merlcanUkrainian Nuclear 

Relations 

Roman Popadiuk 

lu.~ m|;h..... ~.s 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
Roman Popadiuk 

McNair Paper 55 

October 1996 

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ISSN 1071-7552 

.................................... ................................................. 
Nuclear Weapons ........................ 2 

Kravchuk's May 1992 Visit to the White House ..... 4 

Nuclear Weapons and Economic Assistance ....... 5 

Lisbon Protocol ............................. 6 

The U.S. and the Nuclear Question ............ 7 

2. UKRAINE'S APPROACH TO NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS ............................... 11 

3. THE END OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ..... 21 

. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION APPROACH .. 25 

Kravchuk Takes the Initiative .................. 28 

The U.S. Reappraisal ........................ 29 

. THE DEFACTO PROCESS: THE U.S.-UKRAINERUSSIA TALKS ........................... 33 

U.S. Deactivation Proposals .................. 33 

U.S.-Ukraine-Russia Dialogue ................. 35 

Ukraine Moves Toward Nuclear Status .......... 38 

Ukraine-Russia Stalemate .................... 39 

The Trilateral Agreement ..................... 41 

. FACTORS INFLUENCING UKRAINE'S 

RATIFICATION ............................ 45 

The Role of U.S. Pressure .................... 46 

The Issue of Security Assurances .............. 48 

Ukraine's Security Concerns .................. 50 

Negotiations over Security Assurances .......... 52 

7. CONCLUSION ............................. 57 
APPENDIX E: Map of Ukraine ................... 77 

APPENDIX F" Ukraine's Nuclear 

Inheritance ............................... 79 

APPENDIX G: Chronology ..................... 81 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ......................... 85 

iv 
Strategic Studies, both of which provided the initial encouragement 

to undertake this project. 

I am also grateful to the School of Area Studies at the Foreign 

Service Institute of the State Department for the opportunity to 

institute and teach the Area Studies Course on Ukraine. The 

lectures in that course, as well as my public appearances throughout 

the country, helped me shape my thoughts in approaching the 

challenge of writing this study. I wish to thank the staff in the 

Bureau of Public Affairs of the State Department for their courtesy 

and dedication in arranging my numerous speaking engagements 

throughout the United States. 

The American staff in Kiev, who exhibited a high degree of 

professionalism and dedication under difficult and changing 

circumstances, served as a source of inspiration. Their efforts were 

key in laying the foundation for a sound U.S.-Ukrainian 

partnership. The sense of history that they wimessed and helped 

shape demonstrated the high quality and expertise of the American 

Foreign Service at its best under trying circumstances. Our efforts 

in the field were supported admirably by the people in the European 

Bureau and the Ukraine Desk of the State Department, who also 

displayed the type of professionalism and support that eased the 

difficulties in establishing the U.S. presence in Ukraine. 

And, most important of all, I wish to thank my wife, Judith, and 

my children, Gregory, Matthew, Catherine, and Mary, for the 

support they gave and the burdens they shared in furthering United 

States policy in Ukraine. They served as selfless ambassadors to 

schools, institutes, and other organizations in representing 

American culture and in reaffirming the U.S. commitment to 

Ukraine. They, once again, reinforced their mark on me as a 

dedicated and supportive family. 

V 
BACKGROUND 

On June 1, 1996, the last strategic missiles were shipped from 

Ukraine to Russia, bringing to an end a contentious issue that had 

marred the early stages of U.S.-Ukraine relations. In welcoming 

this development, President Clinton stated, "I applaud the Ukrainian 

government for its historic contribution in reducing the nuclear 

threat .... We remain committed to supporting Ukraine through its 

ambitious and far-sighted reforms and to working with Ukraine and 

our European partners to promote Ukraine's integration into the 

European community." 

Elimination of Ukraine's strategic warheads was a goal that had 

spanned two U.S. administrations and that had been at the center of 

Western concerns. There were many obstacles that had to be 

overcome on all sides. Through a combination of diplomacy and 

cajolling, Ukraine had undertaken a final ratification of the START 

Treaty in February 1994, and acceded to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in November 1994. And in January 1994, in 

tile Trilateral agreement, tile United Stales, Ukraine, and Russia laid 

the foundation for the elimination of the warheads that was 

completed in 1996 mad that led to President Clinton's positive 

assessment. 

This study examines the early history of U.S.-Ukraine relations 

over the nuclear weapons issue. It presents both the history of a 2- 

year period, 1992-1994, and posits a number of explanations as to 

why things developed the way they did. The goal is to establish a 

framework of this important period from which scholars can further 

proceed. 
Union. Ukraine also declared its intention to voluntarily rid itself 

of those weapons. Prompted by the Chernobyl tragedy, Ukraine 

had made a comnfitment to a non-nuclear status as early as July 

1990 in its Declaration of State Sovereignty which pledged Ukraine 

not to accept, produce or purchase nuclear weapons. This pledge 

was reaffirmed in October 1991, by Ukraine's Parliament, the 

Verkhovna Rada. The Rada declaration stated that Kiev would get 

rid of its weapons in the shortest time but made reference to 

numerous considerations--including teclmical, finm~cial and 

environmental--that would need to be addressed. 

The Ukrainian nuclear arsenal included 176 missiles located at 

two sites, Khmelnitsky and Pervomaysk. There were 130 liquid 

fueled SS-19 missiles tipped with 6 warheads each based in 

Khmelnitsky and Pervomaysk, and 46 solid fuel SS-24 missiles 

with 10 warheads each at Pervomaysk. In addition, there were 

about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Approximately 600 air 

launched cruise missiles, as well as approximately 42 strategic 

bombers were based at Uzhin and Prilyki. 

INITIAL U.S.-UKRAINE CONTACTS OVER 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Early in the developing relationship it became clear that tile 

question of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, as well as in Belarus and 

Kazakhstan, was going to be of major concern to Washington. The 

issue emerged after Ukraine's declaration of independeuce from the 

crumbling Soviet Union on August 24, 1991. 

When Chairman of the Rada Leonid Kravchuk visited 

Wa.shington in September 1991, Ukraine's nuclear weapons were a 

primary topic. Kravchuk favored central c~mtrol of the nuclear 

weapons but voiced reservations about shipping them to other 

republics for dismantlement. Dmytro Pavlychko, then chairman of 

the Ukrainian Rada's Foreign Affairs Committee, who accompanied 

Kravchuk, spoke of the need to destroy the weapons in Ukraine, a 

view that Kravchuk shared. Earlier in the month, Russian Republic 
referendum, nuclear weapons were again a major point of bilateral 

discussion. During his December visit to Kiev, Secretary of State 

James Baker heard Kiev's reaffirmation of its intent to ratify 

START, accede to the NPT, and to ratify the CFE Treaty. In 

addition, Secretary Baker received assurances that the nuclear 

forces would be under a central CIS (Commonwealth of 

Independent States) command, thereby precluding unilateral 

Ukrainian control. 

In the early stages, things appeared to be moving without 

problems. Kiev agreed to give up its tactical weapons to Russia for 

dismantlement in keeping with the Alma Ata agreement, which was 

signed on December 21, 1991, during a CIS meeting in that city. 

The agreement also committed all four nuclear republics--Ukraine, 

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan--to the position that any use of 

nuclear weapons would have to be agreed upon by the four 

countries' leaders. It also committed Kiev to join tile Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. And at the Minsk 

CIS meeting of December 30, 1991, Kiev committed itself to 

dismantle its strategic nuclear forces by the end of 1994. By early 

May 1992, Kiev had fulfilled its pledge on the tactical nuclear 

weapons, thus actually beating the July 1, 1992, deadline set by the 

Alma Ata agreement. 

However, Ukraine's temporary halt of shipments of tactical 

nuclear weapons to Russia in March-April, 1992 raised much 

concern in Washington. In announcing the suspension on March 

12, Kiev explained that it had no guarantee that the tactical weapons 

shipped to Russia would be destroyed. Furthermore, Ukraine was 

concerned that the weapons might wind up in the wrong hands. 

This decision by Kiev was doubly troubling for the United States 

since in a 20-minute phone conversation on February 27 with 

President Bush, Kravchuk had stated that Ukraine would meet the 

goal of withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons. After an 

agreement was signed with Russia on April 16 forming a joint 

commission for monitoring the transfer and dismantlement of the 

tactical weapons, Ukraine resumed the shipments. Washington's 
Congress on April 8 that Ukraine met file conditions for eligibility 

to receive Nuxm-Lugar assistance to dismantle its nuclear weapons. 

The certification was based on Kiev's assurances and practices. 

KRAVCHUK'S MAY 1992 VISIT TO THE 

WHITE HOUSE 

In the wake of the March stall by Kiev on tile tactical nuclear 

weapons withdrawal, the high-level interagency team of Ed Hewett 

of the NSC, Paul Wolfowitz, then Undersecretary of Defense, and 

Dennis Ross of the State Department traveled to Ukraine in April in 

an effort to broaden tile relationship and to move it beyond the 

initial concerns over nuclear weapons. This visit helped to set tile 

stage for Kravchuk's successful May 6 visit to the White House. 

During the visit, Kravchuk stated his commiunent to ratify START, 

to eliminate the strategic nuclear weapons during the 7-year period 

as mandated by file treaty, and pledged that Ukraine would join the 

NPT as a non-nuclear state in the shortest possible time. The 

administration was not happy with the NPT formula since it wanted 

Ukraine to commit itself to a specific short-term date, and the 

Ukrainian version left that open. 

The United States had hoped to persuage Kiev to adhere to a 

shorter timetable for elimination of the weapons, especially in view 

of the fact that Ukraine had pledged to rid itself of the strategic 

weapons by the end of 1994 under the Minsk agreement. Kravchuk 

also indicated that, while the warheads would be removed and 

shipped to Russia for dismantlement, Kiev was reserving the right 

to hold onto some of the missiles, particularly the advmlced SS-24s, 

to use them for commercial purposes and to remove the temptation 

tor Russia's redeploying the missiles. 

In addition to the nuclear understaJtding a number of 

agreements were reached. Ukraine walked away with a firm U.S. 

commitment to a bilateral partnership, a trade agreement, extension 

of OPIC activities into Ukraine, a Peace Corps agreement, $110 

million in agricultural credits, an agreement on cooperation in 
cooperate in political, economic, and security interests. It 

concluded by stating that the United States and Ukraine "have laid 

the foundation for a strong and special partnership." Atier tile East 

Room signing ceremony of the trade agreement, the President 

stated, "Ukraine's future security is important for the United States 

and for stability in Europe" and that the United States hoped to 

establish "the closest possible political and cultural ties between 

independent Ukraine and the United States." 

Ukraine felt satisfied and, coupled with the announcement of 

the removal of the last of the tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine 

to Russia during the visit, the beginning bilateral steps were strong 

and held out the prospect for greater progress. Prior to his meetings 

with the President, Kravchuk and a delegation of Ukrainian 

businessmen brought along to stimulate U.S. trade in Ukraine had 

had a working breakfast at Blair House with Commerce Secretary 

Franklin. These meetings all appeared to show that the Ukrainians 

were going to be moving forward in a serious fashion. Indeed, the 

President subsequently wrote to Kravchuk that their meetings were 

"successful in laying the foundation for a close partnership." 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ECONOMIC 

ASSISTANCE 

Despite Baker's April comments, there was no attempt to link 

economic and nuclear issues. In the interagency meetings leading 

up to the Kravchuk visit, there had been no discussion of tieing 

economic assistance to the nuclear weapons. Despite Baker's 

frustration, President Bush's National Security Advisor Brent 

Scowcroft believed that Ukraine would eventually cooperate oll the 

nuclear issue and, therefore, economic assistance was not tied to the 

nuclear issue. At most, a message that was often driven home to the 

Ukrainians both publicly and privately was that tile nuclear 

stalemate could hamper Western investment in Ukraine for fear of 

the political uncertainties this could create. 
proposal outlining the funds that were contingent on the START 

process and the separate funds that the United States was examining 

to help Ukraine's financial situation. The latter support depended 

on Ukraine's undertaking some economic reform. Scowcroft 

viewed the rocky start of the relationship as the result of the United 

States' overemphasis on the nuclear weapons, but equally 

important, he believed, was a Ukrainian government under 

Kravchuk that was geared toward preserving the old nomenklatura's 

prerogatives rather than on working with the West on economic 

reform. 

LISBON PROTOCOL 

With the tactical weapons withdrawn in early May, the strategic 

weapons were the next hurdle. The United States had sought to 

keep the strategic nuclear weapons under Moscow's control, thus 

making Russia responsible for dealing with the other three nuclear 

republics in dismantling the missiles much as they had arrived at a 

formula for the tactical weapons. By April, 1992, it had become 

obvious that this plan would not work, as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, 

unable to work out their differences with Russia at CIS summits, 

began to insist on equal treatment with Russia. The growing 

conflict over the nuclear weapons had been magnified by Ukraine's 

aforementioned temporary stoppage of tactical shipments to Russia 

in March. In addition, friction over the strategic forces was 

growing. Kravchuk was upset by Russian President Boris Ycltsin's 

unilateral call in January, 1992, for further U.S. and Russian 

reductions in nuclear warheads. Kravchuk, believing that the 

weapons were under central CIS control for the four former 

republics, had assumed Ukraine would be consulted on the Russian 

initiative. The United States, therefore, proposed making the 

former republics a party to START, but with their commitments to 

join the NPT regime and become non-nuclear states. For Ukraine, 

this was an important step for separating itself from Russia and 

positioning itself as an independent country that should not be 
pgy

Tlu'oughout this whole period, Ukrainian officials also gave private 

assurances of Ukraine's desire to live up to its nuclear 

commitments. But when it came to the actual implementation of 

these promises, Ukraine balked. 

THE U.S. AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION 

For the United States, the nuclear issue had global and regional, as 

well as bilateral significance. It became an issue of Ukraine's 

credibility to abide by its public and private commitments. Having 

so often stated its intention to ratify, Kiev's seeming delaying 

actions came to put into question Ukraine's overall reliability as a 

diplomatic parmer. In addition, Ukraine appeared at times to be 

backtracking on agreed positions. Thus, in his May 1992 meeting 

with President Bush at the White House, Kravchuk switched from 

Ukraine's commitment to rid itself of the strategic weapons by the 

end of 1994, as agreed at the Minsk CIS summit, to a pledge to get 

rid of them in a 7-year period--which was the actual allowable time 

period under the START I Treaty. Ukraine's diplomatic footwork 

was also evident regarding the issue of the SS-24 warheads. At 

times, Ukraine claimed---rightly--that the SS-24 warheads were not 

covered by the START I Treaty and, therefore, would not be 

involved in any dismantlement. This position went counter to a 

number of agreements that Ukraine had entered and that were 

considered legally binding. During the same May, 1992, visit to the 

White House, Kravchuk gave President Bush a commitment that 

Kiev would dismantle all its nuclear weapons within seven years. 

The U.S. Senate, in ratifying START later in the year, noted 

Ukraine's commitment to President Bush and stated that any 

violation would be a violation of START I. Furthermore, in late 

May, 1992, in becoming a party to the START Treaty with the 

Lisbon Protocol, Ukraine had pledged to eliminate all its nuclear 

weapons. 
, pg y 

on START ratification. These technical talks were plagued by a 

number of issues that Kiev considered important and that revolved 

around the interpretation of the START Treaty and to which the 

Ntmn-Lugar funds, earmarked for dismantlement, could properly be 

put to use. Ukraine was concerned about using Ukrainian resources 

in the dismantlement process, such as railcars for transportation, 

and for using empty missile silos as storage facilities rather thm~ 

blowing them up which Ukraine contested would damage 

surrounding agricultural lands. Another concern Kiev had was its 

desire to seek to find ways by which it could profit from the liquid 

missile fuel by putting it to commercial use. A final SSD agreement 

was not reached until late 1993, thus underscoring the complex 

nature of the dismantlement process. But an early legal ratification 

could have placated Washington and reaffirmed Kiev's standing as 

a serious international actor. 

There was also a geostrategic concern on the part of the United 

States. With so many weapons scattered throughout the four former 

republics, it was tbared that they could become easy targets for 

acquisition by terrorists. After a November 1992 visit to Ukraine, 

Senators Ntmn and Lugar cogently reported that while the threat of 

a nuclear strike on the United States was at an all-time low, the 

threat of an unauthorized launch or a nuclear accident had 

increased. (Russia was able to both play on and add to these 

concerns.) Their report further stated, for example, that during the 

Moscow portion of the trip, they had been warned by Russian 

military officials that the safety and control of the nuclear weapons 

in Ukraine was "deteriorating." As a result, Russia warned that 

there could come a point at which Moscow would no longer 

guarantee the weapons' safety. 

The Nunn-Lugar report also listed the nuclear weapons issue in 

all four countries---Russia, Ukraine, Kazaldastan, and Belaru--as 

the top priority for the United States. This attitude reflected the 

strong congressional interest in the issue, aJld must be considered 
Russia in January, 1993. Russia's Parlimnent had stipulated that 

there would be no exchange of the instruments of ratification for 

START I until the other nuclear republics acceded to the NPT as 

non-nuclear weapon states. And START II would not come into 

lbrce until START one had been successfully resolved. It was also 

feared that Ukraine's reluctance could set the precedent for 

increased nuclear proliferation and could have jeopardized the NPT 

regime wlfich was due for review in 1995. But above all, 

Washington believed that Ukraine's retention of nuclear weapons 

ironically endangered Ukraine's own long term security and 

stability, rather than enhancing it. 

Ukraine exhibited a false sense of security based on the 

presence of the 176 nuclear missiles on its territory. There was thus 

all inordinate anaount of attention placed on the nuclear weapons by 

Kiev itself, without United States prompting, and Kiev sought to 

use the issue to its own advantage. Ukraine was lax in 

understanding that security involves not only an external factor but 

an internal one as well. 

Furthermore, Ukraine did not have operational control of the 

missiles--what it called administrative control, which included 

appointment and dismissal of officers with C1S agreement, supply 

of the strategic force persommi with salaries, housing, and food, and 

the right to block the use of weapons from Ukrainian territory. 

Operational control was in the hands of the CIS, including Ukraine, 

but with Russia having the actual power to launch. Only Russian 

troops had direct access to d~e missiles. 

During their November 1992, visit to Kiev, Senators Nunn and 

Lugar learned from Defense Minister Morozov one of the more 

candid views of Ukraine's "veto" over Russia's possible launch of 

Ukrainian missiles. He claimed that Ukraine had no operational 

control but that an organizational control over the non-employment 

of the weapons had been put in place. President Kravchuk would 

have to give an order that no launch could take place, then the 

troops would have to disobey the Moscow order for a launch. Hc 

stated that this was a political and not a technical system, but, as he 
The danger of the missiles leaking and spreading radioactivity 

posed a concern in the West, particularly given Kiev's and 

Moscow's initial inability to work out a maintenance regime. Thus 

Ukraine, which had, of course, experienced the nuclear disaster of 

Chernobyl, could risk its future and that of the surrounding region 

with these missiles. 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

There were many reasons tor Ukraine's inaction on the nuclear 

front, but one of the fundamental problems was the multiplicity of 

confusing sign,s that emanated from its own parliament. While the 

executive branch maintained its public commitment to fulfilling 

Ukraine's non-nuclear pledge, in the Rada there were various 

competing trends. The dominant position was the commitment to 

abide by Ukraine's promise of becoming non-nuclear but with the 

caveat that certain prerequisites would first need to be met. This 

was in line with the Rada's declaration of October 1991. 

But there were different variants of this position, such as the 

view of some parliamentarians that Ukraine would need to retain 

the weapons for the near future as a tool to foil perceived Russian 

aggression, but did not exclude eventually giving them up. To 

further complicate the picture, supporters of ratification posited at 

times the view that even with START ratification, Ukraine may not 

necessarily accede to the NPT in the near future. There was talk, for 

example, by Defense Minister Morozov that Ukraine may require 

a unique status, meaning membership in the NPT with nuclear 

weapons for some period of time. There was also the small vocal 

minority spanning nationalists, on the one hand, who saw the 

weapons as security against Russia and wanted Ukraine to remain 

a nuclear state and conservative forces, on the other hand, who 

viewed the missiles as a means for helping to re-establish links with 

Moscow. There were also factions that supported retaining the 

more advanced SS-24 missiles for some period of time or of rearming them with conventional warheads. What made the overall 

picture even more confusing was the fact that parliamentarians 

would either attach themselves at different times to any of the above 

points of new or up the ante on various preconditions that needed 

to be met before ratification could take place. The latter was 

11 
warheads both strategic and the already shipped tactical weapons, 

and financial assistance for dismantlement. 

The executive branch, however, was not immune to much of 

tiffs confusion. In June 1993, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma stated 

before the parliament that, while Ukraine should ultimately become 

a non-nuclear state, Ukraine may have to temporarily retain the 

more modem SS-24 missiles. Although Kuelnna spoke in his 

capacity a.s a Rada deputy and not as Prime Minister, his statement 

did underline the divisions in the Ukrainian polity. These 

contradictory goals and divisions within file govermnent only 

compounded the confusion of what was the ultimate goal of 

Ukraine and left a great deal of frustration and confusiol~ in 

Washington. 

In these confusing cross-winds, the Rada becmne a convenient 

whipping boy for Kravchuk. Kravchuk and his ministers 

consistently voiced their support of START but pointed Io the 

parliament as the obstruction. Washington's position was that the 

United States should not get involved with negotiating with 

parliament and that Kravchuk should take the leadership in dealing 

with his parliament. But there were ample complaints from the 

Parliament against Kravchuk. Former Rada Defense Committee 

Chairman Valentyn Lemish complained in July, 1993, that 

Kravchuk's advisers had submitted poorly prepared documents the 

previous December to the Rada. Because they were not properly 

thought out, they left much work for the Rada to do, thus delaying 

the START debate process. 

But on this issue, as on others, Kravchuk let the parliament 

define the debate and, as a result, START became a political 

football for the Rada, with no one seemingly in control. More 

cynical observers viewed this as a good cop, bad cop approach by 

which Kiev sought to see to what extent it could derive as much as 

possible from file United States. If that indeed were the case, then 

it was a game that had gotten out of hand. But it is more likely that 

weak leadership was the case. Kravchuk, ever cautious, tended to 

stand back and let events unlold rather than try to shape them. In 
py qy g p

wanted a closer examination of the issue. Many deputies believed 

that Ukraine was moving too quickly and not receiving adequate 

security assurances or financial assistance in return. Thus, 

Kravchuk, who himself estimated the Rada opposition to START at 

some 40 deputies in the fall of 1992, had seen this grow by the 

spring of 1993 to a majority of deputies either opposing or favoring 

ratification with some conditions. 

Therefore, while Kravchuk from the outset was promising 

ratification, the signals from parliament were quite different. The 

Rada declaration of October, 1991, had given the first warnings 

when it spoke of the need to address the technical, financial, and 

environmental issues associated with dismantlement. With the 

United States Senate moving on START ratification in September, 

1992, the first strong hints of the problems that the United States 

was going to encounter with Kiev were beginning to crop up. In his 

meeting with Scowcroft that month during a visit to Washington, 

then Security Service Chief Yevgheny Marchuk claimed that there 

was a move on in parliament to retain the 46 SS-24 missiles and to 

rearm them with conventional warheads. He claimed that Kravchuk 

was opposed to this effort. 

Late that month, Pavlychko warned that the Rada would 

consider adding amendments to START ratification. He claimed 

that deputies were concerned about such items as these: economic 

assistance for dismantlement; conducting dismantlement in 

Ukraine; disposal of fuel in an ecologically safe manner; Ukraine's 

right to sell the lIEU extracted from the warheads; and the need for 

security assurances. He claimed that a political groundswell was 

developing in this direction. 

The obstacles that the Rada would present became evident on 

October 28, 1992, when it refused to accept the military doctrine 

submitted by Defense Minister Morozov. Foreign Minister 

Anatoliy Zlenko tried putting a positive spin on the parliamentary 

action, cl',Brning that no final decision had been made and that there 

were issues such as military training that needed to be refined and 
from Russia. 

The next day, General Burns, the U.S. SSD negotiator in town 

for another round of talks, met with a senior government official to 

discuss the Rada action. The point was made that top Ukrainian 

officials had all "along assured the United States that although there 

was parliamentary opposition, they believed that START would be 

ratified. They now claimed that the Rada action on the military 

doctrine was a surprise even to them and that the tide seemed to 

have changed dramatically over the previous three days. They 

pointed out Parliament's concern over the growing political 

problems that Yeltsin was encountering in Russia as well as the 

deputies' concern that the United States was interested in Ukraine 

only because of its nuclear weapons. 

According to some Ukrainian officials, two elements led to the 

vote agah~st the doctrine: those in parliament who wanted to force 

Ukraine into a military relationship with the CIS and, on the other 

hand, radical deputies who opposed Ukraine becoming a nonnuclear state. The former considered a nuclear Ukraine would need 

to rely on Russia Ibr maintenance of the warheads and other 

administrative support and thus be a step toward military and 

political re-unification with Russia. 

Parliamentarians also pointed out that it had taken the United 

States Senate over a year to ratify the START agreement so it was 

unfair to keep pressuring Ukraine to act quickly. Various issues 

such as the costs of dismantlement, environmental impacts, and the 

social impact in terms of the jobs that would be affected and other 

related factors all had to be exmnined. Deputies were wont to point 

out that, as a budding democracy, Ukraine had to adhere to new 

rules, regulations, and procedures and that it was ironic that the 

United State,s would seek to short circuit this democratic process by 

demanding a mindless ratification. But there was a practical aspect 

involved here as well. With no staff and the Foreign Ministry's 

resources limited and strained already, the deputies were basically 

left on their own, without the necessary expertise to analyze the 

START documents. This only served to prolong the process. 
the value out of the warheads--information that should have been 

routinely provided by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Indeed, it 

had in fact appeared in the press. In order to ensure that the 

Parliament was well briefed on Washington's views, experts were 

dispatched to Kiev to meet with various Parliamentarians and other 

officials to inform them at a quiet level of what the United States 

was willing to do for Ukraine, particularly as regarded the technical 

aspects of support for dismantlement. 

In addition, Parliament faced issues that it believed were far 

more pressing, such as tile economy. The everyday economic crisis 

of Ukraine--both purely economic in terms of inflation and the 

economic downturn as well as tile political problem between 

reformers and those who would maintain the status quo--kept 

parliament embroiled in endless intramural squabbles and conflict 

with the executive. And even this turmoil was overshadowed by 

internecine political squabbles involving President Kravchuk, Prime 

Minister Kuclmaa, and Parliamentary Speaker Ivan Plyusch. [The 

tltree competed for the presidency in 1994, with Kuchma emerging 

as the victor]. And, while nothing was resolved in the political 

squabbles save for the resignation of Prime Ministers Fokin and 

Kuchma in 1992 and 1993, respectively, there was not much room 

for dealing with anything else. Sound economic policy and START 

ratification took a back seat to these squabbles. Intertwined in these 

debates, was the question of defining Ukraine's basic foreign policy 

principles and military doctrine, including the notion of Ukraine's 

national interests and identifying who may be Ukraine's enemies. 

Parliamentary debate over these issues extended over a year, and it 

was not until fall 1993 that Ukraine voted its foreign policy and 

military doctrines. The resolution of these issues had a direct 

bearing on START, thereby further compounding the delay over 

ratification. And everything was overshadowed by Kiev's concerns 

about Russia, a concern which logically became intertwined with 

the nuclear issue. 

Given the history of colonization and expluitation that Ukraine 

has experienced at the hands of Moscow over the centuries, it is no 
source of psychological security for Ukraine. Whether rightly or 

wrongly, the weapons became a psychological support for Kiev in 

its bargaining with Russia in all fields---economic, political and 

military. 

Many Ukrainian leaders viewed their nuclear weapons as a 

short-term insurance policy against Russia. Well aware of the 

fragility of their state, and feeling the pressure of Russian claims 

against their territory either directly--as expressed by the now 

defunct first Russian parliament--or indirectly as concerns the 

disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, Ukrainian leaders openly spoke 

of the need for Ukraine "to get on its feet." In addition, there were 

fears that instability in Russia could overflow into Ukraine. During 

1993, President Yeltsin was at odds with the Parliament, which 

eventually led to a bloody show down with govermnent forces 

storming the Parliament in October. The speaker of that now 

defunct parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, had made claims against 

Ukraine's territory. 

In early 1993, Vycheslav Chornovii, one of the thunders of the 

RUKH (Popular Movement of Ukraine) reform movement, argued 

that ratification of START should not take place at least until the 

spring. (Ratification with provisions took place in November. The 

Provisions were rescinded in February, 1994.) He explicitly stated 

that the Ukrainian government was using the nuclear weapons as a 

guarantee against Russia and to help Ukraine through the winter 

without Russian economic pressure. In the spring, he surmised, the 

economic situation with Russia would be better and then ratification 

could proceed. Of course, ratification did not take place but 

Chornovil's admissions became symptomatic of the Ukrainian 

concerns. 

Pavlychko argued along the same lines, claiming that Russia 

needs time to adjust to the realities of an independent Ukraine and 

that Ukraine needs time to create the structures of a viable state. 

During this process the nuclear weapons would help Ukraine gain 

the time for both sides to benefit. In addition, as a principal figure 

in the 1991 declaration for a non-nuclear Ukraine, Pavlychko had 
period, Ukraine would dismantle the SS-24s. At the end of the 14- 

year period Ukraine would then adhere to the NPT. What this 

framework would provide for Ukraine would be the time to develop 

economically and politically--the nuclear weapons being an 

important factor in equalizing the relationship between the two 

countries. At the end of this 14-year period, Pavlychko surmised 

that Russia would have adjusted to the realities of Ukrainian 

independence and accept Ukraine as an equal state. 

But there was also a more practical consideration at stake for 

many of tile Rada deputies. Having given up tile tactical weapons, 

Kiev expected that it would become a respected member of the 

international community and, more importantly, open the doors to 

economic support and assistance. In addition, Kiev had moved 

quickly in June, 1992, to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe 

Treaty. While Kiev did not view the matter as a quid pro quo it 

could not but believe that i! had been taken for granted. Kravchuk, 

for example, lamented in November, 1992, that Ukraine had 

received nothing in return for the tactical weapons. This experience 

made Ukraine doubly sensitive in view of the historical lack of 

identity that it has had to deal with. Forever seen as Little Russians, 

ignored at the expense of Moscow, and only turned to when 

something was needed--traditionally wheat and now nuclear 

weapons--the Ukrainian leadership saw itself as mistakenly and 

naively prolonging this trend. With national pride and identity 

being snubbed, it was inevitable that Ukrainians would eventually 

seek to assert themselves raflaer than endlessly lick lheir wounds. 

And with the West putting such great emphasis on the weapons, it 

did not take long for the Ukrainians to realize that this issue was 

their ticket to big-power attention, thus neutralizing tile age-old 

frustration of national identity. Kiev, therefore, sought some form 

of reimbursement for the tactical weapons, arguing that Ukraine 

should be compensated for these weapons before it ratified 

START I. 

Furthermore, Ukrainians could not but believe, as many 

parliamentarians openly stated, that if the weapons were given up, 
the issues uppermost in the minds of many deputies, as well &s the 

Foreign Ministry, when the issue of NPT membership was 

broached. Kiev feared that declaring its nonnuclear status by 

joining the NPT would be sacrificing any claims for reimbursement 

for the nuclear material in the warheads that it would be giving up 

under the START I Treaty. Therefore, many Ukrainian officials, 

were making it clear that even though START could be ratified, 

early accession to the NPT was not necessarily true. 

And many Ukrainian deputies claimed that West and East 

European states were not as eager for Ukraine to give up its nuclear 

weapons, a claim that Pavlychko and other deputies sought to use 

as leverage against the United States for obtaining security 

assurances. Such states as Poland and France allegedly regarded the 

Ukrainian nuclear potential as security against Russia. The notion 

that the Ukrainians were fond of pedalling as an excuse--that the 

West made nuclear weapons important to Ukraine by focusing on 

the issue--therefore is somewhat a moot point, given the 

predilection of much of the Rada leadership to utilize the weapons 

as leverage in the negotiations with Russia and against the West. 

Ukraine always pointed to extenuating circumstances for its 

failure to act on START. It blamed the West either for failing to act 

to stop Russian flu'eats, or for acting otherwise improperly and thus 

muddying the political waters in parliament. Ukrainian leaders 

were always prompt in pointing out that events in Russia would 

affect the START decision proce,~s. In March, 1993, during his first 

meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Foreign 

Minister Zlenko warned that Yeltsin's troubles with his parliament 

were stimulating greater support in the Ukrainian parliament for 

retaining the nuclear weapons. In like manner, in July of that year, 

subsequent to the U.S. bombing of Baghdad, Zlenko cautioned that 

the action was creating resistance in parliament to START 

ratification. Ukraine had condemned fl~e bombing for fear it could 

set a precedent for Russian action against Ukraine, thus some 

deputies started to question the wisdom of giving up Ukraine's 

nuclear force. 
Kravchuk wrote that the Rada's decision would be influenced to a 

large degree by the technical and financial assistance that Ukraine 

would receive. But even earlier in the year, at the January Davos 

conference, Kravchuk had floated the idea of an international 

conference providing aid for dismantlement. 

Ukraine claimed, rightly, that as a country undergoing 

economic changes it would be difficult to burden itself with the 

high costs of dismantlement. Throughout 1992 Washington had 

discussed with Ukraine the costs of dismantling its arsenal. After 

mutual discussions, Kiev informed Washington that a sum of $174 

million would be needed. In response, in December, President 

Bush informed President Kravchuk by letter that the United States 

was prepared to offer Ukraine $175 million as a preliminary offer 

of assistance. There would be more financial and other assistance 

offered as Ukraine moved toward disarmmnent. Kravchuk 

welcomed the President's letter and, underlining the Russian factor 

in the Ukrainian debate, said that Parliament would move forward 

on START but cautioned fl~at it might be passed with reservations 

aimed at Russia. He warned that Kiev continued to be concerned 

about Russia's intentions toward Ukraine since at that very time 

Russia's parliament was discussing the fate of file Ukrainian city of 

Sevastopol in Crimea. 

Ukraine, however, took no action on the warheads, but did 

pursue its own internal study relating to costs, estimating tiffs could 

be as high as $1.5 billion. This figure was soon revised up to $2.8 

billion, and at one point, Minister of the Environment Yuri 

Kostenko stated that it could be as high as $3 billion. Ukraine's 

Ambassador to the United States Oleh Biiorus even worried in a 

conversation in Washington that it could be $6 billion. Ukraine's 

explanation was that the increasing figure was a result of inflation 

and an inadequate original analysis. A sense of exasperation 

developed in Wa,shington that monetarily as well as politically Kicv 

was moving the goal posts on the United States. In this regard the 

United States had made it clear during deputy Foreign Minister 

Boris Tarasuk's January, 1993, visit to Washington that 
energy is supplied by nuclear energy. Furthermore, Ukraine 

depends on Russia for the majority of its oil and gas needs. To 

break this dependence on Russian energy supplies Ukraine has been 

looking toward augmenting its civilian nuclear sector, but to do so, 

it needs the LEU as fuel for these reactors. For Ukraine, therefore, 

obtaining LEU from the tactical and strategic warheads was an 

important motivating factor. The issue of energy needs is evident 

from Ukraine's continued reluctance to shut down the Chernobyl 

reactor unless it receives adequate compensation. 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 

During the later stages of the Bush Presidency, the United States 

undertook a number of steps aimed at coaxing Kiev toward START 

ratification and accession to the NPT. In addition to the offer of 

$175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds, the Bush administration took a 

number of other measures. 

In early October 1992 Undersecretary of State Frank Wisner 

visited Kiev to outline the U.S. willingness to assist Ukraine on 

HEU profit sharing, security assurances. He took concrete steps on 

discussing the early deactivation of the Ukrainian missiles even 

while START was still being debated and had not been ratified. 

On October 26, 1992, President Bush wrote to President 

Kravchuk outlining the basic U.S. position regarding many of the 

issues surrounding the nuclear question. Bush emphasized that the 

weapons needed to be transferred to Russia for dismantlement. He 

stated that any policy of dismantlement in Ukraine would be 

counter to Kiev's previous commitments and that it would be too 

costly as well as too time consuming. The United States was also 

committed to supporting Ukraine's de.sire to monitor the destruction 

of the warheads. The United States was also ready to assist Ukraine 

technically and financially in the dismantlement of the missiles and 

launchers. The President also declared that the United States was 

looking to supporting defense conversion projects in Ukraine. And, 

file President made clear, the United States supported an equitable 

sharing of the proceeds between Ukraine and Russia from the sale 

of the HEU derived from the dismantled warheads. (Ukraine, which 

claimed a right to the components of the weapons sought 

compensation for the highly enriched uranium--HEU--that the 

warheads contained. With discussion centering on the 

dismantlement of weapons in Russia, Kiev feared it would not 

21 
appropriate facility). 

The United States, which, as late as May, had opposed any 

security assurances for Ukraine, had by now started a serious 

dialogue with Kiev on the issue. In early January 1993, the United 

States provided Kiev with draft security assurances and continued 

working with Russia and Britain to also provide similar assurances. 

The U.S. efforts had no success in moving the process forward. 

Indeed, the lame-duck status of the Bush administration appeared 

to be working against any quick success. With the election of 

President Clinton, there was a focus on the transition period, in 

Washington as well as Kiev. Nunn and Lugar, in their December 

report, realized file danger of the transition period and urged the 

outgoing and incoming administrations to stay in constant 

communication and that both should focus their energies on the 

former Soviet Union since the United States could not afford to 

"take a break from history." In Kiev fl~ere was an unspoken 

assumption that the possibility of obtaining a better deal with the 

new administration existed. And if that were not possible, then at 

least Kiev would be able to gain some more breathing room since 

any new administration would need time to get its people and 

policy in place. 

On two occasions in December, 1992, after the mid-December 

target for START ratification had passed, President Kravchuk stated 

that ratification would take place in January of the new year. On 

December 18, he stated that on January 15 START would be 

brought forth in the Rada and that within two days after that, 

ratification would take place. In a December 24 phone conversation 

with President Bush at Camp David, Kravchuk thanked tile 

President for his December 4 letter offering $175 million in 

assistance for nuclear dismantlement. He stated that the Rada was 

studying the START documents and he was sure that the deputies 

would adopt them. 

On December 30, Kravchuk once again reiterated that the 

START treaty would be introduced in the Rada on January 15--if 

not earlier. He said he discussed START with deputies on a daily 
held a bilateral meeting with Yeltsin on January 15. Kravchuk had 

given similar abortive promises in mid year when he expected 

ratification to take place before the Rada's July, 1992 holiday 

adjournment). 

On January 4, 1993, Pavlychko related that debate on START 

would not start before the then-scheduled January 22 CIS summit, 

which was contrary to what Kravchuk had been saying. Pavlychko 

said that Moscow was pressuring Ukraine to sign the CIS charter 

and he feared that Russia would use oil and gas leverage as pressure 

against Ukraine. As a result, he believed that Kravchuk would find 

it politically difficult to pressure the Rada on START, while 

Ukraine is experiencing problems with Russia. Indeed, at the 

January 22 Minsk summit, Ukraine refused to sign the CIS statute 

but put forth its own declaration which was signed by all, calling for 

economic cooperation and leaving open the option that may state 

could sign the CIS statute in the future. 

Whatever the case, in the waning days of the Bush 

admilfistration, there was a frustration that Ukraine kept to a 

delaying strategy. Publicly and privately the administration sought 

to move Kiev toward action, h~ December, 1992, Secretary of State 

Eagleburger stressed at the Brussels NACC meeting that Kiev's 

failure to act "inevitably will have an impact on the bilateral 

relationship between the United States and Ukraine." Concern 

about Kravchuk's resolve in tile face of parliament's stalling tactics 

was evident by Eagleburger's admonition "that more forceful 

advocacy of those two treaties [START and NPT] by the leadership 

in Ukraine might tend to deal with some of those parliamentary 

concerns." And President Bush, in Iris December 30 letter to 

Kravchuk, emphasized the importance of START ratification on the 

eve of the Clinton administration. The President stressed that the 

action could begin the momentum for expanding relations between 

both countries. 

And it was the perception of being "stiffed" by Kravchuk that 

helped persuade the administration in its waning days not to pursue 

a further tranche of the $200 million October, 1992, agricultural 
meant added pressure on Ukraine to reach an agreement. This 

problem continued into tile Clinton administration, which refused 

to grant Kiev a new tranche because Kiev continued to be noncredit worthy. Kicv was paying the interest but not the principal. 

The Clinton administration, did, however, offer a new $40 million 

package in July 1993. 
APPROACH 

At the outset, the Clinton adminisuation was in a quandary about 

whether to pursue a carrot or stick approach. The Embassy for long 

had sought to reorient policy so that tile United States would give 

economic assistance to Ukraine and thus underline Washington's 

overall support. In addition, the Embassy had argued that the 

United States would have to play the role of divorce lawyer between 

Kiev and Moscow, something the Bush administration started to do 

on the HEU and nuclear issues including security assurances 

whether or not it wanted to. The Embassy argued the important role 

that Ukraine could play in the region and, therefore, that it was 

important to have a viable, independent Ukrainian state. 

The Clinton administration, having seen the frustration 

experienced by tile previous administration and possibly wanting to 

pre-empt any chance of Kiev's squeezing out new concessions, 

preferred a policy of pressure against Ukraine. At its best, this 

policy envisioned positive inducements of tempting Kiev by 

strc~ssing how quickly other states, such as Belarus, were receiving 

assistance in the wake of START ratification. 

The relationship, at first, appeared to get off to a good start with 

the President's lengthy January 26 phone conversation with 

Kravchuk. While President Clinton urged START and NPT action, 

he emphasized that the United States seeks a relationship that 

involves not only security, but economic and political issues as well 

and urgexi Kravchuk to work with the International Monetary Fund. 

In February, however, showing the overriding importance of the 

nuclear issue, Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote to 

Zlenko urging START ratification. He noted tiaat Belarus had 

recently ratified the treaty and adhered to the NPT and that it was 

25 
adhering to its nuclear commitments. Christopher emphasized the 

importance the United States attaches to good relations bul that, 

while the United States wants to be helpful with credits and 

investments, the nuclear issue remained a cloud over the 

relationship. He stressed that failure to act on START and NPT 

could complicate relations and make it difficult to develop the kind 

of strong bilateral relations both countries would like. In a note of 

exasperation similar to that of the previous administration, the 

Secretary reminded Zlenko that during their January phone 

conversation, Zlenko had promised that the treaties would soon bc 

taken up by the Rada. Two months later, the Secretary continued, 

nothing had moved and Zlenko was now even less encouraging. 

From his side, Zlenko put an emphasis on obtaining security 

assurances. 

In his meeting with President Clinton during that March visit, 

the President emphasized for Zlenko the importance of START. 

The President stated that START was a "pre-condition" for a 

successful relationship, a statement that was regarded by some 

Ukrainian deputies as a threat. The Ukrainian media, however, 

stressed the good status of United States-Ukrainian relations and 

did not tbcus on the differences over the nuclear issue. President 

Clinton's comment regarding START as a "pre-conditiou" for better 

relations was first reported in the Russian and not Ukrainian press. 

During this period, the administration was deeply concerned 

about reports that Ukraine was developing its own launch capability 

and was debating on how to approach Ukraine on this question. 

This concern, no doubt, added to the belief for the need to keep the 

pressure on Kiev. The President's message was re-emphasized by 

the Codel led by then House Majority leader Dick Gephardt (DMO.) in early April, which carried a presidential letter explaining 

to Kravchuk that the furtherance of bilateral relations depended on 

Ukraine living up to its nuclear commitments. 

That same month the administration sought to drive home the 

price for Ukraine's intransigence. Prime Minister Kuchma had 

tentative plans to travel to Washington as a guest of the House 
who would be traveling during the proposed time frame--would be 

available during his visit. But to make sure that the message was 

clear, it ended with the caveat that a visit would be more advisable 

later in the year once Ukraine had ratified START and acceded to 

the NPT. A State Department official leaked the story to the press 

that Kuchma had been refused a visit to Washington as punishment 

for Ukraine's nuclear policy and as pressure to get Kiev to act 

accordingly. This public humiliation reverberated throughout the 

Ukrainian government, leading to an unofficial freeze on high level 

contacts from the government with the Embassy. 

The Embassy protested Washington's decision, noting that by 

receiving Kuchma the adminisla'ation would be dealing with an 

individual who as former Director of the Pivdenmash Missile 

facility had built the SS-24 rockets and, therefore, it was wise 

politics to cultivate him even if it was to restate the long standing 

U.S. nuclear position. Furthermore, Kuchma was the only one on 

the Ukrainian horizon who was actively pushing for economic 

reform and had the political will and acumen to possibly maneuver 

through the Ukrainian political guagmire. The argument did not 

convince people in Washington. To cover Kuchma, Zlenko 

dispatched a letter on April 9 reporting that Kuchma was unable to 

travel to the United States. 

Ukrainians constantly complained that the U.S. position was 

only making parliament more recalcitrant in ratifying the treaty. 

But this view was open to debate. Some political leaders, like those 

of the Christian Democratic Party, believed Western pressure was 

not counterproductive but was helpful in highlighting for Ukraine 

the dangers Ukraine faced by holding onto the nuclear weapons. A 

particular concern of the Christian Democrats was that retention of 

the weapons would expose Ukraine to continued Russian influence 

and thus they supported greater Western pressure on Kravchuk to 

give up the weapons. 
thus showing the type of initiative that Washington had been 

seeking. He reported that, according to Ukrainian experts, Ukraine 

cannot produce nuclear weapons nor provide for their proper 

technical maintenance. He also emphasized that Kiev did not 

control file nuclear button. Ukraine, therefore, he urged should 

move to comply with the START Treaty but he made clear his view 

that Kiev should withdraw its weapons over a seven year period and 

that withdrawal should depend on Ukraine obtaining material 

compensation and security assurances. A Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs official, tailoring his remarks for U.S. consumption, 

characterized the speech as "hard" in favor of START, the Lisbon 

Protocol and the NPT and that the United States would have been 

pleased by it. 

The Rada deputies were less than enthusiastic thus giving 

Kravchuk the benefit of showing his commitment much as his 

December, 1992 remarks to the Embassy did, but not moving the 

process forward at all. The deputies favoring ratification were 

concerned that, while in the fall of 1992 the percentage of the public 

favoring ratification was 80-20, now it was supposedly 55-45. 

However, a poll taken by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences 

Sociology Institute reported in the Ukrainian press on April 23 that 

31 percent of the public favored retaining the weapons, while 52 

percent favored destroying them, and die remaining 17 percent were 

undecided. 

The trnth of the matter was that while there was greater public 

awareness of the nuclear issue, mainly because of the Gephardt 

Codel visit, the Embassy's lobbying of Parliament, and public 

statements, and the Vancouver summit between Presidents Clinton 

and Yeltsin, most Ukrainians were still more concerned about the 

economy. The failing economy and falling standard of living 

overshadowed any concerns regarding START and the NPT. As a 

media focus, corruption and the m~a were more of a favorite topic. 

START was becoming an elite issue focused within the 

government. A poll of parliamentarians, employees of State 

ministries, and directors of large state enterprises taken by the 
y p, g pp

to Ukraine, launched an interagency review aimed at broadening 

United States policy toward Ukraine. The National Security 

Council was pushing for SSD negotiator James Goodby, who had 

replaced General Burns, to come to Ukraine to talk not only SSD 

but "also to lay the groundwork for Ambassador Strobe Taibott's 

scheduled early May visit, by discussing file broader United StatesUkrainian relationship. [Talbott, who is currently Deputy Secretary 

of State, was at that time in charge of the Newly Independent States 

at the State Department]. Ukraine, however, was not willing to host 

the Goodby mission on April 26, even though it was made aware of 

Goodby's wider mandate, pleading that its small foreign ministry 

staff was overburdened in working to push the START Treaty 

through the parliament. There was also a newly emerging 

congressional interest in having United States policy more 

forthcoming toward Ukraine. Indicative was a letter from 

Congressman Norm Dicks (D-WA) to the late Secretary of Defense 

I_es Aspin urging better relations with Ukraine and questioning the 

overall focus by the administration on Russia at the expense of the 

other republics. 

But there was one item that needed to be resolved prior to 

Talbott's visit, because it could undermine the good words he 

planned to bring. The issue dated back to March and involved the 

reports that Kiev was allegedly seeking to develop its own nuclear 

launch capability. There was much public discussion of this 

alternative in Ukraine. Environment Minister Kostenko, stated in 

late April that Ukrainian specialists believed that Ukraine had the 

scientific and industrial potential for the upkeep of the nuclear 

weapons, but which he estimated as possibly costing a prohibitive 

$40 billion. Pavlychko echoed this sentiment when he claimed that 

the technicians who had put the warheads together had been located 

in Ukraine, thus indicating that Ukraine could develop an 

independent nuclear capacity. 

While there was talk of Ukraine retaining nuclear weapons, it 

was mostly unrealistic. For this to have been a viable and credible 
the face of U.S. and Russian opposition. In early May, a senior 

Ukrainian official was apprised of the U.S. fears. He categorically 

denied the allegations and re-stated Ukraine's goal of becoming a 

non-nuclear state. 

But while the United States was shifting in its approach, Russia 

was pushing a harder line during Senators Nunn and Lugar's early 

May visit to Moscow. The Russians complained that the United 

State, s had committed a number of mistakes in its approach and that 

it had not exhausted all of its leverage against Kiev. Specifically, 

the Russians believed that the United Nations Security Council 

should get involved in the Ukrainian nuclear question. Foreign 

Minister Kozyrev was blunt in his view that the Ukrainians were 

seeking to gain control of the nuclear weapons and that the United 

States should be stricter with Kiev. And other officials claimed that 

Ukrainian officials had told them that Ukraine planned to keep the 

SS-24 missiles and re-target them. 

After a dress rehearsal with Deputy Foreign Minister Boris 

Tarasiuk in Washington on May 3 in which he stated that both sides 

should leave old business behind and start anew, Ambassador 

Talbott outlined the changing U.S. policy during his May 9-10 visit 

to Kiev. He also offered that the United States could serve as a 

facilitator in Ukrainian-Russian relations. On his return to Kiev, 

however, Tarasiuk claimed that he had told U.S. officials of Kiev's 

dissatisfaction over the bilateral relationship. 

One of the keys for the success of the new U.S. message was for 

Talbott to meet Kravchuk. But, with the Ukrainian government 

smarting from the public snub accorded Kuchma's aborted trip to 

the United States, Kravchuk pleaded a busy schedule. By this time, 

Western media were already carrying the story that Talbott had been 

refused a meeting. It was only through the intercession of Vasily 

Durdinets, Deputy Speaker of Parliament and a close associate of 

Kravchuk, that a meeting was arranged. Talbott presented 

Kravchuk a letter from President Clinton in which the President 

stated his desire to expand the bilateral relationship and authorized 

Talbott to discuss a full range of political and security issues. 
Kravchuk ended the meeting by emphasizing that continued 

Ukrainian independence hinged on the economy and Kiev's 

relations with Russia. While Talbott brought nothing to offer in 

terms of economic assistance, he did tell Kravchuk that the United 

States would use its good offices to diminish problems that existed 

between Kiev and Moscow. But he made it clear throughout his 

other meetings and in his public statements that this would come 

about only if both sides would agree to such a role. 

During the visit, Talbott stated his belief that Yeltsin's 

government had no imperial tendencies and that the success of 

Russia in its economic and other reforms would have a positive 

influence on Ukraine. However, for the Ukrainians, the statements 

seemed to only once again underline the secondary importance of 

Ukraine. And nothing in the administrations's rhetoric indicated 

any lessening in the focus on START. In his May 11 appearance 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary 

Christopher stated that the United States was looking forward to 

Ukraine acting soon on START and NPT and then the two sides 

could act on a broader agenda of cooperation and partnership. 

By this time, however, both sides were worn out due to the 

nuclear loggerhead, so any signal, rhetorical or concrete, was 

viewed by Kiev as welcome and as a step to i'enewing the 

relationship and putting the past behind. But Kiev made it clear 

that while Washington's intentions were welcome, Kiev would 

stand on guard. In their meeting during Talbott's visit to Kiev, 

Zlenko told Talbott that during his own March visit to Washington, 

he had not noticed anything new in the relationship but now 

Talbott's visit gave rise to hopes. But the Ukrainians are realists, 

and Zlenko did caveat that he hoped Talbott's statements were more 

than words and would be followed by action. 
THE U.S.-UKRAINE-RUSSIA 

TALKS 

U.S. DEACTIVATION PROPOSALS 

The new Clinton "administration approach to Ukraine was facilitated 

by the fact that approaches to the nuclear weapons issue had already 

t~en two roads. There was the legal ratification issue that the Rada 

had to settle--and that was the most visible irritant in the bilateral 

relationship. But on an informal level, as a result of UkrainianRussian negotiations, as well as U.S-Ukrainian-Russian 

discussions, a tormula and a process lbr deactivating the Ukrainian 

warheads were being worked out as well as a process for 

dismantling and shipping them to Russia. In this milieu, the 

administration believed it was on the road to achieving denuclearization and that it was important to push the technical talks, 

which stayed out of the realm of parliamentary oversight. Given 

these developments, the administration had an incentive to change 

its rhetoric toward Ukraine and believed it could gain greater 

leverage on the nuclear issue by doing so. The process had started 

early on, before the Clinton administration had come into office. 

Defense Minister Morozov believed as early as February 1992 

that nuclear weapons were not a viable choice f~r maintaining 

Ukraine's independence. He believed that a strong conventional 

force would be the best alternative and exerted his energies in this 

direction. At this stage the nuclear issue was being dealt with at the 

executive levels of both governments and thus was being handled 

as a technical rather than a political issue. It moved into the latter 

domain in May. With Ukraine balking at having Russia as the sole 

representative of the nuclear weapons, the Bush administration had 

allayed Kiev's concerns by having Ukraine become part of the 

33 
and teclmical matters related to dismantlement, had commenced in 

the winter of 1992, and continued into the Clinton administration, 

when agreement was reached late in 1993. During the winter of 

1992, Ukraine also held discussions with U.S. firms regarding tile 

actual mechanics of missile dismantlement, including what would 

be done with the missile fuel. h~ April 1992 Kiev raised with a U.S. 

finn the question of dismantlement at civilian reactor sites as an 

alternative to shipment to Russia, which turned out not to be 

feasible. 

More importantly, in October 1992 Undersecretary Wisner led 

a delegation to Kiev that addressed a broad range of security and 

nuclear issues. Thus started a serious discussion on moving 

forward on the deactivation of missiles even while tile START 

ratification issue was still being debated. 

In November, the Embassy discussed with the Foreign Ministry 

the proposal Wisner had delivered for the deactivation of the 

nuclear missiles, including defueling of the liquid fueled missiles 

and removing the front sections of the missiles. These steps were 

aimed at implementing a procedure that would normally be required 

as part of the elimination process once START was ratified and 

implemented. In addition, under this offer, the United States was 

prepared to discuss financial and leclmical assistoJ~ce to help in the 

early deactivation. The United States emphasized its willingness to 

pursue this and the other proposals on a priority basis and to do so 

in discussions with both Ukraine and Russia. 

The United States and Russia were already deactivating 1CBMs 

and SLBMs that were slated to be eliminated under START, and the 

U.S. proposal was geared to bring Ukraine on board even before 

Kiev's ratification of the treaty and its coming into force. In the 

Clinton administration, Wisher, who had moved over to the Defense 

Department to become Undersecretary for Security Affairs, before 

going on to be Ambassador to India, continued to pursue the 

deactivation proposal. 

The primary focus of the deactivation proposal was Russia. 

The Pentagon devised the program because it was concerned over 
gwy 

changes ongoing in Russia, Moscow's command and control of the 

nuclear weapons could become tenuous and thus create problems of 

possible accidental launches and nuclear accidents. Buttressing 

these two concerns was a political goal. It was believed that the 

proposal could help to solidify the new political environment 

between the two states. With the United States and Russia thus 

pursuing early deactivation, the Pentagon decided to expand the 

program and seek to include Ukraine. Just prior to leaving office, 

in January, 1993 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney expressed a 

desire to remove by 1995 a number of systems such as Minuteman 

II ICBM'S and Poseidon missiles that were due for elimination 

under START I. And in April, 1993, President Clinton announced 

a speed up of the deactivation of START I weapons. 

U.S.-UKRAINE-RUSSIA DIALOGUE 

Meanwhile, Ukraine had started the process of beginning a dialogue 

with Russia over nuclear issues. On November 16, 1992, the 

Cabinet of Ministers decreed the formation of a commission for 

negotiating the elimination of strategic missile warheads with 

Russia. Then, on January 26, 1993, outside of Kiev, Ukraine and 

Russia started talks on the elimination and dismantling of the 

warheads. The talks were headed by Ukrainian Environment 

Minister Yuri Kostenko and Russian Ambassador Yuri Dubinin. 

While no decisions were made, Kiev saw the meeting as a positive 

step forward. The main stumbling block was Ukraine's claim to the 

nuclear components of the weapons, something Russia was not 

willing to accept at first. 

By March, 1993, the United States sought to bridge the gap 

between both sides. Until then, the United States had urged both 

sides to reach an agreement on compensation, but now Washington 

was willing to support file Ukrainian position by making a 

distinction between "ownership" and the "value of components," 

which would involve the HEU. In short, without touching on the 
in summer 1992 that the United States was reaching an agreement 

with Moscow on HEU sales, but making no reference to the 

Ukrainian missiles, which Moscow considered its property. This 

announcement had prompted Kravchuk to request that a similar 

agreement be reached with Kiev. When Washington realized the 

dilemma, it rectified the situation by notifying Ukraine that 

Moscow had been informed that it was important h)r Russia to 

reach an agreement on profit sharing from the HEU in the Ukrainian 

missiles. The March 1993 announcement moved a step beyond 

urging both sides to reach an agreement and clearly stated the 

Ukrainian right to such compensation. 

The Ukrainians had regarded themselves as being at a 

disadvantage just a few weeks earlier. In February, 1993, 

Washington notified Kiev that an HEU agreement had now been 

actually signed with Russia but would not be implemented until 

Moscow reached an agreement on profit sharing with Kiev. At the 

time, Ukrainian officials became upset, claiming that the agreement 

showed support of Russia at a time when both were negotiating 

nuclear issues. These alternating accusations were to mar U.S. 

efforts at trying to get both sides together on various nuclear issues. 

In early April, 1993, Kravchuk sent Yeltsin proposals on 

breaking the deadlock on the nuclear negotiations, which Ukraine 

viewed as being stalled by Russia's insistence that the talks could 

resume only after Kiev had ratified START and acceded to the NPT. 

For Moscow's part, Dubinin stated in a mid-month interview wifl~ 

lzvestia that an agreement had been reached on the Ukrainian 

missile complex but that the Ukrainians had balked and were 

raising questions about the text already agreed upon. To break the 

continuing stalemate, the Ukrainian negotiating commission was 

terminated in early May, and, as a result of an agreement between 

Kravchuk and Yeltsin, the negotiations were upgraded to the Prime 

Minister level. 

In late April, possibly reflecting the U.S. policy shift of March 

on the value of nuclear components, 162 deputies signed a 
nuclear weapons in Ukraine. In theory, the nuclear weapons in 

Ukraine are subordinate to the CIS, including Ukraine. Russia's 

statement, according to Kiev, changed this status, and in effect 

introduced the concept that only foreign--that is, Russian--troops 

have jurisdiction, and there is no law permitting the stationing of 

foreign troops in Ukraine. 

By early spring, however, Ukraine had also developed a plan 

for removing warheads from the missiles. This was a decision by 

the Cabinet of Ministers and was to involve the Defense Ministry 

as the lead agency. Prior to Talbott's May 9 visit to Kiev, a 

Ukrainian official expressed Kiev's interest in discussing detargeting and the removal of both the guidance systems and the 

warheads from the missiles. All this could take place while the 

START ratification process was proceeding in Ukraine. 

In his meeting with Defense Minister Morozov in Kiev in May, 

Talbott stressed U.S. and Russian steps toward deactivation even 

without the START Treaty being in force. Morozov responded that 

this was a good example for other nuclear states and, without 

elaborating, stated that in the near future Ukraine would be able to 

report the dismantling of its own missiles. 

For the U.S. part, Defense Secretary Aspin travelled to Kiev on 

June 6, 1993, bringing a deaclivation proposal whose foundation 

had been set by Wisner's 1992 visit. This proposal would involve 

the removal of missile warheads and storage in Ukraine before 

shipment to Russia. The program would be internationally 

supervised. Once Russian dismantlement facilities were ready the 

warheads would go to Russia. And, once the warheads were 

destroyed, Ukraine would receive payment for the HEU. The 

United States was also willing to bridge the gap between Ukraine 

and Russia in their nuclear dispute. Morozov accepted the 

proposal. He claimed that it paralleled a proposal Kiev had made to 

Moscow the previous summer, but that Russia had not shown any 

interest. Kozyrev's view, however, was contrary. According to him, 

Russia had made such a proposal but Ukraine had rejected it. When 
Kazakhstan and Belarus to remove their non-nuclear pledges and 

lead Ukraine to maintain its nuclear force. In addition, he urged 

that the United States exercise greater pressure on Ukraine for 

ratification. Moscow continued to be troubled by what it regarded 

as a U.S. willingness to compromise with Ukraine and viewed U.S. 

efforts at mediating the Ukrainian-Russian dispute as interference. 

On June 11 Talbott flew into Kiev's Borispol airport for a 

meeting on the technical aspects of deactivation. The United States 

viewed the process in stages, such as first demating the warheads 

and then defueling the missiles. By mid-June Russia was signalling 

its positive reaction to the deactivation proposal. By the end of the 

month, Ukraine and Russia were getting closer to an agreement on 

maintenance of the missile components and warheads. At the June 

17 Moscow summit, Ukraine and Russia had reached preliminary 

agreement on maintenance of the Ukraine based weapons, even 

before START ratification by the Rada, a step that was welcomed 

as a positive development by the U.S. Missile maintenance was 

becoming a problem since lack of proper care could lead to 

accidents with human and environmental consequences. As early 

as February 24, 1993, Morozov confirmed that there was a problem 

regarding Russian maintenance of the missiles due to a failure to 

reach a financing agreement. At that time he claimed that the lack 

of maintenance was affecting the operational readiness but not the 

safety of the missiles. 

UKRAINE MOVES TOWARD NUCLEAR 

STATUS 

On July 2, by avote of 226-15, the Ukrainian Rada voted a foreign 

policy doctrine stating that Ukraine has ownership rights to the 

nuclear weapons. The relevant words were that Ukraine had 

"acquired its own nuclear weapons for historical reasons" but would 

never use them. This wording was widely interpreted as Ukraine's 

finally having declared itself a nuclear state. The Ibreign ministry 

sought to discount this interpretation by denying the allegations and 
START article by a Dutch academic outlining the advantages to 

Ukraine of an early ratification of START. The article highlighted 

the prospects of economic gains as well as the problems of 

servicing weapons as reasons for ratification to take place. 

Kravchuk, himself, however endorsed the Rada vote when he 

claimed that Ukraine must be the owner of the weapons until their 

actual destruction. 

UKRAINE-RUSSIA STALEMATE 

By July, however, Ukraine was reaching a point of frustration in its 

discussions with Moscow. In the wake of his June 17 summit with 

Yeltsin, Kravchuk had declared that the issue of nuclear weapons in 

Ukraine had been "resolved in principle," a step that the U.S. had 

welcomed when first reported. On July 8, however, Kravchuk 

complained to visiting Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) that he 

finds it difficult to finalize nuclear agreements he reaches with 

Moscow. Kravchuk lamented that he did not know with whom to 

speak in Russia and requested United States assistance in the talks. 

However, at the fringes of the Tokyo economic summit, 

President Clinton met with Yeltsin on July 10 to discuss the 

Ukrainian nuclear issue. At a joint news conference, Yeltsin 

announced that the United States and Russia had agreed to present 

Kiev with the idea of a trilateral nuclear agreement. The United 

States saw the Russian step as a positive development--one of 

many that the United States and Russia were mutually undertaking 

to help resolve the Ukrainian-Russian stalemate in nuclear 

negotiations. The U.S. State and Defense Departments, for 

example, had already been exchanging ideas in a three-way format 

involving Ukraine and Russia on how the reduction of nuclear 

weapons could begin prior to the entry into force of the START 

treaty. 

During his July visit to Washington, Tarasiuk gave formal 

Ukrainian acceptance to the early deactivation proposal. In the 
pg ppg

Based on positive responses by Ukraine in June and early July, 

preparations had been made to begin talks on the teclmical aspects 

of deactivation. A delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Ashton Carter arrived in Kiev on July 22 to hold such 

talks. A week earlier Kiev had taken first steps already toward 

deactivation. On July 15, true to Morozov's comments to Talbott in 

May, Ukraine started to deactivate 10 SS-19's with the goal of 

completing the process by the end of tile year. According to 

Morozov, the 10 missiles had reached the end of their service life. 

He believed that Ukraine had the capability to extend the service 

life but that file decision had been made by Kravchuk to deactivate 

before START ratification, thus, in fact, beginning the START 

process de facto. Morozov said, however, that until file ownership 

issue was resolved, storage of warheads would be in Ukraine, not in 

Russia. In his visit to Washington at the end of July, Aspin also 

notified Morozov that a portion of the Nunn-Lugar funds of $175 

million promised by the Bush administration would be released to 

speed this dismantlement and would no longer be conditioned for 

release on ratification of START and NPT. In addition, a military 

cooperation agreement was reached, including annual visits and the 

goal of widening military contacts. 

The road to ratification was still not smooth. On June 3, the 

Rada had started deliberations on START. Zlenko made clear in his 

remarks to the deputies that Ukraine did not possess the financial 

nor technical means to maintain a nuclear force and urged quick 

action, lest a delay hurt Ukraine's international image. However, 

Rada action was slow in coming. It continued to be troubled by the 

issues of financial assistance, compensation, and security 

assurances. In September, as Kravchuk and Yeltsin arrived at an 

agreement for the sale of the Black Sea Fleet in exchange for 

Ukraine's energy debts to Russia, Kravchuk, under pressure from 

forces in Parliament, was lorced to renege. However, the nuclear 

weapon agreements concluded at this Massandra summit appeared 

to set the foundation that led to eventual success regarding nuclear 
START. The Ukrainian side also claimed that Moscow had agreed, 

for the first time, to provide compensation for the withdrawn 

Ukrainian tactical weapons, but this was disavowed by Russian 

officials. 

Within weeks everything seemed to unravel when Russia pulled 

out of the agreement, accusing Ukraine of changing the wording to 

indicate that only those nuclear weapons covered by START I and 

not "all" weapons would be eliminated. It was a charge denied by 

Kiev, which claimed that Russia had presented for signature a text 

different from the one that had been actually agreed upon. The 

agreement on compensation and warhead maintenance, however, 

appeared to weather the political storm but not without some 

problems. The maintenance agreement was rocked by Russian 

accusations that Ukraine was storing too many SS- 19 warheads at 

Pervomaysk thus raising a radiation danger, a charge that Kiev also 

denied. 

During his October visit to Kiev, Secretary Christopher made 

an effort to move the START process forward by telling the 

Ukrainians that the United States would not tie the nuclear weapons 

issue to U.S. support of Ukraine's economic development. This was 

a welcome step for Kiev which had come to experience 

administration opposition to any economic assistance for Ukraine. 

During the trip, on October 25, Christopher and Zlenko signed the 

SSD umbrella agreement. 

THE TRILATERAL AGREEMENT 

On November 18, the Rada finally ratified the START treaty but 

with thirteen conditions, including security and financial concerns. 

The Ukrainian action "also aimed at destroying only 42% of the 

nuclear warheads, and did not deal with the Lisbon Protocol and the 

NPT. The Rada's action raised serious concerns in W~shington, 

with the U.S. reminding Kiev of its commitments to President Bush. 

The Rada action, however, did not preclude the U.S. from pursuing 

SSD implementing agreements. In December, in separate dates in 
Rada action of November actually had given Kravchuk a yardstick 

against which to measure his negotiations with the U.S. and Russia. 

He could thus claim that he had fulfilled the Rada's mandate and 

leave file Rada exposed to redefining the criteria. On December 21 

Kravchuk stated that a tripartite agreement on security, 

compensation and assistance would shortly be reached. The 

previous day Ukraine, in a sign of good faith, had begun the 

deactivation of 17 SS-24 missiles, which the West had feared would 

be retained by Ukraine. The stalemate was quickly broken when it 

was agreed to have a trilateral signing in Moscow on January 14, 

1994. 

The trilateral agreement provided for the transfer of Ukraine's 

nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement, outlined Russian 

compensation for the HEU in the transferred warheads and stated 

the security assurances Washington and Moscow were ready to 

provide Ukraine once Ukraine ratified START and acceded to the 

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The agreement was the outcome 

of intensive multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations the three 

parties had been conducting since the previous summer. The 

trilateral agreement gave each of the parties what it had sought: For 

the U.S. and Russia it gave a non-nuclear Ukraine, for Ukraine it 

gave it the security assurances and compensation it had long sought. 

Ukraine committed to eliminating all of its nuclear weapons within 

the seven year period outlined in the START Treaty. However, a 

secret protocol signed by Ukraine envisaged its actually ridding 

itself of the weapons within three years, a target that Ukraine met. 

On June 1, 1996, approximately 30 months after the Trilateral 

signing, President Kuchma of Ukraine announced that Ukraine had 

shipped the last of its nuclear warheads to Russia. The event was 

marked by a ceremony in which Secretary of Defense William 

Perry, joined by Ukraine's Minister of Defense Valery S hmarov and 

Russia's Pavel Grachev, planted sunflower seeds on a former 

missile silo site at Pervomaysk. In another reported secret protocol, 

Russia agreed to compensate Kiev for the tactical weapons it had 

shipped to Russia by writing off part of Ukraine's energy debt to 
which awaits implementation. Russia agreed to a $450 million 

figure, while Ukraine agreed that the money would be offset against 

Kiev's debt for Russian oil and gas. 

In February 1994, Ukraine ratified the START Treaty, dropping 

its reservations of November 1993. However, it failed to vote NPT 

accession by about two dozen votes, leaving the matter to a new 

parliament that was to be elected starting in late March. Ironically, 

the Rada had insisted on security assurances all along and when it 

had the chance to realize them in the February vote, it fell short. 

One would have thought that, given Yuri Meshkov's election ~s 

president of Crimea in late January and his call for reunification 

with Russia, the Rada would have been spurred to act on NPT in 

order to get the assurances in place. 

qhe new parliament acceded to the NPT in November 1994. At 

the December 5, 1994, CSCE meeting in Budapest, President 

Kuchma who succeeded President Kravchuk in July 1994, presented 

Ukraine's accession to the NPT, exchanged the START instruments 

of ratification, and Ukraine had security assurances pledged by the 

United States, Russia, and Britain. France and China also pledged 

similar assurances. 
UKRAINE'S 

RATIFICATION 

Over the course of 1992 and 1993 a number of circumstances had 

changed, leading Ukraine to realize the importance of START 

ratification. In September 1992 Prime Minister Vitold Fokin 

resigned under pressure from democratic torces who believed he 

was not reforming the economy. In June 1993 the Donbass coal 

miner strike emphasized the political unhappiness that was marking 

file heavily Russified regions that had hoped for a better economic 

future in an independent Ukraine. In September of that year, then 

Prime Minister Kuchma had resigned, underscoring the 

ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian leadership and in particular 

emphasizing the lack of any coherent economic program. 

Economically and politically Ukraine was teetering. Russian 

nationalist Zhirinovsky's unexpected strong showing in the 

December 1993 Russian parliamentary elections drove home for 

Kiev the importance of finding a counter to possible Russian 

nationalism by cooperating with the United States. Growing unease 

about Crimea, where pro-Russian activism appeared to be 

increasing, also drove home for Ukraine the importance of a better 

relationship with file West. On a practical level, Ukraine had come 

to realize both the growing environmental flu'eat if unserviced 

missiles began to leak as well as the politicai and economic costs of 

holding onto the missiles. 

But there were a number of positive aspects that helped the 

Rada act. There was the trilateral agreement with Russia on the 

sharing of proceeds from the highly enriched urmfium that was to 

be removed from the Ukrahlian warheads. The congressional move 

in the summer of 1993 to provide $300 million in assistance to 

45 
vv, g

its more constructive approach. On October 19, the Rada approved 

the military doctrine, one year after it first took it up. The doctrine 

stated Ukraine's goal of becoming a non-nuclear state, but linked 

this to security assurances and compensation, something the 

November ratification also did. By this time Ukraine had finally 

resolved the issue of defining an enemy. The noted doctrine stated 

Ukraine would view any state as an enemy if its policy was a 

military threat to Ukraine. The failed doctrine of the previous year 

had stated that Ukraine did not view any state as an enemy. 

THE ROLE OF U.S. PRESSURE 

U.S. pressure, however, continued throughout this process. Despite 

having laid down the verbal foundation of a new policy and 

pursuing the process of de facto implementation of START, the 

Clinton administration continued to maintain diplomatic and 

economic pressure on Kiev. In an effort to stymie the belief that 

some European states favored Ukraine retaining its nuclear 

weapons, the United States urged various European capitals to 

discuss the issue with Kiev and to tell Kiev it could not expect to 

receive economic assistance until it moved on START and NPT. 

On July 3, 1993, Kravchuk, apparently eager to test the pledge 

of a new relationship by the Clinton administration forwarded a 

letter--in which he made the transparent connection between 

START and financial assistance--to the President regarding the 

upcoming G-7 meeting in Tokyo. No doubt his effort may have 

been spurred by his June 12 phone conversation with the President 

in which the President emphasized the importance of Ukraine and 

expressed his willingness to extend food credits and grants. Of the 

G-7, Kravchuk requested a $I00 million fund for small business 

development, a $1 to 1.5 billion stabilization fund, an international 

disarmament fund, $300 million for a privatization fund and 
international status. They were also informed of U.S. 

dissatisfaction that Ukraine, unlike Russia, was not taking any steps 

toward economic reform and that many of the participants had been 

upset with Kiev's opposition to the U.S. bombing of Baghdad that 

month. Undaunted, the Ukrainians asked for a Kravchuk visit prior 

to the then scheduled Ukrainian September 26 referendum. (This 

was eventually changed to pre-term Presidential and Parliamentary 

elections for 1994). They were pointedly told, however, that for a 

visit to be approved, Ukraine would have to make progress on 

START and the NPT. 

In July, the administration voiced its opposition to the 

McConnell aid action. Senator Mitch McConnell had become 

convinced that in order to tmderscore U.S. interest in Ukraine, it 

was important for the United States to provide some form of 

financial assistance. Moreover, sensitive to Ukraine's complaint 

that it had always been lumped with Russia, McConneli realized the 

importance of sponsoring aid that was specifically geared toward 

Ul~aine--an issue that some U.S. officials had long been urging on 

two administrations, and which was a subject of discussions during 

the Senator's July visit. In November, 1992, Kravchuk made this 

desire clear when he told an interviewer that Ukraine wanted aid 

channeled to it directly, without being tied to the former Soviet 

Union or Russia. In the summer of 1993, Senator McConnell 

prevailed in allocating to Ukraine not less than $300 million, thus 

keeping the door open to further assistance. 

The admhfistration, however, opposed the congressional move, 

and the State Department wrote the Hill stating the administration's 

objections. Ostensibly, the issue revolved around the 

administration's opposition to Congressional earmarks. But it soon 

became clear that a more generic opposition to Ukraine assistance 

existed. An NSC official reportedly claimed that Ukraine would not 

get any money and, furthermore, that Ukraine did not deserve any 

assistance, since Kiev had not undertaken any economic reforms as 

Russia had. When the Congressional action passed, the 
not supportive of Ukraine. Despite Talbotts May visit to Kiev, it 

appears that it was the congressional action that brought the change 

in US-Ukraine relations. The Congress had removed the economic 

weapon that the administration had been using against Ukraine and 

which had not been very effective. 

In October 1993, in an apparent effort to capitalize on the 

congressional action, a U.S. economic delegation visited Ukraine, 

seeking to pledge U.S. assistance with economic reforms separate 

of the nuclear issue. The administration was now willing to de-link 

economic aid and the nuclear weapons question, a message that was 

reinforced by Secretary Christopher's visit to Kiev later in the 

month. 

Indeed, the promised congressional aid became a carrot for 

further moving Ukraine on the desired nuclear track. Despite the 

Rada's failure on NPT, Ukraine had started on the road to 

disarmament and its bilateral relationship with the United States 

was improving. During President Kravchuk's March, 1994, visit to 

the White House, it was announced that the first shipment of 

warheads was enroute to Russia for dismantlement. To cement the 

growing relationship, President Clinton announced a $700 million 

aid package, divided evenly between Nunn-Lugar funds for denuclearization and economic assistance. The latter funds, reflecting 

the earlier congressional action, were contingent on Ukraine 

undertaking serious economic reform. The administration soon 

started to note that Ukraine was one of the largest recipients of 

United States assistance. 

THE ISSUE OF SECURITY ASSURANCES 

From the outset of the bilateral relationship, Kiev had been seeking 

security assurances from the United States. While Kiev never 

considered it could be a member of NATO, officials did hint at 

various times Ukraine's desire to have a NATO-like umbrella, 

whereby it would fall under U.S. protection in the event of an 

attack. On January 20, 1993, Dmytro Pavlychko, Chairman of tile 
binding treaty giving Ukraine security assurances would also be 

sought of Russia. While the Pavlychko draft was a non-starter, the 

incident did serve to magnify the central role of security in the 

whole nuclear weapons issue. 

In March 1992, then Environmental Minister Scherbak made an 

impassioned plea for security assurances, during his visit to the 

White House. During President Kravchuk's May 1992 visit to the 

White House, the Ukrainians, spearheaded by Foreign Minister 

Zlenko, sought to capitalize on President Bush's positive words oil 

Ukraine by hammering Secretary Baker on the issue of security 

assttrances. Prior to the luncheon in the Old Family Dining Room 

on the State Floor, while the President and Kravchuk lagged behind, 

the two delegations gathered in the Red Room to pursue the 

discussion. Baker, with his voice rising, and his hand chopping the 

air was emphatic that the United States could not give security 

assurances. If Ukraine were to receive them, then other countries, 

such as Poland and Hungary, which already expressed interests in 

this direction would demand similar assurances. Where would the 

process end Baker demanded rhetorically'? The Ukrainians were 

unmoved and, as if not hearing Baker's discourse, kept coming back 

to their demand. They wanted not only a guarantee against 

aggression but against the threat of aggression as well, to which 

Baker retorted, without getting a response, of who would define all 

this. 

When President Bush and Kravchuk entered the room they 

joined in the discussion. Kravchuk pointed out that the United 

States has NATO for security. The President countered that is what 

the role of the Helsinki process and the CSCE is all about. With the 

issue unresolved, the entourage moved to the dining room, but as 

the weeks passed the issue kept becoming increasingly important. 

In late June 1992, the United States, while not explicitly 

offering security assurances, made a number of commitments that 

were aimed at easing Kiev's concerns. The United States pledged 

to seek immediate action at the UN Security Council to give 

assistance to a non-nuclear Ukraine if it were attacked or threatened 
undertaking political and economic reforms as a means for 

maintaining security and pointed to the need for Ukraine to become 

fully integrated into the international community, particularly by 

participation in such bodies as the United Nations, the Conference 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic 

Coordinating Council. 

The U.S. view began to shift by autumn 1992 to the point where 

the idea of security assurances for Ukraine became a viable option. 

Scowcroft had always believed that assurances would help 

encourage Kiev to move forward on START ratification but that 

there was no way that the United States would be able to give 

Ukraine a security guarantee, that is, a legally binding agreement 

co~mniuing the United States to the defense of Ukraine. The issue, 

as Scowcroft viewed it, was the compromise agreement that both 

the United States and Ukraine would settle for. Thus, in the 

Autumn of 1992 commenced an intricate pattern of negotiations 

aimed at satist~cing both sides' needs. The talks also involved the 

Russians and the British. 

UKRAINE'S SECURITY CONCERNS 

A country devoid of natural borders, with a rich agricultural soil, 

~md a crossroads between Europe and Asia, Ukraine has historically 

been a target of aggression or the site of empires fighting out their 

colonial drives. And none of the historical occupations have been 

conducive to Ukraine's development. Indeed, they have aimed at 

destroying the Ukrainian identity, focusing on barring the use of the 

Ukrainian language as the Czars did in the 19th century, as well as 

in physically attempting to crush the national spirit as witnessed by 

the forced migrations to Siberia and the Soviet induced famine of 

the 1930s. Given this historical background, one can understand 

Ukraine's concerns regarding possible Russian intentions. 

But there is another dimension. Historically, pressed from 

various sides, Ukraine has sought to gain its security by appealing 

to or allying itself with ouLside forces. Ukraine has never had the 
them. 

Complicating this security dilemma is the fact that Ukraine's 

contemporary borders were artificially produced. While 

encompassing much of the etlmic and historical territory conceived 

of as Ukraine, the borders were created by the Soviet regime 

through a combination of readjusting the borders with Ukraine's 

neighbors and, in a most glaring example, by bequeathing Crimea 

to Ukraine in 1954. In these circumstances Ukraine sees its security 

potentially threatened on many fronts. 

What the West initially failed to grasp was the powerful 

historical b~sis of Ukraine's approach. And while the West 

eventually came to appreciate Ukraine's concerns, Kiev did not see 

the West as willing to defend Ukraine. Ukraine needs to be visibly 

assured of its security. It needs this crutch as an interim approach 

while it learns to build its own security from internal sources, 

including the structuring of conventional forces as well as economic 

and political reform. 

The concerns over Russia were eviden! both by how events 

were unfolding in Russia and Moscow's attempts to undermine 

Ukraine's image. On November 22, Num~ and Lugar came to Kiev 

concerned by reports in Western media mad in other CIS states 

regarding Ukrainian intentions on START ratification. That Sunday 

evening, they met with Kravchuk, who made an exception to his 

rule of not holding Sunday meetings. Kravchuk reaffirmed his 

conunitment to go non-nuclear, but emphasized the importance of 

obtainh~g security assurances. He expressed particular concern that 

the conservative forces in Russia may present Yeltsin with political 

problems that can impact on Ukraine. 

That much of the hysteria regarding Ukraine's nuclear 

intentions was fueled by Russia was a perspective that the Senators 

carried in the back of their minds. At various times Russia had 

claimed to U.S. officials that Ukraine was developing launch codes, 

that Ukraine would be able to fire missiles in 12-18 months, that 

Ukraine cannot properly maintain the missiles, that nuclear 
ASSURANCES 

On October 2, 1992, a delegation headed by Undersecretary Wisner 

arrived in Kiev to discuss nuclear issues. In the ensuing 

discussions, Ukraine proposed a United Nations resolution 

sponsored by the "Penn Five" regarding security assurances that 

would help ease START ratification. 

By mid-November, 1992, discussions with Ukraine were 

proceeding along the line of the possibility of a joint US-Russian 

security assurance and the possible language that any prospective 

statement would involve. Kiev aweed with the U.S.-proposed basic 

principles--the main feature being the pledge contained in the June 

commitment about going to the United Nations in the event of a 

nuclear attack or nuclear flu'eat against Ukraine. Discussion also 

centered on the type of statement it should be, and settled on the 

goal of a joint US-Russian statement and the prospect of it being 

issued at a Presidential level. 

Ukraine was willing to accept the proposed U.S. security 

assurances but with a number of changes. Kiev wanted Ukraine 

specifically named throughout the agreement. Kiev was concerned 

that the language Washington was prepared to offer was standard 

language drawn from existing international agreements and treaties. 

Kiev wanted original language geared toward recognizing Ukraine's 

unique position as a country willing to give up its nuclear arsenal. 

Ukraine also wanted a specific guarantee against economic coercion 

as well as a guarantee against conventional attack. This latter point 

was somewhat moot, since the proposed assurances spoke of respect 

for the independence of the CSCE member states (which included 

Ukraine), respect for each CSCE country's existing borders and of 

refraining from the threat or use of force against the "territorial 

integrity" of the newly independent states of Ukraine, Belarus, and 

Kazakhstan. 

By early January 1993, however, the negotiations met a bump. 

Pavlychko stated that Parliament had upped the ante: he claimed 

that a statement of assurances was insufficient and that a security 

treaty with a juridical basis was necessary. The British were also 
gambit. He gave the standard commitment that START would get 

priority treatment once the Rada reconvened in January. U.S. 

officials complained that while the United States had been 

forthcoming on assurances, Nmm-Lugar funding and the need for 

Ukrainian-Russian profit sharing on lIEU, this had only led to 

increased demands by the Rada. Nonetheless, Tarasiuk was given 

a copy of tile proposed United States assurances after his 10-minute 

Oval Office meeting with President Bush on January 8. 

The assurances provided to Tarasiuk included commitments on 

the part of the United States that would also be expected to be 

provided by Russia to Ukraine. The U.S. commitments were drawn 

from previous public commitments. The United States pledged as 

it did in 1968 to non-nuclear NPT members, to assist Ukraine, as a 

member of the NPT, by seeking immediate action by the UN 

Security Council if Ukraine were attacked or threatened by nuclear 

weapons. Next, the United States pledged not to use nuclear 

weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that was part of the 

NPT unless the United States was attacked by a nuclear state with 

which the non-nuclear state was allied. This was a pledge that the 

United States had also made to non-nuclear NPT members in 1978. 

The United States also pledged to respect the independence of 

Ukraine, Ukraine's existing borders and noted that border changes 

could only be made by peaceful means; all these were in keeping 

with the CSCE charter that the United States signed in 1975. And, 

finally, the United States committed itself not to use the threat or 

use of force against any state (Ukraine), only in self defense and in 

accordance with the charter of the United Nations. 

Kravchuk, however, believed that the assurances were not 

specific enough and wanted to re-open the dialogue. The Foreign 

Ministry claimed that the U.S. proposal did nol meet Ukraine's 

security concerns. The assurances did not contain the economic or 

conventional guarantees that Ukraine had been seeking. In fact, 

Kiev had already received the Russian text, which it also found 

unacceptable since it would recognize Ukraine's borders in the 

context of the CIS. Because Ukraine was not willing to join a 
peaceful means and that this applied to Ukraine. 

At their January 15 meeting in Moscow, Yeltsin stated to 

Kravchuk Russia's willinguess to supply security assurances against 

both nuclear and conventional attack, to Ukraine. Yeltsin had 

pcrsonally directed Kozyrev to come up with language that would 

please Ukraine and that Russia would be willing to provide the 

assurances prior to ratification but that they would take affect only 

alter ratification took place. This language was a source of dispute 

between the United States m~d Ukraine. Washington believed that 

it was not wise to make the assurances public in advance of 

ratification, since it would open the possibility that Parliament 

could use this to its advantage to pressure the United States into 

more concessions. 

In February, the United States approached Moscow to provide 

Ukraine assurances in the framework of the CSCE rather than the 

CIS. While Russia accepted the proposal, it still insisted on 

retaining the CIS language. Moscow's rationale was that the CSCE, 

signed in 1975, did not cover the Ukrainian-Russian border since 

this was not an international border in 1975 and thus the CIS 

language was better protection for Ukraine. But this kind of 

thinking could only raise concerns about Russia's intentions toward 

the republics and its eventual role in the region of the former Soviet 

Union. The State Department expressed its concerns to the Russian 

govenunent. 

On February 26 Ukraine got a new draft text from Russia still 

containing the CIS language that continued to perturb Kiev. 

Tarasiuk spoke with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Berdennikov 

about it, but the latter adamantly claimed that there could be no 

more changes. 

Kiev was doubly unnerved when Yeltsin called for Russian 

peacekeeping in the CIS and Kozyrev made mention of Ukraine as 

being a mythical slate. These actions--plus Kozyrev's "joke" in 

December, 1992, at the Stockholm CSCE meeting when he publicly 

raised the specter of an obstructionist Russian foreign policy if the 

conservative nationalist forces took control of Moscow--Tarasiuk 
By mid-March, 1993, however, Washington had reconsidered 

its position on some of the Ukrainian concerns and had drawn up 

economic assurances derived from the CSCE language. However, 

the United States was still unwilling to approach Kiev with this 

change until Russia was willing to do likewise. 

Ukraine continued to push for legally binding assurances. On 

June 28, 1993, Tarasiuk outlined that Kiev was working a "legally 

binding" multiple security assurances document to be presented to 

the United Nations Security Council Perm Five. This brought the 

whole process back to the October 1992 starting point. Tarasiuk 

presented this document to Talbott at their July 22 meeting in 

Washington but was told that the United States could not support a 

legally binding instrument. During Talbott's May 1993 visit to 

Kiev to lay the beginning of a new relationship, the Ukrainians had 

broached the idea of a legally binding treaty akin to the Austria 

State Treaty as a means to guarantee Ukraine's security. Talbott's 

delegation brushed the suggestion aside, noting it took ten years to 

negotiate such a treaty and that such a route would create more 

problems than it would solve, including delaying the 

implementation of Ukraine's nuclear commitments. And so the 

process continued until the January 14 Trilateral Statement outlined 

the fully acceptable security assurances Ukraine would receive after 

START ratification and accession to the NPT. 

Kiev received most of what it had sought: a high level and 

public endorsement of the assurances by Presidents Clinton, 

Kravchuk, and Yeltsin; assurances from Russia; assurances against 

economic coercion; and no language on the CIS. For all practical 

purposes, the assurances can be viewed as having been granted 

before ratification, since the final ratification that removed the 

November 1993 conditions did not take place until February 1994. 

At the December 5, 1994, CSCE meeting in Budapest, the 

assurances came into formal play when Ukraine presented its 

accession to the NPT, which had been acted on by its parliament the 

preceding month. In addition, Britain, France and China have 

provided the same assurances thus fulfilling Ukraine's desire that 
Foreign Ministry Russian Ambassadors in Eastern Europe were 

warning those governments not to deal with Ukraine, since Ukraine 

was in Russia's sphere of influence. The fear of future action, either 

through the withholding of energy supplies by Moscow or by its 

exploitation of the Black Sea Fleet issue or the Russian minority 

will always be in the back of Kiev's mind. 
CONCLUSION 

Brent Scowcroft has stated in hindsight that it was a mistake for the 

United States to have concentrated so much of its bilateral effort on 

the nuclear question. The Clinton administration had the benefit of 

the tlavails of its predecessor and, while it started off on a sour note, 

appears to have steadied the relationship and embarked on a broader 

relationship with Ukraine. This development is a cause for 

optimism. 

For the United States, over the course of two administrations, 

nuclear weapons had been the focus of the bilateral relationship. 

Ukraine has now moved to fulfill its obligations in this domain. 

The real test of United States policy, therefore, is only beginning. 

With nuclear weapons the focus, it was easy to structure diplomatic 

and economic incentives and pressures toward this goal and to 

maintain a stake in Ukrainian affairs. Once the weapons are 

removed, the United States has to address the issue of what kind of 

Ukraine is in its national interest and what kind of energies and 

resources Washington has at its disposal and, more importantly, 

will be willing to exert on behalf of a constructive policy. 

Outside of the policy challenges the United States will face, 

there are a number of lessons that can be learned from the handling 

of the issue. Clearly, the United States achieved its objectives, both 

in a narrow and a broad sense: Ukraine fulfilled its pledge to 

become a non-nuclear state and this, in turn, will stem the 

possibility of nuclear proliferation in the region and lead to a 

greater degree of stability, both important developments for U.S. 

national interests. In achieving this, the United States has also 

gained a greater appreciation of Ukraine's regional role and of its 

concerns, and is establishing a working relationship with Kiev, 

thereby enhancing U.S. political flexibility in the region which is 

also a potentially important security development for Washington. 

While these are actual or potential successes, there were a number 

57 
facto steps toward denuclearization Ukraine was willing to 

undertake. Furthermore, the administration was hampered by the 

fact that Nunn-Lugar funds could only be released after START 

ratification. Under-, the Clinton administration, there was a 

reinterpretation, whereby Nunn-Lugar funds could be released for 

dismantlement purposes prior to ratification, a point that was 

announced during Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov's July 

1993 visit to Washington. The lesson one carries from this is to not 

limit one's potential options that can serve, as they did for the late 

Secretary Aspin, as a means for furthering a policy objective. Also, 

with the impending change of administrations, the Bush 

administration wanted to end its term with complete arms control 

agreements. Thus, the signing of the START II Treaty in January, 

1993, and tile pressure on Ukraine to acl on START I. But, the 

main problem from the U.S. side was that Washington at first 

viewed tile nuclear issue as a bilateral United States-Ukrainian 

issue. 

Ukrainians themselves realized the importance of Russia in this 

process, more than that of the United States. In April, 1993, the 

government newspaper Uriadovii Kur'er ran an interview with 

Tarasiuk who focused his comments on Russia, including the 

compensation issue, and failure for progress in their bilateral 

nuclear talks. In addition, Tarasiuk expressed understanding for the 

United States concern over nuclear weapons since the Ukrainian 

missiles were aimed at the United States. 

Some U.S. officials had cautioned that the issue was really a 

Ukrainian-Russian issue but Washington continued to view it 

bilaterally and believed that through a policy of verbal admonition 

it would be able to get Kiev to act accordingly. Not until the fall of 

1992 did this view change. 

Starting then, and intensifying in the Clinton administration, the 

United States was able to skillfully involve Moscow in the 

negotiating process. This had a two-fold effect. It reassured Kiev 

thai the United States was sensitive to its historic as well as current 

concerns regarding Russia, and at the same time helped to reassure 
the Ukrainian Parliament, did make Ukraine a separate party to the 

START I Treaty, thus enhancing its status as an independent State). 

First, by insisting that Moscow needed to arrive at an agreement 

with Kiev on the profits from the HEU before U.S. payments would 

be made to Russia, the United States created some pressure for 

Russia in its negotiations with Ukraine. Second, the United States 

was able to maneuver the security assurances for Ukraine over the 

shoals of both Ukrainian and Russian concerns and objections. 

Even before these events, Washington had sought to placate the 

Ukrainian side and achieve a balance between Kiev and Moscow. 

The further skill with which the United States was able to carry out 

this trilateral diplomacy was Washington's ability to withstand 

Moscow's pressure to be even tougher in its negotiations with Kiev, 

while at the same time not offending Moscow. While this trilateral 

diplomacy was extremely successful, marking the skills of U.S. 

diplomacy, it was aided in no large parl by Moscow's own desire to 

rid Ukraine of nuclear weapons and Moscow was well aware that 

with Ukraine Washington had more credibility and leverage than it 

did given the historical Ukrainian-Russian relationship. This 

mutuai goal, undoubtedly, permitted the trilateral diplomacy to 

reach fruition. 

Irrespective of the initial difficulties, the United States did 

adhere to a set of diplomatic principles that eventually led to 

success. U.S. diplomacy was quite successful throughout the whole 

process, exhibiting a blend of flexibility and creativeness that met 

both U.S. objectives and served to reassure Kiev. The United States 

did not lose sight of its goal, the removal of nuclear weapons, and 

did not sacrifice that objective throughout the whole process. This 

accomplishment served to reinforce for Kiev the seriousness of the 

U.S. approach as well as the futility of Ukraine seeking to possibly 

hold on to the weapons. However, the United States was flexible in 

examining what Ukraine sought in exchange, as witnessed by the 

negotiations over security assurances. 

While the United States was willing to entertain the idea of 

security assurances, it was not willing to provide ones that would be 
to accept Ukraine's suggestions. Starting with the initial draft, any 

acceptable amendments therefore served to reassure Kiev that the 

United States was, indeed, looking out not only "after its own 

interests, but after Kiev's as well. 

Equally important is the political climate in which negotiations 

are taking place. The atmosphere improved with the Talbott visit 

of May and with the vote of Congressional assistance. This 

experience tmderscores the importance of broader tangential issues 

and fhe influence that they may have oil a specific negotiation. 

Furthermore, the Embassies in Kiev and Moscow were utilized 

Olroughout the whole process and each was able to contribute ideas 

and suggestions that helped to move the process forward. This only 

serves to reinforce the importance of U.S. diplomatic missions and 

the need of having skilled observers and negotiators on the scene. 

One also cannot dismiss the cultural influences that Washington 

had to deal with. Having been a submerged nation for centuries, 

there was limited appreciation in Washington of the historical and 

cultural motivations in Kiev. There was a learning process for 

Washington policymakers, whereby outside the words of 

recognizing Ukraine as an independent state, they had to come 

around to dealing with and treating it as an independent state and 

this meant respecting its positions and negotiating rather than 

dictating or expecting automatic action. 

A further issue was the role of Congress. Senators Nunn and 

Lugar made two trips to Ukraine in 1992 both for the express 

purpose of pushing the ratification of START. This strong interest 

in and direct involvement in the process of diplomacy was 

something that no administration could withstand and that probably 

added to the overall early inflexibility that the United States has 

exhibited over the subject. Congressional support of foreign policy 

is extremely important and active involvement of individual 

representatives has been long standing. But care needs to be taken 

that such involvement not be independent of or be viewed as 

independent of the executive, thereby complicating the process of 

diplomacy. 
with Moow over an important international issue Ukraines 

nuclear weapons--Washington can conceivably offer its offices in 

future disputes. In such a case, Washington would undoubtedly 

always have the support of at least one of the aggrieved parties, that 

is any of the former republics, since they would view Washington 

as a more credible mediator and a balance against Moscow. Indeed, 

at some point it is possible that Washington may not have a choice. 

The Trilateral Agreement, if called into force by Kiev, would make 

it incumbent upon Washington to respond at least in a diplomatic 

fashion on Kiev's behalf. Whether because of this diplomatic 

commitment or by the past de facto engagement, the United States 

has theoretically established the basis for future involvement in the 

former Soviet bloc. The greatest limitation to this would be selfimposed: to what degree does Washington have the political will 

to shape the region's events without fearing a possible Russian 

backlash. 

The evolution of the post-Soviet region is still taking place and 

it is not entirely certain how things may turn out. As a result, it is 

important for the West and the United States in particular to stay 

actively involved in all areas of the emerging order to make certain 

that events continue to take a positive course. It appears that the 

West now has a greater appreciation of Ukraine's value as an 

economic and political partner. Ukraine however, has a long way to 

go before its attains a high level of economic and political well 

being. But Ukraine cannot accomplish its objectives alone; it will 

require international assistance and understanding. Ukraine and the 

West are at a historical crossroad: How they solve the challenges 

may well define Ukraine's future and the future of the European 

region. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary 

(Moscow, Russia) 

For i~ediate Release 

TRILATERAL STATEMENT AND ANNEX: SUMMARY 

The Trilateral Statement and Annex signed by Presidents Yeltsin, 

Kravchuk and Clinton represent a significant victory for all 

three countries. They culminate a trilateral process begun last 

sum.met -- at U.S. initiative -- to assist Russia and Ukraine in 

resolving the complex questions regarding nuclear weapons locg~ed 

on Ukrainian territory. 

The Statement and Annex provide for transfer of all nuclear 

weapons in Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement; specify prompt 

compensation by Russia to Ukraine for the highly-enriched uranium 

(HEU) in transferred nuclear weapons; preview security assurances 

the U.S., Russia and United Kingdom will provide Ukraine on its 

accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear 

weapons state; and reaffirm U.S. commitment to assist the safe 

and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces. 

The Presidents look forward to early entry-into-force of START i, 

including the Lisbon Protocol and associated documents, which 

commit Ukraine to accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time 

and eliminate all nuclear arms on its territory. 

The Presidents note that arrangements have been worked out to 

provide Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus with fair and timely 

compensation for the value of the HEU in nuclear weapons on their 

territory. For its part, Ukraine will receive compensation 

simultaneously with the transfer of weapons to Russia. 

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin informed President Kravchuk of the 

security assurances the U.S., Russia and United Kingdom (the NPT 

depositary states) will provide Ukraine once 5TA.~T I enters into 

force and Ukraine Joints the NPT. These include commitments: to 

respect Ukraine's independence and sovereignty and refrain from 

the threat or use of force against it; ~o refrain from economic 

coercion; to seek UN Security Council assistance if Ukraine 

should be the object of a threat involving nuclear weapons; and 

not to use nuclear weapons against it. 

President Clinton reaffirmed the U.5. commitment to assist the 

safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces. The U.S. has to 

date agreed to provide almost 800 million dollars in Nunn-Lugar 

funds for projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 

Additional funds have been authorized by Congress. 

63 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 

Presidents clinton, Ye!tsin and Kravchuk met in Moscow on 

January 14. The three Presidents reiterated that they w111 deal 

with one another as full and equal partners and that relations 

among their countries must be conducted on the basis of respect 

for the independence, sovereignty and territorlal integrity of 

each nation. 

The three Presidents agreed on the impoDtance of developing 

mutually beneficial, comprehensive and cooperative economic 

relations, in this connection, they welcomed the in~ention of 

the United states to provide assistance to Ukraine and Russia :o 

support the creation of effective market economies. 

The three Presidents reviewed the progress that has been made in 

reducing nuclear forces. Deactivation of strategic forces is 

already well underway in the United S~ates, Russia and Ukraine. 

The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation of RS-18s 

(SS-19s) and RS-22s (SS-24s) on Ukrainian territory by having 

their warheads removed. 

The Presidents look fo~eard to the entry into force of the 

START I Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocol and associated 

documents, and President Kravchuk reiterated his commitment that 

Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Prollferation Treaty as a nonnuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time. Presidents 

Clinton and Yeltsln noted that entry into force of START I will 

allow them to seek early ratification of START If. The 

Presidents discussed, in this regard, steps their countries would 

take to resolve certain nuclear weapons questions. 

The Presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety 

and security of nuclear weapons pending their dismantlement. 

The Preslde~ts recognize the importance of com~ensatlcn to 

Ukraine, Kaza~hstan and Belarus for the value of the highlyenriched uran!u~ in nuclear warheads located on their 

territories. Arrangements have been worked out to provide fair 

and tlme!y compe~satlon to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as ~he 

nuclear warheads o:: their ~errltory are transferred to RUssla for 

dismantling, 

Presidents Clinton anl F~]rsLn expre~ced sazlsfaot±o~ wzth ~he 

commies!on of the hlghiy-enrlched uranium contract, which was 

s!gne~ by approprlate authorities of the United States and 

R~ssia. ~y ccnverz!ng weapons-grade uranium Lnto ~rani~im which 

con only be used for peaceful purposes, the h:ghly-enr!ched 

uranlum agreement is a major step fcr~'ard !n fu!fililn~ the 

ccuntrles' m~tua! non-proliferation objectives. 
the United 5~ates and Russia are prepared to provide security 

assurances %o Ukraine. in particular, once the.START I Treaty 

enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state 

party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United 

States and Russia will: 

-- Reaffirm their co~T~itment to Ukraine, in accordance with the 

principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the 

independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the 

C5CE member states and recognize that border changes can be 

made only by peaceful and consensual means; and reaffirm 

their obligation ~o refrain from the threat or use of force 

against the territorial integrity or political independence 

of any state, and that none of their weapons will ever be 

used except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with 

the Charter of the United Nations; 

~- Reaffirm their com.mitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the 

principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic 

coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the 

exercise by another C5CE participating state of the rights 

inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of 

any kind; 

-- Reaffirm their co~T, itment to seek i,~unediate UN Security 

Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a nonnuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, if Ukraine should 

become a victim of am act of aggression or an object of a 

threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; and 

-- Reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to 

use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state 

party to the h~T, excep~ in the case of an attack on 

themselves, their territories or dependent territories, 

their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in 

association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state. 

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin info.~r.ed President Kravchuk that 

consultations have been held with the United Kingdom, the third 

depositary state of the NPT, and the United Kingdom is prepared 

to offer the same security assurances to Ukraine once it becomes 

a non-nuclear-weapon sta~e party to the N?T. 

President Clinton reaffirmed the United States coF~itmen% to 

provide technical and financial assistance for the safe and 

secure dismantling of nuclear forces and storage of fissile 

materials. The United States has agreed under the !Cunn-lugar 

Frocr~m to provide Russia, Ukraine, Kamakhstan and ~elarus with 

nearly USD 8C0 million in such assistance, including a mimimum cf 

USD 175 million to Ukraine. The United States Congress has 

authorized additional ~unn-Luqar funds for this program, and the 

United States will work intensively with Russia, Ukraine, 
For ~he Uni=ed States of America: 

WILLIAM J. CLINTON 

For Ukraine: 

LEON!D K~%VCHUK 

For the Russian Federazion: 

BORIS YELTSIN 
ten months fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations containing 

i00 tons of low-enriched uranium. By the same date, at least 200 

nuclear warheads from RS-18 (55-19) and RS-22 (SS-24) missiles 

will be transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling. 

Ukrainian representatives will monitor the dismantling of these 

warheads. The United States will provide USD 60 million as an 

advance payment to Russia, to be deducted from paymenzs due to 

Russia under the highly-enriched uranium contract. These funds 

would be available to help cover expenses for the transportation 

and dismantling of strategic warheads and the production of fuel 

assemblies. 

All nuclear warheads will be transferred from ~he territory of 

Ukraine to Russia for the purpose of their subseqFuent dismantling 

in the shortest possible time. Russia will provide compensation 

in the form of supplies of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for the 

needs of its nuclear power industry within the same time period. 

Ukraine will ensure the elimination of all nuclear weapons, 

including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory in 

accordance with the relevan~ agreements and during the seven-year 

period as provided by the START ! Treaty and within the context 

of the Verkhova Rada Statement on the non-nuclear status of 

Ukraine. All SS-24s on the territory of Ukraine will be 

deacuivated within ten months by having their warheads removed. 

Pursuant to agreements reached between Russia and Ukraine in 

1993, Russia will provide for the servicing and ensure the safety 

of nuclear warheads and Ukraine will cooperate in providing 

conditions for Russia to carry out these operations. 

Russia and the United States will promote the elaboration and 

adoption by the I ~A.EA of an agreemen~ placing all nuclear 

activities of Ukraine under I ~AEA safeguards, which will allow the 

unimpeded export of fuel assemblies from Russia to Ukraine for 

Ukraine's nuclear power industry. 

# # f 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 

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Nuclear Weapons 

FB1S-SOV-96-107 

3 June 1996 

Ukraine: Kuchma Issues Statement on Removal of 

Nuclear Weapons 

LD0106193596 Kiev UT.1 Television Network 

in bTtrainian 1800 GMT 1 Jun 96 

[FB1S Translated Text] Ukrainian .President Leonid 

Kuchma ~oday issued the following sl~tement: 

The ',,.Stbdrawal of strategic nuclear warheads from 

Ukraine was completed on 1 June 1996. By th2s. the 

Ukrainian state demonstrated. '.o the w,"rld its comrrdtment to the idea of global nuclear d!sarmament. The 

people of Ukrarne once had to finance an exhausting nuclear arms race during the Cold War. at the expense of 

their own we!l-being and economic development. Having pr~lalmed itself the Ov,,ner of nuclear weapons deployed in its t.erri:ory and inhe::ted from the former 

USSR, UL°aine regarded these wen?one not as a..'~ active military force but, above all. as ~.-i asset tha; could, 

at least t:artiai',y, compensate tar ::s losses. No n'.:clear 

threat to mankind ever emerged from an independent 

Ukraine. 

C~aideri by :he sa.:ne p."inc}ple, the Uk.r~2nia.n Supreme 

Council announced in the Doclara:~on on State 

Sovereignty in !990 that Ukraine would abide by 

three nc, n-n~ac!ear principles: ncn-Seploymen,., nonproduction, and r~0n-acquisltior, of ."..~c~eaf weapons. 

This decision was later confirmed in a]! e.f Ukraine's 

documents an,::l practical stets in the sphere of nuclear 

disarmament. The remo,,al of the last r, uc;ear 'o.arhead 

from Ukraine is the ~o~ical eznclusion of this process 

and cc, nvincit:g proof ;hat our policy is consistent 

and predict~'.e. This historic event marks the t;me!y 

and complete fulfillmem of our country's obligations 

according to the trilateral statement of the U.S., 

Ukrainiar, and Russian presidents on 14 January 1994, 

and represents Ukraine's considerable cont.ribuuon to 

the disarmament process. 

The complete elimination of nuclear v, eapons deployed 

on Ukrainian territory provides a unique opportunity to 

implement ',he idea of a ruc'.ear-free Central and Eastern 

Europe from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. Its creadon 

will promote the development of an atmosphere of trust 

among counmes '.n the region and wall considerably 

reduce the danger of new li~es of division emerging 

on the European continent. 

"I2~e people of Ukraine, who have exper!en...ed the dc- 

$1mctive consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl 

nuclear power plato, are all too we!l a'.,,,are of the real 

threat of catastrophe posed by nuclear arms. Tl'.at is why 

Ukraine is confidem In ~ts ~oice ef a hue;ear-free status 

and urges other countries, first ~f nil the nuclear powers, to follow the same road and fin their best to remove 

nuclear weapons from the face of our planet as soon as 

possible and forever. 

71 
Ukraine 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of Press $acreta=y 

For Immediate aelease June i, 1996 

STATF~LENT BY THE PI~ESIDENT 

Removal o~ Nuclear warheads from Ukz'alne and 

K@reement on CFE Fla~k Tssne 

Ukralnian President Kuchma has announced that all nuclear 

warheads have been re~r,,oved from the territory of Ukraine. This 

is a remarkabl~ achievement. In 1991, there we=e more than 4000 

strategic and tactical nuclear w~rheads in Ukraine. Today there 

arc none. I applaud the Ukrainian government for its historic 

contribution in reducing the nuclear threat. When the Presidents 

of Ukraine, Russia and I signed thc January 1994 Trilateral 

5tatemenL on this issue, we looked forward to a day that has now 

arrived. 

The trust and cooperation the United Stanes and Ukraine have 

estmb!ishcd in resolving this issue are a cornerstone of a broad 

and productive relationzhlp. Ukraine has ~mbarked on a bold 

course of political and economic reform, laying the foundations 

for democracy and a market economy. We remain committed to 

supporting ~;kraine through its ambitious and f~r-sighted reforms 

and to working w£th Ukr~i~,e ~nd our European parLnezS to promote 

Ukraine's integration into the European community. 

I also want to note the fact that both the United States and 

Russia are ahead of the reduction schedule provided for in the 

STA~T I Treaty. To date, ~he United States has eliminated 750 

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and about 800 strategic 

nuclear delivery vehicles in the former Soviet Union have bemn 

eliminated, including more than ?00 in Kussia. Th~ Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program has playeG a major role in 

the elimination of these weapons in the former Soviet Union and 

in the denuclearization of Ukraine. 

T have asked Secretary P~rry to meet next week with his Ukrainian 

and Kussian counterparts, Minis%era $h~:arov and Grachev, and mark 

the succcmsfu± implementatio~ of the Trila%eral 5tatem~r,t by 

visiting a destroyed ICBM silo and a former nuclear weapons 

storage facility in Ukraine. In doing so, they will celebrate 

another il%~portant steD in making the world safer for us all. 

On this day of important milestones, I also welcome the agreement 

that was reached today ir~ Vienna by the 30 nations party to the 

73 
led by the United States. I congratulate all parties, including 

our NATO allies, RUSSia, Ukraine and the states of the Caucasus 

and Ccntral and Eastern Europe, for their hard work, coo~eratlon 

and dedication to preserving the integrity and effectiveness of 

this crucial Treaty. 

The CFE Treaty is a key ~lemen~ of a new, more stable Europe. 

The Treaty has resulted in the destruction of over 50,000 tanks, 

armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat alr~raft and 

attack helicopters. ~t has also es~ablishe~ a sysnem of 

transparency measures, whic~ will increase confidence through 

on-site inspections, notifications and information exchanges. 

### 
FACT SHEET 

Removal of Nuclear Warheads from Ukraine 

The U.S.-~Issia-Ukraine Trilateral Statement and Ai%nex were 

signed on January 14, 1994 in Moscow by Presidents Clinton, 

Yeltsin and Kravchuk. The Statement and Annex: 

provided for the transZer of all nuclear weapons on the t~rri~ory 

of Ukraine to Russia for dismantlemcnt; 

speciZied prompt compensation by Russia to Ukraine for the 

highly-enriched uranium in the transferred weapons; 

provided for security assurances by the ~.S., Russia and United 

Kingdom to Ukraine on Ukraine's accession to the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state; and 

tea=firmed the U.S. co~mltment to assist the safe and secure 

dismantlement of nuclear forces through the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program. 

The provisions of the Trilateral Statement and Annex are being 

implemented. When they werc signed, there were some 1900 

strategic nuclear warheads in Ukraine, most of which were on 

aS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs targeted at the U.S. As of June i, there 

are none. (In addition, in 1991-9~, some 2500 tactical nuclear 

weapons were transferred from Ukraine ~o tussle.) There were far 

more nuclear warheads on thc territory of Ukraine than in any 

country other than the United States or Russia. 

Russia is dJsmantllng the removed nuclear warhcads and has 

provided Ukraine compeosation for the strategic nuclear warheads 

in the form of fuel rods for civilian nuclear power plants in 

Ukraine. Th~sc fuel rods are being delivered according to a 

schedule agreed to by Russia and Ukraine. 

On December 5, 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Non-ProllZeration 

Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. On that same date, the 

U.$., Russia and United Kingdom provided security assurances to 

Ukraine, and the STA.AT I Treaty also entered into force. 

77 
SS-24 46 460 

SS-19 180 ~8o 

176 1,240 

BOMBERS 

BEAR H 

BLACKJACK 

22 352 

20 240 

42 592 

Totals 218 1,832 

TACTICAL WI~ApONS 3,000 

79 
July 16, 1990 

Ukrainian Rada votes Declaration of State Sovereignty, pledging 

not to accept, produce or purchase nuclear weapons. 

July 31, 1991 

U.S. and Soviet Union sign START I Treaty. 

August 24, 1991 

Ukraine declares independence, subject to a December referendum. 

October, 1991 

Rada reaffirms its non-nuclear pledge of July, 1990, and commits 

to getting rid of nuclear weapons but that technical, financial and 

environmental needs would have to be addressed. 

December 1, 1991 

Ukrainian referendum overwhelmingly endorses independence. 

Leonid Kravchuk is elected President. 

December 8, 1991 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) created by Russia, 

Ukraine and Belarus. 

December 21, 1991 

Alma Atay Agreement. The former Soviet nuclear republics agree 

that nuclear weapons can only be used by agreement by all four. 

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus agree to withdraw tactical 

weapons to Russia by July 1, 1992. 

81 
Ukraine agrees at Minsk Commonwealth stmmfit to dismantle its 

strategic nuclear forces by the end of 1994. 

March 12, 1992 

Ukraine suspends shipment of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. 

April 16, 1992 

Ukraine and Russia form joint commission to supervise shipment 

of tactical weapons. Transfers resume. 

May 7, 1992 

During visit to Washington, President 

completion of tactical shipments to Russia. 

Kravchuk announces 

May 23, 1992 

Ukraine signs Lisbon Protocol making it an official party to the 

START I Treaty. 

August 31, 1992 

U.S. and Russia agree to compensation on HEU issue. 

October 1, 1992 

U.S. ratifies START I Treaty. 

October 2, 1992 

Undersecretary of State Frank Wisner visits 

deactivation proposals and security assurances. 

Kiev to discuss 

November 4, 1992 

Russia ratifies START I Treaty. 

November 17, 1992 

U.S.-Ukraine dialogue 

commences. 

on contents of security assurarlCeS 
strategic nuclear warheads. 

April, 1993 

162 Ukrainian Deputies issue statement declaring Ukraine a nuclear 

state. 

May 9-10, 1993 

Ambassador Strobe Talbott visits Kiev to restart U.S.-Ukraine 

relations. 

June 7, 1993 

Secretary of Defense Aspin visits Kiev to discuss deactivation. 

July 2, 1993 

Ukrainian Rada votes that Ukraine has ownership rights to the 

nuclear weapons. 

July 10, 1993 

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discuss in Tokyo need for a Irilateral 

agreement with Ukraine to resolve the nuclear weapons issue. 

July 15, 1993 

Ukraine begins deactivating 10 ss-19 missiles. 

September 3, 1993 

Massandra Summit between Ukraine and Russia leads to 

agreements on Black Sea Fleet and nuclear dismantlement, most of 

which are disavowed by both sides later in the month. 

October 19, 1993 

Military Doctrine voted by Rada. 

November 18, 1993 

Rada ratifies START I Treaty with 13 conditions. 
February 4, 1994 

Rada ratifies START I Treaty dropping its reservations 

November, 1993. 

of 

March 4-5, 1994 

During President Kravchuk's visit to Washington, President Clinton 

announced $700 million aid package divided between economic 

and nuclear dismantlement assistance. 

November 16, 1994 

Rada accedes to the NPT. 

December 5, 1994 

At CSCE meeting, President Kuchma presented Ukraine's accession 

to the Nl-q" and exchanged instruments of START ratification, 

thereby putting the security assurances into place. 

June 1, 1996 

Last Ukrainian strategic nuclear warhead withdrawn to Russia. 
p, 

Foreign Service since 1981, served as Ambassador to Ukraine from 

1992-1993. From 1993 to 1995 he was on the faculty of the School 

of Area Studies at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute. 

In August 1995, Ambassador Popadiuk assumed duties as 

Internation',d Affairs Advisor and senior civilian on the staff of the 

Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

National Defense University. 

In January 1989, President Bush appointed Ambassador 

Popadiuk to be Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Press 

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a position he held until 1992. In 

President Reagan's administration, he served as an Assistant Press 

Secretary from July 1986 until March 1988, when he became 

Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for 

Foreign Affairs. In October of that year, the President appointed 

him a Deputy Assistant. 

Ambassador Popadiuk graduated from Hunter College and 

received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Center of the City University 

of New York. 

85 
Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 

July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. For 

information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution 

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort McNair, 

Washington, DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/685-4379; DSN 

325-4379). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 1989. 

2. Jotm E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch? OcTober 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Marlin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World, February 1990. 

7. Jolm Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," at~d Fr~mcis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court l-'risk, A Strategic View of 

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jaanieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dtmn I11, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, Jtme 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 
Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, mid J,'unes McCarthy, 

European Security Toward the Year 2000. August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lives, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. Willizun H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping : The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks ~md William Lewis, Triage for Failing States, 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure, 

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, 77ze Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy." An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The 

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role in 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic 

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford. interagency Cooperation: 

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 
Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. Jolm Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French 

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Trahzing: An 

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in ArabIsraeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense, 

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, 

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Miilitary, 

January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kr,amer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble in Paradise? 

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War 11: Myth 

and Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security, 

September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, October 

1996. 

53. Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin 

American Security, October 1996. 

54. Ivelaw L. Griffith, Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century, 

October 1996. 
is pleased to announce 

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