SPECIAL REPORT 1

INSS Special Report

T

his report draws heavily on the proceedings of the Second International

Conference on the Lessons Learned

and the Enhancement of the Membership

Action Plan organized by the Institute for

National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University, the George C. Marshall

European Center for Security Studies, and the

Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, with support

provided by the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. The conference was held in Sofia,

Bulgaria, on May 28–29, 2001.

Jeffrey Simon is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University.

He is the author of numerous works on European security affairs, including NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in

Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Simon can be

reached at (202) 685–2367, by fax at (202)

685–3972, or via e-mail at simonj@ndu.edu.

A nation’s effective integration into the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is

an arduous, time-consuming, and resourceintensive task. The nine countries now aspiring

to Alliance membership should heed the problems that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic have encountered since accession and

redouble their efforts on defense integration

and civil-military reforms in the Membership

Action Plan (MAP) program.

During the past year, MAP has become a

more versatile instrument for forging defense

and civil-military reform. With further

strengthening, the process will help not only to

inform Alliance decisions on choosing new

members at the 2002 Prague Summit but also

to ease post-accession challenges for invitees.

Upon accession to the Alliance, Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic were disqualified from important bilateral assistance programs as NATO shifted attention to the nine

MAP partners. After the next round of invitations, the United States and NATO need to keep

the new allies eligible for and engaged in

assistance programs after accession.

The first MAP cycle (1999–2000) put

NATO and its partners on a steep learning curve

as they sought to implement a new and

untested Annual National Plan program. This

program, a core element in membership action

planning, established standards but issued no

assessments. In marked contrast, augmented

NATO teams dealing with all aspects of MAP

rationalized the planning process and generated real assessments that partners considered

fair and frank during the second MAP cycle

(2000–2001). MAP partners view the third

cycle (2001–2002) progress reports as playing

a critical role in the next enlargement decision.

Indeed, while allied governments will rely

heavily on MAP performance to begin membership negotiations, NATO should link the date of

actual accession to the completion of specific

(to be determined) core requirements from

each of the five chapters.

The MAP process has positively influenced

the growth of interministerial coordination

within MAP countries and enhanced international cooperation among those countries.

MAP has become an increasingly important tool for member governments to build

public support for NATO as well as parliamentary support for necessary resources. NATOrelated educational programs are necessary to

help MAP partners implement public information strategies to build public opinion support

for the Alliance.

NATO and the European Union need to

make further efforts to help MAP members

delineate the relationship between the two

organizations because some partners are finding it difficult to establish priorities for NATO

and the European Union.

Partnership for Peace

When NATO adopted the Partnership for

Peace (PFP) program at the Brussels Summit

in January 1994, few had any notion of how

important and essential PFP would become.

Many aspiring members were disappointed

with PFP, perceiving it as a “policy for postponement” of NATO enlargement. In response

to persistent pressures from partners to join,

NATO produced a Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995 that outlined Alliance

Roadmap to NATO Accession:

Preparing for Membership

by Jeffrey Simon

Institute for National Strategic Studies October 2001

National Defense University

About this report
expectations of new members. The study noted

that

PFP would assist partners to undertake

necessary defense management reforms

[such as] transparent national defense

planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PFP

Planning and Review Process (PARP) and

PFP exercises will introduce partners to

collective defense planning and pave the

way for more detailed operational planning.

After the December 1995 North Atlantic

Council (NAC) Ministerial launched enhanced

16+1 dialogues with those partners interested

in joining the Alliance, 12 partners expressed

such an interest by early 1997. When the

Madrid Summit invited Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic in July 1997, NATO reiterated its Open Door policy, strengthened the role

of partners in PFP decisionmaking and planning, and adopted new terms of reference under

the enhanced Partnership for Peace to broaden

cooperation beyond peace enforcement operations. The Political-Military Steering Committee

continued to manage PFP programs, including

the development of the Partner Work Program

(PWP) and Individual Partner Programs (IPP).

The PFP Planning and Review Process became

more significant, and NATO expanded the

number of Standardized Agreements

(STANAGS) made available to partners (now

1,169) through the Partnership Coordination

Center in Mons, Belgium. The Alliance did so to

plan military exercises and develop PWP and

PARP interoperability objectives.

At the June 1998 NATO Defense Ministerial, allies and PARP partners agreed to a report

entitled “Expanding and Adapting the PFP

Planning and Review Process,” which suggested major enhancements to PARP to make it

more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). Beginning in 1999,

NATO approved PARP Ministerial Guidance

(now like the DPQ) that replaced the old interoperability objectives with Partnership Goals

(PGs) for Interoperability and for Forces and

Capabilities, which aimed to develop specific

armed forces and capabilities that partners

could offer in support of NATO operations. In

addition, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

provided the forum for greater partner participation in deliberations involving operations to

which they contribute forces.

Why MAP?

The NATO Washington Summit in April

1999 unveiled the Membership Action Plan

(MAP) concept, in part to convince the remaining nine aspirants that Article 10 and the Open

Door policy were not hollow and to assist the

aspirants in developing forces and capabilities

that could operate with NATO under its new

Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). MAP

went further than the 1995 Study on NATO

Enlargement in defining what the aspirants

needed to accomplish on the path to membership. It was designed to incorporate lessons

learned in the accession discussions with

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

MAP has four essential components:

■ a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) 

that identifies key targets spanning the political/

economic, defense/military, resources, security, and

legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP

parlance) of Alliance membership

■ a feedback mechanism by which NAC

members and the partner can jointly assess progress

■ a clearinghouse for coordinating security

assistance from NATO members to the partner

■ enhanced defense planning at the country

level that establishes and reviews agreed planning

targets.

Just as the Partnership for Peace has

matured into a fundamental program not

originally envisioned by its architects, the MAP

process contains even greater potential.

Though tailored to specific situations, MAP

provides an authoritative, jointly agreed set of

targets for wide-ranging political and civilmilitary reforms—targets that help aspiring

members to mobilize domestic support for the

painful and expensive defense reforms that are

necessary for accession. Accordingly, it is appropriate to assess the defense planning experiences of new members and of the nine MAP

partners over the past 2 years to improve the

MAP program and to better inform the NATO

enlargement decision at the Prague Summit

planned for 2002.

The Newest Members

Since their accession on March 12, 1999,

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have

demonstrated how unprepared their armed

forces were for functional integration into

NATO, although cooperation with the Alliance

within the Partnership for Peace was fruitful

in terms of training and education. Participation in the Bosnia-based NATO operations

helped, but the Kosovo conflict, occurring

within days of accession, further challenged

the new members.

Since joining NATO, all three members

have engaged in strategic reviews of their armed

forces; as a result Poland will reduce forces to

150,000 by 2006, Hungary to 37,500, and the

Czech Republic, still engaged in review, to

38,000–40,000. All share the objective of creating more professional, mobile, and flexible

armed forces but find that obstacles to politicalmilitary integration remain in civil-military

relations. Also, there remains a need to increase

the number of NATO-competent, Englishtrained civilians and military officers to staff

numerous posts in the Alliance, as well as the

national structures that cooperate with NATO

and provide appropriate protection of classified

information. For example, Hungary still has

difficulty assigning officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to NATO commands and

headquarters. Of the 59 positions allocated to

Hungary in Southern Regional Commands—

its strategic and highest priority—it has assigned only 41 persons, or 69 percent.

Poland. Domestic political pressures in

Poland following NATO accession have accelerated force reductions rather disturbingly and

undermined force goal implementation. But

NATO inattention also has been to blame.

Whereas it criticized Polish civil-military relations before accession, NATO ignored them

after accession, and relations eroded. Since

joining the Alliance, the Polish defense ministry and general staff have maintained two

separate lines of command; consequently, the

general staff link to the political process weakened. Also, once in the Alliance, Poland found

that NATO was hesitant to provide advice to

allies. In the absence of such advice, the Polish

armed forces 2006 plan (recently completed)

was driven more by economic and political

exigencies than by defense planning requirements. Despite allocating 2.1 percent of gross

domestic product (GDP) on defense, Poland’s

rapid deployment units continue to absorb the

2 SPECIAL REPORT

MAP provides an

authoritative, jointly

agreed set of targets for

wide-ranging political and

civil-military reforms
majority of its defense resources and starve its

national forces.

Hungary. Meeting force goals and

deploying and maintaining armed forces

abroad presented challenges for Hungary.

Initially, it had difficulty with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force

(SFOR), and then with a Kosovo Force (KFOR)

guard and security battalion of 350 personnel

that it sent to Pristina in July 1999. As a consequence, Hungary began a strategic review after

joining the Alliance. In the first phase, the

strategic review calls for reductions in the

Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) to 45,000

(including 7,500 civilians) by 2003. To achieve

its deployment requirements, Hungary is to

increase (from 35 to 70 percent) the manning

level of its combat formations with volunteer

reserves rather than conscripts (in part because

9-month conscription introduced in 1997 is to

be reduced to 6 months in 2002 again). In the

second phase (2004–2007), HDF plans to

improve training, and during the third phase

(after 2007) to begin acquisition. Because it

allocates only 1.6 percent of GDP for defense,

the test of Hungary’s strategic review implementation will concentrate on how to reduce

and restructure its “reverse pyramid” officer

corps, attract and retain contract soldiers, find

resources to finance the reserve volunteers, and

utilize costly 6-month conscripts effectively.

Czech Republic. While spending 2.2

percent of GDP on defense, the Czech Republic

shares many of Hungary’s problems. Human

and resource constraints remain evident in that

the Czechs have assigned only one of the five

officer and two or three of the NCO slots allocated to them at Supreme Allied Command,

Atlantic. (The Poles maintain four officers and

one NCO, while the Hungarians have two

officers at Norfolk.) Because a National Security Strategy (NSS) was not in place, two major

factors continue to undermine the Czech Republic capacity to meet its NATO obligations.

The decision made years ago to acquire an

excessive number (72) of L–159 subsonic

aircraft coupled with the downsizing expenses

to resettle officers have dried up defense funds,

so that its NATO training requirements remain

unfulfilled. To address the crisis within the

defense ministry and general staff establishment, which has ballooned to 3,500 personnel

with the addition of background institutions,

Prime Minister Milos Zeman in May 2001

relieved Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy. He

appointed Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik,

who immediately replaced defense ministry

deputies and tasked them with developing a

concept in 90 days for developing a totally

professional force in 4 to 6 years.

In sum, the defense planning capabilities

of new members have not improved perceptibly

since accession, and in some cases have eroded.

MAP Progress Report

During the first MAP cycle, aspirants

attempted openness, but they were overly ambitious. In the second cycle, while ANPs were

more sober and realistic, they remained more

ambitious than resources permitted. The second MAP cycle witnessed a growing community

effort by aspirants to find more creative, tailored solutions to meet their individual “national” situations. Not only is this diversity seen

as a positive development, compared to the

“cloning” that was evident in the first cycle,

but more generally the MAP process is ushering

in a security environment that is much more

transparent and cooperative than ever before.

Former Warsaw Pact

Despite strong support for NATO and

relatively high defense expenditures (2.2 and

2.8 percent of GDP respectively), Romania and

Bulgaria have many of the same problems as

new NATO members in dealing with the vestiges of the Warsaw Pact culture, reducing and

restructuring large and heavy armed forces,

and dealing with the challenges of NATO defense planning. During 1999, the United States

performed defense reform assessments for

Romania and Bulgaria (the so-called Kievenaar assessments), and their 1999 Annual

National Plans benefited from this experience.

Romania. A number of lessons were

learned by Romania from the initial MAP

cycle. First, because the Romanian late budget

approval cycle was not synchronized with the

NATO planning cycle, it did not have sufficient

money for the first 5 months of 2000. Second,

because there were numerous overlaps in the

planning period, Romania adopted the NATO

planning cycle in ANP 2001. Third, since the

ANP 2000 objectives exceeded available resources, they had to be scaled back. Fourth,

Romanian efforts to correct these problems

included establishing an Interdepartmental

Committee for NATO Integration at the state

secretary level chaired by the foreign ministry

and a defense planning council and led by the

defense minister.

Romania’s main achievements during

ANP 2000 include improving domestic coordination mechanisms, training 158 officers and

civilians in NATO and member schools, further

downsizing of 2,020 military personnel (1,256

officers, 764 NCOs and warrant officers) and

1,200 civilians, counseling and training for

released personnel, and continued support to

SFOR and KFOR.

Outlook. As of early 2001, the new Romanian government revised priorities include:

■ Creating a fair and transparent career

development and promotion system. Since many

foreign-trained officers, who need to be retained,

have lost patience, the government wants to have a

promotions board operational by June 2001. Future

general officers need to achieve STANAG–English

language level-3 so that they can operate in international units, since Romania must keep 180 troops

trained to rotate and fill requirements.

■ Developing more realistic defense planning.

As of March 2001, of the 84 PGs Romania initially

assumed, only 9 have been fully implemented and

61 partially implemented, and 14 have been postponed until after 2004.

■ Restructuring armed forces as a result of

disbanding a number of units. The 1999 Kievenaar

defense reform assessment provided 3 troop variants—140,000, 112,000, and 85,000—for 

Romania’s Plan 2004. Though Romania planned 

a target of 112,000, its forces are now at 97,800

because its resources could not sustain the plan.

Romanian wartime strength will be scaled back

from 370,000 to 230,000. Its current 446 flag

officer positions must be reduced to a total of 140

by 2004, at which time only 82 currently serving

flag officers will remain.

■ Implementing Air Space Operations Control

and acquiring a military digital communications

system that is consistent with STANAG specifications.

Bulgaria. June 2001 elections resulted

in the first Bulgarian government to serve its

full 4-year mandate since the democratic

transition. Bulgaria has achieved sustained

economic growth over the past 3 years and

maintains good bilateral relations with neighbors. Also, Bulgaria participates in several

SPECIAL REPORT 3

defense planning

capabilities of new

members have not

improved perceptibly

since accession
4 SPECIAL REPORT

forms of regional cooperation: South-East

European Defense Ministerial; Black Sea Naval

Force Cooperation; hosting the brigade headquarters of Multinational Peace Forces SouthEastern Europe in Plovdiv; establishing a

multinational Engineer Task Force; and participating in a regional information network for

crisis management.

Similar to Romania’s experience with

MAP, Bulgaria found that its budget cycle was

not synchronized with the Alliance. It also

discovered during the second cycle that plans

needed to be more realistic and consistent with

resource availability. As a result, Bulgaria is

emphasizing practical implementation and

maintaining a better dialogue with NATO. It

wants to establish specific objectives with concrete timeframes and to avoid duplication with

the European Union. Bulgaria learned that it

needs to develop a new model of economic

accountability, as well as new laws on the

exchange of information and on protecting

classified information and security.

Even though it has a defense budget of

2.8 percent of GDP for 2001, which is to be

sustained through 2003, Bulgaria realized that

a mismatch exists between the risks that it

faces in the Balkans and the resources that the

country can allocate to defense. It has also

learned that it lacks capabilities not only for

making assessments but also for prioritizing

MAP activities. In May 2000, Bulgaria introduced a planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) that prepared the 2001

defense budget comprising 21 programs. These

programs are to be optimized and reduced to

12 in 2002. Bulgaria has established reform

priorities. The first priority is to restructure and

downsize its armed forces while achieving

interoperability in the key areas of air defense

and air traffic management; command, control, communications, and computers; logistics

(including host nation support); and education and training (including language). A

second priority is to modernize and rearm,

which led to the creation in April 2001 of a

new Armaments Policy Directorate in the

defense ministry.

Outlook. During the second ANP cycle,

Bulgaria learned that its personnel management and career development program for

officers and NCOs needed special attention,

including using foreign-trained officers more

effectively. Defense planners have proposed

legislative authorization of personnel ceilings

by category and eventually by rank that will

provide greater parliamentary control of the

armed forces. This is particularly important

because the Bulgarian armed forces comprised

81,500 troops in 1999, then downsized to

71,778 in 2000, and will be further reduced to

45,000 by 2004, with an ultimate goal of creating a fully professional force by 2015. Stated

simply, Bulgaria’s present officer corps (13,899)

is too large, while its NCO corps is too small. To

fix this reverse-pyramid problem, which was

highlighted in Partnership Goal G 0028 (Review of Force Structures), the current ratio of

senior/junior officers of 54/46 percent needs to

change to 45/55 percent by 2004. Bulgaria also

needs to reform the active forces by restructuring personnel in the rapid reaction formations

and in the reserve forces, whose strengths are

not sustainable in terms of training, equipment, or budget. Defense planners are attempting to identify 1,000 key positions and establish

a database on personnel and career development. Their intention is to train people for

those posts, but planners find it difficult to

identify potential leaders 5 years in advance.

In 2000, Bulgaria accepted 82 PGs (of

which 47 are MAP related) and allocated $21

million for their implementation in 2001.

NATO, however, at the March–April 2001 19+1

progress report session, suggested that Bulgaria

further adjust some of its plans to bring objectives and priorities in line with financial resources. The Bulgarians find the OCC useful in

preparing forces for NATO non-article V (that

is, out-of-area) activities and are completing

PARP questionnaires for the Pool of Forces

Database. They lack, however, essential NATO

documents and criteria for assessment. The

Bulgarians consider the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative useful to bring armed forces

reform closer to membership requirements, but

they desire more information to avoid wasting

resources. Finally, since the second MAP cycle

progress reports for Bulgaria’s defense/military

reforms (so-called chapter 2) were drawn from

the PARP assessment, and no PARP assessment

is planned for next year, Bulgaria would like a

MAP progress review on all criteria in 2002 as a

basis for the enlargement decision at the

Prague summit.

The Baltic States

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were members of the Warsaw Pact as Soviet republics, but

not independent states. Unlike Romania and

Bulgaria, the three Baltic states have had to

build state institutions and defense establishments from scratch. Also, since the populations

of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are so

small—1.5, 2.65, and 3.6 million

respectively—they are building combined

military institutions such as the joint Baltic

Battalion, Baltic Defense College, and BALTNET

radar system. During 1998, the United States

performed defense reform (Kievenaar) assessments for all three Baltic countries, and their

1999 ANPs reflected this experience.

Estonia. During the second cycle of

MAP (2000–2001), Estonia’s Parliament (Riigikogu) approved an Emergency Preparedness

Act (September 2000), a National Security

Strategy (NSS) on March 6, 2001, and a National Military Strategy on February 28, 2001.

Reforms in Estonia’s defense structure included

the creation of the Army Staff and further

implementation of PG G 0028 to optimize the

Estonian Defense Force (EDF) structure. The

Prime Minister chairs the governmental Commission on NATO Integration. Estonia’s PGs

were also incorporated in its Annual National

Plan, and all ANP goals were coordinated with

the defense ministry. Defense ministry ANP

goals are reviewed quarterly by the ministry’s

Secretary General, and those under other ministries every 6 months, with the objective of

linking goals with available resources.

In its second ANP, Estonian efforts on the

political/economic front (chapter 1) included

final approval of its NSS and continued participation in NATO and UN peace operations, as

well as the border monitoring efforts in Georgia

of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Meanwhile, its efforts to build

domestic support for the Alliance saw an increase from 53 to 66 percent in favorable

public opinion from 2000 to 2001. Regarding

defense and military issues (chapter 2), the

government approved the National Military

Strategy, forming the basis for optimizing the

EDF structure, reorganized the General Staff

into a Joint Staff, and formed an Army Staff. In

January 2001, the government established a

Logistics Center and EDF Medical Center; on

March 20, 2001, it decided to create the Estonian Rapid Reaction Battalion, which should be

operational by 2005.

Outlook. Estonia’s priorities now include

completing (by September 2001) a Review of
Force Structures (PG G 0028) for initial government approval in November and (by the

end of the year) completing a long-term equipment procurement plan. The defense budget

has steadily increased from 1.4 percent of GDP

in 1999, to 1.6 percent in 2000, to 1.8 percent

in 2001, and will rise to 2 percent in 2002, with

overall economic growth at 5 percent since

2000. These funds will permit Estonia to generate a small immediate reaction force in 24

hours; a battalion-size rapid reaction force in

30 days; and 2 brigades of main defense

forces—one mobilized at 90 days, the other at

180 days. Regarding resources (chapter 3),

Estonia plans to develop further mechanisms

for defense planning and budgeting and to

focus on infrastructure development with an

eye to procurement in 2003. Concerning security (chapter 4), the Riigikogu adopted (on

December 20, 2000) the Security Institution

Act, which reorganized Estonian intelligence

and security services; it came into effect March

1, 2001. During the third cycle, special attention will be paid to information security. Lastly,

on legal issues (chapter 5), the government

drafted domestic legislation in the form of a

new Peacetime National Defense Act, which is

proceeding through Parliament. It has also

implemented “Legal Arrangements for Participation in Collective Defense” (PG G 0050 1).

Latvia. Lessons learned in the second

cycle ANP 2000 include how to coordinate

national plans better with NATO interoperability requirements as well as how to use MAP to

develop self-defense capabilities and prepare for

membership. The Prime Minister heads an

interagency NATO Integration Council. Latvia

has become more realistic about its priorities;

its ANP 2000 had 22 activity areas, including

277 activities, while its third cycle, ANP 2001,

contains only 18 activity areas and 85 activities. During the second cycle, Latvia developed

resource-based plans for each activity, monitored monthly by an ANP Implementation

Control System that proved to be effective in

that 245 activities (88 percent) were completed,

19 (7 percent) were cancelled, and 13 (5 percent) postponed.

During the second cycle (ANP 2000), work

on political and economic issues (chapter 1)

focused on naturalizing Latvia’s Russian minority (nearly 40 percent of the population),

cooperating with Russia cross-border, and

building public support for NATO (now at 57

percent). In the defense and military area

(chapter 2), the Partnership Goals and Individual Partner Program activities were integrated

within ANP 2000. Latvia introduced a PPBS,

significantly improved the quality of life for the

military, improved the personnel management

and education systems, and began to develop

logistics and procurement systems that should

become operational by 2002.

Outlook. Latvia will achieve a new threshold of capability in 2003, when its defense

budget is expected to reach 2 percent of GDP. At

that time all of its forces should be able to

operate with NATO on Latvian soil; its rapid

reaction force will be able to participate in

operations outside Latvia; and it will build

specialized capabilities in peace support operations (PSOs), including military police, divers,

and medical units. In the security sphere

(chapter 4), Latvia has introduced NATO standards within Latvia’s legal framework on physical and personnel security and recognizes the

need to develop further communications security. In the legal area, the government has

approved the Law on National Security, drafted

laws on mobilization and military personnel,

drafted regulations on armed forces procurement and logistics, and analyzed the legal

aspects of NATO membership. Even so, Latvia

faces major challenges in further streamlining

its Partnership Goals, Individual Partner Plans,

and Annual National Plans. It needs to acquire

and translate more NATO documents, improve

internal institutional and external Baltic states

coordination, and allot more time to evaluate

NATO proposals for PGs (since they had to

postpone seven of them).

Lithuania. Strong support for NATO

and EU enlargement is reflected by the agreement between the 11 parliamentary (Seimas)

parties and the government regarding the

future contours of Lithuanian defense strategy.

One of the major lessons learned from the MAP

process is the need to establish a prioritization

of Lithuanian national plans. This has been

aided by the candid feedback from the second

cycle MAP. During the ANP 2000, Lithuania

made progress in developing its command,

control, and communications system, new

force structure, professional military education,

training and doctrine, logistics, infrastructure,

airspace management, and quality of life for

the military.

During the third cycle, Lithuania will

focus on the personnel and career management system, personnel and physical security,

constitutional and legislation requirements for

NATO membership, and public support for

defense. Of the 66 activities in ANP 2001, 5

have already been implemented, and progress

has been registered in 43 others. So far, Lithuania has implemented nine PGs, completed the

local area network for the defense staff, established the National Crisis Center, and made

progress in building the defense communication network.

Outlook. Lithuania’s highest priority MAP

goals emphasize the need to provide realistic

and resource-based ANP tasks. The 2001 defense budget was pegged at 1.95 percent of GDP

to accomplish the tasks that include the further

development of the armed forces and implementation of a 3-year planning, programming,

and budgeting system. The NAC progress report

of March 29, 2001, has been immensely helpful

in reviewing programs and modifying priorities. This report criticized Lithuania’s:

■ legal system, which prohibits long-term

contracts for procurements. As a consequence, the

Seimas Security and Defense Committee approved

an updated law that would permit 3-year contracts.

■ defense plans for four combat brigades,

which were too ambitious. For that reason, 

Lithuania now plans to have one high-readiness

brigade by 2006. By 2002, it will maintain one

battalion (without rotation capacity) for PSO

deployment and further develop logistics capabilities for sustainability.

■ training of its territorial defense forces and

reserves. Lithuania is seeking advice to address this

problem.

Lithuania has learned that the ANP

progress report has been a useful device to help

shape national plans.

In summary, all three Baltic states have

found PARP helpful in their force planning,

and they found the PGs especially useful in

aligning scarce resources among competing

priorities. In addition, they have found the

trilateral Baltic cooperation both necessary and

valuable because of the small size of their forces

and the fact that all three essentially share the

same goals. Finally, mentoring partnerships

SPECIAL REPORT 5

Latvia faces major

challenges in further

streamlining its Partnership Goals, Individual

Partner Plans, and Annual

National Plans
with NATO members and partners have been

extremely helpful: Sweden and Finland (which

are not in MAP) for Estonia; and Poland, 

Denmark, and America for Lithuania.

New States

Slovakia and Slovenia, with respective

populations of 5.6 and 2 million, face the

challenges of constructing new defense institutions (a ministry, general staff, and armed

forces), with only 1.89 and 1.45 percent of GDP

allocated for defense respectively. These new

states also face the challenge of building popular understanding of and support for NATO,

which presently stands at about 50 percent. The

United States first performed defense reform

assessments for Slovakia and Slovenia during

2000; thus, their 1999 ANPs did not benefit

from this influence and experience.

Slovakia. To the new state of Slovakia,

MAP is more than a mere technical tool in that

it has enhanced political contacts with NATO,

enabled Slovakia to assess the state of its preparedness, and generated a healthy tension for

Slovak parliamentarians to understand the

need to provide necessary human and material

resources. The April 20, 2001, NAC progress

review session positively assessed that, during

the second MAP cycle, Slovakia accomplished

the following:

■ amended its constitution to remove remaining accession impediments

■ adopted a Security Strategy in May 2001

■ maintained good relations with neighbors

■ acceded to the Council of Europe’s Charter

for Regional or Minority Languages

■ removed antipersonnel mines and SS–23s

from its arsenal

■ stabilized its macroeconomy and increased

foreign investments

■ established a National Security Office 

and drafted a new law on protecting classified

information.

Outlook. The NAC review session has

underscored what Slovakia needs to do during

the third MAP cycle. Slovakia intends to:

■ strengthen public support for NATO integration (now at 52 percent)

■ adopt a formal Defense and Military Strategy

■ prepare a Long Term Concept for Building

Armed Forces—2010

■ restructure the defense ministry for more

effective defense planning, crisis, and human

resources management.

This process began with the integration of

the general staff with the defense ministry

during January–May 2000 and accelerated in

earnest when Josef Stank replaced Defense

Minister Pavol Kanis in January 2001 and

initiated significant changes within the ministry. Stank appointed an apolitical state secretary, Rastislav Kacer, to oversee NATO integration, and he intends to reduce the defense

ministry’s seven directorates to two or three,

thereby improving Slovakian defense planning

capability and prospects for NATO membership.

The Defense Strategy (adopted by the

government in May 2001) is to be presented to

parliament in Bratislava in the fall, and the

draft Military Strategy is to be submitted soon

to the government. The 2010 Concept for

Slovakia’s Armed Forces, initiated in March

2001 and based on the above strategic documents, will lead to a new structure of small

mobile forces that should be presented to the

Alliance in autumn 2001. Slovakia’s armed

forces will be reduced from 45,000 to 32,000 by

2002. Parliament is committed to maintain a

defense budget at 1.89 percent of GDP for 2002,

which provides sufficient resources to complete

64 Partnership Goals.

Slovenia. In its first and second ANP

cycles, Slovenia found MAP useful. Indeed, the

Slovenian government now regards MAP as a

strategic priority in preparing the country for

membership. During the first cycle, Slovenia

learned what to do and how to do it but went

off track by producing an unachievable ANP

2000–2001. Slovenia also did not reassess

threats and risks after significant changes had

occurred in the region and failed to determine

what it could afford for defense.

The elections in autumn 2000 confirmed

Slovenian democratic traditions and commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovenia is

pursuing a communications strategy to

strengthen public support for NATO, which

remains at only 53 percent. In addition, the

government intends to approve a NATO classified data bill in July 2001, after which it will

revise legislation to establish a National Security Authority. Although the Slovenian constitution makes no provision for sending troops

abroad or receiving foreign troops on Slovenian

soil, all political parties agree that it does not

need to be amended. They do, however, recognize the need to modify both the Defense Act

and the Military Service Act. Slovenia has

learned that legal issues regarding NATO membership are more taxing and challenging than

originally anticipated.

The NAC and Slovenia’s progress assessment of April 2001 was sober and useful and

provides the basis for the third cycle of MAP.

The report was silent on the second and third

chapters of MAP (defense/military and resources) simply because Slovenia had not done

much in these areas. The Slovenian Armed

Forces 2010, which had been adopted by parliament in February 2000, called for defense

budgets of 1.86 percent of GDP ($400 million)

in 2001 and was to rise to 2 percent ($440

million) in 2002. The new government was

aware before the election that the plan was

unrealistic and unachievable and revised the

defense budget to a realistic 1.45 percent of

GDP in 2001 ($300 million), which should

provide enough resources to fulfill 56 PGs. The

new Slovenian government also plans to adopt

the Swedish system of multiyear budgeting and

planning and rewrite the Slovenian National

Security Strategy and Defense Strategy.

Outlook. Though Slovenia lost a year, it

has learned a great deal from 2 years of MAP.

The next Annual National Plan will be realistic

and resource-based, reflecting a shift from the

goal of working for an invitation to building

capacity that can command respect within the

Alliance. Slovenia accepted NATO comments,

criticisms, and recommendations in a constructive spirit, and the ANP third cycle will

likely register substantial improvement in

overall Alliance assessment of Slovenian armed

forces programs. To do so, Slovenia has established an Interdepartmental Working Group for

cooperation with NATO, which is chaired by 

the state secretaries of the foreign and defense

ministry and includes the General Staff, 

supported by five other ministries and foreign

advisors to develop a restructuring concept.

Slovenia’s mobilization capacity will be reduced from the planned 47,000 troops in 2010

to 35,000 by 2004, and defense budget cuts

have been halted. In 2001, Slovenia also intends to establish three other intergovernmental working groups for information, interoperability, and crisis management.

Based upon MAP experience and outside

advice (the so-called Garrett U.S. Defense

Assessment, plus input from British advisors),

6 SPECIAL REPORT

the Slovenian government

now regards MAP as a

strategic priority
Slovenia has written “Guidelines for the Operation of the Ministry of Defense Up to 2004.”

This document focuses on providing adequate

financial resources to the Slovenian armed

forces for the purpose of implementing a personnel policy for officers, NCOs, and conscripts

with proper legislation. This implementation

should permit contracted reservists to participate in peace support operations and should

help to restructure the reverse pyramidal structure of the Slovenian officer corps.

Challenged States

Albania and Macedonia, with populations

of 3.6 and 2 million respectively, have experienced significant political and social challenges to their state institutions. During 2001,

the United States performed defense reform

(Garrett) assessments for both countries; thus,

the ANPs of both countries for 1999 and 2000

did not benefit from the experience.

Albania. In contrast to most other MAP

partners, Albania has expressed high popular

support for NATO as a result of the 1999 Kosovo

operation. Albanian national objectives are to

build a constitutional state with democratic

institutions and civilian oversight of the armed

forces. Albania’s political and economic recovery (MAP chapter 1) has not been easy since

the 1997 total collapse of the state. Some improvement has been registered with internal

security and public order, but corruption, illicit

trafficking, and organized crime remain rampant. The October 2000 local elections exemplified some political progress, as did the June

24, 2001, parliamentary elections. Some economic growth (roughly 7 percent) was registered in 2000 and 2001. Albania has signed

good neighbor treaties with all neighbors,

including Macedonia, and has reestablished

diplomatic relations with Serbia.

Albanian authorities initially believed that

MAP ANP applied only to the defense ministry,

but after the first cycle realized that it had

nationwide application. Hence, to deal with

MAP, Albania created new structures, including

a senior interministerial commission headed

by the Prime Minister and an interministerial

commission comprising the integration departments of the defense and foreign ministries and

three General Staff structures.

Outlook. On military and defense issues

(chapter 2), Albania plans first to transform

from heavier to smaller, more efficient armed

forces during 2000–2004, then to modernize

them during 2005–2009. Albania’s old armed

force structure comprised 5 divisions/32

brigades, with no engineers, logistic, or civil

protection structures; the new structure will

comprise 7 combat brigades and 3 combat

support brigades. Albania’s total armed forces

are to decline from 43,000 to 31,000 troops

(15,000 army; 3,500 air force; 2,500 navy;

9,000 command; and 1,000 students and reservists) with a wartime strength reduction

from 232,000 to 120,000. By 2004, the officer

corps will decline from 6,000 to 4,000; the NCO

corps will increase to 4,500 from 4,000; 

and the 30,000 conscripts will decline to

19,000, of which 9,500 will be volunteers.

Finally, though English-language training has

improved, only 13 percent of the officer corps

now speaks English.

As for resources, Albania’s defense budgets

in 2001 and 2002 amount to only 1.1 percent

of GDP. During the first cycle, Albania targeted

80 PGs; during the second cycle, the number of

PGs was more realistically reduced to 53, which

still stretched the financial capacities of a weak

country. Thus, Albania will place priority on

those PGs linked with NATO Minimal Military

Requirements. Albania realizes that it needs

NATO assistance because it lacks expertise,

especially in communications and personnel

management. Regarding security issues (chapter 4), Albania plans to establish under the

Council of Ministers a classified information

office responsible for information standards,

procedures, and controls. On legal issues

(chapter 5), Albania possesses no constitutional

obstacles to NATO membership. Parliament

approved a National Security Strategy and a

Defense Policy on January 23, 2000, and 

later passed new laws on war powers and command authority, military hierarchy and ranks,

and payment and allowances for military 

and civilian personnel. Albania is now developing new legal frameworks for structuring the

state police, addressing organized crime and

illicit trafficking, and creating a National

Military Strategy.

Macedonia. While it sought to develop

democratic institutions and equitable interethnic relations since independence in 1991, these

goals have proved elusive for Macedonia, and

the de facto result has been Albanian (roughly

30 percent) minority separation. As a result,

Macedonia has sought significant assistance

from Western institutions. On May 18, 2001,

when the NAC met with Macedonia to review

MAP performance, it found that the constitution and laws do not present obstacles to NATO

membership. In supporting NATO operations

and accepting more than 360,000 refugees

during the Kosovo campaign, Macedonia acted

as if it were a de facto NATO member. Macedonia demonstrated this quasi-membership by its

PFP status-of-forces agreements, which permitted the stationing and transit of NATO armed

forces during the campaign and the Agreement

on the Status of KFOR. Unfortunately, popular

support for NATO, which had been 80 percent

before the Kosovo campaign, eroded to 58

percent in November 2000 and may have

deteriorated further in the wake of renewed

troubles in spring 2001.

Outlook. As a result of the first MAP cycle,

Macedonia accepted the fundamental requirement to integrate its national security strategy

with its force planning and defense budgeting.

During the second cycle, it made important

progress: In August 2000, the country approved

a reorganization of its defense ministry and

general staff; it also implemented initial operational capability for the Border Brigade and 

1st Infantry Brigade in June and October respectively, prepared the Defense Law, which awaits

Parliamentary approval, and is drafting the

Military Service Law.

Escalating internal strife is clouding

Macedonia’s third cycle ANP work. Nonetheless,

the country’s plans for 2001–2002 remain

ambitious: full operational capability of the

Border Brigade and 1st Infantry Brigade during

the next few months; the reorganization of the

defense ministry and general staff by January

and February 2002 respectively; and establishment of new commands for training, logistics,

and air defense and aviation by February,

March, and April 2002, respectively. Macedonia

has reduced the 45 PGs originally accepted in

PARP to 24 priority PGs for ANP 2001. In building light and mobile armed forces to be interoperable with NATO, Macedonia plans total

SPECIAL REPORT 7

Albania is now developing

new legal frameworks 

for structuring the state

police, addressing organized crime and illicit

trafficking, and creating a

National Military Strategy
armed forces of 15,000, with a wartime

strength of 60,000. Macedonia also plans to

increase the number of professionals in the

forces and to reinforce the 1st Infantry Brigade.

The goal of the Military Service Law is to

provide support for recruitment and retention

of the military by creating a personnel management system based on a rational rank

structure and developing an NCO corps and a

progressive and systematic military education.

The new Defense Law provides for participation of Macedonian armed forces outside

Macedonia, imparts host nation support within

Macedonia, and prohibits political activity

within the armed forces. ANP has helped

Macedonia not only to identify and prioritize

key tasks but also to recognize the difficult task

of balancing capabilities and resources.

Assessing MAP Impact

In retrospect, the first cycle of MAP was a

learning process, as one would expect with

any new program. First, the Alliance had to

determine what should be incorporated into

the Annual National Plans and then had to

establish a process with the Political-Military

Steering Committee, Senior Political Committee (Reinforced), NAC, and MAP partners. 

The first cycle provided no universal standard

and did not result in an assessment. PARP

appeared to be disconnected from the Individual Partner Programs (IPP), and PGs focused

on interoperability rather than NATO membership objectives.

During the second cycle, NATO streamlined the process and provided a set of real

assessments. As a consequence, there is now

only one review meeting for IPP, PARP, and

ANP. The Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) no longer convenes, but only the NAC

(19+1). With PGs and plans now in place,

realistic measurements can be made for utilization of resources. NATO made an effort to

link the overall PFP (PWP) with ANP and

provided a closer linkage with the PARP survey,

modeled on the Defense Planning Questionnaire. NATO teams were enlarged to cover all

five MAP chapters, and these teams, in turn,

improved progress reports to assist partners

better. Partners then viewed NATO feedback as

fair and frank. Transparency was enhanced in

that some partners invited others to hear their

progress review.

In its ANP assessments, NATO has sought

a judicious balance between encouragement

and constructive criticism. In broad terms, it

has found criminality to be a problem among

many MAP partners, with the corresponding

need for better border control. While treatment

of minorities generally has improved, problems remain in Macedonia with Albanians, in

Latvia and Estonia with Russians, and in

Romania generally. Public opinion support for

integration remains uneven, and the Alliance

needs to assist partners in developing more

effective ways to inform and educate public

opinion. NATO also finds it difficult to make

uniform comparisons of economic indicators

among MAP ANPs. While some economic

improvement was registered, relative stagnation with unemployment and inflation remains. For example, Slovenia showed economic growth but experienced a decline in

investments. In some cases where privatization

has been significant, partners have funded

their PGs from accrued funds, so their ability

to sustain these resources is questionable.

In the defense and military spheres, all

MAP members are hampered by limited resources and are struggling with force restructuring. Most MAP members made genuine

efforts to commit human resources and improve interdepartmental coordination, but

their defense efforts varied, and significant

progress is still required. Though MAP partners

demonstrated their crisis-management capability by participation in IFOR, SFOR, and

KFOR, they still need to focus more on their

involvement in the OCC, Political-Military

Framework for NATO-led PFP Operations, and

Defense Capabilities Initiative.

One area that requires across-the-board

improvement is deployment of forces. While

most partners have identified required resources, their ability to sustain deployments

remains limited. Most have experienced rotation problems that severely tax their human

and material resources. Resource constraints

continued to exceed the more sober and realistic second cycle objectives of MAP members

and will further influence their third cycle

objectives. Not only has ANP chapter 4, on

security activities, contributed to building MAP

cooperative security processes, but so have

experiences in the Balkans. NATO engaged for

the first time militarily in IFOR/SFOR in

Bosnia, then for the second time in KFOR in

Kosovo. With respect to legal and constitutional issues, some MAP members are still

encumbered by domestic constraints on deploying troops for sustained operations abroad.

The enlargement process continues to

play a vital role in shaping the progressive

transformation of Central and Eastern Europe

military institutions. Both MAP and ANP have

helped create a structure for defense reform

and civil-military coordination that otherwise

might not have arisen. This is exemplified by

the performance of the new members who did

not benefit from MAP experience. MAP also has

helped aspiring Alliance members to contribute

more effectively to NATO operations as well as

to look hard at security challenges within their

own areas. At the same time, the Alliance needs

to make further adaptations to institutionalize

the new dimensions of this partnership—

particularly in the areas of flexibility and

sustainability of armed forces, establishing new

training and equipment standards, standing up

Combined Joint Task Forces and deployable

headquarters, developing a faster force generation process, and improving the capability of

Alliance partnership institutions to engage in

effective crisis prevention.

8 SPECIAL REPORT

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or

implied in this publication are solely those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense,

or any other governmental agency.

NDU PRESS

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

all MAP members are

hampered by limited

resources and are

struggling with force

restructuring