Defense

Most U.S. and European leaders want to heal the rift over Iraq

by restoring NATO unity and effectiveness. But how can this worthy

goal be accomplished? This urgent question requires a credible

answer. Some observers argue that because the United States and

Europe cannot agree on security policies outside Europe, they

should limit their cooperation to such soft-power issues as economic

trade, foreign aid, and combating HIV/AIDS. While common action

on soft-power issues is useful, this strategy would leave NATO—the

transatlantic community’s premier military alliance—with no serious role to play in the ongoing struggle against terrorism, tyrants,

WMD proliferation, and radicalism in the Islamic world. Something

better is needed: a constructive security strategy for NATO that also

employs hard power in sensible ways, and that both Americans and

Europeans will agree upon.

Need for a New Dual-Track Strategy 

We believe that such a strategy can be crafted if the United

States and Europe recall how they solved similar serious problems

during the Cold War. On earlier occasions, the Alliance successfully

coped with an assertive American military agenda that troubled

many European countries for political reasons by creating dual-track

strategies that combined military modernization with new political

endeavors. The first case arose in the mid-1960s, when the Alliance

used the “Harmel Report” to mate deterrence and defense with

détente. The second case occurred in the early 1980s, when NATO

agreed to deploy Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles

(GLCM) on European soil while also pursuing nuclear arms control

negotiations with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, NATO

successfully pursued a third dual-track strategy by engaging Russia

diplomatically while enlarging into Eastern Europe.

A new type of dual-track strategy should be pursued today.

NATO already has crafted the first half of this strategy: a visionary

defense transformation agenda for enhancing military preparedness.

Adopted at the Prague Summit of 2002, this agenda aims at fielding

a new NATO Response Force (NRF) and other measures to prepare

for new missions outside Europe. This forward looking defense

Overview

Recent strains between the United States and some European

allies have raised concerns that NATO is becoming irrelevant or

even headed toward extinction. A breakup of NATO would

severely damage the United States and Europe as well as

prospects for global peace. As an urgent priority, NATO must

restore its unity and strengthen its capacity for common action in

the Greater Middle East. But how can this goal be achieved in

today’s climate?

The solution is for NATO to pursue a new dual-track strategy

of military and political transformation that could be launched at

the Istanbul Summit next spring. The military track should further

strengthen efforts to field a NATO Response Force and otherwise

prepare European forces for expeditionary missions. The political

track should aim to create a common transatlantic vision for the

Middle East, while enhancing NATO’s capacity to act flexibly and

constructively there in peace, crisis, and war.

Such a NATO strategic realignment is not mission impossible. NATO has survived previous trans-Atlantic stresses by adopting dual-track strategies that harmonized American and European interests. For example, almost forty years ago the Harmel

Report reconciled detente with deterrence and defense. A new

Harmel Report is needed to forge a similar reconciliation of U.S.

and European policies toward NATO’s role in the Middle East. In

addition, the Istanbul Summit can take other practical steps: e.g.,

a NATO resource commitment to increase defense investments as

force structure is reduced, a NATO defense transformation

roadmap to guide force improvements, and a new “Partnership

for Cooperation” that would pursue ties with friendly Middle

Eastern militaries. A bold Istanbul agenda of this sort offers

NATO an opportunity to replace recent debates with a common

approach for making the alliance more secure and effective in a

troubled world.

Dual-Track Transformation

for NATO

by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

OCTOBER 2003

Number 35

Horizons

October 2003 Defense Horizons 1
agenda must now be pursued vigorously by promptly fielding the

NRF, creating a NATO transformation roadmap, and designing a new

U.S. military presence in Europe. As an urgent priority, NATO now

needs to craft the second part of this dual-track strategy: an accompanying political transformation agenda for strategic realignment.

The goal of this political agenda should be to achieve NATO consensus behind fresh, well-construed policies and decision processes for

applying power in the Middle East and other regions to deal with

emerging threats and strengthen relationships with friendly countries. Such an agenda of political transformation should include four

measures that, along with military transformation, would produce a

major strategic realignment of NATO: 

■ Writing a new Harmel Report that would help lay out a common

strategic vision of threats, goals, priorities, and standards for using military

force and other instruments in the Middle East. 

■ Reforming the NATO decisionmaking process to create greater flexibility and responsiveness in performing missions outside Europe in peace,

crisis, and war. 

■ Finding ways for NATO and the Europeans to play larger roles in

post-war situations where stabilization and reconstruction operations must

be launched. 

■ Creating a new “Partnership for Cooperation” (PFC) to help foster

cooperative military ties between NATO and friendly Middle Eastern militaries.

This new dual-track strategy of defense transformation for military preparedness and political transformation for strategic realignment can be adopted at the NATO

summit in Istanbul in spring, 2004.

Prompt and vigorous implementation

is vital, so collaboration among leading

NATO powers is essential. The United

States and Britain must work constructively with Germany and France,

and vice-versa. The times are too dangerous to permit internal quarrels that leave the Alliance divided

and adrift. If NATO is to be salvaged, the United States and Europe

must want to do so. Nothing in this dual-track strategy implies that

the United States and its close friends should cede the option to act

outside NATO when the situation merits. Yet, both the United States

and Europe will benefit if NATO can be consistently employed as a

preferred instrument of choice. The new dual-track strategy is

meant to make this practice possible. 

Why Save NATO?

To experienced hands, the proposal that NATO pursue transformation will sound familiar. NATO has been undergoing transformation for at least a decade; Europeans began using this term long

before it became popular in the U.S. military. But the NATO transformation of the early 1990s was different from that of today. Then,

NATO was trying to shift from being a Cold War defense alliance

toward one helping to create a Europe that was stable, whole, and

free. NATO was filled with optimism and hopeful visions of a bright

future for itself.

Today, transformation involves a quite different type of strategic realignment: preparing NATO to project power and purpose not

on the European continent, but into the Middle East and other distant areas. The environment also is different. NATO is filled with

misgivings about its future as it tries to recover from a badly damaging debate over Iraq that shook its foundations. 

In today’s troubled setting, the idea of NATO crafting a bold

political-military transformation for strategic realignment runs

counter to the instincts of those who are content to see NATO lose

relevance or disintegrate. Those Americans who have given up on

NATO judge that the United States should act unilaterally, with only

Britain and a few “cherry-picked” European allies by its side. Similarly, some Europeans see NATO as an impediment to casting off

American domination and becoming independent on the world stage. 

Critics on both sides of the Atlantic are right about one thing:

letting NATO wither would be easier than keeping it alive and

healthy. Why, then, should NATO be saved? The perfunctory answer

is that an effective NATO will enable both the United States and

Europe to preserve security within and beyond Europe. This truism,

however, has been cited so often by NATO advocates that it has

become worn and unpersuasive. A

more effective way to set out what is at

stake is to ask the question, “What

would the world be like without

NATO?”

Some observers claim that the

choice is not between transforming

NATO and losing it. They argue that

NATO can cling to the status quo while doing little of consequence

outside Europe, apart from providing a launch-pad for U.S. forces

and preparing a few allies to participate in ad-hoc coalitions led by

the United States. This mistaken judgment, however, is a prescription for NATO to slip into irrelevance. The United States and Europe

would lose interest in NATO and would not be able to prevent its

demise. A big organization without purpose eventually loses its legitimacy and will to live. After that, a slow death is inevitable. 

The collapse of the Atlantic Alliance might not bother those in

the media and the general public who see little value in NATO. It

might please those Europeans who view the United States as an arrogant superpower. It might also please those Americans who dismiss

Europe as a decadent civilization. But when the dust settles and

realization grows that the world’s oldest, most successful democratic

alliance has been lost, a different reaction might settle in. The widespread response might not be applause, but instead anger at the

short-sighted governments on both sides of the Atlantic that allowed

this travesty to occur. Such governments might not stay in office for

long. Even if they endured, their reputations for wise stewardship

would suffer a grievous blow. Nobody would emerge a winner in the

court of public opinion or the verdict of history. 

2 Defense Horizons October 2003

Dr. Hans Binnendijk (binnendijh@ndu.edu) is Director of the Center for

Technology and National Security Policy. Dr. Richard L. Kugler

(kuglerr@ndu.edu) is a Distinguished Research Professor at CTNSP.

This paper will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book edited by

Daniel Hamilton.The book is part of the Transatlantic Transformation Project

run by The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

the times are too dangerous

to permit internal 

quarrels that leave the

Alliance divided and adrift
Loss of NATO would damage not only the reputations of ruling

governments, but also the enduring interests of the United States

and Europe. A first casualty would be the war on terrorism.

Although the main event has been the invasion of Afghanistan, this

war is mostly being fought in the twilight, behind the scenes, and

with many instruments other than military force. Tracking down

small, dispersed terrorist cells across the globe requires extensive

multilateral collaboration in many areas—diplomacy, intelligence

sharing, law enforcement and extraditions, disruption of terrorist

finances, homeland security, training and aid to foreign governments, and strikes by special forces. Moreover, the conquest of

Afghanistan is now requiring peacekeeping, stabilization, and

reconstruction efforts aimed at preventing the Taliban from regaining power. Today NATO is providing this multilateral collaboration

or creating a framework for it to occur. If NATO vanishes, much of

this cooperation would be lost, and terrorists would be given a new

lease on life.

The damaging effects of NATO collapse would extend far

beyond the war on terrorism into the strategic realm of traditional

security affairs. For the United States, loss of NATO would be a more

serious setback than advocates of unilateralism realize. At a minimum, the

United States would lose influence

over Europe’s evolution and would

face even greater anti-Americanism.

In other regions, the United States

might not have its wings clipped to

the degree envisioned by some Europeans—a global superpower has

many other friends—but it would suffer from the loss of political

legitimacy that European and NATO support often gives to its

endeavors in the Middle East and elsewhere. Although France, Germany, and a few others criticized the U.S. and British invasion of

Iraq, fully 75% of current and prospective NATO members gave vocal

political support to it. Such strong support would be less likely in a

world without NATO. Militarily, the United States would lose valuable infrastructure in Europe that is helpful in projecting power to

distant regions. The United States also would be damaged in crises

and wars that require allied force contributions. In theory, the

United States could still draw upon friendly European countries to

create ad hoc coalitions of the willing. But if NATO no longer exists,

fewer countries may be willing to join U.S.-led coalitions. Also important, their military forces might be less able to work closely with U.S.

forces because NATO no longer would provide them the necessary

interoperability. 

The biggest loser would not be the United States, but, Europe.

NATO collapse would result in a major U.S. political and military

withdrawal from the continent. The United States might retain a

foothold through bilateral ties with Britain and other countries, but

it no longer would play a multilateral leadership role. Along with this

withdrawal would come removal of the many valuable strategic roles

that the United States plays behind the scene. The United States

continues to provide extended nuclear deterrence coverage over virtually all of Europe, a still-vital protection in this era of nuclear powers and proliferation. As shown in the Kosovo war, U.S. conventional

forces provide about three-quarters of NATO military power-projection assets for crises and wars on Europe’s periphery. These nuclear

and conventional contributions, moreover, enable Europe to defend

itself with annual defense budgets that are $100–150 billion smaller

than otherwise would be the case. In effect, the United States is

helping fund the European Union, because these savings equal the

EU budget.

Perhaps the Europeans could fund a big defense buildup to

compensate for loss of American military guarantees, but the price

could be quite high, because a European buildup absent NATO would

be costlier than a buildup under its auspices; NATO offers many

economies of scale and opportunities to avoid redundancy through

integrated planning. In addition, a European military buildup would

be controversial. How would Europe erect an umbrella of nuclear

deterrence? How would it prepare for crisis operations on its periphery? What would be the European reaction if Germany were compelled to build nuclear forces and a large mobile military?

A European military buildup, however, seems unlikely. Is there

any reason to believe that European parliaments would surmount

their current anti-military attitudes to fund bigger defense budgets?

Their reaction might be to slash budgets further on the premise that

the collapse of NATO made defense strength less necessary and that

Europe could avoid war through diplomacy. As a result, Europe might withdraw into a disengaged foreign policy.

Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer

would enjoy U.S. help in developing

new-era doctrines, structures, and

technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be

left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could

be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile

defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious

forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult,

without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift,

and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave

Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the

regions that produce these threats.

In addition to these adverse military consequences, American

political contributions to European unity, peace, and prosperity

would decline precipitously. For the past fifty years, America’s constant presence has assured small European countries that they will

not be dominated by powerful neighbors. It also has helped guarantee that the continent will not slide back into the competitive geopolitical dynamics that produced two world wars in the 20th Century.

The U.S. presence helped Germany find a welcome role in an integrating Europe and permitted leadership by the so-called “Quad”

(the United States, Britain, Germany, and France) in a manner that

gained the support of other NATO members. Recently, the United

States has been a leading advocate of NATO enlargement and European unification. In the absence of NATO, the European Union itself

might be weakened, especially if the United States decided to selectively seek allies among EU members. Nor would the EU’s influence

and positive impact on world affairs be likely to increase. Indeed, the

opposite could be the case.

October 2003 Defense Horizons 3

a first casualty 

of the loss of NATO would be 

the war on terrorism
A NATO that can project power and purpose outside Europe will

greatly enhance the odds of preserving world peace while advancing

democratic values. The simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global problems of the contemporary era alone, and

neither can Europe. Together, however, they can succeed. This is a

main reason for keeping NATO alive and healthy, and for transforming it in the ways needed to perform new missions. The challenge facing the Atlantic Alliance is to pursue these goals in an effective manner that both the United States and Europe will support. 

The First Track: Carrying Out Prague Defense

Transformation Agenda

Pursuit of these goals is the main reason for adopting a new

dual-track strategy aimed at defense transformation and strategic

realignment. Fortunately, a strong foundation for the military component of this strategy already exists. The Prague defense agenda

consisted mainly of three measures: 1) A new NATO Response Force

(NRF) to be fielded by 2006; 2) A

Prague Capability Commitment

(PCC) to replace the stalled

Defense Capability Initiative (DCI);

and 3) A streamlined integrated

military command plus a new Allied

Transformation Command (ATC) to

guide European military transformation. While the NRF was showcased at Prague, all three initiatives are important. As experience

shows, agreeing to these measures is only the first step in a long

process. What comes now is the tedious, time-consuming process of

pursuing them to completion while making appropriate adjustments.

In today’s climate, success cannot be taken for granted. The situation calls for NATO political and military leaders to pay sustained

attention to these measures to ensure that they unfold as planned.

The Prague Summit agenda now needs to be modified in ways that

will sharpen its focus and take into account new issues. A revised

NATO defense transformation agenda should include the following

three elements:

■ Vigorous efforts to field the NRF promptly and in ways that overcome hurdles along the way.

■ Preparation of a NATO Transformation Roadmap that, along with

the PCC, will help provide focus and direction and encourage speedy

progress toward transformation.

■ Design of a new American military presence in Europe that supports

NATO defense transformation and can work closely with the NRF in preparing for expeditionary warfare. 

Strategic Motivations for Defense Transformation

The Prague agenda was the product of four developments: 1) the

frustrations of the 1990s, when European forces made little progress

toward remedying core deficiencies in power-projection; 2) growing

perceptions of a widening transatlantic gap in new-era military capabilities; 3) the disappointments of the war in Afghanistan, when the

United States declined offers of European help because most allied

forces lacked the necessary capabilities; and 4) the acceleration of

U.S. defense transformation in ways that open the door for European

forces to acquire capabilities for expeditionary warfare.

The 1990s began with NATO sitting on the sidelines during the

Persian Gulf War, but with Britain, France, and other countries contributing to the U.S.-led coalition. The victorious Desert Storm campaign ended with widespread recognition that European and NATO

forces needed to improve in many areas to contribute more effectively to future conflicts. Declining defense budgets and withering

public support, however, sent European improvement efforts into a

prolonged stall. When the Kosovo war was waged in 1999, the United

States contributed 75% of NATO forces. In that airpower-dominated

campaign, shortfalls in European forces were exposed in such areas

as C4ISR, smart munitions, defense suppression, and all-weather/

day-night assets. 

In response, the Washington Summit of 1999 produced a new

NATO strategic concept and a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI)

aimed at strengthening European capabilities in multiple areas. Several countries, including Britain and France, announced long-range

plans to upgrade their forces, but little progress was made. During

1999–2001, knowledgeable observers fretted about a growing

transatlantic gap in military capabilities for new-era warfare. While

the United States had long been

better than Europe at rapidly

deploying forces, it was now pulling

ahead in capabilities for waging war

once forces arrive at the scene.

Indeed, the U.S. military was creating a new form of network-centric

warfare anchored in precision fires, fast maneuver, and close integration of air-ground fires. The aim was to replace the old emphasis

on massed forces and separate operations by components with integrated joint operations conducted by dispersed, high-tech forces.

Most European militaries were not embracing this new form of warfare. Indeed, they were moving toward a growing emphasis on

peacekeeping, thus creating a widening gap not only in capabilities

and budgets, but in strategic missions and burden-sharing as well. 

The invasion of Afghanistan starkly confirmed NATO’s need for

military transformation. After NATO invoked Article 5 to wage the

new war against terrorism, many European governments wanted to

participate in Afghanistan. But except for Britain, the U.S. military

turned aside these offers with the explanation that European militaries lacked the precision-strike assets for this new form of warfare.

Only European SOF forces proved useful in the battles. After the

major fighting ended, European forces performed peacekeeping.

Later, NATO acquired a formal role in this mission, but this development only reinforced the growing impression that, while NATO might

be helpful in cleaning up the mess afterward, it is not an instrument

for serious war-fighting. 

The U.S. defense transformation effort, accelerated shortly

after the Bush Administration took power, opened the door to NATO

defense revival for unintended reasons. The original purpose was to

prepare U.S. forces for the Information Age by equipping them with

advanced information networks, new weapons platforms, eversmarter munitions, and exotic, futuristic technologies. To fund this

effort at enhancing force quality, a big increase in the American

4 Defense Horizons October 2003

the invasion of Afghanistan

starkly confirmed NATO’s need

for military transformation
defense budget was authorized. Initially it seemed that accelerating

American military transformation would leave Europeans in the dust

and thereby further magnify an already-big gap in transatlantic capabilities. But closer inspection showed that the Europeans did not

need to mimic U.S. forces in new technologies and structures.

Instead, they merely needed to develop the capacity to “plug and

play” into the “system of systems” (integrated information grids)

being created by U.S. forces. Moreover, many core operational concepts of transformation could be applied to European forces: e.g., the

emphasis on joint expeditionary warfare, networked forces, littoral

missions, close integration of air and ground fires, high-speed

maneuvers, and simultaneous operations with dispersed forces. 

Thus, although the Europeans were unlikely to match hightech U.S. forces soon, they could embark upon their own form of

transformation aimed at facilitating interoperable, complementary

operations with U.S. forces on

modern battlefields. Moreover,

they did not need new, expensive

weapon platforms (e.g., tanks and

fighter aircraft) to become better

at swift power projection and

lethal strike operations. Instead,

they needed improvements in

such areas as joint planning,

C4ISR, smart munitions, combat

support units, mobility, and long-distance logistics for missions in

austere areas. Acquiring these assets did not promise to be cheap,

but if only a modest number were needed, they were affordable for

European budgets. This promised to be the case if NATO and the

Europeans focused on transforming only a small portion of their

forces rather than their entire posture, which exceeded the size of

U.S. forces by more than 50%. 

Bringing the NRF to Life

The idea of fielding the NRF responded to this imperative. This

idea was suggested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in

reflection of a proposal from the National Defense University, and it

quickly took hold in NATO and European military circles. At the

Prague Summit, it was adopted with widespread acclaim as the centerpiece of the new NATO plan for defense transformation. By spring,

2003, it had been equipped with a strategic concept and implementation plan by the NATO Military Committee. SACEUR General

James Jones promised quick progress—fielding of initial units by

fall, 2003, instead of 2004 as originally envisioned. 

Why the NRF for an alliance that already has many formations

for many purposes? In the eyes of its American creators, the NRF

reflects an effort to plug a serious hole in NATO military posture for

new missions. Before the NRF, NATO mainly relied upon the ACE

Mobile Force (AMF) and the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for

such missions. Both of these formations suffered from flaws. Originally conceived for limited emergencies, the AMF was too small and

lightly equipped for intense combat operations too focused on continental contingencies. Moreover, NATO had already reached a decision to disestablish the AMF because it seemed unsuited to most

contemporary missions. By contrast, the ARRC is a huge force of 4

heavy divisions backed by 300 combat aircraft and 100 ships that is

too big and ponderous for swift deployment outside Europe. What

NATO needs is an expeditionary force big enough to make a difference in high-tech strike operations alongside U.S. forces, but small

and agile enough to be deployed swiftly. The modest-size but potent

and deployable NRF is designed to fill this need while also enabling

NATO and the Europeans to focus intently on a top-priority force

rather than dissipating scarce resources in other directions. 

The defense concept behind the NRF is simple but breaks new

conceptual ground for NATO. Prior to the NRF, SACEUR defense planning was mainly anchored in large ground formations, with air and

naval forces playing supporting roles. While this concept made sense

for old-style continental warfare, it makes considerably less sense for

new-era expeditionary warfare, which requires heavy doses of air and

naval power and relatively fewer ground forces. Accordingly, the NRF

concept calls for a truly joint posture of about 21,000 military personnel. It is to be composed of a single

well-armed ground brigade task

force, one or two tactical fighter

wings, and a naval flotilla of 8–10

combatants with aircraft, cruise

missiles, and other strike assets.

These forces will be designed to

operate jointly in carrying out

new-era operational concepts and

to be highly interoperable with

U.S. forces owing to plug-and-play C4ISR systems as well as similar

doctrines, weapons, and smart munitions. Equally important, the

NRF is to benefit from advanced training in new-era operational concepts that will not only elevate its own combat capabilities, but also

help introduce such skills into other European forces, thereby helping them pursue transformation as well.

The NRF posture is to be capable of being used in multiple different ways, e.g., as a stand-alone NATO force for limited contingencies, as the spearhead of a later-arriving deployment by larger NATO

forces, or as a NATO contribution to an ad hoc coalition led by U.S.

forces. It would have been ideally suited for the invasions of

Afghanistan and Iraq, two very different military operations. It thus

promises to greatly enhance NATO capability, flexibility, and adaptability in an era that requires such characteristics for operations

across the entire spectrum of conflict. Meanwhile, it promises to be

a cutting-edge leader of European force transformation by exposing

NRF units to U.S. initiatives and by helping develop new NATO doctrines through training, exercises, and experiments. As the NRF

learns the lessons of transformation it can transmit them to other

European forces. Over time, successive cohorts of European units

will pass through the NRF experience, thereby steadily enlarging the

pool of forces that have directly experienced transformation for new

missions. While Northern European forces will benefit, the forces of

new-member East European countries and the southern region will

benefit also. For example, Polish forces will learn how to operate

with their European and American allies, and will thereby become

better providers of security, not just consumers. 

October 2003 Defense Horizons 5

the idea of fielding the NRF was

suggested by Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld in

reflection of a proposal from

the National Defense University
The NRF should not be merely a NATO force configured to pursue the U.S. military’s way of war. Instead, it should embody a synergistic blend of American and European approaches; both sides have

something to offer in creating this force and its operational doctrines. Above all, the NRF should be capable of performing a wide

spectrum of operations, not merely high-tech strikes with missiles

and smart munitions. If such a flexible, multifaceted force is to be

fielded, the Europeans will need to take it seriously. The same

applies to the United States, which likely will need to loosen export

control restrictions on some technologies.

By design, the NRF will not interfere with the EU’s European

Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The missions of the NRF and ERRF

are different. Whereas the NRF is intended for high-intensity combat

and expeditionary strike missions, the ERRF currently is slotted primarily for peacekeeping and other Petersberg tasks. The NRF is also

to be smaller than the ERRF and differently structured. Whereas the

NRF will have only 21,000 personnel, the slowly evolving ERRF will

have 60,000 ground troops and enough

air and naval assets to bring the total

to 100,000 personnel. The biggest difference is that whereas the NRF

always will be assigned to NATO integrated command, the ERRF will not be

committed to fulfilling NATO missions.

As a result, NATO will still need the

NRF even if the ERRF eventually

comes to life with better capabilities

than now envisioned. Because the NRF

will be a small posture, its budget costs

will be low, totaling $3–4 billion per year for investments. Extra

spending on manpower and operations will not be needed because

the forces to be assigned to the NRF already exist and therefore do

not have to be freshly created. While the Europeans will have to set

priorities, they possess the manpower and budgets to support both

the NRF and the ERRF, and therefore do not have to choose between

them. Care, however, will have to be taken to ensure that “dual-hatting” of forces does not result in conflicting assignments for crisis

response. As a general rule, European units assigned to NRF duty or

preparing to assume this duty should not have additional assignments elsewhere, including to the ERRF. When these forces come off

NRF duty, standard practices for dual-hatting can be followed.

The NRF is to be a ready force that can deploy within a week to

a month and have 30 days of sustainment in intense combat. It is to

be anchored in a rotational readiness scheme. During any six-month

period, a full-sized NRF of 21,000 troops is to be on duty, ready to

deploy on short notice. Meanwhile, another NRF force will be going

through advanced training and exercises to prepare for its upcoming

tour of duty. Concurrently, a third NRF that has recently completed

its tour will be standing down. Thus, at any moment, three different

NRFs will be operating to one degree or another, but for different

purposes. Each NRF is to be composed of multinational NATO forces,

with the exact mix to be determined by national contributions and

operational requirements. For example, one NRF might be manned

largely by British and Dutch forces, and another by French and Italian forces. The NRF is a volunteer posture. It is meant to provide

opportunities for participation to all NATO members who are willing

and able to meet its operational requirements. The composition of

each NRF posture might vary from one duty cycle to the next, thus

enabling many European militaries to participate over the course of

a few years. 

The NRF will draw its combat and support assets mainly from

NATO High Readiness Forces: the pool of forces that includes the

ARRC, the Eurocorps, the German-Dutch Corps, and other top-tier

ground, air, and naval formations. Thus, it will employ only forces

that already are strongly committed to NATO integrated command,

and it will not interfere with other European military priorities.

While the NRF is to be mostly an all-European force, the United

States will need to commit assets in such important enabling categories as C4ISR, strategic mobility, defense suppression, and logistics

until the Europeans become self-sufficient in these areas. The NRF

will be assigned to the new Allied Command Operations (ACO), with operational command rotating among its

two new Joint Force Commands

(JFC’s) and one maritime Joint Force

Headquarters. The effect will be to

make all three commands skilled at

employing the NRF and engaging in

expeditionary strike operations. 

The NRF is off to a good start. An

initial, small version of it will be

fielded in 2003 with an emphasis on

SOF assets. Many European countries, including France, have committed to in joining the NRF as it is fielded. Whether the NRF will

meet its 2006 goal of full operational capability, however, is uncertain. The requisite air and naval forces seem likely to be fielded, but

ground forces may be a different matter because of changes that

must be made in many areas. The NRF needs to be a properly transformed force with the requisite technologies, networks, and digitization required to perform its missions alongside U.S. forces. As the

NRF comes to life, care must be taken to ensure that operational

readiness is its first priority. Otherwise, it might fall victim to a

dynamic aimed at including too many forces from too many nations

under its mantle, thereby weakening its combat power. Likewise, the

NRF should take part in transformation, but not at the expense of

participating in so many experimental changes that it loses its focus

on being ready to fight wars on short notice. 

The NRF’s command arrangements also bear watching. Each

JFC must have a deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters that can

command the NRF on distant battlefields. Another issue is the U.S.

role. While the United States initially should provide support in critical enabling areas, the Europeans should be encouraged to acquire

self-sufficiency in them as soon as possible. In the long run, the NRF

should become a mainly European force with the United States contributing on a normal rotating basis. If the NRF becomes dominated

by the United States and Britain, its purpose will have been

defeated. Likewise, if the NRF is populated by forces from countries

that might refuse to participate in its missions at the moment of

need, its credibility will be compromised. Whether the NRF needs an

6 Defense Horizons October 2003

in the long run, 

the NRF should become a

mainly European force with

the United States

contributing on a normal

rotating basis
opt-out clause can be debated, but opting-in by making firm commitments must be the dominating imperative. For these reasons,

NRF success cannot be taken for granted. It will need careful management attention from senior NATO political and military leaders

for the foreseeable future. 

Preparing a NATO Defense Transformation Roadmap

Prague’s decision to create an Allied Command Transformation

(ACT) in dual-hat status with the U.S. Joint Forces Command

(JFCOM) is a major innovation. It offers the promise of bringing U.S.

expertise to bear in focusing and accelerating European transformation for expeditionary warfare. If ACT is to succeed, it must be given

a major role not only in exploring new ideas, but also in ensuring

that, as European forces train and exercise with U.S. forces, they

learn new operational concepts. The more fundamental challenge,

however, is to ensure that NATO defense transformation is guided by

a sound intellectual vision and a powerful program of coordinated

measures to ensure that it succeeds on schedule. The PCC can help

in this regard, but it needs to be supplemented by a NATO Defense

Transformation Roadmap. It also needs to be supplemented by an

Istanbul Summit “Transformation Reinvestment Commitment” to

apply savings from European force reductions to enhanced investments in readiness and modernization for the forces that remain. 

Although fielding the NRF will be NATO’s top priority, the PCC’s

progress deserves support. The original impetus behind the PCC was

to slim down and prioritize the DCI,

which allegedly was bulging with its

five major categories and 54 specific

measures. When the PCC emerged,

however, it was even bigger than the

DCI, with eight major categories and

450 accompanying measures. The eight

categories include such measures as

C4ISR, WMD defense, interoperability,

information superiority, combat effectiveness, mobility, sustainment, and logistics. Their main effect is to

provide NATO leaders with a useful top-down view of force improvements. Meanwhile, the many accompanying measures provide a bottom-up perspective that NATO members can use to develop specific

programs. NATO has created a special committee of two Assistant

Secretaries General to monitor the PCC with a view toward focusing

it on the NRF. Progress on this goal is being briefed every three weeks

to the NAC. 

Only a few months after its adoption, the PCC already seems in

trouble because, for predictable reasons, it is making slow progress.

Critics are dismayed, but the truth is that the PCC is a sensible creation, provided that its limited role is kept in mind and a sense of

realism guides expectations. The PCC is another in a long line of

NATO efforts that focus on functional categories of military activity

rather than forces and missions. It was preceded by the Long-Term

Defense Plan (LTDP) of the 1970s, the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) of the 1980s, and the DCI of the 1990s, all of which used

functional categories to generate a detailed look at European forces

in key areas. By spelling out a host of worthy NATO-wide improvement measures covering all members, the PCC provides a valuable

instrument for helping guide NATO force goals, resource guidance,

and country plans. Nor is it too large and encompassing as a tool for

broad-scale program and budget management. Comparable Pentagon tools, such as the FYDP and Service POMs, are bigger and

include even more measures. But because it is so big and wide-ranging, the PCC is not a good tool for focusing on key forces and top

strategic priorities and for propelling NATO transformation forward. 

What is to be done? The answer is not to junk the PCC or

ratchet it downward. Nor is the answer to try to bolster NATO Ministerial Guidance, which is too vague and general to guide the specifics

of force development. Nor are better NATO Force Goals the answer

because they result in a dissipated appraisal of NATO individual

members in ways that often see only parts of the whole, not the

whole itself. All of these long-standing instruments of NATO military

planning help provide a comprehensive overview of many endeavors

by a huge alliance, but they do not provide an intense focus on new

force-building efforts or transformation. Indeed, their main effect is

to encourage a business-as-usual emphasis on incremental change,

not bold leaps into the future. 

To solve this problem, NATO should follow the Pentagon’s

example by writing its own Defense Transformation Roadma supplemented by a Transformation Reinvestment Commitment. Confronted

by ponderous FYDP’s and POMs, senior Pentagon leaders instructed

each Service to write a focused

roadmap spelling out how they propose

to pursue transformation and to set

their priorities accordingly. The resulting roadmaps helped focus attention

on the meaning, essence, and

prospects for U.S. military transformation. In particular, they helped highlight not only where the Services are

succeeding, but also where they can do

more to pursue transformation jointly and where troubles are likely

to be encountered. As a result, U.S. defense transformation now has

a better sense of direction and purpose, and senior leaders are better-equipped to guide it.

A NATO transformation roadmap can help perform the same

function for the Alliance. As the U.S. experience shows, the process

of preparing such a roadmap will encourage NATO and the Europeans to review, revise, and integrate their defense plans and programs. Such a roadmap should provide meaningful guidance, not

vague abstractions. It should identify key strategy goals and operational concepts for guiding transformation. It should focus on outputs: the forces and capabilities of old and new members that will be

needed to perform each major strategic mission. It should show how

NATO members can act individually and collectively to field the necessary forces and capabilities. It should portray budget requirements

and force development priorities. It should identify the types of

transformation initiatives that are needed, including new weapons

and technologies, new doctrines, and new structures. It should

encourage innovation and experimentation. Without pretending to

design a fixed blueprint, it should establish an evolving transformation strategy for the near-term, mid-term, and long-term. A mid-term

October 2003 Defense Horizons 7

NATO should write its own

Defense Transformation

Roadmap supplemented by

a Transformation

Reinvestment Commitment
focus is particularly important because it provides a connecting

bridge between the tangible near-term and the foggy long-term.

Above all, a NATO transformation roadmap should establish

clear strategic goals and priorities. Today, NATO’s urgent task is not

border defense and peacekeeping in absence of anything else, but

instead, as MC 317/1 says, becoming better-prepared to conduct joint

expeditionary warfare. An expeditionary war involves a deployment

for a specific purpose to a distant place outside Europe. It requires

NATO forces that can deploy swiftly, operate jointly, and strike

lethally. Because NATO lacks such assets, its transformation roadmap

should focus on fielding the NRF as quickly as possible. The transformation roadmap should specify the NRF assets that must be acquired,

a NATO program for acquiring them, the coordinated roles to be

played by country plans, and tasks for common NATO investments

and the integrated command. 

Once such an NRF program is established, a NATO transformation roadmap can address how to improve and transform other highpriority forces. Because NATO HRF forces will provide the NRF’s

assets and otherwise be important for power projection, they should

be treated not as static legacy assets, but as candidates for transformation in the mid-term. Gradually modernizing the HRF forces with

new weapons and doctrines is

necessary, but new organizational structures also should be

examined. This especially is the

case for ground forces. In the

Information Age, ponderous divisions and corps with massive

logistic support tails need to give

way to smaller, agile, and modular formations with lighter support. The U.S. military needs to

change in this area, and so do European forces. Simply stated, expeditionary wars will not need the big sustainment assets needed for

the Cold War. Recognition of this new-era reality can help pave the

way toward high-leverage innovations at affordable cost.

Likewise, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq show that U.S.

and European militaries will need improved assets for post-war

occupation, stabilization, and reconstruction. European forces are a

natural for these important missions, but not to the exclusion of

remaining well-prepared for combat. Some observers mistakenly

judge that continental European forces should focus on peacekeeping missions while relying upon high-tech U.S. and British forces to

do the war fighting. This prescription is wrong because it underestimates what European forces can achieve and would perpetuate an

unhealthy division of labor. During the Cold War, many European

militaries were highly proficient at combat operations. They can be

made fully capable of modern-era combat if they merely acquire new

assets and doctrines in achievable ways. Similar to the U.S. military,

European militaries can be capable of both winning wars and winning the peace afterward. While pursuing sensible role specialization, a transformation roadmap should point European forces in this

twin-hat direction.

A NATO transformation roadmap should pay attention to other

military forces and capabilities for old and new members, including

counterterrorism, missile defense, and establishing a network of

bases, facilities, and schools for helping the new ATC perform its job.

But once this goal is accomplished, a transformation roadmap

should set stiff priorities by showing how NATO members can economize to extract greater strategic mileage from their defense budgets. Accordingly, it should call for major reductions in European

border defense forces that no longer have critical roles in NATO

defense strategy or other important national missions. Today, only

10–20% of European ground forces can deploy outside their borders.

A transformation roadmap could endorse reductions of 30–40% in

existing European force structures, while shifting toward deployable

forces. This step would reduce Europe’s forces to about 1.6 million

military personnel, 35 divisions, 2100 tactical combat aircraft, and

200 naval combatants. Ample forces would remain for performing

NATO missions and national missions. 

The advantage of such a steep reduction is that it could free

large funds—$20 billion or more annually—for investments. As a

result, European spending on research, development, and procurement could increase by 50%, thereby propelling transformation forward at a significantly faster pace. The Europeans would have more

funds for spending not only on the NRF and other combat forces, but

also on homeland security and missile defense, both of which are

important priorities. Such an

intensified transformation will

be possible, however, only if the

funds freed from force reductions are retained in national

defense budgets. A NATO transformation roadmap should

endorse this budgetary strategy

as the sine qua non for Alliance

health. Its goal should be to convince European governments

and parliaments to embrace the prospect of bolstering NATO military preparedness without driving defense budgets through the ceiling, rather than trying to capitalize on a new peace dividend that

would not bring peace at all. At the Istanbul summit, NATO leaders

could issue a pledge to reinvest for transformation. “Transformation

Reinvestment Commitment” would be a logical partner to the

“Prague Capability Commitment” provided both are focused on

transformation, the NRF, and other top force priorities. 

Designing a New U.S. Military Presence in Europe

With the United States now poised to begin altering its military

presence in Europe as part of a global reshuffle, the act of ensuring

that a sensible presence emerges is a final priority for NATO defense

transformation agenda. For the United States, the goal should not be

to punish long-standing allies for their opposition to the Iraq war, but

instead to craft a new European presence that supports both U.S.

defense strategy and NATO strategic priorities. This goal can be

accomplished, but only if care is taken along the way. The United

States needs to act wisely after consulting with NATO and its members, and European countries will need to have a proper understanding of the reasons why they should support changes that are forthcoming. The core reason for change is that while the status quo is a

8 Defense Horizons October 2003

a transformation roadmap could 

endorse reductions of 

30–40% in existing European

force structures, while shifting

toward deployable forces
recipe for stagnation, a newly designed U.S. presence can be a vehicle for leading NATO toward an era of relevance and performance.

Today’s officially declared U.S. military presence in Europe is

about 110,000 troops. This number, however, is not always what it

seems. It does not include troops on peacekeeping duty in the

Balkans or the 10,000–20,000 sailors and marines aboard the CVBGs

and ARGs that regularly patrol the Mediterranean. Today’s typical

presence thus is about 130,000 troops: somewhat higher than the

roughly 100,000 troops deployed in Asia. In addition, the U.S. military

commitment to NATO and Europe is measured not only by peacetime

presence, but also by other forces that would deploy to Europe in a

war. In the Kosovo War, for example, large U.S. air and naval forces

converged on the scene. Counting forces in both categories—peacetime presence and wartime reinforcement—the total U.S. military

commitment to NATO and Europe is about 350,000 troops. This total

commitment seems unlikely to change appreciably so long as a legitimate NATO requirement exists for it. What is mutating today is not

this total commitment, but merely the portion permanently stationed in Europe.

Designing an effective future U.S. presence in Europe begins

with remembering why the current presence was chosen a decade

ago. When the Clinton Administration

took power in early 1993, it inherited a

presence of 150,000 troops—well

down from the Cold War posture of

330,000 troops. The Administration

decided to reduce this presence to

100,000 troops. Of this number, fully

two-thirds were stationed in Germany

at old Cold War bases, and the remaining troops were mainly based in Britain and Italy. The reason for

retaining 100,000 troops in Europe was not because this figure had

special meaning, but because this number was needed to field the

forces deemed necessary for political and military reasons. 

A posture of this size enabled the United States to deploy a balanced, multi-mission force of sizable headquarters staffs, four heavy

Army brigades stationed in Germany, two or three USAF fighter

wings, and Navy bases in the Mediterranean supporting 6th Fleet

operations. These forces enabled the U.S. military to maintain its

influence in NATO, to preserve a hedge against reappearance of

threats to alliance borders, to prepare for new mobile missions as

mandated by NATO then-existing strategic concepts, and to conduct

training and exercises with allied forces. Since then, the U.S. force

presence has been altered in minor ways, such as deployment of a

light Army brigade and more prepositioned equipment in Italy. But

for the most part, the U.S. presence has stayed remarkably constant,

even though NATO, Europe, and the entire world have changed a

great deal. Recognizing the need for fresh thinking, DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 called for a new approach to global overseas presence in Europe and elsewhere. But apart from suggesting

redeployment of some ships to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, it left

the details of the future European presence to further studies. Such

studies are now underway. 

Today, new strategic priorities are altering the calculations taking place in the U.S. government. Because threats to Europe’s borders no longer exist and the U.S. military has become better at power

projection from the United States, there is no longer a need to station large ground combat forces in Germany, which is now one of

Europe’s safest regions. Many of these forces could be put to better

use elsewhere in ways that will benefit not only the United States

and Europe, but Germany as well. New strategic requirements for

U.S. forces and missions elsewhere in Europe, however, are emerging. A vital new mission will be to ensure that U.S. forces in Europe

can work closely with the NRF in peace, crisis, and war. Likewise,

U.S. forces in Europe must remain capable not only of fulfilling their

other defense commitments to NATO, but also of deploying off the

continent swiftly to carry out operations of their own. The same

applies to U.S. bases and facilities in Europe, which should provide

hubs for power projection. Another mission will be to signal continued U.S. engagement and leadership of NATO to old and new members in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the northern and

southern regions. Guarding the Mediterranean and its sea lanes

against new threats will remain critical. Yet another mission will be

to maintain interoperability between U.S. and European militaries. A

final mission will be to help keep U.S.

and NATO defense transformation on

parallel tracks. 

All of these missions should be

taken into account in designing the

future U.S. military presence in

Europe. American missions for NATO

suggest that while this presence can

be smaller than now, the United States should take care not to

reduce its presence too far. The future presence should be neither

tiny nor purely symbolic. It will depend in part on the size of U.S.

force deployments in the Gulf region. The U.S. forces that remain

should disperse outward from current bases in Germany to occupy

positions in Eastern Europe and along the southern region: locations

where new-era requirements are growing to perform both multinational integration and power projection missions. The United States

will no longer require four Army brigades in Germany, but it likely

will need two clusters of ground forces in Europe. One cluster should

be composed of heavy forces in Northern Europe for promoting

NATO interoperability and transformation. The other cluster should

be composed of light forces in Italy and elsewhere in southern

Europe for swift power projection to the Middle East and other

regions. The same calculus applies to designing U.S. air forces in

Europe: current bases in Germany (e.g., at Ramstein), Britain, Italy,

and elsewhere will remain valuable. As for U.S. naval forces, existing

bases and facilities will still be needed to support the 6th Fleet, but

its Mediterranean deployments may be smaller than during the past,

and in any event, likely will vary as a function of changing conditions. 

What do these imperatives mean when they are added up?

Future manpower levels will need to be determined on the basis of

analysis, but the more important consideration is the type of U.S.

forces deployed, their locations, and their missions. Manpower levels

should stem from these considerations, not the other way around.

October 2003 Defense Horizons 9

American missions for NATO

suggest that the United

States should not reduce its

presence too far
Indeed, the manpower level may be a variable, not a constant. The

future U.S. presence will rely more heavily than now on forward operating locations and prepositioned equipment rather than fixed bases

occupied by stationed forces. During times of training and exercises,

U.S.-based forces will temporarily deploy to Europe, thereby elevating manpower well-above normal levels. After they leave, troop

strength will recede until the next deployment cycle. Regardless of

their manpower levels, the forces that remain in Europe, or are

newly deployed there, should be designed to support U.S. interests

and to help enhance NATO strategic effectiveness. Provided this is

the case, the new U.S. presence may be smaller and significantly

altered, but it can be a powerful instrument for pursuing a bright

future for the Alliance. 

The Second Track: Pursuing Political

Transformation for Strategic Realignment

For all its importance, a vigorous NATO defense transformation

agenda will lack a compelling strategic purpose and will not be fully

effective unless it is accompanied by the second part of a

dual-track strategy: NATO political transformation for strategic

realignment. Whereas the

Afghanistan war demonstrated NATO need for defense transformation, the war in Iraq highlighted NATO’s need for strategic realignment by exposing fault-lines that can cripple the alliance’s ability to

act in politically unified ways outside Europe. Defense transformation is unlikely to succeed unless political transformation also

occurs, and vice-versa. These two enterprises thus go hand in hand. 

What does “strategic realignment” mean? Basically, it means a

process of change by which the Alliance enhances its political-military capacity to project power and purpose southward into the 

Middle East and adjoining areas. As stated earlier, strategic realignment can best be pursued through the following four-fold agenda

that, along with defense transformation, will produce a more unified

and effective Atlantic Alliance:

■ Creating a common vision of threat perceptions, goals, strategy, and

standards for using military force

■ Reforming NATO decisionmaking to create greater flexibility and

responsiveness for handling security issues outside Europe

■ Organizing NATO forces for stabilization and reconstruction operations

■ Creating a new Partnership for Cooperation in the Greater Middle

East.

These four measures should be seen not only on their individual merits, but also in terms of their combined impact. The first two

measures aim at strengthening NATO political capacity to forge

united and effective policies for the Middle East and other regions.

In the aftermath of the Iraq debate, opportunities have opened for

the United States and Britain to work closely with Spain, Italy,

Poland, and other new members. Whether the “Quad” can be recreated is to be seen, but NATO clearly cannot function effectively if the

United States and Britain are always at loggerheads with Germany

and France in ways leaving other members torn between them. The

first measure of creating a common vision aims at bringing these four

leaders closer together so that NATO will be better able to act as a

unified alliance. Conversely, the second measure of reforming NATO

decisionmaking aims to provide the Atlantic Alliance with the flexibility to act when lack of unanimous consensus threatens the capacity of mission-responsible countries to defend common interests. 

Whereas these two measures address NATO internal politics,

the last two measures seek to enhance NATO performance for situations other than war-fighting. Obviously NATO needs the ability to

fight wars at long distances. The defense transformation measures

discussed earlier will provide the requisite capabilities and are a

part of strategic realignment. Yet NATO will be a limited alliance if it

can only fight wars but do little else. It also needs a better capacity

to address post-war situations and to become active in the Middle

East in peacetime. The third measure aims to provide NATO with a

stronger role in post-war situations, such as the stabilization and

reconstruction of Iraq. The fourth measure creates a peacetime outreach program, similar to NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) in

Eastern Europe that would pursue improved ties to friendly Middle

East militaries. Together, these four measures are intended to

strengthen NATO cohesion and

performance in mutually reinforcing ways. If they are all

adopted, along with a robust set

of military measures, they will

produce a new Atlantic Alliance that is strategically realigned in the

best sense of that term.

Writing a New Harmel Report to Help Establish a

Common Strategic Vision.

The damaging confrontation over Iraq makes the importance of

this measure crystal clear. The Atlantic Alliance badly needs to forge

a common strategic vision that will narrow the cavernous gap

between the United States and key European countries—especially

Germany and France—on the issues surrounding the use of strategic power outside Europe. Otherwise, similar confrontations may

erupt in the future, and the next one could destroy NATO, not merely

damage it. The term “common strategic vision” does not mean that

the United States and Europe must agree on everything. But it does

mean that they must agree on the strategic basics, possess a shared

framework for cooperative action, and respect each other in areas

where disagreements still exist. 

Some observers judge that now is not the time to debate these

issues. Their understandable reason is fear that a high-profile debate

will do more harm than good by widening the gap in visions rather

than narrowing it. They argue that since an eerie calm has settled

over NATO in the aftermath of Iraq, the prudent choice is to let

wounds heal. Today’s calm in Brussels, however, is illusory. The bitter divide on strategic policy is not caused by differences at NATO

Headquarters, where most people think alike and want to keep

NATO alive. Instead, the divide is caused by sharply differing views

in national capitals, the media, and public opinion. Ignoring the

divide will not close it. It will reappear with the next crisis. The only

way to lessen it is to grapple with the core issues in ways that produce a better transatlantic understanding . 

10 Defense Horizons October 2003

the war in Iraq highlighted NATO’s

need for strategic realignment
The bitter flare-up over Iraq occurred because a gap-closing

dialogue had not taken place earlier. Such a dialogue was attempted

in 1999 when the new NATO strategic concept was adopted at the

Washington Summit, but this compromise document largely papered

over unresolved differences that lay hidden for the next three years

and surfaced at the United Nations. The terrorism of Sept. 11, 2001,

exacerbated the problem by deeply alarming the United States while

leaving Europe less worried. Because the current interlude between

crises may be temporary, it may be a last opportunity to resolve these

issues before they can no longer be addressed in a civil manner. The

gap between Americans and Europeans is not so great that it cannot

be closed or at least appreciably narrowed. The United States grasps

that the use of military force in the Middle East and elsewhere must

be tempered by mature political judgment and respect for international law. The Bush Administration has made clear that it anticipates no additional wars in the Middle East, that it will use diplomacy to address remaining

problems, and that military

force will be a last resort.

Most European governments grasp that sometimes military power must be used against dangerous threats arising

from these regions. The interim EU report by Javier Solana on “A

Secure Europe for a Better World” provides a good basis for a sensible dialogue. Many European foreign ministers acknowledge that on

occasions of imminent threat, preventive war sometimes is necessary. The grounds for a meeting of minds exist by forging a sensible

a blend of these positions. 

Confidence in success also comes from history. This is not the

first time NATO has been divided. Indeed, stiff debates arose during

the Cold War. An especially bitter debate erupted in the early 1960s

when the United States wanted to shift NATO defense strategy from

massive retaliation to flexible response, and the Europeans resisted

out of fear this step would weaken deterrence. The debate resulted

in Germany threatening to develop nuclear weapons and France

leaving the integrated command. But it was finally resolved when

Americans and Europeans rolled up their sleeves, began talking

calmly, and showed the patience to analyze the complex issues carefully. They eventually agreed upon a new strategy of flexible response

that bolstered conventional forces but preserved the option to climb

the ladder of nuclear escalation if the initial defense failed. The

common strategy adopted by them proved to be highly successful. It

laid the foundation for NATO growing defense strength that helped

win the Cold War. A successful outcome of this sort is possible again

if the Alliance merely recalls its own history and its mechanisms for

consensus-formation.

Exactly what is to be done? How can the Alliance transform the

bruised feelings and deep suspicions over Iraq into a constructive

dialogue that results in a meeting of minds? The answer is not for

NATO to engage in an official study, for this step could result in many

governments digging deeper into entrenched positions. A better idea

is to prepare a new Harmel Report akin to the original report written

in 1967. Such a report would be written by a team of independent

European and American thinkers. They would have the freedom to

examine the issues outside the glare of publicity and pressures from

their governments. When their judgments and recommendations

were finalized, NATO would be free to accept, reject, or modify them.

The good features of their analysis could be adopted as official policy to help harmonize American and European perspectives. 

The Harmel Report was named after Belgian Foreign Minister

Pierre Harmel, who proposed the idea. It sought to blend detente

with deterrence and defense in ways that maintained NATO solidarity. It was commissioned in early 1967 and written over a period of

six months. Although it was conducted under the auspices of NATO

Secretary General, its four sub-groups were led by senior rapporteurs

from outside NATO, who spoke for themselves and did not take official instructions from their governments. When their final report

was issued, it was reviewed by NATO headquarters and national capitals. Many of its arguments

were adopted by NATO ministers in December 1967,

and the entire document

was issued as an annex to

their communiqué. As the logic of the Harmel Report became established throughout NATO in the following months, the effect was to

help provide the Alliance with stronger footing for handling a troubled future. 

Today, a new Harmel Report could be drafted using a similar

procedure. Its goal should not be a bland compromise that submerges

differences, but an intelligent blend of American and European views

that resolves these differences and produces coherent strategic concepts acceptable to both sides of the Atlantic. The EU Solana report

takes future threats seriously and calls upon the EU to play an

assertive role in global security affairs in partnership with the United

States. Although Solana’s study does not put forth an agenda for

NATO, it could become a launch pad for a group of European and

American wise-men to create a new Harmel Report.

What issues should the new Harmel Report address? First, it

should focus on establishing a common definition of future threats.

Whereas today the United States is deeply worried about threats

posed by terrorists, tyrants, and WMD proliferation, Europe has less

fear of them. If a shared understanding of threats can be forged, the

United States and Europe will have a stronger basis for acting jointly

and be better able to elicit support from parliaments and publics.

However, it must offer more than an intelligence estimate. It must

also provide a coherent sense of common goals, strategies, and

actions not only for combating these threats but also for eradicating

the conditions that generate them. Thus, it must address how the

United States and Europe should work together to promote democracy and markets across the Middle East and elsewhere. 

Likewise, a new Harmel Report should forge a common understanding of the strategic roles that the United States and Europe are

to play in carrying burdens and accepting responsibility in the coming years. It should aim for a relationship in which both sides work

together in exercising soft and hard power, rather than rely upon a

dysfunctional division of labor in which Europe provides the soft

power and the United States the hard power. Finally, it must help

forge a shared understanding of standards for employing military

October 2003 Defense Horizons 11

the EU Solana report could become 

a launch pad for a new Harmel Report
force against threats. Many Europeans cling to the Westphalian concept that military power should be employed only after aggression has

occurred. By contrast, the United States has adopted a new doctrine

of preventive war when threats are “grave, gathering, and imminent.”

NATO cannot survive in the face of a militant America and a pacifist

Europe. A similar mindset on this critical issue is vital if NATO is to

remain united in the coming years. If this difficult issue is discussed

sensibly, an alliance-wide standard for going to war can be found. 

A new Harmel Report need not result in a NATO strategy that

either hamstrings the United States or compels Europeans to blindly

support decisions from Washington. Instead, it can help ensure that

the United States and Europe work closely more often to strike a wise

synthesis of restraint and the muscular use of power. Before and after

a new Harmel Report is written, both

sides of the Atlantic can take other

steps to encourage a respectful dialogue. The United States can do a

better job of consulting with European governments. It also can mount

a public relations campaign to

explain its foreign policy to Europeans, including its many still-important contributions in Europe. Meanwhile, Germany and France can

rediscover the importance of acting as counterparts of the United

States and Britain, not counterweights. Other European governments

can do a better job of explaining the benefits of cooperating with the

United States to their publics in ways that counter the simplistic,

erroneous messages often conveyed in their media. Such steps would

help cool the temperature of what has become a fevered relationship,

thereby allowing calm heads to prevail. 

Reforming NATO Decisionmaking

Even with a common strategic vision, making decisions to project NATO power into distant areas does not promise to be easy. During the Cold War, NATO possessed consensus behind defense plans

for responding quickly to aggression against its borders. In the current era, swift responses may also be needed against threats that

emerge outside NATO borders, and even normal peacetime activities

often will not permit extended delays. Difficulties will especially

arise when gray-area situations create legitimate debates over how

best to respond. Such situations typically take place under Article 4,

when the use of NATO power is discretionary, rather than under Article 5, when alliance borders are threatened and using military power

is virtually mandatory. In such situations, NATO must be able to perform two key functions: to debate options thoroughly and then to act

decisively. NATO today is good at the former, but not the latter. 

Most democracies value both debate and action. This is why

they make most policy decisions by majority rule, not unanimous

votes, which are a prescription for paralysis because dissent is

inevitable. NATO, however, is not a normal democracy in this regard.

Today’s problem is that France and Germany oppose key features of

how the United States and Britain are acting in Iraq. But a big underlying problem will remain, even if these four countries patch up their

current differences. The problem is that NATO is a big alliance with

a proclivity to act only when its members unanimously agree on the

action. Because NATO already has 19 members and will soon have

26, unanimity could become a scarce commodity in the years ahead.

True, a single, stubborn country will normally be hard-pressed

to use its veto power to block NATO action. But as the debate over

defending Turkey in the weeks before invasion of Iraq showed, a

small group of dissenting countries can cause serious problems.

While the Turkey problem was ultimately solved, in the future such

a group could prevail in damaging ways by stubbornly standing its

ground. The risk is that NATO will be plunged into paralysis when

assertive activity and regular gear-shifting are needed. When unanimity does not exist, NATO could be prevented from responding in

crises and wars. Equally bad, mission-responsible countries—those

willing to accept responsibility for performing demanding missions

outside Europe—will lack the peacetime authority to work with the

integrated command to prepare the forces and plans that must be

invoked in crises. If advance preparations are not made, quick and

decisive NATO action at the moment

of truth may be impossible even if

members unanimously agree to act.

This risk is not hypothetical and

futuristic: it already exists in spades

because the integrated command cannot prepare full-scale plans

and programs unless the NAC unanimously authorizes it to do so in

each case. 

NATO possesses finessing mechanisms that can help circumvent the unanimity rule on occasion, but all of them are thin reeds to

rely upon in today’s world. One finessing mechanism is the “silence

procedure” whereby a member who disagrees with a widespread consensus chooses to abstain from voting, thereby allowing the consensus to carry the day. Another mechanism is to shift decisionmaking

from the NAC to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). This

allows NATO to make decisions without France, which belongs to the

NAC but not the DPC. A third mechanism is for the Secretary General to claim to speak for a unanimous consensus without taking a

formal vote. This mechanism was employed in the Kosovo war and

helped enable NATO to conduct military operations even though

some members had misgivings. A fourth mechanism is that SACEUR

and other commanders can prepare informal defense plans. 

The problem with these finessing mechanisms is that they only

work sometimes and can easily be overturned by a small number of

members intent on having their way. Such members can refuse to

stay silent, can insist the NAC be used, can deny the Secretary General the authority to speak for NATO, and can block NATO military

commanders from planning informally. 

Today’s situation requires decision processes that are more

flexible and responsive. NATO can gauge how to create them by

recalling its history. The use of unanimous voting is a recent practice. It began in the early 1990s, when France was objecting to

emerging NATO policies in the Balkans, and the Alliance wanted

France and others on board for this new out-of-area operation. During the Cold War, NATO employed unanimity when making major

decisions about core strategic concepts or such controversial

nuclear matters as deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles.

But in conventional defense planning, NATO acted differently. It

12 Defense Horizons October 2003

NATO unanimity could

become a scarce commodity in

the years ahead
wisely delegated considerable authority to those countries that were

mainly responsible for key missions in different areas. For example,

it permitted the nine countries responsible for defending FRG borders to carry out their important business without interference from

other members. The same practice applied in the north Atlantic,

northern Europe, and southern Europe, where defense plans and

forces were built by even smaller coalitions of responsible contributors. The bottom line is that NATO has shown flexibility in the past,

and there is nothing in the Washington Treaty that mandates unanimous voting practices.

What can be done to create more flexibility in ways that avoid

paralysis yet preserve healthy debate and widespread consensus-formation? The guiding principle should be to craft new decision procedures whereby members who regularly accept responsibility for

new-era missions are granted reasonable discretionary authority to

act in proper ways yet are still subjected to scrutiny by the rest of the

alliance to ensure that they are acting wisely. An initial step toward

this model can be taken by allowing the Secretary General to authorize the integrated command in peacetime to prepare contingency plans for

potential contingencies. The Secretary

General could take this step in

response to requests from a threatened member, from SACEUR, or from

members that could be called upon to

perform NATO missions outside

Europe. These planning activities

would be supervised by the Secretary

General and the Military Committee. Provided they are consistent

with NATO strategic concepts and Ministerial Guidance, they could

not be vetoed by the NAC and DPC. Likewise, NATO military leaders

would be authorized to prepare the necessary forces under the Secretary General’s guidance by using the standard force-building

process in consultation with participating members. These steps

would have the advantage of enabling NATO to prepare for future

responses, thereby helping ensure that the Alliance has the necessary wherewithal when the need arises. 

Along with this practice, a bigger step would be to depart from

the unanimity principle at the NAC for making decisions in crises.

While alternatives need to be studied, a sensible model for NATO

might be a variation on decisionmaking by the U.N. Security Council.

UNSC gives veto power only to its five permanent members. When

these five members agree, it seeks only majority support from the

Council as a whole, which has ten non-permanent members. The

Council does not have a reputation for impulsive conduct, but unlike

NATO, it can act despite limited internal dissent, and it has done so

in the past. If NATO adopts such a model, it should not create “permanent members” who always have veto power. Instead, it should

grant veto power only to those members who regularly commit substantial resources and efforts to each key mission. When these countries agree to act in their area of responsibility—for example, by

using the NRF—voting by the rest of the NAC would be conducted by

majority rule or a two-thirds rule. Normally, this practice would

mean that a solid NAC majority of 15–20 members must vote in favor

of an action. Such a practice would ensure review by the NAC, yet

allow for action even if a few countries disagree.

Perhaps this U.N.-like model could be applied to the NRF and,

if it proved its worth, be expanded to other NATO forces and bigger

operations. This model does not imply creation of a single coalition

of members for carrying out all actions. Most likely, it would result in

multiple coalitions or “committees of contributors”, each of which

would handle a different mission or region.1 These coalitions would

vary in composition, size, and orientation. A coalition handling North

Africa might differ from one handling the Persian Gulf. Often, the

United States and Britain would lead these coalitions, but not

always. Regardless, all NATO members would be welcome to belong

to the coalitions of their choice. But to join as a full-fledged member,

a country would be required to commit significant resources and to

prove its mettle as a worthy, reliable partner. Its influence within the

coalition would be a function of its resource commitments and its

willingness to accept responsibility for missions. 

This model is not a prescription for liberating the United States

and Britain from the shackles of Germany and France, who still

could recruit supporters when they dissent. Moreover, if these or

other countries want veto authority,

they merely must establish demonstrated track-records of accepting

responsibility in the mission-areas of

their choice. Germany, France, and

other countries thus would be free to

participate in missions of importance

to them and would wield substantial

influence over how these missions are

handled. Indeed, they may find themselves leading some NATO missions and thereby value their

enhanced discretionary authority. 

Would the United States lose its veto power? The answer is that

if it wants veto power, it merely needs to be a leading contributor to

missions of its choice. In most cases of NATO power projection, the

United States will be such a contributor. What about the matter of

identifying who should possess veto power within each coalition? To

prevent countries from making small contributions to gain veto

power with disruptive purposes in mind, a standard should be established whereby veto power is granted only to those members who

make significant contributions and establish consistent track

records for responsible conduct. Such standards were applied in the

Cold War. When France withdrew from the integrated command, it

lost its right to major influence over NATO forward defense plans

even though it still made forces conditionally available for rear-area

roles. By contrast, the FRG and other members maintained their

influence at high levels because they never flagged in their forward

defense duties.

The following chart summarizes how these changes would produce a new style of NATO decisionmaking. Yes, this process would be

more complex than the current practice of unanimity across the

board. NATO still would require unanimity for such encompassing

decisions as its strategic concept, core goals, strategy inside and outside Europe, decisions to admit new members, and generic standards for using military force. But it would have greater flexibility to

October 2003 Defense Horizons 13

NATO might consider a

variation on

decisionmaking by the

UNSC, which can act despite

limited internal dissent
prepare contingency plans and engage in necessary pre-crisis force

preparations. When crises erupt, it would make decisions in a manner similar to the U.N. Security Council, and thus would have greater

flexibility in handling them. It no longer would face the type of paralysis that threatens its relevance and effectiveness.

Involving NATO in Post-War Stabilization and

Reconstruction.

Creating a common strategic vision and adopting flexible decisionmaking processes will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance for the

years ahead. But concrete steps are also needed to broaden NATO

activities in the Middle East and elsewhere for the near-term. What

can be done? Decisions in this arena should be guided by the principle that NATO must become an alliance that has a full spectrum of

capabilities. 

When the time is right, NATO clearly should become involved in

the post-war task of stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq. Performing

this task seemingly will require a sizable military presence for a considerable time. Today, the United States is

contributing most of the forces for

this duty, yet it will face strong pressures to trim its presence in the

months ahead. Britain, Poland, and

other NATO countries are already

present in significant numbers, but larger European forces will be

needed. If the NATO integrated command is called upon to help, it

could provide the leadership architecture needed to guide multinational forces. 

In addition, NATO should broaden its thinking beyond Iraq.

Crises and wars that mandate NATO participation may occur elsewhere. As a result, NATO should develop a better organized standing

capacity to perform stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. They involve such activities as securing still-troubled zones,

establishing police forces and the rule of law, restoring public services in electrical power, water and sewage, repairing damaged

bridges and roads, cleaning up war destruction, and building democratic governments. These diverse functions require specialized military and civilian assets such as military police, construction engineers, medical personnel, and civil administrators. European

militaries and governments possess such assets. New NATO members could make major contributions. But these assets need to be

organized so that they are ready when needed. NATO can work with

members to prepare for such missions by either the integrated command or ad-hoc coalitions. 

Some Americans blanch at the idea of NATO becoming regularly involved in S&R missions. They fear a loss of U.S. influence and

bungled operations. In this arena, however, NATO already has proven

its mettle in the Balkans and is now taking over the ISAF mission in

Afghanistan. In Iraq, much will depend upon whether participating

NATO members agree upon the strategic goals for reconstruction. In

other cases, a common vision will be equally necessary. Provided

consensus exists on strategic goals, NATO can be an effective instrument for this important mission.

Creating a Partnership for Cooperation in the Greater

Middle East.

NATO could helpfully involve itself in peacetime affairs of the

Middle East by creating a Partnership for Cooperation (PFC) that

would seek to establish constructive relations between NATO and

friendly militaries there. NATO already has a “Mediterranean Dialogue” with some North African countries, but it is mostly confined

to diplomatic exchanges and does not

cover the entire Middle East and Persian Gulf. A PFC might be part of the

existing Partnership for Peace (PFP)

in Eastern Europe and surrounding

areas. Alternatively, it might be an

entirely separate creation, with a

mission and administrative staff of its

own. The tradeoffs between these two models need to be examined.

Expanding upon the PFP would be the simplest, easiest, and leastcostly alternative. Yet dealing with the Middle East will be quite different from dealing with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union. This argues for a separate effort.

Regardless of the option chosen, a PFC would not be intended

to prepare Middle East countries for admission into NATO. Instead,

it would aspire to build ties with Middle Eastern militaries in peacebuilding efforts that strengthen their roles in the war on terrorism,

encourage their democratization, familiarize them with the United

States and Europe, and enhance their efficiency for self-defense missions. A PFC might provide collaboration in such areas as law

enforcement, disrupting terrorist cells, budgeting and programming,

peacekeeping, search and rescue, disaster relief, and border control.

Such a PFC must be focused on enhancing regional stability, not fostering military competition. The PFC must not endanger the security

of any country, including Israel. It could begin small, with such

already-friendly countries as Egypt, Jordan, and Gulf Cooperative

Council States. Afterward, it could gradually expand to include a

widening set of other countries. 

14 Defense Horizons October 2003

NATO should develop a better

organized standing capacity

to perform stabilization and

reconstruction missions

Changes to NATO Decisionmaking

NATO Decisions Cold War Today Proposed

Contingency Planning Continuous NAC-Directed SACEUR-Authorized with Oversight by NATO Secretary General

Force Preparations Ongoing NAC-Directed NATO Secretary General-Authorized Through Consultations with Members

Crisis Response When Attacked NAC-Directed U.N. Security Council Model

Overall Process Automatic Road-Blocked Flexible and Responsive
A PFC would be intended to initiate a process of growing dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Middle Eastern Countries.

This PFC would not be a one-size-fits-all creation. Instead, each participating country would be able to craft a PFC program suited to its

tastes, in consultation with NATO members willing to work closely

with it. Thus, PFC programs might differ appreciably. The NATO PFP

in Eastern Europe pursued flexible arrangements from the onset,

which helps account for its considerable success over the past

decade. East European countries were able to approach NATO at a

scope and pace of their own choosing. The same philosophy would

apply to a PFC for the Middle East. 

A PFC would be a historic departure for NATO. It would give

NATO a valuable new mission and would involve NATO in the visionary task of bringing peace, security, and democracy to a big region

that, even after the victory in Iraq, promises to be troubled for years

to come. It could begin by taking stock of comparable efforts already

being pursued by NATO members that act unilaterally in various

Middle Eastern countries. It could ascertain how efforts by additional countries could be added to

forge a multinational NATO program

with each PFC member. Each PFC

member thus would benefit from

help provided by a team of NATO

countries. 

How effective can a PFC be?

Especially in its initial stages, it likely

will be considerably less effective

than was the PFP in Eastern Europe. At the time PFP appeared, East

European countries had recently been liberated from communism

and the Soviet Union. They were struggling to adopt democracy and

market economies. They wanted to join NATO to gain security and

the EU to become prosperous. Their militaries wanted collaboration

with NATO militaries to adopt new doctrines, weapons, and practices

that clearly were better than those of the Warsaw Pact. For all these

reasons, their governments wanted to belong to the Western Club,

and their publics mostly agreed with them. As a result, many rushed

to embrace PFP because it was a vehicle for pursuing these larger

goals, not because of specific measures.

Middle Eastern conditions today are vastly different. The

Israel-Palestinian conflict could inhibit many Arab governments.

Most Arab states are ruled by monarchies or traditional regimes that

are chary of democratic reforms, even though they recognize the

advantages of market economies. Still animated by nationalism,

many governments are also suspicious of western countries, fearing

American domination or renewed European imperialism. Islamic

societies vary in their fundamentalism, but few hold much love for

western culture, which is seen as too secular and materialist. Their

militaries likely will see significant technical attractions in a PFC

that allows them to strengthen their capabilities in useful areas. But

they will not want NATO to control their defense strategies and

forces, or even to acquire full knowledge of them. These attitudes are

impediments to quick success of a PFC.

Whether initial success by a PFC would produce a wholesale

shift toward pro-western Arab foreign policies is another matter.

NATO members might find themselves laboring in PFC vineyards for

a long period while questioning the merits of the enterprise. Yet,

gains might be made in such important areas as counter-terrorism

and in softening the sharp edges of Islamic fundamentalism. Likewise, PFC might help nudge the Middle East toward greater stability

and help plant seeds of democratization. If such gains are achieved,

they could make PFC a sound investment even if they do not transform the Middle East in the ways that Eastern Europe has been

transformed. As a result, NATO needs to be realistic in its expectations, yet assertive in pursuing an idea that makes sense. 

Conclusion

Is this dual-track strategy of political and military transformation for strategic realignment needed by an Atlantic Alliance in deep

trouble? Yes. Will it be adopted and will it succeed? That remains to

be seen. One thing can be said. Ten

years ago, a common refrain was that

NATO must “Go out-of-area or go out

of business”. The Alliance responded

by moving eastward but not southward. For the good of the United

States and Europe, it now needs to

move southward. The larger meaning

of the war on terrorists and tyrants is

that the United States is now coming ashore in the Greater Middle

East in a historic attempt to bring peace, democracy, and freer markets to that troubled region. NATO also needs to do so because the

United States cannot handle this ultra-demanding task alone. If

NATO fails to respond, this time it truly will go out of business.

Note:1 The “Committee of Contributors” model is developed in Leo G. Michel, “NATO

Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?,” Strategic Forum 202, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, August 2003).

October 2003 Defense Horizons 15

PFC might help nudge the

Middle East toward greater

stability and help plant seeds

of democratization

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy through the

Publication Directorate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Defense Horizons and other National Defense University publications are available online at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director