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Management Alert – 

Security and Safety 

Concerns at Border Patrol 

Stations in the Tucson 

Sector 

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September 29, 2017 /$:(1)25&(0(176(16,7,9( OIG-17-115-MA 
 

 

 

 

 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

 Department of Homeland Security 

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

6HSWHPEHU

MEMORANDUM FOR:	 Kevin K. McAleenan 

Acting Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

FROM: John Roth 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT Management Alert – Security and Safety 

Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson 

Sector – Law Enforcement Sensitive 

For your action is our final report, Management Alert – Security and Safety 

Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector. We incorporated the 

formal comments provided by your office. 

The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving physical and 

other security concerns. You concurred with the two recommendations. Based 

on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider 

recommendation 1 open and unresolved. As prescribed by the Department of 

Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of 

Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this 

memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes 

your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target 

completion date for the recommendation. Also, please include responsible 

parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about 

the current status of the recommendation. Until your response is received and 

evaluated, the recommendation will be considered open and unresolved. 

Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we 

consider recommendation 2 open and resolved. Once your office has fully 

implemented the recommendation, please submit a formal closeout letter to us 

within 30 days so that we may close the recommendation. The memorandum 

should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective 

actions. 

Please send your response or closure request to 

OIGInspectionsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post a redacted version of the report on our website. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Jennifer L. 

Costello, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations, at 

(202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 

2

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Management Alert 

In April 2017, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) conducted unannounced spot inspections of Border Patrol stations and 

the Tucson Coordination Center (TCC) in the Tucson Sector in Arizona. During 

these unannounced inspections, we toured the facilities, reviewed 

documentation from previous inspections, and interviewed Border Patrol staff. 

This alert describes physical security issues we identified that pose an 

immediate threat to Border Patrol agents, assets, and operations at stations 

within the Tucson Sector, as well as security issues related to cameras and 

access at two other Border Patrol stations and the TCC in the Tucson Sector. 

Physical Security Issues at Stations within the Tucson Sector 

During our recent spot inspections of Border Patrol stations in the Tucson 

Sector, we observed, and Border Patrol agents corroborated, multiple physical 

security issues that raise concerns about agent safety at two locations. Both 

facilities have vulnerable outdoor storage containers secured with padlocks 

that could be easily opened with common bolt cutters. Container tops and 

walls could also easily be compromised with a blow torch or other widely 

available tools. The containers we inspected held ammunition; small arms; riot 

control explosives; proprietary surveillance equipment; seized drugs; and 

sensitive hardcopy prosecution, investigation, and personnel documents. 

One station’s 8-foot high perimeter wall has inadequate camera coverage and 

allows public access to the full perimeter and visibility of storage containers, as 

well as seized and Government vehicles. Further, poor outdoor lighting hinders 

night camera surveillance. At another station exterior cameras are inoperable, 

and the surrounding 6-foot high chain link fence allows public access to the 

full perimeter and visibility of Government vehicles, storage containers, 

structures, a fuel storage tank, and operations. 

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Padlock Securing Container _i.. _..-. I 

Figure 1. Photos taken during inspection of storage containers a t stations in the Tucson 


Sector showing a sample of dangerous and sensitive items in easily accessible padlocked 


containers. 


Source: OIG 

During interviews with Border Patrol agents, we learned of other security risks: 

• 	 An "intelligence" trailerl at one station in a vulnerable location near the 

perimeter fence; 

• 	 Incidents at one station in which detainees forced open detention cells; 

and 

• 	 Agents having to park their personal vehicles in a public lot adjacent to 

the station because of insufficient space 

1 Agents assigned to the Tucson Sector Intelligence Unit occupy the intelligence trailer, which 

is designated for processing and handling Border Patrol intelligence information. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 	 OIG-17-115-MA 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

.. Figure 2. Photos 

taken during OIG 

inspection ofthe 

station perimeter 

walls and 

adjacent public 

Source: OIG 

Intel Trailer J 

During our spot inspection of stations in the Tucson Sector, we discussed the 

physical security issues described above with supervisory Border Patrol agents 

and agree with their concerns that these are serious potential threats to agent 

safety and mission execution. 

Security Issues at Three Other CBP Facilities in the Tucson Sector 

During our inspections, we also observed security issues related to camera 

visibility at three additional stations. Specifically, at two facilities, control room 

monitor displays that cover detainee cells were either not functional, too blurry 

to provide detail, or too small to be effective. At the third station, we were able 

to follow Border Patrol vehicles through the main gate, access the facility, and 

roam the vehicle storage areas, all unchallenged by staff in the station 

compound. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that CBP promptly upgrade the 

infrastructure at Tucson Sector stations and ensure Border Patrol agent safety 

by providing the resources necessary to correct the urgent physical security 

issues. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that CBP review the security policy and 

procedures at Border Patrol stations and CBP facilities in the Tucson Sector to 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ensure cameras are operable and facility access is secure. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP concurred with the recommendations and provided comments to the draft 

report. A summary of CBP’s response and our analysis follows. We have 

included a copy of CBP’s management comments in their entirety in Appendix 

A. CBP also provided technical comments to our report. We made changes to 

incorporate those comments, as appropriate. 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that CBP promptly upgrade the 

infrastructure at Tucson Sector stations and ensure Border Patrol agent safety 

by providing the resources necessary to correct the urgent physical security 

issues. 

CBP Response: Concur. According to its response, CBP has a Policy and 

Compliance Team which verified operability of the entrance gate camera and 

confirmed that personnel continuously monitor that camera feed at the Tucson 

Sector facility. CBP also has a Facility Security Plan in place which mandates 

Closed Circuit Television coverage of critical areas and systems. 

CBP also noted they cannot control the station maintenance schedule because 

the buildings are leased. As such, CBP stated they are unable to make facility 

improvements. CBP also cited the leased status as the reason for limited 

parking for agents’ personal vehicles, but stated that issue will be resolved 

through attrition. 

CBP disagreed with OIG’s assessment that the outdoor containers were 

vulnerable and stated that there is a recessed lock on the outdoor storage 

containers and, as such, they cannot be breached using bolt cutters. CBP 

noted the dual locking mechanism on the weapons storage container met the 

requirements outlined in the applicable Code of Federal Regulations. 

CBP addressed OIG’s concerns with the poor outdoor lighting at one station by 

referencing an April 2017 Federal Protective Service Vulnerability Survey 

Report which deemed the facility lighting to be uniform and sufficient. CBP 

noted that the fence around the Tucson facility has concertina wire atop it, 

which serves as a deterrent. 

OIG Analysis: CBP concurred but the comments and proposed actions are not 

fully responsive to the recommendation. CBP cited the leased status of the 

Tucson sector facilities as the reason they are unable to make facility 

improvements or control maintenance schedules. CBP must fully and 

transparently accept risks to agent safety, regardless of building ownership. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-17-115-MA 

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CBP provided a photo of one storage container with dual locking mechanisms. 

Nonetheless, the OIG report noted that the security risk is due to several 

factors and is not limited to the locking mechanism. CBP also noted the April 

2017 Federal Protective Service Vulnerability Survey Report, which deemed the 

Tucson facility lighting to be uniform and sufficient, was a functionality test to 

determine if lighting was operational and properly maintained. The inspection 

occurred over six months prior to the OIG site visit. Conditions can and do 

change and while on site OIG staff observed that the lighting conditions 

hindered night camera surveillance. CBP provided photo evidence of the 

concertina wire atop the chain link fence; however, OIG maintains the fence is 

still easily breached below the wire, especially when surveillance cameras are 

inoperable. 

This recommendation is considered unresolved and open until CBP can provide 

a corrective action plan that addresses the risk to agent safety identified in the 

report. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that CBP review the security policy and 

procedures at Border Patrol stations and CBP facilities in the Tucson Sector to 

ensure cameras are operable and facility access is secure. 

CBP Response: Concur. In response, CBP provided a copy of the Facility 

Security Plan which outlines requirements for closed circuit television systems 

in critical areas. CBP indicated they have a Policy and Compliance team in 

place to identify security vulnerabilities and bring them into compliance. This 

team will conduct a review to ensure detention area cameras are operational 

and feeds are visible. CBP also noted they have a pending work order to install 

seven cameras at the Tucson facility, but this project is on hold due to funding. 

OIG Analysis: CBP’s response to this recommendation addresses the intent of 

the recommendation. This recommendation is considered resolved and will 

remain open until CBP provides evidence that it has reviewed security plans for 

other Tucson Sector facilities identified by OIG as having vulnerabilities due to 

non-functioning cameras or unmanned camera feeds and secured funding to 

remedy the cameras it has already deemed need replacement. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305

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