regulates frequencies for non-federal users’ respective boundaries. 

3. Electromagnetic spectrum supportability is the combination of 

technological developmental engineering that focuses on physically matching 

electromagnetic spectrum attributes with desired system(s) characteristics toward the 

accomplishment of functionality and electromagnetic spectrum compatibility, from 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-17 

system(s) conception to grave. Equipment (systems) certification and host nation 

coordination processes are both considered part of electromagnetic spectrum 

supportability. The goal of electromagnetic spectrum supportability is to provide 

functional electromagnetic compatible systems in support of combatant command 

missions.

(d) Both national defense electromagnetic spectrum management and joint 

electromagnetic spectrum operations, to varying degrees, apply elements of strategic 

management of electromagnetic spectrum, electromagnetic spectrum operations 

(electromagnetic spectrum operational planning and frequency management), and 

electromagnetic spectrum supportability.

1. National defense electromagnetic spectrum management are 

those activities carried out by the national defense electromagnetic spectrum 

management establishment (OSD, Joint Staff, combatant commands, MILDEPs, DOD 

agencies, and others) and is oriented toward the planning, programming, budgeting, and 

execution activities for electromagnetic spectrum within DOD, as well as national and 

international electromagnetic spectrum legal, regulatory, and policy coordination. 

2. Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations are those activities in 

the joint warfighting arena carried out by joint electromagnetic spectrum operators 

(combatant command staffs, JTF, and others) whose objective is to successfully plan and 

execute joint or multinational operations across the battlespace. Assured access to the 

electromagnetic spectrum and electromagnetic compatibility are key enablers to joint or 

multinational mission success and the focus of joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.

(e) Electromagnetic Spectrum Planning

1. Electromagnetic spectrum management is the effective use and 

control of the electromagnetic spectrum. It is critical to national security in terms of 

global C2 of the nation’s military forces. The rapid, ever-increasing growth of highly 

sophisticated weapons systems, as well as operational, intelligence, and communications 

systems, will increase electromagnetic spectrum demand (see Figure III-2). If this 

demand is not coordinated and carefully preplanned, it could have an adverse effect upon 

users sharing the available resources. Effective electromagnetic spectrum management is 

a building block of IO in defensive operations. It ensures necessary operations can be 

conducted with minimal unintentional interference (electronic fratricide) and without 

adverse electromagnetic environmental effects to ordnance.

2. Electromagnetic spectrum management boundaries extend beyond 

the realm of the joint force. Electromagnetic wave propagation does not stop at arbitrary 

boundaries, such as operational areas, or national boundaries. Therefore, coordination 

with all friendly and neutral parties vulnerable to EMI is essential. Interaction with the 

United Nations, host nations, allied/coalition nations, and nongovernmental entities may 

be required. Electromagnetic spectrum use by US forces, host nations, multinational 
Chapter III

III-18 JP 6-0 

partners, and even an adversary, requires that planning for a military operation be timely, 

thorough, and comprehensive. 

3. Each GCC is specifically tasked by the joint electromagnetic 

spectrum use policy to establish a joint frequency management office (JFMO). This 

office establishes procedures that authorize and control the electromagnetic spectrum 

resources in the GCC’s command. 

4. Command policy establishes how the electromagnetic spectrum is 

used in a specific operational area. Through established coordination procedures, the 

JFMO obtains clearance (or approval) from host nations for use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum. It ensures that assigned military forces are authorized sufficient use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum to execute their designated missions.

Defense

Meteorological Satellite 

Program

Airborne 

Warning and Control 

System

Airbase

Tankers Combat Air 

Patrol

Anti-Radar

Air-To-Air 

Defense

Bombers

Altitude 20,000-35,000 feet

Air-To-Air

Defense

8-10 miles

Jammers

Civil 

Networks

Civil Networks

Commercial 

Satellite

Ultrahigh Frequency Satellite 

Communications

DSCS/

WGS

Milstar

Global

Positioning System

Air Defense Radar

Special 

Operations 

Forces

Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle

Border

Radar

Jammers

Reconnaissance

Altitude 25,000- 45,000 feet

2

Altitude

4

5,000- 5,000 feet

Altitud 25 e

4

,000- 5,000 feet

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ELECTROMAGNETIC 

SPECTRUM USE

Altitude 25,000-35,000 feet

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications WGS

System

Wideband Global Satellite 

Communications (SATCOM)

Figure III-2. Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Use
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-19 

5. Each JFC establishes a JSME to accomplish these tasks in the 

operational area. The JSME is staffed with personnel from the Service frequency 

management offices (FMOs), GCC’s JFMO, or a component’s staff. The JSME must 

have joint trained electromagnetic spectrum managers experienced in joint 

electromagnetic spectrum use and knowledgeable of the electromagnetic spectrum 

requirements of the JFC’s JOA. Electromagnetic spectrum management processes are 

critical to the success of the joint force and require close coordination with all the joint 

staff and relevant host nations. Electromagnetic spectrum managers at the Joint 

Spectrum Center and Service FMOs are available to help initiate these processes. The 

JFMO and JSME are tasked to implement these tasks to satisfy the needs of the military 

users and provide coordination with other entities. The JSME is responsible to: 

a. Establish and maintain the common database necessary to plan 

coordinate, and control electromagnetic spectrum use. The database should contain 

electromagnetic spectrum use information on all emitters and receivers as appropriate for 

the operational area involved. 

b. Analyze and evaluate potential electromagnetic spectrum use 

conflicts as part of the JOPES process, ongoing missions, and training. Support other 

staff sections with electromagnetic spectrum analysis to minimize electronic fratricide 

prior to or during operations. 

c. Serve as the focal point for inclusion of electromagnetic 

spectrum use considerations in the JOPES. 

d. Exercise frequency allotment and assignment authority. This 

may be delegated to facilitate decentralization and to provide components with the 

maximum latitude and flexibility to support combat operations.

e. Coordinate required military electromagnetic spectrum use with 

the electromagnetic spectrum authorities of host nations and if applicable the United 

Nations and NATO.

f. Develop and distribute appropriate electromagnetic spectrum

use plans that include frequency reuse and sharing schemes for specific frequency bands. 

g. Provide administrative and technical support for military 

electromagnetic spectrum use.

h. Prepare a joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) for approval by 

the J-3. This is accomplished through membership in the IO cell, or equivalent, and in 

conjunction with the joint force J-2, J-3, and J-6. 
Chapter III

III-20 JP 6-0 

i. Update and distribute the JRFL periodically, or as required by 

changes in the task organization, geography, and joint communications-electronics 

operating instructions (CEOI), and transition through operational phases. 

j. Receive, report, analyze, and attempt to resolve incidents of 

harmful EMI.

k. Assist in planning, coordinating and deconflicting 

electromagnetic spectrum use for electronic warfare activities through the joint force 

commander’s electronic warfare staff (JCEWS) or the electronic warfare coordination 

cell (EWCC).

l. Assist and coordinate the resolution of electromagnetic spectrum 

use conflicts resulting in unintended consequences with members of the JCEWS and the 

IO cell or their equivalent.

6. Electromagnetic spectrum managers currently use a suite of 

automated tools that support CCDR, joint force, and component frequency managers. 

These tools include a frequency assignment database, proposed electromagnetic spectrum 

use templates, an equipment characteristics database, and a collection of engineering 

tools, to calculate the effects of current and proposed electromagnetic spectrum use on 

the electromagnetic environment.

7. EW activity. J-6 coordination and deconfliction for EW activity is 

critical because of its impact to the GIG. The GIG’s increasingly wireless and spacebased communication nodes are susceptible to interference from EW. Through the J-6, 

JCEWS/EWCC must coordinate closely with the combatant command’s TNCC and 

designated JFMO. The TNCC will coordinate with the JTF-GNO to deconflict any 

anticipated effects of EW operations on the GIG. 

See CJCSI 3220.01A, Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations, and 

CJCSM 3320.02, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures. See also 

CJCSM 3220.01A, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, for additional 

information about the functions and processes of the JFMO and JSME. It contains

numerous samples of data call messages, planning checklists, flowcharts of processes, 

and descriptions of CCDR/joint force/component nets typically used. 

4. Communications Planning Methodology 

a. Planning Group. Planners within J-6 engage with their counterparts within the 

operations, intelligence, logistics, administrative, and policy communities to ensure 

proper consideration and inclusion of communications system support in mission 

execution. In addition, they plan the evolution of the communications system to support 

future operations. Communications system planning is divided into five areas: mission 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-21 

analysis, information needs analysis, interoperability, compatibility, and supportability 

analysis, capability analysis, and allocation of communications system assets.

 (1) Mission Analysis. During mission analysis, communications system 

planners develop the communications system estimate and specified and implied tasks to 

be performed by operators and communications system personnel. The communications 

system estimate is the J-6’s assessment of COAs that serve as the foundation of the 

commander’s estimate, mission statement, intent, commander’s critical information 

requirements (CCIRs), and concept of operations and support of it. Using foundational 

knowledge of the C2 organization and communications system capabilities, planners 

translate the concept of operations, concept of support, CCIRs, and environment into 

specified and implied tasks during each phase of operations. Tasks are developed for the 

deployment, implementation, operations, sustainment, modification, and restoration of 

C2 systems and networks to achieve IS throughout operations and support. Network 

management tools and C2 systems facilitate planning as well as SA.

 (2) Information Needs Analysis. Communications system planners work 

closely with all functional communities to develop IERs. IERs identify products to be 

transmitted and received, as well as the throughput, quantity, and characteristics of those 

products. The communications system is tailored to meet the projected IERs. During 

military operations, planners conduct analysis to see if the mission, concept of the 

operation and support, CCIRs, and C2 organization necessitate the increase or decrease of 

the IERs, or new exchange requirements. Adjustments are made to the IERs as 

appropriate. 

For a more detailed discussion of IERs, refer to CJCSI 6212.01E, Interoperability and 

Supportability of Information Technology and National Security Systems. 

 (3) Interoperability, Compatibility, and Supportability Analysis. Planners 

identify interoperability, compatibility, and supportability requirements and assess them 

against documented capabilities. When the mission permits, key interoperability and 

compatibility solutions will be validated before mission execution. Any shortfalls or 

deficiencies are assessed for operational and mission impact. In cases where operational 

and mission impact are too severe, the communications system planners determine 

whether it is operationally and technically feasible to resolve the problem in theater; if 

not, they request assistance from higher HQ.

 (4) Capability Analysis. Based on mission analysis, information needs, 

interoperability, compatibility, and supportability analysis, communications system 

planners identify the C2 systems and networks that can support the OPLAN. Service 

component planners should be brought into capabilities analysis as soon as possible. 

Capabilities analysis is a daily assessment during all phases of the operation. In the joint 

environment, attention is given to the organic C2 systems and networking capability of 

deploying and in place units. Provisions must also be made for higher HQ connectivity 

to its subordinate HQ and component-to-component connectivity. Normally, a Service 
Chapter III

III-22 JP 6-0 

component unit is assigned responsibility for communications system support at each HQ 

or other element, and a standard package of C2 systems and networks is provided. The 

standard packages are matched against operational needs. Listings of overages and 

shortages are produced for each location, major platform, and mission. Special attention 

is given to the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) information and intransit C2 for deploying units. In the end, a template exists that indicates the C2 systems 

and networks needed at each location, for each mission, and for each major platform. 

 

 (5) Allocation of Communications System Assets. After the template is 

developed, joint force and Service and functional component planners must examine all 

available resources and plan a tailored communications system. Planners engineer the 

various C2 systems and networks needed for the joint force. C2 systems and networks 

are centrally managed to ensure their proper performance. Organic communications units 

should be kept within their parent commands as much as possible. Some 

communications system units may be task-organized to meet the enlarged or reduced 

roles of higher HQ. Where units are collocated, planners should use the communications 

system assets of one unit to cover the other unit’s requirements. Through all phases of 

the operation, planners should utilize commercial systems where appropriate. 

Communications system planners shall centrally plan and manage strategic and tactical 

SATCOM, electromagnetic spectrum use, and other C2 systems and networks to support: 

 (a) The joint force HQ. 

 (b) Service and functional components in the operational area. 

 (c) Connectivity to the DISN, commercial communications systems and 

networks, multinational communications systems and networks, and the Service 

communications system.

For more information on communications planning, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

and Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operation Procedure Version 1.5.

 b. Planning Tools. Automated planning and management tools are available to 

facilitate network planning, engineering, activation, and modification. These tools: 

 (1) Create/modify databases for communications system equipment and 

organizations. 

 (2) Define the network topology based on sites and by organizations. 

 (3) Create/modify subordinate unit tasks, responsibilities, schedules, and track 

performance.

 (4) Conduct feasibility analyses using M&S. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-23 

 (5) Create/modify and support distribution of communications plans and orders 

(communications annexes, the joint CEOI, JRFL, and communications service requests). 

 (6) Perform detailed network planning and engineering for a joint force 

network, including: 

 (a) Circuit switch planning and engineering. 

 (b) Asynchronous transfer mode planning and engineering. 

 (c) Data network planning. 

 (d) Video network planning and engineering. 

 (e) AMHS planning and engineering. 

 (f) Message switch planning and engineering.

 (g) Backbone transmission system planning and engineering across the 

electromagnetic spectrum, to include the satellite ground segment.

 (h) Radio network planning and engineering. 

 (i) Engineering plans and orders. 

 (j) Coordinate link and network activations/deactivations. 

 (k) Coordinate and integrate host nation communications system resources 

into the joint/multinational network.

 (7) Graphically display network configurations and status changes in near real 

time.

 (8) Provide the joint force access to communications system status information 

to enhance SA.

 (9) Conduct performance analysis. 

 (10) Provide automatic capability to discover network devices and services, 

populate network management databases, and save each discovery for automated 

reporting of differences.

 (11) Perform network device configuration/reconfiguration. 

 (12) Generate and process change orders.
Chapter III

III-24 JP 6-0 

 (13) Perform automated fault management.

 (14) Model, evaluate, and optimize proposed network changes. 

 (15) Assign and deconflict frequency resources. 

 (16) Perform automated communications propagation analysis. 

 (17) Support EMI resolution. 

 (18) Display regional defensive IO device status in near real time.

 (19) Correlate IA events with respect to their impact on C2 systems and 

networks. 

 

 (20) Support electronic key management systems. 

For detailed guidance of the communications system operation planning process, refer to 

CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning 

Formats. See also CJCSM 6231.07D, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical 

Communications - Joint Network Management and Control.

c. Development of the Network Plan. Planners use automated and manual 

planning tools to integrate all communications system resources to ensure unity of effort, 

exploitation of total force capabilities, the fusion of information, and proper positioning 

of critical information. The network plan includes assignments of responsibility, 

hardware connectivity and configuration, software and application usage, and process 

functionality. The network plan provides the details necessary to bring communications 

system support together. 

 d. Continuous Planning. Planners must continuously update communications 

system plans until mission completion. Often, communications system support is first in 

and last out. As operations proceed through branches, sequels, and phases, planners must 

modify communications system plans as appropriate. The fog of war creates expected 

and unexpected contingencies that the planner must handle. Performance information on 

C2 systems and networks needs continuous analysis to identify trends and tendencies that 

may need to be changed during future operations. Communications system resources are 

continuously tracked. 

e. In the absence of automated planning tools, planners must be prepared to use 

manual planning techniques. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-25 

5. Communications Planning Factors

a. The J-6 should be brought into the overall operation planning process early. The 

J-6 must understand the concept of operations and provide advice to the JFC during 

planning. 

 b. The important factors for a communications system plan are feasibility and 

the adequacy of the plan to satisfy the JFC’s information requirements. A useful 

first step is the constant assessment of the communications system plan during the 

development process for its consistency with basic principles (see Chapter I, 

“Introduction”). 

c. Although communications system planning takes place in unison with the other 

planning elements of the joint staff, in reality, communications system planners must 

anticipate user requirements throughout all phases of joint operations. Every aspect of 

joint operations depends upon information to direct and accomplish the assigned mission. 

Plans and initial communications system support must be incrementally developed, 

deployed, and employed to meet the JFC’s continually evolving mission. 

 d. Other factors to consider as the communications system plan is developed are: 

 (1) Organic Communications System Resources. As units are assigned to the 

mission, a quick assessment of available organic communications system resources is 

required. The objective is to keep organic communications system resources intact; 

however, there are situations where this is not practical. Throughout the planning 

process, the planner must track organic communications system resources within each 

unit and HQ. In a joint force scenario, where a commander of a Service force is 

designated the JFC, the Service force’s organic communications system resources will be 

augmented by other Service components to facilitate the establishment of joint 

requirements.

 (2) Practical Communications System Support. To the extent possible, 

communication planners should rely on joint standards and TTP to support the mission. 

In a complex network environment, unplanned changes and new approaches can have 

significant consequences if not fully tested and planned for. Training, exercises, 

demonstrations, and experimentation provide lessons learned and outcomes that identify 

what works and does not work. As the planning for current operations is ongoing, the 

prudent outcomes of brainstorming, exercises, training, demonstrations, and 

experimentation are employed in the current mission. 

 (3) TPFDD Flow. The JFC prioritizes the flow of units into theater. 

Communications system planners must monitor and influence the flow of 

communications system units, personnel, and equipment into the operational area to 

support the C2 of forces in theater. 
Chapter III

III-26 JP 6-0 

 (4) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI). 

Planners must arrange for communications system support during JRSOI. Limited 

organic communications system resources will be employed during this phase. Joint 

force planners coordinate with the Service components’ planner for appropriate 

communications system support. 

 (5) Incremental Building. Because military operations seldom occur at the 

same location as the preponderance of our military forces, the JFC should expect planners 

to build the communications system incrementally. Most operations initially rely on 

SATCOM to move information between HQ and commanders. As the mission and assets 

allow, planners install voice, data, and video systems. Connections to the DISN and 

commercial networks become more extensive and robust as operations progress. Once 

the operation is complete, the communications system should also deactivate/redeploy in 

an incremental fashion.

 (6) Modular Packaging. Based on the mission, the commander’s intent, the 

OPLAN, the capabilities, limitations, and availability of equipment, and the 

communications infrastructure in the operational area, planners build modular packages 

to meet the commander’s needs. Planners tailor these packages to existing conditions and 

link the individual communications system modules into a cohesive communications 

system.

 (7) Interoperability should be achieved primarily by a commonality of 

equipment, software, and systems. Planners must know the capabilities and limitations of 

the other component communications system resources and must be able to integrate 

them into the joint communications system plan. The joint CEOI and COMSEC must be 

coordinated with Service CEOI/signal operating instructions and COMSEC must also be 

coordinated.

 (8) Standardization should be evident in the planned communications system. 

Planners should ensure equipment strings and system configurations are standardized 

throughout employed units. The JFC’s communications system requirements must not be 

compromised by uncontrolled, widespread use of nonstandard systems, protocols, 

procedures, or terminology. 

 (9) Impact of Internal and External Changes to C2. Planners must anticipate 

change and be able to respond in a timely manner to variations in the initial mission. The 

communications system plan should include a variety of communications system 

resources. Connectivity among commanders, HQ, and units must incorporate alternate 

routes and methods. A diversity of systems and alternate routes contribute to the 

communications system’s flexibility, survivability, and responsiveness. 

 (10) Commercial Capabilities. Planners should consider and plan for the use 

of commercial systems. The availability of commercial communications system 

resources may offer an alternative means to satisfy the JFC’s needs and may reduce the 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-27 

number and size of deployed modular communications system packages. Commercial 

capabilities resident in the operational area may allow planners to compensate for tactical 

communications system resource shortages and meet the early information requirements 

of a joint force deployment. The use of commercial systems and networks may affect the 

planned mix of deployable communications system modules. Planners must ensure the 

deployed modular packages include sufficient capabilities to interface with commercial 

systems. Commercial capabilities may also assist in meeting the JFC’s tactical 

communications system redeployment requirements.

 (11) Training. The level of training of managers and operators of the 

communications system should be addressed. Of particular importance is training of 

individuals to integrate and operate commercial capabilities and networks with the JFC’s 

organic capabilities. Additionally, communications system personnel need to possess 

adequate language skills to work with host nation and multinational forces. Language 

training needs to be available prior to deployment and in the operations area. 

 (12) Discipline. Communications system resources are limited. The JFC 

should ensure the information that moves through these limited resources supports 

necessary decisionmaking actions and overall mission execution. The mission and the 

commander’s intent guide what information is provided to the joint force. The

commander should provide additional guidance on what information is to be “pushed” 

and “pulled” to the joint force from the GIG. Long-established procedures such as 

“minimize” should be used and augmented to promote communications system discipline 

beyond just controlling the flow of record message traffic (e.g., VTC, e-mail attachment 

size, briefing slides, and others). 

 (13) Timelines. The goal of the communications system should be the 

acquisition, processing, storing, transporting, controlling, and presentation of information 

in real time, that is, as the event happens. The JFC should identify all critical information 

requirements. Priority lists that allow timely restoration of the most critical information 

should be developed. 

 (14) Simultaneous Planning. Planners should participate in the numerous 

planning cells of the joint force. Some of these planning cells are for targeting, future 

operations, IO, and others. The planning process for each of these cells is continuous and 

iterative. Communications system planners perform high-level planning to develop 

comprehensive estimates to design, engineer, implement, and maintain the 

communications system. Activation of communications system links and networks 

occurs when an OPORD is executed. During the execution phase of an operation, 

planners must consider the next phase of the JFC’s operational concept and plan for its 

support. 
Chapter III

III-28 JP 6-0 

 (15) Operational Limitations

 (a) Connectivity. The communications system should establish a level of 

robust connectivity that enables communication with the joint force, its subordinate 

forces, its higher HQ, and any additional reachback capabilities required. To the 

maximum extent possible, the hardware and software interfaces should be transparent to 

the system user. The continued flow of information should not depend on action by an 

intermediate user.

 (b) Range. Range is a factor in connecting nodal points and networks. 

Equipment capabilities and the distance between nodal points must be considered.

 (c) Environment. The communications system must be tailored to the 

environment, to include hydrographic, terrain, meteorological, vegetation, manmade, and 

cultural features. Such environmental surroundings determine the usable frequencies, 

output power, and location of communications system resources. 

 (16) Collaborative Capabilities. Planners should consider that a fully 

functioning environment of collaboration requires more than just collaborative 

capabilities that help participants share information and knowledge. A second 

component of this environment is infrastructure — the various information systems on 

which the tools reside and the networks that link these systems. The C2 systems, 

networks, and collaborative tools need procedures — based on accepted theory and 

practice and established to meet joint force needs — which regulate use in ways that 

facilitate collaboration. The full benefit of these capabilities is realized only with a fourth 

component — users who are trained to use the tools and systems and educated to 

understand the advantages and power of a collaborative information environment. 

6. Communications System Employment

a. Communications system needs and capabilities of a small joint force with a 

limited humanitarian mission are vastly different from those of a CCDR with continuing 

multitasked, multinational-based combat missions. The phases of joint operations in a 

campaign are highly situation-and-mission dependent. Timelines between phases may be 

severely compressed. Phases may not follow each other in sequence; they provide a 

guideline for the JFC and communications system planner. Within the phases of an 

operation, it may be helpful to consider several activities that potentially affect 

communications system employment. For example, actions during an early phase may 

require mobilization and other predeployment activities to set the terms and conditions 

for operations. During predeployment activities, JFCs exercise flexible deterrent options 

and tailor forces for deployment. IA considerations are critical to all activities.
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-29 

 b. Predeployment Activities

 (1) During this time, the JFC is designated and forces are assigned. CJCS 

warning and alert orders provide the JFC with guidance to initiate planning. The JFC 

issues a mission statement and commander’s intent. Subsequent to the mission statement 

and commander’s intent, the concept of operations is developed. 

 (2) The objective is to produce a plan to support the commander’s intent, 

mission, and concept of operations and prepare initial communications system 

deployment packages to provide an initial operating capability that supports the 

operational plan. In addition, the planning of en route communications to support initial 

tactical entry may be required.

 (3) The method. The communications system planner uses the planning 

methodology previously discussed to develop a plan to support the commander’s concept 

of operations. To begin mission analysis and initial planning, the communications 

system planner must clearly understand the command relationships of the joint force. 

 (a) The basis of all communications system planning is an understanding of 

what joint and multinational forces are assigned, attached, or in support of the JFC. 

Collaborative planning, both horizontal and vertical, is a priority throughout all phases of 

the operation. The JFC communications system planner must involve subordinate and 

supporting organizations throughout the planning process. Automated aids, historical 

data, previous experiences, and intuitive judgment assist to develop the communications 

support plan. 

 (b) During mission analysis, the joint force planner works simultaneously 

with component planners and supporting defense agencies, such as DISA, to evaluate the 

existing communications infrastructure in theater to determine the strategic and tactical 

communications assets required. It is imperative that communications system plans 

properly sequence the deployment of assets to support the operational plan. The 

commander’s C2 capabilities are limited by the capacity of deployed communications 

system assets.

 (4) The means. This phase of the operation will rely exclusively on the 

existing commercial, strategic, and tactical communications infrastructure.

c. Deployment Activities

 (1) The plan is completed and published. The communications system is 

expanded to provide improved information flow between the JFC and component 

commanders. As the system deploys, large pieces are extended into the operational area. 

Communications system assets deploy incrementally in support of the build-up in the 

operational area. Initial tactical communications are global, but can be insufficient in 

capacity if not properly planned, coordinated, and employed. The primary focus of initial 
Chapter III

III-30 JP 6-0 

tactical communications system deployment packages is decision support to the on-scene 

commander and to provide the foundation for network expansion to support follow-on 

operations (e.g., lodgment expansion). 

 (2) The objective is to provide for the continuous flow of information between 

commanders during the initial phases of the operation and establish the base strategic and 

tactical communications system infrastructure to support follow-on operations. 

 (3) The method. Lift assets deploy the initial communications system 

capability. This initial communications system capability is composed of a modular 

package that provides the commander with voice, data, and video connectivity. The 

initial deployment package provides global connectivity as well as the foundation to build 

the remainder of the network incrementally. In austere tactical environments, the initial 

network is not robust and may be severely degraded when disturbed. Communications 

system support must include reliable, redundant capabilities that ensure the commander is 

always able to maintain C2 of component and supporting forces. 

 (4) The means. This phase of the operation relies on a mix of strategic, 

commercial, and tactical communications to support the introduction of forces into JOA. 

The JFC employs UHF SATCOM, military and/or commercial SHF SATCOM, EHF 

SATCOM, tropospheric scatter radio, and other military and commercial assets to 

support strategic and tactical long-haul communications requirements. The joint force 

uses other systems, such as UHF, very high frequency, and HF radio assets, to provide 

redundancy and support internal information requirements. 

 d. Employment Activities

 (1) Organization during deployment is the primary challenge. The J-6 must 

maintain an effective organization that allows for rapid change. Although each 

subordinate command has responsibility to identify, schedule, and prioritize units and 

equipment for deployment, the J-6 needs to track arrival of communications equipment 

that supports key nodes. The J-6 needs to provide a centralized point of contact for 

coordination and status for deploying communications system equipment and personnel 

and ensure joint communications assets are included on the TPFDD. As units deploy into 

theater, they typically require tactical entry into the DISN via one of the theater DOD 

Gateway sites. Access to DOD Gateway sites requires close coordination and 

troubleshooting between unit and DOD Gateway technical control. Consequently, DOD 

Gateway activation support may have to be prioritized by the JNCC. 

 (2) Communications build-up during employment may be constrained by the 

deployment process. Both lift availability and unit preparation for deployment may delay 

immediate establishment of portions of the communications system. The structured 

approach to build-up of the communications system enables theater capabilities to rapidly 

provide initial communications, followed by a managed expansion of communications 

support. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-31 

 (3) Network Monitoring, Control, and Reporting. One of the critical 

functions of the JNCC during employment is network monitoring, control, and reporting. 

Control of communications system functions consists of assessing the effectiveness of 

communications system operations, providing information, maintaining the currency of 

the estimate, and changing communications system operations in response to the evolving 

operational scenario. Network monitoring takes a macro look at the JOA from the J-6 

perspective with the goal of ensuring optimum network performance. Reporting requires 

the establishment of performance measures and reporting thresholds, delineation of 

organizational relationships, responsibilities, and procedures (e.g., formats, media, 

timelines, and others), and identification of special interest systems, circuits, or 

communications system support for critical operational functions. 

 (4) The joint force and the Service and functional components continue a 

sequenced, balanced deployment. As assets arrive, they add capability and redundancy to 

the existing communications system. The JFC employs communications system assets to 

meet current requirements as well as support the planned operational scheme of 

maneuver.

 (5) The objective is to produce a reliable, redundant, and robust 

communications system that supports the JFC’s concept of operations. 

 (6) The method. A more capable communications system continues to arrive 

and expand as dictated by the mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and to 

a certain extent, lift assets. Large capacity satellite, terrestrial switching, and 

transmission systems arrive during this phase of the operation. The J-6 through the 

JNCC establishes numerous alternate routes to increase the robustness of the network. 

Local area networks (LANs) are established at the joint force and functional component 

levels and are networked to the global WAN to increase information flow. As the system 

increases in complexity, more sophisticated systems are employed to maintain effective 

technical control over the expanding network. Throughout employment, the J-6 

continues to plan the expansion and transition of the communications system to support 

the JFC’s concept of operations for future operations. 

 (7) The means. The JFC relies on various systems including JCSE systems to 

connect to and expand other portions/services of the GIG into the operational area. Large 

capacity ground mobile forces and commercial satellite systems connect to the GIG with 

a mix of satellite and terrestrial systems to further extend the communications system into 

the JOA. SHF and UHF terrestrial multi-channel radios connect voice, data, and video 

via digital switches and technical control facilities. Maximum use is made of existing 

commercial and government systems throughout employment activities.
Chapter III

III-32 JP 6-0 

e. Sustainment Activities

 (1) The J-6 continues to refine and improve the communications system. 

The communications system remains robust and flexible to support changes in the 

scheme of maneuver. An increasing concern during this phase is the quantity and 

availability of repair parts and consumables that are necessary for preventive and routine 

maintenance.

 (2) The objective is to sustain and improve the automated flow and processing 

of information between the various commanders and develop plans to support any 

changes in the OPLAN.

 (3) The method. Changes are made to the existing communications system as 

guided by the continuing mission, the needs of the commander, and the users. These 

changes improve the overall capacity of the system to move information seamlessly and 

transparently among components and national organizations. Less-than-perfect circuit 

design is corrected. As design flaws are corrected and the communications system

becomes increasingly reliable, attention is turned to those actions that keep the system 

functioning. Plans are made for the redeployment of JCSE-controlled assets as other 

communications system resources are put in place. Continued attention must be paid to 

preventive and routine maintenance, adequacy of stocks of spare and/or repair parts, and 

consumables. 

 (4) The means. JNCC directs modifications to the communications system to 

respond to changing mission requirements and user demands or complaints. Technical 

control facilities take on an increasingly important role as they make changes to the 

established systems and maintain continuous service to the customers. Service organic 

and common-user transportation assets move consumables and repair parts to established 

repair facilities.

f. Transition Activities

 (1) Branch and Sequel Planning. Changes in the JFC’s mission, organization, 

or operations may require changes to the communications system architecture. Another 

source of change may be shortfalls in communications system support to operations, 

equipment or network degradation, and/or availability of a new communications system 

capability. JNCC future operations planners must actively monitor for these potential 

changes and develop branches and/or sequels to respond appropriately. 

 (2) Transition Planning. Although the original communications system plan 

will have a transition plan, the dynamic operating environment will make it necessary to 

review and redraft the plan. In many cases, although major operations cease, a residual 

communications capability is required, transition planning should consider both the 

transition of communication services to a permanent infrastructure and the potential 

deactivation of US communications system services. Frequently, services will transition 

to commercial or host nation provided communications system services. 
Joint Force Communications System Operations Planning 

and Management 

III-33 

 (3) Transition. During this time, the J-6’s priority is executing the transition 

plan. It is possible that a joint force for redeployment is standing or that there is a semipermanent US presence left in and around the country. In this case, the J-6 needs to 

liaison closely with the newly designated organization to conduct a smooth transition of 

responsibilities and control. 

g. Termination or Post-Conflict Activities

 (1) The planner must anticipate the termination of combat operations or 

the transition to post-conflict operations. This stage of planning and execution must 

establish the basis for redeployment operations and continue to meet the communications 

system needs of supported commands. 

 (2) The objective is to monitor the transition of communications system assets 

to meet changing operational requirements and ensure continuous support for the joint 

force.

 (3) The method. It is imperative that the communications system is not 

reduced too rapidly so it may continue to support the JFC’s follow-on mission. The 

planner must retain a flexible, dynamic network to meet rapidly changing mission 

requirements. As subordinate elements reposition or are assigned new missions, the 

JNCC adjusts the network to provide continuous capabilities. Reliance on satellite 

systems may grow during this period as more forces prepare to redeploy while the JOA 

remains the same. The planner employs redundant capabilities such as UHF TACSAT to 

ensure the continuous flow of information across the operational area. The planner must 

anticipate an increased reliance on the local commercial infrastructure to facilitate host 

nation coordination. 

 (4) The means. As with the previous phases, this phase of the operation relies 

on various systems to connect to and expand the GIG into the operational area. Largecapacity satellite systems continue to provide connectivity to other parts/services of the 

GIG to dispersed forces throughout the operational area. Systems such as UHF TACSAT 

or host nation communications provide redundant capabilities throughout the operational 

area.

 h. Redeployment Activities

 (1) As during predeployment activities, planning is the most important part 

of the redeployment. The communications system must continue to provide information 

flow to the commanders, even as it purposefully disengages and large components of the 

network are removed for redeployment. 

 (2) The objective is to redeploy unnecessary systems and continue to provide 

communications support for the JFC and those multinational and functional component 
Chapter III

III-34 JP 6-0 

forces remaining in the operational area. The JNCC must focus on retaining and 

transitioning network control until the joint network no longer exists. A JNCC should 

remain standing whenever either of two conditions exist: there is a portion of the 

operational joint network where more than one subordinate command requires the 

communications support from another subordinate command; or there exists one or more 

deployed joint organizations which require communications system support. During this 

time, the JNCC must ensure all units follow J-6 guidelines regarding deactivation of their 

respective communications system resources. To ensure an orderly deactivation and 

continued support of minimum network services, supporting 

components/commands/units coordinate with the JNCC prior to deactivating DISN 

services.

 (3) The method. While amount of sustainment capability and the number of 

redundant systems will decrease, the J-6 must maintain some communications system 

capabilities until the JFC no longer requires them. In the final days of redeployment 

activities, the communications system may look very similar to the system originally 

deployed. 

 (4) The means. The original commercial and government infrastructure should 

support as much of the communications system redeployment as possible. Lacking such 

an infrastructure, the last systems to redeploy are typically the mobile and easily 

transportable assets; such as UHF single-channel and small SHF satellite terminals.
CHAPTER IV

NETWORK OPERATIONS

IV-1 

1. Introduction 

a. NETOPS provides integrated network visibility and end-to-end management of 

networks, global applications, and services across the GIG, establishing, maintaining, and 

protecting DOD’s networks that are a part of cyberspace. Network visibility enables 

commanders to manage their networks as they would other combat systems. Effective 

NETOPS culminates in assured service to the joint force facilitating network enabled 

operations. Visibility of NETOPS across the GIG is critical to operational transparency 

and resource efficiencies. Shared SA for all aspects of NETOPS along with coordination 

between stakeholders on potential events allow GCCs to be aware of network actions 

taking place in their AORs. GCCs will have the final authority over network activities in 

their AOR during contingencies. 

(1) NETOPS is the responsibility of all DOD components. In accordance with 

the Unified Command Plan, the mission assigned to CDRUSSTRATCOM is to plan, 

integrate, and coordinate DOD global network operations by directing GIG operations 

and defense.

(2) A common set of NETOPS mission-driven metrics, measurements, and 

reporting criteria is used to assess GIG operating performance and to determine the 

mission impact of service degradations or outages.

 b. The NETOPS mission is to operate and defend the GIG. Unlike many missions 

that are deemed successful at a defined completion date, the NETOPS mission is 

perpetual, requiring continual support to be successful. NETOPS provides a suite of 

assured network enabled services in support of DOD’s full spectrum of warfighting, 

intelligence, and business missions throughout the GIG. 

c. The effectiveness of NETOPS is measured in terms of availability and reliability 

of network enabled services, across all areas of interest, in adherence to agreed-upon 

service levels and policies. The method for service assurance in a net enabled 

collaborative environment is to establish operational thresholds, compliance monitoring, 

and a clear understanding of the capabilities between enterprise service/resource 

providers and consumers through service level agreements (SLAs). Proper 

instrumentation of the GIG enables monitoring of adherence to these SLAs, as well as 

enables timely decisionmaking, service prioritization, resource allocation, root cause, and 

mission impact assessment. SLAs are used to facilitate the transfer of funds between 

“Network centric warfare posits merging our warfighting capabilities into a 

seamless, joint warfighting force. It capitalizes on the trust we place in our 

junior and noncommissioned officers. As information moves down echelon, 

so does combat power, meaning smaller joint force packages wield greater

combat power.” 

Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, US Navy

Retired 15, January 2004
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 6-0 

organizations to perform tasks. Operational level agreements are used to coordinate 

actions between organizations when funds do not need to be transferred. A key factor in 

NETOPS is the readiness posture of DOD, the combatant commands, Services, DOD 

agencies, and the GIG. All mission relevant factors must be included in assessment of 

readiness of the DOD components to perform their assigned missions and functions. 

Understanding of current readiness is dependent upon the current situation. Therefore, 

global and local SA is the key to achieving the goals of NETOPS. 

 d. The purpose of NETOPS is assured system and network availability, assured 

information protection, and assured information delivery, which protect and maintain 

freedom of action for DOD missions within cyberspace. Integration of the NETOPS 

essential tasks must be performed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and 

across all DOD warfighting, intelligence, and business areas of interest to be successful. 

To meet these goals, the J-6 must manage the entire network within the operational area 

and be cognizant of the performance of those portions of the GIG outside of the 

operational area that affect the information needs of the joint force. The three goals of 

NETOPS are: 

 (1) Assured System and Network Availability. Provide visibility and control 

over the system and network resources. Resources are effectively managed and problems 

are anticipated and mitigated. Proactive actions are taken to ensure the uninterrupted 

availability and protection of the system and network resources. This includes providing 

for graceful degradation, self-healing, fail over, diversity, and elimination of critical 

failure points.

 (2) Assured Information Protection. Provide protection for the information 

passing over networks from the time it is stored and catalogued until it is distributed to 

the users, operators, and decisionmakers.

 (3) Assured Information Delivery. Provide information to users, operators, 

and decisionmakers in a timely manner. The networks are continuously monitored to 

ensure the information is transferred with the correct response time, throughput, 

availability, and performance that meet user needs.

2. Network Operations Responsibilities

a. As the DOD CIO, ASD(NII) is responsible for the policy and architecture for 

NETOPS.

 b. CJCS maintains operational oversight of the GIG through the NMCC and 

USSTRATCOM.

c. CDRUSSTRATCOM has the mission to direct the operation and defense of the 

GIG. CDRUSSTRATCOM has delegated operational and tactical level planning, force 

execution, and day-to-day management of the operations and defense of the GIG to 

USCYBERCOM. 
Network Operations 

IV-3 

 (1) USCYBERCOM leads the operation and defense of the GIG through GIG 

Enterprise Management (GEM), Global Information Grid (GIG) Network Assurance 

(GNA), and Global Information Grid (GIG) Content Management (GCM). The JTFGNO under USCYBERCOM, maintains SA, end-to-end management, and DOD network 

defense. JTF-GNO directs, manages, controls, monitors, assesses, and reports on 

essential elements and applications of the GIG to ensure its availability to support the 

needs of the President, SecDef, CCDRs, Services, agencies, business, and intelligence 

environments. The GNC leverages the capabilities of DISA to provide overall 

management, control, and technical direction of GIG and oversees a collaborative 

coordination process involving all CCDRs, Services, and agencies. 

 (2) The Services retain responsibility to provide interoperable communication 

systems, units, and personnel for the provision of their NETOPS requirements internal to 

their own theater forces and to be capable of expansion and support of other Service or 

multinational forces as determined by the CCDR. In addition, each Service must provide 

for its own NOSC and computer incident response teams according to the standards 

established by JTF-GNO for the IA and security of its internal networks. Services may 

also be tasked to operate a portion of the GIG when designated by the proper authority. 

3. Network Operations Operational Construct

 The NETOPS operational construct consists of SA, the essential tasks, and C2. 

a. Situational Awareness 

 (1) A commander makes an assessment of the situation and environment by 

receiving information from staff elements, personal experience, reporting, other sources 

of information, and the COP. Once the information is collected, commanders then 

develop an initial understanding by putting it into a context, thus creating SA. The 

context is created by deducing patterns of interaction among the various factors in the 

operational environment. These patterns are the result of a combination of the 

commander’s previous experience and his/her intuition. They assist the commander to 

arrange disparate facts into a logical and understandable construct that helps the 

commander to both deduce a COA and communicate complex information to others 

quickly and easily. 

 (2) JFCs operate in joint and multinational operations that encompass a 

multitude of units, organizations, and actors. The ability for all these players to 

collaborate with one another is instrumental in the success or failure of these operations. 

Collaboration is joint problem solving for the purpose of achieving shared understanding, 

making a decision, or creating a product. It allows experts to better interpret situations 

and problems, identify candidate actions and solutions, formulate evaluation criteria, and 

decide what to do. In the context of joint C2, collaboration is used to coordinate the 

development of decisions and actions across multiple basic C2 processes. It allows 

commanders to gain better SA, have a better understanding of the operational 

environment, better comprehend how their decisions will affect the operating 
Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 6-0 

environment, and coordinate their limited resources with others. Collaboration is enabled 

through a collaborative information environment that allows for key collaborative C2 

functions to tie together the basic C2 processes across all command levels and within all 

battlefield functions. 

For detailed guidance on collaboration capabilities and tools employment, see CJCSM 

6715.01A, Joint Collaboration Tools (CT) Employment.

 (3) By sharing information, SA, and understanding, individual commanders are 

able to improve their ability to monitor and collect data on their environment. The 

individual commander is then able to develop a more thorough understanding of the 

situation by being able to exploit the experience and perspectives of other individual 

commanders. The selection of a COA and the development of plans to execute the COA 

can be developed and executed with the collective knowledge of the decisions and plans 

of others. Plan execution can be monitored by all commanders with an understanding of 

the assumptions and information available when the COA was developed and selected.

 (4) NETOPS is an enabling capability in achieving shared SA through the GIG 

system, network, and information availability. GIG support to achieving SA is provided 

through the integrated capability to receive, correlate, and display a functional or theaterlevel view of systems and networks (voice, video, and data). The primary purpose is to 

enable a real time understanding of the impact to on-going operations as a result of 

degradations to the GIG and facilitate opportunities to apply immediate corrective or 

mitigation measures. This shared SA supported by the GIG is derived from common 

reporting procedures and requirements using enterprise-wide management tools within 

the broader issues of SA as it relates to operational impact, planning, architectures, and 

other factors. The GIG reporting flow is depicted in Figure IV-1. SA of the network 

proceeds from visibility of the intensity of activity, traffic load, and throughput potential. 

It enables dynamic rerouting based on priority, system status, and capacity. The effects 

of disruptions and intrusions are minimized through allocation of traffic to unaffected 

network paths. Joint and Service commanders need SA of the network to: 

 (a) Monitor, protect, and prioritize their networks. 

 (b) Assess operational impact of network disruptions. 

 (c) Respond to network outages/attacks. 

 

 (d) Dynamically reallocate network traffic.
Network Operations 

IV-5 

(5) Component, joint force, subunified command, and agency NOSCs are 

responsible for assimilating and integrating NETOPS SA data of their respective 

operational areas. Each NOSC installs, maintains, and operates network management 

and intrusion detection software and populates a local database to build a near real time 

view of their environment. Firewall configurations are maintained to ensure the integrity 

of the network while enabling essential GIG SA information exchange. Each local 

configuration database provides an input to the next echelon (e.g., base, region, theater, 

global). Defense-in-depth activities and installations follow the prescribed configuration 

so that virtual views of the entire enterprise can be created at any level. 

 (6) Services and agencies provide SA of their portions of the GIG to the TNCs, 

the GNC, JTF-GNO, USSTRATCOM, and their Service/agency leadership.

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID SITUATIONAL 

REPORTING FLOW

FILTERED & FUSED

OVERLAYS

SINGLE INTEGRATED NETWORK

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS VIEW

COALITION

Fault Management

IA Event Management

System and Network

Performance Management

•

•

•

Alarm Surveillance

Fault Localization

Trouble 

Administration

• Event Type

• Source of Attack

•

•

•

•

Traffic 

Measurement

Probability of 

Congestion

Response Time

Throughput

•

•

Fault Correction

Test 

Management

• Affected Systems

• Corrective Action

•

•

•

•

Mean Delay Time

Quality of 

Service

Probability of 

Delay

Availability

NAVFOR

ARFOR

AFFOR

MARFOR

TNC/GNC

INTEL

AFFOR

ARFOR

GNC

IA

INTEL

MARFOR

NAVFOR

NETOPS

TNC

Air Force forces

global NETOPS center

information assurance

Army forces

intelligence

Marine Corps forces

Navy forces

network operations

theater NETOPS center

Figure IV-1. Global Information Grid Situational Reporting Flow
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 6-0 

 b. Operational Construct. The GIG operates, through cyberspace, as a globally 

interconnected, end-to-end, interoperable network-of-networks, which spans traditional 

boundaries of authority. Given the inherent global reach of the GIG, many NETOPS 

activities are not under the command authority of a using CCDR. Therefore, a great deal 

of coordination and collaboration (unity of effort) is essential to fully enable NETOPS 

capabilities. 

 (1) The JTF-GNO established the GNC through the merger of elements from 

the JTF Computer Network Operations’ Directorate, DISA’s Global NETOPS and 

Security Center, and the DOD computer emergency response team (CERT). In the past 

construct for operating and securing the DISN, the Global NETOPS and Security Center, 

and DOD-CERT were treated as separate organizations. DISA also established a TNC in 

each theater through the merger of elements from DISA’s regional NETOPS and security 

center and the regional CERT. 

 (2) JTF-GNO houses the GNC and is the operational command for Global 

Information Grid (GIG) Network Defense (GND). The goal of the JTF-GNO is to 

provide support in defense of the GIG and to operationalize GND for the JFC. The JTFGNO joint intelligence support element ensures intelligence is integrated into all JTFGNO operations. 

 (3) TNCs as subordinate commands of JTF-GNO within each theater provide 

technical support and execution for the geographic CCDRs for those parts of the GIG 

under their control. The TNCs establish, maintain, and provide the theater-level portion 

of the GIG, extending the GIG into the theater of operations. The local SA views are 

provided by the supporting TNC, which will: 

 (a) Collect SA information and provide customized views for combatant 

commands within their AOR.

 (b) Provide backbone connectivity and support to the GCCs in their AORs. 

 

 (4) TNCCs oversee and direct NETOPS for GCCs within their AOR to support 

their missions. The TNCC supports the combatant command J-6 with overall network 

SA sharing and coordination of NETOPS activities throughout the GIG. The primary 

mission of the TNCC is to lead, prioritize, and direct resources to ensure they are 

optimized to support the geographic GCCs’ assigned missions and operations, and to

advise the GCCs of the ability of the GIG to support current and future operations. The 

specific roles of the TNCC include:

 (a) Monitoring of the theater portion of the GIG. 

 (b) Determining operational impact of major degradations and outages. 

 (c) Coordinating responses to degradations and outages that affect joint 

operations. 
Network Operations 

IV-7 

 (d) Coordinating GIG actions in support of changing operational priorities. 

 (5) Global Network Operations (NETOPS) control centers (GNCCs) oversee 

and coordinate NETOPS for functional CCDRs to support their missions. The GNCC 

supports the combatant command J-6 with overall network SA sharing and performs 

coordination of NETOPS activities throughout the GIG. Functional combatant 

commands will establish a GNCC to oversee and coordinate NETOPS to support their 

missions. Functional CCDRs will exercise OPCON of their portions of the GIG through 

their GNCC. The GNCC will establish operational priorities for and impact assessments 

of NETOPS actions in support of their missions. The GNC and TNCs will provide 

general support to the GNCCs. 

 (6) NOSCs, established by a Service and agency resource owner, coordinate 

their NETOPS activities with the GNC, TNCC, or GNCC and other NETOPS centers as 

appropriate. An NOSC acts for the Service or agency to ensure all required GIG SA data 

is collected and shared, that network components comply with DOD and joint directives, 

and the GIG COP is maintained for SA. 

 (7) The JNCC manages the tactical communications of the joint force, serving 

as the NOSC for the deployed portion of the GIG supporting a joint force. It exercises 

staff supervision over network service centers belonging to deployed components and 

subordinate commands. The JNCC provides the appropriate TNCC with: 

 (a) Local SA information (directly to TNCC and TNC). 

 (b) Mission impact assessments of system and network events. 

 (c) GIG requirements beyond the JFC’s current assets or authority. 

 (8) The Commander, JTF-GNO created the Global Network Operations 

(NETOPS) Support Center (GNSC) as a subordinate command to provide the day-to-day 

technical operation, control, and management of the portions of the GIG that support 

global operations but are not assigned to a combatant command. This organization was 

created from the DISA CONUS Regional NETOPS and Security Center. The GNSC 

conducts GIG backbone NETOPS, DOD Gateway mission support, provisioning of 

provided services, network engineering, circuit implementation, and intertheater 

connectivity from CONUS to the Pacific, European, Southern, and Southwest Asian 

theaters. The GNSC provides general support to the GCCs and TNCs. The GNSC 

provides direct support to the functional CCDRs. Functional CCDRs have a global 

mission, often providing support to the GCCs, and have a global requirement for 

NETOPS support. Some functional combatant commands operate their own global 

networks. As such, the functional CCDRs receive direct support from the GNSC and 

general support from USSTRATCOM, JTF-GNO, and all TNCs. Functional CCDRs 

exercise OPCON over their portions of the GIG through their GNCC. The GNCC 

coordinates the functional CCDR’s NETOPS requirements with the GNSC and the 

TNCCs.
Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 6-0 

 (9) Effective GND operations require a partnership of NETOPS, law 

enforcement, intelligence, and command leadership. The National Coordinating Center 

(NCC) of the NCS is another member of the global NETOPS team. The NCC runs an 

Information Sharing and Analysis Center, a joint industry/government center that 

coordinates initiation and restoration of telecommunications services during national 

emergencies. 

 (10) A NETOPS event is a collective term for all NETOPS activities that have 

the potential to significantly and negatively impact the operational readiness of the GIG. 

To effectively operate the GIG globally while realizing the GCCs’ requirements to direct 

GIG operations in their theaters, an event-based C2 structure is used for GIG operations. 

C2 of GIG operations will be based on the situation at the time. The three possible 

circumstances that determine the C2 of NETOPS are known as global, theater, and nonglobal NETOPS events. 

(a) Global NETOPS events are those activities that have the potential to 

impact the operational readiness of the GIG and require a coordinated response. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global NETOPS events and will 

issue orders and direction through JTF-GNO.

(b) Theater NETOPS events are those activities occurring within a theater 

that have the potential to impact the operations in that theater. The affected GCC is the 

supported command for theater NETOPS events. USSTRATCOM is a supporting 

command to the affected GCC for theater NETOPS events.

(c) Non-global NETOPS events are those activities whose impact affects 

functional CCDRs, unassigned Title 10, USC, forces, or DOD agencies and are neither 

global nor theater in nature. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for nonglobal NETOPS events.

c. Joint NETOPS is an integrated approach to GEM, GNA, and GCM. 

 (1) GIG Enterprise Management. GEM is defined as the technology, 

processes, and policy necessary to effectively operate the systems and networks that 

comprise the GIG. This essential task merges IT services with the NETOPS critical 

capabilities. 

 (2) GIG Network Assurance. GNA incorporates protection, detection, and 

response of any unauthorized activities against the GIG. It provides end-to-end 

protection to ensure data quality and protection against unauthorized access and 

inadvertent damage or modification. GNA incorporates IA protection activities, CND,

and critical information protection. This is not intended to replace the terms of IA and 

CND. Additionally, GIG constituent systems that meet the definition of a national 

security system (NSS) must follow the appropriate IA guidelines and policies for NSS. 
Network Operations 

IV-9 

Other GIG systems not designated NSS must be provided adequate IA so as not to 

jeopardize the security of GIG NSS.

 (3) GIG Content Management. GCM provides awareness of relevant, 

accurate information through automated access to newly discovered or recurring 

information in a timely, efficient, and usable format. 

 (4) Defense-in-Depth

 (a) DOD relies on digital electronic information capabilities to store, 

process, and move essential information to plan, direct, coordinate, and execute 

operations. Cyberspace threats are a real and imminent danger to the GIG. These 

sophisticated threats can exploit security weaknesses. Robust IA and securing vital 

networks and data is a high priority. The current cyberspace defense strategy is to reduce 

vulnerabilities and mitigate the threat by linking our nation’s offensive and defensive 

capabilities. Weaknesses that can be exploited become vulnerabilities that can jeopardize 

the most sensitive components of information capabilities. However, we can employ 

deep, layered defenses to reduce vulnerabilities and recover after an attack. 

 (b) GND requires a defense-in-depth strategy that integrates the capabilities 

of people, technology, and operations to establish multi-layer and multidimensional 

protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. GND is important to the 

JFC’s ability to conduct warfare and other military operations. A shared-risk 

environment is created when a vulnerable system connects to other systems that trust it to 

be secure; it, thereby, exposes the other systems to exploitation by adversaries. Defensein-depth must ensure that the level of protection of one system is not undermined by 

vulnerabilities of other interconnected systems. The underlying principles of this strategy 

are applicable to any information system or network, regardless of organization. Figure 

IV-2 illustrates the principal aspects of the defense-in-depth strategy. 

 (c) To counter different attack methods, the JFC must employ a variety of 

security methods. The weaknesses of one safeguard mechanism should be protected by 

the strengths of another. To block threats to different locations in the protected 

environment, the JFC must deploy defenses at multiple locations or layers. In principal, 

no sector or avenue of approach into the sensitive environment of the information system 

should be unprotected. The security measures may not be uniform but must be 

interoperable, coexisting in the same environment. They cannot impose unacceptable 

computing, communications, or organizational burdens and obstacles that hamper 

accomplishment of vital operations. They should work together in such functions as 

sharing data and providing cues, indications, or triggers to perform actions. 

 1. People 

 a. People use technologies to conduct GND practices and are the 

central element of defense-in-depth. Information systems and the information they 
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 6-0 

process need protection from unauthorized actions that jeopardize their ability to function 

effectively. 

b. The JFC is responsible for protection of information and the 

communications system. The trained and aware user is the first and most vital line of 

defense. A comprehensive program of education, training, practical experience, and 

awareness should be provided to the members of the joint force and mission partners. 

The defense of DOD networks must be accountable to the highest levels, and managed as 

such. It is imperative that commanders enforce measures to ensure the readiness of 

networks managed by personnel under their purview. Discipline and diligence will help 

prevent our adversaries from exploiting and successfully attacking our networks. 

 c. Every person who creates, uses, manages, destroys, oversees, or 

administers information systems (military, government civilian, contractor, and foreign 

national) has a responsible security role. Key roles include the system administrator, IA 

manager, IA officer, and DAA. 

DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGY

Information Assurance

Robust and Integrated Set of 

Information Assurance Measures and Actions

Successful Mission Execution

PEOPLE TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS











Training

Awareness

Physical Security

Personnel Security

System Security 

Administration











Defense-In-Depth 

Technology 

Framework Areas

Security Criteria

Information 

Technology/ 

Assurance 

Acquisition

Risk Assessments

Certification and 

Accreditation











Assessments

Monitoring

Intrusion Detection

Warning

Response

Defense-in-Depth Strategy

Figure IV-2. Defense-in-Depth Strategy
Network Operations 

IV-11 

 2. Technology. A collection of local computing devices 

interconnected via LAN, governed by a single security policy, regardless of physical 

location is considered an “enclave.” The enclave boundary is the point at which 

information enters or leaves the enclave or organization. The JFC must protect the vital 

lines of electronic communication that link the local computing environment enclaves. 

Some important technologies that help defend these networks include: 

 a. Redundant and multiple data paths. 

 b. Automated tools for monitoring and management. 

 c. Intrusion detection. 

 d. Firewalls and guards. 

 e. Malicious code and virus detectors. 

 f. Biometrics. 

 g. Cryptography and encryption. 

 h. Protected distribution systems. 

 3. Operations 

a. Defense-in-depth requires widely distributed intrusion detection 

activities to recognize and describe activities that are different from the normal pattern or 

fit known “bad” patterns, and to limit and contain the access across networks that a 

malicious user may exploit. The nature and scope of the incident, effects, cause, and 

vulnerability must be determined. After an intrusion is detected, incident information 

must be reported through established channels to appropriate authorities, specialized 

analysis, and response centers. Incident response begins with immediate local emergency 

damage-limitation and survivability actions that should be stated in organizational 

information systems security policy, procedures, tactics, and training guidance (e.g., 

standard operating procedures, contingency plans, and others) and implemented 

promptly. 

b. INFOCON. The INFOCON system provides a framework 

within which the CDRUSSTRATCOM, GCCs, Service chiefs, base/post/camp/station/ 

vessel commanders, and agency heads can measure and report the readiness of their 

networks to match operational priorities. The framework is a set of prescribed and 

optional actions and cycles necessary for reestablishing the confidence level and security 

of information systems for the commander. INFOCON operates within an environment 

of “defense-in-depth” and supports that strategy by returning critical assets to a secure 

baseline at a specified operating tempo. GCCs have the authority to change INFOCONs 

within their AORs. Functional CCDRs have the authority to change INFOCONs for the 
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 6-0 

unique systems and networks supporting their mission areas. Local 

(base/post/camp/station/vessel) commanders have the authority to change INFOCONs for 

their information systems and networks. The system provides a predefined sequence of 

actions necessary for achieving a common level of INFOSEC for DOD information 

systems. The INFOCON system is characterized by predefined directive defensive 

postures designed to mitigate risk. The information assurance vulnerability management 

(IAVM) program is the comprehensive distribution process to notify CCDRs, Services, 

and agencies about vulnerabilities and the corresponding corrective actions. 

c. CND response actions, tailored response options, and thorough 

analysis of events across the information systems provide for strengthening of the JFC’s 

defensive posture, eliminating or reducing attack effects, and focusing response efforts to 

threats to the JFC information and information system.

For additional information on the INFOCON system and the IAVM program, see CJCSM 

6510.01, Defense-In-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense 

(CND). 

(d) The use of EW tactics such as spectrum jamming needs to be taken into 

account both for how it affects enemies as well as its potential to unavoidably disrupt 

joint/coalition communications.

5. Management of the Global Information Grid 

a. USSTRATCOM has overall responsibility for global NETOPS and defense in 

coordination with CJCS and the other combatant commands. 

 b. GIG Configuration Management

 (1) Uniform configuration management of the GIG ensures interoperability and 

survivability of the DOD IA. In addition to the expected adherence to DOD policy, GIG 

configuration is controlled through compliance with the GIG architecture. GIG 

assets, to include those that are commercial off-the-shelf, are to be configured IAW 

approved information assurance policy, capabilities, documents, and standards and be 

compliant with the operational, system, and technical views of the GIG architecture. 

 

 (2) Operational assets are also uniformly configured to ensure architecture 

standards compliance, INFOSEC, operational effectiveness, and efficiency and quality of 

service across the GIG. Configuration control boards (CCBs) are often used to 

determine and regulate actual communications system configurations. The theater joint 

tactical networks (TJTNs) CCB is one such board that, as its charter states, seeks to 

coordinate initiatives, control the configuration of systems and networks, and synchronize 

the acquisition and fielding of the software and hardware products associated with the 

deployed networks of the GIG. The Army is the Executive Agent for TJTN. Together 

with the TJTN CCB, the Army oversees and coordinates development and life-cycle 

enhancement of theater-deployable networked communications system to achieve DOD 
Network Operations 

IV-13 

compatibility, interoperability, and integration objectives for systems composing the 

TJTN. ASD(NII) participates in an advisory capacity (see Figure IV-3).

 (3) GIG assets of the combatant commands, Services, and agencies are 

configured generally to meet the requirements of the command being served; however, 

the priority requirement is to support the NMCS (see Chapter V, “Communications 

System Support to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence 

Community” for further details on the NMCS). GIG assets of a combatant command also 

include the GIG assets of subordinate unified commands and JTFs when such 

organizations are established and assigned or attached. 

c. The DOD CIO (ASD[NII]) is responsible for developing, maintaining, and 

enforcing compliance with the GIG architecture. Inherent in the CIO’s architecture 

responsibility is to enforce interoperability, IA, net-centric data sharing, use of services, 

and program synchronization. 

 d. The GIG is essentially a global network that combines the specific 

communications system capabilities of the DOD components. Operation and defense of 

THEATER JOINT TACTICAL NETWORKS

 CONFIGURATION CONTROL BOARD

National Level Information

Resources Tier 0 NCA

Special

Purpose

Ckts

DSN

ISDN

CAS

DVSG

Secret

Unclas

JWICS

IDNX Based

INTEL Svcs

DRSN

DISN Long

Haul Tier 1

Tri-Band

X-Band

X-Band

STEP

TIER 2

TELEPORT

TIER 2

ARFOR HQ JSOTF HQ

NAVFOR HQ AFFOR HQ

Tri-Band

Joint Force Level Tier 4 JTF

HQ

CINC

Information

Resources TCCC

CINC HQ

Theater Level Resources Tier 3 Commercial

Satelite Access Pt

Commercial

Satelite Access Pt

Leased Commercial

Telecomm Access Pt

STEP

TIER 2 CINC

Information

Resources

MARFOR HQ

VSAT

SIPR

Services

NIPR

Services

Legend

GMF(SHF)

Terrestrial Mux

TRI-BAND Satcom

DISN Services

Operational Area Network: High Level View

NCTAMS

TIER 2

ACQUISITION 

SUPPORT 

PROGRAM

EXECUTIVE AGENT

TJTN WEBSITES

INDUSTRY 

PARTNERSHIPS

JOINT USERS 

INTEROPERABILITY 

COMMUNICATIONS 

EXERCISE

TJTN CCB SUBWORKING GROUPS 

COUPLED WITH CLOSER ALIGNMENT OF 

COGNIZANT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

WORKING GROUPS WITH TJTN CCB

ARCHITECTURE 

DEVELOPMENT

ENGINEERING 

ARM

COMBATANT 

COMMANDERS/

SERVICES/AGENCIES

TJTN CCB

PROGRAM

SYNCHRONIZATION

CHARTER

CERTIFICATION

CRITERIA

OPERATING

PAMPHLETS

TERMS

OF

REFERENCE

COMMUNICATIONS 

SYSTEM PLANNERS 

TOOLKIT

TJTN

CCB

theater joint tactical network

configuration control board

Figure IV-3. Theater Joint Tactical Networks Configuration Control Board
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 6-0 

the GIG is largely a matter of overarching common processes, standards, and protocols 

orchestrated by USSTRATCOM. The purposes of this framework are to govern common 

activities by all subscribers, deal with competing demands for service, and solicit 

essential joint force support from relevant agencies. CJCS, DISA, and the Services 

ensure that commanders at each echelon have the necessary capabilities to employ the 

GIG to accomplish their assigned missions. CJCS is responsible for operational network 

policy and overall direction of the DISN as DOD’s primary and global provider of GIG 

joint information services and information systems. This oversight responsibility does 

not infer command authority and is executed and facilitated through the assistance of the

NMCC, as well as through USSTRATCOM’s global NETOPS C2 structure. Non-DOD 

IC agencies retain C2 of their respective networks and assets which interface with the 

GIG in support of warfighting and other national interests. They interface at the SCI 

level via JWICS, in compliance with the guidance and directions of the Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency. The GIG networks are controlled within a tiered management 

hierarchy consisting of global, regional, and local control centers enabling a survivable, 

flexible, and disciplined C2 capability for DOD’s GIG. 

e. DISA has established TNCs to provide a single point of contact for theater 

network services, operations status, and communications system anomalies. Each TNC is 

responsible for the effective operation and defense of the GIG within their theater and for 

providing support to the GCC. The TNC develops, monitors, and maintains a GIG SA 

view for the theater and provides that SA to the GCC and JTF-GNO. These control 

centers also serve as a central point of contact for operational matters in support of a 

GCC. In some theaters, CCDRs have established a TNCC or equivalent organization, as 

an adjunct to the JOC, to gain network SA, as well as to assess operational impact when 

network anomalies arise. These organizations interface with component control centers 

within the theater. At the joint force level, the J-6 establishes a JNCC to manage and 

control joint networks. This is another local control center in the GIG operational 

hierarchy. As such, it also interfaces with Service component control centers in the 

operational area.

f. Regardless of the source, GIG resources assigned to CCDRs operate under 

their COCOM and are an integral part of their C2 system until such time as the 

President, SecDef, or the CCDRs determine that further support is no longer needed or a 

higher priority necessitates redeployment of the assets. The command authority and 

responsibilities of the GCCs include control, review, and coordination of assigned GIG 

resources and actions affecting such resources within the GCC’s AOR. CCDRs 

coordinate and direct NETOPS activities consistent with USSTRATCOM guidance to 

ensure the availability and protection of the GIG. GCCs have the authority to change 

INFOCONs within their AORs. Functional CCDRs have the authority to change 

INFOCONs for the unique systems and networks supporting their mission areas. Local 

(base/post/camp/station/vessel) commanders have the authority to change INFOCONs for 

their information systems and networks. Local commanders may only raise INFOCON 

above applicable baseline, unless granted waiver by controlling INFOCON authority. 
Network Operations 

IV-15 

g. CCDRs normally develop plans that integrate the DISN, NCS, commercial, and 

multinational systems as well as organize joint and Service organic and component 

tactical GIG assets into interoperable and compatible theater networks to support their 

mission. As a part of their planning, CCDRs determine priorities for information flow 

and allocate network resources, to include bandwidth within the AOR of their commands, 

and those required by component and other subordinate commands. The GCCs exercise 

oversight over their theater portion of the GIG through their support relationship 

with DISA regional offices, as well as through those forces assigned to them in the 

Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, or as modified by deployment orders.

 h. Operating elements of the DISN are subject to authoritative direction from 

different sources because of ownership. However, IAW DODD 5105.19, Defense 

Information Systems Agency (DISA), DISA field organizations, under the command of 

the Director, DISA, exercise operational direction (the authoritative direction 

necessary to ensure the effective operation of the DISN) over the DISN operating 

elements. Directors of DISA field organizations as well as Service component 

commanders though, will be responsive to the operational needs of the CCDRs, who 

exercise COCOM over the Service component operating elements of the DISN. GCCs 

develop agreements that clearly delineate the commanders’ relationships with the DISA 

field organizations within their AORs. In exercising COCOM, the CCDRs are cognizant 

of DISN support to the President and SecDef, DOD agencies, and other CCDRs, and 

preserve DISN integrity and standards to the maximum possible extent. With respect to 

the DISN, DISA coordinates and controls the provisioning of network services across the 

DISN transport network and across service delivery points or demarcation lines (which 

are associated with the ownership and subsequent technical control of GIG resources), 

IAW CCDR requirements. CCDR planners must acknowledge the highly integrated 

nature of their theater network as a part of the GIG. Consequently, development of 

communications system annexes to their campaign plans and OPLANs requires close 

coordination among their components to include DISA field operating commands, to 

ensure interoperability among forces. 
Chapter IV

IV-16 JP 6-0 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER V

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

V-1 

1. National Military Command System 

a. The NMCS is the priority component of the GIG designed to support the 

President, SecDef, and the JCS in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS 

provides the means by which the President and SecDef can receive warning and 

intelligence so that accurate and timely decisions can be made, the resources of the 

Services can be applied, military missions can be assigned, and direction can be 

communicated to CCDRs or the commanders of other commands. Both the 

communication of warning and intelligence from all sources and the communication of 

decisions and commands to military forces require that the NMCS be a responsive, 

reliable, and survivable system. An enduring command structure with survivable GIG 

systems is both required and fundamental to NMCS continuity of operations. 

 b. The NMCS command nodes are the NMCC, the National Airborne Operations 

Center, the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center (for essential emergency actions 

only), USSTRATCOM distributed C2 nodes, and the United States Northern Command 

Mobile Consolidated Command Center, and other command centers as designated by 

SecDef. Support of the NMCS is the priority function of all primary and alternate 

command centers. These centers are continuously staffed and ready for use, linked by 

reliable GIG infrastructure and supported by warning and intelligence systems. Special

capabilities within the GIG provide for communication with strategic offensive and 

defensive forces and for other forces that may be required for quick reaction in crises. In 

this case, the communications will be designated and operated to ensure minimum 

elapsed time for the transmission of orders to the operating units of these forces. The 

NMCS also includes infrastructure connecting NMCS centers with primary and alternate 

command centers of the following: 

 (1) HQ of the combatant commands. 

 (2) HQ of the Services.

 (3) Other designated commands and DOD agencies that provide support 

through the GCCS family of systems. 

 (4) Major or key intelligence direction, analysis, and indication and warning 

centers.

“It is recognized that the President’s responsibilities as Head of Government 

complicate the problem of ensuring his survivability as Commander-in-Chief. 

This latter survivability is achieved by providing for survivability of the Office 

as distinct from survivability of the man.”

National Military Communications System Master Plan
Chapter V

V-2 JP 6-0 

 (5) Other functional activities (e.g., counterdrug). 

c. The GIG also supports effective coordination and liaison with those activities of 

the US Government outside DOD that have functions associated with the NMCS (e.g., 

the White House Situation Room, Department of State Operations Center, Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. Central Intelligence Agency Operations Center, the National 

Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, United Nations Military Mission, United 

States Coast Guard Command Center, Federal Aviation Administration Executive 

Communications Control Center), and other agencies, activities, or centers as designated. 

The GIG supports homeland defense and civil support (to include defense support of civil 

authorities) by enabling DOD and the interagency mission partners to seamlessly share 

vital information. Military information flows to these command and operations elements 

through the NMCS, using GIG communications systems. In addition, political, 

intelligence, diplomatic, and economic information for the NMCS is provided by these 

same systems. Finally, the NMCS provides communications to support representatives 

of the White House and other government activities that may use the NMCS in a politicomilitary situation concerning strategic direction of US military forces.

d. The GIG provides for lateral coordination with US Government activities external 

to DOD for interchange of data to and from the NMCS. 

2. Nuclear Command and Control 

General operational responsibility for the Nuclear Command and Control System 

(NCCS) lies with CJCS and is centrally directed through the Joint Staff. The NCCS

supports the Presidential nuclear C2 of the combatant commands in the areas of 

integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, decisionmaking, decision 

dissemination, and force management and report back. To accomplish this, the NCCS

comprises those critical communications system components of the GIG that provide 

connectivity from the President and SecDef through the NMCS to the CCDRs with 

nuclear capabilities and nuclear execution forces. It includes the emergency action 

message dissemination systems and those systems used for tactical warning/attack 

assessment, conferencing, force report back, reconnaissance, retargeting, force 

management, and requests for permission to use nuclear weapons. The NCCS is integral 

to and ensures performance of critical strategic functions of the GCCS family and 

systems. The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network provides 

assured communications connectivity between the President and the strategic deterrent 

forces in stressed environments. 

3. Intelligence Community 

a. The joint intelligence systems architecture is an integral part of the GIG. 

Although intelligence organizations use a variety of sensors and other information 

sources to collect and analyze data and produce intelligence products, the 

communications system support to intelligence is normally limited to providing the 
Communications System Support to the President, the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Intelligence Community 

V-3 

communications interface and media required to move intelligence and related 

information. Communications system support does not typically cover the collection and 

production of intelligence. 

 b. DODIIS 

 (1) DODIIS is the combination of personnel, procedures, equipment, computer 

programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive 

preparation and presentation of intelligence information to military commanders and 

national-level decisionmakers. DIA is responsible for implementing and managing the 

configuration of information, data, and communications standards for DOD intelligence 

systems and for IC systems that interface with, or directly support DOD. As such, DIA 

establishes defense-wide intelligence priorities for attaining interoperability between the 

tactical, theater, and national intelligence systems and the respective communications 

system at each level.

 (2) In a technical sense, DODIIS is the SCI portion of the GIG that provides the 

interface between the CCDRs and the IC. The joint intelligence systems architecture is 

an integral part of the GIG, and consists of an integrated network supporting voice, data, 

and VTC. The JWICS, the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System, and the 

Distributed Common Ground System currently form the foundation of the SCI portion of 

the GIG. This interface consists of more than the SCI networks. DODIIS also provides 

the interfaces between the JWICS SCI IC systems and the SIPRNET IC systems. It is 

through this interface that much of the real time intelligence gathered by the CCDRs is 

passed up into the national IC systems and the national intelligence products are passed 

back down to the CCDRs. Additionally, this interface extends multinational networks 

that are essential partners in today’s missions. As such, DODIIS has evolved into an 

enterprise consisting of mission applications, communications services, and user 

equipment consolidated under centralized management to better serve the CCDRs and 

provide more responsive intelligence. This consolidation is shaped around an enterprise 

approach using regional service centers (RSCs). The globally linked RSCs provide the 

foundation and interface for data to be managed as a single enterprise entity transparent 

to the users. Data will reside on, or be accessible through the enterprise that connects the 

policy makers, analysts, planners, and decisionmakers in support of the joint force. 

4. National Communications System 

a. The NCS, consisting of federal member departments and agencies, is responsible 

for ensuring the availability of a viable national security emergency preparedness (NSEP) 

telecommunications infrastructure (see Figure V-1). The NCS consists of the 

telecommunications assets of the entities represented on the NCS Committee of 

Principals and an administrative structure consisting of the executive agent, the NCS 

Committee of Principals, and the manager. The NCS includes, to the extent permitted by 

law, other executive entities that bear policy, regulatory, or enforcement responsibilities 

of importance to NSEP telecommunications capabilities. The assets are operated and 

funded by their respective parent agencies, pursuant to cross-Service or mutual support 
Chapter V

V-4 JP 6-0 

arrangements. The Department of Homeland Security’s Undersecretary for Information 

Assurance and Infrastructure Protection manages the NCS. 

 b. The addition of competitive service providers with multiple points of contact 

within industry for planning and service provisioning has complicated the means for 

satisfying NSEP telecommunications requirements. To help manage how service 

providers are selected, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 

(NSTAC) was established in 1982 by Executive Order 12382, President’s NSTAC. 

Composed of chief executives from major telecommunications and IT-related companies, 

the NSTAC provides the President with a unified source of national security 

telecommunications policy expertise unobtainable solely within the Federal Government. 

While the NCS Committee of Principals serves as the mechanism for federal interagency 

coordination, the NSTAC and its working group structure are the means for the NCS to 

work with industry to address the range of NSEP telecommunications issues. The Joint 

Staff J-6 engages with the NCS through participation on the NSTAC. 

Federal Telecommunications System

DSN

MTSO

PBX

NCC

NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY

PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATIONS

Commercial Satellite 

Communications Interconnectivity

Emergency Restoration of 

Long Distance Trunks

Emergency 

High 

Frequency 

Message 

System

National 

Transportable 

Telecommunications 

Capability 

Emergency 

Restoration of 

Local Services

Network Management

Mobile/Transportable 

Telecommunications 

Emergency 

Restoration of 

Local-to-Long 

Distance Trunks

Commercial Network 

Survivability 

Cellular Access, Alternate 

Routing

International 

Circuits

DSN

NCC

PBX

MTSO

Defense Switch Network

Network Control Channel

Private Branch Exchange

Mobile Telephone Switching Office

National Security/Emergency 

Preparedness Communications 

support critical government 

users in the event of national 

disasters or war

Government Emergency Telecommunications 

Service

Enhanced Routing, 

Congestion Avoidance

Figure V-1. National Security Emergency Preparedness Communications
APPENDIX A 

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID COMPONENTS

A-1 

1. The Seven Global Information Grid Components

The seven GIG components are: warrior, global applications, computing, 

communications, NETOPS, information management, and foundation (see Figure A-1).

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID COMPONENTS

SUMMARY

DISN Defense Information Systems 

Network

MSS mobile satellite service

Global Information 

Grid Components















Warrior

Global Applications

Computing

Communications

Information 

Management

Network Operations

Foundations

RF radio frequency

SATCOM satellite communications

Information M

anagement

Net

w

ork 

O

peratio

n

s

Policy

Doctrine

Spectrum

Architecture

Foundation

Standards

Engineering

Governance

Commercial 

Fiber

Communications

Global Applications

Global Combat 

Support System

(GCSS)

Global

Command and 

Control System 

(GCCS)

Business 

Applications

Medical

Software Distribution from 

Central Files

Computing

Warrior Component

Electronic Mail 

Delivery Web Services Megacenter 

Services

Wireless 

Comm

Teleports RF Nets SATCOM

MSS DISN

Figure A-1. Global Information Grid Components Summary

“When the soldier hits push-to-talk, I want him to be able to bring the full 

power of the entire US military to bear at the point of need...the network 

makes that possible...that’s what’s keeping folks alive.”

Lieutenant General Austin, Director of the Joint Staff, 26 August 2009
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 6-0

2. Warrior Component

The joint force is directly connected to the network by the GIG warrior component. 

The warrior component is the personal, shipboard, track-, vehicle-, and aircraft-mounted 

radios, computers, software, and display devices that directly contribute to SA, 

collaboration, and access to information critical to combat operations to the 

decisionmaker/shooter (see Figure A-2). All components of the GIG support the warrior 

component. 

3. Global Applications Component

The global applications component (see Figure A-3) is the set of information 

applications used by the joint force over the GIG. It provides the information needs of the 

force and includes applications in areas such as fire support, weather, logistics, medical, and 

business. The GCCS-J, the GCSS-J, and the AMHS are three critical applications of the 

thousands supporting DOD. 

WARRIOR COMPONENT



























First Tactical Mile

Soldier Systems

Ground Vehicles

Aeronautical Platforms

Naval Platforms

Missile Defense

Missile Systems

Targeting

Battle Damage Assessment

Fire Support

Global Positioning System

Combat Identification

Joint Suppression of Enemy 

Air Defense

ENABLING THE SHOOTER’S DECISION

Equipment and Non-applications 

Software Supporting:

Enabling Precision Joint Fires,

Precision Maneuver,

Using Precise Information

Figure A-2. Warrior Component
Global Information Grid Components

A-3 

4. Computing Component

The computing component (Figure A-4) consists of hardware, software, and 

processes. It includes search services, shared data warehouses for storage/access, 

software distribution from central locations, shared mapping services, licensing services, 

electronic mail delivery, web services, common directories, and collaboration services to 

share information and ideas. The DISA defense enterprise computing centers can 

provide a significant portion of these services to the joint force. 

5. Communications Component

The communications component (Figure A-5) provides common-user information 

transport and processing services to all DOD users. It extends from the local base post, 

camp, station, and ship through the strategic networks, to the user. To achieve this, 

Service FMOs work directly with combatant command FMOs to coordinate and negotiate 

the electromagnetic spectrum supportability of the communications components (e.g., 

electromagnetic spectrum dependent devices). The communications component includes 

a mixture of DOD and commercial communications including global fiber, the aerial 

layer, SATCOM, wireless, radio frequency nets, and ever evolving, more capable DOD 

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM - JOINT

 IN THE GLOBAL APPLICATIONS COMPONENT

Global Command and Control System -

The set of information Joint (GCCS-J)

applications used by the 

joint force over the GIG.

It includes thousands of 

applications in areas 

such as fire support, 

weather, logistics, 

medical, and 

business providing 

the information 

needs of 

the force.

Figure A-3. Global Command and Control System – Joint in the Global Applications 

Component
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 6-0

COMPUTING COMPONENT

























Megacenter Services

Software Distribution from 

Central Locations

Shared Data Warehouses for 

Storage/Access

Collaboration Services --Shared 

Information and Ideas

Data Services

Common Directories

Shared Mapping Services

Web Services

Electronic Mail Delivery

End User Devices

Licensing Services

Search Services

Figure A-4. Computing Component

Gateway sites. DOD Gateway sites connect the joint force to the DISN long-haul 

services to provide a reachback capability for DISN voice, data, and video services across 

all frequency bands. The DISN provides the joint force with the ability to access needed 

capabilities worldwide. 

6. Network Operations Component

a. NETOPS provides integrated end-to-end management of networks, global 

applications, and services across the GIG to provide network visibility to enabling 

commanders to manage their networks as they would other battle systems. The GNC 

command center provides worldwide network monitoring, contingency support, network 

crisis action support, network resolution management, and network IA integration. 

USSTRATCOM executes DOD global network operations through USCYBERCOM. 

b. NETOPS provides integrated network visibility and end-to-end management of 

networks, global applications, and services across the GIG and facilitates net-centric 

operations. It provides the service assurance goals of: assured system and network

availability, assured information protection, and assured information delivery. 
Global Information Grid Components

A-5 

There are three significant attributes of NETOPS: SA, the operational construct, and

mission essential tasks.

c. SA is an enabling capability of NETOPS. GIG SA is the integrated capability to 

receive, correlate, and display a functional or theater-level view of systems and networks 

(voice, video, and data). The primary purpose is to enhance knowledge of the GIG to 

collaboratively improve the quality and speed of decisionmaking regarding the 

employment, protection, and defense of the GIG. 

d. Given the inherent global reach of the GIG, many global NETOPS activities are 

not under the command authority of a using CCDR. Therefore, a great deal of 

COMMUNICATIONS COMPONENT

Disciplined Information/Bandwidth on Demand

Integrated Space, Aerial, and Terrestrial Layers

COMM

CWAN

DISN

c

coalition wide area network

Defense Information 

Systems Network

ommunications MSS

RF

SATCOM

multiple satellite system

radio frequency

satellite communications

Satellite (Military and 

Commercial) Wireless Comm

DOD 

Gateway

Commercial 

Fiber

MSS

DISN

Tactical Data 

Links

Tactical Internet

and Networks

Deployed

CWAN

Ne wo t rk Operations

Policy

Doctrine

Spectrum

Architecture

Foundation

Standards

Engineering

Governance

Commercial 

Communications

Global 

Global Combat 

Support System

(GCSS)

Global

Command and 

Control System 

(GCCS)

Business 

Applications

Medical

Software Distribution 

Computing

Warrior Component

Electronic Mail 

Delivery Web Services Megacenter 

Services

Wireless 

Comm

Teleports RF Nets SATCOM MSS DISN

Information Management

Figure A-5. Communications Component
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 6-0

coordination and collaboration (unity of effort) is essential in the operational construct

of NETOPS to fully enable NETOPS capabilities. 

e. As depicted in Figure A-6 the essential tasks of GIG NETOPS are GEM, GNA, 

and GCM. 

NETOPS and its subcomponents are discussed in Chapter IV, “Network Operations.”

NETWORK OPERATIONS COMPONENT

Enable Decisionmaking

for the Warfighter

Right Information

Right Place

Right Time

Fusion Across the GIG

ASSURED

INFORMATION

PROTECTION

 Connect

 Process

Allocate

 Configure

 Resist

 Recognize

 Respond

 Recover

 Reconstitute

 Route

 Flow

 Account

 Maintain

 Retrieve

 Cache

 Compile

 Catalog

 Distribute 

ASSURED 

SYSTEM 

NETWORK 

AVAILABILITY

ASSURED

INFORMATION

DELIVERY

 GNA GCM

GEM

NET

OPS

NET

OPS

GCM GIG Content Management

GEM GIG Enterprise Management

GIG Global Information Grid

GNA GIG Network Assurance

NETOPS network operations

Figure A-6. Network Operations Component
Global Information Grid Components

A-7 

7. Information Management Component 

The IM component enables the planning, manipulating, and controlling of 

information throughout its life cycle (e.g., creation or collection, processing, 

dissemination, use, storage, and disposition). The IM component allows the joint force to 

access needed databases with appropriate permissions, anywhere in the world. IM 

provides joint forces with the critical ability to dynamically tailor and prioritize their 

information requirements to support the mission and environment. IDM discussed earlier 

as a subset of NETOPS is also a subset of IM. While some boundaries have been 

established, this does not mean IDM is totally divorced from the production of 

information or the presentation of information. Figure A-7 depicts the IM/IDM 

relationship. 

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

COMPONENT

Warfighting

Decisions

Information

Collection

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

IM

IDM

Producer

IM

Consumer

Sensing

Awareness

Access

Delivery

Generation

Compilation

Cataloging

Caching

IM/IDM Relationship

DATA

SERVICES

SEARCH

SERVICES

LICENSING

SERVICES

MEGACENTER

SERVICES

Information 

Requirements WEB

SERVICES

END USER

SERVICES

COMMON

DIRECTORIES

ELECTRONIC

MAIL DELIVERY

SHARED

MAPPING

SERVICES

Utilization

Presentation

Retrieving

Distribution

Selection Publication

Collaboration 

Services

-- Share Information 

and Ideas

Shared Data 

Warehouses for 

Storage/Access

Software 

Distribution

from 

Central Locations

IM information management IDM information dissemination management

Figure A-7. Information Management Component
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 6-0

8. Foundation Component

The foundation component (Figure A-8) includes doctrine, policy, compliance, 

architectures, testing, electromagnetic spectrum, and host-nation approval. It anchors and 

defines the GIG through policy and standards. It provides the basis for an interoperable, 

secure DOD networked enterprise. The GIG baseline capability encompasses integrating 

all DOD requirements — strategic, operational, tactical, and base/post/camp/ 

station/shipboard — providing flexible, assured bandwidth regardless of environment. 

FOUNDATION COMPONENT





























Doctrine

Policy

Governance

Training

Engineering

Resourcing

Compliance

Organization

Data Standardization

Modeling and Simulation

Architectures (Operational, System, and Technical)

Interoperability Standards Development

Testing for Interoperability and Standards

Spectrum/Host-Nation Approval

Figure A-8. Foundation Component
APPENDIX B 

JOINT FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

ESTIMATE PREPARATION GUIDE

B-1

1. General

This appendix provides communications system planners with an outline to assist 

planning. This outline was adapted from the USJFCOM communications system 

estimate training guide.

2. Situation

The JFC has received a planning directive (e.g., CCDR’s warning order, planning 

order). Normally, the joint planning group (JPG) has been assembled, and the 

planning of an operation is ongoing. The communications system planner will 

develop the communications system estimate by identifying, coordinating, and 

integrating communications system support into the joint force operation. 

REFERENCES: JP 3-0, JP 3-33, and CJCSM 3122.01A.

3. Developing the Communications System Estimate Analysis 

a. Determine known facts, status, or conditions of communications system 

elements provided in the commander’s planning guidance document (e.g., warning 

order, planning order, or alert order). 

b. Understand the CCDR’s mission and proposed operations/tasks to 

components. 

(1) Mission assigned to the CCDR. 

(2) Required results. 

(3) Actions required to achieve results. 

(4) Location of required results. 

(5) Timing of required results. 

(6) Limitations on freedom of action. 

c. Review and describe the communications system situation. 

(1) Characteristics of the operational area; emphasize factors affecting 

communications system activities.

(2) Adversary capabilities. Place specific emphasis on communications 

system matters.
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 6-0

(3) Friendly forces.

(a) Disposition (positions) of major units that have been provided by 

the combatant command for planning. 

(b) Own COAs. State the proposed COAs under consideration. 

(c) Probable operations/tactical developments. Review major 

deployments and communications system preparations necessary in all phases of the 

proposed campaign/major operation. 

(4) The logistic situation. Review known logistic problems that may affect 

the communications system situation.

(5) The personnel situation. Review known or anticipated personnel 

problems that may influence the communications system estimate and the selection of 

a specific COA. Consider the requirement for and availability of JCSE augmentation. 

(6) Special features. Special aspects not covered elsewhere that may affect 

the communications system situation, such as the host nation and its ability and 

willingness to allow access/operation of communications system assets or the affects 

of scintillation on long-haul communications 

(7) Communications system. Consider line-of-sight communications, 

SATCOM, UHF SATCOM, ground mobile segment, and DISN interface. Review all 

military and commercial options.

(a) Administrative communications.

(b) Logistics and medical communications. 

(c) Intelligence communications architecture.

(d) COMSEC.

(e) Communications support for combat operations: 

1. Joint tactical air operations. 

2. Air-to-ground operations. 

3. Naval surface fire support operations. 

4. Other component-specific communications system.
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-3 

(f) Communications control and aids for supporting operations. 

(g) Interoperability of the communications system, both horizontally 

and vertically.

(h) Communications required for other activities (video teleconference, 

etc.).

d. Understand the deception guidance — objective, target, story, if any. 

e. Understand the guidance on risk, if any. 

f. Understand the desired end state. 

g. Provide factors affecting communications. 

(1) The topography in the JOA. 

(2) The available communications resources.

(3) The communications readiness of available forces.

h. Determine limitations.

(1) Restrictions placed on the JFC. 

(a) Constraints. Required actions that limit freedom of action (e.g., 

conduct air strikes within a specific period of time).

(b) Restraints. Actions the JFC is prohibited from taking (e.g., cannot 

pursue the adversary across an international border). 

(2) Imposed by higher HQ, host nation, alliance/coalition, etc. 

(3) Implied by conditions, circumstances — may be described as 

assumptions. 

i. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown information. NOTE: 

Assumptions must be valid (likely to occur) and necessary (essential for continued 

planning), e.g., sufficient satellite channels/bandwidth availability. 

(1) Intelligence related assumptions. See the J-2 (intelligence).

(a) Impact of characteristics of the JOA.

(b) Adversary intentions, probable COAs, vulnerabilities. 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 6-0

(c) Status of friendly support. 

(2) Operationally related assumptions. See J-3/plans directorate of a joint 

staff (J-5) (operations/plans).

(a) Status of forces at probable execution.

(b) Probability of success after the force ratio analysis.

(c) Available time.

(3) Logistic-related assumptions. See the J-4 (logistics).

(a) Logistic status-of-forces at probable execution.

(b) Logistic impact of characteristics of the JOA.

(c) Acquisition plan for extraordinary material and services. 

(4) Communications/computer-related assumptions. 

(a) Communications status at probable execution. 

(b) Determine national/theater-level communications support in

coordination with the combatant command J-6. 

4. Receive the Joint Force Commander Planning Guidance

The JFC should provide detailed guidance at this point. Planning guidance 

should be disseminated to J-6 personnel and the joint force components. If needed, 

ask the J-3/J-5/JFC for any guidance necessary for continued planning. 

5. Develop Options for Communications System Support of the Joint Force 

Commander’s Courses of Action

a. Use analytical models or databases to assist in determining requirements and 

the communications system architecture.

b. For combat operations. 

(1) Review the mission analysis and the commander’s guidance and intent. 

(2) Develop options for communications system support for each COA. 
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-5 

(a) State clearly what is to be accomplished, including phasing of the 

communications system support to the campaign or operation. 

(b) Outline communications system support to the military deception 

objective and story. 

(c) Specify ways (operations) and means (forces) to provide 

communications system support to accomplish objectives (e.g., attacking adversary 

centers of gravity).

(d) Outline the major communications system tasks to be performed to 

support the JFC, including the supporting/supported relationships by phase, and tasks 

to be accomplished by the supporting organizations and agencies. 

(e) Outline the deployment scheme for communications system 

resources.

(3) Identify force requirements for communications system support. 

(4) Describe C2 means and relationships for communications system 

support. 

c. For noncombat operations. 

(1) Review the mission analysis and JFC’s guidance (e.g., commander’s 

intent).

(2) Develop communications system support options for each COA. 

(a) Clearly state what is to be accomplished.

(b) Specify ways (operations) and means (forces) to provide 

communications system support to accomplish objectives. 

(c) Outline the major communications system tasks to be performed to 

support the JFC, including the supporting/supported relationships by phase, and tasks 

to be accomplished by the supporting organizations and agencies. 

(3) Identify the force requirements for communications system resources. 

(4) Describe the C2 means and relationships for communications system 

support. 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 6-0

6. Participate in the Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

a. Gather tools. 

(1) Identify the adversary and friendly COAs to analyze. 

(2) Prepare maps of the JOA with communications system information.

(3) Join the wargaming team -- normally representatives from J-2, J-3, J-4, 

and J-6. 

(4) Depict current adversary dispositions. 

b. Identify the available joint forces and augmentation from: 

(1) A joint space support team. 

(2) DISA. 

(3) RSSC. 

(4) The Joint Spectrum Center. 

(5) JCSE/CJCS controlled assets. 

c. List assumptions related to communications system support.

d. Review and/or contribute to the development of known critical events and 

decision points — specified and implied tasks and decisions that must be made to 

ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources. 

e. Review or contribute to selecting the wargame method. Generally allow 

action/reaction/counteraction sequence and assessment.

f. Participate in wargaming.

(1) Provide a perspective on communications system requirements related to 

friendly operations. 

(2) Determine communications system objectives and integrate 

communications system support within the context of the COA under consideration. 

(3) Identify potential adjustments to the required friendly force deployment 

to ensure communications system resources for the COA under consideration. 
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-7 

(4) Contribute refinements or modifications to the COAs and to the 

concepts for communications system support. 

(5) Contribute to branches, sequels, or additional critical events — 

additional operations that might be required as a result of adversary actions not 

previously anticipated. 

(6) Contribute to critical information.

(7) Contribute to COA(s) for the associated military deception plan. 

(8) Identify major communications system tasks to the Service/functional 

components. 

(9) Estimate the duration of communications system support requirements. 

(10) Identify major requirements for communications system support of 

operations. 

(11) Develop communications system input/information for the 

synchronization matrix and decision support template. 

(12) Identify advantages, disadvantages of friendly COAs from the J-6 

perspective of supportability. 

g. Repeat for all combinations of adversary and friendly COAs. 

7. Participate in the Course of Action Comparison 

Test the validity of each COA.

a. Tests for suitability.

(1) Does it accomplish the mission?

(2) Does it meet the commander’s intent?

(3) Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?

(4) Does it meet the conditions for the end state?

(5) Does it take into consideration the adversary and friendly centers of 

gravity?

b. Preliminary test for feasibility.
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 6-0

(1) Does the JFC have the force structure (means) to carry it out? The COA 

is feasible if it can be carried out with the forces, support, and technology available, 

within the constraints of the physical environment, and against the expected enemy 

opposition. 

(2) Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this 

time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (e.g., resources are 

obviously insufficient). However, it may be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting 

additional support through the geographic combatant command. 

c. Preliminary test for acceptability.

(1) Does it contain unacceptable risks?

(2) Does it take into account the limitations placed on the JFC (constraints 

[must do] and restraints [cannot do])? A COA is considered acceptable if the 

estimated results are worth the estimated costs. The basis of this test consists of an 

estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity. 

(3) Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the JFC and the 

CCDR, by reviewing the JFC’s contribution to the CCDR’s objective.

(4) COAs are reconciled with external constraints, particularly rules of 

engagement.

(5) Requires visualization of execution of the COA against each adversary 

capability. Although this process occurs during the COA analysis and the test at this 

time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the 

JFC’s definition of acceptable risk. 

d. Test for differences or variety. Is it fundamentally different from other 

COAs? They can be different when considering: 

(1) Focus or direction of the main effort.

(2) Scheme of maneuver (land, air, maritime, and special operations). 

(3) Primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.

(4) Task organization. 

(5) Use of reserves.
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-9 

e. Preliminary test for completeness. Does it answer the questions who, what, 

when, where, why, and how? 

f. Provide forces and deployment requirements to the joint force deployment 

cell.

g. Provide conclusions. 

(1) State whether the JFC’s mission is supportable from a J-6 perspective.

(2) State which COA can best be supported from a J-6 standpoint. 

(3) Identify the major communications system deficiencies and make 

recommendations to reduce or eliminate them.

(a) Are CJCS-controlled assets required? 

(b) Is JCSE required? 

(c) Are en route communications required? 

h. Ensure that recommendations are coordinated with the J-6-equivalent at each 

Service/functional component and the supported combatant command J-6. 

i. Recommend a COA from a J-6 perspective. 

8. Receive the Joint Force Commander’s Decision on the Course of Action

The JFC may select or modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, 

the JFC’s estimate document (or slides) will normally be sent or briefed to the 

supported CCDR for approval. 

9. Prepare and Submit Annex K (communications supplement/instructions) to 

the Joint Force Plan/Order

Note: If steps 1-6 above were completed, most of the information needed for 

annex K is now available. 

a. Identify the communications system functions required to support the 

proposed joint operation. 

(1) Collect information based on the stated need and convert that 

information into the required format for the annex K. 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 6-0

(2) Coordinate, as necessary, with the combatant command J-6 and the J-6-

equivalents at the Service/functional components. 

(3) Provide the information/annex K to the focal point for the 

OPLAN/OPORD, normally the JPG. 

(4) Disseminate essential information regarding communications system and 

networks throughout the joint force, as required. 

(5) Ensure all active and passive communications system support related 

security measures are in effect to deny the adversary access to friendly information 

(e.g., COMSEC, INFOSEC, computer security). 

b. Identify applicable planning guidelines/principles for the communications 

system support. Consider: 

(1) The integration of organic and non-organic military and commercial 

communications systems, so the interfaces are transparent and the systems reliable.

(2) Plan/coordinate for the replacement of JCSE IAW USJFCOM 

instruction 2014.1. 

(3) Horizontal and vertical C2 linkages. 

(4) A balance between “push” and “pull” systems to meet the information 

needs of the joint force. 

(5) Planning principles. 

(a) Modular communications system packages. 

(b) Interoperable procedures, training, and equipment that permits the 

internal and external exchange of information. 

1. What interfaces are required for multinational forces?

2. Can the Joint Interoperability Test Command assist with 

potential interoperability solutions?

(c) The use of liaison officers/teams to provide a means to facilitate 

interoperability during different tactical phases of an operation. 

(d) The flexibility to allow for changes in mission or to accommodate a 

diversity of communications schemes and equipment. 
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-11

(e) Balance the need for redundancy and flexibility with the available 

assets.

(f) Survivable communications system architecture that includes a 

diversity of communications routes, hardening and protection of equipment and 

communications sites, and availability of alternate modular communications system 

packages.

(g) Redundancy that provides diversity of paths over multiple media 

means, with available replacement systems and repair parts. The goal is timely, 

reliable information flow.

(h) Use of available commercial networks.

1. What special interfaces are required?

2. What are the power requirements?

3. Are additional funds required? 

(i) Electromagnetic spectrum management to avoid harmful EMI and 

hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordinance (through host nation coordination 

and analysis and evaluation of potential electromagnetic spectrum conflicts as part of 

the JOPES process, ongoing missions and training) and to protect the most critical 

communications functions through coordination and distribution of a JRFL. 

(j) Security must account for users’ information requirements, the 

vulnerability of communications system to interception, exploitation, disruption, and 

destruction by the adversary. 

(k) IA principles must be included to minimize the threats posed by 

computer viruses, hackers, and denial of service attacks. 

c. Consider equipment and system characteristics necessary for proposed 

operations. The communications system should be designed to be interoperable, 

agile, trusted, and shared. 

d. Refine the concept of communications system support

(1) Determine/refine command IERs.

(a) Should be based on the consolidated requirements of the JFC. 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 6-0

(b) Consider communications system support to other 

operations/functions (e.g., information operations, military deception, psychological 

operations, fire support systems, airspace management, air defense).

(c) Consider the battle rhythm of the staff, reporting times, and times of 

critical planning meetings.

(2) Match communications system IERs with communications system 

capabilities and assets.

(3) Conduct communications system planning and engineering. Design the 

communications system architecture.

(a) Use available automated planning tools (e.g., JNMS). 

(b) Define the architecture in terms of communications system nodes 

and associated communications system, grouped into modular packages keyed to 

operational mission phases and deployment schedules. 

(c) Describe the interconnection of modular packages to 

communications system and the resulting communications system networks. 

Consider using an automated planning tool, then comparing results with mission 

phases and deployment schedules. 

(d) Include description of supporting SYSCON centers, technical 

control centers, and technical control facilities.

(e) Upon validation of the requirements, input applicable information to 

the joint force point of contact for the TPFDD for forwarding to the supported 

combatant command. 

(4) Program the activation of communications system links and networks. 

(5) Plan for management of the electromagnetic spectrum.

(a) Use allocations, allotments, and assignments of frequencies and 

frequency ranges.

(b) Ensure that frequencies have electromagnetic compatibility.

(c) Plan to request monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum for EMI 

(as required).

(d) Develop appropriate joint CEOI. 
Joint Force Communications System Estimate Preparation Guide

B-13

(6) Plan for security of communications system and networks — INFOSEC.

(a) Transmission security.

(b) Cryptographic security. 

(c) Emission security.

(7) Coordinate plan with meteorology and oceanographic observations. 

e. Prepare and submit annex K (communications supplement/instructions) to the 

OPLAN/OPORD.

(1) Use available automated planning/annex preparation tools. 

(2) Include joint CEOI and related instructions. 
Appendix B 

B-14 JP 6-0

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX C 

REFERENCES

C-1 

The following references support the doctrinal concepts described in JP 6-0. 

1. Department of Defense Publications

 a. DODD 4630.05, Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology 

(IT) and National Security Systems (NSS). 

 b. DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

 c. DODI 4630.8, Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of Information 

Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS). 

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCSI 2700.01A, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, 

Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies, and 

Other Friendly Nations. 

b. CJCSI 3155.01, Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) 

Operational Framework Policy. 

c. CJCSI 3320.01B, Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations. 

d. CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operation Instructions. 

e. CJCSI 5721.01D, The Defense Message System and Associated Legacy Message 

Processing Systems. 

f. CJCSI 6211.02C, Defense Information System Network (DISN): Policy and 

Responsibilities. 

g. CJCSI 6212.01E, Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology 

and National Security Systems. 

h. CJCSI 6215.01C, Policy for Department of Defense Voice Networks with Real 

Time Services (RTS). 

i. CJCSI 6241.04B Policy and Procedures for Using United States Message Text 

Formatting. 

j. CJCSI 6250.01C, Satellite Communications. 

k. CJCSI 6251.01B, Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications Demand 

Assigned Multiple Access Requirements. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 6-0

l. CJCSI 6510.01E, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense 

(CND). 

m. CJCSI 6510.06A, Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations. 

n. CJCSI 6731.01B, Global Command and Control System Security Policy. 

o. CJCSI 6740.01B, Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements 

Between the United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign 

Nations. 

p. CJCSM 3150.01B, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions. 

q. CJCSM 3150.07C, Joint Reporting Structure Communications Status. 

r. CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace. 

s. CJCSM 3320.02B, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures. 

t. CJCSM 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures. 

u. CJCSM 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications. 

v. CJCSM 6510.01A, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense 

(CND).

3. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

c. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

d. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

e. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

4. Multi-Service Publication 

FM 6-02.85/MCRP 3-40.2A/NWP 3-13.1.16/AFTTP(I) 3-2.22, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management. 
APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1 

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education 

Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should

address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for 

Battlespace Communications System (J-6).

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 20 March 2006. 

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J6//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint 

Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the 

Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL 

at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 6-0 

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of joint publications for distribution. 

Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and 

https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine 

(NIPRNET).

 b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 

MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1 JP 6-0 

ABCS Army Battle Command System

ACP Allied communications publication

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)

AMHS automated message handling system

AOR area of responsibility

ASD(NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 

Integration)

bps bits per second

C2 command and control

CCB configuration control board

CCDR combatant commander

CCEB Combined Communications-Electronics Board

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CDP commander’s dissemination policy

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command

CEOI communications-electronics operating instructions

CERT computer emergency response team

CFC Combined Forces Command, Korea

CIO chief information officer

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CND computer network defense

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COI community of interest

COMSEC communications security

CONUS continental United States 

COP common operational picture

DAA designated approving authority

DCO Defense Connect Online

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DISA-LO Defense Information Systems Agency-liaison officer

DISN Defense Information Systems Network

DJS Director, Joint Staff

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DODIIS Department of Defense Intelligence Information System

DRSN Defense Red Switched Network

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
Glossary

GL-2 JP 6-0 

DSN Defense Switched Network

DSTS-G Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Satellite 

Transmission Services - Global

EHF extremely high frequency

EMI electromagnetic interference

EW electronic warfare

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FLTSATCOM fleet satellite communications

FM field manual (Army)

FMO frequency management office

GAR gateway access request

GBS Global Broadcast Service

GCC geographic combatant commander

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GCCS-J Global Command and Control System-Joint

GCM Global Information Grid (GIG) Content Management

GCSS-J Global Combat Support System-Joint

GEM Global Information Grid (GIG) Enterprise Management

GIG Global Information Grid

GNA Global Information Grid (GIG) Network Assurance

GNC global network operations (NETOPS) center 

GNCC global network operations (NETOPS) control center

GNSC global network operations (NETOPS) support center

GND Global Information Grid (GIG) Network Defense

GSSC global satellite communications (SATCOM) support center

HF high frequency

HQ headquarters

IA information assurance

IAVM information assurance vulnerability management

IAW in accordance with 

IC intelligence community

IDM information dissemination management

IER information exchange requirement

IGO intergovernmental organization

IM information management

IMSP information management support plan

INFOCON information operations condition 

INFOSEC information security

INMARSAT international maritime satellite

IO information operations
Glossary

GL-3 

IPS Interim Polar System

IS information superiority

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IT information technology 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff

JCCA joint combat capability assessment

JCEWS joint force commander’s electronic warfare staff

JCISA Joint Command Information Systems Activity 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSE joint communications support element

JDN joint data network

JFC joint force commander

JFCC NW Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare

JFMO joint frequency management office

JIMB joint information management board

JNCC joint network operations (NETOPS) control center

JNMS joint network management system

JOA joint operations area

JOC joint operations center

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JPG joint planning group

JRFL joint restricted frequency list

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

JSME joint spectrum management element

JTF joint task force

JTF-GNO Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

Ka Kurtz-above band

kbps kilobits per second

Ku Kurtz-under band

LAN local area network

LPD low probability of detection

LPI low probability of intercept

M&S modeling and simulation

MARS Military Auxilliary Radio System

MCEB Military Communications-Electronics Board

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
Glossary

GL-4 JP 6-0 

MILDEP Military Department

MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCC National Coordinating Center

NCCS Nuclear Command and Control System

NCES Net-Centric Enterprise Services

NCS National Communications System

NETOPS network operations

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGO nongovernmental organization

NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

NMCC National Military Command Center

NMCS National Military Command System

NOSC network operations and security center

NSA National Security Agency

NSEP national security emergency preparedness

NSG National System for Geospatial Intelligence

NSS national security system

NSTAC National Security Telecommunications 

Advisory Committee

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration

NWP Navy warfare publication

OGA other government agency

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

RF radio frequency

RSC regional service center

RSSC regional satellite communications (SATCOM) support 

center

RSSC-LO regional satellite communications support center liaison 

officer

SA situational awareness 

SAR site access request

SATCOM satellite communications

SCI sensitive compartmented information

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SHF super-high frequency

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
Glossary

GL-5 

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

SLA service level agreement

SOM satellite communications (SATCOM) operational manager

SSE satellite communications (SATCOM) systems expert

STEP standardized tactical entry point

SYSCON systems control

TACSAT tactical satellite

TBMCS theater battle management core system

TDL tactical data link

TIM theater information management

TJTN theater joint tactical network

TNC theater network operations (NETOPS) center

TNCC theater network operations (NETOPS) control center 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UFO ultrahigh frequency follow-on

UHF ultrahigh frequency

UNC United Nations Command

USC United States Code

USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

USFK United States Forces, Korea

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

VTC video teleconferencing

WAN wide-area network

WGS Wideband Global Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
GL-6 JP 6-0 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these 

terms and definitions.

architecture. A framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the elements 

of the subject force, system, or activity. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, 

and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling 

operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

commonality. A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and 

interchangeable characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, 

by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training; b. having 

interchangeable repair parts and/or components; and c. applying to consumable items 

interchangeably equivalent without adjustment. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02 with JP 6-0 as the source JP.)

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared by 

more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative 

planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

communicate. To use any means or method to convey information of any kind from one 

person or place to another. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

communication operation instructions. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

communications net. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

communications network. An organization of stations capable of intercommunications, 

but not necessarily on the same channel. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0)

communications satellite. An orbiting vehicle, which relays signals between 

communications stations. There are two types: a. active communications satellite —A 

satellite that receives, regenerates, and retransmits signals between stations; b. passive 

communications satellite — A satellite which reflects communications signals between 

stations. Also called COMSAT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0)

communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny 

unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession 
Glossary

GL-7 

and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their 

interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

communications system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

computer network defense. Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and 

respond to unauthorized activity within the Department of Defense information systems 

and computer networks. Also called CND. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

computer security. The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access 

and exploitation of friendly computer systems. Also called COMPUSEC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

configuration management. A discipline applying technical and administrative direction 

and surveillance to: (1) identify and document the functional and physical 

characteristics of a configuration item; (2) control changes to those characteristics; and 

(3) record and report changes to processing and implementation status. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 6-0 as the source JP.)

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over 

part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and 

photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a 

map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have been or will be 

determined. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure 

that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the 

distribution and use of documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the 

subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate 

regulations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 1 as the source JP for 

Definition 1.)

critical infrastructure protection. Actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the 

risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending on the 

risk, these actions could include: changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures; adding 

redundancy; selection of another asset; isolation or hardening; guarding, etc. Also 

called CIP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

cryptosecurity. None (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

cyberspace. A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 

interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the 

Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors 

and controllers. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: CJCS CM-0363-08)

data link. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-8 JP 6-0 

decrypt. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Defense Information Systems Network. Integrated network, centrally managed and 

configured to provide long-haul information transfer services for all Department of 

Defense activities. It is an information transfer utility designed to provide dedicated 

point-to-point, switched voice and data, imagery, and video teleconferencing services. 

Also called DISN. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 6-0 as the source 

JP.)

Defense Switched Network. Component of the Defense Communications System that 

handles Department of Defense voice, data, and video communications. Also called 

DSN. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 6-0 as the source JP.)

electromagnetic spectrum management. Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use 

of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative 

procedures. The objective of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to 

perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering 

unacceptable interference. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

emission security. The component of communications security that results from all 

measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be 

derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptoequipment and telecommunications systems. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

frequency management. The requesting, recording, deconfliction of and issuance of 

authorization to use frequencies (operate electromagnetic spectrum dependent systems) 

coupled with monitoring and interference resolution processes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 6-0) 

garble. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Global Combat Support System-Joint. The primary information technology application 

used to provide automation support to the joint logistician. Also called GCSS-J. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

Global Command and Control System. A deployable command and control system 

supporting forces for joint and multinational operations across the range of military 

operations with compatible, interoperable, and integrated communications systems. 

Also called GCCS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities, associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and 

managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. 

The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and 

computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security 
Glossary

GL-9 

services, other associated services and National Security Systems. Also called GIG. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Global Network Operations Center. United States Strategic Command operational 

element responsible for providing global satellite communications system status; 

maintaining global situational awareness to include each combatant commander’s 

planned and current operations as well as contingency plans; supporting radio 

frequency interference resolution management; supporting satellite anomaly resolution 

and management; facilitating satellite communications interface to the defense 

information infrastructure; and managing the regional satellite communications support 

centers. Also called GNC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information 

systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 

nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 

incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

information environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that 

collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, 

and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

information superiority. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, 

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 

denying an adversary's ability to do the same. See also information operations. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the 

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US 

Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0.)

interconnection. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

 

interface. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

interoperability. 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 2. 

The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of 

communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged 

directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of 

interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Approved for 
Glossary

GL-10 JP 6-0 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0, and JP 6-0 as the source publication for 

Definition 1, and 2 respectively.)

joint communications network. The aggregation of all the joint communications systems 

in a theater. The joint communications network includes the joint multi-channel 

trunking and switching system and the joint command and control communications 

system(s). Also called JCN. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 6-0 as 

the source JP.)

joint network operations control center. An element of the J-6 established to support a 

joint force commander. The joint network operations control center serves as the single 

control agency for the management and direction of the joint force communications 

systems. The joint network operations control center may include plans and operations, 

administration, system control, and frequency management sections. Also called 

JNCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

joint restricted frequency list. A time and geographically-oriented listing of TABOO, 

PROTECTED, and GUARDED functions, nets, and frequencies. It should be limited 

to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish 

objectives. Also called JRFL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.1) 

minimize. A condition wherein normal message and telephone traffic is drastically reduced 

in order that messages connected with an actual or simulated emergency shall not be 

delayed. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

National Communications System. The telecommunications system that results from the 

technical and operational integration of the separate telecommunications systems of the 

several executive branch departments and agencies having a significant 

telecommunications capability. Also called NCS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0)

National Military Command System. The priority component of the Global Command 

and Control System designed to support the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. Also called NMCS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

network operations. Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information 

Grid. Also called NETOPS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0). 

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, 

processed for onward movement, or terminated. 2. In communications and computer 

systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access 

services to support information exchange. 3. An element of a system that represents a

person, place, or physical thing. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-17, 

JP 6-0, and JP 3-0 as the source publication for Definition 1, 2, and 3 respectively.)
Glossary

GL-11 

physical security. 1. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to 

safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 

material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, 

and theft. 2. In communications security, the component that results from all physical 

measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from 

access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0, and JP 6-0 as the source publication for 

Definition 1, and 2 respectively.)

receipt. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network. The worldwide SECRET-level packet 

switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity 

Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. Also called SIPRNET. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 6-0) 

signal operating instructions. A series of orders issued for technical control and 

coordination of the signal communication activities of a command. In Marine Corps 

usage, these instructions are designated communication operation instructions. 

(Approved for replacement of “signal operation instructions” in JP 1-02.)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest 

practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for 

the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to 

adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, 

administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures 

and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, 

weapons, or equipment; and, d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with 

corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-02) 

systems architecture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical data link. A Joint Staff-approved, standardized communication link suitable for 

transmission of digital information. Tactical digital information links interface two or 

more command and control or weapons systems via a single or multiple network 

architecture and multiple communication media for exchange of tactical information. 

Also called TDL. (Approved for replacement of “tactical digital information link” and 

its definition in JP 1-02.)

telecommunications. Any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writings, 

images, sounds, or information of any nature by wire, radio, visual, or other 

electromagnetic systems. (Approved for replacement of “telecommunication” in JP 1-

02.)

teleconference. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Glossary

GL-12 JP 6-0 

transmission security. The component of communications security that results from all 

measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means 

other than cryptanalysis. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 6-0)
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0

INTELLIGENCE PLANS LOGISTICS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an

overview of the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 6-0 Communications System