BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

____________________________________ ) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for ) Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest ) Docket No. FAA-2009-1093 Requirements ) ____________________________________)

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL’S RESPONSE TO THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSO CIATION’S PETITION TO CONSIDER LATE-FILED COMMENTS

Captain Don Wykoff Chairman, ALPA National Flight Time/Duty Time Committee Air Line Pilots Association, International 1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (703) 689-2270

October 4, 20112 BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

____________________________________ ) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for ) Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest ) Docket No. FAA-2009-1093 Requirements ) ____________________________________)

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL’S RESPONSE TO THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSO CIATION’S PETITION TO CONSIDER LATE-FILED COMMENTS

The comment period on this Docket regardi ng Flight and Duty Limitations and Rest Requirements for flightcrew members closed on November 15, 2010. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) stated:

“...it will consider comments filed after th e comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without in curring expense or delay.”

The Air Transport Association (“ATA”) file d its late comment knowing that the rule which is in a final form is under review by th e Office of Management and Budget. What the ATA is seeking is to essentially go back to squa re one and start the process over in hopes that pilot fatigue will ultimately not be addressed in any substantive way. This is not a routine FAA rulemaking. It is being done because the Congres s of the United States mandated that the FAA publish a final rule by August 2011 to address the concerns about pilot fatigue. Congress made this rulemaking a priority as a result of the Colgan Air cras h. The ATA’s comments should not be allowed to further delay the publication of a fi nal flight limitations rule, which is overdue by two months.

Additionally, the ATA is speculating that this rule will impact jobs in an effort to further the commercial interests of their members. Neither the ATA nor any other non-government entity knows what changes the FAA made to th e proposed rule which may negate the ATA’s entire speculation regard ing costs and jobs. As ALPA ha s previously pointed out, by ATA’s own expert, 93.6% of their estimated cost would be alleviated if three items were adjusted, 1) schedule reliability; 2) flight duty peri od extensions and, 3) flight time limits.

If these provisions have been modified from the proposal then ATA’s comments are essentially moot. We will not know that until the final rule is published.3 Once the rule is published the ATA, if they believe portions of the rule need revisions, can always petition the FAA in the normal rulemaki ng process to change the rule to address any concerns they may have.

For the above reasons, the late comments submitt ed at this time should not be allowed to delay the issuance of a final flight li mitations rule as mandated by Congress.

In ALPA’s view, the issuance of a modern scie nce-based flight limitation rule is critical.

The issue of pilot fatigue and its impact on flight safety has been a matter of concern beginning in the 1930’s. Since the mid-1980’s wh en the domestic flight time rules were modified this concern has been increasingly urgent as aircraft became faster and more complex. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has de termined that air crewmember fatigue is a fundamental factor of flight safety and acknowledg ed that for several year s the flight time rules have needed to be updated.

Since 1985 when the last modification occu rred, there have been 17 accidents where fatigue was identified and discussed as a factor, (s ee attached list ). The accidents caused the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) to call for the modernization of the flight time rules of which many are over 60 years old. Huma n fatigue has been one of the NTSB’s most wanted aviation safety improvements since the in ception of the list in 1990. Since that time, there have been at least 14 hi gh profile aircraft accidents wh ere fatigue was identified or discussed as a factor or concer n in the accident. Most of th ese high profile accidents involved passenger carrying airlines. These high profile fatigue accidents cont inue to occur at an average rate of about one every two years. The most r ecent of these was the Colgan crash in February, 2009, where 50 people were killed.

The Colgan accident energized Congress to en act the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111- 216 (the Act), which directed the FAA among other things to:

“. . . issue regulations no la ter than August 1, 2011 to “specify limitations on the hours of flight and duty time allowed for pilots to ad dress problems relating to pilot fatigue.”

The Act directed the FAA to consider severa l factors that could impact pilot alertness including time of day, number of takeoffs and landings, crossing multiple time zones, and the effects of commuting. In addition, the agency was directed to review the available research on fatigue, sleep a nd rest requirements recommended by the NTSB and NASA, and applicable international standards. Finally, the agency was to explore alternate procedures to facilitate alertness in the cockpit, air carrier scheduling and attendance policies (including sick leave), and medical screening and treatment options.”

The FAA in response convened an Aviati on Rulemaking Committee (“ARC”) that was comprised of all segments of the airline industry. As a result of this effort the FAA issued a proposed flight limitations rule based on industr y advice and the latest sleep science.4 The FAA’s proposed rule is designed to increase the margin of safety for passengers traveling in Part 121 air carrier flights. The FAA has conducte d cost benefit analyses and concluded that the safety benefit outwe ighs the modest increased costs.

The ATA, as they have consistently done in the past, chooses to attempt to derail the rulemaking on the ground “it costs too much” and to ignore the need ed safety improvements this proposed regulation will provide. The ATA’s sugge stions as to the proj ected costs of safety regulations have been shown to ha ve been exaggerated in the past and its current efforts are more of the same. Congress has already directed that an improved rule should have been in place no later than August 1, 2011. There is no good reason to further delay this important safety measure and to continue to expose the traveling public an d airline employees to an increased risk of a fatigue related accident.

We note that just recently the ATA has jumped on the “jobs bandwagon” asserting that the proposed rule will result in a net job loss. (ATA OMB f iling, Sept. 17, 2011).

Oliver Wyman’s analysis, which was paid fo r by ATA, suggests that the change in flightcrew member duty and rest requirements will cost the mainline and cargo carriers an additional $1.96 billion dollars annually and approximately 26,700 jobs (over 4.5% of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (“BTS” ) stated scheduled passenger, charter and cargo airlines employee as of July 2011). Ignoring for the moment that $1.96B increase is likely grossly overstated (fifteen times higher than the FAA estimate) , the jobs impact seems highly suspect as well.

To put the estimated jobs impact in perspec tive, reviewing what happened with fuel costs and employment numbers over the la st few years can be very helpfu l. Consider in 2010 that the industry (US based passenger a nd all cargo airlines) spent approximately $6.5 billion dollars more on fuel than in 2009, yet in that same y ear BTS employment actua lly increased by .9% as revenue rebounded throughout the year . Looking at the year ending July 2011, the same trend is evident as fuel costs are up $7.4 billion, yet empl oyment is up 2.3%. Even if you consider the extreme spike in 2008 where fuel costs increas ed $15.9 billion compared to 2007, employment decreased 5.5%. In other words, it took an approximately eight times bigger cost increase to get similar job reduction to ATA’s forecast.

To further the point, consider that it woul d require an approximate $4.50/bbl change in the price of fuel to equate to Oliver Wyma n’s $2B per year estimated increase in costs (again ignoring that fact the number is likely significantly overstated) . A quick analysis of fuel prices over the last several years show s changes of that magnitude are very common and have even occurred daily on multiple occasions, yet the industry ha s added jobs over the last two years.T issue mo issuing t h

Attachm e T he Congres s

dern flight t i h e final rule

.

e nt s , the ICAO

, i me and res t

. , the NTSB a t rules base d

5 nd the flyi n on science.

Very truly y

Captain Do n Chairman, A Committe e Air Line Pi l 1625 Mass a Washingto n (703) 689- 2 n g public ha v

There sho u

y ours,

n Wykoff A LPA Nati o

e l ots Associ a

a chusetts A v

n , D.C. 200 3 2 270 v e all called

u ld be no fu r

o nal Flight T

a tion, Intern a

v e., N.W. 3 6 for the FA A

r ther delay i n

T ime/Duty T

a tional A to

n

T imeUS Carrier Accidents where pilot fatigue was discussed



## l2ll2l85 Newfoundland, Canada, Arrow 

### Air Flight 12S5 (DC-SXMilitary charter crashed on

takeoff after refueling stop killing all285 on board. Troops were members of the U.S. l.01" Airborne Division returning home for Christmas after performing intemational peacekeeping duties in Sinai)



### 01172189 Utah, Ports of Call Air (707)(Jnscheduled flight with 194 aboard collided with

terrain on landing, aircraft damaged, NTSB probable cause included discussion of pilot fatigue due to disrupted circadian rhythm) 

## fin8189 Hawaii, Aloha IslandAir Flight 

### l7n QA fahlities including 

### I from high school

teams)



### 04105191 Georgia, Atlantic Southeast X'Iight 

### 23tl Q3 fatalities including Sen. John Tower)


### 02115192 Ohio, 

### Air Transport International (3 fatalities, aircraft destroyed, crashed on 2od

attempt to land)



### 04129193 Arkansas, Continental Express Flight 2733 (aerodlynamic stall arising from in-flight

mismanagement by fatigued flight crew resulted in substantial engine damage and subsequent crash landing)



### 08118193 Guantanamo Bay, American International Cargo (Kalitta Air) (3 serious injuries,

aircraft destroyed)



### 02116195 Missouri, 

### Air Transport International Cargo (3 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)


### 04111196 Wyoming 2 fatalities resulted when a Cessna single engine airplane piloted by a7:

year old girl and her father crashed in an attenpt to set a coast to coast record


### 05111196 Florida, Valujet Flight 952 (DC9X110 fatalities, aircraft destroyed))


### 06101199 Arkansas, American Airlines Flight 1420 (MDSZ)(LLfatahties, 105 injuries, aircraft

destroyed)


### 07126/02 Florida, FedEx Flighr 1478 (8727)(3 injured, aircraft desfroyed)


### 10124104 California, MedFlight Learjet (5 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)


### 10119104 Missouri, American Connection Ftight 5966 (15 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)


### 021L8107 Ohio, Delta Connection Ftight 6488 (3 injuries, substantial damage)


### 04t12//07 Michigan, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 (substantial damage)


### 02112109 New York, Coþan Flight 3407 (50 fatzl, zircraft destroyed)