AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI: THE IDEOLOGUE OF 

MODERN ISLAMIC MILITANCY

by 

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 21 

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Ayman Al-Zawahiri: 

The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy 

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein 

March 2004 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

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Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i

The Author.................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... iii 

Dedication.................................................................................................. iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Issam Al-Qamari: Al-Zawahiri’s Alter ego? (1967-1981) .................5 

III. Re-taking Islamic Jihad and Al-Zawahiri’s Revolutionary 

Zeal (1981-1992)..................................................................................7 

IV. Zawahiri’s Appreciation for the Media and Efforts During the 

Soviet-Afghan War (1982-1992)..........................................................8 

V. End of the Afghan War (1989-1998) ................................................10 

VI. Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri Form the World Islamic Front 

for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (1998).............................12 

VII. Al-Zawahiri Out of Control..............................................................14 

VIII. Al-Zawahiri’s Writings and Conclusion...........................................15 

Notes..........................................................................................................19 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

i 
The Author 

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein was commissioned in the 

Navy Medical Service Corps in 1994 to serve as Assistant Material Manager at 

Naval Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. In 1996, he was Task Force Medical 

Administrator aboard USS GUAM (LPH-9) Amphibious Ready Group.

Raised in the Middle East and speaking two dialects of Arabic, he was tasked 

in 1997 and again in 1999 to be the Arabic linguist and Middle East Advisor 

during Exercise Bright Star in Egypt. He then reported to Naval Hospital Great 

Lakes Illinois as Plans Operations and Medical Intelligence Officer. Since

September 11th, he has worked as Middle East advisor at the Defense 

Intelligence Agency and is currently assigned as Country Director for North

Africa and Assistant Country Director for the Arabian Peninsula at the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

Aboul-Enein is a prolific writer of articles, commentary and reviews on 

Islamic militancy and the Middle East for such journals as the USAF

Aerospace Power Chronicles, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Journal 

Military Review and Naval Institute Proceedings. In collaboration with the 

Army Command and General Staff College, he has published essays translating 

excerpts of memoirs of Egyptian, Algerian generals and a Hamas operative. 

He is also the first appointed Book Editor of the Navy Medicine Journal. 

In 1990, Aboul-Enein earned a Bachelors of Business Administration 

degree from the University of Mississippi. He earned a Masters in Health 

Services Administration and in Business Administration from the University of 

Arkansas at Little Rock in 1993. In 2002, he received a Masters of Science of 

Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College in 

Washington, D.C. He has earned Non-Resident diplomas in Command and 

Staff with an emphasis on International Relations from the Naval War College,

the Army War College Defense Strategy Course and the Marine Corps Institute 

Amphibious Warfare School. 

ii 
Acknowledgments 

I wish to thank the Pentagon Librarians for providing materials for 

this work and putting up with me returning items late. I would also like to 

thank my colleagues at Office of Secretary of Defense-Near East and 

South Asian Affairs who are among the most talented people I have 

encountered in government. They have always challenged me to think 

about threats to our nation’s security. Finally, I would like to thank my 

wife, Cheryl Anne, who edited and proofed this monograph. 

Dedication 

This monograph is dedicated to U.S. and Pakistani troops who are 

putting their lives in danger to apprehend Ayman Al-Zawahiri and other 

Al-Qaeda operatives along the Afghan-Pakistan border. 

iii 

Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 1

Ayman Al-Zawahiri: 

The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy 

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein 

I. Introduction 

Egyptian physician Ayman Al-Zawahiri is considered by many to be 

the brains behind Al-Qaeda organization. Understanding Al-Zawahiri is

to understand the most violent form of Islamic radicalism, one where there 

is no negotiation and an uncompromising attitude in waging an offensive 

jihad on those he has deemed as enemies of his brand of Islamic 

fundamentalism. He is even a controversial figure within the Islamic 

political movement. This complex figure requires careful study as we 

embark on our mission to fight terrorism around the globe. 

Biography 

Born in 1951 to a distinguished family, Ayman Muhammad Rabi’ AlZawahiri’s ancestry is of Arabian tribal stock who settled in Egypt around 

1860. His paternal grandfather, Sheikh Al-Ahmadi Al-Zawahiri, was a 

distinguished Islamic scholar and the Imam of the Al-Azhar Mosque. His 

father was a pharmacology professor at Ain Shams University. His

maternal grandfather, Abdul-Wahab Azzam, was a professor of Oriental 

literature, president of Cairo University and Egyptian Ambassador to 

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Well known for his Islamic

knowledge and piety, he was often nicknamed, “the devout ambassador.” 

His granduncle, Abdul-Razaq Azzam, was the first Secretary General of 

the Arab League.1

Muntassir-al-Zayat, an Islamist lawyer who was imprisoned with AlZawahiri in the eighties, wrote a chilling book about Usama Bin Laden’s 

ideologue. Entitled, Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him, Al-Zayat delves 

into the militant rationalism that Al-Zawahiri espouses. The book 

explains how Al-Zawahiri was first turned on to Islam as a means of

violent political expression after the 1967 Six-Day War.2

 After being 
2 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

swept up by Nasser’s wave of Arab nationalism, the crushing defeat sent 

many Egyptians searching for answers, and a few like Zawahiri found it in 

Islamic radicalism. According to Al-Zayat’s book, Ayman Al-Zawahiri as

I Knew Him, the writings of Sayed Qutb offered an explanation for the 

1967 War.3

 Illustrative of Qutb’s writings that speak to those seeking a 

militant Islamic solution are, “our first task is to change society in deed, to

alter the jahiliyah reality from top to bottom. We must get rid of this 

jahiliyah society; we must abandon its values and ideology.”4

 Two

concepts emerge from Qutb’s book Maalim fi-al Tariq (Signposts).5

 The

book reduces the conflict to a war of ideology, in which faith is in conflict 

with the materialism of the West. The book also categorizes the Egyptian 

society, although Muslim in character including the government appointed 

ulama (clergy), as being in a state of jahiliyah or pre-Islamic ignorance. 

Even the founder of the Islamic Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna did not 

characterize Egyptian society as a whole with the label of jahili. This term 

was used to describe the Meccans who waged war against the Prophet 

Muhammad and was not used to describe other Muslims except by fringe 

groups like the Kharijites and the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah. 

Al-Zawahiri would also shape his ideas from Nasserist diatribe. For 

example in Nasser’s book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser 

explains the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the encirclement of his unit in the

Faluja Pocket in terms of needing to defeat the enemy within (the

Egyptian monarchy) before defeating the Israelis.6

 Zawahiri would give 

this an Islamist spin, writing that one can only defeat the enemy who is far

by defeating the enemy who is near (the Egyptian Republic) and this can 

only be accomplished by declaring these rulers apostates and declaring a 

Jihad upon them. 

It is significant to pause and reflect that Ayman Al-Zawahiri 

graduated from high school in 1966 and was on his way to university 

when several events occurred – such as the severe crackdown of the 

Muslim Brotherhood by Nasser and the 1967 Six-Day War. This reflects 

the ideological zeal of youth combined with forming solid jihadist theories

at an early age. Muntassir-Al-Zayat quotes a deposition given by AlZawahiri in 1981, when he stood accused of collaborating in the 

assassination of President Anwar Sadat. In the deposition he says, “I (AlZawahiri) first joined an Islamist organization in 1966 under the tutelage 

of Ismail Tantawi, who advocated the creation of cells within the Egyptian 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 3

government.” He goes on to describe how these theories differed from the

Muslim Brotherhood and that Tantawi’s vision would come to fruition 

with the 1975 Military Technical College revolt.7

 This movement was

patterned after Nasser’s revolt when he organized the Free Officers 

Association within the Egyptian military and cooperated with the Muslim 

Brotherhood who also had cells in the Egyptian military. That brought 

about the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy of King Farouk. This is a 

jihadist adaptation of the events leading to the 1952 creation of the 

Egyptian Republic. 

Among the works that influenced Al-Zawahiri and justified his 

theories for the violent overthrow of Arab regimes is the work of 

thirteenth century Islamic commentator Ibn Taymiyyah who wrote the 

book Al-Siyasah Al-Shariyah (The Islamic Polity). It is a staple of every 

Islamic militant and it proposes such concepts as a social compact 

between the governor and the governed, based upon piety. The people

owe their allegiance to a ruler in return for the ruler governing according 

to Islamic law. 

In addition, he took the extraordinary step of re-awakening the 

seventh century doctrines of the Kharijites (The Outsiders). The 

Kharijites felt that anyone who cheated God of His divine plan is an 

apostate and their killing is sanctioned. The Kharijites also elevated Jihad 

to being a sixth pillar of Islam, contrary to the fact that there are only five

pillars in Islam and Jihad is not one of them. Ibn Taymiyyah applied this 

doctrine on the Mongols, who, although converted to Islam, still retained 

their tribal laws. He argued that since the Mongols did not practice 

Islamic law, they are apostates and their killing is an obligation and duty 

until they accepted Islamic law. His writings became a political tool for 

rulers to declare their political rivals to be apostates. 

In court transcripts of Al-Zawahiri’s trial, obtained by Muntassir AlZayat, he was asked when he became interested in Islamic 

fundamentalism. He responded that it was during his final year of high 

school (1965-1966) during Nasser’s crushing arrests of 17,000 members 

of the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequent execution of many Islamic 

brothers, including the eminent Sayed Qutb, that he looked into forming 

an Islamist group. It became solidified in Al-Zawahiri’s my mind when

Nasser, while visiting Moscow, made his announcement to crack down on

the Muslim Brotherhood that this was an ideological war against Islam 
4 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

and required the efforts of its youth to topple Nasser. He and three other 

students would establish a cell within his high school and call it Tanzeem

(The Organization) in 1966-67. The Emir (Head) of this organization was 

Ismail Tantawi and it continued gathering members until 1975. The 

purpose of the organization was the violent overthrow of the Egyptian 

government and the establishment of an Islamic government in its place. 

When asked by the prosecutor what Zawahiri meant by an Islamic 

government, he explained that he meant a government that rules according 

to the dictates of Islamic Law. 

The prosecution then asked him about his views on Jihad. AlZawahiri answered with clarity that Jihad meant the removal of the current 

government through revolution and bringing about an Islamic government 

in its place. This revolution can only come about through the use of force 

and the cooperation of the military with civilians to bring about this goal. 

He then told the prosecutor that the current regime does not govern 

according to Islamic law and that this was only the start of the revolution. 

Al-Zawahiri said that there was a long road ahead before the violent

overthrow of the Egyptian government could become a reality.8

The name Tanzeem would evolve into Tanzeem al-Jihad or simply 

Al-Jihad which is known by its acronym EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), the 

organization that Zawahiri would take control of in 1975, following 

government purges of his organization and the exile of other Tazeem 

leaders. 

Court transcripts of the 1981 trial offer insight into his revolutionary 

thoughts and include this chilling answer to the question on Al-Zawahiri’s 

ideology by prosecutor Mahmood Masood of Egypt’s national security 

apparatus. 

Al-Zawahiri explained that his organization was striving towards 

gradual stages of the revolution, first recruiting many members from the 

civilian sector while actively pursuing members within the military and

security establishments. He went on to elaborate about revolution being a 

technically complex matter, requiring the planning of someone with a

military background.9

 This is significant, for it shows his modus operandi, 

a mixture of long-range planning, patience and a determination to 

accomplish his objective. 

In his book, Muntassir-Al-Zayat describes Al-Zawahiri as a young 

college student, one with high morals, calm, reflective and not very 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 5

talkative. He was, however, driven and focused in all his efforts to 

achieve his goals and complete his tasks. He was often solicited for 

advice and was the one to take major decisions on the course his Islamist 

group should take after listening to his friends and fellow Muslim 

associates. 

Al-Zawahiri is also keenly proud of his ancestry and heritage and 

perhaps this was one way in which he and Usama Bin Laden found 

common ground,10 as Bin Laden is keenly conscious of his aristocratic 

origins, and is particularly proud of his father. In the case of Al-Zawahiri, 

he is keenly proud of his maternal and paternal grandfathers. Both Bin 

Laden and Al-Zawahiri would be influenced and militarized by the same 

cleric in different years. Shiekh Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian and 

creator of Maktab-Al-Khadamat (Services Offices) that organized 

thousands of Afghan Arabs during the Soviet War in Afghanistan, would 

obtain his doctorate at Al-Azhar University in Egypt in the early seventies, 

meeting Al-Zawahiri and further shaping his jihadist views. 

Sheikh Azzam, known as the fighting Sheikh for his uncompromising

views on offensive jihad, also discovered Usama Bin Laden as a young 

college student at King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, where Azzam’s 

lectures electrified audiences and turned them onto restoring Islamic glory 

through violence. Azzam’s Maktab Al-Khadamat was also known as AlQaeda Al-Sulbah (The Firm Base).11 Upon Azzam’s assassination in

1989, both Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri would inherit the organization now 

known as Al-Qaeda. 

Al-Zawahiri became active in the Islamic militant movement. He

was involved in the Military Technical College Revolt in 1975 and the 

assassination of Sadat in 1981. He completed his medical degree in

1974 and earned a specialization in surgery in 1978.12 Al-Zawahiri spent

three years in an Egyptian jail from 1981 to 1984, after which he left 

Egypt for Pakistan to serve as a physician in the Afghan jihad against the 

Soviets. 

II. Issam Al-Qamari: Al-Zawahiri’s Alter Ego? (1967-1981) 

It is worth devoting a section on the relationship between Al-Zawahiri 

and the late Islamic militant and former armored corps officer, Issam Al-
6 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Qamari. Al-Zawahiri devotes an entire chapter to him in his book Knights 

Under the Prophet’s Banner. He describes Al-Qamari in mythic terms, 

describing how he met a heroic death at the hands of the Egyptian security 

forces while lobbing grenades at them and holding them off until fatally 

wounded. 

Al-Zawahiri’s relationship with Al-Qamari may have gone back to 

their high school days, where they discussed revolutionary ideologies and 

agreed that an Islamic fundamentalist movement was the only way to rid 

Egypt of Sadat and Mubarak. According to Muntassir Al-Zayat’s book, 

they both agreed that a military takeover was the only means of fomenting 

a revolution. This is what led Al-Qamari to join the military academy and 

rise through to the rank of major in the Egyptian Armored Corps. Both 

men dreamt of a quick revolution that spared the Egyptian people from 

bloodshed. 

Al-Zayat writes about the time when both Al-Zawahiri and AlQamari were incarcerated for Islamist activities. Al-Zayat describes AlQamari as a charismatic figure who organized and led Islamist cells within 

Egypt’s Tura Prison and it was during their incarceration and interrogation 

in 1981-1982, that the idea occurred to them of splitting from the AlGamaa Al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group) and forming the more ultramilitant Tanzeem Al-Jihad.

13

The Egyptian Military Technical College Revolt conducted in 1975 

was a seminal event in Al-Zawahiri’s experience. He assesses it in his

2001 book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, writing that this coup

failed because it did not take into consideration the objective conditions 

and the need to prepare well for them. The group who attacked the gate of 

the college was untrained. The lesson for Al-Zawahiri was patience and

training, theories that he would try out later in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Unable to endure torture when he and many other army officers and 

civilians were rounded up during the investigation into Sadat’s 

assassination, Al-Zawahiri gave depositions and served as a witness 

implicating his friend and hero, Al-Qamari. He also led Egyptian security

forces to Al-Qamari’s hideout. Many jihadists within Egypt believe that

Al-Zawahiri as leader of Al-Jihad should have faced martyrdom to protect

the organization. His cooperation with the authorities perhaps led to his 

quick exit from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and on to Afghanistan.14
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 7

In Al-Zawahiri’s book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, AlQamari is depicted as the model Islamic militant, who escapes from prison 

and bravely fights off Egyptian security forces before being killed himself. 

It can be argued that Al-Qamari represents Al-Zawahiri’s alter ego, the 

mythic militant he would want to be. He also credits Al-Qamari as an

Islamic militant visionary. Al Zawahiri writes that Al-Qamari postulated 

that the only way to counter the regime is to form an armed vanguard to 

wage battles, to control the capital (Cairo) and engage the armed forces for 

two weeks before a violent overthrow could be considered. To create this 

army, he argued that Egyptian militants needed weapons training in tanks, 

demolitions and firearms. In Afghanistan, Al-Zawahiri would test these

ideas and re-invent his organization, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). 

III. Re-taking Islamic Jihad and Al-Zawahiri’s Revolutionary 

Zeal (1981-1992) 

It is important to note that Al-Zawahiri spent seven months in 

Afghanistan as early as 1980 and then returned for short trips in 1981, 1984 

and 1986. During this time he formulated his ideas on jihad and reaffirmed 

his commitment to Islamic militancy, seeing the opportunity to gain military 

and political experience for jihadists in Egypt. He envisioned training a 

competent armed vanguard in Afghanistan and then reinserting them into 

Egypt to train and carry out active combat within the country.15

It is also in Afghanistan where Al-Zawahiri and Usama Bin Laden

cooperated for the first time, sharing a similar experience with the fighting 

cleric Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. This cleric hardened their views and, while 

in northern Pakistan, coordinated and organized the thousands of ArabAfghans arriving to participate in the jihad against the Soviets. 

From 1987 to 1990, Ayman Al-Zawahiri concentrated his efforts on 

the jihad against the Soviets. He had spent over five years outside of 

Egypt. During this time, other contenders like the intelligence officer and 

jihadist, Colonel Abood Al-Zummur, had taken over the leadership of EIJ 

while in an Egyptian prison. According to Al-Zayat’s book, Al-Zawahiri 

served as a point man in Afghanistan for Egyptian Islamic militants, 

offering them access to camps, military training and actual combat

experience for EIJ members. 
8 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Two such Egyptian-Afghan mujahideen and EIJ members, Naeem 

Nabeel Abdul-Fatah and Tharwat Salah, would help Al-Zawahiri regain 

control of the organization. They would distribute Al-Zawahiri’s 

communiqués and copious writings to EIJ members. These writings were 

distinguished from other jihadist tracts by fine printing and a special 

yellow cover. They distributed the pamphlets and books written by AlZawahiri to junior members of EIJ and also used them to recruit more 

members. By the time Naeem Abdul-Fatah was apprehended in 1991 and

Tharwat Salah had escaped the authorities by moving to Afghanistan, AlZawahiri had won the media war among Islamists, and was the most 

recognizable name in the EIJ movement.16 Young members thought of

him as a man of action who lived the jihadist ideals he preached in 

Afghanistan. 

IV. Zawahiri’s Appreciation for the Media and Efforts 

During the Soviet-Afghan War (1982-1992) 

Al-Zawahiri’s use of pamphlets to bolster his reputation and to regain 

control of the EIJ demonstrates his appreciation for the media. No doubt, 

he carefully studied how Ayatollah Khomeini used cassette tapes 

smuggled into Iran to foment a revolution against the Shah that finally 

brought about the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. He is also adept at 

manipulating Islamic history to suit his political objectives. 

In Chris Hedges’ book, War is a Force That Gives Life Meaning, he 

describes how every religion and ethnic group nurtures certain myths, 

often centered on the creation of a nation or the movement itself. These

myths lie unseen beneath the surface waiting for the moment to rise 

ascendant to define and glorify followers in times of crisis.17 These myths

are preached in mosques, played on television stations, and preserved in 

books and pamphlets. Al-Zawahiri is a copious writer on Islamic 

militancy and his theses revolve around the myths justifying offensive 

jihad. 

In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner or Al-Zawahiri’s earlier book 

Bitter Harvest, he plays upon the victimization of Muslims around the

world. He demonizes perceived enemies using militant commentators as 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 9

his primary source and then applies select Quran verses along with 

Prophet Muhammad’s sayings taken out of historical context. 

In Al-Zawahiri’s writings he leaves no room for Islamic history that 

shows Prophet Muahmmad’s establishment of a Medinan Constitution in 

which Muslims and non-Muslims lived as one community in Medina. 

There is no mention of the importance of Christians in the nurturing of 

early Islam, such as the granting of asylum for Muslims by the Christian 

King of Abyssinia. Prophet Muhammad mourned his death, because of 

his fair treatment of Muslims under his protection. 

Al-Zawahiri also argues for the return of the Caliphate and an Islamic 

government, even though Prophet Muhammad and the Quran do not give 

guidance on how Muslims should govern themselves. 

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Zawahiri developed a 

recruitment system whereby young members of EIJ who participated in 

the Soviet-Afghan war returned to Egypt in the mid-eighties to recruit 

more fighters for the jihad. He typically sent recruiters to towns in 

Southern Egypt like El-Minia and the region known as Al-Saeed 

(Southern Egypt). Most often college students or graduates were the focus 

of recruitment efforts. It is obvious from Arabic sources that Al-Zawahiri 

was looking for quality fighters who had training in engineering and other 

technical skills.18 This recruitment method required marketing and media 

efforts to attract the college graduates to the Afghan war, again

demonstrating Al-Zawahiri’s prowess in marketing the jihad. 

When Al-Zawahiri was in Afghanistan, he served as a physician in 

Peshawar, Pakistan, organized Maktab Jihad al Islamee (Islamic Jihad 

Office) and published a monthly newsletter entitled, “Al-Fath” (The

Opening). During the war, Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri cooperated, but 

their relationship did not become close until the end of the war in 1988. 

After the Soviet withdrawal, two camps emerged within the Arab-Afghan 

movement. Al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden wanted the Arab Afghans to 

return to their native lands and foment revolution throughout the Middle 

East and North Africa. Abdullah Azzam wanted the Arab Afghans to 

remain and build an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan that would consolidate

itself and begin the liberation of former Islamic Soviet Republics. 

Bin Laden came to rely on EIJ leaders to run his affairs and AlZawahiri came to rely on Bin Laden’s source of funding. Bin Laden’s top 

leadership consisted of Egyptian jihadists like the late Abu Hafs (Head of 
10 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Security), Saiid Al-Masri (Finance), the captured Mohammad Omar Abdul 

Rahman (Operations and Training), and Midhat Mursi (Weapons and 

Research) to name a few top echelon members of Al-Qaeda.19 These are 

all handpicked EIJ members that Al-Zawahiri provides as a means of 

maintaining control of Al-Qaeda behind the scenes. 

In court transcripts during the Sadat assassination trials, Al-Zawahiri 

highlights how his organization differs from the Muslim Brotherhood and 

the organization Al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Migration). 

His Islamic Jihad stands for the overthrow of the Egyptian government 

with no negotiation or compromise. Despite the fact that members of the

Muslim Brotherhood often challenged the Egyptian government policies, 

sometimes violently, Al-Zawahiri, nevertheless, asserts that they have too 

often cooperated with the authorities in Cairo. This, he believes, weakens 

the organization causing members to forget the true mission of replacing 

the government with an Islamic state. He criticized those who would stray 

from this path to pursue, instead, government perks, rewards, and funds. 

He views Al-Takfir wal-Hijrah as isolating itself from what needs to be

done to bring about change, which is the establishment of a vanguard that 

would offer armed resistance to the government.20

Al-Zawahiri opposes any Islamist group that tries to settle with the 

government or is enticed into participating with the regime. Muntassir AlZayat identifies this as the most destructive aspect of Al-Zawahiri and 

explains how many Islamist political groups resent his refusal to negotiate 

or compromise with those in power. 

V. End of the Afghan War (1989-1998) 

The crisis over what to do with the thousands of battle-hardened 

Arabs in Afghanistan came to a violent resolution in 1989 when Abdullah 

Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb along with his two sons in

Peshawar. Bin Laden effectively took control of his organization and 

began creating the worldwide network that is Al-Qaeda; Ayman AlZawahiri became an indispensable advisor and wanted to renew the 

violent overthrow of the Egyptian government using these Arab-Afghans. 

From 1989 to 1992, Afghan warlords debated about what to do with 

non-Afghans who chose to remain. Some were tried in abstentia and 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 11

could not return to the Middle East. Sibghatullah El-Mojaddaddi, the 

interim Afghan President, called for all non-Afghans to leave. 

Burhanuddin Rabbani wanted them to remain as a reserve force to be used 

by his faction against other Afghan warlords.21

Al-Zawahiri worried that if Arab fighters remained in Afghanistan 

they would be sucked up in tribal warfare and sidetracked from his focus

of a violent overthrow of the Egyptian government. He found refuge in 

Yemen and Sudan in 1992, these countries providing bases from which he 

could infiltrate fighters into Egypt in order to organize cells. Al-Zawahiri 

persuaded Bin Laden to adopt a jihadist mission beyond the defeat of the 

Soviet Union, a worldwide jihad using his money and investments in 

Sudan and Yemen to establish a base of operations. 

Muntassir-al-Zayat’s book details the methodical planning AlZawahiri conducted to find a place for his Arab Afghans. This planning

included drawing up a list of nations next to Egypt and assessing their 

viability to conduct armed resistance along the lines of the Afghan model.

This short list was narrowed down to Sudan, Yemen and Jordan. Even the 

cost of living and sustaining cells was taken into consideration, and 

Yemen, unstable due to the skirmishes between tribes, was looked at as 

containing a robust Egyptian community. Al-Zawahiri deemed Sudan a

costly place to sustain cells, but nonetheless viewed it as a useful 

sanctuary from which to conduct violence against the Mubarak regime 

across the border in Egypt.22

From 1989 to 1998, Al-Zawahiri, determined to destroy Egypt’s 

economic resources, primarily tourism, began calling for strikes on the 

symbols of the Egyptian government. He heavily renewed his criticism of

Islamist political groups who negotiate with the government and his 

followers during this time conducted attacks on former Prime Minister

Atef Sidqi, which led to the death of an innocent child. Attacks included 

the 1994 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and a failed 

attack on Israeli tourists in the Cairo bazaar, Khan-el-Khalili. Other 

attacks included the failed assassination of former Interior Minister 

Hassan Al-Alfi, the Luxor attacks, the Cairo Museum bus bombing and an 

attack on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1998. The death of the 

young child Shayma during the failed attempt on former Prime Minister

Sidqi so appalled Egyptian public opinion that Al-Zawahiri was forced to 
12 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

issue a statement regretting her death in the cause of resistance against the 

government. 

The Egyptian people began taking a negative view of Islamists. 

Financing and other forms of support dried up not only for Al-Zawahiri’s

EIJ, but also for other Islamist groups in Egypt. The crackdown by the

government led many violent members of EIJ to escape to Sudan and 

Yemen and Al-Zawahiri became frustrated at the failure of operations

within Egypt.23 He had to search for alternate means of funding as well as 

a new direction for his jihad. 

VI. Bin-Laden and Al-Zawahiri Form the World Islamic 

Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (1998) 

An entire chapter of Muntassir-Al-Zayat’s book deals with the shift of

Al-Zawahiri’s ideology from focusing efforts to topple the Egyptian 

government to attacking the United States. Al-Zawahiri, disappointed in 

his failed plans to foment revolution in Egypt, and the downfall of his 

credibility among the Egyptian public caused by death of a young child, 

was led to shift directions by attacking symbols of American power. 

Another reason for Al-Zawahiri’s doctrinal shift was a major setback

caused by the arrest and conviction of 108 EIJ members in a military 

tribunal in Egypt, in what became known as the Returnees from Albania 

Case. A laptop of a senior EIJ member was discovered that contained 

hundreds of member names and Egyptian authorities promptly rounded 

them up.24

These blows to EIJ could not be overcome and by 1997, Al-Zawahiri 

was looking for an alternate plan to keep the struggle going. Bin Laden 

had already publicly declared war on the United States in 1996. However, 

Al-Zawahiri was still hoping to stimulate the liberation of Jerusalem 

through the violent overthrow of the regime in Egypt. It would be 1998 

before Al-Zawahiri abandoned his slogan of liberating Jerusalem through 

a revolt in Cairo and joined forces with Bin Laden. 

Al-Zayat’s book explains that Al-Zawahiri’s formal alliance with Bin

Laden in 1998, establishing the World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against 

Jews and Crusaders, was driven primarily by financial desperation and the 

search for a credible mission to replace the failures of his operations in
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 13

Egypt. Al-Zayat writes that many Islamist groups, including members of 

his own EIJ, did not know of the formal union between the two until it was

announced on television and in the media. 

Many jihadists and Islamists resented Al-Zawahiri’s doctrinal shift 

from the internal enemy (The Egyptian Government) to the external 

enemy (The United States) without consultation. The Bin Laden/Al

Zawahiri announcement of an alliance followed the bombings of the U.S. 

embassies in Nairobi and Dar-al-Salam, which Al-Zayat claims was 

calculated by Al-Zawahiri to rid himself of Islamist opponents within 

Egypt, including EIJ members who had spoken out against him.

Al-Zayat devotes an entire chapter criticizing the attack on the United

States and the events of September 11th as causing great harm to jihadist 

movements around the world, arguing that the attacks on the United States 

(in particular 9-11) have caused asylum opportunities for Arab-Afghans to 

dry up. It also destroyed sources of income in Europe and America and 

destroyed the lives of many Arab-Afghan fighters who settled in 

Afghanistan and were living normal lives unrelated to the Taliban or AlQaeda.25

Al-Zayat complains that his attack only served to severely curtail the

major source of income for Islamist groups provided by charities and 

Arab-Afghans living in Europe. He goes further by implying in his book 

that the attacks on the United States have also served to seek revenge not 

only on America but also against the Gamaa al-Islamiyah (The Islamic 

Group) and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Zawahiri has had an ongoing 

feud with both of these Islamist organizations for their cooperation with 

and participation in the Egyptian government.26

Al-Zawahiri hoped the attacks of September 11th would galvanize 

Islamist movements and force them away from their policies of 

participating with the government. Al-Zawahiri writes about Islamist 

apathy in his book, Bitter Harvest, and the need to rekindle the flame of 

armed resistance laid down by the late Abboud Al-Zumur.27 From a

strategic perspective, attacking the United States directly is seen to 

stimulate its withdrawal from the region to allow the violent revolution to 

succeed. They now place their failures not only at the feet of the Egyptian 

authorities but also blame the United States that allows the regime to exist. 

Al-Zayat also highlights the 1998 trial of Mohammed Al-Ghizlani, an 

EIJ operative who carried out the failed attack on Israeli tourists in a Cairo
14 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Bazaar. Al-Ghizlani’s anti-Jewish closing argument offers a glimpse of 

Al-Zawahiri’s senior planners. Al-Ghizlani claims that Israel purposefully 

puts out that Egypt is unsafe for tourists in the worldwide media in order 

to divert valuable tourist currency away from Egypt and clandestinely 

shatter its economy.28 His argument is a new way for EIJ to divert blame 

for its unpopular attacks on tourists in Egypt by blaming the Israelis in a

convoluted conspiracy theory. Challenging these theories along with their 

twisting of Islamic law is an important aspect of this war on terrorism. 

VII. Al-Zawahiri Out of Control 

As Al-Qaeda’s chief ideologue, Al-Zayat devotes his last chapter to 

three cases that demonstrate Al-Zawahiri spinning out of control from a 

jihadist standpoint. He begins the chapter by describing the EIJ 

organization. It consists of Al-Zawahiri as the emir (head) and five major

committees beneath the emir. 

The Finance Committee is responsible for finding and developing 

sources of income, managing investments, paying EIJ members and their 

families, and providing fund transfers for EIJ operations. The Civil 

Affairs Committee recruits and trains new members, is involved in the 

indoctrination process and determines how members communicate with 

each other and EIJ leaders. The Military Operations Committee provides 

military training for select members and organizes them into small guerilla 

cells; Al-Zawahiri and EIJ leaders tightly control this committee. The

Islamic Law (Shariah) Committee provides fatwas (religious rulings) and 

sanctions for military operations and works closely in preparing reports to

Islamically justify EIJ actions. The final committee, the Internal Security 

Committee, protects EIJ leadership, conducts background investigations of 

members and carries out executions of members deemed as

collaborators.

29 This committee also participates in obtaining false travel

documents and making travel arrangements for EIJ members and their 

families. 

Al-Zayat describes how a young EIJ member’s son was executed in 

front of his father for collaborating with the Egyptian authorities while AlZawahiri was in Sudan. The Sudanese government was concerned about

EIJ having its own court and executioners that condemned members
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 15

outside the country’s legal system. This, combined with Sudan’s worry 

about relations with Egypt, was one of several determinants that caused 

the Sudanese to get rid of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri in 1998. The 

second story involved an Arab-Afghan fighter and EIJ member Abu 

Khadija who was captured and tortured by Egyptian authorities. Al-Zayat 

claims he was forgiven by Al-Zawahiri during a meeting in Mecca, in

which he assured him that since he was under torture he could not be held 

responsible. Shortly upon his return to Afghanistan Abu Khadija was 

killed in a dubious car accident in Pakistan. A few Islamists feel he was 

murdered on the orders of Al-Zawahiri. The final ploy described in AlZayat’s book is Al-Zawahiri giving his resignation as head of the EIJ in 

1998, only to have it refused by members. Al-Zayat explains that EIJ 

members had no choice but to keep Al-Zawahiri and the source of funds 

he obtained through Bin Laden. His alliance with Bin Laden was EIJ’s 

main source of income by 1998 and accepting Al-Zawahiri’s resignation 

meant EIJ members would be destitute.30

VIII. Al-Zawahiri’s Writings and Conclusion 

This section is an analysis of Al-Zawahiri’s last book, Knights Under 

the Prophet’s Banner, a 2001 series of essays published in Al-Sharq AlAwsat.31 The book’s subtitle, “Meditations of the Jihadist Movement,” is 

revealing because it shows Al-Zawahiri’s ability for deep contemplation 

over the past and future of Islamic militancy. No doubt he has spent hours

in the hills and caves of Afghanistan reflecting on new directions for the

movement. 

Unlike his 1996 book, Bitter Harvest, Al- Zawahiri wrote Knights 

Under the Prophet’s Banner after the events of September 11, 2001, and 

under the pressure of allied forces hunting him down. It is 21 chapters and 

reveals a geo-strategic history and vision of the Al-Qaeda organization. 

“The Arab and Western media are responsible for distorting the image of 

the Arab-Afghans by portraying them as obsessed, half-mad people who 

have rebelled against the United States that once trained and financed 

them,” Al-Zawahiri writes. He is obviously image-conscious and sees the 

U.S. as depriving Arab Muslims of their contribution in destroying the 

Soviet Union. 
16 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Al-Zawahiri also writes that Arab Afghans are not an American

creation, but that financial aid came from Arab sources throughout the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and amounted to $200 million. This

also means that every major attack on the United States is calculated by

Al-Zawahiri to have a media impact, as well as potentially elicit a certain 

predictable retaliation from his adversaries. 

The Bush Administration was wise to pause after September 11th and 

study options to deal with Al-Qaeda, as no doubt Al-Zawahiri hoped for 

global war against Islam to justify their positions. He describes this stage

of the battle as a global one, and that the forces of the disbelievers have

united against the mujahideen. “The battle today cannot be fought on a 

regional level without taking into account the global hostility towards us 

(Muslims).” 

Elements of the geo-strategic impact of Al-Zawahiri’s operations can 

be seen in the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. He writes 

that this particular operation was done to warn the Pakistani government 

of its overzealous cooperation with Egyptian authorities in handing over 

Egyptian Arab-Afghans to Cairo. Al-Zawahiri even states that Egyptians

who became naturalized Pakistani citizens were turned over. A team was 

formed to carry out the plans, and a list of targets drawn, which included 

the U.S. and Egyptian embassies. The list also included cost estimates as 

Al-Zawahiri claims that the U.S. embassy could have been struck but was 

not, due to lack of sufficient funds. 

Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner also lays a plan for future 

jihadists that Al-Zawahiri developed during his time in Afghanistan 

fighting the Soviets. He writes, “A jihadist movement needs an arena that 

would act like an incubator, where its seeds would grow and where it can 

acquire practical experience in combat, politics and organizational 

matters.”32 He advocates that mixing Islam with nationalism has caused 

confusion among young Muslim men and that jihadist ideology needs to 

be kept pure from the taint of nationalism, leftist and communist slogans. 

He uses Palestine as an example of how different ideologies mingled with 

Islam led to the failure of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 

After the ideological purification takes place and experience is

gained, Al-Zawahiri recommends the identification of those Muslim 

leaders that thwart efforts at imposing an Islamic government. He cites 

the murder of President Najibullah after the Soviet withdrawal from
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 17

Afghanistan as an example of a Muslim who prayed and fasted but 

prevented an Islamic state from being created. Finally, he advocates

striking at the superpower, citing the destruction of the Soviet Army in 

Afghanistan by the Islamic militants who defeated a great power. Thus,

he argues, all things are possible. 

Al-Zawahiri highlights some tactical issues that those involved in 

counter-terrorism should pay close attention to. He incites followers to 

attack Americans individually in his book, Knights Under the Prophet’s 

Banner, published in 2001: 

Killing them (Americans and Jews) with a single bullet, a

stab, or device made up of a popular mix of explosives or 

hitting them with an iron rod is not impossible. Burn[ing] 

down their property with Molotov cocktails is not difficult.

With the available means, small groups could prove to be a

frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews.

33

What he is calling for is unstable and random acts of violence in 

American cities. When the sniper shootings occurred in Virginia and 

Maryland in 2002, the first passage that came to mind was this one, before 

they arrested John Muhammad and John Lee Malvo and it was revealed 

they intended on ransoming the city for $10 million. Al-Zawahiri’s

reference to how a popular mix of explosives could be acquired in any 

hardware store is the type of suggestion that makes his book of concern. 

Al-Zawahiri also advocates the careful selection of targets, types of 

weapons employed and careful planning no matter how long it takes to 

strike at a target. In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, he also 

discusses the need for tactical withdrawal if a cell is discovered or 

infiltrated. His identified targets are the United Nations, Muslim nations 

allied with the west, multinational corporations, international 

communication and data exchange systems, international news agencies 

and satellite media outlets, as well as international relief agencies that he 

feels are a cover for evangelism and espionage by non-Muslims. This

may explain the targeting of American missionaries in Yemen, Lebanon 

and Pakistan and does not rule him out as a suspect of the anthrax attack

on NBC headquarters shortly after the 9-11 attack. 

In his book, Al-Hisad Al-Murr (The Bitter Harvest), he considers 

democracy a form of religion that must be destroyed. He sees no solution 
18 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

to the crisis in the Middle East except by violent offensive jihad. The 

Bitter Harvest highlights the need to establish an Islamist base within the 

Islamic world, therefore restoring the caliphate and past Islamic glory. 

There is no mention of how to govern, what an Islamic government is 

supposed to look like or even a program to deal with socioeconomic

problems. In Al-Zawahiri’s world, God will provide. He uses imagery, 

language, emotion and religious commentary to prey upon young 

Muslims. This is best captured by a poem written to his mother that seeks 

approval in the language of rhyme with a touch of classical Arabic 

phraseology.34 He speaks of the separation he has to endure from his 

mother as the price of service to God, as if he were trying to win over a 

new recruit by seeking acceptance and vindication for what he is doing in 

the name of his version of Islam.

In addition to Al-Zawahiri’s use of language and the media, as a 

medical doctor he has a healthy respect for Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and is most likely part of any Al-Qaeda plans to deploy chemical and 

biological weapons. “Al-Zawahiri, dead or alive,” will always be the 

Trotsky of international militant Islam. It is crucial to understand that his 

writings will be a part of Islamic militant lore. Therefore, part of this

battle is to discredit his anarchist views and his manipulation of Islamic 

history and law to suit his revolutionary ambitions. 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 19

Notes 

1. Nimrod Raphaeli, “Ayman Muhammad Rabi Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an

Arch-Terrorist.” Terrorism and Political Violence (Winter 2002, Vol. 14, No. 4), 2. 

2. Muntassir Al-Zayat, Ayman Al-Zawahiri Kamaa Aaraftu/Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I

Knew Him, (Cairo: Dar Misr Al-Mahroosa Publishers, 2002), 38. 

3. Ibid., 39-41. 

4. Sayyid Qutb. “Jihad in the Cause of Allah.” In Milestones, 2nd ed., translated by

S. Badrul Hasan, M.A. Karachi, Pakistan: International Islamic Publishers Ltd, 1988,

107-42. 

5. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 53. 

6. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, (New York: Smith, 

Keynes and Marshall Publishers, 1959). 

7. Al-Zayat, “Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him” 65-66. 

8. Ibid., 75-77. 

9. Ibid., 82-83. 

10. Ibid., 61. 

11. Raphaeli, 5-9.

12. Ibid., 2. 

13. Ibid., 44-45. 

14. Ibid., 55-56. 

15. Ibid., 98-99. 

16. Ibid, 58-60. 

17. Chris Hedges, War is a Force That Gives Life Meaning, (New York: 

PublicAffairs Press, 2002), 45-46.

18. Nabeel Sharaf-al-Din, Bin Laden, The Taliban and the Fundamentalist

Movement (Cairo: Madbooli Press, 2002), 112-113. 
20 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

19. Associated Press diagram of the Al-Qaeda Leadership captured, at large and

killed. Featured in March 3, 2003 edition of Washington Times. 

20. Al-Zayat, “Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him”, 85-86. 

21. Ibid., 104-106. 

22. Ibid., 107. 

23. Ibid., 114-116. 

24. Ibid., 125. 

25. Ibid., 120-126. 

26. Ibid., 130-136. 

27. Ibid., 186-187. 

28. Ibid., 147-149. 

29. Ibid., 195-198. 

30. Ibid., 199-208. 

31. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) provided the author the

complete translation of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s book, “Knights Under the Prophet’s 

Banner.” All excerpts from this article were taken from the FBIS translation of the 

Sharq-Al-Awsat Newspaper in which his writings appeared, Document ID:

GMP20020108000197, December 2, 2001. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes, Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam and

the Future of America (Dulles, Virginia: Brasseys, 2002), 59. 

34. Nabeel Sharaf-al-Din, “Bin Laden, The Taliban and the Fundamentalist

Movement,” 130-131. 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri . . . 21
22 . . . Ayman Al-Zawahiri

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