Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 10839 

State and location Community 

No. 

Effective date authorization/cancellation of 

sale of flood insurance in community 

Current effective 

map date 

Date certain 

federal assistance 

no longer available 

in SFHAs 

Region 4 

Tennessee: Brentwood, City 

of, Williamson County.

470205 March 23, 1973, Emerg; February 1, 1978, Reg; February 26, 2021, Susp. ......do Do. 

Cheatham County, Unincorporated Areas.470026 September 27, 1974, Emerg; May 19, 1981, Reg; 

February 26, 2021, Susp. 

......do Do. 

Hendersonville, City of, 

Sumner County.

470186 May 28, 1974, Emerg; November 4, 1981, Reg; February 26, 2021, Susp. ......do Do. 

Pegram, Town of, 

Cheatham County.

470291 N/A, Emerg; April 9, 1987, Reg; February 26, 2021, 

Susp. 

......do Do. 

Pleasant View, Town of, 

Cheatham County.

470428 N/A, Emerg; August 1, 2011, Reg; February 26, 

2021, Susp. 

......do Do. 

Ridgetop, City of, Davidson 

and Robertson Counties.

470162 N/A, Emerg; March 13, 2009, Reg; February 26, 

2021, Susp. 

......do Do. 

Robertson County, Unincorporated Areas.470158 May 28, 1982, Emerg; June 15, 1984, Reg; February 

26, 2021, Susp. 

......do Do. 

Williamson County, Unincorporated Areas.470204 May 27, 1975, Emerg; April 1, 1981, Reg; February 

26, 2021, Susp. 

Feb. 26, 2021 Feb. 26, 2021. 

* -do- = Ditto. 

Code for reading third column: Emerg.—Emergency; Reg.—Regular; Susp.—Suspension. 

Eric J. Letvin, 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for 

Mitigation, Federal Insurance and Mitigation 

Administration—FEMA Resilience, 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. 

[FR Doc. 2021–03223 Filed 2–22–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–12–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 1 

[WT Docket No. 18–120; FCC 20–183; FRS 

17359] 

Transforming the 2.5 GHz Band 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Dismissal of petitions for 

reconsideration. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission) addresses the Petitions 

for Reconsideration (Petitions) filed by 

National Congress of American Indians 

(NCAI) and Schools, Health & Libraries 

Broadband Coalition and others (SHLB 

et al.), asking that the Commission 

reinstate the eligibility restrictions it 

eliminated in the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order, published on October 25, 2019, 

and create a window for additional 

educational use of the band. The 

Commission dismisses the Petitions in 

part and, alternatively and 

independently, denies the other two 

petitions. The Hawai’i Broadband 

Initiative filed a Petition for 

Reconsideration, which it subsequently 

requested leave to withdraw. The 

Commission grants Hawai’i Broadband 

Initiative’s request to withdraw its 

petition. 

DATES: The Commission adopted the 

Order on Reconsideration denying the 

Petitions for Reconsideration on 

December 9, 2020. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Schauble, Deputy Chief, Broadband 

Division, Wireless Telecommunications 

Bureau, (202) 418–0797 or email 

John.Schauble@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Order on 

Reconsideration (Reconsideration 

Order), WT Docket No. 18–120; FCC 20– 

183, adopted on December 9, 2020 and 

released on December 17, 2020. The full 

text of the Reconsideration Order is 

available electronically via the FCC’s 

Electronic Document Management 

System (EDOCS) website at https://

www.fcc.gov/edocs or via the FCC’s 

Electronic Comment Filing System 

(ECFS) website at http://www.fcc.gov/ 

ecfs. (Documents will be available 

electronically in ASCII, Microsoft Word, 

and/or Adobe Acrobat.) Alternative 

formats are available for people with 

disabilities (braille, large print, 

electronic files, audio format), by 

sending an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or 

calling the Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 

418–0530 (voice), (202) 418–0432 

(TTY). The 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 

WT Docket No. 18–120, FCC 19–62, 

released July 11, 2019 published at 84 

FR 57343 on October 25, 2019. 

Synopsis 

I. Introduction 

1. The 2.5 GHz band (2496–2690 

MHz) is the single largest band of 

contiguous spectrum below 3 gigahertz. 

Too much of this spectrum, which is 

prime mid-band spectrum for next 

generation mobile operations, including 

5G, has lain fallow for more than twenty 

years. In the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 

the Commission transformed the 

regulatory framework governing the 

band in order to move this spectrum 

into the hands of those who will 

provide service to Americans across the 

country, and particularly in rural and 

Tribal areas. The Commission replaced 

an outdated regulatory regime, 

developed in the days when educational 

TV was the only use envisioned for this 

spectrum, with one that not only gives 

incumbent users more flexibility in how 

they use the spectrum, but also provides 

opportunities for additional entities to 

obtain access to unused 2.5 GHz 

spectrum. Among other things, the 

Commission established a Tribal 

Priority Window to address the acute 

problem of lack of access to wireless 

communications services in rural Tribal 

areas, and it decided to hold an overlay 

auction thereafter for remaining 

unassigned spectrum rights. 

2. Three parties sought 

reconsideration of various aspects of the 

order. The National Congress of 

American Indians (NCAI) seeks 

reconsideration of the Commission’s 

decision to focus the Tribal Priority 

Window opportunity on rural Tribal 

land. The Schools, Health & Libraries 

Broadband Coalition and others (SHLB 

et al.), meanwhile, ask that the 

Commission reinstate the eligibility 

restrictions the Commission eliminated 

in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order and 

create a window for additional 

educational use of the band And the 

10840 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

1Licenses obtained in the Tribal Priority Window 

will operate as overlay licenses subject to protecting 

incumbent operations within the relevant 

geographic area. 

Hawai’i Broadband Initiative filed a 

Petition for Reconsideration, which it 

subsequently requested leave to 

withdraw. 

3. The Commission grants the Hawai’i 

Broadband Initiative’s request to 

withdraw its petition, and the 

Commission dismisses in part and, 

alternatively and independently, denies 

the other two petitions. In doing so, the 

Commission affirms the framework it 

adopted to make available the 2.5 GHz 

band quickly by eliminating outdated 

legacy regulations that inhibited full use 

of the band and establishing flexible-use 

rules that will allow commercial 

providers to use this large swath of 

prime mid-band spectrum to provide 5G 

and other advanced services to 

American consumers. 

II. Background 

4. The Commission established a 

Tribal Priority Window to address the 

acute problem of lack of access to 

wireless communications services in 

rural Tribal areas. The Tribal Priority 

Window represents a particularly 

important and unprecedented 

opportunity to address the 

communications needs of rural Tribal 

communities, many of which lack 

meaningful access to wired and wireless 

communications services. Successful 

applicants in the Tribal Priority 

Window will be able to acquire licenses 

for all available 2.5 GHz spectrum over 

their rural Tribal lands—for free, which 

should afford sufficient bandwidth to 

offer broadband wireless service to these 

communities. 

5. The Commission established 

criteria for the Tribal Priority Window 

that would ‘‘provide the most effective 

and targeted way to achieve the 

Commission’s goal of closing the digital 

divide in Tribal lands.’’ Specifically, the 

Commission included four basic 

requirements for Tribes and Tribal 

entities seeking to take advantage of the 

Tribal Priority Window: (1) Eligibility is 

limited to federally recognized 

American Indian Tribes and Alaska 

Native Villages or entities owned and 

controlled by federally recognized 

Tribes or a consortium of such Tribes: 

(2) the license must be for Tribal land, 

as defined in part 54 of the 

Commission’s rules; (3) the geographic 

service area requested must be rural, 

meaning not part of an urbanized area 

or urban cluster area with a population 

equal to or greater than 50,000; and (4) 

the eligible Tribal entity must have a 

local presence on the rural Tribal land 

for which it is applying.1

6. The Commission observed that, 

‘‘[b]ecause the problem of access to 

wireless communications services is 

most acute in rural areas . . . the 

purpose of the Tribal priority window 

should be to promote service to areas 

that are currently unserved or 

underserved.’’ The Commission 

previously has reported that ‘‘the 

population of individuals living on 

Tribal lands is disproportionately 

skewed toward rural, rather than urban, 

areas.’’ As the Commission found in the 

2.5 GHz Report and Order, 

‘‘individualized policies tailored to 

specific deployment issues, such as 

increasing access to spectrum over 

unserved rural Tribal areas,’’ honored 

the Commission’s trust relationship 

with Tribal Nations. As such, the 

Commission established the Tribal 

Priority Window for rural Tribal lands 

that ‘‘are not part of an urbanized area 

or urban cluster area with a population 

equal to or greater than 50,000.’’ 

7. Tribal land for purposes of the 

Tribal Priority Window consists of: Any 

federally recognized Indian Tribe’s 

reservation, pueblo or colony, including 

former reservations in Oklahoma, 

Alaska Native regions established 

pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims 

Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688) and Indian 

Allotments, see § 54.400(e), as well as 

Hawaiian Home Lands—areas held in 

trust for native Hawaiians by the state 

of Hawaii, pursuant to the Hawaiian 

Homes Commission Act, 1920, July 9, 

1921, 42 Stat 108, et seq., as amended; 

and any lands designated prior to July 

10, 2019, as Tribal Lands pursuant to 

the designation process contained in 

§ 54.412. 

8. As explained in the 2.5 GHz Report 

and Order, the Commission adopted the 

same general definition of Tribal land as 

set forth in part 54 of its rules related 

to the Universal Service Fund. In 

addition to ‘‘on-reservation’’ lands, the 

Commission also included offreservation Tribal lands as eligible for 

the Tribal Priority Window if they were 

designated as Tribal lands prior to July 

10, 2019 pursuant to the process set 

forth in § 54.412 of its rules. 

9. After the Tribal Priority Window 

closes, any remaining unassigned 2.5 

GHz spectrum will be made available 

for commercial use via competitive 

bidding, as the Commission found this 

to be the best way to assign spectrum 

quickly and efficiently for its highestvalued use. In seeking to modernize the 

2.5 GHz band and make this valuable 

spectrum available expeditiously for a 

wide range of consumer uses, the 

Commission also determined that the 

original motivations for adopting 

restrictions on Educational Broadband 

Service (EBS) licenses were now 

obsolete. In the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order, the Commission explained: ‘‘The 

circumstances that led to the creation of 

a dedicated educational service no 

longer exist. Substantial technological 

changes over the last 30 years enable 

any educator with a broadband 

connection to access a myriad of 

educational resources—a content 

distribution model that does not require 

dedicated educational spectrum 

licensed to educational 

institutions. . . . [T]oday there are a 

multiplicity of other sources of 

educational programming available to 

institutions with broadband 

connections. All of these factors support 

eliminating the eligibility restrictions at 

this time.’’ 

10. Meanwhile, only a handful of EBS 

licensees have deployed their own 

networks or use their EBS licenses in a 

way that requires dedicated spectrum. 

Instead, most licensees rely on lessees to 

deploy and operate broadband networks 

using their licensed spectrum, and they 

use the leases as a source for revenues 

or devices. In considering the arguments 

surrounding the former EBS eligibility 

restrictions, the Commission 

determined that its elimination would 

promote more efficient use of the 

spectrum, improve operators’ ability to 

attract capital, make the spectrum more 

appealing for commercial operators to 

include in their long-term service plans, 

and better align these licenses with the 

flexible-use licensing policies used in 

similar spectrum bands. Based on the 

record, the Commission found that 

eliminating long-standing, but obsolete, 

eligibility restrictions on EBS licenses 

was the best way of ensuring that the 

band could be fully used for high-speed 

broadband services. 

11. For similar reasons, the 

Commission declined to establish a 

priority window for educational 

institutions. In the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order, the Commission explained that 

an educational priority window ‘‘would 

be at odds with its other decisions to 

provide greater flexibility for more 

providers to make use of the 2.5 GHz 

band to offer high-speed broadband 

service to the public.’’ An educational 

priority window raised the additional 

complication that mutually exclusive 

applications for licenses sought through 

such a window would need to be 

resolved through a system of 

competitive bidding, and that 

educational institutions in a majority of 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 10841 

2 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5469– 

70, paras. 67–68; see id. at 5471, para. 73 

(concluding that ‘‘a Tribal priority window is less 

likely to trigger mutual exclusivity in a significant 

number of license areas than a priority window for 

educational institutions’’ because ‘‘most rural Tribal 

lands areas will likely be associated with a single 

Tribal entity, whereas many localities have a wide 

variety of educational institutions that could have 

a local presence’’). 

SHLB et al. argue that the Commission failed to 

address the use of a settlement window to resolve 

mutual exclusive applications. To the contrary, the 

Commission rejected the use of a settlement 

window, along with all the other alternatives 

suggested by the parties as possible means of 

avoiding mutual exclusivity, because it would not 

comply with the public interest test of section 

309(j)(6)(E) the Communications Act of 1934. See 

2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 5470, 

para. 68 & n.195; id. at 5470, para. 68 (rejecting all 

suggested alternatives to avoid mutual exclusivity, 

including, but not limited to, the examples listed 

in the text, as ‘‘inconsistent either with the 

Communications Act’s requirement that the 

Commission use competitive bidding to resolve 

mutually exclusive applications or with the public 

interest test applicable to alternatives that avoid 

mutual exclusivity.’’). 

3See, e.g., File Nos. 0009056169 (Stockbridge 

Munsee Community), 0009133181 (Confederated 

Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation), 0009164208 

(Duckwater Shoshone Tribe). Under the 

Commission’s rules, waivers will be granted if it is 

shown that: (i) The underlying purpose of the 

rules(s) would not be served or would be frustrated 

by application to the instant case, and that a grant 

of the requested waiver would be in the public 

interest; or (ii) in view of the unique or unusual 

factual circumstances of the instant case, 

application of the rule(s) would be inequitable, 

unduly burdensome or contrary to the public 

interest, or the applicant has no reasonable 

alternative. 

4See 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 

5466, para. 56; see also Inquiry Concerning 

Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 

Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and 

Timely Fashion, 2020 Broadband Progress Report, 

35 FCC Rcd 8986, 9013, para. 47 (2020) (‘‘Rural 

Tribal lands continue to lag behind urban Tribal 

lands, with only 52.9% of all Tribal lands in rural 

areas having deployment of both [fixed and mobile 

broadband] services, as compared to 93.1% of 

Tribal lands in urban areas.’’). 

states would likely be precluded from 

participating in such a process.2

12. In its petition, NCAI supports the 

Commission’s decision to establish a 

Tribal Priority Window but asks that the 

Commission: (1) allow non-rural Tribal 

lands to be eligible in the Tribal Priority 

Window, and (2) revise the applicable 

rules for defining eligible Tribal lands. 

SHLB et al. ask that the Commission 

reconsider its decisions to eliminate the 

educational eligibility restrictions and 

to not create an educational priority 

window. 

13. The Tribal Priority Window 

commenced on February 3, 2020 and 

lasted until September 2, 2020. In the 

Bureau Procedures Public Notice (PN), 

PN 35 FCC Rcd 308, the Wireless 

Telecommunications Bureau specified a 

simplified application process to allow 

for the inclusion of any waiver 

request(s) as part of a specific 

application—including a waiver of the 

Tribal land definition as applied in the 

Report and Order. A number of Tribes 

have filed applications availing 

themselves of this waiver mechanism to 

seek licenses for lands falling outside 

the § 27.1204(b)(2) definition following 

release of the Bureau Procedures PN.3

III. Discussion 

14. It is well established that 

reconsideration ‘‘will not be granted 

merely for the purpose of again debating 

matters on which the tribunal has once 

deliberated and spoken.’’ Petitions for 

reconsideration that rely on arguments 

that have been fully considered and 

rejected by the Commission may be 

dismissed or denied. Both the NCAI and 

SHLB et al. petitions primarily repeat 

arguments that the Commission 

considered and rejected previously. The 

Commission fully considered the policy 

benefits of focusing on rural Tribal 

lands in the 2.5 GHz Report and Order. 

And the Commission adopted the 

definition of Tribal lands contained in 

its part 54 rules. To the extent NCAI’s 

petition reiterates already rejected 

arguments, it is procedurally improper, 

and the Commission dismisses the 

petition and otherwise deny it in its 

entirety. 

15. Regarding the SHLB et al. Petition, 

the Commission previously fully 

considered all the arguments raised 

therein, including whether an 

educational window or flexible use 

would be the best means of promoting 

broadband deployment, the likelihood 

of mutually exclusive applications if the 

Commission opened an educational 

window, and the distinctions between 

the Tribal Priority Window and any 

educational window. Since the petition 

merely repeats previously raised and 

rejected arguments, the petition is 

procedurally improper and dismissed. 

As a separate and independent ground 

for rejecting this argument, the 

Commission finds that in any event it 

lacks merit. SHLB et al. present no 

compelling argument that warrants 

reconsideration of the Commission’s 

decision to make this spectrum 

available for flexible use nor to limit any 

priority application window to Tribal 

entities. 

16. In short, the Commission 

dismisses in part and denies both 

petitions for reconsideration. The 

Commission discusses each issue raised 

by the petitions in turn. 

17. First, the Commission finds that 

the NCAI petition provides no new facts 

or arguments that would provide a basis 

for reconsidering its decision to focus 

the Tribal Priority Window on rural but 

not other Tribal lands. In its comments, 

NCAI claimed that limiting the Tribal 

Priority Window, inter alia, would 

‘‘create separate classes of tribal 

governments, which is inconsistent with 

the intent of Congress.’’ NCAI now 

repeats its argument that the trust 

relationship between federally 

recognized tribes and the Federal 

government ‘‘applies equally to all 

federally recognized tribal nations, not 

just to certain sub-sets of tribal nations 

based on location of tribal lands.’’ In 

other words, it repeats the same 

argument that the Commission already 

rejected. And for good reason. NCAI has 

failed to demonstrate that the 

Commission, in affording Tribes in this 

window an opportunity to obtain 

spectrum licenses over their rural Tribal 

lands, has failed to uphold any specific 

trust responsibility expressed by 

Congress. In contrast, the Commission 

does have a statutory responsibility to 

manage the radio spectrum and 

Congress has exhorted us to speed the 

deployment of broadband to all 

Americans in a reasonable and timely 

manner. In managing this important 

mid-band spectrum, the Commission 

continues to believe that an approach of 

targeting rural Tribal lands for the Tribal 

Priority Window, where the problem of 

access to wireless communications 

services is most acute,4 and 

subsequently offering overlay licenses 

for any remaining unassigned spectrum 

via a competitive bidding process is the 

most effective way to make this 

spectrum available for next generation 

wireless services. The Commission 

carefully considered how to make this 

spectrum available quickly to those able 

to deploy service, and determined that, 

while spectrum over urban areas should 

be made available via competitive 

bidding, the Commission would first 

make spectrum available over rural 

Tribal Lands for free to Tribal entities to 

help them meet the communications 

needs of these rural areas without the 

delay and cost of engaging in 

competitive bidding. 

18. Although NCAI claims that 

limiting rural lands to areas ‘‘not part of 

an urbanized area or urban cluster area 

with a population equal to or greater 

than 50,000’’ was arbitrary and prevents 

Tribes from serving more populated 

portions of their lands, focusing this 

spectrum opportunity on rural Tribal 

Lands is in furtherance of a specific 

policy goal of lowering the cost for 

Tribes to serve the unserved. Indeed, 

NCAI fails to explain its claim that the 

Commission’s choice is unsupported. 

Further, NCAI does not offer a single 

example of a Tribe whose ability to 

10842 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

5 Interested parties can use the 2.5 GHz Rural 

Tribal Priority Window mapping tool, available at 

https://www.fcc.gov/rural-tribal-window-updates, to 

see where eligible Tribal lands are located, which 

reservations contain urban lands, and where 2.5 

GHz spectrum is licensed. 

6See, e.g., 47 CFR part 54, subpart G (Universal 

Service for Rural Health Care Program); 47 CFR 

1.2110(f)(4) (rural service provider bidding credit); 

Modernizing Unbundling and Resale Requirements 

in an Era of Next-Generation Networks and 

Services, notice of proposed rulemaking, 85 FR 472, 

January 6, 2020, 34 FCC Rcd 11290, 11304–05 

(2019) (proposing differing regulatory treatment 

depending on whether an area is a rural or not). 

7The Commission adopted the definition of 

‘‘Tribal lands’’ almost verbatim from the part 54 

universal service rules. Compare 47 CFR 

27.1204(b)(2), with id. § 54.5, and id. § 54.400(e). 

Although the Commission has extended ‘‘Tribal 

lands’’ in the universal service context to include 

certain off-reservation lands, the Commission notes 

that the Lifeline and high-cost programs serve a 

different purpose than the Tribal Priority 

Window—i.e., those programs award funding ‘‘for 

the provision, maintenance, and upgrading of 

facilities and services.’’ In other words, when 

targeting universal service funds, the Commission 

increases funding for rural Tribal areas because they 

(and off-reservation lands) face similar broadband 

deployment and adoption challenges. In contrast, 

the Tribal Priority Window is designed to provide 

federally recognized Tribes with direct access to 

spectrum over their own Tribal lands—as such, a 

narrower initial definition accompanied by a waiver 

process that contemplates possible expansion of 

Tribal lands in special circumstances is more 

appropriate. 

serve its Tribal lands is hampered by the 

limitation. NCAI’s argument overlooks 

the fact that the underlying purpose of 

the Tribal Priority Window is ‘‘to 

address the communications needs of 

their communities and of residents on 

rural Tribal lands, including the 

deployment of advanced wireless 

services to unserved or underserved 

areas.’’ Focusing the Tribal Priority 

Window opportunity on rural Tribal 

lands not only satisfied this policy 

objective but also makes sense from a 

licensing perspective, as most of the 

spectrum over urban Tribal lands 

already is assigned and thus unavailable 

for licensing as part of the Window.5

19. Moreover, the Commission 

regularly distinguishes between rural 

and non-rural areas in carrying out 

policy objectives—in its universal 

service rules, in its competition rules, 

and even in its spectrum-bidding 

rules 6—because the wide geographies 

and dispersed populations in rural areas 

merit a different policy response than 

the challenges faced in non-rural areas. 

The Commission has never before 

suggested that such differentiation 

impugns the sovereignty of the states 

nor its trust responsibilities to Tribes, 

and (as the Commission noted in the 2.5 

GHz Report and Order) the Commission 

fails to see how such differentiation 

here could have such effects. The 

Commission also notes that its 

definition of what land would be 

considered ‘‘rural’’ is both administrable 

and objective—not something that 

requires us to make discretionary 

judgments about individual Tribes. 

20. And to the extent that NCAI 

thinks this decision contravenes the 

Commission’s 2000 Tribal Policy 

Statement (65 FR 41668), the 

Commission disagrees. There the 

Commission committed to working with 

Tribes ‘‘to ensure, through its 

regulations and policy initiatives, and 

consistent with section 1 of the 

Communications Act of 1934, that 

Indian Tribes have adequate access to 

communications services.’’ Making 

spectrum available over rural Tribal 

lands in the Tribal Priority Window 

before making remaining unassigned 

spectrum available via competitive 

bidding does exactly that; NCAI fails to 

show otherwise. 

21. Second, the Commission declines 

NCAI’s request to use the Commission’s 

definition of Tribal lands contained in 

its part 73 rules in lieu of the definition 

based on part 54. NCAI has not 

convinced us that the part 73 definition 

of Tribal lands (which includes off 

reservation trust lands) is more 

appropriate in this context than the part 

54 definition.7 The part 73 definition 

was adopted for a completely different 

purpose than the Tribal Priority 

Window: i.e., to permit comparison 

between non-commercial educators 

applying for broadcast stations. By 

contrast, the Tribal Priority Window 

was adopted to encourage the provision 

of necessary communications services 

in rural areas and to provide federally 

recognized Tribes with direct access to 

unassigned 2.5 GHz spectrum over their 

own Tribal lands before making any 

remaining unassigned spectrum 

available to any eligible provider via 

competitive bidding. The Commission 

required the direct participation of 

Tribal governments, or entities owned 

and controlled by such Tribes, in the 2.5 

GHz context to ensure that licensees 

would have the requisite authority over 

the deployment of facilities and service 

on their rural Tribal lands. 

22. The Commission nonetheless 

recognized that there may be exceptions 

to the general rule. That’s why case-bycase waivers are available, effectively 

allowing for a result similar to 

designation of off-reservation lands in 

the specific context of applying for 

unassigned 2.5 GHz spectrum. Indeed, 

the Commission has received a number 

of waiver requests during the Tribal 

Priority Window to include certain offreservation lands as Tribal lands. And 

this approach mirrors the Commission’s 

approach in the context of spectrum 

auctions, excluding off-reservation 

lands from the definition of ‘‘Tribal 

lands,’’ requiring a winning bidder to 

provide a certification from a Tribal 

government in order to receive Tribal 

land bidding credits and entertaining 

waivers to include off-reservation lands 

within the scope of such bidding 

credits. 

23. Third, the Commission rejects 

NCAI’s request to re-open the offreservation designation process in 

§ 54.412 of the Commission’s rules. 

Contrary to NCAI’s claim, the 

Commission already addressed this 

issue by creating a waiver process that 

applicants can take advantage of to the 

extent they seek to include additional 

off-reservation lands as part of their 

applications. This case-by-case waiver 

process is not dissimilar from the 

designation procedure provided for in 

part 54. In circumstances where Tribes 

can show good cause to include as 

eligible off-reservation lands specifically 

for purposes of participation in the 

Tribal Priority Window, the waiver 

process provides an opportunity for 

them to do so. That waiver process was 

made part of the application procedures 

to allow Tribes to seek eligibility for offreservation lands without delaying the 

Tribal Priority Window or unreasonably 

limiting the ability of Tribes to apply for 

this spectrum. More than 50 such 

waivers were filed in the Tribal Priority 

Window, which closed on September 2, 

2020. 

24. The Commission is not legally 

required to, and it sees no benefit in, 

reopening and starting anew a different 

process that would not only require 

Tribes to make additional filings but 

also delay the processing of all 

applications already filed during the 

Tribal Priority Window, including 

applications of those Tribes who 

properly sought eligibility for such offreservation lands using the waiver 

process available to them in the Tribal 

Priority Window. 

25. Fourth, SHLB et al.’s suggestion 

that, were the Commission to maintain 

eligibility restrictions and adopt a 

separate priority window, most new 

educational licensees would choose to 

deploy their own networks, belies 

strong evidence in the record to the 

contrary. The Commission disagreed 

with this perspective in the 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order. 

26. To start, the vast majority of 

existing licensees, including in rural 

areas, have not deployed their own 

networks but instead lease to 

commercial providers. As of May 13, 

2019, there were 2,087 active leases of 

EBS spectrum, compared with 2,193 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 10843 

8SHLB et al.’s argument that EBS licensees 

should be given additional access to free 2.5 GHz 

spectrum in a priority window because E-Rate 

funding cannot be used to support off-campus or 

home use of E-Rate supported infrastructure (SHLB 

et al. Petition at 5) is unpersuasive; this fact is not 

new. See 47 U.S.C. 254(h)(1)(B), (h)(2). SHLB’s 

argument ignores the fact that this statutory 

restriction was in place when the vast majority of 

EBS licensees chose to lease the spectrum, rather 

than self-deploy networks. 

9SHLB et al. claim that the Commission wrongly 

characterize the SHLB Economic Study as assuming 

a $15/month price for both served and unserved 

areas. SHLB et al. Petition at 7–8. The Commission 

recognizes that the $15/month price applies only to 

the served areas and that the price is assumed to 

be $35/month in the unserved areas. The 

Commission finds it unrealistic, however, that 

educational providers could sustain service to rural 

areas at the $15/month price. The Commission 

found no evidence in the record of such low prices 

except in the case of Mobile Citizen and Mobile 

Beacon, which have leases with Sprint for spectrum 

licenses in ‘‘major and more densely populated 

markets.’’ Furthermore, the Commission finds that 

the $35/month price in unserved rural areas would 

be unrealistic because it assumes that educational 

providers would self-deploy in those areas, which 

is contrary to the Commission’s history and 

experience with the 2.5 GHz band. History has 

shown that the vast majority of EBS licensees 

simply do not provide service—at any price—but, 

instead, lease the spectrum. The Commission is 

unpersuaded that repeating history will provide a 

different result. 

10The SHLB et al. claim that the Commission 

mischaracterizes the SHLB Economic Study as 

purely county-based. While the Commission 

recognizes that the deployment model of the 

educational license holders is not county-based, its 

concern is that the SHLB Economic Study assumes 

that for winners of a potential auction, the 

‘‘commercial deployment model only considers 

deployment to entire counties.’’ This is because the 

SHLB Economic Study rules out any deployment to 

a county with partial deployment or change in plan 

offerings by non-educational providers, which the 

Commission finds unreasonable. The SHLB et al. 

also claim that the Commission’s belief in the 

potential for price reduction after the auction via 

cost reduction is misguided because ‘‘competitive 

dynamics are the key driver of reduced wireless 

prices.’’ While competition is an important 

determinant of wireless prices, the Commission has 

also recognized the roles of costs. For example, the 

Commission recognized substantial cost reductions 

from spectrum combinations in the T-Mobile/Sprint 

transaction that would allow lower prices. 

However, the Commission does not assert that cost 

Continued 

licenses. In fact, SHLB et al.’s assertion 

that ‘‘the record is replete with 

examples of EBS licensees offering 

service’’ qualifies that assertion by 

acknowledging that they are offering 

service ‘‘through the EBS leasing 

model.’’ This ‘‘EBS leasing model’’ is 

not an example of EBS licensees 

providing service, but of EBS licensees 

merely leasing spectrum to a 

commercial provider; that the vast 

majority of EBS licensees chose to lease 

spectrum rather than use the spectrum 

to provide service is one of the very 

reasons the Commission concluded that 

liberating this spectrum and making it 

readily available for flexible use by 

providers—rather than engage in a 

delayed process that put the spectrum 

in the hands of hundreds of entities, 

with each of whom the service provider 

must negotiate a lease—was in the 

public interest. 

27. In fact, the instances that SHLB et 

al. identify where EBS licensees 

deployed their own networks are 

notable because of how rare they are. 

For example, SHLB et al. cite the selfdeployment undertaken by Northern 

Michigan University (NMU), under a 

waiver of the EBS filing freeze. In 

granting the waiver, however, the 

Bureau noted: ‘‘NMU is unique among 

EBS licensees—while most EBS 

licensees have not built their own 

facilities and have leased their spectrum 

to commercial providers, NMU has built 

and operates its own LTE broadband 

network that covers a significant portion 

of the rugged, underserved territory in 

Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.’’ Although 

SHLB et al. state that the Commission 

has granted seven waivers in the last six 

years to ‘‘allow[ ] educational entities 

access to EBS spectrum for the purpose 

of building wireless networks,’’ these 

seven waivers cover only three entities 

(i.e., NMU, Kings County, CA, and 

Monterey County, CA), which further 

demonstrates the rarity of self-deployed 

systems. SHLB et al. also point to the 

interest in developing statewide 

broadband networks expressed by states 

such as Nebraska and Utah, but they fail 

to explain how such interest will result 

in actual deployment, given that much 

of the spectrum in more populated areas 

of those states is already licensed and 

used by commercial providers, in 

contrast with northern Michigan where 

the spectrum was mostly unassigned. In 

short, although NMU has shown itself to 

be a motivated educational institution 

with access to technical expertise, the 

Commission would expect most EBS 

licensees to act consistently with their 

behavior to date and lease spectrum to 

commercial providers if the 

Commission retained the former 

eligibility rules. 

28. In short, the Commission finds 

little support for the argument that 

educators are better positioned to 

deploy their own broadband networks 

in areas that are not served by 

commercial operators. Even in rural 

areas, that simply has not been the case. 

For example, the Wireless internet 

Service Providers Association (WISPA) 

explains that several WISPs ‘‘have 

acquired EBS spectrum lease rights . . . 

to improve service to subscribers and/or 

expand service to new areas, in many 

cases to rural communities’’ and lists 

examples of these WISPs. WISPA 

further argues that ‘‘WISPs have shown 

time and again that they can deploy 

licensed, lightly licensed, and 

unlicensed fixed wireless services in 

rural areas—and do so cost-efficiently 

with unencumbered access to licensed 

2.5 GHz spectrum.’’ And SHLB et al. 

demonstrate the success of commercial 

operators (rather than educational 

institutions) in building out this 

spectrum: ‘‘WISPs like BeamSpeed, 

LLC, Evertek, Inc., Redzone Wireless, 

Rise Broadband, SiouxLan 

Communications, and Watch 

Communications have ‘invested many 

millions of dollars’ in networks that 

‘utilize leased [EBS] spectrum to 

provide high-quality, competitive 

broadband services to consumers, often 

in more rural areas of the United States 

where broadband options are limited.’ ’’ 

SoniqWave Networks LLC also intends 

to participate in the upcoming auction 

and is planning deployments using 

spectrum it has acquired in the 

secondary market from former EBS 

licensees. 

29. In sum, SHLB et al. have failed to 

present any new facts or arguments that 

would cause us to change the 

Commission’s conclusion that the best 

approach to accelerate deployment and 

enable a wide range of potential uses for 

consumers nationwide is to license this 

spectrum for flexible use and eliminate 

the transaction costs (both money and 

time) associated with leasing by 

educational institutions.8

30. Fifth, the Commission rejects 

SHLB et al.’s continued reliance on a 

flawed study in support of maintaining 

the eligibility requirements. The 

Commission previously found this 

study to be premised on an unrealistic 

deployment model. Not only did the 

Commission find that history and 

experience discredit the study’s 

assumption that, in unserved rural 

areas, EBS licensees would self-deploy 

rather than seek to enter into a lease 

agreement with a commercial carrier; 

the Commission also found problems 

with the study’s assumption that, in 

rural served areas, licensees would be 

able to provide broadband service at 

$15/month.9 Further, the Commission 

notes that, while the Catholic 

Technology Network (CTN) and 

National Educational Broadband Service 

Association (NEBSA) supported the 

existing eligibility requirements, they 

did not view the proposal around which 

the SHLB Economic Study was based as 

workable. Finally, the Commission 

found the study to undervalue the 

potential benefits of an auction rather 

than a direct assignment to educational 

and/or tribal entities on numerous 

counts.10 Generation of revenue is not 

10844 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

‘‘primarily’’ determines price as claimed by the 

petitioners. 

11The Petitioners also argue any resulting lower 

price would still not match the price educational 

institutions could provide, but this is based on the 

$15/month price the Commission discounts for 

rural areas. In general, based on the historic success 

of spectrum auctions at the FCC and the ability of 

the overlay auction format to rationalize the 

irregular patchwork of EBS license areas with often 

complicated licensing arrangements, the 

Commission believes that auctioning the fallow 2.5 

GHz spectrum will provide the most benefit to the 

American consumers. 

12The SHLB et al. acknowledge that the 

Commission ‘‘attempt[ed] to distinguish the reasons 

for the Tribal priority window from the more 

general educational priority windows.’’ Id. at 16. 

Rather than address the reasons for distinguishing 

Tribal entities, the SHLB et al. cite a handful of 

submissions in the record to contend that the 

Commission’s ‘‘conclusion that many educators 

might not be positioned to provide broadband is 

unsupported in fact and in the record.’’ As 

discussed above and in the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order, however, the Commission’s experience with 

the EBS service and its review of the record indicate 

that only ‘‘a small fraction of educational 

institutions’’ have expressed an interest in 

providing broadband service in rural areas, which 

does not provide a sufficient basis for establishing 

an educational priority window. 

the only measure of value of an 

auction; 11 society benefits when 

spectrum available for flexible use for 

next-generation wireless services and 

assigned to those who are most likely to 

use it themselves to deploy. The 

Commission therefore finds that making 

the remaining unassigned spectrum 

available via competitive bidding is in 

the public interest and is more likely to 

expeditiously put this spectrum to its 

highest and best use for the benefit of all 

Americans. 

31. Sixth, the Commission previously 

stated its reasons for establishing the 

Tribal Priority Window but not a broad 

window for educational institutions. 

Specifically, the Commission concluded 

that Tribes have an interest in obtaining 

access to 2.5 GHz spectrum to serve 

their rural Tribal lands that is greater 

than and distinct from that of 

educational institutions, based on: (1) 

The unique status of federally 

recognized Tribes and the nature of the 

Commission’s federal trust 

responsibility, (2) the right of Tribes to 

set their own communications policies 

in the lands they govern, (3) the unique 

and significant obstacles to offering 

service in Tribal areas, and (4) the fact 

that Tribes have not previously had 

access to this spectrum. The SHLB et al. 

fail to address these distinctions.12

32. In turn, the Commission finds that 

SHLB et al.’s advocacy for a narrower 

educational priority window analogous 

to the Tribal Priority Window, or an 

educational priority window limited to 

New Channel Group 3 (old Channels 

G1, G2, and G3), would not address the 

Commission stated deployment 

objectives. The Tribal Priority Window 

is readily distinguishable from any form 

of educator window. Moreover, their 

suggestion of creating an educational 

priority window limited to New 

Channel Group 3, comprised of 17.5 

megahertz of spectrum, would not only 

suffer from the same concerns the 

Commission has previously identified, 

but also would result in inefficient 

allocation of mid-band spectrum. Under 

that proposal, only the 17.5 megahertz 

of non-contiguous spectrum in New 

Channel Group 3 would be assigned and 

licensed differently than the adjacent 

commercial Broadband Radio Service 

spectrum. The result would be that 

educators would end up only with a 

narrow spectrum band that they might 

not be able to use fully because of the 

need to protect adjacent channel 

commercial operations. In contrast, in 

the auction context, potential bidders 

can take into consideration the 

availability of and ability to aggregate 

spectrum to make the best use of this 

smaller Channel Group. 

33. For these reasons, the Commission 

affirms its conclusion in the 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order that, ‘‘[g]iven the time 

and effort and delay that would be 

involved in establishing and running 

[an educational] priority window, and 

the likelihood that such a window for 

all educational institutions would result 

in having to auction the spectrum 

anyway, the Commission finds that 

moving directly to flexible use and open 

eligibility would be the most 

expeditious method of making spectrum 

available to provide broadband service 

in rural and underserved areas, 

consistent with the Commission’s 

statutory objective to ensure ‘the 

development and rapid deployment of 

new technologies, products, and 

services for the benefit of the public, 

including those residing in rural areas, 

without administrative or judicial 

delays.’ ’’ The Commission therefore 

denies the SHLB et al. Petition. 

IV. Ordering Clauses 

34. Accordingly, it is ordered 

pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 303(r), 

and 309(j) of the Communications Act of 

1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 

154(j), 303(r), and 309(j), as well as 

§ 1.429 of the Commission’s rules, 47 

CFR 1.429, that the Petitions for 

Reconsideration filed by the National 

Congress of American Indians and 

jointly by the Schools, Health & 

Libraries Broadband Coalition; 

Consortium for School Networking; 

State Educational Technology Directors 

Association; American Library 

Association; National Digital Inclusion 

Alliance; Nebraska Department of 

Education; Utah Education and 

Telehealth Network; Council of Chief 

State School Officers; A Better Wireless; 

and Access Humboldt on November 25, 

2019, are dismissed to the extent 

specified in this Order on 

Reconsideration and, alternatively and 

independently, denied as specified 

herein. 

35. It is further ordered, pursuant to 

section 405 of the Communications Act 

of 1934, as amended, and § 1.429 of the 

Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.429, that 

the Request for Withdrawal of Petition 

for Reconsideration filed by the Hawaii 

Broadband Initiative on March 30, 2020, 

is granted, and the Petition for 

Reconsideration by the Hawaii 

Broadband Initiative on November 25, 

2019, is dismissed. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary. 

Editorial note: This document was 

received for publication by the Office of the 

Federal Register on January 4, 2021. 

[FR Doc. 2021–00051 Filed 2–22–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 64 

[CG Docket Nos. 03–123, FCC 20–105; FRS 

17377] 

Telecommunications Relay Service 

Rules Modernization 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission) eliminates two 

Telecommunications Relay Service 

(TRS) mandatory minimum standards 

because they are no longer necessary to 

provide functional equivalence with 

voice services, and ceases Federal 

Register publication of applications for 

certification of state TRS programs in 

favor of providing notice on the 

Commission’s website and in its 

Electronic Document Management 

System (EDOCS). 

DATES: Effective Date: These rules are 

effective March 25, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Wallace, Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, at (202) 

418–2716, or email William.Wallace@

fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Report