The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II

The

High Road to

Tokyo

Bay

The AAF in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater

Daniel Haulman

Air Force Historical Research Agency

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The High Road to

Tokyo Bay

In early 1942, Japanese military forces dominated a

significant portion of the earth's surface, stretching

from the Indian Ocean to the Bering Sea and from

Manchuria to the Coral Sea. Just three years later,

Japan surrendered, having lost most of its vast

domain. Coordinated action by Allied air, naval,

and ground forces attained the victory. Air power,

both land- and carrier-based, played a dominant

role.

Understanding the Army Air Forces' role in the

Asiatic-Pacific theater requires examining the context of Allied strategy, American air and naval

operations, and ground campaigns. Without the

surface conquests by soldiers and sailors, AAF fliers

would have lacked bases close enough to enemy

targets for effective raids. Yet, without Allied air

power, these surface victories would have been

impossible.

The High Road to Tokyo Bay concentrates on the

Army Air Forces' tactical operations in Asia and the

Pacific areas during World War II. A subsequent

pamphlet will cover the strategic bombardment of

Japan.
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14. ABSTRACT

The story of the Army Air Forces' tactical air operations against Japan in the China-Burma-India, Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific,

and Western Pacific theaters.

34 pp., maps, photos

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PROPERTY OF

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY

Rogue Nation

Japan Becomes a Global Threat

In the 45 years between 1895 and 1940, the Japanese empire

expanded enormously. Before World War I, it had absorbed

Formosa, Sakhalin, and Korea. The Versailles Treaty granted Japan

many of the former German island chains in the Pacific. Under an

increasingly militarist government in the 1930s, Japan captured

Manchuria, and in 1937 it went to war with China, quickly occupying

much of the Chinese coast. By the close of the decade, Japan's

leadership had fought two brief (but disastrous) campaigns against

Soviet Russia. With even more serious consequences, the dominant

Asian power had firmly aligned itself with the two great expansionist

powers: Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

After Germany defeated France in 1940, Japan successfully

pressured the pro-Nazi Vichy regime to allow Japanese troops to

occupy French Indochina. Officials in Tokyo dreamed of a "Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in which Asians would drive out

European settlers (allowing Japanese to take their places). Though

Nazi forces had defeated the Netherlands in 1940, the Netherlands

East Indies remained independent and pro-Allied. Resource-poor,

Japan sought access to the oil and rubber of the Netherlands East

Indies to sustain its war effort in China. Obviously, any attempt to

control that territory automatically meant Japan would be in conflict

with the British in Malaya. And undoubtedly, such aggression would

draw in American forces in the Philippines. Ultimately planning to

conquer all three areas, and imbued with a racist ideology against

all foreigners, Japanese military leaders decided to knock out the

most substantial military force available to challenge them: the

American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands.

The enemy carrier task force attacked Pearl Harbor on

December 7, 1941 (December 8 on the other side of the international

date line). That same day, other Japanese forces invaded the

Philippines and Malaya. The Pearl Harbor attack, like the British

attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, clearly demonstrated the

superiority of aircraft over ships. At Wheeler and Hickam Fields,

Japanese pilots destroyed more than a third of the Hawaiian Air

Force's planes, most of which were imprudently lined up wingtipto-wingtip so that they could be guarded more easily against

saboteurs. At Clark and Iba Fields in the Philippines, enemy air raids

destroyed half the aircraft belonging to the Far East Air Force,

including seventeen of thirty-five newly arrived B-17 Flying Fortresses.
Before the end of December, Japanese land-based torpedobombers sank the British warships Repulse and Prince of Wales off

Singapore, depriving the Allies of much of their regional naval

strength. Japanese air forces had shattered the hopes of naval

adherents who believed in the invincibility of steaming battleships

exposed to air attack. Using air power to supplement naval and

ground offensives, the aggressor was well on the way to conquering

both the Philippines and Malaya by the end of 1941. Japanese

strategists hoped to consolidate the expanded borders of their

empire before the Americans or the British could seriously interfere.

Organizing for Global War

British and U.S. Leaders Build a Coalition

Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain and President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States met in Washington

on December 24, 1941, at the Arcadia Conference. In organizing a

joint war effort, they created a Combined Chiefs of Staff composed

of the top British and American military leaders and also agreed to

direct their primary war effort to defeating Adolf Hitler, while

holding the line against Japan. Following the conference, British

and American leaders divided the world into theaters and appointed

Allied commanders for each region. Early in 1942, the United States

reorganized its military forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

consisting of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Lt.

Gen. Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, Chief, Army Air Forces; Admiral Ernest

J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; and Admiral William D. Leahy,

assistant to the President.

To check Japanese expansion in Asia, the Allies organized a

coalition command composed of American, British, Dutch, and

Australian forces (ABDACOM) under British General Sir Archibald

P. Wavell. ABDACOM would prevent theJapanese from conquering

Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Philippines,

and Australia. Unfortunately, the coalition lacked the necessary

resources, and the Allies grossly underestimated Japanese military

strength and abilities. ABDACOM soon lost all of these areas, save

southeastern New Guinea and Australia. By the end of May, most

dishearteningly, Japanese forces had easily captured even Singapore,

the reputed "Gibraltar of the East". In June the enemy consolidated

positions in New Guinea and some of the Solomon Islands.

Japanese military forces seemed invincible and surprised even

themselves with the rapidity of their conquests. They drove back

2
the Allies to India, western China, and a toehold on New Guinea

near Cape York, Australia.

Faced with a greatly expanded Japanese Empire, Allied

leaders divided eastern Asia and the Pacific into three separate

theaters with independent commanders. On the mainland of Asia,

in what came to be called the China-Burma-India Theater, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and British Admiral Lord Louis

Mountbatten wielded supreme command. U.S. Army Gen. Joseph

W. Stilwell commanded American military forces in the theater. The

Pacific Area, delegated exclusively to the United States because of

its greater contribution of personnel and resources there, was

divided in two. Gen. Douglas MacArthur of the U.S. Army, ordered

in March 1942 from the Philippines to Australia, became commander

of the Southwest Pacific Area, including Australia, New Guinea, the

Bismarck Archipelago, and the western Solomon Islands. Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch forces supported him. Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz of the U.S. Navy presided over Allied forces in the

Pacific Ocean Area.

Two significant naval battles helped stop the seemingly

relentless Japanese advance. The Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7-

8, 1942, was the first battle in naval history fought by aircraft from

ships out of sight from each other. Although the Americans suffered

more losses than the enemy, Coral Sea was a strategic Allied victory,

for it forced the Japanese to abandon their attempt to capture Port

Moresby and southern New Guinea by sea. Such a conquest would

have brought the Japanese to the Australian shore. In June Admiral

Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Pearl Harbor raid and

supreme Japanese naval commander in the Pacific, attempted to

capture Midway Island in the Hawaiian chain and draw out the

American fleet for destruction. U.S. intelligence experts had

deciphered Japanese codes, and Nimitz was ready for the invaders,

though with a pitifully small armada of ships. His airmen more than

made up for many material shortfalls: the Battle of Midway, on June

4-6, 1942, a decisive Japanese naval defeat, was the turning point

in the Pacific War. The enemy lost four carriers and a cruiser, while

the United States sacrificed only one carrier and a destroyer. After

Midway, the Japanese had no choice but to defend their ill-gotten

empire rather than extend it further.

Although Army Air Forces aircraft flew at Coral Sea and

Midway, carrier aviators determined the outcome of both battles.

Boeing B-17s and Martin B-26 Marauders attacked both enemy

troop transports and aircraft carriers during the Battle of Midway, but

land-based aviation would not make a significant contribution to the

Pacific war effort until later.

3
Into the Breach

"Flying Tigers" and Airlift Save China

The Allies ultimately achieved victory over Japan in the

Pacific, but in the China-Burma-India Theater, the goals were more

defensive: to defend India, keep China in the war, and liberate

Burma. Theater commanders were British and Chinese, as were the

bulk of the troops. The American effort consisted almost entirely

of air and logistical support. Three air forces-the Tenth, Fourteenth,

and Twentieth-furnished the Army Air Forces' share of the Allied

effort in this theater.

The first Americans to fight the Japanese on the Asian

mainland were not members of the regular armed forces. They

belonged to the American Volunteer Group, better known as the

"Flying Tigers", organized by Claire L. Chennault in China during the

summer of 1941 at the behest of the Roosevelt administration. The

Flying Tigers' first combat missions were over Burma in December

1941, and they continued operations there during the bleak first half of

1942. Between mid-December 1941 and early July 1942, the

volunteers claimed 297 enemy planes destroyed. Flying Curtiss P-40

fighters adorned with leering sharkmouths, the group downed more

enemy planes than it lost. Though the Flying Tigers on their own

could not stop the Japanese from driving British and Chinese forces

out of Burma, they did prevent the Japanese from securing air

superiority over southwestern China.

When enemy forces conquered Burma during the spring of

1942, they cut the Burma Road by which the Allies transported supplies

to China. To continue the flow of essential war materials to Chiang Kaishek, the Army Air Forces inaugurated an airlift from British-controlled

India over the Himalayas (the so-called "Hump") to southwestern

China. U.S. airmen flew Curtiss C-46, Douglas C-47, Douglas C-54,

and Consolidated-Vultee C-87 transports. When the Tenth Air Force

under Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton moved to India, it took over the

Hump airlift from the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command. The

Tenth's first mission was to protect the Hump route, which stretched

all the way from Karachi, India, to Kunming, China.

The Flying Tigers supported this effort, especially after June

1942, when Brereton and most of the Tenth Air Force's bombers and

some of its transports moved to the Middle East to help the British

counter the German threat in North Africa. The skeletonized Tenth Air

Force remained in India and continued the airlift with reduced

resources; Chennault assumed command of the China Air Task Force

under the Tenth Air Force in July.

4
*iThe China War

TOP LEFT !

A Curtiss C-46 Commando transport of the Air

Transport Command flies over the mountains of

western China, on the famed Hump airlift route.

,~~ ..... o ... .

TOP RIGHT.

Protected by escorting P-40s of the 23d Fighter Group, Consolidated-Vultee B-24J Liberators of the 308th

Bombardment Group, Fourteenth Air Force, drone towards Sinshih, an important Japanese supply point.

CENTER.

Bombs from Fourteenth Air Force B-24 Liberators blast the railroad marshalling yards at Haiphong, French

Indochina.

ABOVE.

Bearing gaudy sharkmouths inspired by the Flying Tigers, these Curtiss P-40E Warhawks of the Tenth Air

Force's 51st Fighter Group defended the Indian terminus of the Hump Route. They also supported Allied

forces during a Japanese invasion of northern Burma in 1943.
As the German pressure eased following El Alamein, the

Tenth Air Force slowly rebuilt its forces. It flew various missionsraiding Japanese bases in China, defending Allied airfields in

Yunnan Province from enemy air raids, and attacking Japanese

shipping along the Chinese and Indochinese coasts. By autumn

1942, targets included port facilities at Hong Kong, Canton, Haiphong,

and Saigon. Long-range Consolidated-Vultee B-24 Liberators even

struck harbor and railroad facilities as far as Bangkok, Thailand,

flying more than 2,700 miles round trip from bases in India.

By late 1942, the Tenth Air Force was overloaded. It could

not easily manage both the Hump airlift and combat operations in

China, India, Burma, and southeast Asia. So the AAF reorganized

some of its theater resources, assigning Hump flights to the globegirdling Air Transport Command. It also set up an India Air Task

Force, on the order of the China Air Task Force. The new task force

defended airfields in Assam Province in northeastern India against

Japanese air attack; attacked shipping in the Andaman Sea; raided

Rangoon, Burma, and Bangkok, Thailand; struck railroad bridges in

Burma; and defended the Hump route.

Further reorganization followed, partly to improve relations

among the Allies. In March 1943, the AAF activated the Fourteenth

Air Force under General Chennault to take over the responsibilities

of the China Air Task Force. This left the Tenth Air Force to deal with

missions in India and Burma that had been handled by the India Air

Task Force. Later in the year, the Tenth became part of the Eastern

Air Command (under Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer), which

served the Southeast Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten,

the Allied theater commander.

Desperate Struggle

Air Power's Role in the Burma and

China Conflicts

Tenth Air Force airplanes moved, supplied, and supported

Allied troops that liberated Burma. Leading the list of targets was

Rangoon, the capital and largest port, Mandalay in central Burma,

and Myitkyina in the north. Republic P-47 Thunderbolts and North

American B-25 Mitchells routinely struck Japanese lines of supply

between Rangoon and the front lines near the Chinese and Indian

borders. The Tenth's bombers mined the Rangoon and Irrawaddy

Rivers and attacked railroad bridges in northern Burma.

During the autumn of 1943, the Tenth Air Force targeted

Myitkyina and otherJapanese airfields in northern Burma to reduce

6
cargo losses in the Himalayan airlift. Monthly tonnages over the

Hump had doubled between June and September, and the Japanese

redoubled their efforts to destroy transports. Soon long-range

Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and North American P-51 Mustangs

arrived in the theater. Some were used to escort transport planes,

but mostly they flew more productive air superiority sweeps against

enemy fighters.

The Tenth Air Force's 1st Air Commando Group was a true

composite wing, consisting of P-51 fighters, B-25 bombers, C-47

transports, and CG-4 gliders (as well as small spotter planes and

even America's first helicopter, the R-4). Most notably, the air

commandos dropped Allied special forces units behind Japanese

lines in Burma and delivered supplies to them in the spring and

summer of 1944. The special forces included British Major General

Orde C. Wingate's "Chindits" and American Maj. Gen. Frank D.

Merrill's "Marauders". In March 1944, an air task force under AAF

Brig. Gen. Philip Cochran supported Wingate by landing about

10,000 men and pack animals in jungle clearings behind enemy lines

in Burma. To help sustain the offensive, Allied planes delivered

almost three million pounds of cargo. Wingate and Merrill severed

Japanese lines of communication, weakening enemy resistance to

British and Chinese armies pressing from the northwest and

northeast. Meanwhile, Air Transport Command airlifted Chinese

troops from China to India and on to Burma for Army Gen. Joseph

W. Stilwell, commander of U.S. forces in the theater.

American airplanes furnished critical support to Allied forces

liberating Burma between mid-1944 and the spring of 1945. Having

captured Myitkyina in northern Burma after a long siege, the Allies

used the landing strips to receive airlifted supplies so that the ground

offensive could continue. In early 1945, AAF transports delivered

reinforcements, rations, gasoline, and ordnance to Chinese and

British troops.

Allied soldiers completed a new Burma Road between India

and China in January 1945, but the Hump flights continued. The

road by itself could not possibly handle all the cargo en route to

China. Brig. Gen. William H. Tunner took command of the Hump

airlift in the summer of 1944 and supervised accelerated deliveries

over the Himalayas. Monthly tonnages increased from 46,000 tons

in June 1944 to 71,000 tons in July 1945. Cargo airplanes, including

C-46s, C-47s, C-54s, and C-87s, delivered fuel, weapons, and

ammunition from Assam province in eastern India to Yunnan

Province in southern China. The Hump airlift not only helped

sustain the Chinese army but also supplied American air bases in

China. On average, transports flew 900,000 ton-miles per day.

7
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Tenth Air Force airplanes continued to support Allied ground

forces, bombing Fort Dufferin in central Burma so that troops could

capture Mandalay in March 1945. In May the Tenth bombarded

Rangoon's coastal area to prepare for an Allied amphibious assault

and then dropped Indian Ghurka paratroops south of the city for the

final assault. When Allied troops entered the Burmese capital, the

Japanese had already left, thanks to unrelenting Allied air attacks.

The Tenth Air Force also assisted ground forces defending

India. Early in 1944, British and Indian troops in the Imphal area of

eastern India, near the Burmese border, faced encirclement by

advancing Japanese troops. Responding to their allies' request for

airlift support, the Troop Carrier Command borrowed C-46s from

the Air Transport Command and delivered more than 1,000 tons by

air between January 1 and mid-February. The Eastern Air Command

transported supplies and reinforcements to the British 17th Division

defending Imphal in the spring. The emergency airlift, coupled with

intense Allied air attacks, helped the defenders break the siege,

Shattered, the Japanese left India for good.

With the Tenth Air Force busy in Burma and India, the

Fourteenth Air Force maintained a hectic pace in China. Having

been activated in March 1943 from components of Chennault's China

Air Task Force, the Fourteenth at first employed older P-40s and B-25s

inherited from the Tenth. Eventually Chennault established a chain of

bases in south central China and acquired long-range B-24s and P-38s

suitable for extended power projection missions. These included

defense of American bases against Japanese air raids (both by

interception and by counter raids), attacks on enemy bases at Hanoi,

Haiphong, and other parts of Indochina, defense of beleaguered

Chinese ground forces, and destruction of Japanese shipping along

the Asian coast. Attacks on coastal shipping helped strangle Japan's

wartime industry and its logistical lifeline to Southeast Asia.

The Fourteenth Air Force often provided support to Chinese

troops under enemy attack. In May and June 1943, Japanese forces

launched an offensive against Chungking, the provisional capital.

When the Chinese appealed to the Fourteenth for direct assistance,

B-24 Liberators from Chengtu attacked the invader's supply lines

and columns in the Yangtze River gorge, the only easy route to

Chungking. In November the Fourteenth Air Force supported

Chinese troops along the Salween River in northeastern Burma. This

effort continued into the spring of 1944, as Chiang Kai-shek

attempted to block enemy forces from entering southern China from

Burma. American B-25s and P-51s also struck enemy troop

columns in China in response to a new Japanese offensive in April.

The Fourteenth's heavy and medium bombers routinely

struck Japanese shipping along the Indochinese and Chinese coasts

9
from the summer of 1943 through most of 1944, not only by attacking

ships and port facilities, but also by sowing mines in Japanesecontrolled harbors of China, Indochina, and Formosa. American

bombers also raided occupied ports along the great rivers of China,

attempting to cut enemy lines of communication running both north

and south across the rivers and east and west along them.

Fearing that the United States would soon base long-range

Boeing B-29 Superfortresses in China for raids on Japan, the enemy

launched a massive assault in the south. Despite vigorous Allied air

raids and desperate Chinese resistance during the summer and fall

of 1944 and into 1945, the Japanese ground forces doggedly

advanced, though with fearful casualties. American aircraft strafed

enemy columns and supply lines between Yochow and Hengyang

late in 1944. Yet between June 1944 and January 1945, the Fourteenth lost thirteen of its bases to the Japanese. Gradually, the enemy's advance slowed, then stopped.

In 1945, while continuing to strike enemy railroads, airfields,

and river shipping, the Fourteenth provided close air support for

Chinese forces on the Honan and Hunan fronts in central and

southeastern China. Helping with these missions was the Chinese

American Composite Wing, an organization composed of personnel

from both Chiang Kai-shek's army and the U. S. Army Air Forces.

That spring, Chinese forces, with American air support, began a

counteroffensive that pushed the Japanese out of some of the areas

they had recently taken. In May enemy forces withdrew from

southern China, under the pressure from the Allied China and Pacific

campaigns. The Fourteenth continued to bomb and strafeJapanese

rail lines, airfields, and troop columns in northern China until the

end of the war.

Boeing Behemoth

The Superfortress Goes to War

Besides the Tenth and Fourteenth, the Twentieth Air Force

played a role in the China-Burma-India theater. Unlike the other

numbered air forces, which served army or navy theater commanders, the Twentieth operated under the direct command of General

Arnold, as executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanding General of the AAF. Arnold sought to prevent strategic

bombardment resources from being wasted on missions of lesser

priority and tasks for which they were not designed. The Twentieth

Air Force employed the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, capable of flying

10
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INDO-CHIN
higher and farther than B-17s or B-24s and carrying up to ten tons

of bombs. The elegant B-29 featured remote-controlled gun turrets

and a pressurized cabin for high-altitude missions. At the Quebec

Conference of August 1943, American military leaders convinced the

Allies initially to use B-29s against Japan from bases in China. The

project came to be known as MAMrERHORN.

Long-range B-29s arrived in India in the spring of 1944. On

June 5, the Superfortresses flew their first mission against railroad

shops at Bangkok, Thailand. Temporarily serving as long-range

transports, these aircraft also carried cargo and aviation fuel over the

Hump into China to help establish bases for MAMtERHORN. On June

15, 1944, B-29s conducted the first bombing raid on Japan's Home

Islands since the Doolittle Raid of April 1942. Forty-seven

Superfortresses from Chengtu bombed steel works at Yawata on

Kyushu. Attacks followed on other strategic targets on Kyushu and

in Manchuria. The B-29s also flew missions in Burma, Malaya, and

other parts of southeast Asia. In August 1944, XX Bomber Command

B-29s took off from a staging base at China Bay, Ceylon, to bomb

Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies. The 4,000-mile round trip marked

the longest non-stop bombing mission of World War II.

Despite these heroic efforts, the sporadic achievements of the

B-29s in China were hardly worth the enormous costs. Each

MA1rERHORN mission was a tremendous drain on resources, especially munitions and fuel, which had to be ferried over the Hump.

By late 1944 American forces had captured islands in the Pacific from

which Superfortresses could strike Honshu and the other Japanese

Home Islands with greater ease and effect. The XXI Bomber

Command in the Mariana Islands assumed the burden of bombing

Japan, and in early 1945 the Twentieth Air Force abandoned its dusty

bases in China and India for the lush Pacific islands of Guam, Tinian,

and Saipan.

Despite the obstacles, the Army Air Forces in the ChinaBurma-India theater succeeded in keeping China in the war,

defending India, and liberating Burma. The accomplishments of

American airmen in the China-Burma-India Theater were both

legion and legendary. The rest was up to the Pacific.

12
Holding the Line

The AAF In the South and Southwest

Pacific, 1942

Even after the Battle of Midway in early June 1942, the

Japanese did not yet recognize the necessity of going completely on

the defensive. The southeastern boundaries of their vast perimeter

remained unsettled, and Premier Heidiki Tojo and his senior military

leaders hoped to secure New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and

then threaten Australia. To that end, Japanese military forces advanced southward from their powerful base of Rabaul in the

Bismarck Archipelago, setting the stage for the prolonged and

bloody Solomons campaign.

Enemy forces had failed to take Port Moresby (in southeastern

New Guinea) by sea, for such a victory was impossible after the

Battle of Coral Sea. Next, in the summer of 1942, they tried an

overland offensive from Buna in northeastern New Guinea, rushing

troops and equipment from Rabaul. Both the towering, fogshrouded Owen Stanley Mountains and treacherous swampland

separated the Japanese from Port Moresby and the narrow straits to

Australia. American and Australian troops at Port Moresby and Milne

Bay defended the southeastern corner of New Guinea in bitter and

relentless battle. They were supported by the Allied Air Forces,

Southwest Pacific Area, under the command of Maj. Gen. George C.

Kenney as of August 1942.

Kenney, an air power visionary, was arguably the most gifted

American air combat commander of the Second World War. He

strengthened Allied air power in the theater in several ways. First,

he directed the improvement of maintenance facilities in Australia,

increasing the number of airplanes in commission. He encouraged

subordinates to think in innovative ways, and they did so. They

developed skip-bombing and low-level attack techniques that

turned attack and medium bombers such as the Douglas A-20

Havoc and the B-25 Mitchell into deadly ship-busters. By increasing

the number of machine guns in the noses of their B-25s and A-20s,

Kenney's airmen improved their effectiveness against enemy

antiaircraft, parked airplanes, and ships. Another important

innovation was a parachute-retarded fragmentation bomb, the

parafrag, which allowed A-20s and B-25s to bomb enemy airplanes on the ground from low altitudes and then escape the

explosions. By improvising new bomb types, Kenney adapted air

power to specific targets. He located his maintenance facilities

close to the front lines and to extend the range of his airplanes,

13
acquired jettisonable fuel tanks. Kenney also encouraged MacArthur

to rely increasingly on airlift to drop paratroops and supplies near

the front.

While the Japanese attempted to take Port Moresby from

Buna, the Allies tried to take Buna from Port Moresby, triggering

bitter fighting in the New Guinea heartland. In August 1942

Kenney's fighter aircraft struck Japanese supply lines between Buna

and the Owen Stanley escarpment. His medium bombers hit enemy

convoys in Milne Bay, helping the resourceful Australians defending

the eastern end of New Guinea. The combination of air-land combat

eventually turned the tide at Buna. What had begun as an Allied

defensive effort turned into MacArthur's first offensive.

MacArthur's air arm under Kenney, which became the Fifth

Air Force in September 1942, played an important part in the

eventual Allied conquest of Buna. By attacking Japanese convoys

between Rabaul and New Guinea, raiding enemy air bases both in

northern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, and providing

air support for Allied troops north of Port Moresby, the Fifth Air

Force gave Allied ground forces an advantage over the enemy.

Airlift also contributed significantly to MacArthur's victorious Buna

campaign. Using the ubiquitous C-47, Kenney airlifted Allied troops

from Australia to Port Moresby and from Port Moresby to the front

lines near Buna. At the end of the year, Allied air forces gained

complete control of the skies over Papua, southeastern New Guinea.

American and Australian troops finally subdued Buna and the

surrounding area at the beginning of 1943.

During the Buna campaign, Japanese forces began to construct an air base on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons--a critical point

for controlling sea lanes between the United States and Australia. The

Solomon Islands lay in the South Pacific Area, east of MacArthur's

domain. Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, serving under the "CINCPAC,"

Admiral Nimitz, commanded Allied forces in this region.

In August 1942 American Marines invaded Guadalcanal,

supported by carrier aircraft of the U.S. Navy. Meanwhile, Army Air

Forces B-17s from Australia bombed Rabaul's airfields to weaken

the enemy's defense. Other Flying Fortresses from Espiritu Santo in

the Hebrides Islands, southeast of the Solomons, flew reconnaissance missions. After the Marines established a beachhead, AAF

planes covered naval supply convoys and provided close air

support, using the former enemy air field on Guadalcanal, renamed

Henderson Field. For the next six months, American and Japanese

forces struggled for control of the island.

Admiral Ghormley proved reluctant to commit his resources

at Guadalcanal, and Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, who led U.S. Army

ground and air forces in the area, questioned Ghormley's manage14
ment of air power in the campaign. In September General Arnold

visited Admiral Nimitz at Noumea in the South Pacific, and they

agreed that Ghormley had to be relieved. Nimitz replaced him with

Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, a feisty and combative sea warrior.

Harmon, the administrator, and Halsey, the naval aviator, worked

well together despite their ties to different services.

Late in 1942 the Seventh Air Force (formerly designated the

Hawaiian Air Force) entered the fray at Guadalcanal, launching

warplanes on reconnaissance and bombing missions from the New

Hebrides Islands. Continued American control of Henderson Field

helped tip the logistical scales, because air power combined with

sea power allowed only American ships to unload cargo on the

island during daylight hours. Army Air Forces Lockheed P-38

Lightnings and Bell P-39/P-400 Airacobras from Guadalcanal joined

Marine Corps and Navy flyers to take control of the skies over the

southern Solomons and attack Japanese ships and barges ferrying

reinforcements to Guadalcanal. During the campaign, a squadron

of radar-equipped B-24 Liberators struck Japanese shipping from

low altitudes at night, proving even more effective than B-17s that

struck by day from higher altitudes.

In January 1943, the Army Air Forces activated the Thirteenth

Air Force in the South Pacific Area and Maj. Gen. Nathan Twining,

who had been General Harmon's chief of staff, became its first

commander. In February, Rear Admiral Charles P. Mason assumed

command of all aircraft on Guadalcanal in a joint organization called

Air Command, Solomons (COMAIRSOLS). Employing Army, Navy,

Marine, and New Zealand air resources, (including planes and

personnel of Twining's Thirteenth Air Force), COMAIRSOLS proved

a successful experiment in interservice cooperation and a valuable

model for subsequent joint force operations. Within weeks of its

establishment, the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. Loss of air

superiority had directly led to unacceptable sea and land losses.

American victories at both Buna in January 1943 and

Guadalcanal in early February prepared the way for subsequent

Allied offensives in the Pacific. Japan lost some of its best air groups

and much shipping in eastern New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,

and these setbacks, coming on the heels of the destruction of

Japanese carrier aviation at Midway, doomed the Tojo regime.

Nevertheless, Generals Kenney and Harmon continued to badger

General Arnold to send more and better aircraft and crews to the

Pacific despite the continued Allied emphasis on defeating Nazi

Germany first. American P-39s and P-40s had suffered in combat

with the Mitsubishi A6M-2, Type 0, the infamous Zero, but their

replacement by the more modern P-38 and P-47 Thunderbolt more

than offset the nimble Zero. Later in the war, the AAF deployed the

15
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Northrop P-61 Black Widow, a powerful, radar-equipped night

fighter that ensured Allied air supremacy even in the dark. B-24s,

which had greater range and speed than the B-17s, arrived in

increasing numbers in the South and Southwest Pacific theaters.

Not only could American aircraft factories outproduce the

Japanese, but the United States could quickly replace losses of

trained air crews, something Japan had been unable to do since

Midway. Elaborate sea and air logistical chains across the Pacific

provided the ground crews, support personnel, and equipment

needed to sustain American offensives in the theater, and American

naval and army construction crews became adept at new air base

construction on the Pacific islands. (Indeed, the entire Pacific

campaign can be interpreted as an effort to secure bases ever closer

to Japan for the projection of long-range strategic air power.) The

enemy simply could not keep up with this deluge of planes, trained

crews, supplies, or bases. By the beginning of 1943, the initiative

in the Pacific had passed to the United States.

Operation CARTWHEEL

The Encirclement of Rabaul

During the first half of 1943, Allied planners developed

Operation CARTWHEEL, an offensive in New Guinea and the Solomon

Islands that would proceed in two prongs toward a common

objective, the powerful Japanese base of Rabaul on the eastern end

of New Britain Island in the Bismarck Archipelago. Command of the

operation would be split between MacArthur in the Southwest

Pacific Area, and Halsey in the South Pacific. While MacArthur

fought his way across northeastern New Guinea and crossed to the

western end of New Britain, Halsey would seize the Solomons Island

chain from Guadalcanal to Bougainville. Kenney's airmen and their

Navy, Marine, and Allied counterparts would support the troops

ashore.

While the CARTWHEEL plans were still being worked out, and

with the help of signals intelligence, Kenney's planes found and

sank aJapanese resupply convoy, consisting of eight transports and

eight escorting destroyers, enroute to Lae during the first week of

March 1943. In what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck

Sea, Fifth Air Force B-17s, B-25s, and A-20s, protected by friendly

fighters and assisted by Australian Bristol Beaufighters and Beauforts,

sank twelve of the sixteen ships, including all eight transports. This

demonstrated the ability of land-based airplanes to interdict seaborne

18
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forces. After the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese abandoned

attempts to reinforce Lae, sealing the fate of their besieged New

Guinea garrisons.

Recognizing the threat of rising American air power in the

region, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese

Combined Fleet, launched a series of air raids on Allied air

installations in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The raids

were generally unproductive, because of effective American interceptions and counter raids on Japanese air fields. So Yamamoto

made a trip to personally offer encouragement to some of his units

in the northern Solomons area. Capitalizing on intelligence information, Guadalcanal-based P-38 pilots intercepted and shot down

Yamamoto's aircraft over Bougainville on April 18, 1943, depriving

Japan of its greatest military commander and the architect of the

Pearl Harbor attack.

Overall, Army Air Forces fighter pilots compiled impressive

numbers of aerial victories during the Pacific war, the P-38 pilots

most of all. Major Richard I. Bong shot down forty Japanese

airplanes in two years (December 1942-December 1944). In a year

and a half, Major Thomas B. McGuire, Jr. achieved thirty-eight

victories before perishing in an accident while trying to outmaneuver a Japanese fighter attacking one of his fellow pilots.

By the summer of 1943, Admiral Halsey was ready to fulfill his

part in CARIWHEEL. When American forces invaded New Georgia

Island northwest of Guadalcanal in July 1943, the Thirteenth Air

Force provided cover, close air support, and supplies. After the

capture of Munda in August, American planes used that base to

accelerate attacks on Bougainville in the northern Solomon Islands.

The Thirteenth helped the U.S. Navy neutralize Kolombangara

Island northwest of New Georgia so it could be bypassed. Finally,

in November American forces invaded Bougainville. To support the

landings, the Fifth Air Force attacked Rabaul with B-25s and P-38s.

In a whirlwind raid, they sank or damaged several Japanese ships

and destroyed thirty-one planes. Thirteenth Air Force aircraft also

supported the invasion, striking enemy shipping around the island

and Japanese airfields in the area. Along with naval aviation, they

also countered enemy air attacks and provided close air support. By

early 1944, the Thirteenth had new bases on Bougainville; Rabaul,

as a useful Japanese base, had been utterly neutralized.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur directed an offensive that

captured the Huon Gulf area of northeastern New Guinea and the

western end of New Britain. He depended in great measure on

Kenney's Fifth Air Force to capture Japanese bases at Lae and

Finschhafen in September 1943. P-38s, P-47s, A-20s, B-25s, and

B-24s flew missions to support the invaders, while transports

20
dropped 1,700 paratroops to capture Nadzab in New Guinea's

Markham-Ramu River Valley and transform it into a key American base.

Kenney's airmen also struck Wewak, Madang, and other air bases

in northern New Guinea, effectively smashing Japanese air power.

Possessing clear air superiority, in mid-December 1943 American

forces, with Fifth Air Force support, invaded western New Britain,

sealing Rabaul's southwest approaches. In March 1944 the Allies

secured bases in the Admiralty Islands northwest of New Britain.

The encirclement of Rabaul was complete. MacArthur wisely left it

to wither for the rest of the war.

One-Two Punch

The MacArthur-Nimitz Two-Pronged Offensive

At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, Allied leaders

agreed to devote more attention to the Pacific and authorized

offensives there. After CARTWHEEL, the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned

a two-pronged advance across the Pacific Ocean. Admiral Nimitz

would guide an offensive across the central Pacific from one island

chain to another, each closer to the Japanese Home Islands. He

would first strike the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, then the

Marianas, where B-29 bases would be established for the strategic

bombing of Japan. Finally, he would advance to the Palau Islands

to establish bases for the invasion of the Philippines. Meanwhile,

General MacArthur would continue westward across the northern

coast of New Guinea and its adjacent islands to Morotai. The two

offensive arms would meet at Leyte in the Philippine Islands.

Although the offensives had different routes, they had

common goals. First was the defeat of Japan through an invasion,

if needed, which would require bases closer to the Home Islands.

Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired bases close enough to the

main Japanese cities for a strategic bombing offensive which

General Arnold thought might knock Japan out of the war before an

invasion would be necessary. Other objectives included stopping

the flow of raw materials by sea from Southeast Asia and the East

Indies to the Japanese war machine and liberating key islands such

as the Philippines from enemy occupation. With careful timing,

each of the two Pacific offensive arms would synergistically help the

other.

The AAF supported both offensives, the Seventh Air Force

behind Nimitz in the central Pacific, and the Fifth and Thirteenth Air

Forces backing MacArthur in New Guinea and the Philippines. The

21
Thirteenth transferred from the South to the Southwest Pacific Area

in March 1944, because Nimitz could draw upon the bulk of carrierbased naval aviation resources. As they moved across the central

Pacific and New Guinea, both MacArthur and Nimitz chose to bypass

certain Japanese bases, isolating and neutralizing their garrisons.

Only superior land-based and sea-based air power allowed this

"island-hopping" strategy.

Straight Up the Middle

Nimitz's Central Pacific Offensive

When the Japanese attacked Midway Island during the first

week of June 1942, they also invaded Alaska's Aleutian Islands.

After air raids on Dutch Harbor, enemy forces landed on Kiska and

Attu, islands in the western end of the archipelago. Eleventh Air

Force airplanes based in the Aleutians raided the Japanese positions

and covered a U.S. Army amphibious landing on Attu in May 1943.

Having secured Attu, American forces landed on Kiska in August,

pleasantly surprised to find that the Japanese had already abandoned their positions in the face of Allied air and sea power.

Although the Aleutian Campaign did not significantly affect the

outcome of the war, it did end the Japanese threat to Alaska and

provided island bases from which American aircraft could strike the

Kurile Islands northeast of Japan, forcing the enemy to keep large

defensive forces in the north. The bulk of the Pacific action, however, happened farther to the southwest.

In November 1943 heavy bombers of the Seventh Air Force

supported U.S. Army and Marine forces invading the Gilbert Islands,

several hundred miles northeast of the Solomons. B-24s from Canton,

Funafuti, and Nukufetau bombarded Tarawa and Makin Islands before

amphibious landings there. To reduce Japanese air power, the

bombers also struck air bases in the Marshall Islands to the northwest.

By December, after bitter fighting and severe casualties, both Tarawa

and Makin were under American control, and the Seventh set up air

bases for use against Nimitz's next objective, the Marshall Islands.

Nimitz shrewdly employed air power in a consistent pattern to support

his amphibious island advances. Before the invasions, he would send

carrier- and land-based planes to smother enemy air bases near the

objective and to soften the landing area. He used carrier aviation for

close air support during the battle, but set a priority on establishing new

bases on the conquered islands for long-range aircraft. Once the new

air fields became operational, Nimitz would withdraw his carriers and

move on to new targets.

22
When American forces invaded the Marshall Islands during

January and February 1944, they selectively targeted key islands.

U.S. Marine and Army units landed on Majuro, Kwajalein, and

Eniwetok atolls, but skipped other islands, where isolated Japanese

garrisons remained. Seventh Air Force aircraft neutralized the

bypassed bases, striking from the Gilbert Islands. After the Seventh

Air Force set up heavy bomber bases on Kwajalein in March and

April 1944, B-24s raided the bypassed Japanese islands in the

Marshalls, while medium bombers continued to strike them from the

Gilberts, ensuring that their frustrated garrisons remained impotent.

Using Eniwetok, a Marshall atoll northwest of Kwajalein, as

a staging base, Seventh Air Force B-24s also bombed enemy bases

in the eastern Caroline Islands, including Truk and Ponape. Like

Rabaul, Truk atoll had been one of the most powerful enemy naval

bases in the Pacific, and although naval air attacks had forced most

of the larger Japanese warships to retire westward, dangerous

airfields remained. Seventh Air Force raids on Truk commenced in

mid-March 1944. Between April and June, the Seventh Air Force

raided Truk from Kwajalein and Eniwetok, while Thirteenth Air

Force bombers hit it from the Solomons to the southeast. When the

Thirteenth Air Force moved north to the Admiralties in June 1944,

it was in a better position to strike, while Seventh Air Force units

continued bombing the atoll from another direction. Meanwhile,

B-25 medium bombers from the Gilberts raided Ponape, a Japanese-held island east of Truk in the eastern Carolines. American

land- and sea-based air power allowed Nimitz to isolate, neutralize,

and bypass Truk and Ponape, just as it had permitted MacArthur's

similar strategy in the Southwest Pacific.

More important than either the Gilbert or the Marshall Islands

were the Marianas, to the northwest of the Marshalls. The Marianas

controlled sea lanes between Japan and the Carolines and New

Guinea. If the Navy established submarine bases in the Marianas,

it could threaten Japan's ability to reinforce New Guinea and cut off

the enemy's supplies from the East Indies. Above all, the islands of

Guam, Saipan, and Tinian offered air bases for B-29s, within range

of the Japanese Home Islands. Such bases would be essential for

the strategic bombing of Japan.

To prepare for the Marianas invas'ion, the Seventh Air Force

launched air raids from the Marshall Islands. Some of the B-24s

practiced shuttle bombing, flying from Kwajalein through Eniwetok

to bomb Guam, then landing in the Admiralty Islands to reload and

refuel, and bombing Ponape on the way back to Eniwetok.

In June 1944, American amphibious forces invaded Saipan,

while Seventh Air Force bombers escorted Navy reconnaissance

planes over Guam and Saipan to prepare the way. As soon as the

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invaders captured an enemy air base on the island (four days after

the initial landing), Army Air Forces P-47s took off from the decks

of the escort carriers that had ferried them to Saipan and landed

ashore. From the new air base the Thunderbolts supported ground

troops as they conquered the rest of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. P-61

night fighters also prevented enemy bombers from harming the

ground troops after dark.

The Marianas offensive attracted the Japanese Navy, rebuilt

after Midway, which now attempted to destroy the U.S. invasion

fleet. During the Battle of the Philippine Sea, American Navy pilots

eliminated the threat of Japanese carrier-based aviation, shooting

down at least two hundred enemy airplanes. In addition, some

Japanese planes were downed by antiaircraft fire from the ships.

Many Japanese pilots lacked training and experience, and the battle

was so one-sided that it entered the history books as the "Great

Marianas Turkey Shoot". For all practical purposes, Japanese

carrier-based aviation was destroyed for good off the Marianas.

By early August, Allied ground forces, with air support, had

secured the three most important islands in the Marianas: Guam,

Saipan, and Tinian. Many Seventh Air Force units moved to new

bases in the Marianas, from which they could raid bypassed

Japanese bases in the Carolines. They also attacked Iwo Jima and

Chichi Jima in the Volcano Islands northwest of the Marianas, half

way to Japan. Allied strategists realized that these islands lay in the

projected path of Twentieth Air Force B-29s that would soon begin

the strategic bombardment of Japan from the Marianas. Iwo Jima

and Chichi Jima could not be allowed to harbor enemy forces that

would harass the raiding B-29s and-conversely-the islands could

serve as U.S. bases for escort fighters and as emergency landing fields

for damaged or ailing bombers. In October 1944, the first B-29

Superfortress landed on Saipan, and by the end of November, about

one hundred of the big bombers were stationed on Guam, Tinian,

and Saipan. Nimitz next moved on to the Palau Islands southwest

of the Marianas. From there, his air and naval forces could strike

westward to the Philippines, where they would join MacArthur.

By Stealth from the South

MacArthur's Advance to the Philippines

After Nimitz's fast carriers attacked Truk in February 1944,

clearing the Japanese fleet from the New Guinea flank, General

MacArthur's hand was strengthened to launch his offensive into

northwestern New Guinea and the islands leading to the Philip25
pines. To prepare for MacArthur's invasion of north central New

Guinea, Kenney's Fifth Air Force launched a series of air raids on

Japanese bases at Wewak and Hollandia. Between late March and

early April, airmen claimed almost three hundred Japanese planes

destroyed on the ground. In late April, MacArthur bypassed the

remaining garrison at Wewak and invaded Hollandia. Allied

warplanes provided ground support for the amphibious landings

and struck enemy troops and supplies along the northern coast of

New Guinea. The Thirteenth Air Force attacked enemy airfields in

the western Carolines from which Japanese planes might have

challenged the invasion.

Almost as soon as ground forces established control over

former Japanese airfields, the Fifth Air Force set up its own bases

there. Hollandia became an Allied air base in May 1944. On June

15 the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces united under General

Kenney's command in a new organization called the Far East Air

Forces or "FEAF" (not to be confused with the earlier Far East Air

Force, which had become the Fifth Air Force). American warplanes

next struck islands off the northwest New Guinea coast to support

amphibious operations there. As at Nadzab earlier, AAF transports

dropped some 1,500 Allied paratroops at Noemfoor. By the end of

July, FEAF had established bases on many of the newly acquired

islands. Meanwhile, Nimitz's advance in the Marianas to the

northeast ensured the Japanese could not reinforce their desperate

forces remaining in the New Guinea area.

In September 1944 FEAF planes supported Allied amphibious forces in taking Morotai, a small, but strategically important

island north of Halmahera between New Guinea and the Philippines. Once Morotai became an American air base, Kenney's aircraft

were in good position to strike the East Indies to the west and south.

From Morotai, Sansapor, and Owi, Thirteenth Air Force warplanes

raided Japanese shipping and bases in Borneo, Celebes, and

Halmahera. Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force B-24s struck at the

enemy's oil refineries at Balikpapan, Borneo, an important source

of aviation fuel. But the most important targets were the Philippine

Islands to the northwest. MacArthur captured Morotai about the

same time that Nimitz moved into the Palau Islands. From these

bases, the two arms of the Pacific advance would meet at Leyte.

American and Allied airmen contributed significantly to

MacArthur's offensives. They seized control of the air, allowing

Allied forces freedom of maneuver. They helped isolate the

battlefields by blocking enemy reinforcements attempting to come

by land or sea. They covered the advance of ground troops,

intercepting air raids and striking the bases from which those raids

could come. They also delivered supplies and reinforcements.

26
Finally, they helped deny supplies to the enemy, weakening the

Japanese garrisons on both the target and bypassed islands.

A Promise Fulfilled

The Liberation of the Philippines

General MacArthur fulfilled his promise of 1942 by returning

to the Philippines in October 1944, landing on Leyte. Nimitz's own

central Pacific drive arrived off the Philippines at the same time; and

indeed, MacArthur's troops relied upon naval escort carriers to

provide air support for the amphibious landings, because most of

the FEAF bases were simply too far away. The Army Air Forces,

however, did play a key role. Bombers from the Fourteenth and

Twentieth Air Forces in China joined Navy planes to strike Formosa,

where powerful Japanese air bases posed a threat to the Allied

invaders. At Leyte, the Japanese introduced the Kamikaze (Divine

Wind) into the military lexicon. During Kamikaze attacks, suicide

pilots aimed their planes like guided missiles directly at American

ships. The Kamikaze strikes did not succeed in sinking many of

Nimitz's ships, but they did make even more urgent the destruction

of Japan's remaining airplanes, for these bomb-and-fuel laden

planes could inflict horrendous casualties. While the Leyte landings

were proceeding, the Japanese navy attempted to destroy the

amphibious forces by luring Halsey's fast carriers away with a decoy

fleet. Although Halsey fell for the bait, heroic action by a small group

of escort carriers and a major fleet action in Leyte Gulf frustrated

Japanese hopes.

At the end of the month, MacArthur's Leyte forces had secured

enough of a beachhead for the first Army Air Forces planes to land

in the Philippines since the dark days of 1942. By the end of

November, FEAF bombers and fighters were flying missions out of

Tacloban, Leyte. Meanwhile, the Seventh Air Force, which had been

advancing westward with Admiral Nimitz across the central Pacific,

established a bomber base on Angaur in the Palau Islands from

which to attack Luzon.

Before the end of 1944, American forces invaded Mindoro,

another Philippine island, closer to Luzon. The Far East Air Forces

transported airborne troops and supplies from Leyte to Mindoro and

covered convoys of Allied troops. In December Kenney's fighters

supported an Allied landing at Ormoc, a major enemy base on the

west coast of Leyte. C-47 transports delivered supplies to Allied

forces on the island as they advanced.

27
From the new air bases in the Philippines and the Palaus,

FEAF and Seventh Air Force warplanes began systematic attacks on

Luzon, the most important of the Philippine Islands. Luzon was the

site of the capital, Manila, and the most significant former American

military bases. It also was the most northern of the major islands

in the chain. By seizing Luzon, MacArthur could cut off theJapanese

on Mindanao and other bypassed islands in the southern Philippines. Control of the Philippines would further impede the flow of

raw materials from the Japanese-occupied East Indies and provide

a staging area for eventual invasion of the Home Islands. When

General MacArthur landed on Luzon in January 1945, he had the

support of Kenney's fighters, medium bombers, and heavy bombers, which covered his convoys to Lingayen Gulf, attacked enemy

airfields harboring Kamikaze planes, raided enemy shipping in the

South China Sea, and supplemented naval airplanes in striking

targets in the battlefield area. Before long, FEAF had new bases on

Luzon from which to support ground forces as they liberated Manila

and Clark Field. C-47 transports dropped reinforcements and

delivered gasoline to MacArthur during his Luzon offensive. They

also dropped paratroops to capture Corregidor Island in Manila Bay.

The Invasion of Borneo

Seizing Japan's Source of Raw Materials

Once MacArthur had liberated the most important parts of

Luzon, some of the Far East Air Forces resources were diverted to

support an offensive to the southwest, the Australian invasion of

Borneo. There were several reasons for the new offensive. The

Allies were determined to drive out the Japanese and restore British

and Dutch authority in the East Indies. They also wanted to stop the

flow of raw materials to the Japanese war machine, and instead,

secure them for their own use. Beginning in January 1945, the

Thirteenth Air Force emphasized destruction of enemy shipping in

the seas around Borneo. At the end of March, the Royal Australian

Air Force took over the job of blockading the waters east and south

of Borneo, leaving responsibility for the South China Sea north and

west of Borneo to FEAF. The Allies used air power to prevent the

flow of resources from Borneo to other parts of the Japanese

domain, and to block enemy reinforcements to the island.

Before the Borneo invasion, MacArthur established air bases

on Palawan Island and the Zamboangan Peninsula of Mindanao in

the southwestern Philippines, which were just across the Sulu Sea

28
Confronting the Japanese Empire

This Douglas C-47 Skytrain is

shown flying near Torkima

Strip, Bougainville, during the

Solomons campaign. As in

other war theaters, airlift of

troops and supplies was

critical to ensuring victory.

CENTER.

The long-range, twin-engine

Lockheed P-38 Lightning

proved the outstanding AAF

fighter of the Pacific war.

Aircraft of this type shot

down Admiral Isoroku

Yamamoto in April 1943, -

thanks to timely intelligence

and careful mission planning, . -

RIGHT. .. ... . _ . .. ..

Intensive Japanese flak made

low-altitude sorties

hazardous. Here a crippled

A-20 Havoc attack bomber

of the Fifth Air Force dives

into the water, narrowly

missing a squadron mate.

BOTTOM RIGHT.

A Douglas A-20 Havoc attack

bomber sits amidst the

falling snow at Ladd Field,

Alaska, during the Aleutian

campaign. . __._ __
from northeastern Borneo. To support Allied operations there,

American and Australian aircraft based at Morotai and areas of the

Philippines already under MacArthur's control flew missions against

Japanese air bases in Borneo. This was a typical case of air power

and ground forces supporting each other. As soon as MacArthur's

forces captured Palawan and the Zamboangan Peninsula, Kenney

set up air bases there to support further surface operations against

the Netherlands East Indies.

Allied forces invaded Borneo between May and July 1945 in

a series of operations called OBOE. Australian and Dutch troops

assaulted the island in three places: Tarakan in the northeast (May),

Brunei Bay and Lutong in the northwest (June), and Balikpapan in

the southeast (July). FEAF units and the Royal Australian Air Force's

1st Tactical Air Force provided air support. Flying from bases on

Morotai and the Philippines, Allied planes neutralized airfields in

Borneo and neighboring Celebes. They also covered the invasion

convoys from Morotai, bombarded the beaches just before the

amphibious landings, laid smoke screens for the invaders, and

provided direct air support during the battles. By attacking land and

sea routes in and around Borneo, Allied warplanes kept Japanese

reinforcements away from the beachheads. Australian and Dutch

troops, with American and Australian air support, successfully

captured their Borneo objectives. The next logical step was an

invasion of Java, but Allied successes in other parts of the Pacific

made the invasion of Java unnecessary.

The End in Sight

Iwo Jima and Okinawa

Before MacArthur and Nimitz were ready to invade Japan,

they needed to capture two more islands: Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

IwoJima was a small island that lay betweenJapan and the Marianas.

As a Japanese air base, it could threaten the B-29 bomber bases on

Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, and intercept the Superfortresses as they

made their way to and from Japan. But the joint Chiefs of Staff were

interested in IwoJima for other reasons than merely denying its use

to Japan. As an American air base, it could host fighters to escort

the B-29s. The island could also serve as an emergency landing field

for B-29s unable to continue their missions or damaged in combat.

Equipped with radio navigation aids, a base there could also help

the bombers navigate to and from their targets. In February 1945 two

Marine divisions invaded Iwo Jima, followed by a third division.

30
After weeks of hard fighting, supported by Seventh Air Force B-24s

from the Marianas and by off-shore naval aviation, the Marines

prevailed (at the cost of more than 20,000 American casualties) and

established a new U.S. air base on the island. P-51 Mustang fighters

used the new airfield to support infantry that took over the rest of

Iwo Jima, and soon were escorting the B-29s flying from the

Marianas. Ahead lay Okinawa.

Between April and June 1945, American forces struggled for

control of Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands, southwest of theJapanese

main islands and northeast of the Philippines. Though the invasion

began with deceptive ease, Okinawa soon degenerated into a brutal

battle, with heavy casualties on both sides, as American troops

sought to dislodge tenacious and, indeed, fanatical Japanese defenders from well-thought-out emplacements and fortifications.

MacArthur and Nimitz needed Okinawa as a base for the invasion

of Japan. They also wanted to use the island to stop shipping

between Japan and Formosa. The Army Air Forces supported

Marine and Army troops on Okinawa with planes from the Fifth,

Thirteenth, and Seventh Air Forces, some of which bombed

Kamikaze bases on Formosa and Kyushu to defend beleaguered

American ships, many of which were damaged or sunk byJapanese

suicide pilots.

After Okinawa finally fell in the summer of 1945, the Seventh

Air Force moved there from the Marianas and joined the Far East Air

Forces. From newly won bases, FEAF flew bombing and strafing

missions against Kyushu, one of the main islands of Japan, and

enemy-held areas of eastern China. Air raids against southern Japan

and against shipping between Japan and Korea prepared the way

for the anticipated Allied invasion of the Home Islands. The

Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, and China air wars were now one:

ahead lay Japan.

But before an even more costly invasion could be mounted

againstJapan, the B-29 raids from the Marianas and two atomic bombs

dropped in August 1945 ended the war. On September 2, 1945,

Japanese envoys surrendered to the Allied powers aboard the USS

Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay. Overhead flew waves of B-29s and

other aircraft-a fitting climax to the Pacific War.

31
The Legacy of Valor

Courage, Sacrifice, and the Defeat of

Japanese Militarism

Seven numbered American air forces-the Fifth, Seventh,

Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth-contributed to the ultimate Allied victory. On the Asian mainland, the

Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces assisted Allied ground forces in

defending India, driving the Japanese out of Burma, and keeping

China in the war on the Allied side. In the Southwest Pacific Area,

the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces aided MacArthur as he drove the

Japanese out of strategic portions of New Guinea, the East Indies,

and the Philippines. In the Central Pacific, the Seventh Air Force

established bases ever closer to the enemy's heartland, from the

Gilberts to the Marshalls to the Marianas, bringing Tokyo and other

important Japanese cities in range of Twentieth Air Force bombers.

The Eleventh Air Force assisted in driving the Japanese out of the

Aleutians, from which American bombers could strike the Kuriles.

Statistics reveal the magnitude of the American air effort

against Japan. According to the AAF Statistical Digest for the war,

AAF aircraft dropped more than 500,000 tons of bombs on Japanese

targets in Asia and the Pacific, and expended millions of bullets.

They destroyed more than 10,300 Japanese aircraft, while losing

4,530 of their own. The AAF flew 669,235 combat sorties against the

Japanese, and inJuly 1945 had 8,722 combat aircraft on hand in Asia

and the Pacific. These figures do not include the thousands of U.S.

Navy and Marine Corps aircraft that also participated.

By the summer of 1945, American land-based airplanes

threatened Japan from China, Okinawa, the Marianas, IwoJima, and

the Aleutians and were fully capable of bombing the enemy's cities,

ports, airfields, military facilities, and mining coastal waters. The

circle of air bases had tightened until allJapanese targets were within

range, not only of the B-29 Superfortresses, but also of B-24s,

medium bombers, and fighters. Thus, no part of the Japanese

Empire remained out of reach of Allied planes, ships, and submarines. The combination of air, land, and sea power had reduced the

Japanese perimeter to a fraction of its reach in mid-1942 and

prepared the way for the final strategic bombing offensive. The

submarine blockade of the Home Islands and the Soviets' entry into

the war helped convince the Japanese to surrender without an

invasion, but the projection of land-and sea-based air power over

vast distances and from hard-won bases made the conditions for

victory possible.

32
The Allied success required cooperation, not only among the

Allied nations, but also among their military services. The U.S. Army

and Navy cooperated with each other, and the Army Air Forces

worked with both. Joint operations achieved the victory-evicting

the Japanese from islands the Allies needed for strategic bombing

bases, liberating the Philippines, and depriving Japan of the

resources it needed to continue the war. Neither surface nor air

forces could have succeeded without the other. Protected by landor sea-based air power, soldiers and sailors secured new airfields,

and these in turn served as bases for future operations by both

services. The American military experience in Asia and the Pacific

during World War II demonstrated the importance of joint operations and the need for the services to cooperate to achieve common

goals. And with far-reaching implications for global security, the

Army Air Forces' wartime successes marked the coming of age of

American air power.

This seasoning came at a heavy price of lives lost and

shattered-the ultimate cost of defending freedom. The Pacific air

war was fought by courageous young men employing an adolescent

but rapidly-maturing form of military power. They did so under

conditions that were often appalling, and against an enemy both

skillful and brutal. There was no leeway for error or accident. They

suffered the wrenching loss of friends to enemy action and

frequently to no-less-dangerous operational circumstances. Any

account of the war would be incomplete without a salute to the

brave and resourceful airmen of the AAF and the ground-based

comrades who kept them aloft.

The End of the Road:

General Douglas MacArthur adds his signature to the Japanese surrender

document on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, September 2, 1945,

bringing the Pacific War to an end.

33
Suggested Readings

Charles R. Bond. Jr., and Terry Anderson. A tFlyinq Tigers Diarj'. College Station: Texas

A & M University Press. 198 1.

Martha Byrd. Chenmault: Giittq W'Ttgs to the Tigler. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama

Press. 198.

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. editors. TheArtny AirForces in1 W crld Mwar!

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Volume 1: Plais and Foarly Operations..Jaumay, 19.39 to Autgtust 1942.

Volume IW: The Pacific- Guadalcanal to Saipan, Augrust 1942 toJful' 1944.

Volume V: The Pacific: AMatterborn to Nagasaki..funte 1944 to Autgutst 1945.

Edward Drca. MacAtlbhur's U L TRA: Codelreakig amlc the Wlrir Against Japan. 1942-1945.

Lavwrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1991.

Daniel Ford. Flying Th•ers: Claire Chelttdalt anld the Anei-ican Volunteer Group.

Washington. D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.

Carroll V. Glints. Attack on 1*amanmoto. New York: Orion Books. 1990.

Cargill Hall. Lýbhtutin Ove'r Bouttainvill.. The }Mamamoto Mission Reconsidered. Washington. D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 1991.

Richard P. Hallion. Strike fronm the kt:)e The Ilistort of Batik field Attack. 1911-1945.

Washington. D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 1989.

George C. Kenney. Dick Bo,'. Ace of Aces. New York: Duell. Sloan and Pearce. 1960.

General Kentmey Repolts. Reprint. Washington. D.C.: Office of Air

Force History. 198'.

The S(aga ofPallppy Gt7. New York: Duell. Sloan and Pearce. 1959.

Major General S. Woodburn Kirhy. Tie l.r7Against.Japaei. London: Her Majesty's

Stationery Office. 1969.

Thomas Guy Miller. The Cactus Air Force. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Samuel Eliot Morison. The Two-Ocean 1t'm A Short llistor, of tbhe Utnited States Nary in

the Seecond WborM WU'?r. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.

William Slim. 1st Viscount. Dtfeat itto Victory. New York: I). McKay, 1961.

Robert Ross Smith. Triuntpb in the Philippit.es. Washington. DC.: Office of the Chief of

Military History. Department of the Army, 1963.

Ronald H. Spector. Eagle Agaiitst tbeSim. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

William 11. Tunner. Over the Hump. Reprint. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1985.

A. Timothy \Vamock. Air Foirce Comhat Medals. Streamem, and Canpaig us. Washington,

I).C.: Office of Air Force H istory. 1990.

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' US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993-- 3 4 1 - 8 0 4 / 8 2 0 6 5