Air University

John F. Regni, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

Robert J. Elder, Jr., Maj Gen, Commandant

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http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-mxwl.htm
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

USAF Combat

Search and Rescue

Untapped Combat Power

LEE K. DEPALO

Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 35

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2005
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

Expending every effort to recover distressed personnel

from harm’s way is an American tradition and one of the nation’s highest priorities during conflict. The Air Force maintains a fleet of HH-60G helicopters and HC-130P aircraft

along with a contingent of pararescue specialists dedicated

to the recovery of personnel isolated on the battlefield. The

traditional training, organizing, and equipping focus of this

force is the recovery of downed aircrews. This focus stems

from doctrine that draws from lessons learned in past contingencies, particularly the Vietnam War, where the Air Force

experienced a large number of downed aircrew incidents. A

robust capability dedicated exclusively to the combat search

and rescue mission area was essential to ensure every effort was made to safely recover and return our aircrews to

fight again.

While maintaining the capability to recover our aircrews

remains sacrosanct for the Air Force, Colonel dePalo argues

in this study that the capability exists to go beyond dedicating these forces exclusively to the combat search and rescue mission. The United States’ ability to quickly and decisively win a major combat operation creates a situation

where we can expect to operate more often in diverse and

complex nonlinear battlespace, particularly in the long-term

global war on terrorism (GWOT). The changing nature of the

battlespace creates an environment much different from

traditional combat operations where the Air Force’s at-risk

population primarily consisted of combat aircrews. The

study draws from Colonel dePalo’s extensive experience supporting combat rescue operations in the GWOT to demonstrate that the missions flown by USAF combat rescue crews

in the GWOT are far different from the traditional rescue of

aircrews behind enemy lines seen in more conventional conflicts. In fact, he points out that the Air Force assets have

flown missions almost exclusively in support of other components’ requirements since air component downed aircrew incidents are virtually nonexistent. Colonel dePalo

challenges theater planners to reevaluate the effectiveness

of keeping a capable force tied exclusively to a rarely executed mission when their combat power could be used to

iii
support other joint force commander objectives in addition

to providing combat rescue support.

Colonel dePalo believes that better application of the doctrinal tenets of airpower is needed for more effective and efficient utilization of USAF combat rescue forces. He uses the

tenets of flexibility, concentration, and persistence to demonstrate that the current force can transform to more effectively support the global war on terrorism and adapt to new

roles and missions leading to a more agile, multifaceted

personnel-recovery capability worldwide. This force can

ably support USAF combat search and rescue requirements

while also supporting broader personnel-recovery requirements for both the military and civilians. The potential exists

to expand even beyond personnel recovery to support other

missions such as the infiltration and exfiltration of battlefield Airmen. He argues that it is important to define the force

as a war-fighting capability instead of as an executable

function. Better integration of the force into strategic planning will facilitate matching this capability to desired effects,

leading to a force able to execute a broad range of missions

in varying environments.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses. 

iv

ROBERT J. ELDER, JR.

Major General, USAF 

Commandant, Air War College
About the Author

Col Lee dePalo is currently assigned as director, Executive Review Secretariat, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC, responsible for the planning, administration,

and execution of Chief of Staff of the Air Force conferences

and the administration of the Air Force Council process.

He has served as commander of the 41st Rescue

Squadron, Moody AFB, Georgia, and operations officer of

the 66th Rescue Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada. He completed other flying tours at Hurlburt Field, Florida; Naval

Air Station (NAS), Keflavik, Iceland; Patrick AFB, Florida;

and Fort Rucker, Alabama; and served a staff tour as chief,

Southwest Asia Branch, and the commander’s personnel recovery action officer at Headquarters US Special Operations

Command, MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a command pilot with

more than 3,500 hours in the MH/HH-60G, CH/HH-3E,

UH-1H, and TH-55 helicopters and has flown multiple combat tours of duty in support of Operations Provide Comfort,

Northern Watch, Enduring Freedom, Uphold Democracy,

and Iraqi Freedom.

Colonel dePalo is a graduate with academic distinction

of the Air War College, Class of 2005. He graduated from the

Air Force Academy in 1986. He is a distinguished graduate

of the Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; a

graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Armed Forces

Staff College, NAS Norfolk, Virginia; and holds a master of

strategic studies degree from Air War College and a master

of science degree in management from Webster University,

Missouri.

v
Introduction

In the early morning hours of 20 April 2004, the 64th

Expeditionary Rescue Squadron (ERQS), operating from a

base inside Iraq, launched two HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters to rescue the five-man crew of a US Army CH-47

Chinook helicopter reported shot down in the vicinity of

Baqubah, Iraq. The mission went smoothly, with the combat search and rescue (CSAR) crew members and pararescue specialists (“PJs,” formerly pararescue jumpers) conducting the operation exactly as they had trained. This

CSAR mission was the second successful recovery of a Chinook crew in four days and the unit’s 11th combat mission

since arriving in early December 2003 to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).1 While this was not the most harrowing mission the unit executed, it was still very significant since it was the unit’s last combat mission tasking for

the next eight months. These low-density/high-demand

(LD/HD) forces, whose members had rotated in support of

the global war on terrorism (GWOT) continuously since the

GWOT began, spent more than 200 straight days after executing the above mission without performing any missions

other than training in the Iraqi theater.

Many of these same individuals faced a similar situation

when operating from Uzbekistan as part of the 46th ERQS

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2002

and 2003. During this timeframe, the 46th ERQS launched

only four missions in 16 months. All four occurred within

the first four months in-theater, with the unit continuing

its deployment for the next year without a combat mission

tasking. The OIF and OEF situations highlight the need to

reexamine the application of air and space doctrine to the

CSAR mission area to determine if there are more effective

means for utilizing CSAR forces in current and future contingency operations. They also demonstrate a need to review how effectively CSAR employment is integrated into

the broader strategies used to achieve air component and

theater campaign objectives. 

The tremendous capabilities these forces possess are

currently underutilized by theater planners because the

potential goes unrecognized to expand beyond the traditional, Cold War–era concept of maintaining a dedicated

1
CSAR capability focused exclusively on rescuing downed aircrews. The USAF needs to expand the role of CSAR forces

to take advantage of their unique capabilities in the new

global battlespace that emerged in the GWOT.

This paper provides background information on how

CSAR forces are currently utilized in the GWOT and highlights the need for better application of three doctrinal air

and space power tenets, leading to more effective and efficient utilization of the force. It concludes with recommendations on how to better employ these forces to support a

broader range of mission areas in this new era that requires

rapid response to unexpected threats and crises both at

home and abroad. USAF CSAR can be a more agile, multifaceted asset, able to rapidly respond to unexpected or

emerging crises across the spectrum of conflict.

Background Information

The brave men and women who serve today, whether in

Afghanistan, northern Iraq, or other theaters for the war on

terrorism, can do so with the full confidence that if they are

captured, become missing, or fall in battle, this nation will spare

no effort to bring them home. This is our solemn pledge; however long it takes, whatever it takes, whatever the cost.

—Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 2004

The USAF CSAR Force and Its Doctrinal Focus

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, dated 1 June 2005, defines CSAR as the

Air Force’s preferred mechanism for personnel recovery execution in uncertain or hostile environments and denied

areas.2 The USAF is the only service to train, organize, and

equip forces solely to carry out this specific task. According to joint doctrine, each service and the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are responsible for performing

CSAR in support of their own operations, consistent with

assigned functions.3 Joint doctrine assigns each service responsibility for its own CSAR because it is not feasible for

any one service to field the force structure necessary to

routinely conduct CSAR in support of another component’s

operations. However, this doctrine leads to a situation where

2 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
the CSAR capabilities that reside in each service vary widely,

ranging from a very limited capability in the US Army to a

robust, dedicated capability in the US Air Force. The assets

in every service except the USAF are multifaceted and often

tasked with additional or separate missions altogether while

deployed.

Three weapon systems encompass the dedicated CSAR

capability in the USAF. The rotary-wing capability consists

of HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters capable of air refueling

and flight in a wide variety of environments, day or night. The

fixed-wing capability consists of HC-130P aircraft capable of

refueling the helicopters and conducting airdrops of people

and equipment in support of a CSAR. The final dedicated

capability consists of highly trained and equipped individuals known as PJs, or pararescue specialists, and led

by combat rescue officers (CRO) that specialize in the recovery and medical treatment of distressed personnel. The

PJs are capable of operating from fixed- or rotary-wing assets

and serve as the vital link between the isolated personnel

and the rescue platforms.4 They can also operate independently from the aircraft for extended periods of time if

necessary. There are many other assets that contribute to

the CSAR mission, such as fighter aircraft employed in

rescue escort or on-scene commander roles, but they are

not dedicated assets and will not be addressed as part of

this paper.

On 1 October 2003 the CONUS-based Air Force CSAR

capability moved from Air Combat Command (ACC) to the

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). CSAR is

a total force capability, with 42 percent of the total CSAR

manpower located in the Air National Guard (ANG) and reserves.5 CSAR in AFSOC consists of one active duty rescue

wing, two ANG rescue wings, and one Air Force Reserve rescue wing. These wings have squadrons based at seven

CONUS locations.6 Additional CSAR units fall under the Pacific Air Forces and US Air Forces in Europe, with squadrons

based in Okinawa, Alaska, and Iceland. Although the overseas units reside under different major commands, AFSOC

is the lead command for all “AF related CSAR issues, HH60, HC-130, CRO, PJ and Rescue Coordination Centers

(RCC).”7

DEPALO 3
Due to the nature of past conflicts, doctrine dictates that

CSAR forces concentrate on training, organizing, and equipping to recover downed aircrews. Before its June 2005 revision, AFDD 2-1.6 stated, “Downed aircrew are the most

likely personnel to require a US Air Force CSAR effort during military operations; therefore, Air Force CSAR doctrine

focuses on this type of operation.”8 This focus stems from

the traditional, linear battlefield with a defined forward

edge of the battle area (FEBA) or forward line of own troops

(FLOT), where those operating beyond the FEBA or the

FLOT were considered at high risk of capture. A high number of combat sorties against an enemy with adequate air

defenses creates a situation where combat aircraft are at

risk of being shot down. Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1300.21, Code of Conduct Training and Education, dated 8 January 2001, highlights those most at risk

on a linear battlefield. “During war and operations other than

war, personnel operating beyond the forward line of troops

(e.g., all aviators, Special Operations Forces, long-range reconnaissance patrol members) are clearly in more danger

than others of becoming prisoners of war.”9 The tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by CSAR forces

today are based on recovering downed aircrews in this type

of environment because it was considered the most likely

environment in which they would operate. However, the

GWOT appears to have changed the nature of the battlefield for all of the DOD.

The GWOT ushered in an era of warfare where combatants and support personnel are not easily distinguishable

from each other and often face the same risks and combat

environments. There is rarely a defining line like a FEBA

or a FLOT beyond which the designated combatants fight

while support personnel remain safely in the rear. If there

is a FEBA or a FLOT, it will likely exist only for a short period

of time during decisive combat operations and will quickly

disappear as forces transition from major combat operations to security and stability operations. The nature of the

threat itself is changing due to the overwhelming combat

power possessed by the United States. According to the

National Military Strategy, “Adversaries threaten the US

throughout a complex, distributed battlespace where military operations may be dramatically different than the

4 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
high intensity combat missions for which US forces routinely train.”10 The likelihood of conducting the majority of

a contingency operation in nonlinear battlespace against

asymmetric threats increases the number of US military

and civilian personnel that are susceptible to hostilities

and the possibility of capture. This was seen most recently

in OIF, even during major combat operations. Of the eight

POWs captured in OIF, only two were aviators (both Army),

while the rest were members of an Army maintenance company operating well into enemy territory to get supplies and

equipment to frontline troops.11 In the current phase of OIF,

American military members taken hostage in Iraq consisted of two Army privates from a transportation company

taken hostage after their convoy was attacked.12 Insurgents in Iraq also captured a number of civilians from various nations. The changing nature of the battlespace in the

GWOT creates an environment where moderate to high

risk of capture applies to a larger, more diverse population. 

While the at risk population increased in the GWOT, the

nature of the enemy and the battlespace from which he

operates also grew more diverse and complex. The National

Military Strategy states, “Adversaries capable of threatening

the United States, its allies, and its interests range from

states to non-state organizations to individuals.”13 The Joint

Personnel Recovery Agency’s Personnel Recovery Modernization Strategy further breaks down the battlespace by stating,

“The global strategic environment presents the US with a

diverse assortment of complex security challenges that includes rogue states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational criminal enterprises, and

ethnic and religious terrorist organizations. . . . US national interests, influenced by these threats, drive a broad

spectrum of ongoing missions for US forces from combat

operations to stability and support, humanitarian, and

homeland security efforts.”14 In this operating environment,

the likelihood of aircrews or other traditional high-risk-ofcapture personnel becoming isolated will vary along with

the nature of the battlespace.

The Personnel Recovery Modernization Strategy defines

isolated personnel as “any individual who has become isolated in a hostile or uncertain environment and is, or may

be, in need of support and assistance to return to friendly

DEPALO 5
control.”15 The traditional CSAR focus was on recovering

aircrews isolated behind enemy lines, denying the enemy a

potential source of intelligence, and preventing the exploitation of captured personnel in propaganda programs designed

to influence our national interests and military strategy—

all to maintain morale and the national will.16 While these

objectives remain vital, the nature of the battlespace must

be closely examined to determine the true at risk population. In the GWOT, the quick shift from decisive combat

operations in linear battlespace to transition operations in

nonlinear battlespace appears to have reduced the likelihood of CFACC (combined force air component commander)

aircrews becoming isolated. The ubiquitous presence of

friendly air and ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan since

the end of major combat operations resulted in the immediate recovery of all aircrews downed through December

2004. There are no occurrences to date of CFACC isolated

aircrew incidents since the end of major combat operations

in OIF and OEF, so all downed-aircrew incidents were from

other components. The type of missions flown and personnel rescued so far in the GWOT by USAF CSAR assets is

much different than the traditional downed aircrews that

Air Force doctrine considers most likely to require CSAR

effort.

The Road to Combat Operations in the Global War

on Terrorism

The road to successful combat recoveries executed in

the GWOT was a difficult one for USAF CSAR. Combat

search and rescue capability atrophied following the Vietnam War and remained stagnant until a slow buildup in

capability started following the USAF CSAR’s no-show in

Desert Storm and their move from Air Mobility Command

to Air Combat Command. Despite improvements to combat

capabilities, USAF CSAR remained an afterthought and was

noticeably absent in almost every contingency operation

that preceded the GWOT. Special operations forces (SOF)

filled the perceived capability gap and conducted all of the

actual CSAR missions during this period except for the

rescue of Capt Scott O’Grady, which was conducted by the

Marine Corps. USAF CSAR gained some theater experience

6 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
supporting no-fly-zone operations in Operations Northern

and Southern Watch, but these assets were not exposed to

actual combat during their tenure. USAF CSAR also was

tasked to support Operation Allied Force, but the orders

came late and the war ended before these assets were fully

employed. It became almost routine prior to the GWOT

that CSAR was either not deployed or deployed too late to

have an impact. The need for SOF, particularly AFSOC assets, to fill in was one of the driving factors of the move from

ACC to AFSOC.17 Another principle driver was the “synergy”

gained by placing assets with similar capabilities under a

command “that will look for ways to get US-based rescue

forces to combat faster.”18 However, even before the move

to AFSOC, the GWOT ushered in a new era for USAF CSAR

due to the nature of the conflict and the combat missions

executed by CSAR forces.

Although the CSAR assets arrived over a month after combat operations began in OEF, they performed admirably,

conducting daring recovery missions. Air Force CSAR forces

demonstrated an ability to go beyond the traditional—and

now infrequent—CSAR missions in support of downed aircrews to broader personnel-recovery (PR) operations. PR is

an “aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain

release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile

environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated.”19 It is an umbrella term that

encompasses CSAR as well as a wide variety of other means

“focused on the task of recovering captured, missing or isolated personnel from harm’s way.”20 From the beginning of

the OEF deployments, issues surfaced over how to best

utilize these assets. The deployed expeditionary squadrons

pushed hard to do more and conduct missions in support of

other components’ operations, but there was continuous resistance from higher headquarters to go beyond sitting CSAR

alert. Missions that could potentially impact CSAR response

to a CFACC downed-aircrew incident were routinely denied,

even when the mission was in support of the theater’s main

effort. Despite the differing views on CSAR utilization, the

CSAR force responded well whenever tasked. After decades

without taking part in actual combat operations, USAF CSAR

was finally given the opportunity to demonstrate a myriad of

DEPALO 7
unique capabilities to recover personnel under demanding

and often dangerous circumstances. 

CSAR Support to

the Global War on Terrorism

To assess how effectively USAF CSAR forces are being

utilized in the GWOT, it is beneficial to examine their experiences to date. USAF CSAR forces conducted recoveries

under fire in OEF for the first time since the Vietnam War

and ably applied lessons learned in OEF to OIF. 

Some trends emerge when reviewing USAF CSAR’s participation in the GWOT that indicate a need to examine the

effectiveness of current utilization of the force and evaluate additional contributions it could make in support of

CFACC or JFC objectives. 

Operation Enduring Freedom

On 2 March 2002, members of the 66th ERQS were called

into action in support of Operation Anaconda, a large offensive targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda strongholds in the

Shah-e-Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan. The 66th ERQS

members knew very little about Operation Anaconda. The

operation’s planners kept it pretty well compartmentalized

and did not foresee the need for recovery capabilities beyond

those resident within Army and SOCOM aviation. Despite

their having conducted six rescue missions since arriving in

early December 2001, little was understood about the USAF

CSAR capabilities outside of the CSAR community. Consequently, they were not factored into the Anaconda plan. However, on the first night of the operation, the 66th ERQS received an execute order and launched two HH-60G Pave

Hawk helicopters, with a total of eight crew members and

four PJs on board, toward the valley to rescue Army soldiers

critically wounded during a fierce firefight.

Arriving at the designated landing zone, they encountered tremendous resistance from the enemy using rocketpropelled grenades, mortars, and small arms to deter the

rescue. Under heavy fire, the PJs departed the aircraft to

assist the most critically injured and load them on board.

Miraculously, no one was hit, and the two aircraft de8 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
parted for a medical facility at a coalition air base, saving

the lives of nine soldiers. This scene would be repeated the

next night when CSAR forces saved the lives of three more

Army soldiers under heavy fire. The aircrews and PJs from

these missions were awarded a total of two Silver Stars

and 22 Distinguished Flying Crosses for their heroics. The

Anaconda missions were a defining moment for USAF CSAR

because they brought the unique capabilities and skills

these forces possess to the forefront. CSAR became an essential part of operations in OEF, and the lessons learned

in Afghanistan would lead to success during major combat

operations in Iraq.

The initial CSAR deployment in support of OEF began,

just as past contingency operations, with CSAR forces arriving in-theater well after combat operations had begun. Special operations forces filled the gap in CSAR coverage for the

CFACC as in past operations. All three types of dedicated

CSAR assets deployed to support this operation, with the

majority of personnel experiencing combat for the first time.

CSAR forces all started at one location, but eventually grew

in size and shifted operations to three geographically separated locations. With a limited threat to CFACC aircraft, the

exact role these forces would play in support of OEF PR efforts was not entirely clear, particularly when it came to

CSAR in support of other components’ operations.

It took nearly a month and a half after their arrival for

these forces to finally execute a combat recovery mission. On

17 January 2002, an HH-60G picked up an Australian Special Forces soldier with leg injuries from a land mine incident.21 The soldier was brought to the airport at Kandahar,

Afghanistan, transferred to an HC-130P, and transported to

Bahrain for a transload to a C-17.22 The crews and PJs on

board the HH-60G and HC-130P were credited with the first

combat save by USAF CSAR crews since the Vietnam era. 

This mission was the first of many and was indicative of

the type of taskings the CSAR forces would get while supporting OEF. The mission was categorized as a casualty

evacuation (CASEVAC)/medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

These terms are used to “classify missions where there

were no isolated or missing personnel involved, but where

there was some degree of injury that required evacuation

to a medical facility.”23 These missions are not normally

DEPALO 9
considered part of the PR function since they do not involve isolated personnel and do not necessarily require the

unique capabilities possessed by dedicated CSAR assets;

however, the majority of missions that CSAR forces conducted from December 2001 through June 2003 were classified as CASEVAC/MEDEVAC missions. Of the 43 combat

missions flown by the HH-60Gs during this timeframe, 34

were classified as CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, three as SAR, and

only six as CSAR (three of these during Operation Anaconda).24 The changing nature of the battlespace in the

GWOT was a major determinant of this apportionment, since

there were fewer incidents of isolated personnel. Other

trends also emerged for CSAR assets as they remained in

this area of responsibility (AOR).

At the beginning of OEF, CSAR assets were flying nearly

all their missions to rescue members of the coalition, particularly coalition SOF. The first 14 combat missions were in

direct support of injured coalition members. This changed in

May 2002 as the mission taskings shifted toward MEDEVAC

missions flown primarily to recover injured Afghan nationals.

Most of these missions were requested by firebases that

provided initial medical treatment to the Afghans and

made the determination that they required urgent medical

care that the bases could not provide. Twenty-two of the 43

combat missions flown by the HH-60Gs from December

2001 through June 2003 were MEDEVAC missions to recover Afghans.

The US Army maintains assets that train, organize, and

equip for the MEDEVAC mission similar to how the USAF

maintains dedicated CSAR assets. They were in-theater as

part of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 and conducted these same types of missions in parallel to the

CSAR forces, but had certain limitations in range and ability

to operate under low-illumination conditions. Missions involving these circumstances would fall to the CFACC’s

forces after CJTF 180’s analysis revealed that they could

not accomplish the mission. Thirty-two of the 43 previously cited combat missions were flown at night after CJTF

180 requested CFACC assistance.

These trends indicated a different employment of CSAR

forces in support of OEF and the GWOT than the mission

they routinely train, organize, and equip to execute. Their ca10 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
pabilities were well suited, however, for accomplishing missions that other assets were unable to accept. OEF CSAR assets maintained continuous alert in the event of a CFACC

downed-aircrew incident, but were never utilized in this capacity since there were not any missions of this nature. Instead, they were used primarily to conduct the non-PR role

of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC when the dedicated MEDEVAC

assets could not execute the mission. These missions were

primarily at night under low-illumination conditions or in

adverse weather. There were a few cases—such as an 11-

hour mission to rescue three Afghan military force soldiers

injured in a truck rollover—that were not under the conditions listed above but required the long-range capability of

the HH-60Gs to air refuel with the HC-130P. As OEF operations progressed, the majority of the missions were in support of Afghan civilians. CSAR utilization in support of OEF

evolved to primarily MEDEVAC support to CJTF 180 because of periodic requirements for their low-illumination,

adverse-weather, and long-range capabilities. The HH-60G

does not possess a truly unique adverse-weather capability, so the aircrews’ ability to accomplish missions under

adverse-weather conditions is more attributable to their

training and experiences gained in assignments in places

like Iceland and Alaska. The circumstances in Iraqi Freedom were somewhat different, but still led to questions on

whether there was a coherent strategy for utilizing CSAR

forces in the GWOT.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

On 1 April 2003 USAF CSAR forces responsible for the

western sector of Iraq successfully rescued the crew of an

F-14 Tomcat isolated in enemy territory. This was the first

mission flown by CSAR assets in support of CFACC personnel isolated behind enemy lines and remains the only

mission of its type executed by USAF CSAR assets to date. 

There were two phases in OIF for USAF CSAR assets. The

first consisted of major combat operations. CSAR forces focused on recovering isolated personnel due to the linear nature of the battlespace and the high probability of a downed

air component asset beyond the FEBA. USCENTCOM planners put together a robust PR architecture that resulted in

DEPALO 11
tremendous success. Air Force lieutenant general Norton

“Norty” Schwartz told conferees attending the 2004

Worldwide Personnel Recovery Conference that “personnelrecovery specialists set an unprecedented record of accounting for every serviceman and woman at the end of major

combat operations in the spring of 2003 during Operation

Iraqi Freedom.”25 USCENTAF reported 55 PR missions executed and 73 lives saved, all run by the largest JSRC (joint

search and rescue center) in history during this phase of

OIF.26 For the CFACC, lessons learned from OEF were applied to OIF. For the first time since the Vietnam War, USAF

CSAR assets were put in place prior to the start of combat

operations, and they deployed in sufficient numbers to execute multiple PR missions at the same time.

The first phase of OIF ended relatively quickly, and the

USAF sent much of its robust CSAR capability home. What

remained in Iraq was a small contingent of helicopters,

HC-130Ps, and PJs tasked to recover isolated CFACC personnel. The HC-130Ps left OIF after a few months since the

need for air refueling was offset by the large number of forward arming and refueling points. The small force that remained faced a situation similar to that in OEF, where the

nature of their taskings was unclear due to the change to a

nonlinear battlespace. The sizable presence of coalition

soldiers throughout Iraq, combined with a greatly reduced

air defense threat to CFACC assets, decreased the likelihood

of a CFACC PR incident. In addition, the MEDEVAC capability deployed by the US Army was very substantial and spread

throughout the country, leaving virtually no area unreachable. Finally, the MEDEVAC assets in OIF did not operate

under the same low-illumination restrictions as in OEF.

These factors combined led to very few mission opportunities

in OIF and zero mission opportunities from April through

October 2004.

The few missions tasked to USAF CSAR after the end of

major combat operations in OIF were all in support of the

ground component, much like OEF. For the most part, the

factors that led to these taskings did not evolve into definable areas as they had in OEF. Adverse weather was the one

element that remained the same. Of the 11 missions flown

from December 2003 to November 2004, four were tasked

due to adverse weather, which grounded the majority of the

12 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
helicopters in the AOR. These missions did not utilize any

unique capability onboard the helicopter. Rather, they depended on the skill and daring of the CSAR aircrews to do

things like descend below a 100-foot cloud deck over a lake

and wire hop to the objective, or fly through a blinding sandstorm at 30 feet above the ground for 20 minutes to reach a

crash site. USAF CSAR forces are often viewed as having an

all-weather capability, which is incorrect but stems from

their success in these demanding environments.

Another unique utilization issue that emerged from OIF

was the use of PJs apart from the aviation assets, which is

an inherent capability for the PJs but is rarely utilized.

Two missions utilized the PJ’s dive training to search for

personnel lost in a river and to recover sensitive items from

the crashed helicopter.27 In another case, the PJs were

tasked with a difficult mission to rescue a soldier injured

by an improvised explosive device and trapped in the

Humvee wreckage. They used their specialized skills and

employed their Rapid Extrication Deployment (REDS) kit

and lifting bags to extricate the soldier from the vehicle.28

The PJs were the capability required for these missions,

not the aircraft. Of the seven missions in OIF that resulted

in lives saved, only two were CSAR missions, both flown in

support of downed CJTF 7 helicopters. The other five were

CASEVAC/MEDEVAC missions.

The end of major combat operations in OIF brought a

change in the nature and type of captivity for coalition personnel. A new, asymmetric threat from insurgents and terrorists emerged, changing the type of captivity from prisoner

of war (POW) to hostage and targeting personnel who were

previously considered to be low risk of capture. The deputy

assistant secretary of defense for POW/Missing Personnel

Affairs summarizes this in his speech at the 2004 DOD

Worldwide Personnel Recovery Conference: “The enemy in

today’s battlespace has found new targets. Whereas we

have traditionally been concerned with recovering our uniformed personnel, we are now faced with an environment

where the primary targets are the ‘soft’ targets—the untrained and unprepared civilians—DOD contractors, US

Government civilians, journalists, humanitarian workers,

and others that are so unprepared for isolation.”29 The

population vulnerable to captivity in this type of battleDEPALO 13
space increases tremendously, but the chances of isolated

CFACC personnel decreases. There is little USAF CSAR can

do in this environment to recover individuals before they are

taken hostage since they are taken without warning.

This new OIF battlespace, along with the robust in-theater

MEDEVAC capability, resulted in very few mission taskings for CSAR assets in that theater. When a force operates

for more than 200 days in a combat zone without getting

tasked, it is necessary to reexamine its role in the operation to determine if a requirement still exists for its capability and to evaluate its capacity to conduct alternative

missions. How USAF CSAR forces are utilized in the current GWOT operations and in future contingency operations is critical to making the best use of these LD/HD assets in this long-term war. Next is the analysis of three

tenets of air and space power that will lead to more effective and efficient utilization of these forces.

Tenets for Effective Utilization of CSAR

in the Global War on Terrorism

“Military Effectiveness is the process by which armed

forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective

military is one that derives maximum combat power from

the resources physically and politically available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of efficiency.”30 This definition of military effectiveness provides a good perspective

for the utilization of USAF CSAR assets in combat, particularly combat operations in support of the GWOT.

The current doctrinal emphasis on utilizing these forces

to recover downed aircrews in isolated territory does not

maximize the combat power of these unique resources.

The PR events in the current and future GWOT will involve

very few downed aircrews due to the change in the nature

of the threat from a nation-state’s military to “adversaries

that are decentralized, autonomous and capable of conducting independent operations and swarming on targets

of opportunity.”31 The battlespace has changed, so the doctrinal precepts upon which CSAR utilization is based must

change with it. All of the tenets of air and space power

apply, but the three tenets outlined below are key to pro14 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
viding a basis for more effective utilization of these forces

to maximize their combat power.

Flexibility

For many people, the word “rescue” conjures up the image of

a helicopter hoisting a fighter pilot from the jungles of Southeast Asia. While that era is largely gone, the personnel-recovery community has yet to mature beyond that heroic legacy. 

—Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, 2004

Through December 2004, USAF CSAR executed seven

combat missions in the GWOT to recover downed aircrews,

with only two of these crews under the operational control

of the CFACC. The remaining aircrew missions were executed for downed US Army helicopters in OIF and OEF,

and for a C-130 crew from the special operations component operating in Afghanistan. The fact that these missions

represented a very small number of the total missions flown,

and only one was a traditional CSAR for aircrews behind

enemy lines, does not mean that the capability to recover

downed aircrews should disappear. On the contrary, it is

still critical that our downed aircrews are quickly recovered

and returned to friendly control. However, the limited number of missions—particularly in direct support of the

CFACC assets that CSAR forces train, organize, and equip to

recover—indicates that the capacity exists for CSAR forces

to go beyond the traditional, narrowly focused CSAR mission scope in current and future contingency operations.

“Flexibility allows air and space operations to shift from

one campaign objective to another, quickly and decisively.”32

Current utilization of CSAR forces in the GWOT does not

abide by the flexibility tenet of air and space power. These

forces remain on a continuous, short-notice alert posture

to recover isolated CFACC aircrews, but are very unlikely

to get tasked to conduct this mission on a nonlinear battlefield against an asymmetric threat. The narrow mission

scope leaves highly trained combat forces with sophisticated equipment sitting in-theater with few combat taskings. This limited activity signifies that the potential exists

to employ USAF CSAR more efficiently by expanding the

scope and looking for untapped roles and missions, turning

DEPALO 15
a limited, rarely used capability into a full-spectrum combat force.33

Gen George Kenney once said, “It really is remarkable

what you can do with an airplane if you really try; anytime

I can’t think of something screwy enough, I have a flock of

people out here to help me. . . . We carry troops, feed them,

supply them with ammunition, artillery, clothes, shoes,

and evacuate the wounded.”34 General Kenney’s flexibility

with his airpower in the Pacific theater during World War

II provided General MacArthur the support he needed in

his drive toward victory over Japan. Utilizing CSAR forces

more flexibly will enable more effective employment of their

combat power. 

One measure for increasing flexibility is to expand the

mission envelope for USAF CSAR from the more narrowly

focused CSAR to the broader based mission of personnel

recovery. This broader focus will increase the spectrum of

operations, since PR is conducted for any type of isolated,

captured, or missing personnel to include coalition and interagency personnel. It also provides opportunities for CSAR

to support other subsets of the personnel-recovery umbrella such as nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR).

Nonconventional means of recovery utilize trained recovery

teams or preestablished recovery mechanisms to return

isolated personnel to friendly control. The more extensive

PR mission provides planners greater latitude in employing

CSAR assets and gives them the ability to direct these assets toward areas most likely to experience a PR event,

particularly if forces in this area do not have imbedded PR

capability.

During the first year of contingency operations in OEF,

USAF CSAR capability was requested numerous times to

accompany Army aviation assets conducting large-scale

air-assault operations in Afghanistan, but the requests

were routinely turned down at the air component level because they did not want to shift focus away from a potential, although unlikely, CFACC downed-aircrew event. The

fallacy in this situation was the notion that USAF CSAR

had to remain static to react to a CSAR event, when the

forces could easily redirect inflight or from a forwardstaged posture toward an incident occurring away from the

air assault. A mission change from CSAR to PR increases

16 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
flexibility by enabling CSAR assets to focus on personnel

that face the highest risk of isolation or incident, while

continuing to maintain the capability to redirect toward a

CFACC downed-aircrew incident. The broader mission

scope provides the joint force commander (JFC) an increased capability and greater flexibility to meet theater PR

objectives.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in a 2002

speech at the National Defense University said, “An ability

to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment.”35 The ability to adapt quickly to new

challenges is an untapped capability of the USAF’s CSAR

force that can readily increase flexibility. These forces are

capable of executing roles and missions beyond PR when

the requirement for their unique capabilities is limited, as

it is now in OIF. However, CSAR assets are rarely utilized

in other areas since CSAR alert for downed aircrews remains the paramount concern of the air component. Conducting operations beyond PR is possible while still maintaining the PR mission but is best suited to contingency

operations where the risk of an executable (not a hostage

situation) isolated-personnel incident is remote.

CSAR forces in OIF conducted non-PR operations in

support of local base defense after an increase in rocket attacks caused the wing commander to look for other means

to deter the attacks. However, they were never relieved of

their stringent CSAR alert commitments, so they could only

support a limited number of base defense missions. Releasing them from alert commitments by giving this mission

higher priority or loosening the stringent alert requirements would have resulted in more effective support to the

base-defense mission. Organizing, training, and equipping

people and aircraft to launch short-notice to recover isolated personnel threatened by enemy forces requires a

myriad of skill sets that are applicable to mission areas beyond PR. Infiltrating PJs to a downed survivor’s location

and protecting them on the ground translates easily into

roles requiring similar skills but focused on different objectives. These LD/HD assets are normally limited in the

amount of combat power deployed, so it is prudent to not

overextend the force when flexing from CSAR operations to

DEPALO 17
other roles and missions. However, utilizing these forces to

conduct operations beyond CSAR is another method for increasing flexibility. 

The principal purpose of USAF CSAR assets should remain the recovery of isolated personnel, but the mission

scope needs to expand from CSAR for downed aircrews to

PR for personnel at high risk of isolation or a PR incident for

more effective utilization. These assets possess unique capabilities—such as long-range flight with aerial refueling,

scuba- and jump-qualified PJs, and multiple infiltration/

exfiltration means—that could prove useful in other roles

and missions. As long as the LD/HD force is utilized only

when a requirement exists for its unique capabilities, expanding the mission to PR and broadening into other roles

will make the CSAR force more flexible by increasing the opportunities for combatant commands to employ its combat

power.

Concentration

“Airmen must guard against the inadvertent dilution of

air and space power effects resulting from high demand.”36

Increasing the flexibility of the CSAR force could result in

the demand exceeding the available force, resulting in fragmentation of effort; so achieving “concentration of purpose”

is essential, particularly through the principle of economy

of force.37 It is critical to concentrate CSAR assets at the

“right time and right place” when a requirement exists for

their unique capabilities.38 When the risk of an isolated

personnel incident is minimal and another component’s

assets can accomplish the PR mission in their absence,

CSAR forces do not need to deploy, can return home for reconstitution, or can conduct other roles and missions. This

situation exists in OIF today and existed in OEF in the

past.

“Dedicated personnel-recovery forces are stretched supporting ongoing combat operations,” Lt Gen Norty Schwartz

noted in an address to the 2004 DOD Worldwide Personnel

Recovery Conference. “We can’t afford to respond to requirements inefficiently.”39 The GWOT is a long-term conflict that will involve many fronts, so it is essential to look

at how USAF CSAR forces are concentrated in the war. As

18 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
the conflict in Iraq evolved toward security and stability

operations in a nonlinear battlespace, the need for USAF

CSAR’s capabilities decreased, as is evidenced by the lack

of missions for over 200 days. The lack of missions is not

a stand-alone indicator of a lack of requirement for CSAR,

as demonstrated by the years spent on alert in Northern

and Southern Watch without a mission. In those operations, a requirement always existed for CSAR due to the

linear battlespace where friendly aircraft operated beyond

defined enemy lines. However, it is a better indicator in the

nonlinear battlespace against an asymmetric threat. OIF

has evolved into a counterinsurgency operation with more

than 160,000 coalition troops on the ground. The USAF

still has fighter aircraft deployed to support the ground

forces, but maintains complete air supremacy. In the event

that there is an air component downed-aircraft incident,

there is little chance of an isolated-personnel situation due

to the abundance of ground and aviation forces in the

AOR. The ground component assets are more likely to

make the recovery in OIF, even with CSAR in-theater, due

to the ground component’s ubiquitous presence. Out of

approximately 33 downed-aircraft incidents (at least 20 by

enemy fire) between May 2003 and December 2004, USAF

CSAR assets solely executed three of these recovery missions and assisted other components in three others.40 The

remaining recoveries were conducted by the ground or

SOF components. Of the six missions recovering or assisting in the recovery of and/or search for downed crew members, only one required unique capabilities beyond those

possessed by the ground component. That mission involved

a flight of two HH-60Gs flying into a sandstorm at 20 feet

off the ground to recover a five-man crew of an Army CH-47

that crashed due to the adverse weather. The success of

the mission was attributable to the bravery of the highly

trained aircrews more than to any unique equipment on

board the helicopters. The robust presence of the ground

component in Iraq should alleviate the requirement to maintain a USAF CSAR presence in-theater, particularly one focused narrowly on the CSAR mission. Using economy of

force, the USAF can rely on the ground component in the

unlikely event of an air component downed-aircrew event

and reconstitute the force to ensure readiness for concenDEPALO 19
tration in a future contingency with a requirement for

CSAR’s unique capabilities.

Combatant command planners need to also take a look

at PR requirements from a joint perspective. There are

cases in the GWOT where too much force is concentrated

on PR because the PR assets come from different components. Economy of force would free up a portion of this redundant capability, enabling reconstitution or utilization

in other areas. Recently in OEF, there were USAF HC-130

aircraft and PJs on CSAR alert sitting side-by-side with

SOF MC-130E Talon I aircraft, also on alert. One of the

principal roles of both aircraft was to refuel CSAR and SOF

helicopters conducting operations in Afghanistan. Each

weapon system also had other, slightly divergent roles such

as resupply of SOF for the MC-130 and air-dropping PJs

to conduct PR for the HC-130. However, these divergent roles

were within the capabilities of either type of weapon system. A joint perspective employing the principle of economy

of force would require only one of these aircraft types along

with the PJs to conduct missions in support of the air component and the SOF component, freeing up LD/HD assets

to reconstitute or conduct missions elsewhere. This not

only concentrates the right force in the right place, but

also increases flexibility in utilization, making more effective and efficient use of available assets. Economy of force

when assets with similar capabilities are in the same area

is a more efficient and effective use of LD/HD assets.

To more effectively concentrate CSAR forces in the GWOT,

war fighters need to use a methodology that addresses

whether the unique capabilities these assets possess are

required for that contingency. This puts the focus on the

requirement and desired effects and moves away from the

more service-oriented perspective of maintaining a CSAR

presence solely because air component assets are operating in the AOR. The first criterion to evaluate is the possibility of an isolated personnel event, particularly one behind defined enemy lines. There is no question that a

robust CSAR force focused on its core mission of downed

aircrew recovery was required in the early stages of both

OEF and OIF. Air component assets were vulnerable to

shoot down in enemy territory, and dedicated CSAR capability was necessary to get them out of harm’s way. CSAR

20 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
assets were also used beyond their scope to conduct PR

missions for in extremis exfiltrations of SOF, which took

advantage of the rapid-response capability of the CSAR

force. As major combat operations ended and ground

forces were present throughout the AOR, new criteria were

needed to determine whether USAF CSAR assets were still

required.

The second criterion to evaluate is whether the PR requirement in-theater exceeds the capabilities of the other

components. Two specific areas to examine are the environment and the threat. Environmental conditions can

drive the requirement for USAF CSAR’s unique capabilities

when the other components’ assets fall short in capability.

While the mission in OEF has evolved from PR to MEDEVAC, it is difficult to redeploy the CSAR assets in-theater

because they have capabilities not matched by the ground

component’s assets. There are parts of the country that the

Army cannot reach with its non-aerial-refuelable helicopters, while the USAF can reach these areas via helicopter or by air-dropping PJs on site. The ground component

has also restricted its MEDEVAC helicopters from operating under low-illumination periods, which creates a void

that is currently filled by the USAF. Until planners decide

to turn to other capable assets like SOF helicopters or the

ground component improves its low-illumination operating

capability, environmental conditions drive a requirement

for a USAF CSAR presence in OEF. This contrasts with OIF

where there are no unique environmental conditions that

impel a requirement for a USAF CSAR capability.

War fighters must also evaluate the threat conditions to

determine if they create a requirement for USAF CSAR,

particularly a requirement to penetrate deep battlespace to

recover isolated personnel. If there are operating areas that

exceed the threat threshold of the other components’ PR

assets but are still within the threat threshold of the

USAF’s CSAR assets, then a requirement exists to maintain the CSAR in the AOR until the threat situation is mitigated enough for the other assets to operate. This is not

the case in either OIF or OEF, but is an area for evaluation

in future GWOT contingencies.

The August 2004 USSOCOM Commander’s Intent

newsletter states, “We cannot afford for all of our units to

DEPALO 21
be worn out in rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq.”41 SOCOM

recognizes the long-term nature of the GWOT and the need

to concentrate force “in exactly the right place at the right

time facing the right adversary.”42 War fighters must view

the LD/HD CSAR assets in the same light and concentrate

them in the locations where and when their capabilities

are required. USAF CSAR is more effectively utilized by

employing when there is a linear battlefield with a chance of

isolated personnel behind enemy lines or when the PR requirement exceeds the capability of the other components’

assets. Using these criteria today, USAF CSAR would continue to operate in OEF until the Army improves its capability, but could draw down operations in OIF. This would

reduce the current helicopter commitment by 50 percent

and the PJ commitment by about 25 percent, enabling the

forces to reconstitute for the next battle. With proper

preparation, this force can rapidly deploy back to theater

should the situation change and the requirement for the

USAF CSAR capability reemerge.

Persistence

“Air and space power does not have to occupy terrain or

remain constantly in proximity to areas of operation to

bring force upon targets.”43 Throughout DOD, transformation is emphasizing the need to be prepared at home and

rapidly deploy to fight the GWOT. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Pres. George W. Bush said, “We’ll move

some of our troops and capabilities to new locations so they

can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats. We’ll take

advantage of 21st century military technologies to rapidly deploy increased combat power.”44 USAF CSAR assets can better meet the air and space power tenet of persistence by

being more rapidly deployable and self-sufficient upon arrival.

Since the Vietnam War—with the exception of OIF—dedicated CSAR assets have not arrived until after the beginning of the contingency or were not deployed at all. An existing presence, lead time, and lessons learned from OEF

enabled planners to put a robust CSAR force in place prior

to the start of the war in Iraq. However, the USAF’s CSAR

force still operates on cumbersome timelines that do not

22 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
match the rapid mobility requirements of other forces like

SOF. Air Force CSAR can offer combatant commanders a

more effective and persistent CSAR capability by transitioning to a force capable of rapid, global mobility to unexpected contingencies across the spectrum of conflict at

home or abroad. Offering a rapid response capability that

arrives prior to the fight will help preclude combatant commands from keeping forces deployed “just in case,” as is

the situation in OIF today. 

In his 2002 speech to the National Defense University,

Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “The future will require us to

think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances.”45 This is the type of force USAF

CSAR must transition toward to match the rapid movements of other forces and provide persistent PR capability

to the combatant commands. 

Work at the tactical (squadron) level on a CSAR rapid response concept known as Lightning Bolt was completed in

October 2001, but the concept did not make the leap to the

operational or strategic level. Lightning Bolt is a concept to

rapidly deploy a lean, versatile, agile package that has the capacity to provide support across the spectrum of rescue

operations.46 It reduces the conventional deployment timeline significantly and cuts the airlift requirement by 50 percent. When properly organized, this small package of helicopters, aviators, PJs, and support personnel provides a

combatant command with PR capability within 24 hours of

notification anywhere in the world via one C-5 or two C-17

aircraft. The package provides rotary-wing rescue operations

for 14 days, contingent on resupply requirements as dictated

by operations tempo, and with full unit type code (UTC) augmentation can continue for the duration of any contingency.

While Lightning Bolt is not the answer to every PR requirement, it does provide a rapid-response PR capability to combatant commanders that can position quickly to support

short-duration or emerging operations in the GWOT. This

type of concept needs to be pushed beyond the tactical level

to provide a more persistent PR capability worldwide.

To offer persistence, CSAR forces must also be more

self-sufficient so they can better position themselves intheater. Lightning Bolt provides rapid capability but also

DEPALO 23
requires a source of base operations support (BOS) for basic

requirements like fuel, food, and billets. A BOS provider is

necessary for all but the shortest duration operations, but

improvements in self-sufficiency will enhance the effectiveness of the force. OIF and OEF demonstrated the requirement and the ability for CSAR assets to leap forward to

bare-base locations, placing PR capability closer to the fight.

However, the equipment and manpower in existing UTCs

does not match the type of combat operations USAF CSAR

forces were asked to conduct in the GWOT and will likely

be asked to conduct in the future.47 OEF was particularly

difficult during the initial leap into Afghanistan due to the

Army not understanding their BOS responsibilities and the

lack of suitable organic communication capability to properly command and control combat operations. The situation improved in OIF due to the lessons from OEF as well

as initiatives at the tactical level to acquire equipment

needed in a bare-base environment. However, effective CSAR

capability depends on making this force as self-sufficient

as possible for future operations relying only on BOS from

others, such as fuel, that are well beyond the scope of CSAR

UTCs.

As DOD transforms to a CONUS-based force capable of

rapidly responding to emerging threats worldwide, USAF

CSAR must transform to provide a relevant and persistent

PR capability to combatant commanders. The key components of this persistent capability are rapid deployability

and self-sufficiency. Combined, these components help

create a force more capable of responding quickly to crisis

worldwide. 

Future Utilization in

the War on Terrorism

We need every nickel, we need every innovation, every good

idea to strengthen and transform our military. A new idea

overlooked might well be the next threat overlooked. If we do

not fix what is broken and encourage what is good and what

works, if we do not transform, our enemies will surely find

new ways to attack us. 

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 2004

24 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
Better application of the tenets of air and space power to

USAF CSAR doctrine will help transform the force to more

effectively support the GWOT and adapt to new types of

roles and missions. They will lead to a more agile, multifaceted personnel-recovery capability able to quickly provide combat power worldwide. A more flexible, persistent

force concentrated in the right places at the right time provides a vital capability to combatant commanders. There

are three mission areas for the USAF CSAR forces to focus

their capability for better utilization in the war on terror.

The first is PR in direct support of military operations,

which is the core mission that the CSAR force trains, organizes, and equips to execute. The second is collateral PR

support primarily for nonmilitary people affected by a terrorist incident, a major disaster, or isolated on the battlefield. The third area includes ancillary missions not directly related to PR but where CSAR assets provide a viable

capability to a joint force commander’s air component.

These three mission areas are not necessarily accomplished separately, but can run concurrently, if required. 

Personnel Recovery in Support of Military

Operations

As DOD transforms to deal with the new global security

environment brought on by the end of the Cold War and

the direct threat from terrorists and rogue nations, “The

United States must refine its capabilities from a force designed to fight only high intensity, conventional battles to

a force prepared to face a wide range of future contingencies across the spectrum of conflict.”48 Air Force CSAR

must operate across this same spectrum of conflict to provide robust PR capability in direct support of military personnel. This support ranges from the traditional battlefield

where the main effort is on recovering isolated personnel

behind enemy lines to the more fluid and dynamic nonlinear battlespace with asymmetric threats and a broader

range of personnel at risk of capture. Personnel-recovery

support to military operations is not new for CSAR forces,

but the scope and diverse types of PR operations required in

the GWOT are a change from the traditional downed-aircrew

focus the force maintains. 

DEPALO 25
To better utilize the CSAR force in the future, the USAF

should move away from defining this force in terms of its

executable, narrowly focused mission and move toward incorporating the force into the broader, effects-based strategies employed by the joint force commander’s air component. This starts by recognizing when and where to provide

PR support across the wide range of operations required

from the “1-4-2-1” national defense strategy (NDS).49 “The

‘1-4-2-1’ construct in the NDS directs a force sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions,

and conduct two overlapping swift defeat campaigns, one

of which we must win decisively.”50 The USAF CSAR force

maintains the combat power to provide PR support across

this construct as long as the assets are utilized only when

a requirement exists for their unique PR capabilities. To

properly assess when to utilize USAF CSAR, air component

planners need to use defined employment criteria tied into

the broader air component strategy. If a viable requirement

exists, rapidly deploy the force to conduct PR operations

until the criteria for further employment are no longer met.

Personnel recovery in future GWOT operations will likely

go beyond the support that CSAR traditionally provided to

air component downed aircrews. Future operations range

from this traditional role to support for the entire joint

force, to include possible support of the nonconventional

realm of personnel recovery. No matter what the scope of

employment is for the CSAR force, it is imperative that it is

utilized as a capability designed to assist in meeting the

joint force commander’s campaign objectives and not just

put in place so the CSAR block can be checked on a planner’s checklist.

This application of CSAR combat power fits nicely with

the USAF’s vision of global strike (GS) and global persistent attack (GPA). “Through the GS CONOPS [concept of operations], the Air Force projects airpower rapidly and at

great distances, to counter threats designed to deny access

to our joint follow-on forces, while denying the enemy

sanctuary.”51 To meet the demands of the GS concept,

USAF CSAR would rapidly deploy to the AOR ahead of the

initial air strikes and would use capabilities like aerial refueling and shipboard compatibility to ensure the strike

force had proper PR coverage. The CSAR force would operate

26 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
from a safe country or a ship initially, until it was secure

enough to leap forward to a bare-base location in country.

USAF CSAR would provide PR coverage for SOF forces, including battlefield Airmen, and operate behind enemy lines

if requested. 

As operations move from GS to GPA, CSAR would continue with PR coverage until the ground component gained

a good foothold and the likelihood of isolated personnel was

minimal. “GPA provides a spectrum of capabilities from

major combat to peacekeeping and sustainment” so the continued presence of the CSAR is dependent on the requirement for its unique capabilities.52 If there are no unique PR

requirements or requirements to support ancillary missions,

the force redeploys for reconstitution and preparation for

other contingency operations. The support to GS and GPA is

just an example of PR support to the military but demonstrates the need for a persistent capability, able to concentrate when needed and redeploy when the PR requirement

no longer exists. Better integration of CSAR utilization within

strategic planning will facilitate matching capabilities to the

desired effect. The capability to achieve this effect may or

may not include the USAF CSAR force, depending on the

level of combat power required.

Collateral Personnel-Recovery Support

Training, organizing, and equipping to conduct personnel recovery of isolated personnel from enemy territory is a

challenging task, but creates a highly skilled force capable

of conducting operations outside of the traditional PR arena.

Support to civilians is one of these areas where intrinsic

skills are applied outside of the core mission area. There

are many applications of this type of collateral mission, but

three areas where the CSAR force makes a vital contribution

are homeland defense, disaster-relief/humanitarian-relief

operations, and interagency support. All three take on

greater importance in the GWOT.

The same tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized to

execute the rescue of personnel in combat translate well in

support of homeland defense. The use of DOD assets for

domestic incident management (DIM) in “emergency circumstances, such as managing major accidents, terrorist

DEPALO 27
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), natural disasters, enemy attack, or other catastrophes in support of

civil authorities” is one of three areas in which DOD may

be involved in homeland defense according to the Air Force

directive on homeland security.53 This is the area where

USAF CSAR forces can assist the most due to their ability

to medically treat and move injured civilians. It is Air Force

policy to “champion and develop dual-use war-fighting capabilities that enhance homeland security capabilities.”54

With little additional training, USAF CSAR can support

homeland defense by responding with its specialized aircraft and PJs to assist civilian agencies overwhelmed by a

mass casualty event. They can also support homeland defense by responding to an area contaminated by a WMD

incident. The ability to medically treat civilians under this

circumstance is very limited, but crews are trained and

equipped to operate in an NBC environment and can move

injured civilians to a more suitable location for decontamination and treatment.

CSAR forces ready to rapidly respond to contingencies

globally can apply this same response posture to a CONUSbased incident. Units are spread throughout CONUS and

could be provided to the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to support homeland defense. NORTHCOM oversees

standing, subordinate groups such as Joint Task Force

Civil Support, which provides specially trained military forces

to support civilian agencies by responding immediately to

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive

attacks.55 With proper coordination and exercise, USAF

CSAR could fall under this type of JTF in support of homeland defense. The inherent capabilities present in the CSAR

force make it suitable for support to this type of operation.

A persistent CSAR capability with the flexibility to move

outside the mission to recover isolated personnel anywhere

in the world is useful in a disaster-relief/humanitarianrelief operation. This is already considered a collateral mission for CSAR, and assets supported this mission area in

the past by conducting flood-relief missions in Mozambique and, more recently, tsunami-relief efforts in southern Asia. The ability to get supplies to the victims quickly

is a key component of relief efforts. Only the USAF has the

capacity to conduct the massive airlift necessary early in a

28 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
crisis.56 Air Force CSAR can assist this effort by providing

a rapidly deployable capability able to deliver relief supplies to remote areas upon arrival or by providing a recovery capability immediately following a disaster. The Lightning Bolt package is a useful tool for this type of operation

because it puts capability in place quickly with little airlift

cost. The CSAR forces begin operations immediately upon

arrival, providing capabilities that may not be available in

the AOR. The United States will likely get involved in a

number of these types of operations in the future, most of

which will be short-duration contingencies. Air Force CSAR

can provide combatant commanders with a rapidly deployable recovery and resupply capability during the initial

stages of relief operations. As with support to military operations, when the CSAR force’s unique capabilities are no

longer required, it should redeploy to reconstitute for its

core personnel-recovery mission.

An emerging area of interest within DOD is interagency

personnel-recovery support. “With increased requirements

of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance,

counter-narcotics operations, OIF, OEF, and the global war

on terrorism, numerous US military, civilian and contractor personnel have deployed overseas in harm’s way.”57

While the military provides PR support for its forces, there

is no such coverage or guidance for civilians supporting

the same contingency operations. A detailed discussion on

interagency support goes beyond the scope of this paper,

but leveraging CSAR’s capabilities when CSAR assets are

deployed in-theater is one potential means of providing some

PR support for other government agencies. Currently, interagency support is ad hoc at best because, while DOD

maintains a personnel-recovery system designed to locate,

recover, and repatriate its isolated personnel, no such system exists for government civilians and contractor personnel.58 Interagency PR support would require prior coordination with the air component staff and a memorandum of

agreement to provide PR support during an isolated personnel situation. USAF CSAR could support this type of

collateral mission while simultaneously providing its core

PR support to the military. This capability is particularly useful for any interagency aviation assets operating in-theater.

DEPALO 29
Broad-based support on an interagency basis is likely beyond the means of one service, but PR support as a collateral

activity to the principal PR mission is within the capabilities of USAF CSAR forces. This, and the other possible support to civilians mentioned above, is not something CSAR

forces specifically train, organize, and equip for, but the

capability to provide PR support to civilians is imbedded

within their existing capabilities.

Ancillary Missions

A force that is capable of conducting long-range operations utilizing a wide variety of insertion and extraction

methods in a threat environment with little prior notification is a force that possesses tremendous combat power. In

the GWOT, the USAF CSAR force maintains a high personnel tempo, but the force’s combat power is often underutilized. Air component planners need to start thinking

of means to better harness this capability, particularly

when a robust PR requirement does not exist. As Darrel

Whitcomb points out in an Aerospace Power Journal article, “CSARing is war fighting—pure and simple.”59 These

same skills and capabilities that apply to a recovery during

a CSAR can also apply to ancillary missions. USAF forces

were involved, to a limited extent, with air base defense in

OIF and with a recovery operation for sensitive technology

on an unmanned aerial vehicle in OEF, but these were not

preplanned applications of the combat power to support

air component or JFC objectives.

While there are too many ancillary mission possibilities

to discuss in this paper, one area that has tremendous potential for the CSAR force is the infiltration/exfiltration of

battlefield Airmen. The tremendous success of Airmen operating on the ground acting as “human sensors to identify targets, control attacks, and assess results” in OEF

and OIF will undoubtedly lead to further integration between the SOF community, where most of these battlefield

Airmen reside, and the USAF.

60 This integration opens up

an opportunity for USAF CSAR assets to infiltrate and exfiltrate these Airmen behind enemy lines. This mission is

in line with existing CSAR training, which encompasses infiltrating PJs to the isolated personnel location, protecting

30 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
them while they are on the ground, and then exfiltrating

them back to safety. The biggest difference between the two

types of missions is the time allotted for mission planning.

Combat rescues are inherently short-notice operations

with little time for mission analysis, while infils/exfils are

accomplished with a longer planning cycle. The skill set

possessed by the CSAR force translates easily into a capability to support battlefield Airmen.

The battlefield Airmen used in the early stages of a conflict are normally SOFs working under a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The JSOTF possesses its own aviation capability, but USAF CSAR support to this type of

operation provides an opportunity for economy of force, freeing JSOTF assets for other missions. This is particularly

true when the CFACC is the supported commander for an

operation and the JFSOCC is a supporting commander, like

the situation that occurred during the counter-Scud hunt

during major combat operations in OIF.61 The marriage of

SOFs operating principally to support the air component

provides the opportunity for CSAR forces to function as the

infil/exfil/resupply asset for battlefield Airmen without confusing command lines. This is an example of an ancillary

mission that effectively utilizes the CSAR’s combat power

through flexibility and concentration.

The USAF’s dedicated CSAR fleet is a highly trained

force capable of operations ranging from its core mission of

PR for isolated personnel to ancillary missions that effectively take advantage of CSAR’s unique capabilities. A force

trained, organized, and equipped for a mission as demanding as CSAR is a combat resource that provides combatant

commands additional combat power when not needed to

support PR or in addition to their PR requirements. Support to battlefield Airmen is one means of applying CSAR

assets to a non-PR role in the GWOT.

Conclusion

Air Force CSAR assets routinely train in the dangerous

and volatile combat environments that exist in Iraq and

Afghanistan. They train to maintain some semblance of

combat skills, since mission taskings are infrequent. They

DEPALO 31
must stay ready in the combat zone because combat missions normally occur under challenging flying conditions.

Routinely training in a combat zone instead of actively supporting the combatant commander’s objectives is a huge indicator that USAF CSAR forces are not effectively employed

in the GWOT. There is too much combat power sitting for

lengthy periods of time without a viable mission, while still

facing the same risks as other combat assets in the course

of training to maintain readiness. With the US military facing a very high operations tempo for the foreseeable future,

every asset employed must be utilized efficiently and effectively. Efficient utilization is even more important for LD/HD

assets already operating at high operations tempo with relatively few assets. Maintaining a force dedicated to a mission

that rarely occurs, and is unlikely to occur in large numbers until the United States faces a near-peer competitor, is

neither effective nor efficient.

The USAF needs to reexamine the CSAR function in

light of the changing nature of the global battlespace and

the transformational efforts taking place throughout DOD.

It is important to define the force as a war-fighting capability instead of by an executable function. Application of

the doctrinal tenets of air and space power demonstrates

that CSAR assets possess greater capabilities and can contribute more to the fight than current GWOT taskings dictate. It is time to realistically assess the need to employ

CSAR forces dedicated exclusively to the CSAR function

and expand the range of employment options for these

forces. CSAR assets are a proven capability under adverse

conditions in the GWOT. Expanding upon this base of experience into personnel-recovery operations across the

spectrum of conflict in support of both military and civilian distressed personnel, along with the application of this

combat power to other mission areas, will result in more

effective utilization. Predator aircraft were not originally

designed to release Hellfire missiles, but creative thinking

resulted in a leap in combat capability for this aircraft by

tying the sensor directly to the weapon. There are undoubtedly ancillary applications that exist for CSAR forces

supporting the GWOT as well. 

The National Military Strategy states that the United

States will face persistent and emerging challenges identi32 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
fied as “traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive

challenges that will require the Armed Forces to adjust

quickly and decisively to change and anticipate emerging

threats.”62 CSAR missions are more likely to take place during traditional military operations, but there is a greater

likelihood that the United States will face irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats in the future rather than

traditional threats. Objectives outlined in the latest strategic planning guidance reflect “new Pentagon thinking that

traditional warfare capabilities must go hand in hand with

a broader set of skills to deal with new security challenges

presented by the global war on terrorism.”63 Today’s CSAR

force can ably execute the CSAR function, but there is too

little probability of CSAR mission tasking for the force to remain so exclusively focused. New strategic planning guidance points to changes in how the US military organizes,

trains, and equips, reflecting the realities of the GWOT and

future threats.64 USAF CSAR is a tool that can conduct personnel recovery as well as ancillary missions across this

spectrum of challenges persistently, if postured to rapidly

respond. The force is capable of executing a broad range of

missions in environments ranging from the traditional to the

unconventional. Viewing the CSAR force as a war-fighting

tool instead of a force confined to a narrowly defined, infrequently executed mission will provide a much wider

array of capabilities to the combatant commands.

Notes

1. Mission statistics are from a personal log kept by the author. Of the

11 missions flown, seven of them resulted in a total of 17 combat saves.

From the remaining four missions, two were river search missions that

ended without finding victims, and two were picked up by Army units before the 64 ERQS crews arrived.

2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery

Operations, 1 June 2005, 30.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and

Rescue, 26 January 1996, I-1.

4. AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, 14.

5. Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Interagency National Personnel

Recovery Architecture: Final Report, Alexandria, VA, Institute for Defense

Analyses, July 2004, D-27.

6. Ibid., D-26.

DEPALO 33
7. AFSOC Programming Plan 03-04, Transfer of Select Combat Search

and Rescue Forces to Air Force Special Operations Command, 1 September

2003, n.p.

8. AFDD 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue, 15 September 2000, 1.

9. Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1300.21, Code of Conduct Training and Education, 8 January 2001, 3.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), National Military Strategy of the

United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004,

n.p.

11. CBS News Online Staff, “7 U.S. POWs Found Safe in Iraq,” CBS

News Online, 13 April 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/04/13/pows

_030413.

12. Martha Raddatz, “U.S. GI Taken Hostage,” ABC News Internet Ventures, 6 April 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/World/iraq_

hostage_soldier_040416.html?USad=true.

13. JCS, National Military Strategy, n.p.

14. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Personnel Recovery Modernization Strategy, 17 February 2004, 11.

15. Ibid., 16.

16. United States Joint Forces Command Fact Sheet, “Joint Personnel Recovery Agency,” http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jpra.htm.

17. Adam J. Hebert, “CSAR, Under New Management,” Air Force Magazine, August 2003, http://www.afa.org/magazine/aug2003/0803csar.asp.

18. Ibid.

19. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, 23 March 1994, as amended through 14 June 2000, 347.

20. Ibid.

21. Combined Forces Air Component Command Joint Search and

Rescue Center (JSRC), JSRC Current Events for Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Southern Watch/Operation Iraqi Freedom, 9 Jun 2003, 3.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. The mission statistics are from a personal log kept by the author

from December 2001 through June 2003. CSAR support to OEF continued beyond this point, but the type and nature of the missions did not

change. 

25. Quoted in Rudi Williams, “Personnel Recovery System Needs Transformation,” American Forces Press Service, 14 September 2004, http://

www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09142004_2004091410.html.

26. US Central Air Forces Assessment and Analysis Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom–By The Numbers, 30 April 2003, 9.

27. Lt Col Vinnie Savino, former commander 38 RQS, e-mail correspondence at Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 16 December 2004.

28. Ibid.

29. Quoted by Hon. Jerry Jennings, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, address to Worldwide

Personnel Recovery Conference, 31 August 2004.

30. Albert R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman,

“The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” International Security 11,

no. 1, (Summer 1986): 37.

34 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE
31. Quoted in Williams, “Personnel Recovery System.”

32. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 30.

33. IDA, Interagency National Personnel, D-25.

34. Herman S. Wolk, “The Genius of George Kenney,” Air Force Magazine, April 2002, http://afa.org/magazine/April2002/0402kenney.

35. Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, address to National Defense University, Washington, DC, 31 January 2002, http://

www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html.

36. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 32.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Quoted in Williams, “Personnel Recovery System.”

40. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, http://www.brookings.

edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf.

41. Commander’s Intent, USSOCOM newsletter, August 2004, 1.

42. Ibid.

43. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 31.

44. Quoted in John D. Banusiewicz, “Bush Announces Global Posture

Changes during Next Decade,” American Forces Press, 16 August 2004,

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123008421.

45. Rumsfeld, address.

46. Lightning Bolt information comes from personal information such

as bullet background papers written by the author or acquired during the

development of the concept.

47. Lt Col Todd Bolger, USAF, retired, former commander, 66th RQS,

e-mail correspondence at Moody AFB, GA, 13 February 2004.

48. Headquarters US Air Force/XPXC, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan 2004, 9.

49. JCS, National Military Strategy.

50. Ibid.

51. Lt Gen John D. W. Corley, principal deputy, assistant secretary of

the Air Force (Acquisition), Statement Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services Committee, US House of

Representatives, 2 April 2003, http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04-02corley.html.

52. US Air Force Policy Letter Digest, Secretary, Chief Discuss Future Capabilities, April 2004, http://www.af.mil/policy/letters/pl2004_04.html.

53. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-8, Homeland Security, 1 October

2003, 1.2.2.

54. Ibid., 5.1.

55. Tom Breen, “US Northern Command: Newest Unified Command

Coordinates Homeland Security Efforts,” Armed Forces Journal, August

2004, 54.

56. Daniel Byman, et al., Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations,

Washington, DC, RAND, 2000, xxi, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/

MR1185/MR1185.sum.pdf.

57. IDA, Interagency National Personnel, 1.

58. Ibid.

DEPALO 35
59. Darrel Whitcomb, “Combat Search and Rescue: A Longer Look,”

Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 29.

60. Hon. James G. Roche, secretary of the Air Force, address to Air Warfare Symposium, 12 February 2004, http://www.afa.org/media/scripts/

Roche_04aws.asp.

61. Ibid.

62. JCS, National Military Strategy.

63. Jason Sherman, “Facing a New Reality: Nontraditional Threats

Change Pentagon’s Weapons Priorities,” Armed Forces Journal, December

2004, 21.

64. Ibid.

36 USAF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE