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Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey, 

Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mauritania in recent years illustrate the continuing influence of security forces on the political trajectories of 

countries around the world. Examples of such instability are particularly recurrent in Africa. When Africa’s 

political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, or 

tragic confrontations, the defense and security forces 

(DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such 

military actions were justified as an established right of 

state sovereignty over domestic issues. Often, they were 

even recognized as such on the international level.

This chaotic state of affairs is no longer acceptable. Much of Africa is now firmly committed to furthering the standards of democracy and human rights 

Africa Security Brief

Democracy and the Chain of Command: 

A New Governance of Africa’s 

Security Sector

By Dominique Djindjéré

A Public ation of the Afric a C enter for Str ategic Studie s

◆ Africa’s senior defense and security officials must adopt higher standards of leadership to reshape 

Africa’s security forces into professional bodies capable of handling contemporary security threats and 

earning the respect of civilian populations.

◆ Politicians’ adherence to constitutional limits on power will avoid placing military officers in the untenable position of choosing between respecting civilian authority and upholding democracy.

◆ Security cooperation and assistance from international partners should favor African states with a track 

record of responsible governance within the security sector.

Hig h lig h t s

No. 8 / November 2010

that have advanced over the past two decades. Nonetheless, the path toward democracy, stability, and development is long and has many blind alleys. If Africa 

is to stay on this path, its defense and security forces 

must resolutely fulfill the role assigned to them by the 

nations they serve with dedicated and consistent adherence to constitutional rule and a republican ethos.

How can the defense and security forces be refashioned to support democracy? Ultimately, this is 

dependent on deep respect for the rule of law by all 

stakeholders, whether civilian or military, governmental or nongovernmental. The caliber of command and 

leadership exercised by a country’s senior officers, accordingly, will determine the DSF ability to effectively 

support democratic governance. To this end, defense 
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and security sector leaders should focus on five priority 

reforms to forge a new military governance in Africa.

Reform No. 1: Establish National , 

Threats- based DSF

Some African defense and security forces continue to operate without any constituent document 

that clearly sets forth their missions and defines their 

rules of deployment. This perpetuates many problems 

and causes great confusion in defining their purposes, 

their configurations, and the resources and the tasks 

assigned to them.

In the field, this often results in forces that are 

insufficiently organized and poorly equipped with 

lopsided troop numbers that are difficult to manage 

and control. Roles and responsibilities of the military and police in some instances are unclear and 

overlap, leading to inadequate budgetary support and 

improper and counterproductive deployments.

To remedy these structural and organizational 

weaknesses, it is incumbent on the senior chain of 

command to:

◆ define a clear and pertinent interservices 

national security strategy

◆ establish suitable doctrines for the use of force

◆ adopt rational organizational structures

◆ establish and maintain appropriate human 

and materiel resource management practices.

Well-conceived national security plans are signs 

of military professionalism and enable proactive, flexible, and rapid responses to threats. Ghana, Senegal, 

Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, among others, have 

made noteworthy progress toward developing such 

comprehensive plans.

A coherent national security strategy provides a 

systematic basis to restructure a nation’s defense and 

security forces. This is a top priority given that force 

structures for many African countries are misaligned 

with today’s threats. A rational defense structure provides commanders and oversight authorities the ability to better balance the missions to be fulfilled with 

available resources. It also fosters a more outcomesbased means to create budgets, recruit, train, procure 

assets, maintain equipment, and reliably track troop 

compensation. As a result, even in a context of limited budget resources, overall efficiency and readiness 

can improve. Additionally, these tools help prevent 

embezzlement and corruption, a frequent affliction 

within African DSF. For example, public submission 

of the defense budget to parliament was reinstituted 

in Zambia in the 1990s and has continuously led to 

adjustments that produce new efficiencies, reveal 

poor management, and rectify the misallocation of 

funds within the DSF.

Restructuring defense and security forces must involve key societal stakeholders. This approach underscores that DSF are from and for the broader society—

not distinct from it. Sierra Leone, which continues to 

consolidate reforms made during a multiyear comprehensive DSF restructuring, provides a model of productive consultative defense review. Citizens’ groups, 

civilian agencies, and senior officers collaborated to design new policies that streamlined the DSF command 

structure, elevated training and personnel priorities, 

and enhanced accountability and transparency.

Reform No. 2: Build Institutions o f 

Professional DSF

Order, discipline, know-how, and rigorous standards have always been the mainstays of effective defense and security forces. Scenes of mutiny, looting, 

and violence by troops in ragged fatigues—all too 

familiar in Africa—are the antithesis of a professional 

DSF. Reforms that enhance ethics, improve training, 

Brigadier General Dominique Djindjéré is Chief of 

Staff of the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso. An expanded 

version of this paper was first delivered as a speech in 

French on March 2, 2010, to participants attending the 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies’ Next Generation of 

African Military Leaders course.

“much of Africa is now firmly 

committed to furthering the 

standards of democracy and 

human rights”
and provide adequate means to support the well-being 

of troops will institute and sustain professionalism.

The foundation of a professional defense and 

security force is reflected by basic ethical values 

typically formalized in an official code of conduct 

meant to guide the thoughts and actions of troops. 

Such values include loyalty to the nation and to the 

armed forces, a sense of duty, selfless service, and integrity. While some security forces in Africa wholly 

lack codes of ethics, others in countries such as Mali, 

Senegal, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi have 

made great strides to inculcate these norms into their 

day-to-day operations. A code of conduct, however, 

is only valuable in so far as it is known and respected. 

As successful efforts in Mali have shown, such codes 

must be instilled in new recruits as well as seasoned 

officers and modeled by commanders if they are to 

be absorbed.

Ethical values must also be reinforced by a 

senior command that scrupulously rewards troops 

on merit and performance and strictly prohibits favoritism and arbitrary decisionmaking. Moreover, 

leadership by example, absent all demagoguery, is 

a fundamental quality of a disciplined and ethical 

DSF. Senior officers must know how to listen and 

advocate for their troops, exercise authority fairly, 

and emphasize professional development. Furthermore, the willingness to embrace ideas from the outside cultivates innovation and improvement across 

the chain of command.

Professionalism within the DSF is sustained 

through ongoing high-level training. This must be 

the underlying principle governing any organization 

that seeks to operate effectively. Professional skills are 

acquired through objective selection of participants, 

meaningful instruction delivered by experienced officers, and by the proper use of human and financial 

resources. Many African states, however, lack the 

staff colleges and other facilities that foster technical 

specialization and advanced strategic comprehension. 

To this end, properly targeted and dynamic military 

cooperation must be developed not only between 

developed and developing countries, but also among 

the latter.

Given the general security environment in Africa, training programs that focus on peace operations, 

responsible crowd and riot control, rules of engagement, soldiers’ compliance with the rule of law, and 

information and communication technologies are 

critical priorities. Such training enhances DSF capabilities and integrates democratic norms. Programs 

must also moderate officers’ and soldiers’ perceptions 

of “enemies” to more humane notions of “adverse 

parties,” particularly during the low-intensity operations common in peacekeeping and those infrequent 

domestic police operations that require DSF support. 

Troops who assess threats dispassionately and rationally will operate more effectively.

Special attention must be paid to the social 

aspects of the military. A social services network 

is needed to ensure a dignified reentry into society, 

retirement, and management of family affairs. Similarly, every effort must be made to establish insurance 

policies to support families in the event of a serious 

injury or death of a member of the DSF. The aim is 

to meet basic material needs, thus facilitating composure, readiness to serve, and decreased susceptibility 

to corruption and the risk of manipulation.

During the 1980s, the Senegalese armed forces 

established a health-care system funded by military 

personnel on a monthly basis. Accountable management led to the addition of a social welfare provision, 

loans for property acquisition, and other services. In 

2007, the armed forces of Burkina Faso established a 

similar system through a modest government subsidy 

coupled with monthly private contributions. The system has worked to the great satisfaction of personnel—boosting morale and pride.

Reform No. 3: Inspire Respe c t f o r 

Republican Values

Endowed by the constitution with the capacity to employ force, defense and security forces must 

transcend partisanship and represent the ideals of 

national unity and patriotism. In short, they must 

reflect an exemplary republican spirit. In a democratic form of government, this means respecting 

citizen rights and freedoms during periods of elections, strikes, protests, and other forms of democratic 

expression. Unfortunately, the demonstration of republican values among defense and security forces in 

Africa remains rare.

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To achieve that spirit, the actions of the senior 

DSF command should focus in particular on three 

main goals.

First, adhere to a legal framework grounded in the 

primacy of the nation’s democratically elected political 

authority over the defense and security forces. This 

basic requirement must be reinforced by the nonpoliticization of the armed forces and by their neutrality 

as an institution. Among Africa’s armed forces, only 

those of Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Senegal, Mauritius, and a handful of others have never orchestrated 

or involved themselves in military coups. If Africa’s 

emerging democratic militaries wish to be widely respected as professional, this must become the norm.

Second, ensure that the nation’s defense and 

security forces are a genuinely national force and 

a melting pot containing all of the country’s ethnic and social components. Such an approach will 

help build a sense of national identity, generate a 

deep-rooted pride in the armed forces, and inspire 

an attitude of sacrifice and readiness to defend the 

interests of the nation. Recruitment in Burkina Faso 

is nationwide and nondiscriminatory. Selection is 

based on a rule of proportionality. Recruitment targets are determined by the size of the population 

living in a given area relative to the total number 

to be recruited at the national level. As a result, the 

DSF better reflects the nation’s diversity.

Third, the conduct of security forces must be exemplary at all times, in all venues, under all circumstances, 

and solidly grounded in international humanitarian law. 

Violence, racketeering, and other types of harassment 

of the local populace must be eliminated if security 

forces are to earn the trust and respect of citizens. To 

foster such conduct, the senior chain of command must 

empower and fully staff Offices of Inspectors General 

within the DSF to deter, investigate, and punish abuses. 

Similarly, senior officers must work closely with parliamentary committees responsible for oversight as well as 

auditors and judicial authorities.

Reform No. 4: Impr o v e 

Civil-military Re lations

Despite efforts from both sides, relations between 

civil and military officials in Africa continue to be 

typified by mutual distrust, deep prejudicial feelings, and taboos based primarily on ignorance and 

lack of communication. Indeed, there are relatively 

few domestic venues where civilian and military officials regularly convene. When African civilians and 

members of the military meet at international events, 

a wide gulf in perceptions is often apparent despite 

their complementary skills.

Forums where civilians and the military can 

freely and confidentially meet and explore common 

interests and establish a culture of dialogue are needed. Such forums not only provide opportunities to 

establish relationships but also offer space to discuss 

integrated approaches to national security and develop shared understandings of roles and responsibilities. 

In times of crisis, the relationships built through such 

forums contribute invaluably to finding consensusbased and durable solutions.

Experiments in bringing senior-level civilians and 

military officers together for strategic planning sessions 

in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt have been constructive. Additionally, the well-respected Southern 

Africa Defence and Security Management Network 

has proven an exceptional initiative for promoting 

transparency, fostering confidence and cooperation 

between civilian and military officials, and contributing to shifts in policy and thinking. Originally developed in South Africa, the network of 10 universities 

and research institutes across the Southern African 

Development Community subregion is an independent 

nongovernmental body funded in part by international 

donors. It provides police, military, and civilian security professionals with joint specialized and accredited 

training, as well as support to governments in defense 

policy analysis and formulation. Similar initiatives 

should be adopted by other African countries and 

subregions. As an initial step, the creation of professional exchange programs between senior officers and 

civilian counterparts would build trust and ensure that 

the actions undertaken on each side are coordinated, 

complementary, and mutually understood.

The culture of secrecy that pervades many of Africa’s armed forces (for example, some do not even publicize their national security plans) is another obstacle 

to constructive civil-military relations. An appropriate communications strategy that provides the public 

and media an understanding of life in the barracks is 

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essential—as a matter of principle and practical benefit. 

A public that knows and understands a DSF and its 

purpose will more freely support it. Such a DSF, in turn, 

will benefit from timely information-sharing, thereby 

enabling it to more effectively fulfill its protection mission. Due to the dramatic expansion of communication 

technologies in Africa, the rapid transmission of rumor 

and suspicions can quickly escalate into crises and complicate DSF missions, as it did in Kenya’s 2007 postelection violence, the 2010 food riots in Mozambique, and 

recurring communal conflict in Nigeria. A proactive 

strategy to share information—often by leveraging such 

technology—can combat confusion and rumor and prevent or stabilize conflict.

Reform No. 5: Mitigat e t h e 

Co mplexity of Nonmilitary Factors

Any progress toward improved governance 

within the DSF will also depend on complex issues 

involving factors beyond the security sector.

As a popular saying puts it so well, “the fish rots 

from the head down.” If the armed forces are subsidiary 

to civilian political authority, then adherence to republican values within the defense and security forces 

will depend to a great extent on the quality of civilian 

political leaders. Unfortunately, sectarianism and individual self-interest have frequently taken precedence 

over the interests of the nation. In order to hang on to 

power or to seize victory in fraudulent or lost elections, 

some African leaders are even prepared to violate the 

constitution and to imperil the country.

Such machinations often involve attempts to manipulate or command military and paramilitary units. 

Moves designed to foment discontent or even uprisings 

are typically started by spreading rumors and false information, sometimes cleverly filtered by vested elements 

within the media. On occasion, some well-off, powerhungry politicians will even deploy private militia in 

pursuit of their ambitions. Such irregular forces and 

armed gangs have played a predominant role in recent 

or current conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Sudan, 

Liberia, Uganda, and Somalia. Elsewhere, weak institutional checks and balances leave DSF vulnerable to 

politicization. For instance, the role of the legislature in 

approving deployments, nominations, and other decisions taken by the civilian commander in chief is often 

unclear even in Africa’s most stable states.

The recurrent and crucial role of private security 

providers also requires attention. Mercenaries motivated 

by money are, at times, entrusted with critical defense 

and security responsibilities. This tends to privatize and 

trivialize the defense and security of the nation. Compounding matters is the persistent intervention by certain major powers that, on occasion, exacerbate internal 

conflicts for strategic, economic, or other motives.

Models of good governance that can counteract these complex nonmilitary factors are available, 

however. In particular, the United Nations, African Union, and Africa’s increasingly vital Regional 

Economic Communities have established legal instruments for strengthening democracy, peace, and 

good governance. For example:

◆ The African Union’s African Charter on 

Democracy, Elections, and Governance

◆ The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s African Peer Review Mechanism 

(APRM), adopted by the African Union

◆ The Economic Community of West African 

States’ Protocol on Democracy and Good 

Governance.

Rather than allow commitments to democratic 

standards, basic human rights, and good governance to 

remain optional considerations, these and similar agreements seek to make their observance obligatory. Disregard of such principles has contributed to weak state 

legitimacy, institutional sclerosis, and other shortcomings that frequently cause and drive crises in Africa. In 

other words, adherence to democratic processes—and 

the legitimacy this engenders—has a direct impact on 

peace and conflict, and therefore on the DSF.

When signatories violate the Charter or Protocol, 

regional bodies and their members are obligated to take 

“a public that knows and 

understands a DSF and its purpose 

will more freely support it”
firm and consistent steps to halt and reverse further 

extra-constitutionalism and destabilization. With particular relevance to the senior command, such actions 

by regional bodies help strengthen the buffer that separates politics and defense and security. Civilian leaders 

who respect these charters earn the trust not only of 

the people but also of military officers and their staffs. 

When that buffer is breached, senior officers confront 

a troubling dilemma: respect the principle of civilian 

authority or uphold the standards of democracy. As a 

result, the state and entire chain of command is left 

compromised and the trajectory of the nation uncertain.

The African Peer Review Mechanism merits 

special mention regarding reforming Africa’s DSF. 

Through the APRM, African states evaluate their 

efforts to advance democratic governance, including 

whether states have effective policies, institutions, 

and processes in place to prevent and manage intraand interstate conflict. To enhance accountability 

and share best practices, this self-assessment is complemented by a separate evaluation conducted by a 

multinational team of African experts. All 12 of the 

completed APRM assessments have identified specific 

vulnerabilities to conflict and recommended how the 

DSF can improve diversity, human rights training, 

due process, and other inefficiencies. In other words, 

the APRM provides the senior chain of command a 

constructive process to measure performance, identify 

areas for improvement, and receive recommendations 

and innovations from African counterparts. The DSF 

should vigorously cooperate with and contribute to 

the APRM process.

Complementing the aims of these African instruments, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (an 

agency of the U.S. Government) is an initiative that 

rewards good governance with greater development investment. This initiative merits replication within the 

security cooperation realm in Africa. Security cooperation and assistance that favors partners with a track 

record of principled and effective performance can incentivize responsible governance within the DSF while 

discouraging the exploitation of defense and security 

forces for political ends and personal interest.

Conclusion

The degree to which democracy is consolidated in Africa is contingent on defense and security 

forces that are well structured, professional, based on 

republican values, and subordinate to civilian political authority. Across the continent, then, all societal 

and governmental leaders, including top military officials, must acknowledge the need to reverse outdated 

mindsets that stymie necessary reforms and adjustments. Additionally, international partners must 

work to consistently encourage good governance and 

unequivocally denounce the interference of defense 

and security forces in politics, politicians who seek to 

skirt constitutional checks and balances, and the use 

of armed militias and mercenaries as an instrument of 

contestation and conquest. Sustained support to committed reformers as they seek to implement sound, 

consensus-based plans is equally critical.

With professional defense and security forces 

fully dedicated to these reforms, Africa will be able 

to sustain the momentum now under way and steadily 

expand the number of countries on the continent respectful of democracy and human rights.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research and 

analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic 

priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, the ACSS 

is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

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Africa Security Briefs

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

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