T

he atmosphere and tone of transatlantic discourse have improved markedly 

in recent months. Sustaining transatlantic security cooperation will require 

narrowing lingering European-American 

differences over threat perceptions, strategy, 

and military priorities. 

There is sufficient commonality of assessments and interests to fashion complementary European and American policies 

toward key challenges including countering 

terrorism and further proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD); promotion of 

Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation and reform 

in the wider Middle East; and relations with 

China, Russia, and Ukraine. 

Progress in these areas requires an 

enhanced transatlantic dialogue, particularly 

more systematic U.S.–European Union (EU) 

policy consultations, coupled with a mutual 

willingness to make policy adjustments. Priority should be given to developing convergent 

approaches to deal with warnings of imminent 

WMD terrorism, failure of diplomatic efforts to 

constrain Iran’s nuclear program, security and 

governance problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

the Palestinian Authority, and China’s global 

rise and military acquisitions. 

In fashioning an equitable transatlantic 

division of labor for the management of global 

security affairs, America’s European partners 

have many important nonmilitary assets that 

should be factored into the equation. Washington will remain reluctant, however, to treat 

Europe as a full partner until it demonstrates 

significant progress on key NATO and EU 

defense improvement goals.

Is the Past Prologue?

Many on both sides of the Atlantic hope 

that European-American relations will resume 

a more civil and cooperative course in the 

aftermath of differences over Iraq. President 

George W. Bush’s visit to Europe in February 

2005 and subsequent initiatives suggest that 

restoring transatlantic security cooperation will 

be a priority of the administration. Given the 

acrimony in official exchanges and the vilification in popular media over the past 2 years, not 

to mention lingering differences over strategy 

and policy, the wounds will not heal quickly. If 

both sides take steps to enhance consultations 

and are willing to make policy adjustments, 

however, there is hope for fashioning complementary and even some common European 

and American approaches to critical transatlantic and global security issues.

The atmosphere and tone of discourse 

have improved in recent months. In his first 

major foreign policy address after his reelection, President Bush expressed a renewed 

commitment to close cooperation with allies. 

His visits to the European Commission and the 

Council of Ministers signaled a willingness to 

work with the European Union (EU) as a fuller 

partner. While President Bush secured only 

modest European contributions for stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, his discussions with European leaders had a much more 

positive tone.

Most European leaders, whose publics 

clearly preferred a different outcome in the 

November 2004 U.S. Presidential elections, have 

generally taken a “wait and see” attitude toward 

the Bush administration. While according the 

President a cordial reception in February, many 

Europeans saw the visit as an admission of 

failure and a search for a second chance. This 

was hardly the White House view, which saw 

the Iraqi elections and the democratic stirrings 

in the Middle East as vindication. Indeed, even 

those European governments critical of the 

U.S.-led invasion of Iraq have now avowed that 

its stabilization, as well as continued progress in 

Afghanistan and the promotion of reform in the 

Muslim world, are shared European-American 

interests. Transatlantic relations have also benefited from U.S. endorsement of EU diplomatic 

efforts to cap the Iranian nuclear program and 

Franco-American cooperation on Syria.

Operating under the tenet that “the mission should determine the coalition,” the Bush 

administration, during its first term, opted to 

assemble ad hoc groups of governments that 

supported its approach to Afghanistan and 

Iraq, rather than working first through North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mechanisms. European capabilities for both these 

missions were limited, and political support for 

U.S. approaches was uncertain. However, the 

demands of postwar stabilization efforts in both 

countries highlight that the United States is far 

better off working with a broad group of allies 

and partners from the outset in undertaking 

such demanding missions. Moreover, NATO still 

enjoys broad bipartisan support among American political leaders and the public for addressing hard security problems.

While these developments are encouraging, sustaining an effective transatlantic 

relationship over the next 4 years will require 

narrowing lingering European-American differences over threat perceptions, strategy, and 

military priorities. There is sufficient commonality of European and American interests to 

fashion complementary policies on such issues 

Sustaining U.S.-European 

Global Security Cooperation

by Stephen J. Flanagan

Strategic Forum

No. 217

September 2005

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 1
2 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005

as countering weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) terrorism and proliferation (particularly vis-à-vis Iran), stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, advancing Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, promoting reform in the broader 

Middle East, and dealing with China, Russia, 

and Ukraine. This will require enhanced 

transatlantic strategic dialogue, particularly 

broader and more systematic U.S.–EU policy 

consultations, coupled with a mutual willingness to make policy adjustments. However, 

Washington will look to European progress in 

narrowing important gaps vis-à-vis the United 

States in defense capabilities as a key indicator 

of Europe’s seriousness of purpose in seeking a 

fuller security partnership.

Diverging Strategies

There are both many commonalities 

and important differences between the 2002 

U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which 

remains operative, and the December 2003 

European Security Strategy (ESS). While international attention focused on the prominence 

that the U.S. strategy assigned to military 

preemption and building coalitions to combat 

terrorism, the NSS was much broader. The 

strategy proposed to use the “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political 

influence” of the United States to realize a 

sweeping neo-Wilsonian transformation of the 

current global political and economic order by 

supporting democracy and open markets.1 This 

principle has been reflected in the commitment 

to democratic transitions in Afghanistan and 

Iraq and in the Group of Eight (G–8) initiative 

for promoting political, economic, and social 

reforms in the wider Middle East.2 The more 

realpolitik elements of the strategy called for 

developing cooperative activities with the other 

main centers of global power including U.S. 

allies in Europe, East Asia, Russia, and China. 

The U.S. strategy also called for working with 

other governments and institutions to defuse 

regional conflicts in Southeast Asia, Latin 

America, and Africa. It recognized that globalization remains a powerful force that interacts 

with old and new security problems in ways 

that can exacerbate nationalist, ethnic, and 

religious disputes, as well as facilitate international terrorism and WMD proliferation.

The European Security Strategy identifies many of the same threats as the NSS, 

including global terrorism, WMD proliferation, 

regional conflicts, state failure, and organized 

crime.3 It also argues that, in an era of global 

threats, global markets, and global media, 

European security and prosperity depend 

on an “effective multilateral system.” The 

ESS underscores the need to develop effective international institutions, processes, and 

rule-based international order. The EU strategy 

places clear emphasis on the word system, 

while President Bush has highlighted the 

need for “effective multilateral actions,” with 

less concern for process. Despite this common 

assessment of the key threats, the ESS offers 

markedly different prescriptions, particularly 

with regard to terrorism and nonproliferation.

From Washington’s perspective, the ESS 

and most European governments approach 

terrorism as a much less urgent, persistent 

security problem, the manifestations of which 

can be addressed most effectively by security 

services, police, and the judicial system. While 

noting that the military has a role in dealing 

with terrorism, the ESS advocates “preventive 

engagement” as its preferred tool in forestalling attacks. There are few signs that 9/11, the 

March 2004 attacks in Madrid, and the July 

2005 attacks in London have fundamentally 

reshaped the threat assessment or security and 

defense priorities of most European governments. However, the threat of catastrophic terrorism does appear to have spawned enhanced 

cooperation among intelligence and security 

services.4 Still, many in Europe seem to consider 

the potential for catastrophic terrorism, possibly including weapons of mass destruction, 

as rather abstract and aimed more at the U.S. 

homeland and overseas interests than at European territory and populations. Among some 

Europeans, catastrophic terrorism seems less of 

a threat than renewed instability in the Balkans 

or lingering concerns about the future direction 

of Russia. This differing assessment has complicated or slowed counterterrorism policy coordination and operational cooperation and led to 

the European perception that the U.S. approach 

to counterterrorism is overly militarized.

The ESS also identifies WMD proliferation as potentially one of the gravest threats 

to European security. However, the strategy 

contends that the existing international treaty 

and export control regimes have slowed the 

spread of WMD and delivery systems, reflecting much greater satisfaction with these 

regimes than exists in Washington. That said, 

the ESS does note that the risk of a WMD 

arms race in the Middle East, the spread of 

missile technology, and advances in biological weapons do pose new and serious risks to 

Europe’s security.5 It advocates a strengthened 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

stricter export controls, universal adherence 

to international treaty regimes, and preventive 

engagement when signs of proliferation 

are detected.

The ESS cites state failure and weak 

governance as other key threats to global and 

regional stability. It also notes the need for 

more effective economic, security, and cultural 

cooperation through the Barcelona process 

with the EU Mediterranean partners, as well as 

a broader engagement with the Arab world.

Transatlantic Cooperation

What can be done to narrow or bridge 

transatlantic differences on strategy and security policy priorities? An intensified, multifaceted, high-level dialogue, initiated early in the 

second Bush term, would seem a good way to 

begin to identify common goals and instruments on critical issues. Such a dialogue would 

be most effective if conducted in NATO, U.S.–

EU, and bilateral national channels. Choosing 

the appropriate venue is not a trivial matter, 

but the important point is that Washington 

and its allies recommit themselves to engage in 

discussion over strategic issues before national 

policies are set in stone.

NATO will remain Washington’s focal 

point for consultations on transatlantic security issues. However, as the Common Foreign 

and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) continue to 

deepen, and contemporary security problems 

Stephen J. Flanagan is Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and Vice President for 

Research at the National Defense University. This paper is adapted from a longer essay in the French journal 

Politique Americaine, no. 2, Paris, Summer–Fall 2005.

Washington will look 

to European progress 

in narrowing gaps in 

defense capabilities as a 

key indicator of Europe’s 

seriousness in seeking a 

full security partnership
No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 3

from combating terrorism to stabilization 

and reconstruction of failed states require the 

integration of many elements of national and 

international power, the need for a more effective U.S.–EU dialogue and policy coordination 

has become evident. NATO is not the right 

venue to discuss coordination of actions to 

track terrorist finances or how best to support 

elections in Afghanistan or Iraq. Moreover, the 

annual U.S.–EU summits and periodic ministerial and other high-level meetings are no 

longer adequate to sustain effective U.S.–EU 

cooperation. During the crisis following the 

November 2004 Ukraine elections, the EU High 

Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and 

then Secretary of State Colin Powell developed 

an informal consultation process to coordinate 

U.S. and EU actions. Similar steps, including the formation of ad hoc contact groups 

of senior officials, should be considered to 

expand and regularize U.S.–EU consultations 

and policy coordination across a broad range 

of issues that impact common interests.

Over the past 15 years, three different U.S. 

administrations have welcomed the development of a stronger European role within the 

Alliance, and the Bush administration, like the 

Clinton administration, has broadly supported 

the emergence of an ESDP that makes a real 

contribution to European capabilities. To be 

sure, Washington’s criticisms of elements of 

ESDP have occasionally raised doubts about 

U.S. willingness to accept a more equitable 

relationship. However, support for greater European integration and an ESDP that complements NATO remains strong. ESDP’s value and 

seriousness will be assessed in Washington on 

the basis of the missions and capabilities that 

EU member governments actually realize. 

Thus, the progress of the EU’s Operation Althea, 

which assumed the main stabilization role in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina previously undertaken by 

NATO and to which NATO is providing planning, 

logistic, and command support under the socalled Berlin-Plus formula, is likely to color U.S. 

attitudes toward future EU operations.6 While 

both NATO and the EU are now providing assistance to the African Union’s monitoring and 

peacekeeping effort in Darfur, this cooperation, 

which complements recent G–8 initiatives on 

Africa, was nearly scuttled by efforts of a few EU 

states to block any NATO involvement.

Renewed U.S.-European policy coordination should give priority to several issues 

including: countering WMD terrorism; Iran’s 

nuclear program; Afghanistan, Iraq, and security concerns in the broader Middle East; and 

strategic policies involving Eastern Europe, 

Russia, and China.

Countering WMD

The highest political imperative for 

President Bush in his second term is to prevent 

another catastrophic terrorist attack against 

the homeland, particularly a “WMD 9/11.” 

During the 2004 Presidential campaign, this 

was one of the few points where John Kerry and 

George Bush were in total agreement. There is 

broad transatlantic consensus that the potential 

acquisition of WMD by terrorists is the gravest 

threat to our mutual security. Developing some 

common policies and operational understandings for addressing this deadly nexus should be 

at the top of the list for a renewed transatlantic 

dialogue. The revelations in early 2004 of the 

illicit transfer of nuclear weapons technology 

to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries 

by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of 

Pakistan’s Khan Research Labs, underscored 

the potential for nuclear materials or weapons 

to fall into the hands of states that have challenged international norms and terrorist groups.

The ESS advocacy of preventive engagement to ameliorate WMD proliferation and terrorism substitutes hope for a strategy. It is evident 

from the Khan operations and other transfers 

that existing nonproliferation arrangements are 

porous. Moreover, while preventive engagement 

might be effective in dissuading certain rogue 

regimes from acquiring or using nuclear weapons, it is hardly an effective tool for dealing with 

al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.

In contrast, the NSS argues that this threat 

warrants robust preventive measures, including preemptive action as a last resort, because 

al Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot 

be deterred and would not hesitate to use any 

WMD they might acquire and because of great 

uncertainty about the deterrence calculus of 

various rogue governments. The NSS cites the 

international legal norm that nations need not 

suffer an attack before taking military actions 

to defend themselves against an imminent 

threat. Administration officials have argued the 

concept of imminent threat must be adapted to 

the capabilities and objectives of contemporary 

rogue states and terrorists. However, many governments have wondered whether the doctrine 

of preemption is limited to rogues and terrorists and whether other actions might be subject 

to preemption. The Bush administration should 

consider clarifying which apocalyptic threats 

and other circumstances it believes warrant 

preemptive military action. 

Given the enormity of what is at stake, 

the United States and European governments 

should be planning now how they would 

respond to an imminent terrorist attack 

involving WMD. The administration might 

propose—in NATO, EU, and bilateral channels—enhanced intelligence cooperation to 

uncover terrorist plots involving WMD; understandings on efforts to disrupt execution of 

any such WMD attack plans (including agreed 

procedures for rapid, combined military, intelligence, and police operations); and plans for 

European-American cooperation on mitigation efforts in the aftermath of any attack.7

Iran and Nonproliferation

While Tehran insists it wants nuclear power 

for energy generation, the bulk of available evidence suggests that Iran has been attempting—

for over 20 years—to achieve self-sufficiency in 

a complete nuclear fuel cycle that could support 

weapons production as well as development of 

long-range missile delivery systems. Moreover, 

the IAEA and many international experts assess that some of the specific capabilities Iran is 

developing or seeking are primarily applicable to 

a nuclear weapons program.

Transatlantic agreement exists on the 

strategic objective of preventing Iran from 

acquiring the complete fuel cycle that would be 

the foundation of a nuclear weapons capability, 

but policy approaches differ. The United States 

had pushed to have Iran declared in violation of 

its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the attendant threat of United 

Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions, for 

concealing elements of its nuclear program. In 

late 2004, the United States expressed support 

given the enormity 

of what is at stake, 

the United States and 

European governments 

should be planning now 

how they would respond 

to an imminent terrorist 

attack involving WMD
4 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005

for the EU–3 negotiations and a willingness to 

consider offering Iran certain incentives, such a 

membership in the World Trade Organization, 

to make the suspension of its uranium enrichment program permanent. At the same time, 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush have underscored that all options 

remain on the table.

Given the limited progress of negotiations 

and the strong conviction among Iran’s leadership that the country should be self-reliant for 

defense, U.S. and European leaders need to discuss what steps they might take if negotiations 

continue to falter or completely collapse. What 

penalties, including Security Council sanctions, would Europeans be willing to support 

if Iran refuses to end its fuel cycle program or 

withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty? NATO should consider the implications 

of a nuclear-armed Iran for mutual defense, 

particularly if Iran proceeds with development 

of longer-range versions of the Shahab-3 missiles that could reach all of Europe.

Afghanistan and Iraq

There is also transatlantic consensus 

that failure to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq 

is inimical to common security interests. 

Afghanistan has become a critical proving 

ground in judging NATO’s ability to contribute 

to international stability beyond Europe’s periphery. NATO’s assumption of command of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

in Afghanistan has been a challenge operationally. While NATO forces have performed well in 

overall terms, European governments were slow 

to provide the forces they pledged to expand 

ISAF support for provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRTs) outside Kabul and for the 2004 

presidential elections. This reflects both the 

scarcity of deployable European forces and, in 

some cases, the lack of political will. Nonetheless, steady progress has been achieved, and 

European governments are expanding support for PRTs. Washington continues to hope 

that Allies will take over the entire mission 

in Afghanistan, unifying ISAF and the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions 

of Operation Enduring Freedom, under an 

integrated NATO command.

The role of NATO and Allied national 

forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom has been 

controversial, and the Alliance’s future role in 

stabilization of Iraq remains uncertain. Given 

political reservations in Europe about the situation in Iraq, as well as the shortage of deployable European forces, it seems unlikely that 

NATO will take on much larger responsibilities 

for stability operations in Iraq. However, in 

December 2004, Allied foreign ministers agreed 

to expand to 300 personnel NATO’s training 

assistance to Iraq. Over time, assumption of 

additional missions in Iraq, such as protection 

of UN personnel, expanded training of police, 

or border security, might be effective ways for 

Europe to contribute to this mission. A fuller 

review of ways to enhance European-American 

cooperation to stabilize Iraq would be desirable. The EU has clear strengths in integrating 

important nonmilitary aspects of postconflict 

stabilization to include economic development, 

strengthening civil society, and security sector 

and judicial reforms.

The Broader Middle East

U.S. and EU security strategies agree 

that weak governance, undemocratic regimes, 

and economic rigidity in the broader Middle 

East are exacerbating economic disparities, 

social problems, and regional tensions. These 

add to a sense of hopelessness that provides a 

fertile environment for terrorism and armed 

conflicts. When the Bush administration first 

advanced some of its ideas for strengthening governance, democratic institutions, civil 

society, and the rule of law in the broader 

Middle East, there was great concern in European capitals that various Arab regimes would 

perceive this approach as threatening and as 

an effort to force certain models of democratic 

polity. As consultations ensued, U.S. and European leaders participating in the G–8 were 

able to reach consensus on a measured, longterm program to support democratic, social, 

and economic reform in the region under 

the rubric of the Partnership for Progress and 

a Common Future, and the Forum for the 

Future dialogues among leaders from government, business, and civil society. Each side of 

the Atlantic brings certain strengths to this 

vast challenge, including the EU interactions 

with its Mediterranean partners in the Barcelona process. The situation is ripe for a sustained dialogue leading to a common strategy 

and explicit or implicit burdensharing.

Reform within the Palestinian Authority since the passing of Yasser Arafat and the 

Israeli withdrawal from Gaza appear to provide 

opportunities for reviving a dialogue between 

Israel and the Palestinians on the roadmap 

to a two-state solution to this conflict. These 

developments also appear conducive to a more 

focused transatlantic dialogue and cooperation. 

The Bush administration has signaled that the 

best way to advance the prospects for a durable 

Middle East peace at this point is to help the 

Palestinian Authority enhance its governance, 

rule of law, and control over the security situation. Here again, both the United States and 

Europe bring many complementary capabilities to this process as well as an established 

pattern of cooperation, including through the 

International Quartet.

Russia, Ukraine, and 

the Balkans

There is still much work to be done in 

completing the vision, first articulated over 

15 years ago by President George H.W. Bush, 

of building a “Europe whole and free.” The 

heavy-handed Russian interventions in Georgia 

and on behalf of Victor Yanukovych during the 

November 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections were stark reminders that democracy has 

not planted deep roots throughout Europe and 

that the potential still exists for new lines of 

division to emerge. Transatlantic cooperation 

in dealing with the Ukrainian election crisis 

was exemplary. With President Victor Yushenko 

settled into office, the United States and Europe 

must craft coherent policies to bolster Ukraine’s 

sovereignty, independence, and integration 

into NATO, the European Union, and the World 

Trade Organization. The United States should 

work with European governments to deepen 

support for Ukraine’s defense and security 

sector reform and cooperation with neighbors, 

including Russia. It should press NATO allies 

to offer intensified dialogue to Ukraine over 

the next several years leading to a membership 

action plan as Kiev is ready. Finally, the United 

States should encourage the European Union, 

even as it considers the membership issue, to 

augment its existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and European Neighborhood 

Afghanistan has become 

a critical proving ground 

in judging NATO’s 

ability to contribute to 

international stability 

beyond Europe’s periphery 
policy regarding Ukraine to advance the country’s integration into Europe in concrete ways.

The increasing threats to democracy and 

open society in Russia, and Moscow’s interference in the affairs of other neighbors, have 

raised concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Some have called for curtailing engagement 

with Russia as a way to dramatize that such 

behavior has costs. However, an isolated and 

beleaguered Russia has the potential to do 

great harm to common transatlantic interests 

in advancing freedom and avoiding instability 

along the periphery of the former Soviet space. 

Europe and the United States need to come 

together on a new strategy for conditional 

engagement of Russia.

Similarly, as the EU takes responsibility 

for maintaining peace in Bosnia, Kosovo’s final 

status and the fragile state of other countries in 

the western Balkans warrant expeditious 

European-American action. Looking to the 

frozen conflicts and lingering turmoil in the 

Caucasus, there are also timely opportunities 

for the United States and Europe to craft policies that would help project prosperity and 

stability from Southeastern Europe across the 

Black Sea.

China Strategy

European leaders seemed surprised by the 

outcry in Washington over the EU proposal to 

lift its arms embargo imposed on China after 

the Tiananmen massacre. This move, portrayed 

in Europe as a way to normalize relations with 

a rising China, was seen in the United States 

as a craven effort to advance European trade 

interests in China, particularly in commercial 

aviation, with complete disregard for vital U.S. 

security interests in East Asia. It raised the 

specter of U.S. military operations in defense 

of Taiwan or other interests coming under 

attack by European-made weapons systems. 

Moreover, the kinds of systems Beijing might 

seek from Europe—advanced surveillance, 

command and control, and communications 

systems—are precisely what the Chinese need 

to develop networked capabilities to disrupt 

U.S. military operations. The enactment of the 

anti-succession law by the Chinese National 

People’s Congress in March 2005 was an affirmation of Beijing’s willingness to use force in 

dealing with Taiwan and reminded Europeans 

of the larger stakes at hand. If the EU presses 

ahead with lifting the arms embargo, Washington would likely press for tight, transparent 

controls on technology exports of concern. The 

EU could demonstrate its continued support for 

human rights in China by making the lift of 

the embargo contingent upon Chinese ratification of the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights. To enhance stability, the EU could 

declare its opposition to any effort to change 

Taiwan’s political status quo by force and to 

develop a security dialogue with Taiwan and 

key East Asian governments.

Above and beyond the arms embargo, 

there is a need for a sustained U.S.-European 

strategic dialogue on China leading to some 

agreed principles or rules of the road.8 Both the 

United States and Europe see great opportunities 

for expanded economic and political engagement with China. However, Europe derives great 

benefit, at no cost, from the enormous burden 

the United States shoulders to maintain stability 

and peace in East Asia. Thus, the EU cannot afford to be cavalier about U.S. security concerns. 

Given the multifaceted, global nature of China’s 

rise, this discussion should not be limited to 

China’s role in East Asia and should take place 

in both U.S.–EU and NATO channels. 

The Capabilities Gap

A key factor shaping Washington’s approach to transatlantic security relations over 

the next 4 years will be how effective European 

governments are in enhancing their defense 

capabilities. NATO and the EU have made 

some impressive decisions concerning military 

capabilities over the past few years, including implementation of new NATO and EU 

command structures; launch of the Prague 

Capabilities Commitments, the Helsinki Headline Goals, and the European Defense Agency; 

and development of the NATO Response Force 

(NRF) and the European Rapid Reaction Force. 

However, it remains to be seen to what extent 

these military capabilities will be realized. 

Procurement plans of most European Allies 

are lagging because adequate resources are 

not being devoted to military transformation 

or defense in general. Only half of European 

NATO governments are allocating 2 percent or 

more of gross domestic product to defense.

The capabilities gap between the United 

States and other Allies is growing. Allies are 

implementing force structure reductions of 

40 to 50 percent, and governments are likely 

to reinvest the resources that supported these 

forces in nondefense programs. This contrasts 

with a 35 percent overall increase in the U.S. 

defense budget since 2001, including growth 

of 26 percent for procurement and 56 percent 

for research and development, both designed 

to accelerate defense transformation. All of 

NATO Europe now spends about $12 billion 

(USD) annually for research and development, 

whereas the United States spends about $60 to 

$70 billion.

NATO’s Prague initiatives were developed 

as an American challenge to European Allies in 

the wake of complaints about Allied exclusion 

from the planning and execution of Operation 

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Bush 

administration reached the assessment that 

most Allies had very few forces they could contribute to the kind of long-range expeditionary 

operations required for Afghanistan. Full development of the NRF will give NATO a rapidly deployable force capable of engaging at the most 

stressful end of modern military operations, 

No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 5

there is a need for a 

sustained U.S.-European 

strategic dialogue on

China leading to some 

agreed principles or rules 

of the road 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press
arrangements and division of labor to safeguard 

many common interests.

Notes

1George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the 

United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 

September 2002).

2 “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with 

the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa,” June 9, 

2004, available at <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/33375.htm>.

3 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 

2003, available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

4See Cofer Black, “European Cooperation With the United 

States in the Global War on Terrorism,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European 

Affairs, March 31, 2004; and Dana Priest, “Help from France Key 

in Covert Operations,” The Washington Post, July 3, 2005, 1.

5 Council of the European Union, 4.

6For a more detailed discussion of NATO–EU relations, 

see Leo G. Michel, “NATO and the EU: Stop the Minuet; It’s Time 

to Tango!” Eurofuture (Winter 2004), available at <www.ndu.

edu/inss/Repository/EuroFuture-2Winter.pdf>.

7For a discussion of the international legal and other 

considerations that make the case for antiterrorist military 

intervention and other preventive actions, see Joseph McMillan, 

Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case for Preventive Action, Strategic 

Forum 212 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

November 2004), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/

SF212/SF212_Final.pdf>.

8Such a dialogue was initiated by the United States and 

the European Union in April 2005. See U.S. Department of State, 

“The National Security and Foreign Policy Implications for 

the United States of Arms Exports to the People’s Republic of 

China by Member States of the European Union,” testimony of 

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs before 

the House Committee on International Relations and the House 

Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2005, available at <www.

state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/45146.htm>.

thereby narrowing a critical gap in capabilities 

and commitment. There is also strong support 

in the United States for transformation of key elements of Allied forces as another way to narrow 

the capabilities gap. The new Allied Command 

Transformation was established with tight links 

to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has a 

leading role in transformation of the U.S. Armed 

Forces, as a way to advance European transformation through transfer of lessons learned in 

U.S. exercises and experiments with new operational concepts.

In the end, U.S. leaders will look to 

progress in enhancing capabilities as the most 

visible measure of Europe’s commitment to a 

fuller partnership in maintaining transatlantic 

and global security. The Prague Capabilities 

Commitments set out eight priority areas for 

action to raise combat effectiveness, including 

enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and target 

acquisition; strategic air and sea lift; air-toair refueling; and deployable combat support 

and combat service support units. At the 2004 

Istanbul summit, NATO leaders agreed to 

further measures to enhance the operational 

effectiveness of their forces: specifically, to have 

40 percent of their national ground forces 

capable of deploying overseas and 8 percent 

capable of being supported in expeditionary 

missions for up to a year. Absent progress in 

these areas, Washington will once again be 

disinclined to look to NATO for addressing 

pressing security challenges.

6 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005

Conclusion

America’s enduring commitment to NATO 

and partnership with the EU and European governments in managing transatlantic and global 

security rest on a firm, bipartisan political foundation and a clear-eyed assessment of national 

interests. While the damage done to transatlantic 

relations over the past few years will take time to 

heal, there appears to be shared good will to move 

beyond the acrimony and find practical ways to 

address emerging security challenges. Leaders on 

both sides of the Atlantic have a new opportunity to 

resume the kind of exchanges and cooperation that 

have served our mutual interests so well over the 

past five decades. This healing process will require 

a frank dialogue and willingness to reassess the effectiveness of current policies and consider a range 

of alternate approaches to these thorny problems.

If this process is to be sustained and equitable, European governments must be willing to 

take on additional burdens of managing global 

security, to include further military engagements. However, economic stagnation, exacerbated by aging, declining populations in most 

EU countries, and other internal concerns seem 

likely to occupy much of Europe’s attention and 

dilute its consensus and capabilities on foreign 

and defense policy. The key challenges for the 

United States will be to encourage a fragmented, 

often reluctant, and not very capable Europe to 

become a fuller partner in managing global security affairs, and to find the right institutional 

Other recent NDU Press

publications on U.S. alliance relations

Strategic Forum 216

U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View, by Paul Dibb (August 2005)

INSS Occasional Paper 2

U.S.-Japan Relations: Progress Toward a Mature Partnership, by James J. Przystup (July 2005)

INSS Occasional Paper 1

NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New Members and Partners, by Jeffrey Simon (March 2005)

Strategic Forum 213

Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era? by Rust Deming (November 2004)

For on-line access to these and other publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu