Foreword

This volume describes the initial direction and strategy of the first major

though limited war that the United States was to fight on the continent of

Asia in the era of global tension that followed World War II. There are

marked similarities as well as some basic differences between the war in Korea

and the war that would follow a decade later in Southeast Asia, and certainly

the study of both is necessary to understand the limitations on armed conflict

under the shadow of nuclear holocaust. One can also discern in this volume

the importance of individuals in altering the course of human events and the

fate of nations, the wider concerns that preclude the massing by a world

power of its military strength in one direction, and many other facets of the

nation's recent military history it behooves all thoughtful Americans to

ponder.

Colonel Schnabel's work is the third to appear in a planned 5-volume

history of the United States Army in the Korean War. It complements the

detailed account of operations from June to November 1950, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, published in 1961, and the sequel to it still in

preparation that will cover tactical operations through June 1951. The

volume entitled Truce Tent and Fighting Front, published in 1966, covers

the last two years of the war, and a logistical history of the Korean conflict

is also scheduled to appear.

Both military and civilian students and the scholarly reading public

should find in this book much that is illuminating and provocative of reflection, and not only about events that happened more than two decades ago.

Washington, D.C. JAMES L. COLLINS, JR. 15 May 1971 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

James F. Schnabel enlisted in the U.S. Army in July 1942 and, after

graduation from officer candidate school, the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill,

Oklahoma, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in January 1943.

Remaining in the service after World War II, he was assigned, as a captain,

to the Military History Section, GHQ, FEC, in late 1949. He served as a

historian in Tokyo until 1953, transferring in May 1953 to the Office of the

Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C., where he remained until 1956. From 1956 until 1960 as a lieutenant colonel he held

the post of Chief Historian, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe,

and Allied Command Europe stationed in Paris, France. In 1960 he returned to the Office, Chief of Military History, and became Historical Liaison

Officer to the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. He retired from the

Army in 1964 and is presently a historian with the Office of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.

A graduate of North Idaho Teachers College, Colonel Schnabel has published several articles on the Korean War and has appeared as a guest lecturer

at the Army War College.

viii
Preface

This book is intended to elucidate United States policy during the

Korean War and to describe the strategies and command methods by which

that policy was carried out. The major decisions that determined the

United States course in Korea and continued to influence the nation's

responses to Communist aggression during the two decades that followed

were taken during the first twelve months of the Korean fighting. Although

the war continued for another two years, no significant change was made in

the policy developed between President Truman's decision to intervene in

June 1950 and the beginning of Armistice negotiations at Kaesong in July

1951. This book concentrates on that initial period.

One of the unique aspects of the Korean War was the close control which

Washington maintained at all times over operations in the field. Routine

transactions and problems which during World War II would have been

handled by a theater commander became, during Korea, matters of great

concern to the nation's highest officials in Washington. These exceptional

practices were owing in large part to the scarcity of United States military

resources when the war began and to the real danger that a miscalculation in

Korea might result in a full-scale war with the Soviet Union and/or Communist China. The vast distance between Washington and the Far East

served to hinder effective, timely communication, further complicating the

problems of directing the war.

I was not aware of it at the time, but work on this book began three days

after the North Korean invasion when I, as an Army captain of artillery

assigned to the Historical Branch, G-2, GHQ, FEC, in Tokyo, was called to

General MacArthur's personal file room in the Dai Ichi Building to examine

copies of first teleconferences between CINCFE and Washington. Notes

taken that day marked the beginning of nearly three years of research in

Tokyo and, briefly, in Korea. Upon my return to Washington in mid-1953

I was designated to prepare the present volume. The first draft of this work

was submitted to the Office, Chief of Military History, in June 1956 concurrently with my transfer to Paris, where I served until June 1960 as Chief

Historian, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe. Returning to the Office

of the Chief of Military History in July 1960 I was able, although assigned

additional duties, to make revisions indicated as a result of the intensive

review and criticism of the manuscript that had taken place in my four-year

ix
absence. Following my retirement from the Army in August 1964 further

revision was performed by Mr. Billy C. Mossman and by Dr. Stetson Conn,

then Chief Historian.

So many individuals have contributed to the present volume that it

would be impossible for me to thank all of them publicly. There are those,

however, to whom I owe special debts of gratitude. During the early years

of my work on this history I received particular encouragement and very

wise counsel from Col. Allison R. Hartman, then Chief, Historical Branch,

G-2, GHQ, FEC. Among those outside critics who have reviewed all or

part of the manuscript in its various stages and to whom I am indebted for

valuable comments and ideas are General J. Lawton Collins, General

Matthew B. Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Mr. Robert Amory,

formerly Deputy for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr.

Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., Chief, Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Other individuals within the Office of the Chief of Military History

whose help and advice have been exceptionally valuable to me include the

Editor in Chief, Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, whose literary guidance has contributed greatly in the final revision of the manuscript; Mr. Charles V. P.

von Luttichau, who is responsible for the fine maps which accompany the

text; Dr. Louis Morton and Dr. John Miller, jr., for their suggestions and

criticism while they were with the Office of the Chief of Military History;

Mr. David Jaffé, whose diligence and skill as an editor I have good reason

to appreciate; and Mrs. Stephanie B. Demma, who rendered most able

assistance to Mr. Jaffé. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony.

Finally, I would be remiss were I not to recognize gratefully the support

I received from the several Chiefs of Military History under whom I served

during the preparation of this volume: Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Maj. Gen.

Albert C. Smith, Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris,

and Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison.

That I have acknowledged the contributions made by those persons

named above in no way implies that they share responsibility for the interpretations of this book or for any deficiencies that it may have. Responsibility for them is mine alone.

Washington, D.C. JAMES F. SCHNABEL

15 May 1971
Contents

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN

T h e Land .......................................... .

Korea's Past ........................................ .

The United States and Korea ........................ .

Korea 1945 ..........................................

The New Zones .................................... .

THE HOUSE DIVIDED

The Americans Occupy South Korea .................. .

The Russians in North Korea ........................ .

The United States Seeks a Solution .................... .

Withdrawal From Korea ............................. .

Building a Native Defense Force in South Korea ....... .

North Korea Prepares ............................... .

Situation in Korea — June 1950 ....................... .

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The Army's Place in the National Defense Structure ...

The Far East Command ............................. .

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

The Intelligence Failure ............................ .

MacArthur's Reaction ............................... .

The United States Responds ......................... .

Emergency Evacuation .............................. .

ADCOM Arrives in Korea ........................... .

Developments in Washington ........................ .

MacArthur Visits Korea ............................. .

CINCFE's Personal Report .......................... .

EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES

MacArthur's Estimates ............................... .

T h e Build-up ...................................... .

Page

1

1

2

3

6

11

13

13

23

25

28

31

36

38

41

42

46

61

61

65

66

71

71

72

74

77

80

83

86

xi
Chapter

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

A NEW CONFIDENCE

First Visit From Washington ......................... .

Air Operations — July 1950 ......................

The Withdrawal Continues ...........................

BOLSTERING THE FORCES

Shaping the Unified Command ...................... .

Rebuilding the U.S. Army ............................

The Theater Scene — August 1950 ................... .

OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT

AND THE PLAN .................................... .

OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES

Marine Forces .......................................

The 7th Division ....................................

Airborne Units ..................................... .

The Assault in Readiness ............................ .

CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION

AND THE PLAN

The Tide Turns .................................... .

The 38th Parallel — Genesis of the Decision ............ .

The ROK Government Returns to Seoul ...............

New Operations Plans ................................

THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA

The United Nations Resolution of 7 October ...........

MacArthur's Plans Change ...........................

The Likelihood of Chinese Intervention .............. .

Eighth Army Enters North Korea .....................

The X Corps Prepares ...............................

A New Obstacle .....................................

The Wake Island Conference ........................ .

SIGNS OF VICTORY

New Plans of Advance ...............................

Another Change .....................................

X Corps Lands ......................................

Occupation Plans ................................... .

The Mirage of Victory ...............................

Page

100

105

108

111

115

115

117

125

139

155

159

165

168

171

173

173

177

184

187

193

193

194

196

202

206

208

210

215

215

218

219

219

221
Chapter

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

XVII.

XVIII.

THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND

The Chinese Move ................................. .

Eighth Army Grows Cautious ........................ .

X Corps and the New Enemy ........................ .

Immediate Effects ................................... .

A Time for Reappraisal ............................. .

The Sanctuary and Hot Pursuit ...................... .

The Mission Is Re-examined ......................... .

THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY

Eighth Army's Plans and Problems .................. .

The X Corps Plan ................................. .

The Cautious View ................................. .

MacArthur Attacks ................................. .

FACING NEW DILEMMAS ............................. .

Intervention ........................................ .

Emergency Meeting — Tokyo ......................... .

Collins Visits Korea ................................. .

MacArthur Is Warned .............................. .

High Level Conferences ............................. .

THE BRINK OF DISASTER

Reinforcement Prospects ............................. .

Possibility of Evacuation ............................ .

X Corps Is Ordered Out of North Korea ...............

Ridgway Takes Over ................................ .

A Decision Hangs Fire .............................. .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Consider Options ............ .

Evacuation Plans ................................... .

THE SEARCH FOR POLICY

The Retaliatory Measures: An Examination ........... .

The Joint Chiefs Visit Tokyo Again .................. .

Encouraging Signs in Korea ......................... .

The 12 January Memo .............................. .

THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK

T h e Combat Scene ................................. .

T he Improved Outlook ............................. .

Page

233

233

234

236

237

239

247

250

257

257

259

266

271

274

274

278

282

284

285

294

294

298

300

306

308

310

312

315

317

325

326

328

331

333

348
Chapter

XIX.

XX.

XXI.

XXII.

THE CROSSROADS

The 38th Parallel Again ............................ .

Advances in Korea ................................. .

Seeking More Forces ............................... .

President Truman Is Displeased ..................... .

Bevin and the British View ......................... .

Ridgway Re-enters North Korea .................... .

THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR

The Formosa Issue ................................. .

MacArthur's Disagreement With United States Policy

in Korea

NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY

The Chinese Offensive — 22 April .................... .

Missions and Responsibilities — CINCUNC ............ .

New Orders for CINCUNC ........................ .

A New Directive for CINCFE ...................... .

The Chinese Attack Again ......................... .

Efforts at Political Settlement ....................... .

Rebuilding the ROK Army ......................... .

Revision of Ridgway's Directives .................... .

SIGNS OF ARMISTICE

Political Factors Influence the Battle Line ............ .

Moves Toward Negotiation ......................... .

T h e Prognosis ..................................... .

Page

349

351

354

356

357

360

361

365

367

371

378

379

380

382

385

387

390

394

395

397

399

402

405

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS

INDEX ........................................................ .

407

412

415

417
Color Maps

No. Page

I. The North Korean Invasion, 25 June-4 August 1950 .......... . 61

II. The Defeat of the North Korean Forces, 15-30 September 1950 ... . 173

III. U.N. Forces Advance to the Yalu, 30 September-1 November 1950 . . . 205

IV. The November Offensive, 6-26 November 1950 ............. . 274

V. The CCF Offensive, 25-28 November 1950 ............... . 274

VI. U.N. Command on the Defensive, 31 December 1950-24 January 1951 308

VII. U.N. Command Strikes Back, 25 January-21 April 1951 ........ . 334

VIII. U.N. Command on the Defensive, 21 April-19 May 1951 ........ . 380

IX. U.N. Command Offensive, 20 May-24 June 1951 ............ . 389

Illustrations

Syngman Rhee ..................... . .

Kim Koo

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur ......... . .

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge ......................................... .

Parade Held by Koreans for the American Advance Party

Russian Member Addresses U.S.-USSR Commission in Seoul

South Korean Mob Protests Proposed Trusteeship

K i m I l Sung .................................................... .

A South Korean Woman Casts Her Ballot

Ambassador Muccio With General Coulter

Members of the Korean Constabulary in Training at Taegu

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1949 ......................... .

D a i Ichi Building, Tokyo ........................................ .

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker ........... .

Page

6

6

15

16

17

20

21

23

27

28

31

44

48

49
Dean G. Acheson ............................................... .

General J. Lawton Collins ....................................... .

Louis A. Johnson ............................................ . .

Maj. Gen. John H. Church ................................. . .

Generals MacArthur and Almond Confer With Ambassador Muccio

Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté ........................................ .

Members of the 25th Division En Route to the Battle Front on

14 July 1950 .................................................. .

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer .................................. .

Refugees Fleeing From the Combat Area Near Taegu

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker and Maj. Gen. William F. Dean

American Artillerymen Protecting Pusan Perimeter ................. .

Replacements Board a Transport Plane at a Japanese Air Base for

Shipment t o Korea ............................................ .

Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright ...................................... .

Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay

Rear Adm. James H. Doyle ...................................... .

A Russian-Made T-34 Tank Knocked Out in Taejon

Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith

Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy ........................................ .

Admiral Arthur W. Radford Conferring With General MacArthur

Vice Adm. Dewey Struble ........................................ .

A Russian-Made 76-mm. Gun in Fortified Position on Wolmi Island

Inch'on Railroad Station After Bombardment by U.N. Naval Vessels

LST's Unloading on Wolmi Island ............................... .

George C. Marshall ............................................. .

Rhee Expresses Appreciation to General MacArthur at Liberation

Ceremonies ................................................... .

Chou En-lai ..................................................... .

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., Arrives at Seoul Airbase

Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen ........................................ .

Tanks and Infantrymen Pursue Communist-Led North Korean Forces

U.S. Troops Pass Supply Wagons Abandoned by the North Koreans

Minesweeper Blows Up in Wonsan Harbor ........................ .

Radford, MacArthur, Pace, and Bradley at Wake Island Conference

President Truman

Equipment Air-Dropped in the Sunch'on Drop Zone ................ .

Canadian Troops Cross the Imjin River ............................ .

Troop Replacements From Thailand Arrive at Pusan ............... .

Brig. Gen. Paik Sun Yup ........................................ .

U.S. Men and Tanks Advance Through Hyesanjin .................. .

Page

51

57

68

72

75

76

85

109

111

113

126

128

140

140

141

142

147

151

152

156

172

174

175

176

180

186

198

201

202

203

204

210

211

213

217

226

227

234

264
Thanksgiving Day Services on Bank of Yalu River

Tracked Amphibious Vehicles Coming Off the Beach at Hungnam

USS Begor Ready To Load as Explosion Rips Harbor Installations

Vehicles To Be Loaded Aboard Ships at Hungnam ................. .

Korean Refugees Slog Through Snow ............................. .

U.S. Infantrymen Enter the Walled City of Suwon

Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder and Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Are

Greeted by Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes ........................... .

Troops Pile Into Assault Boats To Cross the Han River

Directing Artillery Fire on Chinese Positions ...................... .

General MacArthur Is Greeted by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

General MacArthur Receives Warm Welcome on his Return to the

United States ................................................. .

General Ridgway ............................................... .

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet ...................................... .

Buildings Burning in Village North of Ch'unch'on

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

Page

265

302

303

305

309

334

337

355

361

362

366

375

376

388
CHAPTER I

Korea, Case History of a Pawn

The Soviet-sponsored government of

North Korea, having failed to conquer

its southern neighbor by less violent

means, invaded the Republic of Korea

on 25 June 1950. When the United

States, with other United Nations, came

to the aid of the South Koreans, a 3-year

war resulted that cost more than 142,000

American battle casualties.

The campaigns set in motion by the

invasion of South Korea later were

characterized as a "limited war." The

fighting was deliberately confined in geographic terms, political decisions placed

restrictions upon military strategy, and

none of the belligerents, with the exception of the two Korean governments,

used its full military potential. But

there was nothing limited about the

ferocity of the battles.

Erupting from the rivalries of great

nations, the Korean War was greatly influenced by domestic conditions rooted

deep in the history of Korea, and by

the topography of the peninsula where

it took place.

The Land

Korea is a harsh Asian peninsula inhabited by a hardy, harassed people who

rarely if ever had been completely free.

War and tragedy form the main theme

of Korea's history. Suppression and illuse have been the heritage of its longsuffering people. Few habitable areas of

the earth are more unsuited to largescale, modern military operations. The

rugged landscape, a lack of adequate

roads, rail lines, and military harbors,

the narrow peninsula, and, not least,

climatic extremes restrict and hamper

maneuver, severely limit logistic support,

and intensify the normal hardships of

war.

Jutting from the central Asian mainland, the Korean peninsula has an outline resembling Florida's. In the north, a

river-mountain complex separates Korea

from Manchuria and the maritime provinces of the USSR. Eastward, across the

Sea of Japan, the Japanese islands flank

the peninsula. To the west, the Yellow

Sea stands between Korea and China.

The Korean peninsula stretches south

for more than 500 miles, while east and

west, it spans only 220 miles at its widest. Thousands of islets, some scarcely

more than large rocks, rim its 5,400-mile

coastline.
2 POLICY AND DIRECTION

In area, Korea equals the combined

states of Tennessee and Kentucky, covering about 85,000 square miles. The

facetious claim that Korea, ironed flat,

would cover the whole world has an

element of truth, for the terrain throughout the peninsula is mountainous.

Roads and railways wind through tortuous valleys. Ice-free ports exist on

Korea's southern and western coasts, but

the latter shore is distinguished by some

of the most extreme tidal variations in

the world. On the eastern shore, there

are only a few adequate harbors. Although geographers place Korea in a

temperate zone, the classification hardly

mitigates the harsh winters, particularly

in the wind-swept northern mountains,

or the sweltering, dusty, and no less

harsh summers in the south.

Korea's Past

The forces shaping Korea into a nation arose from its unfortunate proximity

to three powers, China, Japan, and

Russia. The periodic surges of ambition

in each of these neighbors turned Korea

into a battleground and a spoil. Sometimes described as a "dagger pointed at

the heart of Japan," Korea became instead Japan's steppingstone to the Asian

mainland. For China and, later, Russia,

Korea was a back gate both to be locked

against intruders and to be opened during any opportunity for expansion.

Korea's ice-free ports fronting the Sea

of Japan were especially coveted by the

Russians. Korea therefore has seldom

been completely free of domination by

one of its stronger neighbors.1

China reached the Korean scene first,

making its impact felt on northern Korea

several centuries before the beginning

of the Christian era. By the 7th century,

A.D., the Chinese had forced their

thought, customs, and manners into the

Korean culture and had turned Korea

into a virtual satellite. Late in that

century, a native dynasty, Chinese-controlled, unified the peninsula. Before

then Japan had occasionally invaded

southern Korea, but with little lasting

effect. Badly defeated by the Koreans

in 663 A.D., Japan retired for nearly a

thousand years.

Like China, Korea endured the Mongol armies in the 13th century. For

nearly a hundred years the savages from

the steppes ruled and ravaged Korea.

Kublai Khan launched two abortive invasions of Japan from Korea, ruthlessly

squandering Korean lives and property

in his depredations.

With the gradual dissipation of Mongol power by the mid-14th century,

Korea again basked in the reflected glory

of a revitalized China. Adapting Chinese

culture to their own talents, the Koreans

1

 Unless otherwise cited, material on Korea's history is based on the following: H. Frederick Nelson,

Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946);

Yoshi Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), vol. I; Ernest W. Clement, A Short

History of Japan (Tokyo: Christian Literature Society, 1926); Andrew Grajdanzev, Modern Korea

(New York: The John Day Company, 1944); Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture

(New York: Ronald Press, 1951); Harold M. Vinacke,

A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New

York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1941), pp. 123-24;

A. Whitney Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the

United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938);

George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, KoreanAmerican Relations, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1951), vol. I; Tyler Dennett,

Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922).
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 3

flourished. Skilled artisans, craftsmen,

and inventors, as well as philosophers and

scholars, brought Korea a level of civilization rivaling that of China. But the

Japanese violently disrupted this happy

era. In a brutal expedition beginning

in 1592, Japanese samurai under the

brilliant Hideyoshi pillaged the peninsula for seven years. Aided by China, the

Koreans eventually expelled the Japanese, but their home had become a

wasteland. Their best artisans and

scholars, along with the greater part of

their portable treasure, were taken home

by the Japanese.

In the following centuries, Korea kept

loose cultural and political ties with

China but withdrew from contact with

the rest of the world. It never again

reached the level of civilization the Japanese had destroyed. When Western

influence spread to Asia in the 19th century, China's peculiar relationship with

Korea baffled the West. Western efforts

to trade with Korea were thwarted by

this misunderstanding. The Koreans

received Western overtures coldly. They

impartially murdered French missionaries and American and Dutch seamen.

Several punitive expeditions by these

Western nations against Korea failed to

improve relations.

Unfortunately for Korea's privacy, in

1860 Russia reached Korea's borders

and later in the century westernization

again whetted Japan's appetite for

territorial expansion. With China, Japan, and Russia fighting for control of

Korea throughout the rest of the 19th

century, the Korean people had little

chance to learn self-government. They

remained separate from the modern

world emerging around them.

Japan won Korea by defeating China

and Russia, in turn, in short but decisive wars. In the Sino-Japanese War

of 1894-95 Japan used Western military

techniques to beat its larger but tradition-bound enemy. Ten years later,

Japan astounded the world by defeating

Russia. Having occupied Korea to fight

Russia, Japan left its troops there. Ignoring Korean objections, Japan disbanded the Korean Army and abolished

the Korean Department of Post and

Communications. It allowed a semblance of self-rule in Korea for several

years, but remained the real master.

Japanese seizure of governmental functions, the forced abdication of Korea's

Emperor, and encroachment in all aspects of Korean society culminated in

an agreement in July 1907 placing Korea

completely under Japanese control. The

annexation of Korea by Japan in August

1910 was simply a formality.2

The United States and Korea

In the quarter century before the

Japanese take-over, the United States

showed a mild interest in Korea and

made some effort to support Korean independence, at least in principle. In

1882, an American naval officer, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, negotiated

a commercial treaty with the Korean

Emperor. The result of four years'

effort, this treaty was achieved through

the reluctant good offices of the Chinese

2

 An account of Korean life under the Japanese

can be found in History of the Occupation of Korea,

August 1945-May 1948, 3 vols. (hereafter cited as

History of Occupation of Korea), prepared in 1948

by historians of the XXIV Corps, vol. I, ch. 2, copy

in OCMH.
4 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Government. It provided for exchange

of diplomatic representatives, protection

of navigation and of United States citizens, extraterritoriality, and trade under

a most-favored nation clause. The treaty

could have given the United States overriding influence in Korea. But when the

Emperor sought an American foreign

affairs adviser and Army military advisers, the United States moved slowly.

The matter dragged on for several years.

The American representative in Korea

repeatedly appealed to Washington for

action. Although requested in 1884,

military advisers reached Korea only in

1888.

The United States treated Korea

casually in the late 19th century. Its

only significance lay in the effect it had

upon relationships with other major

powers in the Far East. According to

one authority, "The Korean Government

was in the position of an incompetent

defective not yet committed to guardianship. The United States was her only

disinterested friend—but had no intention of becoming her guardian."

 3

When the Japanese took over Korea,

the United States made no objection.

President Theodore Roosevelt remarked,

"We cannot possibly interfere for the

Koreans against Japan. . . . They could

not strike one blow in their own defense." On 29 July 1905, Secretary of

War William H. Taft negotiated a secret

"agreed memorandum" with the Japanese Prime Minister. The United

States approved Japan's "suzerainty

over" Korea in return for its pledge not

to interfere with American interests in

the Philippine Islands. The Korean

Emperor's appeal to the United States

for help under the "good offices" clauses

of the Shufeldt Treaty fell on deaf ears.4

Between 1905 and 1910, uprisings and

rebellions erupted frequently throughout Korea. Japan crushed them with

efficient savagery. The Koreans had few

weapons, and Japan was a powerful and

merciless nation. According to Japanese

statistics, 14,566 Korean "rebels" were

killed between July 1907 and December

1908. By 1910, when Japan formally

annexed Korea, little open resistance remained in the land; and no Western nation spoke out against Japan's seizure of

the peninsula.

Complete suppression marked the ensuing thirty-five years of Japanese rule.

The Japanese exploited the people and

the land. But they also modernized

Korea, building highways, railroads,

dams, and factories. Much of this development was designed for military use.

The port of Pusan, for example, was

built for military, rather than commercial, reasons; and the rail line running

from Pusan north to the Manchurian

border had much more military than

commercial value.

The Japanese integrated Korean industry into their own economy. Korea

became completely dependent upon

Japan for semimanufactured commodities, for repair parts, and for markets.

Many key Korean plants produced only

parts used in the final assembly of products in Japan. As Japan embarked on

its program of conquest in Asia in the

1930's, the Japanese turned Korean in3

 Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 495.

4

 (1) Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the United

States, p. 125. (2) Robert T. Oliver, Verdict in

Korea (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1952),

p. 37.
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 5

dustry almost exclusively to military use.

The heavy, sustained use of machinery

without adequate maintenance during

World War II ruined Korean factories

and equipment. The use of almost all

chemical production, especially of nitrogen, in behalf of Japan's war effort caused

severe soil depletion in Korea.5

Banning Koreans from responsible

positions and from educational opportunities, the Japanese controlled key

governmental and economic functions.

Comprising only 3 percent of the population of Korea, the 750,000 Japanese

residents were absolute masters of the

country. Nearly 80 percent of the

Korean people could neither read nor

write.6

The Koreans deeply resented Japanese

exploitation. Judged in Japanese courts

under Japanese laws, they received severe

sentences for minor offenses, more severe

than those given Japanese for similar infractions. The Japanese-controlled Bank

of Chosen charged Koreans interest rates

25 percent higher than those assessed

Japanese competitors. The Korean national debt increased thirtyfold between

1910 and 1945, and the taxation of

Koreans was oppressive. In most industries, Japanese received twice as much

as Koreans doing the same work. Large

numbers of farms were transferred from

Korean to Japanese owners.7

Despite iron-handed Japanese rule

that sought to crush Korean national

aspirations, the flame of patriotism and

independence remained alive in Korea.

Revolutionary groups and movements

sustained the Korean hope for freedom,

defying the Japanese whenever possible.

One strong group working to free Korea

from alien rule called itself the "Provisional Government of the Republic of

Great Korea." It originated on 1 March

1919 when a declaration of independence, signed by Korean students, was

read before a student gathering in Seoul.

The Japanese ruthlessly hunted down the

instigators of this declaration, and many

patriots fled Korea to escape torture and

death. On 10 April 1919 some of these

refugees met in Shanghai and established the Provisional Government. Dr.

Syngman Rhee headed the group as

Premier. After the Manchurian incident in 1931, the Provisional Government moved to Nanking and, later, to

Chungking.

This group sought to achieve complete

independence for Korea and to establish

itself as the Korean Government. Differences on how these goals should be

reached brought frequent clashes in the

leadership of the Korean Provisional

Government. Two men, Rhee and Kim

Koo, emerged at the top. When Kim

Koo became Premier in the mid-1930's,

Rhee served as unofficial representative

of the Provisional Government in the

United States. The group acquired a

considerable following among Koreans

in the United States and China and attracted widespread passive support

within Korea. Both Rhee and Kim were

revered by the Korean people.8

A strong Korean Communist party also

5

 Testimony of Hon. Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration

(ECA) before the House Committee on Foreign

Affairs, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 8 June 1949, in

House Report No. 962, Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, June

1949. p. 9. 6

 Ibid.

7

 History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 2. 8

 Ibid., pp. 46-48.
6 POLICY AND DIRECTION

SYNGMAN RHEE KIM KOO

sprang up in Korea. Organized in 1925,

it pushed the underground movement

against Japan. Communist power in

Korea grew under the well-organized

leadership of the anti-Japanese underground. The Korean Communists were

in contact with the Russian Communists

through the Far Eastern Division of the

Comintern. It is believed, however, that,

owing to a secret agreement with Japan,

the Russians abstained from encouraging

too greatly the Communists in Korea

during Japanese occupation. Many

Communist Koreans took refuge in

Manchuria, China, and Russia.9

In this setting of turbulent and longsuppressed patriotic emotions, it was inevitable that the political void caused

by the fall of the Japanese Empire at

the end of World War II should touch

off a struggle for power.

Korea 1945

When World War II began, Korea

was regarded by the Allies as a victim

of, not a party to, Japanese aggression.

One of the earliest signs that the Allied

Powers were concerned about Korea appeared in a joint statement by the United

States, China, and Great Britain in December 1943, after the Cairo Conference,

which said: "The aforesaid three great

powers, mindful of the enslavement of

the people of Korea, are determined that

in due course Korea shall become free

and independent."

 10

Divergencies between American and

Russian policies appearing in the latter

stages of World War II affected Korea.

The destruction of the Axis in 1945 left

9

 Ibid., vol. II, ch. 2, pp. 7-20.

10

 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the

United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, Dept. of State Publication 7187 (Washington, 1961), p. 448.
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 7

power vacuums in many areas of the

world and brought the differences between the United States and the Soviet

Union into sharp focus. Countries newly

freed from German or Japanese domination assumed significance as possible

targets of clashing American-Soviet

interests.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the United

States attached little importance to

Korea as a strategic area. Korea supported a relatively small population, and

had neither important industrial facilities nor many natural resources. If at

some future date Korea fell into hands

unfriendly to the United States, the

United States recognized that the occupation of Japan might be hampered and

American freedom of movement might

be restricted in the general area. But

with China in 1945 under control of a

friendly government, such a situation

appeared unlikely.

Russia, on the other hand, maintained

its traditional regard for Korea as a

strategic area. As later events demonstrated, the Soviet Union would not

countenance control of Korea by another

power and sought to control Korea itself.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and

Premier Josef V. Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945 touched upon Korea's

future. Roosevelt advocated a trusteeship

for Korea administered by the United

States, the Soviet Union, and China.

Looking at American experience in the

Philippines, he surmised that such a

trusteeship might last for twenty or

thirty years. Stalin said he believed that

Great Britain should also be a trustee.

No actual mention of Korea was made

in the document recording the agreements at Yalta. The secret protocol developed by Roosevelt and Stalin and

agreed to by Prime Minister Winston S.

Churchill only provided territorial and

other concessions to the USSR in the

Far East as conditions for Russian entrance into the war against Japan after

the defeat of Germany. Later, soon after

Roosevelt's death, Stalin told Harry

Hopkins, President Harry S. Truman's

representative in Moscow, that Russia

was committed to the policy of a 4-power

trusteeship for Korea.11

Though American military planners

ostensibly paid little attention to Korea,

they had Korea in mind. On 25 July

1945, the Army Chief of Staff, General

of the Army George C. Marshall, sent a

note to President Truman at Potsdam,

advising him that some guidance on

handling Korea would assist the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. General of the Army

Douglas MacArthur, Commander in

Chief of the United States Army Forces,

Pacific, had already received instructions

to prepare for occupying Japan, and

shortly before Potsdam these orders were

broadened to include Korea. In response to the additional directive, General MacArthur suggested that Tokyo

and Seoul have first priority for occupation, Pusan second priority, and the

Kunsan area on Korea's west coast, third

priority. General Marshall then informed the President that MacArthur

should be able to land a division at Pusan

within a short time of the end of the war.

The other strategic areas in Korea, Mar11

 (1) Department of State, Foreign Relations of

the United States: The Conference at Malta and

Yalta, 1945, Dept of State Publication 6199 (Washington, 1955), pp. 770, 984. (2) Harry S. Truman,

Memoirs, 2 vols., vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope

(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), pp.

316-17.
8 POLICY AND DIRECTION

shall added, were Seoul, near the west

coast, and Ch'ongjin, in the north on the

Sea of Japan. Marshall expected that

the Russians, if they participated in the

occupation, would occupy Ch'ongjin and

would undoubtedly move into Manchuria and perhaps into north China.

He considered it desirable, therefore, to

establish early control over any areas to

be held by the United States.12

Korea was only briefly considered at

the Potsdam conference. Among the

questions discussed were the Soviet timetable for entering the war in the Pacific

and the Allied proclamation demanding

Japan's unconditional surrender. Looking ahead to the surrender of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, the Allied

military representatives drew a tentative

line across the map of Manchuria, above

which the Soviet Union was to accept

surrender of Japanese forces. No mention was at first made of Korea. But

since thousands of Japanese troops were

stationed in Korea, there was a later discussion of Allied operations in that

area.13

At Potsdam, the chief of the Russian

General Staff told General Marshall that

Russia would attack Korea after declaring war on Japan. He asked whether

the Americans could operate against

Korean shores in co-ordination with this

offensive. General Marshall told him

that the United States planned no amphibious operation against Korea until

Japan had been brought under control

and Japanese strength in South Korea

was destroyed. Although the Chiefs of

Staff developed ideas concerning the partition of Korea, Manchuria, and the Sea

of Japan into U.S. and USSR zones,

these had no connection with the later

decisions that partitioned Korea into

northern and southern areas.14

Russian entry into the war against

Japan on 9 August, and signs of imminent Japanese collapse on 10 August 1945

changed U.S. Army planning from defeating Japan to accepting its surrender.

Military planners in the War Department Operations Division began to outline surrender procedures in General

Order No. 1, which General MacArthur

would transmit to the Japanese Government after its surrender. The first paragraph of the order specified the nations

and commands that were to accept the

surrender of Japanese forces throughout

the Far East.15

The Policy Section of the Strategy and

Policy Group in the Operations Division

drafted the initial version of the order.

12

 (1) Lt. Paul C. McGrath, U.S. Army in the

Korean Conflict, n.d., pp. 26-27, OCMH draft MS.

(2) Memo, Marshall for President (delivered at

Potsdam), 25 Jul 45, file OPD 370.9, Case 17/8. 13

 (1) Interv, 1st Lt Paul C. McGrath with Vice

Adm M. B. Gardner, 28 Jan 53, the Pentagon. (2)

Interv, McGrath with Lt Gen Charles P. Cabell, Dir

of the Joint Staff, JCS, OSD, 27 Jan 53. Both in

OCMH.

14

 (1) McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict,

pp. 24-25. (2) History of Occupation of Korea, vol.

II, ch. 3, p. 6. (3) Roy E. Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington,

1961), pp. 2-3. (4) See also discussions of 24 and

26 July in Department of State, Foreign Relations

of the United States: The Conference at Berlin (The

Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 vols., Dept of State

Publications 7015, 7163 (Washington, 1960), II, 345-

52, 408-15. (5) There was widespread misconception that the division of Korea had been agreed

upon at the high-level conference of the Big Three.

In June 1946, the Institute of Pacific Relations published a categorical statement that this agreement

had been made at Yalta. The New York Times in

October 1946 named Potsdam as the place where

the agreement had been made. 15

 McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict,

p. 42.
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 9

Under pressure to produce a paper as

quickly as possible, members of the Policy Section began work late at night on

10 August. They discussed possible surrender zones, the allocation of American,

British, Chinese, and Russian occupation troops to accept the surrender in

the zone most convenient to them, the

means of actually taking the surrender

of the widely scattered Japanese military

forces, and the position of Russia in the

Far East. They quickly decided to include both provisions for splitting up

the entire Far East for the surrender and

definitions of the geographical limits of

those zones.16

The Chief of the Policy Section, Col.

Charles H. Bonesteel, had thirty minutes

in which to dictate Paragraph 1 to a

secretary, for the Joint Staff Planners

and the State-War-Navy Coordinating

Committee were impatiently awaiting

the result of his work. Colonel Bonesteel thus somewhat hastily decided who

would accept the Japanese surrender.

His thoughts, with very slight revision, were incorporated into the final

directive.17

Bonesteel's prime consideration was

to establish a surrender line as far north

as he thought the Soviets would accept.

He knew that Russian troops could reach

the southern tip of Korea before American troops could arrive. He knew also

that the Russians were on the verge of

moving into Korea, or were already there.

The nearest American troops to Korea

were on Okinawa, 600 miles away. His

problem therefore was to compose a

surrender arrangement which, while acceptable to the Russians, would at the

same time prevent them from seizing all

of Korea. If they refused to confine

their advance to North Korea, the United

States would be unable to stop them.

At first Bonesteel had thought of surrender zones conforming to the provincial boundary lines. But the only map

he had in his office was hardly adequate

for this sort of distinction. The 38th

Parallel, he noted, cut Korea approximately through the middle. If this line

was agreeable to President Truman and

to Generalissimo Stalin, it would place

Seoul and a nearby prisoner of war camp

in American hands. It would also leave

enough land to be apportioned to the

Chinese and British if some sort of quadripartite administration became necessary. Thus he decided to use the 38th

Parallel as a hypothetical line dividing

the zones within which Japanese forces

in Korea would surrender to appointed

American and Russian authorities.

The determination of the surrender

zones for the Pacific involved other

countries besides Korea. Since the job

had to be done in a hurry, Colonel

Bonesteel had the paragraphs of the

general order rushed through the Chief

of the Strategy and Policy Group, Brig.

Gen. George A. Lincoln, to the Joint

Staff Planners who were meeting in an

all-night session. This channel was the

same as for all important military policy

papers in 1945. Drafts were routed in

turn through General Lincoln, the Joint

Planners, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and the Secretaries of State, War,

and Navy, until they finally reached the

President.

16

 (1) Ibid. (2) See also Truman, Memoirs, II, 317. 17

 The remainder of this subsection is based on

McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict, pp.

40-53.
10 POLICY AND DIRECTION

When Bonesteel's draft paper reached

the Joint Planners in the predawn hours

of 11 August, Admiral M. B. Gardner

suggested moving the surrender line

north to the 39th Parallel, a recommendation that the planners believed the

Navy Secretary, James C. Forrestal,

favored. Gardner pointed out that the

39th Parallel would place Dairen in the

military zone to be occupied by the

Americans. General Lincoln, however,

felt that the Russians would hardly accept a surrender line that barred them

from Dairen and other parts of the

Liaotung Peninsula; besides, American

units would have great difficulty reaching the Manchurian port ahead of the

Russians. Calling Assistant Secretary of

State James Dunn, Lincoln ascertained

that his opinion was shared. Mr. Dunn

believed that Korea was more important

politically to the United States than

Dairen, and he felt this to be the view of

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. As a

result, the 38th Parallel remained in the

draft when the Joint Planners handed

the general order to the State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee.

While General Lincoln was shepherding the document through the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee on 11

and 12 August, the Russians invaded

Korea, landing on the northeast coast

near Rashin. Russian troops then

poured out of the maritime provinces

of Siberia, down the Korean peninsula,

and into the Kaesong-Ch'unch'on area

above Seoul, where they looted much

equipment, including locomotives and

rolling stock. Reports of the Russian

troop movements reaching Washington

underscored the need for concurrence

in the proposed general order. Otherwise, the Russian advance would render

academic the American acceptance of

the Japanese surrender in southern

Korea. At the same time, swift Russian

troop movements into key areas of southern Manchuria eliminated the possibility of including Dairen in the American

surrender zone.

Between 11 and 14 August, the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the

wording of the surrender instrument.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he

would adhere to three priorities for the

use of the forces under his command.

After the Japanese surrender, the occupation of Japan would come first,

Korea second, China third.

In Washington, the War Department

Operations Division rephrased General

Order No. 1 to the satisfaction of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of

the State, War, and Navy Departments.

On 15 August 1945, clean copies of the

draft order were sent to Fleet Admiral

William D. Leahy's White House office.

Within a few hours President Truman

gave his approval, directing at the same

time that General Order No. 1 be sent

also to the capitals of Great Britain and

the USSR with requests for concurrence

by the heads of those states. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff telegraphed the general

order to General MacArthur and directed that he furnish an estimated time

schedule for the occupation of a port

in Korea.

Among the items it specified, General

Order No. 1 stated that Japanese forces

north of the 38th Parallel in Korea

would surrender to the Russian commander, while those south of the parallel
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 11

would surrender to the commanding general of the U.S. expeditionary

forces. As Washington waited for the

Moscow reaction to President Truman's

message, there was a short period of

suspense. Russian troops had entered

Korea three days before the President

accepted the draft of General Order No.

1. If the Russians failed to accept the

proposal, and if Russian troops occupied

Seoul, General Lincoln suggested that

American occupation forces move into

Pusan.

Stalin replied to President Truman on

16 August 1945. He said nothing specifically about the 38th Parallel but

offered no objection to the substance of

the President's message. He asked that

the general order be "corrected" to authorize Russian forces to accept the surrender of the Japanese in the northern

half of Hokkaido. Stalin also reminded

the President that the Liaotung Peninsula, upon which Dairen and Port

Arthur are located, was part of Manchuria and thus within the USSR military zone. Though President Truman

parried Stalin's proposal to place Russian

forces on Hokkaido, Stalin's message

settled the surrender zones in Korea and

canceled American plans to land troops

at Dairen.

The New Zones

The new dividing line, about 190

miles across the peninsula, sliced across

Korea without regard for political

boundaries, geographical features, waterways, or paths of commerce. The 38th

Parallel cut more than 75 streams and 12

rivers, intersected many high ridges at

variant angles, severed 181 small cart

roads, 104 country roads, 15 provincial

all-weather roads, 8 better-class highways, and 6 north-south rail lines.18

It was, in fact, an arbitrary separation.

South of the 38th Parallel, the American zone covered 37,000 square miles and

held an estimated 21,000,000 persons.

North of the line of latitude, the USSR

zone totaled 48,000 square miles and

had about 9,000,000 people.19 Of the

20 principal Korean cities, 12 lay within

the American zone, including Seoul, the

largest, with a population of nearly

2,000,000. The American zone included

6 of Korea's 13 provinces in their entirety, the major part of 2 more, and a

small part of another.

The two areas, North and South

Korea, complemented each other both

agriculturally and industrially. South

Korea was mainly a farming area, where

fully two-thirds of the inhabitants

worked the land. It possessed three

times as much irrigated rice land as the

northern area, and furnished food for

the north. But North Korea furnished

the fertilizer for the southern rice fields,

and the largest nitrogenous fertilizer

plant in the Far East was in Hungnam.

Although North Korea also had a high

level of agricultural production, it was

deficient in some crops. The barrier

imposed serious adverse effects on both

zones.20

18

 Shannon C. McCune, "Physical Basis for Korean

Boundaries," Far Eastern Quarterly, No. 5 (May

1946), pp. 286-87. 19

 (1) Andrew Grajdanzev, "Korean Divided," Far

Eastern Survey, XIV (October 1945), 282. (2) History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 4, p. 16. 20

 The closing paragraphs of this chapter are

based on information in (1) Testimony of Hoffman,

8 June 1949, House Report 962, June 1949, and

(2) George A. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 52-56.
12 POLICY AND DIRECTION

South Korea had in 1940 turned out

about 74 percent of Korea's light consumer goods and processed products. Its

industry consisted of some large and

many small plants producing textiles,

rubber products, hardware, and ceramics. Many of these plants had been built

to process raw materials from North

Korea.

North Korea, a largely mountainous

region, held valuable mineral deposits,

especially coal. Excellent hydroelectric

plants, constructed during the last ten

years of Japanese domination, ranked

with the largest and best in the world.

Because of its power resources, North

Korea housed almost all of Korea's heavy

industry, including several rolling mills

and a highly developed chemical industry. In 1940, North Korea produced 86

percent of Korea's heavy manufactured

goods. The only petroleum processing

plant in the country, a major installation designed to serve all of Korea, was

located in the north, as were seven of

eight cement plants. Almost all the

electrical power used by South Korea

came from the north, as did iron, steel,

wood pulp, and industrial chemicals

needed by South Korea's light industry.

Sharp differences between north and

south had traditionally been part of the

Korean scene. South Koreans considered their northern neighbors crude and

culturally backward. North Koreans

viewed southerners as lazy schemers.

During the Japanese occupation Koreans

in the north had been much less tractable

than those in the south. Differences in

farming accounted for some of the social

differences in the two zones. A dryfield type of farming in the north opposed a rice-culture area in the south

to produce marked variations in points

of view. In the south were more small

farms and a high tenancy rate, while in

the north larger farms and more ownerfarmers prevailed. Those differences the

38th Parallel promised to exacerbate.
CHAPTER II

The House Divided

The Americans Occupy South Korea

On 13 August 1945 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff designated General Douglas MacArthur to receive the surrender of Japanese forces in those areas for which the

United States was responsible, including

the southern half of Korea.1

General MacArthur stood at the pinnacle of a distinguished military career.

A man of outstanding intellect and physical stamina, son of a Civil War hero, he

was marked early for posts of high responsibility. Graduated from West

Point with the highest scholastic rating

ever recorded there, he rose swiftly in

World War I to the rank of brigadier

general and displayed great courage in

combat. He later served as superintendent of the Military Academy, Chief

of Staff of the Army, and thereafter became the military adviser to the Philippines which gave him the rank of field

marshal in 1936. General MacArthur

after retiring from the United States

Army in 1937 was recalled to active duty

in July 1941 and led Allied forces to

victory over the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area, planning and directing a series of brilliant campaigns.

MacArthur received little guidance at

the outset on how to handle Korea. He

designated the XXIV Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, to

carry out the terms of surrender in

Korea and to occupy and administer

South Korea on behalf of the United

States. General Hodge became commander of the United States Army Forces

in Korea (USAFIK) on 27 August 1945.2

As already noted, the possibility of

establishing a 4-power trusteeship over

Korea had been discussed between

President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin

at Yalta in February 1945, and in conferences with Mr. Harry Hopkins in

May 1945 Stalin had agreed to such a

4-power trusteeship. In June the

Chinese Government had also agreed.

The British Government, although informed of plans for trusteeship, had made

no commitment.3

The paucity of specific guidance in

1

 (1) Hq, United States Army Military Government in Korea, Statistical Research Division, History

of the United States Army Military Government in

Korea, Period of September 1945-30 June 1946, 3

vols. (hereafter cited as History of USAMGIK), I,

22-23, copy in OCMH. (2) WD GO No. 1, 13 Aug

45.

2

 (1) History of USAMGIK, I, 22-23. (2) USAFIK

GO No. 1, 27 Aug 45. 3

 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the

United States: The British Commonwealth and the

Far East, 1945 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations:

The British Commonwealth and the Far East, 1945),

Dept of State Publication 8451 (Washington, 1969),

vol. VI, pp. 1021, 1095.
14 POLICY AND DIRECTION

advance of occupation reflected an assumption that fairly simple solutions

could be found for Korea's problems

in close co-operation with Great Britain,

the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. But neither in Washington nor

in the Far East were serious preparations made for carrying out an American

program in South Korea that would take

into account the entirely different Soviet

outlook with respect to Korea's future.

That General MacArthur expected

problems with the Russians became

evident on 29 August when he warned

Hodge that the Russians might already

be in Seoul when he arrived. He told

Hodge to take over Seoul nevertheless,

to make friendly contact with the Russian commander, and to act with caution

to avoid troublesome incidents. MacArthur believed that Korea would be occupied on a quadripartite basis, with

British, Chinese, Russian, and American

participation, although he had no exact

knowledge of the areas the four powers

would occupy. General Hodge continued to believe that guidance from Washington was inadequate. He contended

that unless he were provided more specific and positive policy instructions the

United States would fail in Korea.4

In the years before World War II the

President of the Korean Provisional

Government in Chungking, Kim Koo,

and its representative in the United

States, Dr. Syngman Rhee, who styled

himself Chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States, had sought

United States recognition and support

but without success. In the closing

months of the war, these men increased

their efforts, seeking not only recognition

by the United States and other governments, but membership in the United

Nations. American national policy forbade such actions however and Rhee was

told in June 1945, after an appeal to

President Truman, that "It is

the policy of this Government in dealing

with groups such as the 'Korean Provisional

Government' to avoid taking action which

might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the

right of the Korean people to choose the

ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish."

 5

On 17 August, with the approach of

allied victory over Japan, Kim Koo

petitioned President Truman, through

the United States Ambassador to China,

for permission to send representatives

of his Provisional Government to Korea

and sought to participate in "all Councils affecting the present and future

destiny of Korea and Koreans." No

immediate action was taken on this request, but General Hodge, a few days

after arriving in Korea, suggested to

General MacArthur that leaders of the

Chungking government in exile be returned to Korea under allied sponsorship

to act as "figureheads" until the political

4

 (1) Rad, MacArthur to Hodge, 29 Aug 45, quoted

in History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 1, pp.

60-61. (2) The history written on this period by

officers of Hodge's headquarters and approved by

him states: "General Hodge had been given little

or no practical guidance by his instructions on such

thorny questions as the eventuality of Korean independence, methods of handling various political

factions or the severance of Korea from Japanese

influence, economic or otherwise. If Washington

or GHQ had given much constructive thought to

Korean problems, it had not been reflected in orders

issued the Corps Commander." History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 1, p. 63.

5

 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1023, 1027,

1030-32.
GENERAL OF THE ARMY MACARTHUR
16 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL HODGE

situation stabilized and elections could

be held.6

While this action was not taken in the

manner Hodge had suggested, the return

of individual members of the Korean

Provisional Government was approved

in late September and transportation and

support provided them by the United

States. Each individual returning to

Korea was required to sign a statement

agreeing to abide by the laws and regulations of the Military Government.7

On 28 August the commander of Japanese forces in Seoul had appealed for a

quick entry into Korea by American

troops to preserve order and to maintain

government functions. He charged that

Korean communists were creating trouble as an excuse to bring Russian troops

into the area below the 38th Parallel.

A small advance party from the XXIV

Corps landed at Kimp'o Airfield near

Seoul at noon on 4 September. Four

days later, the bulk of the corps landed

at Inch'on and entered Seoul. Contrary to prior fears, the Russians had not

taken over the Korean capital. A few

Soviet soldiers had entered smaller towns

in the American sector close to the 38th

Parallel, but no organized units appeared

to be south of the line.8

General MacArthur issued a proclamation to the people of Korea on 7 September establishing American military

control over all Korea south of the 38th

Parallel. "Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and

the determination that in due course

Korea shall become free and independent," he declared, "the Korean people

are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the Instrument

of Surrender and to protect them in

their personal and religious rights. In

giving effect to these purposes, your

active aid and compliance are required. . . . All persons will obey

promptly all my orders and orders issued

under my authority. Acts of resistance

to the occupying forces or any acts which

6

 Ibid., pp. 1036-37, 1053. 7

 Ibid., pp. 1053-60.

8

 (1) History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II, ch. 3,

p. 19. (2) History of USAMGIK, I, 24-26. (3) For

details of arrival of U.S. forces in Korea, including

preparation for movement from Okinawa and events

in Korea between the announcement of surrender

and the actual landing, see History of Occupation

of Korea, vol. I, chs. 1-4.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 17

PARADE HELD BY KOREANS for the American Advance Party.

may disturb public peace and safety will

be punished severely."

 9

General Hodge appointed Maj. Gen.

Archibald V. Arnold, commander of the

U.S. 7th Division—the initial occupation force—Military Governor of South

Korea on 12 September 1945,10 and a

Department of State official had, at

Hodge's request, been assigned as his

Political Adviser. The latter, Mr. H.

Merrell Benninghoff, described for the

Secretary of State a disturbed and chaotic situation in South Korea on 15

September. "USAFIK," he commented,

is operating under two great difficulties,

neither of which can be corrected at this

end. The first is that this headquarters has

no information in regard to the future

policy of the United States or its allies as to

the future of Korea. What is going to happen to the nation and what will be the

solution of the now almost complete division of the country into two parts? What

will be our general policies beyond immediate military necessity? The second difficulty

is that USAFIK is in small strength, and has

too few competent military government and

9

 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1043-44. 10

 USAFIK GO No. 7, 12 Sep 45.
18 POLICY AND DIRECTION

other officers that it can operate only in a

limited area and with little overall effect.11

American forces did indeed face

urgent problems in Korea. Industry

and commerce had virtually ceased.

Public utilities and services hardly

existed. The Korean economy was in a

perilous state. Complicating all these

problems, the political atmosphere was

turbulent and tense. There was little

prospect of an early stabilization of this

political situation and even less chance

that the Koreans themselves could assume orderly control of their own affairs.

Although more than seventy political

parties had been formed in South Korea

in the brief period between Japanese

capitulation and the arrival of American troops, none appeared competent to

govern. Not only were these parties at

odds with one another, but their leaders

had little if any political experience.12

The Japanese heritage had left very

few Koreans qualified for responsible

posts either in government or in industry. Railway jobs, for example, even as

yardmen, much less as engineers, were

beyond the experience and skills of most

Koreans. No trained public administrators existed. Faced with these facts,

General Hodges decided to keep some

Japanese officials in responsible posts

during a transition period. On the day

after he reached Korea, Hodge appointed

General Nobuyuki Abe, wartime governor-general of Korea, temporary head

of the Korean Government, to serve

under American supervision. Hodge

promised that Americans would replace

the Japanese officials as soon as possible,

and Koreans would, in turn, replace the

Americans. His assurances proved to be

a mistake. Deeply offended at seeing

their old rulers apparently still in control, the Koreans reacted violently, forcing Hodge to dismiss the Japanese and to

place many less able Koreans in governmental offices. By December 1945, almost 75,000 Koreans, many of them of

dubious qualification, were holding governmental positions.13

The course of events indicates all too

clearly that the United States had not

foreseen what its role might be in Korea

and had made no effective plans for military government. The first instructions

sent from Washington to General

Hodge were vague. Subsequent instructions were, according to his reports,

incomplete.

Without benefit of specific guidance,

General Hodge tried to keep order, to

restore public utilities, and to shore up

the sagging economy. His efforts were

hampered by the fact that his XXIV

Corps had been organized to fight the

Japanese, not to occupy Korea. Keeping

experienced men and officers in Korea

was next to impossible. A steady and

considerable rotation brought unqualified people into positions at all

levels of responsibility in the Korean

occupation.14

Another indication of how little prepared the United States was to occupy

Korea in 1945 was the almost total ab11

 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, p. 1052. 12

 (1) History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II,

ch. 1. (2) E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press,

Columbia University, 1951), pp. 54-58.

13

 (1) History of USAMGIK, I, 26-27, 29-32. (2)

History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 4, pp.

16-18. 14

 Meade, American Military Government in Korea, p. 48.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 19

sence in the country of Americans who

could speak or understand Korean.

Americans were forced, in dealing with

Korean officials and the general public,

to rely upon English-speaking Koreans.

General Hodge used a Korean to interpret his first press conference. A Korean

translated his first address to the Korean

public. The U.S. military government

became known among the people as a

"government by interpreters." A survey in October 1945 showed that Koreans

distrusted native interpreters and rated

their influence on American officials

among the biggest problems disturbing

them. South Koreans strongly suspected that interpreters were dishonest

and were trying, in many cases successfully, to influence occupation policy.

The situation improved as trained military government officers began arriving

in Korea in increasing numbers late in

October.15

The Soviets had not been idle meanwhile. An inkling of their intentions

existed within the Department of State

even before Japanese surrender. In a

policy paper prepared in June 1945,

State planners had predicted, "The

Soviet Government will, no doubt, establish military government in the portion of Korea under its control and may

subsequently wish to establish a Korean

regime friendly to the Soviet Union composed at least partially of Korean leaders

groomed in the Soviet Union."

 16

Dr. Rhee, whose prestige with the

Korean people was believed by Washington officials and Generals MacArthur

and Hodge to be strong enough to instill

a sense of purpose into the politics of his

native land, reached Korea on 16 October 1945. Kim Koo arrived in Korea

slightly later from Chungking, China.17

Their arrival coincided with the issuance to General MacArthur of specific

guidance from Washington. This guidance, which had been under preparation

within the SWNCC since 1 September,

was sent MacArthur on 17 October. The

basic initial directive stated that the

United States "ultimate objective" in

Korea was "to foster conditions which

will bring about the establishment of a

free and independent nation capable of

taking her place as a responsible and

peaceful member of the family of nations." MacArthur was further instructed, "In all your activities you will

bear in mind the policy of the United

States in regard to Korea, which contemplates a progressive development

from this initial interim period of civil

affairs administration by the United

States and the U.S.S.R., to a period of

trusteeship under the United States, the

United Kingdom, China, and the

U.S.S.R., and finally to the eventual independence of Korea with membership

in the United Nations organization."

 18

The presence of Syngman Rhee and

Kim Koo coincided, perhaps accidentally, with a noticeable rise in communist

activity in southern Korea, all of it directed against the American occupation.

Other antioccupation groups, not necessarily communist, stirred up increasing

trouble. General Hodge criticized in15

 (1) History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch.

4. (2) History of USAMGIK, I, 69. 16

 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 556-80.

17

 History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II, ch. 1,

p. 20. 18 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1073-74.
20 POLICY AND DIRECTION

RUSSIAN MEMBER ADDRESSES FIRST FORMAL MEETING OF THE

U.S. - USSR COMMISSION IN SEOUL

decisiveness in Washington as a "drifting" which could only lead to an

untenable position for his forces. "The

Koreans want their independence more

than any one thing, and they want it

now," he stated. "This stems from the

Allied promise of freedom and independence which is well known by every

Korean without the qualifying phrase

'in due course.' I am told that there are

no Korean words expressing 'in due

course.' " The United States, he insisted, must either take some positive

action at an international level or empower and direct him to seize the initiative in South Korea. As a drastic

alternative, he proposed that both the

United States and Russia withdraw

forces from Korea simultaneously and

leave Korea to its own devices and an

inevitable internal upheaval for its selfpurification.19

At the same time General Hodge ex19

 (1) Rad, CX 56045, CINCAFPAC to JCS, 16

Dec 45. (2) See also Meade, American Military

Government in Korea, p. 48.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 21

SOUTH KOREAN MOB PROTESTS PROPOSED TRUSTEESHIP

perienced unexpected trouble from Dr.

Rhee. After forming a Central Council

for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, Rhee found that he could

not control the Korean Communist

party. Invited by General Hodge to

give a series of nonpartisan radio talks to

the Korean people, Rhee used the opportunity to castigate the Communists.

From then on, a bitter enmity grew between Rhee and the Communists, and

the consequent divisiveness complicated

Hodge's problems.20

Although American policy-makers pinned their hopes on trusteeship, the

Korean people opposed it vehemently.

Foreign control by any name was inimical to Korean national aspirations.

The Koreans wanted at once the freedom

about which their liberators kept talking. Nevertheless, viewed in perspective,

trusteeship represented at least a step

toward the eventual solution of Korea's

problems.

The United States succeeded in bringing about a meeting in Moscow in late

December 1945 of foreign ministers of 20

 History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II, ch. 1.
22 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the United States, Great Britain, and

the USSR. A seemingly constructive

plan of trusteeship for Korea was worked

out among these officials. Under this

plan a U.S.-USSR joint commission

would be formed to recommend, after

consulting with Korean political parties

and social organizations, the creation of

a provisional Korean democratic government for all of Korea. The ministers directed the commission to consult with

this provisional Korean government and

to draw up a program, which would be

considered by their own governments.

The object would be an agreement to

form a 4-power trusteeship of Korea for

a period of up to five years.21

When news of the trusteeship proposal with its "up to five years" clause

reached South Korea, many of the

Koreans reacted violently. Riots, which

had to be quelled by U.S. troops, broke

out on 29 December. In contrast, the

South Korean Communists, presumably

acting on instructions from their Russian

mentors, announced their support of the

trusteeship proposals on 3 January.

The conference of U.S. and USSR

officials in Korea began on 16 January

and ran for fifteen formal sessions

through 5 February 1946. The Americans wanted to integrate the two zones,

but the Russians wanted to keep both

zones and merely to co-ordinate activities

between them. Since neither side would

budge on this basic issue, the sessions

produced little of consequence. On 2

February, Hodge reported that there was

nothing in the attitude of the Russians

to show that they had any thought of

unifying Korea so long as American

forces were present. "So far," he said:

all discussion includes adjustment of the

flow of everything from mail to persons

through central posts along the boundary.

My best guess now is that north and south

will never be really united until the Russians are sure that the whole will be soundly

communistic. Based on current trends, I

question our ability to stem the propaganda

and controlled political maneuvering of the

Soviets.22

The Russian propaganda campaign in

Korea was indeed cleverly contrived and

handled. Taking full advantage of

Korean sentiment, the Russians presented trusteeship to the Korean people

as the brainchild of the United States.

Tass made it appear that the Russians

had been trying to arrange for everything

the Koreans wanted, including full and

immediate independence, but that the

Americans were fighting for a 10-year

trusteeship. General Hodge was bitter

about the Russian success in this venture.

"As the significance of the Tass statement . . . sinks in, the Korean people

are feeling that the U.S. has again 'sold

them down the river,' " he charged,

"this time to the Russians instead of the

Japanese."

 23

After the military-level conferences,

which resulted only in some vague agreements on an exchange of mail, an allocation of radio frequencies, and military

liaison, the Joint Commission of the U.S.-

USSR began deliberations at Seoul on

20 March 1946. The pattern of stalemate was repeated. The Americans

21

 (1) Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948,

Dept of State Publication 3305, FE Series (Washington, 1948). (2) McCune, Korea Today, p. 61, app.

A, Doc 1. (3) Truman, Memoirs, II, 319-20.

22

 Rad, TFGCG 272, Hodge to MacArthur, 1 Feb

46.

23

 Ibid.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 23

KIM IL SUNG

claimed that the Russians obstinately

refused to co-operate or to make any

constructive attempt toward agreement.

The Russians insisted that only Korean

groups fully supporting the Moscow

agreement were eligible for membership

in a provisional government. The Joint

Commission adjourned on 8 May without resolving this fundamental issue.

The Russians in North Korea

Every world area in which Soviet and

American interests touched had become

increasingly sensitive by the end of

World War II. The establishment of

the United Nations Organization in

1945 gave some reason to hope that

Russian - American differences could

eventually be settled by reasonable

process, but it produced no immediate

magic. The failure of Russian and

American negotiators at the conference

table in Korea was symptomatic of doctrinal differences. Unilateral Russian

actions in North Korea extended these

differences into a tangible form.

The Soviets had sent forces into Korea

with definite objectives. From the beginning, they sealed off their zone.

They stopped interzonal communication

and transportation and set up a solid

line of roadblocks. They emplaced machine guns with fields of fire covering

the line which they chose to interpret as

the 38th Parallel, for in actuality parts of

the Russian line were 1,000 to 1,200

yards south of the latitude shown on

American maps. In spite of the Russian

guards, a daily flow of 5,000 to 6,000

destitute refugees from North Korea

poured into the American zone during

the first few months of dual control.

American attempts to set up liaison

in the north proved futile during the first

month of occupation. Suggestions by

General Hodge to his Russian counterpart that interzonal commerce and

communication be allowed, even encouraged, met flat rejection. The major

contacts between the Americans and the

Russians in Korea consisted of an exchange of mail trains once every two

weeks, a small Russian liaison mission

in Seoul, and a similar tiny American

group at the Russian headquarters in

P'yongyang. Telephone communications between zones were subject to

Russian whims and mainly used by the

Russians.24

24

 Statement, Mr. John M. Allison, Deputy Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of

State, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 9 June 1949, in

House Report No. 962, Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, June

1949.
24 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Finally, in October 1945, the Soviet

commander slammed the door on any

further efforts by Hodge to work out

agreements. The Communist official informed Hodge by letter that there would

be no negotiation of any sort at the military level until decisions were made and

relationships established at the top

political level. On 11 October the

Russian liaison detachment was withdrawn from South Korea.25

American and other observers who

penetrated North Korea reported some

alarming developments. The Russians

were molding North Korea into a model

communist state. Korean political parties which fitted the Soviet design were

being placed in nominal power. Behind

a façade of native government the

Russians were communizing North

Korea without arousing the storms of

critical protest that met the Americans

in their efforts to democratize South

Korea.

Russian policy in North Korea was

aimed at creating an indigenous government which would be a replica of the

Russian political system and subservient

to the Soviet Union. The ready-made

strong Communist organization in North

Korea as well as the area's nearness to

Manchuria and USSR territory made the

job easy for the Russians. They brought

back to Korea thousands of Korean

expatriates who had lived, studied, and

become completely communized in the

USSR. A few had held government or

party posts in Moscow.

On 3 October 1945 the Russians introduced into their new nation one of

these Koreans, born Kim Sung Chu but

traveling under the alias of Kim Il Sung.

The Russians hailed him as the leading

exponent of Korean nationalism. The

original Kim Il Sung had been a famous

leader of Korean resistance against the

Japanese. The Russian-sponsored interloper had served as a captain in the

Russian Army. After going to Manchuria in 1930, he became a small-time

bandit leader, and finally disappeared

into the USSR in 1941 or 1942. Backed

by the Russians, Kim Il Sung assumed

control of the Korean Communist party

in late October 1945. At the same time

other Russian-trained Koreans took over

key posts in the North Korean regime.

This seizure of power by the Korean

Communist party in North Korea was

carried out boldly with complete Russian

backing.26

A central North Korean government—

the Interim People's Committee—was

created on 12 February 1946. This

committee, headed by Kim Il Sung and

dominated by Korean Communist party

members, gave wide publicity to Communist measures and reforms. Within

limits defined by the Russians and subject to their advisory control, the Korean

Communists functioned with marked

initiative. By mid-1946 the USSR

position in North Korea had become

sufficiently secure to permit withdrawal

of all but 10,000 occupation troops.

Thereafter, the occupiers further reduced their interference in purely

administrative functions. Assured of reliable leadership, the USSR could

supervise developments in North Korea

25

 Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth

and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, p. 1071.

26

 (1) Department of State, North Korea: A Case

Study of a Soviet Satellite, Report No. 5600 (Washington, May 1951). (2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 320-

22.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 25

through a relatively small number of

strategically placed Russian personnel.

The United States Seeks a Solution

Communist-inspired riots throughout

the southern zone marked the close of the

first year of American occupation. In

the fall of 1946, after Korean mobs overran several police stations and seized

arms and ammunition, General Hodge

declared martial law. But he would

have been hard pressed had a full-scale

uprising occurred, for he then had only

43,500 soldiers in Korea and the over-all

combat effectiveness of his entire XXIV

Corps had dropped to an estimated 10

percent. Meanwhile, reports kept filtering in from North Korea that the

Russians were training hundreds of thousands of young North Koreans and forming a native army; and South Korean

communists passed the word in the

American zone that the North Korean

Army would invade and "liberate" South

Korea. Communists sentenced to prison

terms after the October riots shrugged

off the punishment as unimportant since

they believed that the Russians would set

them free in six months anyway.

The U.S.-USSR Joint Commission resumed its meetings on 22 May 1947.

In mid-July, General Hodge reported

pessimistically, "Based upon performance to date I feel sure that the U.S.-

USSR Joint Commission will fail, with

the break-up coming when the Kremlin

gives the order. So far as I can determine there is no change in the Soviet

stand."

 27

 He charged that the Russian

delegation was under orders to turn

Korea into a USSR satellite.

"We have wasted well over a year on

South Korean rehabilitation in attempts

to placate the Russians and to make

the Moscow decision work," Hodge

claimed, and he recommended that the

United States abrogate the Moscow decision and go it alone if the Joint Commission failed again. "I have always

been aware that Korea has been low on

the agenda of national foreign policy,"

he said, "but I feel that the situation

here is reaching the point where Washington must become aware that it may

soon reach the point of explosion." He

asked that he be given a definite longrange plan to use if the Joint Commission failed, that "all concerned" stop

commenting about Korean plans in the

press until some definite facts had been

established, and that his command be

raised to full authorized strength.28

In July, acting on advice from the

Department of State, President Truman

directed the transfer of the responsibility for civil administration in Korea

from military to civilian control. On

25 July 1947 the War Department

notified General MacArthur that the Department of State would gradually assume civil affairs responsibility. "In

order to facilitate this transfer," he was

told, "CG USAFIK will henceforth report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

political, economic, cultural, social and

nonmilitary operational aspects of the

occupation, the War Department acting

as the Executive Agent for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in all routine matters."

The military command relationship be27

 Rad, CM-IN 2987, CINCFE to JCS (forwarding

message from Hodge), 18 Jul 47. 28

 Ibid.
26 POLICY AND DIRECTION

tween the Commander in Chief, Far

East (CINCFE), and the Commanding

General, USAFIK, was not to be affected,

and CINCFE's military responsibilities

for Korea would remain unchanged.29

The fanatic Korean dislike for trusteeship meanwhile continued to foment

resistance to the Joint Commission, a resistance in which Dr. Rhee was a principal factor. He kept up a continual attack

against communism and against General

Hodge personally. But Rhee need not

have concerned himself with opposing

the negotiations toward trusteeship: the

Joint Commission got nowhere. In a

direct move to break the deadlock, the

United States proposed on 26 August

1947 that the four major powers meet

again to decide how the Moscow agreement could be carried out. China and

Great Britain agreed, but the Soviet

Union refused. Consequently, after two

years of occupation, and with no arrangement for unification and independence

of Korea yet in sight, the United States

placed the problem before the General

Assembly of the United Nations on 23

September 1947.30

In a draft resolution on 16 October

1947 the United States recommended

that both zones of Korea hold elections

before 31 March 1948 under observation

of the United Nations. A United Nations temporary commission would view

the elections and supervise the formation

of a national government. When a unified Korean government had thus been

established, foreign troops were to

withdraw.31

During consideration of this proposal

in the General Assembly, the USSR representative protested that the United

Nations had no jurisdiction over Korea

and that foreign troops must withdraw

before creation of a unified Korean

government. His counterproposal was

that the occupying powers immediately

withdraw their troops. This was rejected. When the General Assembly, on

14 November 1947, approved a resolution supporting the United States

proposal and establishing the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, Russia

refused to take part in the U.N.

commission.32

The Russians did more than refuse

to co-operate. The main source of hydroelectric power for South Korea was

located in their zone, and in November

1947, upon the formation of the U.N.

Temporary Commission, they cut in half

the amount of electricity allowed South

Korea.

Elections took place in South Korea

on 10 May 1948. The North Koreans

did not participate, nor did they recognize the results of the elections. The

U.N. commission itself was barred from

North Korea. But the elections brought

out an estimated 80 percent of the eligible voters in the south who chose

representatives for their National Assembly, and the U.N. commission reported

the results to be valid.33

The new assembly of the Republic of

Korea convened for the first time on 31

May 1948 and elected 73-year-old Dr.

29

 Rad, WARX 82849, WD to CINCFE, 25 Jul 47. 30

 Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, p. 5. 31

 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

32

 (1) Ibid., pp. 8-9. (2) Testimony, Hoffman,

H.R. 5330, 7 Jun 49. 33

 (1) Rpt, House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 81st

Congress, 2d Session, Background Information on

Korea, House Report 2495, 11 Jul 50, pp. 11, 12.

(2) Testimony, Hoffman, H.R. 5330, 7 Jun 49.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 27

A SOUTH KOREAN WOMAN CASTS HER BALLOT at the

United Nations supervised election.

Syngman Rhee as its chairman. After

considerable debate, the assembly produced a constitution in July 1948 and

on the 20th of the month elected Rhee

President of the republic. Whereupon

General Hodge, because of his past differences with Rhee, recommended his

own relief as commanding general,

USAFIK. When Hodge left Korea in

August 1948 he was succeeded by his

deputy, Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, and

he left Korea in August 1948.34

34

 For details of Rhee's biography and his opposition to Hodge, see the following: Current Biography Yearbook 1947 (New York: H. W. Wilson

Company, 1948), pp. 534-36; Robert T. Oliver, Why

War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), pp. 200-203; History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II, ch. I, p. 33, and ch. 2, p. 50;

McCune, Korea Today, p. 244; Memo, CSUSA, 13

May 48, sub: Replacement of CG USAFIK, in G-3,

DA file 091 Korea, sec. V, Case 22/2.
28 POLICY AND DIRECTION

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO WITH GENERAL COULTER

On 15 August 1948, during elaborate

ceremonies at Seoul, General MacArthur

proclaimed the new Republic of Korea

(ROK), Rhee was formally inaugurated

as President, and USAFIK's governmental authority came to an end. The

United States formally recognized the

Republic of Korea on 1 January 1949;

and John J. Muccio, who had been

special representative to the republic

since August 1948, became the first U.S.

ambassador on 21 March 1949.

Withdrawal From Korea

Soon after Rhee was inaugurated, he

quoted General MacArthur as having

promised in private conference: "Personally, I will do anything I can to help

the Korean people and to protect them.

I will protect them as I would protect

the United States or California against

aggression."

 35

 But in their postwar

planning to meet Russian aggression

American military planners were and

had always been opposed to any concept

that included Korea as an area of military importance.

In 1946, the United States was prepared to stay in Korea as long as necessary, that is, until agreement could be

reached with Russia.36 In September

1947, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer

investigated the Korean situation and reported to President Truman that American troops were still needed there. He

believed that Russian forces would stay

until the North Korean puppet government and armed forces were sufficiently

strong to carry out USSR objectives

without the presence of Russian troops.

He warned that Russia might withdraw

when conditions were favorable, primarily to force the United States to fol35

 New York Times, October 22, 1948. 36

 Rad, WAR 87750, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC,

11 May 46.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 29

low suit, and that after American troops

withdrew the Russians had plans for

North Korean forces to seize South

Korea. The USSR delegation on the

Joint Commission suggested on 26 September 1947 that U.S. and USSR troops

be withdrawn simultaneously at the beginning of 1948, and the Russian foreign

minister followed up on 9 October by

making the same suggestion to Secretary

of State Marshall.37

The USSR proposal was declined, but

on 29 September U.S. officials had decided to try for a Korean settlement

which would let the United States withdraw as soon as possible and with

minimum ill effects. Military leaders

concurred inasmuch as the United States

had little strategic interest in keeping

forces or bases in Korea, and because

forces then in Korea were sorely needed

elsewhere. President Truman, on 8 April

1948, called for every effort to create

conditions which would allow a military

withdrawal by the end of the year.

The Department of State held that

American forces should remain in Korea

until a strong South Korean military

force had been established, and a strong

South Korean government formed. It

also desired full United Nations approval of the withdrawal. But the Army

had already started to plan its retirement. Planning dates, in which the Department of State eventually concurred,

set tactical withdrawals to start on 15

August 1948. The ambassador and a

military mission of sixty-one men and

officers would handle United States

interests in Korea.38

A month later than planned, on 15

September, USAFIK units began to

leave Korea. But new political developments in both North and South Korea

soon reduced the American departures.

On 9 September the North Koreans had

formed a government, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea, which immediately claimed jurisdiction over all

of Korea. The Soviet Union and its

satellites quickly recognized this government. On 19 September the USSR notified the United States that all Russian

forces in Korea would depart by the end

of the year and expressed the hope that

American troops would do likewise.

Both the rise of the communist state in

the north and the Russian eagerness for

the withdrawal of all foreign troops

argued against any rapid removal of

American forces. Furthermore, a rebellion within the South Korean defense

force in October, although short-lived,

underlined the seething unrest within

the republic and prompted an appeal

from President Rhee to President Truman for the retention of American troops

until the complete loyalty of his own

forces was assured and until the latter

were capable of dealing with any threat

from without or within.39

Although a State Department repre37

 (1) Lt Gen A. C. Wedemeyer, Report to the

President, Korea, Sep 47, pp. 13 and 25. (2) Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 6-7.

38

 This Defense-State disagreement may be traced

in DA file P&O XO91 Korea, sec. V. 39

 (1) Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors

in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES (Washington, 1962) (hereafter

cited as Military Advisors in Korea), pp. 35-37. (2)

Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 114-

15. (3) Rad, ZPOL 1936, COMGENUSAFIK (Muccio) to Department of State, 20 Nov 48.
30 POLICY AND DIRECTION

sentative in Korea observed in November 1948 that the "presence of U.S.

troops would have a stabilizing effect

locally," earlier withdrawals and normal

attrition had destroyed the ability of

American units, even if augmented by

South Korean forces, to repel a serious

invasion. The United States had decided in September not to match the

USSR plan to withdraw all forces by the

end of 1948, a plan ostensibly carried

out, but to consider the removal of

foreign troops as just one facet of the

Korean question and to await further

action on the question by the U.N.

General Assembly. When that body on

12 December 1948 called for the departure of all American forces, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff ordered the 16,000 troops

then in Korea to be reduced to a single

regimental combat team (RCT) of 7,500

men.40

Early in 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

asked General MacArthur's advice on

the possible effects of withdrawing and

the best time to withdraw these remaining troops. In response to the first part

of the question, MacArthur told the

Joint Chiefs that Russia would never

agree to United States proposals on

Korea. North and South Korea would,

in his words, "continue quarreling."

He bluntly predicted that the United

States could not establish Korean forces

in the south capable of stopping a fullscale invasion from the north. "The

threat of invasion possibly supported by

Communist Armies from Manchuria

will continue in foreseeable future," he

said, and he entertained a pessimistic

view of Korea's chances for survival as

an independent state. "It should be

recognized," he said, "that in the event

of any serious threat to the security of

Korea, [U.S.] strategic and military considerations will force abandonment of

any pretense of active [U.S.] military

support." As to the best time to withdraw, he believed that 10 May would be

a suitable date since it was the anniversary of the Korean elections and "Koreans are much affected by tradition."

 41

Subsequently, the National Security

Council recommended that all U.S. combat troops be pulled out of Korea by

30 June 1949. President Truman approved this recommendation, and on the

date specified USAFIK's last tactical

troops left Korea.

Despite the American appraisal of

Korea as an area of little strategic value,

the U.S. Government made some provision for its ward. It granted limited

financial aid and laid the foundations of

a self-sustaining defense force. In June

1949, in explaining to a Congressional

committee the necessity for giving $150,-

000,000 to the South Koreans, Secretary

of State Dean Acheson insisted that

failure to provide this economic help

portended the loss of all Korea to the

communists within two or three months.

He could not guarantee that the Republic would withstand all pressures. But

he believed that the money and the military assistance then being given to the

South Koreans would at least permit

them to hold their own against the North

Koreans.42

40

 (1) Rad, STFGGG 1888, COMGENUSAFIK to

State Department, 12 Nov 48. (2) Department of

State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 22 and 115-16. (3)

Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 36.

41

 Rad, CX 67198, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jan 49. 42

 (1) Testimony, Secretary of State Dean Acheson,

Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, 23 Jun 49. (2) The House
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 31

MEMBERS OF THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY in training at Taegu.

Building a Native Defense Force in

South Korea

In early November 1945 General

Marshall instructed General MacArthur

to prepare plans for raising a police-type

force in Korea as the first step toward

reducing the number of U.S. troops in

the country. On 28 November General

MacArthur reported plans for creating a

Korean national police force of 25,000

by 1 January 1946, and asked permission

to use surplus U.S. arms for this force.

He pointed out at the same time that it

might be advisable to set up a complete

Korean national defense force.43

On 9 January 1946, the Joint Chiefs

of Representatives rejected the Korean aid bill in

a close vote on 19 January 1950. President Truman

was very concerned over this rejection and made a

strong public statement to this effect two days after

the vote. A new bill finally became law on 14 February 1950. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969),

p. 358.

43

 (1) Rad, CM-OUT 80645, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Nov 45. (2) Rad, CM-IN 9260, CINCAFPAC to WD, 28 Nov 45.
32 POLICY AND DIRECTION

of Staff authorized General MacArthur

to form a Korean police force equipped

with surplus U.S. weapons. They said

that establishing armed forces should

await Korean independence. General

MacArthur thereupon reported that

South Korean police forces would comprise 25,000 regular police, 25,000 state

police, and a coast guard for inshore

patrol. They would be armed only with

rifles, possibly light machine guns.

The first battalion of this police force,

designated the Korean Constabulary,

was activated in late January. General

Hodge assigned a handful of American

officers to guide it, and he equipped it

with captured Japanese rifles.44

The development of the constabulary

was hampered by a lack of equipment,

the language barrier, a scarcity of advisers, and unsettled political conditions.

General Hodge did not press the buildup of the constabulary because he was

concerned about its political reliability.

Training went on with little fanfare.

The constabulary received minimum

publicity. Fewer than a dozen American

advisers were assigned to work with the

constabulary at any one time in 1946

and 1947. By April 1946 its strength

had reached only 2,000 men. By the end

of November 1946 the figure had risen

to 5,000. But by the close of 1947 the

ranks of the constabulary had swollen to

nearly 20,000 men.45

Meanwhile, when the Korean problem

was handed to the United Nations, the

question of a South Korean army, as

distinguished from a police force, arose

again. In October 1947, Washington

told MacArthur that, in view of the

probable U.S. withdrawal from Korea it

might be desirable to create a South

Korean army without fanfare, perhaps by

expanding the constabulary. Washington authorities asked whether a South

Korean army sufficiently strong to hold

off North Korean communists could be

produced in less than a year. They were

concerned also about the optimum size

of a South Korean army and how it

should be equipped.46 The War Department asked MacArthur to give his

views as early as possible since the United

States might be required to withdraw

within the next year.

MacArthur turned to General Hodge

for answers, and on 22 October 1947

sent Hodge's reply to Washington. "I

believe that a South Korean force sufficiently equipped and trained to defend

South Korea against the armed forces

of North Korea could be formed within

one year if equipment can be made

available at an early date, and additional

personnel become available to train it,"

Hodge declared. The minimum goal

must be 100,000 men and officers, organized into an army headquarters, service

troops, and six infantry divisions.

Hodge would have recommended twice

as many men, but he felt that there

would be considerable defection in

North Korean ranks in the event of a

showdown.47

Equipment would be the bottleneck.

Excess ordnance equipment, including

small arm's, 105-mm. howitzers, and 44

 For definitive coverage of the Korean national

defense forces in the prewar period, see Sawyer,

Military Advisors in Korea. 45

 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 17, 23n,

29n.

46

 Rad, WAR 88572, WD to CINCFE, 16 Oct 47. 47

 Rad, CS 56266, CINCFE to DA, 22 Oct 47.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 33

vehicles, was available in Korea for only

about 25,000 troops. "Complete organization of 100,000 can be organized and

basically trained in from 8 to 12 months

if equipment is supplied," Hodge said.

"It is believed that the equipping of 3

divisions and part of Army Service troops

could be accomplished in 90 days from

date authority is given provided equipment is available in Japan." Hodge

recommended that, when his forces

pulled out of Korea, equipment for a

Korean army of 100,000 be left behind

and that small arms for an additional

100,000 also be provided.48

Even though raising an adequate force

before an American withdrawal might

be impossible, Hodge recommended that

the constabulary at least be brought at

once to its full authorized strength of

25,000 and equipped with 81-mm.

mortars and 105-mm. howitzers. He

asked for authority to issue it U.S. equipment at once. Whatever was done, he

said, must be done in secrecy, for the

North Korean communists seemed eager

to invade the south. Although Hodge

doubted that the Russians would instigate an invasion while they still had

forces in North Korea, he considered

an attack on South Korea by North

Korean armed forces likely if the

Russians withdrew their forces unilaterally. General MacArthur threw cold

water on the whole proposition. "I

believe no definite decisions can be made

until action is reached by the United

Nations," he told Washington on forwarding Hodge's views. "Unilateral

action by the United States at this time

would be inconsistent with the proposal

submitted by it to the United Nations.

If the United Nations accepts the problem, decisions such as the one under

discussion will pass to it."

 49

American planners doubted that a

constabulary could be effective against

Russian-sponsored aggression. The Joint

Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) told

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1948:

Present information indicates that the with- drawal of U.S. forces will probably result in

Communist domination, and it is extremely

doubtful if it would be possible to build up

the constabulary in time and with facilities

available ... to prevent Soviet encroachment. Therefore eventual domination of

Korea by the USSR will have to be accepted

as a probability if U.S. troops are withdrawn. However, an augmented constabulary might be a temporary deterrent to overt

acts by North Korean forces.50

General MacArthur advised against the

establishment of a South Korean army

but proposed in February 1948 that the

constabulary be increased to 50,000 men,

equipped with heavy infantry weapons

from stocks in Korea.51 The Joint

Chiefs of Staff authorized this action

on 10 March 1948. General Hodge

assigned more American officers to advise

the constabulary and set up schools for

Koreans in the use of American

equipment.

Because the Department of the Army

had proposed early in 1948 that the

augmented U.S. diplomatic mission to

South Korea include a military section,

and because General MacArthur had

concurred in this proposal, President

Rhee formally asked for a U.S. military

48

 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50

 Rpt, JSSC to JCS, 1483/50, 30 Jan 48. 51

 Rad, CX 58437, CINCFE to DA, 6 Feb 48.
34 POLICY AND DIRECTION

mission in November 1948.52 His reasons were that a constabulary of 50,000

men was entirely inadequate to defend

South Korea, that these forces were too

weak to hold back a North Korean Army,

and that a U.S. military mission would

immediately assuage South Korean feelings of insecurity and assure the public

of safety and protection.

A military mission already existed in

the Provisional Military Advisory Group

(PMAG) established by MacArthur's

headquarters on 15 August 1948. It was

headed by Brig. Gen. William L.

Roberts. Little more than a grouping

of 100 advisers for administrative

purposes initially, PMAG had grown by

the end of 1948 to 92 officers and 149

enlisted men. On 1 July 1949 PMAG

was redesignated the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic

of Korea (KMAG). Authorized 472

officers and men, it was assigned to the

American Mission in Korea (AMIK).

General Roberts was named chief of

KMAG with headquarters at Seoul.

His mission was to develop and train a

South Korean force capable of preserving

internal security, preventing border

raids and incursions, and deterring

armed attack or other aggression by

North Korean forces. Although Roberts

was authorized direct communication

with the Department of the Army on

military matters, he was instructed to

keep General MacArthur informed of

his activities.53 General MacArthur became responsible for the logistical support of AMIK to the Korean water line

and for the evacuation of U.S. nationals

from Korea in an emergency.54 During

the year preceding the North Korean

attack these were his only responsibilities

in Korea.

In late November 1948, the Republic

of Korea (ROK) passed the Armed

Forces Organization Act, and on 15

December set up a department of national defense, which redesignated the

constabulary brigades as divisions.

Although the United States had been

transferring weapons and equipment to

the Republic of Korea for only 50,000

men, ROK forces by 1 March 1949

totaled about 114,000, including a

65,000-man army, 45,000 police, and a

coast guard of 4,000. When the United

States agreed in March to support a

Korean army of 65,000 men, the Republic of Korea moved forward rapidly,

and within five months recruited nearly

100,000 men for the new Army. During

1949 the Army was organized into eight

divisions; and KMAG furnished advisers

to most battalions.55

General MacArthur wanted the ROK

Army to be strong enough to maintain

internal security within the republic,

but no stronger, and he saw no need for

a ROK air force or navy which had no

internal security role and which could

not become strong enough to defeat 52

 (1) Rad, WARX 91520, DA to CINCFE, Jan 48.

(2) Rad, CX 58237, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jan 48. (3)

President Rhee and General Hodge signed an interim agreement on 24 August 1948 providing for

American assistance in training and equipping Republic of Korea security forces. Background Information on Korea, House Report 2495, 11 Jul 50,

pp. 15-16. (4) Rad, No. 186, Muccio, Seoul, to Secy

of State, 5 Nov 48.

53

 Rad, WX 90992, DA to CG USAFIK, 2 Jul 49. 54

 (1) JCS 1483/44, 17 Oct 47. (2) GHQ, FEC

Annual Narrative Historical Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50,

app. IV, pt. 1, p. 8. 55

 (1) Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 41.

(2) Hist Rpt, GHQ SCAP and FEC, 1 Jan-31 Dec 49.

vol. II, p. 26.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 35

North Korean air and naval forces.56

The ROK Army, he felt, should be capable of offering "token resistance" to

invasion, but should "be so organized

as to indicate clearly its peaceful purpose

and to provide no plausible basis for

allegations of being a threat to North

Korea."

 57

In June 1949, justifying an American

withdrawal from Korea, Maj. Gen.

Charles L. Bolté, Director, Plans and

Operations Division, Department of the

Army, announced that South Korean

forces were better equipped than the

North Korean troops. Bolté drew this

conclusion from reports submitted by

General Roberts, the KMAG chief.

Largely on that basis, the Army, as the

executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff for the Far East, was not only

agreeable to the withdrawal of American

tactical units but was heartily in favor

of it.58

When USAFIK withdrew from Korea

in 1949, it transferred to the ROK, under

the Surplus Property Act through the

Office of Foreign Liquidation, military

equipment that originally cost the

United States approximately $56,000,000

and that had a 1949 replacement value of

about $110,000,000. The ground force

equipment was sufficient for a force of

50,000 men. It included 100,000 small

arms, 50,000,000 rounds of small arms

ammunition, more than 2,000 rocket

launchers, more than 40,000 vehicles of

all types, and a number of light artillery

pieces and mortars with over 700,000

rounds of ammunition for them. Individual organizational equipment for

an additional 15,000 men subsequently

arrived in Korea from American stocks

in Japan. Although the United States

Government made plans for further material aid to the Republic of Korea and

allotted Military Defense Assistance Program funds for that purpose, low priorities, administrative red tape, and

procurement difficulties prevented this

aid from reaching Korea before June

1950.59

President Rhee sent an almost frantic

request for greater support to President

Truman in August 1949. He said:

Unless I and my government with the aid

of our friends, do find solutions, the immediate future for our nation is bleak and

bloody. . . . Some American advisors assure us that the Communists will never attack in force, and therefore we may rest

easily defended by our brave army. We

Koreans believe that the Communists, un- der Soviet direction intend to attack in

force, that they will do so, and if they do,

it is we, the Koreans, civilian and military,

who will pay the price, not the good-willed

American advisors. . . . American officers

tell me we have sufficient ammunition for

two months of combat; my own officers tell

me it is only sufficient for two days.

He asked for more equipment and ammunition and for M2 howitzers to replace M3's of limited range. On 26

September 1949, President Truman assured Rhee that KMAG would continue

56

 GHQ, FEC Annual Narrative History Rpt, 1

Jan-31 Oct 50, app. IV, pt. 1, p. 9. 57

 Memo, signed Maddocks for CSUSA, 7 Mar 49,

sub: Strength of SK Armed Forces, Tab A, in G-3,

DA file 091 Korea, sec. I-G, Case 11. 58

 (1) Testimony, Maj Gen Charles L. Bolté,

Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, Jun 49, p. 120. (2) J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 42.

59

 Senate Comm on Armed Services and Senate

Comm on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East

and the Relief of General MacArthur, 1951 (hereafter cited as the MacArthur Hearings), pp. 1992-93.
36 POLICY AND DIRECTION

to make recommendations for the equipping and support of the ROK Army and

that, when Congress appropriated more

military aid funds for Korea, Mr. Muccio

would so advise him.60 The triumph of

the Communists on the mainland of

China in late 1949 apparently had little

effect on expediting further military aid

to Korea.

In October 1949, the ROK Minister

of National Defense asked for 189 M25

tanks. Col. William H. Sterling Wright,

acting for General Roberts who was in

Japan at the time, advised General J.

Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S.

Army, against fulfilling the request.

The rough terrain, poor roads, and

primitive bridges, he said, militated

against efficient tank operations.61

At almost the same time that Colonel

Wright was minimizing the usefulness

of tanks in Korea, Col. John E. Baird,

acting chief, KMAG, in the absence of

both General Roberts and Colonel

Wright, informed Ambassador Muccio

that the type and quality of matériel

available to South Korea were inadequate for war. On 26 October 1949, he

warned that the South Korean Army was

outnumbered in all weapons except individual arms and that the Russians had

given North Korea much better armament. North Korean artillery had

112-mm. howitzers with a maximum

range of 12,980 yards as against the South

Korean 105-mm. howitzer M3 which

could reach only 7,600 yards. During

border clashes, North Koreans placed

their artillery just beyond maximum

range of the 105-mm. howitzer and

shelled at will. They also had the

120-mm. mortar. "The presence in

North Korea of high performance aircraft of fighter and bomber type, artillery

of medium range and a preponderance

of mortars are matters seriously affecting

the spirit of the Security Forces." Colonel Baird recommended F-51 aircraft

for the Republic of Korea, saying, "It is

imperative that Korea be given some

means of defense against air attack." But

the only aircraft the Republic of Korea received were twenty liaison-type

planes.62

The U.S. and ROK Governments

signed a military assistance agreement

on 26 January 1950. This authorized

substantial aid to the new government

and formalized the establishment of the

military advisory groups. The final

stipulation of this agreement came on

15 March 1950, when the United States

promised the Republic of Korea a total

of $10,970,000 in military aid. Of this,

only a few hundred dollars' worth of

signal wire reached the peninsula before

25 June, although signal equipment and

spare parts worth $350,000 were en route

from San Francisco.63

North Korea Prepares

President Rhee's fears of attack from

the north were not unreasonable. The

Soviet Government was developing a

60 strong native army in North Korea. (1) Ltr, Rhee to Truman, 20 Aug 49. (2) Ltr,

Truman to Rhee, 26 Sep 49. Both in DA file P&O

091 Korea, sec. I-E, Book I, Case 16, Incl 1. 61

 Memo, Minister of National Defense, Seoul, for

Gen Collins, 20 Oct 49, in G-3, DA file P&O 091

Korea, sec. I, Case 18.

62

 Ltr, KMAG to Mr. Muccio, 26 Oct 49, sgd Col

John E. Baird, CMP, Actg Chf, KMAG, in DA file

P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, Case 18. 63

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 1992-93.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 37

Trained by Russian officers and equipped with material furnished by the

Soviet Union, the North Korean Army

grew into a powerful and efficient striking force between 1946 and 1950. The

North Koreans began recruiting their

Army in August 1946 and built it up by

the end of that year to a force of 20,000

men. In conjunction with its political

consolidation of North Korea during

1948, Russia provided weapons for

60,000 men. Total mobilization was

declared in 1949, and the addition of

40,000 draftees, 20,000 Koreans who had

been serving the Chinese Communist

Army, and several thousand men trained

for three years in the USSR as cadres

for air and tank corps doubled the size

of the military force. All units received

additional Soviet equipment and training programs were intensified. Early

in 1950, the tempo of military expansion

increased sharply. The Army expanded

to 135,000 men with the addition of new

conscripts and 10,000 more returnees

from the Chinese Communist Army.

Civilians received basic military training. In April and May 1950, large shipments of arms coming from the Soviet

Union re-equipped the Army and Air

Force. North Korea received heavy

artillery prime movers, armor, automatic

weapons, and propeller-driven aircraft in

considerable quantity.64

The organization and training of the

North Korean Army remained under the

close control of the Russians. Key army

commands fell only to men completely

amenable to Russian direction. Russian

advisers accompanied North Korean

Army units from the first, but gradually

decreased in numbers as trusted North

Korean officers were developed. In 1948,

150 Russian advisers worked with each

division. The number dwindled to

twenty per division in 1949 and from

three to eight per division by 1950. But

Russian control remained strong because

of North Korea's dependence on the

USSR for training in critical military

skills and supplies and also for weapons.

Japanese rifles were gradually replaced

by Russian pieces, and gasoline was allocated to the North Korean Army on a

monthly basis that was closely watched.65

The North Korean Communists used

every conceivable means, including propaganda and armed violence, to instigate

the overthrow of the South Korean Government. Agents and terrorists from

Communist-dominated political groups

in North Korea infiltrated the south and

carried out subversive actions, for example, opposing the rice collection program instituted by the American military

government to bring food into the

cities.66 General Wedemeyer reported

in late 1947, "Current political and

economic unrest in Southern Korea is

aggravated by Communistic terrorism

and by Communist-inspired riots and

revolutionary activities in the occupied

area."

 67

 The elections in South Korea

were preceded by violent communist activity. Between 29 March and 10 May

1948, 589 persons were killed and 10,000

64

 (1) Dept of State, North Korea: A Case Study

of a Soviet Satellite. (2) For detailed information

of the North Korean Army prior to 1950, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,

Chapter II.

65

 Dept of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a

Soviet Satellite, pp. 117-18. 66

 Rad, C 54133, CINCFE to JCS, 18 Jul 47. 67

 Wedemeyer, Report to the President, pp. 13, 24.
38 POLICY AND DIRECTION

arrested.68 When the American troops

began to withdraw from Korea, even

more serious attempts to seize control

developed.

Just before the last American forces

left Korea, North Korean communists

launched their first open attack across

the 38th Parallel. On 3 May 1949, they

struck across the border in the Kaesong

area. ROK units repulsed them, but a

mass defection of two battalions of the

ROK Army resulted, the ROK battalion

commanders moving their units into

North Korea and surrendering their men

and equipment. About half of these

troops returned to South Korea later.

In July 1949, North Korean units

again crossed the parallel near Kaesong,

only to be thrown back. Hundreds of

small-scale assaults occurred in the next

year. In every case the ROK Army

pushed the invaders back. While most

skirmishes were confined to small-arms

fire fights, some involved artillery duels

and inflicted heavy casualties on both

sides.69

A strong and effective guerrilla movement in South Korea, subsidized and

directed by the North Korean Government, was also functioning under orders

to overthrow the Republic of Korea. A

series of uprisings on the island of

Cheju-do spread to the mainland by late

1948, and keeping the guerrillas under

control became a major task for the ROK

Army, but, by June 1950, the ROK

Army had virtually stamped them out,

in some cases after full-scale battles.

The ROK Government claimed that its

forces had killed 5,000 guerrillas in

South Korea in the period from September 1949 to April.70

Situation in Korea—June 1950

Korea in 1950 was quite different from

the country entered by the Allies late in

1945. Two political entities with widely

divergent forms of government existed

on one small peninsula separated by an

artificial boundary. Each government

existed only through the support of opposing major powers. Indigenous industrial and economic development

remained impossible for either of the

two portions of Korea. Political unity

seemed out of the question, and bitter

hatreds had developed between them.

From the autumn of 1949, the North

Korean Government had intensified its

"hate" campaign against the Rhee Government. Increasing stress was placed on

service in the national defense as the

highest duty to the communist state. By

June 1950, the North Korean military

machine was ready and the populace was

psychologically prepared for war. As

part of this build-up, the communist

regime conducted a "peaceful unification" campaign. During the spring of

1950 it made a last effort at a guerrilla-led

overthrow of the Republic of Korea, but

failed. At this juncture, under cover of

two unification proposals to the Republic of Korea, offered on 7 June and 20

June 1950, the final steps for invasion

were taken, as the main body of the 68

 George C. McCune, "The Korean Situation,"

Far Eastern Survey, XVII (8 September 1948), 197-

202.

69

 KMAG, Semi-Annual Rpt, 31 Dec 49, sec. IV,

p. 22.

70

 Statement by Ambassador Muccio, Hearings

Before Committee on Armed Services, MDP 1950,

81st Congress, 6 Jun 50.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 39

North Korean Army moved to positions

along the parallel.71

The current estimates of ROK intelligence agencies on 25 June 1950 set the

strength of the North Korean forces at

10 infantry divisions, 1 tank division,

1 air force division, and an antiaircraft

gun regiment—120,000 infantry soldiers,

34,000 constabulary troops, 5,000 armored troops, and 2,000 air force personnel. Weapons strength, according to

ROK figures, amounted to 1,600 artillery

pieces, 50 T-34 tanks and SU-76 selfpropelled (SP) guns, 211 YAK-9 fighters

and IL-10 attack planes.72 A State Department report from Seoul as of 11 May

1950, at some variance with these estimates, credited the North Korean Army

with 103,000 soldiers and constabulary

troops of all types (excluding 25,000

provincial police), 65 tanks, including

some T-34's, 296 light and medium

artillery pieces, 780 medium and heavy

mortars, and 356 45-mm. antitank guns.

Aircraft attributed to the North Korean

Air Force were set at 100 YAK aircraft,

70 IL-10 attack planes, and 10 reconnaissance planes. Later reports, believed

more accurate, gave the North Korean

Army 135,000 men organized into 8 infantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 2

half-strength divisions, 1 separate infantry regiment, and 1 motorcycle reconnaissance regiment. Many of these

troops were veterans from the armies of

the USSR and Communist China. In

addition to large amounts of artillery,

the North Koreans possessed 150 T-34

Russian-made tanks and 180 highperformance combat aircraft.73

In March 1950, General Roberts still

believed that the ROK Army was

stronger than its potential opponent in

the north, but he feared the air capability of North Korea. Pointing out that

the Russians had given their protégés

about 100 combat-type high-performance

aircraft, General Roberts said:

If South Korea were attacked today by the

inferior ground forces of North Korea plus

their Air Corps, I feel that South Korea

would take a bloody nose. Again, then,

knowing these people somewhat, I feel that

they would follow the apparent winner and

South Korea would be gobbled up to be

added to the rest of Red Asia.74

The United States Government received

a clear warning that the ROK Army was

not strong enough when Ambassador

Muccio, in the same month South Korea

was attacked, told the Senate Committee

on Armed Services that the matériel

superiority of the North Korean forces,

particularly in heavy infantry support

weapons, tanks, and combat aircraft

which the USSR had supplied, would

provide North Korea with the margin of

victory in any full-scale invasion of the

republic. Ambassador Muccio told the

legislators that it was vital that the ROK

Army be maintained on an effective defensive level of equality in manpower,

equipment, and training, in relation

to those forces which immediately

threatened it.75

71

 Dept of State, North Korea: A Case Study of

a Soviet Satellite, pp. 17-18. 72

 ROK Army, Military History of Korea, translated from Korean, by Hq, U.S. Army Forces, Far

East, Military Intelligence Service Group, p. 9, copy

in OCMH.

73

 (1) Rad, No. 683, State Dept, Seoul, to Secy of

State, 11 May 50. (2) Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 11. 74

 Ltr, Gen Roberts to Gen Bolté, 8 Mar 50, in

G-3, DA file OPS 091 Korea, sec. I-B, Book I, Case 4. 75

 Statement, Mr. Muccio, Hearings Before Committee on Armed Services, MDP 1950, 81st Congress,

6 Jun 50, p. 80.
40 POLICY AND DIRECTION

In opposition to Ambassador Muccio's

testimony was that of William C. Foster,

then deputy administrator of the

Economic Cooperation Administration

(ECA), given before the Senate Appropriations Committee one week later.

Speaking about the ROK Army, Mr.

Foster said:

The rigorous training program has built

up a well-disciplined force of 100,000 soldiers, one that is prepared to meet any challenge by North Korean forces, and one that

has cleaned out the guerrilla bands in South

Korea in one area after another.

If American legislators were somewhat

confused at this point they could scarcely

be blamed.76

By June 1950, the ROK Army reached

a strength of 95,000, the bulk of which

comprised eight infantry divisions and a

cavalry regiment. But only four of the

divisions were near full strength of

10,000 men each. In artillery, the South

Koreans owned 91 105-mm. M3 howitzers, and in armor, had about two dozen

armored cars and about half that many

half-tracks. To oppose the 180-plane

North Korean Air Force, the ROK Air

Force had a dozen serviceable liaison

planes and ten trainers.77

Meanwhile, in South Korea, elections

for a new National Assembly had been

conducted during May 1950. The U.N.

Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the elections in which 130 seats

went to Independents, 49 to parties supporting Syngman Rhee, and 44 to other

parties. In the north, these elections

and the presence of the U.N. commission

were loudly condemned, and the campaign for a unified assembly was revived.

On 20 June the "Supreme People's Assembly" passed a decree which demanded

the establishment of an all-Korean

legislative body to draw up a constitution

and organize a government of the republic. The decree designated leading

figures of the South Korean Government

as national traitors, called for the unification of military and security forces,

and demanded the withdrawal of the

U.N. commission.

John Foster Dulles visited Korea as

a special representative of the President

in the middle of June 1950. After inspecting South Korean defenses, which

he was assured were adequate, Mr. Dulles

addressed the National Assembly of the

Republic of Korea on 19 June 1950. He

told the legislators that the American

people granted them their support ". . .

consistent with your own self-respect and

primary dependence upon your own efforts." He said that the United States

considered the Republic of Korea a part

of the United Nations and ended saying,

"You are not alone; you will never be

alone, as long as you continue to play

worthily your part in the great design

of human freedom."

 78 76

 (1) MacArthur Hearings, p. 2009. (2) See also

Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 43. 77

 (1) Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, pp. 12-17. (2) KMAG Semi-Annual Rpt,

15 Jun 50, sec. V, p. 16, and Annex X. (3) Sawyer,

Military Advisors in Korea, p. 110.

78

 Speech, John Foster Dulles to ROK National

Assembly, 19 Jun 50, quoted in MacArthur Hearings, p. 2020.
CHAPTER III

National Defense

and the United States Army

It has become almost a truism that

nations inevitably try to prepare for the

war they have just won. Except for substituting the Soviet Union in the role of

chief adversary the United States pursued a course between 1946 and 1950

that appeared to lend credence to this

theory. American military planning in

these years was shaped largely by World

War II experience and the priority afforded to Europe over the Pacific and

Far East. In 1950 the defense of western

Europe still held first claim on American military resources, and plans were

devoted almost exclusively to general

war. Furthermore, reflecting its coalition effort, the United States sought to

strengthen nations that might be helpful

to it in any crisis with the Soviet Union,

its most likely opponent in a time of increasing frictions throughout the world.

The Soviet Union and its allies were

apparently superior to the United States

and its allies in conventional military

strength, for except in nuclear weapons

the United States military power dropped

sharply in the postwar years. Russia, on

the other hand, kept powerful military

forces in being and strengthened and

modernized those of its satellite nations.

Thus, the United States was resolved to

contain Russian influence and prevent

threats to world peace and the independence and stability of other nations by

resorting to collective security arrangements and acting through the United

Nations.

Beginning in 1948, the United States

gave military assistance to a number of

friendly nations in Europe, the Middle

East, and Asia, to enable them to resist

communist encroachment and, if necessary, to join effectively with the United

States in any war with the communist

bloc of nations. More significant was

United States sponsorship of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

which in April 1949 bound the United

States, Canada, and ten nations of western Europe together to prevent the

communist seizure of western Europe.

As the most powerful single nation in

NATO, the United States assumed a considerably enlarged obligation in Europe.

The successful explosion by the Soviet

Union of a nuclear device in September

1949 nullified to some extent the American atomic advantage and intensified ef-
42 POLICY AND DIRECTION

forts by the United States Government

to build stronger collective security arrangements. But this event came too

late to affect specific defense plans in

Strategic planning after World War II

was carried on at the joint level and approved by the President. Within the

joint plans, each military service prepared its own war and emergency plans.

By 1950, broad national military policy

called for meeting an all-out Russian

attack with a strategic offensive in western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in

the Far East.

The Army's Place in the National

Defense Structure

The Secretary of the Army, appointed

by the President, directed the activities of

the Army. The Chief of Staff, the top

military man, advised the Secretary and

acted for him in carrying out approved

Army plans. The Army staff in Washington, D.C., responsible to the Chief of

Staff, planned and supported Army operations and activities throughout the

world. The Chief of Army Field Forces,

stationed at Fort Monroe, Virginia, conducted the training of Army units.1

The President, as Commander in Chief

of all the military forces, exercised his

control through a chain of command

extending downward through the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS), and the commanders of certain

unified and specified commands. The

Secretary of Defense, a member of the

President's Cabinet, was responsible for

directing the services and for advising

the President on military matters. Under his jurisdiction the Army, Navy, and

Air Force were organized into separate

departments.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of

1

 (1) For detailed explanation of changes in Army

organization just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, see Analysis and Explanation of Army

organization bill, DA, Feb 50. (2) The Secretary of

the Army was served by an under secretary, two

assistant secretaries, and such Army personnel as

required. The Chief of Staff's immediate military

assistants in 1950 included the vice chief of staff,

two deputy chiefs of staff, a comptroller, four assistant chiefs of staff, and a secretary of the general

staff. The relationship between the Secretary of the

Army and the Chief of Staff kept the Army under

civilian control while leaving as much latitude as

possible for military planning and operations

by the military experts. The Chief of Staff and

his deputies co-ordinated and controlled the operations of the Army at home and abroad as well as

planning for future operations. The chain of authority from the Secretary of the Army through the

Chief of Staff extended to the Chief, Army Field

Forces, to the army commanders in the continental

United States, and to the various army commanders

overseas. The continental United States was divided

into six continental army areas and the Military

District of Washington. 2

 The powers and authorities of the Secretaries of

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were much

less than those enjoyed by their World War II

predecessors, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of Defense was an

important member of the National Security Council

(NSC), a body which had also been established in

postwar years, and which was charged with advising the President on the integration of domestic,

foreign, and military policies relating to national

security and with seeking the most effective coordination among the services and other government agencies in areas involving national security.

For details of membership, functions, and responsibilities of the Department of Defense and of the

National Security Council, see: National Security

Act, 1947, PL 253, 80th Congress, 27 Jul 47; National

Security Act Amendments, 1949, PL 216, 81st Congress, 10 Aug 49; Timothy W. Stanley, American

Defense and National Security (Washington: Public

Affairs Press, 1956); Truman, Memoirs, II, 58-60;

Statement, Gen George C. Marshall, MacArthur

Hearings, pp. 583-84; Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., "Truman (1945-1953)," in Ernest R. May, ed., The Ultimate Decision, The President as Commander in

Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960).
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 43

the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of

Staff, U.S. Air Force; Chief of Naval

Operations, and a chairman appointed by

the President, comprised the top advisory

body in the United States Government

composed exclusively of military men.

They were designated by law as the principal military advisers to the President,

the National Security Council, and the

Secretary of Defense. Subject only to the

authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the JCS was specifically

charged with the preparation of strategic

plans and strategic direction of the military forces; the preparation of joint logistic plans and the assignment of logistic

responsibility; review of the major requirements of military forces in the light

of prepared plans; and the establishment

of unified commands in strategic areas.3

After World War II, American armed

forces in major overseas areas were

brought under the operational control

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the

formal establishment of unified commands, which included contingents of all

the military services. Operating under

the strategic direction of the JCS, each

of these commands was directly supervised by a particular chief of staff who

acted as the executive agent of the JCS.

In 1950 the major overseas unified

commands established by the JCS were

the Far East Command, the Alaskan

Command, the Caribbean Command, the

Pacific Command, and the European

Command. Within each of these, individual service commanders commanded

the forces of their respective services—

Army, Navy, or Air Force—but they were

under the over-all supervision of a designated commander in chief from one of

the services, and he was named by and

responsible to the JCS.

Army Strength and

Deployment—1950

In June 1950, the strength of the active

Army stood at about 591,000 and included ten combat divisions. About

360,000 troops were stationed within the

zone of the interior (ZI). The remaining 231,000 were disposed in overseas

commands, most of them performing occupation duties. The largest group overseas (about 108,500) was located in the

Far East. In Europe, approximately

80,000 U.S. soldiers were stationed in

Germany, 9,500 in Austria, and 4,800 in

Trieste. Slightly more than 7,000 were

assigned to the Pacific area and about

7,500 to Alaska. In the Caribbean were

about 12,200 troops. Several thousand

more were assigned to military missions

throughout the world.4

3

 In their capacities as members of the JCS, the

individual members represented the entire military

establishment and not their respective services. The

Secretary of the Army, for example, had no direct

control over the Chief of Staff of the Army in the

latter's role as a member of the JCS. The chairman

of the JCS had no vote, but presided over the meetings and deliberations of the body. He frequently

represented the entire membership before the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. Although not a member of the NSC, the chairman of

the JCS usually accompanied the Secretary of Defense to the meetings of the NSC and explained

or defended the views of the JCS, sometimes against

the opposition of the Secretary of Defense. For

details of the composition, functions, and responsibilities of the JCS in 1950, see National Security

Act 1947, PL 253, sec. 211B, 80th Congress; National

Security Amendments, 1949, PL 216, 81st Congress;

Stanley, American Defense and National Security;

MacArthur Hearings, p. 904; Hoare, "Truman (1945-

1953)," PP. 185-94.

4

 (1) STW 1037, Weekly Estimate of Army Command Strength as of 26 June 1950, 2 Jul 50, AGO

Stat and Acc Br, copy in G-3 Deployments Br.

(2) These figures are at slight variance with those
44 POLICY AND DIRECTION

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AT PENTAGON, November 1949. Left to right: Admiral

Forrest P. Sherman, General Omar N. Bradley, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and

General J. Lawton Collins.

The force designated to carry out the

Army's emergency assignments was called

the General Reserve. Except for one

regimental combat team (RCT) in Hawaii, this force consisted of five combat

divisions and certain smaller units in the

continental United States.5 The major

General Reserve units on 25 June 1950

were the 2d Armored Division, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division, 82d

Airborne Division, 11th Airborne Division (- 1 RCT), 3d Armored Cavalry

Regiment, 5th RCT (located in Hawaii), and 14th RCT. In addition, there contained in STM-30, Strength Report of the Army,

1 July 1950, which gives the following data on Army

forces as of 30 June 1950: Total Strength 591,487;

Zone of Interior 347,224; Overseas Strength 244,263.

(3) Total strength in both compilations excludes the

cadet corps at the Military Academy.

5

 For precise definition of General Reserve, see

SR 320-5-1, Dictionary of United States Army

Terms, Aug 50. See also Directory and Station List,

U.S. Army, 30 Jun 50, copy in OCMH.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 45

were smaller combat support and service

support units.6

Besides the General Reserve in the

United States and Hawaii, four tactical

divisions and one RCT were located in

the Far East Command. In Europe the

Army maintained one tactical division,

one RCT, three cavalry regiments, and

one separate infantry regiment. One infantry battalion was in Alaska, and two

separate regiments were in the Caribbean

area.7

The authorized strength of the Army,

as opposed to its actual strength, was

630,201. Budget planning in the spring

of 1950 contemplated a reduction of this

figure to 610,900. The proposed cut

would have eliminated one of the Army's

ten tactical divisions; specifically, it

would have reduced the number of divisions in the FEC from four to three.8

The strength of the United States

Army in 1950 was much less than American military leaders wished. But government economies in the aftermath of

World War II allowed no increase.

Army Training

Training programs were hampered by

lack of funds, and this, together with the

absence of a sense of urgency, detracted

from the combat readiness of Army forces

in being in 1950.9 Until 1949 basic

training lasted only eight weeks, and

graduates sent overseas usually had to

undergo further basic training before

they could be assigned to units. The

Army put in a 14-week training cycle in

March 1949 and, although this cycle did

not provide for branch training (i.e.,

artillery, engineers), it included a sufficient amount of basic subject material

to give an adequate foundation on which

to build individual and unit training.10

This came rather late for the Korean

War.

Army Supply Status

The Army had sufficient stocks of most

items of matériel and equipment to support its peacetime program. Certain imbalances—resulting from the cessation or

curtailment of production, the surplus

property disposal program, and the

breakdown of distribution systems—existed, but these presented relatively

minor problems and were usually localized.

From the standpoint of war-readiness,

the Army's supply position was much

more serious. Army procurement after

World War II was limited mainly to

food, clothing, and medical supplies. The

shift of American industry away from

military production forced the Army to

operate almost exclusively with older and

obsolescent equipment. Nor was money

available for new procurement. The

Army computed its requirements carefully, basing them on minimum essentials, only to find that appropriations

6

 Memo for Gen Collins, 9 Jul 50, sub: Status

of Major Units of the General Reserve Which Have

Not Been Committed to FECOM, unnumbered notebook of Far East Br, G-3, DA, in G-3, DA files. 7

 (1) JSPC 853/6, 4 Jul 50, App C to Incl B, in

G-3, DA files. (2) Four training divisions also were

stationed in the United States. 8

 Army Tentative Plans, FY 1952, Part I, p. 55. 9

 For information in detail on Army training in

the postwar era, see: Annual History, Office, Chief

of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), 1 January-31 December 1949 (hereafter cited as Annual History of

OCAFF), Part I, ch. I, pp. 5-9, ch. VI, pp. 2-3, 5-6,

ch. IX; ibid., 1950, vol. II, ch. XIV; Rpt of Activities

AFF, 1945-49, PP. 8, 10, 54-55. All in OCMH. 10

 Annual History of OCAFF, 1949, ch. VI, pp.

5-6.
46 POLICY AND DIRECTION

habitually fell far short of meeting them.

For the fiscal year 1948, for instance, the

Ordnance Department estimated it would

need $750,000,000 to cover procurement

of essential ammunition and equipment,

storage and distribution of ordnance material, maintenance of stand-by plants

and arsenals, training, and research and

development. The Bureau of the Budget

cut this figure to $275,000,000, and the

Congress reduced the appropriation in

final form to $245,532,000.11

Maintenance of available equipment

assumed greater importance as World

War II items wore out under constant

use or deteriorated in storage depots.

Rapid demobilization had hurt the

Army's maintenance program by reducing personnel and facilities to levels allowing proper storage and continuing

maintenance on no more than a token

basis. At the same time, replacement

parts and assemblies became critical in

many classes of equipment.12

Machine guns and towed artillery were

in plentiful supply, but heavy construction equipment, newly developed radios,

self-propelled artillery, newer tanks, and

antiaircraft guns were critically short.

Installations in the United States supporting the current 10-division Army required more than 38,000 commercial-type

motor vehicles, but in 1950 only 27,000

were on hand, and 23,000 of these were

six or more years old. There were

fewer than 900 serviceable light M-24

tanks in the United States, 2,557 unserviceable ones; 1,826 serviceable medium M4A3 tanks, 1,376 unserviceable

ones. There were only 319 new M-46

General Patton tanks.13

Development of new weapons and vehicles continued, but at a decelerated

pace. New models being developed in

the spring of 1950 would not be available for issue before the end of 1952.

Other research projects indicated many

desirable improvements in weapons and

equipment, but funds were unavailable

to complete development and production.14

Ammunition stocks in the United

States were far out of balance. Training

activities, both of the active Army forces

and the civilian components, normal deterioration, and transfers to foreign countries under military assistance programs,

had eaten away much of the stockpile

remaining at the end of World War II,

while economy budgets prevented significant new procurement. The result

was a woefully inadequate reservoir of

several types of ammunition.15 In sum,

the shortages of men and supplies combined with inadequate training to affect

adversely the combat readiness of the Far

East Command just as they hindered the

effectiveness of the U.S. Army elsewhere.

The Far East Command

On 16 December 1946 the Joint Chiefs

of Staff designated General MacArthur

11

 Statement, Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes, 14 Mar

47, Hearings Before House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 80th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 941, 967. 12

 G-4 Review of the Month, 1 Apr 48, pp. 1, 29,

in G-4, DA files.

13

 (1) Army Presentation Before JCS on Review

of Service Establishment, Phase II, Part III for FY

1951 Budget, 29 Jul 49, pp. 143-47. (2) DF, Supply

Div to Control Office, 11 Jul 51, sub: Supply Sit in

REC and U.S. as of 25 Jun 50, with 7 Incls, in G-4,

DA files. 14

 Ibid.

15

 Summary Sheet, CSCLD/16027, DCofS G-4 (Gen

Reeder) to CofS, 3 Apr 50, sub: Ammunition Reserve, in G-4, DA files.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 47

Commander in Chief, Far East Command, effective 1 January 1947. No

specific boundaries were established, but

forces placed under General MacArthur's

command were located in Japan, Korea,

the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, the

Mariana Islands, and the Volcano and

Bonin Islands. These determined in a

vague manner the geographic limits of

the Far East Command.16

The area was vast. It extended over

265,000 square miles of island area inhabited by almost 100,000,000 people.

Because of the preponderance of sea over

land within the Far East Command and

because of the terrain and climatic conditions, varying from sub-Arctic to tropical,

the military garrison was compartmented

into geographical groups. The primary

land area and the area containing the

largest number of U.S. troops was Japan.17

MacArthur's authorities and responsibilities as CINCFE were defined by directives issued by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Three general missions were assigned him. The first pertained to occupation of former enemy territories in

which he discharged U.S. occupation

responsibilities in Japan, Korea, and

former Japanese islands. The second

broad mission was to support U.S. policies within the areas controlled by his

forces. Third, CINCFE was to prepare

to meet a general emergency at any time.

The top headquarters within the Far

East Command was General Headquarters (GHQ) located in Tokyo, Japan.

This was essentially an Army headquarters, staffed almost entirely by Army personnel, and resembling the structure of

General MacArthur's World War II

headquarters.18

The Navy and Air Force felt that their

activities within the Far East were being

directed by the Army staff under an Army

commander. But General MacArthur

considered his authority over naval and

air forces too limited. He complained

that he could not exercise sufficient control over the internal organization of

these services in his area, direct the troop

control of their units, or supervise fully

their logistical operations.19

As Commanding General, United

States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE),

General MacArthur controlled all Army

units and personnel within his area.

Since this function was inherent in the

broader designation of CINCFE, he

16

 Study, Requirements, Means Available, and

Procedures Evolved to Accomplish CINCFE Missions

(hereafter cited as FEC Papers), Paper 1, 26 Oct 49,

p. 2, in G-3, DA file P&O 333 Pacific, F/w-6/3. 17

 Ibid., pp. 5-7.

18

 (1) Ibid., Paper 5, pp. 2-6. (2) The directive

from JCS which established the command originally

had stated, "Each unified commander will have a

joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the services under this command

in key positions of responsibility." General MacArthur had not gone all the way in meeting the spirit

of unification. But a joint committee of top-ranking

Army, Navy, and Air Force officers was an integral

part of GHQ and met each week, though only to

advise the Chief of Staff, FEC (an Army officer), in

"coordination of interservice matters." Additionally,

frequent co-ordinating conferences were held by

MacArthur with the commanders of major air and

naval elements within his command. Another concession to the principle of unification of command

within GHQ was the establishment of the Joint

Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to

"assist and advise the Commander-in-Chief Far East,

on matters pertaining to the exercise of unified command over Army, Navy and Air Forces allocated to

the Far East Command." The group consisted of

three Army officers, three Navy officers, and two

Air Force officers, but hardly constituted a joint staff

as envisioned by the JCS instructions of December

1946. See JCS 1259/27, 14 Dec 46, and USAF in the

Korean Conflict, USAF Hist Study No. 71, p. 9. 19

 FEC Papers, Paper 12, 1 Oct 49.
48 POLICY AND DIRECTION

DAI ICHI BUILDING, TOKYO

neither used the title commanding general, USAFFE, nor established a separate

staff. Because there were within his

command a major air force and a major

naval headquarters, Far East Air Forces

(FEAF) and Naval Forces, Far East

(NavFE), respectively, some resentment

developed because the coequal Army

headquarters, AFFE, was absent. That

all Army combat forces were assigned

to subordinate Army commands had the

effect of placing these lesser headquarters

on the same level with FEAF and NavFE.

General MacArthur defended this peculiarity in the command structure by saying that imposing an Army headquarters

between subordinate Army units and

GHQ FEC would duplicate the functions of GHQ and detract from the

essential and cohesive relationships between CINCFE and the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP).20

20

 (1) Ibid., Paper 13, p. 4. (2) A succinct and

fairly accurate description of the FEC structure was

rendered by a representative of the Department of

the Army, Army War Plans Branch, who visited the

command in October 1950. He said: "Although a

lack of balanced representation from the three services keeps GHQ FEC from being classified as a joint

headquarters in the commonly accepted sense, certain joint features do exist. . . . Intelligence is
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 49

GENERAL WALKER

In June 1950 GHQ, FEC, located in

Tokyo, Japan, with main offices in the

Dai Ichi Building, had Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond as chief of staff and

Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey as deputy

chief of staff. The major subordinate

Army commands were Eighth Army,

commanded by Lt. Gen. Walton H.

Walker; Headquarters and Service

Group, GHQ, commanded by Maj. Gen.

Walter L. Weible; the Ryukyus Command (RYCOM) under Maj. Gen. Josef

R. Sheetz; and the Marianas-Bonins

Command (MARBO) headed by Maj.

Gen. Robert S. Beightler. In the Philippines, the Thirteenth Air Force controlled U.S. installations through

PHILCOM (AF), a small and rapidly

diminishing headquarters commanded by

Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF.

Naval Forces, Far East, were commanded

by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. Far East

Air Forces (FEAF), came under Lt. Gen.

George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF and NavFE headquarters were located in Tokyo

in buildings separate from GHQ, FEC.

FEC Strategic Planning and Korea

General MacArthur's basic plan to

meet a general emergency in the Far East

was to defend the Japanese islands. Operations were to be offensive-defensive,

with air and naval forces assuming the

tactical offensive to protect the withdrawal of forces from outlying areas and

to deny to the enemy the control of the

sea and air approaches to Japan. The

main body of Army forces would be concentrated on Okinawa, the Marianas, and

the Kanto Plain of Honshu. Those Army

forces located in Korea were to be precipitately withdrawn.

Regarding Korea, the JCS had advised

the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), successor

to the State-War-Navy Coordinating

Committee, in January 1948, that the

withdrawal of the U.S. occupation forces

from South Korea would most likely lead

correlated in Army, Navy and Air Force Group with

Theater Intelligence Section, G-2; planning is coordinated through JSPOG; a joint committee (composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services)

coordinates on the higher level. The Far East Command is a unified rather than a joint command with

command lines following straight service seniority

channels throughout as opposed to command responsibilities on a joint basis by geographical area;

e.g. there is no joint commander of the Ryukyus or

in Marianas-Bonins Command. CINCFE commands

all major Army commands as theater commander

and commands all Navy and Air Force commands

through the Senior Commanders of those services."

See Memo, Lt Col Stevens, AWPB G-3, for ACofS

G-3, 17 Oct 50, sub: Rpt of TDY in FEC, in G-3,

DA file 333 Pac, Case 7.
50 POLICY AND DIRECTION

to communist domination of the entire

nation. And since it was nevertheless

intended to evacuate American troops,

eventual Russian control of Korea would

have to be accepted as a probability, even

though establishing a ROK constabulary

force might serve as a temporary deterrent.21

The definitive write-off of Korea as an

important strategic area came when the

Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that no

military security guarantee should be extended to the Republic of Korea because

such action would risk a major war in

an area where Russia would have nearly

all the natural advantages. As a result,

the President, on 4 April 1948, approved

a policy that stated: "The United States

should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an

action taken by any faction in Korea or

by any other power in Korea could be

considered a 'casus belli' for the United

States." From that moment, Korea was

of secondary importance to U.S. planners

and policy makers.22 General MacArthur had been relieved of his responsibility for defending Korea when the last

American tactical units had been withdrawn from that country in 1949.

In mid-1949 General Omar N. Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, challenged

the national policy toward Korea. On

the eve of the withdrawal of the last

American combat troops from the peninsula, General Bradley suggested taking

the Korean question again to the National Security Council. He feared that

U.S. withdrawal might be followed by an

invasion from the north. He had had

his staff review the courses of action open

to the United States in such an eventuality, and as a result he recommended

that, if an invasion took place, the U.S.

nationals be evacuated and the aggression immediately be presented to the

United Nations Security Council as a

threat to the peace. A U.N. composite

military force might be considered as a

last resort.23

Bradley's fellow members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to bring

this matter again before the National

Security Council. They said:

From the strategic viewpoint the position

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea,

summarized briefly, is that Korea is of little

strategic value to the United States and that

any commitment to United States use of

military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the

potentialities of the over-all world situation

and of our heavy international obligations

as compared with our current military

strength.24

This concept dominated American

planning for the Far East. By 1950, the

United States decided that, in the event

of a Soviet attack in the area, American

Forces would conduct a strategic defense.

Specific missions charged to the Far East

Command were: (1) defense of the Ryukyus and Japan; (2) protection of air and

sea lanes in the FEC; (3) denial of Formosa to the enemy; (4) support of the

Pacific Command, the Alaskan Command, and the Strategic Air Command;

(5) assistance to the Republic of the

21

 JCS 1483/50, Rpt by JSSC, title: U.S. Policy in

Korea, 30 Jan 48. 2 2SANACC 176/39, 22 Mar 48, title: U.S. Policy

in Korea.

23

 JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun 49, Incl, Memo, CSA to JCS,

20 Jun 49, sub: Implications of a Possible Full-Scale

Invasion From North Korea Subsequent to the

Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Korea. 24

 JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun 49.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 51

SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON

Philippines in defense of the islands; and

(6) provision for the safety of U.S. personnel in Korea. American airmen were

to destroy or neutralize enemy air

power.25

That Korea was considered of little

strategic worth to the United States had

scarcely been a matter of public knowledge until 12 January 1950, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson said so in a

speech at the National Press Club in

Washington. Outlining the defensive

strategy in the Far East, he excluded

Korea and Formosa from the American

defensive perimeter. Referring obliquely

to Korea, Mr. Acheson stated:

So far as the military security of other areas

in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear

that no person can guarantee these areas

against military attack. . . . Should such

an attack occur—one hesitates to say where

such an armed attack could come from—

the initial reliance must be on the people

attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under

the Charter of the United Nations which so

far has not proved a weak reed to lean on

by any people who are determined to pro25

 FEOP 1-50, GHQ FEC, vol. I, 1 Feb 50, in G-3,

FEC files.
52 POLICY AND DIRECTION

tect their independence against outside ag- gression.26

In the light of Secretary Acheson's remarks, it appeared that the United States

had no intention of fighting for South

Korea. In the view of many observers,

his statement was an invitation to Communist China, North Korea, and Russia

that they could invade the republic with

impunity.

MacArthur's Forces

The general decrease in Army strength

that took place in 1947 was reflected

sharply in the Far East. General MacArthur had commanded over 300,000

troops, including 42,000 in the Army Air

Forces, in January 1947.27 Just one year

later he had only 142,000 men. When

asked early in 1948 if he could maintain

30,000 men in Korea, MacArthur told

Army officials that to do so would cause

a breakdown in logistic support to the

Far East Air Forces and a breakdown in

the general effectiveness in his command.

The real cause of this situation, he

charged, was Washington's failure to

send him even half the troops approved

for his command.28

MacArthur warned of irreparable

damage to United States national interests in the Far East unless his command

was strengthened. In response, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that

all services were having trouble keeping

up to authorized strength and that calculated risks in the allotment of manpower

had to be accepted throughout the world.

Allocating 134,000 troops (including

28,800 Philippine Scouts) to his command, they ordered him to keep 30,000

troops in Korea until elections had been

held there.29

MacArthur protested. On 24 February 1948 he charged that his personnel

resources were exhausted. He asserted

that there was no substitute for Army

troop strength and that it was essential

to meet the dangers and difficulties that

existed in the Far East.30

There was actually a further decline.

MacArthur's authorized strength for the

year beginning 1 July 1949 was to be only

120,000 men. Insofar as combat strength

was concerned, the Far East Command

reached its lowest ebb at this point, April

1948. The Eighth Army, upon which

the combat effectiveness of the command

depended, was authorized 87,215 men,

but had an actual strength of only 45,561

and a combat strength of 26,494. This

combat strength was spread over five

divisions and an antiaircraft artillery

group, making attainment of any satisfactory degree of combat readiness very

difficult. MacArthur's protests continued, but to no avail. Exemplifying

the general conditions within the Eighth

Army, two regiments of the 25th Division had less than 250 men each.31

On 3 August 1948 MacArthur complained that his carefully analyzed minimum requirements for Army strength

were being brushed aside. He was noti- 26

 (1) Speech, Mr. Dean Acheson to National Press

Club, 12 Jan 50, quoted in MacArthur Hearings,

pp. 1811-12. (2) See also Acheson, Present at the

Creation, pp. 354-58. 27

 Strength Reports of the Army, Central Statistical Office, Office, Chief of Staff, 1 Feb 47, copy in

OCMH. 28

 Rad, CX 58131, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jan 48.

29

 Rad, WARX 96357, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb 48. 30

 Rad, CX 58837, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 48. 31

 (1) Rad, WAR 81295, DA to CINCFE, 6 May 48.

(2) Rad, C 61072, CINCFE to DA, 29 May 48.

(3) Rad, C 61943, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jun 48. (4)

Rad, WARX 86492, DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul 48.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 53

fied on 9 November 1948 that the nation's authorities were contemplating a

reduction in the strength of his Far East

Air Forces. This news brought a sharp

rejoinder and a strategic estimate of his

position in the Far East Command. He

maintained that he could not understand

what devious thinking had prompted a

proposal for reducing his military

strength. He said that it would endanger the nation's military position in the

Far East beyond the acceptable point of

calculated risk. MacArthur charged that

the nation's planners should be contemplating an increase in his naval, air, and

ground forces.32

Despite MacArthur's insistent protests,

the strength level in the Far East Command continued with little substantive

change. During visits to Tokyo by the

Department of the Army Staff, by the

Secretary of the Army, and by members

of the JCS during 1948 and 1949, General MacArthur presented his views and

protests in person. He said consistently

that the support which the Department

of the Army was giving to forces in Europe was out of proportion and that more

support should and could be given to his

command in the Far East.33

The flow of replacements to the Far

East picked up somewhat in 1949 although budgetary limitations on the

Army as a whole enforced restrictions on

replacements available to the Far East

Command. By late 1949, the shortage of

funds had become so pronounced that

the Department of the Army decided to

reduce the number of divisions in the

Army from ten to nine. MacArthur's

command was to take the loss and during

a discussion with MacArthur in October

1949 General Collins, Army Chief of

Staff, told MacArthur so. MacArthur,

of course, objected. The Department of

the Army reversed its decision and kept

ten divisions on duty.34 But, as noted

above, the strength of the Far East Command had dwindled to about 108,500

Army troops by June 1950.

The budget limitations and the low

enlistment rate forced the Department

of the Army to devise a troop program

and troop list which could not be manned

at 100 percent strength. This reduced

over-all personnel ceiling reflected manning levels which, in turn, caused unavoidable reductions either by paring

the strength of all subordinate units or

by eliminating certain units entirely.

Since administrative requirements continued or increased, combat units suffered more than headquarters units.35

As reflected in the FEC, this condition

caused the elimination of certain basic

elements from combat units in order to

maintain the units within the command.

Each of MacArthur's infantry divisions

had only one tank company instead of a

tank battalion, and one antiaircraft battery instead of an antiaircraft battalion.

Each infantry regiment was short its

Table of Organization (T/O) tank company and lacked one infantry battalion;

each of the divisional artillery battalions

was short one firing battery. Although

CINCFE had managed to retain the

4-division structure of Eighth Army, he

32

 (1) Rad, W 92269, DA to CINCFE, 9 Nov 48.

(2) Rad, CX 65569, CINCFE to DA, 23 Nov 48. 33

 Rad, WAR 82319, DA to CINCFE, 6 Jan 49.

34

 (1) JCS 1800/54/56, Sep 49. (2) JCS 2079/3,

Oct 49. 35

 Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug

50, with comments by Chief, OCAFF, in G-3, DA

file 333 Pac, sec. I-A, Book I, Case 8/8 (1950).
54 POLICY AND DIRECTION

had had to eliminate the normal corps

headquarters and corps special troops

(artillery, engineer, and so forth). Service elements of Eighth Army were so

inadequate that over 150,000 Japanese

personnel were being employed in roles

normally performed by service troops.36

The ratio of noncombat to combat

personnel in the Far East was excessive.

This stemmed from the Army's attempts

during the postwar years to make the

Army an attractive career by leaving the

choice of arm or service largely to the

individual. The combat arms, and especially the infantry, failed to attract sufficient men to keep their strength on a par

with other arms and branches. Also the

fact that a substantial percentage of the

already inadequate output of stateside

training divisions went to service schools

for further training reduced the number

of men available for assignment to combat-type units except in specialist capacities.37

MacArthur's combat forces in June

1950 comprised 4 understrength infantry

divisions and 7 antiaircraft artillery battalions in Japan, 1 infantry regiment and

2 antiaircraft artillery battalions in Okinawa. The major combat units were the

1st Cavalry Division (actually infantry)

in central Honshu, Japan; 7th Infantry

Division in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, Japan; 24th Infantry Division in

Kyushu, Japan; 25th Infantry Division

in south central Honshu, Japan; and the

9th Antiaircraft Artillery Group in Okinawa. General MacArthur had registered

frequent protests that his missions in the

Far East required a minimum force of at

least 5 full-strength infantry divisions, 23

antiaircraft artillery battalions, and 1

separate RCT.38

Eighth Army, the main combat force

of FEC, stood at about 93 percent of its

authorized strength on 25 June 1950.

Each division had an authorized strength

of 12,500 men as compared to its authorized war strength of 18,900 and none of

the divisions was even up to its peacetime authorization. Each division was

short of its war strength by nearly 7,000

men, 1,500 rifles, and 100 90-mm. antitank guns; 3 rifle battalions, 6 heavy tank

companies, 3 105-mm. field artillery batteries, and 3 antiaircraft artillery batteries were missing from each division.

In terms of battle potential, the infantry

divisions could lay down only 62 percent

of their infantry firepower, 69 percent of

their antiaircraft artillery firepower, and

14 percent of their tank firepower.39

Until 1949 the primary responsibility

of military units in the Far East Command was to carry out occupation duties.

Engaged in these administrative and

housekeeping tasks throughout Japan

and the outlying areas, units had little

time or inclination for combat training.

The situation was aggravated by constant understrength and excessive turnover of personnel. This turnover

amounted to 43 percent annually in the

FEC. Training in the rudimentary

functions of the soldier was carried on as

time and facilities permitted during the

period from 1945 to 1949 with emphasis

upon discipline, courtesy, and conduct.

36

 FEC Papers, Paper 10, p. 7. 37

 Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug

50.

38

 FEC Papers, Paper 10. 39

 Mono, 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, Personnel

Problems, in History of the Korean War, vol. III,

Part 2, MHS, Hq, FEC, 15 Aug 52, p. 1, copy in

OCMH.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 55

No serious effort was made in these years

to maintain combat efficiency at battalion

or higher level.

This situation changed markedly in

April 1949 when General MacArthur

issued a policy directive announcing that

the stern rigidity which had characterized the occupation of Japan until that

time was to be superseded by an attitude

of "friendly protective guidance." As

a result of this change in policy, combat

divisions of Eighth Army were progressively relieved of the majority of their

purely occupational missions and directed to undertake along with FEAF

and NavFE an intensified program which

would lead to the establishment of a cohesive and integrated naval, air, and

ground fighting team. Although large

numbers of officers and men were detached from military government and

civil affairs activities and returned to

their parent combat units, there still

remained many administrative features

of the occupation which could not be

relinquished and which constituted a

considerable barrier to the full development of the planned training program.40

Main objectives of the new training

program announced by General MacArthur on 10 June 1949 called for the

rapid integration of Army, Navy, and

Air Force components into an efficient

team capable of performing its primary

military mission. Divisions were directed

to complete RCT field exercises and

develop effective air-ground combat procedures prior to 31 July 1950 and to complete amphibious landing exercises for

one battalion of each division by 31 October 1950. Minimum proficiency levels

to be attained were (1) company (battery) levels by 15 December 1949; (2)

battalion (squadron or task force) level

by 15 May 1950; (3) regimental (group

or task force) level by 31 July 1950; (4)

division (air force or task force) level by

31 December 1950; and (5) combined

and joint operations training to include

amphibious exercises concurrently with

RCT and division-level training.41

In a country so heavily populated and

predominantly agricultural as Japan, no

land was wasted and the maintenance of

large military training areas would have

imposed a burden upon the Japanese

economy which was not considered justified. Consequently, troops were generally restricted in their training to small

posts of regimental size. Divisions could

not be concentrated and trained together.

On 8 August 1949 an area in the vicinity

of Mount Fuji was acquired which would

accommodate limited division exercises

over very rugged terrain. Every other

field training area was exploited to the

utmost. Exploitation of the relatively

few training areas during favorable training weather, however, required that some

units undertake field firing problems and

tests ahead of the actual phasing of such

training in the Mobilization Training

Programs. For example, the 7th Cavalry

Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division

completed its battalion tests before completing basic individual training in order

to use that division's lone training area.42

The Army's Career Guidance Program

also worked to the disadvantage of the

40

 (1) FEC Papers, Paper 3, pp. 2-4. (2) GHQ,

FEC Annual Narrative Historical Rpt, 1 Jan-31

Dec 49.

41

 FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 7-8. 42

 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
56 POLICY AND DIRECTION

training program within the FEC according to General MacArthur's staff. Staff

visits indicated that a wide variance

existed between the experience of regimental commanders and their subordinate commanders. There was a great

need for improved leadership of combat

units at the company and battalion levels.

Many officers possessing the qualities of

leadership and training experience necessary for proper development of FEC

combat units had been given directed

military occupational specialties (MOS)

under the Career Guidance Program and

could not be placed in command of

troops where they were needed. From

the standpoint of the enlisted man the

same situation seriously affected the flexibility of organization and training. In

their efforts to strengthen combat units

by transferring men from inactivated

service units, FEC commanders ran head

on into the Career Guidance Program

which prevented assignment of enlisted

men from one field to another.43

The readiness of combat units within

the FEC was not enhanced by the quality

of enlisted personnel assigned from the

zone of the interior. Replacements arriving from the United States during

1949, for instance, were said by General

MacArthur's headquarters to have had a

very high percentage of low intelligence

ratings and a much larger than usual

number of men of questionable character. This situation was reflected not

only in training, but in discipline, administrative problems, and a larger number of individual incidents which caused

criticism of American behavior. In April

1949, 43 percent of Army enlisted personnel in the Far East Command rated

in Class IV and V on the Army General

Classification Test. On an average, enlisted men of the FEC were several years

younger than their counterparts of World

War II. Another factor which intensified the difficulty of training for combat

readiness was the incomplete basic training received by recruits before shipment

to the FEC. According to an FEC report, recruits were not sufficiently indoctrinated to withstand the inactive period

of pipeline experience and had lost much

of the benefit of basic training before

arriving in the Far East Command.44

General Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S.

Army, visited the Far East Command in

the autumn of 1949 and looked into the

training program then in progress. He

was generally satisfied with what he saw

and with what he was told in conference

with General MacArthur. Reporting on

his findings to the Secretary of the Army

General Collins said:

As a result of the reductions in strength of

personnel . . . and because our troops were

primarily engaged in occupation missions

until recently, the troops of Eighth Army

are not now in fighting condition. However, they have recently been brought back

up to strength, are making excellent progress with realistic field training and are

planning exercises with close fighter-bomber

support by the early spring of 1950. Given

43

 (1) Ibid., p. 10. (2) This complaint from the

FEC was verified at a later date by a team of

observers sent to the Korean battlefield in the first

month of the war. These observers noted that classification and assignment procedures had placed in

battlefield command officers and noncoms lacking

experience and proficiency. This kind of assignment

had often resulted in poor leadership, especially at

the regimental and lower levels. The observers

concluded bluntly that the career program had been

detrimental to combat efficiency. See Rpt of OCAFF

Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug 50. 44

 FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 2-3.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 57

GENERAL COLLINS

another six months the divisions I inspected

should be in excellent shape.45

All units of Eighth Army had completed the battalion phase of their training by the target date of 15 May 1950.

An air transportability school had been

established and was functioning, pointing toward battalion airlift exercises. At

an amphibious training center near

Tokyo, one battalion from each division

had received training in landing techniques and a joint landing exercise was

scheduled for August 1950. Reports on

the Eighth Army's divisions which were

sent to the Department of the Army in

May 1950 showed estimates ranging from

84 percent to 65 percent of full combat

efficiency for the four divisions in

Japan.46

45

 Memo, Gen Collins for Secy Army, 20 Oct 49,

sub: Rpt of Visit to Hawaii and FEC, in G-3, DA

files.

46

 Rpt on Disposition, Strength, and Combat

Capabilities of Major Army Forces in Overseas Commands, 30 May 1950, Rpts Control Symbol WDGPO—

6, CINCFE to ACofS G-3, Opns, General Staff, U.S.

Army, Washington, D.C., in G-3, FEC files.
58 POLICY AND DIRECTION

FEC Supply Status

Equipment in the hands of MacArthur's troops was for the most part of

World War II vintage. Much of it had

been through combat, and a good deal

of it, particularly the vehicles, had been

serviced and maintained under difficulty

during the years of occupation.

Adding to the difficulty of the logistic

situation was the unusual dependence

upon indigenous personnel which had

developed within the U.S. Army in Japan

during the years following World War II.

Basically, this dependence stemmed from

the acute shortages of trained American

soldiers to perform specialized functions

of the type normally carried out by service units. In the absence of sufficient

service units and with emphasis transferred to a great extent from field-type

operations, the natural result had been

to exploit the enormous pool of manpower available in Japan. Japanese

workmen carried out duties in support

of U.S. Army units and in installations

ranging from menial mess-hall tasks to

highly technical functions calling for advanced training and great skill. Base

areas, depots, and ports were manned by

Japanese personnel under Army supervision, while protection of these installations, as well as other less sensitive areas

throughout Japan, was largely delegated

to Japanese guards.

After the war's ending in 1945, vast

quantities of U.S. matériel had been left

throughout the islands of the Pacific.

This residue of the Pacific fighting—vehicles, signal equipment, armament, and

other types of military equipment—was

originally treated as excess. In many

cases, it was left where it lay when the

fighting ceased, abandoned for all intents

and purposes, or at best gathered into

assembly areas and maintained halfheartedly. Some was sold to foreign governments or domestic firms at a fraction

of its intrinsic value. In the Philippines

alone, 933,265 tons of such equipment

had been disposed of through surplus

property channels by the end of 1947.

The main islands of Okinawa, the

Philippines, and the Marianas-Bonins

contained the bulk of this equipment.

Since these areas were part of the FEC,

the condition and disposition of the material were matters of concern to General

MacArthur. In 1947 he had ordered

intensive surveys and the initiation of

measures to reclaim as much of it as

possible. Investigation by ordnance officers of the command showed that the

greater part of all classes of this military

equipment had been left in open storage,

without adequate safeguards, with practically no proper segregation as to type,

and with no attempt having been made

to classify or catalogue it.

In the years from 1947 until the outbreak of war in Korea, personnel of the

FEC had, therefore, been putting forth

every effort to reclaim for military use

as much of this valuable equipment as

possible. Under a program informally

known as Operation ROLL-UP, vehicles,

weapons, ammunition, and other types

of supplies from the island areas had

been segregated, classified, and transported to facilities in Japan for repair

and proper storage. Critical shortages

in qualified personnel plus the desire to

arrive at the most efficient and economical solution to the situation had forced

this project to depend upon the use of
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 59

Japanese industry under the direction

of a small American staff.47

The original objective of Operation

ROLL-UP was to support the FEC and to

equip Eighth Army's infantry divisions

at minimum cost and with maximum use

of all matériel which could be reclaimed.

It was planned that the project would be

completed by 30 June 1950. As an indication of the progress attained, 200,000

measurement tons of ordnance supplies

were moved to Japan from Okinawa during 1949. All types of vehicles, artillery

pieces, and ammunition as well as other

items were affected by this program.

One result of Operation ROLL-UP was

to prepare FEC repair and rebuild facilities, including Japanese industry, for the

great expansion necessary to support extensive combat operations. In addition,

thousands of military vehicles were available in substantially better condition

than would have otherwise been the

case.48

A shortage of supervisory personnel

slowed the renovation program and made

unattainable the goal of completing Operation ROLL-UP by 30 June 1950. When

the North Korean attack came stocks of

unusable equipment were still piled up

in storage shops. An estimated 80 percent of the Army's 60-day reserve of

armament equipment was unserviceable

on 25 June. The Far East Command

had received no new vehicles, tanks, or

other equipment since World War II.

Almost 90 percent of the armament

equipment and 75 percent of the automotive equipment in the hands of the

four combat divisions on that date was

derived from the rebuild program.49

Levels of supply on hand in the FEC

by mid-1950 amounted to a 60-day depot

level plus 30-day levels in station stocks.

But supply resources were out of balance

both in quantity and quality. Some

weapons such as medium tanks, 4.2-inch

mortars, and recoilless rifles could hardly

be found in the command. Only a

trickle of supplies was moving through

the pipelines. Units deactivated in the

command had turned in large quantities

of equipment, but most of this was unserviceable. Eighth Army was authorized 226 recoilless rifles, but had only 21.

Of 18,000 1⁄4-ton 4X4 vehicles in Eighth

Army's stocks 10,000 were unserviceable,

and of 13,780 21⁄2-ton 6X6 trucks only

4,441 were in running condition.

Total ammunition resources amounted

to only 45 days' supply in the depots and

a basic load of training ammunition in

hands of units. The level of perishable

food supplies was also 45 days in depot

stocks and operating levels at various

stations. Petroleum products on hand

included a level of 180 days packaged

and 75 days bulk at depots, station levels

of 15 days each of packaged and bulk,

and 15 days with units.50

By mid-1950 American forces in the

Far East had begun a gradual swing away

from their primary concern with occupation duties and had started to look more

closely to their combat skills. This shift

came about more because of the growing

47

 Administrative History of the Ordnance Section, GHQ, FEC, 1 January 1947-31 December 1949. 48

 Hist Rpt, Ordnance Section, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan31 Dec 49.

49

 Mono, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions,

Hq, EUSAK, ch. I, pp. 5, 7, copy in OCMH. 50

 MS, Maj James A. Huston, Time and Space,

ch. V, p. 41, and ch. III, pp. 176, 186, copy in

OCMH.
60 POLICY AND DIRECTION

stability of occupied Japan than from

any real fear that time was growing

short. That these forces were understrength, inadequately armed, and sketchily trained concerned mainly their

commanders. These commanders, within

the limits of their resources, sought to

overcome the inertia imposed by the

years of occupation and the prevailing,

if uneasy, peace. But on the eve of the

storm the command was flabby and soft,

still hampered by an infectious lassitude,

unready to respond swiftly and decisively

to a full-scale military emergency.

CHAPTER IV

The Communist Challenge

The North Korean Army invaded

South Korea at four o'clock in the morning of 25 June 1950—three o'clock in

the afternoon of 24 June 1950, in Washington, D.C. (Map I) Striking without

warning in the predawn dusk, communist

units gained complete tactical surprise

as they burst across the 38th Parallel

swiftly and in strength. Co-ordinated

columns of Russian-made tanks and Russian-trained infantry followed massed

artillery fires and rolled back the South

Korean defenders, engulfing and destroying whole units as they moved toward

their objectives in a well-conceived and

carefully prepared military operation.

North Korean planes, giving tactical support, were virtually unchallenged.1

News of the invasion reached Seoul

within an hour, before 0500. American

officers there were alerted by 0630 and

began to arrive half an hour later at their

duty posts. Belief that the attack was

nothing more than a border raid soon

faded. By 0800, it was obvious that

many North Korean troops were involved at many separate points. The use

of armor and the major orientation on

the approaches to Seoul were ominous.

ROK defenders at Ch'unch'on in central

Korea threw back the first attacks; but

on the east coast, near Kangnung, an

enemy amphibious landing was unopposed.

The Intelligence Failure

Agencies of the United States Government failed to forecast adequately the

North Korean attack. No report sufficiently valid or urgent reached Washington officials before 25 June 1950

indicating that the attack would come

when it did. Some information sent to

1

 (1) Unless otherwise cited all material in this

chapter dealing with events in Korea comes from

the following sources: Daily Opns Rpts, G-3, GHQ,

FEC, Jun 50; DIS, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Jun 50; Interv,

Dr. Gordon Prange with Lt Col A. J. Storey, Oct 50;

Interv, Maj James F. Schnabel with Lt Col Leonard

Abbot, Oct 50; Interv, Maj Schnabel with Capt Frederick Schwarze, former ACofS G-2, KMAG, 17 Nov

53. (2) The international communist bloc later

charged that the South Korean Army had invaded

North Korea, thus triggering a North Korean counterattack. Two documents captured following the

fall of North Korea have been authenticated as

official attack orders issued by North Korean military authorities to their commanders several days

before the assault. Both documents, Reconnaissance

Order No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff

of the North Korean 4th Division and discovered

in Seoul on 4 October 1950, and Operations Order

No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were issued on

22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,

Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of North Korean

Aggression), Part 2.
62 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Washington from the Far East reflected a

strong possibility of action toward the

end of June, but faulty evaluation and

dissemination prevented it from reaching the right people in the proper form.

The invasion therefore took all the

American political and military leaders

by surprise.

The reasons for this intelligence failure

are easy to understand. The United

States had written Korea out of its

national defense plans, and as a result indications from Korea received less attention than those from areas considered

more vital to American interests. There

was nevertheless an intelligence effort in

Korea. KMAG officers worked closely

with their ROK Army counterparts in

assembling data on North Korean activities. They sent this information to

Washington periodically and on occasion

made special reports. Other agencies

and units in the Far East reported to

appropriate officials in Washington.2

KMAG, not General MacArthur, had the

responsibility of securing intelligence

data on Korea. When General Collins

visited Tokyo in early 1950, he asked

whether MacArthur could furnish the

JCS information on some areas beyond

his sphere of responsibility. MacArthur

answered that he had promptly furnished

such reports whenever specific items had

been developed but that he was reluctant

to submit unsupported estimates. If the

JCS wanted to give him new intelligence

responsibilities, he said he would be glad

to have them. He was confident that he

had enough personnel to handle them.3

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the

FEC G-2, had on his own initiative already established a surveillance detachment in Korea called the Korean Liaison

Office. In addition, according to General Willoughby, "The Embassy in Seoul

maintained military attaché groups—

Army, Navy, and Air, as well as their

own diplomatic and political specialists

whose sole business was to gauge the

trend of events."

 4

Significant troop movements and concentrations, forward stockpiling of supplies, border evacuation, and North

Korean Army reinforcement in men and

matériel were some of the meaningful

indications reported to Washington from

the Far East before the June attack. But

this information was poorly evaluated in

the field and at higher echelons. Secretary of State Acheson later testified:

Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA,

the Department of the Army, and by the

State Department representatives here and

overseas, and shows that all these agencies

were in agreement that the possibility for

an attack on the Korean Republic existed

at that time, but they were all in agreement

that its launching in the summer of 1950

did not appear imminent.5

Since October 1946, when General

Hodge had first reported that the North

Koreans intended to attack South Korea,

dozens of such reports had poured into

Tokyo and Washington. Upon the outbreak of border fighting, the reports

2

 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 37ff. 3

 Notes on Visit of JCS to FEC, 29 Jan-10 Feb. in

G-3, DA file P&O 333 Pacific, sec. I, Case 7/4.

4

 Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John

Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 354. 5

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 123, 350, 436, 1832.

1990-91.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 63

gained credence. By late 1949, talk of a

North Korean invasion was almost routine in intelligence circles.6

 By early

1950, there was a pattern of growing

urgency. But it went undetected, or at

least unheeded, against the more riotous

background of threatening communist

activities in other parts of the world—in

Asia, western Europe, and the Middle

East.

On 30 December 1949, General Willoughby sent to Washington several reports that indicated a North Korean

invasion in March or April 1950. But his

own personal evaluation was that "such

an act is unlikely." On 19 February

1950, he passed on two agent reports,

which he also discounted, one saying that

the North Koreans would attack in

March, the other in June. On 10 March,

the Korean Liaison Office sent him an

agent's report that the North Korean

invasion schedule had been set back from

March or April to June 1950. Late in

March Willoughby said:

It is believed that there will be no civil war

in Korea this spring or summer. . . . South

Korea is not expected to seriously consider

warfare so long as her precipitating war en- tails probable discontinuance of United

States aid. The most probable course of

North Korean action this spring and sum- mer is furtherance of attempts to overthrow

South Korean government by creation of

chaotic conditions in the Republic of Korea

through guerrillas and psychological warfare.7

Intelligence in Washington was more

concerned with what appeared to be the

greater danger in Southeast Asia. Indochina seemed a much more likely target

for a communist take-over. In March

1950, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling,

the Department of the Army G-2, stated:

"Recent reports of expansion of the

North Korean People's Army and of major troop movements could be indicative

of preparation for aggressive action."

These preparations could be completed

by late spring 1950. This forecast was,

however, vitiated by the next comment.

"Communist military measures in Korea

will be held in abeyance pending the

outcome of their program in other areas,

particularly Southeast Asia. If checked

or defeated there, the Soviet might divert

effort toward South Korea. In that

event, invasion by the People's Army

would be probable."

 8

The Office of Special Investigations,

USAF, told Headquarters, Far East Air

Forces, in mid-April that Russia had

definitely ordered an attack on South

Korea by the North Korean People's

Army. But in early May 1950 the American Embassy in Seoul reported little

likelihood of a North Korean invasion

in the near future.9

In May 1950, the Department of the

Army G-2 said, "The movement of

North Korean forces steadily southward

toward the 38th parallel during the cur6

 The author, upon being assigned to G-2, GHQ,

FEC, in November 1949, attended a briefing for

newly arrived officers in the Dai Ichi Building in

Tokyo. Discussing the military situation in the

Far East at that time, the briefing officer, a major

from the G-2 section, quite frankly stated that the

feeling in G-2 was that the North Koreans would

attack and conquer South Korea in the coming

summer. The point was not emphasized particularly and the fact seemed to be accepted as regrettable but inevitable.

7

 DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2669, 30 Dec 49; No. 2720,

19 Feb 49; No. 2754, 25 Mar 50; No. 2900, 18 Aug

50; and KLO No. 518, 25 May 50. 8

 Int Div, GSUSA, DA, Weekly Intelligence Rpt,

17 Mar 50. 9

 (1) OSI Rpt (49) 52-12A-4-1, 17 Apr 50. (2)

Rad, Seoul 456, Drumright to State, 4 May 50.
64 POLICY AND DIRECTION

rent period could indicate preparation

for offensive action." On 23 May, in another routine summary, he stated, "The

outbreak of hostilities may occur at any

time in Korea and the fall of Indochina

to the Communists is possible this

year."

 10

A report forwarded routinely on 19

June 1950, six days before the North

Korean assault, provided Washington

with strong evidence of an imminent

enemy offensive—extensive troop movements along the 38th Parallel; evacuation

of all civilians north of the parallel for

two kilometers; suspension of civilian

freight service from Wonsan to Ch'orwon

and the transportation of military supplies only; concentration of armored

units in the border area; and the arrival

of large shipments of weapons and ammunition. But no conclusions were

drawn from these indications.11 On the

same day a report from General Willoughby in Tokyo concluded, "Apparently Soviet advisers believe that now is

the opportune time to attempt to subjugate the South Korean Government by

political means, especially since the guerrilla campaign in South Korea recently

has met with serious reverses."

 12

The Department of the Army G-2 protested charges made later that he had

failed to interpret properly the information sent to him from the Far East Command. "An analysis of reports received

by G-2, DA," General Bolling told General Collins,

shows that all reporting agencies were aware

of [the North Korean] capability to invade

the Republic of Korea. There has been

much publicity originating from Tokyo and

quoting Willoughby that he had informed

the Department of the Army that North

Korean troops would invade South Korea

in June. The statements made by Wil- loughby are correct in part, but he failed

to indicate [in the publicity] his conclusions

that definitely discount the report referred

to. In short, there is no intelligence agency

that reported a definite date for the open- ing of hostilities or stated that an invasion

was imminent. In fact, the general tenor

of reports indicated that the North Korean

regime would continue to employ guerrillas

and psychological warfare together with

political pressure rather than resort to the

overt employment of military forces.13

American intelligence failed to predict the time, strength, and actual launching of the attack because of reluctance

to accept all the reports rendered by

Koreans, a distrust of Oriental agents and

sources, and a belief that the South

Koreans were prone to cry wolf. Situations similar to that in Korea existed in

virtually every other land area around

the periphery of the USSR. Some appeared to be greater potential danger

spots and diverted the focus of interest

from Korea. Signs which marked the

prelude of the North Korean attack had

become accepted as routine communist

activity. The increased troop movement

and activity in North Korea in the spring

of 1950 followed a pattern established

10

 Memo, ACofS G-2, DA, for Gen Wade H.

Haislip, 24 Aug 50, in G-2, DA file SO 24366. 11

 Sec G-2, FEC, files, M.I.S., Item No. 684595, 19

Jun 50. 12

 (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2842, 19 Jun 50. (2)

General Willoughby later insisted that "Washington" had been fully informed of what to expect in

Korea and should not have been taken by surprise.

See Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-

1951, pp. 350-54. See also Douglas MacArthur,

Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp.

323-24.

13

 Memo, Gen Bolling for DCofS for Admin, DA,

18 Oct 50, in G-3, DA file CofS 091, Case 28.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 65

by the communists in 1947 when they

initiated an annual rotation of completely equipped units from the parallel.

The forwarding of reports in a routine

manner detracted from the significance

of the data in many cases.14 In Congressional hearings immediately after the

North Korean attack, Maj. Gen. Lyman

L. Lemnitzer, director of the Office of

Military Assistance, was subjected to

sharp questioning about the failure of

the Department of Defense to anticipate

the attack. Telling the Secretary of Defense of this experience, General Lemnitzer stated:

I believe that there are lessons to be learned

from this situation which can point the way

to better governmental operations and thus

avoid costly mistakes in the future. . . . I recommend that ... a clear-cut interagency standing operating procedure be established now to insure that if (in the

opinion of any intelligence agency, particu- larly CIA) an attack, or other noteworthy

event, is impending it is made a matter of

special handling, to insure that officials

vitally concerned . . . are promptly and

personally informed thereof in order that

appropriate measures may be taken. This

will prevent a repetition of the Korean

situation and will insure, if there has been

vital intelligence data pointing to an imminent attack, that it will not be buried in a

series of routine CIA intelligence reports.15

In the final analysis, the controversy

over the intelligence failure in Korea is

academic. The United States had no

plans to counter an invasion, even had it

been forecast to the very day. The only

planned reaction was to evacuate U.S.

nationals from the country.

MacArthur's Reaction

GHQ learned of the attack six and

one-half hours after the first North Korean troops crossed into South Korea.

The telegram bearing the news from the

Office of the Military Attaché in Seoul

reported:

Fighting with great intensity started at 0400, 25 June on the Ongjin Peninsula, moving

eastwardly taking six major points; city of

Kaesong fell to North Koreans at 0900, ten

tanks slightly north of Chunchon, landing

twenty boats approximately one regiment

strength on east coast reported cutting

coastal road south of Kangnung; Comment:

No evidence of panic among South Korean

troops.

A message ninety minutes later gave confirmation. General MacArthur immediately informed Washington and, within

a few hours, sent the first comprehensive

situation report on the Korean fighting.16

As the news from Korea worsened later

that first day, General MacArthur

warned Washington officials, "Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic intent and is undisguised act of war subject

to United Nations censure." But he

hardly realized how strong it was. His

situation report showed only three North

Korean divisions along the entire border.17

American Ambassador to Korea Muccio conferred with President Rhee, who

said that the ROK Army would be out

of ammunition within ten days. Muccio

quickly cabled MacArthur for replenishment. The Ambassador had already

14

 Interv, Maj Schnabel with Capt Schwarze, 17

Nov 53. 15

 Memo, Lemnitzer for Secy Defense, Jul 50.

16

 (1) Rad, ARMA 21, USMILAT Seoul to DA,

Infor CINCFE, 25 Jun 50. (2) Rad, ARMA 22,

USMILAT Seoul to DA, Info CINCFE, 25 Jun 50.

(3) Rad, C 56772, CINCFE to DA, 25 Jun 50. 17

 Rad, C 56777, MacArthur (Personal) to Irvin,

25 Jun 50.
66 POLICY AND DIRECTION

directed the acting chief of KMAG,

Colonel Wright, to request an immediate

shipment of ammunition for 105-mm.

howitzers, 60-mm. mortars, and .30-caliber carbines.18

Before the day was out, General MacArthur ordered General Walker to load

the MSTS Keathley, then in Yokohama

Harbor, with 105,000 rounds of 105-mm.

ammunition and 265,000 rounds of

81-mm. mortar, 89,000 rounds of 60-mm.

mortar, and 2,480,000 rounds of .30-caliber carbine ammunition. He wanted

the Keathley to reach Pusan no later

than 1 July. He directed FEAF and

COMNAVFE to protect the Keathley en

route and during cargo discharge. In

his information report to the Department

of the Army, MacArthur said that he intended "to supply ROK all needed supplies as long as they show ability to use

same."

 19

These actions MacArthur took independently. He received no authority

from the JCS to supply the ROK until

the following day, at 1330, 26 June.

The United States Responds

MacArthur's immediate reactions—to

send supplies, these to be protected by

air and naval escorts—were as far as he

could go on his own authority. Certain

basic decisions had to be made in Washington, and the key man was the President of the United States, Harry S.

Truman. President Truman was at his

home at Independence, Missouri, on the

evening of 24 June when Secretary of

State Dean Acheson telephoned him the

news of the invasion. The President

agreed with Acheson that the United

Nations Security Council should be

asked to convene at once in order to consider this threat to world peace.

Acheson called the President again the

next morning, a Sunday, apprising him

of the dangerous nature of the developing crisis. The President decided to

leave for Washington without delay, and

he asked the Secretary of State to meet

with the service secretaries and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff immediately to work out

a plan for his consideration.20

At 1400 that afternoon, responding to

the call of the United States Government,

the United Nations Security Council

convened. The USSR representative

was absent, for he had begun a boycott

of that body in January 1950 because of

the United Nations refusal to replace the

Chinese Nationalist representative with

a Chinese Communist. Ernest A. Gross,

Deputy Representative of the United

States, briefly outlined salient events in

the establishment of the ROK and the

continuing opposition of the communists

toward unification of Korea, then denounced the unprovoked aggression. He

submitted a resolution designed to bring

about an immediate cessation of hostilities and a restoration of the 38th Parallel

boundary by the withdrawal forthwith

of North Korean armed forces to it, and

calling upon "all members to render

every assistance to the United Nations

18

 (1) Rad, USMILAT to CINCFE, sent about

1800, 25 Jun 50. (2) Rad, USMILAT to CINCFE,

sent about one hour later, 25 Jun 50. 19

 (1) Rad, 252130, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

25 Jun 50. (2) Rad, C 56775, CINCFE to DA, 25

Jun 50.

20

 (1) Truman, Memoirs, II, 331-43, gives a general background of Presidential action and considerations in the first few days of Korean fighting.

(2) See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.

402-13.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 67

in the execution of this resolution and to

refrain from giving assistance to the

North Korean authorities." The Security Council adopted the resolution by a

vote of nine to zero, with one abstention.

Meanwhile, officials of the Departments of State and Defense had met in

impromptu session on Sunday morning.

Department of State representatives outlined a plan for supporting the ROK

with munitions and equipment and with

U.S. naval and air forces.21

Early on Sunday evening, shortly before the President arrived in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a

teletype conference with General MacArthur. They notified MacArthur of the

tentative plans made by Defense and

State officials to ship supplies and equipment, which MacArthur had already

started, and to extend his responsibility

to include operational control of all U.S.

military activities in Korea. They said

he might also be directed to commit certain forces, principally naval and air, to

protect the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on area to

assure the safe evacuation of American

nationals and to gain time for action on

the measures then before the United Nations. Most significantly, they alerted

him to be ready to send U.S. ground and

naval forces to stabilize the combat situation and, if feasible, to restore the 38th

Parallel as a boundary. This action,

they said, might be necessary if the

United Nations asked member nations

to employ military force.22

No decision on Korea could properly

be made without a careful analysis of

USSR intentions. The United States

believed Russia to be the real aggressor

in Korea, in spirit if not in fact, and

effective measures to halt the aggression

might therefore provoke total war.

Hence, a decision to meet force with

force implied a willingness to fight a

full-scale war with Russia if necessary.

The determinant for Korea was, then, as

always: "What will Russia do?"

 23

The possible reactions of nations other

than Russia were also important. Each

alternative open to the United States was

accompanied by a strong chance of alienating nations upon whose continuing

friendship and support American policy

was based. Inaction would be condemned by some nations as a betrayal of

the ROK Government. It would gravely

impair American efforts to maintain

prestige in Asia as well as in other areas,

and would cause such nations as Great

Britain, Italy, and Japan to re-examine

the wisdom of supporting the United

States. On the other hand, if the United

States took unilateral military measures

against the North Korean attackers, Russian charges of imperialistic action and

21

 (1) U.N. Doc S/PV/473. 25 Jun 50, Statement to

the Security Council by the Deputy Representative

of the U.S. to the U.N. (Gross). (2) U.N. Doc S/1501.

(3) Rpt to Senate Committee on Armed Services and

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Record of

Actions Taken by JCS Relative to the U.N. Operation in Korea From 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951,

30 April 1951 (hereafter cited as JCS Rpt on Korea),

pp. 5-6.

22

 Telecon, TT 3417, CINCFE and JCS, 2330Z,

25 Jun 50. 23

 American determination to resist communist

expansion is clearly reflected in President Truman's

later thoughts. He feared that if South Korea was

allowed to fall no other small nation would dare

resist threats and aggression by their stronger Communist neighbors. Not to challenge this aggression

would mean a third World War, just as similar

failure to challenge aggression had led to World

War II. He also saw clearly that the very foundations and principles of the United Nations were at

stake. Truman, Memoirs, II, 332.
68 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Louis A. JOHNSON

defiance of the United Nations would

appear valid to many nations. The effect

would be to anger these nations and to

render them more susceptible to Russian

points of view.

The most sensible course seemed to be

a co-operative effort among members of

the United Nations to halt the aggression. But South Korea needed help at

once; and the United Nations could

hardly act swiftly enough. Furthermore,

communist members of the United Nations could be expected to oppose joint

action.

President Truman and his key advisers

gathered at the Blair House in Washington on the evening of 25 June for an

exchange of views. Five State Department members, the Secretaries of the

military departments, the Secretary of

Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

were present.24

At this meeting, the policy-makers discussed the major problems facing the

United States in the Far East. Foremost

in their minds was a consideration of

Soviet intentions and American capabilities. Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of

Defense, believed strongly that Formosa

was more vital to the security of the

United States than Korea, and at his direction General Bradley, now Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs, read a memorandum

on Formosa prepared by General MacArthur. At the insistence of Secretary of

State Acheson, questions of Formosa were

postponed temporarily, and the attention

of the group was redirected to Korea.25

Acheson recommended that General

MacArthur furnish supplies and ammunition to the ROK at once and that he

be directed to evacuate U.S. nationals by

any means required. When no one of24

 (1) This group included all members of the

National Security Council except the Vice President

and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. (2) Unless otherwise cited, material

for this portion covering the background of governmental decisions was derived from the following

sources: JCS Rpt on Korea; Albert L. Warner, "How

the Korean Decision Was Made," Harper's, CCII

(June 1951), 100-103; Beverly Smith, "Why We

Went to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post

(November 11, 1951); MacArthur Hearings, pp. 931,

1049, 1475, 2579-81, 2584; and Truman, Memoirs,

II, 332-36. See also Collins, War in Peacetime, pp.

13-14, and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.

404-07. 25

 The Secretary of Defense later recalled that the

only really violent disagreement which ever arose

between himself and the Secretary of State took

place at this meeting over the issue of the relative

importance to American security of Formosa and

Korea. Johnson insisted that Formosa take first

priority in the evening's considerations, while Acheson insisted that Korea should be the prime topic.

President Truman settled the dispute in favor of

Acheson. See MacArthur Hearings, p. 2580.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 69

fered to comment on Acheson's proposals,

Johnson asked each defense representative in turn for an expression of opinion.

The responses came forth, and "A major

portion of the evening was taken in the

individual, unrehearsed, unprepared and

uncoordinated statements of the several

Chiefs and the Secretaries."

 26

Earlier that day General Collins, the

Army Chief of Staff, had received from

General MacArthur a comprehensive report on developing events in Korea, and

he outlined this to the group. All members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the weakness of the American forces

in the Far East and the absence of a general plan for defending South Korea.

Collins then suggested and the President approved that General MacArthur

be authorized to send a group of officers

as observers to Korea. Mr. Truman also

approved a proposal that the Seventh

Fleet be ordered to the waters off Formosa and Korea at once, and Admiral

Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, left the meeting to start this

movement.27 General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, also

left the room to initiate a concentration

of jet aircraft on Formosa.

The President ordered that all U.S.

intelligence agencies throughout the

world be alerted to recheck Soviet plans

and intentions. He called also for urgent

study to determine what would be

needed to destroy Soviet Far East air

bases if Soviet planes intervened in

Korea.

Finally, President Truman called upon

each man for his personal views. Everyone felt that whatever had to be done to

meet the aggression in Korea should be

done. No one suggested that the United

Nations or the United States back away

from the challenge. Vandenberg and

Sherman had said that American air and

naval aid would be sufficient to stop the

North Koreans, but Collins believed that,

if the ROK Army broke, American

ground forces would be required.28

General Bradley summed up the prevailing opinion. He said that the United

States would have to draw the line on

communist aggression somewhere—and

that somewhere was Korea. He did not

believe that Russia was ready to fight the

United States, but was merely testing

American determination. President Truman agreed emphatically. He did not

expect the North Koreans to pay any

attention to the pronouncement of the

United Nations, and he felt that the

United Nations would have to apply

force.29 Before the meeting adjourned

at 2300, President Truman approved the

actions proposed by Secretary Acheson

and already set in motion by General

MacArthur.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary

of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., called General MacArthur into teleconference immediately after the meeting and informed

him of the decisions reached. MacArthur

was to send all arms and equipment

needed to hold the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on

area, with enough air and naval cover to

26

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 2580. 27

 President Truman identifies the proposal to

move the Seventh Fleet as having originated with

Secretary of State Acheson. Johnson, however, testified before a Congressional committee that the

move had been recommended by him and that the

President had immediately approved his recommendation. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 334; MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2580-81.

28

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 335. 29

 Ibid.
70 POLICY AND DIRECTION

insure safe arrival. He was to use air

and naval forces to prevent the SeoulKimp'o-Inch'on area from being overrun,

thereby insuring the safe evacuation of

U.S. dependents and noncombatants. He

was also told to send selected officers of

his staff into Korea as a survey mission.30

The commitment of air and naval

units to Korea established a precedent

for the later commitment of U.S. ground

troops. It was done without sanction

of or reference to the United Nations

and in the full knowledge that U.S. air

and naval forces might engage in open

conflict with North Korean units. Although generally viewed as less vital than

President Truman's later decision of 30

June to support the ROK with U.S.

ground forces, the authority to employ

the Air Force and the Navy on 25 June

rendered the later decision one of degree

rather than one of principle. General

Ridgway, who was present during the

transmission of initial instructions to

General MacArthur by teleconference,

recalls in his memoirs:

I was standing by General Bradley at the

telecom when the directive went out au- thorizing the use of air and naval forces to

cover the evacuation of American personnel

from the Seoul and Inchon area, and I asked

him whether this was deliberately intended

to exclude the use of ground forces in

Korea. He told me, "Yes."

 31

The officers to be sent to Korea as a

survey mission were to send back information and also to furnish overt evidence

to ROK authorities that they had not

been abandoned. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff informed General MacArthur that

the Secretary of State wished KMAG

liaison officers to stay with ROK units so

long as these units remained effective

fighting forces. Answering a request

from KMAG, General MacArthur said

that immediate action was being taken

and that substantial logistic support was

on its way to the ROK forces.32

The ROK Army acquitted itself well

in some areas, poorly in others. In sectors where they were well led and properly deployed, the ROK Army units

fought bravely and well. Elsewhere, they

fell back before the better-trained and

better-equipped North Koreans without

offering determined or effective resistance. All across the front the enemy's

superior concentration of force, his wellplanned tactics, his armor and artillery

supremacy, and his consistently high caliber of leadership forced a general withdrawal.

Four of the eight existing ROK divisions had been deployed widely throughout the interior and southern sections of

South Korea, while the four divisions

along the 38th Parallel had about onethird of their strength in defense positions and the remainder in reserve ten

to thirty miles below the parallel. No

ROK division was able to assemble its

full combat strength in time to stem the

North Korean drive on Seoul. At

Kaesong and Munsan-ni, in the Uijongbu

corridor, and at Ch'unch'on, the ROK

soldiers put up a good fight but were

overwhelmed. An abortive ROK counterattack in the vital Uijongbu corridor

30

 Telecon, TT 3418, JCS and OSA with CINCFE,

260355Z, Jun 50. 31

 General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New

York: Harper, 1956), p. 192.

32

 (1) Telecon, TT 3418, 2603552 Jun 50. (2) Rad,

CX 56796, CINCFK to KMAG, 26 Jun 50. (3) Rad,

CX 46852, CINCFK to KMAG, 27 Jun 50.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 71

failed on 26 June, and North Korean

entrance into Seoul seemed assured.33

Emergency Evacuation

The unexpectedly rapid and powerful

communist onslaught exposed some 1,500

American civilians to immediate peril.

The majority were families of AMIK

personnel, most of them in the Seoul

area. Additionally, more than a hundred women and a sizable number of

male employees were working at Department of State, ECA, and KMAG installations.

According to the evacuation plan

drawn in July 1949 by GHQ and named

CHOW CHOW, the CG Eighth Army, CG

FEAF, and COMNAVFE were assigned

responsibilities to evacuate U.S. civilians,

U.S. military personnel, and designated

foreign nationals. The plan estimated

that North Korean forces would require

at least ninety-six hours to overrun the

Seoul-Inch'on area.34

In the early morning of 26 June

(Korean time) Ambassador Muccio ordered all dependents of U.S. Government

and military personnel evacuated. Two

commercial freighters at Inch'on, SS

Reinholt and SS Norge, were available,

but the Norge was too dirty to be used

and nearly 700 passengers were evacuated

on the 26th aboard the SS Reinholt, a

vessel normally accommodating only

twelve passengers.35 From the morning

of 27 June (Korean time), FEAF transports and commercial aircraft brought

out others during two days of flights, and

the remaining surface evacuation was

from Pusan.

A total of 2,001 people—1,527 of them

U.S. nationals—were evacuated, all of

them to Japan, 923 by air and the remainder by surface transportation. Most

Americans evacuated were members of

AMIK, U.S. Government employees,

military personnel, and their dependents.

Missionaries comprised the next largest

group of American evacuees.36

Mounting in intensity, the battle for

South Korea raged into its third day on

27 June, with Seoul the prime objective

of the North Korean attack. The communists apparently judged that with the

ROK capital in their hands the rest of

South Korea would yield easily. By the

evening of 27 June, the main North

Korean forces were fourteen miles north

of Seoul. Midnight found the northern

defenses of the city under small arms fire

with armor rumbling toward the outskirts. At 0300, on 28 June, all Americans remaining in the city were ordered

to leave. The first artillery fire struck

Seoul around 0600, 28 June. By that

night the city had fallen to the invaders.

ADCOM Arrives in Korea

General MacArthur's survey group

entered Korea at 1900, 27 June, and at

that time he assumed his newly authorized control of all U.S. military activities

in Korea. Maj. Gen. John H. Church,

who headed the group, which was designated GHQ Advance Command and

Liaison Group (ADCOM), had instruc33

 For a detailed account, see Appleman, South to

the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters III and V. 34

 There is a striking similarity between the evacuation on 26 June 1950 and the plan for evacuation

prepared in GHQ almost a full year before. See

Staff Sec Rpt, G-3, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50,

p. 14, and supporting Doc 8. 35

 War Diary, EUSAK, sec. I, Prologue, 25 Jun12 Jul 50, p. 4.

36

 Staff Sec Rpt, G-1, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50,

p. 61.
72 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL CHURCH

tions to make contact with Ambassador

Muccio and ROK officials and to send

MacArthur reports on the developing

situation. A concomitant mission was to

instill an enthusiastic will to fight among

ROK soldiers and officials. 3 7

Ambassador Muccio met the group at

the Suwon airport, south of Seoul, and

Church established a temporary command post in the town of Suwon. After

a frustrating period of communications

failures and general confusion, Church

made contact with General Chae Byong

Duk, Chief of Staff, ROK Army and suggested they establish a joint headquarters. Chae agreed.38

Church told Chae that he had to use

any organized group in the vicinity to

resist the entry of North Koreans into

Seoul by street-to-street fighting. He

recommended straggler points between

Seoul and Suwon to stop the retreating

ROK soldiers and to reorganize them

into effective units. He insisted that the

Han River bordering Seoul on the south

be defended at all costs.

On 28 June, Chae gathered about

1,000 ROK officers and 8,000 men and

organized them into units near Suwon.

Then he dispatched them to defensive

positions on the south bank of the Han

River.39

That evening, Church felt "a reasonable defense of the Han River line from

the south bank could be accomplished."

But if the 38th Parallel were to be restored, he believed, American ground

forces would have to be used. He radioed

this opinion to MacArthur together with

an admittedly fragmentary report of the

situation.40

Developments in Washington

Amidst disheartening reports from

Korea, President Truman and his advisers met again at the Blair House in

Washington at 2100, EDT, 26 June. The

group was substantially the same that had

gathered previously. The President had

received a personal and vehement appeal

for help from Syngman Rhee, and General Bradley made known MacArthur's

latest dispatches forecasting the early fall

of Seoul.41

3 7

 (1) Opus Instructions to Gen Church, GHQ,

FEC, 27 Jun 50. (2) Rad, CS 56850, CINCFE. to

KMAG, 2 7 Ju n 50 . 3 8

 Rpt, Gen Church, sub: Activities of ADCOM,

27 Jun-15 Jul 50, copy in OCMH.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not record these

meetings. During the hearings on relief of General

MacArthur, Senator Harry Cain told General Bradley, ". . . history will not be able to relate the circumstances surrounding the beginning of the war

because the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no notes on

the subject." See MacArthur Hearings, p. 950.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 73

The progressive decline of South Korean resistance and the increasingly obvious evidence of North Korean military

strength led Secretary of State Acheson

to recommend that American air and

naval forces be permitted to engage in

combat operations to support the ROK.

He proposed also that the U.S. Seventh

Fleet be ordered not only to protect Formosa from attack but also to prevent an

attack from there on the mainland. The

President approved these measures, and

after an hour the group adjourned.

Within a few minutes after adjournment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called

General MacArthur into teleconference.

They removed restrictions against air

and naval operations against North Korean military targets below the 38th

Parallel. They informed him about the

new missions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet

in Formosan waters. They urged him

to spread the news that American help

was on the way to South Korea in order

to maintain South Korean morale.42

The air of spontaneity and extemporaneousness which marked the actions

of the President and his advisers during

the first week of the Korean War is misleading. The key advisers called to informal meetings at the Blair House

included all the members of the National

Security Council who were available in

Washington. Thus, although the sometimes ponderous and always timeconsuming normal procedures of the

council to develop positions on matters

of broad general policy were not followed, the President received its views

and advice.43 He obviously felt no need

for Congressional approval, believing

that his decisions were within his prerogatives as Commander in Chief. Later

objection by Congress that he had

usurped its authority was stilled effectively by widespread public approval of

Mr. Truman's actions.44

Although the President's decisions

were decidedly toward complete resistance of aggression, without the slightest

tendency to conciliate or appease, the

United States, on 27 June, had yet to

choose whether to mount a unilateral

effort or to promote United Nations

action. The advantages of acting under

the auspices of the United Nations were

apparent to all, but in the absence of

specific knowledge on the final attitude

of that body, and in a full realization of

the need for quick and effective action,

American officials pursued an independent course that could later be synchronized with any U.N. plan.

On 27 June, after the ROK Government had appealed to the United Nations for assistance, Warren R. Austin,

United States Representative to the

United Nations, addressed the United

Nations Security Council, denounced

the North Korean action, and demanded

stronger measures by the body than the

proclamation of 25 June, which was

having no effect.

The Security Council condemned the

North Korean attack as a breach of the

peace, called for an immediate cessation

42

 Telecon, TT 3426, CINCFE and JCS, 270217Z

Jun 50.

43

 Hoare, "Truman (1945-1953)," p. 191, states,

". . . the President was, for all practical purposes,

consulting the NSC, but telescoping its deliberations." 44

 See Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 31, and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 413-15.
74 POLICY AND DIRECTION

of fighting, and recommended that members of the United Nations ". . . furnish

such assistance to the Republic of Korea

as may be necessary to repel the armed

attack and to restore international peace

and security in the area."

 45

 This resolution confirmed actions already taken by

the United States.

MacArthur Visits Korea

Given the grave danger of a complete

collapse of morale and fighting spirit

among the South Korean people, General MacArthur felt that only a dramatic

move would stiffen their resolve to resist.

He decided to visit the country as immediate, symbolic proof of American

backing. According to General Almond,

MacArthur's chief of staff, the visit was

also a search for firsthand knowledge of

what the Korean Army was doing, what

it intended to do next, and what President Rhee and Ambassador Muccio had

to say.

Against the advice of his staff officers,

who were apprehensive over extremely

poor flying conditions and the threat of

enemy air attack, General MacArthur

flew to Korea. He landed at Suwon Airfield at 1115, 29 June 1950. Five members of his staff and four newsmen were

with him.46

Although two YAK fighter planes of

the North Korean Air Force appeared

over Suwon and one dropped a bomb

at one end of the runway, MacArthur

and his party landed safely. They went

to a small schoolhouse where General

Church and the American officers of

ADCOM awaited them. President

Syngman Rhee, Mr. Muccio, and General Chae were also there.

At General MacArthur's request, the

meeting opened with a résumé of the

current military situation by General

Church, who said he had been able to

locate only 8,000 of the ROK Army's

original 100,000 men. While he was

speaking, he received a report that 8,000

more had been gathered and that Korean

officers hoped to have another 8,000 by

evening.

After a few brief remarks from

Muccio, General MacArthur stated,

"Well, I have heard a good deal theoretically, and now I want to go and see

these troops. . . ." MacArthur and his

group, in "three old, broken-down cars,"

drove thirty miles north to the south

bank of the Han below Seoul, where

they could see the enemy firing from

the city at targets near them. By midafternoon, MacArthur had seen all he

needed to and returned to Suwon Airfield, then departed about 1600.

The fall of Seoul and the obvious

weakening of the ROK forces demonstrated the need of additional American

45

 Department of State, Guide to the U.N. in

Korea, Dept of State Publication No. 4299 (Washington, 1951), p. 13. 46

 (1) This account of General MacArthur's visit

is based on an interview with Lt. Col. Anthony

Storey, General MacArthur's personal pilot, by Dr.

Gordon W. Prange, then Chief, Military Hist Sec,

GHQ, FEC, FEC, UNC, in 1951, and on an account

contained in General Almond's testimony before the

Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 23 November 1954, contained

in U.S. News and World Report (December 10,

1954), PP. 86-94; all quotations are as General

Almond gave them in his testimony. (2) See also

Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-

1951, PP. 356-57, and Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney,

MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History (New

York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 321-32.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 75

GENERAL MACARTHUR AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL ALMOND, confer with

Ambassador Muccio during their 29 June 1950 visit to the battlefront.

efforts. Since the United Nations Security Council had called for assistance by

member nations to repel the invaders,

more, obviously, could be done.

Army officials in Washington who

were analyzing the developments in

Korea unanimously felt that the USSR

had deliberately fostered the outbreak

in Korea. General Bolté, then the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Department

of the Army, reported to Secretary Pace,

on 28 June, "There can be no doubt but

that the invasion of South Korea is a

planned Soviet move to improve their

cold war position at our expense."47

Bolté suggested that the Russians actually were testing United States determination to oppose their expansion. He

pointed out that there was no way of

knowing whether the Korean aggression

was a prelude to a "hot" war, but he

reminded Pace of American emergency

plans in case a shooting war with the

USSR came. These plans relegated the

Far East to a position of secondary stra47

 Memo, Gen Bolté for Secy Army, 28 Jun 50,

sub: Sit in the Far East, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 25.
76 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL BOLTÉ

tegic importance but provided for the

defense of Japan, Okinawa, and the

Philippines. General Bolté was justifiably concerned over the possibility that

a massive response to the Korean incident might weaken the Army's ability to

defend these islands.

If, the Army G-3 told the Secretary,

the American air and naval forces already committed failed to stop the North

Korean invasion and if it became necessary to send American ground troops

from Japan, the United States garrison

there would be reduced to a point where

"it would be most doubtful that, in the

event of a major war, Japan could be

held against Soviet attack." If ground

forces sent to Korea from Japan were

replaced, "the taking of small reinforcements from the small strategic reserve

[General Reserve] in the United States

would seriously affect our war readiness

in other areas."

 48

President Truman's principal advisers

met with him again at 1700, on Thursday, 29 June. Secretary of Defense

Johnson presented a draft directive to

General MacArthur that implied an

American intention to go to war with the

Soviet Union. Truman turned it down

on the ground that it was too strong.

He stated categorically that he did not

want to see even the slightest implication

of such a plan. He wished to be certain

that the United States would not become

so deeply involved in Korea that it could

not take care of other situations which

could well develop.49

But when Department of Defense

officials requested permission to carry out

air operations north of the 38th Parallel,

Truman agreed. When Pace cautioned

that such operations should be clearly

limited, Truman agreed. He pointed

out his desire that these aerial attacks in

North Korea be restricted to attacks on

military targets, since he wished it

clearly understood that operations in

Korea were only for the purpose of restoring peace and the pre-invasion

border.50

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then sent

General MacArthur additional instructions. He could send his planes into

North Korea to bomb "purely military"

targets. He had to keep these planes

well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria

and the Soviet Union. Army ground

forces, both combat and service troops,

48

 Ibid.

49

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 341. 50 Ibid.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 77

could, if it became necessary, be sent

into the Pusan area to hold the port and

the airfield facilities there. Naval vessels could also bombard targets authorized for attack by aircraft.51

 From

stocks available in the Far East Command, he was to furnish the Republic of

Korea munitions and supplies to keep

ROK forces in action. He was to submit

estimates of the amounts and types of aid

required by the Republic of Korea which

he was unable to provide from his own

sources. He was to have operational

control of the Seventh Fleet but only

to neutralize Formosa.52

There was a grave note of caution.

The Far East commander was reminded

that the United States decision to commit

naval, air, and limited ground forces in

support of the South Koreans constituted

no decision to engage in a war with the

Soviet Union should Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

concluded their instructions to their field

commander by pointing out: "The decision regarding Korea, however, was

taken in full realization of the risks

involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces

should defend themselves, should take no

action to aggravate the situation and

you should report the situation to

Washington."

 53

General MacArthur immediately directed his air and naval commanders to

carry out intensive operations against

the North Korean military machine.54

CINCFE's Personal Report

Soon thereafter, General MacArthur

dispatched to Washington his frank and,

in some respects, gloomy impressions of

his visit to Korea. He told Washington

officials:

I have today inspected the South Korea

battle area from Suwon to the HAN River.

My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand

the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.

. . . Organized and equipped as a light

force for maintenance of interior order [the

51

 General MacArthur had not waited for this JCS

directive to order operations in North Korea. On

the flight to Korea, according to Colonel Storey, his

pilot, MacArthur had issued orders via his plane

radio at 0800 (Korean time), 29 July 1950, saying to

FEAF headquarters back in Tokyo, "Partridge from

Stratemeyer. Take out North Korean airfields immediately. No publicity. MacArthur approves."

This action took place twenty-four hours before the

JCS authorized such action in accordance with the

Presidential approval. Col. John Chiles, then SGS

GHQ, UNC, told the author (September 1955) that

he heard MacArthur give this order, dictating it to

General Stratemeyer. And one of the newspapermen who was present on the plane, Roy McCartney,

recounts the following narrative contained in Norman Bartell, ed., With the Australians in Korea

(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pages

165-79: "On the way to Korea, MacArthur resumed

pacing, while weighing out loud how he could 'take

out' the airfields from which North Korean Yak

fighters were operating. 'Where's the President's

directive?' he asked his intelligence chief, Major

General Charles A. Willoughby. 'How can I bomb

north of the 38th Parallel without Washington

hanging me?' Willoughby, it turned out, had left

Truman's directive in Tokyo. A half hour later

MacArthur emerged from his private cabin and

remarked almost casually, 'I've decided to bomb

north of the 38th Parallel. The B-29s will be out

tomorrow. The order has gone to Okinawa.'"

General Whitney describes this incident in his book

on General MacArthur and concludes, "Here was

no timid delay while authorization was obtained

from Washington; here was the capacity for command decision and the readiness to assume responsibility which had always been MacArthur's forte."

See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History, p. 326.

52

 Rad, JCS 84681, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50. 53 Ibid.

54

 Rad, CX 56954, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and

FEAF, 30 Jun 50.
78 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Korean Army was] unprepared for attack by

armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a

force as that embodied in the North Korean

Army. The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of

supply or for a supply system. No plans

had been made, or if made, not executed

for the destruction of supplies or matériel

in event of a retrograde movement. As a

result, they have either lost or abandoned

their supplies and heavier equipment and

have absolutely no means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained

his rifle or carbine. They are gradually

being gathered up in rear areas and given

some semblance of organization by an ad- vance group of my officers I have sent over

for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars

and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to

retard the enemy through the fullest utiliza- tion of natural obstacles and under the

guidance of example of leadership of high

quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly

and prosperous according to their scale of

living. They have retained a high degree

of national spirit and firm belief in the

Americans. The roads leading south from

Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to

accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is esti- mated at not more than 25,000 effectives.

North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable

strength in armor and a well-trained, welldirected and aggressive air force equipped

with Russian planes. It is now obvious that

this force has been built as an element of

communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through

the air-head at SUWON and the southern

port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital,

but is subject to constant air-attack. Since

air-cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and

personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength.

North Korean air, operating from near-by

bases, has been savage in its attacks in

Suwon area. It is essential that the enemy advance be

held or its impetus will threaten the over- running of all Korea. Every effort is being

made to establish a Han River line but the

result is highly problematical. The defense

of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor

is essential to the retention of the only airhead in central Korea.

The Korean Army is entirely incapable

of counter-action and there is grave danger

of a further breakthrough. If the enemy

advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding of the

present line, and the ability to regain later

the lost ground, is through the introduction

of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize

the Forces of our air and navy without an

effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United States Regimental

Combat Team to the reinforcement of the

vital area discussed and to provide for a

possible build-up to a two-division strength

from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.

Unless provision is made for the full

utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in

this shattered area, our mission will be

needlessly costly in life, money and prestige.

At worst it might even be doomed to

failure.55

This message reached Washington an

hour before midnight on 29 June. Because of its urgent tone and extremely

pessimistic outlook, General Collins consulted with General MacArthur in a

teleconference four hours later. He informed the Far East commander that one

RCT could be moved to Pusan to guard

55

 (1) Rad, C 56942, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun 50.

(2) General Whitney states that MacArthur wrote

the report during the return flight from Suwon,

using a pencil and pad. See Whitney, MacArthur,

His Rendezvous With History, p. 332.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 79

that port. MacArthur protested that

this hardly satisfied the basic requirements. He urged speed in securing

permission to place American forces in

the battle area.

Lacking the authority to grant this

request, Collins told MacArthur he

would try to gain Presidential approval.

Collins called Secretary of the Army

Pace, who called the White House. The

President immediately approved dispatching one RCT to the battle area.

In less than an hour, word was flashed

to Tokyo, "Your recommendation to

move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to

further build-up."

 56

Throughout this period of intensive

search for decisions, culminating finally

in the decision to meet the aggressor in

ground combat, the President of the

United States had been the ultimate

arbiter of each step. President Truman

had solicited the advice of those best

qualified to judge the military effects and

requirements of each move taken. General Collins briefed him daily, passing on

the views of the Joint Chiefs. But the

President made the final choice himself.

Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not

favored the use of American ground

forces in Korea,57 primarily because they

knew how unprepared they were for

large-scale combat. They were reluctant

also to weaken the small General Reserve

in the United States, which represented

the minimum essential for defense. Deploying any part of the Reserve to the

Far East would be a risky, perhaps disastrous, undertaking because of possible

Soviet involvement following American

action.58

General MacArthur quite clearly had

tipped the balance in favor of troop

commitment. The risks had not

changed or lessened, but the nation's

leaders became convinced that communist seizure of Korea could not be

tolerated. MacArthur's personal appeal,

in fact, received even wider recognition

on 30 June when he was told, "Restriction on use of Army Forces . . . are

hereby removed and authority granted to

utilize Army Forces available to you."

 59

56

 Telecon, TT 3444, CINCFE and JCS, 300742

Jun 50.

57

 Handwritten Note, to Memo, Dep Secy JCS for

JCCS, 28 Jun 50, sub: Preparation of Study. 58

 Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense when the

decision was made, subsequently testified to an

almost neutral attitude on the part of himself and

his chief assistants. "Neither I nor any member of

the Military Establishment in my presence recommended we go into Korea." Johnson recalled, "The

recommendation came from the Secretary of State,

but I want to repeat that it was not opposed by the

Defense Department, all the members of which had

severally pointed out the trouble, the trials, tribulations, and the difficulties." See MacArthur Hearings, p. 2584. 59

 Rad, JCS 84718, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.
CHAPTER V

Emergency Conditions,

Emergency Measures

President Truman's decision to send

American ground troops against the

North Koreans had come in time, but

barely. Regardless of American air

strikes against their cities, communication lines, and troop columns, and

despite naval surface attack against their

coastal installations and shipping, the

invaders drove the ROK Army down

the peninsula. As the vague line of

battle receded southward in late June

and early July it became clear that the

Republic of Korea could not stand by

itself.

Armed with Presidential authority,

MacArthur sent ground troops into the

fight as fast as he could move them. On

30 June, he ordered the 24th Division

from Japan to Korea, retaining the unit,

for the time being, under his personal

control. On the recommendation of his

chief of staff, General Almond, he

ordered a small task force from the division flown into Korea ahead of the

main body to engage the North Korean

Army as quickly as possible, sacrificing

security for speed. Because it would go

by air, he restricted its size to two rifle

companies, some antitank teams, and a

battery of light artillery. This makeshift

unit was to report to General Church

at Suwon by 1 July; but, realizing that

Suwon might fall at any time, General

MacArthur authorized Church to divert

the force to Pusan if necessary.1

General Church meanwhile struggled

to keep the ROK Army in the fight. He

had no real authority over the South

Koreans, but his status as MacArthur's

personal representative gave weight to

his advice to the ROK Chief of Staff.

In effect, Church took charge of the

1

 (1) Rad, CX 56978, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

30 Jun 50. (2) Rad, C 26979, CINCFE to CG Eighth

Army, 30 Jun 50. (3) Review Comments, Lt Gen

Edward M. Almond, 20 Feb 69. (4) General MacArthur chose this division on the basis of location.

The 24th Division was closer to Korea than other

combat units in Japan and could be deployed more

rapidly. From the standpoint of combat readiness,

while there was little to choose from among the

four divisions in Japan, the 24th Division had been

reported on 30 May 1950 as having the lowest combat effectiveness of the major units. This report

gave the following estimates of combat effectiveness

for FEC divisions: 1st Cavalry—84 percent combat

effective 7th Division—74 percent combat effective;

25th Division—72 percent combat effective; 24th

Division—65 percent combat effective. See Memo,

U.S. Army Major Units FEC. 3 Jul 50, in G-3, DA

files. (5) Interv, author with Brig Gen Edwin K.

Wright, ACofS G-3, FEC, UNC, Dec 51.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 81

faltering South Korean Army. Many

KMAG officers stayed with ROK combat

units, patrolling, feeding information to

General Church, and doing whatever

they could to stiffen ROK resistance

and morale.2

American advice could not stop North

Korean tanks and artillery. The South

Koreans continued to fall back. General

Church's command group pulled out of

Suwon in the early evening of 30 June

to Taejon. Vowing to "run no farther,"

Church, together with Ambassador

Muccio, awaited the small 24th Division

task force.

Around midnight, General Almond

notified the American Embassy at

Taejon that bad flying weather had

forced the diversion of the task force to

Pusan, where it would land as soon as

the weather improved; the first contingents of the main body of the 24th

Division would land at Pusan by ship

within twelve or fourteen hours. General Almond emphasized that these men

were not to be used as "Headquarters

Guards" but to fight the North Koreans.

He was assured that the railroads from

Pusan to Taejon were operating and that

there should be no problem in moving

these troops to the line of battle.

Almond instructed Church to concentrate railroad rolling stock near Pusan

to keep it out of enemy hands and to

have it ready for the 24th Division.3

The small delaying force—part of the

1st Battalion, 21st Infantry—landed at

Pusan Airfield on 1 and 2 July, with Lt.

Col. Charles B. Smith in command. The

artillery battery originally called for had

been replaced by two 4.2-inch mortar

platoons. A platoon of 77-mm. recoilless rifles and six 2.36-inch bazooka teams

had also been added. Because of the

poor flying weather many trucks and

some soldiers could not be flown in

until later.4

General MacArthur was concerned

that the small force lacked artillery, and

on 2 July he ordered General Walker to

fly in howitzers from Japan if he had to.

It was unnecessary to do so, for elements

of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion were

already on their way by LST, and they

landed in Pusan that evening and moved

at once to the battle area.5

The commanding general of the 24th

Division, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean,

flew to Pusan early in the morning of 2

July. After spending 24 hours becoming

acquainted with conditions, he telephoned from Taejon to Tokyo and spoke

with General Hickey, Deputy Chief of

Staff, GHQ. Wanting his initial fight

with the North Koreans to be fully coordinated and supported, he told Hickey,

"This first show must be good. . . . We

must get food and bullets and not go off

half-cocked."

A few hours later, MacArthur named

Dean commanding general, USAFIK.

Dean assumed control of KMAG and

all other U.S. Army troops in Korea.

2

 Interv, author with Gen Church, 16 Jul 50, copy

in OCMH.

3 (1) Rad, A 041, ADCOM to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.

(2) Rad, JSOB/G G-2 to Capt Hutchinson, 1130,

1 Jul 50. (3) Memo, CofS GHQ, FEC, no signature,

1 Jul 50, sub: Telecon Between CofS GHQ and First

Secy of American Embassy, Taejon, 1120. (4) Rad,

CX 57009, CINCFE to ADCOM, 1 Jul 50. All in

AG, FEC files.

4

 Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021810

Jul 50, in AG, FEC files. 5

 (1) Rad, CX 57073, CINCFE to CG FEAF and

CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul 50. (2) Memo, ACofS G-3,

GHQ, for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021700 Jul 50. Both

in AG, FEC files.
82 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Church's GHQ, ADCOM, served as his

temporary staff. At the same time,

MacArthur set up the Pusan Base Command, subordinate to USAFIK and

under Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin.6

The other regiments of the 24th

Division—the 34th and 19th Infantry,

and the remainder of the 21st Infantry,

plus supporting units—moved to Korea

rapidly. By 5 July, most of the division

was there. To provide more armor

General MacArthur ordered Company

A of the 1st Cavalry Division's medium

tank battalion to bolster the division.7

Meanwhile, Colonel Smith's delaying

force, after reporting to General Church

at Taejon, was sent forward to engage

the enemy on sight. Just above Osan,

the task force dug hasty positions on the

night of 4 July and awaited the approaching North Koreans. Shortly after

0800 on 5 July, the North Koreans appeared. They struck the task force with

infantry and about thirty Russian-made

T-34 tanks. The Americans stood until

they expended their ammunition, then

abandoned the field, suffering heavy

losses in the process. Their weapons

had proved to be almost useless against

the enemy armor. Without reserves and

with open flanks, the task force remnants

withdrew to avoid being surrounded and

destroyed.

The pattern of this first engagement

was repeated during the following days.

All combat elements of the 24th Division closed with the enemy along the

main axis of his advance, but the North

Korean firepower and greater strength

overwhelmed these units at every stand.

The men and officers of the 24th Division

fought bravely, but their small numbers

and inferior weapons left no choice but

retreat or annihilation.

General Dean hoped that the 34th

Infantry could delay the North Korean

advance in the P'yongt'aek-Ch'onanKongju corridor. But between 5 and 8

July the regiment, thrown into a fight for

which it was unprepared, was cut to

pieces. Weak in numbers, completely

outgunned, unable to protect its flanks,

and short of ammunition the 34th retreated in some disorder, suffering

extremely heavy casualties.

The 21st Infantry held at Chonui and

Choch'iwon for three days, slowed two

enemy divisions, but, after losing heavily

in men and equipment, had to give way

on 12 July.

East of the main Seoul-Taegu rail and

highway lines, the ROK Army tried to

stem the North Korean drive through the

mountainous central and eastern regions.

In bloody hand-to-hand fighting that cost

both sides dearly, the North Koreans

continued to advance. No defensive

line appeared to offer the prospect of a

determined stand.8

6

 (1) Memo, 031140 Jul 50, sub: Telecon Between

ADCOM (Gen Dean) and CofS (Gen Hickey). (2)

Rad, CX 57153, CINCFE to CG 24th Div, 3 Jul 50.

Both in AG, FEC files. 7

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-3, GHQ, for CofS ROK,

GHQ, 2 Jul 50. (2) Ibid., 3 Jul 50. (3) Rad, CX

57090, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul 50. All

in AG, FEC files.

8

 (1) Rad, ROB 104, CG USAFIK to CINCFE,

6 Jul 50. (2) For a detailed account of these actions,

see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu, pp. 59-108. (3) General MacArthur later testified that he had sent the initial task force in the

hope of establishing a "loci [locus] of resistance,"

an "arrogant display of strength" that would fool

the enemy into believing that much more American

resources were at hand than in actuality. See MacArthur Hearings, p. 231.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 83

MacArthur's Estimates

The understrength American division

so hastily deployed to Korea was unable

to stop the North Korean drive, but

this fact did not become evident for several days after the initial encounter at

Osan. The situation in Korea could

not be accurately evaluated even in

Tokyo let alone in Washington, where

Army officials could do little but wait

impatiently for clarification through

General MacArthur's estimates and descriptions. Until these estimates arrived,

Washington could neither plan adequately nor gauge the scope of the job

to be done. The Army's plans for supporting MacArthur had to be based on

requirements established either directly

or obliquely by his estimates. Washington authorities had no recourse, in

these early days, but to accept his judgment of capabilities and requirements

at face value. They knew the limits

of the nation's immediate resources.

General MacArthur told them what was

happening in Korea and what he felt

had to be done. In the search for a

balance between what they had and what

was needed, the nation's military leaders

followed advice from the Far East commander which they could not accurately

evaluate.9

MacArthur's early estimates fell short

in appraising the ultimate necessary

force, but not in their appreciation of

the caliber of the enemy and the seriousness of the threat. The tenor of

reports from Church, Dean, and others

had already convinced General MacArthur that the situation was indeed

serious. The degree of seriousness remained to be determined. He did not

immediately arrive at a full appreciation

of the strength of the North Korean

attack. General MacArthur progressively revised upward his estimate of the

strength he would need to defeat the

North Koreans.

Late in June, he implied that two

American divisions could restore order.10

But by 7 July his views had changed

materially. He told the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, "It is now apparent that we are

confronted in Korea with an aggressive

and well-trained professional army

equipped with tanks and perhaps other

ground material quite equal to, and in

some categories, superior to that available here." The enemy's leadership was

"excellent." The North Koreans showed

understanding of and skill in tactical and

strategic principles—demonstrated by

their break across the Han River. To

halt and hurl back "this powerful aggression" would, in MacArthur's opinion, require from four to four and

one-half full-strength American divisions

supported by an airborne RCT and an

armored group. To reach this strength

level in Korea 30,000 men and officers

would have to be sent him from the

United States at once. "It is a minimum," he warned the Joint Chiefs,

"without which success will be extremely

doubtful."

 11

9

 Complementary to the failure of U.S. intelligence

agencies to foresee the North Korean assault is the

failure to have determined the true quality of the

North Korean Army, especially the caliber of its

training and the individual worth of the North

Korean soldier. General Bradley testified later,

"The first few days we did not know just how good

these North Koreans were, and it was some time

before we could get a good picture. . . ." See MacArthur Hearings, p. 893.

10

 Rad, C 56942, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun 50. 11

 Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul 50.
84 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Dean echoed this conviction. In a

personal letter to MacArthur on 8 July,

Dean set forth his views on the enemy

strength and on his own most urgent

needs. He asked for battle-ready combat teams immediately, troops with full

combat loads and extra supplies, ready

for co-ordinated action.12

North Korean armor had proven extremely effective. In their first engagements, his troops, Dean pointed out

emphatically, could not stop enemy

tanks. The 2.36-inch rocket launcher,

an American antitank weapon of World

War II, proved dangerously disappointing against the enemy's heavily armored

Russian tanks. The launcher was ineffective against the front and side armor,

and American infantrymen quickly lost

all confidence in it.13 Direct fire by

artillery was of little help after the

pitifully few 105-mm. antitank rounds

available at the guns were exhausted.

Regular high-explosive projectiles, which

composed the bulk of artillery ammunition carried by his batteries, would not

penetrate armor deeply enough. Dean

stressed the need for getting antitank

ammunition to his artillery at once. He

described enemy tank tactics as excellent

and unusually effective despite terrain

which confined tanks mainly to roads.

Asserting that "we cannot afford to be

out-gunned and out-armored," the

hard-pressed American general appealed

for American medium tanks and for

90-mm. towed antitank guns.14

General Dean warned that the North

Korean soldier was a dangerous foe. "I

am convinced," he told General MacArthur, "that the North Korean Army,

the North Korean soldier and his status

of training and the quality of his equipment have been underestimated."

 15

Dean's first-hand account, coupled

with graphic evidence of enemy successes

on the situation maps in his own war

room, brought General MacArthur to

the conclusion that he had been much

too conservative. On 9 July 1950 he

doubled his estimate of the forces

needed. "The situation in Korea is

critical," he told the Joint Chiefs. "It

has developed into a major operation."

For the first time he expressed doubt

that the Americans could stay in Korea.

To build up . . . sufficiently to hold the

southern tip of Korea is becoming increasingly problematical. I strongly urge that,

in addition to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions,

with all component services, be dispatched

to this area without delay, and by every

means of transportation available.16

To lend validity to this sudden revision, General MacArthur re-emphasized

his growing respect for the North Korean

Army. He credited the North Korean

Army and its employment as being as

12

 Ltr, Gen Dean to Gen MacArthur, 080800 Jul

50, sub: Recommendations Relative to Employment

of U.S. Army Troops in Korea, in AG, FEC files. 13

 This weapon, developed during World War II,

was much publicized and widely regarded as a

"wonder weapon." In reality, the 2.36-inch rocket

launcher, or bazooka, did not deserve this reputation. There are relatively few recorded instances

in which it was successfully used against German

armor. See Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1950), ch. XIV, p. 604. Also, the

launcher ammunition used by Dean's men was at

least five years old and had deteriorated.

14

 (1) Ltr, Gen Dean to Gen MacArthur, 080800

Jul 50. (2) Rad, ROB 110, CG USAFIK to CINCFE,

6 Jul 50. 15

 Ltr, Gen Dean to Gen MacArthur, 080800 Jul

50.

16

 Rad, CX 57841, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Jul 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 85

MEMBERS OF THE 25TH DIVISION en route to the battle front on 14 July 1950.

good "as any seen at any time in the last

war." Enemy infantry was first class.

There were unmistakable signs of Soviet

leadership and technical guidance and

of Chinese Communist participation.

The attack could no longer be viewed

as an indigenous North Korean military

effort. "To date," he admitted, "our

efforts against his armor and mechanized

forces have been ineffective." This failure, galling as it was, was not the fault

of the fighting men. "Our own troops,"

he pointed out, "are fulfilling expectations and are fighting with valor against

overwhelming odds of more than ten to

one."

 17

 This appeal to Washington for

an additional army of four divisions

climaxed a series of detailed requests for

men and units and marked the upper

limit of MacArthur's requests for Korea.

On 5 July General MacArthur had

ordered the 25th Infantry Division into

combat, and by 9 July its first RCT had

cleared Japan for Korea. All regiments

of the 25th Division had arrived in or

were en route to Korea by 14 July. They

went into battle at once. The 1st

Cavalry Division was by this time also

preparing for an amphibious landing

on the east coast of Korea. In order

to bring these two divisions and the 24th

Division to some semblance of effective

fighting strength, MacArthur stripped 17 Ibid.
86 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the remaining FEC combat force, the 7th

Division, of trained officers and men.

While this cannibalization of the 7th

fell far short of building up the other

units to a satisfactory war strength, it

left the 7th Division a skeleton, temporarily useless for combat.18

As the odds grew large that the greater

part of Eighth Army would have to fight

in Korea, it became apparent that General Walker would have to take personal

command there. USAFIK was a provisional headquarters, hastily formed for

a specific mission, and could not handle

a large operation efficiently. When General Dean proposed on 7 July that his

headquarters absorb GHQ ADCOM,

General MacArthur had already decided

that General Walker would take over.19

Five days later, on 12 July, MacArthur

named Walker commander of the

ground forces in Korea. The USAFIK

headquarters was dissolved, and General

Church's ADCOM group was ordered

to Tokyo.20

The extension of Eighth Army's area

of responsibility to include Korea introduced the unique situation of an army

fighting on one land mass with responsibility for its own logistical support, including port operation and procurement

of supply, while administering occupied

territory on another land mass several

hundred miles away and serving as its

own zone of communications. For the

sake of convenience, forces in Korea were

referred to as Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

(EUSAK) and those remaining in Japan

were still referred to as Eighth Army or

as Eighth Army Rear. General Walker

retained command of both.

When Walker assumed command in

Korea, he had approximately 18,000

troops spread along a defensive line running along the south bank of the Kum

River to a point just above Taejon,

there curving northeastward through

Ch'ongju and across the Taebaek Range

below Ch'ungju and Tanyang, finally

bending southward to the east coast of

P'yonghae-ri.21

Although General MacArthur had

hoped to save the 1st Cavalry Division

for a later amphibious operation, he

yielded to battlefield necessity and sent

that unit to Korea in mid-July. The

division loaded out of the Yokohama

area between 11 and 17 July aboard

LST's, other U.S. naval craft, and

Japanese-operated cargo ships. The unit

was prepared to make an amphibious

landing on the east coast of Korea near

P'ohang-dong, against enemy opposition

if necessary. No enemy appeared, and

in the early morning of 18 July the units

started coming ashore.22

The Build-up

The years of military privation since

World War II had left their mark on the

ground forces of the United States. Not

18

 (1) Rad, CX 57258, CINCFE to CG Eighth

Army, 5 Jul 50. (2) Memo, G-4 GHQ for CofS

ROK, GHQ, 10 Jul 50, sub: Movement of 25th Inf

Div to Korea. (3) Memo, G-4 GHQ for CofS ROK,

GHQ, 14 Jul 50. (4) Rad, CX 57692, CINCFE to

DA, 12 Jul 50. All memos in AG, FEC files. 19

 (1) Ltr, CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 6 Jul 50, sub:

Org of USAFIK. (2) Ltr, CINCFE to CG USAFIK,

1st Ind, 9 Jul 50. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 146,

9 Jul 50. 20

 (1) GO 13, GHQ FEC, 12 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX

57765, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 13 Jul 50.

21

 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu, p. 108. 22

 (1) Draft Plan, JSPOG GHQ, FEC, Operation

BLUEHEARTS, 2 Jul 50, in AG, FEC files. (2) War

Diary, 1st Cav Div, Jul 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 87

only were they equipped with outmoded,

worn weapons and equipment, but their

numbers were scant. Both Army and

Marine troops had spread thin in their

efforts to perform their interim missions.

Aside from scattered elements in the

Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Army's leaders had only the understrength General Reserve in the United

States from which to draw immediately

for fighting men to throw into Korea.

Additional ground strength could be

developed through Selective Service and

through the call-up of Reserve Component forces, but these methods would

take time. Thus, when General MacArthur, reacting to North Korean victories, impatiently demanded his due, the

nation's military leaders faced a dilemma

of considerable complexity and prime

importance. The very safety of the nation stood, at times, in the balance.

Demands for combat forces by General MacArthur in July and August 1950

fell into three broad categories: replacements, filler units and individual fillers,

and reinforcing units. To meet his demands in any of these categories would

affect the balance of United States military strength. Each tied in with problems far broader in scope than General

MacArthur's problems in Korea. Within

the limits imposed by national policy, as

set by the President, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Department of the Army

made every effort to meet the urgent

requirements developing in the Far East.

Replacements

The sources of replacements within

the Far East quickly dried up. Men were

taken from administrative and noncombatant duties and sent to the combat

units. In the United States, every installation was combed for individuals

who could be shipped quickly to Korea.

General MacArthur first asked for

5,000 combat and 425 service replacements. On 1 July, he asked that these

troops be added to the normal number

shipped to his command each month,

stipulating that they be qualified and

experienced, for they were "going directly into the combat zone in Korea for

an indefinite period. . . ."

 23

 This number could be sent without difficulty, and

most would reach Japan within the

month, the remainder early in August.

The Department of the Army gave

MacArthur special dispensations that

would improve the replacement status

in the Far East while not enfeebling military strength elsewhere. He could retain enlisted men in his command even

though their foreign service tours had

been completed. He could keep Reserve

officers after their category commitments

had expired, if they agreed. He could

call to active duty limited numbers of

Reserve personnel already in the Far

East.24

Airlift of replacements from the

23

 (1) Rad, CX 57013, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jul 50.

(2) General MacArthur's 2-division estimate was the

basis for these figures. This estimate called for

deployment of 25,266 combat troops and 9,246 service troops in the combat zone. The formula applied to this battlefield strength to determine

replacement needs was taken from FM 101-10, 10

August 1949, and provided a surprisingly accurate

figure. United States battle losses in July were

1.3 percent of total strength, whereas the formula

forecast had set expected losses at 1.35 percent. See

Rad, CX 58760, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul 50. 24

 (1) Rad, C 57692, CINCFE to DA, 12 Jul 50.

(2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50, sub:

Casualties and Replacements. (3) G-1 GHQ Log,

Item 41, 5 Aug 50. (4) Rad, C 58232, CINCFE to

DA, 19 Jul 50.
88 POLICY AND DIRECTION

United States to Japan began on a

modest scale on 18 July. A lift of 80 men

a day was gradually expanded to 240

combat soldiers daily. Although sufficient air transport was not immediately

available, the Department of the Army

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did everything possible to increase the aerial flow

in late July and early August. Replacements were flown to Japan in organized

packets of 39 men and 1 officer. Approximately 7,350 replacements reached

Japan in July 1950.25

Army officials in Washington asked

General MacArthur to recheck his figures

on 23 July. Perhaps the actual casualties were fewer than the number forecast.

Maj Gen. William A. Beiderlinden, the

FEC G-1, informed Washington that the

actual number of men and officers lost

in Korea closely approximated his earlier

educated guess. The only discrepancy

was an excessive missing-in-action rate,

which reflected the ability of the North

Koreans to envelop the understrength

American units almost at will. Beiderlinden promised to readjust FEC requirements downward whenever this

action became possible.26

The Department of the Army on 19

July had discarded peacetime strengths

and authorized full combat Table of

Organization and Equipment (TO&E)

strength for all divisions operating in

the Far East Command. This increase

in authorized men and officers, technically called filler replacements, when

added to the number of combat-loss replacements which MacArthur said he

needed by 1 September 1950, brought

the total replacement requirements of

the command to 82,000 men.27

Department of Army officials showed

General MacArthur the bottom of the

replacement barrel on 30 July. All the

men and officers eligible for overseas

assignment were being shipped to the

Far East Command, except for slightly

more than a thousand to other joint commands. Despite Presidential approval

for the recall of 25,000 enlisted Reservists, a severe shortage of replacements

still existed. Individual replacements

from the Enlisted Reserve Corps would

not be available in quantity for at least

two months. All of these men would

have to go to General Reserve units.

The extensive levies placed upon the

General Reserve to furnish FEC replacements had cut the operating capabilities

of the emergency force to a dangerous

level. For the immediate future, at

least, the Army had done about as much

25

 (1) Telecon, TT 3536, CINCFE and DA, 2100,

17 Jul 50. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 17

Jul 50, sub: Air Priority, Replacements Versus B-29

Engines. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 40, 18 Jul 50.

(4) Rad, FAIRPAC 456, FAIRPAC to CINCFE, 26

Jul 50. (5) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 1, 26 Jul 50. (6)

Rad, W 86607, DA to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50. (7) Rad,

W 86677, DA to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50. (8) Rad, CX

58760, CINCFE to DA, 27 Jul 50. 26

 (1) Rad, W 87678, DA to CINCFE, 23 Jul 50.

(2) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 62, 23 Jul 50. (3) Memo,

G-1 GHQ for CofS, 24 Jul 50, sub: Casualty

Analysis. (4) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 37, 24 Jul 50.

27

 (1) Rad, W 86450, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50.

(2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 25 Jul 50, sub:

Replacement Sit in Japan. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item

67, 25 Jul 50. (4) General MacArthur had ordered

on 11 July the establishment of an Army replacement system by Eighth Army to support both Japan

and Korea. A center to receive, process, and allot

the anticipated increased numbers of men and officers slated for the Far East opened near Tokyo at

Camp Drake on 24 July 1950. (5) Rad, CX 57662,

CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 11 Jul 50. (6) Cleaver,

Personnel Problems, p. 82. (7) Memo, Col Grubbs

for Gen Beiderlinden, 8 Aug 50, sub: Assignment

of Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 36, 8 Aug 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 89

as it could do. It could promise only

the most austere replacement support

to General MacArthur.28

Bringing Divisions to Strength

Another significant effort involved the

build-up of MacArthur's divisions from

understrength, unbalanced peacetime divisions to fully manned, properly constituted fighting divisions. With only

two battalions in each regiment, American forces in Korea could not employ

normal tactical maneuvers based on the

full firepower and the flexibility of a

triangular organization. Nor could they

guarantee flank protection. As General

Dean said:

The two battalion regimental organization

with which we are operating does not lend

itself to effective combat. The same is true, though possibly to a lesser degree of our

two battery artillery battalions. Recommend that infantry battalions be sent us to

bring all regiments of the 24th Division up

to regular triangular organization.29

Painfully familiar with the structural

weaknesses of his combat divisions General MacArthur appealed to the Department of the Army on 8 July saying, "In

order to provide balanced means for

tactical maneuver, fire power, and sustaining operations, it is urgently required that infantry divisions operating

in this theater be immediately expanded

to full war strength in personnel and

equipment." The gravity of his concern

prompted a second appeal two days later.

"I am sure that the Joints Chiefs of Staff

realize," he said, "that the division now

in action in Korea, and the other two

divisions soon to be committed are at

neither war strength nor at full author

ized peace strength." General MacArthur asked that completely manned

and equipped battalion units be sent

from the United States wherever possible.30

 He needed 4 medium tank battalions, 12 tank companies, 11 infantry

battalions, and 11 field artillery batteries

(105-mm. howitzers).31 If these units

could not be sent fully trained and battleready as he desired, he wanted trained

cadres, followed by filler replacements.

Asking that organized units, even if

understrength, be sent first, he said he

would find filler personnel in his own

command.

The Far East Command could provide

no trained cadres for new units. Only

60 percent of the first three grades

authorized for existing FEC units were

available. If noncommissioned officers

were taken from divisions already fighting, these divisions would be dangerously weakened. General MacArthur

urged all possible speed in sending him

units, cadres, and fillers.32

The acute shortage of infantry, artillery, and service support units in the

General Reserve in the United States

turned these relatively modest demands

into a problem of major proportions.

In marshaling organized combat units

to fill out the divisions in Korea and

Japan, the Department of the Army

28

 Rad, W 87478, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jul 50. 29

 Ltr, Gen Dean to Gen MacArthur, 080800 Jul

50.

30

 (1) Rad, CX 57465, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, C 57561, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50. 31

 The four FEC divisions had a total of 12 infantry regiments and 12 light field artillery battalions. The Negro 24th Infantry had 3 battalions

and the Negro 159th Field Artillery Battalion had

3 105-mm. howitzer batteries and did not require

augmentation. 32

 Rad, CX 57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50.
90 POLICY AND DIRECTION

stripped battalions, companies, and batteries from the General Reserve. It

pulled trained noncoms from other units

and formed provisional cadres for General MacArthur's command. These

drastic procedures not only vitiated the

combat readiness of the remaining units,

but greatly reduced the mobilization base

for a later build-up of the Army General

Reserve.

The dangers of denuding the General

Reserve in the United States came under

consideration only as a secondary factor

of the larger planning effort: how and

where the General Reserve should be

tapped to bring FEC units to war

strength. The Department of the Army

took in stride the decision to accept the

great risk of military weakness in the

continental United States as it accepted

at face value General MacArthur's

statement of his needs.33

Infantry Strength

The main considerations in selecting

infantry battalions for Korea were early

arrival and combat effectiveness. Army

authorities could have sent eleven cadres

for new infantry battalions, but new battalions, even with full cadres and basictrainee fillers, needed six months to

become combat ready. Only in the case

of the 7th Division, still in Japan, were

three battalion cadres substituted for

ready-to-fight units. The General Reserve held only eighteen battalions of

infantry at this time. From this small

reservoir the Department of the Army

finally selected for the Far East Command 2 full battalions and 3 battalion

cadres from the 3d Infantry Division;

1 full battalion from the 14th RCT; and

3 battalions from the 5th RCT on

Hawaii. The remaining 2 battalions

were taken from the 29th RCT on

Okinawa. This unit was already part of

the Far East Command and its disposition did not affect the General Reserve.

The Department of the Army spared

the 82d Airborne Division and the infantry units of the 2d Armored Division.

The former unit was not touched because General Collins felt he must keep

a completely manned and effective unit

for last-resort operations. The armored

infantry battalions of the 2d Armored

Division were not particularly suited to

the type of action taking place in Korea

and were passed over for that reason.

The removal of battalions from the

General Reserve would reduce the training and mobilization base in the United

States by one-sixth. The 3d Division,

the 2d Armored Division, because of

losses other than in infantry units, and

the 14th RCT would be fit only to serve

as nuclei around which to build new

units. Since it would require from

twelve to fourteen months to rebuild

these combat units, the Army's ability

to carry out emergency missions would

be nullified for at least one year.34

Division Artillery Units

The same general criteria were used in

choosing division field artillery batteries

from the General Reserve for shipment

to the Far East. Although taking only

battery cadres would have placed less

strain on Regular Army units, complete

33

 (1) Memo, CofS USA for Gen Bolté, 17 Jul 50,

sub: Additional Units to Meet Immediate Requirements of the FEC. (2) MFR, 17 Jul 50, attached

to (1). (3) Memo, Study, same sub, 17 Jul 50. All

in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 17.

34

 Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate

Requirements of FEC, Annex B.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 91

batteries were withdrawn. The 3d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions each

furnished three 105-mm. howitzer batteries. Three batteries were originally

scheduled from the 14th RCT and two

from the 6th Armored Field Artillery

Battalion. With the decision to commit

the three batteries of the 5th RCT from

Hawaii, the levy on the 14th RCT was

reduced to two and that on the artillery

battalion was canceled. These eleven

artillery batteries were scheduled to

reach Korea at about 60 percent strength

and at an estimated combat effectiveness of 40 percent.35

 The field artillery

mobilization base was cut about 30 percent by these transfers to Korea, and the

ability of the Army to support other operations with artillery was cut in half

for a full year.

Battalion-sized units could be ready

to leave their home stations two weeks

after receiving warning orders. But

there was no hurry about alerting infantry and artillery units, because all

water shipping from the west coast was

tied up until about 15 August. The

Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army, reporting that 30,000 men and 208,000

measurement tons of equipment were

going to the Far East under the most

urgent priorities, recommended not

shipping the augmentation units until

mid-August. General MacArthur was

notified that the new infantry and artillery units would reach him before the

end of that month.36

When the Chief of Staff, GHQ, and

the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, reached

agreement in a telephone conversation

on 12 July that two battalions of the 29th

Infantry on Okinawa should be sent

to Korea as soon as possible, General

MacArthur ordered the Commanding

General, Ryukyus Command, General

Beightler, to build these battalions to

war strength and send them to Japan

without delay.37 General Walker asked

that the two battalions be sent directly

to the battle area, bypassing Japan. He

said he would give them any training

they needed. This request was granted,

and on 21 July the two battalions sailed

from Okinawa for Pusan, arriving four

days later.38

General Bolté, the G-3, Department

of the Army, had suggested to the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Administration, General Ridgway, on 1 July that the 5th

RCT stationed in Hawaii, be sent to

Korea.39 Ten days later, when General

Collins paused in Hawaii on his way to

visit the Far East Command, he looked

into the matter. In a teleconference with

Ridgway in Washington, Collins asked

him to query key staff officers on whether

it would be better to send the 5th RCT

as a unit or break it down into battalions

and battalion cadres to bring other FEC

regiments up to war strength. His own

35

 (1) Ibid., Annex C. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA

to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50. (3) Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE

to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul 50. (4) Rad, WAR 87500,

DA to CINCFE, 30 Jul 50. 36

 (1) Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate

Requirements of FEC. (2) Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE

to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul 50 (passing on data from DA).

37

 CINCFE ordered these battalions sent at full

war strength even though his existing troop basis

did not allow this. 38

 (1) Memo, CofS GHQ for ACofS G-3, 12 Jul

50. (2) Rad, CX 57798, CINCFE to CG RYCOM,

13 Jul 50. (3) Rad, E 33465, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 14 Jul 50. (4) Rad, CX 57894, CINCFE

to CG EUSAK, 15 Jul 50. (5) Rad, CX 57799,

CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50. (6) Rad, WAR 85875,

JCS to CINCFE, 13 Jul 50. 39

 Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Ridgway, 1 Jul 50,

sub: Anticipated Requirements of CINCFE.
92 POLICY AND DIRECTION

feeling was that the 5th RCT should be

employed as a regiment, not cannibalized. Ridgway and other staff officers

agreed, recommending that the regiment

be sent to Korea at its existing strength

with all possible speed. On 13 July the

Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the commanding general, U.S. Army Pacific, to

send the regiment to Pusan at once.

The regiment sailed for Korea on 25

July with 178 officers and 3,319 men,

entered Korea on 31 July, and went into

combat immediately.40

By late July, the build-up of FEC

divisions to war strength was well under

way. Of the 11 infantry battalions required, 8 had been sent or would reach

General MacArthur's command within

thirty days. The shortage in division

artillery of 11 light batteries was also

being rectified. Three batteries arrived

with the 5th RCT. Three were en route

from the 3d Division, 2 from the 14th

RCT, and 3 from the 2d Armored

Division.41

Reinforcement by Major Units

While he had been asking for replacements and filler units, General MacArthur had also been calling for major

trained combat units from the United

States. Never in this early period did

the Department of the Army openly

question the validity of any of MacArthur's demands. The continuing success of the North Korean Army was

proving vividly that the Far East Command needed fighting units. But as the

calls for help mounted they threatened

to shrink the General Reserve unduly

and had to be considered in terms of

national strategy and acted on at a level

above the Department of the Army.

The first request by General MacArthur for a major unit from the United

States came when he sought a Marine

RCT with attached air support elements.

Made on 2 July, the request was approved on the next day by the Joint

Chiefs, and General MacArthur was told

that the Marine unit would be sent to

him as soon as possible.42

A few days later came his first call for

specific major Army units from the General Reserve. He asked, on 5 July, that

the 2d Infantry Division, then training

at Fort Lewis, Washington, be sent to

Korea as soon as possible. He also asked

by name for smaller units which, if sent,

would further reduce the capabilities

of the General Reserve. On 2 July General MacArthur had pointed out that he

must have more armored units since his

four heavy tank battalions were skeletons

with only one company apiece. Two

were already in Korea and the remaining two were going. He asked for

trained and organized tank companies

from the United States to bring these

battalions to full strength. He asked

also for three additional medium tank

battalions.

40

 (1) Telecon, TT 3512, Collins (Hawaii) and

Ridgway (Washington), 11 Jul 50. (2) Rad, WAR

85696, DA to CINCFE (for Collins), 12 Jul 50. (3)

Rad, WAR 85854, DA to CINCFE, 13 Jul 50. (4)

Rad, WAR 85874, DA to COMGENUSARPAC, 13

Jul 50. (5) Rad, RJ 64645, CG USARPAC to

CINCFE, 25 Jul 50. 41

 (1) Rad, CX 8506, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 23

Jul 50. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA to CINCFE,

19 Jul 50. (3) Rad, WAR 87500, DA to CINCFE,

30 Jul 50.

42

 (1) Rad, C 57061, CINCFE to DA, 2 Jul 50. (2)

Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. For

details of movement of Marine and airborne units,

see below, Chapter IX.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 93

At the same time he made a bid for

an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division

and another for an Engineer Special

Brigade. The weakness of his antiaircraft artillery defenses impelled him

also to seek quick shipment of four additional battalions of antiaircraft artillery.

He backed up this request by pointing

out that Sasebo, the principal Japanese

port of embarkation for Korea, was

completely undefended by antiaircraft

artillery.43

These requests did not surprise Department of the Army officials, but they

did 'pose a serious problem and involve

major decisions. General Bolté advised

General Collins to take units from the

General Reserve and to send them to

Korea as reinforcing units. The Chief

of Staff accepted this view. General

Collins, however, reluctant to tamper

with the combat effectiveness of the 82d

Airborne Division, recommended that

an RCT of the 11th Airborne Division,

which was less combat ready, be substituted. He had at first felt that sending

four battalions of antiaircraft artillery

would be beyond the Army's capability.

He told the other members of the Joint

Chiefs on 3 July that, as their executive

agent for the Far East Command, he

had taken action to send two battalions

to General MacArthur. This was the

maximum deployment of antiaircraft

artillery he then believed could be made

from the General Reserve without reducing the Army's ability to meet its emergency commitments. He reconsidered

this problem in the next few days, decided on 8 July to accept the risks, and

released two additional battalions to

General MacArthur at once.44

While waiting for its recommendations to be considered by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Department of the Army

suggested to General MacArthur certain

priorities for shipping units if their deployment was approved. "It is emphasized," General MacArthur was told,

"that final decision by higher authority

to furnish major reinforcements requested by you has not yet been taken."

The Department of the Army then outlined a proposed shipment schedule for

these units. General MacArthur reacted

immediately and, citing his most recent

appraisal of the deteriorating combat

situation, underscored the "impelling

urgency" of getting a favorable decision

at once. He reversed the proposed order

of water shipment and asked that the

armored units come first, to be followed

by the 2d Division, the antiaircraft artillery battalions, and the Engineer Special Brigade. He asked also that the

airborne RCT be flown to Japan at once,

together with its supporting airlift.45

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that

the Army should send General Reserve

units to General MacArthur. But the

issue was so important in terms of worldwide commitments that the JCS on 7 July

asked the Secretary of Defense to gain

the approval of the President. Mr.

43

 (1) Rad, O 57218, CINCFE to DA, 5 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, C 57093, CINFE to DA, 2 Jul 50. (3) Rad,

CX 57152, CINCFE to DA, 3 Jul 50.

44

 (1) Memo, Gen Bolté for DCofS for Admin

(Gen Ridgway), 7 Jul 50. (2) Memo, Gen Collins

for JCS, 3 Jul 50, sub: FEC Requirements for Opns

in Korea, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Book

1, Case 6. (3) Memo, Gen Ridgway for ACofS G-3,

8 Jul 50. Although the Army Chief of Staff kept

the JCS informed of his decisions on the antiaircraft

artillery battalions, he did not require their approval to send the units. 45

 (1) Rad, WAR 85209, DA to CINCFE, 7 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul 50.
94 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Truman gave it, and the approved units

were immediately ordered to prepare

for shipment.46 By 9 July, the 2d Division, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade,

an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division, the 378th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company, the 15th and 50th

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions (AW),

the 68th and 78th Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalions (90-mm.), and the 6th, 70th,

and 73d Tank Battalions had been

approved for shipment to General

MacArthur.47

The 2d Division

The deployment of the 2d Division

from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the

battlefront in Korea began on 8 July

when the unit was alerted for shipment.48

Nine days later, the first elements of

the division sailed for Korea. One of its

regiments attacked the enemy in the field

a single month after the first alert.

The speed with which this division

reached Korea as an effective fighting

force is remarkable-when the scale of

the shipment and its many complications

are considered. When it began preparing for shipment in early July, the 2d

Division was far from combat-ready.

General Mark W. Clark, then chief of

Army Field Forces, had predicted after

inspecting the division in June that it

would not be ready to fight for at least

four months. The division was approximately 5,000 men short of war strength.

Used during the preceding year as an

overseas replacement pool, it had undergone a personnel turnover of 138

percent in that period.49 General MacArthur's first move on being told that

the division was coming to his theater

had been to ask that it be brought to full

war strength before sailing.50

In order to comply, the Department

of the Army transferred hundreds of men

from other units at Fort Lewis to the

2d Division. But putting approximately

1,500 replacements awaiting shipment

to the Far East from Fort Lawton into

the division evoked an objection from

General MacArthur. He remonstrated

that all replacements scheduled for his

command must come to him directly and

not to be used as fillers for the 2d Division. He considered it "imperative

that the meager strength authorized units

in combat be maintained."

 51

 The Army

had taken this action in order to get the

2d Division to Korea at full war strength

as quickly as possible. The 1,340 replacements already assimilated by the 2d

Division could not be retrieved. Further

diversions were stopped because of General MacArthur's objection, even though

Army officials felt that their method

would have put the greatest number of 46

 (1) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, sgd Gen Bradley, 7 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A,

Case 6. (2) Rad, W 85359, DA to CINCFE, 10 Jul

50. (3) Note by Secys to Holders of JCS 2147, 11

Jul 50. 47

 (1) Memo, G-3 for Gen Ridgway, 8 Jul 50, sub:

Action on Gen MacArthur's Request. (2) Memo,

Gen Thomas S. Timberman for Chief, Org and

Training Div, G-3, DA, 9 Jul 50. (3) Ibid., 8 Jul 50.

All in G-3, DA files. 48

 Rad, WAR 85272, DA to CG Sixth Army, 8 Jul

50.

49

 2d Div, Comd Rpt, vol. I, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50,

prepared by Hist Sec, G-3, Hq, 2d Inf Div, pp. 9-22,

copy in AGO Departmental Records, 302. 50

 Rad, CX 57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50. 51

 (1) 2d Div, Comd Rpt, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50, pp. 13-

14. (2) Rad, AMGA 0720, CG Sixth Army to DA

(citing CINCFE radio message), 6 Jul 50, G-1 GHQ

Log, Item 6, 15 Jul 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 95

men in the Far East Command in the

least period of time.52

Army officials were anxious not only

to meet the requirements set up by the

Far East Command but also to do so in

the manner designated by General

MacArthur. On 19 July, they told him

to decide whether he wanted combat

replacements or a war-strength combat

division. The second increment of the

2d Division, scheduled to sail the next

day, would leave at only half strength

because men from other stations in the

United States could not reach Fort Lewis

by sailing time.

The division commander opposed sailing at only half strength, especially when

3,500 men were at west coast ports of

debarkation awaiting shipment to the

FEC as replacements. Since airlift was

very limited, these replacements could

not reach the FEC for at least three

weeks. Washington asked General MacArthur for an immediate decision as to

whether 1,500 of these replacements

could be placed with the second increment of the 2d Division when it sailed

the next day.53

General MacArthur's preoccupation

with replacements led him to compromise by agreeing that the maximum

number of men from the ports of debarkation could be sent on the same

ships as the 2d Division, but not assigned

to the division. "Anything," his reply

stated, "that will speed up movement

of replacements to this theater is desired." Fifteen hundred replacements

sailed with the 2d Division on 20 July.

General MacArthur had intended to

place these men in the 7th Division, but

changed his mind. On 28 July he directed that they be assigned to the 2d

Division upon reaching Korea.54

In the early stages of the division's

preparations, General MacArthur had

asked that it be shipped to Korea combatloaded. Each increment would thus

land in Korea with its weapons ready to

go, with organic vehicles and supporting

artillery on the same or accompanying

ships, and with each shipload able to

operate independently in combat for a

reasonable period of time.

While Washington recognized some

advantages in combat-loading, there were

compelling reasons why it was not practical. The ships being used were not

designed for combat-loading. Furthermore, combat-loading would have delayed the division's arrival in Korea by

at least two weeks because it was slower

than ordinary unit-loading. The procedure also took nearly twice as much

shipping space. Since convoys were not

being used, unit-loaded shipments would

depart as soon as they were loaded.

Troops would travel on the same ship

as their own equipment insofar as possible. The rest of their equipment and

supplies would arrive on cargo shipping

loaded for selective discharge to match

the unit.55

When the assistant division commander of the 2d Division arrived in

Tokyo late in July with the advance

52

 Telecon, DA and CINCFE, 16 Jul 50, G-2 GHQ

Log, Item 1, 16 Jul 50. 53

 Rad, W 86378, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50.

54

 (1) Rad, C 58193, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50,

G-1 GHQ Log, Item 25, 19 Jul 50. (2) Rad, W

86606, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul 50. (3) Memo, G-3

GHQ for G-1 GHQ, 28 Jul 50, sub: Replacements

2d Inf Div and 7th Inf Div, G-1 GHQ Log, Item

54, 28 Jul 50. 55

 (1) Rad, CX 57546, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50.

(2) Rad W 85426, DA to CINCFE, 11 Jul 50.
96 POLICY AND DIRECTION

party, he reported that almost 1,800 enlisted men had been released from the

division at Fort Lewis because they were

due to be discharged within three

months. This information nettled MacArthur and he asked that these men be

retrieved and sent to him as replacements. He would see that they rejoined

the 2d Division after its arrival. 5 6 General MacArthur's concern was allayed

when he was told that the Department

of the Army had already decreed that

men having thirty days' service remaining were eligible for shipment to the

Far East Command. Port officials had

already rounded up most of the men

originally released and had shipped them

on 20 July. The rest would be shipped

out as soon as statutory authority was

granted to keep all enlisted men in the

service for an additional year.57

As fast as ships were loaded they left

for Korea. The first regiment of the

division unloaded in Korea on 31 July,

while another regiment was still being

loaded on troop transports in the United

States. By 19 August the entire division

had reached the Korean peninsula and

was on its way into action as a unit. 5 8

Supporting Artillery

Lacking nondivisional artillery, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs on 13 July

to send him light, medium, and heavy

artillery battalions. He asked for six

155-mm. howitzer battalions, self-propelled, as the first shipment. He also

asked for an artillery group headquarters and a field artillery observation

battalion. He pointed out that his division commanders in Korea would be

forced, by the extensive frontages,

broken terrain, and the limited road

nets, to employ their divisions by separate RCT's. With a projected American force in Korea, based upon

JCS-approved deployments as of that

date, of 4 Army divisions and 1 Marine

RCT, there would be 13 American

regiments available in Korea. At least

ten of these regiments could normally be

expected to be in the front lines at any

given time. Since only four battalions

of 155-mm. howitzers would be present

with division artillery units, six more

battalions would be required if each of

the ten regiments was to have a medium

artillery battalion when it was used as

an RCT. Two 8-inch howitzer battalions and the 155-mm. guns would be

required for general support along the

whole front. Light battalions could

either reinforce division artillery units,

or, if desirable, be committed in support

of South Korean units. General MacArthur noted that the profitable extent

to whic h American artillery should be

used in support of South Korean forces

was under study by his staff. He received no immediate reply and asked

again, only four days later, for early arrival of the artillery urgently needed in

Korea.59

The General Reserve, weak in all its

components, was particularly deficient

in nondivisional field artillery. Only

eleven battalions were in the United

56

 Rad, C 58583, CINCFE to DA, 25 Jul 50. 57

 Rad, W 87191, DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul 50. 58

 2d Div, Comd Rpt, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50, pp. 23,

27-28.

59

 (1) Rad, CX 57746, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, CX 58055, CINCFE to DA, 17 Jul 50. (3)

Rad, CX 57796, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50. General

MacArthur asked for the 155-mm. gun battalions

after a conversation with General Collins on 13 July

in Tokyo.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 97

States and all were below war strength.

Only four 105-mm. howitzer battalions,

five 155-mm. howitzer battalions, one

155-mm. gun battalion, and one 8-inch

howitzer battalion could be expected to

be partially effective. But Washington

Army officials ordered three of the

155-mm. howitzer battalions, the 8-inch

howitzer battalion, an observation battalion, and the 5th Field Artillery Group

headquarters to Korea.60

General MacArthur protested vigorously upon being told that only five

artillery battalions of the fifteen he had

requested could be furnished him. He

pointed out that fifteen battalions were

an essential minimum based on ten infantry regiments fighting on the line

at any given time. He had now decided

that there should be twelve U.S. regiments in action at all times. "Beyond

doubt," he predicted, "the destruction

of the North Korean forces will require

the employment of a force equivalent

at least to six United States infantry divisions in addition to ROK ground

forces." Fighting in World War II had

proven conclusively, according to him,

that a field army could sustain a successful offensive against a determined enemy,

particularly over difficult terrain, only

if it had nondivisional artillery in the

ratio of at least one for one as compared

to division artillery. While General

MacArthur did not spell out these latest

requirements, he implied that twentyfour battalions of nondivisional artillery

would be needed. He recommended

that, since the necessary battalions were

not available, they be activated and "an

intensive training program of appropriate scale be set in motion at once."

 61

Service Troops

Without an adequate support base behind the battle line in Korea and in the

larger service area in Japan, the fighting

units could not sustain their desperate

defense, much less attack. Although the

greatest emphasis was placed on infantry,

artillery, armored, and other combattype units and soldiers during July, the

demand for service units and troops

increased steadily. Technical service

units to supply front-line soldiers, to

repair damaged weapons and equipment,

to keep communications in operation,

and to perform the hundreds of vital

support operations required by a modern

army, had been at a premium in the FEC

when the war broke out. Japanese specialists and workmen performed in large

part the peacetime version of service

support for the Far East Command.

The few available service units had been

depleted when specialists and other

trained men had been handed rifles and

sent to fight as infantry.

Some types of combat and noncombat

support were needed more immediately

than other types. In view, for instance,

of the hundreds of tons of ammunition

of all types on its way to the Far East

Command for the Korean fighting,

ordnance specialists qualified to handle

ammunition were needed at once. General MacArthur asked on 11 July that

several hundred officers and men qualified for this function be flown to his area

60

 (1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 9 Jul 50,

sub: Strength and Training Status, FA Units, in

G-3, DA files, Blue Book, vol. II, Status of Units

and Equipment. (2) Rad, WAR 86427, DA to Continental Army Comdrs, Info to CINCFE, 18 Jul 50.

(3) Rad, WAR 86558, DA to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50. 61

 Rad, CX 58750, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul 50.
98 POLICY AND DIRECTION

with all possible haste. The next day

he sent a detailed requisition for Army

technical service units, showing, in order

of priority within each service, the support units needed immediately and those

needed later to carry on the essential

service support operations in Japan by

replacing units scheduled for Korea.

Support units coming from the United

States did not appear on this requisition

of 12 July, but showed up two weeks

later on a second requisition.62

The stated requirements of the Far

East Command for technical service units

were viewed in Washington as reasonable

and just, but were beyond the capabilities of the Department of the Army to

supply. General MacArthur had requested over 200 company-sized units

from Chemical, Engineer, Medical,

Transportation, and other technical services. This requisition, if filled, would

involve shipment of 43,472 men and

officers. The Department of the Army

had only about 150 company-sized service

units in the United States.

Between the extremes of sending only

cadres from such units and sending every

technical service unit from the United

States to the Far East, the Department

of the Army charted a middle course.

Cadres would have little immediate

value in Japan and Korea. But the General Reserve could not be stripped

without disastrous effect upon the mobilization base.63

 In order to preserve a

minimum mobilization base and still take

the edge off the Far East commander's

most urgent requirements, Washington

officials withdrew cadres for retention

in the United States and sent about

eighty service support units of company

size to the Far East. Although these

units were only at about 65 percent

strength, their specialized composition

and the technical know-how of their men

and officers enabled them to function

profitably, even at reduced strength.64

As the scale of the Korean action became clearer, General MacArthur on 25

July sent a supplemental list of technical service units which would be

needed. This list brought the total

number of technical service units requested in July to 501, totaling 60,000

men and officers. Officials of the Far

East Command knew that they would

not receive the bulk of these units for

a long time, but they felt that Washington should know their requirements for

planning purposes.65

The need for combat soldiers remained paramount. Of the service

troops sent to Japan as replacements in

July, for example, 60 percent were assigned to front-line fighting troops upon

arrival in Korea.66

The filler units and reinforcing units

which the Department of the Army had

managed to scrape together for General

MacArthur in the first month of the

campaign represented the maximum

force which the United States was able

62

 (1) Rad, CX 57563, CINCFE to DA, 11 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, CX 57693, CINCFE to DA, 12 Jul 50. 63

 For example, General MacArthur requested a

corps signal battalion. There was only one such

unit in the United States. It would have required

nine months to reconstitute such a unit after selected personnel were available.

64

 Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate Requirements of FEC, Annex D. 65

 Memo, Col Daniel H. Hundley for Gen Beiderlinden, 25 Jul 50, sub: Additional Technical Service

Units, G-3 GHQ Log, Item 43, 25 Jul 50. 66

 Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50,

sub: Casualties and Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log,

Item 41, 5 Aug 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 99

to furnish. These units might not be

enough, but no more were going to be

sent until the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

other planners had a chance to take a

better look at the way things were going.

Department of the Army officials told

the Far East commander on 21 July that

they were in no position even to consider

his request for another army of four divisions for the present. Before any decision could be made on that request,

American defense officials would have to

determine just how far they were going

in rebuilding the General Reserve.

Then they would have to see if sending

additional forces to Korea was as important to national security as having

them available for deployment elsewhere

in the world.67

67

 Rad, CM-OUT 86558, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul

50.
CHAPTER VI

A New Confidence

The outbreak of war in June 1950 had

caught the United States flat-footed. The

nation had few forces immediately available and no plans for fighting in Korea.

Nevertheless, American leaders had developed in the post-World War II years

some policies and principles for meeting

communist aggression which they could

use as a basis for raising forces and making plans for Korea. These policies and

principles provided, broadly, that the

United States would work closely with

its treaty allies and with other free nations to stop all forms of communist

aggression, and that any military action

would be taken under the aegis, or at

least with the sanction, of the United

Nations, if at all possible. The United

States earnestly desired to avoid unilateral action, however effective, which

might alienate its friends and possibly

goad the Soviet Government into extreme action and all-out war. Too, it

wished to put to full use the military

resources of its allies rather than bear

the entire burden single-handedly.

Within hours after word of the North

Korean attack reached Washington, the

United States had called on the United

Nations. The resolutions of 25 and 27

June, drawn up in haste and under pressure, had been steps in the right direction but did not go nearly far enough

toward the goal of restoring peace in

Korea.

The Security Council resolution of 25

June had called upon members to refrain from helping the North Koreans.

The United States Government directed

a more specific appeal to the Soviet Union

through its embassy in Moscow, asking

that it prevail upon the North Korean

leaders to halt the fighting. In response,

the Soviet Government called South Korea the aggressor and, by implication,

refused to mediate.1

Faced with Soviet refusal to give even

lip service to the United Nations resolution, and with a combat situation that

worsened hourly, the United States began

carefully to press for a stronger stand and

more effective action by the United Nations.

On 3 July the Secretary General of the

United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated

a proposed resolution to the delegations

of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It suggested that the

Government of the United States would

direct the armed forces of member na1

 (1) Leland M. Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U.S.

Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council

on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 106. (2) State Dept

Bulletin, XXIII, 575 (July 10, 1950), 46-48.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 101

tions in Korea, but with the help of a

"Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." This committee would

co-ordinate all offers of assistance, promote continuing participation in Korea

by member nations, and receive reports

from the field commander. The exact

extent of its control was not stated in

the proposal.2

When, on 4 July, the Department of

State sought the views of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff on the resolution, the latter opposed forming such a committee. They

felt that placing a United Nations committee in the channel between the U.S.

Government and the field commander

would raise serious operational difficulties. Even though the committee might

never try to control military operations,

the possibility that it might do so brought

the Joint Chiefs together in opposition.

They told the Secretary of Defense that,

if a committee were needed for political

reasons, its powers must be defined and

restricted so exactly that it could never

take on the nature of a U.N. command

headquarters.3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a

command arrangement in which the

United States, as executive agent for the

United Nations, would direct the Korean

operation, with no positive contact between the field commander and the

United Nations. The major decisions,

especially those of political content, must

not in any way be made, or influenced,

by the officer commanding the U.N.

forces in Korea. If the United Nations

were to deal directly with the commander on assistance offers, for example,

the top levels of the U.S. Government

would be bypassed and forces accepted

or rejected by a commander, very likely

an American, whose outlook would be

restricted by his own local situation.4

In spite of sympathetic consideration

of the proposal by France and the United

Kingdom, the United States rejected the

projected U.N. committee, and a revised

resolution developed. Because the

United States occupied a privileged position in the terms of the resolution, it

would not have been seemly for the

American representative to introduce it.

Accordingly, on 7 July, the delegations

of France and the United Kingdom

brought the draft before the Security

Council. Seven votes in favor had been

lined up in advance. The resolution

therefore passed the Security Council, by

a vote of seven to zero, with three nations, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, abstaining. The Soviet representative had

not yet returned to the council and cast

no vote.

This resolution made President Truman executive agent for the council in

carrying out the United Nations fight

against aggression in Korea. The Security Council recommended that contributing member nations furnish forces

to a unified command under the United

States. It asked that the American Government select a commander for this unified command and that the United States

submit periodic reports on the course of

operations in Korea. President Truman

designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff his

agents for Korea. To General Collins,

2

 Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U.S. Policy in the

United Nations, p. 119. 3

 Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 50,

sub: Proposed U.S. Position With Regard to Forces

in Korea.

4

 JCS 1776/19, Rpt by JSSC, 5 Jul 50, sub: Proposed U.S. Position With Regard to Forces in Korea.
102 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Army Chief of Staff, fell the task of serving the Joint Chiefs as their primary

representative in Korean operations. At

the Army level, General Bolté, the G-3,

handled operational details for General

Collins. Thus, with authority granted

by the United Nations, vested in the

President, and running downward

through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

United States Army became responsible

for planning and directing the military

operations of United Nations forces in

Korea.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended

that General of the Army Douglas

MacArthur be placed in command of

United Nations forces.6 President Truman accepted their recommendation and

notified General MacArthur of his appointment on 10 July 1950. On 12 July

Department of the Army officials sent

detailed instructions to MacArthur. They

directed him to avoid any appearance of

unilateral American action in Korea.

"For world-wide political reasons," they

cautioned, "it is important to emphasize

repeatedly the fact that our operations

are in support of the United Nations

Security Council." In furtherance of

this, General MacArthur would identify himself whenever practicable as

Commander in Chief, United Nations

Command (CINCUNC), and whenever

justified, would emphasize in his communiqués the activities of forces of other

member nations.7

Two days later, on 14 July, President

Rhee assigned control of his nation's

forces to General MacArthur, stating in

a letter transmitted through the U.S.

Ambassador to Korea:

In view of the joint military effort of the

United Nations on behalf of the Republic

of Korea, in which all military forces, land,

sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under the joint operational command and in

which you have been designated Supreme

Commander, United Nations Forces, I am

happy to assign to you command authority

over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of continuation of the present state of hostilities,

such command to be exercised either by

you personally or by such commander or

commanders to whom you may delegate the

exercise of this authority within Korea or

adjacent seas.8

Although the Security Council asked

the United States to report to the United

Nations on activities of the unified command, no procedure was specified. On

13 July the Department of State proposed to the Secretary of Defense that

reports be sent to the Security Council

each week. These would keep world attention on the fact that the United States

was fighting in Korea for the United Nations, not itself. Apprehensive over

world reaction to the naval blockade of

Korea ordered by President Truman on

30 June, the Department of State was

convinced that the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June amply justified

the blockade, but wished the actual

blockade declaration reported to the Security Council in order to remove any

doubt as to its legality. A report from

the unified command on the blockade

seemed in order. 5

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 14, 989, 326, 1259, 1938. 6

 Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 9 Jul 50, sub: Designation of a United Nations Unified Comdr by the

United States. 7

 Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, 12 Jul 50.

8

 Rad, State Dept Msg41, U.S. Ambassador, Taegu,

to Secy State, 14 Jul 50, 17 Jul 50, containing text

of Ltr, Rhee to MacArthur.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 103

This proposal focused the attention of

the Joint Chiefs on the need for a definite arrangement on how and when

reports should be made to the United

Nations. Late in July they directed General MacArthur to send them a report on

the actions of his forces every two weeks.

The Joint Chiefs would, in turn, submit

the report through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State for

presentation to the Security Council of

the United Nations by the American

delegation at Lake Success, New York.

General MacArthur was assured that he

would be consulted in advance if political

considerations made it necessary at any

time for the Joint Chiefs to alter his

reports.9

On 24 July 1950 General MacArthur

issued orders establishing the United

Nations Command (UNC) with general

headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. With

few exceptions, staff members of the Far

East Command were assigned comparable

duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the

GHQ, United Nations Command, was

the GHQ, Far East Command, with an

expanded mission.10

At the central core of American direction of the operations in Korea on behalf

of the United Nations lay the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. As advisers to the President, the Joint Chiefs concerned themselves with every aspect of American

military power and policy. They had to

deal simultaneously with problems at

home and abroad, in western Europe and

in Korea.

They did not make the national military policy. Yet because they furnished

the President, normally through the Secretary of Defense, information and advice

to help him set this policy, what they did

and what they thought held great importance for the nation and for the Korean War. By the very nature of their

work, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to

consider political factors in deliberating

national military problems. So closely

intertwined were military and political

factors in the Korean War that they could

not be isolated one from the other.

The mechanical process by which military policy recommendations evolved

during the Korean War began with consideration of a particular problem within

the military staffs, usually the Army staff,

and within the joint staff of the JCS

itself. The joint staff consisted of about

two hundred officers selected from all the

services. These officers developed and

furnished recommended positions to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once a final stand on a problem had

been discussed and agreed upon by them,

the JCS presented their views in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Any

political aspects of the matter would be

worked out at this level between the

staffs of the Defense and State Departments or, on occasion, between the respective secretaries personally. The

9

 (1) JCS 1776/39, Note by Secys, Rpts by U.S.

Government to UNSC, 18 Jul 50. (2) MacArthur

Hearings, Part II, p. 1515. (3) Rad, JCS 84885, JCS

to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. (4) JCS 1775/62, Note by

Secys, Rpts by U.S. Government to UNSC, 28 Jul 50. 10

 (1) GO 1, UNC, 24 Jul 50. (2) The United

Nations, at no time in the Korean War, sought to

interfere in the control of operations which were

the responsibility of the United States. General

MacArthur later testified to this when he told a

Senate investigating committee, ". . . my connection

with the United Nations was largely nominal . . .

everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff.

. . . The controls over me were exactly the same as

though the forces under me were all Americans.

All of my communications were to the American

high command here." See MacArthur Hearings,

p. 10.
104 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Secretary of Defense then presented the

views and recommendations thus developed, with a clear statement of any divergencies, to the National Security Council

or, if more appropriate, directly to the

President. On occasion, the procedure

varied but, normally, if there were time

things were done in this fashion.

The issues raised by Korea could not

be separated from those involved in planning for American defense on a worldwide scale. The withdrawal of men and

units from the General Reserve for employment in Korea was incompatible

with existing plans. If the Korean outbreak marked the initial stages of an allout war, it was unsound to tie up large

forces in an area of limited strategic significance. But the United States was

committed, short of global war, to repelling armed aggression in South Korea.

Speculating on 13 July that developments in Korea were part of a general

USSR plan which might involve correlated actions in other parts of the world,

the JCS planning staff said:

It is now apparent from Korea that Russia

is embarking upon an entirely new phase

in her program of world-wide Communist

domination. This is a phase in which she

is now utilizing for the first time the armed

forces of her satellites to impose by military strength a Communist-dominated government upon a weak neighboring state

considered incapable of successful military

opposition.11

A reappraisal of United States objectives and resources thus became necessary. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff

constantly faced the major question,

"How much of our military strength can

we commit to Korea without seriously

damaging our ability to meet a global

emergency?" A correct solution to this

problem would enable them to determine, for instance, if partial mobilization

was needed. A second question was, "If

we limit our commitments to Korea

because of the greater global threat, can

we drive the North Koreans behind the

38th Parallel?"12

Enemy victories in Korea forced the

Joint Chiefs to take action without awaiting answers to the vital questions.

Courses of action had to be considered

individually as they arose. Decisions on

them were greatly influenced by General

MacArthur's recommendations, but as

each new move weakened the potential

means, without lessening the mission, it

brought the need for answers to these

questions into urgent focus.

By mid-July so much American military strength had been drawn into the

Korean War that American military capabilities for action elsewhere had been

much reduced. Reserves of trained men

and matériel diminished as MacArthur's

units were brought up to war strength

and given service support and replacement. A further drain upon reserves of

critical specialists and equipment would

result as operations progressed.13 A key

Army officer commented at this time,

"Our ground force potential is so seriously depleted that further significant

commitments of even a division or more

11

 JSPC 853/15, 13 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091

Korea, sec. I-C, Case 16.

12

 JSPC 853/7/D, 5 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091

Korea. 13

 Study, JCS 1924/20, 14 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 
A NEW CONFIDENCE 105

in size would vitally weaken our national

security at home."

 14

The possibility that U.S. troops might

be thrown out of Korea was far from

academic. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

pointed out on 12 July that the understrength U.S. 24th Division was facing

9 North Korean divisions numbering

80,000 men and equipped with a total of

from 100 to 150 modern tanks. The

enemy not only had a great advantage

in numbers of men and in tanks and

artillery, but was also well trained, and

was fighting determinedly and with great

skill. The JIC concluded that the North

Korean Army was capable of threatening

the security of Pusan within two weeks.

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Administration, had

sketched the same depressing picture for

the secretaries of the armed services on

10 July. He told these men that, while

MacArthur's forces had definitely slowed

the enemy, they could not hold unless

they were substantially reinforced.15

Forced withdrawal of U.S. troops from

Korea would be a political as well as a

military calamity. It could weaken

American alliances and build up communist political influence. It could discredit U.S. foreign policy and undermine

confidence in American military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawal could

be more damaging than a failure to

have sent troops to Korea in the first

place. American commitments would be

marked as unreliable by other nations

and considerable doubt would be cast on

American ability to back up commitments in the future. The United Nations

actions resulted mainly from U.S. initiative, and withdrawal from intervention

on behalf of the United Nations could

greatly weaken American leadership

within the United Nations.

Failure in Korea could force the

United States to revise drastically its

policy of general containment of communism by reducing or limiting its commitments and by planning to combat

communist expansion only at selected

points. The United States would undoubtedly have to start partial military

and industrial mobilization to ready its

forces for other, almost certain, aggressions; or, in another approach, to begin

full mobilization so as to be prepared to

threaten full-scale war in case of further

Soviet aggression.16

First Visit From Washington

President Truman sent two members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins and General Vandenberg, to the Far

East on 10 July 1950. They were to

bring back firsthand information to use

in establishing the scope of expansion of

the U.S. military program. Immediately

upon reaching Tokyo on 13 July 1950,

Collins and Vandenberg talked with

General MacArthur and key members of

his staff. General MacArthur impressed

upon them the dangers of underestimating the North Koreans. He described

14

 Quotation from Brig Gen Cortlandt Schuyler,

Memo for Gen Lindsay, Adm Ingersoll, and Maj Gen

Oliver P. Smith, 14 Jul 50, sub: Estimate of the

Korean Sit, JSPC 853/11, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea. 15

 JCS 1924/19, Decision on Estimate by JIC, 12

Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 46. The

JIC "Estimate of the Situation" included in JCS

1924/19 was not approved but merely noted by the

JCS.

16

 JCS 1924/19, Annex D, 10 Jul 50, in G-3, DA

file 091 Korea.
106 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the enemy soldier as a tough, well-led

fighter who combined the infiltration tactics of the Japanese with the armored

tactics of the Russians in World War II.

General MacArthur praised the North

Korean Army's, ability to march, maneuver, and attack at night. So far, his

own forces had not been able to do the

equivalent successfully. The North Korean Army exploited its tank firepower

to the greatest advantage. Its armored

tactics were extremely efficient and approximated, in his words, "the norm of

tank effectiveness standard in the Soviet

Army." The flexibility of the North

Korean commanders had been very apparent in their quick adoption of night

operations as a countermeasure against

intensified air attacks by American

forces.17

General MacArthur confessed that the

only hope he had seen a week earlier had

been "a desperate rearguard action," to

slow the North Korean Army by "throwing everything in Japan into the fight."

He had done this as fast as he could

although his own forces were, as he

phrased it, "tailored for occupation duty

and not for combat."

 18

By now he had taken a brighter view.

He told Generals Collins and Vandenberg that, while he could not predict

where the military situation would be

stabilized, "that it will be stabilized is indisputable." Originally, he had planned

to stand near Suwon and then to envelop

the north bank of the Han River. After

recapturing Seoul, he would have cut the

enemy's line of communications and his

withdrawal route. He conceded that his

forces were now too far south and too

weak to carry out this plan. He had,

therefore, postponed its execution until

the situation could be stabilized and reinforcements reached him. He placed

no blame on General Dean or his men.

General Dean had done as well as any

man could. The troops had done everything possible, but they were outgunned,

outnumbered, and without adequate defense against the enemy's armor.19

General MacArthur then outlined his

recommendations for winning the fight

in Korea. In his opinion, the success of

the United States in Korea and the speed

of achievement of that success would be

in direct proportion to the speed with

which the United States sent him reinforcements. All American forces he

could spare from Japan would have been

sent to Korea by August. If the United

States backed this commitment with sufficient reinforcements from the zone of

the interior, there would be, in MacArthur's mind, no question as to the result. Without full support, the result

would vary in direct proportion to the

support received. MacArthur contended

that if he were giving advice he would

say, "In this matter, time is of the essence."

 20

He expressed extreme impatience with

delay or partial measures. The strength

of any military stroke depended entirely

upon its speed. Accordingly, General

MacArthur wanted to "grab every ship

in the Pacific and pour the support into

the Far East." He would not start modestly and build up, but would make the

17

 Memo, Lt Col D. D. Dickson for Gen Bolté, sub:

Rpt of Trip to FEC, 10-15 Jul 50, Tab A: Remarks

of Gen MacArthur, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, sec. I,

Case 3. Quotations are taken from the notes kept

by Col Dickson. 18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20

 Ibid.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 107

complete effort at the beginning. In emphasizing these points, the veteran commander said, "Business as usual—to hell

with that concept." Admittedly the

United States was "playing a poor hand

here," but long experience had shown

General MacArthur that "it is how you

play your poor hands rather than your

good ones which counts in the long

run."

 21

The question of how much American

strength should be saved for areas in

other parts of the world obviously interested General MacArthur less than the

Joint Chiefs. He believed that winning

in Korea would slow down worldwide

communism more than any other single

factor. He assured his visitors that he

fully understood the American obligation to maintain its global military posture. But he made a colorful analogy to

point out the error of withholding

strength from the Korean battlefront.

Assuming the world to be a metropolis

of four districts of which District No. 1

was the most important and District

No. 4 least so, General MacArthur asked

his visitors to consider whether a fire in

No. 4 should be allowed to burn uncontrolled because city officials were saving

their fire equipment for District No. 1.

As he concluded, "You may," he said,

"find the fire out of control by the time

your equipment is sent to No. 4." A

general conflagration should not be handled by attempting to place Korea or the

FEC in terms of priority of area. General MacArthur felt that the United

States would win in Korea or lose everywhere.22

General Collins particularly wanted

answers to several specific questions

which could help solve the major questions facing the Joint Chiefs. He asked

General MacArthur when he would be

able to mount a counteroffensive and

how many American troops he would

need in Korea after the fighting ended.

Both questions were keyed to the thorny

issue of how much the United States

should expand its military program.

General MacArthur insisted that a

categorical reply to the first question was

impossible. When three divisions had

been committed to Korea, he hoped to

stabilize the situation. He intended then

to infiltrate north and follow any North

Korean withdrawal. He was centering

his hopes on an amphibious operation.

The overland pursuit of North Korean

forces was incidental to this operation.

As to the second question, General

MacArthur told General Collins that he

would not merely drive the invaders

across the 38th Parallel. He meant to

destroy all their forces and, if necessary,

to occupy all of North Korea. "In the

aftermath of operations," he said, "the

problem is to compose and unite Korea."

His troop requirement in the Far East

Command under this situation would be

eight infantry divisions and an additional

Army headquarters.

Not only General MacArthur but also

two of his key officers took advantage of

General Collins' presence to press for additional forces. General Walker, commander in Korea, and General Almond,

chief of staff, FEC GHQ, each emphasized the need for eleven more infantry

battalions and 3,600 fillers to be sent by

air. The fillers were needed to build up

the 7th Division, which General Walker

described as "only a crust." General

21

 Ibid. 22

 Ibid.
108 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Collins made no on-the-spot commitment

since arrangements to meet these requirements were already under way.

From the Tokyo conference, General

Collins and General Vandenberg flew to

Korea. Collins talked briefly at Taegu

with Walker, Dean, and members of the

Eighth Army staff. Agreeing with General MacArthur's analysis of the combat

scene, Walker told Collins that, barring

unforeseen circumstances, he could hold

an extensive bridgehead with the troops

en route to Korea from Japan. The

commander of the battered 24th Division, General Dean, was very worried

over his losses. On the day of General

Collins' visit, the total of missing soldiers

from Dean's 24th Division had risen

from 200 to well over 800.23

General Collins returned to Tokyo

early on 14 July, leaving for Washington

the same day. Before leaving, the Army

Chief of Staff gave General MacArthur

his personal ideas on which major units

he could count on having for the offensive which he had in mind. In addition

to the four divisions already in the Far

East, these units were the 2d Division,

the 1st Marine Division, the 4th RCT,

the 29th RCT, and an RCT from the

11th Airborne Division.

General MacArthur, after getting Collins' views, told the Chief of Staff that he

would make his plans on the basis of the

anticipated strength of these units. If

Russia or Communist China intervened

in force, the plans would have to be

changed. He assured Collins that he

fully understood the problems faced in

Washington and the necessity of maintaining some kind of General Reserve.24

Air Operations—July 1950

While possible steps to improve MacArthur's ground strength were being considered, moves to improve air operations

in Korea were under way. Since there

was no provision in the FEC GHQ staff

organization for joint representation of

the Navy and Air Force, the central command of air operations over Korea was

not possible below the level of General

MacArthur himself. Anomalous and inefficient operations sometimes resulted.

In early July, as an example, the Navy

sent planes from Task Force 77 against

targets that FEAF planned to attack the

following day. As a consequence, the

Air Force medium bombers sat on the

ground the next day since it was too late

to set up other targets.25

Someone obviously had to take over

the responsibility, and General Stratemeyer made the first bid for over-all control of air operations in Korea. On

8 July, he told General MacArthur:

It is my understanding that the Navy contemplates bringing into your theater some

land-based aircraft; also, as you know, the

Seventh Fleet contemplates another strike

with air at your direction in North Korea. I request that all land-based naval aviation

and carrier-based aviation when operating

over North Korea or from Japan, except

those units for anti-submarine operations,

be placed under my operational control.26

23

 Rad, C 57814, Collins to Haislip, 14 Jul 50. 24

 Ibid.

25

 For detailed coverage of air and naval operations in Korea, see: Robert Frank Futrell, The

United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New

York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1961); James A. Field,

Jr., History of United States Naval Operations,

Korea (Washington, 1962); and Commander Malcolm C. Cagle and Commander Frank A. Manson,

The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U.S.. Naval Institute, 1957). 26

 Memo, Stratemeyer for MacArthur, 8 Jul 50.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 109

GENERAL STRATEMEYER (Photograph

taken in 1944.)

When the Navy objected to Stratemeyer's

acquiring control of naval aircraft for

operations in Korea, General Almond,

the chief of staff, worked out a compromise in a directive issued in MacArthur's

name on 8 July whereby Stratemeyer

would control all aircraft "operating in

the execution of the Far East Air Force

mission as assigned by CINCFE." However, when engaged in naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and

support of naval tasks such as amphibious

assault, naval aircraft were to remain under the operational control of COM

NAVFE.27

U.S. and ROK ground troops needed

every bit of close support that could be

given them in the first weeks of the Korean fighting. Artillery was at a premium. There were not enough batteries,

nor was there enough ammunition. In

view of shortages of infantry units and

their organic support weapons, the Air

Force had to undertake a larger than

normal role in ground force support.

Unfortunately, the Far East Air Force

had an insufficient number of planes of

the most desirable types for supporting

ground troops in close contact with the

enemy. Lacking, too, were men and facilities for air-ground control and coordination.

Drastic measures were taken. Aircraft

normally employed in interdiction missions behind enemy lines assumed ground

support missions. The use of B-29

bombers as close-support weapons, to the

necessary neglect of other functions behind enemy lines, prompted criticism

and serious objections by Air Force officials in the Far East. But General MacArthur overrode them on the basis that,

if the ground troops were overrun, interdiction of targets deep behind enemy

lines would have no significance. He

ordered Stratemeyer to send his B-29's

"to strafe, if necessary" in order to stop

the North Korean drive.

Within several weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Air Force

established the FEAF Bomber Command

as a subordinate element of FEAF. The

bomber command consisted of several

bombardment groups comprised of medium bombers (B-29's), the aircraft

which had been so successful in World

War II in the strategic bombing of Japan.

In the Air Force concept, this type of

bomber should have been employed

against strategic targets beyond the area

27

 CINCFE Ltr, 8 Jul 50, sub: Co-ordination of

Air Effort of FEAF and U.S. NAVFE.
110 POLICY AND DIRECTION

of ground fighting including such installations as factories, rail yards, warehouses,

and other vital points on enemy lines of

communication. Nevertheless, because

of immediate needs and the lack of other

proper aircraft, General MacArthur decided that these medium bombers would

operate in support of ground troops

wherever necessary. General Stratemeyer

had ordered the medium bombers to operate only north of the 38th Parallel.

MacArthur overruled him on several occasions in mid-July and ordered the

mediums sent against enemy troop concentrations and other tactical targets immediately in front of the Eighth Army

lines. MacArthur, on 15 July, also told

General Walker that future emergency

use of these medium bombers would be

ordered by GHQ whenever Walker felt

it necessary.28

When General Vandenberg and General Collins came to the theater in

mid-July, this aspect of the air-ground

relationship concerned both of them.

Vandenberg did not attempt to interfere

since, if Eighth Army troops were driven

off the peninsula and the Air Force was

meanwhile employing its bombers to

bomb remote industrial areas in North

Korea, the resultant effect on public

opinion would have been most unfavorable. General Collins, on the other

hand, expressed great interest in the way

the B-29's were being employed and

asked to be kept informed.

To tighten his control of the air effort

in Korea, General MacArthur on 14 July

established a GHQ Target Group, composed of a chairman, a senior Army officer from Willoughby's G-2 section, and

Air Force, Navy, and Army members.

This group was to advise on the use of

Navy and air offensive power "in conformance with the day-to-day situation."

The group would recommend targets

and priorities which the Air Force and

Navy would bomb. The decisions of the

target group were passed to the G-3, who

passed on the orders to FEAF. Few of

the members appointed to the group

were experienced pilots and their method

of operation consisted of studying maps

of Korea, selecting likely targets from

these maps, and directing that they be

bombed. It was an unwieldy and impracticable method.29

According to Air Force officials, this

abnormal arrangement was not only unproductive but wasteful. Since the target group performed its function using a

standard Army Map Service 1:250,000

map to select targets for medium bombers without checking its information from

other sources, an unusual situation developed. Of 220 targets selected by the

group between 17 July and 2 August,

20 percent did not exist on the ground.

The FEAF commander called on General MacArthur and the latter's chief of

staff, General Almond, on 19 July to complain of this procedure. Stratemeyer followed this visit with a memorandum on

21 July in which he recommended the

creation of a target selection committee

which would include General Hickey,

the FEC GHQ deputy chief of staff, General Willoughby, the G-2, Lt. Gen. Otto

P. Weyland, the vice commander for

operations of FEAF, and a Navy repre28

 (1) Rad, CX 57893, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 15

Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX57755, CINCFE to CG FEAF,

13 Jul 50.

29

 (1) Check Sheet, Almond to All Staff Secs, GHQ

FEC, 14 Jul 50. (2) Interv, Maj Schnabel with

Comdr Reilly, JSPOG, GHQ, Nov 51.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 111

REFUGEES FLEEING FROM THE COMBAT AREA NEAR TAEGU

sentative to be named by Vice Adm.

C. Turner Joy. MacArthur approved

this recommendation immediately, and

FEAF, using the new method, took over

the actual selection of targets for interdiction.30

The Withdrawal Continues

Meanwhile, the North Korean Army

drove hard, aiming to destroy the Republic of Korea and to throw the 24th

Division out of Korea before ground reinforcements arrived. At the Kum River

line the enemy units again outflanked

the 24th Division. The 19th Infantry

and its attached artillery lost nearly onefifth of their men and officers while vainly

trying to keep the superior enemy force

from crossing the Kum on 16 and 17

July. Having breached American defenses on the last natural barrier before

the key railroad center of Taejon, the

enemy slashed southward, intent on taking Taejon with a further view, apparently, of capturing the new South Korean

capital of Taegu.

General MacArthur's chief of staff,

General Almond, contended in a letter

30

 USAF Hist Div, Dept of the Air Force, United

States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict,

25 June-1 November 1950, 1 July 1952, p. 13.
112 POLICY AND DIRECTION

to General Collins on 17 July that the

North Koreans hoped to capture Taegu

mainly for the psychological effect. The

enemy commanders, having outflanked

the Americans, were attacking as well

down the central corridor along the axis

Ch'ungju-Taegu, and were pushing back

the South Koreans. Almond assumed

Collins that General MacArthur was

aware of this "vital threat" down the

middle. Referring to the plans for the

future which General MacArthur had

sketched to him three days before, Almond reported:

Our proposed projects are developing as

planned and we are confident that while the

enemy stubbornly persists in his efforts to

drive us back, we have blunted his principal

strikes, and he is bound to be getting more

exhausted while we become stronger each

day and better organized to stop him. . . .

We have no fear of the outcome and thoroughly understand that current conditions

are the growing pains precedent to future

operations.

General Almond did not believe that

Taejon could be held but was not unduly

alarmed. "It may not last there," he

told Collins, "but the trend is much

better."31

The 25th Division, although its first

elements had reached Korea on 9 July,

had not yet met the enemy. Nor had the

1st Cavalry Division, en route to Korea

while Almond was addressing Collins.

The 24th Division, weakened and disorganized, fell back upon Taejon alone,

the enemy hard on its heels.

When President Truman, on 19 July,

asked General MacArthur for his estimate of the Korean situation, he received

a reply that revealed a new confidence,

quite a contrast with the glum prognoses

issued earlier in the month. The North

Koreans, MacArthur told the President,

had lost their great chance for victory.

The extraordinary speed with which

Eighth Army had been deployed from

Japan and the brilliant co-ordinated support by air and naval elements had forced

the enemy into "continued deployments,

costly frontal attacks and confused logistics. ... I do not believe that history

records a comparable operation." His

forces still faced a difficult campaign.

They would be hard pressed and could

expect losses as well as successes. But

the initiative no longer lay entirely with

the North Koreans, and United Nations

troops held Southern Korea securely.

Apparently heartened by the recent

promises of reinforcements which would

increase his own strength as attrition cut

the enemy's strength, General MacArthur

assured President Truman, "We are now

in Korea in force, and with God's help

we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully

restored."

 32

The 24th Division lost Taejon on 20

July in a hard-fought 2-day battle. The

division commander, General Dean, was

captured after becoming separated from

his troops during the withdrawal from

Taejon. Division casualties approached

30 percent. On 22 July the 1st Cavalry

Division relieved the 24th at Yongdong.

In a 17-day losing battle against two superior North Korean divisions, the 24th

had fallen back almost 100 miles, and had

lost more than 2,400 men missing in ac31

 Ltr, Almond to Collins, 17 Jul 50.

32

 (1) Rad, WH 498, Truman (Personal) to MacArthur, 19 Jul 50. (2) Rad, C 58248, MacArthur

(Personal) to Truman, 19 Jul 50.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 113

GENERAL DEAN, soon to be captured, conferring with General Walker, 8 July 1950.

tion and enough matériel to equip a full

division.33

Two days later General MacArthur reaffirmed his confidence that he could

hold the invading communist armies.

Called to a teleconference by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 24 July and questioned

on an enemy move around the left end

of his line which resembled the start of

a double envelopment, General MacArthur admitted that he lacked the strength

to prevent it, but saw it as no serious

threat. So long as the North Koreans

outnumbered the South Koreans and

Americans at a particular location they

would always be able to mount enveloping attacks. But their main effort continued to be in the center of the line,

and the basic question was whether they

had sufficient strength to force withdrawals there. If his own forces could

hold the center, General MacArthur

would have no special worry about the

incipient envelopment. "If our center

is unable to hold," he said, "our perimeter will have to be contracted." Referring to his recent statements to

President Truman which had predicted

losses as well as successes, General MacArthur pointed out that the situation was

developing in accordance with that estimate.34

General MacArthur's piecemeal commitment in early July 1950 of inadequate

American forces weak in firepower, mobility, and reserves against a disciplined,

determined, and numerically superior

enemy constituted a basic violation of

U.S. military doctrine. The violation

could not be avoided and the consequences had to be accepted. Had General MacArthur waited until his ground

units were completely combat-ready before sending them against the North

Koreans, the entire peninsula would

probably have fallen to the communists.

But his mission was to assist the Republic

of Korea and to prevent it from falling

into enemy hands. He parceled out his

available means deliberately and in full

knowledge of the risk. At the end of

July the situation of American forces in

Korea remained precarious. By breaking off with the enemy and retreating

swiftly, the battered ground units could

have evacuated from Pusan with a good

deal of their equipment. Once back in

Japan, reconstituted and resupplied,

these forces could have joined other units

33

 For the full story of the 24th Division's valiant

fight on the Kum River line and at Taejon, see

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu, Chapters X and XI, pages 121-81. 34

 Telecon, TT 3573, Gens Bradley, Collins, Norstad, and Adm Sherman in Washington with Gen

MacArthur in Tokyo, 24 Jul 50, in G-3, DA files.
114 POLICY AND DIRECTION

in a later concerted amphibious assault

on Korea at a place of the American commander's choosing. But never did General MacArthur seriously consider a

course other than a fighting withdrawal

to a beachhead perimeter around Pusan,

with his men delaying the enemy to the

limit of their abilities until reinforcement arrived. Costly though it proved,

this course avoided the loss of prestige

and political ill effects of voluntary evacuation, at the same time providing a

build-up area on the peninsula for later

exploitation.35

The extraordinary efforts in Washington and Tokyo during July succeeded in

strengthening the unified command in

Korea and staving off its complete collapse. The full effects of these efforts,

because of distances involved, did not become apparent in Korea until July was

nearly over. But with the arrival of new

men and new equipment, late in the

month, backed by the assured arrival of

even greater combat strength in the near

future, the odds in favor of ultimate

North Korean victory dropped sharply.

35

 The North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung, later

remarked on this American tactic as if it were unfair. He said also, in a last appeal to his faltering

forces in October 1950, "The first error we committed was, instead of making a complete siege and

annihilating the enemy, we gave them enough time

to regroup and increase their strength while retreating." See Order from Supreme Commander, NKA,

to All Forces, 15 Oct 50, in ATIS Enemy Docs.,

Korean Opns, Issue 19, 30 Jan 51, Item 1.
CHAPTER VII

Bolstering the Forces

Shaping the Unified Command

Even before the U.N. Security Council

passed its resolution on 7 July, some nations had offered military assistance to

the United States for use in Korea. The

first offer came from the United Kingdom on 28 June 1950, when the British

Government announced that it was placing elements of the Fleet at the disposal

of U.S. authorities for support of South

Korea. The United States accepted the

British naval force without hesitation

and asked that it report to Vice Admiral

Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East.1

Almost at the same time, but through

diplomatic channels, Australia, Canada,

and New Zealand offered naval forces

and combat aircraft. The Secretary of

State passed these offers to the Secretary

of Defense, who called on the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly

agreed that these forces should be accepted and the Secretary of State took the

necessary steps.2

These preliminary offers were encouraging proof of allied support, and on

29 June President Truman told the National Security Council that he wanted to

see as many members of the United Nations as possible take part in the Korea

action. The Secretary of Defense showed

greater reserve, feeling that military

necessity might weigh more heavily than

political considerations in the decisions

to accept or turn down forces offered by

member nations. Although Secretary

Johnson told the Joint Chiefs that they

should lean toward accepting forces offered, he qualified this statement by adding, "to the maximum extent practicable

from the military point of view."

 3

Since at this early date only vague outlines of the unified command had appeared, forces were being offered to and

accepted by the United States, not the

United Nations. Meanwhile, the machinery for processing offers of assistance,

in the very likely event a unified command was established, came under study

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were

convinced that military effectiveness, not 1

 (1) Department of State, United States Policy in

the Korean Crisis, Dept of State Publication No.

3922 (Washington, 1950), pp. 56-57. (2) Memo, JCS

for Chairman, British Joint Services Mission, 30

Jun 50. 2

 (1) MFR, Gen J. H. Burns, OSD, 29 Jun 50, sub:

Telephone Msg From Mr. Satterthwait of State Dept

to Gen Burns. (2) Memo, Secy Defense for JCS, 29

Jun 50. (3) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 30 Jun 50,

sub: Proffer of Aid by Foreign Govts. 3

 (1) Truman, Memoirs, II, 342. (2) Memo, Secy

Defense for JCS, 29 Jun 50.
116 POLICY AND DIRECTION

political necessity, should be the main

consideration in accepting forces for Korea, and thus sought a controlling voice

in passing on military contributions to

the unified command. They told the

Secretary of State, through the Secretary

of Defense, on 30 June, that if, as appeared probable, Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek offered troops from Formosa for

service in Korea, he should be turned

down. To make sure that such an offer

was not accepted by the field commander

unilaterally, they cautioned General MacArthur to refer any Chinese Nationalist

offer to the Department of State, saying,

". . . the decision whether to accept or

reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be

made at the highest levels in Washington." This veiled warning reflected the

resolve shared by the Joint Chiefs that

the field commander should not deal

directly with other nations in any way.4

The Nationalist Chinese Government,

through its Washington ambassador, had,

in fact, already offered to furnish to the

U.N. unified command 33,000 soldiers.

President Truman was, at first, inclined

to accept this offer, but was dissuaded in

a meeting with his Defense and State

advisers. Secretary Acheson warned of

the danger of bringing Communist China

into the war if Nationalist Chinese troops

entered Korea. On the military side,

the JCS deplored the low state of training and lack of equipment of Chiang

Kai-shek's men, and pointed out that

moving them from Formosa would tie up

ships and planes which could be better

used elsewhere. He remained concerned

over the ability of the small available

United States forces to stand off the

enemy. After further discussion, however, the President accepted the position

of the majority that the Chinese offer

should be politely declined.5

Secretary Johnson, on 1 July, asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff how he should

approach the general problem of military assistance from other nations for the

Korean fighting. He wanted to know if

the United States should actively solicit

other nations for troops and, if so, what

kind of troops should be sought. The

passing of the United Nations Security

Council resolution of 7 July made definite standards for accepting or turning

down forces mandatory. Johnson received no answer until 14 July, when the

Joint Chiefs told him that a number of

unknown factors, including combat efficiency and logistics, made a blanket answer impractical. Because of these very

factors they urged that, in every case in

which a nation volunteered forces, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff be consulted.6

They saw that some nations which

might offer military forces to the unified

command might not have the resources

to provide effective fighting forces. To

accept forces so poorly trained, equipped,

and prepared as to be a military liability

in Korea would be unwise. Indiscriminate acceptance of troops, without regard

to actual combat needs in Korea, could

create an unbalanced military team. The

Secretary of Defense assured the Joint

4

 (1) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 30 Jun 50, sub:

Proffer of Aid by Foreign Govts. (2) Rad, JCS 84737,

JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.

5

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 342-43 and 348. 6

 (1) Memo, Secy Defense for JCS, 1 Jul 50. (2)

Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 14 Jul 50, sub: U.S.

Courses of Action in Korea.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 117

Chiefs of Staff that he would seek their

comments on any force offered for Korea.7

As they moved to set up military control over the procedure for accepting

forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned MacArthur in mid-July on his

standards for foreign units to be integrated into the United Nations Command. By this time, when it appeared

that the U.S. reserve of trained ground

forces would be strained to its limit, the

Joint Chiefs felt that some other nations

should be asked to send ground forces to

Korea. He recommended, in an immediate reply, that foreign units should be

sent at no less than reinforced battalion

strength of about 1,000 men, mainly infantry, but having organic artillery support. He would attach these battalions

to his American divisions. If service

units were furnished, they should be

large enough to be usable at once.8

The normal channel through which

member nations of the United Nations

offered military forces and other forms

of assistance to the unified command ran

from the Department of State to the Department of Defense to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. A nation offering assistance

usually approached the Department of

State with its proposal, but made no final

offer until after preliminary informal

talks. During exploratory conversations

the Department of State consulted the

Secretary of Defense who, in turn, sought

the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The latter officials weighed the offer

against needs in the field and the probable effectiveness of the forces offered,

keeping in mind General MacArthur's

criteria. Their recommendations bore

great weight. If they were favorable, the

nation then made a firm offer which was

accepted.

Offers of ground combat forces came

slowly at first, but gradually increased.

By 23 August, the United States had accepted forces offered by seven nations,

totaling almost 25,000 ground combat

troops. Troops of four more nations had

been accepted by 5 September.9 But

most of these troops were a long way

from Korea and many would not arrive

for months.

Rebuilding the U.S. Army

Rushing thousands of men and officers

to the Far East left great gaps in the defenses of the continental United States

and completely vitiated, for the moment,

American plans for emergency operations

in western Europe and other areas vital

to the free world. Yet nothing substantive had been done to repair the damage.

Nor did the Army's top planners have

7

 (1) JCS 1776/23, Rpt by JSSC, 8 Jul 50, title:

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3, DA files.

(2) Memo, Adm Davis, Dir, Joint Staff, for Secy

Defense, 14 Jul 50, sub: JCS Views on Proposed

State Dept Request for Assistance in Korea From

Certain U.N. Nations. (3) Memo, Secy Defense for

JCS, 21 Jul 50. (4) JCS History, The Korean Conflict, ch. III, p. 14. 8

 (1) Rad, JCS 85971, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul 50.

(2) Rad, C 57957, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jul 50.

9

 (1) Memo, Col Williams, International Br, G-3,

DA, for Gen Schuyler, sub: Status of U.N. Aid as

of 23 August, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 77.

(2) Rad, number unknown, DA to CINCFE, 5 Sep

50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 59/16. (3) For

a detailed, comprehensive account of forces contributed to the U.S. command for the Korean fighting, their operations, and problems arising from

their employment, see the following monographs:

Maj. William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations, Military Hist Sec, FEC, 15

Aug 52; and Maj. Sam Gaziano, Problems in Utilization of United Nations Forces, Military Hist Sec,

UNC, 10 Dec 53. Both in OCMH.
118 POLICY AND DIRECTION

any basis for planning to reconstitute the

reserve forces.

At a meeting on 12 July 1950 with

Secretary of the Army Pace, ranking officers of the Army General Staff complained that they were working in the

dark. Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, told the Secretary that he had already scraped the

bottom of the barrel to find men for MacArthur. He had stripped the United

States of trained specialists. But until

someone told him just how much the

Army was going to expand in the face of

the obvious threat to American security,

he had no way of knowing how many

new specialists he should train. General

Bolté, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-3, backed Brooks, charging that, without a clear goal, he too was being forced

to operate on a "piecemeal basis." The

Army's supply chief, Lt. Gen. Thomas

B. Larkin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,

told the same story. "Hand-to-mouth"

described his supply program, he said,

until he knew how many troops were going to Korea and how many would be

mobilized to replace them.10

Siding completely with the Army General Staff, General Clark, Chief, Army

Field Forces, told Secretary Pace that

definite planning goals must be established for all aspects of the Army's expansion as soon as possible. Pace assured

these officers that he would press for definite guidance from above. "It is urgently

necessary that a decision be taken as soon

as possible as to the forces to be mobilized, because upon this is predicated the

vital and related problems of procurement, training capacity, and the degree

of required industrial mobilization," he

said.11

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by

their special planning groups, were of

course involved in comprehensive study

of these very problems. They were, in

certain respects, dependent on the individual services for recommendations and,

in this case, required definite proposals

from the Army as to the optimum degree

of Army expansion.

The General Reserve

T he approximate strength or the General Reserve on 25 June 1950 stood at

140,000. One month later only about

90,000 men and officers remained. Of

this number, 15,000 were employed in

essential operations at posts, camps, and

stations in the United States. Not only

had the General Reserve lost 50 percent

of its units, but also levies for replacements and specialists had reduced most

remaining units to cadre strength. Only

the 82d Airborne Division, the 3d Cavalry, and certain antiaircraft artillery

units retained immediate combat potential. Yet General MacArthur's calls on

the General Reserve continued unabated.

His requirements exceeded the 50,000

men already sent and he had asked for

32,000 more by 25 July. The strength

levels of the Reserve kept dropping

steadily. By 6 August the total infantry

strength in the Reserve had fallen to

40,000.12

10

 Min, 20th mtg, Army Policy Council, 12 Jul 50,

in G-3, DA file 334 APC, set. 1.

11

 Ibid. 12

 (1) Memo, CofS USA, for ACofS G-3, DA, 26

Jul 50, sub: Depletion of Army's General Reserve

by Requirements for Korea, in G-3, DA file 320.2,

sec. I, Case 14/3. (2) Memo, Gen Bolté for Brig

Gen David A. Ogden, Chief, Org and Trng Div,

G-3, DA, 16 Aug 50, sub: Status of Major Combat

Units—Continental U.S., 6 Aug 50, in G-3, DA files.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 119

Throughout July, Department of Defense officials were aware of the situation,

and national leaders had assumed, before

Korea, that mobilization, if required,

would be all-out mobilization of national

military resources. The action in Korea

fell far short of global war, but proved

big enough to involve the greater portion

of the nation's active ground forces by

the end of the first month of fighting.

With American Reserve military strength

so weakened, some degree of mobilization became mandatory. The nation's

military leaders had to decide the degree

of mobilization required and also the

best method of recruiting additional effective forces swiftly with the least damage to the nation's morale and economy.

The solution had to be reached under

pressure and in haste.13

Authorized Strength

The actual strength of the United

States Army had been somewhat less than

its authorized strength when the Korean

War began. But even had the Army's

vacant ranks been filled, it would have

been too small to fight the North Koreans

and at the same time meet American

commitments elsewhere. The first step

in expanding the Army to take care of

the immediate task in Korea without

sacrificing its primary mission was to

raise the Army's authorized strength.

Those directly concerned saw clearly that

the void created in the General Reserve

should, in the interest of the nation's

safety, be filled as soon as possible. When

they selected the 2d Division, the airborne RCT, and the three medium tank

battalions from the Reserve in early July,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff told their superiors that these units would have to be

replaced. Both President Truman and

the Secretary of Defense agreed and on

6 July approved an increase of 50,000.

From this first increment, which raised

the authorized strength of the Army to

680,000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set aside

enough men for two antiaircraft battalions for the General Reserve. They

planned to use the rest, when available,

as individual replacements for General

MacArthur's forces.14

When the President raised the Army's

authorized strength to 740,500 a few days

later, the Joint Chiefs decided to use part

of these 60,500 new spaces to bring units

going to the FEC to war strength, to

furnish more combat and service units

for the FEC, and to replace losses in the

FEC. But they set aside enough spaces

to activate an infantry division to replace

the 2d Division in the General Reserve

and to form two more antiaircraft artillery battalions.15

This memorandum gives a detailed breakdown of

the authorized and actual strengths of General Reserve combat units on 6 August. The 82d Airborne

Division, authorized 17,490 men, had 15,805, while

the 3d Division had only 5,179 of an authorized

18,894. 13

 A comprehensive study of the many and complex problems arising out of the nation's efforts to

mobilize its armed strength widely, with analyses of

each major personnel action, is contained in a monograph by Maj. Elva M. Stillwaugh, History of the

Korea War, "Personnel Problems." Only the most

significant measures will be discussed here. The

extremely detailed and involved steps taken by

Chief, Army Field Forces, in this early period to

raise troops and to mobilize units are set forth in

OCAFF, Actions in Support of FECOM, 3 July-30

September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book. Both in

OCMH.

14

 (1) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 7 Jul

50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 6, I-A. (2) Memo,

Secy Defense for Secy Army, same file, Case 19.

(3) JCS 1800/97, 6 Jul 50, CofS file 230.2, Case 35. 15

 (1) Memo, Secy JCS for ACofS, 10 Jul 50, sub:

Personnel Requirements, SM 1477-50, with attached
120 POLICY AND DIRECTION

By 19 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had asked for and received a third increase in authorized military strength.

The Army limit was lifted to 834,000, a

jump of 93,500 spaces. Some of this addition, too, was scheduled for the Far

East Command as combat and service

support units and replacements. The

JCS set aside the lion's share for twenty

more antiaircraft artillery battalions and

other units to augment the depleted General Reserve.16

But a paper army wins no battles and

deters no aggressor. The Army's authorized strength had to be transmuted into

actual strength quickly. Voluntary recruitment, Selective Service, recall of

individual Reservists, and ordering National Guard and Organized Reserve

Corps units to active service were means

used to fill the Army's manpower needs.

When the Korean War began the Department of the Army was relying almost

entirely on volunteers to fill its enlisted

ranks. Authority existed for procuring

new soldiers through the draft under the

Selective Service Extension Act of 1950,

but the Army had made little use of it.

The increased need for manpower caused

the Department of the Army to call in

late July for 50,000 draftees to be inducted in September.17

Recall of Reserves

Congressional action on 30 June 1950

gave the President the authority to order

units and individual members of the

Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and

units of the National Guard of the

United States into active federal service

for a period of twenty-one months.18 On

19 July President Truman delegated this

authority to the Secretary of Defense,

who further delegated it to the secretaries

of the military departments.19

In the case of both officers and enlisted

men, the Army established and carried

out a policy of recalling individuals from

the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves. In

order to avoid enfeebling Active Reserve

units, already understrength in most

cases, and to enable these units, if it became necessary to call them into service,

to come on duty in some semblance of

handwritten notation, 1130, 13 Jul 50, sgd SGS (Gen

Moore), G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 7. (2) Memo

JCS for Secy Defense 13 Jul 50, sub: Personnel Requirements in Support of Current Opns in FEC, 2d

Increment, same file, Case 48. 16

 (1) JCS 1800/104, Bradley for Johnson, 18 Jul

50, sub: Fiscal Year 1951 Force Requirements. (2)

Memo, Johnson for Secys Army, Navy, and Air

Force, Asst Secy Defense (Comptroller), and Gen

Bradley, 19 Jul 50. (3) The major units for which

the 834,000 Army strength would provide were at

this time 8 infantry divisions, 1 armored division,

2 airborne divisions, 8 separate infantry regiments,

4 separate armored regiments, 72 antiaircraft artillery battalions, and 90 combat battalions of other

types, i.e., armored, field artillery, and engineer.

See JCS 1800/101, 18 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091

Korea, sec. III, Book I, Case 48/2. (4) The Congress

of the United States controls the size of the armed

forces. In this emergency period, approval by the

President was a temporary measure, the only feasible procedure in view of the need for speedy

action. The President immediately asked for and

secured Congressional approval in the form of legislation removing all statutory personnel ceilings and

expanding budgetary appropriations. See JCS History, The Korean Conflict, ch. v, p. 20.

17

 (1) Rpt, sub: Personnel Procurement, pp. 19-20.

(2) Memo, Secy Army for OSD, 25 Jul 50, sub: Additional Selective Service Call. Both in Annual

Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June 1950-8

September 1951, copy in OCMH. 18

 PL 599, 81st Congress. 19

 (1) Rpt, sub: Personnel Procurement, Tab A,

in Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June

1950-8 September 1951. (2) Memo, 8 Nov 50, sub:

Call of Reserves, in CofS, DA file 320.2. (3) Memo,

Secy Defense for JCS, 21 Jul 50.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 121

combat readiness, the Army felt that it

should not take their officers and men.

True, the men and officers in these units

had been receiving pay for attending

drills and were, or could logically be expected to be, more ready for active service than Inactive or Volunteer Reservists.

Nevertheless, when it became necessary

to fill Reserve and Regular units it was

deemed necessary to draw on the Inactive

and Volunteer Reserves. Persons who

were members of the Active Reserve, assigned to units, drilling regularly, and

receiving current training were not recalled to active duty as individuals.

Membership in the Inactive Reserves

meant, in fact, that officers and men had

accepted a Reserve status and all its attached obligations but would not, or

could not, spend the time required for

training in the Active Reserve. The fact

that a man was in the inactive portion of

the Reserve did not, however, obviate

his obligation to serve if his country

needed him. Volunteer Reserves were

those members of the Active Reserve who

were not assigned to mobilization troop

basis units.

Another factor bearing on the problem

was that an important provision of Public Law 810, Both Congress, was in the

process of being implemented as of 30

June 1950. This provision required

those members of the Volunteer Reserve

who had not been sufficiently active to

earn the specified minimum number of

retirement credit points under the above

law would be involuntarily transferred

to the Inactive Reserve. The screening

of the Volunteer Reserve to determine

who should thus be transferred had just

begun when the Korean War broke out.

It was known, however, that a large

number of officers in the Volunteer Reserve would be affected.

When the first order went out for the

involuntary recall of individual Reserve

officers, no real distinction could be made

between the Inactive and Volunteer Reserve since there were so many in the

Volunteer Reserve who had been as inactive as those assigned to the Inactive

Reserve. The first recall program, authorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of

the Selective Service Act of 1948, consequently specified that officers be recalled

from either the Volunteer Reserve or the

Inactive Reserve without establishing a

priority or any other distinction between

the two categories.

The Army met numerous problems in

recalling Reservists. It had no clear picture of the actual number who would be

available for duty. It knew, for example,

that on 30 June 1950 it had 416,402 in

the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves and

184,015 in the organized units of the

Reserve. It did not know, however, how

many of these were physically qualified

for duty. The required periodic physical

examinations for Reservists had been

suspended in February 1947. Many more

Reservists had to be called for physical

examination than the number needed

because of the large numbers found

physically disqualified. Considerable administrative overhead and delay hindered

selections. Further, many Reservists had

undergone changes in economic status

after entering the ORC which made active duty an undue hardship. The result

was authorization of large numbers of

justifiable delays which caused further

difficulty in filling quotas. Records on

Reserve officers were inadequate, and

virtually did not exist for enlisted men.
122 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Finally, the recall of Inactive and Volunteer Reservists engendered much ill-will

from the public, the press, and the Congress.

Since officers, particularly in companygrade and combat arms, were needed

badly, the Department of the Army, on

22 July 1950, appealed to Reserve officers to volunteer for active duty. So few

responded that, on 10 August 1950, empowered by the Congressional authority,

the Department of the Army recalled involuntarily 7,862 male Reserve captains

and lieutenants of both the Volunteer

and Inactive Reserves. On the same date

it announced a program for recalling

1,063 Army Medical Service officers.

These first involuntary recalls of Reserve

officers were followed several months

later by a larger program affecting almost

10,000 company-grade officers of the combat arms.20

The shortage of trained enlisted specialists prompted the Department of the

Army to recall, also involuntarily, 109,-

000 enlisted men from the Reserves during August. All of these men were

specialists, slated to fill critical positions.21

National Guard Divisions

The only source from which the Army

could draw complete, relatively ready,

divisions other than from the General

Reserve was from the National Guard of

the United States. General Collins was

extremely reluctant to advise the calling

up of National Guard divisions until he

was sure that no other solution could be

found to the grave manpower situation.

His reasons for holding back stemmed

from his concern over the great impact

upon the economy and morale of home

areas of selected divisions. The other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

mid-July also opposed federalization of

any National Guard divisions so long as

it could be avoided.22

Many National Guard units were not

divisional in nature, had specialized

functions, and were made up of specialists and other men trained during World

War II. These units appeared to be a

likely source of strength for MacArthur's

forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although hesitating to call on National

Guard divisions, asked for authority to

call to active duty some other National

Guard units if required. "The Joint

Chiefs of Staff," they told the Secretary

of Defense on 14 July,

are of the opinion that the emergence of

the Korean situation cannot be fully met or

in time by merely strengthening units al- ready in existence or by filling them with

untrained men through the Selective Service

process or recruitment. Also it has developed that the requirements for units and

personnel cannot be met on the basis of

voluntary return of Reserves to active duty

for which approval presently exists. . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the

Secretary of Defense obtain at once author- ity for the three Services to call to active

duty, within such personnel ceilings as have

20

 (1) Rad, WCL 34125, DA to ZI Comds, 22 Jul

50. (2) Rad, WCL 37558, DA to ZI Comds, 10

Aug 50. (3) Rad, WCL 37577, DA to ZI Comds, 10 Aug 50. (4) Ltr, DA, 15 Sep 50, sub: Recall of

Additional Reserve Officers to Active Duty, AGAO-S

2104 (ORC), 15 Sep 50. 21

 Hist Summary, 7 Nov 51, sub: Distribution of

Enlisted Replacements, prepared by Manpower Control Div, ACofS G-1, DA, p. 2, copy in OCMH.

22

 (1) JCS 1924/20, Rpt by JSPC, 14 Jul 50, title:

Estimate of the Military Sit in Light of Events in

Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, I-C, Case 16.

(2) MFR, Gen Moore, SGS, DA, 15 Jul 50, in G-3,

DA files.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 123

been or may be approved, such selected

National Guard units and selected units

and individuals of the Army, Navy, or Air

Force as may be required to meet the de- mands of the Korean situation.23

More significant reasons than the disruption of regional social and economic

conditions lay behind the reluctance of

American military planners to call up

complete divisions. General Collins, in

addressing the Army Policy Council on

25 July, admitted that much public sentiment was developing in favor of a rapid

Army expansion, including the calling

up of the National Guard. He pointed

out that, if the Chinese Communist forces

intervened in Korea, the United States

would have to federalize from three to

six National Guard divisions at once.

Calling up divisions immediately, perhaps prematurely, might not be wise.

Too, there was no point in building up

too rapidly, since the ability to meet

American commitments was definitely

limited by shipping. He contended that

federalization of National Guard units

would not help the situation in Korea

since it would take a long time for these

units to become effective.24

The Army Chief of Staff was waiting

for an agreement by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on the size and make-up of the

forces which they wanted to develop.

There had been a difference of opinion

as to whether a small, balanced, and

mobile expeditionary force for emergencies similar to Korea should be

created and maintained in addition to

forces for Korea and the General

Reserve.25

General Bolté nevertheless kept urging

General Collins to call up National

Guard divisions. At a meeting in his

office on the morning of 31 July, General Collins decided to accept his G-3's

recommendations. Later that day, at a

conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

he forcefully proposed that four National

Guard divisions and two RCT's be

called to active duty. Collins said:

In view of the world-wide international

situation and recent developments in Korea, I have now concluded that we can no longer

delay in calling into Federal service certain

major units of the National Guard. ... I

had hoped that this step might prove unnecessary, but it is my firm conviction that

further delay may have grave results on our

ability to insure the security of the United

States.26

The Joint Chiefs of Staff quicklyagreed and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the National Guard

units be called to active duty. This

action meant lifting the Army's authorized strength from 834,000 to over

1,000,000. On 10 August, the Army received word of approval. President

Truman authorized calling into federal

service on or about 1 September four

National Guard divisions and two National Guard RCT's. These units would

be brought to full strength through

23

 Contained in Memo, Col Keith L. Ware, ASGS,

for Asst Secy Army, 14 Jul 50, sub: Proposed Mobilization of Reserve Units and Calling of Selected

Reserve Officers to Active Duty, in CofS, DA file 091

Korea, Case 7. 24

 Min, 23d mtg, Army Policy Council, 25 Jul 50,

in G-3, DA file 334, Case 7.

25

 JCS 1924/20, Rpt by JSPC, 14 Jul 50, title: Estimate of the Military Sit in Light of Events in Korea. 26

 (1) Memo, Bolté, ACofS G-3, DA, for Ridgway,

DCofS for Admin, 7 Jul 50, in G-3, DA files. (2)

Memo, Ridgway for Bolté, 31 Jul 50, in G-3, DA

file 320.2, sec. I, Case 15. (3) Memo, Collins for

JCS, 31 Jul 50, sub: Increased Augmentation of the

Army (above 834,000), in G-3, DA file 320.2, sec. I-B,

Book I, Case 8/1.
124 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Selective Service by 1 November 1950

and would be ready for operational employment by 14 April 1951.27

The question of which National

Guard divisions should be called up had

been under study for some time. General Collins had, on 21 July, asked the

Chief, Army Field Forces, for recommendations. Less than a week later General Bolté asked General Clark for an

expanded study of the same problem.

In considering the problem, General Clark leaned heavily upon the continental Army commanders, soliciting

their recommendations as to which divisions within their areas were best

trained, best equipped, and most ready

to go. After careful study, General Clark

submitted to the Department of the

Army his recommendations of six divisions most appropriate to be called on the

grounds of training, manning, equipment status, and general fitness. The

divisions recommended in order of priority of selection were the 28th Division

(Pennsylvania); the 29th Division (Virginia and Maryland); the 31st Division

(Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th Division (Ohio); the 45th Division (Oklahoma); and the 50th Armored Division

(New Jersey).28

On 31 July, General Ridgway notified

General Clark that the Secretary of the

Army and General Collins were fearful

of the political repercussions unless there

was a better geographical spread among

the divisions selected. Clark said that

he and his advisers had considered this

point very carefully, but had given more

weight to other factors. They had, for

example, looked very closely at the

leadership in the particular divisions,

wishing to avoid the difficulties experienced at the beginning of World War

II when some of the National Guard

commanders had been relieved after callup. They had evaluated the comparative state of training of each division

and had also taken into consideration

the divisional strengths in men and qualified officers. On this latter point, the

Chief, Army Field Forces, felt it important to keep to a minimum the number

of filler replacements which would have

to be transferred into a particular National Guard division to bring it up

to full strength. Ridgway then asked

Clark to consider the readiness status of

divisions on the west coast since it might

be desirable to choose one division from

that area.

Later the same day, General Clark

learned that four divisions would be

chosen. He was asked if he had adjusted his recommendations to conform

with the necessity for a geographical

spread. At that time he recommended

that four divisions be chosen from among

the 28th (Pennsylvania); the 29th (Virginia and Maryland); the 31st (Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th (Ohio);

the 40th (California); and the 45th

(Oklahoma).

The National Guard divisions finally

called into service as of 1 September

1950 were the 28th, the 40th, the 43d

(Rhode Island and Connecticut), and

the 45th. Also called were the 196th

RCT (South Dakota) and the 278th

27

 (1) JCS 2147/3 and Incl, Memo, Secy Defense for

Secy Army and JCS, 10 Aug 50. (2) MFR, CofS USA,

sub: Request for Four Divs in Korea, in G-3, DA

file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-3, Book I, Case 19/7. 28

 OCAFF Rpt, Actions in Support of FECOM,

3 July-30 September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book,

entries of 21 Jul, 27 Jul, and 31 Jul 50, copy in

OCMH.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 125

RCT (Tennessee). These units would

be brought to full war strength. But

General Collins directed Bolté to limit

the number of troops called up to support the divisions. He felt that this

restriction would not involve great risk,

since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made

no commitment to send the new divisions

overseas. If it should become necessary

to send them to Korea later, they could

get by with a far smaller ratio of corps

and army support troops than had been

needed in World War II. General

Collins based this theory on his appraisal

of the terrain conditions and limited

road nets in the Korean area. If the new

divisions reverted to inactive status before deployment, the Army would store

their equipment to have it immediately

available for another emergency.29

The Theater Scene—August 1950

In Korea, meanwhile, ROK and U.S.

forces fought off the North Korean Army

with stubborn determination. General

Walker used his small mobile reserves

with great skill and his men, ROK and

American, fought bravely. The dearly

acquired battle experience and the fresh

strength pouring into Korea began to

show in greater enemy losses and a slackening of his advance. Nevertheless, the

Eighth Army lost ground and fell back

toward Pusan.

Walker proved a determined and tenacious commander. He well appreciated

the great danger of pulling back upon

his base of supply under continuous

pressure. He hated to give up any more

ground to the North Koreans, but on

26 July, with the enemy pressing in on

Taegu where irreplaceable signal equipment was in danger of being lost, Walker

called Tokyo and asked permission to

move his command post back to Pusan.

He did not imply in any way that he

wanted to pull his divisions back to the

port city.30

General Almond, who took Walker's

call, told him that he, personally, objected to any such move. To remove the

command post to Pusan would damage

the army's morale. It might give the impression that the Eighth Army could not

stay in Korea and might trigger a

debacle.

As soon as Walker hung up, Almond

went to MacArthur and recommended

that MacArthur fly to Korea and talk

to Walker at once. Apparently, Walker's

attitude had shaken Almond's faith in

the Eighth Army commander's judgment. Almond told MacArthur that he

felt the situation in Korea had

reached the critical stage and required

MacArthur's personal observation. MacArthur pondered briefly, then told

Almond that he would make the trip

the next day.

On 27 July, MacArthur, with a staff

including General Almond, landed in

Taegu about 1000. This time, MacArthur did not visit the front line, contenting himself with conferences in

Taegu. The most significant conference

took place between MacArthur and

Walker. Only one other person, General Almond, sat in on this 90-minute

meeting.

MacArthur did not mention Walker's

request of the day before, nor did he

29

 Min, 26th mtg, Army Policy Council, 2 Aug 50,

in G-3, DA file 334 (APC) 1950, Case 5.

30

 Interv, Lt Col Roy E. Appleman with Gen

Almond, 13 Dec 50, copy in OCMH.
126 POLICY AND DIRECTION

AMERICAN ARTILLERYMEN fight off enemy efforts to break through Pusan Perimeter.

criticize Walker for any of his actions.

He merely talked over the tactical situation, emphasizing that Eighth Army

must hold its ground. He told Walker

that withdrawals would cease. Later, in

the presence of several members of the

Eighth Army staff, MacArthur said that

there would be no evacuation from

Korea—there would be no Dunkerque.

On 29 July as a result of MacArthur's

visit, Walker issued a widely publicized

order, in the form of a public statement

during a speech to the staff of the 25th

Division. Walker stated that the Eighth

Army would retreat no more, that there

was no line to which it could retreat, and

that, in effect, every man in Eighth Army

would "stand or die" along the present

line.31

The defensive line behind which

Walker intended his troops to "stand or

die" lay mainly on the Naktong River

barrier in the west and fanned out from

31

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Landrum to Appleman, recd

23 Nov 53. (3) War Diary, 25th Div, G-3 Jnl, Jul

50, Div Hist notes.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 127

Pusan. Rectangular in shape, measuring

nearly 100 miles from north to south and

about fifty miles from east to west, the

area quickly became known as the Pusan

Perimeter. (See Map I.)32

Between 1 and 4 August, U.S. and

ROK units withdrew behind this line

and prepared for a last-ditch stand. Most

of the western edge of the perimeter was

traced by the Naktong River with the

exception of about fifteen miles at the

southern end of this line. The northern

border ran through the mountains above

Waegwan and Uisong to the sea, with

the town of Yongdok forming the eastern

anchor. ROK troops held this portion

of the line.

General MacArthur sent his deputy

chief of staff, General Hickey, into the

Pusan Perimeter on 6 August to confer

with the Eighth Army commander.

Walker told Hickey he was worried

about the condition of the 24th Division.

He appraised that unit's combat worth

as negligible after a month of hard fighting. Before it could become effective

again, it would have to be completely

rehabilitated. His other divisions were

in somewhat better condition. The 25th

Division, which had seen less action than

the 24th and which had been less severely

attacked by the enemy, was in fairly good

shape. General Walker expressed some

doubts as to its offensive capabilities, as

he felt it lacked leadership. The Eighth

Army commander told General Hickey

that, because they were too few, all his

army staff members were overworked.

That they were not getting enough rest

was being reflected in the quality of their

work.33

The first weeks of August were marked

by savage North Korean efforts to break

through the Pusan Perimeter. Several

enemy penetrations across the Naktong

into Eighth Army's lines came perilously

close to success, but in each case skillful

deployment of reserves along interior

lines enabled Walker to contain and beat

back the enemy thrusts. Fresh units arriving in the perimeter were quickly

thrown into the fight at key points in the

perimeter. Elements of the 2d Division

arrived from the United States on 31

July, the 5th RCT reached Korea on the

same day from Hawaii, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade closed at Pusan

on 3 August.

The mounting toll of American casualties and the depleted ranks of

Walker's divisions underscored the great

need for fresh fighting men in Korea

And every feasible means of meeting

this need was being exploited by the

Department of the Army.

Replacement Troubles

By 5 August the Department of the

Army had stepped up both air and water

transportation to the Far East Command,

using military and commercial planes

and vessels. Most of the surface shipping

space had been taken for units and equipment, but airlift brought 340 replacements each day. Still, the Eighth Army

was receiving more casualties than re32

 For a complete account of the valiant stand of

Walker's forces in the battle of the Naktong during

August and September 1950, see Appleman, South

to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters XVXXIV. See also Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas

A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-

1953, vol. I, The Pusan Perimeter (Washington,

1954).

33

 Memo, Gen Hickey, DCofS GHQ, UNC, for Gen

Almond, CofS GHQ, UNC, 7 Aug 50, sub: Rpt of

Visit to Korea, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.
128 POLICY AND DIRECTION

U.S. GROUND TROOPS board a transport plane at a Japanese air base for shipment to Korea.

placements. Losses by 5 August totaled

7,859, but only 7,711 individual replacements had reached the FEC and only part

of these had arrived in Korea. General

Beiderlinden, MacArthur's personnel

chief, took an optimistic view, believing

that the near future would bring a

marked improvement in the situation.

He expected casualties in Korea to decrease as the front stabilized and anticipated a great increase in replacements

from the United States by the middle of

August. He was counting also on returning to combat many soldiers who

had recovered from wounds in FEC

hospitals. As an example, the number

of men returned to combat from hospitals on 4 August equaled 30 percent

of the casualties received on the same

day. He told Almond that the Department of the Army appeared to be providing replacements to the limit of its

capability. His greatest concern, justified in light of the latest report from

Washington, was whether there would

be a sufficient reservoir of replacements

in the United States to keep supplying

the FEC's needs until Selective Service,
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 129

National Guard, and Reserve personnel

could be called to duty and made

available.34

The optimism expressed by Beiderlinden on 5 August disappeared with

startling speed two days later. General

Hickey's talk with General Walker

erased the slightly optimistic picture conjured by statistics and promises. General Beiderlinden appealed to General

Almond on 7 August, pointing out that

every division in Korea was suffering

critical shortages of men and officers.

Almond approved an urgent call on

Washington for 8,000 men to reach the

FEC within fifteen days. All infantry

regiments in Korea were so weakened

that unless these men reached them in

two weeks, they would deteriorate so

badly that major steps would be necessary to rebuild them. Most urgently

needed were infantry and artillery soldiers, and company-grade officers.

Almond urged, as a matter of highest

priority, that airlift be expanded to get

the 8,000 men to the theater by 20

August.35

The lack of replacements for Eighth

Army's divisions resulted to a degree

from the way in which replacements

were used after they reached the Far

East Command. Less than half of the

16,000 replacements arriving in Japan

between 1 July and 15 August went

straight to Korea. Some were used to

fill the 7th Division, but more were

assigned to nondivisional units within

Japan. About 25,000 men and officers

under control of Eighth Army remained

in Japan at this time.36

The fighting in Korea prompted staff

agencies of GHQ FEC to seek more

people. They took experienced replacements, particularly officers, out of the

pipeline to Korea. At the same time,

GHQ section chiefs kept at desk jobs

many of their original men and officers

who could have been sent as replacements. At other stations in the

replacement stream from Japan to the

battlefront, men and officers intended for

combat duty were diverted to administrative and rear-echelon service. General

Beiderlinden warned fellow members

of the GHQ staff about allowing this

practice to grow. General Headquarters

could hardly justify its strident pleas for

replacements if it kept these men from

the fighting units. On 15 July he

cautioned, "Until a flow of replacements

commensurate with current critical needs

materializes, it is mandatory that . . .

the tendency to augment administrative and rear-echelon service organizations ... be resisted." He urged the

fullest use of Japanese and American

civilians in Japan.37

This chiding did not deter GHQ section chiefs. General Beiderlinden told

the chief of staff, GHQ, in early August

that he was still worried by the con34

 Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50, sub:

Casualties and Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item

41. 5 Aug 50. 35

 (1) Ibid., 7 Aug 50, sub: Loss Replacements,

G-1 GHQ Log, Item 15. (2) Rad, CX 59519, CINC

FE to DA, 7 Aug 50.

36

 (1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS, 16 Aug 50, sub:

Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 45.

(2) Memo, Col Grubbs for Gen Beiderlinden, 8 Aug

50, sub: Assignment of Replacements, G-1 GHQ

Log, Item 36. (3) Memo, GHQ for Gen Hickey, 12

Aug 50, sub: Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ

Log, Item 54. 37

 Memo, G-1 GHQ for All Staff Secs, GHQ SCAP,

and FEC, 15 Jul 50, sub: Utilization of Personnel,

G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7.
130 POLICY AND DIRECTION

tinuing trend toward empire-building

in the GHQ staff. He felt that, instead

of looking for more people, the GHQ

staff sections should get more mileage

out of those they already had. He hesitated to charge the other staff heads with

wasting their resources, but he believed

that they could, if they tried, achieve

greater efficiency without strength increases. At General Beiderlinden's request, the chief of staff talked with

section chiefs, stressing the importance

of keeping GHQ manpower requirements at as low a level as possible.38

So urgent was the need for front-line

soldiers in August that General MacArthur cut out the short, intensive

training course which had been set up on

14 July for replacements at Camp Drake.

He ordered replacements kept at Drake

only long enough to receive their individual equipment. As a result of this

ruling, replacements were given no

chance to fire their individual weapons.

Many men went into the front lines in

Korea without having determined the

characteristics and proper setting of

their rifles or carbines.39

General Collins sent General Ridgway

to Korea in early August to find out from

MacArthur what specific requirements

had developed since General Collins'

July visit. General Collins gave Ridgway a personal letter to be handed to

MacArthur which, he hoped, would

serve to explain the Army's situation

and to reassure MacArthur that everything possible was being done on his

behalf.

In order to meet your requirements for

four divisions with supporting units [Collins

wrote] we decided to recommend to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff calling for four National Guard divisions to active duty on or

about 1 September 1950. . . . On 1 August

I recommended the Joint Chiefs call up

those units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, but reserved judgment as to definite

commitment of all four divisions to your

theater at this time. This was based on the

fact that no one can definitely foresee the

exact developments of the Korea fighting. I have felt all along that once the weather

clears up and we are able to get effective

results from our air attacks, the logistic

support of the North Korean forces will

rapidly dry up. This might result in your

being able to pass to the counteroffensive

more nearly according to your original time

schedule and your original plans.

You will recall that we agreed that this

might be possible with troops already defi- nitely allotted to you which, including the

full Marine division, and an airborne com- bat team would aggregate almost seven

divisions. On the other hand, if the North

Koreans are continually reinforced from the

North you may well require the full strength

of units requested. . . .

I am confident that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff will be willing to accede to a definite

request for these troops when the situation

has stabilized and you are able to make

more definite plans than is possible now.

Meanwhile we will proceed with the training of the divisions quickly. They will be

permitted to accept volunteers up until the

time of actual induction. . . . Here again

I think we must wait and see how the North

Koreans react during the next couple of

months. I think it is wholly possible that

once they begin to fold, and I am sure they

will under the pressure of your counteroffensive, that they may go very fast. . . .

Let me assure you again of my warmest

support. If there is anything we are doing

38

 Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 2 Aug 50, sub:

Requests for Increase of Staff Personnel (Instant

Case, G-3), G-1 GHQ Log, Item 36. 39

 (1) Rad, 59867, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

12 Aug 50. (2) Memo, GHQ for CofS GHQ, 31

Aug 50, sub: Rpt of Staff Visit to Personnel Pipeline, sgd Col T. A. Seely, GSC, G-1 GHQ Log,

Item 14.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 131

now that should be changed or anything

further that we could do to back you up in

this critical struggle please don't hesitate to

call on me.40

General MacArthur made his needs

known to General Ridgway at once. He

repeated the call already made by his

staff for 8,000 replacements by 20 August.

When Ridgway passed this information

to General Collins, he expressed the

belief that the Department of the Army

could meet the full requirement. The

enlisted Reserve specialists, particularly

those with prior service, could, with a

minimum period of three weeks for

processing and training, be sent to the

FEC by September and would help cut

down the shortages significantly. General MacArthur had suggested that the

United States triple its transpacific shipping by using commercial shipping

lines.41

The principal request which the Far

East commander placed upon the Department of the Army through General

Ridgway was for the 3d Division. In

the relatively near future, Japan would

be completely stripped of American combat troops. So that the Japanese islands,

doubly vital now as a support base for

Korean operations, might not be completely defenseless against a possible

Soviet attack, General MacArthur felt

that the 3d Division should be sent to

Japan by mid-September.42

When General Ridgway returned to

Washington, he met with the Army

Policy Council and, at the request of the

Secretary of the Army, reported his observations on the combat situation.

Ridgway had come away from Korea

convinced that Walker would hold the

Pusan Perimeter. Enemy pressure was

still great enough to force limited tactical

withdrawals from the edges of the perimeter and the actual final line had not yet

been developed, but the defensive line

would be held successfully and the beachhead kept intact. Regardless of his favorable prognosis, General Ridgway was

quick to point out that General Walker

had a serious problem. His forces still

faced a ruthless and savage foe. Any idea

that the North Koreans would weaken

or fall back was faulty and dangerous.

As an example, General Ridgway cited

enemy reaction to the strongest offensive

thrust yet made by Walker's forces.

Eight American battalions had attacked

in the southern sector to stop an enemy

move at Pusan. Within an hour after

the attack jumped off, the enemy

counterattacked fiercely and effectively.43

United Nations forces were still too

few in number to carry on a defense

according to the book. One division

held a 21,000-yard front with six battalions. The enemy could infiltrate the

thinly defended front at night and attack from the rear the next morning.

General Walker had not had time to

organize the ground effectively. General

MacArthur had told Ridgway that he

was pleased with the support given him

by Washington, but had asked for more.

After Ridgway reported to the council,

40

 Ltr, Gen Collins to Gen MacArthur, 4 Aug 50,

in CofS, DA file 323.3 FEC. 41

 Memo, Gen Ridgway for Gen Collins, 18 Aug

50, in G-3, DA files. 42

 The National Police Reserve of Japan (NPRJ)

had been formed only recently, while American

forces left in Japan after September were mainly

service and headquarters troops.

43

 Min, Mtg of Army Policy Council, 8 Aug 50,

in G-3, DA file 334 APC, Case 7.
132 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General Collins told Secretary Pace that

the request for more men and units was

already being studied by his staff, but

that he was gravely concerned by the

demands.44

At a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff held later the same day to hear

General Ridgway's formal report and to

consider the Far East commander's needs,

General MacArthur's request for another

division occasioned a debate. Some

members of the Joint Chiefs wanted to

send the 82d Airborne or a National

Guard division instead of the understrength 3d Division. General Ridgway

recommended that the 3d Division be

sent since he felt that the combat-ready

airborne division must stay in the United

States for use in a general emergency.

After a 15-minute discussion, the tenor

of thought among the Joint Chiefs inclined toward the same view—namely,

to send the 3d Division and to fill it up

from any and every source. No final

decision was made at this time, but

General Collins and Admiral Sherman

were charged with examining the matter

urgently and reaching a recommendation

by 10 August.45

General Bolté, Army G-3, did not

believe that the 3d Division could be

filled and sent to General MacArthur

without seriously delaying the Army's

plans for rapid expansion of training

activities in the United States. He told

General Collins that the 3d Division

could reach the Far East by 15 September, untrained and worthless for combat,

but that the training and mobilization

base in the United States would suffer as

a result. If General Collins could see

his way clear to delay the division until

December, it could be built up with

National Guard and Enlisted Reserve

Corps (ERC) fillers without ruining the

ZI training base and could arrive in the

Far East as a reasonably well-trained division. If General Collins considered it

absolutely necessary to give General

MacArthur another division by 15

September, the 82d Airborne could be

sent. According to General Bolté, the

82d, already at about 85 percent strength,

would not need many fillers. Furthermore, it would be ready to fight on arrival. Its departure, of course, would

leave the continental United States

without a combat-ready division.46

General Bolté's views did not prevail.

The JCS decided to send the 3d Division

to FECOM. On 11 August President

Truman approved its removal from the

General Reserve.47

The 3d Division, although it had three

44 Ibid.

45

 Memos (handwritten), Lt Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, DCofS for Plans, for Gen Bolté, ACofS G-3,

1110, 8 Aug 50; 1125, 8 Aug 50; 1150, 8 Aug 50.

All in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 19/7. This series

of penciled notes sent out of the JCS meeting by

General Gruenther reports the progress of the meeting to the Army G-3, so that, in Gruenther's own

words, "you won't get crash-landed" and "just to

keep you off balance."

46

 (1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 10 Aug

50, sub: Feasibility of Redeployment of 3d Inf Div

to the FEC by Mid-September, in G-3, DA file 320.2

Pac, Case 19/7. (2) Transfer of men and officers

from the 82d to the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne, which was being readied for shipment at this

time, had reduced the division to an approximate

strength of 15,000. See Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen

Collins, 8 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case

6/20. 47

 (1) Memo, Ridgway for Collins, 18 Aug 50. (2)

Memo, Bolté for Collins, 8 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file

320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Book I, Case 6/20. (3) JCS

2147/4, Note by Secys, 10 Aug 50, title: Reinforcement of the FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac. (4)

Memo, Johnson for JCS, 11 Aug 50, sub: Reinforcement of the FEC.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 133

regiments, was very much understrength.

Already it had furnished many men, officers, and units to the Far East Command.

The division was short 2 infantry battalions, 1 tank battalion, and 2 field

artillery battalions. Only drastic measures would place the division in a reasonably effective status, even for occupation

duty. By reducing one regiment to zero

strength and dividing its men and officers

between the remaining two regiments,

then assigning a separate regiment from

Puerto Rico to the division, the Department of the Army succeeded in building

up the division to a semblance of

operational strength.

On 10 August, General MacArthur

learned that the 3d Division, less one

regiment, was being ordered to his command. A supplementary message, explaining that the 65th Infantry from

Puerto Rico had been ordered to the

FEC, where it would join the 3d Division as its third regiment, followed a

few minutes later, but not quickly

enough apparently. Before receiving the

information on the 65th Infantry, MacArthur fired back a radio objecting to

the dispatch of a 2-regiment division and

pointing out, ". . . experience indicates

the ineffectiveness of a two unit organization whether in battalions, regiments,

or divisions." No answer to this reclama

was necessary, of course.48

Fearful, also, that press reports of the

planned movement of the 3d Division

might tip his hand and warn the North

Koreans of his future plans, General

MacArthur asked that no press release be

made until the division was actually engaged in combat. "Information of this

sort," General MacArthur warned Washington, "practically reveals our strategic

concepts to an alert enemy."

 49

Unfortunately, General Ridgway had

already alerted the Army Chief of Information, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, to

release the information on the 3d Division to the press. But the information

had not yet gone out when MacArthur's

warning was received. General Ridgway

was opposed to withholding any such

news from the public. "I saw no possibility short of instituting a strict censorship," he said, "of concealing the fact

and if we acted otherwise, press reaction

would be violent and prompt." When

he went to General Collins and expressed

this opinion, Collins considered a few

moments, then decided to go along with

MacArthur anyhow. Ridgway was

obliged to notify Parks to make no official

release on the 3d Division even though

both men knew that the news would

leak out at once.50

General Collins was determined that

there should be no misunderstanding as

to the great significance of removing the

3d Division from the United States or

to certain restrictions on its combat employment. He sent a personal reminder

to General MacArthur underscoring

both the risk taken by the Army in sending out the division and the need for

special handling of the unit on arrival.

"In withdrawing this division from the

General Reserve," General Collins

pointed out, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff 48

 (1) Memo, Ridgway for Bolté, 10 Aug 50, sub:

Additional Combat Forces for FEC, in G-3, DA files.

(2) Rad, WAR 88401, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug 50.

(3) Rad, WAR 88465, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug 50.

(4) Rad, C 59863, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug 50.

49

 Rad, C 59820, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug 50. 50

 MFR, Ridgway, 11 Aug 50, in CofS, DA file

370, Case 12.
134 POLICY AND DIRECTION

have accepted for the next few months

a further serious reduction in the United

States capabilities to meet other possible

demands for combat ground forces, as

well as a further serious reduction, during the same period, in the Army's capability to train additional forces for your

theater." The Joint Chiefs were sending the 3d Division with the understanding that it would serve for the time being

in Japan, as a theater reserve. They

were assuming also that General MacArthur would, because of the division's

very low combat effectiveness level, permit it "sufficient training time to reach

a minimum acceptance training level"

before committing it to battle.51

Late in August, after comprehensive

inspections of the 3d Division, its ranks

now swelled from a low of about 5,000

to over 11,000, General Clark, Chief,

Army Field Forces, reported the division

to be about 40 percent combat-ready.

There were no major equipment shortages, and since the division was believed

to be structurally sound General Clark

felt it could be brought to an excellent

state of combat readiness in about two

and a half months.52

Corps Headquarters

By late July, it had become apparent

that U.N. forces, comprising American

divisions, ROK divisions, and units expected from member nations of the

United Nations, would soon be so numerous that tighter tactical control would

be necessary. In anticipation of such a

development, General MacArthur, on

19 July, called on the Department of the

Army for two corps headquarters. He

asked that these headquarters be sent

as soon as possible with attached medical

and military police units and with two

signal battalions. If feasible, these two

headquarters should be designated I and

IX Corps.53

A few days later, General MacArthur

revealed that his plans called for using

one of these corps headquarters for an

amphibious enveloping force, and stated

that the operation could be deferred to

no later than 25 September. Although

General MacArthur had not said specifically what use he intended to make of

the other corps headquarters for which

he had asked, the Department of the

Army planners assumed that it would be

placed under Eighth Army to serve in

the breakout and exploitation phase following the initial amphibious assault.

Officers of the DA G-3 section conferred on the matter with officers from

Army Field Forces and determined that

the Army could produce only one corps

headquarters by the target date. The

available corps (U.S. V Corps) was at 75

percent combat effectiveness. Only one

signal battalion, the 4th, suitable for employment with a corps headquarters, was

in active service in the United States, and

it was at 60 percent strength. A lack of

critical signal specialists made its estimated combat effectiveness 50 percent.

Chances for a second corps looked slim

to G-3's planners, particularly in view

of the fact that no other corps signal battalion was on duty in the United States

51 sonal Rad) fo, Wr MacArthur 88954, D,A 1 t2 Au o CINCFE g 50. , Collins (Per52

 Rad, OCAFF 810, Chief AFF to CofSUSA, 24

Aug 50.

53

 Rad, CS 58234, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50. I

and IX Corps had served under General MacArthur

in Japan but had been inactivated in early 1950 as

an economy measure.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 135

and at least six months would be required to train one. They concluded

that furnishing one corps headquarters

with corps troops to the U.N. commander for use in the planned

amphibious operation was the maximum

capability of the Army. The tasks for

which the other corps was slated would

have to be given to Eighth Army.54

The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General

Wade V. Haislip, disagreed vehemently.

In his opinion, a second corps headquarters could most certainly be formed

insofar as the staff personnel were concerned. Nor did he accept the G-3's

position that it would take six months

to train a signal battalion. He pointed

out that the signal battalion to be used

in defensive operations need not be so

highly trained as one slated for offensive

amphibious operations and directed G-3

to restudy the problem.55

As a result of General Haislip's interest, the Department of the Army told

General MacArthur that it would be

possible to activate and send to him a

second corps headquarters, untrained

but having all required staff members.

An additional signal battalion could be

called into service and made available

in six months. Or, if he wished, this

battalion could be sent, untrained and

at little more than cadre strength, in two

months. General MacArthur asked at

once for the earliest movement of the

first corps (I Corps) and for immediate

activation and dispatch of the second

(IX Corps). He asked that the second

signal battalion be called in and sent

to him at once regardless of condition.56

On 30 July the V Corps was redesignated as the I Corps and began to prepare for movement, less certain cadre

personnel, to the Far East Command in

early August. The 4th Signal Battalion

was to accompany the new corps headquarters. Meanwhile, in response to a

request from General MacArthur that

the corps commander and his planning

staff come by air to Tokyo to plan the

details of the forthcoming amphibious

operation, General Coulter, the commanding general, and selected members

of his staff landed at Tokyo on 10

August.57

The IX Corps, activated by Fifth

Army, was to be prepared to move by

15 September. No training time was

allowed. The 101st Signal Battalion was

called into service on 19 August to meet

the requirement for an accompanying

signal unit.58

In mid-August, General MacArthur

was notified that I Corps headquarters

and headquarters company, medical, and

military police units, and the 4th Signal

Battalion at reduced strength were ready

to sail for his command. The signal

battalion could not be brought to full

54

 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 25 Jul 50, sub: Request

for More Troops for FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac,

Case 16/4. 55

 Memo, Col Morse for Col Howell, 28 Jul 50,

sub: Corps Headquarters Requested by Gen MacArthur, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 16/4.

56

 (1) Rad, WAR 87493, DA to CINCFE, 29 Jul

50. (2) Rad, CX 59246, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jul 50. 57

 (1) Memo, quoting DA radio for CG Third

Army, Info CINCFE, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7, 31 Jul

50. (2) Rad, WAR 88025, DA to COMGEN V Corps,

4 Aug 50. (3) Rad, CX 58926, CINCFE to DA, 28

Jul 50. (4) Rad, HICPAC 583, GHQ LNO to

CINCFE, 10 Aug 50. 58

 (1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 29 Jul 50,

sub: Request for More Troops for FEC, Tab A.

(2) Ibid., 8 Aug 50, same sub, in G-3, DA file 320.2

Pac, Case 16/4.
136 POLICY AND DIRECTION

strength before 1 November. The IX

Corps, less its signal battalion, could

sail in about a month but would be untrained. The IX's battalion could, if

trained Enlisted Reserve Corps fillers

materialized as expected, sail for the Far

East Command about 1 November, but

if trained as a unit in the United States

would not be ready until the end of 1950.

Artillery elements of both corps, including the additional nondivisional artillery units which General MacArthur

had requested earlier and were being

activated from Reserve and National

Guard sources, would be only partly

trained if they sailed with the other

corps elements. The Department of the

Army suggested that, since MacArthur's

requirement for this artillery was not

immediate, the units be kept in the

United States and trained until ready to

fight.59

General MacArthur apparently felt

that, in this case at least, a bird in the

hand was worth two in the bush. He

wanted the corps as fast as he could get

it regardless of condition. "Walker is

now controlling four United States and

five ROK divisions," he pointed out.

Believing that the green units could get

their training faster under him than in

the United States, he asked that they be

sent to him as soon as they had been

filled to authorized strength. His request applied to all organic and attached

elements of both I and IX corps.60

Late in August, arrangements were

sufficiently advanced for a schedule giving anticipated arrival dates of the corps

units to be sent to General MacArthur.

The I Corps with attached units, including the 4th Signal Battalion at reduced

strength, was on the high seas and due

to reach Japan on 3 September. The IX

Corps headquarters would arrive in

Pusan about 10 October and would be

followed within three weeks by the

artillery units and the 101st Signal

Battalion.61

Reorganization, Far East Command

Aware that General Walker could ill

afford to divide his attention between

the battlefield and his responsibilities in

Japan, General MacArthur on 24 August

established a new and separate command

relieving the Eighth Army commander

of all duties not directly related to his

combat mission. He directed the establishment of Japan Logistical Command

(JLC), FEC, with headquarters located

in Yokohama in the buildings vacated

by Eighth Army. By this order, responsibilities and functions formerly assigned

General Walker within the geographical

areas of the four main islands of Japan

were delegated to the commanding general of JLC, General Weible. Excluded

from his jurisdiction, although within

these geographical limits, were posts,

camps, and stations assigned to the Commanding General, Headquarters and

Service Command; General Headquarters, FEC; COMNAVFE; and the

Commanding General, FEAF.62

On 28 August, with the concurrence

of GHQ, FEC, General Weible established a subordinate command, the

Northern, at Sapporo, Japan. The Com59

 Rad, WAR 88864, DA to CINCFE, 15 Aug 50. 60

 Rad, C 60346, CINCFE to DA, 17 Aug 50.

61

 Rad, WAR 89882, DA to CINCFE, 26 Aug 50. 62

 GHQ, FEC, GO 22, 24 Aug 50.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 137

manding General, Northern Command,

Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn, was made

responsible for the island of Hokkaido

and certain areas on the northern portion

of Honshu. Somewhat later, on 19 September 1950, another subcommand of

JLC was set up, designated as the Southwestern Command with headquarters at

Osaka, Japan. Brig. Gen. Carter W.

Clarke was named commanding general

of this new command with a zone of responsibility including the islands of

Shikoku and Kyushu and all areas of

Japan located southwest of Shiznoka and

Nagano prefectures, exclusive of those

assigned to the British Commonwealth

occupation forces and of posts, camps,

and stations under control of the

Commanding General, FEAF, and

COMNAVFE.63

In addition to functions in support

of the occupation of Japan, the Japan

Logistical Command took over the task

of getting all supplies from Japan to

Korea. The new agency, actually a

communications zone command for the

Eighth Army, received requisitions for

supplies from Walker's headquarters,

placed requisitions on the proper agencies in the United States, and processed

and transported all supplies to the combat theater, leaving Walker's forces free

to fight without worrying about administrative matters in Japan.

The Chief of Staff, United States

Army, toured the Pusan Perimeter in

late August, visiting all American divisions and conferring with the army

commander. He found the morale of

the troops at the front to be uniformly

high and the major commanders confident and optimistic. But there had been

no letup in the enemy's determined

pressure. The point of greatest concern

to General Walker was still the slow

arrival of replacements in the combat

zone. He told General Collins, on 22

August at Taegu, that the replacement

flow was replacing only about 75 percent

of actual Eighth Army losses and his

units were fighting at less strength than

that authorized them when they came to

Korea.64

On the brighter side, the North

Korean Army had assumed an unbalanced and vulnerable disposition. By

the end of August, virtually all enemy

combat troops were south of the 37th

Parallel and being supported over long,

exposed lines of communications. UNC

air and naval units, now in complete

command of the sky and sea around

Korea, kept these exposed routes under

constant attack so that North Korean

logistical problems worsened daily.

General MacArthur, foreseeing the

enemy's vulnerable disposition, had decided early in the war that the old precept, "Hit 'em where they ain't," fitted

such a situation perfectly. The golden

chance to strike deep behind the enemy's

mass, cut his lines of supply, then smash

his front-line divisions by attacking from

two directions was enticing to the general who, in World War II, had proved

so well the value of amphibious

envelopment against the Japanese.

Indeed, a seaborne strike against the

North Korean rear had long seemed the

logical solution to MacArthur. Of

63

 (1) JLC GO 10, 28 Aug 50. (2) JLC GO 58,

18 Sep 50.

64

 Memo, Col Everett for ACofS G-3, 8 Sep 50,

sub: Rpt of Visit to FEC and USARPAC, 19-30

August 1940, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 5.
138 POLICY AND DIRECTION

course, before such a blow could be

struck, General Walker had to halt the

North Korean Army short of Pusan and

General MacArthur had to build an

amphibious .force almost from the

ground up. By the opening of September, both generals had progressed considerably in meeting these essentials.
CHAPTER VIII

Operation CHROMITE: The Concept

and the Plan

MacArthur had decided on an amphibious operation against the enemy

even before the first clash between American and North Korean soldiers at Osan.

On 2 July he asked Washington for a

Marine RCT. On the next day he

ordered 1,200 specially trained operators

for amphibious landing craft. He asked

on 5 July for an engineer special brigade

trained in amphibious operations and on

the same day called for an airborne RCT

"to participate in planned operations

from 20 July to 10 August."

 1

MacArthur had conceived these "planned operations" a few days after the

North Koreans struck. MacArthur then

believed that he could land an assault

force from the 1st Cavalry Division and

the Marine RCT against the enemy's

rear at Inch'on as early as 22 July. This

force would envelop Seoul and seize the

high ground to the north. At the same

time, all forces available to General Dean

would attack to drive the North Koreans

back against the Han. Maj. Gen. Edwin

K. Wright's planning group, JSPOG,

worked out the details of this early plan.

They assigned to it the code name

Operation BLUEHEARTS.2

General MacArthur on 6 July called

Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, commander

of the 1st Cavalry Division, to Tokyo

and told him of the plan. Some of

MacArthur's staff held high hopes for

the operation. General Willoughby,

MacArthur's G-2, admonished Gay to

step lively or be left behind. "You must

expedite preparations to the utmost,"

Willoughby warned, "because if your

1

 (1) Information on these requests is contained

in previous chapters. (2) Rad, CM-IN 9573, CINC

FE to DA, 3 Jul 50. (3) Rad, C 57248, CINCFE to

DA, 5 Jul 50. (4) The Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, had cabled COM

NAVFE, Admiral C. Turner Joy, that a Marine RCT

could be made available for service in Korea, if

General MacArthur desired. Joy called upon MacArthur in Tokyo on 2 July. MacArthur, who had

just returned from a depressing inspection of the

situation in Korea, accepted with alacrity and, according to Joy, with unusual enthusiasm. For an

account of this transaction, see Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953,

vol. I, The Pusan Perimeter, pp. 48-49.

2

 (1) Draft Plan, Opn BLUEHEARTS, JSPOG, GHQ,

FEC, Jul 50, copy in JSPOG, GHQ files. (2) For

other coverage of the plans and preparations for the

Inch'on landing, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 488-500; Field, Naval

Operations, Korea, pp. 171-83; Lynn Montross and

Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, US. Marine Operations

in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. II, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, chs. I through IV; and Col. Robert Deles

Heinl, Jr., Victory at High Tide (New York: J. B.

Lippincott Co., 1968), ch. 2.
140 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL WRIGHT GENERAL GAY

landing is delayed, all that the 1st Cavalry Division will hit when it lands will

be the tail-end of the 24th Division as it

passes north through Seoul."

 3

Operation BLUEHEARTS died a-borning. The failure of the weak American

and weaker ROK forces to halt the enemy and the forced commitment of the

1st Cavalry Division before 22 July made

the operation, in July or even in August,

quite infeasible. It was canceled on 10

July. 4

The increasingly grave turn of events

on the ground strengthened MacArthur's

determination to strike amphibiously.

He told Generals Collins and Vandenberg of his intentions on 13 July and outlined a tentative strategy. He had not

yet chosen a target date nor a definite

landing site, but informed Collins and

Vandenberg that as soon as the North

Koreans had been stopped, he would

attack their rear on the west coast. He

believed that Inch'on would be the best

place to strike. But he was also considering landing beaches at Haeju and

Chinnamp'o, both north of Inch'on.

A day later, General Collins talked

with some of MacArthur's key staff officers about the proposed landing. The

Army Chief of Staff, aware of the tremendous tidal changes at Inch'on, ques3

 Ltr, Gen Gay to Col Appleman, 24 Aug 53, copy

in OCMH. Gay recalls that his division did hit the

tail of the 24th Division on 20 July, but under quite

different circumstances. 4

 During his briefing of General Collins on 13

July, General MacArthur explained why Operation

BLUEHEARTS could not be carried out. There is a

marked similarity between BLUEHEARTS and the strategic concepts developed later.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 141

REAR ADM. JAMES H. DOYLE

tioned the wisdom of a landing there.

Rear Adm. James H. Doyle, assistant to

Admiral Joy and a man of much experience in amphibious techniques, agreed

that a landing at Inch'on could be extremely difficult and would require considerable preliminary naval bombardment. But he told Collins that it could

be done.5

Turning to General Almond, Collins

asked how the assault troops would cross

the formidable barrier of the Han River

after landing at Inch'on. Almond

pointed out that amphibious trucks,

available in the theater, could be used

to ferry troops. The crossing would

probably be unopposed since General

MacArthur would use the airborne RCT

to seize and secure the north shore of

the Han. General Collins returned to

Washington without committing himself, either for or against the planned

operation. But he described to his fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and to his Army staff assistants the broad

outlines of the maneuver MacArthur had

in mind.6

The commitment of the 25th Division

and the 1st Cavalry Division against the

North Koreans had slowed, but not

stopped, the enemy's drive, and did not

come in time to prevent the fall of

Taejon to the enemy on 20 July. The

loss of all Korea loomed as a very real

possibility. Nevertheless, by that date

General MacArthur had discussed his

idea with General Almond and General

Wright and had ordered detailed plans

drawn up for an amphibious envelopment. Primary emphasis, he directed,

was to be on Inch'on as the assault site,

but he also specified that alternate plans

be prepared.

Wright's planning officers at once began to ready the basic framework of a

plan for an amphibious assault landing

at Inch'on during September and to

draw up several alternate plans as well.

On 23 July all these plans went to GHQ

staff officers most directly concerned with

the proposed operations.7

5

 General Wright calls Doyle "a real expert on

amphibious operations, a real commander in every

sense of the word, a thorough planner and an able

and enthusiastic executive of those plans. . . ." See

Ltr, Gen Wright to Maj Gen E. W. Snedeker, USMC,

16 Feb 56, Marine Corps files. 6

 (1) Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, sub: Rpt

of Trip to FEC, 10-15 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 333

Pac, Case 3, Tabs A and C. (2) Collins, War in

Peacetime, p. 116. (3) President Truman, in volume

II, page 348, of his Memoirs, recalls that on his

return from Tokyo, General Collins had serious misgivings about MacArthur's plans for the counterattack.

7

 (1) Draft Plan 100-B, JSPOG, 23 Jul 50, copy in

JSPOG, GHQ, FEC files. (2) Plans circulated at the

same time were Plan 100-C, calling for a landing at
142 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General MacArthur confirmed the

message which General Collins had carried back to Washington on 23 July,

when he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that he meant to use the 5th Marine

RCT and the 2d Division for "major

amphibious operations" in mid-September. An airborne RCT would drop into

the objective area soon after D-day to

seize key communications centers immediately ahead of the advancing assault

forces. MacArthur did not pinpoint

his objective area, but he described in

broad terms how the assault would go.

After the beachhead had been seized,

Eighth Army, by that time augmented

by the additional infantry, artillery, and

tank battalions, would attack from the

south and destroy the North Koreans.

"Although the exact date of D-day

is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during the month of August,"

MacArthur reported to Washington:

I am firmly convinced that an early and

strong effort behind his front will sever his

main line of communication and enable us

to deliver a decisive and crushing blow.

Any material delay in such an operation

may lose this opportunity. The alternative

is a frontal attack which can only result in

a protracted and expensive campaign to

slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th

Parallel.8

General MacArthur's proposals for a

September landing reached Washington

at a bad time. They came on the heels

of the grim news that Taejon had fallen

and while the North Koreans were obviously preparing a double envelopment

of Walker's defenses. MacArthur's

term, "enemy reaction during . . . August," probably struck the Joint Chiefs

of Staff as euphemistic. At any rate,

they called General MacArthur to a

teleconference on 24 July and asked

pointedly whether, in the face of increasing enemy pressure and the stepped-up

tempo of the fighting all along the front,

he still believed it wise to schedule an

amphibious landing for mid-September.

Confidently, General MacArthur assured them that, "barring unforeseen

circumstances, and with complete provision of requested replacements, if the

full Marine division is provided, the

chances to launch the movement in

September would be excellent." Complete tactical surprise was essential to

the success of the amphibious operation,

he declared, and warned Washington

not to give away his intentions, saying

"I cannot emphasize too strongly the

necessity for complete secrecy with reference to this matter. The spokesman for

the Department of the Army should not

reveal our grand strategy in the slightest

degree." The Joint Chiefs of Staff derived little assurance from their exchange

Kunsan, and Plan 100-D, calling for a landing on

the east coast near Chumunjin. General Wright recalls that alternate landings featuring Wonsan and

Chinnamp'o were also under consideration. General

Walker, Wright says, wanted a flexible plan with

landings scheduled for either coast so that the main

effort could be mounted with little advance notice.

But from the standpoint of a communications complex which could be used to support the breakout

from the beachhead and the pursuit phase, SeoulInch'on "stood out like a sore thumb," according

to General Wright. See Interv, author with Wright,

Dec 51.

8

 Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 23 Jul

50.

9

 (1) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS and CINCFE, 24 Jul

50. (2) Details of MacArthur's request for the "full

Marine division" mentioned here are contained in

Chapter IX, below.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 143

A RUSSIAN-MADE T-34 TANK knocked out in Taejon.

with MacArthur. They could only

watch and wait for new developments.9

The predicament of Walker's divisions

in Korea concerned General MacArthur

far more than was apparent in his reassuring words to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Walker's slowing but continued

withdrawal before the North Koreans

threatened to render plans for an amphibious operation in September purely

academic. Walker himself was worried

and disappointed because his divisions

were not stopping the North Koreans.

Troops often came close to panic and

commanders sometimes nearly lost control. Walker was particularly disappointed over the failure to check the

enemy advance down the Taejon-Taegu

axis in late July and early August.

Because of the Eighth Army's precarious position, MacArthur took a drastic

step which, seemingly, negated his plans

for a mid-September landing. He ordered the 2d Division and the 5th Marine

RCT, both on the high seas and both

scheduled for his amphibious assault, to

sail directly to Korea where they entered

combat almost at once.

This move by MacArthur caused his

own planning staff to urge a reconsideration of the timing of the proposed

operation. To launch an attack by mid-
144 POLICY AND DIRECTION

September, with his entire assault force

now committed in the Pusan Perimeter,

seemed to them almost impossible. If

the attack was to be made in September,

both the 2d Division and the Marines

would have to be taken away from

Walker, or only the Marines withdrawn

and teamed with the 7th Division for the

amphibious landing. Officers of JSPOG

pointed out to General Almond that if

General Walker needed the 2d Division

in August, he would most certainly need

it in September. Also, pulling a division

out through the cluttered port at Pusan

would tie up supplies and seriously hamper support of Walker's forces remaining on the line. These officers believed

that any plan based on use of the 7th Division would be "visionary and impracticable." That division, still in Japan,

was at less than half strength, and was

not expected to reach full strength before 1 October or to be ready for amphibious operations before 1951. They

recommended that General MacArthur

postpone the target date for the

amphibious operation until 15 October.10

One of General MacArthur's outstanding attributes, demonstrated quite

often in World War II, was a keen sense

of timing. He had not hesitated in the

past to override the recommendations

of his staff whenever he felt his judgment was more correct than its counsel.

Nor did he hesitate in this case. Apparently, he not only believed that forces

for the operation would materialize in

time for the landing in September, but

also, that he could not afford to wait

beyond that date.

General MacArthur's refusal to abandon his mid-September date was influenced by his knowledge of the Inch'on

area as well as by his desire to relieve

the pressure on the Pusan Perimeter as

quickly as he could. October might well

be too late. Low seas were common in

the Inch'on area from May through August, with September a month of transition to the high seas which prevailed

from October through March. This left

September as the only autumn month

when conditions were suitable for landing troops and equipment under fire.

During only three days, even in September, would the tidal conditions favor a

landing. From 15 to 18 September the

tidal surges would be high enough to

cover the extensive mud flats that fronted

Inch'on Harbor and landing craft could

be brought in. The next opportunity

would not come until mid-October. By

that time seas might be too heavy, and

there would be little good weather left

for the pursuit and breakout phase of

the operation.11

He confided to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 29 July that, while the enemy's

successes were upsetting his plans nearly

as fast as they were made, he was still

holding to the September date. "In

Korea," he said, "the hopes that I had

entertained to hold out the 1st Marine

Division [sic: Brigade] and the 2d Infantry Division for the enveloping counterblow have not been fulfilled and it

will be necessary to commit these units

to Korea on the south line rather

than . . . along a separate axis in midSeptember." He had not given up hope

of mounting the waterborne attack even

10

 Memo, JSPOG, for CofS GHQ FEC, UNC, 29

Jul 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

11

 Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing—Victory

Over Time and Tide," Marine Corps Gazette (July

1951), p. 28.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 145

though he now admitted it might have

to be staged out of the Pusan Perimeter

rather than Japan. And he informed the

Joint Chiefs that as soon as the 7th

Division could be brought to approximate strength he was going to throw it

into the fight.12

General MacArthur realized that without full support from Washington the

landing could not be made. And sensing, perhaps, a certain coolness among

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at least an

absence of enthusiasm approaching his

own, he included an evaluation of amphibious landings with particular emphasis on Korea. "It is essential, in my

opinion," General MacArthur told his

superiors, "to utilize our own strength

in naval and air forces in the form of

amphibious envelopment. When and

if this can be accomplished, the ground

initiative which the enemy now possesses

will be wrenched from him and a

decisive result made possible."

On 1 August General Walker had

ordered his entire force to break contact with the enemy and to pull back

behind the Naktong River, there to make

a final stand. On 6 August, General

Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ,

flew into this perimeter, carrying with

him a brief of the plans for the amphibious landing. The hard-pressed

Walker agreed with the concept and

with the detailed provisions of the plan.

But members of General Walker's staff,

particularly those of his G-3 section,

were skeptical of Eighth Army's ability

to carry out the co-ordinated frontal assault provided by the plan. They

frankly and openly doubted that the divisions then in the Pusan Perimeter

could drive through the mountains to

the Kum River. Bridges were out all

across the Eighth Army front. Walker

was seriously short of trucks. But the

biggest obstacle, according to the Eighth

Army staff, would be the North Korean

Army, which would be intact and capable of fierce and sustained resistance

even though the amphibious assault in

its rear was successfully carried out.

Some of Walker's officers felt that the

North Koreans would, if driven from

the roads, take to the surrounding hills

and prevent the American divisions from

breaking out to the north. One key

officer suggested that Eighth Army take

the much longer coastal route up the

west coast where roads were good and

flank protection would be afforded by

the Yellow Sea. Eighth Army officers

generally agreed that after the landing in

the north Walker would need at least

two more divisions before he could

break out.13

President Truman sent his special assistant, Averell Harriman, to Tokyo on

6 August, primarily to discuss Far Eastern political matters with General MacArthur. General Ridgway and Lt. Gen.

Lauris Norstad of the Air Force accompanied Mr. Harriman. While these

officials were in Tokyo, General MacArthur took the opportunity to express

his views on the situation facing him

in Korea, MacArthur believed that speed

was the keystone of victory over the

North Koreans. He told Harriman and

the military officers that the United

States could not afford to wait for a slow

12

 Rad, C 58993, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Jul 50.

13

 Memo, Lt J. B. Warren for Gen Wright, 7 Aug

50, sub: Trip to EUSAK, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC

files.
146 POLICY AND DIRECTION

build-up of forces in Korea. The United

States must destroy the North Korean

Army as early as possible. If not, the

Russians and Chinese Communists, MacArthur feared, would be able to

strengthen their protégé by shipping in

more arms and supplies. MacArthur

also saw in a failure to settle the matter

speedily, political dangers. United Nations members would grow discouraged

and Oriental peoples would be disappointed with, and lose confidence in,

the United States.14

On 12 August, shortly after these visitors departed, another and more fully

developed draft of the landing plan was

issued, setting a target date of 15 September. The strategic concept of this plan

would be put into effect one month

later without substantive change. Without naming major Army units, the plan

proposed committing the GHQ Reserve

and the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation to seize the Inch'onSeoul area and to cut the main lines of

enemy communications and supply to

North Korean units in the south. In

conjunction with the seaborne assault,

the Eighth Army was to break out of

its perimeter and drive northwest along

the Taegu-Taejon-Suwon axis to link

up with the amphibious force. The

Navy and the Air Force would carry

out vital missions of transportation, security, naval gunfire support, carrier aircraft support, and strategic bombing.

The 1st Marine Air Wing would furnish

tactical air cover for the landing.15

These plans for landing at Inch'on on

15 September met opposition both

within MacArthur's own staff and in

other quarters. Navy and Marine officers raised objection to the plans. These

officers did not oppose an amphibious

assault even though they felt that Army

planners were minimizing the problems

which the Navy and Marine Corps must

overcome in carrying and landing the

assault forces on D-day. They did not

want to land at Inch'on.16

Their concern over Inch'on arose from

its natural obstacles to military and naval

operations. From the standpoint of

navigation, sea approaches, and landing

beaches, Inch'on ranked among the

worst harbor areas in Korea. The Yellow Sea in its periodic surges into the

harbor (changes in the sluggish, heavy

tide exceeded thirty feet) had created

broad mudbanks and tidal flats which

fronted the entire harbor. These flats

were so soft and the muck so deep they

would not support men on foot. Twice

a day the tides rolled in to cover these

flats. The naval officers believed it

would require a 23-foot minimum tide

before small landing craft could safely

operate over these flats and a 29-foot tide

before Navy LST's could come into

Inch'on's beaches. This meant that they

could land men and supplies only from

the time an incoming tide reached

14

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 349-51. (2) See also MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 340-41. 15

 (1) Opn Plan 100-B, 12 Aug 50, in JSPOG,

GHQ, UNC files. (2) Special Rpt, U.S. X Corps,

Opn CHROMITE, copy in OCMH.

16

 This portion is based on the following: Chronicles by General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, 22-23

August 1950 (hereafter cited as General Smith's

Chronicles), copy available in Hist Sec, G-3 USMC,

Hq, Washington, D.C.; Special Action Rpt (SAR),

1st Marine Div, 15 Aug-30 Sep 50, copy in same

files; Malcolm C. Cagle, "Inchon, Analysis of a

Gamble," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 80,

No. 1 (January, 1954), 47-51. See also, Field, History

of United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 171-

83.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 147

GENERAL SMITH

twenty-three feet until the outgoing tide

dropped again to that level, a period of

only about three hours. Troops ashore

would then be stranded until the next

high tide about twelve hours later.

Morning high tide for 15 September was

forecast at 0650 and evening tide at 1920.

As already noted, the tide on that date

would be deep enough for landing craft.

Numerous islands bracketed Inch'on

to seaward, forming a natural pocket and

restricting naval maneuver to narrow

channels. Navigation through these

channels, particularly the main Flying

Fish Channel, was treacherous even in

daylight. The channel was narrow,

twisting, and dead-end. If the enemy

mined this channel, approach would be

virtually impossible.

In order to land, the Marines would

have to scale seawalls ranging from

twelve to fourteen feet high which

fronted the harbor across almost its entire width. The Inch'on area was heavily

built-up. The enemy could mount a

very effective resistance, taking advantage of buildings for protection. The

Marines did not want to land in the

middle of a built-up area if they

could help it. To complicate matters,

Wolmi-do, a 350-foot-high pyramidal

island, heavily fortified, dominated

Inch'on Harbor. All in all, Navy and

Marine planners found Inch'on a poor

place to land.

These officers had objected and argued

with General MacArthur's staff from

time to time in general terms, but when

the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith,

reported to Admiral Doyle, Commander,

Amphibious Group One, on 22 August

in Tokyo, these objections suddenly became concrete and specific. General

Smith had flown to Tokyo ahead of his

division to take command of the landing

force under Admiral Doyle who would

command the attack force. These two

officers and their staffs worked very

closely in arranging the details of the

amphibious assault on Inch'on.17

On 22 August, General Smith heard

17

 The Special Action Report of the Marine division says of the command relationships and the

planning phase, "Although relationships between

the division as Landing Force and COMPHIB

Group One were clear from the outset and in accordance with . . . doctrine, the command status

and command responsibilities for the assault landing phase of CG X Corps, CJTF 7 and COMNAVFE

were vague and confusing. None of the latter commands ever appeared under well defined titles and

none of the accepted titles which would have been

appropriate to these echelons was used."
148 POLICY AND DIRECTION

for the first time that the assault was

scheduled for 15 September. He had

been told before leaving the United

States that the target date was 23 September. He found Admiral Doyle very,

very skeptical about landing at Inch'on,

across mud flats, over docks and seawalls,

and in the face of a city of sizable population. Doyle told Smith that he had

sent his reconnaissance parties in at various sites along the Korean west coast

to find a better landing site than Inch'on.

He had found what he regarded as a better location for an amphibious assault.

This area, Posung-Myon, was about

twenty miles south of Inch'on and almost

due west of Osan. Navy underwater

demolition teams had made several trial

landings there and had found that beach

conditions were much better than at

Inch'on and would not restrict the landing to a particular day or hour. The

area was not built up and, according to

Doyle, was in striking distance of the

enemy's lines of communications south

of Seoul.

That evening, General Smith reported

to the Dai Ichi Building for an interview

with General MacArthur. He first met

General Almond to whom he briefly

raised his objections to Inch'on, without,

however, mentioning Posung-Myon. Almond dismissed Smith's protests by

telling him that the enemy had no organized forces at Inch'on, that the difficulties to be met there were only

mechanical, and that the date and place

of the landing had already been fixed.

He then ushered Smith into General

MacArthur's office where the Marine

general received not only a warm greeting, but assurance that the Inch'on landing would be decisive and that the war

could be over in one month after the

assault. General MacArthur insisted

that the North Koreans had committed

all of their troops against the Pusan

Perimeter, and he shared Almond's view

that the Marines would meet no heavy

opposition at Inch'on. When Smith objected that 15 September would be too

early to assemble his forces, General

MacArthur admitted that the landings

would have to be somewhat helterskelter. But he would not consider any

date other than 15 September.

These doubts within MacArthur's own

headquarters were matched at a higher

level by mounting suspicions within the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, suspicions arising

from ignorance of exactly what General

MacArthur was up to. Under the directives given him by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, as well as through precedent in the

considerable latitude granted comparable American commanders in the past,

General MacArthur had authority to dispose and employ his forces as he saw fit.

This authority reflected the fact that

planning for major operations of the

Korean War and decisions of tactical and

local strategic significance originated

with General MacArthur. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff set for him broad objectives and sometimes voiced their concern

over his handling of matters of political

significance. They entered into the planning picture most influentially in matters

involving allotment of forces and supply.

But in the case of the proposed Inch'on

landing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew

increasingly worried during August because MacArthur did not keep them informed of the development of his plans.

He submitted no campaign plan to them

and, aside from his requisitions for
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 149

forces, passed along only the bare outline

of his plans.

Knowing full well the weakened condition of American military resources

at the time, observing the continued successes of the North Korean Army, but

ignorant of the exact nature of MacArthur's preparations and plans for an

amphibious counterblow, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff began to wonder if MacArthur was not getting ready to bite off

more than the United States could chew.

In order to determine more precisely

what was taking place in Tokyo, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff sent two of their

members to the Far East. General

Collins and Admiral Sherman, accompanied by a staff of Air Force and Army

officers, flew to Tokyo on 19 August to

talk with MacArthur.18

Meeting privately with General

Collins and Admiral Sherman upon their

arrival in Tokyo, MacArthur covered

general aspects of the whole Korean

operation, and then staged a full-scale

briefing on the proposed amphibious

movement for top military and naval

officials. This briefing, which took place

in General MacArthur's conference room

on the 6th floor of the Dai Ichi Building

in Tokyo in the late afternoon of 23

August 1950, was attended by Generals

MacArthur, Collins, Almond, and

Wright of the Army and Admirals Sherman, Joy, Struble, and Doyle of the

Navy. Various other officers of lesser

rank participated in the briefing.19

Just before this briefing, General

Smith had approached General Almond

on the possibility of landing in the

Posung-Myon area instead of at Inch'on.

General Almond stated very definitely

that he was not interested in a landing

there except perhaps as a subsidiary landing in connection with Inch'on. Almond

told Smith that the real objective of this

operation was to capture Seoul at the

earliest possible date. Too, GHQ planning officers had looked into PosungMyon and did not believe that the area

had the necessary road net to support

heavy vehicles in any breakout of the

area.20

Admiral Doyle's planning officers presented the first portion of the briefing.

For nearly an hour they covered the

problems faced by the Navy in the landing operation, emphasizing the great difficulties and the risks involved. Their

remarks were decidedly pessimistic. Ad18

 (1) Rad, WAR 89118, DA to CINCFE, 18 Aug

40. (2) General Collins described the purpose of

the visit as ". . . to find out just exactly what these

plans were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark,

and as it was a matter of great concern, we went out

to discuss it with General MacArthur. We suggested certain alternative possibilities and places

and everything of that sort. . . ." Louis Johnson,

who as Secretary of Defense at this time claimed to

have supported MacArthur wholeheartedly in his

proposals for landing at Inch'on, describes the purpose of this visit differently. He stated, "General

Collins . . . did not favor Inchon and went over

to try to argue General MacArthur out of it." See

MacArthur Hearings, pp. 1295, 2618.

19

 (1) Ltr, Adm Joy to Col Appleman, 12 Dec 52.

(2) Ltr, Gen Almond to Col Appleman, 2 Dec 52.

(1) and (2) in OCMH. (3) Walter M. Karig, Battle

Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart,

1952), pp. 166-67. Karig's work, which both Joy

and Almond describe as substantially correct and

factual, is used as the basis for this account of the

23 August briefing. Modifications from Joy's and

Almond's letters have been applied to Karig's version where appropriate. 20

 (1) General Smith's Chronicles, 22-23 Aug 50.

(2) Col John Chiles, SGS GHQ, and later G-3, X

Corps, told the author during a conversation at the

Army War College in February 1955 that he had

examined charts of the Posung-Myon area, and

found the routes of egress entirely insufficient for

an operation of the scale planned.
150 POLICY AND DIRECTION

miral Doyle concluded this presentation

by conceding that the operation was not

impossible, but he stated that he did not

recommend it.

General MacArthur, already familiar

with the views of his naval staff, seems

not to have been taken aback by this

adverse comment. Taking the floor, he

came to the defense of his plans calmly

and with great assurance. He omitted

any mention of the hazards, dwelling instead upon the reasons why the landing

should be made at Inch'on and upon

the tactical conditions which favored its

success. He pointed out the disposition of the North Korean Army and

its vulnerability to an amphibious

encirclement.

If there were one vital spot in the

enemy's line of communications, the

Seoul-Inch'on area was that spot. Almost all of the major rail and highway

lines leading from North Korea channeled through that area. Only by seizing Seoul and Inch'on, MacArthur

insisted, could he achieve a quick and

decisive victory over the enemy. He

also pointed out the tremendous political

and psychological advantages to be

gained by retaking the Korean capital

from the invaders.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman

had suggested to him that a landing at

Kunsan, nearly one hundred miles south

of Inch'on, might be just as effective and

involve less risk. But MacArthur deprecated Kunsan as a main objective

area, maintaining that such a shallow

envelopment would not cut the enemy's

line of communications nor surround

his divisions. It would not lead to quick

victory and a bitter Korean winter campaign would have to be fought. Only

Inch'on, in General MacArthur's opinion, would do.

General MacArthur did not ask

Collins or Sherman to approve his plans,

nor did they offer to do so. The briefing was a briefing and nothing more, but

the purposes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had been served. They now knew what

MacArthur intended to do and how he

intended to do it. They were no longer

in the dark.

General MacArthur's able presentation did not completely convince the

naval and Marine officers. On the morning of 24 August, these officers, in a

meeting which included Admiral Sherman, Admiral Joy, Lt. Gen. Lemuel

C. Shepherd and the lesser naval and

Marine commanders, assembled in a

private airing of their grievances. All

present felt strongly that MacArthur

should give greater consideration to the

Posung-Myon area. They selected General Shepherd, Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific who was reputed to enjoy particular influence with

General MacArthur, to make a personal

appeal for the Posung-Myon area. General Shepherd called upon General MacArthur and presented the Navy-Marine

case but to no avail. From that hour,

the naval and Marine officers abandoned

Posung-Myon and concentrated on

Inch'on.21

Upon their return to Washington,

General Collins and Admiral Sherman

explained to their fellow members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff the concept and the

state of preparation for the attack on

Inch'on. Now that the veil had been

lifted, the Joint Chiefs examined the

21

 General Smith's Chronicles, 24 Aug 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 151

GENERAL SHEPHERD

plans carefully. They found no real

disagreement with what MacArthur intended to do and, on 28 August, notified

him that they approved his plans for an

amphibious operation on the west coast

of Korea. They suggested, though, that

he also prepare plans for an amphibious

envelopment in the vicinity of Kunsan.22

The Joint Chiefs of Staff very pointedly told MacArthur that, from here on

in, they wanted to know what went on in

his theater. "We desire such information as becomes available with respect to

conditions in the possible objective areas

and timely information as to your

intentions and plans for offensive

operations."

 23

Why had the Joint Chiefs of Staff

found it necessary to send MacArthur

approval of his plans? General Collins

may have felt that the controversy evident at the Tokyo briefing had now been

resolved and took this way of clearing

any doubt from MacArthur's mind. The

Inch'on landing would tie up a major

share of the nation's ready combat forces

and, while by strict interpretation, the

landing would be a purely tactical maneuver at the discretion of the theater

commander, failure would have repercussions far beyond Korea. This may

have led the Joint Chiefs to identify

themselves with the operation by granting approval, at the same time placing

them in a better position to call off the

maneuver if the risks suddenly appeared

too great. Their admonition requiring

"timely information" is in line with this

latter possibility. Certainly the Joint

Chiefs of Staff did not tell MacArthur

that they were taking the reins from

his hands.24

Orders for the attack followed almost

immediately. General MacArthur, on

30 August, issued his operations order

for the Inch'on landing, setting forth the

objectives and assigning specific missions

to his commanders.

He directed the U.S. X Corps, the

headquarters of which he established

within the theater (see ch. IX), to land

on D-day at H-hour on the west coast

of Korea to seize Inch'on, Kimp'o Airfield, and Seoul, and to sever all North

Korean lines of communication in the

area. He ordered co-ordinated attacks

22

 Rad, JCS 89960, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50. 23

 Ibid.

24

 General Collins and Admiral Sherman talked

with President Truman on their return, telling him

of MacArthur's plans and informing him that they

had approved these plans. "It was a daring strategic

conception," Truman commented. "I had the greatest confidence that it would succeed." See Truman, Memoirs, II, 358.
152 POLICY AND DIRECTION

from the southern perimeter by Eighth

Army and all available ground, naval,

and air forces, to destroy the North

Korean Army south of the line Inch'onSeoul-Utchin. Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, would command while afloat.

He would furnish Navy and Marine

assault forces and would transport follow-up landing forces. Once the lodgment ashore had been seized, Joy would

land the follow-up troops on the beachhead. After the beachhead was secured,

commanding general, U.S. X Corps,

would land, inform the naval commander of his readiness to assume responsibility for further operations, and

take command of all forces ashore. The

U.S. X Corps would operate directly

under General MacArthur until otherwise ordered. MacArthur charged General Stratemeyer, Commanding General,

FEAF, with general air support to isolate the objective area and with giving

required close support. The principal

air effort would support the Eighth Army

breakout. If so ordered, General Stratemeyer was to ferry, protect, and drop an

airborne RCT. General Walker on D

plus 1 would launch a general offensive

from his perimeter, making his main

effort along the Taegu-Taejon-Suwon

axis. Annexes to the operations order

gave detailed instructions to all commanders on all phases of the operation,

including intelligence, logistical support,

and command relationships.25

A representative of the Department of

the Army G-3, who had been making an

inspection tour of the Far East Command

and who returned to Washington in early

September, reported to General Bolté

that "Plans for the contemplated envelopment operation in Korea are well

advanced. Nearly everyone in FECOM

concerned with these plans is confident

that they can be carried out successfully

despite serious shortages in combat and

service troops and logistic support."

The officer pointed up Washington's

lack of participation in the planning for

Operation CHROMITE: "In order that

DA may further integrate its planning

with that of FECOM," he said, "working level officers in FECOM charged

with preparation of the campaign plan

will attempt to obtain General MacArthur's permission to forward a copy of

this plan to DA. . . ."

 26

When, by 5 September, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, despite their request of

28 August, had heard nothing more from

General MacArthur on his plans, they

again called upon him, saying, "Pursuant

to the request . . . desire to be informed

of any modification which may have

been made in your plans for the midSeptember amphibious operation."

 27

This terse reminder triggered only a

casual reaction from MacArthur. He

replied that "the general outline of the

plan remains as described to you." He

promised that by 11 September, using

25

 (1) Opns Order No. 1, GHQ, UNC, 30 Aug 50,

copy with Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, GHQ, FEC,

1 Jan-31 Oct 50, Annex IV. (2) For a more detailed

study of this order and of the organization of landing and attack forces, see the following: USAF Hist

Study, United States Air Force Operations in the

Korean Conflict, 25 June-1 November 1950, ch. 5,

copy in OCMH; and Malcolm C. Cagle, "Inchon,

Analysis of a Gamble," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings (January 1954), pp. 47-51. 26

 Memo, Col Everett for Gen Bolté, 8 Sep 50,

sub: Visit to USARPAC and FEC, 19-30 Aug 50,

in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 5. 27

 Rad, JCS 90639, JCS to MacArthur, 5 Sep 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 153

VICE ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY

officer courier, he would send them a

detailed description of his planned

operations.28

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had been weighing the possible fruits

of success at Inch'on against the certain

price of failure. They lacked General

MacArthur's complete faith in ultimate

victory at Inch'on. They feared a

debacle at Inchon from which the U.N.

forces might not recover. North Korean

gains along the Pusan Perimeter had

continued into September and, from

Washington, chances of a mid-September

victory on the west coast appeared to be

diminishing rapidly.

On 7 September the Joint Chiefs of

Staff called General MacArthur's attention to the fact that he had committed

almost all of Eighth Army's reserves. He

could expect no more reinforcements

immediately. All available General Reserve units except the 82d Airborne Division had been sent to him already. If

the Inch'on landing failed, the U.N.

forces would be in grave danger. It

would take at least four months before

any of the newly called National Guard

divisions could reach Korea. The Joint

Chiefs called on MacArthur for a new

estimate and a reconsideration of

Inch'on.29

This shadow of doubt cast over his

plans only a week before the target date

evoked from General MacArthur a

forceful protest, couched in the strongest,

most expressive terms. He discounted

the seriousness of the situation confronting General Walker, who was, at this

time, having some of his darkest days.

General MacArthur showed extreme

optimism in describing the probable

effects upon the enemy of a landing

against his west coast rear areas. "There

is no question in my mind," he told the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, "as to the feasibility

of the operation. . . ." He saw the

planned operation as the only hope of

seizing the initiative from the enemy.

If the landing were not made, General

MacArthur warned, the United States

would be committed to a war of attrition

which might drag on interminably and

which the enemy, with his greater potential for reinforcement, might win.

While conceding that General Walker

might have to contract his perimeter,

General MacArthur held that the situation around Pusan was not critical.

"There is no slightest possibility," he

maintained, "of our forces being ejected

from the Pusan beachhead." If, as he

28

 Rad, C 62213, CINCFE to JCS, 6 Sep 50. 29

 Rad, JCS 90908, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Sep 50.
154 POLICY AND DIRECTION

believed the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

implying, small increments of reserves

were fed into the Pusan area merely to

strengthen the perimeter instead of being

used for the encircling attack, the cost in

time, casualties, and matériel would be

immeasurably increased. He suspected,

too, the Washington military officials

were looking at the map too closely and

finding bugaboos. They seemed to fear

the result if Eighth Army failed to break

out and join the landing force at Inch'on

on schedule. In General MacArthur's

opinion, the success of the operation did

not depend on a rapid joining of the

two forces. The seizure of the heart of

the North Korean distributing system in

the Seoul area would "dislocate the

logistical supply of his forces operating

in South Korea" and ultimately result in

the disintegration of North Korean resistance. Both American forces, Eighth

Army and the U.S. X Corps, would be

self-sustaining because of the complete

American control of sea and air. While

the prompt junction of forces would be

"dramatically symbolic of the complete

collapse of the enemy," General MacArthur certainly did not consider it a

vital part of the operation. Troops were

already embarking for the amphibious

sweep, and preliminary naval and air

preparations were going ahead on schedule. "I and all of my commanders and

staff officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the success

of the enveloping operation," General

MacArthur concluded.30

Faced with these most vigorous views

from a man who was in a position to

judge the theater situation more accurately than anyone else, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff acquiesced. They went

further and obtained President Truman's approval for the landing. On 8

September, they gave General MacArthur the final green light for the

landing at Inch'on one week later.31

30

 Rad, C 62423, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Sep 50. 31

 Rad, JCS 90958, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Sep 50.
CHAPTER IX

Operation CHROMITE: The Forces

MacArthur planned his bold amphibious venture at Inch'on sustained only by

hope, credit, and promises. At no time

during his planning did he have the men

and guns he would need. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, moreover, frequently told

MacArthur that, with the military resources of the United States at rock bottom and because of the short-fused target

date on which MacArthur adamantly

insisted, the needed men and guns might

not arrive on time. The disagreements

over time, place, and method of landing

stemmed in part from this fact and were

certainly of less significance. MacArthur

well knew that even with the fullest support by Washington he might not have

by his chosen D-day enough trained men

and equipment to breach enemy defenses

and to exploit a penetration. Trained

men, especially those with amphibious

training, were at a premium in the

United States as well as in the Far East.

To assemble, equip, and move these men

secretly and swiftly to the battle area by

15 September would require an enormous, finely co-ordinated effort by all

involved. The difficulties were appalling, and to surmount them called for

extraordinary energy and ingenuity.

The nature and location of the planned

landing dictated that it be directed by a

tactical headquarters separate from the

Eighth Army. General Walker had his

hands full in the Pusan Perimeter and

could not easily divide his attention, effort, or staff. The size of the landing

force, initially set at about two divisions,

indicated a need for a corps command.

It was for this reason that MacArthur,

concurrently with his efforts to bring the

two corps headquarters to his theater in

late July, had asked that the commander

and planning staff of the I Corps be

flown to Tokyo.1 But by the time General Coulter and his skeleton staff reached

Japan, a need for the I Corps in the

Pusan Perimeter forced MacArthur to

send Coulter on to Korea.

Since the amphibious operation could

not be made without a corps headquarters, members of JSPOG recommended

that their chief, General Wright, ask

MacArthur either to organize a provisional corps headquarters locally or to

bring from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo the

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC)

headquarters, commanded by General

Shepherd. General Wright chose the

latter course and suggested to General

1

 Rad, CX 58296, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jul 50.
156 POLICY AND DIRECTION

ADMIRAL RADFORD conferring with General MacArthur during Inch'on planning.

Almond that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, be

asked if the Marine headquarters could

be moved. "There is urgent need"

General Wright argued, "to get a headquarters in being for the GHQ Reserve

operation. This headquarters must be

one that can operate in the field as a going concern with such things as situation

reports, operations reports, communications, etc., happening automatically."

Forming a provisional headquarters from

theater officers did not appeal to Wright.

"A provisional command group selected

from GHQ officers will not be a going

concern unless it has time to get together

and train in the field," he pointed out.

"This is true no matter how efficient

the individual officers are." Too little

time remained to form and train such a

group since, Wright warned, "With the

target date of 15 September, only thirty

days remain in which to complete the

landing plan, embarkation plan and the

embarkation of the assault element."

Wright cited amphibious doctrine which
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 157

set from 90 to 150 days for planning.

For this reason alone he felt that the

trained headquarters from Hawaii should

be used if available.

General Hickey agreed with Wright.

Hickey told General Almond:

Utilization of this headquarters and staff

which is already organized and functioning

offers many advantages over the hasty throw- ing together of a provisional Corps head- quarters and staff from available personnel

The latter would be at best only a half- baked affair and would contribute to reducing the efficient functioning of GHQ

because of the key personnel withdrawn.2

General MacArthur did not accept

Wright's suggestion. First of all, after

the amphibious landing at Inch'on itself,

CHROMITE would be an overland campaign. Secondly, and perhaps most

importantly, MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE planning accomplished

under his own close and constant supervision, and not by a group less subject

to his direct view than his own GHQ

staff. Wright therefore made no further

attempt to bring in the outside headquarters.3

General Wright's second attempt to

arrange a headquarters proved more successful. "As your advisor on tactical

organization and operations for forces,"

he told Almond on 10 August, "I strongly

recommend that we immediately activate

a command for the GHQ Reserve."

This command, in Wright's concept, was

to be very similar to a corps headquarters. Because of its specialized mission

the command would not need an artillery

headquarters, observation battalion, engineer brigade, or engineer topographical company. He recommended that this

headquarters be moved to the field immediately since the target date of 15

September was fast approaching and the

group would have to be ready to load

aboard ship by 10 September. Only

twenty-five days remained in which to

complete corps-level plans, to condition

units for the field, to develop standing

operating procedures, and to give combat

training to headquarters personnel.4

General MacArthur accepted Wright's

recommendation and ordered the formation of a provisional planning staff, forerunner of the actual corps staff, from

officers of his own GHQ staff. To conceal its true purpose, he designated this

new group as the Special Planning Staff,

GHQ. General Almond chose the officers for this staff and on 15 August directed them to begin part-time planning,

and to continue to work on their regular

jobs only as necessary.

Almond named Maj. Gen. Clark L.

Ruffner, who had arrived from the

United States on 6 August, as chief of

staff of the Special Planning Staff. Ruffner assembled his staff in a bunker-type

concrete structure near the Dai Ichi

Building on 15 August. As a first step,

these officers drew up a troop list and a

standing operating procedure for the

landing. When General Ruffner asked

what forces would be used for the landing and breakout, MacArthur replied,

"The 7th Division which is half-understrength, the Marine Brigade in Korea,

other marines from the United States, 2

 Memo, JSPOG for Gen Wright, 7 Aug 50, with

Ind, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. 3

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen Edward M. Almond to

Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History,

Hq, DA, 10 Feb 67, OCMH files.

4

 Memo, Gen Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC, 10

Aug 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.
158 POLICY AND DIRECTION

and a battalion of Marines from the

Mediterranean."

 5

MacArthur had not yet named a commander for the invasion forces. Near the

end of the third week in August, General

Almond suggested to him that the time

had come to appoint such a commander.

MacArthur turned to his chief of staff

and said, "It is you." MacArthur told

Almond that he would continue as chief

of staff, Far East Command, "in absentia." He was so confident of ending the

war by a quick victory at Inch'on, that

he believed Almond could return to

Tokyo within only a few weeks after the

initial landing. In effect, MacArthur

put General Almond, as well as other

officers on the new corps staff, on loan to

the corps from GHQ for the landing

operation.6

On 21 August, General MacArthur

asked to be allowed to activate, from

sources already available in his theater,

Headquarters, X Corps. Department of

the Army readily granted this authority.7

The Special Planning Staff had already

prepared its version of the best organization for the new corps headquarters.

General Almond approved it. The major deviation from standard corps Tables

of Organization and Equipment was the

addition of a small transportation section

and an area command, headquarters

and headquarters detachment, of about

ninety officers and men. General Ruffner told General Almond that, since

X Corps would be operating separately

"until such time as link-up is effected,"

it would have to carry out some functions normally carried out by an Army

headquarters.8

The corps was activated without a

TO&E, Table of Allowances, or Table

of Distribution being prescribed. The

staff used published equipment and personnel tables as guides, but modified the

structure to enable the corps headquarters to operate as a separate corps along

the lines of a field army headquarters.

As a result, all equipment drawn had to

be requisitioned and such requests had

to be approved as items over and beyond

authorized allowances. Each requisition,

in fact, had to be reviewed personally by

the corps G-4, Col. Aubrey D. Smith,

and approved by the chief, Supply Division, G-4, GHQ. Limited time, inexperienced people, and the urgent press

of planning the impending operation

greatly complicated this problem.9

General MacArthur formally established the X Corps on 26 August. The

Special Planning Staff, GHQ, became

Headquarters, X Corps, and General Almond was officially designated commanding general in addition to his duties as

chief of staff and deputy commander,

Far East Command, United Nations

Command. All units or detachments in

or en route to Japan and previously designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to

X Corps. Next, on 1 September, Mac5

 (1) Diary, CG X Corps, Opn CHROMITE, 15 Aug30 Sep 50, copy in OCMH. (2) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Ruffner, 27 Aug 51. 6

 Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Almond, 13

Dec 51. 7

 (1) Rad, C 60770, CINCFE to DA, 21 Aug 50.

(2) Rad, W 89390, DA to CINCFE, 22 Aug 50.

8

 Memo, CofS Special Planning Staff, GHQ (Gen

Ruffner), for CofS GHQ (Gen Beiderlinden), 23 Aug

50, sub: Org, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, Item 26, 23

Aug 50. 9

 Comments, Col Smith, former ACofS G-4, X

Corps, contained in Hq, EUSAK, Mono, Martin

Blumenson, Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, pp. 51-53, copy in OCMH.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 159

Arthur assigned the code name, Operation CHROMITE, to the planned landing

at Inch'on; and, on 6 September, he

confirmed in writing what he had already

told his major commanders orally, that

D-day for Operation CHROMITE was

15 September 1950.10

With time running short and an

ominous amount of detailed planning

and co-ordination remaining, officers of

the new corps headquarters worked

around the clock. General Almond

crammed as much field training and testing into the few busy days before embarkation as he could. On 1 September,

his entire corps staff together with coordinators and umpires moved to a

wooded area near Camp Drake in suburban Tokyo and set up a field command

post. A tactical exercise prepared by

General Willoughby was used to test the

readiness of the green headquarters. On

the second day of the exercise, General

Almond, to measure the mobility and

flexibility of his staff, ordered the entire

group to displace to Atsugi, twenty miles

away, with no break in the continuity of

the maneuver. Realism in the maneuver

was achieved by confronting the staff

with situations closely paralleling those

expected at the actual landing. Four

main situations were presented, covering

the breakout from the beachhead, a

counterattack by enemy reserves, an opposed river crossing, and the exploitation

of the breakout. Results of this maneuver, which ended on 3 September,

made it apparent that General Almond's

choice of staff officers had been excellent

—the staff demonstrated a state of readiness far beyond expectations.11

Marine Forces

The vital factor of the landing operation remained the availability of a strong,

well-balanced, and specially trained and

equipped amphibious striking force, and

enough follow-up units to consolidate

and exploit the initial landing. The

former could come only from Marine

and Navy sources, while a full Army

division could provide the latter. MacArthur obtained these forces only after

two months of making insistent demands

on Washington and by taking unusual

steps within his own command.

Like its sister services, the U.S. Marine

Corps had shrunk in size during the postwar years. On 30 June, the Marine

Corps had only 74,279 officers and men

scattered widely among security, training,

and administrative posts throughout the

world. The operating segment of the

Marine Corps, 40,000 officers and men,

included the Fleet Marine Force, security forces, and Marines afloat. The

Fleet Marine Force was, in turn, divided

into Pacific and Atlantic sections. Each

of these had a reinforced but reduced

strength division and an understrength

air wing. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, held the 1st Marine Division and

1st Marine Air Wing while the Fleet

Marine Force, Atlantic, had the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Air Wing.

The combined strength of the 1st and 2d

10 (1) GHQ, UNC GO 324, 26 Aug 50. (2) Rad,

C 61660, CINCFE to Major Comds and DA, 6 Sep

50. (3) Ltr, CINCFE to All Major Comdrs, 6 Sep 50,

sub: Designation of D-day.

11

 Rpt, JSPOG for CofS GHQ, sub: Map Maneuver X, copy in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. This

exercise revealed that the corps had no proper

equipment for bridging the Han River.
160 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Marine Divisions did not equal that of a

single war-strength Marine division.

Early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had approved sending a Marine RCT

with supporting tactical air to the Far

East Command.12 The 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade was activated at Camp

Pendleton, California, on 5 July around

the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division,

and Marine Air Group 33 of the 1st

Marine Air Wing. The provisional brigade began loading from the west coast

almost immediately and sailed on 14 July

with about 4,500 ground troops. This

number included engineers, a tank company, a light artillery battalion, a 4.2-inch

mortar company, amphibious elements,

and three infantry battalions, and about

1,350 men in the air group. As of 9 July,

Admiral Radford judged this Marine

force capable of specialized missions, including amphibious landings, "under

conditions where appropriate higher

echelon agencies are present."

 13

 The

information on the amphibious capabilities of the new force was well received by

General MacArthur since it blended admirably with plans then being developed

by his staff. He radioed Washington at

once, asking that the Marine brigade,

"in view of the extensive opportunity for

amphibious employment," be expanded

to a full Marine division with appropriate air support.14

A few days after this request, General

Collins arrived in Tokyo where, in a discussion of the need for forces on 13 July,

General Almond upped MacArthur's

previous request, asking Collins for a

2-division corps of Marines. The Army

Chief of Staff replied that the Marines

were in the same position as the Army,

very short of men, and that even if another Marine division could be built, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had other plans for

it. But, before leaving Japan, General

Collins told General MacArthur privately that he believed one full Marine

division could be sent him.

In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had in Collins' absence

agreed to bring the 1st Marine Division

to war strength. This decision received

strong backing from Admiral Radford

who personally urged the Chief of Naval

Operations to give General MacArthur

a full Marine division as soon as possible.

Admiral Sherman supported Radford,

but with reservations. Radford's support

nonetheless proved instrumental in

bringing the 1st Marine Division to war

strength.15

On 19 July, General MacArthur called

again for the 1st Marine Division, this

time stipulating that all units of the division and the air wing should arrive

by 10 September. He also asked that

equipment and personnel be sent at once

to bring the 5th Marine RCT, already

on the way, to full war strength.16

To fill the 1st Marine Division, the

Marine Corps drew men and equipment

12

 Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. 13

 Rad, 0922322, CINCPACFLT to CINCFE, 9

Jul 50. 14

 (1) Rad, CX 57553, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Jul 50.

(2) Rpt, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve

in the Korean Conflict, Hist Sec G-3, Hq, U.S.

Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH.

15

 (1) Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, 15 Jul 50.

sub: Visit to FEC, Tab B. (2) Rad, C 57814, CINCFE (Gen Collins) to DA (Gen Haislip), 14 Jul 50.

(3) Note by Secy for JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac.

Case 28. (4) Rad, 080941Z, CINCPACFLT (Radford) to CNO (Sherman), 8 Jul 50. (5) JCS 1776/25,

Memo, CNO for JCS, 9 Jul 50, sub: Recommendations of CINCPACFLT Concerning Support of

CINCFE. 16

 Rad, CX 58239, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 161

from all over the United States. So empowered by Presidential authority, the

corps called 138 units with a strength of

1,800 officers and 31,648 enlisted Marines, its entire Organized Ground Reserve, to active service. It also brought

6,800 Regulars of the 2d Marine Division

from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to

Camp Pendleton. An effort was made,

however, to avoid stripping the Atlantic

area completely of Marines. Admiral

Sherman felt that denuding the Atlantic

area would be too dangerous; and at

Sherman's insistence, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff informed General MacArthur that

they could not send him the full Marine

division before November or December.

Nor could they determine the extent to

which the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade could be strengthened until Admiral Sherman conferred with Admiral

Radford in Hawaii.17

This threat to his plans drew fire from

MacArthur, and he urgently requested

the Joint Chiefs to reconsider. Provision

of the full division by 10 September he

saw as an absolutely vital element of his

entire plan. "There can be," he charged,

"no demand for its use elsewhere which

can equal the urgency of the immediate

battle mission contemplated for it."

 18

Unknown to MacArthur, an influential ally had already come to his support.

Admiral Radford, before meeting with

the Chief of Naval Operations, had

sought the advice of General Shepherd.

The Marine general spoke out strongly

for General MacArthur and recommended that his request for Marine

forces be met in the manner desired.

General Shepherd believed that the Fleet

Marine Force "as a whole" could provide the amphibious striking force and

that it could do so without a serious or

lasting impact on the Marine force's

readiness to meet other commitments.

"I feel," he told Admiral Radford, "that

there is a serious war in progress in

Korea and employment of amphibious

forces will prove the key of achievement

of a timely and economical decision for

our arms." He held that the Fleet Marine Force was ready "at this moment"

to send to Korea a force strong enough

to lead the counteroffensive amphibious

movement, "the task for which Marines

are trained and constituted."

 19

Back in Washington, General Bolte

added his support to General MacArthur's plea for early arrival of the Marines. He recommended to General

Collins that the latter use his influence

with the Joint Chiefs to support MacArthur in his call for a full Marine division in the theater by 10 September.20

The intervention of Generals Shep17

 (1) Rad, JCS 86511, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50.

(2) Wilbur W. Hoare, Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy, draft MS, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 13. 18

 (1) Rad, CX 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 50.

(2) This statement reflects General MacArthur's conviction that "Washington" followed a policy of

slighting his command in favor of the western European area. General Whitney's account of this transaction is interesting, if abbreviated. ". . . on July

10," Whitney says, "MacArthur asked the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for the 1st Marine Division. Profiting

by his experience with Washington's penchant for

skeletonizing his forces, he carefully stipulated a division at full strength. He was turned down flat. He

patiently tried again five days later, saying: 'I cannot

emphasize too strongly my belief in the complete

urgency of my request.' He was turned down

again." See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous

With History, p. 343. 19

 Memo, Gen Shepherd, CG FMPAC, for Adm

Radford, CINCPAC, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. 20

 Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 21 Jul 50,

sub: Augmentation of Provisional Marine Brigade,

in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 24.
162 POLICY AND DIRECTION

herd and Bolté prompted the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to reconsider. On 22 July, they

notified General MacArthur that they

would review their previous decision.

They asked him to help by telling them

what he meant to do with the Marine

brigade between its arrival date in late

July and 10 September. At the same

time, they ordered the brigade brought

to full war strength and the Marine

Air Group enlarged to full squadrons.21

Replying immediately, General MacArthur said that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, when it arrived on about

1 August, would be kept in Japan as

GHQ Reserve, "To be used in Korea

only in event of a critical situation."

Meanwhile, he would train, outfit, and

prepare the brigade for major amphibious operations in September.22

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, meanwhile, been weighing General MacArthur's need for a full Marine division by

10 September against the dangers in cutting Marine strength in other parts of

the world. Admiral Sherman proposed

and the other Joint Chiefs approved

a compromise by which the Marine

strength in the Far East Command

would be built up to two war-strength

RCT's by mid-September. Even this

solution, which would put only twothirds of a Marine division in Korea by

15 September, would greatly reduce Marine security forces in the United States

and cause an extensive call-up of Reserves. The Joint Chiefs, in a teleconference on 24 July, told MacArthur that,

"We have now determined it is practicable to further augment the Marine

Brigade after its arrival in Japan and

bring it to division war strength less one

RCT by mid-September. We have directed that this be done. The third

RCT cannot be furnished until winter."

General MacArthur did not care for this

compromise and remonstrated at once.

"Subtraction of an RCT from the Marine division," he contended, "tends to

jeopardize the entire conception and

would involve risks that cannot be determined finally at this time. I regard the

third RCT as essential." But Washington officials stood firm. They explained,

with forbearance, that the only trained

Marine battalions left after sending two

regiments to the Far East Command

would be one battalion in the 2d Marine

Division, one afloat in the Mediterranean, and a battalion of school troops

at Quantico, Virginia. These they considered the minimum for absolutely essential needs in the Atlantic.23

Still unhappy with the new arrangements, MacArthur shelved the matter for

the time being. Other developments

were pressing. Whereas the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had been headed

for Kobe, Japan, mounting pressure by

the enemy against Walker's perimeter

and signs of a strong enemy force sweeping down the west coast to outflank

Eighth Army forced MacArthur to abandon plans to keep the Marines as GHQ

Reserve in Japan. On 25 July, he ordered the ground elements of the brigade

diverted to Pusan, and to be prepared to

execute a rapid nontactical debarkation.

Units and equipment peculiar to am21

 Rad, JCS 86778, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50. 22

 Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul 50.

23

 (1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 24 Jul 50, sub: Deployment of Fleet Marine Forces to the FEC, cited in

Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. V, ch. IV, p. 14. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS

and CINCFE, 24 Jul 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 163

phibious operations were kept on board

ships and taken to Kobe. Upon landing

at Pusan on 3 August, the ground troops

of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade

were attached to General Walker's Eighth

Army and went into a Reserve assembly

near Masan.24

While hastily assembling another

RCT in the United States for shipment

to the Far East Command for use by 10

September, the Joint Chiefs on 10 August decided they need not wait until

winter to send General MacArthur the

third regiment of the Marine division.

On that date, they authorized the formation of the final regiment, the unit to

arrive in the Far East Command during

September. In order that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff appreciate the impact of

their decision, Admiral Sherman sketched

for them the drastic measures that the

Marine Corps had to take to give MacArthur a full division. ". . . it will involve," he told them, "moving to the

FEC the Marine battalion now in the

Mediterranean, one battalion now at

Camp Lejeune, and an RCT, less two

battalions, to be formed at Camp Pendleton. So doing will eliminate the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force in the

Atlantic for several months." The battalion from the Mediterranean would

have to come directly from Suda Bay

through the Suez Canal and be hastily

augmented with men sent directly to the

Far East Command.25

The 1st Marines' additional rifle companies and platoons to bring the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines)

up to war strength, and support and

service units for the division had been

building up at Camp Pendleton. These

loaded at San Diego between 14 and

24 August and reached Japan between

28 August and 2 September. The third

regiment was activated as the 7th Marines on 17 August at Camp Pendleton.

Two understrength battalions of the 6th

Marines from Camp Lejeune and individual Regulars and Reserves were assigned to the new regiment. Its other

battalion, the peace-strength battalion

from the Mediterranean, sailed directly

to Japan from its post with the fleet. A

third rifle company and third platoons

for the battalion's other two companies

formed with the main body of the 7th

Marines.26

Admiral Sherman, during his visit to

the Far East Command in late August,

queried his Washington headquarters on

the arrival date of this final component

of the division. He was touring the

battlefront in Korea when the discouraging reply reached him. "The limiting

factor," Sherman learned, "is the readiness of Marine Corps troops, which cannot be advanced ahead of an already

tight schedule." Owing to the need for

training, the two Marine battalions from

the United States could not reach the

Far East Command until 19 September,

while the battalion coming from the

Mediterranean would arrive in Korea on

12 September. "It is impossible," Admiral Sherman was told, "for the entire

24

 (1) Rad, CX 586628, CINCFE to COMNAVFE,

28 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX 58763, CINCFE to COM

NAVFE and CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul 50. (3) Rpt,

Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, Hq U.S.

Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH. 25

 (1) Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 14. (2) Memo, CNO

for JCS, 11 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case

30/2.

26

 Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing—Victory

Over Time and Tide," p. 28.
164 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Marine Division to arrive in Japan by

10 September."

 27

While aware of the problems facing

the Marine Corps in readying units for

shipment, Admiral Sherman was equally

aware of MacArthur's problem. He ordered the expediting of the departure

from the United States of the 7th Marines' RCT elements. Granting that a

division commander could best judge his

division's training requirements, Sherman nevertheless told naval officers in

Washington that they must take account

of the requirements of the Korean campaign and the great need for bringing

the division up to strength as early as

possible after the Inch'on landing. "It

must be assumed," Admiral Sherman

radioed his staff, "that the operation will

not be delayed and if two battalions are

late, the division will fight without

them."

 28

 But for all of Sherman's urging, the 7th Marines with accompanying

troops did not embark until 3 September,

and reached Korea on the 21st, too late

for the landing.

A minor controversy centered around

General Walker's very natural unwillingness to release the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade. The brigade had been in almost constant action since its arrival,

attacking and counterattacking in the

southern sector of the Pusan Perimeter,

and had proved to be a mainstay of General Walker's defense. When General

Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, reached Tokyo on 22 August, he

had assumed the brigade would be released to him. He had already ordered

liaison officers exchanged between his

division headquarters and the brigade

staff, and key officers of the brigade had

come to Tokyo for briefing on the landing operation. On 30 August, Smith

asked Almond for the brigade at once.

According to Smith, General Almond

appeared very reluctant to commit himself. He apparently did not want to

decide, in his capacity as chief of staff,

GHQ, on a definite date at which the

brigade would be released to the 1st Marine Division to operate under himself

as commanding general, X Corps. General Smith, after his talk, made his request more official, sending a radio to

commanding general, X Corps, asking for

the brigade by September. General

MacArthur's headquarters on 1 September ordered the brigade made available

to the 1st Marine Division on 4 September, but apparently because of objections

raised by General Walker, rescinded the

order the same day.

At a showdown meeting on 3 September, General Smith, backed by Admiral

Joy, Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble, and

Admiral Doyle, again made his demand

for the brigade to General Almond.

General Ruffner and General Wright

were also present. Almond proposed

that the Marine brigade be left with

General Walker. He offered to give the

1st Marine Division the 32d Infantry

Regiment, 7th Division, as a replacement

unit. General Smith refused to accept

at the last minute an untrained and untried Army unit for a specially trained

and tested regiment of Marines. He felt

that it would be unfair to the 32d Infantry and to his own division. He doubted

also if it would be physically possible to

make the substitution. Shipping had

27

 (1) Rad, C 60782, CINCFE (Sherman) to JCS

(CNO), 21 Aug 50. (2) Rad, C 60823, CINCFE to

CO EUSAK for Adm Sherman, 21 Aug 50. 28

 Rad, 221009, COM 7th Fleet to CNO, 22 Aug 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 165

already left for Korea to pick up the Marine brigade and would have to return

if it were to pick up the 32d Infantry.

Naval officers unanimously opposed Almond's solution. Admiral Struble then

hit upon a compromise. He suggested

that one of the 7th Division's regiments

be sent to Pusan, remaining aboard ship

as a floating reserve. This Army regiment would be available to General

Walker in extreme emergency and the

Marine brigade would be released to the

1st Marine Division. Almond agreed to

this plan.

General Wright flew to Eighth Army

headquarters in Taegu on the next day,

telling Walker of the new arrangements.

He relayed instructions from General

MacArthur to pull the Marine brigade

out of the line not later than the night

of 5-6 September and to send it straight

to Pusan. To compensate in some measure for the loss of this valuable force, the

17th Infantry Regiment would arrive in

Pusan Harbor before 7 September.

Wright tendered further compensation when he told Walker that as soon

as the first RCT of the 3d Division, the

65th Infantry, arrived in the theater it

would be sent directly to Pusan for assignment to Eighth Army. This RCT

would arrive in Korea between 18 and

20 September. Then, unless the 17th

Infantry had already been committed to

meet an emergency, it would be sent to

rejoin its parent 7th Division in the

Seoul-Inch'on objective area. General

Walker complied with his orders and

withdrew the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade from the perimeter on the night

of 5-6 September. On 12 September it

sailed from Pusan as the 5th Marines'

RCT, to rendezvous with the 1st Marine

Division at Inch'on.29

The 7th Division

Even before he realized that the 7th

Division would have to make up his major Army component for Inch'on, General MacArthur had begun to rebuild

this depleted unit as much as he could.

In mid-July, when the 2d Division was

still slated for Inch'on, General MacArthur had ordered 20 percent of all

combat replacements from the United

States diverted to the 7th Division in

Japan. He had also halted all further

levies against the division for men and

equipment. By stabilizing the division,

by feeding in such resources as could be

spared from Eighth Army, and by intensive training, he hoped to make the 7th

Division strong enough to fight effectively in Korea by October. On 26 July,

MacArthur ordered General Walker to

prepare the 7th Division "by intensified

29

 (1) Ltr, Gen Smith to Col Appleman, copy in

OCMH. (2) Rad, CX 61738, CINCFE to CG

EUSAK, 1 Sep 50, with penciled notations on copy

in 8th Army file AC 322, 24 Aug-13 Dec 50. (3)

MFR, 4 Sep 50, sub: Visit to EUSAK, by Maj Gen

Edwin K. Wright, in AG, DA files (CofS), FEC,

UNC. (4) Col. John C. Chiles, formerly SGS GHQ,

FEC, told the author on 17 February 1955, that he

had been present in the Dai Ichi Building during

the conference. According to Colonel Chiles, when

General Almond telephoned General Walker that

he would have to release the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade, General Walker became extremely excited

and stated that he could not take the responsibility

for the safety of the Pusan Perimeter if the brigade

was taken from him. Admiral Doyle, on the other

hand, said that he could not accept the responsibility for the Inch'on landing unless he was given

the brigade. According to Colonel Chiles, General

MacArthur personally made the decision.
166 POLICY AND DIRECTION

training and re-equipping for movement

to Korea at the earliest practicable date."

This instruction illustrates the dual

function then charged to General

Walker. While directing his divisions

in combat against the North Korean

Army, Walker, at the same time, remained responsible for the training and

rebuilding of the 7th Division nearly a

thousand miles away. The division then

stood at less than half strength, with only

574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men.

Moreover, many of the division's enlisted

men had had little training, and few of

the specialists and experienced noncoms

taken from the division to patch up units

going into combat in early July had

been replaced.30

Desperately short of men himself, General Walker urgently appealed to General MacArthur on 29 July for the 7th

Division's 32d Infantry to be flown into

his perimeter. This appeal came shortly

before the 5th RCT, the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade, and the 9th RCT of the

2d Division landed at Pusan. Knowing

that these three regiments were to arrive

and aware of the low combat potential

of the 32d Infantry, General MacArthur

denied this request, explaining that

granting it "would completely emasculate present plans for the entire 7th Division, which is being reconstituted and

will move to Korea, probably in late

September."

 31

By 4 August, MacArthur saw clearly

that if the amphibious force for the

Inch'on landing included an Army division, his own command would have to

provide it. He therefore called upon

Walker to rebuild the 7th Division by

15 September. Walker was to let MacArthur know at once of any difficulties

in getting the necessary material and people. MacArthur himself assisted the

rebuilding process by moving to the division from Okinawa 1,600 men originally

intended for a third battalion of the 29th

Infantry Regiment. He also diverted to

the division an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion newly arrived

from the United States, as well as two

companies of combat Engineers, and sent

a rush call to the ZI port of embarkation

asking that the three infantry battalion

cadres destined for the division be sent

without delay.32

MacArthur held little hope that the

key men transferred from the division to

Korea could be replaced in kind, either

from the United States or from Japan.

Efforts to recover these specialists reached

a new high on 7 August, when General

Hickey visited Korea and sought the return of 7th Division specialists. Walker

made a careful survey to determine if he

could give up any of these men, but

30

 (1) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jul

50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 19 Jul 50, Item 62. (2)

Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 22 Jul 50, G-1,

GHQ Daily Log, 22 Jul 50, Item 38. (3) Memo,

G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 24 Jul 50, sub: Replacements for 7th Div, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 24 Jul 50,

Item 36. (4) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 26

Jul 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 26 Jul 50, Item 52.

(5) Rpt, CG 7th Div to CINCFE, 27 Jul 50, G-1,

GHQ Daily Log, 27 Jul 50, Item 52.

31

 (1) Rad, CX 20657 KCO, CG, EUSAK to CINC

FE, 29 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CINCFE to CG EUSAK,

30 Jul 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 30 Jul 50, Item 26. 32

 (1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 9 Aug 50,

sub: Assignment of 29th Inf (less two battalions),

G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 9 Aug 50, Item 53. (2) Rad,

CINCFE to SFPE (Stoneman), 12 Aug 50, G-1 GHQ

Daily Log, 12 Aug 50, Item 60. (3) Memo, G-1

GHQ for CofS GHQ, 10 Aug 50, sub: Replacements

for 7th Inf Div, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 10 Aug 50,

Item 19.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 167

because of the low ebb in Eighth Army's

fortunes and strength at the time, found

their release impossible.33

The lack of specialists and trained men

for the 7th Division was on General

MacArthur's mind when he talked on

7 August with Harriman, General Ridgway, and General Norstad. MacArthur

furnished a complete list of the specialists he needed but who could not be

found in his command and asked why

the Department of the Army did not

quickly recruit experienced noncommissioned officers from among the many who

had served in World War II. These

men could be sent to him by fast ship

and by air.34

Three days later, MacArthur informed

the Department of the Army of the unusual steps he had taken to refurbish the

7th Division. He estimated that 30 percent of all replacements arriving in the

theater before 10 September would be

diverted to the 7th Division so that it

would be only 1,800 men understrength

by the CHROMITE target date. He had

already exhausted all other sources of

replacements.35

The high priority given the 7th Division worked hardships on the American

divisions in Korea. All artillery replacements and all infantry replacements having certain qualifications were channeled

to the division. These actions, while

weakening other units, proved effective

in bringing the 7th Division to a reasonable level. By 7 September, shortly before loading for the invasion at Inch'on,

the division lacked only 1,349 officers

and men of its full war strength.36

Compensating, numerically at least,

for this slight understrength of the 7th

Division, MacArthur, after conceiving

the idea that South Korea might be

called on to provide soldiers for American units, attached more than 8,000 Koreans to the division. On 11 August he

directed General Walker to procure,

screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division approximately

7,000 able-bodied male Koreans. Fortunately the ROK Government co-operated

since no American commander had authority beyond merely requesting these

men. As a commentary on the desperation out of which this measure was born,

General Wright on 17 August talked to

the chief of staff, GHQ, by telephone

from Korea. He told him that about

7,000 Koreans were being shipped out

of Pusan that day. "They are right out

of the rice paddies," he said, "and have

nothing but shorts and straw hats. I understand they have been inoculated,

given a physical examination and have

some kind of paper. I believe we should

get busy on equipment."

 37

 These Korean men were brought to Japan,

equipped and trained briefly, and then

attached to the 7th Division. By 31 Au33

 Memo, Gen Hickey, DCofS GHQ, for Gen

Almond, 7 Aug 50, sub: Rpt of Visit to Korea, copy

in OCMH. 34

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 351. 35

 Rad, CX 59802, CINCFE to DA, 10 Aug 50.

36

 (1) Memo, CofS GHQ Reserve (Gen Ruffner)

for CofS GHQ (Gen Almond), 28 Aug 50, sub:

Strength of 7th Div, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 28 Aug

50, Item 55. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ,

8 Sep 50, sub: Status of 7th Inf Div Personnel, in

CofS GHQ, UNC files. 37

 (1) Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 17

Aug 50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (2) Memo for

Gen Beiderlinden, 8 Sep 50, sub: ROK Personnel

With U.S. Units, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (3) Rad,

CX 59818, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 11 Aug 50. (4)

Rad, CX 60020, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 13 Aug 50.
168 POLICY AND DIRECTION

gust, 8,652 Koreans had joined the 7th

Division.38

In a related action, General MacArthur

ordered General Walker to strengthen

each company and battery of American

troops under his command by adding a

hundred Koreans as rapidly as individual

arms and equipment could be procured.

The increase was to be made without

regard to the present or future strength

of the ROK Army. He authorized

Walker to raise the ROK Army to any

number he deemed practicable or advisable and to requisition equipment when

the figure had been determined.39 But,

by the end of August, little progress had

been made toward attaching Koreans to

American units other than the 7th Division. The 1st Cavalry Division had

739 Koreans, the 2d Division had 234,

the 24th Division had 949, and the 25th

Division 240.40

Admiral Joy recommended to General

MacArthur on 7 August that amphibious

training of the 7th Division begin immediately even though the unit was then

at less than half strength. He pointed

out that the embarkation date for the

prospective assault amphibious landing

was 5 September and that training a RCT

to conduct an opposed amphibious assault would delay it. He had already

conferred with the commanding general

of the 7th Division and had instructed

him on the training objectives to be

achieved before embarkation. These included proficiency in amphibious operations. General MacArthur ordered

amphibious training for the 7th Division

to begin as soon as possible, under the

control and supervision of COMNAVFE.41

Airborne Units

MacArthur had no airborne troops

when the fighting began in Korea. The

11th Airborne Division, which had

served on occupation duties, had returned to the United States more than a

year before. MacArthur now wanted

airborne forces badly. The ability of

such airborne troops to drop behind

enemy lines, to sever lines of communications, and to disrupt rear-area activities had been proven during World

War II. The increasing vulnerability of

the North Korean Army to such tactics

provided the perfect setting for airborne

employment, particularly in conjunction

with amphibious attack.

His early attempts to procure airborne

troops included an effort on 8 July to

have a complete regiment, with its equipment, flown to Japan. He apparently

intended to use this airborne unit in

Operation BLUEHEARTS. General Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff, offered

to fly the regiment and its equipment to

Japan in C-119 aircraft if other members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it

necessary. But this emergency aerial

movement would have required the diversion of Military Air Transport Service carriers and commercial planes which

38

 (1) The complete story of this unique experiment is contained in Mono, Maj Elva Stillwaugh,

Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict, copy in

OCMH. (2) Telecon, TT 3708, DA and CINCFE,

30 Aug 50. 39

 Rad, CX 59709, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

9 Aug 50. 40

 Rpt, unsigned, 31 Aug 50, sub: Strength of

South Koreans Attached to U.S. Divs as of 31 Aug,

G-3 Opns Jnl, FEC and Pac Br, G-3, DA.

41

 (1) Rad, 0707027, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7

Aug 50. (2) Rad, CX 59636, CINCFE to CG Eighth

Army and COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 169

already were flying huge cargoes of men

and matériel to MacArthur. If MacArthur's estimates were correct, these

shipments were much more sorely needed

than an airborne RCT, and should take

precedence.

For this reason, and because no airborne RCT's, except for those of the 82d

Airborne Division, were ready to fight

immediately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

denied MacArthur's July request.42 But

they did take steps to ready an airborne

unit for deployment as soon as possible.

Whereas MacArthur actually had asked

for an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided

against weakening the only effective infantry division left in the United States

and chose instead an RCT from the 11th

Airborne Division. The commanding

general of the 11th Airborne Division

had been informed of the possible deployment on 7 July, but with the decision

against air transport to Japan, no immediate action was taken. Planning continued, however, for possible movement

by ship.

When General Collins learned during

his conference in Tokyo that General

MacArthur's plan for Inch'on included

a role for the airborne RCT, he was

somewhat concerned. He told General

Almond, after hearing the latter describe

the planned seizure of the north bank of

the Han River by an airborne unit, that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take a

very personal interest in how General

MacArthur employed the airborne

troops. He assured General Almond that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff would do their

best to furnish planes to drop the vehicles and howitzers of the RCT, but

cautioned against wasteful and improper

employment of these specially trained

troops. "Don't overestimate what one

RCT can do," the Army Chief of Staff

warned Almond. "Don't get too grandiose in your planned utilization of the

limited troops available."

 43

When using the phrase "limited troops

available," Collins was not exaggerating.

The 11th Airborne Division had so few

men that only one RCT, at less than half

its authorized infantry strength, could

be formed on 15 July. Since the beginning of July Army authorities had been

assigning all officers and men completing

the Army Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia, to the 11th, feeding in

about 400 trained jumpers each week.

General Bolté, investigating the readiness date for the airborne RCT, was told

that by transferring trained jumpers

from the 82d Airborne, the 11th Airborne RCT could be readied for shipment to MacArthur by 1 August. On

the other hand, the current process of

filling the RCT with graduates of the

parachute school only would slow its departure until 20 September. The latter

method did not disrupt the 82d Airborne,

however, and was therefore the method

most acceptable to General Bolté and

General Collins. On 18 July, the Department of the Army told General MacArthur that the 11th Airborne RCT

would be ready at home station by about

20 September. Asked to comment, he

42

 (1) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul 50.

(2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS, 8 Jul 50, sub: Troop

Requirements Forwarded by General MacArthur to

the DA for the JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case

21. (3) Rad, WAR 85328, DA to CINCFE, Collins

(Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jul 50.

43

 Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, sub: Record

of Visit to FEC, 10-15 July 1950, in G-3, DA file 333

Pac, Case 3, Tab 6.
170 POLICY AND DIRECTION

objected that his plans for the landing at

Inch'on required these troops in his theater by 10 September and urged every

effort to have them there on time.44

The brief description presented orally

to General Collins during his visit apparently had not justified sufficiently the

need for immediate deployment of the

RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked

General MacArthur for a more detailed

explanation of the mission he would

give the airborne RCT in the landing

operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount

an airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'on objective

area as soon after D-day as the situation

warranted. They were to seize a key communication center immediately ahead of

troops advancing out of the beachhead

area.

At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious forces

could be sent to MacArthur or that the

landing at Inch'on would even be made,

MacArthur's requirement for airborne

troops appeared, to Army officials, secondary. The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such

that the Department of the Army deemed

it impractical to send any of the division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed

General MacArthur in teleconference

that the RCT would be operational in

Japan by 23 October, but that he could

not count upon using it in his landing

operations. In turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the

unit.45

Despite General MacArthur's protests,

General Ridgway and General Haislip

drew up a plan on 25 July to move the

187th RCT of the 11th Airborne Division to Japan with an operational readiness date in the Far East Command of

21 October. Infantry fillers would be

transferred to the unit from the 82d Airborne if necessary. One hundred C-119

aircraft would arrive in the Far East

Command in time to allow the RCT fifteen days of operational training prior

to 21 October. On this basis, build-up

of the 187th Airborne RCT went forward during July and most of August.

By 19 August, the regiment had been

built up to nearly 4,000 officers and men

and was undergoing intensive training.46

Arrangements progressed ahead of the

original schedule and General MacArthur was told that the 187th RCT would

be at the port of embarkation by 12 September. He again objected that in order

to accomplish his planned operation he

would have to have the unit and its required airlift in Japan by 10 September.

But General Ridgway, himself an airborne officer, opposed any stepped-up

shipment of the airborne RCT. He advised General Collins, after studying

General MacArthur's objections, ".. . I

think the only justification for compli44

 (1) MFR, Col Dickson, G-3, DA, 17 Jul 50, sub:

Readiness Date for the RCT of the 11th Abn Div.

(2) Memo, Gen Ogden, Chief, Org and Training

Div, G-3, DA, for Gen Bolté, G-3, DA, 15 Jul 50,

same sub. Both in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/5.

(3) Rad, W 86323, DA to CINCFE, 18 Jul 50.

45

 (1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul 50.

(2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul 50. 46

 (1) Memo, Gen Timberman, Opns Div, G-3,

for Gen Bolté, G-3, DA, 25 Jul 50, sub: Movement

of RCT of 11th Abn Div to FECOM, in G-3, DA

file 320.2, Case 6/5. (2) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen

Ridgway, 19 Aug 50, sub: Movement of RCT of

11th Abn to FEC, with 1st Ind by Gen Ridgway

(sgd F. F. Moorman) with Incls, same file.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 171

ance would be a situation so desperate

that the addition of an RCT as a straight

infantry outfit was necessary to save the

situation. It does not appear to me that

such is the case." General MacArthur's

objections were overruled and, in midAugust, he was told not to expect the airborne troops in time for his landing

operation.47

General Collins, on a second visit to

Tokyo late in August, found General

MacArthur still insistent that the airborne RCT be sent in time to take part

in Operation CHROMITE. Collins promised to do what he could and, upon returning to Washington, made a special

effort to expedite arrangements. His investigation convinced him that his staff

had been doing its best, and on 25 August he explained to General MacArthur

that he had satisfied himself that an airborne RCT could not be sent by 10

September. He had even considered

taking a regiment from the 82d Airborne

instead of the 11th, but had found that

this drastic action would have made no

appreciable difference in the arrival date.

For the delay was no longer caused by

personnel shortages but by difficulties in

procuring, assembling, and loading the

specialized equipment required for airborne operations. General Collins felt

that every reasonable and practicable

measure had been taken to expedite the

arrival of the RCT but that the unit

would not be there for CHROMITE.

In his final word to General MacArthur on 28 August, he pointed out

that by expediting to the maximum extent, the 187th Airborne RCT could

reach Sasebo, Japan, on 21 September.

The unit could then complete preparations for an airborne drop of the entire

regiment by 29 September, but no

earlier. "I strongly urge," General Collins said, "it not be committed prior to

that date. The unit is presently capable

of daylight operations only. However, I

am confident that this unit will, in all

respects, meet the high combat standards

set by our airborne units in the last

war." There appeared to be no appeal

from these opinions of the Chief of Staff,

and General MacArthur acquiesced, replying that his plans would be adjusted.48

The 187th Airborne RCT left Camp

Stoneman, California, on 6 September

and arrived in Japan on 20 September

with a strength of about 4,400 men and

officers.49

The Assault in Readiness

The U.S. X Corps, at its embarkation,

numbered slightly less than 70,000 men.

Included as its major units were the 1st

Marine Division, the 7th Division, the

92d and 96th Field Artillery Battalions,

the 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor

Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat

Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. The 1st Marine Division had a

47

 (1) Rad, CX 59999, CINCFE to DA, 13 Aug 50.

(2) Rad, W 88966, DA to CINCFE, 16 Aug 50. (3)

Memo, Gen Ridgway for CofS, 14 Aug 50, in CofS

DA file 370, Case 11.

48

 (1) MFR, sgd Lt Col Herrick, 29 Aug 50, sub:

Advancement of Date of Movement to FEC of 187th

RCT of 11th Abn Div, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case

6/4. (2) Rad, W 90063, DA (Collins) to CINCFE

(MacArthur), 25 Aug 50. (3) Rad, WAR 89967, JCS

(Collins) to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50. (4) Rad, C 71576,

CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA (Collins), 30 Aug 50. 49

 (1) Interv, Capt Charles Thebaud with Maj

C. M. Holland, 187th Abn RCT, Beppu, Japan, 19

Jan 52. (2) Ltr, Hq, 187th Abn RCT, to DA, 15

Dec 51, sub: Insignia. (3) War Diary, 187th Abn

RCT, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 50.
172 POLICY AND DIRECTION

VICE ADMIRAL DEWEY STRUBLE

strength of 25,040 men, including 2,760

attached Army troops and 2,786 Korean

marines. The 7th Marines, which arrived on 21 September, added 4,000 men

to the division strength.50

The echelon of command for CHROMITE progressed downward from General MacArthur through Admiral Joy,

COMNAVFE, in the usual pattern established during World War II for amphibious operations. Admiral Struble, as

Commander, Joint Task Force Seven,

and Commander, Seventh Fleet, was

actually in command of the amphibious

phase of the operation. Under him,

Admiral Doyle commanded the attack

force (Amphibious Group One) which,

in turn, controlled the landing force,

composed of the 1st Marine Division.

Command of the landing force was

scheduled to pass to General Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division,

after the beachhead was secured and

Smith had notified Doyle he was ready

to assume command ashore. Command

of the expeditionary troops, the U.S.

X Corps, was to pass to General Almond

from Admiral Struble after the corps

had landed and Almond had indicated

that he was ready to assume command.51

As D-day for Operation CHROMITE

approached, the ports of Kobe, Sasebo,

and Yokohama in Japan and Pusan in

Korea became centers of intense activity.

The 1st Marine Division, less the 5th

Marines, loaded at Kobe, the 5th Marines

at Pusan. The 7th Division loaded at

Yokohama, and most of the escorting

naval vessels, the Gunfire Support

Group, and the command ships, at

Sasebo. In order to reach Inch'on by 15

September, the landing ships, tank

(LST's) had to leave Kobe by 10 September and the attack transports and cargo

ships by 12 September. Only the assault

elements were combat-loaded. The rest

of the invasion force and the vast quantity of equipment and supplies were

organization-loaded.52

General MacArthur, General Almond,

and General Shepherd flew from Tokyo

to Sasebo, joining naval commanders

aboard the Mt. McKinley on the evening of 12 September. Some of the final

arrangements for the landing were

completed aboard the flagship. 50

 (1) 1st Marine Div SAR, vol. 1, Annex A, 5.

(2) Hist Rpt, X Corps, G-3, Opn CHROMITE, p. 2. 51

 (1) Joint Task Force Seven, Inchon Rpt, Opn

Plan. (2) X Corps Opn Order 1, Annex 1, 28 Aug

50.

52

 (1) 1st Marine Div SAR, 15 Sep-7 Oct 50, Annex

D, p. 4. (2) War Diary, 7th Inf Div, Sep 50.

CHAPTER X

Crossing the Parallel: The Decision

and the Plan

The Tide Turns

Events dramatically justified General

MacArthur's firm confidence in Operation CHROMITE. American Marines,

backed by devastating naval and air

bombardment, assaulted Inch'on on 15

September and readily defeated the

weak, stunned North Korean defenders.

(Map II) On hand to see for himself the

fruition of his plans, General MacArthur

sent a cheering report from the scene to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "First phase

landing successful with losses slight.

Surprise apparently complete. All goes

well and on schedule." By mid-day,

Marines had seized Wolmi-do, the

fortress island dominating Inch'on harbor. By nightfall, more than a third of

Inch'on had fallen into their hands.

Obviously enjoying his first taste of

victory in Korea, the U.N. commander

again proudly reported to Washington,

"Our losses are light. The clockwork

coordination and cooperation between

the Services was noteworthy. . . . The

command distinguished itself. The

whole operation is proceeding on

schedule."

 1

Operation CHROMITE stayed on schedule. In the wake of the Marines, the

7th Division landed and struck south toward Suwon. Kimp'o Airfield fell to

the Marines on 19 September, and on

the 20th General MacArthur could tell

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his forces

were pounding at the gates of Seoul.2

So far, American forces had suffered

only light casualties, while the North

Koreans had lost heavily. At Inch'on,

supplies were being unloaded at the rate

of 4,000 tons daily; and Kimp'o Airfield

1

 (1) Rad, 142215Z, CINCUNC to JCS, 15 Sep 50.

(2) Rad, C 63153, CINCUNC to CINCFE and JCS,

15 Sep 50. 2

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were disturbed by newspaper reports that they had opposed the Inch'on

landing and had not fully supported General MacArthur. One such dispatch said, "MacArthur sold

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Inchon landing

despite their unanimous objections to such an ambitious undertaking. . . . Sources close to General

MacArthur said both General Collins and Admiral

Sherman were opposed to the landing at Inchon."

The Joint Chiefs notified General MacArthur that

they were issuing a statement refuting these press

reports and, to a limited extent, giving their own

side of the background story. See Rad, W 91763,

DA to CINCFE, 17 Sep 50.
174 POLICY AND DIRECTION

A RUSSIAN-MADE 76-MM. GUN in fortified position on Wolmi Island.

had swung into round-the-clock operation. When General Almond took

command of all forces ashore in the

Inch'on-Seoul area at 1800 on 21 September, he had almost 6,000 vehicles, 25,000

tons of equipment, and 50,000 troops.3

Fortunately, the success of MacArthur's plan did not depend upon an

immediate juncture of the Eighth Army

and X Corps. For, although MacArthur

had ordered General Walker to attack

out of the Pusan Perimeter beginning

on the day after the X Corps landing,

the North Koreans along the Naktong

fought as fiercely on 16 September as

they had on the 14th, and for nearly a

week stood off all attempts by Eighth

Army to punch through their defenses.

The main body of the North Korean

Army appeared unaware of the landing

at Inch'on, approximately 180 air miles

to its rear, and saw no reason to quit.

3

 (1) Rad, C 63187, CINCUNC to CINCFE and

JCS, 20 Sep 50. (2) Rad, X 10042 IN, CG X Corps

to CINCFE, 23 Sep 50. (3) Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 519.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 175

INCH'ON RAILROAD STATION after bombardment by U.N. naval vessels.

Eighth Army intelligence officers had

predicted this kind of enemy reaction,

pointing out that a success at Inch'on

would not necessarily relieve the pressure on Eighth Army, since the enemy

could still move men and supplies against

the perimeter over alternate routes along

the east coast.4 Indeed, the Eighth Army

G-3 had pessimistically speculated that

the most likely enemy reaction to the

landing would be an all-out drive to push

the Eighth Army into the sea.

General Walker, who had never been

convinced that he could break out on

schedule, blamed equipment shortages

for the delay. He complained to General Hickey on 21 September that he

was ". . . ready to break loose if it

weren't for the physical trouble." He

could not get his armor across the Naktong, he pointed out, and, referring to

the greater logistic support given the X

Corps, noted, "We have been bastard

children lately, and as far as our engineering equipment is concerned we are

in pretty bad shape." He seemed anxious that General MacArthur's staff

should appreciate his plight, telling

4

 Intelligence Annex (10 Sep 50), Eighth Army

Opns Plan 10, 6 Sep 50.
176 POLICY AND DIRECTION

LST's UNLOADING ON WOLMI ISLAND

Hickey, "I don't want you to think that I

am dragging my heels, but I have a river

across my whole front and the two

bridges which I have don't make much."5

Walker's failure to keep to his schedule made General MacArthur somewhat

doubtful that the Eighth Army would be

able to break out of the Pusan Perimeter

at all. He perhaps recalled earlier warnings by Eighth Army officers that

Walker's divisions could not fight their

way north even if the Inch'on landing

were successful. At any rate, after three

days of indecisive struggle along the

perimeter, MacArthur ordered General

Wright to implement the alternate plan

for an amphibious landing at Kunsan,

by using two of Walker's American divisions and one of his ROK divisions in

the amphibious assault. Kunsan, on the

west coast about one hundred air miles

south of Inch'on, had originally been

favored by General Collins as the primary objective area. A landing there

now, MacArthur felt, would threaten the

enemy's immediate rear and cause a

5

 Telecon, Gen Walker with Gen Hickey, 21 Sep

50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 177

North Korean collapse. When General

Hickey discussed this plan with General

Walker on 22 September, the latter objected to giving up any of his forces for a

landing at Kunsan or anywhere else. But

the argument ended there. For by this

time, signs of an enemy collapse had appeared and MacArthur shelved the

Kunsan plan. The signs proved correct

and by the next day the North Korean

Army, at last feeling the effects of its

severed lines of communications and the

presence of a formidable force in its rear,

began a general withdrawal from the

Pusan Perimeter. The withdrawal

turned into a rout. During the next

week, Eighth Army pursued the fleeing

enemy. On the morning of 26 September, a task force from the 7th Cavalry

Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, of

Eighth Army met elements of the 31st

Infantry, 7th Division, of X Corps near

Osan to mark the juncture of the two

forces.6

General Almond's corps meanwhile

had enlarged its holdings in the Inch'onSeoul area. By 26 September, the

Marine-Army team had wrested control

of the South Korean capital from the

enemy and North Korean resistance in

the sector was dwindling rapidly.

The 38th Parallel—Genesis of the

Decision

Two decisions in the third week of

September 1950 were to rank among the

most significant of the Korean War.

The first of these, the decision to invade

North Korea, stemmed in part from military expediency but the underlying

issues were mainly political. The second

decision, to use the X Corps in another

amphibious operation, was completely

military. General MacArthur figured

to a large degree in the 38th Parallel decision and personally decided how the

X Corps would be used. Both decisions

were made as the recapture of Seoul became a certainty; and both were reached

in the course of establishing a plan for

operations in Korea that would best

serve the interests of the United States

and the rest of the free world.7

President Truman, of course, bore the

full and final responsibility for choosing

a course of action for Korea. But from

his military and civilian advisers at several stations within the executive branch,

he demanded and received the best advice available on all aspects of a problem,

including the alternatives and consequences, before he took a stand.8

 Before

the Korean War was three weeks old,

and while American and ROK forces

were falling back on Taejon, the President called on these advisers to tell him

whether MacArthur should eventually

send forces across the 38th Parallel.

These advisers saw no need to test the

legality of crossing the parallel. The

basic authority under which the United

6

 (1) Opn Plan 100-C, JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

(2) Rad, 063180, CINCUNC (Wright) to CINCFE

(Hickey), 19 Sep 50. (3) Memo, Gen Hickey for Gen

Wright, 23 Sep 50, JSPOG files. (4) For details of

Eighth Army's breakout, see Appleman, South to

the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters XXVII

and XXVIII.

7

 Except as otherwise indicated, this section is

based on the 091 Korea file of G-3, Department of

the Army, for 1950, Cases 14/14, 14/16; 14/17, 14/19;

14/20, 14/22; 14/28, 14/30; 14/31, and 79/3. 8

 Symbolic of his approach to decision-making, a

small sign resting on President Truman's White

House desk carried the reminder, "The Buck Stops

Here."
178 POLICY AND DIRECTION

States directed operations of the unified

command in Korea lay in the U.N.

Security Council's resolution of 7 July

1950; and within this resolution the

United States had been called upon to

direct United Nations forces so as "to

assist the Republic of Korea in defending

itself against armed attack and thus to

restore international peace and security

in the area." The United Nations' call

for the restoration of peace and security

in the area, was generally considered

sufficient legal basis to enter North

Korea.

The main concern was whether crossing the parallel would provoke an attack

by the neighboring Chinese Communists

or by Russia. Indeed, from the time of

the President's first call for recommendations through the period of preparation

for the Inch'on landing, American officials sought out the best ways to achieve

military and political objectives without

causing World War III. They tried, in

particular, to determine a long-range

policy toward Korea that would

strengthen the United States' position

in relation to that of the USSR. For

they assumed that the USSR was America's chief antagonist in Korea and elsewhere, and that if the course chosen by

the United States came too directly into

conflict with Russian aims and interests,

the United States might have to fight to

hold that course.

Those authorities nearest the President concluded by 1 September 1950

that the United States was in no position

to commit itself finally to any single

course of action. There were too many

unknowns, namely, what Russia or China

might do and whether the United States

could count on the United Nations, even

on those members considered to be allies,

to back up an American policy that

might bring on a general war.

In searching for some flexible stand for

the United States to take, Truman's top

advisers became convinced that any

crossing of the 38th Parallel by General

MacArthur would evoke certain reactions from Russia. The Russians might

encourage the Chinese to occupy North

Korea, even to commit troops into battle

in the hope of fomenting war between

the United States and China. In the

latter event, the American officials believed, U.N. forces should continue to

fight as long as there was a reasonable

chance of successfully resisting the

Chinese; General MacArthur should be

authorized to take appropriate air and

naval action against Communist China;

and the United States should take the

matter to the U.N. Security Council in

order to have the Chinese condemned as

aggressors.

Or, as MacArthur's forces approached

the parallel, the USSR itself could reoccupy North Korea and trump up an

arrangement with the North Korean

Government whereby the Russians

would pledge to defend North Korean

territory. If this proved the case, that

is, if major Russians units entered the

fighting either openly or covertly anywhere in Korea, the top advisory officials

felt that General MacArthur should go

on the defensive, make no move that

would aggravate the situation, and report

to Washington. Exactly what MacArthur would be told once he had reported to Washington was not yet

decided. But it was definite that the

United States did not want its resources

tied up in Korea, an area regarded as of
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 179

little strategic importance, if general war

came.

In line with their own advice against

commitment to any single course of action, these advisory officials recognized

that certain military conditions could

arise, such as an opportunity to destroy

the North Korean Army completely

which would, from a tactical point of

view, justify military operations north

of the parallel. But it the President,

who alone had the authority and sufficient knowledge of all factors to make a

decision on the crossing, did authorize

a move above the parallel, there should

be a clear understanding that no U.N.

force would cross the northern boundary

of Korea into Manchuria or the USSR,

and that as a matter of policy only

Korean units should operate in the

border region. Further, if either Russian or Chinese forces had already entered Korea or had announced that they

intended to enter, no matter how well

the tactical situation might otherwise

favor crossing the parallel at the time,

General MacArthur should refrain from

moving above the line. This did not

mean, however, that he should discontinue air and naval operations in North

Korea.

Truman's top advisers did not consider crossing the parallel to be a necessary ingredient of victory. They

believed that the military situation

eventually would be stabilized along the

parallel and that the United Nations,

instead of crossing, could offer surrender

terms to the North Koreans as soon as a

U.N. victory seemed assured.

The opinions of President Truman's

closest advisers did not find favor among

the Joint Chiefs of Staff or with General

MacArthur. MacArthur, since mid-July,

when he had received the United Nations

7 July resolution as a guide but no detailed instructions, held a directly opposing view. "I intend to destroy and

not to drive back the North Korean

forces," he told Generals Collins and

Vandenberg at the time, adding that "I

may need to occupy all of North

Korea."

 9 MacArthur continued to favor

crossing the parallel even after his G-2,

General Willoughby, reported on 31

August that ".. . sources have reported

troop movements from Central China to

Manchuria for sometime which suggest

movements preliminary to entering the

Korean theater." Willoughby placed

the number of regular Chinese troops in

Manchuria at about 246,000 men, organized into nine armies totaling thirtyseven divisions. Eighty thousand men

were reported assembling near An-tung,

just across the Yalu from Korea.10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed

with the view that the Korean fighting

would be stabilized along the 38th Parallel. While quite aware of the possibility of Russian or Chinese entry into

the conflict, they did not believe that

MacArthur should be held back from

crossing the parallel if he wished to do

so for tactical reasons. Any views and

proposals to the contrary, the military

chiefs told Secretary of Defense Johnson

on 7 September, were unrealistic. They

agreed with General MacArthur that

the initial objective to be obtained was

the destruction of North Korean forces.

"We believe," they stated:

9

 Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, 15 Jul 50,

sub: Rpt of Trip to FEC, 10-15 Jul 50, in G-3,

DA file 333 Pac, case 3. 10

 DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2913, 31 Aug 50, p. 1-d.
180 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

that after the strength of the North Korean

forces has been broken, which is anticipated

will occur south of 38 degrees North, that

subsequently operations must take place

both north and south of the 38th Parallel.

Such operations should be conducted by

South Korean forces since it is assumed that

the actions will be of a guerrilla character.

General MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength of the South Korean forces

so that they should be adequate at the time

to cope with this situation.11

Touching next on the subject of the

posthostilities period, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that they and General MacArthur

agreed that the occupation by U.N.

forces should be limited to the principal

cities south of the 38th Parallel and

should be terminated as soon as possible.

Further, U.S. troops should be taken

out of Korea as early as safe to do so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also pointed

out that General MacArthur and President Rhee had agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea should

be re-established in Seoul as soon at it

could be done. Rhee was willing, upon

re-entry into the capital, to grant a general amnesty to all except war criminals

and to call for a general election to set

up a single government for all of Korea.

The final policy proposal sent to President Truman on 9 September included

the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Without making any changes, the President approved the proposal on 11

September.

In order that General MacArthur

might have advance notice, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 15 September sent

him those provisions of the new national

policy applicable to operations above the

38th Parallel and actions to be taken if

Russia or Communist China intervened.

The Joint Chiefs had not yet been told

to work this new policy into a new directive for MacArthur, but were anticipating such instructions from the

Secretary of Defense. General MacArthur had other things on his mind on

the day he received this informative

message (it was D-day for Operation

CHROMITE), but he wanted to know more

about the national policy on Korea. As

soon as he could, he asked the Joint

Chiefs to forward by courier the entire

text of the approved policy paper. This

the Joint Chiefs arranged by handing

copies to an officer from the Far East

Command who was returning after an

official visit in Washington.

11

 Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 7 Sep 50, sub:

U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to Korea.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 181

As of 18 September, the Secretary of

Defense had not yet told the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to prepare instructions for MacArthur based on the new policy. This

inaction perhaps was occasioned in part

by Secretary Johnson's resignation, which

he had submitted on 12 September, and

which President Truman had accepted

and made effective as of 19 September.

General of the Army George C. Marshall

became the new Secretary of Defense on

21 September.

Meanwhile, hoping to lend impetus to

the matter of new instructions to MacArthur, General Gruenther, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, proposed

to draft a directive at Army level for

submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the Joint Chiefs had anticipated

Gruenther and had already worked out

the new directive.

Ten days after American troops

stormed Inch'on, the Joint Chiefs sent

MacArthur's directive for future operations in Korea to Secretary Marshall.

They told him that while they had dealt

with military matters primarily, the implications of the directive affected other

agencies of the United States Government; and they suggested that the Secretary obtain the concurrence of these

other agencies. They had taken no

action on aspects of the new national

policy outside their purview, assuming

that the responsible agencies would take

care of these in directives of their own.

The Joint Chiefs did ask, however, that

they be allowed to comment from the

military point of view on any directives

prepared by other agencies.

Several days went by with no word on

the directive and General Bolté became

impatient. The reports from Korea, encouraging from the military viewpoint,

were nevertheless disconcerting to the

Army G-3, who knew that General MacArthur would soon reach the 38th Parallel and the limit of his current

instructions. The advance information

which had gone to MacArthur had made

it plain that he would not cross the 38th

Parallel without specific authority from

the President. "In view of the rapidity

with which military operations in Korea

are approaching the 38th parallel,"

Bolté told the Chief of Staff on 27

September, "it is a matter of military

urgency that the commander of the

United Nations forces be given authority to cross this parallel to accomplish

attainment of his military objective."

 12

General Bolté was fearful that a delay

in definite orders from Washington

would cause U.N. forces to hesitate and

break stride in their advance at the parallel thus enabling the North Korean

Army to retreat in orderly fashion without being destroyed. He recommended

that General Collins press the Secretary

of Defense for approval of MacArthur's

crossing of the parallel.

Actually, Secretary Marshall had been

waiting for State Department concurrence in the directive before showing it

to President Truman. The State Department approved the draft but added a

paragraph of instructions on the return

of Seoul to the Republic of Korea Government. Before General Bolté's objections had reached the Chief of

12

 Memo, Gen Bolté for CofS, 27 Sep 50, sub: U.S.

Course of Action in Korea, with note by Gen Gruenther on original.
182 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Staff, the President had approved the

directive.13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the directive to General MacArthur on 27

September, stipulating that it was being

furnished to provide him with "amplifying instructions as to further military

actions to be taken by you in Korea."

They warned him, "These instructions,

however, cannot be considered to be

final since they may require modification

in accordance with developments." Obviously wary of what the Russians or

Chinese might do, they ordered MacArthur "to make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese

Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which will be

reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as

a matter of urgency."14

For the first time MacArthur had a

written directive to destroy North

Korean forces.

Your military objective is the destruction

of the North Korean Armed Forces. In at- taining this objective you are authorized to

conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground

operations north of the 38th Parallel in

Korea, provided that at the time of such

operation there has been no entry into

North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese

Communist Forces, no announcement of

intended entry, nor a threat to counter our

operations militarily in North Korea. Un- der no circumstances, however, will your

forces cross the Manchurian or USSR bor- ders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no

non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in

the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet

Union or in the area along the Manchurian

border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel

will not include Air or Naval action against

Manchuria or against USSR territory. In the event of the open or covert em- ployment of major Soviet units south of the

38th Parallel, you will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation

and report to Washington. You should

take the same action in the event your

forces are operating north of the 38th

Parallel, and major Soviet units are openly

employed. You will not discontinue Air

and Naval operations north of the 38th

Parallel merely because the presence of

Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is de- tected in a target area, but if the Soviet

Union or Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either

explicitly or implicitly, that their forces

should not be attacked, you should refer

the matter immediately to Washington.

In the event of the open or covert em- ployment of major Chinese Communist

units south of the 38th Parallel, you should

continue the action as long as action by

your forces offers a reasonable chance of

successful resistance. In the event of an

attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese

Communist units covertly south of the 38th

Parallel, you should continue the action.

MacArthur was directed to use all

information media at his command to

turn "the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean

people" away from the United Nations

and to direct it toward the Communists,

Korean and Russian, and, "depending

on the role they play," the Chinese

Communists.

13

 The genesis of this directive is not clear in

President Truman's memoirs. He states that he

approved a statement of national policy on 11

September and that the JCS sent a "directive" based

on this policy to MacArthur on 15 September. The

JCS sent only the substance of the policy statement

to MacArthur at that time, and did not send him

the actual directive until 27 September. See Truman Memoirs, II, 59-60. 14

 Rad, JCS 92801, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,

27 Sep 50. Because of its importance this directive

will be quoted at length.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 183

When organized armed resistance by

North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the

ROK forces to take the lead in disarming

remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activities should be dealt with primarily by

the forces of the Republic of Korea, with

minimum participation by United Nations

contingents. Circumstances obtaining at the time will

determine the character of and necessity for

occupation of North Korea. Your plans

for such occupation will be forwarded for

approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You

will also submit your plan for future operations north of the 38th Parallel to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for approval.

MacArthur was advised that the

United States was formulating instructions regarding "Armistice terms to be

offered by you to the North Koreans in

the event of sudden collapse of North

Korean forces and Course of Action to

be followed and activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period."

The directive then continued:

As soon as the military situation permits,

you should facilitate the restoration of the

Government of the Republic of Korea with

its capital in Seoul. Although the Government of the Republic of Korea has been

generally recognized (except by the Soviet

bloc) as the only legal government in Korea,

its sovereignty north of the 38th Parallel has

not been generally recognized. The Republic of Korea and its Armed Forces

should be expected to cooperate in such

military operations and military occupation

as are conducted by United Nations forces

north of the 38th Parallel, but political

questions such as the formal extension of

sovereignty over North Korea should await

action by the United Nations to complete

the unification of the country.

According to news reports appearing

about the time the new directive reached

MacArthur, General Walker had informed reporters that his forces were

going to halt along the 38th Parallel for

regrouping and, ostensibly, to await permission to cross. These reports, while

unconfirmed, disturbed the Secretary of

Defense to such an extent that he sent

General MacArthur a personal message:

"Announcement . . . may precipitate

embarrassment in the United Nations

where evident desire is not to be confronted with the necessity of a vote on

passage of the 38th parallel." Secretary

Marshall left no doubt, however, as to

how he himself felt about the crossing

when he said, "We want you to feel

unhampered tactically and strategically

to proceed north of the 38th parallel."

 15

General MacArthur had received no

confirmation that General Walker had

made a statement of this type and

doubted that he had done so. But he

took the precaution of warning Walker

to make no comment on the 38th Parallel to anyone. "The matter is of such

delicacy," he told the Eighth Army commander, "that all reference thereto will

be made either from GHQ or direct

from Washington." And in answer to

the Secretary of Defense MacArthur replied that he had cautioned Walker

against "involvement connected with

nomenclature." "Unless and until the

enemy capitulates," General MacArthur

15

 (1) Rad, JCS 92895, Secy Defense (Personal) to

MacArthur, 29 Sep 50. (2) The President had been

advised on 1 October that General MacArthur had

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wished

to issue a dramatic announcement when the 38th

Parallel had been crossed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

had forbidden this, pointing out the unwisdom of

such a statement. They had instructed him, instead,

to go ahead with his operations but without calling

special attention to the crossing of his forces into

North Korea.
184 POLICY AND DIRECTION

told General Marshall, "I regard all

of Korea open for our military

operations."

 16

The ROK Government Returns to Seoul

General MacArthur, before landing at

Inch'on, had conferred with President

Rhee and agreed informally that the

government of the republic would be reestablished in Seoul as early as possible.

The two had also discussed arrangements

for an election. In Washington, when

the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned these

dealings, great concern arose within the

Department of State. That agency, then

discussing means of a final settlement in

Korea with other U.N. members, deplored any participation by the military

commander in ROK governmental matters. Through the Secretary of Defense,

the Department of State asked the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to call upon MacArthur

for a more complete accounting of his

diplomatic activities. H. Freeman

Matthews of the Department of State

told the Secretary of Defense he did not

wish to use diplomatic channels for this

inquiry, believing, ". . . it would be extremely awkward for Sebald [Political

Adviser to SCAP] to inquire into this

matter, and equally awkward for

Ambassador Muccio."

 17

When, acting on the request, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff asked General MacArthur

for complete details of his plans for restoring President Rhee's authority in

Korea, MacArthur protested any thought

of meddling in the Department of State's

affairs. "I do not know precisely to what

your message refers," he said,

but I have no plans whatsoever except

scrupulously to implement the directives

which I have received. I plan to return

President Rhee, his cabinet, senior members

of the legislature, the United Nations commission, and perhaps others of similar official category to domicile in Seoul as soon

as conditions there are sufficiently stable to

permit reasonable security.

MacArthur pointed out that this involved no re-establishment of or change

in government, since the ROK Government had never ceased to function and

would merely resume control over its

areas liberated from enemy control.18

Conditions in Seoul were not yet quite

"sufficiently stable" for Rhee's return,

for the X Corps had encountered exceptionally bitter resistance in and

around the city. General Almond, under pressure from MacArthur, pushed his

commanders to take the capital quickly.

By 26 September, his troops had seized

all key points within it, and the prize

seemed almost within grasp. "On this

basis," Almond said, "I advised General

MacArthur that he might expect to enter

Seoul on the 29th of September, that in

my opinion the city would be perfectly

safe to restore President Syngman Rhee

to his rightful position at the Capital by

that date."

 19

Almond also sent MacArthur a tenta16

 (1) Rad, C 65035, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

30 Sep 50. (2) Rad, C 65034, CINCFE to DA for

Secy Defense, 30 Sep 50. 17

 Ltr, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Undersecy State, to Gen Burns, OSD, 18 Sep 50, in G-3,

DA file 091 Korea, Case 14/26.

18

 (1) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 7 Sep

50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to

Korea. (2) Ltr, Mr. Matthews to Gen Burns, 18

Sep 50. (3) Rad, JCS 92329, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Sep

50. (4) Rad, C 64159, CINCFE to JCS, 23 Sep 50. 19

 Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj James F. Schnabel,

8 Jul 55.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 185

tive program for the liberation ceremonies. But MacArthur replied:

Arrangements suggested by you are not

in accordance with those already set up by

me. Following is the plan. Arrive Kimpo

0930. No honor guard or other ceremony

there. Will proceed direct to capital building for informal conference with you and

General Walker before arrival of Pusan

party. Ceremony at 1200 hours. I will

personally conduct the proceedings without

being introduced. There will be no invo- cation or benediction necessary as the spiritual features are embodied in my own

address. I will commence ceremony by five

minute speech to be followed by speeches

of similar duration by the Chairman UN

COK, American ambassador and President

Rhee, and I will conclude the proceedings.20

General MacArthur arrived in Seoul

on the 29th as scheduled. In his address

he told President Rhee:

In behalf of the United Nations I am

happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the

seat of your Government, that from it you

may better fulfill your constitutional responsibility. It is my fervent hope that a

beneficent providence will give you and all

of your public officials the wisdom and

strength to meet your perplexing problems

in a spirit of benevolence and justice, that

from the travail of the past there may

emerge a new and hopeful dawn for the people of Korea.

After leading his audience in the Lord's

Prayer, MacArthur told Rhee, ". . . my

officers and I will now resume our military duties and leave you and your Government to the discharge of civil

responsibility."

 21

When MacArthur returned to Tokyo,

he received protests from the Departments of State and Defense. Both departments noted with surprise and alarm

that the American flag had been displayed with undue prominence over the

ROK Capitol during the ceremonies, and

complained that this placed too great an

emphasis on the nature of the Korean

War as a United States, rather than a

United Nations, operation.22 But congratulations also were in order. For, by

the end of September, MacArthur had

achieved the objectives of his landing,

and the Eighth Army and the X Corps

now controlled almost all of South Korea.

Together, the two commands had routed

the North Korean Army, had killed or

captured huge numbers of its troops, and

had destroyed or forced the abandonment of nearly all of its tanks, trucks,

and artillery.

In congratulating MacArthur on 30

September, President Truman said, in

part:

No operations in military history can match

either the delaying action where you traded

space for time in which to build up your

forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has

now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I

am particularly impressed by the splendid

cooperations of our Army, Navy, and Air

Force and I wish you would extend my

thanks and congratulations to the commanders of these services—Lt. Gen. Walton

H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy,

and Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. . . .

I salute you all, and say to all, from all of

us at home, 'Well and nobly done.'

The Joint Chiefs of Staff joined in the

congratulations, praising MacArthur and

his men for a ".. . transition from defensive to offensive operations [that]

20

 Rad, C 64724, CINCUNC to CG X Corps, 28

Sep 50. 21

 Text of message by General MacArthur on

return of Government of Korea to Seoul, 29 September 1950, contained in MacArthur Hearings, page

3481. 22

 Rad, W 92972, DA to CINCFE, 30 Sep 50.
186 POLICY AND DIRECTION

RHEE EXPRESSES APPRECIATION to General of the Army MacArthur at liberation

ceremonies at the Capitol Building, Seoul.

was magnificently planned, timed and

executed."

 23

General MacArthur passed along these

compliments to all of his command, but

they brought no particular joy to General

Almond. For neither President Truman

nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had specifically credited the X Corps or Almond

with any contribution to the success of

the operations. Though the oversight

presumably was unintentional, Almond

complained that this absence of official

recognition adversely affected the morale

of his command.24

The X Corps and General Almond

were to have another opportunity for

recognition as a result of the 27 September directive from the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to MacArthur calling for the destruction of the North Korean armed

forces. During the recent offensive large

numbers of North Koreans had managed

to slip away, particularly through the

eastern mountains, into their home

territory.

In connection with the assigned objective to destroy the North Korean

armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

authorized MacArthur to broadcast a

surrender ultimatum to the North

Korean Government. The broadcast

also was to instruct the North Korean

23

 Rad, ZC 18525, CINCFE to All Comdrs, 30 Sep

50.

24

 (1) Ibid. (2) Telecon, Gen Beiderlinden with

Col Harrison, 2020-2100, 1 Oct 50, recorded in SGS

GHQ, FEC 337 files, 1950.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 187

military leaders on how to handle prisoners of war, to assure them that on surrender their own forces would be fairly

treated, to inform them that the Republic of Korea would be re-established

with its capital in Seoul, and to point

out that the question of the future of

Korea was now before the United Nations. MacArthur, however, placed little

confidence in a call to surrender. He

doubted that the North Koreans would

come to terms until he had beaten them

so decisively as to leave them no alternatives but surrender or annihilation. He

therefore concluded that he should try to

crush the North Korean Army by a pursuit above the 38th Parallel. He, in fact,

had made this decision before he received

his newest directive from the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, but he had seen the gist of the

new policy underlying the directive and

therefore was able to judge the latitude

he would be allowed.25

New Operations Plans

Accordingly, on 26 September, MacArthur instructed General Wright and

the JSPOG staff to plan another amphibious encirclement well above the

38th Parallel. The new landing was to

be co-ordinated with a new overland attack. MacArthur wanted Wright to consider two conceptions of advance into

North Korea. The first of these would

send the Eighth Army in a main effort

along the west coast in conjunction with

an amphibious landing at Chinnamp'o or

elsewhere. MacArthur's other idea provided for an overland attack to the east

coast by the Eighth Army and a simultaneous amphibious landing at Wonsan,

a city of some 150,000, also on the east

coast.26 The plan eventually used included features of both concepts.

General Wright furnished the hybrid

plan, actually an up-to-date version of an

alternate concept prepared earlier for

Operation CHROMITE, on 27 September.27

By this plan, the Eighth Army would

make the main effort in the west to seize

the North Korean capital, P'yongyang,

and the X Corps would make an amphibious assault landing at Wonsan. Wright

told General MacArthur that the amphibious landing could be staged within

ten days of the order to load out if

shipping was assembled early enough.28

Wonsan was an excellent choice for

an amphibious landing. Besides being

sufficiently deep into North Korea, it was

the principal port on the east coast; it

25

 Rad, JCS 92762, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50.

26

 (1) Memo, Gen Hickey for JSPOG (Gen Wright),

26 Sep 50, sub: Plans for Future Opns, JSPOG,

GHQ, UNC files. (2) See also, Appleman, South

to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 609-14 and

618-21. 27

 General Wright, who carried out General MacArthur's planning directives during this period and

supervised their conversion into concrete plans, felt

that the method chosen for entering North Korea

was a natural outgrowth of MacArthur's preoccupation since July 1950 with the possibility of a

double amphibious envelopment. "Even while we

were under the pressure of the Inchon planning,"

Wright has written, ".. . I had JSPOG concurrently

assembling the data for a Wonsan operation." It

was strictly the paucity of men and matériel that

had led MacArthur to settle for a single envelopment at Inch'on in the first place, according to

Wright. And he had kept the Wonsan operation

in mind, for the time when he would have enough

strength to mount it. "I think it can be inferred

that he had rather definite plans for Wonsan immediately following the success of the Inchon operation." See Ltr, Gen Wright to Maj Schnabel, 14

Jun 55, copy in OCMH. 28

 (1) Memo, Gen Wright for CofS GHQ, 26 Sep

50, sub: Plans for Future Opns. (2) Interv, Col

Appleman with Gen Wright, Feb 54.
188 POLICY AND DIRECTION

was the eastern terminus of the easiest

route across the narrow waist of the

peninsula; and it was a road and rail

communications center. Wonsan, in

fact, was the principal port of entry for

Russian supplies and military equipment

received by sea from the Vladivostok

area and a key point on the rail line from

the same area. Moreover, from Wonsan

a military force could move inland and

west across the peninsula to P'yongyang

or north to the Hamhung-Hungnam

region, the most important industrial

area in all Korea.29

General MacArthur readily accepted

the plan tailored to his specifications.

On 28 September he informed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff: "If the North Korean

Armed Forces do not surrender in accordance with my proclamation to be

issued on 1 October 1950, dispositions

will be made to accomplish the military

objective of destroying them by entry

into North Korea." He sketched his

plan briefly. He would send the Eighth

Army across the 38th Parallel through

Kaesong and Sariwon to capture

P'yongyang. Almond's X Corps would

land amphibiously at Wonsan, thereafter

"making juncture with Eighth Army."

Presumably, this juncture would require

the X Corps to attack west along the

Wonsan-P'yongyang road.30

Mindful of the warning contained in

his latest directive, General MacArthur

promised Washington that he would use

only ROK troops for operations above

the line Ch'ungju-Yongwon-Hungnam.

"Tentative date for the attack of Eighth

Army," MacArthur reported, "will be

not earlier than 15 October and not later

than 30 October. You will be provided

detailed plans later." Washington's concern over possible Chinese or Russian

interference in the Korean fighting

prompted General MacArthur to report

also that there was no indication of

"present entry into North Korea by

major Soviet or Chinese Communist

Forces."

 31

On the following day, just before he

delivered his address in Seoul, MacArthur summoned General Walker, General Almond, Admiral Joy, and General

Stratemeyer to a conference in a room

on the second floor of the Capitol to tell

them of his new plan. Although the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet approved

the plan, he pointed out, approval was

expected with no material change in the

concept of the operation. He directed

Almond to relinquish the Seoul area

to Walker by 7 October, to plan on

moving the 7th Division overland for

embarkation at Pusan, and to embark

corps troops and the 1st Marine Division

from Inch'on. He tentatively set 20

October as the date for the Wonsan

landing.32

The actual plan for destroying North

Korean forces above the 38th Parallel

was based on three assumptions. Two

were correct, namely, that the bulk of

the North Korean forces had been destroyed and that the United Nations

Command would conduct operations

29

 (1) JANIS 75, ch. VIII (Korea—Cities and

Towns), pp. 52-53. (2) GHQ FEC Terrain Study 6,

North Korea, XIV, 26-27, and Map No. 760, Wonsan City Plan, Plate 12. (3) War Diary, X Corps,

Oct 50, Opns, pp. 18-19, and Diary CG X Corps,

24 Oct 50. 30

 (1) Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50.

(2) See also Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 357-60.

31

 Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50. 32

 Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj Schnabel, 8 Jul 55.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 189

north of the 38th Parallel. The third,

that there would be no outside interference, was less sound. The plan called

on the forces of the Eighth Army and

the X Corps to advance to and hold a

line across Korea from Ch'ongju, through

Yongwon, to Hamhung. The target date

for the Eighth Army assault was set at

twelve days after the Eighth Army had

passed through the X Corps in the

Inch'on-Seoul area. General Walker's

ground attack might precede General

Almond's amphibious assault by three

to seven days. General Wright estimated

that it would take six days to load the

assault elements of the X Corps and four

days to sail to Wonsan.33

Most of MacArthur's principal staff

officers had assumed, before seeing the

new plans, that the UNC commander

intended to place the X Corps under

General Walker after Seoul was returned to ROK control. MacArthur had

created the X Corps specifically for the

landing at Inch'on, had tailored it hurriedly, and had taken its key officers from

his own staff. As the corps completed

its mission in late September, it could

logically be assumed that the combat elements of the corps would be assimilated

by the Eighth Army and that the key

officers would return to GHQ and their

normal duties. Generals Hickey and

Wright advised General MacArthur to

follow this course; Maj. Gen. George L.

Eberle, MacArthur's G-4, also strongly

favored Walker's taking over the X

Corps; and General Almond had always

understood "that when the Inchon operation was completed that the X Corps

troops would be absorbed by Eighth

Army. . . ."

 34

 Subsequently, General

MacArthur could not believe that these

officers really disagreed with his decision.

To the contrary, the decision to retain a

function of GHQ command and coordination between the Eighth Army and the X

Corps until such time as a juncture between

the two forces had been effected was, so far

as I know, based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members of my staff. It

but followed standard military practice in

the handling and control of widely separated forces where lateral communications

were difficult if not impossible.35

General Walker and the Eighth Army

staff apparently felt very strongly that

the X Corps should become part of the

Eighth Army. Walker seems to have

had two plans in mind for the possible

employment of Almond's forces. In one

of these, the X Corps would drive overland from Seoul to seize P'yongyang, and

the rest of the Eighth Army, after coming up behind the X Corps, would then

move laterally from P'yongyang to

Wonsan on the east coast where it would

join the ROK I Corps as the latter moved

up the east coast. Such a maneuver

might save a great deal of time, since

the X Corps was already in position to

advance on P'yongyang, and would establish a line across Korea at the narrow

waist that could cut off a large number of

North Koreans still trying to move northward through the central and eastern

mountains. Meanwhile, the X Corps

33

 (1) Opn Plan 9-50, 29 Sep 50, in JSPOG, GHQ,

UNC files. (2) Memo, Gen Hickey for JSPOG, Note

2, Gen Wright to CofS, GHQ, UNC, 26 Sep 50, sub:

Plans for Future Opns.

34

 (1) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Wright,

Feb 54. (2) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Eberle,

12 Jan 54. (3) Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj Schnabel,

8 Jul 55. 35

 Ltr, Gen MacArthur to Gen Snedeker, USMC,

G-3, Hq USMC, Washington, D.C., 24 Feb 56, copy

in OCMH.
190 POLICY AND DIRECTION

could move on above P'yongyang toward

the Yalu River. The operations of both

the X Corps and the Eighth Army could

be co-ordinated under Walker's command; and both could be supplied from

Pusan and Inch'on until the Wonsan

area fell, at which time the forces operating in the east could be supplied by

sea through Wonsan and Hungnam,

farther north.36

General Walker's second plan was to

approach Wonsan by a more direct,

diagonal route. Assuming that the X

Corps became a part of the Eighth Army,

Walker would, in this instance, send a

corps to the east coast objective through

the Seoul-Ch'orwon-Wonsan corridor.37

If these were the plans Walker had in

mind, he did not ask authority to carry

out either of them. Apparently unaware

of what Almond's plans were he contented himself with asking General MacArthur discreetly that he be let in on

what was going on: "To facilitate advance planning for the approaching juncture with the X Corps, request this

headquarters be kept informed of the

plans and progress of this Corps to the

greatest extent practicable. To date the

X Corps operations plans have not been

received."

 38

General MacArthur told Walker that

as soon as X Corps had completed its

CHROMITE missions, he would place it

in GHQ Reserve in the Inch'on-Seoul

area and that he, MacArthur, would direct its future operations. These operations would be revealed to the Eighth

Army commander at an early date.39

MacArthur, in fact, consulted neither

Walker nor Almond on the next operation until the plan was almost in final

form.

MacArthur's guidance to his planners

was tantamount to an order that they

recommend another amphibious operation by the X Corps. While MacArthur

did not specify that the X Corps would

make the amphibious landing, no other

element of the United Nations Command could have carried out the maneuver. Too, General MacArthur had

been most favorably impressed by Almond's performance at Inch'on and by

the over-all results of his operations.

Furthermore, he saw amphibious maneuver as the best means of slashing deep

into North Korea, of cutting off escape

routes for thousands of fleeing enemy

soldiers, and of seizing a major port to

support his troops. This last-named

purpose was perhaps uppermost in his

thinking. Ammunition, food, gasoline,

and most other supplies that kept the

UNC divisions fighting in late September came into Korea through two ports,

Pusan and Inch'on. As troops moved

farther north, Pusan's value dwindled,

since the rail lines and roads over which

matériel had to be brought from the port

to the combat units had been severely

damaged in the earlier heavy fighting.

The other port, Inch'on, had a limited

capacity for receiving vessels and could

scarcely have supported, with its facilities, all U.N. forces involved in the

fighting.40

36

 Interv, Col Appleman with Maj Gen Leven C.

Allen, 15 Dec 53, copy in OCMH. 37

 Ltr, Wright to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55. 38

 Rad, G 25090 KGO, CG Eighth Army to

CINCFE, 26 Sep 50.

39

 Rad, CX 64610, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

27 Sep 50. 40

 General Wright points out in this connection,

"Inchon was not capable of fully supplying Eighth
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 191

General Wright, in later analyzing the

decision and the planning for entering

North Korea, said,

Both General MacArthur and General

Walker realized that any successful cam- paign in North Korea would need the full

operation of an east coast port, preferably

Wonsan or Hungnam. And I believe that

their staffs were in full agreement. The

point at issue was simply that of how to

capture such a port and who should do it. 4 1

Any campaign north of the P'yongyang-Wonsan corridor would certainly

encounter a most difficult logistical problem. The northern Taebaek Range rose

to rugged heights in the east central part

of the peninsula, forming a nearly trackless mountain waste in the direction of

the Manchurian border. Few roads or

trails ran west and east. The principal

lanes of travel were axial routes that followed the north and south trend of deep

mountain valleys. The only reasonably

good lateral road connected P'yongyang

with Wonsan, where it joined the coastal

road running northward to Hamhung

and Hungnam. A rail line crossed the

peninsula in the same general area

between P'yongyang and Wonsan.

General MacArthur apparently decided that he could not supply both

Eighth Army and X Corps through

Pusan and Inch'on and over the crippled

road and rail system in a campaign that he

wanted to end quickly so that his forces

would not have to fight during North

Korea's severe winter weather. Weeks of

concentrated work by all the available

engineer troops would be needed before

even the main lines of communication

could be repaired as far as the 38th Parallel, not to mention the area to the

north where the next phase of the campaign would be fought. But with the

addition of the Wonsan port facilities,

MacArthur reasoned, two separate forces,

co-ordinated and supported from Japan,

could operate in Korea without impairing the effectiveness of either.42

 Of the

two methods by which he could seize

Wonsan, amphibious encirclement took

precedence over ground advance. The

means were at hand in the X Corps, his

directives specifically authorized amphibious operations in North Korea, and

he apparently hoped the waterborne

movement would be as successful as the

one at Inch'on.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having already established the principle that MacArthur could carry the fight into North

Korea, did not quibble over MacArthur's

methods. They passed the plan on to

the Secretary of Defense for final approval, asking that he act with great

speed since "certain ROK Army Forces

may even now be crossing the 38th Parallel." President Truman and General

Marshall agreed to the plan at once, and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General

MacArthur to carry out his plan on

schedule.43

Army and I think a logistical check will show that,

temporary handicap to Eighth Army as it was, the

movement out of X Corps enabled Eighth Army to

provide itself with the logistic capability to perform

its advance to the Pyongyang area." See Ltr, Wright

to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55. 41

 Ltr, Wright to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55.

42

 Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Ruffner, formerly CofS X Corps, 20 Aug 51. 43

 (1) Rad, JCS 92975, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Sep 50.

(2) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 29 Sep 50,

sub: Future Korean Opns. (3) To later critics who

noted that ROK troops captured Wonsan on 11

October before American units were even disembarked and that MacArthur had noticed this, General Wright pointed out that General MacArthur
192 POLICY AND DIRECTION

had indeed noticed and was impressed by the remarkable advance of ROK soldiers up the east coast

of Korea where, by late September, they had driven

almost to the parallel. But those same ROK troops

had, only weeks before, shown themselves to be

extremely vulnerable to pressure and counterattack.

And there was every good chance that these troops

would run into guerrilla forces, reinforced by retreating North Korean survivors, when they reached

the mountainous area west of Kaesong and Kojo.

Too, MacArthur did not feel that he had sufficient

control of ROK troops. While technically under

his command, their subordination to him was based

merely on an understanding between himself and

President Rhee of the Republic of Korea. This fact,

according to General Wright, made their conduct

under certain conditions problematical, and had to

be considered in any planning for a major operation. In other words, any plan which hinged on

ROK troops to any degree (i.e., to seize and hold

Wonsan) was felt to be leaning on a weak reed. See

Ltr, Gen Wright to Maj Schnabel, 14 Jun 55.
CHAPTER XI

The Invasion of North Korea

At noon on 1 October, General MacArthur broadcast from Tokyo a call to

the North Korean commander in chief,

demanding his surrender. The call went

unanswered.1 Hence there appeared to

be no alternative to sending UNC forces

into North Korea if the remainder of the

North Korean Army and the Communist

regime were to be destroyed. But since

the United Nations had not ordered or

even clearly authorized the entry into

and occupation of North Korea, American authorities were careful not to make

public any plans for occupying the northern half of Korea while they worked to

achieve some definite form of United

Nations approval.

The United Nations Resolution of

7 October

The Departments of State and Defense

agreed that if North Korea collapsed and

its Russian and Chinese neighbors kept

hands off, MacArthur should occupy

North Korea under the auspices of the

United Nations. Some officials favored

a unilateral occupation by the United

States if the United Nations took no new

steps authorizing occupation, "even at

the expense of some disagreement with

friendly United Nations nations."

 2 But

this was decidedly a minority view.

In late September, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had sent MacArthur a State Department opinion which held, "It will be

necessary to consult with and obtain the

approval of United Nations members

before the United Nations commander

can be authorized to undertake the occupation of North Korea." The State Department proposed that MacArthur send

mainly South Korean and other Asian

troops to occupy only key points in

North Korea. U.S. troops would leave

Korea as early as possible. There would

be no revenge or reprisal in the occupation. "The general posture of United

Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation," State Department authorities believed. General

MacArthur agreed and told the Joint

Chiefs, "The suggested program from

the standpoint of the field commander

seems entirely feasible and practicable."

 3

1

 Text, Broadcast, CINCUNC to CINC NKPA,

1 Oct 50, in State Dept Bulletin, 9 Oct 50.

2

 Memo, Chief, Plans Div G-3 (Col Johnson) for

DCS for Plans (Gen Gruenther), 21 Sep 50, sub:

Program for Bringing Korean Hostilities to an End,

in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 99/3. 3

 (1) Rad, JCS 92608, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Sep 50.

(2) Rad, CM-IN 15683, CINCFE to JCS, 26 Sep 50.
194 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Secretary of Defense Marshall also

wanted United States troops to stay out

of the picture during any occupation of

North Korea. "I wish to state," Marshall

told Secretary of State Acheson on 3

October:

that the Department of Defense continues

to believe that as few United States troops

as possible should engage in the physical

occupation and pacification of areas north

of the 38th Parallel, once organized military

hostilities have ended. It remains important, therefore, to increase the number of

other United Nations troops sent to Korea,

particularly from countries in Asia.4

General Marshall deplored the lack of

an organized United Nations agency,

other than military, to handle "the tremendous problems that will follow hostilities." He reminded Secretary Acheson

that the United Nations Commission in

Korea (UNCOK) was neither staffed nor

equipped to meet the problems that

would face it if the United Nations occupied North Korea. He called upon

Acheson to sponsor the formation by the

United Nations of one combined or three

separate agencies to handle the three

major problems—relief and reconstruction, political unification, and security.5

The Department of State had already

drawn up a resolution for the United

Nations to consider. This resolution

supported the political objectives of the

United Nations in Korea, including

means for carrying them out through

occupation if necessary. State Department officials talked informally with representatives of friendly member nations

in the United Nations and solicited their

support for the passage of the resolution.

The United States could not work

through the Security Council as in earlier

days, since the USSR delegate to the

council had returned to his seat in August, bringing a veto power likely to be

used against any American-inspired resolution. Consequently, the American

delegation moved the Korean question

before the General Assembly where the

USSR had no veto power and where

American greatly outweighed Russian

influence.

On 7 October the General Assembly

passed the resolution. It did not clearly

call for the conquest and occupation of

North Korea but gave implicit assent.

The General Assembly recommended:

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure

conditions of stability throughout Korea;

and, (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the

auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and

democratic Government in the sovereign

State of Korea. . . .

This resolution also established the

United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

(UNCURK) which replaced the old

United Nations Commission in Korea.6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent

a draft copy of the resolution to General

MacArthur, at the same time informing

him that the United States Government

considered it as supporting operations

north of the 38th Parallel.7

MacArthur's Plans Change

"All appropriate steps" to "ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea" 4

 Ltr, Secy Defense (Marshall) to Secy State (Acheson), 3 Oct 50, Incl to JCS 1776/129, 3 Oct 50, in

G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 99/11. 5

 Ibid.

6

 State Dept Bulletin, XXIII (23 Oct 50), 648-49. 7

 Rad, JCS 93555, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 195

meant only one thing to General MacArthur, particularly since the enemy refused to answer his surrender demand.

He went ahead with his preparations for

destroying the North Korean Army on

its own ground. His original plans for

doing so were scarcely recognizable by

the time they went into effect. In order

to keep pace with the swift advances in

the east and west, General MacArthur

had to change his scheme of late September. Other deviations from the prepared plans became necessary because of

unexpected conditions encountered at

Wonsan.

In late September, Walker's troops on

the west and central fronts, although

poised for the assault on North Korea,

had to be held in check temporarily.

Walker's divisions were delayed, not by

reluctance or enemy opposition, but simply by a lack of sufficient food, fuel, and

munitions for sustained operations in

North Korea. All supplies had to come

forward on badly damaged overland

routes; incoming cargo jammed limited

port facilities; and all available air transport was busy rushing supplies into the

few usable airfields so that MacArthur's

troops might attack as soon as possible.

As the Eighth Army and X Corps

pressed into the crowded maneuver area

along the border of west and central

Korea, MacArthur established a boundary between them. He made Eighth

Army responsible for establishment and

publication of complete bombline locations for all of Korea. Boundary control

points between areas of responsibility of

the two major commands were selected

by General Walker who then notified

General Almond. Walker received permission to use roads through Almond's

areas in carrying out the necessary surveying work. Direct communication

between the two commanders was authorized. The U.N. commander, when it

appeared that the enemy's lines of communication and other facilities would

soon be under his control and would be

needed in the advance into North Korea,

changed policy and forbade any further

unnecessary destruction of railroad facilities and equipment, bridges, and

enemy airfields.8

The North Korean Army seemed to

have melted away, so rapidly did it retreat. Even as MacArthur called for surrender and while American divisions

waited in the west, the ROK 3d Division

of the ROK I Corps on the east coast

crossed almost unopposed into North

Korea on 1 October. MacArthur reported the crossing to the Joint Chiefs

the next day: "Probings by elements of

the ROK Army are now well across the

38th Parallel. Advances on the extreme

right are between ten and thirty miles in

the coast sector with practically no resistance." These ROK troops were under Walker's command.9

General MacArthur foresaw that he

might not need to use X Corps amphibiously, if successes in the east continued.

"It is possible," he told the Joint Chiefs

on 2 October, "if the enemy's weakness

is pronounced that immediate exploitation may be put into effect before or in

substitution for my prepared plans."

 10

Yet he sent no more troops into the

coastal operation in support of the ROK

8

 (1) Rad, C 64621, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army

and CG X Corps, 27 Sep 50. (2) Rad, CX 65139,

CINCFE to All Comds, 1 Oct 50. 9

 Rad, C 65252, CINCFE to DA (JCS), 2 Oct 50. 10

 Ibid.
196 POLICY AND DIRECTION

drive, and on the same day issued orders

for an overland attack north along the

Kaesong-Sariwon-P'yongyang axis and

an east coast amphibious landing at

Wonsan to encircle and destroy North

Korean forces south of the Ch'ungjuKunu-ri - Yongwon - Hamhung - Hungnam line. The Eighth Army was to

make the main ground attack on P'yongyang, and the X Corps was to perform

the amphibious movement. After the

Eighth Army had seized P'yongyang and

the X Corps had invested Wonsan, each

was to attack toward the other along an

east-west axis, join up, and cut off all

enemy escape routes. On the ground,

only ROK troops would operate north

of the line Ch'ongju-Kunu-ri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, except on

MacArthur's direct order. He ordered

Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, to outload

X Corps. The assault force from the 1st

Marine Division was to load at Inch'on;

the remainder of the corps, principally

the 7th Division, was to embark from

Pusan. These orders were completely

within the authority granted General

MacArthur on 27 September.11

General Walker would command all

United Nations ground forces in Korea

with the exception of X Corps and the

187th Airborne RCT; X Corps, under

General Almond, would revert to GHQ

Reserve when passed through by Eighth

Army and remain under the direct command of General MacArthur. Upon embarkation for the assault and while on

the water, X Corps would be controlled

by Admiral Joy. The commander of

Joint Task Force Seven would command

all forces in the amphibious assault until

General Almond had landed and indicated his readiness to assume responsibility for further operations ashore.

On 3 October, General MacArthur

canceled his previous delineation of the

Inch'on-Seoul area as a X Corps objective

and took direct control of the 187th Airborne RCT, which had entered Korea

on 23 September and been operating in

the Kimp'o area. General Walker relieved General Almond of responsibility

for the Inch'on-Seoul area at noon on

7 October.12

By 1 October, the total ground force

strength within the United Nations Command in Korea, divided among the

Eighth Army, X Corps, and service units,

amounted to more than a third of a million men. Far East Air Forces under

General Stratemeyer, on the same date,

totaled 36,677, and U.S. Naval Forces,

Far East, under Admiral Joy numbered

59,438.13

The Likelihood of Chinese Intervention

Political Signs

From the very beginning of U.N. operations in Korea the United States and

its allies had kept close watch on the

political and military reactions of Korea's

giant neighbor, Communist China. Possessed of a powerful army and led by

men fanatically dedicated to communism, China could have interfered with

serious effect during July, August, and

11

 GHQ, UNC Opns Order No. 2, 2 Oct 50.

12

 (1) Rad, CX 65371, CINCFE to All Comdrs,

3 Oct 50. (2) Rad, X 10665, CG X Corps to CINC

FE, 8 Oct 50. 13

 (1) Rpt, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength

in Korea, 31 July 1950-31 July 1953, DA COA, 7 Oct

54. (2) Appleman, South to the Naktong, North

to the Yalu, p. 605.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 197

September. The fighting in Korea, however, received far less attention in

Chinese newspapers and in policy statements than did Formosa, which China

seemed to consider more important to

her immediate interests. Too, the relationship between China, the USSR, and

North Korea did not emerge clearly at

first. The Chinese appeared content to

allow Russian propagandists and officials

to champion the North Korean cause in

July and August.

On 13 July, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India suggested to

Premier Stalin and Secretary of State

Acheson that Communist China, more

formally, the Peoples' Republic of China,

be admitted to the U.N. Security Council

and that the United States, USSR, and

China, "with the help and cooperation

of other peace-loving nations," informally explore means to end the Korean

War. Stalin promptly accepted, but the

United States rejected the offer on 18

July. Chinese leaders made no immediate official comment.14

On 4 August, Jacob Malik, USSR

representative to the United Nations,

proposed that the "internal civil war" in

Korea be discussed with Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations and that all foreign troops be

withdrawn from Korea. On 22 August,

Malik warned that any continuation of

the Korean War would lead inevitably

to a widening of the conflict. This statement seemed to signal a turning point

for Chinese propagandists who, in public

journals and official statements, began to

hint darkly that if necessary the Chinese

people would defend North Korea

against its enemies. On 25 August,

China formally charged the United States

with strafing its territory across the Yalu.

On 6 September, the U.N. Security

Council voted down Malik's 4 August

proposal and on 11 September, defeated

his move to have Chinese Communists

come to the United Nations to consider

Chinese charges of border violation by

the United States.15

MacArthur's successful landing at

Inch'on brought no actual intervention,

as feared by some, but it did trigger a

barrage of threatening pronouncements

from high Chinese officials. On 22 September, the Chinese Foreign Office declared that China would always stand on

the side of the "Korean people," and on

30 September, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai publicly warned, "The

Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they

supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors

being savagely invaded by the imperialists."

 16

Late on 3 October, Chou En-lai called

in the Indian Ambassador to Peiping,

Dr. K. M. Pannikar, and, obviously expecting that his message would be conveyed to the U.S. Government, informed

him that if United Nations troops entered North Korea, China would send

in its forces from Manchuria. China

would not interfere, however, if only

South Koreans crossed the parallel. Next

day, Pannikar communicated Chou's

message to the United States through the

British Minister at Peiping.17

14

 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 60.

15

 Ibid., pp. 69-70, 92-94. 16

 Ibid., p. 108. 17 K. M. Pannikar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a

Diplomat (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp.

109-11.
198 POLICY AND DIRECTION

CHOU EN-LAI

Because earlier threats had not materialized, and because of the assumption

that the Chinese, if they really were serious, would not give away their intentions, Chou's warning caused no change

in MacArthur's orders. The fact that

the message came from Pannikar also

raised doubts that the warning was genuine. For Pannikar had shown distinct

Communist leanings and anti-American

feelings in the past. Only a few days

earlier, moreover, when the United

States asked India to advise Communist

China that it would be in the latter's best

interest not to interfere in Korea,18 Pannikar reported that China did not intend

to enter Korea.19 For these reasons,

American intelligence officials discredited

the newest message from Pannikar.

Still another factor which detracted

from the validity of Chou's warning was

a resolution pending before one of the

committees of the General Assembly of

the United Nations. The key vote on

the resolution was to take place on 4 October. President Truman felt that the

Chinese threat could well be a blatant attempt to blackmail the United

Nations.20

Military Signs

Military indications of Chinese plans

to invade North Korea were hard to

come by. MacArthur on 29 June 1950

had been warned to stay well clear of

Manchurian and Soviet borders. This

order forced him to rely almost entirely

upon outside sources for information on

the strength and disposition of the

Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria.

Using these sources, General Willoughby,

MacArthur's intelligence chief, reported

on 3 July that the Chinese had stationed

two cavalry divisions and four armies in

Manchuria. A Chinese army normally

possessed about 30,000 men but this

figure varied.21

Other reports, often conflicting and of

doubtful credence, told of troops of Korean ancestry being sent into North

Korea by the Chinese. Throughout July

and August 1950, the Department of the

Army received a mass of second- and

18

 Since the United States did not recognize the

Peiping government, it did not deal directly with

the Communist Chinese.

19

 Memo, G-2 DA for DCofS for Plans, DA, 25 Sep

50, sub: Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Korean Hostilities, in CofS, DA file 000.1, Case 1. 20

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 362. 21

 MS, Col Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the War

Department Intelligence Division, Part VII, ch. V.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 199

third-hand reports that more Chinese

troops were moving from south China

to Manchuria. Willoughby estimated

by the end of August that the Chinese

had moved nine armies totaling 246,000

men to Manchuria.22

Indications that the Chinese Communists possibly intended to enter the fighting continued to be reported to the

Department of the Army by the G-2 Section of the Far East Command. In daily

teleconferences between officers at the

Department of the Army and MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, General

Willoughby, or his officers, relayed the

latest information of Communist Chinese

military activities. Each day, also, the

United Nation Command's Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) went to the Department of the Army by courier, arriving

several days later in Washington. This

summary carried all reports received

from intelligence sources on the Chinese

Communists and made an effort to evaluate these reports. At the top intelligence

level, the Central Intelligence Agency

combined reports from its own sources

with those of the United Nations Command and then analyzed the actions and

intentions of the Chinese for high-level

governmental agencies.

To determine through outward manifestations alone whether the Chinese

intended to intervene was virtually impossible. But by using such indications

as movements of troops and supplies,

American intelligence agencies could

gauge this intention with some hope of

accuracy. Penetration of Communist

China to ascertain these movements was

an almost impossible task. But certain

agencies, particularly those allied with

the Chinese Nationalist Government on

Formosa and others operating out of

Hong Kong, relayed reports of Chinese

Communist military movements.

Although there were no definite military indications after Inch'on that the

Chinese meant to enter the fighting in

Korea, General Willoughby speculated

that 450,000 Chinese troops were massed

in Manchuria. The nation's planners

had given full consideration to Chinese

strength and the possibility of its employment in Korea when they drew up their

blueprint for national policy in September.23

 While the primary concern of

these authorities continued to be the

possibility of intervention by the USSR,

much attention had also been given to

whether or not Chinese forces would

come into Korea, and if so, what course

should be followed by the United Nations Command. On 27 September, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General

MacArthur to make a special effort to

determine if the Chinese intended entering the war.24

 On the next day, General

MacArthur assured them that there was

no present indication of the entry into

North Korea by Chinese Communist

forces.25

On the day of Chou's warning, 3 October, the UNC intelligence staff reported

some evidence that twenty Chinese Communist divisions were in North Korea

and had been there since 10 September.

They also commented on the reported

warning from the Chinese Foreign Minister and other recent public statements

that "Even though the utterances . . .

22 Ibid.

23

 DIS, GHQ, FEC, 2934, 21 Sep 50. 24

 Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50. 25

 Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50.
200 POLICY AND DIRECTION

are a form of propaganda they cannot be

fully ignored since they emit from presumably responsible leaders in the Chinese and North Korean Communist

Governments. The enemy retains a

potential of reinforcement by CCF

troops."

 26

On 5 October, noting the purported

entry into North Korea of nine Chinese

divisions, GHQ intelligence officers observed that recent reports were taking on

a "sinister connotation" and concluded

that the potential "exists for Chinese

Communist forces to openly intervene in

the Korean War if United Nations forces

cross the 38th Parallel."

 27

 General Willoughby told Washington officials that

the USSR "would find it both convenient

and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of Communist China perform the task as part

of the master plan to drain United States

resources into geographical rat holes of

the Orient." He informed them that a

build-up of Chinese forces along the Korean-Manchurian border had been reported by many of his sources and that

"while exaggerations and canards are always evident, the potential of massing at

the Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive." According to

his computations, between nine and

eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese divisions believed to be in Manchuria were

massing at the border crossings. Yet,

MacArthur's intelligence chief did not,

as far as is known, attempt to dissuade

General MacArthur from crossing the

parallel. Moreover, continuing reports

of Chinese Communist troops crossing

into Korea in early October were discounted by the Far East Command intelligence officers since "no conclusive

evidence" existed; and the recent Chinese threat to enter North Korea if

American forces crossed the 38th Parallel

was characterized as "probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail."

 28

Nevertheless, the possibility that the

Chinese Communists might actually intervene caused President Truman to direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give

General MacArthur instructions covering such an eventuality. On 9 October,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur that ". . . in the event of the

open or covert employment anywhere in

Korea of major Chinese Communist

units, without prior announcement, you

should continue the action as long as, in

your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable

chance of success. In any case you will

obtain authorization from Washington

prior to taking any military action

against objectives in Chinese territory."

 29

One day earlier, the delicate balance

of international relations received a substantial jolt when two of MacArthur's jet

26

 DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2946, 3 Oct, and 2947, 4

Oct 50. 27

 DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2948, 5 Oct 50.

28

 (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, Nos. 2951, 2952, 2957, 8, 9,

14 Oct 50. (2) The Indian Ambassador to China

asserts that on 9 October, Ernest Bevin, U.K. Foreign

Minister, sent him a message to be transmitted to

Chou En-lai personally and which was ". . . friendly

in tone and contained vague assurances . . . that

the Korean Commission would give the Chinese

views their most careful consideration." Dr. Pannikar sent along this message which, in his viewpoint, added insult to injury since the Korean

Commission consisted of such countries as the Philippines and Siam. "In any case," Pannikar notes,

"Bevin's approach was too late, for the Chinese

armies were already in Korea." See Pannikar, In

Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 111-12. 29

 (1) Rad, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Oct 50. (2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 362.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 201

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FRANK PACE, JR., arrives at Seoul airbase for an inspection

tour and is greeted by General Milburn.

fighters attacked a Soviet airfield in the

Soviet maritime provinces near Sukhaya

Rechk. This incident was tailor-made

for the USSR to use as an excuse to intervene in the Far East, especially since it

occurred at almost the same time that

American divisions moved above the 38th

Parallel for the first time.

The United States informed the Soviet

Union that the pilots had made a navigational error and had used poor judgment, that the commander of the Air

Force Group responsible had been relieved, and that disciplinary action had

been taken against the two pilots. The

United States also expressed deep regret

and offered to pay for all damages to

Soviet property which were, it was reported, considerable. But the Russians

did not acknowledge this offer.30

One intelligence report reaching President Truman on 12 October stated that

Chinese military forces, while lacking the

necessary air and naval support, could

intervene effectively but not necessarily

decisively. Further, in spite of statements by Chou En-lai and troop movements to Manchuria, there were no

convincing indications of Chinese Communist intentions to resort to full-scale

intervention in Korea. The general conclusion of the report was that the Chinese were not expected to enter North

Korea to oppose the United Nations

Command, at least not in the foreseeable

future. Several reasons were given for

this conclusion: The Chinese Communists undoubtedly feared the consequences of war with the United States.

Anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence

would be endangered. The Chinese

Communists also would hesitate to endanger their chances for a seat in the

United Nations. Moreover, in the unlikely event that the Chinese entered the

war without the benefit of Soviet naval

and air support, they were bound to

suffer costly losses. On the other hand,

acceptance of Soviet aid, if forthcoming,

would make China more dependent on

Russia and would increase Russian control in Manchuria. This report agreed

with many others that from a military

standpoint, the most favorable time for

intervention had passed. For all of these

reasons, U.S. intelligence officials concluded that while full-scale Communist

intervention in Korea had to be regarded

as a continuing possibility, such action,

30

 (1) Rad, JCS 93885, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Oct 50.

(2) Rad, No. 412, Secy State (Acheson) to USUN,

N.Y., 18 Oct 50.
202 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL ALLEN

barring a Soviet decision for global war,

was not probable in 1950. This optimistic forecast was bolstered by a report from

the Far East Command on 14 October

implying that China and the USSR, "in

spite of their continued interest and

some blatant public statements," had

decided against "further expensive investment in support of a lost cause."

 31

Eighth Army Enters North Korea

By 3 October, the ROK I Corps was

well inside North Korea on the east

coast. But until the second week of

October, Walker's divisions in the west

continued to occupy the Seoul-Inch'on

area and to prepare for their drive on

P'yongyang.

Supply shortages still plagued Walker's

forces. Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn,

now commanding the U.S. I Corps which

was slated to lead the Eighth Army attack, was uneasy about these shortages,

and especially wanted at least 3,000 tons

of ammunition in forward supply points

near Kaesong to support his divisions in

the attack. But it was physically impossible to raise the forward supply

levels. The Army simply had outrun its

logistic support (I Corps, for instance,

was 200 miles north of its railhead at

Waegwan); and Inch'on helped hardly

at all since unloading almost halted during the first half of October when its

port facilities were diverted to the outloading of X Corps.32

Walker nonetheless was convinced by

7 October that it was time to move.

Since MacArthur's order for the attack

to the north had not designated a beginning date for the Eighth Army advance

and since Walker had had no word since

the initial order on 2 October, he directed his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Leven

C. Allen, to get in touch with Tokyo

and find out what was wanted. Allen

immediately called General Hickey, acting chief of staff, FEC GHQ, for an answer. "Your A-Day will be at such time

as you see it ready," Hickey replied.

Allen asked for and received immediate

confirmation of this by radio. Two days

later, on 9 October, Walker notified

MacArthur that he had ordered his commanders to strike out for P'yongyang

without delay.33

31

 (1) Rpt in CofS, DA file 323.3, 12 Oct 50.

(2) DIS, GHQ, FEC, 2957, 14 Oct 50.

32

 (1) 3d Log Comd Hist Rpt, Oct 50. (2) EUSAK

War Diary, G-4 Sec Rpt, 10 Oct 50. (3) Interv, Col

Appleman with Gen Eberle, GHQ, FEC, UNC G-4,

12 Jan 54. 33

 (1) Telecon, Gen Hickey (Tokyo) with Gen

Allen (Korea), 1130, 7 Oct 50. (2) Rad, CX 65711,

CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 7 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 203

TANKS AND INFANTRYMEN of the 1st Cavalry Division pursue Communist-led

North Korean forces approximately 14 miles north of Kaesong.

Also on 9 October, basing his action

on the new U.N. Security Council resolution, General MacArthur made a second attempt to persuade the North

Koreans to surrender. "In order that the

decisions of the United Nations may be

carried out with a minimum of further

loss of life and destruction of property,"

he told enemy leaders by radio, "I, as the

United Nations Commander-in-Chief,

for the last time call upon you and the

forces under your command, in whatever

part of Korea situated, to lay down your

arms and cease hostilities." He assured

the enemy that the people of North Korea would be treated fairly and that the

United Nations would rehabilitate their

devastated country as part of a unified

Korea. But he warned that unless he

got an immediate agreement from the

North Korean Government, "I shall at

once proceed to take such military ac-
204 POLICY AND DIRECTION

U.S. TROOPS pass supply wagons abandoned by the North Koreans in their haste

to escape from P'yongyang.

tions as may be necessary to enforce the

decrees of the United Nations."

 34

Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Premier, rejected this demand out of hand.

He knew that, even as MacArthur's message reached him, Walker's divisions in

the west were entering North Korea

while in the east the ROK I Corps was

fast approaching Wonsan.

Information on North Korean activities north of the parallel had already

convinced the Eighth Army that hard

fighting awaited on the road to P'yongyang. ROK intelligence agents described

extensive North Korean fortifications

and other defensive preparations, including the moving up of new units of fresh

troops who had not fought in South

Korea.35

In the U.S. I Corps zone, patrols from

the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division crossed the

38th Parallel on 7 and 8 October; and on

9 October, the full division struck across

the boundary north of Kaesong. The

34

 Radio Broadcast, CINCUNC to CINC NKPA,

9 Oct 50.

35

 EUSAK PIR Nos. 82, 89, and 90, dated 2, 9, and

10 Oct 50.

THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 205

British 27th Brigade, the ROK 1st Division, and the U.S. 24th Division also took

part in the drive. The attackers encountered prolonged and fierce resistance at

Kumch'on, but on 14 October they seized

that battered town and by 16 October

the enemy front lines ceased to exist.

American, British, and ROK troops then

raced toward P'yongyang. (Map III)

The progress of the two divisions of

the ROK I Corps along the east coast of

Korea was even faster, and at times spectacular. Although enemy resistance appears to have been lighter in the area,

the ROK advance nevertheless reflected

a creditable offensive spirit.36 The speed

with which these South Korean soldiers

pursued their adversaries up the peninsula made inevitable the bypassing of

comparatively large numbers of enemy

troops in the east coast mountains.

These troops later turned to guerrilla

warfare and proved an annoying, even

dangerous, thorn in the side of U.N.

forces.

Because General Walker was not sure

of how much control he held over ROK

units, General Allen, when he talked to

General Hickey on 7 October, had asked

for guidance. Referring to the attack

order from GHQ, Allen said, "In the

order you notice, there is a line up beyond which certain people [ROK] go.

. . . Is KMAG under our control and

logistic support? We would like to know

if we can organize the ROK Army itself." Hickey was not able to provide an

immediate answer, but called Allen back

fifteen minutes later saying, "Red, I've

got the confirmation on the way to you

by wire regarding those elements you

mentioned. They are to be considered

as members of the team and working

with the team in whatever area they may

be employed."

 37

ROK units on 11 October captured

Wonsan, the objective area for the pending X Corps assault. General Walker

flew into the city on the day of its capture. He was so impressed by the ROK's

successes that he tacitly established his

own plan for cutting a line across Korea

from P'yongyang to Wonsan. By taking

Wonsan before X Corps arrived the

ROK units had changed considerably the

tactical picture existing at the time of

the issuance of Operations Order No. 2,

nine days before. The ROK forces

seemed to be in a position to carry out

the original mission assigned to X Corps,

advancing along the Wonsan-P'yongyang

axis to link up with other Eighth Army

forces and sealing off Korea to that line.

The success scored by the ROK I Corps

and mounting evidence of landing problems at Wonsan had already caused General MacArthur to think of changing the

employment of X Corps. He had directed his planners to modify plans for

Almond's landing and to prepare for a

possible landing by the Marines at Hungnam instead of Wonsan. The 7th Division would land administratively a few

miles north of Wonsan, then strike out

overland for P'yongyang. The Marines,

in the meantime, from their base at

Hungnam would head toward P'yongyang also. On 8 October, General

Wright presented General MacArthur

with such a plan. This plan pointed 36

 General MacArthur paid tribute to the ROK

forces engaged in this operation by stating that

"In . . . the exploitive pursuit they are unequaled."

See MacArthur Hearings, p. 4.

37

 Telecon, Gen Hickey and Gen Allen, 1115, 7

Oct 50, and 1130, 7 Oct 50.
206 POLICY AND DIRECTION

out that the Hungnam area was a feasible location for an amphibious assault

operation. After reviewing the plan,

General MacArthur called in Admiral

Joy, pointed out that ROK units were

even then approaching Wonsan, and told

him that he was considering this alternative method of landing. Joy strongly

opposed the change. He pointed to the

great disadvantages of splitting the two

forces, the lack of time for detailed naval

planning, and the impracticability of

clearing both Wonsan and Hungnam

harbors of mines in the short time left

before the landing was to take place.

General MacArthur accepted Joy's views,

gave up the idea of changing landing

places, and on 10 October ordered all

major commanders to carry out the original plan as scheduled.38

General Walker, on the next day, reported to General MacArthur, "The I

ROK Corps has entered Wonsan and is

now mopping up enemy resistance. The

II ROK Corps [is] advancing north on

the Wonsan area from the vicinity of

Chorwon-Kumhwa-Kumsong." Then,

apparently believing that this welcome

news gave him sufficient license, General

Walker announced some plans of his

own:

In order to support the planned operations

of the ROK Army in securing the Wonsan

area and advance to the west to Pyongyang

in conjunction with the advance of the

U.S. I Corps from the south and southeast,

it is vital to provide for the supply of five

divisions of the ROK Army through the

port of Wonsan. Request that the harbor

be swept clear of GF mines as soon as

possible.39

General MacArthur had no intention

of leaving X Corps out of the operations.

He made this very clear to Walker, removing any delusions that Eighth Army

was going to expand its mission. "Wonsan port facilities will be secured and

utilized for operations of X Corps in

accordance with the United Nations

Command Operations Order No. 2," he

instructed General Walker. He told him

that the Navy would continue its sweeping operations to remove mines from

Wonsan Harbor and would maintain its

gunfire and air support of ROK divisions. But no additional LST's for carrying supplies to the ROK troops could

be furnished until after X Corps troops

had landed. MacArthur also told Walker

that the Eighth Army would lose the

ROK forces in the Wonsan area when

X Corps came in. "I now plan to place

X Corps in operational control of I ROK

Corps. . . ."40

The X Corps Prepares

At the close of September, at X Corps

headquarters in Ascom City near Inch'on,

General Almond briefed his division

commanders and principal staff officers

on the coming amphibious operation.

General Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, viewed the plan skeptically, especially the concept of marching

westward across the peninsula to contact

Eighth Army. "It involved a movement

38

 Karig, Battle Report, The War in Korea, ch. 25,

pp. 301-02. (2) Rad, C 55002, CINCFE to All

Cindrs, 10 Oct 50. (3) Opn Plan CINCFE 9-50

(Alternate).

39

 (1) War Diary X Corps 8 Oct 50, Wonsan-Iwon

Landings. (2) Rad, GX 25744, CG EUSAK to

CINCFE, 11 Oct 50. 40

 Rad, CX 66169, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

11 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 207

of 125 miles across the rugged central

mountain chain of Korea," he wrote

later. "There were many defiles and

many stretches of the road were one-way.

The Eighth Army in its rapid drive

north from the Pusan Perimeter had bypassed thousands of North Korean troops.

These enemy troops had faded into the

central mountains and were making

their way north to a sanctuary somewhere in North Korea. In a drive across

the central mountain range, the protection of the MSR would present a serious

problem, as the drift of the North Koreans would be across the MSR." The

matter was not for Smith to decide, however, and the division officers began planning for the new operation at once.41

The 1st Marine Division, scheduled

to assault the Wonsan beaches, began

assembling in the Inch'on area on 4 October. By 7 October, the division and a

regiment of South Korean marines

moved into staging areas at Inch'on and

on 9 October began boarding ship for the

830-mile sea voyage to Wonsan.

The other major component of the X

Corps, the U.S. 7th Division, started

moving south to Pusan by road and rail

on 5 October. Several times during the

long trip, groups of bypassed enemy soldiers attacked the column, but were

beaten off. The leading regiment of the

7th Division reached Pusan on 10 October. By the 12th, all units were in their

Pusan assembly areas; and on 16 and 17

October, the division boarded ship.

By General MacArthur's direction,

the Eighth Army was responsible for the

logistical support of all United Nations

forces in Korea. Thus, General Walker

was responsible for supplying the X

Corps without having any control over

the corps' operations. This arrangement

added confusion and misunderstanding

to an already unusual relationship

between the two major commands. MacArthur may have felt that Almond's extremely tight time schedule in preparing

for the amphibious move, the general

dislocation of Almond's forces during the

transfer of divisions, and the weaknesses

inherent in corps logistical facilities as

compared to an army, justified saddling

Walker with this additional responsibility. Too, there was reason to believe

that the Wonsan operation would be

completed within a matter of weeks,

thus rendering Walker's obligation a

temporary measure of short duration.

Colonel Smith, X Corps G-4, had decided views on the effect of MacArthur's

decision to make Eighth Army responsible for X Corps supply. "The preparation for the East Coast landing," Smith

commented:

was further complicated from a logistic

viewpoint by action taken by GHQ to revise

channels during the out-loading so that the

Eighth Army became responsible for logistic support of the Corps instead of Corps

dealing directly with logistical agencies in

Japan. Through direct contact of X Corps

staff with JLCOM [Japan Logistical Command] Agencies, detailed supply plans had

been completed. . . . The introduction of

Eighth Army into channels interrupted

these arrangements at a critical time.

Although Eighth Army made every effort

to assist the Corps in out-loading in conformance with the plan, the loss of direct

contact with JLCOM resulted in resupply

difficulties during the unloading phases.

Rations arrived on large ships, bulk loaded.

In order to assemble logical menus for issue

to troops, almost the entire ship had to be

unloaded before a balanced meal could be 41

 General Smith's Chronicles, p. 371.
208 POLICY AND DIRECTION

provided. This required emergency airlift of rations into the Corps area. Had the

original plan for shallow-draft ships with

cargo prepared for selective discharge been

followed, it would have been possible to

have met the troop requirements from day

to day.

A similar problem occurred in the outloading of Signal supplies. At this time the

Corps was utilizing three ports for unloading. Instead of distributing Signal supply

items to permit this discharge at each area,

all items were placed on one ship and unloaded at Iwon with the Seventh Division.

Lack of rail facilities and limited truck

transportation delayed redistribution of

these supplies to other units.

POL intended for resupply of Seventh

Division was never outloaded by JLCOM

due to a misunderstanding based on a cancellation of what they thought to be a

duplication. This necessitated an emergency shipment by LST to meet an urgent

requirement for the Seventh Division.

It is believed that the above and many

similar problems were created primarily by

the change of channels at a time when all

staffs were over-worked and involved in a

very complicated operation requiring the

closest of liaison and direct coordination.

Many of these difficulties would not have

arisen had X Corps continued to receive

logistic support direct from JLCOM at least

until the initial landings had been established on the East Coast.42

A New Obstacle

While the loading of X Corps ran its

course, other developments in the objective area threatened even more directly

than supply and shipping problems to

wreck the entire landing operation. The

enemy had mined Wonsan Harbor and

all its approaches.

The U.S. Navy had discovered enemy

mines in Korean waters as early as 4

September. Operations at Inch'on had

been somewhat hampered by contact

mines laid in the entrance channel.

(Magnetic mines had also been discovered but, fortunately, ashore.) Between

26 September and 2 October five U.N.

ships had struck mines. Intelligence reports confirmed that the enemy had

mined the approaches to Wonsan Harbor. But the depth and thoroughness of

the enemy's mining operations along the

coast of northeast Korea did not become

apparent until Almond's troops had already begun loading at Pusan and

Inch'on.43

The Navy attack order, issued on 1

October, had called for minesweeping

operations to begin five days before the

landing date. But reports of mines at

Wonsan and the possibility of bad

weather or influence mines making the

clearing a longer operation, prompted

Admiral Struble to advance the beginning date to 10 October.44

When on the 10th ships of Joint Task

Force Seven turned toward Wonsan to

begin their minesweeping, they encountered mine patterns as concentrated and

effective as any in the history of naval

warfare. At least 2,000 mines of all

types—contact inertia, contact chemical,

pressure, and electronic—lay in the path

of any invasion fleet. Intelligence reports later disclosed that Russian technicians and advisers had assembled the

mines, planned the minefields, and su42

 Blumenson, Miscellaneous Problems and Their

Solution, p. 52.

43

 (1) Comd and Hist Rpt, COMNAVFE, SepNov 50, Annex to Rpt of GHQ, FEC, UNC. (2)

Field, History of United States Naval Operations,

Korea, pp. 229-42. 44

 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 233.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 209

pervised their laying. Civilians impressed from Wonsan had laid the mines

simply and economically by rolling them

off towed barges. The Russians had

meant to lay 4,000 mines, but had not

finished when ROK forces drove them

out of Wonsan.45

Although 20 October had been established as the corps landing date, Admiral

Doyle, commanding Task Force 90, directed that the landing be delayed until

the transport and landing areas were

positively clear of all mines. The command ship for the operation, USS Mt.

McKinley, with Generals Almond and

Smith aboard, proceeded to the Wonsan

area to await developments; but the remainder of the assault shipping was ordered to delay arrival at Wonsan by

alternately sailing north for twelve hours

then south for twelve hours and while

awaiting orders from Admiral Doyle to

proceed to Wonsan.46

Since the ten American minesweepers

in the theater were not enough to sweep

the harbor in time for a 20 October

landing, and with no time to bring more

sweepers from the United States, Admiral Joy had petitioned General MacArthur for permission to use Japanese

minesweepers. Necessity overcame any

political objections, and General MacArthur granted permission. He stipulated that Japanese crew members must

be volunteers and that they receive

double pay. Subsequently, 19 minesweepers—10 American, 8 Japanese, and

1 ROK—concentrated for the sweeping

operations which began on 10 October.47

The use of Japanese contract vessels

and crews introduced problems stemming from misunderstanding. The

Japanese had been informed that they

would not be used in sweeping operations north of the 38th Parallel; they did

not know how to communicate with the

Japanese Maritime Safety Agency without breaking radio silence; a question

arose as to whether the double pay feature was applicable to base pay and

allowances or merely to base pay; they

felt that they were inadequately supplied; they were sweeping with 3.2-meter

draft ships while the mines were planted

only three meters below the surface; and

they were conducting the first sweep,

the combat sweep, whereas they had been

promised that they should perform only

the second sweep. They registered their

complaints but to little avail.48

The situation hardly improved on 17

October when one of the Japanesemanned vessels struck a mine and sank.

The Department of State hurriedly

cabled General MacArthur and cautioned him not to release any information on the sinking because of the great

propaganda advantage that the Communists could gain from the fact of

Japanese participation in Korean operations. MacArthur assured Washington

that he was keeping the news under

wraps, but insisted that his use of Jap45

 (1) Comd Rpt, NAVFE, Sep-Nov 50. (2) Field,

History of United States Naval Operations, Korea,

p. 237. 46

 General Smith's Chronicles, pp. 404-09.

47

 For additional details of minesweeping operations in Korea, see Field, History of United States

Naval Operations, Korea, pages 229-42. 48

 (1) Rad, 012344Z, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 1

Oct 50. (2) Rad, C 65564, CINCFE to COMNAVFE,

6 Oct 50. (3) Action Rpt, Joint Task Force Seven,

Wonsan Opn, 1-C-2. (4) Rad, 230310Z,

COMNAVFE to Comdr, Task Force Seven, Info

CINCFE, 24 Oct 50.
210 POLICY AND DIRECTION

MINESWEEPER blows up in Woman Harbor from a Russian-type contact mine.

anese minesweepers was perfectly legitimate. "These vessels," he asserted,

"were hired and employed, not for combat, but humanitarian purposes involved

in neutralizing infractions of the accepted rules of warfare." The infractions MacArthur mentioned referred to

the use of free-floating mines by the

North Koreans. Whether classified as

a combat operation or a humanitarian

effort, the sweeping continued with

Japanese participation.49

The Wake Island Conference

While Eighth Army troops pressed forward into North Korea and X Corps

prepared to land at Wonsan, President

Truman called General MacArthur to a

conference at Wake Island. On 10

October, the President announced:

General MacArthur and I are making a

quick trip over the coming weekend to meet

in the Pacific. . . . I shall discuss with him

the final phase of United Nations action in

Korea. . . . We should like to get our

armed forces out and back to their other

duties at the earliest moment consistent

with the fulfillment of our obligations as a

49

 (1) Rad, No. 650, Secy State to SCAP, 19 Oct 50.

(2) Rad, CX 67066, CINCFE to DA, 21 Oct 50.

(3) Comd and Hist Rpt, NAVFE, Sep-Nov 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 211

RADFORD, MACARTHUR, PACE, AND BRADLEY at Wake Island Conference.

member of the United Nations. Naturally,

I shall take advantage of this opportunity

to discuss with General MacArthur other

matters within his responsibility.50

President Truman had intended to

take all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with

him. But after being advised of the

danger of taking them all from Washington under conditions then existing in

Korea and in other potential trouble

spots, the President took only the chairman, General Bradley, and Secretary of

the Army Pace as his military advisers.51

In addition to his two military experts,

50

 Rad, 101910Z, DA to SCAP, 11 Oct 50.

51

 For the details of the Wake Island Conference,

the author has relied upon a compilation of notes

by General Bradley. These notes, which were kept

by the Washington conferees, were augmented by

shorthand recordings taken by a secretary who listened to the meeting from an adjacent room. General MacArthur later objected that he had no

knowledge that a verbatim transcript was being

taken, or that, indeed, any record of the conference

was kept. General Bradley states that five copies of

this material were forwarded to General MacArthur

on 19 October 1950 and that one of General MacArthur's aides signed for them on 27 October 1950.

According to his own testimony, General MacArthur
212 POLICY AND DIRECTION

President Truman was accompanied to

Wake Island by Ambassador-at-large

Philip C. Jessup, W. Averell Harriman,

and Assistant Secretary of State Dean

Rusk. General MacArthur arrived with

Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney of his staff.

Admiral Radford, Commander in Chief,

Pacific, also attended the main conference. All conferees arrived on 15 October.

The President and General MacArthur first conferred privately for approximately an hour. Afterward, Mr.

Truman opened the general conference

by asking the United Nations commander to give his views on the problems

facing the United States in rehabilitating

Korea. In reply MacArthur was extremely optimistic, stating that he believed that formal resistance by the

enemy would end by Thanksgiving.

The North Korean Army was pursuing

a forlorn hope in resisting the United

Nations forces then attacking it. The

enemy, according to MacArthur, had

only about 100,000 men left and these

were poorly trained, led, and equipped.

They were fighting obstinately, but only

to save face. "Orientals," General MacArthur pointed out, "prefer to die rather

than to lose face."

General MacArthur described his

tactical plan in broad outline, saying

that he was landing X Corps at captured

Wonsan from which this corps could cut

across the peninsula to P'yongyang in

one week. He compared this planned

maneuver to the Inch'on operation and

noted that the North Koreans had once

again erred fatally in not deploying in

depth. "When the gap is closed, the

same thing will happen in the north as

happened in the south."

Eighth Army, if things went according

to General MacArthur's schedule, would

be withdrawn to Japan by Christmas.

The 2d and 3d Divisions and certain

U.N. units of smaller size would remain

in Korea under the X Corps to carry out

security missions and to support the

United Nations Commission for the Rehabilitation and Unification of Korea.

He hoped that elections could be held

before the first of the year, thus avoiding

a military occupation. "All occupations are failures," General MacArthur

commented.

General Bradley, who was quite concerned over the shortage of American

forces in Europe and who saw the end

of the Korean War as an opportunity to

get another division into Europe in a

hurry, asked General MacArthur if the

2d or 3d Division could be made available for shipment to Europe by January.

MacArthur responded with a promise to

make either division ready for shipment

by that time, but recommended that the

2d Division be sent since it was a battleproven organization and better trained

than the newly arrived 3d Division.

Before their 1-day conference ended,

President Truman asked MacArthur

what chance there was of Chinese interference. The United Nations comdid not bother to look at the copies of the record

furnished him. He said, however, "I have no doubt

that in general they are an accurate report of what

took place."

Immediately after his return from Wake Island,

Secretary Pace reported to the Army Policy Council

on the meetings. His report, made at a time when

the record was not the political issue it later became,

is identical in content to General Bradley's notes.

See also Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Substance of

Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on

October 15, 1950 (Washington, 1951).
PRESIDENT TRUMAN
214 POLICY AND DIRECTION

mander replied, "Very little." He felt

that the Red Chinese had lost their

chance to intervene effectively. He

credited the Chinese with having 300,000

men in Manchuria, with between

100,000-125,000 men along the Yalu,

and estimated that 50,000-60,000 could

be brought across the Yalu. But the

Chinese had no air force, according to

General MacArthur; hence, in view of

U.N. air bases in Korea, "if the Chinese

tried to get down to Pyongyang there

would be the greatest slaughter." This

broad assurance from MacArthur must

have done much to allay any fears entertained by Mr. Truman and the other

top authorities that China meant to

intervene.52

52

 See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, pp. 760-61.
CHAPTER XII

Signs of Victory

New Plans of Advance

Upon his return from Wake Island,

General MacArthur moved vigorously to

validate his prediction of imminent victory. Although enemy mines had temporarily stymied the landing of the X

Corps, MacArthur did have troops in

North Korea in the east as well as on the

west and west central front. As a first

step in exploiting the situation in the

east, he placed all units in the Wonsan

area under Almond's command. On

16 October, MacArthur told General

Walker:

In order to exploit to the maximum all

forces under CINCUNC and to imple- ment the full concept of operations . . . X

Corps, operating as an independent Corps

of GHQ Reserve, will, effective at 1200

hours, 20 October 1950, and until further

orders, assume operational control of all

UN and ROK ground forces operating

north of 39 degrees and 10 minutes north.1

Strengthening Almond's command still

more, MacArthur ordered the 3d Division—two regiments of which were

then in Japan and the other, the 65th

Infantry, in Korea—readied by 2 November for shipment to Wonsan.2

Turning to Walker's zone, MacArthur

alerted the 187th Airborne RCT which

had gone into GHQ Reserve around

Kimp'o Airfield, for an airdrop across

the two main arterial routes north of

P'yongyang near the towns of Sukch'on

and Sunch'on. He directed the 187th

to be ready to drop on 21 October to

stop enemy withdrawals to the north,

to cut off enemy reinforcements, and to

disrupt enemy communications. He

hoped, also, to capture important North

Korean officials and to rescue U.N.

POW's before the enemy could move

them northward. MacArthur apparently still believed that the X Corps

would be operating ashore within a few

days. For he directed that when the

corps had landed and driven west to

establish contact with the 187th north of

P'yongyang, General Almond was to assume operational control of the airborne

unit. The commanding general, Far

East Air Forces, became responsible for

lifting the 187th and for furnishing

1

 Rad, C 66549, CINCFE to CG Army Eight, 16

Oct 50.

2

 Rad, C 66553, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG

X Corps, 15 Oct 50.
216 POLICY AND DIRECTION

tactical air support to the airborne troops

throughout the operation.3

On 17 October, as Walker's troops approached P'yongyang, MacArthur issued

new orders designed to wring every advantage out of the favorable battlefield

situation. He set up a boundary between the Eighth Army and the X Corps

to become effective on his further order.

MacArthur wanted the Eighth Army to

advance on the left of the new boundary

to the general line Sonch'on-Chongsanjangsi-Koin-dong-Pyongwon. The X

Corps would advance to the eastern

extension of this line, Toksil-li-PungsanSongjin.4

 For this general advance, MacArthur removed the restrictions against

using any but ROK forces north of the

line Ch'ongju-Kunu-ri-Yongwon-Hamhung. But he directed that only ROK

troops would operate north of the new

objective line. His new concept, of

course, also canceled his previous plan to

cross and seal off the peninsula between

P'yongyang and Wonsan. For the new

objective line ranged from 80 to 130

miles north of the P'yongyang-Wonsan

road and approached within 40 miles of

the Manchurian border.5

P'yongyang fell on 19 October, whereupon MacArthur started the all-out drive

toward the new objective line. He

stepped up the airborne operation by one

day, sending the 187th Airborne into

the Sukch'on-Sunch'on area in the first

airdrop of the Korean campaign on 20

October. The Eighth Army assumed

operational control of the 187th RCT

after it hit the ground.

From his own plane, General MacArthur, accompanied by Generals Stratemeyer, Wright, and Whitney, watched

the parachute troops land and assemble.

He then flew to P'yongyang, where he

commented to reporters that the airborne landings seemed to have completely surprised the North Koreans and

that "This closes the trap on the enemy."

When he returned to Tokyo on 21

October, he predicted that "the war is

very definitely coming to an end

shortly."

 6

On the east coast, General Almond

went ashore at Wonsan by helicopter on

19 October to take charge of the ROK

I Corps which was still moving rapidly

to the north. By that date, the 1st

Marine Air Wing had been flying out

of Wonsan Airfield for five days; and

shore parties, engineers, and advance

billeting parties were in Wonsan preparing for the landing of the 1st Marine

Division.7

Although to Admiral Struble, commander of the Seventh Fleet, Almond

expressed unhappiness over the delayed

landing of his remaining forces, Struble

would not authorize a landing until he,

himself, was satisfied with mine clearance

operations. Hence, transports arriving

3

 (1) UNC Opn Order No. 3, 16 Oct 50. (2) Rad,

CX 66591, CINCUNC to All Comds, 16 Oct 50. 4

 The new boundary ran westward along the 39th

Parallel from the Sea of Japan to a point at 126

degrees 45 minutes east longitude, then generally to

the north and northeast through Sinup at 39 degrees, 28 minutes north, 127 degrees, 8 minutes east,

and Changjin at 40 degrees, 54 minutes north and

127 degrees, 10 minutes east, to Huch'ang at 41

degrees, 24 minutes north and 127 degrees, 4 minutes

east. 5

 UNC Opns Order No. 4, 17 Oct 50.

6

 (1) Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 21, 1950,

p. 1, col. 6. (2) New York Times, October 21, 1950,

p. 1, col. 8, Parrott dispatch; also p. 3, col. 1 and

p. 16, col. 2. (3) EUSAK War Diary, 22 Oct 50,

Daily News Bulletin. 7

 General Smith's Chronicles, pp. 404-10.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 217

EQUIPMENT AIR-DROPPED in the Sunch'on drop zone.

off Wonsan with the 1st Marine Division

on 20 October steamed back and forth

outside the harbor, a maneuver that the

Marines promptly dubbed "Operation

Yo-yo." Meanwhile, the 7th Division

remained idly afloat in Pusan Harbor

awaiting word to proceed to the objective

area.

General Almond did not easily give

up his efforts to get Marines ashore before the minefields were completely

cleared. On 21 October, he asked that a

battalion of the 1st Marine Division be

landed at Kojo, about thirty-nine miles

south of Wonsan, to relieve ROK

soldiers guarding a supply dump there.

Since Japanese and ROK LST's had

put into Kojo even though the adjacent

waters had not been swept, Almond felt

that Navy LST's could do the same. But

Admiral Doyle did not consider a Kojo

landing urgent enough to justify jeopardizing the troops and ships.

On 22 October, Admiral Doyle estimated that the Wonsan landing would

not be feasible for another two or three

days. A longer delay appeared possible

on 23 October when a new row of mag-
218 POLICY AND DIRECTION

netic mines was encountered. But on

the 24th, the results of sweeping operations indicated that the magnetic mines

were about cleared out, and that the

troop landings could therefore soon be

made.

Another Change

On the same date, General MacArthur

in an extraordinary order commanded

Walker and Almond to drive forward

with all possible speed using all forces at

their command. The objective line he

had set up only a week before was merely

to be an initial objective; and the restriction he had placed on using other than

ROK forces was removed since, as he reminded his commanders, the prohibition

had been established only in view of a

possible enemy surrender.8

This order conflicted with the instructions the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

sent MacArthur on 27 September

wherein they had told him that "as a

matter of policy no non-Korean ground

forces will be used in the northeast

province bordering the Soviet Union or

in the area along the Manchurian border." The Joint Chiefs, upon learning

of MacArthur's new order, objected in

the form of an inquiry. "While the

Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told

him, "that you undoubtedly had sound

reasons for issuing these instructions they

would like to be informed of them, as

your action is a matter of some concern

here."

 9

MacArthur defended his action with

characteristic vigor. He held that his

order had been prompted by military

necessity since his ROK forces had

neither sufficient strength nor enough

skilled leadership to take and hold the

border areas of North Korea. As to the

legality of his decision, MacArthur

pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had

told him that the directive of 27 September was not final, that it might require

modification in accordance with developments. For additional justification, General MacArthur emphasized that the

Joint Chiefs had not actually banned

the use of other than ROK forces but

had merely stated that it should not be

done as a matter of policy. Finally, in

his mind, the instructions from the Secretary of Defense on 30 September,

which had assured him, "We want you

to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the parallel," had certainly modified any prior

instructions from the Joint Chiefs and

he had proceeded to issue his orders on

that basis. He made no move to placate

his superiors. While he assured them

that he understood their concern, he

also hinted of dire developments if he

took any other course and clinched his

argument by claiming that "This entire

subject was covered in my conference at

Wake Island."

 10

 Thereafter, the Joint

Chiefs allowed General MacArthur's

order to stand.

8

 Rad, CX 67291, CINCUNC to All Comdrs, 24

Oct 50. 9

 (1) Rad, JCS 94933, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 24 Oct 50. (2) General Collins later pointed

to this instance as an example of violation of orders

by the U.N. commander in MacArthur Hearings,

pp. 1240, 1301-02.

10

 Rad, C 67397, CINCFE for JCS, 25 Oct 50.

None of the other persons attending the conference

on 15 October recorded any mention of the use of

non-ROK soldiers along the Manchurian and Soviet

borders.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 219

X Corps Lands

By 1500 on 25 October, ships began

coming into the swept area of Wonsan

Harbor preparatory to the landing of

troops and equipment. That evening,

five LST's containing advance parties

hit the beaches and on the following day,

the main troop landings began.

General Almond meanwhile made almost daily reconnaissance flights up the

east coast, checking the progress of the

ROK troops and searching for a suitable

alternate landing area for the 7th Division. In view of the recent change

of plans, he chose not to set the 7th

Division ashore in the wake of the

Marines, but to land it deeper in North

Korea and thus accelerate carrying out

MacArthur's new instructions for a drive

to the border. Following close aerial

inspection of the coast, he decided to

land the Army division at the small port

of Iwon, 105 miles northeast of Wonsan.

After he completed arrangements for

landing at the new site with Admirals

Struble and Doyle, the 7th Division

sailed north from Pusan on 27 October

and began landing at Iwon two days

later.11

Occupation Plans

As military prospects brightened during October, American planners turned

their efforts to devising a system of military government for North Korea. In

Washington, the Army staff prepared a

detailed directive for military government, and on 10 October forwarded it

to General MacArthur for comment.

Under this directive, the occupation

of North Korea would have three phases.

In the first phase, which would last until

internal security had been restored, General MacArthur would act as supreme

authority in North Korea, subject to the

control of the United Nations and the

United States Government. During the

second phase, which would last until

national elections had been held throughout Korea, MacArthur would retain

complete authority, but a United Nations commission would furnish advice

and recommendations which he would

honor within the bounds of security of

his forces. The third phase, from the

completion of national elections to the

withdrawal of all non-Korean United

Nations forces, would see a gradual

release of control to the elected government of Korea. The military commander, in this final phase, would be

responsible only for such missions as

might be assigned to him.12

MacArthur's primary duties during

the occupation would be to establish

public order, to rebuild the nation's

wrecked economy, and to prepare the

people for unification. But while he

would definitely dissolve the Communist government of North Korea, he

would not replace it with the ROK Government of President Rhee. In fact, he

would create no central government for

North Korea other than as part of his

occupational control machinery. This

would be deferred until free, Korea11

 (1) X Corps WD, Oct 50. (2) General Smith's Chronicles, pp. 404-10. 12

 Rad, W 93721, DA to CINCFE, 10 Oct 50.
220 POLICY AND DIRECTION

wide elections had been held under

jurisdiction of the United Nations.13

Neither the United States nor the

United Nations intended that Rhee's

government should automatically assume

control of liberated areas of North Korea.

General MacArthur had been so advised

by the Joint Chiefs on 27 September

when they had told him, "political questions such as the formal extension of

sovereignty [ROK sovereignty] over

North Korea should await action by the

United Nations to complete unification

of the country." On 9 October, he was

reminded that the authority of the Republic of Korea over North Korea had

not been recognized and that as United

Nations commander he would not

recognize any such authority.14

A fuller explanation of this potentially

explosive issue came on 12 October when

the Interim Committee of the General

Assembly of the United Nations formally resolved that the United Nations

recognize no government as having "legal

and effective control" over all of Korea.

The committee asked that the unified

command (U.S. Government) assume

provisionally all responsibilities for the

government and civil administration of

all parts of North Korea coming under

control of the U.N. forces "pending

consideration by the United Nations

Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories."

 15

At the Wake Island Conference, General MacArthur had expressed fears that

the committee's action might have a bad

effect on U.N.-ROK relations. "I have,"

he told Mr. Truman, "been shaking in

my boots ever since I saw the United

Nations resolution which would treat

them [South Koreans] exactly on the

same basis as the North Koreans." President Truman sided with MacArthur and

stated that the United States would continue to support the ROK Government.

But the President announced no decision to place the Rhee government in

control of captured North Korean

territory.16

When President Rhee learned of the

U.N. resolution, he protested hotly to

General MacArthur. Never temperate in

his approach to the unification of Korea,

the veteran statesman accused the U.N.

committee of reviving and protecting

communism by its resolution, and asserted that his government was "taking

over the civilian administration whenever hostilities cease." MacArthur

passed Rhee's protest along to President

Truman.17

The President attributed Rhee's reaction to an incomplete understanding

of the U.N. committee's resolution. The

American Government continued to support the U.N. position that the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea did not

automatically extend over North Korea

and that the U.N. commission would

arrange for elections and other constituent acts required to unify the

country.18 On 29 October, this policy

13 Ibid.

14

 (1) Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCFE (Personal)

for MacArthur, 27 Sep 50. (2) Rad, WAR 93721,

DA to CINCFE, 9 Oct 50. 15

 Rad, W 94093, DA to CINCFE, 12 Oct 50.

16

 Substance of Statements, Wake Island Conference, 15 Oct 50. 17

 Rad, CX 66554, CINCFE to CG USARPAC,

MacArthur (Personal) for Truman, 16 Oct 50. 18

 (1) Rad, JCS 94710, JCS to CINCFE, transmitting message from President Truman, 20 Oct 50.

(2) Rad, WAR 94472, DA to CINCUNC, 18 Oct 50.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 221

was affirmed and General MacArthur was

directed not to recognize the authority

of Rhee's government in North Korea

but to consult with that government "in

matters of national scope" through

Ambassador Muccio.19

General MacArthur apparently interpreted this directive too literally to suit

authorities in Washington. When it appeared to them that MacArthur was

prohibiting South Koreans from participating in civil affairs matters in North

Korea, they explained to him on 2

November:

It is not intended that pertinent directives

or any other instructions prohibit the use

of ROK administrators, police, military

forces, or any other ROK asset in North

Korea as long as it is clearly and publicly

understood that such resources are not under control of ROK but rather are designated as UN instrumentalities, and are

placed under CINCUNC's control and at

CINCUNC's disposal.20

The Department of State was anxious

to release to the Interim Committee of

the United Nations and to send to the

press the text of the directive for conducting civil affairs in North Korea.

But when General MacArthur's opinion

of such a move was solicited, he replied,

"I believe that the public release of the

directive would be premature, at least

until major hostilities have come to an

end. The effect upon troops engaged in

serious combat of this type of advance

planning based upon assumptions not

yet realized, cannot be overestimated."

 21

The Mirage of Victory

In some respects, the critical situation

in Korea during the first four months

of fighting had proved beneficial to the

United States Army. Moved by the obvious need for greater combat strength

in Korea and aware of the increased

danger of Communist aggression elsewhere in the world, American leaders

had relaxed the rigid controls over military appropriations prevalent from 1945

to mid-1950. As one result, the Army

had expanded its strength and facilities.

Some of the Army expansions during

these months had little direct relationship to Korea's needs, but were aimed

instead at placing the Army in a more

favorable position to meet any general

emergency. On 27 September, the Secretary of Defense had authorized the

Army to increase its strength during

Fiscal Year 1951 to 1,263,000.22 Keeping

step with the increase in manpower, substantial increases in logistical support for

the Army were authorized and steps were

taken to transmute these authorizations

into matériel.

In connection with this growth, Secretary of the Army Pace pointed out to

the Army Policy Council on 5 October

that many of the measures taken by the

Army as a result of the Korean fighting

had not received the specific approval of

the Congress. More important, the

Army, in its efforts to build up rapidly,

had obligated and spent funds that had

not yet been appropriated by the Congress. He anticipated less concern

among the nation's law-makers over the

19

 Rad, JCS 95238, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Oct 50. 20

 Rad, WAR 95715, JCS to CINCUNC, 2 Nov 50. 21

 Rad, C 67920, CINCFE to DA, 31 Oct 50.

22

 (1) Memo, Secy Defense for Secy Army, 27 Sep

50. (2) Ltr, DA to All Cmdrs, 15 Sep 50, sub: Recall

of Additional Reserve Officers to Active Duty.
222 POLICY AND DIRECTION

use of funds than over the question of

whether the Army had violated a principle and usurped authority rightfully belonging to the Congress. He directed

a careful and thorough re-examination

of all Army programs under the assumption that the United States requirements in Korea would be much less than

originally contemplated.23

Signs of Retrenchment

Throughout October, optimism grew

that the fighting would soon end. Consequently, the Department of the Army's

planners began to anticipate a need to

curtail much of the support developed

for Korea. The efforts of responsible

officials had started a dynamic flow of

men and matériel to the Far East Command which, if allowed to continue at

its current rate after the fighting stopped,

would flood that theater with unneeded

forces and supplies. Millions of dollars

would be wasted because of poor storage

facilities in Japan and Korea and the

great cost of returning men and supplies

to the United States.

General MacArthur, after returning

from Wake Island, ordered the JSPOG

staff to prepare detailed plans for the

withdrawal of forces from Korea and for

keeping certain units as occupation

troops. He based his instructions on

agreements and understandings that he

felt had been reached on this general

topic at Wake Island. On 20 October,

JSPOG issued CINCFE Operations Plan

No. 202 outlining procedures to be followed after combat operations had dwindled, so that some U.N. forces could be

withdrawn from Korea. The plan assumed that the fighting would end in

the destruction of organized enemy

forces, but that North Korean guerrillas

would still resist in the mountains. The

plan also assumed that neither Soviet

nor Chinese Communist forces would

intervene.24

General MacArthur, as Commander in

Chief, United Nations Command, would

carry out such missions and functions as

became necessary to bring things to a

satisfactory conclusion in Korea. The

X Corps was named to stay in Korea for

occupation duty. It would have one

American division, plus all other U.N.

units in Korea, ROK Army units, and

KMAG. The U.N. units would be withdrawn progressively, with European

units leaving first. Insofar as possible,

no forces other than ROK would be

stationed in South Korea.

The Eighth Army headquarters, along

with its original four American divisions,

would return to Japan; and the 5th RCT

would go back to Hawaii. Within

Japan, after the return of the Eighth

Army, the Northern and Southwestern

Commands would be dissolved and their

functions assumed by the Eighth Army.

The Japan Logistical Command would

be retained to perform all army logistic

functions in Japan.25

23

 Min, Army Policy Council, 2 Oct 50 and 5 Oct

50, in CofS DA file 334 APC.

24

 On the day the plan was issued, the GHQ Daily

Intelligence Summary carried what it termed a "reliable report" that 400,000 Chinese Communist soldiers were in border-crossing areas, alerted to cross

into North Korea. To detect any such crossings, the

U.N. Command ordered daily air reconnaissance

flights over the border area. 25

 (1) CINCFE Opn Plan No. 202, 20 Oct 50,

in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. (2) General Smith, the

Marine division commander, gives some hint of the

effect of this planning and what he calls the "end

of the war atmosphere." He recalls, "On 21 October
SIGNS OF VICTORY 223

This plan had scarcely reached the

interested staff members of General MacArthur's headquarters when word from

Washington disrupted its entire concept.

On 21 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

told General MacArthur that demands

for American troops in other parts of the

world were forcing them to withdraw the

2d and 3d U.S. Divisions from the Far

East Command as soon as possible after

fighting ended in Korea. Consequently,

the forces to guard Japan and also to

occupy Korea would have to come from

the four divisions originally based in

Japan.26

MacArthur had left Wake Island under the impression that the 3d Division

would be kept in Korea as part of the

occupation force. For General Bradley

had asked only that one division, either

the 2d or 3d, be made available for

Europe by January 1951, and MacArthur

had recommended the 2d. He therefore

objected when he learned that the Joint

Chiefs planned to take both divisions

from him. He explained his understanding of the arrangements agreed

upon at Wake Island, saying he was

". . . under the impression that this proposal had received approval of all concerned. I resubmit it at this time for

your consideration."

 27

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not

hastily reached their decision to take

both divisions. The American force in

western Europe badly needed strengthening; and on the basis of estimates from

General MacArthur and other sources,

they had concluded that the Far East

Command would soon revert to its preKorean War status. Since their planning

was global and took in the needs of the

American defense system as a whole,

they undoubtedly felt that their decision

should not be unduly influenced by the

opinions of a theater commander who

was understandably biased in favor of

his own needs. On the other hand, the

Korean fighting had not yet ceased and

the Far East Command was still on a

wartime basis. So they made no final

decision for the moment.

When General Bolté went to the Far

East in late October, he discussed the

matter with General MacArthur. He

sent a full report of these talks to General Collins, sketching the current status

of the 3d Division and recommending

that the Joint Chiefs modify their previous decision slightly. General MacArthur had ordered the 3d Division to

embark for Korea from Japan on 9

November to operate initially in the

southern sector of North Korea and later

to serve as the only U.S. occupation division. "When I departed Washington,"

I received a dispatch from COMNAVFE stating

that upon the conclusion of hostilities it was the intention to recommend to CINCFE that the 1st

Marine Division, less one RCT, be returned to the

United States. The RCT not returned to the United

States would be billeted at Otsu, Japan. I was requested to comment. On 24 October, we learned that

X Corps had received a document, for planning purposes only, to the effect that the present Corps commander would become Commander of the Occupation Forces. One American division, probably the

3d Infantry Division, would remain in Korea as part

of the Occupation Forces. Under this plan the

Eighth Army would return to Japan. The receipt

of information such as that cited above could not

help but spread the impression that the war was

about over. There was a noticeable let-down. However, it was only a matter of days until the operations at Kojo brought home to us forcefully the fact

that the war was not over. Talk of redeployment

was never heard again." See General Smith's Chronicles, p. 403. 26

 Rad, JCS 94651, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50. 27

 Rad, C 67065, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Oct 50.
224 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General Bolté recalled, "the final disposition of the 3d Division was unresolved." MacArthur had apparently

raised some very convincing arguments,

for Bolté told General Collins, "From

what I have learned here regarding the

many administrative and organizational

problems in reconstituting the FECOM

balanced force coupled with the requirement for a division now to accomplish

operational tasks in North Korea, I

recommend that FECOM be authorized

to retain the 3d Division until elections

in North Korea are held but not later

than 1 May 1951." He concluded by

pointing out that if later required in

western Europe, the 3d Division could

be placed in an effective status of training and combat readiness as rapidly in

the Far East Command as elsewhere.28

The Joint Chiefs, probably on the basis

of General Bolté's recommendation, suspended the provisions previously set up

for the 2d and 3d Divisions, but notified

General MacArthur to be ready to move

the 3d Division from the theater within

sixty days of receipt of orders. The 3d

Division could be kept in the theater

until 1 May 1951.29

In the same vein, Washington proposed a cutback of personnel support to

General MacArthur. He was told on

25 October:

Reduction of the scale of operations in

Korea compels immediate reconsideration

of the number of service enlisted fillers and

replacements previously scheduled for ship- ment to FECOM. To reduce this number

to the minimum, Department of the Army

proposes to cancel shipment of enlisted

reserve corps personnel presently scheduled

for October and November except 17,000

NCO grades.

Normal rotation of foreign service tours

would resume in January 1951.30

Some of the other nations committed

to support the United Nations in Korea

read the handwriting on the wall and

found it encouraging. The United

Kingdom had offered the 29th Infantry

Brigade for service in Korea and its first

echelon had sailed from England on 4

October. The heartening news from

Korea led the British General Staff to

conclude that requirements had diminished and that some remaining elements

of the 29th Infantry Brigade need not

be sent. They proposed to withdraw the

armored regiment, the 8th Hussars, from

the brigade since "the possibility of

future battles in Korea in which heavy

armor will be required seems remote"

and "in the event of a general war the

8th Hussars would be required elsewhere." But General Bolté objected.

He considered the future course of the

war in Korea, for the moment and for

some time to come, too uncertain, at least

until all of North Korea was cleared of

enemy and the intentions of the USSR

and the Chinese Communists could be

determined. Too, the probability of a

general war in the near future was not

great enough to justify withholding

forces from the Korean effort.31

General Collins took the matter up

informally with the other Joint Chiefs

on 4 October and was instructed to advise the British representative in Washington that the United States felt the

28

 Rad, C 677985, Bolté (Personal) for Collins,

1 Nov 50. 29

 Rad, W 95625, DA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50.

30

 Rad, S 94985, DA to CINCFE, 25 Oct 50. 31

 Memo, G-3 (Bolté) for CofS (Gruenther), 4

Oct 50, in CofS DA file CX 370, Item 21.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 225

fighting in Korea was far from over and

that if the British engaged the enemy,

General MacArthur had no surplus tanks

available for supporting them. The

British Government pursued the topic

no further and the 8th Hussars

accompanied the 29th Brigade to

Korea.32

Canada during this period also proposed to cancel the shipment of a special

fighting force which had been slated for

Korea. This proposal, together with the

earlier suggestion from the British Government, brought the need for a policy

on continuing United Nations support

into sharp focus. General Bolté took

the stand that all U.N. forces in Korea

and scheduled to arrive there might be

required to conclude the fighting successfully and would certainly be needed

to provide an adequate occupation force.

He voiced concern to General MacArthur over the fact that recent operational successes were fostering a growing

tendency among other United Nations

members to consider additional forces

unnecessary. He suggested that MacArthur include in his next report to the

United Nations a special statement to

encourage additional contributions from

these other nations. General Bolté forcefully recommended to General Collins

that, as a matter of policy, the Department of the Army should oppose the release of foreign U.N. military units

previously accepted for service in

Korea.33

By late October, troops of five nations,

totaling about 9,000 men and officers,

were serving alongside U.S. and ROK

troops in Korea. Two British units, the

2-battalion infantry brigade from Hong

Kong and a marine commando unit, and

a 5,000-man Turkish infantry brigade

were already in Korea. Additional U.N.

units, totaling 27,000 men, were either

en route to the battlefront or preparing

for departure from their home countries;

and infantry brigades from Great Britain,

Canada, and Greece, infantry battalions

from Belgium, the Netherlands, France,

Australia, and Thailand, and an artillery

battalion from New Zealand had been

offered to the unified command by the

respective countries and these offers accepted. But the developments in Korea,

and particularly the favorable prognosis

brought back from the Wake Island Conference by the returning conferees, had

a profound effect on General Bolté's

attitude and on that of all concerned

with deciding what should be done about

curtailing the shipment of forces to the

battlefront. On 23 October, General

Bolté advised the Chief of Staff that he

felt a total of 36,000 U.N. troops other

than U.S. and ROK soldiers was too

great and that the time was now ripe

for reducing the current and projected

strength of such troops to about 15,000.

"In view of the state of operations in

North Korea," Bolté said:

and in general consonance with the Wake

Island conversations, it is considered desirable to review current and projected plans

for utilizing other United Nations in Korea.

The problem is to reduce logistic burdens

on the United States and at the same time

32

 MFR, sgd Gen Collins, 5 Oct 50, CofS DA file

CS 370, Item 21. 33

 (1) Rad, WAR 93605, DA (Bolté) to CINCFE,

6 Oct 50. (2) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 13

Oct 50, sub: Continuing Need for U.N. Forces in

Korea, in G-3, DA file CS 091, Case 25.
226 POLICY AND DIRECTION

CANADIAN TROOPS CROSS THE IMJIN RIVER IN LIGHT ASSAULT BOATS

retain the political advantages of multinational United Nations representation.34

General Collins agreed with his G-3

and presented his views to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff at once. He told his fellow service heads that the United Nations contingents were a logistical burden

on the United States, although not so

pronounced in the case of British units

that used their own arms and equipment.

From the viewpoint of operational usefulness there was also a wide divergence

in the quality of the various contingents.

Turning to fiscal matters, General

Collins noted that "the degree of ultimate reimbursement to the United States

may prove problematical in many cases."

He did see the political advantages to be

gained by having a wide representation

of United Nations contingents even if

only token forces were involved. He

felt, as did General Bolté, that the

Korean operations were approaching a

34

 Memo, G-3 (Bolté') for CofS (Collins), 23 Oct

50, sub: Cutback in U.N. Ground Forces in Korea

(other than U.S. and ROK).
SIGNS OF VICTORY 227

TROOP REPLACEMENTS from Thailand arrive at Pusan.

point where some of the U.N. units

could be dispensed with. Basing his

final judgment on all the factors—

logistic, political, and operational—General Collins then recommended changes

in the U.N. lineup.

After considering Collins' views, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the request for the Belgian battalion, the

Netherlands battalion, the French battalion, the New Zealand artillery battalion, and the additional Australian

battalion should be canceled and the

countries concerned asked not to send

these units. They decided also to ask

Canada and Greece to reduce their respective brigades to battalion size and

for the redeployment of the Philippine

battalion and the British marine commando unit to their own countries.

Finally, the U.K. 27th Brigade would be

returned to British control as soon as

the U.K. 29th Brigade arrived from

Hong Kong to replace it. General MacArthur was notified of these decisions at

once, and the Secretary of Defense was

asked to co-ordinate with the Secretary

of State in obtaining the concurrence of
228 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the countries concerned. On 2 November, Secretary Marshall wrote the Secretary of State asking that he make the

proper arrangements.35

Equally as pronounced a reaction to

the success of United Nations operations

came from those persons charged with

logistic support planning for the Korean

fighting. During a visit to the Far East

Command in late September, Lt. Gen.

Thomas B. Larkin, the Department of

the Army G-4, conferred with General

MacArthur on the matter of cutting back

the wartime flow of supplies to his

theater. He asked particularly that MacArthur take steps to reduce substantially

his requisitions for ammunition and

other items.36 The Army's supply experts were very worried because the bulk

of the Army's supplies and equipment

were being drawn to the Far East. Because of the rapid developments in Korea

since July, the Far East Command had

not been able to get its inventory and

stock reports in good condition and there

was a tendency to draw out of the United

States larger amounts of supply and

equipment than were needed.37

Upon his return from Japan, General

Larkin expressed concern that no real

plans to reduce the logistic support of

the Far East Command to conform with

posthostilities requirements had yet been

made. "Present indications," Larkin

said, "are that hostilities in Korea may

end at an early date (VK-day)." He

ordered his staff to begin planning on a

priority basis for the cutback and diversion of excess supplies en route, for

the roll-up of supplies in excess of FEC

needs, and for the movement and housing of forces diverted and redeployed

from the Far East. But in order to plan,

his staff had to know how many troops

were going to be stationed in the Far

East and Korea after the war ended, and

what levels of supply and special reserves would be needed for the U.S.

Army, the ROK Army, and the other

U.N. forces. He asked General Bolté to

provide that information as soon as possible, "due to the possibility of early

suspension of major hostilities in Korea

and the probable necessity of diverting

cargo ships on the high seas."

 38

 Bolté

saw the problem but had no ready answer

and turned to the Chief of Staff for

advice. Bolté pointed out that the Army

could not make plans until the Joint

Chiefs had determined what forces were

going to be kept in the Far East when

the war was over and how much support

was going to be given the ROK and

Japanese security forces. He insisted

that the matter should receive the highest possible priority.39

 General Collins

on 3 October asked the Joint Chiefs to

start considering the problem.40 Bolté,

giving Larkin such information as he

35 could without waiting for a decision by (1) Ibid. (2) JCS 1776/144 and 2d corrigendum

thereto, 25 Oct 50. (3) Memo, Secy JCS (Adm

Lalor) for CofS USA (Collins), 27 Oct 50, sub: Cuthack in Ground Forces in Korea. (4) Ltr, Secy Defense (Marshall) to Secy State (Acheson), 2 Nov 50.

All in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 111-111/6. 36

 Min, 43d mtg Army Policy Council, 19 Oct 50,

CS 334. 37

 Min, 42d mtg Army Policy Council, 5 Oct 50,

CS 334.

38

 Memo, DA G-4 (Larkin) for DA G-3 (Bolté),

26 Sep 50, sub: Post-Korean Hostilities Basis for

Logistic Support, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 99. 39

 Memo, Gen Bolté (G-3) for CofS, 27 Sep 50,

sub: Responsibilities for Supply in FEC, Posthostilities in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case

99/6. 40

 JCS 1776/124, 3 Oct 50.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 229

the Joint Chiefs, told him on 3 October

that levels of supply in FECOM after

the fighting ceased should be those in

effect before the fighting started. But,

in addition, MacArthur's theater should

be given a 90-day reserve at combat rates

for a 4-division balanced force which, it

was contemplated, would constitute the

posthostilities troop basis. The Army

planned to continue moving those troop

units and casuals which were en route or

scheduled for shipment for the Far East

as of that date. This procedure would

permit the use of the incoming filler

personnel to complete the organizational

structure of units already in the theater.

Furthermore, the few service troops who

were alerted for the Far East would be

needed to support the revised 4-division

troop basis for the FEC. Future shipments of units and soldiers not already

alerted for the theater would be carefully

screened to prevent unnecessary redeployment. Two days later Bolté furnished Larkin with a list of American

units tentatively planned to garrison the

Far East Command after the fighting

ceased. He accompanied this with an

Army plan for the deployment of troops

from the Far East Command.41

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the problem of the posthostilities

troop basis and supply needs in the Far

East Command, and before they could

arrive at a final decision, the problem

was overtaken by events. Nevertheless,

the Department of the Army took its

planning seriously, and on 15 October

informed General MacArthur of the projected size of his command once the

campaigns in Korea were over. In a

definite move toward retrenchment, the

Department of the Army also asked him

to cancel immediately all outstanding

requisitions for supplies from the ZI and

to resubmit his requests on the basis of

the anticipated posthostilities force.42

Several logistic actions taken within

the Far East Command indicate that the

Department of the Army officials were

not alone in foreseeing an early end to

the fighting. On 22 October, General

Walker requested authority from General MacArthur to divert to Japan all

bulk-loaded ammunition ships arriving

in Korea after 20 October. Ammunition

already in Korea, Walker believed, could

take care of the North Koreans and still

leave a balance for posthostilities requirements. MacArthur granted this

request and ordered Japan Logistical

Command to take the necessary actions.

In the same vein General Weible, commander of Japan Logistical Command,

asked MacArthur to authorize the return

to the United States of six ships loaded

with 105-mm. and 155-mm. artillery ammunition and aerial bombs. Both General MacArthur and General Stratemeyer

agreed that this ammunition was in excess of the needs of the Korean theater

in view of the existing tactical situation.

MacArthur, on the other hand, felt it

would be highly desirable to have a reserve stock of ammunition placed at

Hawaii for use in the event of another

emergency and asked the Department

of the Army at least to consider diverting

these ammunition ships to Hawaii before ordering them back to the United 41

 Memo, Bolté for Larkin, 3 Oct 50 and 5 Oct

50, with Incls, sub: Post-Korean Hostilities Basis

for Logistic Support, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 99/6. 42

 Rad, W 94227, DA to CINCFE, 15 Oct 50.
230 POLICY AND DIRECTION

States. General Weible also requested

the San Francisco Port of Embarkation

to cancel all outstanding requisitions for

ammunition and to unload any ammunition-carrying vessels that had not left

port.43

A Minority View—Just in Case

Regardless of the general feeling of

optimism and the retrenchment moves, a

disturbing, low-key concern over a possible Chinese intervention still remained.

Consequently, while planning for the

mundane aftermath of victory in Korea,

the Army staff gave some attention to

what might happen if the Chinese suddenly moved against MacArthur. On

11 October, a survey of MacArthur's resources for meeting such an attack was

completed and sent to General Bolté by

Brig. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, Chief of the

Operations Division, G-3, Department

of the Army. Gaither's survey showed

that U.N. members other than the

United States were scheduled to furnish

additional troops to the U.N. Command

to bring the total up to 29,700 troops by

March 1951; General MacArthur had

indicated his intention to activate five

more ROK divisions, one each month

beginning in November, with each division having an approximate strength of

11,000; 60,000 fillers for American units

were scheduled to be furnished between

10 November and late December; and

by 31 December, American strength in

the Far East Command would total 6

Army divisions, 1 marine division, 1

infantry RCT, 1 airborne RCT, and 1

infantry regiment, all at full strength.44

If the Chinese intervened and further

reinforcements were required, the situation would be a little tight. The most

readily available source of nondivisional

unit reinforcement were 108 units previously allocated for shipment to the

FEC. The nondivisional artillery and

Engineer units on this list would be operationally ready by 1 January and could

materially strengthen the combat capability of the United Nations Command.

The four National Guard divisions federalized in September would be trained

and ready about 1 June 1951. The 82d

Airborne Division was ready at any time

and could be committed within thirty

days if necessary. An additional marine

division, to be ready by June 1951, had

been organized and was now in training.

The rest of the General Reserve in the

United States, including the 2d Armored

Division, 11th Airborne Division, 14th

RCT, 196th RCT, and 278th RCT, was

just beginning a program of reconstitution but could be ready by June 1951.45

Underscoring the Chinese threats of

intervention early in October, another

warning was sounded, if faintly, on 18

October when American reconnaissance

planes flying close to the Yalu found

almost one hundred Russian-built fighters lined up on An-tung Airfield across

the river in Manchuria. MacArthur's

air commander, General Stratemeyer,

minimized this ominous discovery by

telling General Vandenberg in Washington that the planes were probably there 43

 (1) Rad, CX 7506, CINCFE to CG Army Eight

and CG JLCOM, 26 Oct 50, with MFR on file copy,

SGS files, GHQ. (2) Rad, CX 67702, CINCFE to

DA, 28 Oct 50, and Memo for Record on file copy,

SGS, GHQ.

44

 Memo, Gen Gaither (Opn Div G-3) for Gen

Bolté (G-3), 11 Oct 50, sub: Reinforcement of U.N.

Forces in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 109. 45 Ibid.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 231

purposely to lend "color and credence

to menacing statements and threats of

Chinese Communist leaders, who probably felt that this display of strength

involved no risk in view of our apparent

desire to avoid border incidents." Stratemeyer certainly did not believe that the

Chinese meant to use these fighters to

attack his planes since they had not done

so when the observation aircraft, an easy

target, had come close. "I believe it

especially significant," he told Vandenberg, "that, if deployment for possible

action in Korea were under way, it would

be highly unlikely that aircraft would

have been positioned to attract attention

from south of the border."

 46

Almost at the same time that Chinese

fighters appeared on the border, the Department of State suggested to the Joint

Chiefs that General MacArthur be instructed to disavow publicly any intention of destroying certain hydroelectric

power facilities along the Manchurian

border. This suggestion stemmed from

some evidence that the Chinese intended

to move down into Korea to protect the

Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant and the

installations along the Yalu. An announcement by MacArthur would have

the dual purpose of allaying Chinese

Communist fears of trespassing into Manchuria by the United Nations Command

and of showing the rest of the world that

his expedition into North Korea was not

primarily destructive in purpose. The

State Department asked also that General

MacArthur's announcement contain a

statement that the U.N. Commission for

the Unification and Rehabilitation of

Korea would consult with all interested

parties on this and other problems which

might come before it. Since Communist

China qualified as an interested party

to any operation along the Manchurian

border, this could be construed as a

willingness by the commission to deal

with Communist China on matters involving Korea. The Joint Chiefs felt

such an announcement would be militarily undesirable. They were, however, directed by President Truman to

send the suggestion to MacArthur. They

did so, telling him he could issue the text

of the announcement if he wished. "It is

considered desirable," they concluded,

"that President Rhee be advised with

regard to this action if it is to be

taken."

 47

General MacArthur did not feel that

the time was propitious for such an announcement, especially since the Suiho

Hydroelectric Power Plant at Sinuiju

was not under United Nations control

and no determination could be made at

long range of how much power was being

turned out or where it was going. MacArthur did not propose, if he could

avoid it, to tie his own hands with a commitment that he might later find

militarily inconvenient.

There would certainly be no intent on the

part of this command to disturb any peace- ful and reasonable application of this power

supply, and it would be repugnant to de- structively interrupt any constructive uses

to which it is being applied. If, however, this power is being utilized in furtherance

of potentially hostile military purposes

through the manufacture of munitions of

war or there is a diversion of it from the

minimum peaceful requirements of the Korean people, most serious doubts would at 46 Rad, A 25438 INT-IE, CG, FEAF to CS USAF,

20 Oct 50. 47

 Rad, JCS 94799, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50.
232 POLICY AND DIRECTION

once arise as to our justification for main- taining status quo.

Nor did MacArthur feel that he should

speak for the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea by predicting any of its

future policies or decisions. The Joint

Chiefs did not press the matter and the

announcement was never made.48

Despite Mao Tse-tung's early October

threats and the midmonth discovery of

fighter aircraft just over the Manchurian

border, apprehensions subsided as the

end of the month approached without

Chinese intervention. Likewise, the difficulties of supplying the Eighth Army

and the unexpected hitch in landing the

X Corps at Wonsan became mere annoyances as Walker's forces moved deep

into western North Korea and as the

force that Almond so far commanded

ashore, the ROK I Corps, moved far up

the east coast. The Wake Island Conference truly had been the catalyst

that generated wide confidence in

MacArthur's march to victory. 48

 Rad, C 67154, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Oct 50.
CHAPTER XIII

The Chinese Take a Hand

The Chinese Move

Unbeknown to MacArthur or to Washington authorities, the Chinese Communist government had begun sending

infantry divisions into North Korea on

14 October. Between 14 October and

1 November, it appears, some 180,000

troops from the Chinese Fourth Field

Army crossed the Yalu into Korea. More

than two-thirds of this force had been

in Manchuria, near the border, since

July 1950. Three days before these

crossings, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs prefaced this invasion with a

blunt public warning: "Now that the

American forces are attempting to cross

the thirty-eighth parallel on a large scale,

the Chinese people cannot stand idly by

with regard to such a serious situation

created by the invasion of Korea. . . ."

Ominously, the Chinese Foreign Office

described MacArthur's operations as

". . . a serious menace to the security

of China. . . ."

 1

The first real proof that Chinese soldiers had entered the fighting came about

noon on 25 October, when the ROK 1st

Division in western Korea clashed with

a Chinese force and captured the first

Chinese Communist soldiers taken in

the Korean War. The ROK 1st Division

commander, General Paik Sun Yup,

found many dead Chinese on the battlefield and so informed General Milburn,

the I Corps commander. General Paik

also took prisoners, who, by revealing

that they belonged to organized units and

that Chinese soldiers were in Korea in

large numbers, gave ample proof of intervention. In eastern Korea, Almond's

troops met Chinese units and took their

first Chinese prisoners on the same day

as did the Eighth Army. By 31 October

they had captured a total of twenty-five

Chinese and General Almond had

personally interrogated some of them.2

The evidence, however, was not accepted at face value in any quarter that

counted. General Willoughby, after reporting to Washington that Chinese

troops had been captured and that he

believed organized Chinese units to be

in Korea, said, on 28 October:

From a tactical standpoint, with victorious

United States divisions in full deployment,

it would appear that the auspicious time 1

 (1) Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 115. (2)

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,

pp. 687 and 767.

2

 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu, pp. 675-708.
234 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL PAIK SUN YUP

for intervention has long since passed; it is

difficult to believe that such a move, if

planned, would have been postponed to a

time when remnant North Korean forces

have been reduced to a low point of effec- tiveness.3

Indeed, American ears were attuned to

victory and the ominous harbinger of

military disaster wrought no change in

General MacArthur's plans to advance

to the border with all speed and with all

forces.

Despite the assurances they had received, the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed

apprehension over the indication of

Chinese Communist intervention. General Bradley noted on 31 October that

the intervention was conforming to none

of the patterns envisaged by the Joint

Chiefs in their studies and in their directives to General MacArthur. Chinese

actions were "halfway between" and left

some doubt as to what the specific countermoves by MacArthur should be.

Bradley based his analysis on information

which showed that elements of five

Chinese Communist divisions had been

identified south of the Yalu, the largest

element being a regiment. On the same

day, General Collins told the Army

Policy Council that these reported crossings of the Yalu River might reflect a

face-saving effort since Chou En-lai had

said that his government would not stand

idly by and watch the North Koreans

go down in defeat. Collins did not think

that the Chinese would cross the river in

sufficient numbers to risk a serious beating by MacArthur's forces. Nevertheless, when asked if the Chinese could

become a real threat to the United Nations Command, Collins replied that they

definitely could in spite of their lack of

airpower and their weakness in artillery.4

Eighth Army Grows Cautious

Despite the Chinese threat, General

Walker attempted to carry out his current instructions from General MacArthur. He sent two of his corps

plunging toward the border in the west.

In the coastal sector, the I Corps fanned

out in a 3-pronged drive, crossing the

Ch'ongch'on River and rolling up hardfighting North Korean units making a

last-ditch stand. Farther east, the ROK

II Corps pushed columns northward

along main roads. One of these columns,

a regiment from the ROK 6th Division,

3

 DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2971, 28 Oct 50.

4

 (1) Memo, CVRS for Maj Gen Robinson E. Duff,

31 Oct 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 14/38.

(2) Min, Army Policy Council, 31 Oct 50, in CofS,

DA file 334 (APC), 31 Oct 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 235

stepped far ahead of the others and on

26 October pushed its reconnaissance

troops all the way to the Yalu at

Ch'osan. There was little elation over

this feat, for almost simultaneously other

ROK divisions of the ROK II Corps ran

head on into very strong Chinese units.

Not only was the ROK 1st Division badly

mauled, but the regiment of the ROK

6th Division on and near the border

also was cut off by the Chinese and

nearly destroyed. The climax of this early

Chinese intervention came on the night

of 1-2 November when the 8th Cavalry

Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, was attacked by a full Chinese division in positions near Unsan and very roughly

handled.5

As soon as Walker saw what was happening, he ordered the advance halted

and withdrew his forces back across the

Ch'ongch'on, holding only a shallow

bridgehead above the river. When General MacArthur learned that Walker had

stopped driving toward the border, he

directed his acting chief of staff, General

Hickey, to telephone Walker in Korea

and find out why. Hickey reached

Walker's chief of staff, General Allen,

who furnished an interim explanation on

1 November. Walker a few days later

followed this with a fuller and more detailed explanation in a letter to General

MacArthur in which he said:

On 26 October Eighth Army was advanc- ing on a broad front in widely separated

columns in pursuit of defeated North Korean Forces. The advance north of Pyongyang was based upon a calculated logistical

risk involving supply almost entirely by airlift. Supplies available were sufficient for

bare maintenance of combat operations of

one reinforced American division and four

ROK divisions against light opposition with

no possibility of accumulating reserves to

meet heavier opposition. An ambush and

surprise attack by fresh, well-organized and

well trained units, some of which were Chi- nese Communist Forces, began a sequence

of events leading to complete collapse and

disintegration of ROK II Corps of three di- visions. Contributing factors were intense,

psychological fear of Chinese intervention

and previous complacency and overconfi- dence in all ROK ranks. There were no

indications that Chinese troops had entered

Korea prior to contact. The presence of

Chinese troops increased materially the will

to fight of remaining and reconstituted

North Korean units. The ROK Corps re- treated in confusion to a position in the

vicinity of KUNURI, 13 miles from the

only crossing area into the I Corps combat

zone, before some semblance of order could

be restored. Losses in equipment and per- sonnel were large. The collapse on the

east flank together with heavy attack on the

1st ROK Division and 8th Cav RCT on

the east flank of the I US Corps seriously

threatened the only road supplying the

I Corps and dictated temporary withdrawal

of exposed columns of 24th Inf Div on the

west, a regrouping of forces, an active defense, a build-up of supplies pending resumption of offensive and advance to the

border. By intense effort progress is being

made in reorganization and stabilization of

II ROK Corps, however, it is at most only

fifty percent effective at present. The 2d

US Division has been brought up in a position to take over in the event of collapse by

ROK forces.

There has never been and there is now

no intention for this Army to take up or

remain on a passive perimeter or any other

type of defense. Every effort is being made

to retain an adequate bridgehead to facilitate the resumption of the attack as soon as

conditions permit. All units continue to

execute local attacks to restore or improve

lines. Plans have been prepared for re5

 See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, pages 689-708, for detailed account of these

actions.
236 POLICY AND DIRECTION

sumption of the offensive employing all

forces available to the Army to meet the

new factor of organized Chinese Commu- nist Forces. These plans will be put into

execution at the earliest possible moment

and are dependent only upon the security

of the right flank, the marshalling of the

attack troops and the restoration of vital

supplies. In this connection there now

exists in the forward areas only one day of

fire. Opening of Port of Chinnampo and

extension of railroad to Pyongyang is essen- tial to movement of supplies and troops.6

Meanwhile, traces of further Chinese

participation in the west faded quickly as

the new enemy pulled back into the

mountain masses from which he had

come.

X Corps and the New Enemy

Across the Taebaek mountain range

far to the east of the Eighth Army and

completely out of physical contact with

Walker's forces, General Almond meantime had landed the rest of his American

forces and was preparing to carry out his

part of General MacArthur's directive

to advance with all possible speed to the

border. His plan of advance called for

the ROK I Corps to drive up the east

coastal road to the northeastern border

of Korea. He ordered the U.S. 7th Division, which had landed at Iwon, to

drive up the corridor from Pukch'ong

through Pungsan and Kapsan to the Yalu

River at Hyesanjin. To the U.S. 1st

Marine Division, Almond assigned the

task of pushing up from Hamhung to the

Changjin Reservoir, from where it could

either drive north to the border or shift

its attack to the west and then north

again. The rear areas around WonsanHamhung were to be guarded by the 3d

Division, which was en route from Japan

after having completed a very brief training period.7

 Until the 3d Division arrived, the 1st Marine Division had the

responsibility for securing the WonsanHamhung area and therefore would not

be entirely free to concentrate for its

advance to the Changjin Reservoir.

It was while moving toward this reservoir that the ROK 26th Regiment had

on 25 October found its way blocked by

strong Chinese forces at the small village

of Sudong. Prisoners taken in the heavy

fighting identified the unit opposing the

ROK regiment as the CCF 124th Division. The ROK regiment fell back

and for the next few days made no headway. But the 7th Marines, U.S. 1st

Marine Division, coming up from Hamhung, took over from the ROK unit on

2 November and in a fierce running encounter, marked by the first and last

appearance of Chinese tanks in the area,

virtually destroyed this Chinese division.

The 124th was barely accounted for,

however, before the Marines picked up

prisoners from a fresh division, the 126th.

It was now quite clear that the eventuality so long discussed by American

planners, Communist China's entry on

the side of North Korea, was no longer

hypothetical. Yet there was great reluctance at Eighth Army and X Corps

headquarters, at GHQ in Tokyo, and in

Washington to accept this intervention

at face value.

6

 Memo, Gen Walker for Gen MacArthur, 6

Nov 50.

7

 War Diary, X Corps, 4 Nov 50, G-1 Rpt, Notes

on Conference Between CG X Corps and Gen

Partridge, CG 5th AF, 4 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 237

Immediate Effects

The open employment of Chinese

units against the United Nations Command in late October and early November caused a swift reversal of plans to

reduce support to that command. General Bolté, Department of the Army G-3,

had flown to Tokyo on 31 October to

confer with MacArthur. On the next

day he discussed with General MacArthur, General Wright, and the JSPOG

staff the cancellation and reduction of

forces to be sent to Korea and the plans

for redeployment of forces already there.

Even as these officers were talking, the

Chinese struck Walker's advancing divisions and hurled them back. From

Tokyo Bolté flew to Korea where he

conferred with Walker, all corps commanders, and some division commanders.

As a result of his observations, General

Bolté cabled Washington that he was

". . . convinced that any deferment, cutback, or cancellation of requested units,

individuals, or material would be premature." He urged that full support of

MacArthur be continued. He pointed

out that even the psychological impact of

withdrawal or diminution would now

adversely affect the command in the field.

"Recent reverses—in Eighth Army,"

Bolté concluded, "require assurances of

full support, which I have given them."

 8

Army officials in Washington had anticipated General Bolté's call for reappraisal. Maj. Gen. Robinson E. Duff,

acting G-3 during Bolté's absence, immediately replied that action had been

started on 3 November to halt the cutback trend. He had recommended to

General Collins that all units originally

intended for shipment to EEC, but held

in the United States when it appeared

they would not be needed to finish the

job in Korea, be sent at once. He also

asked that the planned reduction in

United Nations units be called off.9

Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of

Defense, also noted the new developments with some alarm. He was particularly disturbed by an intelligence report

on 1 November which estimated that the

Chinese Communists had decided to

establish a cordon sanitaire south of the

Yalu border. This report, coupled with

what Lovett described as "the renewed

vigor of the enemy attacks in the border

area," caused him to counsel the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to reconsider their plans

to reduce the number of United Nations

units to be sent to Korea. The acting

G-3, General Duff, seconded this suggestion, pointing out that "the possible

utilization of the enormous manpower of

Communist Asia against the United

States makes it mandatory at this time

to provide General MacArthur with the

largest possible United Nations force until the overall situation is better clarified." Duff held that it was now

necessary, politically and militarily, to

set a pattern for the development and

use of the manpower of other friendly

world areas, particularly those where

manpower was the chief military resource. The United States, Duff felt,

could not continue to provide the bulk

of anti-Communist manpower for military operations, but ". . . must preserve

its technical and scientific resources, its

8

 Rad, Gen Bolte to Gen Duff, 5 Nov 50, in G-3,

DA files.

9

 Rad, WAR 95938, DA to CG RYCOM (Pass to

Bolté), 6 Nov 50.
238 POLICY AND DIRECTION

productive capacity, and its trained

military leadership."

 10

On 6 November, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff agreed that the time was no longer

propitious for reducing contributions

from other nations and set out to amend

the steps they had already taken in that

direction. They recommended to the

Secretary of Defense that, "due to the

fluid situation in Korea," action on cutting back United Nations forces be deferred. The Secretary of Defense

subsequently passed this recommendation to the Department of State and the

move to retrench was halted.11

From the Far East Command, the G-1,

General Beiderlinden, again demanded

replacements. "This theater has been

operating throughout hostilities seriously

understrength," he charged on 5 November. "The shortage of essential replacements is continuing and reaching critical

stage." The current situation made it

mandatory that replacement schedules

be revised and that substantial numbers of men be shipped at once. General

Beiderlinden admitted that it would be

difficult to estimate what the losses would

be in November and December, but he

maintained that the trend was upward to

a marked degree. Department of the

Army officials were unable to understand, since there was no accompanying

explanation, on what basis Beiderlinden

was predicting increased battle casualties.

When General Brooks, the Department

of Army G-1, asked Beiderlinden for an

explanation at the next teleconference,

it became apparent from the reply that

Beiderlinden had accepted Chinese Communist intervention as a proven fact and

that he expected the worst. He pointed

out that battle casualties had risen from

40 per day in October to 326 per day in

the first week of November and that this

upward swing was no flash in the pan.

He based his theory on a number of disturbing considerations, and felt that the

United Nations Command faced a situation as dangerous as that of the Pusan

Perimeter. He noted that the new enemy

would be better trained and equipped

than the North Koreans, and that the

fighting would be carried on in bitter

winter weather. Furthermore, the

Eighth Army was already experiencing

transportation, supply, and evacuation

difficulties which would multiply; combat divisions were understrength; periods

which the individual soldier must spend

in combat would probably increase; and

there had already been a great drop in

morale among combat men at the prospect of continued heavy fighting.12

At a higher level, General MacArthur

on 7 November appealed to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for more combat strength.

He told them that the appearance of the

Chinese Communist forces in strength

had completely changed the over-all situation and asked that all previous plans

for sending men and units to his command be put into full effect immediately.

Holding that it was essential for the replacement flow to his theater to be re10

 (1) Memo, Robert A. Lovett, Dep Secy Defense

for JCS, 4 Nov 50, sub: Reduction in Forces to be

Deployed in Korea, (2) Memo, G-3 (Duff) for CofS,

USA, 6 Nov 50, sub: Utilization of U.N. Ground

Forces Contingents, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Cases

111/8,111/10. 11

 (1) Decision on JCS 1776/152, 6 Nov 50. (2) Ltr,

Secy Defense to Secy State, 16 Nov 50, in G-3, DA

file 091 Korea, Cases 111/8, 111/2.

12

 (1) Rad, CX 68300, CINCFE to DA, 5 Nov 50.

(2) Telecon, TT 3982, DA and GHQ (Brooks and

Beiderlinden), 7 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 239

sumed at full force, MacArthur asked

also that all Army combat and service

units previously requested be sent

without delay. He could not say at that

date whether more Army, Air Force,

and Navy units than had already been

asked for would be required, but he was

certain "that the full requirement for

balanced forces as stated during the

earlier phases of the campaign must now

be met with possible appreciable augmentation thereof." "The alternatives,"

General MacArthur warned, "are either

a stalemate or the prospect of losing all

that has thus far been gained."

 13

Department of Army officials had already taken action to send 40,000 replacements to the Far East in November and

December, and it was estimated that all

units in the Far East would be up to

strength by March 1951. With regard

to the additional units, 112 combat and

service units of various types had been

recommended for shipment to the Far

East, although shipment of 92 of these

was contingent upon approval to send

civilian component units overseas. On

16 November, the Chief of Staff told

the United Nations commander that

steps to fulfill his needs were being

taken. "In view of the gravity of the

current situation," Collins said, ". . . the

flow of Army replacements has been resumed at an increased rate and you will

be informed earliest of the combat and

service type units alerted for movement

to your command."

 14

One interesting outgrowth of the

Chinese intervention was the effect on

personnel policy in the Far East with

respect to the ROK soldiers who had

been integrated into American units in

September. The Far East Command had

established a policy during the period of

October optimism of releasing South

Korean soldiers to ROK Army control

as American replacements arrived to take

their places. As of 7 November, over

8,000 of these Korean soldiers had been

released from Eighth Army's units. On

that date, however, the practice was suspended because of the new threat, and

more than 20,000 Koreans remained in

American divisions.15

A Time for Reappraisal

One of the first intelligence reports on

the Chinese intervention to reach Washington was that of General Willoughby,

who revealed on 2 November that 16,500

Chinese Communist soldiers had entered

North Korea. The Chinese Communist

government reputedly was labeling these

troops "volunteers." The Sinuiju radio

had announced that these troops formed

the "Volunteer Corps for the Protection

of the Hydroelectric Zone" and had

entered Korea expressly to prevent the

destruction of hydroelectric facilities

along the Yalu. General Willoughby

admitted that the increasing resistance

being met by MacArthur's forces had

removed the problem of Chinese intervention from the realm of the academic

and turned it into "a serious proximate

threat." He was puzzled by the Chinese

device of committing "volunteers" in 13

 Rad, CINCFE to DA, 7 Nov 50. 14

 (1) Memo, Bolté for CofS USA, 10 Nov 50, sub:

Regarding CCF in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 14/42. (2) Rad, WAR 96672, DA (Collins) to

CINCFE, 16 Nov 50.

15

 Telecon, TT 3992, DA (Brooks) and GHQ

(Beiderlinden), 9 Nov 50.
240 POLICY AND DIRECTION

"special units" instead of in regular organized regiments of the Chinese Communist Army. He speculated that the

Chinese, who he acknowledged were extremely subtle and obsessed with "saving

face," might be doing this in order to

have their cake and eat it too. By labeling their troops "volunteers" and claiming that no recognized units of their

army were in Korea, the Chinese would

avoid the appearance of intervention.

Nor would they involve the prestige of

the Chinese Communist Army if defeated. On the other hand, by furnishing troops to North Korea, China could

claim credit for helping North Korea

in its hour of need. MacArthur's intelligence chief concluded by warning:

Although indications so far point to piecemeal commitment for ostensible limited

purposes only, it is important not to lose

sight of the maximum potential that is

immediately available to the Chinese Com- munists. Should the high level decision for

full intervention be made by the Chinese

Communists, they could promptly commit

29 of their 44 divisions presently deployed

along the Yalu and support a major attack

with up to 150 aircraft.16

On the same day, 2 November, the

American Consul General in Hong Kong

sent Washington a report that in August,

at a conference of top Sino-Soviet leaders,

a joint decision had been made that

Communist China would enter the

Korean War. According to his report,

the formal decision had come on 24

October at a meeting presided over by

Premier Mao Tse-tung. An estimated

twenty Chinese Communist armies had

been sent to Manchuria.17

On the next day, Willoughby reported

316,000 regular Chinese ground forces

and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or security forces, in Manchuria. Most of the

regulars were believed to be along the

Yalu at numerous crossing sites.18

These disclosures had an extremely

ominous ring and, coupled with the

news of the withdrawal of Eighth Army

before Chinese forces already in Korea,

caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call

on General MacArthur for an evaluation.

They requested his earliest "interim appreciation of the situation in Korea and

its implications in light of what appears

to be overt intervention by Chinese Communist units."

 19

MacArthur's reply scarcely enlightened them. He told them, "It is impossible at this time to authoritatively

appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea."

MacArthur posed four courses of action

which the Chinese Communists might be

following. The first was open intervention with full force and without restraint; the second possibility, covert

intervention concealed for diplomatic

reasons; the third course might be the

use of "volunteers" to keep a foothold

in Korea; the fourth, Chinese forces

might have entered Korea assuming they

would meet only ROK units which they

could defeat without great difficulty.20

Full intervention, according to General MacArthur, would represent a

"momentous decision of the gravest international importance." "While it is a

16

 Telecon, TT 3968, G-2 DA (Boiling) with G-2

FEC (Willoughby), 2 Nov 50. 17

 Intelligence Rpt, 2 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files.

18

 Telecon, TT 3971, DA and GHQ UNC, 3

Nov 50. 19

 Rad, WAR 95790, CSUSA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50. 20

 Rad, C 68285, CINCFE to DA for CSUSA for

JCS, 4 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 241

distinct possibility," he told the JCS,

"and many foreign experts predict such

action, there are many fundamental

logical reasons against it and sufficient

evidence has not yet come to hand to

warrant its immediate acceptance." Although he made no definite prediction,

MacArthur felt that a combination of

the last three courses of action by the

Chinese were, at the moment, the most

likely. In a cautious mood, he told the

Joint Chiefs, "I recommend against hasty

conclusions which might be premature

and believe that a final appraisement

should await a more complete accumulation of military facts." Nothing in the

tone or content of General MacArthur's

report implied that an emergency existed

or that the situation even showed signs

of getting out of hand. His report was,

in a sense, reassuring.21

On the same day that General MacArthur sent this appraisal to Washington, the Chinese Communist government

in an official statement charged that the

United States was bent on conquering

not only Korea but also China, as "the

Japanese imperialists have done in the

past." The statement, possibly made to

prepare the Chinese people for further

moves in Korea, claimed that in order

to protect China, Chinese military forces

must now assist North Korea.22

Chinese troops had crossed and were

continuing to cross into North Korea

over a number of international bridges

leading in from Manchuria. By 3

November, General MacArthur's headquarters accepted the possibility that

34,000 Chinese had entered Korea and

that 415,000 regular troops were located

in Manchuria, ready to cross if ordered.

Two days later, General Willoughby

warned that the Chinese Communist

forces had the potential to launch a largescale counteroffensive at any time.23

The appearance of Chinese military

formations in Korea, and evidence that

these forces were being augmented rapidly, caused MacArthur to call for an allout air effort to smash them. On 5

November, he directed General Stratemeyer to throw the full power of the Far

East Air Forces into a 2-week effort to

knock the North Koreans and their new

allies out of the war. "Combat crews,"

he ordered, "are to be flown to exhaustion if necessary." He instructed Stratemeyer to destroy the Korean ends of all

international bridges on the Manchurian

border. From the Yalu southward, and

excluding only Rashin, the Suiho Dam,

and other hydroelectric plants, the Far

East Air Forces would "destroy every

means of communication and every installation, factory, city, and village."

MacArthur warned that there must be no

border violations and that all targets

close to or on the border must be attacked only under visual bombing

conditions.24

On 6 November, General MacArthur

notified Army authorities that he intended to have his B-29's take out immediately the international bridges

across the Yalu between Sinuiju and

An-tung. He hoped, by destroying these

bridges, to prevent or at least slow down

21

 Ibid. 22

 Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5

Nov 50.

23

 DIS GHQ, FEC UNC, No. 2977, 3 Nov 50 and

No. 2979, 5 Nov 50. 24

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, United States Air

Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30 June 1952, ch. I, p. 22.
242 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the flow of Chinese military strength into

Korea. MacArthur conveyed this information to Washington in a routine

manner during a teleconference with

the Army staff at the Pentagon.25

Had this matter been handled routinely by the Army staff and merely reported through channels, the mission

might have been well under way before

the nation's leaders learned of MacArthur's intentions. However, General

Stratemeyer, apparently feeling that his

chief's decision held more than passing

interest, sent to Air Force authorities in

Washington a message describing his

orders from MacArthur. Within minutes, Under Secretary of Defense Lovett

had been informed and the fat was in the

fire.26

Lovett doubted very seriously that the

advantage of bombing the SinuijuAn-tung bridges would offset the great

danger of bombing Chinese territory.

He went at once to discuss the problem

with Secretary of State Acheson and with

the Assistant Secretary of State for Far

Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk. The latter

pointed out that the United States had

promised the British Government not to

take action which might involve attacks

on Manchuria without consulting the

British. Also, the United States was even

then taking steps to have the Security

Council pass a resolution calling on the

Chinese to halt action in Korea, a resolution that surely would be jeopardized if

bombs fell in Manchuria. Rusk was concerned, too, over possible Soviet reaction

if China should invoke the mutualassistance treaty with the Soviet Union.

Acheson and Lovett agreed that MacArthur's attack should be held up until

the Korean situation became much

clearer, particularly in view of Rusk's

comments. Lovett then called Secretary

Marshall and informed him of the details. Marshall agreed that unless a

mass movement across the Yalu was

threatening the security of MacArthur's

forces, the planned bombing was unwise. Lovett then directed the Air

Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter,

to tell the JCS of the feeling at State and

Defense that the action by MacArthur

should await a decision from the President himself. As a final step, Acheson

called the President who was in Independence, Missouri. President Truman

stated that he would approve this bombing only if there was an immediate and

serious threat to MacArthur's forces.

Since MacArthur had reported no such

threat and, indeed, only two days before

had cautioned Washington against precipitate judgment and had recommended

a wait-and-see attitude, the puzzlement

of Mr. Truman and his chief advisers

was natural. The President directed

that the attack be put off and that MacArthur be asked to explain why he

found this potentially dangerous action

suddenly so necessary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on

the President's instructions, immediately

directed MacArthur to call off until further orders any bombing of the international bridges. "Consideration is being

urgently given to the Korean situation

at the governmental level," they told

him.

One factor is the present commitment not

to take action affecting Manchuria without

consulting the British. Until further orders

25

 Telecon, TT 3976, DA and GHQ, UNC, 6

Nov 50. 26

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 374.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 243

postpone all bombing of targets within five

miles of the Manchurian border. Urgently

need your estimate of the situation and the

reason for ordering bombing of Yalu River

bridges as indicated.27

This order from Washington brought

from General MacArthur an immediate

protest couched in strong terms which

portrayed the situation in Korea in the

most pessimistic vein since July and

August. He warned on 6 November that

"men and materiel in large forces are

pouring across all bridges over the Yalu

from Manchuria," and, for the first time

since Chinese entry had become evident,

admitted that the situation was serious.

"This movement not only jeopardizes

but threatens the ultimate destruction

of the forces under my command." He

described for them how the Chinese were

moving across the bridges under cover

of darkness. Chinese troops could be

committed without being attacked effectively by air because of the short distances from the river to the front lines.

"The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of

these bridges and the subjection of all

installations in the north area supporting

the enemy advance to the maximum of

our air destruction," General MacArthur

declared. "Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood."

He had intended hitting the main crossing at Sinuiju within the next few hours

but in accordance with the Joint Chiefs's

order had suspended the strike "under

the gravest protest that I can make."

He pointed out that his original order

to bomb the bridges was, in his opinion,

entirely within the scope of his directives,

the rules of war, and the resolution made

by the United Nations. It constituted to

him no slightest act of belligerency

against Chinese territory.

It is interesting to note MacArthur's

reference to the resolution of the United

Nations since he received his operating

instructions and directives from the very

quarter at which he was lodging his

protest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

resolutions of the United Nations were

merely guides which the United States

Government, as the Unified Command

under the United Nations, used in determining the specific policies for the

United Nations Command in Korea.

General MacArthur seemed sure that the

Joint Chiefs did not realize the disastrous

effect, both physical and psychological,

that would result from the restrictions

they were imposing. In an extraordinary request, he asked that President

Truman be informed of the restriction,

saying, "I believe that your instructions

may well result in a calamity of major

proportion for which I cannot accept the

responsibility without his personal and

direct understanding of the situation."

He concluded by asking immediate

reconsideration of the decision.28

27

 (1) Rad, JCS 95878, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 6 Nov 50. (2) This series of actions reveals

clearly the speed with which important decisions

could be taken and the "streamlining" of the normal

policy-making methods. Stratemeyer's message had

been received in Washington about three and onehalf hours before his planes were scheduled to take

off on their missions. In the interim every appropriate official within the Defense and State Departments had been consulted and the Presidential

decision based on their advice had been reached.

The JCS had sent out the order to MacArthur only

an hour and twenty minutes before the B-29's were

scheduled to take off from Japan. See Truman,

Memoirs, II, 374-75.

28

 Rad, C 68396, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 6 Nov

50. That MacArthur did not fully understand the
244 POLICY AND DIRECTION

The sense of grim urgency conveyed

by MacArthur's protest and his accompanying picture of a sudden, mammoth

build-up of Chinese Communist forces

in Korea surprised Washington. General Bradley called the President and

read to him MacArthur's message. Still

concerned over the dangers of bombing

Manchuria by mistake, Mr. Truman

nevertheless agreed to let MacArthur go

ahead with his plans. President Truman, because MacArthur was on the

scene and felt very strongly that this was

of unusual urgency, told Bradley to give

him the green light.29

Nevertheless, it was evident that both

Truman and the military planners in

Washington were gravely concerned by

the tone of MacArthur's protest. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur in

an immediate reply that the situation

he now depicted had changed considerably from that described in his last

report of 4 November. They agreed

that destruction of the bridges in question would probably alleviate the immediate problem but that the cure might

be worse than the ailment. It might well

bring increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contributions in response to what the Communists might

construe as an attack on Manchuria.

Not only would this endanger MacArthur's forces, it would enlarge the area

of conflict and American involvement to

a dangerous degree.30

But in view of the apparent emergency, with men and matériel pouring

across the Yalu bridges, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff told MacArthur that he could

bomb these bridges but with certain restrictions. ". . . you are authorized to

go ahead with your planned bombing in

Korea near the frontier including targets

at Sinuiju and Korean end of the Yalu

bridges." This did not mean, General

MacArthur was cautioned, carte blanche

to bomb any dams or power plants on the

Yalu River. The Joint Chiefs expressed

deep concern that careless action by the

United Nations Command near the Yalu

might trigger a crisis which would cause

the fighting to spread. They specifically

warned MacArthur on this, urging him

to enforce extreme care to avoid Manchurian territory and airspace and to

tell them promptly of any hostile action

from Manchuria. They chided him

obliquely for being lax in reporting new

developments, prompted no doubt by

the great discrepancy between his description of the situation on 4 November

and that of 6 November. Certainly the

routine and special reports from his

command had not indicated so great a

change in the Chinese Communist situation as appeared to have actually taken

place. "It is essential," the Joint Chiefs

maintained, "that we be kept informed

of important changes in the situation as

they occur and that your estimate as requested . . . be submitted as soon as

possible."

 31

American intelligence agencies had

been busy, meanwhile, preparing the best

possible estimate of Chinese intentions

based on the pooled information from all

mechanical procedures by which the instructions he

received were evolved in Washington is evident. He

seems to have assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had ordered a halt to his planned attack without

Presidential backing. 29

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 376. 30

 Rad, JCS 95949, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 50. 31

 Ibid.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 245

their sources. This estimate was furnished all high-level planning and policy

groups, including the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, on the same day General MacArthur's pessimistic report arrived. The

estimate concluded that between 30,000

and 40,000 Chinese were now in North

Korea and that as many as 700,000 men,

including 350,000 ground troops could

be sent into Korea to fight against the

United Nations forces. These Chinese

forces would be capable of halting the

United Nations advance by piecemeal

commitment or, by a powerful all-out

offensive, forcing the United Nations to

withdraw to defensive positions farther

south. The report concluded with a

significant warning:

A likely and logical development of the

present situation is that the opposing sides

will build up their combat power in succes- sive increments to checkmate the other until

forces of major magnitude are involved. At

any point the danger is present that the

situation may get out of control and lead

to a general war.32

This chilling prognosis was followed

at once by another report from the

United Nations commander. He confirmed that the Chinese threat was a real

and developing one. That Chinese

forces were engaging his troops was

unquestionable although their exact

strength was difficult for his commanders

to determine. They were strong enough

to have seized the initiative from

Walker's forces in the west and to have

materially slowed Almond's advances

in the east. "The principle seems

thoroughly established," General MacArthur declared, "that such forces will

be used and augmented at will, probably

without any formal declaration of hostilities." He emphasized that if the

Chinese augmentation continued it could

force the United Nations Command to

perform a "movement in retrograde."

But he affirmed his intentions to resume

his advance in the west, possibly within

ten days, and to try to seize the initiative,

provided the enemy flow of reinforcements could be checked. In his first

reference to what he later termed a "reconnaissance in force," General MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

"Only through such an offensive effort

can any accurate measure be taken of

enemy strength."

 33

Once again he reiterated his conviction that the bridges had to be

bombed "as the only resource left to me

to prevent a potential build-up of enemy

strength to a point threatening the safety

of the command." This bombing was,

in his eyes, so plainly defensive that he

could hardly conceive of its causing increased intervention or provoking a general war, as the Joint Chiefs had

intimated it might do. He promised

that there would be no violation of the

Manchurian or Siberian borders and that

he would not destroy the hydroelectric

installations along the Yalu.34

Twelve railroad and highway bridges

spanned the Yalu and Tumen Rivers

from Manchuria and Russia into Korea.

The most important of these were the

rail and highway bridges at Sinuiju and

An-tung. These bridges were 3,000 feet

long and very sturdy. The highway

32

 Intelligence Estimate, 6 Nov 50, sub: Chinese

Communist Intervention in Korea, in G-2, DA

files.

33

 Rad, C 68465, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50. 34

 Ibid.
246 POLICY AND DIRECTION

bridge at Sinuiju had been built in 1900

by the American Bridge Company and

perhaps equaled in strength any in the

world. Despite the swift current, winter

ice, and spring floods, the builders had

laid the foundations on bedrock. The

Japanese had built an equally sturdy

double-track rail bridge of twelve trusses

in 1934, 350 yards north of the highway

bridge. It was the largest rail bridge

ever built by the Japanese.35 Near

Sakchu a double-track railway bridge

spanned the Yalu, while at Manp'ojin

both a rail and footbridge crossed the

river. Other highway bridges were located at Ongondong, Ch'ongsongjin,

Lin-chiang, Hyesanjin, Samanko, and

Hoeryong.

As authorized by the President, MacArthur sent his bombers, starting on 8

November, against the bridges at Sinuiju, Sakchu, Ch'ongsongjin, Manp'ojin,

and Hyesanjin. But bombing the Yalu

River bridges involved almost insurmountable difficulties. Antiaircraft fire

from Manchuria forced the bombers

above 20,000 feet, and enemy jet fighters

threatened them on their bomb runs.

MacArthur's orders positively forbidding

any violation of Manchurian airspace

severely limited the possible axes of approach to the bridges and permitted

enemy antiaircraft artillery to zero in

on the flight path of the bombers. Also,

the provision that the bridges could be

attacked only under visual bombing conditions meant that any cloud cover at

the target diverted the bombers to

secondary or last-resort objectives.

On 12 November, carrier-based Navy

bombers joined in the effort to destroy

the bridges. All during November, the

aerial attacks against the bridges continued but the results were disappointing. By the end of the month, the air

effort had succeeded, at great cost, in

cutting four of the international bridges

and in damaging most of the others. But

by this time the Yalu was frozen over in

many places and enemy engineers were

building ponton bridges across the Yalu

at critical points. On 5 December, the

bridge attacks were suspended.36

35

 (1) DA WIR No. 91, 17 Nov 50, p. 38, NK

Border Crossings. (2) FEC Intelligence Digest, vol.

I, No. 13, 16-30 June 1953, p. 26.

36

 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 72, U.S. Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 50-30

June 1952, ch. 1, pp. 27-31. (2) Maj. Gen. Emmett

"Rosie" O'Donnell, Commander, FEAF Bomber

Command, during the period in question, testified

before the Senate committee investigating General

MacArthur's relief to the difficulty of destroying

the Yalu bridges in November 1950. General O'Donnell said, "We were not, however, allowed to violate

Manchurian territory, and by violation of territory

I mean we were not allowed to fly over an inch of

it. For instance, the Yalu has several very pronounced bends like most rivers before getting to

the town of Antung, and the main bridges at Antung we had to attack in only one manner. There

was only one manner you could attack the bridge

and not violate Manchurian territory, and that was

a course tangential to the southernmost bend of the

river. So you draw a line from the southernmost

bend of the river to the bridge and that is your

course, and these people on the other side of the

river knew that, and they put up their batteries

right along the line and they peppered us right

down the line all the way. . . . In addition to that,

they had their fighters come up along side; while I

didn't see them myself, the combat mission reports

indicate that they would join our formation about

2 miles to the lee and fly along at the same speed on

the other side of the river while we were making our

approach, and just before we got to bombs-away position, they would veer off to the north and climb

up to about 30,000 feet and then make a frontal

quarter attack on the bombers just about at the

time of bombs-away in a turn. So that they would

be coming from Manchuria in a turn, swoop down,

fire their cannon at the formation, and continue

the turn back into sanctuary—and the boys didn't

like it." See MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3069-70.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 247

The Sanctuary and Hot Pursuit

On at least three separate occasions,

American pilots, through error, had previously violated their instructions and

attacked targets in Manchuria and Siberia. Although the U.S. Air Force

attributed these incursions upon neutral

territory to pilot and navigational error,

these incidents, regardless of their cause,

were serious matters. It was entirely

possible that either China or Russia

could have used the incidents as an excuse for expanding the war or for

retaliating in other forms.37 Indeed,

after mid-August, Chinese antiaircraft

batteries in Manchuria fired at U.N.

aircraft flying south of the Yalu. By

late October one American plane had

been shot down and another damaged.38

The Department of State had been

particularly apprehensive lest further

such encroachments should provide the

Russians or Chinese a semblance of

justification for overt attacks against the

United States. In a series of pointed

questions addressed to the Secretary of

Defense, the Secretary of State had asked

whether it was necessary for American

air and naval forces to operate along

the North Korean border and whether

the Joint Chiefs should not caution MacArthur against such operations. Secretary Marshall had requested advice

from the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs,

who had already instructed General

MacArthur on the matter of border violations, felt that MacArthur was fully

aware of the necessity for avoiding such

incidents and that they could not curtail

his mission. Consequently, on 1 November, the Joint Chiefs told the Secretary

of Defense, "The need for air interdiction operations in areas contiguous to

the international boundaries of Korea

is sufficient justification for not further delimiting air operations." They

pointed out that it appeared to them that

all United Nations forces would be

required to operate clear up to the international boundaries of Korea. "Therefore," they said, "it is not considered

desirable from the military point of view,

to deny these ground troops air and naval

support in these areas, nor would acceptance of the loss of life entailed by

such denial be justified."

 39

The efforts to bomb out the international bridges brought the question into

sharp focus. The sorties against these

bridges continued to be strongly opposed. Russian-built jet aircraft, later

identified as MIG-15's presumably

piloted by Chinese pilots, had been encountered by American pilots in the

area since 1 November, when one such

aircraft made a nonfiring pass at a U.N.

plane; and when the U.N. air force

undertook the bombing of the Yalu

bridges on 8 November the enemy jet

pilots attacked in earnest. One MIG

was sent down in flames on the first day

of the attacks.

The enemy jets did not stray far from

the Manchurian border, and since American planes were forbidden to cross,

enemy pilots enjoyed an almost insurmountable advantage. They could

break off combat whenever things got

37

 USAF Hist Study No. 72, ch. 5, pp. 80-81. 38

 Rad, CX 67701, CINCFE to DA, 28 Oct 50.

39

 (1) Memo, Ch Intnl Br, G-3, for Gen Schuyler,

sub: Delimitation of Air Opns Along the Northern

Border of Korea, JSPC 853/60. (2) JCS 2150/9,

Incl A, Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 1 Nov 50, in

G-3 DA file 091 Korea, Case 115.
248 POLICY AND DIRECTION

too hot for them and dash across the

border to safety. American Air Force

commanders naturally complained to

General MacArthur about the protection afforded enemy pilots by their

Manchurian sanctuary.

MacArthur had already sought help.

"Hostile planes are operating from bases

west of the Yalu River against our forces

in North Korea," General MacArthur

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7

November. These planes were increasing in number; and the distance from

the Yalu to the main line of contact was

so short that it was almost impossible

to deal effectively with the hit-and-run

tactics that enemy pilots were employing.

"The present restrictions imposed on

my area of operation," MacArthur asserted, "provide a complete sanctuary for

hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchurian-North Korean border. The effect of this abnormal

condition upon the morale and combat

efficiency of both air and ground troops

is major." General MacArthur predicted that unless corrective measures

were promptly taken the air problem

could assume serious proportions, and

asked for instructions for dealing with

this new and threatening development.40

He did not, it should be noted, ask

specifically for permission to bomb

Manchurian air bases or to follow enemy

planes across the border.

The Joint Chiefs could not tell MacArthur to send his fighter planes into

Manchuria after the fleeing Chinese

pilots. All they could do was push the

matter with their superiors, and in an

immediate reply to the United Nations

commander they told him that "urgent

necessity for corrective measures" was

being presented for highest United

States-level consideration.41

Meanwhile, other member nations of

the United Nations had noted the situation growing out of Chinese intervention

and American border violations with

mounting alarm. The French Government made two proposals designed to

reassure the Chinese that the United

Nations Command meant to respect their

territory. The French first proposed that

the United Nations General Assembly

should publicly call upon the United

Nations Command to refrain from

bombing the Yalu River power installations "except the military necessity

arises." The second proposal was in

the form of a resolution to be passed

by the General Assembly which would

assure the Chinese that the United Nations Command considered the Chinese

border "inviolate." The Joint Chiefs

had no objection to the first French

proposal since General MacArthur had

already assured them he did not intend

to bomb the power installations. Besides, the phrase "military necessity" was

extremely elastic. But they considered

the second French resolution wholly unacceptable because the term "inviolate"

would convey an impression to the

Chinese that the United Nations would

not, under any conditions, trespass beyond the border, whereas there was no

guarantee that the United States might

not have to operate across the Chinese

frontier even before the General As40

 Rad, CS 68411, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7

Nov 50. 41

 Rad, CX 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 249

sembly had a chance to adopt the

French-sponsored resolution.42

On 10 November, the Secretary of

Defense transmitted to the Secretary of

State the views of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on the French proposals for resolutions by the United Nations General

Assembly. Marshall agreed with the

State Department view that some form

of reassurances to the Chinese Communists was called for. "I believe it should

be made clear," he told Mr. Acheson,

"that a sanctuary for attacking Chinese

aircraft is not explicitly or implicitly

affirmed by an United Nations action."

 43

A draft resolution calling for withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Korea

and sponsored by six nations of the

United Nations, including France, the

United Kingdom, and the United States,

was placed before the Security Council

of the United Nations on 10 November.

This draft resolution assured the Chinese

that ". . . it is the policy of the United

Nations to hold the Chinese frontier

with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone. . . ."

(Department of Defense objections to

the term "inviolate" obviously were unavailing.) But this measure was never

passed by the Security Council since the

representative of the Soviet Union

exercised his power of veto against it.44

On 16 November, President Truman

also attempted to reassure the Chinese

Communist government that the United

Nations Command had no designs on its

borders and, further, that the United

States desired no expansion of the war.

In a public announcement, he took note

of the resolution then under consideration by the Security Council, affirmed

American support of this resolution, and

declared that "Speaking for the United

States Government and people, I can

give assurance that we support and are

acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have

never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China."

 45

Chinese aircraft operating out of bases

in Manchuria meantime attacked MacArthur's planes with increasing intensity.

By mid-November, large groups of Communist jet aircraft were ranging across

the border to intercept U.N. fliers. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General

MacArthur that this should be stopped

and proposed corrective action. They

favored the removal of as many restrictions on U.N. air operations as would

allow MacArthur's airmen to pursue

enemy attackers six or eight miles across

the Manchurian border. This would

greatly reduce the Communist fliers' advantage of being able to attack and

escape without suffering effective retaliation. Secretary Marshall approved this

scheme and later testified that his views

were shared by Secretary Acheson and

President Truman. But these American

42

 Memo, Actg ACofS G-3 (Duff) for CofS USA

(Collins), 10 Nov 50, sub: Resolutions in the U.N.

to Provide Certain Assurances to the Chinese Communists, JCS 1776/157, Incl to Decision on JCS

1776/157, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 14/39. 43

 Ibid. 44

 U.N. Doc S/1894, Joint Resolution of the Security Council, 10 Nov 50, contained in Department

of State Publication 4263, United States Policy in

the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951,

Doc 13.

45

 Statement, President Harry S. Truman, 16 Nov

50, quoted in Department of State Publication No.

4263, Doc 14.
250 POLICY AND DIRECTION

authorities were reluctant for the United

States to take the initiative in giving

MacArthur permission to enter Manchurian airspace. To do so without

consulting other nations whose forces

were in Korea would be viewed by those

nations, it was believed, as unilateral

American action and might well cause a

rift between the United States and its

allies.46

Secretary Acheson, in mid-November,

instructed his ambassadors in certain

key nations to sound out their attitude

toward "hot pursuit," as the issue was

termed, of Chinese aircraft into Manchuria. The reaction was unanimously

against any such action by the United

Nations Command. Typical was the

attitude of one nation whose official

spokesman expressed the fear that

"United States unilateral action in this

regard would afford a basis to the Soviet

charge that the United Nations is only

a front for the United States." One

American ambassador after interviewing

the officials of the country to which he

was accredited stated that he firmly believed that the Atlantic Pact nations

would disassociate themselves from such

American action as being unilateral and

without United Nations endorsement.

As a result, the United States shelved the

idea of carrying the air war into

Manchuria.47

The Mission Is Re-examined

The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile

reacted cautiously to the mounting evidence of Chinese intervention. After

examining intelligence from the theater

and other sources, they informed General MacArthur that the eventuality anticipated in their instructions to him of

27 September, "entry into North Korea

by major . . . Chinese forces," appeared

to have arrived. At least the introduction of Chinese forces to the extent reported by him would so signify. "We

believe therefore," they warned him,

"that this new situation indicates your

objectives as stated in that message, 'the

destruction of the North Korean armed

forces,' may have to be re-examined."

 48

A change of mission in the face of

Chinese pressure could mean abandoning the drive to the Yalu, going on the

defensive, and consolidating the ground

seized since Inch'on.

But MacArthur was of no mind to

abandon his drive to the Yalu. Protesting to the Joint Chiefs against any

re-examination of his mission, MacArthur pointed out that their instructions to him on 10 October had exactly

defined his course of action in this present situation. They had told him, in

the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major

Chinese Communist units without prior

announcement, to continue the action as

long as in his judgment his forces had

a reasonable chance of success.49

MacArthur rejected completely any

course of action short of his original

intentions. "In my opinion it would

46

 All of the following are in the MacArthur

Hearings: Testimony of General Marshall, p. 329,

1912; Testimony of General Vandenberg, p. 1410;

Testimony of Secretary Acheson, p. 1723. 47

 JCS 2150/10, Note by the Secys to the JCS,

sub: Reactions to Proposal to Permit U.N. Aircraft

to Pursue Attacking Enemy Aircraft into Manchuria, 4 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case

48

 Rad, JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50. 49

 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd Mac115/5. Arthur, 9 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 251

be fatal to weaken the fundamental and

basic policy of the United Nations to

destroy all resisting armed forces in

Korea and bring that country into a

united and free nation," he charged.

General MacArthur proclaimed his faith

in the effectiveness of air interdiction by

telling the Joint Chiefs that he could,

with his air power, keep the number of

Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu

low enough to enable him to destroy

those Chinese already in Korea. He

meant to launch his attack to destroy

those forces about 15 November and to

keep going until he reached the border.

"Any program short of this," he

explained:

would completely destroy the morale of my

forces and its psychological consequence

would be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention of our military

forces along difficult defense lines in North

Korea and would unquestionably arouse

such resentment among the South Koreans

that their forces would collapse or might

even turn against us.

He charged that anyone who hoped that

the Chinese, once they had succeeded in

establishing themselves in North Korea,

would abide by any agreement not to

move southward would be indulging in

wishful thinking at its very worst.50

The Joint Chiefs had told MacArthur

that consultation with the British Government on any new course of action

against China was an integral part of

American policy. In an unusually vehement burst of impatience, MacArthur

directed a scathing comment at what he

termed, "The widely reported British

desire to appease the Chinese Communist by giving them a strip of Northern

Korea," and cited British action at

Munich in 1938 as historic precedent for

their present attitude.51 He went further and referred to a State Department

criticism of the British appeasement of

Hitler to lend emphasis to his statement.

He charged that any such appeasement

of the Communists carried the germs of

ultimate destruction for the United Nations. "To give up any portion of North

Korea to the aggression of the Chinese

Communists," General MacArthur declared, "would be the greatest defeat

of the free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and

influence in Asia and render untenable

our position both politically and militarily." MacArthur asserted that by

moving to halt his forces short of the

Yalu River American authorities "would

follow clearly in the footsteps of the

British who by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest of

Asia without gaining that of the Chinese

segment."

 52

51

 A current news report had stated that Mr.

Bevin favored a buffer zone south of the Yalu. Dr.

Pannikar recalls that in mid-November Mr. Bevin

sent a message through his minister in Peiping to

be conveyed to Chou En-lai or the highest accessible

Chinese official. Pannikar says of this message to

which he apparently was given access, "It was a

strange communication, an elucidation of the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, an assurance

from Britain that Chinese boundaries would be

respected. . . . when Hutchinson [the British Minister] discussed the matter with me I frankly told him

that I doubted whether the Chinese would look at

any proposal which did not include an offer of direct negotiations of the whole issue with them; and

that I considered that the idea of Britain assuring

China of the inviolability of her boundaries was patronizing, to say the least." See Pannikar, In Two

Chinas: The Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 114-15. 52

 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd MacArthur, 9 Nov 50.
252 POLICY AND DIRECTION

After elaborating his point, General

MacArthur said that he believed that the

United States should press the United

Nations for a resolution condemning the

Chinese Communists and calling upon

them to "withdraw forthwith to positions

north of the international border on

pain of military sanctions by the United

Nations should they fail to do so." He

ended his protest on a note of confidence

as he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

complete victory could be achieved if

"our determination and indomitable will

do not desert us."

 53

Despite the optimism implicit in General MacArthur's protest that his mission

should remain unchanged, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were not cheered. His

protest merely underscored the critical

need for a firm course of action to meet

the Chinese interference in Korea.

President Truman directed the National

Security Council to meet on 9 November to consider on an urgent basis what

the national policy should be toward

Chinese Communist participation. The

Joint Chiefs had been instructed to furnish their views on what should be done.

It will be recalled that the national

policy agreed upon in September had

provided that in the case of Chinese

Communist intervention the United

States should attempt to localize the

action in Korea and thereby avoid a general war. A second position, but one

that had only tentative approval for use

as a planning guide, stated, in substance,

that United Nations forces would continue the action so long as such action

had a reasonable chance of success, and

that the United Nations commander

should be authorized to take appropriate

air and naval action outside Korea

against Communist China.54

As of 8 November, however, no firmly

established set of instructions outlining

detailed measures against Chinese Communist intervention, regardless of degree, had been agreed upon by the

nation's leaders. That was the task

which faced them as MacArthur, heartened by the dwindling evidence of

Chinese participation after the first week

of November, demanded to be allowed

to continue his original line of action in

Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 November forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for the National Security Council

a lengthy analysis containing their view

on the significance of the Chinese intervention and some suggestions on what

the United States should do about it.

Without accepting the theory that the

Chinese troops in Korea were volunteers,

the Joint Chiefs expressed the opinion

that such a view was feasible in the event

that the Chinese merely wanted to gain

time for the defeated and disorganized

remnants of the North Korean Army.

But they pointed out that intelligence

reports did not back up this theory,

since they showed that Chinese Communist soldiers were entering Korea

both as individuals and in wellorganized, well-led, and well-equipped

units, probably of division size.55

Examining Chinese motives in send53 Ibid.

54

 Memo, ACofS G-3 (Bolté) for CofS USA

(Gruenther), 8 Nov 50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action

With Respect to Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 37. 55

 Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense (Marshall), 9 Nov 50, sub: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 253

ing military forces against the United

Nations Command, the Joint Chiefs saw

three possibilities, although none of these

had as yet been made clear by Chinese

actions either in Korea or in Manchuria.

The Chinese might wish to protect the

Yalu River and the Changjin-Pujon

Reservoir power complexes and establish

a cordon sanitaire in North Korea; they

might wish to continue the active but undeclared war in Korea to drain American

resources without expending too much

of their own military strength; or they

could be planning to drive the United

Nations forces from Korea. If the

Chinese Communists were prevented,

through United Nations action, from obtaining electricity from the Yalu power

systems, Manchuria's economy would

suffer severely. Consequently, if the

Chinese Communists had intervened in

North Korea solely to protect the power

plants, it might be well, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff told the Secretary of Defense, to

announce an unmistakably clear guarantee that the United Nations would not

infringe on the sovereignty of Manchuria, would not damage the power

plants, and would not interfere with

their operation. If the Chinese Communists rejected such a guarantee, the

United States could feel fairly certain

that they had had some other objective

in intervening.56

That the Chinese might be planning

a limited war of attrition in Korea to

tie down and dissipate United States

strength was also a real possibility. As

the Joint Chiefs pointed out, "Korea is

at such a distance from the United States

that it would be expensive for the United

States in manpower, materiel, and money

to conduct an undeclared war in that

area over a long period." Conversely,

the Chinese, being next door to Korea,

would find it comparatively inexpensive,

with their practically unlimited manpower and Soviet equipment, to carry

on such a war indefinitely. The continued involvement of United States

forces in Korea would, in the opinion of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be in the interests of Russia and of world communism by imposing a heavy drain on U.S.

military and economic strengths. They

still considered Korea a "strategically

unimportant area" and felt that, in the

event of a global war, fighting in Korea

would leave the United States off-balance

while Russia completed its plans for

global conquest. The Joint Chiefs could

also visualize quite clearly a situation

whereby the United States, through concentrating its strength to defeat the

Chinese in Korea, might, "win the skirmish in Korea but lose the war against

the USSR if global war eventuates."

 57

The Joint Chiefs did not truly believe

that the Chinese Communists intended

to drive the United Nations forces from

all of Korea. While it was possible that

the Chinese did have that intention, the

Joint Chiefs felt they could not force

MacArthur's men off the peninsula

"without material assistance by Soviet

naval and airpower." If Russia did intervene to that extent, it would be evident that World War III had begun and

the United States should get its divisions

out of Korea as fast as possible.58

If the Chinese intervened in full

56

 Ibid.

57

 Ibid. 58

 Ibid.
254 POLICY AND DIRECTION

strength, the Joint Chiefs foresaw three

possible courses of action for United

Nations forces: to continue the action

as planned; to set up a defensive line

short of Korea's northern border; or to

withdraw. In the first instance, some

augmentation of United Nations military strength in Korea might be necessary if a drive to the Yalu were to

succeed, even if no more Chinese troops

entered the fighting. The second course,

pause and dig in, was, in the eyes of the

Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, indeed, perhaps expedient in the face of

unclarified military and political problems raised by Chinese entry. But they

rejected withdrawal because "if conducted voluntarily it would so lower the

world wide prestige of the United States

that it would be totally unacceptable. . . ." If the United Nations forces

were compelled to leave Korea involuntarily it "could only be accepted as the

prelude to global war." With specific

reference to global war, the Joint Chiefs

maintained that current conditions did

not conclusively indicate that global war

was imminent, only that the risk of

global war had been increased.59

One significant conclusion drawn by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the evidence which they had was that the

United States should, as a matter of

urgency, make every effort to settle the

problem of Chinese intervention by

political means. They recommended

that, through the United Nations, the

Chinese be reassured concerning the

intentions of the United Nations Command and, if necessary, that direct negotiations be carried on through the

diplomatic channels of nations that had

recognized Communist China and thus

had some access to the leaders of its

government. Insofar as General MacArthur's assigned mission in Korea was

concerned, the Joint Chiefs were willing

to await clarification of the Chinese Communists' military objectives before recommending a change in the plan to drive

to the Yalu. But with respect to American preparedness elsewhere, they recommended that plans and preparations be

made on the basis that the risk of global

war had been substantially increased by

the Chinese action.60

At the very important meeting of the

National Security Council on 9 November in Washington, General Bradley presented views developed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff with regard to possible

intentions of the Chinese Communists

in Korea. Bradley ventured a personal

opinion that U.N. forces could hold in

the general area of their present positions

but that the question of how much

Chinese pressure these forces would have

to take before being impelled to attack

the Manchurian bases would become increasingly urgent. He pointed out, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

agreed that any decision to attack

Chinese territory would have to be a

U.N. decision since under the terms of

U.N. authority, which now was the guiding force behind MacArthur's directives,

no such attack was authorized. Bradley

told the assembled leaders that he did

not agree with MacArthur that the

bombing of the Yalu bridges would stop

the Chinese from entering Korea in

strength should they choose to continue

59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 255

their incursions. General Smith added

that within fifteen to thirty days the Yalu

would be frozen anyway, rendering the

entire question of bridge bombing

academic.61

When Secretary of Defense Marshall

questioned the disposition of X Corps,

which he felt was in some danger because of its great dispersion and lack of

depth, Bradley defended MacArthur's

reasons. He pointed out that in deploying his troops MacArthur sought to

carry out his directives to occupy all of

North Korea and to hold elections. On

this same point, Secretary Acheson

pressed Bradley to tell them whether

there was not a better line for MacArthur's forces to occupy in Korea.

Bradley agreed that, from a purely military point of view, the chances of defending a line in Korea would increase

as that line was moved south of the Yalu.

But he noted also that any backward

movement on MacArthur's part would

reduce U.N. prestige and might adversely affect the will of the South

Koreans to fight.62

Acheson then recommended consideration of a buffer zone twenty miles

deep, ten miles on each side of the Yalu.

He felt that the Russians were interested

in such an arrangement. Insofar as the

Chinese were concerned, he saw them

as having two interests, first, to keep the

United States involved and, secondly and

less important, to protect the border and

its power plants. The Chinese, of course,

would, if such a buffer zone were proposed, insist on the departure of all foreign troops from Korea. This would

have the effect of abandoning Korea to

the Communists.63

After studying these various views and

recommendations, the National Security

Council recommended certain interim

measures to the President of the United

States. These recommendations represented the combined sentiments of the

nation's policy-makers, and largely aimed

at a possible political solution to the

problem of Chinese Communist intervention and in keeping with the established policy of avoiding, by every

honorable means, a general war.

The President later recalled that

November 1950 found the United States

mainly concerned with three moves with

regard to Korea. The United States was

attempting to reassure its European

allies, especially England and France,

that it did not intend to widen the conflict or to abandon Europe for new

entanglements in Asia. Secondly, in the

United Nations the United States was

attempting to gain maximum support for

resistance to Chinese Communist intervention, at the same time avoiding any

United Nations move toward military

sanctions against Peiping—which would

have undoubtedly meant war. Third,

the United States was making every effort

to ascertain the strength and direction

of the Chinese Communist effort.64

Although these moves may seem to

have been inadequate in light of the

problem that developed later, it should

be remembered that the problem itself

was then in the formative stage. The

61

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 378-80. 62

 Ibid.

63

 Ibid.

64

 Ibid., 381.
256 POLICY AND DIRECTION

moves, at the time, did present a logical

basis from which to proceed as the problem developed, and formed the framework of the policy that the United Statespursued until changes were forced by

the pressure of events.
CHAPTER XIV

The Threshold of Victory

The gauntlet cast down by the Chinese

in late October and early November left

American intelligence experts guessing.

Were the Chinese merely saving face?

Were they bluffing? Or did the Communist Chinese seriously mean to throw

their vast armies into Korea to defeat

MacArthur's United Nations forces?

American and other intelligence analysts

might disagree on Chinese motives and

intentions. But all corroborated that

Chinese armies had massed in great

strength along the Yalu in Manchuria,

disposed for early action in Korea if the

signal came, and that an unknown number had entered Korea. It was indeed a

time for careful treading and sober consideration.

Eighth Army's Plans and Problems

The temporary setbacks in early November did not alter MacArthur's plans.

He continued to prepare for the northward advance in the face of proof that

Chinese Communist forces had entered

Korea. General Bolté had visited Korea

just after, as he described it, "the Chinese had destroyed the 8th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team." He found

General Walker apprehensive but confident over the ultimate outcome. Walker

assured Bolté that he had no intention of

going on the defensive and had withdrawn only as a temporary regrouping

measure. Walker, at the time, was bringing up his IX Corps on the right of his

I Corps in order to renew the attack in

greater strength.1

Walker intended to advance three

corps abreast, the U.S. I Corps on the

west, the U.S. IX Corps in the center,

and the ROK II Corps on the east. He

had set D-day at 15 November and given

his army the mission to "attack to the

north destroying enemy forces, and advance to the northern border of Korea

in zone."

 2

Walker's main concern in preparing

for the attack lay in alleviating a shortage

of supplies in his forward areas. Since

moving above P'yongyang, the Eighth

Army had been supplied mainly by airlift. General Milburn, commanding the

I Corps, told General Bolté that his corps

was operating with only one day of fire

and one and one-half days of POL in

reserve. General Walker felt that he

1

 Memo, G-3 (Bolté) for CofS USA, 14 Nov 50,

sub: Visit of Gen Bolté and Party to the Pacific

Area, in G-3, DA file Pac, Case 8/2. 2

 (1) EUSAK Opns Plan No. 14, 6 Nov 50.

(2) War Diary, EUSAK G-3 Sec, 6 Nov 50.
258 POLICY AND DIRECTION

could not improve this dangerous situation in the face of the limited transportation, the poor roads, and the long

distances involved, unless the Chinnamp'o port was in full operation. General Bolté thought that the solution to

these supply problems lay in greater

effort by the Air Force. He pointed out

that the Air Force was lifting 1,000 tons

daily but could double this with more

flight crews and better maintenance.

"Cargo aircraft stand idle and supply is

critical," Bolté complained to Washington, "Cannot this be remedied soonest?

I emphatically recommend more help

including triple crews immediately."

 3

In response to Bolté's question, General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United

States Air Force, stepped in and asked

General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, if his command was supporting

the Eighth Army to its fullest capability.

MacArthur's air chief replied indignantly

that his planes could do no more to step

up airlift tonnage because the capacity

of Korean airfields simply would not permit doubling airlift while at the same

time rendering combat tactical air support. "General Bolté's statement re the

ground situation is quite correct," he

asserted, "but his statements re Tunner's

[CG FEAF Combat Cargo Command]

are not quite so accurate. We could use

much more airlift than is available, but

Bolté's recommended solution of triple

crews is an over-simplification."

 4

Reporting by teleconference to the

Army chief of transportation on 9 November, the transportation officer of the

Far East Command sketched the situation with regard to ports and lines of

communication in Korea. Pusan was

handling about 15,000 metric tons of

supply daily, and Inch'on about 8,000

metric tons. Chinnamp'o, a vital port

since it was much closer to the front, had

been opened for partial operation but

could handle only shallow-draft vessels.

The port had not been completely mineswept, and the large tidal basin at the

port had silted up considerably. Some

LST's were being unloaded even though

they rested on the bottom of the harbor

at low tide.5

Rail lines were equally restrictive.

Single-track bottlenecks and destroyed

bridges materially reduced their capacity.

The supply shortage remained serious,

and General Walker decided to postpone

his attack. On 14 November, General

MacArthur's headquarters so notified the

Department of the Army. When pressed

for reasons, the Far East Command staff

officers told their counterparts in Washington that the logistical estimate on

which General Walker's decision was

based was not available to GHQ. Meanwhile, Walker's forces took a few steps

forward along the Ch'ongch'on River to

positions they would use as a line of departure when they did reopen their general advance.6

The Eighth Army would need about

4,000 tons of supply per day in order to

sustain the offensive northward. By 20

November, the efforts of all supply agencies began to pay off and achieved the 3

 Rad, CM-IN 8483, CINCFE (Bolté) to DA, 6

Nov 50. 4

 (1) Rad, AFOOP-OD56864, CG USAF to CG

FEAF, 10 Nov 50. (2) Rad, AX 3359 B VCAP, CG

FEAF to CG USAF, 12 Nov 50.

5

 Telecon, TT 3992, DA to GHQ, 9 Nov 50. 6

 Telecons, TT 4011, DA to GHQ, 14 Nov 50,

and TT 4016, 15 Nov 50.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 259

required figure.7 General Walker, on

Arthu 22 November r that th,e notifie logisticds problem Generasl iMac n the -

forward area of the Eighth Army had

been solved and that he could now support a renewed offensive.8

The X Corps Plan

Logistically, the X Corps on the east

coast enjoyed a somewhat better status

than Eighth Army. Supplies came in at

Wonsan, Hungnam, and Iwon. Almond's combat units sat relatively close

to those ports in early November. ROK

units moving up the east coast were actually supplied by LST's operating over

the beaches. The situation of the 7th

Division and the 1st Marine Division,

however, became progressively more difficult logistically as they moved inland

away from the ports.9

The reverses suffered by the Eighth

Army and the appearance of Chinese

troops in front of his own troops sobered

General Almond considerably. Whereas

earlier he had pressed the Marines to

push forward as rapidly as possible to

the border, the brief Chinese intervention caused him to grow more cautious

for a few days. But the virtual disappearance of the Chinese from the field

had the same effect on him as it had had

on General MacArthur. In any case,

Almond was under orders to resume the

advance. On 11 November, he again

directed the Marines to advance to the

north.10

The presence of Chinese forces at the

front of the X Corps caused General

MacArthur's staff to re-examine the

scheduled operations of Almond's corps.

The staff now assumed that the coming

attacks would not be routine marches to

the border. General Willoughby's intelligence report to the Department of

the Army on 10 November showed that

the enemy's offensive potential had been

materially strengthened. Particularly

significant was a Chinese build-up in the

Changjin-Pujon Reservoir area. Willoughby told Department of the Army

that this build-up posed a serious threat

to Almond's forces not only in the immediate area but also in the coastal area

along the northeast shoreline of Korea.

"It is believed," Willoughby stated, "that

this enemy concentration even now may

be capable of seizing the initiative and

launching offensive operations." He

speculated that such operations might

take the form of a concerted drive to the

south in an effort to cut off U.N. forces

then located to the north and east of

Hungnam. Willoughby estimated that

as of that date there might well be as

many as 64,200 regular Chinese troops

in Korea. By the next day, on 11 November, he had raised this figure to

76,800.11

7

 (1) Interv, Col Appleman with Col Albert K.

Stebbins, EUSAK G-4, 4 Dec 53. (2) War Diary,

EUSAK, G-4 Journal, Rad 7, 241015 Nov 50.

(3) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Allen, 15

Dec 53. 8

 Rad, GX 50025 KGIX, CG Army Eight to

CINCFE, 22 Nov 50. 9

 Telecon, TT 3992, DA and GHQ, 9 Nov 50.

10

 X Corps Opns Order No. 6, 11 Nov 50. 11

 (1) Telecon, TT 3996, DA and GHQ, 10 Nov

50. (2) Telecon, TT 4000, DA and GHQ, 11 Nov 50.

(3) Later analyses of Chinese troop movements and

order of battle during this part of November show

that, in fact, the Chinese had, as of this date, moved

300,000 men, organized into 30 divisions, into Korea.

In front of the Eighth Army stood 180,000 men and

120,000 were concentrated in front of Almond's X

Corps. See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North

to the Yalu, pp. 768-69.
260 POLICY AND DIRECTION

In the face of the enemy strength evident in General Almond's area and in the

Eighth Army's zone, General Wright's

JSPOG staff closely examined the original plan developed for X Corps operations. The Eighth Army attack was to

be the main U.N. effort. Wright's staff

looked at the X Corps' plans from the

standpoint of "how can X Corps best

assist Eighth Army?" The JSPOG planners had either not consulted or did not

believe intelligence estimates forwarded

to Washington by Willoughby, since

their planning assumptions credited the

Chinese with less strength than shown

in Willoughby's reports of the same date.

According to JSPOG assumptions on 12

November, the Eighth Army faced 18,000

Chinese troops, and the X Corps, 7,500.

These troops were in addition to 50,000

North Koreans fronting the X Corps'

path of advance. The Chinese were

credited with the ability to reinforce at

the rate of 24,000 men per day.12

As JSPOG officers saw it, Almond's

plan called for an advance to the Korean

border and destruction of enemy forces;

keeping contact with the Eighth Army;

protection of the Eighth Army's right

flank against enemy forces sideslipping

into it from the north; elimination of

guerrillas; administration of his area.

These projected operations would not

provide direct assistance to the Eighth

Army in its attack, but JSPOG officers

noted that successful completion of X

Corps plans would be of considerable

incidental aid to the Eighth Army.13

Advantages seen in the X Corps'

planned operation were that momentum

of forces moving along an established

direction would be retained; North Korean forces would not have time to dig

in and resist; logistics difficulties within

the X Corps would be minimized; and

the route of the 1st Marine Division's

advance (to Changjin thence north to

the Yalu) would pose a threat of envelopment to the enemy. On the other

hand, certain disadvantages would result

if the X Corps carried out the operation

as then planned. The X Corps' drive

would not immediately affect enemy

forces facing the Eighth Army. The direction of movement of the center of

mass in the X Corps would be away from

the main strength of the enemy. The

most significant observation was the statement that by continuing to advance to

the north, "X Corps incurs the danger

of becoming seriously over-extended,"

and that if progress by the right flank of

the Eighth Army was appreciably slower

than X Corps', the left flank of the X

Corps would be exposed.14 For all practical purposes, that flank was already

exposed.

A prophetic warning was contained in

the portion of the staff study discussing

the advance of the Marine elements of

the X Corps:

As the 1st Marines move toward Changjin

they will tend to be extended. The left

flank of the Marines will be on the mountainous ridge that divides the watersheds of

the peninsula. It is generally impassable

for heavy military traffic. However, prisoner reports show that the 124th CCF Division entered North Korea at Manpojin

and is now in the Choshin [Changjin]

Reservoir area. If the 1st Marine Division

attacks north beyond this route well ahead 12

 Staff Study, X Corps Assistance to Eighth Army.

12 Nov 50, JSPOG files. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 261

of the Eighth Army it will be vulnerable to

attacks on its flank and rear.15

This line of reasoning was quite in

harmony with the views of General

Smith, the Marine division commander.

General Smith on 15 November received

a visit from the chief of staff to COMNAVFE, Rear Adm. Albert K. Morehouse, whom Admiral Joy had sent to

Korea on a liaison and inspection tour.

At that time Smith, feeling that he was,

as he expressed it, "talking in the family," expressed frank concern over what

he considered General Almond's unrealistic planning and his tendency to ignore

enemy capabilities when he wanted a

rapid advance.16

Smith's views on the combat scene are

further illustrated by a personal letter to

General Cates, the Marine Corps Commandant, on the same day, 15 November. He frankly admitted that he felt

Almond's orders were wrong and that he,

as Marine commander in Korea, was not

going to press his own troops forward

rashly to possible destruction. "Our orders still require us to advance to the

Manchurian border," Smith said. "However, we are the left flank division of the

Corps and our left flank is wide open."

Smith pointed out that there was no

Eighth Army unit closer to his flank than

eighty miles southwest. While the X

Corps, according to Smith, could assure

him "when it is convenient" that there

were no Chinese on his flank, he observed, "if this were true, there could be

nothing to prevent the Eighth Army from

coming abreast of us. This they are not

doing."

 17

Smith deliberately stalled on the advance because he did not like the prospect of stringing out his division along

"a single mountain road close to 200

miles long." Smith's principles, which

he followed all the way and which probably accounted for a good number of

saved lives a month or so later, called for

concentrating his entire division into a

reasonable sector and developing as completely as possible his main supply route.

He built under adverse conditions an

airfield at Hagaru-ri, and, through a

slower advance, took care of his flank

security. He outposted the high ground

along both sides of his main supply route

at all times.18

JSPOG officers believed that if X

Corps operations were to be effective in

assisting the Eighth Army, only one general course of action lay open. Almond

should attack to the northwest, thus

threatening the rear of the Chinese

formation facing the Eighth Army and

forcing their withdrawal to avoid envelopment. If Almond called off his advance north, two divisions could be made

available for this attack. Since the attack would probably develop on a narrow

front as a struggle for control of the route

of advance, concentration of forces for a

co-ordinated attack would not be necessary. The attack could be launched at

once using forces already in position.19

The JSPOG staff concluded that the

X Corps must eliminate enemy forces in

the reservoir area before any operations

were feasible, and that once Changjin

15

 Ibid. 16

 Aide-Memoire, Gen Smith, p. 600. 17

 Ibid., p. 609.

18

 See Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953,

vol. III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, ch. VII. 19

 Staff Study, X Corps Assistance to Eighth Army,

12 Nov 50, JSPOG files.
262 POLICY AND DIRECTION

was cleared it might be feasible to revise

the X Corps-Eighth Army boundary and

direct X Corps to attack to the northwest to cut the Manp'ojin-Kanggye road,

which enemy forces, in all likelihood,

were using as a main supply route. They

recommended that no change in the projected operations of the X Corps be made

immediately, but that the X Corps be

directed to begin planning for an attack

to the northwest to cut the enemy main

supply route.20

It is apparent that the joint planning

staff did not like the look of the situation

in northeast Korea and did not completely indorse Almond's plan for operating there. But the planners hedged.

Two factors may have caused them not

to speak out against the plan. First, they

must have known that MacArthur was

set on attacking to end the fighting.

Also, they had a no more acceptable solution to the problem than that under consideration.21

The advantages which the staff read

into Almond's plans were so innocuous

as to seem fabricated. On the other

hand, the disadvantages, or more exactly,

the dangers of Almond's intended advances, were plainly and honestly stated.

An objective appraisal would have

weighed the advantages against the disadvantages and found the scale tipped

completely on the side of disadvantages

and danger. Had this been done, it is

entirely likely that MacArthur's advisers

would have urged immediate changes in

Almond's planned operations to include

more limited objectives, more co-ordinated advances, and, possibly, even preparations for defensive action.

By personal letter to General Almond

on 10 November, General Wright outlined the general plan to be carried out

by the Eighth Army and relayed General

MacArthur's desire that the X Corps do

everything possible to assist Eighth Army.

Then, on 15 November, and accepting

the recommendation of the JSPOG staff,

MacArthur directed Almond to develop,

as an alternate feature of his operation,

plans for reorienting the attack to the

west upon reaching the vicinity of Changjin town, north of the Changjin Reservoir. This alternate operation would be

executed upon order from General MacArthur.22

Meanwhile, General Almond had been

doing some planning of his own and on

14 November sent a letter to General

Wright which, in effect, was quite in line

with the order to plan for a westward

move after clearing the town of Changjin. General Almond told General

Wright:

I have your letter of 10 November relaying the CinC's directive that the X Corps

be made fully familiar with Eighth Army's

plan in order to be prepared for any possi- ble change for a strong effort in coordinating with Eighth Army's attack. Two

members of my planning staff have just

returned from Eighth Army with a draft

copy of General Walker's Operation Plan

No. 15, yet to be published in final form.

They discussed Eighth Army's plan at some

length with General Walker and certain

members of his staff.

As you may already know, the Eighth

Army plan is for a very deliberate and thorough advance to objectives distant only an

average of some 20 miles North of present

front line positions.

20 Ibid.

21

 Ibid.

22

 (1) X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 Nov 50, p. 9.

(2) Rad, CX 69009, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 15

Nov 50.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 263

You will recall that during your recent

visit with us at WONSAN we presented X

Corps capabilities of making an all-out

effort, with not less than two US divisions,

to the west in the event of an enemy break- through or envelopment of Eighth Army's

right flank. We have devoted continuing

efforts in planning possible operations not

only to further the CinC's overall objective

of securing all of North Korea within our

assigned zone as expeditiously as possible

but also to assist Eighth Army's effort.

With the containment by Eighth Army

of the Communist offensive in that area, coupled with the unchanged overall mission, it now appears to me to be inadvisable, at this stage of Eighth Army and X

Corps operations, for X Corps forces to

operate in any strength to the west. The

principal reason for this conclusion is that

the only two feasible vehicular routes to

the westward in X Corps zone, short of

CHOSIN Reservoir,23 are the YONG- HUNG-TAEPYONG-NI and the WON- SAN-YANDOK roads. Since both of these

routes enter the Eighth Army zone in rear

of General Walker's present front lines, any advance in strength to the westward

over them would appear to be a fruitless

operation. Even contacting the Eighth

Army right flank in the vicinity of

ONYANG-NI with more than foot troops

would require a major engineer road-building effort in the mountains to the eastward

thereof. In view of the foregoing, I am convinced

that X Corps can best support Eighth

Army's effort by continuing its advance to

the north, prepared to move westward if

desirable when X Corps elements are well

north of CHOSIN Reservoir, and they will

be prepared to trap and destroy any enemy

forces engaging Eighth Army which depend

upon a line of communication through

MANPOJIN. North of CHOSIN Reservoir

suitable lateral routes to the west appear

to exist but these routes would have to be

verified when that area is reached.

Thus, X Corps Operation Order No. 6, 11 November 1950, directing advance in

zone to the north border of Korea is in

accordance with Part II, CX67291, and is

I believe, at present the most important

contribution we can make to the overall

operation in Korea. The success of this

advance will result in the destruction of

Chinese and North Korean forces in the

reservoir area, which might otherwise be

employed on the Eighth Army front, and

will place X Corps units in a position to

threaten or to cut enemy lines of commu- nication in the Eighth Army zone. As a

corollary, X Corps will secure the important

hydroelectric power installations in its zone

and will be well along toward completing

its ultimate mission prior to the advent of

severe winter conditions. I fully appreciate the CinC's desire for

us to assist the Eighth Army in every possi- ble way. I trust that my analysis of present

X Corps capabilities explains our views

here and hope that energetic execution of

my Operation No. 6 will place assistance

to the Eighth Army before the cold weather

now upon us is much more severe.24

General Willoughby continued to report a crucial build-up of forces in the

Changjin-Pujon Reservoir area north of

Hamhung-Hungnam. Even as Almond

and Wright exchanged views on the best

course of action for the X Corps, Willoughby informed Washington that his

study revealed a great vulnerability of

the open west flank of the X Corps and

of the main supply route leading from

Hungnam to the Changjin Reservoir.

Almost 10,000 enemy troops had been

spotted immediately west of this vital

line. In addition, the enemy had the

equivalent of four divisions in the Changjin-Pujon area. With this strength, the

Chinese could counterattack to the south23

 Chosin Reservoir is the Japanese name for the

Changjin Reservoir, and is the name by which U.N.

forces best knew this body of water. The Pujon

Reservoir, east of the Changjin, was also best known

by its Japanese name, Fusen. 24

 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Wright, 14 Nov 50.
264 POLICY AND DIRECTION

U.S. MEN AND TANKS advance through the rubble-strewn streets of Hyesanjin,

near the Manchurian border.

east with troops from the Changjin area

in an effort to isolate X Corps forces

northeast of Hungnam, could conduct

active guerrilla operations against corps

lines of communications, could throw a

combined offensive against X Corps

using guerrillas and other forces, or could

launch an offensive against the gap between the Eighth Army and X Corps by

sideslipping to the southwest from the

Changjin Reservoir area.25

On 20 November General Almond,

acting on instructions from General MacArthur, warned his command that minimum forces only were to advance to the

immediate vicinity of Korea's northern

border. No troops or vehicles were to

go beyond the boundary into Manchuria

or the USSR, and no fire was to be exchanged with, or air strikes brought

down on, forces north of the northern

boundary. Damage, destruction, and 25

 Telecon, TT 4028, DA and GHQ, 17 Nov 50.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 265

THANKSGIVING DAY SERVICES being held for members of the U.N. forces on the

bank of the Yalu river.

disruption of power plants were to be

avoided.26

Troops of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, reached the Yalu River at Hyesanjin

on 21 November. General MacArthur

immediately congratulated General Almond, who, in turn, commended the

7th Division for "an outstanding military achievement." Almond's message

ended on an optimistic note when he

told Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, "The

7th Division has reached its objective and

I am confident that you will hold it."

 27

Almond meanwhile ordered a plan

made for a westward advance along the

Hagaru-ri-Mup'yong-ni axis. He directed that the road to the Changjin

Reservoir be developed as a corps supply

road and that an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned to seize Changjin town

and to protect the east flank of the 1st

Marine Division. The two objectives,

26

 Rad, X 12811, CG X Corps to All Comdrs, 20

Nov 50.

27

 Rads, X 2867 and X 2859, CG X Corps to CG

7th Division, 22 Nov 50.
266 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Changjin and Mup'yong-ni, were too

widely separated to be assigned to a

single division. General Almond also

directed that the planners take into consideration that extreme winter temperatures of 30 to 40 degrees below zero

Fahrenheit would severely restrict both

friendly and enemy operations.

On 23 November, Colonel Chiles, X

Corps operations officer, took this plan to

Tokyo where he discussed it with General MacArthur's staff. On 24 November, General MacArthur directed that

the plan be carried out with one modification, a shift of the proposed boundary

between the X Corps and Eighth Army

farther west and south in the zone of the

1st Marine Division. General Almond

was told to designate his own D-day.28

The details of the corps plan were passed

on to General Walker and the Eighth

Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on

24 November.29

General Almond ordered his troops to

advance at 0800, 27 November. The

final assignment of tasks directed the 1st

Marine Division to seize Mup'yong-ni

and advance to the Yalu, the 7th Division

to attack from the Changjin Reservoir

and advance to the Yalu, and the ROK

I Corps to advance from Hapsu and

Ch'ongjin areas to destroy the enemy.30

The Cautious View

Other friendly nations meanwhile

were concentrating on the threatening

situation developing along the Yalu border and took a consistently darker view

of it than did the United States. On

13 November, the Australian Prime Minister informed the United States through

diplomatic channels that the Australian

Government now believed that Chinese

intervention had created a new situation

in Korea which called for careful examination. He recommended "military

caution" and forecast that the consequences of Manchurian border incidents

could be so grave that it might be best

"temporarily to ignore Chinese Communist provocation to the extent possible."

 31

From embassies located in Peiping came

other warnings. The Swedish Ambassador to Communist China reported in

mid-November that Chinese Communist

movements toward Korea were on a large

scale. The Burmese Embassy in Peiping

at the same time expressed the view that

the Chinese Communists were ready to

go to any length to aid the North Koreans and that they were fostering mass

hysteria based upon an alleged United

States intention to invade Manchuria.

The Netherlands on 17 November passed

along to the United States Government

information from Peiping that Chinese

intervention in Korea was motivated by

fear of aggression against Manchuria.

If U.N. forces halted fifty miles south

of the Yalu, the Netherlands believed,

there would be no further intervention.

General MacArthur was prescient in

his apprehension that steps might be

taken to prevent his advance to the

northern border of Korea. Strong sentiment was developing among other members of the United Nations and within

the Department of State for a solution

28

 Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 24

Nov 50. 29

 Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps and

CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov 50. 30

 X Corps Opns Order No. 7, 25 Nov 50. 31

 Intelligence Rpt, 13 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 267

to the problem of Chinese intervention

through means other than those currently

planned. General Bolté pointed out to

General Collins on 20 November that

the State Department was seriously considering a "buffer state" or neutralized

zone as a means of stopping the military

action in Korea and decreasing the possibility of world conflict. This idea, according to General Bolté, was being

pushed within the Department of State

with considerable vigor, to the extent

that specific proposals by which the policy would be presented were being drawn

up. The British Government had reportedly suggested that such an approach should be considered by the

United Nations.32

Bolté left no doubt as to where he

stood. He told Collins that he was as

unalterably opposed to a buffer zone concept as was General MacArthur. Bolté

felt that any buffer zone offer by the

United States could seriously restrict the

United Nations (and the United States)

militarily without any resulting gain.

He recommended strongly that General

MacArthur's missions and directives not

be changed.33

The move to halt the United Nations

Command short of the international

boundary took more definite form on 21

November with scheduling of a meeting

between the representatives of the Department of Defense and the Department

of State to discuss the possibility of

negotiating with the Chinese Communists to end the fighting in Korea by

establishing a demilitarized zone on one

or both sides of the Korean-Manchurian

frontier. General Bolté again addressed

the Chief of Staff on the matter and

again expressed strong feelings against

any such method of curtailing military

operations in Korea. "In light not only

of the United Nations objectives in Korea," Bolté said, "but also of our national

objectives world-wide, and until such

time as CINCUNC indicates that he is

unable to continue the action against

the Chinese Communists, his directives

. . . should not be changed, and a decision to halt the action in Korea short

of the Korean frontier should not be

made on military grounds." The Army's

top planning officer felt that the only

grounds on which MacArthur should be

ordered to halt his advance would be

that further offensive action would cause

too great a risk of global war and conversely that cessation of the offensive

would tend to minimize that risk. In

General Bolté's opinion, a continuation

of the action would not, of itself, engender risk of general war nor would a

cessation of the action lessen such a risk.

He held a rather optimistic view of the

United Nations Command's combat potential, saying, "It is not envisaged that

the Chinese Communists can succeed in

driving presently committed United Nations forces from Korea, unless materially

assisted by Soviet ground and air power."

He believed that MacArthur had sufficient strength to hold any line in North

Korea "in light of circumstances now

prevailing." Bolté admitted that the

drive to the border would no doubt increase the tenseness of the situation to

some extent. But he emphasized that

the decision to cross the 38th Parallel

was based on the consideration that all

32

 Memo, Bolté for CofS USA (Gruenther), 20

Nov 50, sub: Buffer State in North Korea, in G-3,

DA file 091 Korea, Case 120. 33

 Ibid.
268 POLICY AND DIRECTION

of Korea should be cleared of Communist forces, and that attack from Manchuria would be recognized as an open

act of military aggression. Further, the

United Nations would actually have a

better chance of localizing the conflict by

driving all Communist forces from

North Korea. A show of strength might

well discourage further aggression where

weakness would encourage it.34

General Bolté urged that if the Secretary of State suggested ". . . a new

United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a demilitarized zone in

North Korea to be administered by a

United Nations body with Chinese

Communist representation," the Defense Department oppose it. He concluded, prophetically, that ". . . history

has proved that negotiating with Communists is as fruitless as it is repulsive.

The present case is no exception."

 35

As a result of the conference and of

further moves by other members of the

United Nations a compromise solution

was worked out. Assistant Secretary of

State Rusk prepared a message for General MacArthur along general lines

agreed to by the Department of Defense.

He forwarded this message to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, noting that "we fully

recognize that the Department of State

does not have drafting responsibility with

respect to this message, but we thought

that a revised draft might provide the

most convenient means for setting forth

our views for the consideration of the

Department of Defense and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff." General Collins made

a few alterations in the State Department

draft and on 24 November the Joint

Chiefs sent the revised message to General MacArthur.36

This message could in no way be considered a directive to MacArthur. At

best, it was a tentative proposal for a

course of action that left him with both

the initiative and the responsibility for

deciding which way the war should go.

General Collins frankly told MacArthur

that the question of halting short of the

border had been raised because of the

growing concern among other members

of the United Nations. The United

States was faced, in this as in other instances, with loss of support in the United

Nations if it did not carefully consider

the views of its allies in Korea. Collins

warned that the United States anticipated

proposals within the United Nations for

resolutions which would place unwelcome restrictions on MacArthur's advance. Considerable sentiment existed

among other nations in favor of establishing a demilitarized zone between the

United Nations forces and the frontier

in the hope of reducing Chinese Communist fear of military action against

Manchuria and a corresponding sensitivity on the part of Russia with respect

to Vladivostok.37

The consensus among American

political and military leaders in Washington, crystallized at the meeting of Department of Defense and State officials,

had been that no change should be made

in MacArthur's immediate mission; but

that the highest officials in the American

Government should at once draft a 34

 Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 21 Nov 50, sub:

State-Defense High-Level Mtg on Korea, with

Annex A. 35 Ibid.

36

 Rad, WAR 97287, CofS USA (Collins) to

CINCUNC, 24 Nov 50. 37

 Ibid.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 269

course of action to permit the establishment of a unified Korea and, at the same

time, reduce the risk of more general

involvement. The State-Defense group

had worked out in exploratory discussions certain military measures which, it

seemed to them, might reduce the tension with Communist China and the

Soviet Union, thus avoiding a rift between the United States and its allies.

These measures, which if adopted would

change MacArthur's mission, were transmitted to him.38

The measures assumed that MacArthur

could push to the Yalu. General Collins

suggested that after advancing to or near

the Yalu MacArthur pull his forces back.

Using a holding force of ROK troops,

he would secure the terrain dominating

the approaches leading from the mouth

of the Yalu to the area held by the 7th

Division near Hyesanjin. Other United

Nations troops would fall back into reserve positions to support the South Koreans if necessary. This plan would be

used only if effective enemy resistance

ceased. The line held would be extended eastward through Ch'ongjin on

the Sea of Japan with no advances being

made by Almond's forces beyond this

line. "It was thought," General Collins

explained, "that the above would not

seriously affect the accomplishment of

your military mission."

 39

Only if it were militarily necessary

would the United Nations troops destroy

the hydroelectric installations in North

Korea. The United Nations Committee

for the Unification and Rehabilitation

of Korea would deal at the appropriate

time with appropriate representatives,

presumably the Chinese Communists, to

insure an equitable distribution of power

from these installations. And in the

event that the Chinese did not again attack in force, orderly elections could be

held in North Korea and the country

unified in line with United Nations

plans. No decision had yet been made

on procedures for handling the matter

of entering northeastern Korea, which

was extremely sensitive since dealings

there would be with the USSR and not

China.40

"While it is recognized," General Collins went on, "that from the point of

view of the commander in the field this

course of action may leave much to be

desired, it is felt that there may be

other considerations which must be accepted. . . ." Apparently, American

authorities still felt that the Chinese

were interfering reluctantly in Korea.

General Collins postulated that this

course "might well provide an out for the

Chinese Communists to withdraw into

Manchuria without loss of face. . . ."

The Russians, too, might be reassured;

and it was felt that Russian concern was

at the root of their pressure on the Chinese to interfere in Korea.41

General Collins asked for MacArthur's

comments on the proposals, to include

timing and method of announcement if

he agreed. He wanted to be sure that

the measures did not impede the military

operation, yet felt it important that the

Chinese and Russians not misinterpret

MacArthur's intention as aggression

against their borders. General Collins

concluded:

38 Ibid.

39

 Ibid.

40

 Ibid.

41

 Ibid.
270 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Since there are many political and military

implications involved in these ideas and

since other nations would be involved, no

action along these lines is contemplated

until full opportunity has been given for

further consideration of your views, final

decision by the President and, possibly discussion with certain other countries.42

General MacArthur turned thumbs

down on the proposals. But his reply, in

contrast to his earlier blast against any

form of restriction upon his advance,

was temperate. The tone of his reply

approached, in some respects, patient

forbearance. The anticipated move to

halt his advance had come, not as an

order, but as a suggestion which could

become an order only after time-consuming negotiation. Walker's forces had already jumped off toward the border and

well might reach it before further political action could be taken.

"The concern underlying the search

for the means to confine the spread of

the Korean conflict is fully understood

and shared here, but it is believed that

the suggested approach would not only

fail to achieve the desired result but

would be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert," General MacArthur stated. He had just returned to

Tokyo from a tour of the battlefront

where he had flown over the Yalu River

area in a "personal reconnaissance."

This flight had convinced him beyond

all doubt that it would be utterly impossible to stop upon commanding terrain south of the Yalu if he were to keep

the lines of approach to North Korea

from Manchuria under effective control.

The terrain, ranging from the lowlands

in the west to the rugged central and

eastern sectors, could not easily be defended. Only along the river line itself,

a line which he was not proposing to

sacrifice once achieved, were there natural defense features to be found such as

in no other defense line in all of Korea.

"Nor would it be either militarily or

politically defensive," he asserted, "to

yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of

Korea."

 43

General MacArthur feared, aside from

the military foolishness of such a move,

that the political results would be

"fraught with most disastrous consequences." Any failure on the part of the

United Nations Command to keep going

until it had achieved its "public and oftrepeated" objective of destroying all

enemy forces south of Korea's northern

boundary would be viewed by the Korean people as betrayal. The Chinese

and all other Asians would, he maintained, view it as weakness and appeasement of the Communist Chinese and

Russians.44

He presented a novel secondary argument against establishment of any sort of

buffer zone by pointing out that political

tension between Manchuria and Korea

required that the international boundary

be closed to minimize bandit raids and

smuggling. His study of Russian and

Chinese propaganda caused him to doubt

that either nation was actually concerned

over the fate of the Yalu power installations. The ROK unit which had reached

the Yalu at Ch'osan in October had

found that the power plants there had

43

 Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA

for JCS, 25 Nov 50. 44

 Ibid.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 271

been shut down for a full month with

much of the machinery and equipment

removed, and nothing had been said by

the Russians or the Chinese about the

loss of power. "In view of these factual

considerations," he said, "one is brought

to the conclusion that the issue of hydroelectric power rests upon the most tenuous of grounds."

 45

General MacArthur continued his

argument by emphasizing that the entry

of Chinese Communist forces into the

Korean conflict was a risk which the

United States had taken with its eyes

wide open when it sent troops into Korea.

"Had they entered at the time we were

beleaguered behind our Pusan Perimeter

beachhead," MacArthur surmised, "the

hazard would have been far more grave

than it is now that we hold the initiative. . . ." United Nations forces were

committed to seize the entire border area,

and had already, in General Almond's

sector, occupied a sector of the Yalu

River. Yet, in his opinion, there had

been no noticeable political or military

reaction by the Chinese or Russians.46

He then outlined his plans for the future in Korea, telling the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that as soon as his men consolidated

positions along the Yalu River he would

replace American troops with ROK

forces. He would then order, through

public announcement so the Chinese

could not fail to hear, the return of

American forces to Japan, and the parole

of all prisoners of war to their homes,

and would leave the unification of Korea

and the restoration of the civil procedures of government to the people, with

the advice and assistance of United Nations authorities.47

If this plan did not effectively appeal

to reason in the Chinese mind, MacArthur maintained, ". . . the resulting

situation is not one which might be

influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present commitments." But by resolutely meeting those

commitments and accomplishing the

publicly proclaimed military mission of

destroying enemy forces in Korea, the

United States could find its only hope

of checking Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs before those countries were

committed to a course from which

". . . for political reasons . . . they

cannot withdraw."

 48

General Bolté urged the Chief of Staff

to subscribe to these views and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

reiterate their approval of the idea of a

full force advance to the border. But

events were to overtake any such action

by the Joint Chiefs.49

MacArthur Attacks

Across most of the battlefront during

mid-November the enemy seemed to be

withdrawing. Cautious probings by

U.N. units occasionally brought strong

local reaction, but American commanders noted a definitely defensive trend.

On 20 November, as the Eighth Army

moved into position for the coming drive

northward, the United Nations Command reported to Washington that the

45

 Ibid.

46

 Ibid.

47

 Ibid. 48

 Ibid. 49

 Memo, Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 27 Nov 50,

sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3, DA

file 091 Korea, Case 121.
272 POLICY AND DIRECTION

enemy had broken contact and was apparently withdrawing to positions farther

north in Eighth Army's zone. But in

the eastern sector, Almond's troops were

still meeting resistance. "Recent reports seem to indicate," MacArthur's

staff informed Washington on 20 November, "that the enemy is organizing

the ground to take advantage of rough

terrain, but it is still not clear as to just

what this general limited withdrawal activity may portend." These officers noted

that similar withdrawals by the enemy

in the past had preceded offensive actions. "On the other hand," they pointed

but to Army officials in Washington, "the

sudden reversal coupled with limited

withdrawals and considerable activity in

the vicinity of strong defensive points

may indicate a high level decision to

defend from previously selected and prepared positions."

 50

Another enemy, North Korea's winter weather, had made its unwelcome

appearance. On 14 November, the temperature across the entire front plummeted to readings ranging from ten

degrees above zero in the west to twenty

degrees below zero in northeastern

Korea.

General Walker's orders to his commanders reflected a considerable degree

of caution and some respect for the

enemy forces facing Eighth Army. He

directed a closely co-ordinated attack by

phase line in order to have the army

under control at all times for any sudden

tactical change required by enemy action. The days of the reckless pursuit

had apparently ended.51 Most units

reached their line of departure by 17

November. Since the logistical picture

had improved and promised to improve

more in the near future, Walker announced to his commanders that the

attack northward would start on 24 November.52

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been

kept informed of the situation as it developed throughout the month, and on

18 November General MacArthur notified them that the Eighth Army would

launch its attack as scheduled on 24 November. He emphasized that the delay

in mounting the offensive had been

caused by logistical difficulties, not enemy

action. Rather euphemistically perhaps,

in light of later events, he assured the

Joint Chiefs that intensified air attacks

by his air forces during the preceding

10-day period had been very successful in

isolating the battle area, stopping troop

reinforcement by the enemy, and greatly

reducing his flow of supplies.53

There was an almost complete absence

of enemy contact on the entire Eighth

Army front as Walker's men assumed

their starting positions on 22-23 November. General MacArthur, suspicious of

this unusual quiet and somewhat worried over the gap between the X Corps

and Eighth Army, ordered General

Stratemeyer to patrol this gap with great

care. But American pilots flying from

twelve to sixteen sorties in daylight hours

and a half-dozen sorties at night located

no enemy forces in the gap.54

General Willoughby reported to the

50

 Telecon, TT 4036, DA and GHQ, 20 Nov 50. 51

 (1) EUSAK Opn Plan No. 15, 14 Nov 50.

(2) War Diary, EUSAK, G-3 Sec, 11 and 14 Nov 50.

52

 RAD, 172100, CG EUSAK to CG IX Corps, CG

X Corps, and CG ROKA, 17 Nov 50. 53

 Rad, C 69211, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Nov 50. 54

 (1) Rad, CX 69453, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 21

Nov 50. (2) Rad, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 22 Nov 50.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 273

Department of the Army on the day before the attack that he felt the Chinese

Communist Army was having supply

problems of its own and intimated that,

if the Chinese did try to stop Eighth

Army, they would be at a disadvantage.

He told Washington military authorities

that the Chinese had "embarked on their

Korean venture in some cases with only

three days rations" and that constant contact with U.N. ground forces and the

pounding from American air had undoubtedly depleted the enemy's ammunition reserves. "Constant United Nations

pressure along the entire line during the

past few weeks," Willoughby stated,

"should make it perfectly clear to the

Reds that this drain on fire power is certainly not apt to be decreased but increased." He did not consider it likely

that the Chinese high command would

make any appreciable effort to alleviate

the supply shortages of their forces,

". . . as the Chinese have always been,

by western standards, notoriously poor

providers for their soldiers." On the day

of the jump-off, 24 November, Willoughby's intelligence staff predicted that

the U.N. forces were opposed, in Korea,

by 82,799 North Korean soldiers and a

Chinese Communist military force of between 40,000 and 70,935.55

In a communique issued only hours

before Walker's divisions started northward, the United Nations commander

sketched an optimistic picture of what he

referred to as his "massive compression

envelopment." He felt that the Air

Force had sharply curtailed enemy

reinforcement and resupply. General

Almond's forces had "reached a commanding enveloping position cutting in

two the northern reaches of the enemy's

geographical potential," and Walker's

forces were now to move forward to

"complete the compression and close the

vise." "If successful," General MacArthur declared, "this should for all practical purposes end the war."

 56

55

 Telecons, TT 4058 and TT 4063, DA and GHQ,

24-25 Nov 50. 56

 Communiqué No. 12, GHQ UNC, 24 Nov 50.
CHAPTER XV

Facing New Dilemmas

Intervention

The Eighth Army moved forward as

scheduled on 24 November, and against

light to moderate resistance registered

gains of as much as twelve miles during

the first thirty-six hours. (Map IV) MacArthur's G-2, General Willoughby, forecast confidently on 26 November that

"Should the enemy persist in his present

non-aggressive attitude and withdraw,

he may find sanctuary behind the Yalu

River.". But in terms more prophetic

than he knew, he added that "Should the

enemy elect to fight in the interior valleys, a slowing down of the United Nations offensive may result."

 1

Beginning shortly after dark on 25 November, strong Chinese forces struck suddenly and hard at General Walker's

central and eastern units. (Map V)

The ROK II Corps, at Walker's right,

scattered before the vicious onslaught.

The IX Corps, in the center, reeled, held

briefly, then gave ground. On Walker's

left, the I Corps, under no pressure except at its east flank, withdrew in coordination with the IX Corps' rearward

moves.2

Walker notified Tokyo at noon on 27

November that the Chinese were attacking in strength, but that it was too early

to tell if the Chinese meant to sustain

their attacks. On the following day, he

reported that the enemy attack force

numbered some 200,000, all of them

apparently Chinese, and that he was no

longer in doubt that the Chinese had

opened a general offensive.3 The Chinese broadened their offensive on 27

November with attacks against the X

Corps. General Almond's Marine troops

had scarcely begun their advance toward

Mup'yong-ni on the 27th before they met

strong resistance; and on the 28th Chinese units slipped southeastward past the

Marines and cut their supply route.

This wide display of Chinese strength

also swept away General MacArthur's

doubts. "No pretext of minor support

under the guise of volunteerism or other

1

 Telecon, TT 4063, DA and GHQ, FEC, UNC,

26 Nov 50.

2

 Details of the Chinese offensive and subsequent

actions may be found in B. C. Mossman, Ebb and

Flow, presently in preparation as part of the

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR series. 3

 (1) Telecon, Gen Hickey and Col Landrum, 1225,

27 Nov 50, in GHQ, UNC files. (2) Rad, G 30065

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 28 Nov 50.


FACING NEW DILEMMAS 275

subterfuge now has the slightest validity.

We face an entirely new war."

 4 Instead

of fighting fragments of the North Korean Army reinforced by token Chinese

forces, Walker and Almond apparently

now faced a total Chinese force of about

300,000.5

MacArthur claimed that Walker's 24

November advance had forced the Chinese to attack prematurely, theorizing

that the Chinese originally planned to

launch their offensive in the spring of

1951 when better weather and greater

supply and troop resources would be at

hand. But even if his claim were correct, the Chinese attack gave MacArthur

no real advantage. For he was finding

it increasingly difficult, and so admitted

to Washington, to interdict enemy routes

of reinforcement and resupply from

Manchuria because the Yalu River was

now freezing hard enough to permit the

Chinese to cross without using bridges.

Furthermore:

It is quite evident that our present strength

of force is not sufficient to meet this un- declared war by the Chinese with the in- herent advantages which accrue thereby to

them. The resulting situation presents an

entire new picture which broadens the

potentialities to world-embracing considera- tions beyond the sphere of decision by the

Theater Commander.

Having thus shifted responsibility for

the next decision to Washington, MacArthur announced that for the time

being he intended to pass from the

offensive to the defensive, making local

adjustments as the ground situation

required.6

As reflected in MacArthur's abrupt

change in tactics, the opening episode of

the Chinese offensive had reversed the

course of the war. The Chinese opening

success was due largely to the skillful

execution of well-laid plans, in particular

to the achievement of complete surprise.

That surprise was not wholly the result

of superior Chinese camouflage and

march discipline. Intelligence received

by MacArthur and his senior commanders had been incompatible and inconclusive. But this intelligence did provide

clear warnings that Chinese forces were

poised between United Nations troops

and the northern border of Korea. Much

of the surprise achieved by the Chinese

stemmed from the tendency of U.N. leaders to discount these warnings.

As a defense of his own judgment and

the efforts of the theater intelligence

officers MacArthur insisted ". . . that the

intelligence that a nation is going to

launch war, is not an intelligence that is

available to a commander, limited to a

small area of combat. That intelligence

should have been given to me."

 7

But at the national level, authorities

declared that Chinese intentions had not

been sufficiently clear to permit a definite

judgment. General Bradley, in fact,

maintained that the Department of Defense had had no intelligence that the

Chinese would enter the war.8

The daily estimates given MacArthur

by his own intelligence staff were supplemented by General Willoughby in private presentations. Whether Willoughby

gave MacArthur different information

from that contained in the daily estimates

is not known, but beyond doubt, Willoughby's presentations amplified the 4

 Rad, C 69953, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50. 5

 Ibid.

6

 Ibid.

7

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 18. 8

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 759.
276 POLICY AND DIRECTION

routine staff reports. On the assumption

that the G-2's published estimates and

personal briefings were similar, MacArthur must have learned of the enemy's

capabilities and the order in which those

capabilities might be employed. But he

possibly found the reports also puzzling

and contradictory. On 15 November,

Willoughby's staff forecast that the most

likely sequence of enemy moves would

be (1) Conduct of offensive operations.

(2) Reinforce with communist forces

from outside Korea. (3) Conduct guerrilla operations. (4) Defend. Then, in

amplification of this forecast, Willoughby's officers reported:

Information received from Chinese Na- tionalist military sources, during the past

few days gives strong support to an assumption that the Chinese Communists intend

to "throw the book" at United Nations

forces in Korea. . . . It is fast becoming

apparent that an excessive number of troops

are entering Northeast China. . . . Such a

marshalling of troops cannot be explained

in terms of redeployment . . . or demo- bilization. It seems doubtful that the Chi- nese Communists, if intending to intervene

in Korea would wait until this late in the

war. On the other hand it seems incredible

that the Chinese Communists have deluded

themselves with their own propaganda and

fear a United States attack on Manchuria.9

Such contradictions could scarcely have

been of much help to MacArthur in deciding for himself what the enemy most

probably would do.

On 16 November, General MacArthur

was told that the Chinese Communists

had probably deployed twelve divisions

of trained soldiers in Korea. Three days

later he was told that "it would appear

logical to conclude that Chinese Communist leaders are preparing their people

psychologically for war." On the same

day that the Eighth Army struck northward in its general offensive, Willoughby

reported that "Even though Chinese

Communist strategy may not favor an

immediate full-scale war, preparations

for such an eventuality appear to be in

progress."

 10

On the second day of the attack, before

the Chinese had fully committed themselves, Far East Command intelligence

officers changed the predicted order of

enemy courses of action, placing reinforcement from outside Korea at the top

of the list, and the conduct of offensive

operations in second place. But again

MacArthur received contradictory estimates of Chinese intentions when he was

told:

Although too early for concrete evaluation,

there are some indications of a withdrawal

of Chinese Communist forces to the Yalu

or across the border into Manchuria. . . On the other hand, there are many reports

of Chinese Communist plans to strengthen

their intervention forces now in Korea and

all indications point to a heavy troop buildup in Northeast China and Manchuria.

. . . Also there are many indications that

the Chinese Communists will stubbornly

defend reservoir and power installations

along the Yalu. . . .11

These vacillatory daily reports contained too many qualifying clauses to

permit a positive forecast. But in the

sense that they indicated a continuing

9

 (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC No. 2989, 15 Nov 50.

(2) General Willoughby's later explanation of intelligence failure sheds no light on the mystery but

is of interest to readers wishing greater detail. See

Willoughby, MacArthur, 1941-1951, pp. 378-90.

10

 (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2990, 16 Nov 50.

(2) DIS GHQ, FEC, No. 2993, 19 Nov 50. (3) DIS

GHQ, FEC, No. 2998, 24 Nov 50. On 16 November,

about thirty CCF divisions were in Korea. 11

 DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2999, 25 Nov 50.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 277

Chinese build-up in Manchuria and Korea and that they did point out psychological and other preparations for an

offensive against United Nations forces,

these reports possessed some validity.

The reasons that prompted General

MacArthur to persist in his drive to the

border in the face of the very obvious

Chinese potential to meet his advance

with considerable military force, must

remain conjectural. He was aware of

the presence in Korea of substantial numbers of Chinese soldiers; and his own

staff had warned him of the great Chinese

potential for immediate reinforcement.

He had never been told, however, that

the enemy had as many divisions in

Korea as actually were present.

MacArthur's determination to pursue

his mission to the bitter end appears to

have had its basis in three concepts.

First, MacArthur apparently thought

that the Chinese build-up and threatening posture were part of a gigantic bluff

and that the Chinese, since they could

not afford to go to war with the United

States, would not attack his forces. The

tenor of his message to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff on 24 November, turning down

their suggestion that he establish a holding line some distance short of the Yalu,

clearly shows that he minimized the Chinese menace.12

 He felt, it is also clear,

that it was pretty late in the day for the

Chinese to be entering Korea, and that

if they had been serious in their intentions they would have intervened when

United Nations forces were still in the

vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Willoughby, too, doubted ". . . that the

Chinese Communists, if intending to intervene in Korea, would wait until this

late in the war."

 13

MacArthur did not fear the Chinese

and felt that in the event he was mistaken

and the Chinese were not bluffing, his

forces were capable of taking care of both

the Chinese and the North Koreans.

For, as noted earlier, he had pointed out

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Chinese

Communist entry was a risk taken in

full knowledge of the situation. Chinese

entry during the Pusan days would have

been extremely dangerous. But now

that the UNC held the initiative and had

less area to defend the risk was much

smaller.14 Only a few days before, he

had told the Joint Chiefs that his air

forces had succeeded in isolating the

battle area and in cutting off enemy reinforcement and choking off enemy

supply.15 MacArthur seems to have overestimated the power of his own command

vis-à-vis the Chinese. Both the Eighth

Army and the X Corps, he reasoned,

were victorious, battle-tested military

forces. His naval and air forces gave him

complete control of the sea and air. Furthermore, Chinese troops, during World

War II, had proven inferior to Japanese

troops and thus, by inference, to American troops.

A significant factor was MacArthur's

belief that his air power could isolate the

battlefield. MacArthur still persisted in

this view on the eve of the attack to the

Yalu. He announced on 24 November,

"My air force for the past three weeks,

in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the

12

 Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC to DA, 25 Nov 50.

13

 DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2998, 15 Nov 50. 14

 Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC to DA, 25 Nov 50. 15

 Rad, C 69211, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Nov 50.
278 POLICY AND DIRECTION

north so that further reinforcement

therefrom has been sharply curtailed and

essential supplies markedly limited."

General Wright contends that this belief

in the effectiveness of air power was one

of General MacArthur's greatest weaknesses in dealing with the Chinese.16

But, from all indications, the overriding consideration in MacArthur's decision to push on to the Yalu was his firm

conviction that his mission, "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces,"

dictated his line of action, and could be

accomplished only by an advance to the

border. This mission, in spite of noticeable tendencies on the part of Washington toward its modification, was not

altered, largely because of MacArthur's

vehement protests during November.17

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

told MacArthur on 8 November that

". . . this new situation indicates that

your objective . . . the destruction of

the North Korean armed forces may have

to be re-examined,"18 MacArthur retorted in extremely strong terms that any

course short of complete destruction of

the enemy would be tantamount to abject

surrender and a breaking of faith with

the peoples of Asia.19

There is little doubt that MacArthur

ardently believed in his mission and that

he was more than willing to call what he

regarded as a Chinese bluff in order to

carry out that mission. He may well

have recalled those tenets of American

military doctrine which hold that "the

mission is the basic factor in the commander's estimate," and that "to delay

action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of

energetic leadership, and may result in

lost opportunities. The situation, at

times, may require the taking of calculated risks." This is borne out by his

explanation later of his northward advance as a "reconnaissance in force."

He stated the alternatives which faced

him on 24 November. ". . . One," he

testified, "was to ascertain the truth of

the strength of what he [the enemy] had;

the other was to sit where we were. Had

we done that he would have built up his

forces, and undoubtedly destroyed us.

The third was to go in precipitate retreat, which would not have been countenanced, I am quite sure."

 20

MacArthur also vindicated his advance

by insisting that ". . . the disposition of

those troops [Eighth Army and X Corps],

in my opinion, could not have been improved upon, had I known the Chinese

were going to attack."

 21

 Actually, the

Eighth Army, when hit by the Chinese,

was deployed on a broad front with its

right flank open and was supported by

few reserves. Almond's corps was strung

out in widely separated columns advancing through extremely rugged terrain.

Not only was the X Corps' left flank unprotected, but Chinese forces of considerable strength had been reported on that

flank.

Emergency Meeting—Tokyo

General MacArthur called an emergency council of war in Tokyo on the

night of 28 November. Generals Walker

16

 (1) GHQ, UNC Communiqué No. 12, 24 Nov

50. (2) Interv, Gen Wright with Col Appleman,

copy in OCMH. 17

 Rad, JCS 69808, CINCUNC to JCS, 25 Nov 50. 18

 Rad, JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50. 19

 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Nov 50.

20

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 20-21. 21

 Ibid., p. 19.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 279

and Almond, hastily summoned from

Korea, joined MacArthur, Hickey,

Wright, Willoughby, and Whitney at

MacArthur's American Embassy residence. In a meeting which lasted from

2150, 28 November, until 0130, 29 November, the seven officers studied the

possible countermoves in meeting the

entry of the Chinese. MacArthur, feeling

that above all he must save his forces,

finally ordered Walker to make withdrawals as necessary to keep the Chinese

from outflanking him and directed Almond to maintain contact with the Chinese but to contract the X Corps into

the Hamhung-Hungnam area.

Since the Eighth Army seemed in

greater danger than Almond's corps, the

main theme of the conference appears to

have been "What can X Corps do to help

Eighth Army?" When General Almond

held that his first mission was to extricate

the Marine and Army forces cut off in the

Changjin Reservoir area, MacArthur

agreed but asked Almond what he could

do to relieve the Chinese pressure on

Walker's right flank. General Wright

suggested that Almond might send the

U.S. 3d Division west across the Taebaek

mountain range to join Eighth Army and

to attack Chinese forces moving in on

Walker's right flank. Pointing out that

the road across the Taebaek Range appeared on the map but was actually nonexistent, Almond objected that the bitter

winter weather and the possibility of

strong Chinese forces in the gap between

the two commands would make any such

relief expedition an extremely hazardous

venture in which the whole 3d Division

might be lost. But he agreed to the

scheme if Eighth Army would supply the

division after it crossed to the west side

of the Taebaek Mountains. Walker

made no such promise, and MacArthur

made no immediate decision on the attack. He later ordered, then canceled, a

drive by a task force from the 3d Division

to link up with the Eighth Army right

flank.22

In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff accepted General MacArthur's appraisal of the situation and

approved his plans for passing from the

offensive to the defensive. For some

time, Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval

Operations, had been expressing concern

over MacArthur's operations in northeastern Korea. In his opinion, the employment of U.S. naval vessels in support

of the X Corps so close to Vladivostok

offered the Russians a tempting pretext

for intervening if they were so inclined.

He insisted that the X Corps should be

withdrawn to a general consolidated defense line.

On 29 November, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff told MacArthur to put aside any

previous directives in conflict with his

current plan to defend. After calling

attention to the need for co-ordinating

Eighth Army and X Corps operations,

the Joint Chiefs suggested that MacArthur should close the gap, more than

thirty airline miles in width in the beginning and now widening, between

Walker and Almond and form a continuous defense line across the peninsula.23

 But MacArthur differed with the

Joint Chiefs. According to him, X Corps

22

 (1) Rad, C 50106, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 30

Nov 50. (2) Interv, Col Appleman with Almond,

copy in OCMH. 23

 (1) Rad, JCS 97592, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Nov

50. (2) Memo, CNO for JCS, 29 Nov 50, sub: Sit

in Northeast Korea.
280 POLICY AND DIRECTION

units "geographically threatened" the

main supply lines of enemy forces bearing down upon the right flank of the

Eighth Army. He maintained that the

Chinese had been forced to commit an

estimated eight divisions to ward off X

Corps thrusts against their supply lines,

thus depriving them of eight divisions to

throw against the Eighth Army. So long

as the X Corps stayed in this position,

MacArthur insisted, the Chinese could

not, with any degree of safety or assurance of success, penetrate to the south

through the existing corridor. He

pointed out also the great difficulties of

closing the gap.

Any concept of actual physical combination

of the forces of the Eighth Army and X

Corps in a practically continuous line across

the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of this line, the

numerical weakness of our forces, and the

logistical problems created by the mountainous divide which splits such a front

from north to south.24

As to the immediate situation within

the X Corps, General MacArthur informed his superiors that he had ordered

Almond to pull his forces into the Hamhung-Hungnam sector. Almond had

been specifically warned against allowing

any piecemeal isolation and trapping of

his forces. These forces were already

fighting their way out of isolation and

entrapment. MacArthur believed that,

while the X Corps might seem overextended, the terrain conditions would

make it extremely difficult for the Chinese Army to take any advantage of this

fact.25

In a second message a few hours later,

MacArthur gloomily predicted that the

Eighth Army would not be able to make

a stand in the foreseeable future and

would ". . . successively have to replace

to the rear." He had now concluded

that the Chinese intended to destroy the

U.N. forces completely and to secure all

of Korea.26

General MacArthur's disclosure of

plans for pulling the X Corps back into

the Hamhung-Hungnam sector and his

forecast of more withdrawals by the

Eighth Army only increased the Joint

Chiefs' concern. MacArthur's citation

of the formidable mountainous terrain

as a deterrent to enemy advances in

strength was nullified, in the opinion of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chinese

demonstrated ability to negotiate rugged

land barriers. The compression of the

X Corps, with the accompanying development of a progressively widening gap

between Almond's and Walker's forces

would, the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur

on 1 December, afford the Chinese additional opportunity to move strong forces

southward between the Eighth Army and

X Corps. The first task, in their opinion, was to extricate the Marines and

7th Division troops from the Changjin

Reservoir. But once that was done, they

wanted the Eighth Army and X Corps

"sufficiently coordinated to prevent large

enemy forces from passing between them

or outflanking either of them." Following their custom of not directing MacArthur's tactical disposition by specific

orders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discreetly

but pointedly suggested once again that

he join his forces in a defensive line

across the peninsula.27

24

 Rad, C 50095, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 30

Nov 50. 25

 Ibid.

26

 Rad, C 50105, CINCFE to DA, 30 Nov 50. 27

 Rad, JCS 97772, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 281

But MacArthur remained solidly

against any junction of the Eighth Army

and X Corps at this time. Joining the

two forces, he explained to his Washington superiors, would produce no significant added strength. It would, on the

other hand, endanger the freedom of

maneuver deriving from their separate

lines of supply by sea.28

General MacArthur again offered

other objections. He called the development of a defense line across the waist

of the peninsula infeasible because of

the numerical weakness of his forces and

the distances involved. He called to the

attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the

necessity of supplying his two major

forces from ports within their respective

areas; and he reminded them of the geographical division of the peninsula into

two compartments by the Taebaek

mountain range which ran north and

south between the Eighth Army and X

Corps. A continuous line across the narrow waist would be approximately 120

airline miles, or 150 road miles, in length.

MacArthur explained:

If the entire United States force of seven

divisions at my disposal were placed along

this defensive line it would mean that a

division would be forced to protect a front

of approximately twenty miles against

greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose

greatest strength is a potential for night

infiltration through rugged terrain. Such

a line with no depth, would have little

strength, and as a defensive concept would

invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction.

MacArthur apparently had changed his

mind about the ability of the Chinese to

operate over the rough terrain in the gap

between the X Corps and Eighth Army.29

MacArthur doubted that the Joint

Chiefs fully realized the great changes

wrought by the Chinese entry. He tabulated for them the latest of his intelligence agencies' estimates of enemy

strength. Twenty-six Chinese divisions

had been identified in combat and an

additional 200,000 men were either in

reserve or being committed. This formidable array of enemy strength was

further augmented by the remnants of

the North Korean Army which were being reorganized in rear areas. ". . . There

stands, of course, behind all this, the

entire military potential of Communist

China."

 30

The terrain on which the fighting was

taking place was having a twofold effect

on the course of battle. It diminished

the effectiveness of MacArthur's air arm

in trying to channelize and interrupt the

Chinese system of supply. Secondly, the

rough ground aided the enemy in his dispersion tactics. These drawbacks, MacArthur maintained, greatly reduced the

normal benefits which would be expected

from complete control of the air. His

naval potential, too, was greatly minimized by the concentration of enemy

forces in areas inaccessible to naval gunfire. Under these circumstances, MacArthur held, the potential destructive

force of the United Nations combined

arms was greatly reduced and the question was becoming more and more one

of the relative combat effectiveness of

ground forces.31

Commenting on the condition of his

28

 Rad, C 50332, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 3 Dec

50.

29

 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31

 Ibid.
282 POLICY AND DIRECTION

own forces, MacArthur pointed out that

while they so far had exhibited good

morale and marked efficiency, they had

been in almost incessant combat for five

months and were mentally fatigued and

physically battered. Moreover, with the

exception of the 1st Marine Division,

each American division then in Korea

was at least 5,000 men understrength.

The Chinese troops, on the other hand,

appeared to be fresh, very well organized,

splendidly trained and equipped, and

apparently in peak condition for actual

operations.32

MacArthur concluded that unless he

promptly got ground reinforcements of

the greatest magnitude, his command

would be forced either into successive

withdrawals with diminishing powers of

resistance after each such move, or into

taking up beachhead positions which,

while insuring a degree of prolonged

resistance, would afford little hope of

anything beyond defense. He charged

that his directives were now completely

outmoded. The strategic concepts which

had been evolved for operations against

the North Korean Army were not suitable for continued application against

the full power of the Chinese. Without

being specific, MacArthur then called

for sterner measures than he was then

authorized to employ. "This calls for

political decisions and strategic plans in

implementation thereof, adequate fully

to meet the realities involved," he declared. "In this, time is of the essence,

as every hour sees the enemy power increase and ours decline."

 33

 In clear

terms, the United Nations commander

issued a prognosis which expressed his

pessimism unmistakably. He told the

authorities in Washington:

This small command, actually under pres- ent conditions, is facing the entire Chinese

nation in an undeclared war, and, unless

some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and

steady attrition leading to final destruction

can reasonably be contemplated.34

Faced with General MacArthur's

strong objection to a defensive line across

the peninsula, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

yielded to his judgment. On 4 December, after obtaining President Truman's

approval, they told MacArthur that they

now regarded the preservation of his

forces as the primary consideration and

agreed to the consolidation of forces into

beachheads.35

Eight thousand miles away from the

fighting, however, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff could not fully sense conditions in

Korea. Consequently, General Collins

flew to the Far East for conferences with

MacArthur, Walker, and Almond and

for a firsthand view of the battle. Collins

intended to find out from MacArthur

what chance he had to defend successfully, what general line or area he could

hold, and for how long. Secondly, Collins wanted to obtain MacArthur's opinion of a cease-fire.36

Collins Visits Korea

Collins arrived in Tokyo on the morning of 4 December, conferred briefly

with General MacArthur, then flew to

32

 Ibid.

33

 Ibid.

34

 Ibid.

35

 (1) Rad, JCS 97917, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50.

(2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 393. 36

 Draft msg for JCS Representative, 1 Dec 50, in

G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 127/8.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 283

Korea for talks with General Walker and

to inspect the Eighth Army's lines.

Walker's troops had been withdrawing

southward as agreed at the 28 November

Tokyo conference, and although enemy

pressure had lessened, were, at the time

of Collins' inspection, dropping back

below Sukch'on and Sunch'on to positions not far north of P'yongyang.

Walker had already told MacArthur that

he could not hold P'yongyang and estimated that the enemy would unquestionably force him to pull south of the

38th Parallel to the vicinity of Seoul.

Walker told Collins that he could continue the withdrawal without serious

losses unless he were ordered to defend

the Seoul-Inch'on area. If this happened

the Chinese could encircle him. Walker

felt, and General Collins concurred, that

an evacuation from Inch'on would be

very costly. If evacuation became necessary, Walker wanted to withdraw from

Pusan, not Inch'on. He was confident

he could get his forces safely into the

Pusan area, and even considered it possible that he could hold there indefinitely

if the X Corps reinforced him.37

Walker's troops passed below P'yongyang on 5 December, destroying many

supplies there and falling back to new

positions to the south. On the next day,

General Collins flew to Hamhung to see

General Almond. He found Almond

confident that he could hold the Hamhung-Hungnam area for a considerable

time without serious losses, and that he

could withdraw successfully and cheaply

when so ordered. Collins agreed with

Almond's estimate.

Returning to Tokyo for a final conference on 6 December, Collins met with

General MacArthur, Admiral Joy, and

General Stratemeyer, and with key staff

officers, Hickey, Willoughby, and Wright,

for a full discussion of what moves to

take against the Chinese. As a framework for their talks, they projected three

hypothetical situations covering the next

few weeks or months.

In the first, they posited that the Chinese would continue their all-out attack,

but with MacArthur forbidden to mount

air attacks against China; that no blockade of China would be set up; that no

reinforcements would be sent to Korea

by Chiang Kai-shek; that there would be

no substantial increase in MacArthur's

U.S. forces until April 1951 when four

National Guard divisions might be sent

MacArthur; and that the atomic bomb

might be used in North Korea. General

MacArthur spoke strongly, charging that

placement of such limitations on his command while it remained under strong

Chinese attack would represent essentially a surrender. Under these conditions the question of an armistice would

be a political matter, helpful perhaps,

but certainly not requisite from a military standpoint. His forces would have

to be withdrawn from Korea in any case,

and the United States should therefore

not be hasty in seeking an armistice under these conditions. He agreed with

Walker and Almond, as did General

Collins, that the United Nations forces

could be safely withdrawn from Pusan

and Hungnam respectively, with or without an armistice.

Under the second set of conditions,

the conferees assumed a situation in

which the Chinese attack would continue, but with an effective naval

37

 Memo, Gen Collins for JCS, 8 Dec 50, sub:

Rpt on Visit to FECOM and Korea, 4-7 Dec 50.
284 POLICY AND DIRECTION

blockade of China put in effect, air reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese

mainland allowed, Chinese Nationalist

forces exploited to the maximum, and

the atomic bomb to be used if tactically

appropriate. Given these conditions,

General MacArthur said he should be

directed to hold positions in Korea as

far north as possible. He would, in this

case, move Almond's X Corps to Pusan

to join the Eighth Army in an overland

movement.

Under the third postulate, that the

Chinese would agree not to cross south

of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur felt the

United Nations should accept an armistice. The conditions of the armistice

should preclude movement of North Korean forces, as well as of Chinese, below

the parallel; North Korean guerrillas

should withdraw into their own territory;

the Eighth Army should remain in positions covering the Seoul-Inch'on area,

while X Corps pulled back to Pusan; and

a United Nations commission should

supervise the implementation of armistice terms. He viewed these as the best

arrangements that could be made, unless

the United Nations should decide to act

under the second postulate. He reiterated a firm belief that the Chinese Nationalists should send troops to Korea

without delay and that other powers in

the United Nations should increase their

contingents to a total U.N. strength of

at least 75,000. He concluded by telling General Collins that unless substantial reinforcements were sent quickly to

his command, the United Nations Command should pull out of Korea.38

MacArthur Is Warned

General MacArthur indeed felt that

he was being forced to fight the Chinese

with his hands tied. His resentment

displayed during talks with General Collins had already welled over into public

channels, giving rise to official concern

and laying the groundwork for later controversy. Shortly before his 6 December

meeting with Collins, MacArthur in an

interview with the editors of U.S. News

and World Report had severely criticized

the restrictions placed upon his command. He called the continuing prohibition against hot pursuit and

bombing Chinese bases in Manchuria

"an enormous handicap, without precedent in Military History."

 39

He also had sent a message to Hugh

Baillie, president of United Press, in

which he again criticized the national

policies under which he was operating.

Disturbed by MacArthur's actions, President Truman on 5 December ordered

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform all

unified commanders that any public

statement concerning foreign policy

should be cleared with the Department

of Defense before issuance. He aimed

this action directly at MacArthur.40 The

38

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, CofS FEC for Gen Collins,

4 Dec 50, GHQ, UNC Comd Rpt, Dec 50, Annex 4,

Part III, "I" 19433.

39

 U.S. News and World Report (December 8,

1950), pp. 16-22. 40

 (1) New York Times, December 2, 1950.

(2) Rad, W 98310, DA to CINCFE, 8 Dec 50. (1) and

(2) are reproduced in MacArthur Hearings, pp.

3532-35. (3) The President later charged that MacArthur's repeated statements had led many into the

impression that the United States had changed its

policy. This the President would not allow. Therefore on 5 December he issued an order to all government agencies that until they received further

written notice from him all speeches, press releases,

or other public statements concerning foreign policy

would be cleared by the Department of State before

issuance. In a second such notice he admonished all
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 285

effect of these instructions became apparent almost immediately when MacArthur on 9 December submitted for

approval by the Department of Defense

a communiqué which he proposed to

release to the press. MacArthur stated

that his forces had successfully completed

tactical withdrawals and were now waiting for "political decisions and policies

demanded by the entry of Communist

China into the war." He continued,

"The suggestion widely broadcast that

the command has suffered a rout or

debacle is pure nonsense." He charged

that "Advance notice of the Chinese decision to attack was a matter for political

intelligence which failed. . . . Field intelligence was so handicapped that once

the decision to commit was made, this

new enemy could move forward . . .

without fear of detection. . . ."

 41

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took exception and replied in a chiding vein that

the proposed release did not conform to

the President's instructions and that in

the future he should confine such communiqués to completed phases of military operations. "Discussion of foreign

and military policy referenced to press

comments and comments relative to political or domestic matters should not be

included in military communiqués issued

in the field," they pointed out.42

High Level Conferences

Collins, upon his return to Washington, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "If

the United Nations decision is not to

continue an all out attack in Korea and

if the Chinese Communists continue to

attack, MacArthur should be directed to

take the necessary steps to prevent the

destruction of his forces pending final

evacuation from Korea."

 43

No one was more aware of the need

for wise decisions than was the President,

who now had to make them. The military collapse in Korea had effectively

erased any illusion that the current national policies would continue to serve

national interests. The crises evolving

from the military failure in Korea and

the even more ominous catastrophe of

open and unrestrained military action by

the Chinese had shocked Washington as

well as Tokyo. But this was not the time

for hasty judgments. In the tinder-dry

international atmosphere the wrong decision could fan the brush fire in Korea

into a flaming worldwide holocaust.

Since a bad decision would be worse than

no decision at all, the President and his

advisers moved slowly and with great

thoroughness and caution in their search

for the right answers.

President Truman first learned of the

Chinese assault early on 28 November

when General Bradley gave him MacArthur's first reports of the crushing

blows being dealt his forces. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, already alerted by the increasing resistance to the Eighth Army's

advance, had been watching the situation

closely all during the preceding day.

President Truman called immediately

officials overseas, including military commanders, to

use caution in their public statements, to clear all

but routine statements with their departments, and

to engage in no direct communication on military

or foreign policy matters with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.

See Truman, Memoirs, II, 383.

41

 Rad, C 50736, CINCFE to DA, 8 Dec 50. 42

 Rad, JCS 98410, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Dec 50. 43

 Memo, Collins for JCS, 8 Dec 50.
286 POLICY AND DIRECTION

for a meeting of the National Security

Council.44

General Bradley told the council that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the

new turn in Korea to be very serious but

not so devastating as newspaper reports

indicated. He stressed the dangers of

MacArthur's command being attacked

from Manchurian airfields, but advised

against authorizing MacArthur to bomb

those airfields.

Secretary of Defense Marshall recommended in strongest terms that neither

the United States nor the United Nations

become involved in a general war with

China. He was joined in this view by

all the service secretaries and by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Reflecting the emphasis

which U.S. military planners were placing on the defense of western Europe,

General Bradley warned that if the

United States allowed itself to become

embroiled in an all-out fight with China

it would not be able to continue the

build-up of forces in Europe. General

Marshall added that it was essential for

the United States, in dealing with this

new and very serious aggression, to keep

strictly within the framework of the

United Nations, regardless of the difficulties which might arise.

The council was in general agreement

that the Chinese intervention made it

extremely urgent for the United States

to build up its military forces and to enlarge its efforts to procure both men and

materials. The President also agreed

with this view and with the necessity for

sending to Congress a supplementary

budget to take care of the increased costs

of greater military readiness.

The Secretary of State told the council

that the Chinese attack on U.N. forces

had moved the United States much closer

to general war. Always to be kept in

mind in approaching the Korean problem, he stressed, was that the real antagonist, the power behind the scene in

Korea and elsewhere, was Russia. Therefore, any action that President Truman

might eventually take must be taken

with full knowledge that a war with

Russia could be the result. If, for example, the United States successfully

bombed Chinese airfields in Manchuria,

the President believed that Russia would

have cheerfully entered the fight.45

The foreign policy of the United

States was, and had been for the past

three years, predicated on containing the

USSR within its 1947 limits. Now, if the

United States took action in or against

Chinese territory and entered the USSR's

perimeter of special influence and interest, it would risk a war it might not win.

Acheson believed that there were a number of ways in which the United States

could damage the Chinese without going

to war with them, although he did not

enumerate these means. But he had

concluded that it would be best for the

United States to find some way to end

the fighting in Korea.

Over the next several days, President

Truman held more meetings with his

top advisers and with Congressional leaders but made no decisions on courses of

action. MacArthur, in his call for political decisions, had not explained what he

meant by the term. But certainly new 44

 (1) Truman, Memoirs, II, 385-87. (2) The following section is based, in addition to specific citation, on an interview by the author with Mr.

Truman at Independence, Missouri, in June 1961. 45

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 387-88.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 287

national policies must now be established

with regard to such questions as whether

to retaliate against China and whether to

attempt to negotiate a cease-fire. Vital

in answering these questions was the determination of USSR intentions, of the

price which the United States could afford to pay for a cease-fire, of the effects

of voluntary withdrawal from Korea,

and of the effect of all these matters upon

America's allies, particularly those of

western Europe.46

Although General MacArthur had not

yet expressed strong public views on the

subject, his obvious opinion that the

United States should strike back at

China, particularly manifest in his readiness to attack the Yalu installations in

early November, had aroused the nations

allied with the United States in NATO.

NATO had existed more than a year and

a half, but its military forces were still

in the planning stages. The forces of the

member nations in western Europe were

at the time few in number, poorly

equipped, badly trained, and inadequately supported. They would be virtually defenseless against the Soviet

Union, or even some of its satellite nations. Without American aid, in event

of an attack from the east, the nations of

western Europe could anticipate much

the same fate that had befallen South

Korea in the first days of the Korean

War. These nations, particularly England, France, and the Benelux countries,

had therefore welcomed the Presidential

decision to oppose me North Korean

venture with armed force. Until then

there had been real doubt among these

nations that the United States would

actually fulfill its NATO obligation

should one of them be attacked.47 These

doubts had been largely removed by the

President's action in June.

But the extension of the Korean War

through Chinese intervention and the

very possibility of increased and more

drastic action by the United States,

brought another fear that if the United

States became involved in a war with

Communist China, American commitments to NATO would, through sheer

necessity, go by the board. China then

might have little difficulty in persuading

Russia to move into western Europe; and

without U.S. resistance to this aggression,

Russia could take all of Europe at little

cost.48

46

 Like so many other decisions of the Korean

War, the decision to evacuate Korea defied classification as either political or military. Ostensibly military, the decision nevertheless held profound

political implications such as its effect on the South

Koreans, the Japanese, the Formosans, and U.S.

allies in other areas of the world.

47

 Article 5 of the Charter of the North Atlantic

Treaty stated, "The Parties agree that an armed

attack against one or more of them in Europe or

North America shall be considered an attack against

them all; and consequently they agree that, if such

an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise

of the right of individual or collective self defense,

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked

by taking forthwith, individually and in concert

with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore

and maintain the security of the North Atlantic

area." 48

 Sentiment in the NATO nations was influenced

measurably by exaggerated speculation in the foreign press. President Truman was aware that foreign newspapers were speculating openly about the

American reaction, quoting some of the more

hawkish senators and talking about General MacArthur's ill-concealed disapproval of American

policy. Some of these papers actually predicted

that the United States would ignore the United Nations and plunge into a war with China. Most

Europeans had heard only that there was opposition

to NATO and to sending American troops to Europe. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 394-95.
288 POLICY AND DIRECTION

The NATO nations, people and leaders alike, distrusted General MacArthur's

strategic judgment. They feared that his

stature and influence might enable him

to appeal so forcibly to the American

people for more drastic military action

as to override the more temperate approaches to the Chinese which seemed to

be favored by Washington.

At times, even Washington officials set

NATO nerves on edge with public statements. On 30 November, at a press conference, President Truman remarked, no

doubt extemporaneously, that the use of

the atomic bomb was under active consideration, unintentionally implying to

some oversensitive observers that its use

would be left to the discretion of General

MacArthur. Even though subsequently

he attempted to subdue the storm of

protest and consternation which followed

by pointing out that only he could authorize use of the atomic bomb and that

he had not given such authorization, he

could not avoid the real issue that any

decision to use the bomb would be a

United States, not a United Nations,

decision.49

The United Kingdom was predominant among the anxious advocates of the

NATO viewpoint. The most respected

leaders of that nation, including Winston

Churchill and Anthony Eden, and of the

Commonwealth of Nations, were seriously disturbed by rumors that MacArthur wanted stern measures against

China. As a result of the mounting tension which, conceivably, could have shattered NATO and the western bloc of the

United Nations as well, Clement Attlee,

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,

proposed conferences between himself

and President Truman. These were

quickly arranged and scheduled to begin

on 4 December.50

In the interim, Attlee conferred with

leaders of the other Commonwealth nations and with the French Premier and

Foreign Minister. Apparently, he was

also to represent the viewpoints of these

nations in his talks with President Truman.

On the day before Attlee's arrival in

Washington, and primarily in preparation for his visit, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Presidential

Adviser Averell Harriman, and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the possible

courses of action open to the United

States. One matter of paramount concern was how to solve the current crisis,

and at the same time preserve solidarity

in the United Nations, especially with

the British Commonwealth nations. At

this meeting, the nation's top authorities

reached general agreement that the military posture of the United States should

be strengthened without delay. The

Army staff was already making studies to

determine what increase in production

schedules and in Army forces and personnel should be made.51

With particular regard to Korea, one

suggestion was that the United States

should press the United Nations for a

resolution calling for a cease-fire on the

condition that the Eighth Army leave

49

 (1) New York Times, December 1, 1950.

(2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 395-96.

50

 The President received a message from the

British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, on 30

November, asking to visit Washington and to discuss, face to face, the meaning of events in Korea

and the possible courses of future action. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 393. 51

 Rad, WAR 97929, DA to CINCFE (Personal),

for Collins from Haislip, 3 Dec 50.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 289

North Korea and pull back across the

38th Parallel. Any such resolution

would obviously have to be passed before

the Chinese pushed the Eighth Army

across the parallel by force. There was

also much concern over the price that

the Chinese would demand for agreeing

to a cease-fire.

Another point discussed was whether

the United Nations forces, in the absence

of a cease-fire, should evacuate as soon as

they had withdrawn into beachheads or

wait until the enemy forced them out.

The conferees also examined the no less

important question of whether the

United States should attack Communist

China by air and sea after the United

Nations were forced out of Korea. No

definite recommendations for the President as to courses of action evolved from

this meeting. It was agreed that such

recommendations must await the return

of General Collins, then still in Korea,

as well as the results of the conferences

which were to begin next day between

President Truman and Prime Minister

Attlee.

The British Prime Minister was

thought to be particularly disturbed by

President Truman's remarks on possible

use of the atomic bomb. The British

position was that the atomic bomb should

certainly not be used without consultation—and probably not without agreement—with them and perhaps other

members of the United Nations; and they

were strongly opposed to its use in

China.52

Just before the arrival of Attlee, Department of State officials examined the

reasons behind his unusual request for a

conference with President Truman and

Attlee's attitude on the Korean situation.

The occasion for Mr. Attlee's visit, they

concluded, was "the sudden change in

the situation in Korea."

 53

The growing British concern over

the U.S. foreign and defense policies

stemmed in part from what Department

of State officials described as "the deterioration in the position of the West

vis-à-vis the Soviet Union." The British

did not entirely trust the discretion of

the United States. Their concern was

heightened by uncertainty as to the consequences of some United States policies

and actions. This concern was not peculiar to the British but was known to

be shared by other western powers.54

The Department of State forecast that

Attlee would express to Truman the

genuine fear shared by all British peoples

that the United States was drifting toward a third world war and that even

though an open war with Russia might

be avoided, the United States would become more completely embroiled in an

exhausting war with Communist China.

The two particularly sensitive points in

this connection were the immediate situ52

 (1) Rad, DA (Haislip) to CINCFE (Collins via

Larsen), unnumbered, 3 Dec 50. (2) The reaction

of the Chinese, as described by the Indian Ambassador, to the statement of President Truman seems

to have been opportunistic. "It was the next morning (the 1st of December)," Pannikar recalls, "that

Truman announced that he was thinking of using

the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed

totally unmoved by this threat. . . . The propaganda against American aggression was stepped up.

The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was

made the slogan for increased production, greater

national integration, and more rigid control over

anti-national activities. One could not help feeling

that Truman's threat came in very useful to the

leaders of the revolution to enable them to keep up

the tempo of their activities." See Pannikar, In

Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 116-17. 53

 JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl B. 54

 Ibid.
290 POLICY AND DIRECTION

ation facing U.N. forces in Korea and

the U.S. policy on Formosa.55

The Department of State officials told

the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

With respect to Korea there is profound

concern that actions have been and may

continue to be taken which unnecessarily

aggravate the situation and bring us closer

to war with China. Germane to this is

the rather widespread British distrust of

General MacArthur and the fear of politi- cal decisions he may make based on military necessity. Bearing on this is the British

belief in the buffer area and their stand

against attacks across the Yalu. Also in- volved is the fear of the effect on Asiatics

of use of the Atomic Bomb or even open

consideration of its use.56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement with that portion of the

Department of State's conclusion which

stated:

We believe that the British are very sincere

in their concern over the above matters

and that they should be handled with full

understanding and appreciation of that

fact. Although we approach them with

understanding and sympathy and meet them

wherever reasonably possible, we should not

give them cause to think that we are fully

satisfied with British actions and policies. In particular, the occasion should be taken

to emphasize to them the importance and

urgency of getting along with the defense

effort. They are inclined sometimes to

regard the world situation as primarily a

United States-Soviet problem and therefore

to keep the sights for their own efforts too

low.57

Insofar as the specifics of action in

Korea were concerned, the Department

of State recommended to the President,

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred,

that he should make no commitment to

Attlee restricting the freedom of action

of the United States on use of the atomic

bomb. The President should tell Attlee

that the United States did not desire to

use the atomic bomb and stress that the

United States fully realized the dire consequences of using the bomb. He should

also tell the British Prime Minister that

the United States desired and expected

to move in step with the British in meeting the current crisis.58

The Department of State proposed

that President Truman should discuss

with the British Prime Minister two

possible courses of action in Korea. The

first of these involved a withdrawal of

U.N. forces to a line on the 38th Parallel

in conjunction with a possible cease-fire

agreement. The second course was the

evacuation of all of Korea. In the event

of military necessity, the Department of

State held, the X Corps should withdraw

from Korea to Japan and an attempt

should be made to stabilize the situation

by a political cease-fire agreement, with

the line of demarcation between forces

along the 38th Parallel. The Department of State wanted President Truman

to tell Attlee that MacArthur intended

to assemble his forces into three beachheads: in the Seoul-Inch'on area, at

Hamhung, and at Pusan. The X Corps

could be evacuated to Japan in any way

that proved militarily practicable.59

The proposal held:

Before the Chinese Communists have

reached the 38th Parallel in strength we

should try to establish a cease-fire on the

basis of the 38th Parallel with the armies 55

 Ibid. 56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo for Secy Defense, 4 Dec 50,

sub: Use of Atomic Bomb. 59

 JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl B.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 291

separated by a demilitarized zone. The

principal purpose of this effort would be

to deny success to aggression and to con- solidate an overwhelming majority of the

United Nations members behind the cease- fire effort. Arrangements for a cease-fire on

the basis of the 38th Parallel would not,

however, be conditioned on agreement to

other issues, such as Formosa and the seating of Communist China in the United

Nations.

During the cease-fire effort (apparently

before a cease-fire had been agreed to by

both parties), the United Nations would

retire on the Seoul-Inch'on area, but

would not begin any evacuation until

the results of the cease-fire were determined.60

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

their planning staff agreed that a ceasefire might be militarily advantageous for

the United Nations Command under

conditions then obtaining, they wanted

to be sure of two things. First, the considerations offered the Chinese in exchange for a cease-fire agreement must

not be too great, and, secondly, the

United Nations commander must not be

operationally restricted. Such a plan as

the Department of State proposed, dictating not only the area into which the

Eighth Army would retire but also restricting the conditions under which

MacArthur might evacuate his troops,

was unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff, in revising the Department of State

proposals, cut out any reference to the

evacuation of the X Corps. "Arrangements for this cease-fire," the Joint Chiefs

of Staff maintained, "must not impose

conditions which would jeopardize the

safety of United Nations forces." In

other words, MacArthur must be free to

withdraw at any time. They also objected to the Department of State provision that would have compelled the

Eighth Army to withdraw on the SeoulInch'on area.61

In the Department of State's recommendation to President Truman regarding the possible necessity of evacuating

Korea was the explanation that the Department's position did ". . . not exclude the possibility of some military

action which would harass the Chinese

pending their acceptance of a United

Nations settlement for Korea and would

not exclude any efforts which could be

made to stimulate anti-Communist resistance within China itself, including

the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities."

 62

It is significant, in view of the early

December date, that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff seized upon this discreetly worded

hint of retaliatory measures and reworded it, not only in stronger terms,

but by adding several possible retaliatory

measures later proposed by General MacArthur, to include a naval blockade of

China and bombing of Chinese lines of

communication outside of Korea.63

President Truman and Prime Minister

Attlee met at the White House on 4 December and on each day thereafter for

five days. Also present at these meetings

were Secretary of Defense Marshall and

Secretary of State Acheson as well as the

British Ambassador to the United States.

Discussion was frank, open, and occa60 Ibid.

61

 (1) JCS 1776/167, with Incls, 3-4 Dec 50.

(2) Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:

(JCS 1776/7) Korea. Both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 129. 62

 Ibid. 63 Ibid.
292 POLICY AND DIRECTION

sionally heated, but ended in agreement

on most major issues.64

It was very clear that the British, and

by inference the other NATO nations,

while they had no intention of deserting

the United States, could not reconcile

themselves to what they believed to be

its unrealistic and extremely dangerous

policy in relation to Red China. Attlee

took the position at first that there was

no choice under current conditions but

to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, with such negotiations most certainly extending beyond Korea and

amounting to the surrender of Formosa

to the Communists, a grant of United

Nations status to the Chinese Communists, and the recognition of their government by the United States as the price

for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of

Chinese troops from the Korean peninsula.65

President Truman emphasized that it

was not the American policy to desert its

friends when the going got rough. He

pointed out that the United States did

not make distinctions between little aggressions and big aggressions. President

Truman's position coincided with that of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he told

Attlee that if a cease-fire were proposed,

the United States would accept it, but the

United States would pay nothing for it.

If a cease-fire were not accepted, or if it

were accepted and the Chinese later

started fighting again, the United States

would fight as hard as it could.

Acheson agreed that an immediate

cease-fire in Korea would be of advantage

to the United Nations. But to buy that

cease-fire in the fashion suggested would

be unacceptable to the United States.

The American leaders were opposed to

Attlee's suggestions on the ground that

they would actually reward China for her

acts of aggression and would seriously

weaken the position of the United States

in the Far East, politically as well as

militarily. As for U.S. retaliation against

China, no promises were made by American authorities that they would not take

more active measures such as blockade

or bombardment of the mainland; but

Attlee was assured that few of the President's key advisers were urging this

course and that, as a basic principle of its

policy, the United States was determined

to avoid any enlargement of the conflict

if at all possible.

Following their meeting on 7 December, Attlee and President Truman agreed

that there would be no general voluntary

evacuation of Korea at that time. General Collins, having returned from Korea, on 9 December briefed the two heads

of government on the military situation.

After the briefing he told reporters that

MacArthur's forces would be able to take

care of themselves without further serious losses.66

After more discussions between the

two heads of state, certain agreements

were reached. Among these was agreement that neither the United States nor

the United Kingdom would object to

64

 (1) This resumé of the discussions is based on

messages sent to General MacArthur by the Department of State informing him of the progress: Rad,

CM-IN 18584, State to SCAP, 8 Dec 50; Rad, CMIN 19784, State to SCAP, 12 Dec 50. (2) Truman,

in his memoirs, gives a good deal of information on

the trend of these talks and of his private conversations with Attlee. See Truman, Memoirs, II,

396-413. and Acheson, Present at the Creation,

pp. 480-85. 65

 Rad, CM-IN 18584, State to SCAP, 8 Dec 50.

66

 New York Times, December 7, 1950 and December 9, 1950.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 293

any appeal by Asiatic nations to the Chinese Communists for a cease-fire. It was

agreed that the objective of both nations

was to achieve a free and united Korea.

A cease-fire and peaceful solution of the

current conflict with the Chinese Communists was desirable in the immediate

future if it could be secured on honorable terms. There was no disagreement

on the matter of keeping Communist

China out of the United Nations, and

there was agreement that the Chinese

Communists would not be granted any

payment for a peaceful solution in Korea, such as Formosa or Indochina. If

no solution could be obtained, American

and British troops would fight in Korea

until they were forced out.67

67

 Rad, CM-IN 19784, Secy State to SCAP, 12

Dec 50.
CHAPTER XVI

The Brink of Disaster

Reinforcement Prospects

When General MacArthur had warned

General Collins on 6 December that

unless material reinforcements were sent

within a reasonable time his forces in

Korea should be evacuated as soon as

possible, Collins had replied that MacArthur could expect no significant numbers of additional troops in the near

future. Collins had not spoken idly,

as was borne out by Department of the

Army officers in Washington who

were then examining the Army's currently available means of strengthening

MacArthur's command.

General Bolté had proposed on 3

December that the 82d Airborne Division, the only combat-ready division in

the United States, be sent to Japan immediately where it would be available

to protect the American base in Japan,

or to fight in Korea if needed. He felt

that the division could move without its

drop equipment since the troops probably would be used in conventional

ground operations only. Bolté maintained that the division could reach

Japan within thirty-four days after being

alerted. Since the division was approximately 2,000 men overstrength, a cadre

of that size could be left in the United

States to activate another airborne division. The Army's G-4, Maj. Gen.

William O. Reeder, admitted that, from

the logistic standpoint, the division

could be sent, but he did not concur in

sending it. General Ridgway recommended to the Acting Chief of Staff, General Haislip, that any decision on sending

the unit be postponed until General

Collins returned from Korea. On 8

December, after Collins' return, the

shipment was disapproved.1

Aside from the 82d Airborne Division,

the Army's means for reinforcing MacArthur with combat-ready divisions were

slight indeed. Two National Guard

divisions, the 28th and the 43d, could

be readied for shipment to Korea by

June 1951; two more, the 40th and 45th,

could be sent by July 1951; by August,

the 4th Infantry Division could join the

others; and by September 1951 the 2d

Armored and 11th Airborne Divisions

could be in Korea. But the current U.S.

ground force capabilities were so limited

that the situation in Korea was likely

1

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:

Movement of 82d Abn Div to FEC, with handwritten comments on original, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac,

Case 59.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 295

to run its course before significant deployments ( other than the 82d Airborne

Division) could be made. Furthermore,

"The greatly increased possibility that

global war will eventuate from the current crisis makes it mandatory that the

United States make no further deployments that are not in consonance with

the strategic concept of the current

emergency war plan."

 2

Replacements

Furnishing individual replacements

was an equally insoluble problem.

When the Chinese struck, each of MacArthur's divisions had lacked about 30

percent of its men and officers. This

weakness, acceptable during operations

against an enemy of inferior strength,

became intolerable after the Chinese intervened.3

 MacArthur made this very

clear on 28 November when he appealed

for more than twice the number of replacements then scheduled for his command. He had been notified that 33,000

replacements would arrive in December.

He claimed that he now needed 74,000

replacements to compensate for losses

suffered in the Chinese attack and to

bring his units up to strength. This

figure did not include losses anticipated

for January.4

The Department of the Army recognized MacArthur's need but could increase neither the number nor the rate

of replacement shipments. In fact, the

promised 33,000 could not even be provided. The best estimate of shipments

during December was placed at 23,000.5

Chinese Nationalist Forces

In search of additional troops, MacArthur had reminded the Joint Chiefs

of Staff of Chiang Kai-shek's July offer

to send 33,000 troops to serve under him

in Korea. This offer had been turned

down on his own advice and on the

advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But

MacArthur felt that the Chinese intervention put an entirely different light

on the offer, and on 28 November applied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the

services of Chiang's troops. He felt that

the original refusal had been prompted

or at least influenced by the belief that

the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea

might give the Chinese Communists an

excuse for coming into the war.

Another reason had been the need for

the Chinese Nationalists to conserve

their strength to meet threatened attacks

against Formosa by the Chinese Communists. Neither reason remained valid,

MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. He maintained that the Chinese

force on Formosa was the only source

of trained manpower available to him

for early commitment against his new

enemy. He estimated that these troops

could reach Korea within two weeks and

in far greater strength than the 33,000

originally offered. "I strongly recommend," MacArthur urged the Joint

Chiefs, "that the theater commander be

authorized to negotiate directly with the

Chinese Government authorities on

Formosa for the movement north and

2

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:

Further Reinforcements for Korea, in G-3, DA file

091 Korea, Case 125. 3

 Briefing, Gen Gaither to Army Comdrs' Conference, 4 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 337, Case 12/2. 4

 (1) Rad, CX 69983, CINCFE to DA, 28 Nov 50.

(2) Rad, WAR 97786, DA to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50. 5

 Rad, WAR 97786, DA to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50.
296 POLICY AND DIRECTION

incorporation in the United Nations

Command of such Chinese units as may

be available and desirable for reinforcing

our position in Korea."

 6

Washington authorities did not share

these views. They felt that the introduction of Chinese Nationalist forces

into the Korean conflict would precipitate a full-scale war with Communist

China and might trigger a global war for

which the United States was unprepared. Furthermore, the use of Chiang

Kai-shek's men would likely be unacceptable to some, if not all, of the United

Nations members with troops in Korea.

The Commonwealth nations, for instance, would very probably refuse to

have their forces employed alongside

Chinese Nationalist troops. In case of

a general war with China, moreover, it

would be better to use Nationalist forces

on the mainland rather than in Korea.

Also, in view of an increasingly critical

supply situation, complicated by recent

substantial losses in Korea, Washington

was reluctant to equip Chinese Nationalist troops for Korea. Politically, the

move would commit the United States

to the Chinese Nationalist regime to an

unacceptable extent. In any case, Washington doubted that the employment of

33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops, which

represented the only firm offer made,

would decisively influence the situation

in Korea.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no immediate, definite answer to MacArthur,

merely replying that they were considering the proposal. But they warned that

the matter could have a worldwide impact which might disrupt the unity of

the nations associated with the United

States in the United Nations and even

isolate the United States from its allies.8

On 18 December, General MacArthur

made another attempt to procure major

reinforcements, although not for Korea,

when he asked that the four National

Guard divisions called to active duty in

September be sent to Japan at once. He

pointed out that a recent build-up of

USSR propaganda interest in Japan and

the increasing tempo of international

Communist pressure upon the remaining free segments of Asia were alarming

the Japanese. In order to provide reasonable safeguards against any USSR

thrust at Japan, he urged that these four

divisions be moved to Japan to complete their training. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff told MacArthur that it did not

appear probable that the National Guard

divisions could be sent him, although

General Collins, then away on a trip to

Europe, would have to give the final

decision. Every effort would continue

to bring MacArthur's units to full

strength and to keep them there.

"Meanwhile," the Joint Chiefs of Staff

suggested, "you may wish to consider

moving a portion of X Corps to Japan

without prejudice to future disposition."

After General Collins' return, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff agreed that since no decision had been made at the governmental level as to the future United

States course of action in Korea, no

additional divisions would be deployed

to the Far East for the time being.9

6

 Rad, C 50021, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50. 7

 Draft Memo for JCS Representative, 1 Dec 50,

with Annex 1, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 127/8.

8

 Rad, JCS 97594, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50. 9

 (1) Rad, C 51599, CINCFE to DA, 18 Dec 50.

(2) Rad, CM-OUT 99274, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec

50. (3) Rad, JCS 99616, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Dec
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 297

Operation Pink

Not only had the Eighth Army and X

Corps suffered numerous casualties in

the Chinese onslaught of late November and early December—they also had

lost considerable amounts of supplies and

equipment through enemy action, abandonment, and voluntary destruction.

The widely separated units of X Corps,

particularly those in the Changjin

Reservoir area, had left behind or destroyed bedding, tentage, ordnance

equipment, signal equipment, and engineer equipment as they made their way

back to Hamhung. General Almond's

supply staff estimated that the X Corps

needed equipment for refitting one-half

a division as a result of the Chinese attacks against his forces in the Changjin

Reservoir area. General Walker's supply

chief told the GHQ G-4 on 1 December

that the Turkish brigade had lost a large

part of its equipment and that at least

one RCT of the 2d Division would need

considerable re-equipping.

From his depot stocks in Japan, General MacArthur ordered the immediate

shipment to Korea of major items of

equipment for two RCT's. As one of

the few concrete steps which it could

take to remedy the situation, the Department of the Army started immediate

action to furnish MacArthur's command

with full equipment for an infantry division. On 4 December, the Department's G-4, General Larkin, ordered

the immediate preparation, loading, and

shipping on a priority basis to the Far

East Command a complete division set

of equipment less aircraft, generalpurpose vehicles, ammunition, and certain other items either not readily

available for shipment or not essential

to combat operations. This shipping

operation was code-named Operation

PINK. Upon being informed of the action being taken, MacArthur asked that

equipment for two divisions, rather than

one, be sent. But the Department of

the Army told him that, because of the

pending augmentation of the Army and

the requirements of units ordered to his

command, further emergency shipments

of equipment could not be made.

Operation PINK took place in an atmosphere of the greatest urgency. Four

ships loaded at San Francisco, California,

and four at Seattle, Washington, commencing on 5 December. On 9 December, these eight ships, partially

combat-loaded, sailed for the Far East.

Much of the equipment they carried

came from Mutual Defense Assistance

Pact (MDAP) stocks, from the Special

Reserve, and from troops located near

San Francisco and Seattle. Among the

items rushed to MacArthur were 140

medium tanks.10

50. (4) Truman says of this transaction, "The Joint

Chiefs of Staff and General Marshall held a series

of meetings with State Department officials, trying

to find some way to meet the problem. Reinforcements were simply not available. . . . The military

chiefs thought that we might consider ways to withdraw from Korea 'with honor' in order to protect

Japan. The State Department took the position,

however, that we could not retreat from Korea

unless we were forced out." See Truman, Memoirs,

II, 432. The author has found no record of these

meetings in files available to him, nor does any indication of this type of thinking by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff appear elsewhere in their discussions.

10

 (1) Telecon, TT 4088, DA and FEC, 2 Dec 50.

(2) Rad, WAR 97969, DA to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50.

(3) DF, ACofS G-4 to ChTechSvcs, 4 Dec 50, sub:

Emergency Shipment of One Div Set of TO&E

Equipment to FEC, in FEC, G-4 file G-4/D5 WAR

98480, 9 Dec 50. (4) Rad, WAR 98907, DA to

CINCFE, 14 Dec 50.
298 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Possibility of Evacuation

During General Collins' absence from

Washington in early December, other

leading officers of the Army staff,

including Generals Haislip, Ridgway,

Gruenther, Bolté, and Reeder, studied

the situation resulting from Chinese intervention and its impact on the United

States Army. These officers were uncertain of the extent of the Korean crisis,

but judging from the situation map and

MacArthur's gloomy reports, concluded

that United Nations forces stood in some

danger of being overrun and destroyed.

General Bolté mindful of MacArthur's warning, that unless large numbers of ground troops were sent him at

once he would be forced to withdraw his

divisions into beachheads, declared that

MacArthur should be directed to pull

out of Korea. He pointed out that the

additional forces needed by MacArthur

simply did not exist in the United States

or in other member nations of the

United Nations. Hence, if MacArthur

continued to fight in Korea, his command might be destroyed.11

Bolté was convinced that the Chinese

intervention had considerably enhanced

Russian capabilities in any global war,

and that the United States must take immediate countermeasures against this

Russian advantage. Even in the most

optimistic circumstances MacArthur's

forces in Korea, including seven U.S. divisions, would be neutralized and useless

in any effort to counter a USSR attack

on the United States or its allies. Consequently, Bolté recommended that MacArthur's mission be modified at once to

permit him to evacuate Korea as soon as

possible.12

The greatest concern and one shared

by American military and political leaders lay in the possibility that the Chinese

intervention in Korea was only the first

step in a USSR move to conquer the

world. Throughout December, these

authorities did what they could and considered what they could further do to

place the United States in the best possible position to meet the global war

that seemed so imminent. General Bolté

set the stage for preparation at the military level early in December when he

urged that American unified commands

be alerted and authorized to put their

current emergency war plans into effect

in case of attack.13

On 6 December, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff took the action recommended by

Bolté. They told their unified commanders worldwide that Chinese intervention had greatly increased the

possibility of general war. "Take such

action," the unified commanders were

directed, "as feasible to increase readiness without creating an atmosphere of

alarm."

 14

At the Department of the Army level,

Army officials in early December considered the initiation of full mobilization

without delay.15 Full mobilization was

judged premature, but intermediate steps

11

 (1) MFR, 3 Dec 50, sub: Korean Sit. (2) Memo,

Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub: Course of

Action To Be Taken as a Result of Developments

in Korea, both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 134.

12

 Ibid.

13

 Memo, Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:

Courses of Action To Be Taken as a Result of Developments in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,

Case 134. 14

 Rad, JCS 98172, JCS to All Comdrs, 6 Dec 50. 15

 MFR, 3 Dec 50, sub: Korean Sit, G-3 091

Korea, Case 134.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 299

were taken to increase the strength of the

Army and greatly broaden the mobilization and production bases. The National

Security Council, acting on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

had approved on 22 November a military

program for fiscal 1951 providing an

army of sixteen combat divisions within

a total Army strength of 1,263,000. By

30 June 1954, the Army would reach a

strength, through gradual expansion,

of 1,353,000, with eighteen combat

divisions.16

Secretary of the Army Pace expressed

the views of many Army officials when

he told the Army Policy Council on 6

December that as a result of the Chinese

intervention Americans were now living

in a world essentially different from the

kind of a world they had been living in

a week before. The Army's requirements of 6 December were quite different

from those of 30 November. He emphasized that the Army's program of an

orderly build-up was not good enough

nor fast enough to meet the emergency

situation. General Ridgway, speaking

for General Collins in the latter's absence, told Pace that the Army staff had

prepared a plan for quick expansion to

a 21-division army of 1,530,000 strength.

Pace approved this concept for planning

purposes only.17

Still, the immediate threat posed by

Chinese action and the larger threat of

possible global war gave some impetus

to Army expansion. On 5 December,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended

an accelerated rate of Army expansion

with the 18-division force originally

scheduled for June 1954 to be created

by June 1952. The National Security

Council agreed to this action on 14

December. As a result of this acceleration policy, the Department of the Army

in December called two more National

Guard divisions, the 31st and 47th, to

active Federal service, beginning in

January 1951.18

Various military authorities, including General Collins and General Ridgway, had expressed the opinion that the

President should proclaim a national

emergency. Such a proclamation would

place in force the statutory provisions

and authorizations normally granted the

President in time of war and facilitate

the expansion of the nation's armed

forces and industrial facilities in support

of these forces.19 On 15 December, in

a radio address to the nation, President

Truman declared that a state of national

emergency existed. On the following

day, he affixed his signature to a proclamation which said, in part:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRU- MAN, President of the United States of

America, do proclaim the existence of a

national emergency, which requires that the

military, naval, air, and civilian defenses

of this country be strengthened as speedily

as possible to the end that we may be able

16

 JCS 2101/25, 22 Nov 50. 17

 Min, 51st mtg Army Policy Council, 6 Dec 50,

in CofS, DA file 334 (APC).

18

 (1) Memo, Gen Ridgway for Gen Haislip, 7

Dec 50, sub: Briefing for the Chief of Staff, in CofS,

DA file 337, Case 14. (2) MFR, 11 Dec 50, sub:

Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45. (3) History of DA Activities Relating to the Korean Conflict, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951, ACofS G-3,

Army War Plans Br, p. 4. (4) MFR, 11 Dec 50, sub:

Augmentation of the Army to Eighteen Divs in G-3,

DA file 320.2, Case 45. 19

 (1) Min, 51st mtg Army Policy Council, 6 Dec

50, in CofS, DA file 334 (APC). (2) MFR, 11 Dec

50, sub: Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45.

(3) PL 450, 82d Congress, 2d session, H. J. Resolution 477 as amended by PL 12, 83d Congress.
300 POLICY AND DIRECTION

to repel any and all threats against our

national security. . . 20

Washington officials asked MacArthur

to sound out opinion within his command on the President's proclamation.

MacArthur replied that because of limitations of time and the "far flung distribution" of his various subcommands

no real sampling of reactions to the

speech could be obtained. But, as far

as he could judge, the reaction was favorable. "There can be little doubt,

however," MacArthur concluded, "but

that most would concur in my own

personal opinion that the crucial realities of the nation's present circumstances

impel the immediate and complete

mobilization of our full military

potential."

 21

X Corps Is Ordered Out of North Korea

The possibility that evacuation might

be forced by enemy pressure was being

considered in Tokyo at this same time.

On 6 December, General Wright gave

General MacArthur a detailed study of

the problem of quitting Korea should

it become necessary. Wright pointed

out that an evacuation through Inch'on

would be slow and dangerous. Pusan,

on the other hand, offered every advantage for speedy and efficient outloading of men and equipment. At Pusan,

twenty-eight ships could be berthed

around the clock while Inch'on could

handle only LST's and similar assault

craft and then only for two 4-hour periods each day. Pusan had pier-crane

facilities for all types of heavy lift, while

Inch'on had none. The turnaround

time from Japan to Pusan, moreover,

was only one-fourth that from Japan to

Inch'on. By conservative estimate, General Wright believed that all U.N. units

and equipment could be taken out of

Pusan five times as fast as from Inch'on.

Wright realized, too, that air operations

against the Chinese would be more effective as the enemy moved deeper into

Korea. If the evacuation took place

from Pusan, it could be inferred that

MacArthur's forces had delayed successively and that rear airfields would be

maintained and protected. Once these

forces reached the old Pusan Perimeter,

Japanese airfields could be used to

continue effective support of the

evacuation.22

Following this line of reasoning, General Wright then recommended that

Almond's corps be sealifted from the

northeastern portion of Korea at the

earliest practicable date and relanded at

Pusan or P'ohang-dong. Wright further

recommended that X Corps be absorbed

by the Eighth Army. Thus strengthened,

the Eighth Army would make withdrawals in successive positions—if necessary, to the Pusan Perimeter.23

General MacArthur was most reluctant to place Almond under Walker's

command, but yielded to what appeared

to him to be the overriding wisdom of

consolidating his strength in Korea. On

7 December, he approved General

Wright's recommendations and notified 20

 (1) Presidential Proclamation 2914, 16 Dec 50.

(2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 3520. 21

 (1) Rad, DA 99090, DA to CINCFE, 17 Dec 50.

(2) Rad, C 51515, CINCFE to DA for Haislip, 18

Dec 50.

22

 (1) Memo, Gen Wright for CofS, GHQ, UNC, 6

Dec 50. (2) Comd Rpt, GHQ, UNC, Dec 50, Annex

4, Part III, "A" 741. 23

 Ibid.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 301

both Walker and Almond of his

decision.24 He told them:

Current planning provides for a withdrawal

in successive positions, if necessary, to the

Pusan area. Eighth Army will hold the

Seoul area for the maximum time possible

short of entailing such envelopment as

would prevent its withdrawal to the south.

Planning further envisions the early with- drawal of X Corps from the Hungnam area

and junction with Eighth Army as practicable. At such time, X Corps will pass to

command of the Eighth Army.25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur

at once that they approved his action

and that they felt Almond's corps should

be withdrawn from Hungnam as early

as practicable.26

At the 28 November meeting in

Tokyo, Almond had told MacArthur

that he could hold at Hungnam forever

if he were so ordered. Considered without reference to the plight of the Eighth

Army in the west, the presence of the

X Corps on the Chinese flank could have

proven of considerable military value.

But military considerations in northeast

Korea had become secondary. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff shortly instructed MacArthur to ignore that region.

Upon returning from the Tokyo consultations, Almond had directed his

forces to retire upon Hungnam. The

first order of business had been to extricate the Army and Marine units cut

off by the Chinese around the Changjin

Reservoir. Fighting as they withdrew

and aided by concentrated close air support, these Marine and Army troops

reached Hungnam on 11 December. By

the same date, most of Almond's remaining forces had reached the same area.

MacArthur converted his 7 December

withdrawal plans into orders on the 8th,

and on the 11th, flew into Yonp'o Airfield near Hungnam to hear in person

Almond's plan for taking the X Corps

out of northeastern Korea.27 Almond

told MacArthur that his corps could

clear Hungnam by 25 December and

close in Pusan by 27 December. The

total tonnage to be outloaded from

Hungnam would reach 400,000 tons.

To move this amount of tonnage by

water, 75 cargo vessels, 15 troopships,

and 40 LST's would be required. About

500 tons of men and equipment would

have to be airlifted each day from 14 to

18 December. Almond believed that the

withdrawal would be orderly, and that

enemy forces in the area were too limited

to interfere with the movement. No

supplies or organic equipment would

be destroyed or left behind.28

On 12 December, MacArthur notified

the Department of the Army that the X

Corps had started withdrawing, with the

ROK 3d Division already en route by

water to Pusan. The plan for the remainder of the evacuation provided for

the contraction of the corps defense perimeter around the Hamhung-Hungnam

area as the corps units departed in

phases.29

There were no manuals to rely on in

24

 (1) Comments, Gen Hickey on Appleman MS,

14 Feb 56. (2) Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to All

Comdrs, 7 Dec 50. 25

 Ibid.

26

 Rad, JCS 94800, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Dec 50.

27

 (1) Rad, CX 50801, CINCUNC to All Comdrs,

8 Dec 50. (2) Comd Rpt, U.S. X Corps, Dec 50.

(3) Rad, CX 50801, CINCUNC to CG X Corps,

9 Dec 50. 28

 Memo, by Gen Almond, 11 Dec 50, sub: Movement of X Corps to the Pusan Area, GHQ, UNC

Comd Rpt, Dec 50, Annex 4, Part III, "I" 1475. 29

 Rad, CX 51102, CINCFE to DA, 12 Dec 50.
302 POLICY AND DIRECTION

TRACKED AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES of 3d Infantry Division coming off the beach

at Hungnam, 24 December 1950.

the planning and carrying out of the

evacuation of such great numbers of

troops and such great quantities of equipment from an area under constant enemy

pressure. There was no time, either, for

research or experimentation. Unlike

Dunkerque, the evacuation plan called

for the removal of all equipment and

supplies.30

Department of the Army officials were

apprehensive lest Almond's force leave

behind supplies and equipment which

would be of value to the enemy. On 19

December, in a teleconference with the

Far East Command's representatives,

they asked what plans had been made

for the evacuation or destruction of X

Corps' supplies and whether or not it

appeared that these plans could be carried out successfully. These officials

were reassured by General MacArthur's

staff, who told them that the evacuation

plan called for the transfer of X Corps'

supplies to the Eighth Army area. Such

items as were excess or damaged but repairable would be sent to Japan. Any

30

 X Corps Special Rpt, Hungnam Evacuation

December 1950.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 303

USS BEGOR LIES AT ANCHOR ready to load the last U.N. landing craft as a

huge explosion rips harbor installations at Hungnam.

supplies which could not be loaded out

in time would be destroyed. Most of

the stocks of food and ammunition would

have been used up by troops covering the

evacuation. "The prospect of successfully implementing the evacuation," Department of the Army officials were

reassured, "are excellent."

 31

Fortunately, and for reasons best

known to themselves, the Chinese made

no concerted effort to overrun the beachhead, although light scattered thrusts

suggesting reconnaissance in preparation

for larger operations were made by them

throughout the evacuation operation.

As the corps perimeter contracted, naval

gunfire, artillery, and air support were intensified against the possibility of enemy

attempts to build up forces for major

assaults. The 3d Division provided the

last defensive force for the perimeter,

and, on 24 December, strongly supported

by naval gunfire and carrier-based marine and naval aircraft, successfully executed the final withdrawal from the

Hungnam beachhead. Extensive demo31

 (1) Telecon, TT 4147, DA and GHQ, 19 Dec 50.

(2) Rad, C 51686, CINCFE to DA, 20 Dec 50.
304 POLICY AND DIRECTION

litions of bridges and installations of

military value were carried out at the

last minute. According to X Corps

officers, no serviceable equipment or supplies were abandoned, and all personnel

were evacuated.32 All together, 193

shiploads of men and matériel were

moved out of Hungnam Harbor aboard

Navy transports. Approximately 105,-

000 fighting men, 98,000 Korean civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons

of bulk cargo were removed from the

beachhead.33

As Almond's troops evacuated their

holdings in northeast Korea, the Eighth

Army continued to withdraw to the

south. Chinese pressure did not force

these displacements. They were part of

Walker's general withdrawal plan to

form a continuous defensive line across

Korea at the most advantageous position.

The Eighth Army still had no contact

with the Chinese, but intelligence reports showed that the enemy was moving

into P'yongyang. By mid-December, the

Eighth Army occupied a vague line extending along the south bank of the

Imjin River, through Yongp'yong,

Hwach'on, and Inje, to Yangyang on the

east coast.34

The Chinese did not follow up Walker's withdrawal as closely as had been

expected. In mid-December, ROK units

in east central Korea had been attacked

by North Korean troops. These North

Korean forces appeared to be engaged

in a screening and reconnaissance mission for the Chinese. Since the North

Koreans were operating on their home

grounds it was natural they should be

used for this purpose. Throughout the

next several days, more and more North

Koreans appeared in front of the Eighth

Army, apparently probing the line on

behalf of the Chinese. American authorities were frankly puzzled by the

actions of the Chinese. General Willoughby had several theories which he

passed along to Washington. "Due to

the depth of the withdrawal executed by

Eighth Army," he said, "it is evident that

the enemy, lacking any great degree of

mobility has been unable to regain contact." He surmised that the Chinese

had expected Walker to make a strong

stand north of P'yongyang and that when

he failed to do so the Chinese had been

thrown off-balance. "There is little

doubt but that he is now regrouping his

forces under the screen of North Korean

units," the UNC intelligence chief asserted, "preparatory to renewing the

offensive at a time of his own choosing."

It had been reliably reported that the

Chinese had entered P'yongyang soon

after it was deserted by the Eighth Army,

but the whereabouts of the main body

of Chinese forces in late December

remained a mystery.35

On 19 December, Willoughby again

expressed his puzzlement, telling Washington, "The whereabouts of the Chinese

Communist forces and the reasons why

these units have remained so long out

of contact continue in the speculative

realm." He felt that an offensive was

not immediately forthcoming since the

lack of contact with the Chinese and the 32

 X Corps Special Rpt, Dec 50, sub: Hungnam

Evacuation, 9-24 Dec 50. 33

 Comd Rpt, GHQ, UNC, Dec 50. 34

 Comd Rpt, Hq, EUSAK, Dec 50, p. 62, plate

6, line B.

35

 (1) Telecon, TT 4135, DA and GHQ, 14 Dec

50. (2) Telecon, TT 4142, DA and GHQ, 18

Dec 50.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 305

VEHICLES TO BE LOADED ABOARD SHIPS at Hungnam during withdrawal from

that town.

relatively light pressure being exerted

by North Korean forces against the

Eighth Army did not point in that direction. In order to find out just what

was going on, General MacArthur directed Walker to conduct aggressive

ground reconnaissance to a considerable

depth through the North Korean screen

with particular attention to finding probable routes of enemy advance, locations,

strengths, and to capture Chinese

prisoners for interrogation.36

General Walker was killed in a vehicle

accident near Uijongbu, Korea, on the

morning of 23 December 1950. General

Milburn, the I Corps commander, became acting commanding general of the

Eighth Army. The possibility that

Walker might be killed had been discussed earlier by General MacArthur and

General Collins during the latter's visits

to the Far East. General MacArthur

had told Collins that if Walker were lost

he wanted General Ridgway, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Department of the Army,

and one of General Collins' key assistants

in Washington, as Eighth Army commander. MacArthur was familiar with

Ridgway's fine combat record in World

War II and realized that Ridgway, in his

position at the Department of the Army,

was in extremely close touch with the

Korean situation and capable of stepping

in at once. Upon Walker's death, an

36

 (1) Telecon, TT 4147, DA and GHQ, 19 Dec

50. (2) Telecon, TT 4156, DA and GHQ, 21 Dec 50.
306 POLICY AND DIRECTION

immediate call was made from Tokyo to

General Collins, who obtained clearance

from Secretary Marshall and President

Truman on the designation of Ridgway

as the new Eighth Army commander.37

General Ridgway left Washington almost immediately and reached Tokyo at

midnight on Christmas Day.

No American outside the Far East

knew more about the Korean situation

than General Ridgway. In his position

as deputy chief of staff for administration all reports, studies, and recommendations on Korea at the national level

had passed through his hands. It was he

who had taken much of the action to

speed the shipments of units and replacements to MacArthur in July and August.

He had gone with the President's special

representative, Mr. Harriman, to Tokyo

in August during the touch-and-go battles around Pusan. He had conferred

with MacArthur and seen the Eighth

Army's plight at first hand.

Ridgway's whole career had prepared

him to command the Eighth Army. As

a young officer he had served in China

and in the Philippines. During World

War II he had commanded an airborne

division, later, a corps. He had led his

troops brilliantly through Sicily and

Normandy, through the Battle of the

Bulge, and to the Baltic at the war's end.

After the war, in a variety of staff and

command assignments, Ridgway had

gained valuable knowledge of Communist methods, purposes, and strategies.

He was convinced they had to be stopped

in Korea.

Ridgway took command of forces in

Korea that had suffered a month of reversals. No major decisions as to future

courses of action had yet been reached

although numerous exploratory steps had

been taken. As in November, once the

enemy relaxed pressure, the nation's

planners seemed to slacken their efforts

to find a solution. The problems facing

the United States and the United Nations Command were more political than

military. Such decisions as whether or

not to take action against the Chinese

aggressors outside Korea had been raised

but not answered. The problem of

whether or not to evacuate had also been

raised, but had been put aside as a result

of lessening enemy pressure. The same

fact had befallen the closely related

cease-fire problem. The question of

whether or not to reinforce the Far East

Command was half answered by the

nation's inability to do so, and the rest

of the answer was obscured by the fog of

indecision surrounding the core of the

problem, "What is the best course of

action now."

Ridgway Takes Over

Christmas found the Eighth Army

halted uneasily near the 38th Parallel,

awaiting its new commander and the

new enemy. Signs were increasing that

the Chinese were closing the gap and

were advancing down the peninsula in

a co-ordinated effort to feel out the

Eighth Army's defenses before launching another major attack. A tense calm

hung over the battle area. In a telephone report from Korea on 26 December, General Allen, Chief of Staff, Eighth

Army, told GHQ officers, "We got

another army. Pick up another one

about every day. They are just build- 37

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 588, 1201-02.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 307

ing up. Don't know when they will hit.

That is all we have. Otherwise dead

quiet."

 38

MacArthur told Ridgway that the best

he could hope for was a tactical success,

possibly holding and defending South

Korea. He remarked, "We are now

operating in a mission vacuum while

diplomacy attempts to feel its way. . . ."

Any substantial military success by Ridgway's Eighth Army would greatly

strengthen the hands of the diplomats.

Tactical air power had proven disappointing to MacArthur, who now

charged that it could not isolate the

battlefield or stop the flow of enemy reinforcements into the battle. MacArthur reiterated that the Chinese were

dangerous opponents and that the entire Chinese military establishment was

coming into Korea to win. Touching

on his recommendations to Washington,

MacArthur remarked that the Chinese

mainland was wide open in the south

for attack by forces on Formosa. He had

recommended that such an attack be

made since it would relieve the pressure

in Korea.39

Ridgway found MacArthur discouraged by the swing of events in Korea

and ready to turn over to him a great

deal of authority and latitude in directing combat operations. MacArthur indicated to Ridgway that he was to be

both empowered and expected to plan

and carry out all military operations of

the United Nations forces in Korea. He

told Ridgway that he was to act as he

thought best. "You will make mistakes

in Korea," MacArthur said, "we all do.

But I will take full responsibility." He

also told Ridgway that the X Corps

would pass to his control as soon as it

arrived in South Korea.40

When Ridgway questioned MacArthur

more specifically as to his authority in

directing operations in Korea, including

a possible attack, MacArthur simply

said, "Matt, the Eighth Army is yours."

"No field commander could have asked

for more," Ridgway says of this full

grant of authority.41

General Ridgway thus went into Korea

carrying a carte blanche to employ the

Eighth Army as he found best and without reference to Tokyo for instructions.

Ridgway could attack, defend, or withdraw; the decision was left to him. But

while he was not required and never did

ask confirmation of his actions, he did

notify MacArthur in detail of his intentions. But MacArthur never questioned him. Whereas Walker had been

kept under close supervision and control,

Ridgway was not.42

38

 General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean

War, Issues and Policies, June 1950-June 1951, pp.

350-53, MS, copy in OCMH. 39

 (1) Ibid. (2) See also Matthew B. Ridgway,

The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co.,

1967), pp. 82-83.

40

 Ibid.

41

 Ibid.

42

 General Ridgway recalls that between the time

he assumed command and March 1951, after the

Eighth Army had begun its northward march, General MacArthur stayed aloof from tactical decisions

and visited Korea only twice. Thereafter he visited

Korea and Ridgway weekly. Ridgway also expressed the belief that, had he thought it necessary,

he could have led the Eighth Army out of Korea

without recrimination from his superiors. General

Hickey, who was acting chief of staff under MacArthur and, later, chief of staff under Ridgway, was

of the opinion that Ridgway was under no restrictions on withdrawing, and that it was Ridgway's

decisions and actions that eventually tipped the

balance and kept the Eighth Army fighting in Korea.

See Intervs, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51, and

Appleman with Hickey, 10 Oct 51.
308 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Fear that the Eighth Army might

evacuate Korea obsessed the South

Koreans. Admittedly, the specter had

substance. The final decision awaited

the outcome on the battlefield but the

prospects were not bright at the moment.

One of Ridgway's first acts on reaching

Korea was to call on President Rhee

in Seoul and to assure him, "I am glad to

be here and I aim to stay." To the men

of his new command, Ridgway announced bluntly, "You will have my

utmost. I shall expect yours."

 43

During his conference with General

MacArthur, Ridgway had asked for and

received permission to attack in order

to regain lost ground, and when he went

to Korea he fully intended to attack as

soon as possible. But he found not only

his major commanders but also his

Eighth Army staff extremely skeptical

of such an attack. They were not, in

Ridgway's words, "offensive minded."

Under the circumstances and in view

of these attitudes, Ridgway decided

against an attack in the immediate future, at least during the remainder of

December. But he ordered plans made

at once for offensive operations and he

set about instilling an "attack" spirit

into his staff. "I skinned Eighth Army

staff officers individually and collectively

many times to have them do what I

wanted," Ridgway later recalled. "I

told them heads would roll if my orders

were not carried out"; and he warned

his staff, "I am going to attack to find

out where the enemy is since G-2 cannot

give me clear evidence."

 44

With characteristic directness, Ridgway began forcing the army to turn its

eyes to the front. Step by step, in deliberate and carefully conceived actions

and orders, he bore down on his new

command. By example and by exhortation, he began shaking his staff, commanders, and men out of the defeatist

mood. Where toughness was required,

he was tough; where persuasion was indicated, he persuaded; and where personal example was needed, he set the

example.

A Decision Hangs Fire

The enemy, meanwhile, had completed his concentrations and other

preparations for attacking the Eighth

Army, and on the night of 31 December

introduced the New Year with a general

offensive south of the 38th parallel.

(Map VI) The Chinese attacked on a

44-mile front stretching east from Kaesong on Ridgway's left flank to a point

northwest of Ch'unch'on on the east

central front. The main effort came

down the Yongch'on-Uijongbu-Seoul

axis, obviously aimed at the seizure of

Seoul and Inch'on. General Ridgway,

in reporting the attack to General MacArthur, predicted that the Chinese invasion of South Korea was a prelude to

an attempt by the Chinese to drive his

command from the Korean peninsula by

sheer manpower. "The Army Eight,"

Ridgway told MacArthur, "will continue

43

 Ridgway's activities and reactions during the

first several weeks after his assumption of command

are well covered in his manuscript, The Korean

War, Issues and Policies, June 1950-June 1951; in

his books, Soldier and The Korean War; in various

interviews and conversations with the author; and

in interviews with Dr. John Miller, jr., Major Owen

Carroll, and Mr. B. C. Mossman, 30 November

1956, copies in OCMH. 44

 Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51.

THE BRINK OF DISASTER 309

KOREAN REFUGEES slog through snow outside of Kangnung, northwest of Samchok,

8 January 1951.

its present mission, inflicting the maximum punishment and delaying in successive positions while maintaining its

major forces intact."

 45

The great strength of the Chinese assault in the west and the imminent danger of a breakthrough and envelopment

down the east central corridors, defended largely by ROK units, forced

General Ridgway reluctantly to direct

certain withdrawals in early January.

On 1 January, Ridgway ordered his

western divisions to fall back from the

Imjin River to a line slightly north of

the Han River that formed a deep

bridgehead around Seoul. But when

the enemy swiftly followed up this withdrawal, Ridgway on 3 January decided

to move south of the Han and to abandon Seoul. He was determined that this

rearward move would be fought as a delaying action and so instructed his corps

commanders. On 4 January, the Eighth

Army started back to a line extending

from P'yongt'aek on the west coast eastward to the coastal village of Samch'ok.46

Reports reached General Ridgway that 45

 Msg, C 52524, CINCFE to DA (quoting Ridgway), 2 Jan 51. 46

 Comd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51, Narrative, p. 56.
310 POLICY AND DIRECTION

in withdrawing from the Han River

some of his major units failed to damage

the enemy materially or even delay him

appreciably. Some units actually had

broken contact with the enemy to fall

back. Ridgway addressed his corps commanders sternly on this matter, emphasizing that he expected them to exploit

fully every opportunity to damage the

enemy.47

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Consider Options

Even before this January demonstration of Chinese power, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had concluded that the Chinese

Communists had enough strength to

drive MacArthur out of Korea. But

they wanted MacArthur to stay if he

could. A quick, massive build-up of

the forces in Korea, much greater than

that for Operation CHROMITE five

months earlier, might keep the Eighth

Army from being shoved into the Sea

of Japan; but a major build-up, especially a quick one, was out of the question

in view of shortages of combat divisions

in the United States and the worsening

world situation. On 30 December, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff scotched any vestigial hopes which MacArthur might

have held for additional ground forces by

telling him that they would not send any

more American divisions to fight in

Korea at that time.48

Chinese successes in Korea had, concomitantly, increased the threat of a

general war, encouraging further Communist military moves against other sensitive areas and heightening the tensions

between the Soviet bloc and those nations allied with the United States. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed this out to

MacArthur and told him bluntly, "We

believe that Korea is not the place to

fight a major war." If more American

divisions were sent to Korea, American

commitments throughout the world, including protection of Japan, would be

seriously jeopardized.49

This news came as no surprise to MacArthur. Collins had told him substantially the same thing three weeks

earlier when he had pressed for an increase in the strength of other United

Nations contingents to a total of 75,000

men. The Joint Chiefs now told him

that this could not be done either. "It

is not practicable to obtain significant

additional forces for Korea from other

members of the United Nations," they

said.50

In the minds of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the best way for MacArthur to keep

from being pushed off Korea was to

fight and to fight hard. If the Eighth

Army fought and killed enough enemy

troops, Chinese and North Korean commanders might give up any attempt to

drive the United Nations out of Korea

as too costly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

expected no miracles. But if the Eighth

Army could, without losing too many

men and too much equipment, stop and

hold the Chinese, not necessarily north

of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur would

have done his nation a great service.

For the prestige, both military and polit47

 Ibid., p. 12. 48

 Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,

30 Dec 50.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 311

ical, which the Chinese Communists had

lately acquired by defeating the United

Nations Command in North Korea, was

exceedingly detrimental to the national

interests of the United States; and MacArthur could deflate that prestige by

staging a military comeback.

The events of the past month had

shown clearly that General MacArthur's

military mission assigned on 27 September stood in need of revision. The Joint

Chiefs revised it in these words: "You

are now directed to defend in successive

positions. . . ." These positions were

those which MacArthur had already described to his major commanders on 7

December. In addition to defending

these positions, MacArthur was to damage the enemy as much as possible, "subject to the primary consideration of the

safety of your troops."

 51

But the Washington authorities fully

realized that mere words and military

directives would not halt the Chinese and

that enemy pressure might, in spite of

MacArthur's best efforts, force him to

evacuate Korea. They saw, too, that it

was advisable to determine, in advance

if possible, the last reasonable opportunity for MacArthur's command to evacuate in an orderly fashion. This was

especially important since the enemy

threatened not only Korea, but, in league

with the Soviet Union, posed, by no great

stretch of the imagination, a real threat

to Japan. With Japan gone, MacArthur's command could only fall

back on Okinawa, Formosa, or the

Philippines.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff told General

MacArthur:

It seems to us that if you are forced back

to positions in the vicinity of the Kum

River and a line generally eastward there- from, and if thereafter the Chinese Com- munists mass large forces against your posi- tions with an evident capability of forcing

us out of Korea, it then would be necessary,

under those conditions, to direct you to

commence a withdrawal to Japan.52

When the Joint Chiefs sought MacArthur's ideas on the timing of such a

withdrawal, MacArthur assured them

that there was no need to make a decision for evacuation until his forces

were actually forced back to what he

called the "beachhead line." Since the

term beachhead line could be interpreted several ways, the Joint Chiefs

asked MacArthur to be more specific.

General Collins had brought back from

the Far East a marked map showing nine

possible defensive positions to be occupied by the Eighth Army in its withdrawal down the peninsula. One line

marked positions held by the Eighth

Army along the Naktong River in early

September, and the Joint Chiefs asked

MacArthur if this line was the beachhead

line he had in mind. He stated that it

was, but pointed out that exactly where

the line would run should be regarded

as completely flexible. "In an actual

evacuation under pressure there would

be progressive further contractions to a

final inner arc," he told them. "The

operation would probably be generally

similar to that at Hungnam." General

Collins still did not understand which

line MacArthur meant. He reminded

MacArthur that three lines on his

marked map could be interpreted as a

beachhead line, and asserted that when

51 Ibid. 52

 Ibid.
312 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the Eighth Army had been forced back to

the northernmost of the three, the time

for final decision would have arrived.53

Evacuation Plans

The rumor of a United Nations withdrawal from Korea spread quickly among

men and officers of the ROK Army.

General Ridgway pointed out to General

MacArthur on 8 January that the apprehension among ROK soldiers as to

their future was dangerous and could

seriously affect his command. Ridgway

suggested that MacArthur make a public

statement which would serve to banish

the fears of the ROK fighting forces.

MacArthur passed this suggestion to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment

that "A reassuring statement by me such

as General Ridgway suggests is impossible unless and until the basis for such a

statement is established by policy

determination at governmental level."

 54

MacArthur had already directed his

staff to continue planning the evacuation

procedures. Since an actual evacuation

would be largely a Navy task, General

Wright, the G-3, turned to the Navy for

advice. Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke,

Deputy Chief of Staff, COMNAVFE, on

7 January addressed Wright on the problems and factors to be considered. If

the evacuation took place from Pusan,

there was a strong likelihood it would be

done under enemy pressure. There

would be little similarity between a

Pusan evacuation and the removal of

forces from the Hungnam beachhead.

Both in scale and difficulty, the Pusan

operation would surpass that at Hungnam. Consequently, the length of time

required to move troops and supplies

would be much greater, and Burke therefore urged the early completion of advance plans. He advised Wright to

designate at once the division which

would hold the final perimeter at Pusan.

Burke recommended the 1st Marine Division since it had special training in

naval procedures, including the requirements for naval gunfire support, and had

proven its combat effectiveness on more

than one occasion. For employment on

the intermediate perimeter, which would

probably be manned by two divisions,

Burke felt that any of the Army divisions

would do.55

No divisions were ever designated for

these duties, since by the middle of January the military situation gave General

Wright some reason to believe that a

forced withdrawal might not materialize.

By 16 January, in fact, Wright was willing to speculate that, unless political

considerations required or indicated

withdrawal as the best course of action,

it would be possible for the United Nations Command to remain in Korea as

long as higher authority dictated. He

hesitated to establish an evacuation target date even for planning purposes

since, in his mind, the proper date would

be dictated by enemy action and "political considerations." He did estimate

53

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS, 30 Dec 50. (3) Rad, DA 80149, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan 51. (4) Rad,

C 52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan 51. (5) Rad, DA

80253, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 4 Jan 51.

(6) Rad, C 52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins,

4 Jan 51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for

MacArthur, 9 Jan 51. 54

 Msg, C 52964, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Jan 51.

55

 Memo, COMNAVFE for Gen Wright, 7 Jan 51,

sub: Plans for Possible Re-Employment From Pusan

Area, GHQ, UNC, G-3 files.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 313

the time required for a complete withdrawal. On the basis of tonnage to be

removed from the peninsula, estimated

at 2,000,000 metric tons, the best possible

out-loading time, using all possible ports

of exit within the contracted defense

perimeter, would be fifty days.56

As a further step in evacuation planning, General Collins, while on another

visit to the theater, informed General

MacArthur on 15 January that if a UNC

evacuation became necessary, President

Truman wanted all members of the

ROK Government, ROK Army, and

ROK police forces taken out. General

MacArthur expressed satisfaction with

this directive, stating that he thought

it essential. Plans for the evacuation

were immediately begun, and when

Collins returned from Korea on 19 January the situation was laid before him.

General Hickey pointed out that more

than a million Koreans would have to be

evacuated under the President's order.

This figure included 36,000 ROK governmental officials and their dependents,

600,000 ROK police, and 260,000 ROK

soldiers. These latter two groups had

about 400,000 dependents. As to the

place to which these people would be

removed, Collins and MacArthur agreed

that as many ROK soldiers as possible

would be placed on the off-shore island

of Cheju-do in order to maintain, after

evacuation, a legal status for continuing

to fight in Korea.

A possible complication in planning

and achieving any evacuation of ROK

personnel as directed by President Truman rested in a recent ROK petition to

the United States for aid in strengthening ROK forces. In December, the

ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs had

asked Secretary of Defense Marshall to

"release to us all the light arms which are

available, in order that our young men

may hurl themselves in the face of the

advancing enemy." At the same time,

the Korean Ambassador, Dr. John M.

Chang, had urged the Department of

State to arm the so-called Korean Youth

Corps, which Chang claimed consisted

of 500,000 young men, all eager to fight

the Chinese. The Department of State

recommended to the Department of Defense that this be done, but only after

these Korean youths had been formed

into organized units under the control

and discipline of the military authorities

in Korea.57 General Marshall directed

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look into

these requests and to obtain General

MacArthur's views on their propriety.

In General MacArthur's mind, the

whole problem of giving more arms to

the ROK Government centered not on

whether these units could be created and

armed but on whether any advantage was

to be gained by so doing. MacArthur

emphasized that large numbers of small

arms had already been given ROK police

units, antiguerrilla security forces, and

special ROK organizations for use in

enemy-held territory. But friendly

guerrilla forces lacked strong-willed

leadership and were accomplishing little

in enemy rear areas. Enemy guerilla

56

 Memo, Gen Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC (Gen

Hickey), 16 Jan 51, sub: Disposition of U.N. Forces

in Korea in Event of Withdrawal From Korea, G-3,

GHQ, UNC files.

57

 (1) Ltr, B. C. Limb, ROK Minister of Foreign

Affairs, to Gen George C. Marshall, Secy Defense,

12 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 149.

(2) Ltr, H. Freeman Mathews, Depy Under Secy

State, to Maj Gen James H. Burns, OSD, 12 Dec

50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 137.
314 POLICY AND DIRECTION

units, on the other hand, continued to

operate effectively throughout South

Korea.58

General MacArthur believed that

checking the enemy would depend upon

setting up a defense with U.S. divisions

deployed in depth and in mutually supporting positions. This observation

strongly indicates that MacArthur felt,

in early January, that his forces would

have to withdraw back to the Pusan

Perimeter or even farther. He expressed

the opinion that, because of the probably

restricted area of the battlefield in which

the United Nations forces might be fighting in the near future, and the greater

value per rifle that might be gained by

arming the Japanese National Police Reserve, training and arming of additional

ROK forces appeared questionable. He

recommended that the extra South

Korean manpower be used to replace

losses in existing ROK units, concluding:

The long range requirement for or desir- ability of arming additional ROK personnel

appears to be dependent primarily upon

determination of the future United States

military position with respect to both the

Korean campaign and the generally critical

situation in the Far East.59

MacArthur had once again taken the

opportunity to point out to the Washington officials that he did not feel their

policy was sufficiently clear. Further,

if evacuation became necessary he did not

want a bigger ROK Army to evacuate.

The big question in MacArthur's

mind, now as before, was whether there

was to be a change in national policy

that would make evacuation unnecessary.

If there was such a change, and the steps

which MacArthur had proposed were

taken, evacuation would not be necessary. But if the nation's leaders appeared unwilling to make this policy

change, MacArthur felt that eventual

evacuation was inevitable and that there

was no reason why the Joint Chiefs of

Staff should not issue their evacuation

directive to him right away. If some

slight chance existed that national policy

might be changed, even if not immediately, General MacArthur felt that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff could delay issuing

the evacuation directive until the Eighth

Army had been forced back to the ninth

and final marked position he had drawn

around Pusan in the hope that an extension of military activity against the

Chinese might be allowed and evacuation

staved off.60

58

 Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51. 59

 Msg, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51.

60

 (1) Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 29 Dec 50. (2) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur

(Personal) for JCS, 30 Dec 50. (3) Rad, DA 80149,

Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan 51. (4) Rad,

C 52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan 51. (5) Rad, DA

80253, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 4 Jan 51.

(6) Rad, C 52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins,

4 Jan 51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for

MacArthur, 9 Jan 51.
CHAPTER XVII

The Search For Policy

The changes in policy to which General MacArthur constantly referred involved decisions by the President to take,

or not to take, certain specific military

actions against the Chinese. General

MacArthur first suggested such measures

in conversations with General Collins

early in December, and throughout the

term of his command in Korea insisted

with increasing emphasis that the actions

he had sponsored be carried out.

MacArthur's view of the world situation, with particular emphasis on his own

theater, was simple in its approach but

exceedingly complex in its implications.

He reasoned that the Chinese had, omitting only the formality of open declaration, gone to war against the United

Nations Command. The Chinese were

prosecuting this war, in MacArthur's

view, with all the resources at their disposal and were being supported logistically by the Soviet Union.

On 30 December, he posed four retaliatory measures that he believed feasible and that would require a relatively

small commitment of military forces.

The first was to blockade the China

coast; the second, to destroy Communist

China's war industries through naval

gunfire and air bombardment; the third,

to reinforce the troops in Korea with

part of the Chinese Nationalist garrison

on Formosa; and the fourth, to allow

diversionary operations by the Nationalist troops against vulnerable areas of the

Chinese mainland. These measures, he

was certain, could not only relieve the

pressure on United Nations forces in

Korea but could indeed severely cripple

Communist China's war-making potential and thus save Asia from a Communist engulfment that otherwise faced it.

While he realized that such actions previously had been rejected for fear of

provoking Communist China into a

major war effort, he now insisted that

Communist China was already fully committed and that the retaliatory steps

therefore could not prompt it to greater

efforts. He also realized that there might

be some danger of Russian interference

if the courses he described were adopted.

But he discounted this risk, reasoning

that any Russian decision to start a general war would be reached solely on a

basis of Russia's own estimate of relative

strength and capabilities of the United

States and itself.1

If Communist China was permitted to

1

 Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS,

30 Dec 50.
316 POLICY AND DIRECTION

get away with what he called its "flagrant

aggression," and if the United Nations

Command evacuated Korea without attacking the Chinese mainland, MacArthur believed that the Asian peoples,

including the Japanese, would be greatly

dismayed. He implied that the United

States would lose so much face with these

peoples that a material reinforcement of

the Far East Command would be necessary even to hold the littoral island defense chain, including Japan.2

MacArthur pointed out that the evacuation of his forces from Korea under any

circumstances, forced or otherwise, would

at once release the bulk of the Chinese

Army then occupied in Korea and leave

them free to attack other areas—quite

probably areas of far greater importance

than Korea itself. MacArthur claimed:

On the other hand, the relatively small

command we now have in Korea is capable

of so draining the enemy's resources as to

protect the areas to the south which would

in itself be possibly a greater contribution

to the general situation than could be made

by such a force disposed in other areas for

purely defense purposes, but not possessing

the power to pin down and localize so massive a part of the enemy's potential as now

committed in Korea.

The ROK Army, if a general evacuation

took place, would disintegrate or become

of negligible value. Japan itself would

become extremely vulnerable following

the loss of Korea.3

MacArthur again assailed the refusal

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send reinforcements to his aid in Korea. This

refusal had been based on the possibility

of a greater need for these forces, in case

of emergency, in areas more strategic

than Korea. MacArthur explained to

his superiors that sending additional

forces to the Far East would foster rather

than hinder the development of military

resources in those strategic areas, particularly in western Europe. "I understand

thoroughly the demand for European

security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector," MacArthur

continued, "but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else—an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to

insure later defeat in Europe." He noted

that the preparations for the defense of

Europe were, by the most optimistic estimates, based upon a condition of readiness two years in the future, and he

argued that sending him more American

divisions could not possibly prejudice

these preparations. Rather, it would insure thoroughly seasoned forces for later

commitment to Europe synchronously

with Europe's own build-up of military

strength.4

Touching briefly upon the Joint

Chiefs' tactical estimate of the situation

in Korea and the danger of forced evacuation, General MacArthur agreed that

their estimate was sound under the con2

 Ibid.

3

 Ibid.

4

 (1) Ibid. (2) On 19 December 1950, President

Truman had, at the request of the NATO Council,

appointed General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Eisenhower was to establish in western Europe an

integrated allied command to which the member nations of NATO would contribute such forces as they

were able. MacArthur knew of this. At this date,

however, the plans for an allied defense of Europe,

including the extent of United States participation

had not been prepared. For the story of this planning and the later build-up of NATO forces in

western Europe, see Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954

(Utrecht: Bosch-Utrecht, 1955).
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 317

ditions then existing. These conditions

were, as he enumerated them: no reinforcements, continued restrictions upon

Chinese Nationalist action, no military

measures against continental China, and

the concentration of China's strength

solely upon the Korean sector.5

The various actions MacArthur recommended against the Chinese outside of

Korea were quite plainly acts of war.

The United Nations was not committed,

and all indications pointed toward a

great reluctance on the part of its member nations to commit themselves to a

war with China. The United States

could endorse MacArthur's recommendations on its own behalf, but the President

lacked authority to send any but American forces against China outside of Korea.

If he ordered MacArthur to carry out

the recommended actions, the United

States, ipso facto, would be at war with

China. Thus far, the Chinese Government had not declared war against the

United States and had, in fact, disclaimed

responsibility for the actions of Chinese

armies in Korea. While this was purely

a technicality it was an important one.

Confining the fighting in Asia to a

limited arena in Korea and preserving

the unity of the bloc of nations allied

with the United States against Communist aggression were basic principles of

established national policy. With these

aims uppermost in their minds, the nation's top policy-makers weighed and

analyzed each of the actions proposed

by General MacArthur to determine

whether or not the benefit to be derived

from it would justify the great risk of

causing the Korean fighting to mushroom and of alienating allied powers.6

The Retaliatory Measures: An

Examination

American leaders studied the specific

courses of possible retaliation against

Communist China carefully, seeking in

each case to determine how effective it

would prove if applied; if it were practicable; the effect of its application on

the unity of United States allies; and,

looming larger than all the other points,

if it would cause a general war. The

existing national policy approved by

President Truman stated, "The United

States should not permit itself to become

involved in a general war with Communist China."

 7 Russia and Communist

China had concluded a "peace and universal security" treaty which was made

public on 15 February 1950. This treaty

could be invoked by either party against

"a state which indirectly or directly

unites with Japan in acts of aggression,"

or where "important international questions touching on the mutual interests

of the Soviet Union and China exist."

 8

Hence, the treaty materially increased

5

 Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS,

30 Dec. 50.

6

 President Truman's thoughts on this controversial subject are pertinent. In his view, the United

States was in Korea in the name of and on behalf

of the United Nations. The unified command under General MacArthur was a United Nations Command and neither the President nor MacArthur

would have been justified in exceeding the mission

originally established by the United Nations General Assembly. Unrestricted military action against

China, however attractive, had to be avoided if for

no other reason than that it was a huge booby trap. 7

 JCS 1924/35. 8 Rpt by the JSSC to the JCS on Possible Action

in Event of Open Hostilities Between the United

States and China, 6 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 381

China, Case 1/3.
318 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the possibility of Russian intervention in

the event retaliatory measures were invoked against China.

Naval Blockade of China

The United States had imposed an

economic embargo on Communist China

on 3 December. All exports from the

United States to Communist China had

been banned with the exception of those

authorized by validated export licenses;

and no more such licenses were issued.

On 14 December, the President authorized the Departments of State and Treasury to work out the application of

controls over Chinese Communist assets

in the United States. On 17 December,

these assets were brought under control

by a blocking order from the Department

of the Treasury. On 16 December, the

Department of Commerce had issued

orders prohibiting United States ships

and aircraft from visiting Chinese Communist ports.9

 But these economic sanctions were never fully effective because

other nations, including members of the

United Nations with forces in Korea,

did not strictly observe them.

General MacArthur had recommended

that the coast of Communist China be

placed under a naval blockade, an entirely different matter from an economic

embargo. For the imposition of a naval

blockade implies the existence of a state

of war between the blockader and the

blockaded. It would have to be limited

to ports and coastal lands belonging to

or occupied by the enemy. It could not

bar access to neutral ports or coasts. It

would have to be applied equally to all

ships of all nations. Hence, if the United

States were to impose a naval blockade

of the Chinese mainland unilaterally and

without the full co-operation of the

United Nations, numerous undesirable

complications could arise.

Unless Port Arthur, Dairen, and Hong

Kong were blockaded, the whole procedure would prove ineffective. Russia

undoubtedly would demand unlimited

access to the Dairen and Port Arthur

areas, over which it exercised military

rights, and other privileges under SinoSoviet treaties. The British most certainly would refuse any American

blockade of Hong Kong. From a political standpoint, unilateral action on a

naval blockade probably would set the

United States apart from its allies and

promote the view that a war with China

would be simply a United States war.

On the other hand, Communist China

was extremely vulnerable to a properly

enforced naval blockade since China depended to a great degree on imports for

the materials of war as well as for other

goods. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore were very much interested in a

United Nations naval blockade as an

instrument of pressure against China.

They felt that if the United Nations

should declare a naval blockade, the Russians would respect it just as they had

the United Nations blockade of Korea.

If the United States undertook its own

blockade, however, the Russians might

conceivably oppose it with military action.10

9

 Note by Secy Commerce, sub: Position of the

United States Regarding a Blockade of Trade With

China, JCS 2118/3, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case

27/6.

10

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff later testified that they

were opposed to any naval blockade of China which

was not fully sanctioned and approved by the

United Nations. Not only did they believe that
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 319

Employment of Chinese

Nationalist Troops in Korea

General MacArthur had insisted on

several occasions, most recently on 30

December, that troops from Chiang Kaishek's forces on Formosa be sent to Korea

to fight. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had

consistently refused this request.

The strongest arguments against using

these troops lay in the political ill effects

of such action. As mentioned earlier, if

Chinese Nationalist troops were employed in Korea by the United States,

the United States would have to accept

the re-establishment, to a large degree,

of the World War II relationship between Nationalist China and the United

States. Recognition of this acceptance

would be widespread both nationally and

internationally. The United States

would have to reconsider, and possibly

revise, its announced policy toward Formosa. This policy, in effect the neutralization of Formosa, was based on

President Truman's announcement on

26 June 1950 in connection with the war

in Korea. Because they believed that

employment of Nationalist troops in

Korea would cause the Chinese Communists to behave with even greater militancy, a majority of the United Nations

members would probably reject a United

States proposal to that effect.

There was also a strong possibility that

any change in the American attitude toward Chiang involved in use of his troops

would be interpreted by western European nations as reducing the defense of

Europe to a lower priority. Further, the

move would be certain to make it much

harder to obtain a political solution to

the Korean conflict through negotiation

with the Chinese and North Koreans.

Chinese Nationalist Operations

Against the Mainland

As one of his proposals for relieving

the Communist Chinese pressure against

his troops in Korea, General MacArthur

had suggested that the United States "Release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action

(possibly leading to counter-invasion)

against vulnerable areas of the Chinese

mainland." If MacArthur's proposal

were taken at face value it would have

meant that the order, sent to him on

29 June 1950 to insure by naval and air

action that Formosa would not be used

as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland by the Chinese Nationalists, need only be rescinded. From then

on, it would be up to the Chinese Nationalists. But the problem was much

more complex than that. In addition,

there were a number of possible interpretations of the term "diversionary action," ranging from guerrilla action to

full-scale invasion by Chiang's forces,

supported by American naval and air

power. Authorities in Washington

studied this proposal from every conceivable angle to determine if it could be

profitably carried out.11

such a blockade would "leak like a sieve" but that

the dangers of alienating the British and of getting

into a shooting war with the Russians were too great

to accept. MacArthur, on the other hand, did not

think that an American blockade, including Port

Arthur and Dairen, would ". . . materially affect

in any way the great decisions that would be involved in bringing the Soviets into a global war."

See Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,

9 Jan 51; and MacArthur Hearings, pp. 261, 355,

483, 1188, 1517.

11

 Rpt, JIC to JCS, sub: Estimate on the Effectiveness of Anti-Communist Guerillas Operating in

China, JIG 318, in G-3, DA file 091 China, Case 41.
320 POLICY AND DIRECTION

The military capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa were

extremely limited. General MacArthur

was quite aware of this, having visited

Formosa on 31 July 1950. In comparison to mainland China, with its population of 452,000,000 and an army of over

2,000,000 men, the Nationalists on Formosa had a population under their control of only 7,500,000 and an army of

428,000 men. The Nationalist Army

had comparatively few arms; and these

were a mixture of American, Japanese,

Russian, and German weapons which

were poorly maintained. The ratio was

one individual weapon for every two and

a half men. American leaders were under no illusion that the Nationalists

could mount any sort of significant attack

against the Chinese mainland unless the

United States furnished the materials and

transportation. Nor could this be done

easily and quickly, even if the United

States should decide to divert resources

from other vital areas to support operations by Chiang Kai-shek.12

Considerations in Bombing China

Direct air and naval surface attacks on

the Chinese mainland were probably the

most immediate way of striking a hard

blow against the Communists. These

were also the actions most likely to precipitate a full-scale war.13

 All of the

nations allied with the United States

against Communist aggression in Korea

were strongly opposed to direct attack on

China. Since China had no great industrial centers, the most profitable targets

would be military and air installations,

railroads, and shipping facilities. But

experience in World War II had shown

that in spite of the best intentions and

most accurate bombing, the civil population suffered along with such targets;

and any heavy loss of civilian life undoubtedly would be sure to turn many

Asiatic nations against the United States.

There was little question, moreover, that

China, if faced with this bombing, would

call upon the USSR to come to its rescue.

Most American leaders were therefore

not willing to risk bombing China except

as a last resort.

In all the discussions of "privileged

sanctuary" enjoyed by the Chinese in

Manchuria no mention had been made

by MacArthur, or by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff for that matter, of a similar privileged sanctuary enjoyed by the United

Nations Command in Japan. Both naval

and air operations against Korea were

mounted from Japanese bases, and Japan

was the main staging area from which

thousands of U.N. troops were sent to

fight in Korea. Consequently, if the

United States bombed Manchuria to destroy enemy bases, the Chinese might

bomb Japan. Whether the Chinese possessed such a capability was certainly a

moot point; but it seemed reasonable to

assume that with Russian help it would

not take them long to acquire such a

capability.

President Truman stated that he had

never been able to believe that MacArthur, seasoned soldier that he was, did

not realize that introducing Chinese

Nationalist forces into mainland China

12

 JCS 2118/15, 29 Jan 51, in G-3, DA file 381

China, Case 6/3. 13

 Other than broadly hinting that the atomic

bomb would be effective in Korea, MacArthur did

not recommend officially or, as far as is known, unofficially, that the decision be taken to use the

atomic bomb against either the North Koreans or

the Chinese, in or out of Korea.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 321

would be an act of war. Certainly, a

commander who had been in the forefront of world events for thirty-five years

must realize that the Chinese people

would react to the bombing of their cities

in much the same manner as the people

of the United States would have done.

The President did not believe, either,

that MacArthur with his knowledge of

the Orient could really think that he

could cut off the vast flow of materials

from Russia merely by bombing Chinese

cities. The next step would have to be

the bombing of Vladivostok and the

Trans-Siberian railroad. Because he was

sure that MacArthur could not possibly

have overlooked these considerations

President Truman was left with the

simple conclusion that MacArthur was

ready to risk general war. The President

was not.14

Because they were not privy to MacArthur's intentions or to the instructions

given him, British officials grew concerned that he might do something that

would cause the conflict to spread beyond

Korea. When these misgivings were

brought to the attention of President

Truman, he attempted to allay British

fears by assuring Prime Minister Attlee:

There has not been any change in the

agreed United States-United Kingdom position that resistance to aggression in Korea

should continue in Korea unless and until

superior force required evacuation of our

troops. Present tactical situation does not

reflect any change in this position but rather

essential adjustments to cover increased

jeopardy to United Nations troops resulting

from recent marked decrease in effectiveness

of sorely tried South Korean divisions.15

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur an interim denial of his proposals

on 9 January. They told him that his

suggestions were being carefully considered but that, for the time being at least,

little chance existed for a switch in the

national policy. The blockade of the

China coast, for instance, if imposed,

would not take place until the United

Nations Command had either stabilized

the situation in Korea or had evacuated

the peninsula. Nor would American

authorities undertake such a blockade

without British approval, in deference

to the extensive British trade with China

through Hong Kong. The Joint Chiefs

felt also that any blockade required the

concurrence of the United Nations

Organization.16

The naval and air attacks which MacArthur wished to launch on the Chinese

mainland would, in the opinion of the

Joint Chiefs at this time, be authorized

only if the Chinese attacked American

forces outside of Korea, but no decision

would be made on the matter until the

eventuality arose. Nor did the Joint

Chiefs, doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek's

troops could have any decisive effect on

the outcome of the Korean campaign,

intend to approve their use in Korea.

They noted that these troops might have

a greater usefulness elsewhere in the

future.17

Neither did they believe that MacArthur should or could count on action

outside of Korea to ease the pressure on

his forces. They directed him to defend

in successive positions, inflicting the

greatest possible damage on enemy forces,

14

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 415-16. 15

 Rad, State to SCAP (including quotation of

Truman msg to Attlee), 12 Jan 51.

16

 Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,

9 Jan 51. 17 Ibid.
322 POLICY AND DIRECTION

"subject to primary consideration of the

safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan." At the same

time, they granted him authority to withdraw from Korea to Japan if in his judgment evacuation was essential to avoid

severe losses of men and matériel.18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given

MacArthur two major interlocking

courses of action to follow. Whereas he

was to defend Korea, this defense was

secondary to his mission of saving his

troops from destruction and protecting

Japan from invasion. The second course,

withdrawal, must have been, in the minds

of the Joint Chiefs, the natural sequel of

the first. But MacArthur chose to interpret the directives strictly and found

them, therefore, incompatible. Arguing

that both directives could not be carried

out simultaneously, MacArthur on 10

January asked for clarification of his

orders. He tied to this request another

hint that American political objectives

needed looking into. He said:

In view of the self-evident fact that my com- mand as presently constituted is of insuffi- cient strength to hold a position in Korea

and simultaneously protect Japan against

external assault, strategic disposition taken

in the present situation must be based upon

the over-riding political policy establishing

the relativity of American interests.

It seemed that he was asking the Joint

Chiefs to decide which of his missions

they considered most important when,

in fact, they already had told him.19

General MacArthur pointed out to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that his command

originally had been sent to Korea to

oppose the North Korean Army. There

had been no intent that the United

Nations Command should engage the

armies of Communist China, MacArthur

claimed; and he doubted very seriously

that his troops would have been sent to

Korea at all if it had been foreseen that

they would have to fight the Chinese.20

His men were capable of holding a

beachhead line in Korea for a limited

time, the United Nations commander

believed, but not without losses. Whether

or not these losses could be termed

"severe" depended, MacArthur said,

"upon the connotation given the term."

He angrily decried the unfavorable publicity given the withdrawals of the Eighth

Army and X Corps. "The troops are

tired from a long and difficult campaign,"

he complained heatedly,

embittered by the shameful propaganda

which has falsely condemned their courage

and fighting qualities in the misunderstood

retrograde maneuver, and their morale will

become a serious threat to their battle effi- ciency unless the political basis upon which

they are asked to trade life for time is

clearly delineated, fully understood and so

impelling that the hazards of battle are

cheerfully accepted.

With these words, MacArthur seemed to

be asking, in the name of his troops, that

the measures he had recommended be

put into effect or that an explanation be

rendered to him and his men.21

Citing the limitations under which he

was being required to carry on the campaign against the Chinese—namely, no

reinforcements, continued restrictions

upon Chinese Nationalist military action,

no measures permitted against China's

18 Ibid.

19

 Rad, C 53167, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS,

10 Jan 51.

20

 Ibid.

21

 Ibid.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 323

continental military potential, and the

concentration of China's military force

in the Korea-Manchuria sector—MacArthur asserted that the military position

of his forces in Korea would soon be

untenable. He strongly recommended

that, under these conditions and in the

absence of any overriding political consideration, his troops should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly

as it was tactically feasible to do so.22

The final factor in deciding what

course to follow, in MacArthur's judgment, was just how far the United States

was prepared to go in order to keep a

position in Korea. If the primary interest of the United States in the Far East

lay in holding a position in Korea and

in pinning down a large segment of the

Chinese military potential, "the military

course is implicit in political policy and

we should be prepared to accept whatever casualties result and any attendant

hazard to Japan's security." The decision

to remain in Korea or to withdraw was

not a matter for him to determine, MacArthur contended.

The issue really boils down to the question

of whether or not the United States intends

to evacuate Korea and involves a decision

of the highest national and international

importance, far above the competence of a

theater commander, guided largely by inci- dents affecting the tactical situation devel- oping upon a very limited field of action.23

Since the directives he had received

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff left the

initiative of the decision to evacuate in

the hands of the enemy, MacArthur

wanted to know if the present objective

of United States political policy was to

maintain a military position in Korea

indefinitely, for a limited time, or to

minimize losses by evacuating as soon as

possible. "As I have pointed out before,"

he concluded, "under the extraordinary

limitations and conditions imposed upon

the command in Korea, its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any

length of time, up to its complete destruction, if over-riding political considerations so dictate."

 24

The Joint Chiefs did not change their

directives to General MacArthur despite

his objection that he did not understand

them. They did attempt to explain them

to him. They made it quite clear that,

after studying all the factors which he

had recently presented, they were under

no illusion that the United Nations Command could stave off a sustained major

effort by the Chinese for any great length

of time. But they wanted MacArthur

to stay in Korea as long as possible and

to kill as many Chinese as possible before

pulling out for Japan. This would be

in the national interest since it would

gain further time for essential diplomatic

and military consultations with other

United Nations members. The Joint

Chiefs told MacArthur:

It is important also to United States prestige

world-wide, to the future of the United

Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization and to efforts to organize anticommunist resistance in Asia that Korea not

be evacuated unless actually forced by mili- tary considerations, and that maximum

practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors.25

The Joint Chiefs could not judge the

morale of MacArthur's troops from

22

 Ibid. 23

 Ibid.

24

 Ibid.

25

 Rad, JCS 80902, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur.

12 Jan 51.
324 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Washington, they freely admitted. But

they were quite concerned about the

effect on his men, especially on ROK

soldiers, if news of imminent evacuation

should reach them. In JCS opinion,

any instructions to evacuate would become known almost at once, despite

security measures, and any resulting collapse of ROK resistance could seriously

endanger the Eighth Army's ability to

reach a secure beachhead about Pusan

and hold it long enough for actual evacuation. "Your estimate is desired," they

told MacArthur, "as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue

instructions to evacuate Korea." Meanwhile, their current directives remained

in effect.26

The President was deeply disturbed by

this. MacArthur was saying, in effect,

that the course of action decided upon

by the National Security Council and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the

President was not feasible. He was saying that his forces would be driven off

the peninsula or, at the very least, suffer

heavy losses. MacArthur had always

been kept informed but apparently few

of the important papers had really found

their way to his desk. President Truman

therefore resolved to send a personal letter to General MacArthur setting forth

the political aspects of the situation from

the standpoint of the nation's leaders.27

"I want you to know," President Truman wrote MacArthur on 13 January,

"that the situation in Korea is receiving

the utmost attention here and that our

efforts are concentrated upon finding the

right decisions on this matter of the gravest importance to the future of America

and to the survival of free peoples everywhere." Mr. Truman took special care

to emphasize that what he said did not

constitute a directive. He merely wanted

to let MacArthur know what was being

considered in Washington. Mr. Truman

called upon MacArthur for assistance in

solving some of the problems facing the

United States. "We need your judgment

as to the maximum effort which could

reasonably be expected from the United

Nations forces under your command to

support the resistance to aggression which

we are trying rapidly to organize on a

world-wide basis," the President told

MacArthur, and enumerated the political

advantages which would come with aUnited Nations victory in Korea.28

President Truman cautioned MacArthur obliquely on the latter's proposals for more direct action against China.

He warned:

Pending the build-up of our national

strength, we must act with great prudence

in so far as extending the area of hostilities

is concerned. Steps which might in them- selves be fully justified and which might

lend some assistance to the campaign in

Korea would not be beneficial if they

thereby involved Japan or Western Europe

in large-scale hostilities.29

The President fully appreciated the

seriousness of the United Nations Command's military position in Korea at that

time and was in no way minimizing the

danger. He recognized that continued

resistance in Korea might not be militarily possible; but he suggested that, if

MacArthur thought it practicable, resistance might still be continued, after

26

 Ibid.

27

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 434-37.

28

 Rad, JCS to CINCFE, JCS 81050, Truman (Personal) for MacArthur, 13 Jan 51. 29 Ibid.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 325

an evacuation, from offshore islands such

as Cheju-do. In any event, Truman

continued, ". . . it would be important

that, if we must withdraw from Korea,

it be clear to the world that that course

is forced upon us by military necessity

and that we shall not accept the result

politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified." Concluding,

President Truman lauded MacArthur

for his conduct of the campaign. "The

entire nation is grateful for your splendid

leadership in the difficult struggle in

Korea and for the superb performance

of your forces under the most difficult

circumstances."

 30

The Joint Chiefs Visit Tokyo Again

General MacArthur's professed failure

to understand their directives and his

statement that troop morale was at a low

ebb convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that it was time for another face-to-face

talk with the Far East commander. General Collins and General Vandenberg,

the designated representatives of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, landed in Tokyo on

15 January.

In the first conference, held on the

15th, MacArthur explained to Collins

and Vandenberg that his confusion over

his directives had arisen because it was

not clear to him how long and under

what conditions he was expected to keep

his forces in Korea. Nor had he felt that

his directives explained clearly enough

his responsibility for defending Japan.

But MacArthur then read to Collins and

Vandenberg the President's letter, which,

he maintained, had removed all doubts

as to his responsibilities and missions.

He interpreted the President's words as

a directive to remain in Korea indefinitely.31

Collins, after hastening to point out to

MacArthur that the President's message

was not a directive, as had been clearly

stated therein, declared that, at a conference with Mr. Truman just before their

departure from Washington, it had been

generally agreed that the decision to

evacuate Korea should be delayed as long

as possible without endangering the

Eighth Army or the security of Japan.

The United States objective was to permit the longest possible time for political

action by the United Nations and the

fullest opportunity to inflict the maximum punishment on the Chinese.32

Collins held that even if a decision

were made to send reinforcements to

Japan, it would take at least six weeks

for them to arrive and that, in the interim, MacArthur's basic mission of defending Japan would remain unchanged.

MacArthur countered by declaring, with

some emotion according to General Collins, that his command should not be

held responsible for the defense of Japan

and still be required to hold a line in

Korea. He maintained that Russian

forces in Sakhalin and in the Vladivostok

area had the capability of attacking

Japan; and because this threat was always present, he urged that the four National Guard divisions he sent to Japan

to help in its defense. MacArthur said

that he understood that these divisions

had been mobilized for this purpose; but

Collins pointed out that MacArthur had

30 Ibid.

31

 Memo, Gen Collins for the JCS, sub: Rpt on

Visit to FECOM and Korea, Jan 51. 32

 Ibid.
326 POLICY AND DIRECTION

already been advised that these divisions

had not been called up for that purpose

and refused to make any commitment on

sending the requested units.33

Encouraging Signs in Korea

The first real chance for a co-ordinated, though limited, attack since the

abortive advance of 24 November, developed in mid-January and General

Ridgway quickly took advantage of it.

An enemy build-up was discovered north

of the Eighth Army's defensive line

between Osan and Suwon, and on 14

January General Ridgway ordered an

armor-supported co-ordinated attack

against this enemy concentration.

He decided on this attack against the

advice of his staff. "To a man, the

Eighth Army staff was against offensive

action north and I alone had to make the

decision," Ridgway stated.34 Ridgway's

purpose was to kill as many enemy soldiers as possible and then to withdraw

to main positions, leaving a covering

force in the area. The attack, known as

Operation WOLFHOUND, jumped off on

15 January and inflicted some enemy

casualties. The attack was most notable,

however, as a sign that the Eighth Army

was no longer entirely on the defensive

and as a harbinger of the offensive spirit

that General Ridgway was bent on developing in his new command.35

Generals Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Korea while Operation WOLFHOUND was in progress. General Collins

spent two days with General Ridgway,

touring the front lines and talking with

corps and division commanders. Both

the Army Chief of Staff and the Eighth

Army commander made statements of

great significance at a press briefing held

on 16 January in Taegu. General Collins told the newsmen, "As of now, we

are going to stay and fight," while General Ridgway seconded this by saying,

"There is no shadow of doubt in, my

mind that the Eighth Army can take care

of itself in the current situation."

 36

When Collins returned to Tokyo on

17 January, he sent a most encouraging

report to his fellow members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He told

them that the Eighth Army was in good

shape and improving daily under General Ridgway's leadership. He had found

morale very satisfactory, all things considered. The weakest link in the United

Nations team was the ROK component.

General Collins considered this force still

capable of holding off North Korean

units, but believed it lacked confidence

and instinctively feared the Chinese. He

had seen no signs of dissatisfaction or

collapse in the ROK Army, but warned

that such reactions could develop quickly

in case of a serious reverse.37

33 Ibid.

34

 Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51. 35

 Rad, CX 101066 KGOO, CG Army Eight to

Corps Comdrs, 14 Jan 51.

36

 Comd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51, Narrative, p. 75.

While it is axiomatic that a field commander must

keep a stiff upper lip and issue optimistic statements

under the most adverse conditions in order to

strengthen the will of his forces and to avoid giving

comfort to the enemy, these statements, both by

Collins and Ridgway, were not to that end. There

is every indication that Ridgway believed exactly

what he said at this point and that Collins, trusting

Ridgway's judgment, was for the first time since late

November satisfied that a successful stand could be

made by Eighth Army troops. 37

 Rad, C 53613, Collins (Personal) for Bradley,

17 Jan 51.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 327

What he had seen of the enemy made

General Collins optimistic. The Chinese

had made no major move to push south

from the Han River, and when counterattacked had usually fled. He had detected signs also of enemy supply

difficulties and indications of a lowered

morale among the Chinese. "On the

whole," Collins reported, "Eighth Army

is now in position and prepared to punish

severely any mass attack."

 38

General Vandenberg, meanwhile, had

inspected Air Force installations in Korea. In making both aerial and ground

reconnaissance, a most remarkable procedure for a man of his high position, he

flew by helicopter twelve miles in front

of the main U.N. positions and joined a

ground patrol.39

Both officers met with MacArthur in

Tokyo once more before leaving for the

United States. Collins read to MacArthur the message that he had sent to

General Bradley forecasting a more favorable future for the United Nations Command. General MacArthur agreed that

things did indeed look brighter and,

after reviewing the military situation as

he now saw it, stated that his forces could

hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely.

He felt that with continued domination

of the sea and air by the United Nations,

and with the enemy's lengthening lines

of communication, the Chinese would

never be able to bring up enough supplies to enable them to drive his forces

from Korea. But he reiterated strongly

his belief that the decision to evacuate

Korea was a purely political matter and

should not be decided on military

grounds.40

The effect of Collins' cheering report

on the nation's leaders and on the national policy can hardly be exaggerated.

For the first time since late November,

authorities in Washington saw reasonable hope that catastrophe might be forestalled in Korea and that all was not as

black as had been painted. Recommendations and plans for national policy

that had been predicated on almost complete United States helplessness to continue the action in Korea faded in

significance.

Clearly, the man most responsible for

bringing about this radical change in the

situation was General Ridgway. There

is little question that when Ridgway

took command of the Eighth Army in

December, he was under no restrictions

as to making further rearward movements. He could have continued falling

back without serious recrimination, in

view of the prevailing belief in Washington and GHQ that enemy strength

was great enough to force the United

Nations Command out of Korea. His

leadership turned the tide, kept the

Eighth Army fighting in Korea, and

paved the way for advances that were

soon to come.

38 Ibid.

39

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 329. Vandenberg's excursion beyond the lines is one of the most remarkable sidelights of the entire Korean conflict. While

speaking well for his courage, it reflects some doubt

on his judgment. Probably no other single individual was in possession of a greater wealth of

knowledge of the status, plans, and developments of

the United States Air Force at this time. If the

Communists were allowed to choose the individuals

they would most like to have at their mercy, Vandenberg would doubtless have ranked well toward

the top of their list; and that Vandenberg risked

capture is certainly apparent.

40

 Memo for JCS, sub: Consultation with Gen

MacArthur, 15-18 Jan 51, sgd by Collins and Vandenberg.
328 POLICY AND DIRECTION

The 12 January Memo

The alternatives facing the United

States in meeting the Chinese moves in

Korea and elsewhere in Asia remained

under constant review. In early January, a series of studies, prepared by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop recommended measures for the consideration

of the National Security Council, enabled the nation's military leaders to

crystallize their views on actions that

should be taken. These views, at first

glance, seemed strikingly similar to those

held by General MacArthur. The essential difference lay in the timing of

some of the recommended measures.

MacArthur wanted all the military actions against the Chinese to take place at

once in order to halt the Chinese drive

in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,

taking a longer view, attached to some of

their recommendations conditions which

would not have stopped the Chinese in

Korea but would have held them to

Korea. Nevertheless, there is in the recommendations made to the National Security Council much justification for

General MacArthur's contention later

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported

him in his demands for direct action

against China.

Admiral Sherman had sparked the

movement in the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

taking a stronger stand against Chinese

aggression. Sherman told the other

members that, so far as he was concerned,

a state of open hostilities existed between

the United States and China. He felt

that since the Chinese, with Russian

logistic support, had intervened so effectively in Korea, the time had come for

the United States to re-examine its objectives and, particularly, the restrictions

which had heretofore been accepted as

necessary to prevent a spreading of the

conflict. Sherman made certain specific

recommendations as to actions which the

United States should sponsor and which,

after due consideration, the other members of the Joint Chiefs accepted and

endorsed.

The Joint Chiefs forwarded their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 12 January. Among them was

a JCS agreement that the United States

should support the South Korean Government as much and as long as practicable, even an exile government, if the

United Nations Command were forced

to evacuate Korea. The preservation of

U.N. combat forces was the most important consideration; but, if possible, the

United States should stabilize the situation in Korea. If that were not possible,

the United Nations Command would be

evacuated to Japan. Major U.S. ground

forces in the Far East should not be increased, but limited to those already engaged. If, however, the Chinese should

prove unable to force the United Nations

Command out of Korea, two of the recently mobilized National Guard divisions might be sent to Japan for defense

of that nation. The economic blockade

of China should be intensified at once.

Further, preparation for an effective

naval blockade of China should take

place immediately. As soon as the

United Nations Command's position in

Korea was stabilized, or in the event of

a forced evacuation, the naval blockade

should be established. They did not

specify, however, that it should be a U.N.

blockade. The Joint Chiefs recommended further that all restrictions on
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 329

air reconnaissance of Chinese coastal

areas and the Manchurian base be removed at once. They also recommended

that restrictions on operations of Chinese

Nationalist forces be removed and that

the United States furnish logistic support

to those forces and to Nationalist guerrillas in China. The Joint Chiefs concluded their recommendations with the

suggestion that damaging naval and air

attacks be mounted against objectives in

Communist China if and when the Chinese attacked U.S. forces outside of Korea. They did not recommend that

Chiang Kai-shek's troops be used in

Korea.41

During his January visit, General Collins had read the 12 January paper to

MacArthur. MacArthur apparently did

not note the stipulated conditions since

he told Collins that he concurred with

all the proposals contained in the Joint

Chiefs' paper. Later, during the hearings on the relief of General MacArthur

in May 1951, this study became rather

notorious as the "January 12 Study,"

with General MacArthur claiming that

the views expressed in this paper by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff coincided with his

own recommendations and that, therefore, he and the Joint Chiefs were in

agreement on actions to be taken against

the Chinese. But MacArthur's recommendations for immediate reprisal and

the Joint Chiefs' recommendations of reprisals only under certain future conditions were hardly identical.

Consideration of the actions recommended against China by General MacArthur on 30 December, and largely

supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

their 12 January memorandum, revealed

differences of opinion among the senior

members of the National Security Council staff. In each case, these differences

stemmed from divergent attitudes with

respect to the question of U.N. support.

The representatives of the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense agreed

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the

desirability of blockading China and

supporting attacks by Nationalist forces

on the mainland, but they did not want

to take such action unless it was done in

co-operation with other friendly nations.

Secretary of the Army Pace, in commenting on this position to the Secretary of

Defense, said:

It appears to me that the split views . . . generally revolve around the question of

obtaining approval of cooperation of other

friendly nations. While I agree that we

should make every attempt to obtain their

cooperation we should not permit the lack

of their cooperation to deter us from a

course of action that would contribute to a

successful prosecution of the war.

Secretary Pace recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he support the

Joint Chiefs of Staff position on these

matters.42

The measures recommended by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff encountered opposition in the National Security Council

and were not approved, although discussion of the various courses continued.43

On 24 January, the President met with

the National Security Council, at which

time the recommendations of the Joint

41

 (1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 3 Jan 51, sub: JCS

2118/5. (2) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 12 Jan 51,

sub: JCS 2118/10. (3) MacArthur Hearings, p. 1532.

42

 Memo, CofS for Secy Army, 16 Jan 51, sub: U.S.

Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression. 43

 Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 23 Jan 51, sub:

Recommended Policies and Actions in Light of the

Grave World Sit, in G-3, DA file 381 Korea, Case 55.
330 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Chiefs of Staff and the counterrecommendations of the National Security

Council Senior Staff were reviewed. But

no decision was reached. Mr. Truman

then directed a continuation of the study

by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in connection with a joint

review of American politico-military

strategy.

General Marshall has stated that as a

result of the encouraging view of the

military situation brought back by Collins and Vandenberg, the courses of

action contained in the Joint Chiefs'

January 12 study went into virtual discard. "As the result of this change in the

military situation from that which prevailed during the early part of January,"

Marshall testified:

It ... [became] unnecessary to put into

effect all of the courses of action outlined

in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January 12. None of these proposed courses of

action were vetoed or disapproved by me

or by any higher authority. Action with

respect to most of them was considered

inadvisable in view of the radical change in

the situation which originally had given

rise to them.44

44

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 324.
CHAPTER XVIII

The United Nations Strike Back

By late January 1951, local successes by

United Nations forces and a renewed

offensive spirit within Ridgway's command had altered the combat scene and

had improved the outlook. No longer

was the threat of forced evacuation so

real. Nor was the need for new decisions

on national policy so pressing.

Attempts by United Nations leaders to

arrange a cease-fire in Korea continued

fruitlessly throughout the winter. A 14

December resolution by the U.N. General Assembly had established a Cease

Fire Group, but otherwise had led to

nothing. The Chinese rejected every

overture to negotiate except on their own

terms. In mid-January, the First Committee of the General Assembly established several principles as the basis for

a cease-fire: withdrawal of all non-Korean

forces from Korea; free elections under

United Nations supervision and arrangements for interim administration; and,

after a cease-fire, a conference including

representatives of the United States,

USSR, and Communist China on settlement of Far Eastern problems. The

United States voted for this arrangement

even though some American authorities

were very skeptical about it.

A statement of these principles was

sent to the Chinese Communist Government with an invitation to negotiate a

cease-fire. The Chinese countered with

a few principles of their own which included their acceptance into the United

Nations Organization and the withdrawal of American forces from the Formosa area. The Chinese must have

known the United Nations would not

agree to these terms, and therefore were

probably not surprised when the terms

were rejected.1

Since the beginning of the Korean

War, relations between the United States

and its most important allies, Britain and

France, had been strained to some degree,

particularly after the October crossing

of the 38th Parallel. The western nations had not yet reconciled their divergent points of view on the conduct of the

campaign, relations with the Chinese

Communists, and the disposition of Formosa. But as a result of the Chinese

Communist rejection of the United Nations cease-fire proposal, there for the

first time appeared to be some ground

for a common allied approach to the

1

 Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Korean

Conflict, July 1950-February 1951 (Washington,

1951), pp. 27-37.
332 POLICY AND DIRECTION

problems posed by the Chinese.2 In following up this slight advantage, American leaders undertook to gain acceptance

of the American viewpoint by Rene

Pleven, French Prime Minister, when he

visited President Truman in Washington

on 29-30 January 1951.3

In anticipation of Pleven's visit, Department of State planners prepared for

the President a statement of American

objectives in Korea and the probable

paths toward those objectives. This compilation of views amply illustrated that

while the American Government had a

broad pattern for Korea, no specific

means to work out this pattern had yet

been developed.

The Korean venture was of necessity

a partnership arrangement. Most of the

partners who had to be consulted by the

United States, the senior partner, hesitated to subscribe to any step which

might enlarge the area of conflict or in

some other way prove detrimental to

their national interests. The United

States had no desire, and indeed no intention, to stand alone against the Communists in Korea. The Department of

State insisted that the United States

should continue to urge the United Nations to adopt a policy of bringing to

bear the greatest possible collective pressure upon the Communist aggressor in

Korea. This policy, it was felt, would

increase the chances of reaching an

honorable solution in Korea and would

deter similar aggressions elsewhere.4

France had supported continued resistance in Korea, but was eager for a

peaceful settlement if possible, and had

expressed great opposition to extending

hostilities outside of Korea. The Department of State therefore recommended

that President Truman assure Pleven

that the United States would continue to

try to confine the fighting to Korea.5

About this time, the United States was

pressing the United Nations to pass a

resolution branding Communist China

as an aggressor. The Department of

State therefore urged the President to

assure Pleven that in the American view

the passage of this resolution would not

constitute authorization for the extension of hostilities to China, and that the

United States had no intention of asking

the United Nations for authority to take

any measures involving operations against

Chinese territory. But the United States

Government, in its capacity as the Unified Command, reserved the right to take

action essential for protecting the United

Nations forces under its command. Consequently, the Department of State felt

that Pleven should know that in the

event of large-scale air attacks against

U.N. troops from Manchurian bases, the

United States would bomb the bases from

which the attacks originated, and that if

the Chinese Communists attacked American forces outside of Korea, the United

States would take counteraction. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that the Department of State was right and placed

their seal of approval on these views.6

President Truman and Prime Minister

Pleven, on the first day of their talks,

concentrated on the situation in Asia.

2

 Memo, Gen Duff, Dep ACofS G-3, DA, for

CofS, USA, 23 Jan 51, Incl 3, in G-3, DA file 320.2,

Case 60. 3

 (1) JCS 1776/187, 26 Jan 51. (2) JCS 1776/186,

24 Jan 51. Both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 151. 4

 Ibid.

5

 Ibid.

6

 Ibid.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 333

The President told the French Prime

Minister substantially what his advisers had recommended. He stated

forcefully that he saw no way for the

United States to recognize the Communist regime in Peiping, and that he was

convinced that the Communists had

moved into Korea because they feared

the progress being made by the western

powers in the Far East. He assured

Pleven that the United States was striving for world peace, but that only collective security could bring this about. The

United States therefore would not negotiate with the Chinese to restore peace in

Korea at the price of collective security

and national self-respect.7

Since the first intervention by the Chinese, the United States, through Ambassador Austin, had championed a

resolution before the General Assembly

of the United Nations which would

brand China an aggressor nation and at

the same time provide a method of bringing about a cease-fire. Many member

nations of the United Nations, fearing

that such a step would only increase the

scope of the fighting and widen the

breach between Communist China and

themselves, hesitated to support the resolution. But President Truman urged

passage of the measure in line with his

determination that "For my part, I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor."

 8 Finally, on 1 February, after

much hesitancy on the part of some member nations and complete opposition by

the USSR and its satellite member nations, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution naming the

People's Republic of China an aggressor

nation and calling for the achievement

of United Nations objectives in Korea by

peaceful means.9 India and Burma voted

against calling Communist China an aggressor. Seven nations of the non-Communist world and Yugoslavia did not

participate in the voting.10

The Combat Scene

Regardless of political efforts to find

common ground for negotiation, the

issue between the Communists and the

United Nations in Korea continued to

be decided at this stage of the war on the

battlefield. The success or failure of the

United Nations political efforts would,

it appeared, depend on the success or

failure of the United Nations military

measures. During late January and February, General Ridgway concentrated on

means of exploiting to the very limit the

capabilities of the forces under his command. Conferring with his I and IX

Corps commanders on 21 January, he

ordered them to mount a strong combat

reconnaissance into the area bounded by

the Suwon-Ich'on-Yoju road and the Han

River to develop enemy dispositions, disrupt hostile concentrations, and inflict

maximum destruction on the enemy.11

This reconnaissance, designated Operation THUNDERBOLT, jumped off on 25

January and made consistent progress

against generally light resistance. (Map

7

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 437-38. 8

 (1) Statement by the President, 25 Jan 51.

(2) Mac Arthur Hearings, p. 3513.

9

 UN Doc A/1771, quoted in Department of State

Pub 4263, U.S. Policy in the Korean Conflict, July

1950-February 1951, p. 37. 10

 Memo, Dr. Ralph J. Watkins for Maj Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, 1 Mar 51, in G-3, DA file 381 China, Case 8/8. 11

 Memo, Notes on Conference with CG I Corps,

CG IX Corps, and Vice Comdr 5th AF, Gen Ridgway, 21 Jan 51, in GHQ, UNC SGS.
334 POLICY AND DIRECTION

U.S. INFANTRYMEN enter the walled city of Suwon.

VII) By the end of January, the enemy's

main line of resistance still had not been

developed; but Ridgway's forces had

reached a line four to six miles north of

the line Suwon-Kumyangjang-ni-Ich'on

and were continuing their advance.

Understandably encouraged by the

January advances, General Ridgway in

early February outlined plans for the

immediate future and his ideas on

longer-range moves. Ridgway informed

MacArthur that the Eighth Army was inflicting maximum losses upon the enemy

and delaying to the utmost enemy attempts to push farther into South Korea.

This was being done, Ridgway claimed,

at the same time that complete co-ordination within and between the corps was

insuring the integrity of all major units.

General Ridgway reported that his forces

in the western sector were moving forward in phased, closely co-ordinated advances to develop the enemy dispositions

on that front and to kill as many of the

enemy as possible with a minimum of

friendly losses. Ridgway told MacArthur

that if it proved tactically sound and

militarily possible, he would send his

troops as far as the Han River where they

would hold. He also planned a co-ordi-

THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 335

nated attack on the central front in the

very near future to reach and hold the

general line Yongp'yong-HoengsongYangnung.12

In General Ridgway's opinion, the advance to the Han, at least as far east as

Yongp'yong, was a sound operation with

potentially high results so long as enemy

resistance did not stiffen to the point

where United Nations losses canceled

out military gains. But from Yongp'yong

eastward to the Sea of Japan, a distance

of ninety airline miles, the Korean front

ran through a rugged, wooded area lacking roads and any natural terrain line on

which to base defensive positions that

could be easily or profitably held. General Ridgway had no illusions about

setting up a static defense or making

substantial advances in that sector. With

regard to this part of Korea, he said,

"Assuming as I do, a continuation of a

major effort to destroy us, prolonged efforts to hold any such line, would in my

view, require far greater forces than are

now available, and entail a heavy attrition, with little or no commensurate

gain." Ridgway made it plain to MacArthur that he saw little wisdom in a

general advance beyond the line of the

Han River in view of the great risks. He

would recommend such an advance only

if the Chinese forces should voluntarily

withdraw north of the 38th Parallel. As

to the 38th Parallel, General Ridgway

told MacArthur that he considered it

indefensible with his present forces. If

Eighth Army tried to hold any part of

the former boundary too many men

would be lost.13

Likewise, any attempt at the moment

to retake the South Korean capital would,

in General Ridgway's opinion, be foolish

from a purely military viewpoint. To

occupy Seoul would place an unfordable

river through or behind his defensive

positions. Therefore, unless a sudden

opportunity arose to trap and destroy a

major enemy force, in which the retaking of Seoul was incidental, he would

leave Seoul to the Chinese.14

Ridgway set forth five major assumptions: the enemy would continue a major

effort to force the Eighth Army from

Korea or to destroy it in place; there

would be no major reinforcement of the

Eighth Army; the basic plan and directives under which the Eighth Army was

operating were sound and required no

present modification; the 38th Parallel

could not be defended with forces then

available; and elsewhere north of the

Han, terrain lines across the peninsula

were not good enough to justify the losses

required to take and defend them. He

asked General MacArthur for his views

on these concepts.15

General Ridgway's analysis and plans

presented MacArthur, according to General Whitney, ". . . with a dilemma."

Whitney explained later that MacArthur

placed far greater stress on the factor of

supply ". . . than Ridgway apparently

did." MacArthur had not changed his

opinion that Seoul was a vital supply hub

which had to be seized if enemy supply

was to be effectively curtailed and that

sound psychological advantages lay in

capturing the ancient capital city.

"Therefore," Whitney recalls, "he had

12 no intention of holding the Eighth Army Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen MacArthur, 3 Feb

51, in GHQ, FEC SGS files. 13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
336 POLICY AND DIRECTION

south of the Han River. Yet he understood fully that Ridgway's caution was

natural because of the heavy blow the

army had sustained when he had sought

to hold the Seoul area before. . . . MacArthur worded his reply carefully."

 16

MacArthur did, indeed, word his reply

carefully, so carefully that he seemed to

agree with all of Ridgway's proposals and

ideas. MacArthur informed Ridgway on

4 February, "I interpret your objective

to be such advance with concomitant

pressure by your own forces as will develop the enemy's main line of resistance." If this line developed south of

the Han, MacArthur agreed that no attempt should be made to push farther.

If, on the other hand, the Eighth Army

reached the Han without serious resistance, MacArthur believed that Ridgway

should drive forward until either the

enemy line had been developed or the

fact established that the enemy had no

such line. Ridgway had said essentially

the same thing when he recommended an

advance only if the Chinese had voluntarily withdrawn north of the parallel.17

MacArthur's thinking on retaking

Seoul seemed to parallel that of the

Eighth Army commander. He agreed

that the military usefulness of Seoul was

practically nil, but that its occupation by

Ridgway's forces would yield certain

valuable diplomatic and psychological

advantages. More tangible advantages

would accrue from taking the Inch'on

port facilities and Kimp'o Airfield. Use

of these would greatly reduce the supply

difficulties and increase the power of

Ridgway's air support in forward areas.

He said that if Inch'on and Kimp'o presented "easy prey," they should be taken.

In closing, MacArthur commended Ridgway highly, saying, "Your performance

of the last two weeks, in concept and in

execution, has been splendid and worthy

of the highest traditions of a great captain."

 18

The enemy had not forgotten the September landing at Inch'on. American

intelligence agencies learned that the

Chinese were very worried over the possibility of another amphibious landing

either at Inch'on or at the narrow waist

of Korea. Ridgway asked MacArthur to

consider exploiting these enemy fears by

naval feints to simulate possible landings. MacArthur ordered these diversionary actions, which, at Inch'on, forced

the employment of at least one North

Korean division to guard the port against

the threatened attack. Later on, this

enemy division was pulled out of Inch'on

and thrown against Ridgway's advance

from the south in Operation THUNDERBOLT. Noting this, Ridgway asked

MacArthur to resume the naval demonstrations to draw enemy forces away from

the front. Hence, high-speed amphibious ships sailed from Pusan and again

simulated actual landing operations in

the Inch'on area.19

On 5 February, General Ridgway or16

 Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, pp. 460-61. 17

 Rad, C 54811, CINCUNC to CG Army Eight

(Personal) for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51.

18

 (1) Ibid. (2) Cementing on this exchange, General Whitney noted, "Here was one of the marks of

leadership; MacArthur thus got his conflicting views

across to Ridgway without doing violence to sensibilities which had been suffering acutely in the

difficult campaign." See Whitney, MacArthur: His

Rendezvous with History, p. 461. 19

 (1) Comd Rpt, G-3 UNC, Jan 51, App. 4, Part

III, Incl 48. (2) Rad, CG-2-621 KGOO, CG Army

Eight to CINCFE, 6 Feb 51. (3) Rad, COMNAVFE

to CTF 90 and CTF 95, 6 Feb 51.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 337

GENERAL REEDER (left) AND GENERAL TAYLOR (center) arrive at Taegu Airstrip

to begin their tour of inspection of the fighting front. They are greeted by

Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Eighth Army.

dered the X Corps to attack in the central

sector. For several days, Almond's troops

made good progress in their advance,

known as Operation ROUND-UP; but

enemy resistance increased steadily as the

X Corps approached the main enemy

positions. In the west, meanwhile, other

Eighth Army units drove ahead, piercing

the enemy's defenses south of Seoul and

forcing the Chinese back across the Han

River in the Seoul area on 10 February.

In reporting these successes to the Department of the Army on 10 February,

General Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2,

adopted a justifiably optimistic tone.

He claimed that the enemy was not voluntarily withdrawing from any of his

positions but was being forced to do so.

He pointed out that once Ridgway seized

the Han River, the enemy could find no

defensive positions short of the old North

Korean defense line along the 38th

Parallel. Any enemy withdrawal to the

38th Parallel would have to be viewed,
338 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Willoughby claimed, as a decision forced

on them by a series of defeats in the field

with an accompanying attrition in men

and matériel. He told staff officers in

Washington that the enemy had definitely been kicked back and so long as

United Nations pressure could keep the

enemy off-balance, the initiative would

remain with MacArthur.20

But just what MacArthur intended to

do next in Korea was not clear to officials of the Department of the Army. In

an effort to get abreast of the situation,

Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, General

Bolté's successor as Department of the

Army G-3, asked General MacArthur to

explain his plans. High-level talks in

which Army officials were to take part in

the very near future made it necessary

that MacArthur submit his views on

probable short-range military developments. Taylor asked MacArthur specifically if he intended to push north and,

if so, if he also intended to move his

prepared defense base forward.21

MacArthur based his reply on the exchange of views with General Ridgway

earlier in the month. In fact, had he

transmitted Ridgway's letter to General

Taylor without change, the effect would

have been the same. "It is my purpose,"

MacArthur told Taylor, "to continue the

ground advance until I develop the

enemy's main line of resistance or the

fact that there is no such line south of

the 38th Parallel." A constant advance,

MacArthur pointed out, would keep the

Chinese and North Koreans off-balance.

This would allow his own forces to take

full advantage of their superior artillery

firepower and armor and, as MacArthur

expressed it, "to flush the enemy from

concealment where he may have escaped

air attack." MacArthur promised that if

his attacks showed that the enemy was

not present in strength south of the 38th

Parallel, he would immediately notify

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and request instructions before moving farther north.

He was obviously preparing well in advance to refute any possible charges that

he intended to make another crossing of

the parallel without full authority from

higher headquarters.22

Although the measures he had recommended against the Chinese outside of

Korea had not been taken and no reinforcement had arrived, MacArthur's command had not been driven out of Korea

as he had predicted. Yet he still insisted

that he be allowed to bomb Manchuria.

"It can be accepted as a basic fact," he

told Taylor, "that, unless authority is

given to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently

constituted cannot with safety attempt

major operations in North Korea."

Where previously he had insisted that

bombing China was necessary to permit

his forces to stay in Korea, General MacArthur had modified this view to the

extent that he now felt it was necessary

to bomb China in order to operate in

North Korea.23

MacArthur said that it was evident to

him that the enemy had lost his chance

of a decisive military decision in Korea.

But he still considered that the Chinese

retained the potential, so long as their

base of operations in Manchuria was immune from air attack, of resuming the

20

 Telecon, TT 4364, GHQ and DA, 10 Feb 51. 21

 Rad, DA 83262, DA to CINCFE, 11 Feb 51.

22

 Rad, C 55315, MacArthur (Personal) for Taylor,

11 Feb 51. 23

 Ibid.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 339

offensive and forcing a withdrawal upon

his command. "We intend to hold the

line of the Han up to the point of a

major and decisive engagement," the

U.N. commander claimed. He no longer

feared forced evacuation, but he did

anticipate being forced back from the

Han, how far he could not say. Once

forced back from the river, however, his

forces would be able to stabilize the line

because logistic difficulties would prevent

the enemy from full exploitation of the

initial advantage. "The capability of

the enemy is inversely and geometrically

proportionate to his distance from the

Yalu," is the way MacArthur expressed

it. MacArthur also made a plea for

security of his plans by telling Taylor,

"It is earnestly requested that no estimate of the situation be released in

Washington." He claimed that in the

past his plans had been jeopardized by

leaks to the press of his secret reports

and by "injudicious speculation which

has emanated from more or less authoritative sources." He reminded Taylor

that reports and estimates should be released only at the discretion of the field

commanders.24

Secretary of the Army Pace grew concerned lest the success of early February

probing attacks lead to overoptimism on

the part of the American public. He

feared this might give rise to speculation

as to whether United Nations forces

might not again advance to the Yalu

River. He notified MacArthur on 13

February that the actual situation was

being depicted for press officials, and that

they were being cautioned against putting out unjustifiably glowing reports on

progress in Korea. He hoped that this

step would curb any wrong trend in

public thinking on the matter.25

General MacArthur visited the battlefront in mid-February for a first-hand

look at the situation in the field. When

he returned to Tokyo, he issued a public

statement which warned that, in spite of

recent advances by his forces, the future

of the Korean fighting depended upon

international considerations and upon

high-level decisions which had not yet

been received by his headquarters. It is

obvious that he still had not abandoned

hope that his recommendations to bomb

China, use Nationalist troops, and blockade Chinese ports would be approved.

Or, if he had abandoned hope, he at least

wanted to keep these recommendations

alive in the public mind.26

With reference to the battlefield situation of the past several months, MacArthur credited his strategy of rapid

withdrawal before the Chinese in December with lengthening the enemy's

supply lines and "pyramiding his supply

difficulties." But he insisted that recent

tactical successes by the Eighth Army under Ridgway not lead to overoptimism.

The Chinese, MacArthur cautioned, still

retained a tremendous potential for further offensive operations. In this last

contention MacArthur was correct.27

Chip'yong-ni

While the successes were being

achieved in the west, Operation ROUND24

 Ibid.

25

 Rad, W 83277, DA to CINCFE, 13 Feb 51. 26

 This public statement was duly noted by Washington authorities and later cited as an example of

MacArthur's violation of the 6 December directive.

See MacArthur Hearings, p. 3539. 27

 Statement, General MacArthur in Pacific Stars

and Stripes, February 14, 1951.
340 POLICY AND DIRECTION

UP was beating itself out against strong

resistance and enemy counterattacks in

the central sector north of Hoengsong.

The U.S. X Corps and the ROK III

Corps met increasingly heavy enemy concentrations in their attempts to advance.

American intelligence already had

warned that the enemy was shifting most

of his forces from the west to the central

zone. Unable to hold in the west, the

enemy apparently was massing his

strength against the relatively weak center of the United Nations line.

On the night of 11-12 February, two

Chinese armies and a North Korean corps

struck the central front, scattered three

ROK divisions, and forced the troops in

this sector to abandon Hoengsong and

withdraw southward toward Wonju.

The enemy was obviously aiming his

attack at the communications centers

of Wonju, near the center, and Chip'-

yong-ni, near the west flank of the X

Corps sector, whose seizure would assist

further advances to the south and west.

General Ridgway therefore resolved that

Wonju and Chip'yong-ni would be held.

At nightfall on 13 February, three

Chinese divisions opened attacks against

Chip'yong-ni. For three days, the 23d

Regiment of the U.S. 2d Division, with

the French battalion attached, staved off

all efforts by the Chinese to overrun the

town and killed thousands of the enemy.

Although the Chinese were stopped in

the Chip'yong-ni area, enemy forces

farther east bypassed Wonju and advanced south almost to Chech'on before

the Eighth Army could halt them.

Weakened by great losses in men and

ham-strung by an inadequate logistic

system, the Chinese and North Koreans

then called off their attack and withdrew.

For the Eighth Army, there was no

resting on laurels. Even before the front

lines stabilized, General Ridgway opened

Operation KILLER to destroy the enemy

east of the Han River line and south of

the general line Yangp'yong-Hyonch'onni-Haanmi-ri. The main effort was directed along the Wonju-Hoengsong and

Yongwol-P'yongch'ang axes. Ridgway

issued strict orders that this would be no

runaway drive north. He demanded

close lateral co-ordination within and between the two attacking corps, the IXth

and Xth, and emphasized that his purpose was to kill enemy troops.

General Ridgway took American newsmen in Korea into his confidence on

Operation KILLER, but with the strict

provision that they would not disclose

the plan until after the attack had

started. By so doing, Ridgway hoped to

prevent publication of rumor or conjecture from compromising his intentions

to attack. But on 20 February, General

MacArthur flew into Korea and during

a press conference at Wonju that day

announced to the newsmen that he was

going to launch an offensive in a day or

two. This startled and amazed General

Ridgway, not only because MacArthur

had disclosed Ridgway's intentions to the

enemy, but also because the planned

offensive had originated with the Eighth

Army, not General MacArthur. The

premature announcement, however, had

no effect on the outcome of Operation

KILLER. When the Eighth Army jumped

off on 21 February, the enemy faded

away; and within eight days, Ridgway's

troops reached their assigned objective.28

28

 Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies,

p. 403.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 341

Supply Problems

Despite the fading resistance, the

Eighth Army's move northward had not

been easy. For heavy rains and thawing

in the combat area had severely hampered the movement of vehicles and

transport of supplies. Besides the harmful effect of bad weather, supply operations were also inhibited by the heavy

battle damage to overland supply routes.

This combination of weather and battle

destruction prompted Ridgway to call

upon General Stratemeyer for greater

effort to support his advance units by air.

He asked that Stratemeyer's planes airlift a daily minimum of 200 tons of cargo

by C-47 aircraft to forward airfields.29

Stratemeyer, believing that Ridgway

was asking too much, appealed to General MacArthur, pointing out that the

forward airfields were too small and dangerous to risk landing planes, even C-47

cargo transports. He claimed that these

forward airstrips would have to be

lengthened to at least 4,000 feet before

they would be safe enough to use in support of Eighth Army front-line divisions,

and asked that the job, if these airfields

were to be lengthened, go to the Army

Engineers.30

But MacArthur supported Ridgway.

He did want the airfields improved, but

he did not want to take engineer troops

away from the Eighth Army to do it. In

reply to Stratemeyer's appeal, MacArthur

declared that army engineers were scarce

even though the maximum number possible had been shipped from the United

States. Units in Korea had been committed and were being used full time to

repair the Eighth Army's overland supply lines. Therefore, no army engineers

would be made available to the Air Force

from Ridgway's scanty resources. Instead, Stratemeyer was directed to bring

up Air Force engineer troops from Okinawa. These troops would be replaced

on Okinawa by native laborers. General

MacArthur noted that his experience in

Japan had shown him that Japanese contractors were capable of handling the

type of construction then being done by

Air Force engineer troops on Okinawa.31

Stratemeyer asked MacArthur to reconsider, but was again overruled and directed to carry out this order. He was

told, however, that if he so desired, he

might accomplish the airstrip improvements without bringing up Air Force

engineers from Okinawa.32

This action, of course, did not solve

the immediate problem. General Ridgway, apparently unaware of MacArthur's

action, called on General Hickey, the acting chief of staff at GHQ, for his support.

"In the northward advance through the

mountainous terrain of central and western Korea," Ridgway explained:

it had become increasingly difficult to maintain pressure sufficient to inflict maximum

casualties upon the enemy. As you know, we have experienced some difficulties arising from recent rains here—we are seeking

every possible means to anticipate and pro- vide for adverse conditions while operating

in extremely rugged terrain over lines of

29

 Rad, CG-2-1399 KGLO, CG EUSAK to CG

FEAF, 26 Feb 51. 30

 Rad, AX 2844 DO, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 16

Feb 51.

31

 Rad, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 16 Feb 51, in G-4,

GHQ, UNC file AG370.5. 32

 (1) Staff Sec Rpt, G-4 GHQ, UNC, Feb 51, ch.

II, p. 3. (2) USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30

June 1952, pp. 151-52 and 155.
342 POLICY AND DIRECTION

communication rendered undependable by

the approaching rainy season.33

Ridgway told Hickey of his request to

Stratemeyer and pointed out that in his

opinion some airfields in the forward

area could be developed rapidly to meet

his needs with a minimum of engineer

effort. "Inasmuch as the support of these

additional aircraft is of vital importance

to current and planned operations, I

would appreciate it very much if you

would give your personal attention to my

recommendations on this subject."

 34

On 6 March, General Stratemeyer

called on Air Force headquarters in

Washington to send him five engineer

aviation battalions and other specialized

engineer units to construct forward airfields. This request was turned down

and Stratemeyer was told by his own

service, as he had originally been told by

MacArthur, to bring up his engineers

from Okinawa. Eventually, in April and

May, Stratemeyer transferred an engineer

aviation group and three engineer aviation battalions to Korea from Okinawa.35

Combat Strength

The seemingly insoluble problem of

the lack of fighting men continued to

plague the United Nations Command

throughout the winter of 1951. Within

the Eighth Army, General Ridgway made

drastic cuts in the service units and transferred the excess men to combat units.

He recommended that the percentage of

service troops be trimmed down in Japan

as well and he asked that the maximum

possible number of men already in or

arriving in the theater be diverted from

service-type duty to combat. He insisted

that the percentage of service personnel

to combat personnel being sent to Korea

was too high for the needs of the Eighth

Army, and he recommended reclassification if necessary to meet the combat requirements. At this time, 57,000 men

were performing service support duties

in Korea and almost 35,000 in Japan.36

But even though the greatest possible

number of men was transferred, Ridgway's divisions remained well below their

authorized strengths in infantry and

artillery.

General MacArthur realized by late

January that he could expect no major

reinforcements for Korea from the

United States. But such successes as

Ridgway's troops had scored during the

month had convinced him that the

Eighth Army was going to stay and make

a fight of it. As anxious as the field commander to see the divisions in Korea

made as strong as possible, MacArthur

took the problem to the Army Chief of

Staff on 29 January. "The continuous

lack of combat replacements for the seven

months of combat is a matter of grave

concern to me," MacArthur complained

to Collins. He anticipated a suggestion

to convert his local service support personnel to combat soldiers, by telling Collins that this had already been done. He

had integrated ROK soldiers into American units also. But, MacArthur told

General Collins, there was no acceptable 33

 Rad, G-3287 KCG, CG Army Eight to CINCFE

(Hickey), 2 Mar 51. 34

 Ibid.

35

 USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1

November 1950-30 June 1952, pp. 151-52.

36

 (1) Rad, CG1-1033 KAGCP, CG Army Eight to

CO Japanese Replacement Center, Info CINCFE,

14 Jan 51. (2) Rpt, Strength of Service Unit, tab

169A, in G-3, DA files.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 343

substitute for trained combat replacements.37

"To date," MacArthur pointed out,

"Army divisions have been fighting from

twenty to fifty percent below authorized

strength in infantry and artillery units."

He expressed particular concern because

this lack of replacements would not let

him rotate combat-weary soldiers. General MacArthur also pointed out that the

shortage of combat soldiers within Ridgway's divisions necessitated extended

frontages which were susceptible to infiltration and which exposed not only

combat elements but supply and communications lines as well. This latter

condition had resulted in abnormally

high casualties in rear areas. Only the

Marine division in Korea did not suffer

from lack of men. MacArthur pointed

out to Collins that this division was at

full strength and had been for some

time.38

The shortage of replacements within

the Far East Command amounted to approximately 40,000 men. General Collins decided that the only way to take care

of this deficiency, at least temporarily,

was to pull more men away from the

General Reserve. He did not intend to

repeat the experience of the previous

autumn when the General Reserve had

been stripped to virtual ineffectiveness,

but he did approve a levy of 14,300 men

in February. Most of this levy was to be

placed on the four National Guard divisions and the two RCT's called to active

duty the previous September. General

Collins directed the Department of the

Army G-1 to start action-at once to ship

these men to MacArthur within the next

four to six weeks. Collins expressed the

hope that MacArthur's needs could be

met almost in full and that, ultimately,

the Army could send him 27,000 men

above and beyond the normal flow of

replacements.39

On 30 January Collins sent to MacArthur a full explanation of the steps

the Army was taking to give him sufficient soldiers. "You can rest assured that

we here are aware of your personnel

shortages and the effect upon your operations," Collins said. He explained that

since the number of men being trained

and shipped to the Far East from the

replacement training centers in the

United States had proved inadequate, he

was calling on the General Reserve. Of

the 14,300 men to be taken from the Reserve, the great majority would be infantry and would arrive in the Far East

during the last week of February. This,

while not meeting the needs entirely,

would at least bring the fighting divisions

closer to authorized strength. Collins reminded MacArthur of their talks in

Tokyo earlier in the month. At that

time MacArthur had agreed with Collins

that any sizable levy upon the General

Reserve would cause a great delay in

bringing units within the United States,

including those destined for Europe, to

a satisfactory state of combat readiness,

and had further agreed that this would

be a most serious mistake.40

Collins also informed MacArthur that

the shortages of trained combat troops

throughout the entire Army were such

that he had directed an Army-wide reduc37

 Rad, C 54360, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins,

29 Jan 51. 38

 Ibid.

39

 Min, 59th mtg Army Policy Council, 30 Jan 51. 40

 Rad, DA 82320, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 30 Jan 51.
344 POLICY AND DIRECTION

tion of 3 percent in service personnel.

He felt that this could be done without

seriously affecting the fighting efficiency

of combat units.41

Although General Collins had told

MacArthur on 29 December that it

would not be practicable to obtain more

troops from other members of the United

Nations, the Joint Chiefs took certain

steps in that direction in late January.

In their opinion, increased active participation in the Korean fighting by other

member states of the United Nations

would not only bolster MacArthur's

forces, but would serve as well to bind

those states more closely together in opposition to Communist aggression, wherever it might occur. The Joint Chiefs

accordingly recommended to Secretary

of Defense Marshall on 24 January that

he ask the Secretary of State to exert

renewed pressure on other member states

to furnish ground forces to MacArthur's

command. They asked that the general

criteria established for such forces in

August 1950 be observed and that Great

Britain and the NATO countries on the

European continent not be solicited.42

When on 6 February the Assistant

Secretary of the Army, Earl D. Johnson,

visited the Far East Command, General

Beiderlinden, MacArthur's G-1, took advantage of Johnson's presence to register

additional complaints on the manpower

shortages. "The failure to provide adequate replacement support has had a

deleterious effect on the entire Korean

operation," Beiderlinden told Johnson.

Every expedient was employed to close the

gap and maintain combat units without

retraining. Wounded men were returned

to the front lines again and again without

sufficient recuperation to assure full recov- ery. Combat units were combined, strip- ping personnel from one to fill another. ROK, United Nations forces, indigenous

personnel and incapacitated limited service, all were exploited to the maximum. . . . The end result of such personnel planning

must inevitably be reflected in extended

frontages, inability to develop full combat

effectiveness, all resulting in adjustments in

tactical planning combined with abnormal

casualties.43

But this reclama could have had little

effect, for the Army was already exerting

the greatest practicable effort to meet

MacArthur's needs. In fact, by 27 February, the effort had been so successful

that Army officials were able to promise

MacArthur twice-monthly increments of

replacements totaling over 55,000 by the

end of April. The majority of these

would be trained in replacement training

centers in the United States.44

National Guard Divisions

During December, General MacArthur

had made several unsuccessful attempts

to secure divisions of the National Guard

for his theater. On 18 December, he had

asked that all four of the National Guard

divisions called to active service in September be moved to Japan at once. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff had turned him

down, "pending continued consideration

at a governmental level as to the future

United States courses of action in Korea. . . ."45

 Again on 30 December,

41

 Ibid. 42

 Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 24 Jan

51, sub: Military Assistance for Korea.

43

 Memo, Gen Beiderlinden for Hon Mr. Johnson,

6 Feb 51, sub: Status of FEC Enlisted Replacements

During FY 51, in G-1, GHQ, UNC files. 44

 Rad, DA 84382, DA to CINCFE, 27 Feb 51. 45

 (1) Rad, C 51599, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Dec 51.

(2) Rad, JCS 99616, DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 23 Dec 50.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 345

MacArthur insisted that these divisions

be shipped to Japan for the defense of

Japan. "Indeed," he told Washington,

"it was my understanding, in which I

may have been in error, that the four

National Guard divisions called to active

duty in September were for ultimate

employment here should the necessity

arise. . . ." In early January, while the

issue of forced evacuation was still in

serious doubt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

hinted that, if Eighth Army's line could

be stabilized with the forces already in

Korea, two partly trained National

Guard divisions could be sent to defend

Japan. But if evacuation took place,

Japan would have to be defended by

troops removed from Korea.46

After General Collins returned to the

United States from his mid-January visit

to the Far East, he reviewed again the

possibility of furnishing National Guard

divisions to MacArthur. The Eighth

Army was giving a good account of itself

in Korea and was stabilizing its position

with the forces already available to it.

Under these conditions it seemed appropriate to carry out the half-promise of

9 January to send two partly trained National Guard divisions to Japan. On

23 January, he told General MacArthur

that if things in Korea kept going as well

as at present and the Chinese could be

contained, two divisions might be sent

him to increase the security of Japan.47

A week of continued successes in the field

followed, and on 30 January Collins

recommended to the other members of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S.

40th and 45th Divisions, both National

Guard, be ordered to Japan to bolster

the defenses there. There were, at that

time, no American divisions in Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and forwarded the recommendation to the Secretary of Defense at once. MacArthur

was informed of this development as soon

as it took place.48 After relatively

lengthy consideration which involved

weighing the interests of the European

theater against those of the Far East, the

Secretary of Defense consented to the

transfer of the two major units. On 25

February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified the U.N. commander that the 40th

and 45th Divisions would reach his command sometime in April. He was specifically ordered to leave these divisions

in Japan and not to employ them against

the enemy in Korea.49

Bombing of Rashin

In the early months of the Korean

fighting, General MacArthur had been

furnished a list of targets in North Korea

which the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought

suitable for destruction by strategic

bombing. Among these key targets was

the port city of Rashin. Rashin, lying

only nineteen air miles south of the

Soviet border on Korea's east coast,

housed a major port and extensive rail

yards. At the time of its selection as a

bombing target, General Ridgway, then

on the Department of the Army staff, had

noted Rashin's proximity to the Russian

46

 (1) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS,

30 Dec 50. (2) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jan 51. 47

 Rad, DA 1706, DA to CINCFE, 23 Jan 51.

48

 (1) Rad, DA 82320, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 30 Jan 51. (2) Min, 59th mtg Army Policy

Council, 30 Jan 51. 49

 Rad, DA 84232, CofS USA to CINCFE, 25

Feb 51.
346 POLICY AND DIRECTION

border and had questioned its selection.50

Nevertheless, Rashin remained on the

target list and was bombed effectively on

one occasion. Another bombing strike

mounted on the port was diverted because of weather conditions. When reports of the Rashin bombing reached the

Department of State, officials there expressed concern over the possibility of

violations of the Soviet border, and asked

that targets close to that border no longer

be bombed.51 The Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 8 September 1950 had directed General MacArthur to make no further aerial

attacks against Rashin and asked his

views on the matter. On 10 September,

General MacArthur replied that he concurred in the restriction on Rashin and

had ordered suspension of all further attacks against the port.52

The matter lay more or less dormant

until mid-February 1951 when the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces,

General Stratemeyer, appealed to General MacArthur for permission to attack

Rashin once more. Stratemeyer pointed

out that the enemy continued to receive

reinforcements and supplies in spite of

his severely crippled transportation system, while Rashin, an important link in

the enemy's supply system, remained

immune from attack. Aerial reconnaissance of the Rashin area indicated a high

level of activity in the city. To disrupt

and destroy the North Korean coast

transportation and supply system effectively, Rashin would have to be attacked

and destroyed. According to Stratemeyer, the month of February offered

the best weather for visual attack on

Rashin. Thereafter, the weather would

progressively deteriorate. Stratemeyer

assured MacArthur that his aircraft could

attack and demolish the city without

violating the international border, and

reiterated that he considered it almost

mandatory that his forces be allowed to

attack.53

General MacArthur, in a switch from

his previous stand, agreed with his air

commander that Rashin should be hit.

He felt that the city was the keystone of

the enemy's logistic system in the east and

was being used at peak activity since the

enemy had correctly guessed that Rashin

might be immune. Accordingly, he recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

15 February that their restrictions against

bombing Rashin be removed. He

pointed out that specific targets in the

Rashin area—large marshaling yards, extensive storage facilities, and dock areas

—were particularly susceptible to visual

bombing during February; and he assured them that his bombers could, without question, destroy Rashin without

violating the international border.54

Before making a decision on the matter, the Joint Chiefs thought they should

know more about Rashin and asked MacArthur to send more specific information

with regard to the types and degree of

military activity in the city as well as the

exact location of installations.55 Mac50

 Note, handwritten, signed AMG (Gruenther), 2

Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 22/2. 51

 Memo (Tel Call), Mr. Matthews, State Dept, for

OSD, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 103. 52

 (1) Rad, JCS 90943, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Sept 50.

(2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 15 Feb 51, sub:

Instructions to the Commander in Chief, FEC, Respecting the Bombing of Rashin, in G-3, DA file 091

Korea, Case 159.

53

 Ltr, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 14 Feb 51, sub: Attack on Rashin, in GHQ, UNC AG 13686. 54

 Rad, CX 55601, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Feb 51. 55

 Rad, JCS 83773, JCS to CINCFE, 17 Feb 51.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 347

Arthur admitted that he could not list

the precise nature or quantity of supplies in the Rashin area, but he insisted

that great depot accumulations of various types were located there. "Rashin

is the last major profitable strategic target in North Korea and has remained

virtually untouched," he maintained. If

he could destroy this last vital link in

the enemy's east coast transportation system the enemy would have suffered a

major loss. Conversely, Rashin's immunity from attack remained a major

threat to MacArthur's forces.56

General Taylor, the Department of the

Army G-3, supported MacArthur and

told the Chief of Staff that he felt it was

operationally essential that MacArthur's

request be granted. He admitted that

the major risk was that USSR aircraft,

maintaining surveillance in the area,

might, as a local defense measure, investigate U.N. aircraft involved and set

off an air battle. There was also a lesser

risk that attacks upon Rashin, even if the

border were not violated, might provide

a basis for Russian propaganda claims

alleging violations of their border.57

There were other reasons why Washington felt it not advisable to bomb Rashin

at this time. The Department of State

still objected vigorously to the possibility

of border violations or USSR claims of

border violations. Too, there was excellent chance that USSR shipping, which

used the harbor freely, might be destroyed and cause a serious international

incident. Militarily, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff did not feel that Rashin was as vital

as MacArthur claimed. The railroad

leading south from Rashin down the

coast was not completed, greatly lessening Rashin's value as a supply point.

Furthermore, even though bombing

might accomplish the immediate destruction of the particular stores then located

in Rashin, the enemy need only transfer

his logistic activities a few miles north of

the Russian border, to Vladivostok for

example, and enjoy the same advantages

afforded by Rashin.58 The Joint Chiefs

of Staff therefore turned down MacArthur's appeal for permission to bomb

Rashin.59

Bombing of Power Installations

In late December, before the Chinese

had attacked across the parallel, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had asked for MacArthur's

advice on whether to bomb and destroy

the power installations on the Korean

side of the Yalu and the power dams on

the river itself. They were contemplating such destruction only if the Chinese

did drive south across the 38th Parallel.

MacArthur had informed his superiors

that the hydroelectric installations in

northeast Korea were inactive. These,

of course, had been physically inspected

by X Corps units. The power plants in

northwest Korea, which his forces had

never seized, were an unknown quantity

insofar as power output was concerned.

But MacArthur felt that none of these

installations had any further military

significance. Their destruction, if accomplished, would necessarily therefore

be a political matter. He pointed out

that he had been instructed firmly in the

56

 Rad, C 55830, CINCFE (Personal) for JCS, 18

Feb 51. 57

 Memo, G-3 (Taylor) for CofS USA, 15 Feb 51.

58

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 356, 431, 750, 1063,

and 1331. 59

 Ibid., p. 17.
348 POLICY AND DIRECTION

past to refrain from destroying these installations and that these instructions had

been widely publicized as evidence of the

United Nations peaceful intent toward

countries north of the Yalu. He stated

that his medium bombers could certainly

destroy these power plants and dams, but

reminded his superiors that this change

in policy "involves considerations far

beyond those of the immediate tactical

campaign in Korea."

 60

 The Joint Chiefs

of Staff, understandably, let the matter

drop since there were no apparent political advantages to be gained.

But on 26 February, General MacArthur once more brought the bombing

of the power installations to the attention

of the Joint Chiefs, telling them that

General Stratemeyer had urgently requested permission to destroy the entire

North Korean power complex, including

those plants on the Yalu River. Stratemeyer believed that by so doing he could

slow down Communist support of their

war effort, undermine the enemy's morale, and cut down any surplus power

going to Manchuria. MacArthur suggested that the political considerations

which prevented earlier bombings might

have changed. He requested instructions as to what he was to do. The Department of the Army G-3 recommended

to the Chief of Staff that MacArthur be

told to carry on without destroying these

power plants since political considerations had certainly not changed to any

great degree. On 1 March, the Joint

Chiefs advised MacArthur that, in view

of his previous statement that the preservation or destruction of the power installations was predominantly a political

rather than a military matter, they did

not believe he should bomb the power

facilities.61

The Improved Outlook

By the end of February, limited but

very real combat successes had dissipated the last traces of the specter of

forced evacuation under Chinese Communist pressure. General MacArthur

cheerfully reported that he was ". . . entirely satisfied with the situation at the

front, where the enemy has suffered a

tactical reverse of measurable proportions. His losses have been among the

bloodiest of modern times." Visibly

pleased by the northward progress of his

forces in the field, the United Nations

commander noted, "The enemy is finding it an entirely different problem fighting 350 miles from his base than when

he had this 'sanctuary' in his immediate

rear, with our air and naval forces practically zeroed out."

 62

The soundness of General Ridgway's

tactics was praised by MacArthur.

Our strategic plan, notwithstanding the

enemy's great numerical superiority, is in- deed working well, and I have just directed

a resumption of the initiative by our forces. All ranks of this international force are covering themselves with distinction and I again

wish to especially commend the outstand- ing teamwork of the three services under

the skillful direction of their able field com- manders, General Ridgway, Admiral Stru- ble, and General Partridge.63

60

 (1) Rad, JCS 99713, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Dec 50.

(2) Rad, C 52125, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd

MacArthur, 27 Dec 50.

61

 (1) Rad, CX 56453, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 26

Feb 51. (2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 26 Feb

51, sub: Bombing of Power Plants in North Korea,

in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 147/4. (3) Rad,

JCS 84577, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51. 62

 Rad, C 56709, CINCFE to DA, 1 Mar 51. 63 Ibid.
CHAPTER XIX

The Crossroads

Although the war had again shifted

in favor of United Nations forces, the

Eighth Army successes through the end

of February 1951 could not be considered

an indication of eventual victory. The

most that could be predicted was that

the enemy forces then arrayed in Korea

would be incapable of forcing the Eighth

Army from the peninsula.

For anyone committed to the viewpoint that a war offers its participants

only the alternatives of victory or defeat,

the current situation was intolerable.

General MacArthur represented this

viewpoint in his suggested counteractions to the Chinese intervention. The

rejection of his proposals, he maintained,

would lead to disaster, their acceptance

to victory. He neither sought nor suggested any middle course.

President Truman, on the other hand,

recognized other alternatives and was

willing to examine them. Consequently,

by the close of February, he had not yet

granted any of MacArthur's calls for

increased action against Communist

China. Furthermore, the resurgence and

stiffening of the Eighth Army under

Ridgway had created an atmosphere in

which the next course of action did not

have to be decided in haste or out of a

feeling of desperate weakness.

The original purpose of United Nations military operations in Korea—to

repel the aggression and to restore peace

and security in the area—of course remained unchanged. So did the longer

range and long-standing objective of the

United Nations, and particularly of the

United States since Cairo, "to bring

about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea." The

achievement of these goals, particularly

the longer range objective, by military

means, however, had become less likely

after the impact of Chinese intervention

and the American decision in December

not to commit additional forces to Korea.

The alternatives consequently narrowed

to some sort of accommodation that

would provide a halt or at least a lull in

the fighting during which diplomatic

negotiation might salvage the prestige

of the United States and the United Nations and at the same time bring some

result not too far short of the basic

objectives.

Through March 1951, the United

States, as the Unified Command of the

United Nations, continued to fight with-
350 POLICY AND DIRECTION

out having elected any new political or

military courses of action. Neither the

Department of State, responsible for advising the President on political matters,

nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his principal

military advisers, seemed willing to state

definitely a proposed course of action

until the other party had done so.

Frequent meetings took place between

State and Defense representatives, but

each Department deferred to the other

for a clear statement of what should be

done in Korea.1

During exploratory talks on 6 February, the representatives of the Department of State had listed five courses of

action which the United Nations might

follow: an all-out military effort to conquer all Korea and unify the country

by force; complete abandonment of

Korea to the Communists; extension of

hostilities to China, thus removing pressure on Korea; an indefinite military

stalemate at approximately the present

battle line; or a peaceful settlement

through negotiation. The initiative in

the first three courses would have to be

taken by the United Nations, but in the

fourth, stalemate, neither side would

have to take the initiative. In view of

the Communist rejection of overtures by

the United Nations, the initiative for

bringing about a peaceful settlement,

the fifth step, now lay primarily with the

Communists.

The Joint Chiefs maintained that they

could not intelligently choose any one

of these steps without knowing what

political course the United States meant

to follow; and since future political

moves by the United States remained

obscure, the Joint Chiefs recommended

no military course of action other than

a continuation of an aggressive defense.2

The Department of State nevertheless

informed American allies participating

in Korea of the five alternative courses

of action that the United Nations might

consider.3

The Secretary of State took the position on 23 February 1951 that neither

the United Nations nor the United States

had assumed any obligation to unify

Korea by military means. The 7 October 1950 resolution of the General Assembly was permissive but not mandatory

on this point. Secretary Acheson believed that most governments having

troops in Korea, including the principal

allies of the United States, would not

support unification as a war aim but

would continue to support it as a

political objective.4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not

sure that the political objectives were

still valid and recommended to the Secretary of Defense on 27 February that

these objectives be reviewed for either

reaffirmation or modification. Once

these objectives were firmly established,

the Department of State should be able

at least to develop some short-range political courses leading toward those political objectives. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff felt they would then be able to

analyze the military capabilities of the

United Nations and recommend military

courses of action to be taken in conjunc1

 (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) Summary of Notes on JCS-State Mtg, 13 Feb 51, JSSC

Rpt to JCS, p. 123.

2

 (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) JSSC

Rpt to JCS, p. 119. 3

 Rad, DA-IN 3983, 21 Feb 51, in G-3, DA files. 4

 JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
THE CROSSROADS 351

tion with and in furtherance of these

political courses of action.5

The 38th Parallel Again

The 38th Parallel assumed an ominous

significance in the eyes of some United

Nations members in February and

March as MacArthur's forces again drove

northward and it appeared that the

Eighth Army, after pushing forward

slowly, would soon be able to cross over.

Many officials, allied and American,

viewing the thrice-crossed parallel as a

symbolic barrier beyond which MacArthur's men should not again venture

lest the enemy strike even harder in retaliation, became greatly concerned.

General MacArthur had fended off

newsmen's questions on the subject in

mid-February by telling them that for

the time being any talk of crossing the

parallel except by patrol actions was

purely academic. MacArthur took this

opportunity to reaffirm his belief that

the Chinese should be attacked on their

own soil, holding that the existing superiority of the Chinese Communist enemy

must be materially reduced before he

could seriously consider conducting

major operations north of the 38th

Parallel.6

This was merely a public airing of the

view he had already expressed to General Taylor on 11 February, when he

had pointed out that unless he received

authority to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, his ground forces as then constituted could not safely attempt major

operations in North Korea. He had at

the same time, of course, told Taylor

that even if he found it possible to cross

the parallel in force, he still would not do

it until he had received instructions

from Washington.7

General MacArthur's directives with

regard to the 38th Parallel had not

changed. He still possessed the authority

to cross granted him on 27 September

by the United States and tacitly confirmed on 7 October by the United Nations General Assembly. But the

Department of State was keenly aware of

the concern felt by some of the members of the United Nations over the

advisability of re-entering North Korea.

To allay this concern, and in anticipation

of the arrival of United Nations forces

at the parallel, Secretary Acheson on 23

February asked Secretary Marshall to

consider revising the 27 September directive so as to limit MacArthur's

advance. Acheson added that any subsequent decision to move substantial

forces above the parallel would require

preliminary discussions with other

governments having troops in Korea.8

Acheson enclosed a memorandum the

tenor of which was generally pessimistic

and which he suggested Marshall send

the President. In it, Acheson pointed

out that any decision to press for the

unification of Korea by military action

would mean a vast increase in United

States military commitments; would almost certainly require the extension of

hostilities to Communist China; would

greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet 5

 Memo, JCS, sgd Bradley, for Secy Defense, 27

Feb 51, sub: Action to be Taken by U.N. Forces

With Respect to the 38th Parallel. 6

 Statement, Gen MacArthur, 13 Feb 51, in MacArthur Hearings, p. 3539.

7

 Rad, C 55315, MacArthur (Personal) for Gen

Taylor, 11 Feb 51. 8

 JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
352 POLICY AND DIRECTION

intervention; and would require a major

political effort to obtain the agreement

of other directly interested nations to

take such action.9

Acheson judged that virtually all members of the United Nations, including

most of those actively participating in

Korea, strongly opposed any general advance across the 38th Parallel. This

opposition was based on the belief that

once the enemy had been driven out of

South Korea the primary objective of

repelling the aggression had been accomplished; that an advance in North Korea

would make an early negotiated settlement of the Korean fighting impossible,

since the enemy would accept nothing

less than the status quo ante bellum; that

crossing the parallel would greatly increase the pressure for extending the

hostilities into China and in turn would

involve American military resources to

an increased extent in indecisive operations in Asia; and that a crossing would

greatly increase the risk of Soviet

involvement and general war.10

A major advance across the parallel,

Acheson claimed, would require full

consultation with major allies and their

agreement, which under current circumstances would be extremely difficult to

obtain. Any unilateral re-entry into

North Korea by the United States, on the

other hand, would create a severe crisis

within the free world and could lead to

the withdrawal of certain allies from

the Korean War. Acheson did concede

that all of South Korea must be captured,

claiming that such would constitute a

major victory for United Nations forces

since it would deny the enemy their

main objective. Nor did Acheson propose to forbid MacArthur's men to set

foot across the parallel; rather, he proposed that no major crossing should be

made. He recognized that so long as

fighting in Korea continued, MacArthur

must be free to attack with naval and

air power across the parallel and to take

such ground action in North Korea

as was required to interrupt enemy

offensive preparations.11

It is evident that the Department of

State officials were looking forward to a

possible settlement of the Korean crisis

by negotiation. They considered it important that United Nations military

action produce a desire on the part of

the enemy to negotiate rather than to

fight, and at the same time not create a

situation in which he would balk at a

negotiated settlement. In other words,

MacArthur's forces should inflict so many

casualties on the enemy that he would

be anxious to negotiate, but on the other

hand, this punishment should take place

in the vicinity of the parallel and not in

the course of pushing the enemy so far

back that he would refuse to accept a

settlement at the line where the fighting

ended.12

Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary

of the Air Force Finletter, and Secretary

of the Navy Dan A. Kimball examined

the Acheson proposals and found them

reasonable. All three agreed that MacArthur should not attempt a general

advance north of the 38th Parallel except to take advantage of favorable terrain for defense. Secretaries Pace and

Finletter wanted the United States to

adopt this policy of restraint and to an9

 Ibid. 10

 1bid.

11 Ibid.

12

 Ibid.
THE CROSSROADS 353

nounce it to the world "as a matter of

principle." But on this point Secretary

Kimball dissented on grounds that discussing such a decision with other governments or publicly announcing that

MacArthur was more or less bound to

the 38th Parallel would have a bad effect

from a military standpoint.13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,

took hearty exception to the Department

of State proposals. They pointed out

that so long as the political objectives

of the United Nations remained unchanged, its military forces should not

be forbidden, for political reasons, to

advance north of the 38th Parallel. Such

a prohibition would be wholly inconsistent with the political objectives.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed,

along with Generals Ridgway and MacArthur, that any directive halting MacArthur at the parallel would permit the

enemy to build up in North Korea such

a concentration of military forces that

MacArthur's own forces would be jeopardized. Nor would a United Nations

prohibition against crossing the 38th

Parallel impose a comparable restriction

on enemy forces. The Joint Chiefs told

the Secretary of Defense that their own

combined military experience convinced

them it would be impracticable to undertake aggressive defensive operations to

keep the numerically superior enemy

off-balance and to disrupt his preparations for new offensives if the 38th Parallel became a limiting feature of

military operations. In sum, MacArthur

had to have freedom of maneuver if for

no other reason than to insure the safety

of his forces.15

The Joint Chiefs considered it premature even to make a preliminary determination of MacArthur's action when

he reached the parallel. They reminded

Secretary Marshall of MacArthur's announced intention to apply to them for

instructions if he found no major enemy

strength disposed south of the parallel.

Until MacArthur reported his findings,

the Joint Chiefs considered any decision

on crossing the parallel to be militarily

unsound. For any decision to restrain

United Nations forces made on the political level and in consultation with other

nations would inevitably be disclosed to

the Chinese and North Koreans who

then could base their own courses of action upon known intentions of friendly

forces. Pressing once again for a decision by the Department of State as to

the course of action to be taken to reach

United States political objectives in

Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Marshall, "Until this governmental decision is reached there should

be no change in that part of the directive

to General MacArthur which now permits him so to dispose his forces either

north or south of the 38th Parallel as

best to provide for their security."

 16

Because of these strong objections, Secretary Marshall told Secretary Acheson

that he did not believe the memorandum

opposing a general advance across the

38th Parallel should be sent to President

13

 Memo, Secys Army, Navy, and Air Force for

Secy Defense, 26 Feb 51, sub: State Dept Draft Memo

for the President on the 38th Parallel, in G-3, DA

file 381 Korea, Case 3/3. 14

 Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 27 Feb 51, sub:

Action to be Taken With Respect to the 38th

Parallel.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.
354 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Truman. Marshall himself agreed with

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there was

a risk in disclosing to the enemy a United

States military decision, that freedom of

action and freedom of maneuver had to

be maintained for United Nations

ground forces, and that it was, in any

event, too early from a military point

of view to reach a final determination

on crossing the parallel.17

On 2 March, General MacArthur submitted through channels a proposed report to the United Nations for the period

15-28 February which concluded with

the statement:

While President Truman has indicated that

the crossing of the parallel is a military

matter to be resolved in accordance with

my best judgment as a theater commander, I want to make it quite clear that if and

when the issue actually arises, I shall not

arbitrarily exercise that authority if cogent

political reasons against crossing are then

advanced and there is any reasonable possi- bility that a limitation is to be placed

thereon.

But Washington authorities saw no profit

in unnecessarily calling the attention of

the United Nations to the 38th Parallel

and asked MacArthur to delete this portion of his report. Both the Department

of State and the Department of Defense

agreed that references to the 38th Parallel from the military point of view

should be avoided whenever possible;

and General MacArthur subsequently

agreed to the excision of this part of his

report.18

Advances in Korea

The United Nations surge up the

Korean peninsula had slackened somewhat in late February. But by 2 March,

General Ridgway completed plans for

Operation RIPPER in which all corps

would move northward through successive phase lines to seize Hongch'on and

Ch'unch'on in the central sector and to

destroy all enemy forces, material, and

supplies in the path of the advance.19

(See Map VII.) Ridgway's troops opened

Operation RIPPER on 7 March. Stubborn delaying actions permitted only

short gains during the first week, but by

13 March, enemy resistance began to

diminish. By 16 March, the enemy was

attempting to disengage and withdraw,

and by the 18th Seoul was once again

in United Nations hands and all other

objectives were generally attained. The

enemy's decreasing effort to contest

Eighth Army's advances, observations of

sizable enemy groups moving northward

out of the battle areas, and statements

by captured soldiers, all pointed to an

enemy decision to fall back on prepared

positions north of the 38th Parallel.

Enemy reserve forces had been located

close to the parallel for some time, and

MacArthur's intelligence officers therefore reasoned that the enemy had had

time to prepare strong defenses on or

near this line of latitude.20

The Department of the Army G-3,

General Taylor, was somewhat displeased

because he was not given the details of

Operation RIPPER in advance, nor even

17

 Ltr, Secy Defense Marshall to Secy State Acheson, 1 Mar 51, in G-3, DA file 381 Korea, Case 3/4. 18

 (1) Rad, C 56709, CINCFE to DA, 2 Mar 51.

(2) Telecon, TT 4477, 7 Mar 51 (3) Telecon, TT

4479, 9 Mar 51.

19

 Ltr, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, 2 Mar 51, sub:

Operation RIPPER, with Incls, in G-3, GHQ, UNC

files. 20

 Telecon, TT 4498, DA to GHQ, 15 Mar 51.
THE CROSSROADS 355

TROOPS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 35TH REGIMENT, 25TH DIVISION, pile into assault

boats to cross the Han River, south of Seoul, 7 March 1951.

told that it was taking place. On 17

March, he asked MacArthur to send him

the details embodied in operational directives issued by General Headquarters

and/or Eighth Army. He suggested

further that in the future the Department of the Army be an information

addressee for all operational directives,

to include those of the Eighth Army.

MacArthur's headquarters had not

planned Operation RIPPER nor had it

issued any operational directives or orders. Ridgway had taken care of the

whole thing, merely advising MacArthur

of his plans. General MacArthur

brushed aside General Taylor's request

by telling him that Operation RIPPER

was merely a development of the constant interchange between his headquarters and the commanders in Korea, and

that no formal orders had been issued by

him. MacArthur insisted that Taylor

was being kept fully informed of all

operations of the command but that it

was impracticable to give Taylor every

detail of intercommand arrangements.21

21

 (1) Rad, DA 86022, DA to CINCFE, 17 Mar 51.

(2) Rad, CINCFE to DA Mar 51.
356 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Seeking More Forces

As one means of increasing MacArthur's ground strength in Korea, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile had

recommended to the Secretary of Defense in late January that the Department of State be asked to seek additional

forces from U.N. members who they believed were not contributing all they

could. Secretary Marshall had asked

the Department of State to do this on

30 January. On 23 February, Secretary

Acheson told Marshall that some action

would be taken to carry out this proposal. Australia and New Zealand

would be pressed to furnish an additional infantry battalion each. Canada

would be asked to increase its commitment to brigade size, according to the

original plan which had been canceled

in October. Certain Latin American

countries also would be asked to send

ground forces to Korea. The Department of State thought that it would be

unwise, however, to ask Turkey and

Greece for more ground forces and also

that there were no other countries capable of sending forces to Korea at that

time.

General Taylor pointed out several

factors which he felt should be taken

into consideration by the Army Chief of

Staff with regard to forces from other

U.N. countries. He told General Collins

on 14 March that in light of the need

for redeploying United States ground

combat units to more strategic areas as

soon as possible, it would be a good idea

to remove them from Korea if they could

be replaced. Too, a United Nations

force composed of complete divisions

from several, different countries other

than the United States would provide a

means of testing certain organizational

and operational methods under study in

NATO. Furthermore, it would be a

long time, according to General Taylor,

before ROK Army units could be

strengthened to a point where they might

relieve some United States combat

troops.

It appeared to Taylor that Turkey,

Greece, Great Britain, the Philippines,

Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia,

and New Zealand were capable of furnishing sizable forces up to division

strength for service in Korea. The difficulty would be in providing logistic

support to these forces since the total

matériel resources of the United States

were needed for current U.S. programs.

Hence, any equipment furnished for

training or employing new units in

Korea could be furnished by the United

States only if its programs were reduced

accordingly.22

American military authorities, despite

possible logistic headaches, continued to

insist that other nations could and should

contribute more heavily to the United

Nations fighting team in Korea. Robert

Lovett, Acting Secretary of Defense,

notified Secretary of State Acheson on

31 March that the Department of Defense was not satisfied that everything

possible had been done to induce these

other nations to furnish more forces, and

that the current situation in Korea presented an opportunity to renew requests

for fuller participation by other members of the United Nations. Lovett

charged that the heavy commitment of

22

 Memo, Gen Taylor, G-3 DA, for CofS USA,

14 Mar 51, sub: Increasing Foreign Contingents in

Korea to Div Size, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 63.
THE CROSSROADS 357

United States ground troops, the high

casualties suffered, the long months of

unrelieved combat duty, and the desirability of reassigning experienced soldiers

to form cadres for mobilization of new

units in the United States and of redeploying battle-tested units to other

strategic areas made it all the more imperative that U.S. units in Korea be

relieved.23

Mr. Lovett wanted real, not token, assistance from these other nations, and

requested that the Department of State

once again prevail on such countries

having trained manpower resources to

provide contingents of worthwhile size

and to equip these units and support

them themselves. He particularly had in

mind the Commonwealth nations of

Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, all

of which could, he felt, well afford to

increase the size of their contingents in

Korea. He thought also that Great

Britain might be able to furnish a full

division, while Latin American countries

such as Brazil and Mexico appeared to

have the military manpower necessary to

send sizable units to Korea.24

President Truman Is Displeased

Almost by default, a political course of

action began to emerge in mid-March.

Encouraged by the results of Operation

RIPPER, which proved that the military

initiative in Korea no longer lay with

the enemy, U.S. policy planners decided

that efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement should be renewed. These planners, from both Defense and State, now

believed that Ridgway's punishing attacks might have rendered the Chinese

more amenable to a political settlement.

To both Departments, it appeared

that the most logical beginning of a

negotiated settlement was for President

Truman to appeal directly to the Chinese

Communists. For while earlier attempts

to bring about negotiations had failed,

President Truman had in none of these

instances been the one to suggest opening

negotiations. Furthermore, the situation

seemed particularly propitious because

enemy forces were being pushed back

into North Korea and could therefore

negotiate on the basis of their prewar

status.25

The Department of State drafted such

a Presidential declaration and after obtaining the Joint Chiefs' approval of its

content, began to clear it with the other

United Nations members having troops

in Korea.26 In substance, the President

was to point out that the aggressors in

Korea had been driven back to the general vicinity from which their unlawful

attack had first been launched and that,

therefore, the principal objective of repelling North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression against the Republic

of Korea had been achieved. He would

assert further that United Nations objectives, such as unification and the

establishment of a free government in

all of Korea, could and should be accomplished without more fighting and

bloodshed. The Chinese Communists

were, in effect, to be invited to cease fire

and to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding issues. They were also to be

23

 Ltr, Actg Secy Defense (Lovett) to Secy State,

31 Mar 51, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 148/19. 24

 Ibid.

25

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 343. 26

 Ibid., pp. 343-44.
358 POLICY AND DIRECTION

warned that if they refused to negotiate,

the United Nations would be forced to

continue the fighting.27

On 20 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

alerted General MacArthur to the

planned Presidential announcement. He

was also informed that some nations

consulted believed that an advance by

major forces of the United Nations Command across the 38th Parallel would

endanger further diplomatic efforts, and

was reminded that time would be needed

to determine the reactions of all concerned, including the Communist governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

had already told the Department of State

that the 38th Parallel had no tactical

significance, a judgment with which the

Department of State now agreed. But

State had asked the military advisers

just what freedom of action MacArthur

should have for the next few weeks in

order for him to maintain contact with

the enemy and at the same time insure

the safety of his forces; and the Joint

Chiefs, in turn, asked MacArthur to

make his own recommendations as to

what latitude he required.28

MacArthur interpreted the latter request as a possible prelude to an order

forbidding him to cross the 38th Parallel

and immediately recommended that no

further military restrictions be imposed

upon his command. He explained that

since he was forbidden to use his naval

and air arms as he had suggested, and

since the enemy's ground potential so far

exceeded his, it remained completely

impractical anyway to attempt to clear

North Korea. In sum, MacArthur felt

that his current directives were adequate

and should not be changed.29

The proposed Presidential announcement was never made. For while it was

still being prepared, General MacArthur

issued a public statement on 24 March

that in the eyes of Washington officials

completely vitiated the contemplated

political move. In his statement, MacArthur declared that the tactical successes of his forces clearly showed

Communist China to be a vastly overrated military power weak in everything

but human resources. Continuing, he

said, "Even under the inhibitions which

now restrict the activity of the United

Nations forces and the corresponding

military advantages which accrue to Red

China, it has shown its complete inability

to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea." The confident tone of

this statement contrasted sharply with

MacArthur's reports to Washington two

months earlier. He also reiterated his

oft-aired contention that ". . . the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their

answer in the diplomatic sphere."

 30

Unmindful of the President's scheduled call on the enemy for negotiation,

MacArthur then declared :

Within the area of my authority as the

military commander, however, it should be

needless to say that I stand ready at any

time to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in the

earnest effort to find any military means

whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to

which no nation may justly take exception,

27

 JSSC Rpt to the JCS, p. 131. 28

 Rad, JCS 86276, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51.

29

 Rad, C 58203, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA

for JCS, 21 Mar 51. 30

 MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 387-88.
THE CROSSROADS 359

might be accomplished without further

bloodshed.

President Truman was angered by MacArthur's statement since it tacitly preempted the President's prerogatives and

criticized, by implication at least, the

national policy. Besides infuriating the

President, MacArthur's announcement

brought down upon Washington a rash

of inquiries from allies of the United

States as to whether MacArthur's words

were the precursor of a drastic change

in national policy.31

President Truman, on the same day he

heard MacArthur's statement, called in

Acheson, Rusk, and Lovett to discuss

what response to MacArthur's act would

be appropriate. They agreed that the 6

December directive to MacArthur and

the other commanders made plain what

they could and could not say without

prior clearance. They further agreed

that MacArthur had violated this directive. But MacArthur was not censured for this violation, only reminded

once again of the directive itself. In

an immediate dispatch, the Joint Chiefs

notified MacArthur, "In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any

further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of

6 December. The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the

field, you immediately report that fact

to the JCS."

 32

General MacArthur had not known

the contents of the proposed Presidential

declaration. The information he received from the Joint Chiefs on 20 March

did little more than tell him that some

sort of Presidential announcement was

to be made. Also, in his own offer to

confer in the field with the enemy commander, MacArthur had stressed the

terms, "Within the area of my authority

as a military commander . . . ," and

". . . to find any military means. . . ."

Evidence that such a move would have

been quite proper is available. Shortly

after the Inch'on landing, when it was

thought the North Koreans might sue

for peace terms, the Deputy Under Secretary of State told the Department of

Defense, "A cease-fire should be a purely

military matter and accordingly they

(the North Koreans) should communicate their offer to the Commanding General of the unified command . . . who

is the appropriate representative to negotiate any armistice or cease-fire

agreement."

 33

On the related issue of recrossing the

38th Parallel, General MacArthur did

not intend to hold the Eighth Army below the line unless so ordered by Washington. Nevertheless, he instructed

General Ridgway on 22 March not to

move above the parallel in force until

specifically authorized to do so. To any

press inquiries on the probability of a

crossing, Ridgway was to reply that the

decision would have to be made by Mac31

 (1) Ibid. (2) The President interpreted MacArthur's action as threatening the enemy with an

ultimatum, implying that the United States and its

Allies might attack China without restraint. This

had implications far greater than usurpation of a

prepared statement which the President had intended to make. In the President's mind, MacArthur had once again openly defied the policy of

his Commander in Chief. See Truman, Memoirs, II,

442-43.

32

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 344, 3542. 33

 Ltr, Dept of State (Deputy Under Secy Matthews) to OSD (Gen Burns), 15 Sep 50, in G-3 DA

file 091 Korea, Case 99, App. to JCS 1776/105.
360 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Arthur himself. MacArthur informed

Ridgway that a new directive for operations in Korea was expected from Washington shortly, apparently in the belief

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by asking

what freedom he needed in his future

operations, meant to send him new instructions, including orders on crossing

the 38th Parallel. But Washington

authorities sent him no new directive on

either the parallel or the conduct of

future operations.34

As to the immediate future, MacArthur told Ridgway, "My present intention is to continue current type of

action north of the parallel, but not to

proceed further than your logistics

would support a major operation."

MacArthur evidently was more concerned with the logistical than with the

political implications of re-entering

North Korea. He continued, "At that

time to pass from the present tactics

which you have so ably conducted to

ranger-type probing by battalions or

companies from divisional fronts operating for ten-day periods with selfcontained supplies supplemented by

guerrilla type activities. If you have any

suggestions, let me have them." General Ridgway replied that he would issue

all necessary instructions to insure compliance. He interpreted MacArthur's

term "in force" as permitting at least

one reinforced infantry battalion per

corps to cross the parallel if a potentially

fruitful opportunity should present

itself.35

Bevin and the British View

In spite of the intransigence thus far

shown by the Communists toward every

United Nations suggestion of settling

the Korean problem by talking instead

of fighting, the British Government remained hopeful that the Communists

would eventually agree to negotiate.

On 30 March, British Foreign Secretary

Bevin proposed a new attempt at negotiation. Bevin suggested the issuance of

a clear statement of Korean policy,

agreed to by all countries having forces

in Korea and specifically endorsed by the

unified command. This, he thought,

would provide a basis for approaching

the Peiping and USSR governments in

order to explore Chinese Communist

readiness to negotiate a settlement by

some procedure other than that of the

Committee of Good Offices of the United

Nations, which he felt could not by

itself obtain the co-operation of the

Chinese. Specifically, Bevin recommended a joint declaration by all nations

having forces in Korea—expressing

their desire to see an independent and

unified Korea, their agreement to the

withdrawal of all foreign troops, and

their readiness to achieve these objectives by other than military means. At

the same time, President Truman, in his

capacity as Chief Executive of the state

providing the unified command, would

announce that the unified command fully

endorsed the military implications of the

joint declaration. Following these two

statements of policy, the Chinese and

the Russians would be asked to express

their views as to the best means of bringing about a peaceful settlement in Korea.

With reference to the Presidential dec34

 Rad, C 58292, MacArthur (Personal) for Ridgway, 22 Mar 51. 35

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rad, G-3 412 KCG, Ridgway

(Personal) for MacArthur, 22 Mar 51.
THE CROSSROADS 361

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE ON CHINESE POSITIONS as U.N. forces advance against

the communists near the 38th Parallel.

laration proposed earlier and General

MacArthur's statement of 24 March, the

British foreign secretary noted that MacArthur's action was further reason for

considering an entirely new procedure

since it was now unlikely that any further statement by the unified command

alone would be taken seriously by the

Communists.36

Ridgway Re-enters North Korea

Lacking specific instructions to the

contrary, General MacArthur meanwhile

approved plans developed by General

Ridgway for advancing above the 38th

Parallel. On 22 March, Ridgway informed MacArthur that he had prepared plans to advance, if MacArthur

approved, to a line that, except for a

short stretch in the west, lay just above

the parallel, generally between the con36

 Rad, 825, Dept of State to USUN NY, 30 Mar

51, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 167/2.
362 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL MACARTHUR is greeted by General Ridgway upon MacArthur's arrival

at Kangnung, 3 April 1951.

fluence of the Han and Yesong Rivers on

the west coast and the town of Yangyang

on the Sea of Japan. Ridgway explained

that operations to reach this line would

have as their objective not the seizure

of terrain but the maximum destruction

of enemy troops and matériel, and that

they would be conducted with particular

care to maintain major units intact and

to keep casualties to a minimum. He

assured MacArthur further that he had

no intention of outrunning his logistical

support. MacArthur approved Ridgway's plan without hesitation, and

without referring it to Washington.37

Ridgway opened the first phase of this

advance (Operation COURAGEOUS) on 22

March, moved steadily forward all along

the front, and attained positions generally along the 38th Parallel by the 30th.

37

 Rad, G-3 412 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) for

MacArthur, 22 Mar 51.
THE CROSSROADS 363

Except for a small area in the west, South

Korea thus was cleared of organized

enemy forces. The latter suffered

enormous casualties, although as a result of the relatively slow Eighth Army

advance compelled by Ridgway's insistence on careful co-ordination and the

preservation of lateral security, the

enemy units themselves managed to

withdraw intact.38

By the time the Eighth Army regained

the parallel, Ridgway, on 29 March,

completed the details of instructions for

the next forward step, which he called

Operation RUGGED. The new objective,

Line KANSAS, differed slightly from Ridgway's 22 March concept by starting at the

junction of the Han and Imjin Rivers,

not the Han and Yesong, then running northeastward and eastward to

Yangyang.39

General MacArthur flew into Korea

on 3 April to discuss this next step northward with General Ridgway and to look

at the ground situation. At that time,

Ridgway explained that when he had

sought approval for an advance to the

Yesong-Yangyang line, he had believed

he would find good hunting in the western area between the Imjin and the

Yesong. But recent intelligence had revealed very few enemy forces in that

region and Ridgway therefore had decided not to advance as far as the Yesong.

Ridgway told MacArthur that the strongest possible line he could seize was the

one toward which he was now aiming,

Line KANSAS. MacArthur agreed and

told Ridgway he wanted him to make a

very strong fight for this line, with any

advance beyond it carefully limited and

controlled.40

On 5 April, MacArthur notified the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Eighth Army

had jumped off in its drive across the

parallel to destroy enemy forces and supplies south of Line KANSAS. MacArthur

also informed the Joint Chiefs that Ridgway intended to follow Operation

RUGGED with Operation DAUNTLESS

which would take the Eighth Army

twenty miles farther into North Korea,

in the west central zone, and enable it

to seize Line WYOMING and thereby gain

control of an area known to be a point of

concentration for enemy troops and supplies. MacArthur explained that, once

Lines KANSAS and WYOMING had been

seized, he intended to maintain contact

with the enemy only by patrols of battalion size. The existing logistical limitations, combined with the terrain,

weather conditions, and intelligence of

enemy dispositions, had convinced him

that a further advance in force beyond

the present objective lines was not

feasible.41

The enemy did not strongly resist the

crossing of the parallel. By 9 April, all

units in the U.S. I and IX Corps and

ROK I Corps had fought their way forward to positions on Line KANSAS; and

although the U.S. X and ROK III Corps

in the central and east central sectors

had been slowed down by rugged terrain

and inadequate supply routes, these two

corps by the same date were drawing

near their KANSAS objectives. Throughout this early April advance, Ridgway

and MacArthur were aware that the

38

 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, Mar 51. 39 Ibid.

40

 Ridgway, The Korean War: Issues and Policies,

41

 Rad, C 59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51.
364 POLICY AND DIRECTION

enemy, particularly the Chinese, was

building up in rear areas and was daily

increasing his capability to launch an

offensive. The enemy build-up was especially notable in the Ch'orwon-P'yonggang-Hwach'on triangle in the west

central area, which in turn accounted for

Ridgway's plan to seize this area by advancing to Line WYOMING. On 31

March, General MacArthur had reported

to the Department of the Army that an

enemy offensive of great strength might

be expected at any time after 1 April.

He estimated that the Chinese had 274,-

000 troops in Korea and 478,000 regular

troops in Manchuria. The North Koreans were believed to have approximately 198,000 men, including guerrillas,

available for an attack.42

Keeping the enemy's offensive capability constantly in mind, Ridgway made

plans to contain the expected offensive

by rolling to the rear with the enemy's

punch. On 12 April, he issued Operation Plan AUDACIOUS, which called for an

orderly, fighting withdrawal through

successive phase lines. This withdrawal

would be made only on Ridgway's order

and would be conducted in such a manner as to inflict maximum losses on the

enemy and to preserve all friendly units

intact.43

About the time Ridgway issued this

plan, he became aware that publishing

it would be one of his last acts as the

Eighth Army commander. As a result

of a decision made by President Truman

two days earlier, the general who had

revitalized the Eighth Army was about

to be elevated to higher command, not

primarily because of Ridgway's accomplishments, but more because of the

President's exasperation with General

MacArthur. 42

 (1) Rad, CX 59065, CINCFE to DA for G-2, 31

Mar 51. (2) Telecon, TT 4597, DA and GHQ, 13

Apr 51. (3) Telecon, TT 4603, DA and GHQ, 15

Apr 51.

43

 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Apr 51, Narrative, pp.

11-13.
CHAPTER XX

The Relief of MacArthur

The focus shifted from military operations after President Truman suddenly

relieved General MacArthur of all his

military commands. The President took

this step following five days of consultation with his chief military and civilian

advisers. The culmination came on 10

April when he directed General Bradley

to send General MacArthur a message

stating:

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as

President and Commander in Chief of the

United States Military Forces to replace you

as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers;

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and

Commanding General United States Army, Far East. You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lieutenant Gen- eral Matthew B. Ridgway.1

The abrupt dismissal of so distinguished a soldier as General MacArthur

aroused considerable furor in the United

States and elsewhere. Charges of "cavalier treatment" and "foreign pressure"

as well as broad hints of political machination followed his dismissal. The entire matter was aired extensively between

May and August 1951 before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

United States Senate. No definite conclusions were drawn, but testimony given

the committees provided some indication

of the reasons which impelled President

Truman's decision.2 Charges that MacArthur's removal was fostered, and actually engineered, by certain nations

allied with the United States in Korea,

particularly the British, were not well

founded. While these nations, through

press media and even through official

channels, criticized General MacArthur's

conduct of the campaign and expressed

1

 Rad, JCS 88180, Bradley (Personal) for MacArthur, 11 Apr 51.

2

 The Joint Committee on Armed Services and

Foreign Relations which conducted these hearings

was composed of Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman; Senator Styles Bridges; Senator Alexander

Wiley; Senator H. Alexander Smith; Senator Bourke

B. Hickenlooper; Senator William F. Knowland;

Senator Harry P. Cain; Senator Owen Brewster; and

Senator Ralph E. Flanders. Witnesses appearing

before the committee included General MacArthur;

Secretary of Defense Marshall; General Bradley;

General Collins; General Vandenberg; Admiral

Sherman; Secretary of State Acheson; General

Wedemeyer; and former Secretary of Defense Johnson. Among its indefinite conclusions the committee reached the following: "The removal of

General MacArthur was within the constitutional

powers of the President but the circumstances were

a shock to the national pride," and "There was no

serious disagreement between General MacArthur

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy

in Korea." See MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3601-02.
366 POLICY AND DIRECTION

grave fears that his recommendations

might lead to a general war, no evidence

existed that any of these nations petitioned President Truman for MacArthur's dismissal.

For months prior to his relief, General

MacArthur had, according to Washington officials, expressed opinions on matters beyond his purview in a manner not

befitting a military commander. These

opinions had not only embarrassed President Truman and his advisers, but

threatened, these same officials claimed,

to have a profound effect upon international public opinion and to jeopardize

the relationships of the United States

with its allies. Until President Truman's order forbidding expressions of

personal opinion on political and military policy, such expressions were more

acts of military impropriety than of misconduct. But after the order, any public

expression of opinion contrary to established national policy violated a Presidential directive.

Although it may have been a contributing factor, General MacArthur's

conduct of the campaign, from a purely

military standpoint, did not bring about

the President's decision. His inability

to anticipate the Chinese attack in late

November and the subsequent withdrawal of the United Nations forces in

December apparently did not cause his

dismissal from command.3

Immediately after MacArthur's relief,

President Truman stated publicly that

MacArthur was unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the

U.S. Government in matters pertaining

to his official duties. He pointed out

that while full debate on matters of national policy was a vital element of any

true democracy, military commanders

had to be governed by the policies and

directives issued to them in the manner

provided by U.S. laws and the Constitution.4

 Hence, General MacArthur's removal from command seems to have

stemmed from his official protestations

and public expressions of dissatisfaction

with United States Far Eastern military

and political policies made by him between August 1950 and April 1951.

The Formosa Issue

The first occasion after the outbreak

of the Korean War on which General

MacArthur ran afoul of President Truman developed not over Korea, but over

the general issue of American policy

toward Formosa. This problem had

been under discussion by officials of the

Department of Defense and the Department of State for some time before the

Korean situation developed.5

3

 President Truman later stated that he did not

blame General MacArthur for the failure of his

November offensive. The President felt that MacArthur was no more to be blamed for the fact that

he was outnumbered than was General Eisenhower

for his heavy losses in the Battle of the Bulge. The

difference, as the President saw it, between Eisenhower in 1944 and MacArthur in 1950 was the manner in which MacArthur tried to excuse his failure.

See Truman, Memoirs, II, 381-82.

4

 During conversations with the author in June

1961, former President Truman declined to elaborate on statements already made in his memoirs as

to his reasons for dismissing General MacArthur.

He stated that General MacArthur had been, and

remained, a "great American and a great general"

and that he had no desire to tarnish MacArthur's

public image. Truman did, however, assert emphatically that his course of action had been the only

one open to him and that, faced again with the

same situation, he would do the same thing. To do

otherwise would have been to abdicate his great

responsibility as Commander in Chief. 5

 Memo, Burns for Rusk, Asst Secy State for Far
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 367

MACARTHUR RECEIVES WARM WELCOME ON HIS RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.

During the extraordinary conferences

at Blair House after the North Korean

invasion of South Korea, General Bradley had read to the assembled high officials a memorandum MacArthur had

given Secretary of Defense Johnson during the latter's Tokyo visit. This paper,

which Secretary Johnson thought brilliant and to the point, set forth in cogent

terms the reasons why Formosa should

not be allowed to pass to the control of

Communist China, but should instead

be fully protected by the United States.6

President Truman, on 27 June 1950,

ordered General MacArthur to deploy

the Seventh Fleet to prevent attacks on

Formosa by the Chinese Communists

and, conversely, attacks by the Formosan

garrison on the Chinese mainland.7 In

a public announcement on the same

date, President Truman explained that

Eastern Affairs, 29 May 50, sub: Notes on StateDefense Conference Held 25 May 1950, cited in

Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV.

ch. IV, "The Knotty Problem of Formosa."

6

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 2579. 7

 DA, TT 3426, 27 Jun 50.
368 POLICY AND DIRECTION

he had taken this action because, "the

occupation of Formosa by Communist

forces would be a direct threat to the

security of the Pacific area and to United

States forces performing their lawful and

necessary functions in that area." He

also fended off any charge that the United

States intended to seize the island stronghold by declaring, "The determination

of the future status of Formosa must

await the restoration of security in the

Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan,

or consideration by the United Nations."

 8

When visited by General Collins in

mid-July, General MacArthur had told

the Army Chief of Staff that as soon as

the Korean situation had become sufficiently stabilized he intended to visit

Formosa for talks with Chiang Kai-shek.

The Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1950 informed MacArthur that the Chinese

Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and would

probably succeed unless the Chinese

Nationalists made timely efforts to defend the island. They had recommended

to the Secretary of Defense, they stated,

that the Nationalists be permitted to

break up hostile concentrations through

military action, even if it meant attacks

on the mainland.9

MacArthur gave full concurrence to

this proposal, and informed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that he and a selected

staff would visit Formosa about 31 July

to survey the situation.10 In reply the

Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that, pending new instructions on certain policy

matters being considered by the Departments of State and Defense, MacArthur

might prefer to send a senior officer to

Formosa on 31 July, and to proceed later

himself. They added, however, that if he

felt it necessary, he should feel free to

go since the responsibility was his own.11

MacArthur chose to make the initial

Formosa visit in person so that he could

resolve uncertainties arising out of conflicting reports from the island about the

status of Chiang's government and its

armed forces.12

MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral

Struble, flew to Taipeh on 31 July where

for two days he conferred with Chiang

Kai-shek and his generals. But not until

five days after his return to Tokyo did

MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.13 Meanwhile, press reports speculating that MacArthur had made binding

agreements and political promises to

Chiang Kai-shek caused Washington officials considerable uneasiness since they

could not judge the validity of these reports. In addition, the Department of

State heard from its representative in

Taipeh that MacArthur was about to

transfer fighter squadrons to Formosa, a

move not authorized by Washington,

and a move which General MacArthur

had not actually planned.14 Chiang Kaishek added fuel to the flame by issuing a

public statement that could be interpreted as indicating the existence of

8

 Statement by the President of the United States,

27 Jun 50, MacArthur Hearings, p. 3369. 9

 Rad, JCS 87401, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Jul 50. 10

 Rad, C 58994, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Jul 50.

11

 Rad, JCS 87492, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jul 50. 12

 Rad, C 59032, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jul 50. 13

 MacArthur considered his report to be timely.

He stated later, "Full reports on the results of the

visit were promptly made to Washington." See

MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 340. 14

 (1) Rad, JCS 87878, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Aug

50. (2) Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol.

IV, pp. 20-21.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 369

extensive secret agreements between himself and MacArthur.15

 There was also

an erroneous but widespread belief that

MacArthur had made the trip to Formosa without the knowledge or approval

of the nation's leaders.

Nevertheless, the uninformed speculation in the press and the lack of real

knowledge as to what MacArthur had

done on Formosa, coming at a time when

the United States was trying to convince

Communist China that there were no

ulterior motives lurking behind President Truman's action toward Formosa,

caused the President, in a sternly worded

message over Secretary of Defense Johnson's signature, to caution MacArthur.

On 4 August, MacArthur was reminded

in no uncertain terms, "No one other

than the President as Commander-inChief has the authority to order or

authorize preventive action against concentrations on the mainland. The most

vital national interest requires that no

action of ours precipitate general war or

give excuse to others to do so."

 16

MacArthur replied the next day that

he fully understood and was operating

meticulously in accordance with the

President's decision of 27 June.17 Then,

on 7 August, he submitted a full report

of his conference with Chiang Kai-shek.

He indicated Chiang's willingness to

co-operate and that there was a real

potential in the armed forces on Formosa, although substantial improvements would be necessary. He explained

that he had directed periodic sweeps of

the Formosa Strait by elements of the

Seventh Fleet, periodic reconnaissance

flights over certain of the coastal areas

of China, and familiarization flights by

small groups of United States aircraft to

include temporary and refueling landings on Formosa.18

President Truman subsequently sent

Averell Harriman to Tokyo, reputedly

to caution MacArthur not only to keep

the President better informed, but, on

other than military matters, to make

recommendations, not decisions. Afterward, Harriman stated that General MacArthur had not overstepped his military

bounds in making the trip to Formosa;

President Truman announced his satisfaction with General MacArthur's performance; and General MacArthur

declared that anyone who hinted of friction between himself and the President

was guilty of "sly insinuations, brash

speculations and bold misstatements."

 19

Communist nations made much of

President Truman's order neutralizing

Formosa and charged that the United

States intended to take over and occupy

the island. In August, the Peiping

regime accused the United States of aggression against Formosa and asked the

United Nations Security Council to order

the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United

States armed invading forces from Taiwan. . . ."20

 In refutation of this

charge, President Truman on 25 August

directed United States Ambassador Austin to address the Secretary-General,

Trygve Lie, on the matter. Austin sent

15

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3383-84. 16

 Rad, WAR 88014, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Aug 50. 17

 Rad, C 59418, CINCFE to JCS, 5 Aug 50.

18

 Rad, C 59569, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Aug 50. 19

 (1) Time, August 21, 1950. (2) For Harriman's

report to President Truman on this visit, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 349-53; for MacArthur's reaction

to Harriman's visit, see MacArthur, Reminiscences,

p. 341. 20

 State Dept Bulletin, XXIII (4 September 1950),

P. 396.
370 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Lie a complete account of the official

American attitude toward Formosa, including a 19 July statement to the Congress by President Truman in which he

declared ". . . that the United States

has no territorial ambitions whatever

concerning that island, nor do we seek

for ourselves any special position or

privilege on Formosa." On 28 August,

the President sent Austin more ammunition with which to demolish the Communist charges concerning Formosa by

telling him that the United States would

welcome United Nations consideration

of the case of Formosa.21

A week earlier, General MacArthur,

who had been invited to speak at the

Fifty-First National Encampment of the

Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in

Chicago, sent instead a paper which he

proposed be read at the meeting. In this

paper, MacArthur stressed the strategic

importance of Formosa and insisted that

the United States must, at any cost, retain

control of that island. He strongly

hinted that the United States would be

able to use Formosa as a base in any

future operations against the Asiatic

mainland. He pointed out also that Formosa would be a formidable threat to

American security if controlled by an

unfriendly power, terming it an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine

tender." "Nothing could be more fallacious," he charged, "than the threadbare argument by those who advocate

appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak

thus do not understand the Orient."

 22

This strong statement evoked an

equally strong reaction from President

Truman when he was informed of it by

Harriman on 26 August before its

publication. The President read MacArthur's paper to Harriman, General Bradley, and Secretary Johnson, then directed

that MacArthur withdraw the statement.

Secretary Johnson immediately cabled

MacArthur that the President directed

him to withdraw the message ". . . because various features with respect to

Formosa are in conflict with the policy

of the United States and its position in

the United Nations."

 23

According to Johnson, when the President learned that MacArthur's rather

lengthy statement to the VFW had been

transmitted through Army communications facilities from Japan, he was particularly indignant. Johnson testified

before the Senate committee, later investigating the relief of General MacArthur, that on 26 August President

Truman discussed with him the advisability of relieving MacArthur as the

commander in Korea, but decided to take

no such action at that time.24

General MacArthur's immediate response to the Presidential order was to

fire a protest to the Secretary of Defense,

claiming that his VFW message had been

carefully prepared to support fully the

President's policy decision of 27 June

with respect to Formosa and pointing

out that the subject of Formosa had been

freely discussed in all circles, "Govern21

 (1) Ltr, Ambassador Austin to Secy-Gen Lie,

25 Aug 50. (2) Ltr, President Truman to Ambassador Austin, 28 Aug 50. (3) MacArthur Hearings,

pp. 3473-76.

22

 Quotation in Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, pp. 378-79. 23

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2586, 3480. 24

 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2587, 3665.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 371

mental and private, both at home and

abroad." MacArthur obviously felt he

could separate his views as a private citizen from those as the commander in

chief, United Nations Command. For

he observed that the views embodied in

his statements to the VFW were "purely

my personal ones." Noting that the

VFW undoubtedly had given wide distribution to his speech in advance press

releases, MacArthur advised Johnson

that suppressing his message under these

conditions would be a grave mistake.25

General MacArthur nevertheless was ordered to withdraw his message to the

veterans' group. President Truman later

softened the blow to MacArthur's feelings by transmitting to him the text of

Austin's message on Formosa to Secretary-General Lie and his own letter to

Austin on the same subject with the

statement, "I am sure that when you

examine this letter . . . you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message

to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was

necessary."

 26

Although General MacArthur informed the national commander of the

VFW that he had been directed to withdraw his message, MacArthur's statement

appeared in print in U.S. News and

World Report on 1 September 1950,27

and thereby provided excellent grist for

the USSR propaganda mill. Andrei

Vishinsky, Soviet Ambassador to the

United Nations, for instance, twisted

MacArthur's comments on Formosa to

his own purposes when, in a speech, he

stated, "None other than General MacArthur recently informed, with cynical

candor, the whole world about the decision of the ruling circles of the United

States of America at all costs to turn

Taiwan [Formosa] into an American

base in the Far East."

 28

Even so, it is probable that the Formosa incident, had it been the last

instance of friction, would have been forgotten, or at least overlooked, by Mr.

Truman. But it was to be only the beginning of a series of incidents that progressively weakened President Truman's

patience with General MacArthur.

MacArthur's Disagreement With

United States Policy in Korea

During the first five months of the

Korean fighting, General MacArthur did

not openly criticize the directives under

which he operated in Korea. From

time to time he did complain through

official channels about shortages of men

and equipment. But at the Wake Island

Conference, the United Nations commander indicated that he understood the

problems Washington faced in supporting him when he told the assembled officials that no commander in the history

of war had ever had more complete and

adequate support from all the agencies in

Washington.29 When, in late October,

he found the terms of his current directive a little too restrictive, he did not

hesitate to ignore it by ordering all his

forces north to the border instead of

using only ROK forces in that area, as he

25

 (1) Rad, DEF 89880, DEF to CINCFE, Johnson

(Personal) for MacArthur, 26 Aug 50. (2) Rad, C

61325, CINCFE to DA for Secy Defense, MacArthur

(Personal) for Johnson, 27 Aug 50. (3) MacArthur,

Reminiscences, pp. 385-86 and 389. 26

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 3480. 27

 JSSC Rpt to JCS, p. 45.

28

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 2002. 29

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 213.
372 POLICY AND DIRECTION

had been instructed. But he did not

openly criticize that directive.

During November, as signs that the

Chinese were intervening in Korea began

to appear, signs of differences between

MacArthur and Washington officials also

began to develop. MacArthur's order

for bombing the Yalu River bridges on

6 November, for instance, aroused consternation in Washington. More than

that, the order was not in accordance

with the instructions issued him on 29

June, warning him to stay well clear of

the USSR and Manchurian borders in

conducting his air operations. When

three days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff

suggested that MacArthur's mission in

Korea might have to be changed in view

of Chinese intervention, he hotly proclaimed his disagreement30

 and his mission was not changed. The 11th-hour

suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

prompted by the conviction of other nations participating in the Korean fighting that MacArthur should check his

attack along a line short of the Yalu, was

likewise roundly condemned by General

MacArthur.31 Yet at no time in this

period did General MacArthur argue his

case publicly, although he did deny that

he had received any suggestion from "any

authoritative source" that he should stop

at any line short of the international

boundary.32

With the intervention by Chinese

Communist armies, however, General

MacArthur's attitude toward public disclosures changed abruptly. Smarting

from the defeat his forces had suffered,

MacArthur spoke out sharply in his own

defense, and in published statements in

early December charged that the limitations upon his operations were an enormous handicap "without precedent in

military history," and intimated that

selfish interests in Europe were causing

support to be withheld from his forces.33

These statements were widely assessed

as a criticism of the United Nations

policy of limited war in Korea and as

an oblique criticism of the Truman administration in its conduct of the war.

They were probably not so intended.

General MacArthur pointed out quite

rightly that at no time had he asked for

authority to retaliate beyond the inviolate northern boundary of Korea. His

statements, issued at a time when the

administration was trying earnestly to

reassure uneasy allies, were nonetheless

of great concern to President Truman

and his advisers. British fears that MacArthur might involve the west in a largescale war with Communist China made

his pronouncements especially regrettable. Too, his insistence on blaming

operational restrictions for the situation

in Korea was taken in Washington as a

reflection on the judgment of the man

who had decided to impose those restrictions. This inference was unfortunate,

even if not intended as such, for the

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that MacArthur was partly responsible for his

own predicament. They had been per30 suaded to approve his plans for the No- Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 Nov 50. 31

 Rad, C 69808, MacArthur to DA for JCS, 25

Nov 50. 32

 (1) Statement, Gen MacArthur (in reply to question from Arthur Krock), New York Times, December 1, 1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 3496.

33

 (1) Statements, Gen MacArthur, 2 Dec 50, in

U.S. News and World Report, December 8, 1950, pp.

16-22, and in the New York Times, December 2,

1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3532-34.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 373

vember advance by his great confidence

that the Chinese either would not, or

could not, intervene effectively.34

President Truman found MacArthur's

statements at this time particularly objectionable. He was irked by MacArthur's publicizing the fact that because

Washington had not let him do things

his own way his 24 November attack had

been defeated and the Chinese had intervened. President Truman charged that

he should have relieved MacArthur at

that point. He had not done so because

he did not wish it to appear that he was

being relieved because the offensive had

failed. Truman had never gone back on

people when luck was against them and

he did not intend to do so in this case.35

Commenting later, President Truman

stated that there was no excuse for the

way in which MacArthur began to publicize his views following the failure of

his offensive. Within four days, in four

different ways, according to President

Truman, MacArthur blamed his troubles

publicly on Washington's order to limit

the hostilities in Korea. He spoke of

extraordinary inhibitions without precedent in military history and made it quite

plain that no blame should be attached

to him or his staff.36

As a result of MacArthur's statements

President Truman had sent to the heads

of all executive departments his 5

December memorandum ordering government officials to clear all public statements concerning foreign policy with the

Department of State and all concerning

military affairs with the Department of

Defense. Although this memorandum

was addressed to all executive branches,

it was directed specifically at General

MacArthur.37

Meanwhile, MacArthur had proposed

to General Collins, then visiting in the

Far East, that the United States should

carry the war to China, through bombing, blockade, and other measures.

Throughout December and January and

into February, he insisted upon these

measures, always through official media

albeit quite forcefully. Not until midFebruary did General MacArthur bring

his views to the attention of the public.

On 13 February, in a statement to the

press, he contended that unless he was

allowed to reduce materially the superiority of the Chinese, ostensibly

through attacks upon their "sanctuary,"

he could not seriously consider conducting major operations north of the 38th

Parallel; and on 7 March, in another

such statement, he held that vital decisions, yet to be made, must be provided

on the highest international levels.

These statements may have been perfectly true, and there is considerable evidence that the latter opinion especially

was valid; but both were considered by

Washington authorities to be comments

affecting both foreign and military policies of the United States Government

that were not cleared by the Department

of Defense and were, therefore, in violation of the President's directive of 5

December.38

34

 Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV,

ch. VII, pp. 32-33. 35

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 384; see also pp. 444-50. 36

 Ibid., 382.

37

 (1) Rad, JCS 98134, JCS to CINCFE, CINCEUR,

CINCAL, et al., 6 Dec 50. (2) MacArthur Hearings,

p. 880. 38

 (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3539-40. (2) Ltr,

Secy Marshall to Hon Richard B. Russell, 17 Aug

51. (3) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3665-66.
374 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General Marshall later said that MacArthur's statement of 24 March offering

to negotiate with enemy leaders in the

field was the culminating factor in President Truman's decision to relieve MacArthur. Marshall charged that this

statement contained a thinly veiled hint

that the enemy should either negotiate or

the war would be carried to the Chinese

mainland. He based this view on that

portion of MacArthur's statement which

said, "The enemy therefore must by now

be painfully aware that a decision of

the United Nations to depart from its

tolerant effort to contain the war to the

area of Korea through expansion of our

military operations to his coastal areas

and interior bases would doom Red

China to the risk of imminent military

collapse."

 39

The President found this to be a most

extraordinary statement for a military

commander of the United Nations to

issue on his own responsibility. He construed MacArthur's statement as defiance

of his orders as Commander in Chief and

a challenge to his authority. Additionally MacArthur was, in the President's

view, flouting the policy established by

the United Nations. By this act General

MacArthur had left the President no

choice. He felt he could no longer

tolerate MacArthur's insubordination.40

President Truman nonetheless delayed a

final decision; neither the general public

nor General MacArthur was aware of

President Truman's steadily mounting

dissatisfaction.

But the stage had already been set for

the final act. On 20 March General

MacArthur, in reply to a personal letter

from Joseph W. Martin, House of Representatives Minority Leader, sent a

relatively mild commentary to the Congressman on American foreign policy.

There was nothing new in what he said,

nor was it said in a particularly inflammatory manner. MacArthur merely

reiterated his views that the Asian

theater was fully as important as the

European and that the United States

must prosecute the Asian war until victory was achieved. MacArthur later

testified that the letter to Congressman

Martin was, in his mind, so trifling a

matter that he could scarcely recall it.41

But it was no trifling matter to President

Truman; and when Martin chose to

make public the contents of the letter

on 5 April 1951, the President reacted

strongly and quickly. On 6 April, he

called together his special assistant,

Averell Harriman, Secretary of State

Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall,

and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, General Bradley, and put the

matter squarely before them. What

should be done with General MacArthur? Harriman told Truman that

MacArthur should have been fired two

years ago.42 But Secretary Marshall appreciated the possible repercussions that

39

 (1) Ltr, Secy Marshall to Sen Russell, 17 Aug

51, in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3655-66. (2) Statement of Gen MacArthur, 24 Mar 51, in MacArthur

Hearings, p. 3541. 40

 Truman, Memoirs, II, 441-42.

41

 (1) MacArthur Hearings, p. 113. (2) See also

MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 385-86 and 389. 42

 Harriman was referring to MacArthur's plea

in 1949 that he was too busy when requested to return to the United States to discuss matters concerning the occupation of Japan, and to subsequent

difficulty in convincing MacArthur to withhold approval from a bill of the Japanese Diet which was

contrary to the approved economic policy for the

occupation. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 447.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 375

GENERAL RIDGWAY

might come with MacArthur's dismissal

and advised caution. He observed that

if the President relieved General MacArthur it might be difficult to get pending military appropriations through

Congress. General Bradley approached

the question from the point of view of

military discipline. He believed that

MacArthur had acted in an insubordinate manner and that, consequently, he

deserved to be relieved of his command.

But he told Truman that he wished to

talk with General Collins before making

a final recommendation. Secretary

Acheson believed that MacArthur should

be relieved, but only after a unanimous

decision to do so by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

President Truman had already decided to relieve General MacArthur but

he kept this decision to himself for the

time being. He asked all four of his

advisers to return again the next day

for more discussion, and directed Secretary Marshall to restudy all messages

exchanged with General MacArthur in

the past two years. The next morning,

7 April, the same group met again in

President Truman's office. Secretary

Marshall told the President that after
376 POLICY AND DIRECTION

GENERAL VAN FLEET

reading all the messages he agreed with

Harriman that MacArthur should have

been relieved two years earlier. Before

this brief meeting ended, President Truman directed General Bradley to obtain

the views of the remaining Joint Chiefs

of Staff and to be prepared to make a

final recommendation on 9 April.43

General Bradley, General Collins,

General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman met on the afternoon of 8 April in

the Pentagon and discussed the military

aspects of MacArthur's relief thoroughly.

At the conclusion of this conference,

these officers conferred briefly with Secretary Marshall. All of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff agreed that from the military

viewpoint the relief of General MacArthur should be carried out. General

Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, later

testified that he based his belief on two

principal factors: first, he was convinced

that General MacArthur was not in

sympathy with the basic policies governing the operation of United Nations

forces in Korea. "I felt," Collins stated,

"that the President, as our Commander

in Chief, was entitled to have as a commander in the field a man who was more

in sympathy with the basic policies and

more responsive to the will of the President as Commander in Chief." Collins

felt, secondly, that MacArthur had failed

to comply with the instructions given

him directing him to clear any public

statement that he made which involved

matters of policy, particularly of foreign

policy.44

After receiving the views of his principal advisers on 9 April, President Truman announced his decision to relieve

General MacArthur of his commands in

the Far East. General Ridgway was to

replace MacArthur and Lt. Gen. James

A. Van Fleet was to become the new

commanding general of the Eighth

Army.

The President originally intended to

notify General MacArthur of his relief at

2000 Washington time on 11 April (1000

Tokyo time, 12 April). A message was

sent to Secretary of the Army Pace, then

visiting in Korea, telling him to deliver

the relief message to MacArthur at his

residence, the American Embassy in

Tokyo, at the time indicated. But Secretary Pace failed to receive these instructions because of a breakdown in a

43

 Truman Memoirs, II, 447-48. 44 MacArthur Hearings, p. 1187.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 377

communications power unit in Pusan.45

In the meantime, late on 10 April, indications appeared that the action to be

taken had become known publicly. It

was then decided by President Truman

to accelerate the transmission of the official notification to General MacArthur

by approximately twenty hours.46

According to General MacArthur, his

first inkling that he had been relieved

came from his wife. One of MacArthur's

aides had heard the news on a radio

broadcast and told Mrs. MacArthur who

then informed her husband. The official

notification, MacArthur claimed, did not

reach him until half an hour later.47

MacArthur immediately ordered General Hickey to telephone General Ridgway in Korea and to notify him of the

change in command. He turned over to

Hickey the functions of command until

General Ridgway could leave the front

and fly to Tokyo to take over in person.48

45

 MacArthur called the communications failure

"incredible. . . . He [Pace] was in Korea at the

moment in immediate message contact with my

headquarters, which had similar contact with Washington." See MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 395. 46

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 345.

47

 (1) Ibid., p. 155. (2) See also MacArthur,

Reminiscences, p. 395. 48

 MacArthur Hearings, p. 155.
CHAPTER XXI

New Direction, New Policy

As the controversy within the national

defense structure heightened and finally

culminated in General MacArthur's relief, tension also mounted steadily at the

battlefront. Pushed back by Ridgway

in March and April, enemy forces had

compressed like a huge spring, and apparently were about ready to burst forth

again in a major attack. Just before

MacArthur's removal, Ridgway had

called his American corps commanders

together and warned them that, if the

Chinese struck in full strength, the

Eighth Army might be in for the worst

period since it had entered Korea.1

General Ridgway learned of the startling command change late on 11 April.

The next day he flew to Tokyo, where

he found MacArthur "amazed" by the

President's action in relieving him but

not outwardly bitter or resentful. MacArthur briefed Ridgway on some of the

key problems of the command, then

wished Ridgway well in his new

assignment.2

The change of commanders was attended by some confusion as to General

Van Fleet's role. The Secretary of Defense, in notifying Ridgway of his own

appointment as United Nations commander, had added that Van Fleet was

being sent to Korea for "such duties as

you may direct." Immediately after

meeting with MacArthur, Ridgway telephoned Secretary of the Army Pace and,

expressing uncertainty as to his authority

in choosing a commander for the Eighth

Army, asked how he was expected to use

General Van Fleet. But Secretary Pace

knew no more about the matter than

did Ridgway and could only refer the

question to Secretary Marshall.3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly set

the matter straight. They notified Ridgway that the President had personally

approved Van Fleet as the successor to

the command of the Eighth Army. They

themselves suggested the phrase, "for

such duties as you may direct," since

they realized the imminence of a major

Chinese offensive and felt that General

Ridgway might wish to retain direct

command in the field for the time being,

presumably until the threatening enemy

offensive had been turned back. Until

that time, they suggested, Van Fleet

1

 Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 418-19. 2

 Ibid., p. 160.

3

 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Apr 51, sec. II, Book

1, OCG.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 379

could serve as General Ridgway's deputy

commander.4

But General Ridgway saw no reason

to delay turning the Eighth Army over

to its new commander. He already had

made plans to meet any Chinese attack;

and the army staff and subordinate commanders could be counted on to carry

their new chief safely past the difficult

familiarization period. General Van

Fleet arrived in Korea at 1230 on 14

April and immediately assumed command of the Eighth Army. General

Ridgway, who had returned to Korea

to receive Van Fleet, left for Tokyo at

1900 the same day.5 Two days later, on

16 April, General MacArthur and his

family left Japan for the United States.

On 16 April, Ridgway reported to

Washington, "Although the enemy has

remained on the defensive since midFebruary, only partially exploiting his

enormous potential of more than sixty

divisions, he retains the capability of assuming the offensive at any time."6

Three days later, Ridgway placed definite

restrictions on the advance of Van Fleet's

divisions out of conviction that the

Chinese would attack soon and that for

Van Fleet to overextend his own lines to

attack could be dangerous. Accordingly,

Van Fleet was not to send any strong

force farther than Line WYOMING

without Ridgway's prior approval.7

Responding to Ridgway's instructions

on the same day, the new Eighth Army

commander informed his superior that

he planned to jump off in a general

advance toward Line WYOMING on 21

April. He also asked Ridgway to approve a secondary limited objective attack in the east, to be opened on 23

April, to seize the Kansong-Inje road by

securing what he called Line ALABAMA

from Yanggu to Songhyon-ni.8

General Ridgway authorized Van

Fleet to secure the Kansong-Inje road,

but designated a modified Line ALABAMA

which ran somewhat farther east and

west than the line proposed by Van

Fleet. Seizure of this line would bring

the eastern quarter of the Eighth Army

front well north of the 38th Parallel.

Ridgway specified that no large enemy

groups were to be bypassed and that

lateral co-ordination within and between

corps was to be maintained.9

In briefing his staff on 19 April, Ridgway described the current enemy situation as much more favorable for United

Nations forces than might appear. Existing North Korean units, in his judgment, could operate successfully only

against South Korean troops; and while

he expected a Chinese offensive soon, he

was certain that the Eighth Army could

defeat it.10

The Chinese Offensive—22 April

United Nations forces were still edging toward Lines WYOMING and ALABAMA when the enemy launched their

expected offensive. The opening attack

4 on the night of 22 April halted Van

 Rad, JCS 88374, JCS to CINCFE (Personal) for

Gen Ridgway, 12 Apr 51. 5

 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Apr 51, sec. II, Book

1, OCG. 6

 Rad, C 60250, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Apr 51. 7

 Rad, CX 60388, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,

19 Apr 51.

8

 Rad, G-4 3901 KCG, Gen Van Fleet (Personal)

for Ridgway, 19 Apr 51. 9

 Rad, C 60684, CINCFE to CG Army Eight, 21

Apr 51. 10

 MFR, sgd Surles, 19 Apr 51, in SGS, GHQ, FEC

files.
380 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Fleet's central forces just short of Line

WYOMING when three Chinese armies

struck toward the Yonch'on-Hwach'on

area. After this initial blow, actually a

secondary effort, the Chinese delivered

the main attack against I and IX Corps

in the west in an attempt at a double

envelopment of Seoul. A tertiary drive

developed simultaneously in the east

near Inje. The Eighth Army held firm

against the assaults everywhere except in

the central sector, where one ROK division crumpled and fell back in considerable disorder for almost twenty

miles. This breakthrough prompted

Van Fleet to withdraw, as previously

planned by Ridgway, to Line KANSAS.

By 24 April, it appeared that 337,000

Chinese were driving toward Seoul in

the main enemy effort, and that the

enemy's secondary effort in the central

zone was being pressed by about 149,-

000 troops.11 In both the west and

central sectors, these enemy forces followed the Eighth Army withdrawal

closely despite high losses. (Map VIII)

By the end of April, additional withdrawals took the Eighth Army back an

average of thirty-five miles to a new defense line arching no more than five

miles north of Seoul in the west and

running generally northeastward across

the peninsula to a point slightly above

Yangyang on the east coast. But Van

Fleet's forces, after again inflicting tremendous casualties on the enemy, fell

back no farther and the Communist offensive beat itself out along this line.

General Ridgway's 19 April evaluation

had been well based.12

Missions and

Responsibilities—CINCUNC

Ridgway applied a similar searching

analysis to all of his new duties as commander in chief, United Nations Command. One of his first acts was to obtain

from his staff a complete recapitulation

of the missions and authorities he had

inherited from General MacArthur.

In summing up, Ridgway's staff

described specific positive missions, inferred positive missions, restrictive missions, and complementary authorities.

As commander in chief of the United

Nations Command, Ridgway was responsible for maintaining the integrity of

United Nations forces; continuing to

fight in Korea so long as, in his judgment, such action offered a reasonable

chance of success; maintaining a blockade

of the entire Korean coast; stabilizing

the situation in Korea or evacuating to

Japan if forced out of Korea; taking all

appropriate steps to ensure stability

throughout Korea; and taking actions

under the auspices of the United Nations

to establish a unified, independent, and

democratic government in the sovereign

state of Korea.13

He was forbidden to take military

action against Chinese territory without

authority from Washington; to use nonKorean forces in areas bordering on

Manchuria or Russia; to allow any of his

forces to cross those borders; to take air

or naval action against Rashin; or to

attack the hydroelectric installations in

North Korea in the vicinity of the Yalu

11

 Telecon, TT 4635, GHQ and DA, 24 Apr 51. 12

 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, Apr 51.

13

 Study, CINCUNC and CINCFE, Current Military Missions as Derived From JCS Communications,

no date, in Comd Rpt, GHQ UNC, Apr 51, Annex

IV, Part III, Doc. 35.

NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 381

River. Nor could he consider the region

above the waist of Korea as a general

objective area, but he could, subject to

the restrictions on troops and targets,

operate north of the 38th Parallel.14

Finally, he had authority to command

all military forces assisting the Republic

of Korea which were placed under the

unified command of the United States;

to use ROK soldiers and civilians in

North Korea so long as they were designated as United Nations instrumentalities under his control; and to dispose of

prisoners of war in such a manner as

would least interfere with military operations, providing such disposition was

in consonance with the provisions of

the Geneva Convention.15

Once aware of what was expected of

him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General

Ridgway sent his major commanders

written instructions telling them exactly what he expected of them. As became apparent to these subordinates,

Ridgway's approach to the Korean conflict differed completely from that of

General MacArthur—Ridgway's greatest

concern seemed to be that some rash act

of his command might cause the conflict

to spread to other areas.

General Ridgway warned his principal

commanders, "The grave and ever present danger that the conduct of our

current operations may result in an extension of hostilities, and so lead to a

world-wide conflagration, places a heavy

responsibility upon all elements of this

command, but particularly upon those

capable of offensive action. "In accomplishing our assigned missions," Ridgway

emphasized,

this responsibility is ever present. It is a

responsibility not only to superior authority

in the direct command chain, but inescapably to the American people. It can be

discharged only if every commander is fully

alive to the possible consequences of his

acts; if every commander has imbued his

command with a like sense of responsibility

for its acts; has set up, and by frequent tests

has satisfied himself of the effectiveness of, his machinery for insuring his control of

the offensive actions of his command and of

its reactions to enemy action; and, in final

analysis, is himself determined that no act

of his command shall bring about an extension of the present conflict, except when

such act is taken in full accordance with the

spirit of the accompanying letter of instructions.16

Ridgway emphatically pointed out that

international tensions within and bearing upon the Korean theater had created

acute danger of World War III, and that

the instructions from Washington reflected the intense determination of the

American people, as well as of all free

peoples of the world, to prevent World

War III, if it could be done without

appeasement or sacrifice of principle.

"In the day to day, in fact the hour to

hour, performance of his duties," Ridgway concluded, "I therefore desire that

every responsible commander, regardless

of rank, bear constantly in mind that

the discharge of his responsibilities in

this respect is a sacred duty."

 17

In his instructions to General Van

Fleet, General Ridgway warned that until American intelligence agencies had

determined otherwise, Van Fleet was to

assume that the enemy forces were determined to drive the Eighth Army from

Korea or to destroy it in place, and that

14

 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

16

 Rad, C 60965, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Apr 51, quoting memo from Ridgway to All Comdrs, 22 Apr 51. 17 Ibid.
382 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Russia might at any time attack the

United Nations Command. "You will

further base your operations," he told

Van Fleet,

on the assumptions that your own forces

will be brought to and maintained at approximately TO&E strength, but that you

will receive no major reinforcements in

combat organizations or service support

units; that the duration of your operations

cannot now be predicted; that you may, at

any time, be directed by competent authority to initiate a withdrawal to a defensive

position and there be directed to defend

indefinitely; that you may at any time be

directed by competent authority to initiate

a retirement designed to culminate in an

early evacuation of the Korean peninsula.18

General Ridgway then charged Van

Fleet with a mission which appears to

have been Ridgway's own idea, a balance

between what the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had directed him to do and the military

capabilities which he felt he possessed.

"Your mission," he told Van Fleet, "is

to repel aggression against so much of

the territory (and the people therein)

of the Republic of Korea, as you now

occupy and, in collaboration with the

Government of the Republic of Korea,

to establish and maintain order in said

territory."

 19

Keeping in mind constantly the restrictions upon his own authority, General Ridgway cautioned Van Fleet that,

while he could operate north of the 38th

Parallel, he could only use Korean troops

in the areas bordering on Manchuria and

Russia and that he must prevent any

border-crossing by these forces.20 "You

will direct the efforts of your forces," he

ordered Van Fleet, "toward inflicting

maximum personnel casualties and material losses on hostile forces in Korea,

consistent with the maintenance intact

of all your major units and the safety

of your troops." Indicating that he was

satisfied with the way things were going

in Korea, Ridgway further stated:

The continued piecemeal destruction of

the offensive potential of the Chinese Communist and North Korean armies contributes materially to this objective, while

concurrently destroying Communist China's

military prestige. . . . Acquisition of terrain in itself is of little or no value.21

Although General Ridgway had not

yet been so directed, he fixed a line

beyond which the Eighth Army could

not advance without his permission.

Clearly, Ridgway intended to keep a

much tighter rein on the new field commander than MacArthur had kept upon

him. In similar instructions to Admiral

Joy and General Stratemeyer, Ridgway

gave strict warnings against violating the

borders of China and the USSR, and

forbade these commanders to employ

their forces except in support of United

Nations operations within a 20-mile

range of USSR territory or within a 3-

mile range of Chinese Communist

territory.

New Orders for CINCUNC

Ridgway's responsibilities as commander in chief, Far East Command, and

commander in chief, United Nations

Command, while nominally separate,

were nonetheless closely related, and on 18

 Ltr of Instructions, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van

Fleet, 22 Apr 51. 19 Ibid.

20

 Ibid. 21

 Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 383

occasion became so intertwined as to

interfere with each other. This had been

one of the major causes of General MacArthur's professed inability to understand or reconcile his instructions.

This conflict between roles became

especially noticeable when General Ridgway on 17 April asked that the Joint

Chiefs authorize him, at his own discretion, to withdraw United Nations

forces from Korea in the event of a

USSR attack and to use them to defend

Japan. He must have known that such a

unilateral procedure would certainly exceed his authority as a United Nations

commander, and probably made the request to emphasize not only the threat

of a Russian attack on Japan but also

the need for making his missions and

authorities clearer by distinguishing between the United Nations in Korea and

the United States in the Far East. In

this purpose, if such it was, he was eminently, but not immediately, successful.22

The immediate response of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff was to turn Ridgway

down. They agreed in principle to a

withdrawal of United Nations forces

from Korea in the event of Russian attack, but retained the right to control

such a withdrawal. They notified Ridgway that "Subject ... to the immediate

security of your forces both in Korea and

Japan, you will initiate major withdrawal from Korea only upon instructions furnished you after receipt of

information from you as to conditions

obtaining." Since Ridgway's first concern in the event of a Russian attack

undoubtedly would be the security of

his forces, these instructions were, to a

degree, unclear.23 On the related matter of employing other than American

and ROK forces against a Russian attack, Ridgway, as he probably expected,

was told that he would not plan on using

such forces for that purpose "pending

further instructions."

 24

Prompted by Ridgway's request, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Army

Chief of Staff to prepare for General

Ridgway a directive governing the conduct of Korean operations. Exhaustively

analyzing all outstanding JCS directives

to CINCFE and CINCUNC, the Army

G-3, General Taylor, furnished General

Collins with a proposed new set of instructions for General Ridgway. Collins

presented it to the Joint Chiefs who

passed it on to the Secretary of Defense

and the President for final approval.25

In the meantime, General Ridgway

had been doing his own analyzing and

on 30 April sent to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff a draft directive to himself, which

he proposed they approve and return to

him as his authority for operating in

Korea. But General Ridgway had

waited too long. The President had already approved the set of instructions

prepared for Ridgway by the Army G-3,

and on 1 May these instructions were

sent to him.26

But even this newest directive did not

clearly separate Ridgway's responsibilities as CINCUNC from those as

CINCFE. The over-all mission assigned

to Ridgway as CINCUNC was "to assist

22

 Rad, C 60308, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Apr 51.

23

 Rad, JCS 88950, JSC to CINCFE, 19 Apr 51. 24

 Ibid.

25

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 21 Apr 51, sub:

Directive to CINCFE for Opns in Korea, in G-3, DA

file 381 Korea, Case 6. 26

 Rad, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51.
384 POLICY AND DIRECTION

the ROK in repelling aggression and to

restore peace and security in the area,"

and his military objective was "to destroy the armed forces of North Korea

and Communist China operating within

the geographic boundaries of Korea and

waters adjacent thereto." But in pursuit

of his objectives in Korea, the security

of forces under his command and his

basic CINCFE mission of defending

Japan were still overriding.27 Here,

then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again had

failed to differentiate between the needs

and powers of CINCFE and CINCUNC

and had defined these unclear relationships with insufficient precision.

The usual injunctions against violating

Communist China or Russian territory

were passed on to Ridgway. If the

Chinese attacked United States forces

outside of Korea by sea or air, in Japan

for instance, retaliation against China's

mainland would be permitted, but no

retaliatory step would be taken without

the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.28

For the first time, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff limited the advance of United Nations forces. Ridgway was to make no

general advance beyond the original

trace of the Lines KANSAS-WYOMING

without prior approval. They did

authorize deeper limited movements.

Ridgway could, at his own discretion,

move north of the line in limited operations, including amphibious and airborne operations, to keep the enemy

off-balance and to maintain contact, or

for the omnibus and elastic purpose of

"insuring the safety of your command."

 29

The restriction on general advances

reflected a growing conviction that the

Korean problem would not be solved by

military action alone.30 Later critics

claimed that this restriction interfered

with the field commander, and attached

various sinister motives to its proponents.

The truth was that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and General Ridgway as well, had

realistically faced the military facts.

They knew that no major reinforcement

was available or would become available

from United States forces. They were

aware of the great reluctance of member

nations of the United Nations to send

more fighting men and equipment to

the United Nations Command and of

the desire of some of these nations to get

out of the Korean situation gracefully

and without unduly aggravating the

Chinese. They were fairly certain that

some sort of armistice negotiations could

be developed if the U.N. advance into

North Korea was so modest that the

enemy could profitably agree to a demarcation line along the line of contact.

They were aware that each mile of advance into North Korea changed the

balance of logistic capability in favor of

the enemy and brought the United Nations forces within ever closer range of

the increasingly strong enemy air force

based in Manchuria. They were reluctant to accept the numerous casualties

that a further advance would cost. But

most of all, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and General Ridgway knew that the

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29

 Ibid.

30

 In this connection see: (1) Rad, C 59397,

CINCFE to JCS, 5 Apr 51. (2) Rad, CX 60388,

CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Apr 51. MFR,

sgd Surles, 19 Apr 51, SGS, in GHQ, UNC, SGS files.

(3) Rad, C 60965, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Apr 51, quoting Memo for Ridgway to All Comdrs, 22 Apr 51.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 385

Chinese had ground forces available in

North Korea and Manchuria that had

not been tapped and that far outnumbered those of the United Nations Command in the area. Furthermore, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff evidently expected

some sort of political effort toward stopping the military operations. They told

Ridgway that, if Communist military

leaders requested an armistice in the

field, he was to report that fact to them

immediately and await instructions.31

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

reminded Ridgway, the prohibition

against the use of the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions had not been lifted.

These divisions were to be kept in Japan

and the integrity of their men and units

preserved. With regard to the ROK

Army, Ridgway could use such forces

as were already available, but the United

States would not furnish logistic support

for any other major ROK units at that

time.32

A New Directive for CINCFE

When General Ridgway examined his

new instructions, he found that they did

not coincide with the version which he

had recommended on 30 April, nor did

he completely understand them. He

therefore notified the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 7 May that he was sending to

Washington "an officer of my staff

thoroughly familiar with our problems

and points of view." "I request," he

continued, "that he be permitted to

consult with your planners on current

ambiguities and conflicting instructions."

 33

 He asked, at the same time,

that he be allowed to operate under the

instructions he himself had proposed to

them "until you approve new instructions as a result of these consultations."

Such authorization would, he claimed,

remove all doubt as to his missions and

as to means and methods permitted in

their accomplishment.34

General Collins was puzzled as to what

constituted the ambiguities and conflicting instructions to which Ridgway referred and directed his G-3 to examine

and report on the two sets of instructions.

After a comparison, the Army G-3 reported some conflicts. General Ridgway, for instance, had recommended

that he be allowed to order his forces

across the Manchurian and USSR borders if he felt it necessary, whereas the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had told him that

under no circumstances would United

Nations forces cross those borders. Ridgway also felt that he, as CINCUNC,

should command all military forces

placed under the unified command by

United Nations members, but the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had specifically excluded

the U.S. 40th and 45th Divisions from

CINCUNC control.35

The Joint Chiefs agreed to receive the

liaison officer from General Ridgway's

headquarters but refused to cancel their

current directive in the interim. They

would clarify any pertinent portions,

where necessary, by radio.36

The Joint Chiefs received a better idea

31

 (1) Rad, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May

51. (2) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 27 Mar 51, Incl

to JCS 1776/201 forwarded to CINCFE on 4 Apr 51. 32

 Ibid.

33

 Rad, C 61932, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 May 51. 34

 Ibid.

35

 Memo, ACofS G-3 (sgd Duff) for CofS USA, 7

May 51, in G-3, DA file 381 Korea, Case 6/15. 36

 Rad, JCS 90687, JCS to CINCFE, 9 May 51.
386 POLICY AND DIRECTION

of what General Ridgway considered

wrong with their directive when on 9

May he registered three major objections. Ridgway objected most strongly

to the mission itself, claiming that it was

impossible, with the forces he had, to

destroy the armed forces of North Korea

and Communist China within Korea,

especially since his forces could make no

general advance beyond Lines KANSASWYOMING. Second, he charged that the

two concepts embodied in the phrases

"security of forces under your command"

and "your basic mission as CINCFE of

the defense of Japan," were antithetical,

and that these two conflicting concepts,

when further complicated by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff order that he would not

evacuate Korea except with their permission, "constitute a serious abridgement of the authority and freedom of

action I believe you intend me to

have in order to discharge assigned

responsibilities."

 37

A successful defense of Japan, Ridgway declared, would be almost impossible if the United States military force

in Korea were destroyed by Russian attack. The only forces then remaining in

Japan would likely be the two National

Guard divisions, such provisional units

as could be organized from the support

forces in Japan, and the comparatively

new and ill-prepared Japanese National

Police Reserve. Ridgway felt that since

his CINCFE mission of defending Japan

took precedence over his CINCUNC

mission of clearing Korea, he should at

least be able to say when his troops in

Korea would withdraw and begin the

defense of Japan. If this decision were

left to Ridgway, he could withhold such

an announcement until the proper time;

and the United States Government could

announce simultaneously a decision to

evacuate ROK soldiers and governmental officials along with the Eighth

Army. But, Ridgway claimed, "If authority is retained in Washington, I believe the difficulty of avoiding premature

disclosure, with consequent risk of

disaster, will be very great if not

insurmountable."

 38

The third major objection to the

Joint Chiefs' instructions sprang from

the permission granted to attack, under

certain conditions, enemy air bases in

Manchuria and China. Ridgway saw

need also for authority to make prior

reconnaissance of these areas.39

These specific objections prompted no

immediate changes in Ridgway's directive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff refused

to grant Ridgway permission to pull his

forces out of Korea on his own initiative.

Without being specific, they told him

that strategic considerations demanded

that they retain authority for ordering

any such withdrawal. Their latest instructions, they believed, gave sufficient

latitude to plan a withdrawal and to take

any preliminary action required. They

did not share Ridgway's fear of a premature disclosure and assured him that

there would be plenty of time for them

to delegate withdrawal authority to him

and that they would not make any premature disclosure of intentions in

Washington.40

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully realized

37

 Rad, C 62088, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9

May 51.

38

 Ibid. 39

 Ibid.

40

 Rad, JCS 90999, JCS to CINCFE, 12 May 51.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 387

that the forces available to Ridgway were

too weak to destroy the North Korean

and Chinese Armies. But, they pointed

out optimistically, if the Chinese withdrew, this condition might change. In

any event, they considered the mission

currently assigned to Ridgway to be in

keeping with existing national objectives.

These objectives were at the time, of

course, under intensive review. "Depending on actions of the President on

recommendations of the National Security Council," the JCS informed Ridgway, "your mission will be made to

accord therewith." But, Washington

authorities bluntly told Ridgway, for the

time being, "Your mission remains unchanged."

 41

The Chinese Attack Again

The Chinese and North Korean

Armies fell back to recover in early May.

But it was clear that they had not been

decisively defeated, and equally plain

that they were replacing losses and rebuilding their offensive strength for

another try at destroying the United

Nations forces. Prisoner reports and

other intelligence sources, in fact,

had long indicated that the enemy

spring offensive would come in two

installments.42

Despite great losses in the first installment, the enemy still had a numerical

advantage over Van Fleet. The Chinese

ground forces totaled about 542,000 men,

according to intelligence estimates on

1 May. Smaller in numbers, but still

dangerous, the North Korean Army

numbered more than 197,000. Across

the Yalu in Manchuria, an additional

Chinese force of almost 750,000 stood

waiting. Van Fleet, on the other hand,

commanded 269,772 U.S. Army, U.S.

Marine, and allied troops and 234,993

ROK Army troops.43

In view of the likelihood of another

enemy offensive, Van Fleet's most profitable tactics were to keep the enemy

off-balance, break up enemy attack

formations, and reconnoiter to discover

enemy dispositions and plan of attack.

Besides, General Ridgway had ordered

Van Fleet on 25 April to "maintain the

offensive spirit of your Army and retain

the initiative." General Van Fleet therefore directed on 4 May that each of his

front-line divisions establish a patrol

base, manned by a complete RCT supported by corps armored units, in

advance of its main position. These

regimental patrol bases were set up seven

or eight miles in front of the main line

of resistance, and from them armorsupported patrols ranged ten to twelve

miles into enemy territory to carry the

fight to North Korean and Chinese

screening units. Other elements of Van

Fleet's forces meanwhile cleared the

Kimp'o Peninsula west of Seoul and

made substantial advances up the

main arterials leading north and east

41

 Ibid. 42

 (1) Comd Rpt, GHQ UNC, May 51, Annex IV,

Part 1, p. 3. (2) Telecons TT 4668, DA and GHQ,

3 May 51; TT 4680, 5 May 51; and TT 4682, 7

May 51. (3) Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative,

May 51.

43

 (1) Enemy statistics from Order of Battle. CCF

and NKA 1 May 1951, DIS, FEC, UNC 3159, 4 May

51. (2) Data on U.N. forces from Comd Rpt, Eighth

U.S. Army, Narrative, May 1951, p. 29 and Plate

No. 12, sec. II, Book 2.
388 POLICY AND DIRECTION

BUILDINGS BURNING in village north of Ch'unch'on as a result of artillery fire of

the 1st Cavalry Division.

from Seoul, recapturing Uijongbu and

Ch'unch'on.44

At the same time, when General Ridgway visited Korea on 3-4 May, Van

Fleet announced that if the enemy did

not attack soon, he intended to open a

general offensive himself. Ridgway

agreed.45

Accordingly, Van Fleet began planning an advance and tentatively set 12

May as the opening date.46 But in the

week following, intelligence sources provided clear signs that the enemy was all

but ready to move out once more in a

full-scale offensive. On 12 May, General Ridgway reported to Washington,

"It appears the enemy is again in the

advanced stages of preparation for the

44 resumption of the offensive which he can

 (1) Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, May

1951. (2) Comd Rpt, GHQ UNC, Introduction,

May 51. 45

 Rad, C 61848, CINCFE to DA, 5 May 51.

46

 Rad, CX-1483, CG Eighth Army to All Comdrs,

9 May 51.

NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 389

launch at any time, probably within the

next 72-96 hours."

 47

 By that date, Van

Fleet already had postponed his own

advance indefinitely.48

From the disposition of enemy forces

Ridgway predicted that five Chinese

armies would make the main effort down

the west central sector toward the lower

Han River corridor, along with a secondary drive on Seoul by three Chinese

armies and one North Korean corps.

He expected a lesser attack farther east

by two Chinese armies and three

North Korean corps striking down the

Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis.49 But the

enemy mass shifted eastward during the

period 10-16 May; and late in the afternoon of the 16th, five Chinese armies

launched the main enemy effort down

the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis. In the

west the enemy made only strong probing

attacks.50 (See Map VIII.)

To General Ridgway it appeared that

the Chinese had concentrated their principal strength of seven armies on a

25-mile front from Ch'unch'on northeastward to the Hwach'on Reservoir, and

that only four enemy armies remained

in the 40-mile sector to the west. Ridgway estimated it would take the Chinese

a full week, probably longer, to shift

their mass again to the Ch'orwon-Seoul

axis in the western sector, and therefore

saw an opportunity ".. . for the Eighth

Army to deliver strong attack on the

Uijongbu axis, using at least two U.S.

divisions with the objective of relieving

the pressure on IX and X Corps by

threatening vital enemy lateral communications through Chorwon." He

held high hopes for this strategy and told

General Van Fleet that if the contemplated counterattack were successful,

"unlimited opportunities for major

exploitation would result."

 51

After reconnoitering the front on 19

May, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to attack immediately not only up the

Uijongbu-Ch'orwon corridor, but across

the entire front. The enemy had obviously overextended and Ridgway hoped

to catch him off-guard.52

Consequently, even as the enemy was

still attempting to move south along a

40-mile front in the east central sector,

Van Fleet ordered his forces forward.

(Map IX) The sudden reversal of direction caught the enemy by surprise. As

a result, not only were substantial ground

gains registered, but also in a single day

the Eighth Army claimed to have killed

21,000 enemy and wounded 14,000.53

Along the entire front, U.N. troops

continued their counterattack against

moderate to weak resistance. By the end

of May, Van Fleet's forces had just about

made their way back to Line KANSAS,

and perhaps more important, had killed

the enemy at a rate higher than ever

previously achieved by Eighth Army.

With the enemy's much-vaunted offensive transmuted into rout and confusion

and the Chinese and North Korean

forces reeling back into North Korea,

47

 Telecons, TT 4682, DA and GHQ, 7 May 51 and TT 4704, 12 May 51. 48

 Rad, GX-5-1176 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to

All Comdrs, 11 May 51. 49

 Rad, CINCFE to DA, 12 May 51. 50

 Rad, G (TAG) 172 KCG, Ridgway (Personal)

for Collins, 20 May 51.

51

 Rad, C 62789, Ridgway (Personal) for Van

Fleet, 18 May 51. 52

 Rad, G (TAG) 172 KCG, Ridgway (Personal)

for Collins, 20 May 51. 53

 (1) Rad, GS-5-3290, CG Eighth Army to All

Comdrs, 19 May 51. (2) Rad, BCX 6355DI, CG

FEAF BOMBCOM to All Comdrs, 22 May 51.
390 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General Ridgway was justifiably confident in reporting to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 30 May that the enemy had

suffered a major defeat in Korea. The

estimate by field commanders of the

total number of enemy soldiers killed

in late May was so high that General

Ridgway could not, he told the Joint

Chiefs, accept it as credible. Nevertheless, he assured his superiors in Washington that the Communist casualties

far exceeded those they had suffered

during the 22 April offensive; and since

the majority of enemy casualties were

infantrymen, the loss of combat effectiveness by major enemy tactical units was

much greater than a mere reduction in

numbers would indicate. Also, the relatively primitive nature of enemy medical and evacuation facilities would

reduce the number of wounded returned

to duty, and would thus compound enemy losses. Moreover, nearly 10,000

prisoners, the vast majority of whom

were Chinese, had been taken by the

Eighth Army.54

Huge quantities of enemy matériel,

Ridgway reported, had been and were

still being captured. Artillery, mortars,

and automatic weapons were seized in

amounts exceeding anything previously

taken in the Korean fighting. Accompanying these enemy losses, understandably, was a noticeable drop in the

fighting spirit of Chinese Communist

forces. A shortage of food was also

lowering enemy morale. Captured

Chinese reported that their units had

had to eat grass and roots because of the

exhaustion of ration supplies. In sum,

Ridgway judged that "A plainly evident

disorganization now exists among both

the Chinese Communist forces and the

North Korean Peoples Army forces."

 55

The outlook for the United Nations

Command, in contrast to that for

the enemy, was comparatively bright.

"Eighth Army," General Ridgway told

his superiors, was "at near full strength

with morale excellent and logistic capabilities little affected to date by deteriorating weather. . . ."

 56

 He concluded

his report to the JCS with a significant

prognosis: "I, therefore, believe that for

the next sixty days the United States

Government should be able to count

with reasonable assurance upon a military situation in Korea offering optimum

advantages in support of its diplomatic

negotiations."

 57

Efforts at Political Settlement

The recent U.N. success in blunting

two major enemy drives took place

against a background of continuing reexamination of the nation's goals and

the laying of plans for achieving those

goals. The opposition of American allies to increased involvement in Asia,

the apparent reluctance of the American

public to increase operations in Korea,

and the uncommitted war potential of

the Chinese Communists all emphasized

the wisdom of negotiating a settlement.

Hence, the thinking of most of the

nation's officials tended strongly in that

direction.

In the course of a meeting on 19

March 1951 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

54

 Rad, C 63744, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 30

May 51.

55

 Ibid.

56

 Ibid.

57

 Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 391

Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, a possible cease-fire leading to an

armistice in Korea was thoroughly discussed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were

specifically directed to re-examine the

proposed armistice terms they had submitted on 12 December 1950 and to determine whether these terms were now

valid.58 But encouraged and emboldened by the fine showing of U.N. military units in Korea under direction of

General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, from the military point of view,

did not then see many advantages in an

armistice. For even in late March, the

Chinese were suffering heavy losses, and

the Joint Chiefs were not averse to seeing

those losses continue. "Any arrangement which did not prejudice their [the

Chinese Communists'] position in Korea

but which would end the infliction of

large losses on the Communists would

be greatly to their advantage," the Joint

Chiefs told the Secretary of Defense.

Conversely, any armistice arrangement

which would keep United Nations forces

in Korea, and which did not prejudice

the position of the Communist forces

there, would be greatly to the disadvantage of the United States. "Such an

arrangement," the Joint Chiefs held,

"would in all probability, jeopardize the

security of our forces, constitute an unwarranted drain on our military resources, and tie down our forces in

Korea almost as effectively as if they were

engaged in combat." Consequently,

from a purely military point of view, the

Joint Chiefs judged that "an armistice

arrangement of itself would not, even

temporarily, constitute an acceptable

solution of the Korea situation."

 59

On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs

realized that the losses being incurred

by the Communists would probably tend

to make them more conducive to a political settlement than heretofore. Indeed, it might be possible, in light of

the military situation, to take political

action to end the aggression, conclude

the fighting, and insure against its resumption. But the nation's military

leaders insisted that any such political

resolution had to provide for a settlement under circumstances which would

permit the ultimate attainment of

United States objectives without forfeiture of or prejudice to the nation's

general position with respect to Russia,

to Formosa, and to the seating of the

Chinese Communists in the United

Nations.60

On 5 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

furnished the Secretary of Defense, for

transmittal to the President and to the

National Security Council, their views

on the military outlook for Korea and on

the military position which the United

States should maintain. If Russia intervened, either with "volunteers" or as

part of a general war, United Nations

forces should be withdrawn from Korea.

If Russia did not start a general war

prior to settlement of the Korean problem, there were two ways to look at the

world situation. The Joint Chiefs felt

that if the immediate objective of the

Russian strategy lay in western Europe,

it would be to Russia's advantage to keep

the maximum number of United Nations

58

 Memo for Secy Defense, 27 Mar 51, sub: U.S.

Position Regarding an Armistice in Korea.

59

 Ibid. 60 Ibid.
392 POLICY AND DIRECTION

forces tied up in Korea. On the other

hand, if Russia's immediate objectives

were in the Far East, they would be

fostered if the United Nations forces left

Korea.61

Conversely, under either of the two

conditions cited, the Communists would

profit by leaving their military forces in

Korea. An armistice which left Communist armies in Korea would be to the

great disadvantage of the United Nations,

and would place a heavy drain on U.S.

military reserves by forcing the retention

of troops in Korea.

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff sounded

the keynote of subsequent American

policy toward Korea, both military and

political, when they told the Secretary

of Defense, "The Korean problem cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactory

to the United States by military action

alone." The Korean problem was a

symptom of world tension which could

only be relieved in a manner satisfactory

to the United States when, and if, there

was a general relaxation of the world

tensions.62

They concluded with four significant recommendations, recommendations

Inter integrated into the basic policy developed by the National Security Council as a statement of American objectives

and procedures in facing the Communist

threat in the Far East. These were: (1)

The United States forces in Korea must

pursue their current military course of

action there until a political objective

for that country appeared attainable

without jeopardizing United States positions with respect to Russia, Formosa,

and seating the Chinese Communists in

the United Nations. (2) Dependable

South Korean units should be generated

as rapidly as possible and in sufficient

strength to take over the major part of

the burden from United Nations forces.

(3) Preparations should be made immediately for action by naval and air

forces against the mainland of China.

(4) Action should be taken as a matter of

urgency to ascertain the policies and objectives of the allies toward Korea specifically and the Far East in general, and

also to discover the degree and nature of

the support which the United States

could expect from them if, while continuing the present military course of action in Korea, operations against the

mainland of China were initiated.63

It grew more apparent each day, particularly in view of the much-publicized

hearings on the relief of General MacArthur which started on 3 May in Washington, that the United States badly

needed a clear, workable statement of its

military and political objectives with regard to Asia and, particularly, to Korea.

Not only had the American people become confused over the issues; they did

not fully understand or appreciate the

reasons why the United States had

pressed for UN intervention. American

military and political strategists had

themselves failed to agree on the proper

objectives, much less the proper ways and

means of attaining them. General MacArthur's return, accompanied as it was

by vituperative and bitter attacks on

national policy, only served to cloud the

issues further.

61 Finally, in mid-May, after long and

 Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense, 5 Apr

51, sub: Military Action in Korea. 62 Ibid. 63

 Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 393

careful consideration of the views of all

main advisory bodies, including the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the National Security

Council submitted to the President a

statement of policy which the council

believed the U.S. Government should

now follow in facing the Communists in

Korea and throughout Asia. This statement of policy was approved by President

Truman on 17 May. In accepting the

advice of the National Security Council,

the President decided that the United

States would retain as an ultimate objective a political, not military, solution

which would provide for a united, independent, and democratic Korea. At

the same time, he directed all governmental agencies to do whatever required

to put the policy in effect at once.64

The significance of this blueprint for

American action in Asia can hardly be

overstated insofar as its effect on the

Korean problem is concerned. For it

was this blueprint, with some modification, that the United States followed

from that day forward in bringing a conclusion to the fighting in Korea. There

was nothing startlingly new in this policy.

Seemingly by instinct, the United States

had been following most of the precepts

right along. But by setting forth in a

single statement the best possible answers to all the questions which had been

repeatedly asked for many months, the

National Security Council took a firm

step toward the immediate goal of stabilizing the situation in Korea. The

statement implied no hope of military

victory in Korea; but it did bespeak a

certain confidence that Communist designs could be thwarted even though

United States aims could not be fully

accomplished.65

The significant portion of the new

policy was, of course, the American Government's intention to seek through

United Nations machinery a settlement

acceptable to the United States which

would as a minimum terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements. But until such an armistice

could be brought about, the United

States would "continue to oppose and

penalize the aggressor." In the absence

of a negotiated settlement, ".. . recognizing that there is no other acceptable

alternative . . . ," the United States

would keep up the current military

course of action ". . . without commitment to unify Korea by military

force . . . ," but with the purpose of

inflicting heavy losses on the enemy,

preventing the seizure of South Korea,

and limiting Communist capabilities for

aggression elsewhere in Asia. While the

United States was determined to avoid

extending hostilities beyond Korea, it

intended to deflate the military strength

and prestige of the Chinese by inflicting

heavy losses upon them in Korea at every

opportunity. Furthermore, the Joint

Chiefs were to prepare detailed plans for

punitive action against China itself

should China take aggressive action outside Korea or if United Nations forces

were compelled by military action to

evacuate Korea. These punitive actions

would include those previously recommended by General MacArthur—blockade, military operations against China,

and exploitation of Chinese Nationalist

forces.66

64

 JCS 1992/82.

65

 Ibid. 66

 Ibid.
394 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Rebuilding the ROK Army

A principal feature of the policy established on 17 May was aimed at generating strong, dependable ROK military

forces to take over from U.N. forces.

The ROK Government itself was fully

in favor of this objective, at least of the

intention to strengthen the ROK forces.

General MacArthur, who in early April

had turned thumbs down on proposals to

arm additional South Korean military

units, had been gone from the Far East

Command less than a week when the

Korea representative to the United Nations handed General Bradley a request

that the United States arm and equip

ten additional ROK divisions, and that

the new divisions be commanded, if

possible, by American officers.67 On 24

April, President Rhee sent President

Truman a duplicate request.68

Past performances of ROK battle

units, most recently during the enemy's

April offensive, lent little support to

these requests. Yet, on 26 April, General Collins sent General Ridgway a

message which seemed to indicate that a

substantial increase in the number of

ROK divisions was being contemplated

in Washington. "It is highly desirable,"

Collins told Ridgway, "to develop possible ways of utilizing available Korean

manpower in order to augment United

Nations forces and eventually to replace

some United States units." General

Collins, mainly seeking information,

asked Ridgway to tell him the answer to

five general questions. These were:

How many Korean males of military age

could be put into the Army without

damaging agricultural and industrial

programs of the ROK? Would it be

possible to expand leadership training

facilities for ROK troops to meet an

increased mobilization and, if so, would

it require more American personnel to

train them? Should Americans command Korean units and, if so, at what

level of command should Americans be

so employed? Was it advisable to send

senior Korean officers to higher American military schools? Should the TO&E

of Korean divisions be changed? General Collins concluded by asking General

Ridgway if he thought the ROK Army

should have ten more divisions as

President Rhee had requested.69

General Ridgway's response to these

questions was emphatically negative.

Like Ridgway, General Van Fleet also

frowned on the idea of activating more

divisions. "If excess trained officers and

non-commissioned officers are available,"

he stated, "they are needed in units

presently constituted."

 70

Both Ridgway and Van Fleet took decided stands against placing any American officers in command of ROK Army

units, because of the language barrier,

for one reason. But also, command, to

67

 When Bradley reported this to General

Marshall, the Secretary of Defense evinced great

interest. He suggested that this request might be

taken into consideration in the contemplated rotation plan then being set up for Korea. He thought

some officers, rather than rotating, would be happy

to transfer to South Korean divisions if promotion

were involved. Memo, Gen Bradley for Gen Collins

and Adm Davis, 19 Apr 51, in G-3, DA file 091

Korea, Case 174. 68

 Rad, 230830Z, USAMB Korea to CINCFE,

Apr 51.

69

 Rad, DA 89517, Collins (Personal) for Ridgway,

26 Apr 51. 70

 (1) Rad, C 61433, Ridgway (Personal) for Collins, 1 May 51. (2) Rad, C 61589, CINCFE to DA,

Ridgway (Personal) for Collins, 2 May 51.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 395

be effective, must include complete

authority to administer and to discipline;

and since the Republic of Korea was

a sovereign nation, American officers

would have no inherent authority to discipline ROK soldiers. Van Fleet pointed

out further that if American command

were to be effective it would have to

extend down to battalions and companies

and therefore would require large numbers of trained officers and noncoms.

He insisted ".. . that the basic problems with the ROK Army at this time

are training and development of leadership qualities. This is a long range

project, especially the development of an

officer corps as would be true in any new

army." Ridgway not only agreed, but

also believed the "Creation of an

officer corps is ... the first and prime

consideration."

 71

The nation's top authorities nonetheless had decided that the United States

would "develop as rapidly as possible

dependable ROK military units in sufficient strength eventually to assume the

major part of the burden of United

Nations forces in Korea."

 72

 Hardly had

this new policy been approved, when

President Rhee announced that if the

United States would only equip his already well-trained soldiers, American

troops could be withdrawn from Korea

and the job left to the ROK Army.

Disturbed by this announcement, General Ridgway sought, through Ambassador Muccio, to induce Rhee to make

no more damaging statements. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff were equally concerned and called on the Secretary of

Defense to seek further action by the

Department of State. They told General

Marshall, "Any action of the United

States will never be entirely successful

without the full cooperation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. . . ."

The Department of State accordingly

directed Ambassador Muccio to convey

to President Rhee, "in the strongest

terms," the grave concern which the

United States felt over the continuance

of such statements.73

Revision of Ridgway's Directives

Two officers of General Ridgway's

personal staff meanwhile had been in

Washington since 11 May to explain and

support Ridgway's own proposed directive of 30 April rather than the one that

Ridgway had been given on 1 May. In

their appeal to the Army Chief of Staff,

Ridgway's representatives suggested that

if the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned down

Ridgway's directive as it stood, that the

existing directive then be revised sufficiently to make it acceptable to Ridgway.74

 General Collins elected to begin

with the latter approach, and on 23 May

presented the revamped directive to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. This revised version was approved by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and was dispatched to General

Ridgway on 1 June.75

71

 Rad, C 63287, CINCFE to CSUSA, Ridgway

(Personal) for Haislip, 25 May 51. 72

 JCS 1992/82.

73

 (1) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 23

May 51, sub: President Rhee (ROK) Statements, in

G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 178/4. (2) Ltr, Rusk

to Lovett, 1 Jun 51, same file, Case 178/3. 74

 (1) MFR, 26 May 51, sub: Staff Visit, GHQ

Representative to DA, sgd Hefelbower and Smith, in

JSPOG GHQ, UNC files. (2) Memo, Hefelbower

and Smith for CofS USA, 16 May 51, sub: Proposed

Modification of CINCUNC and CINCFE Missions, in

G-3, DA file 381 Korea, Case 178/3. (3) Rad, DA

91236, Hefelbower (Personal) for Hickey, 16 May 51. 75

 Rad, JCS 92831, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Jun 51.
396 POLICY AND DIRECTION

The major differences between the

revised directive and the one given

Ridgway on 1 May lay in a definite division of his responsibilities as CINCFE

and as CINCUNC and in a drastically

changed statement of his mission. No

changes were made in the restrictions

upon his operations in Korea. But as

a result of the National Security Council

policy decision, approved by the President on 17 May, certain new instructions

were given him with regard to development of ROK forces, and on planning

for retaliatory action against Communist

China.76

With regard to his duties as

CINCUNC (his duties as CINCFE

were stated separately), by far the most

important feature of this new directive

was the altered mission with which

Ridgway was charged. Influenced both

by Ridgway's protestations that he could

not clear all of Korea, and by the recent

decision to settle the Korean situation by

political means, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

instructed Ridgway to:

Inflict maximum personnel and materiel

losses on the forces of North Korea and

Communist China operating within the

geographic boundaries of Korea and waters

adjacent thereto, in order to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Ko- rean conflict which would as a minimum:

(A) Terminate hostilities under appropriate

armistice arrangements; (B) Establish au- thority of the ROK over all area south of a

northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both

administration and military defense, and

in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (C)

Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate

stages of Non-Korean Armed Forces from

Korea; (D) Permit the building of a sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel

a renewed North Korean aggression.77

The restriction against a general advance

beyond Line KANSAS-WYOMING (defined

by the JCS as a line passing approximately through the Hwach'on Reservoir

area) was retained in the new directive.

Nor was General Ridgway granted permission to withdraw from Korea at his

own discretion.

Ridgway now knew clearly what was

expected of him, and what limits were

set upon his authority as commander

in chief, United Nations Command.

These goals and restrictions would obtain throughout the remainder of his

term of duty. 76

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 22 May 51,

sub: Proposed Changes in Directives to CINCFE,

App. A. 77

 Ibid.
CHAPTER XXII

Signs of Armistice

General Van Fleet proposed late in

May to carry the fight well behind enemy

lines. He asked General Ridgway to let

him mount an amphibious landing on

Korea's east coast to surround and pinch

off a large segment of the Chinese and

North Korean Armies. Basically, Van

Fleet had in mind a maneuver resembling Operation CHROMITE, a deep amphibious encirclement co-ordinated with

an overland drive. His target area lay

well up the east coast, nearly to Wonsan.1

General Ridgway opposed the landing.

First, the objective area lay beyond the

limiting line set by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. This line, of course, could be

altered for sufficiently valid reasons. But

Ridgway also objected that the advantages to be gained, even if the operation

were successful, did not justify the great

risks involved. For Ridgway's main

mission in Korea was to destroy the

greatest possible number of enemy forces

with the least possible loss of his own

men; and he had decided that he could

best do this by a gradual advance to the

Line KANSAS-WYOMING, not by an amphibious landing deep behind enemy

lines. Furthermore, since it was impossible to clear all of Korea of enemy forces

under conditions then obtaining, it

would be unwise to risk heavy casualties

merely for a chance to inflict equal casualties on a more numerous enemy.

Van Fleet tried to counter these arguments, but Ridgway stood fast and the

plan was shelved.2

Ridgway did authorize a limited advance on the east coast beyond the line

set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He told

Van Fleet that he could seize a line

running from the east end of the

Hwach'on Reservoir to the east coast,

a move which would advance Line

KANSAS well north of its position as defined in April. Ridgway did not consider this move to be a general advance

because its purpose was to maintain contact and to keep the enemy off-balance.

Nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff object

when Ridgway notified them of his

decision.3

1

 Rad, GX-5-5099 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to

CINCFE, Van Fleet (Personal) for Ridgway, 28

May 51.

2

 (1) MFR, 31 May 51, sub: Conference Between

Gen Ridgway and Gen Van Fleet, copy in GHQ

UNC, SGS files, (2) Hearings on Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services, Senate Committee on

Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st Session, April

1953 (hereafter cited as Van Fleet Hearings), Testimony of Gen Collins, pp. 1-5. 3

 Rad, C 63730, CINCFE to JCS, 30 May 51.
398 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Adhering to General Ridgway's concepts, Van Fleet on 1 June ordered the

fortification of Line KANSAS. For the

time being, the attacks toward Line

WYOMING would continue, and once

that line was occupied patrol bases would

be established beyond it. If the enemy

launched another major offensive, the

forces on Line WYOMING might withdraw to Line KANSAS to defend there.

Otherwise, "From positions along the

line WYOMING and the patrol base line,"

Van Fleet ordered, "limited objective

attacks, reconnaissance in force, and

patrolling to the maximum capability

will be conducted ... to inflict damage

on the enemy, confuse him and keep

him off balance."

 4

On 9 June, General Ridgway received

Van Fleet's estimate of probable developments within Korea during the next

sixty days. This estimate closely paralleled his own. The enemy, despite the

beating he had taken, still had numerical superiority and retained the capability to launch at least one major

offensive within the next two months.

Van Fleet himself fully expected the

Chinese to strike again as soon as they

had built up enough strength, and

planned to counter this enemy threat,

at least locally, by vigorous limited

offensives which would, when combined

with deception, keep the enemy offbalance or cause him to attack prematurely. Van Fleet had made plans for

three such limited offensives, all calling

for the swift seizure of objective areas,

the destruction of enemy supplies in

these areas, and, after short occupation,

a return to Line KANSAS-WYOMING.5

The Eighth Army reached Line

KANSAS-WYOMING by mid-June; and on

the 14th, General Ridgway, basing his

predictions on General Van Fleet's report, sketched for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff a picture of what could be expected

in Korea during the coming two months.

The enemy's logistic situation was worse

than that of his own forces. Enemy lines

of communications were too long. Recent heavy rainfall and effective interdiction by U.N. air forces were further

aggravating Chinese supply problems.

The Eighth Army, on the other hand,

currently enjoyed adequate logistic support. This support would remain adequate, Ridgway pointed out, provided

Van Fleet made no general advance

north of Line KANSAS-WYOMING during

the period. To advance, Ridgway

claimed, would "tend to nullify EUSAK's

present logistic advantage over the

enemy."

 6

Regardless of a poor supply situation,

the sheer weight of superior numbers in

North Korea and Manchuria made

enemy forces capable of keeping the

over-all initiative and of launching at

least one major offensive in the next

sixty days. Happily, the terrain along

Line KANSAS-WYOMING offered excellent

defensive positions if properly organized. Ridgway intended to hold Eighth

Army along this general line, at least

for the next two months, and to

keep punishing the enemy by mak4

 Ltr of Instructions, CG EUSAK to All Corps

Comdrs, 1 Jun 51, copy in JSPOG Staff Study, Advances North of the 38th Parallel.

5

 MFR CofS GHQ from SGS, GHQ, 13 Jun 51,

in GHQ, FEC SGS files. 6

 Rad, CX 64976, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 14

Jun 51.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 399

ing limited offensive operations with

KANSAS-WYOMING as a base.7

Political Factors Influence the

Battle Line

The new national policy, now based

on a political settlement as opposed to a

complete military victory, of course deterred any grander plans for a general

offensive. Even if the enemy might be

defeated, the cost in lives would be

considerable; and certainly nothing was

to be gained by paying a high price for

terrain which might very possibly be

returned to the enemy at the conference

table. Indeed, behind the national

policy lay factors and conditions beyond

the power of the theater commander, or

for that matter, of national leaders to

control. The decision to seek a solution

by political means in Korea was an outgrowth of world-wide considerations.8

Since General Ridgway had been directed to create conditions favorable to

a settlement of the Korean conflict under

appropriate armistice arrangements, he

gave considerable thought to the best

location of a cease-fire line. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, as of 27 March, had

judged that the demilitarized zone should

be an area about twenty miles in width

centered at, or north of, the 38th Parallel, although they realized that the

exact location would be determined on

the basis of the positions of opposing

ground units in combat at the time of a

cease-fire.

General Ridgway took special note of

this last fact and, in early June, asked for

Van Fleet's views on the best location

for his forces during a cease-fire. Van

Fleet replied that Line KANSAS would be

the most feasible location. "It is assumed," Van Fleet told Ridgway, "that

the Communist forces will violate the

terms of the treaty as they have in the 7

 Some officials later charged that the U.N. forces

did not take sufficient advantage of the enemy's

weakened condition in early June 1951, asserting

that they could have destroyed the "remnants" of

the Chinese and North Korean Armies in Korea.

General Van Fleet later commented on this matter

in press statements in 1952 and during a hearing

before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services

in March 1953. When asked whether he had been

correctly quoted that the United Nations could

have won the war in Korea, General Van Fleet admitted that while he did not believe complete victory was possible in June 1951 he had felt that at

that time he had the Communist armies on the

run. "... They were hurting badly, out of supplies,

completely out of hand or control; they were in a

panic, and were doing their best to fall as far back

as possible, and we, stopped by order, did not finish

the enemy." When asked if he had recommended

the counteroffensive be resumed, Van Fleet replied,

"Oh yes, I was crying for them to turn me loose."

Van Fleet Hearings, p. 32. 8

 "Our whole policy in Korea, in fact, both military and political," Ridgway later maintained, "will

be a question for historians to debate. My own conviction is that the magnificent Eighth Army could

have driven the Chinese beyond the Yalu—if this

country had been willing to pay the price in lives

such action would have cost. Personally, I strongly

doubt that such a victory would have been worth

the cost—particularly in light of the fact that our

Government seemed to have no firm policy on what

steps to take thereafter. Seizure of the line of the

Yalu and the Tumen would have been merely the

seizure of more real estate. It would have greatly

shortened the enemy supply lines and greatly

lengthened our own. It would have widened our

front from 110 miles to 420, and beyond that front

would lie Manchuria and the whole mainland of

Asia, in which all the wealth and manpower of

this country could have been lost and dissipated.

So it is useless to speculate on what might have

been. I was not privy to the councils of our leaders

at home when they decided to accept the Russiansponsored overtures for a truce. But in retrospect,

I do not feel constrained to quarrel with that decision." See General Matthew B. Ridgway, "My

Battles in War and Peace, the Korean War," Saturday Evening Post (February 25, 1956), p. 130.
400 POLICY AND DIRECTION

past by improving their potentialities for

unexpected renewal of aggression."

This being so, Van Fleet insisted that

his forces must occupy ground suitable

for strong defense even during a ceasefire; and Line KANSAS met that requirement. Furthermore, in anticipation of

some type of diplomatic agreement which

would require a 10-mile withdrawal from

the line of contact, Van Fleet considered

it essential that his forces be at least ten

miles in advance of the terrain they

would eventually occupy during a

cease-fire.9

Ridgway's own Joint Strategic Plans

and Operations Group had been working on the same general problem, examining various schemes of maneuver

that would carry the Eighth Army above

Line KANSAS so that this line would not

be lost in any withdrawal required by

cease-fire arrangements. On 13 June,

JSPOG officers briefed Ridgway on four

such schemes; and after hearing them,

Ridgway concluded that Van Fleet

should devise long-range plans for a

general advance to the line P'yongyangWonsan.10

 On the 19th, he directed Van

Fleet to plan the seizure of the P'yongyang-Wonsan line with a main effort

over the Seoul-Wonsan axis and a secondary drive up the Seoul-P'yongyang

axis. Since Van Fleet earlier had stated

that he could make no general advance

for at least the next sixty days, Ridgway

left the target date up to him.11

He cautioned Van Fleet constantly to

remember that the enemy might at any

time choose to negotiate a political settlement, and if this happened, a 20-milewide demilitarized zone might be

established on the basis of the locations

of opposing ground units in combat

at the time. "Therefore," Ridgway

pointed out, "successive main lines of

resistance should be selected with a suitable outpost line, and when and if

negotiations appear imminent, every

effort should be made to make contact

with the enemy ten miles in advance of

the outpost line of resistance." This

line of contact would be known as the

"cease-fire" line. If negotiations were

successful, a demilitarized zone would

probably be set up twenty miles in depth,

having as its center line the cease-fire line.

Within the terms of the agreement, both

sides would likely withdraw at least ten

miles from the cease-fire line. This

would place Van Fleet's forces on the

outpost line in advance of his selected

main line of resistance. Ridgway of

course had no information that the

enemy intended to negotiate. But he

directed Van Fleet to submit his operation plan by 10 July.12

 For if negotiations began in the near future, General

Van Fleet's concept of using Line

KANSAS as his main line of resistance to

be occupied during a cease-fire would

apply. Consequently, Ridgway wanted

Van Fleet to be at least twenty miles in

advance of KANSAS at the beginning of

any negotiations. This, of course, would

permit the 10-mile withdrawal and the

manning of the outpost line of resistance.

He assured Van Fleet that he would try

to warn him of any imminent negotia9

 Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jun 51, sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire (Military

Viewpoint). 10

 MFR, 17 Jun 51, sub: Planning Directive, sgd

Lutes. 11

 Ltr, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 51,

sub: Planning Directive. 12

 Ibid.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 401

tions so that Van Fleet could move at

least part of his troops up to a general

line of contact twenty miles in advance

of KANSAS.13

The wisdom of preparing a cease-fire

line had apparently occurred to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff about the same time. By

mid-June, in view of their increasing

conviction that political negotiations

might soon develop, they had begun to

doubt the wisdom of limiting Van Fleet's

advance. At a meeting on 15 June, they

decided that it was desirable to revise the

current directives to General Ridgway;

and General Collins received the task of

preparing a proposed revision that would

remove any restrictions on ground operations except those inherent in Ridgway's

mission as CINCFE for the defense of

Japan.14

General Collins and General Vandenberg wondered if it might not be wise to

let Ridgway operate in strength as far to

the north as his resources would permit.

They saw the current enemy disorganization and his comparative weakness on the

immediate front as an excellent opportunity to seize more terrain and to better

Eighth Army's position in the event of a

cease-fire. On 20 June, they asked Ridgway what he thought of a change that

would remove "any undue restrictions

upon your ability to exploit tactically

the current situation," and that would

authorize him to "conduct such tactical

operations as may be necessary or desirable to support your mission ... to

insure the safety of your command; and

to continue to harass the enemy."

 15

 In

actuality, it did not really matter whether

or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff removed

their restriction on his advance, since the

realistic restrictions imposed by terrain,

logistics, troop strength, and the enemy

would, in the final analysis, limit his advance anyway. But the Joint Chiefs of

Staff asked for his ideas on how any future advance into North Korea would

affect the target area of his air force,

whether an advance would trigger enemy

air attack, and what would be the effect

of longer lines of communication.

General Ridgway concurred in the

proposed removal of any restriction on

his advance. But he asked to be allowed

to defer answering the questions about

operations deeper into North Korea since

he had directed the Eighth Army commander to submit plans for a general

advance not later than 10 July and

wished to have Van Fleet's ideas before

answering the Joint Chiefs of Staff.16

But Ridgway continued to evince great

interest in the selection of a cease-fire

line, explaining that it should be at least

twenty miles out in front of Line KANSAS,

preferably extending from the confluence

of the Han and Yesong Rivers in the

west, generally northeast past Ch'orwon

and Kumhwa to Kosong on the east coast.

Ridgway pointed out that this cease-fire

line did not include the Ongjin and

13

 Ltr, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. 14

 Memo, Gen Taylor for Gen Collins, ACofS G-3,

DA, for CSUSA, 16 Jun 51, sub: Revision of Directive to CINCFE for Opns in Korea, in G-3, DA file

381 Korea. General Taylor noted that approval of

such a revision would better enable Ridgway to

exploit tactically the current or subsequent situation. On the other hand, the requirement that

CINCFE maintain the security of his forces would

serve to limit his advance.

15

 (1) Memo, Col Arns, Dep Secy JCS, for Gen

Taylor, 19 Jun 51, sub: Possible Change in JCS

92831. (2) Rad, JCS 94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20

Jun 51. 16

 Rad, C 65529, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Jun 51.
402 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Yonan peninsulas along the west coast,

both originally a part of South Korea.

But the value of including these two

peninsulas was out of proportion to the

difficulty of defending them. He asked

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff modify their

position regarding a demilitarized area as

described in their memorandum of 27

March to the Secretary of Defense in

order to conform to the description of

the cease-fire line he had proposed. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff did not consider

this necessary. They pointed out that

their instructions which called for him to

create conditions favorable to an armistice did not imply that he was to gain

military control of all areas south of the

38th Parallel and that such was not intended if the tactical situation did not

warrant it. They did not want to make

an issue out of excluding the Ongjin and

Yonan peninsulas from the provisions of

their directive since it "would have undesirable political implications, particularly, if such came to attention of the

ROK government."

 17

After receiving Ridgway's concurrence

in the decision to revise his operating

directives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took

the matter up with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, and

finally with the President. President

Truman approved the removal of a definite limiting line on Korean operations;

and on 10 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff

informed Ridgway that he was ".. . authorized to conduct such tactical operations as may be necessary to or desirable

to support your mission."

 18

Moves Toward Negotiation

General Ridgway's concern with ceasefire lines was well timed. On 23 June

appeared the first solid indication that

the Communists were prepared to negotiate when during a U.N.-sponsored radio

broadcast entitled "The Price of Peace,"

Jacob Malik, USSR delegate to the

United Nations Security Council, hinted

broadly that his government was in favor

of such negotiations at an early date.

Having assumed all along that the USSR

Government was the chief instigator of

the Communist aggression in Korea and

that ultimate control of Communist

forces in Korea rested with Russia, U.S.

authorities took Malik's remarks seriously.19

General Ridgway, informed that ceasefire proceedings might soon develop as a

result of Malik's speech, immediately

took steps to forestall any letdown among

his forces. "Two things should be recalled," he cautioned his commanders.

One is the well-earned reputation for duplicity and dishonesty possessed by the

USSR, the other is the slowness with which

deliberative bodies such as the Security

Council produce positive action. I desire

that you personally assure yourself that all

elements of your command are made aware

of the danger of such a relaxation of effort

and that you insist on an intensification

rather than a diminution of the United

Nation's action in this theater.20

Only two days earlier, Ridgway had

assured Van Fleet that he would give

17

 (1) Rad, C 65529, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Jun 51.

(2) Rad, JCS 95125, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Jun 51. 18

 (1) JCS 1776/234, 27 Jun 51. (2) Note to Holders, 12 Jul, App. A, 27 Jun 51, in G-3, DA file 381

Korea, Case 8.

19

 For a detailed account of the preliminary steps

leading to the opening of the armistice conference

and of the negotiations themselves, see Walter

G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR (Washington, 1966). 20

 Rad, CX 65667, CINCFE to All Comdrs, 24

Jun 51.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 403

timely warning of any imminent negotiations so that Van Fleet might move forces

forward twenty miles above Line KANSAS.

But on 26 June, after Ridgway and Van

Fleet toured the battlefront and weighed

the situation anew, the two generals decided against any advance beyond Line

KANSAS-WYOMING. They agreed that

such an advance was feasible tactically

and logistically, but that the probable

cost in casualties was too great a price to

pay.21

Enemy forces meanwhile had not slackened their build-up nor tempered their

reactions to the Eighth Army's probing,

especially on the central front. General

Ridgway's intelligence staff concluded

that the enemy was, regardless of armistice moves, regrouping in preparation

for further offensives. Air sightings in

the last week of June indicated that

enemy offensive preparations were well

advanced; numerous forward supply

dumps, artillery positions, and troop

movements were reported in the central

area; and prisoners reported the enemy's

intention to launch a Sixth Phase Offensive sometime in July.22

The enemy build-up, however, became

of secondary importance on 29 June

when General Ridgway received instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

approach the enemy on possible armistice

negotiations. President Truman had directed that at 0800 on 30 June, Ridgway

was to broadcast a message to the commander in chief, Communist Forces in

Korea, saying:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting

to discuss armistice providing for the cessa- tion of hostilities and all acts of armed

forces in Korea with adequate guarantee

for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon receipt of word from you that such a

meeting is desired I shall be prepared to

name my representative. I would also at

that time suggest a date at which he could

meet with your representative. I propose

that such a meeting could take place aboard

a Danish Hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.

Ridgway broadcast this message as directed.23

On the date of Ridgway's broadcast,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Ridgway

instructions for conducting cease-fire

talks with the Communists should such

talks develop. They told him that the

principal military interests of the United

Nations in an armistice lay in the cessation of hostilities in Korea, in assuring

that the fighting would not resume, and

in guaranteeing the security of United

Nations Command forces. Further, any

cease-fire talks were to be limited strictly

to military questions related to Korea.24

Upon receiving these guidelines, Ridgway and his Joint Strategic Plans and

Operations Group developed an agenda

to be proposed to the Communists at the

first session, selected a delegation to represent the United Nations Command at

the conference table, and worked out the

physical arrangements for maintaining

the United Nations Command delegation, including communications, transportation, security liaison, and other

routine matters. On 3 July, the Joint 21

 (1) Ltr, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, sub:

Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. (2) Van

Fleet Hearings, p. 651. 22

 Telecons, TT 4846 and TT 4884, DA and GHQ,

20 Jun 51 and 28 Jun 51.

23

 Rad, JCS 95258, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51. 24

 Rad, JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, (Personal) for

Ridgway, 30 Jun 51.
404 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Chiefs of Staff approved Ridgway's plans

without change.25

Meanwhile, on 1 July, the Communist

leaders replied to Ridgway's message in

a broadcast sponsored jointly by Kim Il

Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-huai,

who styled himself Commander of the

Chinese Volunteers. They agreed to

meet with United Nations Command

representatives but proposed that the

place of meeting be in the Kaesong area

rather than aboard the Danish ship, and

that the meetings begin between 10 and

15 July.26

The enemy proposal to meet at Kaesong, while not entirely unacceptable to

Ridgway, was interpreted as only a further demonstration of a known Communist policy never to accept a proposal in

toto. Ridgway therefore told the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that he planned to accept

Kaesong as the conference site and to

halt combat operations along the Munsan-Kaesong road and in the Kaesong

area. On 3 July, he notified the Communists that he was prepared to meet

their representatives at Kaesong on 10

July "or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations

before that date." He proposed, in order

to insure efficient arrangement of the

many details for the meetings, that three

liaison officers of each side meet in Kaesong on 5 July or as soon thereafter as

practicable. The Communists agreed to

this procedure, but set the date for the

meeting of liaison officers at 8 July.27

The mere promise that negotiations to

end the fighting in Korea might be forthcoming had in the meantime prompted

widespread speculation in the American

press. Such expressions as "Let's Get the

Boys Back Home" and "The War Weary

Troops" were beginning to appear in

the more irresponsible journals. General Ridgway took violent exception to

these sentiments. "I can hardly imagine

a greater tragedy for America and the

free world," he informed the Joint Chiefs

of Staff on 4 July, "than a repetition of

the disgraceful debacle of our Armed

Forces following their victorious effort

in World War II. We can never efface

that blot on the record of the American

people on whom the responsibility

squarely rests." Ridgway vowed that he

would do everything within his power to

eliminate such thinking among the officers and men of his command. "If this

be 'thought control' then I am for it,

heart and soul."

 28

Ridgway also feared that public pressure for an armistice might force him

into military concessions. He told the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I wish with great

earnestness to point out the importance

I attach to the retention by United Nations forces of so much of Korea as will

permit occupation and defense of Kansas

line with a suitable outpost zone for its

protection." He reiterated the view that

KANSAS was the strongest defensive line

in the general area.

It is the most advanced strong defensive

terrain which the tactical situation under

your directives permits me to reach, and

there, logistically to support my forces. . . . Any position taken by our government

which would compel me to abandon the

25

 (1) Rad, CX 66160, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Jul 51.

(2) Rad, JCS 95438, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 51. 26

 Rad, CX 66188, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Jul 51. 27

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rad, DA-IN 11098, Ridgway to

JCS, 5 Jul 51. 28

 Rad, C 66323, CINCFE to JCS, 4 Jul 51.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 405

Kansas line or deny me a reasonable out- post zone for its protection would vitally

prejudice our entire military position in

Korea. Request that copy of this message

be furnished the Secretary of Defense personally.29

Next, before sending his officers to

negotiate with their enemy counterparts,

Ridgway explained to them at length the

objectives they were to attempt to achieve

and what he considered proper demeanor

at the conference table. He stressed that

their skillful conduct of armistice negotiations might well mark the beginning

of communism's recession in Asia.30

The Prognosis

Following two days of stage setting by

the liaison officers of both sides, the two

delegations met for the first time at Kaesong on 10 July. This first meeting

rang down the curtain on the war of

movement. A full year of bitter fighting

had served only to bring the opposing

forces into balance. As armistice negotiations began, United Nations Command ground forces in Korea exceeded

550,000, the bulk of which comprised 17

divisions (7 American and 10 ROK), 4

brigades, 1 separate regiment, and 9 separate battalions. Enemy forces totaled

about 459,000 divided among 13 Chinese

armies and 7 North Korean corps. The

significant point of difference was in

available reserves. Whereas the United

Nations Command had no appreciable

source of reinforcement anywhere, its

opponents had close at hand some

743,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria.

The willingness of the Chinese to

negotiate an armistice rather than commit their large reserve to battle undoubtedly was prompted in large part

by the high losses they had sustained

since intervening eight months earlier.

By 10 July 1951, estimates of total enemy

casualties had risen above 1,200,000, divided almost evenly between the Chinese

and North Koreans. The costs to United

Nations Command forces also had been

dear. By the end of June 1951 American

combat losses stood at about 78,800, of

whom approximately 21,300 were killed

in action or subsequently died as a result

of their combat participation. Losses

among other United Nations contingents

were in proportion to the Americans';

and ROK Army casualties numbered

212,554, including 21,625 dead. The

ROK civilian population had paid a still

higher price, suffering some 469,000

casualties, of whom at least 170,000 had

been killed.

Whereas neither of the opposing forces

had been able to achieve a final victory,

each had made significant gains. The

United Nations Command forces had at

least met their objective of repelling the

aggression against South Korea; for with

the exception of a small area in the west,

the republic had been cleared of enemy

forces, and even some territory above the

38th Parallel now was under United Nations Command control. A startling

gain for Communist China had resulted

from battle successes during the past

winter. These victories had raised the

prestige of Mao Tse-tung's regime and

won it a front-rank position as a military

power While offset to some degree by

a lack of an atomic capability and a de29

 Ibid.

30

 Memo, Gen M. B. Ridgway for General and

Flag-Officer Members of the U.N. Delegation, 7 Jul

51, in GHQ, UNC SGS files.
406 POLICY AND DIRECTION

pendence on the USSR for industrial

and technical support, Communist

China's new prominence was certain to

upset the political balance in Asia.

But these gains would serve neither

side for the duration of the Korean War.

On the battlefield, both sides might claim

to have the stronger force; but the opposing commanders would recognize that

the near parity of military power left

them only the prospect of directing operations in a war they could not win. At

the conference table, both delegations

might profess to be negotiating from

positions of superior strength, but each

would know that the other possessed no

decisive advantage. The challenge here,

then, would be to achieve an armistice

under favorable terms without being

able to dictate those terms. Indeed,

those responsible for policy and direction

during the first year of the Korean War

had set the scene for what could prove

to be a long, tedious stalemate at two

locations: in the truce tent and on the

fighting front.
Bibliographical Note

The official documentary sources upon

which this book is based fall logically

into two categories, records seen originally in the Far East Command, and

Department of the Army records seen in

Washington, D.C., and Alexandria, Virginia. The former records, exploited

during research from mid-1950 to early

1953, comprise a variety of record collections and papers some of which have

been destroyed as part of the normal

records management processes. The remainder have been returned to the

United States and are now in custody of

the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration. Department of the Army records

examined in the Washington, D.C., area

from 1953 to 1956 have been relocated

from original repositories as part of the

decentralization of records during the

late 1960's but remain in custody of the

National Archives and Records Service.

Far East Command Records

Included under this grouping are official records which were maintained under control of the Adjutant General,

FEC, the records maintained with the

General Staff and Special Staff Sections

of GHQ, FEC/UNC, the records of

FEAF and COMNAVFE, and the records of Eighth Army and X Corps. In

addition, certain "convenience" files

were maintained for the Office of the

Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC, and for the

Office of the Commander in Chief Far

East Command/United Nations Command, all of which were made available

for research. The latter files contained

memorandums and reports not normally

available in the Adjutant General's files.

Within the substantial body of Far East

Command records, the following were

especially important in preparation of

this history:

Chief of Staff, GHQ FEC/UNC Files

These files, originally located in the

Dai Ichi building in Tokyo, adjacent to

CINCFE/CINCUNC's offices were not

designed for permanent retention. They

reflect all major activities of CINCUNC

and consist of personal messages and

memorandums, command letters, personal letters, and miscellaneous items.

Their particular value lies in the manner

in which they reflect the day-to-day trends

in CINCUNC's thinking and in the fact

that they contain his instructions to his

senior staff members.
408 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Chief of Staff Daily Folders

Prepared by the SGS, GHQ, for presentation to the Chief of Staff each morning, these folders contained copies of

all pertinent communications between

Washington and Tokyo and between

CINCUNC and his subordinate commanders. Memorandums for record of

important telephone calls, copies of miscellaneous memorandums for record on

meetings, and liaison officer reports on

visits to Korea are among the particularly

valuable items in these files not elsewhere available. These files, comprising

twelve file drawers of material, were

turned over to the Military History Section, GHQ, FEC/UNC, in October 1951.

JSPOG Files

Under control of the ACofS G-3,

GHQ, FEC/UNC, the Joint Strategic

Plans and Operations Group maintained

separate files comprising all the joint

planning files of the theater. These files,

arranged in books by subject, contained

detailed staff studies of contemplated

operations, operations plans and operations orders, interspersed with attached

handwritten comments by key officers of

command.

FEC Reports

Several recurring reports prepared

within the FEC have provided information and views on Korea not available

elsewhere. These are:

The Annual Narrative Historical

Report, GHQ FEC

At the outbreak of the Korean War,

the only recurring historical report prepared by the FEC was the Annual Narrative Historical Report, required by Army

regulations. The FEC had prepared

such a report for 1949 and subsequently

prepared a report for the period 1 January-31 October 1950. Thus the period

25 June-31 October 1950 is covered, not

by a monthly Command Report (see

below), but by the Annual Report which

is less detailed. Nevertheless, the staff

sections of GHQ/FEC, particularly the

ACofS, G-3, included in this Annual

Report unique information and documents on Korean planning and operations. In this connection, the Eighth

Army was relieved of the requirement

for submitting a historical report covering the period 25 June-31 October 1950

and such historical records of Eighth

Army's activities as exist for that period

consist of War Diaries. The period

1 January to 25 June 1950 is not covered

by a historical report from the Eighth

Army.

The Monthly Command Report,

FEC/UNC

Beginning on 1 November 1950,

GHQ, FEC/UNC, prepared and submitted each month to the Department

of the Army a Command Report, describing in detail the operations, activities, and problems of the command. The

basic narrative report is accompanied by

annexes from each General and Special

Staff Section of GHQ FEC/UNC. The

most valuable of these annexes, from the

historian's viewpoint, are those of the

ACofS, G-3, the ACofS, G-2, and those

prepared by the Commander in Chief

and the Chief of Staff GHQ FEC/UNC.

The latter annex did not appear until

April 1951 when the Military History
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 409

Section, GHQ FEC/UNC, assigned an

officer to prepare this report for the Chief

of Staff.

Daily Intelligence Summary

and Special Reports

From the beginning of the war Daily

Intelligence summaries were prepared

by the Theater Intelligence Division,

ACofS, G-2, FEC/UNC. These summaries, in booklet form, contain detailed

information on enemy dispositions, order of battle, the combat situation, and

estimated enemy intentions. Each summary contains several maps illustrating

enemy and friendly action for each 24-

hour period. These Daily Intelligence

summaries received wide distribution

within the command and were sent to

Washington daily. Copies are filed with

the Command Report, GHQ FEC/UNC.

In addition to these summaries, the

ACofS, G-2, prepared in similar format

special intelligence reports on such subjects as enemy order of battle, enemy

LOC's, etc., copies of which were also

placed with the monthly Command Report.

Daily Operations Report

The ACofS, G-3, GHQ FEC/UNC,

issued a Daily Operations Report, covering friendly and enemy information, and

setting forth in some detail the combat

operations for each 24-hour period. In

many respects this report duplicates the

Daily Intelligence Summary, which, of

the two, is more useful to the historian.

Copies of the Daily Operations Report

are also available with the Command

Report, GHQ FEC/UNC.

X Corps Special Reports

The X Corps prepared special reports

on the Inch'on landing, on the Wonsan

landing, on the Hungnam evacuation,

and on the battle of the Soyang River.

These reports, although omitting derogatory information, are nonetheless

useful in establishing dates, locations,

and the general chain of events. Copies

are in custody of the National Archives

and Records Service.

Department of the Army Records

ACofS G-3 Correspondence Files

By far the most productive segment of

Department of Army Records for the

historian interested in Korea are the correspondence files of the ACofS G-3, DA,

for the period. Bearing a file identification of G3 091 Korea, these voluminous

files record the actions and recommendations of the G-3 and of the Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, and contain many important

national policy papers. They contain

all pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff documents received by the Department of the

Army together with the Army input to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are complete files in that each action is backed

up by all pertinent correspondence and

is carried through to the final recommendation or conclusion. Of particular

interest are thirty-one notebooks prepared by the Far East and Pacific Branch,

ACofS G-3, covering specific matters.

These notebooks contain radios, memorandums, and charts and tables used in

briefing the ACofS G-3.
410 POLICY AND DIRECTION

JSSC Committee Report to the JCS

In preparing testimony to be presented

before the Senate committee investigating the relief of General MacArthur, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee to prepare a

synthesis of all matters relating to the

relief of MacArthur and the conduct of

the Korean War. This committee presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a

well-documented narrative of exceptional value to the historian for the

period 25 June 1950-30 April 1951.

This document is filed with the Top

Secret records of the ACofS G-3, DA,

for 1951 in custody of the National

Archives and Records Service.

Radio Files

The exchanges between Washington

and Tokyo, notably between the JCS and

CINCUNC, were carried on by radio

communication. The messages sent and

received by the JCS/Department of the

Army to CINCUNC/CINCFE are on file

in the Staff Communications Center,

Office of the Chief of Staff, DA. Messages exchanged between CINCUNC/

CINCFE and his subordinate commanders are in the Adjutant General's file,

FEC, at the Federal Records Center,

GSA, Kansas City, Missouri.

Teleconferences

Several important teleconferences were

held in the first days of the Korean War,

followed by routine teleconferences for

the remainder of the war, the latter conferences usually on intelligence matters.

Copies of these teleconferences are on

file in the Staff Communications Center,

Office of the Chief of Staff, DA.

Secondary Sources

The MacArthur Hearings

As part of the furor surrounding the

relief of General MacArthur, the Senate

of the United States conducted an investigation. Virtually every responsible

official of the Department of Defense

testified at the Senate hearings on this

matter. The record of this testimony

has been printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in five volumes

totaling 3,691 pages of testimony, an

appendix of selected documents, and an

index. The rather formidable title of

this testimony is Military Situation in

the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United

States Senate, Eighty Second Congress,

First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry

into the Military Situation in the Far

East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments in that

Area. This material is cited in the present volume as the MacArthur Hearings.

General Smith's Chronicles

Major General Oliver Prince Smith,

USMC, commander of the 1st Marine

Division during the first part of the Korean War, maintained a diary which he

furnished to the Historical Branch, G-3

Division, USMC. Capt. Nicholas Canzona and Mr. Lynn Montross of that

branch made available selected portions

of that diary to the author. The designation of this document is "Notes by Lt.

Gen. Oliver P. Smith on the Operations

of the 1st Marine Division During the

First Nine Months of the Korean War."
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 411

Books

The following books are the principal

ones consulted in preparation of this

history:

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W. W. Norton and

Company, 1969.

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong: North to the Yalu. UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN

WAR. Washington, 1961.

Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A.

Manson. The Sea War in Korea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.

Collins, J. Lawton. War In Peacetime.

Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1969.

Department of State. The Conflict in

Korea. Washington, 1951.

Department of State. In Quest of Peace

and Security: Selected Documents on

American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951.

Washington, 1951.

Department of State. Korea, 1945 to

1948. Washington, 1948.

Department of State. Korea's Independence. Washington, 1947.

Field, James A., Jr. History of U.S.

Naval Operations: Korea. Washington,

1962.

Futrell, R. Frank. The United States

Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.

Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study

of U.S. Policy in the United Nations.

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.

Grajdanzev, Andrew J. Modern Korea.

New York: John Day Company, 1944.

McCune, George M., with Arthur L.

Gray, Jr. Korea Today. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1950.

Nelson, M. Frederick. Korea and the

Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,

1946.

Office of the Chief of Military History,

Department of the Army. Korea 1951-

1953. Washington, 1956.

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean

War. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967.

Sawyer, Maj. Robert K. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and

War. Washington, 1963.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of

Trial and Hope, Vol. II. New York:

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the

Yalu. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.
List of Abbreviations

Abn

ACofS

ADCOM

Admin

AFFE

AGO

AMIK

Asst

ATIS

CCF

CG

CINCFE

CINCUNC

Comd

COMNAVFE

DF

DIS

Div

ECA

ERC

EUSAK

FEAF

FEC

FMFPAC

G-1

G-3

G-4

GO

Interv

JANIS

JCS

Airborne

Assistant Chief of Staff

Advance Command and Liaison Group

Administration

Army Forces Far East

Office of The Adjutant General

American Mission in Korea

Assistant

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section

Chinese Communist Forces

Commanding general

Commander in Chief, Far East Command

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Command

Commander, Naval Forces, Far East

Disposition form

Daily Intelligence Summary

Division

Economic Co-operation Administration

Enlisted Reserve Corps

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

Far East Air Forces

Far East Command

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

Operations and training section of divisional or higher staff

Logistics section of divisional or higher staff

General order

Interview

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service

Joint Chiefs of Staff
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 413

JIC

JLC

Jnl

JSPOG

JSSC

KMAG

LST

Ltr

MARBO

MDAP

Memo

MOS

MS

Msg

MFR

Mono

NATO

NAVFE

NKA

NPRJ

NSC

OCAFF

OCMH

Opn

ORC

OSA

OSI

PHILCOM

PMAG

Rad

RCT

ROK

Rpt

RYCOM

SANACC

SCAP

Sgd

SGS

T/O

TO&E

Telecon

Tng

Joint Intelligence Committee

Japan Logistical Command

Journal

Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea

Landing ship, tank

Letter

Marianas-Bonins Command

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

Memorandum

Military occupational speciality

Manuscript

Message

Memorandum for record

Monograph

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Naval Forces, Far East

North Korean Army

National Police Reserve of Japan

National Security Council

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces

Office, Chief of Military History

Operation

Organized Reserve Corps

Office of the Secretary of the Army

Office of Strategic Intelligence

Philippines Command

Provisional Military Advisory Group

Radio

Regimental combat team

Republic of Korea

Report

Ryukyus Command

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Co-ordinating Committee

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers

Signed

Secretary of the General Staff

Table of Organization

Table of Organization and Equipment

Teleconference

Training
414 POLICY AND DIRECTION

UNC

UNCOK

UNCURK

USAFIK

USAMGIK

USMILAT

ZI

United Nations Command

United Nations Commission in Korea

United Nations Commission for the Unification

and Rehabilitation of Korea

United States Army Forces in Korea

United States Army Military Government in Korea

U.S. Military Attaché

Zone of Interior
Basic Military Map Symbols

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry
Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
Index

Abe, General Nobuyuki: 18

Acheson, Dean G. See also State, Department of.

air-naval commitment proposed by: 73

and air operations: 242, 247, 249-50, 286

and armistice proposals: 278, 390-91

Attlee, conference with: 291-92

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249-50, 255,

268

and Chinese intervention: 286

and Communists, negotiating with: 268

and continental China, operations against: 329-30

and financial aid to Korea: 30

on intelligence failure: 62

and Korea as strategic area: 51-52, 68

and limited offensives: 402

on MacArthur relief: 365n, 374-75

and matériel supply to ROKA: 68-69

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 116

and North Korea, operations in: 255, 275

on objectives in Korea: 352

and political settlement proposals: 359

and Soviet intervention: 286, 352

on 38th Parallel, advance across: 351-52

and U.N. troops, requisitions for: 227-28, 238, 356

and unification as objective: 350

and U.S. troops, deployment and withdrawal: 79n

Active Reserves. See Army Reserve; Reserve components.

Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM)

departure from ROK: 86

mission: 71-72

USAFIK, proposed merger with: 86

as USAFIK staff: 81-82

Adviser groups. See Military Advisory Group to

ROK (KMAG); Military missions; Provisional

Military Advisory Group to ROK (PMAG).

Advisers, Truman reliance on: 177-79

Aggression, U.S. attitude toward: 292

Air Force, Department of the. See United States Air

Force; Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.

Air Force, Thirteenth: 49. See also Turner, Maj.

Gen. Howard M. (USAF).

Air operations: 69-70, 73-74, 77, 80. See also Strategic air operations; Tactical air operations,

control of: 109-11

FEAF, control by: 108-09

proposed: 242, 247, 249-50, 286

Air operations, enemy: 76-77

Airborne Divisions

11th: 44, 93-94, 108, 168-71, 230, 294

82d: 44, 90, 93, 118, 132, 153, 169-71, 230, 294

Airborne operations

at Inch'on, plans for: 152

plans for: 169-70, 215-16

World War II experience: 168

Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 187th: 93-94,

108, 119, 142, 169-71, 196, 215-16

Airborne units

requisitions for: 168-71

training program: 169-70

Aircraft

B-29 bombers: 109-10, 241-44

C-47 cargo (transport): 341

C-119 cargo (transport): 168, 170

losses: 247

ROKA strength: 40

shortages of: 109

transports, shortage of: 88

Aircraft, enemy

IL fighters: 39

losses: 247

MIG fighters: 247

strength: 39

YAK fighters: 39, 74

Airfields

construction and repair: 261, 341

defense of: 300

enemy demolition of: 195

Airlift operations

ammunition supply by: 229

control of: 108-09

plans for: 157

to Pusan: 80-81

of supplies: 195, 235, 257-58, 301, 341-42

of troops: 87-88, 127-29, 215-16

ALABAMA line: 379-80

Alaskan Command: 43, 45

Allen, Maj. Gen. Leven C.: 202, 205, 235, 306-07

Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M. See also Corps, X.

and air operations, control of: 109-10

and airborne units, deployment of: 169

as chief of staff, GHQ, FEC: 49

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 264-65

and Chinese intervention: 236, 259

Church, directive to: 80-81

Collins, conference with: 283

and corps organization: 159

and credit for X Corps, oversight in: 186

dual role of: 158

estimates of situation by: 111-12

and GHQ Reserve, headquarters for: 155-58

at Hungnam: 301
418 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M.—Continued

at Inch'on: 141, 148-49, 158-59, 172, 190, 196

MacArthur, conference with: 188-89

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 160,

164-65

and matériel losses and destruction: 301-04

North Korea, operations in: 233, 236, 245, 257, 259-66, 271-73, 274, 278-84

and power plants, preservation of: 264-65

at Pusan: 125, 301

replacements, requisitions for: 129

and Seoul, recovery of: 184-85

supply system and operations: 259, 297

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

training program: 159

troop units needed, estimates of: 107-08

U.N.-ROK ground troops, control of: 215-18

Walker, conference with: 125

in withdrawal operations: 301-06

at Wonsan: 188-90, 195-96, 202, 205-10, 212, 216-

19, 232

Ambush operations, enemy: 235

American Mission in Korea (AMIK): 34

Ammunition

deficiencies and shortages in: 84, 202

estimate of requirements: 45-47

requisitions for: 229-30

supply of: 46, 59, 229-30, 236, 257

supply by airlift: 229

supply to ROKA: 35, 66

Amnesty proclamation, plans for: 180

Amphibious Group One, USN: 147, 172

Amphibious operations, enemy: 61, 65

Amphibious operations and training: 55, 57, 85-86,

134-35, 137-40, 141n, 156, 160-63, 168, 177, 187-

91, 195-96, 205-10, 336, 397

Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, 56th: 171-

72

Antiaircraft artillery, stocks on hand: 46

Antiaircraft artillery battalions: 94

Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 9th: 54

Antiaircraft artillery units, requisitions for: 93, 166

Antiaircraft defense, enemy: 246-47

Antitank defense

deficiencies in: 84

NKA strength: 39

An-tung: 179, 200, 230, 241-42, 245-46

Argentina: 356

Armed Forces Organization Act, ROK: 34

Armistice proposals: 183, 197, 283-84, 287-93, 331-

33, 358-59, 384-85, 390-92, 396, 399-405. See

also Political settlement proposals.

Armor units. See Tank units.

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d: 44-45, 118

Armored Divisions 2d: 44, 90-92, 230, 294

50th: 124

Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 6th: 91

Armored fighting vehicles. See Tanks.

Army, Department of the. See also Pace, Frank, Jr.;

United States Army; War Department.

co-ordination of plans with: 152-53

MacArthur, directives to: 102

Army area organization: 42n Army Field Forces: 42. See also Clark, General Mark

W.

Army Policy Council: 123, 131, 221-22, 234

Army Reserve. See also Reserve components.

Army expansion, role in: 120-22

call-up of: 88, 120-21, 122

troop units, strength: 121

Arnold, Maj. Gen. Archibald V.: 17

Artillery. See Antiaircraft artillery; Field artillery.

Artillery fire support: 81, 84, 96-97, 109, 303, 338

Artillery losses: 111. See also Matériel, losses and

destruction.

Ascom City: 206-07

Asiatic troops, proposal for commitment: 193-94

Atomic bomb, potential use: 283-84, 288, 289-90,

320n

Attlee, Clement R. See also United Kingdom.

Acheson, conference with: 291-92

and armistice proposals: 292-93

and atomic bomb, potential use: 289-90

and Communist China, concessions to: 292-93

and Communist China, U.N. seating: 292-93

expansion of conflict, concern over: 289-90, 292,

321

Marshall, conference with: 291-92

Truman, conference with: 288-93

Attrition tactics: 333-34, 361-64, 382, 396, 397

AUDACIOUS: 364

Austin, Warren R.: 73, 333, 369-71

Australia

and Chinese intervention: 266

military assistance from: 115

troop units, deployment of: 225, 227, 356-57

Baillie, Hugh: 284

Baird, Col. John E.: 36

Bank of Chosen: 5

Barr, Maj. Gen. David G.: 265

Beach conditions, effect on operations: 140-41, 146-

47

Beiderlinden, Maj. Gen. William A.: 88, 128-30, 238

Beightler, Maj. Gen. Robert S.: 49

Belgium and Belgian troops: 225, 227

Benninghoff, H. Merrell: 17-18

Bevin, Ernest: 200n, 251n, 360-61. See also United

Kingdom.

BLUEHEARTS: 139-40, 168

Bolling, Maj. Gen. Alexander R.: 63-64

Bolté, Maj. Gen. Charles L.: 132, 152, 257

and airborne units, deployment of: 169

and Army expansion planning: 118 and Chinese border, inviolability of: 266-68
INDEX 419

Bolté, Maj. Gen. Charles L.—Continued

and Chinese intervention: 298

and emergency declaration: 298

and Far East, security of: 75-76

and General Reserve, levies on: 91, 93

MacArthur, conferences with: 223-25, 237

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 161-62

and National Guard, levies on: 123-25

and North Korea, operations in: 181-82

and replacements, requisitions for: 223-24, 228-

29, 237, 271, 294, 298

ROKA equipment, view on: 35 and Soviet intervention: 75-76, 298

and supply system and operations: 258

and U.N. troops, employment of: 224-27

Walker, conference with: 237

and withdrawal operations: 298

Bombardment, aerial. See Air operations; Strategic

air operations; Tactical air operations.

Bonesteel, Col. Charles H.: 9-10

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N.: 285, 327.

See also Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and air-naval commitment: 70

and Chinese intervention: 234, 254-55, 275, 286

and EUCOM, deployment of troops to: 223, 286

and Formosa, security of: 370

and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-75

and North Korea, operations in: 255

and occupation troops, withdrawal of: 50

and ROKA, expansion and training: 394

and Soviet intervention: 69

and strategic air operations: 244, 286

at Wake Island conference: 211-14

Brazil: 356-57

Brewster, Owen: 365n

Bridges

demolition of: 195, 241-47, 258, 303-04, 372 enemy construction and repair: 246

shortages of equipment: 159n

Bridges, Styles: 365n

British Army troops. See United Kingdom.

British Commonwealth. See commonwealth by

name; United Kingdom.

Brooks, Lt. Gen. Edward H.: 118, 238

Bureau of the Budget: 46

Burke, Rear Adm. Arleigh A.: 312

Burma: 266, 333

Byrnes, James F.: 10

Cain, Harry P.: 365n

Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6, 349

Camouflage operations, enemy: 275

Camp Drake: 88n, 130

Canada: 115, 225, 227, 356-57

Career Guidance Program: 55-56

Caribbean Command: 43, 45

Casualties

civilian: 405

Casualties—Continued

Communist China: 389-91, 405

Communist-inflicted: 37-38

Eighth Army: 127-28, 297

FEC estimates: 88

guerrillas, enemy: 38

at Inch'on: 173, 247

North Korean Army: 405

as percentage of strength: 87n Republic of Korea Army: 235, 405

United Nations Command: 238, 405

U.S. Army: 127-28, 297, 405

X Corps: 297

Cates, General Clifton P. (USMC):261

Cavalry Division, 1st: 54

amphibious operations, plans for: 85-86, 139

combat effectiveness: 80n

deployment to combat: 86, 112-13, 140-41

Koreans attached to: 168

North Korea, operations in: 235

at P'yongyang: 204-05

Cavalry Regiments. See also Armored Cavalry Reg- iment, 3d. 7th: 55, 177

8th: 235, 257

Cease-fire. See Armistice proposals; Political settlement proposals. Cease-fire line. See Demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 65, 199

Chae Byong Duk, General (ROKA): 72, 74

Chang, John M.: 313

Changjin Reservoir area: 216n, 236, 252-53, 259-66,

279-80, 297, 301

Chech'on: 340

Cheju-do: 38, 313, 324-25

Chemical units, requisitions for: 98

Chiang Kai-shek: 368. See also China, Nationalist.

and Formosa, security of: 368-69

MacArthur, conference with: 368

Struble, conference with: 368

troop units, offer of: 116, 283-84, 295

Chief of Naval Operations. See Sherman, Admiral

Forrest P.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. See Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Collins, General J.

Lawton.

Chief of Transportation: 91

Chiles, John H.: 65n, 266

China, Communist. See also Chou En-lai; Mao Tse-tung.

4th Field Army: 233

124th Division: 236, 260-61

126th Division: 236

aggressor, named by U.N.: 332-33

air reconnaissance of: 328

air violations by USAF: 247

armistice, terms rejected by: 331-32
420 POLICY AND DIRECTION

China, Communist—Continued

assets frozen: 318

atomic bomb, attitude toward: 289n

blockade of proposed: 102, 283-84, 289, 291-92,

315, 318, 321, 328-29, 339, 393

border, inviolability of: 188-89, 196-202, 212-14,

235-36, 240-41, 248-56, 264-71, 277, 283-84, 372,

380, 382, 384-85

casualties: 389-91, 405

combat effectiveness: 83, 84-85, 105-06, 238, 277,

327, 358, 398

concessions to, proposed: 292-93

disclaimer for military actions: 317

economic sanctions against, proposed: 318, 328

Formosa, threat to: 197, 366-69

industry, proposed destruction of: 315

intervention by: 85, 178-90, 196-202, 212-14, 222,

239-42, 250-57, 259, 266-67, 271, 274-78, 285-

89, 298-99, 308-12, 318, 322, 327-30, 333, 372

matériel losses: 390

military power status: 405-06

morale: 390

naval operations against, proposed: 320-21, 329

North Korea, pledges support to: 197, 233, 240-41

offensives by: 379-80, 387-90, 398-99, 403

operations against, proposed: 291, 315-18, 319-25,

328-30, 332, 339, 351, 369, 373, 380, 384, 386,

392-93, 396

prisoner of war losses: 233, 236, 390

propaganda campaigns: 289n

rations, shortages of: 390

recognition of, proposed: 292, 332-33

Soviet Union, relations with: 197, 201, 317, 320

strategic air operations against, proposed: 283-84,

289, 292, 320

tank operations by: 236

territorial violation charged to U.S.: 197

troop movements, reports on: 179, 198-200, 233-

34, 238-41, 259, 263, 273, 276-77

troop units, deployment to North Korea: 179,

222n, 233-34

troop units, strength in Korea: 241, 244-45, 259n,

380, 384-85, 387, 405

U.N., proposals for admission to: 197, 290-93, 331

withdrawal operations: 389-90

China, invasion of and influence on Korea: 2-3

China, Nationalist. See also Chiang Kai-shek; Formosa.

and Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6

combat effectiveness: 320

intelligence reports from: 199, 276

logistical support of: 328-29

military assistance, offer of: 116

troop units, employment proposed: 116-17, 295-

96, 307, 315-17, 319-21, 329, 339, 393

troop units, strength: 320

trusteeship, agreement on: 13, 26

weapons, deficiencies in: 320

Chinnamp'o: 140, 141n, 187, 236, 258

Chip'yong-ni: 339-40

Choch'iwon: 82

Ch'ongch'on River: 234-35, 258

Ch'ongjin: 7-8, 266, 269

Ch'ongju: 86, 216

Chongsanjangsi: 216

Ch'ongsongjin: 246

Chonui: 82

Ch'orwon: 206, 364, 389, 401-02

Ch'osan: 234-35, 270

Chosin Reservoir: 263n. See also Changjin Reservoir area.

Chou En-lai: 197-98, 199-201, 234, 251n. See also,

China, Communist.

CHOW CHOW: 71

CHROMITE. See Inch'on (CHROMITE).

Chumunjin: 141n

Ch'unch'on: 10, 61, 65, 70-71, 354, 387-89

Ch'ungju: 86, 112, 188-89, 195-96

Chungking, as seat of Korean provisional government: 5

Church, Maj. Gen. John H.: 74

as adviser to ROKA: 80-81

Almond, directive from: 80-81

defensive measures by: 72

enemy effectiveness, report on: 83

heads GHQ Advance Command: 71-72

MacArthur, briefed by: 74

Churchill, Winston S.: 7, 288

Civil affairs. See also Occupation,

conduct of: 25, 221

transfer from military: 25

Clark, General Mark W.: 134

and Army expansion goals: 118

on combat readiness of 2d Division: 94

and National Guard, levies on: 124-25

Clarke, Brig. Gen. Carter W.: 137

Climate: 2. See also Weather, effect on operations.

Close air support. See Tactical air operations.

Coast Guard, ROK: 34

Collective security

arrangements for: 41

need for expressed: 333

Collins, General J. Lawton

and AAA units, deployment of: 93

and airborne units, deployment of: 169-71

Almond, conference with: 283

and Army troops to halt invasion: 69

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 268-70

and Chinese intervention: 234

and combat effectiveness, enemy: 327

and combat effectiveness, U.S.: 56-57, 292

and emergency declaration: 299

estimates of situation by: 327

and FEC troop unit strength: 53

functions and chain of authority: 42
INDEX 421

Collins, General J. Lawton—Continued

and General Reserve, levies on: 91-93, 133-34,

343

and Inch'on operation: 140-41, 142, 149-51

as JCS representative in Korea: 101-02

Joy, conference with: 283-84

and Kunsan operation: 176-77

limited offensives, directive on: 401

MacArthur, conferences with: 78-79, 105-08, 140n,

149-51, 160, 169, 171, 282-84, 325-29, 368, 373

on MacArthur relief: 365n, 375-76

on MacArthur violation of directives: 218n, 339n

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 160

on morale: 326

on morale status, enemy: 327

and National Guard, levies on: 122-25, 130, 325-

26, 345 and North Korea, operations in: 269-70, 282-85

on press correspondents, statements to: 326

and replacements, requisitions for: 91-92, 108,

130-33, 228, 239, 294-95, 310-11, 313, 325-26, 343-44

Ridgway, directives to: 383, 385

and ROKA, combat effectiveness: 326

and ROKA, expansion, equipping, and training:

394

and ROKA, withdrawal of: 313

and security of troop movements: 133

and service units, reduction in: 343-44

and Soviet intervention: 269-70

Stratemeyer, conference with: 283-84

and supply system and operations, enemy: 327

and survey mission, proposal for: 69

tactical air operations, concept of: 110

Truman, conference with: 79

and U.N. troops, deployment of: 224-28

visits to combat areas: 108, 137, 282-84, 313, 326-27

Walker, conferences with: 137, 282-83

Command and staff: 48, 208, 243n

Commerce, Department of: 318

Communists

Acheson on negotiating with: 268

Japanese occupation, activity during: 5-6

North Korea, domination by: 24-25

ROK, activities in: 19-20

U.S. policy on containing: 67n, 100

Congress

approval of not sought by Truman, 73

Army expansion, approval of: 120n

Army Reserve, recall authorized: 122

MacArthur, hearings on relief: 365n, 392

Congressional committees: 365

Constabulary. See National police, ROK, plans for.

Construction machinery, stocks on hand: 46

Corps

staffs, plans for organizing: 134-36, 155, 158-59

I. See also Coulter, Lt. Gen. John B.; Milburn,

Lt. Gen. Frank W.

Corps—Continued

I—Continued

activated: 134-35, 155, 202

deployment to combat: 135-36, 155

at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 379-80

North Korea, operations in: 234-35, 257, 274,

363 at P'yongyang: 204, 206

in THUNDERBOLT: 333-34

V: 134-35

IX

activated: 134-35

deployment to combat: 135-36

at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 379-80, 389

in KILLER: 340

North Korea, operations in: 363-64

X. See also Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M.

activated: 158-59

casualties: 297

as element of Eighth Army: 189-90, 300-301,

307

Han River, operations around: 336-37, 339-

40

in Inch'on operations: 151-52, 154, 172, 174-

77 at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 380

in KILLER: 340

link-up with Eighth Army: 177, 185

matériel losses and destruction: 297

morale status: 186

North Korea, drive on: 206-10

North Korea, operations in: 363-64

in occupation duty: 222

supply system and operations: 158

in THUNDERBOLT: 333-34

troop units and strength: 171-72

withdrawal from North Korea: 290-91, 300-

306

in Wonsan operations: 187-90

XI: 274

XXIV: 13, 16, 25. See also Hodge, Lt. Gen. John

R.

Correspondents, war. See Press correspondents.

Coulter, Lt. Gen. John B.: 27, 135, 155

COURAGEOUS: 362-63

Dairen: 10-11, 318

Dams. See Power plants; also by name.

DAUNTLESS: 363

Dean, Maj. Gen. William F.: 108

ADCOM, proposes merger with USAFIK: 86

attempts to halt NKA: 82

captured: 112-13

on combat effectiveness, enemy: 83-84

commands 24th Division: 81

commands USAFIK: 81-82

on divisions, expansion of: 89
422 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Dean, Maj. Gen. William F.—Continued

MacArthur, commended by: 106

troop units needed, estimate of: 104

Defense, Department of. See also Johnson, Louis A.;

Marshall, General of the Army George C.

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 267-69

and Formosa, security of: 366-67

military assistance, role in: 117

and national policy, statements on: 373

and North Korea, operations in: 193

on objectives in Korea: 349-50

and political settlement proposals: 357-59

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 354

Demilitarized zone (DMZ)

establishment: 290-91, 384, 399-402, 404-05

proposals for: 290

Democratic People's Republic of Korea. See North

Korea. Discipline. See Morale.

Divisions, number in U.S. Army: 53. See also by

type.

Doyle, Rear Adm. James H.: 140-41, 147-50, 172.

See also Amphibious Group One, USN; Task

Force 90, USN.

and Inch'on operations: 172

MacArthur, conference with: 149

Marine Corps units, employment of: 164, 165n

and Wonsan operations: 209, 217-19

Duff, Maj. Gen. Robinson E.: 237

Dulles, John Foster: 40

Dunkerque, contrast with Hungnam: 302

Dunn, James: 10

Eberle, Maj. Gen. George L.: 189

Economic sanctions, proposed against Communist

China: 318, 328

Eden, Anthony: 288

Egypt: 101

Eighth Army. See also Ridgway, General Matthew

B.; Van Fleet, General James A.; Walker, General Walton H.

armor operations: 175

casualties: 127-28, 297

combat effectiveness: 176, 345, 349

as combat, logistical, and ZI unit: 86, 207-08

deployment to combat: 112

engineer equipment shortages: 175-76

link-up with X Corps: 177, 185

matériel losses and destruction: 297

matériel shortages: 175

morale: 137, 143, 281-82

North Korea, drive on: 183-84, 187-90, 195-96

North Korea, operations in: 202-14, 215, 234-36,

245, 257-60, 262, 266, 271-73, 274-75, 278-83

in Pusan Perimeter: 113-14, 125-27, 131-32,

137-38, 144-46, 148, 151-54, 155, 162-64, 165n, 174-77

replacement problems: 127-34

Eighth Army—Continued

replacement system: 88n, 129

replacements, number received: 127-29

supply system and operations: 398

X Corps as element: 189-90, 300-301, 307

troop unit strength: 52, 54, 342-44

U.S. nationals, evacuation by: 71

withdrawal planned: 222

Eighth Army Rear: 86

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK): 86

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.: 316n

Elections: 26, 40, 180, 219-20, 269, 331

Emergency declaration, U.S.: 298-300

Engineer Combat Battalion, 19th: 171-72

Engineer equipment, shortages in: 175-76

Engineer Special Brigade, 2d: 94

Engineer units, employment of: 93, 98, 166, 191, 230,

341-42

England. See United Kingdom.

Enlisted Reserve Corps. See Army Reserve.

Equipment. See Matériel.

Escalation of conflict. See Expansion of conflict,

concern over.

Estimates of situation

by Almond: 111-12

by Collins: 327

by MacArthur: 105-08, 112-14, 145-46, 148, 150,

212-14, 216, 223, 240-41, 244-45, 274-75, 278-

80, 282-84, 307, 315, 327, 338-39, 348

by Ridgway: 105, 131, 335-86, 379-82, 388-89,

398

by Van Fleet: 398

Europe as chief U.S. interest: 41

European Command (EUCOM)

deployment of troops to: 223, 286

security of: 212, 223, 316, 319, 372

troop unit strength: 43, 45

Evacuation, strategic and tactical. See Withdrawal

operations.

Expansion of conflict, concern over: 242, 244-45, 247,

254, 289-90, 292, 317-18, 320-21, 324, 332, 381

Far East, U.N. conference on problems: 331

Far East Air Forces (FEAF)

air operations, control of: 108-09

aircraft, shortages of: 109

Bomber Command activated: 109

Combat Cargo Command: 258

frontier violations by: 200-201

GHQ, relations with: 47-48

strategic air operations. See main entry.

training program: 55

troop strength: 52-53, 196

U.S. nationals, evacuation by: 71

Far East Command (FEC). See also General Headquarters, FEC; MacArthur, General of the

Army Douglas.

Advance Command and Liaison Group: 70-72
INDEX 423

Far East Command (FEC)—Continued

airlifts, training in: 57

airlifts to Korea: 80

ammunition stocks: 59

amphibious training: 57

armor unit shortages: 89

Career Guidance Program, effect of: 55-56

casualties, estimates of: 88

casualties, as percentage of strength: 87n

combat effectiveness: 54, 56-60, 80n

combat-ready units, requisitions for: 92-99

combat-to-service troops, ratio: 54

command and staff structure: 48

divisions, expansion of: 88-92

equipment. See Matériel, below.

field artillery unit expansion: 90-92

field artillery unit shortages: 89

geographic limits: 46-47

GHQ as top headquarters, 47

infantry unit expansion: 52-54

infantry unit shortages: 89

integration of services: 55

intelligence reports from: 62-64

Japan, industry as aid to: 58-59

Japanese employed by: 54, 58, 97

JCS, defense mission from: 50-52

maintenance and repair programs: 59

matériel, reclamation and supply: 58-60

mission of: 54-55

mortars, reclamation and supply: 59

motor vehicles, reclamation and supply: 59

noncommissioned officer shortages: 89

order of battle: 54

POL stocks: 59

ration stocks: 59

recoilless rifles, reclamation and supply: 59

reorganized: 136-38

replacements, requisitions for: 53, 56, 87-89, 98-

99, 239, 343

SCAP, relations with: 48

service units, strength: 342

staff doubles for UNC: 103

strategic plans: 49-52

subordinate commands: 49

supply status: 58-60

survey mission to ROK. See Advance Command

and Liaison Group (ADCOM).

tanks, reclamation and supply: 59

Tokyo as headquarters: 49

training program: 54-58

troop units, quality: 55-57

troop units, strength: 43-45, 52-54, 230

troops units, structure: 49, 53-54

troop units, turnover: 54-55

as unified command: 43, 48n

USAF and USN without staff representation: 108

weapons, reclamation and supply: 54-60

weapons shortages: 54, 106

Field artillery

stocks on hand: 46

transfer to ROKA: 35

Field artillery, enemy: 39

Field Artillery Battalions. See also Armored Field

Artillery Battalion, 6th.

92d: 171

96th: 171

159th: 89n

Field Artillery Group, 5th: 97

Field artillery units

expansion in FEC: 90-92

requisitions for: 96-97, 136, 230

ROKA strength: 40

shortages in FEC: 89

Fighter aircraft support, enemy: 90-92

Financial assistance to ROK: 30

Finletter, Thomas K.: 42n, 242, 352-53

Flanders, Ralph E.: 365n

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic: 159-60, 163

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: 150, 155-56, 159-61

Flying Fish Channel: 147

Food. See Rations.

Foreign ministers, meeting of: 21-22, 26

Formosa: 199, 289-93, 295, 319, 331. See also China,

Nationalist.

aircraft ordered to: 69

Communist China threat to: 197, 367-69

security of: 68, 367-71

Soviet view on: 371

as strategic area: 68

U.N. attitude toward: 369-71

Formosa Strait: 369

Forrestal, James V.: 10

Foster, William C.: 40

France. See also Pleven, René

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 248-49

combat operations: 340

expansion of conflict, concern over: 332

troop units, deployment of: 225, 227

U.N., introduces resolution in: 101

U.S., relations with: 331

Fusen Reservoir: 263n

Gaither, Brig. Gen. Ridgely: 230

Gardner, Admiral Matthias B.: 10

Garvin, Brig. Gen. Crump: 81-82

Gay, Maj. Gen. Hobart R.: 139-40

General Classification Test: 56

General Headquarters, FEC. See also Far East Command.

FEAF, relations with: 47-48

as FEC top headquarters: 47

NavFFE, relations with: 47-48

staff agencies, replacements in: 129-30

staff structure: 47n, 49

USAF-USN, relations with: 47

General Headquarters Reserve: 155-58
424 POLICY AND DIRECTION

General Headquarters Target Group: 110

General Order No. 1: 10-11

General Reserve

field artillery unit strength: 96-97

importance of maintaining: 108

infantry unit strength: 90

JCS reluctance to levy on: 79, 87, 99

levies on: 88-94, 104, 118-20, 132-34, 153, 230, 343

troop units and strength: 44-45, 118

Geneva Conventions: 381

Geographical area, Korea: 1-2

Great Britain. See United Kingdom.

Greece, troop units: 225, 227, 356

Gross, Ernest A.: 66

Gruenther, Lt. Gen. Alfred M.: 132n, 181, 298

Guerrilla operations: 329

Guerrilla operations, enemy: 38, 64, 191n, 205, 222, 263-64

Gunfire Support Group, USN: 172

Haanmi-ri: 340

Haeju: 140

Hagaru-ri: 261, 265

Haislip, General Wade H.

and airborne units, deployment of: 170

and Chinese intervention: 298 and corps staffs, expansion of: 135

and replacements, requisitions for: 294

Hamhung: 188-89, 191, 195-96, 205-06, 216, 236,

263, 279-80, 283, 290, 297, 301, 303-04

Han River: 72, 83, 106, 139, 141, 159n, 169, 309-10,

327, 333-40, 361, 363, 389, 401-02

Hapsu: 266

Harriman, W. Averell: 306

MacArthur, conferences with: 145-46, 167, 369-70

on MacArthur relief: 374-75

and North Korea, operations in: 288

at Wake Island conference: 212

Headquarters and Service Group, GHQ: 49

Hickenlooper, Bourke B.: 365n

Hickey, Maj. Gen. Doyle O.: 202, 205, 307 and airlift, supply by: 341-42 and Chinese intervention: 235 as deputy chief of staff, GHQ: 49, 110, 189

FEC and UNC, temporary commander: 377

and GHQ Reserve, headquarters for: 157

and ROKA, withdrawal of: 313

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

Walker, conferences with: 127, 129, 145, 177

Hideyoshi: 3

Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R.: 20-21, 23

advisers assigned by: 33

constabulary, arming and organizing: 32-33

Japanese surrender carried out by: 13

martial law declared by: 25

on Moscow decision: 25

occupation directives to: 18, 25 on provisional government, return of: 14-16

Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R.—Continued

relief asked by: 26-27

and ROKA, organizing and training: 32-33 and Soviet propaganda campaign: 22, 25

USAFIK commanded by: 13

withdrawal proposed by: 52

Hoengsong: 334-35, 340

Hoeryong: 246

Hokkaido: 11

Hong Kong: 199, 240, 318, 321

Hongch'on: 354, 389

Hopkins, Harry: 7, 13

Huch'ang: 261n

Hungnam: 11, 188, 190-91, 195-96, 205-06, 259,

263-64

port operations: 301

withdrawal to and from: 279-81, 301-04, 311-12

Hwach'on: 304, 364, 379-80

Hwach'on Reservoir area: 389, 396, 397

Hydroelectric plants. See Power plants.

Hyesanjin: 236, 246, 265, 269

Hyonch'on-ni: 340

Ich'on: 333-34

Imjin River: 304, 309, 363

Inactive Reserves. See Army Reserve.

Inch'on (CHROMITE): 67, 69-70, 139-54, 157-59, 161- 62, 164, 168, 170-90, 196, 202, 308-09, 336, 386

air operations at: 146, 151-52

airdrop, plans for: 152

alternate landing sites planned: 141n, 148-50,

176-77

assault phase: 139-46, 171-77, 196, 397

casualties: 173

casualties, enemy: 173 command and staff structure: 147n, 152, 155-59,

172

DA, co-ordination of plans with: 152-53

intelligence estimates on: 174-75

link-up with Eighth Army: 177

logistical system for: 172

matériel supplies at: 173-74

mine clearance: 208

motor vehicles at: 173-74 naval support: 172

Navy-Marine Corps objections: 146-50

NKA threat to: 71

occupation troops land: 16

port operations: 189-91, 196, 202, 207-08, 258, 300

supply operations: 173-74

surprise, principle applied: 173

tactical air support: 173

target date set: 158-59

tides and beach, hazards in: 140-41, 146-47

training for: 159

troop units, direction of: 155-72

troop units, strength: 173-74, 310

withdrawal to: 283, 290-91, 300
INDEX 425

Independence, movements toward: 5-6

India: 101, 198, 333

Indochina: 293

Infantry Divisions

combat TOE authorized: 88-90

2d: 44, 119, 212, 297

combat effectiveness: 94, 108

deployment to combat: 92-96, 127, 142-44,

165-66

Han River operations: 340

Koreans attached to: 168

North Korea, operations in: 235

withdrawal planned: 223-24

3d: 44, 212

combat effectiveness: 132-34

deployment to combat: 118n, 131-34, 165, 215

Hungnam operations: 303-04

levies on: 90-92

North Korea, operations in: 236, 279

occupation duty: 222n, 223-24

withdrawal planned: 223

4th: 294

7th: 54, 129

combat effectiveness: 80n, 85-86, 90, 107-08,

166-67

deployment to FEC: 144-45, 165, 171-72

Inch'on operations: 157-58, 173-77

Koreans attached to: 167-68

levies on: 85-86, 165-66

North Korea, operations in: 236, 259, 264-66,

269, 279-80

reconstitution for combat: 165-68

Wonsan operations: 188, 196, 205, 207-08,

216-17, 219

24th: 54, 85-86. See also Task Force Smith, USA.

casualties: 108, 111-13

combat effectiveness: 80n, 127

deployment to combat: 80-82

enemy strength faced: 105

Koreans attached to: 168

North Korea, operations in: 235

P'yongyang operations: 204-05

Taejon, defense of: 112-13

25th: 54

combat effectiveness: 80n, 127

deployment to combat: 85, 112, 141

Koreans attached to: 168

troop unit strength: 52

28th: 124-25, 294

29th: 124

31st: 124, 299

37th: 124

40th: 124-25, 294, 345, 385

43d: 124-25, 294

45th: 124-25, 294, 345, 385

47th: 299

Infantry Regiments. See also Regimental Combat

Teams.

17th: 165, 264-65

19th: 82, 111

21st: 82

23d: 340

24th: 81, 89n

29th: 90-91, 108, 166

32d: 164-66, 177

34th: 82

65th: 133, 165, 215

Inje: 304, 379-80

Intelligence

estimates and reports: 62-64, 101-04, 139-40, 179,

198-202, 204, 208, 222, 237, 244-45, 257, 259-60,

263, 272-73, 274-77, 285, 304-05, 308, 337-40,

354, 363, 387-89, 403

failures in: 61-62, 65

at Inch'on: 174-75

from Nationalist China: 199, 276

from U.S. embassy: 62-63

Interim People's Committee: 24

Iwon: 208, 219, 236, 259

Japan

air threat to, enemy: 320

contract shipping from: 209-10

contractors, use by FEC: 209-10, 341

industrial exploitation of Korea: 4-5

industry as aid to FEC: 58-59

interest rates to Koreans: 5

invasion and occupation of Korea: 2-6

legal discrimination against Koreans: 1

mine clearance by: 209-10, 217

National Police Reserve: 131n, 314, 386

nationals employed by FEC: 54, 58, 97

occupation policy, MacArthur's: 55

officials in high Korean posts: 18

population in Korea: 5

quick U.S. entry into Korea, appeals for: 16

rebellions against: 4

security of: 75-76, 131, 301, 307, 316, 322-23, 325,

344-45, 383-86

Soviet threat to: 311

Soviet Union enters war against: 8

surrender procedure: 8-11, 13, 49-50

as U.N. sanctuary: 320

Japan Logistical Command: 136-37, 207-08, 222, 229.

See also Weible, Maj. Gen. Walter L.

Japan Sea: 335, 361

Jessup, Philip C.: 211-12

Jet aircraft support. See Fighter aircraft support,

enemy.

Johnson, Louis A. See also Defense, Department of.

Army expansion, approval of: 119-20

and Formosa, security of: 366, 367, 369-70

and Formosa as strategic area: 68
426 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Johnson, Louis A.—Continued

functions and chain of authority: 42

on ground troops commitment: 79

resigns as Secretary of Defense: 181

role in military decisions: 103-04

Seventh Fleet movement, proposed by: 69n

and Soviet intervention: 76

and U.N. military assistance from: 115-17

and U.S. policy toward Korea: 181

Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also Bradley, General of

the Army Omar N.; Collins, General J. Lawton; Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.; Vandenberg,

General Hoyt S.

and air reconnaissance of China: 328

air-naval operations, directives on: 73, 76-77

airborne units, decision to deploy: 169

and armistice proposals: 291-92, 384-85, 390-92,

396, 403-05

and Army expansion: 118-20, 298-99

and China, blockade of: 318, 321, 328-29

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 248-49, 252-

55, 268, 384-85

and Chinese intervention: 199-200, 231-32, 234,

236, 240, 250-55, 298, 310-12, 327-30

Collins as Korea representative: 101-02

composition: 42-43

constabulary expansion, approved by: 33

and continental China, operations against: 291,

321-23, 329-30, 384, 392

courses of action considered: 295-96

and DMZ, establishment of: 384, 399-402

and economic sanctions against China: 328

and emergency declaration: 298

enemy strength, appraisal of: 384-85

and EUCOM, security of: 223, 319

and expansion of conflict: 242, 244-45, 247, 254

FEC, directive to: 50-52

and Formosa, security of: 368

functions and chain of authority: 42-43

and General Reserve, levies on: 79, 87, 99, 119-20

and guerrilla operations: 329

guidance on Korea sought by: 7

and Inch'on, reported opposition to: 184n

and Inch'on operation: 148-51, 153-54

and Japan, security of: 301, 307, 345, 384-85

and Japan, Soviet threat to: 311

Japanese surrender procedures, role in: 9-10

KMAG ordered with ROK units: 70

and Korea as strategic area: 50-52, 253, 310

limited offensives, directives on: 384-85, 396, 397,

401-02

MacArthur, commendation of: 185-86

MacArthur, conferences with: 67, 69, 73, 142-44

MacArthur, directives to: 67, 69-70, 76-77, 116,

148, 150-51, 153-54, 161n, 180-84, 186-87, 194-

98, 200, 218, 220, 242-44, 268-69, 278-80, 282,

310-12, 321-25, 329, 351, 353, 358-60, 371-73

MacArthur, mission assigned to: 47

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued

MacArthur, recommended as U.N. commander:

102 and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-76

and Marine Corps units, deployment of: 92,

160-63

and morale: 323-24

and National Guard, levies on: 122-25, 130, 317,

344-45, 385 and national policy, clearance of statements on:

285 and Nationalist China, logistical support of:

328-29 and Nationalist China, use of troops: 116-17,

295-96, 319, 321, 329 and naval operations against China: 321, 329

and North Korea, drive on: 179-84, 191

and North Korea, operations in: 180, 193-94,

250, 272, 279-82, 285-86, 288, 290

and objectives in Korea: 179-84, 186-87, 323, 325,

332, 349-51, 386-87, 391-93

occupation, directives on: 196

and occupation troops, withdrawal of: 30

occupation zones planned by: 8

planning and decisions, problems in: 103-04

and political settlement proposals: 357-59, 391-92,

400-401

prisoners of war, directive on: 186-87

and power plants, bombardment of: 347-48

and Rashin, bombardment of: 346-47

and replacements, requisitions for: 79, 92, 93-

94, 99, 119-20, 132-34, 224, 310, 328, 384

Ridgway, directives to: 381-87, 395-96, 401-02

ROK, policy on U.N. occupation: 180

and ROK government, support of: 180, 184, 328

and ROKA, control of troops: 218

and ROKA, effect of withdrawal on: 323-24

and ROKA, expansion and training: 392, 396

and Soviet border, inviolability of: 384-85

and Soviet intervention: 77, 253, 883, 391-92

and Soviet use of allies: 104

and strategic air operations: 242-44, 247, 249,

321, 329, 345 and supply system and operations, enemy: 384

surrender ultimatum, directive on: 186-87

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 353-54, 358,

396

troop strength, justify cuts in: 52

and U.K. concern over U.S, policies: 290

and U.N., military assistance from: 115-17

U.N. agent for operations: 101-03, 243

U.N. command chain, opposes committee in: 101

and U.N. objectives in Korea: 392

and U.N. troop units, requisitions for: 224-28,

237-38, 344, 356-57, 384

unified commands, control of: 43

USAFIK, control of: 25

and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378
INDEX 427

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued

War Department as executive agent: 25-26

and withdrawal operations: 180, 223-24, 228-29,

254, 291, 311-12, 321-25, 328, 383, 386, 391,

395-96

and Wonsan operation: 188

Joint Commission of U.S.-USSR: 21-23, 25-26

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC): 105

Joint Staff Planners: 9-10

Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group

(JSPOG): 47n, 187, 222, 237, 400. See also

Wright, Maj. Gen. Edwin K.

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 33

Joint Task Force Seven, USN: 172, 196, 208

Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner: 115, 261. See also Naval

Forces, Far East (NavFFE).

and air operations, control of: 109-11

Collins, conference with: 283-84

commands NavFFE: 49

and Hungnam operation: 205-06

and Inch'on operation: 152, 168, 172

MacArthur, conferences with: 149-50, 188

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 164

Ridgway, directive from: 382

and Wonsan operation: 196, 209

Kaesong: 10, 38. 65, 188, 191n, 195-96, 202, 204-05,

308, 404-05

Kangnung: 61, 65

KANSAS line: 363-64, 380, 384, 386, 389, 396-404

Kansong: 379

Kanto Plain: 49

Kapsan: 236

Keathley, MSTS: 66

KILLER: 340

Kim Il Sung (NKA)

and armistice proposals: 404

heads North Korea government: 24

surrender demand, rejects: 204

on U.S. tactics: 114n

Kim Koo: 5, 14, 19. See also Republic of Korea. Kim Sung Chu. See Kim Il Sung.

Kimball, Dan A.: 352-53

Kimp'o: 67, 69-70, 196

Kimp'o Airfield: 16, 151-52, 173-74, 215, 236

Kimp'o Peninsula: 387-88

Knowland, William F.: 365n

Kobe: 172

Koin-dong: 216

Kojo: 191n, 217-18, 222n

Kongju: 82

Korea. See also North Korea; Republic of Korea. Cairo Declaration on: 6, 349

Chinese invasion and influence: 2-3

Communist activity during Japanese occupation:

5-6

domestic conditions, influence of: 1

Imperial Russian aspirations in: 2-3

Korea—Continued

independence, U.S. policy on: 14

invasion plans, U.S.: 8

Japanese invasion and exploitation: 2-6

Japanese population in: 5

Japanese surrender procedures: 10-11

JCS, guidance sought on: 7

MacArthur relieved of responsibility for: 50

martial law declared: 25

national debt, 1910-45: 5

objectives in: 177, 179-84, 186-87, 255-56, 292-93,

323, 325, 332, 349-52, 357-58, 383-84, 386-87,

391-93, 397, 405-06

occupation, directives, and plans for: 7, 10, 19,

25-26, 180, 219-21

occupation, JCS directives on: 196

occupation troops, withdrawal: 30

occupation zones planned and defined: 8, 11

political situation, June 1950: 38-40

provisional government, formation and seats of: 5

provisional government, U.S.-USSR proposals for:

22

punitive expeditions against: 3

Soviet invasion of: 10-11

Soviet policy on future of: 14, 19, 23-25

as strategic area: 7, 10, 28-30, 50-52, 62, 68, 75, 178-79, 253, 310

treaties with U.S.: 3

troop units, Soviet proposal for withdrawal: 28-29

U.N. objectives in: 392

unification, Soviet opposition to: 22-23

unification as objective: 350

U.S. policy toward: 20-23, 181

U.S. relations with: 3-4

Wedemeyer report on: 28, 37

withdrawal from proposed: 52

Korean Liaison Office: 62-63

Korean Military Advisory Group. See Military Advisory Group to ROK (KMAG).

Kosong: 401-02

Kublai Khan: 2-3

Kum River: 86, 111-12, 145, 311

Kumch'on: 204-05

Kumhwa: 206, 401-02

Kumsong: 206

Kumyangjang-ni: 334

Kunsan: 7-8, 141n, 150-51, 176-77

Kunu-ri: 195-96, 216, 235

Landing ship, tank (LST): 146, 172, 206, 208, 217,

219, 258-59

Language barrier, effect of: 18-19

Larkin, Lt. Gen. Thomas B.: 118, 228-29, 297, 307-09

Latin American troop units, deployment of: 356-57

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D.: 10

Lemnitzer, Maj. Gen. Lyman L.: 65

Liaotung Peninsula: 10-11

Lie, Trygve: 100-101, 369-71
428 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Limited offensives, directives on: 384-85, 396, 397-

99, 401-02

Lin-chiang: 246

Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A.: 9-11

Lines of communication: 191, 207, 258, 263-64.

See also Supply system and operations.

Lines of communication, enemy: 195, 263, 291, 327,

389, 399

Logistical system and operations: 191, 207-08, 221,

228-30, 258-59, 272, 280. See also Lines of

communication; Supply system and operations,

at Inch'on: 172

Nationalist China, support of: 328-29

Logistical system and operations, enemy: 137

Lovett, Robert A.: 237, 242, 356-57, 359

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas. See also

Far East Command (FEC); General Headquarters, FEC; Supreme Commander, Allied Powers

(SCAP).

AAA units, requisitions for: 93, 166

advice followed in Washington: 83

air force, ROK, view on activating: 34-35

and air-naval operations: 77

air units, requisitions for: 239

airborne operations, plans for: 169-70, 215-16

airborne units, requisitions for: 168-71

and airlift, supply by: 341-42

Almond, conference with: 188-89

and ammunition supply: 229-30

amphibious operations, plans and training for:

134-35, 137-40, 160-63, 168, 177, 187-91, 195-

96, 205-10

armament, proposals for: 31-32

and armistice proposals: 183, 283-84, 358-59

army, ROK, view on organizing: 33-35

Army directives from: 102 and artillery fire support: 338

artillery units, requisitions for: 230

assumes control of U.S. forces in ROK: 71

and atomic bomb, potential use: 288, 320n

and blockade of China: 291, 315, 318, 339

Bolté, conferences with: 223-25, 237

chemical units, requisitions for: 98

Chiang, conference with: 368

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 188-89,

196-202, 212-14, 235-36, 240-41, 250-56, 266-67,

269-71, 277, 283-84, 372 and Chinese intervention: 188-89, 196-202, 212-14,

235-36, 240-41, 250-56, 266-67, 271, 274-78, 285,

315, 322, 328, 372

Church briefed by: 74

Collins, conferences with: 78-79, 105-08, 140n,

149-51, 160, 169, 171, 282-84, 325-29, 368, 373

and combat effectiveness, enemy: 83, 84-85, 105-

06, 277, 358 and combat effectiveness, U.S.: 282, 322-23

combat-loading asked by: 95

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Continued

combat-ready units, requisitions for: 92-99

command authority: 47-48

commands FEC: 46-47

commands USAFFE: 47-48

and Communist China industry, destruction of:

315

conflict in command roles: 382-83

Congressional hearings on relief: 365n, 392

and continental China, operations against: 315-

17, 319-25, 328-29, 339, 351, 369, 373

and corps staffs, plans for: 134-36, 155, 158

Dean commended by: 106

departure from Japan: 379

directives, violation of: 218n, 339n

and divisions, expansion of: 89-90

Doyle, conference with: 149

and emergency declaration: 300

engineer units, use of: 93, 98, 166, 230, 341

estimates of situation by: 105-08, 112-14, 145-46,

148, 150, 212-14, 216, 223, 240-41, 244-45, 274-

75, 278-80, 282-84, 307, 315, 327, 338-39, 348

and EUCOM, security of: 212, 316, 372

and expansion of conflict: 321

FEC reorganization: 136-38

field artillery units, requisitions for: 96-97, 136

and Formosa, security of: 68, 366-71

and General Reserve, maintaining: 108

and GHQ Reserve, headquarters for: 157-58

GHQ Target Group activated by: 110

and ground units, deployment of: 78-79, 80

and guerrilla operations, enemy and friendly:

183, 284, 313-14, 360

Han River, operations around: 335-36, 338-39

Harriman, conferences with: 145-46, 167, 369-70

and Inch'on operation: 139-54, 155, 158-59, 170,

172, 173-89, 336

intelligence furnished to: 275, 285, 305. See also

Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A.

invasion, forecast and reaction to: 30, 65-66

Japan, occupation policy in: 55

and Japan, security of: 131, 316, 322-23, 325,

344-45

and Japanese contractors, use of: 209-10, 341

and Japanese National Police Reserve, arming:

314

Japanese surrender, role in: 13

JCS, commended by: 185-86

JCS, conferences with: 67, 69, 73, 143-44

JCS, directives from: 67, 69-70, 76-77, 116, 148,

150-51, 153-54, 161n, 180-84, 186-87, 194-98,

200, 218, 220, 242-44, 268-69, 278-80, 282, 310-

12, 321-25, 329

Joy, conferences with: 149-50, 188

Korea, relieved of responsibility for: 50

and Kunsan operation: 176-77

Larkin, conference with: 228
INDEX 429

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Continued

and Manchuria, air operations in: 241-46, 251,

272-73, 277-78, 281, 283-84, 291, 320-25, 338-

39, 351

and Marine Corps units, requisitions for: 92, 139,

142, 143, 159-64, 165n

Martin, Joseph W., letter to: 374

and matériel losses and destruction: 301-03

medical units, requisitions for: 98

military career: 13

mission, adherence to: 106-07, 179, 183-84, 186-

87, 190, 195, 234, 245, 252, 262, 270, 277-78,

282

missions assigned by JCS: 47

and morale: 322

Muccio, conference with: 74

and National Guard, levies on: 296, 325-26,

344-45

national police, plans for: 30-33

national policy, disagreements with: 284-85, 287n,

322-23, 325, 349, 358-59, 366, 371-74, 376

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 295-96,

307, 315-17, 319-20, 339

NATO, distrust of: 288

and naval gunfire support: 281

naval operations, plans for: 336

Navy units, requisitions for: 239

and North Korea, drive to: 107, 179, 183-91

and North Korea, operations in: 193-202, 205-10,

215-19, 278-84, 361-64, 371-72. See also Yalu

River, operations around,

objectives in Korea, directive on: 180-84, 349

occupation directives and plans: 7, 10, 19, 25-26,

180, 219-21

offensive, maintenance of: 338

ordnance specialists, requisitions for: 97-98

overoptimism, cautions against: 339

and patrol actions: 363

plans for supporting: 83

and political settlement proposals: 358-59, 360-

61, 374

and power plants, air operations against: 231-32,

241, 244-45, 248, 269-71, 347-48

press correspondents, statements to: 340, 351, 358-

59

prisoners of war, plans for rescuing: 215

proclamation on occupation: 16

and Pusan operations: 176, 314

and Rashin, air operations against: 345-47

reconnaissance, aerial: 270

relief of: 364, 365-67, 374-77

replacements, requisitions for: 87, 89-99, 131-33,

136, 153, 155, 166-67, 238-39, 282-84, 294-95,

316, 325-26, 342-44

and replacements, shipment priorities for: 93-94

report on post-invasion events: 69

Rhee, address to: 185

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Continued

Rhee, conference with: 74

Ridgway, conferences with: 145-46, 167, 307, 378

Ridgway, relations with: 305-07

Ridgway commended by: 336, 348

and RIPPER: 354-55

ROK, responsibilities in: 34

and ROK government, restoration and security:

180, 183-87, 313

ROK proclaimed by: 28

and ROKA, attachment to U.S. units: 167-68,

342-43

and ROKA, control of troops: 102, 188, 191n,

215-16, 218

and ROKA, expansion and training: 168, 230,

313-14, 394

and ROKA, withdrawal of: 312-13, 316

and security, maintenance of: 133, 339

and Seoul, operations around: 14, 72, 335-36

service units, use of: 97-98, 342-43

and Seventh Fleet, control of: 77

Sherman, conference with: 149-51

shipping, requisitions for: 106-07

signal units, requisitions for: 134-35

Smith, conference with: 148

and Soviet border, inviolability of: 372

and Soviet intervention: 188-89, 315, 325-26

and Soviet propaganda campaigns: 296

and Soviet Union, air operations against: 321

specialists, requisitions for: 139, 155, 166-67

Stratemeyer, conference with: 188

Struble, conference with: 149

Struble commended by: 348

supplies, requisitions for: 81-86, 228-30, 297

and supply system and operations: 335, 360, 363

and supply system and operations, enemy: 327,

339, 346-47

and surrender demand: 187-88, 193, 195, 203-04

tact, demonstration of: 336n

and tactical air operations: 109-10, 215-16, 307

tactical plans: 106-07, 113-14, 126, 145-46, 177,

195-96, 205-06, 212-14, 215-19, 245, 271, 275,

279, 290, 311-12, 314, 315, 328, 335-36, 338-39,

348, 349, 360

and tank support: 338

tank units, requisitions for: 92-93

and Task Force Smith: 82n

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 338, 351-54,

358-60

timing, sense of: 144

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

training, directives on: 130, 165-66, 168

transportation units, requisitions for: 98

and troop unit strength, enemy: 212-14, 274-77,

280-81, 364

troop unit strength, protests cuts in: 52-53

troop units, requisitions for: 83-86, 106-08, 118
430 POLICY AND DIRECTION

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Continued

Truman, commendation by: 185-86, 325

U.K., attitude toward: 251

U.K., distrusted by: 288, 290, 365-66, 372

UNC, named commander of: 102

UNC activated by: 103

UNO, directive on reports to: 102-03

and UNO, military assistance from: 117

and UNO, military control by: 103n

Vandenberg, conferences with: 105-06, 140, 325-27

VFW, message to: 370-71

visits to combat areas: 74-79, 216, 301, 307n, 339,

363

at Wake Island conference: 210-14, 218, 220, 222-

23, 232, 371

Walker, conferences with: 125-26, 188-90

Walker, relations with: 307

and withdrawal operations: 30, 180, 222-30, 237,

271, 290, 294, 300-303, 311-14, 316-17, 322-23, 327, 338-39

Yalu River, operations around: 250-56, 257, 262,

266, 268-73, 274, 276-78, 287, 290, 372

Machine guns, stocks on hand: 46. See also

Weapons.

Maintenance and repair programs: 59

Malik, Jacob

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249

political settlement proposed by: 197, 402

UNO, boycott by: 66, 101, 194

Manchuria: 179, 182, 191, 198-201, 216, 218, 230-32

air operations in, proposed: 235, 241-46, 251, 272-

73, 277-78, 281, 283-84, 291, 320-25, 338-39,

351, 386

air reconnaissance of: 328

as enemy sanctuary: 274, 320

occupied by USSR: 10-11

Manp'ojin: 246, 260-61, 263

Manp'ojin-Kanggye road: 261-62

Mao Tse-tung: 232, 240, 405-06. See also China,

Communist.

Mariana Islands: 49

Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO): 49

Marine Air Group, 33d: 160

Marine Air Wings

1st: 146, 159-60, 162, 216

2d: 159-60

Marine Divisions

1st

combat effectiveness: 108, 159-160, 312

deployment to combat: 146, 160-61, 163-65,

171-72

at Inch'on: 173-77

North Korea, operations in: 236, 259-61,

265-66, 274, 279-82

in Pusan operation: 312

troop unit strength: 171-72, 343

withdrawal planned: 222n

Marine Divisions—Continued

1st—Continued

in Wonsan operation: 188, 196, 205-08, 216-

17, 219, 236

2d: 159-62

Marine Provisional Brigade, 1st: 127, 144, 157, 160-

66

Marine Regiments

1st: 163

5th: 142-44, 160, 163, 165, 172

6th: 163

7th: 163-34, 171-72, 236

Marshall, General of the Army George C. See also

Defense, Department of.

and armistice proposals: 390

Atlee, conference with: 291-92

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249

and continental China, operations against: 329-30

Korea, seeks guidance on: 7

and limited offensives: 402

and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-76

named Secretary of Defense: 181

and National Guard, levies on: 345

and North Korea, drive on: 183-84, 191

and North Korea, operations in: 194, 218, 255,

286, 288

and objectives in Korea: 181-82

occupation priorities proposed by: 7-8

and political settlement proposals: 374

Ridgway, directive to: 383

and ROK government, restoration of: 184-85

and ROKA, arming of: 313, 394n

Soviet occupation foreseen by: 8

and strategic air operations: 242, 247, 249

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 353-54

and U.N. troops, requisitions for: 227-28, 238, 356

and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378

and withdrawal operations: 395

Martial law declared: 25

Martin, Joseph W.: 374

Matériel

estimate of requirements: 45-46

losses and destruction: 112-13, 238, 283, 297,

301-04

losses and destruction, enemy: 390

reclamation and supply: 58-60

shortages in Eighth Army: 175

state of: 45-46

supply to ROKA: 35, 77

World War II, disposition of: 58

Matthews, Francis P.: 42n

Matthews, H. Freeman: 184

Medical units

requisitions for: 98

reservists called up: 122

Mexico: 356-57

Milburn, Lt. Gen. Frank W.: 202, 233, 257, 305.

See also Corps, I.
INDEX 431

Military Advisory Group to ROK (KMAG): 205.

See also Provisional Military Advisory Group

to ROK (PMAG).

activation and mission: 34

intelligence reports from: 62-63

with ROKA units: 80-81

Military Air Transport Service (MATS): 168-69

Military assistance. See also Financial assistance to

ROK.

other than from U.S.: 115

Rhee asks for: 34-36

State Department role in: 117

from UNO, requests for: 61

UNO channels in: 117

from U.S.: 35-36

world-wide, by U.S.: 41

Military attaché, U.S. See United States Embassy,

Seoul.

Military government. See Civil affairs; Occupation.

Military missions. See also Advisers, Truman reliance on; Military Advisory Group to ROK

(KMAG); Provisional Military Advisory Group

to ROK (PMAG).

Rhee asks for: 33-34

Soviet to NKA: 37

U.S. to ROK: 4, 29-30

U.S. world-wide, strength: 43

Military policy, U.S.: 41-42

Mines, clearance of: 206, 208-10, 215-18

Mission, doctrine on: 278

Missionaries evacuated: 71

Mobilization, problems in: 119. See also Emergency

declaration, U.S.

Mongol invasion: 2-3

Morale

Communist China: 390

Eighth Army: 137, 143, 281-82

enemy: 275, 327

ROKA: 65

U.S. troops: 322-24, 326, 390

X Corps: 186

Morehouse, Rear Adm. Albert K.: 261

Mortars

enemy strength: 39

reclamation and supply: 59

transfer to ROKA: 35

Moscow meeting of foreign ministers: 21-22, 26

Motor vehicles

at Inch'on: 173-74

numbers in stock: 46

reclamation and supply: 59

shortages: 145

transfer to ROKA: 35

Mount Fuji: 55

Mt. McKinley, SS: 172, 209

Mountains. See Terrain, effect on operations.

Muccio, John J.: 36, 395

ADCOM, liaison with: 71-72

Muccio, John J.—Continued

on combat efficiency of NKA: 39, 40

MacArthur, conference with: 74

and supply of arms to ROKA: 65-66

as U.S. ambassador: 28, 184, 221

U.S. nationals, orders evacuation of: 71

Munsan-ni: 70-71, 404

Mup'yong-ni: 265-66, 274

Mutual Defense Assistance Pact (MDAP): 297

Naktong River: 126-27, 145, 174-75, 311

Nanking: 5

National defense, effect of Korea commitment on:

104-05

National Guard. See also Reserve components.

Army expansion, role in: 120, 122-25

levies on: 122-25, 130, 153, 230, 283, 294, 296, 299,

317, 325-26, 344-45, 385

policy on federalizing: 124-25

public reaction to call-up: 123-24

National police, ROK, plans for: 30-34

National Police Reserve, Japan: 131n, 386

National policy

MacArthur disagreements with: 284-85, 287n,

322-23, 325, 349, 358-59, 366, 371-74, 376

statements on, clearing: 284-85, 324-25, 332-33,

349, 358-59, 366, 373

National Security Council (NSC): 391

and Army expansion: 298-99

and blockade of China: 393

and Chinese intervention: 252, 254-56, 285-86,

328

and continental China, operations against: 329-

30, 393

functions: 42n

military decisions, role in: 103-04

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 393

objectives in Korea: 392-93

and political settlement proposals: 393

Truman, meeting with: 73

and withdrawals from Korea: 30, 393

Naval Forces, Far East (NavFFE). See also Joy,

Vice Adm. C. Turner.

GHQ, relations with: 47-48

Joy commands: 49

personnel strength: 196

training program: 55

transport operations: 196

U.S. nationals, evacuation of: 71

Naval gunfire support: 112, 151-52, 279, 281, 303-04.

See also Naval operations.

Naval operations: 69, 70, 73, 76-77, 336. See also

Naval gunfire support.

against Communist China, proposed: 320-21, 329

JCS directives on: 73, 76-77

Navy, Department of the. See Kimball, Dan A.;

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.; State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).
432 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Nehru, Jawaharlal: 197

Netherlands

Chinese intervention, report on: 266

troop units, deployment of: 225, 227

New Zealand: 115, 225, 227, 356-57

Night operations, enemy: 106, 281

Noncommissioned officers, shortages in: 89

Norge, SS: 71

Norstad, Lt. Gen. Lauris (USAF): 145-46, 167

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 41

and Chinese border, inviolability of, 250

and Chinese intervention: 287-89

MacArthur, distrust of: 288

mutual support article: 287n

Soviet threat to: 287

U.S. role in: 287

North Korea. See also Korea.

agricultural resources and methods: 11-12

area and population: 11

communications with South broken: 23-24

Communist China pledges support: 197-98, 199-

201, 233-34, 240-41, 251n

Communist domination of: 24-25

cultural differences from South: 12

decision to invade South: 177-84

defections to: 38

drive on: 107, 179-91, 195-96, 206-10

electric power resources: 12

government established: 23-25, 29

industrial resources: 11-12

invasion, U.N. reaction to: 66-67

jurisdiction over, question of: 220-21

Kim Il Sung, head of government: 24

mineral resources: 12

occupation, plans for: 219-21

operations in: 180, 193-94, 202-14, 215, 234-36,

245, 250, 254-55, 257-62, 266, 271-83, 285-86,

288, 290

POL production: 12

propaganda campaigns by: 38

strategic air operations in: 281

subversion against ROK: 37

supply system and operations in: 281, 363-64

and surrender, demand for: 187-88, 193, 195, 203-

04

tactical air operations in: 272

troop withdrawals, USSR: 24-25, 29

withdrawal from: 290-91

North Korean Army

aircraft strength: 39

aircraft supplied by USSR: 37

amphibious operations by: 61, 65

antitank gun strength: 39

artillery shellings by: 36

artillery strength: 39

artillery supplied by USSR: 37

attacks on South: 38

casualties: 405

North Korean Array—Continued

Chinese participation evident: 85

combat effectiveness: 39, 83, 145, 212

initiative lost by: 112, 114, 125, 137, 188-89

invasion of ROK: 1, 36-38, 61-65, 80-82, 111-12

logistical problems: 137

military missions, USSR: 37

mortar strength: 39

night operations, skill in: 106

organization and training: 36-37

POL supplied by USSR:

rout of: 185

Seoul, advance on and seizure: 70-72

Soviet influence evident: 61n, 67, 75-76, 84-85,

178

Soviet Union, arming by: 37, 187-88, 208-09, 230-

32, 247

superiority of: 70

tank strength: 39

tanks supplied by USSR: 37

training by Soviets: 25

troop movements, reports on: 273

troop units, strength: 36-37, 39, 387, 405

troop units, structure: 39

withdrawal from South: 195, 204-05

Nuclear weapons. See Atomic bomb, potential use.

Occupation

directives and plans for: 7, 10, 19, 25-26, 180, 219-

21

Hodge, directives to: 4, 18, 25

JCS directive on: 196

MacArthur proclamation on: 16

North Korea, plans for: 219-21

opposition to: 19-20

priorities proposed: 7-8

Soviet zone defined: 11

U.N. control of: 219-21

U.S. objective defined: 19

U.S. troop units land: 16

U.S. troop units withdrawn: 29-30, 50

zones planned and defined: 8, 11

O'Donnell, Maj. Gen. Emmett C. (USAF): 246n

Office of Foreign Liquidation: 35

Office of Special Investigations, USAF: 63

Okinawa

native laborers from: 341

security of: 75-76

as staging area: 49

Ongjin Peninsula: 65, 401-02

Ongondong: 246

Onyang-ni: 263

Operations Division, WDGS: 8-11

Ordnance Department: 45-46

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company, 378th: 94

Ordnance specialists, requisitions for: 97-98

Organized Reserve Corps. See Army Reserve.
INDEX 433

Osan: 82-83, 139, 177, 326

Otsu: 222n

Pace, Frank, Jr.: 69

and Army expansion and reduction: 118, 221-22,

299

and Chinese intervention: 299

and continental China, operations against: 329

functions and chain of authority: 42

and MacArthur, relief of: 376-77

and National Guard, levies on: 124

overoptimism, cautions against: 339

and 38th Parallel, operations around: 352-53

and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378

at Wake Island conference: 211-14

Pacific Command: 43. See also Radford, Admiral

Arthur W.

Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen. (ROKA): 233

Pannikar, K. M.: 197-98, 200n, 251n, 289n

Parks, Maj. Gen. Floyd L.: 133

Partridge, Maj. Gen. Earle E. (USAF): 348

Patrol actions: 363, 387-88, 398

Peng Teh-huai (CCF): 404

People's Democratic Republic of Korea. See Korea;

North Korea.

People's Republic of China. See China, Communist.

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)

FEC stocks: 59

North Korea production: 12

Soviet supplies to NKA: 37

supply of: 208

Philippine Scouts: 52

Philippines

security of: 75-76

troop units, deployment of: 227-28, 356

Philippines Command, USAF (PHILCOM): 49, 58

Piburn, Brig. Gen. Edwin W.: 137

PINK: 297

Pleven, René: 332-33

P'ohang-dong: 86, 300

Police forces. See National police, ROK, plans for.

Political parties, number in ROK: 18

Political settlement proposals: 197, 352, 357-61, 374,

390-93, 396, 400-402. See also Armistice proposals.

Port Arthur: 11, 318

Port systems and operations: 2, 195, 207-08, 258

Hungnam: 301

Inch'on: 189-91, 196, 202, 207-08, 258, 300

Pusan: 4, 172, 188, 190-91, 196, 207, 208, 258, 300

Wonsan: 206, 259

Posung-Myon area: 148-50

Potsdam Conference: 8

Power plants

output slowed by USSR: 26

preservation of: 231-32, 241, 244-45, 248, 264-65,

347-48, 369-71, 380-81

Press correspondents

clearing statements to: 284-85, 324-26, 332-33,

349, 358-59, 366, 373

MacArthur statements to: 340, 351, 358-59

Ridgway statements to: 326, 340, 359-60

Prisoners of war

Communist China: 233, 236, 390

enemy, disposition of: 381

JCS directive on: 186-87

plans for rescuing: 215

Propaganda campaigns

Communist China: 289n

North Korea: 38

Soviet Union: 22, 25, 296, 347

"Provisional Government of Republic of Great

Korea": 5

Provisional Military Advisory Group to ROK

(PMAG): 34. See also Military Advisory Group

to ROK (KMAG).

Public opinion, reaction to calling reserve components: 121-24

Pugen Reservoir. See Fusen Reservoir.

Pujon: 252-53, 259, 263-64

Pukch'ong: 236

Pungsan: 216, 236

Pusan

air operations, enemy: 76-77

airlift to: 80-81

Base Command: 81-82

in occupation priority: 7-8, 11

perimeter, operations around: 113-14, 125-27,

131-32, 137-38, 144-46, 148, 151-54, 155, 162-

64, 165n, 174-77

port system and operations: 4, 172, 188, 190-91,

196, 207, 208, 258, 300

U.S. nationals evacuated from: 71

withdrawal to and from: 283-84, 290, 300-301,

312, 314, 324

P'yongch'ang: 340

P'yonggang: 364

P'yonghae-ri: 86

P'yongt'aek: 82, 309-10

Pyongwon: 216

Pyongyang: 187-91, 195-96, 202-06, 212, 215-18,

235-36, 257, 283, 304, 400

P'yongyang-Wonsan road: 216

Radford, Admiral Arthur W. See also Pacific Command.

and Inch'on operation: 156

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 160-61

at Wake Island conference: 212

Radio sets, numbers in stock: 46. See also Signal

equipment, supply of.

Railroads

demolition of: 195

routes and operations: 4, 81, 191, 258, 347

shortages of facilities: 208
434 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Rashin: 10, 241, 345-47, 380-81

Rations

shortages, enemy: 390

stocks in FEC: 59

supply of: 207-08

Rebuild programs. See Maintenance and repair

programs.

Recoilless rifles, reclamation and supply: 59

Reconnaissance, aerial: 219, 230, 270, 272, 305, 327-

28, 346, 369

Reconnaissance, ground: 327

Reconnaissance, ground, enemy: 303-04

Recruits. See Replacements.

Reeder, Maj. Gen. William O.: 294, 298

Refugees, from North Korea: 23

Regimental Combat Teams. See also Infantry Regiments.

4th: 108

5th: 44-45, 90-92, 127, 166, 222

9th: 166

14th: 44-45, 90-92, 230

196th: 124-25, 230

278th: 124-25, 230

Reinforcements. See Replacements; Troop units.

Reinholt, SS: 71

Repair programs. See Maintenance and repair pro- grams.

Replacements. See also Troop units.

airlift of: 87-88, 127-29, 215-16

Eighth Army system: 88n, 129

FEC requisitions for: 53, 56, 87-89, 98-99, 239,

343

numbers received: 127-29

problems in supplying: 127-34, 238

requisitions for: 69, 79, 91-94, 107-08, 119-20,

129-33, 137, 166-67, 223-24, 228-29, 237-39,

271, 282-84, 294-95, 298, 310-11, 313, 316, 325-

28, 342-44, 384

shipment priorities for: 93-94

training of: 130

Reporters. See Press correspondents.

Republic of Korea. See also Kim Koo; Rhee, Syngman.

agricultural resources and methods: 11-12

area and population: 11

armament, report on needs: 36

Armed Forces Organization Act: 34

assembly convenes: 26-27

casualties, civilian: 405

casualties, Communist-inflicted: 37-38

coast guard, strength: 34

Communist activity in: 19-20

constabulary, organization and armament: 32-33

courses of action open to U.S.: 67-68

cultural differences from North: 12

economy, state during occupation: 18

election results: 26, 40

financial assistance to: 30

Republic of Korea—Continued

government, restoration and security: 180, 183-

87, 313, 386

government, support of: 180, 184, 328

government employees, number: 18

guerrilla operations, enemy: 38, 64

industrial resources: 12

Japanese officials, reaction to: 18

Kim Koo heads provisional government: 5, 14, 19

MacArthur, responsibilities in: 34

MacArthur assumes control of U.S. forces: 71

MacArthur proclaims restoration: 28

matériel supply to: 68-69

military assistance to: 35-36

military missions to: 4, 29-30

national police, activation and training: 32, 34

navy, MacArthur on need for: 34-35

NKA, attacks and withdrawals by: 1, 36-38, 61-65,

80-82, 111-12, 195, 204-05

North Korea, subversion in: 37

occupation, opposition to: 19-20

occupation, U.N. policy on: 180

plans for defending: 66-71

political parties, number: 18

political situation at occupation: 18

provisional government, return of: 14-16

refugees from North: 23

riots, Communist-inspired: 25

Soviet intentions, analysis of: 67-68

Soviet liaison mission withdrawn: 24

Soviet troops, entries by: 16

troop unit strength, U.S.: 25, 52, 86

troop unit withdrawals, U.S.: 28-30

troop unit withdrawals, USSR demand for: 26

U.N., admission to sought: 14

U.N., appeal to: 73

U.N. resolution on security of: 193-94

U.N.-ROK ground forces, control of: 215-18

U.S. control structure: 25-26

U.S. failure, political effects: 105

U.S. nationals evacuated: 67-69, 71

U.S. recognizes: 14, 28

U.S. support assured: 40

withdrawal from proposed: 30, 393

Youth Corps: 313

Republic of Korea Army. See also National Police,

ROK, plans for.

I Corps: 189, 195, 202-06, 216, 232, 236, 266, 363-

64

II Corps: 206, 234-35, 257, 274

III Corps: 339-40, 363-64

1st Division: 204-05, 233-35

3d Division: 195, 301

6th Division: 234-35

26th Regiment: 236

air-naval support as precedent: 70

air units, MacArthur on need for: 34-35

aircraft strength: 40
INDEX 435

Republic of Korea Army—Continued

ammunition supplies to: 35, 66

arming of: 65-67, 313, 394n

artillery strength: 40

artillery transferred to: 35

attached to U.S. units: 167-68, 171-72, 188, 239, 342-43

casualties: 235, 405

combat effectiveness: 39-40, 70-71, 191n, 205, 326,

394

defections to North: 38

early defeats: 82

expansion, equipping, and training: 32-33, 35,

168, 230, 313-14, 392, 394-96

intelligence reports from, distrust of: 64

KMAG with: 70, 80-81

matériel losses: 238

matériel supplied to: 35, 77

morale: 65

mortars transferred to: 35

motor vehicles transferred to: 35

rocket launchers transferred to: 35

troop units, control of: 188, 191n, 205-06, 215-16,

218, 381-82, 385

troop units, strength: 34, 40, 387

troop units, structure: 34, 40

U.S. aid in forming: 30-36

U.S. officers to command, proposed: 394-95

weapons transferred to: 35

withdrawal of, proposed: 312-13, 316, 323-24

Republic of Korea Marine Corps: 207

Research and development: 46

Reserve components. See also Army Reserve; National Guard.

recalls to active duty: 87

specialists recalled: 122, 131, 135-36

USMCR, levies on: 160-62

Retrograde movements. See Withdrawal operations.

Rhee, Syngman. See also Republic of Korea.

amnesty proclamation, plans for: 180

arrival in Korea: 19

assistance to ROK, assured of: 35-36

Communists, enmity toward: 20-21

elected chairman of ROK Assembly: 26-27

elected and inaugurated president: 26-28

elections, plans for: 180

heads provisional government: 5

invasion, fears of: 35-37

MacArthur, assigns control of ROKA to: 102

MacArthur, conference with: 74

MacArthur address to: 185

military assistance asked by: 33-36

and North Korea, jurisdiction over: 220-21

provisional government representative: 5, 14

Ridgway, relations with: 308

and ROK government, restoration of: 180, 184-87

and ROKA, expansion and training: 394-95

trusteeship, opposition to: 26

Rhee, Syngman—Continued

U.N., seeks admission to: 14

U.S. recognition and support sought: 14

U.S. troop units, appeals for: 29, 72

and U.S. troop units, withdrawal of: 395

Ridgway, General Matthew B.: 376. See also Eighth

Army; Far East Command (FEC); United Nations Command (UNC).

and airborne units, deployment of: 170-71

and airlift, supply by: 341-42

air-naval commitment, recalls: 70

and amphibious operations: 336, 397

and armistice proposals: 399-405

and Army expansion: 299

attrition tactics: 333-34, 361-64, 382, 396, 397

in AUDACIOUS: 364

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 380, 382, 385

and Chinese intervention: 298, 308-09

Collins, directives from: 383, 385

command authority: 381, 385

command roles, conflict in: 382-87

command roles, redefined: 396

commanders, directive to: 381-82

commands Eighth Army: 305-06

and continental China, operations against: 380,

386, 396

in COURAGEOUS: 362-63

in DAUNTLESS: 363

departure from Korea: 379

and DMZ, establishment of: 399-402, 404-05

and emergency declaration: 299

estimates of situation by: 105, 131, 335-36, 379-

82, 388-89, 398

and expansion of conflict: 381

and General Reserve, levies on: 91

Han River operations: 334-40

Inch'on operations: 308-09, 336

intelligence reports to: 308

and Japan, security of: 383-84, 386

JCS, directives from: 381-87, 395-96, 401-02

Joy, directive to: 382 at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 389, 397-404

in KILLER: 340

leadership, effect on troops: 327-28

limited offensives, directives on: 384-86, 397-99,

401-02

MacArthur, commendation by: 336, 348

MacArthur, relations with: 145-46, 167, 305-07,

378

and Manchuria, air operations against: 386

Marshall directives to: 383

military career: 306

mission as CINCUNC, evaluation of: 380, 382,

385-86

and morale: 390

and National Guard, levies on: 124

and naval operations: 336

North Korea, operations in: 361-64
436 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Ridgway, General Matthew B.—Continued

and objectives in Korea: 383-84, 397, 405

offensive, maintenance of: 308-10, 326, 331, 387,

402

and political settlement proposals: 390, 396, 400-

401

and power plants, preservation of: 380-81

press correspondents, statements to: 326, 340, 359-

60

and prisoners of war, disposition of: 381

and public reaction to armistice: 404

and Rashin, air operations against: 345, 380-81

and replacements, requisitions for: 130-32, 294,

384

Rhee, relations with: 308

in RIPPER: 354-55, 357

and ROK government, security of: 386

and ROKA, control of troops: 381-82, 385

and ROKA, effect of withdrawal plans on: 312

and ROKA, U.S. officers to command: 394-95

and ROKA expansion and training: 394-96

in RUGGED: 363

and security of plans and movements: 133, 340

Seoul, operations around: 308-10, 335-37, 354

and service units, reduction of: 342

and Soviet border, inviolability of: 380, 382, 385

and Soviet intervention: 381-83, 386

Stratemeyer, directive to: 382

supply system and operations: 341-42, 361-62

tactical plans: 308-09, 326, 333-38, 340, 348, 364,

378-80, 382, 387-89, 400-401

Taylor, directive from: 383, 385

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 335-38, 351,

353-54, 359-60, 379-82

in THUNDERBOLT: 333-34, 336

Truman, directive from: 383

and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378-79

Van Fleet, directive to: 381-82

victory, comment on possibility of: 399n

visits to combat areas: 388-89, 402-03

and withdrawal operations: 309-10, 312-14, 331,

364, 382-83, 386, 395

and Yalu, air operations around: 380-81

Riots, Communist-inspired: 25

RIPPER: 354-55, 357

Road systems: 191, 279, 335

Roberts, Brig. Gen. William L.: 34-35, 39

Rocket launchers

deficiencies in: 84

transfer to ROKA: 35

ROLL-UP: 58-59

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 7, 13

Roosevelt, Theodore: 4

ROUND-UP. See Han River.

Ruffner, Maj. Gen. Clark L.: 157-58, 164

RUGGED: 363

Rusk, Dean: 212, 242, 268, 359

Russia, imperial: 2-3. See also Soviet Union.

Russo-Japanese War: 3

Ryukyus Command (RYCOM): 49

Sakchu: 246

Sakhalin: 325

Samanko: 246

Samch'ok: 309-10

San Francisco Port of Embarkation: 229-30, 297

Sariwon: 188, 195-96

Sasebo: 93, 172

Seattle Port of Embarkation: 297

Sebald, William J.: 184

Secretary of the Air Force. See Finletter, Thomas K.

Secretary of the Army. See Army, Department of

the; Pace, Frank, Jr.; United States Army.

Secretary of Defense. See Johnson, Louis A.; Marshall, General of the Army George C.

Secretary of the Navy. See Kimball, Dan A.; Matthews, Francis P.

Secretary of State. See Acheson, Dean G.

Security measures: 133

Selective Service system in Army expansion: 120-24

Seoul: 67, 69-70, 82, 152, 196, 202. See also United

States Embassy, Seoul.

loss of forecast: 72

NKA advance on and seizure: 14, 70-72

in occupation priority: 7-8, 11, 14

population: 11

recovery of: 106, 139, 146, 149-52, 154, 173, 177,

184-85, 188-89

U.S. occupation of: 16

withdrawal to and from: 283-84, 290-91, 308-09,

335-37, 354

Seoul-Ch'orwon-Wonsan corridor: 190

Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on defensive line: 67, 69-70

Seoul-P'yongyang axis: 400

Seoul-Wonsan axis: 400

Service units

employment: 97-98, 342-43

ratio to combat units: 54

reduction of: 342-44

troop strength in FEC: 342

Seventh Fleet: 69, 73, 77, 367, 369. See also Struble,

Vice Adm. Arthur D.

Shanghai: 5

Sheetz, Maj. Gen. Josef R.: 49

Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. (USMC): 150, 155,

161-62, 172

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P. See also Navy, Department of the; United States Navy.

and Chinese intervention: 328

MacArthur, conference with: 149-51

and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 376

and Marine Corps troops, employment of: 160-64

and naval forces to halt invasion: 69

and replacements, problems of: 132

Seventh Fleet, orders move of: 69

and Soviet border, inviolability of: 279
INDEX 437

Shipping

Japan, contracted from: 209-10

requirements: 106-07, 300-301, 313

shortages in: 91

Shufeldt, Commodore Robert W.: 3-4

Signal Battalions, 4th and 101st: 134-36

Signal equipment, supply of: 208

Signal units, requisitions for: 134-35

Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95: 3

Sinuiju: 231, 239, 241-46

Sinup: 216n

Small arms. See Weapons.

Smith, Col. Aubrey D.: 158, 207

Smith, Lt. Col. Charles B.: 81. See also Task Force

Smith, USA.

Smith, H. Alexander: 365n

Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. (USMC)

and Inch'on operation: 147-49, 164, 172

MacArthur, conference with: 148

and Marine Corps troops, employment of: 164-65

and North Korea, operations in: 254-55, 261

and overoptimism in planning: 222n

in Wonsan operation: 206-07, 209

Sonch'on: 216

Songhyon-ni: 379

Songjin: 216

South Korea. See Korea; Republic of Korea.

Soviet Union. See also Malik, Jacob; Russia, imperial; Stalin, Joseph V.; Vishinsky, Andrei A.

aggressor resolution, vote against: 333

air violations of by USAF: 200-201, 247

arms and aircraft supplied to NKA: 37, 187-88,

208-09, 230-32, 247

blockade of China, attitude toward: 318

border, inviolability of: 279, 346-47, 372, 380,

382, 384-85

Communist China, relations with: 197, 201, 317,

320

concessions to, proposed: 7, 288

elections protested by: 26

entries by troops: 16

foreign policy toward: 286

and Formosa issue: 371

intentions in Korea, analysis of: 67-69, 104

intervention by, plans for meeting: 69, 75-77,

178-80, 182, 188-89, 199, 222, 253, 268-70, 286-

87, 298, 315, 325-26, 352, 381-83, 386, 391-92

invasion by NKA, role in: 61n, 178

Japan, enters war against: 8

Japan, threat to: 311

Korea, differences with U.S. over: 6-7, 23-25

Korea, policy on future of: 14, 19, 23-25

Korea invaded by: 8-11

liaison mission in ROK: 24

Manchuria occupied by: 10-11

military missions to NKA: 37

military strength: 41

NATO, threat to: 287

Soviet Union—Continued

NKA, influence on: 67, 75-76, 84-85

as nuclear power: 41

occupation by anticipated: 8

occupation zone defined: 11

POL supplies to NKA: 37

power plant flow cut by: 26

propaganda campaigns: 22, 25, 296, 347

provisional government, proposals for: 22

training of NKA by: 25

troop units withdrawn from North Korea: 24-

26, 29

trusteeship, agreement on: 21-22, 26

U.N. jurisdiction, objection to: 26

unification, opposition to: 22-23

U.S. calls on to intervene: 100

withdrawal proposed by: 28-29

Special Planning Staff, GHQ: 157-58

Special Reserve equipment stocks: 297

Specialists

requisitions for: 139, 155, 166-67

Reservists recalled: 122, 131, 135-36

Staffs. See Command and staff.

Stalin, Joseph V.: 9

and armistice proposal: 197

Hopkins, conferences with: 7, 13

Soviet occupation zone defined by: 11

trusteeship, agreement on: 7, 13

State, Department of. See also Acheson, Dean G.;

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

(SWNCC).

and armistice proposals: 290-91, 359

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 266-69

CINCUNC reports to UNO proposed by: 102-03

civil affairs, conduct of: 25, 221

and Communist China, admission to U.N.: 290-91

and continental China, operations against: 291,

332 courses of action considered: 349-51

DMZ, establishment proposed: 290-91

and expansion of conflict: 332

and Formosa, security of: 366-68

and Japanese contract shipping: 209-10

and Manchuria, air operations against: 235, 247

military assistance, role in: 117

military decisions, role in: 103-04

and national policy, clearance of statements on:

373

and North Korea, operations in: 193-94

and North Korea, withdrawal from: 290-91

and objectives in Korea: 181-82, 332, 349-51

and occupation troops, withdrawal of: 29-30

and political settlement proposals: 352, 357-59

and power plants, preservation of: 231-32

and Rashin, air operations against: 346-47

and ROK government, restoration of: 184-85

and ROKA, arming of: 67, 313

and Soviet border, inviolability of: 346-47
438 POLICY AND DIRECTION

State, Department of—Continued

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 351-54, 358

and U.K. concern over U.S. policies: 289-90

and withdrawal operations: 395

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

(SANACC): 49-50

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC):

9-10, 49-50

Strategic air operations: 108, 110, 112, 137, 241-44,

246-47, 249, 272, 277-78, 286, 300, 321, 329, 345. See also Air operations.

Air Force concept: 109-10

B-29 aircraft in: 241-44

central control lacking: 108

against Communist China, proposed: 283-84, 289,

292, 320

by Far East Air Forces: 241-44

GHQ Target Group, practice by: 110

in Inch'on operation: 146, 151-52

JCS directives on: 73, 76-77

against Manchuria, proposed: 241-46, 251, 272-73,

277-78, 281, 283-84, 291, 320-25, 338-39, 351

by Navy: 246

in North Korea: 281

against Soviet Union, proposed: 321

along Yalu, proposed: 241-46, 273

Stratemeyer, Lt. Gen. George E. (USAF). See also

Far East Air Forces (FEAF).

and air operations, control by: 108-09

air operations, plans for: 110-11

and airlift, supply by: 258, 341-42

and ammunition supply: 229

and Chinese intervention: 230-31

Collins, conference with: 283-84

commands FEAF: 49

and engineer troops, use of: 342

and Inch'on operation: 152

MacArthur, conference with: 188

and power plants, bombardment of: 348

and Rashin, bombardment of: 346

Ridgway, directive from: 382

and strategic air operations: 110, 241-42, 243n,

272

Struble, Vice Adm. Arthur D.

Chiang, conference with: 368

commands Joint Task Force Seven and Seventh

Fleet: 172

and Inch'on operation: 172

MacArthur, commended by: 348

MacArthur, conference with: 149

and Marine Corps troops, employment of: 164-65

and Wonsan operation: 208, 216-17, 219

Sudong: 236

Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant: 231, 241

Sukch'on: 215-16, 283

Sukhaya Rechk: 200-201

Sunch'on: 215-16, 283

Supply system and operations: 158, 190-91, 195,

229-30, 257-59, 263, 265, 297, 335, 341-42, 360-

62, 363. See also Logistical system and operations; Matériel.

by airlift: 195, 235, 257-58, 301, 341-42

of ammunition: 229-30, 236, 257

in Eighth Army: 398

FEC stocks, daily levels: 59

at Inch'on: 173-74

in North Korea operations: 281, 363-64

ration supply: 207-08

reduction, plans for: 222, 232

requisitions for: 81-86, 228-30, 297

shortages: 202

in UNC augmentation: 356

Supply system and operations, enemy: 261-62, 272-

73, 279-81, 340, 346-48, 384, 398-99, 403

Support units. See Service units; and by type and

name.

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP): 48.

See also MacArthur, General of the Army

Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B.

"Supreme People's Assembly": 40

Surplus Property Act: 35

Surprise, application of: 173

Surprise, application by enemy: 62, 235, 275

Surrender demand by UNC: 186-88, 193, 195, 203-

04

Suwon: 71-72, 74, 80-81, 106, 173, 326, 333-34

Sweden: 266

Tactical air operations: 109-10, 173, 215-16, 307.

See also Air operations. concept of: 110

diversion of bombers to: 109-10, 241-44

in Inch'on operation: 146, 152

at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 398

by Marine Corps and Navy: 216, 303-04

in North Korea operations: 272

in withdrawal operations: 303-04

Tactical air operations, enemy: 61

Taebaek Ridge: 86, 191, 236, 279, 381

Taegu: 82, 111-12, 125, 326

Taejon: 82, 86, 111-13, 141, 142, 143, 177

Taejon-Taegu line: 143

Taejon-Taegu-Suwon line: 146, 152

Taft, William Howard: 4

Taiwan. See China, Nationalist; Formosa.

Tank Battalions: 94

Tank support: 82, 175, 326, 338, 387-88

Tank support, enemy: 236

Tank units

NKA strength: 39

requisitions for: 92-93

shortages of: 89

Tanks employment, advice against use: 36

number serviceable: 46
INDEX 439

Tanks—Continued

reclamation and supply: 59

supply to Eighth Army: 297

Tanks, enemy: 39, 82, 84

Tanyang: 86

Task Force 77, USN: 108

Task Force 90, USN: 209

Task Force Smith, USA: 81-82

Tass news agency: 22

Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 351

and Han River operations: 338-39

limited directives, directive on: 401n

and power plants, preservation of: 348

and Rashin, bombardment of: 347

Ridgway, directives to: 383, 385

and RIPPER: 354-55

and U.N. troops, requisitions for: 356

Technical services units. See Service units; and by

type and name.

Technicians. See Specialists.

Terrain, effect on operations: 1-2, 191, 270, 280-81,

335, 341-42, 363-64, 398-99

Thailand: 225

38th Parallel

operations around: 335-38, 351-54, 358-60, 379-

82, 396

origin as demarcation line: 9-11

topography and communication lines: 11

THUNDERBOLT: 333-34, 336

Tides, effect on operations: 140-47

Toksil-li: 216

Tokyo

conference at: 278-82 as FEC headquarters: 49

in occupation priority: 7

Topography. See Terrain, effect on operations.

Training

airborne units: 169-70

for airlift: 57

for amphibious operations: 57

FEAF program: 54-58

for Inch'on: 159

MacArthur, directives on: 130, 165-66, 168

in NavFFE: 55

in North Korean Army: 36-37

realism applied: 159

X Corps program: 159

Walker, role in: 165-66

Transport aircraft, shortage of: 88

Transportation units, requisitions for: 98

Trans-Siberia railroad: 321

Treasury, Department of the: 318

Troop units. See also Replacements; also by type

and name.

Army Reserve strength: 121

Asiatic, employment proposed: 193-94

Australian, deployment of: 225, 227, 356-57

Belgian, deployment of: 225, 227

Troop units—Continued

Canadian, deployment of: 225, 227, 356-57

combat to service, ratio of: 54

combat-ready troops, requisitions for: 92-99

Communist China, deployment of: 179, 222n, 233-34

decision to commit: 79, 80

Eighth Army strength: 52, 54, 342-44

enemy strength: 36-37, 212-14, 241, 244-45, 259n,

260, 274-77, 280-81, 364, 380, 384-85, 387, 405

estimates of needs: 107-08

EUCOM, deployment to: 223, 286

EUCOM strength: 45

FEAF strength: 52-53, 196

FEC, quality of: 55-57

FEC, strength and turnover: 43-45, 52-55, 89-92,

230

FEC, structure in: 49, 53-54

French, deployment of: 225, 227

General Reserve strength: 44-45, 118

Greek, deployment of: 225, 227, 356

infantry shortages in FEC: 89

Latin America, deployment of: 356-57

Marine Corps. See United States Marine Corps,

military missions, strength in: 43

movement, security of: 133, 340

Nationalist China, use proposed: 116-17, 283-84,

295-96, 319-21, 329

Netherlands, deployment of: 225, 227

New Zealand, deployment of: 225, 227, 356-57

NKA structure: 39

occupation forces withdrawn: 30

PACOM strength: 43

Philippines, deployment of: 227-28, 356

reductions, protested and justified: 52-53

requisitions for: 78-79, 80, 83-86, 106-08, 118

ROKA, control of: 205-06, 218, 381-82, 385

ROKA strength: 34, 40, 387

ROKA structure: 34, 40

service units, reduction of: 343-44

Thai, deployment of: 225

Turkey, deployment of: 225, 356

U.K., deployment and withdrawal: 224-25, 227-

28, 356-57

UNC, number employed: 117, 196, 225, 230, 405

UNC, requisitions for: 224-28, 237-38, 344, 356-

57, 384

UNC, withdrawal of: 222

U.S., withdrawal of: 28-30, 395

U.S. strength: 25, 45, 52-53, 86, 123, 221

withdrawal of demanded by Soviet Union: 26

Trucks. See Motor vehicles.

Truman, Harry S.

advisers, reliance on: 177-79

and aggression, U.S. attitude toward: 292

air-naval commitment approved by: 69, 73

air operations, directive on: 76

and armistice proposals: 287, 292-93, 403
440 POLICY AND DIRECTION

Truman, Harry S.—Continued

Army expansion approved by: 119-20

Army Reserve, call-up by: 88

and atomic bomb, potential use: 288

Attlee, conference with: 288-93

and blockade of China: 102

in chain of authority: 42

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249

and Chinese intervention: 198, 200-202, 231, 252,

285-86

civil affairs, transfers from military: 25

and collective security, need for: 333

Collins, conference with: 79

as Commander in Chief: 79

and Communist China, admission to U.N.: 292-93

and Communist China, concessions to: 292-93

and Communist China, recognition of: 332-33

and Communist China as aggressor: 333

Communist China assets frozen by, 318

Communist expansion, determination to resist:

67n

Congressional approval unsought: 73

and continental China, operations against: 317-

18, 320-21, 324, 329-30, 369

defense officials, meetings with: 68-70, 72-74, 76

emergency declaration by: 299-300

and expansion of conflict: 317-18, 320-21, 324

and Formosa, security of: 366-71

and General Reserve, levies on: 93-94, 132

ground forces, decision to deploy: 79, 80

and Inch'on operation: 151n, 154

invasion, reaction to: 66

and Japanese surrender procedures: 10

Joseph W. Martin letter: 374

and Korea as strategic area: 50

and limited offensives: 402

MacArthur commended by: 185-86, 325

and MacArthur violation of directives: 359, 366-

67, 373-74

military-naval reinforcements ordered by: 69

and National Guard, levies on: 123-24

and national policy, clearance of statements on:

284, 324-25, 332-33, 349, 358-59, 366, 373

National Security Council, meeting with: 73

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 116, 320-21

and North Korea, drive on: 183n, 191

and North Korea, operations in: 282, 285-86

and objectives in Korea: 177, 179-82, 255-56, 349,

357-58, 393

and occupation, U.N. directives on: 220-21

Pleven, conference with: 332-33

and political settlement proposals: 357-59, 374,

393

Rhee, reassurance of assistance to: 35-36

Ridgway, directive to: 383

ROK, view on fall of: 67n

and ROKA, expansion and training: 394

and ROKA, withdrawal of: 313

Truman, Harry S.—Continued

and Soviet intentions, analysis of: 69

and Soviet intervention: 76, 286-87

and strategic air operations: 242-44, 246, 249

and UNO, military assistance from: 61

as UNO agent: 101

and U.S. as UNO agent: 317n

and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378

and VFW. MacArthur statement to: 370-71

at Wake Island conference: 210-14

and withdrawal operations: 30, 287, 292, 296n,

324-25

Trusteeship

agreement on: 7, 13, 21-22, 26

Communist support of in South Korea: 22

Nationalist China agreement on: 13, 26

opposition to in South Korea: 21-22, 26

Soviet agreement on: 7, 13, 21-22, 26

Tumen River: 245-46, 399n

Tunner, Maj. Gen. William H. (USAF): 258

Turkey

matériel losses by: 297

troop units, deployment of: 225, 356

Turner, Maj. Gen. Howard M. (USAF): 49. See

also Air Force, Thirteenth.

Uijongbu: 70-71, 308, 387-89

Uisong: 127

Underwater demolition teams: 148

Unification, proposed and opposed: 20-23

Unified commands: 43, 45, 47n, 48n

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). See

Russia, imperial; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph

V.

United Kingdom. See also Attlee, Clement R.;

Bevin, Ernest.

8th Hussars: 224-25

27th Infantry Brigade: 204-05, 227

29th Infantry Brigade: 224-25, 227-28

and blockade of China: 318

and Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249, 267

and Chinese intervention: 251

MacArthur, attitude toward: 251, 288, 290, 365-

66, 372

military assistance from: 115

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 296

and objectives in Korea: 292-93

and political settlement proposals: 360-61

and strategic air operations: 242-43

troop units, deployment and withdrawal: 224-

25, 227-28, 356-57

trusteeship, view on: 13, 26

UNO agent, introduces resolution on: 101

U.S., relations with: 331

U.S. policies, concern over: 289-93
INDEX 441

United Nations Command (UNC). See also MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B.

activated: 103

casualties: 238, 405

and Chinese troops, reports on: 199-200

and CINC, reports from: 102-03

CINC, U.S. asked to appoint: 101-02

evacuation of Korea considered: 289, 290

FEC staff doubles for: 103

JCS opposes committee command: 101

MacArthur named CINC: 102

objectives attained: 405-06

supply in augmentation of: 356

troop units, number employed: 117, 405

troop units, withdrawal of: 222

troop units strength: 196, 225, 230, 405

UNC-ROKA forces, control of: 215-18

United Nations Organization (UNO)

aggressor resolution, vote on: 332-33

and armistice proposals: 288-90, 331, 333

and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249, 268

Commission in Korea (UNCOK): 194

Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation

of Korea (UNCURK): 194, 212, 220, 231-32, 269

Committee on Coordination of Assistance for

Korea (CCAK): 100-101

Committee of Good Offices: 360

Communist China, admission proposed: 197, 290-

93, 331

and Communist Chinese intervention: 242, 266-

67

and continental China, operations against: 317,

320

DMZ, proposals for: 290

elections, supervision of: 219-20, 269, 331

Far East problems, conference to settle: 331

and Formosa issue: 369-71

France introduces agent resolution: 101

invasion, reaction to: 66-67

JCS as agent for: 101-03, 243

joint action, resolution on: 73-74, 100-102, 177-

78, 185, 369-71

joint action, U.S. proposal for: 68, 73, 100

jurisdiction protested by USSR: 26

Korean stability, resolution on: 193-94

Malik proposal rejected: 197

military assistance from: 61, 115-17

and Nationalist China, use of troops: 319

objectives in Korea: 349, 392

occupation, control by: 219-21

occupation, directives on: 220-21

occupation troops ordered withdrawn: 30

reports to, directive on: 102-03

ROK admission sought: 14

ROK appeals to: 73

seen as composing differences: 23

Soviet boycott of: 66, 101, 194

United Nations Organization (UNO)—Continued

Temporary Commission on Korea: 26, 40

and 38th Parallel, advance across: 351, 353

and troop units, control of: 103n

and troop units, requisitions for: 224-28, 237-38,

344, 356-57, 384

and Truman as Security Council agent: 101

U.K. introduces agent resolution: 101

U.S. action confirmed by: 73-74

U.S. as agent: 317n

U.S. brings problem to: 26

U.S. commitment without sanction of: 70, 73

and withdrawal operations: 331

United States. See also Roosevelt, Franklin D.;

Truman, Harry S.

and Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6

China territorial violation charged to: 197

and collective security: 41

communism, policy toward containing: 100

Communist China, recognition proposed: 292

elections proposed by: 26

Europe as chief interest: 41

independence, policy toward: 14

invasion plans: 8

Korea, relations with: 3-4

Korea, treaties with: 3

language barrier, effect of: 18-19

military assistance from: 35-36

military missions to ROK: 4, 29-30

military policy: 41-42

national defense, effect of commitment on: 104-05

Nationalist China, relations with: 319

nationals evacuated: 67-69, 71

NATO, role in: 41, 287

and objectives in Korea: 292, 349-50

occupation objective defined: 19

occupation zone defined: 11

policies, foreign concern over: 289-93

and provisional government, return of: 16, 22

ROK, recognition of: 14, 28

Soviet Union, calls on to intervene: 100

Soviet Union, differences with: 6-7, 23-25

trusteeship, agreement on: 21-22, 26

U.K., relations with: 331

U.N., problem brought to: 26

as U.N. agent: 317n

U.N. joint action proposed by: 68, 73, 100

U.N. sanctions action: 73-74

unification, proposals for: 20-23

United States Air Force. See also Air Force, Department of the; Far East Air Forces (FEAF); Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.

China, air violations of: 247

commitment proposed: 70, 73

no FEC staff representation: 108

GHQ, relations with: 47

intelligence reports, evaluation by: 63

Soviet territory, violations of: 200-201, 247
442 POLICY AND DIRECTION

United States Air Force—Continued

strategic air operations, concept of: 109-10

units, requisitions for: 239

United States Army. See also Army, Department of

the; Pace, Frank, Jr.; War Department.

ammunition stocks: 46

antiaircraft guns, stocks of: 46

Army area organization: 42n

Army Reserve, role in expansion of: 120-22

casualties: 405

combat effectiveness: 56-57, 282, 292, 322-23

Congress approves expansion: 120n

construction machinery stocks: 46

divisions, number in: 53

expansion and reduction: 118-22, 238, 297-99, 307-09

field artillery stocks: 46

Kim Il Sung on tactics of: 114n

Koreans, number attached to: 167-68, 171-72, 239

matériel, state of: 45-46

matériel, World War II, disposition of: 58

mobilization base, effect of levies on: 90-91

motor vehicles stocks: 46

national defense, structure in: 42-43

National Guard role in expansion: 120, 122-25

NSC, role in expansion: 298-99

radio stocks: 46

ROKA, officers to command: 394-95

Selective Service role in expansion: 120-24

strategic planning, post-World War II: 41-42

strength of, expansion and reduction: 46, 86-88,

119-20, 221-22, 239, 288, 299

tanks in stock: 46

troop strength, periodic: 43, 45, 53, 123, 221

weapons, deficiencies in: 86-87

weapons research and development: 46

United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK)

ADCOM, proposed merger with: 86

governmental authority ends: 28

Hodge succeeded by Coulter: 26-27

inactivated: 86

JCS, placed under control of: 25

United States Embassy, Seoul: 62-63, 65

United States Marine Corps

air support by: 216, 303-04

Reserve forces, levies on: 160-62

troop units, employment of: 92, 139, 142-43, 159-

65

troop units, strength: 86-87, 159-60

United States Navy. See also Kimball, Dan A.;

Naval Forces, Far East (NavFFE); Navy, Department of the; Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.

air support by: 216, 246, 303-04

commitment proposed: 70, 73

no FEC staff representation: 108

GHQ, relations with: 47

units, requisitions for: 239

Unity of command, principle exemplified: 114-17

Unsan: 235

U.S. News & World Report: 284, 371

Utchin: 152

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.

and amphibious operations: 397

arrival in Korea: 379

assignment of: 378-79

commands Eighth Army: 376, 378-79

and DMZ, establishment of: 399-400

estimate of situation by: 398

at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 380, 387-89, 398-403

and limited offensives: 398, 400-402

patrol bases, operations from: 387-88, 398

Ridgway, directives from: 381-82

and ROKA, control of troops: 382

and ROKA, expansion and training: 394

and ROKA, U.S. officers to command: 394-95

tactical plans: 379, 387-89, 397-98, 400-401

tank support, use of: 387-88

troops, number commanded by: 387

victory, comment on chances of: 339n

and withdrawal operations: 379-80

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.: 168, 330. See also Air

Force, Department of the.

and air forces to halt invasion: 69

and airlifts, plans for: 157

and airlifts, supply by: 258

Formosa, orders aircraft to: 69

and limited offensives: 401

MacArthur, conferences with: 105-06, 140, 325-27

and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 376

and reconnaissance, aerial and ground: 327

strategic air operations, concept of: 110

visits to combat areas: 108, 327

Veterans of Foreign Wars: 370-71

Vishinsky, Andrei A.: 371. See also Soviet Union.

Vladivostok: 188, 268, 279, 321, 325, 347

Volunteer Reserves. See Army Reserve.

Waegwan: 127, 202

Wake Island conference: 210-14, 218, 220, 222-23,

232, 371

Walker, General Walton H. See also Eighth Army.

Almond, conference with: 125

and ammunition supply: 229-30, 236, 257

and amphibious operations: 141n

Bolté, conference with: 237

and Chinese intervention: 235-36

Collins, conferences with: 137, 282-83

combat and training, dual role in: 165-66

commands Eighth Army: 49

commands EUSAK and Eighth Army Rear: 86

commands UNC ground forces: 196

commands U.S. ground forces: 86

death of: 305 enemy troop strength, estimates by: 274

ground units, deployment by: 91
INDEX 443

Walker, General Walton H.—Continued

Hickey, conferences with: 127, 129, 145

and Inch'on operation: 145, 153-54

and Kunsan operation: 176-77

MacArthur, relations with: 125-26, 188-90, 307

and Marine Corps troops, employment of: 164-65

and Naktong River operations: 145

North Korea, drive on: 183-84, 189-90, 195-96

North Korea, operations in: 202-14, 215, 234-36,

245, 257-60, 262, 266, 271-73, 274-75, 278-83

and Pusan operations: 113-14, 125-27, 131-32,

137-38, 144-46, 148, 151-54, 155, 162-64, 165n,

174-77, 283-84, 290, 300-301, 312, 314

and P'yongyang operations: 216, 218, 235-36, 304

replacements, requisitions for: 107-08, 137, 166

and ROKA troops, control of: 205-06

specialists, requisitions for: 166-67

supplies, requisitions for: 297

supply system and operations: 257-59

tactical plans: 125-27, 131-32, 257-59, 272, 304

Taejon-Taegu line, defense of: 143

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

withdrawal operations: 304-05

War Department: 25-26. See also Army, Department of the; State-War-Navy Coordinating

Committee.

Weapons. See also Matériel; also by name.

deficiencies in: 82, 84-87

nationalist China deficiencies: 320

reclamation and supply: 54-60

research and development in: 46

shortages: 54, 106

transfer to ROKA: 35

Weather, effect on operations: 191, 266, 272, 279,

341, 346, 363, 390, 398

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C.: 28, 37, 365n

Weible, Maj. Gen. Walter L.: 49, 136-37, 229-30.

See also Japan Logistical Command.

Weyland, Lt. Gen. Otto P. (USAF): 110-11

Whitney, Maj. Gen. Courtney: 161n, 212, 278-81,

335-36

Wiley, Alexander: 365n

Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A.

and air operations, control of: 110-11

Chinese troops, reports on: 179, 198-200, 233-34,

239-41, 259, 263, 273, 276-77

intelligence estimates and reports by: 62-64, 139-

40, 179, 202, 259-60, 263, 272-73, 274-77, 304-05,

337-38

North Korean troops, report on: 273

tactical exercise by: 159

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

Withdrawal operations: 30, 180, 222-30, 237, 254,

271, 287-92, 294, 296n, 298, 300-306, 309-14,

316-17, 321-25, 327-28, 331, 338-39, 364, 378-

80, 382-83, 386, 391, 395-96

air support of: 303-04

Withdrawal operations—Continued

by Communist Chinese: 389-90

doctrine lacking on: 301-02

ROKA, effect on: 323-24

WOLFHOUND: 326

Wolmi-do: 147, 173

Wonju: 340

Wonsan: 236, 397, 400

naval support at: 208, 216-17, 219

operations at: 141n, 187-91, 195-96, 202, 204-10,

212, 216-19, 232, 236

port operation: 206, 259

Wonsan Airfield: 216

Wonsan-P'yongyang road: 188

Wonsan-Yandok road: 263

Wright, Maj. Gen. Edwin K. See also Joint Strategic

Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG).

and airfields, defense of: 300

enemy troop strength, estimates by: 260

and GHQ Reserve, headquarters for: 155-57

and Hungnam operation: 205-06

and Inch'on operation: 139, 141n, 149, 176, 190n

and Koreans, attachment to U.S. units: 167

and Marine Corps units, employment of: 164-65

and North Korea, drive on: 187-89, 191

and North Korea, operations in: 260-63, 279

and strategic air operations: 277-78, 300

at Tokyo conference: 278-82

and withdrawal operations: 237, 300-301, 312-13

Wright, Col. William H. S.: 36

WYOMING line: 363-64, 379-80, 384, 386, 396, 397-

99, 401-03

Yalta Conference: 7

Yalu River, operations around: 179, 190, 197, 230-

31, 233-37, 240-47, 250-56, 257, 262, 265-66.

268-73, 274, 276-78, 287, 290, 347-48, 372, 380-

81, 399n

Yanggu: 379

Yangnung: 334-35

Yangp'yong: 340

Yangyang: 304, 361, 363, 380

Yellow Sea: 145, 146

Yesong River: 361, 363, 401-02

Yoju: 333

Yokohama: 172

Yonan Peninsula: 401-02

Yonch'on: 379-80

Yongch'on: 308

Yongdok: 127

Yongdong: 112-13

Yonghung-Taepyong-ni road: 263

Yongp'yong: 304, 334-35

Yongwol: 340

Yongwon: 188-89, 195-96, 216

Youth Corps, ROK: 313

Yugoslavia: 101, 333

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991 O 304-303