* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 26 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DERRAL SCHRODER, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 98-1396

v. (D.C. No. 98-D-1196) O. EDWARD SCHLATTER, Magistrate Judge, and John and Jane Does One Through Unlimintd [sic], (D. Colo.)

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted w ithout oral argument. Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant Derral Schro der appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging violati ons of his federal constitutional1 Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in the Uni ted States District Court

for the District of Columbia. Because Plaintiff an d Defendants resided in Colorado, and because the alleged wrongdoings appear to have occurred in Colorado, his action subsequently was transferred t o the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. -2- rights. In his complaint, 1 Plaintiff alleged that O. Edward Schlatter, who wa s at the relevant times acting in his capacity as a Colo rado state court judge, along with various John and Jane Does, violated his due p rocess rights by convicting him of criminal charges and sentencing him to three and a half years’ imprisonment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged thatJudge Schlatter deprived him of due process of law “when he refused to recognize [P laintiff’s] free character and right to freedom of religion.” R., Doc. 1 at 9. P laintiff also claimed due process violations as a result of being forced “to answer f or an infamous crime by Police Power, without a presentment or indictment of a Gra nd Jury,” and of being “deprived of liberty and property without due proce ss of law.” In addition, he claimed that his private property was taken for pub lic use without just compensation. See id. at 10. Finally, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants deprived him of due process of law by denying him assistance of counsel and “the right to enjoy a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of one million dollars for th ese alleged violations. He also filed an application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis

. In its Order dated June 11, 1998, the district court granted Plaintiff leave to-3-

proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district court explained that P laintiff’s complaint sought monetary damages against Judge Schlatter for “actio ns he may have taken in his role as a state court judge.” R., Doc. 3 at 2. Th e court stated that “[j]udges are absolutely immune from liability in civil rights su its for money damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity.” Id. Because Plaintiff’s suit was legally frivolous and sought monetary relief against a defe ndant who was immune from such relief, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s damage s claims against Judge Schlatter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I), (iii). The districtcourt also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against various “John and Jane Does” as legally frivolous because he “fail[ed] to identify these de fendants or the claims asserted against them in any other way.” Id. at 3. According to the court, such conclusory allegations “do[] not entitle a pro se pleader to a day in court, regardless of how liberally the court construes such pleadings.” Id. Subsequently, the district court denied Plaintiff’s “Objection to Order Dismissing Complaint and Request to Correct Order, and Issue J udgement,” which it construed as a motion to reconsider. Plaintiff the n filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. On appeal, Plaintiff renews his motion for leave to proceed in forma-4-

pauperis on appeal and raises essentially the same alleged constitutional violations he raised in his complaint. He also accuses Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, who issued the decision on appeal in this case, of denying him due process of law and alleges that Judge Daniel “has no delegation of authority, jurisdiction and venue, to hold [Defendant] to a foreign jurisdictio n . . . and refuse [him] due process of law as our Bill of Rights guarantees Cit izens for the United States.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Further, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that Judge Schlatter was “above the law and only subject to [his] superior officer’s orders.” Id. at 9. Upon careful consideration of Plaintiff’s brief, the district court’s order, and the applicab le law, we agree with the district court’s conclusions that Judge Schlatter is absolut ely immune from Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages. See Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Hunt
v. Bennett , 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.) (citing Stump v. S parkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 832 (1994). We also agree with the court that Plaintiff’s claims against the “John and Jane Does” are not cognizable due to their vague and conclusory nature. See Northington v. Jackson , 973 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1992). We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s clai ms under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for substantially the reasons stated in the district2 We grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on

appeal. -5- court’s Order filed June 11, 1998. 2
Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge