Cover

The Naval War College campus on

Coasters Harbor Island—a view from the

south. The buildings are, from left to

right, Pringle Hall, Luce Hall, McCarty

Little Hall, and Founders Hall (the original home of the College, now containing

the Museum and offices of the Maritime

History Department and of the Naval

War College Press). Above Luce Hall, to

the right of the cupola, is a portion of

Conolly Hall. In the foreground is Dewey

Field, site of June graduation exercises

and summer Navy Band concerts.
China’s Nuclear Force Modern

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

Lyle J. Goldstein, Editor, with Andr

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Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Twenty-two

2005

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy

Provost/Dean of Academics, Naval War College

Professor James F. Giblin, Jr.

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Dr. Kenneth H. Watman

Naval War College Press

Editor: Dr. Peter Dombrowski

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@nwc.navy.mil

Web: www.nwc.navy.mil/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Editor of the Naval War College Press. To

request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions to

the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

ISSN 1544-6824

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Contents

Foreword, by Peter Dombrowski 

Introduction, by Lyle J. Goldstein 

CHAPTER ONE China’s Nuclear Command

and Control 

by Stephen Polk

CHAPTER TWO China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent:

Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready? 

by Christopher McConnaughy

CHAPTER THREE China’s Space Development

and Nuclear Strategy 

by Dominic DeScisciolo

CHAPTER FOUR Chinese BMD Countermeasures:

Breaching America’s

Great Wall in Space? 

by Andrew Erickson

Conclusion, by Lyle J. Goldstein 

Endnotes 

Bibliography 

Abbreviations 

Contributors 

The Newport Papers 

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Foreword

The Naval War College has expanded its expertise in the Asia-Pacific Rim region in 

cent years largely in response to the growing significance of the region to U.S. nati

security. The College has actively hired prominent scholars and hosted a number o

ferences, workshops, and guest speakers focusing on the problems and possibilities 

the Pacific Rim. South and Northeast Asia, after all, are home to some of the world

est-growing economies and close American allies, as well as several potential pol

and diplomatic flashpoints. Even more to the point, China is an ascending econo

and military power both in the region and on the world stage. The U.S. Navy pla

leading role in maintaining stability in the region with its strong presence and ab

guard the freedom of navigation in vital sea lines of communication.

The efforts of the Asia-Pacific Rim specialists at the Naval War College in some w

represent a case of “back to the future.” One of the proudest episodes in the Coll

history came in the 1930s when Newport played a central role in developing the 

tary plans necessary to cope with the ascendance of another Asian economic and 

tary power—Japan. Although we expect that wise diplomacy and national self-in

will prevent a reoccurrence of similar difficulties in the coming decades, there is 

substitute for military preparedness and well-thought-out international and reg

strategies for dealing with the important region. The Naval War College Press ha

its part in providing its readers with many excellent articles on regional security 

in the Naval War College Review; an important book—Jonathan Pollack, editor, 

gic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century (released Mar

2004); and now Newport Paper 22.

Professor Lyle Goldstein of the Strategic Research Department of the College’s C

for Naval Warfare Studies has been at the forefront of recent research into China

ture. In this project he has guided a handful of naval officers through the puzzle 

China’s ongoing nuclear modernization programs. With the able assistance of A

Erickson, these sailor-scholars have examined various aspects of nuclear modern

tion from ballistic missile defense to nuclear command and control. In general th

chapter tells a cautionary tale; the progress of China’s nuclear modernization do

mented here should give pause to those inclined to dismiss China’s military mod

ization. Steadily and with relatively little attention the People’s Republic continu

improve its technologies and weapons systems. As the authors emphasize, no

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U.S. Navy as now constituted would find challenging indeed.

We can look forward in the coming years to still more research and analysis of China’s

reemergence in global politics from the Naval War College. Professor Goldstein, his

colleagues, and the students from all U.S. military services will be closely observing the

changing politics, economics, and security arrangements across the Pacific in the coming years. The Naval War College Press stands ready as always to help publish such pro

jects in the interests of the U.S. Navy, the American national security community, and

interested parties across the globe.

PETER DOMBROWSKI

Editor, Naval War College Press

Newport, Rhode Island

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Introduction

LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN

Relations between Washington and Beijing improved swiftly in the wake of the 9

terrorist attacks, especially in comparison to the nadir that had been reached du

the April 2001 EP-3 incident.1

This new tide of cooperation has included

counterterrorism initiatives, regional partnership in such complex situations as A

ghanistan and North Korea, and even some modest agreement on the importanc

maintaining the status quo with respect to Taiwan’s status.2

A strong foundation for this strategic cooperation is, of course, a burgeoning tra

lationship, which received a further boost from China’s entry into the World Tra

ganization in November 2001. In 2003, trade between the United States and Chin

amounted to $191.7 billion, up 23.2 percent from 2002. Remarkably, the total fo

was more than double the figure for 1998. The United States is China’s second m

important trading partner nation (Japan is first).3

Many reasonable strategists, o

ing this data, consider armed conflict between Washington and Beijing impossible

the economic losses that both would incur almost immediately. Unfortunately, his

has not been kind to the school of theorizing, known as commercial liberalism, wh

holds that economic interdependence prevents conflict. Indeed, the belligerent pow

prior to both world wars had achieved impressive levels of economic interdepende

Despite noteworthy progress in since 2001 in relations between the United State

the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there are lingering tensions and disquietin

signs that possible difficulties may loom on the horizon. Concerning the volatile 

wan issue, assertive moves toward independence by Taipei (concerning, for exam

the “peace referendum,” constitutional reform, the flag, and names of diplomati

ties) in 2003–2004 prompted a series of relatively open rebukes from Washingto

which seeks strict adherence to the status quo by both Taipei and Beijing.5

If the 

pected defeat of the pro-independence forces in the December 2004 Taiwan parl

tary elections offered hope for a stabilizing cross-Strait situation, this optimism 

quickly tempered by Beijing’s pronouncement that the National People’s Congre

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Notes
cursor for a firmer line by China against Taiwan.

Even aside from this thorny issue, some sensed an increasing rivalry in the 2004 APEC

(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference. President George W. Bush’s arrival in

Santiago, Chile, prompted violent public protests and a rather serious diplomatic blun

der;6

President Hu Jintao of the PRC, in contrast, made successful visits to both Argentina and Brazil, as well as Cuba.7

More significantly, bilateral cooperation on the is

sue of North Korea also appeared to be essentially stalled in 2004. Likewise, major

differences appeared to be emerging in Sino-American relations regarding policy

toward Iran.8

Indeed, the prospect for strategic rivalry between the United States and China in the

twenty-first century and beyond remains—and certainly cannot be ruled out. There is

deep unease in the United States concerning Beijing’s lack of progress in the arena of

political reform and a trade deficit that is said to threaten U.S. manufacturing jobs, no

to mention the seemingly accelerating pace of China’s military modernization. Suspicion is also palpable on the Chinese side, where it is feared that the “War on Terror” is

simply a cover for policies that justify increases in American military expenditures that

could in turn enable Washington to cement its position of global hegemony. Given the

persistence of these underlying tensions and suspicions, it is simply prudent for U.S.

analysts to observe closely China’s military modernization and the strategic implications that could follow from its true emergence as a major power.

PRC military modernization has received ample attention during the last decade, and

these studies show a pattern of increasing sophistication. However, China’s nuclear

modernization is one neglected component of Beijing’s broad effort to improve its

armed forces. Certainly, this is largely the result of the extreme opacity of the data

available on Chinese nuclear forces and their future development. Another explanation

could be perplexity concerning the overall significance of a nuclear force that is so different from that of the United States.

This study comes at an opportune moment, insofar as China’s nuclear forces appear to

be on the threshold of a new qualitative level. According to the 2003–2004 issue of the

IISS Military Balance, one brigade (eight missiles) of the long-anticipated DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is now deployed, with more presumably to follow

in relatively short order.9

One gains some appreciation of Beijing’s perspective on the

significance of this new weapons system when one realizes that the Chinese first revealed it to the world on 1 October 1999, the fiftieth anniversary of the communist

state.10 While this is not the first road-mobile, solid-fuel missile deployed by China, it i

the first one capable of striking the continental United States. A related major

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Notes
development in late 2004 was the revelation in the U.S. media that the first of Ch

second-generation nuclear missile submarines, called Type 094, had been launch

July 2004.11 As a platform for the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM), the 094 may well be able to strike the continental United States from Ch

territorial waters. For China, these are very significant, if long anticipated, steps 

finally establishing credible nuclear deterrence. It is also notable, from the stand

of China’s nuclear weapons policy, that during the reform of the Central Militar

mission in September 2004 the commanders of both the Second Artillery Corps 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were, along with the Air Force, accor

new seats the CMC, in China’s highest military decision-making body.

At the same time, rather wide disagreement remains among American analysts a

military strategists regarding the meaning of China’s nuclear modernization for 

China relations. Some have asserted that nuclear weapons are the best guarantee 

peace and stability for Washington and Beijing. These weapons help to stabilize t

lationship, so the logic goes, because they infuse each side with extreme caution; 

close observer of Chinese nuclear strategy goes so far as to describe this conditio

“nuclear peace.”12 A second school of thought holds that China’s arsenal will rem

relatively small and primitive. In such circumstances, Beijing’s nuclear weapons w

be either wholly irrelevant to U.S.-China strategic interaction or even give Wash

a tool for pressuring Beijing. This rather relaxed approach was implied by a 1995 

ment by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye: “If deterrence prevented 10,0

viet missiles from reaching the United States, it baffles me as to why it wouldn’t p

20 Chinese missiles from reaching Alaska.”13

Source: Chinese Defence Today

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Notes
China and also experts on nuclear strategy. Thomas Christensen and Richard Betts, for

example, have asked, “How would the U.S. respond if China used a nuclear weapon

against elements of the 7th Fleet in the context of a Taiwan scenario?”14 Brad Roberts

has conducted the most detailed and thoughtful research on this subject to date. Disturbingly, his 2001 study concludes: “It certainly also seems to be the case that nuclear

deterrence would be unreliable. Given the asymmetry of stake and [China’s] willingness to bear costs, U.S. nuclear threats may simply lack credibility in many phases of [a

U.S.-China] war.”15 He further observes: “In China there has been an active debate

about nuclear uses that might fall below Washington’s perceived retaliation threshold. . . 

In response to PRC escalation, some Chinese analysts argue that the U.S. does not have

many good response options.”16

Chinese strategists have openly discussed the “nuclear shadows on high-tech warfare.”

Thus, Major General Wu Jianguo, writing in the premier PLA journal Junshi Kexue

[Military Science], observes a new “flexibility of nuclear use in actual operations.” He

explains: “When countries possessing nuclear weapons and high-tech conventional

weapons are involved in a war in which the conflict is intensifying, the possible use of

nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.... [They are] still a trump card.” In the end, he

strenuously argues in favor of China’s nuclear modernization, citing Mao Zedong’s

metaphor, “What is he holding in his hand? It is a knife. What is the use of a knife? It can

kill a person. . . . The Chinese people also have hands, and they can hold knives too.”17

Given the concerns outlined above, this study examines select aspects of China’s nuclear modernization. It is deliberately not comprehensive. This topic is far too broad,

and the available data is not sufficiently reliable to allow complete and definitive judgments at this stage. We have elected to capitalize upon our own comparative advantage—that the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) teaches some of the nation’s most

promising graduate students in the field of national security studies. Unlike many

comparable civilian institutions, NWC students bring with them a “hands on” understanding of military operations and strategy. This study leans heavily on the military

experience of its authors.

Indeed, the backgrounds of the given students have had a major influence on the selection of topics for this study. Thus, Lieutenant Stephen Polk, USN, an aviator with extensive background in nuclear command and control (NC2), contributes the first essay, on

developments in Chinese NC2. Next, Lieutenant Chris McConnaughy, USN, a submariner with experience on strategic missile boats (SSBNs), describes the significance of the

recent launch of a new generation of Chinese SSBNs. The third paper, concerning the influence of China’s space program on strategic nuclear modernization, was written by

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Notes
USS Rentz (FFG 46) in the Pacific. The final essay, addressing the crucial topic of 

nese countermeasures against U.S. ballistic missile defense, was written by Andre

Erickson, a Princeton Ph.D. candidate with fluency in Chinese and specializing i

nese aerospace development.

Collectively, these researchers paint a portrait of a strategic modernization progr

that is making steady strides. Beijing appears determined to upgrade its nuclear 

ture, even as it simultaneously prepares for local war under high tech conditions

This study is intended to lay the essential foundation for further and deeper inve

tions into the U.S.-China nuclear relationship. In time, the issue may emerge as o

the most important quandaries confronting twenty-first-century strategists. It is 

doubtedly essential to the future shape of the U.S. Navy.

A number of people and institutions were crucial to this project and its complet

First and foremost were the contributors, who did not shy away from the intimid

and complex challenge that China poses for researchers. Their determined and d

plined efforts have paid off. A secondary goal of this project was to increase awar

of China among a select group of future U.S. military leaders (including the stud

authors), and in this it has undoubtedly succeeded. Thanks are also due to the au

families, who have graciously parted with their loved ones during many weekend

research and writing.

Andrew Erickson, in addition to his written contribution, superbly assisted the e

in the crucial final stages. This study additionally benefited from advice and con

tion from the faculty and leadership at NWC, including Captain Richard Suttie, 

Professors Stephen Downes-Martin, William Murray, Jonathan Pollack, Andrew 

and Peter Dombrowski. Professor Catherine Kelleher, Elizabeth Davis, and mem

the NWC Press provided invaluable support as well. Finally, and crucially, this pr

was partially funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to which the edito

presses particular thanks.

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China’s Nuclear Command and Control

STEPHEN POLK

Since China became a nuclear-weapons state in 1964, the intricacies of China’s n

forces and policies have proven mysterious to outsiders. There was only one nea

tainty: China would follow its own nuclear path, and one likely to depart signific

from the route taken by the superpowers during the Cold War. An independent 

nese path was clearly established with the announcement of a “no first use” polic

shortly after the first test in 1964. This defensive posture would eventually place 

cant pressure on both superpowers, as it spawned worldwide calls to limit the co

and dangerous nuclear arms race.

But today Beijing faces a dramatically different set of choices. No longer the scrapp

sider, China is now a “nuclear insider,” supporting many arms control initiatives, s

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Of much greater concern today, however, is th

China no longer faces the material constraints that once obliged it to build nuclear 

on a shoestring budget. Severe financial constraints required China to make a num

unique decisions regarding the structure and operations of its nuclear forces.

By contrast, contemporary China is able to lavish sizeable resources on its military 

ernization program. It is suggested that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Secon

tillery Corps is “clearly a favored force of the PLA, and can be expected to grow in

resources, personnel . . . and weaponry.”1

Indeed, the commander of the Second Ar

General Jing Zhiyuan, was accorded a special seat, along with those of the Navy an

Force, in the Central Military Commission in September 2004. Yet there is no cons

among Western analysts about where China’s nuclear modernization is headed.

The three chapters that follow examine the pace of China’s nuclear modernizatio

der the sea and in space, as well as its relationship to U.S. missile defense initiativ

This chapter will systematically evaluate the overall strategic integration of Chin

clear forces, focusing on the issue of nuclear command and control (NC2). Perh

even more than the companion papers in this volume, such an effort necessarily 

on a highly circumscribed data set. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus in secu

CHAPTER ONE

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Notes
trines that stand behind the weapons themselves. Indeed, at a time when there are dramatically diverging estimates concerning the future dimensions of China’s nuclear

forces, such a “software” approach may be most appropriate.

An NC2 Primer

U.S. military doctrine defines NC2 as “the exercise of authority and direction by the

President, as Commander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear

weapon operations of military forces”2

NC2 concerns not only the authority to execute

nuclear operations but also the mechanism by which that authority is transferred to

the forces that execute nuclear missions.

The essence of NC2, therefore, is in effect a simple network of communications links

and a delineated and recognized chain of command for the devolution of power. The

NC2 challenge is daunting, of course, because this network must be built to survive un

der the most stressful conditions imaginable—nuclear war. Indeed, NC2 is highly theo

retical discipline, because no such network has ever been put to a true test.

During the Cold War, the dilemmas associated with NC2 drove each of the superpowers toward “Strangelovian” extremes of contingency planning. In the 1950s, scrambling

to reduce its vulnerability to a perceived danger of a Soviet nuclear first strike, Washington built an enormous structure of early warning radars, in addition to the famous

North American Air Defense (NORAD) Command at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. Today, in the post–11 September world, the Cheyenne Mountain facility—with

blast doors that can withstand 1.5 million tons of TNT, three miles of tunnels, and fifteen large buildings, all inside a mountain atop more than a thousand large underground springs (enabling the base literally to bounce under impact)—is now enjoying

a revival of sorts. However, according to the criterion that applied when it was built—

ability to fight a nuclear war against the Soviet Union—the facility was virtually obsolete by the 1970s, when Soviet nuclear warheads achieved accuracy and yield sufficient

to destroy it. Eventually, U.S. command and control (C2) moved away from the strategy of “digging deep” toward dispersing NC2 units throughout the United States and

abroad on a rotating schedule of twenty-four-hour alert periods (often airborne). Soviet NC2 planning appears to have been no less strenuous and elaborate.3

Both sides genuinely feared the possibility of nuclear “decapitation”—that the other side

might be able to accomplish a “splendid first strike,” effectively disabling the adversary by

surprise. The most important element of such a blow would have been strikes against po

litical and military leadership. To kill the snake, it was reasoned, aim for the head. Such

concerns were not merely military “worst-casing” or even unchecked bureaucratic

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Notes
much more “rational” strategy than attrition warfare, under nuclear conditions.

Robust nuclear command and control during the Cold War was a requirement, t

fore, if only to prepare for a scenario that both sides deemed logical. The most im

tant goal of NC2 is to enhance survivability, preserving the ability to retaliate. On

confidence that an adversary is convinced that nuclear preemption—and especia

capitation—is impossible gives assurance that it will not resort to that strategy in 

sis. Thus, successful NC2 may be viewed as an essential foundation of “second-st

forces—that is, assured retaliation—and of strategic stability in general.

During the 1990s, academic discussion of nuclear proliferation brought forth an il

nating debate about the impact on strategic stability of potentially backward comm

and control arrangements in new nuclear states. Paralleling the prevailing logic of 

Cold War, “proliferation pessimists” argued that unstable civil-military relations o

tional deployments could result in “hair-trigger” postures, encouraging either pree

strikes or escalation. The “proliferation optimists” sought to allay such concerns, a

that NC2 for small arsenals and simple nuclear strategies was much simpler than f

huge arsenals and complex strategies of the superpowers.4

Today, since the dimens

China’s nuclear arsenal in some respects resemble more closely those of “emerging 

clear states” than of the superpowers, this debate remains highly relevant.

Also relevant are two specific objectives of any NC2 system. Preemptive strateg

short flight times, and immensely complicated warning networks prompted co

during the Cold War that nuclear hostilities might break out by accident. Scho

have revealed, for example, a number of potentially dangerous occurrences du

the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis—for example, a test launch of an intercontinent

listic missile (ICBM) from Vandenberg Air Force Base without specific author

from the Pentagon. Such an incident could have caused uncontrollable escalati

pecially if the Soviets had possessed better early warning data than was the cas

the time.5

Nuclear command and control, therefore, must minimize the risk of 

inadvertent escalation. Relatedly, it must also strive to eliminate the possibility 

“rogue” commander could gaining access to nuclear weapons. This problem is 

sidered to be most serious in states with unstable civil-military relations, but t

might be inherent in civil-military relations generally, if, as has been suggested 

some scholars, military officers tend to be more inclined to offensive doctrines 

their civilian counterparts.6

A third and final goal of any state’s NC2 is considerably more controversial—to 

hance the state’s capacity for not only nuclear coercion short of use (“muscle flex

but also limited nuclear warfare. Nuclear muscle flexing became a common featu

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Notes
of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States frequently resorted to movements of nuclear

forces, combined with presidential rhetoric, to convey its intentions and capabilities.

Such weapons movements require proper coordination if they are to send exactly the

right message—adequately ominous but not so threatening as to alienate world opinion or precipitate further escalation. The role of NC2 in a limited nuclear conflict

would be analogous, but several orders of magnitude more important. In such circumstances, if one can imagine them, there would be an extraordinary necessity to “signal”

effectively so as prevent an “all-out spasm of violence,” wherein both states launch all

their weapons. For example, a limited counterforce strategy (that is, against missile

launchers, etc.) could spiral out of control if “value” (that is, urban) targets were inadvertently struck instead through a failure of NC2. Under such circumstances, and depending on the magnitude of hostilities, control over one’s own forces could pose a

substantial challenge.

A paradox thus emerges for the role of NC2 within strategic rivalries. On the one hand

its complete development is clearly beneficial to all parties, since it increases survivabil

ity and prevents accidents, enhancing crisis stability. But on the other hand, robust

NC2 can also open the door to more complex forms of nuclear coercion, including

limited war, simply by improving the overall coordination, reliability, and effectiveness

of a state’s nuclear forces.

Historical Development of Chinese NC2

Chinese NC2 is a product of the broader Chinese experience with nuclear weapons,

and also with command and control in wartime. In its early history, the PRC was a frequent target of nuclear coercion: first in the Korean War, subsequently during the Taiwan Strait crises, and again during the 1969 Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, Chinese leader

had a close familiarity with nuclear threats—the limits of such pressure but also the in

herent possibilities for catastrophe. It is likely that these searing experiences, so proximate to the founding of the new state, had a powerful impact on the status of nuclear

weapons policy in the new state, a status today reflected in the very high profile of the

Second Artillery in Chinese military modernization. In its present relation to nuclear

weapons, Beijing might be compared to an adult who was abused as a child.

The PLA’s molding experiences under fire with respect to command and control

should also be briefly considered. In the Korean War, the young Chinese army fought

the United States to a draw, albeit at a horrendous cost in casualties. Major problems

with command and control surfaced during that conflict. Mao’s inclination to direct al

major operations personally despite his distance from the front (and consequent paucity of information) yielded in the spring of 1951 a debacle in which the PLA exceeded

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the previous winter. Other command and control failures in this conflict include

ability of units to communicate and coordinate across Korea’s difficult terrain an

a basic incapacity to coordinate warfare specialties, especially artillery and logist

with infantry.

The PLA proved fairly adept at correcting these mistakes during the stalemate th

lowed the initial Chinese thrusts.7

During the next significant armed conflict tha

Beijing faced, a successful border war with India in 1962, improved command an

trol arrangements served the PLA well in combat. Senior leaders made timely an

fective decisions, and regional commanders were given substantial leeway in exe

making well coordinated attacks.8

During the 1960s, Beijing proceeded with its nuclear weapons program mindful 

was vulnerable to decapitation. Before the development of an actual NC2 system

shal Nie Rongzhen, commander of the nuclear weapons project, dispersed scient

and laboratories so that they could not be eliminated in a single strike.9

The Seco

tillery, comprising the PRC’s “strategic rocket forces,” was founded in mid-1966, 

the Cultural Revolution was plunging China into a new period of turmoil. Thou

goals of the otherwise immensely wasteful “Third Front” were not entirely antith

to effective nuclear command and control, recent research by Nathan Busch pers

sively argues that great instability occurred in Chinese NC2 development during 

period.10 For instance, an unprecedented test of a missile armed with a nuclear w

on a flight path that took it over numerous population centers was executed in O

1966 under pressure from Red Guards, who supported an aggressive testing regim

dismissed the safety concerns of Nie, then de facto leader of the Second Artillery

strategic weapons test center at Lop Nur was threatened on two occasions during

1966–67 by forces external to China’s NC2 system, first by General Wang En-Ma

commander of the Xinjiang region, who had fallen into a serious dispute with M

The test center and its associated weapons were threatened once again when Ma

nephew Mao Yuanxin led a group of Red Guards across the country to assault Lo

Fortunately, these incidents were defused without any substantial breach.

Only three years after the Second Artillery was established, it faced a significant t

a major nuclear confrontation, the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969. Moscow m

specific nuclear threats, backed by operational preparations detected by U.S. inte

gence, strongly hinting at the possibility of exploiting the “opportunity” to destr

China’s nuclear arsenal before it could grow even more menacing. This episode r

mains much more murky than most other Cold War crises, making it difficult to 

the effectiveness of China’s early NC2. Preliminary evidence, however, suggests t

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Notes
haps the preeminent Russian expert on the crisis today, “Soviet intelligence possessed

the requisite targeting information to carry out a disarming first strike.”12 This is not

terribly surprising, given that the Soviets had helped build much of China’s nuclear

weapons infrastructure. Indeed, a substantial portion of that infrastructure had been

deliberately built near the border, so as to take full advantage of Soviet assistance programs, which were fully abandoned only in 1960. It is noteworthy that in the most detailed account published to date of the negotiations between Soviet premier Alexei

Kosygin and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai that eventually resolved the crisis, Zhou did

not highlight China’s nuclear capability but rather “conceded that China was incapable

of fighting a nuclear war because of the weakness of its arsenal.”13 The Chinese leadership took the extreme measure of evacuating senior personnel from Beijing and other

cities at the conclusion of the crisis, further suggesting the rudimentary state of the

state’s early warning capability and nuclear command and control.14 Indeed, the SinoSoviet crisis of 1969 was probably a “wake-up call,” following the ebullient optimism

that had flowed from China’s first nuclear test and subsequent successful testing regimen (which included thermonuclear detonations). This crisis appears to have brought

home to PRC strategic planners the fact that tests in and of themselves do not readily

translate into leverage in a severe crisis, whereas survivability and, perhaps above all,

robust NC2 are crucial.

It is likely that the 1969 crisis precipitated a major effort in these areas over the

course of the 1970s. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, testifying before Congress in 1974, “The Chinese are clearly sensitive to the importance of secondstrike capabilities and are making a considerable effort to minimize the vulnerability

of their strategic offensive forces.”15 One part of this effort was adopting a doctrine o

“in-cave storage/preparation and out-cave erection/filling/firing” for China’s medium range missiles, a step that was apparently ordered by Mao in May 1975.16According to John Lewis and Xue Litai, by the mid-1970s, “Chinese missile

commanders . . . and their leaders within official councils quietly expressed confidence that they now deployed a formidable and relatively invulnerable retaliatory ar

senal.”17 However, “in 1975, China dismissed the option of launch-on-warning

because it was unable to build a reliable early warning system.”18 Although research

on large phased-array radars (LPARs) appears to have begun in 1970, the program

did not yield results for more than a decade.19

The 1980s witnessed modest progress in modernizing China’s nuclear deterrent. To be

sure, there were some dramatic successes, such as the first successful launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1982. But severely depressed defense

funding, reflecting Deng Xiaoping’s determination to improve the Chinese economy,

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Notes
ceeded in launching its first communications satellite in 1984.20 The first LPAR a

to have been deployed by 1986, situated to warn of a Soviet attack.21 As of 1987, Beiji

still said to lack the permissive-action link (PAL) technology that is crucial for NC2.2

The Tiananmen Square crisis in June 1989 fueled questions regarding Chinese N

Specifically, there were signs of major fissures within the PLA. In fact, various re

figures within the Second Artillery itself, including both Nie Rongzhen and Zhan

Aiping, were said to oppose the use of force against the protesting students in th

square.23 It may have been concern about NC2 during the Tiananmen Square crisis 

later prompted Chinese leaders to express interest in American PAL technology in 

Chinese NC2 Today and Tomorrow

The 1990s witnessed a gradual but significant escalation in Chinese defense expe

ture. It is now apparent that in that decade and subsequently, China’s military m

ization effort has been both broad and deep. One expert on the PLA recently sug

that in the future we will look back on the present as a period of extraordinary g

in the PLA’s aptitude and capabilities.25 Not surprisingly, NC2 is improving in th

text of an extensive effort to revamp PLA command and control generally.

Nonetheless, it must be understood that Chinese NC2 is improving from a very 

level of development—one that might be described even as primitive. For most o

history, Chinese NC2 has had a fundamentally defensive orientation, relied on m

rather than technology, contended with unwieldy liquid-fueled missiles, stored w

heads and weapons separately, could expect little or no warning of an attack, rar

ercised its nascent sea-based deterrent, and assumed delay and extended reaction t

It seems, however, that most of these problems are today being solved, in the con

China’s nuclear modernization. Let us now turn to the most fundamental issues 

rently confronting Chinese NC2.

Who Has Final Release Authority?

China’s NC2 network appears to be highly centralized under the rubric of the Ce

Military Commission (CMC). The Second Artillery Corps is not a separate bran

the armed services, but it is said to have direct links with the CMC. Operational 

mand, however, apparently is exercised by the General Staff Directorate (GSD). A

cording to David Shambaugh:

It is not certain exactly how the communication to launch missiles is conveyed via the GSD, b

believed that there are also separate and secure communications lines from the CMC to Secon

lery headquarters and thence to all launch brigades. It is also understood that a launch brigad

receive separate communications from the CMC and GSD before a launch is authorized.26
CMC offices are apparently now located on the top floor of the new downtown Beijing

offices of the Ministry of Defense, which were completed in 2000.27 The GSD maintains a

hardened facility in Xishan (in the western suburbs of Beijing), from where the PLA lead

ership controls its strategic missile forces.28 All operational orders originate from there.29

The Second Artillery headquarters complex is located not far away, in Qinghe.30 Given th

increasing profile of China’s sea-based deterrent (see chapter 2), it is notable that seabased strategic systems do not seem to be under the command of the Second Artillery.31

In light of the heretofore rudimentary state of Chinese NC2, it is widely speculated tha

operational units have been given predelegated launch authority under certain

CCP Central Committee Politburo

Central Military Commission

(Party & State)

State Council

PLA Second

Artillery

PLA Navy PLA Air Force People's Armed

Police

Shenyang

MR

Lanzhou

MR

Chengdu

MR

Guangzhou

MR

Nanjing

MR

Jinan

MR

Beijing

MR

Military Districts and

Subdistricts

People's Armed

Forces Committee

People's Militia

PLA Ground

Forces

General Staff

Department

General Political

Department

General Logistics

Department

General Armaments

Department

National Defense Science

& Technology University

Academy of Military

Sciences

National Defense

University

State National Defense

Mobilization Commission

Ministry of National Defense

COSTIND

Source: “The Command Structure of the People’s Liberation Army,” figure in David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Pro

ress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 111.

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problem with low-tech, but politically reliable, “messengers” for launch authoriz

However, in terms of the chances of accidental nuclear war, such primitive NC2 

dures would be problematic.

A relatively new and potentially difficult issue concerns the continuing bifurcatio

military and political elites within China’s leadership. To a large extent, this tend

simply reflects the increased professionalization of the PLA over the last two dec

an evolution that clearly tends toward more effective NC2. However, a major pro

arose during 2002–2003 because China’s most senior leadership was split betwee

Politburo of the Central Committee, headed by President Hu Jintao, on the one 

and the CMC, chaired by ex-President Jiang Zemin. Jiang’s retirement from the C

Military Commission in September 2004 reduced the confusion, but the Politbu

mains almost entirely civilian in composition, while the CMC is almost entirely 

tary. There is as yet no fusion of military and civilian policy makers, as in the U.S

National Security Council. This bifurcation raises profound questions for the NC

structure, not all of which were resolved by Hu’s ascendance to chairmanship of the 

Apparently the differing roles of the Politburo and the CMC have caused command-

control friction before—for example, during the 1979 war with Vietnam.32

Alert Status

Beijing is deliberately opaque regarding all aspects of its nuclear force: quality; q

tity, and alert status. What is clear, however, is that the Chinese force has been an

mains significantly smaller than either the American or Soviet arsenals, even afte

major post–Cold War reductions by Washington and Moscow. Also Chinese nuc

weapons have traditionally been maintained on a much lower alert status.

In general, the missiles of the Second Artillery are neither fueled nor mated with nuc

warheads.33 Many are stored in caves or in silos. The DF-4 is stored in caves but evide

cannot be fueled there, because “the skin is too thin for it to be filled with propellant

this [horizontal] position without causing serious body damage.”34 The DF-5, which 

pable of striking the United States, is stored in silos. Aside from sta

hardening, these missiles are apparently protected by a large nu

of bogus silos that have been constructed as decoys.35 The DF-5 

pelled by storable liquid fuel, but this fuel is corrosive after twenty-four hours, for wh

reason the fuel is stored in tanks near the silos. Most of the Second Artillery’s curren

mobile weapons are tactical missiles. Regarding its perhaps 150 gravity bombs, it is 

whether they are distributed to bomber bases or kept in a c

stockpile. It is well known, however, that China’s single nuc

powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), the Xia, has r

DF-5 (East Wind)

Xia (Type 092, Xia Dynasty)

Notes
States. To do so, it would have to deploy to the central or eastern Pacific, a

its JL-1 missiles have a rather restricted range, 1,700 kilometers.36

However, major weapons systems now in the final stages of testing will dramatically alter the alert status of China’s nuclear forces. This “great leap” has been enabled by, on the one hand, miniaturization of the warheads, and on the other hand

by success with solid fuels. These advances have been incorporated into the new

road-mobile DF-31, which the PLA is now in the early stages of fielding. A truly in

tercontinental missile, the longer range version DF-31A (reportedly under development) will bring the continental United States into range from China itself.

Meanwhile, the extended range of a new, second-generation SLBM will allow

China’s new SSBNs (see chapter 2) to remain in the western Pacific, and perhaps

even permit the pierside shots of which Soviet SSBNs were capable by the end of

the Cold War.

Technology Upgrades

To network this new generation of advanced platforms, the PLA is fielding a panoply o

advanced communications technology. China has the capabilities and components of a

communications network: switching systems, fiber optics, satellite-to-ground and

ground-to-satellite communications, microwave communications, cellular telephones,

and pagers. Moreover, China has demonstrated at least partial capabilities in many important communications applications, including the ability to manufacture and deploy

JL-1 (Great Wave)

Xia, in distance, with a Kilo SS

Source: Chinese Defence Today

Notes
priority for the PLA in recent years.38 In 1997, the signal unit of the Second Artil

began preliminary deployment of digital microwave communications, further en

ing all-weather connectivity between units.39 New shortwave systems are now als

ing deployed in the Second Artillery.40

The Second Artillery has additionally undertaken significant efforts to develop a

“paperless” network-centric system for distributing information. This process of

“informatization” enables real-time monitoring of personnel, vehicles, support e

ment, and weapons systems. A massive effort to educate Second Artillery cadres 

computer technology has been required.41 Other expected advantages of the new 

tem may be accelerated training activities, more efficient logistics management, 

transmission of meteorological data, and reduced personnel at storage facilities.4

Communication satellites are a major priority for the PRC at present, and Chinese 

gic forces will no doubt benefit from this aspect of overall command and control m

ernization. In 1997 China successfully launched the first of its second-generation D

communications satellites. Apparently having a strong resemb

to the GE Astro Space 5000 series, this satellite represents a ma

improvement over its predecessors, with up to twenty-four tra

sponders with uplink/downlink frequencies of 6/4 gigahertz and an operational lif

eight years.43 Beijing put its first explicitly military communications satellite into o

January 2000, the Feng-Huo-1 (FH-1). According to one source, the PLA “has been 

the DFH series communications satellite as a part of its nationa

[command, control, communications, computers, and intelligen

systems for over a decade, but the FH series will provide new ca

ties, which will allow commanders to communicate with and share data with all fo

under joint command at a theater level.”44 A follow-on generation of communicati

ellites will enable the PLA to “transmit tailored data . . . maps, pictures, and enemy 

ployments . . . to hundreds of units simultaneously . . . without the need for groun

station rebroadcast.”45

Despite these advances, there is reason to believe that communications satellite p

duction capacity is insufficient to satisfy current and future demand. Therefore, 

continues to purchase foreign-built satellites and to lease capacity. In 2002 Beijin

tracted with a French company to build the Apstar-6 communication satellite, w

scheduled to be launched in April 2005.46 In addition, Israel will supply two satel

be received in 2005–2006.47

DFH-3 (East is Red)

Feng-Huo-1 (Beacon)

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Notes
A revolution in PLA training has gradually become evident over the last decade. Most

fundamentally, it has involved a transition from rote, scripted exercises to more objective “red-versus-blue” engagements that are designed to force commanders to adapt to

circumstances on the spot, and to spur the development of new doctrine and tactics.

The new approach is referred to as “confrontational training,” and it is no surprise tha

the elite Second Artillery has taken it up with vigor.48

Second Artillery training appears to occur regularly under challenging conditions—fo

example, in remote deployment areas or at night—under the guiding philosophy, “If

you fear risk on the training field, when it comes to the battlefield you might lose your

head.”49 Enhanced communications technology is playing an essential role. For example, increased connectivity has been crucial to the development of simulation technology, at a time when “10 thousand liang of gold is spent [for each] cannonball [that] is

fired.”50 A network or “online equipment clinic” linking maintenance battalions with

research institutes and manufacturers now enables “technical personnel . . . [to] . . . review the ‘medical history’ and prescribe the right medicine” to make speedy repairs.51

There is additionally a degree of recognition in the Second Artillery that the human di

mension should not be neglected in the vast effort to integrate information technology

into the force. Thus, noncommissioned officers have been singled out for special atten

tion in training regimens, and Second Artillery leaders have concerned themselves

about the psychological conditioning of their troops.52

A further, and essential, element of Second Artillery training is that no sharp separation exists within the corps between conventional-missile and nuclear-armed units. In

other words, the same command provides both the personnel who man the conventionally tipped short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan and the custodi

ans of China’s nuclear deterrent. Undoubtedly, the SRBM forces have proved an

invaluable teaching resource for the nuclear forces. Mobile SRBM units have been observed to operate at high tempo and with impressive levels of proficiency, stealth, and

readiness; one can reasonably assume that the lessons they learn spread rapidly and efficiently throughout the nuclear modernization process.

NC2 for SSBN Operations

To this point, this chapter has mainly addressed NC2 as a problem for the Second Artillery. However, as the next chapter will suggest, it is quite conceivable (contingent on the

success of the “094” project) that the sea leg of China’s nuclear triad will receive renewed

impetus in the new century. We now turn briefly to the specific problem of communicat

ing with strategic submarines.

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Notes
A long-range submarine communications tower proved to be a major bone of co

tion during the Sino-Soviet dispute of the late 1950s. Mao resented as high-hand

a request by Moscow to build a naval communications facility on Chinese sovere

territory. After the Soviet technical advisers withdrew from China in 1960, howe

Beijing pressed ahead with the long-wave station for its own use, using with mat

and plans left behind. This facility began routine communications with PLAN su

rines in mid-1965.53

PRC researchers apparently made good progress in very-low-frequency (VLF) co

nications; Mao himself approved the construction of an extremely high-powered 

station. Research was undertaken at Institute 722 in Wuhan, and completed in 1

soon “the navy felt confident that its headquarters could communicate by VLF w

strategic submarines in all proposed operating zones.”54 (Given the extremely lim

operations of the Xia over the last two decades, however, that supposition seems

doubtful.) Apparently anxious about the ability of advanced navies to home in o

transmission bursts, the PLAN also pursued “a high-powered microwave system 

could communicate via space satellites.”55 Accordingly, the General Staff and the 

were given highest priority for satellite channels when China launched its first se

communication satellites in the mid-1980s.56

Data on contemporary PLAN submarine communications practice is sparse. If C

goes the route of other submarine powers, it is likely to pursue total redundancy 

submarine command and control, relying on multiple means employing differen

physical principles. Extremely low frequency (ELF) communications have the ad

tage that messages can be received at depths of two to three hundred meters,

Source: Chinese Defence Today

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Notes
maximizing submarine stealth and survivability. There are major problems with ELF in

practice, however, and it is not clear that China has mastered that technology. In reality

most SSBN (peacetime) communications are, for efficiency’s sake, conducted by highfrequency and very-high-frequency radio; submarines receive messages at periscope

depth or by floated antennas. China will likely create a dedicated maritime aircraft

squadron for communications with its submarine fleet, if it has not already done so. A

lengthy profile in the Chinese journal of naval warfare, Jianchuan Zhishi, of the U.S.

“Take Charge and Move Out” (TACAMO) air fleet,

which supports American SSBN operations, supports

the general conclusion that Beijing is determined to per

fect its communications with its submarine fleet, as it launches a new generation of nu

clear vessels.57

Conclusion

It is evident that China now places a high priority on the command and control of its

military forces. This emphasis reflects not only careful analysis of American military

successes over the last decade but also occasionally painful lessons from China’s own

military history. Having a special sensitivity on nuclear matters that undoubtedly

springs from having itself been subjected to nuclear threats, Beijing is poised to adopt 

more robust NC2 posture.

There are very significant unknowns, one of them whether China will make the kind of

investments in early warning that would be consistent with a launch-on-warning doctrine. A plethora of new strategic platforms and capabilities (ranging from mobile, solidfueled ICBMs to a new generation of SSBNs), intensive training, and a wide variety of

new communications technologies, together imply a shift to that strategic posture.

Source: Chinese Defence Today

Jianchuan Zhishi (Shipping Knowledge)

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Notes
risk of accident, launch by rogue elements, or proliferation of technology to thir

ties is likely to be significantly reduced under the new, more sophisticated NC2 r

men. Conceivably, a Chinese nuclear deterrent that is more in conformity with

superpower or peer-competitor practices, one that moves from minimal deterren

credible deterrence, might make Beijing more amenable to arms control and mo

in its crisis behavior, based on observing the “principles” of mutually assured de

tion. What is troubling, however, is the possibility that a more muscular nuclear po

afforded additional flexibility by enhanced command and control, could encourag

nese proponents of nuclear coercive and even limited war-fighting strategies.

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China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent:

Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?

CHRISTOPHER MCCONNAUGHY

We will have to build nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 

MAO ZEDONG

There is a general consensus that China is rapidly modernizing is military. Howe

there is no clear consensus on what this modernization means to the United Stat

While some analysts argue that focusing on specific Chinese nuclear capabilities 

out looking at the nuclear strategy debate behind those capabilities is too narrow

some point capabilities must be reviewed to assess potential threats in order to p

a solid foundation for future force structure planning.2

China’s newest nuclear-pow

ballistic-missile submarine, known as the Type 094, is no exception. The revelati

the open press during the late fall 2004 that the first prototype had been launche

July of that year underlines the imperative for such analyses, although the boat i

yet operational;3

that is especially true given that “the advent of truly reliable S

capable of regular long patrols ...would revolutionize [China’s] second strike 

clear capabilities.”4

There are no absolutes in the world of international relations and politics. It is, t

fore, prudent to ask whether the United States will be prepared to counter given

weapon systems. Defense planners cannot sit on the sidelines and wait for the re

tion of a debate over a potential adversary’s intentions.

Under many circumstances, the deterrence provided by SSBNs is a significant an

credible strategic threat. From a purely military perspective, they have the capaci

quite literally, to change the world, by exacting severe destruction on whole socie

From a geopolitical perspective, by the threat of a strike from an SSBN skilled an

termined statesmen can force another state to deal with their own on a level play

field however backward their own economy and ideology may seem to the other

other words, a credible SSBN force could translate directly into political leverage 

CHAPTER TWO

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Notes
rines [has been] the chief objective of [the twentieth] century.”5All indications are

that this priority on nuclear submarines will continue and even accelerate in the

twenty-first century.

The United States advertises its ballistic-missile submarine fleet as the most survivable

component of its nuclear arsenal, and for good reason. Nuclear power enables ballistic

missile submarines to stay submerged for weeks and even months, the only limiting

factor being food for the crew. The submerged endurance of an SSBN allows it to patrol quietly in locations known only to its commanders, greatly complicating the track

ing problem for those interested in knowing where they operate.

In principle, there are two methods for neutralizing the threat from a submarinelaunched ballistic missile.6

The first is to employ a nuclear-powered attack submarine

(SSN) to track and trail an SSBN and, at the instigation of hostilities, to destroy it before it can launch its nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event of an unexpected missile

launch, the SSN would immediately eliminate the SSBN to prevent further launches.

This method requires having available a sufficient number of SSNs (relative to the

number of the enemy’s SSBNs) to devote to such an undersea warfare campaign. The

second method of countering SLBMs would be to establish a ballistic-missile-defense

system to destroy any missiles after their launch. Significant advantages that the SSN

enjoys over a ballistic-missile-defense system in this scenario include the facts that the

SSN is proven technology and does not have to contend with decoys deployed by the

ballistic missile.7

However, only a few nations, since the demise of the Soviet Union, possess the capability to track and trail an SSBN in blue water, and no nation can guarantee the destruction of intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight.8

SSBNs, accordingly, when properly

operated and supported, provide a very robust, highly assured second-strike—or even

preemptive nuclear strike—capability. For any state that seeks to have its voice heard in

the world and does not want to be subjected to nuclear coercion, SSBNs are prized

commodities—albeit so expensive that they are feasible only for the most determined

and advanced aspirants.

Much has been written within the last decade on China’s defense modernization, as if i

had only recently begun. To the contrary, while China’s defense modernization has not

progressed equally within all areas, and its pace has been inconsistent—with a more

rapid pace seen in the last decade, due to a newly opened intellectual climate and increased economic capacity—China has been modernizing and improving its strategic

nuclear forces since their inception over four decades ago. As the editors of a recent

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Notes
thing but stagnant.”9

China is only now reaching the point in the development of its nuclear arsenal th

can strike globally. The present articulation of the U.S. triad recognizes that toda

conventional capability—through better technology—may be able to accomplish 

would have previously required a nuclear strike.10 However, the United States can

lose sight of the fact that nations like China lack the awesome, global, convention

strike capability that the U.S. military enjoys and so still place significant empha

their strategic nuclear forces. China recently achieved a limited capability to thre

the continental United States from deep in the central Pacific. Now a new, more 

ble SSBN, with a new SLBM of far greater range and accuracy, will be able to stri

United States from the relative safety and security of proximate waters.

Still, it is easy to discount Chinese efforts at SSBN developm

and the threat that they may pose.11 Currently, the Xia—whi

recently emerged from an extended overhaul—is the only op

tional Chinese SSBN; The 094 is expected to become operational in the next few ye

contingent on the successful development of the JL-2 SLBM.12 Nevertheless, China

fense modernization must be viewed in terms of contemporary C

not the backward political and economic practices of the past; the 

of today is not that of yesteryear. China is enjoying a relatively sta

cial and political environment; its economy is thriving.13 In contrast with the perio

when China built its first generation of nuclear submarines, today its defense mod

tion is receiving a substantial amount of assistance from Russia. Naturally, China i

to play catch-up. The U.S. Navy already had a strong conventional submarine prog

when it made the decision to build nuclear-powered submarines, and only when it 

firm footing in nuclear propulsion did it embark on submarine-launched ballistic 

siles. China initially tried to do it all at the same time; now, however, it has emerge

those dark days.

There has been little written on China and its ballistic-missile submarine progra

which is not surprising, given its slow progress and how little information there 

upon which analysts can draw. In China’s Strategic Seapower, however, John Wils

Lewis and Xue Litai provide a remarkably detailed and insightful analysis into th

treme challenges that China’s nuclear-powered submarine (both SSN and SSBN) 

SLBM projects faced. Lewis and Xue’s work is a neglected resource that deserves 

careful attention of American naval strategists. It makes the divergence between the 

of the past and that of the future acutely clear. China’s capabilities are changing—fro

Xia (Type 092, Xia Dynasty)

JL-2 (Great Wave)

Notes
defense modernization efforts to the recent introduction of its newest nuclear-powered fast

attack submarine, to China’s first manned

space flight, to a more mobile, more secure,

and more lethal nuclear strike capability. The

China of tomorrow will be radically different.

China wants a secure nuclear-strike capability and to do this is investing in roadmobile ICBMs and SSBNs. In 1997, General Liu Huaqing of China’s Central Military Commission stated, “Fewer than ten

percent of China’s land-based missiles would

survive a large-scale nuclear first strike; the

less vulnerable SLBMs would preserve our

nuclear counterattack capabilities.”14 China is

displaying a patient and steady determination to produce a modern military with a viabl

and credible land-mobile and undersea nuclear deterrent that is worthy of focused study

This chapter is written in two basic sections that reflect the distinct dichotomy between

the struggling China of the past and the emerging powerhouse. The first part examine

the development of China’s nuclear-powered submarine program and, more specifically, the development of its first SSBN, the Xia. Relying heavily on the path-breaking

research of Lewis and Xue, it offers technical detail to illustrate the tremendous difficulties China experienced in the production of its first submarines. Some would argue

that it was an exhibition of gross incompetence in the Chinese defense industry; it

would be more accurate to say that these were the first faltering steps of amateurs, not

outright ineptitude. It is a safe and logical bet that Chinese technology will only continue to improve. The Xia experience was neither a great success nor a total failure.

Above all, it was a down payment on China’s robust nuclear future. Although the Xia

has, for the most part, remained alongside the pier, China is now in a position to capitalize on the investment; it now has an indigenous capability to design and construct

SSBNs and their SLBMs. China’s future in submarines looks bright.

The second part of the chapter is a look at what the future may bring if a Sino-U.S.

maritime and nuclear rivalry becomes more intense. Accordingly, it asks whether the

U.S. Navy will be prepared to resume a more aggressive strategic ASW posture in the

event that China does deploy a substantial SSBN force, as has been projected. Future

advances in Chinese attack submarines, improvements in the education and training o

Source: Chinese Defence Today

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Notes
ist today, the geographic constraints of the Asia-Pacific region, the decline of the 

Navy’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, and the expected reduction in t

number of American SSNs are all variables here. This chapter reaches the prelim

conclusion that the U.S. Navy will be ill prepared to execute strategic ASW again

China in the coming decades unless the atrophy of its ASW assets is not only sto

but reversed.

China’s First Generation SSBN: Failure or Foundation?

It is true that our country is very poor. But even a poor man nee

stick to drive away a dog.

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHEN YI

A Grand Vision

I felt that the Bureau of Ships had in the past been so restricted in their design studies by cont

tory instructions concerning characteristics that it was impossible for them to produce the bes

marines. . . . First, they designed a hull and then every person in the Department began to stuf

both ends. In the old days, design became a four ring [sic] circus. The Bureaus of Ordnance, E

neering, Navigation and Construction and Repair all vied with one another to get their own p

jects included.15

Rear Admiral Charles B. Momsen made this statement in 1948, during the design 

the USS Albacore, the U.S. Navy’s first submarine with a teardrop-shaped hull. H

servation reflects how bureaucratic organizations can unnecessarily complicate w

should, ideally, be a purely scientific endeavor. China’s first experiences in subma

design were different only in the extremes to which the domestic and organizatio

politics interfered.

The pace of the Chinese SSBN and SLBM programs has been excruciatingly slow 

Western standards. On the other hand, when viewed within the context of a deve

nation that at the beginning of its quest possessed only a rudimentary indigenou

fense industry and no capacity for nuclear reactor, submarine, or ballistic-missil

duction, the performance is rather remarkable. China has built—from square on

formidable, albeit still incomplete, military-industrial base in less than half the t

that the United States and other Western powers have had to develop their own.

Great Leap, Cultural Revolution, and Third Front

The Chinese defense industry owes its existence to the SSBN and strategic weapo

programs.16 In July 1958, a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine project (

09) and submarine-launched ballistic-missile project (the JL-1, Project 05) were 

rized, though China did not possess the military, industrial, or scientific capacity 

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Notes
were not enough, from 1958 to 1960 China had to endure Chairman Mao Zedong’s

misguided Great Leap Forward, in which Mao set aside all rationality in an attempt to

exceed British industrial production levels within fifteen years. The social turmoil just

before and during the Great Leap severely impacted the SSBN and SLBM projects, to

the point that their “defense scientists and engineers were devoting less than half the

day to professional work.”18

On the heels of the failed Great Leap, from 1966 to 1976, came Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Supported by Mao, “radicalized technicians and workers in the research organs

under the [Defense Science and Technology] commission berated, persecuted, and

then sundered the relations between senior scientists and leadership cadres, between

the technical community and the policy makers.”19 Political upheaval, social unrest, and

cuts in spending were not the limits of the damage done by the Cultural Revolution.

Mao, in an effort to purify the Chinese Communist Party, demanded that “reactionary

leading academic figures” be tracked down.20 The violence resulted in numerous casual

ties in the submarine and ballistic-missile research communities, including the directo

of Institute 703, Yao Tongbin, who was responsible for JL-1 materials testing.21 Mao’s

Cultural Revolution was to blame for the suicide and killing of personnel involved in

the strategic weapons programs, lack of funding for equipment and facilities, poor

working conditions and diet, the destruction of equipment, distrust in political leaders

poor quality in materials and workmanship, and outright warfare among technicians.2

In 1966, defending the premises of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Vice Chairman o

the Central Committee, stated, “It stands to reason that a cultural revolution should

accelerate production, and this has been borne out by the facts.”23 Quite to the contrary

China’s Cultural Revolution, in addition to the enforced geographic separation of various organizations involved (as will be seen below), resulted in a ten-year stagnation of

the JL-1 project.24 Mao’s belief “that men equipped with correct political ideas were

more important in war than weapons” turned the Chinese defense industry on its head

and cost China dearly.25 Mao is generally regarded as a military genius—historians

place him alongside the likes of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Jomini—but his capability as

a leader in war did not translate well into success as a statesman. With respect to national security, Mao’s methods were, ironically, of greater benefit to China’s potential

adversaries than they were to China.

As if political, social, and economic turmoil were not enough, the research and development phases of the SSBN and SLBM projects were fraught with inefficiency and

contradiction. Mao ordered the creation of a “Third Front,” by which virtually the entire Chinese defense industry was moved to the interior, far from the coasts, to guard

against attack.26 This effort began in earnest in 1965; ultimately 483 factories and

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workers were transferred to China’s interior from the coastal areas.27 The econom

costs and the delays resulting from the Third Front effort were staggering.

Marshal Nie Rongzhen, in overall charge of the strategic submarine and missile 

grams, appears to have severely underestimated their magnitude and complexity

talent and expertise required to design and produce an SSBN is not abundant in 

most technologically advanced societies today, let alone the relatively backward C

of the 1960s. Nevertheless, Nie chose to pursue a competitive strategy, assigning 

separate organizations to perform research and development. This diluted the sm

pool of scientists and engineers as well as of material resources.28

From 1958 until the first successful submerged test launch of the JL-1 SLBM in 1

the various organizations involved went through countless restructurings.29 This 

part of a larger pattern in which China’s political system favored organizational 

tions” for R & D problems. Yet the reorganizations were often ineffective: they fa

get to the root cause of the problem and did not produce the desired progress: “

logic of the times was to destroy the system in order to save it.”30

If China has been persistent in its efforts to produce both nuclear-powered attac

ballistic-missile submarines, that desire has wavered at times. When it was recog

that design and production were not going to be speedy, some demanded that th

jects be discontinued. General Luo Ruiqing, the director of the National Defense 

dustry Office (NDIO) wanted to see Project 09 terminated, arguing in a remarka

moment of candor that China could not produce a diesel-powered submarine, le

alone a nuclear-powered one. Opposing Luo, the Chinese foreign minister, Chen 

gued that for the sake of national security the effort should continue, regardless 

time it required.31 Project 09 research continued but was downsized substantially 

August 1962. Unrestricted design and production did not resume until August 1

Research and Development

Considering that China was creating its technological and industrial base from s

and on the back of the strategic weapons program, it is not difficult to see why th

learning process was painfully long.33

Nuclear Power. Aside from the political climate, Project 09 engineers faced daun

obstacles in the design and development of the first submarine nuclear reactor p

The work was as problematic as one might expect an initial foray into nuclear-re

design and construction to be. The first reactor design was completed in 1960 an

went through numerous iterations.34 The two organizations tasked by Nie for rea

plant design, the Qinghua University Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology an

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try of Machine Building (nuclear industry), gathered what information they could on

foreign designs and made separate proposals. Qinghua University promoted a design

based on a German nuclear-powered ship, the Otto Hahn; Institute 194 favored a design

based on the Soviet icebreaker Lenin.

35 The decision between the two proposals was based

not on their merits and suitability for submarine operations but on the political clout of

the two agencies. Institute 094 had more, and in 1965 the Lenin design was selected.36

The Institute 194 designers were to encounter difficulties with, among other things,

control-rod drive mechanisms, nuclear instruments, reactor instrumentation, and the

steam generator.37 The physics calculations were completed by hand, which required an

extraordinary amount of time; they had to be repeated with each successive modification to the plant design.38 The uranium-235 fuel concentration for the reactor plant

was enriched to only 3 percent, meaning that the Chinese submarine would require

more frequent refueling than American submarines.39

The initial stages of the reactor development, under Institute 194’s Reactor Engineerin

Research Section, were difficult at best. Working conditions were poor; worse, “young

and inexperienced technical personnel . . . [were] left . . . to their own devices, without

any data, experimental equipment or computers.”40 Counting on Soviet assistance,

China had placed little emphasis on the development of indigenous support capability

for nuclear research and manufacturing. When Soviet assistance was withdrawn in

1960, the Chinese were no longer able to focus exclusively on production and instead

had to step back and try to fill the void left by the departed Soviets.

Successful operation of a prototype reactor, to verify the validity of the design, was a

prerequisite to the installation of a submarine unit.41 The sense of urgency in Project 0

to get the first attack submarine to sea is amply evident in the fact that China opted

to design and build prototype and submarine reactor plants simultaneously.42 From

an engineering perspective, failure to evaluate a design properly prior to the manufacture and operation of the final product is an invitation to disaster. This is especially true in the world of nuclear engineering, as the Chinese apparently learned the

hard way at an early stage.43

The exact dates are unclear, but sometime around 1970 the prototype reactor was

tested at its full rated power.44 The engineers experienced difficulties with test instrumentation, pulse tube leaks, and secondary valves. Further design problems were encountered with the reactor safety set-points, which apparently caused several

unwarranted automatic shutdowns.45 The design, construction, and testing of China’s

first prototype nuclear reactor was to take twelve years.

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plant. Initial criticality of the SSN reactor plant and the maiden voyage of the att

submarine on which it was fitted, the Han, occurred in 1971. During sea trials (w

were not completed until 1974) and thereafter, “severe problem

were encountered with the reactor plant.46 These included high 

tion exposure to the crew; leakage in the steam generator from 

primary water circuit to the secondary, with the result that radiation was detecte

the secondary system drains; primary system valve leakage; and steam line ruptu

These persistent problems—as well as corrosion, steam leaks from the steam gen

tors, and defective pumps, main condensers, and main reduction gears—demon

that the Project 09 engineers had much to learn about materials and precision de

and construction.47 The PLAN accepted the Han—designated hull number 401—i

gust 1974, but it could hardly be considered fully operational. China incorporated 

modifications in the second Han-class unit, hull number 402, commissioned in 19

many of the original problems persisted.48

The Submarine: Hull and Interior Arrangement. The design and construction 

submarine itself was no less difficult. China decided to complete its first nucle

powered submarines as attack boats, due to the time required to develop the JL-

sile and an SSBN launcher system.49 When the Soviet Union terminated its assist

submarine design and construction, the Chinese, as in the reactor project, turne

other external sources to fill the void. Huang Xuhua, the chief designer for Proje

summed up their attitude: “To derive nourishment from others’ experiences . . . 

can get twice the result with half the effort if you know how to pick others’ brain

(Some argue that this practice continues to this day, as is consistent with a Chine

proverb, “Stones from the other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one—a

from others may help one overcome one’s shortcomings.”)50 Accordingly, Chines

neers adopted the teardrop hull shape of American and Soviet nuclear submarin

chose to construct a double hull similar to those of Soviet boats.51

High-quality welding, to conjoin hull plates and attach interior and exterior equ

and fittings to the hull, is absolutely critical to the survival of a submarine. Chin

gineers and shipyard welders had serious difficulties; numerous weld failures on 

hull resulted from improper welding techniques and equipment. The engineers m

have been expected to determine the causes of the defective welds and provide so

to the welders, but they did not; the welders were left to conduct experiments on 

own and devise a method for heat-treating steel hull plates.52 China’s first subma

hull, accordingly, was not a product of exceptional Chinese engineering or first-r

Han (Han Dynasty)

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product of trial and error.53

In keeping with the trial-and-error “principle,” engineers at the Bohai Shipyard (Plant

431) did not have a sound plan to fit out the submarine. In fact, construction of the

hull commenced before the layout of interior subsystems had been completed. The risk

was not to the basic hull shape but to the configuration of compartments, hull openings, bulkhead penetrations, and interior supporting structures. Although limited use

was made of a wooden scale model, pipefitting was completed and subsystems were in

stalled by the “best guess” method. Not surprisingly, in view of the inevitable numerous rearrangements, the builders encountered a great degree of difficulty in calculating

the boat’s center of gravity and center of buoyancy.54 In general, the manner in which

the Chinese constructed their first nuclear-powered attack submarine suggests a deep

urgency in the minds of the Chinese leadership, which continued to push forward regardless of unresolved technical issues.

The Submarine: Sound Silencing and Combat Systems. The stealthiness of a submarine—its ability to stay hidden from an adversary—depends a great deal on the noise i

emits. The engineering, manufacture, and operation of the submarine determine how

much or how little noise it will radiate into its environment. The Project 09 engineers

recognized the need for silencing and took measures to limit the noise level of their

submarines, such as mounting equipment on pedestals and covering the equipment

with sound-absorbent material.55 Other factors considered were the number of hull

openings, flow noise through internal piping and over the hull, and screw cavitation.56

Ideally, weapons systems are designed to meet particular needs, specified prior to construction. This was not the case in China’s SSN and SSBN development. For the SSN, it

was not until 1966, eight years after the decision to build the nuclear submarine, that

China’s Defense Science and Technology Commission identified the type’s desired

functions. Neither was the SSBN the product of a rational strategic debate. Mao saw in

the unlimited Soviet assistance then available simply an opportunity to acquire a weap

ons system that might prevent other states from taking further advantage of China.57

Failure to identify specific capabilities required of the submarines proved detrimental

to their development.

One area in which this failure would manifest itself was in combat systems. Torpedoes

were the raison d’être of SSNs. The principal mission of the an attack submarine is attack, and to carry out an attack, it requires torpedoes.58 China’s torpedo developmen

however, lacked focus. Gas-powered torpedoes, electric-powered torpedoes, rocketassisted aerial torpedoes, torpedoes with passive acoustic homing, torpedoes with ac

tive and passive acoustic homing, torpedoes for surface targets, and torpedoes for

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from the early 1960s until 1989, when China believed it had finally fielded a wea

comparable to Western torpedoes, the Yu-3.59 As a further example, the director 

China’s Seventh Academy (and subsequently commander of the PLAN), Liu Hua

instructed his engineers “to copy a Soviet model torpedo for missions against su

targets. Although Liu’s experts understood that the principal prey for the torped

the future would be submarines, not surface ships, they accepted the assignment 

made it one of their top priorities.”60 The consequence of this haphazard approa

the torpedo—the sine qua non of the SSN—was that the Han did not have a cap

torpedo until 1989, fifteen years after its commissioning. 61

The Ballistic Missile Submarine and the JL-1. A preliminary design for the SSBN 

completed in 1967, with the intention of launching a boat in 1973.62 The major d

ence between the attack submarine and the ballistic-missile submarine, of cours

the addition of the missile compartment. For that reason, China’s first SSBN enc

tered many of the same problems, with the reactor plant and combat systems, that th

tack submarine endured in addition to those of the launching system and the SLBM 

By March 1964, when the JL-1 project was initiated, China had been working on 

sile technology for nearly eight years.63 In 1967 China, perceiving the vulnerabili

its fixed land-based strategic-missile systems to satellite reconnaissance, decided 

cus more of its efforts on road-mobile missiles and SLBMs.64 Today, China’s basi

sile technology seem fairly robust and at least moderately successful.65 At the tim

however, the crucial differences between an SLBM and a land-based missile creat

technological hurdles that the PLAN could not easily or quickly overcome. Lik

U.S. Navy, China explored liquid fuel for its first SLBM.66 When the Soviets wit

China, noting the progress of the U.S. Polaris Missile Program, decided to purs

solid-propellant technology for the JL-1. Solid rocket propellant, therefore, was 

the first obstacles the program encountered.67

Unlike a land-based missile, an SLBM must be ejected from the missile tube und

ter to a point above the surface, from a depth that can vary with each launch. Mo

over, if a ballistic missile is to strike a target, its guidance system must be given th

precise location from which it is being launched. For a land-based missile this is 

most part a static problem; even with a road-mobile system, technicians can dete

the launch location with relative ease. In contrast, the SLBM requires dynamic in

mation; its position is continuously changing up to the moment of launch.68 Las

once the missile is above the surface, its motor must ignite. At that point, as for i

land-based counterpart, guidance and flight control systems must put the missil

target with an accuracy inversely proportional to the yield of its warhead.69

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including the motor, were finalized in 1967.70 As for the SSBN, the work on the JL-1

proceeded by trial and error, and it was not until 1980 that the Chinese engineers developed a satisfactory motor.71 Chinese engineers working on the project moved

through a series of stages, starting with a sixty-five-millimeter-diameter design and

then trying 300 mm and 654 mm approaches before settling upon the 1,400 mm design ultimately utilized in the first- and second-stage motors of the JL-1.72 The designers had to overcome challenges presented by the motor’s chemical composition, the

star-shaped hollow core needed for even burning, case-bonding of the propellant to

the motor casing, plastics, high-strength steel, heat shields, adhesives, nozzles, and

thrust-vector control—to name only a few problem areas.73

Chinese engineers chose “to copy foreign models as best they could” for the JL-1’s

guidance system, but finally adopted the guidance system of the JL-1’s land-based DF

variant.74 The guidance system, which used inertial navigation, was capable of in-flight

course corrections only in the boost phase, not in the missile’s ballistic phase.75 China’s

choice to shoot the SLBM from a moving (vice a hovering, static) submarine created

additional problems.76 The flow of water over the hull during a launch sequence subjects an SLBM to forces perpendicular to the desired direction of travel. The designers

apparently found that the missile could be pushed as far as sixty degrees from the verti

cal; they had to ensure that the launcher and the missile’s flight controls could compensate for the induced error.77 The functional gyros this required were not completed

until 1976, and an adequate attitude-control system was not available until 1980.78 Two

years later, the JL-1 was successfully launched from a surfaced Golf-class submarine.79

The End Result

As a result of such technological challenges, as well as of political and organizational

upheavals, China did not conduct a successful submerged launch of the JL-1 from the

Xia until 1988—a full thirty years after the decision to build China’s first SSBN, and fif

teen years after the intended launch date of the Xia.

80 The question remains of China’s

ability to effectively operate such a complex piece of machinery—especially in the face

of advanced ASW forces. It is believed that the Xia has had very little time at sea and

that, hence, its operational readiness is highly questionable.81 It seems that the years of

struggle to provide China with a more secure nuclear strike capability produced in the

end a submarine of marginal value, an SSBN that has been brushed off as a nonthreat.82

The Xia itself, as a weapons platform, is much less significant than the process by whic

China built it, developing a physical and intellectual infrastructure that have enabled

the state to continue its forward progress. The launch in December 2002 of the Type

093 attack submarine, the successor of the Han class, and in July 2004 of the first follow

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though the boats’ true capabilities are likely to remain a mystery for some time.

Strategic ASW and the U.S. Navy Today

One would like to destroy these missiles or the means of launchin

before they are launched, if possible, and if so launched we would 

destroy the missiles immediately and then get those that have no

launched. In other words, missile destruction is considered as ass

with the antisubmarine warfare program.

ADMIRAL HO

DIRECTOR OF ASW RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Strategic ASW

During the Cold War, American and Soviet submarines engaged in a high-stak

derwater contest.83 Nuclear-powered attack submarines pursued ballistic-missi

rying submarines. The mission of the SSNs, in the event of hostilities between 

United States and the Soviet Union, was to destroy the SSBNs—preferably befo

SLBMs were launched. Owen R. Coté, Jr., labels the period of time between 19

1990 the “Third Battle” of undersea forces, one in which both the United State

USSR invested heavily in undersea technology, each side trying to maintain qu

tive or quantitative advantages.84 Coté describes the little-studied topic of strat

antisubmarine warfare—ASW directed specifically at submerged strategic wea

carrying platforms, the SSBNs. Generally, ASW involves, as the term suggests, t

tection, location, and destruction of submarines; it has been pursued in a varie

ways since the introduction of the submarine. Strategic ASW, however, is a pro

of the nuclear age.

Were hostilities to break out between two countries in possession of SSBNs, the 

their respective attack submarines would be to eliminate the other’s SSBNs—tha

the SSNs would be conducting strategic ASW. Conversely, the goal of the SSBNs 

be to remain undetected and able to launch their SLBMs if so ordered. Strategic 

requires SSNs to shadow SSBNs, to track them continuously, utilizing cues from 

sources as satellite imagery, antisubmarine aircraft, and fixed, passive underwate

acoustic arrays.85 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy has not had 

face a peer competitor underwater, and consequently its ASW skills and capabili

have atrophied.86 They have also declined, in part, due a reduction in funding as 

creased emphasis is given other mission areas, such as power projection ashore.8

the U.S. Navy is forcing a greater emphasis on antisubmarine warfare by the crea

a new Fleet ASW Command, but funding remains a critical issue. For example, t

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aircraft fleet by one-third, due to funding shortfalls, airframe fatigue, and the need to

fund the next-generation ASW aircraft—the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).8

September 2003 remarks of the Commander, Naval Submarine Forces, reflected the

U.S. Navy’s shift from open-ocean ASW to operations in contested littorals and to

strike warfare.89 In the words of Owen Coté, “Geopolitics and technology are conspiring to pull the Navy ashore from the sea, without eliminating the traditional and irreducible need for a navy that is capable of controlling the sea.”90

Scholars, analysts, and government officials all seem to believe that the years 2005–10

will see the emergence of China’s newest SSBNs. It is time to give antisubmarine warfare once again the energy it had during the Cold War, to ensure that the United States

has an adequate number of submarines and other ASW assets in the coming decades to

ensure its security. Once the new Chinese Type 094 SSBNs become operational, world

events could oblige the United States to hold them at risk of immediate destruction, as

was once done against the Soviet Union, when strategic ASW was a national mission o

extreme importance.91 In those years, sizeable resources were sunk into developing and

deploying attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface-ship ASW capability,

and undersea sound monitoring. For much of the Cold War, these resources were employed (as will be seen in more detail below) in an effort to create a barrier that would

prevent Soviet SSBNs from coming close enough to the continental United States to

launch a nuclear strike that would arrive on short notice. American strategic ASW capability evolved through improved technology and better operational practices that op

timized all components that could be brought to bear—air, surface, and subsurface.

The American civilian leadership and the Navy recognized the nature and seriousness

of the threat and, accordingly, gave a high priority to strategic ASW. Today there is a

danger that U.S. strategic ASW capabilities, so formidable a few decades ago, will not

be up to the task if called upon again.92

China’s Advance

Since 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed the benefits of

its Cold War investment in ASW, because there has been no serious competitor for undersea dominance. Today that situation is changing. China is gradually emerging as a

serious undersea power. As U.S. ASW capability has withered, Chinese diesel submarines are becoming extremely difficult to detect and, consequently, more lethal. In the

world of nuclear-powered submarines, China’s technology is also improving. Unlike

the notoriously noisy Han class, the Type 093 is estimated to be acoustically comparable to the Soviet Victor III.93 Certainly, the 094 will benefit from the improvements in

the 093.94 The introduction of the Victor III in the mid-1980s, it has been argued,

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submarine that surprised the Navy with its acoustic stealth, and its deployment w

harbinger of worse to come.”95 The Soviet Victor III was the forerunner of the Ak

“the first Soviet submarine that approached or achieved acoustic parity with its A

can contemporaries.”96

Granted, that was two decades ago; the U.S. Navy has continued since then to up

its own submarine technology while China is still trying to catch up. Nonetheles

likely that the second generation of Chinese nuclear submarines will represent a 

leap forward.”

Limits, and Narrowing the Margins

There are limits to the levels of quietness and sound detection that can be achiev

due to the nature of technology and the inherently noisy environment (especiall

the littorals) in which submarines operate. The improvements seen today in sub

technology today are minor compared to the enormous advances between the U

Holland and the USS Los Angeles.

97 An analogy can be drawn with advances in au

bile racing cars over the last century. The world saw in the vehicle that propelled 

Foyt to his seventh national Indianapolis 500 car championship in 1979 major a

vances in performance over the cars that Henry Ford raced in the early 1900s—s

was with the Los Angeles and the Holland. However, the difference in performanc

tween the car that A. J. Foyt drove and those raced today is minor—hundredths 

second rather than the hours that would have separated Ford and Foyt had they 

against one another. The difference between winning and losing comes down to 

experience and proficiency. Likewise, in an undersea contest between two moder

marines, experience and proficiency are likely to be the decisive factors. In a com

son between the United States and China, the U.S. Navy still has a major advanta

but, as with racing cars, occasionally a rookie pulls off a win. Barring some unfo

technological breakthrough, the days of major advances in acoustic detection are 

designers now tweak systems to gain that “hundredth of a second” advantage.

China’s purchase of advanced Russian-built Kilo-class diesel submarines (SSK) r

sents much more than a mere increase in its number of attack submarines; it has 

forded China the opportunity to improve the silencing and combat systems of th

indigenous Song-class diesel boats and, surely, its new nuclear-powered boats as 

Unlike during its first foray in nuclear submarine design and c

struction, China is now receiving assistance from Russia—a gr

deal of it—and its SSBNs will certainly benefit.99 Even without 

sian assistance, however, advanced computer technology is widely available toda

last two decades’ exponential improvement in microprocessor performance has

Song (Song Dynasty)

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allowed designers rapidly to shrink margins in performance. According to the Defense

Department’s 2003 annual report to Congress on the PRC, “China will continue purchasing foreign technology to improve quieting, propulsion, and submarine design.

China also will benefit from the maturation of its domestic submarine research and

development infrastructure to achieve a capability to design and manufacture modern

submarines domestically.”100 The Chinese defense industry that is building the 094

SSBN is without a doubt far more capable than the one that struggled with the Xia.

What We Know and What We Don’t Know

Regarding intelligence estimates, Michael I. Handel asks, “How can anyone know, in a

world of secrecy, deception, and subjective perceptions, that his estimates of the enemy’s strength are correct?”101 Not surprisingly, estimates concerning China’s future

SSBNs vary considerably, but they are all in agreement that China will have an improved

undersea nuclear strike capability in the very near future.102 Nonetheless, Handel’s point

is well taken, in the sense that the consequences of not being prepared to hold a future

Chinese SSBN fleet at risk make it prudent to hedge one’s bets.

If China’s early SSBN and SLBM programs suffered from political and social upheaval

and a lack of physical and intellectual infrastructure, this is not the case today. China

enjoys political and social stability, its economy is blossoming, and the costs of the nec

essary infrastructure have been paid. These factors enable China to pursue, at the construction and design levels, its own highly competitive “Indy car.” China is making

parallel improvements in both its officer and enlisted training. Also, notably, a

Source: Chinese Defence Today

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emphasis will be placed on the submarine force.103 Further, in the fall of 2004 Ad

Zhang was given a seat on the Central Military Commission, and as a result a subm

now has a voice in China’s most important national security decision-making bod

The U.S. Defense Department reported in 2003 that “training and exercise activi

the PLAN] in 2002 was robust”; exercises were conducted in the South China Se

lizing air, surface, and subsurface assets. Close observers of China’s submarine fo

have stated that the PLAN is in fact undergoing a training revolution—joining th

of the PLA in moving from rote, scripted exercises to “confrontational training” 

encourages innovation and on-the-spot decision making.104 To become effective 

potent, the PLAN submarine force needs to make regular use of instrumented ra

for weapon shots at sea, and its crews—both of attack and ballistic-missile boats

need, when not deployed, regular sessions in attack training centers in realistic s

lated environments.105 This would be especially important for China’s SSBN crew

currently have little, if any, time at sea. Indeed, China has established training cent

where PLAN personnel, including submariners, can train ashore in their respective 

fare areas.106

Should Washington Be Concerned?

The increased emphasis within the U.S. submarine force on strike, special operat

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance raises the question of whether 

U.S. Navy will able to perform strategic ASW missions adequately in the future. 

enough time, however, it is easier to train than acquire an adequate force structu

therefore, the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces are the real question mark. Because it is im

ble to predict the future, it cannot be said with any certainty what the future hol

Sino-U.S. relations. The United States could, however, confront a China that seek

much more prominent position on the world stage and is not willing to bend to 

ington’s wishes. Indeed, initiatives by the pro-independence movement in Taiwa

ing the winter of 2003–2004 led China once again to make very public and delib

statements that it is willing to go to war to prevent Taiwanese independence, eve

that means suffering a setback in its economy and sacrificing the 2008 Olympics

are to be held in Beijing. This seeming willingness to bear such costs is contrary 

what some analysts have argued.107

It is widely agreed that a war between Taiwan and China could involve the Unite

States, although it is entirely possible that the United States and China will never 

to blows—and, yes, China’s economic growth and integration into the world cou

to peaceful and prosperous coexistence between the United States and China.108 S

the cost of preparedness for strategic ASW would be minuscule compared to the

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cially in the midst of a crisis.

A Worthy Opponent?

There is a certain apparent reluctance to take the Chinese submarine force seriously.

Regarding the current and future capabilities of the American submarine force vis-àvis China, one U.S. submarine captain wrote, “You can buy the very best subs, you can

study the lessons learned by others and utilize the training methods of the very best,

but still it will take many years of internal growth to produce an effective submarine

force.”109 With respect to a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan,

he writes, “China could put its entire [submarine] force to sea around Taiwan and the

U.S. will still be at risk to lose one or two platforms (if only to bad luck). However, our

[the U.S.] submarine force alone would easily be able to go in and destroy the Chinese

sub force.” He believes that China will not, within the next ten years have a submarine

force capable of competing with the U.S. submarine force as a peer competitor although, “the [submarine] force they are building will increase the risk of U.S. losses . . 

in the future.”110 Referring to a possible conflict over Taiwan and to the recent purchase

of eight Kilo-class submarines, he states, “If the political will of the U.S. holds and

there is a willingness to accept the loss of a few ships or submarines, then the outcome of the battle is not in question—[the United States would triumph]. But if U.S

[leaders] are not willing to have even one U.S. submarine or ship [sunk] then we

have already lost the battle and they [the Chinese] might as well stop at four Kilos

vice eight.”111

The latter point, concerning losses, is an important one that deserves careful consideration in light of the impending deployment of larger, more capable Chinese SSBN flee

It implies that were a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan to

erupt when China possesses more capable attack submarines, American SSNs and

other antisubmarine assets might not be able to guarantee the safety of high-value

forces, such as aircraft carriers. If the SSNs could not protect aircraft carriers, it is likely

that they could not perform strategic ASW either. For that reason, though confidence

in the capabilities of the U.S. submarine force is not unwarranted—it is undeniably th

strongest submarine force in the world today—a note of caution is prudent and necessary.

Simply in terms of numbers alone, the entire Chinese submarine fleet—currently

numbering approximately sixty-nine—could put the U.S. submarine force to the ultimate test.112 Other significant complications would be knowledge of the local acoustic

operating environment, the shallow water of the Chinese littorals, a hostile merchant

and fishing fleet, and mines. The experience of the Royal Navy during the Falklands

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for antisubmarine forces.

In 1982, Argentina possessed four submarines of varying capability. Only one, th

Luis, could conduct offensive operations against the British task force. Facing tha

gle submarine were elements of NATO’s North Atlantic ASW force, Antisubmari

Group 2, arguably one of the most experienced in the world at the time. Noneth

the Argentinean boats were able to conduct two attacks on the British task force 

of which failed, but only due to weapon malfunctions). Local acoustic condition

dered British forces helpless; they released over 150 weapons but scored no hits. 

cording to the captain of the San Luis, “There was no effective counter attack. I d

think that they knew we were there until they heard our torpedoes running.” The im

tion is that every weapon expended in the British ASW effort was fired at false target

The Royal Navy was fortunate in that the weapons of the lone Argentine submar

failed. In a face-off with China, odds are that not every weapon on every PLAN s

rine would do so. The U.S. submarine force would be further stretched to its lim

Chinese SSBNs were involved. The United States would undoubtedly prevail, alb

some cost, in a series of sub-on-sub engagements. If, however, China chose to th

the United States with nuclear weapons—even if as a bluff—the U.S. Navy could 

difficulty, with the number of attack submarines it is projected to have, in holdin

a small Chinese SSBN force at risk.

The United States cannot afford to become overconfident in its ability to cope w

China. Prominent analysts like David Shambaugh believe that China will be hard

pressed to catch up to the technology of the West;114 certainly, China’s submarine 

would pose a greater threat to the U.S. Navy were its capabilities equal. However

cause of the nature of undersea warfare, with its complexities and variables, and 

SSBN operations in particular, China does not have to catch up with the West to 

serious threat to the United States in a conflict.115

Is Ballistic Missile Defense the Answer?

It will be many years before U.S. ballistic-missile defense (BMD) will be capable 

viding the level of protection required to counter the Chinese nuclear forces of t

let alone those of ten or twenty years from now. The JL-2 SLBM, as well as other m

land-based Chinese ICBMs, will have (or already have) multiple independently tar

reentry vehicles (MIRVs).116 Multiple warheads on each missile and the dozens of b

missiles that China is already capable of launching could deliver an attack that any 

system would find exceedingly difficult to counter with 100 percent accuracy.117 Ev

were a future ballistic-missile defense system thought capable of intercepting all

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to rely on that technology alone—the United States would be putting all of its eggs in

the BMD basket. Perhaps when U.S. BMD becomes a reality, American SSNs could increase its effectiveness in a conflict by containing the Chinese submarine force within a

geographic area, such as the Yellow Sea, enabling the defenses to focus on that single

vector. But until that time, it is incumbent upon U.S. planners to ensure that the defense against ballistic missiles is a layered one, in which strategic ASW is the first line.

In the words of President John F. Kennedy, “Until technology permits the deployment

of an effective defense against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the principal

measures of protection should be provided by the capability to attack prior to

launch.”118 Kennedy advocated the ability to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk of destruction

through a stronger ASW capability, and his words still have relevance today.

Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?

Despite the advances in submarine technology and antisubmarine warfare over the

past fifty years, the conclusions of a study conducted in the 1950s still hold true today.

“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate means o

navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombardment by submarine

becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a long coastline requires a very

large effort.”119 It would be a mistake of the greatest magnitude for the United States to

allow itself to be caught shorthanded and unprepared, especially where China’s decidedly mobile and capable nuclear forces are concerned. If the United States itself does

not want to be subjected to the “nuclear blackmail” that Mao complained of so bitterly

whether today or in the future, Washington must once again elevate strategic ASW to a

national mission.120

The recently retired commander of naval submarine forces, Vice Admiral John J.

Grossenbacher, believes that if at least two Virginia-class boats are not built per year,

the U.S. Navy’s fleet of SSNs will decline to thirty submarines.121 Vice Admiral

Grossenbacher argues that American SSNs would then no longer be able to meet the

demands placed on them. As of early 2005, leadership of the Defense Department appears to have made a definitive decision against this plan, and has opted to build a single SSN each year.122 In the defense arena, a significant amount of time is needed to make

ideas reality. The time to begin construction of a larger, more robust fleet of nuclearpowered attack submarines has already arrived.

If relations between the United States and China deteriorate, will there be enough SSN

to maintain continuous contact with a growing fleet of Chinese SSBNs? Many factors

must be considered. How many SSBNs would China be able to keep deployed simultaneously? How long would they stay deployed? Would each SSBN have two crews, like

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from, and where would they patrol? Would the United States have assets other th

SSNs that could assist in tracking them? How robust would Chinese SSBN defen

protection by diesel or nuclear attack boats—be?

If maintenance support for its SSBN was robust and each boat had two crews, it 

ceivable that China could keep four of six SSBNs deployed continuously, the rem

two undergoing maintenance between deployments.123 To maintain close contact 

the four deployed SSBNs, up to twenty SSNs would be required—nearly half of t

current inventory.124 Even that rough estimate illustrates that a substantial comm

would be required of a submarine community that is already turning missions a

due to a lack of resources. Even if the PLAN does not make such a significant tra

(from a single SSBN that rarely goes to sea to a fleet of six that stay deployed 60 

of the time) and only one or two SSBNs were on patrol, the U.S. Navy would stil

quire five to ten SSNs to hold them at risk.125

China may choose to use the Yellow Sea as a bastion, in order to provide better p

tion for its SSBNs; that could significantly complicate matters. The Yellow Sea is

tively speaking, extremely shallow. Shallow water places substantial restrictions o

submarine maneuverability, and its poor acoustic environment degrades ASW. C

would have the advantage of greater familiarity with the theater. High traffic den

further restricts submarine maneuverability, to avoid collisions; it also produces 

ambient noise, which makes passive acoustic detection extremely difficult at best

would also be a challenge for the most proficient U.S. SSNs to gain access undete

such a bastion. China can employ a barrier strategy, as the United States did dur

Cold War. Existing shore-based defenses on the Yellow Sea would be to China’s a

tage; its aircraft would enjoy short transit times and, accordingly, longer periods 

tion than would U.S. aircraft, if without shore bases of their own. If China were 

the Yellow Sea as a bastion, therefore, an ability to stage naval and air ASW opera

from South Korea, the Philippines, and Guam would be essential.126

Venturing out into the Pacific or other oceans, however, would require Chinese S

to be sufficiently quiet to avoid U.S. Navy ASW assets—perhaps clustered to form 

barrier along the “first island chain” (an arc from the Kuriles through Japan, the

Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago).127 China re

nizes the threat to its nuclear deterrent posed by the ballistic-missile defense init

of not only the United States but also Japan and Australia.128 China will seek to n

any advantages that the Washington and its allies may have in the region in orde

maintain a credible second-strike capability.

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which its SSBNs could operate in the South China Sea.129 It would provide China’s

SSBNs with immediate access to the South China Sea and put them much closer to

the Indian Ocean. For political reasons, basing SSBNs on Hainan Island, in its South

Sea Fleet area of operations, makes sense for China, because the United States is not

China’s only concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, if Chinese SSBNs were

to operate from two bases about 1,600 nautical miles apart, U.S. ASW assets would

be denied the opportunity to concentrate in a particular area.130 Furthermore, an additional base would afford China more pier space. Whether or not China would actu

ally launch JL-2 SLBMs from the Indian Ocean, its SSBNs might operate there, and

elsewhere, simply to complicate U.S. ballistic-missile defense and tie up more antisubmarine assets.131

During the first three decades of the Cold War, prior to introduction of the Soviet Delta

SSBN, the U.S. Navy relied on a barrier strategy to detect Soviet SSBNs. Pre-Delta Soviet

SSBNs were forced to pass through geographic choke points, such as the “GreenlandIceland-U.K. Gap,” in order for their SLBMs to be able to reach the United States. The

barrier strategy took advantage of this weakness; fixed passive acoustic arrays, submarines, and land-based ASW aircraft made it quite successful.132 The Delta SSBN, however, could threaten the continental United States from Soviet territorial waters. This

effectively negated the U.S. barrier strategy, since the Deltas could strike the United

States without having to cross the barriers—the Deltas used bastions.133 In light of the

eventual deployment of possibly up to six Chinese SSBNs, the American response to

the Soviet Deltas is worthy of consideration.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, favored an emphasis on sea control to ensure the ability to reinforce Western Europe.134 Focusing on the defense of Western

Europe, Zumwalt argued, would avoid a potentially costly diversion of naval assets to Sovie

SSBN patrol areas, which could escalate a conflict between the United States and the Soviet

Union from a strictly conventional to a nuclear level. The alternative viewpoint was that “a

explicit attempt should be made to go forward and hold Soviet SSBNs at risk.”135 The argument was that the destruction of Soviet SSBNs would change the strategic nuclear balance

and therefore possibly decrease the will of the Soviets to escalate in the event of a stalemate

Furthermore, holding the Soviet SSBNs at risk in their bastions was held to be beneficial to

the U.S. mission of sea control, in that it would force the Soviet Navy to divert assets in an

attempt to deny access to American SSNs—a strategy that worked during the Cold War.136

The same logic could be applied to a conflict between China and the United States ove

Taiwan, but only if the United States has available sufficient strategic ASW assets to

hold Chinese SSBNs at risk—which it might not in the future. If the numbers were

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and other ASW assets were hunting them would force China to withdraw its bes

marines to protect its SSBNs. Due to geography of a Taiwan conflict, the U.S. Ar

Air Force would be hard pressed to join in a fight over Taiwan. Consequently, ev

set that the U.S. Navy could muster to the region would be vital to success. Coté 

to such a challenging scenario in his concluding remarks:

The most challenging scenario for the Navy is one where U.S. access to overseas bases is greatl

duced, and where the proliferation of relatively low cost and easy to use access denial weapon

as modern diesel-electric submarines, antiship and antiaircraft missiles, and naval mines—con

to grow. This is a world in which the Navy will have to provide a larger portion of national po

jection capabilities, while also placing much more emphasis on sea control than it does now.13

Given the modest scale of its current ASW capability, the United States would lik

completely occupied protecting its battle fleet while finding and destroying the n

ous Chinese submarines—including even the low-technology platforms that the 

still operates. During a major conflict over Taiwan the United States would likely 

one or more carrier battle groups within operational range of Taiwan. One can i

ine the “one-way conversation” that would occur when the local ASW command

the battle-group commander that it could take weeks to eliminate the subsurface 

to his ships, due to the large number of Chinese submarines, not to mention the 

submarine-laid mines that China could employ.138 If China elects to threaten a n

response to U.S. “interference” in what it considers an internal issue, the battle-g

commander would then presumably be forced to shift assets to strategic ASW, pe

rendering his own capital ships even more vulnerable.

Such dire scenarios can be prevented in the future if the right force-structure pla

decisions are made today. To prepare for the future and all of its conceivable thre

the U.S. Navy needs a fleet of close to seventy SSNs and enough air and surface A

capability to support not only the missions the submarine force is already tasked 

but also strategic ASW, if China does in fact build a significant undersea nuclear 

rent.139 In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in June 2000, 

Commander Submarine Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Albert H. Konetz

tified that the United States needs a minimum of sixty-eight SSNs to meet curre

future requirements.140 If, after China begins deployment of the first of its new S

it is evident that they will adhere to the habits of the past—remain pierside, emp

single crews, or stay within a defined geographic area—the American strategic A

force structure can be adjusted as necessary. It would be much easier to cut fund

and halt construction than it would be to respond suddenly to a threat, having b

caught unprepared.141

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past.”142 Recent and upcoming advancements like the Multimission Maritime Aircraft,

the Advanced Deployable System, the new Fleet ASW Command, the Littoral Combat

Ship, and the May 1998 engineering test143—to name only a few—represent significant

present day and future ASW achievements but they are not the complete solution.144

Force-structure planning involves identification of threats in the near, middle, and long

terms; the United States has the opportunity to “get a jump” on a threat now on the

horizon now, by reviving its former antisubmarine prowess. Ensuring that the U.S.

Navy has the right number of SSNs and air and surface ASW assets—more than it has

today—is vital to the security of the United States.

Conclusion

The development of the Chinese defense establishment over the past five decades has

been excruciatingly slow and turbulent, and so was the development of China’s first

SSBN. Having invested in a physical and intellectual infrastructure to create its early

strategic weapons programs, China is now reaping the benefits. China now has a solid

capability to design and construct SSBNs and SLBMs that are much more advanced

than their predecessors.

The debate will continue on China’s true intentions, but the strategic implications of a

more numerous and capable Chinese SSBN fleet are rather clear. China seeks an assured nuclear strike capability, and SSBNs are well suited to the job. Such a force would

raise the risks of confronting China in a crisis and may even decrease American leverage in a given crisis, unless it can be effectively neutralized.

China has already a limited capability to threaten the continental United States, but th

introduction of new, more capable submerged strategic systems with far greater range

and accuracy would enable it to strike the United States from the relative safety of its

own waters. The rationale behind the decision to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk in the Cold

War are applicable today. By the time China’s new SSBNs are deployed, it is unlikely

that the United States will have developed a totally reliable ballistic-missile defense sys

tem—especially against sophisticated countermeasures (see chapter 4 of this volume).

Therefore, as in the Cold War, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Navy to equip and train it

self for strategic ASW.

Will the U.S. Navy be able to resume a more aggressive strategic ASW posture in response to a new and improved fleet of Chinese SSBNs? As a result of the future advances in Chinese attack submarines, improvements in the PLAN education and

training, the numerous Chinese submarines in existence today, Asian-Pacific

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the U.S. Navy could be ill prepared to do so.

It is quite conceivable that strategic ASW will once again rise to the highest natio

importance. The period remaining before China deploys a larger number of SSB

within the next five years—affords the United States and its navy a vital opportu

The United States should plan now to stop the decline in U.S. strategic ASW cap

by halting the decline in the number of SSNs, increasing SSN end-strength to at 

seventy, and build up air and surface ASW capability. After all, nuclear-powered 

marines, aircraft, and surface ships are cheap—compared to the cost of replacing 

city of Los Angeles.145

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China’s Space Development

and Nuclear Strategy

DOMINIC DESCISCIOLO

China has recently become one of only three nations that have achieved human 

flight. This considerable achievement has served China, its government, and its p

on many levels, and it will continue to do so. It has symbolized to the world the t

nological power of a nation ascendant; it affirmed the legitimacy of China’s poli

system some fifty-four years after the communist revolution; and it has provided 

the national prestige to bring it ever closer to assuming its place among the great 

ers of the twenty-first century.

Another, less heralded beneficiary is the ongoing effort undertaken by Beijing to 

ernize its strategic nuclear capability. The military significance of the success of t

Chinese civil space program—largely overseen by the People’s Liberation Army—

should not be underestimated. Indeed, the contemporary linkage between missil

velopment and China’s burgeoning civil and commercial space operations has de

historical roots. This civil-military nexus, common to space programs the world

has over a period of decades led to both direct and indirect improvements in Ch

strategic nuclear forces.1

Initially, China’s nuclear program drove its intercontine

ballistic-missile delivery requirements, thereby galvanizing China’s space program

Now that both programs have matured, the dynamic seems to be mutually reinfo

Potentially significant examples of the military benefits of this symbiotic relation

include improvement in: ICBM range, accuracy, and survivability, as well as spac

based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, counter-spa

weapons, and ballistic-missile-defense countermeasures.

One need not appeal to Sun Tzu’s injunction that “all warfare is based on decept

understand the significance of this relationship.2

The theoretically civil Chinese 

program—including the human space flight component—is simultaneously acc

ing China’s quest to modernize its strategic nuclear forces.

CHAPTER THREE

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The launch of Shenzhou V on 14 October 2003, China’s first manned space mission,

brought Beijing acclaim both at home and around the globe.3

The achievement capped an extraordinary half-century effort

accelerated in the 1990s, to gain access to an exclusive club of

space-faring nations that had previously comprised only the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. This membership will help affirm China’s place among the great

powers of the twenty-first century. Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, China’s first

yuhangyuan to venture into space, has become an instant hero;4

he is to an electrified

Chinese public a legendary figure—on the order of Yuri Gagarin

and Alan Shepard.5

The success of the mission, and correspondin

public approval, has also provided a boost to the political legitimacy of the communist leadership at a time of considerable uncertainty regarding the

party’s future role in Chinese society. It has touched a deep nationalistic chord as another

example of the new China, reborn after two centuries of decline. Internationally, its appear

ance on the world stage of as a third space-faring nation may be viewed as yet another indi

cation that China, long considered backward and hopelessly outclassed, is rising.

Chinese technical and political leaders have stated repeatedly that Shenzhou will only

be the beginning of an exciting future of space stations, reusable space shuttles, and

missions to the moon and planets. Given the current moribund state of the U.S. civil

space program in the wake of the Columbia shuttle disaster of 1 February 2003, and

with the much downsized Russian program only a shadow of its former greatness, one

can only marvel and share in the excitement of a Chinese civil space program, apparently on track and reaching for the stars.6

But what about the strategic implications of this putatively peaceful and scientific quest for

the heavens? One need not look very far for the answer. The July 2003 appointment of Gen

eral Li Jinai, director of the General Armaments Department, as the new head of the

Manned Space Project provides an essential clue.7

In fact, lying largely out of public view is

the influence exerted by the PLA over the entire civil space effort. More importantly, however, it may be the long-standing relationship between the PLA Second Artillery Corps

(China’s strategic rocket forces) and the civil and commercial launch and satellite program

that provides the best indication that China’s success in space will inevitably contribute to

the state’s growing military power.

The codevelopment of launch vehicles for both military and civil purposes has a long

history, dating back almost fifty years. More recently, civil space-related technologies,

whether indigenously developed or purchased internationally, are spilling over into the

military realm. This technology transfer has direct military applications, especially in

Shenzhou V (Heavenly Vessel)

yuhangyuan (astronaut)

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ments in space-based ISR and targeting, as well as the development of space wea

Not surprisingly, then, while China forges ahead in space, its strategic nuclear fo

have likewise undergone a modernization effort that continues unabated.

In PRC development of a robust manned space presence, are we witnessing a “gr

vision for the future to explore space [that is] inspiring to the Chinese people,” a

lated by Huang Chunping, chief commander of rocketry for the Shenzhou proje

are we seeing China’s attempt to gain all the military advantages of “the new hig

ground” (a common reference to space during the Cold War) along the lines of t

viet manned space program of the last century? In pursuing both goals simultan

will China become the new “Red Star in Orbit?”9

This chapter addresses the linkage between the rise of the Chinese space program 

the PLA’s ongoing strategic nuclear modernization program. First, the historical 

of that linkage are examined to gain a better understanding of the “spin-on/spin

relationship of the two programs. Second, some current examples of both direct 

indirect military benefits resulting from that relationship are presented in order 

preciate more fully the military implications of China’s success in space and also 

outline areas of potential future concern. Finally, current Chinese efforts will be 

pared to those of the American and Soviet space programs at their height in ord

gain insight into the possible future course of the Chinese manned space progra

comparison will then be used shed light on the impact for China’s strategic nucl

modernization.

Linked at Birth: The Role of Qian

One can hardly appreciate the modern history of China’s ballistic missile and sp

velopment without encountering an almost larger-than-life figure—Qian Xuesen

Chinese-born, MIT and Cal Tech–educated scholar who, deported to China in 1

under suspicion of being a communist, was (and still is) probably the most influ

personality in this story.10 Qian’s contributions to early theories on rocket aerody

ics and space travel as one of the founding members of the Jet Propulsion Labor

in Pasadena are legendary. Other studies by him laid the foundations for develop

of both the U.S. Air Force and the national space programs. The ultimate loss to 

ington (and gain for Beijing) of this brilliant visionary was of such magnitude th

Undersecretary of the Navy Daniel Kimball declared, “I’d rather see him shot tha

him go. . . . He’s worth three to five divisions anyplace.”11 Echoing that sentiment 

Qian’s Cal Tech–appointed attorney, Grant B. Cooper: “That the government pe

this genius, this scientific genius, to be sent to Communist China to pick his bra

one of the tragedies of this century.”12

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Back in China in 1955, Qian pledged “to do my best to help the Chinese people

build up their nation.”13 In fact, he went to work to initiate and develop China’s

ballistic missile program. One of Qian’s first recommendations to the Chinese gov

ernment in 1956 was patterned on the study he had done for the U.S. Air Force for

its long-term weapons development. The plan placed emphasis on atomic energy,

missiles, computer science, semiconductors, electronics, and automation technology. Qian also emphasized the exploitation of foreign—especially U.S.—technical

materials as guides for indigenous development. Most importantly, Qian convinced

the Chinese government that missile development should take precedence over air

craft development.14

Qian became immersed in turning this plan into reality. Confronting the backwardness of China’s industrial base in the mid-1950s, Qian set about almost singlehandedly to develop the science and technology infrastructure that would be critical

to China’s success. He was instrumental in establishing the Fifth Academy of National Defense, China’s first institute for missile design. Today, many of the various

Chinese state organs of science, technology, and industry relating to defense and

space trace their lineage either directly to the Fifth Academy or to one of its subacademies.15 Iris Chang observes:

He was capable of organizing, decades in advance, gargantuan projects involving thousands of scientists, as well as introducing the kind of engineering systems that could track the tiniest details within

an organization. He played a key role in taking a primitive military establishment and transforming it

into one that could deliver nuclear bombs intercontinentally; he initiated and guided numerous projects that brought China into the space age.16

1955—Mao Zedong initiates nuclear weapons program

1964—China detonates first atomic bomb

1966—China undertakes unprecedented nuclear-armed missile test

1967—China detonates first hydrogen bomb

1980—First operational test of DF-5 ICBM

1988—JL-1 SLBM successfully launched from Xia SSBN

1995—Successful test of DF-31 ICBM

2001—First submerged launch of JL-2 SLBM, from Golf-class submarine

2003—Deployment of first brigade of DF-31 ICBMs

2004—Type 094 SSBN launched; JL-2 test failure

Sources: Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program—From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004) pp. 32

328; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Globalsecurity.org.

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purchased in 1956. By late 1957, Qian had arranged for the delivery of the first R-2 

siles, an improved version of the R-1. Despite the 1960 break in Sino-Soviet collab

tion, China succeeded that year in launching its first indigenous atmospheric-soun

rocket, the T-7. In September 1960 China launched a Soviet R-2 filled with indigen

propellant, and in November it successfully launched the first Chinese-built replic

R-2, from the new Jiuquan launch site in the Gobi Desert.17 Building on these succ

Qian and his growing legions of personally trained engineers and technicians work

a series of missiles, ultimately producing the Dong Feng. The initial goal, set in 1961

“DF” was a ten-thousand-kilometer-range missile capable of s

the continental United States. Beset by technical difficulties co

with the chaos surrounding the Great Leap Forward, Qian wa

forced to lower the bar.18 After some initial overconfidence and overstretch, a meth

development of a series of missiles began of successively greater capabilities, each m

having its own specific purpose: the DF-1 was a simply a renamed R-2, but the DF

would be capable of hitting Japan, the DF-3 the Philippines, the DF-4 Guam, and t

5 the continental United States.19

The Cultural Revolution had a severe impact on all of China’s strategic weapons 

grams. It is a wonder that any significant progress was achieved in this tumultuo

disruptive period. During these years the Chinese engineers conducted under po

pressure one of the riskiest and most dangerous missile test launches of all time 

scribed in chapter 1). Barely two years after successfully detonating its first atom

weapon, on 27 October 1966 China launched a modified DF-2 intermediate-ran

1955—American missile expert Qian Xuesen returns to China

1960—China launches first indigenously manufactured rocket

1970—PRC launches Dong Fang Hong-1, its first Earth satellite

1975—PRC launches first remote sensing satellite, FSW-0

1985—China offers first commercial launch services

1992—Jiang Zemin approves Project 921, PRC manned spaceflight program

1993—PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian visits Russia’s Star City, inaugurating bilateral

space cooperation

1999—Shenzhou 1 prototype initiates active testing stage of manned space program

2000—Beidou 1, first PRC navigation satellite, launched

2003—Shenzhou 5 launches Lt. Col. Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut

Space Program Time Line

Sources: Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program—From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004

328; Globalsecurity.org.

Dong Feng (East Wind)

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the western Xinjiang desert.20 According to a communiqué, “China successfully conducted over its own territory a guided missile nuclear weapons test. The guided missile

flew normally and the nuclear warhead accurately hit the target at the appointed distance, effecting a nuclear explosion.”21 By 1969 the deterioration of relations with the

Soviet Union had reached the point of military confrontation, leading to a redesign of

the DF-4 to increase its range enough to reach Moscow.22

Qian’s technical and organizational achievements were not limited to military missile devel

opment. The Soviet launch in May 1958 of the 1.3-ton Sputnik III geophysical observatory

the third and most successful of the Sputnik series, was viewed in China as an impressive

advance from the ten-kilogram Sputnik I of only seven months prior.23 Chairman Mao’s re

action to Sputnik III prompted the creation of Project 581—to develop and launch China’s

first satellite. Although the effort would take over eleven years to bear fruit, Qian’s personal

leadership in the design, development, and successful launch of China’s first satellite, Dong

Fang Hong (DFH-1), is undisputed. The chief result of this effort, after the satellite itself, was the coincidental development

of China’s first civil (and later commercial) launch vehicles, th

Chang Zheng (CZ series). The CZ-1 evolved directly from the DF-4 IRBM (also known as

the CSS-3).24 On 24 April 1970, the DFH-1 was successfully launched atop a CZ-1 threestage booster, making China only the fifth country to conduct satellite operations.25 On 1 May 1970, Qian was “hailed as a hero” by

Mao amidst much fanfare in Tiananmen Square.26

In the subsequent decades, China’s space program made impressive gains, in part

due to the new stability that followed Deng Xiaoping’s ascendance in 1978–79.

However, one of Deng’s important initiatives was to cut military spending—a factor that probably encouraged China’s missileers to examine the possibility of supplementing government funding with revenue from commercial launches. In 1985

the nearly simultaneous Challenger disaster and failure of Europe’s flagship Ariane

booster provided new international demand for China’s launch services. Moreover

Beijing in April 1992 undertook Project 921 (a PLA designation)—the manned

space program—giving additional impetus to China’s overall space efforts.27 The

rise of Jiang Zemin, a technocrat and confirmed space enthusiast, over the course

of the 1990s also accelerated the Chinese space program.

The success of the CZ series has continued nearly unabated for over thirty years and

has produced an extensive family of launch vehicles, with over twelve distinct types an

more under development.28 The follow-on to the CZ-1, known as the CZ-2, is the civil

ian, commercial version of the DF-5 (or CSS-4) ICBM; it now has a twenty-five-year

Dong Fang Hong (The East is Red)

Chang Zheng (Long March)

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thousand kilograms in low earth orbit (LEO) and 2,500 kilograms in sun-synchr

orbit.30 The launch vehicle chosen for the Shenzhou manned missions was the C

two-stage rocket with four strap-on boosters, capable of lifting over nineteen tho

pounds to LEO.31 This rocket has flown successfully five times since 1999, culmin

in the launch of Shenzhou V. Through Qian, therefore, the launch vehicle carryi

Lieutenant Colonel Yang, and with him the hopes of Project 921, can trace its lin

directly back to the earliest DF ballistic missiles. Moreover, according to Joan Joh

Freese of the Naval War College, “The symbiotic nature of the technology and th

tertwined nature of the Chinese military and civil space program allowed parallel 

opment of a missile/launcher for dual application purposes.”32

Notwithstanding such triumphs, China suffered a series of launch failures during 

1990s that made its commercial satellite launch industry virtually uninsurable. Sub

quently, suspicions that American satellite technologies were being illegally transfe

China by U.S. satellite manufacturers led to a Congressional investigation which b

known as the Cox Committee. The commission’s report, issued in May 1999, charg

that China had dramatically improved its launch vehicle reliability and warhead m

turization through a coordinated program of espionage, both in China and at Am

national laboratories.33 The “Cox Report” has proven immensely controversial, rec

ample criticism from a range of scholars and policy analysts.34 Much of this criticis

however, has attacked the report’s context and tone (“The [Chinese Communist Pa

main aim for the civilian economy is to support . . . the aims of the PLA”) rather th

puting allegations concerning Chinese “information gathering” practices or the ex

control violations for which Loral Space & Communications and the Hughes Spac

Telecommunications Company ultimately paid multimillion-dollar fines.35

Regardless of the Cox Report’s claims, it is worth noting that China has not suffe

major launch failure since allegedly receiving assistance from Loral and Hughes. 

has become one of the global leaders in commercial satellite launchers, with ove

seven successful attempts by October 2000.36 A source of much-needed revenue f

China’s space program, commercial satellite

launches also provide a mechanism for space 

eration (and technology acquisition) with in

tional partners, among them Germany, France, Brazil, and countries of the

former Soviet bloc. Additionally, China has fielded several series of its ow

ellites. The DFH family of communication satellites w

soon joined by the Fanhui Shi Weixing (or FSW) recov

able military reconnaissance satellites and by the Feng

(FY) meteorological satellites.

Fanhui Shi Weixing (Return Type Satellite)

Fengyun (Wind and Cloud)

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influence was even broader. He also had a hand in other programs of great military im

portance, including antiship cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, and the development

of the tracking, telemetry, and control network used to monitor military, civilian, and

commercial space launches.37 Qian officially retired in October 1991, but his presence i

still felt in both the Chinese space program and within the Second Artillery Corps. It is

too easy to compare Qian Xuesen to Werner Von Braun in the United States or Sergei P

Korolev in the Soviet Union.38 A more appropriate analogy might be to Admiral

Hyman P. Rickover, the father of the American nuclear navy and a figure who also

loomed larger than life, a presence in every aspect of the nuclear program. Of Qian’s

legacy, three lasting imprints on the development of China’s ballistic missile and space

programs have been noted:

• Confidence that China can match the West in its technological development

• Top priority for the strategic nuclear and missile industries in the defense industria

hierarchy

• A forward-looking approach, bold in its engineering ambitions, to defense science

and technology strategy.39

Escape Velocity: Reaping the Benefits of Interdependence

Whereas Qian Xuesen was the best-understood link in the commingled history of the

development of China’s space and ballistic missile programs, the “activities and tests in

the former used to advance objectives in the latter” form the basis for concern today.40

Qian and his “activities” had woven an intricate, inseparable relationship between the

two programs, one that continues to reap benefits for China’s strategic nuclear modernization now under way. Those military benefits have yielded direct qualitative improvements in ICBM accuracy, range, and survivability.41 In fact, two recent examples

of ICBM improvements are directly attributable to this civil-military nexus.

Currently only three types of ICBMs in the Chinese inventory are capable of striking the continental United States from bases in China: two versions of the liquidfuel DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1 and Mod 2) and the new solid-fuel DF-31. Though first

successfully flown in September 1971, the twelve-thousand-kilometer DF-5

achieved initial operating capability only in 1981, its development and production

having been prolonged to ten years by the Cultural Revolution.42 An improved version, the DF-5A, extends this range a thousand kilometers. Both are identical copies of what ultimately became the CZ-2C commercial booster, which was

codeveloped during this period. Their single warheads and the silo-basing (and

two-hour fueling) requirements were but two of shortcomings that led to the

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bly rail-) mobile DF-31 is the land-based version of the Julang 2 (JL-2) subm

launched ballistic missile (see chapter 2). The missile is rep

to be MIRV capable, using the smaller seven-hundred-kilog

one-megaton warhead developed for the JL-1 SLBM develop

the 1980s.43 The DF-31 is reportedly now being fielded in small numbers; a lon

range variant (twelve thousand kilometers) is in development.44

Emerson Niou of Duke University has offered an innovative theory suggesting th

Chinese strategic planners now have the elements a potential fourth delivery sys

one with roots in the early satellite development program. Modern development 

solid rocket motors (SRMs) in China dates back some forty years. This technolo

used in the FG-2 third (upper) stage of the first CZ-1 launch vehicle, as part of t

DFH-1 satellite program of the early 1970s.45 The CZ-1D production line having 

cently been reopened for ostensibly civil, commercial launches, the Second Artil

Corps could replace the satellite payload on the CZ-1D with a seven-hundred-ki

warhead. Since the CZ-1D is directly descended from the DF-4 IRBM, such com

tion of an FG-2 SRM third stage and JL-1 warhead would extend the range of th

sile to that of an ICBM.46 To be sure, the CZ-1D (DF-4) still possesses a liquid-fu

stage and thus requires a fixed launch site and fueling infrastructure. However, th

atively rapid conversion and upgrade of an existing launch vehicle would provid

Second Artillery with the ability to increase dramatically the numbers of its ICB

Why might such an option be important to Chinese strategic planners? Clear

China is alarmed at U.S. efforts to deploy a ballistic-missile defense system (

chapter 4 in this volume). By rapidly expanding the ICBM force through IRB

conversion and using the MIRV capability of the DF-31, Beijing may well ho

saturate American missile defenses, to overcome the strategic impact of BMD

through sheer volume, thereby preserving the deterrent quality of its force.47

The second recent ICBM breakthrough concerns the survivability aspect of the n

road-mobile DF-31. Thanks to SRM technology, the DF-31 has the mobility, wit

transporter-erector launchers, to reduce its vulnerability to targeting in the earli

stages of hostilities, and even, possibly, to evade a counterstrike. This degree of s

strike capability would give Chinese strategic planners options, overcoming wha

now considered the “use-or-lose” nature of the twenty or so fixed-site DF-5s.48 A

tionally, the DF-31 SRMs offer operational flexibility, not having to be fueled, lik

DF-5, immediately prior to use.

The relationship between China’s space program and its strategic nuclear forces ef

tively adds space warfare to the options before Chinese strategic planners—an opt

Julang 2 (Great Wave)

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Beijing clearly appreciates the role space has played in recent conflicts—from DESERT

STORM to the present day—and intends to develop space-based defense and intelligence

assets to support its strategic nuclear modernization efforts. To that end, several new

families of satellites are under development—including radar imaging, electronic reconnaissance, and electro-optical reconnaissance types—all of which will improve current

space-based ISR capabilities.49 Here again, cooperation with international partners under

ostensibly civil frameworks has yielded another military application: “In January 2003,

the Chinese launched their second Zi Yuan (ZY-2) photoreconnaissance satellite, capable

of resolution in the range of ten to twenty centimeters. It is a military version of a satellite jointly developed by China and Brazil for remote sensing (the ZY-1, or China Brazil

Earth Resource Satellite [CBERS])—evidence of how development of a civil program can

have clear military benefit.”50

In fact, yet another Chinese product of SRM technology is the small, solid-fuel

Kaituozhe 1 and 2 (KT-1/2) satellite launch vehicle, designed to provide rapid reliable

access to space in times of crisis or increased ISR requirements.51 According to China Defense Today, the Kaituozhe is

“possibly based on the technology of the DF-31” ICBM.52 Also

instrumental to China’s pursuit of space influence is the development of microsatellite

technology designed to reduce lift requirements sharply. It may improve China’s already demonstrated ability to place multiple satellites in orbit with a single launcher.53

Moreover, a larger constellation of smaller satellites would theoretically increase individual satellite survivability in space, being less susceptible to antisatellite (ASAT)

weapons.54 Improved space-based ISR will have a significant impact on targeting for

both regional and global scenarios. Combining rapid launch capability with improved

ground processing capacity could allow real-time imaging that would provide decision

makers much-needed information in the prehostilities phase of any conflict.55

China is attempting to reduce its reliance on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)

satellite network by joining Europe’s competing Galileo project. Meanwhile, Beijing ha

developed a rudimentary two-satellite supplement to GPS known as

Beidou. This may ultimately insulate the PLA against restrictions

upon GPS in wartime, as well as increase the accuracy of conventional and strategic systems.

China has taken much interest in the 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess

United States National Security Space Management and Organization, a report of a

panel chaired by the current secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. China, while

officially taking a position against weaponization of space, seems nevertheless to be

Kaituozhe 1 and 2 (Explorer)

Beidou (Big Dipper)

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ceivably for space-based missile defense.56 According to a senior fellow at the

Jamestown Foundation, “China needs to be able to deny to the United States 

and use of space, as they themselves expect to be able to support their own

forces.”57 To that end, the Chinese are “seeking to minimize the space technol

gap with the United States.”58 Integral to these efforts appears, once again, to 

acquisition of foreign technology:

Beijing already may have acquired technical assistance that could be applied to the developmen

radars used to track and image satellites and may be seeking an advanced radar system with th

bility to track satellites in low earth orbit. It may also be developing jammers that could be use

against Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. In addition, China may already possess th

bility to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerab

damage by laser. Beijing may also have acquired high-energy laser equipment and technical assis

which probably could be used in the development of ground-based ASAT weapons.59

For a nation struggling with modernizing its industrial base and raising its techn

standards, all the while asserting itself on the world stage, it seems only reasonab

seek foreign assistance in order to buy time to prepare its own technological base

sidering that 95 percent of space technologies are potentially dual-use, sharing te

ogy between the space program and the military is perfectly logical.60

Of course, codevelopment of ICBMs and civilian rockets was not invented by th

nese. One could even argue that the real beneficiary of the civil-military overla

the growing civilian, commercial booster family—the CZ-1 and CZ-2, derived 

the DF-4 and DF-5, respectively. The early U.S. space program relied heavily on

ICBM-derived launchers until purpose-built rockets like the Saturn V could be d

oped.61 In fact, the R-7 rocket used today by the Russians to loft Soyuz capsules t

International Space Station (ISS) is little changed from the SS-6 Sapwood ICBM b

that placed Yuri Gagarin in orbit (and in the history books) over forty years ago.

China’s exploitation of space as a war-fighting medium may be simply a respons

the stunning battlefield success enjoyed in recent years by the United States with 

based assets. Prudence would therefore dictate that if one expects to face a space

competitor like the United States, development of space weapons might be a goo

vestment of limited resources. Nonetheless, disturbing characteristics of China’s 

woven military and civil space programs remain, in three respects.

First, unlike other contemporary space programs, which relate to a country’s mil

establishment at some level, the Chinese space program has been described as “d

in the degree of its military involvement, the extent of its military functions, and 

scale of its military significance.”62 As such, China’s space program should be vie

not as merely related to the military but as managed by it (as should all activities

sions, and events in that context).

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technological development becomes a continuous source for cut

ting-edge innovations and general

improvements for military and

strategic systems, China will remain wedded to foreign sources.

The PRC has always demonstrated

a propensity to acquiring, adapting, and applying technology developed outside of China. The

essentially one-way flow from foreign technology sources through

civilian and commercial space applications, and ultimately to strate

gic nuclear modernization is likely

to continue for the foreseeable

future.

Third, beyond technology transfer

China clearly sees the national stra

tegic importance of a viable space

program. China desires to become

a space power and accrue all the benefits and prestige of that status, both domestically

and internationally. Despite public proclamations of peaceful intentions—the lofty

preamble to the PRC’s 2000 white paper on space is an example—the national security

motive plays a major role.63

When viewed in this light, the implications of China’s space program for strategic

nuclear modernization now under way become clear. China’s space ambitions will

continue to serve as the vehicle for the acquisition, adaptation, and application of

space-related technologies for military purposes.

The New Domain of the Dragon: Shenzhou and Beyond

The first manned flight of Shenzhou on 14 October 2003—the capstone event of Project 921—was, predictably, a conservative, risk-averse, and brief (twenty-one-hour,

fourteen-orbit) mission, carrying only Lieutenant Colonel Yang.64 After all, this flight

was intended simply to validate the spacecraft’s systems—or was it? According to one

report, the spacecraft also deployed a “new Chinese military intelligence-gathering satellite.”65 Is this a key mission of Project 921 (properly, the National Manned Space

Source: Chinese Defence Today

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be like? What will come after Shenzhou, and how will future programs relate to t

overall Chinese strategy for space?

China being only the third nation to achieve human space flight, only two other 

programs are available to serve as models for comparison. Both the United State

Russia (and the USSR before it) can lay claim to certain “firsts” in space. During 

Cold War space race each country followed its own strategy and built a space pro

that was based on its respective culture, ideology, goals, capabilities, and resourc

intense competition that ensued reveals in retrospect the strengths and weakness

and ultimately insight into, the two programs, and so represents a lens through w

to view the nascent Chinese program. Already Project 921 has reflected characte

of both the early American and Soviet programs in terms of appearance, method

aspiration, and ultimate purpose. Which program better “fits” what China is doi

(and therefore might be a predictive model) is not yet clear. China may yet choo

entirely different path.

A Soviet Model

With the demise of their manned lunar-landing program in the early 1970s, the 

recognized the limited utility of the Soyuz capsule for living and working in spac

The design is highly suitable, however, as a space ferry; in that role it continues t

largely unaltered, to service the ISS. Before that, the Soviet Union used the Soyuz

docking techniques were perfected, to ferry cosmonauts to and from the Salyut s

stations. The Salyut stations of the 1970s and 1980s, centerpieces of the post–mo

race Soviet manned space program, were the precursors of the highly successful 

Of the seven then-operational Salyuts ultimately built, Salyuts 2, 3, and 5 are com

monly referred to as the “military Salyuts” for their highly secretive military surv

lance roles.67 The distinctive feature of the military Salyuts was a separate recove

module on the forward end of the spacecraft—the docking module was aft. The 

module presumably served to transfer film canisters and other forms of collected 

from the station back to earth. Experience gained from the military Salyuts was m

than likely applied to next-generation Soviet space-based ISR systems, both man

and unmanned.68

The Chinese began developing the Shenzhou in the 1990s, largely with Russian a

tance. Though the Chinese assert that it is an indigenous design, Shenzhou is in 

scaled-up version of the Soyuz, capable of accommodating up to three yuhangyu

they are to progress to the more ambitious projects they have announced, the Ch

are likely to outgrow the Shenzhou rapidly. Because the Shenzhou is basically of 

sian design, the Chinese have also purchased the Kurs androgynous docking syst

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gether, or one to a larger space station.

Just as its first manned spacecraft resembles a Soyuz, will China’s first space station be

reminiscent of a Soviet Salyut, at least in function? It is too early to tell; however, aside

from the military satellite placed in orbit along with the Shenzhou capsule, an indication

exists that a move in that direction is already apparent. As early as 15 February 2003,

General Li Jinai’s predecessor, Zhang Houying, publicly acknowledged that while no scientific experiments would be carried on board Shenzhou V, mounted on the exterior of

the spacecraft would be “a CCD [charge-coupled device] transmission camera, with a

ground resolution of 1.6 meters. Its main use will be in military reconnaissance.”71

Space American Style

Whatever Beijing’s ultimate intentions, China will have to master orbital maneuver,

rendezvous, and docking. Without them the Chinese manned space program will

quickly become a quaint throwback to the earliest manned space missions of the Soviets and Americans. The Chinese appear determined to apply a step-by-step, exceedingly cautious approach. In the early Soviet program, Premier Nikita Khrushchev,

obsessed with timing space events for maximum political gain, frustrated his engineers

(Korolev among them) by pushing for high-flying “circus acts.”72 These events, staged

for propaganda value, became the ends themselves, rather than means of achieving sys

tematic program goals.

While international acclaim and recognition, as well as domestic politics, are surely im

portant to them, the Chinese have modeled their program instead after the triumphan

American space effort of the 1960s. The Chinese have constituted their program, assembled their infrastructure, and developed and tested their spacecraft and techniques

in an incremental fashion reminiscent of Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. As illustrated by the unmanned Shenzhou launches, a logical, methodical approach marks each

mission. The Chinese can be expected to carry out their ambitious program with a steadfas

singularity of purpose, each phase a necessary building block to some future goal.

That individual characteristics of the Chinese space program have roots in the Soviet

or American programs does not in itself portend a menacing future. China may conclude, as did the United States in the 1960s and the Soviets in the late 1970s, that a

manned ISR platform in space is neither economical nor sensible in light of the advan

tages afforded by unmanned satellites. Additionally, although appearing to mirror the

goal-oriented approach taken by the United States in its own moon quest, China may

have determined that such a course would not be sustainable. The United States

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reality may force Beijing to scale back its more grandiose space-exploration aspir

Yet when considered in the aggregate, these characteristics take on a new meanin

synergy of combining civil and military functions in its manned space program 

prove irresistible to Beijing. Until a robotic substitute can be developed and field

meet China’s remote-sensing and targeting needs, its manned space program ma

shoulder part of this mission. It might indeed be some time before a true distinc

appears between China’s civil exploration of space and military exploitation of t

“new high ground,” if it ever does.

What of China’s potential plans to land on the moon? According to Robert S. Wa

former chairman of the House Science Committee,

The Chinese have a long history of undertaking projects designed to enhance their national im

[A] nation with the technological capacity to do a sustained moon program would have achie

ability to build, integrate and utilize spacecraft. Without even ascribing any hostile intent to su

pability, our strategic planners would have to acknowledge the profound impact on the balan

power. . . . Space dominance is a twenty-first century challenge we dare not refuse.74

The Real Legacy of Qian

China’s achievement of a place among the true space-faring nations caps a half-c

effort and well deserves the international acclaim that has been forthcoming. No

less, the military significance of the event cannot be overlooked.

The Second Artillery Corps of the PLA is sure to benefit from the panoply of new 

nologies associated with this emerging capability. Each new cooperative agreeme

tween China and any of its space partners—Russia, France, and Germany among

them—means potential assistance to its nuclear modernization. It is naive to acc

face value public statements that the Chinese space program arises merely from 

peaceful aspirations of a nation ascendant, seeking to expand the realm of scient

knowledge. To ignore the strategic nuclear implications of any new space breakth

or capability—including Shenzhou—would be irresponsible.

It is not difficult to see the military implications of China’s civil space program. 

program is not only managed by the PLA but was born in the same cradle as the 

tic missile program, dating back to 1956. The space program certainly owes muc

early development to its older sibling, but it is now repaying the debt with intere

Further, and though it is steadily closing the technology gap with the West, Chin

relies on foreign technology for military modernization; the symbiotic relationsh

tween the two programs will continue to produce net gains in the acquisition, ad

tion, and application of foreign military technology. Such a gain has been recent

improvement in the range, accuracy, and survivability of the ICBM force. China 

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weapons. Its manned space program appears poised to support that exploitation as well.

Missile and space codevelopment, once indispensably led by Qian Xuesen, has endured

obstacles and impediments, mainly to internal factors, over the past forty-eight years.

Yet Qian’s lasting legacy may be that he created the interdependence that exists betwee

the two programs. China’s relative economic prosperity and the growing scope and

successes of its diplomacy (for instance, with the European Union) now place Beijing

in an optimal position to reap the full benefits of that synergy. Accordingly, China today is at once reaching out into space and modernizing its strategic nuclear forces.

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China’s BMD Countermeasures

Breaching America’s Great Wall in Space?

ANDREW S. ERICKSON

A significant component of contemporary naval transformation involves adaptin

force to meet the emerging ballistic missile defense challenge.1

With the advent o

based BMD, the U.S. Navy has entered a new era. One naval strategist views the a

of “missile defense task forces” within the surface warfare community as being o

with the dramatically successful transformation of the submarine force led by A

Arthur W. Radford in the 1950s to embrace the strategic deterrence mission.2

Fo

reason, maritime forces are poised to play a critical role in securing American in

from the growing threat of missile attack in a variety of regions around the glob

Northeast Asia, the 2004 deployment of an Aegis cruiser equipped with the SM-

(Standard Missile 3) for continuous patrol in the Sea of Japan heralded the dawn 

this new chapter in naval warfare.

Northeast Asia represents a highly complex military and diplomatic environmen

the United States. What impact will the U.S. Navy’s BMD initiative have on the v

region? What will be the larger geopolitical consequences of U.S. BMD as its arch

ture continues to evolve? BMD’s significance for North Korea is frequently discu

and is relatively straightforward; it is, rather, China’s reaction to American BMD

cluding its naval component, that will have the most profound impact on global 

tics in the twenty-first century.

The question of whether U.S. BMD could or should address China-related co

gencies was raised by a debate in 2002 between two respected China specialis

Heritage Foundation vice president Larry Wortzel and Council on Foreign R

tions senior fellow Adam Segal. Wortzel advocated constructing BMD with C

in mind, arguing that “building a missile shield now will head off Chinese nu

blackmail later.” Segal opposed building BMD specifically against China, arg

that “setting up an antimissile system aimed at the Chinese will leave the Un

CHAPTER FOUR

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mains unresolved.

The United States has invested in BMD development sporadically since the 1950s, but

with little consensus regarding its limitations or ultimate purpose. Questions of overal

system effectiveness aside, the debate has centered on which nations would constitute

the proper “targets” of such a system. While some of BMD’s strongest proponents con

tend that a robust multi-tier system is readily achievable and could ultimately protect

the United States from all intercontinental missiles, many policy makers have been con

cerned about the costs and benefits—and even the feasibility—of defending against

certain threats. Virtually all missile-defense supporters believe that it is possible to defend the United States against missiles launched from the territory of rogue states, but

regarding China there is much less consensus.

This chapter addresses China’s likely countermeasures against U.S. BMD and their implications. The purpose is not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the merits of investing in BMD per se but rather to explore how current investments can be made to

yield the greatest security dividends for the United States given present geopolitical realities. It begins by outlining the American BMD debate as it relates to China, reviewing the evolution of BMD and countermeasures, and considering the potential impact

of ballistic missile defense on China’s nuclear strategy. There follows a detailed discussion of China’s potential BMD countermeasures and a comparison of American and

Chinese missile-defense strategies. Finally, the chapter offers conclusions and policy

recommendations—for the nation and the U.S. Navy.

Uncertainty in U.S. BMD Strategy

Despite China’s potentially growing importance to American nuclear strategy, its relation to missile defense remains unclear. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations

have stated that American BMD is not intended to “target” China.4

A nascent America

missile defense could not block a barrage of Russia’s several thousand ICBMs,5

but it

could conceivably block a significant portion of the approximately thirty-two Chinese

missiles currently estimated to be capable of striking the continental United States.6

Recent American administrations have repeatedly and energetically attempted to reassure Russia that it is not a target of U.S. ballistic missile defense.7

Russia has apparently

acquiesced to the construction of a U.S. national missile defense system. But China’s

situation is more problematic. While American policy officially states that BMD’s purpose is to protect the nation against rogue states, many believe that its ultimate purpose is to constrain China. “While Washington does not mention Chinese missiles as a

justification for missile defense,” it has been pointed out, “some private analysts do.”8

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For example, military scholar James Hentz asserts, 

The U.S. NMD [national mi

defense], from a strategic and deterrent perspective, is essentially about China.”9

ington Times reporter Bill Gertz declares that

because China is sharply building up its missile forces, a U.S. national missile defense directed 

countering China must be deployed as soon as possible. China has shown no willingness to cu

building of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles, and the development and deployment o

ican missile defense to counter them must be speeded up. The missile defenses will neutralize 

element of China’s program of power: nuclear missiles, both intercontinental and regional.10

Still other American analysts, a Chinese nuclear strategist notes, “argue that the 

should not care about China’s reactions to NMD development and deployment b

cause China will modernize its nuclear force in any case.”11

The question of whether BMD can help defend against China has also attrac

attention of Congress. In this context, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) has reported

clared that “China may be one of the countries that we will have to protect a

one day.”12 In May 1999 the House of Representatives Select Committee on Nat

Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 

as the “Cox Committee,” asserted in a lengthy report that China was making rap

progress in ICBM development. Many in Washington now cite the report as evid

of the need for BMD to deter Chinese aggression.

At the same time, however, the report also emphasized Chinese advances in BMD co

measures. The Cox Committee postulated that China seeks to threaten America’s str

capability by developing more advanced ICBMs and, possibly, developing technolog

feat a future American missile-defense system. The vulnerability of China’s silo-base

missiles has prompted Beijing to begin developing a road-m

solid-propellant version, the committee asserted—as part o

larger modernization program.13

As the Cox Report also noted, statements by Chinese officials demonstrate that C

is opposed to the development of both U.S. NMD and theater missile defense (T

systems (such as one to protect Taiwan) that could counter Beijing’s currently lim

nuclear forces. China is already pursuing a variety of means to preserve its nucle

pability. China’s future initiatives could include expanding its ballistic missile for

developing penetration aids, maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs), or multipl

dependently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The first would be intended to c

a missile defense system, the second to outmaneuver it, and the third to overwhe

The Cox Committee projected that “within 15 years” China could deploy an “IC

force consisting of up to 100 ICBMs.”14 The committee further argued that “the 

sive development of a MIRV system by the PRC could permit the deployment of

DF-5 (Dong Feng/East Wind)

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the report elaborated, require smaller warheads than China has yet deployed.

By contrast, Countermeasures, a detailed report produced by the Union of Concerned

Scientists and the Security Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, contends that “the planned NMD system would not be effective against a Chinese

attack” because China

has indicated that it would take steps to permit it to penetrate the planned NMD system. China woul

likely respond by deploying more long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States. More sig

nificantly, as the 1999 [U.S.] National Intelligence Estimate notes, China has developed numerous

countermeasures. The United States must therefore expect that any Chinese ballistic missile attack—

whether using existing or new missiles—would be accompanied by effective countermeasures.16

Countermeasures has been criticized by proponents of an ambitious missile defense,

but it is taken seriously in China. A popular textbook on ballistic missile design written

by a popular professor and published by Beijing Aerospace University Press, for example, adopts wholesale the report’s conclusions on BMD penetration methods.17 In a

separate technical article, the textbook’s author concludes:

The NMD system’s interception methods reveal some inherent system flaws. These inherent flaws

should be closely considered, as countermeasures are to be determined. The above-mentioned methods were only brief introductions from relevant literature abroad. In research of the NMD countermeasures, our own practice should be combined and integrated with these known measures. Only by

doing so, [will] breakthroughs . . . be accomplished.18

Countermeasures was translated into Chinese and published by Beijing’s National Defense University Press the same year that it appeared in the United States.19 This seems

to suggest that a new generation of top Chinese missile engineers is being taught that

“‘Nothing is hard enough not to be destroyed,’ ‘Attack is always easier than defense,’

and ‘Attack is the best defense.’”20

Chinese analysts have closely followed the American debate over BMD and its relation

ship with China policy.21 They are concerned about the implications for their nation’s

nuclear deterrent: “By 1996 there was rising concern in many circles in China that

America’s BMD strategy in Asia was being pursued as part of a covert containment

policy toward China.”22 Indeed, Qinghua University strategists Wu Rui and Li Bin emphasize that “U.S. NMD deployment is a new element that concerns China about the

effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.”23 China is therefore carefully studying America’

BMD development and appears to be actively planning a set of counterstrategies.

A Survey of BMD and Countermeasures Development

Ironically, U.S. ballistic-missile-defense deployment originated with China in mind.24

The first competitive impetus for missile defense emerged in 1966, when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced Moscow’s deployment of the Galosh system.25

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President Lyndon B. Johnson felt pressured to respond, but had to acknowledge 

America’s available response—the SENTINEL system—could not defend adequate

against Soviet ICBMs. By contrast, China, though a growing nuclear and politica

threat, had yet to develop ICBMs. On 18 September 1967, McNamara delivered a

speech at the San Francisco Press Club that argued against the possibility of defe

against Soviet missiles but for the potential to “defend against the predicted sma

nese ICBM threat and accidental launches.”26

The Chinese rationale proved inadequate for President Richard M. Nixon, who d

SENTINEL deployment in order to review nuclear programs, before approving it 

next month as “SAFEGUARD.” The Senate barely approved deployment in August 

with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting a tie-breaking vote.

In May 1972 Washington and Moscow signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) T

which prohibited national missile defense but permitted each party two missile d

sites, each with a maximum of one hundred interceptors. In July 1974, by mutua

agreement, sites were reduced to one each.

SAFEGUARD began operation in Grand Forks, North Dakota, on 1 October 1975 

was closed by the House of Representatives the following day. Three months late

Senate concurred. In an ironic twist of fate, it was Defense Secretary Donald Rum

who announced SAFEGUARD’s demise, which was completed in 1978. The progra

fallen victim to a growing antinuclear movement and to fears that its nuclear int

tors—themselves a potential source of fallout—would serve as a magnet for Sov

tack. The North Dakota site had been chosen because citizens of more populous 

such as Washington, D.C., had refused to accept that risk.

It was President Ronald Reagan who resurrected NMD, rekindling a debate that 

ues to this day. Reagan introduced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in a dram

speech on 23 March 1983 that surprised even members of his cabinet. On 24 Ap

1984, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger signed the Strategic Defense Initiativ

ganization (SDIO) charter. Reagan injected deliberate uncertainty by threatenin

render the USSR’s nuclear arsenal “impotent and obsolete.”27 While the technica

munity was divided over SDI’s viability, many American and Soviet politicians a

zens were convinced that it would prove workable. Some Soviet scientists may ha

been skeptical, but their nation’s loss of the space race and its declining power de

them of the credibility to undermine Reagan’s claims. Moscow’s “ABM system, th

losh, was perceived as obsolete, while [its] economic capacity to engage in a new 

race in NMD was already deemed suspect.”28

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helped the United States to win the Cold War, by pressuring the Kremlin. But since

then, the metrics have shifted. NMD is now judged primarily on its anticipated effectiveness. Unfortunately, it has evolved somewhat fitfully, because of political vicissitudes and a resulting lack of consistent vision as to its ultimate architecture and use.

Phase I of the current U.S. NMD program occurred at the end of Reagan’s presidency,

between 1987 and 1989;29 thousands of ground- and space-based interceptors were envisioned to help deter a Soviet first strike. Phase II was President George H. W. Bush’s

1989–92 program for Global-Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS proposed hundreds of ground- and space-based interceptors to guard against accidental o

unauthorized launch. Bush also reduced the Soviet nuclear threat, by signing the

START I treaty, arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with Premier Mikhail

Gorbachev, on 31 July 1989, by which each nation’s arsenal fell to six thousand deployed strategic warheads. The START II agreement, which Bush later signed with the

Russian Federation’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, further reduced deployed strategic

warheads, to between three thousand and 3,500.

President Bill Clinton’s two terms, corresponding to Phases III and IV, reflected both a

struggle to adapt the U.S. military to a changing post–Cold War world and a pragmatic

noncommittal attitude toward missile defense. In May 1993, as if to signal a retreat

from Reagan’s SDI ambitions, Defense Secretary Les Aspin renamed SDIO the Ballistic

Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Phase III, known as “Technology Readiness,”

entailed the development of technology to expedite deployment of a ground-based sys

tem between 1993 and 1995 but without fully committing the nation to such a system.

Two Chinese analysts have recently cited cost concerns as underlying the Clinton administration’s hesitation to deploy NMD.30

Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.), who ran against Clinton in the 1996 presidential election, did not succeed in making the administration’s lack of enthusiasm for NMD an

issue.31 Dole was trying to build on a near success on 15 February 1995, when the

House of Representatives approved legislation requiring NMD deployment as rapidly

as technically possible. A similar measure failed in March 1996 because of cost. Pressure from congressional Republicans, nevertheless, prompted Clinton to devote Phase

IV, from 1996 to 1999, to “Deployment Readiness,” by integrating systems so as to allow possible deployment of tens of exclusively ground-based interceptors. Clinton left

the decision of whether to deploy them to his successor.

President George W. Bush made NMD a 2000 campaign issue and has since withdrawn

the nation from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and pushed an ambitious

multi-tier defense system designed to incorporate ultimately hundreds of ground

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based interceptors. Already partially tested by BMDO

s successor, the Missile De

Agency (MDA), the system achieved its first stage of deployment in October 200

when six interceptors were placed in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska. Its scope, purpo

effectiveness remain matters of heated debate.

Countermeasures Programs

In several major reports concerning BMD—such as Countermeasures, The APS S

and Technical Realities, panels of distinguished physicists have argued that China 

even other BMD opponents may well be able to exploit inherent asymmetries of 

ics to defeat BMD: “The defense faces the extremely difficult task of assessing an

sponding to an attack that is explicitly designed to defeat it. The attack may have

characteristics quite different from anything that has been anticipated or that th

fense has been tested against. And the defense will have to respond quickly and s

fully the first time it is tried.”32

American countermeasures development started around 1958 and by 1964 was c

suming the equivalent of two billion dollars annually in advanced research on de

chaff, and other countermeasures.33 As the Cold War subsequently threatened to 

up, the United States produced decoys for the Atlas F and Titan 2 ICBMs and for 

MIRV “buses” of the Minuteman ICBM and the Poseidon submarine-launched b

tic missile. When first deployed in 1971 the Poseidon SLBM could carry as many 

fourteen MIRVs, giving the U.S. Navy confidence that it could defeat Moscow’s a

able hundred interceptors. The United States also developed other SLBM counte

sures, such as the Trident’s Mark 500 MARV. All current U.S. ICBMs likely have

countermeasure capacity.

Aware of BMD’s potential weaknesses, the United Kingdom and France, like oth

vanced nuclear-weapons states have long pursued sophisticated countermeasure

tiatives; research remains highly classified, but broad outlines have emerged. Brit

and French countermeasures programs were more limited, being focused on Mo

Britain’s Polaris SLBMs, which entered phased retirement in 1995, employed the 

vanced CHEVALINE system. CHEVALINE carried two warheads and four decoys (e

rocket-motored to facilitate simultaneous reentry), all six of which may have bee

closed in gas-filled metal-coated balloons” to be released among many empty ba

While lack of indigenous SLBM production experience ultimately caused Londo

seek American help in developing the system’s maneuvering bus, CHEVALINE’s so

cation alone is impressive. Britain’s current Trident II SLBMs, the basis of its lon

range missile force, may employ even more advanced countermeasures. France’s 

warhead S-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile and M-20 SLBM also used deco

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and apparently boasts “nuclear hardening and reduced radar cross sections.”

Sophisticated countermeasures development has been the province of the United

States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—as well as, to some extent, China, the

related initiatives of which are addressed below. There seems to be a consensus that de

veloping states would not likely be capable of fielding sophisticated countermeasures

(not only for boost phase, the most difficult, but also for midcourse and terminal

phases) without significant assistance or outright purchase from such aerospace powers as China or Russia. According to a report prepared for BMDO, in the absence of

such mentoring, planners in rogue states tend to “exploit existing information . . . [;]

[e]mphasize available technology . . . even if [it] is considered ‘obsolete’ or ‘low-tech’ b

the West[; c]hoose simple solutions over ‘high tech’ ones to countermeasure requirements [;] and [a]dopt a broad range of countermeasures initially and then rely on sub

sequent combat experience to prove which are more effective.”34

Even if such states obtained them for prestige purposes, without effective testing countermeasures might prove impossible to use successfully. Few American experts seem to

argue that rogue states, with their resource and technical limitations, would be capable

of reliably defeating a robust, even if limited, U.S. missile defense.

Relative Countermeasure Vulnerability of BMD Phases

BMD intercept is divided into three categories: the boost, midcourse, and terminal

phases of an enemy missile’s flight. Some scientists and other experts are especially

concerned about the possibility that U.S. BMD could be foiled in the midcourse and

terminal phases. Midcourse intercept is the current focus of the evolving American

NMD system and hence today the most fully developed. However, according to Richar

Garwin, an experimental physicist who has assisted the U.S. government with missile

defense since the 1950s, emphasis on midcourse intercept is misguided, because “the

countermeasures are all too simple. The money and skill needed to implement them

are trivial compared with the effort required to design, build, and care for the ICBMs

themselves.”35 In fact, Garwin contends, America’s “present missile defense approach is

utterly useless against ICBMs of new or existing nuclear powers because midcourse

countermeasures are so effective.” To be sure, Garwin’s claims may apply more to Chin

than to (less technologically capable) rogue states. But Garwin’s experience as chair of

the State Department Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board from 1994

to 2001 and as a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile

Threat to the United States in 1998 merit that his assessment be considered seriously.

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Terminal phase intercept is even more problematic, because the need to distingu

tween incoming missiles and decoys requires the system to wait until atmospher

entry to attempt interception, leaving little margin for error. It requires position

interceptors no more than fifty kilometers from the targets they defend, potentia

volving an exorbitant number of interceptors to protect even a small percentage 

nation’s vulnerable sites. Also, by the time of atmospheric reentry, incoming mis

could already have deployed multiple warheads or submunitions (e.g., biologica

ons). In any case intercepting nuclear weapons at this late stage could blanket Am

can territory with fallout.

The one aspect of BMD, then, that many of its critics—including Garwin and an 

spoken specialist at MIT, Professor Theodore Postol—have endorsed is boost-ph

tercept, primarily because it is very difficult to use countermeasures at this stage

Garwin points out, “credible decoys cannot be released from the ICBM while the

rocket is still firing—they would soon be left behind.” The American Physical So

concludes that while “such [extremely advanced] countermeasures as multiple la

[including that of dummy missiles], maneuvering, rotation, ablative coatings, or 

shortening could be used during boost phase,” nonetheless “boost-phase system

tentially offer three important advantages: [1] the possibility of destroying missile

fore they can deploy multiple warheads or submunitions, [2] the presumed difficu

developing countermeasures, and [3] the ease of tracking the bright exhaust plum

ICBMs in powered flight.”36

Garwin believes that the APS study is “in reasonable agreement of my qualitative 

mates of 1999,” which led him to “urge [BMDO] . . . to abandon the midcourse d

and assign higher priority to boost-phase intercept instead.” The approval of bot

Garwin and the APS study suggests that boost-phase intercept may be worthy of 

cial consideration for future U.S. BMD systems.

BMD’s Impact on China’s Nuclear Strategy

China currently maintains a limited nuclear deterrent with a somewhat cred

second-strike capability. This is a logical outgrowth of China’s nuclear policy, an

nounced when it detonated its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964. China dev

its nuclear capability to “prevent nuclear blackmail,” “break the superpowers’ mo

oly,” and also to secure great-power status. Chairman Mao Zedong’s dialectical v

shaped Beijing’s nuclear policy. That is, Mao condemned nuclear weapons as a “

tiger” and vowed not to stockpile a large arsenal. He declared that “nuclear weap

and their delivery systems could not alter the basic nature of warfare or require t

vision of his People’s War doctrine.”37 Yet he ordered for such purposes the expen

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that China would have to develop.38 For much of the Cold War, China decried arms

control as imperialist monopolism;39 it still views many arms control agreements as inherently unequal.40 Due to dysfunctional strategic management, “until the early 1980s,

there were no scenarios, no detailed linkage of the weapons to foreign policy objectives

and no serious strategic research.”41

China has pledged never to use nuclear weapons in a first strike, and it has pointed to

the comparatively small size of its nuclear arsenal as evidence that its purpose is strictl

that retaliatory second strike. The inaccuracy of China’s initial ICBMs necessitated a

focus on countervalue, as opposed to counterforce, targeting. Throughout most of the

Cold War, including conventional hostilities with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s—

during which Moscow reportedly considered surgical strikes on China’s nuclear facilities—it was far from certain that China had a fully reliable second-strike capability,

given its relative paucity of weapons and their relative lack of sophistication (e.g., liquid fuel, etc.).

China’s leaders themselves were concerned that their second-strike capability might be

unreliable and hence not fully credible to a potential opponent. In the short term, the

People’s Liberation Army attempted to make the most of its arsenal by dispersing and

concealing its ICBMs in caves and hardened silos and by constructing decoy silos.

China’s long-term strategy was to modernize its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems

gradually, in order not to alarm its neighbors and trigger a regional arms race. Hoping

to take advantage of post–Cold War disarmament and “multipolarity” to make time fo

strategic modernization, Beijing adopted the ABM Treaty as a key link in its arms control strategy.

Ironically, China had come around to embracing the ABM Treaty just as the United

States was about to abandon it. As the Bush administration prepared to withdraw from

the ABM Treaty, China launched a diplomatic initiative to fight for its preservation.42 I

1999, Ambassador Sha Zukang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Director General, charged that “any amendment, or abolishing

of the [ABM] treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt

multilateral [e.g., Chinese] disarmament as well.”43

China’s diplomatic offensive crumbled when Russia, having few alternatives, acquiesce

to American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 in return for fairly minor

concessions.44 On 24 May 2004, Moscow and Washington signed the Strategic Offensiv

Reductions Treaty, committing each side to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads to be

tween 1,700 and 2,200 by 31 December 2012.45 Since then, China has taken a principled

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stand against missile defense but has moderated its rhetoric.

Chinas current re

silence on the issue reflects both acknowledgement of a temporary setback and o

emergence of a new calculus that if BMD cannot be prevented outright, it must 

dered harmless to China.

China contends that BMD would enable Washington to engage in “nuclear blackm

Credible U.S. BMD capabilities, if attainable, would threaten China’s current lim

deterrent. That could encourage China to rely even more heavily on secrecy and 

tion to promote nuclear deterrence, thus creating the dangerous potential for mi

lation.48 As Chinese nuclear strategist Li Bin points out, “China will most probab

maintain the policy of quantitative ambiguity as a way of protecting its nuclea

terrence until it has built up a survivable nuclear retaliatory force that relies on 

graphical ambiguity instead.”49 Long a practitioner itself of strategic ambiguity

Beijing views American uncertainty concerning its nuclear and aerospace pow

source of security.

Desire to retain its limited deterrent without a major increase in spending is onl

reason why China officially opposes U.S. ballistic missile defense. Beijing’s vocal 

tance seems in fact based far more on regional concerns than on actual fear that 

might prove effective and irrevocably neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent.50 Inde

Bin contends that the United States “will not be able to build a real national mis

fense capability quickly because some of the technical problems are difficult to s

Another analyst emphasizes that while “NMD has its tactical defense value again

emy countries’ other than major nuclear powers or intermediate-level nuclear co

tries that possess a certain long-range nuclear strike capability . . . NMD, no mat

how perfect it becomes, could not truly stop a nuclear war or a nuclear strike on 

continent.”52 Rather, China is concerned that U.S. national and theater missile-de

systems might (1) embolden Taiwan, by increasing domestic support for pro-indepe

leaders; (2) trigger Japanese rearmament, by involving Tokyo more closely in Americ

itary planning and missions—particularly those involving Taiwan; (3) consolidate A

ica’s hegemony, by making its deterrent more credible to current and potential allies

(4) undermine existing arms control initiatives.53

The United States has made only limited attempts to involve China in BMD poli

these have had little success. For instance, President Bush and members of his ad

tration have attempted to reassure China that it is not the “target” of ballistic mi

defense. Immediately after President Bush’s 1 May 2001 speech on BMD, and aga

October 2001, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly met with Chinese officials

retary of State Colin Powell met with Chinese interlocutors in July 2001. In Dece

2001, just before the United States formally announced its intent to withdraw fro

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parts. Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman followed suit in September 2002.54

President Bush himself called Jiang Zemin (then General Secretary of the Chinese

Communist Party, as well as president of the PRC and chairman of the Central Militar

Commission) to inform him that Washington would withdraw from the ABM Treaty

and “to express interest in holding strategic stability talks.”55 He later hosted Jiang at hi

ranch in Crawford, Texas. These efforts may have helped to avert the most dire Chines

suspicions, but the face-conscious Chinese government could not help noticing that

Russia had received firmer assurances, from higher-level officials, sooner than China

did. Furthermore, these reassurances tended to warn China that it had no reason to

build up its nuclear arsenal to counter BMD without addressing the issues that might

motivate precisely such a response. According to Admiral Eric McVadon (U.S. Navy,

Ret.), Secretary Powell’s arguments that the U.S. missile defense system would be limited and no threat to Chinese long-range missiles was, for the Chinese, drowned out by

other signals from outside (but close to) the administration and silence within it as to

how the concept would evolve.56

“Americans can insist that they mean no harm with national missile defense,” Council

on Foreign Relations vice president James Lindsay and Brookings Institution scholar

Michael O’Hanlon contend, “but that will not stop China and Russia from taking steps

to protect their interests.”57 In fact, new American and Russian strategic flexibility has

come at China’s expense. “The Bush administration has reportedly told the Russians

[that] they could MIRV . . . their missiles should they feel uncomfortable with U.S.

BMD plans, and, accordingly, the Russians have effectively revoked START-II in June

2002 to allow them to place multiple warheads on their strategic missiles.”58 China, by

contrast, has enjoyed none of these reassurances and accordingly feels anxious about

Washington’s and Moscow’s quests for strategic flexibility. There is increasing concern

in Beijing that with the Soviet Union gone, and despite the War on Terror, China has

become the new focus of American military pressure.59

China’s ballistic missile modernization began before it assessed that the United States would deploy a

missile defense, but China likely will take measures to improve its ability to defeat the defense system

in order to preserve its strategic deterrent. The measures likely will include improved penetration

packages for its ICBMs, an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs, and perhaps development of a

multiple warhead system for an ICBM, most likely for the CSS-4.60

In 2003 a Council on Foreign Relations task force determined that “in accordance with

published CIA estimates ...China has straightforward means available to overcome

the U.S. [NMD] now planned for deployment and that China will do what is required

to maintain and strengthen its nuclear deterrent.”61 A Chinese expert agrees that

“China will certainly seek possible approaches that help maintain the effectiveness of

its nuclear deterrent.”62 That is why China is already investing in countermeasures to

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defeat BMD: because China 

places a premium on ensuring [that] its ballistic m

force would be able to penetrate any future missile defense architecture, collectio

information that would support development of effective missile defense counte

sures has a relatively high priority.”63 China would prefer not to be forced into su

course of action but believes that it can maintain deterrence: “In the long run, an

are confident that China will be able to counter BMD.”64

China’s Potential BMD Countermeasures

China’s rapidly growing technological and defense industrial capabilities—parti

in aerospace—give it increasing symmetric and asymmetric options to defeat U.

BMD. This discussion relies on open sources to address a topic on which inform

is severely restricted due to China’s lack of transparency.

Quantitative and Prelaunch Countermeasures

China could deploy prelaunch, postlaunch, and infrastructure-targeting counter

sures. Some measures are already likely deployed, others are undergoing develop

and testing, and still others perhaps remain at the conceptual stage for considera

the perceived need for them becomes sufficiently urgent. Achieving reliable capa

to defeat U.S. BMD would require significant investment and testing, but China 

resources and would be likely to commit them if its nuclear deterrent were truly 

ened. According to one report, the majority of Chinese policy makers support a 

fold response to American missile defense: “(1) increase the total number of war

deployed to a level just beyond the saturation point; (2) develop MIRVs (multip

dependently targetable reentry vehicles that can overwhelm missile defense); and 

pursue other effective countermeasures to defeat the U.S. system.”65 China has a 

variety of options to support each of these three counterstrategies.

The most straightforward course of action for China would be to continue to im

and expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems with the goal of saturating d

fenses. China has already enhanced the prelaunch survivability of its nuclear wea

by shifting to solid propellants; improving C4ISR (command, control, communi

tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—see chapter 1 in 

volume); using camouflaged, hardened silos; and developing road-, rail-, and ba

mobile ICBMs. Possible sub-elements of this process could include increasing m

accuracy, developing a robust submarine-launched second strike (see chapter 2)

even ultimately replacing Russia as the “second nuclear power.” Chinese strategis

Dingli projects that a ninefold increase in Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting U.S

gets would defeat even a BMD system with a 90 percent interception rate, and at 

manageable cost of several billion dollars over one or two decades.66 According t

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The reason for this is that the buildup option is so mathematically simple to understand and so certain to work. So, in the Chinese debate this idea would easily

win some support from nontechnical people. Another advantage is that the

buildup would be visible to the outside and would therefore help discourage any first

strike against China.”67

The unclassified version of the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s December 2001 report estimates that “Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015”

and that by that year “Beijing’s... ICBM force deployed primarily against the United

States . . . will number around 75 to 100 warheads.”68 A Chinese missile buildup would

facilitate, among other things, wartime launch of strikes incorporating the use of different types of missiles in “synchronized launches from a wide range of azimuths in or

der to stress active missile defenses and associated battle management systems.”69

China could also conceivably increase the deterrent power of its current nuclear arsenal, by altering its nuclear doctrine. This might entail placing its forces on a higher

state of alert or even abandoning its no-first-use policy in favor of “launch on warning.” China might seek to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities by slowing or reversing arms control commitments. This could entail continuing “production of fissile

material for nuclear weapons. China may also fail to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT), particularly given the rejection of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, or may

even resume nuclear testing in order to develop countermeasures to the NMD system

or warheads for multiple-warhead missiles.”70

A more radical approach, which would represent a significant problem for Washington

could be “horizontal escalation.” China’s nuclear buildup might improve not only Chinese but also—through technology transfer—Pakistani capabilities vis-à-vis India, pos

sibly triggering a regional arms race: “Because the United States needs China’s

cooperation in limiting missile proliferation, a deterioration in U.S.-China relations

may also lead to an increased missile threat from other countries.”71 An antagonized

China could increase the missile capabilities of rogue states like North Korea and Iran.

According to a Carnegie Endowment study, China is “a major supplier of nuclear technology and equipment in the developing world, and its past behavior in the nuclear

and missile fields is a significant non-proliferation concern.”72 Indeed, Li Bin suggests

that China’s current compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime hinges

on American respect of its strategic interests.73 Li and fellow Qinghua University strate

gist Shen Liangyin note that while unilateral export controls are popular in U.S. Congress, they typically have limited utility in halting technology transfers.74

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Postlaunch Countermeasures

A technologically advanced nation like China could deploy a wide variety of count

sures to enhance the postlaunch survivability of its nuclear weapons. Postlaunch c

measures, which include counter-intercept measures and penetration aids, can be

combined to increase their effectiveness.

Counter-intercept measures, which are designed to prevent interceptor target en

ment, include multiple warheads placed on multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or 

ple independently targeted reentry vehicles, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and th

hardening or spinning of ballistic missiles.75 MIRVs can be placed in different tra

ries by a bus platform that changes position slightly as it launches them in succe

MARVs, even more sophisticated, are capable of independently altering their tra

ries even in the terminal phase. Spinning and rolling (spinning off-center) a ball

missile makes a specific portion of it more difficult to target, complicating partic

the use against them of lasers, which may need to focus on an object for several s

onds in order to destroy it. Laser cladding involves protective coatings that harde

sile exteriors against laser beams.76 Lasers are also vulnerable to smoke, which ca

emitted from a canister on the missile itself.

Warhead miniaturization decreases the infrared signal of a reentry vehicle, maki

much harder for an interceptor to target.77 Miniaturization could also permit the 

MRVs and MIRVs. According to a noted American expert on the PLA, “It should 

ably be assumed that MRV, and quite possibly MIRV ...research and developme

been under way for some time [in China], and that the question of force size is b

seriously . . . debated within Beijing’s community of security strategists.”78 Indee

Bin claims that “China has the capability to develop . . . MIRVs . . . but has not d

so.”79 Because MRVs are easier to develop than MIRVs, “the U.S. intelligence com

nity assesses that China could develop a multiple [reentry vehicle] RV system for 

DF-5 ICBM in a few years.”80

R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. . . . Th

force of DF-5A missiles is deployed with single warhead[s], but in November 1983 China inau

a DF-5 modification program to arm these ICBMs with MIRVed warheads. Technical difficul

however, have stalled the program. The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental United 

(CONUS), was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no evidence that they 

been deployed. Some sources claim that at least four DF-5As have already been MIRVed, thou

generally asserted that while MIRVing may occur within the next few years no DF-5s have yet 

ted with MIRVed warheads. Based on the DF-5A throw weight and warhead shroud the missi

be equipped with . . . six reentry vehicles with each RV [reentry vehicle] weighing six hundred 

grams (the size of the single warhead on the DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has f

nier engines, which reportedly fire for 190 seconds after the main missile engine cuts off. Thu

5A could direct a warhead bus over a fairly large arc covering an array of aim points. But the e

tus of this program cannot be confirmed based on open sources.81

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According to three Chinese experts, penetration aids “are inexpensive and they have a

low political cost. Further, it is technically unlikely that a U.S. defense system would

ever work so well that it could sort out penetration aids from warheads. That would

ensure that China’s retaliatory force would remain viable.”82

China has already begun to develop and test decoys to some extent. Of two major decoy variants, the simpler saturation option, decoys (such as balloons), are designed to

overwhelm midcourse or terminal defenses. Deception decoys (such as fast-burn motors and boost-phase maneuvering) are designed to evade interceptor vehicles by complicating predictions of flight trajectory.83 Decoys can mimic the warhead’s visual

appearance or infrared signature. They can utilize active electronic countermeasures,

such as radar-jamming signals. They can even physically protect the warhead from an

interceptor. Exoatmospheric decoys accompany warheads during the midcourse phase

but because of their light weight they separate upon reentry; endoatmospheric decoys

reenter the atmosphere with the warhead.

As American interceptor test failures in three out of nine recent tests have demonstrated, “to pick out the warhead from deliberately designed decoys is one of the most

challenging problems to the development of a missile defense system.”84 Some question

whether these tests were even representative of the countermeasures challenges that

NMD might face: “Basic physics argues strongly that decoys closely resembling real

warheads simply cannot be distinguished from actual threats by the U.S. sensor system

now in development.”85 Li Bin states that “decoy technology is not too complicated for

China. This means that the deployment of decoys is a much more efficient and simple

way than MIRVs for China to defeat the NMD system.”86 Intercept could be complicated by a combination of decoys. Chinese ICBMs could be designed to “discharge

chaff just prior to releasing decoys and warheads—to prevent radars from seeing what

happens during the release—or by [developing] a more sophisticated release mechanism that makes decoys and warheads indistinguishable even at the moment of separa

tion from the bus. It is for these reasons that the decoy problem is acute, and possibly

not solvable for the foreseeable future, in the case of midcourse defenses.”87

Other postlaunch countermeasures include cold launch, trajectory manipulation, and

infrared stealth. Cold launch, also known as “ejection” or “soft launch,” is a means of

reducing the infrared signature of a missile by propelling it out of a silo with compressed air or other gas before engine ignition. For example, the silo-based American

LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile, which is fully encased in a canister, would be “ejected

by pressurized gas some fifty feet into the air before first stage ignition.”88 In 1975, the

UR-100MR/SS-17 Spanker became the first Soviet missile with a cold-launch system.89

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Even a highly effective boost-phase defense would technically be susceptible to th

launch of missiles, which delays detection of launch slightly and thereby reduces 

in which to launch an interceptor. Fortunately, cold launch may well be too diffi

rogue states to employ for the foreseeable future; only the United States, Russia, 

and South Korea have mastered it. China cold-launches the JL-1 solid-propellant S

in December 1998 China conducted a cold-launch test on the new DF-31 ICBM.91

Trajectory manipulation involves “depressed” and “lofted” trajectories.92 Depress

missile’s trajectory means flattening its flight path, bringing the normal apex of 

miles as low as sixty miles in order to minimize its time outside the atmosphere 

thus its exposure to space-based and midcourse defenses. Chinese testing and m

indicates that the trajectory of the DF-31 could be reduced from 330 miles to six

miles, albeit with a significant loss in range.93 Lofting a missile’s trajectory raises 

apex altitude in order to increase reentry speed.

Finally, infrared stealth “can be implemented by several means, such as using low

emissivity coatings or a cooled shroud.”94 Fast-burning motors shorten the durat

boost phase.

Aside from the challenges of cold launch and fast-burning motors, a boost-phas

cept system would also have extreme difficulty in defending “against missiles lau

from large countries such as Russia or China,” because of the difficulty of getting

American interceptor platforms close enough to launch sites in the interiors of t

large continental powers.95

Infrastructure Targeting

China might also consider targeting the U.S. BMD system’s structure directly, th

antisatellite attacks, direct attack on ground-based radars, and indirect electroni

tack on elements of C4ISR structure.

A successful U.S. test on 13 September 198596 and three follow-up tests,97 indicat

ASAT is technically feasible. China has conducted extensive research concerning 

ican military satellites and ASAT weapons.98 “In the military realm, microsatellit

play an indispensable role in future information warfare,” one Chinese analyst h

stated, reflecting a view widespread in China’s defense industrial sector.99 China 

exploit a variety of options to defeat space-based interceptors (a laser, for instan

such as pellet clouds, ground-based rockets, or space mines.100 The Department o

fense 2004 Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC states, “A Hong Kong 

paper article in January 2001 reported that China had developed and ground-tes

and would soon begin space-testing an antisatellite (ASAT) system described as 

sitic microsatellite.’101 This claim is being evaluated.”102 Such a capability would b

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“‘suicide satellite’ . . . to destroy both SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared System]-high and

SBIRS-low on the NMD system would paralyze its early warning and surveillance capa

bilities. Then preemptive attacks can be launched at each component of the defense system.”103 Two nongovernmental analysts dismiss the source that the Pentagon report

cites.104 However, the majority of analysts agree that China is conducting research to enhance its space-control capacity.105

Electromagnetic-pulse weapons could completely disable U.S. radars. Active electronic

countermeasures include the use of devices to jam X-band and upgraded early-warning

radar systems. U.S. BMD ground stations are themselves vulnerable to attack. China’s growing submarine force may permit it to

use SLBMs, submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), or

land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), against radars and support facilities. China is

making a concerted effort to develop the Chang Feng and Hong Niao series LACMs.106

Even the best BMD system is incapable of defending land targets

against SLCMs and LACMs.107 A Chinese source arguing for the potential of such weapons asserts that “special forces may be trained to

effectively infiltrate and destroy the [missile defense] stations.”108

Both types of Chinese missiles might be susceptible to U.S. GPS jamming.109 This, how

ever, is a larger problem that Beijing is working to address—possibly through improve

ment and expansion of its currently rudimentary Beidou satellite navigation system.110

According to China Defense Today, Beijing is developing Beidou “to

improve the accuracy of its weapons and the situational awareness of

its military forces.”111

Chinese Countermeasures Testing and Deployment

China’s potential to deploy countermeasures to foil U.S. ballistic missile defense—whil

not yet proven by a vigorous testing program—has long since passed the theoretical

stage. The father of modern Chinese rocketry, Qian Xuesen, first called for “the development of an advanced DF-5 warhead with penetration aids” on 4 January 1966.112

Thanks to a Cold War–era need to deter the Soviet Union, with its Moscow-based

BMD system, China had long ago established a record of developing and testing various BMD countermeasures to improve ICBM survivability.113 Early measures focused

primarily on improving prelaunch survivability through more rapid fueling of liquid

propellants and on cleverer means of concealment. These pragmatic measures periodically alternated with ambitious responses to American and Soviet advances. According

to a Carnegie Endowment study, American initiation of SDI “reportedly spurred

[China’s] plans to develop multiple-warhead technology. The first test of a multiple

Chang Feng (Long Wind)

Hong Niao (Red Bird)

Beidou (Big Dipper)

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warhead missile took place in September 1984.

Lack of warhead miniaturizati

pabilities impeded deployment of MRVs or MIRVs at the time; today those capa

should finally be within China’s grasp. Chinese experts have carefully studied Ru

Topol-series advanced ICBMs as the model of an advanced BMD-defeating miss

China’s more recent tests suggest a trend toward a more systematic evaluation of 

termeasures. CSS-5 (Dong Feng-21) Mod 1 and 2 tests in November 1995 and Ja

1996 apparently employed decoys, as did that of the new road-mobile DF-31 on 

gust 1999.116 DF-31 tests on 10 November 1995 and 10 January 1996 may have in

endoatmospheric reentry decoys.117 A third test in November 2000 “involved dec

warheads traveling on a shorter flight path.”118 In July 2002 China reportedly “tes

a medium-range missile [CSS-5, DF-21] containing [six to seven] dummy warhe

designed to defeat BMD.”119 A Russian reporter cites the Pentagon as having obse

that the missile “successfully avoided several ‘airborne destructive objects.’”120 Ac

ing to Jamestown Foundation analyst Richard Fisher, “the emergence of penetra

aids all points to the [CSS-5, DF-21] as a highly survivable and accurate missile t

will have the capability of defeating future American theater missile defenses.”121 

jor Japanese newspaper reports that China tested the DF-21 with MIRVs in Dece

2002 and “has begun testing the DF-31 with multiple warheads.”122

China is also known to have tested chaff and other penetration aids. Since the exis

and capabilities of its countermeasures are generally highly classified, China may w

have conducted other tests not reported in open sources—or even, as for compone

testing, observable to the U.S. military. Russian cooperation could give China acce

advanced technologies specifically designed to counter an American ballistic missi

fense system. There is no reason to believe that China will not be capable of impro

techniques in the future, particularly as its overall aerospace capabilities continue t

vance. While it has been projected that “PRC countermeasures on longer-range ba

missiles are unlikely to keep pace with U.S. technology,” inherent asymmetries favo

missile offense may more than compensate for any shortcomings in this regard.123 

tainly American policy makers cannot afford to assume otherwise.

At the same time, Russian countermeasures technology—which has long targ

the United States, with a series of different systems—may be both most avail

to, and most relevant for, China. It will be important for American analysts t

termine the extent to which China is gradually improving early-generation c

termeasures designed to target Moscow and that to which it is actually develo

innovative new countermeasures specifically to target American defenses. A 

and intensive search for foreign expertise in a specific area might indicate th

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suffered in developing CHEVALINE.

124

Chinese Responses to U.S. BMD Strategies

What potential PRC responses to missile defense would most threaten American interests? How will BMD affect China’s strategic triad? What would be America’s optimal

strategy, given such realities?

U.S. BMD deployment will probably affect prioritization within China’s strategic triad

by making more attractive the development of SLBMs and ICBMs. SLBMs arguably of

fer greater survivability. As chapter 2 of this volume emphasizes, China is rapidly improving its submarine force; an improved submarine force will allow China both to

assert better control of its vast maritime periphery and to create a more effective platform for nuclear deterrence. Range improvements may allow China to develop a robus

second-strike capability relying on SLBMs on board submarines hidden and protected

in territorial water bastions.

As asserted above, ICBM-related improvements may offer China the potential to defea

American BMD either by saturating it or foiling it with countermeasures. If its nuclear

deterrent seems vulnerable, China is likely to build up its ICBM force and possibly to

multiply its effectiveness by developing the capacity to MIRV its nuclear warheads.

Strategic bombers would likely remain a lower priority for China. Aside from nuclear

deterrence, China’s primary strategic flashpoints are close to its current territory; also,

it lacks overseas bases for power projection.125 China’s aircraft construction capabilities

have thus far been modest, and China does not yet have an advanced long-range

bomber to deploy. Moreover, China has not yet demonstrated the capacity to develop

aircraft with stealth or electronic jamming. Therefore, bombers do not appear to be an

especially promising leg of the nuclear triad for China now or for the foreseeable future.126 A Carnegie Endowment study concludes that China is unlikely to “invest substantial resources in its airborne nuclear capability unless it is able to purchase the

[advanced] T-22M Backfire [bomber] from Russia.”127 Moscow will use Backfire

bombers in a joint military exercise to be held with Beijing in 2005. It may feel pressured to offer them for sale to secure Chinese aerospace purchases in light of Brussels’

potential lifting of the EU arms embargo imposed on Beijing in 1989.128

Potential Chinese responses that would be most detrimental to American interests include a major nuclear buildup to preserve the deterrent. Such a buildup might be triggered by NMD development that does not address China’s core national interest in

maintaining a limited deterrent. The key issue “is whether China could and would retaliate in ways that could counter or even outweigh the benefits of having missile

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defense. China clearly has the means.

If its limited nuclear deterrent were thre

ened, China would also have the motive.130 It thus seems reasonable to conclude 

Although many Americans might desire a shield against a possible Chinese ICBM attack, it alm

certainly cannot be achieved given China’s ability to take measures to defeat it. Even worse, th

trying to build NMD capability against China would worsen U.S.-China relations significantly

increasing the odds that China would help the likes of North Korea gain [some of] the technic

bility to overcome whatever U.S. missile defense system is built.131

Washington will probably not be able to use NMD to goad Beijing into Soviet-st

military overextension. China’s leadership has carefully studied the Cold War’s o

come and is “determined to avoid the ‘overreaction to [SDI] which contributed 

downfall of the USSR.’”132 Rather, China’s leaders acknowledge the true state of

China’s development, and do not hope to directly match U.S. military might in 

near future.133 In fact, robust BMD might even favor Chinese interests, by consum

American resources that could otherwise have been invested in such systems as s

rines, for which China has only more limited and less asymmetric options. Some 

nese experts, indeed, view American national missile defense as “more of ‘a wast

U.S. effort than it is a great problem for China.’”134 Two have concluded that Am

current NMD system “would have only symbolic meaning rather than fighting c

ity in the real world. In the long term, some budgetary and cost problems could 

the NMD development.”135 Indeed, it is already rumored that MDA may suffer sub

imminent budget cuts because of competing priorities. Interviews conducted by A

McVadon with Chinese interlocutors in 2002 confirmed that many Chinese analysts 

“NMD will cost a lot and not work.”136 McVadon judges that such statements seem “

likely” to reflect genuine opinions and are not merely coordinated misinformation.13

While North Korea’s ability to absorb Chinese assistance is unclear, China’s long

capabilities should not be underestimated. Whereas construction of aircraft carr

could trigger a costly reallocation of Chinese economic resources, something tha

Beijing has thus far studiously avoided, attempts to contain China with NMD co

place the United States at a disadvantage by emphasizing expensive technology t

highly susceptible to asymmetric countermeasures—“Offense is always going to 

much cheaper and less technologically demanding than defence.”138 In fact, like t

on Terror, BMD may play a vital U.S. national security role and yet fail to enhanc

American capabilities vis-à-vis China—or even make them lower than they othe

would be, by diverting resources from the Pacific theater.139 Even if Washington d

force China into an arms race, “there is no reason to believe that when the race e

the United States will have a defense that can defeat a modernized Chinese arsen

The Chinese response most favorable to the United States would be a nonrespo

that is, refusal to build up rapidly its nuclear and space weapons capabilities. B

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to be threatened.

Some might invoke China’s capabilities and BMD vulnerabilities to argue against U.S.

development of any sort of BMD system. But that nonresponse would be a mistake, fo

several reasons.141 First, the United States continues to face a proliferation of missile

threats. Missile threats from rogue states, while not the greatest single threat to U.S. security, are increasing. Second, the low probability associated with missile threats is offset by their potentially catastrophic effect, particularly if such threats are accompanied

by weapons of mass destruction. To be sure, some argue that even the most revisionist

dictators are deterrable, that radical leaders are unlikely to cooperate with terrorists.

They emphasize further that terrorists are unlikely to be capable of deploying WMD b

missile.142 But the instability currently threatening Pakistan and continuing attempts to

assassinate its leader suggest that loss of control of a nuclear arsenal is not a categorica

impossibility. Third, defending against rogue state missile launch is a realistic goal. The

force size and countermeasures potential of even the most capable rogue state falls far

short of China’s. Rogue states are likely to remain just that, because they lack China’s

tremendous resource, technology, and talent base.143

Finally, while no ballistic missile defense is likely to be flawless, even a partially effectiv

system can give American leaders significant leverage in terms of perception. Here

again, China’s capabilities must not be conflated with those of less advanced states.

BMD could give the United States important leverage over North Korea and Iran. Unlike potential scenarios involving China, those with North Korea or Iran typically lack

asymmetry of interests, thus making a U.S. threat more credible. But attempting to use

BMD against China could lead to crisis instability or costly miscalculation. The nexus

of the most likely potential U.S.-China crisis, Taiwan, is so important to China that

Beijing would be extremely difficult to deter regardless of American capabilities. According to Li Bin, “The Taiwan issue has always been the most sensitive and important

issue for the bilateral relationship and it could cause a serious confrontation between

the two countries if not managed carefully. In this context, the effects of nuclear weapons cannot simply be excluded. Nuclear issues could become very important if the

Sino-U.S. relationship deteriorates because of the Taiwan problem.”144

For all these reasons, the question for the United States should be not whether to develop BMD but how. Washington can encourage a best-case security outcome by devel

oping a system that focuses on rogue states and eschewing a futile attempt to negate

China’s nuclear deterrent. Perhaps some combination of sea-based platforms and

boost-phase intercept could best provide this form of security.

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Removing China from the Missile Defense Calculus

This chapter offers four major propositions:

• Despite reassurances, China perceives itself to be the target of U.S. BMD.

• China fears that BMD threatens its limited nuclear deterrent, a cornerston

its security.

• China likely has the capacity to overwhelm U.S. BMD by developing and prolif

missiles, and possibly sophisticated countermeasures as well.

• By focusing more closely on sea-based and boost-phase BMD, the United State

maximize defense against rogue states while minimizing negative Chinese respo

American policy makers have not been able to reach consensus concerning the tr

utility of ballistic missile defense. If the United States is to succeed in developme

deployment of such challenging technology and avoid unintended negative cons

quences, they would do well first to agree on BMD’s purpose.

Missile defenses against China might trigger the expansion of the Chinese nucle

nal. It might even tempt Beijing to renounce previous arms control agreements i

der to increase its strategic flexibility and opportunities for weapons testing. Tha

suggests it would be counterproductive for the United States even to attempt to 

defense against Chinese missiles. U.S. BMD capability, which will likely take time 

perfect, is best directed not against China but against rogue states. China can me

challenges necessary to counter BMD, and rogue states generally cannot—unless 

by a more capable power, such as China.

Based on his interviews with American experts, Chinese strategic expert Wu Rui 

cludes that “there are divergent views on whether U.S. NMD should be aimed at 

To convince China that NMD is not aimed at it, the United States could put som

straints over NMD capability and explain the constraints to China. This could h

eliminate] the Chinese concern over the negative impact of NMD on China’s nu

deterrence.”145 While such Chinese claims should not be accepted uncritically, th

United States could realize significant benefits with such a policy. American inte

might be best served by ballistic missile defenses—such as a sea-based boost-pha

tem—that target rogue states without threatening China’s nuclear deterrent.

By making it clear that U.S. BMD does not target China per se (as the White H

seems to have done with Russia), the United States might be able to minimize 

matic fallout and to avoid an asymmetric arms race in which China would be a

ratchet up American defense spending with a far smaller investment of its own

guments concerning the counterproductive nature of BMD—primarily that it 

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even the United States, less secure—would be neutralized were China removed from

the equation.

Space is emerging as a new high ground of great-power competition, thus far a fairly

peaceful one. Here the United States can promote its interests, but only if it acknowledges the needs of the other major players. China is the major potential obstacle to

American security in space and in BMD development on earth; it is a power with an

economic base and technical capabilities that cannot simply be ignored.146 By addressing Chinese and Russian concerns about preserving nuclear deterrence, the United

States can avoid pressuring those space powers into aggressively threatening its own

wide array of space assets with ASAT and other asymmetric weapons. Washington has

already begun to address Moscow’s concerns concretely; now it is time to look to

Beijing’s as well. If the United States can reach an understanding with China in this regard, growing international opposition to missile defense—which could frustrate multilateral cooperation in such areas as counterproliferation—may be diffused.147 The

aerospace frontier is too important for the United States to goad China into threatening its progress there.148

Russia, which has already received substantial American reassurances, lacks the resources for a significant weapons buildup. Rogue states lack the technological base and

economic resources to nullify U.S. BMD. Some members of the international community might still fear that even limited ballistic missile defense could increase American

propensity toward unilateralism, but this is likely to be an issue in any case. It is still th

great powers, including Russia and China, that define the international system. As long

as their major national security concerns are addressed, the United States is unlikely to

face insurmountable international opposition to providing for its own defense needs.

Chinese propaganda periodically rails against American “hegemonism”;149 as long,

however, as Beijing’s core security needs—such as limited deterrence and energy access—are respected, it tends to be cautious and reactive in international fora, such as

the UN Security Council, that could affect U.S. interests. Also, given its modernization

imperative, and with the exception of Taiwan-related initiatives, China could thereby

be induced to pursue a more gradual pace of military development. The sooner that

Washington agrees that BMD has limited utility against China, the sooner it will be

able to focus on the real and growing missile threat posed by accidental launch, by

rogue states, and even by terrorists.

To meet these larger objectives, the United States could offer China voluntary and

nonbinding assurances, similar to those that it has already given to Russia, demonstrat

ing that American ballistic missile defense has not been “sized” to China. A new focus

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on boost-phase intercept would help greatly. It could pave the way for a broader 

of arms control discussions, as President Bush suggested to President Jiang, to de

strate American understanding of China’s security concerns, just as the United S

has briefed Chinese decision makers on its future military basing plans without 

them a veto or opening American policy to foreign debate.

In return, Chinese decision makers would be expected to understand America’s n

protect itself from attack by rogue states and to constrain the latter’s missile or c

termeasure capabilities. It would be particularly dangerous, assuming it was tech

ically feasible, for China to market missiles with built-in countermeasures, which

might be extremely attractive to developing states incapable of producing them 

digenously.150 Even absent a quid pro quo, discussion could recalibrate in a positi

rection both sides’ strategic positions. If progress were realized in this area, it wo

become a key example of strengthening the United States’ own security by volun

limiting the nation’s power to threaten others. Such restraint helped to make the 

tieth century one of American global leadership, and it has an important role to 

the twenty-first century as well.151

The U.S. Navy’s Role: Supporting Sea-Based and Boost-Phase BMD?

Many supporters of the current midcourse system deployment advocate the crea

a layered defense that will ultimately include a boost-phase component. Perhaps 

best near-term solution to likely missile threats would be a BMD system that foc

more closely on a combination of SM-3, submarine platforms, and boost-phase 

cept. These Navy assets could offer maximum protection against rogue-state mis

threats without needlessly provoking China by threatening its nuclear deterrent.

Boost-phase BMD offers manifold potential benefits. Most importantly, it target

enemy missile in its earliest and most vulnerable flight stage, when it is most diff

to deploy countermeasures. Second, because boost-phase BMD relies on proxim

launch sites, it does not threaten China’s or Russia’s nuclear deterrent, concentra

the remote interiors of those states. This seeming weakness is actually an advant

the sense that both powers would probably otherwise be motivated to use their v

aerospace capabilities to defeat U.S. BMD with countermeasures. Boost-phase in

also means that any debris or fallout is more likely to fall on the offending nation

rather than over the United States.

Air-based platforms may not be the best solution for boost-phase BMD. Of cour

laser travels at the speed of light, and time is at a premium during the short boo

phase. Further, airborne lasers (ABLs) have made steady progress.152 But the ABL 

form is vulnerable to air defenses; it is difficult to imagine how an ABL platform 

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including “coatings on offensive missile bodies that reflect rather than absorb the laser’s energy.”153 While rogue states could find decoys like balloons too difficult to deploy, they might be able to buy protectively coated missiles from a more technologicall

capable country, such as China. In any case, both ABL and space-based systems are expensive to operate and resupply. A cheaper, less vulnerable sea-based platform would

have considerable advantages in this respect—the “radars and missile interceptors required for defense against ICBMs are large and heavy. Placing them aboard a ship is a

very cost-effective way to make them mobile.”154

No longer constrained by the ABM Treaty, sea-based BMD plays to America’s strength

and exploits rogue states’ weaknesses. All nations that the United States must currently

defend against—particularly North Korea and Iran—are of subcontinental size and

possess coastlines, rendering them vulnerable to sea-based and boost-phase BMD.155

Unlike Russia and China, such states lack strong antisubmarine warfare capabilities

and are unlikely to sustain the investment necessary to develop them. According to

Jane’s Defense Weekly, Defense Department officials believe that “sea-based capabilities

offer inherent advantages over fixed land systems” because “BMD ships would have the

ability to manoeuvre and deploy to areas of conflict or in preparation for anticipated

hostilities.”156 Under international law, American vessels are free to remain indefinitely

twelve nautical miles off any nation’s coast, where they can conduct electronic eavesdropping, detect missile launches, and prepare to attack. Vessels are not subject to host

nation approval, can move to avoid attack, and can be redeployed to protect against an

emerging threat, such as short- or medium-range missiles appearing off U.S. coasts.

The SM-3 forms the basis of the U.S. Navy’s midcourse Aegis BMD System (previously

known as “Navy Theater-Wide”). It is now based on three Aegis destroyers, the USS

Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), and USS Fitzgerald (DDG

62).157 One of them has already been deployed to the Sea of Japan to defend against

North Korean missiles. SM-3 was first field-tested in June 2002, on the day that the

United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.158 In a subsequent test in December 2003

the cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) hit a target warhead with an SM-3.159 The ship has

now joined the Seventh Fleet.160 The Pentagon has already delivered five SM-3 intercep

tors to the U.S. Navy and “plans to field a total of up to 30 SM-3s on Aegis ships by

2007.”161 SM-3 currently targets enemy missiles in midcourse, but ship-based BMD

should be readily adaptable to boost-phase targeting.

SM-3 is rightly heralded as an innovative system that promises to reduce the threat

posed by such rogue states as North Korea; nonetheless, the nature of its platform

raises questions about its long-term utility. The proliferation of antiship cruise

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Notes
missiles, even among the states of concern, suggests an increasing threat to Amer

surface vessels in years to come.

It is much harder to find and attack a submarine, and it is much more difficult t

chase” the requisite capabilities. While ship-based interceptors and radars are no

ing deployed, therefore, submarine-based intercept also merits careful considera

According to a recent article in Sea Power, “‘You buy yourself lots of flexibility w

sub[marine]s as a basing mode. You can move a lot closer to the [adversary’s lau

sites]. And the closer you get, the easier it becomes to [intercept the attacking mi

in the boost-phase. That is a huge advantage.’”162 Submarines can patrol with rela

economy, particularly in contrast to air-based systems like ABL. Though hardly a 

cea, submarines offer BMD launch platforms that are more cost-effective and rel

than many other potential platforms and stealthier than any. Trident submarines 

fire several kinetic interceptors from their missile canisters, submerged or surfac

firing while submerged, submarines could avoid a key vulnerability of other boo

phase-intercept systems—their “susceptibility to direct attack and neutralization 

a state with numerous cruise missiles [e.g., Iran] or other advanced technologies

Maintaining reliable communication from a submerged position would be the k

challenge for submarine-based BMD.165 Notwithstanding the survivability of sub

rines, the employment of several of them backed by a surface-ship radar platform

(standing off at a considerable distance) would increase efficiency and ensure re

dancy of missile targeting.

While other naval platforms merit close attention, the already deployed SM-3 sy

extremely promising for coping with the present missile threat. SM-3 can addres

cific threats without risking strategic instability in other areas. Regarding China, 

versatility of sea-based BMD is already proving advantageous. As with virtually a

eas of U.S. military development, Chinese sources are monitoring SM-3 develop

closely;166 encouragingly, preliminary indications suggest they do not view SM-3 

major threat. PRC analysts appear to have realized that, because SM-3 is deploye

the Sea of Japan and not closer to Chinese territory, it is in fact directed against N

Korea. Land-based systems, for example the site now under development at Fort

Greely, do not allow deterrence to be channeled so directly.

Designing BMD to pressure China would be a strategic mistake. The U.S. Navy’s 

as well as follow-on sea-based BMD options, will enable the United States to targ

real enemies without making new ones in the process.

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Notes
Conclusion

LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN

Far from inevitable, conflict between the United States and China is, fortunately

unlikely, because of numerous potent constraints, the most obvious of which is a 

geoning trade relationship. Could workers and consumers or business and politi

elites on either side of the Pacific really accept an indefinite hiatus in or—worse 

destruction of their livelihoods? Beyond this simple but powerful reality, Washin

and Beijing appear to have found a modus vivendi that allows them to cooperate 

portant circumstances of mutual concern. After the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese po

leadership quickly made it clear that Beijing would stand by Washington in its h

need. Indeed, China appears to have taken the crucial step of counseling Pakistan 

low U.S. troops to enter the country in support of operations in Afghanistan, an

actively supported the new regime in Kabul as well. Moreover, there is still hope 

U.S.-China cooperation will prove instrumental in a lasting resolution of the on

nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.1

Even the nettlesome Taiwan issue may be amenable to a negotiated solution. Eco

and other forms of interdependence are expanding at a prodigious rate and are h

an ever greater impact on relations between the PRC and Taiwan. In 2002, some th

quarters of Taiwan’s companies had investments on the mainland, totaling approx

sixty billion dollars.2

Such statistics prompted one PRC official to claim exuberant

“Our economy is our best weapon. We won’t attack them. We will buy them. 

very Chinese.”3

Cross-Strait marriages are becoming increasingly common; a

imately thirty thousand brides went from the mainland to Taiwan in 2003, an

thousands of Taiwan residents have opted to move to the PRC.4

Meanwhile, a 

three links” agreement has enabled the smaller islands close to the mainland (Jin

and Mazu) to open direct trade, transport, and postal services. And on January 

2005, the first direct commercial flights in fifty-five years occurred between Ta

and mainland China. Those six flights, and another forty-two over the next thr

weeks, were scheduled to celebrate the Lunar New Year.5

Had Lian Zhan won the

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Notes
gin), he might well have embarked on a “journey of peace” to Beijing, as he had

pledged during the campaign.6

Nonetheless, and as discussed in the introduction to this volume, Sino-American strategic rivalry in the twenty-first century remains a real possibility, and armed conflict

between these two nuclear powers cannot be ruled out. Even if the volatile Taiwan issu

is set aside, a variety of potential flashpoints still come readily to mind: the South

China Sea, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and even in the distant future

perhaps the Middle East. Disturbingly, it is quite plausible that such a conflict could re

sult from the actions of a variety of third parties, Taipei foremost among them.

Military institutions are bound to focus on (often low-probability) worst-case scenarios and on the doctrines and capabilities arising therefrom. This study is part of a

broader analytical effort to understand the contemporary PLA and its future trajectory

accepting the broad caveat concerning the basic stability of U.S.-China relations outlined above. A second caveat is also essential—that this study in no way assumes that

nuclear weapons will necessarily be employed in a U.S.-China war. Quite the contrary;

the assembled papers generally view these arsenals as deterrent weapons that may be

brandished to gain leverage in the midst of crises, or perhaps even to prompt

deescalation during actual hostilities. Even if nuclear use seems outlandish, one can

easily envision how nuclear shadows might affect decision makers in both Beijing and

Washington, not to mention commanders in the theater of operations. For example,

would Chinese political leaders order all-out strikes on American carrier battle groups

without considering the possibility of nuclear retaliation, especially if those strikes

were successful? Would American decision makers undertake major conventional

strikes against targets (airfields, ports, missile bases, etc.) without regard to Chinese

nuclear retaliation?

Such questions illustrate the potential importance of nuclear strategy for the possible

dynamics of a U.S.-China conflict. However, war-fighting dilemmas presented by nuclear capabilities on both sides are not the major focus of this study. Instead, the paper

assembled here present straightforward descriptions of several dimensions of emergin

PLA nuclear capabilities. The value of such descriptions in an unclassified venue is tha

they significantly widen the scope of discussion concerning the strategic implications

of these emerging capabilities. In other words, these capabilities merit consideration

beyond the realm of military and intelligence analysts.

Chapter 1, by Lieutenant Commander Stephen Polk, U.S. Navy, described developments in PLA nuclear command and control. It provided background on the theory of

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Notes
synopsis of the PLA’s overall experience with military command and control gen

and NC2 specifically. Next, the paper reviewed current developments in PLA NC

cusing on the evolving processes for release authority; on ample technology upg

including fiber optic, satellite, and microwave communications; and the likeliho

more ambitious alerting posture. A crucial insight to take from Polk’s review of r

vamped Second Artillery Corps training practices is the fact that lessons from th

tive and highly proficient SRBM force are likely to be disseminated quickly and

efficiently into the new mobile long-range nuclear forces now being deployed. In 

end, Polk concluded that while there may actually be benefits to China’s moving 

nuclear posture of “credible deterrence” with robust NC2—for example, a reduc

chance of accidental launch—there are also dangers, including the possibility of 

phisticated PLA coercion and even limited war-fighting strategies.

The second chapter, by Lieutenant Christopher McConnaughy, U.S. Navy, depict

rapid progress in China’s SSBN force. The late 2004 announcement that the prot

of Type 094, the PLA Navy’s second-generation SSBN, had been launched in July 

reinforces the importance of this detailed examination of China’s efforts to deve

sea-based deterrent. The first half of this chapter was a synopsis of research by Jo

Lewis and Xue Litai on the subject of China’s first-generation SSBN, the Xia (Ty

092). The author asserted that analysts have mischaracterized the 092 program a

complete failure. He argued instead that the arduous steps toward developing an 

enous SSBN are best viewed as an essential down payment on the research and d

opment groundwork that underlay the likely success of the follow-on Type 094 p

The second part of the chapter explored 094’s probable capabilities, basing mode

doctrine. Special analytical attention was devoted to the notion that Beijing mig

adopt the Soviet “bastion” strategy of the late Cold War. The chapter concluded 

stark warning that current plans for the future U.S. submarine force may not be 

quate to cope effectively with an invigorated Chinese SSBN program.

The close relationship between China’s civil space program and its strategic nucl

modernization was the subject of the third chapter, by Commander Dominic

DeScisciolo, U.S. Navy. The author argued that the two programs were “linked a

birth,” as each was profoundly influenced by the American émigré scientist Qian

Xuesen, who instilled in both programs “the confidence that China can match th

in its technological development.” As in other space programs, it asserted, the co

gling of civil and military space and rocketry efforts is readily apparent: thus, the 

ICBM is extremely similar to the CZ-2A commercial booster, and the DF-31 ICB

likely has its civilian analog in the Kaituozhe launch vehicle. Using the civil space 

gram as a conduit for foreign technology, DeScisciolo maintained that recent

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the synergy between PRC civil and military space programs. Appraising the success of

China’s recent manned space vessel, Shenzhou V, DeScisciolo noted that General Li

Jinai leads that program; further he voiced concern that the program may have direct

military applications, especially in the vital realm of remote sensing. The chapter concluded with a comparative analysis of Soviet and American paths for space development, tentatively finding that China’s methodical approach more closely approximates

the American approach. This conclusion suggested that Beijing will become a potent

future challenger to the United States in the realm of space.

The last chapter, written by Andrew Erickson, represents an attempt to fathom PRC

responses to the U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Erickson found that

American strategic planners are deeply divided concerning the value of U.S. BMD fo

China-related contingencies. Next, the author demonstrated that BMD countermeasure systems, including specifically Chinese variants, have a long history of development, reaching far back into the Cold War era. A brief review of the evolution of

Chinese nuclear strategy suggested that American BMD poses a rather direct challenge

to the PRC emphasis on minimal nuclear forces. The analysis subsequently revealed a

plethora of options for countering U.S. ballistic missile defense that Chinese planners

appear to be exploring, including especially saturation, decoys, and multiple methods

for direct attack on the BMD system itself. Chinese nuclear strategists appear to have

high confidence that U.S. BMD can be overwhelmed. Given the PRC’s increasingly impressive defense science and technology infrastructure, the author concluded that

American ballistic missile defense should focus on defending against threats from

smaller, less capable rogue states, such as North Korea or Iran. Based on the efficiency,

stealth, and flexibility of sea-based platforms, Erickson suggested that the U.S. Navy

must play a central role in the ongoing evolution of BMD architecture.

As acknowledged in the introduction, this study makes no claim to comprehensiveness

in its treatment of this subject. Instead, we have opted to make selective probes, aiming

to improve knowledge in certain, rather narrow, domains of this complex subject, rely

ing where possible on the unique professional experience and abilities of the student

authors. A rather predictable, but nonetheless significant, finding of this research is the

need for continued focused study. Specific analytic areas that are not treated adequatel

here include nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, preemption strat

egies, nuclear threats during the 1996 crisis, Taiwan’s calculations concerning nuclear

weapons, and the impact of China’s nuclear forces on the strategies of such critical regional players as Japan, South Korea, India, and Russia.

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cal nature of the present U.S.-China nuclear relationship is unique and makes th

ation rather different from that with Russia, with its several thousands of nuclea

weapons, at one end of the spectrum, or with North Korea on the other. The imp

this asymmetry on nuclear rivalry in general and crisis interaction in particular 

serves special study. There are some historical analogies available—including the

much-studied Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The second lesson is methodological 

applies to the study of China’s military as a whole. A wide variety of new Chines

sources must be carefully analyzed to gain the closest possible understanding of 

ongoing military modernization. This method, if undertaken in a methodical m

can mitigate the recognized problem of “mirror imaging,” and it can produce m

search findings, such as the pathbreaking studies by John Lewis and Xue Litai, th

better inform policy.

The four papers assembled here are careful to point out continuing weaknesses i

China’s nuclear force (for instance, in its early warning network) and not to exag

the pace of the ongoing nuclear modernization (which has been, if steady, not pa

larly swift). Collectively, however, they demonstrate significant progress and ind

profound upgrade in the quality, and potentially the quantity as well, of China’s 

clear forces. The most potent symbols of China’s transition to credible deterrenc

the new DF-31 ICBM, as well as the 094 SSBN and associated JL-2 SLBM, but th

study demonstrates a broad front effort that goes well beyond these two systems

This development should not surprise anyone. After all, China has been the targ

nuclear coercion more times than any other single state. The lesson that nuclear 

ons have significant strategic utility is not lost on China’s present leadership. Mo

the world is faced with the challenge of integrating a rapidly transforming China

ter more than two decades of stability and double-digit economic growth—into 

evolving international system. Beijing, no longer constrained by momentous thr

resource austerity, now has the opportunity, for the first time in its history, to cr

systematically its nuclear forces and strategy it believes optimal.

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Introduction 

 1. For a timely debate on this subject, see Jonathan 

Pollack, ed., Strategic Surprise: U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century (Newport, R.I.: 

Naval War College Press, 2003). 

 2. See, for example, Charles Hutzler, Susan 

Lawrence, and Jason Dean, “China, U.S. Show 

Signs of Solidarity,” Wall Street Journal, 15 

December 2003. 

 3. The EU nations, in aggregate, displaced Japan 

as China’s number one trading partner on 

May 1, 2004. “EU Becomes China’s Largest 

Trading Partner,” People’s Daily Online, retrieved from www.chinadaily.com/English/ 

doc/2005-01/07/content_406961.htm on February 3, 2005. 

 4. A good recap of the contending theories 

relating to trade and international conflict is 

available in Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 

Expectations,” International Security 20 

(Spring 1996), available at www.mtholyoke 

.edu/acad/intrel/copeland.htm. 

 5. Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Cautions Taiwan on 

Independence,” Washington Post, 22 April 

2004, p. A22. 

 6. See “Bush Pulls Secret Service Agent From 

Scuffle,” CNN.com, 22 November 2004, www 

.cnn.com/2004/World/americas/11/20/apec 

.bush.security.ap/. 

 7. “China’s Latin Business Trip,” International 

Herald Tribune, 26 November 2004, available 

at www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/25/opinion/ 

edchina.html. 

 8. On these tensions see Dan Blumenthal, “Unhelpful China,” Washington Post, 6 December 

2004, p. 21. 

 9. Christopher Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2003–04 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 

2003), p. 152. 

 10. Deng Jun, “Zhongguo He Liliang yu He 

Zhanlue” [China’s Nuclear Forces and Nuclear 

Strategy], Bingqi Zhishi (May 2002), p. 41. 

 11. See Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile 

Submarine,” Washington Times, 3 December 

2004, available at washgintontimes.com/ 

national/20041202-115302-2338r.htm; or 

Richard Fisher, “Submarine Incident Highlights Military Buildup,” Asian Wall Street 

Journal, 17 November 2004. 

Expectations: Interpreting China’s Ar

International Security 22 (Winter 199

pp. 71–73. 

 13. Remarks to the Defense Writers Grou

October 1995, Washington, D.C., cite

Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Seco

clear Age (Lexington: Univ. of Kentuc

1996), p. 41. 

 14. Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Ch

sen, “China: Getting the Questions 

National Interest 63, no. 1 (Winter 

2000/01), pp. 17–29. 

 15. Brad Roberts, China-U.S. Nuclear Re

What Relationship Best Serves U.S. In

IDA Paper P-2640 (Alexandria, Va.: A

2001), p. ES-3, available at www.dtra

about/organization/ab_pubs.html. 

 16. Ibid., p. 21. 

 17. This entire paragraph is drawn from 

General Wu Jianguo, “Nuclear Shado

High-Tech Warfare,” in Chinese view

ture Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (W

ton, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Pr

1997), pp. 137–46. 

Chapter One 

China’s Nuclear Command and Contr

 1. David Shambaugh, Modernizing Chi

Military: Progress, Problems, and Pro

(Berkeley: University of California P

2002), p. 169. 

 2. See “United States Nuclear Comman

Control Support,” 21 August 1987, F

of American Scientists, www.fas.org/n

guide/usa/doctrine/dod/dodd-3150_

 3. On Soviet NC2, see “Strategic Comma

Control,” Federation of American Scien

www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/c3i/ind

A more detailed description of Soviet 

munication and launch procedures c

found in Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian S

Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 

2001), pp. 175–76, 278–82, 363–66. 

 4. The “pessimist” versus “optimist” de

essentially dates from Kenneth Waltz 

Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear W

A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). 

role of NC2 specifically, see also Pete

“Command and Control in Emerging 

Nations,” International Security 17 (W

1992/1997), pp. 160–87; David Karl, “

tion Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear 

ers,” International Security 21 (Winter 

Back
“Less Is More: The Command and Control 

Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security 

Studies 6 (Summer 1997), pp. 50–91. 

 5. On this incident and others, see Scott D. 

Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and 

National Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 

Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 135–75. 

 6. The debate on this tendency within security 

studies was initiated by Jack Snyder, “CivilMilitary Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9 

(Summer 1984), pp. 108–46. 

 7. Mao also took less of an interest in the conflict after the war became stalemated in mid1951. This allowed the Chinese commander 

in Korea, Peng Dehuai, to bring greater coherence to command and control arrangements, which in turn increased PLA combat 

efficiency. This entire paragraph draws heavily on Shu Guang Zhang, “Command, Control, and the PLA’s Offensive Campaigns in 

Korea, 1950–51,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. 

Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949

(London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 91–122. 

 8. Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA 

Operational Principles and Limited War: The 

Sino-Indian War of 1962,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting, pp. 190–91. 

 9. Lyle J. Goldstein, “When China Was a Rogue 

State: The Impact of China’s Nuclear Weapons 

Program on U.S.-China Relations during the 

1960s,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, 

no. 37 (November 2003), pp. 741–42. 

 10. The “Third Front” was a massive attempt 

beginning in the mid-1960s to move China’s 

industrial plant into the interior of the country in preparation for protracted (nuclear) 

warfare against one or both of the superpowers. On the details of the Third Front, see 

Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defense 

Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” 

China Quarterly, no. 118 (Autumn 1988), 

pp. 351–86. 

 11. This point and the remainder of this paragraph 

is drawn from Nathan Busch, “What the Proliferation Debate Has Ignored: Command and 

Control, MPC&A, and the Case of China,” paper delivered at the 41st Annual International 

Studies Association Convention, Los Angeles, 

14–18 March 2000, pp. 15–16, available at 

www.arches.uga.edu/~nbusch/ISApaper.pdf. 

stein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? 

Nuclear Weapons and the Sino-Soviet Crisis 

of 1969,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 

(Spring 2003), p. 70. For Gobarev’s study of 

the crisis, see his “Soviet Policy toward China

Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949–1969,” 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12 (December 1999), pp. 1–53. 

 13. Recently published observations of Soviet 

diplomat A. Elizavetin, discussed in Goldstein, 

“Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter?” p. 61. 

 14. On the “Order No. 1” of 17 October 1969, se

Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to 

Mao and the End of Maoism,” in The Politics 

of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. 

Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 264. 

 15. Quoted in John Lewis and Xue Litai, China 

Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 

Univ. Press, 1988), p. 215. 

 16. Avery Goldstein, “Understanding Nuclear 

Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and 

China’s National Experience,” Security Studie

2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 58–59, note 58

 17. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 214. 

 18. Busch, “What the Proliferation Debate Has 

Ignored,” p. 12. 

 19. See “Command and Control,” Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world

china/c3i.htm. 

 20. Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China’s 

Commercial Technology (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 2001), p. 28. 

 21. See “Command and Control.” 

 22. Dan Caldwell, “Permissive Action Links: A 

Description and Proposal,” Survival 29, no. 3 

(May/June 1987), p. 231, cited in Busch, “What 

the Proliferation Debate Has Ignored,” p. 14. 

 23. Busch, “What the Proliferation Debate Has 

Ignored,” p. 18. 

 24. Steve Coll and David Ottaway, “Will the 

United States, Russia and China Be Nuclear 

Partners or Rivals in the 21st Century?” 

Washington Post, 11 April 1995, p. A1, cited 

in Busch, “What the Proliferation Debate Ha

Ignored,” p. 15. 

 25. Comments of David Finkelstein, presented to 

an Institute for National Strategic Studies 

(INSS) conference, “China’s Nuclear Future,

U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, 

30–31 July 2003 [hereafter INSS conference]

Back
pp. 166–67. 

 27. Ibid., p. 121. 

 28. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 

p. 45. 

 29. Ibid., p. 46. 

 30. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military,

p. 168. 

 31. Andrew N. D. Yang, “The Question of Command and Control of the Second Artillery in 

Time of Crisis and War,” INSS conference, p. 1. 

 32. Ibid., p. 2. 

 33. Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “The Chinese 

Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in China and Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: Implications for the United 

States (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1999), available at www.fas 

.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html. 

 34. Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile 

Programs,” p. 22, cited in Busch, “What the 

Proliferation Debate Has Ignored,” p. 11. 

 35. Ibid., p. 12. 

 36. This estimate is from Federation of American 

Scientists, fas.org/nuke/guide/china/slbm/ 

jl-1.htm. 

 37. Cliff, The Military Potential of China’s Commercial Technology, p. 17. 

 38. See, for example, “Xinjiang Military District 

Helps Lay 12,000 km of Fiber Optic Cable,” 

Urumqi Renmin Jundui, 15 August 2002, 

FBIS CPP20020925000177, or “Jiefangjun 

Bao Carries Photo of PLA Fiber-Optics Maintenance in the Field,” Jiefangjun Bao, 20 November 2002, FBIS CPP20021203000224. 

 39. “[PRC] Command and Control,” from 

Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/ 

wmd/world/china/c3i.htm. 

 40. Zhang Zingye, “Second Artillery’s First ShortWave Self-Responsive Communications System Passes Verification,” Huojianbing Bao, 6 

April 2002, FBIS CPP2002042000287. 

 41. Wang Hong, Xi Xiaolei and Fan Xiangsheng, 

“Rush to Occupy the Vantage Point: The Engineering Corps’ Experience in Inormatizing 

Its Headquarters,” Huojianbing Bao, 29 May 

2003, FBIS 20030624000263. 

29 November 2003,” 11 August 2003

CPP20040115000164. 

 43. “DFH-3,” Globalsecurity.org, at globa

.org/space/world/china/dfh-3.htm. 

 44. “FH-1 Military Communications Sat

China Defense Today, www.sinodefen

space/spacecraft/fh.asp. 

 45. “DFH-4 Communications Satellite,” 

Defense Today, www.sinodefence.com

spacecraft/fh.asp. 

 46. “April 2005,” Orbital Report News Ag

retrieved from www.orbireport.com/

on 8 February 2005. 

 47. Annual Report on The Military Power 

People’s Republic of China, Report to 

Pursuant to the FY 2000 National De

Authorization Act (Washington, D.C

2003), p. 34. 

 48. Zhang Xianqiu, “Second Artillery Bas

proves Quality of Confrontational Tr

by Freeing Itself from Outmoded Ide

fangjun Bao, 7 May 2004, FBIS 

CPP20030507000047. 

 49. Wu Xudong and He Tianjin, “Honin

Heavenly Sword to Win,” Zhonguo Q

Bao, 30 May 2002, FBIS CPP2002053

 50. “A Certain Base under the Second Ar

Corps Builds Network-Based Military 

ing Platforms,” Jiefangjun Bao, 21 Ma

2003, FBIS CPP20030313000039. 

 51. “PLA Second Artillery Corps Sets Up 

Equipment Repair, Maintenance Wo

Jiefangjun Bao, 19 March 2003, FBIS 

CPP20030319000050. 

 52. See, for example, “Wang Xiaojun and 

Hongqing, “A Certain Brigade under 

ond Artillery Force Focuses on Comb

Tactical Training Exercises and Progr

Training Officers and Soldiers Separa

Jiefangjun Bao, 13 January 2004, FBIS 

CPP20040113000099, and Zhang Xu

Liu Jiexiang, “Second Artillery Corps 

Postgraduate Psychiatrists,” Xinhua, 

gust 2002, FBIS CPP20020830000069

 53. John Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Str

Seapower (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford U

Press, 1994), p. 118. 

 54. Ibid., p. 119. 

 55. Ibid. 

 56. Ibid. 

Back
Xuji” [Technological Means for Communicating with Submarines] Jianchuan Zhishi, 

no. 287 (August 2003), pp. 42–45. 

Chapter Two 

China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: 

Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready? 

 1. For example, at a recent conference on 

“China’s Nuclear Future,” many of the nation’s leading China military analysts had 

widely divergent views on the significance of 

recent developments within the People’s Liberation Army. “China’s Nuclear Future” conference, Boulder, Colorado, U.S. Air Force 

Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. 

Air Force Academy, 30–31 July 2003. 

The epigraph is found in John Wilson Lewis 

and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), 

p. 18. 

 2. Michael S. Chase and Evan S. Medeiros, 

“China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and the Doctrinal Debate” (unpublished research paper, RAND 

Corporation, Washington, D.C.: 2002), p. 1. 

 3. See Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile 

Submarine,” Washington Times, 3 December 

2004, available at washgintontimes.com/ 

national/20041202-115302-2338r.htm; or 

Richard Fisher, “Submarine Incident Highlights Military Buildup,” Asian Wall Street 

Journal, 17 November 2004. 

 4. Richard D. Fisher, “Navy Systems” in The 

Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on 

the Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army, forthcoming, p. 3. 

 5. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, former commander of the PLA Navy (1988–96), quoted 

in Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide 

Submarine Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Navy Dept., 1997), p. 18. 

 6. An argument could be made that there are 

more than two methods to neutralize an 

SLBM in that air and surface antisubmarine 

assets possess an offensive antisubmarine capability. However, the assumption is that the 

aircraft or surface ship would have to be in 

the immediate vicinity of the SSBN at the 

time of launch and be able to detect preparations for launch. It is possible, but not likely, 

that an SSBN would launch its ballistic missiles 

in the immediate vicinity of a surface ship or 

aircraft. To do so would be to jeopardize the 

maining as covert as possible to continue its 

launch sequence. It is more likely that a U.S. 

SSN could remain undetected in an SSBN’s 

baffles, enabling it to be present immediately 

prior to or immediately after, than it is for a 

hostile (to the SSBN) surface ship or aircraft 

to remain undetected by the SSBN and not 

prompt it to go elsewhere. 

 7. Of course, if the ballistic missile defense system was capable of destroying the missile 

prior to the deployment of its warheads and 

decoys, that is to say in the boost phase, any 

employed decoys would be rendered useless. 

 8. From 1985 to 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly $65.7 billion dollars for ballistic 

missile defense and will be deploying a system 

with only limited capability in 2004. See “His

torical Funding for BMD FY85–02,” Missile 

Defense Agency MDAlink, “Budget and Legislative Guidance,” www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/ 

bmdolink/html/guide.html. 

 9. “The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75,” Strategic Studie

Institute, “Regional Studies: Asia/Pacific,” 

www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/region.html 

#asia. 

 10. See excerpts at GlobalSecurity.org, “Nuclear 

Posture Review,” www.globalsecurity.org/ 

wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. 

 11. This appeared to be the outlook of most analysts at the “China’s Nuclear Future” conference

 12. The 094 project may have experienced a 

considerable setback during the summer of 

2004 when a JL-2 suffered a testing failure. 

Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” Washington Times, 3 December 

2004, available at washgintontimes.com/ 

national/20041202-115302-2338r.htm. According to Jane’s, the Type 094 SSBN may be 

operational by 2008, with four to six boats to 

be built. They will carry eight to eighteen mis

siles with a range of eight thousand kilometers and one warhead, or three to eight 

MIRVs with decoys and penetration aids. Th

exact timeline may be constrained by the development of the JL-2 SLBM. See “JL-2(CSSNX-5),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 3 

June 2003, available, www.janes.com; also 

Jane’s Fighting Ships, “China/Submarines: Stra

tegic Missile Submarines/Introduction,” 20 

March 2003, www.janes.com. The 2003 Annua

Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China is vague. It states that the JL-2 i

Back
next decade but is not specific about the 094. 

U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

(Washington, D.C.: 2003), p. 27. 

 13. See, for example, “China’s Economy Is No 

‘House of Cards,’” Business Week Online, 16 

January 2003, available, www.businessweek 

.com. 

 14. General Liu Huaqing quoted in Office of 

Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine 

Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy 

Dept., 1997), p. 1. 

 15. Rear Admiral Charles B. Momsen, quoted in 

Richard E. Winslow III, Portsmouth-Built: 

Submarines of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth, N.H.: Peter E. Randall, 

1985), p. 138. 

Epigraph found in Lewis and Xue, China’s 

Strategic Seapower, p. 29. 

 16. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 20. 

 17. Ibid., p. 4. 

 18. To illustrate further, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, 

who was responsible for weapons research 

and development of the SSBN and SLBM 

projects, relocated the Metal Physics Research 

Section of China’s Institute of Atomic Energy 

(IAE) from Shenyang and Beijing to the Gobi 

Desert in Inner Mongolia to shield its workings from the effects of the Great Leap. Nie 

was forced to walk both sides of the fence by 

appearing to support the party line while at 

the same time insulating his workers from the 

impact. See Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic 

Seapower, pp. 26, 34. 

 19. Financial resources were heavily impacted as 

well. There are examples too numerous to be 

recounted here of the impact of the economic 

devastation that resulted from the Great Leap 

and the Cultural Revolution on the SSBN and 

SLBM programs. Nevertheless, a brief illustration of what the defense establishment had 

to endure occurred in 1966 during the development of the JL-1 solid propellant engine. 

The Fourth Academy, under the Seventh 

Ministry, which was responsible for development of the JL-1 solid propellant engine, had 

to halt construction of engine test facilities in 

1968 due to spending cuts that resulted in a 

substantial modification of the testing schedule and a two-year delay. See Lewis and Xue, 

China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 144–46. 

 20. Ibid., p. 146. 

 22. Ibid., pp. 138, 144–45, 147–49, 162, 1

 23. Lin Biao quoted in Michael Schoenha

China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966–19

(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 

 24. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Sea

p. 149. 

 25. “The Lessons of History: The Chines

ple’s Liberation Army at 75,” Strategi

Institute, “Regional Studies: Asia/Pac

www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/regio

.html#asia, 7 September 2003, p. 409

 26. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seap

pp. 88–89. 

 27. Massive amounts of scarce financial r

were thrown at the Third Line and af

effort was largely completed, a partia

occurred from 1986 to 1989 in which

the 2,000 large and medium-sized en

in remote mountain areas were remo

the coastal provinces” to curtail the d

of isolated and disgruntled workers fr

Third Line. See David Shambaugh, M

ing China’s Military (Berkeley: Univ. 

fornia Press, 2002), p. 227. 

 28. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seap

26. Under the right circumstances co

tion can be a positive force for develo

pable, high-quality, and low-cost wea

systems. For example, the U.S. Depar

Defense tasks multiple defense contra

develop competing designs for a sing

weapon system. However, China sim

not have the financial strength or scie

and engineers educated in submarine 

ballistic missile design to pursue a co

tive strategy in its state-run defense in

 29. For examples see Lewis and Xue, Chi

Strategic Seapower, pp. 138–40, 162, 1

203. 

 30. Ibid., p. 162. 

 31. Gen. Luo Ruiqing was the director of 

from 1961 to 1966. He was also the ch

the General Staff and secretary genera

Central Military Commission from 1

1966, a member of the Central Secret

and the office director of the Fifteen M

Special Commission from 1962 to 1

was toppled during the Cultural Rev

because he stood for a more profess

and less ideological PLA. Others wer

volved in the debate as well, such as 

Long, the director of the National D

Back
Zhou Enlai. See Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 28–29, 246. 

 32. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 29, 32. 

 33. As a point of comparison, the U.S. SLBM 

effort also suffered many growing pains in its 

initial stages. In the 1950s, the U.S. Navy was 

unable to articulate a cohesive position on 

ballistic missiles and, consequently, was 

forced to pursue a joint endeavor with the 

U.S. Army on the Jupiter Program as a costsaving measure. For one year the Navy 

worked with the Army on the liquid-fueled 

Jupiter, until it recognized the need to pursue 

a solid-fueled option and was able to convince the Department of Defense of the rationale for pursuing a solid-fueled ballistic 

missile. Additionally, the Special Projects Office within the Department of the Navy, responsible for the development of the Fleet 

Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine force, was 

considered the model of managerial success, 

when in fact it was not. It should be noted, 

however, that even though the U.S. Navy 

went through some growing pains with the 

FBM program, it was still one of the most 

successful weapons development programs in 

the history of the United States; only five 

years elapsed from the establishment of the 

Special Projects Office until the first successful submerged test launch of a Polaris in 

1960. Even after the U.S. Navy had the experience of constructing its first SSBNs—the 

“Forty-one for Freedom”—the follow-on 

Ohio-class SSBNs were not without their own 

governmental, defense contractor, and funding problems. Overall, however, the delays in 

the U.S. Navy’s strategic weapons programs 

have been minuscule in comparison to those 

of China. See Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris 

System Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972). For an interesting 

overview of the Polaris and Fleet Ballistic 

Missile (FBM) submarine programs see Bureau of Naval Weapons Special Projects Office, Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Weapon 

System Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Navy Dept., 1 June 1966). For an overview of 

the Trident program see D. Douglas Dalgleish 

and Larry Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale: 

Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1984). 

 34. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 25. 

 35. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 

that the Lenin reportedly suffered in 1966 or 

1967 a major reactor plant casualty—possibly 

a reactor meltdown—that may have killed up 

to thirty of its crew. More than a year after th

accident, the three original reactor plants on 

the Lenin were replaced by two of a different 

design, It is impossible to say what the exact 

cause of the casualty was, even if the casualty 

was due to operator error, the root cause of 

such a major reactor accident could still be 

traced to plant design, since the reactor plant 

safety features were apparently inadequate. A

the time of the accident on the Lenin, SinoSoviet relations were at a low point; it is possible that the Chinese designers were unawar

of flaws. It is also possible that any flaws in 

the Lenin design were completely irrelevant, 

since the Chinese may have used the design a

a general guide rather than a specific template. China’s choice was an ominous one 

nonetheless. (See Lewis and Xue, China’s 

Strategic Seapower, p. 31.) According to Jane’

Defence Weekly, CBS News obtained CIA 

documents that provided details on the Lenin

accident. See “Soviet Submarine Accidents: 

New Details,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 Janu

ary 1985, p. 85. 

 37. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 24, 27. Control-rod drive mechanisms en

able an operator to remotely insert or withdraw the control rods within the reactor core 

to start up the reactor, maintain criticality, or 

shut it down. The Chinese utilized hafnium 

(Hf) control rods. 

 38. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 27

 39. According to one of Lewis and Xue’s sources

U.S. submarines use a uranium enrichment o

93 percent. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic 

Seapower, p. 23, p. 259 note 1. 

 40. Ibid., p. 7. 

 41. Deng Liqun, Ma Hong, and Wu Heng, eds., 

China Today: Defence Science and Technology

(in English) (Beijing: National Defence Industry Press, 1993), p. 318. 

 42. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 27

 43. For a basic introduction to submarine reacto

design, see “Nuclear Propulsion,” Federation 

of American Scientists, www.fas.org/man/ 

dod-101/sys/ship/eng/reactor.html. The Chinese reactor was a pressurized-water reactor 

with separate primary and secondary systems

Primary plant pressure was 140–150 atmospheres (2,057–2,204 psi), and the fuel cells 

Back
clad with zirconium alloy. The rated reactor 

power for the prototype plant was forty-eight 

megawatts; it was reportedly capable of twelve 

thousand shaft horsepower. Chinese designers evidently had some serious difficulties 

with the primary-to-secondary heat exchanger—the steam generator. They discussed the necessity of maintaining the 

integrity of both the primary and secondary 

systems to ensure that the radioactive primary 

coolant does not enter the secondary system 

but the only detail provided is that “the Chinese had serious problems devising a safe exchange system between the two loops. Early 

on they felt the iron fist of Murphy’s Law.” 

This suggests that in their initial reactor plant 

design efforts, the Chinese most likely suffered a primary-to-secondary reactor coolant 

leak. See Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic 

Seapower, p. 24, and Deng, Ma, and Wu, eds., 

China Today, pp. 321–31. The prototype reactor remained in operation for nine years, 

from July 1970 to December 1979, for complete testing to be completed. Ibid., p. 328. 

 44. According to Lewis and Xue, construction 

apparently began on the plant and facilities in 

early 1968, more than a year before the complete design of the prototype reactor was finalized in 1969. China Today states that 

construction began in 1965 but was delayed 

by the Cultural Revolution until 1968. Construction of the prototype reactor plant was 

said to have been completed in April 1970, 

with test operations beginning in May 1970; 

however, according to Lewis and Xue, manufacture of the fuel cells for the prototype was 

not begun until the summer of 1970. The fuel 

cells most likely were completed well before 

May 1970. China Today also lists May 1970 as 

the first operation of the prototype reactor. 

Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 

45; and Deng, Ma, and Wu eds., China Today,

pp. 318, 324–26. 

 45. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 43, 45. 

 46. Ibid., pp. 106, 108, 109. 

 47. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 109, 110. 

 48. Ibid., pp. 68, 110. 

 49. Deng, Ma Hong, and Wu eds., China Today,

p. 314. At the beginning of Project 09, a 

group of designers studied and took notes on 

a toy model of a U.S. Polaris SSBN which 

edge the Project 09 engineers had on 

rine design and the, “somewhat unre

in which [they] operated.” Lewis and 

China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 50. 

 50. Huang Xuhua, quoted in Lewis and X

China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 65; and 

proverb quoted by David Lai, “Learn

the Stones: A Weiqi Approach to Ma

Sun Tzu and the Chinese Way of Wa

Diplomacy,” Asia-Pacific Studies Gro

search Seminar, Naval War College, 3 

vember 2003. 

 51. China conducted scale-model tests in 

indoor wave tank and arrived at the m

less conclusion that “the scale-model 

ments repeatedly verified the overall 

superiority of the more revolutionary 

drop shape, but the tests left unresolv

eral questions about the maneuverab

stability of a submerged submarine so 

ured.” That the engineers could conc

the teardrop-shaped hull was superio

out resolving the critical factors of m

ability and stability illustrates the prim

nature of Chinese submarine design a

time. See Lewis and Xue, China’s Stra

Seapower, pp. 51–53, 56. The USS Alb

was an experimental U.S. submarine 

the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to te

among other things, the concept of a 

drop-shaped hull. The design subord

the performance of the surfaced subm

that of the submerged submarine. Ex

testing resulted in greater submerged 

and underwater speed records. See Wi

Portsmouth-Built Submarines of the Po

mouth Naval Shipyard, p. 143, and “U

bacore,” American Society of Mechani

Engineers, “ASME Roster of Landmar

and Collections,” www.asme.org/hist

roster_a.html. 

 52. China had to develop nondestructive 

tion techniques to verify the quality o

weld and had difficulty implementing 

quality control necessary to eliminate 

fects resulting from the inexperienced 

yard workers. For more specific infor

on welding difficulties on China’s subm

see Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Se

pp. 52, 104–106, 286–87, notes 9–16. 

 53. Coincidentally, but not surprisingly, 

first submarine hull was completed in 

on Mao’s birthday, 26 December. Lew

Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 10

Back
where the various components for the subsystems were being built in order to weigh them 

and determine individual component centers 

of gravity. Foreshadowing the quality of the 

product they were to eventually complete, 

they resorted to “educated guesses” to determine the stability of the submarine and a 

practice of “designing while manufacturing.” 

This paragraph summarizes Lewis and Xue, 

China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 65–66, 106. 

 55. The effectiveness of the pedestals depends on 

the type of mounts used and their ability to 

prevent the transmission of the equipment 

vibration to the hull. Covering of the equipment in sound-absorbent material is of limited value, since the air between the covered 

equipment and the hull is a poor transmission 

medium for sound relative to the direct path 

between the equipment mounts and the hull. 

 56. Cavitation results from the movement of the 

screw (propeller) through the water, which in 

turn creates areas of extremely low pressure. 

The low pressure causes local boiling of the 

water, which can cause cracking, pitting, and 

corrosion of the screw blades, further increasing cavitation. The design, machining, speed, 

and cleanliness of the screw as well as the ambient water pressure (which is proportional to 

depth) all contribute to screw cavitation. 

With respect to the speed of the screw 

through the water, the lower the shaft RPM 

(SRPM), the less likely it is that cavitation will 

occur. The SRPM of China’s first nuclear 

submarine was 125 to 200, even after the engineers had already been forced to lower it 

due to excessive cavitation. Lewis and Xue, 

China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 53, 109. 

 57. Ibid., pp. 4, 67. 

 58. The capabilities of the torpedo are dependent 

on the environment and the target. The depth 

of the water in which the torpedo will be fired 

and whether or not it is intended to strike a 

submerged or surface target are critical variables for which designers must account. 

 59. Lewis and Xue state that the Yu-3 is the Chinese Sturgeon 2. According to Jane’s Naval 

Weapon Systems, the Yu-3 is equivalent to the 

Soviet SET-53 acoustic homing torpedo. 

Jane’s Fighting Ships states that the Yu-3 is 

equivalent to the Soviet SET-65E wake homing torpedo. China’s earlier torpedoes, the 

Yu-1, the Yu-2, the Yu-4A, and the Yu-4B 

were all deemed inadequate by China. See 

“Underwater Weapons/Russian Federation/ 

YU 3/YU 4 Heavyweight Torpedoes,” Jane’s 

Naval Weapon Systems, 29 November 2002, 

available, www.janes.com; “Xia Class (Type 

092) (SSBN)” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 20 March 

2003, available, www.janes.com; Lewis and 

Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 66–67. 

 60. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 66–67. 

 61. Similarly, it was not until the mid-1980s that 

the Han was outfitted “with acceptable [navi

gation and communication] subsystems.” 

Ibid., pp. 66–67, 110. 

 62. Ibid., p. 68. 

 63. In 1956, Mao Zedong initiated the research 

on missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. At the time of the JL-1 project initiation the missile designation, JL-1, meant 

Giant Dragon No. 1 (julong yihao). In 1972, 

the meaning of the designation was changed 

to Giant Wave (julang) for political reasons. 

Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 130, 137. 

 64. Ibid., p. 143. 

 65. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile 

Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat 

through 2015 (Washington, D.C.: 2001), p. 9. 

 66. In 1959, the Soviet Union sold China the 

designs and necessary equipment to produce 

its own version of the liquid-fueled Soviet 

SLBM, the R-11FM. However, China decided 

to focus first on the production of a landbased strategic weapon, to produce a nuclear 

strategic deterrent in less time than it would take 

to produce a functional SSBN. See Lewis and 

Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 131–32. 

 67. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower,

pp. 132–33. 

 68. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development,

p. 136. 

 69. For an SLBM, missile ignition does not occur 

immediately, as it does for a land-based missile, but after the missile is above the surface 

of the water. Ignition would be triggered, 

most likely, as a result of the negative acceleration rate sensed by the missile flight control system. As the missile reaches its highest 

point following missile ejection it momentar

ily falls back toward the surface; the missile 

flight control system senses this and triggers 

engine ignition. 

Back
pp. 133, 143–44. See Lewis and Xue, chap. 6, 

for a more detailed analysis of China’s solid 

rocket propellant development. 

 71. The price paid for the trial-and-error method 

was at times high. In 1962, a technician was 

killed while working with the composite propellant at Plant 845 (part of the Solid Rocket 

Motor institute under the Fifth Academy) in 

Xian, and in 1974 there were several mishaps 

involving the grain casting plant, the worst 

killing the deputy head of the plant. Lewis 

and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, pp. 136–

37, 151–52, 153. 

 72. Ibid., pp. 136–37, 139, 141, 144, 151. 

 73. Ibid., pp. 139, 143, 153. 

 74. Ibid., p. 158. 

 75. Ibid., p. 159. 

 76. The other option would have been to launch 

the SLBMs while the SSBN hovered in place. 

To facilitate a hovering SSBN, the ship must 

have a ship control system capable of making 

rapid adjustments in ballast by either bringing water on board or driving water into and 

out of variable ballast tanks. Hovering, therefore, requires technology that can automatically detect changes in ship’s depth and 

rapidly compensate by utilizing a system of 

pumps and valves capable of moving massive 

amounts of water in a very short time. The 

Chinese designers developed a launchassistance system that incorporated rails 

within the missile tube to compensate for the 

perpendicular force of the water (relative to 

the direction of the ejected missile); it is likely 

that they believed this system would be less 

complicated than designing a hovering system 

for the submarine. Lewis and Xue, China’s 

Strategic Seapower, pp. 71, 174. 

 77. Ibid., p. 155. 

 78. Ibid., pp. 171, 175. 

 79. China built a Golf-class diesel-electric submarine under license from the Soviet Union. The 

Golf was modified to be a test platform for 

JL-1 missile launches; it is believed to have 

continued service as a test platform for the 

new JL-2 SLBM. (Lewis and Xue, China’s 

Strategic Seapower, pp. 69, 111–15, 186, 197–

200.) Beyond the challenges particular to an 

SLBM, China had to develop the telemetry 

systems for testing and tracking, as well as the 

tracking ships necessary to monitor the performance of the JL-1 during its flight tests. 

pp. 73, 171, 191–96. For a more in de

overview of the JL-1’s guidance and f

control systems, function, and perfor

see ibid., chap. 7. 

 80. In 1967, when the initial design for th

was completed, Nie Rongzhen and th

fense Science and Technology Comm

set the target launch date for the Proj

submarine as 1973. Lewis and Xue, C

Strategic Seapower, pp. 68, 204. 

 81. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at S

napolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2

Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Mi

271; “NRDC Nuclear Notebook,” Bu

the Atomic Scientists, “Nuclear Noteb

www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenote

nukenote.html. 

 82. At the “China’s Nuclear Future” conf

several questions were posed to leadin

perts on the PLA about the Xia in on

exchanges and in open forum. The ge

consensus was that the Xia did not re

a threat. 

 83. Epigraph quotation found in Owen 

Jr., The Third Battle, Newport Paper 

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College P

2003), p. 51. 

 84. Coté defines the First and Second Bat

World Wars I and II, respectively (ib

 85. On the U.S. Navy’s fixed underwate

sive acoustic (SOSUS) initiative du

Cold War, see ibid., chap. 4. For the 

Navy’s development of mobile und

acoustic arrays, see “Advanced Dep

System Will Help Find Quiet Diese

InsideDefense.com, 8 February 199

.insidedefense.com, and “Dual-Arr

Testing,” InsideDefense.com, 1 De

2003, www.insidedefense.com. 

 86. John Morgan, “Anti-Submarine War

Phoenix for the Future,” Undersea W

(Fall 1998), p. 18 (Captain Morgan w

Director, Anti-Submarine Warfare D

[N84] in the Office of the Chief of Na

erations); Capt. James E. Pillsbury, Ex

Assistant to the Chairman of the Stra

Policy Department, Naval War Colle

view by author, 22 August 2003, New

R.I.; Coté, The Third Battle, p. 84. 

 87. “Antisubmarine Warfare after the Co

MIT Security Studies Program, “Publi

Conferences, & Symposia Page,” web

.edu/ssp/Publications/pubs.html. 

Back
Revealed Structural Fatigue,” InsideDefense 

.com, 20 November 2003, www.insidedefense 

.com. 

 89. Vice Admiral Kirkland H. Donald. See 

“VADM Donald Remarks at NDIA 2003 Joint 

Undersea Warfare Technical Conference,” 

Commander Naval Submarine Forces, 23 September 2003, www.sublant.navy.mil/remarks 

_2003NDIA.htm. 

 90. Coté, The Third Battle, p. 84 [emphasis original]. 

 91. Ibid., p. 20. 

 92. In order to ensure the SSN fleet does not 

continue to decline in numbers, the Navy 

must begin in the near future to build at least 

two new submarines per year. Congress recently rejected a plan to build seven Virginiaclass submarines in a five-year period. See 

Dale Eisman, “Congress Gives $2 Billion for 

Navy Shipbuilding Plan,” Virginian Pilot, 30 

September 2003. 

 93. Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997, p. 21. 

 94. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on the 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China (Washington, D.C.: 2003), pp. 8, 28. 

 95. Coté, The Third Battle, pp. 66–67. 

 96. Ibid., p. 69. 

 97. The USS Holland was the first submarine 

purchased by the Navy in 1900; the USS Los 

Angeles (SSN 688) was the first of a class that 

today represents the backbone of the U.S. 

submarine fleet. 

 98. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on the 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China (Washington, D.C.: 2003), pp. 8, 27. 

 99. In the 1990s, China spent nearly seven billion 

dollars on advanced Russian weapons systems 

and its purchases have continued. The contract with Russia to purchase eight Project 

636 Kilo class submarines as well as other 

weapons systems will provide China with 

formidable weaponry that could, if properly 

utilized, present a serious challenge to the 

U.S. Navy. See Shambaugh, Modernizing 

China’s Military, p. 218. 

100. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on the 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China (Washington, D.C.: 2003), p. 27. 

101. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War (London: 

Frank Cass, 2001), p. 237. 

the 094 prototype was launched in July 2004. 

However, estimates on its initial operating 

capability vary considerably (see footnote 12 

above). In addition, Bernard Cole states that 

the first 094 will not be in service until 2010 

and that the JL-2 will have a range of 

twelve thousand kilometers. (Bernard D. 

Cole, The Great Wall at Sea [Annapolis, 

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001], p. 185.) 

David Shambaugh says that the 094 will be 

in service possibly within a decade and that i

will carry sixteen JL-2 SLBMs each carrying 

six warheads and will have a range of eight 

thousand kilometers. (Shambaugh, Moderniz

ing China’s Military, p. 272.) A monthly Hon

Kong magazine article states that there are or 

will be three variants of the JL-2: the JL-2 

with an 8,600 km range with four to five war

heads, the JL-2A with a 12,500 km range with 

seven to eight warheads, and the JL-2B with a 

range of 14,000 km and ten warheads. 

(Ch’ing T’ung, “China’s First- and SecondGeneration Nuclear-Powered Submarines,” 

Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 June 2003

FBIS CPP20030620000084.) A less credible 

article in the Chinese Military Update published by the Royal United Services Institute 

states that three 094 SSBNs have already been 

commissioned and that they may already 

have six 094s. (Sheng Lijun, “PLA Modernization: Tactical and Strategic Weapons for th

Taiwan Strait,” Chinese Military Update 1, no

3 [June 2003], p. 6.) There does seem to be 

some convergence in that the 094 will likely 

carry sixteen JL-2 SLBMs, that they will have 

a range between eight and twelve thousand 

kilometers, and that they will have MIRV. 

103. For a more detailed look at the improvement

China has made training its officer and 

enlisted personnel, see, Cole, The Great Wall 

at Sea, chap. 6. 

104. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Under

sea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine 

Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 

(Spring 2004), pp. 175–76. 

105. Pillsbury interview. 

106. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 70–71. 

107. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Officers Warn That 

Taiwan Referendum Could Lead to War,” 

New York Times on the Web, 3 December 

2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/12/03/ 

international/asia/03CND-Chin.html?ex 

=1071678576&ei=1&en=b38e0023e2b245d8

A 2003 report from the Council on Foreign 

Back
Olympics creates an even greater need [for 

China] to avoid additional external tensions.” 

(“China’s Military Power,” Council on Foreign 

Relations, “All Publications,” www.cfr.org/ 

pubs.php?year=2003&type=>.) 

108. Visiting the United States, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, and President George W. 

Bush were fairly united in their response to 

Taiwan’s recent push to conduct a referendum. David Stout, “Bush Tells China’s Leader 

He Opposes Taiwan’s Referendum,” New 

York Times on the Web, 9 December 2003, 

www.nytimes.com/2003/12/09/international/

asia/09CND-Bush.html?ex=1072000124 

&ei=1&en=f134bf550961d0c4>. 

109. The commentary, quoted with permission, 

was provided to the author as a review of an 

unpublished draft on China’s submarine 

force written by a colleague of the author. The 

U.S. submarine captain has extensive experience in both fast attack and ballistic missile 

submarines and wished to remain anonymous [emphasis original]. 

110. Anonymous U.S. submarine captain [all 

emphasis original]. 

111. Ibid. 

112. This number is derived from Christopher 

Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2003–

2004 (Glasgow, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 

2003), p. 153. 

113. “Submarines and Peacekeeping,” Journal of 

Military and Strategic Studies (Spring 2000), 

available at www.jmss.org/2000/article3.html. 

An account in the U.S. Navy’s Undersea Warfare magazine argues, “The San Luis operated 

in the vicinity of the British task force for 

more than a month and was a constant concern to Royal Navy commanders. Despite the 

deployment of five nuclear attack submarines, 

24-hour per day airborne ASW operations, 

and expenditures of precious time, energy, 

and ordnance, the British never once detected 

the Argentine submarine.” Morgan, “AntiSubmarine Warfare,” p. 19. 

114. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military,

p. 283. 

115. For a compelling explanation of this concept, 

see Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems 

Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International 

Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40. 

Developments and the Ballistic Missile 

through 2015 (Washington, D.C.: 200

117. For more detailed information on U.S

Missile Defense efforts, see the Missile 

Agency at www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/. A

2003 “China’s Nuclear Future” confer

tired Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 

Center for Naval Analyses, stated that 

lieves China is building to a “substanti

of 250–300 road-mobile ICBMs. 

118. John F. Kennedy quoted in Coté, The 

Battle, p. 20. 

119. Nobska Report quoted in ibid., p. 20. 

120. After China’s first atomic test in 1964

stated that the first atomic test, “mark

bankruptcy of the imperialists’ policy 

clear monopoly and nuclear blackma

frustrated the attempts to pressure th

nese people into submission.” Mao Z

quoted in Lewis and Xue, China’s Str

Seapower, p. 150. 

121. Robert A. Hamilton, “Lack of Subs Co

Pace of Technology, Admiral Warns,” 

London Day, 30 September 2003, pp. A

122. Bryan Bender, “Navy to Cut Orders; 

Losses Seen,” Boston Globe, 7 Februar

p. 1. 

123. See Goldstein and Murray, “Underse

ons,” note 109. 

124. The estimate of twenty SSNs assumes 

U.S. submarines would be easily able 

and maintain contact with an SSBN. 

timate is based on a forty-day mainte

period, a seventy-day patrol, and two

manning for each SSBN, allowing fou

SSBNs to be at sea at any given time. 

SSNs would be deployed for six mon

twenty days of transit or training tim

ther end of the deployment, and twel

months between deployments. The e

assumes that five SSNs would norma

theater for four deployed SSBNs; it doe

into account nonavailability for such re

technical problems or medical emergen

125. The number of SSNs is based on simi

sumptions as the previous estimate w

change being that a lower number of 

are on patrol. If the U.S. Navy were to 

armed, unmanned undersea vehicles, i

sible that the number of SSNs required 

a scenario could be reduced, but such 

ogy could take at least two decades to m

Back
Yellow Sea as a bastion. It would negate one 

of the principal advantages of the SSBN—the 

ability to exploit the expansive Indian and Pacific Oceans, or at the very least the South 

China Sea. Additionally, unlike the Cold War, 

when Soviet SSBNs made use of bastions to 

avoid SOSUS barriers and stay within the protective envelope of the Soviet Navy, in today’s 

world, with ballistic missile defense systems 

looming on the horizon, the use of bastions 

may not be feasible. Maintaining SSBNs in the 

Yellow Sea would reduce the uncertainty for a 

future theater ballistic missile defense system. 

For a more detailed discussion of U.S. and 

Soviet use of barrier strategies as well as the 

use of bastions, see Coté, The Third Battle. 

127. For the Chinese perception of “island chains,” 

see Chris Rahman, “Defending Taiwan, and 

Why It Matters,” Naval War College Review 

54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), esp. p. 73. 

128. See, “Australia to Join U.S. Missile Defense 

System,” New York Times on the Web, 4 December 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/12/ 

04/international/asia/04AUST.html?ex 

=1072014262&ei=1&en=f97544a85990d50e. 

129. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Developing U.S.-

Chinese Nuclear Naval Competition in 

Asia,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 16 January 2005, retrieved from 

www.strategycenter.net/printversion/print 

_pub.asp?pubID=60 on 25 January 2005. 

130. Thanks to Prof. William Murray from the War 

Gaming Department of the Naval War College 

for this insight, as well as for many others. 

131. Chinese SSBN operations in the Indian Ocean 

would preclude launch against the U.S., due 

to the range. However, China may choose to 

demonstrate its nuclear deterrent to India. To 

do this, its submarines would have to transit 

some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. 

132. For a more detailed discussion on the barrier 

strategy, see Coté, The Third Battle. 

133. Ibid., pp. 63–64. 

134. Ibid., p. 64. 

135. Ibid. 

136. The ASW debate that occurred as a result of 

the Soviet deployment of its Delta SSBNs is 

covered in ibid., pp. 64–65. 

137. Ibid., p. 86. 

138. Ibid., p. 82. 

Analyses sees China’s nuclear future as more 

mobile, more penetrable, more accurate, and 

capable of surprise. (“China’s Nuclear Future” conference.) A more robust fleet of 

Chinese SSBNs and the JL-2 SLBM are consistent with all of these. China wants an assured second-strike capability that is less 

vulnerable to U.S. precision conventional 

strike and nuclear attack. For this reason, an 

investment in a larger fleet of SSBNs is highly 

plausible, and there is little reason to doubt it

140. “Statement of RADM Albert H. Konetzni, 

U.S. Navy Commander, Submarine Force 

United States Pacific Fleet before the House 

Armed Services Committee Procurement 

Subcommittee Submarine Force Structure 

and Modernization Plans Hearing 27 June 

2000,” Federation of American Scientists, 

“Military Affairs in Congress: 2000,” www.fa

.org/man/congress/2000/index.html. From 

the U.S. Navy’s Undersea Warfare magazine: 

“The new challenge is becoming clearer, and it 

is time to shift gears. . . . [T]he Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Navy’s LongRange Planning Objectives — also call for a 

robust ASW capability that links warfare requirements to the real dangers and vulnerabilities introduced by the proliferation of 

next-generation submarines.” Morgan, “AntiSubmarine Warfare,” p. 20. 

141. Thanks to Capt. Dan Farson of the Navy 

Warfare Development Command (NWDC) 

for his thoughtful critique and suggestions. 

142. Coté characterizes the ability of the Navy to 

keep pace with ASW development during the 

first, second, and third battles as having been 

“saved by the bell.” See Coté, The Third Battle, pp. 2, 78. 

143. See “Ship Antisubmarine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring (SHAREM), re

trieved from www.globalsecurity.org/ 

military/ops/sharem.htm on 8 February 2005

144. While these advancements are positive, there 

remain many negatives for U.S. ASW capabil

ity. The MMA aircraft, if it remains on sched

ule, will not be available until 2013 at the 

earliest. Additionally, S-3 Vikings that in the 

past were devoted almost exclusively to ASW 

now function as aerial refueling aircraft. The 

SOSUS system capability has been severely 

downgraded, and the number of ASW-capable 

surface combatants is being drastically reduced

Without an easily identifiable threat to the 

United States, the tendency in force planning 

Back
forming multiple missions—the Littoral 

Combat Ship and the SSGN are good examples. The disadvantage to this approach is that 

crews that operate these weapons platforms 

are not afforded the opportunity to specialize 

and excel at specific mission areas, such as 

ASW. For a more complete discussion on 

U.S. ASW capability, see Goldstein and 

Murray, “Undersea Dragons.” 

145. This is a reference to remarks, sometimes 

regarded as a nuclear threat, by Gen. Xiong 

Guangkai offered to former State and Defense Department official Charles W. Freeman, Jr., in December 1995. On this event, 

see James Mann, About Face: A History of 

America’s Curious Relationship with China, 

from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage 

Books, 2000), p. 334. 

Chapter Three 

China’s Space Development 

and Nuclear Strategy 

 1. The military implications of this nexus are 

thoroughly discussed in William C. Martel 

and Toshi Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. 

Space Race,” Washington Quarterly 26 (Autumn 2003), pp. 21–23. 

 2. Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of 

War (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), p. 66. 

 3. “Shenzhou” is the name apparently given to 

the spacecraft by former President Jiang Zemin. 

 4. There are three major terms used to describe 

China’s astronauts. The one used in this 

chapter, yuhangyuan (宇航员), or “astronaut,” is the official term used by the PRC 

government and media. A second mainland 

Chinese term, apparently of academic origin 

in the 1970s, is hangtianyuan (航天员), or 

“spaceflight person.” A third term, taikongren

(太空人), or “space person,” is more commonly used in Taiwan and among overseas 

Chinese. Taikongren has been anglicized into 

“taikonaut.” For more information, see Brian 

Harvey, China’s Space Program: From Conception to Manned Space Flight (New York: 

Springer Praxis, 2004), p. 251. 

 5. Yuhangyuan are to China as are “astronauts” 

to the Americans and “cosmonauts” to the 

Russians. 

 6. It is worth noting, however, that approximately one year after the Columbia tragedy, 

President George W. Bush announced an 

ambitious new program to explore the possi

.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/

20040114-1.html. 

 7. Peng Hai-lei, “Shenzhou V Spacecraf

Leave the Factory As Planned; Li Jina

pointed as Commander-in-Chief of C

Manned Space Project,” Wen Wei Po

July2003, FBIS CPP20030725000088. 

 8. Ted Anthony, “China Plans to Launc

Manned Flight in 2003,” on the webs

Space.com, 2 January 2003, at www.s

.com/missionlaunches/china_manne

_030102.html/p. 2. 

 9. See James E. Oberg, Red Star in Orbit 

York: Random House, 1981). It is the 

work by America’s foremost space wa

the Soviet space program (and its mil

underpinnings) at the height of the C

 10. See Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm 

York: Basic Books, 1995), and William 

Ryan and Sam Summerlin, The China 

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). This st

does not constitute an attempt to den

the vital role of other major decision 

especially that of Marshal Nie Rongzh

oversaw all aspects of China’s nuclear w

programs. On Nie, see Evan A. Feigenb

China’s Techno-Warriors: National Se

and Strategic Competition from the Nu

the Information Age (Stanford, Calif.: 

Univ. Press, 2003). In addition, Qian 

aided in his efforts by an elite of forei

trained scientists and engineers. 

 11. Ryan and Summerlin, The China Clo

 12. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 198

 13. Ibid., p. 199. 

 14. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Mo

tion: Implications for the United States 

lisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institu

p. 170, available at www.fas.org/nuke

china/doctrine/chinamod.pdf. 

 15. Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Sp

gram: A Mystery within a Maze (Mala

Krieger 1998), pp. 65–66. 

 16. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 229

 17. Ibid., 218–19. 

 18. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “Chi

Ballistic Missile Programs: Technolog

Strategies, Goals,” International Secur

no. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 14. 

 19. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 22

Back
 21. Ryan and Summerlin, The China Cloud, p. 237. 

 22. Lewis and Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” p. 17. 

 23. Phillip Clark, The Soviet Manned Space Program (New York: Orion Books 1988), p. 13. 

 24. Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 

p. 47. 

 25. The other four countries capable of satellite 

operations in 1970 were the United States, the 

Soviet Union, France, and Japan. 

 26. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 227. 

 27. Tian Zhaoyun and Xi Qixin, “Launching 

Shenzhou 3 Is a Preview of Sending Astronauts into Space,” Liaowang, 1 April 2002, 

cited in Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: 

From Conception to Manned Space Flight

(New York: Springer Praxis, 2004), p. 247. 

 28. Mark Wade, “China,” Astronautix.com, 4 

March 2003, www.astronautix.com/articles/ 

china.htm, p. 2. 

 29. Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 

pp. 49–50. 

 30. Kathryn L. Gauthier, China as Peer or Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, 

and Information Warfare, Maxwell Paper 18 

(Maxwell Air force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 

July 1999), p. 12. 

 31. “Space Policy Project: CZ-2F Space Launch,” 

Federation of American Scientists, “World 

Space Guide,” 12 May 2000, www.fas.org/ 

spp/guide/china/launch/cz-2f.htm. 

 32. Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program,

p. 49. 

 33. The full text of the report is available at www 

.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999_r/cox. 

 34. See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, “The 

Cox Report’s ‘Dirty Little Secret,’” Arms Control Today (April/May 1999), pp. 26–35; and 

Alastair Iain Johnston, W. K. H. Panofsky, 

Marco Di Capua, Lewis R. Franklin, and M. M. 

May, eds., The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security and Cooperation, 1999). 

 35. See www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999 

_r/cox/ch1bod.htm. 

 36. Wade, “China,” p. 2. 

 37. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, pp. 224–25. 

 38. Werner Von Braun is commonly referred to 

as the visionary behind NASA in the race to 

part in the Soviet Union, the legendary chief 

designer responsible for Sputnik and the first 

manned missions during the same period. 

 39. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 

171–72. 

 40. Gauthier, “China as Peer Competitor?” p. 16

 41. Ibid., p. 16. 

 42. “Chinese Defense Today: Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM),” Sinodefence.com, 

at www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/icbm/ 

default.asp. 

 43. “DF-31: China Nuclear Forces,” Federation of 

American Scientists (FAS), fas.org/nuke/guide

china/icbm/df-31.htm. 

 44. Ibid. One brigade of eight missile launchers i

said to be operational. Christopher Langton, 

ed., The Military Balance 2004–05 (London: 

Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), p. 170. 

 45. Ye Dingyou, Zhang Dexiong, “Progress in 

Solid Rocket Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, 1 December 2002, pp. 24–27, FBIS 

CPP20030213000194. 

 46. Emerson Niou (Duke University), “Nuclear 

Deterrence over Taiwan,” 21 July 2003, pape

presented to the “China’s Nuclear Future” 

conference, Boulder, Colorado, U.S. Air Forc

Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air 

Force Academy, 31–31 July 2003, pp. 10–11. 

 47. Matt Rice and Joseph Cirincione, “China’s 

Nuclear Modernization,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non Proliferation

Proliferation Brief 2, no. 8 (7 April 1999), 

available at www.ceip.org/programs/npp/ 

brief28.htm.

 48. “Dong Feng, Julang series Missiles,” available 

at www.softwar.net/dongfeng.html. 

 49. U.S. Defense Dept., 2003 Annual Report on 

the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China (Washington, D.C.: 2003), p. 32. 

 50. Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s Manned Spac

Program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux” Naval 

War College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003)

p. 56. 

 51. U.S. Defense Dept., 2003 Annual Report on 

the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China, p. 37. 

 52. “KT-1, 2 Space Launch Vehicle,” China Defense Today, available at www.sinodefence 

.com/space/launchvehicle/kt1.asp. 

Back
must be emphasized, however, that this technical feat—accomplished on 20 September 

1981—did not prove that China “possessed 

or was actively pursuing MIRV technology. In 

fact, that launch tested neither a MRV nor a 

MIRV. The lift capacity of the launcher, a 

modified DF-5, was simply too large to carry 

just one or two small scientific satellites. 

However, the carrier’s nose cone was too 

small to contain three of them, and the 

launch crews had to put one of the three in 

the tail-deck of the second stage.” John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, 

Goals,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Autumn, 1992), p. 22. 

 54. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 

173–74. It is worth noting, however, that 

while microsatellites are well suited for communications purposes, they have inherent 

drawbacks in the surveillance mission due to 

fundamental principles of optics. 

 55. Mark A. Stokes, “Weapons of Precise Destruction: PLA Space and Theatre Missile Development,” in China and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction: Implications for the United States

(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence 

Council, 1999), available at www.fas.org/irp/ 

nic/china_wmd.html. 

 56. U.S. Defense Dept., 2003 Annual Report on 

the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China, p. 36. 

 57. Leonard David, “China’s Space Program 

Driven by Military Ambitions,” Space.com, 

13 March 2002, www.space.com/news/china 

_space_020313.html. 

 58. Johnson-Freese, “China’s Manned Space 

Program,” p. 66. 

 59. U.S. Defense Dept., 2003 Annual Report on 

the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China, p. 36 [emphasis added]. 

 60. Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China’s 

Commercial Technology (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND 2001), p. 27. 

 61. Johnson-Freese, “China’s Manned Space 

Program,” p. 60. 

 62. Chong-Pin Lin, quoted in Gauthier, “China 

as Peer Competitor?” p. 17. 

 63. “Space Policy Project: China’s Space Activities,” 

Federation of American Scientists, “World Space 

Guide,” 22 November 2000, www.fas 

.org/spp/guide/china/wp112200.html. 

Mission?” Space Daily: Dragon Space, 

tember 2003, available at www.spaced

.com/news/shina-03z.html. 

 65. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “

the Sky,” Washington Times, 17 Octo

p. 5. 

 66. Phillip Clark, The Soviet Manned Spa

gram (New York: Orion 1988), p. 66. 

 67. Ibid., pp. 67–68. 

 68. Ibid., 75. 

 69. Mark Wade, “Shenzhou,” Astronauti

March 2003, www.astronautix.com/c

shenzhou.htm. 

 70. “China in Space: China’s Astronauts,

Today Online, 2003, www.spacetoday

China/ChinaTaikonauts.html. 

 71. Hou Yi, “Shenzhou-5 Launcher Read

Transfer to Jiuquan Launch Site,” We

Po, 11 August 2003, available at www 

.spacedaily.com/news/china-03u.htm

 72. James Harford, Korolev: How One Ma

terminded the Soviet Drive to Beat Am

the Moon (New York: Wiley, 1997), p

 73. The U.S. space program, as executed b

National Aeronautics and Space Admi

tion (NASA), at its height in the mid-1

employed over four hundred thousand 

and enjoyed a peak budget (in 1965) o

cent of the nation’s gross domestic pro

 74. Robert S. Walker, “The Race into Spa

Washington Times, 29 May 2003, p. 1

Chapter Four 

Chinese BMD Countermeasures: 

Breaching America’s Great Wall in Spa

 1. According to U.S. policy, BMD is a co

hensive term encompassing all missil

fense. This paper concerns nuclear st

however, and will therefore focus mo

ily on the strategic context of nationa

defense (NMD), as opposed to theate

defense (TMD). For this reason, I wil

term TMD only to describe instances 

which TMD would engender differen

gic considerations than would NMD. 

 2. William Murray, Associate Professor

Naval War College, “The Strategic Su

Ship,” 2004, unpublished manuscript

 3. Larry M. Wortzel, “Should The Unite

Counter China’s Missile Buildup? Ye

sight Magazine, 13 May 2002; and Ad

Back
China’s Missile Buildup? No,” Insight Magazine, 13 May 2002. 

 4. For example, MDA spokesman Rick Lehner 

recently declared that U.S. NMD “is geared 

only to a North Korean threat, not China or 

Russia.” Bill Gertz, “From the Ground Up: 

U.S. takes quiet approach to missile defense 

system,” Washington Times, 12 December 

2004, p. 1. 

 5. However, it is doubtful that Russia has thousands of strategic weapons ready for use because of declining readiness. 

 6. According to one estimate, China has 24 

DF-5A (CSS-4) and 8 DF-31 (CSS-9) ICBMs 

capable of striking targets in the continental 

United States. John Chipman et al., The Military Balance 2004/2005 (London: Oxford 

Univ. Press, October 2004), p. 170. 

 7. See “Russia/Missile Defense,” Voice of America, 18 March 1999, available at www.fas.org/ 

nuke/control/abmt/news/990318-abmt.htm; 

“Russia Willing to Talk with U.S. on Missile 

Defense,” USA Today, 19 June 2004, available 

at www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001-05 

-02-missiledefense.htm. 

 8. Amy L. Freedman and Robert C. Gray, “The 

Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast 

Asia,” Orbis, Spring 2004, p. 346. 

 9. James F. Hentz, “The Paradox of Instability 

and Stability: United States ‘Primacy,’ China, 

and the National Missile Defense (NMD) Debate,” Opinions on Defense and Security, Defense & Security Analysis 19, no. 3, September 

2003, p. 293. 

 10. Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s 

Republic of China Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000), p. 203. 

 11. Li Bin, “China and Nuclear Transparency,” in 

Nicholas Zarimpas ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political 

and Technical Dimensions (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), p. 54. 

 12. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle 

over Shielding the United States from Missile Attack (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001) p. 173. 

 13. China has had a deployable solid propellant 

SLBM since 1988. “JL-1 [CSS-N-3],” available 

at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/ 

jl-1.htm. 

 14. Cox Report, vol. 1, p. 185. 

 15. Cox Report, vol. 1, p. 186. 

Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile 

Defense System, Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000

p. xxi. 

 17. He Linshu, ed., Solid Ballistic Missile Design

(Beijing: Beijing Aerospace Univ. Press, 

2004), pp. 90–91. 

 18. He Linshu, Wang Shuhe [The School of Astronautics of Beijing University of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics], “PRC S&T: Penetration 

Measures Against NMD,” Bejing Daodan yu 

Hangtian Yunzai Jishu in Chinese, 10 June 2002

pp. 23–26, FBIS CPP20021007000146. 

 19. The Countermeasures translation, which is 

clearly marked as such, is referenced as 

卢胜利 米建军 译 [Lu Shengli and Mi Jianjun, translators], NMD与反制NMD [NMD 

and Countering NMD] (Beijing: 国防大学 

出版社 [National Defense Univ. Press]), December 2000. 

 20. He Linshu, Solid Ballistic Missile Design, p. 90

 21. For analysis of the political debate behind 

NMD, see 周宝根,李彬 [Zhou Baogen and Li 

Bin], 党派政治对冷战后美国军控政策的 

影响 [Impacts of Party Politics on American Arms Control Policy after the Cold 

War], 世界经济与政治论坛 [Forum of 

World Economics and Politics], no. 4, 2002. 

pp. 62–65. 

 22. Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile 

Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond (Alexandri

Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003), p. 20. 

 23. Wu Rui and Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. 

Nuclear Politics on China: A Political Perspective,” Conference on Northeast Asian Se

curity, Beijing, April 2004, p. 8. 

 24. Data in this historical section are derived 

largely from “Missile Defense Timeline 1944–

2004,” Missile Defense Agency Historian’s 

Office, available at www.acq.osd.mil/mda/ 

mdalink/html/milstone.html. 

 25. The U.S. Army had anticipated missile defense since the end of World War II, but it 

was not until 1957 that the United States initiated development of Nike-Zeus. This initial 

effort failed technologically, and gave way to th

Nike X nuclear-tipped interceptor program. 

 26. David N. Schwartz, “Past and Present: The 

Historical Legacy,” in Ballistic Missile Defense

ed. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz 

Back
1984), p. 339. 

 27. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: 

Touchstone, 1994), p. 778. 

 28. Roger Handberg, Ballistic Missile Defense and 

the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions, Technology, and Policy (Westport, 

Conn.: Praeger, 2002), p. 61. 

 29. Data in this paragraph are derived from “National Missile Defense Program Evaluation,” 

BMDO Fact Sheet JN-00-04, January 2000. 

 30. 周宝根,李彬 [Zhou Baogen and Li Bin], 

军备控制中的非军事因素 [Nonmilitary 

Factors in Arms Control], 国际经济评论

[International Economic Review], no. 5 (2002), 

pp. 24–28. 

 31. Bill Gertz, “Missile Defense Fails to Take Spot 

Among Campaign Issues,” Washington Times,

22 October 1996. 

 32. Sessler et al., Countermeasures, p. 33. See also 

“Report of the American Physical Society 

Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific 

and Technical Issues,” July 2003, and Lisbeth 

Gronlund et al., “Technical Realities: An 

Analysis of the 2004 Deployment of a U.S. 

National Missile Defense System,” Union of 

Concerned Scientists, May 2004, available at 

www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile 

_defense/page.cfm?pageID=1403. 

 33. Data in this and the next four paragraphs are 

derived from Sessler et al., Countermeasures,

pp. 145–48. 

 34. Andrew W. Hull and David R. Markov, “Implications of Third World Ballistic Missile 

Strategies and Operations for SDIO/POET: 

Planning Dilemmas, Warhead Tradeoffs, and 

Countermeasures Acquisition,” Prepared for 

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 

(BMDO) and the Phase One Engineering 

Team (POET) (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for 

Defense Analysis, 1993), p. S-3. 

 35. Unless otherwise cited, quotations and other 

data for this and the next two paragraphs are 

largely derived from Richard L. Garwin, 

“Holes in the Missile Shield: The National 

Missile Defense Now Being Deployed by the 

U.S. Should Be Replaced with a More Effective System,” Scientific American, November 

2004, pp. 72–79. 

 36. “Report of the American Physical Society,” 

pp. xxix, 3. 

Ballistic Missile Programs: Technolog

Strategies, Goals,” International Secur

no. 2 (Autumn, 1992), p. 20. 

 38. For the most detailed account to date

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Ch

Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Sta

Univ. Press, 1988). 

 39. 周宝根 [Zhou Baogen] , 中国与国际

机制的一种建构主义分析 [A Const

Analysis of China and International N

Nonproliferation Regime], [世界经济

World Economics and Politics, no. 2 (2

pp. 23–27. 

 40. For a popular Chinese view of the sec

Gulf War and its link to the “hypocri

tablished Western nuclear powers tow

veloping states’ acquisition of weapon

mass destruction, see 美伊战争引发

赛?[U.S. War on Iraq Initiated Nuc

Races?], 世界新闻报 [World News Jou

May 2003. 

 41. Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Mi

Programs,” pp. 5–6. 

 42. For a survey of Beijing’s attempts to c

ate both politically and technological

Moscow against U.S. BMD, see第三章 

俄羅斯及中共聯合反制美國飛彈防

交戰略[Chapter 3: The Diplomatic S

of Russia and China’s Alliance Again

ica’s Missile Defense] in 林宗達 [Lin 

ta, 中共與美國飛彈攻防之外交戰略

Struggle of Powers: The Diplomatic S

of Missile Offense and Defense in PR

USA] (Taipei: 晶典文化事業出版社 

Book], 2003, pp. 212–41. 

 43. John Pomfret, “China Warns of New 

Race,” Washington Post, 11 Novembe

p. 1. 

 44. According to Li Bin, “The U.S. withd

from the ABM Treaty indicated that t

no longer recognizes a nuclear parity 

Russia and a moderate Russian respo

showed that Russia has accepted that 

李彬 [Li Bin], [国际军备控制陷入低

“Arms Control entering a difficult pe

人民日报 [People’s Daily], 11 Januar

p. 7. 

 45. “Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions 

White House, Office of the Press Secr

May 2002, available at www.whitehou

news/releases/2002/05/20020524-3.ht

Back
man Says, China Does Not Approve of Missile Defense Systems,” Xinhua Asia-Pacific 

Service in Chinese, 27 February 2003, FBIS 

CPP20030227000118. 

 47. China vehemently opposes such development 

not through ideological principles but rather 

because it threatens the effectiveness of its 

nuclear arsenal. After all, China pursues important military applications in its own space 

program (e.g., Taiwan Strait surveillance). 

 48. “Chinese nuclear deterrence partially comes 

from the quantitative ambiguity of its nuclear 

arsenal.” Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD 

on Chinese Nuclear Modernization,” working 

paper, Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security, Seoul, April 2001. 

 49. Li Bin, “China and Nuclear Transparency,” 

p. 52. 

 50. See, for example, Li Bin, “Arms Control in 

2002,” Arms Control Program Newsletter 2, 

Issue 1, Institute of Strategic Studies, Qinghua 

University, Beijing. 

 51. 李彬 [Li Bin], 军备控制: 能否挽救 [Saving 

Arms Control], Beijing Review 45, no. 16 (18 

April 2002), p. 12. 

 52. Weng Hansong, “How Useful Is the U.S. 

National Missile Defense in the Final Analysis,” Renmin Wang (in Chinese), 10 November 2004, FBIS CPP20041110000035. 

 53. Kori Urayama, “China Debates Missile 

Defence,” Survival 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 

p. 125. 

 54. Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense, 

p. 32. 

 55. Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher, and Adam 

Segal, Chinese Military Power (New York: 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 17. 

 56. Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Reactions to New 

U.S. Initiatives on Missile Defense,” in 

China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives 

on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed. Andrew Scobell and 

Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2002), p. 188. 

 57. James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 22. 

 58. Urayama, “China Debates Missile Defence,” 

p. 134. 

对华安全政策 [Absolute Gains, Relative 

Gains and U.S. Security Policy on China], 

世界政治与经济 [World Economics and International Politics], no. 11 (2002), pp. 17–21

 60. “DF-5,” available at www.globalsecurity.org/ 

wmd/world/china/df-5.htm. 

 61. Brown et al., “Chinese Military Power,” p. 17

 62. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD,” p. 6. 

 63. Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile 

Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: 

Challenges and Responses,” in China’s Growing Military Power, ed. Scobell and Wortzel, 

p. 127. 

 64. Urayama, “China Debates Missile Defence,” 

p. 129. 

 65. Freedman and Gray, “Implications of Missile 

Defense,” p. 346. 

 66. Urayama, “China Debates Missile Defence,” 

p. 132. 

 67. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD,” p. 9. 

 68. National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile 

Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat 

through 2015,” December 2001, www.cia.gov/ 

nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf

 69. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces,” p. 115

 70. Sessler et al., “Countermeasures,” p. 112. 

 71. Ibid. 

 72. Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: 

Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Wash

ington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter

national Peace, 2002), p. 142. For a Taiwanes

scholar’s perspective on PRC missile and 

WMD technology proliferation to rogue 

states, see第二章 中共及其聯合北韓反制 

之外交戰略, “Chapter 2: China and its Ally 

North Korea’s Counter System Diplomatic 

Strategy”) in 林宗達 [Lin Tsung-ta], 

中共與美國飛彈攻防之外交戰略 [The 

Struggle of Powers: The Diplomatic Strategy of 

Missile Offense and Defense in PRC & USA] 

(Taipei: 晶典文化事業出版社 [Crystal 

Book], 2003), pp. 120–30. 

 73. Li Bin, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Missile Technology Control Regime,” paper presented at the VIII International Castiglioncello 

Conference, “New Challenges in the Spread of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Castiglioncello

Italy, September 1999. 

 74. 申良音, 李彬 [Shen Liangyin and Li Bin], 

从出口管制看美国企业界在安全政策中作

Back
Influence of Industrial Groups on U.S. Security Policy], 世界经济与政治论坛 [Forum of 

World Economics and Politics] 243, no. 2 

(2004), pp. 64–67. 

 75. The Chinese term for “counter-intercept” is 

fǎn lán jié (反拦截). Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic 

Missile Forces,” p. 132. 

 76. Ibid., p. 134. 

 77. He and Qiu, “THAAD-Like High Altitude 

Theater Missile Defense: Strategic Defense 

Capability and Certain Countermeasures 

Analysis,” Science and Global Security 11 

(2003), p. 179. 

 78. Paul H. B. Godwin, “The PLA Faces the 

Twenty-first Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations,” 

in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. 

James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh 

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999), p. 58. 

 79. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD.” 

 80. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces,” p. 133. 

 81. “ DF-5.” 

 82. Li Bin, Zhou Baogen, and Liu Zhiwei, “China 

Will Have to Respond,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists 57, no. 6 (November/December 

2001), pp. 25–28. 

 83. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces,” p. 

132. The Chinese terms for “saturation decoys,” “deception decoys,” and “fast-burn 

motors” are yòu ěr (诱饵), bǎo hé (饱和), and 

sù rán zhù tuī qì (速燃助推器), respectively. 

 84. Three interceptors have failed to strike the 

target properly, and the most recent one 

failed to launch. See David Stout and John H. 

Cushman, Jr. “Defense Missile for U.S. System Fails to Launch,” New York Times, 16 December 2004; and He Yingbo and Qiu Yong, 

“THAAD,” p. 181. 

 85. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 94. 

 86. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD,” p. 9. 

 87. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 47. 

 88. “U.S. LGM-118A Peacekeeper,” available at 

www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ 

lgm-118.htm. 

 89. “UR-100MR/SS-17 Spanker,” available at 

www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ur

-100mr.htm. 

 91. “DF-31,” available at www.globalsecu

wmd/world/china/df-31.htm. 

 92. The Chinese terms for “depressed tr

tory” and “lofted trajectory” are yā d

dào (压低轨道) and gāo dàn dào (高

respectively. 

 93. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces

 94. He and Qiu, “THAAD,” p. 177. 

 95. Sessler et al., “Countermeasures,” p. 

 96. William L. Spacey [Maj., USAF], Doe

United States Need Space-Based Weap

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Un

Press, 1999), p. 61. 

 97. For a summary of the U.S. ASAT pro

see Dwayne A. Day, “Aiming for the 

Frontier,” Spaceflight 46, December 2

467–72, and Paul B. Stares, The Milit

of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984 (Itha

Cornell University Press, 1985). 

 98. See, for example, Han Shijie, “Nanos

Will Open the Path for Microsatellite 

opment,” International Space (July 20

Long, “Overseas Microsatellite Techn

Development,” International Space (J

2000); Xiao Bin, “Modern Military M

tellites: A Brief Survey,” International 

(September 2001); She Jinpei, Yang G

and Liang Xuwen, Chief Editors, Mod

Small Satellite Technology and Applica

(Shanghai: Shanghai Universal Scienc

lishing House, March 2004); Zhan Ya

Ma Zhengxin and Cao Zhigang, “Mo

Microsatellite Technology and Devel

Trends,” Electronics Journal (July 200

Jianhua, Wang Jing and Gong Ke, “M

satellite Technological Development 

plication,” World Telecommunication

(November 2001). 

 99. Xiao Bin, “Modern Military Microsa

A Brief Survey,” International Space 

tember 2001). 

100. Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield,

101. The Chinese term for “parasitic satell

shēng xīng (寄生星). 

102. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “A

Report on the Military Power of the 

Republic of China,” 29 May 2004, p. 

available at www.defenselink.mil/pu

d20040528PRC.pdf. See also Office o

Secretary of Defense, “Annual Repor

Military Power of the People’s Republi

Back
.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf. 

For a Taiwanese scholar’s detailed analysis of 

China’s possible possession of a parasitic microsatellite, which cites the same Hong Kong 

source, see 第四章 軍備建構互動之分析

[Chapter 4: Arms Construction Interaction 

and Analysis] in 林宗達 [Lin Tsung-ta], 

中共與美國飛彈攻防之軍備建構 [The Military Construction of Missile Offense and Defense in PRC & USA] (Taipei: 晶典文化事業 

出版社 [Crystal Book], 2003, pp. 296–97. 

103. He Linshu, Wang Shuhe, “PRC S&T: Penetration Measures Against NMD,” Daodan yu 

Hangtian Yunzai Jishu in Chinese, 10 June 

2002, pp. 23–26, FBIS CPP20021007000146. 

104. See Bradley Graham, “Some Question Report 

on Chinese Space Arms,” Washington Post, 14 

August, 2004, p. A14; Gregory Kulacki and 

David Wright, “A Military Intelligence Failure? 

The Case of the Parasite Satellite,” available at 

www.ucsusa.org/global_security/china/page 

.cfm?pageID=1479. 

105. See, for example, “Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] 

Capabilities,” available at www.globalsecurity 

.org/space/world/china/asat.htm. 

106. See Huang Dong, “China Succeeds in Test-Firing 

Hongniao Cruise Missile,” Hong Kong Kuang 

Chiao Ching in Chinese, 16 September 2004, no. 

384, p. 55, FBIS CPP20040920000029. See also 

pp. 115–20, 第二章 中共遠距攻陸飛彈與 

其防禦武力[Chapter 2: China’s Long Distance Land Attack Missiles and Its Defense 

Force] in 林宗達 [Lin Tsung-ta], 

中共與美國飛彈攻防之軍備建構 [The Military Construction of Missile Offense and Defense in PRC & USA] (Taipei: 晶典文化事 

業出版社 [Crystal Book], 2003. 

107. However, the United States may also be developing a cruise missile defense (CMD) system. 

See Tang Baodong, “U.S. Intensifies Weaving 

of a New ‘Space Net’: From TMD and NMD to 

CMD,” Jiefangjun Bao (in Chinese), 25 December 2002, p. 12, FBIS CPP20021225000036. 

108. Chen Xuejun, Lang Daqiang, “Methods for 

Defeating GPS,” Junshi Wenzhai in Chinese, 1 November 2004, pp. 52–53, FBIS 

CCP20041109000197. 

109. “Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) 

Hong Niao/Chang Feng,” available at www 

.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/lacm 

.htm. See also “US deploys satellite jamming 

system,” People’s Daily Online, retrieved from 

_162370.html on 9 February 2005. 

110. For more information, see “Beidou (Big 

Dipper),” available at www.globalsecurity 

.org/space/world/china/beidou.htm. 

111. “BD-1 Navigation Satellite,” China Defense 

Today, available at www.sinodefence.com/ 

space/spacecraft/bd1.asp. 

112. Lewis and Hua, “China’s Ballistic Missile 

Programs,” p. 21. 

113. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 58. 

114. Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals, p. 144

115. Shi Fengxia, “PRC S&T: How Topol-M Deal

with U.S. NMD,” Zhongguo Hangtian (in 

Chinese), 1 December 2002, pp. 39–41, FBIS 

CPP20030213000195. 

116. Sessler et al., “Countermeasures,” p. 37. 

117. “DF-31,” available at www.globalsecurity.org

wmd/world/china/df-31.htm. 

118. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 

“Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003,” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, available at www 

.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn 

=nd03norris. Norris and Kristensen also cite 

page 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency, Na

tional Intelligence Council’s December 2001 

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015” as stating 

that “‘Chinese pursuit of multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs . . . and SLBMs 

would encounter significant technical hurdle

and would be costly.” However, in this 2003 

report they also conclude that “Given the sig

nificant problems China has had with the Xia

deployment of a Project 094 submarine and 

its new missile is many years away.” In fact, 

China deployed its first 094 submarine in 

2004. This indicates China’s capacity for sud

den technical developments that Western 

analysts failed to anticipate. 

119. Urayama, “China Debates Missile Defence,” p. 

133. Figure of six to seven from Bill Gertz, 

“China Tests Arms Designed to Fool Defense 

Systems,” Washington Times, 23 July 2002, p. 1. 

120. Vladimir Urban, “Anti-Missile Umbrella for 

Sale: Russia May Take Advantage of the New 

Cycle of the Arms Race,” Novye Izvestia, 16 

October 2002. 

121. Gertz, “China Tests Arms Designed to Fool 

Defense Systems,” p. 1. 

Back
Warhead Missiles: New ICBMs to Be Deployed,” Daily Yomiuri (in English), 7 February 

2003, FBIS JPP20030207000154. 

123. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces,” p. 142. 

124. For more information on Chevaline and its 

challenges, see Sessler et al., “Countermeasures,” p. 148. 

125. Moreover, Chinese bombers would presumably have to fly over Philippine, Russian, or 

Japanese air space—although improved 

LACMs could make China more confident 

about such overflight. 

126. Indeed, some analysts predict that even the 

United States may find it advantageous for 

long-range missiles to assume bombers’ responsibilities as opponents’ air defenses continue to improve. 

127. Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals, p. 144. 

128. “Russia, China Tighten Security Links,” 

China Daily, 3 February 2005. 

129. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 128. 

130. For a Chinese argument in support of this 

point, see 李彬 [Li Bin], 美国打算怎么运

用它的核武器? [How Will the U.S. Make 

Use of Its Nuclear Weapons?], 世界知识

[World Affairs], no. 7 (2002), pp.16–17. 

131. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 130. 

132. Freedman and Gray, “Implications of Missile 

Defense,” p. 346. 

133. 王辑思 [Wang Jisi], 苏美争霸的历史教训和 

美中国的崛起新道路 [The Historic Lesson 

of the U.S.-Soviet Contest for Hegemony and 

China’s Peaceful Rise], in 中国和平崛起新

道路 [China’s Peaceful Rise: The New Path] 

(Beijing: 中共中央党校国际战略研究所

[Central Committee of the CCP Party School 

International Strategy Research Institute], 

April 2004). 

134. Freedman and Gray, “The Implications of 

Missile Defense for Northeast Asia,” p. 346. 

135. 刘志伟, 李彬 [Liu Zhiwei and Li Bin], 

美国NMD的费用问题以及部署前景 [U.S. 

NMD Expenses and Its Future Deployment], 

现代国际关系 [Contemporary International 

Relations], no. 1 (2003), p. 33. 

136. Eric McVadon, “Chinese Reactions,” p. 177. 

137. Ibid. 

p. 129. 

139. For examples of the Iraq and terror w

negative impact on U.S. Pacific capab

see Bryan Bender, “Arms Reductions

Increase Eyed: War’s Toll Prompts Shif

orities,” Boston Globe, 17 December 20

140. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending Am

pp. 21–22. 

141. Contrary to what some critics have as

BMD investment is not inherently un

The significant funding required for 

also represents an investment in the v

America’s defense industrial sector—

particularly its aerospace component

needs a degree of freedom to engage 

research without the shortsighted con

of quarterly earnings reports. BMD p

nents are correct to emphasize that res

can produce unintended successes just 

American program to maintain milita

munication in the event of nuclear w

(ARPANet) led to the creation of the 

Such continuity is especially importa

competitive economy that lacks the lo

manufacturing stability of its Europe

East Asian counterparts. The United 

suffers from a government-industry d

nect in which Congress insists on ann

funding in a manner that tends to un

long-lead expenditures. By galvanizin

space development in a manner relev

U.S. national security, judicious miss

fense funding can help to further the 

logical development on which Ameri

global position depends. 

 142. For a Chinese perspective that seems to 

these anti-NMD arguments, see 周宝根 

Baogen], 九一一对国际军备控制的影

Impact of Sept 11 on Global Arms Con

联合早报 [Zaobao Online], 29 October 

143. Resources are finite, and technologic

formation would probably require fr

thought and innovation that if even a

might necessitate reform of rogue state

thoritarian governments in a manner t

would decrease their threat to the Unit

144. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD.” 

145. 吴锐 [Wu Rui], 美国安全精英对中

题的认知 [American Perspectives ab

nese Nuclear Policy: Report of the In

in Washington, DC], Institute of Inte

tional Studies, Tsinghua University, B

June 2003. 

Back
power is declining. The other major space 

powers—Europe, Japan, and India—are capitalist democracies whose national interests are 

far more congruent with those of the United 

States. They do not feel directly threatened by 

U.S. aerospace development. Less capable nations simply lack the means to successfully 

challenge American BMD development. 

147. Chinese sources frequently cite “unilateralism,” presumably on the part of the United 

States, as being a major factor in frustrating 

arms control. See, for example, Li Bin and Liu 

Zhiwei, “The Contribution of Arms Control 

to Fighting Nuclear Terrorism,” Disarmament 

Forum, 2003, no. 2, pp. 17–22; Wang Guosheng and Li Wei, “U.S. Comprehensively 

Adjusts Nuclear Strategy,” Jiefangjun Bao (in 

Chinese), 30 January 2002, p. 12, FBIS 

CPP20020130000076. 

148. For a Chinese analysis supporting the notion 

that China’s space warfare capabilities will be 

influenced by the threat that China perceives 

from the United States, see 李彬 [Li Bin], 

外空战的后果 [The Consequences of a Space 

War], Paper presented at the Pugwash Workshop on Preserving the Non-Weaponization of 

Space, Castellon de la Plana, Spain, May 2003. 

149. The Chinese term for “hegemonism” is bà 

quán zhǔ yì (霸权主义). 

150. For instance, anti-laser reflective coatings. 

151. For an eloquent explanation of this apparent 

contradiction, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The 

Paradox of Amercan Power: Why the World’s 

Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New 

York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). 

152. “Airborne Laser Expected to Achieve Key 

Goal ‘Very Soon,’” Aerospace Daily & Defense 

Report, 17 November 2004. 

153. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, p. 

111. For a detailed Chinese analysis of antilaser countermeasures, see Gu Lixiang, “PRC 

S&T: U.S. Boost Phase Laser Interception Technology and Countermeasures,” Daodan yu 

Hangtian Yunzai Jishu (in Chinese), 10 April 

2003, pp. 25–32, FBIS CPP20030625000147. 

154. Hans Binnendijk and George Stewart, “Toward 

Missile Defenses from the Sea,” Washington 

Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 197. 

155. For more details on targeting North Korea and 

Iran, see Congressional Budget Office, “Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,” July 

.cfm?index=5679&sequence=1. 

156. Michael Sirak, “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile 

Defense: The ‘Standard’ Response,” Jane’s De

fense Weekly, 30 October 2002. 

157. Nancy Montgomery, “New Job for 7th Fleet: 

Missile Patrol in Sea of Japan,” Pacific Stars 

and Stripes, 12 September 2004. 

158. “U.S. Conducts Ship-Based Missile Test; Withdraws from ABM Treaty,” Xinhua (in English), 

14 June 2002, FBIS CPP 20020614000042. 

159. Montgomery, “New Job For 7th Fleet.” 

160. Nancy Montgomery, “USS Lake Erie Makes 

Its Presence Known in Pacific Waters,” Pacifi

Stars and Stripes, 25 October 2004. 

161. “U.S. Navy Gets Interceptors for Sea-Based 

Missile Defense,” Aerospace Daily & Defense 

Report, 21 December 2004. 

162. Rick Barnard, “Subs: Best Basing Mode for 

Boost-Phase Defense?” Sea Power (October 

2003), available at www.navyleague.org/ 

sea_power/oct_03_27.php. 

163. In another example of submarines’ versatility 

and enduring relevance to post–Cold War 

conflicts, conversion of Trident SSBNs into 

guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) could 

also enable them to carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each, delivering precision guided missions (PGMs) with a 

combination of stealth and cost-effectiveness

164. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America,

p. 108. 

165. BMD requires accurate, high-volume, sustained communication. If current wire antennas cannot handle the flow and overcome 

problems of sporadic wave immersion, submarine commanders would have to rely on 

rigid bridge-top antennas. Roughly the heigh

of the bridge itself when fully extended, the 

eight-inch-wide antenna would have to protrude three to ten feet above the water to receive uninterrupted signals. A related 

complication is that the Trident submarine is 

not designed to stay at periscope depth for ex

tended periods of time. The low-pressure are

formed above the missile deck could pull the 

submarine to the surface—that is, broach. Al

ternatively, the submarine could surface, but 

this could cause instability in fixed position. 

Of course, a surfaced submarine would be les

stealthy and more vulnerable to attack. 

Back
Pressing on toward DPRK; DPRK Foreign 

Minister: Danger of War Rapidly Growing,” 

Renmin Wang, 3 October 2004, FBIS 

CPP20041004000021. 

Conclusion 

 1. For Afghanistan, Charles Hutzler, “China’s 

Economic, Diplomatic Aid to Pakistan Has 

Played Key Role in U.S.’s War on Terror,” 

Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2004. 

 2. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses 

Unification, Should the United States Care?” 

Washington Quarterly 25 (Summer 2002), p. 16. 

 4. For thirty-thousand figure, “Foreign 

to Become Eligible for Government A

Taipei Times, 4 October 2004, availab

www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar

2004/10/04/2003205467. 

 5. “Direct China-Taiwan Flights Start,” 

News World Edition, 29 January 2005

trieved from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asi

-pacific/4215889.stm on 9 February 2

 6. “Editorial: Lien More Quisling than Q

otic,” Taipei Times, 2 April 2003, ava

www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/arch

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Scientists, 12 May 2000, www.fas.org/spp/ 

guide/china/launch/cz-2f.htm. 

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Navy Commander, Submarine Force United 

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russia/c3i/index.html. 

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May 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news

releases/2002/05/20020524-3.html. 

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Support.” 21 August 1987, Federation 

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usa/doctrine/dod/dodd-3150_6.htm. 

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.org/wmd/world/russia/ur-100mr.htm

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Engineers at “ASME Roster of Landma

and Collections Page.” www.asme.org/

roster_a.html. 

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Liberation Army at 75.” Strategic Studi

tute at “Regional Studies: Asia/Pacific 

www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/region

#asia. 

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.com/articles/china.htm. 

———. “Shenzhou.” 4 March 2003, 

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.com/craft/shenzhou.htm. 

REPORTS/MONOGRAPHS 

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Segal. Chinese Military Power. New Yo

Council on Foreign Relations, 2003. 

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Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernizat

the Doctrinal Debate. Unpublished Res

Paper, RAND Corporation, Washingto

2002. 

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Commercial Technology. Santa Monica

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Paper 16. Newport, R.I.: Naval War Co

Press, 2003. 
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Information Warfare.” Air War College Maxwell Paper 18. Maxwell Air force Base, Ala.: Air 

Univ. Press, July 1999. 

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Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible 

Deterrence.” In National Intelligence Council, 

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1999. 

Hull, Andrew W., and David R. Markov, “Implications of Third World Ballistic Missile Strategies 

and Operations for SDIO/POET: Planning Dilemmas, Warhead Tradeoffs, and Countermeasures Acquisition.” Prepared for Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization. BMDO) and the 

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Di Capua, Lewis R. Franklin, and M. M. May, 

eds. The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment. 

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Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for 

National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues.” July 2003, available at www.aps 

.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm.

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Modernization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non Proliferation/ 

Proliferation Brief 2, no. 8, 7 April 1999. 

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1955 to 2002 and Beyond. Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003. 

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Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, Union of Concerned Scientists 

and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000, 

available at www.ucsusa.org/global_security/ 

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ENCE PRESENTATIONS 

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Has Ignored: Command and Control, 

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Association Convention, Los Angeles, 14–18 

March 2000. 

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Approach to Mastering Sun Tzu and the Chinese Way of War and Diplomacy.” Asia-Pacifi

Studies Group Research Seminar, Naval War 

College, Newport, R.I., 3 November 2003. 

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Technology Control Regime.” Paper presented 

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———. “The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese 

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Force Institute for National Security Studies, 

U.S. Air Force Academy, 31–31 July 2003. 

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Force Academy, 31–31 July 2003. 

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Politics on China: A Political Perspective.” 

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and Control of the Second Artillery in Time of 

Crisis and War.” Paper presented to the INSS 

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Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, 30–31 

July 2003. 

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the chairman of the Strategy and Polic

partment, Naval War College, intervie

thor, 22 August 2003, Conolly Hall, N

R.I. 
Abbreviations

ABL airborne laser

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Organization)

ASAT antisatellite

ASW antisubmarine warfare

BMD ballistic-missile defense

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

CMC Central Military Commission

C2 command and control

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelli

surveillance, and reconnaissance

ELF extremely low frequency

GPALS Global-Protection Against Limited Strikes (program)

GPS Global Positioning System

GSD (Chinese) General Staff Directorate

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ISS International Space Station

LACM land-attack cruise missile

LEO low earth orbit

LPAR large phased-array radar

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MDA Missile Defense Agency

MIRV multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle

MMA Multimission Maritime Aircraft

MRV multiple reentry vehicles

NDIO National Defense Industry Office

NC2 nuclear command and control

PAL permissive action link

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC People’s Republic of China

RV reentry vehicle

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile

SM-3 Standard Missile 3

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

SRM solid rocket motor

SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine

SSK hunter-killer (diesel-powered) submarine

SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine

START (I, II) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (treaties)

TMD theater missile defense

VLF very low frequency

WMD weapons of mass destruction

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Contributors

Commander Dominic DeScisciolo is currently commanding officer of the guided-

frigate USS Rentz (FFG 46), based in San Diego, California. He recently received 

M.A. in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College in Ne

Rhode Island, as both a Mahan Scholar and the honor graduate of the Novembe

class. Having previously completed the Surface Warfare Officers School Division 

cer Course as the Arleigh Burke Leadership Award recipient, he served in the gui

missile frigate USS Estocin (FFG 15), then as chief engineer in the guided-missile

cruiser USS Cape St. George (CG 71). He commanded the mine countermeasure

USS Gladiator (MCM 11) from January 2000 to August 2001, earning two conse

“Golden Anchor” Fleet Retention Awards, the Navywide 2000 Search and Rescue 

lence Award, and the 2000 Ney Award for Food Service Excellence. Ashore, Com

mander DeScisciolo has served as flag aide and administrative assistant to the Di

for Operations (N3), Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; academic directo

the Surface Warfare Officers School Division Officer Course; and as a Prospectiv

utive Officers Course instructor at the Command Leadership School in Newport

awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Comm

tion medal (fourth award), the Army Commendation Medal (second award), the N

and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various campaign and service medals

Andrew S. Erickson is a research fellow in the Strategic Research Department, Ce

for Naval Warfare Studies, at the Naval War College. He is currently a Ph.D. cand

in Princeton University’s Politics Department, where he is writing a dissertation 

China’s aerospace development. Erickson previously worked for Science Applica

International Corporation as a Chinese translator and technical analyst. He has a

worked at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong, the Wh

House, the U.S. Senate, and the Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C. H

proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Japanese, and has traveled extensively in Asi

Erickson graduated magna cum laude from Amherst College with a B.A. in histo

political science. His publications include “Why America and China Need a New 

tary Maritime Agreement,” available in English and Chinese at www.ncuscr.org/E

_Contest/2002winners.htm.

Lyle J. Goldstein is associate professor of strategic studies in the Center for Naval 

fare Studies at the Naval War College. His areas of research specialization includ

nese and Russian security policies, Central Asia, civil-military relations, and

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A Comparative Historical Study, is forthcoming from Stanford University Press. Professor Goldstein has published work on Chinese military policy in such journals as China

Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, and International Security. He holds a Ph.D.

from Princeton University as well as an M.A. from the Paul J. Nitze School of Advanced

International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Lieutenant Christopher J. McConnaughay currently serves in the Strike Warfare Directorate of the U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. As a member

of the Missile Strike Team, he is responsible for submarine-launched ballistic-missile

planning. Prior to commissioning, Lieutenant McConnaughay served as an Aviation

Electronics Technician (Air Warfare) at Naval Air Stations Patuxent River, Maryland,

and Sigonella, Sicily. While at Sigonella he was selected for the Enlisted Commissionin

Program and attended the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign, where he earned

a bachelor’s degree in 1998. Upon commissioning in May 1998 he pursued nuclearpower training, serving aboard USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) (Blue Crew) and qualify

ing in submarines. Lieutenant McConnaughay earned a master’s in national security

and strategic studies at the Naval War College in November 2003. He holds the Navy

Achievement Medal (four awards).

Lieutenant Commander Stephen Polk, a naval flight officer, is currently an exercise planne

at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific and is scheduled to become division chief. A naval

flight officer, Lieutenant Commander Polk has accumulated over two thousand hours in

the Navy E6-A aircraft. He has also served as an aviation personnel detailer and as Assistant Strike Operations Officer on board the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in

support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Lieutenant Commander Polk holds a master’s degree in national security strategic studies from the Naval War College.

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The Newport Papers

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombin

Christopher C. Harmon (December 1991).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy f

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (April 1992

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B. Robe

Jr. (October 1992).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (June 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, 

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (August 1993).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the E

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (October 1993).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German 

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (June 1994).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenb

(December 1994).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, an

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired)

(December 1995).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James, 

Air Force (October 1996).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strat

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (April 1997).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myro

Nordquist (August 1997).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U

Atlantic Fleet, with David G. Freymann (March 1998).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component 

mander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (August 1998).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conv

during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suomine

(December 2000).

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marines, by Owen R. Coté, Jr. (2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (2003).

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial

Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross (2003).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John B. Hattendorf

(2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert H. Gile (2004).

Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, edited

by Paul D. Taylor (2004).

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