Filed 6/14/23 In re Kieran S. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re KIERAN S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B318672

 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00321A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMBER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.

Jonathan Grossman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Amber C., mother of two-year-old Kieran S., appeals from 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders 

after the court sustained a petition filed by the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).

1 

Amber argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s 

finding her substance abuse put Kieran at a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm. She also argues substantial evidence did 

not support the court’s findings that absconding with Kieran and 

failing to protect her from her father’s drug use and mental 

health problems also placed Kieran at a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm. Because substantial evidence supported

the first jurisdiction finding, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Department Investigates the Family, and Amber 

Absconds with Kieran

Amber and Victor S. (not a party to this appeal) are 

Kieran’s parents. In April 2019, when Kieran was two months 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

old, the Department received a referral stating the parents used 

drugs in the child’s presence. A Department social worker met 

with the parents at a home in Lancaster. Victor admitted he 

used marijuana; Amber denied she used any drugs and said she 

intended to return to Shasta County. The parents agreed to take

drug tests. On April 30, 2019 the social worker received the

results: Victor’s sample was diluted; Amber’s positive for 

amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine. When the 

social worker discussed the test results with Amber the next day, 

Amber denied using methamphetamine. 

On May 2, 2019 the social worker called Amber and left a 

voicemail message asking her to return the call. On May 6, 2019

Amber sent the social worker a text message stating she left 

Lancaster and was in Sacramento with her father “for now.” The 

social worker asked Amber for her new address so that a child 

protective agency could conduct a welfare check on Kieran. 

Amber did not reply to the message or answer the phone when 

the social worker called. 

Unable to learn where Amber and Kieran were, the social 

worker concluded Amber was evading the Department, which on 

May 13, 2019 filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), 

alleging Amber’s substance abuse put Kieran at substantial risk

of serious physical harm. The juvenile court issued an order 

detaining Kieran from both parents, a protective custody warrant 

for Kieran, and an arrest warrant for Amber. On June 19, 2019 a 

social worker spoke with Amber on the phone, but Amber refused 

to disclose where she and Kieran were. Amber stated: “[I]f I let 

you guys know where I am then you will take my child and I 

cannot let you guys do that.” Amber also denied she used drugs,

suggested the test result was “mixed up,” and claimed the 
4

Department could not prove she used drugs “while with 

[Kieran].” 

On August 16, 2019 Amber appeared in juvenile court in 

Los Angeles County Superior Court. She left, however, before the 

court called the matter for a hearing. The Department had no 

contact with Amber for almost two years.

In April 2021 Amber gave the Department an address 

where she claimed Kieran lived with his maternal grandmother. 

Despite several welfare checks by local law enforcement, Kieran

was not found at the address. On October 13, 2021 Kieran was 

finally located in a home in Shasta County and subsequently

placed in a foster home in Los Angeles County. According to a 

detective working on the case, Amber admitted she used 

methamphetamine “that day or the day before” and 

acknowledged she had a “problem with meth.” The detective 

reported that law enforcement found a pipe used for smoking 

methamphetamine in an unattached room of the home and that 

the home was clean and Kieran appeared to be doing well. 

On October 27, 2021 the Department spoke to Amber about

the allegations in the petition. During the conversation Amber 

denied any drug use and claimed she “never got in trouble for 

meth.” She admitted, however, she had a 10-year addiction to 

opiates. Amber also said Victor used methamphetamine and 

marijuana, drank too much alcohol, and had mental health 

issues. The Department also learned that Victor claimed Amber 

used drugs with her father (Kieran’s maternal grandfather), that 

Kieran’s godmother reported Amber used methamphetamine 

recreationally, and that the family’s “biggest concern was 

[Amber’s] methamphetamine . . . abuse.” Based on this

information, the Department on November 23, 2021 filed an 
5

amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b), to add

allegations that Amber and Victor placed Kieran at risk by 

absconding with Kieran and that Amber failed to protect Kieran 

from Victor’s mental and emotional problems. The Department 

asked Amber to take an on-demand drug test, but Amber did not 

appear for the scheduled test.

B. The Juvenile Court Sustains a Petition and Makes

Disposition Orders

At the January 28, 2022 jurisdiction hearing counsel for 

Amber asked the court to dismiss the petition because there was 

no “indication [Amber] was under the influence” when Kieran 

was detained and “there was no current risk or harm or showing 

of neglect to [Kieran] in mother’s care.” Counsel for Kieran asked 

the court to sustain the petition because of Amber’s 2019 drug 

test and the methamphetamine pipe found recently in her home. 

The juvenile court sustained amended counts under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), concerning Amber: substance abuse (count b1), failing to protect Kieran from Victor’s mental and emotional 

issues (count b-3), and absconding with Kieran (count b-4). 

At the February 17, 2022 disposition hearing the court 

declared Kieran a dependent child of the court, removed him from 

his parents, ordered Amber to attend a drug treatment program, 

and ordered reunification services. Amber timely appealed from 

the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders.

2

2 Amber challenges the disposition orders only to the extent 

she argues substantial evidence did not support the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction findings. 
6

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The purpose of section 300 ‘is to provide maximum safety 

and protection for children who are currently being physically, 

sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and 

emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’” 

(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see § 300.2, 

subd. (a).) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is 

subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction 

hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is 

seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps 

necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may 

consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs 

the court’s protection.” (Cole L., at pp. 601-602.) 

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), “allows a child to be 

adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court when ‘[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or 

inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise 

or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the 

child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the 

child from the conduct of a custodian with whom the child has 

been left.’ A jurisdiction finding under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), requires the Department to prove three 

elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or 

failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and 

(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of 
7

serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L., supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) 

“‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we 

determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings 

and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note 

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’”’ 

[Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous 

with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence 

must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable 

in nature, credible, and of solid value.’” (In re Cole L., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.)

Finally, “[a]pplication of the doctrine of justiciability in the 

dependency context leads to the conclusion that ‘[w]hen a 

dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion 

that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a 

reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of 

jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for 

jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by 

substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need 

not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory 

grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ 

[Citation.] This is true because no effective relief could be 

granted in such a situation, as jurisdiction would be established 
8

regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any 

such additional jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329.) As the Supreme Court explained, 

“the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, 

not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that “‘[a]s long as there 

is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that 

another might be inappropriate,’”” so that “where there are 

multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one finding 

may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” 

(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdiction Findings Based on Amber’s Substance 

Abuse

1. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile 

Court’s Finding Amber Abused Drugs

The juvenile court found, among other things, Amber 

abused substances, a finding Amber does not directly

challenge. Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding. 

Amber’s 2019 drug test result revealed she was using 

amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine.3 When law 

enforcement finally found Amber and Kieran two years later,

Amber admitted that she had used methamphetamine within the 

previous two days and that she had a substance abuse problem. 

In addition, investigators found a pipe for smoking 

methamphetamine in the house (albeit in a separate, unattached 

3 Amber said she had a prescription for morphine. She 

promised to show it to the Department, but she never did. 
9

room). By that time, by her (occasional) admission, she had been 

addicted to methamphetamine and other psychostimulants for 

over a decade.

4 And, as Amber admits, “[h]er absence in the two 

year gap” while she was hiding from child protective agencies and 

avoiding law enforcement “could give rise [to] an inference she 

used during that period.” 

Amber’s persistent lying about her drug use was a further 

indicium of drug abuse. Amber denied drug use when the 

Department initially asked her to take a drug test and again 

after she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, 

and morphine. In June 2019 Amber again denied using drugs, 

insisting to a social worker that her positive test result must 

have been falsified and that the Department could not prove she 

used drugs in Kieran’s presence. In October 2021 Amber once 

again denied drug use, contradicting her previous admission she 

had recently used methamphetamine, and claimed she had been 

drug-free for five years. (See In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 

593, 601 [juvenile court could reasonably infer from the mother’s

“dissembling about . . . drug use” she was “trying to hide [an] 

ongoing drug addiction”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293

[“‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether 

persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without 

court supervision.’”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 

197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a [drug] problem one fails to 

acknowledge”].)

4 Amber also acknowledged she was arrested in 2017 for 

possessing a controlled substance for sale. 
10

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile 

Court’s Finding Amber’s Drug Abuse Created a 

Substantial Risk of Physical Harm

As discussed, Kieran was an infant when the Department 

became involved with the family in April 2019, and was two years 

old when the authorities found her with Amber in Shasta County 

in April 2021. Because Kieran was a child under the age of six, 

the juvenile court’s finding Amber was abusing substances 

created a rebuttable presumption of a substantial risk of physical 

harm to Kieran. (See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 

1210, 1219 [for children “six years old or younger at the time of 

the jurisdiction hearing,” a “finding of substance abuse is prima 

facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide 

regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm”]; In re 

Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 767 [same]; see also In re 

Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 [mother’s 

“continuous illicit drug use” put her infant daughter “at 

substantial risk of harm”].)

Amber argues she rebutted the presumption because there 

was evidence Kieran “was well taken care of,” had “no signs of 

injuries or neglect,” and was living in a home that was “clean and 

even decorated.” Kieran may have been living in a clean home 

and, so far, may have escaped injury and neglect in the care of a 

parent who was abusing drugs. The juvenile court did not know 

for sure because Amber was “on the run” with Kieran and 

incommunicado with the Department for almost two years and, 

as Amber concedes, her absconding with Kieran “created the 

[D]epartment’s concern it did not know if he were being 

neglected.” In addition, Amber had a long history of substance 

abuse, and nothing suggested she was trying to face, let alone 
11

overcome, her drug addiction. But Kieran’s continued good 

fortune was not guaranteed, and as discussed, the juvenile court 

did not have to wait until Kieran suffered actual injury or neglect 

before asserting jurisdiction. (In re Cole L., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 

126, 133 [“[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future 

behavior”]; In re A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 289 [“court may 

consider past events to determine whether the child is presently 

in need of juvenile court protection”]; In re Kadence P., supra, 

241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [parent’s drug abuse created a 

substantial risk of harm to the infant child, even though the child 

had not yet been harmed].)

The cases Amber relies on, In re Rebecca C. (2014) 

228 Cal.App.4th 720 and In re Drake M. supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

754, are distinguishable. In Rebecca C. the court held substantial 

evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding the mother’s 

substance abuse caused, or there was a substantial risk it would 

cause, physical harm to the child because the child in that case 

was 13 years old and denied any physical or emotional abuse. 

(Rebecca C., at pp. 727-728.) Kieran is only two years old; a 

13-year-old child, like the one in Rebecca C., is much more 

mature, independent, and able to take steps to protect himself or 

herself from a substance-abusing mother than a two-year-old 

child who is entirely dependent on his mother and who requires 

constant care and attention.

In In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 the court 

held that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s 

finding the father was abusing substances and that his use of 

medical marijuana did not support the finding he failed to 

supervise or protect his nine-month-old child. The court stated 
12

there was no evidence that the child was exposed to marijuana or 

secondhand marijuana smoke or that the father had failed to 

provide the child with adequate supervision or protection. (Id. at 

pp. 765-767.) Moreover, while the father in Drake M. was using 

medically prescribed marijuana for arthritis, Amber was abusing 

methamphetamine, a substance that is far more dangerous and 

that causes severe side effects that can impair a parent’s ability 

to provide regular care for a child. (See In re Alexzander C.

(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 449 [methamphetamine is “‘an 

inherently dangerous drug known to cause visual and auditory 

hallucinations, sleep deprivation, intense anger, volatile mood 

swings, agitation, paranoia, impulsivity, and depression’”].) 

Again, the juvenile court did not need to wait for actual harm to 

occur before asserting jurisdiction to protect Kieran from a parent 

whose drug abuse created a substantial risk of physical harm. 

(See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 [“‘The court need not 

wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume 

jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’”]; 

In re K.B., supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 603 [“The court need not 

wait for disaster to strike before asserting jurisdiction.”].)5

5 Because substantial evidence supported at least one of the 

juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings, that is enough. (In re 

Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 328-329; see In re A.F., 

supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 290 [“if one of the three jurisdictional 

bases relative to mother’s conduct is supported by substantial 

evidence, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding must be 

affirmed regardless of whether either of the other alleged 

grounds for jurisdiction is supported by the evidence”].)
13

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

orders are affirmed. 

SEGAL, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.