United States Joint Forces Comma

Joint Warfighting Center

Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Warfighters Joint Test and Evalu

22 March 2002

Commander’s

Handbook for

Joint Time-Sensitive Targeti
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER

116 LAKE VIEW PARKWAY

SUFFOLK VA 23435-2697

22 Ma

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER

This Handbook is designed for joint force commanders and thei

assist them in rapid target engagement. It is meant to be a resour

the joint force commander, joint force headquarters, and the j

components. Though consistent with joint and Service doctrine, 

doctrinal publication. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for 

17 January 2002, is the authoritative publication and has an app

time-sensitive targeting considerations.

As we learned from experiences in such locales as Iraq, Kos

Afghanistan, our ability to engage time-sensitive targets in a timely

and effective manner is a requisite for successful military operat

forces are faced with an ever-increasing threat from adversaries tha

could pose) a direct danger and demand an immediate respon

complexities of engaging time-sensitive targets require joint force com

and their staffs to fully appreciate the coordination and integratio

required to minimize the chance of fratricide and other collateral eff

Handbook provides examples from combatant commands and joint t

to assist in the prosecution of time-sensitive targets.

Corrections or suggestions for improvement of this Handbook are 

They should be sent to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center (U

JW 100), 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, Virginia, 23435-2697.

GORDON C. NASH

Brigadier General, U.S. Mari

Commander
The United States Joint Forces Command Joint

Warfighting Center and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense Joint Warfighters Joint

Test and Evaluation have developed this

Commander’s Handbook for Joint TimeSensitive Targeting, to facilitate rapid target

engagement by a joint force commander (JFC)

within an operational area. This handbook is

not intended to be authoritative, but is offered

as a supplement to extant joint targeting

doctrine.

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

defines time-sensitive targets (TST) as,

“Those targets requiring immediate response

because they pose (or will soon pose) danger

to friendly forces or are highly lucrative,

fleeting targets of opportunity.”

For the purposes of this handbook, a “joint”

TST refers to a TST that requires cooperation

and/or coordination by two or more Services

or components to successfully engage.

Examples of joint TSTs include those cases

when one component fires into or through

another component’s area of operations (AO),

or when the effects of attacking a TST could

cause fratricide or other collateral effects that

may impact another component’s mission.

The focus of this handbook is on the

processes required to engage joint TSTs in a

timely, efficient, and effective manner. Only

joint TSTs are addressed to highlight the

coordination required between the joint force

components to successfully engage these

targets. Additionally, only targets on the

Earth’s surface, whether on land or sea, are

discussed since joint doctrinal procedures are

well established within the air and maritime

components that effectively address

engagement of time-sensitive air and

subsurface targets, and therefore will not be

discussed in this handbook.

This handbook has been develo

for:

• JFCs—who develop and 

rules of engagement, issue 

guidance, establish risk pa

designate TSTs.

• The joint force headqua

who prioritize target

boundaries and control me

an operational area, and c

deconflict joint TST at

among the joint force com

• The joint force compon

those who ultimately 

weaponry to engage joint 

Considerable emphasis has b

the significance of the JFC gu

joint TST process. (Note: Th

handbook, maroon print has b

additional emphasis or clarifica

be seen, not only is the JF

guidance an indispensable for

measure, it could be, depend

threat, one of the most critica

the entire joint operation.

This handbook explores the co

TSTs and discusses the TST d

The importance of joint TST c

control is highlighted, along w

sample of a possible JFC joint T

statement.

Lastly, useful collaborative too

examples from combatant comm

task forces, and checklists have 

to facilitate the prosecution o

within an operational area.
ii

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
Preface ...........................................................................................................

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING

• Introduction ...............................................................................................

• Targets .......................................................................................................

• Targeting ....................................................................................................

• Joint Targeting ...........................................................................................

• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting ....................................................................

• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting in a Major Theater of War ...........................

• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting in Small-Scale Contingencies ......................

CHAPTER II

JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING DECISION CYCLES AND COMPON

CONSIDERATIONS

• Introduction ...............................................................................................

• The Joint Targeting Cycle ...........................................................................

• Service-Specific Considerations for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting .............

• Space Force Considerations for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting ..................

CHAPTER III

JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING COMMAND AND CONTROL

• Introduction ...............................................................................................

• The Importance of Joint Target Visibility .....................................................

• The Joint Task Force Commander ...............................................................

• The Joint Task Force Operations Directorate, J-3 ........................................

• The Joint Task Force Intelligence Directorate, J-2 ........................................

• The Joint Targeting Coordination Board .....................................................

• The Joint Fires Element (JFE) ......................................................................

• Joint Targeting Coordination Measures ......................................................

CHAPTER IV

ENGAGING JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS

• Introduction ...............................................................................................

• Centralized Planning ...................................................................................

• Decentralized Execution..............................................................................

• Intelligence/Operations Interface ................................................................

• Engagement Capabilities and Limitations....................................................

• Combat Assessment ...................................................................................
iv

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

B US Central Command TST Procedures and Tools ......................................

C US Forces Korea TST Procedures and Tools .............................................

D Engagement Capabilities and Limitations ..................................................

E Notional Time-Sensitive Target Check List ................................................

F Joint Time-Critical Targets .........................................................................

G References ................................................................................................

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................

Part II Terms and Definitions .....................................................................

FIGURE

Figure I-1 General Target Categories and Subcategories .......................

Figure I-2 Time-Sensitive Target Categories ...........................................

Figure II-1 Joint Targeting Cycle Phases .................................................

Figure II-2 Time-Sensitive Targeting Process ..........................................

Figure II-3 Force Enhancement Operations-Surveillance and

Reconnaissance ......................................................................

Figure III-1 Joint Force Areas of Target/Engagement Responsibilities ....

Figure IV-1 The Combat Assessment Process ..........................................

Figure C-A-1 Shared Target Worksheet “State Diagram” ............................

Figure C-A-2 Target Worksheet ...................................................................

Figure C-A-3 Notional Target Worksheet Distribution Configuration .........

Figure C-B-1 TST Web Page ........................................................................

Figure C-B-2 Target Coordination Log ........................................................

Figure C-B-3 TST Web Page Edit Feature ...................................................

Figure C-C-1 “My Information” Window Set-up .........................................

Figure C-C-2 TST Conference Selection ......................................................

Figure C-C-3 “Text Chat” and Targeting Log Desktop ................................

Figure C-C-4 Enter Target Worksheet ..........................................................

Figure C-C-5 Nominate Target Worksheet ...................................................

Figure C-C-6 Authorize Prosecution Worksheet .........................................

Figure C-C- 7 Clear Execution Worksheet ....................................................

Figure C-C-8 Reported Employment Worksheet ..........................................

Figure C-C-9 Report Results Worksheet ......................................................

Figure F-1 TST/TCT Relationship ...........................................................
1. Introduction

a. In an operational area, surface timesensitive targets (TSTs) located and identified

within a joint force component area of

operations (AO) may be engaged by the

component commander using inside-the-AO

coordination and organic assets. Similarly,

joint force air defense and subsurface forces

have established doctrinal procedures for

engaging adversary air and submarine TSTs.

However, a large proportion of TSTs within

an AO involve cross-boundary and/or multicomponent joint force assets for detection,

analysis, identification, decision, and

execution. These joint TSTs are prioritized,

categorized, coordinated, deconflicted, and

directed for engagement by the joint force.

b. To ensure a common understanding of

the concept of joint TST, this chapter provides

a targeting overview based upon Joint

Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine for

Targeting, JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire

Support, and Air/Land/Sea Application

Center Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures Publication, Targeting.

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

defines TSTs as, “Those targets requiring

immediate response because they pose (or will

soon pose) danger to friendly forces or are

highly lucrative, fleeting targets of

opportunity.” For the purposes of this

handbook, the following terms are used for

ease of understanding:

• A TST is defined as stated above.

• A joint TST refers to a TST that requires

cooperation and/or coordination by two

or more Services or components to

successfully engage. Examples of joint

TSTs include those cases when one

component fires into or th

component’s AO, or when 

attacking a TST could caus

other collateral effects tha

another component’s miss

d. Succeeding chapters wil

force TST decision cycles a

command and control with em

significant role of the joint forc

(JFC), and offer detailed g

recommendations for engaging 

2. Targets

a. JP 1-02, Department 

Dictionary of Military and Asso

defines a target as: “1. An a

installation, force, equipmen

function, or behavior identifie

action to support the commande

guidance, and intent. Targets 

general categories: planned an

2. In intelligence usage, a c

installation, agency, or person 

intelligence operations are dir

area designated and number

firing. 4. In gunfire support usa

burst that hits the target.” T

discusses the first definition on

b. Figure I-1 depicts the g

categories and subcategories.

• Planned targets are tar

known to exist in an operat

against which effects are 

advance or are on-call. Ex

from targets on joint targ

applicable campaign pla

detected in sufficient time 

air tasking order, mission-t

fire support plans. Planne

two subcategories: schedu
I-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

•• Scheduled targets are planned targets

upon which fires will be delivered at a

specific time.

•• On-call targets are planned targets

that are known to exist in an operational

area and are located in sufficient time for

deliberate planning to meet emerging

situations specific to campaign

objectives.

• Immediate targets are those that have

been identified too late, or not selected

for action in time to be included in the

normal targeting process, and therefore

have not been scheduled. Immediate

targets have two subcategories:

unplanned and unanticipated.

•• Unplanned immediate targets are

immediate targets that are known to exist

in an operational area but are not

detected, located, or selected 

in sufficient time to be incl

normal targeting process.

•• Unanticipated immedia

are those immediate targe

unknown or not expected to 

operational area.

3. Targeting

a. Targeting is defined as: “the 

selecting and prioritizing targets an

the appropriate response to th

account of operational require

capabilities.”

b. Target selection at the join

component-level seeks targets that m

objectives, determines desired effect

or tasks the means to achieve those 

Figure I-1. General Target Categories and Subcategories

AND SUBCATEGORIES

IMMEDIATE TARGETS PLANNED

TARGETS

Scheduled

Targets

Unplanned

Immediate

Targets

Unanticipated

Immediate

Targets OnCall

Targets
delivering fires or attacking targets with both

lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive

means. Targeting is a function shared by both

operations and intelligence. However, the

requirement to deconflict duplicative efforts

of different echelons within the same force,

and to synchronize the attack of these targets

with other components of the joint force,

complicates the targeting cycle. Therefore,

an effective and efficient joint targeting cycle

is essential for the JFC and components to

plan and execute joint operations.

4. Joint Targeting

a. Joint targeting may be described as:

“The process of selecting targets within a

JFC’s operational area and matching the

appropriate component responses to them,

considering operational requirements and

capabilities.” Joint targeting is characterized

by the integration and coordination of land,

sea, air, space, and special operations assets

in the target detection and engagement cycle.

b. The purpose of the joint targeting cycle

is to provide the JFC with a target list to

support the joint force campaign objectives

or a subordinate component commander’s

supporting objectives. Consequently,

components must understand the joint

targeting cycle to achieve the effects necessary

to accomplish JFC objectives. For further

details concerning the joint targeting cycle,

refer to Chapter II, Joint Time-Sensitive

Targeting Decision Cycles and Component

Considerations.

c. The focus of the joint targeting cycle can

range from the restricted time and space

constraints of the immediate tactical

environment to the broadest extent of the

geopolitical sphere in the strategic

environment. However, its primary concern

d. The joint targeting cycle 

commander’s campaign plan

scheme of maneuver, and em

military force to achieve a de

endstate. It integrates capabilit

assets, geographic combatan

subordinate joint forces, multin

and component commands, 

possess varying capabilities and 

The joint targeting cycle is d

“cyclical process” with seque

However, the joint targeting cy

continuously operating serie

related, interacting, and int

functions. The six functions

commander’s objectives, guidan

target development, validation

and prioritization; capabilit

commander’s decision and forc

mission planning and force e

combat assessment (CA). The j

cycle is not a static, inflexibl

rather a dynamic one that mu

applied. (See Figure II-1 on pa

e. Joint targeting integrates i

the threat, target system, 

characteristics with operations 

posture, capabilities, weap

objectives, rules of engagemen

doctrine. Joint targeting match

and guidance with inputs from 

operations, and other function

as logistics and communicatio

the forces necessary to achieve t

Joint targeting examines a

nonlethal applications of force 

only nuclear and conven

applications, but also electro

space, and special operations. T

joint targeting must iden

weapon for the intended 

appropriate timing to meet t

established by the JFC.
I-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

a. Other adjectives commonly used to

describe a joint TST are emerging, perishable,

high payoff, short dwell, or critical-mobile.

This handbook deals exclusively with surface

(land or sea) joint TSTs. Most surface TSTs

typically move rapidly and hide throughout

the battlespace, limiting their exposure time,

however, depending upon the operational

situation, fixed targets may also be designated

as joint TSTs.

b. In terms of the joint targeting cycle, the

JFC and component commanders specifically

designate surface joint TSTs as priorities within

the commander’s objectives and guidance

phase. Target development dedicates sensors

for detection and identification, and

weaponeering assessment provides the JFC

options for attack. Force application assigns

attack assets, after which the execution

planning/force execution phase employs force.

c. Examples of mobile surface joint TSTs

include:

• Mobile rocket launchers (MRLs)

• Mobile high threat surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs)

• Naval vessels, military or civ

act of laying mines

• Loaded transporter, erector

(TEL)

• Deployed weapons of mass 

(WMD)

• Deployed theater ballisti

(TBM)

• Armored concentrations m

strike

• Troops in contact situations

• TSTs designated by the J

operation order (OPORD) a

in subsequent fragmenta

(FRAGorders)

d. Fixed surface joint TSTs m

operational-level command cente

their location is determined, 

destroyed quickly to enhance fri

actions. Other fixed-surface joint 

include surface-to-surface miss

bridges. For example, a previously 

Joint TSTs may include armored concentrations.
adversary counterattack.

e. Surface joint TSTs are classified as either

planned or immediate (Figure I-2).

• Planned surface joint TSTs are ordinarily

fixed targets, known to exist in an

operational area, that have been upgraded

to time-sensitive status due to JFC/

component commander priorities. This

is normally the result of a newly acquired

“short dwell” status that presents an

exceptional operational or tactical

opportunity. Fires and attacks are placed

on-call against planned surface joint

TSTs. Generally, surface joint TSTs (as

planned targets) are limited in number.

• Immediate surface joint TSTs are mobile

TSTs against which fire or attacks

have not been scheduled. Some fixed

joint TSTs also may be immediate.

•• Unplanned immediat

TSTs are those known to 

operational area but hav

attacks scheduled. They 

the largest category of surfa

They require established p

proactive, timely acquisiti

and immediate response o

The JFC directs componen

to assign adequate atta

respond to all unplanne

surface joint TSTs in an op

In situations where a JFC 

commander does not ha

attack assets, prioritization 

•• Unanticipated imme

joint TSTs are those surfa

not expected or unknown 

operational area. This categ

joint TST is often highly 

Figure I-2. Time-Sensitive Target Categories

TIME SENSITIVE

TARGET CATEGORIES

PLANNED TARGETS

(KNOWN) IMMEDIATE TARGETS

Scheduled Unplanned

Targets

(Known)

On-Call Unanticipated Targets

(Unknown)

Time-Sensitive Targets
I-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

acquisition and immediate response are

still required. JFC/component

commanders can minimize the effect of

this element of surprise by ensuring

procedures are flexible to responses

against this type of target.

6. Joint Time-Sensitive

Targeting in a Major Theater

of War

a. The joint TST cycle is essentially the

same in major theaters of war (MTW) and

small-scale contingencies (SSC). However,

in a MTW, the geographic combatant

commander normally establishes broad

targeting guidance during theater campaigns

and major operations. This guidance may

impact on the JFC designation of joint TSTs

within the operational area.

b. In some cases, strike approval may be

required from the combatant commander

and/or Secretary of Defense, depending on

political considerations.

c. The appropriate response for each joint

TST is often heavily dependent on the level

of conflict, the clarity of the desired outcome,

and ROE. For example, during a MTW the

JFC may be able to accept a higher level of

risk to friendly forces and noncombatants to

ensure a quicker response when attacking

adversary WMDs. But during a limited

contingency operation, the risk of collateral

damage may require more detailed and

time-consuming coordination.

d. Targets are prioritized based on the JFC

objectives and guidance and the differing

requirements of joint force components as

they strive to achieve the joint force

objectives. The joint targeting cycle integrates

military force to achieve the JFC’s objectives,

gravity and interdiction of adver

integral part of joint planning du

operations. With the advice of 

commanders, JFCs set prioritie

targeting guidance, and determine 

of effort to be provided to various 

The JFC identifies and clearly p

joint TSTs for acquisition and e

Subordinate commanders recomm

JFC how to use their combat p

effectively to achieve the objectiv

e. The joint intelligence sec

support joint TST development wi

of the theater Joint Intelligence C

at the geographic combatant com

or the joint intelligence suppo

(JISE), at the subordinate joint task 

level. Component intelligence 

intelligence organizations, a

augmentation from national in

agencies, also contribute. The 

provides the coordination of i

resources, reporting, and services 

the tactical commanders.

f. The theater JIC is located at 

command level and integrates all n

Department of Defense s

capabilities to develop a current 

picture. The National Mili

Intelligence Center (NMJIC) sup

efforts. The theater JIC is the 

intelligence activities supportin

J-2, and components and provid

source analysis and target material

the targeting and CA process.

g. At the JTF, a JISE assists in c

JIC operations. However, curre

systems do not allow unified

coordination and deconflict

components. Likewise, nation

theater sensors do not necessarily 

components with a “common pic
battlespace to the air component’s Theater

Integrated Situation Display (TISD). As a

result, components view the battlespace from

their unique perspective.

7. Joint Time-Sensitive

Targeting in Small-Scale

Contingencies

a. As was previously mentioned, during a

limited contingency operation, the desire to

minimize collateral damage may require more

detailed and time-consuming targeting

coordination than in a MTW.

b. All military operations are driven by

political considerations. However, SSCs, such

as military operations other than war

(MOOTW), are more sensitive to such

considerations due to the overriding goal to

prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.

In MOOTW, political considerations

permeate all levels and the military may not

be the primary player. As a result, these

operations normally have more restrictive

targeting ROE than in a MTW.

c. As in a MTW, the goal in a SSC is to

achieve national objectives as quickly as

possible and conclude military operations on

terms favorable to the United States and its

allies/coalition partners. However, the

purposes of conducting a SSC may be

multiple, with the relative importance or

hierarchy of such purposes changing or

unclear; for example, to deter potential

aggressors, protect national interests, support

the United Nations (UN) or regional

organizations, satisfy treaty obligations,

support civil authorities, or provide foreign

humanitarian assistance (FHA). The specific

goal of a SSC may be peaceful settlement,

assistance rendered to civil authorities, or

providing security for FHA.

counterdrug operations, enf

sanctions, nation assistance, n

evacuation operations, peace 

strikes and raids. Joint TST 

requires special emphasis on the 

need to limit collateral damag

emphasis on limiting collateral 

dictate an increased employmen

engagement kinetic weapons o

nonlethal JTF assets.

e. ROE in SSCs are gen

restrictive, detailed, and sensiti

concerns than in MTW, consiste

the right of self-defense. ROE 

are balanced between the nee

and restraint. Restraint is best a

targeting ROE issued at the be

operation address most anticipa

that may arise. ROE should b

reviewed and revised as necess

f. During SSCs, joint force j

associated fire support capabi

more limited, with fewer nation

assets available, than in a MTW

components establish a force li

equipment, and supplies) an

movement requirements to sup

joint force operation. The 

combatant commander, in coor

other commanders, then de

military forces and other na

required to accomplish the mis

or requests the military forces, a

the command relationships for t

Because the joint force force 

related to the joint force missi

component engagement capabil

will reflect the current joint forc

normally will be significantly l

allocated during a MTW.
I-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Introduction

The surface and air targeting processes are

well documented in JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine

for Targeting, Appendix C. Accordingly,

this chapter focuses on the joint targeting

cycle, TST processes, and Service-specific

and space force enhancement TST

considerations.

2. The Joint Targeting Cycle

a. The joint targeting cycle establishes the

distinct qualities of each targeting function in

its corresponding phase within t

joint targeting cycle has 

commander’s objectives, guidan

target development, validation

and prioritization; capabilit

commander’s decision and forc

mission planning and force e

CA. (See Figure II-1)

• Phase 1 - Commander’

Guidance, and Intent

objectives support the 

Defense's desired endstate f

of military actions, while 

provided with the objecti

Figure II-1. Joint Targeting Cycle Phases

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

JOINT TARGETING

CYCLE

Commander’s

Decision and Force

Assignment

Target Developm

Validation,

Nomination, a

Prioritization

Commander’s

Objectives, Guidance, and Intent

Mission Planning and Force Execution

Combat

Assessment

Capabilities

Analysis
II-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

intent summarizes the “bottom-line” to

subordinates so that all know the general

idea of what must be accomplished in the

fight and why. Understanding the

commander’s objectives, guidance,

and intent is the most important phase

in the joint targeting cycle, because it

encapsulates all the higher national-level

guidance in a set of outcomes relevant to

the present warfighting situation and sets

the course for all that follows.

• Phase 2 - Target Development,

Validation, Nomination, and

Prioritization. The JFC’s objectives are

normally directed against adversary

capabilities. These capabilities are

themselves enabled by physical and virtual

infrastructures. Critical to the success of

the targeting cycle is the establishment of

intelligence requirements. Targeteers

must work closely with collection

managers to ensure that target

development, and pre-strike and poststrike requirements, are integrated into the

collection plan. This intelligence support

is vital for the analysis performed in target

development, as well as to prepare for

future targeting during the execution

of operations. Integral to target

development is target validation. Target

validation determines whether a target

remains a viable element of the target

system and whether, under the law of

armed conflict (LOAC), it is a permissible

target. Once potential targets are identified

and validated, they are nominated through

the proper channels for approval, generally

involving their deliberation in a

coordinating body, such as a joint force or

component target board/meeting. Targets

are then prioritized based on the JFC’s

objectives and guidance and the mutual

• Phase 3 - Capabilities 

Coincident with the determ

targets and desired outcome

targets, it is necessary to sele

promising forces for applica

those targets. This phase o

targeting cycle involves est

effects of lethal or nonlet

against specific targets. Its p

weigh the relative effica

available forces as an aid to 

the objectives set forth by th

subordinate commanders. 

capabilities analysis phase is 

the results can be merge

individual component target n

to create the target recommen

the JFC. The essential elemen

targeting cycle is to link 

effects to the JFC’s objective

• Phase 4 - Commander’s D

Force Assignment. Target 

lists and associated forces 

through the appropriate co

bodies representing the j

components and national i

groups to ensure compli

commander’s objectives, gu

intent. Once the JFC has ap

target list, or elements there

orders are prepared and rele

executing components and f

joint targeting process fac

publication of tasking 

providing amplifying in

necessary for detailed f

planning of operations. This p

joint targeting cycle sets the s

planning and execution of ope

perform discrete tasks in 

support of over-arching obje
the execution of operations. The joint

targeting cycle supports this planning by

providing the tactical-level planners with

direct access to detailed information on

the targets, supported by the nominating

component’s analytical reasoning that

linked the target with the desired effect

(Phase 2).

• Phase 6 - Combat Assessment. CA

is a crucial part of operations. The joint

targeting process provides short-term

assistance for immediate decisions and

aids long-term planning for the

composition and capabilities of future

forces. This is essential to provide to the

JFC a fully developed picture of the

battlespace. A critical ingredient for

effective CA is an understanding of all

aspects of target development and its link

to the JFC’s objectives and guidance. CA

is performed at all levels. At the JTF

level, the CA process should normally

be an all source joint program supported

by all components and designed to

determine if the required effects on the

or apportioned missions. 

impacts the JFC’s ap

nominations and decision. 

commander makes these 

The end product of CA at t

level is an assessment that i

into strategy and guidance 

CA is composed of thre

components: battle damag

(BDA), munitions e

assessment (MEA), and fu

or reattack recommendat

target nominations a

recommendations, merge 

what was done (BDA) wi

done (MEA) and compa

with predetermined m

effectiveness that were de

start of the joint targeting 

purposes of this phase in th

to determine degree o

achieving objectives and to 

required follow-up actions

readiness to move on to ne

path to achieving the 

objectives.

Upon receipt of tasking orders, detailed planning is performed

for the execution of operations.
II-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

cycle in a short time. The JFC has several

options with which to structure C2 operations

for attacks against TSTs. One of the key

elements in reducing the coordination time

for these attacks is to delegate the authority

to engage as low in the chain of command

as possible. Though the overall responsibility

for the mission will remain with the various

component commanders, the authority to

engage should be delegated within the C2

node that has the best information or

situational awareness to perform the mission

and has direct communications with firing

units. Placing the appropriate level of

battlespace awareness at subordinate C2

nodes can streamline the C2 cycle and allow

timely engagement of these targets. The

decentralized C2 nodes can exchange sensor,

status, and target information with a fidelity

that permits them to operate as a single,

integrated C2 entity. Tied together by wide

area networks and common interactive

c. Compressed Decision Cycle

successful attack of TSTs re

targeting process to be signific

compressed, each individual join

cycle phase is still performed 

those unique TST instances spec

JFC. To successfully time-co

targeting cycle, the joint force and 

staffs must be thoroughly famili

details of each phase of the cycle a

specific nodes or cells in the join

components responsible for each 

the process. Conducting det

planning and coordination bet

forces, a thorough intelligence 

of the battlespace (IPB), em

of interoperable command

communications, computers, and 

(C4I) systems, and clear guidan

constitutes a TST, all save consid

Figure II-2. Time-Sensitive Targeting Process

Target

TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING PROCESS

Detect

Locate

Identify

Assess

Strike

Decide

RESTRIKE
For the initial engagement, the outer cycle

(detect, locate, identify, decide, and strike) is

used. After the initial engagement, both cycles

run at the same time and interact through

analysis at the decision step. The six steps of

the mission cycle interact continuously at the

decision stage where target analysis is

performed.

3. Service-Specific

Considerations for Joint

Time-Sensitive Targeting

a. Air/Ground Operations. The theater

air-ground system (TAGS) is the functional

architecture through which interoperable air/

ground operations occur. Joint air operations

are normally directed from a joint air

operations center (JAOC). Depending on the

appointed joint force air component

commander (JFACC), the JAOC may either

be an Air Force forces (AFFOR) air operations

center (AOC), Marine Corps forces

(MARFOR) aviation combat element tactical

air command center (TACC), or Navy forces

(NAVFOR) tactical air control center (TACC).

Ground operations are normally directed

through an operations center, such as the Army

forces (ARFOR) tactical operations center

(TOC) or MARFOR combat operations center

(COC). Other key ARFOR agencies for

ground operations are the fire support element

(FSE), Army Air and Missile Defense

Command (AAMDC), deep operations

coordination cell (DOCC), and air, missile

defense planning coordination system tactical

operations center (AMD PCS TOC). Key

MARFOR agencies include the force fires

coordination center (FFCC), fire support

coordination center (FSCC), and fire direction

center (FDC). The NAVFOR supports ground

operations with the supporting arms

coordination center (SACC).

• Deconfliction of the battle

• Coordination and synch

attack assets

• Expeditious joint target co

• Transmission of joint battle

and coordination measure

• Conversion of target coordi

latitude/longitude (LAT

universal transverse merca

• Exchange of component 

target lists

• Employment of common g

(grid boxes)

• Enhancement of mutua

situational awareness

c. Liaison Agencies. Betwe

and the land or maritime 

commander, liaison agencies ex

coordination, deconfliction, syn

and integration of operati

established JAOC, the ARFO

battlefield coordination detach

Liaison officers (LNO), as 

represent the MARFOR and NA

Army Corps has an attached 

operations center (ASOC) that i

aligned to coordinate close 

Similarly, the MARFOR opera

support center (DASC) to c

operations with land operation

the MARFOR COC or ARF

appropriate.

d. Unique Air/Ground C2 

The ARFOR and AFFOR em

capabilities that enhance joint T
II-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

DOCC into the AO. The DOCC is a C2

node that plans, coordinates, and

manages deep operations; to include

surface joint TST attacks, within the land

force commander’s AO. The DOCC

develops deep attack plans and selects

attack assets based on several factors

including the location of attack assets

with respect to targets, the operational

status of attack assets, target ranges, the

number and type of missions in progress,

munitions available, the adversary air

defense threat, and the accuracy of the

targeting acquisition data. This targetweapon pairing process is automatic.

Targets that can be better serviced by joint

or other component assets will be

nominated to joint headquarters for

prosecution (such as a JAOC). DOCCs

may recommend direct sensor-toshooter dissemination of targeting

information to meet critical timelines

associated with urgent joint TSTs.

The DOCC may employ an AMD PCS

TOC to decentralize execution of surface

TST attacks.

• Interconnectivity. Currently fielded C4I

systems have significant limitations in

electronic interconnectivity and

automated data planning between the

JAOC (whether it be the USAF AOC,

USMC TACC, or USN TACC) and the

BCD. See Appendices A through C for

recommendations establishing joint TST

collaborative tools. Presently, only

verbal and manual hardcopy

coordination and deconfliction occurs.

Similar limitations exist between

the ARFOR TOC/MARFOR COC

and ASOC/DASC. The level of

interoperability is solely dependent on the

ability of personnel in all organizations

to work with each other. However,

component unique C2 systems exist:

a set of 54 applications, of w

used jointly by all Services, th

planning, execution, and i

processing in support of the ai

for force and unit level operat

developed from re-engineeri

air operations application 

Contingency Theater A

Planning System and 

Command and Control Syst

Command and Control Syste

Integrated Imagery and Intell

the Defense Information In

Common Operating En

(DII COE); commercial-of

(COTS); and other supplied 

products. TBMCS also uses 

Unified Build (UB) core an

components to produce an al

Common Operational Picture 

presents an integrated battlesp

•• Advanced Field Artille

Data System. The adva

artillery tactical data system 

is the primary C2 fire supp

for the ARFOR/MARFOR

digitally links the land/a

force commander with their 

operations centers, FSE/F

firing units (to include 

tactical missile system [A

AFATDS enables timely and 

C2 connectivity, sharing of 

awareness, and coordin

deconfliction of surface TS

•• AFATDS - TBMCS 

Currently, AFATDS and T

undergoing modifications to 

system to share key el

information. Initially, AF

TBMCS will be able to share 

air information (such as th

airspace control plan [ACP]) a
•• Information Requirements:

Interoperable air/ground operations in the

pursuit of surface joint TST attacks

require information to be passed between

air and ground C2 agencies.

4. Space Force Considerations

for Joint Time-Sensitive

Targeting

a. Space systems and space-based

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) assets can provide increased battlespace

awareness to a JFC. Space systems may be

able to detect an adversary’s movement

and support a TST engagement before its

actions can affect the friendly operation.

b. Precision navigation and smart

munitions permit the engagement of targets

with the minimum number of weapons needed

to achieve the desired effect while minimizing

collateral damage. This allows a JFC to

application of overwhelming 

points of attack. For exam

navigation signals can impr

accuracy, thus increasing the 

kill against fixed targets, minimi

damage and allowing use of ad

off munitions to increase crew 

c. The unique advantag

coverage, wide fields of v

capability to revisit targets mak

of the Earth from space a powerf

forces can have access to any p

and proper management of sate

constellations offers overflight 

d. Intelligence, Surveil

Reconnaissance. ISR is the a

personnel and capabilities that pro

information about a given operati

monitoring of air, land, and maritim

space contributes to the JFC

awareness by providing inf

adversary threat locations, dis

intentions. (See Figure II-3)

Space systems may be able to detect an adversary’s movement.
II-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

• Intelligence. Space systems contribute

to the development of intelligence

through surveillance and reconnaissance

activities.

• Surveillance. Space systems can provide

commanders with systematic observation

of space, air, surface or subsurface areas,

places, persons, or things by visual, aural,

electronic, photographic, or other means

that provides commanders with increased

situational awareness within a given

operational area.

• Reconnaissance. Because space systems

have unrestricted overflight of otherwise

denied areas, they can gather information

about the activities and resources of an

adversary or potential adversary, or

provide data concerning meteorological,

hydrographic, or geographic

characteristics of a particular area.

e. Space Liaison Officers, Joint Space

Support Teams, and Component Space

Support Teams and Support Personnel

• Space Liaison Officers. US Space

Command (USSPACECOM) LNO may

be attached to supported combatant

command staffs in order to help ensure

that space-based capabilities are

appropriately integrated into 

combatant commander’s 

operations, training, and exe

• Joint Space Support Tea

request of a supported c

commander and on order of th

of Defense, USSPACECOM 

task-organized joint space su

(JSST) to the operation

(OPCON) of the supported c

to facilitate tasking and use of 

forces, and ensure that space 

provided to the supported 

commander. JSSTs provide 

the combatant commande

reach-back to USSPACECO

Operations Center (SPOC)

examples of tailored support p

JSSTs to the JFC include:

•• Facilitating the distributio

warning data and other sp

information to the theater

•• Forecasting the vulne

friendly operations to obse

satellites of hostile nations

•• Providing information 

space reliance and methods 

exploit) adversary utilizatio

Figure II-3. Force Enhancement Operations-Surveillance and Reconnaiss

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance

Surveillance

World-wide access

Quick reaction

Atmospheric distur

Predictable overflig

schedule

APPLICATION ADVANTAGES LIMITATION
•• Providing deconfliction of space

systems requirements between the

component commanders

•• Providing detailed information on US

and foreign satellite capabilities and

operational status and the threat posed

by foreign space systems

•• Coordinating in-theater space control

assets

• Component Space Support Teams and

Support Personnel. In addition to

JSST support, the commander,

USSPACECOM may also direct space

component commanders to provide

tailored SSTs. Both Army Space

Command (ARSPACE) and Naval Space

Command (NAVSPACECOM) have

SSTs that are task-organized and

equipped to meet the needs of the

supported combatant commander. The

USAF does not maintain SSTs but has

integrated space support personnel into

all Air Force component staffs. Specific

•• Analysis of impac

capabilities on courses of 

•• IPB

•• Mission rehearsal supp

•• Imagery and rectified 

imagery (MSI) products in s

•• Predicted global positi

(GPS) navigation signal ac

to support TST

•• Adversary and comm

order of battle assessment

•• Orbit predictions t

vulnerabilities of forces o

and availability of US, a

commercial satellites

•• Space-based informati

and necessary reach-back
II-10

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Introduction

Pre-established and well-rehearsed C2

procedures are essential to the timely

engagement of joint TSTs. Beginning with

the JFC’s guidance on what constitutes a joint

TST within the operational area, levels of

acceptable risk are established and specific

guidance is disseminated to joint force

component commands. Joint force

headquarters elements and components

identify, monitor, and track targets and

recommend target engagement priorities to the

JFC. C2 coordination measures establish the

parameters that are necessary to successfully

engage targets across component boundaries

and liaison elements within the joint force

expedite the joint targeting process.

2. The Importance of Joint

Target Visibility

a. The JFC has several options with which

to structure C2 operations for attacks against

joint TSTs. Though the overall responsibility

for the mission execution remains with the

component commanders, the 

engage may be delegated to the 

has the best information o

awareness to perform the missi

specified by the supported an

relationship of the C2 nod

Placing the appropriate level o

awareness at component C

streamline the C2 cycle and 

engagement of these tar

decentralized C2 nodes can exc

status, and target information w

that permits them to operate 

integrated C2 entity. Tied toge

area networks and common 

displays, they can effectiv

decentralized, coordinated 

joint time-sensitive attacks. Se

A through C for recomme

establishing and using joint TST 

tools.

b. Fire support plann

coordinators should ensure 

acquisition systems are identifie

on detecting and locating pri

Staffs should ensure that targe

Target acquisition systems must be focused on locating priority targets
III-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

from adjacent and supporting elements.

c. Timely response is key to successful

joint TST attack. To expedite joint TST

response times, rapid communications and

coordination between the components and

their elements are vital. Often there are formal

liaison elements in place to do just that. An

example of one such liaison element is the

BCD situated within the JAOC. The BCD

stays abreast of the operational situation and

provides information reports to its higher

headquarters. If the BCD, or any other

element, recommends direct attack of a

joint TST, the affected commander must

be informed as soon as practicable.

d. In-flight reports are also a valuable

source of target information. Information on

joint TSTs should be passed to responsible

commands immediately. The JAOC, ASOC,

airborne battlefield command and control

center (ABCCC), Joint Surveillance, Target

Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Airborne

Warning and Control System (AWACS), and

radar sites monitor in-flight reports and are

able to expedite target information to the

appropriate component commands via

component liaison links.

3. The Joint Force Commander

a. Commander’s Guidance

• The JFC develops guidance that directs

and focuses operational planning and

targeting. The commander’s objectives

and guidance identify what is to be

achieved and under what conditions

and parameters. This is the most

important stage in the joint targeting

cycle. Without clear understanding of

what is to be achieved, it is impossible

for efficient targeting strategies to be

guidance should also clearly 

coordinate joint TST pr

Unclear guidance may 

misunderstandings and c

procedures throughout the joi

delay attacks on joint TS

guidance provides the fram

employing forces to ac

objectives.

• During the commander’s obj

guidance phase, the JFC/c

commander designates spec

joint TSTs as priorities 

immediate response. Als

establishes specific guidan

coordination, deconflic

synchronization will occ

components assigned in the 

area. Once this guidance i

planned and reactive proc

attacking surface joint 

established. JFC guidanc

basic procedural framewo

components to comply 

commander’s intent and 

targeting of surface jo

Commanders should also p

review in-place TST gui

possible adjustments to keep 

changing situations and the fl

or operation.

• Defining joint TSTs, as a m

focused target set, is insu

guarantee proper plan

coordination to allow r

effective prosecution. The 

the JFC or component com

designate their priorit

commander’s guidance. A 

list of joint TSTs can then be 

using this guidance. How

some joint TSTs may be u

unanticipated during norma
cycles, the commander’s joint TST

guidance should be broad enough to

allow quick designation of, and response

to, a new joint TST type, while still

following the commander’s intent.

• JFCs must also clearly define what a joint

TST is so components have a common

understanding of what constitutes a joint

TST. In this regard, the JFC and

component commanders must identify

those joint TSTs that truly require

immediate action and are not just

highly mobile or merely lucrative

targets.

• JFC objectives and guidance to

component commanders enable and

support different phases of the joint

targeting process. Examples include:

•• Identification and assignment of

primary sensors and weapon systems

specifically assigned to support attacks

on joint TSTs.

•• Establishment of planned, deconflicted

fire areas (with definable trigger events)

against specific surface joint TSTs.

•• Directives to componen

to task assets for standby 

missions as backup to pri

and weapon systems. An e

be the JFACC designating 

likely to be diverted to 

operations.

•• Determination of surfa

engagement authority and 

supporting relationships b

component commander A

commander assigned m

combination thereof.

•• If necessary, specifica

few, exceptional circums

component commande

acquire specific surface 

have authority for 

engagement responsibili

of assigned AO or miss

words, the JFC should de

situations, if any, wher

destruction of the immine

outweighs the potential fo

duplication of effort. In

determination, to whateve

allow a component to 

JFCs must clearly define a joint TST.
III-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

should be accomplished before

engagement. The JFC carefully balances

the risk between the surface TST threat

and the potential for fratricide.

•• Identification of specific

communication/data links between

component C2 elements to conduct rapid

coordination. This includes authorizing

direct liaison and coordination authority.

Establishment of priority sensor to

shooter communication links with

defined conditions for circumventing

normal command/coordination channels,

to improve timeliness of response.

•• The JFC also communicates guidance

and intent to component commanders to

allow them the flexibility to make the

proper decision regarding rapid selection

of “best capable” attack asset.

•• The JFC objectives and guidance are

shaped by the principles of war, the

LOAC, and established ROE.

b. Rules of Engagement

Defense and operational co

US forces all operate under sta

of engagement (SROE). The 

the SROE is to enable the in

of self-defense and provide g

the application of force f

accomplishment. US For

apply to all military oper

contingencies including war. 

components and supporting c

are responsible for ensuring c

• The JFC provides guidance 

that may not be engaged unde

or applicable ROE. The JF

make available specific 

operational area-wide employ

as a certain number of AT

Tomahawk land-attack 

(TLAMs).

• Many air defense threa

identified in enough tim

suppression. This “o

suppression is usually unp

includes aircrew self-defense 

against targets of opportunity

Air defense threats may not be identified in time to plan suppression.
• Certain joint TSTs, designated by the

JFC may preclude the use of normal

coordination procedures. In such cases,

appropriate coordination measures, prior

coordination, on-scene command, and

ROE should allow rapid attack of these

targets. Joint TSTs and other targets of

opportunity should be coordinated

between affected component

commanders prior to attack. When

mission objectives, desired effects, and

general deconfliction and time

sequencing have been jointly planned

and integrated, details such as attack

tactics and individual mission

deconfliction can be worked out by

components responsible for execution.

c. Acceptable Risk

• The initial risk assessment is key to

responsive joint TST prosecution. With

the compression of the decision cycle

comes increased risks due to insufficient

time for more detailed coordination.

Therefore, the requirement for early risk

assessment and determining what

constitutes acceptable risk becomes vital

to an efficient joint TST program. Time

compression and the resulting

increased risk requires dedicated

means for expediting cross component/

staff coordination. The solution lies in

thorough training, detailed operating

procedures, robust real-time

communications, and an enabling

collaborative tool. When target

acquisition of an emerging joint TST

occurs, operators rely upon JFC’s

guidance and their own experience to

assess acceptable risk.

• Understanding the level of risk

acceptable to the JFC is a critical aspect

of successful joint TST engagement.

causes an increase in 

considerations must be bal

the danger of not attacking 

in time and thus risking m

or harm to friendly forces

considered in the risk asses

•• Risk to friendly forces

••• Possible fratricide

••• Increased risk to at

due to less time for 

coordination

•• Risk to noncombatant

collateral damage

•• Disruption of divertin

their deliberately planned 

•• Risk of possible redund

•• Accepted use of n

weapons

• JFC’s guidance may stipul

of acceptable risk when eng

joint TSTs. Specific join

be such a threat to the 

mission accomplishment 

is willing to accept a highe

and attack the target 

upon its detection. In its s

this may mean announcin

is about to be fired on rathe

for confirmation of 

deconfliction. More comm

associated with joint TST

possible trade-off of diverti

and/or attack assets from 

mission to that of a joint TS

involved in the prosecu

TSTs must have a clear un

of the risks involved and 
III-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

time required for coordination against

the danger of not engaging the target

in time.

• While the JFC may accept an

increased risk of fratricide in attacking

joint TSTs, this does not eliminate the

requirement to try to minimize this

risk during joint TST engagements.

• Once a joint TST is identified, the major

steps required to prosecute it are similar

to those in the deliberate joint targeting

process. The key to accomplishing the

required steps quickly enough to be

effective against joint TSTs is to do as

much of the coordination and decisionmaking ahead of time as possible.

Successful prosecution of joint TSTs

requires a well organized and well

rehearsed process for sharing sensor data,

targeting information, identification of

suitable strike assets, obtaining mission

approval, and rapid clearance for weapon

employment.

• The appropriate response for each joint

TST is heavily dependent on the level of

conflict, the clarity of the desired

outcome, and the ROE. For example, to

ensure a quicker response during a major

theater contingency the JFC m

to accept a higher level of risk 

forces and noncombata

attacking adversary WMD. 

a SSC, the risk of collateral d

require more detailed 

consuming coordination.

• Of particular concern in risk m

are those situations where it is 

that joint TSTs may develop 

force rear area. Coordin

deconfliction of these t

especially difficult since the 

balance the need for fast res

the uncertainties of accurate 

all the personnel in the rear 

military and civilian.

d. Sample Joint Force Com

Joint TST Guidance

• Normally, the JFC will des

TSTs in a joint force OPORD 

the list in subsequent j

FRAGorders.

• Once a joint TST list has be

by the JFC, the desired ef

immediate destruction, 5

damage, etc.) and the level of 

Prosecution of joint TSTs requires a well organized process for sharing dat
responsibilities of the joint force

components should be spelled out in

detail. If joint TSTs are of sufficient

importance to be designated joint TST,

per the JFC guidance, a joint force staff

would probably want to ensure that they

are kept informed after each engagement.

• For a notional joint force with a mission

of protecting a host nation’s key

leadership and keeping local sea lanes of

communication open against an

adversary that has threatened use of

WMD, an example of JFC joint TST

guidance in the joint force OPORD could

resemble the following:

“Joint TSTs. Joint TSTs are

designated as follows:

• Maritime vessels, military or civilian,

in the act of laying mines.

• Adversary unconventional warfare/

special operations forces.

• Adversary weapons systems capable

of engaging the host nation’s capital.

These joint TSTs require expedient

identification and engagement

consistent with a compressed joint

targeting cycle. Destruction of these

joint TSTs is desired.”

4. The Joint Force Operations

Directorate, J-3

a. The J-3 assists the JFC in the discharge

of assigned responsibility for the direction and

control of operations, beginning with initial

planning, follow-through, and completion of

specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3

effective unity of effort. If a j

coordination board (JTCB) is e

the JFC, the J-3 will normally 

JTCB and serve as a member.

b. Normally, the J-3 fires 

prepares draft targeting gu

objectives in conjunction w

planning group (JPG). This 

submitted to the JTCB member

and then sent to the JFC for ap

approval, the guidance is 

subordinate headquarters a

planning and joint TST develo

c. At the JTF level, the joi

center (JOC) is the foca

synchronizing and integrating jo

and fires throughout the JO

instances, JFCs have established 

teams in the JOC to addre

engagement within the JOA.

d. The joint force J-3 norm

joint targeting related duties as 

• Provides current operation

• Publishes the JFC’s jo

guidance and objectives a

daily joint targeting guida

• The joint integrated priorit

(JIPTL), restricted target l

no-strike list (NSL) are re

JTCB. The J-3 forwards 

the JFC for approval. F

approval, they are used 

targeting planning process

• Develops, for JFC approv

fire support coordinati

(FSCMs) and other 

measures submitted by co

subordinate commanders.
III-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

component commander forward

boundaries.

• Provides the JTCB with the

commander’s joint targeting objectives,

boundary, and FSCM changes for future

operations to assist in the development

of future targeting requirements.

• Recommends targets for inclusion in the

JIPTL as part of the JFC’s planning staff.

• Monitors, and integrates as appropriate,

targets in support of information

operations (IO) objectives.

• Nominates targets in support of the

theater deception plan.

5. The Joint Force Intelligence

Directorate, J-2

a. The theater JIC provides the

coordination of intelligence resources,

reporting, and services to support the joint

force.

the warfighting process. For t

effective target development by the 

an important contribution to 

execution of a JFC’s campaign pla

c. The J-2 oversees the in

operations of the joint force an

intelligence to all levels of the co

planning, directing, and c

operations. The J-2 is the staff a

the primary responsibility for prio

intelligence collection efforts, targ

validation, and BDA. Additional

a major participant in the detectio

and the target prioritization p

addition, the J-2 provides a signi

to the J-3 and/or J-5 in the form o

COA assessments critical to the 

prioritization process and ident

joint TSTs.

d. Joint targeting related duti

normally performed by the J-2 are 

• Assists the J-3 and J-5 in 

targeting guidance, prior

objectives for inclusion in 

The J-2 oversees the intelligence operations of the joint force.
• Identifies joint TSTs for immediate

attack based on inputs using all-source

fusion analysis in the JIC or JISE.

• Recommends targets for inclusion in the

JIPTL.

• Supports target development for

components via the JOC.

• Assists the J-3 in development of the JFC

RTL and/or NSL.

• Manages theater collection priorities via

the daily aerial reconnaissance and

surveillance conference and maintains

appropriate collection operations

management liaison with the components

and national intelligence agencies during

execution.

• Manages JFC’s priority intelligence

requirements.

• Serves as executive agent for overall

coordination and direction of the JFC

BDA cell within the JIC or JISE in

support of the J-3’s CA.

• Provides the theater and/or JOA

intelligence assessment.

6. The Joint Targeting

Coordination Board

a. Typically, JFCs organize a JTCB. If the

JFC so designates, the JTCB may be an

integrating center for the targeting oversight

effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In

either case, it must be a joint activity

comprised of representatives from the joint

force staff, all components and, if deemed

necessary, their subordinate units.

Component and joint force staff 

on the JTCB should also possess 

rank, experience, and knowle

authoritatively for their 

components and staff elements

c. The JFC defines the role 

The JTCB provides a forum 

components can articulate s

priorities for future operations 

they are synchronized and int

JTCB normally refines the dr

presentation to the JFC for app

d. In multinational operatio

may be subordinate to a m

targeting coordination board, 

their agents representing the joi

multinational board.

e. The JTCB is typically re

the following:

• Reviews targeting informa

• Develops targeting gu

priorities.

• Refines the draft J

responsibility may be dele

• Maintains a complete list 

targets and areas wh

operations forces (SOF) o

reconnaissance units are 

avoid fratricide and end

current or future operation

• Maintains a macro-level 

operational area and e

targeting nominations are c

the JFC’s concept of opera
III-10

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

f. The JTCB may address at least three joint

planning cycles that are either being planned

or are about to be executed. A three-part

possible agenda follows.

• Review. The first section is a review of

previous assumptions, plans, and

decisions that will be executed within the

next 24 to 48 hours. This is a final review

of the next day’s targeting plan(s) to

ensure that it is still valid. The plan is

balanced against the latest CA and the

projected adversary and friendly

situations. This review is the JTCB’s

final chance to modify the approved

targeting priorities before it is executed.

It should be noted that the JTCB is

concerned with future operations, not the

current battle. The operators already

have the current day’s targeting plan(s)

in hand and are preparing to execute.

Changing priorities on the day of

execution is possible, but that will

normally be handled through the J-3

rather than the JTCB. Moreover,

component commanders are normally

authorized to make execution day

changes compelled by current conditions

consistent with the JFC’s intent and

mission objectives.

• Plan. The second portion of the agenda

covers the main focus of the daily JTCB;

i.e., approving or validating the joint fires

plan to be executed 48-72 hours out. The

board will review the proposed JIPTL

and apportionment recommendation. If

necessary, the board may recommend a

target or target set be handled by a

specific component. The planning phase

of the JTCB ensures that operations (to

include SOF), IO, fires, and intelligence

are fully integrated and coordinated in a

complementary effort throughout the

depth of the battlespace.

out. The targeting guidance a

approved for the 72 to 96 ho

will guide the components targ

for the upcoming joint targe

The approval of the JFC or 

representative is usual

immediately upon adjournm

JTCB. The targeting-related d

then promulgated in mess

throughout the joint force.

7. The Joint Fires Elem

(JFE)

a. The JFC may approve the fo

a JFE within the joint force J-3. 

an optional staff element tha

recommendations to the J-3 to 

fires planning and coordination

duties would be assigned by th

approval by the JFC and may inc

all of the J-3’s tasks previously ide

JFE would provide the cap

accomplish fires planning and c

functions. Essentially, the JFE i

subject matter expert on joint 

recommends joint fires guidance a

priorities. The JFE has n

authority.

b. In its role as the JTCB prim

the JFE may pass guidance and app

decisions to the joint force compon

JFE responsibilities could include

• Coordinates the drafting of 

JIPTL with the J-2.

• Assists the JIC in developing 

targets (HVT) and high-pay

(HPT).

• Prepares and dissemina

bulletins.
• Monitors for the J-3 TST attack

operations and makes recommendations

for deconfliction.

• Deconflicts and validates target

nominations originating at the JFC level

and higher, then prioritizes and forwards

to the J-3 for review and eventual

transmission to the JFACC’s JAOC for

inclusion in the JIPTL.

• Identifies potential conflicts in

preparation for the JTCB.

• Organizes a strategy team to address

intermediate targeting efforts to bridge

the gap between current operations and

future plans being developed.

8. Joint Targeting Coordination

Measures

a. JFCs employ various maneuver and

movement control and FSCMs to facilitate

effective joint operations. These measures

may be used to expedite attacks against

surface joint TSTs. Joint control and

coordination measures apply to all joint force

components, and as such, the JFC has final

approval authority. The follow

targeting coordination measure 

more detailed information see 

Doctrine for Targeting, JP 3-0

Joint Operations, JP 3-03, Doc

Interdiction Operations, JP 3-09

Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-56

and Control for Joint Air Ope

JP 3-09.3, Joint TTP for Clos

(CAS) has several excellent exa

these different coordination me

used in different combinatio

attacking forces in many differ

b. A fundamental aspect o

target is the supported and 

commander relationships. The 

the forward line of own troop

the fire support coordination l

generally considered to be the 

operations. Deep operations ex

FSCL through the limits of the A

force land component c

(JFLCC’s) deep operations ex

FSCL to the forward bou

Additionally, the battlespa

framework below describes 

authorities/responsibilities of the 

in relationship to their battle are

III-1)

The JFE may pass guidance to the joint force components.
III-12

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

c. The JFC is responsible for ensuring

coordination measures are appropriate,

function as designed, and are well understood.

These measures include use of boundaries,

FSCMs, and ACMs.

d. Boundaries are maneuver control

measures that define surface areas to facilitate

coordination and deconfliction of operations.

JFCs use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries

to define AOs for land and naval forces.

Boundaries give the JFC the ability to

clearly define areas requiring coordination

and deconfliction of surface joint TST

attacks between components and units.

• FSCMs and associated procedures assist in

the C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs,

land and amphibious commanders employ

permissive and restrictive FSCMs to

enhance the expeditious attack of targets;

protect forces, populations, critical

infrastructure, and sites of religious or

cultural significance; and set the stage for

future operations. Commanders position

and adjust FSCMs consistent with the

operational situation and in consultation

with superior, subordinate, supporting, and

affected commanders. FSCMs are

identified by location and date/ti

(as well as termination da

applicable). FSCMs, when use

aid in the rapid engagemen

joint TSTs.

•• Permissive Measure

measures are normally used t

the attack of targets without c

from the establishing comman

the commander’s applicable b

if certain circumstances 

Permissive measures includ

areas (FFAs), coordinated 

(CFLs), and the FSCL.

••• FFAs are specific 

which any weapon syste

without additional coord

the establishing headqua

do not adequately 

between air and surface 

surface TSTs unless 

combined with adequ

The appropriate ground c

establishes FFAs.

••• Coordinated fire lin

are lines beyon

* See JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations

Figure III-1. Joint Force Areas of Target/Engagement Responsibilities

FSCL

FORWARD

BOUNDARY

AND

BEYOND

AREA

OPERATIONS

AREA

Supported

Commander

Joint Force

Land

Component

Commander

(JFLCC)

Joint Force

Land

Component

Commander

(JFLCC)

Joint Force Air

Component

Commander

(JFACC)

Joint Force

Maritime

Component

Commander

(JFMCC)

Joint Force

Special

Operations

Component

Commander

(JFSOCC)

Jo

T a

(if 

Supporting

Commander A s ll Others A s ll Other A s ll Other A s ll Other A 

ll Other 

Targeting

Responsibility

A l ll A l l A l l A l l A l 

Airspace

Control

Authority

(ACA)

J C FACC J C FAC J C FAC J C FM J FAC 
support [NSFS]) may fire at any

time within the boundaries of the

establishing headquarters without

additional coordination. Typically,

land and amphibious forces use

CFLs. CFLs expedite surface joint

TSTs attacks as long as surfaceto-surface means are used because

they do not adequately deconflict

surface joint TST attacks by fixedwing aircraft. CFLs are established

by the appropriate ground

commander and should be placed as

close as practical to the FLOT.

••• A FSCL is a fire support

coordinating measure that is

established and adjusted by

appropriate land or amphibious

force commanders within their

boundaries in consultation with

superior, subordinate, supporting,

and affected commanders. FSCLs

facilitate the expeditious attack of

surface targets of opportunity

beyond the coordinating measure.

An FSCL does not divide an AO by

defining a boundary between close

weapon systems usin

ammunition. Forc

targets beyond an 

inform all affected co

sufficient time to all

reaction to avoid 

Supporting elemen

targets beyond the 

ensure that the att

produce adverse effec

rear of, the line. Shor

all air-to-ground an

surface attack op

controlled by the app

or amphibious force 

The FSCL should 

defined terrain 

Coordination of attac

FSCL is especiall

commanders of air, lan

operations forces. I

circumstances, the 

conduct this coordin

preclude the attack of t

the FSCL. However

so may increase the ris

and could waste limit

FSCMs and associated procedures assist in the C2 of joint forces.
III-14

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

They may be established by any

component commander and are normally

applicable to all subordinate elements.

Examples of restrictive measures are

no-fire areas (NFAs), restricted fire lines

(RFLs), restricted fire areas (RFAs), and

airspace control authorities (ACAs).

••• NFAs are areas into which no

fires or effects may enter. The

purpose of an NFA is to protect

forces operating forward of the

FLOT or to protect areas, friendly

or adversary, that may serve a

purpose in future operations. SOF

NFAs are of particular concern

during TST attacks before SOF

teams are often providing “eyes on”

for the attacks and are therefore often

very close to the target locations.

••• RFLs are lines established

between converging forces that

prohibit fires or the effects of fires

across the lines without coordination

from the establishing headquarters.

RFLs deconflict component

surface joint TST attacks “by

default.” RFLs aid in deconfliction

but limit the JFC’s flexibility.

••• RFAs regulate and control fire

and attacks into an area, according

to stated restrictions. Surface TSTs

acquired within a RFA may only

be attacked in accordance with

the firing restrictions, unless the

establishing authority approves

otherwise.

••• ACAs are three-dimensional

blocks of airspace with defined

dimensions that significantly

enhance deconfliction of surface

joint TST attacks among

fixed-wing aircraft giv

lateral or vertical airsp

which to operate. AC

simultaneous componen

surface TSTs in close p

each other by multi

means, of which one is n

ACAs are designed with 

altitude, maximum altitud

width/length, and defined 

between two coordin

Friendly fires are not 

through established ACA

• Airspace Control Measu

airspace in a combat zone 

dimension of the battlespace 

components of the joint and a

to conduct assigned mission

concentration of friendl

subsurface, and air-launch

systems must share this airsp

unnecessarily hindering com

that is being applied in accor

the JFC operation plan. T

combat zone airspace co

enhance air, land, maritime

effectiveness in accomplishin

objectives.

• Common Reference 

Common reference system

universal, joint perspective 

to define specific areas of the 

enabling the commanders to 

coordinate, deconflict, inte

synchronize attacks. A 

reference system is especi

when used to coordinate 

accessible areas of attack an

deconflict attack operations

reference systems result 

deconflicted attacks, 

probability of mission su

reduced potential for duplicat
are flexible enough to be used for a

variety of other purposes, such as

geographically identifying search and

surveillance areas, identification of

restricted zones, designation of high

threat areas (such as adversary surfaceto-air missile battery locations), and

reference points navigation,

deconfliction, and target guidance. The

primary purpose of a common system

is to provide an integrated common

frame of reference for joint force

situational awareness to facilitate

attack coordination, deconfliction,

integration, and synchronization.

There are two general categories of

theater-established common reference

systems: area and point.

•• An area reference system provides a

three-dimensional reference, enabling

timely and effective coordination and

control and facilitates rapid attacks

throughout the designated operational

area. Once identified, these areas may

integrate control and coordinating

measures (in particular FSCMs and

ACMs), thereby enabling unhampered

precision attack and flexibility of weapon

system employment. Theater-level area

reference systems are often described as

“grid references,” “kill boxes” or, in the

•• Point references com

references by providing a 

common surface points 

coordination throughout th

area. The point referen

similar to the area referen

that it can be used to provid

with a common perspe

battlespace and allow 

identification of mutual

attack areas. In addition, 

to identify the center p

establishment of an appro

and/or ACM.

• Bullseye and Search and 

(SARDOT). The bullse

system is normally u

counterair engagements f

awareness on targeted an

airborne threats and for ot

coordination. Normally, 

only establish a few bulls

points to ensure effectivene

are not meant to provide d

guidance, but genera

information. Search and 

called “SARDOTs,” like 

very few in number and pr

area reference for searc

operations.
III-16

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Introduction

a. Successfully engaging joint TSTs

requires centralized planning and

decentralized execution. Centralized planning

occurs at the joint force level with JFC

guidance and intent, target prioritization, and

establishing the criteria for what constitutes

joint TSTs and the actions against them.

Decentralized execution consists of delegating

engagement authority to joint force

component commands—either directly, or

through joint force target coordinating

agencies.

b. The joint force has several joint TST

capable attack assets—each with its unique

capabilities and limitations. However, no

single weapon system encompasses the best

of all of these characteristics under all

conditions. No single weapon system is

always “best capable” to deal with the joint

TST threat.

2. Centralized Plannin

There are many ways a JFC m

centralized joint TST targetin

within a joint force. The ca

Appendices A through C prov

of how some joint commands 

TST issues. Of course different 

of these examples can be selec

to better fit a given environmen

3. Decentralized Execu

When directed, joint force co

their assigned forces execute op

monitoring other components. 

report laterally to each other an

the JFC. Component comman

the execution phase and prov

recommendations for redirect

reattack, and other taskings as 

warrants. Intelligence must als

The joint force has several joint TST capable attack assets—each with 

unique capabilities and limitations.
IV-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Mission execution requires the flexibility to

react to unforeseen TSTs. The intelligence

architecture and collection plan must be

designed to rapidly address these types of

threats.

4. Intelligence/Operations

Interface

a. Intelligence and operations staffs work

closely to optimize the force necessary to

achieve the objective considering operational

realities and data (available assets). With

guidance from the JFC, component

commanders conduct force application

planning to fuse target, weapon system, and

munitions options. This results in the jointly

coordinated selection of forces and associated

weapon systems or platforms.

b. IPB can significantly enhance the

targeting process for surface TSTs by

identifying the probable locations or operating

areas where surface TSTs may emerge.

Depending on the seriousness of the threat,

resources available, and level of confidence

in the IPB, component commanders may elect

to position or posture target acquisition and

strike assets to rapidly respond to the

forecasted areas. During execution planning,

intelligence also closely monitors target status

in order to update final planning before

execution. It must identify changes required

to current taskings, as well as provide changes

to follow-on target development phases and

weaponeering phases. Inputs from

intelligence planners update adversary threat

assessments and directly impact a broad area,

such as tasking orders, OPORDs and

associated annexes, deconfliction plans,

decision support templates (DSTs), schedules

of fires, and support OPORDs. Intelligence

planners also play a major role in mission

planning support. This includes threat

5. Engagement Capabil

Limitations

a. Introduction

• Generally, the primary weap

suitable for surface joint TST 

an operational area are f

aircraft, attack helicopters, 

multiple launch rocket system 

conventional artillery, cruis

NSFS, and SOF.

• Determination of the “best ca

asset begins during the we

assessment phase and contin

the force application pha

component provides recom

highlighting the pros and co

available weapon systems bas

current situation. The JFC al

guidance to component com

allow them the flexibility t

proper decision regarding rap

of “best capable” attack asse

• Each of the different weapon s

associated pros and cons in 

following areas:

•• Effectiveness against diff

types

•• Responsiveness

•• Range

•• Accuracy

•• Vulnerably to adversary t

•• Associated risks of emplo
b. Surface-to-Surface Systems

• The MLRS and cannon artillery are

usually the most numerous TST-capable

systems in the battlespace. They provide

near immediate response times and

all-weather capability. However, their

limited firing ranges make them most

suitable for TSTs located in the general

area between the FSCL and the FLOT.

• ATACMS possesses the responsiveness

of MLRS, but with a much greater range.

Although the ATACMS warhead is

designed for attack of soft targets, its

accuracy and all-weather capability,

coupled with the extended range and quick

response time, make it a formidable

system against TSTs. The high angle of

launch and impact, along with a very high

altitude flight path, does not require large

amounts of airspace to be deconflicted

prior to firing. However, since the missile

cannot be redirected after launch, it is

difficult to employ against moving targets.

• NSFS provides the ad

responsive, all-weather, m

missile support. However, 

short ranged, limited in 

restricted to use in the litto

attacking land-based targe

c. Cruise Missiles. The lo

accuracy of cruise missiles m

excellent weapon for use aga

high threat areas, but the lead-

to plan and execute cruise mi

could be a limiting factor again

d. Manned Aircraft. Due 

speed, and flexible weapon sele

aircraft are well suited to 

Because the aircrew can prov

during the attack, manned a

particular advantage when atta

targets or when exact target co

unavailable. However, a perm

environment or suppression of 

defenses may be require

unacceptable risks to aircraft 

MLRS and cannon artillery are usually the most numerous TST-capab

systems in the battlespace.
IV-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

capability, but are weather-dependent.

• Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The ability of

fixed-wing aircraft to move long

distances in relatively short times

provides the force with the flexibility to

quickly mass effects throughout the

battlespace. Weapon payloads can be

adjusted to suit the mission, and with airrefueling they are capable of extended

loiter times. If needed, they can be

quickly diverted in-flight to a new target

as long as suitable communications links

are available.

• Rotary-Wing Aircraft. Attack

helicopters provide excellent accuracy

with an array of weapons but have

relatively short range. They are both dayand night-capable, but are more vulnerable

to adversary defenses than fixed-wing

aircraft due to low altitude and relatively

slow speed. However, due to their

capability of slow flight, rotary-wing

aircraft can often operate in poorer weather

conditions than fixed-wing aircraft.

e. SOF. SOF’s primary contribution

against TSTs is covert reconnaissance,

surveillance, and terminal control of weapons

systems. If required, SOF can be employed

in direct action to destroy or disable a TST,

but this may compromise their primary

mission and require extraction of the team.

f. Sensors. Various sensor platforms, both

manned and unmanned, provide the

warfighter with the capability of detecting,

identifying, tracking, and assessing TSTs.

These sensors are most effective when crosscued, and linked, to provide multiple sources

and types of information.

• Manned airborne sensors allow flexible

options and detailed information

employment is their vulner

high threat environment.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles (U

many of the same benefits 

airborne sensors without risk

life. This makes them an exc

to provide surveillance 

defended areas. They a

redirected if required, posses

times, and provide real-tim

UAV sensor packages can b

by adverse weather. Some U

limited field of view and h

responsiveness while being r

the battlespace due to their rel

speed.

• Space-based sensors provide 

large area surveillance wit

resolution and with minimal v

to adversary actions. Depend

and positioning, they may su

surveillance periods and may 

to shift to a new surveillance 

nature, satellite coverage sc

predictable and the adversary 

activities to avoid detection

responsiveness of inform

space-based assets may no

timelines for targeting TSTs

6. Combat Assessment

a. CA is a crucial part of opera

joint targeting process provides 

assistance for immediate decisio

long-term planning for the comp

capabilities of future forces. This 

in order to provide to the JF

developed picture of the battlespac

ingredient for effective C

understanding of all aspects 
b. CA is performed at all levels. At the

JFC level, the CA process should normally

be an all source joint program supported by

all components and designed to determine if

the required effects on the adversary

envisioned in the campaign plan are being

achieved. CA addresses the effectiveness of

operations for tasked or apportioned missions.

This directly impacts the JFC’s apportionment

nominations and decision. The supported

commander makes these assessments. The

end product of CA at the operational and/or

strategic level is a campaign assessment that

is incorporated into strategy and guidance

development. (Note: Simply attacking targets

on the JIPTL does not represent the total

effectiveness of the operations.)

c. CA is composed of three interrelated

components: BDA, MEA, and future targeting

or reattack recommendations.

Combat assessment is a crucial part

of operations.

a three-phased approach to 

a micro-level examination 

or effect inflicted on a spe

ultimately arriving at 

conclusions regarding th

outcomes created in the t

retracing the macro-to-m

analysis in target deve

addition, to conduct B

three-phased approach, a b

target system damage 

measures of effectiveness 

be established. These 

measures are invaluable t

a standard measure o

effectiveness. They he

conduct of military opera

target systems in a mo

systematic fashion—achie

a greatly reduced effort, r

The first phase examines 
IV-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

components; and the third phase projects

results on the overall functioning of the

target system and the consequent changes

in the adversary’s behavior. The purpose

of BDA is to compare what was actually

accomplished to what target development

determined should be accomplished

when the targeting options were being

formulated. (See Figure IV-1)

Consequently, a critical ingredient for

effective BDA is detailed familiarity with

all aspects of the analysis performed in

the target development that justified the

chosen targets and their linkage to the

JFC’s objectives and guidance.

how capabilities were perform

method in which they were 

complements the estimative 

capability assessment by exa

forensic evidence after 

determine whether weapons a

systems performed as expe

purpose of MEA is to compar

effectiveness of the means e

their anticipated effectivenes

during the capability assess

of the joint targeting process. 

of MEA support both 

improvement in force em

tactics and techniques and 

THE COMBAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Combat Assessment

Reattack Recommendation

(Or Future Targeting Development)

Munitions

Effectiveness

Assessment

Battle Damage

Assessment

Physical Damage Assessment

Functional Damage Assessment

Target System

Assessment

Figure IV-1. The Combat Assessment Process
familiarity with all inputs to the

calculations performed in capability

assessment that resulted in weapon

system selection.

• Future target nominations and reattack

recommendations merge the picture of

what was done (BDA) with how it was

done (MEA) and compares the result

with predetermined MOE that were

developed at the start of the joint targeting

process. The purposes of this phase in

or to indicate readiness to 

new tasks in the path to 

overall JFC objectives. Th

in the final phase both c

begins the joint targeting 

by linking the achieved o

stated objectives that bega

For further information 

assessment, refer to JP 2

Intelligence Support to T
IV-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
Annex A US European Command TST Collaborative Tools
A-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

1. United States European Command

(USEUCOM) has considered the following

concept of operations for coordination and

deconfliction of joint TSTs within the

USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

a. The USEUCOM J-2 Targeting Division

(ECJ22T) manages the TST effort for

headquarters (HQ) USEUCOM. It

administers the federated TST support

network, acts as broker between theater and

national targeting agencies to determine

federation responsibilities, and provides

direction to focus the intelligence preparation

of the battlespace (IPB) effort during

deliberate planning. ECJ22T is responsible

for HQ USEUCOM TST roles until a joint

force staff is established and prepared to

assume them.

b. The JFC has primary responsibility for

prosecuting TSTs within a JOA. Authority

for TSTs are normally delegated to a

component commander in the interest of

minimizing the TST engagement timeline.

However, the JFC retains TST oversight. The

joint force staff is instrumental to the TST

process during crisis action planning (CAP),

providing recommendations for TST

procedures. The JFC dictates how

coordination, deconfliction, and

synchronization will occur among

components as well as develops a basic

procedural framework for TSTs, and delegates

collection management authority for IPB.

c. Specific targeting responsibilities of the

joint force staff include:

• Promulgating procedures for 

joint fires coordination meas

are used to deconflict comp

and distinguish between pro

close air support (CAS)/joint 

(JFS) and TSTs.

• Providing a prioritized list o

target type and/or geography 

JFC’s intent for fires. This can 

a weight of effort for TSTs com

other fires, and is used to 

intelligence, surveillan

reconnaissance (ISR) and stri

TSTs during a given ATO cyc

is presented at the daily JTC

where it is coordinated and d

with the joint force compone

d. Joint force component comm

their staffs carry out the air t

support/strike operations orders 

planning and preparations for eng

forces. Component commanders 

specific procedures for engaging 

satisfy the overall TST CONOP ar

promulgated, and rehearsed to the 

extent possible. During combat 

each component commander inte

TST collaborative network to m

and efficiently engage TSTs.

e. During deliberate plan

foundation is established for f

prosecution. Analysis is performed 

enemies, providing assessmen

military capabilities. CONOPS 

techniques, and procedures 

Appendix A was extracted from the US European Command, ED 40-1

Targeting Support Architecture, dated 11 March 2001.
f. During CAP, procedures and IPB are

expanded and focused to the operation. The

goal is to be fully prepared and rehearsed to

prosecute TSTs once hostilities commence.

A joint force is identified and formed,

guidance and intent promulgated, forces

assigned, and procedures finalized. While

time may be limited, it is essential to have a

functioning TST process in place prior to force

execution. To make use of valuable time as a

joint force is being formed, USEUCOM staff

directorates begin the planning for TST

operations until the joint force staff is prepared

to assume TST responsibilities.

g. Soon after a joint force is established, a

TST authority is appointed, and the JFC

promulgates guidance on how collateral

damage will affect TST engagement as well

as methods of deconfliction between

functional/Service components.

h. Authority for TSTs is normally

delegated to a functional component

commander. This allows the prosecution of

TSTs at a low enough level to minimize

engagement timelines, yet high enough to

interact effectively with other components. The

JFC weighs such factors as preponderance of

force, operational objectives, and enemy

disposition prior to making this decision. TST

authority can be delegated to any component,

and, depending on circumstances, may even

be held by the joint force. While the chosen

component maintains control of the TST

process, all components will perform certain

TST functions, as outlined in specified TST

procedures.

broad at first, it should allow t

to begin developing tactics to 

prosecute anticipated TSTs. Po

courses of action should b

allowing a quick response to en

Collection managers fashion a

most efficiently prosecute 

designated TSTs. The guidanc

identify ROE, commander’s 

TST approval (what is needed 

level), allowing the TST cell t

upcoming hostilities. Whil

guidance may change as th

matures, it provides a baseline 

process.

j. The USEUCOM TST 

cycle mirrors the joint target

is executed in an accelerated 

the preparatory work allows 

identified, tracked, prioritized, 

engaged in very short order. W

procedures, adequate commun

and trained personnel allo

component to place the right w

on the right target at the right tim

component TTP conforms to 

procedures. These procedures 

a collaborative network is est

continually manned with all o

supporting TSTs.

k. The component dele

authority manages the co

network with input from oth

of the network. TST procedure

in parallel to the maximum exte

minimize the TST timeline.
A-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Existing systems are used by all

USEUCOM organizations engaging TSTs

to quickly pass data between themselves.

This allows rapid coordination and

deconfliction between components.

2. Specific system requirements are identified

in JTF TTPs. An example of likely

USEUCOM TST collaboration tools include

the following:

a. SIPRNET. A dedicated SIPRNET

collaboration room (information workspace

or equivalent) used by all federated TST

partners to track, real time, all information

gathered on potential TSTs. This

collaboration also allows the federated

development of Digital Target Folders

(DTF) for each TST, and provides voice, chat,

and white board capability. DTFs are

constructed for TSTs in much the same

manner as they are prepared during fixed

target development, but on an accelerated

timeline. During deliberate planning, DTF

templates are constructed to the theater

standard. They contain those fields necessary

to develop a TST (target identification,

location, image, collection time delay,

significance, target type dwell time, collateral

damage estimate, etc). During force

execution, the DTF is quickly built on the

TST collaborative network to efficiently

develop the target use of the DTF provides

a common standard for TSTs, and ensures

that all commands participating in the TST

fight have the same information.

b. Sensitive Compartmented 

(SCI) ZIRCON Chat. A windo

program that is capable of c

information from certain ISR ass

be passed on the SIPRNET.

c. Secure Telephone Unit 

capability for backup and point-

communications when necessa

d. Collection Management

collection management cell is 

TST prosecution, collection 

software is provided. This 

requirements management sy

planning tools for resource 

synchronization, and managem

or similar tools.

3. Conducting TST prosecutio

environment requires a comp

releasable to coalition partners. 

a NATO operation may 

Operational Intelligence Ce

(LOCE), with installed c

software, as the hub of the TST 

network. This setup may not al

TST engagement cycle due to 

releasing certain US-ONLY 

information. The need to uti

assets versus the degradation in 

to be weighed when deciding to 

in a coalition operation.
A-A-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
Annex A US Central Command JTF TST Reaction Team Work
B-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

1. In United States Central Command,

(USCENTCOM), some subordinate joint

forces have established “TST Reaction

Team Procedures” within their joint

operations centers (JOCs).

a. The TST Reaction Team consists of:

• Senior FSE Representative

• J-3 Current Operations

• JOC Battle Captain

• Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)

Fire Direction Officer

• Judge Advocate General (JAG)

Representative

• Army Airspace Command and Control

(A2C2) Representative

• Collections Manager

• Special Operations Component

Representative

• C2 Representative

• Others as required

b. The TST Reaction Team procedures are:

• Notification of a surface joint TST is

passed from the land component analysis

and control element (ACE) to the joint

force FSE by the quickest available

method. (This is normally secure voice

with SIPRNET backup.)

• The FSE determines if ATACM

force TST engagement asse

because of its response time, ac

all-weather capability) is an 

asset for employment against 

fact, if ATACMS is not availab

Reaction Team is not conven

TST is processed as a routine 

a compressed time cycle.

• If ATACMS is available, the F

an “At My Command” missi

land component and/or init

mission through the BCD. C

ATACMS and air att

USCENTCOM’s preferred 

engaging joint TSTs. A

Command” mission indicat

joint force FSE will provid

targeting information and e

authorization to the land com

• A “TST Alert” announceme

in the joint operations and 

center. Upon this announcem

watch TST Reaction Team c

the FSE map immedia

notification of a TST that 

could require an ATACMS e

• The FSE Watch Officer rapid

TST Reaction Team fro

Reaction Team Worksheet. A

of the TST Reaction Team W

in Appendix B.

• Following the TST bri

ATACMS mission is either a

disapproved by the senior me

TST Reaction Team.

Appendix B was extracted from a US Central Command JTF s

operating procedure.
following normal air targeting cycle

procedures.

• If ATACMS is approved, mission

coordination continues and authorization

to engage is passed to the land

component. The FSE ensures time

separation between ATACMS and air

engagement assets.

• Following the TST engage

attempts to obtain and pas

ACE, determines re-

requirements, if any, and 

mission once desired effect
B-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. ROLL CALL

_____ Senior FSE Rep ______ JAG _______ JSOTF/SOC

_____ J-3, Current Ops ______ A2C2 _______ C2 Rep

_____ Battle Captain ______ Collect Mgr _______ Other: ____

_____ ASOC FDO

2. FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT TST SITUATION UPDATE

(* Indicates information required from the Analysis and Control Element [AC

* Target Type/Size: __________________________________________

* Target Location: Lat/Long ___________________________________

 UTM ____________________________________________________

* Activity/Movement: ________________________________________

* Acquisition Source: _________________________________________

* Acquisition Time: __________________________________________

* Observed Target Now: Yes or No

* Observed Target at TOT1

: Yes or No or Undetermined

Launcher Location: __________________________________________

Other Remarks: _____________________________________________

ATTACK OPTIONS: ATACMS and:

(Circle all that apply) USAF Air USAF PushCAS USMC Air Oth

ATTACK RECOMMENDATION: ___________________________

3. APPROVED ATTACK ASSET (S): __________________________

APPROVED BY: _____________________ at __________________

(Date/Time)

4. AUTOMATIC RE-ATTACK CRITERIA: _____________________

(Minimum measurable desired effects)

5. FINAL CLEARANCE

_______ JAG _____ BCD (airspace cleared at ____ until ______ 

_______ A2C2 _____ USMC (airspace approval if required)

_______ ATACMS “Ready” with _____________time of flight.

6. FIRE ATACMS (Complete the below procedures)

_______ Notify BATTLE CAPTAIN of “SHOT”

_______ Obtain and pass BDA to ACE

_______ Determine re-attack requirements, if any, and end the ATACMS 

once desired effects are achieved.

________________________________________________

1

 Time on target.
B-A-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
Annex A Shared Target Worksheets and Database

B Joint TST Website

C Joint TST Information Network

D Text Chat, Audio Chat, and Secure Conferencing

E Whiteboarding
C-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

1. In United States Forces Korea (USFK), the

CINC’s staff plans fires and maintains

centralized control while delegating actual

execution to the components for decentralized

execution. For example, the JFLCC may

designate a multiple launch rocket system

(MLRS) platoon in a “hot” status to expedite

fires on TSTs. The field artillery battalion

postures launchers within the “hot platoon”

with “At My Command” missions to reduce

response times. In the case of air assets, the

JFACC may designate a block of aircraft sorties

to be kept in a higher than normal alert status

for rapid launch, or pre-identify sorties as

suitable candidates for a possible re-role of

its current airborne mission.

a. The decision authority to prosecute

individual TSTs is maintained by the

components. Some general guidelines

(relative to joint TST decision authorities) are

outlined below:

• TST location and current AO boundaries

determine the lead component for each

TST.

• TST targeting authority is derived from

supported and supporting command

relationships.

• The supported commander is

responsible for converting JFC’s

guidance into actionable TST taskings

based on the current operational

situation.

• There is only one authority in each

component that may nominate TSTs for

joint prosecution.

• Supporting commanders w

augmentation or other su

supported commander as re

develop supporting procedu

b. USFK has established 

Information Network which 

information, enables rapid dissem

target information, and enab

execution instrumental to a sensor

application. This virtual group of 

warfighters facilitates joint TST p

and integrates component TST de

requirements into joint procedure

c. The USFK component

coordination requirements are sa

the TST information network, wh

of the TST server, a shared targe

database, a TST website, and a p

guide. The network is implemente

information CONOPS. It supports 

of information when, for whatever 

dynamic targeting is employed. 

flexibility is required to capital

capabilities, changes to the plan 

unsought consequences. The 

applies existing software appl

improve timeliness of lateral coord

to reduce response cycle times asso

joint TST prosecution.

d. The TST server is a rider on 

wide-area network (WAN) 

MeetingPoint conferencing 

Microsoft NetMeeting, a web se

TST web site, and a Microso

database. The MeetingPoint co

software is used to enable multi-ch

conferencing. Microsoft NetM

Appendix C was extracted from the Department of Defense Joint War

Test and Evaluation, Time-Sensitive Target (TST) Guide, dated Februa
of MeetingPoint conferencing users are limited

by the number of licenses purchased.

e. Target information is shared using

electronic target worksheets generated by the

database software in a shared directory on

the TST server.

f. The USFK TST web site is a web-based

capability primarily designed to post TSTs,

their prosecution status, and advise of BDA.

It also provides a central location containing

links to battle rhythm related data,

commander’s guidance, and legacy electronic

documentation. This capability provides near

real-time information to the theater’s targeting

positions and cells. All TST-related positions

can access the TST web site via the Netscape

browser using AFATDS, TBMCS, Joint

Targeting Toolbox (JTT), and GCCS.

g. The TST web page contains target

information posted to a joint TST targeting

log, planning documents, command guidance,

and other reference material.

h. Links are provided to each associated

command’s/ component’s web page. This

selected battle rhythm products

copy of the TST guide, as well 

component TTPs and other ref

i. Links to the JFC and comp

provide a bulletin board to 

command guidance and interes

as JFC and component specific 

prosecuting TSTs.

j. Both target development a

analysts use the log. Target 

uses the log to examine the scop

targeting activity, to anticipate B

and to update the JIPTL. Opera

use the log to provide feedba

plans. Additionally, based on In

(IP) address control, a user m

privileges to edit any target rec

the latest version of the TS

individuals (we recommended s

can designate whom they 

network. This eliminates p

technicians bringing the applic

add/change users. The edit f

based on password vice IP add
C-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Target information is shared using

electronic target worksheets generated by an

Access database application in a shared

directory on the TST Server. The application

allows users to configure data views that are

formatted into targeting worksheet forms.

Views of database records are distributed in

programmed frames to selected clients. These

distributed views effectively query clients for

database inputs then redistribute the data to

another set of clients, based on the TST

process and associated information

requirements. An Access application file

generates the selective views of the data

records, effectively filtering data for the

selective redistribution by assigning data

states. After data is entered on a target

worksheet, the data updates the database and

changes the data record state. The worksheet

state diagram is shown in Figure C-A-1.

2. The target worksheet that displays these

different data states is shown in Figure C-A-2.

The target worksheet is design

electronic database. A form from 

serves as an electronic rout

SALUTE or SPOT format tha

system message alert (SMA) 

system. The users can config

worksheet routing.

3. An example configuratio

target worksheet distribution 

Figure C-A-3. A check in a 

node box allows the checke

viewed by that node. The only 

the first state or “Enter Target” 

single send to restriction. The de

in the “Send To Initial Data” col

view “Enter Target” data from th

nodes. This ensures that each c

specified node[s]) screens eac

joint TST and verifies, validates

the target.

Figure C-A-1. Shared Target Worksheet “State Diagram”

Implement

TST

Guidance

Perform

Target

Development

Perform

Wpn/Ops

Assessment

Plan

Execution

Execute

Attack

Asses

Effect

Protected Target List (PTL)

HPTL and Component Hit List (actionable Supported

Commander target selection standards and TST criteria)

Target

Data

Write to Database and Post

to Joint Targeting Log

Targetable

Information

Required

Changes

to JIPTL

Battle Damage

Assessment

(BDA)

Entered

Target

Nominated

Target

Authorized

Prosecution

Cleared

Execution

Reported

Employmen

TST Network (Terminals with shared target

worksheets and collaboration privileges)

Reject

Defer Tasking

Re-task

Reject

Re-task

Mission Report

(MISREP)

Write to 

and Pos

Targetin

Component Guidance, Objectives, and Specialized

Tasks

Mobile Target

Updates

Coordination

and

Deconfliction

Tasked

Assets

Required

Notifications

Reported

Employment

Data

Dism

WAN (terminals with web

browser)

TST Server (Meeting-Point M

Database, Web Site, and File 
C-A-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Figure C-A-2. Target Worksheet

Figure C-A-3. Notional Target Worksheet Distribution Configuration
1. The TST web site is a webbased capability

designed to establish a central location

containing links to battle rhythm related data,

commander’s guidance, and legacy electronic

documentation. This capability provides near

real-time information to the theater’s targeting

positions and cells. The web server provides

a central site for all targeting information

relative to current operations. An example

web page is illustrated in Figure C-B-1. The

top half of the page deals with proactive or

timely targeting information. The bottom half

is component guidance actionable tasks. All

TST-related positions are able to access the

TST web site via CTAPS, ADOCS, AFATDS,

TBMCS, and GCCS.

2. The TST web page contains target

information posted to the joint targeting log,

HPTL link, mobile target updates, unsourced

changes to the published wea

sourced JIPTL, and the protect

3. The command patch button

each command’s web page. Th

to provide the component’s 

scheme of maneuver, master a

fire support plan. Links are als

selected battle rhythm products

copy of the US Forces Korea T

well as theater and compone

references.

4. “Hit List” buttons under eac

patch provides a bulletin 

components to post specific gui

items, or commander’s guidanc

actions required to prosecute TS

commanders are responsible fo

guidance—relative to their 

Figure C-B-1. TST Web Page

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED
C-B-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Information includes actionable tasks and

control measures required to execute preplanned attacks and dynamic targeting as well

as securing target data when the operational

situation dictates and combat effects are most

critical.

5. The joint targeting log provides a history

of joint target prosecution data, decision, and

activity taken directly from the Access

database. This log can be sorted by column

heading and may be viewed as a full page

spread sheet. Color codes are used to show

the current status of each target. A notional

targeting log is shown in Figure C-B-2.

6. Both target development and operational

analysis should use this log. Target

development uses this log to examine the

scope of dynamic targeting activity, to

anticipate BDA reporting, and to update the

JIPTL. Operational analysts use this log to

future plans should be adjusted a

Analysis of data should determin

measures allowed adequate respon

were too restrictive for dynamic 

be effective. Analysts should also 

if these changes were the result o

operating inside our decision cycle 

strike effects were not as 

Additionally, based on internet p

address control, a user may be give

to edit any target record. This TS

edit feature displays the edit scr

example is shown in Figure C-B-

7. The “The How To Use This 

link on the web page (Figure C-B-

user information as well as 

maintaining, updating, and manip

site. A “Suggestion for Improve

allows users to post comm

suggestions for improving the sit

Figure C-B-2. Target Coordination Log
Figure C-B-3. TST Web Page Edit Feature
C-B-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Based on USFORKOREAs experience,

some recommended information network

operational procedures are summarized

below.

a. TST Information Network

• Restrict the Access target worksheets to

only the core component TST lateral

coordination points-of-contact terminals.

• Allow others to load amplifying target

worksheet information using the TST

web page edit feature through all

collateral C4I systems.

• Always “Refresh” the target worksheet

to pull-in updated information (loaded

from the TST web page) before making

processing decisions.

• Implement separate component TST

information networks as inputs to the

joint TST information network.

b. Collaboration

• Use more broadcast “Text Chat” for

announcements and acknowledgements

associated with web page TST record data.

• Use private “Text Chat” for component

TST activity and Access target worksheet

coordination.

• Format “Text Chat” like radio

transmissions and use to support the TST

network and not as a system work-around.

2. The decision authority to prosecute

individual TSTs is strictly limited to

warfighting components. Some simple rules

(relative to joint TST decision authorities) are

outlined below.

Authority is derived from 

supporting command relat

• Supported commander is r

converting commander’s 

actionable TST taskings 

current operational situatio

• Only one component au

“Nominate Target” for join

• Target location and AO d

lead component for 

Prosecution.”

• Attack asset OPCON deter

component for “Clear Exe

• Supporting commanders 

augmentation or other 

supported commander as 

develop supporting proced

3. Specific CONOPS for each 

joint TST prosecution process a

tool/applications are outlined b

a. “Text Chat” Collaboratio

• Configure “My Informati

“Tools” and “Options” me

shown in Figure C-C-1. 

instant recognition of n

collaboration.

• Conference number one i

text chat. Four other co

available for different ap

listed in Figure C-C-2. 

administrator can establish 

number of conferences.

• A good way to keep abreas

activities is to open Netsca
C-C-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

web page and open text chat across the

bottom half of the screen as shown in

Figure C-C-3. Start Access and the

“Startup” form. When the “Waiting for

Targets...” dialog box appears, minimize

Enter Your Position:

FSC/CIO/IDO

Enter Your Position:

FCE/CIO/IDO

DOCC/2ID/HTACC/KCOIC/

CACC/CMEF/TFCC

DOCC/2ID/AOC CO/

ACE/MARFOR COC/TFCC

Enter your GCCS “USE

Enter your GCCS-K “U

Select ‘For Business’ Select ‘For Business’

Leave

as is

Leave

as is

Ensure that your Location, Position and 

information is entered correctly.

Ensure that your Location, Position and 

information is entered correctly.

Figure C-C-1. “My Information” Window Set-up

Once the conferencing service is established, the operator must select a

conference to join. A panel will display showing what conferences are available.

Select/highlight the conference of your choice, then select OK

Once the conferencing service is established, the operator must select a

conference to join. A panel will display showing what conferences are available.

Select/highlight the conference of your choice, then select OK

Conference Selection Window

Figure C-C-2. TST Conference Selection

Access and the TST client 

emerge as a system message a

when TST data is distributed. 

participate in the “Initiate” pr

minimize Access until a targe
c. Perform Target Developm

• Acknowledge the red pop-

clicking “OK” or scroll w

queue to a specific targetin

• Review target worksheet a

target responsibilities (a

current targeting guidanc

and limitations).

• Collaborate (using broadca

or “Secure Conferencing”

level of confidence in rep

determine targetable data 

determine what additional 

required to prosecute th

available assets, and to 

sensitive requests for infor

• Perform target developme

collateral damage restricti

Figure C-C-3. “Text Chat” and Targeting Log Desktop

log and 

Current TST prosecution status or state

3-way sortable

• Descending

• Ascending

• Recent on top

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOV

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

Sele

from 

men

in C

priv

on

for TST priority consideration. Open

Outlook and minimize until needed.

b. Implement TST Guidance

• Review component synchronization cell

definition of TST operational situations

and convert into actionable tasks.

• Focus ISR cross-cueing and operational

tipping resources to monitor operational

situations likely to generate TSTs.

• Load TST detection (SALUTE or SPOT

format) into a target worksheet.

• Click the “Enter Target” button followed

with private text chat, plain text message,

or secure voice. (See Figure C-C-4)

• Update target worksheet (by assigned

reference number) on TST web page with

the edit feature.
C-C-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Figure C-C-4. Enter Target Worksheet

• Track target and develop target data

package (formatted for the specific

weapon system selected for

employment).

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet to

display any additional information

loaded into the target record.

• Modify or update target worksheet.

• Input “Targetable Information Required”

remarks. (See Figure C-C-5)

• Record your decision by either selecting

“Dismiss” or “Nominate Target.” (Note:

“Dismiss” removes the record from all

worksheet views but keeps it on the web

page for future consideration in the

planning cycle).

d. Perform Weaponeering/O

Assessment and Force Applicatio

• Acknowledge the red pop-up 

clicking “OK” or scroll wo

queue to a specific target wo

• Review target worksheet an

what options are available an

effects on current operations 

activity.

• Assume component respon

TST prosecution based on tar

and supported and s

commander relationship.

• Coordinate and de-conf

collaboration (broadcast “Te

“Secure Conferencing”) to de

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

information updates the TST web page when Netscape  refresh/reload is sel
optimum joint asset available to provide

the required target effects and other

options available.

• Perform weaponeering and operational

assessment.

• Execute force application.

• Present the recommended course(s) of

action to the OPCON decision authority

for the attack assets.

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet to

display any additional information

loaded by other TST decision authorities.

• Assume responsibility for TST execution

planning if you have OPCON authority

of selected attack asset.

• Perform risk assessment 

combat losses, collateral 

mission failure.

• Apply control measure

associated alert orders.

• Input “Coordination & De

remarks. (See Figure C-C

• Record your decision by e

“Reject” or “Approve Pro

e. Perform Execution Planni

Execution

• Acknowledge red pop-u

clicking “OK” or scroll w

queue to targeting worksh

number.

Figure C-C-5. Nominate Target Worksheet

and if the acquired target meets all criteria to be a joint TST. Click Refre

deciding to “Dismiss” or “Nominate” the target (as this will provide update

information entered from any source via the web page edit feature). “Dism

removes the record from others view and records the node’s decision in the 

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED
C-C-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

Figure C-C-6. Authorize Prosecution Worksheet

• Review target worksheet and determine

what final coordination, alert order or

notifications, and orders are required to

execute attack.

• Broadcast intentions or warning order

with “Text Chat”, and issue associated

orders.

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet to

display any additional information

loaded by other coordinating authorities.

• Issue “Execution Orders”. (Figure

C-C-7)

• Input “Tasked Assets” and “Required

Notifications” remarks.

• Record your decision by either selecting

“Defer,” “Reject,” or “Clear Execution.”

• If “Clear Execution” is se

decision authority is accept

of collateral damage, miss

fratricide, and mission lo

ensuring control measures ar

to prevent unsought consequ

f. Assess Mission Results 

Effects

• Select “Refresh” on target w

display any additional in

loaded by other reporting u

management, and/or m

agencies.

• Input “Reported Employm

remarks. (See Figure C-C-8

• Record your decision by eith

“Re-task” or “Report Emplo
Figure C-C-7. Clear Execution Worksheet

pyg gpg

situational leadership, system capabilities, and risk assessment; decide to “D

(which moves the state back to “Approve”), “Reject” (which moves the sta

“Nominate”), or “Clear Execution” (which moves the state forward to “Rep

Employment”). Associated orders and warning notifications must be tran

C2 systems) and recorded in the “white” text blocks as deemed necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

• Broadcast employment execution

accomplished on “Text Chat.”

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet to

display any additional information

loaded by other reporting units or as

reflected in a mission-fired report,

INFLTREP, and MISREPs.

• Input MISREP and/or B

(See Figure C-C-9)

• Record your decision by se

“Re-task” or “Report Resu

• Broadcast mission results o
C-C-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

supporting actions. Report confirmation that fire unit, tactical element, or as

mission authority has accepted employment tasking. Prior to input of “Repor

Employment Data”, click on “Refresh” to update worksheet data from any no

loaded target record data directly through the TST Web Page “Edit” Feature. 

on available information, decide to either “Re-task” (which changes state bac

“Nominate”) or “Report Employment”.

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

Figure C-C-8. Reported Employment Worksheet
Figure C-C-9. Report Results Worksheet

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

(and when weapons system mission reporting is not available to all compo

record the “Mission Fired Report”, INFLTREP, and/or MISREP into the “

/or BDA” data field. Based on the results and collaboration with decision 

decide to either “Re-task” (which changes the state back to “Nominate” an

historical data and tracks last history), “New Target” to start fresh, or “Rep

to log the record and remove the target worksheet from view. Action can b

however, holding a worksheet open will prevent the SMA feature from fun

the pop-up SMA will only occur when no previous records are waiting in a 

queue).
C-C-10

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Text Chat

a. “Text Chat” is the preferred method

for communication by collaborative

groups. It also has the important benefits of

providing a log of activities as well as allows

members to review what has gone on in

previous sessions. Several considerations are

listed below.

b. Although all nodes can save the “Text

Chat” record, one node should be designated

to save the “Text Chat” as an official record

of the session.

c. “Private Chat” provides a two-person

virtual private network capability. “Private

Chat” can enhance the collaborative effort, but

too much use can negatively impact the group

effort. One use of “Private Chat” is the ability

to brief a node that arrived late on

what happened during its absence

without interrupting the rest of the group.

2. Audio Chat. “Audio Chat” is secure voice

communications to complement “Text Chat.”

Audio allows group members to quickly

express ideas and understand the

group direction. Several “Audio Chat”

considerations are as follows:

• Decide what actions the group will take

when a member loses audio. Is it

necessary to duplicate the “Audio Chat”

via “Text Chat”? Users must determine

the criticality of the cell losing audio to

the current collaborative session.

• Decide when and if the group will allow,

“hot miking.” Hot miking leaves

microphones on during the entire session.

While hot miking makes the audio portion

more like normal conversa

disadvantages. First, it 

classified conversatio

background. For this reaso

cannot be done from sensit

as a sensitive compartmente

facility (SCIF). Second, the

participants will talk at the 

cause some confusion 

information. The session 

determine whether or not 

miking.

• The network may not have 

to support audio for ev

When this occurs, the g

reschedule the session or 

text only. If one or more of 

lose audio, then the group 

decide on how to proceed. 

is greatly simplified if ag

made on to how to handle 

prior to the session.

• Military personnel using 

should view the audio ca

extension of a tactical rad

radio procedures in the 

environment. Members 

specific requests or give spe

3. Secure Conferencing. Secu

network (SCN) is a telephon

rapidly connects all TST 

conference call mode. The inst

particular node may be a dedica

DRSN telephone, or simply 

mode on a secure telepho

conferencing is both an indep

of collaborating on TST prosecu

to support other collabo

such as NetMeeting.
C-D-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Whiteboard is a graphical collaboration

tool. It is the primary tool to share a common

view of things such as PowerPoint slides,

maps, and imagery. The utility of the

whiteboard is that anything seen on the

desktop of one member’s computer

(regardless of the program, application, or web

site) can be captured and placed onto the

whiteboard for group viewing. When a

whiteboard is initiated, everyone in the

conference will receive the whiteboard in front

of other applications. Each time a change is

made to the whiteboard, the board re-opens

in front of all other windows. You must

always lock to maintain control of the

whiteboard. If bandwidth is restrictive, do

not allow collaboration (which allows

different, collaborative users to edit

whiteboard while all other view the session).

2. The whiteboard can be used concurrently

with “Audio and Text Chat.” However,

operators must ensure that the “Text Chat”

box is not obscured by the whiteboard to

prevent loss of information flow. Each

operator should keep the whiteboard at less

than full screen size and align it with the upper

left-hand corner of the screen. The “Text

Chat” box should then be aligned with the

lower right right-hand corner of the screen to

remain visible while not interfering with the

view of the whiteboard.

3. Protocols for whiteboard use should be

established, disseminated, and enforced.

Some organizations have found whiteboard

control to be of such concern that it is only

used between two or three nodes at a time

rather than shared with the entire network. To

enable all TST cells an opportunity to use this

valuable collaborative asset, the following

considerations are recommended:

• The whiteboard has a common view that

is shared by all persons in the conference.

The session leader should lock the

whiteboard and allows ot

entries only after the coo

“Audio or Text Chat.” W

the whiteboard is handed o

member, the new whitebo

should lock the whiteboa

others from changing the 

person changes the view o

erases an object, all me

conference will see 

simultaneously. Chaos 

several people try to make 

changes or entries.

• The session leader is re

orchestrating the save oper

whiteboard or image loadi

•• He decides who is re

placing images on the whit

one cell should load image

multiple cells simultaneo

image onto the whiteboar

to load will override the ot

image is loaded before 

whiteboard is saved, the 

previous whiteboard is 

properly saved).

•• He decides who is re

saving the work in-progr

often it will be saved. Frequ

will depend on the expe

group, the importance of 

the amount of work done 

save operation.

• Each cell should be assign

whiteboard marking. Th

members to quickly ascerta

a comment or drawing on th

Colors can be assigned to 

as well as text.

• The session leader decide

responsible for clearing th
C-E-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

•• When a whiteboard is saved using

routine procedures, it is saved to the

server. This can be a problem in the event

of server failure and the whiteboard file

is lost. Therefore, one of the TST cells

in the network should be designated to

save the whiteboard to its personal hard

drive. It is easier if this is the same cell

responsible for clearing the whiteboard.

•• Another technique used for protecting

the saved whiteboard is called multi-save.

Multi-save is saving the product to the

server twice under two different names.

The multi-save technique is implemented

using the suffix of “bu” for back up. If

the whiteboard product were called

TST5, for example, then a second copy

named TST5bu would be also saved to

the server. This ensures that a copy of

the master is available should someone

accidentally destroy your work.

However, the file is still subject to loss if

the server becomes inoperable.

• Before clearing annotations or images

from the whiteboard, other cells in the

session should be notified and provided

4. Advanced Techniques

• Place standard session requi

the bottom of the whitebo

groups list their requiremen

Chat” or in a Word document 

in a file. By transferring the re

to the bottom of the white

screen (whiteboard) does no

moved to access information 

documents.

• A good way to work on s

capture a PowerPoint slid

whiteboard and then have 

annotate changes. While th

making changes and c

consensus, one group m

updating the slide in the P

program on his computer. 

group is finished collaborat

changes are made to the ori

the updated slide is capture

PowerPoint user’s computer 

on the whiteboard. Now the 

view the final product to 

members agree with the chan
1. US Army Assets

a. Attack Helicopters. Attack helicopters are employed in a variety of rol

they are employed by components as organic assets. Army attack helicopte

employed as a maneuver unit capable of all normal maneuver force missi

circumstances, the Army does not consider attack helicopters a CAS syst

they can perform CAS functions when operating in support of another compo

Advantages. Rapid response times and weapons accuracy.

Disadvantages. Inclement weather flying restrictions, speed, limited range 

munitions, and vulnerability to adversary fire.

A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

A H-1F "Cobra" BGM-71 TOW missiles, 2.7

rockets, 20mm cannon

A H-64 "Apache Longbow" AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 

rockets, 30mm cannon

O H-58D "Kiowa Warrior" AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 

rockets, 50 cal machine gu

b. Missiles. The ATACMS provide long-range, surface-to-surface fire 

ATACMS are ground-launched missile systems consisting of a surface-to-s

missile with an anti-personnel/anti-materiel (APAM) warhead.

AH-64 Apache
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Disadvantages. Limited effectiveness against hardened targets.

W E EAPON RANG

A m TACMS 300,000

c. Rockets. The MLRS provides counter battery fire and suppression of ad

defenses, light materiel, and personnel targets. The MLRS is a free-flight, area-f

rocket system that supplements cannon artillery fires by delivering large volumes o

in a short time against TSTs. The basic warhead carries improved conventional sub

Advantages. Range, all weather capability, wide area coverage, and rap

time.

Disadvantages. Accuracy and limited effectiveness against hardened targe

W E EAPON RANG

M m LRS 32,000

M m LRS Extended Range 45,000

ATACMS
d. Artillery

Advantages. All weather capability, accuracy, and rapid response time.

Disadvantages. Range

W R EAPON C E ALIBE RATE OF FIR 1 RA

M m 102 13 05m 15,300

M m 119A1 13 05m 19,500

M m 109A6 11 55m 30,000

M m 198 12 55m 30,100

MLRS

1

 Rounds per minute.
D-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

2. US Marine Corps Assets

a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and rapid response time.

Disadvantages. Inclement weather flying restrictions and vulnerability t

fire.

M109A6 "Paladin"

F/A-18 "Hornet"
b. Attack/Utility Helicopters

A V-8B Harrier IILaser-guided bombs (LGB

65 Maverick missile, AGM

Sidearm missile, Joint Sta

Weapons (JSOW), Joint D

Attack Munitions (JDAM), g

purpose (GP) bombs, clus

units (CBU), 2.75" rockets

rockets, 25mm cannon

F /A-18A/C/D "Hornet" LGB, AGM-65 Maverick m

AGM-62 Walleye missile, A

SLAM missile, AGM-88 HA

missile, JSOWs JDAMs, G

bombs, CBUs, 2.75" rocke

rockets, 20mm cannon

A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

U H-1N "Huey" 7.62mm machine gun, .5

machine gun, 2.75" rocke

A H-1W "Super Cobra" BGM-71 TOW missile, A

Hellfire missile, 5" rocket

rockets, 20mm cannon, A

Sidearm missile
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

c. Artillery

AH-1W "Super Cobra"

W R EAPON C E ALIBE R ATE OF FIR RAN

M m 198 12 m 55m 30,100

M198
g 

A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

F -14 "Tomcat" LGB, GP bombs, CBUs, 2

cannon

F /A-18A/C "Hornet" LGB, GP bombs, CBUs, A

Maverick missiles, AGM-62 

missiles, AGM-84 SLAM m

AGM-88 HARM missiles, J

JDAMs, 2.75" rockets, 5" r

20mm cannon

S-3B "Viking" GP bombs, CBUs, 2.75" ro

rockets

P s -3 "Orion" JSOW

b. Missiles. US Navy TLAMs can be effective interdiction assets and pro

employment option to the joint force. Several variants provide single warhead 

or multi-effect submunition capabilities. Low risk, accuracy, and range make 

viable in the planning of interdiction contingency operations against stationary, 

targets. The TLAM weapon system may require coordination between strik

theater and supporting mission planners out of theater. This is an ongoing proces

of the decision to use the weapon. With proper preplanning, TLAMs are capable 

short-notice strikes, without aircraft support, against targets in heavily defende

the probability of the loss of manned aircraft is too high. TLAMs are al

F-14 "Tomcat"
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

in the AO.

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Response time.

W E EAPON RANG

T m LAM 1,836k

c. NSFS. US Navy cruisers and destroyers are armed with a 5-inch, 54-calib

lightweight gun which provides accurate naval gunfire against fast, highly ma

surface targets, air threats, and shore targets.

Advantages. Accuracy, rate of fire, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Range.

Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile
4. US Air Force Assets

a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft

MK 45

W R EAPON C E ALIBE R ATE OF FIR RA

M h K 54 5 0 inc 1 6-2 14.9 m

A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

A /OA-10A "Thunderbolt II" LGBs, GP bombs, CBUs, A

Maverick missile, 2.75" roc

30mm cannon

B s -1B "Lancer" GP bombs, CBUs, JDAM

B -2 "Spirit" JDAMs, JSOWs, GP bomb

B-52H "Stratofortress" ALCMs, JDAMs, LGBs, GP 

CBUs, AGM-142 Have Nap 

F-15E "Eagle" JSOWs, JDAMs, LGBs, GP 

CBUs, 20mm cannon

F -16 "Falcon" LGBs, JDAMs, GP bombs, 

AGM-65 Maverick missile, 

cannon

F -117 "Nighthawk" LGBs, JDAMs, GP bombs, 
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

5. Special Operations Command Assets

a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft

F-16 "Falcon"

A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

A C-130H "Spectre" 105mm howitzer, 40mm cann

20mm cannon

A C-130U "Spectre" 105mm howitzer, 40mm cann

25mm cannon

AC-130 "Spectre"
A S IRCRAFT WEAPON

A H-6J AGM 114 Hellfire missile, 2

rocket pods, 40mm MK 19 

launcher, .50 caliber mach

7,62mm miniguns

M H-53 "Pave Low" .50 caliber machine gun, 7

miniguns

MH-60G "Pave Hawk" XM-218 .50 caliber machi

7.62mm M-60 machine gu

7.62mm machine guns, an

a long range hover platform 

employment of shoulder fir

weapons

M s 60K "Blackhawk" M134 7.62mm minigun

c. SOF Direct Action. One of the many capabilities provided by SOF i

operational targets by direct action. SOF are specially trained and equipped uni

skills enabling them to penetrate deep into adversary areas to execute critical m

units are rapidly deployable and can be inserted by parachute, boat, submarine

on foot.

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Mission planning and rehearsal time.

MH-60 "Blackhawk"
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

SOF may attack operational targets by direct action.
General Considerations

1. Are rules of engagement (ROE) available?

2. Is commander’s guidance available?

3. Are there redundant, secure communications between key nodes in 

components?

• Secure conferencing telephone?

•• STU-III

•• KY-68

•• Red Phones

• Collaborative tools (such as NetMeeting)

• Are communications established?

• Is e-mail available/established?

4. Are common maps and charts available and posted showing:

• Friendly forces

• Adversary forces

• FSCMs and ACMs

• Kill boxes

• Bullseyes
E-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

battlespace?

• Forward line of own troops (FLOT) to

FSCL

• FSCL to forward boundary

• Forward boundary & beyond

• Amphibious objective area

• Special operations area

• Rear area

2. What are the command relationships?

• Who is the supporting commander?

• Who is the supported commander?

3. What assets are available for attacking

TSTs?

• Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

(ISR) assets

• Attack helicopters

• ATACMS/MLRS

• Artillery

• Fixed-wing aircraft

• NSFS

• SOF

• Space assets

4. What available assets can rang

5. What available asset is most 

for the TST type?

• Ground-based

•• What is the risk of counte

• Aviation

•• Are appropriate weapons 

•• Is suppression of adv

defenses required?

•• Is refueling required?

6. Estimate of TST dwell time?

7. Impact on joint targeting co

board plan of re-rolling or dive

asset from planned targets?

8. Should TST be attacked, mo

exploited?
commander of operational area where target

is located?

2. Does collection management have the most

current PIR/intelligence requirement (IR)?

3. Are PIR/IR adequately defined?

4. Were all the PIR/IR converted into specific

orders and requests?

5. Does collection management worksheet

match the high-payoff target list (HPTL) and

master air attack plan (MAAP)?

6. Does collection management worksheet

match accuracy requirements specified in PIR/

IR?

7. Are assigned reconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition (RSTA) adequate to

detect, locate, identify and track targets? Can

we get required information from sensor/

platform?

8. Have additional assets from higher,

adjacent, or subordinate units been requested/

coordinated?

9. Are high-payoff targets (HPTs) adequately

covered in the collection management plan

(CMP)?

10. Are JFC high priority targets sufficiently

covered?

11. Are component HPTs aligned and

integrated IAW campaign guidance?

rapid cross-cueing?

13. Are there procedures in pla

platform hand-off?

14. What RSTA assets are 

support extended TST tracking

15. Does collection plan prov

for ad hoc or dynamically r

collection assets?

16. Have all collection o

considered?

17. Has immediate post-strik

requested on selected targets?

18. Were ad hoc re-taskings 

passed to appropriate authority

19. Did the component collect

pass target collection requiremen

theater collection manager?

20. Was the ad hoc re-tasking 

21. Were requests for dynam

passed to appropriate authority

22. Was the CMP approved?

23. Is the CMP easily availabl
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

2. Have components deconflicted airspace requirements internally and external

3. Have formal and informal airspace coordination area options been considere

4. Has a common reference system been identified?

• Grid box

• Kill box

• Bullseye

5. Do all components have the most current version of the system?

6. Has short-notice TST target area deconfliction been accomplished?

7. Are there particular weapon systems considerations?

• ATACMS (fire direction center (FDC) evaluation w/BCD input, as required

• Aircraft (combat air patrols, diverts, re-roles, airborne elements of the Theater 

System advisories)?

• Helicopter minimum risk route (MRR) considerations?

8. SOF operations conflicts?

• SOF area protection measures?

• Clandestine operations impact?

9. Have activation/deactivation windows been established?

10. Are there any current airspace control order implications?
1. Request permission from the commander responsible for the target area 

target.

2. The commander or his representative will:

• Determine whether he has the means to attack the target.

• Determine whether or not to attack the target.

3. Is the airspace clear?

• If clear, clear ground component to attack.

• If not clear, determine whether airspace can be cleared in time.

•• If airspace can be cleared in time, clear ground component to attack.

•• If airspace cannot be cleared in time and target destruction is not d

priority, notify air control element that the target is deferred.

•• If airspace cannot be cleared in time and target destruction is deemed a 

notify the air component and clear ground component to attack when b

confirmed.

4. Ground component will notify air component of imminent weapons launch

5. AWACS, control and reporting centers (CRCs), forward air control posts an

will broadcast bullseye call.

6. Ground component will launch/fire into a commander’s AO when cle

commander or his representative.
E-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

TST? (Either by the current collection plan

or TST supporting assets.) (Intel)

2. Was initial BDA received within time

limits? (1⁄2 hour from ground or air component

depending on weapon employed and target

disposition.) (Intel)

3. Was the TST successfully struck? (Refer

to BDA reporting responsibilities chart)?

(BDA reporting schedule should support

timing requirements.) (Intel)

4. Can the level of damage/destruction to the

TST be determined from initial BDA?

(Conclusive combat assessment of BDA

intelligence source.) (Ops/Intel)

5. Is Phase I BDA (physical damage) analysis

sufficient for making re-attack

recommendation (if required)? (Ops/Intel)

6. Are indications clear enough for an

informed follow-on decision? (Ops/Intel)

7. If Phase II BDA (functional damage)

collection is still required, is the collection

timeframe supportive of re-attack

recommendation? (Ops/Intel)

8. Does current collection plan account for

TST location? (Intel)

9. Does initial combat assessment confirm

that the objectives were met? If yes, then this

TST process is complete. (Ops)

10. Is the criticality of the TST such that

additional BDA collection must be acquired?

(Ops/Intel)

11. Was high priority effort initiated with

commensurate level of support required?

(Ops/Intel)

advised?

13. Will the current collectio

altered? Consequences incurred? 

14. Are all TST data requiremen

to the CM? (Complete and acc

target data is a key requirement.) 

15. Did combat assessment pr

attack recommendation? (Ops/In

16. Coordination process expedit

window of opportunity. (Intel)

17. What is the impact of ch

collection management plan?

18. Have possible impacts on n

hours been weighed against a

objectives? (Ops/Intel)

19. Are collection assets/sensors a

expedited collection?

20. Did CMs review component a

availability? (Intel)

21. Is this an ad hoc or dynamic 

collection requirement?

22. Is priority of TST high enou

current plan. (Ops/Intel)

23. What is the timeframe for re

24. What is the window of vu

especially for mobile targets? (O

25. Have weapons options chang

26. Determine revised target d

fixed or mobile, hardened or soft
28. Consider most recent weapons options/

developments for best success. (Ops/Intel)

29. What are ATACMS limitations/

availability (fixed/soft targets)?

30. Has type and range of target been

determined? (Ops/Intel)

31. Has aircraft re-role/diversion been

considered?

33. Has the CM requested t

collection plan be adapted for a

BDA requirements?

34. Has the requirements list b

and adjusted accordingly? (Int

35. Is this a new/revised stand

requirement?
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Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
1. Joint Time-Critical Targets

Although not currently approved by joint

doctrine, many combatant commands use the

term “time-critical target (TCT)” as a subcategory of TSTs. These TCTs are deemed to

pose such a threat to friendly forces that they

are afforded distinctive ROE by the JFC.

a. In these instances, a joint TCT may be

defined as: “Those targets, specified by the

JFC that require immediate engagement

because they pose (or will soon pose) a

significant threat to friendly forces. The JFC

determines those situations, if any, where

immediate engagement of the TCT

threat outweighs other operational

considerations. Component commanders,

who first acquire specified TCTs, may be

specifically delegated the authority by the JFC

for immediate engagement responsibility

regardless of assigned area of operations or

mission.”

b. Joint TCTs are normally based upon

adversary capabilities. In other words, a joint

TCT is a target of great immediacy that poses

such a significant threat to the joint force that

it is specifically designated by the JFC for

immediate engagement in ord

damage to friendly forces.

c. Attacks against surface j

characterized by preemptive 

offensive actions, executed b

component commands, intend

land or sea targets as part o

strategic attack, interdiction, 

antisurface warfare, strike warf

operations direct action missio

d. As seen in Figure F-1, TC

subset of TSTs. It is up to the J

which TSTs will be considered 

what actions are to be taken 

The TCT guidance from the 

dependent on the current situa

the campaign, adversary capab

may be changed or updated as 

2. Risk Assessment

When required, the JFC speci

exceptional circumstances wh

component commanders, who 

specific surface joint TCTs, have 

for immediate engagement r

Joint TCTs Require Immediate Engagement
F-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

assigned AO or mission. In essence, the JFC

determines those situations, if any, where

immediate destruction of the surface joint

TCT threat outweighs the potential for

friendly casualties, collateral damage, or

duplication of effort. Inherently, this

determination, to whatever degree, may allow

a component to bypass the requirement for

informing, coordinating, deconflicting, and

synchronizing. However, if time allows, these

efforts should be accomplished before

engagement.

3. Commander’s Guidance

The JFC may issue a statement, similar to

that below, to make command guidance on

joint TCTs clear to component commanders:

“The adversary is known to possess, and has

the capability to employ nuclear WMD against

the joint force. Accordingly, the 

target types are designated joint T

• Adversary activities deploy

from known storage areas.

• Known or suspected TBM w

payloads.

These joint TCTs require i

engagement. Components will 

affected agencies when attacking 

but they will not delay the at

requirement to wait for coordinatio

affected components is waived. D

of these joint TCTs is desired. 

accepts the risk of fratricide, lo

and duplication of effort in atta

joint TCTs. Immediately notify th

joint TCT engagements.”

Time-Sensitive Targets

Require Immediate Response

Time-Critical Targets

Require Immediate Engagement

Figure F-1. TST/TCT Relationship

“(USCENTCOM) Current Operations works with two categories of target

sensitive and time-critical. Time-sensitive targets call for speed but allow 

time to coordinate to clear the airspace. Time-critical targets are like t

missiles during the Gulf War and call for a notice to airmen: ‘Clear the a

We are engaging the target now.’”

General Tommy R. Franks, U

Commander in Chief, US Central Co

FA Journal, May-Ju
The Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting is based upon 

primary references.

1. Joint Pub 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligen

Targeting, (under development).

2. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998.

3. Joint Pub 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, 13 October 1999.

4. Joint Pub 3-55, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconna

and Target Acquisition (TA), (under development).

5. Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002.

6. Department of Defense Joint Warfighters Test and Evaluation, Time-Sensitiv

Guide, dated February 2001.

7. US Joint Forces Command, Coherent Joint Fires 2000, Final Report dated 

8. US European Command, ED 40-16, Crisis Targeting Support Architecture, d

2001.

9. US Air Forces Europe Air Operations Center briefing, “Time-Sensitive Target

10. Air, Land, Sea Application Center, Targeting (The Joint Targeting Process an

for Targeting Time-Critical Targets), dated July 1997.

11. Air, Land, Sea Application Center, J-Fire (Multi-Service Procedures 

Application of Firepower), dated November 1997.

12. FA Journal, Volume VII, No.3, May-June 2001.
G-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

Intentionally Blank
A2C2 US Army airspace command and con

AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Comm

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and con

ACA airspace control authority

ACE analysis and control element

ACP airspace control plan

ACM airspace control measures

AETACS airborne element tactical air control sy

AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data sy

AFFOR US Air Force forces

AI air interdiction

AMD PCS TOC air, missile defense planning coordin

tactical operations center

AO area of operations

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

APAM anti-personnel/anti-material

ARFOR US Army forces

ARSPACE US Army Space Command

ASAS all source analysis system

ASOC air support operations center

ATACMS US Army tactical missile system

ATMDE US Army theater missile defense elem

ATO air tasking order

AWACS airborne warning and control system

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

C4I command, control, computers, and int

CA combat assessment/counter air

CALCM conventional air-launched cruise miss

CAP combat air patrol/crisis action plannin

CAS close air support

CFL coordinated fire line

CM collection manager

CMP collection management plan

COA course of action

COC combat operations center

COP common operational picture

COTS commercial off-the-shelf

CRC control and reporting center

CTAPS contingency theater automated planni
GL-2

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

DOD Department of Defense

DST decision support template

DTF digital target folder

FB forward boundary

FDC fire direction center

FFA free-fire area

FFCC force fires coordination center

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FLOT forward line of own troops

FRAGorder fragmentary order

FSCC fire support coordination center

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSCM fire support coordination measures

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GPS global positioning system

HPT high-payoff target

HPTL high-payoff target list

HQ headquarters

I3 integrated imagery and intelligence

IO information operations

IP Internet protocol

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespac

IR intelligence requirement

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais

J-2 joint force intelligence directorate

J-3 joint force operations directorate

J-5 joint force planning directorate

JAG Judge Advocate General

JAOC joint air operations center

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFE joint fires element

JFS joint fire support

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component comman

JFSOCC joint force special operations component c

JIC joint intelligence center

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list

JISE joint intelligence support element

JOA joint operations area
JSST joint space support team

JSTARS Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, Rad

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

JTF joint task force

JTL joint target list

LAT latitude

LNO liaison officer

LOAC law of armed conflict

LOCE linked operational intelligence centers 

LONG longitude

MAAP master air attack plan

MARFOR US Marine Corps forces

MEA munitions effectiveness assessment

MISREP mission fired report

MLRS multiple launch rocket system

MOOTW military operations other than war

MRL mobile rocket launcher

MRR minimum risk route

MSI multi-spectral imagery

MTW major theater of war

NALE naval amphibious liaison element

NAVFOR US Navy forces

NAVSPACECOM US Navy Space Command

NFA no-fire area

NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence C

NSFS naval surface fire support

NSL no-strike list

OPCON operational control

OPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PRISM planning tools for resource integration

synchronization, and management

RFA restricted fire area

RFL restricted fire line

RMS requirements management system

ROA restricted operations area

ROE rules of engagement

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and targe

RTL restricted target list
GL-4

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

SCN secure conference network

SMA system message alert

SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

SOMPF special operations mission-planning fold

SPOC space operations center

SROE standing rules of engagement

SSC small-scale contingency

STU secure telephone unit

STW strike warfare

TACC tactical air command center (USMC)

tactical air control center (USN)

TARBUL target bulletin

TBM theater ballistic missile

TBMCS theater battle management core system

TCF tactical combat force

TEL transporter, erector, launcher

TCT time-critical target

TISD theater integrated situation display

TLAM tomahawk land-attack missile

TOC tactical operations center

TST time-sensitive target

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UB Unified Build

UN United Nations

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USEUCOM United States European Command

USFORKOREA United States Forces Korea

UTM universal transverse mercator

WMD weapons of mass destruction
p

to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s

military potential before it can be brought

to bear effectively against friendly forces

at such distance from friendly forces that

detailed integration of each air mission with

the fire and movement of friendly forces is

not required. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to task

and disseminate to components,

subordinate units, and command and

control agencies projected sorties,

capabilities, and/or forces to targets and

specific missions. Normally provides

specific instructions to include call signs,

targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well

as general instructions. Also called ATO.

(JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and

accurate estimate of damage resulting from

the application of military force, either

lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined

objective. Battle damage assessment can

be applied to the employment of all types

of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and

special forces weapons systems) throughout

the range of military operations. Battle

damage assessment is primarily an

intelligence responsibility with required

inputs and coordination from the operators.

Battle damage assessment is composed of

physical damage assessment, functional

damage assessment, and target system

assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

bullseye An established reference point from

which the position of an object can be

referenced. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and

rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets

that are in close proximity to friendly forces

and that require detailed integration of each

those forces. Also called C

air interdiction. (JP 1-02)

collateral damage. Unin

incidental injury or damage 

objects that would not be la

targets in the circumstances 

time. Such damage is not un

as it is not excessive in light 

military advantage anticipa

attack. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determ

overall effectiveness of force 

during military operation

assessment is composed o

components: (a) battle damag

(b) munitions effectiveness as

(c) reattack recommendation

CA. (JP 1-02)

high-payoff target. A target 

the enemy will significantly 

the success of the friendly co

High-payoff targets are tho

targets that must be ac

successfully attacked for the 

friendly commander’s missio

HPT. See also high-value 

(JP 1-02)

high-value target. A targe

commander requires for th

completion of the mission. Th

value targets would be expect

degrade important enem

throughout the friendly comm

of interest. Also called HVT

pay-off target; target. (JP 1-

immediate targets. Targets th

identified too late, or not sele

in time to be included in 

targeting process, and there
GL-6

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,

delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface

military potential before it can be used

effectively against friendly forces. See also

air interdiction. (JP 1-02)

joint fires element. An optional staff element

that provides recommendations to the J-3 to

accomplish fires planning and

synchronization. Also called JFE. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term

applied to a combatant commander,

subunified commander, or joint task force

commander authorized to exercise

combatant command (command authority)

or operational control over a joint force. Also

called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force

composed of significant elements, assigned

or attached, of two or more Military

Departments operating under a single joint

force commander. See also joint force

commander. (JP 1-02)

joint integrated prioritized target list. A

prioritized list of targets and associated data

approved by the joint force commander or

designated representative and maintained

by a joint force. Targets and priorities are

derived from the recommendations of

components in conjunction with their

proposed operations supporting the joint

force commander’s objectives and

guidance. Also called JIPTL. (JP 1-02)

joint target list. A consolidated list of

selected targets considered to have military

significance in the joint operations area.

Also called JTL. (JP 1-02)

functions that may include b

limited to coordinating 

information, providing targetin

and priorities, and refining 

integrated prioritized target list

is normally comprised of repr

from the joint force staff, all c

and, if required, component s

units. Also called JTCB. (JP 

joint targeting. The process o

targets within a commander

designated JOA and mat

appropriate component respon

considering operational requir

capabilities. (Commander’s Ha

Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

joint task force. A joint fo

constituted and so designa

Secretary of Defense, a c

commander, a subunified com

an existing joint task force c

Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

joint time-critical target. Tho

specified by the CJTF th

immediate engagement becaus

(or will soon pose) a significa

friendly forces. The CJTF deter

situations, if any, where i

engagement of the imminent 

threat outweighs other op

considerations. Component co

who first acquire specified joint 

be specifically delegated the a

CJTF for immediate en

responsibility regardless of as

of operations or mission. (Co

Handbook for Joint Time

Targeting)
components to successfully engage.

(Commander’s Handbook for Joint TimeSensitive Targeting)

kill box. A three-dimensional area reference

that enables timely, effective coordination

and control and facilitates rapid attacks.

(JP 1-02)

measures of effectiveness. Tools used to

measure results achieved in the overall

mission and execution of assigned tasks.

Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite

to the performance of combat assessment.

Also called MOEs. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with the

purpose, that clearly indicates the action to

be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In

common usage, especially when applied to

lower military units, a duty assigned to an

individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching

of one or more aircraft to accomplish one

particular task. (JP 1-02)

no-strike list. A list of geographic areas,

complexes, or installations not planned for

capture or destruction. Attacking these may

violate the law of armed conflict or interfere

with friendly relations with indigenous

personnel or governments. Also called

NSL. (JP 1-02)

offensive counterair. Offensive operations

to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy

aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and

their supporting structures and systems both

before and after launch, but as close to their

source as possible. Offensive counterair

operations range throughout enemy

territory and are generally conducted at the

initiative of friendly forces. These

operations include attack operations, fighter

sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy

air defenses. Also called OCA. (JP 1-02)

planning to meet emergin

specific to campaign objectiv

planned targets. Targets that 

exist in an operational area

which effects are scheduled 

are on-call. Examples range 

on joint target lists in th

campaign plan, to targets 

sufficient time to list in the air 

mission-type orders, or fire 

Planned targets have two s

scheduled or on-call. (JP 1-0

reattack recommendation. A

derived from the results of b

assessment and munitions 

assessment, providing the 

systematic advice on reattack 

further target selection 

objectives. The reattack rec

considers objective achievem

aimpoint selection, attack ti

weapon system and muniti

The reattack recommen

combined operations and 

function. Also called RR. (

restricted target. A target tha

restrictions imposed upon it

exceed specified restrictions 

until coordinated and app

establishing headquarters. (J

rules of engagement. Directi

competent military authority 

the circumstances and limi

which United States forces w

or continue combat engagem

forces encountered. Also 

(JP 1-02)

scheduled targets. Planned 

which fires will be delivered 

time. (JP 1-02)
GL-8

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive T

support the commander’s objectives,

guidance, and intent. Targets fall into two

general categories: planned and immediate.

2. In intelligence usage, a country, area,

installation, agency, or person against which

intelligence operations are directed. 3. An

area designated and numbered for future

firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact

burst that hits the target. (JP 1-02)

target of opportunity. A target visible to a

surface or air sensor or observer, which is

within range of available weapons and

against which fire has not been scheduled

or requested. (JP 1-02)

time-sensitive targets. Those targets

requiring immediate response because they

pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly

forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting

unanticipated immediate targ

immediate targets that are unkn

expected to exist in an opera

(JP 1-02)

unplanned immediate targe

immediate targets that are kno

in an operational area but are n

located, or selected for action i

time to be included in the norm

process. (JP 1-02)

weaponeering. The process of d

the quantity of a specific type 

nonlethal weapons required to 

specific level of damage to a g

considering target vulnerabilit

effect, munitions delivery accura

criteria, probability of kill, a

reliability. (JP 1-02)
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