* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. DOMINGO BAEZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 10-30350 D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00149-JDS-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Jack D. Shanstrom, Senior District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 14, 2011 ** Portland, Oregon Before: FISHER, PAEZ, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Domingo Baez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for return of $1,351.00 in cash seized from him by drug enforcement agents in September 2008. Baez contends that the declaration of civ il forfeiture must be set aside because he 

# FILED
DEC 29 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS1 The government contends that Baez waived this argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. Pro se litigants, however, are held to a lesser standard where their compliance with statutory pr ocedural requirements is at issue. See Draper v. Coombs , 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). We therefore construe Baez’s arguments before the district court that his attorneys advised him against pursuing the return of his property as having raised the notice issue. 2 did not receive actual notice of the forfeiture. 1 The plain language of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1)(A), forecloses Baez’s argument. The statut e requires only that the government take reasonable steps to provide notice to potentially interested parties; it does not require actual notice. Moreover, Baez cannotshow that he did not know, or have reason to know, of the seizure within su fficient time to file a timely claim, as CAFRA requires, since the monies were seized from his person. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1)(A). Baez’s additional contention that due pro cess requires that he receive actual notice prior to the forfeiture of his assets is likewise without merit. “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States . . . from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’” Dusenbery v. United States , 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). “[I]ndividuals whose property interests are at stake are entitled to ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard.’” Id. Due process requires only that the notice afforded to interested persons be “‘reasonably3 calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. at 168 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). CAFRA’s requirement that the government take reasonable steps to provide potential claimants with notice mirrors th e requirements of the Due Process Clause. Due process plainly does not require actual notice. See id. at 170-71 (rejecting inmate’s claim that the government was required to assure delivery of notice of forfeiture to his cell and noting that “ourcases have never required actual notice”). AFFIRMED.