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The Letort Papers

SOMALIA:

LINE IN THE SAND—

IDENTIFICATION OF MYM VULNERABILITIES

Eloy E. Cuevas

Madeleine Wells

September 2010

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-460-0
iii

FOREWORD

Continuing instability in Somalia has increased 

concern that terrorists who seek to establish a foothold in Africa may use such insecure places as a safe 

haven and launching pad. Several attempts have been 

made to establish lawful governments in Somalia; 

however, warlord and clan interests have managed to 

take center stage among the population. The Somalibased al-Shabaab (also known as the Mujahidin Youth 

Movement [MYM]) is a militant organization born out 

of both successive regional turmoil and international 

salafi-jihadi ideology, which continues to actively undermine the United Nations (UN)-supported African 

Union (AU) peacekeeping force, the fledging Somali 

Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all UN 

efforts to support Somalis in creating a stable state. 

Al-Shabaab’s ability to orchestrate a strategic communications campaign has resulted in support from both 

al-Qa‘ida and Usama bin Laden, as well as funding 

and personnel recruitment from pockets of Somali diaspora throughout the world. 

 While U.S. administration officials deny direct 

U.S. support for AU forces, AU leadership claims the 

contrary, suggesting direct U.S. military support has 

been crucial to fighting al-Shabaab over the past few 

years.

Any direct effort the United States undertakes 

in favor of the TFG against al-Shabaab and its associated militias must involve a whole of government 

approach focused on the areas where al-Shabaab has 

demonstrated vulnerabilities. Such interagency action 

to leverage these vulnerabilities will certainly limit 

al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical (SOT) 
iv

prowess more than military campaigns and objectives 

alone.

 The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab 

SOT vulnerabilities organized according to four 

sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the 

group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts 

or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be 

kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, 

economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on 

those diplomatic and informational options and do 

not address the military or economic implications at 

this time.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ELOY E. CUEVAS is a Strategic Intelligence officer 

in the U.S. Army and recently completed a fellowship 

at the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation. He is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While assigned to RAND, he provided support to U.S. Army and federal interagency 

research projects. Lieutenant Colonel Cuevas has a 

B.A. in history and political science from Texas A&M 

University-Kingsville, an M.A. from Webster University in human resource development, and an M.S. in 

strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College.

MADELEINE WELLS is a Research Assistant at 

the RAND Corporation, where she analyzes religious 

extremism and terrorism, focusing on the Arabian 

Gulf and Horn of Africa. She also does work on global 

health and infrastructure in Palestine and terrorism in 

Russia and Central Asia. She is currently assisting the 

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Ms. Wells 

has a B.A. in government and Near Eastern studies 

from Cornell University and an M.A. in Islamic studies from Columbia University.

SUMMARY

The influence of Islam on governance and clan 

politics has both negatively and positively affected 

the people of Somalia. It has facilitated justifying the 

removal of national, regional, and grassroots or clan 

leadership, especially if socioeconomic conditions and 

quality of life standards have been degraded or the 

leadership failed to ensure the safety of the people. 

Additionally, charismatic clan leaders have leveraged 

the low level of education among the Somali population to incite leadership changes. On a positive note, 

enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia) has been a major 

factor in helping to stabilize the lawlessness that has 

gone unchecked throughout the ungoverned parts of 

Somalia. By establishing courts and increasing the appointment of judges, Islamic leaders have attempted 

to bring normalcy to people’s daily lives, amid all 

the street-level battles, clan intra and interconnected 

struggles for leadership and influence, and the presence of foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict. 

The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as 

the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its allies have been active opponents in undermining the 

United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) 

peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional 

Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to 

support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the internet and control of the local news media has resulted 

in its ability to disseminate its story to the Somali public, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the 

greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its 

strategic communication campaign through the use of 

organic websites, publication of online magazines and 

vii
viii

newsletters, and with international press conferences 

and interviews.

If the last 2 years is an indicator of what may happen in Somalia, the United States needs to consider undertaking a more direct role in limiting the demise of 

the TFG, and extending itself to counter any advances 

that al-Shabaab may gain. However, as military leaders and policymakers have suggested, this effort to 

limit the advances of al-Shabaab must be focused and 

involve a whole of government approach. This whole 

of government approach must be focused on the areas 

where al-Shabaab has been shown to have vulnerabilities. 

The authors of this monograph identify alShabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of 

national power: diplomatic, informational, military, 

and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s 

inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then 

provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the 

group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or 

military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, 

or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic 

and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time.
1

SOMALIA:

LINE IN THE SAND—

IDENTIFICATION OF MYM VULNERABILITIES

INTRODUCTION

The disintegrating state of Somalia is located at the 

strategic crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, with 

one foot mired in clan warfare and intra-Horn of Africa’s politics, and another stretching across the Red Sea 

into an increasingly globalized salafi-jihadi and maritime struggle. The region is important to the United 

States for reasons of naval security and commerce, but 

also for the protection of troops stationed in Djibouti 

and continuing counterterror (CT) efforts in the Horn 

and Yemen. The U.S. Government, the Department of 

Defense (DoD), and the international community are 

devoting increasing resources to fighting extremism 

in the region, hoping to subdue a devastating trend of 

chaos caused by Islamic radicals. As our focus on the 

al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliated al-Shabaab group continues, 

so must our focus on developing an increasingly wise 

toolbox with which to defeat its cause. Thus, policymakers must seriously assess al-Shabaab’s strengths 

and weaknesses to allow CT efforts in the region the 

upper hand in fighting an international terrorist ideology.

The people of Somalia live in a state of decay from 

day to day, not knowing if their lives will end. For 

the last 2 years, southern and central Somalia has been 

embroiled in a conflict ostensibly based on religion. It 

is a conflict intimately tied to notions of national liberation, clan loyalties, and admittedly varying interpretations of Islam. The aggressive nature of the conflict 

has resulted in thousands of deaths, the destruction 
2

of sacred monuments, and brother-on-brother, clanon-clan battles. The battle lines have been drawn in 

the sand. On one side, there is the Somali Transitional 

Federal Government (TFG) and its African Union 

(AU) and international supporters. On the other side, 

there is the the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), 

also known as al-Shabaab, and its affiliated fighters 

and militias.1

The battle between these two groups has been 

waged on the streets of Mogadishu, in the desolate 

towns and villages of central and southern Somalia, 

and through a sophisticated media and online front.2

Al-Shabaab has gained increasing attention in the last 

year from friends and enemies within Somalia and the 

Horn of Africa, the Muslim world, and international 

counterterrorism experts. The group has been warmly 

praised by AQ and several of its regional affiliates in 

the past year, and rhetorical support from independent salafi-jihadis has demonstrated growing interest 

in the Somali theater. Indeed, the MYM’s increased 

popularity and resonance as it engages in battles on 

the ground and in the virtual world of jihadi web forums has been astonishing, especially considering the 

group’s relatively recent formation as an independent 

organization with minimal local guidance and financial support from al-Qa’ida Central (AQC).

However, careful analysis of the MYM’s strategy 

reveals multiple vulnerabilities that analysts should 

be able to counter with a strategic campaign. A synchronized effort by the United States, the AU, and 

TFG agencies may result in limiting the success that 

the MYM has enjoyed over the last several years. This 

monograph provides an assessment of vulnerabilities 

which, if aggressively attacked, could result in the reduction of the MYM’s manipulative ability.
3

BACKGROUND

Continuing instability in Somalia today has increased concern that terrorists who seek to establish 

a foothold in Africa will use insecure places as safe 

havens and launching pads. Several attempts have 

been made to establish lawful governments; however, 

warlord and clan interests have managed to take center stage among the population. Local leaders have 

been unwilling to subordinate themselves to a national-level form of government. This unwillingness and 

grassroots focus has resulted in the establishment of 

local militias, formed to protect the interests of clans 

and their leaders.

These militias have maintained order within their 

jurisdictional boundaries when threatened by external 

forces, when clan leaders wanted to enforce their decisions, or when emergencies required an organized 

force to assist in the relief effort. Following years of 

this sort of military arrangement, a group of leaders 

believed clan militias could not defend the interests 

of the Somali people; therefore, they formed an organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The 

UIC is also referred to by others as the Islamic Courts 

Union (ICU). 

The UIC/ICU’s intent was to provide a nationallevel decisionmaking organization, form a military, 

and start consolidating grassroots leadership into a 

Somali government. Unfortunately, key leaders disagreed on whether to adopt a nationalistic versus a 

hard-line Islamic focus. Those propagating the Islamic 

focus attracted the attention of the United States and 

several neighboring countries, due to their ties to AQ 

and involvement in the recruitment and training of 
4

jihadist fighters for the struggles in Iraq, Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, and other locations where caliphates 

had been declared by Islamic fundamentalists. Subsequently, in 2006, Ethiopian armed forces crossed the 

border, dissolving the UIC and returning Somalia to 

the hands of local militias. 

Ethiopian forces attempted to provide peace enforcement operations in Somalia; however, they faced 

opposition from groups which were now united in 

the determination to regain control of Somalia and establish an Islamic form of government. These groups 

would later form the basis for the establishment of the 

MYM and its allies, who will be described later in this 

paper. In 2007, the AU authorized the deployment of 

up to 8,500 troops to maintain order in Somalia and 

assist, guide, and provide security to the TFG for the 

establishment of its rule. Before we examine the vulnerabilities of the MYM, in order to provide a balanced 

assessment we will briefly examine the vulnerabilities 

of the TFG.

TFG Vulnerabilities. 

The government of Somalia has demonstrated a 

willingness to reach out to various competing groups. 

However, its new and immature leadership, in combination with competing hard-line Islamic groups, 

continues to push it to the edge of failure. Specifically, 

the TFG is vulnerable because it remains unable to 

provide the people of Somalia a secure environment 

in which to live and work, unable to win the strategic communications war, and unable to develop and 

negotiate a long-term strategic national plan which 

would result in a peaceful nation.
5

ROLE OF ISLAM AND CLANS IN SOMALIA

Some of the parties who are trying to overthrow 

the government now are increasingly using Islam as 

a mechanism to increase popular support. To fully 

appreciate the Somali situation, it is important to understand the role Islam has taken in Somalia as both a 

populist response to perceived Western encroachment 

and as a type of political order to fill the governance 

gap that has persisted for nearly 2 decades. 

First and foremost, it is important to note that Islam 

in Somalia was not always practiced with extremism. 

Mystical Sufi brotherhoods have long been prevalent 

in Somali Islam. Alongside a peaceful Islamic current, 

however, there has also been a more reactionary, extremist one. Socialism in the 1950s and 1960s diminished the role of Muslim leaders, and certain institutions traditionally controlled by religious scholars 

were transferred to secular authorities. Although the 

new government was professedly Islamic, its actions 

both disenfranchised and disenchanted some Somalis 

who followed the regional current of Islamic revivalism. The upswing in fundamentalism in the Middle 

East in the late 1970s and early 1980s also impacted Somalia, which was geographically close enough to the 

Arabian Peninsula to be influenced by certain Islamic 

fundamentalist teachings. Additionally, a xenophobic 

trend grew in tandem with an increasingly extremist 

religious trend. Distrust of outsiders and past persecution of Muslims by Westerners have long fueled antiWestern rhetoric in Somali mosques. Indeed, Western 

nations have intervened in Somalia since the British 

and Italians picked apart the country in the 19th century. Whereas mistrust of foreigners and their types of 

governance is commonplace, Islam offered and offers 
6

an alternative framework for rule and law that is perceived by some to be more indigenous and authentic.

On a political level, it is important to note that Islam has filled a gap in Somalia for a very specific reason—the ICU and other Muslim social and political 

structures have offered services and structure where 

successive attempts at central governments have 

failed since the early 1990s. In the last 10 years ‘Ulema

(Islamic scholars or religious leaders) have gained 

popular support both within the clans and among average Somalis. More recently, the possibility of a strict 

implementation of sharia (the all-encompassing legal 

order given by God and based on the Quran and the 

subsequent body of Islamic law) has become a central 

contention of Islamists seeking to gain control.3

 Finally, it is also of note that some Islamic teachings encourage the removal of leaders if they fail to provide 

for the welfare of the community. This may explain 

both the confrontation between Islamic extremists and 

successive governments as well as the continuous infighting between the clans. 

Clan Politics.

Intra- and inter-clan fighting in Somalia can be explained partially in terms of clan organizational structure and the multiple barriers inherent in the system 

which impede unity and contribute to instability in 

society. First of all, clan culture allows for the questioning of leaders at the tribal, regional, or national 

level. When leaders gain authority, they often have 

not developed means for the lowest members of the 

group to feel like valued members of the organization. Furthermore, many leaders have not instituted 

symbols to bind members and create loyalty within 
7

the clan. In addition to the absence of such symbols 

or slogans, many leaders have also not used Islamic 

teachings to create an underlying doctrine to nurture 

followers and create synergy.4

The lack of an educated and informed membership 

poses an impediment to clan unity while also facilitating the attractiveness of clan membership. Somali 

clans include a hodgepodge of youths and uneducated men and women from villages—often with no family or ethnic background in common. Whereas people 

who are tied ethnically tend to be more wary of fighting one another, the absence of blood ties means that 

intertribe conflict occurs more often. Additionally, 

lack of education plays a role in clan membership and 

instability. According to the UN Unite for Children 

website, only 22 percent of school-aged children attend school.5

 This has profoundly impacted the literacy of the total population, which is slightly less than 

38 percent.6 This lack of an educated public makes 

clan membership more desirable and attractive, since 

the only skills required are the ability to follow orders 

and carry a weapon. 

The idea of sacrificing such uneducated, low-level 

clan members appears acceptable to many senior clan 

leaders. Some charismatic clan leaders may justify 

most intertribal fighting according to a need to gain 

power, while savvy Islamic clan leaders legitimize 

their fighting as a jihad, or holy war.7

 According to 

the latter, Muslims have a duty to fight nonbelievers. 

This means that many low-level clan members are essentially expendable to the upper-level leadership. 

Finally, clan leadership turnover may be a result of 

a lack of anything akin to a military’s “Non- Commissioned Officer” (NCO) Corps. An NCO Corps represents a form of middle-management which can provide 
8

hands-on supervision to young low-level members 

who do not feel a symbiotic sense of allegiance to their 

leadership; this absence of an NCO corps allows for 

the possibility that another charismatic leader can garner support to help topple the leadership. Essentially, 

clan politics is a cycle of one leader following another 

promising to look after the members. When the leader 

fails to provide for the good of the clan, clan culture 

allows for the replacement of the leader. This cycle 

will continue to affect Somali society because leadership fragility and organizational flux is not conducive 

to attaining a long-term, negotiated peace.8

Methodology.

Methodologies for organizing information on insurgent groups are often hyperanalytical or far too 

technical, forcing intelligence or operational planners 

to disregard them as merely analytical tools rather 

than useful frameworks to inform decisionmaking. 

We endeavored to find a more basic design to optimize user-friendliness and encourage applicability in 

multiple future scenarios. Figure 1 depicts the MYM’s 

vulnerabilities, which were organized using the following four sources of national power for the purpose 

of this assessment: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).9

 Our next consideration 

was whether the vulnerability occurs at the strategic, 

operational, or tactical level (SOT) of war.10 To clarify 

our SOT analysis, we are defining “strategic” as when 

the TFG, the international community, or the MYM 

and its allies seek to enforce or influence security objectives and guidance, and develop and use national 

or international resources to achieve these objectives. 

Furthermore, we define “operational” as when cam-
9

paigns and major operations are planned, conducted, 

and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Finally, we define “tactical” as where battles and engagements are planned 

and executed to achieve objectives assigned to tactical 

units or task forces. This is where the local community 

is influenced to provide or deny support.11

Figure 1. Composite of al-Shabaab Vulnerabilities.

While intended to provide a lens into the power 

of nation-states, the DIME framework can be applied cautiously in the case of al-Shabaab, for while 

it is technically a nonstate actor, as it evolves from an 

organism to a more regimented organization, it in-
10

creasingly utilizes tools similar to those used by state 

organs, particularly in the military and informational 

domains. This is even further true as the organization 

continues to operate in a state of war against elements 

of a national government and international troops—

causing it to counter many of their national structures.

Several additional caveats are in order here. This 

methodology is not intended to suggest a typology 

applicable to all militant structures, either in the Horn 

of Africa or elsewhere. Indeed, it must be noted that 

not every organization operates in all four vectors. In 

the aftermath of September 11, 2001, several explanations of salafi-jihadi Islamist movements have been 

put forward. Arguments for organizations like AQ 

as hierarchical, networks of franchise or, conversely, 

pockets of leaderless resistance have caused significant debate.12 In reality, salafi-jihadi actors exist in all 

three types of structures; none of these theories are 

mutually exclusive, although not all elements may 

be present in each one. For instance, in a self-starting 

group with no distinct leadership, the diplomatic and 

informational vectors may be virtually irrelevant in 

individual cells. Likewise, very little is known about 

the current organization of al-Shabaab, other than its 

relative decentralization, so the methodology applied 

here analyzes the main messages and actions coming 

from the official center, which does appear to operate 

within the DIME paradigm. This methodology is useful as a mechanism for visualizing certain vulnerabilities of radical groups, regardless of the groups’ level 

of centralization and irrespective of whether their cell 

structures are top-down or bottom-up.
11

MYM Vulnerabilities.

As previously mentioned, the current MYM organization and structure is difficult to know with any certainty. Estimates of local cell composition and strength, 

along with their concrete religious disposition, vary 

across scholars and analysts, with projections ranging 

from hundreds to thousands of members. Frequent 

MYM leadership changes, and challenges in pinning 

down the identity of personnel under pseudonyms, 

further complicates any detailed analysis.

The MYM’s current leadership hails from different 

backgrounds and nationalities, complicating the task 

of ascribing a singular strategy to disparate, decentralized operating groups. Some leaders have combat 

experience in Afghanistan or other theaters, and their 

rhetoric suggests they see jihad in Somalia as part of 

a coordinated global effort. Other leaders and collaborators are more focused on providing order so that 

Somalia and its people can emerge from poverty, the 

misrule of clan warlords, and turnstile transitional 

governments. Likewise, their individual adherence 

to various hardcore salafi-jihadi ideology remains in 

question. Figure 1 is a composite of the vulnerabilities 

identified, given the limited open source information 

on the MYM. The remainder of this monograph will 

provide a description of the vulnerabilities and recommended capabilities that can be applied to limit the 

MYM .

Goals.

For the purposes of this analysis, vulnerabilities 

are measured with respect to what we identify as the 

strategic goals of the MYM based on an extensive re-
12

view of their propaganda and literature. The objectives of the MYM’s grand strategy include expelling 

Ethiopians and foreign peacekeeping forces, delegitimizing and expelling the TFG of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 

Ahmed,13 implementing a puritan form of sharia, and 

eventually establishing one contiguous Islamic emirate in Somalia. Judging by its propaganda, the group 

is keen on accepting as many fighters —local and international —as necessary to reach this goal.14 Indeed, 

estimates of foreign fighters operating in Somalia currently range from 280 to 450.15 At the same time, it 

should be noted that high-level agreement about more 

transnational aims, which largely coincide with AQC 

strategy, depends on individual leaders, and is most 

closely associated with those MYM figures who have 

direct contact with AQ.16 Given a basic understanding 

of the goals, we can now move on to the likely vulnerabilities.

Diplomatic-Strategic Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Gain national and international support, relevance and legitimacy. Both the MYM and the 

government of President Sharif have sought the support of the Somali people and neighboring countries.17

In their struggle to influence the public, the TFG has 

been endorsed and subsequently supported with financial aid and weapons by the UN, the AU, and the 

international community. This international legitimacy could limit the MYM’s ability to gain international 

support, acceptance, and ultimately relevance beyond 

the Somali terrorist context. Indeed, unless the TFG 

does something viewed as unethical or irresponsible, 

it will continue to be supported by international and 

AU governments regardless of its battle losses to the 
13

al-Shabaab, making the MYM’s attainment of its strategic goals difficult. 

Perhaps more important, Somali and external religious clerical groups have endorsed the TFG. The 

MYM has not been endorsed by recognized Somali Islamic leaders, in part because it has assassinated multiple leading clerics who disagree substantively with 

its use of violence. Even the leadership of the HizbulIslam (HI) alliance, with whom the MYM is loosely 

affiliated, only agrees on certain elements key to the 

MYM’s strategy.18

The TFG and international community must continue to seek clerical legitimacy and endorsement in 

order to gain the support of the local population, since 

the people tend to believe their religious leaders and 

often seek their guidance.19 It is difficult to determine 

how long the TFG will continue to receive aid and 

public support, especially if it shows limited results 

in its ability to provide basic services and protection 

to the public. 

Diplomatic—Operational Vulnerabilities.

MYM Strategy: Gain local provincial and clan support, relevance and legitimacy, particularly with respect 

to Islam. As stated before, multiple Somali and external religious clerical groups have endorsed the TFG. 

Such groups furnish an important form of legitimacy 

in a war increasingly waged utilizing Islamic rhetoric. 

Since January 2009, the MYM’s alliance with the more 

politically pragmatic HI has not resulted in any endorsements by other moderate Islamic organizations 

within the country. While the MYM may not be actively seeking support from such organizations, this 

support would assist in gaining endorsement from 
14

Somalis still unsure of whom to support. In addition, 

gaining popular support of moderates would increase 

MYM influence throughout Somalia and among the 

international community. 

Somali moderate Islamic organizations and civic 

groups, such as the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), the 

Organization of Somali Religious Scholars, the Hawiye Cultural and Unity Council, the National Reconciliation Committee, and several civic and professional 

organizations, have actually endorsed the TFG and 

expressed their desire for peace.20 The MYM has, in 

fact, alienated these organizations and their members 

because of its commitment to violence and unwillingness to negotiate. Moreover, these and several other 

organizations have influenced their members and 

international supporters to align themselves with the 

TFG, hoping that international pressure will force the 

MYM to the negotiating table with the TFG.

The aforementioned organizations have criticized 

the MYM for its aversion to compromise with the TFG 

and its determination to seek Taliban-style sharia. 

That such organizations seek both peace and stability is in direct contrast to the violent path the MYM 

has adopted in realization of its goals. As long as the 

MYM rejects peace and continues to attack AU and 

TFG forces, these moderate groups will continue to 

reject MYM claims for leadership of the country.21

Diplomatic-Tactical Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Promote the use of Islamic law, stability and security in order to garner further public support 

and emphasize ground campaign capability. The MYM’s 

rigorous enforcement in most areas of Taliban-style 

sharia has resulted in the loss of public support from 
15

Somali and international groups and leaders.22 While 

the MYM’s enforcement of sharia has been recognized 

and supported by AQC leadership and their affiliates, 

it has also resulted in the TFG and neighboring countries using this against the MYM in the ongoing public 

information war.23 In some cases the group’s active 

propaganda message about this has backfired. For instance, when hardcore Islamic law was instituted and 

publicized in the southern border city of Kismayo, one 

of the first areas to come under official MYM control, 

the outcome resulted in considerable chafing on the 

part of the local population. The Islamic administrations set up from Baidoa have concentrated largely on 

service provision. Indeed, the propaganda from the 

summer suggests the MYM’s pragmatism as it moved 

from exploiting harsh sharia punishments to enumerating its services in favor of Somali security.24

In one sense, the inconsistent application of sharia

across MYM-controlled locales gives insight into the 

semi-fluidity of its strategy; it is proof that the group 

has proven itself flexible depending on the reaction of 

locals. At the same time, it brings up the more important issue that the MYM’s dispersed cellular structure 

and organization has not resulted in a synchronized 

propaganda or kinetic campaign. Analysis of its attacks on TFG and AU forces has shown that attacks 

seem to be uncoordinated between MYM units in 

central and southern Somalia. In addition, MYM’s 

military attacks look to be local, with no centralized 

command and control organization nor a continued 

reinforcement of forces after capture of key cities or 

resources. In fact, the holding of key terrain or parts of 

the country seems to be temporary, with no long-term 

strategy.25
16

MEDIA STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

Before discussing the MYM’s informational vulnerabilities, it is important to gain an understanding 

of the media strategy that the MYM is employing. 

The MYM understands the criticality of spreading the 

word of its jihad in Somalia to the greater worldwide 

Islamic community. This attracts foreign fighters or 

refugees seeking to return to Somalia, gains financial 

support, and also obtains greater worldwide media 

exposure. Without it, the likelihood of victory, especially against a government supported by the AU, 

the international community, and Somali moderate 

groups, will be limited. Thus, the MYM has taken a 

three-pronged approach to its media campaign:

1. Partnering with the Global Islamic Media Front 

(GIMF) and Establishment of MYM Websites: This 

medium serves as the base for dissemination of battlefront reports, recruitment videos, videos showcasing 

AU forces being attacked, pre-suicide bomber testimonies, and postings for both AQ and MYM senior 

leadership seeking public support and giving words 

of encouragement.

2. Development of an Online Magazine: In October 

2008, MYM produced a new propaganda magazine, 

Millat Ibrahim, which was printed in Arabic, with articles focusing on a variety of topics, including battlefield tactics, influencing the people through media 

messages, religious justification to attack TFG and 

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, 

and forming relationships with other jihadist organizations. Contributors included Somali academics, religious leaders, or other well-known individuals from 

the online jihadi forum discussions.
17

3. News Conferences, Interviews, and Online 

Chat Sessions with Senior MYM Leadership: Sheikh 

Mukhtar Robow, who was the former official spokesman for the MYM, has given multiple interviews 

over Al-Jazeera and other Arab networks; however, 

other senior and mid-level MYM leaders have also 

taken advantage of the availability of news reporters 

in Somalia. Whether at press conferences or private 

interviews, since January 2009 MYM leaders have addressed the need for support in Somalia as well as the 

need to change TFG leadership by ousting President 

Shaykh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. They have also praised 

AQC leadership and supporting media infrastructure 

for their role in publicizing the struggle in Somalia. 

Figure 2 depicts media strategy and propaganda of 

the MYM.

Figure 2. Media and Propaganda Strategies.
18

It is important to note here that the MYM’s media campaign depends on the GIMF for its reach into 

the outside world because of its inability to sustain its 

websites. MYM leadership has indicated its appreciation to the GIMF for assisting its propaganda efforts, 

and has acknowledged its technological shortfalls 

against Western efforts to block MYM website information dissemination.26 The MYM announced the 

creation of a new media arm on December 20, 2009, 

in order to confront “global challenges.”27 It may be 

expected that the MYM’s media bent will become increasingly international in the coming months.

Information-Strategic Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Recruit and self-promote using information technology such as the internet and AQ-affiliated 

media conglomerates. Despite its diplomatic shortcomings, the MYM has enjoyed the support of AQC-affiliated information websites and publicity affiliates 

in the last several years. Many of these are surprisingly high-tech and visually striking, perhaps making 

the TFG’s public pronouncements look amateurish 

in comparison.28 However, over the last year, MYMhosted websites have been taken down or disrupted 

by allies of the TFG. When this occurs, the MYM has 

had to depend solely on AQC websites and their correspondents for dissemination of tactical victories, 

magazines, videos, and forum bulletin board announcements. Dependency on someone else’s website 

leaves the MYM vulnerable. Indeed, the fact that its 

last three websites have been disrupted points to its 

lack of skills in the cyber-warfare arena.29
19

Information-Operational Vulnerabilities.

MYM Strategy: Indoctrinate followers with military 

and political objectives. In addition to being dependent 

on AQC websites for disseminating their information, the top leadership of the MYM seems to have 

varying strategic communication messages. Current 

MYM Emir Abu Zubayr has long placed Somalia at 

the center of AQ’s transnational project, imbuing it 

with both strategic and theological-historical importance.30 Other leaders have been less sweeping and 

historical in their statements. Longtime spokesman, 

Sheikh Mukhtar Robow spoke several times about 

the MYM’s independence from AQ and the need to 

consider national objectives first, before expanding 

beyond Somalia’s border. HI Leader Hassan al-Turki 

has also advocated a “Somalia first” strategy.31 Robow’s messages may have led to his removal in May 

2009; however, there have been other instances where 

MYM’s top leaders have expressed differing military 

and political objectives.32 Current MYM spokesperson Ali Raghe has said Somalia must be fully liberated before contemplating international expansion.33

Indeed, given the inconsistency in statements, and the 

probable lack of consensus on what, if anything, to do 

beyond Somalia, MYM actions have taken an overwhelmingly domestic course thus far.

Information-Tactical Vulnerabilities.

MYM Strategy: Emphasize local victories to build 

morale and recruit further ideological adherents and/or 

foot soldiers. In the information operations war being 

waged on the internet, the MYM has published daily accounts of its tactical victories over the TFG and 
20

AU. These can serve as words of encouragement to 

affiliated fighters. At the same time, despite claiming 

victories and destruction of TFG and AU resources, 

there does not seem to be a long-term sustainment or 

capitulation of these areas. 34 For example, a 2009 UN/

AMISOM and MYM web release suggests that the 

MYM and the ASWJ have battled over cities in western Somalia, and MYM/HI and TFG/AMISOM forces 

have fought over neighborhoods in Mogadishu only 

to hold them temporarily, until the other counteracted 

with a larger force, or MYM forces were withdrawn 

because they were needed elsewhere within Somalia.35 These MYM daily battle accounts could have a 

negative impact on recruitment of locals, since they 

imply the group would rather be violent than go to the 

peace table. Therefore, the MYM may unintentionally 

be labeled as uncooperative and always seeking military conflict. In addition, moderate and even hard-line 

Islamists may tire of this publicity with no tangible 

results or strategic outcomes.36

Military-Strategic Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Aggregate and recruit followers around 

certain military personalities. The MYM has showcased 

a number of leaders, each giving interviews, directing 

forces in the field, and developing their own followers. Yet, AQC propaganda and open source reporting 

suggests that these independent leaders may have 

their own agendas. The fact that AQC leadership has 

not formerly acknowledged anyone within the MYM 

as its military leader indicates that there is no single 

individual leading the MYM.37 This, in turn, points to 

the lack of a grand strategy and operational concept.38

While Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr is allegedly the 
21

emir of the MYM, no public or published announcements indicate that he provides strategic guidance or 

political, military, or informational objectives to other 

MYM senior leaders. In fact, in a military perspective, 

he does not hold other MYM senior leaders accountable in the sense of a true chain of command.

Military-Operational Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Utilize fighters from anywhere as foot

soldiers in the MYM cause. The MYM dependency on 

foreign fighters may delegitimize its argument that Somalis support its struggle against the TFG. Reporting 

suggests that within the MYM military structure, both 

leaders and foot soldiers originate from Middle Eastern (i.e., Arabic-speaking countries,) as well as, from 

English-speaking nations. Recently, in a recruitment 

video, an American named Abu Mansur Al-Amriki 

was featured leading a MYM unit. In addition, antiterrorist law enforcement officials have apprehended 

Somali diaspora attempting to migrate back to Somalia. When asked, they claimed that they were answering a call to join the jihad in Somalia.

Finally, AQC leadership, including senior military leader Abu Yahya Al-Libi, has called on Muslims 

worldwide to join the MYM in its struggle.39 This dependency on foreign fighters may indicate local Somali youth are either rejecting or refusing to join the 

MYM’s fight against the TFG.40 Indeed, experts suggest the MYM is increasingly seen as a tool of foreign 

extremists wreaking havoc (for example, the non-Somali tactic of suicide bombing) locally at the expense 

of already downtrodden residents.41

Finally, the continuing struggle between the MYM 

and the TFG has resulted in the deaths of MYM key 
22

leaders and catalyzed the creation of rifts among MYM 

and HI senior leaders. For example, the deaths of key 

leaders Saleh Ali Nabhan and Aden Hashi Ayro42 and 

the removal or diminishing of authority of former alShabaab spokesperson Abu Mansur and HI figures 

Dr. Umar Iman Abubakar and Hassan Al-Turki may 

reveal disagreements on where both the MYM or the 

HI should be heading. While there is little insitutional 

centralization, dependency on a core of leaders with 

military operational experience has left the MYM vulnerable to losing momentum. Without an effective 

training and replacement system, this makes it vulnerable to losing military engagements, as well as the 

information war with the TFG. Over the last 2 years, 

the MYM has lost leadership at the regional and operational levels. Since the MYM does not have a formal 

military advancement system, in-fighting between 

field commanders may occur as key leaders are killed. 

Admittedly, the group’s success often has more to do 

with the local milieu than with charismatic leadership. 

The movement is not personality-driven, and it is important to admit that leaders’ deaths provide propaganda material to the more ideological members, as 

well as to al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.43

Military–Tactical Vulnerabilities.

MYM Strategy: Wage a multi-front war against Ethiopians, remaining present African forces, the TFG, and 

Westerners in general. The MYM continues to fight a 

multifront, multienemy, and multilevel war. Sustaining it may be difficult, especially if the TFG receives 

additional resources from the United States, the UN, 

and the AU. The MYM has a host of enemies, includ-
23

ing the TFG, the AU, moderate Islamic organizations, 

and neighboring countries whose forces are growing 

rapidly. In addition, AU and UN policymakers will 

be providing the TFG with an information operations 

capability in addition to advisors on nation-building. 

With the increase in external resources and committed TFG leadership, the MYM’s ability to recruit and 

resource its struggle will be limited. In the last few 

months, U.S. administration and AU leaders have 

committed themselves to helping the TFG defeat 

the MYM. The MYM’s continued rejection of peace, 

coupled with an impatience by Somalia moderate and 

civic organizations, will undoubtedly result in the 

MYM’s loss of influence to an ever-growing TFG and 

its allies.44

Economic-Strategic Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Gain funding from international and 

local allies. While several high-profile members seem 

to be indoctrinated and have fought jihad in other theaters, economic incentives are rumored to be a major 

factor in MYM recruitment and sustainment of foot 

solders.45 Money is also important for providing local stability and buying new weapons. Given a local 

economy in ruins, MYM’s dependency on the overseas Somali diaspora makes it vulnerable to shortfalls 

in funding if this support were cut off at the source. 

Somali diaspora living in Western countries have provided funding to MYM, which, in turn, has been used 

to pay for weapons, salaries, and other resources.46

Western intelligence agencies and anti-terrorist organizations’ identification and neutralization of this 

support system could result in the MYM shifting dependency to the Somali population and political sup-
24

porters—such as Eritrea and other AQ affiliates.47 As 

noted earlier, the Somali population’s inclination for 

peace has largely alienated the MYM from this source 

of income.

Economic-Operational Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Get funding for MYM operations. One 

of the biggest vulnerabilities the MYM contends with 

is competition for resources with other Islamic organizations. The creation of the HI in January 2009 has 

had both positive and negative effects on the MYM. 

While elements of the HI can be counted on to provide 

manpower or reinforcements on a tactical level, the 

HI also competes with the MYM on a funding level. 

HI and MYM financial leaders both appeal to the local Somali public, but also to the Somali diaspora in 

Western countries. Perhaps even more difficult for 

the MYM, is the fact that the HI is composed of four 

organizations merged into one.48 Combined, their resources are likely to be sent to a larger organization 

with proven and established leadership. Finally, HI 

and MYM leaders support one another only as long 

as it serves the interests of their organizations, which 

clearly differ on long-term strategies. In a land where 

brothers fight each other, alliances are temporary and 

turning to the other side is not uncommon. Both TFG 

incentives and offers for influential positions may 

tempt HI leadership to side with President Sharif and 

his government.49

Economic-Tactical Vulnerabilities. 

MYM Strategy: Consolidate resources and support by 

clans affiliated with the MYM. The MYM’s base of sup-
25

port permeates from clans that provide both leaders 

and foot soldiers. Clans in Somali have for the most 

part attempted to remain neutral in the struggle for 

Somalia, switching sides, as either the MYM or the 

TFG/AU/ASWJ capture or recapture villages and 

towns. Clan elders and civic organizations continue to 

be interested in which group will bring basic services 

and peace to their people, not one which will enforce 

a particular form of sharia.50 The MYM’s continued 

violent attacks and persistence on the Taliban-style of 

sharia has alienated clans, forcing others to join the 

TFG or ASWJ.51 In the long run, MYM rule by fear has 

clan leaders willing to compromise and accept MYM 

regional civil administrations; however, acceptance of 

the MYM is balanced between surviving today and 

enduring for tomorrow. 

DEFEAT MECHANISMS

Now that we have explained the MYM vulnerabilities and media strategy, we will provide recommendations on what efforts or capabilities may be 

leveraged in defeating or deterring the MYM and its 

erstwhile allies. We emphasize here that the instruments for defeating the MYM or limiting its influence 

do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can 

be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The following 

paragraphs provide examples of what instruments of 

national power/capabilities or organizations can support, defeat, or deter the MYM’s campaign. This manuscript will only provide examples of the diplomatic 

and informational aspects of the DIME vulnerabilities.
26

Diplomatic/Strategic.

• International community supports the TFG:

— Efforts should be made by U.S. and UN strategic communication planners to highlight 

in Somalia that the TFG has gained the support of Islamic scholars, UN organizations, 

and other pan-Islamic and African organizations. This can be done by media, radio 

broadcasts, the internet, and grass-rootslevel newspapers and pamphlets throughout Somalia.

Diplomatic/Operational.

• Moderate islamist groups support the TFG:

— Efforts should be made to provide material support to moderate Islamist groups 

and local clan leaders to counter economic, 

military, and informational advantages the 

MYM has gained within its areas of influence. These moderate groups need to be 

vetted by UN or regional organizations to 

ensure there is no corruption and fair distribution of material or funds. 

Diplomatic/Tactical.

• Dispersed cellular organizational leaders:

— Efforts should be made to negotiate with 

MYM leaders who seem to have disagreements with mainstream MYM leaders. Gestures of formal power, positions within the 

TFG parliament, humanitarian aid, or as-
27

sistance with the establishment of economic 

aid for their population may encourage these 

leaders to break away from hard-line MYM 

leaders.

Informational/Operational.

• Rifts in MYM leadership:

— Efforts should be made to publicize and 

highlight the rifts that are materializing in 

MYM leadership. Third parties should introduce peace options to senior leadership 

within the MYM who appear tired of conflict 

and may seek compromise.

Informational/Tactical.

• Disregard/disrespect of Somali religious clerics/daily battle reports with no long-term effects:

— Efforts should be made to consolidate and 

publicize the sermons, announcements, and 

public interviews of leading Somali ‘ulema

who have supported the TFG. In addition, 

TFG and senior clerics need to denounce 

and issue fatwas against MYM leaders who 

assassinate clerical leaders. Holding meetings and conferences with religious leaders in Somalia or Yemen to develop peace 

strategies, and broadcasting outcomes and 

findings in support of peace, would limit or 

delegitimize the MYM’s violent campaign.
28

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review provides insight into what role the U.S. military will play in Africa.52 Echoing similar strategic objectives, General 

William Ward’s testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on March 9, 2010, acknowledged 

AFRICOM’s partnership with the AMISOM countries.53 Recognizing the limited extent of U.S. support 

to Somalia—that of supporting AMISOM forces preparing for their deployment into Somalia—raises the 

question, “Is supporting AMISOM forces enough to 

prevent the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa?”

From a regional viewpoint, Somalia has been 

in the middle of U.S. efforts to counter the growing 

threat in Africa. AQ views Somalia as a stepping stone 

for submerging the rest of Africa into an Islamic caliphate. For nearly 20 years, Somalia’s economically 

depressed population has been caught in the center 

of inter- and intraclan battles, rotating Somali governments, and the worst humanitarian disaster to hit an 

African country in years. These conditions have made 

the country attractive to Islamic fundamentalist determined on making Somalia a safe haven for AQ—a 

haven where jihadists can hone their tactical skills and 

return to other areas within the Middle East where 

they can engage against the United States and its allies. Some analysts have even suggested that Somalia 

is becoming an unofficial al-Qa’ida exchange program. 

Contrary to U.S. official public statements, Somali military leaders have publicly stated that the 

U.S. military is providing support in identifying and 

neutralizing MYM and AQ leadership.54 Regardless 

of the extent of U.S. military involvement there, what 
29

the United States does in Somalia will have ramifications throughout the Horn of Africa, the greater 

African continent, and perhaps worldwide. Relying 

on AMISOM forces to assist the Somali government, 

while a positive gesture, has done little to degrade 

MYM capabilities and influence. Waiting too long and 

entrusting AMISOM forces to prevent expansion of 

the MYM and AQ will unnecessarily be putting neighboring countries and the world at risk.55 Strategically 

gambling on AMISOM to improve Somali government capabilities has yet to pay off. In March 2010, 

the UN pointed to the lack of progress and increased 

influence of the jihadists. Maybe a more aggressive 

strategy is needed to safeguard the region and world 

against this growing threat.

CONCLUSION

The existence of the MYM depends on many factors, including its ability to recruit soldiers, provide 

weapons of war to these soldiers, obtain support either abroad or at home, and continue to appeal to the 

Somali population. Its battles have been brilliantly executed, with hundreds of AU and TFG forces losing 

their lives or withdrawing from Somalia. That said, 

the MYM does have vulnerabilities, and this monograph provided an explanation of the SOT vulnerabilities, organized along the DIME model. In addition, 

this monograph provided examples of what actions 

the TFG or its allies could take in the diplomatic and 

informational areas, which are perhaps two of the easiest areas to implement immediately, given conditions 

on the ground. Not addressed in this monograph, due 

to time and length constraints, were the military and 
30

economic aspects of the vulnerabilities. A coalition of 

UN, AU, TFG, and U.S. operational planners can further refine these vulnerabilities and apply operational 

capabilities, which could result in the limitation of 

MYM influence in Somalia and abroad.

ENDNOTES

1. This is the shortened form for Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin or Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM). “Somalia: No Peace 

without Islam Video,” MYM Media Section, translation in Open 

Source Center (OSC) AFP2008123041008, December 28, 2008; 

“Situation Report: Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab,” Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, June 3, 2009. The 

U.S. Government included the MYM in its list of Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations in 2008.

2. “OSC Media Aid: Main Insurgent Groups Adeptly Use Media,” OSC Media Aid in English, AFF20090818049001, August 18, 

2009; “Islamists Pledge to Continue Fighting Foreign Troops in 

Somalia,” translation in OSC AFP20090409950055, April 8, 2009; 

“Al-Shabab Calls For Renewed Fighting Against Somali Government, AU Troops,” translation in OSC AFP20090412950031, Universal TV, in Somali, 1900 GMT, April 11, 2009.

3. David Zeidan, “The Islamic Fundamentalist View Of Life 

As a Perennial Battle,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 

December 26, 2001.

4. Interview by the author with Thomas Dowling, former Department of State Middle East Foreign Service Officer, October 4, 

2003. 

5. United Nations Unite For The Children, UNICEF-Somalia, 

January 18, 2010, available from www.unicef.org/infobycountry/

somalia_statistics.html#56.

6. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook—

Somalia, December 20, 2009, available from www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. This number is dis-
31

puted, with the Somali Information Resource giving a 24 percent 

literacy rate.

7. Abdulkadir M. Nur (Eno), Address to the meeting on Somalia’s Finance and Economic Issue, March 28-29, 2008, available from 

www.hiiraan.com/op2/2008/apr/the_somali_youth_%E2%80%93_

somalia_s_lost_generation.asp; United Nation Security Council 

(UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, 

July 20, 2009, p. 15.

8. Analysis by the author, result of a class lecture given by 

Thomas Dowling, October 4, 2003.

9. See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 13, 1995; and JP 2-0, Joint 

Intelligence, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 9, 2000, 

for further explanation of the DIME concept. 

10. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, October 27, 2009, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

11. Ibid.

12. See Olivier Roy, “Netzwek des Terrors - Markenzeichen 

al-Qa’ida”(Terror Network—al Qa’ida Trademark), Le Monde Diplomatique (German edition), September 10, 2004; Peter Bergen, 

Chapter 10, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London, UK: Phoenix, 2001; and Jessica Stern, “The Protean 

Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.

13. It is noteworthy that Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was a 

moderate leader in the interface control unit (ICU), which furnished part of the opposition to the previous TFG.

14. See Associated Press/LA Times, “Foreign Fighters Aid 

Militants In Somalia,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2009, available 

from articles.latimes.com/2009/may/16/world/fg-somalia16; Matthew 

Clark, “Pakistani Muslim Missionaries Killed in Somalia Mosque: 

Why?” Christian Science Monitor, Global News Blog, August 12, 

2009, available from features.csmonitor.com/globalnews/2009/08/12/

pakistani-muslim-missionaries-killed-in-somalia-mosque-why/.
32

15. In May, the UN Envoy to Somalia estimated 280-300 foreign fighters in Somalia. As of August, the Agence France-Presse

estimates 450.

16. One former recruit noted that the MYM aimed to secure 

an ungoverned place for AQ to serve as an operating outpost and 

provide a safe haven to senior AQ operatives facing difficulties 

elsewhere. “Somalia: Former Al-Shabaab Recruit Says al-Qa’ida 

Wants Somalia as ‘Safe Haven,’” Shayciye.com, OSC translation in 

AFP20090528327001.

17. “Somalia: Islamist Says They Will Support Government If Shari’ah Is Implemented,” translation in OSC 

AFP20090404950006, Universal TV, in Somali, 1900 GMT, April 3, 

2009; “UN Security Council’s Monthly Report, on Somalia April 

2009,” AFP20090403577004, New York, UN Security Council Report, in English, April 3, 2009; “New Somali Leader Takes Oath, 

Vows To Form Broad-Based Government,” translation in OSC 

AFP20090131507001, Doha, Al Jazeera Net WWW-Text, in English, January 23, 2009; “Al-Qaradawi Congratulates HAMAS on 

Gaza ‘Victory,’ Sharif on Somali Presidency,” in translation OSC 

GMP20090201666005, Doha, Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television,

in Arabic, 1905 GMT, February 01, 2009.

18. HI originally was called the Somali Mujahidin (SM) in a 

press release issued on January 3, 2009. This press release was 

issued by the Somalimirror.com website in a statement called “Somalia: Mujihidin Factions Issue Joint Statement.” In the statement, the Somali Islamic Front (SIF), the Raskamboni Fighters, 

the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)—Asmara Faction, and the AlFurgaan Fighters declare the creation of SM, later to be called HI. 

For more information on the original purpose of the HI, see Open 

Source Center Report, AFP20090105327001, Somalimirror.com, in 

Somali, January 3, 2009.

19. “Somalia: Moderate Islamic Group Welcomes Election of 

New President,” translation in AFP20090131301001, Angered, Somaliweyn WWW-Text, in Somali, January 31, 2009; “Somalia: Islamic group urges rival sects to stop fighting,” in translation OSC

AFP20090122950097, Mogadishu, On Sub-Saharan Africa, in Somali, January 22, 2009; “Somalia Clan Elders Urge Fighting 
33

Groups to Heed Religious Leaders’ Calls,” in translation OSC 

AFP20090226950028, Mogadishu, Shabeelle Media Network (Internet Version-WWW), in Somali, February 26, 2009.

20. “Clan Elders in Somali Capital Denounce Attacks on African Union Mission,” in translation OSC EUP20090122950002, Toronto, Waagacusub.com, in Somali, January 21, 2009; “Somali Opposition Official Calls for Cessation of Violence,” in translation 

OSC AFP20090104950051, Mogadishu, Shabeelle Media Network 

(Internet Version-WWW), in Somali, January 04, 2009; “Ethiopia: 

Communication minister pledges to support Somalia,” in translation OSC AFP20090131950052, Addis Ababa, Walta Information 

Centre (Internet Version-WWW), in English, January 31, 2009; “Somali Minister Says Those Behind Mogadishu Fighting to be Held 

Responsible,” in translation OSC AFP20090226950046, Gaalkacyo, Radio Gaalkacyo, in Somali, 1015 GMT, February 26, 2009. 

21. “Al-Shabab Calls for Renewed Fighting Against Somali 

Government, AU Troops,” in translation OSC AFP20090412950031, 

Universal TV, in Somali, 1900 GMT, April 11, 2009; “Somali 

Clerics Council Chairman Denounces Attacks on Government, 

AMISOM,” in translation AFP20090410327001, Somalimirror, Somali, April 10, 2009; “Forum Member Accuses Somali President 

of Combating Islam, Deceiving Muslims,” in translation OSC 

GMP20090407241001, Jihadist Websites — OSC Summary in Arabic, April 03, 2009.

22. In an interview with the New York Times, Somali President 

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed stated that elements of Hizbul Islam 

and Al-Shabaab had already joined the government; “A Talk with 

Somalia’s President,” The New York Times, September 17, 2009; In 

addition, early after the establishment of the Sharif administration, religious clerics declared support for the TFG. See Alishu 

Ryu, “Sufi Clerics in Somalia Support Unity Government,“ News 

VOA.Com, February 18, 2009; United Nations Security Council, 

“Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,” 

July 20, 2009; “Somalia: Moderate Islamic Group Welcomes Election of New President,” in OSC Translation AFP20090131301001, 

Angered, Somaliweyn WWW-Text, in Somali, January 31, 2009; 

“Somalia: Hawiye Clan Spokesman Says Public Won’t Tolerate 

Islamist Attacks,” in OSC Translation AFP20090119301002, Angered, Somaliweyn WWW-Text, in Somali, January 18, 2009; Soma-
34

lia: “Clan Elders Warn Al-Shabab against Fighting AU troops in 

Capital,” in OSC Translation AFP20090117950071, Mogadishu, 

Shabeelle Media Network (Internet Version-WWW), in Somali, January 17, 2009; “Somalia: Muslim Scholar Blames Insurgents for 

Mogadishu Fighting,” in OSC Translation AFP20090226301003, 

Gololey Online News, in Somali, February 26, 2009; “Somalia Clan 

Elders Urge Fighting Groups to Heed Religious Leaders’ Calls,” 

in OSC Translation AFP20090226950028, Mogadishu, Shabeelle 

Media Network (Internet Version-WWW), in Somali, February 26, 

2009; “Somali President Seeks Tribal, Arab Support To Establish 

Security, End Chaos,” in OSC Translation GMP20090224825002, 

London, Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online, in Arabic, February 24, 2009.

23. “Analysis: Terrorism — Al-Qa’ida’s Online Supporters 

Regularly Use YouTube,” in translation OSC FEA20090406842722, 

OSC Feature, International OSC Analysis, April 06, 2009.

24. For instance, the MYM confiscated expired flour and 

pasta from the al-Bakkara Market in Mogadishu in June and released a statement resolving to close all warehouses with damaged food. The statement says, “Just as shari’a, which we strive 

to apply, called for self-preservation, the movement’s leadership 

has given great importance to the social order and taking care of 

public places, in addition to protecting the Muslim land and public buildings.” See “Mujahidin Youth Movement Confiscates Expired Food From Al-Bakkarah Market June 29,” Jihadist Websites, 

OSC Summary in AFP20090702302002, June 29, 2009.

25. Over the last 2 years, the MYM, TFG, and ASWJ have each 

captured cities in both southern and central Somalia only to abandon them when a counterattack would occur. For example, in 

Mogadishu neighborhoods have changed hands frequently over 

the last few months. This leads us to believe that the strategy is 

more opportunistic than long term or structured.

26. See “Media Aid: Somalia—Update to Profile of alShabaab’s Official Website,” OSC AFF2009022604800, February 

26, 2009. 

27. SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Creates New Media 

Arm,” December 21, 2009. 
35

28. Ibid., OSC Media Aid in English, AFF20090818049001, 

August 18, 2009; “Somalia: Website Posts ‘Public Alert Notice’ Warning Against Fake Jihadist Sites,” in translation OSC 

AFP20090410302002, Jihadist Websites — OSC Summary, in Somali, 

April 09, 2009.

29. “Somalia: New Jihadist Website for Mujahidin Youth 

Movement Announced,” in translation OSC AFP20090408327001, 

Jihadist Websites — OSC Summary, in Somali, April 07, 2009.

30. Abu Zubayr once described Somalia the Horn of Africa 

as “the land of the two emigrations and the country’s southern 

belt of defense from the al-Mustafa Peninsula [The Arabian Peninsula] . . . seen as the battlefield of the current crusade.” This 

lofty theological description of the Horn of Africa likely refers to 

the 614 AD migration (hijjra) of Muslims from Mecca to Ethiopia 

to flee persecution. Notably, in the article in which Abu Zubayr 

is quoted, Assad al-Jihad agrees that Somalia is a strategic choke 

point by which to defend the Arabian Peninsula. He notes at the 

end that he does not believe that a merger between AQ and MYM 

is likely. Quoted in Assad al-Jihad2, “Istratijiya Tanzim al-Qa’ida 

f1 11/9/2008 wa-bida’ Mukhatita al-Azim,” “Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy on 11/9/2008 and the Beginning of Its Great Plan,” Al-Jazira, 

posted on September 12, 2009, available from www.aljazeeratalk.

net/forum/archive/index.php/t-153528.html.

31. In a February interview, Abu Mansur slightly clarified his 

position on maintaining links with al-Qa’ida central, comparing 

it to 

that between a Muslim and his Muslim brethren. . . . 

Sometimes, it gives us useful pieces of advice through 

the Internet and sends us e-mail messages which please 

us a lot, the latest being the videotape our brother abu 

Yahya al-Libi has sent us. . . . We have no closer relationships with it because it is not from us and we 

are not from it, but it is from us and we are from it as 

Muslims and mujahidin having the same enemy. We 

both fight the Americans and other unbelievers, [and] 

want to apply the Islamic Law on the ground.
36

Abu Mansur has said that he would not move beyond Somalia before both expelling the TFG and implementing sharia. See, 

OSC, “Somali Mujahidin Youth Movement Spokesman on Government, AU Forces, Other Issues,” Al-Jazirah, translation in OSC 

GMP20090224643001, February 24, 2009.

32. “Somali Mujahidin Youth Movement Spokesman on 

Government, AU Forces, Other Issues,” in translation OSC 

GMP20090224643001, Doha, Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, in Arabic, 1430 GMT, February 24, 2009; “Somalia: Hardline Islamist Group Official Accused of Being Clan Oriented,” in 

translation OSC EUP20090408950001, Toronto, Waagacusub.com,

in Somali, April 07, 2009; “Somalia: Dissenting Islamist Pledges 

To Defend Government if Shari’ah Applied,” in translation OSC 

AFP20090406410002, Somalia Today, in Arabic, April 05, 2009; 

“‘Bitter Rift’ Emerges within Hardline Somali Islamist Group AlShabaab,” in translation AFP20090129950046, Internet, Midnimo 

(Internet Version-WWW), in Somali, January 29, 2009.

33. In a recent interview, MYM Spokesperson Ali Raghe concentrated on local objectives before international ones. At the 

same time, most of the Islamic administration in Kismayo (500 km 

south of Mogadishu) has expressed interest in attacking Ethiopia and Kenya. See “BBC Radio Interviews Al-Shabaab’s Spokesman on Current Developments in Somalia,” BBC World Service, 

translation from Somali in OSC AFP2009062532001, June 23, 2009; 

Author unknown, “Somalia: Islamic administration in Kismayu 

town says they will attack Ethiopia and Kenya,” Shabelle, worldanalysis.net, June 30, 2009, available from worldanalysis.net/modules/

news/article.php?storyid=830.

34. United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary 

General on the Situation in Somalia, July 20, 2009, (hereafter 

UNSC Report, July 20, 2009). 

35. See Professor Michael A. Weinstein, “The Status of Conflict in the Southern and Central Regions of Somalia”; and Anonymous, “A Diagnosis of Somalia’s Failing Transitional Government,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Iss. 7, July 2009.

36. “Somalia: Islamist Groups Hold Anti-Government 

Sermons in Mogadishu,” in translation AFP20090403301002, 
37

Markacadey.net, in Somali, April 03, 2009; Ibid, See UNSC Report 

on Somalia, April 2009, OSC AFP20090403577004.

37. The sum total of communiqués in the past year suggests 

that the group also has units for missiles, artillery, explosives, 

martyrs, and security, in addition to an intelligence body and media wing. However, the fact that they have not formally recognized one lead military commander can be contrasted with the 

way they organize in other sectors. For instance, the group does 

have an official emir, spokesperson, and local leaders of Islamic 

courts. Abu Mansur al-Amriki, an American showcased in three 

videos over the last 2 years appears to operate as one commander, 

particularly of foreign fighters, but has not been definitively introduced as the military commander at large.

38. This is based on an analysis of OSC products, 

FEA20090319833838, FMP 200902234416014, and GMP200902

24643001. In addition, senior MYM leaders have indicated that the 

MYM is not subordinate to AQ, but rather is in ideological agreement with its jihad. New spokesman Ali Raghe has emphasized a 

common enemy in the West rather than an institutional kinship. 

Consistent with current MYM spokesman Ali Raghe’s comments 

on the issue, AQ in Afghanistan leader Mustafa al-Yazid noted in 

a June interview that, 

Al-Shabab al-Mujahidin Movement are our brothers 

and loved ones. We recognize one another, and we 

support one another. We proceed on one path and 

have one ideology, God be praised. You are aware that 

we have played a role in jihad in Somalia and some of 

our brothers participated in this jihad. . . . [O]ur relationship with them is a relationship of allegiance, support, and love. Even though there was no merger on 

the organizational level, the allegiance in faith and the 

ideological allegiance is superior to the organizational 

allegiance. We support and back them, and we back, 

support, and love all the sincere mujahidin in Somalia.

See OSC, “Al-Qa’ida Official Views Activity in Muslim 

World, Events in Pakistan, Others,” Al-Jazirah, OSC translation in 

GMP20090621648003, June 21, 2009; “Somalia: Afghan Al-Qa’ida 
38

Leader Speaks to Al-Jazirah About Links With Al-Shabaab,” OSC 

translation in AFP20090622327002, Shaaciye.net, June 22, 2009.

39. Abu Yahya al-Libi has released three videos on Somalia 

in the past year. The most recent, “Somalia... The Cloud of Summer Dissipated,” was released on July 30, 2009. The previous two 

Al-Libi productions on Somalia were: “Somalia...Victory Comes 

With Patience,” Al-Sahab Media Production Organization, February 13, 2009; and “No Peace Without Islam,” Al-Sahab Media Production Organization, December 28, 2008. Osama bin Laden also 

released “Fight On, Champions of Somalia,” on March 19, 2009.

40. Ibid; OSC FEA20090319833838, FMP 200902234416014, and 

GMP20090224643001; Elliott, Andrea, ”A Call to Jihad, Answered 

in America,” New York Times, July 12, 2009, National Section, pp. 

1, 14-15.

41. Ken Menkhaus, “Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab 

Recruitment in America,” Congressional Testimony, Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 11, 2009; Andrea Elliot, “A Call to Jihad, 

Answered in America,” New York Times, July 11, 2009, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html. 

42. “Key events in recent history of Somalia,” Associated Press, 

September 17, 2009. 

43. Therefore, external kinetic operations against MYM leadership may further endear the public to their leaders and ideology 

of martyrdom, rather than effectively stymieing the strength of 

the movement. In this sense, targeting should prioritize operatives not of Somali origin who may be seen as more peripheral to 

the movement.

44. “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,” United Nations Security Council, July 20, 2009; Janine 

Zacharia, “Clinton Urges Eritrea to Stop Backing Somali Militia,” 

Bloomberg.com, August 6, 2009, available from www.bloomberg.com/

apps/news?pid=2067001.

45. “Somalia: Former Al-Shabaab Recruit Says al-Qa’ida 

Wants Somalia as ‘Safe Haven,’” Shayciye.com, OSC translation in 
39

AFP20090528327001. Other fighters may be expressing revenge 

on behalf of clan loyalties, or intend to fight against their age-old 

enemy, the Ethiopians, and those seen as their successors. However, we believe that the economic incentive should be studied 

further.

46. Paula Christina Roque, “Somalia: Understanding AlShabaab,” Institute for Security Studies Situation Report, June 3, 

2009; UNSC Report, July 20, 2009. 

47. Roque.

48. Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State, “Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable 

U.S. Strategy Toward Somalia,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, May 20, 2009. 

49. “Somalia: Mujahidin Factions Issue Joint Statement,” in 

translation OSC AFP20090105327001, Somalimirror.com, in Somali, 

January 03, 2009; “Insurgent group vows to continue fighting new 

Somali government,“ in translation OSC AFP20090207950062, 

Mogadishu, Shabeelle Media Network, in Somali, February 7, 2009; 

“Somalia: Newly Formed Islamic Party Vows To Fight on Until 

Sharia Rules,” in translation OSC AFP20090207301001, Kaambooni,

in Somali, February 07, 2009; “Somalia: President Shaykh Sharif 

Reportedly Meets With Militant Islamist Leaders,” in translation 

OSC AFP20090209301003, Angered, Somaliweyn WWW-Text, in 

Somali, February 9, 2009.

50. “Religious Leaders Reiterate Call for Support of New Somali Leader,” in translation OSC AFP20090209950044, Mogadishu, Shabeelle Media Network, in Somali, Feburary 9, 2009; “Elders 

to Mediate between Islamist, Government Forces in Southwestern 

Somalia,” in translation OSC AFP20090212950091, Mogadishu, 

Shabeelle Media Network, in Somali, February 12, 2009; “Somalia: 

Islamist Says They Will Support Government If Shari’ah Is Implemented,” in translation AFP20090404950006, Universal TV, in Somali, 1900 GMT, April 3, 2009.

51. “Somalia: Clan Chiefs Seek To Mediate Between 

Al-Shabaab, Moderate Islamic Group,” in translation OSC 
40

AFP20090402301001, Falaar.com, in Somali, April 1, 2009; “Somalia: Secret Talks between Government, Opposition Groups,” in 

translation AFP20090409950079, Garoweonline, in English, April 8, 

2009.

52. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/QDR/.

53. U.S.-African Public Affairs News Release, “U.S. Diplomat: ‘We Do Not Plan, Direct or Coordinate’ Military Ops for 

Somalia Government,” available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.

asp?art=4155&lang=0.

54. Jeffrey Gettleman, “U.S. Aiding Somalia in Its Plan to Retake Its Capital,” New York Times, March 5, 2010.

55. UNSC, Letter dated 10 March 2010 from the Chairman of the 

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 

1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President 

of the Security Council, March 10, 2010, pp. 6-7.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Eloy E. Cuevas

Ms. Madeleine Wells

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil