Insurgency: Modern Warfare

Evolves into a Fourth Generation

by Thomas X. Hammes

Strategic Forum

F

ourth-generation warfare, which is now

playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a

modern form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political

leaders that their strategic goals are either

unachievable or too costly for the perceived

benefit. The fundamental precept is that

superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and

military power. Because it is organized to

ensure political rather than military success,

this type of warfare is difficult to defeat.

Strategically, fourth-generation warfare

remains focused on changing the minds of

decisionmakers. Politically, it involves

transnational, national, and subnational

organizations and networks. Operationally, it

uses different messages for different audiences, all of which focus on breaking an

opponent’s political will. Tactically, it utilizes

materials present in the society under attack—to include industrial chemicals, liquefied natural gas, or fertilizers.

Although these modern insurgencies are

the only type of war that the United States

has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia),

they can be overcome—witness Malaya

(1950s), Oman (1970s), and El Salvador

(1980s). Winning, however, requires coherent,

patient action that encompasses the full

range of political, economic, social, and

military activities. The United States cannot

force its opponents to fight the short, hightechnology wars it easily dominates. Instead,

the Nation must learn to fight fourth-generation wars anew.

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush

declared the end of major combat in Iraq.

While most Americans rejoiced at this announcement, students of history understood

that it simply meant the easy part was over. In

the following months, peace did not break out,

and the troops did not come home. In fact,

Iraqi insurgents have struck back hard. Instead

of peace, each day Americans read about the

death of another soldier, the detonation of

deadly car bombs, the assassination of civilians, and Iraqi unrest.

Barely 3 months later, in August, a series of

bombs hit a police academy graduation ceremony, the Jordanian Embassy, and United

Nations (UN) headquarters in Baghdad. The

Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim (leader of

the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in

Iraq) was killed, and an attempt was made to

kill the Baghdad chief of police. These attacks

marked the opening of the anti-coalition campaign that continued through the turnover of

authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. As of

this writing, the violence continues as Iraqi

authorities struggle to provide security for their

people and work to rebuild their country. Unfortunately, Iraq has become the scene of another

fourth-generation war.

At the same time things were degenerating

in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan was moving

into fourth-generation conflict. While al Qaeda

and the Taliban were not attacking U.S. troops

directly, they were moving aggressively to defeat

the U.S.-supported Hamid Kharzai government.

Decisively defeated in the conventional campaign by a combination of U.S. firepower and

Northern Alliance troops, the anti-coalition

forces have returned to the style of warfare that

succeeded against the Soviets. The Taliban’s

emphasis on derailing the recent presidential

elections shows they understand that fourthgeneration warfare is a political rather than

military struggle. By trying to prevent Afghans

from voting, they sought to undermine the

legitimacy of whoever won the elections. Instead

of defeating the government’s security forces,

they plan to destroy its legitimacy. While polling

for the presidential election proceeded without

major incident, it remains to be seen whether

this positive step has set the Taliban back politically—and much more contentious legislative

elections are just over the horizon.

In Iraq, the attacks on and threats against

oil pipelines are economic and political in

nature. The insurgents are assessing a tax on

the entire world’s economy by raising the price

of oil. They hope such attacks will weaken the

Iraqi government while simultaneously bringing economic and political pressure to bear on

the United States. Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al

Sadr’s shift from military action to the political

arena most likely means no real change in

goals, only methods. He can use his political

and social networks in conjunction with his

militias to advance his goals.

In Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Spain, al

Qaeda and its affiliates managed a series of

high-profile attacks and are promising a major

attack on the United States. Despite the Bush

administration’s declaration of victory in Iraq

and Afghanistan, the war on terror has not

been an entirely one-sided fight.

As debilitating and regular as these attacks

are, this kind of warfare is not new but rather

has been evolving over the last seven decades.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have moved

No. 214

January 2005

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 214, January 2005 Strategic Forum 1
from third-generation warfare, America’s forte,

to fourth-generation warfare. It is much too

early to predict the outcome of either fight, but

the anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan and

Iraq are attempting to tie their fourth-generation tactics into integrated strategic campaigns.

At the same time, al Qaeda is maintaining its

own strategic campaign: to defeat the United

States and its allies.

Opponents in various parts of the world

know that fourth-generation warfare is the only

kind the United States has ever lost—and not

just once, but three times: in Vietnam,

Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare

also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It

continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the

United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other

areas where it is engaged in the war on terror.

This record of defeat of major powers by much

weaker fourth-generation opponents makes it

essential to understand this new form of warfare and adapt accordingly.

Mao Tse Tung was the first to define modern insurgency as a political struggle and use it

successfully. Each practitioner since has learned,

usually through a painful process of trial and

error, from his predecessors or co-combatants.

Each then has adjusted the lessons to his own

fight and added his own refinements. The cumulative result is a new approach to war. The

anti-coalition forces in Iraq, the Taliban in

Afghanistan, the Chechens, and the al Qaeda

network are simply the latest to use an approach

that has been developing for decades.

Since World War II, wars have been a

mixed bag of conventional and unconventional

conflicts. Conventional wars—the Korean War,

the Israeli-Arab wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973,

the Falklands (Malvinas) War, the Iran-Iraq

war, and the first Gulf War—generally have

ended with a return to the strategic status quo.

While some territory changed hands and, in

some cases, regimes changed, each state came

out of the war with largely the same political,

economic, and social structure with which it

entered. In short, the strategic situation of the

participants did not change significantly.

In contrast, unconventional wars—the

Communist revolution in China, the first and

second Indochina wars, the Algerian war of

independence, the Sandinista struggle in

Nicaragua, the Iranian revolution, the AfghanSoviet war of the 1980s, the first intifada, and

the Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon—

display a markedly different pattern. Each

ended with major changes in the political,

economic, and social structure of the territories

involved. While the changes may not have been

better for the people, they were distinct. Even

those unconventional wars where the insurgents lost (Malaya, Oman, El Salvador) led to

significant changes. The message is clear for

anyone wishing to shift the political balance of

power: only unconventional war works against

established powers.

Strategic Aspects

Fourth-generation warfare attempts to

change the minds of enemy policymakers

directly. But this change is not to be achieved

through the traditional first- through thirdgeneration objective of destroying the enemy’s

armed forces and the capacity to regenerate

them. Both the epic, decisive battles of the

Napoleonic era and the wide-ranging, highspeed maneuver campaigns of the 20th century

are irrelevant to this new warfare. More relevant is the way in which specific messages are

targeted toward policymakers and those who

can influence them. Although tailored for

various audiences, each message is designed to

achieve the basic purpose of war: to change an

opponent’s political position on a matter of

national interest.

The struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan

show these characteristics. In each, the insurgents are sending one message to their supporters, another to the undecided population, and a

third to the coalition decisionmakers. Supporters are told that they are defending the faith

and their country against outside invaders. The

message to uncommitted or pro-coalition

countrymen is to stay out of the fight between

the insurgents and the invaders, who will

eventually leave. Finally, the coalition, particularly the Americans, is advised to withdraw or

be engaged in an endless, costly fight.

Fourth-generation warfare is not bloodless.

As shown in the chart on page 4, the casualties

we have sustained in fighting insurgents in Iraq

long ago passed those we sustained in the

comparatively short, high-intensity phase that

toppled Saddam. And even then, most casualties

will tend to be civilian, a pattern borne out by

fighting in Iraq, Chechnya, Palestinian areas,

and elsewhere. Further, many of those casualties

will be caused not by military weapons but

rather by materials made available within

society. Thus, the opponent does not have to

build the warfighting infrastructure required by

earlier generations of war.

As displayed in the Beirut bombings, the

Khobar Towers bombing, the Northern Ireland

campaign, the American Embassy bombings in

Africa, the 9/11 attacks, and the ongoing

2 Strategic Forum No. 214, January 2005

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, is senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at

the National Defense University. Questions may be sent to Colonel Hammes at hammest@ndu.edu.

Fourth-Generation Warfare in Perspective

The term fourth-generation warfare came into use among military strategists and planners

in the late 1980s as a way to characterize the dynamics and future direction of warfare.

This community postulated the evolution of warfare in several distinct phases. The first

generation of modern (post-Westphalian) war was dominated by massed manpower and

culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. Firepower characterized the second generation,

which culminated in World War I. The third generation was dominated by maneuver as

developed by the Germans in World War II. The fourth generation has evolved in ways that

take advantage of the political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War

II. It makes use of the advantages those changes offer an unconventional enemy. For

background and a compilation of papers and articles on the subject, see the Defense and

the National Interest Web site at <http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_

warfare.htm>.

opponents in various

parts of the world know

that fourth-generation

warfare is the only kind

the United States has

ever lost
bombing campaign in Iraq, fourth-generation

warfare practitioners are increasingly using

materials made available by the society they

are attacking. This allows them to take a very

different strategic approach. It relieves the

practitioners of the necessity of defending core

production assets and frees them to focus on

offense rather than defense. It also relieves

them of the burden of moving supplies long

distances. Instead, only money and ideas—

both of which can be digitized and moved

instantly—must be transported.

Furthermore, even at the strategic level,

the importance of the media in shaping the

policy of the participants will continue to

increase. This was demonstrated when U.S.

interest in Somalia, previously negligible, was

stimulated by the repeated images of thousands

of starving Somali children. Conversely, the

images of U.S. soldiers being dragged through

the streets ended that commitment. The media

will remain a major factor from the strategic to

the tactical level. In fact, worldwide media

exposure can quickly give a tactical action

strategic impact. 

Political Aspects

Fourth-generation warriors exploit international, transnational, national, and subnational networks politically for their own purposes. A growing variety of international

conduits are available: the United Nations, the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the

World Bank, the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries, and dozens of others. Each

organization has a different function in international affairs, but each has its own vulnerabilities and can be used to convey a political

message to its leadership and then to target

capital cities. While these international organizations may not be able to change the minds of

national leaders directly, they can be used to

slow or paralyze an international response.

The prime objective of the fourth-generation practitioner is to create political paralysis

in both the international organizations (usually

not a difficult task) and the target nation (difficulty varies with the nation being targeted). In

addition to normal political attacks, planners

can influence other aspects of the target society.

For instance, they know that the security situation in a country has a direct effect on the

ability of that nation to get loans. This gives the

attacker a different venue to affect the position

of a nation—the mere threat of action may be

enough to impact the financial status of the

target nation and encourage it to negotiate.

Thus, if the objective is to paralyze the political

processes of a target nation, a number of methods can be used.

Attacks by the al Sadr militia on oil production infrastructure in southern Iraq have

illustrated this fact. Nigerian rebels have also

used the threat to oil production to force negotiation on the Nigerian government. The fact

that oil prices were at a record high gave the

rebels more leverage because each day’s delay

increased the costs to the Nigerian government.

As the world becomes ever more interconnected,

the potential for varied approaches increases,

and the effects may reinforce each other.

A coherent fourth-generation warfare plan

always exploits transnational elements in

various ways. The vehicles may include not

only extremist belief-based organizations such

as Islamic Jihad, but also nationalistic organizations such as the Palestinians and Kurds,

mainline Christian churches, humanitarian

organizations, economic structures such as the

stock and bond markets, and even criminal

organizations such as narco-traffickers and

arms merchants. The key traits of transnational organizations are that none are contained completely within a recognized nationstate’s borders; none have official members that

report back to nation-states; and they owe no

loyalty to any nation—and sometimes little to

their own organizations.

The use of such transnational elements

will vary with the strategic situation, but they

offer a number of possibilities. They can be a

source of recruits. They can be used (at times

unwittingly) as cover to move people and assets.

They can be an effective source of funds; charitable organizations have supported terrorist

organizations as diverse as the Irish Republican

Army (IRA) and al Qaeda. During the 1970s, for

example, Irish bars on the east coast of America

often had jars where patrons could make donations, ostensibly to provide support to Irish

families, but in fact much of the money went

directly to support IRA insurgent operations.

At times, entire organizations can be used

openly to support the position of the fourthgeneration warfare operator. Usually this is

done when the organization genuinely agrees

with the position of one of the antagonists, but

false flag operations are also viable. Such

support can lend legitimacy to a movement

and even reverse long-held international views

of a specific situation.

National political institutions are primary

targets for fourth-generation messages. Insurgents fighting the United States—whether the

North Vietnamese, the Sandinistas, or the

Palestinians—know that if Congress cuts off

funds, U.S. allies would lose their wars. Thus,

Congressmen have been targeted with the

message that the war was unwinnable and it

No. 214, January 2005 Strategic Forum 3

Insurgencies throughout History

Insurgency, often referred to as guerrilla warfare, is not new. The very name guerrilla (“little

war”) dates back to the Spanish resistance against Napoleon’s occupation of Spain

(1809–1813). In fact, insurgency far predates that campaign. Darius the Great, King of Persia

(558–486 BC), and Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) both fought insurgents during their

reigns. Insurgency continued as a form of war through the ages. The Irish nationalist,

Michael Collins, drove the British out of Ireland with an insurgent campaign during

1916–1921. In all cases, the weaker side used insurgent tactics to counter the superior

military power of its enemies. However, in the 20th century, the political aspects of insurgency

came to dominate these struggles. The goal became the destruction of the enemy’s political

will rather than the exhaustion of his conventional military power. Advances in communications technology and the growth of formal and informal networks have greatly increased

the ability of the insurgent to attack the will of enemy decisionmakers directly.

the prime objective of 

the fourth-generation

practitioner is to create

political paralysis in both

the international organizations and the target

nation
4 Strategic Forum No. 214, January 2005

made no sense to keep fighting it. The Sandinistas even worked hard to make individual

Congressmen part of their network by sponsoring trips for congressional aides and mainline

church groups to insurgent-held areas in

Nicaragua. If they could convince their guests

that Anastasio Somoza’s government was

indeed corrupt, they would actively lobby other

aides and the Congressmen themselves to cut

off aid to Somoza. Nongovernmental national

groups—churches, diaspora associations,

business groups, and even lobbying firms—

have been major players in shaping national

policies. The United States must assume its

opponents will continue these efforts.

Subnational organizations can represent

both groups who are minorities in their traditional homelands, such as the Basque, and

those who are self-selecting minorities, such as

Sons of Liberty and Aryan Nation. These groups

are in unusual positions; they can be either

enemies or allies of the established powers. It

simply depends upon who best serves their

interests. Even more challenging is the fact that

since they are not unified groups, one element

of a subnational group may support the government while another supports the insurgents.

Political alliances, interests, and positions

among and between insurgents will change

according to various political, economic, social, and military aspects of the conflict. While

this has been a factor in all wars (Italy

changed sides in the middle of World War II,

the largest conventional war), it will be prevalent in fourth-generation war. It is much easier

for nonstate entities (tribes, clans, businesses,

criminal groups, racial groups, subnational

groups, and transnational groups) to change

sides than it is for nation-states or national

groups. A government usually ties itself to a

specific cause. It has to convince decisionmakers or its people to support it. Thus, it can be

awkward for that government to change sides

in midconflict without losing the confidence of

its people. Often, the act of changing sides will

lead to the fall of the government. In contrast,

nonstate entities get involved only for their own

needs, and, if these needs change, they can

easily shift loyalties.

Operational Techniques

To influence this wide variety of networks

effectively, the fourth-generation warfare

operational planner must seek different pathways for various messages. Traditional diplomatic channels, both official and unofficial,

are still important but are no longer the only

route for communication and influence. Other

networks rival the prominence of the official

ones. The media have become a primary

avenue, as seen in places such as Vietnam, the

West Bank, and Iraq. However, the sheer diversity and fragmentation of the media make it

much more challenging for either side to

control the message. Professional lobbying

groups also have proven effective.

An increasingly important avenue is the

Internet and the power it provides grassroots

campaigns. Whether it is the international

campaign to ban landmines or Abu Musab alZarqawi’s terror campaign in Iraq, the Internet

provides an alternate channel for high-impact

messages unfiltered by editors or political

influence. It can also be used to raise money.

A key factor in a fourth-generation warfare campaign is that the audience is not a

unified target. It is increasingly fragmented

into interest groups that may realign or even

shift sides depending on how a particular

campaign affects their issues. During the first

intifada, the Palestinians tailored messages for

different constituencies. The Israelis have used

the same technique during the al Aqsa intifada,

and the anti-coalition forces are doing so today

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

to complicate matters,

fourth-generation warfare

will incorporate elements

of earlier generations of

war

0

30

60

90

120

150

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

March 2003

April 2003

May

June

July

August

September

October

NovemberDecember

January 2004

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

NovemberDecember

U.S. Named/Reported Dead

U.S. Wounded

March 2003

April 2003

May

June

July

August

September

October

NovemberDecember

January 2004

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

NovemberDecember

Major Combat Phase Insurgency Phase

Total Dead Total Wounded

U.S. Military Casualties in Iraq: Higher Against the Insurgents Than Against Saddam’s Armed Forces

Source: Based on U.S. Government data compiled on the Global Security Web site, available at http://globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm.
The United States has been slow to understand the importance of these communications.

As recently as last year, military spokesmen

insisted that the insurgent attacks on U.S. troops

in Iraq were “militarily insignificant.” This was

at a time when each attack was on the front

page of major daily newspapers in the United

States and Europe. While the actual casualties

may have been few, each story reached the

decisionmakers in Congress and the public.

To succeed, the fourth-generation operational planner must determine the message he

wants to send; the networks best suited to carry

those messages; the actions that will cause the

network to send the message; and the feedback

system that will tell him if the message is being

received. In Bosnia, the seizure of UN hostages

by Serb forces during the NATO bombing campaign of 1995 was the first step of a cycle. The

media were used to transmit images of the

peacekeepers chained to buildings. Then the

Serbs watched television to determine the

response of the various governments. It allowed

them to commit the act, transmit it via various

channels, observe the response, and then decide

what to do next. All this occurred much faster

than the bureaucratic reporting processes of

NATO could complete the same cycle.

During the first intifada, the Palestinians

made an operational decision to limit the use of

violence. They confronted the Israeli Army not

with heavily armed guerrillas but with teenagers

armed only with rocks. Thus, they neutralized

U.S. support for Israeli action, froze Israeli

defense forces, and influenced the Israeli national election, which led to the Oslo Accords. 

Similarly, the series of bombings conducted by the Iraqi insurgents throughout the

fall and winter of 2003–2004 carefully targeted

the organizations most helpful to the Coalition

Provisional Authority—police, the United

Nations, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), coalition partners, the Kurdish political parties, and Shia clerics. Each event was

tactically separated by time and space, but each

fit together operationally to attack America’s

strategic position in the country.

In Iraq, the United States has found no

evidence of central direction at this early date in

the insurgency, yet the pattern of the attacks has

represented a coherent approach to driving the

coalition out of the country. The question is:

With no coordination, how could the insurgents

reinforce each others’ actions?

The insurgents could track each attack

and, to a degree, measure its effectiveness by

monitoring the Iraqi, U.S., and international

media. Those attacks that succeeded were

quickly emulated; those that failed ceased to be

used. The insurgents showed many of the

characteristics of a self-organizing network.

Each attack is designed to prevent a stable,

democratic government from emerging. Not all

attacks have succeeded, but they have kept UN

presence to a minimum and have driven many

NGOs out of the country. Further, the coalition

is shrinking, and the insurgency has clearly

affected the price of oil. And the threat of instability spreading to the rest of the Persian Gulf

increases the upward pressure on oil prices. 

To complicate matters, fourth-generation

warfare will incorporate elements of earlier

generations of war. Even as the Israelis struggled with the intifada, they had to remain

aware that major conventional forces were on

their border. In Vietnam, the United States and

later South Vietnam had to deal with aggressive, effective fourth-generation guerrillas while

always being prepared to deal with major North

Vietnamese conventional forces. Clearly, the

new generation of warfare seeks to place an

enemy on the horns of this dilemma. Just as

clearly, this is an intentional approach that

reaches all the way back to Mao.

Action in one or all of the fields above will

not be limited to the geographic location (if

any) of the antagonists but will take place

worldwide. From New York to Bali and Madrid,

al Qaeda and its affiliates have forcefully illustrated this to their enemies. Though some

elements will be more attractive as targets, no

element of American society, no matter where it

is in the world, is off limits to attack. The Bush

administration actions in Afghanistan and

elsewhere against the al Qaeda network show

that effective counters must also be worldwide. 

The range of possible fourth-generation

opponents is broad. It is important to remember that such an opponent does not need a

large command and control system. At a time

when U.S. forces are pouring more money and

manpower into command and control, commercial technology makes worldwide, secure

communications available to anyone with a

laptop and a credit card. It also provides access

to 1-meter-resolution satellite imagery, extensive information on U.S. troop movements,

immediate updates on national debates, and

international discussion forums. Finally, it

provides a worldwide financial network that is

fairly secure. In fact, with the proliferation of

Internet cafes, one needs neither the credit card

nor the laptop—only an understanding of how

email and a browser work and some basic

human intelligence tradecraft.

Ideas and funds can be moved through a

variety of methods from email to surface mail

to personal courier to messages embedded in

classified advertisements. The opponent will

try to submerge his communications in the

noise of the everyday activity. He will use

commercial sources and vehicles to disguise

the movement of material and funds as commerce. His people will do their best to merge

into whatever civil society they find themselves

in. As a result, detecting the operational-level

activities of a sophisticated opponent will be

extraordinarily difficult.

Tactical Considerations

Fourth-generation warfare takes place in

the complex environment of low-intensity

conflict. Every potential opponent has observed

the Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and

operations in Afghanistan. They understand

that if the United States is provided clear targets, no matter how well fortified, those targets

will be destroyed. Just as certainly, they have

seen the success of the Somalis and the Sandinistas. They have also seen and are absorbing

the continuing lessons of Chechnya, Bosnia,

Afghanistan, and Iraq. They will not fight with

conventional means.

In attempting to change the minds of key

decisionmakers, antagonists will use several

tactical paths to get their message through to

presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members,

legislators, and even voters. Immediate, highimpact messages will probably come via visual

media—and the more dramatic and bloody

the image, the stronger the message. Longer

term, less immediate but more thought-provoking messages will be passed through business, religious, economic, academic, artistic,

No. 214, January 2005 Strategic Forum 5

though some elements

will be more attractive 

as targets, no element 

of American society, no

matter where it is in the

world, is off limits to

attack
and even social networks. While the messages

will be based on a strategic theme, the delivery

will be by tactical action such as guided tours

of refugee camps, exclusive interviews with

insurgent leaders, targeted kidnapping, beheadings, car bombings, and assassinations.

This warfare will involve a mixture of

international, transnational, national, and

subnational actors. Since the operational planner of a fourth-generation campaign must use

all the tools available, the United States probably will have to deal with actors from all these

arenas at the tactical level as well. Even more

challenging, some will be violent actors and

others nonviolent. In fact, the term noncombatant applies much more readily to conventional conflicts between states than to fourthgeneration war involving state and nonstate

actors. Nonviolent actors, while being legally

noncombatants, will be a critical part of tactical

actions. By using crowds, protesters, media

interviews, Internet Web sites, and other nonviolent methods, fourth-generation warriors can

create tactical dilemmas for opponents. Tactical

resources in police, intelligence, military, propaganda, and political spheres will be needed to

deal with the distractions they create.

Tactical military action (for example,

terrorist, guerrilla, or, rarely, conventional) will

be tied to the message and targeted at various

groups. The August 19, 2003, bombing of the

UN headquarters in Iraq convinced the organization that continuing to operate in Iraq would

be too costly. The August 19, 2004, burning of

southern Iraq oil buildings had an immediate

effect on the per barrel price of oil. These were

two tactical actions with different messages for

different target audiences, yet they both support

the strategic goal of increasing the cost to the

United States of staying in Iraq. 

WMD Attacks

Only by looking at current conflicts as

fourth-generation warfare events can America’s

true vulnerabilities to an attack with weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) be seen. Even a

limited biological attack with a contagious

agent, such as plague, will result in a shutdown of major segments of air travel, shipping,

and trade. Smallpox will require a total quarantine of the affected areas until the incubation period has passed. The potential for billions of dollars in losses to disrupted trade is

obvious, as well as years of continuing loss due

to subsequent litigation.

WMD attacks may not focus on physical

destruction but rather on area denial or disruption. The ability of a single person to shut down

Senate office buildings and post offices with two

anthrax letters is a vivid example of an area

denial weapon. Disruption can easily be made

even more widespread. The use of containerized

freight to deliver either a WMD or a high-yield

explosive will have more far-reaching and costly

effects on the international trade network than

the shutdown of international air routes. Security for airliners and air freight is easy compared

to the problem of inspecting seaborne shipping

containers. Yet containers are the basic component for the majority of international trade

today, and the United States has no current

system to secure or inspect them. By taking

advantage of this vulnerability, terrorists can

impose huge economic costs with little effort.

They do not have to limit their actions to the

containers but can also use the ships themselves.

Ships flying flags of convenience do so to minimize the ability of government efforts to regulate

or tax them. It is logical to assume the same

characteristics will appeal to terrorists. 

Finally, terrorists do not even have to

provide the materials for simple chemical

attacks. The 1984 chemical plant disaster in

Bhopal, India, killed more people than 9/11

and left more with serious long-term injuries.

While Bhopal was an accident, it presents a

precedent for a devastating chemical attack.

The existence of chemical plants and the

movement of toxic industrial chemicals needed

to support the American lifestyle ensure the raw

material for a chemical attack is always present. In addition to the widely recognized potential for chemical attack, it is fairly certain

terrorists are today exploring how to use liquid

natural gas tankers, fuel trucks, radioactive

waste, and other available material for future

attacks. These are just a few of the resources

available to an intelligent, creative opponent. 

Long Timelines

Fourth-generation warfare timelines,

organizations, and objectives are very different

from those of conventional war. Of particular

importance is the fact that timelines are much

longer. Failure to understand that essential fact

is why many observers do not fully appreciate

the magnitude of the challenge presented by a

fourth-generation enemy.

When the United States has to fight, it

prefers to wage short, well-defined wars. For the

United States, a long war is 5 years—which, in

fact, was the duration of major U.S. involvement

in Vietnam (1965–1970). The Nation entered

when the war was already under way and left

before it was over. Even then, the U.S. public

thought the country had been at war too long.

But fourth-generation wars are long. The

Chinese Communists fought for 28 years; the

Vietnamese Communists for 30; the Sandinistas

for 18. The Palestinians have been resisting

Israeli occupation for 37 years so far—and

some would argue they have been fighting since

1948. The Chechens have been fighting over 10

years—this time. Al Qaeda has been fighting for

their vision of the world for 20 years since the

founding of Maktab al-Khidamar in 1984.

Numerous other insurgencies in the world have

lasted decades. Accordingly, when getting

involved in this type of fight, the United States

must plan for a decades-long commitment.

From an American point of view, duration may

well be the single most important characteristic

of fourth-generation warfare. Leadership must

maintain the focus of effort through numerous

elections and even changes of administration to

prevail in such an effort.

The United States must understand that

fourth-generation organizations are different.

Since Mao, they have focused on the long-term

political viability of the movement rather than

on its short-term tactical effectiveness. They do

not see themselves as military organizations

but rather as webs that generate the political

power central to this type of warfare. Thus,

these organizations are unified by ideas. The

leadership and the organizations are networked

to provide for survivability and continuity when

attacked. And the leadership recognizes that

their most important function is to sustain the

idea and the organizations, not simply to win

on the battlefield.

These opponents focus on the political

aspects of the conflict because they accept that

war is ultimately a political act. Since the final

6 Strategic Forum No. 214, January 2005

fourth-generation warfare

timelines, organizations,

and objectives are very

different from those of

conventional war
objective is changing the minds of the enemy’s

political leadership, the intermediate objectives

are all milestones focused on shifting the

opinion of the various target audiences. They

know that time is on their side.

Noted military strategist Harry Summers

recounted how he once told a North

Vietnamese colonel that the United States had

never been beaten on the battlefield. The officer

replied, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”1 Because of the long timelines and its

political nature, the objectives are different.

Fourth-generation opponents do not seek the

defeat of the enemy forces. They seek the erosion of the enemy’s political will and can win

even if the opposing military force is largely

intact. They focus on winning wars, not battles.

U.S. Response

Fourth-generation opponents are not

invincible. They can be beaten, but only by

coherent, patient actions that encompass all

agencies of the government and elements of

the private sector. Their warfare encompasses

the fields of diplomacy, defense, intelligence,

law enforcement, and economic and social

development. American efforts must be organized as a network rather than in the traditional

vertical bureaucracies of Federal departments.

This interagency process will have to exert its

influence for the duration of the war—from

the initiation of planning to the final withdrawal of forces. 

Besides dealing with the long timelines,

developing genuine interagency networks will

be the most difficult U.S. problem in fighting a

fourth-generation opponent. This will require

fundamental changes in how national security

leadership trains, develops, promotes, deploys,

and employs personnel across the Federal

Government. The current system, which is

based on 19th-century bureaucratic theory,

cannot support 21st-century operations. In

particular, the United States must be able to:

■ train personnel in a genuine interagency

environment. From the classroom to daily operations to interagency training exercises, personnel

must think and act as part of a network rather than

a hierarchy.

■ develop personnel through the equivalent

of military joint tours. As in the military, these tours

must be an essential step for promotion.

■ deploy interagency personnel from all

segments of the U.S. Government overseas for much

longer tours. The current 3- to 12-month overseas

tours in a crisis cannot work in fights lasting decades.

■ operate as interagency elements down to

the tactical level. This means abandoning the

agency-specific stovepipes that link operations

overseas to their U.S. headquarters. The British War

Committee system used in the Malaya emergency

provides one model that eliminated the stovepipes

and ensured unified effort at every level of government. Starting in peacetime, personnel must be

trained to be effective linking into the interagency

process, and those who do so should be rewarded.

The current process of rewarding those who work

entirely within a specific agency prevents effective

networking.

■ eliminate the detailed, bureaucratic

processes that characterize peacetime government

actions (particularly contracting and purchasing).

People have to be trusted and held accountable.

Longer tours of duty will be essential, both to ensure

that personnel understand the specific situation well

enough to make decisions and can legitimately be

held accountable for their actions. The current short

tours mean no one masters his or her job, the

records are incomplete, and accountability cannot

be maintained.

■ develop procedures for fully integrating the

range of international organizations, NGOs, allies,

and specialists necessary to succeed against an

adept, agile insurgent.

These are major challenges, but a model

exists with which to work. Presidential Decision

Directive 56 provides an excellent starting point.2

Based on lessons learned from U.S. involvement

in multiple crises and complex contingencies

during the 1990s, it provides guidance for both

training and operations in an interagency

environment that can be adapted for the purpose of waging fourth-generation warfare.

Yet this is only a starting point. In the

same way that the Armed Forces had to learn

to fight jointly to master third-generation war,

the entire government must learn to operate

in a genuine interagency fashion to master

fourth-generation conflict. There are no

simple, one department, one-dimensional

solutions to these wars. Even with a fully

functioning interagency process, the assumption must be made that fourth-generation

wars will last a decade or more.

Conclusion

As German military strategist Carl von

Clausewitz once observed: “The first, the

supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have

to make is to establish by that test the kind of

war on which they are embarking; neither

mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into,

something that is alien to its nature.”3 Fourthgeneration war, like its predecessors, will continue to evolve in ways that mirror global

society as a whole. As the United States moves

away from a hierarchical, industrial-based

society to a networked, information-based

society, its political, socioeconomic, and technological bases will also evolve.

With this evolution come opportunity and

hazard. The key to providing for security lies in

recognizing these changes for what they are. In

understanding the kind of war being fought,

the United States must not attempt to shape it

into something it is not. Opponents cannot be

forced into a third-generation war that maximizes American strengths; they will fight the

fourth-generation war that challenges U.S.

weaknesses. Clausewitz’s admonition to national leaders remains as valid as ever, and it

must guide the planning for future wars.

Notes1

Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of

the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 1. 2

Presidential Decision Directive 56 was developed by the

Clinton administration to manage complex contingency

operations. Although canceled by the Bush administration, it still

provides a well-thought-out model for insurgency operations. 3

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret and

Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

No. 214, January 2005 Strategic Forum 7

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy

research and strategic gaming organization within the National

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its

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senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press
8 Strategic Forum No. 214, January 2005

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Strategic Forum series

For on-line access to these and other publications, go to: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html

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Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era; a collection of articles by the Honorable Ike Skelton. A leader in the House on

defense issues, Congressman Skelton is the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee and a strong proponent 

of Joint Professional Military Education.