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66–125 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–11 

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRAGEDY IN JAPAN 

BRIEFING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TO

PROVIDE AN UPDATE FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFF 

ON THE RECENT EVENTS AT THE TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY’S FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI REACTOR COMPLEX DUE TO THE 

EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI THAT OCCURRED ON MARCH 11, 2011 

MARCH 29, 2011 

( 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

ROBERT M. SIMON, Staff Director 

SAM E. FOWLER, Chief Counsel 

MCKIE CAMPBELL, Republican Staff Director 

KAREN K. BILLUPS, Republican Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page 

Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico ........................................ 1 

Borchardt, R. William, Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission ........................................................................................................... 4 

Lochbaum, David, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists .................................................................................................................... 24 

Lyons, Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy ..................................................................................................... 2 

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska ............................................... 1 

Pietrangelo, Anthony R., Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, 

Nuclear Energy Institute ..................................................................................... 28 

(1) 

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRAGEDY IN JAPAN 

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in room 

SD–366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman, 

chairman, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, why don’t we get started? 

Thank you all for being here. This is a briefing. This is not a 

hearing as such. I think the reason we tried to do it as a briefing 

is so that people wouldn’t have to file written testimony 72 hours 

ahead of time and all of that. Things are changing very quickly 

with regard to the evolving situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. 

While this committee does not have direct oversight on the safety 

of U.S. nuclear plants, we do have to consider how events such as 

those at Fukushima affect the ability of our nation’s nuclear fleet 

of 104 reactors to supply electricity. This, of course, these 104 reactors currently account for about 20 percent of the electricity that 

we use. What the future of nuclear energy will be as part of our 

nation’s energy mix. 

The events at Fukushima are changing by the hour. They’re serious. We are watching those events unfold on the other side of the 

world. 

Our knowledge at best is incomplete. As we look forward to these 

experts informing the committee on what they see occurring at the 

plant. How it impacts on our nation’s existing fleet of reactors and 

answer questions that the Committee members might have. 

Before I introduce our first panel, we’ve got 4 witnesses, 2 on this 

first panel and then 2 on the second panel. Before I introduce the 

first panel let me call on Senator Murkowski for her comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning 

and welcome to those who will be presenting today. I do appreciate 

the timeliness of this hearing this morning or this oversight this 

morning as we try to better understand what is unfolding at the 

Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan. 
2 

As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, it’s probably too early 

for us to say that this situation is under control. I think it is important to recognize though that the workers who are there on a daily 

basis. The progress that they—are being made, hopefully positive 

steps being achieved there. 

But I think it is important to recognize. To really praise the very 

courageous efforts of those workers that are on the ground trying 

to stabilize the situation. They have been going round the clock for 

over 2 weeks now. 

Probably no doubt exhausted at the same time they’re dealing 

with personal stress issues brought about by loss of loved ones, loss 

of their homes. It’s perhaps easy for us in this country to be sitting 

back looking at the situation, picking at the issue. But we do need 

to keep in mind the very selfless acts that these individuals are 

embarking on everyday as they work to prevent further damage 

and to protect their fellow countrymen. 

Mr. Chairman, I do hope that this is an opportunity for us as a 

committee as well as other committees here in the Congress to 

really take away some lessons learned here. So I’ll be listening 

with great interest this morning. As we continue in the weeks 

ahead to understand more of what has happened with this disaster 

in Japan. 

With that, I look forward to the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Our first panel is Dr. Peter Lyons, who, of course, is the Acting 

Assistant Secretary. We hope soon to be the Assistant Secretary of 

the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. 

Mr. Bill Borchardt, who is the Executive Director for Operations 

at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

So why don’t we go in that order unless you have a reason to go 

in a different order? 

Dr. Lyons, why don’t you go right ahead and give us your perspective? Then Mr. Borchardt. Then we’ll undoubtedly have some 

questions. 

STATEMENT OF PETER LYONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Mr. LYONS. Thank you. 

Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and members 

of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss the nuclear accident situation in Japan. 

The Department of Energy’s response to that situation. 

Relevant research development and deployment programs within 

my office of Nuclear Energy. 

Let me briefly recap our current understanding of the still evolving events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant with its 

6 nuclear reactors, albeit with many gaps in our knowledge. When 

the earthquake on March 11 struck, the 3 operating reactors shut 

down in accordance with operating procedures. Back up diesel generators started but were damaged by the tsunami. The operating 

units used battery power to continue to run their cooling pumps 

until the batteries were drained or the pumps failed. 
3 

As the reactor cores heated from radioactive decay steam was 

produced. The pressure build up from that steam required venting 

which released some radioactive materials. It also lowered the 

water level in the three reactor pressure vessels, reducing the cooling of the core. It appears that all three reactor cores are damaged 

to unknown extents. 

Additionally as the fuel temperature increased, a reaction took 

place between the zirconium fuel cladding and the steam or water 

in the pressure vessel producing hydrogen. This hydrogen was 

vented along with the steam and may have ignited at all three reactors. Vision products have been released through these processes. 

Once pumper units were brought in sea water cooling was used 

for many days until fresh water supplies were available. Water levels at the spent fuel pools also have concern with some reports that 

at least one of them was empty for some time. Sea water is being 

used to cool those spent fuel pools until fresh water supplies are 

obtained. 

Current information suggests that the plants are in a slow recovery from the accident. However, long term cooling of the reactors 

and pools is essential during this period and has not been adequately restored to date to the best of my knowledge. A massive 

cleanup operation obviously remains for the future. 

To assist in our country’s response the Nuclear Incident Team 

Operations Center at the Department of Energy was promptly activated and has been continuously staffed by NNSA and Office of 

Nuclear Energy personnel since the accident. The focus of all DOE 

activities led by the Operations Center has been to understand the 

accident progression and offer advice and assistance to the Japanese officials, who have the direct responsibility to manage the accident recovery. The Department of Energy has deployed about 40 

people and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment including 

NNSA’s aerial measurement system and several so called Consequence Management Response Teams. 

The National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability at the 

Livermore Laboratory has been modeling transport, potential 

transport of radioactive materials. The Office of Nuclear Energy 

has established a Nuclear Energy Response Team that is utilizing 

our national lab capabilities to analyze the situation and suggest 

approaches and industry teams providing important support both 

in Japan and here. In addition Secretary Chu and White House 

Science and Tech Advisor John Holdren have reached out to Laboratory Directors and other imminent scientists for technical advice. 

Beyond our response to the accident the research development 

and deployment programs of the Office of Nuclear Energy are highly relevant to future decisions about the potential options for nuclear power in the United States. As examples, our proposed small 

modular reactor program will explore designs that offer safety advantages through extensive use of passive systems. We’re also conducting research and development at a high temperature gas reactor designs that offer inherent safety features. Our light water reactor sustainability program is exploring whether the lifetime of 

our operating reactors can be extended with no compromise in safety. 
4 

Research in fuel cycles is also within the Office of Nuclear Energy. While we await guidance from the Blue Ribbon Commission 

on America’s Nuclear Future, we’re conducting research and development into a broad range of options for the nation’s fuel cycle with 

careful attention to safety, environmental protection and non-proliferation. Safety of future systems is key to all of the DOE programs. 

Selected research areas like work on fuel claddings that cannot 

generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that are virtually impossible to melt have various, obvious relevance. The new modeling 

and simulation hub based at Oak Ridge National Laboratory will 

be providing important new capabilities to the nuclear industry, capabilities that can be used to assess and improve the safety of existing and future reactors. 

I fully concur with the recent statement made by Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman. That we view nuclear energy as a very important component for the overall portfolio we are trying to build 

for a clean energy future. The programs of the Office of Nuclear 

Energy are focused on assuring that the option for safe nuclear 

power remains open to the nation. 

By way of concluding these brief comments the earthquake and 

the resulting tsunami brought tremendous devastation on Japan. 

At the Department of Energy and indeed throughout the Administration, we are making every effort to assist the Japanese people 

in their time of need. Thank you. I’ll try to answer your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Borchardt, go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF R. WILLIAM BORCHARDT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Chairman Bingaman, Senator Murkowski, 

members of the committee, good morning. The staff of the NRC is 

deeply saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the NRC staff have had many years of very close professional and personal interaction with our regulatory counterparts in 

Japan. We would like to extend our condolences to them. 

The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure 

the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the 

American people. We have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing all available information. Review of 

this information combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight allow us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants 

continue to operate safely. There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the 

U.S. licensees. Notwithstanding the very high level of support 

being provided as a result of the events in Japan, we continue to 

maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities. 

On Friday, March 11, an earthquake hit Japan resulting in the 

shutdown of more than ten reactors. From what we know now it 

appears that the reactor’s response to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have 

caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating current power 
5 

to 6 units at the Fukushima Daiichi site. It is those 6 units that 

have received the majority of our attention since that time. 

It’s our assessment at this time that units 1, 2 and 3 have experienced some degree of core damage, but that they are currently 

stable and being cooled with fresh water. Units 2 and 3 appear to 

have some primary containment damage. There have been releases 

of radioactivity that are a continuing significant concern, including 

significant contamination in the lower levels of the unit 2 and unit 

3 turbine buildings. 

The spent fuel pools on units one through four have experienced 

varying water levels, but also have been receiving sea water from 

helicopter and spray systems. The unit 2 spent fuel pool has now 

started receiving fresh water. They are trying to change all of the 

units from fire trucks to normal pumping in the next few days. 

Tokyo Electric Power Company has restored electric power to the 

site and to the 6 reactor control rooms. The situation in general 

continues to further stabilize although there are many hurdles that 

remain. 

Shortly after four o’clock in the morning on Friday, March 11, 

the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call to inform NRC management of the earthquake. We went into the monitoring mode at the Op Center as the first concern was for possible 

tsunami impacts on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the 

West Coast and in Hawaii, Alaska and the U.S. territories in the 

Pacific. On that same day we began interactions with our Japanese 

regulatory counterparts and dispatched 2 experts to Japan to help 

at the U.S. Embassy. By Monday, March 14, we dispatched a total 

of 11 staff to Japan. We subsequently rotated in additional staff to 

continue our on the ground activities. 

The areas of focus for the NRC team in Japan are to assist the 

Japanese government with technical support as part of the USAID 

response and to support the U.S. Ambassador. 

While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way we can, the 

experience will also help us to assess the implications for U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner as possible. 

Let me also just note here in concluding this section of my remarks 

that the U.S. Government has an extensive network of radiation 

monitors across the country. We feel confident, based on the current data for monitoring at nuclear power plants and through the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s system, that there is no reason 

for concern in the U.S. regarding radioactive releases from Japan. 

I’ll now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We have since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used the philosophy of defense-in-depth, 

which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight and operation, and safety 

does not rely on any single level in order to protect the public 

health and safety. There are multiple physical barriers to fission 

product release at every reactor design. Beyond that, there are both 

diverse and redundant systems that are required to be maintained 

and in operable condition. They are frequently tested to ensure 

that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any 

scenario. 
6 

Beyond this we’ve taken advantages of lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous 

improvement. We’ve learned from the experiences across a wide 

range of situations including the Three Mile Island accident in 

1979. As a result of those lessons learned we significantly revised 

emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures. 

We’ve addressed many human factor issues regarding how control room employees operate the plant. We’ve added new requirements for hydrogen control to prevent explosions inside containment. We’ve also created requirements for enhanced control room 

displays showing the status of pumps and valves. We have a post 

accident sampling system that enables the monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel degradation. One of the 

most significant changes we made after Three Mile Island was the 

expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, which has at least 2 

full time NRC employees on each and every site with unfettered access to all licensee activities, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

As a result of the operating experience and ongoing research programs, we’ve developed requirements for severe accident management guidelines. Our program of continuous improvement based on 

this operating experience will now include evaluation of the significant events in Japan. We’ve already begun enhancing inspection 

activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff to 

look at the licensee’s readiness to deal with both design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents. We’ve also issued an information notice to licensees to make them aware of events in 

Japan and advising them to verify their capabilities to mitigate the 

conditions that result from severe accidents. 

Over the past 20 years there have been a number of new 

rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet’s preparedness 

against some of the problems we’re seeing in Japan. For example, 

the station blackout rule requires every plant in the country to 

have analyzed what the plant response would be if it were to lose 

all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for 

a period of time. Then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site. 

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impact of 

hydrogen generated for beyond design basis events. 

Regarding the type of containment design used by most of the 

heavily damaged plants in Japan, we’ve had a boiling water reactor, Mark 1, containment improvement program since the late 

1980s. This has required the installation of hardened vent systems 

for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of 

the automatic depressurization system. 

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from Japan, 

the Chairman of the NRC with the full support of the Commission 

has directed the NRC staff to establish a Senior Level Agency Task 

Force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should 

make additional improvements to our regulatory system and make 

recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This 

activity will have both near term and longer term objectives. 
7 

For the near term we’re beginning a 90-day review. This review 

will evaluate all of the currently available information from the 

Japanese event to identify immediate or near term operational or 

regulatory issues potentially affecting any of the 104 operating reactors including the spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to 

station blackouts, severe accidents, spent fuel accident progression, 

radiological consequence analysis, and severe accident management. Over this 90-day period we will develop recommendations, as 

appropriate, for changes to the inspection procedures and licensing 

guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, 

or other regulatory requirements are needed. 

The Task Force’s longer term review will begin as soon as the 

NRC has sufficient information from the events in Japan. The Task 

Force will evaluate all the technical and policy issues related to the 

event to identify additional potential research, generic issues, 

changes to the reactor oversight program, rulemakings, or adjustments to the regulatory framework. A report with the appropriate 

recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 

months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day report and 

the final report will be made publicly available in accordance with 

normal Commission procedures. 

In conclusion I want to reiterate that we continue to make our 

domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. 

fleet our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate 

safely. At the same time, we are undertaking a thorough look at 

the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts 

we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of U.S. nuclear power plants. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Borchardt follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. WILLIAM BORCHARDT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR

OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deeply saddened by the 

tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the NRC staff have had many 

years of very close and personal interaction with our regulatory counterparts and 

we would like to extend our condolences to them. 

INTRODUCTION

The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. We have been very 

closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, allows us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants continue to 

operate safely. There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function 

of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees. 

We have a long history of conservative regulatory decision-making. We have been 

using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, over more than 35 

years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we have never stopped making improvements to our regulatory framework as we learn from operating experience. 

Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided to respond to 

events in Japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities. 

I’d like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response. 

I then want to spend the bulk of my time discussing the reasons for our confidence 

in the safety of the U. S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward 

that we will take to ensure we learn any lessons we need to from events in Japan. 
8 

THE NRC’S IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN JAPAN

On Friday, March 11th an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of 

more than 10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears possible that the reactors’ response to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, 

however, appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency AC power to the 

six units at the Fukushima Daiichi site; it is those six units that have received the 

majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site 

were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were 

in previously scheduled outages. 

Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake 

and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the monitoring mode at the 

Emergency Operations Center and the first concern for the NRC was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, 

and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories in the Pacific. 

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to help at the U.S. embassy in Japan. By Monday, 

we had dispatched a total of 11 staff to Japan. We have subsequently rotated in 

additional staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of 

focus for this team are: 1) to assist the Japanese government with technical support 

as part of the USAID response; and 2) to support the U.S. ambassador. While our 

focus now is on helping Japan in any way that we can, the experience will also help 

us assess the implications for U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely 

a manner as possible. 

We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have ongoing interaction, including the White House, Congressional staff, our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies 

around the world. 

The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center continue with 

the dedicated efforts of over 250 NRC staff on a rotating basis. The entire agency 

is coordinating and pulling together in response to this event so that we can provide 

assistance to Japan while continuing the normal activities necessary to fulfill our 

domestic responsibilities. 

Let me also just note here in concluding this section of my remarks that the U.S. 

government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across this country. 

Monitoring equipment at nuclear power plants and in the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) system has not identified any radiation levels of concern in 

this country. In fact, natural background radiation from sources such as rocks, the 

sun, and buildings, is 100,000 times more than doses attributed to any level of the 

radiation from this event that has been detected in the U.S. to date. Therefore, we 

feel confident, based on current data, that there is no reason for concern in the 

United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan. 

CONTINUING CONFIDENCE IN THE SAFETY OF U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

I will now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. 

We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used 

a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the 

highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not 

rely on any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin with 

designs for every individual reactor in this country that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site. 

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to 

be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant 

is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario. 

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. 

We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including most 

significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons 

learned, we have significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves. 

The NRC has a post-accident sampling system that enables the monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel degradation. One of the most significant 
9 

changes after Three Mile Island was expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, 

which has at least two full-time NRC inspectors on site at each nuclear power plant. 

These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees’ activities. 

As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs, we have developed requirements for severe accident management guidelines. These are components and procedures developed to ensure that, in the event all of the above precautions failed and a severe accident occurred, the plant would still protect public 

health and safety. The requirements for severe accident management have been in 

effect for many years and are frequently evaluated by the NRC inspection program. 

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces 

of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a 

plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new 

procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe 

situation. 

Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience will now 

include evaluation of the significant events in Japan as well as what we can learn 

from them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the 

region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees’ readiness 

to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents. 

The information that we gather will be used to evaluate the industry’s readiness for 

similar events, and will aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory 

actions need to be taken in the immediate term. 

We have also issued an information notice to the licensees to make them aware 

of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged 

in to verify their readiness. Specifically, we have requested them to verify that their 

capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the 

loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. Licensees are verifying the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to the 

nuclear plant. They also are verifying the capability to mitigate problems associated 

with flooding and the resulting impact on systems both inside and outside of the 

plant. Also, licensees are confirming the equipment that is needed is in place for 

the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events appropriate for the site, because each site has its own unique seismic profiles. 

During the past 20 years, there have been a number of new rulemakings that 

have enhanced the domestic fleet’s preparedness against some of the problems we 

are seeing in Japan. The ‘‘station blackout’’ rule requires every plant in this country 

to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current 

so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the 

core. 

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that 

you would see under a design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment 

design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, 

which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure 

relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system. 

The final factor I want to mention with regard to our belief in the ongoing safety 

of the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place 

that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees’ emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis. 

THE PATH AHEAD

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events in Japan, the 

Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review 

of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and make recommendations to the 

Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both near-term and 

longer-term objectives. 
10 

For the near term effort, we are beginning a 90-day review. This review will 

evaluate all of the currently available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting 

the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to 

station blackouts, severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression, radiological 

consequence analysis, and severe accident management issues regarding equipment. 

Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for 

changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend 

whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed. 

This 90-day effort will include a 30-day ‘‘Quick Look Report’’ to the Commission 

to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. fleet 

based on information we have available at that time. Preparing a ‘‘Quick Look Report’’ will also ensure that the Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts 

and prepared to resolve any policy recommendations that surface. I believe we will 

have limited stakeholder involvement in the first 30 days to accomplish this. However over the 90-day and longer-term efforts we will seek additional stakeholder 

input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report will be provided to the Commission 

and to the public. The task force’s longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC 

has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan. 

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event 

to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that 

should be pursued by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency 

issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek 

input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance 

with normal Commission processes. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that 

the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there is 

a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet underway, and we are 

continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, 

we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the 

U.S. fleet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks to both of you for that testimony. Let me 

start with questions. We’ll have 5 minute round of questions. 

On the Fukushima Daiichi plant let me ask if there have been 

reports about high levels of radioactive water, radioactivity in the 

water that is found in the turbine building’s basements. Do we 

know what the source of that radioactive water is? Do we know the 

extent of the problem that that could create going forward? 

Either of you? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes. We have very limited information on this 

as with many other aspects. But we believe that the water is the 

result of the bleed and feed process that they have been using to 

keep water in the reactor cores and in the containment of the 

units. 

It is leaking out. The exact flow path of that leakage has not 

been determined. But it is a result of the water that they’ve been 

injected since shortly after the onset of the event. 

Mr. LYONS. I can add to that, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. LYONS. About complications. As I noted, it is essential that 

they restore dependable, long term cooling to those systems. The 
11 

existence of the high backgrounds from that leak water, whatever 

the source, are certainly complicating those efforts. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Let me ask about the thrust to use passive safety features and 

passive designs and get to a point where if power fails you don’t 

have this kind of potential for crisis that we’ve seen occur in Japan. 

To what extent are we trying to ensure that those passive type designs and systems and safety features be put in place in our nuclear power plants? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. In the United States there are 2 principle reactor designs that are called passive reactor designs. The reason 

they’re called passive is because, as you mentioned, they don’t rely 

on alternating current in order to respond to an event of this magnitude. There are no pumps that need to start and run off of alternating current. Any valves that need to change position change because of stored air, a pneumatic system or off of a DC battery 

power supply. 

Then once they’re running, they rely on natural processes like 

gravity in order to create a water flow to keep the core cool. These 

are designs that have undergone extensive NRC review. They are 

receiving approval. 

In fact, there are designs that are being planned for construction 

in the United States that utilize this design concept. 

The CHAIRMAN. But I’m right in thinking that none of the 104 

currently operating plants have these design features in them at 

the current time. Is that right? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. That’s correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Dr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Bingaman, just a comment that the small 

modular reactors that are of great interest looking into the future 

in our program, each of the light water, small modular systems 

that has been proposed is a highly passive system. That’s certainly 

one of the aspects that we look toward in terms of the potential for 

the future of the small modular systems as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Mr. Borchardt, let me ask you on re-licensing. I gather that there 

are quite a few nuclear power plants in this country that are scheduled for re-licensing or at least are going to be applying for re-licensing sometime in the next few years. To what extent do you 

think this development in Japan will impact on the actions of the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission on those re-licensing applications? 

Is there any way to judge that at this point? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Senator, as you mentioned, over half of the 104 

operating reactors in the United States have already received a license renewal for an additional 20 years of operation. We expect 

that the other half will continue with either an in-process license 

renewal review or they will apply for a license renewal in the future. It is our intent through the lessons learned programs and our 

continuous operational oversight of the operating fleet that if there 

was a design change necessary in order to adapt the plants to what 

we’re learning from Japan, that we would take that action absent 

or outside of the license renewal review process. We would take 

that without hesitation. 
12 

So there’s no technical reason that I’m aware of that this would 

impact the license renewal process for the remaining plants in the 

U.S. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, 

thank you. 

Mr. Borchardt, you mentioned the task force and the 90-day review that you will be undertaking here. So much of what we need 

to learn, of course, we’re not able to know at this point in time because we cannot safely go into the facility. Do we have any idea 

how long we are looking at to get these units cooled down so that 

in fact we can enter the area, examine the reactors, look at the 

spent fuel? What do you anticipate? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I really can’t even hazard a guess on how long 

that will be. But the reason that we’re approaching with a 90-day 

lessons learned immediately is because we didn’t want to wait for 

whenever that time period is. We think that there are things we 

can evaluate, should evaluate, immediately. That’s why we’re beginning that review. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Dr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Murkowski, just as a possible addition to 

that. The Department has provided information to the government 

of Japan on radiation hardened robotic capabilities available within 

the country. A shipment is being readied. I don’t know if it has left 

yet. 

But there will be radiation hardened robotics available soon. I 

can’t say exactly when, in Japan, which could provide some of the 

information that you’re asking about. Certainly not all we need, 

but some. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do I understand correctly that Japan did 

not have any of the robotics that we are making available to them 

at this time? 

Mr. LYONS. I can’t speak to whether such capabilities are available in Japan. I can only speak that the government of Japan has 

been very, very interested in understanding the capabilities that 

can be brought to bear from this country and we have provided 

that information. They have identified needs. We’re moving expeditiously to ship, not only the robots, but also operators who perhaps 

will be used to train Japanese operators. We don’t know yet how 

close it will be necessary for the operators to be to the site. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Let me ask a question about the decisionmaking process at the NRC to evacuate U.S. residents. The decision was made for evacuation with a 50-mile radius within the reactor itself. Of course, initially the determination from the Japanese was that it was 12 and a half miles. Then they bumped that 

to 19 miles. 

Can you tell me how this decision was reached? Who made it? 

Was it a vote of all the Commissioners? How did you conclude that 

50 miles was the appropriate evacuation range? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. The factors that were taken into consideration 

include all the indications that we had a strong belief that there 

was likely fuel damage in three reactors. There were degraded 
13 

water level conditions in at least 2 of the spent fuel pools at the 

time. There were elevated radiation releases from those plants. 

Given those realities and then given the uncertainty of the progression at that time, we ran some models to see what kind of releases would be possible under those scenarios. Made the conservative decision that although the conditions did not exist at that instant to require an evacuation, we thought that it was a conservative and prudent recommendation to make. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. You mentioned the radiation monitoring 

units that we have in place. Alaska received 3 that we understand 

are up. I hope that all three are up now. 

But there’s a lot of concern about what may end up in our 

oceans, impact to the fisheries. Do we have radiation monitors off 

of Honshu that are measuring anything in the ocean or is it just 

monitors that are evaluating the air? 

Mr. LYONS. The Department of Energy systems are, as I mentioned, the airborne system that is monitoring ground contamination, but not out over the ocean. It’s the EPA, through their 

RadNet has made the monitors that you mentioned in Alaska. 

Guam, Hawaii has added several additional monitors. I am not 

aware of monitoring capability within the ocean that we have. That 

certainly could be added if it was deemed necessary. 

I should add that the Department of Energy through the 

calculational capabilities at Livermore using the source terms developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as being the worse 

cases. We do not anticipate a significant health effect in any of the 

United States areas. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to the 

panelists. Thank you for being here. 

I think we begin to learn that just because an event is improbable, doesn’t mean that it’s impossible. In that spirit, let me turn 

to the design of the spent fuel pools. It seems like, based on what 

you’ve told us this morning, that’s a key part of the ongoing crisis 

there at Daiichi. 

I understand that the same design is employed at almost a quarter of our plants here in the U.S. It seems like this is a design flaw. 

I’m surprised we hadn’t addressed it previously. But what are we 

doing now and what can we do to address it in the months and the 

years ahead? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Even after the events of 9/11 the NRC took a 

concerted review effort to look at risks to the plants regardless of 

the cause. One of the issues that we looked at is optimizing the 

ways that you can fill the spent fuel pool and keep water injected 

into the reactor vessel to keep the core cool. So there are a number 

of both procedures and pieces of equipment that can be put into 

place in order to keep the spent fuel pool full. 

So that has been greatly enhanced, as well as having a backup 

system and power supplies to do the same thing. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. Lyons, do you have thoughts both from the 

point of view of the Department of Energy but I would certainly 

welcome your personal opinions on ways in which we can make 

spent fuel broad storage systems safer and moving forward? 
14 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Udall, I was on the NRC as we conducted 

many of those evaluations, extremely careful evaluations of the 

safety of the existing spent fuel pools and dry casks. Using the best 

information available at the time those both storage systems were 

deemed to be safe. I look forward to the review that will be conducted by the NRC, as Bill said, the pools will certainly be part of 

that review. Whether that will lead to any suggestions for changes, 

I await their review. 

I do not have concerns today based on the NRC studies to date. 

Senator UDALL. I know you have an official point of view, but 

personally do you have any other thoughts about how we might 

make spent fuel rod storage safer in the future, just thinking creatively, thinking as the engineer that I know you are? 

Dr. LYONS. Senator Udall, I think my comments should say that 

we should await the review of the NRC. We certainly include within our program’s research on the longevity of dry cask storage that 

may prove to be relevant in these discussions. But that would be 

the main area that I can think of offhand that would be applicable 

to your question. 

Senator UDALL. I believe there is a design where the spent fuel 

rods are stored in the basement or the lower level. 

Mr. LYONS. Yes, that will be the case on the—I’m sorry. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, and I was just going to talk about the engineering challenges to do so. I have to believe that it’s easiest to 

bring the fuel rods out of the reactor at the top. Then you move 

them at that same level into these spent fuel rods. But they’re 5 

or 6 stories up in the air. Gravity works against us in that kind 

of situation. 

Mr. LYONS. Bill can help me on this. But I believe all of the PWR 

pressurized water reactors in this country utilize ground level or 

near ground level storage of the spent fuel poles. Knowing of your 

interest in the small modular reactors with their underground 

siting, the intent there is that spent fuel pools would be sited well 

underground in those designs. 

Senator UDALL. I appreciate your mentioning of that new technology, that new engineering approach. 

Mr. Borchardt, did you want to comment? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, Senator, I’ll just mention that it was really 

the difference between the boiling water reactors that are above 

grade and the pressurized water reactors that are near ground 

level is really just one of the original design philosophy during the 

early development of those designs, probably in the 1950s and 

1960s. So there isn’t really a technical barrier that would prevent 

changing that configuration for a new design. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is about to expire. But again this is obviously a very timely topic. 

I look forward to working with you as we move forward to understanding what’s happened. I think we’re all frustrated with the 

various kinds of information, that’s often contradictory, coming out 

of Japan. For the record I will ask you both to comment on how 

we could do a better job given a situation developing in our own 

country. I think that’s added to the sense that this is out of control 

and the improbable has become actually the possible. So thank you 

for being here today. 
15 

Mr. LYONS. Certainly. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this briefing and the 2 of you for being here. Obviously working 

together to try to deal with this issue in the best way that we can. 

Senator Udall actually went down a line of questioning that is 

similar to mine. On the quarter of the reactors that we have that 

are boiling water reactors here in our country. Is it your sense that 

over the course of time we’ve done things to alleviate the same type 

of risk in our own country? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, sir. As I mentioned we’ve done a number 

of improvements to the design. Some were not specific to the boiling water reactors, but included both pressurized and boiling water 

reactors like the station blackout rule, which looks at the loss of 

alternating current, complete loss at a site. 

There are things that are specific to boiling water reactors, which 

is the hardened vent that’s the way to relieve pressure from inside 

the containment. That is a design improvement. We’ve required the 

inerting inside the containment that’s to prevent the possibility of 

an explosion by having the containment inerted with nitrogen. 

Again, generically for all reactor designs, we’ve looked at severe 

accident mitigation guidelines. These are programs and procedures, 

pieces of equipment that exist in the plants. That say even with all 

the careful design, all the design requirements we’ve imposed, 

what if the unthinkable still happens? We should have systems in 

place to adapt to that. So we’ve done those at all of the plants in 

the country. 

Senator CORKER. So I’ll knock on wood as I ask this question. I 

mean, your sense is that you’ve seen nothing that’s occurred in 

Japan thus far that you haven’t already tried to engineer or change 

in our own existing facilities of that nature? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I would say that’s true. But that’s why we’re 

doing this extensive, both short term and longer term review. So 

that we can do a thorough analysis and make sure that we’re not 

missing something. 

Senator CORKER. You know, Senator Udall asked a little bit 

about the storage situations. I know we’ve had a debate in this 

country that is sort of stalled out at present. But we’ve looked at 

a national repository. I mean one of the reasons we have these 

spent fuel rods onsite as we do in this country is we never came 

to an agreement about what we might do with them over the long 

haul. 

Are there any editorial comments you all might make about regional or national repositories or? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Corker, I think the main comment I’d make 

is that the Secretary created the Blue Ribbon Commission to look 

at the back end of the fuel cycle to include repository, possible reprocessing issues. That Commission which certainly includes a 

number of technical and other leaders from around the country is 

fairly close to their interim report anticipated in July. Personally 

I’m very hopeful that that report will provide some important suggestions and perhaps guidelines as the Nation moves forward with 

this challenge. 
16 

Senator CORKER. But you don’t want to state what you hope 

those guidelines say, I guess. You’ll wait. 

It will be interesting to see. It certainly at some point would love 

to hear comments about a catastrophe of this nature happening 

and how that might have affected things if they had had a different 

type of storage mechanism. 

Back to the SMUs, the small modular reactors. They utilize a 

more of a natural cooling process. I too am very interested in that 

technology. I’m hoping we’re getting ready to move ahead. You 

know, these are reactors where U.S. you know, U.S. engineering 

can be more greatly deployed and certainly at lesser capital up 

front. 

That more natural cooling process that occurs, is there anything 

about this recent disaster that makes you feel those are going to 

be even more useful to us or more safe or less safe? Have you 

learned anything from the Japanese incident regarding them? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Corker, I don’t know specific from the Japanese incident but in general as we discussed earlier those small 

modular reactors that we’re interested in would have highly passive systems. They would rely as Bill Borchardt already noted, on 

natural forces, on gravity, on convection. They would not require 

pumps. 

At least one obvious concern in Japan has been the loss of AC 

power, the loss of the pumping capability. That would not be an 

issue for a highly passive system such as we’re exploring for the 

SMRs. 

Senator CORKER. I assume what you’re saying is that some of the 

failures that have occurred recently in Japan likely would not occur 

with these SMUs. 

Mr. LYONS. At least the small modular reactors would not depend on the use of pumps in an accident situation. So that is one 

very, very major difference. The designs in Japan are very much 

dependent on such pumping capability. 

Senator CORKER. Now I know my time is up. This is a yes/no. 

I’ll move quickly. 

The Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade sort of does 

what—they sort of do both sides of the equation. They promote nuclear, Japanese nuclear products. They also regulate them. 

Have you seen any issue there as it relates to lack of oversight 

because of that dual mandate? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Senator, no, we’re not aware of any interference. There is a very strong focus internationally about independence of the regulator. There has recently been an IAEA review 

done of the Japanese regulator and they did not identify any of 

that kind of interference concern that I think you’re referring to. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Gentlemen for your testimony. 

In the 2006 report published by the National Academies, they 

recommended that the spent fuel rods stored in pools onsite should 

be arranged to place old, cool fuel rods next to newer hotter rods 

to prevent hot spots and fires in the event that the pools lost 

enough water to cover the rods. In an editorial in the Washington 
17 

Post on March 24, Matthew Bunn wrote that despite these recommendations ‘‘no such action has been taken either in the United 

States or in Japan.’’ Mr. Borchardt, does the National Regulatory 

Commission have plans to review these recommendations and possibly implement them? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Senator I believe, and you can ask perhaps the 

next panel, but I believe it’s a common practice to do such a thing 

at the plants in the United States that there is a movement of fuel 

in order to optimize the storage conditions in the spent fuel pool. 

But we would certainly—— 

Senator FRANKEN. That’s at odds with what was written in the 

Post. But we’ll ask the next panel. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Sir. 

Senator FRANKEN. We have a nuclear plant in Monticello, Minnesota that basically is the same design as the Fukushima reactors. You know, we’re not going to have, probably an earthquake 

in Minnesota and we’re probably if we have a tsunami there we 

probably got bigger problems. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. But we do have floods. Is there any chance 

that the backup generation of places like Prairie Island in Minnesota or Monticello could be overwhelmed by unforeseen levels of 

flooding? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Monticello and every other plant in the country 

has an extensive review done before original licensing that looks at 

that specific site and looks at the historical record for things like 

flooding, tornados, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and does a 

review using that historical record to make sure that that plant 

can respond to all of the kinds of natural events that happen. 

Senator FRANKEN. Do they do those kinds of reviews in Japan? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I can’t really speak to that. I know they do—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Wouldn’t that be—— 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Some part of design basis—they consider some 

of those factors, but the specifics of how Japan did their licensing 

site reviews, I don’t know. 

Senator FRANKEN. Wouldn’t that be a good thing to know? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Certainly. Yes, sir. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. I would suggest hopping right on that. 

On terms of the cost of nuclear power has the events in 

Fukushima changed any sense of what the costs of nuclear power 

is vis-a`-vis other sources of electricity? Either of you? 

Mr. LYONS. At least the way I would respond, Senator, would be 

that that remains for the results of the NRC evaluation. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. 

Mr. LYONS. To the extent that they identify needed changes then 

that might change the cost equation. But I couldn’t speculate for 

now. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Fine. 

Let’s say that we have a few reactors—what happened here is we 

had a very large earthquake and then a tsunami. Are there any reactors in the United States, say in California, that are built near 

faults and oceans or just one ocean? 

[Laughter.] 
18 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Of course there are and, as I mentioned in my 

previous answer, what we do is we look at the earthquake history 

for the plants in California, for example, and do an evaluation of 

the distance and the conditions that would be felt on the site. So 

you have to consider what kind of soil and formations exist between the fault line and the plant. That distills down to how much 

motion you will see at the plant. 

The systems have to be designed to withstand that motion plus 

a little bit more. There’s always margins that are built into the reviews. The same is done looking at flooding or tsunamis and other 

natural events. 

So that’s part of the design basis. Every plant therefore has its 

own design basis and will have its own requirements based upon 

its specific geographic location. 

Senator FRANKEN. I see. Again, your testimony is you’re not 

aware of whether or not they did that same kind of analysis in 

Japan? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. That’s right. I can’t speak to the Japanese design criteria. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Because my feeling is they didn’t expect 

this. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both 

for being here today. 

There are going to be ongoing lessons learned from this tragedy. 

That’s going to continue the situation on the ground actually, still 

is evolving. Our focus is clearly helping the Japanese people get 

through this disaster. I was happy to see Secretary Chu publicly 

assuring Americans that the people in the United States are in no 

danger from the tragedy in Japan. He’s also indicated that the Administration supports building additional nuclear power plants. 

Senator Corker talked about needs to finalize a long term solution for storage of nuclear waste. The Administration has stopped 

the long term nuclear storage facility and has created the Blue Ribbon Commission to look at the problem. As you discussed, you said 

we’d have a report possibly in July. 

Fundamentally is it safer to store nuclear waste in temporary 

storage facilities around the country or at a permanent disposal 

site? 

Dr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Barrasso, the way I would respond is that 

the NRC would evaluate both. Both can be made safe and their requirements would assure that safety. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Borchardt. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I agree with Dr. Lyons. 

Senator BARRASSO. When you talk about the report and I think 

you said, hopefully soon, perhaps July. You think that that Commission will have an opportunity then to really learn the lessons 

of what we’ve seen happening in Japan to apply those or will we 

have a report they’ve been working on and they’re kind of ready 

to put out from preparation prior to the current disaster that we’re 

studying? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Barrasso, I don’t have any detailed information of what they will have in that report. That should be left up 
19 

to them. But the report in July is their so-called interim report. It 

is due July 29. 

The plan after that interim was to allow 6 months for public 

comment, further refinement and the final report in January of 

next year. In response then to your question I think there’s very 

adequate time for the BRC to take whatever lessons may be necessary from Japan and at least incorporate it in the final, if not the 

interim. 

Senator BARRASSO. The more recent news, Reuters reported this 

morning that plutonium has been found in the soil at the nuclear 

complex. I mean, it was the reactor No. 3 was the only one to use 

plutonium in the fuel mix, may indicate a breach in the containment mechanism. Could you speak to that? 

Mr. LYONS. At least the reports that I saw were reporting trace 

levels of plutonium. The report I saw was that it was still debatable exactly what those levels were derived from. All operating reactors whether they start with any plutonium in the fuel or not, 

build up plutonium in the course of operation. 

So finding plutonium, it was derived from either the operating 

reactors or the spent fuel pools, would not be regarded as a major 

surprise. Certainly it would be a concern if it were in significant 

levels. At least anything I’ve seen was it’s not significant at this 

point. 

Senator BARRASSO. Then the New York Times today reported 

that highly contaminated water, I think Senator Bingaman commented on this, could actually leak into the ocean. What are the 

implications of that? 

Mr. LYONS. Certainly that has to be monitored from the standpoint of fisheries from food products. There are other agencies in 

our government that would be tracking whether there were any 

concerns from a U.S. perspective on that. Certainly the Japanese 

have adequate resources to be verifying that from their own standpoint. 

I think it’s fair, certainly from the Department of Energy’s standpoint and I would guess from the NRC’s standpoint, our focus now 

very, very much is on controlling the accident, stabilizing the accident and trying to move toward a situation where we can see a 

long term path toward eventual resolution, whatever that may be. 

So our focus now has not been on that particular issue, but that 

may well be for other agencies and the Japanese government. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks for the testimony. 

Help me out a little bit here because I’m somewhat new to all 

of this. I don’t tend to begin to be an expert in any sense of the 

word. But we see these news reports that keep coming out. The 

public reacts in a way that, potentially I think, could undermine 

any kind of consensus building for the place of nuclear energy in 

addressing energy needs in the future whether it’s here in the 

United States or elsewhere in the world. 

Obviously the carbon footprint of a nuclear plant is extraordinarily less if virtually nothing compared to other sources of energy. So a wrong perception or a wrong conclusion in terms of how 
20 

we should go forward with nuclear energy possibilities for our 

country and others could lead to some very significant consequences in a whole number of ways. So I’m trying to get my head 

around a little bit about what we see in the paper everyday or see 

on TV every day. 

Every time a plume of steam escapes it’s immediately on the networks. The headlines talk about and things that have just been 

mentioned here, plutonium potentially leaking into the seawater 

and so forth and so on. Then we read about news that has come 

out about babies should not be drinking milk in Tokyo. Vegetables 

may be contaminated. 

Give me some perspective in terms of levels of radiation where 

we need to be concerned as opposed to those where it’s something 

that is not at such a serious nature. For instance in your testimony, Dr. Lyons I believe it was, basically stated that some of the 

levels of detection here in the United States emanating from the 

Japanese coast line. We get 100,000 more radiation, units of radiation or however measures you do, just simply from natural causes, 

rocks, sun, buildings, etcetera, etcetera. 

So I’m trying to put all this in perspective because when you look 

at the paper the average person doesn’t pay any attention to this 

100,000 times more. That was what was recorded in Tokyo relative 

to vegetables or so forth. I mean, is this something that should 

cause us the kind of concern that we’re having or—I’m just trying 

to put it in better perspective. 

Mr. LYONS. There have been several press releases from the Department of Energy trying to assist with the general point that 

you’re making, Senator. You’re indeed right that we essentially live 

in a sea of radiation. We all have natural exposures of the order 

of 300 milligram to natural causes in a year. A milligram happens 

to be a convenient unit. 

To put that somewhat into perspective a flight across the country, you pick up about three millirem simply from that flight. Cosmic rays as you went up in altitude. But radiation is everywhere. 

It’s important. We have certainly tried and we will continue to try 

to put in perspective the radiation levels that are measured. 

I don’t mean to suggest that there are not harmful levels where 

the EPA and others have defined so called protection action guidelines. We pay careful attention to those guidelines to assure that 

levels are far below. Levels in the United States are many, many 

orders of magnitude below anything close to a protective action 

guideline. 

Senator COATS. What I’m—— 

Mr. LYONS. In some areas in Japan they are going to have to be 

much more careful with attention to at least their version of protection action guidelines. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Senator, if I could just add. The EPA monitoring sites and all of the operating reactors in the country are continuing to take samples and readings. We haven’t seen any readings that would be of any concern whatsoever to public health and 

safety. 

Mr. LYONS. To quantify that slightly more, we have the aerial 

monitoring system which is taking countless measurements around 

the site. Just to give you one figure, the highest within two and a 
21 

half miles of the site. They haven’t gone any closer. Within two and 

a half miles of the site there has been no level detected greater 

than 30 millirem back to that unit per hour. 

As the flights have continued those levels have gone down. But 

they are seeing—they are measuring levels of radiation well above 

background. That information is available on DOE’s website, available to the Japanese. We’re trying to share that information as 

much as possible. 

Senator COATS. Yes. I don’t think that really has been understood or maybe even shared. So 30 millirem within what circumference? 

Mr. LYONS. That was the highest level observed for flights that 

came within two and a half miles of the site. There certainly are 

higher levels closer than that. 

Senator COATS. Right. 

Mr. LYONS. But our crews and our planes are not going any closer—30 millirem per hour. 

Senator COATS. Put that 30 millirem in perspective to the danger 

level of that. 

Mr. LYONS. The level to which the NRC, the EPA recommend the 

public stay below in a year is 100 millirem. So that would be, if 

it was 30 millirem per hour that would be of the order of 3 hours 

would be the maximum you should spend at that. Again, that is 

the highest dose observed. It’s gone down every day that they’ve 

flown since. 

Senator COATS. Within two and a half miles? 

Mr. LYONS. Within two and a half miles. 

Senator COATS. OK. 

Mr. LYONS. But levels on the site are much higher. 

Senator COATS. Of course, but I think the perspective is is that 

these types of levels are floating across the Nation of Japan, hanging over Tokyo, reaching the West Coast and so forth. So I think 

it’s important that you put that in that perspective. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Bingaman. Thank you to 

the panel for your informative and helpful testimony today. 

I’ll simply reaffirm what Senator Coats was just asking about. I 

do think there is broad concern in the general public about radiation and dosages. As I’m sure you’re both far more familiar even 

than I am, general confusion about orders of magnitude, about consequence and about possible impact on the public health. I happen 

to represent a state that has no nuclear facilities within it but is 

within 50 miles of four others that are currently operating, one of 

which is of the design of the reactors of question. 

As I understand the incident and reading and listening to your 

testimony today, one of the core areas of concern and potential future action has to do with backup power with spent fuel rod pools 

and in particular with battery power. The unique circumstances 

that occurred in Japan may not occur in the United States. But 

there are other circumstances that might give rise to the need for 

a more than four or 8 hour backup power scenario. 

What are you doing to look at safety training and backup power 

generation and in particular battery capacity to focus on the issue 
22 

of the spent fuel rod pools. Particularly given the lack of a clear 

path forward for the long term for managing spent fuel rods in the 

United States? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Senator, the types of issues that you raise are 

exactly why we’re putting together this lessons learned. We’re 

going to look at both the station blackout rule that required a review of the coping capability of all the U.S. reactors to deal with 

the loss of all alternating current, and then look at what conditions, capabilities exist at all of the 104 reactors to see if we need 

to strengthen regulatory requirements. 

I mean one of the obvious questions we’ll be asking ourselves is 

do we need an enhanced battery supply, a battery supply that can 

last longer? We already have safety related, well protected, constantly tested diesel generators that are onsite. There is a day tank 

that provides fuel oil to those diesel generators that’s also protected. So there is a robust capability that exists already. 

But given what we’ve learned in Japan, it’s obvious the question 

that we need to ask ourselves. Do we need to make it even more 

robust and stronger? So that will be part of the review we’ll be 

doing. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. I’m glad to hear that is a part of the 

review. I was pleased to see that there was a prompt move toward 

a top to bottom review nationally. 

My closing concern would be to simply urge you to then implement whatever the outcome is of that review. I understand this is 

an industry that already is subject to stringent, regulatory review 

to significant safety and backup procedures. But I think this particular incidence in order to address legitimate concerns of the 

broad American public we need to focus on the specific failure 

mechanisms here. On making sure, particularly for the longer 

term, that we’ve dealt with spent fuel and exactly how it’s being 

stored and maintained in ways that couldn’t lead to a reoccurrence 

of this sort of an accident in the United States, so. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. On the subject of spent fuel I mean, let me just 

say, that we’ve done a thorough evaluation of that storage, in either the wet spent fuel pool or in dry cask storage; which many of 

the plants in the country are currently using, and both provide 

adequate protection and safety. 

Senator COONS. Are spent fuel pools subject to also in the event 

of the loss of power they have lower backup power standards currently is that accurate? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. They require, over the long term, to have a circulating pump if you will, that provides cooling to the pool. But it 

would be many days as long as that there’s no damage to the spent 

fuel pool and no leakage of water out. It would take many days for 

it to heat up to a point where it began to boil off and you would 

lose water level. 

What the industry has done in coordination with some of the regulatory requirements we imposed after 9/11 was came up with 

other backup ways to put water into the pool. I mean, using fire 

hoses and other things that aren’t even hard height to the spent 

fuel pool because it’s really a simple issue. All you need to do is 

keep the pool full and you protect the integrity of that fuel. 
23 

Senator COONS. Thank you both. We look forward to the outcome 

of the 90-day review. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. I thank you both for your testimony. Dr. Lyons I 

wanted to start out with a question to you. I know much of your 

career has been devoted to nuclear safety issues. I suspect you 

would agree that the people in Japan are doing everything they 

can, doing the best job they can to deal with the situation. 

But I was wondering as you look at it, if you had been in charge 

of this from the outset, knowing what you know now, is there anything different that you might have done than was done in Japan 

to deal with this disaster? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Lee, as part of the standard procedures that 

the NRC would go through to say nothing of the special review, it 

would be a very careful lessons learned study of any event whether 

it’s Three Mile Island, whether it’s 9/11, whether it’s the DavisBesse events recently. There’s always lessons learned and careful 

study of what transpired. 

That needs to be done in this case as well. As was stated earlier 

we do not have enough detail now to really do that. But as that 

detail becomes available it will be very important, as I think you’re 

suggesting, to understand in detail the steps that were taken and 

to understand whether an alternative sequence of steps, different 

timing of steps, could have been more effective. 

But for now, that’s a little premature. We’re very much focused 

on trying to help them with restoring the cooling which almost 

independent of the accident sequence that got us here. They need 

to restore that cooling. 

Senator LEE. OK. Are you fairly confident that once we’ve reviewed all of that and had the opportunity to conduct the post 

mortem of what happened that you’ll be in a position to be able to 

evaluate whether if the same thing, the exact same set of environmental conditions that occurred there, if those were presented here 

in the United States, whether or not we’d be able to withstand 

them without a meltdown or without the release of radiation that 

occurred there? 

Mr. LYONS. I guess I’d perhaps word it just—I mean, in general, 

yes, sir. But slightly differently because as Bill indicated for each 

of our plants there is an assessment of what can happen from a 

natural disaster perspective. Depending on the location of the plant 

one will evaluate different natural phenomenon. 

But as part of the review that the NRC must undertake there 

has to be another check of whether there has been a sufficiently 

robust estimate of what those maximum cases could be. 

Senator LEE. OK. Then I’ve got a couple of questions for either 

or both of you just dealing with spent fuel following up on what 

some of my colleagues have asked. 

First of all, can either of you tell me what’s the biggest single impediment to our using spent fuel reprocessing in the United States 

as one approach to take with spent fuel rods? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator, reprocessing certainly is one of the issues 

that the Blue Ribbon Commission will be studying. I’m sure it will 

be part of their recommendations. It’s not particularly obvious to 
24 

me how reprocessing or not would have dramatically changed at 

least what we’ve seen to date. 

But again, from the U.S. perspective we need to await the Blue 

Ribbon Commission and within my office we have a range of research programs looking at different potential options or solutions 

for the back end of the fuel cycle. Those, that research, guided by 

the BRC, I hope will allow us to suggest options that Congress may 

want to consider for the future for used fuel management. 

Senator LEE. But in the meantime you consider indefinite onsite 

storage, sustainable practice between now and whenever we get 

that figured out? 

Mr. LYONS. I was at the NRC when we did—when they did a 

number of evaluations of the safety and integrity of spent fuel 

casks. I have to admit that I have never seen a spent fuel cask 

until I was at the NRC and had many opportunities to see them. 

These are rather impressive structures. 

Yes, I have great confidence in the safety of dry cask storage. 

You know, I mentioned that we do have research programs within 

my office as does the NRC at trying to understand how long a duration one should consider for the use of dry casks. I don’t think 

we know what that upper ground is. We need research to establish 

that. But these are very impressive structures. 

Senator LEE. OK. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski, did you have other questions of this panel or should we go to the second panel? 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I think in the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, we should go to the second panel. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank both of you for your excellent testimony. We will go ahead and dismiss you and allow the second 

panel to come forward. 

Our second panel is Mr. David Lochbaum, who is the Director of 

Nuclear Power Project with the Union of Concerned Scientists. 

Also Mr. Anthony Pietrangelo, I think I’ve got that pronunciation 

correct, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer with the 

Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Mr. Pietrangelo, did I correctly pronounce your name? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Why don’t we go ahead? Mr. Lochbaum, if you’d like to proceed 

with your testimony and then we’ll hear Mr. Pietrangelo and then 

we’ll have a few questions. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR 

SAFETY PROJECT, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Sorry. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 

Japan experienced a station blackout. A station blackout occurs 

when a nuclear power plant loses electrical power from all sources 

except that by onsite batteries. The normal power supply energizes 

all the equipment needed to operate the plant on a daily basis as 

well as the emergency equipment needed during an accident. 

When a normal power supply is lost, backup power is supplied 

from onsite emergency diesel generators that provide electricity 

only to the smaller set of equipment needed to cool the reactor 

cores and maintain the containment’s integrity. At Fukushima the 
25 

earthquake caused the normal power supply to be lost while the 

tsunami caused the backup power supply to be lost. This placed the 

plant into a station blackout. 

Batteries provided sufficient power for the steam driven systems 

to cool the reactor cores on units one, 2 and 3. When those batteries were exhausted there were no cooling systems for the reactor 

cores or the spent fuel pools. Fuel in the reactor cores and some 

spent fuel pools has been damaged by overheating. 

Had either normal or backup power been restored before the batteries were depleted we would not be here today. There are lessons 

that can and should be applied to lessen the vulnerabilities at U.S. 

reactors. I cannot emphasize enough that the lessons from Japan 

apply to all U.S. reactors not just the boiling water reactors like 

those affected at Fukushima. None are immune to station blackout 

problems. All must be made less vulnerable to those problems. 

As at Fukushima, U.S. reactors are designed for a station blackout of only a short duration. Eleven U.S. reactors are designed to 

cope for a station blackout lasting 8 hours as were the reactors in 

Japan. Ninety-three of our reactors are designed to cope for only 

4 hours. One lesson from Fukushima is the need to provide workers with options for dealing with a prolonged station blackout. 

In other words the moment that any U.S. reactor enters a station 

blackout condition response efforts should proceed along three parallel paths. 

First, restoration of the electrical grid as soon as possible. 

Second, recovery of one or more emergency diesel generators as 

soon as possible. 

Third, acquisition of additional batteries and/or temporary battery generators as soon as possible. 

If either of the first 2 paths leads to success, the station blackout 

ends and the re-energized safety systems can cool the reactor core 

and spent fuel pool. 

If the first 2 paths lead to failure, success on the third path provides enough time for the first 2 paths to achieve belated success. 

The timeline associated with the third path should determine 

whether additional batteries are required at existing facilities. For 

example, the existing battery life may be sufficient when a reactor 

is located near a facility where temporary generators are readily 

available. Such as the San Onofre Nuclear plant in California 

which is right next door to the U.S. Marine Base at Camp Pendleton. 

When a reactor is more remotely located it may be necessary to 

add onsite batteries to increase the chance that the third path 

leads to success when the first 2 paths do not. 

A reminder from Fukushima involves vulnerability at spent fuel 

pools. All U.S. reactors have more irradiated fuel in the spent fuel 

pool than exists in the reactor core. All U.S. reactors have the 

spent fuel pool cool by fewer and less reliable systems than are provided for the reactor core. At all U.S. reactors the spent fuel pool 

is housed in less robust containment than surrounds the reactor 

core. 

More irradiated fuel that is less well protected and less well defended is an undo hazard. There are 2 simple measures that can 

be taken to better manage this risk. 
26 

Accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from the spent fuel pools to 

dry cask storage. 

Second, upgrade the guidelines for how to address an emergency 

and provide operator training for spent fuel pool problems. 

Currently the U.S. spent fuel storage strategy is to nearly fill the 

spent fuel pools to capacity and then transfer fuel into dry cask 

storage. This keeps the spent fuel pools filled nearly to capacity, 

thus maintaining the risk as high as possibly achievable. A better 

strategy would be to reduce the inventory of irradiated fuels in the 

pool to only the fuel discharged from the reactor in the last 5 years. 

Less irradiated fuel in the pools generates lower heat load. The 

lower heat load gives workers more time to restore cooling or the 

water inventory in the spent fuel pool. If irradiated fuel in the 

spent fuel pool did become damaged, having fewer assemblies in 

the spent fuel pool means the radioactive cloud is much smaller. 

Following the accident at Three Mile Island reactor owners significantly upgraded emergency procedures and training that the 

operators relied upon. Prior to that accident the procedures relied 

on the operators diagnosing what happened and taking steps to fix 

that problem. If they misdiagnosed the accident the guidelines 

could lead them to taking the wrong steps for the actual accident 

that they faced. 

Today’s procedures guide the operator’s response to abnormally 

high pressure or unusually low water level without undo regard for 

what caused that condition. These revamped emergency procedures 

represent significant improvements over the pre-TMI days. But 

they only apply to reactor core accidents. No comparable procedures would help the operators respond to a spent fuel pool accident. It’s imperative that the comparable emergency procedures be 

provided for spent fuel pool accidents as they’ve helped protect us 

against reactor pool accidents. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROJECT, 

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

The Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant in Japan experienced a station blackout. 

A station blackout occurs when a nuclear power plant loses electrical power from 

all sources except that provided by onsite banks of batteries. The normal power supply comes from the plant’s own main generator or from the electrical grid when the 

reactor is shut down. All the equipment needed to operate the plant on a daily basis 

as well as the emergency equipment needed during an accident can be energized 

by the normal power supply. When the normal power supply is lost, backup power 

is supplied from onsite emergency diesel generators. These generators provide electricity only to the smaller set of equipment needed to cool the reactor cores and 

maintain the containments’ integrity during an accident. 

At Fukushima, the earthquake caused the normal power supply to be lost. Within 

an hour, the tsunami caused the backup power supply to be lost. This placed the 

plant into a station blackout where the only source of power came from batteries. 

These batteries provided sufficient power for the valves and controls of the steamdriven system—called the reactor core isolation cooling system—that provided cooling water for the reactor cores on Units 1, 2, and 3. When those batteries were exhausted, there were no cooling systems for the reactor cores or the spent fuel pools. 

There are clear indications that the fuel in the reactor cores of units 1, 2, and 3 

and some spent fuel pools has been damaged due to overheating. 

Had either normal or backup power been restored before the batteries were depleted, we would not be here today discussing this matter. The prolonged station 

blackout resulted in the inability to cool the reactor cores in Units 1, 2, and 3, the 

spent fuel pools for all six units, and the consolidated spent fuel pool. There are les-
27 

sons, learned at high cost in Japan, that can and should be applied to lessen the 

vulnerabilities at US reactors. And I cannot emphasis enough that the lessons from 

Japan apply to all US reactors, not just the boiling water reactors like those affected 

at Fukushima. None are immune to station blackout problems. All must be made 

less vulnerable to those problems. 

As at Fukushima, US reactors are designed to cool the reactor core during a station blackout of only a fairly short duration. It is assumed that either the connection 

to an energized electrical grid or the repair of an emergency diesel generator will 

occur before the batteries are depleted. Eleven US reactors are designed to cope 

with a station blackout lasting eight hours, as were the reactors in Japan. Ninetythree of our reactors are designed to cope for only four hours. But unless the life 

of the on-site batteries is long enough to eliminate virtually any chance that the batteries would be depleted before power from another source is restored, one lesson 

from Fukushima is the need to provide workers with options for dealing with a station blackout lasting longer than the life of the on-site batteries. In other words, 

the moment that any US reactor enters a station blackout, response efforts should 

proceed along three parallel paths: (1) restoration of the electrical grid as soon as 

possible, (2) recovery of one or more emergency diesel generators as soon as possible, 

and (3) acquisition of additional batteries and/or temporary generators as soon as 

possible. If either of the first two paths leads to success, the station blackout ends 

and the reenergized safety systems can cool the reactor core and spent fuel pool. 

If the first two paths lead to failure, success on the third path will hopefully provide 

enough time for the first two paths to achieve belated success. 

The timeline associated with the third path should determine whether the life of 

the on-site batteries is adequate or whether additional batteries should be required.. 

For example, the existing battery life may be sufficient when a reactor is located 

near a facility where temporary generators are readily available, such as the San 

Onofre nuclear plant in California, which is next to the US Marine base at Camp 

Pendleton. When a reactor is more remotely located, it may be necessary to add onsite batteries to increase the chance that the third path leads to success if the first 

two paths do not. 

The second lesson from Fukushima is the need to address the vulnerability of 

spent fuel pools. At many US reactors, there is far more irradiated fuel in the spent 

fuel pool than in the reactor core. At all US reactors, the spent fuel pool is cooled 

by fewer and less reliable systems than are provided for the reactor core. At all US 

reactors, the spent fuel pool is housed in far less robust structures than surround 

the reactor core. This means that any release of radiation from the pool will not be 

as well contained as radiation released from the reactor core. It also means that 

spent fuel pools are more vulnerable to terrorist attack than is the reactor itself. 

More irradiated fuel that is less well protected and less well defended is an undue 

hazard. There are two measures to better manage this risk: (1) accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from spent fuel pools to dry cask storage, and (2) upgrade the 

guidelines for how to address an emergency and the operator training for spent fuel 

pool problems. 

Currently, the US spent fuel storage strategy is to nearly fill the spent fuel pools 

to capacity and then to transfer fuel into dry cask storage to provide space for the 

new fuel discharged from the reactor core. This keeps the spent fuel pools nearly 

filled with irradiated fuel, thus maintaining the risk level about as high as possible. 

Added to that risk is the risk from dry casks stored onsite, which is less than that 

from the spent fuel pools but not zero. 

A better strategy would be to reduce the inventory of irradiated fuel in the pools 

to the minimum amount, which would be only the fuel discharged from the reactor 

core within the past five years. Reducing the spent fuel stored in the pools would 

lower the risk in two ways. First, less irradiated fuel in the pools would generate 

a lower heat load. If cooling of the spent fuel pool was interrupted or water inventory was lost from the pool, the lower heat load would give workers more time to 

recover cooling and/or water inventory before overheating caused fuel damage. And 

second, if irradiated fuel in a spent fuel pool did become damaged, the amount of 

radioactivity released from the smaller amount of spent fuel would be significantly 

less than that released from a nearly full pool. Reducing the amount of irradiated 

fuel in spent fuel pools would significantly reduce the safety and security risks from 

a nuclear power plant. 

Following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, reactor owners significantly upgraded emergency procedures and operator training.. Prior to that accident, procedures and training relied on the operators quickly and correctly diagnosing what 

had happened and taking steps to mitigate the consequences. If the operators misdiagnosed the accident they faced, the guidelines could lead them to take the wrong 

steps for the actual accident in progress. The revamped emergency procedures and 
28 

training would guide the operators’ response to an abnormally high pressure or an 

unusually low water level without undue regard for what caused the abnormalities. 

The revamped emergency procedures and training represent significant improvements over the pre-TMI days. But they apply only to reactor core accidents. No comparable procedures and training would help the operators respond to a spent fuel 

pool accident. It is imperative that comparable emergency procedures and training 

be provided for spent fuel pool accidents to supplement the significant gains in addressing reactor core accidents that were made following the TMI accident. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has announced a two-phase response plan to 

Fukushima; a 90-day quick look followed by a more in-depth review. If the past 

three decades have demonstrated anything, it’s that the NRC will likely come up 

with a solid action plan to address problems revealed at Fukushima, but will be glacially slow in implementing those identified safety upgrades. A comprehensive action plan does little to protect Americans until its goals are achieved. We urge the 

US Congress to force the NRC to not merely chart a course to a safer place, but 

actually reach that destination as soon as possible. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pietrangelo, go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY R. PIETRANGELO, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Thank you, Senator. Good morning, all. 

First, on behalf of NEI and our members our thoughts are with 

the Japanese, our friends and colleagues in the industry there and 

in particular those workers on the ground who have been struggling with trying to bring this plant to a safe condition over the 

last couple weeks. So Senator Murkowski, I echo your empathy for 

them. I can’t pretend to understand what it’s like to get hit by a 

massive earthquake, followed by a tsunami, followed by additional 

aftershocks of a very significant magnitude. So they are doing a heroic job there to bring that plant to a safe condition. 

There have been a lot of questions thus far this morning about 

could it happen here? What are the events that could bring us to 

this similar condition in Japan? What I like to say is that and Bill 

Borchardt and Pete went over the provisions that go into the licensing of our plants. 

But I think for the people at the stations it almost doesn’t matter 

what gets you in the condition, whether it’s an earthquake, tsunami, flood, hurricane, tornado, equipment failure, operator error, 

manufacturing defect, all those areas are exhaustively reviewed by 

the NRC before you can get a license. If you did get some rare combination of those that puts you in a station blackout or any other 

concern where you can’t get cooling to the core, that’s why we prepare the way we do at our plants. We’re ready for those kinds of 

measures. 

I want to start with the proactive steps we’ve taken as an industry. Basically looking at severe accidents and what goes into, what 

we prepare for in terms of beyond design basis events. When the 

NRC licenses to plants originally the demonstration had to be that 

you could place the plant in a safe condition given the extreme design basis events, earthquake, loss of offsite power, etcetera. 

Since that time through both NRC regulation and other measures we put in place we’ve gone beyond the design basis. 

We’ve used probalistic risk assessment to look at combinations of 

initiating events and equipment failures and human actions that 

could damage the core and what we could do to respond to those. 
29 

So we’ve identified vulnerabilities in the designs that we’ve addressed. 

We’ve identified accident management insights for the operators. 

I agree with David’s suggestion about looking at severe accident 

management for fuel pools. 

We have some numbers in place, some measures in place, but not 

to the extent we do for the reactors. 

Also I think the President got it right on March 17. Again, these 

designs have been exhaustively reviewed. But it’s incumbent upon 

us as an industry and NRC as a regulator and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency and operators all over the world to fully understand the lessons learned that come out of Fukushima and 

apply them. 

I do want to talk a little bit more about the improvements we’ve 

put in place since the plants were licensed. I mentioned the PRA 

improvements. Also after September 11, 2001, we did a lot of work 

on fires and explosions related to aircraft impact. Wiping out quadrants of the plant and seeing what contingency measures could be 

put in place to deal with the loss of key safety functions. 

This even goes beyond some of the station blackout measures 

that David talked about. The ability to get water into steam generators and PWRs or water into the primary containment and 

BWRs to look at backup pooling measures. We put a lot of those 

measures in place. Those measures included contingency measures 

for spent fuel pools including getting sprays to the pools and connections to stand pipes or existing equipment to keep the fuel covered. 

Bill mentioned that the analysis of the spent fuel pools. It’s not 

quite as complicated, thankfully, as the reactors are. Basically you 

have to keep water in the pool. It’s a great radiation shield and a 

great coolant. You can go to any spent fuel pool in the country and 

look over the handrail right down at the used fuel without any protective clothing on whatsoever. 

You know, Bill mentioned that depending on the age of the fuel 

and how long it’s been in there it will take days, more likely weeks 

before you would boil off the inventory. Typically there’s 20 to 30 

feet of water above the top of those used fuel rods. So that’s a long 

time to be able to deal with the event if it occurs. 

One thing I can say going forward is that our industry, our hallmark is learning from operating experience. We learned a lot from 

TMI in terms of operator training as well as design enhancements. 

We will enhance safety as a result of Fukushima. We will get these 

lessons learned. 

We started that already. But it’s going to take a long time to get 

a full understanding of what transpired there. But when we do I 

can assure you that we will enhance safety margins across the industry. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for your testimony. 

Let me ask first, Mr. Lochbaum, what are your thoughts this— 

we had testimony in the first panel about the station blackout rule 

that the NRC has put in place that presumably would build in 

some safety precautions against the kind of loss of power that 

we’ve experienced or at least the consequences from loss of power 
30 

that we’ve seen in the case of the Japanese plant. Could you give 

us your views as to the adequacy of that station blackout rule? 

Whether it does what it should do or whether there are other 

things it should have done that it didn’t accomplish? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I think the station blackout rule was to the NRC 

and the industry’s credit. It did significantly reduce or improve 

safety. Put it more positively. 

I think what Japan showed us is that when the event lasts 

longer that our assumptions either four or 8 hours, we shouldn’t 

leave the operators with no choices. When the station blackout in 

Japan lasted longer than their assumed duration of 8 hours, they 

were left with no options. As a result the reactor cores and the 

spent fuel pools were overheated and damaged. 

We need to do a better job of increasing the reliability that either 

we restore AC power from the grid or restore AC power from the 

diesel generators within the 4 to 8 hours that we assume, and also 

provide the operators with something else should those very dedicated and intense efforts fail so they’re not left without any options 

other than a miracle. Miracles are great, but you can’t rely on 

them. 

So I think we need to look at that to increase the odds that 

things are corrected before the station blackout duration ends. Be 

prepared should that duration end without success on the restoration of power. I think we can do that. I don’t think it’s difficult. 

I think Japan showed the price of not doing that. So I think it’s 

cheap insurance for the reactors in the United States to go ahead 

and do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pietrangelo, did you have a thought on any 

of those comments? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. I think that’s one of the obvious places 

that we’ll have to look. But just looking at the event in Japan with 

the earthquake and then the tsunami, destroying all the infrastructure around that plant. What is was was a massive common mode 

failure of all those backup emergency diesel generators. 

It’s hard to postulate that here. It’s very, very unlikely to occur. 

Also destroy the entire infrastructure around the plant such that 

you can’t get help there soon. 

We’re already looking at trying to stage equipment regionally. 

We’ve done it locally at the sites in response to 9/11 such that we 

can go beyond the station blackout duration and still provide cooling. But to get the 48 hours or 72 hours, pick a number. We’re 

going to take a hard look at that and see what resources would be 

necessary to extend the capability that long. 

But again, it’s pretty remote that you’d get that kind of common 

mode failure across all your systems. Really the station blackout 

was predicated on giving sufficient time to either restore AC power 

from the grid or get one of the emergency diesel generators started. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pietrangelo, let me ask your comment on another statement that Mr. Lochbaum makes in his testimony. He 

says a better strategy would be to reduce the inventory of irradiated fuel in the pools to the minimum amount which would be only 

the fuel discharge from the reactor core within the past 5 years. 

Reducing the spent fuel stored in the pools would lower the risk 

in a couple of ways. He goes into that. 
31 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Have you looked at that recommendation and do 

you have a thought about it? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. First of all it’s not a new recommendation. It’s been out there for quite some time. I think as a result of 

Fukushima we need to take a real hard look at how we manage 

used fuel in our country. Hopefully while it’s not a crisis situation, 

get some momentum behind a national policy to deal with used 

fuel. 

The issue is with the spent fuel pools. I think, you know, that 

with a lot of analyses done of what happens to used fuel if it gets 

uncovered and some kind of worse case scenarios. We don’t know 

exactly what happened in those used fuel pools yet. I think part of 

those lessons learned is going to be specifically focused on the risk 

from uncovering that fuel and what happens when it gets uncovered. 

Nevertheless, while there would be some risk reduction in unloading the pools of the fuel rods after 5 or 6 years. The freshest 

old fuel is where the most heat load is and where the most radio 

toxicity is. So you would still have some risk going forward even 

if you unloaded all of the older old used fuel. 

So the problem doesn’t go away. It’s really a marginal reduction 

in risk when you do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Alright. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow 

up on that then. 

So the decay radiation in this spent fuel that we’re moving and 

saying OK, after 5 years we’re going to move this. You’re still going 

to have a level of radiation there. Do we know what kind of decay 

radiation we have? 

Then understanding that, do we have to design some type of a 

new dry cask to contain that radiation? How do we deal with it? 

Either one of you. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. The reason we said 5 is that the casks that are 

being used today, there are hundreds of casks at U.S. plants 

around the country, are designed for fuel that’s been out of the reactor for 5 years or more. So we don’t have to go to new casks. We 

can use the ones that are currently certified by the NRC and being 

used by the industry. 

We would just like to accelerate the transfer from the pools into 

those already certified casks and available casks. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. OK. So really we don’t have to do that 

much in terms of any new technologies. We just move it quicker. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. That’s correct. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Let me ask a question about the use of the 

sea water to act as a coolant. I understand that we are now in the 

process, the United States is now in the process of helping ship in 

some fresh water. But in the meantime, the sea water has been 

used. There’s been some question about the corrosive nature of the 

salt. 

I don’t know, maybe this was a question that was best asked of 

either the 2 gentlemen before you, but can either one of you speak 

to this as an issue whether or not the salt in the sea water is per-
32 

haps having an impact on our ability or on the Japanese ability to 

get the reactors under control? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. I think the concern was as you boil off 

the sea water you’re left with the salt that could get crusted in the 

fuel and thereby preclude the cooling of it. So that’s why as soon 

as they had fresh water available they’ve started injection to the 

reactor vessels with fresh water. 

Those barges from the U.S. Navy, I believe have arrived now so 

they’ve got about a half a million gallons of fresh water available 

to continue that exercise. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. But given that we’ve already used some 

pretty substantial amounts of sea water. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Right. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do we know whether or not that has proven to be an impediment or caused a delay or further complications 

in getting this under control? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. I don’t know, Senator. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I think just the opposite. It helped. They were 

facing very dire situations. So the sea water helped stop whatever 

fuel damage was ongoing. 

So they dealt with their most immediate problem with the use 

of sea water as they should have. Now as they’re probably doing. 

They’re diluting that sea water with fresh water. So it looks like 

they took the right steps for the right reasons. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Senator, even in our plants in this country 

there are provisions when you lose your available inventory of 

fresh water in a tank, provisions to use river water or sea water 

in existing systems. So, it’s not exactly what the situation you want 

to get to. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. But it’s there if you need it. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Does it, does the salt have any impact, do 

we know on the spent fuel pools? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. I think it’s the same concern that it would be 

in the reactor. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. It could impede the cooling. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. But again, the concern about any corrosive 

effect? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. There are stainless steel liners that help retard 

more resistant to corrosion than other forms of steel. I think the 

problem for the pools would be the instrumentation and the other 

controls over the water flow through the reactor. But we heard in 

the last couple days they’ve restored fresh water supplies to the 

pools. 

So they’ll be diluting the salinity of the water in those pools. So 

whatever damage has been done is getting better from now on as 

long as they’re able to sustain that progress. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Yes. I have couple areas I want to get into. 

I’m getting some idea about how we approach assessing all the 

safety factors of a nuclear plant when we site it. 
33 

Mr. Pietrangelo, you spoke in some good detail about that. But 

when I asked Mr. Borchardt of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

how the Japanese system compared to ours, he said he didn’t know. 

Now I think that if Americans are going to get some kind of, take 

some kind of comfort that our system when everything you describe 

actually works. It would be nice to know how our system compare 

with the Japanese system. 

Because what we’re seeing in Japan didn’t work. So Mr. 

Lochbaum, I find this disturbing that this far into this crisis that 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission doesn’t know how to compare 

the Japanese system of siting and looking into the safety verses 

ours. Do you have any thoughts on that? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I’m in an unusual role of defending the NRC, 

that’s typically not my role. But I think the NRC has 4,000 people. 

They have an International Programs Unit that probably knows 

those answers, but to Mr. Borchardt’s defense, he doesn’t know the 

combined knowledge of those 4,000 people. 

I would be willing to bet this week’s paycheck that the NRC has 

that answer and could get it fairly quickly. So the situation is not 

quite as bad as it may look on the surface. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK—— 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. By the way, it wasn’t my paycheck. It was somebody else’s 1 week paycheck I’m betting. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Senator, I think going forward you’re absolutely right. We have to understand not only the differences in the 

regulatory systems. But from an industry perspective understand 

what design mods were made to those plants. 

What operational practices they put in place? Their emergency 

planning they’ve done for events like this and compare it to what 

we have in place. Then assess the gaps, if you will, to see whether 

we would have been able to better deal with it or that we still need 

to do additional things. 

Senator FRANKEN. Yes, because, you know, it’s hard to take a lot 

of comfort from what we do if you can’t compare it to what they 

do because obviously what they did wasn’t sufficient, right? 

OK. Now, I quoted a Washington Post editorial by Matthew 

Bunn. Did you read that? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. I did, sir. 

Senator FRANKEN. Did you read that, Mr. Lochbaum? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Yes. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. In it he wrote that despite the recommendations by the National Academies that spent fuel rods be 

stored in pools onsite that they should be arranged place old, cool 

fuel rods next to newer, hotter fuel rods to prevent hot spots and 

fires in the event that the pools lost enough water to uncover—to 

cover the rods. That despite that recommendation in 2006 there is 

no such action. This is a quote. 

‘‘No such action had been taken either in the U.S. or Japan.’’ 

Mr. Borchardt said they had been. So now I ask 2 questions. 

One, Dr. Bunn is an expert at Harvard. Is he wrong? Is Mr. 

Borchardt wrong? 

Is this a good recommendation? 
34 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Mr. Bunn is wrong. There was a correction. It 

was hard to see. So about 2 or 3 days later in the editorial section 

in the Post from Mr. Bunn saying that there had been measures 

taken to address some of the concerns he raised in his op ed. 

We refer to it as a checkerboard pattern of the fuel, precisely 

what he was talking about. 

Secondly, as part of the post 9/11 measures to get additional capability to refill the pools in the event of fires, explosions or any 

other event that could lose inventory in the pools. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. That answers that. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. 

Senator FRANKEN. One last thing. I have 20 seconds left, so but 

I can the question and then you can take whatever time you want 

to answer it. 

Evacuation. We kind are seeing, kind of, a lot of controversy 

about how much area around the reactor in Fukushima is a safe 

area. We see that there—if you take a 50-mile radius from some 

of our reactors you have 10 and 10 of millions of people around 

them. Do we have adequate evacuation plans in case something 

like this would happen in the United States? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Yes. Our evacuation plans are based on studies done in 1970s by both the NRC and other agencies. The ten 

mile emergency planning zone or EPZ, as we refer to it, was determined to be sufficient to protect public health and safety. 

There’s also a 50-mile zone that looks at the ingestion path, any 

contamination of food products or dairy products and so forth that 

can be sampled. 

I’d also note there’s provisions to increase the evacuation or protective action recommendations be it evacuation or sheltering beyond the ten mile EPZ. Every 2 years each plant conducts an emergency planning exercise that’s overseen by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA. In addition we practice those drills 

quarterly onsite. 

So we think we’ve got the gold standard of emergency planning. 

It was a difficult situation for the NRC 2 weeks ago when we were 

in the middle of this event when they were looking at 3 cores and 

4 spent fuel pools and limited and conflicting information. I think 

they do what they always do is think of, when there’s a lot of uncertainty on the ground, they make a very conservative decision. 

I think we’ve seen that over the years with how the agency regulates. That’s what happened here. 

Senator FRANKEN. Mr. Lochbaum, do you have any opinion about 

the state of our evacuation plans? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I think our plans are as good as those in Japan 

on March 10. 

Senator FRANKEN. I don’t know what that means. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. It means we would be equally in dire straits if 

we were faced with that kind of disaster. We have great plans on 

paper. If we put them to practice I think that we’re going to show 

that we’re going to come up short. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. But I would also add, Senator, that the Japanese, I think responded exactly as we would with our emergency 

plan. They evacuated within their, I think it’s 12 1⁄2 miles or 20 kilometer radius. They put sheltering in place later. 
35 

So they did precisely the kinds of actions and protective action 

recommendations we would take to protect public health and safety. In our country it’s the state and local officials acting on recommendations from the plant operator in the event and overseen 

by the NRC, who makes that decision. 

Senator FRANKEN. But this Fukushima is not as dense an area. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Certainly not. 

Senator FRANKEN. As many of—— 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Certainly not. 

Senator FRANKEN. I mean, Indian Point was brought up as an 

example. Let’s say you live within, I mean there’s millions and millions and millions of people living within 50 miles of that plant. 

Let’s say you’re a parent, your kid is at school going the opposite 

way of exiting, getting away from there. 

Mr. Lochbaum, do you think that we need to improve on what 

we’re doing? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Around Indian Point, for example, the local and 

state officials have said they can’t get their people out if they need 

to. The Federal Government overruled what the local and state 

government said and said, it would happen anyway that some miracle would occur and the people would not be harmed. I tend to 

trust the local and state officials. They deal with issues on a daily 

basis. 

If in their best judgment they can’t protect those people, I don’t 

know why anybody else should believe that we can. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. I’m way over my time. Thank you, 

gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Just very quickly. Do you think that it was 

confusing the fact that the evacuation order from the Japanese government that it be 12 1⁄2 miles initially and then the United States 

coming in and saying 50-mile radius. What does that message say 

that Americans are more worried about the radiation than the Japanese are to those that are living there? 

Was that a confusing directive? 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. We support what the President recommended 

for American citizens in Japan. I think it’s a different decision to 

evacuate U.S. citizens. There’s not going to be as many living within that radius as it is for Japanese people who have been raised 

there and live there now. 

I can understand where some of the confusion comes. But again, 

based on the information they had at the time and the potential 

for it to degrade. I think they made a conservative decision, but I 

understand where the confusion could come. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Lochbaum. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. In the United States one of the things we 

learned from Three Mile Island was it’s good to have one voice to 

avoid confusion like you’re suggesting. I think what this accident 

may suggest is we need to look at an international concept of one 

voice. So that there’s not a discrepancy that one side or the other 

could say it was either too much or too less. 

So that I think the same reason we went to a one voice after 

Three Mile Island, it probably be a good idea to look at it on an 

international level to see if the same factors apply. 
36 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for your testimony. I think this 

has been a useful hearing or useful briefing for us. We appreciate 

it. 

If additional issues come to your attention, please let us know 

and we’ll try to inform the full committee on all of those as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PIETRANGELO. Thank you, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the briefing was adjourned.] 

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