## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Darius L. , 2012 IL App (4th) 120035

Appellate Court Caption I n re : DARIUS L
., a Minor, THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Petit ioner-A

ppellee, v. D ARIUS L ., Respondent-Appe llant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-0035

Argued Filed August 7, 2012 September 12, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Respond en t m inor was entitled to prese ntencing cre dit for the time he spent in his county ’s “t re atment program” for juveniles, since the program constitut ed “custody” withi n the m eaning of t he Unified Code of Corre ctions for sente ncingcre dit purposes.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Adams County
, No. 10-JD-90; the Hon. J ohn C. W ooley

han, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med in pa rt as modified and reve rsed in par t; cause r emande d with direc tions.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pell et i er, Kare n Munoz, and J acque line L

. Bullar d (ar gued), all of State Appe llate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Springf ield, for a ppellant.

J onathan H. Ba

rnar d, Sta t e’ s At torney , of Quincy (Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman, and Anastac ia R. Br ooks (ar gued), all o f State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor’s O ffice , of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE POPE delivered the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices Steigma

nn and Kne cht conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In Novembe r 2 0 1 0
, the Adams County circ uit court adjudicated respondent, Darius L

. (born J uly 6, 1995), a delinquent minor pursuant to the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 I L CS 405/1-1 to 7-1 (West 2010)) when he pleade d guilty to reta il theft (720 I L CS 5/16A-3(a ) (West 2010)), a Class A misdemeanor, a

nd the cour

t sentence d him to a y ear ’s probation, including as a condition his succe ssful co m pletion of the Adams County Detention Center treatment program (Tre atm ent Prog ram). After his rele ase from the Treatment Program, the court revoke d responde nt’s probation twice. In September 2011, the trial court revoke d responden t ’s probation a third time and rese ntence d him to the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice (De partment) for an indeterminate period. The court denied

re s pondent’s reque st for sentenc ing cre dit for time spent in the Treatment Prog ram fr o m November 16, 2010, to Marc h 18, 2011, a total of 123 day s. Additionally
, the court did not

awa rd cre dit for time spent in the Adams County Detention Center (De tention Center) from J uly 12 to J uly

15, 2011. ¶ 2 Respondent appea ls, arg uing the circ uit court err ed when it denied sentenc ing cre dit for time spent in the Trea

tment Prog ram. Specifica lly
, responden t argues (1) the Treatment Prog ram qualifies as “custody” for sentenc ing cre dit pu rp oses; (2) the distinctions from Detention Center

residents–namely

(a) assig nment to a detention ce nter off icer to work on “ar eas of conce rn,” (b) “privileg es” of chore s, (c) supervised outings, and (d) home visits–do not affe ct Tre atment Prog ram re sidents’ custody status; ( 3) the J uvenile Act require s he be

awa rded cre dit for time spent in custody ; and (4) the Treatment Pr o gram is unauthorized “dete ntion” beyond the 30-day limit in the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( v) (West 2010)). ¶ 3 The Stat e re s p o n d s (1 ) respondent’s appea l is moot; (2) responde nt is attempting to ap p ea l h i s underlying probation order ; and (3) responde nt does not show he could be prosec uted for “ esca

pe” f rom the Tre atment Prog ram. ¶ 4 We agree responde nt is entitled to sentenc ing cre dit for ti m e s p en t i n the Tre atment

-2-Prog ram as it is “custody” within the meaning of sec tion 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code of Correc tions (Unified Code) (730 I L CS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2010)) and reve rse and

rema nd with direc tions to acc ord him sentenc e credit for time serve d in the Treatment Prog ram. We conclude we are without jurisdiction to rea ch responde nt’s contention that time

serve d in the Treatment Prog ram is unauthorized “dete ntion.” We aff irm in part as modified,

reve rse in par

t, and re mand with direc tions.

¶ 5 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 6 In September 2010, the State filed a petition fo r ad j udication of war dship pursuant to section 5-105 of the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-105 (West 2 0 1 0 )) against responde nt, alleg ing that on Septe mber 18, 2010, he committed one count of r etail theft (f irst offense ),

a Class A misdemeanor (720 I L CS 5/16A-3(a) (West 2010)), and one count of theft over $300, a C lass 3 felony

(720 I L CS 5/ 16-1(b) (4) ( West 2010)). In October 2010, responde nt admitted reta i l t h ef

t as alleg ed in the S eptember 2010 petition and the State dismiss ed the
count of theft over $300. Acc ording to the fac tual basis, responde nt took a packa g e of stereo

ear buds, valued less than $150, from a Quincy Fa mily Dollar store without p ay i n g. In November 2010, the trial court held the ini t i al s en t en cing hear ing. The State introduced a social investigation re p o rt (S I R ) pursuant to section 5-701 of the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 4 0 5 / 5-701 (West 2010)). The State rec ommended responde nt complete the Treatm en t Prog ram and one y ear of probation. The court sentenc ed responde nt to probation for one y ear

an d
, as a condition of probation, order ed him to succe ssfully complete the Tre at m en t Prog ram. Additi o n al l y , responde nt was order ed to serve 30 day s’ home confine ment afte r rele ase from the Treatment Prog ram and 30 day s’ (stayed) detention in the Detention Center. ¶ 7 The trial court order ed responde nt to complete the Trea tment Prog ram under section 5- 715(2)( e) of the J uven i l e Ac t , which permits the court to order a minor “as a condition of probation *** [t o] attend or reside in a fac ility established for the instruction or residenc e of persons on probation” (705 I L CS 405/ 5-715(2) (e) (West 2010)). ¶ 8 Respondent participated in the Treatm en t P ro gra m for 122 day s from November 16, 2010, to Marc h 18, 2011. At the Fe bruar y 15, 2011, revie w hear ing, Rolli e T homas, responde nt’s probation office r, repor ted responde nt was involved with counseling service s at Recove ry Resource s and mental-he alth counseling at the Treatment Prog ram fac ility

. Acc ording to the rec ord, at some time while at the Treatment Progr am, re spondent ref used
to continue attending substa n c e

- a b u s e tre a tm e nt at Recove ry Resource s. The rec ord indicates responde nt rec eived a home visit on Fe bruar y 26, 2011, Marc h 4, 2011, Marc h 5, 2011, and Marc h 11, 2011. ¶ 9 Acc ording to responde nt’s Treatment Prog ram repor t dated April 14, 2011, his are as of

conce rn wer e identified as “leg al history
, peer /community relations, and school.” Respondent’s g oals wer e identified as (1) lear ning how to pick appropr iate peer g roups; (2) lear ning to respe ct authority figures; and (3) lear ning to set g oals and what i t t akes to

acc omplish them. Fur

ther, the repor

t shows responde nt participated in drug and alcohol education and support g roups provided by Addicts Victorious. ¶ 10 After responde nt was rele ased from the Treatment Prog ram, the State filed supplemental

-3-petitions alleg ing probation violations. In May and J une 2011, the State filed supplemental

petitions alleg ing r espondent violated pr obation terms, and on June 6, 2011, the t rial court modified the probation terms to place r espondent on home c onfinement until further order of t he court. On J une 15, 2011, the S tate filed an amended s up plemental petiti on restating the alleg ations set forth in the ear lier J une petition and alleg ing responde nt violated the J une 6 court orde r. At the June 20, 2011, hear ing on the J une petitions, re spondent admitted the all egations contained in the J une petiti ons. At the J uly 11, 2011, rese ntencing hear ing, the State rec ommended responde nt be rese ntence d to the Depa rtment. Respondent told the court he had a substance- abuse problem. The court amende d responde nt’s probation order to require him to attend substance- ab use treatment at Gatew ay Foundation (Gateway ) in Springf ield, I llinois
, and extended probation until J uly 10, 2012, including as a condition 30 day s’ home confine ment o n c e r e le a s e d f r o m G a te way

. Respondent rema ined in the Detention Center until J uly

15, 2011, when he was tra nsfer red to Gateway

. ¶ 11 In August 2011, the State filed a third amende d supplemental p e ti ti o n a ll e g in g r e s pondent

was unsucc essfully

discharg ed fr om Gatewa y on August 16, 2011, and he f ailed to re main in home confine ment. The same day a hear ing was held on the third amende d petition, a nd responde nt admitted the alleg ations set forth in the petition. In September 2011, a third

rese ntencing hearing was held and the court revoke d responde nt’s probation and rese ntence d him to an indeterminate period of commitment in the Depa rtment. The court awa

rded cre dit for 122 day s serve d. Acc ording to the written judg ment, cre dit wa s awa rded for time spe nt in the Detention Center as follows: September 18, 2010, to November 1 5
, 2 0 10; J une 1, 2011, to J une 6, 2011; J une 17, 2011, to J uly 11, 2011; and August 19, 2011, to September 19, 2011. Respondent reque sted cre dit for 122 day s spent in the Treatment Prog ram from November

17, 2010, to March 18, 2011, but the c ourt denied his re quest. ¶ 12 In October 2011, responde nt filed a motion to rec onsider, arguing the trial court err ed in
not g ranting cre dit for time serve d in the Treatment Prog ram. In J anuar y 2012, the court held

a hear ing on the motion to rec onsider. Respondent ag ain arg ued he should rec eive cre dit for time served dur ing the Treatment Progr am. ¶ 13 In the trial court, the parties stipulated to fac ts reg ard i n g t h e T re at m en t Prog ram a s follows. The Trea

tment Prog ram is a 90-day program wher e the resident “wor ks on are as of

conce rn, such as schooling
, appropr iately interac ting with or responding to authority
, [and] drug use.” Ar ea s o f conce rn are identified through a Youth Assessment and Scree ning Instrument (YASI ) administered by the resident’ s probation office r. The d et en t ion cente r office r who works with the resident doe s not have specia l tr aining for his or her Treatment Prog ram duty

. ¶ 14 T he Treatment Prog ram is housed in the Adams County J uvenile Detenti o n C en t er

. Detention Center residents are juveniles deta i ned awa iting trial or sentenc ing on a delinquency petition or who have been sentenc ed to a period of detention. Treat m ent Prog ram residents are housed toge ther with Detention Center residents. Residents’ ro oms consist of a concr ete slab with a mat, a pillow, and a combined sink and toilet. T re at m en t Prog ram residents attend the same s ch o o l as and dine with Detention Center residents. Treatment Program residents wea r the same uniform as Detenti o n Center residents. All residents pa

rticipate in the same re cre ational ar ea a s one another

. The outdoor rec reational

-4-are a is either walled or fenc ed and the fence is 50 to 75 fee t high and curves i n toward the

rec reational are a. Treatment Prog ram minors are not permitted to walk throug h any door at the Detention Center without permission. The Detention Center is a locked fac ility

. Treatment Progr am minors are locked in their c ells at nig ht. ¶ 15 Treatment Prog ram residents may rema in in the Trea tment Prog ram longe r than 90 day s if the resident fails to make adequate progress. Treatment Program residents are assessed on

a scale of differ ent g rade d levels. Treatment Program residents who “ar e making progress” may leave the Detention Center in the custody of a detention office r as a rew ard. Treatment Prog ram residents may perf orm “privileg es” such as cooking
, washing dishes, and unloading

a truck under the supervision of a detention office r. A Treatment Prog ram resident may also be permitted to visit his home for a few hours with subsequent visits b ei n g i n cr ea sed to overnight visits. Gene rally speaking
, there are no outings or home visits during the first 60 day s in the Trea

tment Program. When a resident r eturns fr om a home visit, he is subjec t to

a strip sear ch, pat-down sear ch, and urinaly sis testing. De t en t i o n Center residents are not permitted these “privileg es.” Treatment Prog ram residents do not h av e re qu ired activities additional to those of Dete ntion Center re sidents. ¶ 16 The trial c ourt denied r espondent’s motion to rec onsider. ¶ 17 This appea l followed.

¶ 18 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 19 A. Mootness ¶ 20 W e fi rs t co n s ider the State’s mootness argument. “An issue on appea l become s moot wher e events occur

ring afte r the filing of the appea l rende r it ‘impossible for the revie wing
court to g rant effe ctual relief to the complaining part y

. ’ ” In re Christ opher K

. , 217 I ll. 2d 348, 358-59, 841 N.E.2d 945, 952 (2005) (quoting People v. Roberson
, 212 I ll. 2d 430, 435, 819 N.E.2d 761, 764 (2004))

. As responde nt solely challeng es his sentenc ing cre dit and has completed his Depa

rtment sentenc e , th is a

ppeal is moot. Gene rally
, this court will not resolve

a m o o t question befor e it solely to establish prec edent or g overn future litigation. In r e Commitment of

Hernande z , 239 I ll. 2d 195, 201, 940 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (2010). This court will addre ss a moot question only if one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies. Id. at 201-02, 940 N.E.2d a t 1086. ¶ 21 Respondent main tain s th e p u

b li c

- in te r e s t e xc ep ti o n a

p p li e s

. T h e public-intere st ex ception require s (1) the exis tence of a question o f p ub l i c i m portanc e; (2) the desirability of an authoritative deter

mination for the purpose of guiding public office rs in the perf ormanc e of their duties; and (3) the likelihood that the question will rec ur. In re J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d 338, 350, 851 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2006). These criter ia m u s t b e clea rly satisfied. Id. The public-intere st exception considers potential rec urre nces to any person, not only the complaining party

. Holly v. M

ontes , 231 I ll. 2d 153, 158, 896 N.E.2d 267, 271 (2008). ¶ 22 In our case , the first element is satisfied as res p o n d ent’s appea l involves a question of available sentenc ing cre dit, undeniably prese nting a question of public importance (see J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 350-51, 851 N.E.2d at 8; In re B.L.S.
, 202 I ll. 2d 510, 519, 782 N.E.2d 217, 223 (2002) ( an inca

rce rate d juvenile’s liberty is restraine d just a s eff

ectively as that of a

n adult

-5-offe nder) ). The third element is also satisfied because this issue is likel y t o rec ur for other

juveniles if Adams County public officia ls believe the Treatment Prog ram does not qualify for se ntencingcre dit. ¶ 23 T h e s ec o nd element, desirability of an authoritative deter mination, is contested by the State. Respondent asser

ts the issue of whether the J uvenile Act require s sentenc ing cre dit for

a p ro gra m like the Trea

tment Prog ram is a matter of first impression and has not bee n addre ssed in a repor

ted I llinois case

. As such, he states Adams County public officia ls “ar e in need of critica l, timely guidance on the limit s” of juvenile incar ce ration. The State disputes responde nt’s claim “about the nece ssity of [an] authoritative resolution for ‘a matter of first impression’ ” beca use there is no conflictingappellate authority on this iss ue. ¶ 24 The State made a substantially simil ar argument about th e re qu i re m ent of conf licting prec edent in the public-intere st exc ep t i o n i n In re Shelby R.
, 2012 I L App (4th) 110191. There
, we found the State’s treatment of Hernande z , 239 I ll. 2d 195, 940 N.E.2d 1082, and Christ opher K.
, 217 I ll. 2 d 3 48, 841 N.E.2d 945, too broad. Fur ther, neither case , nor any

case cited by

the S tate, ex pressly states t he ex istence of conflictingprec edent is a r equire d element of the public-intere st exception. The State’s argument is circ ular and would eff ectively fore close development of the law in case s of short duration but otherwise of important public interest. As a key purpose of t h e p ublic-intere st exception is to provide guidance to public office rs, we c onclude we may do so in this case.

¶ 25 B. Me rits ¶ 26 We next consider responde nt’s arguments the trial court err ed when it denied se ntencing

cre dit for time spent in the Treatment Prog ram. Respondent argues he is entitled to cre dit for 122 day s spent from November 1 7
, 2 010, to Marc h 18, 2011, in the Treatment Prog ram. Addit i o n ally
, responde nt arg ues he is entitled to five day s’ cre dit for time spent in the Detention Center from J uly 11 to J uly 15, 2011, betwee n his J uly 2011 sentenc ing and transfe r to Gatew ay

. (The State conce des responde nt is entitled to four day s’ cre dit from J uly 12 to J uly 15, 2011.) ¶ 27 The State responds this court lacks jurisdiction beca use responde n t i s at t em p t i n g to appea l his November 2010 probation order (orde ring the Treatment Prog ram), which he did
not timely appea l. Additionally
, the State asser ts a nece ssary component of “custody” is the potential to be prosec uted for esca pe (720 I L CS 5/31-6(b) (West 2010)), and section 5-4.5- 100 of the Unified C o d e (730 I L CS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2010)) makes sentenc ing cre dit permissive for time spent in the Treatment Prog ram. We addre ss the parties’ contentions in
turn.

¶ 28 1. Standard of Review ¶ 29 As responde nt’s challeng e require s this court to co n s t ru e t h e l an gu age o f s ev er al
sentenc ing cre dit statutes, our revie w is de novo

. In re Rodney S.
, 402 I ll. App. 3d 272, 285, 932 N.E.2d 588, 600 (2010)

. ¶ 30 The primary objective in construing a statut e i s t o as ce rt ai n an d gi v e eff ect to the

-6-leg islative intent, and the mos t reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary

meaning of the statutory languag e itself. People v. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d 237, 243, 890 N.E.2d 5 1 5
, 5 19 (2008). The statute should be considere d in its entirety in light of the s ub j ec t i t addre sses and the leg islature’s objective i n enac ting it. In re Jerom e S. , 2012 I L App (4th) 100862, ¶ 10, 968 N.E.2d 769. This court wi l l “n o t d epar t from the plain languag e of the
statute by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that con fl i ct with the expressed inten t

. ” P eo

p l e v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 323-24, 864 N.E.2d 196, 204 (2007). Under the doctrine of in pari materia , two or more statutes conce rning the same subject must be construed toge ther to produce a harmonious whole. People v. Rinehart
, 2012 I L 111719, ¶ 26, 962 N.E.2d 444. Any ambiguities in a penal statute are construed in favo r o f t h e

acc used. Jerom e S. , 2012 I LApp (4th) 100862, ¶ 10, 968 N.E.2d 769.

¶ 31 2. State’s Argument Re spondent Is Appealing a Probation Order ¶ 32 W e fi n d u np er s uasive the State’s contention responde nt is attempting to appeal h i s November 20 1 0 p robation order

. Gene rally
, “ ‘ “[w]hen no direc t appea l is taken from an order of probation and the time for appea l has expired, a revie wing court is prec luded from revie wing the propriety of that order in an appea l from a subsequent revoc ation of that probation, unless the underlying judgme nt of conviction is void.” ’ ” People v. Felton
, 385 I ll. App. 3d 802, 804, 896 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (2008) (quoting People v . Gregory , 379 I ll. App. 3d 414, 418, 883 N.E.2d 762, 765-66 (2008), quoting People v. Johnson
, 327 I ll. App. 3d 252, 256, 762 N.E.2d 1 1 8 0
, 1183 (2002))

. When the circ uit court revoke s probation, a

new s en t ence is imposed. Felton
, 385 I ll. App. 3d at 804, 896 N.E.2d at 913. In this case , responde nt i s appealing the court’s September 2011 denial of sentenc ing cre dit on his Depa rtment commitment order

. See In re Gennel l C.
, 2012 I L App (4th) 110021, ¶ 9, 968 N.E.2d 1258 (dispositional orde r in a juvenile delinquenc y

proce edingis a final order). As his appea l from his rese ntencing order was timely filed, we may consider whether responde nt is entitled to sentencingcre dits. ¶ 33 Howeve r, we do not consider whether the Trea tment P ro gra m v i o l at es t h e 30-da y limit ation on detention (705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( v) (West 2010)), a s responde nt did not appea l the November 2010 probation order placing him in the Trea tment Prog ram. As such, responde nt may not use this appea l to mount a collater al attack on his underly ing probation order conditions.

¶ 34 3. The Juve nile Act Sente ncing Credit Requireme nts ¶ 35 Whil e the J uvenile Act express l y ad d re s s es s entenc ing cre dit for juveniles place d in detention (705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( v), (1)(b) (West 2010)), the supreme court has applied the broade r adult senten ci n g cre dit require ments of section 5-8-7(b), now section 5-4.5- 100(b), of the Unified Code to juveniles ( J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 352, 851 N.E.2d at 9). A juvenile who is c ommitt ed to the Depa rtment for an indeterminate term is e ntitled to predisposition
sentenc ing cre dit “for any p art of a day for which he spent some time in custody .” In re Rakim V.
, 398 I ll. App. 3d 1057, 1059, 925 N.E.2d 339, 341 (2010); J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 353, 851 N.E.2d at 9-10; see also Jabari C.
, 2011 I L Ap p (4th) 100295, ¶ 35, 962 N.E.2d 8

-7-(juvenile entitled to sentenc in g cr ed i t fo r day of arr est althoug h not admitted to detention

cente r). As responde nt is entitled to cre dit for any time spent “in custody” as a condition of probation (

People v. Scheib
, 76 I ll. 2d 244, 251, 390 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1979); People v. Dieu
, 298 I ll. App. 3d 245, 250, 698 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1998))
, the fac t the trial court order ed responde nt to complete the Treatment Prog ram as a condition of probation under section 5- 715(2)( e) of the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-715(2)( e) (West 2010)) does not af fec t our analy sis of whether

he is entitled to sentencingcre dit. ¶ 36 Section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code provide s, in pertinent par t: “[An] offe nder shall be g iven cre dit on the deter minate sentenc e or maxi mum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentenc e was imposed ***. Ex cept when prohibited by subsection (d), the trial court may g ive cre dit to the defe ndant for time spent in home detention, or when the defe ndant has been confine d for psychiatric or sub s t ance abuse treatment prior to judgme nt, if the court finds that the detention or confine ment was custodial.” (Emphasis added.) 730 I L CS 5/ 5-4.5-100(b) (West 2010). ¶ 37 Ba sed on prior prec edent and section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified C o d e, we n ee d not deter mine whether the Treatment P rogram qualifies as “detention” for section 5-710(a)( v) of the J uvenile Act as responde nt urg es us. We need only deter mine if this program qualifies as “c ustody” for

sentenc ing c redit purpose s.

¶ 38 a. Custody ¶ 39 The I llinois Supreme Court has defined “cus tody” for purposes of sentenc ing cre dit as “the leg al duty to submit” to leg al authority and not actua l phy sical confine ment. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 252, 890 N.E.2d at 524; Jabari C. , 2011 I LApp (4th) 100295, ¶ ¶ 34-35, 962 N.E.2d 8 (holding juvenile had a “ ‘l egal duty to submit’ to the control of the arr esting office r” and was entitled to sentenc ing cre dit). In Beac hem
, the supreme cou rt held the defe ndant was in cus t ody for prese ntencing cre dit purposes wher e he was assig ned to the Cook County Sheriff’ s Day Reporting Center program. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 239, 253, 890 N.E.2d at 517, 524. The court stated the plain langu age d ef i n i tion of custody is “ver y expansive” and “may encompa ss va rying degree s of state c ontrol.” Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 245, 890 N.E.2d at 520. Finding the sentenc ing cre dit statute ambiguous, the court examined p ri o r cases to conclude it is the “lega l duty to submit” that define s a defenda nt’s custodial
status for cre dit purposes. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 252-5 3
, 8 9 0 N. E .2d at 524. The court noted t he defenda

n t “had a l eg al dut y to submit to [t he sheriff’s] authority at any time and for a ny rea son” as defe ndant had “no right to be in the Program a nd had no re course under the statutes of this state if the she riff de cided to reinc arc erate him, or even to te rminate the

en t i re P ro gram and reinc arc erate all the participa nts.” Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 253, 890 N.E.2d at 524. Fur

ther, the Beac hem court noted even if phy sical confine ment was require d
to constitute custody
, Be ache m was subject to limit ed confine ment beca use (1) service s wer e provided at the discretion of the sheri ff ; (2 ) d efe ndant was not fre e to come and g o as he please d; (3) defe ndant was not fre e to structure his day as he saw fit; (4) defe ndant was obli gated to repor

t at an established time and participate in a state-r un program; and (5)

-8-defe ndant could not decline to attend the program. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 253, 890 N.E.2d

at 524-25. Additionally
, the court found the fac t defe ndant’s failure to repor t to the program could result in an esca

pe prosec ution supported its conclusion. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 254, 890 N.E.2d at 525. The court stated, “ ‘A defe ndant must nece ssarily be in “custody” while participating in these programs if he is to be held acc ountable fo r “e s cape ” for failure to comply with the t erms of the progra ms.’ ” Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 254, 89 0 N.E.2d at 525 (quoting People v . Campa , 217 I ll. 2d 243, 259, 840 N.E.2d 1157, 1168 (2005)).

¶ 40 b. The Tr eatment Program a nd Sentencing

Credit ¶ 41 Participants in the Trea tment Program had a leg al duty to submit to state authority . We t ak e j u d icial notice of details about the Treatment Prog ram as set forth in the compani o n

case , In re Christ opher P.
, 2012 I L App (4th) 100902. As there
, responde nt had a leg al duty
to submit to state authority while in the Treatment Prog ra m an d was in “custody” for sentenci n g cr edit purposes. Important to our conclusion are the following fac ts: (1) responde nt was court-or dere d to participate in this county -run program; (2) responde nt was held beyond the schedule d 90-day period at the discretion of Detention Center officia ls (not the trial court); (3) responde nt’s fre edom of movement was restric ted by locked external and internal doors throug hout the Detention Center, including lockdown in his cell at night; (4) respondent was subject to the same policies and conditions as Detention Center residents (who are entitled to sentenc ing c redit); and (5) respondent resided in the Detention Center completely integ rate d with Detention Center residents, i.e. , attending school side-by -side with Detention Center residents, eating meals with Detention Center residents, and wea ring the same blue uniforms as Detention Center residents. See also People v. Ramos
, 138 I ll. 2d 152, 159, 561 N.E.2d 643, 647 (1990) (supre me court noting char acte ristics of institutional confine ment include reg imented structure , surveillance
, and lack of privac y ). As Treatment Prog ram residents are either restra ined within the Detention Center while perf orming chore s

or restra ined by a detention office r while on an outing, the fac t Treatment Prog ram residents

rec eive such “privileg es” does not aff ect our an al y sis. Whil e phy sical confine ment is not require d for “custody

” for sentenc ing cred i t purposes, sever al fac ts further support our d eter mination responde nt had a leg al duty to submit to state authority : (1) this p ro gra m i s housed inside the Adams County Detention Center and (2) Treatment Program residents are under the state’s phy sical control. ¶ 42 T h e S t at e ar gu es t h e T re at m en t Prog ram cannot be considere d custody becaus e responde nt fails to show he could be prosec uted for esca pe if he chose to leave the Detention Center. We are not persua ded. The State’s contention “the only officia l co ntrol over responde nt derive d from the probation order require ments for him to reside in and follow all rules” of the Detention Center and as such responde nt might not “be held direc tly responsible for esca pe offe nses” is unpersua sive. I f responde nt failed to complete the Treatment Prog ram

as a term of his probation, he would be in violation of the probation order a nd subject t o a probation revoc ation proce eding under section 5-720 of the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5- 720 (West 2010)). Second, we note the J uvenile Act would permit the trial court to consider

a Trea tment Prog ram resident’ s unauthorized depar ture from the program in modifying the minor’s probation di spo s i t i o n. See 705 I L CS 405/5-710(3) (West 2010) (sentencing order

-9-is subject to modification until final closing o r comm itment to Depa rtment); People v. Taylor
, 221 I ll. 2d 157, 181, 850 N.E.2d 134, 147 (2006) (“Beca u s e t he circ uit court in juvenile proc eeding s maintains jurisdiction unti l the minor turns 21 year s of age
, the court would be fr ee to exercise its discretion in modifying a minor’s term of c ommitm ent, when possible, for any infrac tion involving a minor leaving a detention fac ility wi thout

au t h o rization.”). Third, we find unpersua sive the State’s rea ding of Beac hem for the proposition potential prosec ution for the offe nse of esca pe is a “nec essar

y com p onent” of custody

. In Campa
, 217 I ll. 2d 243, 840 N.E.2d 1157, the case Beac hem quoted in its esca pe discussion, the supreme court deter mined the Cook County Sheriff’ s Day Reporting Center qualified as “custody” for speedy-trial purposes. There
, the supreme court found support for its c onclusion in the fac t the defe ndant could be prosec uted for esca pe if he failed to r eport to the Day Reporting Center. Campa
, 217 I ll. 2d at 255, 840 N.E.2d at 1165. It stated, “Since

esca pe is the unauthorized depar ture from custody [citation]
, a defe ndant cannot esca pe unless he is first in custody .” Campa
, 217 I ll. 2d at 259, 840 N.E.2d at 1168. The court found such additional support in Beac hem as well. Beac hem
, 229 I ll. 2d at 254, 890 N.E.2d at 525. Neither case stated esc ape is a nece ssary component of custody as the State sug g ests. Both

case s found support in th e following logic al syllogism: I f (1) esca pe is the depar

ture from “custody” and (2) one can be prosec uted for esca pe for failure to repor

t to the Day Reporting Center, then (3) require d attendanc e at the Day Reporting Center i s “custody .” Howeve r, assuming arguendo esca

pe is an element of custody
, res pondent could very well be “held direc tly responsible” if he so chose to esca pe or leave the Trea

tment Prog ram. Fur

ther, these direc t repe rcussions support our conclusion responde nt had a “leg al duty to submit” to state authority while at the Treatment Prog ram. In the companion case , In re Christ opher P.
, 2012 I L App (4th) 100902, the responde nt was place d in solitary confine ment for rules infrac tions while he wa s in the Treatment Progr am. ¶ 43 L ast, the State argues if the Treatment Pro gra m i s custodial, then sentenc ing cre dit is permissive under section 5-4.5-100 of the Unified Code. Section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code provides in per

tinent part: “Except when prohibited b y subsection (d), the trial court may give credit to the defe ndant for time spent in home detention, or when the defe ndant has been confine d for psychiatric or substance a b u s e tr ea tment prior to judgme nt, if the court finds that the detention or c onfinement wa s custodial.” (Emphases added.) 730 I L CS 5/ 5-4.5-100(b) (West 2010). The permissive languag e of section 5-4.5-100(b) of the Unified Code ref ers to “psychiatric

or substance abuse treatment.” The tr ial c o u rt invoked section 5-715(2) (e) of the J uvenile Act to authorize responde nt’s place ment in the Treatment P rogram, not section 5 -7 1 5 (2 )(d) of
t he J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-715(2)( d) (W est 2010)), which expressly provides, a s a condition of probation, the juvenile may be require d to underg o medical, psychiatric
, or drug and alcohol addiction treatment. See also 705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( iii), (1)( c) (West 2010) (providing for substance- abuse treatment); 705 I L CS 4 0 5/5-740(1) (West 2010) (naming alternative place ments for delinquent minors). Fr om the rec ord, we kn o w treatment coordinators are not licensed in substance- abuse trea tment, and the Treatment Prog ram is not specific ally desig ned fo r p s y chiatric or substance- abuse treatment but g ener al “ar eas of

-10-conce rn.” Fur ther supporting our conclusion this program is not a substance- abuse treatment program is the fact responde nt was later orde red to complete substance- abuse treatment at Gatew ay

. Whil e labeled a “tre atment program,” this program does not fall within the permissive languag e of se ction 5-4.5-100 of the Unified Code.

¶ 44 C. Validity of Tre atment Prog ram ¶ 45 R es p o ndent urg es us to find the Treatment Prog ram and its 90-day schedule d leng t h
, which was actua lly 122 day s for responde nt, is in confli ct wi t h t he 30-day detention limit ation in the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( v) (West 2010)). Respondent appea rs to asser t we need to find the Treatment Prog ram is “dete ntion” (see 705 I L CS 405/5- 710(1)( a)( v) (West 2010) (“A minor shall not be deprive d of cre dit for ti m e s p ent in d e te nti o n ***.”); 705 I L CS 405/5-105(5) (West 2010) (def inition)) to deter

mine h e is e nti tl e d
to sentenc ing cre dit; but under Rakim V. and Jabari C.
, we need only deter mine whether the Treatment Program is “custody .” Our deter mination responde nt is entitled to sentenc ing

cre dit upon commitment to the Depa rtment does not require us to deter mine whether this 90- day Trea tment Prog ram order does in fac t violate the 30-day limit ation of s ec t i o n 5- 710(1)( a)( v) of the J uvenil e Ac t , as we are not called upon to deter mine whether it is “dete ntion” for pur

poses of the J uvenile Act but me rely “custody .” See Campa , 217 I ll. 2d
at 27 0
, 8 4 0 N. E

. 2 d at 1174 (“A court of revie w ‘also ordinarily will not consider issues wher e they are not essential to the disposi t i o n of the cause or wher e the result will not be aff ecte d reg ardle ss o f h o w t h e issues are decide d.’ ” (quoting Barth v. Reagan
, 139 I ll. 2d 399, 419, 564 N.E.2d 1196, 1 2 0 5 (1990)) ). We conclude we are without jurisdiction to revie w the November 2010 Treatment Prog ram condition of probation on revie w of sentenc e imposed in September 2011 af ter re vocation.

¶ 46 D. Respondent’s Cre dits ¶ 47 Respondent arg ues he is entitle d t o fi v e d ay s’ cre dit for time spent at the Dete ntion Center from J uly 11 to J uly 15, 2011, while he was waiti ng for transfe r to Gatew ay

. The S t at e concedes respondent i s entitled to the day s he remained in detention from J uly 12 to J uly 15, 2011. On J uly 11, 2011 responde nt was transporte d from the Detention Center to the
sentenc ing hearing wher e he was order ed to underg o substance- abuse trea tment at Gatew ay

. He was housed at the Detention Center until a bed beca me available at Gatew ay and he was transfe rre d there on J uly 15, 2011. Respondent rec eived cr ed i t fo r J uly 11, 2011, in the September 2011 order

. We acc ept the State’s conce ssion and awa rd four day s’ cre dit for the period July

12 to J uly

15, 2011. ¶ 48 On the merits of this appea l, responde nt argues he is also entitled to cre dit for time spent in the Trea

tment Program from November 17, 2010, to Ma rch 18, 2011. The rec ord shows responde nt did not rec eive cre dit for November 16, 2010, the day of senten ce. Ordinar ily
, responde nt would not be entitled to sentenc ing cre dit for the day of sentenc ing. See People

v. W illiams
, 239 I ll. 2d 503, 509, 942 N.E

. 2 d 1 257, 1261 (2011) (not entitled to prese ntencing cre dit for the day of sentenc e). Her e, responde nt is entitled to sentenc ing cre dit for the day he was sentenc ed to the Treatment Prog ram as he will not otherwise rec eive cre dit

-11-for that day for his eventua l sentenc e to the Depa rtment. See W

illiams
, 239 I ll. 2d at 509, 942 N.E.2d at 126 1 (d ay i n custody should be counted once “but only once” ). Respondent is entitled to 123 day s’ sentenc ing cre dit for time spent in the Treat m en t P rogram from November 16, 2010, to Marc h 18, 2011, toward his September 2011 commitment order

. The

rec ord shows the court improperly awa rded cre dit for September 19, 2011, th e d ay of responde nt’s commitment to the Depa rtment; he is not entitled to cre dit for this day

. In sum, responde nt is entitled to an additional 126 day s’ cre dit for 123 day s in the Treatment Prog ram, 4 day s in the Detention Center from J uly 12 to J uly 15, 2011, less 1 day cre dit for September 19, 2011.

¶ 49 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 50 For the fore g oing rea sons, we reve rse the denial of sentenc e cre dit, aff irm the re mainder of the judgme nt as mo d i fi ed, and rema nd with direc tions to acc ord responde nt minor an additional 126 day s’ sentenc ing c redit.

¶ 51 Affir

med in part a s modified and re verse d in part; ca use re manded with dire ctions.

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