[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11163

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-00806-SDM-MAP

CINDY J. AMES,

DAVID R. AMES, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 versus

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 

NATIONWIDE TITLE CLEARING, INC., 

ERIKA LANCE, 

CYNTHIA A. RILEY, 

LAQUINA WILSON DOATY, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 13, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit 

Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

David and Cindy Ames appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their 

complaint against various defendants for actions related to the refinance of their 

mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings. After a state court issued an 

opinion dismissing a similar suit brought by the Ameses in state court, the district 

court dismissed the federal complaint on res judicata and collateral estoppel 

grounds. Although we conclude that the district court erroneously applied 

Georgia’s law of both doctrines, we nevertheless affirm for the reasons set forth 

below.

I.

In March 2007, plaintiffs David and Cindy Ames entered into a mortgage 

with Washington Mutual, executing a promissory note (the Note) and a security 

deed to refinance their $4.6 million home outside Atlanta. The following year, 

Washington Mutual entered into receivership, and the FDIC obtained the Note.

In October 2010, the Ameses failed to pay their mortgage of approximately 

$22,000 a month. In August 2012, the FDIC assigned the Note to Defendant JP 

Morgan Chase (Chase), which initiated foreclosure proceedings against the 

property later that year.

On December 19, 2012, the Ameses filed a complaint in Georgia state court 

against Chase, Cynthia Riley, a former Chase employee who indorsed the Note,

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and Aldridge Connors, the law firm involved in the foreclosure, to stop the 

foreclosure proceeding. They later voluntarily dismissed this complaint, and, in 

March 2013, filed the instant complaint in a district court in the Middle District of 

Florida. In this complaint, the Ameses named the same defendants along with 

Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC), which prepared the assignment of the security 

deed for Chase, and NTC employee Erika Lance, and Chase employees LaQuina 

Doaty, Pearl Burch, LaShonda Anderson, Shequita Knox, and Angela Payne, all of 

whom either signed, witnessed, or notarized the assignment of the Note.

The complaint sought a declaratory judgment with four determinations: that

the transfer of the Note from Washington Mutual to FDIC was invalid (count 1 

against Chase), that the transfer of the Note from FDIC to Chase was invalid 

(count 2 against Chase), that the assignment of the security deed to Chase was 

fraudulent and void (count 3 against Chase, NTC, Lance, Doaty, Burch, Knox, and 

Anderson), and that the indorsement on the Note was void (count 4 against Chase 

and Riley). The complaint also contained four state-law claims: attempted 

wrongful foreclosure (count 5 against Chase and Aldridge Connors), civil 

conspiracy (count 6 against Chase, NTC, Lance, Doaty, Burch, Knox, and 

Anderson), mortgage fraud (count 7 against Chase and Aldridge Connors), and 

breach of contract (count 8 against Chase). Finally, it alleged a federal claim under 

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the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 to § 1692p (count 9 

against all defendants).

In April 2013, Chase informed the Ameses that it again had initiated 

foreclosure proceedings and that a sale of their property was scheduled for early 

May. The Ameses responded with a new lawsuit in Georgia state court seeking to 

enjoin the foreclosure, along with other claims. All of the allegations and claims in 

that lawsuit related to the transfer and assignment of the Ameses’ Note to Chase 

and the later foreclosure action. A Georgia state court dismissed that lawsuit.

After the district court learned of the state court’s order dismissing the

Ameses’ lawsuit, it instructed the parties to address whether res judicata and 

collateral estoppel barred the Ameses’ federal court complaint. The Ameses 

responded that neither doctrine barred their claims because the state-court decision 

was not final, as they still had time to file an appeal. The defendants then filed 

motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

The district court concluded that the state court decision was final and 

dismissed all claims against Chase and Aldridge Connors on res judicata grounds. 

The court further concluded that the FDCPA claim against all defendants was 

barred by collateral estoppel because its central premise — that Chase had no right 

to foreclose — had been decided against the Ameses in the state court lawsuit. 

The court ruled that the Ameses had failed to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction 

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on the remaining counts, which were all based on state law, and declined to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. This is the Ameses’ appeal from the 

district court’s judgment.

II.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. 

See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008). We review de novo

whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bar a claim. See Ragsdale v. 

Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999).

III.

The Ameses contend that the district court erred by applying res judicata

and collateral estoppel because the state-court judgment was not final when the 

district court entered its order. Because a Georgia court entered the state-court 

judgment, we apply the Georgia law of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See 

Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(“Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must give 

preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as would courts of the 

state in which the judgment was entered.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Georgia’s general rule is:

[A] judgment sought to be used as a basis for the application of the 

doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel must be a final judgment. 

In Georgia, a judgment is suspended when an appeal is entered within 

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the time allowed. And the judgment is not final as long as there is a 

right to appellate review.

Greene v. Transp. Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 761, 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). “Georgia is, apparently, 

among the minority of states that treat a lower court judgment on appeal as not 

final for purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata.” Cox v. Mayan Lagoon 

Estates, Ltd., 734 S.E.2d 883, 890 n.8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).

When the district court entered its order, the Ameses still had a right to 

appeal the state-court judgment, which means that under Georgia law the judgment 

was not final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel. In fact, the 

judgment apparently is still not final. The Ameses appealed it to the Georgia Court 

of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See Ames v. JP Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., No. A14A2131 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015). They then filed a 

petition for certiorari in the Georgia Supreme Court, which granted their petition. 

See Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. S15G1007 (Ga. June 1, 2015). The 

state-court judgment will not be final until the end of the appeals process. The 

district court erred when it ruled that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to 

the Ameses’ claims.

IV.

The defendants contend that we may affirm the district court’s judgment on 

the alternative ground that all the counts in the Ameses’ complaint fail to state a 

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claim without regard to res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Thomas v. Cooper 

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm the district 

court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that 

ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.”); see also 

Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359–60 

(11th Cir. 2011) (applying that principle in the Rule 12(b)(6) context).

Counts 1–4 of the Ameses’ complaint seek a declaratory judgment that the 

assignment of their mortgage to Chase was invalid. Those counts fail to state a 

claim because the Ameses were not a party to the mortgage-assignment contract. 

As a result, they lack standing under Georgia law to challenge the assignment. See

Jurden v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 765 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (holding 

that a homeowner had no standing to challenge “the assignment of the security 

interest . . . [because] he was not a party to [the] contract”); accord, e.g., 

Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 740 S.E.2d 434, 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). Although 

the district court incorrectly ruled that res judicata applied to counts 1–4, it 

correctly dismissed those counts because they fail to state a claim on which relief 

can be granted.

The remaining claims, contained in counts 5–9 of the complaint, are all 

premised on the allegation that Chase “did not and does not possess the authority 

to enforce the debt evidenced by the Note” because the assignment was invalid. 

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Counts 5–9 do not directly challenge the assignment of the mortgage, but they will 

fail unless the Ameses can prove that the assignment was invalid. Because the 

Ameses lack standing to challenge the validity of the mortgage assignment, 

Georgia law also prohibits them from bringing other claims that “are premised on”

that challenge. Jurden, 765 S.E.2d at 442. Paragraph 2 of the Ameses’ complaint 

explicitly acknowledges that counts 5–9 are premised on their challenge to the 

assignment’s validity. Georgia standing law therefore prohibits them from 

bringing the claims contained in those counts. The district court properly 

dismissed them.

1

AFFIRMED.

 1

 The Ameses also contend that the district court should have allowed them to amend their

complaint. The district court did not abuse its discretion because they did not file a motion in the 

district court that requested leave to amend. See Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 

1999); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).

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