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PARISH V. PARISH

Cite as 314 Neb. 370

Robert J. Parish, appellee, v. Kathleen M. 

Parish, now known as Kathleen 

M. Spence, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 2, 2023. No. S-22-066.

1. Modification of Decree: Appeal and Error. Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, 

whose order is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed 

absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the 

reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters 

submitted for disposition.

3. Divorce: Property Division: Armed Forces: Pensions. Federal law 

does not preempt the power of a state court to treat a future nondisability veteran’s pension entitlement as a marital asset in a dissolution proceeding.

4. ____: ____: ____: ____. Disposable retired military pay is divisible 

property in a divorce under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 

Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2018).

5. ____: ____: ____: ____. If disposable retired pay is reduced by the 

veteran’s election of disability benefits, the state court may not order a 

veteran to indemnify a former spouse for the loss of a former spouse’s 

share of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s election to 

separately receive disability benefits.

6. Divorce: Property Division: Armed Forces: Final Orders. Where a 

state court enters a judgment of divorce dividing military benefits, and 

no appeal is taken therefrom, such division becomes a final order.

7. Judgments: Collateral Attack. Only a void judgment may be collaterally attacked.

8. Judgments: Jurisdiction. When considering whether a previous order 

is void, it is critical to differentiate between a judgment entered 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/02/2023 09:07 AM CDT
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Cite as 314 Neb. 370

without jurisdiction and an erroneous judgment that may nevertheless 

be enforceable.

9. Divorce: Property Division: Armed Forces: Claim Preclusion. When 

a divorce decree erroneously divides military benefits, the state law 

of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, applies to determine 

whether relitigation of the issue may occur.

10. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Collateral Attack. Judgments entered without personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction are void and subject to collateral attack.

11. Actions: Jurisdiction. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be 

raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte.

12. Modification of Decree: Alimony: Good Cause: Words and Phrases.

“Good cause” for modifying an alimony award means a material and 

substantial change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances 

of each case.

13. Modification of Decree: Alimony: Armed Forces: Pensions: Waiver.

While a Nebraska court may not include service-connected disability 

benefits awarded to a military retiree as a part of a marital estate, it may 

consider such benefits and the corresponding waiver of retirement pension benefits required by federal law in determining whether there has 

been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie 

A. Martinez, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Aimee S. Melton and Megan E. Shupe, of Reagan, Melton & 

Delaney, L.L.P., for appellant.

Van A. Schroeder, of Bertolini, Schroeder & Blount, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Miller-Lerman, J.

NATURE OF CASE

Kathleen M. Parish, now known as Kathleen M. Spence, 

filed a motion to modify alimony. The district court for 

Sarpy County dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter 
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Cite as 314 Neb. 370

jurisdiction. Kathleen appeals. A dissolution decree (Decree) 

had awarded each party an interest in the couple’s retirement properties and in addition had awarded Kathleen alimony that could be modified if her former spouse, Robert J. 

Parish, accepted a veteran’s disability pension. The Decree 

was not appealed. Robert accepted a veteran’s disability pension, thereby reducing his retirement benefits and consequently 

reducing the value of Kathleen’s share of his benefits under the 

Decree, and Kathleen sought to modify alimony. The district 

court evidently believed that the original alimony award was 

improper and, in any event, believed it was being asked to 

divide Robert’s veteran’s disability benefits, which it concluded 

it could not do because it was preempted by federal law. The 

district court dismissed the matter for “lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, it was 

merely being asked to consider modifying alimony based on 

a reduction in Robert’s nondisability pension he shared with 

Kathleen. We conclude the district court had jurisdiction to 

consider the request to modify alimony, and we reverse, and 

remand for further proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were divorced in 2011 by consent decree. As 

part of the property settlement, Robert received 50 percent of 

Kathleen’s retirement account. The Decree further provided 

that Kathleen was entitled to an interest in Robert’s military pension under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 

Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (2018). 

Kathleen was awarded a 48-percent interest in Robert’s retirement benefits. Because the parties contemplated that Robert 

may receive disability upon retirement, thus reducing his traditional retirement pension to be shared with Kathleen, paragraph P of the Decree awarded Kathleen “Special Alimony” in 

the nominal amount of $1 per year. Paragraph P of the Decree 

stated, “This alimony provision shall be subject to modification only in the circumstance that there be a disability offset 
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against [Robert’s] net disposable, non-disability pension and 

for no other reason.” The foregoing awards were not challenged on appeal.

In 2012, Robert filed for and was given a disability rating 

and was then awarded a veteran’s disability pension, which he 

received separately; that award resulted in a waiver of a portion of his retirement pension. Robert’s disposable retired pay 

changed from $971.36 to $679.40 per month. The decrease 

in Robert’s disposable retired pay reduced the amount that 

Kathleen received under the Decree to a smaller figure.

On May 18, 2018, Kathleen filed a complaint for modification in which she alleged that there had been a material and 

substantial change in circumstances that warranted modification of the special alimony to accommodate for the reduction 

in Robert’s pension because he had converted retirement benefits to disability veteran’s benefits. Robert was served with the 

complaint but failed to file an answer or appear for a hearing, 

and defaulted. In its September 5 order, the district court found 

there had been a material change in circumstances because 

Robert was now receiving disability that reduced the amount 

he received in nondisability pension funds, which in turn 

negatively impacted Kathleen. The district court ordered that 

Kathleen receive as alimony an amount equal to 48 percent 

of Robert’s disability and ordered Robert to pay $13,034.76 

to Kathleen, representing the amount she would have received 

since the commencement of the disability offset to Robert’s 

pension in 2012.

Robert failed to make monthly payments under the order for 

modification. On October 8, 2019, the court issued an order to 

show cause. Robert filed a motion to dismiss and alleged that 

the court “lacks jurisdiction over” Robert. The court denied the 

motion to dismiss.

On February 21, 2020, Robert moved to vacate the order 

that had modified alimony. The court granted the motion, 

and this order has not been challenged. The case proceeded 

on the merits of the modification wherein Kathleen generally 
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maintained that the special alimony should be increased 

because her portion of the retirement benefits had been 

reduced. Robert generally maintained that the original alimony award was improper and that the district court was currently being asked to divide disability benefits, which generally a state court may not divide under federal law.

Trial was held on Kathleen’s complaint for modification on 

December 13, 2021. Both parties testified and evidence was 

adduced, although evidence of the parties’ present relative 

income and wealth was limited. On January 7, 2022, the district court filed an order that dismissed Kathleen’s complaint 

for modification. The trial court characterized Kathleen’s 

complaint, inter alia, as a request to divide Robert’s disability 

pension, which it determined was preempted under federal 

law. The order stated that the district court “lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction to entertain the division of a VA disability 

waiver pension due to federal preemption of that disability pay.”

Kathleen appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Kathleen claims that the district court erred 

when it dismissed her complaint to modify alimony. Kathleen 

specifically assigns, restated, that the district court erred when 

it determined that (1) it was preempted from implementing the 

alimony provisions of the Decree and (2) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[1,2] Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter 

entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, whose order is 

reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed absent 

an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Grothen v. Grothen, 

308 Neb. 28, 952 N.W.2d 650 (2020). A judicial abuse of 

discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are 

clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial 
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right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. Id.

ANALYSIS

The district court dismissed Kathleen’s motion to modify 

alimony on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

We conclude this ruling was in error, and we reverse, and 

remand for further proceedings.

As explained below, as an initial matter we address Robert’s 

assertion, endorsed by the district court, that the provision 

of the Decree which permitted a modification of alimony if 

Robert’s military pension was reduced by receipt of disability 

benefits was preempted and improper. The alimony provision was not improper nor void. As further explained below, 

whether or not the initial alimony award provision was erroneous, the award became final, subject to principles of res 

judicata, and enforceable. Upon Kathleen’s request, the district 

court had subject matter jurisdiction of the motion to modify 

alimony and should have adhered to the customary exercise 

of jurisdiction and standards applicable to a request to modify 

alimony. See Longo v. Longo, 266 Neb. 171, 663 N.W.2d 

604 (2003).

Division of Military Benefits: The Alimony 

Provision in the Decree Is Not Void.

Robert and the district court have indicated their belief that 

the original alimony provision is void. Robert asserted that the 

alimony provision is “undeniably a subterfuge to get around 

federal preemption in hopes that the state court could divide a 

veteran’s disability pension contrary to the [USFSPA], and the 

Mansell and Howell decisions.” Brief for appellee at 13. We 

reject this assertion.

[3-5] It is well settled that federal law does not preempt 

the power of a state court to treat a future nondisability 

veteran’s pension entitlement as a marital asset in a dissolution proceeding. See Longo v. Longo, supra. Disposable 

retired military pay is divisible property in a divorce under 
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the USFSPA, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). See, also, Mansell v. 

Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 

(1989). However, if disposable retired pay is reduced by the 

veteran’s election of disability benefits, the state court may 

not order a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for the loss 

of a former spouse’s share of the veteran’s retirement pay 

caused by the veteran’s election to separately receive disability benefits. Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 

197 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2017).

Our examination of the special alimony provision in the 

Decree shows that it does not indemnify Kathleen for the 

reduction of her share of veteran’s retirement pay. It does not 

require division of Robert’s disability benefits. It merely provides that if Robert’s retired pay is reduced by his election of 

disability benefits, Kathleen may seek a modification of alimony. The reduction of the value of Kathleen’s share of retirement pay would be a relevant consideration in a modification 

of alimony analysis. See Kramer v. Kramer, 252 Neb. 526, 567 

N.W.2d 100 (1997). The district court was not being asked to 

enforce a preempted or otherwise void provision.

We do not read Mansell and Howell as prohibiting a provision that permits a court to take into consideration the receipt 

of disability benefits when calculating awards in family law. 

See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 

599 (1987). The district court had jurisdiction over the request 

to modify alimony, and the alimony provision in the Decree 

was enforceable and not void. See, Longo v. Longo, supra; 

Kramer v. Kramer, supra.

Claim Preclusion: The Special Alimony 

Provision Has Become Res Judicata.

[6-8] Where a state court enters a judgment of divorce 

dividing military benefits, and no appeal is taken therefrom, 

such division becomes a final order. See Ryan v. Ryan, 257 

Neb. 682, 600 N.W.2d 739 (1999). Collateral attacks on 

previous proceedings are impermissible unless the attack is 
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grounded upon the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. Spady v. Spady, 284 Neb. 885, 824 

N.W.2d 366 (2012). Only a void judgment may be collaterally 

attacked. Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 888 N.W.2d 514 

(2016). When considering whether a previous order is void, it 

is critical to differentiate between a judgment entered without 

jurisdiction and an erroneous judgment that may nevertheless 

be enforceable, a distinction we further address below. Foster 

v. Foster, 509 Mich. 109, 983 N.W.2d 373 (2022), amended

509 Mich. 988, 974 N.W.2d 185.

[9] When a divorce decree erroneously divides military 

benefits, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state law of 

claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, applies to determine whether relitigation of the issue may occur. Mansell v. 

Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586 n.5, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 

2d 675 (1989). See Mansell v. Mansell, 498 U.S. 806, 111 S. 

Ct. 237, 112 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1990) (denying certiorari after 

California Court of Appeals held that decree was immune from 

collateral attack under theory of res judicata).

In this regard, a majority of state courts have permitted the 

previously unchallenged division of military benefits to stand 

based on application of the state’s doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata. 2 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution 

of Property § 6:9 (4th ed. 2023) (collecting cases). Several 

courts examining federal preemption under the USFSPA have 

persuasively reasoned, and we agree, that because federal 

law does not have the exclusive federal forum for dividing 

military benefits in divorce actions, states are not deprived 

of subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce involving the 

division of military pension property. See Foster v. Foster, 

supra (stating no exclusive federal forum under 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1408 and 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) (2018)). See, also, Rose 

v. Rose, supra (stating similar veteran’s benefits statute did 

not provide for exclusive federal forum and state courts were 

not preempted from ordering child support paid from military benefits). We agree with the foregoing authorities and 
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conclude that as the forum, Nebraska jurisprudence regarding 

claim preclusion and res judicata applies.

It has been widely held, and we agree, that if the military 

benefits are initially divided by a state court in violation of 

federal preemption, but the service member fails to file a 

proper appeal, the decision is final and the benefits at issue are 

divided in accordance with the initial award. See, e.g., Martin 

v. Martin, ___ Nev. ___, 520 P.3d 813 (2022); Foster v. Foster, 

supra; Matter of Marriage of Kaufman, 17 Wash. App. 2d 497, 

485 P.3d 991 (2021); Shelton v. Shelton, 119 Nev. 492, 78 P.3d 

507 (2003); In re Marriage of Mansell, 217 Cal. App. 3d 219, 

265 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1989). To the extent this reasoning conflicts with our reasoning in Ryan v. Ryan, 257 Neb. 682, 600 

N.W.2d 739 (1999), we disapprove of Ryan. Applying principles of claim preclusion in the instant case, the initial award 

of alimony was directly addressed and resolved in previous 

proceedings and may not be relitigated.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Erroneous 

Exercise of Jurisdiction Distinguished: 

The District Court Was Not Asked 

to Divide Disability Benefits 

and Had Jurisdiction.

As an adjunct to his earlier assertion that the alimony provision is void, which we have rejected, Robert contends: (1) 

Kathleen’s request asks the court to divide disability benefits, 

(2) the alimony provision is unenforceable, and (3) the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In line with these 

contentions, the district court found that because of federal 

preemption, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify 

the award of alimony, which it understood to be a request 

to “entertain the division of a VA disability.” The district 

court misperceived the nature of the request, and this ruling 

was erroneous.

[10,11] We begin by reciting familiar propositions of subject matter jurisdiction. Judgments entered without personal 
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jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction are void and subject 

to collateral attack. See, Becher v. Becher, 311 Neb. 1, 970 

N.W.2d 472 (2022); Young v. Govier & Milone, 286 Neb. 224, 

835 N.W.2d 684 (2013). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any party or by the court 

sua sponte. Williams v. Williams, 311 Neb. 772, 975 N.W.2d 

523 (2022).

However, we must clarify that lack of subject matter jurisdiction differs from an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. The 

Supreme Court of Michigan recently explained this distinction 

in a dissolution proceeding to enforce a judgment that had 

divided a veteran’s disability benefits. The court noted that 

“[t]he loose practice has grown up . . . of saying that a court 

had no ‘jurisdiction’ to take certain legal action when what is 

actually meant is that the court had no legal ‘right’ to take the 

action . . . .” Foster v. Foster, 509 Mich. 109, 124, 983 N.W.2d 

373, 381 (2022) amended 509 Mich. 988, 974 N.W.2d 185. The 

Foster court explained that

“[t]here is a wide difference between a want of jurisdiction, in which case the court has no power to adjudicate at all, and a mistake in the exercise of undoubted 

jurisdiction, in which case the action of the trial court is 

not void although it may be subject to direct attack on 

appeal. . . .”

509 Mich. at 125, 983 N.W.2d at 381 (quoting Jackson City 

Bank & Trust Co. v. Fredrick, 271 Mich. 538, 260 N.W. 

908 (1935)). It has been observed that failing to distinguish 

between “the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction” and “the want 

of jurisdiction”

is a fruitful source of confusion and errancy of decision. 

In the first case the errors of the trial court can only be 

corrected by appeal or writ of error. In the last case its 

judgments are void and may be assailed by indirect as 

well as direct attack.

Id. at 124, 949 N.W.2d at 381 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
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In the present case, the district court had subject matter 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the initial award of alimony. As 

explained above, the alimony provision was not void, and even 

if it was erroneous, in the absence of an appeal or finding of 

mistake, the alimony provision became final. The alimony 

provision did not impermissibly divide disability benefits nor 

was it an indemnification to a former spouse for the loss of 

the former spouse’s share of military retirement benefits due to 

the veteran’s election to separately receive disability benefits. 

Robert’s receipt of disability benefits was merely a condition 

that permitted the court to reevaluate appropriate alimony. 

In the current proceedings, the district court was asked to 

consider whether good cause existed to modify the award of 

alimony, not to divide disability benefits. The district court did 

not lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider a modification 

of alimony.

Alimony.

Kathleen appeals from the order that dismissed her complaint for modification of alimony. As we explained above, the 

alimony provision in the Decree did not divide preempted federal benefits and is properly understood under the customary 

Nebraska law of alimony. See Longo v. Longo, 266 Neb. 171, 

663 N.W.2d 604 (2003).

[12] The complaint alleged that since entry of the Decree, 

there has been a substantial change in circumstances that warrants modification of alimony. The Decree provides in part 

as follows:

P. Special Alimony. [Robert] shall pay as specific 

alimony to [Kathleen] the sum of $1.00 per year beginning on the first day of the first month following the 

entry of this Decree and each year thereafter for the life 

of either party. This alimony shall not terminate upon 

the remarriage of [Kathleen], but only upon the death 

of either party. This alimony provision shall be subject 

to modification only in the circumstance that there be a 
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disability offset against [Robert’s] net disposable, nondisability pension and for no other reason.

Nebraska’s statute for the awarding of alimony, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 42-365 (2016), provides in part:

When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court 

may order payment of such alimony by one party to the 

other and division of property as may be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances of the parties, duration 

of the marriage, a history of the contributions to the marriage by each party, including contributions to the care 

and education of the children, and interruption of personal 

careers or educational opportunities, and the ability of the 

supported party to engage in gainful employment without 

interfering with the interests of any minor children in the 

custody of such party.

Section 42-365 also provides the basis for which alimony 

awards entered pursuant to a consent decree may be modified 

for good cause. “Good cause” means a material and substantial 

change in circumstances and depends upon the circumstances 

of each case. Grothen v. Grothen, 308 Neb. 28, 952 N.W.2d 

650 (2020).

The award of alimony in this case is a nominal award that 

is subject to modification for good cause under the court’s 

authority found in § 42-365 and pursuant to the terms of the 

Decree. The Decree provides a condition precedent for modification of alimony—namely, Robert’s taking a disability offset 

against his pension. Contrary to Robert’s assertion, the award 

of alimony in this case did not become a property division 

or division of his veteran’s disability benefits; the alimony 

provision merely anticipates the possibility that circumstances 

may change if Robert were to waive some amount of retirement benefits to receive disability benefits. See, Longo v. 

Longo, supra; Kramer v. Kramer, 252 Neb. 526, 567 N.W.2d 

100 (1997).

[13] We have previously explained that a trial court may 

reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in cases where the 
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service member has not elected nondivisible disability benefits at the time of the dissolution, and the service member 

may waive retirement benefits in the future. See Longo v. 

Longo, 266 Neb. 171, 663 N.W.2d 604 (2003). See, similarly, 

Collins v. Collins, 144 Md. App. 395, 798 A.2d 1155 (2002). 

We upheld a provision comparable to that found in the instant 

case in Longo. The Longo decree awarded a military spouse 

alimony in the sum of $1 per year for life “‘to be modifiable only upon [the nonmilitary spouse’s] portion of [the] 

military pension being reduced by a portion of said pension 

being received as disability.’” 266 Neb. at 180, 663 N.W.2d 

at 610-11. In Longo, we applied our holding in Kramer that 

allowed benefits exempt from distribution under federal law to 

nevertheless be taken into consideration in assessing the relative financial condition of the parties in a dissolution action. In 

Kramer, we stated that

while a Nebraska court may not include service-connected 

disability benefits awarded to a military retiree as a part 

of a marital estate under Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 

581, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989), it may 

consider such benefits and the corresponding waiver of 

retirement pension benefits required by federal law in 

determining whether there has been a material change 

in circumstances which would justify modification of an 

alimony award to a former spouse . . . .

252 Neb. at 546, 567 N.W.2d at 113. Any question of the 

dominion of state courts over alimony was answered by 

the U.S. Supreme Court in Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 

222, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 197 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2017), which stated 

that “a family court, when it first determines the value of a 

family’s assets, remains free to take account of the contingency that some military retirement pay might be waived, 

or . . . take account of reductions in value when it calculates 

or recalculates the need for spousal support.” See, similarly, 

Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 
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599 (1987) (stating that veteran’s disability benefits can be 

considered in setting child support).

As in Longo, the Decree in this case required Robert to pay 

Kathleen nominal alimony, which could be modified upon a 

change in the nature of Robert’s future pension benefits. Such 

an award of alimony under state law merely considers how 

that award would be affected by future disability or other preempted federal benefits but is not a property division in conflict with Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 

104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989), or Howell v. Howell, supra.

Based on the foregoing, the nominal award of alimony in 

this case is subject to modification under § 42-365 and the 

terms of the Decree. It is undisputed that there was a disability offset against Robert’s net disposable, nondisability 

pension. The offset to the pension in which Kathleen shares 

could justify a modification to the amount of alimony after 

comparing the relative economic circumstances of the parties. See Grothen v. Grothen, 308 Neb. 28, 952 N.W.2d 650 

(2020). To determine whether there has been a material and 

substantial change in circumstances warranting modification 

of a divorce decree, a trial court should compare the financial 

circumstances of the parties at the time of the divorce decree 

with their circumstances at the time the modification at issue 

was sought. Id. In contrast to a division of property, the purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or 

support of one party by the other when the relative economic 

circumstances make it appropriate. § 42-365.

The record before us does not contain sufficient evidence 

of the relative current economic circumstances of the parties, and we are unable to resolve the matter of modification 

of the award of alimony on appeal. Accordingly, we remand 

the cause to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, we instruct the district 

court to consider Robert’s military disability benefits to the 

extent receipt of the benefits affect the relative financial 
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circumstances of the parties. See Kramer v. Kramer, 252 Neb. 

526, 567 N.W.2d 100 (1997).

CONCLUSION

The district court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed 

Kathleen’s complaint for modification for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.