CASE STUDY N O. 9

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Leading Healing in a Broken Unit

Edward H. Powley

Naval Postgraduate School

Scott N. Taylor

University of New Mexico

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of 

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including 

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive 

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental 

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community 

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different 

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. 

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives 

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development 

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States 

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the 

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought 

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the 

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the 

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed 

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need. 

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships 

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the 

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the 

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

Produced 2010. Material in this case study may be used without permission.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 9

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Leading Healing in a Broken Unit

Edward H. Powley

Naval Postgraduate School

Scott N. Taylor

University of New Mexico

LEADING HEALING IN A BROKEN UNIT

What began as an orderly process to allow local civilians to pass through a 

crowded entry control point (ECP) ended when a lone man detonated 

explosives strapped to his body. The blast killed several marines and severely 

wounded nearly a dozen others. Military personnel had been processing 

civilians as usual that afternoon when the suicide bomber entered the checkpoint. Standing between the barriers, he raised his arms in preparation for a 

search when he triggered the explosive device. The blast radiated in front of 

him on the interior side of the ECP, causing harm to those in close range. 

Characteristic of his command style, the senior enlisted leader (SEL), 

Roger Selden, was working directly with his men at the ECP. Their mission 

was to secure a small but significant city in their area of operations (AO). At 

the checkpoint that day, he had noticed the nervous and agitated behavior of 

the apparent suicide bomber, and at the last moment he positioned himself 

in front of one of his men, shielding him from the blast. Selden’s act preserved the lives of several of his men, but he was killed. 

ROGER SELDEN, SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER

Selden was an integral part of the day-to-day operations that led the ground 

combat element (GCE). This was his third tour to the Middle East. He had 

spent most of his time in reconnaissance units and had moved up the 

enlisted ranks, earning respect from his superiors and subordinates alike. 

Earlier in his career, he had been deployed to the Middle East for Operation 

Desert Storm. Now, with twenty-plus years in the service, he was months 

away from retirement to take up a new life with his family. He loved the military, but he now felt he was being called to serve his country in a different 

way. He also wanted to complete his education and go into business or local 
2 ROGER SELDEN, SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

politics because of what he had learned in the military. After much discussion with his family, he had decided it was time to make the move. 

Selden was blessed with an outstanding wife, Julie. The two had known 

each other since kindergarten when, after the second day, she threw a toy 

airplane at him that cut him just above his left eye. Selden enjoyed telling 

others that after twenty-two years of marriage, Julie still “knocks his block 

off” when he gets out of line. Roger and Julie were the parents of three children. 

As a leader of other enlisted men, Selden understood that not everyone 

felt compelled or called to join the military. And yet, he found ways to help 

them discover what they wanted to become as a result of their decision to 

join, regardless of what it was initially. He was known to ask questions like, 

“As you think about your life, who has helped you become who you are 

today?” and “What do you want to become regardless of what happens in 

your life?” 

“Selden was like an experienced weatherman,” said a former commanding officer who had known him for more than ten years. “It was as if he could 

look at weather patterns and with accuracy anticipate what a storm would 

do and when it would hit. Selden had an uncanny ability to predict how his 

men would receive his leadership.” 

On one occasion while with his men on patrol, he noticed their watch 

conditions and its effect on their morale. 

“You’ve been working long hours out here,” he said, “and it’s not the 

most exciting place to spend long hours. Looks like you need more rotations 

and variability in your watch schedules.”

“Yes, sir. We’re kind of feeling burned out,” said a junior enlisted person.

“Sir. Not much happening here, and we’re getting pretty bored.”

“Remember to stay vigilant. Everyone’s depending on you. Tell you 

what, though, I’ll check with the OIC [officer in charge] and see what we 

can do about some rotations.”

He also knew when it would be most helpful to push or persuade, to be 

strict or to be more democratic, and how the person he was working with 

would respond. One time out with his men, he noticed them slipping. 

“I’m not real happy with what I’m seeing here,” he told them. “You’re 

being lazy when discharging weapons. That’ll lead to mistakes, and it’s going 

to cost someone. Safety is a top priority around here! And I don’t want to be 

in a position where I’m standing against you when it comes to being reprimanded.”

Selden had not always had a strong awareness of others and his impact 

on them. It was something he had intentionally started working on not long 

after he and Julie started dating steadily. Some of the biggest difficulties he 

and Julie had experienced in their relationship centered on Selden’s tendency to think he was being helpful when Julie did not see it that way. For 

example, Julie would talk to him about a frustrating day at work, and Selden 

would jump in and try to “solve her problems,” or he would try to encourage 

her, when all she wanted was someone to listen. 
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 3

A fellow marine who knew both Julie and Roger well commented on 

Roger’s growing ability to understand others: “Early conflicts taught Roger 

to learn to look more outward and try to understand others enough so that 

when he did interject or try to help someone, he knew them enough to know 

whether what he said or did would be appropriate and more accurately fit 

what they really needed.” 

 It was routine before deployment for Selden to order his men to spend 

their time taking care of family needs and expressing their confidence in 

those they were leaving behind. While away from home, he would often ask 

his men when the last time was that they had spoken to their family and 

when the last time was that they had heard from them. He encouraged his 

men to tell him “the latest.” He had an ability to remember the details and 

would often follow up on the events they shared weeks after the fact. 

Since the beginning of the current deployment, Selden had felt that his 

men needed to keep focused and engaged so they would not get distracted 

and discouraged with too much down time. Selden would show up in the 

administrative section (in the Headquarters and Service Company, or H&S 

Company) and order his junior enlisted men to work a particular task, but 

this would often occur without first contacting the officer in charge of the 

section, usually an O-3 rank. The OIC of the section had less experience 

than the SEL, so violations in the command structure were not uncommon, 

but the OIC used his authority and chain of command on several occasions 

to set things right. It was ultimately the OIC’s responsibility to maintain the 

prioritized schedule in his section and ensure that requirements from any 

source first be presented to him. He met with the senior enlisted leader as 

well as the GCE commanding officer (CO) and often with the executive 

officer to correct inconsistencies in the chain of command. 

The CO or XO [executive officer] routinely called on Selden for advice 

when dealing with enlisted matters. Selden would first counsel his own men 

before he sent them to the CO, who, on recommendation from the SEL, 

would demote individuals based on their behavior. Likewise, when he saw 

an opportunity to praise his men, Selden would recommend awards or promotions to the CO. He was known to make more recommendations for 

awards and promotions to the CO than any other leader; yet, Selden always 

had convincing documentation to back up his recommendation. As a result, 

almost of all of the requests were granted. When training future leaders, 

Selden would tell them, “It is important to catch your men at their best, and 

acknowledge it when you see it. Be specific with them so there is no doubt in 

their minds about the good you see in them.” If inspections were coming 

and he knew about it, he would tell his men to show their best and be their 

best. He then would expect solid feedback from those conducting inspections on what could be done better. Selden’s philosophy was that the best 

developmental feedback was built upon and took you beyond the best you 

could show. 

When not in combat, Selden was known for recommending lighter punishments when he saw a need to maintain morale over creating frustration 
4 GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

among the enlisted ranks. Before entering the AO, sometimes the enlisted 

men missed curfew. Those involved were to receive some degree of reprimand for not abiding by the rule, but it was Selden who would step in and, 

using his judgment, recommend a less severe sentence. What often was not 

generally known was that Selden would later meet alone with the enlisted 

man who had received a lighter punishment and tell him, “I know who you 

are, and I know what you are capable of.” Selden believed mistakes in noncritical areas were tolerable and could serve as “teachable moments” for his 

men. Few would ever disappoint Selden a second time. In the combat zone, 

however, Selden had little tolerance for lax behavior. He often shared his 

discipline philosophy with his men and the officers: “There is a time to learn 

and a time to perform, and a time to learn about how you performed. The 

combat zone is not the time for lighter punishments when avoidable mistakes are made.” 

Selden was often with his men on combat patrols, working at the ECP, 

or simply spending down time with them and joking with them openly. He 

wanted to be approachable and not only knew the names of his men but also 

knew their spouses and families or girlfriends. 

The commanding officer knew Selden well. They had worked together 

in previous assignments. His assessment speaks to Selden’s deep commitment to serving his men: 

“Selden helped his men draw on the legacy of the Marine Corps, a legacy of 

honor, courage, and commitment. Selden embodied these qualities. He upheld 

honor, exemplifying the ultimate standard of ethical and moral conduct, maintaining unflinching personal integrity, and holding himself and others accountable for their actions. He demonstrated courage and moral strength, which 

sustained him when faced with tough choices, hardships of combat, and adverse 

consequences. He was fully committed and dedicated to being a Marine. He 

voluntarily accepted assignments. In fact this was his third deployment to the 

AO.” 

GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL 

STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

The GCE is one element of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

comprised of both marines and sailors. The GCE includes its own headquarters staff (H&S Company) with several sections, and at least two companies 

(see Exhibit 1). At the senior level is the commanding officer (CO), followed by the executive officer (XO), who works for the CO and spends 

most of his time managing the day-to-day business of the sections, primarily 

in the H&S Company. The CO’s counterpart on the enlisted side is the SEL. 

An officer (designated as the officer in charge, or OIC) over each section 

had responsibility for his staff. The structure of the two companies is similar; 

each has a company commander, a company XO, and a first sergeant with a 
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 5

number of platoons. The administrative section in the H&S Company was 

the important player after the suicide bombing.

The GCE was one with a long history in both world wars, the Korean 

War, Vietnam, various places in the Pacific (i.e., Guam, the Philippines), and 

later in the Middle East. Those attached to the unit took great pride in being 

a part of it. Known for its courage, honor, and cohesiveness through challenging operations, the unit had a deeply embedded culture that caused 

marines to identify strongly with the mission, purpose, and decades-long 

history. As an organization, the unit instilled a sense of purpose and a high 

degree of excitement for their missions. 

Selden spent considerable time with the H&S Company but also, as 

mentioned, worked alongside his men from the other two companies in the 

field. Their mission was to oversee ground security operations, train local 

forces, and search out insurgents. Their rules of engagement were clear: If a 

marine felt threatened by an enemy force or by an incident that was taking 

place, he was authorized to engage. The officers leading the various sections 

and combat elements held ultimate responsibility for the actions and activiExhibit 1. Ground Combat Element Organizational Structure.
6 PREDEPLOYMENT Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

ties of their individual units. These officers and their enlisted counterparts 

motivated and disciplined them and ensured high morale and cohesion 

despite potential challenges. 

PREDEPLOYMENT 

Senior military officials organized the MAGTF several months before 

deployment into CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command). The predeployment workups took nearly six months before leaving homes and families. 

The MAGTF organized the GCE in May—comprised of approximately 

1,200 individuals across several units. They did not depart until October. 

Early on, they spent time organizing the unit and integrating new members 

who would be deployed with them. They took time to get to know each 

other up and down the chain of command and used daily personal fitness 

and physical training sessions to build camaraderie. Through these activities, the ground, air, and logistics elements became increasingly familiar with 

each other. Each exercise in the workup cycle served as a building block to 

facilitate troop readiness and integration with all the command elements of 

the MAGTF.

Throughout the entire six-month workup, the unit trained as though 

their destination were the combat zone, even though they knew this deployment would be noncombat. The workup cycle was physically demanding 

and, during the training exercises, troops were away from families more than 

usual. The often dangerous and life-threatening hardships early on helped 

them establish mission purpose. For example, the unit preparations 

included simulated training and live fire exercises, as if the unit were living 

and working in the area of operations. The training command organized live 

fire zones complete with realistic simulations of IED attacks, house-to-house 

combat, and mortar attacks. The purpose of these exercises was to develop 

individual-, team-, and unit-level war-fighting skills. The urban warfare simulations provided practical applications for dealing with close quarters battle, urban reconnaissance, and surveillance training. Moreover, as they 

trained, the marines endured heat exhaustion, sleep deprivation, and the 

psychological effects of facing enemy combatants. While difficult, these 

exercises bolstered the unit’s collective confidence—the unit even achieved 

significant training certifications and awards designating them as combat 

ready.

Leadership discussions in the predeployment phase established performance standards and reinforced a strong command-and-control military 

culture. Even though officers in the unit had less combat experience than the 

senior enlisted leader, the CO encouraged them to work closely with their 

enlisted counterparts, gain their support, and draw on their experience. 

Junior officers responded positively to these recommendations, often deferring to the senior enlisted leader on matters dealing with the enlisted men in 

the unit. Junior officers were instructed to guide the teams and ensure 
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 7

adherence to policy and procedures from a command perspective. Junior 

officers had responsibility for operations in the forward operating base, and 

the CO reinforced this in leadership discussions: “You are the leaders in 

these units. You will be called upon to manage crisis. You are to be strong in 

the face of these challenges. Your example and courage will not be lost on 

those you serve.” 

Selden respected the senior officers’ leadership counsel and help. He listened to and willingly accepted feedback from senior leadership and junior 

officers with whom he worked closely, and he always found ways to improve 

the performance of his men. As a result, he motivated his force from the getgo. Throughout the predeployment period, Selden was often seen encouraging his men and motivating them when they felt dejected and beaten. On 

one particularly difficult training day, the simulated enemy combatants had 

foiled their attempt to discover a weapons store, and they were nearly 

“killed” when the combatants planted an IED in their access road. After the 

training, Selden could sense the frustration of his men. He spoke with them 

frankly about their mistakes and then provided them some new strategies 

for facing the enemy. He shared stories of his own failures, particularly his 

own experiences in combat and how he had made it through tough situations.

At the end of the predeployment cycle, the unit began training with their 

navy counterparts. This involved transferring gear and equipment back and 

forth from their home base to port where they loaded and debarked to sea 

several times over a six-week period. The at-sea training exercises tested 

core capabilities and shipboard interoperability between the navy vessels 

and the MAGTF. Transitioning from land to sea introduced additional challenges, particularly for new marines who had not been at sea. The “BlueGreen” integration meant marines learned “ship life,” became familiar with 

new routines in a unique environment, experienced what it was like to deal 

with small quarters onboard, and integrated with a different service. Navy 

sailors and marines worked alongside each other loading ships, perfecting 

routines to place on board equipment and supplies, and organizing ships for 

the deployment. Their initial mission was not a combat deployment but 

rather a strategic force protection. 

By and large, the unit was prepared for their overseas deployment. They 

proved they could work well together, and they had confidence in each 

other’s ability to handle important aspects of the mission. The enlisted 

marines were feeling the calm before the storm. Enlisted leaders had prepared their men with precision and exactness. The predeployment exercises 

enabled them eventually to achieve “special operations capable,” a highly 

coveted certification indicating readiness and ability to perform a range of 

specialized operations, particularly to deploy into combat in CENTCOM’s 

AO. 

The well-conditioned unit, ready and anxious to pull out, embarked in 

October. Departure press releases captured enlisted marines’ enthusiasm, 

confidence, and mission-ready focus: “The operating tempo has been 
8 DEPLOYMENT Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

unbelievable.” “The op tempo is as high as it has ever been.” “We’re prepared to execute any mission we’re assigned as the theater reserve.” “We’re 

ready for everything from sustained combat operations ashore to humanitarian relief operations and everything in between.”

DEPLOYMENT

All members of the command headquarters and the population of marines 

and sailors within the unit were hoping to deploy into combat. As the unit 

was deployed, several troops began to ask questions. One junior officer 

asked whether they would be sent to the front and how that information 

would be communicated to them. Another asked how long the deployment 

would be and what resources would be required to stand up an operating 

base. These questions were unclear at the time of initial debarkation and 

would only become clearer piecemeal. Unlike the last deployment, what the 

unit’s members knew they were headed to a combat zone, this time deployment was not a given unless CENTCOM requested the support. “As far as I 

know, that's not going to happen this time,” said a staff sergeant, “but then, 

that could all change any time.” For the early part of the deployment, they 

spent time doing bilateral exercises with allied countries. These bilateral 

engagements, training-like exercises with other host nations, further 

enhanced the unit’s specialized expertise and increased their desire to be in 

the theater of operations. 

While they were not planning to be in combat, the senior staff knew how 

much the MAGTF wanted to be sent to the combat area of operations. They 

sought the opportunity to be part of the action rather than on the sidelines. 

As a result, senior leaders were doing their best to see if they could be part of 

the troop buildup. Even after they pulled out of port and sailed toward 

CENTCOM, their higher headquarters were in a political struggle to decide 

whether or not to send them into combat, because they were only designated as “strategic theater reserve” in the outlying areas. Senior leaders in 

the unit attempted to convince higher headquarters their unit should be sent 

to the front lines, given their special training and exceptional readiness status. On board the ships, there was great anticipation about being in the combat zone; many were quite anxious to be sent into the area of combat. 

Marines and sailors at the lower levels continuously asked whether they 

would be part of the troop buildup. The same answer always came back 

from their officers: “We don’t know,” or “We’ve not been told anything,” 

and “We are doing our best to get an answer to your question.” The tension 

mounted: originally, the unit knew its mission did not include combat operations, but as a unit they had trained as if they would be. Now the MAGTF 

senior officers were sending mixed signals, which resulted in some ambivalence about their ultimate mission.

One junior officer summed up the sentiments of many:
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 9

“You spend so many hours in preparation to execute on a mission. We are ready 

for that. I feel like I am in high school football again where you get tired of 2 and 

3-a-day practices and hitting each other. There comes a point where you are 

ready to face someone else and put your training and preparation to the test.”

The uncertainty surrounding their deployment was exacerbated when 

their families read the newspaper headlines: “MAGTF Sent to Combat” 

before the men in the unit even knew. Families then contacted their 

marines, asking whether it was true or not and why they had not received the 

news directly from them—why had the leadership not used the proper communication channels to relay the information? The servicemen could not 

give their families an answer. While excited about the prospects of being 

sent into combat, the marines criticized the poor communications, which 

created a stir among the ranks: Junior officers and enlisted marines found 

out they would debark and begin operations before their superiors told 

them, and they wondered whether their superior officers were knowingly 

withholding information. Some marines expressed their dismay and loss of 

trust: “Do they know what our mission is?” “Don’t they think of these things 

before deployment?” and, “I’m not sure these leaders really know what they 

are doing.” And while the unit’s senior officers knew it was their duty to 

inform the men about the mission, they believed that someone at the Pentagon had leaked the information to the press. Yet, public affairs officials made 

no pubic statement about the leak.

Selden responded to these concerns by placing emphasis on being 

patient:

“Patience isn’t merely waiting for something to happen. You and I know we are 

ready to go, but being patient also requires actively working to take things as 

they come and trust that our senior leadership knows what is best for us, and 

when. Patience is not passive resignation, either. It is not simply enduring this 

wait but enduring it well. Let’s show them we can do that.”

When they finally arrived and debarked, the MAGTF divided geographically and functionally. Over a period of several weeks, the GCE secured their 

area and set up their command outpost. Enlisted marines and officers lived 

in primitive conditions as they commenced operations. They immediately 

began conducting combat operations and took casualties while living in very 

austere conditions. They slept in shell holes and later filled Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium (HESCO) barriers with dirt and sand to create makeshift quarters (see Exhibits 2 and 3). It seemed that this early 

period, while testing the unit’s previous training, helped establish stronger 

unit cohesiveness. They were far from home doing their duty and being 

proud of the difference they were making in their area of operations. 

In large measure, the GCE achieved several visibly significant results 

early in their deployment. The area of operations had been a trouble spot for 

U.S. and coalition forces previously, due to its reputation for heavy violence 
10 DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

and as a hideout for insurgents. This did not deter the unit from its mission. 

Based on lessons learned, they secured the area, swept through the town, 

and set up security checkpoints. They turned their attention to working with 

locals with the intent of building trust among the town leaders and prominent individuals, even training locals in counterinsurgency methods. Most 

importantly, they were instrumental, primarily through trust building, in 

helping the local population become weary of the intimidation and murder 

carried out by insurgents. In the weeks since they took over, the marines 

experienced a noted decrease in violence as local people grew tired of the 

insurgents. Ultimately the GCE forces were able to break the grip of anticoalition forces in the AO. 

DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT

Since arriving, the unit had experienced early excitement and visible accomplishments, but the deployment began to wear on as the unit spent ThanksExhibit 2. Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium (HESCO) barriers. 

HESCO barriers are expandable, wire-mesh cells shown here filled on site 

with earthen material for use in civil and military applications: entry control 

points, command outposts, and force protection, as well as flood control and 

other Homeland Security contexts. In this photo, seabees assigned to Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 5 lift a HESCO barrier into alignment during a project at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, April 4, 

2009. 

Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Patrick 

W. Mullen III, released/090411-N-8547M-025.
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 11

giving, Christmas, New Year’s, and Valentine’s Day away from home. As the 

holiday seasons passed, the unit began to realize that the time was coming to 

wrap up their mission, but for some unknown reason higher headquarters 

postponed their scheduled departure. Earlier questions about the unit’s 

leadership effectiveness surfaced yet again, this time with respect to the 

unit’s extended deployment: “Maybe we’re still here because we’ve been too

successful.” And, “There certainly seems to be a lack of forward planning 

and poorly outlined timetables from higher headquarters.” 

Regardless, casualties continued to mount, information of the return 

remained inconsistent, and those who had been motivated for combat lost 

steam. Anxiety associated with unclear timetables began to wear on everyone. Complaints from the men about the extensions increased. They simply 

wanted to go home, and the more time that passed, the more anxious they 

became.

The CO, junior officers, and the SEL watched the unit’s morale decrease 

as the men lost sight of the mission and defied safety rules. They became 

complacent about wearing their gear inside the compound, putting on their 

helmets outside the compound, and discharging their weapons properly. In 

Exhibit 3. HESCO Barriers Being Filled.

A Seabee assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 uses an uparmored front-end loader to fill HESCO barriers during a project at Camp 

Bastion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, April 4, 2009.

Source: U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Patrick W. 

Mullen III, released/090411-N-8547M-011.
12 AFTER THE BLAST Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

some cases, they did not represent the United States with integrity and 

honor. There were incidences of stealing from each other and possibly disrupting the lives of and violating those they intended to protect. While nothing newsworthy occurred (such as an incident like Abu Ghraib), signs of 

disrespect for the local people increased. On several occasions when they 

used a local’s home as a lookout point, the unit would leave a mess or move 

and damage personal belongings or not return them. 

Selden was challenged with reining in their poor behavior. They continued to respect him and aligned their actions with his orders, especially when 

things were getting tough. 

“Yes, things were tough, but Selden did not show any sign of cracking, and that 

is what I would say kept most of us going. Had Selden started to complain or 

even just show signs of irritation with the situation, we would have felt it was 

license to voice our frustrations and things would have started to go sour real 

fast. That did not happen,” said one enlisted marine.

Nonetheless, the unit felt as though it might never leave. Furthermore, 

many of the members of the unit were dealing with miserable living conditions while conducting combat operations twenty-four hours a day for three 

to four months, despite any efforts by Selden to alleviate stress from their 

patrols. As the days progressed, the lack of information on a return date and 

the physical and mental fatigue seemed to reach a peak when the suicide 

bomber killed their senior enlisted leader, Roger Selden. 

AFTER THE BLAST

The suicide bomb detonated at the ECP rocked the surrounding area. The 

men back at their command outpost not only heard but felt the blast, too. In 

the chaos of the moment, radio chatter immediately increased as squad leaders, company leaders, and the command outpost worked to determine the 

location and seriousness of the bombing. Within minutes, the GCE commander, though wounded, took control of the airwaves, silencing the chatter. Back at the command, the administrative section’s OIC heard from the 

marine reporting the casualties. They shut down communications and 

waited until the convoy arrived at the command outpost. Upon his arrival, 

the reporting marine quietly indicated that Selden did not make it. Immediately, a somber mood of disbelief filled the room. 

An airlift quickly removed severely wounded men and those killed in 

action out of the area of operations, and the work of recovery began. For the 

next three days, the GCE administrative section made contact with officials 

stateside to let them know what had happened, who had died in the blast, 

and which family members to inform. Together they prepared packages for 

sending the deceased marine’s personal effects. His unit memorialized 

Selden while still deployed, and those at home followed suit. Some state-
Leading Healing in a Broken Unit 13

ments about Selden during various memorial services characterize his effect 

(see Exhibit 4).

The new SEL arrived a week or so later. His reception was rather cold. 

Regardless of his years of experience, he was not a member of the team. He 

had not trained with the unit and had not established the same rapport. One 

OIC said of the new SEL, “He was nothing to us. He did not even compare 

with SEL Selden. He simply filled a position and had really no leadership 

influence in the unit.” Of course, the new SEL was well aware of the big 

shoes he was filling—he did not even stand in the deployment picture with 

his men and those for whom he had direct responsibility. 

Now the unit faced new questions: How would Selden’s loss affect the 

unit? Would his loss paralyze the unit? What impact would this death and 

the subsequent overextended deployment have on their mission focus? 

Would a new leader be able to facilitate recovery and healing in the unit? 

Exhibit 4. Statements about Roger Selden from Fellow Marines and Family.

Marine Corporal

“Roger Selden saved my life. I am forever grateful for what he did for me.

All of his tours of duty weren’t mandatory; he volunteered. He was battletested and completely willing to do anything for his men, so much so that he 

stepped in front of the terrorist at the control point to save my life. When he saw 

the terrorist approaching, he didn’t hesitate to think about the political reasons 

for his actions, nor did he waste precious time to consider the moral foundations for the war. Instead, he saw a threat and responded to it.”

Close Friend

“He was not born into a military background. In fact, no one in his immediate 

family had ever served in the military. Yet, from as long as anyone can remember, his favorite holiday was the Fourth of July, and he deeply loved the freedoms he enjoyed in the United States. I’ve heard from others that Selden was an 

avid reader of American history early in his life, and this interest never waned. 

He was particularly fond of military history and felt a deep sense of patriotism. 

He regularly read the United States Constitution and Declaration of Independence, and copies of these historic documents were among his prize possessions. He kept them wherever he was stationed. He often recounted stories of 

bravery and unconventional wisdom shown by military personnel in the 

moments of combat. 

“By the time Selden was in high school, he had decided to pursue a military 

career. When asked, he would tell you this decision made early in his life was not 

a choice but a ‘response to a call.’ He felt the military was what he was meant to 
14 AFTER THE BLAST Edwand H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor

do in life. It was more than a duty and more than a sense of responsibility to protect and to honor.”

Fellow Marine

“For Selden, his profession was about being true to himself and to something 

greater than himself. Hearing him speak about his choice to be in the military, 

his men would often joke, saying he sounded like he was talking about joining 

the ministry, not the military. He would admit it sometimes sounded this way, 

but he never apologized for it.”

Friend and Former Marine

“Selden was a great man. He did it all and asked for more. I served under him in 

infantry school. We all watched together the planes fly into the [Twin] Towers 

on 9/11. He made a huge impact on my life, personally and in the military. He 

was my friend. He always looked out for me. He used to ask me, ‘What did you 

do today, to prepare?’ He pushed us hard, because he knew it was his job. He 

loved the military, and he loved the men under him. 

“To his family, I grieve with you. I am sorry for your loss. I will miss him 

dearly all the rest of my days. I pray that the Lord is with your family at your 

time of sorrow.”

Family Member

“Roger was always healthy and alive, a perfectionist in what he did and who 

made anything seem possible. I always thought he wouldn’t be one of those 

people who wouldn’t come home. In my eyes, he was Superman.

“He could have moved up even further as an officer, but he wouldn’t have 

been as hands-on. He just wanted to make a difference. Anytime he was asked 

to go somewhere, even times when he didn’t have to, he would. He wanted to 

be there for his troops.”

Exhibit 4. Statements about Roger Selden (continued)
Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University

300 5th Avenue SW

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319

Telephone

Commercial: 202-685-2529

DSN: 325-2529

Fax: 202-685-3581

Web Site

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Dr. Karen Guttieri

Naval Postgraduate School

1411 Cunningham Road

GE-306

Monterey, CA 93943

Contact Information

831-656-2294

guttieri@nps.edu
Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University