HISTORICAL STUDY 

MILITARY 

IMPROVISATIONS 

DURING THE 

RUSSIAN 

CAMPAIGN 

*CMH Pub 104- 1- 1 

MILITARY 

IMPROVISATIONS 

During the 

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

*This publication l'eplaces DA P am 20- 201, August 1951, 
Facsimile Edition, 1983, 1986,2004 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C. 
PREFACE 

This study was prepared for the Historical Division, European 

Command, by a group of former German generals and general staff 

officers. The names of the contributors arc not announced at this 

time. The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained 

the rank of full general (Genemlove1'st), served on the Eastern 

Front thronghout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat 

into the northern plains of Germany. He was successively 

commander of an infantry brigndc, of a panzer division from 

Noycmber 1941 to February 1913, ilnd of two different corps in the 

battles for Khariwv and Belgorod during 1943. Appointed commander of a panzer army on ] December 1943, he participated in 

the withdrawal in t he south until the Germans reached the 

Carpathians. 1n August 1 D44 he was trallsferred to Army Group 

Center, and his Jast assignment was with Army Group Weichsel. 

During this final phase of his military career he played an important part in t he retrcat from Lithuania, East Prussia, and 

Pomerania. 

The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN 

REI'OR'f SEHIES were written by Germans from the German point 

of view and that the procedures of the Gelman Army differed 

considerably frum those of the United States Army. Authorized 

German tables of ol'glj.nization and equipment, official German 

combat doctrine, or standard German staff methods form the 

b<\sis for improvisations throughout t his study. As prepared by 

the authors, this study consisted of a collection of 157 examples 

of improvisations which were screened by the editors for pertinence, 

clarity, and interest to the American reader. Moreover, an attempt 

was made to establish common denominators fol' the great variety 

of examples. Although the manuscript was completely reorganized 

during this editorial process, every effort was made to retain the 

point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the 

authors. 

CONTENTS 

PART ONE. INTRODUCTION 

PART TWO. TACTICAL IMPROVISATIONS 

Chopter I. The Offllnsive 

I. The Elimination oI Russian Forces in a 

German Rear Area 

1. The Blit~krieg Bogged Down in Mud 3 

2. Desperate I mprovisations .. .. .......... 4 

3. The Snail Offensive 7 

4. The Scorpion Offensive .. 10 

6. Cavalry Brigade Model in Operation 

SEYDJ.lTZ • . • . • . . • • • . • . . . • • • • . • . . • . . 11 

II. Some Improvisations Used during Operation 

ZITADELLE 

1. The Crossing of Russian Mine Fields 17 

2. A Flak Division Serves as Corps Artillery 19 

Chapter 2. The Defensive 

J. Improvised Hedgehog Defenses . . . . . . . . .. . . . 22 

II. Defensive I mprovisaLions in Extreme Cold 23 

III. A Moving Pocket Regnina the German Lines . . 26 

IV. Zone Defense Tactics .............. . . . .... 27 

V. Improvised Fortl'esses . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 36 

VI. Defensive i mprovisations in East Prussia . .. 38 

Chop!er 3. Troop Movements 

I. Furlough and Troop Trains under Partisan Attacks 40 

11. The Commitment of Furlough Battalions ...... 41 

Chopter 4. Combo! Arms 

I. Infantry .. . . ... . 

11. Artillery .... . . . . .. . 

III. Combut Engineers as Infantry .. ... . . . . .. •... . . 

PART THREE. IMPROVISATONS IN THE FIELDS OF SUPPLY 

AND TRANSPORTATION 

Chopter 5. Indispensoble Expedients 

4S 

.. 

48 

1. 'I'hc Panje Column ...... .. .. . ... .. ......... . . . 61 

II. The Corduroy Road .......... . . .. . . .... . ...... 63 

Chapter 6. Other E.pcdients 

I. I mprovisations in thc Construction of Bridges 66 

II. Improviscd Road Maintenance .. . .. . .... . . . . ... 66 

III. Deceptive Supply Movements . . . .. . . .. . ...... .. 67 

IV. Invasion Barges aa Means of Transportation .... 67 

V. Transportation over Frozen 'VaterwaYII ........ 67 

VI. Fuel Conservation }o;xpedients ........... 68 

VII. Railroad Tank Cars 'l'oweJ across the Baltic 68 
Chapter 7. Supply by Airlift and by Aerial Deliyery Containers 

I. The First German Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

II. The Stalingr ad Airlift ...................•. .. 61 

Chapter 8. Supply and Transportation Problems in the Arclic: . . . . . . . .• . . . . 68 

PART FOUR. TECHNICAL IMPROVISATIONS 

Chapter 9. Clothing and Equipment ........................ • ...... . 65 

10. Shelter ............... .. .. . ................. • .. .. .. . 67 

11. Weapons ............ . . .. ........ .........•.. • .. .. 68 

12. Technical Training for Arctic Conditions 70 

13. Improyised Front-line Propaganda . .. . . . ..... • .. •... • . .... 72 

PART FIVE. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVISATIONS 

Chllpler 14. The Manpower Problem 

I. The Situation at the Outbreak of War . . . .. . . . . .. 75 

II. The Luftwaffe Field Divisions ......... . . . . . . . . . 76 

III. Maintenance of Combat Efficiency ........... . 77 

IV. The Employment of Women in the Armed Forces 80 

Chllptor 15. The O'gon;%lIllon of Special Units 

I. Staffs ....... ..... . . . . . . . .... . . ............... 82 

II. Special Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 86 

III. Last-Ditch Improvisations 

1. The LEUTHEN Project . . .. . . . . . . .. . . 90 

2. Other Desperate Measures ... .......... 91 

Chaplet 16. Paliticol Measures Introduced by tlte Nlliional Socialist Porty 

I. Civilian Laber Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 

II. The Volkssturm ........................... . 98 

III. Paramilitary Units During the Last Stage 

of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 97 

PART SIX. CONCLUSIONS 

Cho pler 17. Aro Improvisolions InOlitllble? 

I. A voidable Improvisations 99 

II. Unavoidable Improvisations and their Minimization 101 

III. Improvisations in Extreme Emergency ...... . ... 102 

Chaplet 18. The Relatiye Value of lmproyislliions 108 

MAPS 

Re!erence Map ........................... . ...•.......... Frontispiece 

Not.. NUlJlber-ed map. a~ I" Mquenc. after pago 1M. 

MlipNo. 

1. 6th Panzer Division (22 June 1941-20 January 1942) . 

2. The Snail Offensive (End of January to Beginning of April 1942). 

8. Operation SEYDLITZ (Situation on 8 July 1942, the Second Day of the 

Attack) . 

4. Improvisations In East Prussia. 

5. Corduroy Roads in the Leningrad Area. 

6. The Withdrawal Across the Dnepr. 
" ,. 

flNlANI) 

u 5 

R.''' ..... INp 

MIlITARY 

IMPROVISATIONS 

DURING THE 

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

,.-_ ... _ ....., 

5 R 

I 

-."-. .!:l' ... 

PART ONE 

INTRODUCTION 

The art of war involves the correct estimation and careful 

weighing of one's own as well as the enemy's capabilities and is 

marked by the conduct of military operations in a manner promising the highest degree of success. Success in war can be 

achieved only if the military commander employs his resources 

with correct timing in suitable terrain and in a way that guarantees maximum effect. 

The conduct of war is subject to the same imperfections and 

frailties as any other field of human endeavor; for this reason 

emergencies which. of necessity, lead to improvisations arise from 

time to time in every war and in every army. Faulty planning, 

unsatisfactory performance of matCriel, and violations of basic 

principles of warfare cause deficiencies which can be alleviated 

through improvisation but can only be overcome by sacrificing 

time, space, and strength. Blunders are made in every military 

sphere, in all places, and on the highest as well as on the lowest 

level. No wonder that such blunders, oversights, and frictions 

entail improvisations of all types, from the simplest to the most 

elaborate, from the strictly temporary to the chronic. 

By dint of its long duration and ever-widening scope, World 

War II created a persistent state of deficiencies in the German 

Army which forced the military agencies to introduce a multitude 

of improvisations of all types. Insufficiently prepared for the 

campaign in the East, for example, the Army was faced with a 

great calamity as early as the muddy period and winter of 1941-

42. Top-level staffs and field forces alike were forced to improvise extensively. As the campaign wore on and the German 

military potential continued to decline, improvisations of the 

widest variety became increasingly prevalent. Toward the end 

of the war the ratio of strength between the German and Russian 

Armies became so disproportionate that improvisations, especially in combat operations, were rampant. Finally, the entire 

conduct of war was one great improvisation. 

This publication replaces DA Pam 20-201, August 1951. 
2 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

The present study lays no claim to comprehensiveness, but even 

this fragmentary account may show the main characteristics of 

German improvisations and the part they played in military operations. The many separate examples are presented along functional lines. and the material is subdivided into tactical, logistical, technical, and organizational improvisations. Other bases 

could have been adopted. Some readers may be interested in 

analyzing the German improvisations in terms of their causes, or 

of their inevitability, or even chronologically as indicators of the 

extremes to which an army fighting Soviet Russia was put. 
PART TWO 

TACTICAL IMPROVISATIONS 

As the pillar of Germany's military might, the Army had to 

bear the brunt of the fighting during World War II. The heartbeat of the Army was at the front. where deficiencies and shortages of any kind were immediately felt. Improvisations and expedients jnh'oduced . at the front had to show qui ck r esults because, in Lhe face of the enemy. time was of the essence. With 

the territorial expansion of the wal', tactical commanders frequently became responsible for arcas that they were unable to 

control with the troops and materiel at their disposal. Resources 

were particularly taxed whenever the fotcos suffered heavy casualties for which replacements could not be expected to arrive for 

a long time. High and low echelons alike were therefore very 

often forced to introduce improvisations to solve their problems 

as well as possible. Their efforts were concentrated on three types 

of tactical improvisations-the formation and commitment of 

combat staffs and units in sudden critical situations, the employ. 

ment of units for missions outside their normal scope, and the 

adaptation of tactics to unexpected situations. A combination 

of two or more tactical improvisations had to be introduced in 

many cases. 

Chapter 1 

The Offensive 

I. The Elimination of Russian Forces in a German Rear Area 

1. The Blif.zlcrieg Bogged Down in Mud (Map 1) 

On 22 June 1941 the Gth Panzer Division moved out of the 

Tih;it area as part of a provisional panzer army. In true blitz. 

krieg manner it r olled across Lithuania and Latvia within n few 

days, overran every enemy position in its way, broke through the 

Slulin Line, crossed the Dvinn River, and opened the gnteway 

to Leningrad on the Luga Ri ver- all within three weeks from 

its day of departure. This 500-mile trip led through dust and 

sand, woods and swamps, and across rivers and antitank ditches. 

Leningrad was within sight. 

3 
4 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

At this very time the division was called upon to assume the 

leading part in the German attack on the central front. Once 

again the division moved with lightning speed and covered 600 

miles to join Army Group Center. On 10 October 1941, the first 

day of the offensive, its 260 tanks made a deep penetration into 

the enemy lines near Vyazma. Ten days later the Russians were 

encircled and the mission was accomplished. 

The 6th Panzer Division was then to lead the attack on Moscow and take the city. Its spearheads were approaching the objective when l),ature suddenly put a protective wall around the 

Russian capital. The autumn mud brought the blitzkrieg to a 

sudden end. It swallowed the most valuable equipment. The cold 

winter continued the terrible destruction. Then came the German withdrawal during which every tank, every antitank gun, 

and almost every artillery piece of the division had to be sacrificed. 

Enemy attacks and cold weather caused innumerable casualties 

during rear guard actions. When the once-proud 6th Panzer 

Division finally assembled its forces in January 1942, all that remained were 57 riflemen, 20 engineers, and 3 guns. 

After this terrible hemorrhage the remaining staffs and the 

supply and rear elements were assembled forty miles behind 

the front line for the purpose of reorganizing the division. Every 

day a few tankers, artillery men, and others who had escaped the 

carnage trickled back to the divisional area. As soon as they 

arrived they had to help guard the highway and railroad between Smolensk and Vyazma, the life lines of Fourth and Ninth 

Armies, against attacks by Russian cavalry, parachute troops, 

and partisans who had penetrated deep into the rear areas. The 

enemy first advanced southward and then turned east toward 

the railroad and highway connecting Vyazma with Rzhev in 

order to cut off the supply of Ninth Army. The field hospitals 

and motor pools of several divisions were under attack, and two 

airfields were in immediate danger. Far and wide no combat 

troops were available. The ovel'-all situation did not permit 

the r elease of even the few remnants of 6th Panzer Division to 

serve as cadre for an alert unit which was to be improvised in 

the rear. By the end of January 1942 the situation was so tense 

that Marshal Stalin felt justified in announcing the impending 

annihilation of two German armies in the biggest battle of encirclement in history. But events were to develop differently. 

2. Despemte Improvisations 

Emergency alert units had to be improvised and committed immediately even though no combat cadres were available. Actual1y 

the 6th Panzer Division had not the necessary service personnel 

to organize even one such unit. Ninth Army therefore issued 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 5 

orders that the division assemble immediately all the se rvice and 

supply units, as well as c011struction and roadbuilding battalions 

in the army rear area, and intercept all stragglers. Between 

Sychevka and Vyazma a defensive front was to be built up in the 

most expeditious manner. (Map 2) Even the Luftwaffe units at 

the Novo·Dugino airfield were subordinated to the division com· 

mander for use in ground combat. 

Within twenty-four hours the staffs of all units now subordinate 

to 6th Panzer Division were busy intercepting every avail able 

officer and man in their respective areas and forming emergency 

alert units of vnried strength and composition. Special care 

was taken that men from the same unit remained together. De· 

pending on their number, they formed squads, platoons, or companies under the command of their forme r officers. Whenever 

possible emergency alert units of similar composition were 01'-

gnnized into battalions and two or more battalions were placed 

under the command of one of the previously mentioned staffs. 

Each unit WllS to keep the weapons and supplies it had 8.-'llvaged 

from its parent unit. This procedure was a guarantee against 

unnecessary splitting up of available manpower and resources. 

It seemed n better policy to commit units of differing strength 

and composition rather than to destroy unit integrity by equalir .... 

ing numbers. The strength and composition of individual units 

was taken into account in the assignment of defense sectors. 

Most men were armed with rifles. Each company had one or 

two machine guns, and some of the battalions had a few mortars 

and small antitank guns which had been procured from ordnance 

shops in the vicinity. Initially only one recently repaired artillf'ry 

piece was available, but the flow of weapons and equipment im~ 

proved daily because the maintenance and repair shops made a 

maximum effort to send materiel to the front. Numerous. convalescents and men returning from furlough were employed 

along the rapidly forming front facing west. 

The newly formed units had to be committed without delay 

wherever the danger was greatest. Frequently this baptism 

occurred on the very day of their initial organization. If possible, the alert units were committed in a sector where they could 

protect their own service and rear installations, a task with which 

they were only too glad to comply. For the same reason Luftwaffp. units were assigned to the defense sectors that covered their 

own airfields. The remaining gaps were closed by alert units 

which had their assembly area farther away from the new front. 

The most important sectors of the forty-mile front were occupied on the first day, gaps were filled in on the following day, and 

by the third a continuous though thinly~occ upied line was formed. 
6 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

By the end of the first week it was held by 36.000 men. Small 

general reserve unita were improvised by that time, including 

one platoon of five damaged tanks with limited mobility. 

By the tenth day the division had improvised a full-strength, 

completely equipped motorcycle company utiJizing men returning from furlough and convalescents. Several armored reconnaissance cars were turned over to this mobile re.serve which 

could be moved to any danger spot along the RoUbahn [Ed: road 

designated as a main axis of motorized transportation] that fan 

parallel to and closely behind the front. This force was also 

versed in skiing and carried skis on the motorcycles in order to 

have cross-country mobility even though the snow was three feet 

deep in some places. This was a crack unit especially suited for 

local attacks and commanded by battle-tested officers. 

The Luftwaffe signal battalion of VIII Air Corps at NovoDugino laid the necessary telephone Hnes and connected them with 

the air field switchboard. During the organization of the new 

front enemy attacks on the airfield and the adjacent sector to the 

north were repelled by alert units. In the central sector the 

enemy occupied several villages before the arrival of alert units. 

On the southern wing he occupied other villages and stood only 

a half to one mile from the highway which he interdicted with 

his mortars. At night enemy ski units infiltrated through the 

German lines, which initially were not continuous, and disrupted 

the supply of Ninth Army at several points between Vyazma and 

Rzhev. In view of the extreme cold and deep snow, the front 

line was almost exclusively a line of strong points based on villages. Although repeatedly under attack, the center of this line 

held from the outset. 

Thus, the improvised front facing west served its initial purpose. Within a few days the whole sector threatened from the 

west was protected by alert units. Moreover, contact was established with the forces that fought in an arc around Rzhev to 

the north and with similarly improvised Fourth Army units in 

the south. However, the Rollbahn and the railroad were so 

close behind the front line that the continuous disruptions 

became unbearable. Furthermore, the slightest setback of the 

improvised units could result in the complete blocking of the 

traffic arteries by the enemy. This handicap could only be 

remedied by advancing the German outposts farther to the 

west. This involved a winter offensive in extreme cold and 

deep snow with improvised units which were without training 

in offensive operations. Yet, it had to be done. The operation 

could not be an offensive in the usual sense, let alone a blitzkrieg. The tactics to be used necessarily deviated from the 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 7 

conventional pattcrn and had to be especially suited to the pecu~ 

liarities of the prevailing situation and the forces available. 

S. The Snail Offensive (Map 2) 

At the beginning of February 1942, on the eighth day after 

the initial formation of the new front, the sector commanders 

were called to a meeting, informed of thc necessity of an offensive, 

and indoctrinated in the combat methods to be used. The 

mere thought of starting an offensive with their motley units 

caused all commanders to raise serious objections which could 

be fully expressed by one single word : impossible. Only a 

detailed explanation of the tactics to be employed, for which 

the division commander coined the term "snail offensive," gradu~ 

aUy dispelled the numerous objections which were perfectly 

valid from the conventional military standpoint. 

First of all, it was pointed out to the commanders that time 

was not an important factor in this offensive. The speed of 

a snail would be sufficient. In selecting the place of attack 

they were to proceed like a snail which would move only to 

a place where it could find a worthwhile objective without in~ 

curring any danger. The method of advance was to resemble 

that of a snail slowly groping its way and immediately retracting 

its feelers or changing its direction whenever faced by an 

obstacle. Any setback must be avoided because it would dis~ 

courage the weak German forces and tie them up for a long 

time just as a snail withdraws into its shell in a dangerous 

situation and does not dare continue on its way for quite a 

while. Nor were the commanders to forget the shell of the 

snail which affords safety and shelter in case of danger. Despite 

all precautions, however, the sector commanders had to keep in 

mind the rewarding objective at all times, exactly as a snail 

would do in the same situation. 

This comparison served to illustrate the basic idea of the 

combat methods to be employed in the snail offensive. The 

practical application of this doctrine was subsequently ex~ 

plained at the site where the first offensive actions were to 

be launched. The objective of the snail offensive was to push 

back the Russians far enough to place the supply lines of Ninth 

Army beyond their reach. This meant that a line favorable 

for defense was to be reached which followed the edge of the 

vast wooded marshes. All villages in the fertile region to 

the east of it therefore had to be taken from the enemy. A 

secondary but important intention was to deprive the enemy 

of valuable shelter and sources of supply and to make these 

villages available to the German troops. This would be a 

hard blow to the enemy since there were only a few smaH, poor 
8 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

villages in the marshy forests, and the entire enemy force in 

the rear of Ninth Army was beginning to suffer from supply 

difficulties. After the Germans launched a successful panzer 

attack on Bely, the Russian force was practically surrounded 

by Gt!rman units except for a narrow pathless strip across the 

front. 

The tinal obj ective of the 6th Panzer Division was to roll 

back the enemy to a distance of ten to twenty miles team the 

RoUbahn, but this plan was at first llot revealed to the commanders of the various sectors. The success of the initial operations was of paramount importance. 

First of all, the central forces were ordered to eliminate 

the deep enemy wedge in the German lines. The enemy salient 

included three villages held by Russian security detachments. 

(See Map 2, Arrows <D.) There an initial victory should be 

easy to obtam. The attack was not to start until everything 

had heen I:iO well prepared that success could be expected 

with certainty. Ti,e three villages could be observed from 

the high German positions and dominated by cross fire from 

two sides. The enemy dispositions were under constant observation. The foremost village was held by the strongest enemy 

detachment, the two farther to the rear by smaller ones. A 

platoon of volunteers led by an experienced officer was to sneak 

up. at mght on each of the small villages, effect a penetration 

from the rear, make a surprise raid at dawn, and annihilate 

the enemy. Surprise was achieved. two villages were taken and 

the large •. me in front was cut off. Enemy attempts to break 

eut during daytime were stopped by fire. At dusk the German 

forces in both villages were reinforced, the large village was 

surrounded, and the enemy force which attempted to break 

out under cover of darkness was captured. When all three 

villages were in German hands, they were immediately prepared 

for defenl:ie. Farther to the south anotho::r Russian strong point 

was taken oy similar tactics. A strong covering force with 

heavy weapons remained in the old main line of resistance to 

stop a"uy possible reverses. The main line of resistance was 

moved forward only after positions had been constructed in 

the frozen ground and supply and communication routes cleared 

of snow. As long as the enemy showed intentions of counterattacking, strong reserves were positioned behind the danger 

pOints and no further moves were initiated. 

Similarly the initial operations in other sectors were adapted 

to local conditions and carried out at irregular intervals. The 

first week of the snail offensive resulted in the occupation of 

fourteen villages and the capture of numerous prisoners. 
MI LITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAH CAMPAIGN 

Losses on the German side were negligible. 

was the confidence the German units gained 

method. 

9 

Most important 

in this combat 

Gradually more complicated missions could be undertaken. 

However it remained essential to attack in the most effective 

manner and to reach the objective without becoming involved 

in a heavy engagement. Although the Russian forces in this 

sector were better trained ana equipped, their supply of ammunition was limited and they were numerically too weak to 

organize a continuous line of defense. Their strong points 

were secured by outpost lines. The best method of overcoming 

these obstacles was to capture the villages where the outposts were located in order to isolate each main strong point 

until its encirclement was almost completed. Then the enemy 

troops usually abandoned their strong points voluntarily. 

Bogdanovo, a village situated in dominating terrain on the 

southern wing, was one of the most important enemy strong 

points. From here the Russians frequently made thrusts into 

the adjacent sector to the south, penetrated to the Rollbahn, and 

stopped all traffic. In order to eliminate these inconvenient ' disruptions, the Fuehrer Escort Battalion, a crack SS unit which 

normally served as Hitler's personal bodyguard, was reinforced 

with heavy weapons and artillery and moved into the adjacent 

sector to take this enemy defense anchor by assault. After 

a short briefing and hasty preparations the battalion launched 

a frontal attack in the orthodox manner, forced the weak outposts to withdraw, and advanced almost to the edge of the main 

strong point. There the enemy, counterattacking from all sides 

and inflicting considerable losses, pushed back the battalion 

and encircled one company. The company was finally liberated 

under great difficulties, hut the attack was not repeated because 

of the heavy casualties. 

After this failure Ninth Army shifted the.. boundaries to include Bogdanovo in the 6th Panzer Division sector and ordered 

the division to capture it. Within a few days the snail offensive 

procedure scored another success by almost completely isolating the enemy strong point. When the divisional reserves at~ 

tempted to close the ring, the Russians, though raked by heavy 

German fire, hastily evacuated the strong point in a daylight 

withdrawal. The village was immediately occupied and held 

against all later counterattacks. 

In one month the snail offensive achieved the capture of 

eighty villages, and advanced the front line from five to eight 

miles. The principal effect, however, was to put the enemy on 

the defensive along the entire front, making thrusts in the 
10 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

direction of the Rollbahn and railroad out of the question. More 

and more battle-tested soldiers and reconditioned weapons had 

meanwhile been made available and supplied to the front. The 

number of tanks increased to eight, the artillery pieces to twelve. 

By then the operations of all units were well co-ordinated and the 

commanders had full confidence in the new combat tactics: 

thorough preparations and careful implementation of all instructions had prevented the slightest failure. 

The subordinate commanders could now be granted much 

greater freedom for the continuation of the offensive. Division 

headquarters no longer interfered with details. Each sector 

was assigned a weekly phase line that was to be reached under 

optimum conditions. This line was not to be crossed without 

approval from division because safety considerations outweighed 

those of speed. Whenever the alert units ran into particular 

difficulties, they called upon divisional reserves which by now 

included a few tanks and dive bombers. All enemy attempts 

failed to halt the slow but steady advance of the improvised 

front. The snail offensive only paused in places where the 

enemy committed strong reserves; it started to move again immediately after these were transferred to another danger point. 

Since the enemy did not have sufficient forces and materiel tQ 

appear in strength in several places at the same time, he lost 

ground slowly but steadily. By the end of March 1942, two 

months after the start of the snail offensive, the Russians had 

been pushed back into the marshy forests and forced to relinquish more than two hundred villages. 

This tactical, organizational, and logistical improvisation, a 

product of extreme emergency, had reached its intended objective. 

To go farther would have been impossible at this time because 

the two adjacent units had not joined the division in the 

offensive. The 6th Panzel' Division units on the extreme ends 

of the sector had remained in their initial positions in order 

to pl'cvent the opening of gaps in the flanks which would have 

permitted the enemy to infiltrate into the rear of the snailoffensive front. Ninth Army then widened the sector of 6th 

Panzcr Division with orders to eliminate enemy interference 

in the adjacent areas by similar offensive action. 

4. The Sco1-pion On·ensive 

Despite the successes obtained by the use of snail-offensive 

tactics in the central zone, the Germans holding the entire front 

facing west were still infe rior to the opposing Russian forces 

which included some first-rate Guards units around Rzhev. It 

was the mission of the 6th Panzer Division to launch another 

offensive to push back the enemy from the only German high-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 11 

way and railroad line leading from Sychevka to Rzhev. (Map 3) 

The Russian outposts were located one to three miles from these 

essential supply routes and disrupted the traffic on many 

occasions. 

The available forces and materiel were still inadequate for 

an offensive in the conventional manner. Once again it became 

necessary to improvise tactics. Only successive surprise attacks 

with limited objectives plus close co-ordination of all arms had 

any chance of success. Free choice of time and place for each 

intended thrust was another prerequisite since the issue would 

be in doubt if the enemy recognized the German intentions and 

took countermeasures. Whenever the element of surprise was 

lost, the objective had to be changed and the blow delivered at 

some distant vulnerable point. All this had to be achieved with 

a relatively weak striking force which was to be shifted to a· 

different sector of the front immediately after each thrust. 

The tactics to be employed thus consisted of a well co-ordinated 

but flexible system of limited objective attacks. They could 

best be compared to a series of paralyzing stings a scorpion 

would inflict in a life-and-death struggle against a physically 

superior opponent. 

Taken individually, the various lunges were not novel. A 

frontal break-through thrust in the center was followed by 

a double envelopment farther to the south. Only a few days 

later the same combat forces attacked through a deep forest 

to the north, accomplished their mission, and were immediately 

replaced by reserve units. Before the enemy had caught his 

breath, he was surprised by a deceptive thrust into his flank. 

Diagonal jabs at the northern and southern ends of the front 

consolidated the territorial gains achieved by the preceding 

operations. While the German forces suffered only slight losses, 

the enemy was prevented from seizing the initiative during the 

spring of 1942. He was dislodged from the favorable terrain 

he held and was forced to withdraw his forces approximately 

12 miles along a 75-mile front. The German supply lines from 

Vyazma to Rzhev were finally secure, and a base of operations 

was acquired for the summer offensive which led to the annihilation of all Russian units holding out in the rear of Ninth Army. 

5. Cav,al1-y Brigade Model in Operation SEYDLITZ (Map 3) 

The Russian elements that had broken through the German 

lin~s during the winter of 1941- 42 and threatened the German 

supply lines during the spring, succeeded in gaining a foothold 

in the extensive, impassable, primeval forest swamps between 

Rzhev and Bely. Constantly receiving reinforcements of infantry, 

cavalry, and armored units, the Russians assembled a force of 
12 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

60,000 men in the rear of Ninth Army and forced the Germans 

to fight on two fronts. They tied down- strong forces and increasingly menaced the army rear. Russian supply arrived 

by a road leading via Poselok Nelidovo toward Bely. 

In order to eliminate this danger and regain full freedom 

of action, General Model, commanding the Ninth Army, planned 

Operation SEYDLITZ, a concentric counterattack which started 

on 2 July 1942. During the first stage of the operation the 

Germans, in difficult forest fighting, dislodged the Soviet forces 

from their deeply-echeloned positions and hemmed them into 

a narrow area. A quick German thrust into the Obsba valley 

anticipated the apparent enemy intention of breaking through 

the newly~formed German switch position northeast of Bely. 

The Russians attacked simultaneously from the inside and the 

outside and attempted to escape through the breach thus made. 

The enemy units were split along the Obsha River and encircled 

in two pockets. An Russian attempts to break out were frus~ 

trated. Russian forces northeast of Bely directed relief attacks 

from the outside toward the pockets. These attacks were also 

repulsed. Strong tactical reserves which the enemy brought in 

by forced marches via Poselok Nelidovo arrived too late. After 

a battIe lasting eleven days Operation SEYDLITZ ended with a 

complete German victory. 

An improvised cavalry brigade, the formation of which General 

Model had ordered when Operation SEYDLITZ was still in the 

planning stage, played a major role in this success. Its organiza~ 

tion was unique in many ways. Since most of the terrain was 

very swampy or covered with extensive marshy forests, the 

brigade WM to be organized in such a manner that it would 

be able to fight in any terrain and under any weather conditions. 

It was even to be mobile in mud. 

The first organizational problem was the procurement of men 

and equipment. Obviously only officers and enlisted men with 

combat experience in the East could be selected for such a 

specialized unit. Moreover they had to be trained cavalrymen. 

None but tough, healthy, brave men who were in no way 

pampered and who felt a close kinship with nature could be 

used. Replacements from the western theater or the zone of 

the interior were therefore out of the question because the 

troops from the West were softened by the easy ways of occupa~ 

tion life, and the recruits from the training camps at home 

lacked combat experience. Even though the latter had received 

a certain amount of specialized training for the eastern front, 

these recently inducted soldiers were incapable of enduring the 

physical hardships which the Russian theater imposed on the 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 13 

individual. There was not a commander in the field who was 

not aware that the difference between war in the East and 

war in the West was the difference between day and night. 

General Model therefore decided to pull out the reconnaissance 

battalion from each of the eight divisions under his command and 

place them at the disposal of the newly appointed brigade 

commander. This was a very favorable solution for the brigade 

but hard on the infantry divisions, for the reconnaissance battalions were valuable combat units and were greatly missed 

by their parent divisions. 

a. Organization and equipment of the brigade 

The organization and equipment of the brigade was as follows: 

(1) A headquarters staff with one signal communication 

troop. 

(2) Three cavalry regiments, each consisting of .lne or 

two mounted troops and three to four bicycle troops, 

with a total of five troops per regiment. Within a few 

hours all mounted troops of the regiments could be 

assembled and a complete cavalry regiment formed for 

an emergency. Each troop had twelve sections .and 

each section was equipped with two light machine guns. 

Thus each troop had twenty-four light machine guns 

and two heavies. In addition, officers and enlisted men 

were equipped with submachine guns when possible. 

(3) Each bicycle troop was issued two horse-drawn 

wagons which carried ammunition, baggage, and rtl.-

tions. Of course, these wagons were drawn by small 

native Panje horses because only they could master the 

terrain. The mounted troops had German military 

mounts. Mobility in mud was achieved because the Panje 

horses and wagons could pull through practically anywhere. 

(4) In addition, the brigade included an engineer company, a medical company. and one motorized and one 

horse-drawn supply column. 

(5) Tanks and antitank units were to assist the brigade 

whenever terrain conditions permitted. Each regiment 

had only six organic light infantry howitzers. Additional artillery support was also to be provided when 

necessary_ The assistance of infantry and additional 

artillery units for flank protection was promised in case 

of a deep penetration or a break-through. 
14 GERMA.N REPORT SERIES 

b. Tmining and commitment 0/ the brigade 

After about four to six weeks of combined arms training, 

the brigade was committed south of Olenino along the Luchesa 

River. A so-called Rollbahn led from Olenino southward which, 

although it was supposed to be a fairly good highway, was really 

no more than an unimproved country road. Short stretches 

of corduroy road covered particularly wet, swampy sections. 

Only the Luchesa valley was- clear of woods to approximately 

one to three miles in width. Large, swampy forests extended 

on both sides of the valley with but a few clearings of varying 

sizes. Small, swampy creeks flowed through the woods. Maps 

and interrogation of local inhabitants provided the Germans with 

exact information on the terrain behind the enemy lines. Once 

the brigade had broken through the Russian positions at the 

edge of the woods, it would have to contend with swampy forests 

ten miles in depth where scarcely a path was to be found . 

A panzer division was committed to the right of the brigade 

with the mission of attacking along the Rollbahn to the south. 

Since the Russians rightly expected the main effort of the attack 

along this axis of advance, the division was faced by a 

very difficult task. From aerial photographs and the interrogation of deserters it was known that strong enemy fortifications 

such as road blocks and fortified antitank positions were situated along the Rollbahn. The positions farther east and west 

from this road were not as strongly fortified but were secured 

by mine fields in which there were only a few gaps. The Russians thought it most improbable that a major attack could be 

launched east of the Luchesa River because the Germans would 

be unable to move tanks up to the line of departure through the 

swampy forests. They also felt certain that a tank attack across 

the open terrain, the Luchesa River, and through the mine fields 

would hardly be hazarded. 

Approximately ten days before the attack the brigade moved 

up to the line of departure. Intensive reconnaissance of the 

intermediate terrain began immediately with the assistance of 

veteran tankers. Within a short time a complete picture of the 

enemy positions and the intervening terrain was available. 

From this picture it was obvious that, after the necessary preparations, an attack with armored support was definitely feasible. 

For Operation SEYDLITZ the cavalry brigade was attached to 

its right neighbor, the panzer division which was to advance 

afong the RoUbahn. The brigade was to thrust through the tenmil e~ eep forest in one sweep and, if possible, cut the Russian 

supply line on the north-south highway if the nlain body of the 

pamer division was unable to make any progress. Six artillery 
MI LITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 15 

batteries and one tank company with fourteen tanks were attached 

to the brigade for the execution of this mission. 

The unit adjacent to the left, an infantry division, was not 

to jump off until the next day after the initial attack had been 

successful. For the first day the left flank would therefore be 

exposed. In the marshy forest terrain this was not a matter 

of particular concern because a small covering force would surely 

prove sufficient. 

The first difficulties arose when the fourteen tanks had to 

be moved up to the line of departure through thc swampy forcsts. 

Forty-eight hours before the beginning of the attack a com puny 

of engineers with power saws started to cut trees at intervals 

of about one yard along the edge of the forest so that the 

trees fell on open ground along a stretch leading through the 

assembly area. In a very short t ime and with relatively little 

effort a tank path was built which in effect was a corduroy 

road with about one-yard-wide gaps. Few branches had to 

be cut off the trees. For obvious reasons this road could only 

be used by a limited number of tanks and tracked vehicles. 

A few hours after the engineers had gone to work the tanks 

started to move into their assembly area in daylight. This 

was possible because the wooded terrain afforded sufficient 

cover. The noise of the tanks was drowned hy harassing fire 

and low-flying reconnaissance planes. All tanks arrived at their 

destination without incident. Experienced mine-clearing squads 

were assigned to each tank and ordered to ride on the tanks. 

The attack started at 0300. During the artillery preparation 

the tanks started out together with the cavalry troops. Their 

movements were favored by a heavy fog which covered the 

river valley. They crossed most of the intervening terrain without encountering resistance. A ford across the Luchesa River 

which had been reconnoitered in advance was found to be 

adequate for the fourteen tanks. Enemy mine fields were immediately recognized by the experienced tankers and engineers 

and the lanes through the fields were found and widened. 

Suffering no losses, the tanks and cavalry suddenly rose in front 

of a comple~cly surprised enemy. In one sweep the first 

and second lines were overrun and great confusion seized the 

Russians. The tanks had accomplished their mission. They 

could not penetrate any fa rther into the nemy~held forest without sufficient reconnaissance and additional preparation, and 

were therefore ordered to halt and stay in reserve. By then 

the cavalry had penetrated the enemy Iine3 three to four miles. 

The situation on the right was entirely different. Here the 

panzer division was to advance along the Rollbahn. The Russians 
16 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

were prepared for an attack. The German tanks ran into deeply 

echeloned antitank positions which were camouflaged with the 

usual Russian skill. The infantry also could not make headway 

and suffered heavy casunlties in the forest fighting. The entire operation seemed in danger of bogging down. 

At noon the brigade received orders to pivot toward the 

west with all available forces and to attack the Rollbahn from 

the east. One regiment turned to the right and thrust toward 

the Rollbahn through primeval forest swamps. At times the 

men sank in up to their knees. Direction had to be maintained 

by compass. The troops performed seemingly impossible feats 

and the surprise attack was a full success. By nightfall the 

regiment controlled a stretch of the RoUbakn, the pressure on 

the panzer division subsided, and the enemy was in an untenable 

position. The Panje supply wagons were able to move through 

the swamps and bring rations and ammunition to the completely 

exhausted troops. 

On the following morning the continuation of the attack m&t 

hardly any resistance. On the other hand the physical requirements were extraordinarily high since the men had to traverse 

six miles of wooded swamps. Before noon the brigade emerged 

from the forest and a f ew hours later the first heavy equipment arrived. The terrain ahead extended over a wide area 

and Russian columns, single vehicles, and individuals could be 

seen moving about in wild disorder. It was obvious that the 

enemy command had lost control over its troops. The Russian 

defense lines had collapsed and the German divisions were advancing everywhere. 

c. Conclusion8 

Even though Operation SEYDLITZ would probably have been 

successful without the cavalry brigade, it would have involved 

a much greater loss of men and equipment. During the eleven 

days of the operation 50.000 prisoners, 230 tanks, 760 artillery 

pieces, and thousands of small arms were captured. The situation of Ninth Army had been improved by the elimination of 

these Russian forces in its rear. The army rear area was safe 

except for partisan activities. 

The composition of the brigade proved to be effective. The 

proper training for such a special mission requires from six 

to eight weeks with troops already experienced in Russian warfare. Before the attack the units must be in their jump-off 

positions for at least two weeks in order to become well-acquainted 

with terrain conditions through intensive reconnaissance. All 

intelligence and reconnaissance information must be carefully 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 17 

rechecked because the slightest inaccuracy can result in failure 

in that type of terrain. 

Preliminary training in teamwork botween armor and cavalry 

is of definite advantage. In an attack over this kind of terrain 

it may occasionally happen that the cavalry advances ton fast. 

In that case the tanks must radio the cavalry to slow down 

because terrain difficulties prevent them from keeping up. 

Portable radio sets are not always reliable because of the densit;y 

of the forest, and telephone communications therefore have to 

bE!' used extensively. For that reason each regiment must carry 

more than the customary quantity of wire. 

If possible every officer and enlisted man should be equipped 

with a submachine gun. 

Rations should be concentrated; t he lighter they are, the better. 

The American combat ration (K ration) would be well suitp.d, 

particularly since it is also protected against moisturCl 

It would be advantageous to equip troops with rubber "onts 

and impregnated raincoats, camouflage jackets and windbreakers, 

because dew causes a high degree of moisture in the underJlrush. 

Camouflage covers for steel helmets are essential and camouflage 

in general is of utmost importance. 

The commissioned and noncommissioned officers must be 

versatile and able to make quick decisions and improvise. Every 

officer must be able to act independently and ready to assume 

responsibility. Detailed inquiries addressed to higher echelons 

cause delays and unfavorable developments which can usually 

be avoided. Leaders with good common sense and a portion 

of recklessness are best suited for such speeial assignments. 

The scholarly type of officer who relies chiefly on maps is completely out of place. 

In general, it may be said that the compm~ition and equipment 

of the cavalry brigade proved effective for the special mission 

of advancing and attacking through marshy foref't,s and alo n~ 

muddy paths. 

II. Some Improvisations Used During Operation ZITADELLE 

1. The Crossing of Russian Mine Fields 

In preparation for Operation ZITADELLE, the German pincer 

attack on Kursk during the summer of 1943, XI Infantry Corps 

made a thorough study of the problem of crossing t he extensiv~ 

mine fields on the east aide of the Donets. The usual procedure 

of sending engineer detachments to clear narrow lanes for the 

adVance of the infantry spearheads was not considered satip~ 

factory since the terrain offered no cover and the enemy could 
18 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

inflict heavy casualties upon engineers and infantry by concentrating his fire on these lanes. Several improvised methods for 

overcoming this obstacle were therefore under consideration. 

The identification of the mined area was the first prerequisite 

since the infantry had to know its exact location prior to the 

crossings. This was possible because the German-held west 

bank commanded the Russian positions on the other side of the 

river. Another prerequisite was that the infantry should be 

able to spot the location of individual mines at close range with 

the naked eye. In many places small mounds or depressions, 

dry grass, differences in the coloring of the ground, or some 

other external marks facilitated the spotting. The engineers 

had made a number of experiments in mine detecting. In the 

early days of the war, the infantry sometimes crossed narrow 

mine fields after individual engineers lay down beside the mines 

as human markers, taking great care not to set them off by 

pressure. Although neither engineers nor infantry troops suf~ 

fered Josses during these early experiments, the procedure was 

risky and could only be applied on a small scale. It was therefore of little consequence during the later stages of the war. 

A second, more promising method that fulfilled expectations 

consisted of marking individual mines by placing small flags 

or other simple markers next to the mines. This was done by 

engineers or infantrymen who were trained in the recognition 

of mines. This procedure was applied repeatedly and showed 

better results than the first but its large-scale use presented 

difficulties. The third and best method was to thoroughly instruct 

all infantrymen in enemy mine-laying techniques and in spotting 

mines by using captured enemy mine fields as training grounds. 

This procedure required that all infantrymen be sent to rear 

areas in rotation and was therefore rather time-consuming. 

These requirements could be met in the case of Operation 

ZITADELLE since the time of the attack had been twice postponed 

with an ensuing delay of several weeks. The divisions committed 

in the narrow attack zone had moved two thirds of their combat 

forces to the rear where the daily training schedule featured tanks 

passing over foxholes and the crossing of Russian-type mine 

fields. This training paid off since it helped the soldiers to 

overcome their fear of tanks and mines. 

The beginning of the attack was so timed that the infantry 

would be able to detect the enemy mines without difficulty. All 

the mine fields were quickly crossed by spearheads which suffered 

practically no casualties. Only one battalion acted contrary to 

orders and attacked before daybreak, its commander being afraid 

that he might otherwise suffer heavy casualties from enemy fire 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 19 

while his men were crossing the extended open terrain in his 

zone. In the dark, this battalion ran into the previously uncovered mine fields and the two advance companies suffered 

approximately twenty casualties from mine explosions. When the 

battalion continued its advance by daylight it had no further 

losses. 

After the first wave had passed through, the engineers rapidly 

cleared a number of lanes and marked them with colored tape 

so that the reserves and heavy weapons could follow. Again 

there were no mine casualties. Only when the supply units 

followed the infantry through the mine fields, were some of the 

men and horses blown up by the mines because they were careless or tried to byp"ass obstacles. 

How safely anyone experienced in the detection of mines 

could move around in these mine fields was demonstrated during 

a conference on a completely mined hill, attended by about twenty 

unit commanders and specialists. No one had previously set 

foot on this hill but it was the only plQce which afforded a 

good view of the terrain. During the ascent of the hi1l each 

mine was clearly marked and no accidents occurred even thoug;, 

the mine field was crossed in various directions. 

This improvised procedure of crossing mine fields became 

common practice because it avoided many casualties. resulted in 

quick capture of enemy positions, and was therefore very effective 

in the Russian theater. 

2. A Flak Division Serve8 as Corps Artillery 

In the plan for Operation ZITADELLE XI Infantry Corps was 

to cover the southern wing of the panzer corps that was to 

spearhead the attack. For this purpose corps was reinforced 

by two light motorized artillery battalions and by the fully 

reorganized 7th Flak Division. This Luftwaffe division, composed 

of three regiments with seventy-two SS-mm. and approximately 

900 smaller antiaircraft guns, was to serve as a substitute for 

missing medium artillery. 

According to Luftwaffe policy the subordination of Flak officers to Army unit commanders was prohibited. The corps 

artillery commander therefore depended on the voluntary cooperation of the Flak division commander. This led to repeated 

minor frictions but worked out quite well in general. 

The division's first mission was to take part in the artillery 

preparation under the direction of the corps artillery commander. 

For this purpose the division was echeloned in depth and committed in three waves of one regiment each. The first echelon 

was in position in the main line of resistance and closely behind 

it; its mission was to place direct fire on enemy heavy weapons 
20 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

and pillboxes. In addition it had to form Flak assault detachments for antitank combat to give close support to the advancing infantry. Together with the corps artillery, the two 

other regiments were to shatter the first enemy line of defense and paralyze his infantry by delivering sustained concentrations. After that, elements of the first echelon, with the 

exception of the assault detachments, as well as the entire second 

echelon, were to support the advancing infantry. The third 

echelon was to take over the antiaircraft protection of the entire 

artillery area and was also to participate in counterbattery 

missions. 

Enemy intelligence found out that the attack was to start 

on 5 July at dawn. The Russians laid down intensive harassing 

firc on the jump-off positions but this interference ceased as 

soon as the German artillery concentrations started. These 

were placed so well and the initial shock was so great that the 

first assault wave was able to cross the enemy mine fields, 

penetrate his main line of resistance without delay, and thrust 

a few hundred yards beyond it. Thousands of tracers tired 

by the numerous small Flak guns proved particularly effective. 

The Russians abandoned the trenches immediately and fled into 

their deep dugouts where the advancing infantry surprised 

them and had no difficulty in ferreting them out. But when 

the infantry I'cached the two-to three-mile-deep zone of battle 

positions prepared duri ng the preceding months. they had to 

make extensive USE" of hand grenades in order to mop up the 

maze of deeply dug-in trenches and bunkers, some of which 

were a Uozp.n or more feet deep. At the same time artillery 

and Flak fired counterbattery on enemy heavy weapons which 

resumed rirc from rear positions. on reserves infiltrating through 

tn!uo.:hes, and on medium artillery. The third echelon of the 

antiaIrcraft division was fully occupied with defense against 

enelllY bombers whicn attacked the corps area incessantly. During the lirst two hours they downed more than twenty enemy 

planes. 

Within eight hours the German infantry penetrated the enemy 

fortification system in ita entire depth and reached the railroad 

embankment parallel to the Doneta. Suddenly a Russian counterattack supported by forty tanks threw back the German covering 

forct:. from the woods OJ, the south flank aud hit the right wing 

division which wal: echeloned in depth. But the defensive fire 

of the divisional artillery and a concentration of all medium 

antiaircraft batteries stopped the enemy counterattack at the 

edge of the forest. Then the medium Flak was directed against 

tank concentrations, which had been recognized in tht: under-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 21 

brush, and dispersed them. Repeated enemy attempts to resume 

the attack from this area failed without exception. Flank protection was soon restored and the threat eliminated. 

On the second day of the operation, the high ground ahead 

was captured under the protection of Flak artillery fire; all 

counterthrusts were repelled. On the morning of the third 

day the enemy attempted to recover lost ground and counterattacked with two heavy tank brigades and motorized infantry 

units. The tanks overran the battle line of the German infantry 

and penetrated deeply, but the motorized infantry which followed 

was repelled. The enemy' tank break-through hit the corps center 

behind which, however, several F lak assault detachments and 

numerous medium antitank guns were sited in a mutually-supporting formation. The enemy ran into this dense network of 

antitank defenses as well as a flank attack by thirty-two assault 

guns and was completely annihilated. The last enemy tank which 

had penetrated to a divisional command post was surprised by 

an assault detachment carrying gasoline cans and was set on 

fire. Sixty-four enemy tanks had begun the counterattack and 

two hours later sixty-four black columns of smoke gave proof 

of their destruction. Discouraged by his failure, the enemy 

made no further attempts at an armored break-through at any 

point of the corps sector even though he had plenty of additional 

armored units available. The improvised commitment of the 

antiaircraft division contributed decisively to this defensive 

success and the formation of Flak assault detachments proved 

highly effective in the destruction of Russian armor. 
22 

Chapter 2 

The Defensive 

I. Improvised Hedgehog Oefenses 

GERMAN R.E PORT SERIES 

From the very first days of the campaign, the vastness of 

European Russia and the peculiarities of Russian warfare led to 

the repeated isolation of individual units and combat teams. Allaround defenses and security measures were the only possible 

remedy. Far from being stressed. these defense tactics were 

frequently not even mentioned in the field service regulations. 

The field forces improvised them and designated them very appropriately as "hedgehog defenses." As time went on these 

tactics were applied morc and morc frequently and adopted by 

larger units. Their use was not confined to defense. During 

offensive actions advance detachments had to build hedgehog 

defenses as protection against enemy surprise attacks by night. 

For instance, during their advance throug'h a swampy forest 

region in Lithuania where strong, dispersed enemy forces were 

reassembling, combat teams of 6th Panzer Division formed the 

first hedgehog positions during the initial week of the Russian 

campaign. Several hay barns in a major clearing were selected as the location for the divisional command post. Covered 

by thick underbrush, the tanks were placed in a wide circle 

around the barns with their guns ready to fire at the edge of 

the woods. In front of the tanks was an outer ring of infantry in foxholes and ditches and behind embankments which 

enabled the tanks to fire over their heads. Security patrols 

and outposts formed an outer cordon. The Russians recognized the strength of these protective measures and did not dare 

carry out the surprise attack they had planned. They reRigned 

themselves to harassing the hedgehog area with tank and machine 

gun fire and a few rounds of altillery shells. 

The hedgehog defense provided the troops with security and 

rest and thus passed its first major test. Before long these 

precautions became a routine security and defense measure for 

armored spearheads. The first large-scale employment of this 

measure occurred during the thrust toward Vyazma in October 

1941 when an entire panzer division with 260 tanks spent the 

first night of the attack in an elaborate system of hedgehog 

positions in the woods. (Map 1) Forming the spearhead of a 

powerful wedge, the division had penetrated the enemy lines to 

a depth of twenty miles. In its rear and on its flanks de-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 23 

feated enemy divisions were withdrawing under cover of darkness. A retreating enemy corps staff sought refuge in a small 

isolated village in the forest which was occupied by the German 

divisional staff. Enemy troop units were around the entire system of tank hedgehogs. As long as the German tanks were on 

their own, the intermittent firing of flares and machine guns 

indicated their great uneasiness. This changed with the arrival 

of the armored infantry which followed the tanks. When the 

divisional artillery and engineers arrived and were also integrated into the hedgehog defense system, a restful night was had 

by all. Early next morning the Russians departed very quietly 

because they were unable to find any rest in the immediate vicinity 

of the German division. 

II. Defensive Improvisations in Extreme Cold 

During the last days of 1941, the 6th Panzer Division was 

outmaneuvered by superior Russian forces and dislodged from a 

chain of villages which surrounded a large forest region. The 

division was faced with two alternatives: It could either withdraw a certain distance to another group of communities and 

be enveloped and split up, or it could establish defense positions 

in front of or hetween these indefensible villages in a temperature 

of - 49 <) F. without adequate shelter whi~h would mean certain death from exposure. During the engagements of the last 

few days, most of which had of necessity taken place in open 

terrain, the daily casualties from frostbite had increased at an 

alarming rate. By 3 January 1942 the number of moderate and 

severe frost bite casualties had risen to 800 per day. At that 

rate the division would soon have ceased to exist. The immediate construction of shelters and bunkers, with whatever 

heating facilities could be installed. was mandatory. But these 

defensive positions could not be built because only one corps 

and two divisional engineer battalions with 40 to 60 men each 

and very little equipment were available. On the other hand a 

large quantity of explosives had recently arrived at division. In 

view of the critical situation, the engineer battalion commanders 

were ordered to disregard the frost and to blast enough craters 

into the solidly frozen ground along the tentative defense line 

to provide shelter for all combat units including the reserves. 

These craters were to be echeloned in width and depth and were 

to hold three to five men each. The enginecrs were also to 

mine certain areas and build tank obstacles in three places. The 

reserves and sel'vice troops were ordered to pack down paths be-
24 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

tween the craters and to the rear. They were to use readily 

available lumber to cover the craters. 

The hlasting along the entire line started early next morning. 

The noise of the lO,OOOMpound explosive charges somehow gave 

the impression of a heavy barrage. Fountains of earth rose all 

around and dense smoke filled the air. The enemy watched with 

surprise, could not understand what was happening, and remai ned quiet. The blasting was over by noon and by nightfall 

the craters were covered and occupied by the combat elements. 

Soon afterward smoke rose from the craters where the crews 

kept warm at open fires. The craters formed an uninterrupted 

line of positions in front of which outposts were established. A 

maze of ahatis lay in front of these, guns were emplaced along 

the thoroughfares behind the tank obstacles, and the entire 

front line was r eady for defense within twelve hours after the 

first detonation. This position withstood all enemy attacks and 

was not abandoned until ten days later, in milder weather, when 

the adjacent units on both wings were forced to withdraw after 

enemy tanks had penetrated their lines. 

The engineers who prepared the positions in the fiercest cold 

and suffered 40 percent frostbite casualties saved the combat 

units and restored the situation by their sacrifice. The very 

next day the casualties from frostbite dropped from 800 to 4 

cases and thus practically ceased. 

This improvisation was introduced at a time when 6th Panzer 

Division had lost all its tanks during the preceding withdrawal. 

Before blasting the positions, fighting had centered upon the POSM 

session of villages which alone could offer shelter from the extreme cold. Groups of villages had formed natural phase lines 

for both the attacker and the defender who had been forced to 

ignore all other tactical considerations. Whenever the Russians 

failed to capture a village by day, they withdrew to the last 

friendly village for the night. Not even the best-equipped Siberian 

troops attempted to continue an attack on a village after dusk. 

Bla·sting positions in open terrain was therefol·e an innovation 

that served the double purpose of stabilizing the front and maintaining the combat efficiency of the remnants of the division. 

On another occasion the blasting of ice proved much less effective. In order to prevent the enemy from making an enveloping thrust across Lake Pskov on the Russian-Estonian borde!· 

during the winter of 1943- 44, Army Group North blasted a 

ten-foot-wide, several-mile-long canal into the ice north of the 

isle of Salita. At that time the ice was so thick that it could 

carry medium guns and prime movers. But here, as in other 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 25 

instances, it became apparent that the blasting of ice created 

no permanent obstacle because the water froze immediately in 

the extreme cold and shortly afterward the ice was again capable 

of carrying heavy loads. In extremely low temperatures all attempts to stop enemy advances by blasting frozen bodies of water 

were doomed to fail. 

Almost a year later, toward the end of 1944, the Germans devised another improvisation to prevent the Russians from crossing a frozen hody of water. By late autumn the Russians had 

driven a wedge into the German front near Memel [Ed: now 

Klnipeda] and had reached the Kurisches Haff. (Map 4) The 

Germans intended to prevent the landing of enemy forces on the 

west side of the Haff. A large-scale landing was not expected 

because the prerequisites for such an undertaking did not exist, 

but it seemed quite likely that the enemy would attempt to land 

sabotage or raiding parties, spies, agents, or commandos along 

the coast under cover of darkness. The coastal defenses composed of service units. volunteer organizations. and Volkssturm 

fEd: Peoples' militia assembled during the last years of the war] 

supported by weak reserve elements from Koenigsberg lEd: 

now Kaliningl'ad 1 were thought to be sufficient to thwart any 

such operation. 

It was a known fact that the Haif froze over in winter and 

that the ice cover would carry men and vehicles. This might encourage enemy attempts to envelop the exposed German wing, 

cut off the only supply route to Memel, or undertake Borne other 

major operation. For that reason plans were drawn up to block 

the Kurisches Haff in its entire width of ten miles. 

In the late fall of 1944 a number of wooden bunkers with heating facilities were constructed for this purpose. They were 

approximately five feet high and could hold a crew of three to 

five men and their weapons. The bunkers were placed on rafts 

with sled runners in order to give them mobility on ice and 

simultaneously to protect them from sinking into the water in 

CMe the ice suddenly broke. This possibility had to be taken 

into account because of the sudden changes in temperature which 

occur in this area. By the end of December 1944 the first groups 

of hunkers were moved onto the freezing Haff, the edges of which 

were hy then sufficiently strong to carry them. The bunker 

positions were spread over the ice as the freezing process progressed. Approximately 150 bunkers were laid out in two 

parallel lines in checkerboard formation, giving each other fire 

support. The hunkers were reinforced with blocks of ice on the 

outside and camouflaged with snow. A continuous line of en-
26 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

tanglements with alarm signals was to prevent the enemy from 

infiltrating between the bunkers. Reserves were held in readiness behind hoth lines of bunkers. Ice boats and motor sleighs 

needed by the reserve!:! to give them mobility did not arrive in 

time and the plans for organizing a combined ice-boat and 

motor-sleigh brigade had to be abandoned. Artillery support was 

provided from both shores. 

Since the Russians lacked fast means of transportation on ice, 

they could only have advanced on foot over the long distances of 

the Haff. This was probably the reason why they failed to 

attack during the wi nter and this improvised position was therefore never put to the test. 

III. A Moving Pocket Regains the German l ines 

In some instances German divisions were left behind the Russian advance and were forced to fight their way back to the west. 

For example during the large-scale Russian offensive in the winter 

of 1942, the 320th Infantry Division, which had held a sector 

on the Don front with two Italian divisions at its sides, suddenly found itself behind the enemy lines because of the rapid 

disintegration of the allied units. The division commander decided to fight his way back to the German lines. On the way 

all the divisional motor vehicles ran out of gasoline and had to 

be destroyed. The horse-drawn batteries and trains also lost 

a great numher of horses in battle and from exhaustion. Altogether, the fighting power and mobility of the division was 

greatly impaired. If it was not to resign itself to its fate, it 

had to resort to improvisations. What was needed either had to 

be wrested from the enemy or taken from the land. In this 

manner the division procured hundreds of small draft horses 

for the light vehicles. The medi um artillery was drawn by oxen. 

Cows and oxen were used as draft animals for the transportation of radio and signal equipment. Even the division commander decided to use such a team as a sure means of transportation. The loss of many weapons such as machine guns, antitank guns, and artillery pieces could only be offset by weapons 

captured from weak enemy detachments on occasional raids. The 

ammunition needed for the use of captured weapons was also 

taken from the enemy and the same methods were applied in 

obtaining r ations. Small radio sets and other sensitive equipment had to be carried on litters. Infantrymen mounted on 

Panje horses were charged with reconnaissance and security. The 

difficult retreat of the division took several weeks and was an 

uninterrupted series of marches, combat actions, and improvisa-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 27 

tiona. Aa the division approached Kharkov, it suddenly made 

radio contact and asked the German units in the city for assistance in its attempt to break through to the German Jines. A 

strong armored thrust from inside the city was co-ordinated with 

a simultaneous attack by the division. The enemy lines were 

pierced at the point designated by the division and it was able to 

rejoin the German lines. Its appearance hardly resembled that 

of a German unit. A strange conglomeration of weapons, equipment, vehicles, and litters, small and large shaggy horses, oxen 

and cows, accompanied by soldiers in a variety of winter clothing created the impression of a traveling circus on parade. And 

yet it was a battle-tested unit with excellent morale that had 

courageously fought its way through enemy territory, had returned to its own lines, and was to be considered a precious 

addition to the corps strength. By the following day the division once again stood shoulder to shoulder with the other 

corps units and held a sector facing east. Its strong will to 

survive and skillful improvisations enabled the division to regain its freedom. 

IV. Zone Defense Tactics 

During the last years of the war, Russian break-throughs were 

accomplished by the same methods that had been employed so 

successfully by the same enemy in World War I. These methods 

had little in common with customary tactical doctrines but were 

based on great superiority of manpower and materiel. After 

weeks of logistical build-up and moving up the enormous quantities of ammunition needed, the German front was breached after 

several hours of concentrated fire. This was followed by the 

break-through of massed infantry forces and deep thrusts of 

armored un t.~ in order to gain freedom of maneuver. The system was absolutely foolproof so long as the opponent did not 

interfere with the sequence of events. An essential prerequisite 

was that the defender would rigidly hold that sector of the front, 

wllich was to he attacked, until he received the deadly blow. 

In the Enst the Germans complied with this prerequisite since 

their forces had strict orders not to relinquish one inch of 

ground voluntarily. These defense tactics were enforced almost 

without exception until the end of the war. Being aware of 

the army's numerical inferiority and its loss of combat efficiency caused by heavy casualties, Hitler perhaps doubted its 

capability of conducting a flexible active defense and therefore 

ordered all army units to cling rigidly to prepared positions. 

But such tactics could never prevent an enemy break-through, let 
28 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

alone lead to victory. Despite the fact that Russian casualties 

were relatively heavier than those suffered by the Germans and 

the fighting qualities of the Russian soldiers vastly inferior to 

those of their opponents, the always-present crucial problem 

was to make up for the Russian superiority in men and materiel. 

Aside from their greater fighting capabilities the Germans had 

no other means of offsetting their inferiority than by employing more flexible and superior tactics. If the military leaders 

lost their faith in the superiority of the German armed forces 

in these two fields. or if shortages of matCriel became so acute 

that these advantages CQuid not be exploited. then a favorable outcome of this war was no morc to be expected than in World 

War I. It was the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, 

Adolf Hitler. to recognize this fact and draw the necessary conclusions. Until that time it was the duty of the commanders in 

the field to do their utmost to prevent a collapse of the front 

lines. The greatest imminent threats to the fighting front were 

the Russian massed attacks with subsequent break-throughs. 

Since adequate reserves for successful defense were rarely available, it became all the more necessary to prevent the annihilation 

of the front-line units by Russian fire concentrations. bombing 

attacks, and massed armored thrusts in order to preserve their 

combat efficiency. 

An improvisation devised for this purpose was the zone defense tactics introduced toward the end of the war. It was derived from an analysis of the reasons for the success of most 

enemy break-throughs. The principal factors to be considered 

were the following: 

a. The annihilation of front-line troops by mass concentration 

on points along the main line of r esistance ; 

b. The neutralization or destruction of the German artillery 

by heavy counterbattery fire and continuous air attacks; 

c. The elimination of command staffs by air attacks and sur· 

prise fire on command posts up to army level ; 

d. The harassing of reserves by artillery fire and air attacks 

on their assembly areas; 

e. The disruption of the routes of communication to the front 

which delayed movements of reserves and cut off supply; 

f· The massed armored thrusts in depth which enabled the 

Russians to obtain freedom of maneuver. 

For obvious reasons the task of the defender Wl\8 to neutralize 

these enemy tactics or at least to reduce them to tolerable proportions. One of the panzer armies in the eastern theater de-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 29 

vised the following defense measures and employed them successfully: 

u. There were two ways of preventing the annihilation of the 

frontline troops: either by constructing bombproof and 

shell proof positions or by withdrawing the forward units 

in time to evade the devastating barrages. Since the construction of shell proof positions required an expenditure of 

time and materials beyond the German capabilities, the 

adoption of evasive tactics was the only solution. Such 

evasive tactics had already been employed during the last 

stage of World War I. The forward positions were evacuated shortly before an imminent attack and the defending troops moved far enough to the rear into a new and 

even stronger line to force the enemy to regroup his forces, 

always a time-consuming maneuver. The difficulties encountered by the enemy before he was able to resume the 

attack were to be enhanced by demolitions in the intermediate terrain. These evasive tactics were tried out in 

1918 in the West when the German combat forces withdrew 

to the Hindenburg Position and in the South on the 

Italian front along the Piave River. The loss of some 

ground which was involved in the application of these 

tactics was a well-considered sacrifice. But to achieve a 

permanent gain was possible only if the new positions 

could he held without fail. Another method of evading 

fire concentrations and a subsequent break-through was 

the adoption of elastic defense tactics in a deeply echeloned 

system of machine gun strong points which, however, often 

lacked the necessary r esiliency to stop a major enemy 

attack. 

A method frequently applied by the Germans as another 

form of evasion can best be compared with saber-fencing 

tactics. A cut is warded oft' by sudden retirement with 

appropriate guard, followed by an immediate counterthrust 

which will permit the fencer to regain his former position. 

Like the fencer, the forces holding the threatened sector 

of the front executed a surprise withdrawal at the last 

moment. They moved far enough to the rear so that the 

blow would miss them, the pursuing enemy could be repelled, 

and the initial position could be regained by a counterthrust. 

In order to satisfy these requirements. the terrain in which 

the pUl'suing enemy was to be intercepted had to bo;! well 

chosen and systematically prepared in order that the withdrawing forces could resume the defense within a few 
30 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

hours. It was therefore neither possible nor essential to 

withdraw the front-line units so far to the r ear that they 

were out of reach of enemy guns. Past experience indicated that the enemy fired his concentrations only on the 

main line of resistance and on strong points in the zone 

of resistance. For this reason it was absolutely necessary 

to evacuate this zone. Depending on the t errain and local 

fortifications, it was usually quite sufficient to withdraw the 

most forward troops 900 to 2,200 yards. Here was the 

forward edge of the battle position, a well-camouflaged 

organized system of defense that took advantage of all 

favorable terrain features. Numerous strong points and 

sizable local reserves were distributed throughout the position which extended back to the artillery emplacements 

and even beyond. In a camouflaged area behind the artillery were the general reserves of corps and army. By 

following this procedure, targets were so well dispersed that 

fire from as many as a thousand guns directed at so large 

an area could cause only local damage but could never 

wipe out entire units. 

b. If the German artillery was to avoid neutralization and 

escape destruction it had to switch to alternate emplacements in the battle position at the decisive moment. In 

addition the artillery also had to use alternate observation 

posts. These alternate positions had to be prepared well 

in advance, provided with ammunition, and equipped with 

a smoothly functioning wire and radio communication system. Additional battery positions and observation posts 

had to be reconnoitered and organized in depth so that 

they would be ready for immediate occupancy and utilization in case of emergency. This was to guarantee continuous support for the infantry even in the event of a 

reverse since only the flexible employment of artillery units 

which were always intact and ready to strike promised a 

successful defense. Furthermore, each battery had to establish two or three additional alternate positions and one 

or two dummy positions and had to fire from them with at 

least one r egistration gun in order to determine firing 

data for every emplacement. Altogether between five and 

eight positions had to be prepared by each battery. The 

Russian build-up allowed sufficient time for such extensive 

preliminary work and the Germans could therefore devote 

several weeks to these preparations. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 31 

c. All necessary precautions had to be taken to protect the 

command staffs and their communication system from destruction by artillery preparations and the ensuing general 

attack. For that reason no command staff from battalion 

up to army was permitted to stay at the command post it 

occupied before the start of the enemy attack. Each staff 

had to prepare a well-camouflaged, shellproof command post 

away from inhabited communities and was required to install a telephone switchboard in a separate bunker. Communications with the command post had to be assured by 

wire, radio, visual signals, dispatch riders. or runners, and 

in an emergency by a combination of these various means 

of communication. Telephone wires had to be laid in such 

manner that they could not easily be cut by fire or tracked 

vehicles; wherever possible they were laid along ditches 

and swampy depressions or strung on trees. Radio trucks 

had to be dug into the ground in inconspicuous places, protected against fragments, and well camouflaged before the 

attack started. Then strict radio silence had to be enforced. 

d. Before the general attack, all reserves had to leave their 

billeting areas and move into the battle-position quarters 

which had to be well camouflaged, outside inhabited communities, and ready for immediate use. Telephone, radio, 

and other communication media had to be readily available. 

e. The routes of communication to the front were of vital importance and therefore had to be kept open under all circumstances. Bottlenecks had to be avoided, defective 

stretches of road made serviceable even in inclement 

weather, and strict traffic control imposed for two-way traffic. Alternate bridges had to be built in suitable places 

away from the existing ones and provided with approach 

roads. At least two alternate routes had to be determined 

through each community so that convoys could detour narrow streets whenever there was danger of air attacks. 

/. One of the major problems was to intercept massed armored 

attacks and prevent break-throughs. This involved extensive countermeasures which could only gradually be enforced and slowly integrated into the defense system. 

First of all the terrain particularly suited for an armored 

break-through was mined to a quite unusual extent. Selecting such areas and mining them with due consideration 

for Russian tactical doctrine presented little difficulty to 

an experienced panzer expert. The numerous mine fields 
32 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

were to be laid in depth and width in a checkerboard pattern 

in such a manner that the German armored units could de· 

tour them on the basis of information received. All signs 

designating mine fields were removed prior to the enemy 

attack. No mines were laid in front of the German main 

line of resistance because the enemy could have r emoved 

them and used them for his own purposes before the start 

of the attack. The main battle position was mined in 

depth up to fifteen miles to the rear. Prior to the major 

offensive in the area east of Lvov during the summer of 

1944, the sector where the main attack thrust was ex· 

pected was mined with 160,000 antipersonnel and 200,000 

antitank mines within the zone defense. This was the first 

time that the Germans applied zone defense tactics of the 

type described in this study. 

The most forward divisional antitank guns had to take up 

positions approximately one mile behind the main line of 

resistance. The bulk of the artillery and numerous medium 

antitank and antiaircraft guns were to form centers of gravity behind the forward guns up to twelve miles in depth. In 

addition, all roads suitable for sudden armored thrusts 

in depth were blocked by tank obstacles, captured immobile nntitank guns, and antiaircraft guns emplaced at 

all important points up to a depth of twenty-five miles, In case of critical developments numerous self-propelled 

antitank g uns were to rei nforce the defense. To camoufl age these guns, tank ditches had to be dug and approach 

roads built in suitable terrain. 

The army reserves had to be sufficiently strong to support 

the front and stop the enemy in case he suddenly shifted 

his main effort and turned his tanks to an adjacent sector 

which had not been prepared according to zone def ense 

principles. For instance, during the battle near Lvov the 

nrmy commander held in reserve five strong panzer divisions which he had withdrawn from sectors that were not 

in immediate danger. Two of them were to support the 

front in the center of gravity and the three strongest 

were to be instantly committed to stop any armored thrust 

elsewhere in case the enemy shifted his point of main effort. The two divisions assigned to the center of gravity 

were expected to be able to lend them assistance in due 

course. The reserves formed mobile battle groups and 

equipped them with many antitank and assault guns in 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DUR ING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 33 

order to enable them to give immediate support to front~ 

line sectors threatened by sudden disintegration. In most 

cases these battle groups consisted of reconnaissance or 

motorcycle battalions reinforced by antitank and assault 

gun battalions which were held in instant readiness and 

formed advance detachments of their respective divisions. 

The task of indoctrinating the unit commanders in all the 

essential jwne defense measures was far from easy. After de~ 

tailed briefings. map exercises. and tactical walks. they not only 

grasped the idea but became thoroughly convinced of the ex~ 

pediency and feasibility of the plan and lent their enthusiastic 

support to its execution. Discussions and training exercises con~ 

tinued down the line to the smallest units. 

The next step was to put these measures to their practical 

test and examine them in the light of experience. Starting with 

individual arms, these tests were later extended to larger units. 

Finally, zone defense tactics were adopted and enforced by entire divisions and corps. The tremendous effort entailed in 

these preparations was to pay high dividends. 

The fencer derives an advantage from cutting into his opponent's sequence when the latter intends to stri ke because the 

attacker usually exposes himself on that occasion. This intercepting blow was also included in the zone defense tactics. 

Since the enemy moved his forces close to his most advanced 

positions and massed them there bafore jumping off to attack, 

he exposed himself to concentrated surprise fire from all artil~ 

lery pieces and rocket launchers. Two basic loads of every type 

of ammunition had been set. aside for just that purpose. 

The most difficult and critical problem was to determine the 

correct time for withdrawing to the battle position. If too late 

a moment was chosen, the safety measures against the annihila~ 

tion of the com hat forces by an enemy barrage would have remained ineffective. The front-line units and intermediate commands alone were unable to gather sufficient positive clues regard~ 

ing the hostile intentions to enable the higher echelons to draw 

the correct conclusions as to when the enemy attack would begin. 

This can be easily understood since their observation of enemy 

activities was restricted to the most advanced areas of the front. 

But well-organized combat intelligence and constant air observation, co-ordinated by the army commander in person, gathered 

so much information on enemy preparations and covered his 

rear areas so completely that the H Hour for the attack could 

be determined with a high degree of accuracy. The most re~ 

liable information was secured by rad io interception. As much 
34 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

as 70 percent of all reliable information was obtained from this 

source. 

The improvised defense system was first appJied in the summer of 1944 in the battle of Lvov and for the second time in 

January 1945 during the second battle for East Prussia. In 

both instances the Russians attacked at precisely the point and 

in exactly the manner expected by the army commander who devised this zone defense system. H Hour for the enemy attack 

in East Prussia was determined to the exact day and hour. In 

the battle near Lvov. however, the enemy started his offensive 

two days later than expected. Interrogation of prisoners confirmed that the attack was postponed by two days at the last 

moment. As a result the evasive maneuver had to be repeated 

on three successive nights. On the first day the Russians either 

did not notice the withdrawal because German rear guards left 

in the forward positions simulated the weak routine harassing 

fire or they lacked time to react to this sudden change. On the 

second day they attacked several evacuated positions with combat teams up to regimental strength and pushed back the rear 

guards. 

Even this turn of events was foreseen in the original plan. 

Strong counterthrusts supported by massed artillery fire from the 

regular firing positions sealed off the enemy penetrations and 

at dusk the former main line of resistance was once again occupied by the infantry. As expected, the enemy resumed his 

attacks during the night to find out whether the Germans would 

continue to occupy the positions. When these night attacks had 

been repelled everywhere and the Russians had convinced themselves that the positions were held by their full complements, 

the fighting broke off and the front calmed down. After midnight the positions were evacuated for the third time and, when 

the enemy fire concentration was unleashed at dawn, it hit empty 

positions. The units that had moved into the battle position 

suffered hardly any losses and, supported by assault guns and 

one battalion of Royal Tiger tanks, they were able to drive back 

nearly all Russian forces which had advanced beyond the empty 

positions. The artillery preserved its entire fire power because 

the shelling and air bombardment hit the empty battery positions 

which assumed the role of dummies. Not a single gun, not a 

single command post was hit. The telephone communications 

from army down to regiment suffered no disruption. But the 

former positions that had been evacuated were in poor shape. 

The towns were badly damaged by air attacks, and the debris of 

bombed buildings blocked the main roads in several villages. 

Nevertheless. the traffic continued to move along the previously 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 3S 

designated alternate routes and was stopped only intermittently 

whenever the enemy air force scored direct hits on convoys. 

The reserves were left untouched by the air attacks directed 

against them since they had moved to locations that were unknown 

to the enemy. The advancing Russian infantry was hit by the 

defensive fire of an artillery and rocket launcher brigade which 

was fully intact and well supplied with ammunition. When the 

enemy infantry attempted to disperse and take cover it walked 

straight into the mine fields which had been laid behind the 

German main line of resistance. This took the momentum out 

of the attack and prevented the Russian infantry from concentrating its effort in one direction. The advance slowed 

down and became hesitant. Practically all territorial gains had 

to be abandoned by the Russians whcn the German troops that 

had evaded the destructive effect of the initial barrage started 

to counterattack later during the day. The distress signals sent 

out by the Russian infantry brought their armor to the scene. 

Like a cataract released by the sudden opening of a dam, the 

massed armor poured across tht Seret River into the historic 

hattie ground of Yaroslavichi where exactly thirty years before, 

during the summer of 1914, Austro-Hungarian and Russian 

cavalry divisions had clashed head on in the last major cavalry 

charge in history. 

History repeated itself. Once again the Russians had numerical superiority and once again the battle ended in a draw. In 

1914 the defender achieved this result by the use of new machine 

gun and artillery tactics whereas in 1944 he introduced zone defense tactics to overcome his inferiority. On the very first day 

of the armored attack, the enemy lost eighty-five tanks in the 

mine fields. The number of tanks lost increased rapidly when 

the armored thrust came within reach of the antitank guns 

and was brought to a halt. The losses assumed truly disastrous 

proportions when the German panzer divisions proceeded to 

counterattack. 

In 1914 as in 1944 the battles for Lvov were not decided by the 

cavalry charge or the armored thrust near Yaroslavichi but by a 

major Russian break-through north of Lvov in the adjacent army 

sector to which the enemy shifted his main effort. Unfortunately 

for the Germans in 1944,. the SS panzer corps with the three 

strongest panzer divisions had previously been transferred to the 

Western Front because the Allies had meanwhile landed in 

France. For this reason sufficient forces were no longer available to stop the Russian armored drive in the new area of penetration. 
36 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

V. Improvised Fortresses 

By 1944, aite," the Germans had suffered a succession of defeats, Hitler frequently tried to reverse the tide by the arbitrary 

designation of fortresses. In the face of an imminent enemy attack, many towns suddenly became improvised fortresses and 

had to suffer encirclement and siege as if they were well-equipped 

strongholds that had been systematically constructed and provisioned over a number of years. A commander was appointed 

for each fortress, given absolute powers, and put under a special 

oath. He thereby received authority of life and death over all 

persons within his . jurisdiction and could employ them as he 

saw fit, even though most of them were merely passing through 

his territory. These men and their equipment were frequently 

the only resources at the disposal of the commander who actually 

was forced to pick them off the streets. 

Thus, the city of Kolberg was declared a fortress early in 

March 1945 when the battle for Pomerania was in full swing. 

The small city was overcrowded with wounded, the railroad 

station filled with hospital trains. Columns of refugee carts 

blocked the roads and enemy tanks were only twenty~five miles 

off. Precisely at that moment the newly appointed fortress commander who was entirely unfamiliar with the situation was 

flown in by plane. He was not acquainted with the duties of a 

fortress commander and had to be briefed in detail. The fortress was absolutely defenseless. Hitler's attention was called 

to this fact, but he nevertheless decided that Kolberg must be 

held as a fortress under all circumstances. In his reply Hitler 

stated that the Spandau depot would receive instructions to im~ 

mediately dispatch twelve new antitank guns to Kolberg by rail. 

This was at a time when the single-track railroad line to Kolberg 

was completely blocked and enemy tanks were expected to appear 

in the immediate vicinity of the city within a few hours. Obviously, the antitank guns never arrived. The commander was 

forced to pick his defense force and weapons from the streets. 

Indiscriminately everybody and everything moving through the 

city was stopped, whether they were Luftwaffe, naval personnel, 

damaged tanks, antiaircraft, antitank, or artillery guns, and integrated into the fortress defenses. 

It was difficult to imagine why Hitler decided that this former 

small coastal fort should be defended, unless for historical reasons. In modern times, however, t he events that occurred in 

Napoleon's day could not possibly be repeated. However, the 

enemy seemed to be impressed by the glorious past of the city 

because his approach was slow and hesitant. The first Russian 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 37 

attack was delayed for two days, but the defensive tactics employed by the Germans soon revealed their weakness and after 

only a few days the enemy captured the city. Most of the entirely improvised garrison was rescued by the Navy. 

The location of some of the fortresses was so unfavorable that 

their defense seemed hopeless from the outset. Despite all 

remonstrances, even these places had to be held at all cost. For 

instance, Brody, a small town in eastern Galicia completely surrounded by woods, was located in a valley without observation 

facilities. Dominated by a nearby plateau in enemy hands, the 

town was under complete enemy observation and at the mercy of 

his artillery. At one point the woods even reached up to the edge 

of the town. Because of the lack of space, there was not even a 

suitable area for the artillery emplacements in case of a siege. 

In order to avoid an imminent disaster, the army commander 

circumvented Hitler's orders and adopted tactics that prevented a 

siege of the town. 

The situation at Ternopol was similar; there the garrison held 

out hravely for one month only to succumb for lack of rations 

and ammunition after an attempt to break the siege had bogged 

down in the mud. 

By the end of January 1945 one of the German panzer armies 

had three of its hest divisions in Fortress Koenigsberg, two in 

Fortress Memel, and only tlie two weakest at its disposal for 

operations in the field. At this decisive time an entire army 

group with the hest available troops was hemmed in in Kurland and eliminated from participation in the defense of the 

German homeland hecausc it had strict orders to hold out in 

place. 

These tactics were championed by Hitler in person and enforced with all the authoritative powers at his disposal. In 

the end they ohstructed all operational freedom and devoured the 

very substance of the German Army until ther e was no army 

left. 

But the picture was entirely different whenever the encircled 

forces broke out and remained intact. In February 1943 

Kharkov was surrounded by enemy armies and ordered to hold 

out in a hopeless situation. In his last telephone message the 

corps commandcr called attention to the seriousness of the situation and stated emphatically that the only choice was between losing the city alone or losing the city with all the troops in 

it. The reply was that "Kharkov must be held to the last man." 

On the following morning a second order came through by 

teletype stating that "Kharkov must be held to the last man but 

the defenders must not allow themselves to be encircled." On 
38 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

the strength of this ambiguous order, the second part of which 

precluded the first, the encircled corps took immediate steps for 

a breakout to the rear without the knowledge or approval of 

army. After two days of hard fighting, which ended with the 

loss of several hundred motor vehicles, this corps rejoined the 

German lines. The decision proved to be correct for, together 

with some divisions detrained in the Poltava area under its protection, the corps was able to launch a counterattack only one 

month later, recapture Kharkov and Belgorod. and reach the 

upper Donets. 

This example demonstrates very convincingly that it is not 

of decisive importance to hold a town at all cost but rather to 

have some forces available for further operations. 

VI. Defensive Im provisations in East Prussia 

As the danger of an invasion of eastern Germany loomed 

toward the end of 1944, tens of thousands of civilians were 

mobilized to construct a number of continuous defense lines in 

East Prussia. Everywhere people could be seen digging trenches 

and defense positions. Altogether twelve main defense lines and 

switch positions were constructed, many of which were well 

equipped. Perhaps their most outstanding feature was the con· 

struction of improvised machine gun emplacements which were 

very practical and consisted of two large concrete pipes. One 

pipe stood upright in the ground and served as the gun emplace· 

ment proper whereas the horizontal pipe was connected to the 

base of the upright one and employed as a personnel shelter. 

This improvisation offered shelter against tanks, could be con· 

structed in a minimum of time, was easy to transport, and 

highly effective. 

In addition to these defensive positions a continuous antitank 

ditch was constructed which cut across all roads. Temporary 

bridges, ready for immediate demolition in case of emergency, 

spanned the ditch where it cut through the roads. Some 18,000 

laborers were diverted to the construction of this antitank ditch 

alone, although they were badly needed to build fortified defensive zones. In order that such zones could be prepared at 

least in the most essential areas, every man belonging to rep 

serve, service, supply, or headquarters units was assigned his 

daily quota of obligatory digging that was measured in cubic 

feet. If necessary the work had to be done at night. To get 

these positions ready for immediate winter occupancy, the rear 

echelon units as well as Volkssturm battalions moved into the 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DUR ING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 39 

positions to make the quarters livable. Slit trenches were dug 

along the roads and antitank and machine gun nests were prepared at all important points. Perimeter defenses were established around every village and hamlet. 

The over-all effect of these numerous, fully integrated defense 

installations was to transform the most vulnerable northeastern 

part of Germany into one great fortress area. Although some 

of the defensive positions never played any part in the subsequent fighting, others proved very useful during the battle 

for East Prussia. If they failed to change the fate of that 

doomed province, it was due to the entirely insufficient number 

of troops and to the inadequacy of the weapons which could be 

mustered for its defense. 
40 

Chapter 3 

Troop Movements 

GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

I. Furlough and Troop Trains under Partisan Attacks 

Precautionary measures for the protection of railroads had 

to be stepped up because of increasing partisan activities in 

the East. Furlough and troop trains moving over railroad lines 

which crossed partisan-infested forests were organized as combat units. When a man was sent on furlough he had to carry 

his rifle until he reached a designated station. He left it there 

and picked it up on his return trip_ The transport commander 

was simultaneously combat commander, the ranking man in 

every car was car commander. Demolition of tracks combined 

with raids from the forests which came close to the lines on 

both sides were to be expected at all times, particularly at night. 

In case of a surprise attack or upon a specific alarm signal, 

the occupants of all cars were instructed to jump oft'-evennumbered cars to the left, odd-numbered to the right-and to 

repel the attack. A few assault detachments and a small reserve 

remained at the disposal of the transport commander in case 

of a special emergency. 

An interesting incident occurred in November 1942 when 6th 

Panzer Division was moved to the area south of Stalingrad 

after its rehabilitation in Brittany. The division was loaded 

on seventy-eight trains of approximately fifty cars each. Each 

train was organized for combat in accordance with the abovementioned procedure. Numerous raids and surprise attacks 

occurred during the trip through the marshy forests. Only 

a few trains got through the Pripyat region without incident. 

Most of the attacks were directed agai nst the trains hauling 

tanks and artillery, and fierce fighting broke out in each instance. 

One artillery battalion commander and several men were killed 

and a number of officers and men wounded. The trains were 

greatly delayed and many of them had to be rerouted. During the ten-day trip they were mixed up and arrived at their 

destination in improper order and long overdue. A special 

problem was created by the fact that the trains loaded with 

artillery and tanks arrived last because twenty such trains were 

attacked by partisans, some of them repeatedly. This materiel 

was urgently needed because, from the time when the first train 

unloaded at Kotelnikovo, the division was under enemy artillery 

{ire and the railroad station was attacked by dismounted cavalry. 

To secure and enlarge the detraining area required additional 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 41 

fighting. The division had. to detrain where the enemy was 

assembling his forces because there was no continuous German 

front in this area after the encirclement of Stalingrad. It 

was due only to enemy hesitation that the units, which had 

just been unloaded and lacked heavy weapons support, did not 

get into serious trouble. The enemy started his attack on 

the assembly area of the completely isolated division immediately 

after the arrival of the trains carrying the German tanks. On 

5 December 1942 an entire Russian cavalry corps with sixtyfour t anks drove into the flank of the assembly area south of 

the Aksay River and achieved a penetration. But during the 

night the German tanks were unloaded close to the enemy. Some 

of them were detrained outside of the railroad station and prepared for the counterthrust. On 6 December the bulk of the 

division with 160 tanks attacked the enemy's flank near Pokhlebin, 

cut off his retreat, and pushed him against the steep banks of 

the unfordable Aksay. The Russians suffe red a crushing defeat from which only small remnants of t he corps and six tanks 

were able to escape. 

II. The Commitment of Furlough Battalions 

A few weeks later when the Russians broke through along 

the Don, the Germans attempted to establish a new front along 

the Donets River. The situation was serious. The forces available were weak because several armies put in the fi eld by 

Germany's allies had suddenly collapsed. Every German unit, 

every German soldier was urgently needed to strengthen the 

front. 

Upon returning from furlough members of units enclosed in 

the Stalingrad pocket were stopped at Kamen!-lk Shakh tinski on 

the Donets, assembled, organized into a battalion, and immediately 

committed along the Donets east of the city. A young first 

lieutenant was appointed battalion commander and noncommissioned officers commanded the companies. The men came from 

various units and arms. They did not know their leaders who 

in tu rn did not know their men. Equipped with rifles and 

only a few machine guns, they were to defend a six-mile sector 

a long the river. 

The Russians soon spotted this weak sector and, covered by 

tanks and artillery, crossed the Donets with greatly superior 

forces and attacked the battalion. They broke through the 

thinly manned front at various points and advanced swiftly 

toward the south. The infantry division to which the battalion 

was attached was involved in heavy defensive battles and could 

not provide any help. But mobile reserves of the 6th Panzer 
42 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Division which held the sector adjacent to the east moved up 

quickly and attacked the enemy from the rear. Within a few 

hours the hostile force was destroyed and its remnants captured 

or shattered. After a few more hours the furlough battalion 

which had suffered heavy casualties was reassembled. It was 

immediately disbanded and the men were assigned to their basic 

arms within the panzer division, where their capHcities could 

again be fully utilized. Every individual member of the furlough 

battalion was a battle~tested front-line soldier. But hastily 

assembled in an improvised unit, without the essential heavy 

weapons, these men could not be utilized in accordance with 

their abilities. The battalion was doomed in this unequal battle. 

The formation of furlough battalions was an unavoidable 

expedient in critical situations, but it real1y meant the improper 

expenditure of good combat soldiers. Fo_r this reason furlough 

battalions had to be dissolved as quickly as possible and the 

men returned to their original units. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 43 

Chapter 4 

Combat Arms 

I. Infantry 

In pursuit, German and enemy forces alike found it expedient 

to mount on tanks. This improvisation proved effective on innumerable occasions when a defeated enemy was to be pursued. 

For instance, when 6th Panzer Division spearheaded the drive 

of Army Group North during the first days of July 1941, it 

broke through the pillbox-studded Stalin Line after two days 

of fighting. (Map 1) The enemy offered renewed resistance 

farther to the northeast hut after a few hours the Russians were 

dislodged from the fortified frontier zone and dispersed into the 

surrounding forests. In order to take possession of three major 

bridges before their destruction, it was necessary to prevent the 

enemy from gaining another foothold. Spearhead panzer units, 

composed of some fifty tanks with infantry mounted, pursued the 

retreating Russians relentlessly, occupied the bridges, andmeeting with Httle resistance-reached the day's objective, the 

city of Ostrov, within three hours. 

Another good example was the battle of annihilation fought 

southeast of Plavskoye in the Army Group Center scetor. It 

started in the middle of November 1941 when an enemy cavalry 

division attacked the exposed flank of the army group. Assault 

guns were to disperse the enemy fonnations and infantry was 

to annihilate his forces completely. In order to move the infantry 

straight into the depth of the battlefield together with the assault guns, volunteers from infantry units mounted the assault 

guns and, hanging on like grapes on a vine, rode into the enemy 

Jines with all guns ablaze. The enemy cavalry division was 

obliterated. 

In both instances the enemy was totally vanquished and shattered. The completeness of the success of this improvisation 

can be traced to the panic spread in the enemy ranks by the 

German tanks. But whenever the enemy was firmly entrenched 

in front or on the flanks, this venture turned out to be dangerous 

and costly. During the later years of the war this improvisation 

was generally discontinued because of heavy casualties caused 

by antitank weapons and air attacks. Moreover, it was superseded by the introduction of armored personnel carriers. 

The Russians also used this expedient repeatedly and found it 

a fast means of transportation. But whenever they encountered 

German resistance they always suffered heavy casualties from 
44 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

machine gun fire. For that reason they discontinued this practice when they came close to the German lines. 

II. Artillery 

In position warfare daily fire direction exercises carried out 

by the artillery and infantry howitzers assumed great significance. 

During these exercises all wire and radio communications were 

prohibited for extended periods. As substitutes field expedients 

had to be used to maintain communications between observation 

posts and gun positions. Some of the media employed were 

signals transmitted by discs, inscriptions on blackboards fead 

with the help of field glasses, mounted messengers, runners, and 

relayed messages. Much time was devoted to training in Morse 

code transmission by signal lamps. 

Since the German infantry units were usually understrength 

the Russians were often able to infiltrate through their defense 

lines. The artillery positions therefore had to be fortified and 

constructed as strong points in the depth of the defensive zone. 

The artillerymen had to be given advanced infantry training 

and were issued extra machine guns and hand grenades whenever possible. The gun crews had to be ready to make counterthrusts which were specified in the combat orders of each 

battery. 

Such a system of strong points proved effcctive during the 

summer of 1943 when the Germans were engaged in heavy defensive battles west of Kharkov. The artillery troops intercepted an enemy force which had infiltrated through sunflower 

fields. For a while the situation looked very critical but the 

artillerymen. fighting a delaying action, gained sufficient time 

for the launching of a counterattack which led to the annihilation of the enemy forces. 

Some German commands on the Russian front issued orders 

prohibiting their artillery from firing on enemy command posts. 

The enemy was to feel secure and was to establish a network 

of communication lines and observation posts based on his command posts and was not to suffer any interference during that 

time. But the destruction of uncovered command posts was 

to be prepared in such a manner that it could be carried out 

instantaneously in accordance with the demands of the tactical 

situation. The sudden elimination of enemy command installations never failed to produce a favorable effect on offensive 

or defensive operations. 

Flat trajectory fire from howitzers proved very effective in 

clearing tree tops in forest fighting. In one instance, during 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 45 

operations near Leningrad in the autumn of 1942, marshy terrain 

prevented the howitzers from going into position to deliver flat 

trajectory fire and to assist in the penetration of a large 

wooded area. The following t actics were therefore employed 

to cross the wooded region: All artillery pieces, heavy infantry 

howitzers, antiaircraft g uns, and ground support planes were 

temporarily subordinated to the artillery commander so that 

he could exercise centralized fire direction. Heavy rolling barrages systematically raked the woods and cleared lanes in one 

sector after another. For this purpose the wooded zone was 

divided into !GOO-foot squares which, in turn, were subdivided 

into 400-foot squares. Artillery, infantry, and Luftwaffe units 

marked identical squares on their maps. According to the attack 

pJan one square after another was raked by heavy concentrations either from front to rear or from rear to front or alternately, but always in conformity with the requests of the assault troops. Smoke shells were interspersed to obstruct the 

enemy's vision and prevent him from conducting a systematic 

defense of the forest. The forward assault units were withdrawn a few hundred yards shortly before Ii Hour to enable 

the artillery to soften up the enemy positions without endangering the infantry. The delay caused by this withdrawal was 

made up by the immediate launching of the attack as soon as 

the fire lifted. During the course of the assault the advancing 

infantry closely followed each shift of fire, moving into each 

square as soon as it had been cleared, and proceeded to mop it up. 

The detection of German artillery positions by enemy observation was sometimes made more difficult by camouflaging the 

firing report with the help of an improvised device that simulated 

detonations. At the beginning of the war most observation 

battalions were equipped with such simulating devices, but later 

on only few of them were available and those few were inadequate 

for actual deception because of the great variety of guns used 

in counterbattery fire and for infantry support. Actual deception of the enemy artillery observation could only be achieved 

if the deceptive firing report sounded ]ike the detonation of a 

real gun both to the enemy ear and to his sound-ranging equipment. A close similarity between the actual and the deceptive 

report was achieved with the assistance of engineer specialist':! 

who built a makeshift detonation device which was thoroughly 

tested behind the front. The amount. of explosives used in this 

device was regulated in accordance with data provided by the 

sound-ranging check points. These experiments were continued 

until the instruments finally showed that the detonations could 

have originated from 150-mm. field howitzers or 210-mm 
46 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

howitzers. Furthermore it was established that the most effective deception could be achieved by placing the rletonation 

device approximately one mile to the front of the battery which 

was to be protected but never on its sides or to its rear. 

The results of these experiments were confirmed in 1942, 

when it was necessary to deceive the enemy about the positions 

and strength of the German artillery in the Volkhov sector of 

Army Group North. There the 818th Artillery Regiment was 

faced by numerically superior Russian artillery in extremely 

narrow positions hemmed in by woods, marshes. and impassable 

terrain. Deception was essential in order to protect the positions 

from counterbattery fire and air attacks and to divert the enemy 

fire by misdirecting it into unoccupied territory. For some time 

the impact areas of the enemy fire in the immediate vicinity of 

the detonation devices gave the impression that the improvisation had served its purpose and that the enemy had been deceived, at least for a while. Yet, some caution against overestimating the effect on an alert and well-trained enemy may 

well be indicated. Although the accuracy of his observation 

can often be frustrated by distorting the sound patterns at 

his control points, the continuous deception of the enemy requires the introduction of a few additional improvisations which 

might present inconveniences to the artillery units applying 

them. These are: 

a. Several men would have to be permanently assigned to 

servicing the detonation device and maintaining telephone 

communications with the gun emplacements. In co-ordinating the simulated detonations to the actual gun reports 

it is necessary to pay careful attention to the velocity-ofsound factor. 

b. The dummy positions must have the outward appearance 

of fully occupied firing positions. This can be achieved 

by burning wood fires that leave traces of smoke in the 

air and show up on air reconnaissance photos. 

c. It will be helpful if the camouflage materials are frequently 

renewed, particularly in the event that tree trunks are 

supposed to represent guns. 

In the field of sound deception, which assumed particular importance when a weak force faced a considerably stronger enemy, 

several other expedients proved quite effective: 

u. Co-ordinating the fire of several batteries or battalions by 

issuing simultaneous fire commands over the wire or radio 

fire direction system in order to prevent the enemy from 

identifying individual emplacements. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 47 

b. Moving individual guns out of the firing positions and in~ 

eluding these roving guns in the fire~command system. 

c. Combining a medium battery with a light howitzer battery 

for simultaneous firing, particularly during the registration 

fire by sound and flash methods which provided the data 

for firing for effect, since these preliminaries always took 

time and were easily observed by the enemy. 

Critical ammunition shortages forced the artillery to fire 

almost exclusively on observed point targets. In view of the 

circumstances this produced better results than firing on area 

targets with insufficient ammunition. Harassing fire by sudden 

concentrations was also excluded. Instead, slow fire by single 

pieces from many batteries had to be carried out simultaneously 

according to a precise firing plan. The advantage of this method 

was that it could be continued all through the night and that 

enemy communications to the front could thus be seriously hamp~ 

ered and more effectively disrupted than by intermittent con· 

centrations. This expedient was successfully applied at Sevasto· 

pol in 1942. According to intercepted radio messages all Russian 

supply movements had come to a standstill during the nights 

preceding the German assault. 

In many instances the Germans were painfully short of artillery 

for area targets while the Russians always had plenty of multi. 

barreled rocket launchers and long·range heavy mortars. These 

were the most suitable weapons to cover an area with surprise 

fire and to protect flanks. 

During position warfare the Germans made up for this de· 

ficiency by flexible artillery tactics which included many im· 

provisations. They fired mass concentrations on single point 

targets when all batteries within range would fire one round. 

If, for instance, eighty batteries were within range of a target, 

it would be hit by eighty rounds on one single command. As 

a result, the individual batteries achieved a maximum concen· 

tration on a given area with a minimum expenditure of am· 

munition. The effect was excellent and this procedure had the 

additional advantage of frustrating all enemy attempts to detect 

the location of individual batteries by sound range. 

Whenever there was a shortage of antitank guns and when· 

ever defensive sectors were overextended, field howitzers and 

antiaircraft guns were used as antitank weapons by the Ger. 

mans. They were emplaced in rear area strong points and 

were given the mission of stopping at point.blank range all 

enemy tanke and assault forces which might hreak through. 

The field howitzer batteries frequently consisted of only three 
48 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

guns which, however, proved fully sufficient for routine missions 

particularly when ammunition was in good supply. A Russian 

cavalry division which had broken through in the 97th Light 

Infantry Division sector in the winter of 1941 was routed by 

field-howitzer fire from all directions. 

On 26 July 1941 another German infantry division committed 

its entire artillery regiment for antitank defense against an 

enemy corps north of Lvov. After the Russians lost a large 

number of tanks they were no longer in a position to continue 

the attack. In later years armored break-through attempts 

repeatedly failed due to the improvised antitank defense system 

of the artillery. The standing op_crating procedure for light 

artillery batteries prescribed that only three guns were assigned 

to purely artillery missions whereas the fourth was to be employed as antitank weapon. 

Although the inaccuracy resulting from wide dispersion made 

rocket launchers generally unsuitable as antitank weapons, 

they occasionally proved effective in massed fire. Thus, during 

the fighting around Minsk in July 1941, an armored thrust 

launched by the Russians from the woods south of the city 

was stopped with the assistance of two rocket launcher batteries. 

In massed fire they scored some di rect hits on tanks and succeeded 

in shooting the turret off one tank. 

Massed fire by several rocket launcher battalions against an 

enemy armored attack echeloned in depth had a particularly 

strong impact on enemy morale. During the fighting near 

Voronezh in mid-July 1942 an armored thrust, launched by 

the Russians from cover of nearby forests, ground to a halt 

in the face of rocket-launcher fire. Several, tanks attempting 

to mfiltrate through gullies were stopped by the fire of some 

300-mm. mobile launchers. Particularly in this case the psychological effect was greater than the material damage. The tanks 

stopped and the crews dismounted and ran away. The other 

tanks which formed the main spearhead turned back in the 

face of 320-mm. incendiary rockets. Actually, rocket launchers 

were not intended for fire on point targets or the destruction 

of tanks. 

III. Combat Engineers as Infantry 

When critical situations developed in wide sectors the Germans 

were often forced to employ combat engineer units as infantry. 

But this expedient backfired because many essential and almost 

irreplaceable engineer specialists were lost in combat. This 

wasteful dissipation of valuable personnel had to be repeated over 

ana over again despite the fact that the responsible commanders 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 49 

were fully aware of its disadvantages. Necessity knows no 

Jaws; in critical situations every available man had to be committed at the front. The employment of combat engineers as 

infantry was very tempting because they were trained for 

combat and also because they were exceptionally good floldiers. 

Many commanders were prompted to commit them as infantry 

when the situation did not fully justify the change. This was all 

the more regrettable since it was none other than the infantry 

which had to pay for the improper utilization of the engineers. 

In extreme emergencies it was of course necessary to use 

engineer units as infantry. On many occasions the courage 

and staunchness of the engineers saved the day. For example, 

when the enemy broke through southwest of Rzhev in 1942, 

a corps engineer regiment, all engineer units of one division, 

and even all the construction engineer companies and some of the 

road-building battalions from the vicinity were committed to 

stop the Russian thrust into the rear of Ninth Army. The 

engineers halted the enemy advance and allowed the tactical 

command sufficient time for countermeasures which eliminated 

the danger. (Map 1) 

PART THREE 

IMPROVISATIONS IN THE FIELD OF 

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION 

The German supply and transportation system in Russia was 

greatly dependent on improvisations because of the peculiarities 

of terrain and climate. From the outset of the campaign, supply 

columns were improvised with motor vehicles of every type 

which had been requisitioned from private owners. They did 

not f ully replace standard military columns since some of the 

vehicles were in poor condition and therefore of Httlc service. 

In addition, the problem of replacing spare parts for so many 

different types of trucks caused incessant difficulties. Yet, most 

of these vehicles were in service for many years and some of 

them lasted for the duration of the war. 

Chopter 5 

Indispensable Expedients 

I. TnQ Panjc Column 

In Russia. motorized transportation was useless many months 

of the year. During winter and muddy periods the entire supply 

and transportation system would have been completely paralyzed 

if supply columns of Pan,je wagons or Panje sleighs had not 

come to the rescue. These vehicles were in use throughout the 

Russian campaign and were looked upon as vital for the prosecution of the war. 

When the German armored and motorized units swept across 

the dusty plains of Russia during the summer of 1941, nobody 

paid much attention to the insignificant little peasant horses 

of the Russian steppe. The tankers and truck drivers could 

not fail to notice the industrious little animals pulling heavily 

loaded peasant wagons cross-country whenever they were pushed 

off the road by the modern mechanical giants. They were looked 

upon sympathetically, but what was their performance compared to that of the steel colossi and multiton carriers? Any 

comparison obviously was out of the question. Many a man 

dismissed them with a disdainful gesture and the words: "A 

51 
52 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

hundred years behind the times," Even next to the heavy cold· 

blooded draft horses and the tall mounts of the infantry divisions 

their dwarfish cousins seemed slightly ridiculous and insignificant. 

A few months later the Panje horse was judged quite differently. It came into sudden demand during the muddy sealOon 

when no motor vehicle could operate and any number of coldblooded horses could not move the heavy guns and ammunitiol1. 

How were the advance elements to be supplied when they were 

stranded without provisions? By Panie columns. Who brought 

the urgently needed ammunition to the front when the organic 

divisional supply columns were stuck in the mud as far as fifty 

miles to the rear of the advance elements? Again the Panje 

column. Who was capaole of moving gasoline from the railheads 

to the mechanical colossi even through the deepest mud? The 

Panje horse. By what means of transportation were the badly 

wounded to be transported when the most modern ambulanl!es 

could no longer advance in the mud? The answer was always the 

Panje horse and wagon. From then on they became faithful, 

indispensable companions of the field forces. In winter the 

Panje horse proved even more essential. The Panje sleigh became 

the universal means of transportation when motor vehicles were 

incapacitated and roads were snowbound or nonexistent. During the first months of 1942 some panzer divisions had as many 

as 2,000 Panje horses but hardly a single serviceable motor vehicle. For that reason they received the nickname "Panje divisions." This unexpected turn of events made the veterinarian 

the busiest man in any panzer division. 

A good idea of the role played by the Panje horse may be 

gathered from an incident which occurred to the 51st Rocket 

Launcher Regiment when it was moved into the Vitebsk area in 

January 1942. After having lost most of its vehicles during the 

battles for Moscow, the regiment was in the midst of reorganization when it was suddenly called upon to participate in the de_ 

fense against a major enemy break-through at Toropetl'l. The 

organic prime movers were either unserviceable or had been 

lost in previous battles. Only a few trucks in poor condition were 

available. Snowstorms and high snowdrifts at a temperature of 

_ 220 F. impeded all motor traffic on the roods. Enemy spearheads were approaching the vicinity of Vitebik, Vellzh, and 

Velikiye Luki. 

In this emergency two rocket launcher batteries were hurriedly 

mounted on sleighs. Each battery of six 150-mm. launchers was 

assigned seventy-five Panje horses and three ammunition sleighs 

for each launcher. Mter they had crossed the frozen Dvina 

River the two batteries were commItted for the relief of Velizh 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 53 

as part of a reinforced corps. Because of the heavy weight of 

the ammunition - each projectile weighed approximately 110 

pounds-the few remaining trucks had to use the Vitebsk-Velizh 

highway after it had been cleared of snow and mines. During 

this emergency march the local model of low, small sleighs usually drawn by one or two Panje horses proved to be the only effective means of transportation. The large sleighs supplied by the 

German Army were too heavy and far too wide for the narrow 

tracks made by native sleighs. Moreover the harness of the 

Panje horses which had to be used in this emergency was suitable 

for only limited loads. Despite very difficult terrain conditions 

the rocket launcher batteries reached the city in time to relieve 

it. On the other hand, four medium howitzers drawn by heavy 

German horses never reached their destination. 

There was not a single German military agency in Russia 

which was not forced to employ Panje vehicles or columns during 

winter, not even excepting the Luftwaffe. German mechanization 

had not made sufficient progress to cope with the Russian mud 

or terrain conditions in winter. As a result German motor vehicles were incapable of replacing native means of transportation despite the fact that the latter were "a century behind the 

times." 

II. The Corduroy Rood 

War could never have been waged in the vast swamp regions 

of Russia had they not been made accessible by improvised corduroy roads. These were the most important static improvisation 

of the entire Russian campaign and many operations in swampy 

forests and in the mud of northern and central Russia were 

feasible only because of the construction of such roads. The 

first corduroy road was built soon after the Germans crossed into 

European Russia; the last one during the westward retreat across 

the German border. In the intervening period hundreds of miles 

of corduroy road had to be built or repaired during the muddy 

seasons in order to move up supplies and heavy equipment. At 

the beginning of the war it was often sufficient to construct a 

cordurory road 25 to 100 yards long to get hundreds of boggeddown vebic.l@s back on the move. 

During the thrust on Leningrad in mid-July 1941 an entire 

panzer corps bogged down in the swampy forests, separating the 

corps from the Luga River. For several days the corps was unable to assist its hardpressed advanced elements which were 

surrounded in a bridgehead on the other side of the river. Only 

corduroy roads built with considerable effort could restore the 

former mobility of the corps. In another instance, in 1942, 
54 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Eleventh Army had to abandon a planned offensive in the direction of the Neva River because corduroy roads could not be built 

in time. 

The swamps along the Volkhov River were impassable because 

there were no usable roads. The construction of corduroy roads 

was the only means of overcoming such terrain ditnculties. Since 

Russia lacks rock and gravel but has an abundance of timber 

in the central and northern parts, the construction of concrete or 

paved roads was impossible and corduroy roads became the only 

feasible substitute. 

In constructing these roads it was important to select logs 

about ten inches in diameter and place them in several layers. 

As in the superstructure of a bridge, stringers, double layers of 

crossed logs, and siderail lashings had to be used. The guard 

rails had to be wired because nails could not be used. The cross 

logs had to be topped with a layer of sand- not dirt--or, when 

no sand was available, with cinders or rubble. Time and personnel permitting, the top layer of logs was to be levelled off. Only 

such thoroughly constructed corduroy roads could stand the 

strain of constant traffic. 

The crossing of the many small swamps found along almost any 

Russian road caused many special difficulties. It was at these 

points that the supply convoys got stuck when the heavy trucks 

of the motor transportation regiments sank in. As a result, 

serious traffic disruptions lasting many hours and sometimes even 

several days occurred quite frequently. Over and over again 

the convoy commanders made the same mistake of failing to wait 

until the roadbed was repaired by the construction of corduroy 

roads. Instead, they believed that they could force their way 

through. The flat swampy stretches, which could have been repaired within a relatively short time before they were completely torn up, were soon in such a condition that their restoration became extremely difficult. The road had to be closed to all 

traffic since it had become impassable and the swampy stretChes 

obstructed the flow of traffic. Frequently repair work could not 

be undertaken in time because the road construction engineers 

had no motor transportation and therefore arrived too late at 

crucial points. In general, the construction of a corduroy road 

proved sufficient to bridge small swamps. But whenever swamps 

were too deep a regular bridge had to be built across them. 

Corduroy roads had a detrimental effect on the speed of movements since they slowed down tl'afflc. The avel'age march performance of foot troops dropped to two miles an hour whereas 

motor vehicles could cover about five miles an hour. Traveling 

along a corduroy road on foot or by motor was very stl'enous, and 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 55 

equipment. especially sensit.ive instrllrnents. suffered from incessant · concussions. These roads complicated and slowed urgent 

movements of reserves in critical sit.uations. 

In the Leningrad area there was not a single serviceable hardsurface road leading east toward the German front. (Map 5) 

In this sector the local army commander was wholly dependent 

upon two long corduroy roads that covered a total distance of 

eighty miles. Since they were the only arteries for troop movements and supply trame, they were u!>ed by day and night and their 

maintenance therefore presented many problems. 

In the vicinity of Leningrad two types of construction were 

commonly used : the heavy corduroy road built over a foundation 

of five log stringers and the light one which was placed directly 

on the ground. The two layers of cross logs forming the roadway consisted of logs about five inches in diameter that were 

secured on both ends by guard rails which in turn were anchored 

to the ground by drift pins and wire loops. The road was just 

wide enough for one truck because longer logs could not be procured. Turnouts were built at lOOO-yard intervals. Special 

traffic-regulating detachments directed all movements along these 

roads. 
56 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 6 

Other Expedients 

I. Improvisations in the Construction of Bridges 

In European Russia temporary bridges were built almost exclusively of wood because iron and steel were scarce. In general, 

the first construction was a wooden emergency bridge which was 

not secure against the danger of floods. Later on, this bridge 

was usually replaced by a permanent structure above flood level. 

Whenever it was possible, attempts were made to construct doubletrack bridges. GHQ engineers, bridge-construction engineers, or 

ordinary construction battalions were usually employed for the 

building of the first temporary bridges. The bridges above 

flood level were built by bridge-construction battalions and Organization Todt [Ed: paramilitary construction organization of 

the Nazi Party, auxiliary to the WehrmachtJ personnel. The 

local civilian population served as auxiliaries and were paid for 

their services. 

During the spring of 1942 one division was ordered to move 

from Kiev across the Seim River to the east. The floods were 

assumed to have receded by then, but this was not the case and 

no bridges above flood level were available. A low emergency 

bridge had to be quickly constructed. No engineer units were 

within reach because they were all at the front. There was therefore no other choice but to recall one competent officer and some 

technicians from the front and to build a 600-foot bridge and a 

450-yard corduroy approach road with the help of local civilian 

labor. The work was completed within five days with the help 

of 500 women volunteers. These native women were well paid 

and fed; they performed their heavy work in the best of spirits, 

The hauling of the essential lumber and the procurement of 

nails and iron straps always constituted great problems, mainly 

because the engineers were chronically short of organic vehicles. 

Timber-and-nail stringers had to be SUbstituted for the long steel 

I-beams which were not available. 

II. Improvised Road Maintenance 

Army and paramilitary construction units were responsible 

for keeping roads and highways in serviceable condition. This 

meant hard work and required a lot of manpower, particularly 

in spring. Special roads were reserved for armored vehicles and 

maintained with particular care. Along these roads the con-
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 57 

struction units had to build bridges or fords for heavy tanks 

and assault guns since the existing ones usually could not carry 

such heavy loads. These improvised methods of improving the 

road net facilitated quick movements of entire units and reinforcements which were to be transferred from one sector to 

another. They contributed decisively to the success of many defensive and offensive operations. 

III. Deceptive Supply Movements 

Supply vehicles were frequently dispatched along certain routes 

in order to deceive the enemy and make him believe that these 

movements meant the relief or arrival of troop units. Dust raised 

by motor or horse-drawn vehicles behind the front lines also deceived the enemy. The vehicles dragged tree trunks or brushwood 

along the roads in order to raise more dust. 

IV. Invasion Barges os Meons of Transportation 

During the course of preparations for a landing in England 

in the late summer of 1940, the Germans built invasion barges, the 

so-called Siebel ferries, in record time and put them through various tests. These ferries were equipped with four SS-mm. guns and 

an appropriate number of 20-mm. Flak guns which could be fired 

at air, land, or naval targets. Powered by obsolete aircraft engines, these ferries reached a speed of four knots. They were 

actually used for transportation on Lake Ladoga, in the Mediterranean, and in the Straits of Kerch where they performed 

well. 

V. Transportation over Frozen Waterways 

Most rivers in European Russia freeze during winter and the 

ice was frequently used as a roadbed for supply routes. For this 

purpose the roadway was reinforced by blocks of ice and, whenever the ice grew thinner, by rafts. Such improvised supply 

routes across and along rivers could be found in all parts of the 

Russian theater. Leningrad, for instance, was supplied over ice 

roads during many months of the year and, during the later 

stage of the siege, even by a railroad that crossed the deeplyfrozen Lake Ladoga. The Russians also used their most important inland waterway, the Volga, as a main traffic artery for 

motor vehicles and sleighs during the winter months. 

In East Prussia the entire supply of Fourth Army moved over 

ice bridges across the Frisches Half in February 1945. More-
58 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

over, during the winter 1944- 45. elements of Third Army were 

supplied with rations, ammunition, and equipment over an ice 

route across the Kurisches Haff. 

VI. Fuel Conservation Expedients 

Forced to apply strict conservation measures because of the 

gasoline shortage. which gradually increased during the war, 

the Germans introduced wood-gas generators in ever greater 

numbers. At first these were installed on supply trucks used 

in the zone of the interior. Fuel conservation measures had to 

be imposed on combat units soon afterward but the conversion 

to wood-gas generators was impracticable for tactical reasons. 

The railroads had to carryall supply as close as possible to the 

front and were used even for minor local troop movements. In 

the Tilsit area in East Prussia ration and ammunition trains 

moved as close as 500 yards behind the front line. On the lower 

Memel front a narrow-gauge lateral supply railroad was built 

at 500-yard distance from the main ]ine of resistance. 

These measures alone were far from sufficient. The field forces 

therefore introduced expedients on their own initiative. Every 

empty truck had to take a second empty in tow. With the exception of certain staff cars no passenger vehicles were allowed 

to undertake individual trips. Passenger vehicles had to be towed 

by trucks even during troop movements. These and some othe'r 

similar measures subsequently became standing operating procedure and their enforcement was strictly supervised. They did 

not alleviate the over-all gasoline and oil shortage but it was only 

by their enforcement that it was at all possible to maintain the 

most essential motor traffic. 

VII. Railroad Tonk Cars Towed Across the Baltic 

(Map 4) 

Continuous air attacks during 1944-45 drained Germany's fuel 

reserves and reduced her means of transportation. The heavy 

losses of tank cars caused a great shortage of vehicles capable of 

transporting fuel by rail. Seventy tank cars immobilized in 

Memel were therefore urgently needed. But it was no longer 

possible to move them out of Memel because the city was surrounded by Russian forces. Nor were there any suitable vessels 

on hand that could transport tank cars across the sea. Various 

expedients were considered in an effort to find a way out but 

none promised success. Finally an engineer officer calculated that 

empty tank cars could float on the sea if they were sealed airtight. 

On-the-spot experiments immediately confirmed this theory. Local 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 59 

naval units instantly received orders to tow all the tank cars 

from Memel across the Baltic to the nearest port with railroad 

facilities. Despite all doubts expressed by the Navy, the army 

commander insisted on the execution of this order. The first 

vessel with five tank cars in tow arrived in Pillau, west of 

Koenigsberg, in the fall of 1944 after a night journey of 110 

miles across a fairly calm sea. The cars were undamaged upon 

arrival and were put into service without delay. Thereafter 

these phantom voyages continued in the same manner night after 

night with the number of cars in tow varying between eight to 

ten per convoy. Everything went according to plan. Only toward 

the end of these curious railroad-sea convoys was it found that 

several cars had broken loose because of heavy seas and had 

floated away from their towing vessel. They caused considerable 

excitement in coastal shipping when they were first discovered 

and reported as enemy submarines. Naval planes and patrol 

boats immediately put to sea to observe this enemy threat from 

closer range. To everyone's relief the dangerous submarines 

turned out to be the turret-like superstructures of the tank cars 

which had been lost at night and were now rocking on the hi2"h 

seas. The runaways were soon caught and towed into port. 
60 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 7 

Supply by Airlift and Aerial Delivery Containers 

I. The First German Experiments 

For the Germans. dropping supplies by parachute to encirc1ed 

units from battalion to army strength had all the characteristics 

of improvised operations. At the beginning of the first winter 

in Russia, the Army High Command asked the Luftwaffe to give 

immediate assistance to isolated or temporarily encircled units 

by dropping rations, medical supplies, and ammunition in aerial 

delivery containers which were originally designed for the supply 

of parachute units in action. In most cases these missions were 

successfully accomplished in a spirit of unhesitating co-operation 

between the services. 

The need for the first airlift operation arose in 1942, when 

major elements of Eighteenth Army were trapped in the Demyansk pocket and Hitler ordered that they be supplied hy air. 

The First Air Force was given this mission and assigned three 

groups of Junkers transport planes as well as some cargo gliders 

to carry it out. The chief supply officer of the air force formed 

a special air transport staff which, in co-operation with the 

responsible army agencies, carried out the supply operations in 

accordance with requests received from the encircled units. 

An adequate airstrip was available within the pocket. The 

surrounding terrain could be used as a parachute drop zone. The 

enemy territory to be crossed was narrow and fighter cover was 

available throughout the fli ght and during the take-off from the 

airstrip. There were but few days on which the air lift was 

interrupted by SIlOW storms, the formation of ice, or fog on the 

ground. Under such favornble circumstances it was not too 

difficult to maintain the fighting strength of the encircled forces. 

On return flights the carrying capacity of the aircraft was 

taxed to the utmost since they were loaded with sick and wounded, 

official and soldiers' mail, Rnd sometimes even with scurce matCriel in need of repair. Although few planes were lost through 

enemy action, the rate of attrition from weal' and tenr was very 

high, requiring constant replacement of the transport planes. 

Because of increased demands by other sectors of the front and 

the low rate of production, it was even necessary to employ training planes in order to fill the gaps that developed. 

In addition to regular airlift operations, aerial delivery containers were dropped by bombers to various isolated units which 

were in immediate need of supply. In round-the-clock fli ghts 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 61 

the bombers dropped their containers at the lowest possible altitudes despite strongly increased antiaircraft fire. These missions 

were very costly and put the personnel to a severe test. During 

February 1942, I Air Corps fl ew 1,725 bomber sorties in direct 

support of ground operations and 800 supply missions for the 

Army; by March the supply missions required 1,104 bomber 

flights. These figures clearly indicate that great numbers of 

bombers were diverted from their original purpose and employed 

in an improvised supply operation. 

The Demyansk pocket was eventually relieved and in the 

opinion of top-level Army experts the air supply operations had 

been of decisive importance in enabling the encircled forces to 

hold out. 

II. The Stalingrod Airlift 

As a result of the above experience Hitler ordered that Sixth 

Army, which was encircled in Stalingrad during the winter of 

1942, be supplied by air. Goering accepted the assignment without opposition although his assistants raised strong objections. 

The Fourth Air Force was charged with the mission of transM 

porting 500 tons of supplies per day to a suitable airfield near 

Stalingrad. The experiences of the past winter indicated that only 

50 percent of the planes could be fully operational at any given 

time and that therefore 1,000 transport aircraft carrying an 

average load of one ton each were required. This calculation did 

not take into account adverse weather conditions or losses by 

enemy action. Germany had just about that many transport 

planes but they were scattered all over Europe. The organizaM 

tional machinery needed to concentrate most of these planes 

in the Stalingrad sector, and to improvise the essential procureM 

ment and transportation measures, reached truly gigantic prOM 

portions. 

The circumstances surrounding this venture clearly indicated 

that it was doomed to failure and Luftwaffe experts therefore 

seemed extremely skeptical. That their misgivings were justified 

became obvious when the Russians continued their advance and 

captured most of the departure airfields within easy reach. As 

a result many aircraft were lost while they were grounded for 

repairs. The approach flights led over an everMwidening strip 

of enemYMheld territory which soon extended beyond the range 

of German fighter cover. Losses in men and materiel were replaced by crews and aircraft from the training commands, so that 

virtually all training of bomber crews came to a stanristill durM 

ing the winter of 1942-43. By the following spring the StalinM 

grad airlift accounted for the 16sB of 240 training crews and 365 
62 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

training aircraft. The training program did not recover from 

the effects of these losses until 1944. 

Inclement weather also played its part. Heavy snowstorms 

disrupted all air operations for days on end. Russian fighter and 

antiaircraft strength increased steadily. Nevertheless, the German crews did their utmost to accomplish their mission which, 

however, was far beyond their capabilities. The amount of supplies which eventually reached Sixth Army was small and could 

not nvert the impending disaster. 

Airlift operations in support of entire armies constitute a 

task which can only he accomplished after careful planning and 

preparation and then only by an air force which has all the 

necessary means at its disposal. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

Chapter 8 

Supply and Transportation Problems 

in the Arctic 

63 

Most of the supply and transportation problems in the arctic 

were caused by terrain difficulties. by the virtual absence of 

routes of communication, by the arctic winter weather with its 

abundance of snow and icc, and tinally by the fact that all sea 

traffic from Germany to northern Finland was dependent on the 

navigability of the Baltic. From this arose the need for numer~ 

ous improvisations. 

In the absence of roads that could be used as traffic arteries, 

the transportation problem could be solved only by the use of 

very narrow conveyances which could move across open country, 

through swamps of little depth, and through snow. The ideal 

means of transportation was the Finnish cart, a narrow two~ 

wheeled vehicle drawn by a small horse. In addition the Germans used self~spru g drag sleds formed of tree forks, which 

the Finns called purill<t8. pack animals. and human pack bearers. 

Reindeer served as draft animals during the winter. These reindeer were purchased with the assistance of local experts and given 

some time to get accustomed to the German soldiers who were to 

be their new handlers. With its highly developed sense of smell 

the reindeer does not take to strangers and is likely to run away. 

For the transitional period of adjustment it was therefore decided 

to hire the Lapps who had hitherto handled the reindeer. The 

next step was to train the troops in the handling and care of 

these animals. In summer the reindeer roam on the open range 

like any other wild game and can only be classified as such, 

whereas in winter they become domesticated animals. Even 

the methods of harnessing and driving reindeer are unusual and 

must be learned. Each division received one reindeer transport 

column with fifty reindeer for the primary purpose of facilitating 

the sl!Pply of raiding detachments and reconnaissance patrols. 

Partly because of foreign exchange considerations the Germans 

employed relatively few reindeer whereas the Russians organized 

an entire reindeer division and committed it in midwinter after 

excuting a major enveloping maneuver on the southern flank of 

the German arctic front. In thi~ operation the Russian troops 

and all their equipment were transported on reindeer sleds. 

During the unusually severe winter of 1941-42 the Baltic Sea 

was frozen over for several months and it was not until several 

weeks afterward that freight traffic was partly restored. Out-
64 GERMA.N REPORT SERIES 

side the icebound Finnish ports supplies were transshipped to 

lighters for which a narrow traffic lane could be kept open by a 

light ice breaker. At times these lighters were unable to come 

alongside the freighters. In such instances supplies had to be 

transferred to the lighters over boardwalks laid across the ice. 

This additional handling had to be taken into account in the pack~ 

ing of supplies at their points of origin. 

Supply by airlift was an emergency measure to be employed 

only when all other means had failed. Under the t erra in conditions encountered in the arctic, landings in winter could be 

made on the frozen surface of lakes, whereas in summer the use 

of medium and larger-sized lll.nd-based aircraft was altogether 

out of the question. Special crews therefore had to be trained 

for dropping supplies by parachute. Airlift operations aJso 

proved extremely valuable for speeding up the evacuation of 

wounded from the arctic wilderness. 
PART FOUR 

TECHNICAL IMPROVISATIONS 

Chapter 9 

Clothing and Equipment 

Improvisations of clothing became necessary when the GerR 

man Army was suddenly faced with the prospect of a winter campaign in Russia. To alleviate the lack of adequate c10thing during the winter of 1941-42, several divisions helped themselves 

by organizing large sewing workrooms in near-by Russian cities. 

From used blankets and old clothing, local workers produced flannel waistbands, ear muffs, waistcoats. footcloths, and mittens with 

separate thumbs and index fingers. Sheepskins were tanned 

and transformed into coats for sentries and a limited number of 

felt boots were manufactured in small Russian workshops. It 

was possible to requisition fur garments and felt boots from local 

inhabitants for a small number of men. Some winter clothing 

was also acquired from dead enemy soldiers. Fur-lined coats, 

warm underwear, gloves, and ear muffs of regular winter issue 

did not arrive from Germany until the early spring of 1942. 

During the first crucial winter the available supply was sufficient 

for only a small percentage of the forces. The clothing of the 

great majority of men was not nearly adequate since few of them 

had more than one item of winter clothes. Whoever possessed 

extra underwear wore one set on top of the other. All supplies 

of underclothing in the divisional and army dumps were issued. 

Eventually every man was able to protect his head and ears to 

some extent by using rags and waistbands. 

Effective relief gradually reached the front once the so-called 

fur collection campaign got under way throughout the Reich. 

This campaign was by far the greatest and most valuable improvisation in the field of clothing. Even though the outfits were 

of varied appearance they fulfilled their purpose. If it had been 

started earlier many casualties could have been prevented during 

the severe winter of 1941-42. 

At the beginning of the war the German armed forces were 

quite unfamiliar with the geographic data and climatic conditions 

of the far north. German clothing and equipment allowances 

failed to take into account the peculiarities of warfare in the 

65 
66 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

arctic. The troop sent to this theater were unable to operate 

effectively until they were issued the same clothing and equipment 

as mountain divisions. This consisted of laced mountain boots instead of standard infantry boots, mountain trousers and tunics 

instead of regular issue, visored mountain caps with turn-down 

ear and neck protectors instead of the ordinary field caps, and 

rucksacks in the place of field packs. Every man was issued 

complete skiing equipment. 

Intermediate and lower commands improvised many other items 

of clothing and equipment but most of them were of little consequence or of limited application and are therefore not mentioned 

in this study. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPA.IGN 

Chapter 10 

Shelter 

67 

The construction of temporary shelters assumed great im~ 

portance during the fighting in the far north. A lean to, set 

against the wind, topped with branches and twigs, served as shel· 

ter for raiding detachments in the arctic winter. To obtain heat 

two logs were split lengthwise, placed on top of one another at the 

entrance to the shelter, and set afire. This reflecting fire produced sufficient heat even in very low temperatures. In many 

instances igloos were built and used as emergency shelters. 

Portable Finnish plywood structures and Swedish canvas tents 

were provided as semipermanent shelters to protect personnel 

from the rigors of the arctic winter. Motor vehicles and the recoil fluids in guns were kept from freezing by the use of various kinds of stoves of improvised construction. 
68 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 11 

Weapons 

There were few improvisations in the field of weapons. The 

field forces made minor improvements but never went as far as 

to create new weapons. Captured weapons were not popular 

with the field forces but frequently had to be used, in order to 

compensate for German shortages. Captured artillery pieces were 

organized into batteries and battalions or employed individually. 

Most of the time they were committed on secondary fronts or in 

the depth of the battle position as antitank weapons. Their performance was rarely equal to that of German guns. For many 

of these pieces no firing data were available, others had no sighting devices, and still others were without adequate transportation 

facilities. Whenever several types of captured guns were assigned to one unit, as in the Crimea and other secondary theaters, 

the defects and difficulties multiplied in proportion to the variety 

of types. Lack of ammunition soon put an end to the employment 

of many of these weapons. 

One of the exceptions to the above observations was the Russian 

heavy mortar which was very popular with the Germans. This 

weapon was easy to operate, effective, and justly feared. Captured Russian mortnrs were often organized into batteries and 

committed at the front with German crews. By request of 

the field forces, mortars of the same type were produced in Germany in 1944. Even then they could not be issued at all or only 

in limited quantities because the necessary ammunition was not 

available at the front. 

Painting silhouettes of the most common types of enemy tanks 

in front view and profile on the shields of artillery and antitank 

guns proved a very practicul antitank defense aid. The vulnerable 

points were marked in l'2d. In addition there was a warning sign 

on the shield: "Observe carefully, take good covel', and open 

fire at a maximum range of 1,000 yards." The distances were 

indicated by markers on the ground at 200-yard intervals in all 

directions so that reference points for the exact distance were 

ulways available. 

As the standard German antitank weapons proved ineffective 

agai nst the Russian T34, light howitzers as well as captured 

Russian 76-mm. guns were used as direct-fire weapons against 

tanks. In addition, hand grenades and mines were produced 

locally and used us makeshift antitank weapons. During periods 

of position warfare. the engineers prepared large quantities of 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 69 

wooden-box mines. The bodies were made of impregnated wood 

and the mines were fired by pressure. The introduction of the 

Panze1'!aust-a recoilless antitank grenade and launcher, both 

expendable--completely superseded previous improvisations in the 

field of antitank weapons. 

Sunflower oil proved excellent for the care of weapons. During the winter of 1941- 42 sunflower oil was the only available 

lubricant which would permit proper functioning of weapons in 

the cold climate that prevailed on the Russian front. Unfortunately it was produced only in the southern regions and even there 

not in sufficient quantities. 

In general, the existing German weapons were adequate for 

arctic operations. The need for additional antiaircraft weapons 

was met by mounting light artillery pieces, barrels pointing upward, on revolving platforms. For operations against Russian 

raiding parties on the Kandalaksha front, captured Russian 

tanks were placed on flanged-wheel cars and thus transformed into 

armored cars on rail. Cross-country mobility was stressed in the 

choice of weapons but not all requirements could be met. To increase the mobility of the artillery, one pack artillery battalion 

replaced a field howitzer battalion in each artillery regiment. 

Later the arctic theater was assigned a recoilless gun battalion. 

Although this battalion was not nearly so mobile as the pack 

howitzer units, it was more suitable than ordinary light artillery. 

Moreover the number of mortars was greatly increased in order 

to make the infantry more independent of artillery support in 

difficult terrain. Most rifles issued to the infantry were replaced 

by submachine guns because the former proved ineffective during 

combat in the wilderness. 
70 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 12 

Technical Training for Arctic Conditions 

The improvisation of arctic clothing, equipment, and weapons 

had to be complemented by special training. The most important 

objective in this technical trai ning was to make an indefatigable 

and accomplished skier of every soldier, regardless of where he 

might be employed. The German training methods deviated from 

the Finnish since the Finns stressed cross-country skiing. Accustomed to the use of skis as a means of locomotion from their 

early childhood, the Finns were capable of covering distances of 

twenty-five to thirty miles a day even during heavy snowstorms. 

The German skiing technique always emphasized downhill runs. 

The type of bindings used by the two nations fully expressed the 

difference between their skiing techniques. Finnish skis merely 

had a loop to hold the pointed boot whereas the Germans used a 

regular binding like the Kandahar and mountain boots with 

toe plates and g rooved heels. The Finnish binding did not permit the execution of speed turns while the German binding 

which had a tight hold on the foot made it impossible to discard 

the skis instantaneously whenever the tactical situation required 

it. Although the Finnish method had great advantages in the 

arctic, where the downhill technique is of little use and where 

one can easily dispense with speed turns, German skiing instruction continued to follow the Alpine method. The training program included certain theoretical courses such as those on the 

proper treatment of skis, on the best way to dress in arctic temperatures, and on protecting oneself from frostbite. Special instruction in the handling and firing of weapons by troops on skis 

played an important part. The training program was standardized throughout the entire theater; it culminated in a field exercise under combat conditions continuing several days and in 

wi nter sports competition. 

Every replacement assigned to the Kandalaksha front first 

had to undergo a two-month special training course at Kairala 

in order to adjust himself to the Jiving and combat conditions 

of the arctic. The local command had issued explicit directives 

for this orientation course, including examples of the proper 

tactics to be employed in the wilderness north of the Arctic 

Circle. These directives were brought up to date by the inclusion of the most recent tactical lessons, above all in small 

unit actions. Thus, for instance, studies were issued on the 

subject of long-distance marches, march security, combat and 

reconnaissance patrols, outposts, strong points, guard duty, 
MILITARY M~ROV ISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 71 

combat inteJ1igence, movement of supply through enemy·infested 

areas, and operations in snow and ice as well as in primeval 

forests and swamps. 

This type of training was designed to adjust a newcomer to 

his environment and its peculiar climatic features. Moreover 

it was to stimulate and further the soldier's natural affinity to 

primeval forests and vast spaces and to assist him in orienting 

himself, tracking down the enemy, avoiding ambush, and in· 

terpreting footprints and ski tracks. In fact, it was a kind of 

"Cowboys·and·Indians" training course. Proper attention was 

devoted to everyday problems such as passing the night in the 

open in the arctic wi nter, constructing a brushwood shelter or 

an igloo, building a reflecting fire out of split logs, finding food 

in the wilderness, and applying first aid in case of accident or 

battle injury. A newcomer had to acquire a great deal of 

knowledge on such subj ects before he was qualified to be as· 

signed to a combat unit without jeopardizing himself and his 

comrades. The numerous field exercises often lasted several 

days and took place at great distances from the training center. 

They were conducted under the continuous threat of enemy 

raids and, almost without noticing it, the novices to arctic warfare became adjusted to the percuIiarities of fighting and living 

in the extreme north. Whenever the combat troops were transfe rred to quiet sectors, they continued to r eceive supplementary 

training which ranged from improving their skiing technique 

to the proper care of weapons, equipment, clothing, and rations, 

and included protective measures against frostbite. Courses 

in the proper treatment of reindeer had to be r epeated over and 

over again in order to prevent the loss of any of these animals 

which were so difficult to replace. Thus even the experienced 

combat soldiers in the far north could always acquire additional 

knowledge. 
72 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 13 

Improvised Front-Line Propaganda 

During the Russian campaign the Germans made extensive 

use of frontline propaganda and achieved remarkable results 

in many cases. The following incident occurred during the 

winter of 1941- 42 when 6th Panzer Division launched a series 

of limited objective attacks to the west to secure the lines of 

communication of the German units facing the main Russian 

assault from the east. (See Snail Offensive, p. 7) In this instance, 

front-line propaganda was improvised very effectively after the 

second thrust. Among the many wounded and dead Russians 

collected on the battlefield was Vera, an eighteen-yeal'-old female 

sergeant. After a few hours treatment for shock, she l'ecoverd 

from her horrible experience which she compared to the "end 

of the world." Vera was a medical auxiliary with the battalion 

that had held the main strong point and had been completely 

annihilated with the exception of one officer and fourteen enlisted personnel. 

During her first days as a prisoner of war she was under a 

severe emotional strain. Her interrogation confirmed other 

intelligence on enemy dispositions gathered from statements of 

other prisoners. By her own admission she was a member of 

[(omsomol I Ed: the Russian communist youth organization 1, 

that is to say, a convinced Communist. Before she was evacuated 

with the next transport of prisoners she innocently requested permission to return to her former regiment. Asked for the reason 

for her request, she replied in a serious and calm tone: "I want 

to tell my comrades that it is hopeless to fight against such weapons and that the Germans will treat them well. They should come 

over to the German side." Asked whether she had any other 

reasons for returning, she answered: "Yes, I would like to 

save the life of my friend who is still over there." To the 

question of whether this was not a subterfuge to escape from 

the Germans, she replied: "No, I have already stated that I 

shall return and bring along my friend." 

Since she could not possibly give away any German secrets 

and her self-assured statements seemed trustworthy, her request 

was granted. Dressed in civilian clothes she crossed the German 

lines at a point opposite the sector held by her former regiment. 

German scouts escorted her through the deep, snow-covered 

forest to a place close to the enemy outposts. She promised to 

return at the same point once her mission was accomplished. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPA IGN 73 

Several days passed but the girl did not return. After twelve 

days many people expressed doubts as to her true intentions. 

But on the fourteenth day the designated front sector reported 

the arrival of two Russian deserters, one of whom was a woman. 

It was Vera and her companion. Half exhausted from the long 

march through the deep masses of melting snow, they arrived 

at the command post. Vera had an interesting story to tell. 

After her return to the Russian lines Vera was immediately 

interrogated by a Politruk (Ed: low-ranking political officerl 

who doubted the veracity of her statements when she told him 

that she had been treated well by the Germans and was able 

to escape in civilian clothes because of the carelessness of her 

guards. For five days and nights she was imprisoned in an 

ice bunker in the company of criminals under sentence of 

death and was fed bread and water. When she was questioned 

again she r epeated her previous statements. As a result she was 

returned to her former regiment, given another uniform and 

assigned to a front-line battalion ns a medical auxiliary. This 

battalion was waiting for the arrival of urgently needed replacements since it had lost its entire manpower with the exception of one lieutenant and a few soldiers. After she was initiated 

in her duties she took the lieutenant's map and compass and went 

to the front. There she surprised a Russian sergeant while he was 

reading a German propaganda leaflet and persuaded him to 

desert by telling him of her own good experience with the 

Ge>"mans. She talked to a few more men and told them the same 

story. They believed her and the story spread like wildfire. 

One hour after Vera's return to the German lines the remnants 

of the sergeant's unit consisting of six men and one machine 

gun arrived at the point where she had crossed and surrendered. 

They had overheard the conversation between Vera and the 

sergeant and decided to follow their example. For several days 

groups of two to three deserters arrived daily at various points 

along the front. This provided the division with exact information on enemy intentions and facilitated the planning of further 

attacks. 

With regard to the effect of propaganda leaflets dropped from 

the air, Vera stated that they were hardly ever read by Russian 

soldiers because such an offense was punishable by death. Moreover the contents were not believed because of the intensive 

counterpropaganda to which the commissars subjected them. 

But she was certain that her former comrades would believe 

anything she wrote in personal letters. Her idea was taken up 

and soon this valuable correspondence was in full swing. German 

patrols delivered her hand-written letters at various points in 
74 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

the forest near Russian outposts and attached them to branches 

in the trees. They were easily recognizable by their red markings. 

The results were unmistakable since the number of deserters 

doubled within a short time. When, in addition, her voice was 

recorded and transmitted over loud speakers near the enemy 

lines, the number of deserters along the entire sector increased 

so much that it exceeded 400 only three weeks after the start 

of this improvised propaganda campaign. This figure was much 

higher than the combined total of deserters on all other sectors 

of the entire army front. The idea of using Vera as the mainstay of this propaganda campaign proved very effective. 

Four days later a few bottles of liquor made a powerful propaganda improvisation that eliminated the danger of a local enemy 

penetration. After a German attack with Jimited objective the 

enemy attempted several strong counterthrusts. The situation 

became very tense when several Russian tanks penetrated the 

German lines and the last reserves had to be committed. The 

tanks were destroyed but some of the enemy infantry succeeded 

in infiltrating through the German lines, Not many Russians 

got through at first but more and more followed. In this difficult 

situation the local German commander sent a civilian with 

several bottles of liquor to the Russian soldiers behind his line 

and invited them to taste these samples. They were told that they 

could drink to their hear~'s content if they decided to come 

over unarmed. Slightly inebriated by the first bottles they began 

to arrive hesitantly and in small groups without arms. As soon 

as the first men had convinced themselves that the Germans 

had no intention of killing them, about fifty additional Russians 

turned up to receive their liquor. They indulged so heavily that 

they forgot all about their weapons, quite apart from the fact 

that they were physically incapable of returning to them. Meanwhile a strong German detachment picked up the abandoned 

weapons and stopped all further enemy infiltration attempts. 
PART FIVE 

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVISATIONS 

Chapter 14 

The Manpower Problem 

I. The Situotion at the Outbreak of War 

Improvisations in the field of manpower were rarely necessary 

as long as the war took a normal course and the nation was 

capable of providing the men needed for new combat units 

and as replacements. The situation changed when the manpower reserves at home began to run low and special measures 

had to be taken to make up for the serious shortage of replacements. Even at the beginning of the war, the Germans had 

to resort to some organizational improvisations, particularly to 

strengthen the defenses in the West. 

At the outbreak of war in 1939, the frontiel' defense command 

of St. Wendel in the Saar was ordered to defend that sector of 

the West Wall which extended from Mettlach to Saarbruecken. 

Only a very small force of regular troops was available. It 

consisted of frontier guard units stationed in the Saar prior to 

the war. To a frontage of seventy-five miles there were altogether 

two battalions of medium artillery, with one infantry or machine 

gun battalion to every twelve miles. Reinforcement by secondwave divisions could not be expected for about fourteen days, 

whereas first-wave divisions were to be made available later 

on after the conclusion of the Polish Campaign. The number 

of available antitank guns and artillery pieces of every caliber 

was ample but there were no gun crews. To form these crews, 

conscripts from near-by towns who were in the older age groups 

were to be drafted directly instead of being inducted through 

regular channels. No preparations of any kind could be made 

because the frontier defense command was not notified before 

mobilization. Consequently quite a few of the men had received 

different mobilization orders and had already left to join their 

units. Others had been removed from their homes during the 

evacuation of those districts of the Saar territory that were 

closest to the front. Nevertheless, crews for the antitank guns 

were formed without delay and given hasty two-day instruction 

75 
16 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

courses at their gun positions. Sufficient personnel could be 

found even for the artillery guns which were organized to 

form reserve batteries, although the men drafted for this purpose 

had been trained with entirely different guns. 

On the other hand it was impossible to find suitable battery 

commanders or technical specialists. These reserve batteries 

were therefore attached to batteries of regular artillery battalions 

which were part of the frontier defense command. Local border 

patrol personnel were organized into a regiment with four bat· 

talions in order to increase the defensive strength of the infantry 

and. above all, to obtain personnel acquainted with terrain conditions. Each battalion was assigned to one of the four subsectors 

along the Saar River. This measure alone amounted to a doubling 

of the infantry forces and meant the addition of particularly 

qualified personnel since all the border patrolmen were former 

noncommissioned officers of the 100,OOO-man Army. 

Even the second-wave divisions activated at the outbreak of 

the war might be termed improvisations. In addition to a certain 

number of reservists. many other men had been called up to 

fill the divisions' ranks. Some of these men had merely undergone a short, eight-week basic training course during the last 

few years. Others had served during World War I and had 

never since taken part in any military exercise; their average 

age was around forty-five. During the winter of 1939- 40 the 

enemy granted the Germans sufficient time for further preparations during which these divisions were consolidated and trained 

and the men belonging to older age groups were reassigned to 

service units. 

II. The luftwaffe Field Divisions 

The Luftwaffe was still in the development stage when the 

war began and was experimenting with various forms of aerial 

warfare. During the course of its operations it was often faced 

with missions that could only be solved by improvisations. This 

study describes only those major improvisations in which the 

Luftwaffe was closely connected with ground operations. 

One of the best known Luftwaffe improvisations was the 

creation of Luftwaffe field divisions. In 1941 the Luftwaffe was 

at full personnel strength as it was to be greatly expanded after 

the anticipated rapid conclusion of the Russian campaign. Not 

only did these plans fail to materialize but. during the winter 

of 1941- 42, the Army was faced with the first major manpower 

shortage when it ran out of combat troops. On various sectors 

of the Eastern Front local commanders took the initiative of 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS OURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 77 

quickly organizing and committing provisional units composed 

of Luftwaffe ground personnel, construction battalions, and signal 

communication units in ground combat. Shoulder to shoulder 

with Army units, most of them gave a good account of themselves. 

As a further step in this direction, Adolf Hitler ordered the 

transfer of seven divisions from the Luftwaffe to the Army. 

Goering, the commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, always 

jealously concerned with his prestige and possibly hoping for 

a more favorable turn in events, suggested that these divisions 

remain under the jurisdiction of the Luftwaffe and be subordinated to the Army only in tactical matters. This suggestion 

was adopted and the Luftwaffe organized ground combat divisions under its own jurisdiction. The personnel of these divisions 

met with the highest physical standards but the training of 

the commissioned and noncommissioned officers was totally inadequate for the purposes of ground fighting. The care of 

weapons and horses left much to be desired. Since the Army 

was taxed to the utmost, it could provide few instructors and 

little equipment. Consequently these divisions were sent into 

combat after receiving only superficial training. They fought 

as bravely as most other units but their casualty rate was above 

normal. To the very end of the war, these divisions continued 

to present a never-ending series of problems to both the Army 

and the Luftwaffe with the latter obliged to provide a continuous 

flow of replacements. Time and again the Army had to transfer commissioned and noncommissioned officers to these divisions 

and provide additional instruction and training so they could 

serve their purpose. 

The consensus is that this improvisation was ineffectual. Despite great devotion and heroism displayed by individual divisions, it would have been preferable to ignore prestige matters 

and place this valuable personnel at the disposal of the Army 

without attaching any strings. The policy was not reversed 

until the last stage of the war when transfers of personnel from 

the Luftwaffe to the Army finally became unconditional. 

III. Maintenance of Combat Efficiency 

Delays in the arrival of replacements occurred very early in 

the Russian campaign. The combat strength of some infantry 

companies often dropped to an unbearably low level. The first 

stop-gap measure to be introduced was to screen all supply and 

service units for men who were fit for front-line duty. When 

these units were no longer in a position to provide suitable 

men, others with little or no training were called upon. They 

were transferred to the infantry as long as they could somehow 
78 GERMAl" REPORT SERIES 

meet the physical requirements. Since propel' training facilities 

were rarely available, the combat efficiency of the front-line 

units suffered considerably by the employment of such replacements. Another expedient was to form rifle companies with 

surplus personnel from artillery, antitank, or armored units that 

had lost their equipment and to commit them as infantry. 

Many artillery and signal units were forced to release commissioned and noncommissioned officer personnel to the infantry 

and these arms were soon short of technicians and leaders. Any 

fu rther transfers were therefore out of the question. In such 

instances the infantry units short of the minimum number of 

leaders had to be merged. The personnel and training situation 

of the field forces improved only after each division was assigned 

its own field replacement training battalion which guaranteed 

a satisfactory flow of replacements. During position warfare 

the divisions in the field were then able to raise the training 

standards by organizing a variety of courses, but the shortage 

of combat units frequently forced the command to commit these 

training battalions as temporary combat units. During the last 

stage of the war, training and replacement divisions of the 

various armies as well as Army service schools were often called 

into action in emergencies. As a result, training organizations 

that had been built up under great difficulties were repeatedly 

torn apart and destroyed. 

Maintaining the combat efficiency of the infantry divisions 

despite their continuous commitment and the impossibility of 

relieving entire divisions presented a special problem. When the 

fighting raged with full f ury for several consecutive weeks, it was 

impossible to relieve the front-line units by reserves because 

the situation usually was too critical. Only too often the troops 

were forced to continue fighting until they were completely 

exhausted. In order to have at least some small but well-rested 

assault detachment available, the units alternated in withdrawing 

a small number of soldiers from the thick of the fighting to give 

them two or three days' r est behind the lines. For the same 

purpose headquarters and higher echelon supply personnel up 

to and including army staffs were committed at the front in 

rotation. 

Since transportation to and from Germany was often disrupted, leaves and furloughs had to be frozen for long periods. 

Whenever the situation permitted, armies, corps, and divisions 

therefore established rest camps for the men who were due 

furloughs. These camps were invaluable in maintaining the 

combat efficiency and morale of the troops. Another improvisation was the introduction of so-called sponsorships at higher 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 79 

headquarters. Certain staff officers maintained constant personal contact with specific combat units and took them under 

their wings. Moreover, up to 10 percent of the personnel assigned to headquarters staffs rotated with their comrades at 

the front to allow them to go on leave or to a rest camp. These 

measures were of benefit to the troops and improved the relationship between headquarters staffs and combat units. 

A very successful improvisation was the introduction of rehabilitation units. Soldiers who had been sentenced to serve 

extended prison terms but who showed promise of reforming 

were not relieved of front-line duty but put on parole and transferred to improvised rehabilitation platoons, companies, or battalions. These were committed at critical points of the front. 

The rehabilitation units had particularly efficient commissioned 

and noncommissioned officers and gave a good account of 

themselves. This very effective improvisation soon became a 

permanent institution which received unanimous approval and 

was accepted as a good solution not only by the prisoners but 

also by the officers to whose units they were assigned. In 1944 

one of these rehabilitation battalions fought exceptionally well 

in the encircled fortress of Ternopol in eastern Galicia. When 

the town fell a number of noncommissioned officers and men 

of this battalion fought their way back to their own lines under 

great hazards and hardships. 

The organization of indigenous units was another improvisation 

designed to strengthen German fighting power. Such units were 

organized in occupied territories and friendly countries, especially by the Waffen-SS [Eel: combat arm of the SS; in effect a 

partial duplication of the German Army] . They relieved German 

units of minor duties and were also frequently committed as 

combat units. Their performance at the front was far below 

the standard of German troops. For this reason the front-line 

troops usually objected to the employment of indigenous units. 

On the other hand, many volunteers from prisoner-of-war camps 

were employed as auxiliaries to replace soldiers transferred 

from supply and service units. In general they were quite 

dependable and useful. 

Late in the war, when few 01' no replacements were available, 

all divisions in the field had to use some of their service troops 

to form emergency alert units. These were originally intended 

for the defense of strong points 01' towns in their rear areas 

or as security detachments for rear positions; but frequently 

they had to be committed in the front lines to close a gap and 

sometimes even for the purpose of local counterattacks. 
80 GERMAN upon SERIES 

As another emergency measure, convalescent furloughs granted 

to sick or wounded soldiers were severely curtailed in order to 

Ahorten all period8 of absence from the front. But, since it 

was obvious that combat units could only use fully recovered 

men, most local military authorities failed to comply with these 

regulations. They also showed great r eluctance in carrying out 

another order which pertained to the induction of men in advanced age groups who were also affeced by the draft because 

the age Hmit had been raised. It was felt that these older 

men ought to remain in their civilian occupations where they 

would be able to serve the nation much better than as soldiers. 

IV. The Employment of Women in the Armed Forces 

The employment of women with the German field forces was 

not as widespread as among enemy armed forces. During the 

latter part of the war women were used as clerical and signal communication auxiliaries at German forward headquarters. They 

took over these duties from men who were thereby released for 

combat. These women soon became familiar with living conditions at the front and settled down to do an excellent job. In 

the arctic the possibilities for employing women were very 

limited. In that region army headquarters was the lowest 

echelon to which the auxiliaries were ever assigned. The Russians on the Kandalaksha front, however, had divisional signal 

battalions exclusively composed of female personnel. Female 

radio operators were frequently identified as members of small 

Russian commando and sabotage teams dropped by parachute 

in the arctic. Generally these detachments consisted of one 

female radio operator and eight men. 

In Germany proper the program of substituting female for 

male military personnel met with a great deal of opposition because it ran counter to well-established military traditions. The 

responsible administrative officials were very hesitant in introdllcing this new program but as the war progressed the increasing manpower shortage imposed the extensive utilization of 

women in a variety of military jobs. 

One of the first measures was to employ women as insb'uctors 

at riding and driving schools and as grooms at remount depots. 

They were also used as maintenance crews for aircraft at training centers, as parachute riggers, and as refueling personnel 

at airfields. A great number of women were employed as antiaircraft auxiliaries at fixed Flak installations throughout Germany. Toward the end of the war the percentage of female 

personnel in several searchlight units rose to 90 percent. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 81 

The Russians often used women to work as laborers on construction projects. In one instance some women captured near 

Orel told the story of a Russian improvisation to provide urgently 

needed laborers for work on fortifications. The impending 

German advance on Bryansk in 1941 was to be stopped by a 

strong belt of fortifications at the approaches to the city. For 

this purpose 100,000 laborers had to be recruited without delay. 

Among them were women from the Caucasus who had been hotel 

employees. One day the entire personnel of the hotel were 

suddenly ordered to assemble in the backyard. Not allowed to 

return to their rooms, they were marched to the railroad station 

where a train was waiting to take them to Bryansk. The work 

on the fortifications around the city took four weeks. At the 

e:nd of that period all laborers were released on the spot and 

left to their fate. 

The organization of the Finnish Lottas shows how the employment of women can raise a country's fighting power by releasing men. The Lotta-Svaerd, a sister organization of the 

Finnish security corps, had a membership of over 100,000 women 

and girls. During the war they performed all military duties 

which could possibly be taken over by a woman, regardless of 

the proximity of the enemy. Lottas were encountered in field 

kitchens of companies in the front lines. The commander of a 

Finnish border infantry battalion in a very exposed sector of 

the arctic front used a Lotta as battalion clerk and interpreter. 

The Finns also employed young boys in army uniforms as messengers and for similar duties. 
82 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Chapter 15 

The Organization of Special Units 

I. Staffs 

Special command staffs are otten needed to carry out certain 

types of improvisations. A wise commander will anticipate such 

situations by keeping special staffs at his disposal for any emergency. This is only possible if all staffs not absolutely essential 

at the front or in rear area assignments are actually pulled out 

and thereby made available to the command. The Germans might 

have accomplished a lot more in this respect. For instance, the 

commander of XXXVI Mountain Corps was under the impres· 

sian that a corps staff was not needed on the Kandalaksha front 

and might be put to better use elsewhere. He suggf'.sted that 

a divisional staff with an expanded supply branch would be 

quite adequate to exercise the tactical command functions in 

this area. Although he submitted several suggestions along these 

lines, they were quickly turned down by army. In similar cases 

it should always be possible to transfer such a staff without 

delay, if necessary by air, to a point where it might be urgently 

needed. 

In many instances a command staff had to be suddenly improvised to take over some special mission. After the Stalingrad 

disaster the staff of XI Infantry Corps wns reconstituted from 

an unassigned corps staff which was hastily organized in the 

beginning of February 1943. Formed in the area north of 

Kharkov, it consisted of one general and several general staff 

officers who happened to be in this area on an inspection trip. 

The staff was to assume command over three German divisions 

which had been committed to strengthen sectors formerly held 

by Hungarian and Rumanian forces. These divisions were without higher headquarters after the collapse of Germany's allies 

on the Stalingrad front. The lowel' echelons of the staff were 

picked from the field units, and a Hungarian signal battalion, 

later replaced by a small German unit, took care of signal 

communications. The initial difficulties were gradually overcome. It took five months and required numerous reassignments 

and organizational changes to transform the improvised corps 

staff into a regular one, Other corps staffs were improvised in 

a similar mtlnner and their deficiencies were eliminated step 

by step until they finally became fully organized corps staffs. 

In one instance the improvisation of two special traffic regulating staffs made it possible to withdraw ten divisions and 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 83 

thousands of refugees across the Dnepr River. (Map 6) During 

the course of the large-scale Russian counteroffensive in AugustSeptember 1943. the enemy advanced rapidly from the Belgorod 

area toward Kiev, and Army Group South had to be withdrawn 

behind the Dnepr. The crossing of the river. which was 2.500-

3,500 feet wide in this area, was complicated by the fact that 

only a few bridges were left standing. Some of the bridges 

were threatened by the enemy advance while others had been 

reached by the Russians before the at'rival of the German troops. 

Every possible step had to be taken to delay the enemy advance 

and simultaneously accelerate the crossing of t he German units 

over the few remaining bridges. 

The long wooden bridge at Kremenchug alone had to serve 

as a crossing point for ten divisions. six of which were panzer divisions. The XI Infantry Corps was put in charge of the river 

crossing and was assigned t wo special staffs to assist in this 

miSSIOn. One staff had to make certain that the march order 

was observed on the north bank and had to enforce one-way 

traffic in order to ensure a steady flow of approaching units. The 

other special staff was employed on the south bank of the river 

at Kl'yukov with the mission of assuring the rapid debouchment 

of the divisions. Although the mission sounded simple enough. 

its execution presented all manner of difficulties. Even before 

the previously scheduled withdrawal of garrison installations 

and unwieldy army and a rmy group supply units had been 

completed. the situation demanded that the panzer divisions 

cross immediately. Some Russian parachute troops had meanwhile landed on the other side of the river and their ground forces 

had begun to cross the river upstream. Only motorized units 

were capable of reaching the south bank of the river between the 

bridges in time to restore the situation. In order to give the 

panzer divisions precedence over other units, it was necessary 

to stop all traffic and clear the roads for the tanks. F or five 

days mixed columns of all arms extending over many miles 

camped in the adjacent fields or, wherever this was impossible 

because of the many swamps, they kept to the side of the road 

and waited for the signal that would allow them to continue on 

their way. Their campfires were close to their foxholes. Alongside these columns. or trapped between them, were streams of 

refugees and herds of cattle. 

Only radical measures against traffic violators of all kinds made 

it possible to put the panzer divisions at the head of the columns. 

Even more difficult than the approach to the 2,500-foot highway 

bridge was the exit on the south bank because the streets of 

Kryukov were very narrow and winding. In addition, the drivers 
84 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

had a tendency to slow down once they had reached safety on the 

south bank or to stop altogether to obtain information on the 

whereabouts of their parent unit. This had a. delaying effect and 

was therefore very harmful. The attempts of mixed convoys to 

find the right branch of the road and turn off immediately after 

crossing the bridge also caused major delays. The drivers seemed 

to forget that many thousands of vehicles behind them were 

waiti ng to cross the river. To overcome this difficulty all units 

were ordered to continue on the highway to the south for twenty 

miles from the bridge without regard to resulting detours. 

Drastic steps had to be taken to enforce this order anu. many control points and even airplanes had to supervise the flow of traffic. 

The two special staffs worked with perfect co-ordination and 

during the first days directed 5,000 to 7,000 motor vehicles a day 

across the river. Later this l'ate was stepped up to an average 

of 8,000 to 10,000 and within ten days a total of 70,000 motor 

vehich!s had crossed the highway bridge. 

Simultaneously, three infantry divisions with their horse-drawn 

vehicles as well as the trains of two additional infantry divisions 

crossed the fiver on a railroad bridge covered with planks. Alongside this bridge engineers built an improvised floating bridge for 

the crossing of the 30,000 civilian vehicles that were routed 

through the Kremenchug area during the same period. 

The special staffs also regulated the traffic across these two improvised bridges. It was particularly difficult to designate the 

approach routes to the bridges in such a manner that the columns 

would not cut across each other or, where that was unavoidable, 

to establish intersections at points where cross-traffic would cause 

the least disturbance. 

Regulation and control of the river crossing topped all other 

tactical considerations for ten days. Despite SO many difficulties, 

all divisions crossed !\uccessfully with' their vehicles and it was 

even possible to get the slow-moving evacuation transports and 

various supply columns across the river. The rear guards held out 

long after the time limit set by army and saw to it that even the 

last immobilized tanks were moved across the highway bridge. 

Several tanks were coupled by cables and towed by prime movers 

although permission for their demolition had been given several 

days before. At Poltava, twelve freight trains loaded with tanks 

and other valuable equipment stood ready for demolition because 

enemy tanks had already cut the railroad track connecting 

Poltava with Kremenchug. A counterattack by German armor 

cleared the line sufficiently to allow all twelve trains to pa.ss the 

threatened points and reach Kremenchug. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 85 

The two infantry divisions whose trains had been put across 

the river at Kremenchug had to cross the Dnepr fifteen miles 

downstream. Some of the civilian columns and most of the 

herds of cattle were diverted to that crossing point. None of 

the engineer units in the area had any standard military bridging 

equipment, motor boats, pneumatic pontons, or civilian shipping 

facilities. For this reason the two divisions had to resort to 

whatever expedients they could devise at the time. The last remaining fishing boats were assembled, floats were built from old 

logs and native wagons without wheels, and some mill boats 

anchored along the banks were used as ferries. 

With these improvised craft soldiers and civilians were moved 

across the river with all their equipment and possessions. Wagons 

that were unsuitable for use as ferries were disassembled, floated 

across, and reassembled on the south bank. Tied to the various 

makeshift ferries, the horses swam across without resistance. 

Herd after herd of cattle was driven into the water, but the animals repeatedly shied away from the 2,500-foot-wide river. Only 

when led oxen were willmg to precede them did the mass of the 

cattle follow into the river accompanied by shouting peasants 

crossmg in boats on both flanks. Slowly and with deafening 

roars the cattle wadea across the 700 to 1,000-foot-wide shallows. Then they suddenly sank into the navigation channel 

and with heads up swam silently through the very deep and up 

to 1,000-foot-wide channel until they could set foot again about 

350 to 600 feet before reaching the other bank. Herd after herd, 

800 to 1,000 head of cattle each, was driven across the slowflowing river. Even though some herds had been on the move 

for a month and had covered distances of 125 to 200 miles, there 

were no casualties. A total of 64,000 horses and more than 

80,000 head of cattle swam the Dnepr. The young animals followed separately on large, boarded-up ferries. This completely 

improvised measure contributed greatly to relieving the bridges 

at Kremenchug and proved very effective. 

Tht: successful completion of the difficult mission may be attributed to the fact that the dual responsibility for the conduct of 

operations and for the technical problems of the river crossing 

was vested in the local corps commander. By this arrangement 

all tactical and technical measures were coordinated under a 

single man. But a considerable part of the success is to be 

credited to the efficient special staffs and to the additional crossing facilities-both major organizational improvisations. Yet 

aU these efforts could have been frustrated had the enemy used 

strong air forces at the right time. However, they were not effectively committed until 90 percent of the forces had completed the 
86 GElMAN REPORT SERIES 

crossing. Then a Russian bomber scored a direct hit on the 

detonation device installed on the highway bridge which had 

been readied for demolition. The charge was set off and the 

bridge was destroyed. At that time, however, the loss of the 

bridge was not particularly serious because the rear guard tanks 

and assault guns were able to withdraw across the railroad 

bridge which remained intact. Before this attack enemy air 

activity was negligible, and only one light bomb scored a direct 

hit on the highway bridge. It merely pierced the surface without 

damaging the vital bridge structure. The vehicles bypassed the 

small hole which was covered up within one hour. The flow 

of traffic was not interrupted. 

II. Special Formations 

A certain number of the organizational improvisations mentioned in this chapter deserved to be permanently incorporated 

into the tables of organization and equipment of the units concerned. But only a few were officially adopted because manpower 

and materiel shortages usually prevented the introduction of farreaching changes. In order to overcome some of the chronical 

deficiencies, the infantry corps and divisions were forced to use 

a number of expedients. When they were on the defensive and 

had to hold overextended front-line sectors without motorized 

units, they scraped together all the available motor transportation to have at least one motorized battalion or just one company 

for emergency purposes. These elements used Panje wagons 

during the muddy season and sleighs during the winter. By this 

improvisation the command had mobile reserves on hand even 

though they were sman. 

The formation of so-called K o1'ps Abteilungen (Ed: provisional 

corps) was an emergency measure that was also helpful in deceivi ng the enemy. Remnants of three divisions which had been 

badly mauled in difficult extended battles were merged into one 

division with each of the original divisions forming onc regiment. 

The new division was designated Korps Abteilung and distinguished by a letter A, B, C, etc. Each provisional corps carried the corps insignia and each infantry regiment was designated by the number of its former division. The regiments drew 

their replacements from the Wehrkreis· of their original divisions. 

The provisional corps had the combat value of an infantry 

division and fought equally well. The merger had the advantage 

that the staffs of two divisions with all their organic units became 

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A ...... ; It hd the .. ddIUnn .. ' fun ~lk> ... nf admlnlsterln,. ~on..,dJ)tlon J)OllclM .. vd tU"'t.blnll' 

... pl .. e~ment.o to l oec:lf", unit. ... 1I11M 110m ... tatlon ........ oe.~ In til. Webrktebl. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 87 

available for reassignment to new divisions or could be used as 

special staffs or for some other purpose. On the other hand, the 

new regiments could not be used as battle~tested cadre for newlyorganized units. This disadvantage outweighed all benefits that 

could be expected from the formation of Korps Abteilungen. 

The field forces resented this measure as well as the policy of giving preference to the organization of new divisions with inadequate cadres instead of providing experienced, though weary, 

front-line divisions with r eplacements to restore their former 

striking power. Whenever a new division without sufficiently 

experienced cadre was suddenly committed in a major battle 

in the Eastern theater-as happened only too often-it just 

melted away like snow in the midday sun. The field forces unanimously requested that the battle-tested divisions be reorganized. 

Yet, as a rule, new inexperienced divisions were sent to the front 

despite all the damage caused by. this procedure. 

The provisional corps may have fulfilled their purpose as a 

temporary measure, but in the long run they proved to be a 

handicap rather than an asset. If the purpose of this expedient 

was to eliminate divisions that had not performed well in combat, it would have been better to dissolve them entirely and not 

to preserve them in parts. 

The German experiments with the employment of task forces 

were more conclusive. In one instance an improvised task force, 

organized for a specific purpose, played a decisive rolf! in the 

annihilation battle near Plavskoye in November 1941. The enemy 

had moved up an armored brigade, which the Germans were 

unable to match at that time since their panzer forces were 

heavjly engaged in the vicinity of Tula and no armored units 

of divisional or brigade strength could be withdrawn from that 

sector. In this emergency Second Panzer Army entrusted a 

brigadier general on the staff of XXIV Panzer Corps with the 

mission of improvising a panzer brigade. Time was of the 

essence. Discussions with other agencies were no longer feasible 

and, in any event, they would have been fruitless. For this reason 

army released some panzer units to the improvised brigade. 

Equipped with ample authority, the brigade commander succeeded 

in assembling his force within a few hours. In addition to the 

panzer units assigned by army, he picked up some motorized 

artillery and other combat units on his way to the front and 

brought them along. Other units volunteered to join his task 

force. 

The next day the commitment of the brigade led to a decisive 

victory. The battle southeast of Plavskoye was won with very 

heavy casualtie3 to the enemy. Most elements of the improvised 
88 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

brigade could then be returned to their parent units. This example shows that the success of an improvisation greatly depends 

upon the man who is charged with its execution. Responsible 

commanders must therefore always keep in mind who is best 

suited to carry out an improvisation if they want to avoid the 

mistake of selecting an officer just because he happens to be available. This is of particular importance whenever an improvisation may have decisive influence on the entire situation. 

The formation of more or less independent regimental comhat 

teams often became necessary in view of the vastness of European 

Russia and its terrain conditions. The composition of theRe 

teams was usually adapted to local requirements which meant that 

organized operational unit.~ such as divisions had to be split into 

two or more improvised forces. This measure proved expedient 

in specific situations which occurred quite frequently in Russia, 

but was applied only on exceptional occasions because maximum 

striking power could be assured solely by committing an entire 

division as one unit. Regimental combat t eams were effective 

whenever they were employed to turn the tide of battle at a decisive point. 

A railroad combat team was improvised when the German 

offensive reached Ore! in 1941 and two Ru!\sian armored trains 

were captured intact at the railroad station. One infantry regiment, some artillery, F lak, and railroad engineer elements were 

loaded on captured railroad trains and attached tn the armored 

trains manned by German crews. This improvised combat team 

made a thrust to the south in the direction :If Kursk and succeeded in surprising the Russians. Within two days the combat 

team reached Ponyri on the way ~o Kursk and took firm possession of the railroad lines after some small-scale fighting. Thus the 

unit contributed materially to the success of an operation 'vhich 

resulted in the capture of Kursk during the muddy period of 

1941. 

Flying columns were committed for the same purpose as combat teams. In most instances these were motorized units composed of elements from various branches and their strength and 

structure depended on the mission they were to receive. For 

instance, in 1941 the 97th Light Infantry Division left its rear 

elements in the assembly area and improvised a flying column 

with truck transportation from its service units. This column 

was composed of three motorized units---one infantry battalion, 

one artillery battery, and one antitank battalion. By its quick 

action and deep enveloping maneuvers it spared the follow-up 

division many casualties. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 89 

In another instance a flying column was committed in the Kerch 

Peninsula immediately after the German break-through of the 

Parpach,.Line during the Crimean Campaign. The same evening 

the column reached the Tartar Wall, a fortified line west of 

Kerch, and captured the enemy positions. The crucial point for 

the recapture of the peninsula was thereby once again in German 

hands. The 132d Infantry Division which followed in the rear 

could never have reached this point in time. 

An interesting improvisation took place in the arctic when a 

mountain pack bearer battalion was transformed into a mountain 

infantry battalion. The mountain pack bearer battalion was composed of men in advanced age groups who hailed from the Alps. 

They were gradually replaced by younger men and the battalion 

was transformed into a combat unit. Clothing and equipment 

were appropriate. All members of the unit were experienced 

skiers but, since they needed specialized training, they were withdrawn from the line for a two-month period. Upon completion 

of the training this battalion was capable of difficult independent 

missions in the arctic wilderness. 

At the outset of the campaign north of the Arctic Circle it 

became clear that formations of a special type were required. 

In the midst of operations, however, any kind of large-scale 

reorganization was out of the question. As a modest beginning 

the command decided to experiment with the formation of a 

swamp battalion which was to be particularly .qualified for independent small-unit action in the arctic. Since there was no 

precedent for the formation of such a unit, it was organized by 

selecting young soldiers in excellent physical condition who were 

experienced skiers. They were issued the same clothing and 

equipment as mountain infantry troops. This proved, so effective 

that all combat troops in the arctic were subsequently equipped 

in the same manner. A few captured trucks were to provide 

the battalion with motorized transportation. The men soon gained 

confidence and adjusted themselves to the difficult conditions prevailing in the arctic wilderness. The Finns provided instructors 

and gave some welcome assistance. When XXXVI Mountain 

Corps applied for official recognition of the unit, the request was 

approved and the battalion was designated a bicycle battalion. 

A shipment of bicycles promptly arrived; needless to say, they 

were absolutely useless in the arctic. Following another request 

the battalion was finally redesignated as an independent motorized 

infantry battalion. It was issued command cars and Volkswagen 

[Ed: the German version of the jeep} which had proved extremely useful in the snow and on the poor, narrow, rocky roads. 

Now the battalion was truly mobile. Later when the Finnish 
90 GERMAN REPORT SER IES 

units which had been attached to corps were pulled out, the new 

battalion carried out difficult combat and reconnaissance patrols 

in the arctic virgin forests and barren wastes north of the Arctic 

Circle. 

III. Last-Ditc h Improvisations 

1. The LEUTHEN Project 

When the Russian armies poured across Germany's eastern 

borders in the beginning of 1945, the Army High Command introduced a major improvisation, the LEUTHEN Project, which constituted a radical change in the Army's replacement and training 

policy. To the German mind Leuthen. a small town in Silesia 

where Frederick the Great had won a major battle with improvised forces, was the symbol of a victorious last-ditch stand. 

It was probably for this reason that the Army selected the term 

Leuthen to designate this project. The plan foresaw that all 

training units of the entire replacement army were to be transferred and assigned to the field forces as soon as the code word 

LEUTHEN was transmitted to them. In immediate proximity 

of the front these training units were to be subjected to a more 

realistic combat training than they could possibly receive in the 

zone of the interior. Moreover, they were to serve as security 

forces in rear area positions or defense lines. The original idea 

was therefore both sound and practical, but it should have been 

put into effect much sooner, when the front was still stable. What 

actually prompted the execution of the LEUTHEN Project at that 

late stage, whether it was still the original intention as officially 

proclaimed or rather the steadily deteriorating situation on the 

fighting fronts, must be left to conjecture. In reality all the 

LEUTHEN units were immediately committed and thrown into 

the thick of fighting in critical situations. 

What did the LEUTHEN units look like? In every Wehrkreis 

there were a number of training and replacement units of various 

arms which were under the command of division staffs. The men 

who had completed their training and were ready for combat 

duty were in the replacement units. The training units were composed of recently inducted recruits who were to be prepared for 

combat by undergoing an eight-week basic training course. Upon 

receiving the code word LEUTHEN, the division staffs were to 

move out with all training units that had completed one to seven 

weeks of training. 

One of the units alerted in this manner was the Special Administrative Division 413 which consisted of several training 

battalions, a regimental headquarters, an artillery battalion with 

an odd assortment of guns, and elements of an engineer and a 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 91 

signal battalion. As a tnctical unit, the division was really no 

more than a reinforced infantry regiment commanded by an 

elderly general with a small staff. Needless to state, it was absolutely incapable of any combat assignment. The cadre up to 

the division commander consisted of personnel unfit for combat 

because of sickness, injury, or for lack of tactical qualifications. 

Most of the noncommissiond officers had suffered combat injuries of such severity that they were barely fit for garrison duty. 

Some of the men were entirely untrained, others had completed 

one half to three quarters of their basic training. Some of them 

were unarmed because the number of weapons provided for training units did not suffice to arm every soldier. In addition, the 

various formations had absolutely no organic transportation. 

There were no more horses than those needed for the normal 

garrison functions and the division had no field kitchens since 

the food had always been prepared in the permanent garrison 

kitchens. The clothing and equipment were equally defective. 

Quite a few soldiers, for instance, could not be issued garrison 

belts. In general, everything was in exactly the condition to be 

expected from a home station in times of stress where shortages 

have become the rule rather than the exception. 

When the LEUTHEN division moved out it was therefore no 

more than an improvisation of the poorest sort. This might not 

have mattered so much had the division undergone a rigid training schedule far behind the lines. But even while it was on the 

approach march to its destination, one of its battalions was 

shifted from the Main River valley to Hammelbul'g where a small 

enemy armored force had broken through. The remainder of the 

division was immediately sent into combat and annihilated. 

In summarizing, one may state that the LEUTHEN Project was 

doomed from the outset because it was applied in a situation for 

which it was entirely unsuited. 

2. Other Desperate M easu1'es 

In view of the extremely heavy losses of manpower, the shortage of weapons, and the precarious condition of the transportation system, the situation of the German Army became so critical 

that the need for improvisations grew even more urgent during 

the last few weeks of the war. The organizational improvisations 

of that period were a fa r cry from those introduced during earlier 

stages. In many cases the selection and training of replacements 

was makeshift. Equipment of all types was totally inadequate 

and consisted of whatever was left over or could be picked up. 

Since no g UllS were available, the organization of new artillery 

units was practically impossible. Whatever new infantry units 

were organized during this period were of limited capability in 
92 GERMA.N REPOkT SERIES 

the field. In Bavaria, for instance, the last regular activation 

of a new infantry division took place in November 1944. What 

followed thereafter was pure improvisation, not so much because 

of the shortage of trained replacements, but because of the inadequate supply of weapons and equipment. 

Although the organization of new divisions had become impossible. replacement units were sent to the front until the beginning of March 1945. Then even this function could no longer 

be accomplished. Each Wehrkreis assumed command over its 

replacements, organized a few emergency infantry battalions 

and transferred them to the nearest tactical command. Many 

well-trained soldiers were still available but, because of the serious 

shortage of infantry heavy weapons, it was no longer possible 

to organize entirQ machine gun companies. The battalions were 

therefore composed of a small battalion staff and four rifle companies. Each company had one machine gun platoon with two 

heavy machine guns and a few locally requisitioned wood-gasburning trucks. one of which carried a cook stove. The few 

artillery battalions organized during this period were composed 

of a great variety of guns. No two batteries were alike and 

every aection had guns of different caliber. 

During that period occurred a very significant incident which 

demonstrated the effects of the improper utilization of administrative personnel. Several first.-rate panzer battalions were in the 

process of rehabilitation at the Grafenwoehr troop training 

grounds in Bavaria. When enemy armored spearheads approached 

the area, a corps commander responsible for a near-by sector of 

the front ordered the staff of the training center to assume the 

tactical command of the panzer battalions and stop the enemy 

advance. The commander of the training center was a general 

well along in years who had always handled administrative assignments very competently but had never during his long career 

commanded a panzer unit. His staff was composed of elderly 

reserve officers and ordnance specialists. Their leadership spelled 

disaster for the panzer battalions. 

The numerous organizational improvisations introduced during that period were only stop-gap measures applied in time of 

extreme emergency. Since most of them were adopted to overcome purely local critical situations they are of little consequence 

in a study of this type. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. 

Chapter 16 

Politicol Measures Introduced by the National 

Socialist Party 

I. Civilian Labor Procurement 

93 

During the years preceding the outbreak of the war. civilian 

labor procurement had to be improvised on a large scale for the 

construction of fortifications. Even at the time when the West 

Wall was under construction, the allocation of manpower was 

essentially an improvisation of a'igantic proportions. Receiving 

unusually high pay and enjoying a variety of other benefits, 

hundreds of thousands of men were employed by the Todt Organization and moved from one building project to the next. Not 

everything that was built at that time was beyond criticism, yet 

some of the achievement of the years 1938-39 would not have 

been possible without these improvisations. Toward the end bf 

the war another improvised labor force was formed to construct 

additional fortifications in the west. This time it consisted of 

entire Hitler youth units, of men who were in age groups subject to labor conscription but too old for military service, and of 

men who were no longer fit for combat. 

The improvisations introduced during that period had highly 

political aspects. They were directed by laymen some of whom 

had never seen military service and whose technical knowledge 

was very limited. They were unaware of the major importance 

of materiel in military planning and were inclined to confound 

a temporary surge of enthusiasm-such as undoubtedly existed 

among the Hitler Youth Combat Units-with r~al fighting ability. 

These Party functionaries were under the erroneous impression 

that their own fanaticism was shared by everybody and that this 

alone would make up for all the shortages and deficiencies which 

characterize all last-minute improvisations. On the other hand, 

there was little opportunity for preventive measures at a time 

when only painstaking efforts could conceal the existing chaos. 

The Volkssturm might perhaps have presented such an opportunity if only it had been rlrawn up as a levee en masse with 

long-range material preparations and if entirely different slogans 

had been used for the mental and spiritual conditioning of the 

people. 

II. The Volkssturm 

The most extensive improvisation undertaken by the National 

Socialist Party was the mobilization of the Volkssturm during the 
94 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

last few months of the war. The idea was to call on the last forces 

of resistance the German people were capable of mustering. A 

misunderstood and misinterpreted tradition built on memories of 

1813 may also have played its part in the minds of some Party 

officials. 

The Volkssturm included all men up to the highest age groups 

as long as they were capable of bearing arms and were not 

already serving with the armed forces. This might have pro~ 

vided a broad basis for successfully mobilizing whatever fighting 

strength had not yet been tapped if there had not been a complete lack of weapons, clothing, and equipment. Whereas clothing 

and equipment might conceivably be improvised, this docs not 

hold true of arming hundreds of thousands or even millions of 

men. The Wehrmacht could spare nothing. At the same time it 

became more and more obvious that the paramilitary Party formations had hoarded and hidden weapons and ammunition, but i n 

view of the large number of Volkssturm draftees these weapons 

were of little help. Then, a Party official had the idea of manu-

·facturing simplified Volkssturm rifles with barrels he could 

"procure" from some factories in Saxony. This plan was also 

of little consequence. Thus the whole project of staging an armed 

levee en masse was doomed from the very outset. 

Leadership and training were two of the other problems to be 

solved. Among the men of the Volkssturm were many veterans 

of World War I. Although there had been many changes in the 

field of tactics, these men had sufficient military background to 

cope with the simple missions of which the Volkssturm was 

capable. To provide adequate training was a more difficult matter. Men who differed widely in age, former branch of service, 

or type of training, as well as men without uny training whatsoever, were attending military drill periods in their spare time, 

as a rule on Sundays. Occasionally, in towns with local garrisons, 

one 01" two instructors were provided by regular army units. 

That was all the assistance the Wehrmacht could give because 

it had no men to spare. Moreover the Volkssturm was a Party 

improvisation and probably deliberately kept apart from the 

Wehrmacht from its initial organization. 

Only when actually committed in combat was the Volkssturm 

to be placed under the tactical control of the Wehrmacht and fight 

in conjunction with the regular fie ld forces. There was no reason 

for great expectations. The call to arms for an extended tour of 

duty was to be locally restricted. The men were to be called 

upon only if the enemy threatened their home county and even 

then they were to be used exclusively for local defense. Even 

that was almost too much to expect. When, toward the end of 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 95 

the war, entire Volkssturm battalions were committed far away 

from their homes on the Eastern Front, this emergency measure 

was contrary to the spirit and original mission of the Volkssturm 

and could only lend to failure. 

Guard duty and local security assignments were practically 

the only missions for which the Volkssturm was really qualified. 

Its composition, its limited training, and the fact that no more 

than rifles and in some cases only pistols and hand grenades could 

be issued as weapOIlS, precluded its commitment in real combat 

operations. Since it was incapable of withstanding critical situations, the Volkssturm could only become a liability and threat 

to the troops it was to join in battle. Its proper mission was to 

construct and guard road blocks. Important psychological considerations spoke against restricting Volkssturm units to purely 

local commitment. Surely the primary interest of the men resided 

in inflicting a minimum of war damage to their home towns where 

their families lived. Thus, it was safe to assume that the Volkssturm men would prefer to avoid any last-ditch stand in the immediate vicinity of their home towns. The tactical commanders 

therefore took the precaution to suggest that road blocks and 

fortifications should be erected at a sufficient distance from any 

community in order to spare it the effects of combat action. Later 

orders from higher headquarters specified that no Volkssturm 

units should be committed any closer than thirty miles from their 

immediate home towns. This, however, meant a complete r eversal 

of the basic principle of restricting the Volkssturm men to the 

defense of their immediate home territories. 

In East Prussia the Volkssturm did a better j ob than anywhere 

else. It was there that the idea of the Volkssturm levy had originated since East Prussia was the first German province directly 

threatened by the enemy. There the organization and training 

of the Volkssturm made the greatest progress. 

East Prussia alone raised thirty-two Volkssturm battalions. 

All of t hese remained in that province even when, in November 

1944, the civilian population from the northern districts had to be 

evacuated. After that, most of the Volksstul'm units were used 

to prepare reserve battle positions in the rear area for a possible 

withdrawal of the combat troops who in turn provided instructors for the Volkssturm battalions. Months of continuous instruction raised their standard of training to such a degree that 

a number of Volkssturm battalions were able to carry out limited 

combat missions. A few of these so-called special employment 

units were equipped with a sufficient number of modern weapons 

such q,s the most recent 7G-mm. antitank guns, the latest model 

machine guns, and some older-type small-caliber antiaircraft 
96 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

guns. Some of them even had adequate motor transportation. 

The units were composed of a small percentage of World War I 

veterans with the rest about ~qually divided between 16- and 

17-year old youngsters and elderly men from 60 to 75. Some of 

the battalions we're under the command of former staff officers who 

had distinguished themselves in World War I but were now 

amicted with various physical disabilities. The majority of the 

battalions were short of weapons, equipment, and training, an,d 

their employment in actual combat operations was out of the 

question. It was plann~d to integrate them into the field forces 

only in case of a general withdrawal of the lines. 

From the outset this was recognized as a serious handicap 

which, however, could not be corrected since the Army had no 

jurisdiction over these formations. Time and again the Army 

requested that the battalions be immediately disbanded and all 

Volkssturm men fit for combat duty be transferred to the field 

forces. Yet everyone of these requests was flatly rejected by 

the Party. Thus, during the latter part of January 1945 when 

the front began to give way, most of the Volkssturm battalions 

employed in East Prussia were of no U3e to the Army. Wherever 

they did not disintegrate altogether, they suffered heavy casualties. 

But contrary to standing orders, a few battalions had been moved 

up into combat alongside seasoned field units during the precedM 

ing weeks and these battalions gave a good account of themselves. 

Special mention is due to Volkssturm Battalion Labiau which 

fought as part of a division improvised from service troops. 

Three times the battalion was dislodged, but in every instance 

it succeeded in recapturing its original position by launching 

counteratfacks. In this bitter struggle the battalion commander 

and most of his troops remained on the field of battle. 

At another time the Volkssturm performed less well. Showing 

much zeal in military matters, Party headquarters in East Prussia 

produced its own 75Mmm. antitank guns with ironMwheeled gun 

mounts and conducted short training courses to familiarize members of the Volkssturm organization with the weapon. By the end 

of January 1945 the situation near Tapiau east of Koenigsberg 

was obscure. (Map 4) There, the personnel of an Army ordnance school was engaged in bitter fighting against advancing 

enemy armor. The commanding officer of the ordnance school 

had been killed and Tapiau had changed hands several times but 

was held by German troops at that moment. Rumor had it that 

enemy tanks had broken through and were advancing on Koenigsberg. Thereupon Party head<$Uarters improvised an antitank 

gun battalion with twenty new 75Mmm. antitank guns frqm its 

training school and dispatched it to the area east of Koenigsberg 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 97 

to take up positions for the protection of that city. At sundown 

strong armored formations suddenly came into sight opposite 

the antitank gun position. This impressive spectacle caused such 

a state of terror among the inexperienced gun crews that they left 

their guns and ran for cover in all directions. Their leader. a 

young first lieutenant, tried in vain to stop them. Assisted by a 

few instructors he succ'eeded in getting some of the guns ready for 

action and was just about to open fire when he realized to his 

surprise that he was facing German tanks. It was the 5th 

Panzer Division which, after heavy tank fighting in the area 

east of Tapiau, had succeeded in breaking through the enemy 

lines and was now assembling in this area in compliance with its 

orders. For once the failure of an improvisation was of distinct 

advantage. 

III. Paramilitary Units During the Last Stage of the War 

Toward the very end of the war the Party organized certain 

tactical units which were to be committed in the field. Political 

considerations predominated and outweighed all others. For 

some time past, elements of the Reich Lahor Service had served 

as antiaircraft units. Since there wer"e absolutely no other 

forces available, elements of Jabor service battalions were employed to defend the road blocks they had previously constructed. 

Hitler Youth Combat Units, organized during the last weeks 

of the war, were assigned to the field forces on various sectors 

of the front. Their special task was the pursuit and destruction 

of enemy tanks with the help of bazookas and Panzer!austs. 

Just before the end of the war, Party Secretary Bormann attempted to organize an Adolf Hitler Volunteer Corps. 

The accomplishments of these various paramilitary units are 

unknown to the authors. 
-... 

'".!,l'.'" 

'I 11·~ ,-, ',':~d ~\, 

I ':~l 
PART SIX 

CONCLUSIONS 

Chapter 17 

Are Improvisations Inevitable? 

A considerable number of the improvisations described in the 

preceding chapters could undoubtedly have been avoided by normal advance planning. Other improvisations could have been 

minimized by preparatory measures of a general nature which 

could have been further developed if and when the need arose. 

A third category of improvisations could not have been even 

generally anticipated because they were caused by such abnormal 

conditions or extraordinary circumstances. 

I. Avoidable Improvisations 

In an attempt to avoid improvisations one must search for and 

examine all the problems that may possibly confront an armed 

force in future wars. First of all it is necessary to determine 

the probable theaters of war. Nowadays any conflict is likely 

to assume the proportions of a global war if it transcends the 

limits of a purely local police action. Prior to World War II 

the Germans did not think far enough ahead. When, for instance, 

the Armed Forces Academy needed maps of Finland, it was discovered that the available supply of such maps at the Map 

Service of the Reich War Ministry was inadequate. 

The next step is the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of the 

potential theaters of war, a knowledge not limited to their broad 

geographic or military-geographic features, but which includes 

above aU their climatic conditions. In every geographic region 

the native mode of life is determined by the climatic conditions. 

For obvious reasons this influence is especially pronounced in the 

many fields of military activity. Strategy and tactics, organization, weapons, munitions, equipment, clothing, food, training, 

replacements, billeting, and many other factors are strongly 

affected. 

Moreover, a great deal may be learned in advance about one's 

potential enemy. Differences between his armed forces and one's 

own are usually not fortuitous but rather reflect a discrepancy 

99 
100 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

in the military policy of the two nations. The observation of any 

striking deviations from standard procedures should t.herefore 

give rise to speculation about their inherent causes. This will 

make it possible to decide upon the appropriate measures which 

must be introduced in every military sphere in case of an armed 

conflict with that country. Friendly nations which are subject 

to the same climatic conditions as those of the potential enemy 

may serve as a source of IIseful information in peacetime. 

Senior commanders in the armed forces and military specialists 

in all important fields must acquire firsthand knowledge of the 

climate and terrain as well as the social, economic, political, and 

military conditions in any potential theater of war or at least 

in those neutral or friendly countries which show similar characteristics. On the basis of their own observations, these men 

must determine what is essential for the conduct of military operations. Firsthand personal impressions are indispensable; they 

may be supplemented by the study of pertinent books and documents and by consultation with private citizens who are likely 

to have a sound judgment of foreign countries. 

Military history is another SOUl'ce of valuable information. It 

is never too late to determine the r easons for the success or the 

failure of past operations. Many of the decisive factors have 

retained their validity throughout the years and their effect 011 

military operations in our time would be very much the same as 

in the past. 

In view of the foregoing, the Germans were in a good position 

to learn the general as well as the climatic conditions of European 

Russia and the far north. If they actually acquired this knowledge, the Germans certainly failed to draw the proper conclusions for their military policy. Instead, they were forced to use 

improvisations because of the lack of advance planning and 

preparations. If they did not get that information in the first 

place, they were obviously guilty of neglect. For instance, the 

Finns might have told them t.hat ordinary flat-country divisions 

are not suitable for fighting in the impenetrable forests. the 

r.ocky labyrinths, and the swamps and marshes of the arctic. Perhaps German planners were still too deeply entrenched in Central 

European military traditions. Also, the military were not sufficient1y familiar with foreign lands and particularly with countries whose climatic conditions differed from the German. As 

a result they were lacking in proper personal understanding of 

what was to be expected. They probably took matters too light1y 

at the outset. In the fi eld of tactics and logistics in European 

Russia and the arctic, better preparations might have been made 

before military operations began. Many improvisations per-
MllITAR't IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 101 

taining to tactics and logistics could have been foreseen, in particular those which developed into permanent institutions and 

were eventually incorporated in German standing operating procedures. 

Thus if improvisations are to be avoided, one of the essential 

prerequisites is the logical application of any knowledge possessed 

or acquired about a potential theater of war. It may happen that 

a country becomes involved in a war by surprise; in that event 

the top-level military leadership must act immediately and take 

appropriate steps to master the situation. It is wrong to wait 

until the field forces began to help themselves by introducing 

improvisations which in some cases may be the wrong ones and 

difficult to eradicate. After weighing the requirements against 

the available emergency resources, all spheres of the war effort 

must immediately be adjusted to the new situation by concerted 

action. This will prevent many adverse psychological effects 

which may otherwise easily disrupt the confident r elationship between the top-level command and the field forces. 

II. Unavoidable Improvisations and their Min imization 

A different category of improvisations will be unavoidable 

whenever an unexpected or unpredictable situation produces the 

need for extraordinary tactical or logistical measures. A number 

of the improvisations mentioned in the preceding chapters could 

not have been avoided, even if adequate preparations had been 

made. The need arose so suddenly or was so localized that preparations carried out elsewhere could not be used in time to remedy 

the situation. Logistic preparations, for example, will prove 

effective only if mobile transportation is readily available in case 

of a sudden break-down in the movement of supplies. For this 

purpose higher headquarters may resort to airlift, truck, railroad, or inland water transportation. Such preparations must be 

made well in advance in order to assure immediate availability 

of stand-by transportation of the above-mentioned types in sufficient numbers and within reasonable distance. 

In situations which require immediate emergency measures 

there is at first no choice but to improvise extemporaneously. If 

such improvisations are enforced for some time, it will be possible 

to correct their deficiencies gradually and to introduce systematic 

improvements. 

Improvisations in the fields of weapons, ammunition, equipment, 

clothing, or rations can rarely be avoided since it is impossible 

to anticipate all requirements. In some instances stop-gap 

measures may well consist of emergency purchases of consumer 
102 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

goods, but a general solution can be found only if the rigid system of standards and specifications adhered to in military procurement can be modified and adjusted to the flexible methods applied by private industry, It WQuld then become possible to provide suitable equipment for specific needs in time, thereby eliminating many improvisations. It goes without saying that one cannot 

possibly mass produce arctic equipment in peacetime in expectation of an armed conilict in the arctic at some time in the future. 

III. Improvisations in Extreme Emergency 

In times of extreme emergency. improvisations must be approached from a different. point of view and applied with other 

standards than those used during other periods of the war. In 

such situa.tions preparatory measures hardly enter the picture 

because then it is a matter of living from hand to mouth while 

being catapulteri from one crisis to the next. The pressure of 

time assumes tremendous proportions. Obviously no country at 

war will ever expect to be faced by a situation such as that with 

which the Germans had to cope during the clmdng days of the 

last war. Much less will allY country attempt to prepare for such 

an emergency. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 103 

Chapter 18 

The Relative Value of Improvisations 

The preceding chapters give a fairly detailed account of German military improvisations and indicate their relative value in 

a variety of situations. By presenting numerous examples, an 

attempt has been made to demonstrate why certain improvisations 

served their purpose whereas others failed. This presentation 

should enable the reader to draw a number of conclusions that have 

general validity. The most obvious conclusion is that. because 

of their always-present inherent defects, improvisations should 

be avoided altogether whenever possible. On the other hand, 

some of the improvisations presented in this study were absolutely essential and proved effective. For instance, it would 

have been absolutely impossible to conduct operations in the arctic 

or to control the supply situation in the Russian theater, had not 

improvisations been introduced. That many of them were eventually accepted as standing operating procedures simply indicates 

that they should never have been improvisations. Their success 

was based on the fact that they were initiated and carried out 

by experts and that the essential prerequisites for putting them 

into effect existed in these specific cases. 

The failure of any improvisation could be attributed either 

to the lack of proper planning or to the fact that it had been introduced at a time when the necessary means to implement it 

were no longer available. In many instances its failure could 

be traced to the laymen who were charged with the responsibility 

for its execution. All these factors predominated during the 

last stage of the war when a great number of improvisations failed 

to meet expectations. 

In general, however, improvisations proved effective provided 

the right men were selected for their implementation and provided they were enforced with the best available materiel and 

the firm determination to achieve the intended military purpose. 

An observer who looks at the Russian campaign in retrospect 

will come to the conclusion that the multitude of improvisations 

which were employed far exceeded what Mottke once designated 

as a " system of expedients" in the tactical sense. Actually. the 

Germans were forced to introduce the first improvisations as soon 

as they crossed the eastern border. The farther they advanced 

into Russia the more expedients they had to devise. The number 

rose by leaps and bounds when operations began to be hampered 

first by mud and swamps and later by snow and ice. During the 
104 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Jast stage of the war, improvisations permeated every compartment of the war effort both within Germany and at the front. 

At the culminating point expedients assumed the proportion of an 

avalanche, the momentum of which eventually buried the entire 

military machine. Improvisations could never be expected to 

compensate for the lack of vision and the fundamental blunders 

of German leadership. It is no exaggeration to state that the 

entire Russian campaign will go down in history as one gigantic 

improvisation. 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

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6th PANZER DIVISION 

(22 June 1941-20 Jonuor~ 1942) 

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106 

Map 2 

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GERMAN REPORT SERIES 
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 

• 

Mop3 

OPERATION SEYDLlTZ 

(SilUGliGn on 3 Ju11 1942. 

the Second Ooy of the Attock ) 

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107 
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lMPROVlSATlONS IN 

EAST' PRUSSlA 

• 

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KoeniQsberg 

p= .... _ , . """,(.Kaliningrad) 

• • • • 

GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

Loblou 

Toplau 

LEGEND 

~"J,ll O"'O 

......... FOII TIFICIoTIDN$ 

00000 10. 1~. ClI 

--- 110.1,0 
MILITAIY IMPIOVISATIONS DUliNG THE IUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 109 

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Mop 5 

CORDUROY ROADS 

IN THE 

LENINGRAD AREA 

LEGEND 

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110 

Map 6 

THE WITHDRAWAL 

ACROSS THE DNEPR 

LEGEND 

.-- DIRECTION OF 

THf WITHDRAWAL 

~~~ SWAMP 

~~~ SWAMPY FOREST 

ROAD 

__ RAILROAD 

, 

- o 

rl 

GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

, 

= MILts 

GPO ; 2004 307·366 

PIN: 081055- 000