MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Delmas Sexton, II

New Castle Correctional Facility

New Castle, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Delmas Sexton, II,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Keith A. Barand, Brian T. 

Taylor, and Ryan A. Masoner,

Appellee-Defendants

February 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

38A04-1504-CT-145

Appeal from the Jay Superior 

Court

The Honorable Terry C. 

Shewmaker, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

38D01-1007-CT-6

Crone, Judge.

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Case Summary

[1] Delmas Sexton, II, was convicted of felony murder in 2011 and is now serving 

a sixty-five-year sentence for that crime. He has been jailed since at least 2009 

and, during that time, he has filed numerous unrelated civil causes of action 

against various defendants, and several appeals of the lower court decisions in 

those cases. The current appeal involves a defamation claim filed by Sexton in 

July 2010. Specifically, he is now appealing the trial court’s order denying his 

repetitive motion for change of judge, as well as his motion for relief from 

judgment, motion for evidentiary hearing, and numerous other motions. 

Concluding that he has waived our review of his claimed errors, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Discussion and Decision

[2] We begin by noting that Sexton proceeds in this appeal pro se. A pro se litigant 

is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent 

leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 

N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se 

is that he will not know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would 

know how to accomplish. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009), trans. denied. Because the same standards apply to pro se appellants 

as to others, any alleged errors are waived if applicable rules are not complied 

with. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 496 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

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[3] Although failure to comply with the appellate rules does not necessarily result 

in waiver of the issues presented, it is appropriate where, as here, such 

noncompliance impedes our review. See In re Moeder, 27 N.E.3d 1089, 1097 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. First, Indiana Appellate Rule 43(C) states 

that an appellate brief “shall be produced in a neat and legible manner using 

black print” and “may be copied by any copying process that produces a 

distinct black image on white paper.” The handwritten text in Sexton's thirtypage appellate brief is virtually illegible, and the copying process he used 

produced indistinct images. Consequently, there are countless words and 

sentences that we are unable to decipher or understand. 

[4] Additionally, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) requires that contentions in an 

appellant's briefs be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authorities, 

statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal. Sexton’s brief is 

replete with bald statements and assertions unsupported by cogent argument or 

citation to relevant authority. Sexton repeatedly directs us to items that were 

not properly submitted to this Court and therefore are not part of the record on 

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appeal.1

 Moreover, his mere citation to authority in support of an argument is 

insufficient because it is not also supported by cogent reasoning. Sexton’s 

reasoning, as far as we can discern from his illegible brief, is illogical. Failure to 

provide cogent argument has resulted in waiver of Sexton’s claims on appeal. 

See, e.g., Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d 468, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. 

[5] Affirmed. 

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

1 From what we are able to decipher, the crux of Sexton’s primary claim is that he is entitled to a change of 

judge because he has proof that the trial judge is biased against him, but the trial judge used “his power as a 

judge to strike legitimate and admissible evidence” of that bias. Appellant’s Br. at 14. This so-called 

legitimate and admissible evidence consists of copies of various affidavits containing what the trial court 

described as “scandalous and indecent allegations” against the trial judge and other court officers. 

Appellant’s App. at 11. The trial court twice instructed Sexton that if he wanted the court to consider any 

affidavits, he needed to file original affidavits with original signatures of the affiants. When Sexton again 

filed copies that merely purported to be originals, the court deemed the affidavits inadmissible. Sexton urges 

that if this Court would just review the trial court clerk’s record, we would determine that the affidavits he 

tendered to the trial court are in fact originals. However, Sexton did not properly request a copy of the clerk’s 

record from the clerk of the Jay Circuit and Superior Courts pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 12(A), and 

our motions panel has denied his repeated requests for this Court to simply “order” transmittal of that record. 

“It is the responsibility of the appellant to present a record which reveals the error complained of.” Garage 

Doors of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Morton, 682 N.E.2d 1296, 1299, n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied (1998).

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