* Pursuant to 5th C I R

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11522

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SANDRA D. SWEET, also known as

Sandra P. Smith,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the

Northern District of Texas

No. 3:96-CR-0156-1-R)

November 19, 1997

Before JOHNSON, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sandra D. Sweet appeals her guilty-plea con viction for bank

fraud committed in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Sweet first

asserts that her plea was not knowing and voluntary because the

district court did not follow the requirements of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11 in several respects. Second, she argues that

the indictment was insufficient because it failed to allege an2

essential element of the offense, namely that the wording of the

indictment did not mirror the language of 18 U.S.C. § 20. Third,

she appeals the district court’s calculation of her criminal

history under the guidelines.

W e need not determine whether harmless error or plain error

analysis governs our review of the alleged variances in Rule 11

procedures beca use reversible error does not exist under either

standard. To analyze the validity of a guilty plea, we conduct a

two step inquiry focusing on whether the district court varied from

Rule 11 procedures and if so, whether such variance affected the

substantial rights of the defendant. United States v. Johnson , 1

F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993)(en banc). After a careful review of

Sweet’s arguments and the record in this case, we hold that Sweet

has not demonstrated that any varianc es in Rule 11 procedure

affected her substantial rights.

Second, Sweet has not shown that the failure of the indictment

to allege that Texin’s Credit Union was a “financial institution”

with the precise language used in 18 U.S. C. § 20 renders the

indictment insufficient. When the question of the sufficiency of

an indictment is raised for the first time on appeal and the

defendant has failed to assert prejudice, during t he court’s d e

novo review of the sufficiency of the indictment the “indictment is

to be read with maximum liberality finding it sufficient unless it

is so defective that by any reasonable construction, it fails to

charge the offense for which the defendant is convicted.” United1 The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Board insures

member accounts of credit unions that are in compliance. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1781(a); see Waddell v. Forney

, 1 08 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir.

1997). The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund is used by

the NCUA Board as a revolving fund to carry out the

administration’s purposes. 12 U.S.C. § 1783(a).

3 States v. Fitzgerald

, 89 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

,

117 S.Ct. 446 (1996). Such a reading is appropriate in the present

case. After careful review, we hold that the indictment was

sufficient. 1

Third, we do not address Sweet’s challenge to the calculation

of her criminal history. As part of her plea agreement, Sweet

waived her right to appeal on this ground. We review the record d e

novo to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of appeal is

voluntary and informed. United States v. Melancon , 972 F.2d 566,

567-68 (5th Cir. 1992). When “the record of the Rule 11 hearing

clearly indicates that a defendant has read and understands his

plea agreement, and that he raised no question regarding a waiver

of appeal provision, the defendant will be held to the bargain to

which he agreed...” United States v. Portillo

, 18 F.3d 290, 293

(5th Cir.), cert. d enied

, 513 U.S. 893 (1994). After a thorough

review of the record, it appears that Sweet understood her plea

agreement and raised no questions regarding a waiver of appeal

provision. We therefore hold that she waived her right to appeal

this ground.

Therefore, for the foregoing reas ons, the district court’s4

judgment is AFFIRMED.