DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MICHAEL MAYS, an Individual, KALA HENNESSEY, an Individual, and

MGM RESTORATION, LLC, a Limited Liability Company,

Appellants,

v.

JOE TAYLOR RESTORATION, INC., a Florida Corporation,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-917

[August 24, 2022]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth 

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; James Nutt, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

50-2020-CA-001769-XXXX-MB.

Jay L. Farrow and Meera K. Koodie of Farrow Law, P.A., Davie, for 

appellants.

Joshua S. Widlansky and Stephen J. Padula of Padula Bennardo 

Levine, LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from the unraveling of a relationship between an 

employer (“JTR”) and its former employees (“the Defendants”). JTR, a mold 

remediation company, sued the Defendants for breach of noncompete 

agreements and tortious interference with contracts and/or business 

relationships, among other claims. The lawsuit was based in part on 

negative allegations which the Defendants made about JTR on the internet

and shared widely to their professional network, which overlapped with 

JTR’s professional network. The trial court entered a temporary injunction 

barring the Defendants from interfering with JTR’s business relationships 

by posting negative content on social media, from which the Defendants 

appeal. We find no merit to most of the arguments raised by the 

Defendants. However, we reverse for the trial court to make certain 

required findings, to modify the injunction so it places the Defendants on 

notice of what conduct is barred, and to set a bond.
2

The Defendants raised numerous arguments on appeal, but we reverse 

on only three issues. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and 

the trial court’s credibility findings, we reject the Defendants’ argument 

that JTR did not establish certain prerequisites to the imposition of a 

temporary injunction: irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the 

merits as to the tortious interference and breach of contract claims, and 

no adequate remedy at law. The trial court was not required to address 

these prerequisites with respect to JTR’s defamation claim, as JTR’s 

motion for temporary injunction was not based on that claim. 

However, we agree with the Defendants that the trial court failed to 

make sufficient findings as to whether the injunction serves the public 

interest. A party seeking a temporary injunction must establish that a 

temporary injunction will serve the public interest. Shake v. Yes We Are 

Mad Grp., Inc., 315 So. 3d 1223, 1226-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). And the 

trial court must make factual findings supporting that element. McKeegan 

v. Ernst, 84 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). The trial court here 

did not expressly address the public interest element and must do so on 

remand.1 

We also agree with the Defendants that the injunction is overbroad. 

“Every injunction shall . . . describe in reasonable detail the act or acts 

restrained without reference to a pleading or another document . . . .” Fla.

R. Civ. P. 1.610(c). “[A]n injunction should ‘never be broader than is 

necessary to secure to the injured party relief warranted by the 

circumstances involved in the particular case.’” Krapacs v. Bacchus, 301 

So. 3d 976, 979-80 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Chevaldina v. R.K./FL 

Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). The injunction 

here directs the Defendants to “[s]top using social media to harm 

Plaintiff[’s] reputation and business relationships” and that “[n]o further 

malicious extra-judicial communications that lack a legitimate purpose 

shall be made.”2 These directives do not place the Defendants on notice 

1 The Defendants also argue that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings 

as to the other prerequisites to imposition of a temporary injunction, but their 

argument is conclusory and fails to address the sufficiency of the findings which

the court made. 2 The order also bars the Defendants from “disseminating the May 10th supposed 

‘settlement’ letter and its attachments.” The trial court was apparently 

referencing the proposed settlement letter dated March 10, 2020, as no such 

letter is dated May 10. Any error related to this portion of the order appears to 

be moot. The March 10 settlement proposal letter was sent to persons who had 

a connection to JTR, and it was sent before the civil RICO suit was filed. Now 

that the Defendants have filed the civil RICO lawsuit, any new settlement 
3

of what is prohibited, and are overbroad in that the directives could 

encompass conduct/speech which does not constitute tortious 

interference with JTR’s business relationships. We reverse and remand 

for the trial court to modify the injunction so that it makes clear which act 

or acts are restrained and is narrowly tailored to prevent interference with 

JTR’s business relationships.3

Finally, on remand, the trial court must hold a hearing on the setting 

of a bond. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b) (“No temporary injunction shall be 

entered unless a bond is given by the movant in an amount the court 

deems proper, conditioned for the payment of costs and damages 

sustained by the adverse party if the adverse party is wrongfully 

enjoined.”); Pinder v. Pinder, 817 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) 

(“Under the compulsory language of [rule 1.610(b)], the trial court has no 

discretion to dispense with the requirement of a bond.”).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

proposal would be based on the operative complaint, not a threatened complaint, 

and it would be served on named defendants.

3 We recognize that “a temporary injunction directed to speech is a classic 

example of prior restraint on speech triggering First Amendment concerns,” and 

that “protection against prior restraints on speech extends to both false 

statements and to those from which a commercial gain is derived.” Vrasic v. 

Leibel, 106 So. 3d 485, 486-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). However, “a limited 

exception . . . applies where the defamatory words were made in the furtherance 

of the commission of another tort,” such as “statements made as part of an 

alleged tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship,” and 

where a party “demonstrates a special harm.” Id. at 487. Here, based on the 

evidence and the trial court’s factual findings, we find the trial court did not err 

in concluding the limited exception applies.