i

ENSURING A STABLE ARCTIC THROUGH VIGILANCE, POWER PROJECTION, COOPERATION, AND PREPARATION

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

ARCTIC STRATEGY
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The Department of the Air Force 

Arctic Strategy 

The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy 

fully supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy 

(NDS) and implements the 2019 Department of 

Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy embracing the DoD’s 

desired Arctic end-state: A secure and stable region 

where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the 

homeland is protected, and nations address shared 

challenges cooperatively.

The strategy outlines the Department of the Air 

Force’s unique role and optimizes Air Force and 

Space Force capabilities for the region. The Arctic’s 

increasing strategic importance, coupled with the 

Services’ significant regional investment, requires 

the Department to have a unified, deliberate, and 

forward-looking approach, ensuring the Air and 

Space Forces can compete and defend the nation’s 

interests in the Arctic region.

Residing at the intersection between the U.S. 

homeland and two critical theaters, Indo-Pacific and 

Europe, the Arctic is an increasingly vital region for 

U.S. national security interests. The Arctic’s capacity 

as a strategic buffer is eroding, making it an avenue 

of threat to the homeland, due to advancements 

by great power competitors. Additionally, it hosts 

critical launch points for global power projection 

and increasingly accessible natural resources. 

While the DoD analyzes the immediate prospect 

of conflict in the Arctic as low,1 the confluence of 

activities in the region by great power competitors 

with increased physical access due to receding land 

ice and sea ice, yields the potential for intensified 

regional competition as well as opportunities for 

cooperative endeavors with allies and partners.

The Department of the Air Force contributions to 

U.S. national security in the Arctic are large, but 

relatively unknown. Given the Arctic’s vast distances 

and challenges to surface operations, air and space 

capabilities have long been essential to gain rapid 

access and provide all-domain awareness, early 

warning, satellite command and control, and 

effective deterrence. Offering a solid foundation on 

which to build and project power across the region, 

the Department of the Air Force is the most active 

and invested U.S. military department in the Arctic.2

The strategy identifies the Arctic as a region of 

strategic opportunity for the Air and Space Forces, 

Joint Force, allies, and partners. It provides 

recommendations in light of the Arctic’s most 

significant strategic threats and opportunities, 

based on Combatant Commander requirements and 

the Air and Space Forces’ missions. 

The Department approaches the Arctic with four 

main lines of effort: Vigilance, Power Projection, 

Cooperation, and Preparation. The strategy outlines 

how the Air and Space Forces will organize, train, 

and equip to provide Combatant Commanders 

with combat-credible assets capable of conducting 

operations throughout the Arctic into the future.

1. DoD Report to Congress: Arctic Strategy 2019.

2. DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016.

Executive Summary
3

First, through investments in missile warning 

and defense, as well as command, control, 

communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C3ISR), the Air and Space Forces 

will defend the homeland by maintaining vigilance.

Second, the Air and Space Forces will utilize unique 

positioning afforded by bases in locations like 

Alaska and Greenland to project combat-credible, 

all-domain air and space power. Infrastructure, 

focused on thermal efficiency and durability, will be 

combined with fifth generation aircraft and lethal 

capabilities to ensure the Air and Space Forces 

remain agile and capable in the future.

Third, strong alliances and partnerships in the Arctic 

are a strategic advantage for the United States. The 

strategy outlines ways to enhance cooperation as 

well as interoperability, operations, and exercises 

between the United States and its Arctic partners. 

To uphold the international rules-based order in the 

Arctic, the Air and Space Forces must leverage the 

strong defense relationships among Arctic nations 

and work closely with regional and joint partners.

Finally, the strategy outlines essential training 

and preparation for operations within this 

unique environment. To meet this challenge, the 

Department will renew focus on training, research, 

and development for Arctic operations, while 

leveraging the Arctic expertise of the Total Force.
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The Air & Space Forces 

in the Arctic

The Arctic represents a cornerstone of the nation’s 

defense. The Department of the Air Force provides 

close to 80% of DoD resourcing to the Arctic region.3

Installations across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland 

include large bases, training complexes, satellite 

command and control stations, and a constellation 

of more than 50 early warning and missile 

defense radars. For reference, page 5 highlights 

Department of the Air Force Arctic equities.

Geographically, the Arctic region consists of the 

Arctic Ocean, adjacent seas, and parts of eight 

nations: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark 

(including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, 

Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.4 

Demographically, among the millions of Arctic 

inhabitants, indigenous communities possess 

millennia of knowledge about the Arctic domain 

passed down through generations. 

Several factors make the Arctic particularly reliant 

on air, space, and cyberspace power to provide 

rapid access, reach, and domain awareness. The 

area above the Arctic Circle (above 66 degrees 

North latitude) is vast, almost 2.5 times the 

size of the continental United States. Lacking 

the climate-moderating effect of the warm 

Gulf Stream, the North American Arctic hosts a 

much harsher environment than the European 

Arctic and significantly less road and maritime 

infrastructure. Alaska epitomizes this geographical 

disparity in infrastructure. It is the largest state 

(twice the size of Texas) covering 586,000 

square miles, but offering only 5,600 miles 

of highway.5

The Arctic is a region of immense geostrategic 

significance and a key location for global power 

projection. With two large Alaska air bases, Joint 

Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson Air 

Force Base (AFB), and other strategic facilities, 

the Air and Space Forces project power into 

two critical theaters: Indo-Pacific and Europe. 

Often unrecognized, Alaska offers the quickest 

flight access to strategic locations across the 

Pacific region and western Russia. As evidence of 

Alaska’s strategic location, once the planned F-35 

bed-down is complete, Alaska will be home to 

more advanced fighters than any other location in 

the world.

As strategic as the Arctic is to power projection, it 

is equally critical to deterrence and U.S. defense. 

From an air and space power perspective, it is the 

shortest distance for adversaries to threaten the 

homeland with strategic air and missile attacks. The 

Alaska Radar System and the 50-plus radars that 

comprise the North Warning System across Canada 

provide vital early warning for homeland defense 

and North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD). Locations like Clear, Alaska and Thule, 

Greenland uniquely enable missile warning and 

defense in addition to space domain awareness, 

helping USSPACECOM track tens of thousands of 

objects daily.

From aerial refueling tankers to the Air National 

Guard’s ski-equipped aircraft, the Air Force brings 

mobility capabilities that provide access to some 

of the harshest and most remote locations in the 

Arctic. Meanwhile the Alaska Rescue Coordination 

Center and affiliated rescue squadrons work closely 

with partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, on 

hundreds of search and rescue missions annually.

3. DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016. 

4. The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy uses the definition of the Arctic codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4111. The Arctic means all U.S. 

and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, 

and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian 

Islands chain.

5. Alaska Department of Transportation & Public Facilities. Department Fast Facts Prepared for Legislative Session 2020.
5

Department of the Air Force Equities in the Arctic

DAF is responsible for

of DoD Arctic Resourcing 

Source: 2016 DoD Report to Congress

UNITED STATES

SAMPLE OF ARCTIC REGION MILITARY FACILITIES

NORWAY CANADA

DENMARK/GREENLAND RUSSIA

ALASKA

CANADA

GREENLAND

FINLAND SWED

ICELAND

Barrow & North 

Warning System

JBER & Alaska Rescue

Coordination Center

Eareckson

AS

Raven

Camp

Eielson AFB, Clear 

AFS, JPARC

North Warning 

System

Thule

AB

79%

Map Source: National Geospatial-Intell

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON (JBER):

F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue 

Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, Polar 

Survival School 

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX 

(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

POINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: Alaska 

Radar System (15 radars, 3 part of North 

Warning System)

EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense Radar

NORAD: North Warning System (~50 radars)

THULE AB: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130

UNITED STAT

SAMPLE OF A

DENMARK/GR

CANADA

GREENLAND

F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue 

Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, Polar 

Survival School 

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX 

(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

POINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: Alaska 

Radar System (15 radars, 3 part of North 

Warning System)

EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense Radar

NORAD: North Warning System (~50 radars)

THULE AB: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130

SAF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC

UNITED STATES

SAMPLE OF ARCTIC REGION MILITARY FACILITIES

NORWAY CANADA

DENMARK/GREENLAND RUSSIA

FINLAND SWEDEN

ICELAND

Barrow & North 

Warning System

JBER & Alaska Rescue

Coordination Center

Eareckson

AS

Raven

Camp

Eielson AFB, Clear 

AFS, JPARC

North Warning 

System

Thule

AB

%

Map Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

SON (JBER):

escue 

5, Polar 

PLEX 

s

rning, 

ska 

rth 

ar

radars)

ning, 

0

USAF EQ

DAF is responsible for

of DoD Arctic Resourcing 

Source: 2016 DoD Report to Congress

U

SAM

D

ALASKA

CANADA

GREENLAND

79%

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON (JBER):

F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue 

Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, Polar 

Survival School 

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX 

(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

POINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: Alaska 

Radar System (15 radars, 3 part of North 

Warning System)

EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense Radar

NORAD: North Warning System (~50 radars)

THULE AB: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130

AF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC

UNITED STATES

SAMPLE OF ARCTIC REGION MILITARY FACILITIES

NORWAY CANADA

DENMARK/GREENLAND RUSSIA

FINLAND SWEDEN

ICELAND

Barrow & North 

Warning System

JBER & Alaska Rescue

Coordination Center

Eareckson

AS

Raven

Camp

Eielson AFB, Clear 

AFS, JPARC

North Warning 

System

Thule

AB

%

Map Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

N (JBER):

ue 

olar 

EX 

ng, 

ars)

g, 

USA

DAF is responsible for

of DoD Arctic Resourcing 

Source: 2016 DoD Report to Congress

ALASKA

CANADA

GREENLAND

79%

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON (JB

F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue 

Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, Polar 

Survival School 

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX 

(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

POINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: Alaska 

Radar System (15 radars, 3 part of North 

Warning System)

EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense Radar

NORAD: North Warning System (~50 radars)

THULE AB: Ballistic Missile Early Warning, 

Space Domain Awareness

RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130
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Changing Physical Environment

Increasing Access & Human Activity

Great Power Activity in the Arctic

Changes in the Arctic environment are transforming 

Arctic ecosystems.6 The environment is often cited 

as the greatest adversary to Arctic operations. 

Variations in weather and climate forecasting 

hamper missions and long-term planning for Joint 

Force needs and capabilities. Thawing permafrost 

affects infrastructure across the region, including 

Department of the Air Force hangars and runways. 

Reductions in single and multi-year polar ice are 

accelerating the rate of coastal erosion, putting 

Air and Space Forces’ already sparse infrastructure 

at risk.

Melting ice, transportation advances, and extraction 

innovation are exposing resources once thought 

inaccessible. The Arctic is estimated to harbor 

over 90 billion barrels of oil reserves, 30% of the 

world’s untapped natural gas, and around one 

trillion dollars’ worth of rare earth minerals.7 

Extended seasonal access, growth in commercial 

traffic, and an uptick in tourism increase 

international competition and the potential need 

for disaster response.

Russia is an Arctic nation. No other country has as 

much permanent military presence above the 66th 

parallel. Russia’s recent Arctic initiatives include 

refurbishing airfields and infrastructure, creating 

new bases, and developing an integrated network 

of air defense, coastal missile systems, and early 

warning radars to secure its northern approaches. 

Further, Russia seeks to regulate maritime traffic on 

the Northern Sea Route in ways that may exceed 

its authority permitted under international law. 

Close to 25% of Russia’s gross domestic product 

comes from the Arctic region. Reflecting this, Russia 

is expected to continue investing in the region to 

advance its economy and bolster national identity. 

The Russian military plays a significant role in 

securing these interests and may leverage ostensibly 

defensive capabilities for other purposes. Finally, 

Russia tightly manages its Arctic messaging to 

highlight its capabilities and control.

China is not an Arctic nation (its northernmost 

city, Mohe, shares roughly the same latitude of 

Philadelphia and Dublin), but it sees the region as 

important to its long-term economic and security 

interests. China’s Arctic narrative attempts to 

normalize Chinese presence in the region, enhance 

polar operating capabilities, and gain a regional 

governance role. In 2018, China linked its Arctic 

activities to its One Belt, One Road initiative 

underscoring its strategic ambition toward the 

region’s vast quantities of rare earth minerals, 

hydrocarbons, and fisheries. 

6. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Richter-Menge, J., M. L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries: Arctic Report Card 2019.

7. U.S. Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas North of the Arctic Circle 2008.

The Changing Strategic 

Environment

The United States is an Arctic nation, and a number 

of trends impact U.S. interests in the complex 

security environment.
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DoD Arctic Objectives

Lines of Effort

The Department of the Air Force will contribute to 

the achievement of the three objectives set out in the 

2019 DoD Arctic Strategy:

The Air and Space Forces will enhance vigilance, 

reach, and power through four coordinated lines 

of effort:

The Air and Space Forces’ ability to protect the 

homeland requires Arctic domain awareness 

including threat detection, targeting and tracking, 

communications, and weather forecasting sufficient 

to build a reliable operational picture.

Defend the homeland

Vigilance in All Domains

Compete when necessary to maintain 

favorable regional balances of power

Projecting Power through a 

Combat-Credible Force

Ensure common domains remain free 

and open

Cooperation with Allies & Partners

Preparation for Arctic Operations

1.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Vigilance in All Domains

Defending the homeland is the first priority for the 

DoD. The Department of the Air Force is responsible 

for the majority of the architecture used to detect, 

track, and engage air and missile threats that could 

transit the Arctic. These architectural assets include 

COBRA DANE, which provides real-time missile data, 

and the new Long Range Discriminating Radar at 

Clear, Alaska, which provides persistent long-range, 

mid-course discrimination, precision, and tracking 

of missile threats. Adding to these capabilities, 

cooperation with Canada through NORAD is critical 

to the defense of the northern approaches. NORAD 

relies on radar systems like the aging North Warning 

System, a network of aerospace surveillance radars 

in northern Canada and Alaska, for early detection 

of adversary air threats. 

The DoD’s ability to detect threats and defend 

North America is challenged by rapidly advancing 

strategic competitors’ capabilities. Today’s threats 

have longer range, better precision, and lower radar 

cross-sections. To counteract evolving threats: 

The Department of the Air Force will enhance 

its missile defense surveillance system in the 

northern tier while continuing to work with 

Canada to identify materiel and non-materiel 

solutions to the North Warning System. 

The Department of the Air Force will improve 

domain awareness through new technologies 

ranging from over the horizon radar to 

space assets. 

Missile Defense

A secure and stable Arctic region, founded on respect 

for national sovereignty and the international 

rules-based order, benefits the United States. Many 

challenges transcend borders. Arctic nations have 

historically respected sovereignty and constructively 

engaged even when interests diverge. In recognition 

of the Arctic’s strategic significance to the defense 

of the homeland and American national security 

interests, the region remains a focus for the 

Department of the Air Force.
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The Air and Space Forces will work as 

part of the Joint Force to develop an Arctic 

communications roadmap that examines 

current capabilities and emerging technologies. 

The Department will pursue satellite 

communications options with the Joint Force 

and ally and partner nations to develop 

critical communications and data links for 

operations in the region. 

The Air and Space Forces will work as part of 

the Joint Force and with interagency partners 

to ensure adequate C3ISR coverage to match 

projected activity in the region.

The Space Force will work closely with allies, 

partners, and the private sector to establish 

mutually beneficial relationships that address 

common goals in space and the Arctic region. 

The Space Force will develop new technologies 

and modernize existing assets in the Arctic 

necessary to ensure access to and freedom to 

operate in space.

The Space Force will devise capabilities 

to mitigate and predict environmental 

disturbances unique to the Arctic region.

The Air and Space Forces will collaborate with 

interagency partners to address understudied 

areas and expand meteorological coverage 

including terrestrial and nascent air and space 

surveillance systems. 

Thule Early Warning Radar

Space Capabilities

Space assets reduce the need for a physical footprint 

in the demanding Arctic operating environment 

while supporting ISR, missile defense, satellite 

command and control, and all-domain awareness. 

Challenges in the space domain are particularly 

acute in the Arctic. To operate effectively, the 

Space Force must overcome Arctic-unique orbital 

mechanics and electro-magnetic obstacles as well 

as rising threats from the United States’ principal 

competitors. The Department can no longer assume 

space superiority. In response: 

Weather in the North American Arctic remains 

difficult to predict due to terrain, scarce surfacebased sensors, and underdeveloped climate models. 

Frequent winds, fog, and icing are hazardous to 

air operations. In response:

Terrestrial Weather 

Forecasting & Prediction

Arctic communications capabilities and capacity 

above 66 degrees North latitude must meet Joint 

Force and Air and Space Forces’ needs for the region. 

Environmental and geographic limitations challenge 

the Air and Space Forces’ three main communications 

capabilities in the region: satellite communications, 

high frequency radio, and long-haul terrestrial 

systems. In response to these impediments:

Command, Control, Communications, 

Intelligence, Surveillance & 

Reconnaissance (C3ISR)
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Protecting America’s interests in the homeland 

and abroad entails more than a vigilant defensive 

posture. The Arctic also affords significant strategic 

opportunities for all-domain power projection. 

2. Power Projection through a 

Combat-Credible Force

With increasing levels of air and space traffic over 

the Arctic, it is imperative that the region remains 

a free and open domain. Air and Space Forces 

must retain the global access guaranteed under 

international law.

Fundamental to this access, Alaska bases 

provide air and space power to significant 

portions of USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM 

while simultaneously providing defense for North 

America’s northern and western flanks. Recent 

upgrades to Clear, Alaska’s Early Warning Radar 

enhance the detection of satellites, further enabling 

space combat power. Additionally, once the planned 

F-35 bed-down at Eielson AFB is complete, Alaska’s 

unparalleled concentration of fifth generation 

fighters will present a highly-effective power 

projection capability.

Supporting military, interagency, and civil Arctic 

activities, the Department provides year-round 

access to the Greenland ice sheet via ski-equipped 

LC-130s. Critically, long range strike aircraft 

provide reach, combat ability, and a growing 

sensor capability contributing to regional deterrence, 

vigilance, and power projection. To ensure power 

projection: 

Because the U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary, 

the NDS highlights the need for flexibility and agility 

in force posture and employment. New concepts 

to complicate adversary planning include agile 

Power Projection

Source: NORAD/NORTHCOM. The distances depicted in 

nautical miles are to select world capitals from Joint Base 

Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER). 

Global Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility

USAFRICOM

USCENTCOM

USEUCOM

USNORTHCOM

USINDOPACOM

USSSOUTHCOM

Agile Operations & Logistics

The Department will work with the Joint Force 

to protect and maintain freedom of navigation 

and overflight.

The Air Force will provide strategic airlift and 

critical refueling to both U.S. and partner 

aircraft operating in the region and provide key 

mobility to parts of the Arctic unreachable by 

other means. 

The Air Force will advance recapitalization and 

explore modernization of existing and emergent 

polar mobility platforms that are critical for 

reaching remote areas. 

The Air and Space Forces will work with 

interagency partners to forecast changes to the 

Arctic environment that impact infrastructure 

and operations.
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The Arctic is among 

the world’s most 

strategically significant 

regions – the keystone 

from which the U.S. 

Air and Space Forces 

exercise vigilance.

BARBARA BARRETT

Secretary of the Air Force
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The Department of the Air Force must adopt 

Arctic-grade, resilient permanent infrastructure 

and expeditionary, modular components.

The Department of the Air Force, with the Joint 

Force, will develop Arctic basing concepts that 

complicate enemy targeting systems. 

Infrastructure Development

Base infrastructure across the northern tier is a 

central component to Air and Space Forces’ power 

projection, and the Department maintains significant 

installations across the Arctic region. To survive 

in the region, materials need to meet standards 

including: high thermal efficiency; long-term 

durability; tolerance to repeated freeze and thaw 

cycles; and resistance to permafrost degradation. 

Infrastructure in many austere locations, like 

Thule, Greenland, has deteriorated due to extreme 

environmental factors. To address this: 

The Department of the Air Force will advocate 

for investment in installations that match future 

operational needs. 

Alliances and partnerships represent key strategic 

advantages for the United States in the Arctic. The 

United States maintains strong defense relationships 

with six of the seven other Arctic nations. Four are 

NATO Allies: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark 

(including Greenland), Iceland, and Norway; and 

two are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners: 

Finland and Sweden. 

3. Cooperation with 

Allies & Partners

Air Chiefs from Sweden, Finland, U.S., Norway, Denmark sign 

letter of intent to develop Arctic Challenge Air Exercise in 2017

Interoperability is especially critical in the Arctic 

region due to terrain, limited access, and the 

low-density of domain awareness assets. Through 

the centuries, regional allies and partners have 

developed concepts, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures from which the Joint Force can greatly 

benefit. Allies and partners are on the frontline of 

deterrence; maintaining their partnership is critical 

to Arctic domain awareness.

By developing interoperable systems with 

sister Services as well as allies and partners, the 

Department of the Air Force demonstrates capability, 

enhances operational flexibility, and conveys a strong 

deterrent message. To support interoperability: 

Interoperability

operations, which may involve expanded fixed 

bases, unoccupied airfields, or portable radar 

systems. The Arctic supply chain remains complex 

and expensive, and most operations must provide 

their own logistical support. In response: 

Ally and partner nations that comprise the Arctic 

share unique experiences, capabilities, and security 

interests. 

The Department of the Air Force will continue 

building relationships and promoting air 

and space information sharing with ally and 

partner nations.
12

Joint exercises demonstrate cooperation, enhance 

interoperability, and expand deterrence. In air, 

maritime, land, space, or cyberspace, exercises 

mitigate operational uncertainties and build 

trust with allies and partners. Working with local 

indigenous communities, who possess unique 

knowledge about the region, helps Air and Space 

Forces understand the Arctic environment and 

enriches training and exercises. To build on 

these efforts:

U.S. cooperation with Arctic allies and partners is 

based on shared values as well as defense, safety, 

and security goals in the region. Building these 

relationships counters influence from adversaries, 

whose actions are not aligned with U.S. interests, 

and bolsters U.S. national security. The Department 

of the Air Force must work to highlight shared 

goals, ensuring a peaceful and stable region 

where international norms and standards are 

upheld. To strengthen collaborative international 

security relationships:

Exercises

Expand Collaborative 

Planning Opportunities

The Department of the Air Force will enhance 

and explore additional training, exercises, 

wargames, and combined deployments with 

regional and joint partners. 

The Department of the Air Force will look for ways 

to build upon Arctic operations-focused forums to 

increase collaboration, information sharing, and 

trust building. 

The Department of the Air Force will assess 

requirements for Arctic readiness certification, 

designating personnel with Arctic training and 

experience in the event of an emergency. 

The Department of the Air Force will work 

across Services, Joint Staff, and Combatant 

Commands to enhance integration of Arcticrelated exercises and maximize existing 

training capacity. 

Preparation is essential to operate in the Arctic 

where a lack of training and understanding of the 

environment can have perilous consequences. 

4. Preparation for Arctic Operations

The Arctic environment requires specialized training 

and acclimation by both personnel and materiel. The 

ability to operate and survive extreme cold weather 

(down to -60 degrees Fahrenheit) is fundamental for 

contingency response or combat power generation 

in many potential operating areas. The Joint Pacific 

Alaska Range Complex, offering some of the best 

training airspace in the world, and the Air Force’s 

polar survival school at Eielson AFB represent a 

strong foundation on which to build. To ensure Arctic 

operational readiness: 

Exercises & Training

The Department of the Air Force will 

learn from ally and partner operating concepts, 

including advanced F-35 implementation, 

dispersed basing, and search and rescue 

techniques.

The Department of the Air Force will continue 

working toward shared capabilities, such as 

hosted payloads, mobility, logistics, and basing.

The Department of the Air Force will build 

upon existing relationships with indigenous 

communities in the Arctic region.

The Department of the Air Force will cooperate 

with ally and partner nations as well as Air 

National Guard units from cold weather states 

to take advantage of mutual interests and skills.
13

A substantial portion of the Department’s 

Arctic expertise resides with the Air Reserve 

Component. The Alaska Air National Guard 

conducts civilian and military search and rescue 

operations with its Guardian Angel personnel, 

HH-60 helicopters, and HC-130 aircraft. The Air 

Force Reserve operates F-22s out of Joint Base 

Elmendorf-Richardson, while the New York Air 

National Guard operates LC-130s, the DoD’s only 

ski-equipped transport and contingency aircraft. 

Both the Guard and Reserve play a critical role in 

supporting space missions at Clear, Alaska and Thule, 

Greenland. To increase Arctic capability throughout 

the Total Force: 

Total Force

The Department of the Air Force will leverage 

Guard and Reserve expertise to enhance Arctic 

training and operations.

The Department will pursue mutual objectives 

with the National Guard’s Arctic Interest Council, 

a group of Guard units from states with Arctic 

interests, capabilities, and resources.

The Air and Space Forces must assess 

how they deploy capabilities for the mostlikely large-scale disasters and personnel 

recovery missions. 

To ensure readiness, the Air and Space Forces 

must prepare for increased activity in the 

region and practice jointly and multi-nationally, 

learning from allies and partners.

The Air and Space Forces will work with 

Alaskan Command and the U.S. Coast Guard to 

further develop air-deployable rescue packages 

and personnel recovery techniques for Arctic 

conditions and locations.

Research & Development (R&D)

Humanitarian Assistance 

& Disaster Response (HADR) 

& Personnel Recovery

Foundational to future operations, Air and 

Space Forces’ R&D ranges from research on the 

space environment and engineering standards 

to cold-weather materials and radar technology. 

In the future: 

Because of the Department of the Air Force’s 

inherent rapid-response and long-range capabilities, 

Airmen will likely be first to the scene in the event 

of any Arctic disaster. Through air and space 

systems that build situational awareness, establish 

communications, or deliver Arctic survival packages, 

the Department’s substantial capabilities often 

augment other departments’ HADR and personnel 

recovery missions in the Arctic. To ensure these 

capabilities in the future:

The Air and Space Forces will work as part of the 

Joint Force along with USNORTHCOM’s Arctic 

Capability Advocacy Working Group to sustain 

Arctic R&D to address operational needs.

Eielson AFB Cool School Attendee
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Conclusion

Since its earliest days, the Department of the Air 

Force has recognized the strategic importance of 

the Arctic. The Department will continue to lead as 

the DoD’s most active and invested department in the 

region – critical as a juncture between the homeland, 

Indo-Pacific, and Europe. Building on a globally 

capable force and its current posture in the Arctic, 

the Department will continue innovating along four 

lines of effort:

The Air and Space Forces value the Arctic. As 

the Arctic’s importance increases, so too will the 

Department of the Air Force’s focus on the region. 

The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy 

supports both the NDS and DoD’s effort to secure 

a stable region where U.S. national interests are 

safeguarded, the homeland is protected, and nations 

address shared challenges cooperatively.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Vigilance in All Domains

Projecting Power through a 

Combat-Credible Force

Cooperation with Allies & Partners

Preparation for Arctic Operations

This strategy is accompanied by a Classified Annex. 
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Notes
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Notes
ii
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