Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

JENNA J. WHEELER, on behalf of 

herself and her minor daughter, 

CHASTITY YOUNGBLOOD, and 

as the Personal Representative of 

the Estates of NIKOLAS W. 

WEISENBACH and OMEN W. 

WEISENBACH,

Appellants,

v.

MARVIN G. BOCK and NADINE 

EVANS, husband and wife, and 

the marital community composed 

thereof; MACPHERSON’S 

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 

INC., a Washington corporation,

Respondents,

SUBARNA KAKSHAPATI, a single 

person; PEAK IMPROVEMENTS, 

LLC, a Washington limited liability 

corporation, 

Defendants. 

 No. 79427-2-I

 DIVISION ONE

 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, J. — This case concerns the tragic death of a young man and his 

son. Nikolas Weisenbach and his son, Omen, died from smoke inhalation 

caused by a fire in the apartment where they lived with Jenna Wheeler and her 

daughter, Chastity Youngblood.

1

 After their deaths, Jenna, on behalf of herself, 

 

1 We refer to individuals by their first names where it provides a distinction 

between family members. 
No. 79427-2-I/2

2

her daughter, and the decedents’ estates (collectively Wheelers), sued 

MacPherson’s Property Management (MPM) and Marvin Bock and Nadine Evans 

(collectively respondents) for wrongful death. The Wheelers alleged that the 

respondents acted negligently by violating the municipal code, which required 

property owners to have a self-closing and self-latching door between private 

garages and dwelling units. 

After the Wheelers’ fire dynamics expert, Kenneth Rice, contradicted his 

deposition testimony and opined that Nikolas and Omen were alive before 

neighbors forced open the apartment’s exterior garage door, MPM moved to 

strike Rice’s declaration. The trial court granted MPM’s motion but only with 

regard to Rice’s statements that Nikolas and Omen were alive prior to the garage 

door being opened. Because the statements were in clear contradiction to his 

prior testimony, we affirm the trial court’s order striking Rice’s statements. We 

further conclude that the admissible evidence failed to present any genuine 

issues of material fact as to whether the broken self-closing mechanism was the 

cause in fact of Nikolas’s and Omen’s deaths. Therefore, we affirm the trial

court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents. 

FACTS

Beginning in 2015, Nikolas and Jenna, along with their children Chastity, 

age nine, and Omen, age four, leased unit A at 2307 O St. NE in Auburn, 

Washington. Unit A was a part of “a two story, multi-family” structure with four 

single family units and “four single car garage spaces on the south side of the 

structure” (property). Throughout their lease, Jenna and Nikolas used their
No. 79427-2-I/3

3

attached garage as a “living space” and did not park an automobile therein. 

In 2017, Bock and Evans sought to purchase the property, which MPM 

managed. Prior to their purchase, Bock and Evans received two inspection 

reports, one report from the previous owner’s inspection, and a second report, 

which they had completed. Both inspection reports found that unit A’s selfclosing door between the garage and the kitchen was broken. The first 

inspection report noted that the self-closing door was “intended to prevent vehicle 

fumes from entering living spaces and to slow the spread of fire from the garage 

to living spaces.” The second inspection report recommended that the property 

owners repair the self-closing door. Bock later testified that he was aware of the 

issue but did not “want to jeopardize the sale of the property by asking for too 

much,” so he did not request that the previous owner repair the door.

On July 9, 2017, Bock and Evans finalized their purchase of the property. 

That same day, Jenna and Nikolas were in their garage, drinking, smoking 

marijuana, and listening to music with their friend and neighbor, Ashley Sodorff. 

Ashley and her father, Robert Sodorff lived at the property in the unit adjacent to 

Nikolas and Jenna. Shortly after Ashley returned to her home, at around 

11:30 p.m., a fire started in unit A’s kitchen. A pot of vegetable oil was left 

unattended and caught fire after overheating. In his report, Valley Regional Fire 

Authority (VRFA) Deputy Fire Marshall John Monsebroten found that “[t]he 

activation of the stove element appears accidental based on interviews and the 

area of origin exam.”
No. 79427-2-I/4

4

When the fire started, Chastity and Omen were sleeping in their bedroom 

on the second floor. When she smelled smoke, Chastity told Omen to stay there 

and went downstairs. She “saw fog everywhere” and “described the smoke level 

to be at about 4 feet, just low enough to have to stoop but not so low as to crawl.” 

However, Chastity did not see any flames until she reached the kitchen. When 

Chastity entered the kitchen, Jenna entered from the garage, and they exited 

through the slider door on the side of the house. They left the slider door open. 

Nikolas, who was originally outside as well, entered the home through the slider 

door and went upstairs to get Omen. 

The Sodorffs heard a commotion and exited their unit through their

garage. At some point, Matthew Ditmar, another individual living at the property,

and Robert forced open the exterior garage door to unit A. At the time, “[t]here 

was no fire in the garage,” but the kitchen was a “[a] wall of fire,” from “[f]loor to 

ceiling.” “[W]ithin two to three seconds,” the fire spread towards the exterior 

garage door, “rolling up along the ceiling” of the garage space. Various 

witnesses stated that at one point, they “thought they heard” an explosion and 

that, thereafter, the fire grew significantly in size and intensity.

At some point, Nikolas opened the children’s bedroom window. Deputy

Fire Marshall Monsebroten testified that based on a video exhibit, while he did 

not have a “defined timeframe” for when Nikolas opened the window, “it changed 

the [fire’s] vent path,” accelerating the fire. He testified that with “‘the fire 

behavior that occurred on floor 2,” it is unlikely that anyone “would have survived

[even] in PPE.’” His report also stated that “[t]he garage door being opened 
No. 79427-2-I/5

5

effected ventilation of the fire” and “increased fire growth in the garage and 

kitchen.” The fire then intensified and spread “to adjacent areas.” 

In her declaration, Megan Chaney, another witness, recalled that when 

she and Trevor Smith heard screaming and saw the fire, they ran to the 

Wheelers’ home to assist them. At the time, she remembered seeing “Nickolas 

[sic] moving around in the children’s upstairs bedroom through the window in that 

bedroom.” She stated that there was no fire in the bedroom at that time, but that

shortly after she and Smith arrived, “[w]hat had been a relatively small fire 

confined primarily to the kitchen area had suddenly and unexpectedly turned into 

a massive fire enveloping the entire unit.” 

In his declaration, Smith stated that he could not remember “whether the 

garage door was opened or closed” when he approached the house. When he 

reached the slider door, Smith alleged that “the fire suddenly erupted” and 

engulfed the second floor. After the fire enveloped the rest of the apartment, 

Chaney “could again see Nik in the children’s upstairs bedroom,” standing at the 

open window. Instead of jumping, as onlookers suggested, “Nik turned and went 

back into the bedroom.” Chaney testified that, thereafter, she heard him scream.

The respondents’ expert fire investigator, Richard Carman, testified that 

the fire “expanded out very quickly,” creating a “tremendous amount of” smoke, 

or what he referred to as “unburned fire gases.” According to Carman, unburned 

fire gases are “molecules of toxic chemicals” that are “extremely dangerous and 

deadly.” He alleged that the fire gases “immediately . . . extended to the 

stairway[ and] . . . filled up the second floor,” and that Omen “was obviously 
No. 79427-2-I/6

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affected very quickly.” Carman testified that based on Omen’s autopsy, Omen 

had a 52 percent saturation of the harmful chemical, carbon hemoglobin, and 

that such a percentage “is certainly more than enough to kill someone.” Carman 

stated that an individual begins to lose consciousness at 40 percent saturation of 

carbon hemoglobin. Carman further asserted that Nikolas “probably died within 

one to two minutes after he reached the second floor because his saturation level 

was 72 percent,” but that Nikolas became disoriented immediately upon entering 

the second floor to look for Omen.

After the fire was extinguished, Nikolas and Omen were found deceased 

in the children’s second story bedroom: Nikolas “at the foot of the children’s 

bunk-bed,” and Omen “face down in the doorway.” Autopsies indicated that both 

Nikolas and Omen died from “toxic asphyxia due to smoke inhalation.” Nikolas 

had prominent thermal charring of his body, and Omen had “near total charring of 

the body surface.” 

PROCEDURE

In September 2017, the Wheelers sued the respondents for the wrongful 

death of Nikolas and Omen.

2

 The Wheelers alleged that the respondents were

negligent in failing to repair the self-closing door between the garage space and 

the kitchen and that when the neighbors forced open the exterior garage door, air 

from the outside accelerated the fire, causing Nikolas’s and Omen’s deaths. 

Specifically, the Wheelers argued that had the interior garage door automatically 

 

2 Other listed defendants, including the previous property owner, are not 

parties to this appeal. 
No. 79427-2-I/7

7

closed as required by the city of Auburn’s (City) municipal code, oxygen would 

not have been able to enter the home and accelerate the fire. 

During discovery, the respondents deposed the Wheelers’ “fire science” 

expert, Rice. During the deposition, the respondents asked Rice, “Can you 

testify whether Nik and Omen were still alive or not when the exterior garage 

door was opened?” He responded, “No.” Rice also said that he did not have an 

opinion on how long someone could survive in smoke or heat without protective 

gear. 

In October 2018, MPM and Bock and Evans separately moved for 

summary judgment dismissal of all of the Wheelers’ claims. MPM asserted that 

the Wheelers failed to present a genuine issue of material fact with regard to 

causation. MPM also argued that Jenna’s expert, Rice, did not and could not 

testify that Nikolas and Omen were alive when the neighbors forced open the 

garage door. 

In their opposition, the Wheelers submitted Rice’s declaration, where he 

opined that Nikolas and Omen were alive when the neighbors forced the exterior 

garage door open. He explained the contradiction to his deposition: “When I 

stated in my deposition that I could not ‘testify whether Nik and Omen were still 

alive or not when the exterior garage door was opened’, I meant that I could not 

testify to such a fact from my own personal knowledge or observation.” 

In their reply to the Wheelers’ opposition, MPM moved to strike Rice’s 

declaration, in particular, his statements that Nikolas and Omen were alive before 

the neighbors opened the exterior garage door. MPM argued that these opinions 
No. 79427-2-I/8

8

were contrary to Rice’s own deposition testimony, were speculative, and were 

“beyond the scope of his expertise.” The court granted the motion to strike with 

regard to Rice’s statements that Nikolas and Omen were alive when the garage 

door was opened. It concluded that the statements were “conclusory, 

unsupported and directly contradictory to very clear, significant questions that 

were asked of him at [his] deposition.”

Thereafter, the court granted the respondents’ summary judgment motions 

but “not without tremendous consideration and care.” Specifically, the court 

concluded that the Wheelers failed to present evidence from which reasonable 

inferences could be drawn without speculation and that “[t]here simply [was] an 

absence of . . . [the] causation element.” The Wheelers moved for 

reconsideration, which the trial court denied.3 The Wheelers appeal both orders 

granting summary judgment. 

ANALYSIS

Rice’s Opinion Testimony

The Wheelers contend that the trial court erred when it struck Rice’s 

 

3

In their assignment of errors, the Wheelers contend that the trial court 

erred when it denied their motion for reconsideration. However, the Wheelers did 

not discuss the standards applicable for the court’s review of a motion for 

reconsideration, namely, CR 59, they provided no legal argument on that basis, 

and even following MPM’s assertion that they failed to adequately present the 

issue for our review, they did not discuss the motion for reconsideration. 

Because “[w]e will not consider arguments that a party fails to brief,” Sprague v. 

Spokane Valley Fire Dep’t, 189 Wn.2d 858, 876, 409 P.3d 160 (2018), we do not

address this claim and do not consider evidence that the Wheelers attached to 

their motion for reconsideration. See Sprague, 189 Wn.2d at 876 (refusing to 

address petitioner’s claims, where he did not brief the claims and cited no law 

establishing them).
No. 79427-2-I/9

9

opinion testimony that Nikolas and Omen were alive before the garage door was 

forced open. Because the statements contradicted his deposition testimony, we 

disagree.

Although we usually review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to strike for

abuse of discretion, when a motion to strike a statement from an affidavit or 

declaration “is made in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment, we 

review de novo.” Southwick v. Seattle Police Officer John Doe No. 1, 145 Wn. 

App. 292, 297, 186 P.3d 1089 (2008). “[A]ffidavits shall be made on personal 

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 

stated therein.” CR 56(e). “[A]n affidavit cannot be used to create an issue of 

material fact by contradicting prior deposition testimony.” Davis v. Fred’s 

Appliance, Inc., 171 Wn. App. 348, 357, 287 P.3d 51 (2012). Specifically, 

“‘[w]hen a party has given clear answers to unambiguous [deposition] questions 

which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party 

cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, 

without explanation, previously given clear testimony.’” McCormick v. Lake 

Wash. Sch. Dist., 99 Wn. App. 107, 111, 992 P.2d 511 (1999) (second alteration 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Klontz v. Puget Sound 

Power & Light Co., 90 Wn. App. 186, 192, 951 P.2d 280 (1998)). Such testimony 

will be considered inadmissible, and a court cannot consider it “when ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment.” Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 535, 716 

P.2d 842 (1986).
No. 79427-2-I/10

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McCormick is instructive. There, Laurie McCormick appealed a summary 

judgment order dismissing her claims based on her alleged employment with

Lake Washington School District. McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 109. McCormick 

asserted that although she received neither board approval nor a written contract 

as required for employment, a District representative, Becky Anderson, had 

apparent authority to hire her and made a verbal offer of employment, inducing 

employment by estoppel. McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 109. To this end, in her 

deposition, McCormick stated that she did not know whether Anderson had the 

authority to offer her a position. McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 111-12. However,

in a later declaration, she “unequivocally” stated that Anderson had such 

authority. McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 112. The court concluded that 

McCormick’s declaration was inadmissible because it was “in ‘flat contradiction’ 

to her deposition and therefore [could] not be used to determine whether issues 

of material fact exist[ed].” McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 112.

Here, like McCormick’s statements, Rice’s subsequent opinion in his 

affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony. In his deposition, Rice testified 

that he did not know—or could not testify as to—whether or not Nikolas or Omen 

were alive when the neighbors forced open the exterior garage door. But in his 

affidavit, relying on the declarations of Chaney and Smith, and the VRFA report, 

he stated unequivocally that “Nikolas was alive before the garage door opened, 

and died shortly after it was opened” and that the “evidence establishes that 

Omen was alive before the garage door opened.” Thus, like in McCormick, 

Rice’s declaration statements were in flat contradiction to his deposition and
No. 79427-2-I/11

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were inadmissible to determine whether an issue of material fact existed.

In an attempt to explain the contradictory nature of his testimony, Rice 

alleged that his opinion had changed because, in his deposition, he only had

meant that he “could not ‘testify’” to whether Nikolas or Omen were alive “from 

[his] own personal knowledge or observation” and that he gave his deposition 

before reading the declarations of Chaney or Smith. His explanation is 

unpersuasive and disingenuous for at least two reasons. First, while a statement 

that explains a previous statement may be admissible, a statement that 

contradicts a previous statement is not. See McCormick, 99 Wn. App. at 112. 

And like in McCormick, Rice’s statement does not “merely explain” his deposition 

testimony. 99 Wn. App. at 112. Second, Rice’s contention that his deposition 

testimony was only with regard to his personal knowledge, does not ring true. He 

was an expert witness, not a fact witness. And “expert witnesses are not 

required to have personal, firsthand knowledge of the evidence on which they 

rely.” State v. Lui, 153 Wn. App. 304, 321, 221 P.3d 948 (2009), aff’d, 179 

Wn.2d 457, 315 P.3d 493 (2014). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it 

struck Rice’s statements pertaining to the timing of Nikolas’s and Omen’s deaths.

The Wheelers disagree and attempt to distinguish testimony from an 

opinion, stating that “Rice was never asked whether he had an opinion as to 

whether Nikolas and Omen were alive when the exterior garage door was open.” 

Contrary to the Wheelers’ assertion, opinion and testimony are distinguishable 
No. 79427-2-I/12

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only in that testimony can be, but is not always, an opinion. 4 Thus, when asked 

if he could testify as to whether Nikolas and Omen were alive, Rice was asked if 

he could opine as to the issue. Accordingly, there is no relevant distinction 

between opinion and testimony, and we are not persuaded by the Wheelers’

attempt to manufacture one. 

Summary Judgment

The Wheelers contend that the trial court erred when it granted the 

respondents’ motions for summary judgment. Because there were no genuine 

issues of material fact with regard to cause in fact, we disagree.5

“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). 

“Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, affidavits, 

depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law.” Green v. Normandy Park, 137 Wn. App. 665, 681, 151 P.3d 1038 

(2007). “Summary judgment is proper on a factual issue only if reasonable 

minds could reach but one conclusion on it.” Bohn v. Cody, 119 Wn.2d 357, 363, 

 

4 Under “opinion testimony,” Black’s Law Dictionary states, “See 

TESTIMONY.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (11th ed. 2019).

5 Because we conclude that the Wheelers failed to present evidence of 

cause in fact, we do not reach the issues of duty and breach based on the City’s 

building code. See, e.g., Lynn v. Labor Ready, Inc., 136 Wn. App. 295, 309-313, 

151 P.3d 201 (2006) (dismissing plaintiff’s negligence claim and refraining from 

deciding the issue of duty and breach where the plaintiff failed to present 

evidence of proximate cause).
No. 79427-2-I/13

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832 P.2d 71 (1992).

To prevail on their negligence claim, the Wheelers were required “to 

establish (1) the existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a resulting 

injury, and (4) a proximate cause between the breach and the injury.” Behla v. 

R.J. Jung, LLC, 11 Wn. App. 2d 329, 334, 453 P.3d 729 (2019), review denied, 

460 P.3d 180 (2020). “Proximate cause consists of two elements: cause in fact 

and legal causation.” Sluman v. State, 3 Wn. App. 2d 656, 701, 418 P.3d 125, 

review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1005 (2018).

To prevail on the issue of cause in fact, the Wheelers were required to 

“supply proof for a reasonable person to, ‘without speculation,’ infer that” the nonclosing interior garage door “more probably than not caused” Nikolas’s and 

Omen’s deaths. Behla, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 335 (emphasis added) (quoting Little 

v. Countrywood Homes, Inc., 132 Wn. App. 777, 781, 133 P.3d 944 (2006)). “As 

a determination of what actually occurred, cause in fact is generally left to the 

jury.” Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 778, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). But “[c]ause-infact may be determined as a matter of law if the causal connection is so 

speculative and indirect that reasonable minds could not differ.” Doherty v. Mun. 

of Metro. Seattle, 83 Wn. App. 464, 469, 921 P.2d 1098 (1996).

Here, we clearly have a tragic injury: the deaths of Nikolas and Omen, and 

it is undisputed that Nikolas and Omen died from asphyxia due to smoke 

inhalation.6 However, the evidence is not sufficient for a reasonable juror to 

 

6 For some of their propositions, the Wheelers rely on declarations 

attached to their motion for reconsideration. As discussed above, those 

declarations were not before the court on the respondents’ motions for summary 
No. 79427-2-I/14

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conclude or infer that the respondents’ alleged breach—i.e., their failure to repair 

the self-closing door—more probably than not caused Nikolas’s and Omen’s 

deaths. Specifically, there was not sufficient evidence that (1) Omen was alive 

before the exterior garage door was open and (2) had the self-closing door 

functioned properly, either Nikolas or Omen would have been able to safely exit 

the property and more likely than not would have survived. 

No one testified that they saw Omen alive before the garage door was 

open. Thus, there is no evidence—direct or circumstantial—which supplied proof 

that had the interior garage door properly functioned, Omen more likely than not 

would be alive. To allow the jury to conclude that he was alive when the garage 

door was opened would invite unreasonable speculation. Accordingly, there was 

no genuine issue of material fact as to the proximate cause of Omen’s death, and 

the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of respondents 

on that issue. 

Similarly, there was no direct evidence to support the conclusion that 

Nikolas was alive when the neighbors opened the exterior garage door. No 

witness could have observed the bedroom window and the garage door at the 

same time because the bedroom window, located above the sliding glass door, 

was on a different side of the unit and out of the line of sight from the bedroom 

window. However, taking the circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Wheelers, a reasonable juror could conclude that Nikolas was still alive 

 

judgment, and accordingly, we do not rely on them in completing our review. 

See Green, 137 Wn. App. at 678 (The appellate court reviews a motion for 

summary judgment “based solely on the record before the trial court.”). 
No. 79427-2-I/15

15

when the neighbors forced open the exterior garage door

Nonetheless, the Wheelers provided no evidence below and point to none 

on appeal that supports an inference that either Nikolas or Omen would have 

been able to exit the home safely had the self-closing door functioned properly

and oxygen not entered the home when the exterior garage door was forced 

open. Before the garage door was opened, Nikolas was upstairs, and the fire 

had grown into a “wall of fire” in the kitchen. There is no evidence that Nikolas 

would have been capable of surviving the toxic smoke in the home or avoiding 

the fire in the kitchen before it expanded to the second floor. Because we do not 

deny summary judgment based on “an unreasonable inference,” Marshall v. AC 

& S Inc., 56 Wn. App. 181, 184, 782 P.2d 1107 (1989), we conclude that 

summary judgment was proper based on the proximate cause element. 

The Wheelers disagree and assert that if fire or “thermal injury”

contributed to their death, it is dispositive proof that both Omen and Nikolas were 

alive prior to the garage door being opened. This contention fails for a number of 

reasons. First, while there is evidence in this case that Nikolas and Omen were 

burned, there is no evidence that burns caused their deaths. Second, the 

Wheelers do not provide evidence that the thermal injury could have occurred 

only after the neighbors opened the exterior garage door. Indeed, Nikolas and 

Omen could have been burned prior to the garage door being opened. Thus, we 

are not persuaded.

The Wheelers also contend that “[s]ince John Monsebroten could not 

assume that the fire had reached the second floor before the garage door was 
No. 79427-2-I/16

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opened, . . . it is reasonable to infer that Omen [or Nikolas] died after the garage 

door was opened when the fire reached the second floor.” But Deputy Fire 

Marshall Monsebroten’s inability to draw a conclusion as to whether the fire had 

reached the second floor does not allow for a reasonable inference that Omen 

and Nikolas were still alive when it did. This is particularly true because Nikolas’s 

and Omen’s autopsies concluded that they died from smoke inhalation.

Finally, the Wheelers rely on Martini v. Post, 178 Wn. App. 153, 313 P.3d 

473 (2013), for various propositions. There, Thomas Martini and his wife, Judith 

Abson, leased a house from Paul Post. Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 157. The 

second story bedroom windows were broken and would not open, and Post failed 

to repair them. Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 156-57, 159. Abson died from smoke 

inhalation after she was trapped in the second floor bedroom by a fire that began 

in the home’s basement. Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 157-58. Martini sued Post 

under multiple theories of liability. Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 170-71. After the trial 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Post on the issue of proximate 

cause, Martini moved for reconsideration and introduced new evidence of 

handprints around the bedroom window and a declaration from a medical expert

that Abson would have survived had the bedroom window functioned properly. 

Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 159. 

On appeal, the court held that the newly introduced evidence presented a 

genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the broken windows were 

the proximate cause of Abson’s death. Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 159, 166. It 

therefore concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. 
No. 79427-2-I/17

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Martini, 178 Wn. App. at 171-72. Here, unlike in Martini, there is no evidence 

from which a reasonable juror could infer that Nikolas and Omen more likely than 

not would have survived had the door been repaired. Thus, Martini is not 

persuasive. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

WE CONCUR: