NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM JERMAINE FLETCHER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND PAROLE; SANDY JONES; KAREN CLIFFORD,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 21

- 35128
D.C. No. 1:18

- cv - 00267

- BLW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 11, 2023 Seattle, Washington Before: BYBEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG, * * District Judge. William Fletcher appeals the district court’s dismiss al with prejudice of his claims for damages against Karen Clifford, a Deputy manager of the Idaho

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

APR 20 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Department of Correction (IDOC) , and Sandy Jones, the Executive Director of the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole (ICPP) , alleging that h is due process r ights
were violated when he was classified and subjected to supervision and treat ment as a sex offender. Fletcher also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for those same defendants on his claim for injunctive relief . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Reviewing de novo, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc. , 847 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2017), we affirm

. 1

. I njunctive relief claim s . “[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the subj ection of [a] targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program . . . create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.” Neal v. Shimod a , 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, before a state classifies an individual as a sex offender and subjects him to sex

- offender treatment, the individual must be provided due
process. Id. at 829

– 31. Fletcher pleaded guilty to felony injury to a chi ld , which is not a sex offense.
See Idaho Code §§ 18

- 501, 18

- 8304. However, Fletcher’s amended information
detailed the sexual nature of his conduct underlying the charge , and he pleaded guilty to the offense as alleged in the amended information

. 1 Additionally, under the terms

1 Defendants’ request for judicial notice, D.E. 55, is GRANTED

. See Bennet v. Medtronic , Inc. , 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). However , t hat judicial3

of his plea agreement, Fletcher agreed to submit to a psych o sexual evaluation and
be amenable to treatment

. Thus , his actions during the plea proceedings undermine any argument that he did not receive the proces s that he was due. By knowingly and explicitly accepting evaluation and treatment , Fletcher also accepted the attendant stigma associated with that evaluation and treatment and affirmatively waived any further procedural protections required under Neal

. Se e United States v. Navarro

Botello , 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) ( “[I]t is not a due process violation for a defendant to waive constitutional rights as part of a plea bargain

. . . . ”)

. Accordingly , because the record establishes that Fletcher cannot show he was denied due process , we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Clifford and Jones on this ground

. 2

. D amages claims. 2 The district court dismissed Fletcher’s damages claims against Clifford and Jones with prejudice because they were asserted against
these defendants in their official capacity. See Shos h one - Bannock Tribes v. Fish &
Game Com m ’n , 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] claim for damages against
state off icials in their official capacities is plainly barred.”). Pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal reading of their complaint, notice of any perceived pleading

notice of these documents was not requested until the eve of oral argument was of great disservice to the court. W e caution counsel to provid e such judicially noticeable documen ts in a timely manner in the future

.

2 Fletcher does not challenge the dismissal of his claims against the IDOC or ICPP , only against the individual officials identified herein, Clifford and Jones

.4

defects, and an opportunity to amend unless it is clear that amendment would be
futile. Akhta r v. Mesa , 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). While t he district court failed to instruct Fletcher about his pleading deficiencies and grant him leave to
amend , we conclude that this was no t reversible error . A ny amendment would be futile given our concl usion that the terms of Fletcher’s plea agreement fatally
undermine his asserted d ue - process violation. See Parents for Privacy v. Barr , 949 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020) ( explaining that a dismissal with prejudice is proper
where it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by amendment).
AFFIRMED
.