Eliminating Adversary WMD:

Lessons for Future Conflicts

by Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca

Strategic Forum

T

he failure to find substantial evidence

of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons in Iraq has exposed serious

weaknesses in the U.S. understanding of the

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat

posed by its adversaries and in its ability to

deal with these threats. A rancorous and

highly politicized debate, primarily about the

intelligence assessments of Iraqi WMD

capabilities before Operation Iraqi Freedom,

has dominated the national discussion of

WMD in Iraq for months. Although Iraqi

WMD capabilities remain elusive and, indeed, weapons may never be found, elimination operations conducted there provide

important lessons.

The United States must begin to develop

a permanent capability to plan for and conduct

WMD elimination operations. The Department

of Defense (DOD) in particular must begin to

build such a capability as part of its overall

approach to combating WMD proliferation. To

be effective, however, DOD must work in

concert with interagency partners and avoid a

go-it-alone approach to this national priority.

Preserving the knowledge and experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan and

translating them into effective structures and

doctrine will be key challenges for military

and civilian planners. Incorporating WMD

elimination into early planning, ensuring

access to key enabling capabilities, providing

sufficient time to train units and exercise

concepts, and, perhaps most importantly,

following a program-centric approach to

address the totality of adversary programs and

stockpiles are all critical to future success.

As tensions between Iraq and the United

States worsened in mid-to-late 2002 and as

preparations began for Operation Iraqi Freedom, policymakers and military planners

began to wrestle with the challenges posed by

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Indeed, Iraqi defiance and deception in the

face of United Nations (UN) sanctions, coupled

with growing fears of WMD transfer to terrorist

organizations—most prominently al Qaeda—

were two primary reasons for confronting

Saddam Hussein. Just as in the first Gulf War in

1991, deterring and defending against possible

Iraqi use of WMD against coalition forces were

key concerns for planners. However, as the

crisis escalated in 2002, Department of Defense

(DOD) planners began to foresee another

challenge: how to remove comprehensively and

permanently the threat of Iraqi WMD, not just

to U.S. troops but also to the Middle East region

and the world.

When faced with this challenge in late fall

2002, military planners and supporting DOD

organizations realized that the comprehensive

elimination of an adversary WMD program

would entail far more than targeting enemy

sites for destruction. A new mission, WMD

elimination, was created, and planners began

trying to define, adapt, and incorporate this

mission into existing and developing war

plans. As they did, they discovered critical gaps

in U.S. preparations for dealing with a WMDarmed adversary.

While DOD made great strides over the

last 10 years in improving the U.S. military’s

ability to fight and win in a WMD environment, far less attention was paid to the tasks

of locating, understanding, and removing (or

disposing of) an adversary program. In Operation Desert Storm, these tasks were not addressed until after the cease-fire agreement,

and then they were handled as postconflict

activities under UN management. In the leadup to Iraqi Freedom, policy and military

experts disagreed about what exactly the role

of the military would be; how long, if at all, it

would assume primary responsibility; and

when and to whom it would hand off mission

responsibility.

Despite these uncertainties, planners

began crafting concepts of operation to allow

troops on the ground to locate, characterize,

and secure Iraqi WMD and attendant development programs and delivery systems—a

process that came to be known as exploitation.

Even as WMD exploitation plans progressed,

strategies to deal with the actual disposition or

destruction of Iraqi WMD stocks, weapons, and

production capabilities lagged far behind.

Given the long and tortuous history surrounding Iraq’s illicit weapons programs and the UN

role in attempting to eliminate these capabilities verifiably, it was unsurprising that the

actual disposition or destruction of Iraqi WMD

was initially considered a secondary task that

would fall primarily to non-DOD organizations. As such, destruction issues were not

addressed as early and to the same degree as

other WMD elimination tasks.

Some within DOD assumed that rapid

regime change itself would produce conditions

under which adversary WMD and associated

programs could be located and disposed of

cooperatively and peaceably. Others assumed

that rapid military victory would allow some of

No. 211

October 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 211, October 2004 Strategic Forum 1
the slower processes of WMD elimination to be

delayed until the end of major combat operations, when security conditions would permit

nonmilitary and non-U.S. partners to perform

the required tasks. As conflict drew closer,

planners reassessed some of these assumptions

and took steps to formulate and build additional elimination capabilities. But, as has

since become clear, many assessments and

assumptions remained relatively unaltered

from prewar through warfighting. Particularly

in the critical area of prewar intelligence, only

after the start of combat operations were serious problems identified.

A relatively new mission, or at least a

newly rediscovered one (if one includes the

precedent of post–World War II Germany),

WMD elimination has suffered from serious

growing pains in Iraqi Freedom: incorrect

planning assumptions and intelligence, lack of

preparation time, and problems with execution

and implementation, among others. Yet there

were demonstrable successes. Without a doubt,

there are important lessons to be learned from

the Iraq experience.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

In late 2002, DOD began designing an

exploitation task force that could locate,

identify, characterize, and (to a very limited

extent) secure and disable adversary WMD

capabilities. DOD settled on a multitiered and

sequenced approach to eliminating the WMD

problem in Iraq. At the first level, site assessment teams (SATs)—comprised of fewer than

a dozen individuals and forward deployed

with maneuver elements—would locate and

identify sites of interest and perform first-order

analysis of whatever was uncovered. At the

second level, three mobile exploitation teams

(METs) would perform confirmatory analysis

on sites and evidence uncovered by SATs, as

well as other sites identified on an ad hoc

basis. With greater analytical, logistical, and

manpower capabilities, METs would systematically exploit sites and people of interest as

maneuver elements pushed ahead toward

objectives. Manning SATs and METs were both

military and civilian experts from across the

services and various defense agencies.

To provide command, control, and supporting capabilities to these newly formed

units, military planners selected the 75th Field

Artillery Brigade from the U.S. Army III Corps

and renamed it the 75th Exploitation Task Force

(XTF). With much of its heavy equipment

unavailable for combat because it was floating

off the coast of Turkey, this unit would instead

lead the effort to find and secure Iraqi WMD.

However, there remained a growing concern

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense

that even the new capabilities anticipated by

the 75th XTF would be insufficient to disable

and eliminate the nuclear, biological, and

chemical capabilities expected to be found in

Iraq. Thus, in late March 2003, the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established

Task Force Disablement and Elimination (TF

D/E) to take the lead in disabling and disposing of any weapons or WMD-related equipment

and materials discovered by the 75th XTF or

other units. In addition, special operations

forces would play an important role in finding

and neutralizing WMD threats.

Supporting the 75th XTF and these other

units was a range of individuals and organizations drawn from across DOD and other government agencies, which included intelligence

specialists, microbiologists, physicists, chemists,

and other scientific experts and uniformed

personnel experienced in handling hazardous

materials. For example, the U.S. Army Nuclear

and Chemical Agency created a nuclear disablement team to assist DTRA and TF D/E

efforts.1 The Army’s Technical Escort Unit also

contributed its unique experience with detecting, monitoring, rendering safe, and escorting

WMD materials. In addition to this specialized

expertise, the 75th XTF required myriad enabling capabilities drawn from major supported commands in theater, notably Army V

Corps and Marine Corps I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Such capabilities included

transportation (air and ground), logistics,

communications, linguists, and security and

explosive ordnance disposal. Similarly, connections with the Intelligence Community and

U.S. Government and nongovernmental scientists behind the front lines provided important

reachback analytical capabilities.

2 Strategic Forum No. 211, October 2004

Rebecca K.C. Hersman is a senior research professor in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass

Destruction at the National Defense University. Todd M. Koca is a former research assistant in the Center.

Please address any questions or comments to Ms. Hersman at hersmanr@ndu.edu.

Origins of This Study

In late 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the Center for the Study of

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) to generate lessons and recommendations for

elimination operations during and after military conflict. The WMD Center conducted several

workshops and a series of roundtable meetings to bring together operators and analysts

experienced in elimination operations with key Department of Defense and interagency

partners. The WMD Center built a community of interest, gleaned important lessons from

prewar planning as well as its conduct and aftermath, and developed recommendations for

institutionalizing established capabilities and creating new ones. In addition, in February

2004, the Center hosted a classified conference to address the most important lessons

learned from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and to discuss how best to institutionalize

WMD elimination for future contingencies. The major findings from these activities are

summarized in this Strategic Forum and reported more fully in Rebecca K.C. Hersman,

Occasional Paper 1, Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What’s at Stake?

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2004). The

Center plans to continue its efforts in these areas.

a relatively new mission... WMD elimination

has suffered from serious

growing pains in Iraqi

Freedom ... [but] there

are important lessons to

be learned from the Iraq

experience
The speed and professionalism with

which the 75th XTF and other elimination

organizations activated and deployed were

commendable but could not fully compensate

for the lack of preexisting plans, doctrine,

training, exercising, and resources. It was not

until early 2003 that the 75th XTF was able to

bring its constituent elements together to

begin training, developing, and testing specific

tactics, techniques, and procedures. At the

same time, general guidance from senior-level

military and civilian leaders was being refined.

As conflict commenced in mid-March, the

weaknesses of the intelligence guiding the

targeting process and shaping exploitation

priorities posed increasing challenges. Moreover, the task force lacked the organic transportation, communication, and security assets

necessary to establish and maintain positive

control over key sites and positions. V Corps

and I MEF, which supplied many of these

enabling capabilities when they were not

resident within the 75th XTF, had to reconcile

competing priorities. Delays and shortfalls

inevitably followed. Finally, as the hunt for

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction grew more

complex and the smoking gun evidence of

WMD programs proved surprisingly elusive,

exercising effective and integrated command

and control over all the different units associated with the hunt became more difficult.

Throughout, individuals and units charged

with finding and eliminating the weapons had

to deal with ad hoc, evolving organizational

structures that were managed by several different offices and commands.

As major combat operations drew to a

close in late April 2003, significant changes

regarding the elimination mission were under

way. With little WMD material to disable or

destroy, efforts shifted toward an investigatory

approach. Leaders both in theater and in the

United States recognized the need to make

forensic and analytical components larger and

more robust. On-the-ground intelligence,

particularly human intelligence, would need to

expand substantially, and operations would

have to move away from the site-centric

approach that prevailed during the early weeks

of the war. Replacing it was an approach that

focused more on gleaning intelligence from

people and documentation. In line with this

shift, in late April and May, the 75th XTF began

transferring its responsibility for WMD exploitation operations to the nascent Iraq Survey

Group (ISG). In June 2003, the 75th XTF

resumed its prior designation as the 75th Field

Artillery Brigade and returned home to Fort

Sill, Oklahoma.

The ISG assumed full operational control

for the mission in mid-June 2003, but it took

several weeks before the organization was fully

deployed and functioning in support of the

WMD elimination mission. In Washington,

concerns over the WMD search continued to

escalate, and in Iraq, operations slowed as

leadership of the elimination mission

remained unclear. Unfortunately, in the operational pause that occurred as the 75th XTF

began to step down and as the ISG started to

form, operating conditions in Iraq continued to

deteriorate as a result of looting, insurgency,

and terrorism. By most accounts, it was not

until midsummer, when David Kay took control, that the ISG became fully operational. In

the transition period between the 75th XTF and

the ISG, however, many sites had suffered

depredations caused by looting and destruction,

intentional or otherwise, seriously hampering

long-term efforts to get to the bottom of Iraq’s

prewar WMD efforts. Meanwhile, security

conditions continued to decline, and the permissive conditions needed to reduce dependence upon military capabilities for these operations never materialized.

Much of the success of the 75th XTF, special operations forces, and the follow-on ISG

has been masked by the seemingly futile hunt

for WMD stockpiles in Iraq, but certain accomplishments should not be overlooked. In a

matter of weeks, a large conventional unit was

transformed into a site exploitation organization. In the course of the development and

deployment of the 75th XTF, the U.S. military

built a preliminary force structure, plans,

definitions, and community around the entirely new concept of WMD elimination. With

little training, few concepts of operation, and

no doctrine, these teams operated safely on the

No. 211, October 2004 Strategic Forum 3

Challenges in the Iraqi WMD Hunt

Even before the end of major combat operations, several important operational problems

surfaced:

■ The character of operations shifted from an expected focus on illicit weapons and

agents to a much more geographically dispersed “investigation” of potential WMD

sites.

■ Existing intelligence produced “dry holes” with little information or evidence of WMD

activities at suspected sites.

■ Assessment teams armed with WMD detection equipment, developed for force

protection rather than for identification and analysis of agents in the field, registered

false positives at an alarming rate.

■ Most teams had expected a focus on chemical agents and weapons, but, in reality,

radiological materials (non–weapons-grade) played a much larger role.

■ Most teams lacked sufficient training, expertise, and operational concepts for retrieving

important information contained in documents and computers, developing human

intelligence, or conducting forensic analysis.

■ Shortfalls in transportation, security, logistics, and other enabling capabilities delayed

operations and limited effectiveness.

■ Systematic and comprehensive looting, public disorder, and a hostile security

environment made exploitation operations complex, resource-intensive, and dangerous.

while not uncovering the

large-scale stockpiles that

many anticipated, the Iraq

Survey Group has shed

considerable light on illicit

Iraqi WMD activities
WMD Elimination

battlefield in a hostile environment. As conditions and requirements changed, the organization adapted—first, as preexisting intelligence

regarding sites proved less useful than hoped,

and later, as the scope of the mission broadened to encompass a full accounting of Iraqi

WMD programs and their history (as under the

ISG). While not uncovering the large-scale

stockpiles or extensive research, development,

and production programs that many anticipated, the ISG has shed considerable light on

illicit Iraqi WMD activities. Moreover, it has

done so in an environment where much information was lost to looting, vandalism, and

coordinated destruction.

Why Elimination Matters

Given the extent of nuclear, biological,

and chemical proliferation around the globe,

the United States can ill afford to assume that

any significant future adversary would not

possess a WMD capability. WMD threats to U.S.

interests and operations may stem from either

a hostile state or a transnational actor bent on

subverting American interests or mission success. As demonstrated by evidence uncovered in

Afghanistan, the public exhortations of terrorist

leaders, and repeated incidents over the last

decade, certain terrorist organizations have a

serious and growing interest in acquiring and

using nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons. With numerous states currently

seeking or possessing such weapons, preparations for prevailing against WMD use will be

critical to military strategy and planning.

Developing effective WMD elimination capabilities, however, is equally important.

Elimination operations can play a vital

role in the ongoing war on terrorism by removing sources of precursor agents or raw materials, denying access to developmental facilities,

scientists, and their knowledge, and securing

completed weapons. Precluding the opportunity

for terrorist organizations to acquire weapons

of mass destruction from a sympathetic regime

or to gain control of materials, know-how, and

weapons in the chaotic aftermath of a military

campaign is essential. Elimination operations

cannot substitute for the range of tools needed

to deal with active WMD proliferation between

states or from states to groups. But in wartime

and postwar scenarios, conducting speedy and

comprehensive WMD elimination operations

may be the first, best, and only effective tool.

In addition, the United States may have to

enter a state to secure, remove, or destroy portions or all of its WMD arsenal or infrastructure

when growing domestic discontent or destabilization caused by radical elements risks the use

or proliferation of such weapons or their technology. WMD elimination could become necessary even where WMD materials were either

previously unknown or unsuspected. Emerging

intelligence or outright discovery of weapons or

related materials in destabilized or deteriorating

regions or states would pose serious proliferation risks that might be solved only through

elimination operations.

Understanding and accounting for an

adversary’s nuclear, biological, or chemical

programs are vital to combating weapons of

mass destruction. Revelations in Afghanistan,

Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and

elsewhere demonstrate the interconnectedness

of the proliferation challenge. The networks

crafted by Saddam Hussein, A.Q. Khan, Moammar Qadaffi, and Kim Jong-Il—not to mention

others yet unknown—will not be readily recognized or easily severed. U.S. forces in Iraq continue to learn about Saddam Hussein’s activities

(WMD-related and otherwise) and doubtless will

continue translating and analyzing documents

and data well after U.S. troops relinquish control. Even a defeated or subdued state can pose

a serious proliferation challenge—and gaining

a complete understanding of how its proliferation networks operate may be equally daunting.

Defining Elimination

WMD elimination encompasses the range

of activities necessary to effect the systematic

control, removal, or destruction of a hostile

nation’s or organization’s capability to research, develop, test, produce, store, deploy, or

employ nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. WMD elimination, therefore,

is not simply the final portion of a process

leading to the ultimate physical seizure, destruction, or removal of weapons of mass

destruction and their delivery means. Rather,

elimination includes the entire process of

locating and characterizing these programs

(exploitation) as well as destroying, removing,

or neutralizing them (destruction and disposition) and ensuring that they will not be reconstituted or transferred in the future (monitoring and redirection).

When faced with a WMD-armed adversary,

the United States must eliminate not only the

weapons themselves but also the attendant

programs, infrastructure, and expertise. However, WMD elimination can be distinguished

4 Strategic Forum No. 211, October 2004

EXPLOITATION

Locate, characterize, secure, and neutralize the adversary’s 

WMD material, weapons, equipment, personnel, and 

infrastructure. Develop appropriate forensic evidence.

DESTRUCTION AND DISPOSITION

Destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer, or otherwise safely and 

verifiably dispose of the adversary’s WMD material, weapons, 

equipment, and infrastructure, to include designated dual-use 

assets, infrastructure, and capabilities.

MONITORING AND REDIRECTION

Monitor, inspect, and redirect/convert to prevent transfer, 

reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities.

EXPLOITATION

DESTRUCTION

MONITORING

ELIMINATION

understanding and accounting for an adversary’s nuclear, biological,

or chemical programs are

vital to combating weapons of mass destruction
from other disarmament activities, such as

cooperative threat reduction or negotiated international agreements between relatively unified

partners, because the elimination mission is

focused on real or potential adversaries whose

WMD programs and capabilities threaten American interests. Clearly, this is a broad mission and

mandate but one with a unified purpose: to

remove completely and verifiably the threat of

WMD from a hostile state or organization.

The Right Approach

WMD elimination is more than finding

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; it is

about understanding the range of activities the

adversary has undertaken to acquire these

weapons, including development, production,

and employment. While existing weapons pose

the most immediate threat, WMD weapons are

an end product of a long process. To eliminate

an adversary program, the United States must

first be able to find and secure research, development, and production capabilities, as well as

scientific and technical expertise, in each of the

major weapons categories and their delivery

systems. This programmatic approach is especially important because many potential WMDarmed countries may develop “break-out”

systems that can be put into production and

weaponized in fairly short order without maintaining stocks of weapons.

Second, WMD elimination is not a mission

that can be delayed until the postwar phase of

operation when major combat operations have

ceased. A military strategy that relies on holding

and securing WMD sites until they can be exploited and destroyed in a more leisurely fashion

(preferably by nonmilitary forces) fundamentally misunderstands the nature of these programs. Decentralized and dispersed hide sites

and dual-use facilities are far more likely to

characterize future weapons of mass destruction.

Even where larger facilities are correctly identified, effective security is a profoundly daunting

prospect during combat operations.

When the United States engages a WMDarmed adversary, the process of eliminating

these capabilities will inevitably span all phases

of conflict from prewar engagement through

combat operations to postwar reconstruction.

To be effective, this must entail a single, integrated command and control structure capable

of identifying resources and capabilities, leading the planning process, and directing training and exercises for all phases of conflict

across a broad range of scenarios. While DOD

has numerous options for designing and deploying such a headquarters, there are certain

prerequisites: it must be joint, operational, and

able to interact with international and interagency elements, and it must provide senior

command leadership.

Third, while DOD needs an institutionalized WMD elimination capability, it cannot and

should not take a go-it-alone approach. In some

cases, elimination activities might be best led by

non-DOD agencies and organizations where the

Department of Defense plays a supporting role.

In all cases, however, WMD elimination is a

highly interdisciplinary activity. Effective operations will demand an unprecedented fusion of

operational capability, subject matter expertise,

and intelligence support. The allocation and

distribution of scarce WMD assets is one of the

most essential elements of elimination planning

and operations. Maintaining the right balance

of deployed operational capability and reachback connectivity is essential.

WMD elimination operations obviously

require highly specialized expertise (in microbiology, chemistry, and physics, for example)

and equipment (such as sophisticated detectors, mission-oriented protective posture and

decontamination gear, and sampling and

forensic kits). Less obvious but no less important are the enabling capabilities that allow

subject matter experts to carry out their activities. Key among these are security forces, transportation assets (air and land), linguistic

support, intelligence assets (both in-field and

reachback), communications equipment and

operators, and other logistics. Pre- or postconflict, and particularly during a war, these enabling capabilities are likely to be in high

demand and short supply. Speed is crucial to

the success of any elimination mission. Ensuring quick and reliable access is essential to

enabling capabilities, including developing

organic capabilities when necessary, for units

tasked with WMD elimination.

The U.S. Government must appropriately

resource its intelligence collection and analysis

against WMD programs as well as appropriately

account for adversary counterintelligence

activities. Where intelligence on sites and

individuals is weak, the tasks of establishing

priorities for targeting and operations are

nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the gaps in

WMD intelligence are extensive and unlikely to

be filled in the near term. Any elimination

operations that do not expect and plan for gaps

and surprise are doomed to failure.

The Wrong Lessons

Given the unresolved outcome of the

Operation Iraqi Freedom weapons hunt, the

potential for learning the wrong lessons is

high. Three particular wrong lessons may

No. 211, October 2004 Strategic Forum 5

Organizations Contributing

to WMD Elimination

■ Military services 

■ Combatant commands

■ Office of the Secretary of Defense

■ The Joint Staff

■ Defense Threat Reduction Agency

■ Defense Intelligence Agency

■ Central Intelligence Agency

■ Department of State

■ Department of Energy

■ National Security Council/Executive

Office

■ Department of Homeland Security

■ National Laboratories (Sandia, Los

Alamos, and others)

■ Federal Bureau of Investigation

During wartime, add:

■ Land component commander and

specific military units (for example,

V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary

Force during Operation Iraqi

Freedom)

■ Coalition partners

any WMD elimination

operations that do not

expect and plan for gaps

and surprise are doomed

to failure
appear attractive or logical but could bode ill

for the future if given credence.

Wrong Lesson 1. “Iraq is an outlier case;

therefore, we won’t have to do this often.”

While removing WMD threats under nonhostile

circumstances, as in Libya, is far more preferable than doing so through conflict, it appears

likely that the United States will be called upon

to conduct WMD elimination operations nearly

as often as it is called upon to go to war. The

Nation cannot afford to be less prepared in this

area than it is for general battlefield success,

especially in light of continued terrorist efforts

to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Wrong Lesson 2. “Intelligence failure

explains everything.” This conclusion implies

that with the proper intelligence, ad hoc U.S.

preparations for elimination operations would

have been sufficient. However, the WMD hunt in

Iraq cannot be explained as a single point of

failure. In all areas, from planning and doctrine

to training and exercises to capabilities and

resources, there exist substantial problems with

the ability to conduct WMD elimination operations. Moreover, perfect intelligence is an unattainable goal. The U.S. military needs to be able

to operate in uncertainty. It also needs forces

that can locate, exploit, and disable WMD programs in hostile areas, even in the absence of

precise, actionable intelligence. If the Nation

allows a simple summary of “intelligence failure” to suffice as explanation of the WMD

experience in Iraq, it will miss the larger lesson.

Wrong Lesson 3. “This is not a DOD

mission; it is somebody else’s job.” Some argue

that the WMD hunt in Iraq demonstrates how

DOD should not have these responsibilities,

that military forces should do the minimum

necessary to secure sites and areas, and that

most WMD elimination activities should be left

in the hands of civilian or international entities

with expertise in these areas. Unfortunately,

that assessment simply does not stand up to

scrutiny. When the United States engages a

WMD-armed adversary or is required to undertake military operations in pursuit of these

weapons, the first order of business is finding,

securing, and eliminating them. So much vital

knowledge and information has been permanently lost in the chaos of postwar Iraq and the

rampant looting following the U.S. invasion

that the true parameters of Iraqi WMD activities

will almost certainly never be known. Indeed,

in Iraqi Freedom, the United States may well

have gotten lucky in terms of WMD dispersal—

at least there were not large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons for international

terrorists or Iraqi insurgents to plunder after

major combat operations ceased.

Lessons Learned

Despite the difficulties faced by operators

in Iraq, critical lessons can be learned from

the experience of Iraqi Freedom. The 75th

Exploitation Task Force, TF D/E, special operations forces, and the Iraq Survey Group all

provide a wealth of information and experience that can and must be tapped as policymakers and planners move to institutionalize

the WMD elimination mission. Although there

are many, eight overarching lessons emerge.

The United States should:

Embed and Institutionalize the Mission.

Like any other task undertaken as part of combat operations, WMD elimination must be fully

integrated into the deliberate planning process

and reflected in all major base plans, the strategic planning guidance, contingency planning

guidance, and budget development process. If

this is not done, WMD elimination will simply

not exist as a DOD mission. Institutionalizing it

makes it real. A clear, standardized vocabulary

for elimination must be created, observed, and

embedded in planning and doctrine. Without

common terminology and well-understood

definitions, both accurate assignment and

execution of mission tasks are impossible.

Organize for Success. Current and future

threats require a standing peacetime organization specifically assigned the WMD elimination

mission. This organization should have a clear

command and control structure headed by a

general officer and staffed with trained personnel atop a combination of pre-identified and

dedicated assets. This structure should be readily

augmentable, deployable, and capable of operating, in one form or another, across all phases of

a conflict. This organization must be joint in

character, preferably as part of a combatant

command. Moreover, though this structure

should be military in nature, it should establish

strong and deep links with interagency and

international partners, civilian experts, and the

private sector. This office can then provide a

center of focus for DOD-wide efforts on this

issue, act as the primary conduit for information, doctrine development, training, and exercising, and coordinate DOD activities with (the

necessary) contributing civilian organizations.

The Department of Defense should neither

attempt single-handedly to resource and conduct this mission nor concede its role.

Prepare for the Worst. Coercive disarmament is an inherently nonpermissive activity.

The United States must be capable of conducting WMD elimination operations, concurrent

with major combat operations when necessary,

to find, exploit, and secure WMD materials and

programs. In addition, even operations

planned for or delayed until postconflict are

likely to be conducted under less-than-hospitable circumstances, whether resulting from

popular resistance, military holdouts, guerrilla

activity, contamination (in cases of WMD use

or unintended agent release), looting, or general instability. Viewing WMD elimination as

just another postconflict activity to be conducted at some later date in a largely permissive environment is simplistic and dangerous

and increases the likelihood that such operations will ultimately be unsuccessful.

Plan for Surprise. Improving WMD intelligence across the board will be a vital mission

in coming years. The apparent divergence

between prewar intelligence regarding Iraq and

the on-the-ground reality underscores the need

for better capabilities in this area. The revelations in Tripoli regarding the unexpected extent

of the Libyan programs and the general lack of

WMD-related intelligence in North Korea also

lend credence to the importance of this mission.

However, even if intelligence capabilities are

improved in key areas—particularly human

intelligence—gaps and surprises will remain

the norm, not the exception. Thus, WMD elimination operations must be flexible and responsive to emerging intelligence, the cycling of new

information, and dramatic changes to on-theground knowledge. Intelligence-sharing and

collaboration between operational elements and

6 Strategic Forum No. 211, October 2004

viewing WMD elimination

as just another postconflict activity to be conducted at some later date

in a largely permissive

environment is simplistic

and dangerous
the Intelligence Community also must be

improved and enhanced. In addition, both

military and non-military components must

incorporate a strong counterintelligence element into their planning and operations.

Train and Exercise. Forces tasked with

eliminating WMD command and control must

have the opportunity to test plans and procedures as well as to resolve key difficulties. Only

through advance preparation can DOD address

issues such as deconfliction, communications,

intelligence and information sharing, and

competing logistical demands before they pose

a threat to mission success. Units must be

given time to test plans with one another so

that these problems can be mitigated or resolved. Moreover, intensive red-teaming of

concepts and strategies prior to conflict will

better prepare coalition forces for the aggressive

counterintelligence efforts and adaptive tactics,

techniques, and procedures employed by hostile

elements as they attempt to conceal or destroy

evidence of WMD activities.

Target Programs, Not Places. WMD

elimination clearly encompasses a wide range

of tasks, but at its core is one central mission: to

find and remove permanently a hostile nation’s

WMD capability and the threat it poses to the

United States. To achieve this core mission in

future contingencies, elimination operations

should be organized to follow a programcentric approach that seeks a comprehensive

understanding and full accounting of an adversary’s WMD programs and capabilities. As such,

efforts should be fully integrated and balanced

between exploiting sites, people, and data/documentation. This will allow U.S. forces to collect

and utilize the entire panoply of information

and evidence and do so as rapidly and effectively as possible. Adopting a program-centric

approach puts a premium on fusing subject

matter expertise, intelligence assets, security,

linguistics, and other supporting capabilities—

creating truly interdisciplinary units.

Employ and Improve Technology. The

Department of Defense must look to technological innovation to enhance the efficiency, speed,

and overall effectiveness of WMD elimination

operations, as well as to reduce manpower

requirements. Key areas of focus include detection, monitoring, analysis, communications,

agent and weapons neutralization or defeat, and

security. Many of the problems experienced in

Iraqi Freedom—recurring false positives of

chemical agent detectors, insufficient bandwidth

to convey images and information from realtime sites under exploitation, and looting and

intentional destruction caused by inadequate or

nonexistent security at sites of interest—could

be ameliorated by such innovations. In addition,

technological improvements could reduce the

overall number of forces needed for WMD elimination operations, by either increasing the pace

of operations or reducing the number of personnel required to conduct them or providing

equivalent analytical, investigative, and support

capabilities to teams of reduced size. Using

technology to make more of these capabilities

organic to WMD elimination–specific units may

be an effective way to align demands and resources more closely.

Maintain Focus. Directing senior-level

military and civilian attention to the issue of

institutionalizing and resourcing the WMD

elimination mission within DOD and the

broader national security community is itself a

serious challenge. Yet without effective advocates at the upper echelons of government,

adequate funding and prioritization simply will

not materialize. Without knowledgeable and

active senior-level advocates to ensure sustained

funding, a significant WMD elimination capability is unlikely to be developed.

What’s at Stake?

With the passage of time, weapons of mass

destruction are becoming both easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport and more

appealing to states and terrorists who seek to

threaten the United States and its allies. A

robust WMD elimination capability is essential

to meet this threat and protect Americans from

catastrophic disaster. Hostile states and terrorists have every incentive to pursue the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction if

they believe that our ability to detect, locate,

and destroy these capabilities is inadequate.

Moreover, to engage in military conflict with a

WMD-armed or -suspected adversary without

the plans, doctrine, and capabilities necessary

to find and eliminate its weapons is to court

disaster. To do so endangers future military

operations and the protection of U.S. forces and

civilians, risks a crisis of confidence among

coalition partners and allies, and may worsen

the proliferation of these weapons and capabilities through dispersal, leakage, and dissemination. There can be no enduring victory in

situations in which an adversary is defeated but

its weapons of mass destruction or the ability to

produce them remains intact. The United

States simply cannot afford to be wrong when it

comes to eliminating the world’s most dangerous weapons in the hands of its most dangerous enemies.

Note1

Gerard Vavrina and John Greaves, “Nuclear Disablement

Team Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Parts 1 and 2,”

NBC Report (Fall/Winter 2003), 7–10, and (Spring/Summer

2004), 25–30.

No. 211, October 2004 Strategic Forum 7

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy

research and strategic gaming organization within the National

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its

components, and interagency partners. The institute provides

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an

active outreach program, including conferences and publications,

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press

to engage in military

conflict with a WMDarmed or -suspected

adversary without the

plans, doctrine, and

capabilities necessary 

to find and eliminate 

its weapons is to court

disaster
8 Strategic Forum No. 211, October 2004

Other titles in the

Strategic Forum series

For on-line access to, go to: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html

Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It

Succeed?

Judith S. Yaphe

(No. 208, June 2004)

Collision Avoidance: U.S.-Russian

Bilateral Relations and Former 

Soviet States

Eugene B. Rumer

(No. 207, April 2004)

Partnership for Peace: Charting a

Course for a New Era

Jeffrey Simon 

(No. 206, March 2004)

Securing Afghanistan: Entering a 

Make-or-Break Phase? 

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

(No. 205, March 2004) 

Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case

for Preventive Action

Joseph McMillan

(No. 212, forthcoming) 

Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy:

Entering a New Era?

Rust Deming

(No. 213, forthcoming)

Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa:

Pillars of a New Strategy

Johnnie Carson

(No. 210, September 2004)

Deploying Missile Defense: Major

Operational Challenges

M. Elaine Bunn

(No. 209, August 2004)

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counterproliferation Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American

security. Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research

to the challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing “vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, and outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security

implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of fashioning effective responses to them. Education and outreach programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates

to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, and operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center

hosts annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and participants from the government and private sectors.