[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-13517

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cr-00034-WTH-TBS-5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

PRISCILLA N. RICHARDSON, 

Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(March 19, 2013)

Before HULL, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Priscilla Richardson appeals her conviction for conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

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§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. Richardson’s sole argument is that the district 

court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal because the 

evidence against her was entirely circumstantial. 

I.

The evidence at trial was that in November 2011, Richardson and a friend, 

Crystal Echeverria, picked up six kilograms of cocaine at the Paradise Inn Hotel in 

Houston, Texas and delivered it to known drug distributors in Ocala, Florida. 

Richardson and Echeverria transported the cocaine in a secret compartment located 

underneath the backseat of Richardson’s Volkswagen Passat. When they arrived 

in Ocala, the women dropped off the Passat with Eleuterio Hernandez. 

Hernandez’s job was to remove the cocaine from the hidden compartment, sell it 

locally, and stow the profits back in the compartment so that Richardson and 

Echeverria could return with the money to Texas.

Hernandez informed Echeverria and Richardson that it would take him two 

to four days to complete his task. In the meantime, the women stayed at the 

Howard Johnson Hotel in Ocala. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were tracking the developments 

between Richardson, Echeverria, Hernandez, and others, having been tipped off 

that two female drug couriers were expected to initiate a large drug deal in the 

Ocala area. On December 2, five days after their arrival in Ocala, and after 

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arresting Hernandez and securing his cooperation, DEA agents arrested Richardson 

and Echeverria as they were returning to their hotel to pick up the Passat and drive 

home to Texas. 

Richardson testified at trial. Her account of the events was quite different 

than that described above. Richardson explained that she lived in Austin, Texas 

with Echeverria, her friend from high school. In November, Echeverria urged 

Richardson to buy a car because Echeverria was no longer able to drive her around. 

Echeverria even arranged for Richardson to purchase a car—the Volkswagen 

Passat—from Echeverria’s boyfriend. Richardson recalled that although 

Echeverria’s boyfriend was a car salesman and showed her “a couple other cars,”

he and Echeverria strongly encouraged her to buy the Passat. 

Richardson testified that after buying the Passat, she made plans to visit her 

mother in Merritt Island, Florida. En route, she intended to visit a boyfriend in 

Houston. At her own boyfriend’s suggestion, Echeverria agreed to tag-along. 

Before the trip, Richardson lent the Passat to Echeverria a few times because 

Echeverria’s car was broken down. 

When they got to Houston, Richardson and Echeverria rented a hotel room, 

but only stayed for a few hours because Echeverria was eager to get back on the 

road. Indeed, Richardson’s time with her boyfriend was so brief that she described 

it as “a blink.” Richardson recalled that Echeverria drove most of the way to 

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Florida and that the women stopped in Ocala because Echeverria knew friends 

there and wanted to visit. Richardson also explained that she gave the Passat to

Hernandez—Echeverria’s friend—because it was making “noises,” “something 

was really wrong with [it],” and Echeverria had suggested that Hernandez would

fix it for cheap. 

While waiting for Hernandez to fix the car, Richardson and Echeverria 

stayed at the Howard Johnson and “kill[ed] time.” They were arrested as they 

were coming back to the hotel to meet Hernandez so that he could return the 

Passat, having completed the repairs. Richardson testified that she did not know

about the Passat’s hidden compartment, or that six kilograms of cocaine were 

stashed there, until after she was arrested. 

At the close of the government’s case, and again at the conclusion of her 

defense, Richardson moved for judgment of acquittal arguing that the government 

had failed to carry its burden because its case was based entirely on “circumstantial 

evidence . . . [and] there remain[ed] a reasonable hypothesis of [her] innocence.” 

The district court denied Richardson’s motion each time and submitted the case to 

the jury. After deliberating less than a day, the jury returned its verdict.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of judgment of acquittal on 

sufficiency of evidence grounds, considering the evidence in the light most 

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favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility 

choices in the government’s favor. United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290–

91 (11th Cir. 2011).

A jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction 

of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence need not be 

inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the 

jury is free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to 

be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. But when the 

government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, 

not mere speculation, must support the conviction.

Id. at 1291 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted). 

“To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics the 

government must prove that 1) an agreement existed between two or more people 

to distribute the drugs; 2) that the defendant at issue knew of the conspiratorial 

goal; and 3) that he knowingly joined or participated in the illegal venture.” 

United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks 

omitted). The government can prove each element by direct or circumstantial 

evidence. See United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam).

Richardson’s argument on appeal amounts to an assertion that she was an 

unwitting accessory to a scheme devised and executed by Echeverria and 

Hernandez and, therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to convict her of 

the conspiracy. While we have “repeatedly held . . . that mere association with a 

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conspirator and presence in a vehicle which engages in [activities related to the 

conspiracy] is not sufficient to establish participation in a conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine,” United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d 438, 441 (11th Cir. 1995), 

Richardson’s appeal fails because the evidence here was sufficient for a reasonable 

jury to conclude that her role was significantly greater than that. In addition to the 

evidence detailed above, the jury heard testimony that Richardson made phone 

calls to, and received calls from, her coconspirators; that Richardson and 

Echeverria discussed the drug trade in the presence of coconspirators; and that 

when she was arrested, Richardson had in her possession a hotel receipt from 

Houston with “Ocala, Florida” written on the back, as well as a pre-paid cell phone 

used to contact other known drug dealers. The jury also heard testimony from 

DEA agents that it is common practice for drug couriers to title vehicles in their

own names so as to avoid suspicion if stopped by police; that the Passat’s hidden 

compartment was “very sophisticated” and of the kind used for serious drug 

running; and that it would have been prohibitively risky for a drug supplier to put 

six kilograms of cocaine in the car of an unwitting driver, on the off-chance that 

she happened to end up where the drugs were intended to be delivered. See United 

States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A reasonable jury 

could infer from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not likely 

to entrust such valuable cargo to an innocent person without that person’s 

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knowledge.”). Finally, the jury heard testimony undermining Richardson’s own 

account of her trip to Ocala, including that Richardson’s mother was unaware that 

she intended to visit, and that neither Richardson nor Echeverria ever told 

Hernandez that they believed the Passat was broken down, despite Richardson’s 

claim that Hernandez was supposed to fix it.

In sum, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that 

Richardson was aware of, and willingly participated in, the conspiracy to distribute 

cocaine. Brown, 587 F.3d at 1089; see also Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d at 722.

III.

For these reasons, Richardson’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.

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