Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

This volume provides the foundation of the landmark research

conducted by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working

Group, a project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the

National Defense University. Sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the five-member working group was established in

September 1999 to help build intellectual capital for the upcoming

QDR. The project was based on the assumption that a small effort

conducted outside the Pentagon could serve as an independent,

unbiased body to develop options and provide insights on critical

defense policy choices for the next administration. With limited

resources, the working group focused on areas where either bureaucratic

or election year politics would make comparable efforts difficult or

impossible, namely: defense strategy, criteria for sizing U.S.

conventional forces, and force structure and capability issues. From its

inception, the working group sought to provide options, insights, and

recommendations for further analysis, not answers. As such, it was

intended to jump-start the QDR process, not preempt it. 

This book offers a comprehensive review of the broad strategic 

choices facing the new administration—without biases or distortions. 

A solid presentation worth the time of every American with more 

than a passing interest in national security.

—Barry M. Blechman

I appreciate the fact that this effort was courageous enough 

to point out in stark terms the trade-offs required for difficult policy

choices. Senior military and defense leaders won’t be able to hide 

from the reality of their decisions.

—Richard L. Armitage

Contra tor to adjust spine as ne essary 
Page iii—No folio

QDR 2001

Strategy–Driven

Choices for 

America’s Security
Page v—No folio

QDR 2001

Strategy–Driven

Choices for 

America’s Security

Edited by Michèle A. Flournoy

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2001
Page vi—No folio

Research and writing was completed in December 2000.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or

implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency

of the Federal Government.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

QDR 2001 : strategy-driven choices for America’s security / edited by Michèle A. Flournoy.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-57906-052-8

1. United States—Military policy. 2. Strategy. 3. United States—Armed

Forces—Appropriations and expenditures. 4. World politics—21st century. 5. Military

Planning—United States. I. Flournoy, Michèle A.

UA23.Q27 2001

355’.033573—dc21 2001030434

First printing, April 2001

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. For publications online, access the GPO Web site at:

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html.

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National

Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.
vii

Contents

Foreword................................. xi

Acknowledgments ......................... xiii

Chapter One

Introduction: Twelve Strategy Decisions .......... 3

Michèle A. Flournoy

Chapter Two

The Future Security Environment, 2001–2025:

Toward a Consensus View ..................... 25

Sam J. Tangredi

Chapter Three

The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities 

for Defense Planning ......................... 75

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Chapter Four

The Defense Budget: Meeting Growing 

Requirements with Constrained Resources ........ 107

Richard L. Kugler

Chapter Five

Defense Strategy Alternatives: Choosing Where 

to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk ....... 137

Michèle A. Flournoy and Sam J. Tangredi
Chapter Six

Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria 

and Methodology ........................... 167

Michèle A. Flournoy and Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Chapter Seven

Assessing Risk: Enabling Sound Defense 

Decisions.................................. 193

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Chapter Eight

Identifying Force Structure Issues:

Sifting the Screen ............................ 217

Michèle A. Flournoy, Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.,

and John J. Spinelli

Chapter Nine

The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence............. 235

Roger Cliff, Sam J. Tangredi, and Christine E. Wormuth

Chapter Ten

Peacetime Operations: Reducing Friction ......... 263

John J. Spinelli

Chapter Eleven

Modernizing and Transforming U.S. Forces:

Alternative Paths to the Force of Tomorrow ....... 293

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Chapter Twelve

Strategic Nuclear Forces and National Missile 

Defense: Toward an Integrated Framework ........ 319

M. Elaine Bunn

viii QDR 2001
Chapter Thirteen

Choosing among Strategy-Driven 

Integrated Paths: Setting the DOD Course......... 351

Michèle A. Flournoy

Chapter Fourteen

Elements of Success for the QDR................ 373

Michèle A. Flournoy

Abbreviations and Acronyms................... 383

About the Authors ........................... 387

CONTENTS ix
x

Illustrations

Tables

2–1 Common Assessments, 2001–2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2–2 Divergence and Contradictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

2–3 Consensus Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4–1 Defense Spending Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

4–2 Defense Spending Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

4–3 Service Shares of Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

4–4 Defense Spending by Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

4–5 Trends in Line-Item Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

4–6 Trends in Defense Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

5–1 Defense Strategy Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

6–1 Smaller-Scale Contingencies: Operational Categories . . . 175

6–2 Smaller-Scale Contingencies: Levels of Involvement . . . . . 183

10–1 Summary of U.S. Forward-Deployed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 267

10–2 Summary of Recent Smaller-Scale Contingencies . . . . . . . 270

10–3 Low Density/High Demand Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

13–1 Strategy A. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

13–2 Strategy B. Engage More Selectively and 

Accelerate Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

13–3 Strategy C. Engage More Selectively and 

Strengthen Warfighting Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

13–4 Strategy D. Engage Today to Prevent 

Conflict Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

Figures

6–1 Steps for Force Sizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

7–1 A Roadmap for Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

8–1 Modeling Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

12–1 Illustrative Strategic Nuclear Forces and National 

Missile Defense Force Mixes for 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
xi

Foreword

Every new Presidential administration seeks to implement its policy

objectives rapidly, but in the vast organization of the U.S. Government, such changes take time. The Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) of 2001 offers the new Bush administration an important opportunity, as well as a great responsibility, to reexamine America’s defense

priorities in a comprehensive, top-to-bottom, strategy-to-program approach and provide early guidance for change. This is a gargantuan task.

Current legislation requires the final report of QDR 2001 to be provided

to Congress in September 2001. Even with early Senate confirmation of

top defense officials, completing such a thorough review in just 8 months

is a daunting charge. One of the lessons learned during QDR 1997 was

that advance efforts to identify key issues for the review process can be

critical to success.

Fortunately for the incoming administration, an independent effort

to develop intellectual capital for QDR 2001 was started in the autumn of

1999. This effort consisted of a small working group which was chartered

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and established in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University

(NDU). Leading the group was Michèle A. Flournoy, a veteran of the

QDR 1997 effort and the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. This volume is a product of

the group’s work as well as contributions from outside experts associated

with the project. A major conference on the project was held at NDU in

November 2000, at which a final report was issued. This book provides

the intellectual underpinnings of that report.

To some extent this book is—as noted in the introduction—very

much like the results of screening at an archeological dig. The issues in this

book are not new; they were already part of the defense policy debate of

our great democracy. But the authors carefully unearthed—stratum by

stratum—insights and options in a systematic manner, placing the issues

in context. No defense issue lives in isolation; all are part of the process of

priority-setting that is required to craft a successful strategy in the context
xii QDR 2001

of a finite budget. To help the new administration set its priorities, the

working group and outside contributors have outlined a series of integrated paths that lead from strategy alternatives to force-sizing criteria to

force structure and other programmatic issues, and they identify the forks

in each path and the signposts along the way.

This valuable book provides a unique service to the Department of

Defense and the Nation, whether the new administration uses the QDR

or some other review process as its primary vehicle for setting defense

priorities. It represents an effort to transcend both the tyranny of the urgent and the bureaucratic rivalries that tend to dominate the analyses

conducted within the Pentagon. It does so in a practical, logical, and supportive manner. It does not provide solutions but instead offers options

from which the Bush administration can craft a new defense policy. In a

sense this book represents a consummate menu of choices: an outside

view that only knowledgeable insiders could provide.

There are options identified in this book that some people might support enthusiastically, and others the same people might strongly oppose.

But no one can fail to be impressed by the fairness of this effort and the

professional skill with which it was completed. As members of a bipartisan team of senior advisors, we periodically reviewed the research of the

working group. While we do not necessarily support all of their findings—neither individually nor collectively—we have been continually

impressed by the quality and soundness of their logic.

Thus, this book represents a service to the Department of Defense

and the new administration with few parallels. It provides an excellent

starting point for a review of defense strategy, policies, and programs.

Richard L. Armitage

Barry M. Blechman

Michael J. Dugan

George A. Joulwan

Charles R. Larson

Arnold L. Punaro

Martin R. Steele
Acknowledgments

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working Group, a

project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University, was sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as an independent effort to frame issues and develop options

for the next QDR. Without the unwavering support of General Henry H.

Shelton, USA; Lieutenant General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC; Brigadier

General James E. Cartwright, USMC; Lieutenant General Richard G.

Chilcoat, USA; and Hans Binnendijk, this project would not have originally

gotten off the ground. Without the equally unflinching follow-on support

of Vice Admiral Scott A. Fry, USN; Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN;

and Stephen J. Flanagan, it might not have survived to completion.

The working group comprised myself and four truly exceptional officers: Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC; Lieutenant

Colonel Philip M. Ruhlman, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel John J. Spinelli,

USA; and Captain Sam J. Tangredi, USN. Their extraordinary contributions were critical to the success of the overall project and to the completion of this book. Each made invaluable substantive contributions, and

they formed a superb team. Without their efforts, this project would have

been immeasurably reduced in scope, quality, and importance. I feel privileged to have worked with them. Moreover, I am grateful to the service

chiefs for sending their best and brightest officers to work with me as colleagues for 15 months.

Two other people were absolutely essential to our daily work. We were

extremely well supported by two talented and committed research assistants, first Helit Barel and then Justin P. Bernier, both of whom deserve

enormous credit.

I am also indebted to two groups that regularly reviewed and commented on our work. A group of stakeholders—representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, services, and unified commands—gave us candid reactions and helpful insights from inside the

Pentagon as well as from the field and the fleet. In addition, a group of senior advisors—seasoned defense practitioners, both civilian and military,

xiii
Republican and Democrat—offered invaluable perspectives and advice.

They included Richard L. Armitage; Barry M. Blechman; General Michael

J. Dugan, USAF (Ret.); General George A. Joulwan, USA (Ret.); Admiral

Charles R. Larson, USN (Ret.); Arnold L. Punaro; Lieutenant General

Martin R. Steele, USMC (Ret.); and Dov S. Zakheim. I am deeply grateful

to each for his insights, time, and support. Although the working group

benefited enormously from the input of both groups, we do not speak for

them, nor were any members of these two groups asked to endorse the

conclusions and recommendations found in this volume, which remain

the views of the authors alone.

The project benefited greatly from the analytic support provided by

Daniel B. Fox and his team at RAND; James R. O’Brien and members of

the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute/AB Technologies

Group; Terrence R. Colvin and Larry A. Schaefer of Synergy, Inc.; and

Robert J. Kurz and his colleagues at Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc.

I also want to thank several people who reviewed our work and offered invaluable comments and suggestions along the way, including W.

Seth Carus, Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Andrew R. Hoehn, Richard L. Kugler,

Frank LaCroix, Clark A. Murdock, and David A. Ochmanek. I am also

grateful to members of the Futures Group at the National War College for

informally vetting early drafts of our work.

I am especially grateful to those who were not part of the working

group but agreed to contribute chapters to this volume: M. Elaine

Bunn, Roger Cliff, Richard L. Kugler, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Christine E. Wormuth. Thanks are also due to those who reviewed draft

chapters and provided valuable comments to the authors, including

Peter Dombrowski, David Gordon, Paul F. Herman, Frank G. Hoffman,

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Michael Krepon, John R. Landry, John

LeHockey, James Miller, Clyde T. Owan, Scott Trout, Michael Wheeler,

and staff of various members of our Stakeholders group.

We were also blessed to have found an exceptionally gifted consulting

editor in Teresa J. Lawson, whose masterful initial editing measurably reduced unnecessary words while immeasurably increasing the quality of

the prose that remained.

I am also indebted to the staff of the Institute for National Strategic

Studies who helped make the overall endeavor a success: the Director of

Research, Stephen A. Cambone; Director of Publications, Robert A. Silano,

and the staff of NDU Press—William R. Bode, George C. Maerz, Lisa M.

Yambrick, and Jeffrey D. Smotherman; and the Director of Conferences,

xiv QDR 2001
James R. Graham, and the members of the Conference Directorate—

Donna J. Roy, Technical Sergeant Edwin Roman, USAF, and Brenda D.

Bennett; and Linda B. Vaughn and other behind-the-scenes miracle workers in the institute.

Finally, I want to express my deepest appreciation to my husband,

W. Scott Gould, my children, Alexander and Victoria, and Mireya Vargas,

as well as the families of the other working group members. Without

their love, support, and patience, this book would not have been possible.

Michèle A. Flournoy

Editor and Project Director

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv

Page xvi —Blank
QDR 2001

Strategy–Driven

Choices for 

America’s Security

Page 1—No folio
Chapter One

Introduction:

Twelve Strategy Decisions

by Michèle A. Flournoy

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) presents the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with an invaluable opportunity and a

tremendous responsibility. The QDR offers the opportunity to articulate

a compelling defense strategy for protecting and advancing U.S. national

interests and to develop a sound programmatic and budgetary blueprint

to realize that strategy. At the same time, the QDR brings with it the responsibility to address a mismatch between defense strategy and resources estimated at between $30 billion and $50 billion per year.1 This

mismatch must be addressed not simply because it exists—many would

argue that there will always be such a gap—but because of the highly corrosive effects it will produce over time: serious tempo and readiness

strains, chronic inability to meet modernization objectives, deterioration

of the morale and quality of life of the force, and recruiting and retention

shortfalls. If these pitfalls are to be avoided and the unparalleled quality

of the U.S. military maintained, the next administration must make hard

choices to close the gap between strategy and resources.

The Iron Triangle: Spend More, 

Cut Costs, or Do Less

Since 1990, no fewer than five major defense reviews have occurred:

the Base Force Review (1991), the Bottom-Up Review (1993), the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (1993), the Quadrennial Defense Review (1997), and the National Defense Panel (1997).

Yet the strategy-resources gap has persisted and, in recent years,

widened. This persistence suggests that the new administration will have

to take a somewhat different approach than its predecessors if the 2001

QDR is to be successful. Most importantly, it must be willing to make a

3
4 QDR 2001

more fundamental and difficult set of choices. The magnitude of the

strategy-resources mismatch and the damage it will cause over time demand that the next administration take substantial action in one or

more of three key areas: increasing the level of resources devoted to defense; working with Congress to take advantage of potential “tradespace”

in the defense program—that is, making tradeoffs that reduce costs

while keeping risk at an acceptable level; or changing the defense strategy

to reduce the demands placed on the U.S. military. This fundamental set

of choices—spend more, cut costs, or do less—might be called the iron

triangle of the 2001 QDR, and it will require substantial political will

and leadership on the part of the new administration.

In reality, all three legs of the iron triangle may need to be adjusted to

bring strategy and resources into alignment. Although the new administration and the new Congress probably will support an increase in defense spending, the level of increase is unlikely to be sufficient to close the

projected strategy-resources gap completely. Increasing defense spending

by $30 billion–$50 billion per year is more than the political traffic will

bear, given the broad range of competing priorities, even considering the

projected surplus.

This suggests that any increase in the defense topline will have to be

accompanied by efforts to identify potential tradespace—changes to the

defense program that would reduce costs without incurring undue risk.

For example, the tradespace of a given strategy might include eliminating

excess infrastructure, canceling a particular modernization program, or reducing or converting an underutilized part of the force structure. Some

argue that after a decade of cutting budgets and forces, little or no tradespace is left in the Department of Defense (DOD). However, others argue

that substantial efficiencies and savings still can be had in such areas as reducing excess infrastructure, reforming personnel management systems,

and adopting better business practices throughout DOD.2 Although all of

the low-hanging fruit may already have been picked, additional tradespace

does exist, and further efficiencies must be part of any solution to the

strategy-resources problem. Taking advantage of this tradespace, however,

may require some fairly heroic acts on the part of both the new administration and the new Congress. The new defense leadership must demonstrate its willingness to make hard choices and break some long-cherished

rice bowls within the Department. And the new Congress must, in some

cases, put aside the politics of pork to enable the Department to reduce or

eliminate low-priority programs, close or convert excess infrastructure,
INTRODUCTION 5

and change inefficient ways of doing business. This effort will require extraordinary leadership from the President, his defense team, and key

members of Congress, as well as a willingness to spend significant

amounts of the new administration’s political capital on defense. This is a

tall order but not an impossible one if the parties understand that the

long-term health of the U.S. military hangs in the balance.

The final element in this equation is the defense strategy: what the

President calls on the U.S. military to be able to do in peace and in war.

The strategy-resources mismatch will require the new administration to

be more explicit about its defense priorities—where it chooses to place

emphasis and where it chooses to accept or manage a degree of risk. If the

combination of anticipated increases in defense spending and anticipated

savings from the tradespace is insufficient to close the projected $30 billion–$50 billion annual shortfall, the new administration will have to

make hard choices about reducing the demands placed on the U.S. military while continuing to protect and advance American interests.

The NDU QDR Working Group

For these reasons, in September 1999 the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, established the QDR 2001 Working Group at the National Defense University (NDU). Directed by

Michèle Flournoy, the group comprised four officers, each one chosen by

their service: Lieutenant Colonel Frank McKenzie, USMC; Lieutenant

Colonel Philip Ruhlman, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel John Spinelli, USA;

and Captain Sam Tangredi, USN.

The primary objective of the working group was to help build intellectual capital for the next QDR. The project was based on the premise

that a small group outside the Pentagon could serve as an independent

and unbiased body to identify issues, develop options, and provide insights for those who will participate in the next review. The working

group focused most of its efforts on areas where bureaucratic politics or

election-year politics would make analysis inside the Pentagon difficult or

impossible: defense strategy alternatives, criteria for sizing U.S. conventional forces, and force structure and capability issues.3 In an effort to address the broader range of issues that will be important in the QDR, the

working group commissioned a number of outside experts as chapter authors; their work is presented in several chapters of this volume.4

The working group benefited greatly from the advice and counsel of

two groups. A group of stakeholders—several dozen one-star and two-star
6 QDR 2001

representatives of the Joint Staff, services, unified commands, and Office

of the Secretary of Defense—met several times to review our work and

provide us with candid reactions and helpful insights from inside the Pentagon as well as from the field and the fleet. In addition, a group of senior

advisors chosen by the project director—seasoned defense practitioners,

both civilian and military, Republican and Democrat—offered invaluable

perspectives and advice.5 They contributed a great deal to the intellectual

capital that is presented in this book, but the views expressed in this volume do not necessarily represent theirs, and we do not speak for them.

Similarly, although the project was cosponsored by the CJCS and the NDU

Institute of National Strategic Studies, we do not speak for the Chairman,

the President of NDU, or any other official in DOD, nor did any such official exert editorial control over any aspect of the project.

From its inception, the working group undertook a scoping effort designed to provide not answers but rather options, insights, and recommendations for further analysis. We aimed to help jump-start the review,

not preempt it. The project might be compared to a big screen on an archaeological dig, designed to sift through vast amounts of material in an

effort to identify the major finds worthy of more in-depth examination.

This book contains the analysis and insights of the working group’s

15-month effort.6 The initial chapters provide important context for the

next QDR. Chapter 2 (“The Future Security Environment, 2001–2025: Toward a Consensus View”) surveys the future security environment from

2001 to 2025 to identify the principal challenges and opportunities that

should illuminate U.S. defense planning. Rather than taking a tabula rasa

approach, it distills points of consensus, issues of debate, and potential

wildcards from more than 300 sources on the subject and offers DOD decisionmakers some guideposts on what the U.S. military should plan for

and what it should hedge against in the future. It also offers DOD a new

and more robust methodology for assessing the future security environment in the QDR and beyond. Chapter 3 (“The Rise of Asymmetric

Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning”) argues that the unmatched

power of the United States will lead future adversaries to use asymmetric

strategies rather than to challenge the United States directly. The chapter

surveys and categorizes a broad range of asymmetric threats in an effort to

provide a framework for thinking about and ultimately prioritizing these

threats in U.S. defense planning. It identifies the 10 most serious asymmetric threats and offers QDR decisionmakers options for improving the U.S.

ability to deal with these challenges. Chapter 4 (“The Defense Budget:
INTRODUCTION 7

Meeting Growing Requirements with Constrained Resources”) paints a

picture of the budgetary environment in which the QDR will be conducted, assessing not only projected budget trends but also recent trends

within the defense budget that have contributed to the strategy-resources

gap and make it difficult to address. It argues that pressures for additional

defense spending are rising faster than the defense budget is likely to grow

and that there are few, if any, easy or painless cost-cutting measures. This

puts a premium on setting clear, strategic priorities and carefully examining the tradespace to determine what we truly need and what we can do

without—risks to be minimized and risks that we are willing to accept.

Chapter 5 (“Defense Strategy Alternatives: Choosing Where to Place

Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk”) identifies the range of plausible defense strategy alternatives for the new administration. It describes where

each strategy would place emphasis and where it would accept or manage

a degree of risk, highlighting the most important strategy choices the new

administration will have to make. It also assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. Many of the options discussed in subsequent

chapters are derived from the set of strategy alternatives this chapter describes. It offers the Bush administration a menu of options that can be

used singly or in combination to help jump-start the strategy development process in the QDR and thereby increase the chances that the strategy will drive the rest of the review.

A means of translating strategy into force structure options is outlined

in chapter 6 (“Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria and Methodology”). In

the absence of any approved or common DOD approach to sizing U.S. conventional forces, it offers a transparent, step-by-step approach to force sizing that can be used with any strategy, highlighting the key decisions the

administration will have to make in this area. As part of this process, it also

lays out several force-sizing criteria alternatives to the current standard of

preparing for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. The chapter recommends that, whatever the strategy developed in the QDR, U.S. forces

should be sized in a manner that takes into account not only the strategy’s

near-term warfighting requirements but also its priority peacetime demands as well as anticipated future capability requirements.

Although rigorous, transparent, and replicable risk assessments will

be critical to supporting sound decisionmaking in the QDR, DOD does

not have a methodology for such assessments. Chapter 7 (“Assessing

Risk: Enabling Sound Defense Decisions”) seeks to fill that void by offering a comprehensive and rigorous approach that could be used in the
8 QDR 2001

QDR. It defines categories of risk, levels of risk, and metrics for measuring risk in an approach that is adaptable to any strategy and is compatible with a broad range of models and other analytic tools. Such an approach to risk assessment will be critical to enabling the QDR

decisionmakers to make hard choices about where and how to accept or

manage risk.

Chapter 8 (“Identifying Force Structure Issues: Sifting the Screen”)

identifies some of the force structure and capability issues that merit further analysis in the QDR. These issues generally fall into two baskets: approaches to reducing the costs of implementing a given strategy (potential tradespace candidates) and approaches to reducing the level of risk

associated with a priority element of a strategy. The objective here is not

to recommend specific force structure changes but rather to identify options and issues that merit a closer look in the QDR process.

Overseas military presence is examined in chapter 9 (“The Future of

U.S. Overseas Presence”) as well as whether this posture should be modified, and if so, how to reflect changes in both the security environment and

in U.S. defense strategy. The chapter identifies issues that should be addressed in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and Southwest Asia, and offers options for

modifying the U.S. posture in each region. Its aim is to build intellectual

capital for the new administration as it reassesses in the QDR both the

overseas presence requirements of its strategy and alternative ways of

meeting those requirements.

Chapter 10 (“Peacetime Operations: Reducing Friction”) provides a

framework for understanding the broad range of peacetime operations the

U.S. military conducts as well as the impact of these operations on

warfighting readiness and on operations and personnel tempo. It identifies

several key points of friction that need to be addressed, including how

smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) are funded, rotation base requirements,

turbulence in the parent and sister units of deployed forces, and tempo

strains in parts of the force that are in highest demand. It argues that unless

the administration is willing to live with current levels of friction in the

force, it faces a basic choice: reducing peacetime demands for U.S. forces or

increasing their availability or supply for peacetime operations. The chapter

recommends that several specific options for either reducing demand or increasing supply be considered in the QDR.

Two broad approaches to meet the challenges of the future are identified and assessed in chapter 11 (“Modernizing and Transforming U.S.

Forces: Alternative Paths to the Force of Tomorrow”). Each alternative
INTRODUCTION 9

offers a different approach to investment in science and technology, research and development, concept development and experimentation, and

procurement of major weapon systems. The intent of this chapter is to

provide the new administration with a menu of options that highlights

some of the most important acquisition decisions it will have to make.

Chapter 12 (“Strategic Nuclear Forces and National Missile Defense:

Toward an Integrated Framework”) explores a complex and interconnected set of strategic issues, including strategic nuclear forces, national

missile defense (NMD), and strategic arms control. It calls for a new vision to guide and integrate U.S. policy across these areas and offers several alternative offense-defense force mixes for the new administration

to consider. It urges the new administration to conduct a strategic posture review early in its term to assess the implications of its strategic options not only for the U.S.-Russian relationship but also for the strategic

calculus of other actors.

The broader implications of the primary strategy alternatives discussed

in chapter 5 are fleshed out in chapter 13 (“Choosing among Strategy-Driven Integrated Paths: Setting the DOD Course”) by examining four strategy-driven integrated paths. Each describes what a strategy would look like

if fully funded, identifies tradespace candidates to reduce costs while still

maintaining an acceptable level of risk consistent with the strategy in a resource-constrained environment, and highlights key indicators that should

force a decision to change the level of resources devoted to defense or to

change the defense strategy itself. This chapter highlights many of the most

important programmatic questions that decisionmakers will have to address in the QDR and links them to strategy and to the iron triangle.

The concluding chapter (“Elements of Success for the QDR”) summarizes principal findings and recommendations, reiterating the theme that

the 2001 QDR will be fundamentally different from recent defense reviews:

the stakes will be higher, the choices more difficult, and the level of leadership and political will required from the new administration substantial.

The Top Twelve Strategy Decisions

Twelve key decisions will define the essence of the administration’s

defense strategy and establish its defense priorities. What follows in this

Introduction is intended to provide the new DOD leadership with some

channel markers for navigating the dozen most important defense strategy decisions it will confront early in its term. These also are the principal

questions that the rest of this book seeks to address.
10 QDR 2001

Key Decisions for National Security Strategy

The first several decisions should be addressed not only by DOD

leadership but also by the President and the new administration as part of

the national security strategy (NSS) review process, which will likely be

conducted concurrently with the QDR.

How should the United States define its national interests? 

Any sound strategy must have as its foundation a clear conception of

national interests. What is it that the United States should be seeking to

protect and advance? Most strategies begin to answer this question by

defining a hierarchy of national interests. The current national security

strategy, for example, defines three categories of national interest: “vital,”

“important,” and “humanitarian and other.”7 More important than the

categories, however, is determining which particular interests belong in

which categories. The process of doing so can go a long way toward defining administration priorities in the national security arena, but only if the

administration chooses to live by the hierarchy of interests it defines. Perhaps the most compelling use of such a hierarchy is to inform decisions

about the use of military force and forces: for what interests is the administration willing to put American service members in harm’s way and the

nation’s credibility on the line? 

What are the most significant threats to U.S. interests, and what are the

most significant opportunities for advancing those interests? 

The new administration must develop its own assessment of the

near-term security environment in which it will be operating as well as

the longer-term environment for which its various investment strategies

(for example, weapons acquisition and personnel recruitment and training) should help the United States prepare. The challenge here will be to

distill from as wide a variety of sources as possible a consensus view of

the most significant challenges and opportunities the United States is

likely to face over the next 25 years. At the same time, the administration

should pay close attention to dissenting views that identify potential wildcards against which it may be wise to hedge: that is, low-probability but

high-risk contingencies that remind us that the future might unfold in

ways dramatically differently than anticipated.8 (Such an assessment of

the future security environment is offered in chapter 2.) The new administration’s assessment of the future security environment also must include detailed regional assessments to identify both threats and opportunities that should be considered in U.S. national security and defense
INTRODUCTION 11

planning. In particular, the new team should take a fresh look at any

threat scenarios that will be used in force planning.9

What should our primary national security objectives be? 

Identifying the national security objectives that should guide U.S. engagement abroad also will be critical.10 If taken seriously, the process of

setting these objectives can profoundly influence the development of interagency policies, the utilization of various instruments of national

power (including the U.S. military), and the allocation of resources

among and within numerous agencies of the U.S. Government. In the

past, however, the development of the NSS has too often been conducted

as a pro forma staff exercise to produce a Congressionally mandated public document, rather than a senior-level exercise in strategic planning. The

next administration should make the NSS review a rigorous exercise to

establish the new President’s national security vision and priorities, one

that involves the principals from all the relevant agencies and that results

in clear objectives, priorities, and guidance for planning, resource allocation, and resource management among and within agencies.

Key Decisions for Defense Strategy

The next several decisions come under the umbrella of perhaps the

most central question of the next QDR: What are the strategic priorities of

the U.S. military? This question goes to the core of an administration’s defense strategy and to the very question of why the United States has a military. It asks not only what the military should and should not be prepared to do in support of national security objectives, but also what

priority should be given to each type of mission relative to the rest. The

answer to this overarching question will be determined by how the administration answers the next six questions.

What kind of wars should the U.S. military be prepared to deter and, if

necessary, fight and win over the next 10–20 years?

In both the Bottom-Up Review in 1993 and the QDR in 1997, the

ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars

(MTWs) was the highest priority mission assigned to the U.S. military.

Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and North Korean aggression against South Korea were offered as examples of the kind of

large-scale, cross-border aggression for which the U.S. military should

prepare. In practice, however, these two illustrative examples have become

canonical cases and the focus of the vast majority of DOD planning.
12 QDR 2001

Putting aside for the moment the issue of whether two MTWs is the

best criterion for which to size U.S. forces, this narrow focus on two particular scenarios is problematic for several reasons. First, both scenarios

are cases of aggression involving large armored invasions on land, but not

every plausible MTW would take this form. One need only contemplate

the possibility of Iranian aggression across the Strait of Hormuz or the

defense of Taiwan against Chinese aggression to recognize that the challenges and requirements of other MTW scenarios might be vastly different from those for which U.S. forces are currently sized and shaped.11

Second, different MTW scenarios might involve different end-state

objectives. Whereas one case might seek to restore the international border between victim and aggressor and impose a sanctions regime, another

might seek to remove the aggressor from power, usher in a new regime,

and help to restore stability post-conflict. The second end-state objective

is a much more ambitious undertaking that would require substantially

more forces and more time to execute. The differences in objectives might

be dismissed as a technical point of force planning were the implications

for the size and shape of the U.S. military not so profound. The ramifications for the military raise crucial questions for the Bush administration

in the QDR. What are the appropriate MTW scenarios and end-state objectives for U.S. force planning? 

Third, the two canonical MTW cases of Iraq and Korea do not represent the full range of challenges that the U.S. military could face in the future—even the near future. For example, more capable regional foes

might employ antiaccess strategies to thwart U.S. power projection. Given

the diffusion of advanced military technologies and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), an adversary might be armed with longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles, WMD, advanced integrated air defense systems, or

sophisticated antiship mines and missiles by 2010, if not sooner. If these

systems could delay or deny U.S. access in a distant theater of operations,

the U.S. military would have to employ very different operational concepts for a rapid and decisive response to aggression, including overcoming initial limits to access and simultaneously facilitating greater access so

that additional U.S. forces could be brought to bear. Such operational

concepts could put a premium on combinations of capabilities different

from those that have been optimized for the Iraq and Korea scenarios.

Plausible scenarios also exist involving situations other than large-scale,

cross-border aggression (an MTW as currently defined) that could require

a comparable level but different type of effort from the U.S. military if it
INTRODUCTION 13

were directed to intervene. Consider these scenarios as illustrative examples: the collapse of North Korea creates a humanitarian crisis of enormous

proportions; Colombia erupts in full-scale civil war between drug cartelbacked guerrillas and government forces; or the United States embarks on

another coercive campaign on the scale of recent operations in Kosovo.

These scenarios raise an important question for the next 

QDR: should the notion of major theater war be redefined? Should the

most challenging category of military operations be defined by the nature

of the aggression to which it responds or by the level of U.S. military effort

required? The next QDR offers DOD leadership an opportunity both to

clarify its terms and to broaden the set of high-end planning scenarios to

capture a richer and more representative set of challenges.

We believe that the scenario set used for force planning should be

broadened to include a wider range of potential warfighting cases, endstate objectives, operational constraints, and joint concepts of operation

to ensure that the U.S. military is prepared for the full range of challenges

it may encounter in the future. We recommend that the President and

Secretary of Defense give particular attention to the issue of appropriate

objectives as they determine what range of military options should be

maintained and what assumptions should guide the sizing and shaping of

the Armed Forces.

What are the appropriate uses of the U.S. military short of major war?

How much and what kind of involvement should the U.S. military have

in SSCs and in peacetime engagement activities?

Early in its tenure, the administration will need to decide which types

of missions it believes to be appropriate assignments for the U.S. military

and which are not appropriate. Many missions are likely to inspire little debate: warfighting, shows of force to deter aggression against American interests, noncombatant evacuations, strikes against terrorists who target U.S.

citizens, forces, or territory, and support to homeland security and civil authorities. But other missions are likely to be more contentious, among them

peacekeeping, peace accord implementation, humanitarian intervention

and assistance, foreign disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and sanctions enforcement. Under what circumstances, if any, should these types of

operations be considered appropriate missions for the U.S. military? To answer this question, the next administration will need to develop guidelines

for making decisions about the employment of U.S. forces. The nature of

these guidelines will depend on how the administration defines the hierarchy of U.S. national interests and U.S. national security objectives. (The
14 QDR 2001

spectrum of peacetime operations and their implications for the readiness

and tempo of U.S. forces is discussed in chapter 10.)

At least four issues tend to define the spectrum of opinion about

the appropriate uses of the U.S. military: the nature of the global responsibilities of the United States as the sole superpower; whether there

are appropriate uses of the military in situations short of vital or important interests but involving American values; when in a crisis or conflict

the military should be employed; and whether and to what extent others

should be expected to undertake these missions in lieu of the United

States or without its leadership. One end of the spectrum is defined by

the view that U.S. global responsibilities do not extend beyond national

interests, that there are few appropriate uses of the U.S. military for less

than vital or truly important interests, that employment of the military

should be a last (or almost a last) resort, and that in many cases allies

and partners should take the lead, or at least shoulder more of the burden, in lesser contingencies. This view would support a policy of more

selective U.S. military involvement in SSCs, that is, the full range of military operations beyond peacetime engagement but short of major theater warfare. At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the

United States has global responsibilities that extend beyond purely national interests to include hands-on stewardship of the international

order and management of significant threats to international peace and

stability; that there are many appropriate uses of the military to support

not only national interests but also American values; that employment

of the military may be needed early in a crisis to support deterrence and

prevention; and that allies and partners could do more but that they require U.S. leadership and participation. This view would support a

more expansive military involvement in SSCs. Where the Bush administration positions itself on this spectrum will have profound implications for how the U.S. military is employed and potentially for how it is

sized and structured.

This issue also may suggest the need for some new terms and definitions. The current DOD definition of SSCs encompasses 14 different types

of operations.12 Although useful as a catchall phrase, the term “smallerscale contingency” may blur distinctions between different types of contingency operations that will be important in establishing guidelines on

the use of force. The QDR presents an opportunity to redefine terms in a

way that would sharpen the guidance offered in U.S. defense strategy.
INTRODUCTION 15

Answering the question of appropriate uses of the military also will require the Bush administration to set guidelines for the appropriate level

and nature of military involvement in peacetime engagement activities—

that is, the wide range of activities such as combined training, exercises, and

military-to-military interactions that are designed to enhance constructive

security relations and promote U.S. security interests. If used well, these activities have the potential to be a highly effective tool of American foreign

policy. But they also could add significantly to the strains on the Armed

Forces arising from an increased tempo of operations. Therefore, the next

administration will need to set some clear guidance on this issue, determining the broad objectives for such activities, which countries should be engaged on a priority basis, and appropriate guidance for commanders in

chief in developing their theater engagement plans.

What are the appropriate roles and missions for DOD in support of

homeland security? 

The combination of the unique position of the United States in the

world, the rise of anti-American sentiment in some quarters, and the emergence of asymmetric threats that can threaten Americans at home means

that the nation cannot take the security of the homeland for granted. Indeed, homeland security has moved from the wings of the defense debate

to center stage in recent years. Yet the U.S. Government response to this

highly complex challenge remains a work in progress. Homeland security

involves a multiplicity of missions, agencies, levels of government, nongovernmental actors, and legal authorities and constraints.

The QDR offers the Bush administration an opportunity to make some

progress in this area. The first challenge is to define homeland security and

the associated military missions. Currently, no agreed DOD or interagency

definition exists. The working group definition may offer a good starting

point. We define the military dimensions of homeland security as military

operations and activities to deter, prevent, defend against, and respond to

attacks on the homeland. These operations and activities include NMD,

territorial defense, critical infrastructure protection, counterterrorism activities, consequence management, and other activities undertaken in support of domestic civil authorities. Defining the military role in homeland

security will be complicated by the fact that an unresolved tension exists

between the peacetime assumption that in most areas, the Pentagon will

play strictly a supporting role to civilian agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and

the very real possibility that in a large-scale crisis, DOD would be expected
16 QDR 2001

to do much more. The second challenge is to determine the relative priority

of each of these missions within the strategy. This ranking will be particularly important if the strategy is to guide contingency planning and the allocation of defense resources.

The third challenge will be to develop planning factors to address the

number and types of concurrent homeland security missions the Armed

Forces should be prepared to undertake and then to assess the capabilities

and forces required to meet this standard. Homeland security requirements must be viewed not in isolation but in the context of other priority

demands that may be placed on the U.S. military at the same time. Because the most likely time for an attack on American soil may be during

or just before a major war abroad, the Bush administration will need to

evaluate homeland security requirements in the context of one or more

major military commitments. Otherwise, the President might be placed

in the untenable position of having to choose between securing vital

American interests at home and securing them abroad.

The last challenge will be to use these planning factors to assess the

combined requirements of homeland security and other priority operations and to address any capability shortfalls in the current defense program. (This issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.) In sum, the

next QDR will offer the new administration a chance to define more

clearly the DOD role in homeland security and the requirements that

these missions place on U.S. forces and on the Department more broadly.

What should the objectives of military transformation be, and how urgently should they be pursued?

Military transformation, an oft-used but rarely defined term, here

refers to the set of activities by which DOD attempts to harness the revolution in military affairs to make fundamental changes in technology,

operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure. In contrast to recapitalization (the replacement of aging systems), transformation involves not only acquiring new military systems, but also modifying doctrine, organizations, training and education, matériel, leadership,

and personnel policies to maximize the capabilities of future military

forces. Most would agree that some form of transformation should be

pursued if the U.S. military is to maintain its military superiority in the

future and that the broad vision of future military operations in Joint Vision 2020 should guide DOD transformation efforts.13 But little consensus exists on the specific objectives that should guide transformation, the

degree of urgency with which transformation should be pursued, or
INTRODUCTION 17

what exactly will be required—in terms of investment and divestment—

to transform the military. (These issues are addressed in chapter 11.) The

Bush administration must address the first two issues in articulating a

defense strategy and the third in programming guidance.

However the next administration chooses to define the objectives,

pace, and requirements of transformation, it must also offer an explicit

accounting of the associated risks. If the Bush administration pursues a

policy of accelerated transformation, it will need to account for additional risk in the ability of the Armed Forces to meet near- and mid-term

requirements, such as warfighting. Conversely, if the administration pursues only a modest transformation program, it will need to account for

additional risk in the U.S. ability to deal with future challenges.

What should the overseas presence posture of the U.S. military be?

Four factors suggest the need for a fresh look at overseas (or forward)

presence, that is, the military forces permanently stationed overseas, or rotationally or intermittently deployed there, for the purposes of influence,

engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response. (Overseas

presence issues are addressed in chapter 9.) First, the U.S. overseas presence posture is critical to deterring and responding to crises and conflicts

abroad. As such, it needs to reflect the mission priorities and the regional

emphases of the broader defense strategy. As a matter of principle, it

should be a part of any major strategy review. Second, plausible changes in

the future security environment—such as the reconciliation of North and

South Korea, or a general shift southward in threat focus toward the arc of

instability that extends from southern Europe and northern Africa

through the Persian Gulf to south and southeast Asia14—may mean that

U.S. forces are not optimally postured or positioned for the future. Both

their locations and their capabilities merit review. In addition, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, WMD, and information and surveillance systems

suggests that the manner in which U.S. forces conduct their overseas presence missions and the mix of forces involved should be closely examined.

Third, recent U.S. military experiences in Southwest Asia and the Balkans

have raised the issue of where long-term SSCs stop and overseas presence

begins. Such situations need to be evaluated as part of any review of U.S.

overseas presence posture. Finally, because of the rotational nature of

much overseas posture, overseas presence requirements are a significant

driver of force structure requirements for substantial parts of the U.S. military. Relatively minor changes to overseas presence requirements can have

major force structure implications when the rotation base required to
18 QDR 2001

meet a given demand is factored into the equation. (This particular issue is

discussed in detail in chapter 6.)

What is the appropriate role of nuclear weapons? What mix of strategic

offenses and defenses should be pursued?

The Bush administration will face a major strategy challenge in the

interconnected areas of nuclear forces, NMD, and arms control. The

fundamental issue is defining the offense-defense vision that should

guide U.S. policy in these areas. What kind of nuclear posture and missile defense posture are we trying to achieve and why? Developing this

vision will require the administration to return to first principles and

take a fresh look at current policies and programs.15 What is the purpose of nuclear weapons a decade after the end of the Cold War? What

nuclear threats should the United States strive to reduce? Do current

U.S. nuclear policy, doctrine, and posture adequately reflect the fundamentally changed relationship between the United States and Russia,

our relationships with other states, and our threat reduction priorities?

What role should missile defenses play vis-à-vis which countries, and

what are the implications for defensive architectures?

Addressing such questions will require the new administration to

develop a new and comprehensive framework for thinking about strategic offense and defense issues. (Chapter 12 seeks to provide such a

framework.) Nuclear deterrence and stability must be reexamined in

light of the changed relationship between the United States and Russia,

the fact that other states must be factored into the U.S. strategic calculus,

and the urgent need to reduce a variety of nuclear threats. This state of

affairs means that the next Nuclear Posture Review must be a broad

strategic review that takes a fresh and integrated look at U.S. nuclear policy, doctrine, forces, and posture, as well as NMD, arms control, and

nonproliferation policies.

What roles should we expect allies and coalition partners to play across

the spectrum of operations?

Imagining any future major U.S. military operation that will not involve critical support from allies and friends is difficult. Coalition operations are a fact of life today and are likely to remain so. Less certain are

the exact level and nature of allied contributions across the spectrum of

operations. Such contributions can be influenced by the priorities that

U.S. strategy places both on relations with key allies and partners and on

helping them develop stronger defense capabilities, even when their own
INTRODUCTION 19

defense expenditures are declining. The QDR will need to address the

role of allies from at least two perspectives, peacetime engagement and

force planning.

A strategy that seeks to enhance the role of allies and coalition partners in future operations will need to give priority to peacetime military

engagement with the forces of those countries. The key strategy challenge here is to articulate as specifically as possible the objectives and

priorities for U.S. military interactions with potential allies and partners, in the form of combined training, exercises, and military-to-military exchanges.

Assumptions about allied and coalition contributions will also be

crucial to QDR force planning, as they can significantly influence U.S.

force requirements. An allied provision of bases and port facilities, hostnation support, or troops may reduce the requirements for Armed

Forces in some operations, while in others, an allied force contribution

may increase the demands on U.S. mobility, logistics, and communications assets. What operations, if any, should we expect our allies to lead,

with the United States playing only a supporting role? To which U.S.-led

operations should we expect allies and partners to contribute significantly, and what forms would that contribution take? Are there particular roles that we would call on allies to play in certain emergency situations, such as filling in for U.S. forces withdrawing from SSCs in the

event of two concurrent major theater wars? What a strategy says about

the roles of allies and partners can offer valuable context for force planners to assess the specific contributions that can be expected from allies

in scenarios from major wars to SSCs. (Some of these issues are addressed in chapter 8 on force structure and capabilities.)

How should these various strategy elements be prioritized? 

Once the administration has thought through the decisions above, it

will need to determine where to place emphasis and where to accept or

manage risk within the strategy. (A proposed methodology for assessing

risk in the QDR is found in chapter 7.) It will need to be as explicit as

possible about the relative priority given to each element of the strategy.

This is particularly important in a resource-constrained environment in

which not every element of the strategy can be provided with enough resources to reduce risk to a low level. It also is a critical step if the strategy

is to provide meaningful guidance for resource allocation within DOD.

(This process of prioritization is described in chapter 6.)
20 QDR 2001

What strategy-based criteria should be used to size the force? What

should the associated declaratory policy be?

Among the most critical tasks for any defense strategy is to set the criteria for sizing the force and to offer a public rationale for this decision.

Typically, force-sizing criteria delineate the number and types of operations the U.S. military should be able to conduct concurrently. Missions

or activities not explicitly cited are generally treated as lesser-included

cases: things that the military may be required to do but for which additional forces are not provided. (Chapter 6 covers both a methodology for

force sizing and a range of strategy-based force-sizing criteria.)

For the past 8 years, the primary criterion for sizing U.S. conventional

forces has been for two nearly simultaneous MTWs, with the exception of

naval forces, which are sized for forward presence. All other operations and

activities are treated as lesser-included cases as far as force sizing is concerned. In practice, this has meant that U.S. conventional forces are generally dual-tasked or even triple-tasked; they are expected to remain prepared

for warfighting (by training and exercising) while also being able to conduct the full range of peacetime operations, such as multiple concurrent

SSCs, presence missions, and peacetime engagement activities. Indeed, current policy calls for the complete disengagement of all U.S. forces from

peacetime operations and their redeployment in the event of two MTWs.

The two-MTW standard has become a focus of heated debate, making

it a major issue for the next QDR. Supporters of the current policy argue

that maintaining a credible two-MTW capability is central to deterring

opportunistic aggressors and to ensuring that the U.S. military can defeat

aggression by a more capable adversary or under circumstances that are

more difficult than expected.16 They further argue that maintaining a twoMTW force gives the U.S. military the flexibility to cope with the unpredictable and the unexpected, the depth of capability to respond effectively

across the spectrum of operations, and credible combat power that translates into U.S. influence around the globe. Supporters also warn that

falling off a two-MTW capability would bring into question America’s

standing as a global power and the credibility of its security commitments

to key allies. Also at work is the desire not to let go of a known standard

until convinced that there is a better alternative.

Critics argue that the two-MTW standard has become too closely

linked with two particular MTW cases (Iraq and Korea) that do not capture

the full range of challenges for which the U.S. military should be

preparing.17 They also contend that the two-MTW standard has lost its
INTRODUCTION 21

credibility with key constituencies, most notably those on Capitol Hill who

champion military transformation, because it is perceived as focusing the

U.S. military (and the entire defense program) on known near-term challenges (fighting the last war) rather than on more significant future challenges.18 Others have become dissatisfied with the two-MTW focus for a

different reason. The last several years, they argue, have demonstrated that a

force built primarily for two MTWs does not necessarily have the capabilities needed to handle the full range of other contingencies without putting

undue strains on the force, as evident in the existence of low density/high

demand assets and pervasive reports of overstressed units and personnel in

peacetime. These critics advocate greater emphasis on sizing and shaping

the force for the full range of demands placed on the U.S. military, including priority peacetime demands.

Emerging from this debate, however, is a growing consensus that the

new administration must articulate in the QDR a fundamentally new rationale for the size, capabilities, and resource requirements of the U.S.

military, one that changes the factor of the equation (to something other

than MTWs) and that reflects the broader range of missions that U.S.

forces must be prepared to perform to protect and advance American interests. The challenge here will be substantial, as the audiences for U.S.

declaratory policy are many and diverse, ranging from Congress and allies

abroad to potential adversaries in every region of the world. Nor are these

words lost on the men and women who serve in the U.S. military; what is

said in U.S. declaratory policy has a very real impact on the perceptions

and morale of those who serve. Are they being deployed to missions that

are recognized as legitimate? Have they been given the resources they

need to live up to the stated standard? The next QDR will offer the incoming administration an opportunity to rethink both force-sizing criteria and declaratory policy and to articulate a standard that will maintain

U.S. military superiority into the future while offering a more compelling

and complete rationale for U.S. forces and defense expenditures. (Alternative force-sizing criteria are discussed in some detail in chapter 6.)

Conclusion

Addressing these twelve questions will be made more difficult by the

compressed timelines of the QDR. The review cannot begin in earnest until

the new Secretary of Defense and key members of his team are in place.

Congress has mandated that the Secretary submit the QDR report to Congress no later than September 30, 2001.19 Even without this Congressional
22 QDR 2001

deadline, the new administration will have powerful incentives to conclude

its review in time to shape how the services build their programs in the

next budget cycle. In past reviews, this has meant trying to develop a defense strategy, size the force, and tailor the defense program to meet strategy requirements within resource constraints in 6 to 8 months. Given the

more profound set of choices that the next QDR must confront if it is to be

successful, the new administration may be wise to pause and reconsider the

objectives and scope of the review. Rather than striving to complete a comprehensive strategy and program review, it might be wiser to conduct a

truly strategic review aimed at establishing a vision, setting broad priorities,

and deciding the big strategy and program issues, with a follow-on effort to

conduct more in-depth analysis and refine a more comprehensive implementation plan.

Whatever the ultimate scope of the review, its compressed timeline

puts a premium on advance preparation. The more work that could be

done in advance to identify key issues and develop options for consideration in the next QDR, the better chance the administration has of executing a successful review. This was the motivation behind the working

group, its final report, and this book.

Notes1 The Congressional Budget Office estimates the shortfall to be approximately $50 billion per

year. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2000). Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates the shortfall in defense spending to be between $30 billion and $50 billion per

year, using fiscal year 2000 as a baseline. Some might argue that the gap is smaller because of increases in budget authority in 2001. However, using the 2001 baseline also means that the available

surplus would be greatly reduced. As a result, any further increase in defense spending would come

from a smaller pool of resources.

2 See, for example, Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, MA, and Stanford, CA: Harvard University and Stanford University,

September 2000; MIT Press, 2001).

3 The working group did not address all of the national security strategy issues that will provide important context to the next QDR or flesh out in detail all the programmatic and budgetary

implications of the issues examined.

4 These outside experts included M. Elaine Bunn, Roger Cliff, Richard L. Kugler, Michael E.

O’Hanlon, and Christine E. Wormuth.

5 The working group’s senior advisors included Ambassador Richard L. Armitage, Barry M.

Blechman, General Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret.), General George A. Joulwan, USA (Ret.), Admiral

Charles R. Larson, USN (Ret.), Arnold L. Punaro, Lieutenant General Martin R. Steele, USMC (Ret.),

and Dov S. Zakheim.

6 For a summary of the project’s findings and conclusions, see Michèle A. Flournoy, Report of

the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC:

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2000).
INTRODUCTION 23

7 See A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 1–2. Others have defined somewhat different hierarchies. The Commission on America’s National Interests, America’s National Interests (Washington, DC: July 2000), 5–8, identified the

four categories of interest as vital, extremely important, important, and less important or secondary.

The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert

for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom (Washington, DC: April 15, 2000), 7–8, suggests three

levels: survival, critical, and significant.

8 A number of techniques have been used to assess the future security environment, including

estimates, scholarly forecasts, and alternative futures scenario-building. What has been lacking in past

defense reviews, however, has been a rigorous effort to combine methodologies and to distill a consensus view from myriad assessments. Additionally, only a limited effort has been made to identify

dissenting views and potential wildcards. Chapter 2 seeks to remedy these deficiencies.

9 The new administration also should consider whether the intelligence community has adequate resources and appropriate organization to support the full range of its national security requirements, but this subject is beyond the scope of this report. See, for example, Robert J. Hermann,

“Keeping the Edge in Intelligence,” Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, chapter 4.

10 The current national security strategy articulates three core objectives (enhancing American security, bolstering U.S. economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad) as

well as a long list of sub-objectives and tasks. See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 3. Others have suggested that U.S. national security objectives should be defined somewhat differently. For example, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century identified six broad objectives: to defend

the United States and ensure that it is safe from the dangers of a new era; to maintain America’s social

cohesion, economic competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength; to assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia, and India, into the mainstream of the emerging

international system; to promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy and improve

the effectiveness of international institutions and international law; to adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which America’s partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility;

and to help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change.

See Seeking a National Strategy, 8–13.

11 Indeed, the characteristics of the future security environment described in chapter 2 suggest

the need for a broader range of planning scenarios.

12 In the DOD definition, SSCs include opposed interventions, coercive campaigns, humanitarian

interventions, peace accord implementations, follow-on peace operations, interpositional peacekeeping

operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, domestic disaster relief and consequence management, nofly zone enforcement, maritime intercept operations, counterdrug operations and operations in support

of other agencies, noncombatant evacuation operations, shows of force, and strikes.

13 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000).

14 The notion of a new “southern belt of growing strategic instability and danger” comes from

Richard L. Kugler, “Controlling Chaos: U.S. National Security Strategy in a Globalizing World,”

Global Forum 1, no. 3 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic

Studies, September 2000), 35–38.

15 Congress has mandated that a new Nuclear Posture Review be completed by December 1,

2001. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4205, Subtitle C, Strategic

Forces, Sec. 1015, “Revised Nuclear Posture Review.”

16 For a more detailed defense of the two-MTW criterion, see Secretary of Defense, Report of the

Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), 12–13.
24 QDR 2001

17 For a sampling of criticisms of the two-MTW standard, see the U.S. Commission on National

Security/21st Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting

Freedom (April 15, 2000), 14; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment

(Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, February 1994); Richard L. Kugler, “Replacing the 2-MTW

Standard: Can A Better Approach Be Found?” Global Forum (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000); Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Rethinking

Two War Strategies,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 24 (Spring 2000), 11–17; Baker Spring, Jack Spencer,

and James H. Anderson, “National Defense: Restoring U.S. Military Strength” in Issues 2000: The Candidate’s Briefing Book (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2000); and Michael G. Vickers and

Steven M. Kosiak, The Quadrennial Defense Review—An Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, December 1997).

18 This view was also expressed in the final report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming

Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, 23–24.

19 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Sec. 118, Quadrennial Defense Review.
Chapter Two

The Future Security

Environment, 2001–2025:

Toward a Consensus View

by Sam J. Tangredi

Whether in business or defense, the first steps to any strategic

plan include a definition of objectives and an evaluation of the

environment in which those objectives will be pursued. This

chapter addresses the latter requirement for the next QDR by outlining a

consensus view of the future security environment for the years

2001–2025.1 It derives this consensus through an attempt to reconcile the

existing group of competing assessments of the anticipated outlines of future conflicts. Mindful of the potential for bias, it also seeks to identify

dissenting viewpoints and potential wildcard events. The objective is to

develop a baseline consensus of the probable future, but at the same time

to identify those unpredictable catastrophic events—or predictable, yet

unlikely, developments—against which hedging strategies could be

adopted as a form of national defense insurance. Additionally, the intent

is to identify issues about which a consensus could not be developed but

which must be debated if any defense review is to be effective.

Like its 1997 predecessor, QDR 2001 is intended to be a strategy-driven

assessment that balances the preparations of the present with the anticipated challenges and opportunities of the future.2 On the surface it would

appear relatively easy to construct an assessment of future trends to guide

the review. A recent survey identified over 50 academic or professional “futures studies” conducted since 1989, the approximate end of the Cold War.3

But there are problems in attempting to apply the results of these studies to

effective policymaking, among them their lack of coordination, the significant differences in their methodologies and the time periods examined, the

broad and divergent scope of topics, the presence of underlying and often

unidentified biases, and the wide range of contradictory results. Many of

25
26 QDR 2001

the individual studies were constructed from a clean slate, taking scant account of previous related work. An unedited compilation of these studies

would be capable of generating much debate, but would provide only a

limited basis for policymaking.

To construct a policy requires a baseline consensus from which implications and issues can be examined and analyzed. The methodology developed by the working group and reported in this chapter is straightforward. Thirty-six studies (unclassified or with pertinent unclassified

sections) concerning the future security environment were selected based

on standardized criteria.4 These studies were representative of views from

a wide range of organizations involved with or interested in national defense issues. The studies, with two exceptions, were published between

1996 and 2000. The choice of which studies to include here was based on

the assumption that earlier themes would have been reflected in QDR

1997. These studies are identified in the appendix to this chapter.

The 36 studies were analyzed in detail and compared on a subject-bysubject basis. Sixteen points of consensus and nine points of divergence

were identified and are reported in this chapter. The points of consensus

are those on which 85 percent or more of the sources agreed. Points of divergence are those on which there was no clear majority position.

The consensus and divergence points were compared with the conclusions of over 300 other sources, most of them specialized studies of the

specific topics.5 The purpose was to identify dissenting positions on the

points of consensus, as well to validate the fact that the consensus represents a majority view.

Both the primary and consulted sources were also surveyed for the

identification of wildcards: events that could not normally be predicted,

but that could present a considerable challenge if they were to occur during the 2001–2025 time period. Along with the divergence points, the

wildcards indicate changes in the security environment that might require the development of hedging strategies.

The result was a consensus scenario that describes the anticipated

2001–2025 future security environment, presented below in narrative form,

along with a list of potential unanticipated events that merit hedging.

Estimates, Forecasts, Scenarios, and Caveats 

There are limitations, both conceptual and practical, in providing a

consensus view of the future. First is the difficulty in comparing a mixture

of assessments that use differing techniques. Three distinct methodologies

are currently in favor for use in assessing the future security environment.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 27

Estimates utilize an assessment of current conditions to identify possible future events. The priority is accuracy, which requires a relatively short time

horizon. Forecasts represent longer-range assessments, primarily relying on

trends-based analysis. Most forecasts are issue-specific. Scenarios can be

thought of as a range of forecasts, which tend to be richly developed depictions of alternate worlds based on plausible changes in current trends.

The strengths and weaknesses of the three primary methodologies for

futures assessment have implications for policy recommendations.6 But

the most important is the understanding that any attempt at deriving a

consensus view requires the mixing of methodologies that were not necessarily designed to be compatible.

Moreover, while an assessment of the future security environment is

the essential starting point for all strategic planning, history cautions

against both its inappropriate use and a belief in a high degree of certainty.7

Other factors also justify caution, including the problems of normative assessments, institutional bias, emotional reaction of individuals, and feedback effects, or the effects of taking action.8 Futures assessments, even those

that are based on linear trends in political events or the development of

technology, inherently carry the biases of the assessors. Institutions and organizations, such as individuals, also have inherent biases. Such biases do

not have to be products of deliberate distortion, but can evolve from seeing

the world from a particular viewpoint. Within the Department of Defense,

for example, each service has a unique culture evolved from its historical

experience and the particular mediums in which it operates and through

which past, present, and future are perceived.

Perhaps the most significant difficulty in developing futures assessments and translating them into policies and actions is the fact that all actions taken have the inherent effect of changing the future. By carrying

out a plan, the conditions that inspired the plan are changed. The “feedback” dynamics of such change increase through the unfolding of competing actions, such as the plans of an enemy or its counterthrusts.

The limitations of futures analysis and the historical cautions concerning its use mean that the acceptance of any assessment entails risk.

While, as a starting point for defense planning, the assessment of the future security environment is essential, it cannot guarantee the success of

any policy based on its premises. Compiling a comparative assessment

from a balanced mix of representative sources thus appeared to the NDU

Working Group to be the best method of mitigating this risk.
28 QDR 2001

Aspects of an Anticipated Future: Common

Assessments and Consensus Predictions

The comparative analysis generated by the survey of the 36 identified studies identified 16 propositions that represent a general consensus

of the sources. These propositions reflect a common assessment of the

future security environment and mark the boundaries of the most likely

future events. All of the propositions concern the time period

2001–2025. They can be divided into three broad categories: consensus

concerning potential threats, consensus concerning military technology,

and consensus concerning opposing strategies.

Such a “derived consensus” does not represent absolute agreement by

the majority of sources, nor does it represent complete agreement with

Table 2–1. Common Assessments, 2001–2025

Threats:

1. There will not be a rival ideology.

2. There will not be a rival military coalition.

3. There will not be a global military peer competitor.

4. There will be economic competitors, but this competition will not lead to war. 

5. There will be regional powers that will challenge the United States militarily (but there

is disagreement on who—China, Russia, rogue states?).

6. There will be more failing states.

7. There will be more nonstate threats to security.

Military technology:

8. Advanced military technology will become more diffuse.

9. Significant operational intelligence will become commercially available.

10. Other nations will pursue a revolution in military affairs, but the United States will retain

the overall lead in technology.

11. If there is a technological surprise innovation, it is likely to be developed by the 

United States or one of its allies.

Opposing strategies:

12. The United States will retain control of the seas and air. 

13. Regional powers will use antiaccess and area denial strategies.

14. Large-scale combat involving U.S. forces is likely to include the use of WMD. 

15. The homeland of the United States will become increasingly vulnerable to 

asymmetric attacks.

16. Information warfare will become increasingly important.
any proposition by any particular source. It is meant to be a starting point

from which choices about appropriate future strategies, policies, and

force structure can be developed.

Almost every consensus point has a corresponding dissenting or

contrary view. In the process of translating the implications of future

assessment into policy recommendations, the contrary views deserve

consideration, both as cautions against precipitous policy recommendations and also as indicators of potential events against which a prudent

strategy should attempt to hedge. Therefore, the following discussions

identify both the details of the consensus view and the arguments of

prominent dissenters.9

1. There will not be an ideological competitor to democracy on the

scale of Cold War communism.

The propellant of the Cold War was the ideological struggle between

democracy and communism as embodied in the United States and Soviet

Union. With the dramatic victory of the West, ideology as an element of

history did not end, but the rivalry between democratic capitalism and

communism did end, at least for the foreseeable future.

The majority of future security-environment studies—both governmental and private—do not identify any other ideologies with global appeal, and thus do not foresee a competing ideology before at least 2025.10

The expansion of democratic values appears to be a by-product of globalization.11 This does not mean that there will not be authoritarian nations

claiming to be democracies, when in fact their political structure falls far

short. However—with one significant dissenter discussed below—the

consensus remains that the future will be one of an evolutionary increase

in democratic states.12 But the consensus view does include room for potential public discouragement and disillusionment in democracy and

market capitalism.13

Although not professing to be a direct forecast of the future security

environment, the thesis advanced by Samuel Huntington is that there are

cultural challenges to Western-style democracy.14 His view is that cultural

identity plays a significant role in global politics and that there are natural

frictions between the ethnic civilizations of our multipolar, multicivilizational world. In particular, he identifies the Islamic culture, with its traditional linkage between religious and political authority, as posing the

greatest potential challenge to Americanized democratic liberalism by

threatening a clash of civilizations.15

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 29
30 QDR 2001

2. There will not be a rival coalition of states to challenge the

United States militarily. 

The consensus view is that economic and political globalization

makes it unlikely that a rival coalition could form to challenge the United

States militarily. Various nations may express their displeasure at particular U.S. foreign policies or the overall specter of American cultural imperialism, but most would have much to lose and little to gain in an antiU.S. alliance.16 There have been no credible forecasts that the European

Union (EU) interest in developing a unified military force independent

from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will lead to a potential military confrontation with the United States.17

Supporters of the view that a rival coalition is unlikely argue that the

desire of lesser-developed nations, as well as Russia and China, to join the

“first tier” mitigates anti-Western hostility. The closer both nations are

economically tied to the West, the consensus view argues, the less likely

that an anti-U.S. coalition will be formed.

However, a representative dissenting view postulates a loose rival

coalition driven by “an increasingly more assertive China aligned with a

much weaker, authoritarian Russia.” 18 The primary driver would be U.S.

action to deter a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan in the 2010 timeframe.19 The argument is that “while to some extent a worst-case scenario

[and “the least likely to develop by 2025”], the potential for both Japan

and Europe to turn inward and leave the United States alone to face a

major challenge from China and other states is plausible and, as a parameter for future planning, must be considered.” 20

Although this is an unlikely scenario, there has been evidence of a desire on the part of the Russian leadership for a symbolic rapprochement

with China as a way of countering “global domination by the United

States,” especially U.S. criticism of Russian military actions in Chechnya.21

Russia also sought, in late 1999, to recharge its diplomatic relations with

the so-called rogue states.22 Likewise, there have been suggestions that

China would seek to put together alliances that “can defuse hegemonism

by the U.S.” 23

3. There will be no conventional military peer competitor capable

of sustained, long-term power projection beyond its immediate

region.

To define peer competitor, one must ask what the military forces of

the United States can do that those of other nations cannot. The succinct

answer is that the United States is capable of projecting its military
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 31

power on a global basis in a sustained fashion by means of its unparalleled logistics capabilities, including airlift, sealift, an extensive series of

alliances, and expeditionary forces. Other nations can do so only to a

limited extent.24

Whether military peer competitor is defined in terms of a “Soviet

Union–equivalent” or by the capacity to sustain global power projection,

the consensus view is that such a peer competitor cannot develop prior to

2025. It is not simply a question of pursuing the development of powerprojection capabilities; rather, 25 years appear insufficient to duplicate the

unique U.S. logistics and alliance networks.

However, the QDR 1997 report held out the possibility of the emergence of a “regional great power or global peer competitor,” with Russia

and China “seen by some as having the potential to be such competitors,

though their respective futures are quite uncertain.” 25

Additionally, a Russia-China-led alliance could pose the possibility

of simultaneous conflicts in multiple regions, which would severely tax

the ability of U.S. forces to respond. This would be the closest equivalent to a global peer competitor, but it would still not match U.S. powerprojection capabilities.

4. Economic competitors will challenge U.S. domination of the

international economic system, but this will not lead to war.

Propelled by the perception of increasing trade competition between

the United States and Japan, the 1990s saw a series of publications suggesting the potential for military conflicts based on economic rivalry. Although the particular controversy was effectively smothered—at least for

the time being—by the Asian economic downturn of the late 1990s, the

view of a linkage between economic conflict and war has remained. A

staple of Marxist theology and post-First World War assessments, it

resurfaced in the view that the Gulf War was all about oil. The potential

for China to become an economic power, along with the evolving EU,

have also been cited as precursors to politico-military confrontation with

the United States.26

Despite popular concerns, the consensus remains that economic competition need not lead to military confrontation and that it is very unlikely

to do so in the 2001–2025 period. The particulars of U.S.-Japanese economic conflict are largely seen as reconcilable differences that will not affect security arrangements.27 The prevailing view of the phenomenon of

globalization is that such greater economic interconnection decreases,

rather than increases, the potential for military conflict.28
32 QDR 2001

One diverging view, however, holds a contrary view of the conflictual

nature of globalization and global prosperity:

Paradoxically, increased prosperity and integration tends to increase political instability. Prosperity leads to greater economic integration and

dependency resulting in greater insecurity by increasing the importance

of international economic relationships and therefore increasing the opportunities for friction. This, in turn, leads to greater insecurity.29

5. Regional powers may challenge the United States militarily.

The threat that regional powers will challenge the United States militarily and seek to prevent the United States from projecting power into

their regions is universally considered the primary challenge that U.S. foreign and defense policy will face in the first decades of the 21st century.

Regional dangers is the term used over and over again to describe the potential for “the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression

against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.” 30 There is, however, disagreement over which power

will pose such a challenge.

Initially, the first prime regional threat was thought to be the unpredictable actions (or collapse) of North Korea, the world’s last true Stalinist

state. The second was the actions of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or the simmering hostility of Iran towards its Arabian Gulf neighbors and the West.31

However, these two MTWs do not necessarily represent the most demanding future threats. Nations that can sustain sophisticated defense industries and produce significant quantities of relatively modern

weaponry and that have access to a large pool of trainable manpower

would be the most formidable foes. From that perspective, there is clearly

a rank order of potential (and current) regional military powers. Within

this order, almost every futures assessment identifies Russia and China as

having the greatest potential for regional dominance.32

Several additional rogue states, such as Iraq, Iran, or Libya, have the potential of becoming military powers in their region, particularly through

the acquisition of WMD.33 Rogue state scenarios are considered the basis

for two–MTW planning. Rogue states might also seek to use terrorism or

other deniable means, rather than confront the United States directly.

One or more of the rogue states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and

Syria) might seek to challenge the United States militarily in the near

term. Such an assessment is based on current hostilities, plans or desire

for regional dominance, propensity for aggressive military action, or a

pattern of anti-U.S. military activity. In a longer-term view, the potential
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 33

for conflict with a major regional power may grow, with Russia or China

as the most difficult potential military opponents. However, there is no

consensus as to which regional power or rogue state is likely to take action at any particular time.

In the sources surveyed, there are no significant arguments that a regional conflict is unlikely prior to 2025. There is, however, a perception

that effective U.S. actions, along with a well-trained and technologically

superior military, could deter such conflict. Likewise, astute management

of relations with Russia, China, and India may prevent the development

of actual hostilities.34 Some sources argue that hostile states are simply

too weak to mount a credible military threat to the overwhelming power

of the Armed Forces.35 However, a pessimistic view of the constant potential for regional conflict is widespread.

6. There will be more failing states, but U.S. involvement will

remain discretionary.

The terms failed states or failing states have been increasingly used to

describe nations that cannot provide law, order, or basic human necessities

to their population. Such states may be wracked by civil war, ideological or

ethnic hatreds, or other conflicts that prevent the central government from

providing internal security or promoting general welfare.

While the internal consequences of such disorder have long been recognized, the external effects within the international environment have

not always been considered a security threat to distant, stable nations. The

question of exactly where the United States has vital or important interests fuels the argument that American efforts to restore order in failed

states are largely a humanitarian effort that has little positive impact on

U.S. national security. However, there are still compelling arguments for

American intervention to stop genocide or massive loss of life.36 Such arguments contributed to the American decision to prompt NATO intervention in Kosovo. But given the nature of democratic politics, such intervention ultimately remains discretionary.

Few if any sources are willing to predict categorically a future security

environment in which significant numbers of failed states do not occur.37

There are, however, optimistic scenarios that are envisioned, even in the

case of Africa.38 While some sources suggest an increase in the desire to take

action to stem such conflict, others point to an increasing reluctance on the

part of most nations to become involved.39 Additionally, arguments have

been made that advocates of intervention underestimate the complexity of

involvement and that such involvement is often counterproductive.40
34 QDR 2001

7. There will be more nonstate threats to security, but they will

increase gradually, not dramatically. 

The term nonstate threats is used to denote those threats to national

security that are not directly planned or organized by a nation-state.

Today, foremost among these threats are acts of terrorism other than those

sponsored by a rogue state. A loosely defined spectrum of nonstate threats

includes humanitarian disasters, mass migrations, piracy, computer network attack, organized international crime and drug trafficking, terrorism

with conventional weaponry, and terrorism with WMD. Nonstate actors

include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), multinational corporations, and multinational interest groups.

Alarmist predictions that nonstate actors, issues, and threats would

overwhelm and break the abilities of most nation-states to deal with them

have not materialized.41 Nations that have collapsed into anarchy have

largely been victims of civil wars, a phenomenon that long preceded the

current definition of nonstate threats. Many of these civil wars have been

fueled or supported by foreign parties, international actors, or other nations. To that extent, nonstate or transnational threats do contribute to

such internal collapse, but in ways that are not unprecedented historically.

The consensus of the sources is that nonstate threats will increase in

number and intensity in the future. However, this anticipated increase

parallels vulnerabilities that are by-products of the evolutionary process

of globalization. Nonstate threats may seem more potent due to the advantages modern technologies may bring to the perpetrator. However, the

same or other modern technologies can be used to strengthen defenses.

But this does not solve the near-term problems of terrorism, particularly

if terrorist groups come into possession of WMD. The consensus view is

of concern about the near-term potential for terrorist incidents, but the

level of current and future vulnerability of societies to terrorism is still

hotly debated.42

No sources maintain that nonstate threats will not increase in the

2001–2025 timeframe. However, some sources do view the rise of these

threats as exponential rather than gradual, with more alarm than the consensus view might imply. Of particular concern is the possibility of terrorism with WMD, also known as catastrophic terrorism.

43

8. Advanced military technology will become more diffuse.

The category of advanced military technology constitutes a spectrum

of technologies or innovative uses of technology developed during the
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 35

last few decades: from emerging biological weaponry and other WMD, to

new forms of nonlethal weapons, including information operations using

mass media.44 It includes highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles;

fourth-generation combat aircraft; complex surveillance, detection, tracking, and targeting equipment; surface-to-air missiles; nuclear powered

submarines; and other relatively high-cost systems.

The consensus of the sources is that advanced military technology

will continue to be diffused through sales, modification of dual-use systems, and indigenous weapons development programs. Although international export control regimes may exist for certain types of advanced

weapons, these agreements appear to be easily circumvented. Iran, Iraq,

North Korea, Pakistan, and India have all effectively foiled the efforts of

the Missile Technology Control Regime.45 Control regimes appear to have

slowed potential nuclear weapons development by rogue states, but there

appear to be other covert proliferation efforts.

Although there are sources that endorse greater efforts to negotiate

and strengthen weapons control regimes, none argue that military technology will not continue to become more diffuse in the 2001–2025 period. In fact, it is the rate at which military technologies are spreading

that prompts the more urgent calls for international controls. Under current circumstances, proliferation of advanced systems appears to be simply a matter of time and resources.

9. Significant operational intelligence will become 

commercially available.

Given the current trends in space launch and commercialization, the

consensus is that operational intelligence—primarily satellite imagery—

will become more and more commercially available. Yet the consensus is

that the United States will “maintain a preponderant edge, using its technical systems to produce timely and usable information.” 46 The infrastructure necessary is simply too difficult to create except through the obvious expenditure of considerable resources. The consensus viewpoint

concerning militarily significant commercial information is that although

it might be available to a potential aggressor until the commencement of

hostilities, it would be voluntarily or covertly shut down upon the initial

attack. But the fact that operational intelligence would not remain available during conflict may be of little consolation, since the information

obtained before hostilities would be sufficient to target fixed sites, such as

land bases, in advance. The use of WMD might also make the need for

real-time targeting information moot.
36 QDR 2001

None of the sources surveyed suggested that operational intelligence

will not become commercially available in the 2001–2025 timeframe.

Opposition to the consensus view revolved around two points: that satellite information is largely irrelevant to the most likely threats the U.S.

military will face, such as Third World anarchy and small-scale guerrilla

warfare, and that a cut-off of commercial imagery during hostilities cannot be presumed.47

10. Other nations will pursue a revolution in military affairs (RMA),

but the United States will retain the overall technological lead.

A number of advances in military technology are frequently cited as

evidence that an RMA is under way, and even skeptics concede that these

advances have had a tremendous effect on warfighting.48 Advances in information processing and command and control are cited most frequently,

with predictions of increasing availability of real-time information at the

command level. Some proponents claim that new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology and battle management systems can dispel the fog of war that has previously prevented commanders

from having a thoroughly accurate picture of the battlefield.49

Also frequently linked to the RMA are precision weapons. Other

technological advances, from biological weapons to miniaturized “nanosystems,” are also frequently seen as pushing modern warfare away from

the bloody killing fields of ground combat.

Critics concede that the advances in military technology have greatly

increased the striking power of modern militaries. However, they argue

that such advances have not changed the fundamental concept of warfare

and that victory ultimately requires closing with the enemy and occupying territories or destroying centers of gravity.50

Potential opponents may pursue an RMA through the development

of advanced weaponry, but—barring a catastrophic economic disaster in

the West—they cannot surpass the overall U.S. lead in advanced military

technologies during the 2001–2025 timeframe.51 Certain niche technologies, such as advances in chemical and biological warfare or the development of miniaturized nano-weapons that would be easier to transport

and deploy in space or on earth, could provide a temporary technological lead in specific areas.52 Developing such a niche could give a state

with limited resources more bang for its buck, but such a development

would be unlikely to make the entire U.S. arsenal obsolete, or completely

paralyze decisionmaking. At the same time, the overall technological lead
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 37

by the United States would facilitate the development of defenses against

these advantages, or at least methods of mitigating the threat.

While conceding America’s current overall lead in military technology, several sources point to alarming trends. The Nation is not producing enough engineers and scientists to maintain the knowledge capital to

retain the overall technological lead.53 Worse, from this perspective, the

American education system is loyal to potential opponents.54 Eventually

other countries could take technological leadership.

Other sources argue that the United States is not taking the RMA seriously enough and is squandering its technological lead.55 In this view,

DOD continues to spend money on so-called legacy systems, while underfunding both basic and advanced research and development and experimentation. This combination could give opponents an opportunity

to leapfrog over the capabilities of the formidable U.S. arsenal and to

make its overall technological superiority moot.56

11. If there is a technological surprise, it is likely to be developed 

by the United States or one of its allies.

A consensus of the sources examined views a truly unanticipated development in military technology as unlikely in the 2001–2025 period.

But if one were to occur, the consensus view holds that it would most

likely be the product of a Western or developed nation, not a nation hostile to the United States. If a technological surprise were to occur in a hostile state, it is likely that it could be quickly replicated somewhere in the

West. Infrastructure, knowledge base, and commercial incentive appear to

be the drivers of new, surprising innovations, and these are centered in

the democratic capitalist states.57

Among those assessments of the future security environment that

identify potential wildcards, a major technological surprise was listed as

an occurrence of potential concern.58

12. The United States will retain control of the seas and air.

The consensus is that the size and level of operational experience of

the Navy and Air Force make it nearly impossible for potential opponents

to mount a serious challenge in the waters and in the air space over the

world’s oceans.59 This is likely to continue until 2025. Even if potential opponents are not deterred from direct competition against these American

strengths, it would take at least 20 years for any competitor to build to the

numbers and sophistication of the naval and air fleets. That is not to say

that an opponent would not seek to contest sea and air control in its own
38 QDR 2001

region, or even individual force-on-force engagements outside its region.

However, the investment needed to challenge the United States on a global

basis in areas that the Nation has long maintained operational advantages

is staggering.60

No source suggests that U.S. naval and air assets could be decisively

defeated, and particularly not within the global commons in the

2001–2025 period. However, concerns are frequently expressed that the

United States could become complacent with its current margin of superiority and elect not to replace aging systems with more technologically advanced first-line platforms. Over a long term, the cumulative effect of a

procurement holiday might make the bulk of U.S. naval and air forces obsolete.61 The concept of block obsolescence for legacy systems also appears

in the arguments of proponents of transformation. Critics of American

complacency also point to the continuing development of high-technology weaponry for export by technologically advanced nations.

Some also argue that general American dominance of sea and air is

largely irrelevant in dealing with the more likely future threats of terrorism, chemical, biological, and information warfare, and failing states, as

well as against the prepared antiaccess or area denial strategies of

regional opponents.62

13. Regional powers will use antiaccess and area denial strategies.

The potential use of antiaccess or area denial strategies against

American power-projection capabilities has been a focal point of research by the Office of Net Assessment within the Office of the Secretary

of Defense since at least the mid-1990s.63 Originally these studies had a

maritime focus. In the logic of the antiaccess approach, a potential opponent would not seek to engage the Navy at sea, where the United States

holds absolute dominance. Rather, it would seek to prevent U.S. maritime forces from entering its littoral waters by massive attrition attacks

using asymmetric weapons, such as WMD.64 However, these studies were

soon expanded to include examination of all U.S. overseas presence and

power projection forces.

The obvious first step in such an area denial effort would be to neutralize any existing lodgment that the Armed Forces already have within

the region by destroying U.S. forward-presence forces while simultaneously attacking the regional infrastructure for follow-on power projection

forces. Another step would be to attack the ports and airfields for the embarkation of forces in the continental United States (CONUS). However,

that is generally outside of the anticipated conventional capabilities of
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 39

most regional powers.65 Additionally, a strike against the U.S. homeland

could strengthen rather than discourage national resolve.66

With regional land bases destroyed and maritime access denied, the

potential regional opponent would have effectively extended its defenses

out to the entry points of its region. The United States will find itself in the

position of having to undertake potentially costly forcible entry operations. Even in this war of attrition, it is likely that the United States would

eventually breach the antiaccess defenses, particularly through the use of

standoff weapons stationed outside the region or in CONUS. However, the

real goal of an antiaccess strategy is to convince the United States or its allies and coalition partners that the cost of penetration is simply too high.67

The consensus of sources surveyed is that antiaccess or area denial is

the most likely campaign plan for an opponent of the United States to

adopt, and thus the likely opposition that strategic U.S. power projection

forces would face in an MTW. This conclusion is based not only on the

proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons, including WMD, but

also on the underlying logic of the strategy itself.68

None of the sources surveyed maintain that it is unlikely that a potential opponent would adopt an antiaccess strategy in order to prevent

the United States from intervening to stop regional cross-border aggression. If such an MTW were to occur, an antiaccess strategy would appear

the best—perhaps only—method to blunt U.S. power-projection

strength. However, a number of sources see the occurrence of cross-border aggression and MTW as much less likely than the chaos of failed

states and internal civil strife.

Perceptions also differ concerning the actual ability of regional aggressors to carry out regional closure in the 2001–2025 timeframe.69 Several sources suggest that, before 2025, most potential opponents will be

unable to use ballistic missiles effectively against moving targets, leaving

U.S. air and naval forces free to attack the weak points of an antiaccess

campaign.70 Other sources suggest that the ability of rogue states to coerce potential allies into denying American access to their territory has

been overstated.71

14. Large-scale combat involving U.S. forces is likely to include 

the use of WMD. 

The desires of certain states for WMD arsenals, the rate of actual proliferation, a seemingly growing disregard of the laws of armed conflict,

and the lessons of the Gulf War suggest a potential for integration of

WMD into military operations.72 Most sources assume that proliferation
40 QDR 2001

will continue in the 2001–2025 timeframe and that many of the international control regimes seeking to prevent the spread of WMD will break

down or will be ignored. Terrorist groups also appear interested in purchasing or developing WMD. Underlying technologies, particularly dualuse systems such as nuclear reactors that could enrich uranium as well as

generate power, are becoming available to potential aggressors and provide cover for weapons development. Humanitarian NGOs report that

the laws of war appear increasingly to be disregarded, with less and less

discrimination between attacking military forces and civilian noncombatants. Tyrannical regimes facing potential removal by outside forces—such

as those of the United States or a U.S.-led coalition—appear increasingly

tempted to use WMD in combat.

The majority of the sources surveyed view the likelihood of use of

WMD during large-scale conflict in the 2001–2025 period as quite high.

The consensus is that use of chemical or biological weapons would be

more likely than nuclear war. Many sources view WMD use as the primary future threat to American security. There seems to be agreement

that, if certain rogue states have WMD, they would be used for the survival of tyrannical regimes.

The potential of WMD in the hands of terrorist groups is considered

a more frightening situation by many sources. Terrorist attacks could be

directed against vulnerable civilian populations as well as military forces.

There is a perception, however, that use of WMD against the United

States in conflict can be deterred.73 The rate of increase in nuclear arsenals during 2001–2025 does not suggest that more than perhaps two or

three states, if any, could threaten the United States with mutual destruction. Because chemical and biological weapons are routinely categorized

along with nuclear weapons as WMD, there is, by definition, ambiguity as

to whether use of chemical or biological weapons would provoke a U.S.

nuclear retaliation. Thus, the use of WMD against forces in large-scale

armed conflict with the United States might be deterred by the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Sources that view chemical and biological weapons as the significant threats of the 2001–2025 period do not necessarily dispute the deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or even the deterrent effect of

conventional power-projection forces. Rather, they argue that it is possible to use WMD on American soil or against U.S. forces in a manner

that could render the source of the attack unidentifiable.74 If they could

make it appear to be a terrorist attack, potential state opponents might
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 41

believe that they could successfully attack the United States without retribution.75 They might use ostensibly unsponsored terrorist groups as

proxies in a WMD attack designed to paralyze American response to

far-off regional aggression.

Other sources argue that technology (and the American psyche) will

inevitably render such attacks attributable, mitigating the attractiveness

of such a reckless course of action. An additional deterrent might be U.S.

theater ballistic missile defenses. If positioned in theater prior to the actual outbreak of conflict, such defenses might deter WMD use in the initial stages, or perhaps deter the entire conflict itself.

It has also been suggested that a U.S. declaratory counterproliferation

policy of pursuing regime change in the event of WMD use, or threats of

use, would also have considerable deterrent effect. If the likely end result

of any WMD confrontation with the United States or ally would be the

decapitation of the aggressor, rogue states might reconsider any potential

tactical advantages of WMD use.76

15. The U.S. homeland will become increasingly vulnerable to

asymmetric attacks.

The perception that the U.S. homeland will become increasingly vulnerable in the 2001–2025 period can be traced to the National Defense

Panel report of 1997. It has subsequently become an almost universal

forecast. In 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

echoed the prevailing perception that “America will become increasingly

vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us.” 77

With the end of the Cold War and the agreed de-alerting of nuclear

forces, along with reductions in overall U.S. and Russia nuclear arsenals, it

would appear that the American populace is much less directly vulnerable

than they have been in at least 30 years. However, others point to the balance of terror that made a nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union irrational. Rogue states, they argue, are less likely to be deterred

from making asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland in the event of a

conflict.78 Indeed, asymmetric attacks may be the most useful—and perhaps only—military tool in the hands of potential opponents.79

The consensus is that the U.S. homeland will become more vulnerable to new threats, particularly chemical and biological weapons in the

hands of rogue states and terrorist groups.80 The ability to transport such

weapons in small packages that can easily be smuggled is often cited as a

contributing factor. In addition, rogue regimes such as in North Korea are
42 QDR 2001

attempting to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States. States that do not possess fissile material could opt for

chemical or biological warheads.

Realization that the forward-defense posture allows for only limited

defense of the U.S. coastline and airspace has increased.81 At the same

time, the Internet and the ubiquitous nature of computer control seem to

have made the American infrastructure more vulnerable to information

warfare. Computer network defenses are possible, but at both financial

and social costs.

The consensus position differs from more alarming forecasts on

questions of the degree of future vulnerability. The majority view is that

the increase in such threats is evolutionary, rather than exponential. As

use of the Internet continues to penetrate society, the vulnerability to disruption increases, but so will redundant and protected systems. As globalization causes a rise in transnational or nonstate threats, such as massive

migrations, its economic benefits may mitigate such threats. Meanwhile,

the United States appears to be taking steps to deal with the potential for

catastrophic terrorism and infrastructure attack.82

Several sources suggest that the rate of development of future

threats—fueled primarily by the malicious use of new technologies—is

indeed increasing dramatically. From this perspective, increasing homeland vulnerability is inevitable, particularly if active defenses, interagency

cooperation efforts, redundancy, and reconstitution do not receive substantial funding increases within the U.S. defense budget.

16. Information warfare will become increasingly important.

Information warfare refers both to the use of various measures to attack the information technology (IT) systems on which a military opponent may depend and to the control and manipulation of the information available to the civilian populace of an opposing state.83 Computer

network attack might be aimed at systems providing the ISR or command

and control capabilities necessary for modern, high-technology warfare,

or it might be an asymmetric strike on the civilian infrastructure of the

opponent’s homeland. Additionally, an IT-based public relations war

could have a less lethal and more indirect effect on the populace than

computer infrastructure attack, but as seen in the Vietnam War experience, it could have a more direct effect on the government’s willingness to

prosecute a war.84

The U.S. government has recently addressed computer network defense and critical infrastructure protection, but in the face of an emerging
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 43

and somewhat indistinct threat, defense necessarily lags offense.85 An aspect of concern to some is the potential anonymity of attack and the possible use of information warfare by nonstate actors, particularly terrorist

groups. Hackers and terrorists could use multiple paths of entry to disguise their identities and intentions.86 Although it is possible to trace these

paths to a source, such efforts take time and resources.87 The question remains whether a hostile state could mask an information attack to such an

extent that the United States would be unable to determine the source in

order to take timely defensive or retaliatory actions.

In classical military terms, the use of information is an attempt to lift

the fog of war that envelops the battlefield. Commanders have always

tried to acquire accurate information; what is different is that modern IT

appears to provide a greater opportunity to clear away the fog than ever

before. Thus, it is natural for U.S. forces to strive for “information dominance” or “knowledge superiority” in any conflict.88 The fact that there

are more tools to make more information available suggests that information has become more important to victory.89 This also implies that deception, disinformation, and the use of mass media are also of increasing

value as military tools.

The consensus of sources is that information is increasing in importance as IT increases in reach and capacity. But the growing dependence

on precise information for combat operations also creates greater opportunities for deception. Technologically superior armies, like open societies, appear more vulnerable to denial and deception than less interconnected forces or closed societies.

While there is no overt disagreement with the proposition that information will be a critical element in future warfare, there is disagreement

over the extent to which information—and, by extension, information

warfare—will be the dominant element.

An opposing viewpoint is that modern IT does ensure that the fog of

war can be lifted and suggests that the U.S. military must be radically

transformed in order to optimize its capabilities in an information warfare-dominant future.90

Divergence and Contradictions

The 16 points of consensus form a baseline from which an effective

debate on defense planning priorities, during QDR 2001 or any other defense review, could proceed. Likely issues of such a debate can be identified from the diverging views and contradictions among the 36 surveyed
44 QDR 2001

sources. These alternative assessments of the future are presented here as

either-or statements, but there are varying degrees of agreement, and the

either-or statements generally represent the extreme ends of the range.

Table 2–2. Divergence and Contradictions

Nature of conflict: 

1. A. It is unlikely that two MTWs would happen simultaneously.

or

B. Two nearly simultaneous MTWs will remain a possibility. 

2. A. Future wars will be more brutal with more civilian casualties.

or

B. Information operations and precision weapons will make warfare less deadly.

3. A. Chaos in littorals or panic in the city are more likely contingencies than MTW.

or

B. MTW will remain the primary threat to security.

4. A. Space will be a theater of conflict.

or

B. Space will remain a conduit of information, but not a combat theater.

Threats:

5. A. A near-peer competitor is inevitable over the long term; we need to prepare now.

or

B. Preparing for a near-peer will create a military competition (thus creating a near-peer). 

6. A. Overseas bases will be essentially indefensible.

or

B. Future capabilities will be able to defend overseas bases.

Opposing Strategies:

7. A. Current (legacy) U.S. forces will not be able to overcome antiaccess strategies except 

at high cost.

or

B. Techniques of deception or denial of information will remain effective in allowing legacy

systems to penetrate future antiaccess efforts.

8. A. Nuclear deterrence will remain a vital aspect of security.

or

B. Nuclear deterrence will have an increasingly smaller role in future security.

9. A. Conventional military force will not deter terrorism or nonstate threats.

or

B. U.S. military capabilities will retain considerable deterrent or coercive effects against 

terrorism and nonstate threats.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 45

For the purpose of defense planning, identification of contending

predictions about the future security environment is the prelude for making deliberate choices on how to prepare for and perhaps to hedge against

an analytically uncertain future.

1. (A) It is unlikely that two MTWs would happen simultaneously.

or 

(B) Two nearly simultaneous MTWs will remain a possibility. 

A number of critical assessments—some of which are linked to a recommended strategy or force structure different from the current posture—discount the possibility of two MTWs occurring nearly simultaneously. Preparing for two such overlapping contingencies is dismissed as

unsupportable worst-case thinking. Yet, despite dismissive rhetoric, few

present detailed logic as to why such an occurrence could not happen.

Taking a cue from the National Defense Panel, many analysts find the

two-MTW construct inconvenient to their recommendations for transformation, since readiness for the simultaneous scenarios requires considerable expenditure of resources and the maintenance of considerable

standing forces.

When assessments of potential regional conflicts (derived from consensus point number 5 above) are combined, the possibility of crises or

conflicts developing nearly simultaneously in two or more regions seems

plausible. There are both historical precedents and strategic logic for a

potential regional opponent to make aggressive moves when conflicts are

occurring in other parts of the world. While the United States is responding to the first conflict or contingency, an aggressor might believe that the

objectives of a second conflict would be easier to achieve.

It has become common to describe recent NATO actions against Serbia—presumed to be a smaller-scale contingency—as using one MTWworth of airpower.91 If SSCs occur at a near-continuous rate, it is almost

inevitable that two or more will occur nearly simultaneously. The United

States may not choose to involve itself in more than one SSC, but if it did

choose to handle two, what would happen if one or both were to require

an effort worth two MTWs? The divergence of views on the probability of

overlapping MTWs, like the other contradicting statements, forms fundamental issues of the debates to be expected in the QDR 2001 process.
46 QDR 2001

2. (A) Future wars will be more brutal with more civilian casualties.

or 

2. (B) Information operations and precision weapons will make 

warfare less deadly. 

The question of whether future wars will be characterized by greater

brutality and greater civilian casualties or instead by more discriminate

attacks and fewer civilian casualties often arises in debates concerning the

existence and effect of an RMA and the importance of information warfare. At one end is the view that the trend is toward a “world of warriors”

in which youthful populations of less economically developed nations are

involved in ethnic, religious, or tribal conflict. This gives rise to more brutal forms of warfare, in which in the international laws of war are rarely

observed.92 The ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and Kosovo (along with a

myriad of civil wars), conducted largely by paramilitary terror squads

whose primary activities involve the killing of unarmed civilians, are cited

as representations of the future of war.93 Combatants and noncombatants

are rarely distinguished. Victory consists of complete destruction of the

lives and property of an enemy.94 Such wars will involve ethnic cleansing,

genocide, mass movement of refugees, famine, torture, and rape.

Weapons can range from the primitive to the merely unsophisticated.

While armored vehicles, artillery, and shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles

may be used, the dominant platform is the individual warrior—as young

as 12 or under—and the small arms carried.95 Commercial global positioning system receivers and cellular phones are useful, but not essential

for operations. The implication is that the sophisticated precision

weapons, along with the information systems, that characterize U.S.

Armed Forces have relatively little effect against such an enemy.96

At the other end is the vision that precision weapons and information

warfare will make warfare both less likely and less bloody. Kosovo is also

used as an illustrative case, this time as an example of how precision

bombing, with considerable effort to spare civilian lives and property, was

able to win a modern war and reverse ethnic cleansing. Because such precision strikes rely on accurate ISR, the processing of information is a

dominant feature of this style of war. Proponents of information warfare

argue that the manipulation of information may, in itself, preclude physical combat in future conflicts.97 Under perfect conditions, it is argued, the

manipulation of information will prevent a populace from going to war

by persuading its members that the war is unjustified or is already over, or

turning them against governments intent on war.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 47

Somewhere in between these views is the argument that future wars

will not necessarily be more brutal, but that precision strike and information warfare do not presage an era of immaculate warfare. The U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, while generally enthusiastic

about the precise effects of emerging military technology, expresses this

middle ground in its findings:

Despite the proliferation of highly sophisticated and remote means of

attack, the essence of war will remain the same. There will be casualties,

carnage, and death; it will not be like a video game. What will change is

the kinds of actors and the weapons available to them. While some

societies will attempt to limit violence and damage, others will seek to

maximize them, particularly against those societies with a lower tolerance for casualties.98

3. (A) Chaos in littorals or panic in the city are more likely

contingencies than MTW. 

3. or 

3. (B) MTW will remain the primary threat to security.

The issue of the separation between military personnel and civilians,

or between combatants and noncombatants, underlies the question of

where and how future warfare will take place. Classical warfare is assumed to take place between clearly identified armies in terrain suitable

for direct engagements. History—replete with siege warfare, attacks on

infrastructure, and massacres of civilian populations—may demonstrate

that the ideal is actually an exception. However, there remains the popular

impression that war is, or at least should be, about defeating cross-border

aggression as envisioned in the current MTW scenarios.

Of course, the Armed Forces are used for more than MTWs.

Throughout its history, America has called on its Armed Forces to deal

with many contingencies outside of formally declared wars. These contingencies have ranged from punitive expeditions to humanitarian interventions. The number of such SSCs has greatly increased since the end of the

Cold War. Along with a greater propensity on the part of American decisionmakers to intervene, American military involvement in MTW against

cross-border aggression has been relatively rare. From this perspective,

Operation Desert Storm represents the exception rather than the rule.99

Given the apparent increase in the number and frequency of nonstate

threats and the potential for asymmetric operations, it has been suggested

that the primacy of the DOD focus on preparing for classical MTW is a
48 QDR 2001

mistake. The threats of the future, according to this view, will be significantly different and require a different emphasis in preparations.

One perspective is that future conflicts—particularly those within

failed states—will present little opportunity for firepower-intensive warfare.

There will be no front lines, no rear areas, and, in some cases, no clearly

identifiable enemy force. Rather, there will be an overall atmosphere of

chaos in which the primary mission of U.S. military forces will be to establish order and to quell violence in the most humane way possible. Forecasts

sponsored by the Marine Corps point to the continuing urbanization of the

world’s population and the continued breakdown of failed states as leading

to numerous tribal-like conflicts.100 Apropos of a naval service, Marine

Corps–sponsored briefs point to the fact that over 70 percent of the world’s

urban population is within the operating range of a coastline, otherwise

known as the littoral region. Chaos in the littorals is shorthand for such future contingencies that occur within the region, intervention into which

could potentially be done best by forces from the sea.101

A slightly different perspective can be termed panic in the city,

spurred by the potential use of chemical or biological weapons in urban

areas. Proponents of this view are concerned that asymmetric or terrorist

attacks could create chaotic conditions within the U.S. homeland.102 The

U.S. military would be expected to stabilize chaotic conditions not only

overseas, but also to do the same at home. While many emerging strategy

alternatives call for increased military involvement in homeland security,

most assume that the military would play merely a support role to civil

authorities, providing resources that may not be readily available in the

civil sector. In contrast, those who view panic as the new weapon envision

homeland security as the preliminary or even the primary mission of the

Armed Forces. The implication is that civilians cannot face the physical or

psychological aspects of the chemical and biological warfare threat alone

and that both precautions and responses should be a direct military function. Once the perception of homeland sanctuary is broken by an actual

attack, the American population would panic into fleeing toward areas of

perceived safety and demand that their elected officials cease whatever

foreign activities may have provoked such an attack. To prevent such a

scenario, sources argue, the military needs to refocus its efforts away from

the less likely case—classical military response to cross-border aggression—and toward the more direct and more likely threats of asymmetric

attacks against the homeland and the use of panic as a weapon of the

globalized future.103
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 49

In contrast, a significant number of sources continue to view MTW

as the most likely warfare in which the United States would become involved, and job number one for its military. From this perspective,

America’s large-scale warfighting capability is the primary deterrent of

both chaos and asymmetric attack. The divergence of opinion on

whether future warfare will primarily take the form of chaos in the littorals and panic in the city, or will mostly resemble the expected forms

of MTW, appears to be more related to preferred prioritization of threats

than any conclusive forecast of wars to come. But there is evidence on

both sides of the issue.

4. (A) Space will be a theater of conflict. 

or 

4. (B) Space will remain a conduit of information, but not a combat 

theater.

The question of the so-called militarization of space is particularly

contentious. Space-based ISR is critical to U.S. military operations. They

gave such an informational and command and control advantage during

Operation Desert Storm that some have referred to the Gulf War as “the

first space war.” 104 However, there are great distinctions between the military use of space, a war from space, and a war in space.105 Every future assessment predicts increasing use of space assets by the military; however,

there are wide differences over whether a war from or in space could

occur in the timeframe prior to 2025.106

A number of sources are very certain of the potential for a force-onforce space war. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century’s

“Major Themes and Implications” states explicitly that “Space will become a critical and competitive military environment. Weapons will likely

be put in space. Space will also become permanently manned.” 107

An opposing viewpoint is the forecast that militarization of space is

not likely to occur prior to 2025. This reasoning projects a continuing

U.S. advantage in military space systems based on its previous investment

and infrastructure development. From this posture, “the United States is

in a good position to win any ensuing arms race.” 108 Another potential inhibitor of space-based weapons are the international treaties governing

space activities.109

But skeptics of treaty prohibitions tend to share a view of the inevitability of the introduction of space weaponry in the 2001–2025 timeframe. As former Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall argued, “We

have a lot of history that tells us that warfare migrates where it can—that
50 QDR 2001

nations engaged in conflict do what they can, wherever they must. At a

very tender age, aviation went from a peaceful sport, to a supporting

function, very analogous to what we do today in space—to a combat arm.

Our space forces may well follow that same path.” 110 A similar argument

was made by the DOD Space Architect in 1997: “To hope that there will

never be conflict in space is to ignore the past.” 111

5. (A) A near-peer competitor is inevitable over the long term; we

need to prepare now. 

5. or 

5. (B) Preparing for a near-peer will create a military competition

(thus creating a near-peer). 

As discussed above in consensus point number 3, the development of

a global military near-peer competitor to the United States prior to 2025

is unlikely. However, that forecast does not quell the debate on whether

such a near-peer is inevitable in the long term. Sources that view a nearpeer as inevitable base their argument on historical example; every aging

leader is eventually challenged by younger, growing competitors. To ignore this is also to ignore the past. In the study of international relations,

there appears always to be a struggle among states to become the hegemon that dominates the international system.112 Even scholars who question the morality of hegemonic control—and in particular the apparent

U.S. position as the current hegemonic power—appear to believe that

such a struggle is natural between states.

If the struggle for hegemonic control is the natural order of the international system, it would also be natural that those responsible for the security of the United States—including its freedom, its institutions, its

population, and its prosperity—would prepare for such a struggle. While

there may be a continuous debate as to which preparations are most appropriate and how the outbreak of hostilities can be deterred in the near

term, there seems to be agreement among many that a dissatisfied state

could eventually build itself into a military near-peer to the United States

sometime after 2025. The belief in the inevitability of a near-peer is also

reflective of consensus point number 8 that “advanced military technology will become more diffuse.” As military technology becomes more diffuse, it appears inevitable that any American advantage in military technology will gradually shrink, creating de facto near-peer competitors.

There is, however, an alternative view on the inevitability of military

near-peer competition. In this view, it is not “natural order” that causes

near-peer challengers to arise, but, rather, the actions of the leading power
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 51

that cause such a competition.113 Supporters of this view range from those

who see a competitive international system as an anomaly of the capitalist

world to those who view gradual world democratization as eventually leading to a world free from major war, under the premise that democracies do

not fight democracies. Others subscribe to the belief that near-peer competition is not inevitable as an unspoken corollary to their idea that a leading

power can take actions that prevent such a competition from occurring. To

some extent, such a view underlies the premises of the proposal by Ashton

Carter and William Perry for “preventive defense.” 114

The question of the inevitability of a near-peer competitor after 2025

is not merely an academic question. It ties directly to the choice of a future defense policy. If conflict with a near-peer competitor is inevitable

after 2025, it would behoove the United States to take distinct steps to develop a defense policy and force structure that would retain military superiority sufficient to dissuade, deter, or—if necessary—defeat a potential

near-peer opponent.115

However, if it is actual or proposed military preparations of the hegemon that propel other states to seek parity, it may be in the interest of the

United States to break the cycle of increasing military expenditures in

order to prevent the development of a near-peer. Specific policies could

be adopted—along the lines of preventive defense—that seek to co-opt or

to manage a potential near-peer by allowing a degree of American vulnerability in order to preserve the current balance, which appears to favor the

United States.116

6. (A) Overseas bases will be essentially indefensible. 

or 

6. (B) Future capabilities will be able to defend overseas bases.

The potential reach of opponents into space, along with the adoption

of other techniques of antiaccess or area denial warfare, would have a

damaging impact on the overseas bases upon which America’s current

power-projection forces appear to depend. If the 2001–2025 period is indeed one in which potential opponents strengthen their antiaccess capabilities (as appears to be the consensus in point number 13 above), then

the threat to overseas bases would appear to increase. This forecast is

commonly accepted.117 However, there is a debate among the sources as to

whether the nature of the future security environment, and the laws of

physics and diffusion of technology, will make an overwhelming threat to

fixed land bases permanent.
52 QDR 2001

To the bases-will-be-indefensible school, defensive measures simply

cannot keep up with the offensive threat that places fixed military forces

at grave risk.118 In this perspective, the action-reaction phenomenon of

military technological development naturally favors offensive systems.

Even with theater ballistic missile defenses in place, overseas bases could

be attacked with WMD by other means of delivery, such as cruise missiles, attack aircraft, or artillery shells.

At the same time, there may be political vulnerabilities that make

overseas bases, particularly those within the sovereign territory of a host

nation, much more difficult to defend. The host nation may seek to placate

a potential aggressor by insisting that defenses be kept minimal in order to

maintain the current strategic balance. If the base relies on the movement

of mobile defenses into the theater, such as Patriot missile batteries, then

they are vulnerable to preemptive attack or coercion. The host nation may

decide not to let the United States use its base facilities lest such permission provoke an attack by a regional aggressor. This would make mounting

a power-projection campaign considerably more difficult.

It may be a reaction to the implications for American power projection that causes other sources to insist that overseas bases could be successfully defended in the 2001–2025 timeframe. To admit growing vulnerability could cause undesired revolutionary changes in the allocation

of defense resources. However, the view that bases can be defended also

argues that emerging military technologies can make defenses against

WMD more effective. The continuing and natural lead of America and its

allies in emerging military technology, as identified in consensus points

10 and 11, cause some to conclude that defenses can match offenses, particularly when backed by the eventual triumph of qualitatively (and possibly quantitatively) superior U.S. power projection.119 Likewise, the regional use of WMD may be deterred by the vast U.S. nuclear arsenal, use

of which might be provoked by significant casualties of American military personnel or host-nation civilians. Other sources argue that overseas

bases can be defended by sea-based or space-based systems.

Additionally, there is the argument that the vulnerability of land bases

actually works to the advantage of the Nation. If overseas-based U.S. forces

are attacked, then it is likely that U.S. determination to push for the enemy’s

regime change would be reinforced. This perception could potentially deter

a regional aggressor from launching such a strike. Also, the vulnerability of

the host-nation’s territory to an aggressor might provoke the host nation to

seek greater rather than lesser military cooperation with the United States.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 53

Some also argue that any host nation that could be coerced to restrict U.S.

access to bases is an ally simply not worth defending.120

7. (A) Current (legacy) U.S. forces will not be able to overcome

antiaccess strategies except at high cost. 

7. or 

7. (B) Techniques of deception or denial of information will remain

effective in allowing legacy systems to penetrate future

antiaccess efforts.

The debate on the defensibility of overseas bases has a parallel with

that on the continuing effectiveness of power-projection forces. Supported by the same data concerning the growing development of antiaccess systems and strategies (consensus point 13), a number of sources

suggests that the power-projection forces of the United States—as they

are currently constituted—will have increasing difficulty penetrating antiaccess defenses in the 2001–2025 period.

The proponents of this view, however, do not necessarily see these developments as an evolutionary challenge to which the United States can

modify and adapt its current forces. Rather they see this as a revolutionary

development that is enabled, in part, by foreign adaptation to the RMA.

This position leads to the advocacy of radical changes in the U.S. defense

posture. Indeed, the perception of the growing strength of antiaccess

strategies is a major impetus to calls for defense transformation.

In contrast, there remains a body of literature that characterizes antiaccess strategies as natural aspects of war that require incremental improvements in U.S. power-projection forces, but are not a revolutionary

development requiring radical change. This view argues that current developments, particularly in theater missile defense and standoff and precision weapons, allow power-projection capabilities to keep pace with antiaccess systems.121 The Army vision of a strategically responsive force that

is less dependent on heavy equipment and multiple air- and sea-lifts contributes to the perception that power projection forces may become even

more effective in the 2001–2025 period.122

8. (A) Nuclear deterrence will remain a vital aspect of security. 

8. or 

8. (B) Nuclear deterrence will have a smaller role in future security.

Sources are split in their assessment of the importance of nuclear

weapons and the validity of traditional nuclear deterrence in the

2001–2015 period. On the one hand are those who see nuclear weapons
54 QDR 2001

as decreasingly effective tools in deterring war.123 On the other are those

sources who concede that nuclear weapons may have a different role

than at the height of the Cold War, but who argue that they remain 

the ultimate deterrent, with considerable effect on the actions of even

rogue states.124

Many who state a moral opposition to nuclear weapons have translated

this into forecasts of a globalized world in which nuclear deterrence no

longer makes sense. With greater economic interdependence, this argument

runs, even the so-called rogue states will be reconciled to the international

order, renouncing or reducing their overt or covert nuclear arsenals.

Sources that view future conflict as consisting primarily of brutal civil

wars in undeveloped states—along with Western intervention to prevent

suffering and injustice—see no utility in nuclear weapons. From a considerably different perspective, some suggest that the RMA has simply

passed nuclear weapons by. If information operations will be the dominant form of conflict in an internetted world, the use of nuclear weapons

would seem merely suicidal. Nuclear effects, such as electromagnetic

pulses (EMP), hold the potential of destroying much of the technical access to information on which both war and international society are dependent. Again, there would seem to be no utility in nuclear warfighting,

and therefore nuclear deterrence is confined to a background role. Others

who focus on the potential for RMA advances to make national missile

defenses effective argue that a defense-dominant world will eventually

lead to the abolition of nuclear arsenals. Some sources argue that nuclear

deterrence has little effect on irrational rogue regimes and terrorist

groups, the two types of adversaries most likely to attempt asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Others view nuclear weapons as retaining considerable deterrent effect, even on rogue regimes. Since, it is argued, active defenses can never

be 100 percent effective, the potential for nuclear destruction will remain.

Nuclear deterrence therefore retains a considerable role in protecting the

homeland from WMD.125 A few sources suggest that a world in which

there are more nuclear powers is a world in which interstate conflict is

much less likely.126 Peace would be even more dependent on nuclear deterrence than it is today.

Divergence of views on the importance of nuclear deterrence in

2001–2025 seems to presage a continuing debate on that portion of future

American defense policy.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 55

9. (A) Conventional military force will not deter terrorism or

nonstate threats. 

9. or 

9. (B) U.S. military capabilities will retain considerable deterrent or

coercive effects against terrorism and nonstate threats.

Sources that focus on the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. homeland

and on the potential for asymmetric attack tend to doubt the ability of

conventional military force to deter such attacks. Many of these sources

tend to downplay the role of nuclear weapons and assume that potential

opponents would concentrate on developing chemical or biological WMD,

rather than expend resources on developing an extensive nuclear arsenal.

Biological weapons, in particular, are frequently assumed to be immune to

deterrence by conventional military forces, and possibly by nuclear

weapons as well.127 The logic is that opponents who would be so irrational

or immoral as to use biological weapons (particularly against civilian populations) would not easily be swayed by the threat of extensive damage to

their own people.128 More importantly, terrorist groups—having no state or

population to protect—do not necessarily present the vulnerabilities of a

traditional military opponent. If there is an inherent difficulty in determining the actual perpetrators of a biological attack, then there may be no apparent target for conventional (or nuclear) forces to attack.

An opposing viewpoint is that there are always vulnerabilities that

can be attacked—even for terrorist groups.129 Presumably, terrorists act

for causes that have overt elements, such as political independence for a

certain population. Contrary to the most alarmist speculations, effective

terrorist groups tend not to be crazy or self-destructive.130 Proponents of

this position point to the example of the 1986 Eldorado Canyon reprisal

on Libya, which appeared to cause Muammar Qaddafi to reduce his support of terrorist activities.131 With a combination of intelligence, overt

reprisal, covert reprisal, effective law enforcement, and some degree of

consequence management preparations, it would seem possible that terrorist activities—particularly with weapons as sophisticated as WMD,

which are extremely difficult to obtain or to utilize effectively—could be

prevented, dissuaded, or deterred.

Conclusion

The nine points of divergence described above are based on differing

assumptions concerning the implications of the previously identified consensus points. It is possible for opposing points of view to accept the plausibility of any or all of the consensus points and yet to advocate substantially
56 QDR 2001

different defense policies. This allows for the development of baseline expectations that American defense policy will need to fulfill to maintain security in 2001–2025. From this baseline, alternative options for policy can

be explored. In developing likely strategy choices for the QDR, the working

group incorporated the differing positions on the nine points into the alternative worldviews that drive the choices.

The identification of divergent viewpoints helps to frame the more

contentious issues of the defense debate. But, in addition, it suggests that

there may be potential developments that future defense policies may

need to hedge against. If reputable, well-informed sources differ as to the

future impact of chaos and urban warfare, for example, or on the future

role of nuclear deterrence, it may be prudent to develop policies that are

effective under multiple alternatives. Another element that suggests the

need for hedging strategies is the identification of outliers and wildcards.

Constructing a Consensus Scenario

Having identified the points of consensus appropriate for consideration in the QDR 2001 process, the task is to present these findings in a

way that is useful for defense planning. Constructing a consensus scenario that identifies a baseline common view of the expected future is a

logical starting point. To this baseline can be added the contentious issues and appropriate potential wildcards. The alternative views of the

dissenters can then be used as conceptual excursions from the baseline.

Table 2–3. Consensus Scenario

In 2001–2025, U.S. military forces need to prepare for:

■ military challenges by a regional competitor;

■ attempts by a regional competitor to attack the U.S. homeland utilizing 

asymmetrical means;

■ use of antiaccess and area denial strategies by regional competitors;

■ use of WMD by regional competitors as part of antiaccess operations;

■ involvement in failed states and in response to nonstate threats at the discretion 

of national command authorities (but some degree of involvement is inevitable);

■ operations in urban terrain and under “chaotic” conditions (by some, but not all, of the force);

■ continual diffusion of military technology to potential competitors and 

nonstate actors;

■ high level of information warfare.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 57

By means of these excursions, policy decisions based on the consensus

scenario can be evaluated in terms of their ability to hedge against alternative futures. Table 2–3 provides the outline for a baseline consensus

scenario that incorporates both the points of consensus and common aspects of some of the points of divergence. The consensus scenario for

2001–2025 can also be presented in narrative form as outlined in the

following discussion.

The most critical challenge to the Armed Forces will be readily identifiable military threats by one or more regional competitors. These regional competitors will not have the global power-projection capabilities

of the United States and will not be able to mount militarily significant

operations outside of their own immediate regions against the Armed

Forces. U.S. control of the global commons of sea and international airspace will remain relatively secure.

But, because they cannot compete as a global military peer, regional

competitors will seek to increase their chances of success by developing

the capabilities to conduct limited attacks on the U.S. homeland and by

excluding the military from their immediate region using antiaccess or

area denial strategies and systems.

In peacetime, their intent will be to create an appearance that the

United States would not have the means or will to prevail in a conflict in

their region, thus neutralizing potential allied support for American actions. In wartime, their intent would be more to achieve a political settlement favorable to their objectives than to inflict a decisive military defeat

on the Armed Forces. The threat of severe American personnel casualties

is increased through the possession and use of WMD against forward-deployed forces and U.S. power-projection forces entering the region, or the

allied infrastructure that could support U.S. intervention. It will be increasingly difficult to defend overseas U.S. land bases from mass attacks.

The likelihood of WMD use in these circumstances is high, although the

weapons used are likely to be chemical or biological rather than nuclear.

WMD attacks would likely be focused on military forces or supporting infrastructure rather than U.S. or allied populations. This will

not be the result of moral qualms, but rather an attempt to prevent the

equivalent of the Pearl Harbor effect on the United States (or one of its

allies) provoked to seek revenge. Another potential aspect of WMD use

would be a nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) in an attempt to eliminate the U.S. advantage in ISR command, control, and

communications (C3) systems.
58 QDR 2001

As an adjunct to their antiaccess efforts, and in an attempt to sway

U.S. public opinion toward a political settlement, regional competitors

would attempt to conduct a high level of information warfare. American

public opinion will be seen as a center of gravity. Information warfare—

as well as overall antiaccess capabilities—will be facilitated by a continual diffusion of advanced military technologies throughout the world.

This diffusion includes access to commercial imagery and communication via space systems.

However, the diffusion of military technology is not likely to cause a

reduction in the U.S. advantage in military technology, which derives from

overall American economic and technological strengths. It is likely that

major technological breakthroughs will occur primarily in the United

States or its economically developed allies, generated through commercial

efforts. Regional competitors may be able to generate a temporary military

advantage in a particular technological niche, but such advantages will not

hold for long. Opponents’ access to commercial satellite systems is not

likely to continue during hostilities against the United States.

Increased military technology will also be sought by potential nonstate adversaries, such as terrorist groups, and in the myriad of civil conflicts erupting in an increasing number of failed states. Military intervention against nonstate actors and in failed states will be expected

missions, although not the primary ones, for the Armed Forces. Such interventions or SSCs will continue to remain discretionary, and different

U.S. administrations may choose differing levels of involvement. However, some level of involvement appears inevitable. As part of these interventions (and possibly as part of a regional war), some portion of the

U.S. military will be expected to conduct operations in urban terrain and

under chaotic conditions.

The Armed Forces will be expected to utilize available assets in humanitarian assistance and in support for domestic civil authorities. Likewise, homeland defense—in response to asymmetric threats—will be an

expanding mission. Evolving challenges in homeland defense will include

the possibilities of limited ballistic missile attacks by rogue states and the

potential use of chemical or biological weapons by terrorists. However,

the majority of the U.S. military will be required to remain organized to

conduct power-projection operations during regional conflicts, a posture

conceptually similar to today.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 59

Events to Hedge Against 

In addition to the use of the consensus scenario as a planning tool,

there are a number of wildcards or unlikely events that a prudent defense

plan would consider as potential contingencies. Wildcards can be defined

as risks to national security that, by their very nature, cannot be predicted

or fully anticipated.132 However, the effects of some wildcards could be so

devastating to American security that their consideration in creating

hedging strategies is of vital importance.133 These include an eventual

military near-peer competitor; an alliance of regional competitors; attempts to leap-frog into space warfare; collapse of key ally or regional

support; and a trend toward a world of warriors.

This list is based on both a review of the points of divergence and an

examination of wildcards identified during the survey of sources. Some

appeared inappropriate for defense planning and are not included in the

five events identified above.134 The five events selected have three features

in common: they are events for which preparations in military planning

or force structure are practicable; if they occurred, then their effects

would be magnified by the expected trends identified by the consensus

security environment; and they hold the potential to create significant

danger for the United States.

A hedge against an unexpected event could take two forms: Contingency plans could be developed and a select group of resources could be

maintained in reserve in order to carry out the plans; or highly adaptive

systems could be developed to operate under unexpected conditions as

well as to perform optimally in anticipated missions.

Conclusion

The debates that defense reviews engender are always messy. The

media make quite a sport of pointing out the conceptual disunity and

lack of jointness among the “squabbling” armed services. Rarely mentioned is the fact that defense policy in a democracy was meant to be contentious and inefficient. To debate up until the very moment the guns

sound was always considered a healthy thing. This is in clear contrast to

the policies and procedures of authoritarian regimes. For example, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Deng Xiaoping admonished his political and military strategists: “Don’t debate. . . . Once debate gets started,

things become complicated.” 135 But powerful militaries that do not debate, such as the German Wehrmacht or the Soviet armed forces, seem to

end up on the wrong side of history.
60 QDR 2001

Americans like debate, and we generally view the future as complicated, even if we would like to be able predict it. QDR 2001 will also be

complicated, as will any subsequent review. But one of the ways we can

begin cutting through the complications and getting to the issues worthy

of debate is to start from a consensus view of the characteristics we expect

in the future security environment.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 61

Appendix: Primary Sources Surveyed

The underlying objective of the selection process for the primary

sources was to collect material that generally represents viewpoints

from the range of different types of organizations (and, by extension,

individuals) that influence defense planning in the United States. A

working assumption was that a representative view could be identified

for the following types of organizations: Congress (in the form of congressionally-mandated reviews); the White House; intelligence community; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); Joint Chiefs of Staff and

unified commanders in chief (CINCs) of combatant forces; war colleges; individual services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force); federally-funded research institutes; independent research institutes; NGOs;

independent or ad hoc citizen commissions; private consultants; political opposition; and a range of independent scholars whose work influences the defense debate. After prospective sources were identified for

the above organizational categories, the following standardized criteria

were used to determine whether the source constituted an assessment of

the future security environment suitable for detailed analysis. In accordance with the criteria, a primary source should:

■ focus on the overall future security environment, not just the individual

drivers (such as population growth, availability of resources, etc.) of future trends;

■ examine multiple subjects affecting the future security environment;

■ be potentially representative of the collective views of an organization influential in national defense policymaking;

■ be produced by a source with a solid professional or scholarly reputation;

■ have been published since 1996; and

■ if a U.S. government product, be unclassified or provide analysis of the

future security environment in unclassified sections.

Based on these criteria, at least one source per category was selected;

in certain cases, multiple sources were deemed necessary to provide for

the representative view. Representative views of the future are not necessarily the official view of the organization concerned.

Some studies published in 1996 might not have achieved wide

circulation by the May 1997 completion of the QDR 1997, hence the

inclusion of that year. Two 1995 studies were included because they represent organizations that did not sponsor a later study on the future

security environment.
62 QDR 2001

Congressionally-Mandated Reviews

Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,

May 1997.

National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in

the 21st Century, December 1997.

U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World

Coming: Studies and Analyses, September 15, 1999.

White House/National Security Council

The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century,

October 1998.

The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century,

December 1999.

Intelligence Community

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010 (Washington, DC:

November 1997).

Working papers, briefing materials and notes from “Alternative

Global Futures: 2000–2015” workshops held September, October, and December 1999. (Global Trends 2015 project is still ongoing. Background

and briefing material and discussion notes were used for the survey.)

Defense Intelligence Agency, Alternative Futures in International Security Affairs, 2015: A Summary Study of the “Transformed World, 2015” Project, December 1997. (Unclassified section; classified material from this

project was not used by this survey.)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Department of Defense, “The Projected Security Environment,” from

Defense Planning Guidance Update for Fiscal Years 2001–2005 (Washington, DC: April 1999), 4–7. (Unclassified section; classified material from

this project was not used by this survey.)

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report,

Asia 2025 (assembled briefing slides and text), Newport, RI: July 25–August

4, 1999; and Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study

Final Report, Maintaining U.S. Military Superiority (assembled briefing

slides and text), Newport, RI: July 25–August 4, 1999. (Unclassified section;

classified material from this project was not used by this survey.)
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 63

Joint Chiefs of Staff/Unified CINCs 

Joint Staff, Joint Strategy Review 1998 Report (September 4, 1998).

(Unclassified section; classified material from this project was not used by

this survey.)

Joint Forces Command (J–9), “Futures Program” briefing slides,

notes, and handouts, November 1998–September 1999.

National Defense University

Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, July 1996).

Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense University

Press, 1998).

Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

U.S. Air Force

Colonel Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et al., Alternative Futures for 2025:

Security Planning to Avoid Surprise (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University

Press, September 1996).

U.S. Army

Series of briefing slides and notes on the “Future Military Art”

(1998–99).

William T. Johnsen, Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI

(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February

18, 1998).

Earl H. Tilford, Jr., ed., World View: The 1998 Strategic Assessment

From the Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, February 26, 1998).

U.S. Navy

CNO Strategic Studies Group XIV, The International Security Environment to the Year 2005, study group final report (Newport, RI: June 1995).

Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How

to Address Them (New York: Center for International Political Economy,

February 1999).
64 QDR 2001

U.S. Marine Corps

“Ne Cras: Not Like Yesterday,” commandant’s briefing, slides, and

notes (numerous presentations, 1997–1999).

Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,”

speech presented at National Press Club, Washington, DC, October 10,

1997, published in Vital Speeches of the Day, December 15, 1997, 139–141.

Federally-Funded Research Institutes

Zalmay M. Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds., Sources of Conflict in the

21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, 1998) (produced for U.S. Air Force).

Frederick Thompson et al., Vision-21 Source Book, Volume 1: The

Process (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, November 26, 1996)

(produced for the U.S. Marine Corps).

Independent Research Institutes

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Conflict Environment of 2016: A Scenario-Based Approach (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 1996).

Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025:

U.S. Security Planning for a New Era (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1999).

Nongovernmental Organizations

Allen Hammond, Which World?: Scenarios for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998).

Edmund Cairns, A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War

(Oxford, UK: Oxfam Publications, 1997).

Michael Marien, ed., World Futures and the United Nations (Bethesda,

MD: World Futures Society, 1995).

Independent Commission

Graham T. Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, lead authors, America’s

National Interests (The Commission on America’s National Interests,

July 2000).

Private Consultant (For-Profit)

“Decade Forecast—Decade Through 2005,” December 24, 1994 (website <stratfor.com>) and “Decade Forecast—2000–2010,” December 20,

1999 (website <stratfor.com>). (1994 forecast included, with 1999 as

background reference.)
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 65

Political Candidate

Governor George W. Bush: “A Period of Consequences,” speech delivered at The Citadel, Charleston, SC, September 23, 1999 (text from website <http://www.georgewbush.com/News/speeches/092399_consequences.html>).

Individual Scholars and Projects

Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the

Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New National Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 1999).

Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: World Politics in a New

Century, 3d ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

Notes1 This chapter summarizes the details contained in Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward A

Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025, McNair Paper 63 (Washington, DC:

National Defense University, 2000).

2 The future security environment for QDR 1997 was primarily derived from classified intelligence estimates and the unclassified work of two primary sources: the Global Trends 2010 project of

the National Intelligence Council and assessments by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. This chapter proposes a more inclusive input.

3 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Philip L. Ritcheson, primary

author, “Study Addendum” to New World Coming (published on website only; not released with report text), September 15, 1999, 10–11.

4 These standardized criteria are discussed in the appendix to this chapter and detailed in Tangredi, All Possible Wars? 8–9.

5 The 300 secondary sources are listed in Appendix B (161–183) of Tangredi, All Possible Wars?

6 A detailed evaluation of these strengths and weaknesses can be found in Tangredi, All Possible

Wars? 15–20.

7 Perhaps the most telling historical example of unwarranted belief in certainty was the British

Cabinet’s “Ten-Year Rule” used between the First and Second World Wars. See Brian Bond and

Williamson Murray, “The British Armed Forces, 1918–39,” in Allen R. Millet and Williamson Murray,

eds., Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 101.

8 See Tangredi, All Possible Wars? 21–29.

9 The term “prominent dissenters” here refers to analytical, political, or scholarly sources that

we deemed likely to have an effect on U.S. defense policy: generally authorities used by DOD for

analysis, or who have a track record of influencing the thinking of government decisionmakers.

10 A succinct statement of this argument can be found in Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: World Politics in a New Century, 3d ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 128–130.

11 Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025: U.S. Security Planning for

a New Era (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1999), 14–15.
66 QDR 2001

12 A number of previously enthusiastic authorities on the post-Cold War expansionism of democratic values now suggest that exponential growth in democracies may be over. See, for example,

Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996), 20–37.

13 See, for example, Ralph Peters, “Our Old New Enemies,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, Challenging the

United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 1998), 215–238; Robin Wright, “Democracy: Challenges

and Innovations in the 1990s,” The Washington Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Summer 1997), 23–36. The National Security Strategy For A New Century (October 1998 version) suggests that “if citizens tire of

waiting for democracy and free markets to deliver a better life for them, there is real risk that they will

lose confidence in democracy and free markets”; iv.

14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72,

no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22–49.

15 However, other sources—including Middle East regional specialists—tend to agree that, “like

their secular counterparts, on most issues many [Islamic-oriented political actors] would operate on

the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a

globally interdependent world.” Even some who acknowledge the potentially destabilizing effect of Islamic fundamentalism argue that fundamentalism is now waning. See John L. Esposito, “The Islamic

Factor,” in Phebe Marr, ed., Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role (Washington,

DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 61–62; Max Rodenbeck, “Is Islamism Losing Its Thunder?” The Washington Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 177–194.

16 See <www.stratfor.com>, “Global Intelligence Update—5 June 2000; Retrieving the Irretrievable: The Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy,” June 4, 2000.

17 However, there are discussions of how an independent European military structure could balance American power. See, for example, Jean-Marie Guehenno, “The Impact of Globalisation on

Strategy,” Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998–99), 16–18; Frederick Bonnart, “U.S. Starts to Fret Over EU

Military Independence,” International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2000.

18 Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025, 226. “Chinese opposition to the United States is

not the result of current trends in Sino-U.S. relations... [but] developed following a series of poor

policy choices by both Beijing and Washington that have moved them into a more antagonistic posture than either state had intended.”

19 Others suggest that the PRC is more likely to employ a massive military strike without warning against Taiwan, spearheaded by ballistic missile attack. See, for example, Robert Kagan, “How

China Will Take Taiwan,” The Washington Post, March 12, 2000, B7; and Gary Schmitt and Thomas

Donnelly, “Our Interests Lie With Theirs,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2000, B4.

20 Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025, 238.

21 Henry Chu and Richard C. Paddock, “Russia Looks to China as an Ally Amid West’s Ire,” Los

Angeles Times, December 8, 1999, 1. Rajan Menon describes Russian-Chinese rapprochement as a

“strategic convergence” directed against the United States rather than based on any mutual “trust or

goodwill.” Menon, “The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China,” Survival 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 101–125.

22 <www.stratfor.com>, “Herding Pariahs: Russia’s Dangerous Game,” Stratfor.com, Weekly

Global Intelligence Update, February 8, 2000.

23 Agence France-Presse in Beijing, “Alliances Can Defuse Hegemonism by U.S.,” South China

Morning Post, March 8, 2000. Arguing that an effective alliance is unlikely is Jennifer Anderson, The

Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper

315 (New York: Oxford University Press, December 1997). See also Norman Friedman, “The China

Puzzle Continues to Baffle the West,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 3 (March 2000), 4–6.

24 The QDR 1997 report used the analogy of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, stating that “the

security environment between now and 2015 will also be marked with the absence of a ‘global peer

competitor’ able to challenge the United States militarily around the world as the Soviet Union did

during the Cold War.” Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, 5.

25 Ibid.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 67

26 A recent essay on the linkage between economic and military competition with China is Dana

Rohrabacher, “Q: Should Congress be concerned about China and the Panama Canal?” Insight on the

News, December 27, 1999, 40. A discussion on American fears of a competition with the EU can be

found in William Wallace and Jan Zielonka, “Misunderstanding Europe,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6

(November–December 1998), 65–79.

27 See C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Nolan, Reconcilable Differences?: United States–Japan Economic Conflict (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, June 1993). A review of recent sources on U.S.-Japanese security arrangements is Chris B. Johnstone, “Redefining the U.S.-

Japan Alliance,” Survival 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 173–181.

28 See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New

York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999); Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm, 14–15.

29 <www.stratfor.com>, “Decade Forecast—Decade Through 2005,” December 24, 1994, 1.

30 QDR 1997, 3.

31 Current major theater war (MTW) planning focuses on Iraq, rather than Iran. However, the

two contingencies are often linked when addressing American foreign policy objectives in the Gulf region. “This approach is consistent with the dual containment policy of the United States, which treats

Iran and Iraq as twin pariahs. Although both reject being classified as a pair, American policy groups

them together.” Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 1998), xiii.

32 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2010, argues that internal contradictions

in both states would prevent such dominance in the near term. See 8–10. New World Coming states

that “Major powers—Russian and China are two obvious examples—may wish to extend their regional influence by force or the threat of force.” United States Commission on National Security/21st

Century (USCNS/21), New World Coming, 47.

33 Rogue states are generally “those states that support aggression and terrorism. A rogue state is

an outlaw country capable of instigating conflict with the United States and its allies.” NDU INSS,

Strategic Assessment 1999, 3. Raymond Tanter identifies the “primary criteria” of rogue status as “large

conventional forces, [support for] international terrorism, and [desire to possess] weapons of mass

destruction. Tanter, Rogue Regimes, 261, note 1. Five states are usually included in intelligence assessments as rogues: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. Tanter includes Cuba under the category

of rogue regimes because it appears to support international terrorism. Sudan, which is also considered a rogue because of its support for terrorism, generally is not included in the list because it is

thought to be a client state of another rogue—Iran—and does not possess large conventional forces.

On June 19, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright announced that the Clinton administration would no longer use the term “rogue states,” but that “henceforth nasty, untrustworthy, missileequipped countries would be known as states of concern.” This would appear to be a reaction to a recent meeting of the South and North Korean heads of state. See Steven Mufson, “What’s In A Name?

U.S. Drops Term ‘Rogue State’,” The Washington Post, June 20, 2000, 16. However, the term is ubiquitous within the analytical literature, and therefore has been retained in this chapter.

34 There is a wealth of published recommendations in this regard. Prominent among them is

Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New National Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 1999), which discusses the immediate need for

engagement of both Russia and China.

35 A particularly witty treatment of this argument is Hank H. Gaffney, “Oh, to be weak” (unpublished paper circulated in 1998; available from author at Center for Naval Analyses).

36 One argument for intervention to prevent massive but not normal levels of war-related deaths

can be found in Stephen J. Solarz and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Humanitarian Intervention: When is

Force Justified?” The Washington Quarterly 20, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), 3–14.

37 Arguing that the cumulative effect of failed states is a significant international security threat

is Susan L. Woodward, “Failed States: Warlordism and ‘Tribal Warfare,’” Naval War College Review 52,

no. 2 (Spring 1999), 55–68.

38 New World Coming, 96–99. Several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) claim that pessimistic forecasts for Africa discourage investment, therefore perpetuating instability. The implication
68 QDR 2001

is that they should be balanced by more optimistic assessments. See, for example, Peter Veit, ed.,

Africa’s Valuable Assets: A Reader in Natural Resource Management (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1998).

39 Snow, The Shape of the Future, 170–172.

40 See James F. Miskel, “Are We Learning the Right Lessons from Africa’s Humanitarian Crises?”

Naval War College Review 52, no. 3 (Summer 1999), 136–147.

41 But see Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press, 1999), 336–421.

42 An argument that “super-terrorism” is unlikely and that measures taken to prevent it may be

counterproductive is Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, no. 112 (Fall

1998), 110–119.

43 Zachary S. Davis, Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Terrorist Threat? CRS Report to Congress

97–75 ENR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 8, 1997); Advisory Panel to

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, First

Annual Report: Assessing the Threat (Washington, DC: RAND, December 15, 1999). A list of current

sources on the topic of catastrophic terrorism can be found in USCNS/21, New World Coming, as

footnote 95, 48.

44 A number of sources identify information operations or information warfare as “weapons of

mass destruction.” The logic of this argument is that death and destruction on a large scale can occur

by attacks on the computer networks controlling public utilities and transportation. However, these

sources do not convincingly demonstrate that such attacks would result in casualties as extensive as

from a successful nuclear or biological attack. In New World Coming, the more realistic term

“weapons of mass disruption” is used (52).

45 USCNS/21, New World Coming, 51. See also INSS, Strategic Assessment 1999, 293–294.

46 On this point, New World Coming cites Roger C. Molander, David A. Mussington, and Richard

F. Mesic, Strategic Information Warfare Rising (Washington, DC: RAND, 1998) as its source.

47 See Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et al., Alternative Futures for 2025 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:

Air University Press, 1996), 49–53, 150, 169; Lieutenant Colonel Larry K. Grundhauser, USAF, “Sentinels Rising: Commercial High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and Its Implications for U.S. National

Security,” Airpower Journal 12, no. 4 (Winter 1998), 74–76; Frederick W. Kagan, “Star Wars in Real

Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare,” Parameters 28, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), 117–118.

48 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996); James R.

FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly 4 (Spring 1994),

24–31; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Cavalry to Computer: The Patterns of Military Revolutions,”

The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994), 30–42. A more skeptical discussion is Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Can

High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?” Foreign Policy 113 (Winter 1998–99), 72–86; and O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000).

49 One of the more enthusiastic advocates of pursuing the RMA is Admiral William A. Owens.

See William A. Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2000), especially chapter 6, “Winning the Revolution.”

50 See Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions (Carlisle, PA:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 23, 1995); Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond

Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR,” Parameters 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 15–21.

51 “Only one country—the United States—currently has capabilities in all [RMA] areas, thereby

indicating its centrality in any discussion of the RMA.” Andrew Richter, “The American Revolution?

The Response of the Advanced Western States to the Revolution in Military Affairs,” National Security

Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 3.

52 Engelbrecht et al., Alternative Futures for 2025, 171–172.

53 USCNS/21, New World Coming, 120.

54 Michael Dorgan, “Few surprised at firing of Los Alamos Scientist: Tip of Iceberg seen on Chinese spying,” Arizona Republic, March 14, 1999, A17; Fox Butterworth and Joseph Kahn, “Chinese

Intellectuals in U.S. Say Spying Case Unfairly Cast Doubts on Their Loyalties,” The New York Times,
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 69

May 16, 1999, 1, 32; David Talbot and Ed Hayward, “Students say focus is studies, not spying,” Boston

Herald, May 26, 1999, 030.

55 For example: Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Military Experimentation—Time to Get Serious,”

<www.csbahome.org>, March 3, 2000.

56 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Restructuring for a New Era: Framing the Roles and Missions Debate

(Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, April 1995), 44–47; Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computers:

The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” 37.

57 “At present, the vast majority of countries in the developing world appear totally unprepared

to adapt to the RMA, and thus any study that focused on them would, by definition, be brief.” Richter,

“The American Revolution,” 1.

58 Among future studies devoted specifically to potential wildcards is John L. Petersen, Out of the

Blue: Wild Cards and Other Big Future Surprises (Washington, DC: Arlington Institute, 1997).

59 Jan S. Breemer refers to this circumstance as “the end of naval strategy,” implying that U.S.

forces can focus on directly influencing effects on land. Jim Wirtz refers to it as “the golden age of

United States seapower.” See Breemer, “The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power,” Strategic Review 22, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 40–53; Wirtz, “QDR 2001:

The Navy and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” National Security Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 43–60.

60 It is likely that some competitors will seek to build or to purchase fourth-generation platforms and the most modern ocean-going warships in relatively small numbers to dominate regional

opponents. If used in actual combat operations directly against the U.S. naval and air fleets, it is likely

that they would operate as a high-tech guerrilla force, attacking areas of perceived weakness until they

were destroyed or securely hidden from U.S. response.

61 Illustrative of this argument is John A. Tipak, “Can the Fighter Force Hold Its Edge?” Air Force

Magazine 83, no. 1 (January 2000), 25–31.

62 Martin Van Creveld maintains that the warmaking abilities of the modern state will continue

to weaken, ensuring that large-scale clashes of sea or air power will not occur. In a sense, his overall

argument implies that all states will become failing states. Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of

the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 337–354, 419.

63 Arguing that “increasingly, other countries strategies will be oriented around keeping the U.S.

out of their region” is Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 1999 Summer Study Final Report, Maintaining U.S. Military Superiority (assembled briefing slides and text), Newport, RI, July 25–August 4,

1999; quotation, 19.

64 WMD can be considered asymmetric because the U.S. Navy is largely configured for openocean operations. An excellent study of the historical and environmental factors influencing nearshore naval operations is Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (Portland, OR:

Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

65 A skeptical view of the ballistic missile threat to CONUS can be found in “NMD: The Hard

Sell,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 33, no. 11 (March 15, 2000), 19–23.

66 See discussion in Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the

QDR, McNair Paper 62 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), 8–10.

67 See discussion in Thomas G. Mahnken, “America’s Next War,” The Washington Quarterly 16,

no. 3 (Summer 1993), 171–184.

68 A typology of antiaccess strategies that could be used against power-projection forces can be

found in McKenzie, Revenge of the Melians, 46–52.

69 See James R. Boorujy, “Network-Centric Concepts Can Guarantee Access,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings 126, no. 5 (May 2000), 60–63; Gary W. Schnurrpusch, “Asian Crisis Spurs TBMD,” U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 9 (September 1999), 46–49.

70 See Sam J. Tangredi, “The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 5 (May 2000), 28–32.

71 John P. Jumper has said, “Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of the

nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely an issue.” Jumper quoted in “The Access
70 QDR 2001

Issue,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 10 (October 1998), 42–46. See also “Operating Abroad,” Air Force

Magazine 81, no. 12 (December 1998), 28–29.

72 Robert W. Chandler with John R. Backschies, The New Face of War: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Revitalization of America’s Transoceanic Military Strategy (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press,

1998), 199–223; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 879–915.

73 “Given the West’s still-sizable nuclear arsenal and its relatively robust capability to deal with

other-than-nuclear WMD warfare, are WMD really asymmetrical to the West? So long as the West

maintains its current capabilities, it seems rather unlikely that an adversary could decisively employ

WMD against it.” Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the

Western Mindset,” in Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically, 5.

74 Robert Kupperman and David W. Siegrist, “Strategic Firepower in the Hands of Many?” in

David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999), 49.

75 Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 32–34.

76 Based on historical survey, Stuart D. Landersman maintains that “Chemical warfare is employed [only] when there is no chance of reciprocal use.” Landersman, “Sulfur, Serpents, and Sarin,”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 8 (August 1998), 42–43.

77 USCNS/21, New World Coming, 141.

78 Khalilzad and Lesser, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 18–19.

79 McKenzie, Revenge of the Melians, 3–4, 10–12; USCNS/21, New World Coming, 49–50.

80 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, December

1997, 25. Representative arguments include Chandler with Backschies, The New Face of War, 177–194;

Raymond S. Sheldon, “No Democracy Can Feel Secure,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 8

(August 1998), 39–44.

81 NDP, Transforming Defense, 26–27.

82 See F.G. Hoffman, “Countering Catastrophic Terrorism,” Strategic Review (Winter 2000), 55–57.

83 See Steve Goldstein, “Pentagon Planners Gird For Cyber Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, December 1, 1999, 1; and Robert E. Podlesny, “Infrastructure Networks Are Key Vulnerabilities,” U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 2 (February 1999), 51–53.

84 A North Vietnamese commander is quoted as saying: “The conscience of America was part of

its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its

democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win.” From “How

North Vietnam Won the War,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995, A8. For a discussion of potential

future effects, see Brent Baker, “War and Peace in a Virtual World,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

123, no. 4 (April 1997), 36–40; and Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York:

Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2000), 191–196.

85 Robert Callum, “Will Our Forces Match the Threat?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no.

8 (August 1998), 51–52. E. Anders Eriksson argues that “the cyber WMD problem is likely to be transitional in the sense that as information technology matures, defense will outweigh offense.” Eriksson,

“Information Warfare: Hype or Reality?” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring–Summer 1999), 58.

86 <www.stratfor.com>, “‘I Love You’ and the Problem of Cyberforce,” May 15, 2000, 3.

87 William E. Pohde, “What is Information Warfare?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 2

(February 1996), 36–38.

88 “Information superiority” is the term used in the 1997 National Military Strategy and Joint

Vision 2010 to indicate “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of

precise and reliable information, while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”

National Military Strategy, 18. “Knowledge superiority” was used in a U.S. Navy briefing to describe

the objective of developing network-centric warfare capabilities.

89 Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5, Information Operations (August 5, 1998), i.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 71

90 See, for example, Owens, Lifting the Fog of War.

91 Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters: “I think everyone has agreed that what we did in

Kosovo was equivalent to a single Major Theater War.” “Whit Peters on the Issues,” Air Force Magazine

82, no. 10 (October 1999), 47.

92 See Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph? (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 32–47; Caroline Davies, “Drinks, drugs, and terror-cocktail that turns boys into

killers: Using children in combat has reached a horrifying scale in Africa,” The Daily Telegraph (London), May 25, 2000, 4.

93 “In our lifetimes, this morally savage, unruly killer, not the trained, disciplined soldier, will be

the type of enemy most frequently encountered by Euro-American militaries.” Peters, Fighting for the

Future, 48.

94 Testimony to the growing brutality of modern war comes from NGOs and relief agencies. Edmund Cairns, A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War (Oxford, UK: Oxfam Publications,

1997), has sketched a future in which the majority of wars—fought primarily in the developing

world—will focus on the civilian as target, will flout the existing laws of war, and will be fought over

the distribution of resources within or between states.

95 “The U.S. Army will fight warriors far more often than it fights soldiers in the future.” Peters,

Fighting for the Future, 44.

96 Ignatieff, Virtual War, 210–212.

97 See Don Stauffer, “Electronic Warfare: Battles Without Bloodshed,” The Futurist 34, no. 1

(January–February 2000), 23–26.

98 USCNS/21, New World Coming, 143.

99 See discussion in Anthony C. Zinni, “A Commander Reflects,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

126, no. 7 (July 2000), 34–36.

100 Other sources include Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban

Warfighter of 2025,” Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999), 74–86.

101 The term “chaos in the littorals” is adopted from a joint U.S. Naval Institute–Armed Forces

Communications and Electronics Association conference of that title held at San Diego on February

10–11, 2000.

102 Danzig, The Big Three, 42–49.

103 Danzig, The Big Three, 40–42.

104 Craig Covault, “Desert Storm Reinforces Military Space Direction,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology, April 8, 1991, 42; Steven J. Bruger, “Not Ready for the First Space War: What about the

Second?” Naval War College Review 48, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 73–83.

105 William L. Spacey II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Cadre Paper 4

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1999), 1–7, 109; Randall G. Bowdish and Bruce

Woodyard, “A Naval Concepts-Based Vision for Space,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 1

(January 1999), 50–53.

106 See John E. Hyten, A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in

Space, ACDIS Occasional Paper (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, April

2000).

107 USCNS 21, New World Coming, 143.

108 Spacey, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? 107.

109 There are also other political constraints. See Kagan, “Star Wars in Real Life,” 112–118.

110 The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, “The Space and Air Force of the

Next Century,” address to the National Security Forum, Maxwell AFB, AL, May 29, 1997

<www.af.mil/news/speech/current/The_Space_and_Air_Force_of.html>, quoted in Spacey, Does the

United States Need Space-Based Weapons?, 4.

111 Quoted in Spacey, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? 4.
72 QDR 2001

112 In terms of the current status of the United States, see Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm

2025, 286–288.

113 Seyom Brown has argued that gross imbalances in military power combined with inherently

destabilizing deployments cause such competition. See Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War, 2d

ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 94–98.

114 A similar approach (concerning Russia) was suggested earlier by Fred C. Ikle, “Comrades in

Arms: The Case for a Russian-American Defense Community,” National Interest 26 (Winter

1991/92), 22–32.

115 This is the basis behind the planning methodology known as competitive strategies. See

Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies Against

Weapons Proliferation (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000),

10–11. See also Khalilzad and Lesser, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 19–20.

116 One proposed approach is to allow other powers to have their own geographic spheres of influence, as suggested in James Kurth, “American Strategy in the Global Era,” Naval War College Review

53, no. 1 (Winter 2000), 7–24.

117 Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 1996), 136–137.

118 See, for example, Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 63–70.

119 This view is implied by Cronin: “while American military presence overseas would retain its

value, the form and context of the presence must be adapted to the shifting parameters of conventional warfare.” Cronin, 2015: Power and Progress, 145.

120 “The Access Issue,” Air Force Magazine, 42–46.

121 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Washington,

DC: ONI, 1997), 26–31.

122 A discussion of the force structure implications for the Army can be found in Davis and

Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025, 306–313.

123 See, for example, John Mueller, “The Escalating Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons,” in T.V.

Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the

Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 73–98.

124 Robert G. Joseph and Ronald F. Lehman II, project directors, U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st

Century, Final Report (Washington, DC: National Defense University/Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, 1998), 1.13–1.16.

125 See Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear

Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring

2000), 85–115.

126 See in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New

York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

127 “Traditional methods of deterrence have inherent limitations and tend to be ineffective in

countering proliferation of WMD today.” David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999), 7, 18. An opposing view is implied by the discussion in Joseph and Lehman, U.S. Nuclear

Policy in the 21st Century, 1.13, 2.40–2.41.

128 “For example, deterrence may prove difficult against religiously-motivated terrorists who believe they are carrying out the will of their Supreme Being. The components of deterrence need to be

reexamined, then refocused, with other more pertinent options added.” Siegrist and Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S., 18.

129 “If their strategy can be beaten, terrorists can be defeated.” Gray, “Combating Terrorism,” 20.

130 Ibid., 22.

131 See Mark E. Kosnik, “The Military Response to Terrorism,” Naval War College Review 53, no.

2 (Spring 2000), 13–39.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 73

132 See discussion in Tangredi, All Possible Wars? 12–13.

133 Davis and Sweeney maintain “that basing studies of the future security environment on such

unexpected and unanticipated events ill serves the defense planner or the foreign policy professional,

since it is almost impossible to prepare for such eventualities . . . . Putting aside for a moment whether

or not these [wildcards] are even valid arguments, the broader point remains that such possibilities

are useless to long range planning.” Davis and Sweeney, Strategic Paradigm 2025, 218. The NDU

Working Group disagreed with their conclusions and sees great value in developing hedging strategies against selected wildcards. Apparently, so do Davis and Sweeney, who later suggest that there are

at least “three wild cards worth considering”; ibid., 219–221.

134 The sources surveyed originally identified seven wildcards: (1) creation of a United Nations

army; (2) Congress revises or repeals restrictions on direct military involvement in domestic law enforcement; (3) a worldwide economic collapse; (4) cascading economic disasters; (5) unexpected development of a military near-peer; (6) collapse of a key U.S. regional ally; and (7) the rise of neo-fascism or ethnic hatred as a potent world ideology. All wildcards are not of equal probability. A careful

selection needs to be made as to which are best candidates for further study. Among the best guides

are the degrees to which current plans could be adjusted quickly to a particular unexpected event,

and the relationship between the particular wildcard and the dissenting arguments identified through

the development of the consensus. Detailed assessment can be found in Tangredi, All Possible Wars?

119–132.

135 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press, 2000), xxiii.

Page 74 is Blank—no folio
Chapter Three

The Rise of Asymmetric

Threats: Priorities for 

Defense Planning

by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the United States is ubiquitous, and ubiquity brings vulnerability. Because of this, hostile nations and groups will inevitably seek ways to undermine U.S.

strength by attacking its vulnerabilities. These have come to be called

asymmetric threats. The interest of the defense establishment in asymmetric threats is a recognition of an enduring truth: weaker powers, both state

and nonstate, will seek ways to mitigate the dominance of the strong.

The first task of this chapter is to define asymmetry. The proposed definition emphasizes the psychological components and disproportionate effects of asymmetric warfare. Three recurring themes are identified that give

structure to the definition. First, asymmetric options are sought actively by

the weaker party when there is a disparity of interest between the two antagonists. Second, the target of all asymmetric approaches is the will of the

stronger opponent. Third, this is achieved through the pursuit of psychological effect on the strategic level, no matter what level of war is involved.

The second task of this chapter is to determine what the asymmetric

threats are to the United States and to suggest where it should concentrate

in defense planning. This requires establishing a broad typology of asymmetry. Six threats are identified: nuclear, chemical, biological, information operations, alternative operational concepts, and terrorism. Each of

these is examined in-depth, across the strategic, operational, and tactical

levels of war. The integration of asymmetric threats and potential U.S.

vulnerabilities enables the creation of a list of the 10 most serious asymmetric threats to the United States. Identification of such a set of potential threats can give discipline to the planning process and allow for the

design of appropriate counters.

75
76 QDR 2001

The final task of this chapter is to suggest what the United States

might do to improve its ability to counter asymmetric threats. The United

States does not, at the present time, have a single accepted concept for

how to organize for asymmetric defense, and there is little coordination

between existing initiatives. A top-down, simple, and clear concept is the

starting point for improvement, based on three imperatives: minimize

vulnerabilities, accentuate unique strengths, and prevent disproportionate

effects. Based on these three organizing ideas, recommendations are offered to minimize U.S. vulnerability to asymmetric attacks.

We define asymmetric warfare as leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to

achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent’s will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives. This definition emphasizes the element of disproportionate effect—achieving strategic objectives through application of limited

resources—and the explicit recognition of the importance of the psychological component. These elements are essential to considering how

an asymmetric actor can achieve strategic objectives through an operation—even a failed operation—that, from the perspective of the larger

power, is otherwise only a tactical attack.

Any consideration of asymmetric threats must start with the most

basic asymmetry of all: disparity of interest. The greatest incentive for

using asymmetric approaches rises from a real or perceived disparity of

interest. A weak adversary who has a vital interest that conflicts with the

nonvital interest of a strong state has the greatest incentive to use asymmetric approaches. Given the breadth of American security interests,

there will be many areas of potential conflict where no vital interest is at

stake for the United States, but where a regional actor has vital interests.

Asymmetric approaches can work in three ways. First, they can deter U.S.

entry into crises where there is no U.S. vital interest by threatening disproportionate damage to the United States. Would the loss of Seattle to a

ballistic missile attack be a reasonable trade for the unconditional surrender of a hostile Pyongyang government? Absent a vital American interest,

such a threat would have a powerful effect on U.S. planners. This situation is the most likely to have a positive outcome for the weaker state.

Second, if a decision has been made to employ U.S. forces in a contingency that involves a less-than-vital national interest, an asymmetric approach by an adversary that threatens to cause rapid and disproportionate effect may halt a U.S. entry or accelerate a withdrawal. If the perceived
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 77

U.S. stake is low and if it becomes apparent that involvement may become

very expensive in terms of human and material cost, then a weaker state

might calculate that a shocking display of force might cause the United

States to recalculate the costs and benefits of engagement.

Third, an asymmetric approach may enable regional actors to pursue

aggressive strategies indirectly, by making it hard for the United States to

marshal the will to act. Information operations, terrorist attacks, or other

unconventional approaches could make it difficult to trace sponsorship

with the certainty required by the United States for action, ultimately diffusing the U.S. response until it may be too late to act effectively. To this

end, regional states will work hard to manage their relationship with the

United States, pursuing regional objectives while working assiduously to

prevent or to minimize U.S. interference.

Asymmetric approaches can achieve powerful effect through manipulation of the psychological element. Aimed directly at the will of the opponent, they can compensate for material or other deficiencies. While the

method of the approach may be tactical, the psychological effect is sought

at the strategic level. This is a distinguishing feature of asymmetry: the

continual focus on strategic effect by reliance on the psychological component of the approach selected. In functional terms, the target becomes

the mind and in particular the will of the opponent. Asymmetric approaches have been applied on all levels of war, but the most effective

asymmetric approaches seek to attain strategic effect regardless of the

level on which they are applied. It follows that there may be a definitional

blurring between the level of the action and the level of the effect, and, for

the asymmetric actor, the goal is to produce effect on the highest possible

level. The strategic level encompasses, in the broadest sense, actions taken

to accomplish national-level security and foreign policy objectives. Actions on the tactical and operational level may yield strategic outcomes,

the ideal objective of any asymmetric approach.

Determining effectiveness is critical in evaluating asymmetric approaches. What works and what does not work? Effective asymmetric approaches tend to have several common characteristics. From the perspective of the target, they are unexpected actions. The intuitive response may

worsen the situation, while the most effective response may be counterintuitive. Effective asymmetric operations cause a disproportionate amount

of damage to the target for the investment in resources, time, and money

by the attacker. U.S. actions and strategic choices will drive the nature of

the asymmetric threat. As the United States refines operational practices,
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potential adversaries will look to find ways to counter. This process of action-reaction is inescapable.

What Are the Asymmetric Threats?

This section outlines the range of potential asymmetric threats that

the United States could face through the year 2010, focusing on the general types of potential asymmetric approaches that reasonably could be

expected to be employed. As stated above, it identifies a typology of six

potential asymmetric threats: nuclear, chemical, biological, information

operations, operational concepts, and terrorism. These six categories of

threats are logical descendants of asymmetric approaches used throughout history. The greatest change at the beginning of the 21st century, however, is the dramatically increasing effectiveness of technology and its

ability to create global effects from local events.

Nuclear Weapons

The ultimate expression of power in the world today is the possession

of nuclear weapons. Owning nuclear weapons allows a state or nonstate

actor to have a seat at the high stakes table. The former Indian army chief

of staff, General K. Sundarji, is reported to have said that a principal lesson

of the Gulf War is that if a state intends to fight the United States, it should

avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons.1

On the tactical level, a nuclear weapon could be employed directly

against maneuver or support forces in the field by short-range ballistic

missile, tactical aircraft delivery, or mining or other covert means. In this

context, the asymmetry of approach is principally derived from the deterrent effect that an adversary’s possession of such a weapon would have on

U.S. responses to crises. Actual state-sponsored use of a nuclear weapon

against forces in the field is the least effective method of employment of a

nuclear weapon; in fact, in many ways it is no more than the ultimate

symmetric response.

Adversaries will be hesitant to employ nuclear weapons on the tactical level for several reasons. First, unless the attack is a complete strategic

surprise, tactical maneuver forces can disperse rapidly, making it hard to

achieve military effect commensurate with political cost. Second, it will

be very easy to trace responsibility for the attack, particularly if it is delivered by conventional means. Third, use of nuclear weapons against U.S.

forces would almost certainly invite a staggering response that might not

stop short of the imposition of unconditional surrender. Last, adversaries
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 79

will not have many nuclear weapons, and targeting fielded forces is surely

the least cost-effective method of employing them.

Nuclear weapons would have the most potential utility in the early

stages of a major theater war, when they can threaten or deter U.S. deployment into a theater. They would be of less utility after U.S. forces

close and the theater matures, but they would again become a significant

factor in the end-state of an MTW, particularly if the adversary saw the

possibility of cataclysmic defeat. In this case, the temptation would be

strong to use any and all means in a spasmodic response to try either to

change the tide of battle or simply to take revenge on the United States or

its allies.

The use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces on the tactical level by a

rational state actor is unlikely. The tactical employment of nuclear weapons

against forces in the field is not really a practical asymmetric approach. If

executed, it would tend to create a case of vital national interest for the

United States, where perhaps there had not been one before. The concept of

disproportionality would then be turned upon its head, and high risks

would be accrued by the actor with little gain. The threat of use is more

problematic, although threats against fielded forces also carry many of the

risks of a deterring strategy while reaping few of the advantages.

Nuclear weapons can be employed operationally against the deployment and theater support infrastructure in order to deter, slow, or even

halt the deployment of forces into a theater. Attacks against fixed targets

would be easier to plan and to execute than attacks against forces in the

field. The advantage of employment against fixed rear-area targets is that

instead of targeting the most-prepared forces (usually tactical maneuver

forces that possess organic mobility), targets could be selected from forces

with less protection and little ability to move.

It follows that, for a state actor, the greatest opportunity to employ or

to threaten to employ nuclear weapons would be in the early stages of a

conflict. The intent would be initially to deter and to complicate U.S.

force deployment considerations and potentially to destroy critical infrastructure in order to prevent physical deployment. If employed early

enough, they might destroy or degrade critical aerial and surface ports of

debarkation before U.S. forces even arrive, creating a difficult situation

for the National Command Authorities (NCA). If nuclear weapons were

employed against U.S. forces, the response would clearly be overwhelming and direct, but what if they were employed against an ally, and few, if

any, U.S. forces felt the results? Such a use or even its threat might make
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potential U.S. allies more reluctant to participate in a coalition structure.

The direct threat of nuclear employment against an ally or potential ally

very early in a crisis might have the effect of dissuading that nation from

participating in a coalition with the United States.

Strategic employment is the threat or the use of a nuclear weapon

against the U.S. homeland. Strategic effect is sought by direct strategic attack. For a regional power or rogue state, the greatest asymmetric utility

for these weapons is in their deterring effect. A demonstrated or otherwise credible ability to strike the U.S. homeland would have a sobering effect on any U.S. decisionmaker considering bombing a regional adversary’s capital or even deploying forces in the face of threats or warnings

when vital national interests are not at stake. The possession of nuclear

weapons, and the demonstrated (or even suspected) capability to deliver

them against the American homeland, could have the effect of dampening sentiment for intervention.

It is difficult to conceive of a rational actor electing to employ nuclear

weapons against the United States in a direct strategic attack. To do so

would invite its own annihilation. The deterrent effect of a U.S. response,

however, might erode in a war in which the regional actor sees events

going badly against it. If it looked as though the United States and its allies planned either to bomb a country into submission or to occupy its

capital, then that country would have little to lose; in such a Götterdämmerung scenario, the possibility of actual use would become likely.

In an extended MTW, aggressive U.S. efforts to destroy or to neutralize a foe’s nuclear delivery structure might result in another response familiar from the Cold War: a “use ’em or lose ’em” response. An opponent

cannot stand to see its strategic trump card taken away. This does not

imply that the Armed Forces should never attempt to do this, but it must

be prepared for an adversary to use its weapons if we engage in aggressive

WMD reduction during a regime-threatening war.

A threat to use nuclear weapons directly against the U.S. homeland is

a powerful asymmetric measure. It achieves clear strategic effect and operates directly against the will of the United States. Such an approach

might tend to make the United States rethink just where its vital national

interests lie. Many of these asymmetric advantages could be lost, however,

if a threat were actually carried out. A nuclear attack would provoke a

powerful and unrelenting response from the United States. There is a fine

line between the positive disproportionate strategic effect achievable by
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 81

the possession of nuclear weapons and the potentially disastrous consequences of their actual use against the United States.

The use of nuclear weapons by nonstate actors against the United

States is the least likely alternative because of the difficulty of procuring,

infiltrating, and emplacing the weapon. It is, however, a possibility and

may ultimately prove the most troubling of all the strategic nuclear

threats. Such an attack could be just as damaging as anything launched by

a state actor, but the United States would find it difficult to establish responsibility. The threat of use of nuclear weapons thus has the greatest effect at the strategic level, although threats on both the operational and

tactical levels could create similar disproportionate benefits. In terms of

actual employment, the use against regional supporting infrastructures is

probably the most effective; it will never be a good idea to use nuclear

weapons directly against the Armed Forces or the U.S. homeland.

Chemical Weapons

Of the three types of WMD, chemical weapons are generally considered to be the least damaging. On the other hand, they are also the easiest

to procure, and, if history is any guide, less stigma is associated with their

use. Iraq has used them extensively against Iran and against its own

Kurds.2 As with nuclear weapons, the use of chemical weapons on the tactical level against U.S. maneuver forces—the most-ready part of the U.S.

force structure—is not cost-effective. Some of the delivery complications

that apply to nuclear weapons also operate here, although the use of

shorter-range artillery and tactical rocket delivery may partially ease

them. The application of chemical weapons against refugee or other noncombatant populations could be an attractive option to opponents because it could stress the capabilities of U.S. forces to care for themselves

and for a large pool of suffering noncombatants, and thus dramatically

cloud the battlefield.

The Armed Forces are generally well prepared to fight and to win in a

chemical environment; this is both a legacy of decades of preparation to

fight the Soviets and a function of a renaissance of tactical chemical

awareness in the past 5 years. Even so, the use of chemical weapons on the

tactical battlefield would tend to slow the tempo, as units are forced to

don protective overgarments and to conduct chemical reconnaissance

and frequent decontamination. Slowing the tempo of operations will be a

key component of any attempt to counter U.S. dominance.

Allied forces may be less well prepared, and this critical weakness may

be exploitable through asymmetric approaches on the tactical level. Attacks
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against allied forces would require the United States to provide support for

less capable forces, stretching thin its capability to provide adequate chemical defense coverage for its own forces. At the same time, an attacker might

use chemicals against allies instead of against the United States, hoping to

avoid a massive response, or at least to create some uncertainty about what

the American response might be. Using chemical weapons against tactical

U.S. maneuver forces could not change the basic dynamic of a campaign.

The use of chemical weapons could only slow the pace of fighting. Employment against allied units or a civilian population that remains on the battlefield could prove to be far more effective. Such an approach might bring

an adversary huge political dividends as well, if the United States were unable to correct potential deficits in allied chemical defense training and

equipment rapidly or provide immediate succor to threatened civilians.

This approach does promise disproportionate effect and might well achieve

significant strategic effect through an aggressive information operation.

Many of the considerations regarding nuclear weapons apply also to

the use of chemical weapons at the operational level. The most likely targets would be the deployment infrastructure in a theater, command and

control facilities, and the combat support and combat service support infrastructure that support the operations of U.S. and allied air forces. Another potential target would be the host-nation population in the theater

service area, with the intent of stressing host-nation, allied, and U.S. medical support systems as well as political unity.

Chemical weapons could play a role in strategic attack, which, as with

nuclear weapons, means an attack on the U.S. homeland. While they are

less lethal than biological agents and not as destructive as nuclear

weapons, they are inherently more stable, an important consideration

when dealing with less well-trained operatives. They can still be very effective, particularly when employed against indoor and point targets.

Chemical weapons do not have the shock and horror of biological or nuclear ones, but that is a relative consideration. A few pounds of VX or

Sarin in a busy subway station in New York or Washington would have a

tremendous psychological effect. Perhaps the greatest distinction between

chemical weapons and nuclear weapons is that tracing the origin of a

strategic chemical attack may be more difficult. For this reason, the

threshold of employment may be lower than with nuclear weapons.

Chemical weapons are thus the least potent of the WMD triad. They

do not have the open-ended potential for disaster of both nuclear and biological weapons. They are easier to produce than nuclear weapons but
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 83

require a larger and more visible infrastructure than that required for biological agents.3 There are precedents for their use throughout this century, which probably means that they will continue to be employed.

Across the spectrum, chemical weapons offer the most asymmetric effect

when employed as threats against regional allies. A regional aggressor can

expect to be able to threaten the homeland of adjacent states with these

weapons. Employment in this manner promises strategic effect at a relatively small cost. Even if an actor carries through on its threats to employ

these weapons, it may be careful to avoid U.S. forces, which could make it

harder for the Nation to respond forcefully, and possibly crumble a regional alliance.

Biological Weapons

An interesting historical parallel may be developing with the first

decade of the 20th century, in which the all-big-gun Dreadnought-class

battleship became emblematic of national power. These ships were built

or ordered not only by leading powers, such as England, Germany, and

the United States, but also by lesser powers, such as Chile, Greece, and

Turkey, which had no obvious use for them. As the numbers of these

ships grew, however, the dynamics of war at sea changed their utility, and

they were supplanted by the aircraft carrier as the ultimate weapon; few

were ever employed. In much the same way today, even as lesser states

pursue the nuclear totem, nuclear weapons may eventually be relegated to

secondary status behind biological weapons, which are cheaper, easier to

move or to hide from prying inspectors and, most importantly, profoundly lethal. They can also be employed in a manner that might make it

hard to trace sponsorship of an attack.

Biological weapons, like all WMD, are not very effective on the tactical level, for many of the same reasons that pertain to chemical weapons.

They are even more volatile and susceptible to biodegradation and corruption than chemical agents. They are also more difficult to disperse

over a wide area. The target of a tactical biological weapon attack might

be inoculated against the most common agents. In short, on the tactical

level, the use of biological weapons is not asymmetric warfare but rather

another case of an attack against the strongest part of the defense. The

same considerations that apply to the tactical use of chemical weapons

apply here. This is not an asymmetric approach, although the use of biological weapons against a civilian population could create problems even

more significant than those caused by chemical weapons. The medical

stresses, in particular, could prove far more complex and long term.
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The use of biological weapons against theater-level targets offers the

most lucrative and cost-effective employment option of all forms of

WMD use. Biological weapons enjoy the same deterring effect as chemical weapons on the operational level, but they can be far more potent in

effect. The threat of anthrax, tularemia, or Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, for example, against a theater aerial or surface port of debarkation

that depends upon host-nation support could have a crippling effect on

the flow of U.S. forces into a theater. They have the added advantage over

nuclear weapons for the attacker because it would be more difficult for

the United States to trace sponsorship of an attack in order to retaliate.

Many airlines, including those mobilized in support of U.S. deployments (the Civil Reserve Air Fleet), may not be able to fly into areas with

reported biological weapons attacks.4 Without them, it may not be possible to complete the deployment of U.S. forces into a theater of operations.

The use of anthrax, for example, in even small quantities might cause

heavy casualties and tie up medical and other infrastructure; even the

hint of its use, coupled with an aggressive information warfare campaign,

might greatly slow the pace of a U.S. strategic deployment.

Biological weapons offer many of the same coercing features of nuclear weapons within a regional environment. Their principal advantage

for the attacker would be the potential for attack without attribution. If

they were introduced by special operations forces or terrorists, then it

might be very difficult for the United States to link a regional actor to a

specific attack, however strong the motive and our suspicions. For this

reason, they represent ideal asymmetric approaches. While the attack

would be operational, the effect would be strategic.

A host of recent movies and books have highlighted the threat of

strategic employment of biological weapons, and it is, with nuclear attack, at the most-dangerous end of the scale. When considered for its potential coercing or deterrent value against the United States, this threat

has every advantage of the strategic nuclear threat and can be delivered in

a more covert manner. For this reason, the firewall between deterrence

and use may not be as strong as in the nuclear case; there may be a greater

likelihood of employment.

The use of biological weapons by nonstate actors, particularly terrorists, is even more of a threat, although their use is less likely. No mainstream terrorist organization has ever elected to pursue this method of attack.5 However, increasingly radical terrorist organizations, including

those with millenarian views, may not have this restraint. It is reassuring
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 85

that the organizational skills, scientific knowledge, and cool heads (and

hands) required for the conceptualization and delivery of a biological

weapons attack are not normally associated with radical terrorist groups.

Nuclear and biological weapons share an unfortunate feature: they

can end the world as we know it. Biological weapons are easier to produce

and easier to hide than either nuclear or chemical weapons.6 The method

of attack can be secret and difficult to trace. When employed to deter potential U.S. involvement in a regional crisis, they can achieve strategic effect, and, like nuclear weapons, cause the United States to weight very

carefully the costs and benefits of potential involvement. If threat fails to

have its effect, then use offers the advantage of forensic ambiguity. For

these reasons, in the short to mid-term, biological weapons will increasingly become the tool of choice for both state and nonstate actors contemplating asymmetric approaches. The likelihood of actual employment

is higher in a regional theater of operations than directly against the continental United States, but the implicit threat of use against the continental United States as a deterring or coercive tactic will rise.

Information Operations

The modern U.S. military concept of fighting is built upon the rapid,

efficient exchange of vast amounts of information.7 In this, it mirrors the

explosion of cultural and business information exchange unleashed in the

last 20 years by the power of the personal computer and the World Wide

Web. This global system supports not only the financial well-being of the

United States, but also the operation of an increasing proportion of the

physical infrastructure necessary for day-to-day life in the United States,

from air traffic control to hydroelectric plant management. Allied with

this is the growth of a global culture that fosters the rapid exchange of information on a vast variety of subjects. This is the environment, ripe with

both promise and danger, for information operations.8

It is difficult for any other country to compete with the United States

technologically on the tactical level. Tactical combat information systems

are generally well protected and resistant to direct attack. The best asymmetric approaches will probably be passive: camouflage, clutter, and concealment techniques that will make it hard for U.S. intelligence-gathering

systems to gain a clear picture of the battlespace. This could be coupled

with aggressive deception operations and a psychological warfare campaign that seeks to magnify U.S. missteps. This means taking advantage of

the fact that in a world of near-instantaneous global communications, a

tactical event can have immediate strategic effect. Denial or degradation
86 QDR 2001

of superior U.S. battlefield vision capability, coupled with relentless efforts to gain strategic effect from U.S. tactical missteps, will characterize

adversary tactical information operations.

On the operational level, it will become easier to conduct computer

network attack against the family of systems, both classified and unclassified, that support the U.S. deployment infrastructure because an increasing percentage of information traffic will be carried on systems external

to the Department of Defense. U.S. allies and coalition partners will be at

least as vulnerable. Even well-protected defense communications systems

are dependent to some degree upon unclassified routing and vulnerable

public domain structures.9

Adversaries will also target regional allies and any coalition structure

with psychological operations and propaganda. When conducted in conjunction with the threat or actual use of other asymmetric approaches

(such as WMD), a powerful synergy can result, linking information operations with events on the ground, whether real or imagined. Charles

Dunlap has outlined an extreme but thought-provoking scenario in

which a regional opponent might elect to employ nuclear weapons

against its own population, blaming the United States for the attack.10

The management of publicly released information will remain a core

competency for any crisis. What people see, read, and hear both in the

United States and abroad will ultimately shape their perceptions of the

rightness or wrongness of the American cause.

A potential cyber attack against the U.S. homeland has probably received more recent media attention than any other form of asymmetric

warfare. The United States is both relatively and absolutely more dependent upon computer systems than any other nation in the world for activities ranging from personal banking to management of highways. Some of

these systems are protected, most are not, but virtually all are interlinked

to some degree that increases their vulnerability.11 Our ability to identify

and to defend against these potential attacks is fragmented to some extent

simply because of the scope of the threat. It may prove very hard to identify attackers, and the line between criminal activity and state-sponsored

attack will be blurred.

High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

Perhaps the most dangerous and misunderstood form of information

warfare attack is that of high-altitude EMP: a combination of nuclear

weapons and information warfare that can challenge the very heart of

U.S. operational doctrine and national political stability. High-altitude
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 87

EMP results from the explosion of a nuclear weapon detonated above the

earth’s atmosphere, typically above 30 kilometers.12 Apart from the fireball, blast, light, and heat, the explosion results in an EMP as gamma-ray

energy is converted in the earth’s atmosphere to radio frequency energy

that propagates toward the earth’s surface.13

The higher the altitude of the explosion, the less the direct blast effect

of the weapon and the greater the indirect effects such as high-altitude

EMP will be. Space systems are especially vulnerable.14 A particularly

ominous danger is the fact that an exoatmospheric explosion anywhere

over the surface of the earth, even over the attacker’s own territory, could

affect satellites.15

Virtually all electronic systems in the United States today are potentially vulnerable to high-altitude EMP: televisions and mainframe computers, telephone systems, aircraft, and satellites.16 High-altitude EMP can

cause malfunction or device failure directly, or it can trigger the system’s

internal power sources in unintended ways that cause damage.17

Relatively little of either the commercial or the military world is effectively and verifiably protected. Within DOD, tactical military communications systems are probably the most vulnerable, followed closely by theater

command and control architecture. The threat extends to tactical aircraft

and, in fact, to any system that uses advanced solid-state electronics to perform basic functions. This encompasses most of the systems in the U.S.

military today, from wheeled vehicles to helicopters.18 “Quite simply, the

use of commercial satellites is now so tightly woven into the fabric of our

commercial and military endeavors that the consequences of the loss of

these assets is unthinkable, yet such loss is a very real possibility.”19

While the effects of high-altitude EMP may seem arcane, the Soviet

Union studied it as an integral part of its strategic warfighting concept

during the Cold War and devoted a significant part of its strategic order

of battle to achieving decisive high-altitude EMP effects in a general nuclear war.20 It is reasonable to assume that other nations have consulted

Soviet analyses.

An exoatmospheric nuclear detonation offers a regional state the ability to apply nuclear weapons in a nonlethal application (a 20-kiloton

burst at an altitude of 150 kilometers would produce no visible radiation,

blast, or fire effects on the ground) that would have profoundly disruptive

effects on U.S. space, air, ground, and sea operations. It could change the

character of a theater war from that of a Desert Storm to a Verdun, from

an information-rich environment to one in which intelligence would be
88 QDR 2001

local in nature and very hard to pass along both laterally and vertically.

Most importantly, the use of nuclear weapons in this manner potentially

avoids crossing the nuclear Rubicon—a direct attack upon U.S. forces

that would bring a clear, unequivocal response. A high-altitude EMP attack is a sideswipe that would force the NCA to reconsider its responses.

Is an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion—in which no U.S. personnel die

as a direct result—serious enough to warrant a nuclear response against

Baghdad, Tehran, or Pyongyang? 

Alternative Operational Concepts

In choosing not to compete directly against the United States technologically, potential adversaries may make a conscious attempt to avoid

mirroring Western military organizations and approaches to war.21 A refusal to adopt Western approaches may go well beyond questions of operational convergence and military effectiveness. The most lucrative potential approach could be to seek advantage by operating well outside the

moral framework of the traditional Western approach, rejecting what the

United States sees as universal norms of behavior. It might, for example,

seek to exploit what is widely believed to be the extreme sensitivity of U.S.

society to even minor casualties (not withstanding recent evidence that

indicates this may not be so).22

Regional aggressors or rogue states may choose to view their populations as assets to be expended, using what has been called the “operational

maneuver of starving women and children.”23 If innocent civilians are

starving, left exposed to the elements, or attacked, their condition will become of intense interest to the U.S. theater commander. The regional

commander in chief will have to take their well-being into account in

making operational plans and to be prepared to allocate scarce assets to

care for them. This will inevitably become a competing priority with ongoing military operations, because of NGO efforts and the pressures exerted by the CNN effect.

While a combination of technological approaches and innovative tactics can be used against U.S. forces, the best counter may rest in an opponent’s battlespace selection. If an opponent can force the fight onto complex urban, mountain, or jungle terrain, U.S. sensors and weapons

accuracy will be degraded, and the potential for U.S. casualties will rise.

Choosing the right ground may well prove to be the most significant advantage available to an adversary, and U.S. forces may not be able to

refuse to enter such killing grounds.24
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 89

Other supporting tactical asymmetric approaches might include the

use of the civilian population as hostages, as human shields, and as de

facto weapons with which to overstress U.S. and allied medical systems.

All of these factors will tend to reduce the effectiveness of precision engagement systems, clouding the picture of the battlefield and imposing

greater exposure on the Armed Forces. They create the risk of U.S. tactical

mistakes, which an effective information operations campaign could then

turn to great effect.

Antiaccess efforts can deter, slow, or prevent U.S. forces from entering

a theater. The technologies for antiaccess are not new: they range from

high-tech to low-tech, from conventional sea-based mines to shoulderfired surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. Where terrain is unfavorable and U.S. interest is only low to moderate, these approaches may

gain powerful advantage. They will tend to be less effective when a vital

U.S. national interest is at stake.

Antiaccess measures can be grouped into four broad and overlapping

categories: deterring measures, coercing measures, antideployment measures, and anti-invasion measures. They can be either conventional or

WMD. The level of U.S. national interest at stake is fundamental to analyzing antiaccess approaches. If the United States seeks access and a vital national interest is at stake, then stopping U.S. forces will be difficult. The loss

of a carrier or a number of B–2 bombers, for example, might be acceptable

if the objective is important enough. However, such a loss might be enough

to deter the United States in situations where its interest is very low.

There is also a hidden and dangerous dynamic at work for the state

that makes these calculations: a shocking and successful attack on a U.S.

asset may well prove to be the catalyst that drives national interest to a

far greater level than it might have otherwise been. The calculation of

deterrence will be tricky for potential foes, and the risks of getting it

wrong are substantial.

Terrorism

Terrorism is not a perfect fit in this matrix of threats. If terror is the

means chosen by a state actor, it fits more or less into all of the previous

categories. Here, however, the focus is on nonstate-sponsored groups that

operate outside the framework of international relations. Their financial

and scientific base will be narrower than those of state-sponsored organizations, but this is compensated for by their readiness to select more radical techniques that would be suicidal for groups linked to states.
90 QDR 2001

The rise of the United States as the global lightning rod, coupled with

the growing availability of weapons that promise massive and visible results with minimal outlay, means that the potential for nonstate actors to

threaten use of weapons formerly reserved for states is clear and growing.

The Cold War formula of the least-likely-is-most-dangerous is fast eroding, and many unsavory scenarios can be imagined that are all reasonably

likely to occur.

Summing Up Asymmetric Threats

Two principal conclusions can be drawn from this examination of

asymmetry. First, a number of potential adversaries are exploring strategies, the most dangerous and threatening of which are usually based on

the acquisition of WMD, that may narrow certain gaps with the United

States. The second observation deals with the relative importance of

WMD within the typology of asymmetry. It is inviting to reduce the asymmetric argument to a discussion of the strategic WMD threat to the U.S.

homeland. This is a dangerous oversimplification because, while it captures the most destructive and frightening end of the asymmetric spectrum, it also ignores a number of far more likely applications of asymmetry. Weapons—regardless of the type—are themselves of less importance

than the effect they create in the mind of the attacked. There are also other

ways besides WMD to achieve similar effects. We should not limit our

thinking about how to defend against asymmetric approaches to an overly

narrow band that encompasses only the most dangerous weapons.

What Are the Worst Asymmetric Threats?

This section distinguishes the most dangerous threats to the United

States. It is difficult to plan for threats unless we differentiate between

them, to lend structure and a comparative approach to asymmetric

threats and heed the caution that “we should not spend more time inventing asymmetric options for other states than those states’ leaderships

do themselves.”25 Ten threats are identified, based on the recurring themes

developed in this chapter. They are not ranked, and none is singled out as

“most dangerous” to the United States; they are all dangerous. They also

represent other threats that have not been included; they outline the spectrum of potential asymmetric threats about which U.S. policy decisions

can be crafted.
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 91

Nuclear or Biological Attack on U.S. Soil

The first asymmetric approach considered is the threat of a nuclear or

biological attack against the American homeland. Such an attack threatens the greatest damage. Possession of nuclear or biological weapons and

means of delivery thus gives a regional competitor or a rogue state a

credible means of influencing U.S. decisionmakers. This is true disproportionate effect. Any Presidential decisionmaking process will be constrained when an enemy possesses the credible capability to deliver a nuclear or biological countervalue attack on the United States.

Particularly under circumstances when a national interest of the

United States is not unambiguously involved, this type of threat would severely compress the U.S. range of options.26 This is a threat that operates

almost purely at the strategic level of war. As a threat, this is both a highly

dangerous possibility and one that is increasingly likely, and for these reasons this alternative is the only asymmetric approach considered among

these ten that is based on the principle of coercion and that might not involve actual use of a weapon. It is the threat of attack that coerces or deters potential American action in this case. An actual attack would surrender many of the advantages of an asymmetric approach.

The threat of such an attack could include either covert or conventional means. Conventional means—cruise or ballistic missiles or

manned aircraft—are less likely as a means of delivery for a non-peer

competitor. Technological considerations alone would make it difficult to

deliver such a weapon to the continental United States, and the trail back

to the source would be clear and unequivocal. An alternative is the covert

infiltration of a nuclear weapon or a biological weapon into a major

urban center. The possibility of an irrational state actor cannot be discounted, however, when the stakes are so very high and the delivery of a

small number of nuclear weapons by ballistic missiles should be considered a viable, though less likely, lesser included case of this threat.

Crossing the line between threat and actual attack would be a very

dangerous step for any state. For this reason, coercive asymmetric approaches of this nature might be coupled with an intensive diplomatic

campaign and information operations designed to achieve limited results

below the threshold of actual use.

Information Warfare Attack

A concerted information warfare attack against our national information systems infrastructure would probably include information
92 QDR 2001

management systems vital for the operation of the critical infrastructures of public safety, transportation, and banking and finance. Such an

attack could run the gamut from attacks of precision disruption aimed

at specific elements of infrastructure (air traffic control systems, for example) to a broadly disruptive attack based on high-altitude EMP.27 The

relative likelihood of such an attack is high, given the level of U.S.

dependence upon such systems. The potential damage could be severe,

but it would probably not approach the devastation possible from a nuclear or biological attack; however, a high-altitude EMP strategic attack

on the United States could be devastating to the entire national information infrastructure. Because of the combination of opportunity and

vulnerability, this is assessed as a very real threat whose potential scope

will only grow with time. Such an attack targets the will of the United

States by operating directly against the civil population. It has disproportionate effect and, if used as a threat or coercing tactic, could have

many of the deterring advantages of nuclear and biological weapons.

Biological and Chemical Attacks

Biological and chemical attacks against host-nation support and alliance forces in a theater would have the dual goals of splitting a coalition

and eroding national will in the United States. An attack of this nature

would seek to exploit weaker elements of a coalition by attacking principally with biological and chemical weapons. The relative likelihood of this

form of attack is high in an MTW environment, and the relative danger

to U.S. and allied forces is high. Because of its potential effectiveness, the

threat of this form of attack could also be used to coerce potential regional allies in the early days of a crisis.

Such an attack—or threat of an attack—would be directed against

the weakest elements of any coalition or host nation. It would strictly

avoid targeting U.S. forces and would instead be directed against the personnel who are the vital theater enablers for U.S. forces. The most lucrative form of this attack might be to target civilians crucial to offloading

U.S. equipment as it enters a theater. They would not be under military

discipline, would not likely have had any NBC training, nor would they

have much or any protective equipment, such as the inoculations that

U.S. and allied forces presumably will have had. These workers are the

Achilles’ heel of any theater that will require the heavy flow of U.S. forces

through a limited number of ports of entry, either air or sea.

If the will of regional allies can be degraded by these threats or by actual employment, then it could have a pernicious effect on the will of the
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 93

United States to participate. A regional aggressor might achieve its goals by

threats, but the line from threat to employment is easier to cross within a

regional scenario and when the primary targets will not be U.S. forces.

WMD Attacks against Deployment Systems

WMD attacks could be mounted against strategic deployment

systems, including air and sea ports of debarkation in theater, en-route

facilities, and enabling infrastructure. The primary threat is that of chemical and biological weapons. The relative likelihood of such an attack is

high in a major or near-MTW scenario. The potential for damage is high.

Many of the considerations that apply to attacks on allied and coalition

forces are also operative here. There are also some greater risks because in

this case the attack is now being delivered directly against U.S. forces as

they enter a theater.

An attack of this nature would be a central component of an antiaccess

strategy that would seek to slow the arrival of U.S. forces into a theater.

Chemical attacks would be the least effective but easiest to execute, while

biological warfare attacks could gain high leverage. It would not take more

than a very small biological attack, coupled with an aggressive information

operations plan, to disrupt severely the large number of non-military enabling systems that support the deployment architecture. A lesser-included

case or alternative form of attack could be the aggressive employment of

conventional special operations forces and perhaps terrorists who operate

against the deployment infrastructure without using WMD.

Information Warfare

Information warfare includes the threat of high-altitude EMP attack

against forces in a theater. This is a potent threat across the spectrum of

information operations, but the most dangerous form is the use of highaltitude EMP to degrade U.S. and allied capability to achieve information

dominance. The relative likelihood of this form of attack is moderate—

the technical requirements to prosecute such an attack successfully are

daunting—but the danger to U.S. forces would be very high if the attack

were successful.

As a general principle, offensive information warfare will grow less

fruitful for an opponent as the level of warfare moves from strategic to tactical. It is harder to enter U.S. tactical computing systems, and a variety of

aggressive U.S. defensive information operations will also be taking place.

The use of high-altitude EMP at a tactical level, however, maximizes the advantages of disruption inherent in this weapon while minimizing the
94 QDR 2001

provocation of an attack on or above U.S. soil with nuclear weapons. States

that possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems will also have the potential deterrence benefit that accrues from this capability. In actual operation,

however, this threat would exist below the strategic level, although favorable

strategic effects could be secured by operations that follow such an attack.

Battlespace Selection

Opponents may force the United States to fight in places where its information and other forms of superiority are blunted. An opponent

would seek to lengthen U.S. operations in time while maximizing opportunities for American casualties. The relative likelihood of this method of

attack is high—if the terrain will support it—and the potential for danger

is also high. As the world becomes more urbanized, the Armed Forces will

often be forced to enter and to operate in such terrain, perhaps most of

the time. The examples of Stalingrad, Hue City, Manila, and Mogadishu

are clear and evident.

Antiaccess Measures without WMD

Non-WMD antiaccess measures include mines, missiles, and other

tried-and-true measures to slow deployment or forcible-entry operations.

The relative likelihood of these tactics being employed is high, and the potential for damage at the operational level is also high. This approach relies

on legacy systems from the Cold War along with newly emerging systems

to prevent the entry of amphibious, airborne, or air forces. It is a tactic

that has limited opportunity for success unless applied in concert with

other measures. This has the greatest chance of success in a small-scale

contingency, where there is no direct U.S. vital national interest at stake.

Warrior Tactics

Fighting methods and conduct on or around the battlefield—or warrior tactics—grossly violate generally accepted norms in an attempt to

shock and to disrupt an opponent. There is a growing belief, perhaps inaccurate, that the United States is uniquely vulnerable to this approach to

fighting. The premium placed on force protection and a current emphasis

in U.S. planning on no or low casualties tends to reinforce the attractiveness of an approach that would disregard casualties in an attempt to gain

an advantage in a regional conflict. The relative likelihood of such tactics

being employed is high, and the potential for damage to U.S. forces is

moderate, although it is far from certain that such a primitivist approach

could offset significant U.S. technological and training advantages.
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 95

Chemical Attack against CONUS

The potential for chemical attack is often left in the shadow of the biological warfare threat to the homeland, but it is a distinctly separate

threat, with a slightly higher relative likelihood of being employed. It is

more likely because it is easier to introduce chemical weapons into the

United States than nuclear weapons, and it does not draw the international revulsion that attends biological weapons. The potential for largescale damage to the United States, however, is low. This is a less likely alternative for state actors than for nonstate actors with limited resources

and delivery alternatives.

Wildcards

The last asymmetric threat is the one that we cannot even envision:

the wildcard. Threats will emerge that we cannot plan for. While most of

them will be reactions to the specific weapons systems and operational

principles the United States employs, they will take root in the fertile soil

of their own unique culture and experience and may prove to be the most

dangerous of all.

Addressing Asymmetric Threats

Broad disparities in level of effort, interest, and potential effectiveness

mark current U.S. responses to asymmetric threats. No overarching or coherent theme ties all elements of potential asymmetric countermeasures together. This lack of a unifying theme follows from the differing definitions

of asymmetry that have influenced policies. Improving our responses to the

asymmetric threat must begin with adoption of a consistent philosophy of

how to deal with asymmetry, based upon a consistent definition. Such a

philosophy can be derived from the themes laid out in this study.

To counter asymmetric threats effectively, our policies need to reflect

three interlinked concepts. First, our policies should minimize U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack by deterring potential attackers and by having

the capability to defend successfully against asymmetric attacks on both deployed forces and the homeland if deterrence were to fail. Should an asymmetric attack prove successful, we need demonstrated competency in consequence management at home and the operational flexibility to prevail in

the face of asymmetric attack on deployed forces. Such capabilities will tend

to make asymmetric attacks less attractive to potential adversaries.

Second, our policies should accentuate our unique strengths by continuing to pursue transformation and modernization objectives such as
96 QDR 2001

those expressed in Joint Vision 2020 and its successor documents. In

doing this, we must avoid overreacting to asymmetric threats. The American way of war, emphasizing speed, shock, and rapid battlespace dominance, is inherently asymmetric itself when compared to the capabilities

of most potential opponents. Our way of war works, and we do not need

to overcorrect in attempting to anticipate asymmetric approaches.

Third, in dealing with asymmetric threats, it will be critical to prevent

disproportionate effects. This is the heart of asymmetric advantage, and it

must be countered at all levels of war; preventing tactical and operational

effects from modifying our strategies is the most important component of

this approach. For the United States, disparity of interest with a broad

range of potential opponents is an enduring reality. As long as we remain a

global power with many strategic interests, some interests will always be less

important than others. DOD must, in dealing with the issue of asymmetric

warfare, ensure that U.S. foreign policy options are not artificially circumscribed by state or nonstate actors who seek, by threat or action, to impose

a disproportionately high price on our continued engagement.

A number of specific actions to implement this objective are grouped

under the three organizing ideas: minimizing vulnerabilities, accentuating

unique strengths, and preventing disproportionate effects. When a proposed action falls partially or wholly outside DOD, this is noted. Some

will require action from departments and agencies across the Federal government, as well as state and local governments.

Actions to Minimize Vulnerabilities

To reduce vulnerabilities, immediate action to reduce the direct

threat of strategic attack against the American homeland is important.

This might include early deployment of an effective limited national

missile defense (NMD) system capable of high-confidence interception

of small numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles.28 This would

counter the threat of direct attack on the United States homeland with

ballistic-missile-delivered WMD. Such a defense would limit, however,

only one potential avenue of attack for an aggressor, who might still

choose to employ other covert means to attack the United States with

WMD.29 A ballistic missile defense system should, therefore, be part of a

comprehensive approach to strategic defense that also comprises a broad

range of counterproliferation initiatives, an explicit deterrence strategy,

and a variety of activities designed to prevent or minimize the possibility

and consequences of a covert attack.
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 97

The United States can also reduce the threat of direct or covert WMD

attack on the homeland by demonstrating a capability for consequence

management. For example, under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program,

first responder training could be doubled from its current level of 120 cities

to at least 240 cities.30 Larger cities may need larger teams, and perhaps

more of them. The existing system for regional stockpiling of medical

equipment and medicines, the responsibility of the Centers for Disease

Control, could be expanded, based on updates from the intelligence community. This system could include improved methods for inventory control

and contingency plans for rapid movement and concentration of these resources. Significant improvements have been made in the level of epidemiological monitoring within the United States. Such continued efforts would

be helpful in more rapid detection of a covert biological or chemical attack.

Long-term DOD support for local and state agencies for consequence

management (CM) can come primarily from the Reserve components,

and over time, elements of the Army National Guard may be restructured

to reflect this.31 This can be accomplished by dual-missioning in the short

term; ultimately, however, the requirement for WMD response and CM in

the continental United States could well evolve into a primary mission for

the National Guard. This is a natural choice because of the long affiliation

between the National Guard and local governmental structures, and its ultimate responsibility for the defense of the United States.32

The capability of the National Guard to assist in routine and contingency planning for CM activities and in incident response should be enhanced. Incident response would include support for command, control,

communications, and computer infrastructure, augmentation of physical

security, emergency mobile medical assets, nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance, and mass evacuation operations if required.33

The capability to deploy from the United States for some of these

forces will thus become of lower priority. First call on designated elements of the National Guard force structure may eventually be linked to

requirements for WMD (and other) CM within the United States, and

only secondarily to any requirement to deploy on short notice in support

of theater contingency plans. This will require a huge change in thinking

on the part of the National Guard; it will need to reorient inward, despite

resistance to this idea.

Under this proposal, the highest priority for the National Guard

would be pre-attack, attack management, and post-attack CM within

U.S. borders. The National Guard would still retain the ability to support
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limited rotational deployments overseas in support of the active component and would still have a strategic reserve mission, but it would no

longer be explicitly linked to short-term regional warfighting operations

plans. The restructuring of the National Guard would increase the numbers of low-density, high-demand units critical to CM: chemical, medical, military police, and other combat service support capabilities.

The first step toward this end could be a detailed analysis of what

would be required to make such a broad change in thinking, capabilities,

and supporting structure. Such an analysis would of necessity encompass

more than just the National Guard because of its growing role in rotational deployments in support of peace, humanitarian, and other operations. The increasing percentage of critical combat service support force

structure embedded in the Reserve components will need to be reevaluated. The comprehensive restructuring of the Army invites a parallel renaissance in the National Guard. These changes would reaffirm the longstanding relationship between the American people and the National

Guard and return something directly to the communities with which

these Reserve forces are affiliated.

Specific Actions to Accentuate Unique Strengths

The United States should take immediate steps at the interagency

level to improve its strategic intelligence posture that monitors the global

environment and actively scouts for potential asymmetric approaches

that might threaten it. This effort should go beyond traditional adversaries and examine new threats that may arise. The earlier that we can

sense wildcards, the more effective our response will be. In many cases,

the knowledge that we are looking and listening will itself be a deterrent.

This would require substantial retooling of our technological base for

information collection as we listen to a world that is increasingly encrypted and less dependent upon broadcast signals.34 The qualitative edge

in electronic monitoring that the United States enjoyed for so long has

evaporated, and we may never be able to fully recover it. The expanded

use of human intelligence will only begin to fill this void.35

A key element of intelligence gathering is ensuring that it is ultimately disseminated to those who need it, both within the United States

and among our allies. This is typically the greatest weakness of any intelligence program. Part of this expanded dissemination must be the continuous process of sharing with allies and likely coalition partners the latest

available information on and counters to potential asymmetric threats.

We need to take steps to assure that we will have continued access to those
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 99

areas where we may be called upon to deploy in order to deter or to fight.

These might include fielding effective theater ballistic missile defense systems, both upper and lower tier, to provide high-confidence coverage of

arrival airfields and ports, their associated assembly areas, airbases, critical host nation support infrastructure, and both U.S. and allied land- and

sea-based forces.36 Through military-to-military contacts with allies and

potential coalition partners, we should ensure that a common competency in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection is established

and maintained and that procedures are established and rehearsed as integral parts of CINC plans for combined measures to be taken in the

event of NBC attack. This should include the common provision of a single standard of prophylaxis across a combined force. We should also continue to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures and the associated equipment necessary to ensure continued access for amphibious,

air-delivered, and air forces in environments across the spectrum of engagement, from benign to forcible entry.

For air forces, such an approach would translate into a continual refinement and improvement of the ability to destroy or to degrade enemy

air defenses, particularly against a foe that chooses to employ its weapons

in innovative and nontraditional ways. “The SEAD [suppression of

enemy air defenses] capability that we’ve built in the U.S. Air Force is a

little bit dependent on the enemy fully utilizing his assets—if they’re not

emitting, then you’re not suppressing very much.”37 Functionally, this

means that we need to have a destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD)

capability as well as a suppression capability. We should also continue to

explore the technical and tactical feasibility of extreme long-range air operations for circumstances when the threat will require distant basing.

For ground forces, the principal requirement will be the ability to

conduct forcible-entry operations and subsequent logistical sustainment

in extremely austere environments, potentially with an extended acrossthe-beach or limited airhead flow of supplies for lengthy periods. The

top-to-bottom reassessment of Army organization will yield a force that

is both lighter and significantly more deployable than the current one.

Aside from parachute infantry and air assault forces, how this force will

integrate into forcible entry operations remains to be fully resolved, in

terms of equipment, doctrine, and structure.

For naval forces, the ability to defeat the mine, cruise missile, small

fast attack craft, and coastal submarine threat, and to ensure safe passage for amphibious, surface fire support, and follow-on logistics ships

will be paramount.38 Mines remain the principal threat to both
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warfighting and sustainment vessels, and the current program of eight

antimine assigned systems (one submarine-launched, one surface-combatant-launched, and six helicopter-launched) will be critical in correcting this long-term deficiency.

All joint forces must also be prepared to conduct operations for extended periods of time in hazardous chemical and biological environments

and to overcome this challenge through protective measures on the ground,

in the air, and at sea.

In concert with industry, we should ensure that all future military

and specific civil communications and satellite systems emphasize radiation-tolerant microelectronics. This would include all satellites launched

by the United States, not just military-specific systems. It is not fiscally

feasible to harden all, or perhaps even all military, satellites against direct

(that is, kinetic or directed energy) attack, but satellite systems can have

higher levels of environmental protection designed to counter high-altitude EMP. Total costs have been estimated at between 1 and 5 percent.39

Selective retrofitting of critical U.S. theater and tactical level communications systems should also be undertaken to protect against high-altitude

EMP. This cost will be significantly higher, as much as 10 percent of each

program, reflecting the difficulty and greater expense of modifying existing systems. This decision needs careful study of what systems are necessary to execute Joint Vision 2020, which depends on the ability to share a

common operational picture of the battlefield and requires assured

broad-bandwidth communication.

Rejuvenating the radiation-tolerant microelectronics industry will require a significant government-defense industry partnership and efforts

to make it financially attractive for nonmilitary satellites to incorporate

hardening into their design. This will not be cheap since hardening requires new electronics and additional weight, which are both expensive in

a system to be launched into space.

While the interagency process for dealing with the consequences of

mass catastrophic terrorism in the United States has been refined and

improved with the establishment of a central coordinator within the

White House, particular emphasis should be placed on the nature of the

support DOD will provide in such an event. This is particularly important regarding the utilization of low-density, high-demand units and

equipment in the Reserve and active components, such as chemical decontamination and medical support elements that might be needed at

the same time for contingencies outside of the United States. DOD

should articulate explicitly how it will support the civilian government
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 101

when faced with a catastrophic attack on the United States. The time of

greatest danger for an attack on the continental United States might be

during a significant international crisis in which many of our forces are

deployed abroad. In this instance, worst-case planning is prudent.

DOD should begin this process by ensuring that all theater contingency plans are thoroughly coordinated through the Joint Staff; that

potential conflicting claims by theater CINCs and homeland defense on

LD/HD assets and on stored equipment and supplies unique to catastrophic management are reconciled and prioritized; and that associated

risks are assessed and articulated. This reconciliation, prioritization, and

risk assessment should be articulated and agreed at the interagency level.

We should also be red-teaming our own capabilities so that we have an

accurate net assessment of our strengths and weaknesses. This is an important effort that requires protection and continuity and should be located

outside the intelligence community, although it must have strong ties to it.

For such an organization to have credibility, it must possess not only analytic capabilities, but also operational respectability; it must be staffed with

operators as well as analysts. It must also have access, and thus high-level

sponsorship. There is a need for such red-teaming on every level: the services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands. On the Joint Staff, such an organization would be charged with review of plans and operational concepts

from an adversarial, intelligence-based, and operationally validated perspective. Similar organizations might prove useful within each regional and

functional combatant command. The services have strong vested interests

in looking ahead at alternative futures and in continually refining their responsibilities. They should continue those efforts.

Specific Actions to Prevent Disproportionate Effect

It has been argued throughout this analysis that the ultimate goal of

any asymmetric approach is to seek strategic effect against the will of the

opponent. This can be achieved through deterrence or coercion, or—

once battle is joined—through such approaches as warrior tactics and

battlespace selection. While every action recommended to this point will

tend to contribute to the reduction of this effect, the most important

step that can be taken in this regard is for the leadership to explain

clearly to the American people the purpose of an operation. While it has

become conventional wisdom in some circles that the people of the

United States will not accept even minimal casualties in military operations far from home, the truth is actually more complex. If the goals and

objectives of American involvement in operations abroad are clearly and
102 QDR 2001

explicitly explained, support at home is likely to be both broad and deep.

Telling the American people why their fighting men and women are in

harm’s way will be ever more important in a world in which the hierarchy of information is getting flatter. Other advocates, perhaps unfriendly

to our interests, will also be telling their side of the story. We must take

advantage of every opportunity to explain what we are doing, and we

must do it better than our potential opponents.

Conclusion

The proposals outlined above argue for the continuation and refinement of existing programs, and in some cases for the adoption of new

ones. Some have obvious benefits but will require presidential decision

(for example, the deployment of an NMD) because of the larger political

and diplomatic consequences. Some will require the breaking of longheld paradigms (for example, the role of the National Guard). These will

be difficult choices.

While significant sums have been spent and are now currently programmed, a decision to deploy an NMD would require significant future

commitment of resources. Of lesser but still significant fiscal impact is the

recommendation to improve and to protect our information architecture

from high-altitude EMP. The single recommendation having the greatest

potential domestic political volatility, as well as significant fiscal impact, is

the recommendation to retool elements of the Army National Guard for

the domestic CM threat.

The objective of these recommendations is to gain the best competitive advantage for our nation at the least cost—in human life and national

treasure—in a strategic environment in which our interest in any given

engagement may not be as great as our adversary’s. In preparing for this

environment, it is important that we do not design our responses so narrowly that we become prisoners of our own actions. For that reason, these

recommendations have sought to fulfill a basic responsibility of civil government—the protection of its citizens and their property—without becoming fixated on the defense of the United States homeland as the beginning and end of the asymmetric threat. The dual objectives of protecting

our citizens at home while advancing American interests abroad form the

most effective possible response to asymmetric threats.
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 103

Notes1 From Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical Environment, Occasional Paper of the Center for Counterproliferation Research (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 4.

2 Richard A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 226–227.

3 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass

Destruction, OTA–BP–ISC–115 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 77–81 and

throughout, for an excellent discussion.

4 See R. J. Larsen and R. P. Kadlec, Biological Warfare: A Post Cold War Threat to America’s

Strategic Mobility Forces (Pittsburgh: Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies,

University of Pittsburgh, 1995), 12 and throughout, for an excellent discussion of the strategic mobility threat posed by these weapons.

5 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, 46–59.

6 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, 8.

7 Henry H. Shelton, Information Operations: A Strategy for Peace, The Decisive Edge in War

(Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999).

8 Two recent survey works on the current state of information operations are Zalmay Khalilzad

and John P. White, eds., The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

1999); and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

9 Bob Brewin, “Pentagon Hit by ‘World Wide Wait’,” Federal Computer Week, November 15,

1999, 1.

10 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007,” The Weekly Standard, January 29, 1996, 22–28.

11 Robert T. Marsh et al., Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures: The Report of

the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: The President’s

Commission on Infrastructure Protection, 1997) (Hereafter referred to as the Marsh Report).

12 Discussion in this section is largely based on Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The

Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1977), chapters X,

“Radar and Radio Effects,” and XI, “The Electromagnetic Pulse and its Effects”; and S.J. McGrath,

“The Electromagnetic Pulse Environment and Its Influence on Tactical Electronic and Communications Equipment,” unpublished thesis for MS in Telecommunications, Naval Postgraduate School,

Coronado, CA, March 1992.

13 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 515.

14 Ibid., 518.

15 R.C. Webb et al., “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” Defense Electronics, August 1995, 24. Martin C. Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, McNair Paper 61 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1999), 14,

warns that: “The few really good eyes in the U.S. space inventory may be vulnerable to attack.”

16 See Andrew Koch, “Interview: Dr. Jay Davis, Director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction

Agency (DTRA),” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 16, 2000, 32: “An EMP attack ‘is technically quite

simple to do with a relatively crude nuclear weapon’.... ‘If you look at the effects of that on our

communications and telecommunications systems, and if you look at the more problematic effect

of EMP from a high-altitude burst over U.S. forces or over part of the USA, it becomes an attractive equalizer for a less sophisticated military opponent or even a terrorist.’”

17 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 520–532.

18 See Bruce D. Nordwell, “EMP, High-Powered Microwaves Pose New EW Threat to Aircraft,”

Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 26, 1998, 68.

19 Webb, “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” 21.
104 QDR 2001

20 Ibid.

21 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths,” Landpower in

the 21st Century: Preparing for Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1998), 83–93.

22 Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” The Washington Post, November 7, 1999, B3, describe the results of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies Casualty Aversion Survey, conducted from September 1998 through June 1999.

23 This term was used in a briefing at Headquarters, Task Force Eagle, 1st Cavalry Division,

Tuzla, Bosnia, January 1999.

24 See Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, 47–50 for a thoughtful discussion of this problem.

25 Paul F. Herman, “Asymmetric Warfare: Sizing the Threat,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 6, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 180. This excellent article clarifies the conceptual underpinnings

of asymmetric warfare.

26 A good summary of this can be found in Brad C. Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security (Summer 1993): 158: “In the United States, proliferation is likely to

sharpen the debate about vital versus peripheral national interests, undermine the political support for

military intervention, or even long term engagement, increase U.S. vulnerability to coercive diplomacy

by regional actors, and narrow the room for maneuver in [the] international environment.”

27 E. Anders Eriksson, “Viewpoint: Information Warfare: Hype or Reality?” The Nonproliferation

Review 6, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1999), 57–64.

28 Deployment decisions about what the best missile defense system would be—ground-based,

space-based, in-theater (boost-phase), or post-boost-phase—are beyond the scope of this study.

29 Two differing perspectives on the NMD issue can be found in Henry A. Kissinger, “The Next

President’s First Obligation,” The Washington Post, February 9, 2000, 21; and George N. Lewis, Lisbeth

Gronlund, and David C. Wright, “National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System,” Foreign Policy

117 (Winter 1999–2000), 120–131.

30 This program provides funds and training support to create a nucleus of local personnel able

to respond effectively to large-scale consequence management contingencies.

31 See the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Study

Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1999).

32 This builds on recommendations in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Reserve Component Study completed in 1999, and the 1999 Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD) Study (Washington, DC: Science Applications International Corporation,

February 1999). When in a state-supporting role, the Guard is exempt from the provisions of the

posse comitatus statute (18 U.S.C. 1385), which prohibit Federal military forces from performing law

enforcement duties.

33 OSD, Reserve Component Study, C–1, 2. The 1999 Report to the National Guard Bureau

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Study, 4, identified 141 potential support roles for the National Guard, and then refined them to “47 mission consistent potential National Guard WMD response support roles.”

34 See Seymour M. Hersh, “The Intelligence Gap,” The New Yorker, December 6, 1999, 58–67, for a

discussion of the challenges facing the National Security Agency (NSA). For example, “the North Koreans . . . have bought encrypted phones from Europe, high-speed switching gear from Britain, and up-todate dialing service from America—a system the NSA cannot readily read.” A U.S. intelligence official

was quoted as saying of the North Koreans that “All their military stuff went off ether into fiber—from

high frequency radio transmission to fiber-optic cable lines,” capable of carrying much more traffic

than any radio transmission, and not readily read by external monitoring systems. Douglas Farah, “New

Drug Smugglers Hold Tech Advantage,” The Washington Post, November 15, 1999, 1, outlines some of

the encryption techniques readily available to well-funded transnational criminal organizations.

35 Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel, 282–286, makes some of these recommendations in

chapter 5, “Recommendations: An Agenda for the American Government.”

36 In the TMD arena, the Army PAC–3 and the Navy Area Defense systems are already budgeted.
ASYMMETRIC THREATS 105

37 Major General Bruce Carlson, USAF, quoted in John A. Tirpak, “Dealing With Air Defenses,”

Air Force Magazine, November 1999, 26.

38 Unattributed, “Navy Mine Warfare Official Warns ‘Judgment Day’ Is Coming,” Inside the

Navy, November 22, 1999, 7.

39 Joseph C. Anselmo, “U.S. Seen More Vulnerable to Electromagnetic Attack,” Aviation Week

and Space Technology, July 28, 1997, 67.

Page 106 is Blank—no folio
Chapter Four

The Defense Budget:

Meeting Growing

Requirements with

Constrained Resources 

by Richard L. Kugler

Where is the U.S. defense budget headed? This chapter has a

theme of impending challenge ahead. Because the globalizing

world remains a dangerous and uncertain place, the United

States needs to stay strong militarily, second to none. In the years ahead,

the defense budget will need to grow—perhaps by more than is now realized—so that U.S. forces can be properly strengthened. But even if the

budget does increase moderately, the Department of Defense will not be

able to spend its way out of the mounting dilemmas facing it. Pressures for

added spending are rising faster than the defense budget is likely to grow.

Nor does the Pentagon have ready opportunities to cut costs for existing

forces in big ways that are painless. Because DOD is not likely to get all the

money it wants and arguably may need, strategic priorities will have to be

set in ways that help close the widening gap between growing requirements and constrained resources.

What must be avoided is a strategy-force mismatch in which U.S.

military capabilities fall far short of being able to carry out an overly ambitious strategy. Equally to be avoided is an incoherent military posture

unable to execute a sound strategy that would be feasible if plans and

programs were wisely prepared. In order to use resources effectively, the

Department of Defense—as well as the President and Congress—will

need to determine not only what the military requires, but also what it

can do without. The emerging situation calls for a careful examination of

tradespace: the realm where difficult yes and no decisions are taken, some

107
108 QDR 2001

improvements are pursued rather than others, and shortfalls are accepted

when the risks are deemed tolerable.

After outlining the strategic context for shaping the U.S. defense budget, this chapter describes current and potential future budgets. Next, it

sketches the internal components of the defense budget, including spending on services, programs, and line-item activities. It then explores in

more detail where pressures will arise for more spending in such areas as

military personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M), procurement,

international operations, and conventional force structure enhancements.

The analysis concludes by discussing how these growing pressures add up

to significant challenges ahead for both the overall size of future defense

budgets and their internal priorities. By providing an overall framework,

this chapter helps set the stage for the chapters that follow, which address

the detailed issues surrounding analysis of alternative strategies, forces,

and programs.

The Strategic Context 

For the past 8 years, U.S. defense preparedness policy—that is, the

building of forces as opposed to using them in crises—has been humming along quietly, not attracting much public attention. The Pentagon

has been busily crafting new doctrine and upgrading its forces in low-visibility ways. But because a broad public consensus existed on military affairs and because defense budgets were not rising, DOD actions did not

trigger the intense political struggles that swept over such domestic issues

as deficit reduction, taxes, and social policies. This tranquil setting is now

mutating, not only because of changes taking place in U.S. military forces,

but also because the still-turbulent world is producing new dangers and

requirements. In the coming years, defense spending is likely to reclaim

its old place as a controversial issue in national political life.

U.S. forces thus far have been able to handle today’s peacetime missions, crises, and wars. But they have been stretched thin by their heavy

load of overseas engagement missions, peacekeeping, minor and major

crisis interventions, and staying prepared for two regional wars in overlapping time frames. In the coming years, the strategic demands on them

could even increase. A short while ago, the principal concern was the distant future of 20 years from now, when new and well-armed adversaries

could appear. Lately, concern has been shifting to the mid-term, 5–10

years or less, when new, hydra-headed threats seem capable of gaining

strength. The U.S. military’s need to remain effective in the near term,
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 109

while upgrading for the mid-term and preparing for the long haul, further complicates defense planning today.

As a result, the U.S. defense budget has been rising lately. The political

debate now starting to sweep over the larger security community is a reflection of the internal struggle within DOD over how best to use scarce

resources in order to meet future needs, a struggle that promises to get

worse before it gets better. During the Cold War before the Reagan

buildup, there were great battles over strategy and resources. Today’s situation is not as stressful. But the Pentagon already is laboring with the task

of keeping its forces ready, carrying out new missions abroad, handling a

rising tempo of operations, dealing with an aging infrastructure, reforming its business practices, paying its military personnel adequate salaries,

adopting new doctrines, and carrying out the final stages of R&D on a

new generation of weapons. As these new weapons enter production, they

will elevate needs for procurement spending. Beyond this, entirely new

strategic requirements are arising. National missile defense may be needed

in order to defend against proliferating weapons of mass destruction. U.S.

conventional forces may require changes in their size and configuration so

that they can perform new missions. These and other new requirements

will place further upward pressures on the defense budget.

In theory, this troublesome situation could be resolved by increasing

the defense budget by large amounts. In order to close the widening gap

between existing resources and plausible needs, a common estimate is

that the annual defense budget could be increased by $10–20 billion

today and by $30–50 billion above official forecasts in a few years. Some

analysts are citing a need for even bigger increases. Perhaps the defense

budget will grow beyond current plans, but most likely not to that extent.

Regardless of the outcome, DOD will need to extract the maximum

mileage out of the resources available. Above all, it will need to preserve a

coherent military posture. It cannot afford to pursue so many new initiatives in such uncoordinated ways that its forces are left in tatters, partially

able to do many things, but adequately effective at few of them.1

Current Budget and Future Topline 

When President John F. Kennedy entered the White House 40 years

ago, he instructed his Secretary of Defense to find out what the United

States needed to defend itself, and to buy it at the lowest possible cost. His

guidance aptly framed the dilemma that has bedeviled presidents since

then: how can the United States not only build an effective defense posture,
110 QDR 2001

but do so in affordable ways? Although the Cold War has given way to a

new era of accelerating globalization and complicated security affairs, this

dilemma remains alive today. Indeed, it has become even tougher because

the new era is so murky and uncertain.

Defense planning would be easy if the task was simply to identify a

theory of requirements and then tailor the budget to fulfill it. But requirements are not easy to pinpoint. Moreover, the issue is seldom meeting requirements fully or neglecting them wholly, but instead deciding upon

how much defense capability is enough and how many risks can be accepted. Military effectiveness must be considered, but so must costs even

when high preparedness is the standard. Difficult judgments must always

be made about how to strike a reasonable balance between being adequately prepared and spending money that does not grow on trees.

As in past eras, today’s search for a reasonable balance takes place

within the framework of basic policy decisions made by the President and

Congress. Today’s dominant national goals abroad are to create a stable

security system in which American interests are protected, to build a vigorous world economy in which the United States can prosper, and to promote democratic values where possible. To help achieve these goals, current national security strategy is one of global engagement, animated by

the precepts of shaping the international environment, responding to

crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future. National military strategy for supporting these precepts is anchored in a combination of overseas presence and swift power projection. To carry out this strategy, U.S.

defense planning calls for sufficient forces to wage two nearly concurrent

MTWs, while flexibly using these forces for a wide variety of additional

purposes in peace, crisis, and war. This planning framework creates the

need for today’s force posture of 13 active Army and Marine divisions, 20

Air Force fighter wings, 12 carrier battle groups, plus sizable mobility

forces, logistic support units, Reserve component forces, and other assets.

These forces, in turn, give rise to today’s DOD manpower totals of

1,380,000 active troops, 865,000 Reservists, and 700,000 civilians.2

These policies are not immutable, but a stance of high military preparedness is likely to be adopted by the Bush administration. The current force posture, or a similar posture, will require a large defense budget to support it. But exactly how large a budget, and how should it be

spent? Because this question can be answered in different ways, it lies at

the core of the mounting debate over the size and directions of the U.S.

defense effort.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 111

The Clinton administration answered this question in ways that gradually shifted during its 8-year tenure. Its first major study of defense policy was the Bottom-Up Review of 1993. Reacting to the Base Force inherited from the Bush administration, the review called for a somewhat

downsized but adequate defense effort for the post-Cold War era. It

adopted the two-MTW concept, reduced force levels by 10–15 percent,

and charted a course of gradually declining budgets that fell to $251 billion by 1994 and then leveled off at $255–258 billion over the next 3

years. The next major study was the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),

issued in mid-1997. It unveiled the new strategy of “shaping, responding,

and preparing,” and grappled with the dilemmas over priorities and new

requirements beginning to infect the defense budget. Its central decision

was to strike a balance between the near-term dictates of keeping large

and ready forces, and the long-term pursuit of modernization in carrying

out a revolution in military affairs and the new military doctrine set forth

in Joint Vision 2020.

By early 1999, the administration had decided to fund somewhat

larger defense budgets. Accordingly, Secretary of Defense William Cohen

announced that $112 billion would be added during 2000–2005. Of this

amount, $84 billion came from actual topline increases, and the remaining $28 billion was savings from lessened inflation, lower fuel prices, and

other adjustments. Cohen’s plan for the increase called for spending $35

billion on military personnel, $49 billion on O&M, and $28 billion on

procurement. Most of these funds were to be provided in 2002–2005, but

some were added to DOD budgets for 2000 and 2001. These two budgets

halted the decade-long decline in real defense spending and started

restoring a measure of growth.

The context for spending increases now in train is seen in table 4–1,

which shows historical trends in budget authority from 1985 to 2001, in

both current dollars—the money actually budgeted each year—and constant dollars, a figure that removes inflation and therefore is a better measure of the real value of each budget in today’s dollars. The DOD budget

fell by only 12 percent from 1990 to 1998 in current dollars, but in constant dollars—real purchasing power—it declined by about 28 percent

(while DOD manpower shrank by a similar amount). The stable currentdollar budgets of the mid-1990s thus were being slowly eroded by inflation. It was this steady downward trend that Cohen’s increases were designed to start reversing.
112 QDR 2001

Table 4–2 portrays how future defense budgets may unfold as a function of alternative funding strategies. It first displays projections for

2001–2010 if the defense budget grows by only enough to offset inflation

rates of 2.5 percent annually, thus providing no real growth. It shows that

budget would grow to $328 billion by 2006 and to $362 billion by 2010.

But in real terms, the Pentagon would get no additional funds for new

measures. This projection accords closely with official DOD estimates.

Table 4–2 also shows how the defense budget would grow if it receives inflation offsets plus annual real growth of 1 percent or 2 percent. At the

bottom, the table shows the range of added funds, above inflation, that

would be received if real growth strategies of this sort are carried out each

year for the coming decade.

Table 4–2 illustrates that annual real growth rates of 1–2 percent

would provide added funds that are relatively small at first and then

grow slowly as the decade unfolds. Whereas the annual defense shortfall

could rise to $30–50 billion by mid-decade, this budget would provide

enough extra funds to cover this shortage only late in the decade, and

only if the shortage itself does not grow further by then. The key point

is that if modest annual growth rates become politically feasible, they

can provide valuable additional funds. But unless they are accompanied

by a substantial step-level increase in the next few years, they will not

resolve defense budget dilemmas and the need to confront strategic priorities any time soon.

Future defense spending will depend upon decisions taken by the incoming administration and the Congress, and thus could be different

Table 4–1. Defense Spending Trends (Budget Authority)

(billions of dollars)

FY85 FY90 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01

Current Dollars 286.8 293.0 254.4 258.0 258.5 278.4 279.9 291.1

Constant (FY01)

Dollars 436.4 382.5 284.5 282.4 277.2 292.6 287.8 291.1

Percent Real Growth 6.3 2.1 2.6 0.7 1.9 5.5 1.6 1.1

Constant Dollars

For more detail, see Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office,

2000). Budget figures for 2001 reflect DOD requests as of mid-2000. Subsequent Congressional decisions have altered these

figures in small ways.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 113

than projected here. In some quarters, calls are being heard for bigger defense budgets than now planned. But there are countervailing calls for

employing the federal surplus for other purposes, including tax cuts and

domestic programs. Defense spending seems unlikely to be reduced, but

barring an international downturn, a major buildup similar to that of the

Reagan years seems equally improbable. In Congressional hearings, the

Senate and House Armed Services Committees added $4.5 billion to the

Clinton administration’s request for the 2001 defense budget. While this

is a significant amount, it is not Reaganesque. The idea of vastly bigger

defense budget hikes gained little traction in the 2000 presidential campaign. Both candidates spoke in decidedly more moderate terms, and

their stances resonated in public opinion polls. The reality is that while

the American public wants a strong military and accepts current defense

budgets, it is not clamoring for a big, expensive buildup. Complaints

about budget shortfalls are being voiced mostly by defense specialists, not

by a public gripped with fear of enemies on the march.

The exact dimensions of future budgets are uncertain, but unless the

current political climate changes, fully 90 percent or more of the funds

likely to be available to DOD have already been planned. As yet, further real

increases are a vision, not necessarily a reality. Even if such increases become available, DOD will need to spend its money wisely, for success at this

enterprise will have a big impact on determining U.S. defense preparedness

and combat power in the coming decade. Additional funds could help

Table 4–2. Defense Spending Projections (Budget Authority)

(billions of current dollars)

Funding Strategy FY01 FY02 FY04 FY06 FY08 FY10

Annual Inflation Offsets

(No real growth) 291 298 313 328 345 362 

Annual 1%

Real Growth 291 301 322 345 369 395

Annual 2%

Real Growth 291 304 331 361 394 429

Added Funds 0 3–6 9–19 17–33 24–49 33–67

from Real Growth

For official long-range budget projections and other details, see Budget of the United States Government (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 2000). Useful procurement budget estimates are provided in a study released by the Congressional

Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2000).
114 QDR 2001

lessen shortfalls and dilemmas. But they will not alter the imperative for an

intelligent setting of priorities.

Internal Composition of Defense Budget 

Analyzing how the defense budget is spent can best begin by addressing its internal composition: the multiple ways in which its funds are allocated. Doing so helps answer a larger strategic question seldom asked in

the debate today: why is the budget as big as it is? After all, the U.S. defense budget is far bigger than any other in the world—in many cases by a

factor of four or more, even though the active U.S. military posture of 1.4

million troops equates to only about 7 percent of the 20 million troops

under arms worldwide. Whereas the United States now spends about

$290 billion on defense each year, its European allies spend only $170 billion for a much larger posture of 2.3 million troops. On a per-capita

basis, the United States spends nearly $200,000 per active troop each year,

but the Europeans, who may underfund their budgets but take defense seriously, spend only $66,000. The same disparity holds true, only more so,

when the U.S. defense posture and budget are compared to other regions.

Why so much DOD money for so few forces?

One reason is strategy. The United States has a demanding global defense strategy, which dictates hefty requirements for a wide spectrum of

capabilities. Because most countries focus only on their borders or local

regions, they are able to deploy a limited set of assets, which keeps costs

down. For example, Germany needs a large army and air force, but not a

blue-water navy, or a nuclear posture, or big transport forces. Its ability to

focus and specialize allows it to get by with low spending. Most other European countries are similarly situated; the partial exceptions are Britain

and France, both of which have large defense budgets by European standards. The United States, in contrast with the European norm, must

maintain many different types of forces: still-sizable nuclear forces, large

mobility forces, strong ground and air forces for continental operations,

powerful carrier and amphibious forces for maritime operations, advanced command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) systems, big overseas bases and facilities, and a diverse domestic infrastructure able to support swift power

projection abroad. Each of these components must be highly capable in

itself, while all of them must be able to work closely together. This sophisticated posture yields a requirement for many different types of weapons,
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 115

equipment items, training regimens, and operational practices. Nearly all

of them are expensive in ways that propel the defense budget upward.

The other reason is the U.S. emphasis on high quality. Precisely because U.S. forces are not overpoweringly large, they must rely on superior

quality to defeat enemies, who often possess numerical superiority, in a

wide variety of distant locations and difficult terrain conditions. Contributing importantly to high quality is the U.S. practice of relying on a

professional and all-volunteer force, which produces skilled military personnel but is expensive. Most active-duty combat forces are kept at full

manning and high readiness so that they can deploy quickly and fight immediately. They also train a great deal, considerably more than other militaries, which permits them to carry out modern military doctrines that

are key to high combat effectiveness. Their technologies, especially their

weapons, munitions, and information systems, are the most sophisticated

in the world. They also are provided large and multifaceted logistic support assets plus extensive stocks of ammunition, fuels, and other supplies

that give them firepower, tactical mobility, and endurance. This combination of readiness, modernization, and sustainment has a synergistic effect

in producing the highest quality forces in the world, but it comes at the

price of big defense budgets.

The important roles played by global strategy and high-quality forces

dispel the accusation that the defense budget is large simply because of

duplication, redundancy, and waste. No large and complex bureaucracy is

perfect; but even so, DOD is among the best-managed departments in the

U.S. Government or anywhere else. Forty years of management efforts by

civilian and military leaders have been devoted to economizing, trimming

unnecessary assets, and consolidating forces. The biggest and easiest gains

in these areas have already been realized. The process of streamlining continues today with efforts to close surplus bases, adopt modern business

practices, and redesign logistic support assets. Critics sometimes accuse

the Pentagon of fielding multiple armies and air forces, but its tri-service

structure helps promote strength through diversity. In aggregate, today’s

military forces reflect the requirements of national strategy, rather than

exceed them. Because this is the case, the accusation of widespread duplication misses the mark.

The defense budget is best seen as a direct product of conscious

strategic choices, not an unchecked bureaucracy at work. Today’s budget

is made possible by a booming U.S. economy that permits spending

nearly $300 billion annually on defense by allocating a historically low
116 QDR 2001

share of GDP to the enterprise. The problem of rising pressures for more

defense spending cannot easily be resolved by some wholesale paring

away of outdated military assets that no longer make sense in today’s

world. Most of the drawdowns made possible by the end of the Cold War

have already been taken. This does not imply that DOD budget and force

structure are immutable; continued economizing steps make sense. But

major reductions could be made only by paring U.S. defense strategy or

reducing the quality of U.S. forces, both of which would entail important

sacrifices in preparedness. This, at least, is the judgment of the U.S. Government to date. Because the task of managing the defense effort is truly

complex and difficult, the choices ahead do not promise to be easy.

Spending on Services and Programs 

The combination of a global strategy and high quality helps create

the distinctive pattern of U.S. defense spending, in which large funds are

allocated in multiple directions on behalf of many different activities.

This pattern starts becoming evident when service shares are examined.

As table 4–3 shows, the Army gets about 25 percent of today’s budget; the

Navy, 31 percent; the Air Force, 29 percent; and DOD agencies, 15 percent. These shares are similar to the mid-1980s and earlier. The only

major shift has been transfer of some funds to DOD agencies, mostly a

reflection of consolidating common activities.

Surface appearances suggest that the Army receives less funding support for its forces than the other two services. With a roster of 480,000 active soldiers, the Army has one-third of DOD manpower but receives only

one-fourth of the budget. To a degree, this pattern reflects the higher cost

of Navy and Air Force equipment; the Army is less technology-heavy. Even

Table 4–3. Service Shares of Defense Spending (Budget Authority)

Share of Budget Percentage of Budget

in FY00 

Service (billions of dollars) FY85 FY90 FY95–FY99 FY00

Army 69.5 26 27 25 25

Navy 87.2 35 34 31 31

Air Force 81.2 35 32 29 29

DOD Agencies 41.9 5 7 15 15
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 117

so, the reality is more complicated. The Navy share includes the Marine

Corps, which costs about $10 billion annually, and whose three active divisions provide one-fourth of U.S. active land forces. The Air Force and

Navy are also largely responsible for such national assets as nuclear forces,

C4

ISR activities, and strategic mobility. When funds for these measures are

set aside, the accurate conclusion is that DOD spends fairly similar

amounts for the key combat forces and support assets of all three services.

The outcome is a joint posture with balanced strength in all components,

but it also makes the defense budget diverse and complex.

The complexity of the defense budget becomes further evident

when spending on multiple programs is examined, as shown on table

4–4. The budget is composed of 11 programs. For simplicity’s sake, the

following chart shows nine: it displays the new special operations forces

program as part of general purpose forces, which includes main conventional units such as divisions, fighter wings, and carriers. Table 4–4

also displays the low-cost SOON program (support of other nations) as

part of administration.

A common public impression is that the general purpose forces account for the bulk of defense manpower and spending. In fact, they consume only about 50 percent of manpower and 37 percent of spending,

slightly over $100 billion each year. The other eight programs account for

fully 50 percent of DOD manpower and over 60 percent of spending.

They average about $24 billion apiece, but they vary greatly in size.

Whereas the “training, medical, and OGPA [other general purpose activities]” program costs nearly $45 billion, the strategic mobility program—a

bargain, given its contribution to swift power projection—costs only

about $11 billion. Reserve forces are often criticized for their large manpower and uneven readiness, but they come at a relatively low cost: they

provide nearly 40 percent of mobilizable military manpower, plus key assets, for only 8 percent of its budget.

Recent years have shown important trends in funding for these programs. Whereas the strategic forces have shrunk to 3 percent of the budget, the percentage share for intelligence and communications has nearly

doubled, to 11 percent of the total. Smaller variations have occurred in

other programs: some have grown at the margins, and others have declined in similar ways.

Notwithstanding these changes, the overall picture for the program

budget is one of continuity. During the Cold War, DOD spent 50–55

percent of its budget on the four principal programs for combat forces:
118 QDR 2001

nuclear forces, general purpose forces, mobility forces, and Reserve

forces. Today it still spends roughly 50 percent on these programs. By

comparison, the Pentagon spends about 50 percent of its budget on the

other five programs that provide various types of support activities. Support, however, comes in various guises, many of which provide teeth

rather than tail. For example, the C3I and space program provides support that is critical to combat operations: this program has grown in importance because its high-technology assets enhance the warfighting

strength of Armed Forces. The R&D program creates the weapon systems of the future. The other three programs provide domestic infrastructure and logistic support that have less immediate bearing on combat power, but they play major roles in training and supplying U.S.

forces. They cost about $76 billion, or 26 percent of the defense budget.

The large size of these programs reflects the need to preserve adequate

assets in key support areas even as manpower and combat forces are

downsized. DOD has succeeded in preventing these programs from

Table 4–4. Defense Spending by Category (Budget Authority) 

Percent of Budget FY00

Program (billions of dollars) FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY00

Strategic Forces 7 7 9 7 3 3

General Purpose Forces 103 35 38 35 35 37

C3I and Space 32 6 9 10 12 11

Mobility Forces 11 2 2 2 4 4

Guard/Reserve Forces 23 6 5 6 8 8

Research and Development 27 8 9 10 10 10

Central Supply 18 10 9 7 7 6

and Maintenance

Training, Medical, and 45 21 12 14 17 16

Other General Purpose 

Activities (OGPA)

Administration and 13 2 2 4 4 5

Support of Other 

Nations (SOON)

Source: Author’s estimates based on multiple sources.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 119

growing larger, preserving the current portion of funding for its all-important combat forces.

This brief look at defense programs helps illuminate some key points

about defense spending. Pressures for increased spending come not from

just one source but from several. The natural instinct in all programs is to

seek ways to improve effectiveness, or at least to replace outdated assets

with new systems. The combined effect of improvement activities in all

programs can create pressures for bigger defense budgets even when no

new threat looms. Equally important, these programs make it hard to reduce the defense budget in major ways by making cutbacks in only one

area. A 20 percent cut in a single average program of $30 billion could

greatly weaken its performance, yet would yield only a 2 percent savings in

the defense budget. As a result, big savings would require cutbacks in multiple programs, all of which have good reasons for their current activities.

This reality dampens the incentive for major cuts in key combat forces,

namely, the general purpose forces. Some critics, for example, argue for a

10 percent cutback in divisions, fighter wings, and carriers in order to generate savings for other activities, including research and development. But

even though this defense program is the biggest, such a cutback would reduce overall defense spending by 4–5 percent or less. Is an annual savings

of only $10–15 billion worth the damage that could be done to U.S. defense strategy and warfighting capacity by reducing a force posture that already is barely adequate to meet the requirements of the regional commanders in chief? In past years, the answer to this perennial question has

been clear. If savings are needed, the best way is to seek them from every

defense program. Small savings in one program matter little, but similar

savings in all of them can add up to something major.

Rising O&M Spending, Falling Procurement

A picture of greater change appears when defense budget line items

(functional categories) are examined. As table 4–5 shows, spending on

military personnel has remained fairly constant since 1990: 26–28 percent

of the budget. The shares devoted to research, development, technology,

and engineering (RDT&E) and to construction, housing, and other also

have remained mostly constant. By contrast, spending on O&M has shot

upward, and procurement spending has plummeted. In 1990, O&M and

procurement consumed equal shares of the DOD budget, about 30 percent apiece. In 2000, O&M consumed 38 percent, and procurement less

than 20 percent. The widening gap between them is important and merits

a discussion of its causes.
120 QDR 2001

Today’s O&M spending is big not only in relative terms, but in absolute terms as well. In constant dollars, DOD in 1990 spent about

$57,000 on O&M per active-duty servicemember. Today, it spends about

$79,000 per individual: an increase of nearly 40 percent. The oddity is

that whereas the forces of 1990 were widely praised for their high readiness, today’s forces are often faulted for shaky readiness. Thus, the upsurge in per-capita O&M spending since 1990 apparently has not produced a parallel upsurge in readiness. Nor is this O&M increase due

solely to recent peacekeeping and crisis operations; because these operations currently cost about $4 billion annually, they account for only a

small portion of the $30 billion difference between today’s O&M budget

of $109 billion and the lesser amount that would be funded at 1990 percapita rates: $79 billion. Nor are the alleged fast-paced operations of

today’s combat forces the sole contributor: the general purpose forces

consume only 32 percent of the O&M budget, which is less than their 38

percent share of the entire DOD budget. What then is the cause? Why

has O&M shot upward to become such a large spender?

Multiple factors seem to have been at work. The upsurge results

partly from high-level decisions in recent years to strengthen readiness,

which was slipping in key ways. The result has been more funds for

peacekeeping and crisis operations, high operating tempo, new training

regimens, and increased spending on stocks, spare parts, maintenance

backlogs, and other aspects of matériel readiness. But the upsurge also

Table 4–5. Trends in Line-Item Spending

FY01 Budget Percent Distribution (billions

of dollars) FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY00

Military Personnel 76 30 24 27 28 26

Operations and 109 33 27 30 37 38

Maintenance

Procurement 60 25 34 28 18 19

RDT&E 38 10 11 12 14 14

Construction, Housing, 8 2 4 3 3 3

and Other
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 121

results partly from deeper dynamics embedded in the O&M account.

The O&M budget funds DOD civilian personnel, which cost over $40

billion, and the rest is distributed among 31 separate line items in the defense program. Combat forces aside, other programs are big O&M

spenders. Evidently O&M costs in several of these areas, which often escape public notice, have been rising.

Many other unseen dynamics have pushed O&M spending higher.

Today’s modern weapons often cost more to operate, maintain, and repair

than earlier models. For the Army, O&M costs for the Abrams tank and

the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle are about double that of their predecessors. For the Air Force, O&M costs for the F–15 and F–16 are less than

earlier models, but costs for the B–1 and B–2 bombers are more. For the

Navy, modern carriers are cheaper to operate, destroyers cost about the

same, cruisers are more expensive, and O&M costs for combat aircraft

cost 30–50 percent more than earlier models. The meteoric rise in care

costs across the United States has also been felt in DOD. Also contributing to bigger O&M budgets have been expenses for environmental cleanup, repair of aging facilities, expensive fuels, educational and training

programs, assets for child development and family centers, contractor

support, and many similar activities that are small in themselves but add

up when counted together.

Thus far, few public complaints have been voiced that rising O&M

costs are crowding out spending on other programs. But with pressures

growing for military pay raises and bigger procurement budgets, such

complaints seem inevitable if O&M expenses continue rising. Although

DOD voices the expectation that future O&M budgets will rise only due

to inflation, recent trends are a cause for concern that this goal may be

hard to achieve. Conversely, today’s large O&M budget is a potential target for savings in order to generate more funds for procurement and

other measures. Perhaps efforts to consolidate and streamline far-flung

O&M activities can generate such savings. DOD would seem well-advised

to devote careful attention to its O&M budget in the coming years. Traditionally, other more glamorous programs have captured the lion’s share of

high-level attention. But O&M spending has grown to the point where it

can no longer be taken for granted.

The decade-long downswing in procurement spending, and its recent

upswing, can be more readily explained in terms of a single strategic

cause. The Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s resulted in a major upsurge in procurement spending in order to buy a new generation of
122 QDR 2001

weapon systems for all three services. When this effort was complete,

DOD was able to go on an extended procurement holiday. DOD spent

significant funds on RDT&E for future weapons, but it no longer had to

buy large numbers of Reagan-era models. In 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup, procurement spending was fully 34 percent of the budget. In

1990, it stood at about 28 percent. By mid-decade, it had plummeted to

less than 20 percent. Table 4–6 shows trends for procurement spending in

current and constant dollars.

The procurement budgets of the mid-1990s hovered at $40–45 billion. Most of the funds were used to buy such secondary items as trucks

and other vehicles, logistic equipment, spares, replacements, stocks, munitions, and other materiel. Few funds were allocated to buying new

weapon systems. In 1997, for example, only about $12 billion was spent

on procuring new weapons or upgrades for all three services. In these

years, the Navy bought some new ships, and the Air Force some new aircraft. But overall, the pace of acquiring new weapons was far slower than

in earlier years. This pattern of using available funds mostly to maintain

the existing inventory, rather than to modernize with new weapon systems, prevailed throughout most of the 1990s.

The procurement budget is now headed back upward for the simple

reason that the holiday of the 1990s is coming to an end. The Reaganera weapons are approaching the ends of their life cycles, and new

weapons are poised to begin emerging from the RDT&E process, ready

for procurement. This especially is the case for air forces, but to a lesser

degree it also is true for naval and land forces. In response, the DOD

procurement budget rose from $47 billion in 1998 to $55 billion in

2000. Of these funds in 2000, $22 billion were earmarked for the Navy

and Marines; $19 billion for the Air Force; $9 billion for the Army; and

the remainder across DOD as a whole. For 2001, DOD requested a

larger procurement budget of $60 billion, with even bigger budgets to

come later.

Table 4–6. Trends in Defense Procurement 

(billions of dollars)

FY85 FY90 FY96 FY98 FY00 FY01

Current 97 81 42 45 54 60

Constant 138 98 45 47 55 60
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 123

This infusion of extra procurement funds is allowing the services to

accelerate their acquisition of new weapon systems, munitions, and other

hardware. In 2000–2001, the Army is upgrading its tanks and infantry

fighting vehicles; improving its attack helicopters; and acquiring missiles,

ammunition, C4

I systems, and logistic support vehicles. The Navy is buying a new CVN–77 aircraft carrier, 3 DDG–51 destroyers, 1 attack submarine, 2 LPD–17 landing ships, 20 V–22 Osprey aircraft, and 42 F/A–18 E/F

fighters. It also is remanufacturing the AV–8B aircraft, and acquiring new

helicopters, missiles, and C4I systems. The Air Force budget includes

funds for 30 F–16 aircraft for defense suppression roles, initial production

of F–22 fighters, 1 E–8C JSTARS aircraft, 12 C–17 transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and missiles and munitions, such as the AIM–9X

air defense missile and several new ground attack weapons.

The procurement budget seems destined to continue growing in the

coming years in ways that will permit faster acquisition of new weapons,

munitions, and other systems for all three services. DOD envisions the

procurement budget rising to about $70 billion in 2005. If so, it will consume about 22 percent of the budget. But this share will still be low when

compared to past periods of intensified procurement. How much further

will the procurement budget need to rise by then and afterward, when

new weapons start entering the inventory in large numbers? Only time

will tell, but the effect will be to complicate defense planning further.

Growing Pressures for New Defense Spending

In the coming years, the DOD budget is likely to be subject to pressures for new defense spending from numerous quarters. In order to

continue funding the current military posture, spending for military

personnel, O&M, construction, RDT&E, and procurement may need to

increase beyond current projections. In addition, new policy and strategy

goals may call for strategic departures in several areas, for example, ballistic missile defense, international operations, and conventional force

enhancements. These multiple pressures, combined with projections of

only modest growth in defense spending, are the core reason for concern

about a widening gap between resources and requirements that could

rise to $30–50 billion in a few years, and maybe more later. Whether all

of these pressures will find support in the political process is to be seen.

But to the extent they do, they will create dilemmas for DOD, the President, and the Congress. The following analysis does not identify all candidates for spending increases, but it fingers enough of them to show
124 QDR 2001

that even if the defense budget grows moderately, future expenses may

rise faster than the resources to fund them.

Military Personnel Spending 

Military pay has risen about 7 percent over the past 2 years. This increase reflects a judgment that past pay increases were not sufficient to

attract, retain, and adequately compensate servicemen and servicewomen. In constant 2000 dollars, the DOD budget in 1990 provided

$54,000 in pay per active-duty individual. In 1999, it provided $55,000.

While these figures conceal many complexities, the basic reality is that

aggregate military pay remained mostly constant throughout the past

decade. In 1990, U.S. servicemembers were widely regarded as well-paid.

While they received basically the same compensation in 1999, with annual increases to offset inflation, the national economy grew considerably in ways that steadily elevated pay for comparable jobs in the private

sector. The result was to make military service less financially attractive

for officers and enlisted personnel, especially for those with high-technology skills in demand in the private sector. The pay raises now being

funded will help rectify that problem.

How will military pay evolve in the future? Current projections suggest that it will rise at an annual rate somewhat above inflation. If so, military personnel in 2005–2010 will be paid better than those of today. But

will these modest increases be enough to continue making the all-volunteer force viable, manned by skilled people? U.S. military forces are becoming more sophisticated by the day as a result of new technologies and

information systems. In the coming years, they will need well-educated

and productive people at all ranks. The problem is that if the U.S. economy continues to boom, it will offer ever-higher pay to precisely those

people whom the military will need. How this challenge will be met remains to be seen. But pressures seem likely to mount to elevate military

pay above the levels now being contemplated.

O&M Spending and Construction 

Although per-capita O&M spending has spiraled upward in recent

years, current projections envision that the O&M budget will level off and

grow only at the rate needed to offset inflation in the future. Will this, in

fact, be the case? One reason for concern is that a big part of the O&M budget is used to pay DOD civilians. Because they too will face the allures of

the booming U.S. economy, bigger pay increases than now planned may be

needed to retain a properly skilled civilian workforce. Second, U.S. military
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 125

units and personnel will need increasingly sophisticated, expensive training

in order to acquire adequate proficiency with the high-technology systems

and doctrines of the future. Third, as current weapon systems age, they will

require more maintenance in order to keep them operating. Fourth, as new

weapons, munitions, and information systems enter the inventory, some of

them will require higher maintenance spending than their predecessors.

Fifth, costs for health care and similar support activities may continue rising. Sixth, the physical infrastructure—bases, buildings, and other facilities—is aging. This trend could require not only added maintenance funds,

but also more spending on military construction. Perhaps steps being taken

by DOD to streamline and reduce costs will generate enough savings to offset these pressures for more spending—but perhaps not.

Acquisition Spending: RDT&E and Procurement 

Now that DOD is entering the final stages of designing a new generation of weapon systems in many areas, the need for high levels of RDT&E

spending might be expected to decline. During the past few years, efforts

to develop new weapons and other technologies resulted in an RDT&E

budget that hovered at about $35–40 billion, or 14 percent of defense

budget. Future projections anticipate that RDT&E spending will decline

steadily in real terms, and will consume only about 10 percent of the budget later in the decade. However, political pressures are now rising to

leapfrog the weapon systems now slated for procurement by developing

an entirely new, more advanced generation of military technologies. Such

pressures could produce a burst of new RDT&E spending.

Pressures for more procurement spending are not speculative, but

real. Although the annual procurement budget is slated to grow to $70

billion by mid-decade, this increase might not be enough to fund the

coming bow-wave of new weapon systems poised to enter the inventory

in large numbers. Whereas a $70 billion effort will total only about 22

percent of defense budget at mid-decade, past periods of major procurement have resulted in 30 percent or more of the budget spent on this enterprise. Much depends upon future decisions for the nature and timing

of acquisitions, but if the required allocation rises to 25–30 percent of the

budget, annual procurement spending could total $80–100 billion. While

this figure is illustrative, it suggests the magnitude of the challenge confronting DOD in this arena. Once the upcoming modernization cycle

gains momentum, it could generate pressures for $10–30 billion of more

annual procurement spending than is now being planned.
126 QDR 2001

In order to replace its aging inventory, DOD will need to buy large

numbers of major weapon systems of nearly all types in the coming

decade and beyond. This will not require matching the procurement rates

of the Reagan years, but it still will need to buy new weapons at a much

faster rate than achieved during the 1990s. The costs of air modernization

loom largest, not only because new airplanes are expensive, but because

three services—the Air Force, Navy, and Marines—will be buying them in

sizable numbers. Thus far, public attention has focused on the costly Air

Force F–22 fighter, but the challenge goes far beyond this single aircraft.

In order to modernize virtually the entire inventory of major combat and

support aircraft, over 4,000 aircraft might have to be bought in the next

15 years. Costs for the small number of F–22s being bought—333 are

now planned—might be only 15–20 percent of a total air modernization

effort that could rise to $300–400 billion during the coming decade. It is

the remainder of the aircraft—cheaper individually but more costly in aggregate—that could drive the total bill so high.

The coming procurement bow-wave has its origins in the 1950s,

when the United States hurriedly equipped its entire inventory of Air

Force, Navy, and Marine fighters with jet aircraft, replacing propellerdriven models inherited from World War II. The impetus was not only

jet technology, but also the Korean War and the Cold War nuclear standoff in Europe. This sweeping effort, carried out by the Truman and

Eisenhower administrations, set the stage for a block-obsolescence problem. It meant that in the future, aircraft from all three services would

reach aging obsolescence at about the same time. The second big wave of

modernization began in the 1960s, when such aircraft as the F–4, F–105,

A–4, and A–7 were purchased. After serving in the Vietnam War and

standing guard in Europe during the early 1970s, these aircraft gave way

to the third generation, which was introduced later than normal because

of the small defense budgets of the mid-1970s. This third generation included the models now in service: the F–15, F–16, A–10, F–14, and F–18.

Because procurement was slow during the late 1970s, the Pentagon

rushed to make up for lost ground in the 1980s, when the big Reagan defense budgets opened the gates to fast purchases. During these years, a

large number of aircraft were procured quite quickly—about 4,500 combat and support aircraft in a 10-year period. DOD suddenly acquired a

gleaming, modern air inventory of new aircraft with similar production

dates. Because many of these aircraft are now approaching the end of
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 127

their life spans, waiting to replace them is the fourth generation, led by

the F–22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the F/A–18 E/F.

As each new generation arrived, unit costs for fighters and bombers

rose steadily. This upward trend owed heavily to the high cost of buying

the sophisticated technologies—airframes, engines, avionics, and armaments—being developed in response to demanding service performance

requirements. At each stage, the services and the aircraft industry worked

together to push new technology as far as the state of the art would permit, and sometimes further. Another contributing factor was the practice,

starting in the 1960s, of designing aircraft that could perform multiple

missions with high effectiveness. The aircraft of the 1950s were designed

for waging nuclear war, but not other missions. When U.S. strategy

switched from massive nuclear retaliation to flexible response with conventional forces, aircraft were designed with broader capabilities in mind.

The F–4 and F–105 were more flexible and effective than their predecessors, but the Vietnam War showed that they were far from ideal in air-toair engagements or striking hard-to-hit targets on the ground. The designers of the next generation set about to rectify this deficiency by

producing new models that could perform multiple missions, win dogfights, and bomb ground targets with pinpoint efficiency. They succeeded

in ways that revolutionized modern air power, but they also gave birth to

aircraft with expensive price tags.

During the 1970s, a single F–4 fighter was priced at about $10 million. When the Air Force F–16 and F–15 appeared, they were priced at

about $20 million and $40 million apiece. The Navy F–18 and F–14 were

equally expensive. In the late 1970s, the higher costs for this third generation of aircraft created great angst and white-hot politics within DOD

and the U.S. Government. These aircraft offered high military performance, but they also threatened to break the banks of the procurement

budgets of the time. Debates swirled about whether to extend old aircraft

by upgrading them, and whether to buy the less-expensive F–16s and

F–18s, rather than the more-expensive F–15s and F–14s. DOD eventually

decided upon a high-low mix of these aircraft, while also buying the

F–117 Stealth aircraft and A–10 tank-killer. Nonetheless, the debates

about affordability and effectiveness ended only when the Reagan budgets

permitted a big increase in procurement spending.

The Reagan-era policy of equipping the services with these new fighters was expensive, but it helped greatly enhance the combat power of U.S.

forces. The aircraft were major contributors, but so also were the smart
128 QDR 2001

munitions and modern information systems that accompanied them.

American air forces became proficient not only at sweeping the skies clear

of enemy aircraft, but also at influencing the ground battle with lethal

strikes against enemy targets on the battlefield and in the rear areas. The

Persian Gulf and Kosovo conflicts showed an added advantage: modern

U.S. combat aircraft can operate over enemy territory with few losses to

themselves. Over the past decade, the networking of air forces with

ground and naval forces has played a major role in propelling U.S. military doctrine toward its growing emphasis on joint operations. The

strategic implication is that air power has come of age, fulfilling its

promise of being able to greatly influence the outcome of wars. But this

achievement did not come cheaply, and pursuing it further will not be

cheap either.

Today’s terms of debate—the struggle to balance effectiveness and

affordability—are exactly the same as they were in the 1970s. Only the

names of the aircraft and their costs have changed. Today’s candidates

for procurement are more effective than the aircraft to be replaced, but

even after inflation is taken into account, their higher costs are eyebrowraising. Per-unit costs for these aircraft are a variable, and will be known

only when their exact components are finally approved, production

schedules are set, and foreign buys are determined. The premier Air

Force fighter, the F–22, offers low radar signature at high speeds, advanced avionics, and high aerodynamic performance. It will enter into

full production in a few years, but currently, test models are priced at

about $184 million apiece. The less-sophisticated Joint Strike Fighter,

which is slated to be bought in larger numbers, currently is priced at

about $75 million apiece. The Navy F/A–18 E/F fighter currently is

priced at $86 million per copy. DOD will need to buy enough new fighters not only to equip Air Force, Navy, and Marine air wings, but also to

provide trainers, maintenance floats, replacements for losses, and test

aircraft. The cost implications of buying over 3,000 new fighters, along

with their maintenance packages and smart munitions, are obvious.

Although these fighter aircraft will dominate the air modernization effort, substantial numbers of support aircraft must also be bought. Support

aircraft often escape public notice, but they are large in numbers, and they

play a big role in making modern fighters and bombers effective in combat. In the coming 15 years, about 800 of these aircraft likely will need to

be procured. They include command and control aircraft, electronic

warfare aircraft, tactical and strategic transports, tankers, and fixed-wing
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 129

submarine hunters. Many of them are more expensive than fighter aircraft. For example, the C–17 transport costs $335 million per copy, and the

E–8C JSTARS, $560 million. These important support aircraft and their

costs significantly drive up the expense of air modernization.

Air modernization is not the only driver of growing procurement requirements. For land forces, the Army will be buying about 1,200 Comanche helicopters, and the Marines, 360 tilt-rotor V–22 Osprey aircraft.

In addition, several hundred scout and utility helicopters will have to be

replaced or upgraded owing to obsolescence. The Army is planning to remanufacture 530 Apache helicopters in order to use the Longbow Hellfire

missile, and to buy 500 new Crusader artillery tubes. It also is upgrading

about 1,500 M–1 tanks and 1,100 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. The

Marines are planning to buy over 1,000 advanced amphibious assault vehicles, and to acquire new lightweight howitzers. In addition to these

measures, the Army recently has adopted a plan to equip several of its

brigades with potent lightweight weapons that can quickly be airlifted to

crisis spots around the world. Its quest for mobile but well-armed

brigades that deploy quickly is leading it to develop a new generation of

light tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery tubes, and other weapons.

The cost of this important effort is yet to be seen, but it promises to be

several billion dollars. Overall, this Army and Marine modernization plan

is relatively modest and can be carried out over 15 years or more, but it

will create further pressures for larger procurement budgets during the

coming decade.

Another procurement driver will be shipbuilding plans. Whereas the

Navy aspired to 600 ships during the Reagan years, it has been downsized

in the past decade to its current posture of 316 “battle force ships.” During this period, the Navy has been carrying out a modest construction

program of about seven ships per year. Over the long haul, this rate will

be insufficient to keep a 300-ship Navy. Some analysts worry that unless

new construction increases, the Navy is destined to shrink to 250 ships or

less in the coming years. This trend flies in the face of recent Navy calls

for a re-buildup to 360 ships (discussed below). In addition, new Navy

ship models are now under consideration, including the small “Streetfighter,” high-technology destroyers and cruisers with small crews, submarines capable of carrying large cargoes with many cruise missiles, and

big floating platforms that function as large airbases. What these developments will produce is as yet unknown. As of now, a reasonable conclusion

is that owing to the scheduled obsolescence of existing ships, the Navy’s
130 QDR 2001

current construction program through 2005—47 new ships and 28 extensions/overhauls—is likely to be subjected to calls for a bigger effort over

the coming decade. If so, this trend will create added pressures for a larger

DOD procurement budget than now planned.

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a highly visible strategic departure

that comes in two forms: theater air and missile defenses (TAMD) for U.S.

forces and allies, and NMD for the United States. In response to accelerating WMD proliferation, multiple missile defense programs are now progressing through the R&D cycle, and deployment decisions will be made

in the next few years. TAMD programs include lower-tier systems such as

the Army PAC–3, the Navy area defense system, and the NATO medium

extended air defense system, and upper-tier systems such as the Army theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) system, the Navy theater-wide

program, and the Air Force airborne laser for boost-phase intercept.

NMD systems are not as far along. They are focused on defense against

limited attacks and accidental or unauthorized launches. Design concepts

include a combination of endo-atmospheric, exo-atmospheric, and boostphase systems. Testing problems have precluded deployment decisions to

date, but in early 2000, Secretary Cohen’s Annual Report to the President

and Congress spoke of a “first phase” NMD architecture that would include

100 ground-based interceptors, an X-Band radar deployed in Alaska, five

upgraded early warning radars, and other components. If an NMD system

is deployed, it will be part of a larger effort to create improved homeland

defenses against an array of threats, including terrorist attacks.

The idea of creating ballistic missile defenses is not new. It was explored in the 1960s, when Spartan and Sprint missiles were being developed. It was examined again in the 1980s, when the Reagan administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Both efforts yielded

the conclusion that full-scale defense against very large missile threats was

neither affordable nor possible against an enemy determined to maintain

a strong offensive capability. But limited defense against small threats, either abroad or at home, was a more feasible proposition, provided the

technical problems of networking missiles, radars, and command and

control systems could be solved. Current programs are anchored in the

premise that with modern technologies and information systems, these

problems are resolvable in affordable ways.

What the future holds is uncertain. For TAMD, initial production of

PAC–3 and the Navy area defense system is already under way, and
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 131

THAAD is entering the manufacturing stage, with initial deployment expected in 2007. With other systems still undergoing testing and review, the

exact combination of future lower-tier and upper-tier systems has not yet

been decided. Future NMD systems are even less clear; much will depend

upon WMD threats, technological progress, and arms control negotiations. The NMD program is slated to cost $10–15 billion through 2005,

but this expense is mostly for R&D measures, not full-scale deployment.

Costs for procuring and operating TAMD and NMD systems will depend

upon the size, nature, and rate of deployment. Any estimate is speculative,

but a few years from now, DOD could be spending several billion dollars

annually for BMD.

While public attention is likely to remain focused on missile defense

controversies, pressures for added defense spending in the nuclear arena

might also come from another source: strategic forces for offensive missions. As a result of START negotiations, these forces are slated to decline

to 836 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—with a total of 2,250 warheads—and 93 heavy

bombers by 2007. Although the future force will be far smaller than during

the Cold War, current weapons will be aging by then, and efforts to modernize them with new systems and subsystems could exert pressure for

more spending. Today’s strategic forces budget of about $7 billion is slated

to increase by only enough to offset inflation, but this forecast could

change if interest builds in new modernization. The same holds true for

the command, control, communications, and information and the space

programs, which support both strategic and conventional forces. Spending

for this program too is slated to rise only enough to offset inflation. But

with information systems and space technologies becoming more important in U.S. defense strategy, this forecast may not be viable.

International Operations, Infrastructure, and Overseas Presence 

Only time will tell whether the recent upsurge of humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, and limited crisis interventions becomes a

permanent feature. Perhaps limits will be set by U.S. policy, as suggested

elsewhere in this volume. But because many regions are so turbulent, pressures for such operations may remain as high as today, or even increase. If

the current pace continues, the cost will be about $4 billion annually.

While these operations are not hugely expensive, they are not cheap. Often

they inflict temporary turbulence on the defense budget because O&M

funds must be used to pay for them before Congress can pass a special

supplemental appropriation. The bigger drain comes from the higher
132 QDR 2001

tempo imposed on parts of the force structure. Often DOD must employ

units with special capabilities, and because these units exist in limited

numbers, they are easily overtaxed. When combat forces are deployed to

lengthy involvements in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, they

are diverted from staying prepared for wartime missions. When deployed

on such operations, these forces could be hard to extract for combat assignments in event of war elsewhere. For these reasons, these operations

are widely viewed as having a more deleterious impact on defense preparedness than their relatively minor size and budget impact would suggest. The core problem is the lack of the manpower, forces, and funds both

to perform these operations regularly and to stay prepared to carry out its

warplans under the two-MTW strategy.

Although public debate is focused on this controversy, a different issue

may prove to have an equal or greater impact on the defense budget:

spending on overseas bases, facilities, and related infrastructure. Currently,

about 235,000 troops are stationed abroad. These forces are mostly based

in three areas: Central Europe (110,000), Northeast Asia (93,000), and the

Persian Gulf (25,000). Current trends suggest that many future operations—peacetime and wartime—may be conducted at places far removed

from these locations. For a host of reasons, the so-called southern belt may

become a new focal point of U.S. defense commitments. This unstable belt

begins in the Balkans and Caucasus, passes through the Greater Middle

East and South Asia, and stretches along the Asian crescent from Southeast

Asia northward to Okinawa and Japan. At the moment, the U.S. military

has few of the bases, facilities, prepositioned equipment, coalition arrangements, and other assets that would be needed for operations there. For example, withdrawal from the Philippines a decade ago left the Armed

Forces with no major air and naval bases in Southeast Asia, where it may

be called upon to operate with growing frequency in the coming years. If

acquiring these assets becomes necessary, the effort could impose significant spending requirements on the defense budget.

The effect could be even greater if steps are taken to alter the size and

nature of U.S. overseas presence. Because the current presence reflects fading Cold War missions, it may not prove well-aligned with future missions

and needs. In Europe, DOD may need fewer heavy land formations in

Germany, but more mobile brigades, air forces, and naval units for use in

the Southern region, including Turkey, the Balkans, and elsewhere. In the

Middle East and Persian Gulf, the need to develop a wider network of

coalition partnerships may necessitate larger U.S. troop deployments there
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 133

if political conditions permit. In Asia, the large American presence in

Korea and Japan may be rendered obsolete if Korean reconciliation ends

the risk of war there. Other Asian security affairs could compel the design

of an entirely new military presence, with different forces, deployment

patterns, basing arrangements, coalition practices, and reinforcement

plans. Although the future is uncertain, the key point is that significant

changes may lie ahead. To the extent this proves to be the case, designing

of a new and different overseas military presence could have significant

consequences for the defense budget. Savings might be possible in some

areas, but added costs could be the case in others.

Conventional Force Enhancements 

Although conventional forces will be improved by procuring new

weapons, additional pressures seem likely to rise for changes in the structures of these forces in order to enhance their capacity for warfighting

and other missions. One reason is the effort to develop new joint doctrines under the mantle of Joint Vision 2020 and the revolution in military

affairs. As ongoing experiments give rise to ideas for implementation,

they may produce changes in how basic force elements—divisions, fighter

wings, and carrier battle groups—are organized and operated. The key

concepts of information networking, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and responsive logistics could result

in new forms of joint operations and force structures that may require

significant funding to pursue.

In addition, CINCs may be seeking new capabilities in order to carry

out their war plans and to offset asymmetric strategies. One example is the

growing emphasis on forced-entry capabilities in the event a war begins

with surprise enemy attacks that inhibit the U.S. capacity to carry out reinforcement plans. A second example is the growing need to conduct rapid

lethal strikes against enemy WMD assets in order to prevent their use

against U.S. forces. A third example is the need for larger, better stocks of

smart munitions and cruise missiles in order to carry out the growing emphasis on deep-strike operations for defense and offense. The need for new

capabilities to carry out these and other missions could give rise to new

technologies and systems that are only dimly understood today. If so, the

result could be further pressures on the U.S. defense budget.

Unless U.S. defense strategy is scaled back or allies improve their forces

for new-era missions, DOD is also likely to face requirements for at least a

modest expansion in the size of the force structure, including more units

and manpower. One candidate is so-called LD/HD forces: scarce assets that
134 QDR 2001

provide special capabilities often in demand for peacekeeping, warfighting,

or both. Examples from all three services (not all of which are on the official LD/HD list) include medium truck companies, military police, construction engineers, civil administrators, psychological operations units,

special forces, coastal patrol boats, unmanned aerial vehicles, refueling aircraft, command and control aircraft, defense suppression aircraft, and

search-and-rescue aircraft. Recent experience has shown the U.S. force posture to be short in several of these areas; the result is that existing units have

been run ragged in meeting demands for their services. If this trend continues, DOD will have a compelling reason to seek more of these assets.

As for other forces, various options to alter the status quo may receive consideration. The Army might not need more active divisions and

brigades, but it will continue improving the mobility and firepower of

existing units, while also upgrading 15 Reserve component brigades to

higher readiness. The Army may also seek more active logistic support

units, more deep-fires units, more prepositioned equipment, and additional command, control, and information assets. The Air Force’s current structure of 20 active and Reserve fighter wings may be deemed adequate for most warfighting needs. But the role of airpower in U.S.

defense strategy is growing, and already a large number of the 12 active

wings are deployed overseas, resulting in strains on its posture and unusual reliance on Reserve units. The idea of adding one or two wings,

plus more support aircraft, may gain support in the coming years. Likewise, the Navy may have enough combat forces for warfighting, but its

force needs are strongly influenced by peacetime deployment practices

and the large rotational base needed to sustain them. Already the Navy is

arguing for a reversal of downsizing, and a buildup from today’s posture

of 316 major ships to 360 ships, including more carriers. This argument

seems likely to gain strength in the future.

Some of the pressures for more forces and manpower could be offset

by streamlining existing combat, support, and national infrastructure assets as the information revolution unfolds, new technologies appear, and

consolidation is pursued. If success in these areas is achieved, perhaps

DOD can carry out future missions with its current manpower of 1.38

million troops. But if not, a manpower expansion of 10–15 percent could

be needed. This step would require added funding, not only for more

military pay, but also to provide for the accompanying increases in O&M,

procurement, and other accounts. The impact on the defense budget

would be significant.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET 135

The Challenge Ahead

The coming decade will bring a major challenge to defense planning.

With both international conditions and U.S. forces entering an era of

transformation, clinging to the status quo will not be possible. The Bush

administration’s strategic reviews should focus on the fundamentals of

U.S. defense strategy, force posture, and budgets. They also should address

the growing need for allies and coalition partners, especially NATO and

European forces, to improve greatly their forces for future missions and

operations outside their borders. Adequate allied and partner forces are a

vital complement to U.S. defense strategy, but they will not be a substitute

for strong U.S. forces.

Enough of the multiple pressures arising for new U.S. defense spending are likely to take sufficient hold to create a widening gap between resources and requirements. Serious dangers will arise if future U.S. defense

strategy is too ambitious for DOD forces to carry out effectively. The result could be insufficient assets in one or more key areas of strategy. A

second danger arises if scarce budget resources are allocated inefficiently

in ways that result in an incoherent, unbalanced force posture. Such a

posture might not be able to fulfill a well-designed strategy that otherwise

would be supportable if resources are used wisely. An even bigger danger

is a strategy-force mismatch combined with an incoherent, ineffective

posture. The damage done to U.S. military preparedness and national security could be considerable.

The easiest way to avoid these looming dangers would be to fund significantly larger defense budgets. A combination of a sizable step-level increase in the near term followed by steady real increases of 1–2 percent

annually in later years likely would be needed. But while moderate budget

increases may be forthcoming, a bigger increase of this magnitude does

not seem feasible in today’s political climate. As a result, DOD will be

compelled to make do with the resources that are available, and to make

strategic decisions wisely and responsively. Thus, the Department of Defense, the President, and the Congress must focus on three critical tasks:

shaping a defense strategy that meets key security needs yet is affordable;

designing a force posture that can implement this strategy effectively; and

crafting an integrated program path that strengthens the force posture in

coordinated, well-planned ways.

To the extent that resources fall short of requirements, defense planning will need to weigh alternative options that provide different ways to

navigate the future. A number of such options are presented in other
136 QDR 2001

chapters of this book. Perhaps the solution will be to retain the current

strategy, or even enlarge its scope, while better tailoring the future posture

to support it. Or the solution may be to scale back the strategy in ways

that permit an intense focus on fewer strategic demands. Above all, this is

a time for clear thinking. Decisiveness will be needed, but simple-minded

approaches should be avoided. Great damage will be done if the United

States succumbs to the impulse to withdraw from world affairs in some

major way, or slashes its forces deeply, or scuttles a procurement effort

that is key to remaining the world’s strongest military power. Careful

analysis instead may result in the United States urging allies to assume

more responsibility for some missions, and in DOD being less preoccupied with preparing for two regional wars and stretching out its procurement efforts. Most likely a balanced approach will remain best, but not

necessarily in ways that perpetuate the status quo. By 2010, the Nation

may be conducting its defense affairs, at home and abroad, in significantly different ways than now. If change can produce a sound strategy

and an effective posture for the strategic conditions, then it is something

to be welcomed, not feared.

Regardless of the given strategy and force posture, firm priorities

will have to be set. DOD will need to survey the tradespace of its programs in order to determine both the capabilities that the military

needs and those that it can do without. This means that it will be compelled to identify not only the strategic risks that must be eliminated or

minimized, but also those that can be accepted. None of these decisions

promises to be easy. But they are the stuff of living in a still-dangerous

world where nothing is perfect, the future is up for grabs, and little can

be taken for granted. The consolation is that if America makes these decisions wisely, it will greatly enhance its chances for making the new

century an era of peace and progress.

Notes1 For similar views on the future funding shortfall, see Michèle A. Flournoy, Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2000).

2 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House,

December 1999).
Chapter Five

Defense Strategy

Alternatives: Choosing

Where to Place Emphasis

and Where to Accept Risk

by Michèle A. Flournoy and Sam J. Tangredi

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review will provide the Bush administration with its primary opportunity to articulate a defense

strategy for the United States. Whether the Bush team chooses to

retain, revise, or significantly depart from the themes of the current strategy, the resulting defense strategy should chart the course of defense decisionmaking for the next 4 years. The strategy developed in the QDR will

provide the basis for the new Defense Planning Guidance, which sets the

planning and programming priorities for the Department of Defense. It

will also constitute the principal DOD input to national security strategy

(NSS), which will be developed concurrently by the National Security

Council for the President. Most importantly, it will serve as the Bush administration’s chief vehicle for communicating its vision and priorities

for the U.S. military to Congress, the American people, and both allies

and potential adversaries around the world.

During the 1997 QDR, there was a great deal of debate about whether

defense reviews should be strategy-driven or resource-constrained.1 Fundamentally, however, this debate was premised on a false choice. In truth,

any responsible defense review must be both strategy-driven and resource-constrained. It must be strategy-driven to ensure that the Nation

spends the limited resources that it devotes to defense (means) in the

most effective ways possible to achieve its national objectives (ends). But

ultimately it must also be resource-constrained to be relevant; a strategy

that assumes unconstrained resources may enlighten as to what we might

devote to defense in an ideal world, but it is not particularly useful to the

137
138 QDR 2001

real-world decisionmaker wrestling with hard choices about how to

spend the next dollar.

This tension between the ideal and the practical is illustrated in the

juxtaposition of two definitions of strategy. The first is from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff: “Strategy [is] the art and science of developing and using

political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during

war and peace, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to

lessen the chances of defeat.” 2 Ideally, a choice of strategy would indeed

“afford the maximum support to policies.” But in the real world, “Strategy

is a fancy word for a road map for getting from here to there, from the situation at hand to the situation one wishes to attain.” 3 Strategy involves the

same resource constraints and issues of any journey—not just where to go,

but questions about when to go, how fast to travel, and how much it will

cost. The image of a road map—taken from a volume appropriately subtitled ends and means—reminds us that the decision to adopt a particular

strategy is but the first choice of any integrated path of decisions linking

objectives to the actual employment of resources. The real challenge is to

determine the best strategy possible given the available resources, while explicitly accounting for risk when actual resources fall short of the ideal.4

Strategy as the Driver

For strategy to drive the rest of the QDR, at least three conditions

must be met. First, the strategy must be developed and endorsed at the

highest levels of DOD early in the QDR process. Given the compressed

timelines of the review, crafting the defense strategy must be an immediate top priority, perhaps the most crucial one, for the new Secretary,

Chairman, and rest of the senior DOD leadership.5 In practice, failing to

make strategy an early priority would mean conducting the rest of the review without the benefit of a clear vision and priorities: in essence, attempting to do strategic planning without a clear sense of the desired

outcomes. The result would be a disconnected journey full of stops and

starts, which is subject to the pull of inertia that is often described as

muddling through.

Second, as soon as DOD leadership is comfortable with the new strategy, it needs to issue the resulting strategic vision in the form of binding

guidance to the rest of the review’s participants. Otherwise, the strategy

risks being ignored by those who would prefer to see the review primarily

as a “budget drill,” and thus risks being ultimately disconnected from how
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 139

DOD actually allocates its resources. Without a binding strategy, QDR participants could be tempted to stick to the most familiar, and possibly most

parochial, paths—another recipe for collective muddling through.

Third, the strategy must have teeth. It must articulate clear choices

about where to place emphasis and where and how to accept or to manage a degree of risk. It must be consistently enforced in the decisionmaking fora of the review. Only thus can the QDR achieve a concert of the

whole from the sum of very capable but potentially competing parts.

This chapter seeks to jump-start the strategy development process by

identifying the reasonable range of defense strategy alternatives for the

Bush administration. It begins by laying out a menu of six broad defense

strategy options, describing where each strategy would place emphasis

and where it would accept some degree of risk. It assesses the principal

strengths, weaknesses, and risks of each. It concludes by arguing for a

strong linkage between strategy and resource decisions.

Each of these strategy alternatives is essentially a different approach to

dealing with the future security environment discussed in chapters 2 and 3

and to answering the 12 strategy questions articulated in the introduction

(chapter 1). These strategy alternatives also provide the foundation for

many of the chapters that follow. The discussions of force sizing, force

structure, overseas presence, peacetime operations, transformation, and

strategic forces and national missile defense, and strategy-driven integrated paths are all grounded in the strategies presented in this chapter. In

essence, this is the heart of the book, a central and unifying point of reference for the chapters that follow.

Alternatives for the Bush Administration 

The current defense and foreign policy debate in the United States

suggests six broad defense strategy alternatives for consideration by the

Bush administration. They are summarized in table 5–1. This range of

alternative strategies represents the range of plausible, if not necessarily

probable, U.S. defense strategies. In determining plausibility, the dominant question asked about each alternative was whether it represents the

thinking of a significant group with direct influence on American politics.

Foremost but not exclusive sources were the stated positions of U.S.

presidential candidates in the 2000 election campaign. Another significant source was the views expressed by participants in ongoing or previous defense reviews, such as the 1997 National Defense Panel. Other

commentary in influential public media by noted defense experts was a
140 QDR 2001

third source; however, much of that defense debate was already reflected

in the alternative campaign positions.

In the pages that follow, each of these alternatives is described in terms

of its worldview, that is, what it identifies as most important about the future security environment; its assessment of the U.S. role in the world; key

elements of the strategy; and the priorities that it would establish for the

U.S. military and for DOD more broadly. More specifically, we compare

and contrast how each strategy treats the following types of issues:

■ Overseas presence and peacetime military engagement: how much is appropriate? for what objectives? 6

■ Smaller-scale contingencies: which SSCs merit U.S. involvement? what

should the U.S. role be, once the United States is involved? 7

■ Major theater wars: how likely are such conflicts? what kind of wars

should DOD prepare for? should DOD prepare for one or more MTWs? 8

■ Homeland security: what is the nature and immediacy of the threat? what

is the appropriate role for DOD? 9

■ Nuclear deterrence and NMD: what are the appropriate roles for nuclear

weapons? what offense-defense vision should guide U.S. strategic policy,

posture, and arms control efforts?

■ Transformation: what are the objectives of transformation? what capabilities should it yield? at what pace should it be pursued? 10

■ Role of allies and partners: how much should the United States rely on its

allies and international partners, and what assumptions should be made

about their capabilities and participation in combined operations?

While a host of other issues affect American defense choices, such as

the ability to recruit and to train quality personnel, these seven issues appear to have the most direct effects on the choice of strategy. They are the

Table 5–1. Defense Strategy Alternatives

Strategy A: Shape, Respond, Prepare—The Current Defense Strategy

Strategy B: Engage More Selectively and Accelerate Transformation

Strategy C: Engage More Selectively and Strengthen Warfighting Capability

Strategy D: Engage Today to Prevent Conflict Tomorrow

Strategy E: Strategic Independence

Strategy F: Preventive Defense
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 141

key characteristics that distinguish one defense strategy from another in

the contemporary world.

Strategy A: Shape, Respond, Prepare—The Current

Defense Strategy

Although the descriptive phrase “shape, respond, prepare” was first

articulated during the 1997 QDR, it describes the premises of U.S. defense

strategy throughout the Clinton administration. The strategy has had

both vocal supporters and critics outside the administration, but there

has been general agreement that it represents a serious effort to come to

grips with defense requirements in the post-Cold War world.

In the worldview underlying Strategy A, the international system is

viewed as stable overall, but the security environment is seen as dynamic

and uncertain, with a number of ongoing and potentially festering regional

threats to peace. There appears to be no global threat from a military nearpeer competitor (like the Soviet Union was during the Cold War), and the

rise of such a global competitor is considered very unlikely until at least

2025. The primary military challenge comes in the form of aggression by

rogue states; of particular concern is the potential of large-scale, cross-border aggression against a U.S. friend or ally. In addition, given its unique position of power in the world and its conventional military dominance, the

United States faces the rise of asymmetric threats, such as weapons of mass

destruction, information warfare, and terrorism that could threaten its interests, allies, forces, and even the U.S. homeland.

Strategy A’s worldview is unabashedly internationalist, seeing American support of democracy and market capitalism as suitable foundations for a just world system. Rather than subordinating American interests to some sort of collective worldview (largely unformed),

proponents of this strategy argue that these interests propel the United

States into seeking a position of leadership that is vital to the continued

maintenance of international community. The United States is seen as a

global power with global interests. These interests are perceived as transcending mere parochial national objectives, due to the unique U.S. role

as sole superpower. To the strategy’s proponents, the United States has

both a requirement and a mandate to provide the necessary leadership

to ensure peace and stability in those regions that it views as vital to its

national interests—and, by definition, to the interests of the world community. Without U.S. leadership, long-term peace and stability are uncertain in many world regions. The mandate to lead is bolstered by the
142 QDR 2001

apparent international consensus that the United States is the preferred

security partner for most nations and that the United States plays a relatively fair role as a “balancer” between potentially competing regional

powers and as the provider of regional stability.

To ensure that the United States maintains the political influence to

play these roles, a policy of engagement is seen as a crucial element of

its foreign affairs.11 Engagement is critical in maintaining U.S. influence

in regions where the United States has vital and important interests, ensuring that the security environment evolves in ways that are favorable

to U.S. (and also world) interests, and deterring actions antithetical to

national interests.

A particularly important aspect of U.S. leadership is the strengthening and adapting of U.S. regional alliances and coalitions. Many of these

alliances were created as elements of the strategy to contain the expansion

of the Soviet Union. However, the linkages forged in that era appear to

transcend the bounds of the Cold War and remain relevant in dealing

with the regional threats of the post-Cold War world.12 At the same time,

the necessity for U.S. leadership in building coalitions of the willing has

been among the most widely accepted of the lessons of Operation Desert

Storm. Proponents of Strategy A accept the military role in alliance-building and coalition-building as essential for the achievement of U.S. economic, political, and security goals.

The key elements of Strategy A can be characterized in terms of shaping the international environment, responding to the full spectrum of

crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future. Conceptually, the strategy strives to strike a balance between these three elements. Although

funding decisions create a de facto set of mission priorities, the strategy as

described in the official documentation does not prioritize the elements.

Critics have identified this lack of prioritization as a primary flaw of the

current strategy.

Shaping refers to efforts to promote regional stability, prevent conflicts and reduce threats, and deter aggression and coercion in peacetime.

As such, it encompasses many of the peacetime functions of U.S. military

forces. Peacetime engagement activities are focused primarily on promoting regional stability through building alliances and coalitions with likeminded nations, consistent with the U.S. role envisioned in Strategy A’s

worldview. The overseas presence of combat-credible U.S. military

forces—a major feature of the peacetime military posture called for by

the strategy—provides a cadre of forces to conduct a robust program of
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 143

engagement. At the same time, their presence helps to deter regional

threats while reassuring allies and coalition partners of American support

for their security. This counterbalances the coercive abilities of potential

regional aggressors. If regional deterrence fails and actual hostilities

occur, then presence forces are available to provide the initial military response for containing the conflict and reversing the aggressor’s gains.

The responding role calls on the U.S. military to be able to deal with

the full spectrum of potential crises, from deterrence in crisis, to conducting SSC operations, to being able to fight and to win MTWs, including

those in which asymmetric threats such as chemical and biological

weapons are used. In emphasizing full-spectrum capabilities, Strategy A

sets the expectation that joint forces can transition with relative ease from

peacetime operations to increasingly higher levels of conflict.13 Perhaps

the most challenging and important capability requirement set by the

strategy is for the U.S. military to be able to deter and, if necessary, to

fight and to win two MTWs in overlapping timeframes. For force structure planning purposes, the two MTWs are currently assumed to be on

the Korean Peninsula and in Southwest Asia (with Iraq as the aggressor).

In addition, forces are expected to be able to conduct multiple concurrent

SSCs and to transition to fight MTWs in accordance with required timelines. At the same time, the strategy calls for a secure, survivable, and robust strategic nuclear force to deter the use of nuclear weapons—and potentially other forms of WMD—within the limits established by arms

control treaties.

Although the strategy does not explicitly prioritize these elements of

response, in practice the two-MTW requirement has been treated as “the

first among equals.” It has come to drive much of DOD resource allocation

in the areas of force structure and modernization. In some quarters, this

has led some to refer to Strategy A (erroneously) as the two-MTW strategy.

In addition to shaping and responding, U.S. military forces are expected to prepare now for an uncertain future. This is the least developed

portion of the overall strategy, particularly because of the relatively indistinct nature of future threats envisioned by the worldview. Strategy A calls

for a focused modernization effort intended to maintain the U.S. qualitative military superiority and technological edge over potential foes. Strategy A also embraces the concept that a revolution in military affairs is occurring—driven most notably by the revolution in information

technologies—and argues that it should drive the transformation of U.S.

military systems, operational concepts, and organizational structures. But
144 QDR 2001

Strategy A lacks the sense of urgency of some of the other strategy alternatives with regard to transformation, pursuing a gradual, evolutionary approach rather than a rapid, more radical approach.14 Consistent with this

approach, Strategy A maintains funding for basic science and technology

(S&T) and R&D programs, as well as concept development and experimentation, albeit at levels lower than the strategy alternatives that would

seek to accelerate transformation. This modernization effort is assisted by

several management initiatives within DOD, particularly a series of improved business and acquisition measures known collectively as the revolution in business affairs (RBA), which seeks to enhance DOD efficiency

and to free up additional resources for investment in high priority areas.15

Homeland defense is a newer element of Strategy A, receiving initial

attention during QDR 1997 and in the subsequent National Defense

Panel report. Recent presidential initiatives have placed efforts at consequence management and infrastructure protection within the responsibilities of DOD (in support of other agencies and civil authorities). NMD

remains a technology development program, rather than a requirement,

in formal expositions of Strategy A.

In short, Strategy A calls for a full-spectrum force that attempts to

pursue all priority missions with near-equal emphasis. The result has

been a balanced mix of overseas and forward presence with global powerprojection capabilities. Overseas presence is retained in Europe and Asia

(albeit below Cold War levels), while a rotational presence is maintained

in Southwest Asia. Critical to the success of the strategy is a series of elements identified as force enablers, including high-quality and welltrained personnel, a globally vigilant high-technology intelligence network, global communications, access to space (and potential space

superiority if challenged), and retention of the sea and airspace superiority largely developed during the Cold War.

In terms of force structure, Strategy A (as currently implemented) sizes

conventional forces primarily to meet the demands of the two overlapping

MTWs, with the exception that naval forces are sized for presence. It assumes that such a force is sufficiently large to handle the requirements of

SSCs, peacetime engagement, a modest transformation effort, and homeland defense. Separate strategic nuclear forces are retained, although some

platforms originally designed for that mission (such as the B–2 bomber)

have been assigned to conventional forces. Because of the emphasis on two

overlapping MTWs, a high level of readiness is required throughout the

force in order to meet the demands of the MTW operational timelines. The
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 145

use of an MTW-structured force for multiple, concurrent SSCs has resulted

in a significantly high tempo in the deployment of personnel (PERSTEMPO) and strains on some scarce specialized capabilities (LD/HD assets). Such assets include platforms that also would be in high demand in

the MTW scenarios, as well as some assets that would hold a lower priority

in MTW timelines but are essential for operations at the lower end of the

spectrum of SSCs. High PERSTEMPO in peacetime is perceived to exacerbate the problems inherent in recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer

force, especially in a period of economic growth, and has a potentially corrosive effect on long-term readiness.

Strategy A has been praised by its supporters for trying to balance

risk across the near, mid-, and longer term and for broadening DOD

focus beyond crisis response and warfighting to include the more proactive elements of shaping the international security environment and

preparing now for an uncertain future. But it has also received criticism.

Some have argued that sizing U.S. forces primarily for MTWs and naval

forward presence sends a mixed signal regarding transformation. Effective transformation, they argue, requires increasing the level of resources

invested in S&T, R&D, concept development and experimentation, and

leap-ahead technologies while reducing the readiness of the units being

transformed. This puts the goal of transformation in tension with the objective of maintaining high warfighting readiness across the force. High

readiness also demands considerable resources, squeezing available funding for modernization in a fiscally constrained defense budget. Strategy A,

as currently articulated, calls for a procurement target of approximately

$60 billion per year, focused primarily on the modernization or replacement of current platforms. Critics see this modernization focus as an incremental effort that ultimately discourages transformation. In this light,

Strategy A can be seen as taking a modest, cautious approach in preparing

for the future security environment.

However, the loudest criticism of Strategy A is that it is too ambitious

and has failed to articulate clear priorities, especially when resources have

fallen short of requirements. The strategy, it is argued, has overcommitted

the force; it has called on the U.S. military to do too much with too little.

In practice, the strategy has called on the U.S. military to undertake a variety of missions beyond those for which the force was sized and resourced (MTWs and naval forward presence). This has contributed to a

resource shortfall that is allowed to revolve among the elements of the

strategy: if readiness is fully funded, then modernization is squeezed; if
146 QDR 2001

modernization is emphasized, risk is taken in MTW preparation; if involvement in SSCs exceeds a certain level, both readiness for MTWs and

investment in future capabilities may suffer.

Seeking to balance the requirements of shaping and responding in

the near term with the need to prepare now to meet future requirements

may be a conceptual strength for Strategy A, but the strategy’s failure to

articulate more explicit priorities that suggest where to place emphasis

and where to accept a degree of risk when available funding is insufficient

to meet all of the strategy’s requirements has contributed to the projected

strategy-resources mismatch.

Strategy B: Engage More Selectively and

Accelerate Transformation

In contrast to the current strategy, Strategy B establishes a different

set of priorities and reduces the emphasis on the requirements of two

overlapping MTWs. The primary emphasis of Strategy B is on accelerating the transformation of the U.S. military to meet emerging and longerrange future threats. The primary source for details of such a transformational approach is the National Defense Panel report of 1997, and

Strategy B remains the most widely discussed alternative to the current

strategy. Additional support for a Strategy B–like approach appeared in

the presidential campaign speeches of Governor George Bush; however,

support for alternative B crosses partisan lines.16

The underlying worldview is similar to that of Strategy A in that it

sees a dynamic, uncertain security environment in which the United

States, as sole superpower, must provide global leadership. The rise of a

military near-peer competitor in 2001–2025 is seen as less likely. However, the proponents of Strategy B see the rise of a near-peer competitor

some time in the future as a natural aspect of the competitive nature of

the international system. Thus, they view efforts to maintain American

military superiority over any rising near-peer as the primary long-term

objective of the strategy. In the interim, the strategy focuses on the rise of

potential regional military competitors, such as the possible emergence of

a hostile China in the Pacific region.

The emphasis on the emergence of near-peer or regional competitors gives this strategy’s proponents a greater sense of urgency with

regard to asymmetric threats and antiaccess or area-denial strategies.17

Thus, homeland defense is elevated to one of the top DOD priorities.
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 147

An accelerated, more revolutionary transformation of U.S. powerprojection forces is seen as necessary in order to keep pace with regional

antiaccess strategies and area-denial capabilities. More regional powers

are seen as having both the capability and the intent to challenge the interests of both the United States and a stable world. The proliferation of

WMD, information systems, improved ballistic and cruise missiles, and

other advanced technologies—many available in the commercial sector—

are seen as placing potent offensive weaponry within the grasp of rogue

states and terrorist organizations. Resentment of American power and influence is perceived to be rising among the disaffected populations of

have-not states, fueled by the xenophobic nature of many autocratic

regimes. At home and abroad, Americans appear to be the most lucrative

targets for those seeking media attention or notoriety.

This raises more than a threat to homeland security: U.S. foreign policy measures face greater opposition abroad at the same time that domestic support for American overseas military presence may be wavering. Coercion by rogues or regional competitors may be more successful in

dissuading allies or coalition members from providing access or host-nation support for U.S. forces. The worldview of Strategy B involves greater

concern about delayed or denied access and the survivability of American

power-projection forces in a contested regional theater. The survivability

of legacy systems in the face of unexpected and aggressive use of advanced military technology by opponents is questioned. A transformation

to a more capable, more high-technology force is required. This is a perception shared by many who view an ongoing RMA as the defining element of the future security environment.

This emphasis on the need for transformation effectively displaces

the need to prepare for multiple overlapping MTWs as the primary concern of defense strategy. Strategy B proponents view as unlikely a situation in which the United States is forced to fight two major wars in two

separate theaters at the same time, but in the event that such a situation

actually occurred, they are confident that new technologies and operational concepts could reduce the capabilities necessary to fight and to win

both wars. To some extent, this correlates with the view that the quality

and technological advantages of the U.S. military, particularly in air and

space forces, could bring cross-border aggression to a rapid halt, thereby

eliminating the requirement for two simultaneous major campaigns and

thus allowing for the staggering of counteroffensives.
148 QDR 2001

The requirement for U.S. military involvement in multiple concurrent

SSCs is also challenged by this strategy. Strategy B suggests that the United

States—even in its superpower leadership role—can and should be more

selective in choosing to engage militarily in SSCs. The U.S. military should

not, as a rule, be used in situations in which vital or truly important American interests are not at stake. In situations involving less-than-vital interests, the United States should refrain from taking a leadership role and

should instead allow regional allies or partners to provide the required

leadership and capabilities. U.S. involvement in such situations should be

governed by the notion of comparative advantage; that is, the United States

should bring to the table only what others cannot. For example, the success

of a coalition of the willing in dealing with a particular SSC might hinge on

maritime, air, or strategic lift capabilities that only the United States could

provide, while the United States would probably offer no particular comparative advantage in putting peacekeeping forces on the ground. A current

model for encouraging an ally to lead while providing limited but important forms of support would be U.S. support for Australia’s leadership of

the multinational response to the East Timor crisis.

Proponents of more selective engagement also argue that extensive

U.S. involvement in SSCs generates high operational and personnel deployment tempos that degrade warfighting readiness and negatively affect recruitment and retention in the U.S. military. This aspect of Strategy B would also suggest that peacetime military engagement should be

more selective overall and that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from

some of the long-term deployments in which they are currently involved. The resources and efforts thus made available could then be

channeled into the transformation effort or the increased emphasis on

homeland defense. Many Strategy B advocates express support for significant efforts toward an NMD, which would require considerable resources. But even without NMD, the perception is that a strong commitment to an increasing DOD role in developing capabilities for detection

and response to future asymmetric threats could require a shifting of resources away from engagement. A reduction in operational tempo could

also allow greater scope for the organizational transformation efforts

needed to match the high-level interest in new approaches to warfighting

that might prove more effective and do more with less.

In setting out the desired missions and activities of the U.S. military, Strategy B provides a distinct set of priorities. The highest DOD

priorities would include the acceleration of more revolutionary military
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 149

transformation directed at preparing for future regional competitors or

near-peers possessing considerable antiaccess and asymmetric warfare

capabilities. This would be complemented by an increased DOD support for homeland defense. The more traditional military ability to

“fight and win the nation’s wars” would also be a priority; however, proponents of Strategy B might well reassess the scenarios and requirements for MTWs, paying more attention to asymmetric threats and antiaccess challenges as well as to the potential of new technologies and

operational concepts. SSCs that directly affect vital national interests

would also be a high priority, but those involving non-vital interests

(such as American values or humanitarian concerns) would not. This

strategy would also give greater priority to modernizing the nation’s nuclear deterrent.

Strategy B would most likely opt for a balanced mix of overseas presence and power-projection capabilities, both geared toward survival in

the expected antiaccess environment. This would include full-spectrum

force protection against asymmetric threats, including chemical and biological warfare and terrorism. The primary homeland defense efforts

would be NMD, WMD consequence management, computer network defense, and domestic and international counterterrorism.

One of the implications of implementing Strategy B in a resourceconstrained environment would be potential reductions in modernization programs, force structure, and readiness (particularly readiness for a

second MTW) in order to finance transformation and homeland defense.

Supporters of the strategy advocate more investment in concept development and experimentation, on both the service and joint forces level. To

achieve the material goals of transformation, selective investment would

be made in modernization, with less emphasis on the recapitalization of

legacy systems and more funding for basic science and technology, military R&D, and potential leap-ahead technologies. Many of these technologies would be directed toward defeating regional antiaccess systems,

as well as toward strengthening homeland defense.

Emphasis on transformation and homeland defense programs would

be balanced by the policy of selective engagement and the resulting reduction of PERSTEMPO and current strains on LD/HD units. This could

help to resolve some of the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining the highly capable personnel needed in a transformed military.

Strategy B is praised for both its emphasis on reducing the employment of today’s military and for its focus on transforming DOD to deal
150 QDR 2001

with emerging and future challenges that could, if not adequately

addressed, compromise U.S. military superiority and ultimately threaten

vital national interests. Critics of this strategy, however, raise two primary

concerns. The first is a great skepticism that any future President will be

able to be significantly more selective in the commitment of the Armed

Forces to operations such as Kosovo, Bosnia, or Somalia. The past, they

argue, is prologue; decisions regarding U.S. military intervention are ultimately political decisions, and politics will frequently override the calculus of national interest and stated policies about the use of force.

The second set of concerns relates to transformation. What exactly is

transformation? What are its objectives? What capabilities will it yield? And

what will it require in terms of force structure reductions, reallocation of

resources among the services, or cancellation of major procurement programs? These issues need to be addressed by the strategy’s proponents. The

primary criticism of Strategy B, however, is that it underestimates the nearterm risks associated with accelerating transformation. These critics argue

that near-term threats, such as large-scale aggression in Southwest Asia, on

the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere, remain real and that ensuring that the

U.S. military can respond effectively to them is the primary responsibility

of any Secretary of Defense. Therefore, near-term readiness and force structure should not be sacrificed to facilitate transformation. Whether they

agree, any administration that adopts Strategy B will need to be more explicit in accounting for any additional near- or mid-term risk that it would

accept as it shifts additional DOD resources into transformation.

Strategy C: Engage More Selectively and

Strengthen Warfighting Capability

Strategy C represents a blend of the selective engagement principles of

Strategy B and the more traditional emphasis on high-end warfighting that

is the de facto priority of Strategy A. The underlying worldview is similar to

that of Strategy A: the future security environment is seen as dynamic and

uncertain, requiring the leadership of the United States to support a stable

international structure. No military near-peer opponent is seen on the immediate horizon (at least until 2025); but unlike the Strategy B worldview,

the long-term rise of a near-peer (beyond 2025) is not necessarily seen as

inevitable, nor is it considered to be a dominant planning factor for defense

policy. Strategy C’s worldview focuses on near-term threats of large-scale

aggression. Like Strategy A, Strategy C accepts the possibility of multiple

overlapping MTWs; indeed, it makes these scenarios the focus of defense
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 151

planning. In this context, it is more concerned about asymmetric threats to

overseas presence and power-projection forces than about emerging threats

to the U.S. homeland.

The ultimate goal of Strategy C is to achieve the warfighting objectives

of Strategy A, but at a lower level of risk and without a potential strategyresources mismatch. Strategy C’s priorities stem from a view of a peacetime U.S. role in the international system that is more similar to the B position: U.S. leadership is seen as not essential for collective responses to

SSCs where less-than-vital national interests are involved. Strategy C is

more selective toward SSCs and engagement. Any decision to use force

would be tied directly to U.S. vital interests. But Strategy C is also likely to

focus its peacetime engagement efforts toward measures that would enhance the warfighting capabilities of key allies and coalition partners.

This is a back-to-basics strategy in which the primary mission of the

Armed Forces would be to “fight and win the Nation’s wars,” including

two overlapping MTWs. Preparing for SSCs involving vital interests and

maintaining a robust and credible nuclear deterrent would also be considered high priorities. To reduce tempo strains on LD/HD assets and

personnel and to increase the level of MTW warfighting readiness, military forces currently deployed to long-term less-than-vital SSCs would be

withdrawn. Resources would be redirected toward correcting warfighting

capability shortfalls, improving readiness, and modernizing combat platforms. As a general policy, Strategy C would likely gain considerable support from many active-duty and retired military officers, particularly

those tasked with Title 1X service responsibilities for recruiting, training,

and equipping the force.

Implementation of Strategy C at a full level of resources would undoubtedly result in a very high quality warfighting force, with a balanced

mix of overseas presence and power-projection capabilities. Emphasis

would logically be given to forward presence and prepositioned forces in

regions where the warfighting risk is judged to be most likely (currently

East Asia and Southwest Asia). Readiness would be kept at very high levels,

and the overall defense program would be focused on identifying and correcting current warfighting capability shortfalls in areas such as strategic

lift, ISR, precision munitions, combat service and service support, and

chemical and biological defense.

The primary bill-payer would be the strategy’s more selective engagement policy with regard to SSCs, but resources saved here would

not likely be adequate to cover proposed additional investments in
152 QDR 2001

warfighting readiness and capabilities. Selectivity toward SSCs could

also result in reductions in PERSTEMPO and in the use of LD/HD assets, ameliorating two current resource issues. Increases in high-end

warfighting effectiveness would require increased investment in the recapitalization of current platforms and systems, as well as a robust

modernization program. However, there appears to be no conceptual

imperative for a particularly aggressive transformation program, given

the focus on near- and mid-term regional threats rather than the potential rise of a near-peer competitor. While RMA-style technological developments would be welcome, they are not seen as urgently needed to

maintain U.S. superiority in the prosecution of future wars. Improving

homeland defense would be considered part of any Strategy C defense

program, but it, too, would be pursued at only a moderate pace. Homeland defense efforts would likely revolve around military support to

civilian agencies. In sum, Strategy C reflects the highest-priority mission of Strategy A, along with a selective engagement philosophy similar

to that of Strategy B.

Strategy C is praised by some as refocusing DOD on its most central

and enduring mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Supporters argue that this strategy would reduce the wear and tear on U.S.

forces, enhance their core warfighting competencies, and ensure U.S.

military superiority well into the future. Critics of the strategy are

united in the argument that the opportunity costs of focusing primarily

on warfighting are too great, but they are divided on what those opportunity costs are. Proponents of Strategy A and Strategy D (discussed

below) emphasize the loss of opportunities to shape the international

security environment and to use the U.S. military more proactively to

prevent small crises from becoming larger and more costly conflicts. By

contrast, proponents of Strategy B are more concerned about Strategy

C’s lack of urgency with regard to both homeland security and transformation. They believe that the focus on near- to mid-term regional

threats is misguided and that a modest homeland defense and transformation efforts will not be sufficient to meet emerging and future challenges at home and abroad.

Strategy D: Engage Today to Prevent 

Conflict Tomorrow

Although the specifics of the worldview underlying Strategy D may

appear similar to the other alternatives, there is a profound difference in
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 153

philosophy toward the nature of deterrence and the role of the United

States in the international system. Strategy D calls for maximum peacetime engagement by U.S. military forces, in the belief that such a level of

engagement can deter or prevent conflict, including the outbreak of MTW.

The Strategy D worldview sees few threats to vital U.S. national interests, but identifies many smaller near- and mid-term threats to regional

peace and security as meriting U.S.-led collective intervention. Crises

such as ethnic conflicts and failing states are judged de facto threats to

America’s long-term interests, even if they do not have a direct effect on

America’s national survival. From this perspective, the U.S. military is an

effective tool for an interventionist as well as internationalist foreign policy. U.S. leadership is seen as the essential mobilizer of collective action,

and the cost of such leadership is perceived to be the willingness to put

“boots on the ground” and U.S. troops into the more dangerous situations of peace enforcement.

Overseas presence becomes a dominant military activity in the world

of Strategy D. However, the predominant logic of presence is not the traditional justification of having forces available for initial response to

crises that could become MTWs. Rather, there is a certain degree of skepticism among Strategy D proponents about whether MTWs are likely in a

world marked by globalization and economic interconnectivity. Presence

is seen, instead, primarily as a deterrent and a moderator of the outbreak

of lesser regional conflicts, a politico-military symbol of U.S. involvement, a method of engaging and training foreign militaries and promoting democracy, and a means of providing the initial forces for SSCs.

Large-scale cross-border aggression is largely seen as a threat of the past.

The implication is that presence forces are needed in great numbers, but

not all such forces necessarily need to be as credibly combat-capable for

high-end warfighting as they have been configured in the past.

Likewise, there is considerable skepticism about the eventual rise of a

military near-peer competitor because of both the expected ameliorating

effect of globalization and the belief that an interventionist but evenhanded American foreign policy—with considerable efforts at multilateral diplomacy and international consensus-building—would preclude

the jealousies and competitions that might provoke the rise of a military

competitor. Conflict among the advanced nations would be prevented by

shared trade and converging values; conflict with lesser-developed states

by ensuring that they receive a share of the globalized economy; and conflict within failing states, with rogue states, and with terrorist groups by a
154 QDR 2001

policy of multinational response, always supported and sometimes led by

the United States.

With the overwhelming military superiority developed during the

Cold War and demonstrated in the Gulf War, the United States is uniquely

positioned to take more of the initiative in shaping the international environment, blending military power, diplomacy, foreign assistance, and

commercial ties to reduce threats, resolve crises, and prevent conflicts. This

unique leadership role is, according to Strategy D, best played by advancing the shared interests and values of the international community

through more effective multilateral alliances, coalitions, and institutions,

and especially through the United Nations. This would require that the use

of U.S. military forces be governed not only by U.S. national interests, but

also by U.S. values concerning freedom, peace, and justice for all humanity. The Strategy D motto might be “We should do what we can, and all we

can,” to promote peace, stability and international norms.

The key elements of Strategy D would focus on a more active use of

the military to shape the international environment, preferably within

multinational organizations and institutions as well as U.S.-led coalitions.

Peacetime engagement would be the primary employment of U.S. forces,

most of it directed toward enhancing key multilateral capabilities through

the involvement of unique U.S. assets. Strategy D would greatly increase

U.S. involvement in SSCs in order to prevent them from precipitating

greater conflicts and to mitigate their international effects. As an adjunct,

the United States would increase efforts to enlist regional allies and partners to join in such efforts. Although it is difficult to identify current realworld proponents of this strategy, it reflects the arguments made by several prominent officials at one time or another, including former

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and some regional CINCs.

To reorient assets toward increased peacetime engagement and SSCs,

alternative D would reduce (or even eliminate) the current emphasis on

multiple MTWs. Transformation efforts would be pursued at a modest

pace or perhaps downgraded in order to finance maintenance of and upgrades to a larger force structure with an expanded inventory of legacy

systems. Modest support to civilian agencies for homeland defense would

be continued. Nuclear deterrence forces, which appear to have no role in

engagement or SSCs, would face reduced emphasis and would be shaped

by greater emphasis on arms reductions.

Based on its worldview and emphasis, Strategy D would set distinctly

different priorities for the missions and activities of the U.S. military. The
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 155

highest DOD priorities would incorporate the lowest priorities of alternatives B and C and include proactive peacetime engagement, particularly

directed toward building alliances and coalitions; support for multilateral

international institutions; intervention in multiple, continuing SSCs so as

to prevent or to mitigate the development of crises or conflicts of greater

scale (such as MTWs); support for arms control and international accords; and the ability to fight and to win one MTW, although not necessarily at low risk, if deterrence failed.

Homeland defense, transformation, nuclear deterrence, and preparations to fight multiple MTWs would be much lower priorities. Theoretically, these elements would be of lesser concern due to the strategy’s robust

overseas presence adapted to post-Cold War world realities—including

globalization—and greater involvement with multilateral alliances, coalitions, and institutions.

Current power-projection capabilities would be reoriented to support

multiple concurrent SSCs and to provide for a transition to fighting a single MTW if that were necessary. Potential strains on LD/HD assets would

be mitigated by building more of these units, shifting additional units

from the Reserve to the active force, or selectively substituting alternative

units as circumstances allowed. This strategy might also employ greater

tiering of readiness, particularly for forces that would deploy late to an

MTW. Overstretch would be a distinct possibility if this strategy were not

fully funded, and affordability could be problematic under projected fiscal constraints.

Another major implication for the joint force might be broader application of the current rotational approach to peacetime force management

to include more than naval forces and the new Air Expeditionary Forces.

The entire force, including the Army Reserve, might even be reorganized

for rotational deployments. Modernization of existing platforms and systems would be more selective, with a distinct emphasis on recapitalization

rather than transformation. Under a philosophy of “numbers count most

for presence,” the acquisition policy might be one of accepting less-capable platforms in order to afford greater quantities, resulting in a force

structure with much more of a high-low mix than today’s force. This

might also slow the growing capability gap between high-tech U.S. forces

and those of the allies and coalition partners with whom the United

States seeks to operate.

A modest, reoriented concept-development and experimentation effort would optimize tactics and techniques for the increased number and
156 QDR 2001

types of SSCs. Funding for strategic nuclear forces would undoubtedly

be reduced.

Strategy D is praised for its willingness to use American preeminence

in the service of international peace and stability and for its emphasis on

conflict prevention. Its supporters argue that this strategy refocuses the

U.S. military on deterrence as its most important mission. They view

greater involvement in peacetime engagement, presence, and SSCs as fully

legitimate military missions toward that end. Critics, on the other hand,

argue that Strategy D risks a promiscuous level of U.S. military intervention that could create serious tempo strains (even for a larger force), undermine warfighting capability and credibility of the U.S. military over

time, and potentially backfire by generating anti-American sentiment in

reaction to U.S. interventionism.

Strategy E: Strategic Independence

Strategy E can be seen as almost the mirror-image of the priorities of

Strategy D. There are, nonetheless, some remarkable similarities in their

worldviews, if not in their interpretation of future events. Strategy E, like

Strategy D, posits a low probability for multiple overlapping MTWs, as

well as the lack of a military near-peer for the foreseeable future, to at

least 2025. It also predicts the frequent occurrence of ethnic and regional

conflicts, failed states, and internal wars. Unlike Strategy D, however, it

sees no reason for the United States to involve its military forces in any of

these less-than-vital SSCs.

Its strategy of strategic independence is predicated on the belief that

there are very few threats to truly vital U.S. interests. American allies,

most of which are the among the richest nations on earth, are assumed

to be economically and politically capable of taking more (or total) responsibility for their own defense and in coalition operations, and for

any SSCs in which they choose to involve themselves. In this worldview,

the alliances and coalitions of the past are seen as increasingly burdensome entanglements and are a prime cause of threats to U.S. forces by

drawing the United States into conflicts and dilemmas that have no real

impact on U.S. national interests. It sees part of the resentment toward

the United States—which appears to be expanding in some regions of

the world—as caused by American involvement in entangling alliances

and unnecessary operations.

Additionally, many allies are viewed as having been allowed to be free

riders on the U.S. defense effort. Their political support may have been
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 157

important during the Cold War, but it is no longer in U.S. interests to

keep funding their defense. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, a

“strategic pause” in the security environment should enable the United

States to focus on more pressing domestic concerns.

The proponents of Strategy E—which appear to include representatives of both the far left and the far right, the latter represented by the

publications of libertarian think-tanks such as the Cato Institute—may

accept that America is a global power with global interests.18 But they

have no interest in accepting the role of world policeman and see only

danger in being the unequivocal provider of a nuclear umbrella for the

free world. U.S. global interests are best protected and advanced primarily

through economic means, although many Strategy E supporters may retain a profound skepticism toward economic globalization. To them, international leadership means moral leadership and empowering allies and

others to help themselves. Direct involvement of the United States military in situations that affect less-than-vital national interests is seen as

squandering U.S. credibility and power, both of which should be focused

on supporting the sources of national strength: the American people,

their freedom, their prosperity, and their way of life. Allies are best encouraged to pursue more independent defense efforts and to contribute

more to any necessary coalition operations.

In implementation, Strategy E would not necessarily reduce overall

U.S. military strength. It would see great value in maintaining, as an insurance policy, a strong military with unmatched warfighting capabilities.

But it would employ the Armed Forces rarely and very selectively. Strategy E would probably call for a military prepared to fight and to win multiple MTWs in the unlikely event that they occurred. Such strength would

be seen as deterring any serious challenge to vital U.S. interests. However,

peacetime engagement activities would be reduced to a minimum and involvement in less-than-vital SSCs would be avoided. Where such involvement could not be avoided, the responsibility for SSCs would be handed

off to coalition partners as soon as possible. Allies and coalition partners

would also be expected to accept more responsibilities in preparing for

possible MTWs.

One area of increased emphasis would be homeland defense, especially defense against asymmetric threats, since they could have a direct effect on the American people and could limit U.S. freedom and prosperity.

Attacks on the U.S. homeland could provoke an overwhelming response
158 QDR 2001

by U.S. power-projection forces.19 However, there appears to be no overriding impetus for more than a modestly funded transformation effort.

Like other defense strategies, the primary military mission of Strategy

E remains being prepared to “fight and win the nation’s wars.” Similar to

Strategies A and C, alternative E might consider maintaining a two-MTW

capability as appropriate insurance for the nation’s security. Interpretations would differ, however, as to what constitutes an MTW and when to

involve U.S. forces in combat. Only SSCs deemed critical to the protection

of America’s vital interests would be seen as legitimate missions for the

U.S. military.

Homeland defense would also be a high priority in Strategy E, since it

would contribute most directly to the protection of American freedom,

lives, and property. A robust NMD would be a significant element of

homeland defense, along with WMD consequence management, computer network defense, and counterterrorism.

Nuclear deterrence against threats to the United States and its vital interests would also be a priority and is conceptually linked to homeland defense. It is doubtful, given the underlying worldview, that there would be

much faith in arms control as a permanent element of U.S. security policy.

With alliances and engagement viewed as entanglements, the following activities would receive much lower priority: alliance and coalition

commitments, extended nuclear deterrence, and peacetime engagement

not directly tied to vital national interests. The lack of a military nearpeer competitor on the immediate horizon would also tend to make

transformation a lesser priority, at least initially. However, maintaining

overall U.S. technological superiority over potential threats would be considered important.

Strategy E would call for a much different military posture than

today, with significantly reduced overseas presence. Instead, power-projection capabilities based in the United States would be robust and well

equipped. The need for increased standoff capabilities might eventually

lead to a greater emphasis on transformation, if legacy systems appeared

to lack the ability to defeat evolving antiaccess challenges. These powerprojection capabilities would be balanced by equally robust homeland defense capabilities.

Alternative E carries with it a series of substantially different implications for the overall force. Given the assumption that we are now in a

“strategic pause,” it is likely that the DOD budget would be reduced in

order to provide funding for domestic priorities. A significant portion of
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 159

these cuts would come from reducing the overseas basing structure and

forces stationed or deployed overseas, and curtailing most engagement activities, although any element of the force that is not structured for MTW

(or vital-interest SSCs) would be a candidate for reduction or elimination.

MTW forces would be kept at high levels of readiness, and this would

be assisted by great reductions in PERSTEMPO and substantial reductions in the peacetime use of LD/HD units.

Investment in selective recapitalization and modernization, rather

than an overall transformation of the force, would be the preferred

method of maintaining the current military technology edge. However,

there would be modest funding of transformation activities to keep pace

with evolving threat capabilities.

Nuclear programs tied primarily to extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over allies might be reduced, while investment in overall strategic

modernization would be increased. Funding for nuclear testing or upgrades to stockpile stewardship capabilities might also be increased.

While Strategy E is praised by some for its greater focus on homeland

security, it is widely criticized for its isolationism. Critics argue that

pulling back from our international commitments and bringing the bulk

of U.S. forces home would severely damage important alliances, our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to crises, and ultimately our vital national interests.

Strategy F: Preventive Defense

Although Strategy F is included in the range of defense strategy alternatives suitable for examination during QDR 2001, it could be placed in a

different category. For starters, it comes from a very specific source, rather

than a compilation of sources and statements. Its most detailed expression appears in Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America by

Ashton Carter and William Perry, although it has also appeared in articles

and seminar reports. It is included in our range of potential defense

strategies because of the influence of its concepts and the stature of its

proponents in the defense policy debate.20

It is also different from the other strategy alternatives in its scope and

means of execution. Even its proponents admit that the particulars of

preventive defense make it more of an overall national security strategy

than a defense strategy to be executed by DOD. “It is a broad politicomilitary strategy, and therefore draws on all the instruments of foreign

policy: political, economic, and military.”21 As such, many of its elements
160 QDR 2001

may lie outside the scope of the actual QDR process. But “the role of the

U.S. Department of Defense is central.” Perry states that during his tenure

as Secretary of Defense, “we established a number of programs and initiatives that made a strong start at incorporating the strategy of Preventive

Defense into the activities of the Defense Department.”22

It is a strategy with a very explicit focus on four specific threats that it

considers potential mid- or long-term challenges to the survival of the

United States: the return of an aggressive Russia; “loose nukes” or the uncertain security of fissionable material from the former Soviet Union; the

rise of a hostile China; and the continuing proliferation of WMD, and especially the potential for WMD terrorism on U.S. soil.

But as explicit as these specific threats are in determining the character of alternative F, the underlying worldview is similar to Strategies A

and C. While the security environment may always be dynamic and uncertain, there are no imminent threats (in the short term) to U.S. survival,

although there are currently a host of lesser regional threats. No actual

military near-peer competitor is seen as possible until beyond 2025, although a central purpose of the strategy is to prevent the two likely candidates, Russia and China, from becoming such competitors. However, the

rise of asymmetric threats is recognized, especially the potential for

WMD terrorism against the U.S. homeland. The high level of concern

about asymmetric threats is similar to that evidenced in alternative B. The

proper role of the United States in the international environment is the

same as that of current Strategy A.

Key elements of Strategy F revolve around preventing future threats

to survival of the United States. The strategy calls for an emphasis on

shaping the international environment through peacetime engagement at

a level greater than Strategy A in regard to the four long-term threats

identified above. But it would not spread the engagement effort across the

board as implied in Strategy D. Such a broad brush, it would be feared,

could all too easily neglect the four major threats.

Alternative F would place greater emphasis than today on transformation activities, but it would do so as a hedge against the failure of preventive

defense efforts rather than as a centerpiece of the strategy. There would

likely be a much greater emphasis on being able to fight and to win in the

face of asymmetric threats and antiaccess strategies, particularly in a WMD

environment. This concern with WMD extends to homeland defense, with

consequence management and counterterrorism being the foremost emphasis, although computer network defense and some limited form of
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 161

NMD (oriented toward rogue states, but potentially capable of dissuading

others from greater WMD and missile investments) might also be pursued.

As part of the overall philosophy of international engagement, Strategy F would posit some involvement in SSCs, but it would be more selective than the current strategy in order to maintain resources and focus on

the big four threats. As part of the preventive defense approach, which is

intended to ensure that Russia and China become satisfied members of

the community of nations, Strategy F would pursue further reductions in

strategic offensive arms and use both bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements to further international security.

The highest priorities of alternative F would be efforts to diminish

the four long-term threats to U.S. survival. For DOD, this would require

peacetime military engagement to influence Russia to develop and maintain close ties to the West and to help establish a stable European security

order; efforts to reduce and secure the WMD legacy of the Soviet Union

in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and steps to engage and to build a strategic partnership with

an economically rising China.

U.S. power-projection forces would also be required to maintain (and

to improve) the ability to fight and to win an MTW, even in the face of

extensive regional WMD use and sophisticated antiaccess strategies.

Homeland defense, and especially counters to WMD terrorism, would be

a DOD priority. Transforming the force to deal with increasingly hightechnology threats might also be a priority, but primarily as a hedge

against failure of the overall strategy to prevent the rise of a military nearpeer competitor.

Lower priorities for alternative F would logically include preparation for multiple MTWs; peacetime engagement that is not focused on

the four primary potential threats; SSCs involving other-than-vital interests; and nuclear forces and programs beyond what is needed for

basic deterrence.

Alternative F would opt for a balance between overseas presence and

power-projection forces similar to the mix inherent in Strategy A. To some

extent the similarities between these two alternatives are to be expected. As

Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997, Perry set in place many of the

policies later codified in QDR 1997, and he then articulated them in Preventive Defense not long after leaving office. The overseas presence posture

of alternative F would not necessarily be radically different from today’s

posture; what might be different is the level and direction of engagement
162 QDR 2001

activities. Rather than focus on allies and coalition partners, engagement

activities might be primarily directed at neutralizing the four primary

threats. For example, the United States might seek to conduct a series of

combined exercises with the forces of Russia and China. There might be

increased levels of cooperation with non-military as well as military counterterrorist forces of other nations.

However, the basing of U.S. forces overseas might be adjusted in ways

designed to encourage more positive relations with Russia and China or

to dissuade them from taking undesired actions. This could include reductions in overseas presence at certain locations, such as in Europe or

the Western Pacific, or—conversely—an increase in presence in those

areas in order to deter them from threatening actions toward neighboring

states. In any event, the focus of presence and engagement would be adjusted toward preventive defense.

With an eye toward the proliferation of antiaccess or area-denial systems, Strategy F would tend to advocate a full-spectrum power-projection

force that could overcome advanced regional defenses. Increased emphasis would be placed on counterproliferation and counterterrorism, to

foreclose any WMD option as part of an antiaccess or asymmetric warfare campaign, and to neutralize any deterrence of the U.S. ability to project power by a threat to use WMD on U.S. soil.

In a fiscally constrained environment, Strategy F might shift resources from some current programs to programs specifically designed to

address WMD and terrorist threats. Such a focus might require more extensive experimentation to deal with new threats and selective modernization that would hold recapitalization in abeyance until the development of even more advanced technologies. Although the concept of

preventive defense does not necessarily call for a reduction in the current

level of PERSTEMPO and the operational strains in LD/HD units, its

proponents have indicated such reductions are necessary to prevent an

eventual decline in the quality of American military personnel.23

This strategy is praised for placing greater emphasis on some of the

more serious potential future threats to U.S. security and for attempting to

make their prevention the primary focus of U.S. national security planning.

The primary criticism of this strategy is like that of Strategy B: that it fails

to give adequate weight to near- and mid-term threats to U.S. security, such

as regional aggression, and that, in a resource-constrained environment,

this might result in inadequate resources for and higher risk in mission

areas, such as warfighting and SSCs.
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 163

Hybrids and Fading Distinctions

None of these six strategy alternatives constitutes rigid dogma; elements can be blended to create hybrid alternatives within the range identified. There are, in fact, potential constraints that could encourage such a

blending. One area of concern that has been frequently voiced is the question of just how free the President might be in selecting among SSCs in

which to involve the U.S. military. Considerable skepticism has been expressed concerning the ability of decisionmakers to resist intense media

attention on what would be considered a non-vital interest under an

adopted strategy alternative. Could an administration patiently explain

the logic of American non-involvement in a crisis involving potential

genocide, starvation, or gross injustice and repression when the eyes of

the American people have focused on the crisis, or would it be forced to

act regardless of its formal, declared strategy? If the latter, would one of

the sharp distinctions between, for example, strategy alternatives A and B

become muted?

Another constraint is available resources. Is the level of presence, engagement, and involvement in SSCs that is postulated by Strategy D affordable? Would the American people be willing to bear a greater economic burden in order to be able to “engage everywhere all the time”? Or

would fiscal constraints force a scaling-down of the ambitious engagement program in alternative Strategy D, making it look more like a version of Strategy A?

Our point is that political and economic constraints could easily force

a blending of the principles and priorities of the strategy alternatives as

described. This in no way mitigates the need for a comprehensive assessment of the priorities and risks inherent in each of the strategy alternatives. Such assessments provide an analytical basis for actual choices. But

sharp distinctions blur when plans are translated into real-world policies.

As Helmuth von Moltke reportedly said about military operations: “No

plan survives contact with the enemy.” Some of the starker distinctions

between strategy alternatives might not survive contact with practical

policy constraints.

Thus the real, not merely rhetorical, differences between the strategy alternatives become most evident when the strategies are translated

into program and resource allocation decisions. For example, the distinctions between alternatives A and B become very clear when the

question “What levels of funding would be applied to which priority

mission?” is asked. Again, this points to the need to examine the linkage
164 QDR 2001

between strategy alternatives and their associated integrated paths of

programmatic implications.24

Conclusion

The challenge and opportunity of QDR 2001 require closely linking

the strategy selected and the force structure and management choices that

define the defense program, as well as identifying the areas and degrees of

risk that will be accepted in making those choices. Whatever strategy is

adopted, the administration must strive to do three things well: to articulate the strategy in a way that makes it understandable and acceptable to

the American people; to derive force sizing criteria and to make acquisition and force management choices that implement the inherent priorities of the strategy; and to be explicit as to the risks—military, political, or

economic—that it is willing to accept in implementing the strategy. Execution of these three imperatives may be the most critical factor in the

success of the next QDR.

Being explicit as to priorities and risks could make the administration

vulnerable to public criticism (both just and unjust) and posturing by

political opponents. It also disallows the fuzzy rhetoric that blurs the clear

identification of winners and losers in the competition between ideas and

programs. Egos and budget shares could get bruised. A considerable degree of political courage is required, but the potential dividend of such

explicitness—a coherent, sustainable, supported, and successful defense

policy that will guard American interests, deter war, and preserve a just

peace—is worth the risks.

Notes1 For example, see Bryan Bender, “U.S. defence review to be strategy-driven,” Jane’s Defence

Weekly 34, no. 5 (August 2, 2000), 5; Williamson Murray, “Preparing to Lose the Next War,” Strategic

Review 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 51–62; Robert P. Haffa, Jr., “Planning U.S. Forces to Fight Two Wars:

Right Number, Wrong Forces,” Strategic Review 27, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 15–21; and Michael G. Vickers and Steven M. Kosiak, The Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Center

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, December 1997), 14–16.

2 Definition of strategy from United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02 (June 10, 1998), 429–430.

3 Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 97.

4 See chapter 7 on assessing risk.

5 The QDR legislation requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a final QDR report to

Congress by September 30, 2001. Even in the absence of a congressional deadline, a new administration would have strong incentives to finish the review by the late summer or early autumn in order to

influence the building of the service Program Objective Memoranda and the new President’s first full

budget submission.

6 Terms such as presence and engagement are often used rather loosely. Following a survey and

analysis of existing sources, we developed or adopted specific definitions for the terms used to describe
DEFENSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES 165

these strategy issues. We define overseas presence as military forces permanently stationed or rotationally or intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response. We define peacetime military engagement as encompassing all U.S.

military activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and promote broad U.S. security

interests, including activities such as combined training and education, military-to-military interactions, security assistance, and various other programs. U.S. overseas presence forces are often also involved in conducting peacetime military engagement activities.

7 We define smaller-scale contingencies as military operations encompassing the full range of

joint/combined operations beyond peacetime engagement activities, but short of major theater war.

Such operations include show-of-force operations, coercive campaigns, limited strikes, noncombatant

evacuation operations, no-fly-zone enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, operations to deal

with large migrations of populations, counterterrorism operations, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and support to U.S. domestic civil authorities.

8 We define major theater war as U.S. military operations to deter and defeat large-scale aggression by a state or coalition that threatens an ally or the stability of a region. MTW involves joint and

potentially combined military operations that project, apply, and sustain substantial U.S. combat and

combat support forces for high-intensity conflict.

9 We define homeland security (as it relates to the DOD role) as military operations and activities

involved in deterring, preventing, defending against, and responding to attacks on the U.S. homeland.

These operations and activities could include NMD, territorial defense (air, land, sea, space), critical

infrastructure protection such as computer network defense, selected counterterrorism activities, consequence management (CM), and other activities in support of domestic civil authorities.

10 We define transformation as the process by which DOD seeks to harness the revolution in military affairs (RMA) to make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and

organizational structure in order to better prepare the United States to meet future challenges. There is,

however, considerable disagreement and debate as to what properly constitutes military transformation.

11 Confusingly, the term engagement is used in several different ways in the delineation of the

“shape, respond, prepare” strategy. On the level of overall national security, engagement is used to describe the elements of an activist, internationalist security policy (as in A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, the pre-1997 title of the President’s published national security strategy). This could be considered engagement writ large. On the level of national military strategy, engagement is seen as the use of military forces to interact in peacetime as a politico-military means of

positively affecting regional stability, bolstering friends and allies, and deterring and dissuading potential adversaries. This makes the term nearly synonymous with shaping. On the theater level, peacetime military engagement is seen as the day-to-day interaction of U.S. military forces with foreign

militaries, generally in the form of combined training, exercises (in both their supporting and deterring functions), or other professional contacts.

12 For a detailed discussion of post-Cold War alliance and coalition formation, see Stephen M.

Walt, “Coalitions,” in Patrick M. Cronin, 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 85–114.

13 See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996), and Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000).

14 See discussion in Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and

Congress, 2000 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), 123–136.

15 For example, see Michael J. Lippitz, Sean O’Keefe, and John P. White, “Advancing the Revolution in Business Affairs,” Chapter 7 in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, Keeping the Edge: Managing

Defense for the Future (Cambridge, MA, and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project, 2000; forthcoming, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

16 See George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” speech delivered at The Citadel, Charleston,

SC, September 23, 1999.

17 On the details of asymmetric threats and antiaccess strategies, see chapter 3.

18 See Ivan Eland, “Tilting at Windmills: Post-Cold War Threats to U.S. Security,” Policy Analysis

no. 332 (February 8, 1999), <www.cato.org>.
166 QDR 2001

19 This is sometimes referred to as the “Pearl Harbor effect,” meaning that an attack on U.S. territory would stiffen—not shake—U.S. resolve. Colin Gray argues that the American people would

likely demand a “healthily disproportionate action” in response to WMD terrorism. Colin S. Gray,

“Combatting Terrorism,” Parameters 23, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), 22.

20 To develop a strategy comparable to the other strategic alternatives, we have added elements

to the version laid out in the publications by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter

and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. In doing so, we have tried to stay as close as possible

to the assumptions, assessments, and overall philosophy of the original authors. Ultimately, however,

Strategy F may deviate from ideas that Carter and Perry would support. As a small way of indicating

this difference, we render “preventive defense” in lower case as opposed to using initial capitals in the

term “Preventive Defense” as Carter and Perry do in their writings.

21 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 18.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 214.

24 The NDU QDR 2001 Working Group elected to examine in detail the force structure and programmatic implications of only the first four strategy alternatives (A, B, C, and D). While Strategy E,

which we dubbed “strategic independence,” is a hardy perennial in the U.S. defense and foreign policy

debate, it does not appear at present to have the standing that would make it a plausible alternative for

the Bush administration. Strategy F, preventive defense, is more of a broad national security strategy

than a defense strategy that provides concrete guidance on how to size, structure, and employ the U.S.

military. The adoption of alternative F as an overall national security strategy could conceivably result

in the development of a concurrent defense strategy along the lines of one of the other strategy alternatives presented. For more on strategy-driven integrated paths, see chapter 13.
Chapter Six

Sizing Conventional Forces:

Criteria and Methodology

by Michèle A. Flournoy and Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

F or better or for worse, those who will do the hard work in the 2001

QDR of translating strategic priorities into force structure options

will have a huge audience as they do their work. To ensure that key

judgments and decisions are made explicitly and in a manner that reflects

the strategy’s guidance on where to place emphasis and where to accept or

to manage a degree of risk, they will need to create a process for force sizing that is both rigorous and transparent. The purpose of this chapter,

then, is to outline a methodology for sizing conventional forces to meet

the requirements of a given strategy. This methodology enables force

planners to translate the priorities of a chosen strategy—whatever those

priorities may be—into discrete force structure options that can then be

further assessed through modeling and analysis.1

This chapter reviews four alternative approaches to force sizing. Because each has its strengths and weaknesses, all four approaches informed

the development of the NDU QDR Working Group’s proposed methodology, which is next described. The chapter details each step in the force

sizing process and highlights the key decisions and judgments that must

be made along the way.

Four Perspectives

One can view the challenge of sizing U.S. conventional forces from at

least four different perspectives. Each has an internally consistent approach to generating force structure, based on varying worldviews and

assumptions about missions, scenarios, and capabilities. Comparing the

strengths and weaknesses of these approaches raises a number of key

choices that were central to the development of the force-sizing methodology that we propose later in this chapter.

167
168 QDR 2001

Threat-Scenario Approach 

The threat-scenario approach sizes U.S. forces based on specific

threats. It uses validated threat estimates provided by the national intelligence community to identify specific threat scenarios to which the U.S.

military might have to respond in the near to mid term. This methodology

then prioritizes scenarios in accordance with the strategy, placing greater

emphasis on those scenarios that fall into priority-mission categories.

Once priority-threat scenarios are identified, critical assumptions about

warning, concurrency, and separation time are established and specific requirements for the U.S. military are determined. The final step is identifying one or more force structure options that can meet these requirements.

The advantages of this approach to force sizing center around the

high credibility of scenarios derived from validated intelligence assessments. This approach tends to generate a force that emphasizes contingency response capabilities and warfighting competencies. Its disadvantages stem from the fact that focusing on specific scenarios may yield

forces (and rationales for those forces) that are not readily adaptable to

change, such as unforeseen changes in the security environment. Indeed,

the near-term focus of this approach tends to neglect preparation for

long-term threats and hedging against uncertainties. Perhaps most important, it also neglects the utility of military activities to shape the international security environment: it sizes forces to respond to foreseen

threats, not to prevent or deter them.

Regional-Missions Approach

The regional-missions approach sizes U.S. conventional forces based

on prioritized regional requirements. Based on current geographical divisions outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), this approach

sizes the force according to identified military requirements in five key

regions: Western and Eastern Europe (U.S. European Command), Asia

and the Pacific Basin (U.S. Pacific Command), the Middle East and Central Asia (U.S. Central Command), Central and South America and the

Caribbean (U.S. Southern Command), and the continental United

States. For each region, two principles are applied. The first is sizing for

peacetime engagement and presence: the day-to-day demands placed on

the military. The second is sizing for contingency operations in the same

regions, including CONUS-based forces and strategic reserves.

These principles are applied in the following manner. First, baseline

and minimum engagement and presence forces are calculated for each
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 169

theater. Baseline forces are those that the regional commander in chief

requires to undertake day-to-day presence and engagement activities in

the region. Minimum forces are those stay-behind forces that the CINC

would need to ensure stability in the region, even in the midst of one or

more major wars elsewhere. Second, forces for anticipated smaller-scale

contingencies are derived for each theater. Finally, potential major theater

war requirements are determined for each theater. These requirements

are then viewed in combination, on a global basis, to determine both relative priorities and how forces would be allocated across regions. As part of

this process, theater-level shortfalls and contingency and support forces

are identified, from other theaters or from the United States.

This approach captures both the shaping and contingency-response

requirements of any given strategy. In addressing a broad range of potential scenarios and options, it emphasizes regional CINC needs. On the

other hand, the decentralization inherent in this approach emphasizes

local requirements and, in a resource-constrained environment, begs for

additional prioritization to adjudicate competing requirements across regions. This bottom-up compilation of many diverse requirements may

also be difficult to summarize in a succinct and compelling rationale for

the size and shape of U.S. forces. Lastly, the near-term focus of this approach tends to reinforce current concepts of operations (what we need

today) more than innovative approaches to anticipated future challenges

(what we may need for tomorrow).

Generic-Missions Approach 

The generic-missions approach sizes forces based on generic missions

derived from the priorities of a particular strategy. Based on strategy-driven guidance, this approach sizes the force for the missions or activities

explicitly identified in the strategy, such as MTWs, homeland security,

overseas presence, peacetime engagement, SSCs, and transformation.

After these missions or activities are identified, they are prioritized according to the dictates of the strategy. Forces are allocated to each category in priority order. Areas of potential overlap—generally forces that

are appropriately given more than one mission—are identified, for example, naval forces that would provide overseas presence in peacetime and

also be part of the initial response to deter or fight a war.

The principal advantage of this approach is that it is highly sensitive

to strategy guidance and can effectively capture all of the priority missions identified. But it also has the defects of its virtues. For example, the

sensitivity of this approach to a particular strategy’s priorities can be a
170 QDR 2001

weakness if it yields forces that do not have the flexibility or balance to

deal with the unexpected—that is, to respond effectively to developments

not anticipated by the strategy.

Future-Capabilities Approach 

The future-capabilities approach sizes forces based on capabilities required to deal effectively with future threats and opportunities. Under

this approach, the characteristics of the future security environment (for

example, in 2025) are outlined, and anticipated priority military missions

and operating assumptions are identified. Force structure options are

then developed based on the capabilities required to carry out these missions. This process is generally oriented toward the future security environment considered most likely, but it also permits sizing forces to hedge

against wildcard developments, that is, less likely but dangerous futures.

Because this approach focuses on longer-term threats to U.S. security, it

can be more difficult to implement. No crystal ball provides a clear and certain picture of the military challenges that we will confront in the future,

and the more distant the future, the murkier the picture. There are also political sensitivities associated with planning against potential future adversaries who are not yet adversaries. This uncertainty places a premium on

hedging against a range of future possibilities rather than optimizing the

force for one anticipated or hoped-for future. In addition, if applied independently, this approach might not yield a force well suited to near-term

contingencies, but any force-sizing approach that we apply must be able to

negotiate the near term. No sitting Secretary of Defense can take on an unacceptable level of risk today in order to better prepare the U.S. military for

tomorrow: he or she must strike a balance. Therefore, this approach is

probably most useful not as a stand-alone approach, but as one that complements others that capture near-term requirements as well.

Integrating the Approaches 

Each of these four approaches looks at the problem of force sizing from

a different perspective, and each has unique strengths and weaknesses.

However, no single approach seems strong enough to stand on its own

merits. For this reason, the working group developed a composite force-sizing methodology that integrates elements of all four approaches. It seeks to

draw on the strengths of each approach while avoiding its most serious

weaknesses. DOD does not yet have a common or approved methodology

for force sizing, so we offer this approach as a useful starting point for force

planners and decisionmakers in the QDR.
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 171

Step 1: Define sizing elements (e.g., MTWs,

overseas presence, peacetime engagement,

SSCs, homeland security); they should reflect

strategy’s key elements

Step 2: Prioritize sizing elements consistent

with strategy and determine acceptable level of

risk for each

Step 3: Develop force structure building block

for each element consistent with its acceptable

level of risk

Step 4: Determine degree of overlap between

building blocks, considering acceptable level 

of risk

Step 5: Integrate rotational base for presence

and long-term SSC forces as required

Step 6: Adjust aggregate force structure to

address force generation and other unique

requirements not previously integrated

Step 7: Model and analyze the resultant force

structure across all requirements of the strategy, using comprehensive risk assessment

Figure 6–1. Steps for Force Sizing
172 QDR 2001

Proposed Methodology 

Each of the four defense strategy alternatives described in chapter 5

offers a different set of priorities for the U.S. military and DOD. Once the

Bush administration determines the defense strategy that it wishes to

pursue, its challenge is to translate its priorities into criteria for sizing the

force and allocating resources within the DOD. Moreover, it will face critical decisions about where to place emphasis and where to accept or to

manage risk.

This section describes a step-by-step methodology for sizing U.S.

conventional forces (see figure 6–1). This approach to force sizing can be

used to support any strategy alternative chosen by the Bush administration. As this seven-step process sizes conventional forces to the requirements of a given strategy, it makes the most critical policy decisions and

military judgments transparent and unavoidable.

■ Step 1 defines the terms that form the language of force sizing. These sizing elements should reflect the key missions and activities identified in

the strategy, such as MTWs, homeland security, overseas presence, peacetime engagement, SSCs, and transformation.

■ Step 2 prioritizes these elements to reflect the strategy’s guidance on

where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk.

As part of this process, a target level of acceptable risk is established for

each element. For example, in a resource-constrained environment, one

might aim for low or low-to-moderate risk in a strategy’s highest priority areas while accepting moderate-to-high or high risk in some lower

priority activities.2

■ Step 3 develops individual force structure building blocks for each of the

sizing elements, consistent with the target level of risk.

■ Step 4 melds the discrete building blocks of forces based on key considerations, such as assumptions about which forces would disengage from SSCs

to redeploy to MTWs, which forces would swing between MTWs (that is,

take part in one campaign and then quickly redeploy to another), or which

forces would be dual-tasked (such as forward presence forces also available

for MTWs). Here again, the target level of risk must be considered as the

building blocks are adjusted, because a low-risk force for a given set of

missions may be markedly different from a high-risk force.

■ Step 5 develops the rotational base requirements for forces involved in

overseas-presence and long-term SSC operations. For example, how many

carrier battle groups are required in the force to keep three of these groups

■ forward-deployed at any given time? How many Army brigades are

needed to support one forward-deployed in Bosnia on an ongoing basis?
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 173

■ Step 6 assesses the forces necessary to generate the combat and support

forces required by the strategy. Any unique capabilities and requirements that were not fully integrated as building blocks should also be

included here, such as training units (supporting force accession or

training missions), higher-echelon maintenance and support units, and

strategic mobility forces.

■ Step 7 evaluates the ability of the resultant force structure to support the

associated strategy. An iterative process of wargaming, modeling, and

analysis determines whether strategic priorities and areas of emphasis are

accurately reflected in the force structure. The force structure can be further adjusted if target risk levels are not met initially or if they are subsequently modified for specific sizing elements.

Step 1: Definition of Sizing Elements

The key elements used in force sizing should be the priority missions

and activities assigned to the U.S. military by a given strategy. Obviously,

these elements—how they are defined and what priority they are given—

will vary by strategy. In developing its approach to force sizing, the NDU

QDR Working Group adopted or developed several definitions based on

the range of missions and activities that the U.S. military currently prepares for or undertakes. These definitions are provided below to illustrate

the first step in the methodology, recognizing that some of these terms

may change or be defined differently in a future strategy.

Any U.S. defense strategy will include deterring and, if necessary,

fighting and winning major wars as a key element. In the absence of an

official DOD definition, the NDU Working Group defined an MTW as

U.S. military operations to deter and to defeat large-scale aggression by a

state or coalition that threatens an ally or the stability of a region; it involves joint and combined military operations that project, apply, and

sustain substantial U.S. combat and combat support forces for high-intensity conflict. This definition was crafted to support a broader MTW

scenario set than the two canonical MTWs that are currently the primary

basis for U.S. defense planning (Iraq and Korea).

Another key element of any defense strategy is overseas presence, which

we define as the military forces permanently stationed or rotationally or

intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response. Because many

overseas-presence forces require a substantial rotation base, this element

has potentially profound implications for the size of the associated force.
174 QDR 2001

In the past, U.S. forces have been sized predominantly for two elements

alone: warfighting and presence. Other missions and activities have been

treated, explicitly or implicitly, as lesser included cases in sizing the force: it

was assumed that forces sized for warfighting and presence would be sufficient to meet any other demands. However, the increasing peacetime demands placed on the U.S. military in the last decade have called this assumption into question, with increases in so-called low density/high

demand (LD/HD) assets, and chronic operations and personnel tempo

strains in parts of the force. Even under a strategy of more selective engagement, we propose including peacetime demands explicitly in the force-sizing process so that decisions about whether to treat them as lesser included

cases are conscious and explicit.

Peacetime demands can be thought of in at least two categories. The

first of these is the full range of military operations beyond peacetime military

engagement but short of MTW. This category of operations has been known

by many different names over the last decade, from low-intensity conflict,

to military operations other than war, peace operations, and smaller-scale

contingencies (SSCs). The current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)

identifies more than a dozen kinds of SSCs, as indicated in table 6–1.

The second category is peacetime military engagement: U.S. military

activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and to promote broad U.S. security interests, including activities such as combined

training, military-to-military interactions, and various other programs.

At least one of the defense strategy alternatives outlined in chapter 5

would place greater emphasis on homeland security. Thus, homeland

security should also be treated as a potential element in force sizing.

While its effect on the size of U.S. conventional forces overall might be

only marginal, its effect on the size and shape of certain elements of the

force may be substantial. We defined the military elements of homeland

security as those military operations and activities involved in deterring,

preventing, defending against, and responding to attacks on the U.S.

homeland, including national missile defense, territorial defense (air,

land, sea, and space), critical infrastructure protection, selected counterterrorism activities, consequence management, and other activities in

support of domestic civil authorities.

The Bush administration may also want to consider, as part of its

force-sizing calculus, the requirements of transformation, that is, the set

of activities by which DOD seeks to harness the revolution in military affairs to make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 175

Table 6–1. Smaller-Scale Contingencies: Operational CategoriesIntervention Opposed Intervention/ Deploy forces to rapidly restore legitimate governments, coerce or Just Cause (Panama) 1989; Operations Coercive Campaign defeat an opposition force, and restore stability. Allied Force (Kosovo) 1999

Humanitarian Intervention Provide security for delivery of humanitarian assistance in Restore Hope (Somalia) 1992; 

the midst of an ongoing conflict. Provide Comfort (Iraq) 1991

Peacekeeping Peace Accord Implementation Assist in implementing military aspects of an agreement to Bosnia IFOR 1995; Restore Operations (large) end a conflict by overseeing terms of the agreement. Democracy (Haiti) 1994

Follow-on Peace Operations Long-term operations to enhance or maintain stability in region Bosnia SFOR 1996

long enough for local authorities to gain independent, effective control.

Peacekeeping Interpositional Peacekeeping Observe and patrol buffer zones between former warring parties Sinai since 1982;Operations (small) to ensure cease-fire terms and prevent spillover. Macedonia since 1993Humanitarian Foreign Humanitarian Relieve or reduce the results of disasters or other endemic conditions Support Hope (Rwanda) 1994; Operations Assistance that seriously threaten life or great damage. Safe Haven (Cuban refugees) 1994

Domestic Disaster Relief Lawful temporary support undertaken when an emergency overtaxes Hurricane Andrew 1992; Task 

the capabilities of civil authorities. Force Wildfire (western states) 1994

Other Operations No-fly Zone Patrol airspace to enforce restrictions placed by the international Southern Watch (Iraq) since 1991; (long) community on a government or entity. Deny Flight (Bosnia) since 1993

Maritime Intercept Operations Patrol seas to enforce restrictions placed on a government or Sharp Guard (Adriatic) 1992; 

entity; includes migrant pickup/enforcing sanctions. Arabian Gulf 1991–98

Support to Domestic Authorities Long-term support for domestic authorities where Counterdrug Support

the military is not the lead governmental agency. 

Other Operations Non-combatant Evacuation Extract American and/or other citizens from unstable Assured Response (Liberia) 1996; (short) Operations areas where commercial transport is unsafe/unavailable. Silver Wake (Albania) 1997

Shows of Force Deploy forces to a crisis area to deter some action or signal Iraq 1998; China/Taiwan 1996; 

commitment and resolve and to enhance military options. Vigilant Warrior (Iraq) 1994

Strike Short-duration attacks (air, land, or sea) against high-value targets Eldorado Canyon (Libya) 1986;

or in response to an adversary’s action. Desert Strike (Iraq) 1996

Source: Defense Planning Guidance.
176 QDR 2001

and doctrine, and organizational structure. Specifically, should the administration set aside forces for concept development, experimentation,

and reconfiguration, or should it treat such activities as additional rotational demands on the operational force? If transformation is a high priority in administration strategy, it will need to be factored into calculations of overall force structure.

Step 2: Prioritization

The second step in sizing the force is to prioritize the various sizing

elements in accordance with the strategy and to determine the level of acceptable risk for each element.3 This step yields the criteria that will be

used to develop one or more force structure options. Force-sizing criteria

are often expressed as equations designed to indicate the number and

types of operations that the U.S. military should be able to conduct concurrently, such as 2 MTWs, or 1 MTW + 1 halt + 3 SSCs (where halt

refers to an operation in its halt phase, to halt an adversary’s advance).

Missions or activities not included in the equation are generally treated as

lesser included cases: things that the military may be required to do, but

for which additional forces are not provided.

If, however, force-sizing criteria are to influence the resource allocation process more accurately, it may be more useful to think of them as a

list of explicit resource priorities rather than as an equation. The

strength of this more vertical approach is that it explicitly identifies a

lowest-priority category as the principal area in which a greater degree of

risk would be accepted or managed, if resources are constrained. For example, each of the following force-sizing criteria would be consistent

with the current “shape, respond, prepare now” defense strategy that we

have called Strategy A:

In practice, however, these two sets of priorities could have very different implications for resource allocation and U.S. conventional forces.

In the first case, DOD would seek to provide all necessary resources for

First MTW

Full peacetime engagement,

presence, and SSCs

Second MTW

First MTW

Second MTW

Full peacetime engagement,

presence, and SSCs

OR
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 177

the first MTW, then for the second MTW, and only then for the level of

peacetime operations presently engaged in, such as presence, engagement,

and SSCs. In a resource-constrained environment, this approach could

result in serious tempo strains in parts of the force, particularly for those

assets in highest demand in peacetime, and could mean an inability to

maintain desired levels of overseas presence and military engagement

around the globe. In the second case, DOD would seek to provide full resources for the first MTW, then for peacetime operations, and only then

for the second MTW. Here, a higher priority is given to what the U.S. military now does day-to-day in support of shaping and responding. In practice, this might translate into greater resources for the rotation base and

high-demand assets required to sustain the prescribed level of presence,

engagement, and SSCs. If resources were constrained, it might also mean

accepting a greater degree of risk in the second MTW in some form, perhaps by dual-apportioning forces (assigning some forces roles in both

MTWs), relying more on the Reserve components, reducing the number

of forces allocated to the second war, or some other approach.4 Strategy A

presents a fundamental choice between sizing the force primarily for

warfighting or sizing the force for a combination of warfighting and priority peacetime demands.

Another critical factor in sizing the force for Strategy A, as well as

the other strategies, is the MTW scenario set. If it were broadened

beyond the two canonical cases to include a wider range of threats, endstate objectives, operating conditions, and concepts of operation, the

same force-sizing criteria might yield a force very different from today’s

force. In practice, this would mean looking across a number of scenarios to identify the most demanding combinations of challenges for each

element of the force, and then sizing each element accordingly. For

example, the Navy might be most stressed by a combination of two

MTWs involving the closure of sea lines of communication and crossstraits aggression (as in a hypothetical case of aggression across the

Strait of Hormuz or the Taiwan Strait). The Army might be most

stressed by cases involving defeating large land invasions, supporting a

regime change, and restoring stability on the ground post-conflict (as in

the canonical cases of Korea or Iraq). Sizing different elements to meet

the most stressing combination of plausible MTW challenges would

make force sizing a more iterative process in which the capabilities of

U.S. forces would be optimized across a larger range of scenarios 

and challenges.
178 QDR 2001

Strategy B suggests a different set of force-sizing criteria alternatives.

Each of the following sets of criteria would be consistent with a strategy

of engaging more selectively and accelerating transformation:

Here, again, the two different sets of priorities would have very different implications for the size and shape of the U.S. military and for resource allocation more broadly. In the first case, DOD would seek to provide all necessary resources for the first MTW, then DOD support to

homeland security, then transformation (for example, standing experimentation forces, or forces undergoing reorganization and retraining),

then a more selective level of presence, engagement, and SSCs, and finally

a second MTW. In a resource-constrained environment, this would effectively shift resources from the second MTW to higher-priority areas, such

as homeland security and transformation. Strategy B might manage risk

in the second MTW by adopting a limited end-state objective (such as

restoring the pre-war border) and an alternative concept of operations

that would reduce the U.S. forces required to fight and to win the war.

The second set of priorities would take a fundamentally different approach to force sizing, consistent with the Strategy B emphasis on preparing for more serious future threats, such as conflict with a more capable regional foe or near-peer competitor. This future capabilities approach would

identify the capabilities that the U.S. military would need to fight and to

win a major war against a much more capable regional foe in the

2015–2020 timeframe, and then reorient and reshape the current force incrementally toward that end. This approach would increase investment in

priority future capabilities, in preference to those capabilities with declining

relevance. It would also put a premium on forces for homeland security

and transformation. Both of these force-sizing criteria for Strategy B would

size U.S. forces for a mix of warfighting and other priority demands. The

fundamental choice here is one of timeframe: Should U.S. forces be sized

First MTW

Homeland security

Transformation

Limited presence,

engagement, and SSCs

Second MTW

More demanding future

regional conflict

Homeland security

Transformation

OR
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 179

primarily to meet near and mid-term demands, or rather according to anticipated future capability requirements?

Strategy C—“Engage More Selectively and Strengthen Warfighting

Capability”—is less ambiguous about the criteria it would use to size U.S.

conventional forces:

First, this approach would seek to provide all necessary resources for

the capability to fight two major theater wars; second for overseas presence geared toward deterrence and crisis response, and third for a more

selective level of peacetime military engagement and SSCs in support of

U.S. vital interests. Here, the critical issues lie in how requirements are defined in each of these categories. The choice of MTW scenarios would be

critical, as would the definition of presence requirements. In a resourceconstrained environment, this approach would seek to manage risk primarily in the category of peacetime engagement and SSCs. In practice,

this might mean accepting higher tempo and readiness strains in highdemand units and personnel, reducing training for and potentially the

quality of performance in SSCs, and cutting back on military-to-military

interactions with allies and partners.

Strategy D—“Engage Today to Prevent Conflict Tomorrow”—suggests

a radically different choice of force-sizing criteria alternatives that would

give much greater emphasis to sizing U.S. forces to meet the requirements

of an expanded level of involvement in presence, engagement, and SSCs:

Expanded presence and

engagement

Expanded SSCs

First MTW

First MTW

Expanded presence and

engagement

Expanded SSCs

First MTW

Second MTW

Presence

Limited peacetime

engagement and SSCs

OR
180 QDR 2001

The first case would give highest resource priority to the peacetime

operations and activities of the U.S. military, while also maintaining a

core warfighting capability as a hedge against the possibility that even a

more active deterrence strategy could fail. In the second case, DOD would

first seek to provide all necessary resources for a single MTW—preserving

a core warfighting capability—and then the expanded levels of presence,

engagement, and SSCs called for by the strategy. Here, the fundamental

choice is whether to preserve a core warfighting capability as a top priority, a choice that would likely hinge on judgments about how much

warfighting capability would already reside in forces designed primarily

for presence, engagement, and SSCs.

This process of prioritization raises several crucial force-sizing decisions, including whether:

■ to size the force primarily for warfighting;

■ to size the force for both warfighting and priority peacetime demands,

such as presence, engagement, SSCs, and homeland security as identified

and prioritized by a given strategy;

■ to size and to shape the force based on required capabilities for the future;

■ to size the force primarily for what the military does daily while maintaining a core warfighting capability.

Part of the prioritization process is setting a target level of acceptable

risk for each element of the force-sizing criteria. These will vary by strategy, but only a low-to-moderate level of risk might be accepted in a strategy’s highest priority areas, whereas higher levels of risk might be accepted or managed, if necessary due to resource constraints, in one or

more lower priority areas. Such judgments about acceptable levels of risk

must be made as explicit as possible to enable sound force structure decisions that reflect the priorities of a given strategy and the desires of the

DOD senior leadership.

Step 3: Developing Force Building Blocks

Once the Bush administration has a prioritized set of force-sizing criteria and an understanding of where it is willing to accept or to manage, at

least in principle, a degree of risk, the next step is to develop force building

blocks for each element of the criteria. What follows seeks to highlight

some of the issues that will need to be considered and judgments that will

need to be made along the way with regard to MTWs, overseas presence,

SSCs, homeland security, and, in some cases, transformation.
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 181

Major Theater Wars

Several key factors must be considered in developing a force building

block for major theater wars: the number of MTWs for which to be

prepared, assumptions about concurrency if planning for the possibility of

more than one MTW at a time, the level of acceptable risk for each MTW,

the overall scenario set, and the particulars of individual scenarios.

The number of MTWs to be sized for and the general degree of concurrency should be spelled out in the strategy, whereas the target level of

risk for each MTW should be developed in prioritizing the sizing criteria

during Step 2. For example, one standard would require the ability to

conduct two overlapping MTWs, both at low-to-moderate risk; another

would require the ability to conduct two overlapping MTWs, the first at

low-to-moderate risk and the second at moderate-to-high risk. In all

cases, the target level of risk may have significant implications for the

size and nature of the MTW force building block. Accepting low-to

moderate-risk in an MTW may yield one type of force building block,

whereas accepting high risk may yield quite another. How general terms

like nearly simultaneous or overlapping are translated into specific assumptions about how many days, weeks, or months might separate two

or more major wars will also have a major impact on force requirements.

Developing force building blocks for MTWs will be more challenging

if, as we recommend, the Bush administration seeks to optimize the force

across a range of MTW scenarios broader than the canonical Iraq and

Korea cases. This would require a substantial shift in approach, that is,

from designing forces to meet the requirements of two specific cases, to

developing a portfolio of forces and capabilities that can meet the most

stressing requirements of a wider variety of potential warfighting scenarios. Based on our assessment of the future security environment,5 we recommend that the MTW scenario set include not only cases of large-scale,

cross-border land invasions by enemy armored forces, but also crossstraits aggression involving enemy missile, air, naval, and, possibly, amphibious forces. Our assessment of future threats also suggests that the

U.S. military should plan to be able to operate in the face of delayed or

denied access to key bases and facilities in the theater, as well as adversary

attempts to thwart U.S. power projection through attacks on U.S. deployment sites and en-route infrastructure.

In practice, developing forces to meet the demands of such a broadened scenario set involves identifying the most stressing MTW cases for

each type of force—heavy ground forces, light ground forces, amphibious
182 QDR 2001

forces, naval forces, air forces—and then sizing and shaping a force building block for that type of force accordingly. For example, whereas heavy

ground forces might be most stressed by scenarios involving an armored

land invasion, naval forces might be more stressed by cases of cross-straits

aggression, naval blockade, or closure of sea lines of communication. In

each case the Bush administration would need to consider individual

force requirements in the context of the joint campaign. Such an approach has the potential to yield a more robust set of forces and capabilities that can meet the most stressing aspects of a broader range of potential future challenges.

The particulars of each warfighting scenario will require that at least

six key factors be assessed: adversary objectives, forces, capabilities, and

concepts of operations (including the use of weapons of mass destruction

or other antiaccess measures); U.S. and allied end-state objectives and

concepts of operations; anticipated strategic warning time; level and timing of U.S. mobilization; campaign phasing and synchronization; and allied and coalition contributions. Each of these variables can significantly

affect the size and shape of the forces required.

Finally, in developing the MTW and other force building blocks, it

will be important to size not only major combat elements, such as divisions, wings, and carrier battle groups, but also other combat and critical

support forces and capabilities (such as special operations forces, logistics forces, tankers, airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities).

Overseas Presence

Developing a force building block for overseas presence involves several

steps. The first is to understand whether the Bush administration’s strategy

calls for any changes in the requirements for U.S. forces deployed permanently or rotationally overseas. Does the strategy require changes in U.S.

overseas posture based on existing or anticipated changes in the security

environment, new regions of emphasis in U.S. security policy, or a reassessment of priority missions and activities of the U.S. military? Secondly, is the

administration willing to consider new ways of meeting overseas-presence

requirements, such as substituting one kind of force for another, forwardstationing additional elements of the force, or keeping platforms forward

for longer periods while rotating their crews? Our examination of defense

strategy alternatives in chapter 5 suggests that while the overall need for the

U.S. military to be forward-deployed will not be called into question in the

2001 QDR, the particulars of overseas presence—both the specific
Table 6–2. Smaller-Scale Contingencies: Levels of Involvement

National Concurrent

Level of Commitment

Category Type Limited Full Expanded

Intervention Opposed

Operations Intervention

Humanitarian 1 1 1

Intervention

Peacekeeping Peace Accord 1

Operations (large) Implementations

Follow-On Peace Operations 1 1

Peacekeeping Interpositional 1 2 2

Operations (small) Peacekeeping

Humanitarian Foreign Humanitarian 1 1–2 1–2

Operations Assistance

Domestic Disaster Relief 1 1 1

Other Operations No-fly Zone 1 2 2 

(long) Maritime Intercept 1 1 1

Operations

Support to Domestic 1 1 2

Authorities

Other Operations Non-Combatant Evacuation 1–2 1–2 1–2

(short) Operations

Shows of Force (large) 1 1 1

Strike 1 1 1

SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 183

requirements and how those requirements are met—may be fertile ground

for change.6

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

The primary consideration in developing a force building block for

smaller-scale contingencies is the notional level of U.S. commitment to

SSCs that is expected to result from the chosen strategy. Based on the four

principal strategy alternatives examined in chapter 5, three notional levels

of U.S. military involvement in SSCs were developed. The three levels of

commitment were designated as limited—somewhat less than today,

based on the more selective engagement called for in Strategies B and C;

full—approximately equivalent to today, as reflected in Strategy A; and

expanded—greater than today, reflecting the more extensive U.S. military

engagement called for by Strategy D. Table 6–2 outlines the three levels.
184 QDR 2001

While it would be impossible to predict a president’s actual decisions

on use of force, it is important that the Bush administration seek to identify

the level of U.S. military involvement in SSCs that it expects—with assumptions about the numbers, types, and concurrency of operations—as

part of the force-sizing process in order to capture the particular demands

of such operations on the force over time. Our analysis suggests that this

will be true even with a more selective engagement policy. Even with the

most limited level of commitment to SSCs, a number of high-demand assets experienced substantial tempo strains.

Once a notional level of commitment is defined, force planners

should estimate the steady state forces required to sustain the major part

of the operation. In some cases, these forces may be somewhat smaller

than the forces initially required and significantly larger than the forces

required in the final phases of the operation. This calculation will not be

easy; no two SSCs will be alike, and timelines and force requirements will

vary widely, even for SSCs with similar characteristics.7

Force structure requirements derived from this approach are measured in the same terms described for the MTW building block, but with

additional considerations. First, the SSC building block should not take

into account possible force substitutions (this issue is addressed in subsequent modeling and analysis). Second, there may be potentially larger

force requirements (surging) at the start of some SSCs, such as opposed

interventions and peace accord implementations. These force levels are

not reflected in steady state forces; rather, the building block should be

based on anticipated force size and types called for over the predominant

portion of the SSC. Third, some SSCs, such as shows of force, may be precursors to MTWs, undertaken to deter aggression and to signal U.S. resolve. In such cases, no additional force structure should be considered

beyond that already included in the MTW building block. Fourth, longterm rotational requirements and use of presence forces are not directly

reflected in this stage of the methodology. (These requirements are addressed in Step 5.) The result of this step in the process should be a notional building block of forces designed to meet the anticipated SSC requirements of a given strategy.

Homeland Security

If a strategy gives high priority to DOD support for civilian agencies

in a variety of homeland security missions, then force planners should

examine the implications of this set of missions for the size and shape of

U.S. conventional forces. Referring to Step 1 and Step 2 definitions and
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 185

priorities of the military missions included under the homeland security

umbrella, one would begin by identifying which priority missions would

have a potentially significant impact on conventional forces. This led the

working group to focus on critical infrastructure protection (for example, computer network defense, information operations, and deployment

infrastructure) and on consequence management in response to WMD

terrorism on U.S. soil.

For each mission area, a set of planning factors should be developed

that articulates assumptions about the number, type, and concurrency of

such operations that the U.S. military should be prepared to undertake.

For example, one might plan to be able to respond to one large or one

small kinetic WMD event concurrent with one large and one small

chemical, biological, and radiological WMD event, while also being able

to provide simultaneous physical protection of up to 10 strategic deployment sites. Here, it will be important to view homeland security requirements not in isolation but in the context of other priority demands that

may be placed on the U.S. military at the same time. Given that the most

likely time for a WMD terrorism attack on U.S. soil may be during or

just before a major war abroad, the Bush administration will need to

consider a new standard: meeting homeland security requirements while

fighting one or more major wars. This is true not only for domestic consequence management, but also for the full range of potential DOD

homeland security missions. Otherwise, the President might be forced to

choose between securing vital American interests at home and securing

them abroad.

Based on these planning factors, the homeland security building block

should include those forces required to meet homeland security missions

over and above those required to meet the strategy’s warfighting requirements. Such forces will be primarily small, specialized, and currently scarce

units that would provide unique command, control, logistic, and organizational capabilities in support of local, state, and Federal agencies.

Transformation

Finally, if transformation is treated as a force-sizing element, then

planners must determine whether to develop a building block of standalone forces that would be set aside for activities such as concept development, experimentation, and reconfiguration, and essentially unavailable

for other missions, or instead to treat transformation requirements as

simply another set of peacetime demands on the force that should be met

on a rotational basis.
186 QDR 2001

Step 4: Addressing Overlap

With initial force-structure building blocks established, the next two

steps tailor the aggregate force based on several practical considerations

usually defined in policy or by planning assumptions. These include assumptions about extracting forces from one operation to participate in

another, requiring some forces to stay behind in unengaged (that is, nonMTW) theaters even in the midst of one or more MTWs and other policy

and planning assumptions that could affect force availability, such as

swinging or dual-apportioning forces between major military operations,

the timing and sequencing of force movements, and use of the Reserve

components.

Accounting for Planned Force Extractions 

Current policy assumes a 100 percent disengagement of U.S. forces

from SSCs in the event of two MTWs. But this policy may be neither attainable nor strategically sound in practice. There may be real constraints

on the ability of the Armed Forces to withdraw from SSCs in a timely

manner and to redeploy to an MTW. Equally vital U.S. interests may be at

stake in the SSC; a U.S. withdrawal might cause the collapse of an entire

coalition operation; allies or Reserve forces might not be willing or able to

fill in for departing U.S. forces; or the additional strategic lift required

might not be available in a timely manner. Therefore, the working group

applied a more conservative assumption that 50 percent of the forces involved in SSCs would disengage and redeploy to a major war.8 This means

that only half of the force requirements for a given strategy’s level of commitment to SSCs is considered in force sizing. The other half is assumed

available for other higher priority activities. The value of this approach is

that it clearly articulates SSC force requirements as a discrete category,

separate from MTWs, and acknowledges that, in practice, some forces

may not be easily extracted, reconstituted, and redeployed in accordance

with CINC timelines. How this overlap is defined—by a percentage of the

force or by types of units or personnel—can be modified, but the conceptual underpinning remains constant.

Counting Presence Forces

The role of overseas-presence forces in MTWs and SSCs is also considered at this stage of the process, and the overall force structure adjusted

accordingly. For example, forward-deployed naval, air, and ground forces

may be part of the initial response to a crisis; indeed, this is an express part

of their purpose. Therefore, care must be taken not to double-count such
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 187

forces in both the presence and MTW or SSC building blocks. On the

other hand, some forward-deployed forces may be so vital to deterrence

and stability in a given region that they would not be withdrawn from an

unengaged theater even in the event of MTW execution. For the purposes

of the working group’s analysis, assumptions about which forces should be

treated as stay-behind forces were derived from judgments about what

would be required to meet U.S. treaty commitments, maintain deterrence

and regional stability in a given theater, and provide the regional CINC

with minimum essential levels of force protection, support to noncombatant evacuation operations, and strike capability.

Swinging, Dual Apportionment, and Use of the Reserve component

Additional adjustments to the aggregate force structure must be considered in light of various policy assumptions. The first such assumption

deals with forces that would swing between operations, that is, be used in

one campaign and then quickly redeployed to another. Forces that are

considered as candidates to swing between operations are generally selfdeploying or require relatively little strategic lift, such as long-range

bombers and certain naval assets. The second assumption deals with

forces that are dual-apportioned, that is, forces that could be allocated to

one or another theater in wartime. These are usually scarce or unique assets that more than one CINC would desire in wartime, such as the 82d

Airborne Division or unique chemical-biological defense assets, whose

deployment would hinge on a decision of the National Command Authorities as a crisis unfolded. Finally, there are assumptions to be made

about the Reserve forces that would be called up in the event of one or

more MTWs and about mobilization timelines. The greater and more

timely the mobilization of the Reserve components assumed, the less the

demand for active-duty forces, and vice versa.

All of these considerations should be taken into account to determine

where force building blocks should be counted in a purely additive manner and where overlap should be discounted to avoid double-counting

forces that are appropriately assigned more than one mission or function.

Step 5: Assessing Rotational Base Requirements

Step 5 in our force-sizing methodology accounts for the rotational

base requirements associated with overseas commitments of long

duration, that is, both overseas presence and participation in long-term

SSCs. In this step, force planners examine those operations or activities

that would necessitate rotations of forces in order to keep time away
188 QDR 2001

from home for given units or individuals within acceptable levels, as defined by their service.9 This involves, first, identifying the presence, engagement, and SSC commitments that would require rotations to sustain. These might include, for example, maintaining a nearly continuous

naval presence in a given region, keeping a brigade-equivalent of ground

forces deployed to an SSC over several years, or sustaining a no-fly zone

or sanctions-enforcement regime on an indefinite basis. The forces required to meet these long-term commitments are then multiplied by a

service’s rotational factor, generally between 4 and 5, but sometimes

higher. The resultant force structure is then compared to the aggregate

force structure derived from the various building blocks (adjusted for

overlap), and the greater of the two becomes the force structure option

for a given strategy.10

Step 6: Making Final Adjustments

Up to this point, the force-sizing effort has focused primarily on

major conventional force elements such as Army divisions and Navy carrier battle groups. Step 6 is designed to ensure that adequate attention is

paid to those forces necessary to generate and to sustain this capability, as

well as meeting other unique requirements. In this step, any such forces

that have not been included thus far must be identified and integrated

into the overall force structure. Such generating forces might include

training units (supporting force accession or training missions), higherechelon maintenance and support units, and strategic mobility forces.

Key sustainment forces might include strategic lift, tankers, logistics

forces, and ISR capabilities.

Step 7: Modeling and Analysis

In Step 7, the overall force structure that results from the previous steps

is tested through iterative wargaming, modeling, and analysis to determine

whether it meets the requirements of the strategy at the levels of risk

deemed acceptable. This is no small challenge for several reasons. First, a

force must be assessed not only in terms of its performance of warfighting

missions, but also in terms of its performance of the full range of priority

missions identified in the strategy, its ability to sustain the prescribed level

of peacetime operations (such as presence, engagement, and SSCs), its flexibility to deal with both anticipated and unanticipated future threats, and its

affordability.11 However, few if any currently available force performance

models accurately reflect how the U.S. military actually operates, nor are

there adequate models that capture the full range of peacetime demands
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 189

and facilitate evaluation of force sustainability over time. Most existing

models have critical deficiencies, and the lack of better models makes it difficult to assess and to compare alternatives. This state of affairs will present

a difficult challenge for decisionmakers in the 2001 QDR, requiring them to

make critical judgments and decisions with inadequate analytic support.

Conclusion

The Bush administration will face several key decisions in sizing U.S.

conventional forces to meet the requirements of its chosen strategy at acceptable levels of risk. The purpose of this chapter has been to outline a

methodology that addresses each of these decisions and offers QDR

planners a transparent and replicable way to translate strategy into force

structure options. DOD currently lacks such a methodology. There is

great promise in the proposed approach, and it is offered to the 2001

QDR as a way to proceed. Whatever the specific strategy developed in

the QDR, the NDU Working Group believes that the administration

should size the force in a manner that takes into account not only the

strategy’s warfighting requirements, but also its high-priority peacetime

demands, whatever those demands may be. We also recommend taking a

second look at the size and shape of the force through the lens of future

capability requirements. Equally important, whatever the methodology

used to arrive at the force structure that will support the selected strategy, it must explicitly account for risk and be able to withstand open, independent scrutiny.

This will be no small challenge given the current state of the available

models and analytic tools. While some might be tempted to use the need

for better analysis or more rigorous risk assessment to postpone some of

the most difficult decisions, they cannot afford to do so in the 2001 QDR.

Failure to confront the hard choices that must be made to close the strategy-resources gap would be a decision in and of itself, one with serious

consequences for the U.S. military. Given the lack of adequate models, the

QDR should focus primarily on developing a defense strategy, setting

clear priorities for DOD, and making the most important program decisions. A follow-on effort should conduct more in-depth analysis to flesh

out and refine all of the programmatic implications. Risk assessment during the QDR itself should aim for rough order-of-magnitude judgments

of risk to inform the most significant decisions; more detailed risk assessment could be part of the follow-on analytic effort.
190 QDR 2001

Consistent with this approach would be a more varied and iterative

set of tests (reflecting a given strategy’s priorities) to assess and to refine

force structure options. Such an approach might begin with a series of

seminar wargames that would play a given set of force-structure options

across a broad range of high-end operations—including a wider range

of potential threat scenarios, end-state objectives, operational constraints, and concepts of operations—consistent with the chosen strategy. The same options might be played in a concurrent series of wargames aimed at assessing force sustainability over time. Those options

that look most promising in wargames might then be subjected to more

in-depth modeling and analysis to further assess force performance. In

the 2001 QDR, this will require cobbling together a suite of existing

joint and service models to examine various aspects of force performance in major contingencies.12 Promising options could also be assessed in terms of force preparation risk and affordability risk. Based on

initial results and on the tradespace candidates consistent with the given

strategy, the force structure options could be refined and reassessed.

The result of such a process would be a more rigorously tested force

structure optimized across a more representative range of strategy-driven challenges.

This will inevitably be a highly imperfect process in the next QDR,

given the state of the tools available. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive

and iterative approach to force structure assessment is far better than one

that relies primarily on a limited set of modeling runs that do not fully

capture how the U.S. military operates.

In the longer term, DOD needs to give much higher priority to investment in new modeling, analysis, and decision-support tools as well

as to the creation of a common conceptual framework for the assessment

of risk. In the near term, however, DOD should strive to create a rigorous and transparent process for force sizing that ensures that key judgments and decisions are made explicitly and in a manner that reflects the

strategy’s guidance on where to place emphasis and where to accept or

manage a degree of risk.

Notes1 The working group’s approach to force structure modeling and analysis is found in chapter 8.

2 For more discussion of assessing risk, see chapter 7.

3 An in-depth discussion of levels of risk appears chapter 7.

4 These issues are explored in more detail in the discussion of force structure and capability

issues in chapter 8.
SIZING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 191

5 See chapter 2 on the future security environment.

6 See chapter 9 on overseas presence.

7 The working group considered vignettes and force lists under development for the Dynamic

Commitment wargames conducted by the Joint Staff, as well as in the Defense Planning Guidance, to

determine the range and scope of potential SSCs.

8 Other percentages might be considered, and subsequent analysis should examine other alternatives in this area. For example, the working group assumed only a 25 percent withdrawal of SSCs in

Strategy D at low risk.

9 See table 10–2 on page 270 in chapter 10 for a listing of peacetime operations.

10 Rotational requirements are discussed in more detail in chapter 9 for overseas presence and in

chapter 10 for peacetime operations.

11 Each of these areas is discussed in more detail in chapter 7 on risk assessment.

12 The so-called JWARS suite of models being developed for DOD was intended for use in the

2001 QDR, but will not be ready in time as development and validation have proceeded more slowly

than anticipated.

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Chapter Seven

Assessing Risk: Enabling

Sound Defense Decisions

by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Risk assessment will be a fundamental part of the 2001 QDR. According to the National Defense Authorization Act, “The assessment . . . shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That assessment

shall define the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the national defense strategy. The results of the review [shall be submitted to

Congress] including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense

strategy of the U.S. and the force structure best suited to implement that

strategy at a low to moderate level of risk.” 1 The objective of this chapter

is to establish a methodology for talking about, measuring, comparing,

and deciding on defense issues from a perspective of risk assessment.

This chapter proposes a general theory of risk assessment with two

goals: establishing the conceptual basis for a detailed risk assessment

analysis and suggesting principles to inform work on risk assessment in

the 2001 QDR. To accomplish these goals, a set of definitions is outlined,

beginning with national security risk and then addressing strategic military risk and operational risk. A methodology is outlined for evaluating

force structure alternatives by assessing different levels of risk that combine force performance (how a force structure fights and deters) and

force sustainability (how a force structure maintains readiness over time).

Other measures for risk assessment are defined that include affordability (Can we afford to buy the force?) and preparation for the future,

which has two components: transformation, which involves preparing for

the most likely future, and hedging, which means preparing for less likely

futures. The methodology combines quantitative measures with qualitative judgments. A toolkit for force planners (see page 211) integrates all of

the elements into a consistent, replicable process for risk assessment. The

193
194 QDR 2001

toolkit is designed to have broad applicability for use with a host of current and potential modeling and analysis approaches.

Concepts of Risk

For a subject so important to defense planning as risk, it is surprising that there is no current DOD-wide definition as it relates to force

planning. In the definitional manual of the Joint Staff, the only mention

of risk is as a technical definition associated with the employment of nuclear weapons. Neither current national security nor national military

strategy discusses risk. Also, the 1997 QDR report and the associated National Defense Panel report are both silent on this issue. Most recently,

the annual DOD report to Congress for 2000 did not address risk. Senior

military leaders have not been silent on this issue, however. In recent

congressional testimony, the Chairman voiced concern about the ability

of the Armed Forces to execute assigned missions under conditions of

acceptable risk.2 Some of the best recent treatments of risk assessment

have come from the private sector, but this literature tends to focus on

business and portfolio management risk, as well as complex system risk.3

The idea of risk in relation to strategy and force structure is an idea

more talked about than formally embedded as an element of U.S. defense planning.4 The measurement of risk is becoming increasingly important in force planning and strategy development, but it has proven

resistant to quantification.

National Security Risk Assessment

National military strategy (NMS) is a distillation of broader national

security strategy (NSS). The latter operates the classic levers of military,

economic, and diplomatic power to support and to advance U.S. global interests. It embodies the highest statement of national security objectives.

National security risk therefore is the overall probability that the application of the national elements of power will be unable to achieve national

security objectives. The 1999 NSS established three primary objectives: enhancing American security; bolstering economic prosperity; and promoting democracy and human rights abroad. This is the grand arena of foreign

policy, where the largest and most enduring national objectives of the

United States are pursued.

NMS focuses more narrowly on the military lever of national power.5

The most recent NMS, which was published in 1997, uses the “shape, respond, prepare” construct to describe how military forces are to be used
ASSESSING RISK 195

for national military objectives in support of NSS. The broadest national

objectives of the United States provide the framework within which NMS

operates. This is an important consideration because any military strategy

draws its planning horizons from the role given to the military element of

national power under the national security strategy. While reference has

been made to the existing NSS and NMS, the concepts that are proposed

in this chapter are designed to be useful for evaluating any strategy.

Defining Strategic Military and Operational Risk

The working group proposed a working definition of strategic military

risk as the overall probability that a military force will be unable to achieve

all of the objectives of a defense strategy. Strategic military risk involves

prioritizing between, while simultaneously accomplishing, the objectives

of a defense strategy. Strategic military risk involves the aggregate effects of

operational activities and how they influence overarching security objectives, such as maintaining strong alliances, influencing (or coercing) potential adversaries, and supporting peace and stability. These objectives are

operationalized as deterring and fighting major theater wars, conducting a

broad range of smaller-scale contingencies, participating in a wide variety

of presence and engagement activities abroad, and preparing the U.S. military forces for the future by transforming the force for expected future demands and by hedging against uncertainty.

Operational risk is the probability that a military force will be unable

to achieve operational objectives within a defense strategy. Operational

risk involves a given force structure’s performance in two areas: first,

meeting operational objectives in MTW scenarios, SSCs, and other operations short of theater-level war (and the deterrence that obtains from the

demonstrated ability to execute these operations); and second, sustaining

acceptable long-term readiness across an extended timeframe and a range

of operations, including SSCs and presence and engagement operations.

The first question to ask about strategic and operational risk is

whether failure is likely. The second question is equally important: What

are the consequences of failure? While the failure of a military strategy

might directly threaten the survival of the United States, operational failure might have lesser, if still significant, effects. Measuring risk is a function of assessing the two variables: the likelihood of occurrence and the

magnitude of the undesired consequences. As the consequences of failure

increase, the degree of risk that can be tolerated decreases.

The ability of a given force structure to support the mission areas of a

given military strategy determines operational risk. Strategic military risk
196 QDR 2001

depends not only on operational risk, but also on the relative priority of

the different elements that comprise the strategy, as well as whether the

elements are affordable. The working group’s approach emphasizes the

relationship between strategic military and operational risk, focusing its

attempts to quantify strategic risk on assessments of force performance,

sustainability, preparation for the future, and affordability. (Other factors—such as diplomatic and economic—also influence the calculation

of national security risk, but they are beyond the scope of this work.) 

This chapter addresses a force planner’s and a strategist’s definition of

risk assessment; however, it does not directly address tactical risk in the

sense of ongoing military operations (that is, whether we will be outgunned, out-flown, out-ranged, out-leveraged, etc.). Initiatives at the

service level address issues of tactical risk associated with training and

combat operations. The working group’s definition also diverges slightly

from the Congressional mandate to consider “political, strategic, and military” elements of risk. This study’s definition subsumes some of the political considerations, while others are beyond the scope of this analysis,

and even beyond the scope of the QDR, because they depend on factors

outside of DOD, such as interagency issues.

Defining Levels of Risk

Four levels of risk are specified in this study. In general, low risk is a

judgment that failure is unlikely, and objectives will be realized within acceptable levels of expenditure of resources and time.6 Moderate risk is a

judgment that failure is still unlikely, but success may require the expenditure of somewhat higher than desirable levels of resources. The timeframe to achieve success may also be extended. High risk is a judgment

that failure is possible (although still unlikely), and the expenditure of

high levels of resources across an extended timeframe is likely. Unacceptable risk is a judgment that failure is likely, and the expenditure of very

high levels of resources across an extended timeframe is probable, with

no assurance of a favorable outcome.

The definitional structure deliberately omits a category for very low,

zero, or negligible risk. While pursuing a strategy and an associated force

structure that operate without risk may be desirable, the cost of moving

from low risk to no risk may require an exponential increase in resources. There is a trend in defense thinking to enshrine very low- or norisk options as among the most desirable characteristics in any concept,

program, or plan, but this is unrealistic. Time and energies are better

spent managing risk.
ASSESSING RISK 197

The Consequences of Failure

Understanding what consequences are associated with the failure of a

strategy and a force structure is important. National security strategy failure could threaten both the immediate and the long-term survival of the

nation. An example of this type of failure would be the collapse of a critical collective security alliance, such as NATO.

Strategic military failure directly affects the vital national security interests of the United States and could threaten the physical, political, or

economic survival of the nation.7 Strategic military failure could lead to

national security strategy failure. It could result in loss of political or military leadership; weakened alliances and coalition-building capability; loss

of deterrent capability and military credibility; loss of domestic political

support; or renewed opportunity for others to challenge U.S. interests.

Failure at the operational level involves the loss of national resources,

such as ships, planes, vehicles, or, most importantly, personnel. Failure at

this level might also include the loss of terrain, noncombatant casualties,

and other adverse operational outcomes that have an ultimately negative

effect on the national military strategy.

Assessing Strategic Military Risk

Strategic military risk involves issues of national survival, stability of

regions and key allies, and critical global interests, commitments, and influence. The relative priority among the four primary elements characterizes a given strategy: MTWs (and how many are planned for); SSCs; presence and engagement activities; and preparing for the future (including

both transformational activities taken to prepare a force for the most

likely future, and hedging activities undertaken to prepare for a less likely

future).8 These four elements are the actual activities that all military

strategies must undertake—below the level of “shape, respond, prepare.”

The relative emphasis that alternative military strategies place upon each

of these activities becomes the measure of their differences.9

Differences become apparent as strategies establish priorities among

the different elements that define them. A judgment of risk is derived from

the relative ordering of the elements (for example, a strategy that assigns a

lower priority to MTWs is tacitly accepting some measure of risk in that

element) as well as how well the associated force structure supports the different elements. The aggregation of these elements yields a judgment of

strategic risk. For the purposes of this study, factors that operate at the
198 QDR 2001

national security strategy level (for example, diplomatic and economic elements of power) are recognized, but not explicitly analyzed.

Strategic military risk is a complex cumulative judgment based on the

priorities assigned to elements within a given strategy as well as the operational risk that is determined by the military strategy’s associated force

structure. Aggregated operational risk (explained below) affects strategic

military risk, as do the long-term issues; for example, how well does it

prepare for the unexpected? For this reason, a qualitative analysis of how

any military strategy prepares for the future—that is, how it transforms

and hedges—must also be part of any strategic military risk assessment.

Last, is a given military strategy affordable? Can the nation afford to

expend the treasure a military strategy requires and to sustain the strategy

over time? While this is inherently quantitative, it also requires assessments of political will (How much should be spent on defense?) that

make it ultimately a qualitative analysis as well.

Assessing Operational Risk

The credibility of a force structure rests upon its perceived ability to

execute the tasks called for by its associated military strategy. These are

both immediate (the ability to perform satisfactorily in contingency taskings, also known as force performance) and long-term (the ability to retain

effectiveness over many operations and a long period of time, also known

as force sustainability). To be credible, a force structure must be effective

in both areas. Force credibility is the core military contribution to both

deterring and executing the full spectrum of military operations.

The methodology suggested in this section uses both a quantitative

and a qualitative approach, but the numbers assigned here are less important than the overall process. The numbers are open to discussion, and

there may well be better values to plug in than those that have been selected here. The method is meant to suggest ways to assess operational

risk more rigorously.

Measuring Force Performance Risk

Force performance risk is the probability of a given force structure’s

failure to meet established objectives when executed against a given scenario. The potential scenarios range from the most stressing that military forces will face, from major theater warfighting to SSCs and lesser

contingencies. The analysis considers risk for execution of both a first

and a second MTW (or however many the strategy dictates), and other

lesser requirements. The analysis is built around the most difficult tasks
ASSESSING RISK 199

military forces could be called upon to execute: MTWs.10 There are,

however, a myriad of other demanding contingency operations that

might prove at least as challenging for all or part of a force structure.

Four operational objectives were adopted as the primary means of

measuring force performance in the most demanding scenarios.11 Taken

together, they attempt to capture what happened within the battlespace:

what key terrain was lost, gained, or changed hands; what damage was inflicted upon the enemy; how long key activities took to accomplish; and

what friendly losses were incurred.

These metrics are no more than tools for analysis; they can assist but

not supplant sound military analysis in making the final judgment of the

level of risk for a given MTW. However, some quantification is desirable,

so long as the results of modeling and assessment are subjected to the

common sense test.

Battlespace 

Physical occupation of ground will remain the ultimate determinant

of an aggressor’s success in any scenario involving invasion or occupation.

Concurrently, airbases, ports, and maritime chokepoints govern the use

of air and sea forces. The ability to exploit space influences all other capabilities. Key terrain is uniquely tied to geographic localities and specific

scenarios, but some generalization is possible. Aerial ports of debarkation

(APODs), surface ports of debarkation (SPODs), and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) necessary for force deployment are key terrain.

Some—not all—airbases are also key terrain (such as those airbases critical to force flow and friendly air operations). Political centers—almost always cities—are key terrain, with the national capital usually being primary. Physical features, such as mountain passes, rivers, and other lines of

communication, may be crucial. Key terrain may refer to terrain that is

initially either friendly or enemy. Three potential snapshot days were used

to measure retention or control of terrain within the battlespace: the halt

day, the counteroffensive day (COFFD), and the campaign completion

day (CCD).

Designating key terrain is not a rigid, mechanical process. In evaluating force performance, the noncontiguous nature of the modern battlefield must be considered. In U.S. doctrine, for example, the retention of

terrain is meaningless unless it serves some operational purpose. Thus the

process must be qualitative as well as quantitative and must encompass

some measure of the operational art.
200 QDR 2001

At low risk, at the end of the operations, the enemy does not control

any key terrain. For moderate risk, the enemy may control some key terrain, but no airfields, APODs, SPODs, or political centers. At high risk,

the enemy may control some key terrain, including tertiary political centers, and at least one APOD, SPOD, or airbase, and may threaten a SLOC

to the degree that significant maritime assets must be dedicated to maintaining its security, and seaborne force flow is reduced by 25 percent or

less. Unacceptable risk is where the enemy controls key terrain including

multiple political centers, and more than one APOD, SPOD, or airbase,

and closes SLOCs through mining or other sea-denial operations to the

extent that seaborne force flow is reduced by 26 percent or greater.

Effect on an Enemy 

A measure of the warfighting capabilities of the enemy is critical to assess force performance. Enemy strength and effectiveness will directly influence the types and quantities of friendly forces required. Degradation of

enemy capability is a fundamental criterion for transition between phases

of campaign plans. Five metrics have been selected for this evaluation.

■ Ground forces: the mobile offensive ground forces of an opponent.

■ Air forces: the fighters and attack and bomber aircraft that are capable of

undertaking their primary missions.

■ Air defense: both integrated area air defense systems and nonintegrated

point air defense.

■ Enemy naval forces: surface, subsurface, and purely naval aviation assets.

■ WMD: encompassing offensive systems that could be employed either

against forces in the field or against countervalue targets.

Low risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by approximately 50 percent and have lost the ability to maneuver above battalion level; air forces are not capable of coordinated operations; air defense is negligible, except for sporadic point defense; enemy naval forces

are unable to conduct operations, and possess a limited and uncoordinated capability to conduct sporadic antiaccess operations; the enemy

possesses a very limited WMD capability, able to deliver only infrequent,

inaccurate, and uncoordinated attacks.

Moderate risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by

approximately 30 percent and have lost the ability to maneuver above

brigade level. As above, air forces are not capable of coordinated operations,

and air defense is negligible, except for sporadic point defense. Enemy naval

forces are unable to conduct coordinated offensive operations but, unlike

the low risk assessment, can conduct some limited antiaccess operations.
ASSESSING RISK 201

The enemy possesses a limited WMD capability, with the capability to deliver only inaccurate but more frequent attacks.

High risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced by less

than 30 percent and retain the ability to maneuver offensively at division

level. Air forces are capable of limited operations. Air defense is limited to

point defense. Enemy naval forces retain the capability to challenge with

limited sea denial operations and can conduct coordinated antiaccess operations that materially reduce seaborne movement of forces into the theater. The enemy possesses a limited WMD capability, with the capability

to deliver sustained, if still inaccurate, attacks.

Unacceptable risk means that enemy ground forces have been reduced

by less than 20 percent and retain the ability to maneuver offensively

above division level. Air forces are capable of limited operations and may

be capable of locally challenging friendly air superiority. Air defense is

limited to point defense. Enemy naval forces possess the capability to

challenge U.S. and allied sea superiority at a time and place of their

choosing and can conduct coordinated antiaccess operations that

threaten to halt the flow of seaborne reinforcements (this is linked to

SLOC control in the key terrain metric). The enemy possesses a WMD capability, able to deliver sustained attacks that are coordinated with

ground or air operations.

In evaluating the metrics of enemy degradation, if a single condition

obtains from a higher level of risk, then the higher level of risk is the condition that is reported. For example, if all conditions are met for an evaluation of moderate risk but the enemy retains the capability to conduct

sustained WMD attacks, then the overall enemy risk degradation would

be assessed as high instead of moderate.

Time

The length of the campaign, or the portion of the campaign within

which force performance is measured, is established based on the

achievement of theater operational objectives. Three measures can be

used, depending on the insights that are being sought. The first is halt

day, which is the time when an enemy advance is stopped. The second is

COFFD, which is the day that the CINC plans to begin his or her counteroffensive, based on closure of the joint force and establishment of operational preconditions. The third is CCD, which is the planning date for

the completion of operations.12 These days are generally expressed in the

language of force performance risk already outlined: possession of key

geographic objectives, enemy degradation, and friendly status.13 Also,
202 QDR 2001

these dates have dual significance. First, they are temporal anchors, the

specific points in time at which the other measures of force performance

are assessed. Second, the dates reflect the cost in time for the execution

of a scenario. The period between the planning dates for either COFFD

or CCD and the actual dates is the measure of risk. The ability to halt the

initial enemy offensive enables all other subsequent operations. The actual dates of these three measures are triggered by the accomplishment

of required objectives.

Low risk means that halt day, COFFD, or CCD has been met either by

the designated day or by a delay of not more than 20 percent of total time

elapsed; moderate risk means a delay of 21–50 percent; and high risk means

a delay of 51–100 percent. Unacceptable risk means delay of more than 100

percent, or that the halt day, COFFD, or CCD cannot be triggered because

of an inability to meet the required operational objectives.14

U.S. Air, Ground, and Sea Losses 

This metric captures the loss rates of U.S. forces over the timeframe

of a given scenario.15 Air losses are measured as a percentage of all aircraft

operating in theater. Ground losses are measured as a percentage of all armored fighting vehicles and artillery in theater. Sea losses are measured as

a percentage of all warships and support craft operating in theater.16

For air, sea, and ground forces, a total loss of 2 percent or less in each

category is considered to be low risk; 3–6 percent, moderate risk; and

losses of 7–10 percent, high risk. Losses greater than 10 percent are considered unacceptable.17 For the purposes of this study, damaged vessels

that must be withdrawn from operations are considered losses.

Linking risk assessment to friendly losses is a potentially emotional

issue. In this study, these numbers are used as a force planner’s assessment

tool, not an operational planner’s decision support criteria. This is a critical distinction because the dynamic chaos of an actual warfighting environment could reasonably justify an operational planner’s acceptance of

losses in excess of those stated above. On the other hand, to a force structure planner, a potential force that performs relatively poorly in this area

may require greater scrutiny and analysis.

In addition to the primary force performance metrics, four supporting measures were examined: a measurement of the day that aerospace

superiority was attained in the theater, the day that maritime superiority

was attained, the day that enemy air defenses were effectively suppressed,

and the total allied air, ground, and sea losses. Other measures may be

worth further study, such as the measurement of personnel losses, either
ASSESSING RISK 203

in addition to or instead of equipment losses; the measurement of collateral civilian losses; effects of attack on enemy strategic infrastructure; a

rolling comparison of relative combat power; and a qualitatively-based

measurement of the attainment of political objectives in SSC operations.

The four primary metrics are applied with equal weight in this analysis. Changing the relative weighting might result in significantly different

insights and assessments. There are also potential linkages between different metrics worthy of further exploration. The most obvious example of

linkage is that between losses and time. A shorter campaign might not be

as sensitive to U.S. losses as one that is longer. Applying different weights

to metrics is an area ripe for further exploration.

Some cautions must be kept in mind when applying this methodology. First, this approach measures battlefield outcomes; it cannot measure, except indirectly, the effects of these outcomes on the political will

of the enemy. Since influencing the will of the enemy is a primary objective of any military engagement, this is a notable deficiency. This can be

compensated to some extent by parametric adjustments, such as assuming that an opponent will halt or withdraw after sustaining a given set of

operational reverses.18 Unfortunately, this is a relatively clumsy input,

rather than an output.19

It is easy—and wrong—to overstate the relationship between force

performance risk and national will. The risk assessment that is derived

from how a given force structure performs against a given scenario will

not change, even if the level of U.S. national interest does. Losses that are

acceptable in some circumstances may prove unacceptable in others, but

this is not a reflection on the performance of the force. Instead, it mirrors

different levels of national interest. Risks and losses that were acceptable

in Normandy in 1944 were not acceptable in Mogadishu in 1993. This

methodology uses a reasonable person scale that attempts to capture what

is acceptable and unacceptable. This scale may change as a function of national will, but it is a matter that is external to the questions of force performance that are evaluated here.

Examining Different Conditions for Force

Performance Risk 

The methodology for determining force performance risk is based

on describing the overall attributes of a given force structure in the execution of a given scenario. To be useful, however, the methodology must

go beyond a single assessment of a base case force structure and a base
204 QDR 2001

case scenario. To capture fully the robustness of the force, a variety of

variables are considered. The same force structure is examined against

scenario excursions that introduce different assumptions about such factors as warning time, postures of engagement, separation time, enemy

WMD employment, and enemy force performance. For ease of measurement, these excursions from the base scenario are executed in increasing

order of difficulty against each force structure. Other potential variables

could also be employed to enrich and to fine-tune the assessment of

force performance risk.

In aggregating the results of force performance evaluations, the highest single level of risk within a given outcome dictates the overall risk

score assigned to a given force structure.20 This is a conservative methodology, based on the belief that the force planner must always be prudent

in examining force structure alternatives because the future can be seen

only dimly. Things are different for the operational planner, who can, and

often must, accept less conservative approaches to risk assessment.

This methodology for assessing force performance risk, anchored in

high-end warfighting, can yield useful insights into operations of lesser

intensity, such as coercive campaigns and other high-end operations.

However, domestic disaster relief and other less stressing humanitarian

operations, as well as many special operations, are less susceptible to this

form of analysis.

In MTWs, there is a silent assumption that we are fighting for vital

national security interests. In an SSC or other type of operation, this

probably is not the case; thus the tolerance for U.S. losses may well be

much lower. There may also be a time constraint. Changing the values associated with different levels of risk is a starting point.

Force Sustainability Risk

Force sustainability risk is the probability that a given force structure

will be unable to meet established readiness objectives and availability requirements when executed against a given future scenario.21 The force

structures evaluated are the same structures that are being examined for

force performance risk. The notional future security environments include a range of SSC, presence, and engagement requirements of varying

degrees across a specified period of time. In this study, the period is 6

years. Different futures are executed, based on a range of scenarios with

variable intensity, frequency, and concurrency, and linked to the assumptions of different NMS. Readiness objectives are measured in three areas:

operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for service force elements, demand for
ASSESSING RISK 205

and employment of jointly-managed LD/HD elements of the force, and

PERSTEMPO, measured within each service.

The objective of a force sustainability analysis is to identify force elements that will have significant tempo problems, as well as those that are

underutilized. Taken together with force performance, this approach yields

an overall picture of how effectively a given force structure adapts across a

broad spectrum of challenges. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that excessive OPTEMPO causes units and personnel to function

at lower levels of readiness, manifested in terms of additional wear and

tear on equipment, cost, and violation of service force management policies.22 This can lead to morale and retention problems and an inability to

perform higher-priority missions. Unavailability of certain units, because

of excessive demand or simple shortages, is also critical information.

We assign a score of low risk in force sustainability for major force elements when requirements are met with less than 3 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO (meaning in excess of service rules), there

are no nonavailability issues, and no substitution is required (replacement

of a required force element with another of functionally similar capabilities but dissimilar basic type, either interservice or intraservice). Low risk

in force sustainability for LD/HD assets occurs when requirements are met

with less than 10 percent experiencing broken OPTEMPO, there are no

nonavailability issues, and no substitution is required. Low risk in force

sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements

are met with less than 3 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in

excess of service rules.

We assign a score of moderate risk in force sustainability for major

force elements when requirements are met with 4–6 percent of the force

experiencing broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is less than 5 percent

and is met through substitution; LD/HD asset requirements are met with

11–15 percent of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; and nonavailability is 6–10 percent and is met through substitution. Moderate

risk in force sustainability for individual servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with 4–6 percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

High risk in force sustainability for major force elements occurs

when requirements are met with 7–12 percent of the force experiencing

broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is 6–10 percent and is met through

substitution; LD/HD asset requirements are met with 16–25 percent of

the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO, nonavailability is 10–15
206 QDR 2001

percent, and requirements cannot always be met through substitution

(that is, shortages occur). High risk in force sustainability for individual

servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with 7–12 percent

of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

Unacceptable risk in force sustainability for major force elements occurs when requirements are met with 13 percent or more of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO, nonavailability is 11 percent or greater

and is not always met through substitution. Unacceptable risk in force

sustainability for LD/HD assets occurs when requirements are met with

26 percent or more of the force experiencing broken OPTEMPO; nonavailability is 16 percent or greater; and requirements cannot always be

met through substitution. High risk in force sustainability for individual

servicemembers occurs when requirements are met with more than 13

percent of the force experiencing PERSTEMPO in excess of service rules.

Force sustainability risk assessment looks at the robustness of force

structures over an extended period of time. As with the force performance evaluation, if an element performs at a higher level of risk, then

the entire structure is assessed at that higher level. However, not all shortfalls or OPTEMPO failures are equal. In assessing results, sound military

judgment must remain the final test.

Operational Risk: Aggregating Force Performance and Force

Sustainability Risk

The operational risk associated with a given force structure is a combination of its ability to perform in contingency operations (MTWs and

higher-end SSCs) and in the extended day-to-day deployments that characterize the vast majority of current military requirements, namely, the

lower-end SSCs and presence and engagement elements of a strategy.

There is a tension between the definition of the principal utility of military force structure on one hand, “Henceforth the adequacy of any military establishment will be tested by its ability to preserve the peace,” as articulated by Henry Kissinger, and the assertion on the other that “the

purpose of the military is to fight and win the Nation’s wars,” as claimed

by Colin Powell. Since force performance risk assessment is not subsumed under force sustainability, it is necessary to assess each separately.

After a given force structure is evaluated by the force performance and

force sustainability methodologies, two measurements of risk are the result.

These evaluations receive equal weighting under the rubric of operational

risk.23 The higher of the two risk evaluations becomes the overall operational risk assessment. For example, a force that performs at a moderate
ASSESSING RISK 207

level of risk in force sustainability analysis might have an unacceptable level

of risk in force performance analysis; the force would receive an overall assessment of unacceptable.

This is a simple and straightforward merger that yields a clear audit

trail. The utility of a methodology that is transparent, linear, and replicable

is obvious. Values can be changed to fit differing assumptions and biases;

the approach is broad enough to accommodate alternative approaches.

At this level of aggregation the methodology used for determining

force performance is immaterial; either a quantitative or a qualitative approach will yield the necessary input. Some combination of the two is

probably the best approach. The working group used contractor modeling as an input and its own judgment as the basis for evaluating force performance. Force sustainability was modeled by a simple spreadsheet approach, which informed the final analysis. Regardless of the approach

selected, modeling and analysis must inform and not dictate final judgments of risk. Key assumptions must be explicitly stated and all findings

qualified by reference to them. The final result of this process is an assessment of operational risk.

The Future and Money

The focus in time to this point has been through 2010. To develop a

fuller picture of the risks associated with a given military strategy, it is

necessary to look also at the longer-term future (transformation and

hedging), and the fiscal reality (affordability, both internal and external to

the defense program).

Transformation and Hedging

Near-term strategies and force structures have a cumulative effect on

the long-term future. Incremental planning, by its nature, tends to accept

that the future will be a continuation of the past and that trends are basically linear. Thus an overarching long-term plan is needed for longerterm objectives, and near-term plans need to be developed with the longrange objectives in mind. Both the long-term and near-term plans should

routinely be evaluated in light of actual and potential changes in the future security environment. In essence, a peacetime military portfolio

plays a role in deterrence, shaping, and influence; however, the overriding

factor is to provide insurance against catastrophic and potentially unanticipated loss by being able to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Insurance

is intended to prepare against events that are possible—perhaps even
208 QDR 2001

likely—and this requires transformation of the force over time. At the

same time, prudence dictates that we also prepare for less likely but perhaps more dangerous futures—and this is hedging.

There will always be a level of risk about the longer-term future,

which in this case is the probability that a strategy and an associated force

structure will be unable to achieve future strategic objectives. An example

would be the inability of the United States to defend an ally in the face of

enemy use of antiaccess strategies. A balanced and flexible strategy and

associated force structure is one that can deal with both anticipated and

unexpected developments.

To prepare against all possible future threats is prohibitive in terms of

resources and decisionmaking ability. The objective, therefore, is not so

much to maintain an ability to do everything all of the time as it is to be

able to adjust, modify, or augment current forces so as to do what is

needed when necessary. Whatever strategy and force we create will be

wrong to some degree; the goal is not to be so wrong that we are unable

to recover and to adapt to unexpected future contingencies. There are a

number of methods to evaluate what we might need to deal with future

trends and discontinuities.

One practical method is to establish a checklist against which military

strategy and force requirements can be evaluated. For example, transformation and hedging provide a framework for assessing strategies against

a set of future risk criteria. Other checklist items could be added to expand the scope of the analysis.

The first area is that of transformation: whether a given military strategy and defense program will adequately prepare the U.S. military for the

most likely long-term security environment. Low risk in this area would be

a strategy and program that reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future, coupled with an action plan for the creation of force structure capabilities that will yield low-to-moderate risk outcomes in assessments of force

performance in the 2025 timeframe. Moderate risk in this area would be a

strategy and program that reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future,

coupled with an actionable plan for the creation of force structure capabilities that yield moderate-to-high risk outcomes in assessments of force performance in the 2025 timeframe. High risk in this area would be a strategy

and program that still reflect a coherent long-term vision of the future,

coupled with an actionable plan for the creation of new and emerging force

structure capabilities that, nevertheless, yield high to potentially unacceptable outcomes in assessments of force performance in the 2025 timeframe.
ASSESSING RISK 209

Unacceptable risk in this area would be a strategy and program that do not

represent a coherent long-term vision of the future. Elements of the future

vision might be present, but there is no linkage between the vision and the

potential strategies and force structures.

The second area is that of hedging: whether a given military strategy

and associated defense program have the flexibility to respond quickly

enough to unexpected military or technological developments. This area

has both a long-term and a short-term component. Unexpected political

developments can occur in the immediate future, while threatening technological developments are normally associated with more distant timeframes. The critical element is the ability to respond effectively in the

time period between strategic warning and the actual emergence of the

threat. However long this period is, can we create an effective counter?

Low risk means that there is both sufficient flexibility in U.S. force structure and a negligible external threat. There are no warning indicators. In

this case, the event horizon is well beyond the response time. Moderate

risk assumes that there are indicators of potentially threatening political

or military developments in the long term, but initiatives are under way

within the existing force structure to address the potential threat. This is

the current state of affairs. High risk assumes that there are compelling

indicators of potentially threatening political military developments in

the near term, but it is not certain that initiatives under way to address

the potential threat will be completely effective or ready before the threat

matures. Unacceptable risk assumes that a potential threat looms, but

there is no effective counter available within the timeframe of warning

and threat maturation. These are qualitative judgments and, therefore,

have a higher degree of subjectivity than many of the operational risk issues that have been previously discussed. Because of this, the most effective way to apply this evaluation may be to work with a range of outcomes (displaying the results of short- and mid-range analysis against a

spread of potential futures), based on different views of the future security environment. The working group did not conduct this modeling and

assessment, but this field is ripe for additional analysis.

Affordability

The final test of any military strategy and its force structure is that of

affordability. Affordability risk is the probability that a given defense

strategy and program will not be fully provided with necessary resources; the resulting mismatch could be more dangerous than a more

modest strategy that is fully funded. Affordability is measured in two
210 QDR 2001

areas: internal and external. Internal affordability refers to the departmental program. Are the basic elements of force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness provided with all required resources?

The degree to which there is a resource shortfall for these elements—the

departmental programs—reflects the degree of risk assumed. We assign a

score of low risk to a program funded at or near the total cost of the

force structure; moderate risk to one funded close to the total cost, but

with certain shortfalls; and high risk to a program that underfunds significant program elements. We assign a score of unacceptable risk to a

program that underfunds significant program elements and where the

gap increases over time, resulting in pronounced and cumulative effects

in combat readiness and preparedness for the future that cannot be readily remedied. In effect, judgments in this area evaluate the internal consistency of the DOD program. Does the budget match the plan? This is

easier to measure historically rather than to predict because few programs at inception assume less than full funding. Because of this, this

measure of risk may be of less utility in assessing future risk.

External affordability refers to the DOD program. Does the total program meet guidance on resource expenditure? This assessment requires

the application of explicit assumptions. The risk here is the likelihood

that the program, whether it is internally consistent, will survive external

political scrutiny, based on the bottom line of total expenditure. In

essence, how much is the Nation willing to spend on defense? In assessing

this metric, it is important to understand what is being measured. It is

not the soundness of the program, but its political viability. In other

words, will the program survive? 

Low risk is a defense program that falls within the anticipated

topline. Moderate risk is a program that is slightly above the anticipated

topline. High risk is a program that is significantly larger than the anticipated topline. A program that is more than 10 percent above the anticipated topline is unacceptable. These calculations and assessments reflect

working group assumptions about the likelihood of future spending patterns. They could be adjusted or changed in other analyses to reflect different views of these issues. As in prior cases, the higher of the two risk assessments is the operative assessment.24

A Toolkit for Risk Assessment

Ultimately, the judgment about the level of risk for a given military

strategy and associated force structure is a combination of both
ASSESSING RISK 211

quantitative and qualitative factors. The process that is suggested here is cumulative, but it must not become rigidly mechanical. The greatest analytical danger is that a risk assessment process that relies on the aggregation of

risk may become, in Winston Churchill’s famous aphorism, no more than

“the sum of their fears,” a result that may be neither useful nor insightful.

The approach to risk assessment that has been developed throughout this chapter is depicted in figure 7–1. Step 1 defines a military strategy by prioritizing the elements of the strategy. For the working group

modeling effort, the primary elements are MTWs and deterrence, SSCs,

presence and engagement, and preparing for the future. This process

must be closely linked to the overarching national security strategy and

its associated national military strategy. If the latter de-emphasizes engagement, for example, it would place a lower premium on the utility of

the presence and engagement element. Prioritizing elements of the strategy begins the process of defining the bounds of acceptable risk. Since

there will be both strategic emphasis and fiscal constraints, not all elements of the strategy will receive the same support.

Step 2 determines a range of force structure options to execute the

strategy. A number of different approaches can be used to accomplish this.

The easiest way may be to begin with the existing force and make successive

adjustments that incrementally change the composition of the force structure. The resultant force structures should reflect a broad range of options.

Develop

strategy-driven

prioritization 

of force 

requirements

Assessment 

complete

Revisit strategy 

Revisit force 

options

Force 

performance

Force 

sustainability

Preparation 

for future

Affordability 

analysis

1

Develop

force

options

2

Determine

risk metrics

and levels

3

Model

and

assess

4

Assess risk:

acceptable?

5

YES

NO

Figure 7–1. A Roadmap for Risk Assessment
212 QDR 2001

Step 3 determines explicit risk metrics and levels of emphasis for all

elements of the strategy, based upon the work done in Step 1, focused on

the force structure.

Step 4 evaluates the force structure options developed in Step 2 to determine whether they meet the four major requirements of the strategy:

force performance, force sustainability, preparing for the future, and affordability. Force performance and sustainability assessments are combined to yield the overall assessment for operational risk, which reflects

the highest level of risk of the two.25 This is the measure of force credibility, which is one of the most significant contributions of a given force

structure to a military strategy. Operational risk directly influences the

levels of risk not only for MTWs and higher-end SSCs (specifically as a

function of force performance), but also for lower-end SSCs and presence

and engagement (as a function of force sustainability). The next areas of

assessment are those of preparing for the future (transformation and

hedging) and affordability.26

Taken together, these measures yield a level of strategic military risk

for a given strategy and a given force structure. The overall risk score is

based on the highest level of risk of any category for any given force structure. In this methodology, all factors receive equal weight, but subsequent

analysis may indicate that this is too blunt an instrument. Areas could be

assigned different weights; the policy of assigning overall risk as a function

of the highest level of risk in any category may also merit rethinking.

This is an iterative process, as scenarios and force structure excursions are examined and adjusted to meet different risk criteria. This may

prove the most difficult part of the entire process. It will be relatively easy

to design forces that meet risk criteria of a given strategy; it will prove far

more difficult to design forces that meet acceptable strategy-driven risk

criteria and affordability requirements.

Step 5 examines the results of Step 4. Force structures that meet all

risk assessment criteria can be taken forward for further detailed analysis.

Force structures that do not meet risk criteria are returned to Step 3 for

adjustment and, where indicated, re-appraised. While modeling is an important part of this process, ultimate decisions about relative levels of risk

must lean heavily on qualitative analysis.

The objective of the methodology is to arrive at Step 5 with a force

structure that meets the requirements of the strategy, is affordable, and

leaves a clear audit trail of analysis and decisions.27
ASSESSING RISK 213

How can unacceptable levels of risk be mitigated? There are two

broad approaches to this issue. The first is the most common, and the

most dangerous: redefine the problem or assume it away. When there is

an apparently intractable mismatch of resources and ends, simply redefining success or the nature of the threat is a common approach. The

danger is that the redefined threat may not accurately reflect the real

world. Redefining strategic problems is a dangerous business and must be

anchored in thorough analysis and realistic assessments.

The second approach is to increase resources. It is easier to develop

conceptual solutions to strategic problems when increased resources can

be presumed. The problem here, of course, is that key elements of this solution lie outside DOD. Current attempts by service chiefs to identify the

need for an increase in the topline, and the resistance their efforts are

meeting, are testimony to this. Ultimately, some balance of the two approaches is the most likely outcome.

Conclusion

This chapter has articulated a general theory of risk assessment for

the 2001 QDR, designed to have utility for a broad variety of potential

models and analytic approaches. It makes no attempt to prejudge or to

compare the effectiveness of differing approaches. The general theory

that has been advanced in these pages should be evaluated independently of the particular models that the working group used. The shortcomings of the models used have been identified; their deficiencies,

however, should not reflect on this general theory of risk assessment. It

has been said, “All models are wrong. Some are useful.”28 Modeling has

been useful in illuminating some specific cases of this general theory,

but the level of modeling available precluded comprehensive analysis.

Two recommendations flow from this chapter. First, the DOD needs

a systematic approach to assessing risk. This begins with the creation of a

common definitional and conceptual structure for the discussion of risk.

This approach must be able to evaluate risk—strategic military and operational—in an internally consistent manner, without reference to the

sliding scale of national will. All too often the discussion of risk in an operational context defaults to relative judgments based on perceptions of

national security policy. While this linkage is important, it is more important for the force planner to be able to make consistent risk judgments based on known, replicable information. Quantitative analysis has
214 QDR 2001

a role to play in this process, but it must never be subordinated to sound,

seasoned military judgment.

Second, the DOD must pursue better models to support analysis of

alternative force structures. All existing models have critical deficiencies,

which limit any study that uses them; this study is no exception. The absence of good modeling means that new ideas and concepts cannot be

validated or rigorously assessed. A second-order effect is to reinforce the

tendency to evaluate operational outcomes at the national security strategy level (in terms of national will). This robs analysis of rigor.

The thread that will guide force planners through the next QDR is a

common understanding of risk, based on robust analysis and transparent methodology. Understanding how to assess levels of risk is the tool

that differentiates between strategies. It is easy to create strategies and

force structures with unconstrained resources. It becomes far more difficult when inadequate means are the only tools at hand. Building

strategies and force structures that are obviously unaffordable and then

making incremental or salami-slice cuts is a fundamental abrogation of

responsibility. A constant referral to ends, means, and potential tradeoffs is the best approach.

Notes1 S. 1059, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

2 See General Henry H. Shelton, Posture Statement before the 106th Congress House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee, March 1, 2000, 13. See also Shelton’s August 1999 reconfirmation speech, 9. Both texts assess the risk associated with the first of two MTWs as medium, and

with the second of two MTWs as high. More recently, in congressional testimony of September 2000,

the Chairman noted a strategy-resource gap within the current strategy, based on risk assessment.

3 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: John Wiley and

Sons, 1996), is an excellent overview of risk and risk assessment in a historical and financial context.

Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984; 1999 reissue with new foreword), particularly 306–328, contains a good discussion

of risk assessment.

4 In August 2000 the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J–5), Joint Staff, did issue a

comprehensive issue paper on risk as part of the Joint Strategic Review (JSR) process.

5 The thrust of the working group’s analysis thus focuses on NMS, recognizing that the development of the next NMS will be strongly informed by the strategy developed in the 2001 QDR.

6 In the context of this analysis, resources include tangible assets, such as equipment and

money, intangible assets, such as political capital and, most significantly, the lives of U.S. personnel.

7 The working group has adopted the following definitions: a vital interest is of broad, overriding

importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the nation; an important interest does not affect U.S.

national survival, but affects the Nation’s well-being and the character of the international security environment; humanitarian and other interests are interests that affect or involve U.S. values and leadership.

These definitions are based on the 1997 QDR Report; and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000

8 Definitions of major theater war, smaller-scale contingency, peacetime military engagement,

and overseas presence are set forth in chapter 6.
ASSESSING RISK 215

9 See chapter 5.

10 Time and resource constraints precluded the working group from assessing risk in the first

of two MTWs and also from examining operations below the MTW level with the force performance methodology. To reflect this, the study makes two basic assumptions in examining force performance risk: 1) that in all cases the first MTW of any combination will be executed at low-tomoderate risk, and 2) that force performance in operations other than MTWs will be executed at

low-to-moderate risk. More analysis is needed to examine the first of two MTW performance and

force performance in operations other than high-end warfighting.

11 These operational objectives are not linked to any specific model. They could be applied to

any theater-level campaign model, including TACWAR, JWARS, or a number of other approaches.

The NDU QDR Working Group used RAND Corporation’s Joint Integrated Contingency Model

(JICM) as its primary force performance model. JICM limitations must be kept in mind in assessing

results of this modeling: It is attrition- and fire-centered; it cannot readily capture the effects of

strategic attack, maneuver, or the cumulative effects of superior command and control, including

space operations and stealth; and maritime (blue-water) combat, including amphibious operations,

cannot be modeled. As a result, JICM output on many of the measures of effectiveness used in this

section are largely ground- and air-centric.

12 These dates, specified in operations plans, are generally classified.

13 Stability and occupation operations executed subsequent to the end of organized resistance

are not calculated in this methodology. It is recognized that these operations may be large and, for

practical purposes, open-ended. It is also evident that timing measures are generally more applicable

in MTW-like scenarios than in many SSC-type operations.

14 It is a generally accepted article of U.S. doctrine that shorter wars are more desirable, reducing the potential for friendly and civilian collateral casualties and minimizing the potential strain of

holding an alliance together for an extended period of time. While this remains a good planning

benchmark, the real world of theater operations may dictate other priorities. In the actual execution

of a theater-level campaign, there may be good reasons why a CINC might take longer to initiate the

counteroffensive or to complete a campaign than is assumed in prior planning.

15 The loss rate can be measured at halt day, COFFD, or CCD. Ally losses are calculated separately (although this important data is captured and is part of the supporting analysis).

16 Naval losses are further divided into losses of capital and noncapital ships. Capital ships are

multipurpose aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, amphibious assault ships, multipurpose amphibious assault ships, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. The loss of any capital ship raises the

statistically derived level of risk by one level. For example, if U.S. maritime losses were under 2 percent, but a nuclear-power sub was lost, then the level of risk would be moderate instead of low.

17 These measures of effectiveness are based on a representative sampling of losses in World War

II, Korean, Southwest Asian, and Middle East campaigns (including D–Day, Korea 1950–53, the Yom

Kippur War, and Desert Storm). The most recent data on naval losses is the British 1982 campaign in

the South Atlantic. It could, however, be argued that these loss thresholds are based on large

campaigns that may not be replicated again and, more importantly, that future campaigns might not

enjoy the same degree of public support. One such view would adjust loss thresholds to levels of low,

1 percent, moderate, 2 percent, high, 5 percent; anything greater than this as unacceptable.

18 For example, it was assumed that an enemy ground advance would halt when it sustained 50

percent casualties.

19 At least one school of thought argues that the battlespace-oriented measures introduced as

measures of effectiveness are less than complete. This argument proposes that a more complete set of

measures would include ways of measuring accomplishment of friendly objectives without focusing

on enemy fielded forces. The current state of modeling does not support the use of measures of this

nature, although it is certainly deserving of further study.

20 No attempt has been made to optimize concepts of operation in this analysis. They are treated

as constants. Different concepts of operation might be optimized to yield more favorable results.

21 The quantitative measurements used as thresholds in this section are notional and do not represent the final analytical product. They are included only to highlight the methodological approach.
216 QDR 2001

22 This methodology employs no direct measurement of material or training readiness; it presumes that deficiencies will occur more frequently in forces that are unable to meet service-mandated

tempo limits.

23 It might be useful to weight these differently, although the working group did not do so. An

implicit weighting process is applied a priori to these measurements through the strategies that they

support. For example, if a strategy chose to employ lesser levels of presence, engagement, and SSCs,

they would receive equal weight in the evaluation process, but discrimination would already have

been applied at the strategic level, in the emphasis selected for the elements.

24 The working group performed only external, not internal, affordability risk assessment.

25 The working group assumed low-to-moderate risk for the first of two MTWs and assumed

low-to-moderate risk in force performance for all contingency operations other than the second of

two MTWs.

26 No assessment was provided for transformation and hedging, nor for internal affordability.

27 The product of this analysis yields a force structure that supports NMS, which is keyed to the

requirements levied on the military element of national power by NSS. However, if the NSS reflects a

flawed view of the world, then NMS and its associated force structure may not be properly constituted to deal with the challenges of a security environment, regardless of how faithfully NMS executes

its tasks assigned by NSS.

28 George Box, “Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building,” in R. L. Launer and 

G. N. Wilkinson, eds., Robustness in Statistics (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 202.
Chapter Eight

Identifying Force Structure

Issues: Sifting the Screen

by Michèle A. Flournoy, Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., and John J. Spinelli

The efforts of the NDU QDR Working Group function like the big

screen used in an archeological dig to identify potential artifacts

that are worthy of greater scrutiny and subsequent detailed analysis. This concept has proven to be a useful organizing principle for the

work of the group. Our objective in this chapter is to identify force structure and capability issues that merit further examination in the 2001 QDR

or in follow-on analysis, not to recommend specific force structure

changes. None of the issues in this chapter is an original idea; all have been

raised in one way or another by influential members of the defense community. These issues generally fall into two baskets: potential tradespace

candidates—that is, approaches to reducing the costs of implementing a

given strategy while staying within the bounds of acceptable risk—and approaches to reducing the level of risk associated with a priority element of

a strategy. Few of these approaches, however, have been subjected to rigorous or comprehensive analysis. Consistent with the big screen approach,

the working group conducted a scoping-level analysis to confirm whether,

and at what level, further analysis may be merited in the next QDR. The

resulting insights and recommendations are provided in this chapter.

Based on the four strategy-driven integrated paths described in

chapter 13, the working group analyzed a number of force structure and

capability issues:

■ Greater reliance on Reserve component (RC) warfighting contributions;

■ Tradeoffs between enhancements to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and to precision munition and shooter platforms;

■ Enhanced strategic lift and prepositioning;

■ Critical warfighting enhancements;

■ Force mix in the second major theater war;

■ Modified end-state objectives and concepts of operations;

217
218 QDR 2001

■ High-demand assets for smaller-scale contingencies;

■ Greater reliance on allies in warfighting;

■ Meeting warfighting and homeland security requirements concurrently;

■ Size and composition of the strategic reserve; and

■ Investment priorities.

For each issue, we first determined the strategy alternatives to which it

was relevant and developed a working hypothesis to be tested in the subsequent analysis. For example, in examining greater use of Reserve components in warfighting, we sought to test the hypothesis that using more Reserve forces in place of active-duty forces in the second of two MTWs

would meet requirements with no appreciable increase in risk while allowing for a reduction in overall force structure that would result in substantial savings. We then examined each issue from three complementary angles: force performance, force sustainability, and cost. Force performance

and sustainability were assessed, where possible, using the risk methodology described in chapter 7. The direct costs of specific modeling excursions were considered to provide a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of

potential costs or savings. We developed this three-pronged approach to

ensure that the potential usefulness of an issue in one area, such as improved force performance in MTWs, did not mask a serious shortfall in

another area, such as unacceptable tempo strains on the force.

To assess force performance issues in the second of two MTWs, the

working group used the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) force, updated Mobility Requirements Study movement data, and the RAND Joint

Integrated Contingency Model to explore numerous hypothetical scenarios. The model’s strengths include its ability to generate significant numbers of runs and outputs (with varying parameters such as effects of

WMD, warning time, and the time between MTWs). However, it does

have several shortcomings: its attrition-based and deterministic construct

makes it less useful for assessing some aspects of force performance, and it

does not represent naval and amphibious warfare except for strikes against

land targets. Its limited focus and high level of aggregation constrain its

capacity to analyze many specific service considerations in detail.

To assess force sustainability issues and identify potential high-demand assets in SSCs, the working group used a model developed by the

Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute/AB Technologies

Group. This model allocated a selected list of forces from the POM force

across a hypothetical 6-year future of strategy-derived SSC requirements.

A key strength of this model was its ability to complete multiple runs that
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 219

replicate the force demands of each strategy alternative’s likely posture of

engagement. However, the model could not fully capture a number of issues and considerations related to SSCs, such as lift and tanker requirements, regional support by some units (such as special operations forces),

engagement and other “time away from home” activities, overseas presence policies (for naval forces in particular), and readiness levels. Database constraints and minimal service interaction with the model limited

the ability to analyze many specific service considerations in detail.

To get a sense of some of the costing implications, the working group

relied on the Joint Cost Assessment Tool developed by Synergy, Inc. This

tool identified aggregate peacetime direct costs of the specific forces under

analysis. This model helped to identify potential rough order-of-magnitude

costs or savings as well as the potential breakeven point for some excursions

that were analyzed parametrically. However, the results clearly would not be

a sufficient basis for program decisions. Because our assessment did not address two vital areas—indirect and future program costs—this scopinglevel effort was insufficient to support any detailed insights.

As illustrated in figure 8–1, each excursion was subject to assessment

by each model wherever possible. However, several issues could not be

modeled effectively within this project—specifically, greater reliance on

allies in warfighting, meeting warfighting and homeland security requirements concurrently, size and composition of the strategic reserve,

Investigate

in alternate model

Re-analyze

Risk and 

affordability

analysis

Direct

force costs

(Synergy, Inc.)

Force structure

options

Explore force

sustainability

Explore force

performance

Force allocation

modeling

(IITRI/AB Tech)

Force structure

excursions

(RAND)

Sufficient

tradespace

for further

analysis

If passes all

risk and cost

reviews

Report

findings

Has

potential? Insights

Insights

Insights

YES

NO

Figure 8–1. Modeling Relationships
220 QDR 2001

and investment priorities. Each of these issues was researched and assessed but not modeled.

Whether modeled or not, all excursions required the interpretation of

data and the application of judgment. Interpreting modeling can be more

of an art than a science, warranting a healthy dose of skepticism and caution. The working group analysis was limited to a scoping-level analysis, so

these insights and recommendations focus on avenues for further analysis

rather than answers, serving as the big screen in the early stages of the dig.

The analytic agenda detailed below should not be seen or used as a

barrier to making the hard decisions that must be made in the next QDR.

The big decisions inevitably will have to be tackled without answers to

every analytic question. What these insights and recommendations for

further analysis offer is a menu of follow-on work to assess and refine

some of the implications of the larger, imperative decisions.

Reliance on More Reserve Forces in Major Wars

Planned RC contributions to major wars already are quite substantial.

A key issue for QDR force planners is whether to assume that the Reserves can play an even greater role in warfighting, particularly in a second MTW. Three key questions must be addressed here. Could using

more Reserve forces in place of active forces meet CINC requirements

with no appreciable increase in risk? If a corresponding reduction in active-duty force structure were made, could the resulting forces also meet

peacetime requirements? Would this change result in substantial savings?

Each service has different missions, structures, and employment concepts for the use of Reserve components. They vary from employing large

units as freestanding organizations to providing smaller units and individuals as augmentation or replacements. Some Reserve forces require

substantial mobilization time before deployment, while others are well

integrated into the active component’s operations and organizations. In

all cases, the Reserves are assumed to provide substantial capability at

lower cost than their active-duty counterparts.

The working group explored whether and under what conditions existing Reserve forces could play a larger role in major wars. Specifically,

could additional selected Reserve units, substituting for active-duty

counterparts, meet existing CINC timelines and capability needs at reduced cost? Based on the working group assessment of mobilization

timelines and requirements, the replacement of an Army heavy division

with an Army National Guard heavy division was not supportable, as the
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 221

force could not meet CINC timelines in all theaters. However, when the

mobilization base was enhanced with additional training sites and when

new notification, mobilization, and training requirements were adopted,

the Guard division was able to meet timelines in one of two theaters.

No similar impediments were identified to replacing three active Air

Force fighter squadrons with Reserve squadrons, whose capability, mobilization, and training standards are comparable to the active force. However, specific unit types and numbers matter in this case, and the impact on

the peacetime rotation base needs to be considered. For example, this substitution would not work for types of fighter squadrons in high demand in

peacetime. Increasing the proportion of Reserve components in a high-demand force could establish substantial new tempo challenges.

Based on this analysis, the working group recommends that QDR

planners validate these findings through additional analysis. Two major

issues also should be addressed. First, options should be developed and

assessed for increasing reliance on and integration of Reserve forces of all

services in the fighting of major wars while exploiting the inherent cost

savings. Specifically, the QDR should examine:

■ Whether integration and employment of smaller RC ground units at

lower levels of command and control (roundout concepts) are feasible;

■ Whether the Air Force could increase its reliance on some types of Air

Force Reserve fighters;

■ Whether more use of Reserve forces could be made as replacements and

augmentation, in contrast to stand-alone operational units;

■ In all of these cases, whether reliance on the Reserves could be increased

without incurring unacceptable impacts on the peacetime rotational base.

Second, we urge QDR planners to assess whether current levels of RC

utilization in other missions such as peacetime operations, base generating forces, and backfill for active forces in SSC and engagement activities

can be sustained. If so, planners should explore whether even greater use

could be made of the Reserve components in such operations without

exceeding acceptable levels of tempo for Reserve personnel.

Tradeoffs Between ISR/PM Enhancements 

and Shooter Platforms

Enhanced capability in the area of ISR promises near-real-time identification and targeting of many enemy forces through integrated systems

and processes. At the same time, as precision munitions (PM) become

more accurate and smaller, the concept of kills per sortie is replacing the
222 QDR 2001

age-old sorties per kill. If ISR and PM enhancements can be combined to

enable existing weapon systems to engage targets faster, more often, and

with increased lethality, it may be possible to reduce the number of

shooter platforms required to achieve the same effects. This possibility

raises three key questions for the QDR. First, what types and quantities of

ISR/PM capabilities will yield measurable increases in the effectiveness of

the force? Second, if the Department of Defense invests in these ISR/PM

capabilities, could it achieve the same effects with a smaller force? And

third, what savings might be realized through reductions in present and

planned shooter systems that would no longer be necessary?

The working group explored the potential linkage between ISR/PM

enhancements, combat effectiveness, and cost using parametric analysis.

Specifically, we examined whether percentage increases in combat effectiveness due to ISR/PM enhancements could enable percentage reductions in shooter platforms without any meaningful increase in risk. This

scoping-level analysis appeared to confirm a relationship between increased effectiveness and potential platform tradeoffs and identified a potential break-even point for cost investment (in ISR/PM) to cost savings

(in shooter platforms) for a specific set of shooter platforms.

However, the working group could not assess all aspects of force performance risk and cost. The level of our analysis was too broad to go beyond observing that a viable tradeoff between ISR/PM enhancements and

shooter reductions may exist. QDR planners are urged to validate these

findings through additional analysis and to explore more potential tradeoffs between ISR/PM and shooter platforms. We recommend that they:

■ Develop specific ISR/PM enhancement options;

■ Determine whether and to what extent each enhancement option would

increase combat effectiveness;

■ Model these enhancements with different combinations of shooter reductions to identify which provide the greatest saving without significantly

increasing risk;

■ Assess the impacts of any potential shooter reductions on the peacetime

rotational base; and

■ Determine the costs or savings associated with each option.

Enhanced Strategic Lift and Prepositioning

American military forces presently rely on strategic lift and certain

prepositioned equipment to project and sustain combat power rapidly

overseas. CINC timelines for the execution of major theater wars are

predicated on the availability of adequate strategic lift. The rapid arrival
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 223

of potent combat forces can quickly halt aggression, stabilize crises, and

facilitate subsequent military operations. A shortfall in strategic lift capability raises the risk in MTW execution, particularly in the second of two

nearly simultaneous MTWs. This poses important questions for force

planners in the next QDR: Would increases in strategic airlift, sealift, or

prepositioned equipment better enable U.S. forces to meet CINC timelines and lower risk in the second MTW? If so, is the change worth the

additional investment? 1

The working group explored 10–20 percent increases in strategic lift

and assessed their impacts on CINC timelines and risk for the second of

two MTWs.2 No changes were made to lift allocation. Somewhat to our

surprise, the analysis suggested that strategic airlift and sealift increases of

10–20 percent generally did not significantly alter timelines for halting an

initial enemy attack or for launching a U.S.-led counteroffensive. We recommend that QDR planners validate our findings through additional

analysis to explore further the implications of enhanced lift and prepositioned equipment. Specifically, we suggest that they:

■ Explore additional lift increases in conjunction with different approaches

to lift allocation to identify options that would supply the highest priority

CINC assets more rapidly, substantially improving warfighting outcomes

and reducing risk;

■ Analyze the lift and prepositioning requirements associated with a

broader range of MTW scenarios;

■ Assess increases in strategic lift and prepositioning commensurate with

the need to move a larger force in accordance with CINC timelines if significant increases in force structure are contemplated in the QDR;

■ Explore ways to decrease the demand for lift by increasing the combat

power and effectiveness of units, thus reducing the lift required for multiple units (as part of transformation); and

■ Assess the benefits of additional prepositioning and of different mixes of

prepositioned equipment in key theaters.

Critical Warfighting Enhancements

Other critical warfighting shortfalls also contribute to assessments of

higher risk in two-MTW scenarios. Among them are ISR/PM shortfalls;

unfilled war-reserve secondary items such as spare engines, repair parts,

and consumable supplies; a lack of support forces; and inadequate chemical, biological, and radiological detection and decontamination capabilities. These shortfalls pose a significant question for the QDR: How much
224 QDR 2001

and what types of critical warfighting enhancements could increase the

overall effectiveness of U.S. forces and lower risk? 3

The working group developed a notional package of enhancements

and assessed their effects parametrically by assuming that they increased

the effectiveness of U.S. forces by 0, 10, 20, or 30 percent. These increases

in combat effectiveness were then played in major war scenarios to observe

their impact on force performance. This analysis suggested that increases

in combat effectiveness of 10–20 percent yielded slight-to-significant reductions in warfighting risk, depending on the theater of operations.

Thus, we recommend that QDR planners validate our findings through

additional analysis and further explore the implications of critical

warfighting enhancements by:

■ Conducting detailed analysis of which enhancements would improve

force performance most; and

■ Prioritizing enhancements so that alternatives can be developed if full

funding for all enhancements is not available.

Force Mix

Critical warfighting enhancements such as those noted above could

increase the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces in major wars. If such increases in effectiveness can be achieved, force planners must ask two important questions in the next QDR: Would these enhancements enable

changes in the mix of forces required for a second MTW without incurring undue risk? If so, would the changes result in substantial savings?

The working group began its analysis of this issue with the same assumptions of 0, 10, 20, and 30 percent increases in combat effectiveness

that were used for the notional package of critical warfighting enhancements. We then made iterative adjustments to the force mix for the second of two nearly simultaneous MTWs (using current DOD planning

scenarios) and assessed force performance based on current DOD endstate objectives and concepts of operations. These adjustments involved

removing single units (for example, a heavy division, expeditionary

brigade, or carrier) or a percentage of the force (for example, some share

of Air Force fighters). Several levels of single-service and joint force reductions were considered.

This analysis suggested that across-the-board reductions—removal of a

combination of units from across the services—generally increased risk the

most. In addition, force decrements applied in the absence of any increase

in combat effectiveness from critical enhancements caused an increase in
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 225

risk in nearly all cases. However, when increases of force effectiveness between 10 and 20 percent (based on critical enhancements) were assumed,

some adjustments did not appear to increase the level of risk overall, suggesting that some force reductions or changes in force mix might be supportable if effectiveness of the remaining forces is enhanced. We recommend that QDR planners validate these findings through additional

analysis and that they further explore the force mix changes and requirements reductions that might be enabled by increases in combat effectiveness. Specifically, we suggest that they examine the implications of critical

warfighting enhancements for overall force requirements and force mix by:

■ Conducting detailed analysis of whether critical warfighting enhancements actually can yield combat effectiveness increases in the 10 to 20

percent range;

■ Analyzing various force mix options to determine which could yield lowto-moderate risk outcomes in major wars;

■ Assessing alternative force mixes for the broader range of MTW scenarios;

and 

■ Evaluating the costs of the alternative force mix options.

New Concepts of Operations

The new administration will need to determine the MTW end-state

objectives that should guide U.S. force planning. In addition, proponents

of Strategy B (described in chapter 5) and others have expressed considerable interest in new approaches to warfighting, especially new concepts

of operations that would reduce the force requirements associated with

fighting and winning MTWs. This raises two key questions for the next

QDR. Could a new joint concept of operations for restoration of the geographic status quo ante bellum substantially reduce U.S. force requirements? If so, can this reduction result in significant savings and no appreciable increase in force performance risk?

The working group explored this issue for the second of two nearly simultaneous MTWs using the hypothetical campaign objectives of halting

enemy aggression and launching a limited counteroffensive to restore the

previous border. Although concepts of operations necessarily varied by

theater, in all cases the defeat mechanism was air strikes and ground- and

sea-launched missile strikes against advancing enemy forces. Limited

counteroffensives were launched to restore border integrity as soon as the

forces required to do so—much smaller than the traditional MTW “building block”—arrived in theater.
226 QDR 2001

This scoping-level analysis offered mixed results. The alternative concept of operations coupled with a much smaller force consistently increased

the risk of unacceptable outcomes in one of the MTW theaters examined,

but in the other theater it was able to achieve success under certain circumstances. In the successful case, both the prewar movement of ground forces

to the theater and the authorization to launch early air strikes before the

enemy crossed the border were critical to success. The working group did

not have the resources to test this alternative concept of operations against

a broader set of scenarios or to vary the force structure package supporting

it. Thus, we recommend that should the new administration decide to pursue new concepts of operations in planning for a broader range of MTWs,

these findings should be validated through additional analysis. In addition,

QDR planners should:

■ Analyze similar concepts of operations in other MTW scenarios to gain

broader insights on their viability and force requirements; and

■ Undertake detailed analysis to determine whether other force structures

could reduce the sensitivity of success of this concept of operation to

the very early movement of ground forces and to preemptive strike requirements.

Meeting the Demands of SSCs and Presence

Whatever the strategy chosen in the next QDR, the associated posture of engagement will place specific demands on military forces to

conduct operations in some number of SSCs, provide some level of

overseas presence in key theaters, and undertake peacetime engagement

activities with important allies and partners. Whether the Bush administration chooses a more selective or a more expansive engagement policy, peacetime operations can be expected to place high demands on

certain segments of the force. In particular, low-density assets with

unique capabilities may experience personnel and operational tempos

that stress them and their respective services. This poses two important

questions for planners in the next QDR: What is the anticipated magnitude of the tempo stress that a given strategy is likely to create? Are

there high-demand assets for which additional force structure or manning should be provided?

The working group explored this issue by generating notional postures

of engagement that reflect the levels of SSCs and other peacetime activities

that each of the four strategy alternatives logically would require.4 Generic

operations and hypothetical SSC vignettes were used to identify the types
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 227

and amounts of forces typically necessary for these operations.5 Six-year

postures of engagement were developed, and illustrative force requirements

were identified. Using service policies on tempo and force management, the

impacts of each strategy-driven posture of engagement were analyzed.

This analysis confirmed the effectiveness of the DOD Global Military

Force Policy (GMFP) program at tracking LD/HD assets. It also confirmed that continued careful and joint force management is warranted.

Different strategy-driven postures of engagement—either more selective

or more expansive than today—did not significantly alter the GMFP list

of LD/HD assets. However, the analysis did identify several other potential candidates for LD/HD status—units that were subject, at least, to high

demand or were otherwise at risk of becoming so because of potential

tempo demands. These included, for example:

■ Army Patriot air defense maintenance companies, certain types of medium

truck companies, and military police companies (combat support);

■ Navy carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and maritime

prepositioning ships ;

■ Marine Corps unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons, refueling and transport aviation (KC–130) squadrons, and Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team

platoons;

■ Air Force B–2 stealth bombers, F–16 CJ aircraft for suppression of enemy

air defenses, and F–117 stealth fighters; and

■ U.S. Special Operations Command psychological operations tactical battalions, AC–130 gunships, and the 528th Support Battalion.

Thus, the working group recommends that the QDR validate these

findings through additional analysis and that it:

■ Identify the force requirements associated with the anticipated posture of

engagement of a given defense strategy;

■ Wargame or model force structure alternatives against the anticipated

posture of engagement to identify potential high-demand or stressed

units and assets;

■ Determine whether potential force management approaches, such as force

substitution or contracting out functions, or force structure adjustments,

such as unit conversions or a different mix of active and Reserve components, could mitigate the impacts of unacceptably high tempo demands;

and

■ Develop and analyze alternative rotational and overseas presence policies

that could improve force management and reduce the force structure necessary to meet posture of engagement requirements.
228 QDR 2001

Greater Reliance on Allies in Warfighting

Allied and coalition political support, access to key bases and facilities, and host-nation support will be critical to success in any conceivable

major war of the future. The key question for QDR force planners in this

regard is what assumptions to make about allies and coalition partners

when assessing force requirements for major wars. More specifically,

should the United States plan on greater allied force contributions in specific scenarios? Would such force contributions enable corresponding reductions in the Armed Forces?

Two approaches must be considered. The current DOD approach includes only the forces of those countries the United States is defending (for

example, the Republic of Korea or the Gulf Cooperation Council states)

and those with whom we have relevant treaties (such as our NATO allies in

Article V operations). The alternative approach would include the forces of

all allies and potential partners who demonstrate both the willingness and

the ability to contribute militarily significant forces to a particular scenario.

We define militarily significant as forces with the ability to deploy and sustain brigade, squadron, or naval task force units roughly equivalent to U.S.

counterparts in an out-of-area theater without requiring extensive U.S.

support. This is a high standard, but nothing less would permit reduction

of U.S. force requirements.

Based on the working group’s assessment of current allied capabilities,

only a few allies not already included in U.S. force planning for particular

warfighting scenarios could meet this standard, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Others—such as Germany, Italy, and other

NATO allies—could deploy substantial forces if significant U.S. support

were provided. Still others might be able to contribute small but significant specialized capabilities, such as mine clearing, field medical support,

engineering, or linguist units, or make small force contributions that

would have disproportionate political significance. In most cases, however,

greater allied force contributions would require additional U.S. support in

areas such as lift, sustainment, or C3. Furthermore, the ability of allied

forces to meet CINC timelines would depend on whether forces were already involved in other contingencies as well as on unit readiness, geography, and lift availability. Allied force contributions would, moreover, be offered on a case-by-case basis.

The working group concluded, therefore, that it is important to pursue greater reliance on those allies who can make militarily significant

force contributions to the major wars of the future. However, in the near
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 229

term, such contributions are not likely to be large enough, certain

enough, or self-supporting enough to enable corresponding U.S. force reductions unless there is a dramatic change in assessment of what specific

allies can bring to the table. Therefore, the working group offers the following recommendations for the next QDR:

■ The United States should open a bilateral dialogue with those allies potentially willing and able to make militarily significant force contributions to

a major war, aimed at securing a formal commitment to providing forces

in a particular scenario.

■ If such a commitment is made, the United States should conduct integrated operational planning and should determine the impacts of an ally’s

force contributions on U.S. force requirements.

■ The United States should develop and pursue initiatives, such as the Defense Capabilities Initiative, to enhance the potential future force contributions of other allies and partners to major wars and other coalition

operations.6

Meeting Concurrent Warfighting and Homeland

Security Requirements

The DOD provides critical support to civilian agencies for a variety of

homeland security missions. In some cases, such as consequence management in response to WMD terrorism on U.S. soil, the primary contribution by the military would be its specialized assets designed to deal with

chemical or biological incidents.7 However, many of these assets also

would be crucial to the U.S. ability to fight and win a major war abroad

and probably would be deployed early to support CINC warplans. Given

that the most likely time for a domestic WMD terrorism event to occur is

just before or during the execution of a major war, the Pentagon needs to

assess whether the United States can meet homeland security requirements at the same time it is fighting one or more major wars.

This recommendation applies not only to domestic consequence

management but also to the full range of potential DOD homeland security missions. The challenge for QDR planners is, first, to assess the requirements for supporting the full range of homeland security missions

concurrently with fighting and winning one or more major wars, and second, to assess whether the pool of military assets that would be dualtasked in such cases should be enlarged. Failure to do so could force the

President to choose between denying adequate DOD support in response
230 QDR 2001

to a major domestic crisis and denying one of the CINCs what is needed

to fight and win a major war abroad at an acceptable level of risk.

Based on our analysis of this issue, the working group offers the following recommendations for the QDR:

■ Identify the full range of potential DOD missions in support of homeland security.

■ Develop the necessary planning factors (assumptions about types and

concurrency of missions) and assess the associated DOD requirements.

■ Identify areas of overlap between DOD homeland security requirements

and warfighting requirements.

■ Compare the combined requirements to programmed force structure to

determine whether additional forces or capabilities are required to meet

both homeland security and warfighting requirements concurrently.

■ Determine which assets (most likely the Reserve components) could be

converted or reoriented to meet the above requirements.

Size and Composition of the Strategic Reserve

In principle, the size and composition of the strategic reserve—those

forces that are not directly tasked in critical contingency plans—should be

tailored to the requirements of a given defense strategy. In practice, however, much of the strategic reserve has been protected in past defense reviews because of its strong political support in state houses and on Capitol

Hill. Since the end of the Cold War, parts of this force have retained a large

infrastructure and force structure inconsistent with the most pressing military challenges. This continuing inconsistency puts the question of the size

and composition of the strategic reserve back on the table in the next QDR.

The four primary strategy alternatives outlined in chapters 5 and 13

would have different implications for the size and composition of the

strategic reserve. Strategy A would size and structure the strategic reserve for three primary functions: to provide forces capable of ensuring

success in major wars more demanding or prolonged than anticipated,

to substitute for forces committed to contingency operations, and to

provide specialized forces committed to homeland security missions. In

a resource-constrained environment, this strategy would call for converting underutilized or low-demand elements of the strategic reserve

to fill critical shortfalls in warfighting capability or to enlarge the pool

of assets available to support homeland security missions.

Strategy B would focus the strategic reserve primarily on homeland security, building its capability to support missions such as territorial defense,
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 231

domestic consequence management, critical infrastructure protection, and

other activities in support of domestic civil authorities. Its secondary mission would be to provide a hedge against a more difficult or prolonged

major war. Accordingly, this strategy would call for reorientation and significant streamlining of the strategic reserve to meet these two challenges.

Strategy C would focus the strategic reserve on providing additional

warfighting capability in the event that a second major war is more difficult or prolonged than expected. It would convert any elements not identified as part of this hedge to address critical warfighting capability shortfalls. It also would increase the modernization and readiness of those

reserve elements tasked in warplans or identified as part of the warfighting hedge to improve their ability to meet CINC requirements.

Strategy D would maintain a much smaller strategic reserve oriented

primarily toward augmenting active component forces in long-term presence, engagement, and SSC operations. Under this strategy, the primary

purpose of the strategic reserve would be tempo relief for the active force

in unusual circumstances. A secondary focus would be providing support

to civil authorities for homeland security. This strategy probably would require a large active-duty force structure with more capability that could be

diverted in time of emergency. Thus, the combat capability of the strategic

reserve could be substantially reduced, based on the belief that a strategy

of fuller engagement would provide greater strategic warning of emerging

threats and perhaps even prevent a second MTW from ever occurring.

Based on this assessment, the working group recommends that QDR

planners develop strategy-driven options for the size and composition of

the strategic reserve and assess the following factors for each option:

■ Ability to support the strategy’s priorities for strategic reserve;

■ Associated risks, given the strategy’s priorities;

■ Robustness to meet priority missions at the state (rather than federal)

level; and

■ Potential costs or savings.

Investment Priorities

The four primary strategy alternatives described in chapter 5 also

have widely divergent implications for the objectives and priorities of

DOD investment in science and technology, research and development,

and procurement.

Strategies A and C would balance the objectives of urgent recapitalization for parts of the force with long-term transformation of the force
232 QDR 2001

overall to meet future challenges, such as the potential rise of a near-peer

competitor in 2025 or beyond, or the nearer-term prospect of the use of

antiaccess strategies and asymmetric means by regional adversaries. In

short, both of these strategies would aim to balance funding among S&T,

R&D, current acquisition programs, new starts, concept development and

experimentation, and critical warfighting enhancements.

Strategy B would, instead, accelerate funding for more transformational systems and units aimed at maintaining U.S. military superiority in

the face of a future near-peer competitor or a lesser adversary who employs

antiaccess strategies or asymmetric means. Characteristics of transformational systems would include integrated architecture, extended ranges, reduced manning, increased mobility, enhanced precision, and stealth. Strategy B would reduce or cancel buys of nontransformational systems to free

up resources for its higher priorities such as increased investment in S&T,

more robust concept development and experimentation, and new starts

such as national missile defense.

Strategy D would adopt a very different set of modernization priorities. It would reduce or cancel buys of more expensive, high-end transformational systems in order to recapitalize or systematically replace aging

platforms to maintain a larger force. Strategy D would favor procurement

of additional numbers of proven systems, upgrades to existing platforms

and systems, service life extension programs, capability enhancements

such as improvements to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, precision munitions enhancements, and force protection improvements. To the extent

that it would invest in transformation, it would focus on the low end of

the operational spectrum, such as new concepts and capabilities for conducting smaller-scale contingencies.

Based on this assessment, the working group offers the following recommendations for the QDR:

■ Identify strategy-based objectives that should drive science and technology, research and development, and acquisition decisions.

■ Develop strategy-driven options for DOD investment.

■ Assess investment in specific systems and capabilities according to these

objectives and tailor specific options accordingly.

■ Assess near-term risks, long-term risks, and opportunity costs of each

option.

■ Determine the costs (or cost savings) of each option.
FORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES 233

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined potential force structure and capability issues that are worthy of more detailed analysis by QDR planners. Some of

these issues are contentious because they challenge the conventional wisdom, raise fundamental questions regarding service roles and missions,

or challenge fiercely guarded rice bowls. Nevertheless, the QDR working

group believes that these areas warrant a harder look with more time,

depth, and analytic support than the working group was able to devote to

them. In any archaeological dig, the early sifting will yield both gold and

dross. It will be the task of QDR 2001 decisionmakers to decide which of

these issues are worthy of greater analysis and ultimately action.

Notes1 DOD recently conducted an extensive internal assessment of mobility requirements, the Mobility Requirements Study, 2005 (known as MRS–05), which undoubtedly will provide the basis for

much of the Department’s analysis of these issues in the 2001 QDR. Our recommendations are meant

to supplement the work that has already been done in this area.

2 Impact on the first MTW was not investigated. The only consideration of prepositioning was

the assumption that an existing heavy division afloat was deployed to the first MTW and that once

these ships were offloaded, the additional strategic sealift would be available to move other forces

from the United States.

3 Our notional set of critical enhancements to address identified capability shortfalls was by no

means comprehensive. For example, any QDR assessment of potential candidates for increasing

combat effectiveness while reducing costs also would have to consider a variety of space-based assets

and capabilities.

4 This analysis was not able to capture some of the other factors that contribute significantly to

operations and personnel tempo, such as training away from home station and peacetime military

engagement activities.

5 Because of the model’s design constraints, not all unit types were tracked and analyzed for

each service. As a result, the outputs are representative rather than comprehensive: other parts of the

force (for example, tankers or lift) might also be high-demand units.

6 For more on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report

on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, March 2000, II–2—II–3.

7 Among these specialized assets are chemical companies, biological incident detection system

platoons, technical escort units and their chemical-biological response teams, and chemical-biological incident response force units.

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Chapter Nine

The Future of U.S. Overseas

Presence

by Roger Cliff, Sam J. Tangredi, and Christine E. Wormuth

Blessed by favorable geography, sound defense policies, and a propitious history, the United States has not had to fight a major war on

American soil against a foreign power for over 187 years.1 Instead,

it has been involved in conflicts ranging from smaller-scale contingencies

to global wars that have taken place in international seas and airspace or

on the territory of allies or opponents. Considering the physical devastation that war can bring—to say nothing of the military and civilian casualties—the fact that conflicts have been conducted away from the U.S.

homeland can be considered one of the more fortunate aspects of the

American experience.

But this did not occur by grace alone. For much of its existence, the

United States has maintained an overseas military presence in an effort to

prevent hostilities from reaching North America. For this reason—and in

response to American involvement in conflicts overseas, most notably the

Second World War—the contemporary U.S. military has been structured

primarily as a power-projection force.2

However, projecting power into a distant theater without military

forces already in place to slow the enemy advance, and protecting the infrastructure required to receive the incoming friendly forces and the

forces themselves until they can establish their own defenses, are extremely difficult.

Moreover, the actual deterrent effect of a robust power-projection capability never has been particularly clear. During the Cold War, the United

States stationed a considerable share of its active-duty forces overseas to

act as both the means of facilitating the arrival of U.S. power-projection

forces and as a deterrent to the actual outbreak of conflict. U.S. forces were

stationed at the Fulda Gap in Germany and in other places in Europe and

in Turkey to be able to respond immediately to a Warsaw Pact attack and

235
236 QDR 2001

to buy time for the mobilization of other NATO forces and the projection

of forces from the continental United States. They also were intended to be

a deterrent to war in the event of an expanding crisis. U.S. forces stationed

in Asia, notably Japan and Korea, also served as a deterrent to possible

crises or, as in the case of Korea, more immediate ones.

The forward positioning of naval forces within regions of potential

crisis has been a U.S. policy since long before the Cold War. This naval

version of overseas presence, independently known as naval presence or

forward presence, has been an integral part of American diplomacy and

has functioned to protect American access to foreign trade. During the

Cold War, the deterrent element of naval forward presence was emphasized. A key difference is that naval forces operating at sea effectively are

sovereign U.S. territory under the law of the sea, while the stationing of

land-based forces overseas is subject to the desires of the host nation and

is governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements.3

With the end of the Cold War, some have questioned the need to station extensive U.S. forces overseas, particularly the land-based forces

whose status-of-forces agreements require periodic renewal—a procedure

that sometimes involves contentious diplomatic effort. Removing U.S.

forces from overseas locations sometimes is seen as a potential cost savings; however, given the financial and material support that overseas

forces receive from several key host-nation allies, this belief may be false.

At the same time that the end of the Cold War may have called the policy

into question, the United States has taken on an additional overseas presence commitment by stationing forces in the Arabian Gulf region in the

wake of Operation Desert Storm. Such U.S. forces are meant to deter renewed aggression by Iraq or potential action by Iran, and to maintain the

United Nations (UN) sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. overseas presence force posture will be examined as a part of

the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. This chapter examines the policies and issues of the stationing of U.S. forces in three particular regions:

Europe, the Pacific, and the Arabian Gulf. The primary purpose is to

identify options for the Bush administration to consider when crafting

the overseas presence portion of its defense policy. The sections that follow describe—for each of the three regions—the current U.S. posture,

emerging regional missions for the presence forces, the potential mismatches of posture and policy that have developed in the past decade,

and the possible political impact of changes to the current force posture.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 237

Europe

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. forces in Europe numbered close

to 325,000. Stationed mainly in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy,

these forces served two major purposes. First, American forces on European soil were a physical symbol of the U.S. commitment to the security

of Europe. Second, had a war with the Soviet Union broken out, these

forces were the first line of defense. With the dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact and later the Soviet Union itself, the rationale for maintaining Cold

War force levels in Europe no longer existed. DOD began reviewing force

levels in Europe in 1991 and then began the largest drawdown of activeduty forces from Europe since permanently stationing troops there in the

late 1940s.

U.S. Interests

In addition to the continuing U.S. commitment to NATO, economic,

political, and cultural ties to Europe remain strong—and are perhaps the

strongest in the global community. Trade between the United States and

European nations totals over $1 billion daily. Europe shares American democratic political and social values and is its strongest military and diplomatic partner in working to strengthen the international community. At

the same time, the experience of two global wars with origins in European conflicts makes the commitment to supporting peace in Europe a

foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Much has changed since the collapse of

the Soviet Union, but a stable and secure Europe remains important to

the United States. Therefore, the United States will remain seriously engaged in European affairs, and the Armed Forces will be an important

tool in the transatlantic relationship.

About 100,000 military personnel remain permanently stationed in

Europe. The majority of them are members of elements of larger units

that were stationed there during the Cold War. Although most U.S. forces

in Europe are still stationed at Cold War-era bases, the missions that these

forces perform have changed in nature and increased in number since the

fall of the Berlin Wall. Using a force posture that was designed to meet

outdated needs has created what some consider a mismatch between requirements and forces. Tempo challenges and difficulties associated with

SSC operations such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo are, at least in part, manifestations of the

strains thus generated.
238 QDR 2001

In the last 5 years, forces under the Commander in Chief, Europe

Command, have conducted nine noncombatant operations, patrols of

three no-fly zones, two major humanitarian assistance operations, nine

peace enforcement operations, and two major coercive air campaigns.

These forces also have conducted innumerable exercises with NATO allies

and partners, military-to-military contact programs, training and education programs, and other engagement activities. As they were during the

Cold War, most of these forces are stationed in Britain, Germany, and

Italy. In addition to permanently stationed forces, the Navy and Marine

Corps are regularly deployed to the European theater, and the headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Fleet is located in the Mediterranean. The United

States also has maintained forces on the ground in Bosnia and Hungary,

since 1995. U.S. European Command (EUCOM), headquartered in

Stuttgart, and the forces assigned to it are responsible for monitoring and

responding to events in all of Europe, including many of the former Soviet republics, as well as countries in North Africa and the sub-Saharan

region. U.S. military personnel in Europe today are busier than ever before, and although they have done an admirable job advancing U.S. objectives in Europe, the United States would be better served by a force posture designed specifically to address the existing and likely future security

environment in that region.

Potential Challenges

The former Soviet Union no longer dominates the threat scenario for

Europe, but it will present challenges and risks for the United States and

its NATO allies for at least the next 10 years. The evolution of Russia and

its relationship with the Alliance, efforts by NATO to adapt to the new

strategic environment, continuing instability in the Balkans, and the

growing threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons dominate the

security environment in Europe.

Russia no longer poses a major threat to the stability of Europe, although its uneven and unpredictable evolution toward free markets and

democracy will affect the broader security environment for Europe. The

United States and its allies must be concerned about the potential spread

of NBC weapons and expertise from Russia and the other newly independent states that emerged from the end of the Cold War.

Although NATO also has changed since 1991 to meet new realities in

Europe, it remains the preeminent security mechanism for the continent.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched in 1999 to strengthen

allied military capabilities, and efforts to reinvigorate the European Security
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 239

and Defense Identity (ESDI) may further strengthen NATO ability to address European security challenges. The Alliance is likely to invite additional countries to join it in the next several years. NATO also will continue

broadening its focus beyond member territory to address instability in

southern Europe and threats posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons

and ballistic missiles in North African and the Middle East, and perhaps ultimately to deal with broader interests in the Persian Gulf area.

Many aspects of the current and future security environment in Europe are reasonably clear, but certain key variables will have a major impact on European security and the U.S. strategy toward Europe in the future. The future of Russia is the primary unknown with critical

implications for Europe and the United States. The United States and its

European allies and friends will be monitoring developments in Russia

very carefully, trying to strike a balance between assisting the Russian

transformation wherever possible and maintaining a clear-eyed perspective on its long-term strategic orientation. Whether the DCI and ESDI efforts are successful also may affect U.S.-European relations significantly. If

the Europeans succeed in improving their military capabilities, the nature

of U.S.-European roles in NATO may evolve considerably.

The deployment of a national missile defense would have profound

implications for European security. Many European nations argue that an

NMD system would fundamentally undermine the Western relationship

with Russia, particularly if the United States were to abrogate the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty to deploy the system. Europeans also fear that the

system could increase instability in regions such as Asia and could create

different zones of security in NATO in which some nations are more secure than others. Unless all allied nations were to move from shared vulnerability to shared invulnerability under a NATO-wide missile defense

system, many Europeans fear that the European members of the Alliance

could become detached from the United States. Finally, even if these European members were unanimous on the need for an NMD system, almost all of them have grave concerns about how to finance it. Although

many of these concerns can be managed as the United States deliberates

whether to deploy an NMD system, the issue will remain important in

the transatlantic relationship in the years to come.

New Missions

In light of this complex security picture, the United States will need

to maintain a strong partnership with its European allies and friends to

ensure that Europe remains strong, stable, and secure. The U.S. military
240 QDR 2001

will play an important role in maintaining and strengthening the health

of the transatlantic partnership.

In the last decade, the U.S. military has been on the leading edge of

establishing bilateral defense relations with many countries that formerly

were behind the Iron Curtain. American forces stationed in Europe or assigned to EUCOM are uniquely positioned to influence developments in

the European security environment positively. Engagement activities involving U.S. military personnel include exchange programs, exercises,

port visits, and regular assignments at NATO headquarters where American and partner-country personnel work side by side. These engagement

activities, coupled with the regular overseas presence in Europe, ensure

frequent and regular contact between U.S. forces and those from partner

countries. Such contact helps to develop bilateral defense relationships

and in many cases leads to productive collaboration on matters of mutual

security concern.

Through the Partnership for Peace program, the United States and its

allies seek to build positive relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries and the states of the former Soviet Union. American military personnel worked with their counterparts in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic to help prepare them to join NATO. American forces in Europe

also have worked closely with such nations as Ukraine, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and other partner countries, advising on how best to restructure and to reform their militaries and how to increase interoperability with NATO so that they can participate in peace operations such as

SFOR or the Kosovo Force.

Finally, U.S. forces stationed in Europe play an important role in ensuring strong defense relations among the allied countries themselves.

U.S. military personnel are stationed at NATO headquarters throughout

Europe as part of the integrated military command structure; U.S. personnel have served in roles from Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

to enlisted soldier in a ground unit committed to NATO operations.

American forces in Europe participate regularly in Alliance exercises and

also visit individual countries and conduct activities on a bilateral basis.

These regular interactions generate the trust and mutual understanding

that bind the NATO members to each other in times of crisis and that enable military forces from diverse nations to operate together during conflicts, such as the air campaign over Kosovo.

The major air operation over Kosovo in 1999 is just one example of

the many ways in which U.S. forces are called upon to respond to crises
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 241

in Europe and in neighboring regions such as Africa and the Persian

Gulf. American forces in Europe help to maintain stability in the

Balkans, conduct noncombatant evacuations following natural disasters

or violent political uprisings, and serve as peacekeepers after political

resolution of conflicts such as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. forces

in Europe are the foundation of the American Article V commitment to

its NATO allies, however unlikely such a contingency appears in the current security environment.

Precisely because the likelihood of an Article V conflict is, and is

likely to remain, so low in Europe, the primary role of U.S. forces there no

longer is to be the tripwire for a major land war against a powerful adversary. American forces today perform the critical shaping tasks that help to

maintain peace and stability in the region and are the U.S. first responders to conflicts that arise when shaping activities are unable to contain

violence. Bringing forces from the continental United States to participate

in exercises, exchange programs, and training activities is feasible, but the

quality and quantity of these activities would be significantly lower than

if in-theater forces are used. Forces in theater can exercise more frequently and longer because they do not have to spend time traveling

across the Atlantic. They also are better positioned to build relationships

with foreign counterparts because the same personnel can attend multiple events and develop substantive connections over time.

Similarly, forces in theater are better able to respond quickly to

emerging conflicts than forces stationed in the United States. Operation

Allied Force would have been significantly less effective if all or even a significant portion of the U.S. troops and equipment were required to be

transported from the United States. Operations such as noncombatant

evacuations, no-fly zone patrols, shows of force, and other SSCs would be

much more difficult if the only forces available for such operations had to

be brought from the United States. Many SSCs in the region and in surrounding areas might become more serious conflicts.

American forces in Europe not only are concerned with current engagement activities and crises, but they also must focus on preparing to

deal with tomorrow’s challenges. Troops will be transforming themselves

as part of the ongoing evolution of the U.S. military and will play an essential role in encouraging transformation within the militaries of NATO

allies. A strong transatlantic relationship is essential to ensuring that

NATO allies continue to improve their military capabilities. If the relationship begins to deteriorate, the Europeans may move toward maintaining
242 QDR 2001

only the basic military capabilities needed to address security problems in

the immediate area.

Some might argue that a greatly reduced American presence in Europe would force the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their

own security, but past experience indicates that the Europeans might instead choose not to address important security concerns—as happened in

the early years of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. European nations

with only minimal capabilities would be in no position to join the United

States in coalitions of the willing to address larger security threats outside

the European area. A significant American military presence in Europe is

essential to demonstrating the enduring nature of the transatlantic relationship and to providing a continuing incentive for the Europeans to ensure that their military forces can operate effectively with the U.S. military

in the future.

The internal transformation process, the Defense Capabilities Initiative, is the cornerstone of the Alliance effort to reinvent itself for the future. Energetic U.S. participation in DCI will be important, but the European members of the Alliance will ultimately determine its success.

Current budget constraints in Europe are a major hurdle to significant improvements in European military capabilities. As the Europeans try to surmount this obstacle, U.S. forces in Europe will need to manage their own

transformation process to avoid widening the capability gap between

themselves and other NATO forces. The United States will not want to

compromise its own military capabilities to remain interoperable with its

allies, but it will want to avoid exacerbating the types of interoperability

problems that were evident during the air war over Kosovo, such as the

lack of compatible secure communications, of all-weather-capable European attack aircraft, and of European precision-guided munitions. The Alliance was able to manage these problems during the Kosovo conflict, but

if NATO had to confront a more capable adversary than the Serbian military, such problems could prove to be a serious weakness. Finding creative

strategies to remain sufficiently interoperable with its allies while avoiding

dumbing down its own transformation process will be one of the more

challenging tasks facing the United States in the future.

New Forces

The missions of U.S. forces in Europe have changed: containment is

out, and engagement is in. Balkan peace enforcement operations in which

NATO troops and Russian soldiers work side by side have replaced preparations for a clash of the titans on the battlefields of Central Europe.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 243

However, the types of forces that the United States maintains in Europe

have not kept pace with the changed missions. To alleviate readiness and

retention concerns and to give U.S. forces the tools that they need to perform their missions more effectively, the United States should reshape its

forces in Europe to be more deployable, sustainable, and flexible, and less

oriented overall toward heavy combat operations.

Because the U.S. force structure in Europe still reflects its Cold Warera configuration, it is not designed to move troops quickly over long distances to a conflict. Ground forces in Europe are particularly cumbersome to deploy to relatively distant and primitively equipped staging

areas such as Taszar in southeastern Europe or the staging areas in Albania used during Operation Allied Force. Ferrying the 10,300 pieces of

equipment the Army requested for Task Force Hawk in Albania during

the Kosovo operation required 550 C–17 flights. This cargo included

M1A1 Abrams tanks (which are too heavy for most roads in Albania), 37

Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters to support the 24 Apache helicopters

that made up Task Force Hawk, and approximately 6,200 troops sent to

the base in Tirana to support the task force. Although the Army eventually transported all the equipment to Tirana, it faced major obstacles

along the way: record rainfall, thigh-high mud, and primitive landing

pads at the Rinas airport. Conditions such as these probably will be the

rule rather than the exception in future operations in Europe.

Responding to specific criticism of its performance in Kosovo and to

the broader argument that it is too slow and risks becoming irrelevant to

modern conflicts, the Army has begun a transformation process with the

goal of developing a mix of light, medium, and heavy forces. The centerpiece of this transformation process is development by 2003 of three to

five rapidly deployable interim brigades with new medium-weight,

wheeled assault vehicles. Army weapons designers hope to design a future

combat system to replace the Abrams tank by 2010. Such a transformation, if successful, would greatly improve the ability of U.S. ground forces

in Europe to respond effectively to future security challenges.

By contrast, naval forces assigned to EUCOM are inherently highly deployable. Naval assets such as an amphibious ready group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or a carrier battle group are valuable assets that are

used frequently to respond to fast-breaking developments. Naval assets are

relatively scarce, however, so a carrier battle group is assigned to EUCOM

for only 270 days a year and the MEU for just 300 days a year. Carrier battle groups are particularly scarce assets, and without a significant increase
244 QDR 2001

to the U.S. defense budget, the Navy is not likely to build additional carriers beyond what already is envisioned in the defense program. At a minimum, a comprehensive policy review of how naval assets are allocated

globally would ensure that the United States is applying these scarce assets

as wisely as possible.

Another problem is that much of the U.S. force structure in Europe is

oriented toward theater warfighting rather than the types of missions the

military in Europe is now called upon to perform. In light of existing

mission requirements in Europe and the fact that much of the heavy

combat force required for a major theater war in a region such as the Persian Gulf could come from the continental United States, shifting the balance of forces based in Europe from heavy combat units toward mediumweight units and combat support and combat service support units

should be considered. Eliminating combat-heavy forces in Europe altogether would be extremely unwise, but exchanging some portion of the

existing heavy brigades for the new medium-weight units would greatly

enhance the Army ability to address current threats in Europe effectively.

These units would be able to move more quickly to a conflict than today’s

heavy units, but they also would retain sufficient combat power and force

protection measures to maintain their combat effectiveness. A partial shift

away from heavy combat units also would enable the United States to

field more support units in Europe; these units perform many of the missions needed for SSCs. Medical, construction, and communications units,

as well as the entire range of special operations forces stationed in Europe, are experiencing particularly high operational tempo rates. Increasing the number of support units in this theater would better equip the

force structure to meet future challenges.

Although the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is growing

significantly, U.S. forces in Europe do not yet have a significant capability

to defend against such threats or to operate in a WMD environment.

American forces in Europe and worldwide need better protective gear and

chemical and biological weapons detectors and a robust theater missile

defense (TMD) system to protect them from missile threats on the periphery of Europe. The United States already is working to field this

equipment, but it may need to place an even higher priority on this part

of the defense program. Similarly, the U.S. military has made significant

strides in integrating awareness of WMD threats into its program and

planning processes in the last several years, but this issue still is not taken
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 245

into account sufficiently as the Pentagon determines its future requirements and budget needs.

Political Implications

Adapting the U.S. force presence in Europe to suit future security

needs better not only makes military sense, but it also makes political

sense both here and in Europe. A thoughtful, well-implemented plan to

restructure forces in Europe would reassure European allies of the continued commitment by the United States to their security.

A well-structured American military presence in Europe, improved

European military capabilities, and Congressional and public support for

U.S. involvement in European security are inextricably linked. The NATO

DCI, which is critical to bringing about real improvements in European

military capabilities, will not succeed without strong American support

and leadership. In order to lead effectively in Europe, the United States

will need to be able to demonstrate, through a force structure configured

to deal with the real challenges Europe faces, that it is committed to preserving European security. The United States will need Congressional

support for transforming its forces in Europe, but if European NATO

members do not improve their military capabilities over the next several

years, Congressional support for future American involvement in European security affairs will waver. Legislative burdensharing provisions will

proliferate and become more stringent, and the drive to move troops out

of Europe altogether could gain significant momentum.

If managed properly, however, adapting U.S. forces in Europe could

help push these interrelated trends into an upward rather than a downward spiral. An adapted U.S. force posture in Europe would reassure

NATO allies that America remains seriously committed to helping Europe

preserve its security and would provide a significant opportunity for the

United States to lead by example in building support for the DCI. If, for

example, the United States were to station medium-weight interim Army

brigades in Germany, it would help the German government make the

case to its own public and Parliament for lightening its extremely heavy

combat structure, which is essential to making the German military more

relevant for future operations.

Restructuring aspects of the U.S. military presence in Europe also

would provide an opportunity to reevaluate American and allied roles. A

fundamental review of defense roles can realistically take place only when

NATO members are confident that new capabilities exist to support new

responsibilities. A serious dialogue on this issue would reduce suspicions
246 QDR 2001

on both sides of the ESDI debate. Such a dialogue will be essential to ensuring that the effort to flesh out a common foreign and security policy

for Europe does not become a zero-sum game, pitting the European

Union against NATO. A newly balanced division of labor within the Alliance would strengthen both European support for NATO and Congressional support for continued American involvement in Europe by disarming critics who charge that the Europeans are content to let the

United States shoulder the burden on security issues.

The Middle East

The U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and particularly in the

Arabian Gulf, is historically and quantitatively different than its presence

in Europe. An average of 15,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed—

most rotationally or temporarily—within the region. Much of this presence is naval, and the permanent footprint is relatively small. Support for

the flow of follow-on forces exists primarily in the form of prepositioned

war material, along with earmarked afloat prepositioned equipment on

board ships anchored at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The use of Diego Garcia is a helpful legacy of the Cold War, as is the

rotational deployment of naval forces with a small U.S. fleet headquarters

permanently located in Bahrain. But much of the additional access to

supporting infrastructure is the result of U.S. leadership of the multinational coalition that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and most of the

personnel within the region have an ongoing military mission in maintaining UN sanctions against the rogue regime of Saddam Hussein. This

mission gives much of the U.S. land-based presence in the region a very

temporary flavor. Symbolic of this is the fact that the headquarters for

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is located near Tampa, Florida, not

in the Middle East.

Unlike Europe, the host nations within the region do not have permanent defense treaties with the United States, and they traditionally

have been suspicious of the stationing of any foreign forces on their territory. Although Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar,

Oman, and especially Kuwait desire a continuing and strong defense relationship with the United States, political and cultural concerns associated

with Islamic fundamentalism dampen their overt support for anything

that might appear to indicate a permanent U.S.—or other non-Muslim—

presence. Presumably, the end of the UN sanctions or the replacement of

the Saddam Hussein regime by another Iraqi government might lead to a
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 247

regional desire for reductions in U.S. land-based presence, but this impulse might be mitigated by concerns about potential aggression by Iran.

Another element that shadows the regional view of U.S. presence is

long-term American support for Israel. In the wake of the Mideast peace

process and the Gulf War, this shadow is not as big as it was in the 1970s

and 1980s. However, the continuing potential for Arab-Israeli conflict and

the unrest of the Palestinians often are used as premises for unofficial

(and sometimes official) anti-U.S. presence sentiment.

The bottom line is that a clear and evident requirement—deterring

Saddam Hussein or a potentially aggressive Iran—exists for the U.S. presence in the region. Ongoing operations include patrol of the two no-fly

zones by coalition air forces. Preventing genocidal acts against minority

populations such as the Kurds and deterring the proliferation of WMD

are justifications for a reassuring U.S. presence, as is protection of the

flow of oil from the Gulf region. However, political limits on the size of

that presence constrain and channel CENTCOM planning for the possibility of a major theater war.

U.S. Interests

Perhaps the best way to assess the current and future requirement for

a U.S. military presence in the region is to determine what the long-term

U.S. interests are. The Secretary of Defense has identified U.S. interests in

terms of “peace, where access to strategic natural resources at stable prices

is unhindered and free markets are expanding.” 4 Historically, American

interests in the region have revolved around trade. Such interests predate

the discovery of Middle East oil, but the dominance of the British Empire

in the Gulf region limited American commercial involvement until after

the Second World War. The British decision to withdraw all military

forces from east of Aden in the early 1970s effectively ceded outside support for Arabian Gulf security to the United States.

The prospect of a permanent peace between Arabs and Israelis, curtailing threats to regional security by Iraq and Iran, and deterring proliferation or use of WMD appear to be necessary components for Gulf security. Achieving these goals also would eliminate much of the near-term

threat to access. However, the flow of oil and transit through the Strait of

Hormuz (and the Suez Canal) would remain an American strategic interest. Securing this interest would require a long-term (primarily maritime)

presence that would closely resemble the U.S. regional presence before

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
248 QDR 2001

Promoting democratic governance often is cited as a significant element of the engagement activities of U.S. military forces overseas. But

some inherent contradictions exist in this mission for CENTCOM, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, which does not have a tradition of democracy. Indeed, most U.S. allies in the region cannot be considered parliamentary democracies, although the degree of popular participation in

government varies from state to state. Having democracy become firmly

rooted in states throughout the Middle East may be a long-term U.S. and

global interest, but the short-term result might be a regional instability

that allows demagogues and populist dictators to overthrow the more

moderate existing regimes. This possibility makes the near-term goals of

U.S. presence in the region much narrower than its goals in Europe and

East Asia.

Challenges and Implications

Barring heightened fears prompted by an act of overt aggression, regional leaders appear to have no incentive to ask for any increase in U.S.

military presence. Likewise, because rotational naval forces operating in

international waters or temporarily deployed air or land forces conduct

much of the presence mission, no direct incentive exists to call for a reduction in U.S. regional presence. Fundamentalist anti-presence sentiment is focused against land-basing of what are viewed as “crusader”

forces, implying that the presence of Western troops in the 21st century

somehow is analogous to occupation of the Holy Land by Christian

knights during the Middle Ages. Traditional enmities, even those that

defy Western logic, remain.

However, changes in the nature of the potential threats within the region, notably the development of longer-range ballistic missiles potentially armed with WMD, may require changes in the form of U.S. presence posture. The development of antiaccess systems, including Iranian

interest in acquiring antiship missiles and mines and developing a viable

submarine force, appears to increase the range of potential threats to

maritime forces. The October 2000 terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden

harbor in Yemen has renewed public concerns about the adequacy of

force protection for U.S. military personnel in the region.

All these developments suggest an increasing regional requirement

for TMD, chemical and biological detection defense systems, and improved methods of force protection. Although host-nation militaries

could undertake certain of these improvements, many of them would

need to be provided by U.S. forces. Without an increase in the number of
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 249

presence forces, this shift could require a change in their mix, substituting

force protection units for other combat forces.

Another option would be an increase in naval presence, particularly

proposed TMD-capable surface ships, or a focus on amphibious capability in lieu of land-based ground forces. Alternatively, increases in longrange strike systems stationed just outside the region (such as at Diego

Garcia) could replace the emphasis on presence. However, a concurrent

reduction in visible regional presence might have a very severe and deleterious political effect, eroding both deterrence and regional support for

American interests.

Paradoxically, increasing force protection might reduce the regional

engagement that U.S. presence forces currently conduct. The attack on

USS Cole prompted questions about the need for U.S. military engagement with Yemen, a state not known for political stability or support for

Western interests. Another issue has been the potential disparity between

enhanced protection for the Armed Forces in the event of a WMD threat

and the minimal or nonexistent protection afforded to the populations of

the host nations by their own governments. One concern is the destruction of the host-nation support personnel and infrastructure needed for

the entry of follow-on power projection forces. This concern could tilt the

focus from force protection toward civilian population protection, which

would necessitate some changes in the types of presence forces stationed

in the region.

Such issues point to the complexity of maintaining a presence in a region where it is seen as but a temporary solution to current conditions.

U.S. interests in the Middle East would appear to continue to revolve

around resources and free markets. Although presence supports the stability of current governments in the region, it also attracts the ire of Muslim fundamentalists. This imbalance renders quite uncertain the longrange prospects of a contribution by a permanent land-based presence to

democratic engagement and enlargement, previously a continuing goal of

U.S. foreign policy.

Asia-Pacific Region

U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is largely the legacy

of two half-century-ago wars: World War II and the Korean War.5 As a result of these wars, the United States established and has maintained substantial forces in South Korea and Japan. Throughout the Cold War, these

forces helped deter not only North Korean but also Soviet aggression in
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Northeast Asia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these forces continue to serve as a deterrent to North Korean aggression. However, the regional security paradigm is changing. Although predictions of the imminent demise of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have proven to

be exaggerations, the country’s long-term viability remains questionable,

and a fundamental change in the security equation on the Korean Peninsula is likely to occur within the next decade. Meanwhile, Chinese military capabilities are steadily increasing, with no sign that Beijing intends

to give up its authoritarian system of government or its threats to use

force against Taiwan under certain circumstances. In South Asia, both

India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, raising the specter of nuclear war on the subcontinent.

These changes to the Asian security environment offer the United

States an appropriate time to reassess its security posture in the region

and consider what changes it ought to undertake. If major changes to U.S.

posture are needed, time will be required to build the necessary political

consensus and then to implement the changes. The movements in the

Asia-Pacific region may appear to be occurring at the pace of continental

drift, but as the tectonic plates of the security environment grind past

each other, they could suddenly slip—fundamentally altering the landscape before the United States has prepared adequately for change.

U.S. Interests

To secure its fundamental interests of maintaining the territorial, political, and social integrity of the United States, ensuring the lives and

safety of its people, and promoting the prosperity of the Nation and its

people, the United States pursues a number of specific goals. These include

preventing the emergence of a hostile power capable of threatening these

fundamental interests, deterring aggression against U.S. friends and allies,

promoting the growth of democracy throughout the world, ensuring U.S.

economic access to important markets, commodities, and trading partners, and preventing the spread of dangerous military technologies. In the

Asia-Pacific region, only three countries appear to have the potential to

rival the military capabilities of the United States in the next 50 years:

China, Japan, and India. At present, none of these countries is overtly hostile to U.S. interests—although Japan is the most friendly and China the

least—and none of them possesses anything comparable to U.S. military

capabilities. The goal for the United States with regard to these three countries, therefore, is twofold: ensuring that they remain friendly to the

United States, and ensuring that they do not develop military capabilities
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 251

that could challenge those of the United States. The more certain the

United States is of the friendliness of a nation, the more willing it is to accept the possession of significant military capabilities by that nation.

The United States has formal military alliances with Australia, Japan,

the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The United States has a more

ambiguous security commitment to Taiwan, as embodied in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The United States has a security relationship with Singapore that includes a small, permanent military presence there, which

brings with it an implied interest in Singapore’s security. America also enjoys friendly relations with a number of other countries in the region and

would not like to see their sovereignty or independence threatened by a

country hostile to the United States.

Democratization is an ongoing trend in the Asia-Pacific region; South

Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have enjoyed democratic transitions

in the last 15 years, and other states also are taking steps in the direction

of democracy. Many countries still are not fully democratic, however, and

some, such as China, Vietnam, and Burma, remain authoritarian dictatorships. The continuation of the democratic systems in those states that are

already democracies, and the democratization of those that are not, particularly China, are important U.S. interests in the region. Fortunately,

two of the three states with the potential to become major military powers—Japan and India—already are full-fledged democracies.

Although the United States remains dissatisfied with its access to the

markets of many countries in the region, particularly China and Japan, the

Asia-Pacific region is a vital trading partner of the United States, with

transpacific trade well exceeding transatlantic trade. American companies

also have more than $100 billion invested in the region. Any attempt to

create an exclusionary trading bloc that denied economic access to important U.S. trading partners in the region (particularly Japan, China, South

Korea, or Taiwan), or actions that imperiled the economies of major trading partners, would threaten the vital national interests.

The spread of dangerous military technologies also is a concern in the

Asia-Pacific region. Several countries (China, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) already possess nuclear weapons. Some of these countries are attempting to increase their arsenals, and other states may be attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well. A number of regional states

are suspected of possessing chemical or biological weapons, and several

(China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan) are upgrading their ballistic

and cruise missile capabilities. These technologies in the hands of some
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countries, such as India, are not a direct threat to the United States, but

the more countries that possess them, the greater the likelihood that they

will spread to countries that are a direct threat to the United States. China

and North Korea, in particular, indiscriminately will transfer nuclear and

missile technology to any country willing to pay for it, and the mere

demonstration effect of India and Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons

may encourage other countries to pursue them as well. Moreover, the actual use of a nuclear weapon in war would break the nuclear taboo that

has been in effect in 1945, increasing the likelihood of subsequent use—a

development that clearly would counter the interests of the United States

(or almost any other country). The United States, therefore, has a strong

interest in preventing the further spread or development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology in the Asia-Pacific region.

Potential Challenges

The most prominent of several possible developments that could

threaten U.S. regional interests remains conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

The possibility that North Korea could launch an attack on South

Korea—perhaps as an attempt by Pyongyang to maintain its hold on

power by creating a national emergency—remains real, if apparently remote. A more likely scenario would be the collapse of the North Korean

state, which probably would result in the intervention of South Korean

and American forces to restore order. If China also intervened (perhaps

because of refugee flows into Manchuria), the danger of conflict between

China and the United States or South Korea would arise. The United

States already is well positioned to deal with any contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, however, and none of these scenarios seem to require a

change in U.S. force posture.

The possibility of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is of increasing concern. Although Beijing seems to have come to terms temporarily with the

Taiwanese election of a president from the pro-independence Democratic

Progressive Party, China has not given up its claim to the island and continues to assert its right to use force to recover it. Considering current

Chinese military capabilities, which are unlikely to change significantly in

the immediate future, any attempt to invade the island almost certainly

would fail. Nonetheless, evidence indicates that Beijing hopes to force a

resolution of the Taiwan issue by the year 2005 or so. If attempts at peaceful persuasion fail, some form of coercion using air and missile attacks or

a naval blockade would be more likely than an outright invasion.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 253

China also could attempt to use military means to enforce its claims to

the islands of the South China Sea. So far China has adopted a patient approach in resolving these disputes, but it could come into conflict over the

islands with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, or Taiwan. Rather than an

outright attempt by one country to evict another from an island it occupies, the most likely scenario is a clash at sea. Such a conflict might occur

as a result of countries attempting to enforce claims to territorial waters or

of one country attempting to prevent another from landing on an unoccupied island (such as Fiery Cross Reef in 1988) or reinforcing an existing

garrison. Conflict among claimants other than China, although less likely,

also is a possibility. The use of force against an ally such as the Philippines

would be a threat to national interests, and even if a U.S. ally were not involved, naval conflict in the South China Sea could disrupt shipping

through some of the world’s most important shipping routes.

Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be detrimental to U.S.

interests as well. Although neither country is an ally or important economic partner of the United States, nuclear war would be a huge humanitarian and environmental catastrophe. More significantly from a strategic

perspective, the demonstration effect of the use of nuclear weapons and

the breaking of the nuclear taboo could increase the likelihood that other

countries that already possess nuclear weapons might also use them. Likewise, states that do not already possess nuclear weapons could be encouraged to seek to acquire them.

Other interstate conflicts in the region are conceivable, although less

likely. Developments other than interstate conflict also could be detrimental to national interests. An attempt by a regional power such as

China to dominate part or all of the region politically would be one example. Such action could weaken American influence over its allies and

friends in the region, thus undermining overall U.S. power and security

while augmenting the power and influence of a country that could

threaten the United States. Regional domination accompanied by trading

policies that discriminated against the United States would threaten U.S.

economic interests as well.

Any weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance would be a serious concern

for America. A Japan that no longer enjoyed a close security relationship

with the United States would be likely to increase its military capabilities

in order to protect its interests in the region. This buildup, in turn, might

cause other countries—such as China or Korea—to feel threatened and to

bolster their own military capabilities in response. A weakening of the
254 QDR 2001

U.S.-Japan alliance probably would increase pressure for the United States

to withdraw its forces currently stationed in Japan, reducing U.S. ability

to project power and influence in the region. None of the overall results—a Japan no longer closely aligned with the United States and that

had turned its formidable economic and technological capabilities to the

development of military power, an increase in the military capabilities in

other countries in the region, and a reduction of U.S. military capability

in the region—would be in U.S. interests.

Related to this issue is the question of the U.S. role in Korea and

Japan subsequent to a resolution of the Korean problem. Because the

presence of U.S. forces in both Korea and Japan is justified primarily in

terms of potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, popular sentiment in Korea, and possibly Japan as well, probably would strongly favor

the removal of U.S. forces if the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula

dissipated. The result of such a withdrawal, however, would be a Korea

left alone between two major regional powers, China and Japan. Such circumstances might compel Korea to increase its military capabilities,

which could cause Japan to feel uneasy (particularly if the ending of the

potential Korean conflict also resulted in a withdrawal of U.S. forces from

Japan) and to build up its own military capabilities. In turn, China could

perceive this move as threatening, with the net result being a region significantly more militarized than at present, and a weakened U.S. relationship with its two most powerful allies in the region. Preventing such an

outcome, therefore, is an important U.S. interest.

Another development for which the United States must be prepared

is the failure of an important state in the region. The breakup of China no

longer appears plausible, but it still cannot be ruled out with complete

certainty, while the long-term viability of countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and North Korea remains open to question. A Pakistani collapse

would have repercussions throughout South and Southwest Asia. Factional conflict within and between the resultant pieces of the Pakistani

state would be likely and could involve intervention by India from the

east or Iran from the west. Control over Pakistani nuclear weapons would

be a serious concern, with a high risk that they might fall into the hands

of a state or nonstate actor hostile to the United States.

An Indonesian collapse would be detrimental to U.S. interests in the

region. In addition to the humanitarian disaster it would represent, there

also would be a danger of sectarian conflict spreading to other countries
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 255

in the region (primarily the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia), massive refugee flows, and increased piracy and disruptions of commerce.

A final candidate for collapse is North Korea. Although, as with

China, this no longer seems as likely as it did a few years ago, it still cannot be ruled out. Most of the resulting refugees undoubtedly would attempt to migrate south, but some would also flee toward China, particularly if they were thwarted in their efforts to reach South Korea. This

might cause China to intervene in North Korea to restore order. South

Korea would likely attempt to enter the North as well. Since a North Korean collapse probably would result from paralysis of the Pyongyang government, perhaps because of or accompanied by a coup attempt or civil

war, the risk of conflict between some combination of South Korean,

North Korean, and Chinese forces would be high. The situation would be

further complicated by the existence of North Korean NBC weapons.

Developments in military technology also can pose challenges to U.S.

interests in the region. The most significant of these are the increasing

numbers, range, and accuracy of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the postCold War era, the United States has become accustomed to enjoying invulnerability in its rear areas during regional conflicts. This security would

not necessarily be the case in the event of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan all possess ballistic missiles,

and China is developing cruise missiles as well. China has long possessed

nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States,

but the existence of conventional missiles capable of striking U.S. airbases

and other rear-area targets represents a new challenge to conducting military operations in the region.

Implications for U.S. Military Posture

The United States is well postured to respond to the most likely immediate challenges on the Korean Peninsula: inter-Korean conflict or a

North Korean collapse. However, it must also prepare for the eventuality

of a resolution of the Korean problem, which might result in strong popular pressure for the removal of all U.S. forces. As a complete American

withdrawal from Korea would not be in the interest of either the United

States or the Republic of Korea, the United States should seek ways to ensure that it could maintain forces on the peninsula even after the Korean

problem was resolved. This could well entail a significant reduction in

troop numbers along with their reassignment to less intrusive locations,

as well as a skillful public relations campaign to persuade the Korean people of the value of a continued U.S. military presence.
256 QDR 2001

A similar argument applies to U.S. military presence in Japan. Resolution of the Korean problem undoubtedly would increase the pressure for a

reduction in or removal of U.S. forces from Japan, but such sentiments are

already growing. To counter this trend, the United States must seek ways to

revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most fundamentally, this requires treating Japan as an equal partner in the relationship. Although allowing Japan

to move beyond a subordinate role in the relationship might risk having it

question the continued need for U.S. military presence, perpetuating the

current unequal relationship ensures that the issue will one day explode.

As in the case of a post-resolution Korea, the United States must be prepared to contemplate reductions in its presence in Japan.

However, certain U.S. facilities in Japan will remain critical to U.S.

ability to project power and influence in the region even after the danger of inter-Korean conflict has ended and should be retained if possible. The naval facilities at Yokosuka and airbases at Kadena play particularly vital roles. If United States were no longer able to base an aircraft

carrier in Japan (or somewhere in East Asia), U.S. carrier presence

throughout the world would be reduced. Additional carriers would be

needed even to maintain a partial presence in East Asia, but increasing

the total Navy complement of aircraft carriers beyond the current 12

would be very costly.6

The airbase at Kadena also is vital to U.S. security because it is the

only U.S. airbase within tactical fighter range of Taiwan. Without access

to Kadena, the United States would be forced to rely primarily on carrierbased aviation to support defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. (Aircraft also could reach Taiwan from Guam and other distant

bases, but at the cost of a vastly reduced sortie rate and substantially increased requirements for refueling aircraft.) The airbases at Misawa on

mainland Japan are less vital but still are important because of the role

they play in facilitating the movement of tactical aircraft from the United

States to Asia. Short-range aircraft flying out of bases in Alaska are met

over the northern Pacific by refueling aircraft based at Misawa, which enables them to reach Japan. From Japan, the aircraft can, with additional

ground or air refuelings, continue on to contingencies throughout Asia.

The Marine Corps maintains extensive facilities in Japan, primarily in

Okinawa but also in mainland Japan. Replacing these facilities would be extremely costly, and whether another home could be found for III Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) elsewhere in East Asia is questionable.

Nonetheless, the inherent mobility of the Marines means that there is no
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 257

absolute requirement for them to be located in Japan, particularly if they

were no longer needed for a Korean contingency. If a reduction in U.S.

forces in Japan resulted in the relocation of III MEF to Hawaii or the west

coast of the United States, aside from the considerable cost of constructing

facilities to accommodate them, the primary operational impact would be a

several-day increase in the time required for them to deploy to a contingency in Asia. Thus, although valuable, the Marine Corps presence in Japan

is not as vital as the basing of an aircraft carrier at Yokosuka and having an

airbase at Kadena. If a reduction in U.S. military presence in Japan were

necessary, the Marine Corps facilities in Okinawa and the Air Force base at

Yokota probably are the least vital of major American installations in the

country and therefore the most likely candidates for reduction. Reductions

alone, however, will not ensure the sustainability of military presence in

Japan and could simply encourage attempts to eliminate all American bases

in Japan. Reductions should occur only in the context of a restructuring of

the U.S.-Japan security relationship aimed at ensuring the long-term viability of the alliance.

Other than in South Korea and Japan, U.S. military presence in the

region is sparse, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. The U.S. military periodically exercises with the militaries of nations in this region,

and Navy ships transit the region and conduct port calls and exercises. In

addition, Singapore and Australia have allowed the Navy and Air Force to

maintain liaison offices in their territory. The Air Force regularly deploys

aircraft to Singapore for training purposes, and Singapore has built a pier

capable of accommodating visiting nuclear aircraft carriers. The Air Force

and Marine Corps periodically use training areas in Australia, and the

Navy conducts exercises offshore. The United States maintains naval and

air facilities on Guam in the western Pacific and on Diego Garcia in the

Indian Ocean.

The United States should seek ways to increase its military presence

in other countries in South and Southeast Asia. This presence should not,

however, necessarily come in the form of large sovereign bases such as

those the United States maintains in South Korea and Japan (and as it

formerly did in the Philippines). In an era of constrained defense budgets

and the absence of an unambiguous threat, justifying the expense would

be difficult. Moreover, countries in the region are unlikely to allow the

United States to establish new permanent bases on their territory. Almost

all significant overseas U.S. bases were established in the aftermath of a

major war. In the absence of such a war or an immediate threat, countries
258 QDR 2001

will have little motivation to bear the political costs associated with a perceived compromise of national sovereignty.

Instead, the United States should seek to extend to other countries in

the region the type of arrangement it has with Singapore—a small permanent liaison staff and regular temporary training deployments by

larger combat units to facilities owned and operated by the host country.

Regular deployments of land-based forces to these countries would provide an opportunity to train in a variety of regional environments, facilitate interoperability with allies and potential coalition partners, and deter

regional aggression. They also would increase the logistical and political

ability of the United States to operate out of those countries in a contingency, whether interstate war or humanitarian crisis. The Armed Forces

already have considerable naval access and some land-based access to

Australia, but current arrangements should be further expanded, if possible, to make use of the excellent training areas available in that country.

The United States also should seek to expand its presence on the territory

of its other regional allies, the Philippines and Thailand. Given its former

colonial relationship with the Philippines, the United States must be sensitive to the delicacy of the issue there and not attempt to acquire greater

access than is acceptable to the Philippine people. Nonetheless, given the

strategic location of the Philippines, particularly relative to the South

China Sea, and the continuing U.S. alliance relationship with it, both

countries would benefit if America had an increased ability to train with

Philippine forces and operate out of Philippine bases. A similar argument

applies to Thailand, which occupies a strategic location as the only U.S.

ally in mainland Southeast Asia. Where possible, comparable arrangements should be made elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia—perhaps

India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Vietnam.

Finally, the United States should consider upgrading its facilities on

Diego Garcia and Guam. The United States has major air and naval facilities at Guam, but they are underutilized and have fallen into disrepair,

and the facilities at Diego Garcia are limited. Both islands occupy strategically similar locations within their respective regions, being at least several hundred miles from the Asian mainland. This location limits the

ability of tactical aircraft to operate from bases there but has the advantage of being out of range of most missiles possessed by countries in the

region. Thus, long-range aircraft and naval forces could operate out of

bases on these islands in relative safety. Guam has the advantage of being

roughly equidistant between Northeast Asia, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia,
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 259

while Diego Garcia is the only U.S. military facility in South Asia (although the United States does have access to some facilities in the Arabian

Gulf). Refurbishing the air and naval facilities in Guam would enable U.S.

forces to operate more effectively from there in event of a crisis in East

Asia, and expanding the facilities at Diego Garcia would increase the ability of U.S. forces to respond to a crisis—humanitarian or otherwise—in

South Asia.7

Opportunities for Change

Overseas military presence is a fundamental requirement for any defense strategy based primarily on power projection, and QDR 2001 is unlikely to challenge the concept of a robust U.S. overseas presence. However, the type of presence and the nature of the forces stationed overseas

logically will be significant QDR issues.

The potential for some change already is building. The shift of the Air

Force toward a rotational Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, along

with the inherent sovereignty and force protection characteristics of

naval-forward presence, might prompt a move toward a more maritimebased presence backed by greater deployment of longer-range strike

forces stationed just outside or on the well-protected fringes of the region. This model may be a good one for the Arabian Gulf region, where

any increase in land-based presence would seem problematic politically. It

also could be a solution to some Pacific region presence issues. But it

would help little with potential conflicts in the former Soviet republics of

Central Asia, where the United States currently has no presence forces; it

would not increase the interoperability of ground forces in areas such as

South and Southeast Asia; and it would not be sufficient for broader

NATO activities in the Balkans or elsewhere.

The United States maintains a very real and abiding interest in European security affairs. Forces in Europe perform numerous important missions to ensure that the United States can achieve its foreign policy objectives in that region. The needs of the European theater deserve to be given

careful and thorough consideration in light of the essential role played

daily by Americans stationed there. The Soviet Union is a thing of the

past, but the need to maintain a strong and capable U.S. military presence

in Europe is very much an obligation of the present and future. This presence should, however, consist primarily of lighter forces with greater mobility than the Cold War remnants currently in place.
260 QDR 2001

In a resource-constrained environment, reshaping U.S. forces in Europe will not be easy, but the upcoming QDR provides an ideal opportunity for DOD to consider these issues in the context of global U.S. overseas presence. In some cases, changes could be pursued through ongoing

transformation initiatives, such as the Army transformation plan and the

AEF concept. However, attempting to adapt U.S. forces in Europe solely

through a series of existing efforts that are not tightly integrated risks

generating a force structure in Europe that, even if it is better suited than

the Cold War remnants, will fall short of a solid solution. The QDR 2001

provides a needed opportunity to examine the requirements of the European theater across the board and to assess how those needs compare to

those of other theaters.

U.S. presence in the Arabian Gulf region should balance long-term

American interests with current political conditions, in which a rogue

regime continues to defy collective world concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for cross-border

aggression. An additional factor is that the operational U.S. presence tied

to the Northern and Southern no-fly zones imposed on Iraq ultimately

have a UN mandate and are not part of a permanent regional agreement.

A maritime-oriented presence—legitimated by the legal freedom of the

seas—may be optimal for long-term U.S. interests in free trade and the

flow of natural resources, but some degree of land-based presence still appears essential in helping to constrain current threats. Because of the narrow physical confines of the region, notably the Strait of Hormuz, the development of antiaccess weapons and strategies may have even more of

an immediate impact on regional presence decisions than changes in political conditions. Current political conditions may make it difficult for

QDR 2001 to advocate any fundamental change in the size of presence

forces in the region, although a force mix tilted toward counterproliferation and force protection could be a logical recommendation.

The Asia-Pacific security environment is evolving, and U.S. presence

in the region must evolve as well. The Cold War has ended, and the Korean confrontation appears to be winding down, while Chinese power

and reach are growing. The risk of conflict in the South China Sea appears to be increasing, as are the danger of war in South Asia and the

chances of state failure in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. The

United States must ensure that it has adequately prepared the way for the

type of presence it needs to maintain in Northeast Asia when the Korean

confrontation has ended. This includes considerations of stability and
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 261

reassurance for Japan, China, and Korea, and also of U.S. ability to maintain its presence and to project power throughout the region. The United

States must expand its presence in South and Southeast Asia, not

through the establishment of new sovereign bases but through access

arrangements that allow it to deploy forces regularly to countries in these

subregions without compromising their sovereignty. The current defense

relationship with Singapore may provide a suitable model. The United

States also should upgrade its facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia. The

range of missiles possessed by potentially hostile countries is increasing,

and the likelihood of regional crises is increasing. The United States

needs bases that are well away from the mainland but close enough to

support operations in response to those crises. Fundamental shifts gradually are taking place in the regional security landscape; to protect and

advance its interests in the region, the United States must adapt its overseas presence in anticipation of, rather than in reaction to, these shifts.

The QDR will allow DOD to take stock of its entire defense strategy

and what it requires in the context of likely available resources. A decision

in the next QDR to depart from the two-major theater war requirement

clearly would have implications for what might be available for overseas

presence. These implications must be well understood before any decisions are made concerning what to do with those very visible pieces of

U.S. force structure.

In the absence of a change in the requirements needed to implement

the strategy and without significant additional resources for defense, the

only way to make the kinds of changes outlined here will be to make

tradeoffs among force structures in various theaters. Only by carefully

and objectively assessing the needs of one theater against another during

QDR 2001 can sound decisions be reached about whether these types of

changes would be beneficial to achieving U.S. objectives without jeopardizing achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives as a whole.

Notes1 This does not include the wars fought against domestic opponents, notably the American Civil

War and numerous wars against the Native American tribes. There have also been casualties inflicted

on American soil as part of foreign wars (such as at Pearl Harbor); however, no major land battles

were conducted in the continental United States.

2 Power projection is defined as “the ability of a nation . . . to rapidly and effectively deploy

and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to

deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.” From Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.
262 QDR 2001

3 Another method of categorizing overseas presence forces—one used in recent reports of the

Secretary of Defense—is by their degree of permanence. In this construct, overseas presence forces

can be categorized as (1) permanently stationed, (2) rotationally deployed, and (3) deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 2000, 4.

4 Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 2000, 11–12.

5 For purposes of this section, the Asia-Pacific region is taken to be roughly equivalent to the

land portion of U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility. It includes South Asia (from Pakistan

eastward), East Asia, and Southeast Asia.

6 In addition to the naval facilities at Yokosuka, an air base is needed nearby to support the aircraft carrier’s air wing. Atsugi Naval Air Field serves that purpose now, but the field has environmental and safety problems. If the Marine Corps air wing stationed at Marine Corps Air Station Wakuni

or U.S. Air Force units stationed at Yokota were withdrawn, the aircraft carrier air wing could be relocated to either of those facilities.

7 Diego Garcia is British territory leased to the United States for a finite period. The British government currently is facing claims to the land by the descendants of its former residents, Maldive Islanders who were brought to Diego Garcia to work on the copra plantations there. These issues

would have to be resolved before the United States invested in a significant expansion of its facilities

on Diego Garcia.
Chapter Nine

The Future of U.S. Overseas

Presence

by Roger Cliff, Sam J. Tangredi, and Christine E. Wormuth

Blessed by favorable geography, sound defense policies, and a propitious history, the United States has not had to fight a major war on

American soil against a foreign power for over 187 years.1 Instead,

it has been involved in conflicts ranging from smaller-scale contingencies

to global wars that have taken place in international seas and airspace or

on the territory of allies or opponents. Considering the physical devastation that war can bring—to say nothing of the military and civilian casualties—the fact that conflicts have been conducted away from the U.S.

homeland can be considered one of the more fortunate aspects of the

American experience.

But this did not occur by grace alone. For much of its existence, the

United States has maintained an overseas military presence in an effort to

prevent hostilities from reaching North America. For this reason—and in

response to American involvement in conflicts overseas, most notably the

Second World War—the contemporary U.S. military has been structured

primarily as a power-projection force.2

However, projecting power into a distant theater without military

forces already in place to slow the enemy advance, and protecting the infrastructure required to receive the incoming friendly forces and the

forces themselves until they can establish their own defenses, are extremely difficult.

Moreover, the actual deterrent effect of a robust power-projection capability never has been particularly clear. During the Cold War, the United

States stationed a considerable share of its active-duty forces overseas to

act as both the means of facilitating the arrival of U.S. power-projection

forces and as a deterrent to the actual outbreak of conflict. U.S. forces were

stationed at the Fulda Gap in Germany and in other places in Europe and

in Turkey to be able to respond immediately to a Warsaw Pact attack and

235
236 QDR 2001

to buy time for the mobilization of other NATO forces and the projection

of forces from the continental United States. They also were intended to be

a deterrent to war in the event of an expanding crisis. U.S. forces stationed

in Asia, notably Japan and Korea, also served as a deterrent to possible

crises or, as in the case of Korea, more immediate ones.

The forward positioning of naval forces within regions of potential

crisis has been a U.S. policy since long before the Cold War. This naval

version of overseas presence, independently known as naval presence or

forward presence, has been an integral part of American diplomacy and

has functioned to protect American access to foreign trade. During the

Cold War, the deterrent element of naval forward presence was emphasized. A key difference is that naval forces operating at sea effectively are

sovereign U.S. territory under the law of the sea, while the stationing of

land-based forces overseas is subject to the desires of the host nation and

is governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements.3

With the end of the Cold War, some have questioned the need to station extensive U.S. forces overseas, particularly the land-based forces

whose status-of-forces agreements require periodic renewal—a procedure

that sometimes involves contentious diplomatic effort. Removing U.S.

forces from overseas locations sometimes is seen as a potential cost savings; however, given the financial and material support that overseas

forces receive from several key host-nation allies, this belief may be false.

At the same time that the end of the Cold War may have called the policy

into question, the United States has taken on an additional overseas presence commitment by stationing forces in the Arabian Gulf region in the

wake of Operation Desert Storm. Such U.S. forces are meant to deter renewed aggression by Iraq or potential action by Iran, and to maintain the

United Nations (UN) sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. overseas presence force posture will be examined as a part of

the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. This chapter examines the policies and issues of the stationing of U.S. forces in three particular regions:

Europe, the Pacific, and the Arabian Gulf. The primary purpose is to

identify options for the Bush administration to consider when crafting

the overseas presence portion of its defense policy. The sections that follow describe—for each of the three regions—the current U.S. posture,

emerging regional missions for the presence forces, the potential mismatches of posture and policy that have developed in the past decade,

and the possible political impact of changes to the current force posture.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 237

Europe

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. forces in Europe numbered close

to 325,000. Stationed mainly in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy,

these forces served two major purposes. First, American forces on European soil were a physical symbol of the U.S. commitment to the security

of Europe. Second, had a war with the Soviet Union broken out, these

forces were the first line of defense. With the dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact and later the Soviet Union itself, the rationale for maintaining Cold

War force levels in Europe no longer existed. DOD began reviewing force

levels in Europe in 1991 and then began the largest drawdown of activeduty forces from Europe since permanently stationing troops there in the

late 1940s.

U.S. Interests

In addition to the continuing U.S. commitment to NATO, economic,

political, and cultural ties to Europe remain strong—and are perhaps the

strongest in the global community. Trade between the United States and

European nations totals over $1 billion daily. Europe shares American democratic political and social values and is its strongest military and diplomatic partner in working to strengthen the international community. At

the same time, the experience of two global wars with origins in European conflicts makes the commitment to supporting peace in Europe a

foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Much has changed since the collapse of

the Soviet Union, but a stable and secure Europe remains important to

the United States. Therefore, the United States will remain seriously engaged in European affairs, and the Armed Forces will be an important

tool in the transatlantic relationship.

About 100,000 military personnel remain permanently stationed in

Europe. The majority of them are members of elements of larger units

that were stationed there during the Cold War. Although most U.S. forces

in Europe are still stationed at Cold War-era bases, the missions that these

forces perform have changed in nature and increased in number since the

fall of the Berlin Wall. Using a force posture that was designed to meet

outdated needs has created what some consider a mismatch between requirements and forces. Tempo challenges and difficulties associated with

SSC operations such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo are, at least in part, manifestations of the

strains thus generated.
238 QDR 2001

In the last 5 years, forces under the Commander in Chief, Europe

Command, have conducted nine noncombatant operations, patrols of

three no-fly zones, two major humanitarian assistance operations, nine

peace enforcement operations, and two major coercive air campaigns.

These forces also have conducted innumerable exercises with NATO allies

and partners, military-to-military contact programs, training and education programs, and other engagement activities. As they were during the

Cold War, most of these forces are stationed in Britain, Germany, and

Italy. In addition to permanently stationed forces, the Navy and Marine

Corps are regularly deployed to the European theater, and the headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Fleet is located in the Mediterranean. The United

States also has maintained forces on the ground in Bosnia and Hungary,

since 1995. U.S. European Command (EUCOM), headquartered in

Stuttgart, and the forces assigned to it are responsible for monitoring and

responding to events in all of Europe, including many of the former Soviet republics, as well as countries in North Africa and the sub-Saharan

region. U.S. military personnel in Europe today are busier than ever before, and although they have done an admirable job advancing U.S. objectives in Europe, the United States would be better served by a force posture designed specifically to address the existing and likely future security

environment in that region.

Potential Challenges

The former Soviet Union no longer dominates the threat scenario for

Europe, but it will present challenges and risks for the United States and

its NATO allies for at least the next 10 years. The evolution of Russia and

its relationship with the Alliance, efforts by NATO to adapt to the new

strategic environment, continuing instability in the Balkans, and the

growing threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons dominate the

security environment in Europe.

Russia no longer poses a major threat to the stability of Europe, although its uneven and unpredictable evolution toward free markets and

democracy will affect the broader security environment for Europe. The

United States and its allies must be concerned about the potential spread

of NBC weapons and expertise from Russia and the other newly independent states that emerged from the end of the Cold War.

Although NATO also has changed since 1991 to meet new realities in

Europe, it remains the preeminent security mechanism for the continent.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched in 1999 to strengthen

allied military capabilities, and efforts to reinvigorate the European Security
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 239

and Defense Identity (ESDI) may further strengthen NATO ability to address European security challenges. The Alliance is likely to invite additional countries to join it in the next several years. NATO also will continue

broadening its focus beyond member territory to address instability in

southern Europe and threats posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons

and ballistic missiles in North African and the Middle East, and perhaps ultimately to deal with broader interests in the Persian Gulf area.

Many aspects of the current and future security environment in Europe are reasonably clear, but certain key variables will have a major impact on European security and the U.S. strategy toward Europe in the future. The future of Russia is the primary unknown with critical

implications for Europe and the United States. The United States and its

European allies and friends will be monitoring developments in Russia

very carefully, trying to strike a balance between assisting the Russian

transformation wherever possible and maintaining a clear-eyed perspective on its long-term strategic orientation. Whether the DCI and ESDI efforts are successful also may affect U.S.-European relations significantly. If

the Europeans succeed in improving their military capabilities, the nature

of U.S.-European roles in NATO may evolve considerably.

The deployment of a national missile defense would have profound

implications for European security. Many European nations argue that an

NMD system would fundamentally undermine the Western relationship

with Russia, particularly if the United States were to abrogate the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty to deploy the system. Europeans also fear that the

system could increase instability in regions such as Asia and could create

different zones of security in NATO in which some nations are more secure than others. Unless all allied nations were to move from shared vulnerability to shared invulnerability under a NATO-wide missile defense

system, many Europeans fear that the European members of the Alliance

could become detached from the United States. Finally, even if these European members were unanimous on the need for an NMD system, almost all of them have grave concerns about how to finance it. Although

many of these concerns can be managed as the United States deliberates

whether to deploy an NMD system, the issue will remain important in

the transatlantic relationship in the years to come.

New Missions

In light of this complex security picture, the United States will need

to maintain a strong partnership with its European allies and friends to

ensure that Europe remains strong, stable, and secure. The U.S. military
240 QDR 2001

will play an important role in maintaining and strengthening the health

of the transatlantic partnership.

In the last decade, the U.S. military has been on the leading edge of

establishing bilateral defense relations with many countries that formerly

were behind the Iron Curtain. American forces stationed in Europe or assigned to EUCOM are uniquely positioned to influence developments in

the European security environment positively. Engagement activities involving U.S. military personnel include exchange programs, exercises,

port visits, and regular assignments at NATO headquarters where American and partner-country personnel work side by side. These engagement

activities, coupled with the regular overseas presence in Europe, ensure

frequent and regular contact between U.S. forces and those from partner

countries. Such contact helps to develop bilateral defense relationships

and in many cases leads to productive collaboration on matters of mutual

security concern.

Through the Partnership for Peace program, the United States and its

allies seek to build positive relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries and the states of the former Soviet Union. American military personnel worked with their counterparts in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic to help prepare them to join NATO. American forces in Europe

also have worked closely with such nations as Ukraine, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and other partner countries, advising on how best to restructure and to reform their militaries and how to increase interoperability with NATO so that they can participate in peace operations such as

SFOR or the Kosovo Force.

Finally, U.S. forces stationed in Europe play an important role in ensuring strong defense relations among the allied countries themselves.

U.S. military personnel are stationed at NATO headquarters throughout

Europe as part of the integrated military command structure; U.S. personnel have served in roles from Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

to enlisted soldier in a ground unit committed to NATO operations.

American forces in Europe participate regularly in Alliance exercises and

also visit individual countries and conduct activities on a bilateral basis.

These regular interactions generate the trust and mutual understanding

that bind the NATO members to each other in times of crisis and that enable military forces from diverse nations to operate together during conflicts, such as the air campaign over Kosovo.

The major air operation over Kosovo in 1999 is just one example of

the many ways in which U.S. forces are called upon to respond to crises
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 241

in Europe and in neighboring regions such as Africa and the Persian

Gulf. American forces in Europe help to maintain stability in the

Balkans, conduct noncombatant evacuations following natural disasters

or violent political uprisings, and serve as peacekeepers after political

resolution of conflicts such as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. forces

in Europe are the foundation of the American Article V commitment to

its NATO allies, however unlikely such a contingency appears in the current security environment.

Precisely because the likelihood of an Article V conflict is, and is

likely to remain, so low in Europe, the primary role of U.S. forces there no

longer is to be the tripwire for a major land war against a powerful adversary. American forces today perform the critical shaping tasks that help to

maintain peace and stability in the region and are the U.S. first responders to conflicts that arise when shaping activities are unable to contain

violence. Bringing forces from the continental United States to participate

in exercises, exchange programs, and training activities is feasible, but the

quality and quantity of these activities would be significantly lower than

if in-theater forces are used. Forces in theater can exercise more frequently and longer because they do not have to spend time traveling

across the Atlantic. They also are better positioned to build relationships

with foreign counterparts because the same personnel can attend multiple events and develop substantive connections over time.

Similarly, forces in theater are better able to respond quickly to

emerging conflicts than forces stationed in the United States. Operation

Allied Force would have been significantly less effective if all or even a significant portion of the U.S. troops and equipment were required to be

transported from the United States. Operations such as noncombatant

evacuations, no-fly zone patrols, shows of force, and other SSCs would be

much more difficult if the only forces available for such operations had to

be brought from the United States. Many SSCs in the region and in surrounding areas might become more serious conflicts.

American forces in Europe not only are concerned with current engagement activities and crises, but they also must focus on preparing to

deal with tomorrow’s challenges. Troops will be transforming themselves

as part of the ongoing evolution of the U.S. military and will play an essential role in encouraging transformation within the militaries of NATO

allies. A strong transatlantic relationship is essential to ensuring that

NATO allies continue to improve their military capabilities. If the relationship begins to deteriorate, the Europeans may move toward maintaining
242 QDR 2001

only the basic military capabilities needed to address security problems in

the immediate area.

Some might argue that a greatly reduced American presence in Europe would force the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their

own security, but past experience indicates that the Europeans might instead choose not to address important security concerns—as happened in

the early years of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. European nations

with only minimal capabilities would be in no position to join the United

States in coalitions of the willing to address larger security threats outside

the European area. A significant American military presence in Europe is

essential to demonstrating the enduring nature of the transatlantic relationship and to providing a continuing incentive for the Europeans to ensure that their military forces can operate effectively with the U.S. military

in the future.

The internal transformation process, the Defense Capabilities Initiative, is the cornerstone of the Alliance effort to reinvent itself for the future. Energetic U.S. participation in DCI will be important, but the European members of the Alliance will ultimately determine its success.

Current budget constraints in Europe are a major hurdle to significant improvements in European military capabilities. As the Europeans try to surmount this obstacle, U.S. forces in Europe will need to manage their own

transformation process to avoid widening the capability gap between

themselves and other NATO forces. The United States will not want to

compromise its own military capabilities to remain interoperable with its

allies, but it will want to avoid exacerbating the types of interoperability

problems that were evident during the air war over Kosovo, such as the

lack of compatible secure communications, of all-weather-capable European attack aircraft, and of European precision-guided munitions. The Alliance was able to manage these problems during the Kosovo conflict, but

if NATO had to confront a more capable adversary than the Serbian military, such problems could prove to be a serious weakness. Finding creative

strategies to remain sufficiently interoperable with its allies while avoiding

dumbing down its own transformation process will be one of the more

challenging tasks facing the United States in the future.

New Forces

The missions of U.S. forces in Europe have changed: containment is

out, and engagement is in. Balkan peace enforcement operations in which

NATO troops and Russian soldiers work side by side have replaced preparations for a clash of the titans on the battlefields of Central Europe.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 243

However, the types of forces that the United States maintains in Europe

have not kept pace with the changed missions. To alleviate readiness and

retention concerns and to give U.S. forces the tools that they need to perform their missions more effectively, the United States should reshape its

forces in Europe to be more deployable, sustainable, and flexible, and less

oriented overall toward heavy combat operations.

Because the U.S. force structure in Europe still reflects its Cold Warera configuration, it is not designed to move troops quickly over long distances to a conflict. Ground forces in Europe are particularly cumbersome to deploy to relatively distant and primitively equipped staging

areas such as Taszar in southeastern Europe or the staging areas in Albania used during Operation Allied Force. Ferrying the 10,300 pieces of

equipment the Army requested for Task Force Hawk in Albania during

the Kosovo operation required 550 C–17 flights. This cargo included

M1A1 Abrams tanks (which are too heavy for most roads in Albania), 37

Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters to support the 24 Apache helicopters

that made up Task Force Hawk, and approximately 6,200 troops sent to

the base in Tirana to support the task force. Although the Army eventually transported all the equipment to Tirana, it faced major obstacles

along the way: record rainfall, thigh-high mud, and primitive landing

pads at the Rinas airport. Conditions such as these probably will be the

rule rather than the exception in future operations in Europe.

Responding to specific criticism of its performance in Kosovo and to

the broader argument that it is too slow and risks becoming irrelevant to

modern conflicts, the Army has begun a transformation process with the

goal of developing a mix of light, medium, and heavy forces. The centerpiece of this transformation process is development by 2003 of three to

five rapidly deployable interim brigades with new medium-weight,

wheeled assault vehicles. Army weapons designers hope to design a future

combat system to replace the Abrams tank by 2010. Such a transformation, if successful, would greatly improve the ability of U.S. ground forces

in Europe to respond effectively to future security challenges.

By contrast, naval forces assigned to EUCOM are inherently highly deployable. Naval assets such as an amphibious ready group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or a carrier battle group are valuable assets that are

used frequently to respond to fast-breaking developments. Naval assets are

relatively scarce, however, so a carrier battle group is assigned to EUCOM

for only 270 days a year and the MEU for just 300 days a year. Carrier battle groups are particularly scarce assets, and without a significant increase
244 QDR 2001

to the U.S. defense budget, the Navy is not likely to build additional carriers beyond what already is envisioned in the defense program. At a minimum, a comprehensive policy review of how naval assets are allocated

globally would ensure that the United States is applying these scarce assets

as wisely as possible.

Another problem is that much of the U.S. force structure in Europe is

oriented toward theater warfighting rather than the types of missions the

military in Europe is now called upon to perform. In light of existing

mission requirements in Europe and the fact that much of the heavy

combat force required for a major theater war in a region such as the Persian Gulf could come from the continental United States, shifting the balance of forces based in Europe from heavy combat units toward mediumweight units and combat support and combat service support units

should be considered. Eliminating combat-heavy forces in Europe altogether would be extremely unwise, but exchanging some portion of the

existing heavy brigades for the new medium-weight units would greatly

enhance the Army ability to address current threats in Europe effectively.

These units would be able to move more quickly to a conflict than today’s

heavy units, but they also would retain sufficient combat power and force

protection measures to maintain their combat effectiveness. A partial shift

away from heavy combat units also would enable the United States to

field more support units in Europe; these units perform many of the missions needed for SSCs. Medical, construction, and communications units,

as well as the entire range of special operations forces stationed in Europe, are experiencing particularly high operational tempo rates. Increasing the number of support units in this theater would better equip the

force structure to meet future challenges.

Although the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is growing

significantly, U.S. forces in Europe do not yet have a significant capability

to defend against such threats or to operate in a WMD environment.

American forces in Europe and worldwide need better protective gear and

chemical and biological weapons detectors and a robust theater missile

defense (TMD) system to protect them from missile threats on the periphery of Europe. The United States already is working to field this

equipment, but it may need to place an even higher priority on this part

of the defense program. Similarly, the U.S. military has made significant

strides in integrating awareness of WMD threats into its program and

planning processes in the last several years, but this issue still is not taken
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 245

into account sufficiently as the Pentagon determines its future requirements and budget needs.

Political Implications

Adapting the U.S. force presence in Europe to suit future security

needs better not only makes military sense, but it also makes political

sense both here and in Europe. A thoughtful, well-implemented plan to

restructure forces in Europe would reassure European allies of the continued commitment by the United States to their security.

A well-structured American military presence in Europe, improved

European military capabilities, and Congressional and public support for

U.S. involvement in European security are inextricably linked. The NATO

DCI, which is critical to bringing about real improvements in European

military capabilities, will not succeed without strong American support

and leadership. In order to lead effectively in Europe, the United States

will need to be able to demonstrate, through a force structure configured

to deal with the real challenges Europe faces, that it is committed to preserving European security. The United States will need Congressional

support for transforming its forces in Europe, but if European NATO

members do not improve their military capabilities over the next several

years, Congressional support for future American involvement in European security affairs will waver. Legislative burdensharing provisions will

proliferate and become more stringent, and the drive to move troops out

of Europe altogether could gain significant momentum.

If managed properly, however, adapting U.S. forces in Europe could

help push these interrelated trends into an upward rather than a downward spiral. An adapted U.S. force posture in Europe would reassure

NATO allies that America remains seriously committed to helping Europe

preserve its security and would provide a significant opportunity for the

United States to lead by example in building support for the DCI. If, for

example, the United States were to station medium-weight interim Army

brigades in Germany, it would help the German government make the

case to its own public and Parliament for lightening its extremely heavy

combat structure, which is essential to making the German military more

relevant for future operations.

Restructuring aspects of the U.S. military presence in Europe also

would provide an opportunity to reevaluate American and allied roles. A

fundamental review of defense roles can realistically take place only when

NATO members are confident that new capabilities exist to support new

responsibilities. A serious dialogue on this issue would reduce suspicions
246 QDR 2001

on both sides of the ESDI debate. Such a dialogue will be essential to ensuring that the effort to flesh out a common foreign and security policy

for Europe does not become a zero-sum game, pitting the European

Union against NATO. A newly balanced division of labor within the Alliance would strengthen both European support for NATO and Congressional support for continued American involvement in Europe by disarming critics who charge that the Europeans are content to let the

United States shoulder the burden on security issues.

The Middle East

The U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and particularly in the

Arabian Gulf, is historically and quantitatively different than its presence

in Europe. An average of 15,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed—

most rotationally or temporarily—within the region. Much of this presence is naval, and the permanent footprint is relatively small. Support for

the flow of follow-on forces exists primarily in the form of prepositioned

war material, along with earmarked afloat prepositioned equipment on

board ships anchored at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The use of Diego Garcia is a helpful legacy of the Cold War, as is the

rotational deployment of naval forces with a small U.S. fleet headquarters

permanently located in Bahrain. But much of the additional access to

supporting infrastructure is the result of U.S. leadership of the multinational coalition that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and most of the

personnel within the region have an ongoing military mission in maintaining UN sanctions against the rogue regime of Saddam Hussein. This

mission gives much of the U.S. land-based presence in the region a very

temporary flavor. Symbolic of this is the fact that the headquarters for

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is located near Tampa, Florida, not

in the Middle East.

Unlike Europe, the host nations within the region do not have permanent defense treaties with the United States, and they traditionally

have been suspicious of the stationing of any foreign forces on their territory. Although Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar,

Oman, and especially Kuwait desire a continuing and strong defense relationship with the United States, political and cultural concerns associated

with Islamic fundamentalism dampen their overt support for anything

that might appear to indicate a permanent U.S.—or other non-Muslim—

presence. Presumably, the end of the UN sanctions or the replacement of

the Saddam Hussein regime by another Iraqi government might lead to a
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 247

regional desire for reductions in U.S. land-based presence, but this impulse might be mitigated by concerns about potential aggression by Iran.

Another element that shadows the regional view of U.S. presence is

long-term American support for Israel. In the wake of the Mideast peace

process and the Gulf War, this shadow is not as big as it was in the 1970s

and 1980s. However, the continuing potential for Arab-Israeli conflict and

the unrest of the Palestinians often are used as premises for unofficial

(and sometimes official) anti-U.S. presence sentiment.

The bottom line is that a clear and evident requirement—deterring

Saddam Hussein or a potentially aggressive Iran—exists for the U.S. presence in the region. Ongoing operations include patrol of the two no-fly

zones by coalition air forces. Preventing genocidal acts against minority

populations such as the Kurds and deterring the proliferation of WMD

are justifications for a reassuring U.S. presence, as is protection of the

flow of oil from the Gulf region. However, political limits on the size of

that presence constrain and channel CENTCOM planning for the possibility of a major theater war.

U.S. Interests

Perhaps the best way to assess the current and future requirement for

a U.S. military presence in the region is to determine what the long-term

U.S. interests are. The Secretary of Defense has identified U.S. interests in

terms of “peace, where access to strategic natural resources at stable prices

is unhindered and free markets are expanding.” 4 Historically, American

interests in the region have revolved around trade. Such interests predate

the discovery of Middle East oil, but the dominance of the British Empire

in the Gulf region limited American commercial involvement until after

the Second World War. The British decision to withdraw all military

forces from east of Aden in the early 1970s effectively ceded outside support for Arabian Gulf security to the United States.

The prospect of a permanent peace between Arabs and Israelis, curtailing threats to regional security by Iraq and Iran, and deterring proliferation or use of WMD appear to be necessary components for Gulf security. Achieving these goals also would eliminate much of the near-term

threat to access. However, the flow of oil and transit through the Strait of

Hormuz (and the Suez Canal) would remain an American strategic interest. Securing this interest would require a long-term (primarily maritime)

presence that would closely resemble the U.S. regional presence before

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
248 QDR 2001

Promoting democratic governance often is cited as a significant element of the engagement activities of U.S. military forces overseas. But

some inherent contradictions exist in this mission for CENTCOM, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, which does not have a tradition of democracy. Indeed, most U.S. allies in the region cannot be considered parliamentary democracies, although the degree of popular participation in

government varies from state to state. Having democracy become firmly

rooted in states throughout the Middle East may be a long-term U.S. and

global interest, but the short-term result might be a regional instability

that allows demagogues and populist dictators to overthrow the more

moderate existing regimes. This possibility makes the near-term goals of

U.S. presence in the region much narrower than its goals in Europe and

East Asia.

Challenges and Implications

Barring heightened fears prompted by an act of overt aggression, regional leaders appear to have no incentive to ask for any increase in U.S.

military presence. Likewise, because rotational naval forces operating in

international waters or temporarily deployed air or land forces conduct

much of the presence mission, no direct incentive exists to call for a reduction in U.S. regional presence. Fundamentalist anti-presence sentiment is focused against land-basing of what are viewed as “crusader”

forces, implying that the presence of Western troops in the 21st century

somehow is analogous to occupation of the Holy Land by Christian

knights during the Middle Ages. Traditional enmities, even those that

defy Western logic, remain.

However, changes in the nature of the potential threats within the region, notably the development of longer-range ballistic missiles potentially armed with WMD, may require changes in the form of U.S. presence posture. The development of antiaccess systems, including Iranian

interest in acquiring antiship missiles and mines and developing a viable

submarine force, appears to increase the range of potential threats to

maritime forces. The October 2000 terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden

harbor in Yemen has renewed public concerns about the adequacy of

force protection for U.S. military personnel in the region.

All these developments suggest an increasing regional requirement

for TMD, chemical and biological detection defense systems, and improved methods of force protection. Although host-nation militaries

could undertake certain of these improvements, many of them would

need to be provided by U.S. forces. Without an increase in the number of
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 249

presence forces, this shift could require a change in their mix, substituting

force protection units for other combat forces.

Another option would be an increase in naval presence, particularly

proposed TMD-capable surface ships, or a focus on amphibious capability in lieu of land-based ground forces. Alternatively, increases in longrange strike systems stationed just outside the region (such as at Diego

Garcia) could replace the emphasis on presence. However, a concurrent

reduction in visible regional presence might have a very severe and deleterious political effect, eroding both deterrence and regional support for

American interests.

Paradoxically, increasing force protection might reduce the regional

engagement that U.S. presence forces currently conduct. The attack on

USS Cole prompted questions about the need for U.S. military engagement with Yemen, a state not known for political stability or support for

Western interests. Another issue has been the potential disparity between

enhanced protection for the Armed Forces in the event of a WMD threat

and the minimal or nonexistent protection afforded to the populations of

the host nations by their own governments. One concern is the destruction of the host-nation support personnel and infrastructure needed for

the entry of follow-on power projection forces. This concern could tilt the

focus from force protection toward civilian population protection, which

would necessitate some changes in the types of presence forces stationed

in the region.

Such issues point to the complexity of maintaining a presence in a region where it is seen as but a temporary solution to current conditions.

U.S. interests in the Middle East would appear to continue to revolve

around resources and free markets. Although presence supports the stability of current governments in the region, it also attracts the ire of Muslim fundamentalists. This imbalance renders quite uncertain the longrange prospects of a contribution by a permanent land-based presence to

democratic engagement and enlargement, previously a continuing goal of

U.S. foreign policy.

Asia-Pacific Region

U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is largely the legacy

of two half-century-ago wars: World War II and the Korean War.5 As a result of these wars, the United States established and has maintained substantial forces in South Korea and Japan. Throughout the Cold War, these

forces helped deter not only North Korean but also Soviet aggression in
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Northeast Asia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these forces continue to serve as a deterrent to North Korean aggression. However, the regional security paradigm is changing. Although predictions of the imminent demise of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have proven to

be exaggerations, the country’s long-term viability remains questionable,

and a fundamental change in the security equation on the Korean Peninsula is likely to occur within the next decade. Meanwhile, Chinese military capabilities are steadily increasing, with no sign that Beijing intends

to give up its authoritarian system of government or its threats to use

force against Taiwan under certain circumstances. In South Asia, both

India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, raising the specter of nuclear war on the subcontinent.

These changes to the Asian security environment offer the United

States an appropriate time to reassess its security posture in the region

and consider what changes it ought to undertake. If major changes to U.S.

posture are needed, time will be required to build the necessary political

consensus and then to implement the changes. The movements in the

Asia-Pacific region may appear to be occurring at the pace of continental

drift, but as the tectonic plates of the security environment grind past

each other, they could suddenly slip—fundamentally altering the landscape before the United States has prepared adequately for change.

U.S. Interests

To secure its fundamental interests of maintaining the territorial, political, and social integrity of the United States, ensuring the lives and

safety of its people, and promoting the prosperity of the Nation and its

people, the United States pursues a number of specific goals. These include

preventing the emergence of a hostile power capable of threatening these

fundamental interests, deterring aggression against U.S. friends and allies,

promoting the growth of democracy throughout the world, ensuring U.S.

economic access to important markets, commodities, and trading partners, and preventing the spread of dangerous military technologies. In the

Asia-Pacific region, only three countries appear to have the potential to

rival the military capabilities of the United States in the next 50 years:

China, Japan, and India. At present, none of these countries is overtly hostile to U.S. interests—although Japan is the most friendly and China the

least—and none of them possesses anything comparable to U.S. military

capabilities. The goal for the United States with regard to these three countries, therefore, is twofold: ensuring that they remain friendly to the

United States, and ensuring that they do not develop military capabilities
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 251

that could challenge those of the United States. The more certain the

United States is of the friendliness of a nation, the more willing it is to accept the possession of significant military capabilities by that nation.

The United States has formal military alliances with Australia, Japan,

the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The United States has a more

ambiguous security commitment to Taiwan, as embodied in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The United States has a security relationship with Singapore that includes a small, permanent military presence there, which

brings with it an implied interest in Singapore’s security. America also enjoys friendly relations with a number of other countries in the region and

would not like to see their sovereignty or independence threatened by a

country hostile to the United States.

Democratization is an ongoing trend in the Asia-Pacific region; South

Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have enjoyed democratic transitions

in the last 15 years, and other states also are taking steps in the direction

of democracy. Many countries still are not fully democratic, however, and

some, such as China, Vietnam, and Burma, remain authoritarian dictatorships. The continuation of the democratic systems in those states that are

already democracies, and the democratization of those that are not, particularly China, are important U.S. interests in the region. Fortunately,

two of the three states with the potential to become major military powers—Japan and India—already are full-fledged democracies.

Although the United States remains dissatisfied with its access to the

markets of many countries in the region, particularly China and Japan, the

Asia-Pacific region is a vital trading partner of the United States, with

transpacific trade well exceeding transatlantic trade. American companies

also have more than $100 billion invested in the region. Any attempt to

create an exclusionary trading bloc that denied economic access to important U.S. trading partners in the region (particularly Japan, China, South

Korea, or Taiwan), or actions that imperiled the economies of major trading partners, would threaten the vital national interests.

The spread of dangerous military technologies also is a concern in the

Asia-Pacific region. Several countries (China, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) already possess nuclear weapons. Some of these countries are attempting to increase their arsenals, and other states may be attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well. A number of regional states

are suspected of possessing chemical or biological weapons, and several

(China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan) are upgrading their ballistic

and cruise missile capabilities. These technologies in the hands of some
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countries, such as India, are not a direct threat to the United States, but

the more countries that possess them, the greater the likelihood that they

will spread to countries that are a direct threat to the United States. China

and North Korea, in particular, indiscriminately will transfer nuclear and

missile technology to any country willing to pay for it, and the mere

demonstration effect of India and Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons

may encourage other countries to pursue them as well. Moreover, the actual use of a nuclear weapon in war would break the nuclear taboo that

has been in effect in 1945, increasing the likelihood of subsequent use—a

development that clearly would counter the interests of the United States

(or almost any other country). The United States, therefore, has a strong

interest in preventing the further spread or development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology in the Asia-Pacific region.

Potential Challenges

The most prominent of several possible developments that could

threaten U.S. regional interests remains conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

The possibility that North Korea could launch an attack on South

Korea—perhaps as an attempt by Pyongyang to maintain its hold on

power by creating a national emergency—remains real, if apparently remote. A more likely scenario would be the collapse of the North Korean

state, which probably would result in the intervention of South Korean

and American forces to restore order. If China also intervened (perhaps

because of refugee flows into Manchuria), the danger of conflict between

China and the United States or South Korea would arise. The United

States already is well positioned to deal with any contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, however, and none of these scenarios seem to require a

change in U.S. force posture.

The possibility of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is of increasing concern. Although Beijing seems to have come to terms temporarily with the

Taiwanese election of a president from the pro-independence Democratic

Progressive Party, China has not given up its claim to the island and continues to assert its right to use force to recover it. Considering current

Chinese military capabilities, which are unlikely to change significantly in

the immediate future, any attempt to invade the island almost certainly

would fail. Nonetheless, evidence indicates that Beijing hopes to force a

resolution of the Taiwan issue by the year 2005 or so. If attempts at peaceful persuasion fail, some form of coercion using air and missile attacks or

a naval blockade would be more likely than an outright invasion.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 253

China also could attempt to use military means to enforce its claims to

the islands of the South China Sea. So far China has adopted a patient approach in resolving these disputes, but it could come into conflict over the

islands with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, or Taiwan. Rather than an

outright attempt by one country to evict another from an island it occupies, the most likely scenario is a clash at sea. Such a conflict might occur

as a result of countries attempting to enforce claims to territorial waters or

of one country attempting to prevent another from landing on an unoccupied island (such as Fiery Cross Reef in 1988) or reinforcing an existing

garrison. Conflict among claimants other than China, although less likely,

also is a possibility. The use of force against an ally such as the Philippines

would be a threat to national interests, and even if a U.S. ally were not involved, naval conflict in the South China Sea could disrupt shipping

through some of the world’s most important shipping routes.

Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be detrimental to U.S.

interests as well. Although neither country is an ally or important economic partner of the United States, nuclear war would be a huge humanitarian and environmental catastrophe. More significantly from a strategic

perspective, the demonstration effect of the use of nuclear weapons and

the breaking of the nuclear taboo could increase the likelihood that other

countries that already possess nuclear weapons might also use them. Likewise, states that do not already possess nuclear weapons could be encouraged to seek to acquire them.

Other interstate conflicts in the region are conceivable, although less

likely. Developments other than interstate conflict also could be detrimental to national interests. An attempt by a regional power such as

China to dominate part or all of the region politically would be one example. Such action could weaken American influence over its allies and

friends in the region, thus undermining overall U.S. power and security

while augmenting the power and influence of a country that could

threaten the United States. Regional domination accompanied by trading

policies that discriminated against the United States would threaten U.S.

economic interests as well.

Any weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance would be a serious concern

for America. A Japan that no longer enjoyed a close security relationship

with the United States would be likely to increase its military capabilities

in order to protect its interests in the region. This buildup, in turn, might

cause other countries—such as China or Korea—to feel threatened and to

bolster their own military capabilities in response. A weakening of the
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U.S.-Japan alliance probably would increase pressure for the United States

to withdraw its forces currently stationed in Japan, reducing U.S. ability

to project power and influence in the region. None of the overall results—a Japan no longer closely aligned with the United States and that

had turned its formidable economic and technological capabilities to the

development of military power, an increase in the military capabilities in

other countries in the region, and a reduction of U.S. military capability

in the region—would be in U.S. interests.

Related to this issue is the question of the U.S. role in Korea and

Japan subsequent to a resolution of the Korean problem. Because the

presence of U.S. forces in both Korea and Japan is justified primarily in

terms of potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, popular sentiment in Korea, and possibly Japan as well, probably would strongly favor

the removal of U.S. forces if the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula

dissipated. The result of such a withdrawal, however, would be a Korea

left alone between two major regional powers, China and Japan. Such circumstances might compel Korea to increase its military capabilities,

which could cause Japan to feel uneasy (particularly if the ending of the

potential Korean conflict also resulted in a withdrawal of U.S. forces from

Japan) and to build up its own military capabilities. In turn, China could

perceive this move as threatening, with the net result being a region significantly more militarized than at present, and a weakened U.S. relationship with its two most powerful allies in the region. Preventing such an

outcome, therefore, is an important U.S. interest.

Another development for which the United States must be prepared

is the failure of an important state in the region. The breakup of China no

longer appears plausible, but it still cannot be ruled out with complete

certainty, while the long-term viability of countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and North Korea remains open to question. A Pakistani collapse

would have repercussions throughout South and Southwest Asia. Factional conflict within and between the resultant pieces of the Pakistani

state would be likely and could involve intervention by India from the

east or Iran from the west. Control over Pakistani nuclear weapons would

be a serious concern, with a high risk that they might fall into the hands

of a state or nonstate actor hostile to the United States.

An Indonesian collapse would be detrimental to U.S. interests in the

region. In addition to the humanitarian disaster it would represent, there

also would be a danger of sectarian conflict spreading to other countries
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 255

in the region (primarily the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia), massive refugee flows, and increased piracy and disruptions of commerce.

A final candidate for collapse is North Korea. Although, as with

China, this no longer seems as likely as it did a few years ago, it still cannot be ruled out. Most of the resulting refugees undoubtedly would attempt to migrate south, but some would also flee toward China, particularly if they were thwarted in their efforts to reach South Korea. This

might cause China to intervene in North Korea to restore order. South

Korea would likely attempt to enter the North as well. Since a North Korean collapse probably would result from paralysis of the Pyongyang government, perhaps because of or accompanied by a coup attempt or civil

war, the risk of conflict between some combination of South Korean,

North Korean, and Chinese forces would be high. The situation would be

further complicated by the existence of North Korean NBC weapons.

Developments in military technology also can pose challenges to U.S.

interests in the region. The most significant of these are the increasing

numbers, range, and accuracy of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the postCold War era, the United States has become accustomed to enjoying invulnerability in its rear areas during regional conflicts. This security would

not necessarily be the case in the event of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan all possess ballistic missiles,

and China is developing cruise missiles as well. China has long possessed

nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States,

but the existence of conventional missiles capable of striking U.S. airbases

and other rear-area targets represents a new challenge to conducting military operations in the region.

Implications for U.S. Military Posture

The United States is well postured to respond to the most likely immediate challenges on the Korean Peninsula: inter-Korean conflict or a

North Korean collapse. However, it must also prepare for the eventuality

of a resolution of the Korean problem, which might result in strong popular pressure for the removal of all U.S. forces. As a complete American

withdrawal from Korea would not be in the interest of either the United

States or the Republic of Korea, the United States should seek ways to ensure that it could maintain forces on the peninsula even after the Korean

problem was resolved. This could well entail a significant reduction in

troop numbers along with their reassignment to less intrusive locations,

as well as a skillful public relations campaign to persuade the Korean people of the value of a continued U.S. military presence.
256 QDR 2001

A similar argument applies to U.S. military presence in Japan. Resolution of the Korean problem undoubtedly would increase the pressure for a

reduction in or removal of U.S. forces from Japan, but such sentiments are

already growing. To counter this trend, the United States must seek ways to

revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most fundamentally, this requires treating Japan as an equal partner in the relationship. Although allowing Japan

to move beyond a subordinate role in the relationship might risk having it

question the continued need for U.S. military presence, perpetuating the

current unequal relationship ensures that the issue will one day explode.

As in the case of a post-resolution Korea, the United States must be prepared to contemplate reductions in its presence in Japan.

However, certain U.S. facilities in Japan will remain critical to U.S.

ability to project power and influence in the region even after the danger of inter-Korean conflict has ended and should be retained if possible. The naval facilities at Yokosuka and airbases at Kadena play particularly vital roles. If United States were no longer able to base an aircraft

carrier in Japan (or somewhere in East Asia), U.S. carrier presence

throughout the world would be reduced. Additional carriers would be

needed even to maintain a partial presence in East Asia, but increasing

the total Navy complement of aircraft carriers beyond the current 12

would be very costly.6

The airbase at Kadena also is vital to U.S. security because it is the

only U.S. airbase within tactical fighter range of Taiwan. Without access

to Kadena, the United States would be forced to rely primarily on carrierbased aviation to support defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. (Aircraft also could reach Taiwan from Guam and other distant

bases, but at the cost of a vastly reduced sortie rate and substantially increased requirements for refueling aircraft.) The airbases at Misawa on

mainland Japan are less vital but still are important because of the role

they play in facilitating the movement of tactical aircraft from the United

States to Asia. Short-range aircraft flying out of bases in Alaska are met

over the northern Pacific by refueling aircraft based at Misawa, which enables them to reach Japan. From Japan, the aircraft can, with additional

ground or air refuelings, continue on to contingencies throughout Asia.

The Marine Corps maintains extensive facilities in Japan, primarily in

Okinawa but also in mainland Japan. Replacing these facilities would be extremely costly, and whether another home could be found for III Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) elsewhere in East Asia is questionable.

Nonetheless, the inherent mobility of the Marines means that there is no
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 257

absolute requirement for them to be located in Japan, particularly if they

were no longer needed for a Korean contingency. If a reduction in U.S.

forces in Japan resulted in the relocation of III MEF to Hawaii or the west

coast of the United States, aside from the considerable cost of constructing

facilities to accommodate them, the primary operational impact would be a

several-day increase in the time required for them to deploy to a contingency in Asia. Thus, although valuable, the Marine Corps presence in Japan

is not as vital as the basing of an aircraft carrier at Yokosuka and having an

airbase at Kadena. If a reduction in U.S. military presence in Japan were

necessary, the Marine Corps facilities in Okinawa and the Air Force base at

Yokota probably are the least vital of major American installations in the

country and therefore the most likely candidates for reduction. Reductions

alone, however, will not ensure the sustainability of military presence in

Japan and could simply encourage attempts to eliminate all American bases

in Japan. Reductions should occur only in the context of a restructuring of

the U.S.-Japan security relationship aimed at ensuring the long-term viability of the alliance.

Other than in South Korea and Japan, U.S. military presence in the

region is sparse, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. The U.S. military periodically exercises with the militaries of nations in this region,

and Navy ships transit the region and conduct port calls and exercises. In

addition, Singapore and Australia have allowed the Navy and Air Force to

maintain liaison offices in their territory. The Air Force regularly deploys

aircraft to Singapore for training purposes, and Singapore has built a pier

capable of accommodating visiting nuclear aircraft carriers. The Air Force

and Marine Corps periodically use training areas in Australia, and the

Navy conducts exercises offshore. The United States maintains naval and

air facilities on Guam in the western Pacific and on Diego Garcia in the

Indian Ocean.

The United States should seek ways to increase its military presence

in other countries in South and Southeast Asia. This presence should not,

however, necessarily come in the form of large sovereign bases such as

those the United States maintains in South Korea and Japan (and as it

formerly did in the Philippines). In an era of constrained defense budgets

and the absence of an unambiguous threat, justifying the expense would

be difficult. Moreover, countries in the region are unlikely to allow the

United States to establish new permanent bases on their territory. Almost

all significant overseas U.S. bases were established in the aftermath of a

major war. In the absence of such a war or an immediate threat, countries
258 QDR 2001

will have little motivation to bear the political costs associated with a perceived compromise of national sovereignty.

Instead, the United States should seek to extend to other countries in

the region the type of arrangement it has with Singapore—a small permanent liaison staff and regular temporary training deployments by

larger combat units to facilities owned and operated by the host country.

Regular deployments of land-based forces to these countries would provide an opportunity to train in a variety of regional environments, facilitate interoperability with allies and potential coalition partners, and deter

regional aggression. They also would increase the logistical and political

ability of the United States to operate out of those countries in a contingency, whether interstate war or humanitarian crisis. The Armed Forces

already have considerable naval access and some land-based access to

Australia, but current arrangements should be further expanded, if possible, to make use of the excellent training areas available in that country.

The United States also should seek to expand its presence on the territory

of its other regional allies, the Philippines and Thailand. Given its former

colonial relationship with the Philippines, the United States must be sensitive to the delicacy of the issue there and not attempt to acquire greater

access than is acceptable to the Philippine people. Nonetheless, given the

strategic location of the Philippines, particularly relative to the South

China Sea, and the continuing U.S. alliance relationship with it, both

countries would benefit if America had an increased ability to train with

Philippine forces and operate out of Philippine bases. A similar argument

applies to Thailand, which occupies a strategic location as the only U.S.

ally in mainland Southeast Asia. Where possible, comparable arrangements should be made elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia—perhaps

India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Vietnam.

Finally, the United States should consider upgrading its facilities on

Diego Garcia and Guam. The United States has major air and naval facilities at Guam, but they are underutilized and have fallen into disrepair,

and the facilities at Diego Garcia are limited. Both islands occupy strategically similar locations within their respective regions, being at least several hundred miles from the Asian mainland. This location limits the

ability of tactical aircraft to operate from bases there but has the advantage of being out of range of most missiles possessed by countries in the

region. Thus, long-range aircraft and naval forces could operate out of

bases on these islands in relative safety. Guam has the advantage of being

roughly equidistant between Northeast Asia, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia,
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 259

while Diego Garcia is the only U.S. military facility in South Asia (although the United States does have access to some facilities in the Arabian

Gulf). Refurbishing the air and naval facilities in Guam would enable U.S.

forces to operate more effectively from there in event of a crisis in East

Asia, and expanding the facilities at Diego Garcia would increase the ability of U.S. forces to respond to a crisis—humanitarian or otherwise—in

South Asia.7

Opportunities for Change

Overseas military presence is a fundamental requirement for any defense strategy based primarily on power projection, and QDR 2001 is unlikely to challenge the concept of a robust U.S. overseas presence. However, the type of presence and the nature of the forces stationed overseas

logically will be significant QDR issues.

The potential for some change already is building. The shift of the Air

Force toward a rotational Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, along

with the inherent sovereignty and force protection characteristics of

naval-forward presence, might prompt a move toward a more maritimebased presence backed by greater deployment of longer-range strike

forces stationed just outside or on the well-protected fringes of the region. This model may be a good one for the Arabian Gulf region, where

any increase in land-based presence would seem problematic politically. It

also could be a solution to some Pacific region presence issues. But it

would help little with potential conflicts in the former Soviet republics of

Central Asia, where the United States currently has no presence forces; it

would not increase the interoperability of ground forces in areas such as

South and Southeast Asia; and it would not be sufficient for broader

NATO activities in the Balkans or elsewhere.

The United States maintains a very real and abiding interest in European security affairs. Forces in Europe perform numerous important missions to ensure that the United States can achieve its foreign policy objectives in that region. The needs of the European theater deserve to be given

careful and thorough consideration in light of the essential role played

daily by Americans stationed there. The Soviet Union is a thing of the

past, but the need to maintain a strong and capable U.S. military presence

in Europe is very much an obligation of the present and future. This presence should, however, consist primarily of lighter forces with greater mobility than the Cold War remnants currently in place.
260 QDR 2001

In a resource-constrained environment, reshaping U.S. forces in Europe will not be easy, but the upcoming QDR provides an ideal opportunity for DOD to consider these issues in the context of global U.S. overseas presence. In some cases, changes could be pursued through ongoing

transformation initiatives, such as the Army transformation plan and the

AEF concept. However, attempting to adapt U.S. forces in Europe solely

through a series of existing efforts that are not tightly integrated risks

generating a force structure in Europe that, even if it is better suited than

the Cold War remnants, will fall short of a solid solution. The QDR 2001

provides a needed opportunity to examine the requirements of the European theater across the board and to assess how those needs compare to

those of other theaters.

U.S. presence in the Arabian Gulf region should balance long-term

American interests with current political conditions, in which a rogue

regime continues to defy collective world concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for cross-border

aggression. An additional factor is that the operational U.S. presence tied

to the Northern and Southern no-fly zones imposed on Iraq ultimately

have a UN mandate and are not part of a permanent regional agreement.

A maritime-oriented presence—legitimated by the legal freedom of the

seas—may be optimal for long-term U.S. interests in free trade and the

flow of natural resources, but some degree of land-based presence still appears essential in helping to constrain current threats. Because of the narrow physical confines of the region, notably the Strait of Hormuz, the development of antiaccess weapons and strategies may have even more of

an immediate impact on regional presence decisions than changes in political conditions. Current political conditions may make it difficult for

QDR 2001 to advocate any fundamental change in the size of presence

forces in the region, although a force mix tilted toward counterproliferation and force protection could be a logical recommendation.

The Asia-Pacific security environment is evolving, and U.S. presence

in the region must evolve as well. The Cold War has ended, and the Korean confrontation appears to be winding down, while Chinese power

and reach are growing. The risk of conflict in the South China Sea appears to be increasing, as are the danger of war in South Asia and the

chances of state failure in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. The

United States must ensure that it has adequately prepared the way for the

type of presence it needs to maintain in Northeast Asia when the Korean

confrontation has ended. This includes considerations of stability and
OVERSEAS PRESENCE 261

reassurance for Japan, China, and Korea, and also of U.S. ability to maintain its presence and to project power throughout the region. The United

States must expand its presence in South and Southeast Asia, not

through the establishment of new sovereign bases but through access

arrangements that allow it to deploy forces regularly to countries in these

subregions without compromising their sovereignty. The current defense

relationship with Singapore may provide a suitable model. The United

States also should upgrade its facilities in Guam and Diego Garcia. The

range of missiles possessed by potentially hostile countries is increasing,

and the likelihood of regional crises is increasing. The United States

needs bases that are well away from the mainland but close enough to

support operations in response to those crises. Fundamental shifts gradually are taking place in the regional security landscape; to protect and

advance its interests in the region, the United States must adapt its overseas presence in anticipation of, rather than in reaction to, these shifts.

The QDR will allow DOD to take stock of its entire defense strategy

and what it requires in the context of likely available resources. A decision

in the next QDR to depart from the two-major theater war requirement

clearly would have implications for what might be available for overseas

presence. These implications must be well understood before any decisions are made concerning what to do with those very visible pieces of

U.S. force structure.

In the absence of a change in the requirements needed to implement

the strategy and without significant additional resources for defense, the

only way to make the kinds of changes outlined here will be to make

tradeoffs among force structures in various theaters. Only by carefully

and objectively assessing the needs of one theater against another during

QDR 2001 can sound decisions be reached about whether these types of

changes would be beneficial to achieving U.S. objectives without jeopardizing achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives as a whole.

Notes1 This does not include the wars fought against domestic opponents, notably the American Civil

War and numerous wars against the Native American tribes. There have also been casualties inflicted

on American soil as part of foreign wars (such as at Pearl Harbor); however, no major land battles

were conducted in the continental United States.

2 Power projection is defined as “the ability of a nation . . . to rapidly and effectively deploy

and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to

deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.” From Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.
262 QDR 2001

3 Another method of categorizing overseas presence forces—one used in recent reports of the

Secretary of Defense—is by their degree of permanence. In this construct, overseas presence forces

can be categorized as (1) permanently stationed, (2) rotationally deployed, and (3) deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 2000, 4.

4 Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 2000, 11–12.

5 For purposes of this section, the Asia-Pacific region is taken to be roughly equivalent to the

land portion of U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility. It includes South Asia (from Pakistan

eastward), East Asia, and Southeast Asia.

6 In addition to the naval facilities at Yokosuka, an air base is needed nearby to support the aircraft carrier’s air wing. Atsugi Naval Air Field serves that purpose now, but the field has environmental and safety problems. If the Marine Corps air wing stationed at Marine Corps Air Station Wakuni

or U.S. Air Force units stationed at Yokota were withdrawn, the aircraft carrier air wing could be relocated to either of those facilities.

7 Diego Garcia is British territory leased to the United States for a finite period. The British government currently is facing claims to the land by the descendants of its former residents, Maldive Islanders who were brought to Diego Garcia to work on the copra plantations there. These issues

would have to be resolved before the United States invested in a significant expansion of its facilities

on Diego Garcia.
Chapter Ten

Peacetime Operations:

Reducing Friction 

by John J. Spinelli

Fighting and winning the Nation’s wars is the most visible mission of

the U.S. military, but its operations in peacetime also are critical.

When we see a humanitarian disaster in the making or a chance for

peace on the horizon, we often consider committing the military to assist;

the price to pay might be small for the greater good that it can yield.

Given that we are not at war, that we spend billions on defense, and that

we have remarkable advantages in technology and capability, the sheer

size of the U.S. military makes it easy to assume that a few peacetime operations should be “a drop in the bucket.”

Yet today’s military increasingly is showing signs of stress as it conducts peacetime operations while maintaining readiness for war. Recent

recruiting and retention shortfalls as well as slippage in unit readiness

have caused significant concern. Officials worry about an overextended

military, about units losing their warfighting edge by conducting peace

operations, and about scarce and expensive resources mired in commitments with no end in sight.

For this chapter, peacetime operations are defined as those missions

short of major theater warfare that execute U.S. national military

strategy.

1 They occur daily and involve all components of the total force:

active, Reserve, and civilian. The scope of these operations is broad and

includes overseas military activities such as presence, military-to-military

contacts, and exercises; support to domestic authorities such as disaster

relief and counterdrug support; and myriad contingency operations such

as humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and shows of force. Today’s

national security strategy requires integrated approaches that shape the

international environment, respond to crises, and prepare now for an uncertain future. Peacetime operations generally support the shaping and

responding elements of U.S. strategy.

263
264 QDR 2001

This chapter seeks to accomplish three things:

■ Establish a framework for thinking about U.S. military peacetime operations by organizing numerous activities and linking them to U.S. national

security strategy;

■ Identify the major demands for U.S. military forces and the significant

challenges, or points of friction, that are caused by today’s peacetime operations environment, especially smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs); and

■ Offer several broad policy approaches for consideration in future analysis

of defense strategy, force sizing, and force structure.

The chapter begins with a review of the U.S. military missions and

forces integral to the shaping and responding elements of strategy. Points

of friction resulting from these activities are then described and discussed

in detail. The chapter concludes with policy options to serve as a starting

point for analysis during QDR strategy development and implementation.

Shaping the Environment

U.S. military peacetime operations shape the international environment by creating, fielding, and sustaining credible forces that can achieve

multiple purposes: reassure and influence allies, deter adversaries, and influence neutral countries. Overseas presence embodies the notion of

global military engagement and shaping. On a day-to-day basis, thousands of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen demonstrate American values, capabilities, and resolve. The presence of these forces overseas is a

visible signal of U.S. commitment to other nations and their peoples.

Through a variety of engagement activities, the Armed Forces promote

regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment. Participation in alliances and coalitions also can influence decisions on the allocation of

leadership positions and on strategy and policy. Overseas presence forces

must be able to conduct a full spectrum of activities with allies and be capable of independent, sizable combat operations when combined with

forces stationed in the United States. By their operations and activities in

theater, U.S. forces are well positioned to assess the capabilities and weaknesses of allies, potential adversaries, and other regional states alike. They

also are strategically postured for rapid response to crises.

The credibility and deterrent effect of the Armed Forces is not possible without a significant investment in the institutions and infrastructure

that generate military power. A third component of peacetime shaping

operations requires U.S. strategic forces for purposes of deterrence.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 265

Generating Military Power 

Today’s unmatched U.S. military might is the product of years of effort and many unique and vital institutions and processes. These assets—

facilities, equipment, and personnel—conduct or support activities that

recruit, organize, train, equip, maintain, care for, sustain, deploy, redeploy,

and reconstitute the military organizations and personnel that are employed worldwide. For example, they are the people who recruit at shopping malls, teach at boot camps and service academies, provide health care

at hospitals and clinics, write U.S. military doctrine, and run installations

and training ranges. They staff the military departments, operate strategic

deployment facilities, manage finance and accounting systems, and buy

and repair weapons and equipment. Generating military power also includes numerous organizations that conduct planning, direct activities, acquire material and services, and analyze all aspects of military operations.

These assets, including roughly one-third of each service’s active military personnel, as well as nearly all DOD civilians, predominantly are

committed to building the force and power projection of military units

stationed in the United States.2 Thus, they are not directly conducting

peacetime engagement, SSCs, or MTW. In areas such as research and development and acquisition, these DOD assets also support preparing now

for an uncertain future, the third component of U.S. security strategy.

Peacetime Engagement 

The heart of the shaping strategy component is the daily commitment

of over 200,000 military and DOD civilian personnel throughout the

world (see table 10–1).3 Regional CINCs plan and conduct engagement

activities based on guidance from the National Command Authorities and

the Chairman. CINC engagement plans are designed to achieve prioritized

objectives for their area of responsibility and to incorporate the particular

geographic, economic, political, military, and cultural features of the area.

Engagement includes a variety of missions, organizations, and resources

for such actions as international military exercises, military-to-military

contacts, Partnership for Peace activities in Europe, defense cooperation

activities, foreign military sales, the International Military Education and

Training program, treaty obligations and security commitments, humanitarian assistance (including medical and engineering projects), humanitarian demining, and counterdrug operations.

Military engagement activities are viewed as an essential instrument

for bolstering the security of allies, strengthening alliances and coalitions,
266 QDR 2001

and building constructive security relationships.4 In some cases, the U.S.

military serves as the preferred means of engagement with countries that

are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes. Engagement also provides

numerous opportunities to encourage adherence to international norms

and regimes that serve as foundations of peace and stability.

A portion of the U.S. military forward-deployed force is embedded in

the institutions and processes associated with numerous international activities and generally would be unavailable for redeployment to SSCs or

MTW. For example, support to NATO military staff, embassy military attachés, and overseas installation operations probably would continue despite out-of-area operations. Other deployed forces would be available for

contingencies or theater warfare, although such shifting of commitments

may entail additional cost and risk (see table 10–1).

Strategic Nuclear Forces 

Strategic nuclear forces complement conventional U.S. capabilities in

deterring aggression and coercion. They serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those contemplating the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.

The United States maintains a robust triad of strategic forces to deter hostility or attempts to seek a nuclear advantage. These forces are not normally associated with SSCs or MTW. Today’s force structure is estimated

to cost $6 billion per year and includes 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 18 ballistic missile submarines, and 113 heavy bombers.5 (A more detailed review of strategic nuclear forces is provided in chapter 12.) 

Responding to Crises

The United States and others in the international community generally seek to prevent and to contain localized conflicts and crises without

the use of military force. If such efforts do not succeed, however, intervention by military forces may be necessary. Although the spectrum of

possible crises ranges from providing humanitarian assistance to fighting

and winning MTW, the most frequent future challenges are expected to

be SSCs. Peacetime operations that respond to crises include military

assistance to civilian authorities and SSCs.

Aid to Civilian Authorities 

Extending military support to civilian authorities in the United States is

both expected and required in a variety of circumstances, including disaster

relief, immigration emergencies, transport or other support of presidential
Table 10–1. Summary of U.S. Forward-Deployed Forces

Region1 Personnel 2 Army Units3 Navy Units4 USMC Units5 AF Units6

Europe 100,000 2 Heavy Div () 1 CVBG/ARG 1 MEU 2.3 FWE

Pacific 100,000 1 Heavy Div () 1 CVBG/ARG 1 MEF 2 FWE

1 Light Div () 1 MEU 1.25 FWE

(Alaska)

Southwest 15,000 1 Heavy Bn 1 CVBG/ARG 1 MEU 1 FWE

Asia Task Force

1 U.S. Southern Command, not listed, also conducts various engagement activities in its area of responsibility. For example, over 15,400 National Guard and Army Reservists train there annually, comprising 40 percent of all exercises. 2 Approximate steady-state presence; does not reflect “surges” for specific operations and exercises. 

3 Heavy divisions are armored and mechanized; (]) indicates at least one combat brigade is not forward-deployed. An attack helicopter battalion is also located with the Heavy Battalion Task Force in Southwest Asia. 4 CVBG is carrier battle group of a carrier and air wing plus various surface combatant ships and attack subs. ARG is amphibious ready group with large-deck amphibious assault ship, transport dock, and dock landing ships, and embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). 5 MEF is Marine Expeditionary Force, an air-ground task force built around a division/wing team. MEU is Marine Expeditionary Unit built around a battalion landing team, reinforced helicopter squadron, and logistics support unit. 6 FWE is Fighter Wing Equivalent of 72 aircraft, based on primary mission aircraft inventory. As the Aerospace Expeditionary

Force concept is implemented, the designation AEF rather than FWE will be adopted.

PEACETIME OPERATIONS 267

visits and events, wildland firefighting, civil disturbances, and military

assistance to safety and traffic. DOD has supported more than 200 domestic disaster-relief operations since 1975 and was involved in at least 50 different support activities in 1999 alone. Support for civil authorities involves

all military services and requires active and Reserve component (RC) forces

as well as civilians. Often overshadowed by higher-profile events, military

support is a critical, longstanding mission that continues to grow.6

Although the DOD has no “military support to the nation” battalions

or other dedicated force structure elements, the requirements can be dramatic.7 For example, supporting the 1996 Atlanta Olympics required

14,653 active and National Guard personnel from 47 states and territories, over 300 aviation support missions, and more than 300,000 items of

equipment for use by state and local authorities. Over 1,200 active-duty

soldiers and Marines fought fires in California and Oregon during 1996.

Thirteen thousand military personnel (active-duty and National Guard)

were employed to help restore order in the Los Angeles metropolitan area

during civil disturbances in 1992.8

DOD also enhances the capability of the federal government to prevent and to respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
268 QDR 2001

destruction and helps support the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies with regard to such incidents. (Homeland security issues are covered in chapter 3 on asymmetric threats.) Such missions are important, and the military is often the only federal agency

that can provide immediate response, but each operation requires time,

personnel, training, and funding. These activities must be integrated

with the demands of other missions, including SSCs and MTW.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Defense Planning Guidance requires planning for a variety of potential SSCs. No two will be the same, and variables include duration, forces

required, location, participation of allies and other interested parties,

linkage to U.S. national interests, political and military conditions, and

resources available. Demands on a specific service can approach the magnitude of effort planned for an MTW, as in Kosovo, while other services

may have smaller commitments but for longer duration.

Selective participation in SSC operations can serve a variety of U.S.

interests. Swift military action sometimes may be the best way to prevent,

contain, or resolve conflict or humanitarian crisis, averting greater effort

and increased risk later. Commitment of U.S. military forces represents a

significant demonstration of the NCA leadership and interest.9

The post-Cold War trend clearly is toward more U.S. involvement in

SSCs and more operations of longer duration. One study of the two

decades between 1975 and 1995 noted that the highest number of U.S.

responses (over 40) was in the last period (1991–95), along with an increased proportion of such responses requiring a longer time to complete (approximately one-third extended beyond 12 months in duration).10 Data to facilitate review of the various issues (such as short- and

long-term operating costs, forces and skills required, and the contributions of other nations and organizations) are not readily available. The

wide variety of unique criteria and circumstances posed by each SSC

compounds the challenges of understanding their impact. For example,

one service database has listed 200 SSCs of varying size and duration,

while a contractor has listed over 500.11 A DOD report to Congress submitted in March 1999 reported approximately 50 named major overseas

SSCs since the Gulf War.12 The reporting criterion was the deployment of

500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel. These SSCs are summarized

in table 10–2. This summary does not include some important recent

SSCs, such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo; unnamed operations

(such as the two-carrier battle group deployment to Taiwan in March
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 269

1996 in response to Chinese force movements and missile firings); domestic support operations, to include disaster relief; or force protection,

counterdrug, and counterterrorism operations that have not met the deployment criteria of 500 or more military personnel.

Points of Friction: Can Today’s Force Structure

and Resources Continue to Meet the Demands? 

The U.S. military is having difficulty meeting its wide variety of operational and programmatic requirements, despite a significant DOD budget and a large military force. Many demands are competing for people

and dollars. Three notable challenges are costs, increasing demands

(“doing more with less”), and unavailability of assets.

DOD faces the same challenge as any large organization with people,

equipment, and infrastructure: containing the rising costs of doing business. Pressures that generate increasing demands for funding include a

dwindling population base (higher recruiting and retention costs);

higher operating and technology costs; growing environmental management responsibilities (including hazardous waste cleanup, environmental damage mitigation, and weapons demilitarization); excess infrastructure and aging facilities (such as housing); and higher manpower costs.

Although addressing these issues is well beyond the scope of this chapter,

higher costs do affect the manpower and resources available for peacetime operations.

Meanwhile, as the pace of operations has quickened, available forces

have been reduced substantially. Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has

been involved in nearly 100 major commitments of Americans in uniform, both active and Reserve, to almost every corner of the globe. Over

the same period, about a third of the military’s personnel and budget

were eliminated.13

Finally, although active conventional forces (particularly those overseas) may be the most visible sign of U.S. military power, they do not

constitute the majority of U.S. force structure or resource allocation.

Roughly 40 percent of DOD end-strength is associated with institutional

missions, such as recruiting, training, acquisition, maintenance, and management. Active component operational end-strength comprises approximately 30 percent, including the significant overseas presence commitment. The remaining 30 percent are RC forces. Over half of the fiscal year

(FY) 1999 Total Obligation Authority was associated with institutional

requirements, such as research, development, testing, and engineering,
Table 10–2. Summary of Recent Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Number of Operations (and

Contingency Type Location) Reported to Congress General Duration

Category 1 (vital interest or security imperative)

Noncombatant Evacuation 9 (Albania, Cambodia/Thailand, Days–weeks

Indonesia, 6 African Nations)

Show of Force 3 (Kuwait, Iraq) Weeks–months

Limited Strikes1 2 (Iraq) Days–weeks

No-Fly Zone Enforcement 2 (Iraq) Months–years

Intervention 0

Peacekeeping and Enforcement 0

Emergency Operation in Support 1 (Tanzania and Kenya Weeks–months

of Other U.S. Government Agency after embassy bombings)

Category 2 (important national interest)

Show of Force 0

Limited Strikes 1 (Bosnia) Days–weeks

No-Fly Zone Enforcement 2 (Bosnia) Months–years

Intervention 0

Peacekeeping and Enforcement 10 (Somalia, Haiti, Sinai, Months–years

Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo)

Humanitarian Assistance 0

Maritime Sanctions 4 (Adriatic Sea) Months–years

Other Military Support to 6 (migrant operations, Weeks–months

Civilian Authority principally involving Cuba)

Category 3 (humanitarian and other interest)

Peacekeeping and Enforcement 1 (Somalia) Weeks–months

Humanitarian Assistance 9 (Bangladesh, Zaire, Rwanda, Weeks–months–

Iraq, Somalia, Central America) years

Maritime Sanctions Enforcement 0

Other Military Support to 0

Civilian Authority

Source: William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale

Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War, March 1999. 1 Strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan would fit the subcategory of “limited strikes” if they had met the reporting

threshold of 500 personnel deployed.

270 QDR 2001
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 271

military construction and housing, civilian and retired pay, environment,

and health.14 Thus, a large force and big budget numbers do not guarantee unlimited numbers of deployable personnel and units.

The responsibilities and simultaneous activities that DOD must balance range from its force-generation effort to its current worldwide

presence of some 340,000 personnel overseas or afloat in more than 140

countries.15 U.S. military forces must simultaneously be committed in

various peacetime engagement and shaping activities; trained and postured to execute rapidly and to sustain SSC operations; and trained,

ready, and available to meet the demanding deployment and operational requirements to fight two overlapping MTWs. Practically speaking, however, only one pool of U.S. military personnel and equipment is

available to meet all of these important security requirements. As a result, points of friction have developed in such areas as funding, unit

readiness, and the pace of activity, including operations tempo, personnel tempo, and low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) assets. The high demand for forward-deployed and U.S.-based forces has often put the

training, resource, and deployment demands of SSCs in competition

with readiness for MTW.

Funding 

The funding process for contingency operations is problematic. The

bulk of SSC costs is financed from within service operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts but is not programmed in advance. Thus, SSC

funding is generally reactive and creates two significant problems. First,

higher costs from the increased pace of unplanned and unbudgeted operations cause commanders to disrupt programs by robbing O&M training

and maintenance accounts to meet up-front funding requirements of

SSCs. Second, the reimbursement process allows the potential for funding

dissipation from the original programs as well as lost opportunity costs. In

other words, by the time the reimbursement occurs, the original program

already is behind schedule. Higher repair-parts costs compound this problem, leading to shortages and maintenance backlogs. The end result is a

less prepared warfighting force due to lost training opportunities as well as

degradation of various operations and maintenance programs. The RC is

similarly affected by this funding issue and may even be underutilized as a

result of the fiscal uncertainties.16
272 QDR 2001

Tempo: Rotation and LD/HD Assets 

The first broad tempo issue that the military faces today is that of operational tempo of units, such as the commitment of fighter squadrons

and infantry battalions to operational missions or required training. The

second is PERSTEMPO of individuals, which is the amount of time military members spend away from home. Tempo is basically a matter of supply and demand for units and personnel, and problems occur when the

demand is greater than the available supply. Tempo problems manifest

themselves as readiness problems and generally are the effects of deployments on people, equipment, and units, both those deployed and those

that stay behind. Senior DOD leadership frequently has expressed concern that in the long term, high tempo rates can erode readiness dangerously across the board.17

The demands of engagement and SSCs require significant unit and

personnel rotation requirements, which affect a much larger number of

personnel and units than only those deployed. Moreover, many types of

deployments or SSC operations have common requirements or needs,

creating a high demand for certain capabilities and units, some of which

are in short supply (LD/HD assets). Extensive deployment of high-demand units and personnel can degrade unit readiness.

Rotation

Military personnel and units need to rotate their responsibilities; one

unit cannot be on the front line all the time. The military also has numerous tasks that cannot be accomplished adequately under extended deployments, such as equipment maintenance, developmental training and

schooling, personnel reassignments, and some logistics operations. Thus,

rotations are essential for units that are forward-deployed on an extended

basis, such as naval and Marine forces at sea and air or ground forces in

field conditions.

Typically, large-scale rotations have three phases. A preparation and

predeployment phase involves organizing and equipping the forces for

planned operations, training them, and conducting rehearsals of

anticipated missions. The operations phase involves the actual deployment activities, such as training and sustaining the force; these operations

can involve lengthy away-from-home periods. The redeployment and recovery phase facilitates personnel actions (reassignments and schools),

maintenance and recovery (to include time off), resupply, and a return to

general mission training.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 273

Theoretically, this three-phase rotation base calls for only three similar force elements to be committed to a specific operational requirement.

However, several factors necessitate a larger number of personnel, equipment, and units to be available to support such rotations. For example,

maintenance programs remove equipment for periodic refurbishment or

upgrading. Additional forces may be required for operational reasons,

such as overlapping coverage as units replace each other, staging and deployment time considerations, and CINC readiness requirements. Additional forces outside the rotation, such as those that help train and deploy

others (for example, troops playing the enemy for field exercises and simulations, or the guides and tiedown crews for railcars) also are vital. Personnel and smaller elements may be pulled out of larger units to meet

other missions and requirements. Coupled with these factors is the challenge of managing the time that individual soldiers are away from home

for training, schooling, SSCs, or other long-duration commitments, such

as tours requiring separation from family. In many cases, these activities

will preclude availability in rotations. The services have specific policies to

manage peacetime engagement and SSC deployments to help to build

more predictability and control over units and personnel and to address

the unique operational requirements of each service. But the practical lesson of long-duration commitments is that three similar force (and personnel) elements reflecting only what is actually deployed are insufficient.

In general, four or five of a specific asset or unit are necessary for

each element committed. For example, the Navy currently requires 12

aircraft carriers to ensure that 3 are consistently forward-deployed under

Naval Global Force Military Policy.18 The Marine Corps has a similar rotation deployment program for its expeditionary units. The Air Force

uses four to five fighters for each one deployed under an expeditionary

concept that establishes a rotational AEF assignment for contingency operations support.19 The Army is not designed as a rotational force and

does not rotate its combat divisions; instead, it rotates forces below the

division level by crafting tailored deployment packages from its active

and Reserve components.

Rotating units also creates a turbulence problem. Several subordinate

units can suffer significant personnel losses as the parent unit seeks to deploy a stable force from which personnel will not have to depart in midrotation (for such things as reassignment, retirement, or separation) or be

forced into back-to-back extended deployments (such as using personnel

recently stationed in Korea or Bosnia). Tailoring forces for a specific SSC
274 QDR 2001

also may lower the readiness of subordinate elements that lose a support

unit or capability important to its internal operations and training. The

end result is that one or two similar units might be significantly degraded

to make a third unit deployable.20

LD/HD Assets 

Scarce assets with unique mission capabilities frequently are desired

to support CINC warfighting requirements and SSCs. Joint Staff Global

Military Force Policy currently lists 23 LD/HD assets to help manage the

impact of sustained high operations tempo, balance CINC requirements

against available resources, and preserve a surge capability for crisis and

contingency response. Current LD/HD assets grouped by unique mission

capabilities are shown in table 10–3.

Other units also can be in high demand to meet operational requirements. Logistical and medical units, communications elements,

and lightly armed ground units (such as military police, engineer, air

traffic control, airfield security, and light infantry) typically are in high

demand for force protection and to sustain air and ground operations

in missions such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.21 Support units can be called upon to provide area coverage for deployed

forces of all services as well as forces of other nations and civilians.

Some SSCs also make high demands on specific types of capabilities.

Table 10–3. Low Density/High Demand Assets 

Capability Being Managed Number of Systems Affected

Reconnaissance/Battle 8 platforms or systems such as Airborne Warning and 

Management Assets Control System, Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 

Center, Joint Surveillance, Target Attack System, and both 

piloted and unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms 

Electronic Combat Aircraft 2 platforms

Special Operations Forces 9 types of units/equipment; includes a Civil Affairs Battalion,

7 Special Operations Units (helicopter and fixed wing aircraft),

and Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Team delivery vehicle task units

Patriot Air Defense All active Patriot batteries and battalions

Rescue Aircraft 2 platforms

Chemical/Biological Defense 2 units (Chemical Company and Technical Escort Unit)

Source: Derived from Joint Staff Global Military Force Policy Orientation Briefing, September 20, 2000.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 275

For example, current no-fly zone enforcement has placed higher demands on specific types of fighters and support aircraft. Humanitarian

operations may require significant airlift, and the demand may change

over time. For example, humanitarian operations initially may call for

significant naval or air transport and later for larger ground force operations. Peace enforcement may begin with expeditionary air and ground

forces and evolve to more permanent armored or light forces with

larger force protection and logistical support requirements.

Warfighting Readiness

Beyond the basic wearing out of personnel and equipment through

tempo, other adverse effects can occur as SSCs conflict with efforts to

keep potent military forces postured for rapid, high-end combat operations. First, many individual and unit combat skills are perishable; when

they are not practiced routinely, proficiency will degrade. For example,

infantry units must practice assaulting a bunker, gun crews must practice

acquiring targets and firing weapons, and combat pilots must practice

air-to-air combat and ordnance delivery. Timing, teamwork, and skill are

essential in most warfighting tasks. Generally, a train-up period is essential when units are being prepared for operational deployments. The loss

of training opportunities because of SSCs can degrade unit readiness.22

Moreover, U.S. forces must be able to transition from a posture of

global engagement—that is, from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent SSC operations—to fighting

a major theater war.23 With much of the U.S. strategic sea- and airlift

based in the United States, linkup and redeployment of units in an overseas SSC could be extremely complicated. Synchronizing the disengagement or replacement of SSC units as well as their recovery, retraining, and

recommitment stresses and complicates operations at all levels. It also affects equipment arrival times in theater.

Major Peacetime Challenge: SSCs 

SSCs and readiness for major theater warfighting are likely to continue generating points of friction for the military. These requirements of

U.S. defense strategy must be integrated into other imperatives, such as

transformation, strategic nuclear forces and deterrence, and homeland security. In chapter 5, alternative defense strategies reflect possible broad

approaches to the roles and emphasis of peacetime operations in national

security strategy. The Bush administration will face the challenge of

meeting the demands of whatever strategy it pursues with a finite force
276 QDR 2001

structure and capability. Unless DOD chooses to accept the level of friction generated by current force structure and requirements, it has two

choices: reduce the demand for forces and commitments, or increase the

availability or supply of forces.

Overall, SSCs generate the most problematic levels of unpredictability, turbulence, and tempo. However, this problem does not exist in a vacuum. The primacy of MTW readiness in current U.S. strategy, coupled

with a robust peacetime engagement and overseas presence effort, are key

components of the equation for which the United States has but one military force. Thus, SSCs represent a significant category of military effort

frequently linked to vital or important national interests. Redefining what

is important is the quickest way to divest SSC commitments. On the other

hand, a future with continuing high commitment to SSCs may signal a

need to better adjust military structure and policies to accomplish SSCs.

Convincing allies to carry significantly more of the SSC burden in

this era of declining defense resources, particularly when vital and important U.S. interests are at stake, may prove daunting. “Just saying no” may

not be an option, and we must not limit U.S. ability to act unilaterally.

Today’s posture of engagement and force structure often can absorb

short-duration SSCs of vital interest without major difficulty (noncombatant evacuations and strikes, for example), although the cumulative effect of numerous short-duration activities still can affect training, costs,

and turbulence. Longer-duration SSCs appear to pose the greatest nearterm challenge. These operations impose substantial rotational requirements that significantly stress much more than the committed force.

Making Choices about SSCs 

The NCA ultimately decides to commit U.S. military forces to SSCs.

Analyzing the military’s recent experience with SSCs suggests how

much flexibility the Bush administration may have—or may choose to

create—with regard to SSC decisions. This analysis also can provide insight on potential impacts for the military of the SSC choices made by

the National Command Authorities.

Category 1 SSCs are those linked to vital U.S. interests or to highly

compelling security imperatives such as the lives of U.S. citizens or maintaining stability in a key region (see table 10–2). These SSCs appear uniformly nondiscretionary and unavoidable under today’s perspective of

what is vitally important.

Category 2 SSCs are not explicitly linked to vital U.S. interests, but

they may involve important interests, such as contributing to coalition or
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 277

alliance security objectives. Decisions about these SSCs are likely to be

difficult for the NCA, and the predominant considerations will be political, not military. However, this is the most fertile category for reducing

costs and tempo.

Category 3 SSCs that are not linked to vital or important U.S. interests afford the NCA a higher degree of discretion with regard to military

involvement. However, these SSCs often have humanitarian implications

and potentially high media interest. Thus, a political price may have to be

paid for avoiding Category 3 SSCs.

Whether more selective policy regarding U.S. military participation

in SSCs would significantly reduce operational commitments is uncertain. The most recent DOD experience, as reported to Congress in March

1999, reveals that over 80 percent of the reported SSCs were linked to

Categories 1 and 2, with one-third of them vital (Category 1). Thus, substantial reduction in SSC participation appears unachievable without a

new definition of what constitutes important national security interests.

Also unclear is whether more selective participation would result in

a major reduction in tempo. Long-term peacetime engagement does

pose challenges for the services, but they are fairly predictable and can be

managed. Forward-deployed forces or specific deployments of available

forces often can absorb short-duration SSCs. Long-duration SSC operations are the ones that create demand for rotations and prolonged higher

usage of equipment. Assuming rotations for SSCs are needed for durations greater than 5 months, the 1999 DOD report reveals that over onehalf of the named long-duration SSCs support either a vital or an important national interest (this was still true of every current operation as

of late 2000). Thus, unless these operations are avoided or curtailed,

tempo will remain high.

Nor is it clear that more selective participation in SSCs would result

in a substantial cost savings. From FY91 through FY99, DOD has spent

over $21 billion on various contingency operations (not counting Yugoslavia and recent air operations in Iraq).24 This figure probably does

not account for a myriad of other costs and impacts, nor do these costs

reflect the significant second-order effects of troop and equipment rotations, such as turbulence. However, just over one-quarter of all costs appear unavoidable (linked to vital interests in Category 1); an additional 57

percent of funding is linked to important national interests (Category 2).

Less than 15 percent of all contingency funding appears to be clearly

avoidable under Category 3. It should be noted that the costs for Bosnia
278 QDR 2001

and Iraq—two long-duration operations with significant force structure

requirements—dominate the spending (roughly 75 percent). Unless longduration operations are avoided or curtailed, notable cost savings are

doubtful. Even then, the percentage of the DOD operating budget affected would be very small.

Options for Forces and Commitments in SSCs:

Reducing Demand or Increasing Supply 

Options to address the points of friction generated by SSCs are offered as examples of how to reduce the demand for forces and commitments in SSCs or to increase the supply. Demand could be reduced by:

■ Changing the criteria for intervention or participation in SSCs;

■ Increasing the use of civilian contractors, non-DOD U.S. Government

agencies, and nongovernmental organizations;

■ Limiting SSC commitments based on a preset force ceiling;

■ Reducing force commitments to long-duration SSCs based on revised operational concepts or standards of performance; or 

■ Reducing level of engagement overseas.

Supply could be increased by:

■ Resolving U.S. force structure imbalances and inadequacies to enhance

military capability for SSCs;

■ Implementing new force management and deployment initiatives;

■ Establishing a dedicated SSC force; or 

■ Establishing a new funding mechanism for SSC operations.

Changing Criteria for Intervention or Participation in SSCs 

The United States has several particular comparative advantages

over other friendly nations. For example, U.S. strategic lift, electronic

jamming and reconnaissance, and communications capabilities often

are cited as superior to those of its allies.25 The Armed Forces arguably

also have a comparative advantage in the planning and execution of

complex military operations given their command and control technologies and training. However, exploiting such an advantage would

generate expectations of a leadership role. Using comparative advantages as the basis for selecting commitments to SSCs, the United States

can leverage the strengths of allies to pursue common interests.

Through coordination with key allies (which may require negotiations

about what U.S. comparative advantages are and what capabilities allies

are willing to supply), the United States could reduce stress on other
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 279

warfighting capabilities, such as combat aircraft and ground forces. Implicit in this policy is greater and more predictable participation in SSCs

by allies and other interested nations.

A key component of this policy is identification of U.S. capabilities that

are comparative advantages for the Nation. Two recent operations can serve

as a departure point for analysis. Under NATO in Operation Allied Force,

vital U.S. capabilities included strategic lift and deployment, intelligence

collection and reconnaissance, and secure long-range communications. For

UN operations in East Timor, the United States provided airlift, logistics,

command and control, communications, and intelligence support.26

This policy option would require a climate of bilateral or multilateral

understanding with key allies regarding this new burdensharing approach

to SSCs. It also would require a U.S. commitment to plan and to conduct

multinational training for likely SSCs and to ensure interoperability with

American assets as well as enhance the performance of others.

This policy could improve the predictability, limits, and focus of U.S.

military resource requirements in SSCs. It also could substantially reduce

tempo and cost if it could eliminate extended commitment of combat air

and ground forces in peacekeeping operations and other resource-intensive environments.

This policy might fail to meet alliance or coalition expectations for full

partner risk-sharing and commitment. It could undermine the spirit of

cooperation needed to execute SSCs successfully, and it also might require

greater U.S. resource commitments for those comparative advantages that

we intend to employ (which often are already LD/HD assets). Pursuing

this policy could have the unintended consequence of encouraging growth

in this existing capability gap with allies. A greater commitment of U.S.

military resources might be necessary to reinforce the training and capability of allies. A final policy challenge would be the complexity that it

might pose for unilateral or timely action when a predominantly U.S. interest is at stake. The greater reliance on alliance participation requires a

level of collaboration, consensus, and policy adherence that could limit

U.S. flexibility and slow response to crisis. In the end, the complexities of

implementing this policy are significant and depend greatly on the expectations, actions, and capabilities of U.S. allies.

Increasing Use of Contractors, Non-DOD Agencies, and NGOs

SSCs can involve the use of labor-intensive logistics, engineering,

and communications support activities, frequently for long periods of time.

These same capabilities often are required to maintain the combat 
280 QDR 2001

readiness of today’s deployed forces or are found in greater numbers in the

Reserve components. Divesting these support activities through contracting

or commitment of non-DOD or NGO capabilities would free critical

LD/HD units and other frequently deployed capabilities from the stresses

of SSC operations. Contractors already are an important support mechanism for the U.S. military, and precedents exist for successful contractor

support during deployments and even conflict. Similarly, NGOs and nonDOD organizations can fill an important role in the management and execution of many humanitarian efforts around the world. Implicit in this policy is greater and more predictable participation by non-DOD

organizations that traditionally have not assumed a highly assertive role.

This policy would involve identification of specific competencies that

reside in non-DOD and NGO groups. This list may closely track current

functions of various logistical units today, such as feeding, housing, engineering, transportation and storage, fuel support, water production and

distribution, medical care, sanitation, communications, police and other

civil affairs, and psychological operations. The option would require contractor capability to execute desired missions and tasks rapidly, with a prearranged funding strategy to facilitate contract execution without disruption of existing defense funding and programs. It would require an

interagency strategy to build up needed expeditionary capabilities of nonDOD agencies, including gaining necessary support and funding from

Congress; to establish interagency agreements (and funding) for responsibilities assumed by non-DOD agencies (such as the Department of State,

the U.S. Agency for International Development, and others); to coordinate

implementation of contracting mechanisms with allies and other international organizations; and to pursue informal agreements and commitments with NGOs and other international organizations to ensure coordinated and timely support in the conduct of SSCs.

This policy could reduce U.S. military participation in SSC commitments significantly, particularly for logistics and support units. The

highest payoff would occur if military support forces were not committed beyond the first rotation of long-duration SSCs. Such a policy also

facilitates quicker transition of SSC operations from military to civilian

control and creates a more effective effort overall because of an institutionalized approach for integrating non-military capabilities into planning and execution. A premise of this policy is that other organizations

can achieve the responsiveness and agility normally provided by U.S.

military logistics and support organizations.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 281

Several circumstances could limit full implementation of this policy.

First, the policy would require robust and stable funding to ensure that

contractor capability is developed and sustained over time. This may be

difficult to achieve if SSCs are unpredictable or funding support is erratic.

At the same time, higher costs and slower support could result if contract

mechanisms are unfavorable or if the contractor is unable to mobilize

rapidly. Should an unstable or hostile threat environment emerge, degraded contractor effectiveness could pose new challenges and risks for

supporting U.S. forces. A current limitation is the general lack of expeditionary capability within most non-DOD agencies. For optimum implementation of this policy, the interagency process must build effective and

responsive teams across both organizational and international boundaries, particularly with regard to loosely structured groups. Because

NGOs often prefer to retain their independence in operations, special collaboration between the U.S. government, NGOs, and those military and

non-military organizations they work alongside may be required.

Limiting SSC Commitments

Creating a top line for the level of commitment to nonvital SSCs

would set a predictable requirement for military planners to meet. A policy might limit the number of these SSCs conducted simultaneously, the

length of the operations, or the cumulative size of U.S. forces that could

be committed at one time. These or other efforts to tighten criteria for

participation in nonvital SSCs could make that process more selective.

The policy also could assist planners in determining force structure

surge requirements and balancing resources for SSCs against those for

major theater warfighting. Implicit in this policy are the ability to define

a military force that is sufficient for nonvital SSCs and the willingness to

turn away requests that exceed it.

A key component of this policy is specific ceilings on naval, air, and

ground forces that would be deployed at any one time to nonvital SSCs.

For example, a planning ceiling of one long-duration or two simultaneous

short-duration operations represents a modest yet visible commitment of

U.S. forces to nonvital SSCs. Historical data and modeling insights on the

anticipated levels of SSC forces would have to be integrated into development of these ceilings. This option also would require an interagency

implementation strategy to address the concerns of allies, international organizations, and affected parties.

This policy could significantly improve the predictability of nonvital

SSC obligations and reduce overall U.S. military SSC commitments. It
282 QDR 2001

would establish tempo and readiness impacts as an up-front consideration to guard against unanticipated consequences of nonvital SSC involvement. Cost and tempo savings would be achieved based on the ceilings ultimately established. This policy could be expected to generate a

rigorous analysis for each SSC commitment under consideration.

Rigid SSC ceilings could, however, cause several undesirable conditions. First, they could result in unwarranted abstention, should policymakers choose to avoid one SSC believing another more important nonvital contingency might come along. Second, a larger force package

requirement could result in overcommitment of one service’s forces beyond its specified ceiling. Since no two SSCs are alike, inflexible criteria

may be problematic. DOD must acknowledge that decisions to conduct

nonvital SSCs are ultimately political, not military. The distinction between vital and nonvital may be difficult to establish and to sustain. If

forces are structured to this policy and the ceilings are not observed, the

tempo and readiness impacts could be even more serious than today.

Reducing Force Commitments

If U.S. involvement in long-duration SSCs is unavoidable, a deliberate

strategy to reduce the cost of doing business in these operations might reduce current stresses. For example, innovative strategies for patrolling nofly zones and maintaining ground force presence may be possible. By deliberately lessening expectations, we also may be able to reduce

commitments to SSCs. Implicit in this policy is a willingness to exploit

new concepts and enabling technologies as well as possibly revising the

definition of success in the execution of SSCs.

The key policy component would be those operational concepts, capabilities, and policies that reduce military commitments in the employment of naval, air, and ground forces in specific long-duration SSCs. For

example, a new conceptual approach for no-fly zone and maritime sanctions operations could include reducing platform requirements (leveraging unmanned systems and sensors), surveillance through more random

and limited activities (with substantially reduced platform requirements), and an unambiguous retaliation/strike policy to deter cheating.

Similarly, a concept for ground force peacekeeping operations could include monitoring and surveillance through sensor webs of technologies

(platform- and ground-based radar, video, and acoustical systems)

linked to dispersed forces, both positioned and roaming. Response to violations might trigger rapid application of ground forces, containment

barriers (to include nonlethal technologies), or precision fires through
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prepositioned or loitering assets. This policy also would involve integration of operational concepts into technology and doctrine development

programs and alliance interoperability doctrine.

Using such concepts, this policy could reduce significantly the commitment of U.S. military forces in selected SSCs; the focus is assumed to

be long-duration operations. Efforts to pursue this policy could lead to

new and effective operational concepts for broader application.

This policy has programmatic implications and possible operational

shortcomings. It requires DOD commitment to the development and

fielding of new concepts and technologies with uncertain timelines and

uncertain utility, should alternative concepts prove to be less effective or

more susceptible to challenges by opposing forces. From a pragmatic

standpoint, unavoidable aspects of some SSCs (such as the manpowerintensive interactions between military and civilians in the Balkans

today) would not be resolved under this approach.

Reducing Overseas Engagement

By deliberately scaling back expectations and requirements for engagement, we could reduce the demand for peacetime deployments of

forces from both the active and Reserve components. This would facilitate

a reduction in tempo and encourage events that reinforce only essential

warfighting and deterrence requirements. Emphasis would be on using

in-place forces to minimize deployments from outside the CINC area of

responsibility. Standardizing and streamlining initiatives of the regional

CINCs may be necessary. Implicit in this policy is a willingness to reduce

opportunities to interact and to influence the political-military institutions and militaries of other countries.

This policy would include developing guidance for each regional CINC

regarding the highest-priority high payoff engagement activities to be supported within available resources. It should develop programs to use civilians or contractors for selected engagement activities that currently occupy

military personnel and resources. The policy also requires a revised strategy

for forward presence and deployment policies consistent with a reduced

level of engagement. It may generate a reduced training events calendar,

concentrating on the accomplishment of essential alliance or coalition security and interoperability tasks; reduced force packages for engagement,

such as streamlined carrier battle groups or other forward-deployed combat forces, including substitutions for high-cost platforms and units; and

shortened presence and engagement missions (visits and exercises).
284 QDR 2001

The principal advantages of this policy are an anticipated reduction

in deployment commitments for engagement activities and a more controlled operating tempo in the planning and conduct of these events. It

would facilitate more focused and productive engagements because officials will have more time to plan each engagement if there are fewer of

them. Actual benefits would be determined by the extent to which engagement plans and operational commitments are revised.

This policy’s potential benefit might be its most significant disadvantage: a reduced level of interaction and interoperability with military

partners and allies. Such a policy provides less opportunity to influence,

monitor, and otherwise shape events. It also could lead to degraded alliance capabilities and more interoperability shortfalls. The U.S. ability to

respond to crises could be significantly hampered, particularly if this policy led to smaller or less capable forward-deployed forces, but careful

planning could mitigate this drawback.

Resolving Force Imbalances and Inadequacies

This policy, rather than reducing demand, seeks to increase supply. In

the past, SSCs were often considered lesser-included tasks accomplished

by a force structure sized to conduct two near-simultaneous MTWs.

These SSCs can be long and labor-intensive, taxing certain operational

and support forces and affecting overall unit readiness. Building more

units and capabilities currently identified as LD/HD or in constant need

could relieve the stress of unit rotation requirements and posture the U.S.

military more effectively across the full spectrum of possible operations.

Reductions in less-utilized units also should be considered. Such force

structure adjustments must be based on clear criteria for SSC involvement. Tailoring or consolidation of specialized skills and units drawn

from larger support organizations may be necessary to avoid the incremental commitment of a variety of personnel and subunits and the subsequent erosion of overall capability. Both active and Reserve structure

adjustments are envisioned, since the latter already contributes substantial forces to many SSC operations. Implicit in this policy is the willingness to make specific force planning and resource allocation decisions

based principally on the requirements of SSCs.

An essential component of this policy is a program to nominate, assess, and create or restructure both active and RC units and capabilities

to facilitate SSC operations. Consideration should be given to Global

Military Force Policy LD/HD assets; Army and Air Force high-use combat, logistics support, and command and control elements; Navy medical
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 285

and construction capabilities; and Army civil affairs and psychological

operations units.27

For this policy, modular SSC logistics support forces may be beneficial. Common support elements for transportation, general repair, supply,

fuel, sanitation, personnel and ordnance disposal capabilities may be particularly helpful to plan and to optimize ground force operations.

Funding to support acquisition and force structure changes (including impacts on personnel programs) also will be required. Until specific

types and quantities of forces and capabilities are identified, however,

projecting potential costs of this initiative is difficult.

The principal advantage of this policy is that it would reduce current

stresses on U.S. military operating forces conducting SSCs, particularly

LD/HD units and capabilities. In short, CINCs would have more of what

they are asking for, and tempo for these forces would be more manageable. In many respects, U.S. military forces would be optimized for the

operations they are most likely to face.

This policy has two notable implications. First, the costs to build and to

sustain new forces or capabilities for SSC requirements could be substantial. Second, care must be taken to ensure that high-end combat forces necessary for MTWs are not excessively affected by any force restructuring.

New Management and Deployment Initiatives 

A second policy to increase supply addresses force management policies and the stationing and commitment of forces to engagement and

major theater warfighting requirements. New rotation policies, stationing

approaches, or other practices may mitigate constraints on participation

in SSCs. For example, a new policy on stationing forces and equipment

abroad could reduce travel and separation times. New rotation policies

could reduce turbulence and improve predictability in deployments.

Implicit in this policy is the willingness to pursue substantial changes to

longstanding force management practices.

Four areas of this policy need to be developed. The first is new concepts for overseas stationing of forces and equipment that reduce deployment requirements and improve the ability for broader-based SSC

capability. For example, permanent stationing facilitates longer tours of

duty in lieu of continuous temporary rotations of shorter duration. Personnel deployed in one year could be cut 75 percent if a rotational deployment of 100 people every 90 days were replaced with 100 people on

one-year tours. Analysis of permanent stationing aimed at reducing

short-deployment requirements should include Southwest Asia (all types
286 QDR 2001

of forces), LD/HD units and capabilities (globally, all services), Southeast

Asia (principally maritime), and the Balkans (ground and air forces).

(U.S. overseas presence issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 9.) 

Second, new concepts for force management also may yield greater

efficiencies. Examples include standardized design and rotation policy for

Army operational forces, standardized “away from home” deployment

time for all services, or naval rotation practices that retain deployment of

major platforms and assets forward and rotate personnel to them.

Third, new policy on personnel management during overseas deployments may better mitigate turbulence and rotations. Changes might

include additional unaccompanied tours (those in which a servicemember is separated from family) in more forward-deployed locations or in

long-duration SSCs, as well as pay differentials for those volunteering for

tour extensions.

Fourth, greater availability and use of RCs for engagement and SSC

missions should be considered. The manpower, skills, and equipment of

Guard and Reserve forces increasingly are being tapped to fulfill a variety

of roles, such as providing military support to civilian authorities, conducting and supporting peacetime engagement and SSC operations, and

preparing for mobilization and MTW.28 The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 already is seeking ways to enhance RC participation in

SSCs.29 Expanded RC activity should be explored in such areas as providing homeland defense capabilities (for example, consequence management, protection of critical U.S. infrastructure, and national missile defense operations); participation in SSCs through such initiatives as

providing additional LD/HD capabilities and greater support to sustained

operations in Bosnia; and revision of RC roles in MTW plans.30

This policy’s principal advantage is more efficient disposition and

employment of forces, which should reduce tempo while enhancing

readiness. The short-term impacts of implementing various parts of this

policy could be substantial. Changes in basing and personnel management overseas would be expensive. Such changes also would require hostcountry support, which might or might not be forthcoming. Lower readiness could occur if rotation policies that optimize cost savings result in

less training time or adversely affect recruitment and retention. Approaches that expand use of the RC in active operations also may degrade

RC recruitment and retention.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 287

Establishing a Dedicated Force

A select force focused only on SSCs would minimize training and

proficiency issues that occur when cycling wartime-postured units into

such missions. Streamlining of equipment and doctrine also could be

accomplished. These specialty units could establish a valuable base of

expertise for meeting important SSCs undertaken by the United States.

Once that force is fully committed, additional contingencies generally

would not be undertaken. Without the threat of unlimited SSC obligations, the rest of the force could concentrate on key engagement and

warfighting requirements. Implicit in this policy is a willingness to establish and to maintain specialty units and priorities not oriented toward MTW missions.

The major component of this policy is a defined mission set and

size for the SSC force. For example, a specialty SSC force might be defined in terms of general functions that it will perform. Ground forces

might include a combat and force protection force; a logistics force capable of sustaining large-scale multinational area support operations; a

command, control, communications, and intelligence force; and a civilmilitary assistance force with engineers, military police, and medical capability. Air forces might include a strategic lift force; combat and support aircraft; and a reconnaissance/intelligence force (with key

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms). Naval and Marine forces might

include a maritime operations force and an expeditionary force. Analysis should include both active and Reserve components. Also needed are

a program and funding to establish and to sustain this force, and interagency-approved policy and criteria for its commitment. This policy’s

principal advantage would be a viable, dedicated SSC force with adequate resources, available to meet policy needs. It also would provide

predictable allocation of force and workload between SSCs and major

theater warfighting requirements.

This policy has several significant challenges. Each contingency is

different and would dictate equipment and personnel requirements.

SSCs also can change significantly over time, from combat-capable

forced-entry operations to logistical support. The cost of maintaining a

robust, dedicated SSC force could be substantial. A tailored SSC force

could have a potentially diminished role in high-end MTWs, thus posing additional overall risk for the military force structure. The policy

also might introduce the need for specialized recruitment, retention,
288 QDR 2001

and personnel management considerations. Reserve component linkages and training strategies would have to be re-examined. Specialized

forces built to ease the burden on the remainder of the military must

not be overcommitted. Even a small force would require a large rotation

base. This option would not be feasible unless the United States was

willing either to build a much larger force structure or to reduce its

warfighting requirements significantly.

A New Funding Mechanism

Funding procedures for contingency operations could be improved,

and the practice of diverting funds from other critical accounts to support SSCs could be avoided. Currently, DOD budgets for the cost of ongoing contingency operations, and Congress appropriates funds for these

operations to service personnel accounts and the Overseas Contingency

Operations Transfer Fund. DOD then transfers funds to the components’

appropriation accounts as operations unfold during the year. New, expanded, or otherwise unfunded operations force DOD components to

borrow funds from other budgeted activities. To minimize degradation of

readiness programs, lower-priority O&M and investment accounts are

the primary source of borrowed funds. If supplemental appropriations or

reprogramming of funds does not occur, the components must absorb

the costs within regular accounts.31 Providing stable funding levels and

processes can eliminate the need for diversions and reprogramming. This

would improve DOD ability to provide timely support for current and

potential contingency operations.

This policy requires budgetary processes and procedures that ensure

full and independent funding of ongoing SSC operations, without the

need to borrow from other accounts. A dedicated prior-year appropriation of funding would be necessary to support new SSC requirements

until the operation could be integrated into the budget. It would require

processes and procedures to account for any uncommitted funding.

This policy could improve current budgetary and funding practices

for SSCs. It could eliminate uncertainties with respect to supporting future operations and protect operations, maintenance, and investment accounts from raids to support SSC needs. Few shortfalls can be found in

this policy beyond the challenges that it poses politically. Advance funding of SSCs could hinder the level of appropriations discretion that Congress now has. A second concern may be the opportunity costs lost

through the withholding of funds for SSCs that never take place.
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 289

Conclusion

Not all SSCs are the same, and U.S. experience since the end of the

Cold War reveals that the NCA determination of vital and important national interests can dramatically affect the level of SSC commitment and

the resulting tempo, cost, and readiness impacts for the military. Redefining what is important is the quickest way to divest SSC commitments, but

a continuing high commitment to SSCs may signal a need to adjust military structures and policies to accomplish them. The next QDR has several options to consider, either to reduce the demand for U.S. military

forces and commitments for SSCs or to increase the supply of such forces.

Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and each merits additional analysis. In the end, the military is likely to achieve its highest payoff by investing in forces and capabilities that are sufficiently flexible and

adaptable to accomplish a wide range of missions across the full spectrum

of operations.

Notes1 Joint Publication 1–02 defines peace operations as a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping

operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish

and to maintain peace. The term peacetime operations is intended to capture significant DOD military

activities short of major theater war, a far broader scope of activity.

2 Estimates were derived from various service sources and do not include contractor support or

Reserve component (RC) forces. Quantifying these resources is difficult, and estimates vary. For example, Army Initiatives Group, BG Smartbook (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the

Army, October 1999) notes that the fiscal year 2000 active component force structure end-strength

has 63 percent in operational or Modified Table of Organization and Equipment units with the remainder in other accounts. An Air Force briefing on the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (July 26,

1999) notes that 36 percent of its active force is considered nondeploying, involved in space, missile,

acquisition, training, or research and development activities. Another author asserts that about half

of the military’s active duty forces are deployable; see Steven M. Kosiak, Military Readiness: Good

News, Bad News and Questions about the Future (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessment, September 24, 1998).

3 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000;

see chapter 5 for a detailed review of conventional forces. Stocks also are prepositioned in Europe,

Korea/Japan, and afloat. Richard L. Kugler, Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas

Military Presence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), provides an excellent review of current U.S. overseas presence.

4 See A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 11, for discussion of military activities related to engagement and overseas presence. For

a review of perspectives on the value of some engagement activities, see Miles A. Pomper, “Battle Lines

Keep Shifting Over Foreign Military Training,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, January 29, 2000. Reasons for the United States to remain actively engaged around the world are offered by Edward C. Luck,

“The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace Operations,” in Donald C.F. Daniel and

Bradd C. Hayes, eds., Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

5 Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; see chapter 6 for a detailed description of strategic nuclear forces and nuclear agreements. Figures cited are from FY00 and exclude 2

modified fleet ballistic missile submarines accountable under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START) and 93 B–1 bombers accountable under START I now devoted entirely to conventional
290 QDR 2001

missions. The potential cost is nearly an additional $8.3 billion total through 2010 if the Russian

Duma fails to ratify START II and the United States invests in strategic forces to sustain START I levels (buying D5 missiles, refueling and modernizing four Trident submarines, and manufacturing

more Peacekeeper missiles). See Congressional Budget Office analysis of budget function 050 (National Defense) spending and revenue options, item 050–3–04, March 2000 <www.cbo.gov>.

6 See David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson, “Forgotten Mission: Military Support to the Nation,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997.

7 The Secretary of the Army fulfills the role of DOD Executive Agent for Military Support to

Civil Authorities. The 2000 Annual Report to the President and the Congress notes that the Guard and

Reserve are uniquely suited for this mission because of their country-wide presence (spanning nearly

4,000 communities) and well-established links to the civilian first-responders in communities, counties, and states.

8 See Grange and Johnson, “Forgotten Mission,” 110–111.

9 A useful review of the contemporary debate over conditions for military intervention is

found in Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War

World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1994). For examples of SSC descriptions, see Report

of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997; William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War,

March 1999; Defense Planning Guidance Update FY 2002–2007; and Joint Publication 3–0, Doctrine

for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995 (discussion of Operations Other Than War).

10 See Science Applications International Corporation, Historical Analysis of U.S. Military Responses: 1975–1995 (Contract #DASW01–95–D–0077 for HQDA, ODCSOPS).

11 Center for Army Analysis briefing provided by Lieutenant Colonel H.J. Orgeron on December

20, 1999, identified 191 operations; he stated the database was still being updated and has already exceeded 200. A draft study by DFI International identified 552 SSCs in the 1990s.

12 See Cohen, Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War.

13 Rates of deployment vary by service. For example, Army deployments increased 300 percent

since 1990; Navy ship deployments on any given day are up 52 percent since 1994; and Air Force

deployments since 1986 have quadrupled. During these same timeframes, the size of the Army (soldiers and civilians) dropped 40 percent; the number of Navy ships fell 30 percent; and the Air Force

lost one-third of its people. Guard and Reserve forces have seen a thirteen-fold increase since 1990

in the number of days on active duty due to the increased deployments. See

<www.defenselink.mil> for a useful “DOD 101” briefing that also effectively summarizes the various roles, missions, and activities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

14 Derived from Defense Almanac 1999 figures provided by the American Forces Information

Service. See <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac>. Aggregations and simplifications were necessary

because of the nature of personnel and budget data.

15 Cited in “DOD 101” briefing, <www.defenselink.mil>.

16 See discussion of Resource Challenges for the RC Employment, Reserve Component Employment (RCE) Study 2005, approved July 14, 1999, 26.

17 For example, see Posture Statement by General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff before the 106th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999.

18 Traditionally, the Navy has used a 3:1 ratio for deployment rotation of carrier battle groups

(CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs). Conceptually, one CVBG or ARG is deployed, one is

in underway training, and one is in refit/overhaul. However, this formula does not take transit time

into consideration, and the Department of the Navy recently has identified specific ratios to maintain

groups on station at each of the major deployment hubs. According to these calculations, eight

CVBGs or ARGs are required to keep one on station in the Central region (Arabian Gulf/Arabian

Sea); six to keep one on station in the Mediterranean; and one to maintain presence in the Far East

(since a CVBG is permanently homeported in Japan). See Gregory V. Cox, Keeping Aircraft Carriers

Forward Deployed: Harder than It Seems, CNA Occasional Paper 196 (Alexandria, VA: Center for

Naval Analyses, 2000).
PEACETIME OPERATIONS 291

19 See David E. Thaler and Daniel M. Norton, Air Force Operations Overseas in Peacetime, Project Air Force RAND Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 21.

20 See Tom Donnelly, “One War Too Many,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 8, 1999; and

Stephen T. Hosmer, Maren Leed, et al., Bettering the Balance: Large Wars and Small Contingencies,

RAND Issue Paper (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), for more discussion of turbulence.

21 Several studies identify other units and capabilities commonly involved in SSCs. Several factors will determine whether they are truly LD/HD or stressed: frequency and duration of employment, number of units available, and service ability to use “substitute” units and capabilities (for example, infantry or engineers performing the traditional tasks of Military Police or transportation

units). Predictive models, such as the Center for Army Analysis’s Stochastic Analysis of Deployments

and Excursions, may also provide insights on potential future needs. For representative analysis of

high-use units and capabilities in SSCs, see RCE Study 2005; and Bruce R. Pirnie and Corazon M.

Francisco, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief,

RAND Report MR–951 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998).

22 See General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Report GAO/NSIAD–99–69,

subject: “Military Operations—Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies,” for a

detailed review of the various training and readiness issues surrounding SSCs.

23 This requirement is noted clearly in security strategy documents such as the QDR 1997

Report, 13.

24 Costs estimated by the author based on duration and projected activity. Operation Desert Fox in

Iraq was not included. FY91–FY99 costs of U.S. contingency operations are discussed in Steven M.

Kosiak, After the War: Kosovo Peacekeeping Operations Could Cost U.S. $2–3.5 Billion a Year (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 7, 1999).

25 For example, the October 14, 1999, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review by Secretary Cohen and General Shelton cites disparities between the United States and its allies in precision strike, mobility, and command, control, communications, and intelligence. The commander of

U.S. forces in East Timor has described the U.S. role there as providing “force multipliers” such as

communications, intelligence, and strategic lift; Inside The Navy, December 6, 1999. See also Joseph

Fitchett, “Allies Emphasize Need to Prepare for Kosovo-Style Air Wars,” International Herald Tribune,

November 12, 1999.

26 Stephen Clutter, “U.S. Airlifts Thai Troops for Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor,” <okinawa.mcbutler.usmc.mil/currentops/thailift.html>.

27 See chapter 8 on force structure issues.

28 Over the past 10 years, the number of days that Guard and Reserve forces have served on active duty has increased thirteen-fold. In 1998 alone, some 235,000 Guards and Reservists of all services deployed overseas for an average of 19 days on various activities such as humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and readiness training. Some 325,000 deployed (for an average of 22 days) in the

United States to support domestic priorities, such as counterdrug operations and natural disaster

assistance. See the DOD 101 briefing, <www.defenselink.mil> for more information on RC missions

and activities.

29 See Reserve Component Employment (RCE) Study 2005, approved July 14, 1999.

30 For executive summary, see DOD Memorandum, Final Report of the Reserve Component

Employment Study 2005—Action Memorandum, July 15, 1999. The use of Guards and Reservists

does not come without cost, and there are also practical limits on their capability, such as predictable availability of qualified personnel and units; Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up requirements; limited resources to maintain today’s total force integration while adjusting to changing or

new roles; and the effect of high reserve tempo on recruiting and retention.

31 A detailed review of contingency operations costs and funding can be found in U.S. Government Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Defense,

Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency Operations

Costs and Funding, June 2000.

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Chapter Eleven

Modernizing and

Transforming U.S. Forces:

Alternative Paths to the

Force of Tomorrow

by Michael E. O’Hanlon 

Due to the excellent performance of American high-technology

weapons in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as well as the phenomenal

pace of innovation in the modern computer industry, many defense analysts have posited that a revolution in military affairs is either imminent or already under way. The RMA thesis holds that further advances

in precision munitions, real-time data dissemination, and other modern

technologies can help transform the nature of future war and with it the

size and structure of the U.S. military. RMA proponents believe that military technology, and the resultant potential for radically new types of

warfighting tactics and strategies, is advancing at a rate unrivaled since the

1920s through 1940s, when blitzkrieg, aircraft carriers, large-scale amphibious and airborne assault, ballistic missiles, strategic bombing, and nuclear

weapons were developed. For most RMA proponents, this set of judgments

translates into the belief that the United States should transform its military

weaponry, other hardware, organizational constructs, and operational concepts to take proper advantage of what new technologies now make possible—and to make sure that others do not exploit them at U.S. expense.

While in the abstract it is unobjectionable to favor innovation, the prescriptions of some RMA proponents would have major opportunity costs.

As the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review pointed out, and as the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel subsequently concluded that

same year, pursuing an RMA aggressively would require cutbacks in other

areas of defense activity, given likely political and fiscal constraints on defense spending. The United States might need to disengage from military

293
294 QDR 2001

operations in places like the Balkans to devote more resources to experimentation and investment; it might even need to curtail U.S. abilities to

deter or wage war in Korea, the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere. With another Quadrennial Defense Review looming in 2001, these

are not tradeoffs to take lightly. Any RMA transformation strategy needs to

be carefully constructed, and the associated benefits and risks assessed.

Increasingly large projections for the federal budget surplus may

make it possible for the Pentagon to avoid tough choices—to have its

RMA cake while keeping its current force too. However, it seems more

likely that tough choices will still be necessary, even if they will not be as

difficult as once appeared likely. Keeping the current force of 1.36 million

active-duty personnel will probably require an annual real defense spending level $30 billion to $50 billion higher than the 2000 level of $290 billion, even without adding in any extra costs for revolutionary new technology. Moreover, DOD must compete for its share of the federal surplus

with domestic programs, tax cuts, and any expansion of federal entitlement programs in areas such as health care. Even if the non-Social Security budget surplus averages $300 billion a year in the coming decade, as

currently projected, the Pentagon is unlikely to receive much more than

half the amount it would probably need to retain its existing force structure and weapons modernization agenda. (During the 2000 presidential

campaign, Governor George Bush promised about a $5 billion real increase in annual defense spending; Vice President Al Gore promised

about $9 billion.) Money may not be as tight as in 1997, at the time of the

last QDR, but sound defense budget priorities will still be essential.

This chapter focuses on the so-called transformation issue, and most

notably on the hardware side of any revolution in military affairs that

may be in the offing. Specifically, it develops and assesses two options for

future U.S. forces. In doing so, it focuses on the investment or acquisition

accounts, including concept development and experimentation, and emphasizes the medium-term time horizon looking roughly 5 to 15 years

into the future.

The two options differ in their assumptions about the nature and

scope of any incipient revolution in military affairs, the urgency with

which U.S. military forces should be transformed, and the total amount

of resources that should be directed to acquisition accounts. They take as

their point of comparison DOD policy as of mid-2000 reflected in the

1997 QDR and subsequent policy changes. One of the options would emphasize electronics, computers, and communications technologies as well
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 295

as basic research and experimentation. The other would reflect a more

sweeping transformation philosophy, replacing not only electronics systems, sensors, communications networks, and munitions, but also most

military vehicles and major weaponry. The first approach would tend to

see innovation as a continuing process; the second would work toward a

specific end-state radically different from today’s in what would amount

to a transformation.

Before developing these options, it is important to examine the concept of transformation, and the hypothesis that a revolution in military

affairs is now attainable or under way. The concepts have become so important to the American defense debate that they require clear definitions

and critical analysis before influencing any debate about force planning

and modernization programs.

The RMA Hypothesis

Is a revolution in military affairs under way or within reach? If so,

what is its nature? The answers to these questions are of critical importance for developing a defense transformation strategy—and, in fact, for

deciding if there should even be one.

There are many different versions of the contemporary RMA hypothesis. They range from relatively technical military concepts to more

sweeping prognostications about radical changes in human society, the

global economy, and warfare such as those advanced by Heidi and Alvin

Toffler.1 The following discussion focuses on RMA concepts that are concrete enough to be directly related to mid-term defense planning. It

groups them into two main schools of thought and a third category that

is an amalgamation of several RMA concepts from various schools that,

collectively, amount to the existing DOD plan:

■ The C4ISR school emphasizes the potential of modern computers, electronics, and related technologies.2

■ The global reach/global power school is much more sweeping. It envisions

radical change across a whole spectrum of military technologies and military organizations, doctrines, and tactics. Although the term was originally

coined by the Air Force, it can be (and is here) applied more generally.

■ The existing DOD modernization plan as an RMA framework is somewhat confusing, in that its rhetoric far exceeds its substance, but it is an

important baseline for comparison.

Within all three main categories, there are individuals who emphasize

the opportunities that an incipient RMA might offer the United States,
296 QDR 2001

and others who dwell on opportunities for potential enemies. The global

reach/global power school is motivated in large part by the concern that

fixed military bases and large armored formations will become increasingly difficult to protect in the years ahead. It holds that the spread of

missile, mine, and satellite-reconnaissance technology necessitates that

U.S. forces be capable of projecting power from greater distances, outside

the range of enemy weaponry, and that they minimize their footprints

within combat theaters.3 The C4

ISR school, by contrast, is less optimistic

about high-technology solutions to the vulnerability problem but holds

that, by focusing traditional defense investment dollars on those weapons

systems offering the greatest payoff per dollar, more money will be made

available for other critical defense and nondefense investments to mitigate the vulnerabilities of not only U.S. combat forces but the American

homeland as well.4 Those investments could range from roll-on/roll-off

ships and vertical takeoff airplanes (which would reduce U.S. military dependence on large, fixed infrastructure in overseas theaters), to chemical

protection gear, greater counterterrorism efforts, and stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines against various biological warfare agents.

Before analyzing these alternative notions of a contemporary RMA,

however, it is appropriate to subject the RMA hypothesis to critical

scrutiny. If the hypothesis that a revolution in military affairs was attainable

or under way amounted only to a prediction, it would matter little whether

its proponents were proved right. We could view the subject as intellectually

interesting but not particularly important and simply wait to find out.

However, as RMA proponents frequently claim, military revolutions

are the purposeful creations of people. They are created by a combination

of technological breakthrough, institutional adaptation, and warfighting

innovation.5 They are not emergent properties that result accidentally or

unconsciously from a cumulative process of technological invention.

They ultimately require a major investment of effort and money.

For this reason, the RMA debate matters. If the proponents of the

RMA hypothesis are right, it could be dangerous for the United States not

to heed their counsel.6 By contrast, if they are wrong, it could be harmful

to the country’s security interests to adopt their recommendations, since

doing so would divert large amounts of money and attention from other

defense priorities.

RMA proponents tend to argue that more budgetary resources should

be devoted to innovation—research and development, procurement of new

hardware, frequent experiments with new technology—and, to the extent
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 297

necessary, less money to military operations, training, and readiness. To free

up funds for an RMA transformation strategy, some would reduce U.S.

global engagement and reduce the military’s deterrent posture.7 For example, in its 1997 report, the National Defense Panel (NDP) dismissed the

current two-war framework as obsolete (without, however, suggesting what

should replace it). The NDP also suggested that U.S. military retrenchment

from forward presence and peacekeeping operations might be needed simply to free up money to promote the so-called RMA.8 These suggestions, if

adopted, would have important effects on U.S. security policy; and they

should not be accepted simply on the basis of vague impressions that an

RMA may be achievable. To use the lexicon of current official strategy, articulated in Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, RMA proponents would put more resources into preparing

U.S. forces for an uncertain future. Applying a term popularized by the

NDP, they support a U.S. military transformation, which implies a managed

and controlled process, but still a radical one.9 Assuming a given Pentagon

budget level, they would therefore put less emphasis on shaping the future

military environment through American military engagement overseas,

and on being ready to respond to near-term challenges to U.S. interests by

the likes of Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-II. The 1997 QDR struck a balance between preparing, shaping, and responding. Therefore, conducted as

it was in a period that lacked the rosy budget forecasts we now take for

granted, it did not promote an all-out transformation strategy.

This chapter attempts to sketch out the competing transformation visions, and then to assess their relative advantages and drawbacks.

The Electronics or C4ISR School

The C4ISR school of thought on the RMA focuses fairly narrowly on

the potential of modern electronics and computers, the defense-related

technologies undergoing by far the most rapid change in the world today.

It also tends to be a somewhat cautious and skeptical school of thought.

Many members of this school emphasize the concept of a system of

systems, a term popularized by former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Admiral William Owens. (However, Owens himself is now more

ambitious in his RMA aspirations than most proponents of this school

of thought.10) They argue that future warfare will be dominated less by

individual weapons platforms and munitions than by real-time data processing and networking that tie U.S. forces together synergistically. Proponents point to the fact that computers have been getting much faster

for years. Supercomputer computational power has been increasing by a
298 QDR 2001

factor of ten every 5 years.11 Personal computers have improved almost

as quickly, roughly doubling in speed every 2 years since IBM’s personal

computer was introduced in 1981.12 Although the computer’s benefits

for the economy were unclear for the 1980s and the early 1990s, recent

economic evidence suggests that information technology may be largely

responsible for the prolonged U.S. economic expansion of the mid to

late 1990s. If this effect is real and sustainable, perhaps computers will

soon be just as beneficial for military operations.13

Trends in computing power, speed, cost, and size have made it possible to put computers on ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and phased-array

radars in the last few decades. Further advancements now make it possible to put computing capability on all significant platforms and to network the systems together. This will allow such systems to gather information from many sources, process it in real time, and exchange data

rapidly on the battlefield.14 Automatic target recognition capabilities may

finally become useful if trends in processing power continue. In sum, radical progress is under way in command, control, communications, and

computers technologies, and the U.S. military should be able to derive

great benefits from that progress.

Other RMA proponents who focus principally on the potential of

modern-day electronics technologies go further. Convinced that radical

improvements are under way not only in computers but also in sensors

that gather information, they have invoked the term dominant battlespace

knowledge (DBK) to describe a future combat environment in which the

United States would be able to find promptly and continuously track virtually all important enemy assets within a combat zone, often specified as

being 200 nautical miles square (roughly the size of key battlefield areas

in a place such as Kuwait or the Korean Peninsula).

As its name suggests, the DBK school is much more bullish and ambitious than the system-of-systems school. It not only presupposes the

rapid processing and exchange of information on the battlefield, but also

the availability of much better information to process and exchange.15 In

other words, it expects breakthroughs not only in C4 technologies, organizations, and capabilities, but also in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, making for a complete C4

ISR revolution in military affairs. As

General Ronald Fogelman, a former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, put it

before Congress in 1997: “In the first quarter of the 21st century you will

be able to find, fix or track, and target—in near realtime—anything of

consequence that moves upon or is located on the face of the Earth.”16
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 299

Clearly those who subscribe to the more limited system-of-systems

concept understand that sensors will continue to improve. For example,

the miniaturization of electronics, on-board information-processing capabilities, global positioning system receivers, and secure, high-data-rate

radios now make possible such devices as unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs), useful in reconnaissance missions. In addition, improvements or

innovations in sensors will probably take place in such areas as multispectral imaging and foliage-penetrating radar, which will be important in

certain circumstances. Proponents of the system-of-systems concept do

not, however, anticipate that sensors will improve so drastically as to

make the battlefield transparent.

Whatever their differences of opinion, all of these RMA proponents

tend to emphasize defense capabilities within the broad conceptual framework of C4ISR. Some hold out hope that military vehicles and major

weapons platforms will also improve radically in the years ahead, but are

not sufficiently confident to commit to a wholesale replacement strategy

for such equipment. Instead, they prefer prototyping, experimentation, and

patience within the realms of weapons platform modernization. Indeed,

many see the Pentagon’s traditional emphasis on buying large amounts of

expensive, major combat equipment as being at cross-purposes with the

proper goals of an RMA transformation agenda. They would instead favor

more selective and economical modernization of large platforms.17

Global Reach/Global Power School 

Other RMA schools of thought see no tension between C4ISR capabilities and vehicles and major weaponry. In fact, they argue that the

United States should place a large premium not only on electronics, sensors, and munitions, but also on new types of weaponry to deliver ordnance extremely quickly and in new ways. Proponents of this vision contemplate being able to base forces in the United States but deploy them

rapidly and decisively overseas within hours or at most a few days; they

also see the United States being able to avoid dependence on large fixed

bases in combat theaters. They extend the technological bullishness that

characterizes the C4

ISR school to the realm of most types of military platforms as well, ranging from ships to airplanes and from combat vehicles

to rockets. They do so partly out of technological optimism, and partly

out of the conviction that without such a transformation, U.S. military

forces will be too vulnerable when deployed to combat theaters in large

numbers in future conflicts.
300 QDR 2001

The Air Force first coined the term global reach/global power, and

used it to argue for more resources for certain types of Air Force programs.18 Other advocates of airpower have offered similar arguments.

These airpower-oriented visions generally emphasize the firepower and

rapid-response capabilities of systems such as stealthier air-to-air fighters,

B–2 bombers, advanced reconnaissance capabilities, such as UAVs, and

so-called brilliant munitions, such as the sensor-fused weapon with autonomous terminal homing capabilities, that do not require human operators in their final approach to a target.19 They also sometimes include

specific force structure proposals that would require cuts in the other

services, and would entrust the Air Force with more than the 30 percent

of total Pentagon resources it has typically received over the last three

decades.20 These proposals make the Air Force few friends in the Army,

Navy, and Marine Corps. Be that as it may, Air Force proponents offer

specific suggestions that can be scrutinized and evaluated. The alternative

is to give each service its standard share of the budget—in essence making

defense strategy in the comptroller’s office.21

The concept of global reach and global power goes well beyond the

Air Force, however. For example, some envision that ground combat units

could be organized in radically different ways, permitting them to deploy

very rapidly with only modest amounts of equipment and supplies. They

might function in very small mobile teams that conduct tactical reconnaissance and call in precise strikes from distant ships or aircraft as they

locate enemy assets difficult to identify from air or space. According to a

1996 Defense Science Board task force: “There is a good chance that we

can achieve dramatic increases in the effectiveness of rapidly deployable

forces if redesigning the ground forces around the enhanced combat cell

[light, agile units with 10 to 20 personnel each] proves to be robust in

many environments. There is some chance all this will amount to a true

revolution in military affairs by eliminating the reliance of our forces on

the logistics head, much as Blitzkrieg freed the offense after World War I

from its then decades-old reliance on the railhead.” 22

The Marine Corps espouses a related concept. The Marines are experimenting with making future units smaller and basing much of their

logistics support on ships, or perhaps on mobile offshore bases that

have enormous carrying capacity, airstrips, and resilience to attack.

Those capabilities, combined with longer-range airpower, such as the

MV–22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, would supersede the traditional notion of storming the beach, purportedly allowing the Marines to keep
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 301

many weapons and logistics assets at sea while sending maneuver and

scout forces deep into enemy territory directly from their ships.23

More recently, the Army has gotten into the act as well, with the Chief

of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Eric Shinseki, promoting acquisition of

armored vehicles only one-third as heavy as today’s that would eventually

erase the distinction between light and heavy forces, eliminate tracked

combat vehicles from the U.S. military inventory, and permit deployment

of a five-division force in 1 month rather than 3.24

Some imagine going even further with more futuristic weapons. They

envision capabilities such as intercontinental artillery, space-based

weapons that could attack targets on earth only a few hundred kilometers

below, and directed-energy weapons, such as lasers.25

The Pentagon and Joint Vision 2010

Where does DOD stand in the RMA debate? In terms of its rhetoric, it

merges all of the aforementioned schools of thought into an aggregate position that reflects a highly ambitious interpretation of what a contemporary revolution in military affairs should entail. Force structure, weapons

programs, and budgets, however, provide little evidence that DOD is trying to transform forces rapidly. To a large extent, the Pentagon is offering

old wine in new bottles: a traditional set of budgetary preferences and priorities dressed up as a blueprint for a revolution in military affairs.

In 1997 the reports of the Pentagon’s own Quadrennial Defense Review and the independent National Defense Panel gave strong support to

the RMA concept. Both reports used the phrase revolution in military affairs repeatedly, leaving no doubt that they accepted that an RMA is

under way. The long-term joint and service vision documents had already

done the same, so 1997 was, in effect, the culmination of RMA acceptance

in mainstream U.S. defense thinking.26

The official DOD version of the RMA is, as noted, remarkable for

its ambition. It focuses on information systems, sensors, new weapons

concepts, much lighter and more deployable military vehicles, missile

defenses, and other capabilities. The watchwords for effecting this transformation, employed earlier in Joint Vision 2010, begin with information superiority or dominance. They also include the terms dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Dominant maneuver and focused logistics imply light,

agile, deployable, main combat forces. Precision engagement conjures

images of accurate and lethal long-range firepower. Full-dimensional
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protection suggests, among other things, highly effective missile, air,

and anti-submarine and anti-mine defenses.27

There is a certain irony in the fact that the cautious Pentagon has become, rhetorically at least, one of the most prominent proponents of the

RMA concept. In fact, the same QDR report that espoused information

superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional

protection, and focused logistics also included an explicit decision not to

pursue these goals too quickly. The report adopted the rhetoric of the

RMA movement without endorsing its sense of urgency or imminence.

Given limited resources for defense, and the competing needs of deterring

regional war and supporting an activist U.S. foreign policy, that decision

is understandable and possibly sound, but it does tend to belie the claim

that transformation is rapidly achievable and urgently needed.

To put it differently, even as it accepted the RMA hypothesis, DOD

made few plans to reorganize main combat units, increase their interdependence and jointness, or alter priorities within the weapons modernization program. Nor did it increase the total amount of resources devoted to acquisition accounts—research, development, testing, and

evaluation.28 In fairness to the Pentagon, a cautious approach, even if not

internally consistent, may be preferable to adopting a wrongheaded and

impetuous RMA agenda. In addition, as Stephen Rosen has argued,

RMAs in their early phases depend more on high-quality research, concept development, and experimentation than on massive amounts of

money or immediate organizational change.29 But one thing is clear: it is

hard to call current Pentagon policy a transformation plan.

Observing DOD inertia, the National Defense Panel tried to push the

military to do more and do it faster. Its 1997 report critiqued the QDR for

not adopting a sufficiently ambitious reorientation of Pentagon priorities.

But just what the NDP had in mind as a roadmap for the revolution was

difficult to discern. It did little to specify which programs and efforts

should be accelerated and which should be cut to make resources available for new priorities.30

Strategies for Transformation

Given these schools of thought, what is the reasonable range of transformation strategies for Pentagon leaders to consider in the next QDR? It

is appropriate to include the existing Pentagon modernization agenda as

one approach, rather modest in its substance even if ambitious in its

rhetoric. For a study focused on Pentagon force planning, it also makes
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 303

sense to analyze the C4ISR and global reach/global power or radical transformation schools. The first suggests that emphasis on better information, sensor, and communications technologies may be appropriate, both

for purposes of buying weaponry and for reorganizing U.S. military

forces and operational concepts in generally limited ways. The radical

transformation school goes much further, envisioning a wholesale restructuring and reequipping of major combat units. Not only would radios, sensor suites, computers, and munitions change, but also vehicles

and major weapons systems would, and perhaps main combat formations. It can be difficult to translate such radical RMA visions into a concrete agenda for decisionmaking; most proponents do not spell out in detail what their views would imply. But an illustrative set of technologies

and new military units can be sketched, nonetheless.

Although they do not always acknowledge it, members of the C4

ISR

and global reach/global power schools disagree with each other. They all

use RMA rhetoric but their policy recommendations differ widely, particularly in their implications for defense resource allocation and force planning. Sometimes the differences are explicit; more frequently they are implicit and must be ferreted out by analysis. The second of the two schools

calls for a much more radical and more expensive restructuring of the

U.S. military than the former and is plausibly affordable only if the U.S.

defense budget increases substantially, or if the size and deployment

tempo of U.S. military forces are substantially reduced.

A Baseline: The QDR Plan

A starting point for considering transformation strategies is to begin

with one acquisition agenda that few would actually describe as a transformation approach. It is the existing modernization agenda, based principally on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review but also incorporating

subsequent changes—most notably, the Army’s 2000 plan for developing

a lighter, more deployable force.

Much of the DOD plan consists of a traditional approach to procurement. Major platforms such as combat aircraft, surface ships, and transport vehicles constitute the core of the plan. The services intend to continue to modernize their major distinguishing types of combat

capabilities largely independently of each other. If there is a greater relative emphasis on munitions, sensors, advanced communications, or other

key defense technologies that are advancing most rapidly today, that fact

is not obvious from an examination of standard Pentagon budget documents, which still tend to focus on major weapons platforms and do not
304 QDR 2001

present any new categories of technology investment that allow the external observer to discern a shift in basic investment approach. In fact, most

evidence suggests that major weapons platforms will receive just as great a

share of total funding as in the past—witness fighter and helicopter modernization plans and navy shipbuilding programs.31 In its recent study of

the defense budget, the Congressional Budget Office made similar assumptions, based on its understanding of current Pentagon budgeting.32

Revealingly, in their budget presentations to Congress for the 2001 budget, all four service chiefs began with and highlighted platforms—rather

than advanced munitions, or new types of reconnaissance assets, or C4 infrastructure—in their discussions of procurement and modernization.

Joint and service experimentation has a higher priority than it once

did but is still a small budget item. In the years ahead, research and development budgets are expected to decline, even in the relatively inexpensive

and critical areas of basic science and technology.

Redressing U.S. vulnerabilities is a somewhat greater priority than it

was 5 to 10 years ago. Notably, expenditures within (and in some cases,

outside) the defense budget have increased substantially for mine warfare,

ballistic missile defense, chemical and biological weapons protection, and

computer security. Counterterrorist efforts, particularly in the area of intelligence, also appear to be vigorous.

In fairness to the Pentagon, it should also be noted that the current

acquisition plan includes a large number of systems that, while frequently

derided by critics as legacy capabilities, can be justified using the rhetoric

of the RMA movement. Stealthy aircraft, for example, use advanced technology to evade defenses; tilt-rotor planes are intended to use speed and

range to outflank prepared enemy positions; new destroyers will reduce

their detectability while also reducing crew size and packing large numbers of smart munitions. The simple fact that the military services have

invented most of these systems in traditional ways does not automatically

make them bad ideas, even in a purported RMA era. But the longevity of

traditional ways of doing business does raise warning flags about whether

the services really have committed to the concepts of Joint Vision 2010

and the 1997 QDR.

The overall Pentagon procurement program typically cost $80 billion

annually in the Cold War years (in constant 2000 dollars), rose to $100 billion in the 1980s, declined to $45 billion in the mid-to-late 1990s, and is

now about $60 billion in budget authority. It is likely to have to climb again

to $80 billion—and perhaps more—under the existing Pentagon programs.
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 305

Combined with a research, development, testing, and evaluation budget of

more than $30 billion, that translates into a total acquisition budget of

roughly $115 billion, relative to a 2000 level of just under $90 billion. That

figure applies for a steady-state situation; it would not have to be attained

immediately. But given the gradually declining readiness of U.S. military

hardware, the sooner these increases are made, the better.

The reasons for this expected increase are essentially two-fold. First,

modern weapons systems, particularly larger platforms, continue to grow

significantly in cost, and we have every reason to expect that their costs

will keep climbing in the course of development programs and production runs. Second, the so-called post-Cold War procurement holiday

must end; after a decade of enjoying the luxury of having large stocks of

relatively new equipment that did not generally require immediate replacement, the Pentagon will soon need to begin procuring systems at

sustainable rates. (For procurement budget details, see chapter 4.)

What end-state for the U.S. military does this option envision? The

short answer is that there is no such end-state. There is no road map for

actually carrying out and completing a true transformation. The goal is to

shift somewhat more money into experimentation, joint activities, and

programs designed to address certain U.S. vulnerabilities, but otherwise

to continue a traditional, generation-by-generation approach to major

weapons modernization. Again, while this is at odds with the transformation rhetoric of the RMA movement, it is not necessarily a bad thing, if

no radical transformation strategy can be clearly identified and pursued

at present. However, it does lead to questions about why the Pentagon

plans to allow R&D budgets to decline in the years ahead.

C4ISR Transformation Strategy

A transformation strategy for C4ISR would focus on areas of defense

technology where trends in innovation appear to offer the greatest benefit

for the dollar, notably in electronics and computer-related sectors. It would

also take steps to reduce the ability of adversaries to exploit technology

against American vulnerabilities. It would otherwise take a relatively agnostic view of transformation, conducting prototyping and experimentation,

but meanwhile awaiting clear proof in the laboratories or test ranges that

new types of technologies are truly promising before rushing large

amounts of resources into buying new vehicles and major weapons systems. The armed forces would still have to be recapitalized, since hardware

is aging and requires replacement. But in many cases, less expensive equipment would be purchased, such as F–15s instead of F–22s, F–16s instead of
306 QDR 2001

joint strike fighters, helicopters instead of V–22 Ospreys, and so on. Sophisticated equipment would still be purchased, but generally in modest numbers and as part of a high-low mix of weaponry.

This approach would not offer as clear an end-state as the more radical option discussed below. Transformation would be seen as an ongoing

process. The most likely immediate benefits would be in areas of C4

ISR.

Only over time would such large weaponry as ships, combat aircraft, and

armored vehicles be replaced. The U.S. military would become lighter,

more deployable, more survivable, and more lethal—but only gradually,

because vehicles, engines, and large weapons are unlikely to experience

radical rates of technological change in the years ahead.

However, a number of capabilities would likely receive important

support under this approach. They would include advanced munitions;

reconnaissance systems, such as the joint surveillance, target attack radar

system (JSTARS), UAVs, and new types of sensors on existing platforms;

and integrated joint-service digital communications systems, as well as

software to perform real-time data analysis (including automatic target

recognition algorithms) and distribution.

This approach would also keep basic research budgets, including science and technology efforts, at or above historic highs in real dollars.

That policy would be based on the belief that even if current technology

trends and overwhelming American military dominance make it less

than essential to modernize fully all major weapon systems immediately,

more revolutionary and geostrategically challenging eras cannot be ruled

out in the future.

Part of the robust R&D spending would be in the area of joint-service

experimentation, which would be likely to grow to several hundred million dollars a year and remain there (in contrast with the all-out transformation option discussed below, which would boost experimentation

spending more in the near term and reduce it once the end-state force

had been identified). Over time, it is quite likely that experimentation

would grow to include dedicated units that would thus not be otherwise

deployable—perhaps a fighter squadron, a brigade of ground forces, and

a group of ships—with associated annual costs exceeding $1 billion.

This approach would also increase funds for key areas of homeland

and theater defense where current levels of funding appear inadequate.

These could include certain missile defense efforts, such as the airborne

laser and Navy theater-wide system, that may not now be fully funded;

cruise-missile defense architectures; redundant technologies for providing
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 307

national missile defense rather than just the land-based system now under

development for deployment in Alaska; and greater hardening of electronics to deal with potential enemy threats ranging from radio-frequency

weapons to high-altitude nuclear bursts. They could also include civilian

homeland defense measures, such as greater security for key public and

commercial information infrastructure as well as larger stocks of vaccines,

antibiotics, chemical weapons antidotes, and protection gear for the nonmilitary population.

Lighter tanks, combat-capable unmanned aerial vehicles, and perhaps

arsenal ships would be bought in modest quantities to serve special purposes or to be thoroughly tested as prototypes. However, large numbers

would not be purchased until the case for doing so was strong.33

Organizationally, this agenda would not necessitate fundamental

changes in main combat structures. It would, however, require that their

joint-service integration be improved. In addition, some combat structures might need to be scaled back slightly in size or number to save

money for transformation efforts. Such changes would not reflect a radical transformation so much as a modest adjustment made in recognition

of the improving capabilities of modern weaponry. Some new units

would be established for experimentation and prototyping; others might

be created to serve specific C4

ISR roles. But otherwise, the Army might

well retain its divisions, the Air Force its air expeditionary forces, and the

Navy its carrier battle groups under this approach.

This basic option could have higher-cost and lower-cost variants

based on available funding. The general philosophy of the approach

would place less emphasis on modernizing major weapons platforms

than the Pentagon currently does in its weapons plans, allowing silver

bullet purchases of modest numbers of advanced platforms, and perhaps

even the outright cancellation of some currently planned programs.

However, as noted above, many existing weapons modernization programs can be justified—at least rhetorically—on RMA and military

transformation grounds. That means there would be strong resistance to

curbing them, even if transformation became the guiding Pentagon

watchword more than it is today. Many would see the notion of transformation as an addition to the existing modernization agenda, rather than a

substitute for it. Thus, this option could exceed the cost of the QDR baseline by about $10 billion annually. But if difficult decisions were made,

annual acquisition costs could be held to the same $115 billion vicinity as

the QDR plan, or perhaps even somewhat less.
308 QDR 2001

Like the Pentagon’s existing plan, this option would not imply a fixed,

discrete end-state as much as a quasi-permanent change in the way the

armed forces pursue innovation. It would shift more resources into electronics, computing, and other subsystems, and less into platforms, and

would keep doing things that way indefinitely. Concept development and

experimentation would be further bolstered, but without any expectation

of completing a transformation by a certain date. This RMA approach is

somewhat more tentative, and somewhat less confident, than a true transformation strategy would be. The global reach/global power school, by

contrast, envisions a more radical and definite transformation of the U.S.

armed forces. It is RMA with a finish line, rather than a process.

Global Reach/Global Power Transformation Strategy

The global reach/global power transformation strategy would incorporate virtually all elements of the C4

ISR modernization agenda, but it

would also go beyond them. Specifically, both its scope and pace would

increase, particularly in areas of major platforms, such as vehicles, ships,

missiles, and aircraft.

The implications would be numerous. Prototyping would be far less

cautious and exploratory; the goal would be to build a transformed force

fairly quickly, even if that meant accepting greater technical risk. Concept

development and experimentation would be intense over a several-year

period, perhaps involving several fighter squadrons, brigades, and surface

ship groups in dedicated efforts, with a total cost of several billion dollars

annually, counting the costs of maintaining these units.

Intensive R&D, prototyping, and experimentation would last for a finite period, then presumably be scaled back as a concentrated procurement phase began. New concepts, such as arsenal ships and mobile offshore bases, would be built in quantity within service planning horizons

(typically about 15 years). Lighter armored vehicles, some possibly using

new types of power sources, and some possibly unmanned, would be

built to replace M1 tanks and other armor of that vintage. Many combat

aircraft would be replaced with UAVs, and new types of stealthy bombers

and similar systems might be built.

More exotic weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, intercontinental artillery, and orbiting kinetic-energy weapons, would be vigorously researched.34 However, it is difficult to speculate about whether such

weapons could really be part of the near-term transformation agenda,

given the technological uncertainties surrounding them at present. A

wide range of nonlethal arms would be developed as quickly as possible.
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 309

New military organizations would be built as well. Some of the ideas

that have been proposed include eliminating the Army division, organizing the military into joint-service task forces, and drastically streamlining

support capabilities.35 New units could include small formations of

ground soldiers primarily responsible for conducting reconnaissance and

targeting for long-range strike systems. They could include groups of pilotless combat aircraft and unmanned tanks. They could be forces tailored

to operate from mobile offshore bases with a combination of airpower,

special-operations activities, and larger ground-combat formations.

Proponents of this school of thought tend to envision a specific endstate that would be reached when systems and units like those noted

above were procured in large numbers. Military change would not, of

course, stop once the end-state was reached and the transformation complete. But changes from that point on would generally be of degree, not of

kind. They might consist of simply improving new unmanned fighter

jets, mobile offshore bases, and hunter-warrior, ground-combat teams.

The basic transformation in types of military weaponry and organizations would only happen once, and it would be the sort of thing that

could be recorded as a discrete set of events in history books. In that

sense, this global reach/global power school truly does tend to believe in

transformation of the U.S. military, rather than simply a new process and

set of priorities for pursuing defense innovation and investment.

Nonetheless, beyond a certain point it is difficult to spell out this option in detail. Proponents of radical transformation sometimes assume

technologies that, if truly available, could well be worth buying—but they

may in fact not become available. The problem here is that rhetorical

goals and RMA enthusiasm, and even budgetary reallocations, do not

themselves produce revolutionary physical results.

This option is sometimes touted as being a way to save money and get

the Pentagon out of its looming budgetary shortfall. Quite the opposite

seems probable, however.36 Global reach/global power proponents wish to

remake the military more rapidly and more dramatically than would happen under existing Pentagon plans, meaning that they would need to

replace weapons not now slated for near-term replacement. Radical RMA

proponents hold out the hope that systems, such as unmanned aircraft,

may become more affordable as well as more capable than systems, such as

the joint strike fighter, now on the defense drawing board. They also sometimes claim that smaller, higher-technology forces may supplant larger current units, saving money in that way. If they are right, their vision may
310 QDR 2001

prove affordable. But no such transformation proponent has, to my knowledge, made a calculation to show how this might be possible for even one

narrow area of military technology and capability. Global reach/global

power advocates have sometimes described how an enemy might be

stopped during the halt phase of battle by such high-technology forces, assuming the United States responds quickly, munitions work as hoped, and

so forth. But they have generally not considered the full range of possible

scenarios. For example, to conduct counteroffensives into enemy territory

that could involve urban or forest fighting, followed by large-scale occupations of another country, substantial numbers of traditional forces would

be required. High-tech standoff weaponry probably cannot replace them.

Whether the country needs the capacity for two such all-out counteroffensive operations at once can be debated, but global reach/global power advocates rarely engage in such debates.

To consider pursuing a global reach/global power capability, one

would first need answers to the following types of questions:

■ How many aircraft carriers could one mobile offshore base replace?

■ When will unmanned combat aerial vehicles realistically be available, how

capable will they be, and how can the Pentagon maintain its aging

manned fleets in the meantime without spending huge sums of money

doing so?

■ What technical breakthroughs will be needed to make lighter, wheeled

combat vehicles as survivable and lethal as today’s tanks, and how much

are these lighter vehicles likely to cost, once available?

Proponents of radical transformation suggest that it is a straightforward matter to determine which existing defense programs or commitments to scale back in order to fund the new technologies. But it is doubtful

that they could reach a consensus. For example, the 1997 National Defense

Panel used sweeping rhetoric to criticize the existing DOD two-war concept and tactical combat aircraft modernization plan—but failed to offer

specifics about how to change them. Its concrete recommendations were

confined to several systems with a combined annual procurement cost of

no more than several hundred million dollars.

Considering all these factors, an ambitious transformation agenda

would almost surely cost more than the 1997 QDR plan. If platforms

were replaced frequently, in the belief that revolutionary times were upon

us, and that therefore no delay was tolerable in exploiting them, annual

procurement could return to its $100 billion level of the 1980s, or even

exceed it. It is not plausible that this approach would save money. On the
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 311

whole, its total acquisition costs seem likely to range from $120 billion to

$150 billion a year (again, in constant 2000 dollars), with the higher end

of the range more likely than the lower.

Evaluating the Options

Which approach makes sense: the more limited C4ISR RMA vision,

the more sweeping global reach/global power transformation strategy, or

some other concept? In thinking about how to evaluate them, one should

consider the technological underpinnings—and practicality—of each.

One should also consider the geostrategic backdrop. Clearly, if an RMA

were possible in a world with a hostile peer competitor, it would be risky

not to pursue it. By contrast, in a world with lesser, vaguer threats, it

could be counterproductive for U.S. foreign policy to reduce global engagement activities in order to fund an RMA effort.

In my judgment, the C4

ISR/modest-transformation school is a better

way to think about any contemporary RMA than the bolder global

reach/global power concept. Part of the reason is the opportunity cost of

the radical approach; it would necessitate either large increases in defense

spending or a sharp reduction in U.S. overseas commitments that would

probably leave the world less secure.

History provides ample grounds for caution. Most contemporary

RMA enthusiasts make reference to the interwar years and claim that we

are in a period of similar potential, promise, and peril. However, military

technology advanced steadily and impressively throughout the 20th century, including its latter half. Helicopters radically reshaped many battlefield operations after World War II. Intercontinental ballistic missiles and

space-launch vehicles followed. Satellite communications were first used

militarily in 1965 during the Vietnam War. Aircraft-delivered, precisionguided munitions also made their debut in Southeast Asia in the early

1970s. Air defense and antitank missiles played major roles in the 1973

Arab-Israeli War. Stealth fighters were designed in the late 1970s.37 Infrared

sensors and night-vision technologies were fielded in this period, as well.

History also tells us that radical military transformations only make

sense when technology and new concepts and tactics are ripe. The C4

ISR

school, with its relatively modest transformation agenda, is akin to the military innovation spirit of the 1920s, while the more ambitious global

reach/global power school is akin to the 1930s. In the 1920s, such major

military vehicles and systems as the tank and airplane were not yet ripe for

large-scale purchase. Advanced operational concepts, such as blitzkrieg and
312 QDR 2001

carrier aviation, had not yet been fully developed, so they could not guide

hardware acquisition, military organization, or doctrinal development.

Thus, research, experimentation, and prototyping were the proper elements

of a wise innovation and acquisition strategy. In the 1930s, new operational

concepts were better understood, technologies better developed, and

geostrategic circumstances more foreboding. Under these circumstances,

large-scale modernization made sense, and those countries that did not

conduct it tended to perform badly in the early phases of World War II.

Because most radical RMA proponents cannot clearly specify what a

near-term transformation should comprise, I am inclined to liken today’s

situation to the 1920s rather than the 1930s. It is far from obvious that

military technology is now poised to advance even more quickly than it

has in the last half century, as RMA proponents assert when they call for a

radical transformation strategy for current U.S. armed forces. Yet no such

radical DOD-wide transformation strategies were necessary to bring

satellites, stealth, precision-guided munitions, advanced jet engines,

night-vision equipment, or other remarkable new capabilities into the

force in past decades.38

RMA proponents are certainly right to believe that a successful military must always be changing. But the post-World War II U.S. military

has already taken that adage to heart. The status quo in defense circles

does not mean standing still. It means taking a balanced approach to

modernization that has served the country remarkably well for decades.

Indeed, it brought about the very technologies displayed in Desert Storm

that have given rise to the belief that an RMA may be under way.39 It is

not clear that we need to accelerate the pace of innovation now.

Moreover, radical innovation is not always good. If the wrong ideas are

adopted, transforming a force can make it worse. For example, in the world

wars, militaries overestimated the likely effects of artillery as well as aerial

and battleship bombardment against prepared defensive positions, meaning that their infantry forces proved much more vulnerable than expected

when they assaulted enemy lines.40 Britain’s radically new all-tank units

were inflexible, making them less successful than Germany’s integrated

mechanized divisions in World War II. Strategic aerial bombardment did

not achieve nearly the results that had been expected of it: airpower was

much more effective as close-air support for armored formations in

blitzkrieg operations.41 In 1961, the Army Pentomic division concept, intended to employ tactical nuclear weapons, was abandoned as unusable.42
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 313

But these are only historical arguments, uninformed by the realities

of today’s world. What does the current state of technology say about the

prospects for an RMA? In my judgment, here, too, the case for the C4

ISR

approach is much more compelling than for a more radical remaking of

the Armed Forces.

One type of evidence to support this argument is that, in their haste

to push the revolution along, radical RMA promoters tend to lack clear

and specific proposals for how to do so. In that light, even if they are right

that an RMA may be within reach in the foreseeable future, they may be

quite wrong about what should be done about it now. In practical terms,

there is a major distinction between the early stages of a possible RMA

and the later stages. As Stephen Peter Rosen has observed:

The general lesson for students or advocates of innovation may well be

that it is wrong to focus on budgets when trying to understand or promote innovation. Bringing innovations to fruition will often be expensive.

Aircraft carriers, fleets of helicopters, and ICBM forces were not cheap.

But initiating an innovation and bringing it to the point where it provides

a strategically useful option has been accomplished when money was

tight. . . . Rather than money, talented military personnel, time, and information have been the key resources for innovation.43

To put it differently, conceptual innovations are often the most important and difficult elements in military revolutions—and they cannot

always be hastened by throwing resources at procurement budgets in an

effort to drive the transformation process.

Some members of what I have called the global reach/global power

school believe that, the above arguments notwithstanding, the United

States really has no choice but to rebuild its equipment inventories and

combat units from first principles. They believe that future adversaries will

make greater use of sea mines, cruise and ballistic missiles, chemical or biological weapons, and other means to attempt to deny the U.S. military the

ability to build up forces and operate from large, fixed infrastructures, as in

Desert Storm. As a result, they consider major steps to change the way that

the Armed Forces deploy and fight to be not only desirable but essential.

However, the solutions to these problems may not be exclusively in

the realm of advanced weaponry. Long-range strike platforms, missile

defenses, short-takeoff aircraft, and other such advanced technologies

may be part of the solution, but so might more minesweepers, smaller

roll-on/roll-off transport vessels useful in shallow ports, concrete

bunkers for deployed aircraft, and other relatively low-tech approaches
314 QDR 2001

to hardening and dispersing supplies and infrastructure. The military

services are already biased in favor of procuring advanced weaponry at

the expense of equally important but less advanced hardware. By emphasizing modernistic and futuristic technology, the most ambitious RMA

concepts could reinforce this existing tendency, quite possibly to the

Nation’s detriment.

Most centrally, one should be skeptical about the revolution in military affairs hypothesis because many of its key technical underpinnings

have not been well established and may not be valid. Proponents of the

RMA concept often mention Moore’s law—that computing power has

historically doubled every 18 to 24 months—then extrapolate an exponential rate of progress to much different realms of technology. For example, in its 1997 report the NDP wrote: “The rapid rate of new and improved technologies—a new cycle about every eighteen months—is a

defining characteristic of this era of change and will have an indelible influence on new strategies, operational concepts, and tactics that our military employs.”44 However, conflating progress in computers with progress

in other major areas of technology is unjustified. To the extent RMA believers hinge most of their argument on advances in modern electronics

and computers, they are at least proceeding from a solid foundation.

When they expect comparably profound progress in land vehicles, ships,

aircraft, rockets, explosives, and energy sources—as many do, either explicitly or implicitly—they are probably mistaken, at least in the early

years of the 21st century.

The arguments of RMA proponents are also sometimes prone to a

certain tension, if not outright contradiction. They often motivate their

proposals by arguing that enemies will take advantage of U.S. weaknesses

and vulnerabilities, avoiding traditional battlefield encounters, but they

tend to focus on high-end heavy warfare rather than on infantry, urban,

and irregular combat. It is the case, at least, that their common proposals

would typically work better in the former arenas than in the latter.

Specifically, they sometimes fail to note that trends in defense technology

do not make it more feasible for the United States to fight in complex

terrain using standoff weaponry, or to find adversaries hidden within

buildings, forests, and civilian populations. These realities should temper

expectations about just how much warfare really can and will change in

the decades ahead.45
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 315

Conclusion

In 2001, the United States conducts another Quadrennial Defense Review, which will be affected by the large projected budget surpluses, but

also by the need to replace large stocks of aging weaponry and to continue a high pace of global military engagement. That combination of

growing resources and growing demands leads to the conclusion that difficult choices will still need to be made. In particular, the Department of

Defense will need a smart way to think about the possibility that a revolution in military affairs is under way or within reach—and a wise agenda

for what to do about it.

A modernization strategy for the U.S. armed forces should, in my

judgment, be designed to focus principally on gaining maximum benefit

from rapid progress (proven or plausible) in electronics and computers.

That approach does not obviate the need to replace certain stocks of

aging weapons platforms, or argue against limited purchases of more advanced fighters, ships, and armored vehicles. But it does suggest that

fewer resources be devoted to comprehensively modernizing weapons

platforms than the services now intend.

Additional measures would place greater emphasis on R&D and

joint-service experimentation than Pentagon plans now forecast. Finally,

this approach would also include increased efforts to redress U.S. military

vulnerabilities in areas such as mine warfare, missile defense, and protection against chemical and biological agents.

This school of thought might be described as the C4

ISR school, for its

focus on communications, computers, and intelligence. It is analogous in

some ways to the modernization efforts of the 1920s, a period in which a

number of new military technologies and operational concepts were

being envisioned and invented, but were not yet sufficiently mature to

justify immediate, large-scale, military transformation.

A transformation strategy—if one wishes to call it that—focused on

C4

ISR systems, prototyping, experimentation, and alleviation of key U.S.

military vulnerabilities makes the most sense. And it is affordable, if real

defense budgets increase modestly while the current two-Desert Storm

(two-MTW) framework and current service modernization plans are

reevaluated and revised.

Notes1 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).
316 QDR 2001

2 C4ISR embraces the full range of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

3 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Conflict Environment of 2016: A Scenario-Based Approach

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996); General Charles C. Krulak,

“Operational Maneuver From the Sea: Building a Marine Corps for the 21st Century,” National Security Studies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), 19–23; Robert J. Bunker, Five-Dimensional (Cyber)

Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998); Barry M. Blechman

and Paul N. Nagy, U.S. Military Strategy in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research, 1997), 11–16, 68–70.

4 See Gary Hart, Warren Rudman, et al., New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century (Alexandria, VA: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 1999).

5 For one such view, see Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey

Summary Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 235–251.

6 For a similar view, see Jeremy Shapiro, “Information and War: Is It a Revolution?” in Zalmay

M. Khalilzad and John White, eds., The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA:

RAND Corporation, 1999), 114–117.

7 For an argument in favor of taking a large part of the active force structure “off line” so as to

devote it to experimentation and acceleration of the RMA, see James R. Blaker, “The American RMA

Force: An Alternative to the QDR,” Strategic Review 25, no. 3 (Summer 1997), 21–30. For a similar but

more general argument, see also Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 35–84. For the view of a conservative critic of the

RMA concept, see Frederick W. Kagan, “Wishful Thinking on War,” Weekly Standard, December 15,

1997, 27–29. Kagan argues that the country may need to spend more on technology, but must not do

so at the expense of its present engagement and deterrence strategies.

8 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December 1997), vii, 2, 23, 49, 59, 79–86.

9 The National Defense Panel used the terms revolution in military affairs and transforming defense repeatedly and interchangeably, however, so it is not clear that there is really any distinction between them in the current debate. See National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense; see also James

R. Blaker, “Revolution(s) in Military Affairs: Why the Critique,” National Security Studies Quarterly 5,

no. 1 (Winter 1999), 86.

10 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March–April 1996), 23–25; see also Jack Dorsey, “Now’s time to take risks for

new Navy, admiral says,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 26, 1997, 1; “Owens: Get Smart Weapons,”

Navy News and Undersea Technology, October 3, 1994, 1.

11 Kenneth Flamm, “Controlling the Uncontrollable,” Brookings Review 14, no. 1 (Winter 1996),

22–25.

12 Martin C. Libicki, “Technology and Warfare,” in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and

Progress (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 120.

13 On the reasons for skepticism, see Stephen Biddle, “Assessing Theories of Future Warfare,” Security Studies 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998), 34–44; on the recent good economic news, see Steve Lohr,

“Computer Age Gains Respect of Economists,” The New York Times, April 14, 1999, A1.

14 Martin C. Libicki, “DBK and its Consequences,” in Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki,

Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 23–49.

15 See Johnson and Libicki, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge.

16 See Statement of General Ronald R. Fogelman, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, before the House

National Security Committee, May 22, 1997.

17 Prominent in this school are Andrew Krepinevich and Michael Vickers of the Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington.

18 Sheila E. Widnall, “Report of the Secretary of the Air Force,” in William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1997 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), 270.
TRANSFORMING U.S. FORCES 317

19 See, for example, Christopher Bowie, Fred Frostic, Kevin Lewis, John Lund, David Ochmanek,

and Philip Propper, The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993); David A. Ochmanek, Edward R. Harshberger,

David E. Thaler, and Glenn A. Kent, To Find, and Not to Yield: How Advances in Information and Firepower Can Transform Theater Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998); Charles M.

Perry, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Joseph C. Conway, Long-Range Bombers and the Role of Airpower

in the New Century (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995); Zalmay Khalilzad

and David Ochmanek, “Rethinking U.S. Defence Planning,” and Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Technology Revolution in Air Warfare,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 43–64 and 65–83, respectively;

Daniel Gouré and Stephen A. Cambone, “The Coming of Age of Air and Space Power,” in Daniel

Gouré and Christopher M. Szara, ed., Air and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington, DC:

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 1–47.

20 See Ochmanek, Harshberger, Thaler, and Kent, To Find, and Not to Yield. For budget data, see

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY00

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999), 138–141.

21 M. Thomas Davis, Managing Defense After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1997), iv; John Hillen, “Defense’s Death Spiral,” Foreign Affairs 78,

no. 4 (July–August 1999), 2–7.

22 See Defense Science Board, 1996 Summer Study Task Force on Tactics and Technology for 21st

Century Military Superiority 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996), S-4.

23 Richard Danzig, “Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” in Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (1999), 205–206.

24 Steven Lee Myers, “Army is Restructuring with Brigades for Rapid Response,” The New York

Times, October 13, 1999, A14; Robert Suro, “Chief Projects an Army on Wheels,” The Washington

Post, October 13, 1999, A23.

25 On stealth bombers, see, for example, Perry, Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Conway, Long-Range Bombers

and the Role of Airpower in the New Century; and Blechman and Nagy, U.S. Military Strategy in the 21st

Century; on arsenal ships, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., A New Navy for a New Era (Washington,

DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996); on long-range and space weapons, see

Harlan Ullman, James Wade, Jr., et al., Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC:

National Defense University, 1996); and George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War (New

York: Crown Publishers, 1996); for an Army view, see Edward G. Anderson III and Michael Linick,

“Ensuring Future Victories Through Land Power Dominance: The U.S. Army Modernization Strategy,” National Security Studies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), 1–18.

26 See William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense,

May 1997), iv–v, 39–51; National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 5–8; Joint Vision 2010; Joint

Vision 2020.

27 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 39–41.

28 See, for example, M. Thomas Davis, “Warfighting Transformation: Slow Moving Process,”

briefing slides, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, Rosslyn, VA, August 25, 1998.

29 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 252.

30 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 21–27; National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 1–3.

31 See, for example, Lane Pierrot, A Look at Tomorrow’s Tactical Air Forces (Washington, DC:

Congressional Budget Office, January 1997), 31–35.

32 See Lane Pierrot, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2000), 18–21.

33 For more specifics about one interpretation of what such a modernization/transformation

agenda would entail, see Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), 168–191.

34 See Ullman, Wade, et al., Shock and Awe.
318 QDR 2001

35 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997); William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus,

and Giroux, 2000), 205–207.

36 For instance, in an otherwise provocative and insightful new book, the former Vice Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William Owens, argues in one breath that a transformed force could wage

war at 35 percent less cost, but in the next breath claims that “we need to upgrade our military, and

fast, but we can’t do it without money.” Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, 200, 203.

37 Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper no. 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21.

38 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press,

1991). Trevor Dupuy uses yet another categorization scheme, different from those of Krepinevich,

Van Creveld, and others, to understand the history of military innovation. He groups all progress

since 1800 together under the title of “the age of technological change.” See Trevor N. Dupuy, The

Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Fairfax, VA: HERO Books, 1984).

39 For warnings against either dismissing the RMA promise or jumping on the bandwagon too

enthusiastically, see Colin S. Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment

(Camberley, UK: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997), 5–7, 33–34; for a reminder that militaries must always be innovating and changing, see Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship,” International Security 15, no. 3

(Winter 1990–91), 213–215.

40 John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 20; Dan Gouré, “Is

There a Military-Technical Revolution in America’s Future?” The Washington Quarterly (Autumn

1993), 185; Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, 218–220, 258–266.

41 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1996), 87–136, 254–313; Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, “British Armed Forces,

1918–1939,” in Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. II (Boston: Unwin

Hyman, 1988).

42 Stephen Biddle, “Assessing Theories of Future Warfare,” paper presented to the 1997 Annual

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 1997, 37–38; Andrew

J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press, 1986); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993),

362–379; Van Creveld, Technology and War, 193–195; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 13–18, 37–38.

43 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 252.

44 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 7–8.

45 For a more extensive discussion, see O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare,

106–142.
Chapter Twelve

Strategic Nuclear Forces and

National Missile Defense:

Toward an Integrated

Framework 

by M. Elaine Bunn

Both national missile defense (NMD) and strategic nuclear forces

(SNF) will be topics with which the new administration will have

to wrestle early on, either in the Quadrennial Defense Review or in

a separate review. Indeed, whether it views these issues as opportunities

or problems, the administration will have little choice but to address

them, since they have been very much at play in proposals in the Presidential campaign, arms control discussions with the Russians, and commentary both foreign and domestic. The direction President Bush takes

on these issues will have a profound impact on U.S. strategy and force

structure, as well as numerous international ramifications.

President Clinton’s announcement on September 1, 2000, that he

would leave to his successor the decision about whether to deploy an

NMD guarantees that it will be a major issue in the new administration

(and one that probably would have been revisited even if he had made a

decision).1 Two related categories of NMD questions will need to be addressed in any review: first, whether NMD is, on balance, a good idea

from a strategic perspective; and second, how to deal with technical issues, such as the right architecture, countermeasures, cost, feasibility, and

readiness of the individual technologies and system integration. The next

QDR or other review must address both categories of questions, but this

article focuses on the first question: whether NMD is wise from a strategy

perspective, assuming the technical issues can be resolved.

After years of a relatively low public profile, SNF has again become a

topic of policy debate as well. SNF returned to the spotlight after Russian

319
320 QDR 2001

ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and subsequent discussions on nuclear forces at the June 2000 U.S.-Russia summit,

the concomitant hearings and press coverage, and the internal Russian debate about the future of its nuclear forces.2 Governor Bush’s May 23, 2000,

proposal to consider unilateral nuclear force reductions also made this a

topic in the presidential campaign.3 In addition, Congress mandated a new

nuclear posture review (NPR) to be completed by December 2001.4

In the past, nuclear and missile defense issues have too often been addressed piecemeal and in isolation from one another. For example, officials considered only nuclear issues, or just missile defenses, or only U.S.-

Russian issues such as the ABM treaty or what the START III level should

be, or simply the need to respond to rogue-state proliferation, or only

how China might react to NMD deployments. Frequently, these issues

also have been handled piecemeal in terms of time horizons, with decisions made only on near-term, pressing issues (both programmatically,

and with regard to summit-driven arms control), with scant focus on

long-term U.S. goals and objectives, and without adequate thought to the

interaction of offenses and defenses in U.S. long-term deterrence strategy

in the evolving security environment.

Whether in the QDR or in a separate forum, the next administration

will need to address both nuclear posture and missile defense because of

the relationships, real and perceived, between the two sets of issues. The

consideration would in essence be a “strategic posture review,” taking into

account nuclear and missile defense strategy, policy, force structure, operations (including command and control, alert rates, confidence levels, and

reliability of systems), and infrastructure. Also at issue is how the United

States deals with other countries, both allies and potential adversaries,

through cooperative endeavors, confidence building measures, arms control agreements, unilateral actions, declaratory policy, or other means.5

The complex nexus of offenses, defenses, and multiple actors can be

seen as a set of interconnected gears. How the United States deals with one

country or set of countries on nuclear issues and missile defense affects

perceptions of and relationships with others, perhaps with unintended

consequences. Although connections obviously exist, it is less clear in

which direction and how far the gears will turn. China has had a slow but

steady nuclear force modernization under way. How much would China

build up nuclear forces, make them more survivable, or place multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on its missiles only in response to U.S. defenses, and how much would it do in any event? Would a
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 321

Chinese buildup of nuclear forces change the overall strategic equation if

in the end China had approximately the same net nuclear capability over

and above U.S. NMD as it has today absent NMD? What would India and

Pakistan do, and how would their reactions affect U.S interests? Would

Russia really scuttle START, other arms control agreements, and Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts over planned NMD deployments, or would it

ultimately see further arms control agreements as in its interest—given the

declines that will take place in its nuclear forces because of economics and

its interest in getting limits on U.S. defenses? Can the United States balance

an offensive drawdown with defensive limits and still be able to defend

against proliferant states and reduce their ability to keep the United States

out of their backyards by threats to the U.S. homeland? 

Even though all outcomes cannot be predicted confidently, the potential interconnections must be understood in order to develop a comprehensive approach to nuclear deterrence and missile defenses. The United

States will need to decide which issues it wants to consider the drivers.

For example, a strategy that is more concerned about preventive defense

and building partnerships with Russia and China would have a different

emphasis than a strategy primarily focused on WMD threats to the U.S.

homeland or one more concerned about the rise of a peer competitor.

Finding solutions that balance competing (and often contradictory)

objectives will not be easy. Improving one set of strategic relationships

may exacerbate problems in another set. No course of action will be

problem-free. The United States will need to weigh all the implications

and make a considered judgment about the costs and benefits of any action, as well as inaction.

U.S. decisionmakers need a new comprehensive framework for looking

at the offense/defense nexus and its broad ramifications. Such a framework

should integrate several elements: (1) new thinking about deterrence and

stability, including identifying whom the United States is trying to deter

from doing what, and the role of offensive and defensive forces in that deterrence strategy; (2) a recognition that how the United States deals with

one country or set of countries on nuclear forces and missile defense affects

its strategic relationships with others; (3) a U.S. decision about what type of

deterrence future it wants to work toward, including explicit decisions, for

each country of concern, about how much it wants to rely on offensive

forces and how much on defenses; (4) what that decision means for nuclear

and NMD forces (numbers, composition, and posture); and (5) a strategy

for how to deal with other countries to get to the preferred future, whether
322 QDR 2001

through formal arms control agreements, transparency and cooperative

measures, unilateral action, or some combination.

This chapter will review briefly where the United States is today on

nuclear and missile defense issues; address alternative strategies and their

implications; postulate possible future nuclear and missile defense force

mixes; assess their potential effects on rogue states, Russia, China, allies,

friends, and others; address options for dealing with other countries in

getting to the future mix; and propose key issues for the Bush administration’s review of missile defense and nuclear issues.

Current Strategy and Forces

The next QDR or separate review will not start with a clean slate on

nuclear and missile defense issues. It inherits a long history in both areas,

and actual forces in the nuclear area.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

According to the DOD Annual Report for 2000, “nuclear forces are an

essential element of U.S. security, serving as a hedge against an uncertain

future and as a guarantee of U.S. commitments to allies. Accordingly, the

United States must maintain survivable strategic nuclear forces of sufficient

size and diversity . . . to deter or dissuade potentially hostile foreign leaders

with access to nuclear weapons.” Under the START I agreement, the United

States and Russia are each allowed 6,000 accountable weapons by the end of

2001. Under the START II agreement, both sides would reduce to

3,000–3,500 accountable weapons (originally by 2003, subsequently agreed

for the end of 2007). Under the START III framework agreed to in principle

at the March 1997 summit, both sides would reduce to 2,000–2,500 accountable weapons. DOD has said it is “confident that it can maintain the

required deterrent” at those START III levels.

The United States has three types of delivery platforms for strategic

nuclear weapons: ICBMs, SLBMs on submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft with air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs. The U.S. force

structure for START II was defined in the 1994 NPR as 500 single-warhead ICBMs; 14 Trident submarines with D–5 missiles; a bomber force of

21 B–2s and 76 B–52s; and nuclear command and control assets.6 No decisions have been made about a force structure under START III.

The cost of current strategic forces is difficult to calculate. There is no

single budget line, and costs are in various program elements, which are

not always clearly labeled. Bombers would remain in the inventory for
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 323

conventional use even if the United States gave up their nuclear role, so

the marginal cost of having a nuclear role for bombers is minimal. For

dedicated forces—ICBMs and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)/SLBMs—funding is primarily for completing D–5 missile procurement and Minuteman III service life extension activities, and

O&M of existing forces.7 One expert on nuclear force costs, who estimates the total FY2000 DOD cost of offensive nuclear forces at $9 billion

(down from $27 billion in 1990), observed that: “Future savings are likely

to be modest because the United States has cut its long- and short-range

nuclear forces so steeply over the past decade that the cost of having nuclear weapons and delivery platforms has become dominated by the high

fixed cost of staying in the nuclear business.” 8

Outside the DOD budget, the Department of Energy spends approximately $4.5 billion per year on the Stockpile Stewardship Program

(SSP), the primary means of ensuring safety and reliability in the nuclear

forces, absent nuclear testing.9 Because SSP infrastructure is needed no

matter how few nuclear weapons the United States has, even drastic

reductions in nuclear forces would be unlikely to produce a significant

drop in spending by the Department of Energy on nuclear weapons.

National Missile Defense

Missile defense has had a controversial history dating back to the debates in the 1960s and 1970s over the U.S. deployment, then dismantling,

of the Sentinel and Safeguard ABM system. Since President Reagan’s

Strategic Defense Initiative speech in March 1983, a number of major

shifts of policy and objectives have occurred.10 The issue of NMD appeared to be headed for a more bipartisan consensus in the past several

years, as evidenced by the fact that Congress passed and President Clinton

signed into law the Missile Defense Act of 1999.11 The act states, “It is the

policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible

an effective National Missile Defense against limited ballistic missile attack.” However, any consensus on NMD may be fragile, since there is little

agreement on the architecture that should be deployed or how to handle

the strategic ramifications, including arms control and relations with

other countries.

Countries pursuing WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems, and

whose interests may run counter to those of the United States—North

Korea, Iran, Iraq, and potentially others—are the driving factor for the

NMD program as well as for the TMD program. U.S. strategy posits that

proliferant states are likely to choose asymmetric challenges to the Nation
324 QDR 2001

rather than tackling it head-on in areas of strength. U.S. conventional superiority makes it unlikely that these nations would be successful in a

conflict with U.S. forces in the air, on the ground, or in the waters in their

region. Their first task is to prevent the United States from deploying or

reinforcing military forces in the region. Access denial—attempts by potential adversaries to deny U.S. forces access to their regions—can take

several forms. Use of WMD against ports and airfields where U.S. forces

might deploy is one adversary approach and one reason that the United

States is pursuing TMD. Another approach is to attempt to reduce national will to intervene in the region by threatening use of ballistic missiles armed with WMD against the United States. In this situation, NMD

could prevent the United States from being self-deterred from involvement in regional crises.

In the last several years, factors have converged highlighting potential

U.S. vulnerability to proliferant threats. For example, the Rumsfeld Commission report in July 1998 found that the ballistic missile threat to the

United States is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than

originally surmised, and that it may emerge with little or no warning.12

The August 1998 North Korean Taepo Dong test (or attempted satellite

launch) with a three-stage missile surprised the intelligence community.

That surprise increased awareness of the missile threat and decreased the

willingness to assume that the United States would have sufficient warning of the emergence of a threat to begin building defenses later. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency said in March 2000:

North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo Dong-1,

which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM capable of delivering a

small biological or chemical weapon to the United States, although with

significant inaccuracies. It is currently observing a moratorium on such

launches, but North Korea has the ability to test its Taepo Dong-2 with

little warning; this missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear payload

to the United States.

Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean pattern,

could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United

States in the next few years.

Given the likelihood that Iraq continues its missile development—we

think it too could develop an ICBM capability sometime in the next

decade with . . . foreign assistance.13

Other intelligence officials have said that “the missile threat will continue to grow, in part because they have become important regional
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 325

weapons in numerous countries’ arsenals. Moreover, missiles provide a

level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile

means do not.” 14

Some are more skeptical of the proliferant-state ballistic missile

threat and see it as a hypothetical issue that may or may not develop in

the future. Critics of NMD have said that U.S. intelligence agencies “have

dropped the bar for what they consider a threat.” 15 These critics tend to

believe that the threat of U.S. offensive retaliation will be an effective deterrent to these states if they should acquire a ballistic missile capability

against the United States.16

Although no decision was made to deploy, the architecture the Clinton administration used for planning purposes had two phases.17 The first

phase, to be deployed by 2007, was optimized for the most immediate

threat, that from North Korea. Designed to be capable of defending all 50

states against the launch of a few tens of warheads, accompanied by simple

penetration aids, the initial NMD system included 100 ground-based 

kinetic-kill interceptors based in Alaska, an X-band radar at Shemya Island

in Alaska, and upgrades to five existing ballistic missile early-warning

radars. It would also have used, for purposes of initial detection of missile

launches, the space-based infrared satellite system (SBIRS) in high earth

orbit. This initial phase could also defend 50 states against a limited attack

of a few warheads launched from the Middle East. A threshold deployment of the first 20 interceptors in Alaska was planned for 2005, although

the President’s September 1, 2000 announcement recognized that it was

unlikely any NMD could be deployed before 2006 or 2007.

The second phase, in the 2010–2011 time frame, would have had an

enhanced but still limited capability: negation of up to a few tens of

ICBM warheads with complex penetration aids launched from either

North Korea or the Middle East. The second phase would include another

interceptor site, more interceptors (250 total), several more X-band

radars, and the SBIRS-low satellite constellation to help discriminate warheads from sophisticated penetration aids.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would cost $26 billion–$60 billion (depending on which capability and what is included) to

build and operate the Clinton administration’s planned NMD system

over 15 years, with annual costs between $1 billion and $6.5 billion.18

As the new administration reassesses the NMD rationale, architecture, and timing, it will need to factor in the ongoing discussions with

Pyongyang. If North Korea actually agrees to limit its program in such a
326 QDR 2001

way that the United States can be confident that its missiles are not a

threat—a big if—then the timelines for deploying NMD may become less

severe, depending on actions by other countries of concern, such as Iran’s

capabilities and relationship with the United States, lifting sanctions

against Iraq’s pursuit of ballistic missiles and WMD, and the nature of the

leadership in Baghdad.

Nuclear and Missile Defense Implications 

Any consideration of alternative defense strategies and their implications for nuclear forces and missile defenses should start with a set of

basic questions:

■ About whom is the United States worried strategically?

■ What is it worried they will do?

■ How does it deal with and deter those worries? What if they are not deterred? What role do nuclear weapons and missile defenses play?

Defense planners need to ask themselves these questions on a regular

basis and to be prepared for answers that change over time. The answers

to those questions are different now than they were in 1972, when the

ABM Treaty was signed, or in 1983, when President Reagan launched the

original Strategic Defense Initiative designed to counter Soviet ballistic

missiles, or in 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall but before the breakup

of the Soviet Union. In each of those years, the answer to the first question was very definitively the Soviet Union. Now, the United States has

three baskets of potential strategic worries.19

Proliferant states, formerly known as rogues and more recently as

countries of concern—that is, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and potentially

others—are the newest set of worries. Second is Russia: not today’s Russia, but the uncertain Russia of the future, when the United States might

have to deal with a Russia-gone-bad. Three scenarios for Russia would

worry the United States. A more aggressive Russia whose interests conflict with U.S. interests might look on its large remaining nuclear force

to influence such a conflict of interests. A Russia with a large nuclear

force but with uncertain command and control over it might cause the

United States to worry about accidental or unauthorized launches or intentional launches based on faulty information. A Russia hemorrhaging

WMD or ballistic missile technology and know-how would be worrisome for other reasons. Any of these scenarios, or some combination of

the three, would be bad from an American perspective, but how the

United States would deal with each would differ. Finally, China is a hard
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 327

case, because whether it will become a partner, an enemy, or something

in between is unclear.

The concern about any of these countries is that they may use or

threaten to use force against the United States, its forces, or its allies and

friends. This is particularly troublesome if aggression involves nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their delivery means. The threat of use of

WMD, particularly in regional crises, may be part of an enemy antiaccess

strategy to deter or hamper U.S. intervention in the region.

Another of the basic questions is how to deter. The fundamental goal

of deterrence is to prevent aggression by ensuring that, in the mind of a

potential aggressor, the potential risks far outweigh the potential gains. Offensive deterrence and defensive deterrence affect different sides of the deterrence scale: offensive forces, whether conventional or nuclear, increase

potential risks to aggressors by holding at risk what they value, while defensive forces decrease potential gains by denying an aggressor’s ability to

hold the United States at risk. The combination of offenses and defenses

could, in some scenarios involving limited numbers of ballistic missiles,

make an attack “not only fatal because of the certainty of retaliation, but

futile because it would not actually succeed in carrying out the mission

which was assigned to it.” 20

The emphasis that the United States puts on the two sides of the deterrent equation has evolved since the end of the Cold War. The emphasis

varies with the country to be deterred, the action to be prevented, and the

tools thought to be effective in affecting that calculation in the adversary’s

minds. There is significant uncertainty about what various leaderships

value and about how they calculate risks and gains—whether or not they

do so methodically or consciously or in a way that is logical to U.S. thinking. The United States needs to devote significantly more effort to assessing this. The emphasis placed on offensive and defensive deterrence also

is likely to have profound implications for both damage limitation and

escalation control if deterrence fails.

Nuclear forces and NMD currently have different roles with regard to

each basket of concerns. Proliferant states (rogues) are driving the U.S.

NMD program; a limited missile defense can defend against a small use

or threat of use but is not designed to defend against a large nuclear capability such as the Russian one. On the other hand, the Nation has in the

past made a conscious decision to deal with the possibility of a future

hostile, aggressive Russia with traditional nuclear deterrence; indeed, Russia is the driver of the size and posture of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
328 QDR 2001

Although the United States has said it is not designing its NMD program

to defend against Chinese nuclear capabilities,21 it has not tended to grant

China the same status as Russia in the ABM Treaty, where Russia was

guaranteed a nuclear capability that could overcome defenses. Indeed,

even the proposed Phase I NMD system of 100 interceptors would cause

Chinese defense planners concern, given their current nuclear levels.

Some have suggested that the United States should not rule out the possibility of defending against China in the future.22 A consensus does not yet

exist in the United States about how to treat China: whether to try to defend against Chinese nuclear capabilities (treat it like a rogue state); to

continue to deter China with SNF and give it treaty or declaratory commitments that its future nuclear forces will be effective against U.S. defenses (treat it like Russia); or not to size NMD to defend against China,

but also not give it formal or informal commitments that its nuclear

forces can overwhelm U.S. defenses (treat China in a unique category).

For the future, the role of nuclear forces and missile defenses will be

shaped by the overall defense strategy chosen in the next QDR. The six

alternative strategies (A–F) presented in chapter 5 differ in important

ways, including the worldview, the assumptions about the U.S. role, and

judgments about where to put emphasis and where to accept risk. Consequently, the alternative strategies have varying implications for nuclear

and missile defense issues. Key variables include the degree of concern

about rogues who have or will get WMD and ballistic missiles for delivering them, and the implications for both nuclear forces and NMD. Also

key is the degree of concern about a peer competitor in the mid- or long

term, and what that means for nuclear force levels and posture and for

NMD. Whether that peer competitor is expected to be China or Russia

makes a difference, although the strategy alternatives do not address that

explicitly. If it were a hostile and aggressive Russia, the United States

would more likely choose to handle it with traditional offensive deterrence; if it were an aggressive China, the United States would need to

choose whether to emphasize offensive deterrence, defensive deterrence,

or some combination.

Deterrence Futures (2020)

Alternative force mixes, such as those presented below, depend on

assumptions about the relationship between strategic nuclear forces and

national missile defense. There are four ways of thinking about this

relationship.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 329

The first possibility is a direct relationship—that is, the more NMD a

country has, the more nuclear weapons the other side will have, while the

lower the level of NMD, the smaller the number of nuclear weapons (on

both sides) can be. The exact slope of the line is not determined, but the

general relationship of both up or both down is the primary characteristic

of this view. Examples include the 1972 ABM Treaty/SALT, as well as the

current Russian proposal for a reduction in SNF to 1,500 and no NMD (at

least none beyond that allowed by the ABM Treaty).

The second possibility is an inverse relationship: one can trade off

strategic nuclear forces and NMD. This relationship is most often implicit

in budget discussions. An example of this view was the approach briefly

considered during the last QDR to put strategic weapons (SNF and

NMD) in one category and to reduce funds for one in order to fund programs in the other. Another example would be a possible arms control

proposal to have an arms control pot of strategic ballistic missiles, with

freedom to mix between ICBMs/SLBMs and NMD interceptors. This idea

has been discussed in U.S. circles as well as appearing in recent remarks

by the Russian strategic rocket forces commander, who suggested introducing “an unchanging general indicator of strategic weapons which

would include anti-missile defence means as well as means of nuclear attack . . . A country that wishes to increase one of the components will cut

the other.” 23

The third possibility is that no logical relationships exist between the

levels of the two because they are driven by different factors: NMD is

sized by rogue state threats, while strategic nuclear forces are sized to deal

with a potentially hostile Russia that might be viewed as a strategic threat

again in the future. Because there are different drivers, both nuclear forces

and missile defenses should be sized independently of each other, and

therefore many combinations are possible (both high, both low, or one

high, one low).

The fourth relationship between the two types of forces is characterized by the analogy of interconnected gears: there is a relationship, but it

is nonlinear and unpredictable. Predicting cause and effect, or the extent

of the effects, is difficult. Thus, with a number of possible ways to view

the relationship between nuclear and defense forces, no single logic defines the appropriate mix of U.S. offenses and defenses.

Other cautions are in order. First, while defensive force levels in the

force mixes presented below are denominated in terms of numbers of

interceptors deployed, that term is used only as a proxy for defensive
330 QDR 2001

capability. Besides the number of interceptors, other key variables are

the type of interceptors, where they are deployed, their robustness to

countermeasures, and how many threat warheads the missile defense

system can defend against, with what level of confidence. For example,

salvos of four land-based kinetic-kill-vehicle interceptors may be required to defend against one warhead or other credible threat object

(such as a decoy that looks like a warhead).24 Thus, in that case the

negation capability would be about one-fourth of the number of interceptors. Where the interceptors are based—for example, land-based in

the United States, land-based closer to the threat, ship-based, airborne,

space-based—would have huge implications for their effectiveness (particularly against countermeasures), for ABM Treaty negotiations, and

for the way they would be viewed by other countries. For instance, shipbased interceptors or forward-deployed land-based interceptors, as a

complement to U.S.-based interceptors, might be more robust to countermeasures and protect others outside the United States but could raise

other concerns.25 Because force mixes presented in this chapter address

only relative levels of far-term defense capabilities generically, they are

not specific as to the basing mode of the defense interceptor. Nor is the

use of the number of interceptors to describe defense levels meant to

rule out other types of technology in defenses. If a different type of

technology (such as laser weapons) were deployed in the future, one

would have to develop an “exchange rate” to determine where along the

spectrum of force mixes that would fall relative to current hit-to-kill interceptor technology.

Second, none of the options below contemplates the total elimination

of nuclear weapons. It would not seem to be feasible by 2020, particularly

since the knowledge of how to design and make nuclear weapons cannot

be eliminated.26 The verification standards would be incredibly high in a

world in which declared nuclear powers had eliminated their nuclear

weapons, since the leverage for a proliferant state that acquired just a few

nuclear weapons—or even a single one—would be tremendous.27

Third, further significant reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces

would require a fundamental change in the targeting policy that underlies U.S. strategy for nuclear deterrence of a potential future hostile Russia. Current U.S. policy on deterring a Russia-gone-bad (or in the past,

the Soviet Union) means being able to hold at risk what the United

States believes a potentially hostile leadership would value. This has historically involved four categories of targets: nuclear forces, other military
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 331

forces, economic and industrial targets, and leadership and command,

control, communications, and intelligence assets.28 This type of targeting

for deterrence is not based on what would deter the United States or on

having enough weapons to kill a specific number of people, or on targeting cities, nor is it determined solely by what nuclear forces the potential

adversary has deployed. Because being able to hold at risk Russia’s strategic forces is only one part of the strategy, further reductions in Russian

nuclear forces would probably not yield further significant reductions in

U.S. nuclear requirements regarding Russia. Thus, options that look at

levels below the START III framework levels of 2,000–2,500 strategic nuclear weapons would likely require a revision of what the United States

would seek to hold at risk in order to deter a Russia-gone-bad; even

lower options definitely would. This would require a fundamental

change in the guidance by the civilian leadership, including both the

President and Secretary of Defense.29 Such revised guidance might drop

one or more categories of targets, relax the exacting damage criteria that

affect strategic force levels (for example, by reducing the number of targets within each category that must be held at risk with strategic warheads), or adopt a strategy that targets population (a difficult choice,

given American values).30

A fourth caution concerning the force mix alternatives presented

below is that past U.S. decisions, such as in the NPR, were based on the

intention to retain a substantial nuclear force in the face of an uncertain

future for Russia. An implicit assumption in those decisions was that

whatever the level to which the United States reduced, it would never

have more nuclear forces or weapons than that, since increasing nuclear

force levels would be both politically and technically difficult particularly under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The view was that the new

lower level would become a de facto ceiling for the United States. That

assumption induced caution about going to lower levels. Another way

to handle the potential future rise of a peer competitor deemed to require a substantial U.S. nuclear force would be to maintain a robust capability to rearm. This thinking resembles the NPR hedge (including

platforms with upload capacity and retention of offloaded warheads).

But in the NPR, the hedge was the difference between a START I–plus

and a lower START II force. As planners get more comfortable with

being able to deter a Russia-gone-bad with the lower START II level of

forces, a future hedge might mean the difference between START III or

lower levels of nuclear forces (whether treaty-mandated or not) and
332 QDR 2001

START II levels. It might mean having stored components or industrial

capability and nuclear weapons complex infrastructure to increase nuclear capabilities within the period in which a threat might arise to

merit implementation of the hedge. Ironically, the ability to retain such

a rearming capability might be what would allow the United States to

agree to substantially lower nuclear force levels in the face of strategic

uncertainty about future peer competitors. However, the political difficulty of deciding to rearm—whether by putting more weapons on a

downloaded system or by building new ones—should not be underestimated. Unless the situation were clear-cut and unambiguous (not often

the case), such a step would likely be seen as escalatory.

A fifth caution is that of stability, a factor often cited in discussions of

nuclear forces and missile defense. It refers to many different things, including arms race stability (do nations feel a pressure to increase force size

or capability?); crisis stability (do postures mean rapid escalation in times

of tension?), a subset of which is first-strike stability (in a crisis, is there an

incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons?); and political or regional

stability (often defined implicitly by the United States as maintaining the

status quo). A strategic posture review that considers various alternative

offensive and defensive force mixes will need to consider carefully their

implications for all of these types of stability carefully.

Arms race stability has been the focus of much of the discussion to

date regarding stability of NMD and nuclear forces. However, numbers of

nuclear weapons should not be the only—or even the primary—consideration. More important is the posture of forces: for instance, how nuclear forces are deployed, on what platforms, and whether they are survivable in all types of situations, both day-to-day and in times of heightened

tension when a nation may put more of its forces on alert (with the risk

of escalating a crisis by that very action). Such factors have an impact on

whether forces are stabilizing (particularly in the sense of crisis stability),

or whether they invite escalation, by a large peer competitor, by a small

proliferant nation, or even by the United States itself in its response to

crisis situations. Security and stability, not numbers, should be the measure of merit. Lower numbers are not in and of themselves better; one

can postulate a force with lower numbers that is very unstable.31 Additionally, early warning and command and control capabilities are important factors in considering crisis stability.

Sixth, in looking at SNF levels, accountable weapons do not equal available weapons. The accountable numbers under START II, for example,
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 333

include all strategic nuclear weapons that could theoretically be deployed.

However, at any given time, the number the United States actually deploys

is less. For example, bombers and submarines in long-term overhaul would

not be available even if forces were alerted. Actual loadings of available platforms may be less than that allowed by treaty for operational reasons. The

platforms available on a day-to-day basis may be less than in the generated

case (particularly for bombers, which have been taken off alert). The numbers in the options below envision a continuation of the situation in which

accountable weapon levels are greater than actual. In the case of an arms

control agreement with a mechanism to count only weapons actually deployed at any time (for example, on SSBNs at sea, not those in port or undergoing overhaul), or under unilateral declarations that included only deployed forces, the strategic force numbers could be lower.

Finally, the disparity between U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear

weapons becomes more of an issue in looking at lower numbers (perhaps

those below START II, and certainly those below the START III framework).32 Similarly, nondeployed nuclear warheads, production capability,

and reliability of deployed platforms and warheads would have to be examined more closely. With smaller numbers, less of a cushion is available

to absorb problems or uncertainties with one’s own or another nation’s

nuclear posture.

Possible Future Force Mix Options

As noted above, no single logic on the relationship between defenses

and offenses defines the appropriate mix. Consequently, the following eight

illustrative force mixes for the 2020 timeframe offer various notional levels

of NMD (in ascending order, since the current level is zero) and various

levels of strategic nuclear forces (in descending order from the current substantial numbers), combined in illustrative force mixes. (Note that the nuclear force levels include strategic forces only and exclude tactical weapons.) 

Although levels of offensive or defensive forces in these mixes of

forces are not all-encompassing, they cover a range of possibilities that

have been put forward—either explicitly proposed or generally implied—by U.S. government officials, nongovernmental organizations,

Congressional members or staffers, political candidates, other countries,

or foreign or domestic academic analysts. These illustrative force mixes

should be seen primarily as a device to identify and frame key issues

that must be addressed in a strategic review. The precise numbers are

not the issue; numbers are used only to give a sense of relative emphasis
334 QDR 2001

on either nuclear forces or NMD in future strategies and are subject to

the various caveats noted above.

The force mixes listed below are also depicted in figure 12–1:

■ No NMD/heavy SNF (0/3,000–3,500). This option would be a continuation of the no-NMD status quo for the United States, with nuclear forces

at START II levels.

■ No NMD/light SNF (0/1,500). This option would be the mix under the

Russian proposal for nuclear reductions to 1,500 warheads and no NMD

beyond that allowed in the ABM Treaty. Since the United States is unlikely

to want to deploy that defense, it translates to zero for the United States.

■ No NMD/minimal SNF (0/300–500). This option would drastically reduce

nuclear weapons by 2020 and would not deploy NMD. This option might

be attractive to those who are not worried about Russia or China as a future peer competitor and who believe that a very low number of nuclear

weapons (until elimination) is the best route for stability and security (for

example, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament). This mix,

given the worldview inherent in it, would refrain from deploying NMD,

so as to avoid spurring larger or more sophisticated Chinese nuclear

forces or reducing incentives for planned and future Russian reductions.

Instead, it would handle rogue states entirely with diplomatic measures,

with offensive retaliatory capability, or with preemption.

■ Very light NMD/medium SNF (100/2,000–2,500). This option represents a

long-term continuation of the Clinton administration proposal to the

Russians: Phase I of the U.S. NMD program, and START III framework

levels for strategic nuclear forces. It assumes continued robust nuclear deterrence of a potentially hostile Russia, with the current targeting strategy

for Russia driving nuclear force levels and posture and a small rogue

threat driving NMD. It also assumes either very limited countermeasures

by rogues, or breakthroughs in U.S. capabilities to handle them (for instance, with boost-phase interceptors or improved ability to discriminate

warheads from penetration aids).

■ Light NMD/light SNF (250/1,500). This mix represents a future at the

Phase II NMD levels of the Clinton administration plan, to defend against

a few tens of warheads with complex penetration aids launched from either North Korea or the Middle East, and nuclear forces at the levels proposed by Russia.

■ Medium NMD/very light SNF (600–800/1,000). This option would place

NMD at levels comparable to those envisioned under the 1992 U.S.

proposals for the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system and

nuclear forces at the levels to which some predict Russia will fall.

■ Heavy NMD/medium SNF (1,000+/2,000–2,500). This option would maintain nuclear deterrence at START III levels and deploy a robust NMD. The
Figure 12–1. Illustrative Strategic Nuclear Forces and National

Missile Defense Force Mixes for 2020

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 335

nuclear forces in this option might be driven by a worldview concerned

about a Russia-gone-bad, able to overcome even a robust defense, or with

capabilities the United States cannot defend against and to deter which it

therefore needs a large nuclear force. The NMD forces might be driven by

a rogue threat involving multiple rogues, large numbers of ballistic missiles

with WMD, and/or very effective countermeasures against NMD, or by a

decision to defend against a Chinese ballistic missile force that had large

numbers and/or very effective countermeasures.

■ Heavy NMD/minimal SNF (1,000+/300–500). This mix represents defensedominant deterrence: the United States would maintain only low levels of

nuclear weapons as retaliatory insurance against any WMD-armed power

including those that might employ delivery means other than ballistic missiles, and it would deploy robust NMD (in multiple-basing modes) against

all potential threats (Russia, China, and rogue states). With its de-emphasis

of nuclear deterrence, this option would require not only ballistic missile

defense, but also much more emphasis on defending against other types of

WMD delivery, such as cruise missiles or other air delivery, or covert delivery to U.S. soil. However, since some nuclear forces remain, offensive deterrence could still play some role in deterring or retaliating against rogues, or

even Russia or China, although the determination of which valued assets

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
336 QDR 2001

would need to be held at risk, and the resultant strategy, would have to be

very different from today’s.

While the strategy alternatives presented in chapter 5 provided the

context for formulating the force mixes in figure 12–1, there is not a oneto-one correlation between the strategies and the specific force mixes.

However, Strategy A (current strategy of shape, respond, prepare now)

might consider force mixes including no-to-light NMD (0–250) and

heavy-to-medium SNF (3,500–2,000). Strategy B (engage more selectively

and accelerate transformation) might consider force mixes with light-toheavy NMD (250–1,000+) and heavy-to-medium SNF (3,500–2,000).

Strategy C (engage more selectively and strengthen warfighting capabilities) might consider force mixes with no-to-light NMD (0–250) and

medium-to-very light SNF (2,500–1,000). Strategy D (engage today to

prevent conflicts tomorrow) might consider force mixes with no-to-very

light NMD (0–100) and light-to-minimal SNF (1,000–300).

In any event, a considerable amount of time would be needed to reach

any of these future alternative force mixes (except those that approximate

the status quo), since achieving them would mean reducing nuclear forces,

acquiring NMD forces, or both. In the near term, only evolutionary

changes would be possible, but the United States should know where it is

trying to head and what path it wants to be on, even though changes in the

security environment may alter the path and the endpoint.

Assessing the Mix Options

Each of the options outlined above could have a variety of effects on

the potential adversaries, allies, and others that must be considered in

choosing among them. The players whose reactions must be considered

include rogue state proliferants, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, and

U.S. allies and friends.

Rogue State Proliferants 

The “no NMD” options above represent a future world in which either no future rogue ballistic missile threat exists, perhaps because of the

success of nonproliferation efforts, or rogue ballistic missiles may pose a

problem in the future but traditional nuclear deterrence, or even preemption, is determined to be the way to handle those concerns. Deterrence

with the threat of retaliation implies not only that rogue leaders are rational, but also that the United States understands what they value and how

they calculate risks and gains. For preemption, it would require confidence that the United States knew where their WMD was, could destroy it
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 337

all before it was used, and would have the political will to initiate a conflict. Under these options, whether for low or high levels of SNF, the question arises as to whether the United States has the appropriate capabilities

tailored to rogues who place valued assets (leadership, WMD capabilities)

in hardened, deeply buried bunkers. If they cannot be destroyed conventionally, should the United States consider developing earth-penetrating

nuclear weapons with low yield and high accuracy?33 Another consideration in options with very low levels of nuclear forces is the importance of

the posture and survivability of U.S. nuclear weapons. Nuclear reductions

should not decrease survivable nuclear forces to such low levels or concentrate them in so few places that even rogue state capabilities could destroy them.

For those who would choose options that include some NMD deployments, the assumptions are that rogue states will have ballistic missiles capable of threatening the United States and that the United States

cannot be confident that traditional nuclear and conventional offensive

deterrence will be sufficient. Even without assuming that rogue state leaders are irrational, it is difficult to know how leaders such as Kim Jong Il or

Saddam Hussein calculate risks and gains, particularly if regime survival

were at stake and they felt their backs were against the wall. Even without

actual use of ballistic missiles against the United States, the threat of use

by rogue states might be able to keep the United States from intervening

or reinforcing deployed forces. This worldview sees an inherent connection between U.S. involvement in the world and the power projection that

goes with that, and the resulting need for NMD. If the United States is to

continue to have worldwide commitments and be out in the world, it is

likely to incur the wrath of regimes who do not like U.S. “interference.”34

A proliferant’s threat of use of ballistic missiles—and the prospect of

massive deaths of noncombatants on U.S. soil because of potential U.S.

involvement in a far-away situation—could be a powerful deterrent to

U.S. involvement. In this view, it may be that a “good enough” U.S. ballistic missile defense is a small deployment that deflects the threat of use, reassuring the U.S. public that it is not risking Chicago or Los Angeles to an

angry proliferant if the United States projects power into the proliferant’s

neighborhood. In all the options that include NMD, missile defenses

would not be the only tool for dealing with such threats; nuclear and conventional offensive deterrence would still play a role even if one were not

confident that it is sufficient by itself. In this view, the United States could
338 QDR 2001

afford to have less confidence in any one of the capabilities if it has complementary and reinforcing capabilities.35

Russia

Russian officials have said that with any level of U.S. NMD—light or

heavy—they would abandon the START process.36 They have also indicated they might withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces Treaty, which banned all U.S. and Soviet land-based ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in the 500–5,500 kilometer

range. Even if the Russians withdrew from arms control agreements, it

appears to be increasingly economically difficult for them to maintain

large nuclear forces (especially in the near-to medium-term), although

they might keep MIRVs as long as possible, possibly even past the safe

lifetime of systems. They might also put more of their limited resources

into nuclear forces. It has also been suggested they might also sell ballistic

missile or countermeasure technology to rogues. On the other hand,

some suggest that Russia eventually will see that reaching an agreement

with the United States on offenses and defenses is in its interests, given

the declines in Russian nuclear forces forced by economic pressures and

its interest in getting limits on U.S. defenses.37 Others suggest that the

Russians may wait until they are sure that the United States is going ahead

with missile defenses before they negotiate seriously.38

The option for heavy NMD/medium SNF is the one most likely to

trouble worst-case defense planners in Russia who might worry about a

theoretical disarming U.S. first-strike, if there were enough U.S. defenses

to absorb a ragged retaliation with Russia’s remaining nuclear forces. It

would particularly cause them concern if Russia were economically unable to retain more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads, even if there

were no arms control treaty beyond START II. At this level of U.S. NMD,

even if all 1,000 Russian nuclear warheads were survivable and reliable, it

would have no assured deterrence against the United States. The Russians

might respond by putting heavy emphasis on penetration aids or other

countermeasures to eat up U.S. interceptors and assure penetration; they

might also put more emphasis on air delivery if the United States did not

also improve its air defenses.

For strategy alternatives that are more responsive to concerns about

the breakdown of Russia’s strategic command and control system or the

rise of disaffected personnel in the Strategic Rocket Forces (perhaps Strategy F in chapter 5), the question arises as to whether the U.S. NMD system

should be designed against a Russian accidental or unauthorized launch.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 339

The current system is designed to counter the rogue threat and has only

incidental inherent capability to handle a few incoming missiles launched

by accident from Russia or China; it could not handle the numbers that

would be more plausible in an unauthorized launch scenario, from about

ten warheads in a battalion of SS–25s with single reentry vehicles (RVs),

up to 200 warheads for a boatload of SLBMs.39 Both the very light and

light NMD options would be inadequate if an accidental or unauthorized

Russian launch were a driver; for such a scenario, a medium NMD force

might be more appropriate.40

China

Chinese statements indicate that of the U.S. options outlined above,

they would prefer no NMD and minimal SNF.41 China’s most immediate

concern about options that include any level of NMD is likely to be the

erosion of its ability to influence U.S. behavior if it cannot hold the

United States at risk. It is particularly concerned that the United States

might not be deterred from coming to Taiwan’s defense if China used

force to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. They seem to fear that the

more confidence Taiwan has that the United States would intervene on its

behalf, the less restrained it will be in stepping toward independence.

(Chinese concerns about Taiwanese independence and its ability to resist

Chinese coercion—including the threat of use of SRBMs—may be why

China seems to be even more opposed to the United States providing Taiwan with TMD than to U.S. deployment of NMD.)

At very light or light levels of NMD, China may decide to increase its

modernization program further to attain the capability to overwhelm

U.S. defenses. Even 100 U.S. interceptors would be problematic for the

Chinese at their current force levels assumed to be about 20 ICBMs,42

even using the assumptions reportedly used by U.S. defensive planners

(4–5 interceptors required per attacking RV).43 However, while the

United States will be defense-conservative and assume it needs 100 interceptors to have high confidence that none of 20–25 attacking RVs will

get through, Chinese strategic planners will be offense-conservative and

assume that if the United States has 100 interceptors and China has 100

RVs, none of the Chinese RVs might get through. This also applies to the

case of 250 U.S. interceptors and 250 Chinese RVs. Almost any NMD

system capable of defending well against rogue threats will have a significant impact on the Chinese nuclear force from the viewpoint of China’s

offense-conservative planners.
340 QDR 2001

China has long had under way a modernization program that includes

increasing the survivability, range, and accuracy of its nuclear forces.44 It is

likely that China has the capability to deploy MIRVs, although it has not yet

done so.45 A key question is how much China would build up its nuclear

forces, make them more survivable, or MIRV its missiles only in response

to U.S. defenses, and how much it would do in any event.46 If China did

build up its nuclear forces, would it change the overall strategic equation, if

in the end China had approximately the same net nuclear capability over

and above U.S. NMD as it has today absent NMD?47 At what level of NMD

forces—such as the medium or heavy NMD options above—might China

decide not to try to build up to overcome U.S. defenses? Or would it devote

enough resources to overcome defenses at any level?

Apart from NMD, what effect might U.S. nuclear force options have

on Chinese nuclear force levels? For options that include minimal levels

of U.S. strategic nuclear forces (300–500), would the Chinese maintain

their current low levels of strategic forces? How much might they expand

and modernize their forces? Would there be an incentive, for either prestige or security reasons, to build up their nuclear forces equal to or above

U.S. levels? Would the United States make deep cuts without limits on

China’s nuclear forces? These are all questions to be considered by the

United States in making SNF and NMD plans.

India and Pakistan

U.S. NMD deployments and nuclear forces could influence what

India and Pakistan do. If China chose to respond to a U.S. NMD by further increasing its intercontinental nuclear forces, India, a regional rival,

might ratchet up its nuclear forces; this in turn could lead Pakistan to follow suit.48 However, other factors might be more important drivers for

India’s nuclear force decisions, such as China’s more numerous intermediate- and short-range nuclear systems capable of striking India (these

are unrelated to U.S. NMD decisions and possible Chinese decisions

about a buildup of intercontinental nuclear forces).49 Pakistan might also

be more of a driver than China for Indian nuclear force decisions.

Some suggest that reductions of U.S. nuclear forces might set an example to keep India and Pakistan from weaponization and further

buildups. Alternatively, their nuclear decisions may be influenced very little by what the United States does (or does not do) and very much by regional concerns. It is difficult to know what effect U.S. decisions will have

on India and Pakistan, but a considered judgment requires that these

questions be asked.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 341

Allies and Friends

Pacific allies—Australia, Japan, and South Korea—have been less vocal

publicly about their views on NMD, but European allies have raised concerns that U.S. deployment of NMD would jeopardize the ABM Treaty,

upset relations with Russia, and cause a new arms race. Although generally

more skeptical about the rogue state threat, some allies also have raised

questions about whether it would be decoupling for the United States to

have defenses against rogue state ballistic missiles if European allies did

not.50 French and German leaders have been particularly vocal in public

criticism of NMD plans.51 British parliamentarians have cautioned that

the United States “cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK cooperation

with U.S. plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral U.S. abrogation

of the ABM Treaty.” 52 Such cooperation would be needed: U.S. NMD

plans call for upgraded radars at Fylingdales in the United Kingdom, as

well as in Thule, Greenland, which is under Danish control.

In the past, the British and French have expressed concerns about

whether U.S. NMD deployments would prompt higher levels of Russian

defenses, which could undermine the British or French nuclear forces visà-vis Russia. This would seem to be less of a concern with U.S. NMD

against proliferant states, particularly given the Russian economy and the

resulting unlikelihood of a Russian defensive buildup. However, U.S. cooperation with Russia on missile defense might raise these concerns anew.

If the United States chooses a force mix that includes any level of

NMD, it will need to put greater effort into consulting with allies about the

strategic rationale. Some Americans have argued that defenses are an enabler of continued commitments to friends and allies, not a withdrawal

from it, and that the United States is more likely to come to the defense of

allies and of common interests if the homeland is not vulnerable to the use

or threat of use of rogue ballistic missiles.53

U.S. willingness to provide missile defense coverage for allies or to cooperate in their acquisition of defenses may address allied concerns about

decoupling. In many cases, what is TMD for the United States is effectively NMD for allies. A combination of upper and lower-tier TMD systems (such as Theater High-Altitude Area Defense, Navy Theater Wide,

Navy Area Defense, Patriot PAC–3, MEADS, or Airborne Laser) can provide coverage to many smaller countries against the less-than-intercontinental-range missiles that would be targeted at them. The United States

has been discussing possible TMD cooperation with allies for many
342 QDR 2001

years.54 More recently, President Clinton indicated U.S. willingness to

share missile defenses with other “civilized nations.” 55

With regard to strategic nuclear forces, the United States would also

need to consult closely with both NATO and Pacific allies before going to

lower levels, given the long-held U.S. commitment to extend nuclear deterrence to allies.

In the category of friends—such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and

Taiwan, with whom the United States has no formal mutual defense

treaty commitments—there is more ambiguity but some expectation the

United States would come to their defense.56 They might be most concerned about the choices the United States makes about NMD. If the

United States were subject to ballistic missile threats to its homeland, it

might be more likely to be deterred from intervening on behalf of friends

where there is a less formal and more ambiguous commitment than

where vital interests and stakes are clear—that is, on behalf of countries

with whom it has formal treaty commitments.

Getting from Here to There

The discussion above focuses on where the United States might want

to be in the future regarding the offense/defense mix and the possible

consequences in its relationship with other countries. But how to get

there is as important as the destination. How the United States deals with

other countries in reaching its preferred outcome can have a big effect on

how they react.

Three broad categories of options for dealing with other countries include traditional arms control, transparency or cooperative measures, or an

independent, others-be-damned reaction to the security environment. Traditional arms control includes continuing to negotiate treaties, either on

nuclear offensive forces only or on both offenses and defenses. If the decision is to pursue treaties on nuclear forces, a further decision is whether to

continue them as U.S.-Russia only, or to determine at what point in reductions it would make sense to expand them to include China, the United

Kingdom, France, or even India, Pakistan, and Israel. If arms control

treaties on defenses were also pursued, they could be treaties that trade off

offenses and defenses (this might fit in the U.S.-Russia context only—for

example, a treaty that allows a specified number of ballistic missiles, with

freedom to mix SLBMs, ICBMs, and defensive interceptors). They could be

separate but linked treaties (like ABM and SALT I). They could be independent treaties on offenses and defenses that delink the two, on the basis that
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 343

the driving factors for each are different. However, the latter would be difficult, given Russian efforts and motivation to link the two.

An approach based on transparency or cooperative measures, but no

further treaties on offensive or defensive forces, might include a “Global

Protection System” revisited.57 Some have suggested that the time has come

to revive the 1992 U.S. proposal for an international system to share information and possibly defensive technologies and capabilities.58 There were

some similarities with this in President Clinton’s remarks on May 31, 2000,

regarding sharing missile defenses with “civilized nations.” Such a proposal

for cooperation might include building on the agreement reached at the

June 2000 U.S.-Russian summit for joint early warning of missile

launches.59 Other cooperative measures might include the concept put forward by Richard Garwin and Ted Postol on ground-based interceptors in

Russia and elsewhere to catch rogue missiles in boost-phase,60 or the June

2000 proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin to work with NATO to

create “an anti-rocket defense system for Europe.”61 The transparency

approach might involve unilateral U.S. statements regarding plans and

intentions for strategic forces and NMD, encouraging others to follow suit,

but not conditioned on their reciprocating (similar to the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives). It might include declared limits conditioned on

others’ actions: for example, “assuming country A does not increase its offensive forces above N, and country B reduces its forces to R, we will reduce

our nuclear forces to X and limit our national missile defenses to Z.”

The first two approaches—traditional arms control, and transparency

and cooperative measures—are not mutually exclusive and might be

combined by transitioning from existing agreements, retaining aspects of

them, while adding to them or modifying them with other initiatives.

A third approach, in contrast, leaves all countries to undertake their

own independent reactions to the security environment. Each country

does what it believes it needs to do for its own national security (including for its allies and other vital interests) without regard to the actions of

other countries.

Back to the Near Future

Most of the discussion above has looked far ahead. Looking at the near

future instead, what does it all mean for the administration and the next

QDR? The administration needs to make a considered judgment about the

best way to proceed on NMD and SNF in light of its overall strategy and

worldview. In that context, it should consider alternative deterrence futures,
344 QDR 2001

and take a longer view—beyond the next summit or the next election—of

where the United States should be headed with regard to the emphasis it

places on offenses and defenses and the proper mix of forces. It will also

need to consider all of the relevant factors and potential consequences, instead of addressing them piecemeal, and should develop a plan for dealing

with other countries—allies, potential adversaries, and those in between—

in getting to the preferred future. Such a review needs to be conducted early

in a new administration, whether in the QDR or in a separate review.

Notes1 <www.whitehouse.gov/library/hot_releases/September_1_2000_2.html>.

2 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Requirements, May 23, 2000; interview with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen by Katie Couric on NBC’s

Today Show, May 29, 2000, as reported in “For the Record,” The Washington Post, May 31, 2000, 26.

On Russian debate, see Nikolai Sokov, “A Conflict Of Strategic Interests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 2, 2000.

3 See, for example, John M. Broder, “Breaking the Cold War Mold,” The New York Times, May

26, 2000, 1.

4 The House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

(H.R. 4205 and S. 2550) include a requirement (section 1015 in each bill) that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress on the results of a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear posture

for the next 5 to 10 years.

5 A “strategic posture review” could logically be widened to include such “strategic” capabilities

as conventional precision-guided munitions or other nonnuclear capabilities, information operations, special operations, and potentially space assurance. In essence, it would address the question of

what messy future “strategic” situations the United States might face, and how to cut across traditional organization structures to provide the President with a range of options to deal with them.

6 START II prohibits MIRVed land-based missiles, so the United States will eliminate 50 tenwarhead Peacekeeper missiles and download the three-warhead Minuteman IIIs to one warhead

when START II enters into force. There are currently 18 SSBNs, with a combination of C–4 and D–5

missiles. A decision was made in 1999, however, to reduce the SSBN force to 14 submarines even

without START II entry into force. The NPR stated that 66 B–52s were required—a number the Air

Force subsequently changed to 71, then to 76, to have sufficient assets to keep 56 B–52s flying; Congress has mandated retention of 94 B–52s. The original NPR decision was for 20 B–2s; an additional

B–2 was subsequently added.

7 It is unclear that much of that would be saved in the short term, even if the programs were

terminated, given the costs of contract termination. The FY01 budget submission included $464 million in the procurement account for Trident II ballistic missiles, to backfit SSBNs with the D–5, and

$42 million for ICBM replacement equipment. If there were a problem with START II entry into

force and the United States decided to maintain the Peacekeeper missile, DOD would at some point

need either to reopen the production line or to cannibalize the force to have assets for reliability tests.

However, the need for such a decision is not imminent.

8 David Mosher, in Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early

21st Century, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming 2001).

Mosher also notes that “As a result of U.S. (and possibly Russian) concerns about survivability, future

treaties will probably reduce the number of warheads carried on submarines, but not require significant cuts to the Trident force. Even in the case of deep cuts, the United States will likely insist on retaining at least ten submarines in order to ensure—for survivability and targeting reasons—that it

can keep at least three or four submarines at sea all the time, with at least one in each ocean. If the

Trident force is cut to 10, savings would amount to less than $500 million a year because the cost of
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 345

operating the force is driven by the infrastructure necessary to support the submarines and the

weapon system; it is relatively insensitive to the number of submarines in the force. If all 500 ICBMs

are eliminated, savings would not be much more than $1 billion a year through 2020. Reducing the

number of nuclear-capable bombers will not save any money because the size of the bomber force

after the Cold War is driven by the increasing demand for bombers in conventional (non-nuclear)

conflicts. . . . In short, as long as the United States continues to be a nuclear power, keep submarinelaunched ballistic missiles at sea, maintain a robust early-warning network and command and control system, and pursue a science-based stockpile stewardship program, the price tag for nuclear

forces will not fall much below where it is today, even if forces are slashed to 1,000 weapons.”

9 Figures from A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, December

1999, 4.

10 There have been shifts from the original 1983 Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative vision to

make ballistic missiles “impotent and obsolete”; to the 1985 Phase I/II system with space-based lasers

to defend against Soviet systems; to the 1991 Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system with

ground and space-based kinetic-kill interceptors; to the 1993 deemphasis of NMD to make theater

missile defense (TMD) the number-one missile defense priority; to the 1996 “three-plus-three” plan,

which evolved into the Clinton administration plans for a limited ground-based NMD. With so many

changes in objectives, plans, and systems, it is no wonder that $40 billion–60 billion has been spent

with no deployments to show for it and that the Russians are dubious about U.S. assurances that current NMD plans will not affect their nuclear deterrent, since U.S. plans may change.

11 Some analysts have stated that “a political consensus now exists that a limited [NMD] system

provides a necessary answer to the emerging ballistic missile threat from the so-called rogue states,”

and that the question before U.S. policymakers is thus “not whether to deploy an NMD system but

how.” See Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier, and James M. Lindsay, “Deploying NMD: Not

Whether, But How,” Survival 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 6.

12 Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the

U.S. (the Rumsfeld Report), July 15, 1998. Available at the Government Printing Office website:

<ftp://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/gpo_bbs/cia/bmt.htm>.

13 Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security,”

March 21, 2000.

14 Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Statement for the record to the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal

Services on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, February 9, 2000.

15 See, for example, remarks by Joseph Cirincione, “Evaluating the Criteria for NMD Deployment,” Arms Control Today, April 2000, at <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/april00/panap00.htm>.

16 See, for example, comments by Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Steve Fetter, and Joseph Cirincione in

“Evaluating the Criteria for NMD Deployment,” Arms Control Today, April 2000. See also Lawyers’ Alliance for World Security, White Paper on National Missile Defense, April 2000, available at

<www.gsinstitute.org/laws.pdf>.

17 The description of Clinton administration NMD plans is from testimony by Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe to the House Armed Services Committee, October 13, 1999.

Slocombe’s testimony divides the administration plan into Phase I and Phase II, the terminology used

for ABM Treaty discussions with the Russians.

18 Congressional Budget Office paper, “Budgetary Implications of the Administration’s Plan for

National Missile Defense,”April 2000.

19 This chapter focuses on nation-states and does not explicitly address nonstate actors or terrorists, since there appears to be little if any role for nuclear and missile defense forces in dealing with

nonstate terrorists.

20 Walter B. Slocombe, Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 23, 2000.

Slocombe was discussing the combination of limited NMD and “deterrence by retaliation” in dealing

with rogue states armed with WMD.
346 QDR 2001

21 Slocombe said: “our [NMD] system is designed with respect to rogue states. . . . It is not aimed

at China or Russia or any other country, other than the rogue states.” DOD News Briefing, January

27, 2000, <www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Jan2000/t01272000_t0127asd.html>.

22 For example, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R–NC) reportedly

said that “leaving the American people vulnerable to Beijing’s nuclear blackmail is a threat to U.S. national security.” See Miles A. Pomper, “The International Fallout of an Anti-Missile System,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, August 12, 2000. See also Steven Mufson, “In GOP, a Backstage Struggle on

China Policy,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2000, A10: “Other Republicans believe that a missile

defense should guard against China. They fear China might try to blackmail U.S. aid for Taiwan in

the event of a confrontation there.” On the other hand, Mufson quotes Condoleezza Rice, President

Bush’s National Security Advisor, as saying that, “I don’t think China is going to modernize enough—

if we keep our nuke secrets to ourselves—to be a threat to our deterrent capabilities. It can modernize

enough to threaten our missile defenses, but I’m not putting China in a category of states that would

try to blackmail the United States.”

23 Interfax News Service, November 13, 2000.

24 See David C. Gompert and Jeffrey A. Isaacson, “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of

Systems,” RAND Issue Paper 181 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

25 For further discussion of sea-based and other complementary or alternative NMD capabilities, see John M. Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, “National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?” Foreign Policy, no. 119 (Summer 2000); Frank Morring, Jr., “DOD Considering AegisBased System For Down-The-Road Missile Defense,” Aerospace Daily, August 28, 2000; James Glanz,

“Other Systems Might Provide a U.S. Missile Shield,” The New York Times, September 4, 2000, 1, and

Gompert and Isaacson, “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems.”

26 Some have facetiously made a “modest proposal” for eliminating nuclear weapons that includes lobotomizing all nuclear scientists worldwide.

27 For further discussion of the difficulties of “going to zero” in the foreseeable future, see testimony by Walter B. Slocombe before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International

Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Hearing on Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence, February

12, 1997.

28 For example, these categories were explicit in the targeting plans produced as a result of the

1974 National Security Decision Memorandum 242, which continued the refinement of deterrence

concepts already under review since the early 1960s. For further discussion of this and other aspects

of nuclear history, see Michael O. Wheeler, “The Development of Arms Control Strategy and Arms

Control,” prepared as an annex to his paper, “The Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control,”

for a National War College conference on nuclear deterrence held June 29, 2000, in Washington, DC.

Cited by permission of the author.

29 For further discussion of this issue, see Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 23, 2000, particularly the statements by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Command,

Admiral Rich Mies, and Senator Carl Levin.

30 “The evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy . . . has, since the 1940s, been in the direction of seeking options which provide a president something other than wholesale destruction of an enemy’s

major cities if deterrence fails....Sustaining deterrence as we know it today . . . has been an effort to

move away from that as the only option. It is unclear how deeply we can cut U.S. nuclear forces without having to resort to something like an uninhibited city-busting strategy as the only targeting strategy which could be credible to the enemy. Sustaining deterrence under those conditions would cause

a deep crisis in American values over time.” Wheeler, “The Development of Arms Control Strategy

and Arms Control,” 7.

31 For instance, a very small U.S. nuclear force, or one deployed in a limited number of sites and

with no defenses, could make an adversary believe that in a crisis it could wipe out a large portion of

U.S. nuclear forces, even with a small number of warheads. This would also tend to make a U.S. president quicker to “launch before losing” all or a substantial portion of U.S. nuclear forces.

32 Tactical nuclear weapons are relatively small, short-range systems designed for use in battlefield or theater-level operations. These weapons have not been covered by strategic arms control
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 347

agreements or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; they are subject only to the unilateral

declarations made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. According to DOD charts released at

the conclusion of the NPR in 1994, Russia at that time had approximately three times as many active

and inactive non-strategic nuclear weapons as did the United States. For further discussion of possible restraints on these weapons, see William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons That

People Forgot,” International Herald Tribune, May 31, 2000.

33 The Senate version of the FY2001 defense authorization bill calls for the Secretary of Defense,

with the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a study to assess both current and future options to defeat

hardened and deeply buried targets as well as weapons to minimize the effects of WMD.

34 “Reducing the odds of attacks in the United States might require pulling back from involvement in some foreign conflicts. American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability.” Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998).

35 For some time, the consensus has been that, in the face of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, TMD made sense as part of a set of capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats to deployed

U.S. forces and allies. The question is whether the same logic applies to NMD and proliferant or

rogue states. This mix of capabilities would be present in any of the options that include both NMD

and nuclear forces (that is, all but the first three).

36 See, for example, Igor Ivanov, “The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability

and the ABM Treaty,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 5 (September/October 2000). Russian Foreign Minister

Ivanov writes, “If the United States unilaterally withdraws from the ABM treaty, Russia will no longer

be formally bound by its obligations to reduce strategic armaments, and the very process of nuclear

disarmament will be inevitably terminated, if not reversed.”

37 The current debate in Russia between the factions of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who wants

to maintain and modernize the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, who wants

to reduce strategic forces drastically and refocus resources on building more conventional military

forces, would suggest that there are economic pressures for Russia to go to lower nuclear levels. See

“Putin Tries Big Shift In Military Strategy,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 2000, 1. Kvashnin

reportedly recommended that the number of Russian ICBMs should be limited to 150. Sergeyev and

Strategic Rocket Forces Commander-in-Chief Yakovlev said Kvashnin’s proposal would deprive Russia

of a meaningful response to the U.S. NMD system, and added that accelerated elimination of ICBMs

would result in significant short-term costs. See Nikolai Sokov, “A Conflict of Strategic Interests,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, August 2, 2000.

38 There is a precedent for this in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations: as long

as it looked like the United States and NATO might not actually deploy Pershing IIs and Ground

Launched Cruise Missiles (because of internal politics, protesters marching in Europe, and flight-test

failures), there was little incentive for the Soviets to reach an agreement.

39 See Dean A. Wilkening, “How Much Ballistic Missile Defense is Enough?” working paper,

Center for International Security and Cooperation, October 1998, 6.

40 This level is comparable to the 1992 Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system, which

was sized to the threat of accidental or unauthorized launch of a Russian boatload.

41 See, for example, Erik Eckholm, “China Says U.S. Missile Shield Could Force an Arms

Buildup,” The New York Times, May 11, 2000: “China’s chief arms negotiator [Sha Zukang] said today

that the American proposal to build an anti-missile defensive shield posed an unacceptable threat to

China’s security and could force Beijing to significantly expand its own nuclear forces in response.”

Sha is further quoted as saying, “To defeat your defenses, we’ll have to spend a lot of money, and we

don’t want to do this.” With regard to nuclear weapons, China has said that, “The major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals

should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles.” See the Chinese white paper,

“China’s National Defense,” by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

China, July 27, 1998, 27.

42 See Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., in The United States and a Rising China (Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, 1999), 39.
348 QDR 2001

43 See “talking points” on the ABM Treaty, said to have been used by U.S. negotiator John Holum

with Russian officials in Moscow in January 2000, reprinted on The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/treaty_doc.html>. However, a Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization spokesman said the ratio of interceptors to warheads remains classified. See John M.

Donnelly, “U.S. Told Russia About Classified Antimissile Capabilities,” Defense Week, May 1, 2000.

44 See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy (Santa Monica,

CA: RAND, 2000), 121–123.

45 See Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China,55.

46 One press report on a still-classified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding reactions to NMD deployment states, “The intelligence report said that while China did not want to become engaged in a costly arms race, if the United States deployed a national missile defense system,

China was more likely to increase its arsenal of missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads.” See

Tabassum Zakaria, “U.S. Intelligence Assesses Global NMD Reaction,” Reuters, August 8, 2000. See

also Roberto Suro, “Study Sees Possible China Nuclear Buildup,” The Washington Post, August 10,

2000: “China, the study concludes, already is working to modernize and modestly expand its strategic

force of some 20 fixed-silo, single-warhead intercontinental missiles. But, in response to the creation

of a U.S. missile shield, China probably would try to develop both mobile and multiple-warhead

weapons, expanding its force to as many as 200 warheads to be able to overwhelm the American defenses, the officials said.” See also Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Missile Plan Could Reportedly Provoke

China,” The New York Times, August 10, 2000; and Bob Drogin and Tyler Marshall, “Missile Shield

Analysis Warns Of Arms Buildup,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2000, 1.

47 Condoleezza Rice reportedly “could envision China expanding its nuclear missile arsenal beyond its current level of about two dozen to more than 100 without fundamentally changing U.S. nuclear strategy.” Steven Mufson, “In GOP, a Backstage Struggle on China Policy,” The Washington Post,

August 22, 2000, A10.

48 See, for example, Gaurav Kampani, “How a U.S. National Missile Defense Will Affect South

Asia,” May 2000, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies;

and editorial, “Missile Defense Could Be Provocation,” Omaha World Herald, May 26, 2000.

49 See Gregory S. Jones, “From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing

India and Pakistan,” RAND issue paper, Project Air Force, IP–192 (2000). Jones notes (3) that “Compared with India, China has formidable nuclear forces. China is believed to have deployed some 125

long-range (1700 km or greater) nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. . . . In addition, China is believed

to have some 150 bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons and 120 tactical nuclear weapons deliverable

by short-range missiles or artillery. An attack using just a small part of this force could have a devastating effect on an Indian nuclear force.”

50 For example, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine said, “There are members of the alliance who wonder if this won’t lead to unequal security. If there is a real threat, why are you protecting only yourselves?” Quoted in Jane Perlez, “Antimissile Defenses: Clinton Decides To Keep U.S. Options Open,” The New York Times, September 2, 2000.

51 See for example, Christopher Lockwood and Marcus Warren, “Clinton Plea as Missile Plan

Splits NATO Allies,” London Daily Telegraph, June 6, 2000, 1; and Roy Gutman, “Institute Blasts U.S.

Defense Plan: NATO–U.S. rift grows in ‘unnecessary’ step,” Long Island Newsday, May 7, 2000, 21.

52 UK Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report and Proceedings, HC 407, <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/407/40702.htm>.

53 For example, Henry Kissinger has said that a system that protected America against limited

nuclear attacks would “enhance rather than diminish our willingness to defend our allies.” See Perlez,

“Antimissile Defenses.”

54 For example, in 1995, NATO adopted a framework for extended air defense as part of the

NATO Defense Group on Proliferation, and the Conference of NATO Armaments Directors has conducted numerous studies of TMD over the past decade. Discussions with Japan led to a decision in

1998 to cooperate on the Navy theater wide system.

55 See, for example, CNN.com, “Clinton offers to share missile defense technology,” May 31, 2000.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 349

56 Israel has been working on missile defense for over a decade and recently began deployment

of the Arrow missile defense system, which resulted from a joint U.S.-Israeli RDT&E program.

57 For a description of the 1992 Global Protection System proposal, see the statement of Stephen

J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Hearing of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, on “Programs and Architectures for Ballistic Missile Defense,” May 20, 1992.

58 See, for example, Carla Anne Robbins, “Bipartisan Thinkers Look Past Traditional Arms Control,” The Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2000, 28.

59 “Russia–United States Memorandum of Agreement on Establishment of a Joint Center for

Early Warning Systems Data Exchange and Missile Launch Notifications,” Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents, Washington, DC, June 12, 2000.

60 Theodore A. Postol, “A Preliminary Analysis of a Russian-U.S. Boost-Phase Defense to Defend

Russia and the U.S. from Postulated Rogue-State ICBMs,” presented to the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Proliferation Roundtable, October 12, 1999, available at website

<www.ceip.org/programs/npp/postol.htm>; and Richard L. Garwin, “A Defense That Will Not Defend,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000.

61 See Alessandra Stanley, “Putin Goes to Rome to Promote Russian Arms Control Alternative,”

The New York Times, June 6, 2000, 1.
Chapter Thirteen

Choosing among StrategyDriven Integrated Paths:

Setting the DOD Course

by Michèle A. Flournoy

One of the principal challenges for the new administration in the

2001 QDR will be ensuring that the dozens, if not hundreds, of

decisions it will make over the course of the review are consistent

with its chosen strategy rather than ad hoc. The administration will need

a framework that relates specific choices back both to its defense strategy

and to the iron triangle—the choice between spending more on defense,

cutting costs, or asking the U.S. military to do less. It will need to develop

a strategy-driven, integrated path that knits together the broad policy and

programmatic choices consistent with its chosen strategy.

What follows is a description and comparison of four strategy-driven, integrated paths, based on four of the principal strategy alternatives

described in chapter 5. Each of these integrated paths describes what a

strategy looks like if fully funded and identifies what is in the potential

tradespace if it is not fully funded. In addition, we offer a set of key indicators of a strategy-resources gap that would force a fundamental decision to increase the resources available for defense, create more tradespace by changing some of the political constraints affecting what can be

put on the table, or change the strategy. While this project did not have

the resources to develop fully or to cost out the elements of each integrated path, we offer principles to guide decisions in each key area.

Each integrated path includes several significant elements; each of these

key elements is described in two different resource contexts. The context of

full funding—that is, resources are relatively unconstrained—describes the

principles that would guide decisions in a given area if the strategy were

provided with all the resources necessary to achieve a low level of risk. The

second context, where resources are constrained, describes the candidates

351
352 QDR 2001

for the tradespace—approaches to consider to reduce costs in a given area

while aiming for a low-to-moderate level of risk. Even if a given approach is

included in the potential tradespace column, this does not imply that it

would necessarily save meaningful amounts of money while yielding no

more than moderate risk. Its inclusion means only that it has that potential,

appears to be consistent with the strategy, and is worthy of more in-depth

examination in the QDR. (Each key element of the integrated path is described in greater detail and in the tables found on pages 354–61.)

The category of key policies and assumptions presents a given strategy’s priority missions, that is, where it places emphasis. How many

major theater wars should U.S. forces be prepared to conduct? What endstate objectives are envisioned? What is the concept of operations in

MTWs? This element also encompasses the degree to which U.S. forces

should be involved in presence, engagement, and SSCs; assumptions

about the proportion of U.S. forces that would disengage from SSCs to

redeploy to MTWs; and the degree and priority of DOD support to civilian agencies for homeland security.

The force structure element describes the methodology that might be

used to design a low-risk force structure and identifies capability shortfalls that a given strategy would seek to address. It also suggests some of

the force structure and capability tradeoffs that might be considered

under a given strategy to reduce force structure costs while trying not to

incur more than moderate risk.

The modernization element reflects how a given strategy would prioritize investment in science and technology, research and development,

procurement, new starts, and concept development and experimentation

efforts, as well as the approaches it would consider to reduce the costs of

meeting its modernization goals in a resource-constrained environment.

The force manning element of the integrated path lays out the principles that would be used to determine how the force should be manned in

accordance with the priorities of the strategy. Manning refers to the degree to which the billets or spaces in a given unit or organization are actually filled with people. If a unit has fewer people than its organizational

table would suggest, it is undermanned; if it has more, it is overmanned.

This element considers manning for units in warplans, the rotation base

of units that support peacetime operations, high-demand units, and the

force generation base. In the tradespace, this element addresses ways of

reducing demands on active-duty forces.
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 353

Force management deals with policies governing the management of

the Armed Forces in peacetime to meet a strategy’s objectives. This includes approaches to meeting peacetime demands while dealing with

considerations of service tempo rules for both units and personnel; the

flexibility of the force and the degree of tolerance for force substitutions;

alternative basing and rotation concepts; and different approaches to theater engagement plans.

The readiness element articulates the set of standards that a given

strategy would establish in the areas of manning, training, equipment,

and infrastructure under different resource constraints.

In the people/quality of life element, principles that would govern

policies on military pay, housing, quality of bases and facilities, healthcare, pensions and retiree benefits, and family programs are identified for

both the resource-constrained and the resource-unconstrained contexts.

The other element of the integrated path highlights a strategy’s general approach to a select number of other important elements of the defense program, such as strategic nuclear forces, the nuclear labs and

stockpile stewardship capability, counterproliferation programs, the

strategic reserve, infrastructure, and DOD business practices.

Differences among the Strategies

Some factors distinguish one strategy-driven integrated path from

another, while other factors are common to most or all of them. The factors that distinguish one path from another are primarily in the areas of

key policies and assumptions (reflecting the different mission priorities of

the strategies), force structure (particularly in identifying potential tradespace areas), and modernization (both priorities, if fully resourced, and

potential tradeoffs, if not).1

Key Policies

In the absence of resource constraints, all four strategies would call

on U.S. forces to be able, among other things, to fight and win two major

wars with only a low level of risk. Strategy B would likely consider new

concepts of operations for achieving that end. In a resource-constrained

environment, all four strategies would consider accepting low-to-moderate levels of risk in this area. Strategy A and Strategy C would maintain

the current two-MTW standard, while Strategy B might consider adopting a different end-state objective or concept of operations in one of the
354 QDR 2001 Table 13–1. Strategy A. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now Area Fully resourced (low risk) Potential tradespace (low-to-moderate risk) Key policies Deter/win two MTWs—current endstate and concepts of No change except for SSC disengagement policy of 75% operation; 50% (vice 100%) SSC withdrawal for MTWs; (vice 50%) for MTWs full (current) level of SSCs and engagement; full 

presence; limited DOD homeland security mission

Force structure Conservative and robust approach—two MTWs + 50% Allow dual apportioning, swing; greater reliance on 

SSCs + stay behind presence or rotation-based; correct Reserve components and allies; invest in ISR/precision

shortfalls in ISR/precision munitions, lift, support force, munitions and other enhancements to reduce platforms/and chemical, biological, and radiological detection and units; eliminate and/or convert less critical forces, decontamination; expanded ability to support homeland including in strategic reservesecurity when committed to MTWs

Modernization Full acquisition funding; increase funding of basic science Forego/slow select new systems buys; increase ISR/

and technology, research and development, concept precision munitions to reduce platforms; use greater development and experimentation, and new starts hedging; leverage programs of allies

Force manning Full manning of warplans/rotation base; greater manning Less than full manning; greater use of Reserve component

in high-demand elements augmentation; initiatives to civilianize military functions

Force management Rotational rules that allow predictability within service No changes to rotation rules; greater use of substitutions; 

tempo rules; allow for substitutions without difficulty; global resourcing of more selective theater engagement prioritized, predictable theater engagement plans plans; new concepts for presence (basing, rotations, etc.)

Readiness 100% manning of warplan units, greater for high Full manning of key units, no overmanning; resource 

demand; resource optimum training; full funding of essential training; fund maintenance and infrastructure 

maintenance and infrastructure (C-1) at lower levels (C-1/C-2)
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 355

Personnel Improve pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and Maintain current levels of pay, housing, medical, 

family programs retirement, bases, and family programs;

seek efficiencies

Other areas Sustain nuclear forces; exercise robust nuclear Reduce size and readiness of nuclear forces; sustain 

stewardship; expand counterproliferation nuclear stewardship and counterproliferation efforts;

reduce infrastructure

Key indicators for a fundamental review of this strategy and its resourcing:

Inability to resource both MTWs at moderate risk (that is, capability and/or readiness shortfalls are clearly evident)Inability to sustain presence, engagement, and SSCs without unacceptable tempo levelsInability to support homeland security missions and two MTWs concurrently at moderate riskChronic inability to meet modernization funding objectives (that is, inability to meet most urgent recapitalization needs and/or having 

to cancel needed programs to fund others)

Inability to fund high-priority new startsInability to sustain suitable levels of concept development and experimentationInability to cope with technical surprise or emergency threatsChronic inability to meet recruiting and retention goalsDeterioration of morale and quality of lifeInability to maintain a credible, secure, and safe nuclear deterrent
356 QDR 2001 Table 13–2. Strategy B. Engage More Selectively and Accelerate Transformation Area Fully resourced (low risk) Potential tradespace (low-to-moderate risk) Key policies Deter/win two MTWs—current endstate and current or Deter/win two MTWs—one with limited endstate; SSC new concepts of operation; 50% (vice 100%) SSC disengagement policy of 75% (vice 50%) for MTWs; withdrawal for MTWs; selective SSCs/engagement; selective SSCs/engagement and presence; limited DOD 

full presence; limited DOD homeland security mission homeland security mission

Force structure Conservative and robust approach—two MTWs + 50% Size for MTWs, transformation, and homeland security

SSC + stay behind presence or rotation-based; correct only (all else lesser-included); invest in ISR/precision 

shortfalls in ISR/precision munitions, lift, support force, munitions and other enhancements to reduce platforms; and chemical, biological, and radiological detection and allow dual apportioning, swing; greater reliance decontamination; expanded ability to support homeland on Reserve components and allies; eliminate and/or security when committed to MTWs convert less critical forces, including in strategic reserve

Modernization Increase funding of basic science and technology, Focused investing in generation after next systems, with 

research and development, concept development and higher science and technology, research and development;experimentation focused on transformation; fully fund forego/slow systems that do not support transformation; acquisition; increase new start funding leverage programs of allies

Force manning Full manning of warplans/rotation base; greater manning Less than full manning, including rotation base; greater 

in high-demand elements use of Reserve component augmentation; initiatives to 

civilianize military functions

Force management Policies that allow readiness and predictability within Greater use of substitutions; global resourcing of more

service tempo rules; allow for substitutions without selective theater engagement plans; new concepts for 

difficulty; prioritized, predictable theater engagement plans presence (basing, rotations, etc.)
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 357

Readiness 100% manning of warplan units, greater for high Full manning of key units, no overmanning; resource 

demand; resource optimum training; full funding of essential training; fund maintenance and infrastructure maintenance and infrastructure (C-1) at lower levels (C-1/C-2)

Personnel Improve pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and Maintain pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and 

family programs family programs; seek efficiencies

Other areas Sustain nuclear forces; exercise robust nuclear Reduce size and readiness of nuclear forces; sustain 

stewardship; expand counterproliferation nuclear stewardship and counterproliferation efforts;

reduce infrastructure

Key indicators for a fundamental review of this strategy and its resourcing:

Inability to sustain suitable levels of science and technology, research and development, concept development, and experimentationInability to fund high-priority new startsChronic inability to meet modernization funding objectives (that is, inability to meet most urgent recapitalization needs and/or having 

to cancel needed programs to fund other)

Inability to cope with technical surprise or emerging threatsInability to resource both MTWs as envisioned at moderate risk (that is, capability and/or readiness shortfalls are clearly evident)

Inability to support homeland security missions and two MTWs concurrently at moderate riskInability to sustain presence, engagement, and SSCs without unacceptable tempo levelsChronic inability to meet recruiting and retention goalsDeterioration of morale and quality of lifeInability to maintain a credible, secure, and safe nuclear deterrent
358 QDR 2001 Table 13–3. Strategy C. Engage More Selectively and Strengthen Warfighting Capability Area Fully resourced (low risk) Potential tradespace (low-to-moderate risk) Key policies Deter/win two MTWs—current endstate/concepts of No change except for SSC disengagement policy of 75% operation; 50% (vice 100%) SSC withdrawal for MTWs; (vice 50%) for MTWs and more selective presence selective level of SSCs/engagement; full presence; 

limited homeland DOD security mission

Force structure Conservative and robust approach—two MTWs + 50% Size for MTWs only (all else lesser-included); invest in 

SSCs + stay behind presence or rotation-based; correct critical enhancements to reduce platforms; eliminate

shortfalls in ISR/precision munitions, lift, support force, and/or convert less critical forces, including in strategic and chemical, biological, and radiological detection and reserve; allow dual apportioning, swing; greater reliance decontamination; expanded ability to support homeland on Reserve components and allies security when committed to MTWs

Modernization Correct warfighting shortfalls; fully fund acquisition; Forego/slow select new systems; increase ISR/precision

increase basic science and technology, research and munitions buys to reduce platforms; maintain science development, concept development and experimentation, and technology, research and development; use greater and new starts hedging; leverage programs of allies

Force manning Full manning of warplans/rotation base; greater manning Less than full manning, including rotation base; greater 

in high-demand elements use of Reserve component augmentation; initiatives to 

civilianize military functions

Force management Policies that allow readiness and predictability within Greater use of substitutions; global resourcing of more

service tempo rules; prioritized, predictable, and selective selective theater engagement plans; new concepts for 

theater engagement plans presence (basing, rotations, etc.)
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 359

Readiness 100% manning of warplan units, greater for high Full manning of key units, no overmanning; resource 

demand; resource optimum training; full funding of essential training; fund maintenance and infrastructure maintenance and infrastructure (C-1) at lower levels (C-1/C-2)

Personnel Improve pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and Maintain pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and 

family programs family programs; seek efficiencies

Other areas Sustain nuclear forces; exercise robust nuclear Reduce size and readiness of nuclear forces; sustain 

stewardship; expand counterproliferation nuclear stewardship and counterproliferation efforts; 

reduce infrastructure

Key indicators for a fundamental review of this strategy and its resourcing:

Inability to resource both MTWs at moderate risk (that is, capability and/or readiness shortfalls are clearly evident)Inability to sustain presence, engagement, and SSCs without unacceptable tempo levelsInability to support homeland security missions and two MTWs concurrently at moderate riskChronic inability to meet modernization funding objectives (that is, inability to meet most urgent recapitalization needs and/or having 

to cancel needed programs to fund others)

Inability to fund high-priority new startsInability to sustain suitable levels of concept development and experimentationInability to cope with technical surprise or emergency threatsChronic inability to meet recruiting and retention goalsDeterioration of morale and quality of lifeInability to maintain a credible, secure, and safe nuclear deterrent
360 QDR 2001 Table 13–4. Strategy D. Engage Today to Prevent Conflict Tomorrow Area Fully resourced (low risk) Potential tradespace (low-to-moderate risk) Key policies Deter/win two MTWs—current endstate and concepts Expanded levels of SSC/engagement and presence to of operation; 25% (vice 100%) SSC withdrawal for MTWs; deter/prevent conflict (including a second MTW); defeat expanded levels of SSCs, engagement and presence; aggression in one MTW; SSC disengagement policy of 

limited DOD homeland security mission 50% (vice 25%)

Force structure Conservative and robust approach—two MTWs + 75% SSCs + Size for expanded levels of presence, SSCs, and 

stay behind presence or rotation-based; correct shortfalls engagement and one MTW (second is lesser-included

in ISR/precision munitions, lift, support force, and chemical, case); adjust presence concepts of operation to require biological, and radiological detection and decontamination; fewer forces; greater reliance on allies; eliminate and/or expanded ability to support homeland security convert less critical forces, including in strategic reservewhen in MTWs

Modernization Full acquisition funding; increase funding for basic science Forego/slow select new systems buys; greater use of 

and technology, research and development, and concept hedging; leverage programs of allies; invest in development and experimentation (for low-end interoperability with alliestransformation)

Force manning Fully man units in rotation base and warplans; greater Less than full manning of warplan units (late deployers); 

manning in high-demand elements greater use of Reserve component augmentation; 

initiatives to civilianize functions

Force management Rotational rules that allow predictability within service Some rotation rules; greater use of substitutions; 

tempo rules; allow for substitutions without difficulty; global resourcing of more selective theater engagement 

prioritized, predictable theater engagement plans plans; new concepts for presence (basing, rotations, etc.)
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 361

Readiness 100% manning of SSC/presence and warplan units, Fully man SSC/presence and key warplan units only; 

greater for high demand; resource optimum training, full resource essential training; fund maintenance and maintenance, and infrastructure (C-1) infrastructure at lower levels (C-1/C-2)

Personnel Improve pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and Maintain pay, housing, medical, retirement, bases, and 

family programs family programs; seek efficiencies

Other areas Sustain nuclear forces; exercise robust nuclear Reduce size and readiness of nuclear forces; sustain 

stewardship; expand counterproliferation nuclear stewardship and counterproliferation efforts; 

reduce infrastructure

Key indicators for a fundamental review of this strategy and its resourcing:

Inability to sustain expanded presence, engagement, and SSCs without unacceptable tempo levelsInability to resource one MTW at moderate risk (that is, capability and/or readiness shortfalls are clearly evident)Inability to support homeland security missions, other peacetime demands, and one MTW concurrently at moderate riskChronic inability to meet modernization funding objectives (that is, inability to meet most urgent recapitalization needs)Inability to fund high-priority new startsInability to sustain modest levels of concept development and experimentationInability to cope with technical surprise or emerging threatsChronic inability to meet recruiting and retention goalsDeterioration of morale and quality of lifeInability to maintain a credible, secure, and safe nuclear deterrent
362 QDR 2001

MTWs, and Strategy D would likely eliminate the requirement to be able

to prosecute a second MTW.

Given unconstrained resources, Strategy A would maintain current

levels of U.S. military involvement in presence, engagement, and SSCs;

Strategies B and C would adopt a more selective approach to engagement

and SSCs (but not overseas presence); and Strategy D would expand U.S.

military involvement in all of these areas. In a resource-constrained environment, these strategies would make different tradeoffs. Neither Strategy

A nor D would reduce its levels of commitment to presence, engagement,

and SSCs. By contrast, the two strategies that seek to be more selectively

engaged (B and C) might reduce either the level of overseas presence or

the resources devoted to presence.

With regard to policy governing the disengagement of U.S. forces from

SSCs to be redeployed to MTWs, in a resource-rich environment all of the

strategies would be likely to adopt a more conservative approach than

today’s policy, which expects 100 percent of U.S. forces to be withdrawn

from SSCs and redeployed to MTWs in accordance with CINC timelines.

When sufficient resources are provided to keep risk at a low level, three of

the four strategies (A, B, and C) might call for only 50 percent of the U.S.

forces deployed to SSCs to disengage to go to a major theater war.2 Given

Strategy D’s emphasis on the importance of U.S. involvement in SSCs to

prevent and deter larger conflicts, it might adopt an even more conservative approach, perhaps that only 25 percent of U.S. forces would disengage

and redeploy to an MTW. Similarly, in a resource-constrained environment in which the objective would be to accept no more than a moderate

level of risk, Strategies A, B, and C might adopt the more optimistic assumption that 75 percent of U.S. forces would be able to redeploy to the

MTWs within CINC timelines, while Strategy D might assume that 

50 percent could do so.

All of the strategies call for continued DOD support to homeland security missions, but Strategy B explicitly gives these missions—particularly national missile defense and dealing with terrorism involving

weapons of mass destruction—higher priority than do any of the other

strategies. In the absence of resource constraints, all four strategies would

aim for low risk in this area; in the presence of resource constraints, most

would accept up to a moderate level of risk.

Force Structure

Given full resources, each of the four strategies might use a similar

methodology to develop a low-risk force structure; this is not to say that
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 363

the resulting force structures would be the same, only that the approach

to deriving them would use the same principles in each case.3 Specifically,

to derive a notional low-risk force, the working group used two calculations and adopted the larger of the two resulting forces: Approach 1 tallied forces required to deter and win two overlapping MTWs with low

risk (derived from a broader scenario set), plus forces that would remain

in SSCs, based on the level of SSC involvement consistent with the strategy (current, selective, or expanded) and on the strategy’s most conservative assumptions about disengagement (50 percent or 25 percent of U.S.

forces disengage and redeploy to MTWs), plus forces that would stay behind to provide limited deterrence and response capabilities in unengaged theaters. Approach 2 tallied the rotational forces involved in presence, plus rotational forces involved in SSCs, multiplied by the appropriate

service rotational factor (for example, 4:1 or 5:1).4

In addition to determining the greater of these two measurements, a

number of capability enhancements to address identified warfighting

shortfalls would be considered in such areas as intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance; precision munitions; strategic lift and prepositioning; support forces; and chemical and biological defenses.5 In deriving a

low-risk force, one would also expand the U.S. military’s ability to support homeland security missions concurrently with fighting one or more

major wars abroad; this might involve expanding the pool of specialized

assets that would be tasked for both homeland security and warfighting

missions. One might also consider building additional force structure or

shifting additional units from the Reserve to the active components for

high-demand assets that are most likely to experience operations and personnel tempo strains in peacetime. All in all, this is a very conservative

approach to sizing U.S. conventional forces and would yield force structures significantly larger and more expensive than today’s.

In a resource-constrained environment, the four strategies would take

somewhat different approaches to delineating the force structure tradespace—that is, determining the tradeoffs or approaches to be considered

in an effort to reduce costs while accepting no more than moderate risk.

For Strategies A, B, and C, the tradespace candidates might include both

dual-apportioning and swinging some forces between two different

MTWs; greater reliance on the Reserve components in MTWs; greater reliance on allies in MTWs; increased investment in ISR, precision munitions, and other capability enhancements to increase combat effectiveness

while reducing combat platform and unit requirements; elimination or
364 QDR 2001

conversion of less critical forces to fill higher priority requirements (within

and between services), such as warfighting capability shortfalls or low density/high demand units; and altering the size and composition of the

strategic reserve. Here, the focus is on reducing force structure requirements, primarily through different approaches to meeting the requirements of a second MTW. It should be noted, however, that many of these

approaches are already reflected to some degree in today’s force structure

and planning. In a resource-constrained environment, Strategy B would

add to this list one more candidate: it would size forces just for warfighting, transformation, and homeland security, while treating presence, engagement, and SSCs as lesser included cases. Strategy C would offer a variation on this theme: it would size forces only to meet warfighting

requirements, treating all other missions as lesser included cases.

Strategy D would define the force structure tradespace very differently. It would consider sizing forces for expanded levels of presence, engagement, and SSCs, plus one major theater war, treating a second MTW

as a lesser included case (and effectively dropping the two-MTW standard); modifying concepts of operations for overseas presence to allow

greater use of force substitutions and to reduce the associated force structure requirements; eliminating or converting less critical forces to build

the density of assets that are in highest demand in peacetime; reducing

the size of the strategic reserve; and increasing reliance on allies across the

spectrum of operations, especially in SSCs. Here, the focus is on tailoring

the force to meet peacetime demands while maintaining a core capability

to fight and win a single MTW.

The working group examined many of these issues in detail to determine which ones might merit further development in the QDR. Both the

analytic approach and the results of that effort are described in chapter 8

on key force structure and capability issues.

Modernization

One of the most significant areas of difference among the four strategies is that of modernization. Whether sufficient resources are provided to

keep risk at a low level, or resources are constrained, the strategies offer

markedly different defense investment priorities. Strategies A and C would

balance the objectives of urgent recapitalization for parts of the force with

long-term transformation of the force overall to meet future challenges,

such as the potential rise of a near-peer competitor in 2025 or beyond, or

the nearer-term prospect of the use of antiaccess strategies and asymmetric means by regional adversaries. Both of these strategies would seek to
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 365

balance funding across several competing investment priorities: S&T,

R&D, current acquisition programs, new starts, concept development and

experimentation, and critical warfighting enhancements. In a resourceconstrained environment, both would consider similar candidates to define modernization tradespace, including foregoing or slowing procurement of selected systems and retaining legacy systems with upgrades or

service life extension programs (SLEPs); increasing investment in ISR/precision munitions enhancements and reducing the number of shooter platforms procured; greater use of a hedging approach that would keep some

new systems in the R&D and limited prototyping phase until there was

strategic warning of the threat; and taking advantage of allied R&D and

acquisition efforts in areas in which allies or partners have equivalent or

superior technologies.

In contrast, Strategy B would accelerate funding for more transformational systems—those aimed at maintaining U.S. military superiority

in the face of a future near-peer competitor or a lesser adversary employing antiaccess strategies or asymmetric means. These systems typically

might have some or all of the following characteristics: integrated architecture, extended ranges, reduced manning, increased mobility, enhanced

precision, and stealth. Strategy B would reduce or cancel buys of nontransformational systems, to free up resources for higher priorities, such

as increased investment in S&T, more robust concept development and

experimentation, and new starts, such as national missile defense. In a 

resource-constrained environment, Strategy B would focus on increasing

investment in generation-after-next systems for a smaller but more capable force, including increased S&T, R&D, and concept development and

experimentation; reducing or eliminating investment in selected nextgeneration systems inconsistent with the goals of transformation, while

retaining some legacy systems with upgrades or SLEPs to bridge the gap

to generation-after-next systems; increasing investment in ISR/precision

munitions enhancements while reducing the numbers of shooter platforms being procured; and leveraging the R&D and acquisition efforts of

allies in areas in which they have equivalent or superior technologies.

Strategy D would adopt a very different set of modernization priorities.

It would reduce or cancel buys of more expensive, high-end transformational systems in order to replace aging platforms systematically to maintain a larger force. More specifically, Strategy D would favor procurement

of additional numbers of proven systems, upgrades to existing platforms

and systems, service life extension programs, capability enhancements such
366 QDR 2001

as improvements to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, precision munitions enhancements, and force protection improvements. To the extent that Strategy D would invest in transformation, it would focus on the low end of the

operational spectrum, such as new concepts and capabilities for overseas

presence and smaller-scale contingencies. This strategy would focus on improving interoperability with allies and partners. In a resource-constrained

environment, Strategy D would sacrifice procurement of transformational

systems and some investment in S&T and R&D in order to recapitalize and

sustain a larger force structure and a more assertive strategy of engagement.

Similarities among Strategies

Equally striking are the key elements of the integrated paths that do

not exhibit much or any change across the strategies. Here, the fundamental differences were driven not by strategy but by resource assumptions: whether choices were being made in the context of constrained or

relatively unconstrained resources. These factors suggest a host of choices

that will be on the administration’s plate in the next QDR, regardless of

the strategy it chooses.

Force Manning

Given full resources to keep risk at a low level, each strategy calls for

full manning of all units in warplans and the peacetime rotation base,

increased manning in selected high-demand units and specialties, and

increases in force generation capability. All told, this would translate into

a significant increase in the total end-strength of the U.S. military. In a

resource-constrained environment, all of the strategies contemplate less

than full manning for so-called late deployers in major wars; less than

full manning for the peacetime rotation base; no overmanning of highdemand assets; greater use and integration of Reserve component units

and personnel; and initiatives to civilianize some military functions,

such as finance and accounting, computers and information management, long-haul communications, maintenance, repair and refurbishment, and supply chain management.

This raises several crucial questions for QDR decisionmakers. First,

should manning be increased in some types of units to reduce warfighting

risk and peacetime tempo strains? Which types of units should receive

highest priority for additional manning? Given economic and demographic

trends, could this additional end-strength be recruited and retained?
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 367

Second, could the requirements for active-duty personnel be significantly

reduced through greater use of Reserve component units and personnel, or

the transfer of some functions from the military to the civilian sector?

Force Management

Each of the four strategies calls for force-management policies that

would facilitate effective response to peacetime demands through predictable deployment windows consistent with service tempo rules. Three

services—the Navy, Marine Corps and, more recently, Air Force—have

adopted rotational force-management systems that enable them to meet

this objective better under normal circumstances. The Army still faces

enormous force-management challenges as it seeks to use a force designed and organized primarily for fighting major wars to meet a substantial and very different set of peacetime demands. Given full resources,

each strategy also calls for a flexible force structure that facilitates substitutions within and across services and for meeting all CINC theater engagement needs as a priority matter. If resources are constrained, all of

the strategies would envision greater use of force substitutions to manage

peacetime tempo strains; more selective peacetime engagement by the

CINCs and a resource allocation process that would prioritize CINC engagement activities on a global (rather than strictly regional) basis, perhaps resulting in reductions or cancellations of lower priority activities in

one region to facilitate higher priority activities in another; and greater

use of new basing concepts, crew rotation concepts, and force substitutions to reduce the force requirements associated with meeting peacetime

engagement and presence demands.

This raises several crucial questions for QDR decisionmakers. First,

would implementation of a rotational force-management approach similar to those used by the other services be beneficial for the Army? What

would such an approach look like in practice? Second, what is an acceptable standard for cumulative time away from home (days per year or days

per 2 years)? Should the same standard be used across the services? Under

what conditions should this standard be waived in peacetime? Third, how

can DOD put teeth in the theater engagement planning process to ensure

that CINC engagement plans, in combination with other demands such

as training and SSCs, do not create undue tempo strains on the force, and

that resources are consistently allocated to the highest priority demands?

Fourth, are there forward-basing or crew-rotation concepts that could 

reduce some of the requirements associated with meeting the overseas

presence demands of a given strategy?
368 QDR 2001

Readiness

In the readiness arena, the key choices are driven not only by differences in strategy but also by different assumptions about resource levels

and priorities. With full resources, the goal would be full funding for manning, training, equipment, and infrastructure accounts, with the objective

of achieving C–1 status for all units in warplans and for all high-demand

units in peacetime (a force rated C–1 has only minor deficiencies that have

negligible impact on its capability to perform required missions). In the

absence of full resources, one might accept less than full manning for some

units; full funding to meet essential (if less than optimum) training for required missions; less than full funding for spare parts, depot maintenance,

and war reserve materials, and less than full funding for mobilization and

support facilities. In short, the standard here would be adequate funding

to maintain all units in warplans or in high demand at C–1 or at least C–2

status (a force rated C–2 has some deficiencies with limited impact on its

capability to perform required missions).

This raises some critical questions for QDR decisionmakers. First and

foremost, what should the force be ready for? The answer depends on

what priority missions are set by the next defense strategy; this determination will go a long way toward identifying which units should be kept

at what states of readiness. Second, what are the risks associated with less

than full funding of the various readiness accounts? Third, are there any

realistic management initiatives, such as commercialized or competitively

sourced maintenance and logistics functions and other installation activities, that could reduce the costs of maintaining high levels of readiness?

People and Quality of Life

In the absence of resource constraints, all of the strategies would aim

to make service in the U.S. military more competitive with working in the

private sector, guarantee a middle-class life for all members of the All Volunteer Force, and enhance the personnel readiness of the force. In practice, this would mean further increasing the pay of military personnel,

improving access to and availability of quality housing, improving the

quality of the bases and facilities where military personnel live and work,

providing a strong healthcare system, improving pensions and retiree

benefits, and expanding and enhancing programs geared toward military

families. In a resource-constrained environment, some would put such

people and quality of life issues in the tradespace like any other issue and

adopt the standard of maintaining the status quo or avoiding losing
STRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 369

ground in any of the specific areas listed above. They would also put even

greater emphasis on exploring possible areas of reform or divestment that

could generate cost savings.

This suggests several key questions for the QDR. First, should quality

of life programs be in the tradespace? Given the centrality of people to

the quality of the U.S. military and the challenges DOD faces in recruiting

and retaining them, can the United States afford anything less than fully

funding this aspect of the defense program? Second, can DOD provide

comparable or higher quality goods and services to members of the military at reduced cost by fundamentally changing its approach in some of

these areas, such as healthcare, housing, schools, and commissaries?

Other

With full resources, most of the strategies would contemplate enhancing sustainment and perhaps modernization measures for U.S.

strategic nuclear forces, enhancing the current nuclear laboratories and

stockpile stewardship capability, and expanding programs aimed at

countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a more

resource-constrained environment, most of the strategies would contemplate further reducing either the size of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal or its level of launch readiness while seeking to delay major modernization decisions, and maintaining but not enhancing stockpile

stewardship capability and counterproliferation programs. They would

also consider ways of reducing the size or readiness of the strategic reserve of conventional forces.

In addition, all of the strategies would seek ways of further streamlining DOD by eliminating excess infrastructure through additional consolidation, rounds of base closure, outsourcing, and commercialization,

as well as adopting more efficient business and management practices.

Although much of the low-hanging fruit in these areas has already been

picked during the last decade, we believe there are significant additional

savings to be had if the administration, the services, and key members of

Congress are willing to challenge political constraints that have traditionally hampered progress. Reaping substantial savings in this area

would require breaking some zealously guarded rice bowls in the Pentagon, the services, Congress, and possibly the broader community of military retirees and dependents.

Several questions arise for the next QDR. First, what is the future vision

for U.S. strategic nuclear forces? What is the appropriate nuclear posture

and modernization program to support that vision within resource con370 QDR 2001

straints? Should DOD anticipate cost savings or additional investment in

this area over time? Second, what are the most crucial counterproliferation

programs to be pursued in the next decade? Are some of these so essential

that they should be kept out of the tradespace? Third, what kind of conventional strategic reserve is needed to support the defense strategy? Should

DOD anticipate cost savings or additional investment in this area over

time? Fourth, are there realistic ways to streamline infrastructure further

(for example, with more base closures and elimination of other excess facilities), to increase efficiency in DOD business practices, and to reduce costs

over time? Are the administration, the services, and the Congress willing to

pay the political price for substantial savings in these areas?

Key Indicators

The final element of each integrated path is a set of key indicators,

each of which, if present to a significant degree, should cause a fundamental reevaluation of a given strategy and the level of resources allocated to

implement it. These key indicators would be signs of a substantial mismatch between strategy and resources that must be addressed if highly

corrosive effects on the U.S. military are to be avoided. These include:

■ inability to provide adequate resources for the required number of MTWs

at moderate risk, due either to capability shortfalls or to readiness shortfalls;

■ inability to sustain the required level of overseas presence, engagement,

and SSCs without unacceptable tempo levels for LD/HD assets and other

high-demand units;

■ inability to support homeland security missions concurrently with other

high-priority missions (for example, warfighting) at moderate risk;

■ chronic inability to meet modernization objectives, such as the most urgent recapitalization needs, or having to cancel programs to fund others;

■ inability to fund high-priority new starts;

■ inability to sustain suitable levels of concept development and experimentation in support of transformation;

■ inability to cope with technical surprise or emerging threats;

■ inability to maintain a credible, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent;

■ chronic inability to meet recruiting and retention goals;

■ deterioration of the morale and quality of life of the force.6

If allowed to persist, these conditions would degrade the quality, capability, and readiness of the U.S. military and its ability to protect and

advance national interests. Thus, as indicators, they can serve two very

important purposes in the upcoming QDR. The first is to convey a clear

message to the administration, the Congress, and participants in the reSTRATEGY-DRIVEN INTEGRATED PATHS 371

view that, with a couple of notable exceptions, most of these indicators

exist today, suggesting that there is already a profound gap between the

defense program and resources that have been made available to support

it. This increasingly indisputable fact means that the next QDR cannot afford simply to refine the current approach, tweak the current defense

program at the margins, or hope to muddle through. Rather, the next administration must take substantial action to increase defense spending,

cut costs (without increasing risk to unacceptable levels), or ask the military to do less. This is the iron triangle described at the beginning of this

volume that the administration will face in the 2001 QDR; it will require

enormous political will and leadership to manage.

The second way in which some of these indicators could prove useful

in the next QDR is to provide decisionmakers with a means of determining whether they have adequately closed the strategy-resources gap in the

course of the review. Do modeling and analysis indicate that the chosen

force structure can meet the strategy’s warfighting requirements at moderate risk? Do they indicate that the force can sustain a strategy’s anticipated level of peacetime operations within acceptable operations and personnel tempo levels? Do they indicate that the force can support

homeland security requirements concurrently with warfighting requirements? Does programmatic analysis indicate that DOD will be able to

meet its modernization objectives within the fiscal guidance? These key

indicators can be used to focus analysis during the review on the most

important judgments the administration will have to make in creating a

sound defense strategy and a sustainable defense program.

Conclusion

If the administration wants to root its programmatic decisions firmly

in strategy, it will need to develop a strategy-driven integrated path (or

something akin to it) as a framework for decision. Such a framework

would highlight both what a given defense strategy would require across

the various elements of the defense program (force structure, modernization, manning, readiness, and so on) and what cost-saving tradeoffs

(tradespace), if any, might be consistent with the strategy in each area.

Putting the myriad programmatic decisions of the next QDR in such a

strategy-driven context will be crucial to charting a sound and sustainable

course for defense. Our comparative analysis of four different integrated

paths also suggests a host of key questions that QDR decisionmakers will

need to address, no matter what strategy is adopted by the new adminis372 QDR 2001

tration. In order to answer the fundamental question of whether enough

has been done during the review to bring the requirements of the defense

strategy and the resources available into balance, the administration will

need to develop a set of key indicators of a strategy-resources mismatch.

We have offered a short list of such indicators as a starting point, and their

message is sobering and clear: fundamental change is required now if we

are to sustain the health and unmatched prowess of the U.S. military in the

years and decades to come.

Notes1 The costs of the integrated paths also are likely to differ significantly. Although the working

group was unable to estimate the total cost of any path, rough costing will be critical to support

sound decisionmaking and to avoid inappropriate apples-to-oranges comparisons.

2 These percentages are not exact; they simply indicate that one would expect a substantial portion of the force to be unable to withdraw from SSCs and redeploy to MTWs in a timely fashion. This

could be the case if, for example, allies were either unwilling or unable to provide substitutes for withdrawn U.S. forces; if the types of forces involved could not be moved quickly or the necessary lift were

not available; or if an American withdrawal of such critical forces as headquarters, communications,

and logistics could cause the collapse of an entire coalition operation.

3 For a more detailed discussion of a methodology for sizing conventional forces, see chapter 6

on force sizing.

4 How rotational factors are derived is discussed in chapter 10 on peacetime operations.

5 Shortfalls are identified in the DOD Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, April–June 2000.

6 Positive as well as negative changes in assumptions and conditions that underlie defense planning also must be taken into account by the review. Positive indicators that could have comparable

significance include indicators that the primary threats for which DOD plans have decreased in size

or lessened in nature; the prospect that new concepts of operation will allow the Armed Forces to

achieve the same objectives with fewer resources; or favorable changes in allied capabilities.
Chapter Fourteen

Elements of Success 

for the QDR

by Michèle A. Flournoy

The Bush administration must make a more fundamental and difficult set of choices in the 2001 QDR than its predecessors did in

previous defense reviews. It cannot afford to refine the current approach, tweak the current defense program at the margins, or hope to

muddle through. The magnitude of the current strategy-resources mismatch, and the damage it will cause over time if not addressed, demand

that the next administration increase the level of resources devoted to defense, work with Congress to expand and take advantage of potential

tradespace to reduce costs while maintaining acceptable levels of risk, or

change the defense strategy to reduce the demands being placed on the

Armed Forces. This fundamental set of choices, the iron triangle of the

next QDR, will require extraordinary leadership and a willingness to

spend significant amounts of political capital on the part of the President,

Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reality, the administration may need to work all three legs of the

iron triangle to bring defense strategy and resources into balance. While

some increase in defense spending seems likely, it is highly unlikely that

the increase will be large enough to close the projected $30–50 billion annual gap.1 Therefore, any increase in the defense topline will have to be accompanied by efforts to identify potential tradespace—changes in the defense program that would reduce costs without incurring unacceptable

levels of risk. Though some argue that there is little or no tradespace left

after a decade of cutting budgets and forces, others make a persuasive case

that there are still substantial efficiencies and savings to be had. Reducing

excess infrastructure, reforming personnel management systems, and

adopting better business practices are just a few of the examples frequently

cited. Taking advantage of this tradespace may, however, be extraordinarily

difficult for both the new administration and the new Congress. The new

373
374 QDR 2001

civilian leadership in DOD must demonstrate willingness to make hard

and perhaps unpopular choices. The military leadership must demonstrate

willingness to be a fully accountable partner in stepping up to the most

difficult choices. And the new Congress must, in some cases, put aside the

politics of pork to enable the Pentagon to reduce or eliminate low-priority

programs, close or convert excess infrastructure, and change inefficient

ways of doing business. This is a tall order, but not an impossible one if the

parties understand that the long-term health of the U.S. military hangs in

the balance.

The final element in this equation is the defense strategy: what the

President asks the Armed Forces to be prepared to do in time of war and

in peace. If the combination of budget increases and cost-cutting measures are insufficient to close the projected shortfall, then the new administration will have to determine how to reduce the demands placed on the

U.S. military without compromising American security.

In support of this effort, we offer the following primary recommendations to the new administration and those who will participate in the

2001 QDR. The first three recommendations address the nature of the

strategy and policy reviews the administration should conduct early in its

term to set a course on defense and national security issues. The others

identify elements that will be critical to the success of the QDR and to

making strategy-driven choices for America’s security.

Three Interrelated Reviews

In order to set a true course in national security and defense matters

early in its term, the new administration will need to conduct at least

three interrelated reviews: the National Security Strategy Review, the

Quadrennial Defense Review, and a strategic posture review.2 Our recommendations for each follow.

The administration should make the National Security Strategy Review required by Congress a rigorous interagency exercise to establish the

new President’s national security vision and priorities, not just a pro forma

exercise to produce a public relations document. The review should involve the principals of all of the relevant agencies and result in prioritized

objectives and clear guidance for planning, resource allocation, and resource management among and within the national security agencies.

Second, given the profound set of choices that it must confront in the

defense arena, the administration would be wise to pause and reconsider

the objectives and scope of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Rather than
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 375

striving to complete a comprehensive defense strategy and program review in a matter of months, it might be more prudent to conduct a truly

strategic review aimed at establishing a vision, setting broad DOD priorities, and deciding only the big ticket defense program issues, with a follow-on effort to conduct more in-depth analysis and develop a detailed

implementation plan. Adopting this approach would require consultations with Congress to amend some of the substantive requirements in

the QDR legislation, but the end result might be more in keeping with the

type of review the legislation was meant to inspire.

Third, the administration should undertake a strategic posture review

of U.S. policy with regard to both strategic nuclear forces and national

missile defense. Such a review would meet the requirements of the Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review while enabling the administration to take a more comprehensive and integrated look at strategic offense and defense issues in the evolving security environment. Such

a review would focus on establishing the long-term objectives that should

guide U.S. strategic offense and defense policy and on articulating an implementation plan for realizing that vision. It would address a broad

range of interconnected issues: nuclear and missile defense strategy, policy, force structure, operations, infrastructure, and how to deal with other

countries, both allies and potential adversaries, to realize these policy objectives through arms control, unilateral actions, cooperative endeavors,

and other means. (Chapter 12 addressed the range of issues that would

need to be covered and outlines a number of concrete options for the administration to consider.)

These three reviews will undoubtedly overlap in time, issues covered,

and people and organizations involved. All will need to be completed

within the first year of the administration, and all will require a substantial amount of time and effort on the part of the new national security

and defense team. To succeed in setting the administration’s course, these

reviews will need to be conducted in such a way that their results inform

and reinforce one another.

The strategies and policies they produce will also need to be given

teeth if they are to affect resource allocation within and among the national security agencies. This will require the administration to be as explicit as possible about where it wants to place emphasis and where and

how it is willing to accept or manage a degree of risk. It must be clear

about its relative priorities within the strategy. The twelve questions discussed in chapter 1 identify the principal defense strategy choices the new
376 QDR 2001

administration will have to make; the defense strategy alternatives identified in chapter 5 provide a menu of options for the new administration.

These options can be used singly or in combination to help jump-start

the process of strategy development in the QDR. The DOD leadership

must take ownership of the strategy early in the process, issue the strategy

early in the QDR in the form of binding guidance to participants, and ensure that the strategy is consistently and rigorously enforced in the decisionmaking fora of the review.

Elements of Success for the QDR

There are several elements that will be crucial to the success of the

next QDR—that is, crucial to addressing the strategy-resources mismatch and working the iron triangle. The recommendations that follow

aim to distill some of these elements into actionable proposals for the

new administration.

The 2001 QDR must be both strategy-driven and 

resource-constrained.

The QDR must be strategy-driven to ensure that the Nation uses the

resources it devotes to defense (means) in the most effective ways possible

to achieve its national objectives (ends). But ultimately, the review must

be resource-constrained to be relevant. A review that assumes no budgetary constraints is not particularly useful to the President and Secretary

of Defense, who must wrestle with hard choices about how to allocate

limited resources to protect and advance U.S. interests and security objectives. The QDR must confront two broad strategy challenges: first, to

make a strategy-based case for the resources required to meet national

objectives at an acceptable level of risk, and second, to determine the best

strategy possible, given the resources ultimately made available for defense, while explicitly assessing the risks, if available resources fall short of

the ideal.

The administration should conduct a comprehensive assessment of

the 2001–2025 security environment to develop a consensus view

of the threats and opportunities for which DOD should plan, as well

as those against which it should hedge.

This assessment should be one of the first steps taken in the QDR. It

should draw on a broad range of sources and methods to capture not

only areas of agreement on what is most likely but also issues of debate

that suggest greater uncertainty. Chapter 2 offers such an assessment as a
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 377

starting point for further work in the QDR. As chapter 3 argues, particular attention should be paid to the rise of asymmetric threats to the

United States, its interests, allies and forces.

The new administration should articulate a new and more

compelling rationale for the size, capabilities, and resource

requirements of the U.S. military. 

In developing a new defense strategy, the administration should seize

the opportunity to put forward a standard that will maintain U.S. military superiority into the future while offering a more compelling and

complete rationale for U.S. conventional forces than two overlapping

MTWs. Although it may well be prudent to retain the ability to conduct

major military operations in more than one theater at a time, the administration should come up with a new formulation that cannot be equated

to two particular scenarios, such as Iraq and Korea. This will require

changing terms from MTWs to something else and capturing the broader

range of priority missions that the services must be prepared to perform

to protect and advance American interests, now and in the future. Basic

definitions (of MTWs and SSCs, for example) need to be rethought, and

force-sizing criteria and declaratory policy reformulated.

In translating defense strategy into criteria for sizing and shaping

forces, the administration should take into account not only warfighting

requirements, but also high-priority peacetime, homeland security, and

transformation demands. The past decade of experience has made it abundantly clear that forces sized primarily for warfighting cannot meet the full

range of peacetime demands without putting undue strains on the force.

Our analysis suggests this would be true even if U.S. military involvement

in SSCs were more selective. In addition, homeland security missions may

place demands on U.S. forces that should be considered in addition to the

warfighting demands they might have to meet concurrently. QDR planners should also take a second look at the size and shape of the force

through the lens of future capability requirements to ensure that the force

structure chosen in the next QDR puts the U.S. military of 2001 on the

right path to becoming the U.S. military envisioned for 2010 and 2020.

The strategy guidance issued in the QDR should broaden the

scenario set used for force planning and resource allocation in DOD. 

The focus on two particular MTW scenarios, Iraq and Korea, as the

primary basis for U.S. conventional force planning is highly problematic. These two cases are not representative of the range of plausible
378 QDR 2001

MTW scenarios, now or in the future. The focus of U.S. force planning

in the QDR should shift from optimizing the force for two particular

scenarios to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across a

broad range of anticipated and future threats. This will require broadening the scenario set to include a wider range of potential threats, endstate objectives, operational constraints (such as adversary use of antiaccess strategies), and concepts of operations. The President and his

most senior advisors should pay particular attention to the issue of appropriate end-state objectives for a broader range of MTWs, as these

objectives will determine the range of military options available to the

President in war and the assumptions that will guide the sizing and

shaping of the Armed Forces.

The administration must be explicit in its defense strategy about

the priority and objectives of transformation, the capabilities it

wants the effort to yield, and the risks it is willing to accept along

the way. 

The strategy should articulate a prioritized list of future challenges or

scenarios that transformation should seek to address (for example, the

long-term rise of a peer competitor, the mid-term rise of more capable

adversaries employing antiaccess strategies, the rise of asymmetric threats

to the U.S. homeland) and the types of capabilities the effort should yield.

The latter will need to be more specific than the very general “operational

concepts” laid out in Joint Vision 2020 if they are to provide actionable

guidance for those involved in concept development, experimentation,

research and development. The guidance on transformation should also

be as explicit as possible about priority areas in which DOD should invest

additional resources, and areas in which resources should be reduced,

programs eliminated, and activities curtailed. It should at least specify the

criteria that should be used to determine these, as well as the degree of

risk the administration is willing to accept in the near term to pursue its

transformation objectives. In chapter 11, Michael O’Hanlon identified

two main schools of thought on the RMA and transformation: the C4

ISR

school, which emphasizes the potential of modern computers, electronics,

and related technologies; and the global reach/global power school, which

envisions more sweeping and radical change across the whole spectrum

of military technologies, organizations, doctrine, and tactics. Which

school the administration identifies itself with will have profound implications for the size and shape of the DOD investment program.
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 379

The administration should take a fresh, top-to-bottom look at

overseas presence as part of the QDR. 

What does the administration’s defense strategy mean for overseas

presence? Do its requirements differ from current requirements? What

are the best ways to meet these requirements? Should new ways of meeting overseas presence requirements, such as force substitution, additional

forward stationing, or new operational concepts, be considered? As argued in chapter 9, these questions should be addressed for each of the key

regions to which the United States deploys substantial forces—particularly Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia—as well as on a global basis.

The administration should seek to reduce the friction produced by

conducting a robust level of peacetime operations while striving to

maintain high levels of readiness for war. 

As discussed in chapter 10, the administration should examine ways

of both reducing the peacetime demands placed on the Armed Forces

and increasing the available supply of forces for those peacetime operations to which it gives high priority. Specifically, it should consider the

following options to reduce demand: change the criteria for intervention or participation in SSCs; increase use of civilian contractors, nonDOD government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations; limit

SSC commitments based on a pre-determined force ceiling; reduce force

commitments to long-duration SSCs, based on revised concepts of operations; or reduce the level of U.S. peacetime military engagement activities overseas. Several additional options should be considered to increase the available supply of forces for those peacetime missions given

priority in a chosen strategy: addressing force structure inadequacies or

imbalances to enhance military capability for priority peacetime missions; implementing new force management initiatives; or establishing a

new funding mechanism for SSC operations.

The administration should adopt or develop a rigorous and

transparent methodology for developing and assessing force

structure options. 

This has at least three dimensions. First, the administration will face

several key decisions in sizing and shaping U.S. conventional forces to meet

the requirements of its chosen strategy at acceptable levels of risk. It will require a methodology that explicitly addresses each of these decisions and

offers QDR planners a transparent and replicable way to translate strategy

into force structure options. DOD currently lacks such a methodology. We
380 QDR 2001

believe there is great promise in the working group’s approach described in

chapter 8, and it is offered to the 2001 QDR as a way to proceed.

The second dimension is a rigorous and transparent methodology for

assessing risk. Risk assessment is critical to the success of the next QDR

and to sound defense decisionmaking more broadly, yet here again DOD

lacks an adequate approach. Such an approach should integrate risk assessment in several areas, especially in force performance, force sustainability, force preparation for the future, and affordability. Risk should be

treated explicitly in framing the decisions and reporting the results of the

review. The risk assessment methodology presented in chapter 7 offers a

strong foundation on which the QDR can build. Risk assessment during

the QDR itself should strive to yield rough order-of-magnitude judgments of risk to inform the most important decisions; more detailed risk

assessment should be pursued as part of the follow-on analytic effort.

The third dimension is a new overall approach to assessing force

structure alternatives to support a given strategy. A more comprehensive,

varied, and iterative approach to assessing force structure options is

needed to optimize force structure across a broader range of scenarios

and the strategy’s highest priorities. In the longer term, DOD needs to increase investment in new modeling, analysis, and decision-support tools.

Here, an important caution should be kept in mind. The Bush administration cannot afford to use the need for better analysis and more

rigorous risk assessment to postpone some of the most difficult defense

decisions. Failure to confront the hard choices would be a decision in and

of itself that would have dire consequences for the U.S. military. This situation reinforces a previous recommendation that the QDR should focus

primarily on developing a strategy, setting priorities, and making the big

program decisions, with a follow-on effort to flesh out and refine all of

the programmatic details.

Once the administration determines its desired defense strategy, it

should develop an associated integrated path. 

As detailed in chapter 13, the integrated path would describe what the

strategy would require if fully resourced, identify what may be in the tradespace consistent with the strategy if available resources are less than desired,

and delineate the key indicators that can be used to assess whether, after

working the available tradespace, a fundamental mismatch remains between strategy and resources. In so doing, it must rigorously and realistically assess potential tradespace candidates in every area of the defense program, paying particular attention to the specific issues and questions
ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 381

outlined in chapter 13 in the areas of force structure, modernization, force

manning, force management, readiness, people and quality of life, nuclear

forces, business practices, and infrastructure. No aspect of the defense program should be disregarded, and no stone should go unturned.

Numerous force structure and capability issues may merit further

analysis in the QDR as potential tradespace candidates, depending on the

strategy chosen. Here, the objective should be to determine whether opportunities exist to reduce costs without accepting more than moderate

levels of risk in priority areas of the strategy. Chapter 8 identified a number of potential candidates, including greater reliance on Reserve forces,

tradeoffs between ISR/PM enhancements and shooter platforms, force

mix in MTWs, new concepts of operations in MTWs, greater reliance on

allies, the size and composition of the strategic reserve, and DOD investment priorities. Others might be drawn from the list of policy initiatives

to reduce points of friction in the force, as described in chapter 10.

Other force structure and capability areas should be further analyzed

in the QDR as potential areas for increasing investment to keep risk at

low to moderate levels: warfighting enhancements, strategic lift and

prepositioning enhancements, high demand assets in peacetime operations, and capabilities for meeting homeland security requirements concurrently with warfighting requirements.

The integrated path should also delineate key indicators to determine whether the gap between a desired strategy/defense program and

available resources has been adequately addressed over the course of the

review. These key indicators can serve two critical functions in the QDR.

They can send a clear message to the incoming administration, the Congress, and participants in the review that there is already a profound

strategy-resources gap that is beginning to have corrosive effects on the

U.S. military and must be addressed. And they can serve as metrics to

focus analysis during the review on the most important judgments the

new administration will have to make in creating a sound defense strategy and program, and to assist QDR decisionmakers in determining

whether they have adequately closed the strategy-resources gap over the

course of the review.

Tough Choices

The administration must make some tough choices in the 2001 QDR if

the strength and health of the U.S. military are to be maintained in the future. Although the new team may come into office with many competing
382 QDR 2001

priorities, addressing the gap between the projected defense program and

the level of resources devoted to defense will loom large as one of its primary responsibilities. Failing to close this gap would harm the U.S. military

greatly, so the stakes are high. The next QDR will demand difficult decisions and a tremendous level of leadership and political will from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs. With this responsibility, however, comes an historic opportunity to craft a defense strategy and program

that will maintain the unparalleled quality and strength of the U.S. military

and protect and advance American security well into the 21st century.

Notes1 Chapter 4 assesses both the budgetary trends that have contributed to the creation of this

gap and the anticipated budgetary realities that will make it so difficult and so important to address

in the QDR.

2 Congress has mandated the NSS, the QDR, and a Nuclear Posture Review. The working

group argues below that the latter should be broadened to include missile defense issues as well;

hence the term strategic posture review.
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABM anti-ballistic missile

AEF Air Expeditionary Force

APOD aerial port of debarkation

CCD campaign completion day

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CINC commander in chief

C3 command, control, and communications

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM consequence management

COFFD counteroffensive day

CONUS continental United States

DBK dominant battlespace knowledge

DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative

DEAD destruction of enemy air defenses

DOD Department of Defense

EMP electromagnetic pulse

ESDI European Security and Defense Initiative

EU European Union

EUCOM U.S. European Command

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IT information technology

JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar system

LD/HD low density/high demand

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

383
384 QDR 2001

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MIRV multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle

MTW major theater war

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

NDP National Defense Panel

NDU National Defense University

NGO nongovernmental organization

NMD national missile defense

NMS national military strategy

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NSS national security strategy

O&M operation and maintenance

OPTEMPO operating tempo

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

PM precision munitions

POM Program Objective Memorandum

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RC Reserve component

R&D research and development

RDT&E research, development, testing, and evaluation

RMA revolution in military affairs

RV reentry vehicle

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SBIRS space-based infrared satellite system

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SFOR stabilization force

SLBM sea-launched ballistic missile

SLEP service life extension program
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 385

SLOC sea lines of communications

SNF strategic nuclear forces

SPOD surface port of debarkation

SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program

SSC smaller-scale contingencies

S&T science and technology

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TAMD theater air and missile defense

THAAD theater high-altitude area defense

TMD theater missile defense

WMD weapons of mass destruction

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

Page 386 is Blank—no folio
About the Authors

M. Elaine Bunn is a distinguished research professor in the Institute

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and previously served as the Principal Director for Nuclear Forces and Missile

Defense Policy within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Strategy and Threat Reduction.

Roger Cliff is an associate political scientist with RAND and currently

is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Strategy. His field of specialization is East Asian security affairs, including

the military potential of the People’s Republic of China.

Michèle A. Flournoy is senior advisor for international security at the

Center for Strategic and International Studies and previously served as a

distinguished research professor in the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University and as the Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction.

Richard L. Kugler is a distinguished research professor in the Institute

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and previously worked for the RAND Corporation and served as a senior official

in the Department of Defense.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, is assigned to

the QDR office at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and previously

served as a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University.

387
388 QDR 2001

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the

Brookings Institution and teaches at both Columbia University and

Georgetown University.

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Spinelli, USA, is assigned to the Strategy,

Plans, and Policy Directorate at Headquarters, Department of the Army,

and previously served as a senior military fellow in the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Captain Sam J. Tangredi, USN, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and

previously served on the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of

the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Christine E. Wormuth is special assistant for programs and legislation

to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and previously served in the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat

Reduction.
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

This volume provides the foundation of the landmark research

conducted by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working

Group, a project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the

National Defense University. Sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the five-member working group was established in

September 1999 to help build intellectual capital for the upcoming

QDR. The project was based on the assumption that a small effort

conducted outside the Pentagon could serve as an independent,

unbiased body to develop options and provide insights on critical

defense policy choices for the next administration. With limited

resources, the working group focused on areas where either bureaucratic

or election year politics would make comparable efforts difficult or

impossible, namely: defense strategy, criteria for sizing U.S.

conventional forces, and force structure and capability issues. From its

inception, the working group sought to provide options, insights, and

recommendations for further analysis, not answers. As such, it was

intended to jump-start the QDR process, not preempt it. 

This book offers a comprehensive review of the broad strategic 

choices facing the new administration—without biases or distortions. 

A solid presentation worth the time of every American with more 

than a passing interest in national security.

—Barry M. Blechman

I appreciate the fact that this effort was courageous enough 

to point out in stark terms the trade-offs required for difficult policy

choices. Senior military and defense leaders won’t be able to hide 

from the reality of their decisions.

—Richard L. Armitage

Contra tor to adjust spine as ne essary