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Science of Campaigns

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Translators’ Notes

This translation of the original text aims to accurately capture the technical

meanings, in both English and Chinese. This will ensure that the reader will not 

inadvertently draw the wrong substantive understanding based on inaccurate 

translations.

Note on Trouble Terms:

Throughout the text are certain terms that are translated with the Chinese pinyin

modifying the terms. This convention allows the reader to distinguish nuances that exist

in the Chinese terms.

Jihua and guihua plans. The jihua plan is a more specific plan, a plan that is meant to be

carried out to the letter, whereas the guihua plan is a more general plan that is

macroscopically focused. In order to retain the intended Chinese distinction, the jihua

plan is rendered as “plan {jihua}” due to its prevalence in this translation. The guihua

will be rendered in a more customary fashion of guihua plan.

Bushi and bushu dispositions. Bushi disposition is the mission differentiation, organized

grouping, and positioning [deployment] accomplished for strengths within the campaign

task-based organization. Bushi denotes the relationship between one’s own military

forces, the opponent’s military forces, and the combat environment (e.g., terrain). Bushu

disposition is the positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space

on the basis of mission differentiation and the organized grouping of campaign and in

accordance with operational conditions and the enemy’s possible activities.

Xitong, tixi, tizhi, and zhidu systems. The system {xitong} is an elemental system, one

that can operate on its own. The tixi-system is similar conceptually to a System of 

Systems as often seen in systems engineering; in Chinese, a tixi-system is understood to 

be composed of elemental systems {xitong} acting together as a larger whole. The tizhisystem is a large-scale system, typically a national-scale system and understood to be

formalized embodiment of a zhidu-system. The zhidu-system describes a conformance

system, one where all elements of that system conform to how that system is defined.

Note on Table of Contents:

The double pagination shown in the Table of Contents represents: 1) the original page

numbers from Science of Campaigns (2006) followed by 2) the actual page number of

this translation. Additionally, the headings throughout the document also reference

original page numbers from the original-language text.
Science of Campaigns

(2006)

战 役 学

{zhanyi xue}

Editors: Zhang Yuliang {张玉良}

Associate Editors: Yu Shusheng {郁树胜}, Zhou Xiaopeng{周晓鹏}
Cataloging in Publication (CIP) Data

The Science of Campaigns / Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor

Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2006.

ISBN7-5626-1407-0

I. zhan... II. zhang... III. The Science of Campaigns IV. E82

China Edition Library CIP Data Verification (2006) Nr. 046601

Published by National Defense University Press

(A3 Hongshankou, Haidian District, Beijing)

Postal Code: 100091 Telephone: (010) 66772856

Printed by Beijing National Defense Printing Shop

Second Edition September 2006 First Printing September 2006

880 x 1230 mm A5 Font 15.875

Word Count: 529,000 3000 Copies Printed

Price: RMB40.00 Yuan (Paperback), 50.00 (Hardcover)

ISBN7-5626-1407-0
Editing Committee of the Science of Campaigns

Honorary Chief Editors: Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye

Chief Editor: Zhang Yuliang

Associate Editor: Yu Shusheng, Zhou Xiaopeng

Writers (According to the number of strokes in the surname)

Yu Liming Yu Guohua Ma Xiushan Wang Yiping

Wang Renzong Wang Jun Wang Jiyu Wang Xuejin

Wang Houqing Liu Xiaoli Liu Shubin Liu Shengru

Sun Jingwei Li Tangjie Li Jinglong Lu Jianfei

Yang Yueqiang Yang Gongkun Yang Guochuan Zhang Yuliang

Zhang Xingye Zhang Zhanli Yu Shusheng Fan Chengbin

Zhou Guiliang Zhou Xiaopeng Zhou Xinsheng Jia Junming

Yuan Jingwei Tao Qian Xu Jingnian Zhan Xuexi

Tang Xuqi Huang Bin Cao Xiumin Peng Xiwen

Dong Lianshan Xiong Jiben
Preface

The science of PLA campaigns has a long standing historical source. The older generation

of military experts such as Mao Zedong combined Marxism with the practice of China’s

Revolutionary War and creatively established campaign theory with PLA characteristics on

the basis of carrying forward Chinese traditional military thought. This theory underwent

the baptism of the flames of war such as the Agrarian Revolution War, the War of

Resistance against Japan, the Liberation War, and the War to Resist U. S. Aggression and

Aid Korea and developed continuously during confrontation with powerful enemies. From

the guerilla warfare and mobile warfare {yundongzhang} theories in the era of millet and

rifles, it developed into the campaign theories of the mechanization and semimechanization eras, and now, it is making leap forward-mode development towards the

campaign theory of the informationized era.

At present, a military transformation initiated by information technology is swiftly

unfolding. With the aid of this military transformation, advancing informationized armed

forces building and developing operational theory under informationized conditions are the

core topics of armed forces building and military struggle preparation in each major

country. Campaign operational theory is still the core of operational theory under

informationized conditions. Even though the development of medium-long range precision

strike weapons have entrusted even more important significance on tactical activities and

allowed the course and outcome of campaign operations to have important supporting

roles, it has even generated a specific effect on the overall war situation. However, because

of limitations in combat scale, there are limitations in its ability to accomplish missions, so

in a military struggle guarding national major strategic interests, a campaign is still the

main activity pattern. It directly is in the service of military strategy and accomplishes the

missions entrusted by military strategy through operational victory; it also unifies the

overall planning and guidance for various battles and achieves the strategic goal[s] through

correct application of great deal of tactical activities. Therefore, developing PLA campaign

theory under informationized conditions and supporting the military strategic concept of

the new era with advanced campaign theory has become the important work item in putting

into effect Chairman Hu Jintao’s thought on advancing military transformation with

Chinese characteristics and making military struggle preparations practicable.

In order to develop our military campaign theory under informationized conditions, we

should be guided by Chairman Hu Jintao’s important instructions on armed forces building

and be towed by current and real military struggle needs. [We should] have innovating

campaign theory with PLA characteristics as the main mission and study with key points

the main issues such as new campaign form-states, campaign patterns, campaign fighting

methods, campaign guidance and command, coordination, and support. [We should] bring

to light the objective laws and subjective guidance laws of a campaign under

informationized conditions, tow reforms in areas such as the weapons and equipment

development, the organizational structure tizhi-system, and military training with advanced

campaign theory; and make a contribution for ensuring national military security.
xi

Table of Contents

Introduction...1 ................................................................................................................... 1

Part I: Campaigns...17..................................................................................................... 19

Chapter 1 Overview...17................................................................................................ 19

Section 1: Definition, Characteristics, and Classification of Campaigns...17........... 19

Section 2: Objective Essential Elements {keguan yaosu} of Campaigns...23.......... 25

Chapter 2 The Creation and Development of Campaigns...63 ................................... 69

Section 1: The Emergence and Development of Campaigns...63 ............................. 69

Section 2: The Generation and Development of the PLA Campaign...69 ................ 75

Section 3: The Developmental Trend of Campaigns...72.......................................... 78

Chapter 3 Campaign Guidance Thought and Basic Principles...80 .......................... 87

Section 1: Campaign Guidance Thought...80............................................................ 87

Section 2: Basic Principles of a Campaign...93....................................................... 101

Chapter 4 Campaign Preparation and Implementation...102................................... 113

Section 1: Campaign Preparations...102.................................................................. 113

Section 2: Campaign Implementation...112 ............................................................ 125

Chapter 5 Campaign Command and Coordination...122.......................................... 137

Section 1: Campaign Command...122.................................................................... 137

Section 2: Campaign Coordination...139 ............................................................... 156

Chapter 6 Important Campaign Activities...155........................................................ 175
xi

Section 1: Campaign Information Warfare...155 .................................................... 175

Section 2: Campaign Firepower Assault...167 ........................................................ 187

Section 3: Campaign Maneuver...180...................................................................... 200

Section 4: Campaign Special Operations...196 ....................................................... 217

Section 5: Campaign Psychological Warfare...203 ................................................. 224

Chapter 7 Campaign Operational Support...212........................................................ 235

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...212 ................................................. 235

Section 2: Contents and Methods...217 ................................................................... 241

Chapter 8 Campaign Logistical Support...232............................................................ 259

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...232 ................................................. 259

Section 2: Contents and Methods...239 ................................................................... 267

Chapter 9 Campaign Equipment Support...250 ......................................................... 281

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...250 ................................................. 281

Section 2: Contents and Methods...256 ................................................................... 287

Chapter 10 Campaign Political Work...261 ................................................................ 295

Section 1: Missions and Contents...262................................................................... 295

Section 2: Organization and Implementation...266 ................................................. 301

Part II: Joint Campaigns...271...................................................................................... 307

Chapter 11 Overview...271.......................................................................................... 307

Section 1: Definition, Categories, and Features of a Joint Campaign...271............ 307

Section 2: Joint Campaign Command...281 ............................................................ 316

Section 3: Joint Campaign Coordination...285........................................................ 321
xi

Chapter 12 The Joint Blockade Campaign ...292...................................................... 329

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...292 ................................................. 329

Section 2: Main Activities...297 .............................................................................. 335

Chapter 13 The Landing Campaign...310 ................................................................... 351

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...310 ................................................. 351

Section 2: Main Activities...316 .............................................................................. 357

Chapter 14 The Anti Air Raid Campaign...331 ......................................................... 375

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...331 ................................................. 375

Section 2: Main Activities...339 .............................................................................. 382

Part III: Army Campaigns...351................................................................................... 395

Chapter 15 Overview...351......................................................................................... 395

Section 1: Definition, Status, and Classification of Army Campaigns...352 .......... 395

Section 2: Origin and Development of Army Campaigns...357 ............................. 401

Section 3: Characteristics and Principles of Army Campaigns...366...................... 410

Section 4: Army Campaign Preparation and Implementation...374........................ 419

Chapter 16 The Maneuver Warfare Campaign...391 ............................................... 439

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...391 ................................................. 439

Section 2: Main Activities...396 .............................................................................. 444

Chapter 17 The Mountain Offensive Campaign...404 ............................................... 453

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...404 ................................................. 453

Section 2: Main Activities...410 .............................................................................. 459

Chapter 18 The Positional Offensive Campaign...426 ............................................... 481
xi

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...426 ................................................. 481

Section 2: Main Activities...431 .............................................................................. 487

Chapter 19 The Positional Defensive Campaign...442 ............................................... 501

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...442 ................................................. 501

Section 2: Main Activities...450 .............................................................................. 510

Chapter 20 Anti-terrorism Maintaining-stability Operations...460 ........................ 523

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...460 ................................................. 523

Section 2: Main Activities...468 .............................................................................. 531

Part IV: Naval Campaigns...500................................................................................... 567

Chapter 21 Overview...500.......................................................................................... 567

Section 1: Definition of a Naval Campaign, Classification of Naval

Campaigns...500....................................................................................................... 567

Section 2: Birth and Development of the Naval Campaign...502 ........................... 569

Section 3: Naval Campaign Characteristics and Principles...505 ........................... 571

Section 4: Naval Campaign Preparations and Execution...511 .............................. 579

Chapter 22 The Sea Force-Group Campaign to Eliminate the Enemy...523 .......... 593

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...523 ................................................. 593

Section 2: Main Activities...525 .............................................................................. 596

Chapter 23 The Sea-Line Interdiction Campaign...528............................................. 599

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...528 ................................................. 599

Section 2: Main Activities...532 .............................................................................. 603

Chapter 24 The Offensive Campaign against Coral Island Reefs...535................... 607

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...535 ................................................. 607
xi

Section 2: Main Activities...537 .............................................................................. 610

Chapter 25 The Sea-line Guarding Campaign...539 .................................................. 613

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...539 ................................................. 613

Section 2: Main Activities...544 .............................................................................. 618

Chapter 26 The Naval Base Defense Campaign...547 ................................................ 623

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...548 ................................................. 623

Section 2: Main Activities...552 .............................................................................. 628

Part V: Air Force Campaigns...557 ............................................................................ 633

Chapter 27 Overview...557.......................................................................................... 633

Section 1: Definition and Classifications of the Air Force Campaign...557........... 633

Section 2: The Main Characteristics and Principles of the Air Force Campaign...559

................................................................................................................................. 635

Section 3: Air Force Campaign Command and Coordination...564....................... 641

Section 4: Air Force Campaign Preparation and Implementation...568 ................. 646

Chapter 28 The Air Offensive Campaign...575........................................................... 655

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...575 ................................................. 655

Section 2: Main Activities...579 .............................................................................. 659

Chapter 29 The Airborne Campaign...589.................................................................. 671

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...589 ................................................. 671

Section 2: Main Activities...594 .............................................................................. 676

Chapter 30 The Air Defense Campaign...602 ............................................................. 685

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...602 ................................................. 685

Section 2: Main Activities...608 .............................................................................. 692
xi

Part VI: Campaigns of the Second Artillery...616...................................................... 701

Chapter 31 Overview...616.......................................................................................... 701

Section 1: Second Artillery Campaigns, Defined and Classified...616................... 701

Section 2: Characteristics and Principles of a Second Artillery Campaign...618.. 704

Section 3: The Preparation for and Implementation of a Second Artillery

Campaign...624 ........................................................................................................ 710

Chapter 32 The Second Artillery Conventional Missile Assault Campaign...629 . 719

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...629 ................................................. 719

Section 2: Main Operational Activities...632 .......................................................... 723

Postscript...637................................................................................................................ 729
1

Introduction...1

Campaign science is a discipline that studies campaign laws and guides campaign

practice. It is an important component of military science. In order to provide a

systematic, comprehensive and scientific theoretical basis for seizing future campaign

victories, its tasks are to apply scientific methods, reveal campaign laws, and forecast

campaign developments.

I. Objects, Contents and Methodology Studied in the Science of Campaigns...1

(1) Objects studied in the science of campaigns

The study object of campaign science is the campaign. The origination, development and

pattern of movement of campaigns are inevitably tied with human civilization progress

and development. To study campaigns, one must at the same time study the impact of

various social factors on the development of campaigns; one must also study the basic

laws regarding the origination and development of campaigns on the basis of interconnection among the battle history, current state of affairs of as well as future

development in campaigns.

Campaigns in the course of their developments have taken on different patterns. As a

result of different conditional constraints and limits due to different historical phases of

development, various patterns of campaigns have their own special laws. Therefore, the

objects of the study of campaigns are not only focused on the general campaign and the

universal laws governing the general campaign, but the objects also include the study of

various different patterns of campaigns and the special laws of different campaigns.

Furthermore, the objects of study are also targeted at how to correctly use such laws to

resolve such issues as military planning, organization and implementation in future

concrete campaign operations.

Campaign science of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the crystallization of the

PLA’s experience and theories gained through long-term armed struggles under the

guidance of Mao Zedong’s military thought. This is combined with the beneficial

experience drawn from armed struggles in the past and present and both at home and

abroad. It studies not only the laws governing campaigns in wars in general and in

Chinese revolutionary wars, but also campaign theories in people’s wars under modern

conditions. Its long-term task is to study the thoughts, principles and fighting methods in

defeating a superiorly equipped enemy by using inferior arms. At present time, PLA’s

campaign science is focused on exploring and developing theories aimed at winning

campaigns waged with modern technology, particularly in local wars under high-tech

conditions. This focus is premised on the real and potential threats of war that our country

could face, and is based on inheriting past experience and traditions.
2

(2) Contents studied in the science of campaigns

1. The nature of campaigns

The nature of campaigns refers to the inherent attributes associated with campaigns that

are different from those of wars and battles. It is the logical point of departure in the

study of campaign science. Only by exploring in depth the nature of campaigns can one

accurately steer the study of campaign science in the right direction, clearly understand

its categorical difference from the science of strategy and tactics, and thus lay down the

foundation for in-depth study of campaign science.

2. The characteristics of campaigns

Only by studying in-depth the characteristics of campaigns, particularly those of past

eras, can one master the objective laws of campaigns and develop effective fighting

methods that are appropriate for future campaigns.

3. The principles of campaigns

Campaign principles are a reflection and summary of the laws of campaigns as viewed

from different angles. They are the activity standards of campaign operations. In the

study of campaign principles, one should pay major attention to past campaign

experience, so as to establish, in light of new changes and development in campaigns

under modern conditions.

4. Campaign fighting methods

Campaign fighting methods operations are at the heart of the study of campaign science.

Different types and patterns of campaigns undertaken by different services and arms

under different conditions have different campaign fighting methods. Therefore, the study

of campaign fighting methods should be focused on dealing with different campaign

types and patterns, different operational objects, and under different environmental

conditions. While inheriting traditional fighting methods, one must also attach great

importance to developing new fighting methods and especially strengthening the

exploration of campaign operations under modern technological conditions, in particular

under high-tech conditions.

5. Campaign command

Campaign command is a major factor in deciding the outcome of a campaign. Campaign

command must conform to the objective realities of campaigns. Therefore, in studying

campaign command, one must study the general laws of campaign command. Even more

importantly, one must attach greater importance to the study of special laws of concrete
3

campaign command and new problems one encounters during specific periods and under

specific conditions.

6. Campaign coordination

Campaign coordination refers to the coordination and cooperation between various

strengths participating in campaign operations in terms of mission, strength, space, timing

and activities, and centered on a unified intention and based to unified planning. Different

services and arms conducting different types and patterns of campaigns under different

environmental conditions have different modes and methods of coordination. To study

effective campaign coordination is to ensure the full employment of the total campaign

force to carry out concerted operations against the enemy.

7. Campaign strength

Campaign strength is a general term that encompasses all the armed forces participating

in campaign operations. Campaign strength is the material condition of and a prerequisite

for the execution of campaigns. Its formation depends not only on the operational

capabilities of various strength elements of a campaign, but it also depends on the

organizational system of the campaign strength and the mode of composition. Therefore,

campaign science not only studies the organizational structure of general campaign large

formations, but also studies the formation, task organization, and application of campaign

strengths in carrying out a specific campaign in order to form an integrated-whole

composite strength {zhengti heli} to seize victory in a campaign.

8. Campaign support

Campaign support is an important guarantee that ensures the smooth execution of

campaign operations. It includes campaign operation support, campaign logistical and

technical support, as well as campaign political work etc. The importance and the role of

campaign support have been markedly enhanced in modern campaigns. The study of the

contents, characteristics and organization in execution etc. of campaign support under

different conditions, and the search for effective campaign support measures have

become important contents in the study of campaign science.

9. Campaign battlefield

The campaign battlefield is the place of engagement between opposing sides. As in the

case of campaign strength, it is an important objective condition for the execution of

campaigns. Under modern conditions, the campaign battlefield is a three-dimensional and

multi-dimensioned spatial notion constituted from a multitude of factors. The study of

campaign science focuses on the content and requisites in battlefield selection and

preparation, particularly on the impact of the modern campaign battlefield environment

on campaign operations.
4

10. Campaign operational objects

The study of campaign operational objects should be carried out according to national

military strategy and campaign missions. Study should be conducted not only of

immediate threats and main objects, but also of potential threats and potential objects.

First, starting with their operational thoughts, organization, equipment, operational

characteristics and possible activities, analyze their existing strong points and

weaknesses. Then, seek out methods to use one’s own pluses and avoid [one’s own]

shortcomings and defeat the enemy.

11. Campaign history

Studying the origin and development of campaigns not only would allow one to draw on

experience and lessons of the past, but would also allow one to more accurately predict

trends in future development in campaigns.

12. Campaign development trends

As a campaign evolves, its study also should look forward to future campaign

development and conduct appropriate advance research and study on the basis of

historical experience and current realities. Only by being able to scientifically forecast

trends in campaign development can one master the laws of campaign development, and

ensure that studies over different aspects of campaigns follow the right direction and that

campaign theories are in the lead.

(3) Methodology for the study of campaign science

The methodology of the People’s Liberation Army for studying campaign science is

based on the methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Armed

with military dialectics as the thought weapons, it studies the past, present and future in

campaigns. From different angles and perspectives, a multitude of methods can be

summarized in the study of campaign science. The most common methods of study are as

follows:

1. Studying the relationship between campaigns and strategy and tactics

Strategy governs and guides a campaign. A campaign is subordinate to and at the service

of strategy. The study of campaign science can only develop in the correct direction when

it is conducted from the point of view taken at the commanding height of the overall

strategic situation. A campaign is often made up of several battles, and its outcome is

decided by the result of a series of battles. Hence, in this sense, the study of campaign

science can not be conducted in divorce from studying tactics.
5

2. Studying development in science and technologies and weaponry

Weaponry and equipment are the materiel basis for campaign theories and practices. The

rapid development in science and technology and their wide application in the military

field have historically always been the fundamental impetus driving weapon and

equipment modernization and changes in campaign operations. Thus to objectively

analyze the impact of developments in science and technology and weapon systems on

campaign operations and to explore campaign theories that are suited to the needs of

future campaign operations are a basic consideration in the study of campaign science.

Only by timely keeping abreast of the current conditions and future trends in the

development of science and technology and weapon systems can one correctly discover

the laws of campaigns, promote the development of campaign theories and practices, and

deepen the study of campaign science.

3. Studying the development and changes in operational objects

A campaign is the operational activities of opposing sides. The origination and

development of campaign science are also premised on the study of operational objects.

The deeper and more thorough the study of operational objects is conducted, the more

focused and more in keeping with objective realities campaign theories will be.

Therefore, in studying campaign science, one must always keep abreast of the

developments and changes in operational objects so as to sharpen the focus of the study.

4. Adopting the method of integrating quality and quantity

The science of campaigns is a highly practical discipline that embodies many social and

natural sciences. It includes factors that can not be quantified (such as morale), but it also

contains a great amount of quantifiable factors that can be calculated with digital

precision. Hence the study of campaign science must adopt methods that integrate

qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to make the study more scientific and more

precise. It is particularly true when modern science and technology have provided an

effective instrument for quantitative analyses in ever greater degree and precision. They

have helped to increase the weight of quantitative analysis in the study of campaign

science, making it one of the important methods used in such study. At the same time,

this method of utilizing experiential data and the equipment and organizational structure

of both sides to establish mathematical models and conduct calculations and analysis can

test the practicality of PLA campaign theory from one side and strengthen the scientific

quality PLA campaign theory.

5. Studying by adopting simulation methods

Advances in modern technologies, especially in computer technologies and the internet,

have opened up new fields for the study of campaign science. The practice of campaigns,

once impossible to duplicate, now can be repeatedly practiced under close-to-live battle

conditions in “battle labs.” The use of advanced virtual technology shifts the pre-
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determined operational space battlefield into the computer network space, where, based

on the organized structure, equipment and operational thought of the operational object,

one establishes a virtual simulation battlefield and conducts the method of war gaming.

Not only does this save on cost, but it is also easier to organize, closer to reality, and has

a stronger quality of confrontations. One can quickly discover existing problems, test the

feasibility of campaign theories, and continuously enrich and enhance the study of

campaign theories.

6. Assimilating advanced scientific achievements and methods

The science of campaigns has broad ties with military science and other disciplines and

theories. Almost all of the different disciplines in military science, and all the most

advanced scientific achievements and methods in other social and natural studies, can be

applied in the study of campaign theories. Hence only by widely assimilating and

applying these advanced scientific achievements and methods and by constantly opening

up campaign science both in depth and scope can its study become more dynamic.

7. Studying the connection between history, present and future development

Campaigns are evolutionary, and the history, the present conditions and the future of

campaigns are inevitable developments in campaigns. Hence, the study of campaign

science must draw on lessons from history, and base itself on present realities while

looking to the future. To draw lessons from history is to study the history of campaigns

both in history and during the contemporary period, both in China and abroad, and to

draw on useful experience of predecessors in exploring laws of development governing

campaigns. To be based on present realities is to face squarely the real threats that our

country presently faces, and the current conditions of our armed forces in order to make

the study of campaign science conform to objective realities. To look to the future is to

attach great importance to the study of future campaigns so as to be able to predict

possible directions of development in campaigns and to ensure the science of campaigns

stays in the lead and well in advance.

8. Drawing on useful experiences and of foreign militaries

Campaign science is an open discipline. Campaign science in the armed forces of various

countries not only has its own special characteristics, but it also shares some

commonalities. To draw on foreign military campaign theories and fruits of their

practices, especially on the advanced campaign theories and practices by the armed

forces of countries equipped with advanced science and technologies and superior

weapon systems, would help keep us abreast of the new developments in foreign military

campaign theories and practices and learn from them useful experience and practices.

This endeavor is not only an important method in the study of campaign science but also

an effective way to enrich and develop ourselves.
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II. Origination and Development of the Science of Campaigns ...6

Campaign science becoming a discipline of scientific study is a historical phenomenon.

Its origination and development are part of a historical development. Since the

appearance of campaigns, people have begun to gain knowledge of campaign laws and

laws of campaign guidance. With development in campaign practices, people’s

knowledge of campaigns constantly deepened. Such knowledge gradually became more

systematic, thus giving rising to the science of campaigns, which continues to be

developed in practice.

(1) Origination and development of campaign theory

In China, campaign theory came into being relatively early. During the Spring and

Autumn period, wars were constantly fought; armies were greatly expanded, and

operational scales continuously expanded. A number of books on the art of war that

summed up contemporary and past war experiences were written to meet the need for

operational guidance. During this period, for instance, there were the world-renowned

The Art of War by Sun Tzu and other books on the art of war that had a rich content of

military theories for the officer corps such as The Rules of Sima. These books revealed

the many guidance laws used in campaigns, thus providing theories of a guidance nature

for operations by large military formations. Overseas, around the 4th century B.C., some

operational theoretical books based on war practices also appeared. One of them was

Xenophon’s The Anabasis in ancient Greece. Military writings during this era could not

be called pure campaign theoretical works, although it is beyond any doubt that they

contained substantial contents that would serve as guides to campaign operations.

Before the 12th century A.D., operational theories of the “cold weaponry” era did not

distinguish strategy from campaign and tactics. There was no special campaign theory

either. However some theoretical contents relating to campaigns appeared in militaryrelated works. In China, in addition to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and The Rules of Sima

mentioned above, such works as Wu Zi, Sun Bin’s The Art of War, Wei Liao Zi, Six

Strategies, and The Questions and Answers between Emperor Tai Zong of the Tang

Dynasty and Lord Li Wei have put forward a series of guidance thoughts, principles and

fighting methods in operations, which collectively laid the foundation for future

development in campaign theories. After the 12th century A.D., with the arrival of “hot

weapons,” came changes in operational methods. These spurred the development of

campaign theories. In China, during the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, a

substantial number of military works were written. During this period, there were two

distinct characteristics in the development of campaign theories. First was to explain and

study ancient military theories. Second was to focus on solving concrete problems. By

combining lessons of victory and defeat in actual operations, such theories sought to

explore ways to solve problems. Representative works included a number of books

dealing with issues of large unit operations and training such as The Record on Guarding

the City by Chen Gui of the South Song dynasty, The New Book of Records and

Comparison and An Actual Record of Military Training by Qi Jiguang of the Ming
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dynasty, and The Collection of Questions and Answers Regarding Chariots and Camps

by Sun Chengzhong. Overseas, the early 16th century Dell’arte della Guerra by Italy’s

Niccolo Machiavelli touched on theories of major battles. Studies on operational theories

during this period, to some extent, laid the theoretical foundation for the emergence of

campaign science.

Following the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, the development of the

production power led to increased scale and varied patterns of wars and campaigns. In the

early 19th century, Napoleon separated grand tactics from tactics in general. With the

accumulation of campaign operational experience and a further division of the military

science disciplines, the knowledge of the science of campaigns and systematic study of

campaigns had greatly improved. In the 1780s, Henry Lloyd of Britain first put forward

the notion of a campaign in his Prologue to the History of the War of 1756 between

Germany Prussian King and Austrian Queen and her allies (General Iloyd’s Military and

Political Memoir). In the first half of the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz of Prussia in

his On War took major battles as something between a war and a battle and he expounded

the laws of operational guidance, thus playing an important role in the development of

campaign theories. Antoine Henri Jomini of Switzerland in his Precis of the Art of War

began to distinguish grand tactics from strategy and tactics and explained in a relatively

comprehensive manner the theory of grand tactics. In the middle of the 19th century,

Engels not only provided an exact definition on major battles, but also summarized and

revealed the methods and laws governing major campaigns. Hence, he further resolved

the issues of how to understand and study campaigns, laying down the foundation for the

establishment of campaign science. At the end of the 19th century, Russian military

theorists in their military works further expounded the theoretical issues of campaigns

such as campaign formation {zhanyi bingtuan} task organization, campaign bushu

disposition and campaign command. During this period, China formulated operational

rules for the new infantry army and some scholars started studying campaign history.

Thus the main theoretical framework of campaign science was beginning to take shape.

During the late 19th century and early 20th century, armored steam ships, tanks and

airplanes were introduced. They led to big strides in the development of campaign

practices and theories. The infantry preparatory colleges at the end of China’s Qing

dynasty and the infantry colleges in the early Republic period taught Advanced Military

Studies and Dictates of Supreme Command and conducted some relevant campaign

theoretical research. After the 1920s, the Soviet military strengthened its systematic

research on basic campaign theories. And for the first time, it put forward the notion of

campaign science and established institutions for teaching and study of campaign science.

The Soviet military at the same time published relevant rules and regulations as principles

governing the preparation and execution of campaigns by group armies and 

front armies. In 1926, the Soviet military made strategy, campaign art (science), and

tactics the three basic components of military academic learning. In the 1930s, the

Soviets further advanced the theory of the great depth campaign. During the Second

World War, campaign science made new strides with further division within the

discipline, including infantry, naval, air force, and national air defense campaign science.

After the Second World War, following the establishment of the strategic missile force,
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the Soviet military put forward theories on campaigns under nuclear conditions. In its

infantry Operational Compendium published in 1982, the U.S. military also listed

strategy, campaign and tactics as three levels of war operational preparation and

execution and it for the first time clearly made campaign science an independent

discipline of study.

In recent years, the armed forces of the U.S., Russia and other countries have undergone

in a comprehensive manner a revolution in military affairs. They have advanced,

particularly in the field of campaigns, a series of campaign operational theories suited to

new conditions. The U.S. military in particular, on the basis of “integrated air and ground

operations,” advanced the operational theory of “integration” and set up digitalized armed

forces, paving the way for campaign operational theories and practices needed in the

information age.

(2) Origination and development of PLA’s campaign theory

The PLA’s campaign theory has come into being and developed through campaign

practices during long years of revolutionary wars following its founding by the Chinese

Communist Party. The older generation of proletarian military strategists led by Mao

Zedong used the basic principles of Marxism to explore in depth campaign laws and

command laws in the people’s war by drawing critically on past and present Chinese and

foreign campaign theoretical knowledge. They have made outstanding contributions to

the emergence and the development of the PLA’s campaign science.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army

carried out some campaigns in efforts to break out of the enemy’s “encirclement and

suppression” drives and to open up new areas of operation. The main operational forms

were guerrilla warfare {youjizhan} and guerrilla-style mobile warfare {youjixing

yundongzhan}. Mao Zedong, based on a summary of operational experiences, put

forward a general principle of operation for the Red Army during that time, namely

“when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the

enemy tires, we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue” – also known as the

sixteen-character dictum. After the third anti “encirclement and suppression” drive, the

Red Army’s operational principles were basically formed. Among them, the principles

involved with campaign operations include: full preparations-do not miss time

opportunities; concentrate superiority of force strengths-fight by picking the weak and

destroy them one by one; select desirable positions; fight an enemy in movement

{yundong}or when he’s not yet consolidated his position; sudden raids-quick battle quick

decision and strive for full annihilation. By the end of 1936, Mao Zedong in his work On

the Strategies of Chinese Revolutionary Wars, summarized the experience gained during

the Agrarian Revolutionary War and put forward the notion, principles and study method

for campaign science; he also made clear the relationship between campaigns and wars

and battles, and defined tasks for campaign science, thus laying down the foundation for

the PLA’s campaign science.
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During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, tremendous changes occurred

in the operational objects, missions and forms. The main form of the campaign was

guerrilla warfare. The general concept of the campaign {zhanyi zongde fangzhen} was

carry out exterior-line quick decision offensive warfare during strategic interior-line

protracted defensive warfare. The theoretical manuscripts were: The Strategic Issues of

the Guerilla War to Resist Japan {kangri youji zhanzheng de zhanlue wenti} and On

Protracted War {lun chijiuzhan}, etc. The main experiences were: strategic interior line

protracted defense, and campaign combat exterior line quick decision attack; in the face

of a powerful enemy, executed the principle of preserving oneself and wiping out the

enemy; combined the trinity of the main forces, local forces and militia and integration of

military and civilian; mutual complementation and transitions of the three operational

forms of mobile warfare {yundongzhan}, position warfare and guerrilla warfare; stressed

the initiative, flexibility and planning { jihua}-quality of the campaign; created fighting

methods such as raid-attack warfare {xiji zhan}, attack-destroy warfare {pojizhan},

ambush warfare {fujizhan}, tunnel warfare {didaozhan}, mine warfare {dileizhan}, and

broad open-up sparrow warfare {guanfan kaizhan maquezhan} and use of a variety of

means at the same time; and continuously expanded strengths and created conditions so

as to develop towards normal mobile warfare {yundongzhan}. These valuable

experiences not only enriched the contents of the PLA’s campaign science, but also

helped to lay a solid theoretical groundwork for the execution of a variety of campaigns

during the War of Liberation.

The War of Liberation was a period of great development of campaign practice and

theory. In terms of operational form, from the War of Resistance against Japan period

with guerilla warfare in the lead, it developed into concentrating force-strengths and

fighting mobile warfare {yundongzhan} in the lead. In the early days of the war, Mao

Zedong penned the instruction Concentrating Superiority of Force Strengths and

Annihilating the Enemy One by One and clearly stipulated the methods of campaign

operations. Subsequently, Mao put forward The Ten Major Military Principles, in which

he made a high-level theoretical summary on the operational concept, operational

objectives, operational forms, operational methods and operational preparations, and

added more systemization on the principles of campaign operations. During this period of

time, the PLA’s campaign theories and practices entered a period of maturity, and it

became one of the most abundant and magnificent phases in PLA history in terms of

operational types, operational patterns, operational experiences and command art. During

this phase, the PLA explored and summarized a set of fighting ways and experiences for

positional offensive campaigns including urban offensive campaigns; meanwhile we

propelled the highly mobile {jidong} and big-strided advancing-retreating campaign

pattern of mobile warfare {yundongzhan} towards its zenith. The experience gained in

the three major campaigns – the Liao-Shen Campaign, Huai-Hai Campaign and Ping-Jin

Campaign - greatly enriched and developed PLA’s theories in campaign science.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, in the Korean battlefield, the

campaigns mounted by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army developed from combined

arms campaigns toward combined service campaigns. The PLA accumulated rich

experience in waging, under special terrain conditions, mobile warfare campaigns
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{yundongzhan}, positional offensive and defensive campaigns, and campaign air defense

operations against a highly modernized powerful enemy, as well as in campaign logistical

and engineering support. In operations to safeguard socialist construction and in

successive defending the border self-defense operations, the PLA also gained experience

in tri-service joint sea-crossing landing operations and implementing campaign

operations under special terrain and weather conditions against different operational

objects where new contents were added to PLA campaign science. During this period, the

PLA gradually established and strengthened institutions and contingents specially

devoted to campaign theory research and teaching. The entire military has continuously

summarized the experiences of campaign operations and widely opened-up development

in campaign training. We have borrowed from foreign military experiences and

conducted a large amount of campaign theory research activity. We have successively

published a variety of special works on campaign science, and amongst them are:

General Principles of the Science of Campaigns, Anti-Landing Campaign, Air Defense

Campaign etc. These works have thoroughly explored the campaign laws for operations

by one who is inferiorly equipped to defeat a superiorly equipped enemy under modern

conditions. Various sciences of campaigns were successively established and campaign

theories possessing distinctive PLA characteristics were improved. All of this indicates

PLA campaign science has developed to a new phase. Since the 1970s, along with the

continuous acceleration of the construction pace of revolutionization, regularization and

modernization of the armed forces, relevant organizational-units across the PLA have

universally conducted theoretical research suited for campaign operations under modern

conditions and they have summarized many effective fighting methods and experiences.

They have published a large number of special works and teaching materials in the area

of campaign theory, repeatedly set off new rounds of surge in the study of campaign

theory, and formed a relatively robust campaign discipline tixi-system. After several local

wars at the turn of the century, the PLA, facing the serious challenge of dual historical

missions, has made tremendous efforts on the study of campaign theory under

information technology conditions and study of integrated joint operation theory. At

present, these studies are still continuously deepening and will bear plentiful and

substantial gains.

(3) The distinguishing features of PLA campaign science

The PLA’s campaign science has originated and grown from the particular environment

in which it has waged successively revolutionary wars and struggles to defend national

frontiers. Thus it is a campaign science with PLA characteristics. In addition to some

general characteristics of campaign science, the PLA’s campaign science has the

following characteristics.

1. Guided by Marxism and Mao Zedong thought

Marxism and Mao Zedong thought are the guidebook and theoretical bases for PLA

campaign science studies. Their essence mainly includes: applying the tenets of

materialism and dialectics, knowing and summarizing laws from campaign practice, and
12

applying these laws to guide campaign practice; subjective guidance must conform to

objective realities; campaign principles and fighting methods are developed, and not only

must one know the general laws of campaigns but one must also know the special laws of

the struggle one is facing; study campaigns in a historical and a seeking-truth-from-facts

manner, and critically draw on theories and experiences that are both ancient and current,

Chinese as well as foreign; look at problems by applying developmental, interconnected

and comprehensive viewpoints; weapons are important factors in war people are decisive

factors; rely on realities, and flexibly apply principles; dialectically know and process the

relationships such as strengths and weaknesses, attacking and guarding, advancing and

retreating, etc. and correctly implement transitions at the appropriate times.

2. Based on the People’s War

The people are the well from which abundant human and material resources flow. The

will of the people is a fundamental condition that determines the outcome of a war. In

terms of campaign guidance thought, the PLA has always attached great importance to

the practice of relying on the masses, arousing the masses, and conducting people’s war.

In terms of campaign strength composition, carry out the triple-combination of the main

forces, local forces and militia, and extensively mobilize the broad mass of the people in

the theater to participate in and support the campaign. And in terms of battlefield set up,

attach importance to the enemy rear battlefield and guerilla base and guerilla area

construction, resulting in close operational cooperation with the front battlefield. In terms

of campaign operational forms, mobile {yundong} (maneuver {jidong}) warfare,

positional warfare, guerrilla warfare (special warfare) closely complement each other. In

terms of fighting method application, based on different objects, environments and

equipment, to continuously create various new campaign patterns, operational modes,

and means.

3. A distinctive annihilation warfare thought

Based on the fundamental objective of a war – “to preserve oneself and destroy the

enemy” and on the inheritance of traditional operational thought, Mao Zedong advocated

the basic thought of annihilation warfare. As early as during the Agrarian Revolutionary

War period, Mao Zedong put forward: “For the Red Army which draws nearly everything

from the enemy, the basic concept is annihilation warfare.” During the War of Resistance

against Japan, even though the PLA fought mainly guerrilla wars in the interior lines,

Mao still stressed: “The correct requirement of War of Resistance against Japan should

be: annihilation warfare as much as possible.” During the period of the War of 

Liberation, Mao Zedong in formulating the Ten Major Military Principles clearly stated:

“The main objective is to annihilate the enemy’s effective strength, [and] the main

objective is not keeping or seizing cities and localities.” Under the special conditions of

the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong put forward the

operational guidance concept of “nibbling at beef jerky (fighting small annihilation

warfare).” Mao Zedong later on repeatedly pointed out that in the future, when the enemy

comes, we must still concentrate our force strengths to fight annihilation warfare.
13

Annihilation warfare thought and the principles and fighting methods with it as their core

not only have become a distinctive characteristic of PLA campaign science, but also has a

glorious position in the history of world campaign theory development.

4. Emphasis on the subjective initiative of man

The PLA has placed strong emphasis on the decisive role played by the man in campaign

science. Its history of defeating better-armed enemies with inferior weapons has proven

that among the numerous factors of campaign strengths, weapons are an important factor

in a campaign and man is the decisive factor. Bringing into play the extent of awareness,

level of training, spirit of courage and subjective dynamic quality, etc. of a person

directly decides the bringing into play of weapons and equipment effectiveness and the

implementation and execution of higher level intent. Therefore, during operations,

completely stress to fully bring a commander’s superb command art into play, fully

muster the enthusiasm and active qualities of the mass of combatants, and fundamentally

improve force-unit combat power.

5. Attach importance to stratagems and pay attention to fighting methods

China’s thousands of years’ fine tradition in the art of war put a high value on stratagems.

The PLA’s campaign science has inherited and carried forward this fine tradition. In the

organization and directing of campaigns, the PLA stresses the importance of bringing

into full play the commander’s wisdom and talents; it emphasizes winning by stratagem

and by ingenuity – with minimal cost for maximum results. Guided by this thought, a

series of fighting methods with distinguishing features was created. Major areas include:

concentrate a superiority of force-strength and wipe out the enemy one by one; attack the

weaker enemy first and the stronger enemy later; strive to wipe out the enemy when he is

on the move; fight in close quarters and fight at night; combine military strikes with

political collapse, etc. In the area of mobile warfare {yundongzhan} campaign fighting

methods: there is the retreat in order to advance, and the “lure the enemy in deep”

fighting method of awaiting opportunity to break the enemy; there is the “mushroom

[dilly-dally] tactic” of leading the enemy around by the nose and devouring when the

plate softens; there is the we advance when the enemy advances fighting method of

seeking opportunity to annihilate the enemy; there is the fighting method of advancing

and retreating in large steps, dispersing and extending a concentrated enemy, and then

wiping out the enemy one by one; there is the fighting method of carefully biding one’s

time, and carving out a slice from the enemy’s dense formation and wiping it out; there is

the fighting method of surrounding fortifications and fighting reinforcements, attacking

fortifications and fighting reinforcements, and attacking fortifications and blocking

reinforcements; there is the fighting method of ambushing, pursuing and encountering;

and there is the fighting method of deep outflanking, large envelopment and severe

annihilation, etc. Positional warfare and guerilla warfare also have their own distinct

fighting methods.
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III. The Discipline System of Campaign Science...13

The discipline system {tixi} of campaign science is a whole composed of mutually

related and restricted disciplines in campaign science. It is not only the discipline

structure of campaign science but also the hierarchical knowledge system of campaign

science. Since every country has different features and traditions of military culture,

levels of theory development maturity, military organizational systems, and military

theory systems, the discipline system of campaign science also differs. The discipline of

campaign science is a dynamic structure developing with campaign theory and practice.

(1) Basis and requirements of the discipline system of campaign science

The PLA campaign discipline, like any other discipline, is a dynamic system evolving

from simple to complex and developing with enriched PLA campaign practice and

theory. The foundations and requirements of the discipline system of our military

campaign science are as follows:

1. Based on PLA realities, and adapt to the requirements of PLA development

The current state and development {fazhan} of campaign strengths play an important role

in establishing the discipline system of campaign science. The PLA is a combined armed

force {hecheng jundui} developed from a single service – the Army. Because the Navy,

Air Force, Second Artillery were established rather later, over a long period of time, the

campaign science of the PLA had always had at its core the combined campaign science

{hetong zhanyixue} with the Army in the lead. Moreover, the discipline layers were also

not clearly distinguished. After over 70 years of armed forces modernization

construction, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery of the PLA have

developed a great deal, the weapons and equipment of each service continue to improve

and renew, the organizational structure tizhi-system have progressively improved, and a

combined armed force composed of several or several tens of specialized arms has been

formed with the capability of independently carrying out campaign missions. Along with

the transformation of PLA strategic key points {zhanlue zhongdian} and the

reinforcement of service and arms such as the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery

construction, the inter-relationships between services with the Army in the lead is

currently changing. In a future campaign, especially in a campaign of a high tech local

war, the status and function of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery will be greatly

elevated, and a campaign with the Navy in the lead or the Air Force or Second Artillery

in the lead will appear and become more and more important.

The development of service strengths and service campaigns has caused the basic formstate of a campaign to transform from the combined campaign {hetong zhanyi} of the

past into the joint campaign. With its prominent characteristic of being able to fully bring

into play the might of integrated operations, the joint campaign has become the main

form-state armed force campaigns of the world’s military powers. Speaking on just the

PLA, in a future local war under informationized conditions, the potential campaigns we
15

may face will appear in the form-state of a joint campaign such as a landing campaign, a

border counterattack campaign, an anti-air raid campaign, etc. Reinforcing the study of

the joint campaigns is a key point of current PLA campaign science studies. The

establishment of the discipline tixi-system of campaign science also must adapt to

important changes to PLA future campaign form-states so as to establish a solid

theoretical basis for the PLA to strive for victory in future campaign operations.

2. Based on the study conditions of PLA campaign practice and theory, and conform

to the requirements of campaign practice and theory development

Campaign science is a discipline that contains two research objects, campaign practice

and campaign theory. The development of campaign practice inevitably brings about the

development of campaign theory. Without mature campaign practice and theory, it is

impossible to form a complete discipline system of campaign science. Therefore, the

establishment of the discipline system of campaign science must conform to the current

situation of campaign science study and meet the requirements of campaign theory

development. In wartime, our military accumulated rich experience in Army campaigns

and formed the science of combined army campaigns including rich Army campaign

theory. Through campaign training and partial operational practice in peacetime and the

experience drawn from foreign operations, our military has developed service and arm

campaign theory by leaps and bounds, formed more improved service campaign theory,

established the science of service campaigns, and formed our first complete discipline

system of campaign science since our country has been founded. This discipline system is

based on combined Army campaigns. With the development of weapons and equipment

and further enhancement of the status of services, joint campaigns have become the

research focal point of worldwide campaign practice and theory. To study joint campaign

theory has become a development trend of the science of campaigns. At present, our

military is gradually forming joint campaign theory. To build the discipline system of

campaign science, our military should focus on the development of campaign theory and

form the discipline system of campaign science with joint campaign theory as the core.

Campaign science is a very practical discipline. To study campaign science, we must

focus on the practice and development of particular campaigns and reinforce the study of

joint campaign science and service campaign science. In the meantime, campaigns, as a

developing historical phenomenon, have emerged from wars and battles. As a result,

campaigns have the particular development laws distinguishing from their intension and

extension and essential features of other things. To study, summarize, and abstract the

essence, features, and general laws of campaigns is one of the basic missions of campaign

science and the basis of the existence and development of campaign science. Studying the

essential features and general laws of campaigns and exploring general campaign

guidance laws can not only grasp campaigns and the development of general laws but

also have an important meaning for guiding our military campaign practice and theory.

Therefore, the science of campaigns needs to study practice and theory of particular joint

campaigns and service campaigns, and general characteristics and development trend of

campaigns.
16

3. Based on the relevant stipulations of the State Council Academic Degree

Committee

Forming complete campaign theory and the science of campaigns does not indicate that

the legal status of the discipline system is established. The establishment of a science and

the division of the discipline system can only be effective by the approval of related

national departments. The establishment of the discipline system of campaign science

must be based on the relevant stipulations of the PRC State Council Academic Degree

Committee and approved by the State Council Academic Degree Committee. In 1984, the

State Council Academy Degree Committee included military science as one of the

disciplines in our country for the first time. In 1985, it approved nine disciplines and

specialties with Ph.D. and bachelor degrees awarded in military science and for the first

time determined that the Campaign Science discipline tixi-system is constituted by the

first order discipline – the Science of Campaigns and the five second-order disciplines

and specialties of the Science of Combined Campaigns, the Science of Naval Campaigns,

the Science of Air Force Campaigns, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and the

Science of Logistic Campaigns. In 1997, when the State Council Academic Degree

Committee and the National Education Committee revised the Graduate Student

Discipline and Specialty Catalogue, they adjusted the Campaign Science Discipline tixiSystem and determined a ne Campaign Science tixi-System with the Science of

Campaigns as a first order discipline and the Science of Joint Campaigns and the Science

of Service Campaigns as second order disciplines.

(2) The structure of the Science of Campaigns tixi-System and its content

The science of campaigns is a first order discipline. It mainly studies the universal

qualities, essence, and laws of campaigns as well as the essence and laws of the special

campaigns such as the joint campaigns, Army campaigns, Navy campaigns, Air Force

campaigns, Second Artillery campaigns, etc.

The Campaign General Introduction is the discipline that studies campaigns and their

guidance laws. It mainly explores the basic laws of campaigns and the universal quality

tenets of the campaign discipline. The main content includes: campaign definition,

features, and classifications; campaign formation and development; PLA campaign

generation and development; campaign objective factors such as campaign strengths,

campaign battlefield, and campaign time; the characteristics, guidance thoughts, and

basic principles of campaigns; campaign preparation and implementation; campaign

command and coordination; important operational activities; campaign operational

support; campaign logistics and equipment support; and campaign political work. The

campaign general introduction is the highest level of campaign theory and it plays a

leading and guidance role in the Science of Joint Campaigns and the Science of Service

Campaigns from the overall situation.

The Science of Joint Campaigns is the discipline that studies joint campaigns and their

guidance laws. The main study content has: the essence, characteristics, and laws of joint
17

campaigns, the connection and influence between the Science of Joint Campaigns and

related disciplines, and the methods for organizing and implementing joint campaigns,

etc. Under modern conditions, it pays attention to studying and discussing the

characteristics, guidance thought and principles of joint campaigns under modern

technology, especially high technology conditions, the establishment of the joint

campaign strength structure and the command and operational tixi-systems, as well as

campaign patterns, campaign fighting methods, etc.

The Science of Respective Service Campaigns studies the campaign laws of the

respective service or with the respective service in the lead. It is also a discipline that is

used to guide the practice of that campaign. At the same time, it also studies theoretical

problems of the activities of the respective service while jointly implementing a

campaign with other services, and this includes the Science of Army Campaigns, the

Science of Naval Campaigns, the Science of Air Force campaigns, and the Science of

Second Artillery campaigns.

The Science of Respective Service Campaigns emphasizes the study of: the

characteristics and laws of respective service campaigns; the task organization and

missions of the respective service campaign large formations; and the principles and

methods for preparing and implementing the various campaigns of the respective

services, and these include: preparing and implementing a campaign of the respective

service or with that service in the lead, and the activities of that service in a campaign

jointly implemented with other services.
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Part I: Campaigns...17

Chapter 1

Overview...17

Section 1: Definition, Characteristics, and Classification of Campaigns...17

Clarification of the definition of a campaign and a thorough grasp of its essential

characteristics and taxonomic techniques are a basis and prerequisite for studies on the

science of campaigns, and are also the primary mission of such studies.

I. Definition of a Campaign...17

A campaign is the operational activities composed of a series of battles conducted under a

unified command by a large formation to achieve partial [localized] goals {jubu mudi} or

overall situation quality goals {quanjuxing mudi} of a war.

The armed forces of different nations and different historical periods have had differing

formulations of a campaign’s definition, but as for the essential elements {yaosu}

comprising a campaign, the above understanding is basically consistent. These essential

elements are mainly embodied in four aspects: strengths {liliang}, goals {mudi},

command, and composition. In terms of strengths, this mainly refers to a campaign large

formation, but under specific conditions it also refers to an operational strength

equivalent to a campaign large formation which is able to carry out campaign missions.

In terms of goals, a campaign generally generates a specified effect on the overall war

situation {zhanzheng quanju} and is able to achieve partial goals in a war while certain

large-scale strategic-quality campaigns, especially certain campaigns in a localized war

{jubu zhanzheng}, can achieve overall situation quality goals of a war. In terms of

command, this not only includes higher level unified command but also the command of

War, campaign, and battle [combat] are the three different layers of armed struggle, and

among them exists an interdependent, interactive dialectical relationship. War is the

highest form of armed struggle, and occupies the highest layer; it is normally comprised

of a number of campaigns, and directly decides the nature, goals, missions, scale, and

activities of a campaign; it is the overall situation of a campaign. Battle [combat] is the

main body constituting a campaign and it is also the basic means for achieving campaign

goals. Campaign is not only one part of war, it is simultaneously also the main means for

achieving war goals; it directly conforms to and is under the control of the overall the

campaign large formation on its own operations. In terms of composition, battles are the

main body constituting a campaign, but at the same time, it also includes operational

activities such as relevant maneuvers {jidong} and assaults {tuji}.situation of war, and

also to a different extent, it reacts to the overall war situation; a campaign is the overall

situation of all battles, not only does it stipulate the missions of combat, it puts forth the

requirements for completing missions, to a certain extent determining the nature, goals,
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missions, and activities of combat, it also directly exercises an influence on whether a

battle is won or lost. Campaign is situated between war and battle and is an important

link that plays a connecting role between the two. Victory or defeat in a single campaign

– especially victory or defeat in a campaign with decisive significance – can generate a

major effect on the overall war situation, and even affecting the course and outcome of

the war. Hence, in the overall war situation, a campaign, as compared with combat, has a

more important position and role. Under the conditions of a high tech local war, a certain

trend towards uniformity appears between war, campaign, and combat, but there remain

important distinctions in their essence and attributes.

II. Features of a Campaign...18

Campaign features refer to the special attributes of the campaign itself. Compared to

combat, there are mainly the following features:

(1) The participating strengths {canzhan liliang} are numerous

Participating strengths refer to the force-strengths {bingli}, weaponry, materiel, and

equipment participating in campaign operations. In terms of the participating forcestrengths only, in general situations, a single campaign often can involve tens of

thousands to hundreds of thousands, and even up to a million or more people. In terms of

participating strength composition, a campaign is also much more complex than combat.

In particular, a campaign under modern conditions normally is joint operations of all

services and arms, and the weapons and equipment used in a campaign are not only large

in quantity, but many in types and mixed in models. Under modern local war conditions,

due to limitations of war goals, some campaigns have appeared below large formation

scale, so campaign strengths have decreased in terms of quantity, but compared to

combat, it has not yet changed the feature of numerous participating strengths.

(2) The battlefield space is expansive

The campaign battlefield is an idea of three-dimensional space. The expansive quality of

this battlefield space is determined by many campaign participating strengths, large

activity scales, as well as enhanced armed force maneuver capability, amplified weapons

and equipment operational ranges and lethality, and growth of operational means and

modes. For example, the three great campaigns – Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huaihai, and

Beiping-Tianjin – conducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during the

War of Liberation involved almost all regions of the Northeast, Eastern China, and

Central Plains, as well as North China. During the Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition

Forces, in their large-scale air strikes against Iraq and in the follow-on ground offensive,

fully embodied the distinct three-dimensionality of the campaign battlefield. With the

rapid development of modern military technology and unprecedented increases in the

operational capabilities of the services, the modern campaign warfare space is much more

expansive, far exceeding the traditional battlefield bounds; it has assumed a multidimensional, integrated {yitihua} development trend.
21

(3) The duration is relatively long

The duration of campaign operations is generally longer than that of a battle, and can

range anywhere from a few days to as much as a dozen days, several dozen days, and

even 100 days. The reason for this is mainly that during a single campaign, it is normally

necessary to simultaneously or successively launch several battles, and a campaign’s

duration is the sum of the individual battle durations and inter-battle periods; it is thus

clearly and easily seen that a campaign’s duration is longer than a battle’s duration. For

example, the Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huaihai, and Beiping-Tianjin campaigns of the Chinese

PLA during the War of Liberation lasted 52, 65, and 64 days, respectively. During World

War II, the Soviet Army’s Leningrad Campaign had a history that reached 3 years and 1

month. Modern campaigns, though evincing a trend toward gradually shorter courses and

significantly faster tempos – such as the 43-day duration of the Gulf War, with the

ground offensive occupying only 100 hours – nevertheless in overall terms retain

unchanged the feature of having a relatively long duration, compared to individual

battles.

(4) Maneuver activities are extensive

Maneuver {jidong} serves as the main means for an armed force to seize initiative, create

favorable posture against the enemy, capture combat opportunity and achieve activity

suddenness, and it has always occupied a decisive role position amongst military

activities. The PLA has abundant experience and a glorious tradition of excellence in

maneuvers, such as the Long March’s Crossing the Chishui River Four Times {Si du

Chishui} Campaign, the War of Liberation period’s Northern Shaanxi “Three Battles,

Three Victories” {Sanzhan, Sanjie}, and the East China battlefield’s Laiwu Campaign –

all of these are models of maneuver operations. Compared to a battle, a campaign has

more maneuver instruments {jidong gongju} and a broader field of activities, more

frequent maneuvers, more flexible and diversified modes and means of maneuvers, and

more stringent requirements on maneuvers. In a modern campaign, the status of

maneuver has become more prominent, and it is only through extensive maneuvers can

one seize and create favorable postures, produce and catch the favorable combat

opportunities, alter and cast off unfavorable positions, and seize and maintain battlefield

initiative.

(5) The operational patterns {zuozhan yangshi} are diverse

Due to the several services participating in a campaign, the scale of an operation’s goals,

and the breadth of the space and fields involved, a campaign’s feature of diversity in

operational patterns is more pronounced than in combat. For example, in the Liao-Shen

Campaign during the War of Liberation, the PLA successively or simultaneously

conducted the Jinzhou fortification-storming warfare {gongjian zhan} (urban attack), the

Tashan and Heishan blocking attack warfare {zuji zhan} (positional defense), the Liaoxi

decisive battle warfare {huizhan} (mobile warfare {yundongzhan}), and the operations to

liberate Shenyang and Changchun. Another example is in the British-Argentinean
22

Falkland Islands War, there were air raids and counter-air raids; blockades and counterblockades; landing and anti-landing operations, there were air force air warfare with antisea and anti-ground attack operations, there were naval at-sea air defense, surface

operations and antisubmarine operations, and there were army ground attack and defense

operations. It is clear that one campaign, in terms of categories of operations, generally

has both offensive and defensive, with purely offensive and purely defensive operations

rarely seen; in terms of operational forms {xingshi} and patterns {yangshi}, one often

integrates operations such as maneuver warfare, positional warfare, guerrilla warfare, as

well as airborne and anti-airborne operations, and air raid and counter air raid, etc. into

one; and in terms of operational space and domains, there can be ground, sea, and air

operations, and frontal, flanking, enemy rear and depth operations. In addition, there are

also electronic warfare and firepower warfare as well as psychological warfare and

intelligence warfare, etc. In particular, in the all-services and arms joint campaigns under

high-tech conditions, the feature of diversity in operational patterns is even more

pronounced.

(6) The degree of independence is significant

The space of campaign activities is normally in one region {quyu} or one direction of a

war, and this region or direction generally is a relatively independent operational area

{zuozhanqu}. This kind of theater {zhanqu} is not only purely an idea of military region,

but also an physical entity of integrating military, political, and economic into one, and it

has the responsibility for independently accomplishing given local-quality missions of

war. For example, during the War of Liberation, the Chinese PLA operated in five major,

relatively independent theaters: the Northwest, Central Plains, East China, the Northeast,

and North China. This independence is reflected even more clearly in campaigns waged

under modern conditions – and especially in localized-war campaigns. So, for example,

the several border wars of self-defense counterattacks {ziwei fanji zuozhan} waged by

the Chinese PLA since the founding of the PRC have all exhibited significant

independence.

(7) The connection with a war’s overall situation is close

This characteristic is determined by the nature and interrelationship of a war, campaigns,

and battles. What is required in a campaign is achieving a war’s partial or localized goals

and even goals bearing an overall quality {quanjuxing}, but a single battle generally

cannot realize the overall goals of a war. A campaign is assigned missions based on a

war’s overall situation, and is waged for a strategic or even higher-level intent, while a

battle is normally fought for a campaign intent. Hence, a campaign has a more direct and

closer relationship to a war’s overall situation than a battle. This relationship is

particularly close in certain major or important campaigns, as well as in the campaigns of

localized wars. In localized wars waged under informationized conditions, this

characteristic of a close relationship between a campaign and a war’s overall situation

becomes even more pronounced.
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III. Classification of Campaigns ...21

Campaigns are classified based on differentiation in type {leixing} and pattern {yangshi}

made for campaigns under different conditions. The campaign type is the basic

classification of campaigns; the campaign pattern is a further differentiation of the

campaign type. The goals of classification are to reveal the campaign’s inherent nature

and its regular patterns from different angles and at different layers, to facilitate

formulation of subjective guidance and objective theoretical guidance and

countermeasures conforming to reality, and to dynamically wrest victory in all types of

campaigns.

(1) Based on the nature of combat, campaigns are divided into offensive and defensive

An offensive campaign {jin’gong zhanyi} is a campaign with the main goals of

annihilating the enemy and seizing-occupying a specified space; a defensive campaign is

a campaign with the main goals of expending the enemy and guarding a specified space.

These are the two major basic types of campaigns. In the general {zongti} sense of war,

an offensive campaign is the main type and main means for achieving war goals, and

plays a decisive role in seizing war victory. A defensive campaign acts as an important

means for aiding and preparing for attack and it also has a decisive position in war. These

two basic types of campaigns, the offensive and the defensive, can be further divided into

offensive campaigns such as the landing campaign, maneuver warfare {jidong zhan}

campaign, positional offensive campaign, urban offensive campaign, airborne campaign,

anti-airborne campaign, and pursuit-attack campaign, and the defensive campaigns such

as the anti-landing campaign, positional defensive campaign, urban defensive campaign,

counter-siege {fanweigong} campaign, and retreat campaign. In campaign operations,

pure offense or defense does not exist; there are only differences in the proportions of

offense to defense and their main-secondary positions.

(2) Based on the participating services and their interrelationship, campaigns are divided

into joint campaigns and service (combined) campaigns {junzhong (hetong) zhanyi}

A joint campaign is a campaign implemented by large formation of two or more services

(under special situations, this can also be a campaign large formation task-organized of a

number of tactical formations {bingtuan} from at two or more services) under a shared

unified command of a joint command institution. A joint campaign is the basic pattern of

future campaigns, and normally is composed of a series of service (combined)

campaigns. The service (combined) campaign is a campaign independently conducted

with the large formation of a certain service or with the large formation of a given service

in the lead, and implemented with cooperation [complemented] by relevant services and

arms, also called a service campaign (including Army campaigns, Navy campaigns, Air

Force campaigns, and 2nd Artillery Corps campaigns).
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(3) Based on operational space {zuozhan kongjian}, campaigns are divided into land

campaigns, sea campaigns, and air campaigns

A land campaign is a campaign implemented on a land battlefield by an Army campaign

large formation independently or complemented by other services and arms. A sea

campaign is a campaign implemented on the sea battlefield or coastal {binhai} areas by a

naval campaign large formation independently or complemented by other services and

arms. An air campaign is a campaign implemented in an air battlefield or within a

specified space or region by an Air Force campaign large formation independently or

with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and complemented by other

services and arms.

(4) Based on operational form {zuozhan xingshi}, campaigns are divided into the

maneuver warfare {jidongzhan} campaign, positional warfare campaign, and guerilla

warfare campaign

A maneuver warfare campaign is a campaign conducted by a campaign large formation

with the main means of force-strength {bingli}, firepower, electromagnetic maneuver

{dianci jidong} and assault and at a non-fixed battleline. A positional warfare campaign

is a campaign of by a campaign large formation attacking an entrenched {jushou} enemy

or supporting a positional defense, and it is divided into positional offensive campaign or

positional defensive campaign. A guerilla warfare campaign is a campaign conducted in

order to complement the frontal battlefield or the regular operations of a main force large

formation by a guerilla large formation on a battlefield such as the enemy rear or flank

The maneuver warfare campaign, positional warfare campaign, and guerilla warfare

campaign are respectively different in position and role in different wars or different

phases of a war. A maneuver warfare campaign can fully bring the powerful might of the

People’s War into play and it can even more fully bring the leadership art of war directors

and the liveliness of a person into play, thus it occupies a prominent position in a future

campaign. The maneuver warfare campaign is inherited from and developed from the

PLA traditional mobile warfare campaign {yundongzhan zhanyi} under modern

conditions.

(5) Based on operational scale, campaigns are divided into the theater strategic-quality

campaign, theater independent-direction {duli fangxiang} campaign, and group army

{jituanjun} campaign

A theater strategic-quality campaign is a large-scale campaign having a decisive

significance on the overall war situation that is conducted under unified command and by

the entire or large portion of strengths in a theater or by the strengths of a number of

theaters in a provisionally designated operational area. A theater independent-direction

campaign is a campaign implemented in a certain direction of a theater by employing

some or most of the theater strengths and under a theater command or theater-direction

command institution {zhihui jigou}. A group army campaign is a campaign implemented

by the operational strengths of a group army or group army equivalent.
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In addition, based on sequential order of operations, campaigns can be divided into first

campaigns and follow-up campaigns; based on the operational geographical environment,

it can be divided into flatland area, hilly area, and mountain area campaigns, and into

river network area, desert steppe area, desert-gravel desert area, tropical- mountainousjungle areas, and plateau-cold-area campaigns.

Section 2: Objective Essential Elements {keguan yaosu} of Campaigns...23

Victory or defeat in a campaign is subject to the constraints and effects of many essential

elements and these factors are divided into subjective essential elements and objective

essential elements. The subjective essential elements mainly indicate human subjective

activity {nengdong zuoyong} and the superb art of leadership in a campaign. The

objective essential elements are mainly three in number: campaign strengths {liliang},

campaign battlefield, and campaign time. A campaign is a contest between strengths, and

strengths are the objective basis on which victory in the campaign depends. The

battlefield is the objective arena in which the campaign strengths conduct their activities

{huodong}; and time is the objective form {xingshi} where the campaign activity

{huodong} exists. The campaign leaders can direct the “living drama” only by relying on

their strengths, by supporting the battlefield, and by utilizing time. With the development

of campaigns, the influence of all the subjective essential elements on a campaign is

growing more and more extensive. An in-depth study on these influences is an important

prerequisite for seizing victory in a future campaign.

I. Campaign Strength {liliang}...23

Campaign strength is a general term for the armed forces used for campaign operations

and in preparations used for campaign operations. It is the most dynamic essential

element among the three objective essential elements of a campaign, because campaign

confrontation ultimately is a confrontation between strengths. Hence, campaign strengths

are an important content of modern campaign study. Today, with the continually

deepening development of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), campaign strengths

are undergoing an enormous transformation. Armed forces in all respects – from weapons

and equipment to the organizational tizhi-system {bianzhi tizhi}, strategy, tactics,

operational thought, training, and logistics – are experiencing profound changes. The

changes in and development of campaign strengths are important constituent parts of this

RMA. Moreover, the strategic quality of modern campaign strengths has greatly

intensified. In modern wars, no battle is fought unless complete victory is assured; all

military powers around the world fully emphasize concentration of crack troops, setting

the tune with one beat of the gong. Hence, modern campaign strengths have become a

critical component in a nation’s armed strength, or a supporting part thereof; their

strategic status has become quite remarkable.
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(1) All essential elements of campaign strengths

All essential elements of campaign strengths refer to the main components for

constituting the campaign strength, and one can differentiate the various essential

elements based on carrying out the various specific mission needs-requirements. The

basic essential elements of campaign strengths are: information power {xinxi li},

firepower, maneuver power {jidong li}, assault power {tuji li}, and protection power

{fanghu li}, as well as the campaign derivative {paisheng} essential elements:

reconnaissance capability, assault power, electronic warfare (EW) capability, command

and control (C2) capability, operational support capability, logistic and equipment support

capability, protection power, and comprehensive operational capability.

1. Basic essential elements of campaign strengths

Information power refers to the capability of the armed forces in information gathering,

transmission, processing, and control, as well as preventing the enemy from effectively

employing information. The capability for campaign strengths to control the military

information domain {junshi xinxi lingyu} is also precisely the capability for the armed

forces to conduct information warfare [IW]. The military information domain refers to

the sum of all information domains associated with campaign operational activities. IW

refers to a struggle by the armed forces to seize dominance in the military information

domain. Although in military history the essential elements of information power have

always played an important role within campaign strengths, they have not attracted a high

degree of attention until recently.

The military information domain is the functional domain for the essential elements of

campaign strength information power. Today, with the vigorous development of military

technology revolution with information technology [IT] as its core, the status and role

{zuoyong} of the military information domain have increasingly grown more important,

becoming a new operational domain. The military struggle from today forward will be

conducted in an informationized battlefield environment where information can be

transformed into a real operational capability and has become a source of strength for

victory. All of the resources of war – capabilities and materiel – must rely on information

power before they can be fully brought into play. Thus, the armed forces must pursue

information superiority {youshi} and continuously strengthen its own information

strengths before being able to put itself in an invincible position in future wars.

In future IW operations, one must allow the structure of information strengths to have an

integrated quality and allow the integrated {zhengti} functionality of each strength’s

essential elements to be brought into play, so one must grasp the integrated whole

{zhengti bawo} and arrange the unified overall planning {tongchou anpai}. One must

take aim at the characteristics of the information operations strength structure, combine

the realities of specific information operations in conducting the general design {zongti

sheji} of the strength structure, and completely consider and adjust the constituting of the

information operation strengths of the various services and arms. One must completely
27

weigh the real operational capabilities of every strength-essential-factor and scientifically

determine the ratio of information operation strength task-organization so as to allow

mutual adjusting-coordination and complementary functionality in terms of constituting

various strengths. At the same time, one must establish smooth and highly effective C4I

systems {xitong} and ensure that various strengths form organically integrated entities

and consistently adjusting-coordinated activities.

Firepower is the main means used by a campaign large formation to kill the enemy

military’s effective strength {yousheng liliang} and smash its weapons and equipment

and various facilities, thus causing it to lose its operational capability. It is an important

indicator of a campaign large formation’s operational capability. It can be differentiated

according to firepower systems {xitong}, nature of the firearm, and categories and

varieties. In terms of technology, firepower general requirements are: tremendous power,

long range, high precision, rapid fire, and multiple purposes. The trend in modern

firepower development is towards long-range, precision guided firepower. It has the

characteristics of remotely deployed weapon platforms, rapid reaction, high hit accuracy,

ease of concentration, and able to remedy insufficient force-strength maneuver {jidong}.

It can directly strike various targets in the enemy’s campaign depth, and has an important

effect on a campaign’s course and conclusion.

Maneuver power {jidongli} is the sum of a military’s speed and range for transferring

troops and firepower and its capabilities for overcoming the effects of terrain and

weather. Maneuver {jidong} is an activity in which an armed force tends toward the

favorable and avoids harm, and this has historically received a high degree of attention by

the armed forces of all nations both in ancient and in modern times. There are mainly

three functions of maneuver in a campaign: the first is to form favorable posture to

subdue the enemy and seize battlefield initiative; the second is to allow one’s own

strengths to break away from a dangerous location and reverse a passive situation; and

the third is to more fully bring into play the effectiveness of force-strengths and

firepower. The developmental history of war has proven that the density of battlefield

personnel and weapons and equipment has always assumed a declining trend, and the

battlefield of the future could turn into an even wider expanse. Under these situations, if

one wants to effectively concentrate and shift force-strengths and weaponry, one can only

rely on rapid and flexible maneuver {jidong}. In another respect, the large improvements

in the progress of modern military technology and automation of armed forces command

and control systems {xitong} have provided conditions for armed forces rapid maneuver.

Assault power {tujili} is the capability to rapidly and fiercely strike the enemy; it is the

combination of firepower and maneuver power. Modern campaign goals are firm, and its

offensive characteristics are prominent; even in defensive operations, it still requires for

the accomplishment of defensive missions with offensive activities {xingdong}. Hence,

assault power has become an important essential element in balancing the modern

campaign strengths. The assault power of a modern campaign large formation, to a very

large extent, depends on the quantity and quality of maneuver firepower {jidong huoli}

high tech operational platforms. Aviation forces, missile force-units, armored force-units,
28

and artillery force-units, as well as helicopter force-units, are the important strengths of

campaign assault. Within the campaign strengths, one should stress establishing a

powerful assault strength so as to facilitate being able to form an assault fist at a critical

moment {guanjian shike} and open up as well as control {dakai bing zuoyou} the entire

campaign situation.

Protection power refers to the capability of campaign strength on the battlefield to adopt

various measures and activities to preserve themselves. Along with the unprecedented

improvement in a modern campaign large formation’s kill capability, improvement in

protection power has already become a fundamental measure for preserving one’s own

operational strengths. If the armed forces lack protection capability, then all of the other

capabilities will be thoroughly weakened. The widespread application of high-tech

weapons and equipment has elevated the improvement of protection power to an even

more important status.

Within campaign strength, all of the aforementioned essential elements are an organic

integrated [whole] {zhengti}, and together they prop up the campaign strength mansion.

The integrated might {zhengti weili} brought into play from their complementing of each

other is far greater than the sum of the five. Taking for example the relationship between

firepower and maneuver {jidong}, although maneuver and firepower represent two

entirely different thoughts, in actual warfare maneuver and firepower are in fact

integrated {yiti}. Maneuver is not merely maneuver without firepower kill, it is only that

the maneuver component is greater than the firepower component, and its characteristic is

“large maneuver, small firepower” {da jidong, xiao huoli}; whereas firepower is not kill

without maneuver, it is only that the firepower component is greater than that of

maneuver, and its characteristic is “large firepower, small maneuver” {da huoli, xiao

jidong}. It is precisely due to the effective cover of firepower that rapid maneuver under

the threat of enemy firepower is possible, and that renders even more might to maneuver.

Also, it is precisely due to maneuver’s race to seize a favorable occasion and site that

firepower can be fully brought into play and that the armed forces can concentrate

firepower to assault the enemy’s weak points. Between the five essential elements of

campaign strength is precisely such mutual facilitation and mutual remediation to jointly

achieve optimum operational effectiveness of campaign strengths.

2. Derivative essential elements of campaign strengths

Reconnaissance capability is a campaign large formation’s capability for acquiring

intelligence on the enemy’s situation, terrain, and related operations. Without completely

accurate, real-time information acquired from a reliable reconnaissance capability, a

campaign commander cannot implement battlefield command, which will surely affect

bringing operational capabilities into play. The modern campaign battlefield is vast, the

information volume has sharply increased, and time effectiveness is very strong. Thus,

basic requirements on reconnaissance are: a wide detection range, long reconnaissance

range, diverse reconnaissance means, prompt and accurate discovery of targets, rapid
29

transmission of intelligence, and the ability to implement continuous reconnaissance in

full time-space.

EW capability refers to a comprehensive capability for protecting one’s own unimpeded

employment of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and disrupting the enemy’s

employment of the EMS, an important component of information power {xinxili}. It

includes the capabilities for electronic reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance,

jamming and counter-jamming, and destruction and counter-destruction. In a modern

campaign, the position and roles of EW capability increase daily; electronic confrontation

{dianzi duikang} activities will be jointly conducted by multi-service electronic

confrontation force-units and penetrate operations from beginning to end. Not only is the

confrontation’s broad in range, large in both scale and space, the means and modes of

confrontation have trended toward diversification. The strengths or weaknesses of EW

capability have become an important indicator for balancing operational effectiveness of

campaign strengths.

C2 capability refers to the capability of a commander and the command organ to apply

command tools so as to achieve specified goals, comprehensively employ various

strengths and means, command and bring into play subordinate force-units and control

the enemy force activities. Its objective materiel bases are the military information

systems {xitong}. C2 capability occupies a very important position within campaign

strengths, and improving C2 capability is an important way to enhance campaign strength.

Operational support capability is the capability for supporting a campaign large

formation’s smooth fulfillment of its mission; it is a general term for various support

capabilities – communications, transportation, engineering, meteorology, camouflage,

surveying and mapping, protection against nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) weapons,

and battlefield management. In a modern campaign, the degree of reliance by the armed

forces on operational support strengths has continuously increased and the content of

operational support continuously has grown so that operational support strengths are an

indispensable component of campaign strengths.

Logistical and equipment support capability is the sum of the various man-, materiel-,

financial-powers, technology and its organizations that assist and support operations.

Logistical and equipment support capability has a major effect on force-unit operational

capability, campaign decision-making and campaign course and conclusion. Logistical

and equipment support can greatly enhance the flexibility and sustained operational

capability of armed forces operations. Modern campaigns require that logistical and

equipment support must achieve initiative, straightforwardness, flexibility, economy,

reliability, and endurance, and moreover require high self-survivability.

(2) Form-state {xingtai} of campaign strength structure

The foundation of campaign strength structure is the force-units of the services and arms.

Structure decides functionality and the good and bad of campaign strength operational
30

effectiveness not only depends on the qualitative level and quantitative amount of men

and weapons and equipment, but it also depends on whether or not the campaign strength

structure is rational. A rational campaign strength structure can organically combine

{jiehe} the different functional services and arms force-units within the campaign

strength based on an optimum ratio and form the maximum combat effectiveness

{zhandou xiaoneng}.

The modern campaign strength structure is divided into a peacetime structure and a

wartime structure. In peacetime, the campaign strength exists with the mode of services

and arms force-units, and in wartime, the force-units are transferred from the various

services and arms to organize and build the campaign large formation. This structural

mode is decided by the diverse quality of the modern military activities. The patterns

{yangshi} of modern military activities not only include the non-war {feizhanzheng}

activities such as providing security and humanitarian aid, emergency and disaster relief,

seizure of drugs, maintaining peace, the activity of striking terrorists, suppressing riots,

assisting the local governments of other countries, and evacuation of non-combatants, it

also includes large-scale regional conflicts, localized wars, and full-scale wars, and the

intensity of employing armed strengths between them has great differences. Furthermore,

the operational adversary not only can be a powerful enemy possessing high-tech

weapons, but it can also be an ordinary mechanized armed force or it can even be some

irregular armed force {feizhenggui wuzhuang}. The threats and missions to be faced are

different, thus, organizing and building the needed services and arms force-units and the

adopted structure of the joint campaign large formation will certainly be different as well.

1. Peacetime structure of campaign strengths

The differentiation modes of the peacetime structure of campaign strengths are mainly

the following three:

Differentiation according to service. For example, the Chinese PLA is basically divided

into an Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps; the U.S. military is divided into

an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; and Russia’s military is divided into an Army,

Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Navy. This mode of differentiation facilitates each

service’s ability to independently conduct equipping, training and management of their

respective force-units. The modern campaign battlefield is undergoing an extension

toward outer space, and together with its corresponding space force-units {hangtian

budui} it has become a critical part of the modern campaign strength structure. Today,

some developed nations have established Space Commands {hangtian silingbu}, and

some nations have space force-units under the unified command of the Air Force with

launch force-units, monitoring force-units, and scientific research institutions, etc.

subordinate to it. With the development of space technology and its widespread

application in coming wars, the “Space Force” {“tian jun”} will occupy a prominent

position in the composition of future campaign strength.
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Differentiation according to the capability and characteristics of force-units

accomplishing missions. For example, the U.S. military campaign strengths are divided

into ground, naval, aviation, mobile {jidong}, special operations, and space force-units.

Amongst these, the ground force-units are composed of the Army and Marines. The

[U.S.] ground force-units, naval force-units, and aviation force-units possess the

capabilities for fulfilling operational missions in three different physical realms: land,

sea, and air, respectively. The [U.S.] space force-units have the capability for controlling

outer space. Moreover, their so-called mobile force-units are neither a service nor a

service arm, but in reality are composed of air- and sea-transport force-units consisting of

military personnel and materiel dispatched to various places around the world; their

mission is to boost the U.S. military’s capability for large-scale delivery of forcestrengths.

Differentiation according to the differences in the strategic mission assumed by the each

force-unit. For example, the present Western military powers popularly divide campaign

strengths into the following three: forward {qianyan cunzai} force-units, emergency

mobile force-units, and reinforcements. Another example: some Western nations

differentiate between force-units stationed overseas and domestic force-units. The

Chinese PLA’s trinity campaign strength tizhi-system of field-operation large formations

{yezhan juntian}, local formations (force-units) {difang bingtuan (budui)}, and militia is

another method of differentiation. The field-operation large formations are composed of

Army campaign large formations, Air Force campaign large formations, Navy campaign

large formations, and 2nd Artillery Corps campaign large formations, which are

responsible for the operational missions within the entire theater. Local formations

(force-units) execute local operational missions within the range of their specified areas

(province, city, and county). The militia is an irregular armed strength {feizhenggui

wuzhuang} mainly complementing the field-operation large formation and local

formation to carry out their corresponding operational missions.

At present, the differentiation modes are mainly the above three, but this does not exclude

the possibility of having other differentiation modes in the future.

2. Wartime structure of campaign strengths

The wartime structure of campaign strengths refers to the strength group {liliang jituan}

subordinate to the unified command of campaign command institution established from

the needed components to be transferred from within various armed strengths in order to

achieve specially designated campaign goals, based on specific operational objects and

battlefield environments in wartime, all to facilitate carrying out the series of interrelated

battles and operational activities and win a victory in the campaign.

(3) Developmental trends in the campaign strength task organization {biancheng}

After the end of the Cold War, the international strategic order and security

circumstances {xingshi} underwent enormous changes, and regional armed conflicts
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became the main threat to national security; reductions in quantity, improvement in

quality, increases in the high-tech content of weapons and equipment and optimization of

armed force structures have become a common trend in the development of the militaries

of all nations. All nations commonly hold that the composition of future campaign

strengths should be able to ensure that the armed forces effectively handle many kinds of

threats, with regional conflicts as the main threat, and possess a high degree of mobility

{jidongxing} and the capability for implementing “full-dimensional operations”

{“quanwei zuozhan”}. To this end, all the major nations of the world, at the same time as

building the prominent key point force-units {tuchu zhongdian budui jianshe}, have

mostly adjusted the task organization of their conventional strengths based on the

mission, readiness levels {zhanbei chengdu}, and reaction speed.

First of all, the characteristic of “integration of three” {sanwei yiti} appears in the task

organization of campaign strengths. The U.S. divides its conventional strengths into three

parts, forward deployed force-units, contingency force-units, and reinforcing force-units,

while Russia divides its conventional strengths into standing contingency force-units,

rapid mobile force-units, and strategic reserves. The “integration of three” campaign

strength task organization is full of elasticity, and can effectively produce a rapid reaction

for a regional quality crisis for an undetermined direction, region, opponent, scale, and

[or] intensity. A small number of standing strengths bushu-dispositioned in a critical

region can be used for dealing with small-scale crises; when the crisis-level is raised, the

rapid mobile strengths are quickly delivered to the crisis region; and if the crisis further

expands, then the reinforcing strengths are delivered, and war mobilization is conducted.

The key point of the “integration of three” conventional strength task organization is the

rapid reaction force-units. Within the task organization of the rapid reaction force-units

are not only ground force-units such as marine, light infantry units, and air defense forceunits, but also naval, air force, as well as airborne {kongjiang}, air-mobile {kongzhong

jidong}, and special force-units, with a high readiness level, excellent equipment, and

awesome combat power {zhandouli}. The “integration of three” conventional strength

structure not only has reduced the armament scale {junbei} and curtailed military

spending, but also has guaranteed the quality of armed forces construction {jundui

jianshe} and increased armed force rapid reaction capability.

Next, the development of various nations’ campaign strength task organization has also

trended towards smaller scale and integration. The development of military technology

and the massive equipping of force-units with high precision and high lethality weapons

have provided a material basis for reducing force-unit task organization and not lowering

combat power. The integration level of future force-units will be even higher, the

coordinated operational capability will be even stronger, the integrated might will be

even greater, and in terms of organizational structure, one will be able to adapt to various

different conditions and different intensities of wars and carry out various missions.

Third, the following characteristics also emerge in the development of campaign strength

task organization of all nations: in terms of the service proportion, there will be key point

development of naval and air forces, and at the same time the army will be reduced and
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national defense resource allocation will steadily tilt towards naval and air forces. In

terms of the proportion of combat and support force-units, the proportion of combat

force-units will decrease, and support force-units will increase. Among the support forceunits, technical support force-strengths will increase, and service {qinwu} support forcestrengths will decrease. In terms of personnel constitution, the officer staffing {yuan e}

will rise while enlisted personnel staffing will drop; the proportion of technical officers

will rise, while the proportion of command and general staff officers will drop.

(4) The organizational grouping {bianzu} form of the joint campaign large formation

The organizational grouping of the joint campaign large formation is the scientifically

organized allocation {bianpei} and composition for the various services-arms force-units

and for the organized systems at all levels of those participating in the joint campaign and

their personnel, weapons, and technical equipment. Normally, it is flexibly determined in

the campaign preparation phase by the commander on the basis of the campaign

intention, battlefield posture, and enemy task organization, as well as the situations of the

activity characteristics and PLA force-unit realities, etc. Consequently, determining the

organizational grouping form of the joint campaign large formation must be directed at

the scale and pattern of a given specific campaign.

In general terms, during such a joint campaign, the organizational grouping form of the

joint campaign large formation are mainly the following two kinds.

1. Organizational grouping based on operational space

This mode of organizational grouping normally divides the campaign strengths into the

three parts of ground, air and naval operational strengths on the basis of the operational

areas of the various services and arms. Its advantage is that it is easy to form an effective

and unified command of the various services and arms force-units.

2. Organizational grouping based on operational mission

This organizational grouping form is to organize and group several interrelated and interfunctional operational groups according to specific campaign missions and natures so as

to bring into play the optimum superiority of various strengths and to improve the

integrated operational capabilities. This kind of organizational grouping benefits the

implementation of direct command and control in accordance with the special operational

missions assumed by the various groups.

II. Campaign Battlefield...30

The campaign battlefield is the arena on which the two opposing sides of a campaign

conduct a contest of strengths, and has an extremely large effect on campaign activities.

Studying the battlefield environment’s relationship to campaign operations and its effect

on campaign activities {xingdong} and mastering its inherent laws not only have an
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important significance for the campaign directors’ correct decision-making and driving of

the campaign, but they also have an important role for the entirety of force-units to fully

utilize the geographic environment to pursue benefits-avoid harm and use strong pointsavoid shortcomings.

(1) Analysis of the battlefield environment

The modern campaign battlefield is constituted by a land, sea, air, space and

electromagnetic multi-dimensioned battlefield.

1. Land campaign environment

The land campaign environment mainly includes the natural geographic environment, the

human environment, economic conditions, transportation/transport {jiaotong yunshu},

and communications.

(i) Natural geographic environment. The natural geographic environment, based

on its influence on the campaign operations, is further divided into topographic features

(geomorphology), hydrology, and meteorology.

1 Topographic features. Topographic features on land mainly include

mountainous regions, hills, plains, and special topographical deserts.

A mountainous region is a region with a relatively steep slope involving a regional

relative altitude of greater than 200 meters, with a significant run {zouxiang}, and a

height above sea level of more than 500 meters.

Mountainous regions have complex terrain, few roads, thin populations, and meager

materials; they place limits on force-unit {budui} activities, which is particularly

inconvenient for maneuvers, but also inconvenient for command and coordination.

Mountainous regions are easy to hold but hard to attack; are advantageous to defense;

facilitate the occupation and holding of a strategic point {pingxian eshou}, the blocking

of openings and control of valleys, and the construction of positions; and enable a

relatively small force strength to resist the attack of an enemy with superiority.

Mountainous regions are natural obstacles to attackers, can break up attacking

formations, and force them to execute their attack along restricted routes. However, the

blocking effect of mountainous regions is conducive to the attackers’ secret concentration

and closing with the enemy, facilitates penetration/cutting up {chuancha fenge} and

flanking attacks {yuhui gongji}, and also facilitates ambushes.

Hills are gently sloped unbroken low hills with a height differential of 100-200 meters,

and often interconnected with a low mountain(s); it is a region where land battlefield

hostilities have been quite numerous. China’s northern hilly regions mostly open up into

dry farmland, and have few trees, thus having little effect on force-unit {budui} activities.
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In southern China, the hilly regions mostly are woods and thickets, with many small

brooks in the valleys; these place certain restrictions on armed force activities

{xingdong}. Hilly-region rolling and swelling terrain can become an effective support for

defense, and can form a relatively solid defensive position. However, since the height

fluctuations are not large, the degree of dependence on terrain is limited, and defensive

flanks often lack favorable terrain for cover. Hence, the offensive defense of

maneuverability {jidongxing de gongshi fangyu} appears even more important in a hilly

region. Attacking in a hilly region facilitates the execution of multipath, multidirectional

assaults, and facilitates selection of defensively weak positions against which to execute a

concentrated strike, and to rapidly effect an encirclement of the enemy defenders;

however, this also makes it easy for the enemy at an early point to discover your

intention, and difficult for you to conceal your operational activities.

A plain is a regional {quyuxing} flat and open region with an altitude above sea level of

less than 200 meters, a good lookout, developed transportation, many residential places, a

dense population, and convenient supplies, and convenient for maneuver, but

inconvenient for concealment. When defending plains, it is difficult to find favorable

terrain that can be reliably held fast, and it is not easy to select and build various

positions. Cities, towns, river banks, residential places, and prominent hills play an

important role in an overall defensive system. Normally it is necessary to add a defense in

depth; to conduct large-scale preparation of positions; to form a multi-point or multichannel {duodaodai} defensive system that can be not only independently held fast, but

also tightly interconnected; and to stress the antitank and anti-firepower raid-attack

problems. Attacking on a plain facilitates rapid maneuver and concentration of forcestrengths, and execution of multipath, multidirectional, multi-echelon continuous

assaults; it also facilitates widespread execution of flanking maneuvers and encirclements

{yuhui baowei}, so that an operation can simultaneously unfold in full depth – in front,

on the flanks, and in the rear – which benefits command and coordination, and in turn

facilitates pursuit.

A desert {huangmo} is a general designation for any desert or gravel desert area; it refers

to a region with dry weather, low rainfall, sparse vegetation, and relatively flat and open

terrain. Desert regions have many sandstorms, a sparse population, and meager produce,

and they are deficient in sources of water. Those spots that do have a source of water are

the oases. China’s deserts are mostly located in areas inhabited by various minorities, and

in scattered residential areas. Desert terrain is convenient for observing firing, but

inconvenient for judging azimuth and concealing one’s intention; construction of defense

works is difficult. Due to the unusual weather, the great depletion of the physical strength

of personnel, and the many mechanical breakdowns, the great difficulty for rear support.

In a desert, it is difficult for mechanized force-units to maneuver away from the road.

Desert area operations center more on vying for unfolding of water sources {shuiyuan

zhankai} or blocking the opponent’s maneuver passage. In general terms, it favors

attacking, but does not favor defending or holding.
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2 Hydrology. Land battlefield hydrology mainly refers to river hydrology,

including for theater rivers their flow direction, flow length, surface width, water depth,

flow rate, water quality, shoal properties, fording places, bridges, riverbed substrates, and

various changing parameters. River hydrology has a very large effect on campaign

activities. Rivers with deep water and fast currents are a natural protective screen for the

defenders, and are obstacles for the attackers; not only can they block up an attack, and

compel the opponent to make a forced crossing of the river, they also easily create

enormous casualties on the attackers’ side. Rivers with shallow water, slow currents, and

hard substrates can be forded by troops on foot, but can greatly reduce the speed of a

maneuver and attack. Some rivers in ordinary times do not pose obstacles, but chance

heavy rains cause the water level to rapidly rise, which then requires bridging and

preparation of crossing tools. In winter, rivers in severely cold regions are blocked with

ice, and heavy equipment can then cross them unimpeded. Rivers aligned perpendicularly

to the direction of an operation often are a protective screen which the opponent finds it

difficult to overcome; rivers flowing in a direction which is the same as that of an

operation are advantageous to mobile force-units and to transport materiel, but can easily

break apart an operational formation, complicating adjusting-coordination between

friendly forces. Large-scale application of aviation forces and amphibious rapid landing

instruments reduce the effects of rivers on operations, but in on-land operations, the

various effects of rivers still cannot be underestimated.

3Meteorology. Meteorology represents the physical quantities and physical

phenomena of weather conditions. The main elements having a major influence on

campaigns are air temperature, clouds and mist, rainfall, and wind.

Air temperature. Excessively high air temperatures with unbearable extreme heat can

result in decrease of personnel physical strength, irritable morale, sleep deprivation, and

easy contraction and transmission of diseases, and this can create non-combat personnel

attrition. Excessively low air temperature, with casualties from the severe cold and easy

icing, aggravates the load on personnel, inconveniences activities, and reduces the

combat power of force-units. An abnormal air temperature can have effects on both

weapons and vehicles, viz., reductions in efficiency and frequent breakdowns; in

particular, the effect of severe cold is even stronger. The higher the air temperature, the

faster chemical warfare (CW) agents will vaporize, and the greater are the casualties. By

contrast, with lower air temperatures, CW agents do not easily vaporize, even to the point

where they lose their lethality. The casualties created on the opposing sides by an

abnormal air temperature are the same, but bright campaign directors – via various coldproofing and heat-proofing preparations – invariably reduce the unfavorable effects of air

temperature on one’s own side, and convert adverse air-temperature conditions into

relatively favorable conditions, with which to seize victory.

Clouds and mist. Clouds and mist can cause reduced visibility, inconveniencing

observation and firing; they can reduce the hit accuracy of laser-guided and other

precision guided munitions, place limits on various reconnaissance equipment, and create

difficulties for communications, which inconvenience coordination between command
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and various force-units. However, clouds and mist are conducive to the concealment of

the force-unit activities and intentions, facilitate the execution of sudden raids against the

enemy, and can be used for close range {di jin} reconnaissance of the enemy; at the same

time, maneuver and transfer can be conducted under the cover of clouds and mist. The

greatest effect of clouds and mist is on the aviation force takeoffs, landings, and

implementation of various ground operations is subject to very great restrictions, and

under dense fog conditions, aviation force assistance to ground operations will receive

the greatest restrictions.

Rainfall. Rainfall muddies open fields and restricts force-unit maneuver; heavy rains and

torrential rains can cause rivers to rise suddenly and sharply, and valleys and ravines to

flood, which create transportation interruptions and hinder activities. Rainfall can cause

reduced visibility, affecting weapons firing and resulting in frequent machinery

breakdowns; in particular, this creates difficulties for logistical support and various other

types of operational support. Rainfall affects the in-air flight and the safe takeoff and

landing of aircraft. Although rainfall has an unfavorable effect on armed force activities,

if one is good at exploiting advantages, rainfall can also enable one to make full use of

one’s strong points and gain victory through the unorthodox {chuqi zhisheng}. Under

modern conditions, the development of artificial rainfall techniques has caused rainfall to

become an important meteorological weapon in the struggle against an enemy. How to

overcome the various effects of rainfall engendered on operations, and under special

meteorological conditions how to seize the initiative have become important topics in

campaign research.

Wind. Wind has an effect on both personnel activities and weapons firing. In particular,

windstorms, which blow dust and sand around, not only can reduce visibility, but also

can damage the eyes and skin of personnel. Wind-blown sand can seriously damage

weapons and equipment, reduce force-unit maneuver speed, and make it difficult for the

force-units to distinguish directions and discover attack targets. High winds affect aircraft

takeoffs, which creates difficulties for command and coordination. Windstorms are

disastrous weather, which can seriously constrain all operational activities. However,

windstorms in fact are conducive to sudden raid-attacks, to concealment of transfers and

retreats. At the same time, wind determines the propagation direction of nuclear

mushroom clouds and CW agents. A fire attack executed with a favorable wind can yield

twice the result with half the effort.

(ii) The human environment. The human environment refers to the socio-cultural

environment with man as the mainstay. It includes the population composition, political

organization, nationalities and religion, and science, education and hygiene {ke jiao

weisheng}. The population resources of the campaign battlefield are important factors

affecting a campaign’s success or failure; they include both manpower resources and

labor resources, so that a high population density can serve as large utilizable strengths

{liliang}. However, with a low population density, the usable strengths will be limited.

Manpower resources depend on both numbers and quality. Quality includes political

quality, military quality, cultural quality, and physical development. A relatively high
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political consciousness and patriotic spirit and a tenacious will – added to rigorous

training in military technology and tactics, relatively high cultural standards, and various

specialized skills, as well as physical conditioning – can produce a major positive effect

on campaign operations. In the social structure, the bringing into play of the capabilities

of human life is closely related to that structure; necessary here is the attaching of

importance to bringing into play all of the effects of social organization, and to the

maximum degree the mobilizing of the masses in the theater, to wage a People’s War

campaign.

(iii) Economic conditions. Battlefield economic conditions mainly signify the

natural resources, agro-industrial production capacity, and various kinds of materiel

reserves that can provide operational utility. Modern campaigns are on a grand scale,

with enormous depletion of materiel. Campaign support, besides supplying various kinds

of off-the-shelf equipment and materiel, often also requires local production and supply,

so that various types of ordinary and civilian goods and materials are converted into

operational materiel. The quality or shabbiness of battlefield economic conditions is

closely related to gaining the upper hand in a campaign.

These resources, and the lumber and fuel directly associated with military supplies, as

well as water resources and minerals – all these are indispensable raw materials

supporting war production. Industrial production can provide the force-units {budui}

with various kinds of weapons and ammunition, vehicles, communications equipment,

medical equipment, food, uniforms, and other equipment. Agricultural production not

only provides the war industry with raw materials, it also can directly provide force-units

{budui} with grain and non-staple foods. The state of theater materiel reserves directly

determines the sustainability of a campaign.

(iv) Transportation/ transport {jiaotong yunshu} and communications.

Transportation/transport includes transport and transportation vehicles, lines, various

facilities (stations, harbors, air fields, bridges), and the transportation and transport

networks constructed from these. The number of all essential elements comprising

transportation/transport, and the degree of their quality, are important marks in weighing

the status of battlefield transportation/transport. Campaign operations are highly

dependent on transport lines, and wartime requires large-scale expropriation of civilian

transport vehicles and facilities; hence, it is necessary during preparations to be assured

of a variety of transport capabilities within the battlefield range. Rail transport, enabling

rapid, high-volume transport, is the main means for pre-war force-unit and materiel

transport. During campaigns, railroads often become major targets for enemy aviation

forces and missile strikes, and under conditions lacking reliable screening, their

positional functions {diwei zuoyong} can be degraded. The positional functions of public

transport in modern campaigns are increasingly improving; artillery and many other

transport vehicles cannot do without highways. Tanks and [other] tracked vehicles, by

maneuvering along highways, can increase their speed. The quality of rear transport also

mainly depends on highways. Water transport includes inland water transport and sea

transport. Inland water shipping can transport both materiel and troops; river ferrying is
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an important means for ensuring that troops can overcome obstacles and obtain freedom

of overwater activities. Sea transportation/transport can forcefully assist land campaigns

in coastal regions, and is an important prerequisite for seizing victory in a sea campaign.

Air transport is fast and flexible, is not subject to the effects of terrain obstacles,

facilitates execution of long-range rapid maneuvers and sudden attacks against the

enemy, and can also implement long-range transport; it has special functions in modern

campaigns. Under conditions where overland transportation has been damaged, air

transport often becomes a major means for transporting materiel and troops. Pipage has

the advantages of high effectiveness, economy, concealment, and difficulty of being

damaged; effective employment of various kinds of preconstructed {ji she} pipelines on a

battlefield is a major development trend in campaign rear transportation.

Battlefield communications mainly include the following: various communications hubs,

communications stations, major communications equipment layouts, and quantitative and

qualitative states; wired and radio communications network safeguards ensuring

performance and wartime survivability and recoverability; and plants for manufacturing

communications equipment, as well as their production capacity. Campaign

communications only relying on a large formation’s own equipment are insufficient;

instead, campaigns should make full use of a variety of communications facilities –

including civilian communications facilities – preconstructed on the battlefield. This can

augment the communications channels and means, ensuring that campaign

communications requirements are met.

2. Sea battlefield environment

The sea battlefield environment, based on its features, in general includes the natural

environment and its related non-natural environment. With the increasing prominence of

the status of the seas, research on the sea battlefield has become an important subject in

studies on the science of campaigns.

(i) Natural environment. In military geography, there are many ways to divide the

marine natural environment; based on the characteristics of campaign operations, this

division mainly includes the following three parts: the marine composition, marine

hydrology, and marine meteorology.

1 Marine composition. The marine composition is divided into essential element

{yaosu} composition and area {quyu} composition. The essential elements refer to

seacoasts, islands and reefs, straits, marine bodies of water, and seabed landforms

(geomorphy) {haidi dimao}. Considered from the standpoint of campaign operations,

area composition is normally divided into open sea areas, island and reef areas, littoral

{binlu} sea areas, and straits. The effects produced on campaigns by the waters of

different areas also vary. Open sea areas refer to vast waters, mainly the high seas {gong

hai}, including some territorial waters of littoral nations; they are the main arena for sea

campaign struggles. They are characterized as follows: vastness, deep water, few islands

and reefs, and a relatively long distance from the coast; convenient for observation and
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firing of various ship guns and missiles; convenient for communications; convenient for

broad maneuvers implemented by a variety of ships, especially large ships; convenient

for large-scale concentration of all types of ships to be thrown into engagements;

convenient for command and coordination; and convenient for aviation forces assistance.

However, they are inconvenient for concealing activity {xingdong} intention; ships in

open sea areas are easily attacked, do not easily obtain the assistance and cover of shorebased weaponry, and have stringent requirements on precision navigation and

communications. Ship formations must possess multiple comprehensive operational

capabilities, such as air defense and antisubmarine capabilities, and must be able to

implement independent operations, with stringent requirements on logistical support.

Island and reef areas signify sea areas comprised of archipelagos, island chains, cluster

reefs, and table reefs, as well as their adjacent waters. Often, due to contention for

jurisdiction over islands and reefs, these areas become one of the critical arenas for

campaign combat. The characteristics of islands and reefs are that they are scattered here

and there on the sea surface, they echo each other from afar, and they are interrelated.

Islands can be large or small. Large islands often have mountainous regions and hills,

terrain that is strategically located and difficult to access {xian yao}, few strips for

amphibious landings, and favorable terrain convenient for support; on such terrain it is

easy to construct heavily fortified defensive positions, enabling control of certain waters

and airspace, and forcing the enemy to unfold {zhankai} prematurely. Island coastlines

are tortuous and have many havens {gangwan}. Island and reef surface areas are narrow

and small. Southern islands mostly lack fresh water, or have a critical shortage of it; they

are encircled completely by table reefs, have precipitous shore cliffs and open terrain,

generally lack docks, and are fairly difficult to climb. Island and reef areas have complex

seabed landforms, a non-uniform depth, and many zones dangerous for navigation.

During island/reef-area operations, ship navigation is restricted, requirements on

positioning and handling are stringent, and mutual adjusting-coordination is difficult; this

inconveniences command, is unfavorable to maneuver, complicates concentration of

force-strengths to implement relatively large-scale engagements, and is also inconvenient

for both sides to bring into full play their firearm might. Operations in island and reef

areas have an amphibious nature and stringent requirements on sea-land coordination;

and given this, reliance on at-sea strengths is greater. Without powerful sea strengths,

operational goals cannot be achieved. Operations in island and reef areas far from the

mainland have relative independence, and are not easily supported by shore-based and

aviation forces. Under such conditions, aircraft carriers assume great significance for a

campaign victory. Island/reef-area operations are very highly dependent on logistical

support. Speaking only from the standpoint of amphibious landing operations, islands and

reefs are favorable to defense, but inconvenient for the landing forces as they assault the

beach and climb onto land. However, since islands and reefs are narrow and small, the

depth [zongshen] is shallow, maneuvering space {huixuan yudi} is not large, and defense

lacks toughness and elasticity. Moreover, islands and reefs often have outbreaks of many

kinds of disease, which easily cause decreases in noncombat personnel.

Littoral areas signify land-bordering sea areas, including various waters – fringing sea,

gulfs, harbors, and offshore islands – and seacoasts. Littoral areas normally are focal
41

areas for the three armed services to successfully conduct a joint campaign and for the

enemy to put up a fierce resistance, and can also be important areas for the Navy or Army

to successfully conduct a combined campaign. Fringing sea is situated on the mainland’s

fringe, and is also called epeiric sea; its outer side is separated from the ocean by a

peninsula and island chain, it has waters of a certain surface area that are interconnected

with the ocean, and its depth gradually becomes shallower the nearer to the seacoast.

Fringing sea has a flat, shallow seabed formed by a mainland extension toward the ocean;

some regions have small fluctuations and underwater valleys, which are not only special

sites for the opposing sides to deploy weaponry for combat, but also areas where they can

establish stocks and a variety of bases. Bays are the parts of sea regions where the sea

water extends up to dry land; their waters mostly are encircled by land, and they have

fairly shallow water levels and fairly large tidal drops, thus forming large-scale intertidalzone beaches. The sea water in a bay is relatively calm, enabling avoidance of stormy

waves, and terrain is concealed; bays thus normally make good harbors and military

bases. The seacoast refers to the dry land adjacent to the sea fringe, and is divided into

muddy coast, rocky coast, and sandy coast. Muddy coast is mostly connected to river

alluvial plains; it has coastal beaches mostly of sludge, little load-bearing ability, a

straight coastline, a gentle slope, extensive beaches, and a wide variation in the ebb-andflow tidal boundary line, all of which are inconvenient not only to amphibious landing

forces but also to construction of defensive positions, and make maneuvers difficult.

Rocky coast mostly is [where] a mountainous region extends to the sea; it has high and

steep precipices, a tortuous coastline, many offshore islands and reefs, large fluctuations

in coastal terrain, and many estuaries. Rocky coast has few and small landing-capable

stretches, is inconvenient to an amphibious landing force’s development toward the coast,

and is difficult for development in depth; but it is convenient to construction of a heavily

fortified position, and is favorable as a reliable site for establishing a defensive position in

fairly great depth. Sandy coast is mostly formed from a hilly region extending to the sea;

has a regular coastline, spreading beaches, and short and slight slopes; enables ships to

easily draw near the shore; has many stretches convenient to an amphibious landing; 

and is convenient to development in depth. Sandy coast stretches are not convenient to

defense; the coastal projections, coastal heights, and offshore islands are focal points for

fighting between the opposing sides. Some sandy coastal waters have many shoals, which

are not convenient for ship activity {huodong}.

A strait refers to a relatively narrow channel, between two pieces of dry land, which

connects two seas and/or oceans. A strait is often a vital passage along a sea line; it is

mostly the only way to pass through, and thus its strategic position is significant. This

significance is very high both militarily and economically, and thus straits have become

major battlefields on which the opposing sides engage in fierce struggles. Straits

normally have narrow waters, precipitous shores, rapid flows, and sharp changes in water

level, but some straits abut shore terrain that is relatively flat. Straits mostly have regular

shorelines, but there are also some with tortuous shorelines, offering many havens. A

strait’s shore conditions are closely correlated with the shore terrain. Strait waters are

cramped, and the channels are restricted and easy to block; it is especially easy to set up

blocks in relatively narrow channels. In a strait, not only is there no way to deploy large

numbers of force-strengths, there are also the great restraints to which ships are
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subjected. Straits easily come under shore-based firepower and are easily controlled by

shore-based force-strengths; and from a strait’s entrance to its exit one almost always can

encounter a shore-directed block {zuji} and/or blockade. Hence, control over the shore is

more important than control over the [strait] waters, and this point is especially

significant for continental {dalu} straits. The influence of a strait on operations is closely

related to the position occupied by the strait, the terrain of the two shores, the surface

width, the water depth, the flow rate, and the substrate; and it is necessary to acquire

detailed knowledge of all the various kinds of natural geographic conditions related to

these, in order to be able to correctly apply fighting methods and adopt various measures.

The special geographic conditions of a strait have caused blockades and counterblockades to become important forms of a campaign in such an area. In blockade

struggle, the focal points are concentrated, the number of force-strengths employed is

small, and the duration is long, enabling one to achieve major operational goals at a

relatively low cost.

2 Marine hydrology. Marine hydrology refers to the physical phenomena

representing and reflecting the sea water’s depth, temperature, salinity, water color, and

transparency, and also the conditions of sea currents, swells, tides, and sea ice. The

physical phenomena relatively highly related to campaign operations follow: the first is

water depth. Depth determines the activity {huodong} area for various kinds of ships, and

simultaneously also determines the useful range of several kinds of weaponry. For

example, a torpedo attack against an enemy ship should be executed in a relatively deep

sea area, and the position of mines and several kinds of obstacles should be chosen in a

relatively shallow sea area. The second is tides. Their size and ebb-and-flow time change

daily, which greatly affects ship navigation and underwater weapons; and amphibious

landing campaigns must master the tidal patterns, and – based on their features – select

the landing time, strip, and vehicles. In late 1949, the Chinese PLA attacked Jinmen

(Quemoy) Island, and since the activity was not conducted based on tide laws, after the

first wave landed, the flotilla, due to its grounding from an ebb tide, could not return to

deliver a second wave, leading to a setback for the entire campaign. The third is sea

currents and swells. Sea currents signify the horizontal flow phenomena produced under

the effects of meteorological and seasonal factors; their flow speed and flow direction are

relatively stable. The direction and speed of sea currents affect not only ship maneuver

and operational activities, but also the accuracy of calculation of a ship’s position while

underway. Vertiginous currents affect a ship’s handling, and internal waves can

sometimes cause harm to submarines. Swells can affect both a ship’s navigation and the

firing of ship guns and other firearms. When swells are large, seaplane and shipborne

aircraft takeoffs and landings are difficult, and moored mines under the pounding of

waves can shift in position, even to the point where the mooring cable breaks off. A

ground mine laid in shallow waters can move around, causing accidental actuation of its

fuse. The degree of danger of offshore currents and surf directly determines whether

amphibious landing forces can smoothly go ashore. The fourth is the transparency of sea

water. It has the greatest effect on a submarine’s diving depth and execution of a stealthy

attack, and also has an effect on underwater mine laying and the emplacement of other

obstacles, but it is favorable to discovery of enemy underwater targets. In addition, as the
43

sea water depth changes, the various sea-water transition layers – in which the

temperature, salinity, and density undergo sharp changes in the vertical direction – have

very large effects on submarine maneuvering {huodong}, hydroacoustic detection, and

underwater communications; however, clever use of transition layers is advantageous to a

submarine’s execution of a stealthy attack. In overall terms, each of the essential

elements in marine hydrology has an effect on operations, only each has its own degree

of influence. These environmental essential elements should be understood in depth, to

facilitate pursuing the advantage and avoiding harm.

3 Marine meteorology. This is closely season-correlated. The marine

meteorology factors affecting campaign combat mainly include sea fog, wind, and

rainfall. Sea fog, since its position varies by sea area, also shows variance in its nature,

distribution, and duration. The Chinese sea areas are a part of the Western Pacific’s many

foggy sea areas, with advective fog as the primary type of sea fog. Its characteristics are:

an extensive range, fairly great thickness, long duration, a zonal distribution assumed near

the shore, and very high seasonality. Spring and summer are the main occurrence seasons

for sea fog in Chinese sea areas; the fogs start at the beginning of the year in the South

China Sea area, and conclude in a zone of the Yellow Sea in August, with a prominent

south-to-north development pattern. Sea fog mostly lifts at 1-3 hours after sunrise 

, but in sea areas where foggy days crowd together, there are sometimes periods of a

dozen-odd consecutive days when dense fog fails to lift. Sea fog reduces visibility;

creates difficulties for ship navigation, positioning, and visual communications; and often

precludes ship gun firing and minelaying at sea. In particular, it inconveniences

coordinated operations among ships and among all of the service arms, and also presents

command with various kinds of detriment. Fog has certain absorptive and scattering

effects on sound, light, and electromagnetic waves, and can cause impaired performance

in various kinds of technical observation equipment. Sea fog also inconveniences aviation

forces in visual flight, observation, and attacks against ground targets. However, sea fog

can also be used as cover, to conceal operations and intentions, and to launch a surprise

attack on the enemy.

The effect of wind on campaign combat is also very large. The most prominent feature of

Chinese sea areas is seasonally windy weather; tepid southerly winds prevail in summer,

while in the last half of the year, frigid northwest winds commonly blow. Wind can cause

ships and aircraft to deviate from course, and produce error in weapons firing. Wind can

induce waves, causing ships to rock; excessively windy waves can generate difficulties

for ship navigation and weapons use, cause sea-sickness and fatigue in personnel, and

create difficulties for command and coordination. China’s sea areas are areas of frequent

tropical windstorms; these storms belong in the category of severely destructive weather,

which can force aircraft to be grounded and prevent surface ships from maneuvering, and

can create dangers for ships during navigation. After windstorms, recovery of combat

power and adjustment of bushu disposition requires a certain time, which easily gives the

enemy an opportunity that can be exploited to his advantage. Under tropical rainstorm

conditions, there is almost no way to conduct large-scale omni-service-arm joint
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operations, but these conditions are advantageous to submarines in executing surprise

attacks against anchored assembled ships.

Sea-area rainfall, although it cannot produce major effects on sea operations, is

nonetheless also a critical factor that cannot be ignored. The characteristics of rainfall in

Chinese sea areas are: concentration of amount, spells with the same season as hightemperature spells, and amounts gradually increasing from north to south and from west

to east. The South China Sea area is subject to tropical weather-effect multiple torrential

rains. Torrential rains and heavy rains similarly can reduce visibility, which affects ship

navigation safety. Rainy days have much thunder and lightning, which interferes with

radar and communications. When the rainfall level is concentrated, the humidity is high,

various kinds of weapons and equipment easily rust, ammunition easily becomes damp,

and materiel easily gets moldy. Rainfall has relatively large effects on electrical

equipment and on guided weapons.

(ii) Non-natural environments. Like the composition of a land battlefield

environment, a sea battlefield’s non-natural environments mainly are the human

environment, economic conditions, transportation/transport, and communications.

1 Marine human environment. This means the sociocultural environment of the

seas along shores and on islands, and also includes: the population make-up; political

organizations; nationalities, religion, and science education; culture; and health. Its

features include a vast expanse of waters, a relatively sparse population, wartime return of

commercial vessels to port, and, except for special conditions, extremely few nonmilitary personnel and boundless waters. It is a free battlefield for the opposing sides to

move about freely and quickly, and does not require taking into account the problems of

protecting civilians and preventing destruction of the populace’s facilities; but at the same

time it loses the support of the populace. In sea operations, no matter how far from dry

land, the land in the end is still the final place. Hence, emphasis on studies of the marine

human environment, doing well in work with the populace, and to the maximum limit

exploiting operational potential are the critical links in sea battlefield operations. Its

specific content is roughly like that of a land battlefield; what is required for attention is

the distinguishing feature of needing to be based on marine operations, and to perform

well all work in a focused manner.

2 Economic conditions. Economic conditions, besides being the same as those on

coasts, islands, and land battlefields, also include the exploitable marine resources.

Marine resources are extremely abundant, and include both aquatic products and various

mineral products; but among these numerous resources, only the aquatic products can be

directly used outside. Extraction of the remaining resources involves a high degree of

difficulty, added to which is the fact that natural resources are also difficult to rapidly

convert into military supplies materiel. Hence, the sea battlefield’s economic conditions

mainly signify the land conditions on the coasts and islands. Under these conditions, the
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local advantages of the various kinds of support for the battlefield during operations are

relatively decreased.

3 Transportation/transport and communications. Transportation/transport and

communications, especially the vehicles and facilities like the rest of all the essential

elements, mainly depend on the various conditions offshore and on the islands. One is the

size of the numbers, second is the level of the quality, and third is the degree of

exploitability. During wartime, many civilian vehicles and facilities must be refitted,

reconstructed, and enhanced; and it requires knowing the score in order to be able to fully

take advantage of and realize the potential capabilities of the battlefield.

4 Rules of the seas and of naval warfare. Studies on the sea battlefield

environment must stress the rules of the sea and naval warfare, to facilitate during

military combat the capability for reasonable, advantageous, economical, and facile

utilization of the marine environment. The law of the sea is a general term for rules and

regulations related to the rights and interests of the seas; it is a principle in all nations

having marine activities, and is also a standard of conduct for dispute resolution at sea. It

has not only clarified the legal status and regulations of the seabed and sea regions –

territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf, straits,

the open sea, and international seaboard – but also specified the principles and the

various rules and regulations to be followed for at-sea navigational safety, marine

resources extraction and protection, and marine scientific research. The sea combatrelated laws of war also include several special laws and regulations, such as a

specification that a sea battlefield is not restricted to the territorial waters of the

belligerent states, and may be fought on the open sea, but may not hinder normal

international shipping, and may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of

neutral states. The rules of the seas and of war, fundamentally speaking, involve

battlefield range issues, which are very closely related to use of the battlefield

environment; every campaign director must understand and be intimately familiar with

these rules and regulations.

3. Air battlefield environment

The air battlefield environment normally is a general reference to the spatial environment

of the earth’s atmosphere. Based on the effects of the various natural essential elements

in the air on various kinds of flight vehicles, we here mainly study the battlefield

environment of the spatial range from the earth’s surface to an aerial altitude of a few

tens of kilometers, including the troposphere and stratosphere in the earth’s atmosphere,

with a focus on the troposphere. The troposphere refers to the air layer, at the earth

atmosphere’s bottom, which has significant convective motion. Its bottom interface is the

ground, and is subjected to the greatest effects of the surface. Its temperature gradually

drops as the altitude increases. Most of the moisture in the atmosphere is concentrated in

this layer; hence, the troposphere often exhibits weather phenomena such as clouds, rain,

and thunderstorms. The troposphere’s thickness decreases as the latitude gradually

increases, and is normally about 16-18 km in a low latitude, about 10-12 km in a middle
46

latitude, and about 7-10 km at a high latitude. Its thickness is also related to the season,

and in general its thickness in summer is less than the thickness in winter. The

atmospheric layer above the troposphere and up to about 50 km is the stratosphere. The

characteristics of this layer are a temperature that slowly rises as altitude increases, sparse

moisture and dust, basically no cloudy or rainy weather, faint vertical movement of air,

and stable airflow, which is good for high-altitude aircraft flights. However, its air is

rarefied, and the reaction of an aircraft to its controls is slow.

The air battlefield and the land battlefield are interwoven. First, they are interwoven in

the relationship between their natural environments. Second, they are interwoven in the

interdependence of their campaign activities; dry land is the final stopover point of

various types of flight vehicles. In regard to land battlefield problems, we have already

presented in overall terms a brief analysis of the related natural environment; below, we

mainly offer an analysis focusing on all of the meteorological essential elements of

atmospheric space that can have an effect on the flight of various flight vehicles.

(i) Clouds and rainfall. The essential elements with a fairly large effect on flight

are low clouds and clouds with vertical development. These normally run from a few

hundred meters up to about 2000 meters, with stratus clouds that can be as low as a few

tens of meters; they can reduce visibility, and can create very great difficulties for the

takeoff, landing, and formation flying of combat aircraft. At the same time, since stratus

clouds have a low altitude and strong convection, after paratroops during a drop enter

such clouds, at a point very close to the ground, there will not be enough time to

distinguish the ground situation and to adopt measures; this affects landing safety and

control of the landing point. Vertical-development clouds include cumulus and

cumulonimbus, which have abundant water content, and also large supercooled waterdrop clouds; aircraft flying in them easily encounter medium or intense icing, affecting

the normal flight of these aircraft. At the same time, thunderstorms in cumulus directly

impact the safety of personnel and aircraft. In dense cumulus and cumulonimbus clouds

there are sharp ascending-descending airflows and turbulent flows, which create aircraft

bumps, cause fatigue in pilots and prevent aircraft from maintaining the preset flight

altitude and a level-flight state; this not only affects optical sighting, but also causes radar

sighting to be subjected to certain effects.

Several species of clouds can cause aircraft to ice over. For example, in nimbostratus,

altocumulus, stratocumulus, and stratus clouds, icing-over has a large effect on aircraft.

Hence, besides installing de-icing equipment on aircraft, it is also necessary to provide

meteorological support with accurate forecasts, and as much as possible to avoid icing

clouds. Once icing does occur, one must rapidly alter the heading and flight speed, and

break away from ice-over areas.

Poor visibility created by clouds and rainfall can affect aerial reconnaissance and

photography; it also affects visual discovery and sighting of targets and radar target

discrimination. Rain water falling onto a runway can reduce friction between the airplane

wheels and runway, which increases the aircraft takeoff/landing taxi distance, and at
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times can also cause a friction imbalance, affecting safe landing. Current advanced

airfield and airborne equipment can ensure safe takeoff and landing for aircraft in zero

visibility, but excessive slickness on runways after ice and/or snow buildup can affect

aircraft takeoff and landing, and then one must adopt [snow/ice] elimination measures

that can ensure safety.

(ii) Wind. Wind has all-around effects on the takeoffs and landings, flight,

reconnaissance, bomb release, and firing of flight vehicles. Its effects on flight vehicles,

based on its direction, can be divided into tailwinds, headwinds, crosswinds, and vertical

gusts; and based on its speed, it can reach specific flow ranges per second.

Tailwinds can increase the taxi distance for aircraft takeoffs and landings, while

headwinds reduce the taxi distance; hence, one normally chooses headwinds to effect

landings. Tailwinds reduce an aircraft’s flight time, while headwinds extend flight time.

Aerial interception of enemy aircraft requires consideration for the effects of wind

direction, or else there is no advance {chaoqian}, which causes falling behind. Tailwinds

and headwinds each have different effects on surface bombing and strafing; one must

calculate the winds at bombing and strafing altitudes and the mean winds from these

altitudes down to the ground, and then make the sighting corrections, or else one will be

unable to hit the target.

Crosswinds can cause aircraft to experience twists and dips, even to the point where they

cause the aircraft to collide with the runway, or to dip and gyrate. In general, crosswinds

of 6-8 m/s do not greatly impede modern aircraft takeoffs and landings, but if they exceed

11 m/s, twin-engine aircraft will have difficulty taking off and landing. Crosswinds can

cause aircraft to deviate from the predetermined route, and if corrections for crosswinds

are not made, it will be difficult to fly toward the predetermined target. Similarly,

releasing bombs and firing, under crosswind conditions, require correction for

crosswinds, or else the target cannot be hit.

The factors contributing to vertical gusts are mainly the various vortices and convergence

zones in the atmosphere, and mountain range windward- or leeward-slope upflows or

downdrafts. Clear sky sometimes also exhibits turbulence; since this is difficult to

predict, the harm is relatively great, and has become a focus for research. Vertical gusts

cause aircraft bumps, which affect flight and operational activities, even to the point of

causing aircraft to crash.

Wind has a very large effect on paratroop airborne landings; it can cause paratroops to

drift from the predetermined landing point. When encountering upflows, paratroop

landings easily experience fairly large divergences, making it difficult for the paratroops

to assemble per the predetermined plan, and affecting the overall airborne landing

operation.

The effects of wind on the various flight vehicles depend not only on the wind direction,

but also on the magnitude of the wind force. Normally, wind exceeding 10 m/s can create
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a variety of relatively large effects. Gusts possess suddenness, easily cause aircraft

bumps, and can produce severe effects on aircraft takeoffs and landings. Typhoons

belong in the category of destructive weather, which not only affects aircraft flight in the

air, but also often can damage aircraft on land or on a ship. Today, even with technical

advances, so that the wind-resistance capability of various kinds of flight vehicles has

been enhanced, in overall terms the effects of wind on flight vehicles still cannot be

ignored.

(iii) Visibility. Visibility refers to the maximum range over which a human with

normal vision can distinguish target objects from the background. Nighttime visibility is

low. In addition, the degree of visibility normally is more or less determined by minute

droplets and dust suspended in the air. Besides clouds and rain, dense fog, sand, smoke,

and smoke screens all can reduce visibility. Aerial visibility includes three directions –

horizontal, vertical, and oblique – which are one of the meteorological conditions

determining air force flight activities. Although advanced airfields and airborne

equipment can ensure aircraft safe takeoff and landing under zero-visibility conditions,

and also ensure that aircraft under poor-visibility conditions can carry out an attack

against a target, visibility nonetheless remains an important factor determining the

opening or closing of an airfield, and the distribution of dangerous weather reports and

warnings. Low visibility can cause pilots to lose clear sight of the horizon {tiandixian}

and ground marks – and at night to lose sight of, or lose clear sight of, or incorrectly see

luminous points.

Visibility has a relatively large effect on aircraft takeoff, landing, and aerial formation

flying. Poor visibility easily causes an aircraft to deviate off course, or lose course; in air

warfare, it also affects target searches and moreover affects aiming and firing; and it can

also affect reconnaissance aircraft photography. Operations under poor-visibility

conditions can only conduct activities with single planes or small formations; it is

difficult in a short time to send out large numbers of planes to execute a concentrated

strike, and for executing strikes against targets one must have special-purpose specified

equipment support. Poor visibility not only produces unfavorable effects on coordination

among an air force’s various formations, but also has an even greater effect on adjustingcoordination among all of the services and arms.

The effects of visibility on an airborne [landing] force are also fairly large; not only does

it affect safe landing, it also makes it difficult to determine bearing after landing, and

difficult to rapidly concentrate to form combat power. However, poor visibility in fact is

favorable to the concealment of airborne activities and intentions.

In addition, air temperature also has a certain effect on aviation forces’ activities. Its level

can change an engine’s thrust, which affects the airspeed indicator and the

takeoff/landing taxi distance.
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4. Outer-space battlefield environment

Outer space refers to the cosmic space outside the earth’s dense atmosphere, and is also

called deep space, or just space. At the 32nd Congress of the International Astronautical

Federation, convened in 1981, outer space was called the “4th environment,” on a par

with dry land, the seas, and the atmosphere. Thus, people are now also calling outer space

the 4th-dimension battlefield, based on the 3-dimensional (land/sea/air) battlefield. Outer

space, serving as a battlefield environment for military conflict, has a lower-limit range of

100-120 km, which is determined according to the flight altitude of spacecraft. Since 

the density of the earth’s atmosphere below 100-120 km is relatively high, friction

between the spacecraft in flight and the atmosphere can generate high temperature,

causing the spacecraft to incinerate; and even if it does not burn up, the effect of

atmospheric drag on the spacecraft can cause it to lose speed and drop to the ground.

People have their various different partitions of outer space, although the upper limit is

never clearly specified, and serves as an arena for human campaign combat – from the

present viewpoint, this arena is mainly within the flight zones of the various spaceflight

vehicles in motion around the earth. The flight altitude of the various types of spacecraft

is not uniform; geostationary satellites have an orbital altitude of ~36,000 km, and based

on the above conditions, some developed nations have determined that the future space

battlefield altitude range will be within 130,000 km, or about the length of 10 earth

diameters.

The effects of the outer-space battlefield environment on a campaign are prominently

reflected in aspects of its effects on various flight vehicles. These mainly include the

following few factors:

(i) The earth’s gravity. Although gravity gradually decreases as altitude increases,

the amplitude of this decrease is very small; at an altitude of 160 km, it only drops 1%,

and even at an altitude of 2700 km, it decreases only by one-half (50%). When a flight

vehicle needs to enter outer space, it first of all must have powerful sustained thrust. At

the same time, after a flight vehicle enters outer space, so that it will not fall back into the

atmosphere, it must overcome the pull of gravity, and overcoming gravity can only be

accomplished by having the flight vehicle reach a certain speed. This in fact means: flight

around the earth must attain the 1st cosmic velocity, 7.9 km/s; flight around the sun must

reach the 2nd cosmic velocity, 11.2 km/s; and flight beyond the solar system requires

reaching the 3rd cosmic velocity, 16.7 km/s.

(ii) Temperature. The ground temperature can have effects on all types of

weaponry. Ground temperature differences between the equator and the two poles, and

between summer and winter, can reach maxima of more than a few tens of degrees. And

in outer space, due to the sparse air, there is no other medium to transmit temperature; a

flight vehicle will have a temperature as high as 200°C for a sun-facing surface, but as

low as -100°C for the opposite surface (in shadow) – a difference of up to 300°C. In

space, far from a fixed star, the environmental temperature approaches absolute zero,

while in the vicinity of a fixed star, temperature can be as high as several hundred to
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several thousand degrees Celsius. This places very stringent requirements on the

materials used in spacecraft components; not only must they withstand high temperatures,

they must also resist low temperatures, and simultaneously they must also meet various

high targets (indicators), such as light weight, and ease of realizing various effects. A

space shuttle, before returning to earth, in order to resolve the temperature-difference

problem, is forced to roll over its sun-facing side, so that its outer temperature reaches a

uniform level.

(iii) Vacuum. Spaceflight requires overcoming the disadvantages introduced by

vacuum. When the surface air pressure is 760 mm Hg, each cubic-centimeter volume

contains ~240 quadrillion molecules. At a high altitude of 1500 km, atmospheric pressure

is ~10-12mm Hg, and each cubic-centimeter volume contains ~32,000 molecules.

Moreover, in interplanetary space, the average number of molecules or atoms contained

in each cubic centimeter does not reach 100, and in interstellar space this average is only

10. In outer space, if there is no shielding for a flight vehicle’s outer skin, and no oxygensupply equipment, the oxygen atoms in a human body can immediately be cleared out

completely, and this alone will prevent humans from surviving in outer space. Engine

operation requires air, and an aircraft equipped with one typical engine has a climb

altitude limit [i.e., ceiling] of 27 km.

(iv) Harmful radiation. Outer space’s terrestrial space (the space from ~35,800 km

and below) is a high-radiation environment. Solar electromagnetic radiation – X-rays and

infrared rays – has certain effects both on the human body and on materials. Particle

radiation coming from the earth’s radiation belt, solar cosmic rays, and the Milky Way

cosmic rays can seriously affect the environment. A series of corresponding protective

measures must be adopted, in order to ensure the smooth performance of space activities.

(v) Weightlessness. Although the decrease in the earth’s gravity as altitude

increases is fairly small in amplitude, when a high altitude of several 10,000 km is

reached, a spacecraft can experience serious weightlessness. Under these conditions, any

extraneous tiny interference can cause roll or attitude change, which makes normal

operation difficult. A spacecraft’s manufacture must resolve the weightlessness problem,

so the vehicle’s flight attitude is controlled. At the same time, a variety of weightlessstate-induced unfavorable effects on crew activities must be eliminated.

In addition, one must also resolve various kinds of harm to spacecraft and crew brought

about by meteorites, space debris, silence, and loneliness. The outer-space battlefield

environment is a special environment that is both known and at the same time still not

deeply understood; with continuous deepening of such research, the outer space

battlefield will assume further use and development, and the struggle for the outer space

battlefield will further intensify.
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5. Electromagnetic (EM) battlefield environment

With the widespread application of high and new science and technology (S&T) in the

military field – and especially with the unprecedented development of information

technology – the power of various kinds of military EM radiator (radar, communications,

navigation) radiation sources is becoming ever greater, and quantitatively has increased

many times over; also, the spectrum is growing ever wider; on top of which, the

emergence of directed energy weapons (e.g. high-power microwave weapons), EM pulse

bombs, and ultra-wideband and high-EM-radiation jammers has made the battlefield EM

environment extremely complex. According to related reports, the frequency band of

military EM radiation equipment approved for use by NATO has almost covered the

entire common EM-wave spectrum.

Under informationized conditions, operational command cannot do without the EM

environment, which has become an indispensable important factor under operational

command and control. Communications and command systems – at any time, in any

space, and at any point on the battlefield – are always in a certain EM environment, and

the changing posture of the EM environment perforce induces changes in

communications and command system states. For any one side, seizure of EM dominance

has critical effects on mastery of battlefield operational information, on formation of

operational command decisions, and on transmission and feedback of operational orders.

From the viewpoint of practice in several recent localized wars under informationized

conditions, operations always develop in a complex, changeable EM environment; the

contest between the warring sides in the EM environment is more intense and more

spectacular than in a mechanized war. Clearly, under informationized conditions, the

effects of the battlefield’s EM environment directly influence the realization of the

combat effectiveness of weaponry, and determine survivability on the battlefield. Hence,

the effective use of the EM environment, control of EM environmental effects, the

seizure and holding of EM dominance, and then the effective boosting of command

effectiveness and combat effectiveness, are major prerequisites and the utmost important

factors in winning an informationized war campaign. The U.S. military has clearly stated:

“Ensuring use of the EM spectrum is extremely important for the U.S. military’s strategic

and tactical systems’ fulfillment of combat missions.”

It is worth mentioning that since the EM environment is an objective reality that is

“invisible and formless to the naked eye,” regardless of whether in wartime or peacetime,

a campaign commander must make good use of advanced information technology, fully

bring into play the art of stratagem, enhance the protection and ruggedization of

weaponry against EM damage, and be on alert for “electronic surprise attacks;” they must

at the right moment seize a favorable EM environment, actively take the initiative to

transform an EM environment, and do everything possible to disrupt and defilade the

enemy’s EM environment.
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(2) Battlefield characteristics and battlefield preparations

1. Battlefield characteristics

Compared to past campaign battlefields, the modern campaign battlefield exhibits several

new characteristics. These mainly include the following:

(i) An expansive space. The modern campaign battlefield has an extensive

character; its space extends not only transversely, but also vertically. Campaigns in the

past mostly were waged on land or mainly on land, and mostly had spaces ranging from a

few tens of square kilometers to several hundred square kilometers. In the 1950s, the

Shanggan Ridge campaign [i.e., the “Triangle Hill” and “White Horse Hill” battles of

Oct. 1952] waged by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army had a space of only 0.43 sq.

km. Also, in the localized war campaigns since the 1970s, the battlespace has often

involved a length and breadth of several hundred kilometers and even as much as 1000

km or more, and involved the warring sides’ far-reaching depth and even entire [national]

territory. The range of the modern campaign battlefield – besides the scale required for

politics and foreign relations, or for strict control of the war – is almost unlimited; the

span of long-range raids and of the mobile interception range is extremely large.

The modern battlefield space’s vertical extension is especially prominent. First is its

extension into the sky. Past air wars mostly were fought at a medium altitude of 1000-

7000 meters; but with the emergence of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), forcing aviation

forces to develop toward high altitude, many new types of aircraft today have a ceiling

already exceeding 20,000 meters, and approaching 30,000 meters, which has significantly

increased the space for the activities of campaign combat. In particular, the development

of spaceflight technology has caused outer space to become a key constituent of the

campaign battlefield, and has extended the campaign battlespace suddenly upward to

almost 100,000 km. Second is its extension underwater (underground); the seas have

become a more important campaign site. In the later stage of World War II, submarine

dive depth was only ~100 meters, while for a modern submarine it is generally 300-500

meters, and up to 700 meters for some. One U.S.-built deep submersible experimental

vessel has a dive depth now up to 1000 meters. With the widespread use of weapons with

large-scale lethal destructiveness, the underground has become a closely watched,

important arena; this has resulted not only in construction of a large number of air raid

shelters, but also in the concealment underground of both key facilities and arms. Forces,

by fully utilizing underground passages and facilities, frequently execute maneuvers and

operations. Under these conditions, many types of weapons capable of deep earth

penetration and destruction have emerged as the times require, and the underground thus

has become an organic constituent part of the battlefield.

The expansive nature of the modern campaign battlefield is determined by the

development of weaponry. With the continuous advances in S&T, the future battlefield

will further expand toward every field.
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(ii) The “5-dimension” integral whole. Past campaigns mostly were independent

operations of each service, each activity occurring in a corresponding spatial range; land,

sea, and air battlefields each had relatively high independence. However, in modern

campaigns, all battlefields – land, sea, air, space, and EM – are interdependent, and form

a closely connected whole. This mainly arises from the following two causes: the first is

that the joint campaign is the basic form of a modern campaign; only by bringing into

play the overall might of each battlefield’s operations can a campaign victory be seized.

A joint campaign is an integrated operation jointly executed by all service arms, on land,

at sea, and in the air; the connection among the various forces in a campaign is close, and

centers on one campaign goal, bringing into play the overall effects. However, each

service arm’s troops have their own maneuver space; integrated operations have

determined the integrated spatial battlefield. The integral nature stressed in a modern

campaign naturally also includes the integral nature of the campaign battlefield. The

second cause is that in modern campaign operations, all of the battlefields – land, sea, air,

space, and EM – are interrelated, intercoordinated, interdependent, and indispensable.

The land battlefield is a base for the sea, air, and space battlefields; likewise, the sea

battlefield also can serve as a base for the air and space battlefields. Air battlefield

operations and the other battlefields’ operations support each other by coordinated action,

but air operations in particular can directly and rapidly support each battlefield’s

operations, and have become major prerequisites for overall campaign operations. The

outer space battlefield’s intelligence and surveillance directly guide activities on the land,

sea, and air battlefields; and anti-satellite and antimissile warfare can directly cover and

protect each battlefield’s critical targets from discovery and damage. A strike on a key

target in the enemy’s depth is itself a closely coordinated joint operation. The close

coordination among all battlefield operations inevitably fuses all of the battlefields into a

whole.

(iii) Nonlinear forms. In traditional battle, the opposing sides have a relatively

clear battle line; differentiation of the front and the rear is fairly evident, the focus of the

opposing sides’ combat is at the forward edge and at the frontal surface of one line, and

the two sides, based on the campaign’s course, constantly throw in fresh forces and

gradually advance toward the enemy’s depth. However, in modern campaign battle,

friend and foe are very close to or interlinked with each other, even to the point where

they sometimes mutually enter into the opponent’s far-reaching depth and attack; not

only is there no clear battle line, there is also no clear distinction between the front and

the rear, and there is also no marked difference between the front lines and the flanks.

Thus, the battlefield’s external form assumes a complex state in which friendly forces are

within the enemy and enemy forces are within friendly troops.

Modern campaigns not only develop in full-depth expansive space, but also penetrate into

the ground, underground, sea surface, underwater, the air, and even outer space. On the

ground, various types of mechanized equipment undergo altitude maneuvers; on the sea

surface and underwater, various ships contend in different directions and at different

depths; in the air, a variety of missiles and flight vehicles enter into intense combat; in

outer space, various weapons assist and support all battlefield operations –
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simultaneously with all of this, the opposing sides also launch attacks, so that campaign

combat pervades the entire battlefield space.

The constant improvements in all sorts of weapons not only have boosted their

capabilities for overcoming and surmounting complex terrain and water regimens, but

also have enabled them to adapt to operations under a variety of meteorological

conditions; adding to this is the widespread use of meteorological weapons on the

battlefield, enabling campaigns to be continued in various special environments. At

times, in order to enhance surprise, the attacking side also has the possibility for

specialized use of special harmful environments to execute an active strike.

(iv) The status of the air battlefield is prominent. From the viewpoint of campaign

practice in several recent localized wars, the status of the air battlefield is growing ever

more prominent. In 1983, when the U.S. military invaded Grenada, the main forces

thrown in were Army commandos and Marines; but in the entire operation – from

amphibious landing to maneuvers, envelopment, outflanking, and attack – the vast

majority of activities were conducted in the air. The military was held to have fought an

aerialized {kongzhonghua} ground war. In the Gulf War, 1991, the full-course assault of

the Coalition Forces was 42 days, while completion of the air strikes used up 38 of those

days. In the 1980s, Israel’s air strikes on Iraq’s nuclear reactor and on the PLO

headquarters, and the U.S. military’s air strike on Libya – all of these were pure air

operations. Some have gone so far as to hold that if a modern campaign lacks strong

support in the air, then victory cannot be attained.

The prominent status of the air battlefield is because it has greater advantages and

broader development prospects than the ground battlefield. In the air, one can

advantageously look down from a commanding height, with enormous controlling power

and influential power over the ground and the sea; no matter whether for observation or

for fire, one point can control a large sector, the field of vision is wide, and the deterrent

effect is large. The speed of air maneuvers is high; it is 10 or even dozens of times higher

than that on the ground or at sea, is not subject to terrain constraints, and makes it easy to

defeat one’s opponent by a surprise move. The air is more advantageous to bringing into

play a variety of advanced technologies, and electronic transmission in the skies has

much better effects than on the ground. Airborne weapons, compared to ground weapons,

have greater use value and a higher benefit-to-cost ratio, and in manufacturing respects

yield higher benefit for the same expense. The beneficial status of the air battlefield has

promoted a gradual shift in the focus of weapons production toward development of

airborne weapons, which in fact has further boosted the prominent status of the air

battlefield.

(v) The land battlefield is a support for all battlefields. Studies of modern

campaign battlefields must fully and correctly understand the status effect and

interrelationship among the various battlefields. The land, sea, air, and space battlefields

of the 4-dimensional battlefield are mutually influential, interdependent for their

existence, and form an interwoven, unified whole; but in the final analysis the land
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battlefield is the end place for the other battlefields. First, the land battlefield is the place

for human survival, and is also the end place for the entire war’s fighting. This fighting,

regardless of the battlefield, fundamentally speaking is always subject to the service of

the land battlefield. Wars start from a land battlefield, and finally return to the land; the

land battlefield is the decisive battlefield. Second, the land battlefield is an appendage to

and support for the other battlefields. The higher and farther various flight vehicles fly,

and the longer is their flight duration, the more they eventually need to land. With ships,

the farther they sail, the more they need to pull in to shore for supply. The land battlefield

is thus a base for the sea, air, and space battlefields. Although bases similarly can be

established in outer space and at sea, such bases all require starting from land bases. In

particular, under present conditions, each of the other battlefields has an extremely high

dependence on land bases. Third, land targets are critical targets or first-choice targets

against which [the forces on] each battlefield execute strikes. Even with more intense

combat at sea or in the air, in the end the land targets must be finished off; direct strikes

on land targets are advantageous to accelerating a campaign’s course and directly

achieving the campaign goals. Fourth, the land battlefield is the key point for battlefield

construction and use. Not only are the weapon bases for all of the other battlefields on

land, the quality of the land battlefield’s own construction and use is very closely related

to achieving victory in the entire campaign. This indirectly explains the status effect of

the land battlefield.

2. Battlefield preparations

Battlefield preparations are all of the operational preparations conducted in a certain

space for waging a campaign. They include familiarization with the battlefield

environment, selection of an advantageous battlefield, and performing battlefield

construction.

(i) Familiarization with the battlefield environment. A campaign commander,

during the prewar period, based on the possible assumed mission and operational

direction and the land (sea) area, studies and becomes familiar with the battlefield

environment – first, in order to make preparations for the campaign plan {jihua} and for

decisions, and second, to facilitate in wartime the full use of the environmental conditions

to implement flexible command.

The campaign battlefield involves a wide spatial range, with no intervisibility. Hence, the

familiarization on maps must be performed first. However, what are mainly reflected on

maps are the terrain conditions and reliance on these for making operational decisions

and for command is still far from enough; one should also simultaneously study relevant

data: the operational area’s military geography and military topology. By repeated

comparative studies of the various kinds of data, based on fully striving to obtain a

macroscopic thorough grasp of the operational area’s terrain environment, the features of

the theater’s geographic environment are mastered. On this basis, operational

reconnoitering {zhanchang kancha} is then performed; when the situation permits, the air

and ground or sea (or water) reconnoitering should then be conducted, so as to enhance
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perceptual knowledge. Land battlefield reconnoitering mainly ascertains situations such

as the critical-quality high areas where one can control the entire battlefield and where

can play a supporting role on the entire battlefield; it also ascertains the situation of

terrain, passageways, and transportation hubs favorable to use. Sea battlefield

reconnoitering mainly ascertains the situation of coastal terrain, regions advantageous to

amphibious landing, docks and harbors, islands and reefs, marine hydrology, and strait

channels.

To facilitate a comprehensive, in-depth understanding of the battlefield environment, one

should also perform – in a focused, concentrated way – investigational surveys, invite

personnel familiar with the local situation to introduce it, charge the proper specialized

personnel with further testing and revision of relevant figures and data, and really learn

how things stand at the center.

(ii) Selection of an advantageous battlefield. The modern campaign battlefield

possesses very great uncertainties. First is that modern arms are not much subject to

terrain constraints; any space always has the possibility of becoming a battlefield. Second

is that a battlefield is not only determined by one’s own side, it is at the same time also

subject to the enemy’s constraints. However, fundamentally speaking, the geographic

environmental conditions are still the basis for the opposing sides’ operations, and one

cannot break away from and completely transcend these conditions. Added to this,

campaign operations themselves stress stratagems and the spirit of initiative, in which

what is very important is to force the enemy and lure the enemy into an operation under

unfavorable conditions. Hence, selection of an advantageous battlefield is still a critical

factor in gaining the upper hand in a campaign under modern conditions.

There are four main criteria for selection of a battlefield. The first is strategic intent; one

must set out from the strategic overall situation, and in a specified operational direction

and area range, select for waging the campaign the space that is most advantageous to

achieving the strategic goal. The second is the geographic environmental conditions;

mainly, based on the size of the battlefield capacity and the features of the geographic

environment, one chooses a position and range for waging the campaign. The third is the

enemy’s situation; based on the specifics of the enemy’s operation and on the enemy’s

possible main operational direction, one determines the main battlefield and the

secondary battlefield. The fourth is our situation; based on one’s own operational

capability and equipment status, one facilitates one’s ability to develop the strong points

and avoid the weak points.

Different campaign patterns have different requirements on geographic environment; in

terms of universal significance, when selecting a battlefield, one should have a firm grasp

of the following four points: the first is that position is important. Defense requires

selecting a key area that possesses major significance, can cover an important objective

and area, is situated in an enemy offensive communications hub, and can check or

exhaust the enemy’s massed forces {zhongbing} groups; offense requires selecting an

objective or area that has a major impact on the overall situation, and can at one point
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settle and propel the overall situation. The second is that the geographic environment

[should] be advantageous. On defense, one can be entrenched in a strategic place with

difficult access; a forward edge and flank having advantageous terrain can be covered,

which favors friendly maneuvers but disfavors the enemy’s attack. On offense,

geography [should] favor concealed closing with the enemy and unfolding an attack,

facilitating coordinated operations by all of the services and arms and full use of

firepower. The third is that supply is convenient; it can provide the campaign with

material resources and various types of supply. The fourth is that the civilian situation is

favorable; the populace politically [should] actively support – and militarily,

energetically assist and participate in – the fighting.

(iii) Conducting battlefield construction. Battlefield construction includes military

engineering construction, materiel reserve, battlefield data preparations, work with the

masses, and campaign battlefield preparations.

Military engineering construction includes construction of a positional system;

establishment of a stationing and quartermaster system for personnel, weapons, and

equipment; and construction of transportation networks and their corresponding stations,

docks and harbors, wharves, air fields, various command facilities, and rear supply

facilities. Military engineering construction should follow the principles of fast and

urgent at first and slower later, heavy at first and lighter later, and manufacture of

products for both peacetime and wartime use; it should proceed according to plan and

with stress on key points. At the same time, one should also pay attention to the terrain

features, integrate the future possible forms for waging a campaign, and enhance the

directed quality {zhenduixing} of the construction.

Battlefield materiel reserve is normally directed at a potentially occurring war; in

conducting prewar reserves, there are mainly ammunition, equipment, fuels,

pharmaceuticals, and foods. For reserves, one must successfully seize the time

opportunity, being too early not only is inconvenient for preserving, it also facilitates

mold damage. While reserving materiel, one should also – based on the situation of a

campaign’s possible duration – make good use of local materials, and carry out the

preparations for production of military supplies and materiel. In a modern campaign, the

requirements on preparations – water and motive power (especially electric power) – are

very stringent; one should integrate peacetime production and livelihood to establish

various kinds of facilities, to facilitate a wartime capability for self-support.

The various kinds of battlefield materiel preparation are one of the important tasks in

battlefield preparations. One must conduct a detailed collection of preparations for the

overall operational area and the various types of operation-related data, such as terrain,

hydrological, meteorological, transportation, and communications data; and one must

continually complement and improve upon the original basis. Ample materiel

preparations not only are required by commanders to implement battlefield command, but

are also required for force-unit {budui} activities and for bringing into play the optimal

effectiveness of various kinds of weapons.
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The efficacy of battlefield work with the masses is very closely related to a campaign’s

success or failure. Based on a full understanding of the situations of the battlefield

military and civilian numbers and structure, and of the political attitude, one must

enhance the ties to the masses, and assist the masses in performing production and

construction. One must conduct propaganda among the masses, and arouse the broad

masses’ patriotic fervor and sense of justice. Assisting the local governments in building

good relations between the troops and the people, and conducting military training in a

focused manner, will facilitate to the greatest extent the exploitation of the potential of

People’s War.

Campaign battlefield preparations must be performed under a unified plan {jihua} and

leadership, and stress should be laid on maintaining secrecy and concealing the intention.

With the continual use of a variety of weapons on the battlefield, operations will

continually open up new fields, and hence will also cause a constant increase in the

objective factors affecting the battlefield; campaign directors must establish new

battlefield concepts, and enhance in-depth studies on all essential elements of the

battlefield, so as to adapt to the requirements of future operations.

III. Campaign Time...53

Campaign time refers to the entire course of preparations, commencement, and

conclusion of one campaign. Time is one form in which all moving matter exists, and

naturally also should be an objective form in which campaign activities {huodong} exist.

Among campaign activities, campaign time is an exceedingly important objective

essential element. Every phase of campaign development and every activity {xingdong}

in the campaign course has the time variable as its basic condition, and they all also have

time as the objective form in which they exist. Away from time, a campaign cannot exist;

to talk about a campaign away from the time would also completely lack significance. A

campaign acts as a relatively advanced form of military confrontation; the time has

special requirements on it, and has a constraining and influencing effect on a campaign’s

success or failure. Under high-tech conditions, the effects of the time factor become

increasingly important. Hence, research on campaign preparations and execution surely

must do the following: stress their time environment, time field of view, and time scale;

examine and analyze the changes in and updates to the sense of time; and do the utmost

in campaign practice to conscientiously master and put to use the time factor.

(1) Inherent traits of campaign time and its basic functions

1. Inherent trait

In the campaign category, there are very many time-related concepts. From different

viewpoints, campaign time can have different divisions. Based on the order of the

campaign activity {huodong}, this time can be divided into campaign preparations time,

campaign implementation time, and campaign conclusion time, as well as campaign rest

and reorganization time. Based on the time sequence of campaign implementation, it is
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divided into primary campaign time and follow-up campaign time. From the viewpoint of

the course of campaign activities, the inherent basic traits of campaign time are

manifested as duration quality, phased quality {jieduanxing}, and sequential quality.

Duration quality {chixuxing} reflects the length of the full course of the campaign

activity {huodong}. Time is one-dimensional, unidirectional, and irreversible. Hence, it is

the sum reflection of the specific and localized campaign activity {huodong} times

within a single campaign. Any campaign or campaign activity {huodong} is a

continuously performed and change-developing process; moreover, they all have a

mutually interconnected continually developing process of past, present and future.

During this process, each specific or localized activity {huodong} of a campaign is

interlinked, and connects the preceding with the next, thus forming the duration time

{chixu shijian} [sustained time] of an intact campaign. A campaign’s duration time is

normally reflected with time segments, such as several days, ten-odd days, and several

months.

Phased quality {jiduanxing} refers to a gradual-progress quality of the campaign process.

It is a form of expression distinguishing the different development phases in the

campaign’s course. In order to effectively implement a campaign or to achieve results

when a campaign’s external environmental conditions determine that the campaign’s

overall objectives cannot be achieved in a single operational activity, a campaign

normally gradually achieves sub-objectives over a series of operational activities, and

finally achieves the campaign’s overall objectives. Therefore, campaign activities in one

sense are expressed as one continuous, unbroken development process, and in another

sense it has a law of “cycles”, it is conducted with tempo and step-by-step, and thus

campaign time inevitably takes on a phased quality. This phased quality is the most

effective inherent trait in campaign time. Since the emergence of the campaign, people

have discovered and recognized the phased quality law of a campaign, and have

consciously employed this law in campaign operations research {yunchou}, organization,

and implementation. For example, when a commander organizes the plan {jihua} and

implements a campaign, he will divide the campaign into a number of campaign phases,

allowing them to be interlinked. He will create conditions for a campaign’s latter phase

development with the previous phase’s results by adjusting-coordination of campaign

strengths. And in order for the latter phase to more effectively inherit and develop the

previous phase’s results, he will thus render campaign development to have adjustingcoordination qualities, a balanced quality, and a tempo quality. The length of a campaign

phase is normally expressed by use of time segments. It is obvious that it cannot be

greater than the campaign duration time.

The third inherent trait in campaign time is the sequential quality {shunxuxing}. From

the macroscopic viewpoint, a campaign phase gradually progresses from start to finish,

and has a trait of not leaping over, so its division should be based on a campaign’s

specific situation, with a preceding [part] and a latter [part], and it is expresses the

sequence of time. From the microscopic viewpoint, all of the specific, individual, and

localized activities {xingdong} within the developing campaign activity {huodong} all
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have a definite sequence. Hence, the phase differentiation of a single campaign has a

definite time sequence, the overall planning {chouhua} procedure {chengxu} of one

concept {fangzhen} has a definite time sequence, and the arrangement of the various

strengths and their activities within a plan {jihua} also has a definite time sequence.

Fundamentally speaking, these are decided upon because campaign goals cannot be

achieved with a single operational activity. Hence, the sequential quality of campaign

time is the basic assurance for smoothly achieving the campaign’s anticipated goals {yuqi

mudi}. Only by fully grasping sequential quality can a commander genuinely overall plan

{chouhua} and guide a campaign according to the basic movement laws of a campaign

{zhanyi de jiben yundong guilyu}, otherwise, the campaign will fall into chaos.

The duration quality, phased quality, and sequential quality of campaign time are

interrelated. First of all, all three are recognized as inherent traits of campaign time.

Second, the sequential quality of campaign time is reflected in – or in other words is

contained in – the duration quality and phased quality of campaign time. Third, duration

quality normally includes a certain phased quality, and this is manifested in the sequential

quality of campaign time.

2. Basic functions

The various functions of campaign time are reflected in the relationship between time and

the many facets of campaign practice. They basically can be divided into the control

function, the synergistic function, and the transforming function.

The control function refers to the impact of a commander’s use of time on standardization

of generation of campaign activities. That is, during campaign preparations and

operational practice, by seeing that campaign activities are established on the basis of a

time-sequenced structure, and thus overcoming the chaos of campaign activities, one

achieves and maintains a stable operational sequence. Drawing upon the control function

of campaign time, commanders can – based on a specific concept and plan {jihua} –

achieve a campaign’s anticipated goals. In reality, regardless of what campaign control

mode one is in – control of the objective or control of the plan – and regardless of the

duration or time of implementation of control measures, the time factor is always an

important criterion and standard.

The synergistic function means the high benefits obtained by the campaign’s opposing

sides by use of time, generating a positive effect on the campaign’s course. Since the

content of a modern campaign’s operational activities is complex, the operational tempo

fast, and the strengths invested diverse, these require that no matter whether in terms of

activities or in terms of strengths, there should always be close complementation and

coordination in terms of time between the various links of a campaign. Only thus can

there be ordered adjusting-coordination and overcoming of chaos so as to tightly combine

the various systems {xitong} of a campaign. The synergistic function requires relying

upon a full understanding of the time sequence changes in all aspects and layers of a

campaign in order to forecast the campaign’s final orientation, as well as the cyclic
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changes of campaign phases. Only thus can one maintain a clear campaign development

direction and objective, and maintain a favorable campaign tempo so as to lay the

foundation for victory in the campaign. The synergistic function is also manifested in

terms of utilizing combat opportunity, namely, this is adopting an activity at the most

appropriate time, and in this way, one can gain twice the result with half the effort.

The transforming function refers to campaign time changes being able to generate

transforming quality effects on the content of the campaign activity {huodong}.

Campaign time and the content of campaign activity are interrelated, mutually restrictive,

and under certain conditions mutually transforming. For example, campaign rest and

reorganization expends time, but it restores and enhances combat power {zhandouli};

extension of defense time is beneficial for reducing losses in defensive space.

(2) Basic characteristics of modern campaign time

Campaign time in different eras has different characteristics. With the continuous

application of high technology in the military, the operational capability of weaponry and

troops has constantly risen, impelling the continual development of the campaign, which

now possesses several new characteristics. Campaign time acts as the form in which the

campaign activity exists, and also surely will assume a new development trend,

embodying new characteristics.

1. Shortening the duration quality

This is determined by diverse causes. The first is the prominent strategic quality of

modern campaigns, stressing the overall might brought into play by the joint operations

of all the services. Second is the constant improvement in the performance of high-tech

weaponry; this has increased strike lethality, has provided a material basis for curtailing

of campaign duration, and has greatly reduced the response time of modern weapons and

equipment, which has provided the conditions for accelerating the campaign course.

Third is the implementation of campaigns under unreciprocating {buduideng} conditions.

Fourth is the widespread application of various operational support systems, which

greatly shortens the time for each decision-making item of the campaign activity. Fifth is

the enormous consumption in a modern campaign; both sides strive for quick battle-quick

decision {suzhan sujue}. These causes have significantly increased the utilization rate of

campaign time, and have continuously increased the activity density per unit time.

Therefore, the duration of a modern campaign is significantly shorter than that of prior

campaigns; it may be the time used for a single major battle in the past. To give some

examples, the operational duration of the U.S. military’s invasion of Grenada was only 8

days; the duration of operational activities in the U.S. military’s air strike on Libya was

15 hours, with the air-strike operation per se only taking 12 minutes; and the Gulf War

and Iraq War only took 42 days and 43 days, respectively.
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2. Improved precision quality

Various kinds of electronic equipment, precision guided munitions, stealth weapons, and

night-vision devices have gradually taken over a dominant position on the battlefield;

they have not only greatly increased the accuracy of time, but also required that the

computation of time must be more precise. Simultaneously, they have also required that

operational activities and plans {jihua} must be coordinated in time with a high degree of

accuracy. For example, if air operations time is several seconds different from the plan

time, this will harm the coordinated operational capability of operational aircraft. Another

example: concentrating force strength and firepower certainly must have a high degree of

accuracy and consistency in time; otherwise, the effectiveness of the concentration will

be degraded. In addition, the widespread application of high technology in the military

not only has increased the accuracy of firepower maneuver and of force strength

injection, it has also provides a campaign commander with more aided decision-making

means. This greatly boosts the capabilities of a commander to gather information, process

information, conduct decision making, and ad hoc command, and – while organizing,

planning, and commanding a campaign – one can accomplish more precise operations

research {yunchou}. To this end, in the arrangement of time-unit divisions for each

campaign activity {huodong}, one must be even more careful and certain activities

{huodong} must be precise to the minute or second as the permissible range for time

difference grows ever smaller. Hence, a modern campaign requires that campaign large

formations in their activities {xingdong} cannot have even minute carelessness, no matter

whether in combined operational activities or in joint operational activities, one must

always maintain high precision adjusting-coordination consistency.

3. Fuzziness of the phase quality

One expression of the contention between the opposing sides in a campaign is the

opposing commanders’ meticulous arrangement of the transitions between the various

campaign phases. In modern campaigns, the constant improvement in weaponry

performance, as well as the development of campaign theory, has increasingly shortened

the intervals between the campaign phases. The time segments for some campaign phases

constantly overlap and intersect, causing the clear outlines between conventional

campaign phases to tend toward fuzziness. This is expressed as follows: on one hand, the

transitions between campaign phases become even shorter; on the other hand, some

campaigns do not undergo clear phase transitions. The fuzziness of the phased quality is a

major trend in modern campaign development.

(3) Use of campaign time

If one wants to achieve victory in a modern campaign, one must conscientiously study

campaign time, integrate the processes of the various campaign activities, and use

campaign time in the most reasonable, most effective manner.
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1. One must strive to optimize the relationship between time and space

Any campaign process always occurs within a certain time and space. In order to obtain

the greatest operational benefit, commanders should take the overall plan {jihua} time as

their guide, and strive to optimize the tempero-spatial system. First, they must focus on

the time quality of a plan. They must establish a time sequence and time-space sequence

for all plans related to a campaign’s overall situation. Second, they must focus on the

plan quality of time. Based on a campaign’s overall intention, the duration of campaign

operations is taken as a whole for the plan, the operational activities for each campaign

phase and continuation are outlined, and a reasonable time-space relationship is formed;

in a reasonable space, one can reasonably plan and spend the time, and thus more rapidly

achieve the campaign intention. For an optimized time-space relationship, one should

grasp two points: first, one must grasp the laws of campaign development, and

scientifically compute the time. When computing time, one should focus on the need to

precisely calculate and precisely operate the time sequence of every operational activity

and the use of all force-strengths and weaponry. Computation of campaign time should

accurately consider the interrelationship and constraints among time and each spatial

dimension, as well as their impact and constraints on the entire campaign process.

Second, one must reasonably fix a campaign time limit. The time limits of an optimized

campaign time-space relationship generally can be divided into three categories: samestart time limits, same-finish time limits, and synchronous time limits. Same-start time

limits place limits on the unified commencement time for each campaign activity; samefinish time limits place limits on the unified conclusion time for every campaign activity;

and synchronous time limits will restrict each operational activity’s process – from start

to finish – to a certain time segment.

2. One must at the right moment utilize and actively create favorable timeopportunities

A time-opportunity is a moment or time segment of operational activity {huodong} by

both sides. A similar campaign activity {huodong} at different times will achieve very

different results. The time-opportunity problem exists within all campaigns, but in a

campaign under informationized conditions, this problem seems especially prominent.

Hence, a campaign commander must fully grasp the characteristics of different timeopportunities, and work towards placing the various campaign activities {huodong} at the

most appropriate time-opportunity.

The modern campaign battlefield situation changes rapidly; the confrontational situation

varies minute by minute, and the conditions present a more blurred picture. Control over

operational methods, forces, firepower application, campaign processes, tempos, and the

like, will all become abnormally complex and difficult; hence, the time remaining for a

time-opportunity is extremely short, and selection and use of an opportunity will be more

difficult. To this end, one must be adept at recognizing a favorable time-opportunity.

Firstly, one must conduct a comprehensive analytical assessment of one’s own, the

enemy’s, weather, and geographic conditions within the same time, and then select an
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time-opportunity favorable to one’s own side and unfavorable to the enemy. Among

these, one must especially focus on the campaign “apex” {dingdian} problem; for

example, in an offensive campaign, when an “apex” instant will soon arise, or at the time

of approach of an enemy counterattack (decisive counterattack), timely partial or

complete suspension of strike operational activities, or temporarily going on the

defensive, prevents falling into a passive state, due to lack of a “counter-counter [attack]”

capability, when an offensive “apex” appears. A campaign commander must also grasp

natural knowledge, be good at using the weather, and understand time- and season-based

arrangement of opportunities for campaign activities. Secondly, one must be adept at

utilizing favorable time-opportunities. A time-opportunity has a very strong timeeffectiveness quality. It requires a commander to have sharp discernment and a rapid

reaction capability, and to promptly go and use it, avoiding its use too early or too late.

For example, in concentrating strengths – no matter whether the concentration is of forcestrengths or firepower – if done too early, one can easily reveal one’s own operational

intention, and thus cannot achieve suddenness; if done too late, one can then let the timeopportunity slip past, and cannot reach the goal of the concentration. In view of this, a

commander must be adept at standing at the height of the overall situation, examining the

time to measure the circumstances {审时度势 shenshi duoshi}, knowing what’s coming

from a small clue {jianwei zhizhu}, and accurately grasping the time-opportunity to

concentrate strengths. Third, one must fully bring into play subjective dynamic quality,

flexibly apply stratagem means, and create favorable time-opportunities. Timeopportunities have three different situations: the first is the inevitable quality of timeopportunity during the campaign process; the second is the accidentally appearing timeopportunity during the campaign process, and the third is the artificially created timeopportunity during the campaign process. These three kinds of time-opportunities should

be successfully mastered [grasped], but the third kind of time-opportunity requires fully

bringing into play a commander’s subjective, flexible, and planning qualities {jihuaxing},

and requires bringing into play superb stratagem skill. To create a time-opportunity, one

must thoroughly know stratagems and be far-sighted. Fourthly, one must

comprehensively analyze and grasp the time-opportunity from the perspective of the

overall situation. The strategic quality of modern campaigns is prominent; it is subject to

constraints by factors such as political, economic, and diplomatic struggles {douzheng}.

Hence, one must not only consider time-opportunities on the battlefield, but also give

consideration to and take advantage of favorable time-opportunities for struggle in the

political, economic, and diplomatic realms. One must not only employ military means to

grasp and create time-opportunities, but also fully employ a variety of means – political,

economic, and diplomatic – to create and select time-opportunities. One must not only

consider the posture of the battlefield, but also consider the postures of the political,

economic, and diplomatic struggles and their development trends; perform a

comprehensive, integrated analysis; and weigh the advantages and the disadvantages.

Thus, one selects a time- opportunity most advantageous to one’s own side.
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3. One must have sufficient campaign preparations time

The special quality and complexity of modern campaign preparations lead to an increase

in the time for preparations. The opposing sides in a campaign – and especially the side

with an active attack – must have ample time for campaign preparations. Modern

campaigns are not only confrontations in the military arena, but are also confrontations in

the political, economic, and diplomatic fields; campaign confrontations are directly

subject to the control and influence of national strategy. A campaign’s goals and means,

time and space, course and outcome are directly subordinate to, and serve a country’s

strategic objectives. Hence, a commander during campaign preparations must stand at the

height of the strategic overall situation and conduct stratagem-planning of a campaign

from the perspective of the integrated-whole interests of the nation’s politics, economics

and diplomacy. Thus, the military struggle needs a sufficient amount of time to create a

desirable and big environment for campaign initiation from the perspective of the

political, economic and diplomatic struggles. A modern campaign is generally a

confrontation between immense campaign operational systems {tixi} that is constituted

from the campaign strengths, various weapon systems and operational support systems of

all services which must consume large amounts of material resources. Campaign

preparations can involve every layer of a theater; moreover, sometimes they can involve

authorities associated with the entire military and even the entire nation, which facilitates

concentrating the entire military’s crack troops and efficient weapons, to fight a high-tech

campaign. Therefore, one must conduct necessary preparations during peacetime. Before

campaign initiation, one also needs a specific imminent battle preparation time so as to

firmly grasp the further implementation of campaign preparation work. This includes

further improving the positional [emplacement] systems {zhendi tixi}, overhauling and

additional repairs of various facilities and equipment, replenishing materiel and

equipment, and inspecting the work of the masses, as well as organizing imminent battle

training. Only on the basis of sufficient preparations can one ensure the effective conduct

of a campaign.

4. One must have a good grasp of campaign tempo

Adaptation to, and mastery of campaign tempo are of major significance to a thorough

understanding of the speed of a campaign’s course, the length of the campaign activity

{huodong} cycle, the degree of urgency of operational levels, and the joining of

operations to the rest-and-reorganization phase and other phases. Under informationized

conditions, the operational preparations time of campaign strengths has shortened,

maneuver capability has improved, assault speed has increased, the spacing between

operations is gradually disappearing, and the duration of operational activities has

gradually shortened, thus causing an acceleration of campaign tempo. For example, in a

typical positional offensive campaign in World War I, attack speed was only a few tens

of meters per day, the tactical penetration operational phase often required maintaining

for several weeks or even for a longer time, and depth extension operations also required

several tens of days; campaign tempo seemed extremely slow. In World War II, due to

the huge increase achieved in the destructive capability of firepower, and to the rapid
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maneuver capability bestowed on operational groups by mechanization, campaign large

formations acquired a capability for high-speed penetration, the duration of several

operational phases – tactical penetration, campaign expansion, campaign encirclement –

was greatly shortened, and the links between the campaign’s various phases grew tighter,

greatly accelerating campaign tempo. The duration of Germany’s first strategic offensive

campaign against France was 25 days, of which the time for the active attack was 18

days; during this period, the average attack speed along the primary direction was 18-20

kilometers per day. Since the 1980s, campaign tempo has significantly increased. During

the Soviet Army’s Afghanistan invasion war, the Soviet Army’s east/west 2-route assault

group – under the coordination of paratroops, air-landed troops, and armored helicopters

– executed a 3-D penetration, and in 1 week had completed the capture of Afghanistan,

with a mean speed of as much as 120 km/day. In the Gulf War, the U.S. Army’s 101st

Airborne Assault Division (of the XVIII Airborne Corps) executed two airborne assaults

against the Iraqi Army in depth, with attack speeds reaching 150 km/day and 280 km/day,

respectively. Moreover, the entire ground offensive campaign during the Gulf War only

lasted 4 days. The reasons for the acceleration of campaign tempo follow: the first is that

the military possesses powerful campaign firepower. The second is that the maneuver

capability of troops, arms, and firepower has been enhanced. The third is that advanced

operational command systems have enhanced command and control of the battlefield,

troops, and weapon systems, which has enhanced operational activities’ foreseeability,

planned quality {jihuaxing}, and ordered quality, which in turn has enhanced the

flexibility and rapidity of responses. The fourth is the widespread application of large

amounts of night-vision equipment, giving campaign activities a 24-hour/day continuous

execution capability.

This high-speed quality of modern campaign tempo has increased the difficulty of

mastery of campaign tempo. If one wants to correctly understand a modern campaign’s

tempo, one must first understand the factors of campaign tempo. These factors include

the campaign strengths of both-sides, the battlefield, time, and stratagems. All of these

can impact time changes of campaign activities, and accelerate or retard campaign tempo,

thus lengthening or shortening the campaign course. Next, one must understand the

generational features of campaign tempo. Due to a modern campaign’s force-strength and

firepower maneuvers, the decision-making, stratagem-planning {mouhua}, and

controlling of campaign command all show a trend toward rapid tempo. Hence, in the

overall campaign tempo rapidly becoming a law of campaign development, a commander

must rapidly react, in order to be able to adapt to the requirements of that campaign law.

Third, one must understand the principles and methods of adjusting and arranging tempo.

From the viewpoint of principles, although campaign tempo is accelerating, in the

process of directing a campaign one still must adjust and arrange well the speed and

degree of urgency of campaign tempo. For example, in an offensive campaign, the tempo

corresponding to the organization and planning phase is relatively slow; one must

carefully organize, fully prepare, have everything in good order, conduct concealment,

and – after having assurance of these achievements – then act. However, in the campaign

execution phase, one must emphasize the attack’s high speed, and the sudden fierce,

rapid, and continuous assault on the enemy. In a defensive campaign, the organization

and planning phase tempo is perforce faster; it requires fast reaction, accurate decisions,
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careful organization, prompt defense, and maximum reduction of the losses in the

enemy’s early strike. From the viewpoint of methods, one generally must adopt methods

to try to achieve coordinated, balanced development of the campaign course, including

the throwing in of troops and firepower, and the use of offensive and defensive means

and methods – all of these require one’s best effort at coordinated, balanced development.

For example, when formulating campaign plans {jihua}, one must allow for unforeseen

circumstances, have in hand adequate long-range firepower, and establish strong reserve

forces, thus avoiding weakness in the rear (while having strength at the front) and a lack

of reserve strength, or being unable to deal with external events, leading to speed at the

front but slowness in the rear. In addition, one can also employ reinforced troops,

firepower density, and maneuver speed to upset the enemy’s tempo, while simultaneously

adjusting one’s own campaign tempo, so as to effectively shorten the campaign course.

However, at times, in order to adjust-coordinate force-unit activities, build up forces, and

immobilize and disintegrate the enemy, adoption of various methods for adjusting

campaign tempo, and retarding it – envelopment, delayed attacks {huan gong},

encirclement without attack, and careful biding of one’s time – will be beneficial to the

smooth development of a campaign.

5. One must correctly understand and process the relationship between a “quick

decision” {sujue} and “protracted” {chijiu} [warfare]

The duration of modern campaign operations has relatively shortened; but in a specific

campaign, the attacking side seizes the initiative by launching a campaign, and strives to

employ various types of strengths, using active operational means and activities, to seek

out and discover the enemy’s weak point(s), fully bring into play its own superiority,

reduce depletion during the campaign, and strive for a “quick decision” within the

shortest possible time, to achieve the campaign intention. However, the side finding itself

on the defensive mostly is in a passive position in the campaign’s early phase; and in

order to change this passive posture, only by a tenacious defense and aggressive

counterattack, via repeated contention with the enemy, can it shake off this passive

situation in the campaign’s early phase, and strive – on the basis of a “protracted”

resistance, by using the means of active attack – to amplify the attacking side’s depletion,

and [thus] gradually change from passive to active. Since the side conducting the active

offensive normally seeks a quick decision to defeat the enemy, in terms of thought and

psychology [mentality], they do not have preparations for sustained [protracted]

operations; thus, once the defending side has smashed the attacking side’s goal of a quick

decision to defeat the enemy, it can psychologically create pressure against the attacking

side, and this assists the defending side in psychologically achieving the conversion from

passive to active. Moreover, the defending side, once it drags the campaign operations

into a protracted stage, can reduce the attacking side’s expectations, and deny the latter’s

intention, so as to enhance confidence in a defensive victory. From the standpoint of

campaign activities, the defending side, in the midst of a passive early-phase overall

situation, seeks a partial (or localized) initiative, and then from that partial initiative, it

gradually expands to an active state for the overall situation. If the defending side drags

out the campaign into a protracted state, making the attacking side’s campaign goal

difficult to rapidly achieve, then it can cause the attacking side to abandon the offensive
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and conclude the campaign. For example, the U.S. military, during the Vietnam War,

lasting as long as 14 years, and the Korean War, lasting less than 4 years, had the earlyphase initiative in both, and strove for a rapid victory in both; but in the end, following

the prolongation of the [war]time, they fell into a protracted state. Hence, no matter

whether in an offensive position or in a defensive position, all commanders must

understand the dialectical relationship in time between a “quick decision” and a

“protracted” state, and attain very good knowledge of offensive and defensive operations;

in this way they can guide the campaign’s development in a direction advantageous to

their own side.
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Chapter 2

The Creation and Development of Campaigns...63

Section 1: The Emergence and Development of Campaigns...63

I. The Emergence of Campaigns...63

The campaign is an operational form-state {xingtai} that appeared after war and combat.

It is an inevitable product of social productivity and human warfare practice developing

to a certain phase and its emergence has undergone a long and slow process of

development.

Toward the end of the slavery era, the development of production power and population

growth in states provided ample supply of manpower for the military. The subsequent

growth in the size of the military provided an impetus for change in the inner

organization of the military, which in turn led to developments in the modes and methods

of war. These developments served as a catalyst for the emergence of the campaign. With

expanded war scales, development in war practices and prolongation of durations of war

and its continuity, operational forms {xingshi} and patterns {yangshi} of war began to

change. Campaigns subsequently emerged as a class of activity on the battlefield. In

addition, the needs-requirements of the goals of war and subjective guidance have also

pushed forward the appearance of campaigns from a rational aspect.

In China, as early as the pre-Spring and Autumn Period (770-475 B.C.), some battles

with certain campaign characteristics made their debut, for example, the Mingtiao Battle

during the war in which the Shang Dynasty vanquished the Xia Dynasty, and the Muye

Battle during the war in which King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty vanquished the Shang

Dynasty. During the Spring and Autumn Period, frequent battles for supremacy and of

conquest took on distinct characteristics of campaigns. For instance, the Battle of

Changshao of 684 B.C. fought between the Kingdoms of Qi and Lu during the war for

supremacy over central China waged by Lord Heng of the Kingdom of Qi was called “a

little campaign” by Mao Zedong in his “On the Strategies of Revolutionary Wars in

China.” If one believes that ancient Chinese campaigns began to germinate after the

Battle of Changshao, then the Battle of Chengpu of 632 B.C. fought between the

Kingdoms of Jin and Chu during their war for supremacy over central China far exceeded

the scope of an ordinary battle. It took on an embryonic form of a campaign. More than

one hundred years later, the first campaign in ancient China made its debut – the Battle of

Baiju fought between the Kingdoms of Wu and Chu.

The Battle of Baiju of 506 B. C. fought between the Kingdoms of Wu and Chu, in view

of the participating strengths, the operational goals, the organizing of plans {jihua} and

command, and the composition of operational activities, bore the basic attributes of a

campaign. First of all, the Battle of Baiju consisted of a series of battles and operational

activities. Under a unified intention, planning and command and with a unified goal, the
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two sides engaged in battle used their respective main force and conducted, on a vast

battlefield, a series of combat and operational activities, including the Han River

Standoff, the Decisive Battle of Xiangju, the Battle of Pursuit at Shenyuan and the

Capture of the Capital of Chu Kingdom. Secondly, the two sides each deployed several

dozen thousand troops, mobilizing all their main forces in all-out operations. Thirdly, the

battle lasted dozens of days. Historical records clearly indicated that from the time the

Wu and Chu began to deploy their respective forces at Baiju on the 19th of November in

506 B.C. to the time of the fall of Ying, the capital of the Kingdom of Chu, into the hands

of Wu forces on the 29th of November, the battle lasted 11 days. Adding the time for the

thousand li surprise attack by the Wu army, the storming of three passes, and the Han

River standoff, the actual duration of the battle was estimated to have run dozens of days.

Fourthly, the operations affected a large area. Direct engagement by both sides were

fought in an area of more than ten thousand square kilometers, running from Xinyang in

the north to the Han River in the south, and from Baiju in the east to the city of Ying in

the west. Fifthly, the operational activities were conducted under a unified command. In

addition to the kings of the two states being present to supervise the battle, the Wu army

was under the unified command of Fu Kai, brother of He Lu - the King of Wu, and

commanding General Xun Wu, whereas on the Chu side, operations were uniformly

directed by the supreme commander, Yin Zichang and others. Sixthly, in the Battle of

Baiju, the Wu army achieved the goal in the war that affected the overall situation. After

dealing a decisive blow to the Chu army, the Wu army captured the capital of Chu at one

stroke, thus determining decidedly the course and the outcome of the whole war.

In other parts of the world, campaigns can trace their origin to the Marathon Battle during

the Greek-Persian War of 492 B.C. The battle bore many characteristics of a campaign.

During the fifth century B.C., an embryonic form of sea campaign began to emerge. The

naval battle between the state of Wu and the state of Yue in the Yellow Sea in China, and

the Battle of Salamis between the navies of Greece and Persia were representative of such

naval engagements.

II. Development of Campaigns...64

Ever since their emergence, campaigns have undergone a process in which they evolved

and developed from simple to complex and from rudimentary to more advanced. Judging

by development and change in the weaponry, the development of campaigns has

undergone historical phases of “cold weaponry” era to “hot weaponry” era to thermonuclear weaponry era. And now we are moving toward the information era.

“Cold weaponry” era: In China, this era of “cold weaponry” roughly ended in the 12th

century A.D. during the North Song dynasty. In the rest of the world, the era came to a

close around the 14th century A.D. – with the introduction of gunpowder manufacturing

skills from China to Europe. Campaign patterns during this era were mainly field

warfare, attack and defense of fortresses and sea warfare. Field warfare was often fought

over plains and open fields with the opposing sides first lining up in formations and then
71

following with attacks on each other at close quarters. The basic formation was the

phalanx. With the growth in types of arms, foot soldiers were joined by chariots and the

cavalry in mixed formations, and the flexibility and mobility of battle formations were

gradually expanded. More and more attention was devoted to the use of reserves. Better

advantage was also taken of different terrains. Battles were no longer restricted to plains

and open fields. Most battles were still fought in frontal engagement, but a lot of

emphasis was placed on winning through surprise attacks. In terms of operational

methods, the most widely used methods were simultaneous attack from both the front and

the rear, attack from the flanks, ambush and sneak attacks. Attacks on and defense of

fortresses during the cold weaponry era were typical positional warfare. The defense of a

fortress was considered a more advantageous operational pattern. It mainly relied on the

enclosure wall and the surrounding trenches or the moat. Sometimes, other fortifications

and barriers were also constructed for better defense. The focus of such battles though

was consistently centered along the wall and its periphery. In the assault on a fortress, the

main strategies included laying siege and forcing the enemy to surrender because of

starvation and exhaustion, surprise attack, and encouraging defection and other

stratagems. To storm a fortress by stacking up, digging a tunnel or by using other

instruments, generally speaking, would exact a heavy toll on the attacker. Therefore, the

leading thought in this regard regarded such strategy not as the best choice, but as last

resort. The main modes of sea battle engagement were boarding battles, and other times

the ramming of the enemy’s vessel. In sea battles, such tactics as attacking

simultaneously from the front and the rear, attacking from the flanks and other directions

were also used. In China, typical campaigns in this era included the Battle of Chengpu,

the Battle of Baiju, the Battle of Lize, the Battle of Changping, the Battle of Chenggao,

the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Chibi, and the Battle of Yihulao at Luoyang. Typical

foreign campaigns included the Battle of Marathon, the Battle of Cannae, etc.

Era of “cold and hot weaponry:” This era in China lasted for 900 years beginning in the

North Song Dynasty and ending in the mid-Qing Dynasty. In the rest of the world, the era

began in the 14th century and ended in the 17th century. With the emergence of “hot

weaponry,” the cavalry began to decline. Foot soldiers armed with “hot weaponry” reemerged as the dominant force in the battlefield. With growth in the range and destructive

power of “hot weaponry,” the role of close-quarter fighting with “cold 

weaponry” increasingly became subordinate. Campaign bushi disposition and operational

formations underwent constant changes. In the 16th century, in order to avoid casualties

by enemy artillery fire, loose columns replaced ancient phalanx formations in battles. By

the end of the 16th century, the ratio of musketeers in the military units increased. Linear

columns emerged in order to take advantage of their firepower. In the 17th century, linear

columns were widely used. The use of gun power and artillery also greatly spurred the

development of urban offensive and defensive campaigns. To capture a city by forceful

assault became the dominant means. On the other hand, the defenders gradually placed

more emphasis on the defense along a city’s periphery. In sea campaigns, the appearance

of guns on boats also change the way sea battles were fought. Instead of ramming the

enemy ships or close-quarter fighting, fighting was conducted with greater distance

between the opposing sides. With the development in sea campaigns, tactics such as

ambush on the high sea, interception, encirclement and pursuit began to be adopted.
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During this period, typical campaigns fought in China included the Battle of Saerhu and

the Battle to Recover Taiwan by Zheng Chenggong. Overseas, there was the Battle of

Constantinople.

Until the 17th century, there was no permanently organized campaign large formation.

Campaigns were often fought by employing all or most of the forces of the state. They

were fought under a unified intention and plan {jihua} and under the direct and unified

command of the king or military commander. And they often bore the characteristics of a

decisive battle or a massive campaign. Campaigns in this era were generally called

ancient campaigns.

“Hot weaponry” era: This is an era during which campaigns witnessed a great leap

forward. The era can be divided into three phases:

Campaigns in the 18th – early 20th century period: During this period, the Industrial

Revolution led to great development of the production power in capitalist countries in

Europe and North America. A large amount of rifles, guns, automobiles and new types of

steam ships and boats were produced for the military, which also began to be equipped

with wire or wireless communication gears. A new military recruitment system was

adopted, leading to more recruits for the military forces. Also organized were infantry

group armies and naval fleets, which formed campaign large formations. During the

Napoleonic Wars of 1796-1815, not only were extended and column formations used to

cope with enemy fire, but a linear operational method was adopted in attacks against the

enemy. Furthermore, there also emerged maneuver warfare campaigns with

characteristically fast maneuver, active attacks, resolute of goals and short and fast

battles. Campaign operations often involved campaign large formations with more than

one hundred thousand up to several hundred thousand troops that were quickly massed at

selected battlefield. Flexible maneuver warfare was adopted and tactics of encirclement,

outflanking, surprise attack, hot pursuit as well as converging attack were widely used to

wipe out enemy forces one by one. During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the

Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, long-range,

high-density threaded bore guns and artillery were widely used. At the same time, the

building of field fortifications, the appearance of armored trains and armored gunboats

forced the wide adoption of skirmisher tactics. They also led to positional defensive and

offensive campaigns conducted on a wide front by campaign large formations. During the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the group army campaign became the basic campaign

operational pattern. Also appearing were campaigns with front army (a cluster of group

armies) characteristics. Sea campaigns during this period often were conducted by fleets

made up of several dozen to hundreds of armored sail or steam battle ships. Sea blockade

and anti-blockade campaigns also made their debut. The battleground also extended from

shallow waters to deep seas. Maneuver warfare was widely adopted.

Campaigns during the period of the First World War: During the First World War, the

armies of the major participating states had reached unprecedented scales in terms of

their sizes. Fast firing weaponry and new types of artillery pieces were common
73

equipment. The much-improved railway and highway transport networks and the wide

use of both wire and wireless communication greatly enhanced the mobility of the

military forces and facilitated their command. Campaign scales further expanded. Group

armies and front army (group army cluster) campaigns, and fleet and theater fleet

campaigns became the norms of land and sea campaigns. The First World War also

witnessed a big development in positional offensive and defensive campaigns. In

offensive campaigns, the attacking army would first try to open up a point in the enemy

defense line by concentrating its firepower and repeated charges. Then it would exploit

the success by pouring in follow-up units or reserves to encircle and wipe out the enemy

in depth. In defense on the other hand, a line of defensive positions were linked by

trenches. The defender would mainly rely on heavy fire to inflict heavy casualties on the

enemy. Campaign reserves were concentrated behind the main defensive direction to

back up the defense and to execute counter attacks to defeat enemy’s offensive

operations. Toward the end of the war, such new equipment as tanks and airplanes were

introduced in battlefields. And the multi-service and arms combined campaign made its

debut. For instance, the Second Battle of the Marne River of July 1918 witnessed the

participation of thousands of pieces of artillery, hundreds of tanks and more than a

thousand aircraft. Thus a combined and multi-dimensional ground campaign began to

take shape. In sea campaigns, there emerged ship formation attacks. Gun battles among

large surface combatants such as battle ships, cruisers and destroyers, torpedo warfare,

submarine attacks, mine warfare etc. became principal means to achieve victories in sea

campaigns. The introduction of seaplanes added a new dimension to the development in

sea campaigns. After the First World War, a large number of new equipment entered into

service, including artillery guns, tanks, aircraft, ships as well as communication and

engineering equipment. New services and arms were added and existing services and

arms were expanded. These included air force, air-defense corps, naval fleets, armored

corps, motorized infantry units, anti-aircraft artillery forces, airborne forces, antichemical warfare forces, etc. These developments led to the evolution of group armies,

front armies (group army clusters) and front army groups (theater force) into multiservice and multi-arms combined large formations of various categories, which provided

a new material basis for the further development in campaigns. The multi-service, multiarms combined campaign under a unified command began to take shape.

Campaigns in the Second World War: During this period, campaigns further expanded

their scales with the emergence of the front army group campaign, enlarged theater

campaign conducted by several clusters of army groups, and the blue water theater

campaign conducted by several naval fleets. Campaign patterns also became more varied.

The air force campaign, air-defense campaign, airborne campaign and anti-airborne

campaign etc. appeared. There were not only campaigns conducted independently by the

army, navy and air force, but also combined and joint campaigns by the army and air

force, navy and air force, as well as by the army, navy and air force. The integration and

multi-dimensional characteristics were further enhanced. Not only was there maneuver

warfare and positional offensive and defensive campaigns of various scales, but also

guerrilla warfare campaigns of various scales. Campaign operations also witnessed some

new developments. The basis methods of attack were: to concentrate superiority of forcestrengths to first implement a breakthrough and follow it up with a quick grouping or
74

campaign second echelon to enter the engagement in order to throw the enemy’s

defensive bushu disposition into chaos, or to resist an enemy’s counter-attack. Some

force-strengths would be sent to the enemy’s rear in an outflanking move or alternatively

an airborne operation would be executed in the enemy’s depth in order to encircle and

annihilate the enemy. The basic methods of defense were: concentrate the main strengths

in the main defense direction and construct a ringed shape with multiple defense lines,

multiple zones, and a combination of force-strengths, firepower and obstacles. Infantry

and tanks with air and artillery support would try to prevent an enemy breakthrough in

the defense line. And campaign reserves would be used at appropriate time to mount

counter attacks so as to defeat enemy attacks. In sea campaigns, aircraft carrier-based

aircraft and land-based aircraft, and submarines and surface ships, were used to mount

assaults on enemy targets on the sea and naval bases and ports. Active anti-submarine

and air-defense operations were also conducted to protect or disrupt sea-lanes. The

purpose was to wipe out enemy targets on the sea (or in the air) or on the shore and to

seize command of the sea. In air campaigns, a large number of bombers were often used

to mount attacks on major enemy targets such as lines of transport, industrial facilities,

and airports, and on enemy’s strategic and campaign reserves. At the same time, fighter

aircraft would engage the enemy in air battles to wipe out or cripple the enemy’s air

power and to seize control of the air. During this period, the landing campaign and antilanding campaign had developed into a large-scale joint or combined campaign

undertaken by the infantry, the navy and the air force.

Campaigns in local wars in the thermo-nuclear era: After the 1950s, with the introduction

of various nuclear-tipped guided missiles, helicopters, precision-guided weaponry,

electronic equipment into the military, strategic missile force, army aviation corps and

electronic countermeasure units came into being, providing the material basis for the

emergence of new campaign patterns. Typical post-Second World War local wars

included the Korean War, the Middle East War, the Vietnam War, the British-Argentine

Falkland War, the Gulf War and the Kosovo War. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the world

witnessed a number of campaign operations conducted in a modern sense. Especially in

the Gulf War of the early 1990s, the multi-national force led by the United States, under

nuclear and chemical weapon threats, conducted campaign operations that bore the

characteristics of a high-tech war. The scale of air strikes was expanded and their role

enhanced. Operational coordination between the ground and the air, and between the air

and the sea became closer. The pace was accelerated. All these exemplify the

characteristics of a modern campaign - high degree of integration, mobility, multidimensionality and fast pace.

Currently, an information revolution is sweeping across the globe. Information

technology weapons and equipment are being developed and put into use in campaigns.

The Kosovo War of the late 1990s signaled that it would not be long before the arrival of

campaign operations in the information age.
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Section 2: The Generation and Development of the PLA Campaign...69

Since its first campaign – the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, the PLA has a

history of 70 years conducting campaigns. During this period, the PLA has experienced

the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the War of Resistance against Japan, the War of

Liberation, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, and border counter-attack

operations in defense of socialist construction. In all, the PLA has successfully conducted

some 400 campaign operations of various scales. All of them have been undertaken on

the basis of the people’s war, and have been characterized by the PLA defeating a betterequipped enemy with inferior arms. These campaigns have also undergone a process in

which campaign scales have grown from small to large, from a single-service army

campaign to the multi-services and arms combined campaign.

The Agrarian Revolutionary War period: After the Chinese Communist Party-led armed

uprisings created the Worker-Peasant Red Army, this army had limited military strength

during the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. The base areas were small in

size and geographically scattered. Every single force of the Red Army was, from the very

beginning, surrounded by powerful enemies and was the target of constant “encirclement

and suppression” drives by the enemy. The Red Army was mainly engaged in guerrilla

warfare and its dominant campaign pattern was the guerrilla warfare campaign. Every

time the Red Army fought to break out of encirclement or started attack operations in a

new area, in terms of the overall activity of military struggle, it was a strategic problem,

but in terms of operational activities, it was a campaign problem. This kind of one-time

operation often required the Red Army to undertake a number of or even dozens of

related battles of various scales. For any single base area or any single Red Army forceunit, the strategic guidance and campaign or even combat command were often provided

by a single commander and the command organ. Thus they served not only as one who

guides strategy, but also as the one who organizes the command of a campaign or major

battle. Under such conditions, it was difficult to distinguish strategic considerations from

campaign or tactical considerations merely by the size of the army unit and control and

command relationship. However, distinctions could be made by the scope of the military

operation and its impact on the overall situation. Thus, the PLA campaign originated

when the Red Army was incepted. From the first counter “encirclement” conducted at the

central revolutionary base area in the winter of 1930 on, the mobile warfare

{yundongzhan} campaign with guerilla warfare characteristics became the main

campaign pattern for the Red Army. The basic operational method adopted was: when

faced with a multi-pronged “encirclement and suppression” offensive by the enemy, the

Red Army would take full advantage of the friendly people of the base areas and terrain,

and try, first of all, to lure the enemy in deep and compel it to disperse its forces and tire

down the enemy. By concentrating its force-strengths to form a localized superiority, the

Red Army would then seize the opportunity to wipe out the attacking enemy forces one

by one, until finally defeating the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” drive. From

1934 to 1935, the Red Army on the 25,000 li Long March also conducted campaigns to

break out of enemy encirclement as well as offensive campaigns.
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The War of Resistance against Japan period: During the anti-Japanese war, the

operational object of the armed strengths led by the Chinese Communist Party was the

Japanese army and its puppet army. At the same time, [another operational object] was

also the armed forces of the active anti-Communist diehard clique of the Kuomintang

(KMT). Due to limitations in terms of equipment and in human and material resources of

the base areas, the PLA forces were mainly engaged in guerrilla warfare campaigns

aimed at smashing up enemy’s “mopping up drives” (counter encirclement and counter

attacks) and at disrupting enemy transport lines. It also undertook some mobile warfare

{yundongzhan} campaigns of various scales aimed at defending or enlarging its base

areas. In addition, some positional offensive campaigns were also mounted for the

purposes of capturing enemy strongholds as well as small cities and townships. Most

campaigns were conducted under the unified command of a military district or subdistrict. Main campaign participants were mostly division or brigade-strength units or a

number of independent regiments. They received wide support from local forces, militia

and self-defense forces. The characteristics of the people’s war were more clearly

demonstrated in campaigns during this period than those of the Agrarian Revolutionary

War period. With few exceptions, most campaigns were of limited scale and the majority

of them were independently organized and executed. Through repeated counter moppingup drive operations, the PLA made further advances in counter-encirclement tactics

developed during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period. On the other hand, through

offensive operations against a large number of strongholds and small cities and townships

controlled by the enemy, the PLA also enriched itself in positional offensive campaign

experience. However, it still lacked experience in conducting concentrated operations by

big formations.

The War of Liberation period: In the War of Liberation, the PLA’s operational object was

the KMT armed forces. The campaign patterns were mainly mobile warfare

{yundongzhan} campaign and a partial position warfare campaign. With ever increasing

quantities in the PLA and continuous improvements in weapons and equipment, new

arms emerged in the PLA, which developed into a powerful army with infantry in the

lead, and a definite combined quality including artillery, armored, engineering, and

communication forces, etc. As its capabilities to conduct campaigns became stronger, the

scale of those campaigns it mounted became also bigger and the patterns more varied. It

accumulated very rich and important experience in organizing and implementing mobile

warfare {yundongzhan} campaigns, positional warfare campaigns, urban offensive

campaigns, strategic offensive campaigns as well as cross-sea landing campaigns. In

terms of scale, these campaigns included formation {bingtuan} campaigns, field army

campaigns, as well as strategic-quality campaigns conducted jointly by several field

armies. Campaign patterns were highly varied and flexible and operational methods were

flexible and diverse. The main category was attack and the main objective was to wipe

out the enemy’s effective strength. The basic operational method was to concentrate a

superiority of force-strength to wipe out the enemy.

The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea period: After the founding of the

People’s Republic of China, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force fought the War to

Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. In the mountainous Korean Peninsula, the
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Chinese People’s Volunteer Force, together with the Korean People’s Army, fought a

modern war with the “United Nations Force” led by the then most modern army of the

world – the U.S. imperialist forces. In the war that lasted almost three years, the Chinese

People’s Volunteer Force, after waging consecutively five major mobile warfare

{yundongzhan} campaigns, mounted positional defensive campaigns and positional

offensive campaigns. These campaigns had many characteristics different from those

campaigns conducted by the PLA in the past. The gap between the arms and equipment

of the enemy force and the Chinese force was even wider. And the Chinese force had to

operate in a geographical environment that was especially difficult. Nevertheless, it

created new operational methods and gained new campaign experience, especially in how

to achieve a massive breakthrough against a fortified enemy defense in a positional

warfare campaign, and in how to conduct a positional defensive campaign over a broad

front and in substantial depth.

In the period of defending national frontiers and building socialism: After the War to

Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the PLA has taken big strides in developing

weaponry and equipment. The navy and the air force grew steadily in strength.

Campaigns developed into modern multi-service, multi-arms combined campaigns. In the

struggle to safeguard the national frontiers of the socialist motherland, the PLA

successively conducted frontier (sea) campaign operations against expansionists in the

Sino-Indian Self-Defense Counter-Attack, the Sino-Soviet Self-Defense Counter-Attack,

and the Nansha Sea Battle and Sino-Vietnam Self-Defense Counter-Attack etc.

operations. Through these operations, the PLA gained new experience in fighting

different enemies under special natural geographical conditions and in special social

environments.

In peace time, the PLA also organized many campaign maneuvers: Among the most

notable were the Liaodong Peninsula anti-landing campaign maneuver of November

1955, the East China military exercise of September 1981 and the Southeast China joint

army, navy and air force exercises of March 1996.

A survey of the history of campaign practice of the PLA indicates that most of the

campaigns have the following characteristics: the campaigns were conducted on the basis

of the people’s war and close cooperation among the three armed forces; most campaign

victories were won under the conditions of enemy superiority and our inferiority in

technical equipment and stronger enemy and weaker us in strength ratio; the basic

concept was annihilation warfare, the main operational method was concentrate

superiority of force-strength and annihilate the enemy one by one; the main operational

form {xingshi} was mobile warfare {yundongzhan} supplemented by positional warfare

and guerrilla warfare as necessary; in terms of campaign guidance, we stressed setting out

from realities, flexible maneuver and not sticking to one way; have strong and forceful

political work and fully bring the decisive roles of a subjective dynamic quality and

humans into play.
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Section 3: The Developmental Trend of Campaigns...72

Technology determines tactics. Developments in military technology have always been

the material basis for and fundamental dynamics behind changes in operational tactics.

With rapid development in science and technology and wide application in the military

field of high technologies such as space, laser, infrared, information, biological, microelectronic technologies as well as new materials, a new class of high-tech weapons and

equipment has appeared and been used in battlefields. They include tanks, artillery,

aircraft, naval ships, electronic warfare equipment, nuclear and biological weapons,

precision-guided weaponry, space weaponry etc. The developments have triggered new

changes in the internal structures of the military and in the way military operations are

conducted. Some new trends are developing in future campaigns.

I. Continuous Expansion of Battle Space, Continuous Enhancement of Depth and

Multi-dimensional Qualities...72

The development in long-range precision-strike weapons and space weapons has

enhanced the long-range mobility of armed forces and expanded the scope of campaign

activities. Thus a trend is developing toward further expansion in the battle space in

future campaigns. This expansion is full-directional, not only in plane geometrical terms,

developing on the ground and water surface level, but also in stereoscopic terms - from

ground or water surface to the air and even to outer space. A campaign large formation

equipped with modern weapon systems possesses the capability to carry out multiservice, multi-arms joint operations. With the support of strategic weapons, it is capable

of mounting large-scale operations encompassing the entire campaign depth or even in

strategic depth. Strategic and campaign tactical guided missiles, various types of

operational aircraft, ground armored vehicles, and various types of surface and

underwater combatants and weapon systems can be used to mount multi-directional,

multi-wave, great depth and multi-dimensional force-strength and firepower assaults.

Developments in deep-sea weapon systems, under water force-units and space weapons,

in particular, have extended the campaign engagement scope from ground and water

surface, and from the air to underground, under water sub-terrains, and to outer space.

The struggle in the electromagnetic field has in turn introduced into campaign operations

a battleground that is invisible. A future campaign would first start in this “invisible” and

smokeless battleground.

The expansion in campaign and battlefield space has brought about some profound

changes in campaign operational depth and dimensions. The armed forces of different

countries have in general been paying more attention to the study of “in-depth

operations” and “multi-dimensional assault,” and have been putting these concepts to

wide trial and into practice either in their military exercises or in post-Second World War

local wars. During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, for instance,

the Soviet military mounted very deep and multi-dimensional strikes. During the Gulf

War, the multi-national force led by the US also widely practiced multi-dimensional

strikes and drives. In future campaign operations, regarding operational depth and
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dimension, the emphasis will be placed not only on mounting in-depth strikes against the

enemy by maximum use of force-strengths, firepower and electromagnetic power, but

also on actively adopting effective measures to protect the entire depth of one’s own

bushu disposition, not only on supporting ground and sea operations with stereoscopic

reconnaissance, maneuvering, and strikes as well as vertical encirclement, but also on

mounting sea and air blockade and battlefield interdiction with long-range fire power and

electromagnetic power in order to cut off the enemy’s reinforcement and supply lines as

well as retreat route. The past linear operational method of starting from a single point

and broadening it out, starting at the front and then moving to the rear, going through one

layer at a time, and pushing forward step by step is being gradually replaced by multidepth, multi-directional and multi-dimensional non-linear engagement. Full depth

operations and multi-dimensional strikes will become an important trend in future

campaigns.

In view of the actual conditions, the PLA in a short time or in a considerably long period

of time will not possess the deep and multi-dimensional strike capabilities of the world’s

top military powers. However, in the face of this serious challenge in the development of

future campaign trends, it must strive to enhance its deep and multi-dimensional

campaign operations to a new height. That is, it must possess certain capabilities to

mount deep and multi-dimensional strikes, and at the same time, it must also have fairly

good protective capabilities to effectively counter deep and multi-dimensional strikes

mounted by the enemy. This would require that on the one hand, it must improve its

weapon systems and equipment while exploring new operational methods, and on the

other hand, it must, based on present conditions, search for ways and means with

characteristics of its own, to mount or counter in-depth and multi-dimensional strikes.

Only by using its areas of strength to strike at the enemy’s weakness can the PLA achieve

campaign victory in future wars against aggression.

II. Higher Requirement for Integrated Quality in Campaigns...74

Since the emergence of campaigns, the composition of a campaign has undergone a

process of development from small to big and from simple to complex. In terms of

weaponry, swords and spears – chief weapons of the “cold weaponry” era developed into

guns, artillery, tanks, aircraft and naval ships – main weapons of the “hot weaponry” era,

or even into “hot weapons” backed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In

terms of military force, foot soldiers and water units have developed into multi-service,

multi-armed combined military made up of infantry, navy, air force, strategic missile

force and a number of professional technical arms. The battlefield has developed from the

ground battlefield into a vast multi-dimensional space including the ground, the sea and

the air etc. The operational mode has changed from square phalanx and close-quarter

fighting into varied types and patterns of combat and engagement. It is foreseeable that

with further progress in the modernization of weaponry and equipment, and with the

increase in the types of elements forming a campaign large formation, operational modes

and methods, and campaign types and patterns will become more varied. In addition, the

battle operational space will grow. Thus future composition of a campaign will become
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more complex. More importantly, the interdependency and mutual complementarily

among different weapon systems, different operational activities, and different

operational force-strengths will generally increase, though the quantity of operational

strengths in a modern campaign could decrease. Without air cover, the safety of ground

(surface) forces would be gravely threatened. Without the guide and support of electronic

warfare, modern precision-guided weapon systems could not play their roles fully, and

would themselves become very vulnerable. Without logistical support activities, any

campaign operational activities could not be sustained. Therefore, a future campaign is

not a contest of any single strength. Rather, it will be a contest of integrated strengths. It

is a joint operation conducted in even broader space domains, using more and more

advanced weapons and equipment and using more types of operational modes and

patterns. Any single weapon system, operational strength or operational form will not be

able to dominate the battlefield. The complexity of future campaign composition has put

forth even higher requirements for the integrated-whole quality {zhengtixing} of a

campaign. Only by seeking an optimized make-up in integrated-whole terms {zhengti

shang}, scientifically grouping of various operational strengths, closely combining

various operational forms, carefully coordinating the various battlefields and domains

and interlinking the various operational phases and steps to form an organic whole can

one fully bring into play the overall might of the campaign and seize operational victory.

The main reason for the Argentine army’s defeat in the Falkland War lay in its inability

to bring into good play the integrated might of its participating strengths.

In its past campaign operations, among the reasons why the PLA was able to overcome

better armed enemies with inferior weapons and equipment, one important factor was

attributable to its ability to bring into full play the integrated might of its various

campaign strengths. In a future campaign, the PLA will face an enemy that is equipped

with highly modernized weapon systems; its own weapon systems and equipment will

remain inferior; and the composition of the campaign will become increasingly complex.

Under such conditions, one must attach importance to bring an integrated strength into

play. The PLA will be able to defeat the enemy only by proceeding from its actual

conditions, taking advantage of the concept of the people’s war, of the fact that it is

fighting on home territories, and of its superior political work, and by carefully

integrating various factors of a campaign into an organic whole and mounting an

integrated operation.

III. Higher Level Intensity of High-Tech Weaponry Confrontation...74

High-technology weapons are the products of high technologies that bring about a

qualitative change in traditional weapon systems and equipment. The high technologies

here refer to those technologies that have been developed and been widely applied since

the 1970s. They include micro-electronic, computer, optical-electronic, new material,

new energy, space and biological technologies which have formed a new high-tech class.

High-tech weapon systems and equipment refer to weapon systems and equipment that

are either developed or improved with the above-mentioned technologies. Representative

of such weapon systems and equipment are precision-guided weapons, stealth weapons,
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electronic warfare equipment, optical electronic night vision instrument, C4I systems, and

those new-concept weapon systems that are currently under development. To say that the

engagement of technologies of weapons systems and equipment will become more

intense chiefly means that there is a trend pointing to ever increasing intensity in

operations of the above-mentioned high-tech weapon systems and equipment.

Science and technology can be translated into a productive force. Even more so, they can

also be translated into combat power. After the Second World War, particularly since the

1980s, countries of the world have attached great importance to comprehensively

reforming the weapon systems and equipment of the military with the latest products of

science and technology. A great number of new modern high-tech weapon systems and

equipment have, in batches, in complete sets and in families, entered into the ranks of the

organized structure of the armed forces and committed into operational use. They have

influenced the progress and the outcome of campaigns. This has been fully demonstrated

in post-World War II local wars. During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 1982, for

instance, the Israeli army, by first using advanced air radar surveillance and detection

systems, and electronic jamming devices together with air strike weapon systems, was

able to mount attacks on the Syrian guided missile positions in the Bekaa Valley, and was

able to destroy at one stroke 19 Syrian SAM-6 surface-to-air missile positions, thus

winning the battlefield control of the air. The Gulf War and the Kosovo War were turned

into testing grounds for high-tech weapon systems and equipment. The U.S. forces won a

complete military victory due to many reasons. Distinct superiority in technologies was

the most important factor.

With rapid development in modern science and technology, it is foreseeable that by the

middle of the 21st century, there will be a complete new outlook in the military’s weapon

systems and equipment. In addition to the existing weapon systems and equipment

constantly being upgraded, new-concept weapon systems and equipment such as directed

energy weapons, dynamic energy weapons, non-lethal weapons, micro and miniaturized

weapons, subsonic weapons, climatic weapons, genetic weapons, military robots etc. will

gradually enter the battlefield. These developments will lead to weapon systems with

higher energy, and systems that are more diversified, more highly automated and more

intelligent. At the same time, more powerful, longer range and more accurate, these

weapon systems will have an increasing impact on campaign operations. At present,

many countries are actively preparing for high-tech wars of the 21st century. Digitized

force-units and information battlefields could make their debut in 21st century wars. With

the introduction of these advanced technology weapon systems, future campaign

activities will be heavily colored by high technology. The elements of direct hand-tohand engagement of soldiers will gradually decrease while the weight of high-tech

weapon engagement and trial of strength will greatly increase, and high-tech weapons

will become an important pillar for the survival of the armed forces and for winning wars.

It is foreseeable that future wars will be an arena dominated by high-tech weapon

systems; soldier-intensive campaigns will be replaced by technology-intensive

campaigns. The outcome of high-tech trials of strength will have a profound influence

over the theories and practices of campaigns.
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Although the weapon systems and equipment of the PLA have seen great improvement

from the past, there is and will continue to be in the future a considerably large gap when

one compares them with those of forces of developed countries. Therefore, we must

accelerate the development of advanced weapon systems and equipment so as to narrow

this gap while at the same time, we must get prepared to overcome the enemy based on

existing weapon systems and equipment. In future campaign operations, we must stress

countering the enemy with our limited high-tech weapon systems and equipment while at

the same time, attaching greater importance to bringing into full play our strength in

waging a people’s war and in individual subjective initiative. In this way, we will be able

to find ways to defeat, under high-tech conditions, a superiorly armed enemy with

inferior weapons of our own.

IV. More Diversified Operational Patterns and Methods...76

Developments in weapon systems and equipment inevitably give rise to changes in

campaign operational patterns and methods. After the Second World War during which

modern large-scale air warfare, sea warfare, amphibious landing operations, airborne

operations and tank warfare made their debut, new operational patterns and methods have

been widely used in campaign operations in post-War local wars. These include

electronic warfare, missile warfare, precision warfare, psychological warfare, deep multidimensional warfare, infrastructure destruction warfare, integrated offensive-defensive

warfare, raid-attack and long-range raid operations, etc. Taking the Gulf war as one

example, from the very beginning, the U.S. forces kicked off their operations with

electronic warfare, bringing into play their power of reconnaissance, surveillance,

suppression, guidance and control. Five hours before launching the air war, the multinational force mounted its electronic warfare activities codenamed “White Snow” – to

comprehensively jam and suppress the Iraqi command and control, air defense early

warning and communication systems. The operation served as a cover for air and missile

strikes mounted by the multi-national force, which disabled more than 4,000 anti-aircraft

artillery pieces, more than 700 surface-to-air missile launchers, more than 140 Hawk

surface-to-air missiles and almost 700 operational aircraft of the Iraqi forces. After

seizing control of the electromagnetic field, the multi-national force subsequently

launched an air war led by missile strikes. First to take to the sky were some 100

Tomahawk cruise missiles from the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin

positioned in the Persian Gulf. They were followed by wave after wave of various types

of guided missiles and precision-guided munitions launched from land, sea and the air,

which totally paralyzed the entire Iraqi campaign operational system. The trial of strength

between the Patriot anti-missile systems and the Scud missiles “opened a new era of

missiles shooting down missiles in modern war history.” During the 43-day Gulf War,

firepower played a very pronounced role. Just in the first day of air operation alone, the

U.S. forces dropped 18,000 tons of bombs. During the entire war, some 30 types of

aircraft from 10 countries of the multi-national force led by the U.S. flew a total of

110,000 sorties, and dropped a total of 500,000 tons of bombs – averaging 12,000 tons a

day, making it the largest scale, longest lasting firepower strike that involved the largest

number of airmen and weapon systems.
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With the introduction of more and more new types of weapons systems and equipment, in

future wars, more new operational methods and patterns will appear; the trend toward

diversity in the campaign operational methods and patterns will become more

pronounced. This will inevitably lead to profound changes in future campaign guidance

thoughts. Old operational thoughts will step down from the stage of campaign operations

and give way to new campaign operational guidance thoughts that conform to the

campaign development laws.

V. Rapid Future Development in Intelligent and Automated Command...77

In the “cold weaponry” era, the commander comprehended the conditions and

commanded operations mainly through direct visual and audio signals, and he

communicated by simple means such as through foot or horse riding messengers. In

modern times, a commander directs operations mainly by way of telephone and

telegraph; now computer-based command automation systems are being used to execute

campaign command. With the arrival of the information age, the trend moving toward

automated and intelligent command is accelerating. In a future campaign, the vastness of

the battleground requires attention to many points, long lines and broad fronts. It is very

easy to have gaps and blind angles, thus losing control. The battlefield situations rapidly

change, the campaign course and tempo are accelerated, and the time effectiveness

quality of decision making is even higher. Greater amount of available information, and

more numerous variables and undeterminable factors, all have higher requirements on

campaign command. Past ways and means of command by way of human heads and

hands will be far inadequate to meet the needs-requirements of future campaign

operations. Successful campaign command depends on the art of command and on the

astuteness and resourcefulness of the commander. It also depends on advanced command

instruments and the ability to make highly efficient and high quality decisions, and to

direct and control. Hence, in the whole process of organizing and executing a campaign,

a wide range of reconnaissance and surveillance means will be deployed to collect and to

obtain a large amount of intelligence, which in turn will be processed with advanced

technical facilities and by scientific methods; automated and intelligent command

systems will also be used to assist the commander to do operations research and

stratagem plan, as well as optimize courses of action; advanced command and control

systems, on the other hand, will help execute reliable battlefield command and macro

control.

As a symbol of modern command automation systems, the C4I system developed after the

1950s was widely used in post-Second World War local wars, especially during the Gulf

War. With progress in science and technology, a computer-based integrated C4I system

will make its debut in the future battlefield of campaign operations. The level of

automated and intelligent campaign decision-making, command and control will be

further enhanced.

The PLA has started its own command automation system relatively late. However, the

developing campaign theories and practices, and the stark realities of modern warfare and
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campaign operations that it faces, require that the campaign command system of the PLA

must develop in the direction of automation and intelligence in order to meet the needsrequirements of future campaign operations.

VI. Status of the Campaign Support is Clearly More Important...78

Campaign operations are the overall contest of two strengths. Without a wellconsolidated rear, without strong logistical and equipment support, there can be no

victory in campaign operations. With progress in science and technology, with the

upgrading of weaponry and equipment, and with the development in campaign practice

and theories, the opposing sides will in a future campaign become more and more

dependent on the rear. And the status of the campaign rear will become more important.

This can be seen in the following two ways:

First, the campaign rear itself will become a battlefield in that its security will be vital to

the outcome of the campaign. With continuous upgrading of weapon systems and

equipment, and the daily increase in operational methods and means, both sides engaging

in war will either simultaneously or successively unfold an intense contest in the whole

depth of the battlefield. The campaign rear will change from a secured zone in the past to

an important battlefield, and it will become an important target for in-depth operations.

To provide strong logistical support and at the same time to keep the rear secure have

become two important and indispensable tasks for modern campaign logistics, as well as

an important guarantee for victory in campaign operations. During the fourth Middle East

war, the 20,000 Egyptian armed forces that had broken through the Bar-Lev line to cross

to the east bank of the Suez Canal came perilously close to complete annihilation while

the Syrian armed forces that had successfully penetrated the Israeli defense line south of

the Golan Height ended in a major defeat. The main reason was that both the Egyptian

and Syrian campaign rears were raided by the Israeli forces. Therefore, a well-organized

rear defense and enhancing the area’s self-defense capabilities have become an important

issue in the directing of a campaign. It is predictable that in a future campaign, struggle

over the campaign rear will become even more intense.

Secondly, to secure logistical support will be an arduous task. The quality of logistical

support will have a direct impact on the progression of a campaign. As witnessed in a

number of post-War local wars, every campaign would consume large quantities of

materiel, causing a large number of casualties and damage a large amount of equipment,

due to ever increasing intensity in campaign operations and to the multiplication of

elements that could consume war materiel, cause personnel casualties and inflict damage

to equipment. This high consumption and high demand on the logistics, that are

characteristic of a modern campaign, place a heavier burden on logistical support. The

quality of this support would have a direct impact on the progress of campaign

operations. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Chinese

People’s Volunteer Force, in the mobile warfare {yundongzhan} phase, had to repeatedly

slow down the pace of attack, or completely halt its attack in most campaigns, due to the

inability of logistical supplies to keep pace. The launching of the Jincheng Counterattack
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Campaign {jincheng fanji zhanyi} had to be postponed for 10 days because logistical

support was not ready in time. In the Gulf War of 1991, the voracity of war consumption

was even more stunning. The 600,000-strong multi-national force cost an average of one

billion US dollars a day during the 38-day air campaign, and an average of two billion

dollars a day during the 100-hour ground operation phase. The daily consumption of an

average U.S. soldier was as follows: 200 kilos for ground force-units, and 1,100 to 1,400

kilos for naval units. The U.S. spent 1.2 billion U.S. dollars on warplanes alone. This

astounding level of consumption has far exceeded any war in history. The air strike codenamed “Desert Fox” mounted by the U.S. and British forces in 1998 lasted only a bit over

70 hours but cost 1.2 billion U.S. dollars. In a future campaign, the confrontation between

the two sides engaging in war will become much higher; materiel consumption will be

much greater and there will be more personnel casualties and damage to weapons and

equipment. Thus logistical supplies of materiel, field medical aid and services as well as

technical support will present much tougher challenges.

Furthermore, the expanding battlefield operational space, the multiplicity of participating

services and arms, and the fluidity of battlefield conditions will require that logistical

support and its organization and command be raised to a higher level. The quality of

logistical support will have an increasing impact on campaign operations. And at the

same time, the importance of the campaign rear will become even more pronounced.
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Chapter 3

Campaign Guidance Thought and Basic Principles...80

The campaign guidance thought and basic principles are the fundamental theoretical

bases for the overall-planning and organization of a campaign. They are the basic criteria

for guiding and implementing campaign activities. The campaign guidance thought is the

collective embodiment of the campaign basic principles and the campaign basic

principles are the specific reflection of the campaign guidance thought from a different

perspective. The campaign guidance thought and basic principles not only emerge from

campaign practice and guide campaign practice, they develop along with the

development of practices. Studying campaign guidance thought and basic principles

under informationized conditions has major theoretical and practical significance. From a

theoretical perspective, this study occupies a core position in the theoretical system of

campaign science discipline, it is a specific reflection of PLA strategic thought in the new

era, and it directly affects the developmental direction of campaign theory research; from

the perspective of practice, it possesses a major guidance role in unifying the campaign

thought for all-services and arms, overall-planning, organizing and commanding

campaign operations, adjusting the system of the organized structure, developing

weapons and equipment, and guiding campaign training, and especially for joint

campaign practice under informationized conditions. Therefore, on the basis of carrying

on PLA traditional campaign guidance thought, the study of and inquiry into the

campaign guidance thought and basic principles that are suitable for localized war under

informationized conditions and conform to the objective realities of the PLA are very

important and urgent missions.

Section 1: Campaign Guidance Thought...80

In different historical periods, the prompt establishment of a scientific operational

guidance thought on the basis of different objects [targets] of operations as well as

changes to the objective environment of a war to point out the correct direction of

campaign operations is not only the historical experience of the PLA in achieving

operational victory, it is also an important way of the militaries of some of the world’s

great nations. In the late 1980s, based on objective realities, the PLA put forward the

campaign guidance thought of “integrated operations, key point strike.” Putting forward

and establishing this campaign guidance thought played a very good guidance and

unified-grasping role for force-unit readiness, training and weapons and equipment

development. However, we should also see that the current warfare form-state

{zhanzheng xingtai} is transforming from mechanized warfare to informationized

warfare, and a profound transformation is occurring in the factors of various campaign

operations. If we want to adapt to the need-requirements of the new strategic

circumstances {xingshi} and missions and if we want to win a localized war under

informationized conditions, we must conduct adjustments to the guidance thought of the

PLA campaign.
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Based on the spirit of the Central Military Commission’s strategic concept in the new era,

and integrating the ideas consistent with various areas and tendencies, we can make

“integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy”1 {zhengti zuozhan, jingda

zhidi} as the guidance thought of the PLA campaign. The basic connotation of this

thought is: bring into play the total superiority of the People’s War, and persist in you

fight yours and I fight mine {nida nide woda wode},2 the integrated joint campaign

{yitihua lianhe zhanyi} is the basic form-state and necessary requirement of the

informationized war; seizing information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance

is an effective way to overcome the enemy and gain victory.

Integrated operations is namely using integrated methods and information technology,

blending an operational system {tixi} from all services and arms and other types of

armed strengths with operational organizational-units to form an integrated whole, and

achieving integration for a variety of operational strengths, multiple dimensions of

battlefield space, a variety of operational patterns and activities, and various support

systems; with seizing control of the “three Superiorities” as the pivot, master battlefield

control, and starting with the destruction of the integrated structure of the enemy’s

operational system {tixi}, strike the enemy with consistent adjusting-coordination over

the entire depth of operations and in every domain.

Precision strike to dominate the enemy is namely implementing precision operations and

precision strikes of vital areas {yaohai}. This includes precise application of various

operational strengths, especially medium and long range strike strengths, precise

selection of operational targets, precise use of fighting methods and means, precise

control of the operational intensity and course, a tight grip on the vital-area parts within

the enemy’s political, economic and military system and critical links for precision

strikes, and striving to seize joint campaign victory in the shortest time, with the lowest

risk and with minimum cost.

These two, integrated operations and precision strike to dominate the enemy, are a

closely connected unified body. Integrated operations stresses the comprehensive

integration of various operational factors via information and information systems in

order to establish an optimum operating mechanism for the operational architecture

{zuozhan tixi jiegou}, and form an integrated joint campaign capability; precision strike

to dominate the enemy stresses the use of this type of capability and with precise and

accurate operational activities, resolve critical problems for promoting war situation

development, defeat the enemy, and achieve operational goals. The former is the basis

and a condition for achieving victory while the latter is an essential element and pathway

1 Translator’s note: The dominate the enemy {制敌 zhidi} portion of this phrase also can be translated as

control the enemy or subdue the enemy and is the same term used in air-sea-electromagnetic dominance,

etc. {制空海电磁权 zhi kong-hai-dianci quan}.

2 Translator’s note: This phrase was a style of fighting included as part of Mao Zedong’s military thought -

to fight the fight one is prepared to fight and to fight at the time and location one chooses.
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to victory. Both reflect the essence and essential points of campaign guidance thought

under informationized conditions from different perspectives.

I. Firmly Establishing the Main Basis for the Campaign Guidance Thought of

“Integrated Operations-Precision Strike to Dominate the Enemy”...63

Not only is the campaign guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision strike to

dominate the enemy” firmly established on the basis of the PLA’s Military Strategic

Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era {xinshiqi junshi zhanlue fangzhen he

zhanlue renwu} but it is also put forward while directed at the PLA’s objective realities;

not only does it conform to the general guidance laws of the modern campaign, but it also

conforms to the special guidance laws of PLA implementation of a joint campaign under

informationized conditions; not only does it carry on the experiences of PLA tradition,

but it also possesses distinctive epochal features and very strong thought-, scientific- and

directed-qualities.

(1) It is based on the military strategic concept and the strategic mission of the new era

The Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era is determined on

the basis of the national political strategy, the general objective of development, foreign

policy and the international circumstances. The Military Strategic Concept and Strategic

Mission of the New Era is the basic reliance for military struggle preparations, armed

forces construction and conducting war. Moreover, the joint campaign, especially the

joint campaign at the campaign level, is not only a part of the war but also the main way

for reaching the war goals. Thus, the campaign guidance thought must be based on the

Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era, and it must conform to

the requirements of the Military Strategic Concept and Strategic Mission of the New Era.

In a future war, the PLA will implement and execute the Military Strategic Concept of

the New Era, undertaking the historical mission of safeguarding national sovereignty and

territorial integrity, realizing the general objective of national development and providing

a secure and reliable environment. This requires for joint campaign guidance to conform

to and be in the service of strategic needs-requirements, and allows for the joint campaign

goal[s] and activities to be adjusting-coordinated with a nation’s political, economic and

diplomatic struggles and to be consistent with the national military strategy. Strategically

we persist in Active Defense {jiji fangyu}, whereas in a joint campaign we stress an

Active Initiative Offense {jiji zhudong de jin’gong}. This is because only an offensive

defense can be truly Active Defense. No matter whether it is an island offensive

operation, a border counterattack operation or an anti-air raid operation, we must

establish the awareness for flexible response, for preemptively dominating the enemy,

and offensively achieving victory. With active attack activities as the axis, overall-plan

and implement the joint campaign and realize the strategic goals. The guidance thought

of “integrated operations- precision strike to dominate the enemy” emphasizes first, to

fully bring into play the just quality of the war and superiority of operations on one’s own

territory, to mobilize all of the strengths that can be mobilized, to utilize all operational
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methods and means, and to form the overall might of the People’s War in order to win

over the enemy; at the same time, this guidance thought also stresses to fully bring into

play a subjective dynamic quality, to be adept at having a grip on the enemy’s

weaknesses and vital areas, to concentrate our crack strengths to perform precision

strikes, to destroy the enemy’s operational system and to seize victory in a joint

campaign. Therefore, the campaign guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision

strike to dominate the enemy” is the basic requirement for implementing the PLA’s

Military Strategic Concept of the New Era and accomplishing the strategic mission.

(2) It suits the new characteristics and developmental trend of informationized warfare

In future informationized warfare, profound changes will occur in very many areas such

as the battlefield form-states, operational methods, the command system and the view on

operations, and many new characteristics and new trends will emerge. For example, as

mentioned above, battle engagement will unfold in full dimensional spaces such as land,

sea, air, space, electronic and network; space dominance, information dominance and air

dominance will play a leading role in a war; operational patterns will give priority to noncontact, asymmetrical and medium-, long-range precision strikes and be accompanied by

necessary non-linear contact operations; large scale special warfare as well as

psychological warfare will be extensively implemented at the strategic and campaign

levels. The operational thought and operational patterns of the mechanized war era will

be replaced by new operational ideas and operational patterns and various new

operational activities and patterns will unfold in the various battlefields. Additionally,

they will be interwoven and have frequent transitions. These new characteristics and new

trends of informationized warfare can be summarized into their most prominent features:

First, there are higher requirements imposed on integrated operations. The practices of

several recent localized wars have demonstrated that the joint campaign has become the

basic form-state for a campaign. In a certain sense, the joint campaign is precisely

integrated operations and it is a confrontation between the operational systems of the two

sides engaged in combat. Any individual service or operational pattern cannot achieve the

war goals independently. Only by constituting an interconnected and interactively

integrated operational system of all operational essential elements {zuozhan yaosu} such

as diversified campaign strengths, multi-dimensional battlefield spaces, various

operational patterns, operational methods and means can we bring into play an integrated

operational might to overcome the enemy and gain victory. This is also a concrete

reflection of the modern system science theories in the military domain. Especially in a

campaign under informationized conditions, the operational system will be even more

massive and complex. This will require for those guiding operations to strengthen their

view of large system integrated operations, to be adept at applying the tenets and methods

of system science, and to establish an optimized and integrated operational architecture in

order to bring into play an optimum operational effectiveness and gain the victory. A

joint campaign under informationized conditions also has some new characteristics and it

imposes higher requirements on integrated operations from different perspectives. For

example, the struggle in vying for the "three Superiorities" is extremely fierce and
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permeates the entire course of the campaign, which demands even more to bring an

integrated might into play; operational command and support are complex and arduous

and the degree of difficulty in battlefield control is high, and one must maintain an

integrated adjusting-coordination for operational activities. Therefore, to say that

“integrated operations” possesses connotations of the new period and is still a component

factor serving as campaign guidance thought completely conforms to the characteristics

of a joint campaign under informationized conditions as well as its developing trend. This

is scientific and necessary.

Secondly, the modes and ways for gaining victory in operations have changed

significantly. The operational guidance center of gravity is no longer a single military

target and the effective strengths of the armed forces, but it also includes important

political and economic targets. Information attack, psychological attacks, special attacks,

and medium-, long-range precision strikes have become the main operational patterns and

activities. The victories in past campaigns were achieved mainly by fighting annihilation

warfare and wiping out the opponent’s effective strength. Yet in a campaign under

informationized conditions, even though annihilating the enemy’s effective strength is a

very important method, but similarly, one can achieve the strategic goal[s] through full

depth integrated precision strikes, destroying and paralyzing the opponent’s economic

and operational systems, strengthening the psychological strike effects against the enemy

as much as possible, and collapsing and depriving the enemy’s will to resist. One can say

that “precision strike to dominate the enemy” is an important content of the campaign

guidance thought and reflects the objective laws of the localized war under

informationized conditions.

(3) It fully brings into play the total superiority and specialty of People’s War

One of the basic starting points for establishing the PLA campaign guidance thought is to

attach importance in fully bringing the total superiority of our People’s War into play, to

persist in the strategic tactics of “you fight yours and I fight mine” to bring into play our

advantages as much as possible, and avoid our weaknesses. Despite the occurrence of

profound changes in the form-state of future warfare, many new situations and new

characteristics have emerged, not only driving the transformation in areas such as the

content and fighting methods of the People’s War, but the just qualities, the collective

mass quality, and the overall whole quality of war have not changed. It is just as

Chairman Jiang pointed out: “no matter how the form-state of warfare evolves, the basic

laws of the People's War will not change and winning a future war will still rely on the

magic weapon of the People's War.” Fully bringing into play the basic superiorities and

specialty of PLA People’s War is still a [chess board] move the enemy fears the most,

and it is also a basic thought that the PLA must fully embody in joint campaign guidance.

In order to creatively develop and utilize the thought of the People’s War, we must study,

deploy and implement a joint campaign from the operational system of the modern

People’s War. Simply put, the joint campaign system of the People’s War is forming an

optimally combined and integrated operational capability on the basis of a fairly strong
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comprehensive national power and a solid war potential, of combining the military and

civilian, of combining the various armed strengths, and of combining various operational

forms and activity patterns. Having a grip on and centering on the crux of the overall

operational situation, we strike the enemy with adjusting-coordination and precision in

the overall depth and various domains. This kind of full depth integrated operations and

precision operations that are the basis of the People’s War strength system is an effective

way and fundamental method for overcoming the enemy and gaining victory. It is also a

concentrated reflection of the essential feature of the PLA joint campaign, that carries on

and develops the experiences of PLA tradition and possesses distinctive PLA

characteristics and period features. One can say that the guidance thought of “integrated

operation-precision strike to dominate the enemy” specifically manifests and creatively

implements the thought of People’s War.

(4) It focuses on the PLA's objective realities and the needs-requirements of the new

military transformation

The joint campaign under informationized conditions is a manifestation of information

age advanced productivity and production modes in the military realm. Without a doubt,

it needs a series of good military equipment symbolized by high technology, especially

information technology equipment, as its basic support. For example, in order to

implement unified, highly effective and agile command, one needs advanced command

and control (C4KISR) systems; in order to seize information dominance, one needs good

information offense and defense weapon systems, including soft kill informationized

weapons and hard destruction informationized weapons; in order for the operational

strengths to quickly respond and maneuver into position, one needs to have various

modernized transportation tools; in order to implement non-contact long range precision

operations, one must have precision guidance weapons and various informationized

operational platforms, etc. Although there has been much development in PLA weapons

and equipment, we have a fixed quantity of “trump card” weapons equipment, and we

have greatly improved in the operational capabilities of various services and arms as well

as joint campaign capability. With the development of the economic construction and

national defense modernization in our nation, the PLA’s informationization level for

weapons and equipment as well as its joint campaign capability of each service and arm

will continue to advance. However, compared with powerful enemies, our weapons and

equipment is and will remain inferior for a fairly long period of time, especially in terms

of the degree of informationization. Thus, the establishment of campaign guidance

thought must start from the objective reality of the PLA. [We must] seek and create

fighting methods and ways to exalt our strengths-attack our weakness and to defeat

superiority with inferiority based on the new situation and new characteristics. This is an

important focal point for establishing campaign guidance thought.

Currently we are in a period of new military transformation. Chairman Jiang has pointed

out that this current military transformation is the most extensive, most influential, and

most powerful and revolutionary transformation in the history of world military

development. Its core is informationization and its essence is a fundamental change of the
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armed forces model and a fundamental change to the form-state of war. Faced with the

challenge of new military transformation, we should be clearly aware that contact

operations with the objective of annihilating the enemy’s effective strength and an

operational theory of large formations with ground army in the lead have occupied a

leading position in the PLA for a long time. Add to this our lack of practice in a joint

campaign under high-tech conditions, the PLA, until now, has had difficulty in

completely shaking off the constraints and influences from traditional operational

theories. Although we have achieved some breakthroughs and progress in the study of

PLA joint campaign theory, generally speaking, we still lag behind in the form-state of

war which is currently undergoing profound changes. On the basis of carrying on and

developing traditional experiences, we must, with a broad view and forward thinking

insight, fundamentally break through the outdated operational theories and operational

methods and create new operational thoughts. Only then can we adapt to the needsrequirements of new military transformation and winning a localized war under the

informationized conditions. This is the important significance for putting forth the

campaign guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the

enemy.”

II. The Basic Way for Implementing the Campaign Guidance Thought of

“Integrated Operations-Precision Strike to Dominate the Enemy”...86

The campaign guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision strike to dominate

the enemy” is the generic principle and the general requirement put forth from a

macroscopic perspective for a joint campaign under informationized conditions. It has a

complete guidance and restrictive role for a joint campaign at the campaign level.

Implementing the guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision strike to

dominate the enemy” involves every aspect of a joint campaign.

(1) The essential points for implementing the thought of “integrated operations”

In order to creatively implement the thought of integrated operations, we must attach

importance to applying the thought and methods of comprehensive integration and fully

utilizing the connecting and blending quality of information technology, and [we must]

realistically accomplish the comprehensive integration of the intelligence-information

system, the command and control system, the firepower strike system and the various

support systems. [We must] integrate together each subsystem of the participating

strengths into a large system with macroscopic order and optimum integration, and form

an integrated operational effectiveness that is much further along than simply adding

together subsystems. One must especially stress accomplishing the “Four Integrations,”

namely: the integration of multiple elements of operational strengths, the integration of

multiple dimensions of battlefield space, the integration of a variety of operational

activities and patterns and the integration of various assisting-supports {zhiyuan} and

safeguarding-supports {baozhang}.
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1. Scientifically compose to integrate a multi-element operational strength

The operational strength is the material basis for overcoming the enemy and gaining

victory and the basic essential element for implementing the joint campaign. In a joint

campaign under informationized conditions, only by conducting comprehensive

integration and flexibly applying the various different strengths on the basis of their

nature, characteristics and operational capabilities and building an optimal strength

structure can we form a maximum integrated combined strength. First, we must carry out

integration of the military and government, integration of the military and civilian, tight

integration of the military struggle with the struggles along the combat line of politics,

economics and diplomatic, and [we must carry out] the tight integration of the main

strength force-units, the local force-units, the armed police force-units, the militia, and

the broad mass of collective strengths to form of a blended military-local and all-services

and arms integrated modern military and government and the integration of the military

and people in the campaign strength architecture. Secondly, we must tightly center on the

general operational intent, focus on how to bring into play the operational specialties of

each service and arm, organically integrate the strengths of all services and arms such as

the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery, rationally task-organize the

various service operational groupings, and build an all-services and arms joint campaign

integrated strength architecture. Next, scheme [stratagem] functionality through the

structure {yi jiegou mou gongneng}, base each type of weapon system on its operational

characteristic-capability and application characteristics, scientifically task-organize

integrations, integrate “hard strike” with “soft strike,” integrate firepower strike with

special strike and with psychological strike, integrate long-, intermediate- and short range

strike with high-, medium- and low-altitude strike, and form an integrated precision strike

system with key points. To sum up, in implementing a future joint campaign, we must

aim at different objects of operations, battlefield environment and missions, scientifically

compose various operational strengths and build an integrated operational strength

system. We must match up force-strength, firepower and information operation

capabilities and adapt the assisting-support and safeguarding-support capabilities with

operational capabilities. [We must] concentrate the many capabilities such as battlefield

awareness, information transmission, rapid mobility and precision strike into one and

achieve a complement of the superiorities of various operational capabilities. [We must]

form maximum operational effectiveness in the totality of the joint campaign and defeat

the enemy.

2. Make a unified layout, and integrate the multi-dimensional battlefield space

A joint campaign under informationized conditions is a comprehensive confrontation in

multiple dimensions of battlefield space such as the land battlefield, the sea battlefield,

the air battlefield, the electromagnetic battlefield, outer space battlefield and the

"psychological” battlefield, each battlefield space being important and indispensable. It is

difficult for operations in any single battlefield to win victory for the campaign. The crux

is in the integrated adjusting-coordination and close cooperation between operations in

the various battlefield spaces, and this has been proven true by recent localized wars.
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Therefore, in terms of guiding operations, we must be adept at fully utilizing the

favorable conditions of each battlefield and form a highly three-dimensional, full-depth

and integrated battlefield system for the operational strengths of each battlefield space of

land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic, the front, flank and enemy rear battlefields and

the activities, [all] centering on the unified goals, the unified and overall-planned layout

and the rational arrangement. Only this way can we enable each battlefield to mutually

complement each other, mutually increase effectiveness and combine strengths in

multiple dimensions to gain victory. In a joint campaign under informationized

conditions, the outer space domain has become a more and more important operational

space. According to statistical data, during the Gulf War, the coalition forces led by the

US used more than 70 satellites and in the Kosovo War, Afghanistan War and Iraq War

the satellites, more than 50. These [satellites] established a system of many types of

satellites such as reconnaissance early warning, navigation and positioning,

communications and command, which provided omni-directional information assistingsupport and safeguarding support for air, sea and ground assault systems. Outer space has

already become a new strategic commanding height. In a future implemented joint

campaign, we must pay highly close attention in terms of battlefield spaces, build an airspace "reconnaissance-strike" operational system which can effectively carry out

missions and safeguard-support the implementation of consistently adjustingcoordination in the battlefield spaces of land, sea and air, and consequently enable the

multi-dimensioned battlefield to form an organic whole. Moreover, operations are not

only a contest of materials but also a contest of "mental vitality” {jingshen or spirit}. In

the Iraq War, the joint US-British forces comprehensively applied various means in

implementing psychological warfare against the Iraqi military, achieving tremendous

results. Thus, we should incorporate the "psychological warfare” battlefield into the

integrated category of elaborate stratagems in the joint campaign. [We should] broadly

open-up-development on psychological warfare against the enemy, disintegrate and

deprive the enemy’s will to resist, and speed up development on the operational course.

3. Comprehensively apply and adjust-control, integrate a variety of operational

activity patterns

On the one hand, because of weapons and equipment going high-tech, profound changes

have occurred in operational activity patterns and fighting methods, and many new types

of operational activity patterns and fighting methods were predestined to emerge. On the

other hand, modern campaign practices have proven that not a single operational pattern,

fighting method and means can dominate the battlefield. The basic way to gain victory is

the comprehensive application of various operational patterns and fighting methods. Not

only is this an objective requirement of a modern campaign, but it is also a basic content

in the thought of Integrated Operations. Thus, the directors of operations must definitely

comprehensively apply the many types of operational patterns and fighting methods such

as information warfare, firepower warfare, maneuver warfare {jidongzhan}, position

warfare, psychological warfare, special warfare, and network warfare, etc. [They must]

integrate regular operations with irregular operations, offensive operations with defensive

operations, non-contact operations with contact operations, “soft strike” and "hard

destruction,” and military strikes with shock and psychological attack, etc. [They must]
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blend adjusting-coordination of various operational patterns, fighting methods and

means, into one and form a comprehensive might in integrated strike. They must achieve

integration of a variety of operational patterns, not only thoroughly conduct overall-plan

prior to battle, but during battle, they must implement realistically effective adjustingcoordination and control of the various operational activities. To this end, they must build

and perfect the command and control system, establish command relationships that are

authoritative, laterally wide and vertically short, and smooth and highly effective. [They

must] ensure the implementation of strong adjusting-coordination and control of various

operational activities in hopes of obtaining maximum operational benefits.

4. All-around overall-plan, integrate various safeguarding-support systems

The implementation of various careful, prompt and effective safeguarding-supports has a

very important function for seizing victory of a joint campaign under informationized

conditions. Because the objects of safeguarding-support are diversified, the safeguardingsupport space is multi-dimensional, the structure of safeguarding-support strengths is

complex, and the specialization quality and the comprehensive quality of safeguardingsupport are increasing, the various safeguarding-support missions have become more and

more arduous and strenuous. In regards to safeguarding-support strengths, in terms of

structural division, there are safeguarding-support strengths at each level of Army, Navy,

Air, and Second Artillery; in terms of functional division, there are area safeguardingsupport strengths, organizationally structured strengths and local support-the-front

strengths; in terms of classification division, there are operational safeguarding-support

strengths, logistic safeguarding-support strengths and equipment safeguarding-support

strengths; etc. With such a numerous and complicated strength structure, if we do not

conduct all-around overall-planning, then we will not have a centralized command

support system to smooth out command and adjusting-coordination relationships in a

campaign. If we place the organizing of safeguarding-support at anyone’s discretion,

there will naturally be separate departments and areas, orders coming from multiple

places, low efficiency, even causing mutual conflicts, so one will be unable to implement

prompt, effective, and comprehensive safeguarding-support with key points. This

requires for those directing operations to further strengthen their views on large system

integrated safeguarding support. On the basis of the People’s War operational system,

and relying on comprehensive national power and territorial superiority, [we must] carry

out the joint safeguarding-support of the “three integrations” of integrating militarycivilian, integrating all-services and arms, and integrating logistics with equipment. We

should unify-overall-plan and formulate the safeguarding-support plan {jihua} from the

perspective of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetic integration. [We should] unify

and organize the safeguarding-support strengths, unify and differentiate the safeguardingsupport missions, optimize the composition of various safeguarding-support systems, and

then form an integrated safeguarding-support capability. At the same time, we must pay

attention to the confrontational functions of the various safeguarding-support systems,

adopt various measures to strengthen protection of support strengths, support resources,

support hubs and mobile lines, and ensure the implementation of a full-course, full-depth

and omni-directional reliable support to the joint campaign.
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5. Attach importance to destroying the integrated structure of the enemy’s operational

system

In a future joint campaign, in terms of the essence of operational activities, it is a

confrontation between the operational systems of both sides. At the same time as we

strengthen and optimize the structure of our operational system and increase campaign

capabilities to the greatest extent, we will do everything possible to think of ways to

destroy the structure of the enemy’s operational system and weaken its overall

operational capability. This has already become a basic way for gaining victory in a

modern campaign and has critical-quality significance. An important aspect of

implementing and applying the thought of integrated operations is to look at the objects

of operations as an integrated system and focus on destroying its integrated structure. The

enemy's operational system relies on each integrated system of high-tech equipment, and

is closely interconnected, strongly interdependent, and with a certain weakness. If any

critical part or critical link is destroyed, then it can affect the entire system, or even

paralyze the entire system. Therefore, we must be adept in seizing hold of the critical

parts in the enemy’s operational system to conduct destruction: for example, assaulting

and destroying the enemy’s command and control system, information system, weapons

systems and important support systems, etc. In order to create conditions for seizing joint

campaign victory, we will cut apart the enemy’s operational system, destroy the enemy’s

integrated structure and weaken the enemy’s capability for integrated operations through

strikes on parts and link points of the enemy’s vital areas.

(2) The essential points for implementing and carrying out the thought of “precision

strike-dominate the enemy”

“Precision strike-dominate the enemy,” in a narrow sense, does not only refer to precision

firepower strikes, but rather, it refers to precision operations. Precision operations means

to precisely select operational targets, to precisely use various operational strengths, to

precisely apply fighting methods and means, to precisely control the operational intensity

and course, and to defeat the enemy with precise and highly effective operational

activities. The guidance thought of “precision strike-dominate the enemy" not only

contains the requirements for weapons and equipment and operational capabilities, it also

contains the requirements for the skill of joint campaign guidance. In order to implement

the thought of “precisions strike-dominate the enemy,” we should seize upon the

following essential points:

1. Precisely select strike targets

The core of the “precision strike" thought is to accurately strike the enemy’s vital area

targets. The enemy's vital-area targets are targets that directly create important effects on

the campaign and even the strategic overall situation and can form a benefit on the

overall situation. This not only includes important political and economic targets, but also

includes critical systems, parts and links that play a holding together role for the enemy’s

operational system, and it also includes important force-strength groupings and important
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military facilities. Precision selection and precision strikes of these vital area-targets can

effectively destroy or paralyze the enemy’s operational architecture and weaken its

operational capability and war potential. It can strike ruthlessly-strike to hurt the enemy,

shake its morale and deprive its will to fight, so that we can achieve a shaking of the

overall situation by striking one point and achieve the effect of moving the whole body

by pulling one hair. We should pay attention to mastering four points in precision

selection and strike of vital-area targets: first of all, we must stand at the height of the

strategic and campaign overall situation and center on precision selection and strike of

targets to achieve strategic and campaign goals. Secondly, we must set out from

destroying the enemy’s operational architecture in precision selection and strike of

targets, mainly the enemy’s reconnaissance surveillance systems, command and control

systems, high-tech weapon systems and rear area safeguarding-support systems as well as

the critical nodes within these systems. Third, we must rely on our own operational

capabilities in precision selection and strike of targets. We must fully consider our strike

capabilities. Especially for targets of first-battle strikes, we need even more

demonstration-proofs from many angles {duofang lunzheng}. There must be precise and

full accuracy in target data preparation. [We must] thoroughly accomplish quantifications

for every vital-area target and ensure that we can succeed, get results if we strike, and win

if we strike. Fourth, vary the targets of key point strike at the right time. The decisionmaking and planning of precision selection strike targeting must have flexibility and

contingency quality and there must be a variety of courses of action and many

preparations. During the course of operations, carry out tracking of decision-making and

precisely evaluate strike results based on the changes in the battlefield situation. From

within the changes to battlefield posture, be adept at promptly seeking and seizing upon

the exposed vital-area targets in the enemy’s operational system that have holdingtogether and supporting roles and striking them to push forward and alter the battle

situation.

2. Use forces with precision and key points, form superiority of strikes against vitalarea targets

Using forces with precision means we must transform from the past quantitative scale

model towards a precision qualitative model. [We must] attach importance to thorough

calculations of quality and quantity and bring into play the specialty and superiority of

various operational strengths. This is an inevitable requirement of a joint campaign under

informationized conditions on strength application. Using forces with key points is a

military rule having universal significance. Only by using forces with precision and key

points against vital-area targets to form strike superiority can we ensure smashing and

annihilating the vital-area targets. To this end, we should pay attention to master the

following points: first, form the “three concentrations” against the vital-area targets.

Namely, concentrate and use crack strengths in the main direction, key point areas and

critical time segments. We must precisely calculate various operational strengths and

form overwhelming superiority against vital-area targets. Secondly, we must have a good

mastery of the relationship between qualitative and quantitative. Precisely use operational

strengths with a definite quantity as the base, but attach even more importance to the

qualitative factors of the weapons and equipment. Establish a notion of qualitative
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superiority but one must especially stress precise calculations and concentrated use of

crack forces and sharp weapons. Third, we must have a good grasp of the relationship

between concentrate and disperse. The enhanced destruction capability of modern

weapons and the increased battlefield transparency have created an extreme threat, in

terms of time and space, for excessive and lengthy concentration of force-strengths and

weaponry. Therefore, in using forces with precision and key points, we must rationally

disperse and deploy in terms of time and space. In terms of time, we must be adept at

selecting the time-opportunity, accomplishing rapid concentration and use during battle

and rapid dispersal and concealment after battle. Fourth, we must have a good grasp of

the relationship between the force-strength and firepower. The goal of using forces with

precision and key points is to improve operational effectiveness and firepower is the most

direct factor in modern operational effectiveness. Fundamentally speaking, to concentrate

force-strengths is to concentrate firepower, and precise calculations mainly refer to

firepower calculation. Thus, in terms of the relationship between the force-strengths and

firepower, we must emphasize giving priority to concentrating firepower and with

firepower concentration as the prerequisite, improve the effectiveness of using forces

with precision and key points. Fifth, we must have a good grasp of the relationship

between striking targets and selecting force-strengths. Strikes on different targets need

different strike strengths, thus using forces with precision and key points must emphasize

directed-quality. For example, a strike giving priority to destroying the enemy’s

information systems and command systems as the main targets should have forcestrengths and weaponry having “soft-kill” capability in the lead. In strikes against the

enemy’s important military facility and effective strength targets, we should lead with

force-strengths and weaponry having “hard kill” capability. Only in this manner can we

achieve the optimum strike results.

3. Precisely utilize various operational methods and means

In a future joint campaign under informationized conditions, we will face a completely

different battlefield environment, different operational opponents and different

operational activity patterns than in past wars. Therefore, on the basis of carrying on and

developing traditional fighting methods of the PLA, precise, flexible and creative

application of fighting methods is of utmost importance for seizing victory in a joint

campaign. Fighting methods have a layered quality. There are joint campaign fighting

methods of an overall general quality, and there are specific fighting methods for each

operational phase and operational activity. Speaking in terms of the overall general

quality fighting methods, they are mainly to fight well the contention warfare

{zhengduozhan} of information dominance, air dominance and sea dominance; fight well

the high-intensity full-depth assault warfare; fight well the high-efficiency structural

destruction warfare; fight well the highly independent asymmetrical operations; etc. Of

course, the content of fighting methods is very ample. For example, in terms of specific

fighting methods, one cannot exhaust them. However, in applying fighting methods, one

must be precise and flexible, and especially in carrying out specific activities of the forceunits of the services and arms, one must thoroughly plan and precisely calculate. For

example, for landing operations, apply the fighting method of full depth seize-occupy the

landing site. Not only must one assault the first-line defense positions of the enemy’s
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inshore beachheads, but one must also strike the maneuver strengths {jidong liliang}

moving forward from the enemy’s depth; not only must one strike the incoming raid of

enemy aircraft, but one must also seek and annihilate the operational ships at sea and

below the sea; not only must one assault onto land from the sea, but one must also

implement vertical landing from the air; not only must one use hard strike means such as

force-strengths and firepower to smash the enemy’s important targets and kill the

enemy‘s effective strengths, but one must also use soft strike means such as

electromagnetic attack and computer network attack to destroy and jam the enemy’s

reconnaissance and command and control systems; not only must one implement frontal

assault onto land, but one must also implement special sabotage operations in the

enemy’s rear. With such a multitude of strengths and operational activities unfolding at

the same time or in sequence in the full depth of the campaign, we must, based on the

objective situations of the battlefield, conduct precise calculations and thorough

arrangements for the necessary force-strengths, firepower as well as the operational time

and location of every operational activity. [We must] bring into play the subjective

dynamic quality of campaign guidance and with precision, flexibly apply fighting

methods. Only then can we fully bring into play the might of the integrated joint

campaign and achieve the operational goals.

4. Precisely control the operational course

The joint campaign at the campaign level is generally implemented in phases, and each

phase has different operational missions, operational patterns and fighting methods.

However, they are required to be inter-linked, to have mutual functions, and to be

mutually complementary. This requires that those directing a campaign should, on the

basis of the general operational intent and battlefield posture, set out from achieving the

campaign goal[s], have a foothold in the campaign overall situation, and rationally divide

the operational phases, allowing them to be inter-linked; [the campaign directors should]

precisely determine the implementation sequence and methods of various operational

patterns and fighting methods for each service and arm in different phases, and achieve a

consistent adjusting-coordination in terms of time and space; they must conduct realistic

and forceful precision adjustment and control of the critical factors affecting the

operational course and conclusion such as the operational time-opportunities, the

operational intensity and the operational phase transitions, etc. In terms of the joint

campaign guidance, one must attach importance to precisely have a good grasp of the

major key-link quality operations that affect the overall situation. First, one must strive to

fight the first battle well. Though the first battle is the opening match of the battle, it is

the organic prelude to a joint campaign, and its outcome extremely influences the overall

situation. Thus, one must precisely plan and make meticulous preparations in order to

have a good grasp of the time-opportunity to start fighting and to strive to win if there is a

first battle. Secondly, one must precisely have a good grasp of the transitions of the

operational phases and fight well in the operations connecting the middle phases. This

phase is a period of time when severe changes occur in the battlefield posture and when

the situation is complex and contradiction points are many. Many situations will exceed

outside of what was predicted, so one must have a good grasp of the operational centers

of gravity of the new phases and promptly modify and improve the operational plan.
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[One must] quickly adjust the bushi disposition and transition the operational activity

patterns. [One must] ensure that one has a good grasp of the operations of the middle

phases and push forward the smooth development of the battle situation. Third, one must

precisely control the operational conclusion and grasp the operational “apex.” This is to

fight well the concluding battle, as its success or failure relates to whether one can

achieve the entire operational goal. Those directing operations must master the degree of

achieving campaign goals and the changes in the battlefield situation. They must make

scientific calculations and assessments for campaign developing trends and conclusion,

control the operational limits, grasp the operational “apex,” adopt suitably realistic

operational activity patterns, fight well in operations of the last phase and consequently

obtain the complete realization of the entire campaign goals.

Section 2: Basic Principles of a Campaign...93

The basic principles of a campaign are the concrete manifestation of the campaign basic

guidance thought of “integrated operations-precision strike to dominate the enemy” from

a different perspective. They are the basic rules one should adhere to in preparing and

implementing a campaign.

I. Know the Opponent and Know Yourself, Full Preparation...93

To know the opponent and know yourself is a basic prerequisite for correctly guiding a

campaign. The modern campaign battlefield is broad in scope, has multi-elements of

participating strengths, changes in the situation are abrupt, the struggle in reconnaissance

and anti-reconnaissance is fierce, “knowing the enemy and knowing yourself” touches

upon many issues, and the amount of information is large. The scope of the confrontation

between the enemy and us is no longer limited in the material domain such as forcestrength and weaponry. It has expanded to the information domain and the cognition

domain, so the importance of information has increased daily. Centering on these two

domains, information warfare and psychological warfare are unfolded. They will become

the important content of a campaign under informationized conditions, requiring one to

accomplish knowing the opponent and knowing yourself in all areas of land, sea, air,

space, electromagnetic and psychological, and further increasing requirements. To this

end, we should especially pay attention to the following issues: first, we must master

intelligence information even more comprehensively and profoundly. The campaign

commander and the command organ must, on the basis of correctly understanding the

strategic intent, mastering the needs of the strategic interests, profoundly understanding

the operational missions and fully comprehending the requirements of the nation’s

political, economic and diplomatic struggles on the campaign, be as familiar as possible

with the operational capabilities and specialties of both sides. In terms of our side, they

should understand with key points how to enable the operational capability of each

service to mutually match each other and complement each other’s superiorities and

accomplish the campaign missions together; at the same time, they should comprehend

the situations such as the political and diplomatic that are closely related to the campaign

and ensure that the campaign from start to finish conforms to and serves the needs-
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requirements of political and diplomatic struggles. In terms of the enemy's side, not only

must they master the enemy situation that can be gathered from general battlefield

awareness, but they also should more profoundly comprehend the relevant content of the

enemy’s operational will, mental psychology, values and education. Secondly, they must

strive to achieve information sharing among the participating strengths. They should

unify the bushu disposition and application of the reconnaissance strengths of all services

and bring into play the function of information networks. They should join the

reconnaissance and early warning equipment in the different operational spaces and

various operational organizational-units into one, form a functionally and highly

integrated reconnaissance and early warning system, and improve the overall level of

battlefield awareness; at the same time as closely organizing root-level reconnaissance

and early warning, they should also utilize higher level intelligence, common media, etc.

to expand intelligence and information sources and even bring into play further the

superiority of information sharing. Third, is to actively open-up-development of

information confrontation. They must comprehensively: use the various strengths of

information operations, fully bring into play the auxiliary role of local information

sources during information operations and improve the capability of information

operations from an overall standpoint; use a variety of methods together, combine “soft

strike” and “hard destruction,” combine technical means and tactical measures, and

influence the normal bringing into play of the enemy’s information system effectiveness;

and adopt realistic and effective information security secrecy measures, strengthen

protection of PLA information systems, and ensure the normal running of systems.

Superiority without preparation is not real superiority, and inferiority with preparation

can often defeat a superior enemy. On the basis of knowing the opponent and knowing

yourself and dependent on the campaign mission, one must focus on the full course of the

joint campaign and center on the operational needs-requirements to fully prepare. This is

an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring joint campaign victory.

Campaign preparations must be conducted as early as possible to fully utilize the

favorable conditions of peace time. One must: be rooted in the most complex and most

difficult situations, thoroughly and precisely formulate the campaign plans {jihua},

conceive a variety of courses of action, have in advance multiple preparations, and

conduct operational simulations; strengthen battlefield construction and material reserves;

muster the force-strengths at the right time, and organize imminent battle training;

broadly and profoundly accomplish political work; and adopt strict defensive and

safeguarding-support measures, ensure completion of joint preparations with

concealment, safely, and on time.

II. Strive for Initiative, and Seize and Control “Two Dominances”...94

Initiative is a freedom of armed forces activities, a dominance of the battlefield and the

enemy, and it is also a main content that both participating sides strive for on the

battlefield. Striving for initiative and striving to avoid passivity are universal military

rules throughout military history.
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In operations under informationized conditions, striving for initiative faces many new

difficulties and this reveals some special laws. Applying high-tech weapons and

equipment, paralyzing the enemy’s operational architecture, first seizing of critical

domains that sustain the battlefield, and gradual expanding of the aforementioned into the

other domains of the battlefield have already become important ways to seize battlefield

initiative. In a future joint campaign under high-tech conditions, especially under

informationized conditions, the crux of controlling the battlefield and seizing initiative is

to strive and master battlefield information dominance and air dominance. Only after

seizing and controlling these "two dominances” can we smoothly conduct land and sea

operations.

To seize and maintain battlefield information dominance, one must: unify the planning

{jihua} and use of the strengths of various information operations of each service and

fully bring into play the role of the people and masses in information operations; adopt

various effective means, closely organize information reconnaissance, and provide enemy

information and battle conditions at the right time and accurately; strengthen the

protection of information systems and information security in joint operations, adopt

various measures to conduct electronic demonstrations and deception, and make it

difficult for the enemy to gather our real information; fully bring into play the role of the

command automation system and improve the effectiveness of collecting, processing,

transmitting and using information; and implement active and effective electronic

jamming and hard destruction, jam, suppress, destroy, and smash the enemy’s important

information systems such as their command and control systems, and seize information

dominance.

To seize air dominance, we should, with Air Force operational strengths in the lead, fully

bring into full play the overall might of the campaign and tactical missile force-units, the

Army aviation force-units, the air defense force-units and special operational force-units.

[We should] comprehensively use different activities such as missile assaults, air attacks,

air combat, anti-air operations and enemy rear sabotage-raids, etc., and smash and

weaken the enemy’s air combat capability and air defense capability in order seize air

dominance.

To strive for initiative and seize-control of the “two dominances,” we must unify the

overall-planning and organizing and strengthen the adjusting-coordination of various

operational strengths and operational activities; we must give prominence to key points,

adhere to the needs-requirements of the campaign’s realities in different phases,

rationally determine the scope of time and space in seizing and maintaining battlefield

control, enlarge the degree of control over the main area, and ensure the freedom of the

campaign’s main activities.

III. Concentrate Crack Troops, Strike the Enemy’s Vital Areas...95

In a campaign under high-tech conditions, especially under informationized conditions,

and in the situation where the enemy is superior in weapons and equipment and we are
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inferior, in order to strive for campaign victory, we must adhere to the specific patterns

and needs of the campaign and unify the mustering of the crack force-units and high-tech

weapons and equipment of all services. [We must] form a crack strength with crack

troops and sharp weapons in the lead and in combination with a variety of operational

strengths. [We must] seek a comprehensive superiority of qualitative and quantitative

operational strengths, and enhance out capabilities to contend with the enemy to the

greatest extent possible.

In order to concentrate crack troops, first of all, adhering to operational needs, muster

sufficient crack troops and sharp weapons from the services and the goal is to form an

effective key point strike capability in the main operational direction and in the main

operational activities. Secondly, one must attach importance to the mutual aggregation of

operational effectiveness and the factors for gaining victory. [We must] unify the task

organization and the use of strengths, attach importance to the comprehensive integration

of weapon systems and operational factors, allow the various strengths to complement

each other, and form an overall combined power; at the same time as concentrating

strengths, we should pay even closer attention to a comprehensive concentration of long

range operational effectiveness such as electronic warfare, firepower warfare,

information warfare, etc., select the most favorable time-opportunity to release the strike

capability towards the most valuable target, and achieve optimum operational results.

To strike the enemy's vital area is to apply crack strengths, to comprehensively apply

different methods and means, to set out from the needs-requirements of the overall

operational situation, and to select the vital area targets that play a holding together and

supporting role in the enemy’s operational system. It is also what facilitates our achieving

of the operational intention. It is being able to quickly dismember the command and

control systems, the main force-strength groupings, the main weapon systems and

important battlefield facilities in the enemy’s operational system as well as the critical

parts of the assisting-support and safeguarding-support system, and to implement key

point strikes and to quickly destroy and paralyze the enemy.

IV. Rapid and Sudden, Catch the Enemy Unaware...96

In campaign operations, we must adopt effective measures, strive to achieve a sudden

quality in activities, and boldly implement mobility. With rapid activities and catch the

enemy unaware fighting methods and means, [we must] seize and maintain battlefield

initiative and obtain operational victory.

Sudden quality [suddenness] is a multiplier of combat power. Along with the notable

enhancement in the capabilities of armed forces intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance

and information processing under informationized conditions, warfare has become more

and more transparent and it has become more and more difficult to achieve operational

suddenness by relying on traditional concealment measures. War practices have

demonstrated that although camouflage and deception measures can preserve actual

strength, they are after all passive and protective measures and can easily restrict the
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normal conduct of the activity of operations. With the dual roles of mechanization and

informationization, an armed forces’ capability for rapid activities has been significantly

raised. Through rapid and sudden activities, it has become possible to achieve operational

objectives before an enemy can make a response. Compared with achieving suddenness

via concealment, not only can rapid activities directly weaken the enemy’s operational

capability with activities such as firepower damage and force-strength assault, it can

similarly catch the enemy unaware, psychologically fear and awe the enemy, and achieve

the result of manipulating and smashing the enemy’s will to resist. This point was proven

by the Iraq War. If the PLA fights with a high-tech and powerful enemy, we must achieve

operational suddenness. Outside of retaining methods such as traditional concealment,

camouflage and deception, we must further attach importance to bringing the specialties

of PLA traditional maneuver warfare {jidongzhan} and fighting method flexibility into

play, strive to make breakthroughs in the conventional in the range and speed of

operations and operational methods, and strike the enemy and catch them unprepared

through rapid activities and asymmetrical methods and means.

Actively adopt concealment, camouflage and deception measures. Directed at the

enemy’s operational characteristics and the battlefield posture, be adept at applying

stratagems, and strengthen information confrontation. Disrupt the enemy’s

reconnaissance and surveillance with various means of jamming. Conceal the real and

show the false throughout the complete domain of the battlefield. Cleverly deceive and

confuse the enemy. Cause the enemy to be unable to ascertain our activities, bringing

about their false impression and being unaware.

Be adept at taking advantage of the enemy’s mistakes. Those directing a campaign must

be adept at discovering and utilizing the mistakes and carelessness of the enemy. They

must skillfully use stratagems, think of ways to trap the enemy into unfavorable

situations, and compel the enemy to make mistakes. Once combat opportunities appear,

they are able to rapidly respond and strike the enemy to catch them unaware.

Maintain a fast tempo in activities. Boldly implement maneuver operations {jidong

zuozhan} and fully bring the role of command automation systems into play. Strive to be

quicker than the enemy in the command flow and occupy a preemptive position in the

activity flow. Maintaining a rapid operational tempo means that even if the enemy knows

our operational intention, they still are unable to effectively respond, and this restricts and

deprives the enemy’s freedom of action.

Flexibly use strengths and change fighting methods. Based on the specific battlefield

situation, persist in the idea of you fight yours and I fight mine. Bring the PLA’s

operational advantages into play. Attack the enemy at undefended points. Avoid the

strengths and attack the weaknesses. Strike the enemy with means and methods the

enemy is unable to anticipate, and force the enemy to fall into a condition of being

passive and taking a beating.
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V. Combine Offense and Defense, Attach Importance to Attack...97

In an offensive operation, we must strive from the start to paralyze the enemy’s

information systems and air dominance systems with sudden and intense firepower. In

addition, we must win against the enemy’s decision-making superiority and activity

superiority with fast tempo operational activities, and trap the enemy in a passive position

where he is hard put to respond. At the same time, we must adopt necessary measures and

accomplish full-dimensional protection and prevent the enemy from utilizing the

occasions when we cannot form operational capabilities such as our committing,

assembling and unfolding of force strengths to implement strikes for taking the initiative

to subdue the enemy {xianfa zhiren}. The main measures are: accomplish network and

electromagnetic protection and ensure the normal operating of our integrated command

and control system; accomplish well anti-air defense, minimize the operational

effectiveness of the enemy's air raid weapons, and ensure the anti-air security of

important targets; and thoroughly organize anti-airborne landing and anti-special

operations, prevent the enemy's infiltration and disruption, and ensure the security of our

operational rear. Closely match up defensive operations and the offensive, and ensure

achievement of the offensive operational goals.

During defensive operations, with realizing the goals of defensive operations as the core

and setting out from the operational disposition {bushu} needs-requirements in building

key point defense and key point garrison duty, [we must] consider defending operations

and offensive operations unified-overall-planning, and form a great depth and threedimensional disposition {bushi} having both offense and defense. Seizing upon the

occasions when the enemy is committing long range force-strengths, when forcestrengths have not unfolded, and when they have not completed attack disposition

{bushu}, open-up-develop active offensive activities, sudden attacks [assaults] their port

and airfield facilities, and destroy and delay the committing and unfolding of enemy

force-strengths; taking advantage of the occasion when the enemy has yet to construct

their air defense system, strike the enemy’s command system, air defense system and air

combat system; and taking advantage of before the enemy has yet formed a three

dimensional attack disposition {bushu}, sudden-attack the enemy’s key point disposition

{bushu} and delay the initiation of the enemy attack. When the enemy is not done with

the creation of the three dimensional offensive disposition {bushu}, we need to assault

the enemy's key point bushu disposition, and delay it from initiating the offense. In

summary, [we must] strive for implementation of matching up active offensive operations

with defensive operations over the full course of operations and operations of offense

assisting defense and integrated offense-defense.

In a campaign under informationized conditions, both sides have rapid mobility

capability of force-strengths and firepower and possess the capability to implement long

range strikes against an enemy. They both stress implementing preemptive suddenattacks, smashing the enemy’s vital-area targets such as their command and control

systems and precision strike systems in order to seize air dominance and information

dominance and firmly grasping the war initiative. Also, only by accomplishing this point
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can we gain victory in the war. Consequently, whether it is offense or defense, in order to

achieve one’s own goals, one must actively conduct offensive activities.

VI. In-depth Strikes, Attach Importance to Long Range Operations...98

Full-depth strikes are an important way to achieve campaign operational goals. Whether

one can win a modern campaign to a large extent depends on one’s operational capability

to suppress or smash the opponent's depth. In full depth strike, we stress that, at the same

time as striking the enemy's forward force-units, strike the high value targets such as the

strategic centers of gravity in the enemy’s full-depth and the rear area and command

systems. This also includes protecting one’s own full-depth important targets from the

enemy’s assault. In terms of space, this not only includes striking the enemy's depth, it

also includes protecting one’s own depth; not only does this include ground surface but it

also includes air, sea surface (underwater) and even outer space three-dimensional

strikes. In terms of time, in-depth strikes and forward position strikes are conducted

simultaneously or near simultaneously; sometimes in-depth strikes are even conducted

before the forward position strikes. In an offensive campaign, one must alter the methods

of going from forward position to in-depth, instead one should strike against the enemy’s

forward position and in-depth simultaneously; in a defensive campaign, place emphasis

on at the same time actively resisting the enemy's attacks on the forward position, and

strike the enemy’s attack disposition {bushu} with active initiative counterattack

activities.

In terms of strike targets, give priority to the enemy’s vital-area and weak targets. One

should focus on striking the enemy’s command and control systems, rear area assistingsupport systems, airfields, ports, traffic and communication hubs, as well as important

battlefield facilities, etc.; in terms of using strengths, with high-tech “trump cards” in the

lead, fully bring into play the superiority of the People’s War and extensively open-updevelop special operations in the enemy's depth; in terms of operational patterns, with

long range firepower sudden-attack in the lead, combine the application of operational

patterns such as guerrilla warfare, special warfare and airborne [landing] operations, etc.,

and strike the enemy with flexible maneuver and catching them unaware; and in terms of

strike time, select the most favorable time-opportunity and strive to form continuous

strikes during the entire campaign course.

Long range strike capability is the foundation for implementing in-depth strike. One

should apply, inclusively, long range artillery, campaign tactical missiles, weapon

systems such as operational aircraft and ships equipped with various precision strike

weapons, as well as force-strengths undertaking in-depth operational missions. These will

implement long range operations against the enemy and simultaneously strike the full

depth.
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VII. Unified Command, Consistent Adjusting-Coordination...99

In campaign operations under informationized conditions, there are multiple elements of

participating strengths with a variety of functions. The operational activities of the

various battlefield spaces are intermingled, so if one departs from unified command, then

it would be difficult to form the powerful might of integrated operations. Therefore,

flexible and highly effective command systems, command means and command methods,

and smooth coordination relationships are the basic conditions for achieving unified

command and consistent adjusting-coordination. To this end, we must accomplish the

following points:

Establish a highly effective and authoritative command system. In a campaign under

informationized conditions, the operational space is broad, the operational disposition

{bushu} is dispersed and the situational changes are extreme. Especially in an integrated

joint campaign, the command system should have a thin and flat profile, and it should be

laterally interconnected and vertically integrated. It should have robust functionality to

implement command of all types of operational strengths. It should have clear

responsibilities, be highly authoritative, and have a capable, agile and effective

architecture for nimble operating.

Apply command automation means. Under high-tech conditions, especially under the

informationized conditions, there are multiple elements of participating strengths and

battlefield posture changes are extreme. The information volume a campaign commander

needs to receive and process is soaring and time effectiveness requirements are high. One

must vigorously open-up and apply tools such as information fusion, intelligence

analysis, decision-making optimization and plan-formulation, etc. In order to provide the

campaign commander nimble and effective aided decision-making means to conduct

fully automated and real time monitor-control and analysis of the battlefield, [one must]

make command and control automated and intelligent, shorten the command cycle of the

campaign and enhance both the scientific quality of decision-making and the real time

quality of command.

Selecting to use an appropriate level of centralized and dispersed command mode. In a

modern campaign, not only is there a high degree of centralized command required, but

one can also organize operations on one’s own {zizuzhi zuozhan}. [One must] fully

utilize the integrated information network system to achieve a common battlefield

posture awareness, and allow all services and arms, various operational organizationalunits and operational factors participating in operations to grasp corresponding

information of the enemy forces, our forces and the operational environment; and apply

modern organizing and decision-making ideas, establish a new mechanism for joint and

synchronous decision-making, and transform the traditional decision-making and

planning process that was vertical, level-by-level, and unidirectional to a parallel,

synchronous and interactive one. Shorten the time for cognition and decision-making and

elevate the quality and results of decision-making. Not only must we centralize command

and unify the operational thoughts, unify the formulation of plans {jihua}, unify the
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clarification of operational objectives, unify the differentiation of operational phases,

unify the determination of the operational disposition {bushu}, and unify the control of

critical quality operations, etc., but we must attach importance to combining centralized

with dispersed command. This will fully bring into play the initiative and creativity of all

services and arms and the commanders at various levels and overcome the problems of

exercising too rigid control, and lacking in flexibility. It will also allow the subordinate

levels, centered on the general operational intent, to actively and flexibly complete their

operational missions

Establish smooth coordination relationships. Common operational thoughts, operational

principles and full understanding of higher level intent, individual missions and mutual

relationships are the foundation for consistent adjusting-coordination of operational

strengths and operational activities. The campaign resolution and the campaign plans

{jihua} are the basis for coordination. In order to ensure the consistent adjustingcoordination of the various operational strengths, one should: clarify the coordination

relationships and stipulate the coordination discipline; seize upon the links, give

prominence to coordination key points; combine plan {jihua} coordination with ad hoc

coordination; establish the coordination organization and reinforce the coordination

support, etc.; and especially stress that we must set out from the overall campaign

situation to actively coordinate and tacitly cooperate.

VIII. Full-Scale Safeguarding Support and Give Prominence to Key Points...100

Full scale safeguarding support includes operational, logistical and technical support as

well as an integrated comprehensive support to the various services, arms and component

parts. Giving prominence to key points is, on the basis of full-scale safeguarding support,

give prominence to support in the key point operational direction, the key point

operational area, the key point operational activities, the key point time occasions and the

important weapon systems.

Achieve integrated support. One must: fully utilize the favorable conditions of the

People’s War, rationally employ the various safeguarding support strengths and build a

robust safeguarding support system that is military-civilian integrated and services and

arms integrated; based on the needs-requirements of the campaign, unify the organization

of the safeguarding-support strengths, differentiate the safeguarding-support missions,

and implement the safeguarding-support activities; and based on the battlefield situation,

adopt flexible and diverse safeguarding-support modes.

Implement key point safeguarding-support. We must do both unify-overall-planning and

give prominence to safeguarding-support key points based on the safeguarding-support

needs of the campaign mission and various services and arms; first, we must scientifically

differentiate and employ the safeguarding-support strengths, concentrate the main

safeguarding-support force-strengths, materials, equipment to use them in operations in

the main direction, the main battlefield and critical campaign phases, and ensure the

accomplishment of main operational missions. Secondly, within all of the campaign
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safeguarding-support content, we must give prominence to safeguarding-support of the

key point content. The safeguarding-support problems in areas such as intelligence,

communications, air defense, logistics and maneuver are especially prominent, so those

directing a campaign should attach importance and resolve key points in areas such as

technical equipment and personnel, etc. Third, we must secure sufficient materiel

reserves, strength reserves and equipment reserves in order to ensure the completion of

key point safeguarding-support missions and maintain a capability for sustained

safeguarding-support.

Implement safeguarding-support during confrontation. In a modern campaign, the

struggle between safeguarding-support and anti-safeguarding-support is intense and the

confrontation quality of safeguarding-support is enhanced. One should strengthen the

view and measures for implementing safeguarding-support during confrontation. We

must especially combine the safeguarding-support capability of weakening and disrupting

the enemy with improving and strengthening one’s own safeguarding-support capability.

Thus, implement full-scale safeguarding-support during confrontation and ensure the

smooth implementation of the campaign.

IX. . Bring into Play the Superiority of Political Work...101

A campaign is not only a contest between the military and economic powers of the

opposing sides but it is also a competition between their political and mental strengths.

Strengthening political work and bringing political superiority transforms the PLA

officers’ and men’s mental vitality strength into a tremendous combat power and brings

into play a person’s largest dynamic quality to defeat the enemy. [This is accomplished]

on the basis of the excellent political affairs and through the series of political work that

stimulates the high level of operational zeal and the brave spirit of not being afraid of

difficulties and not being afraid of sacrifice by various types of combatants.

Campaign political work must be jointly implemented under the centralized and unified

leadership of the party committees of the campaign large formation to bring into play the

strengths in various areas. It also implements and permeates the full course of the

campaign. Through implementing the orders and instructions of the Party Central

Committee and the Central Military Commission, it upholds the absolute leadership of

the party over the military, and guarantees a high level of centralization and integration of

the force-units; it teaches the force-units to recognize the dialectical relationship between

humans and weapons, to avoid "the worship of weaponry,” to solidify the confidence in

winning if one dares to strike; it promotes military democracy, collective thinking with

broad benefits, and creates fighting methods suitable to the new conditions; through the

broad connections with local governments, it allows the mighty force of People’s War to

be fully brought into play; it focuses on bringing an overall combined power into play, it

teaches force-units to do away with the thought of a single service being able to gain

victory, and it establishes the view of active cooperation and close coordination; it

strengthens education in battlefield discipline and accomplishes well the people’s work;
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and it improves work styles and work methods and adapts the requirements of modern

campaign political work.

In addition, we must especially attach importance to opening-up-development in the

struggles of "psychological warfare" and countering the enemy’s “psychological

warfare.” In a campaign, at the same time as implementing military strikes against the

enemy, we must pay attention to understanding and mastering the psychological dynamic

state of the enemy’s officers and soldiers. [We must] have a grasp of their weaknesses

and contradictions and actively open-up-develop "psychological warfare.” [We must]

collapse the enemy’s will to fight and break up the enemy’s military strengths. At the

same time, we must strive to accomplish the work on countering the enemy’s

“psychological warfare,” and expose the enemy’s “psychological warfare” negative

media and reactionary propaganda. [We must] build a defense line of solid thought and

render the entire body of battle commanders to be able to politically, mentally and

psychologically crush the “psychological warfare” intention of the enemy and ensure

participating force-units unite with solidarity and raise combat power.
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Chapter 4

Campaign Preparation and Implementation...102

Campaign preparation is the prerequisite for ensuring smooth implementation of a

campaign and seizing operational victory. Campaign implementation affects the

realization of the campaign resolution and directly affects campaign success or failure.

Section 1: Campaign Preparations...102

Campaign preparation is the process of conducting campaign overall planning and

organizing by the campaign commander, and it is the basis for the campaign activity.

Campaign preparation time is normally determined by a higher level commander based

on the nature, the conditions, and the scale of operations. A campaign commander and

the command organ should tensely but orderly accomplish operational preparations

within the time limit stipulated by higher level authorities. All preparation work should

be correctly and carefully planned, and quickly and covertly conducted.

I. Determining the Campaign Concept and Setting the Campaign Resolution...102

Determining the campaign concept and setting the campaign resolution are the core

contents of campaign overall planning.

(1) Determining the campaign concept

The campaign concept is the general objective that the campaign must reach as well as

the basic methods to be used. It is the general outline for campaign activities and it is the

fundamental basis for organizing and implementing the campaign. Determining the

campaign concept is a special feature of PLA operational guidance; not only is it a

treasured experience accumulated by the PLA in a long period of war practice, but it is

also an effective way for the PLA to conduct future campaign preparations. The

campaign concept is normally determined by higher level authority, but sometimes it can

be put forth by the campaign commander and reported to the higher level authority for

approval. It can also be jointly determined by higher level authority and the root-level

campaign commander.

1. Contents of the campaign concept

The contents of a campaign concept do not have a fixed model-form and they should be

determined according to the actual situations for each operation. The contents normally

include content such as the campaign goal[s], the operational direction, the operation

objective[s], the operational strengths to be used, the fighting method[s], and the

campaign phases, etc. In each operation, the campaign concept is normally formulated by

capturing one or several of the most prominent and most critical issues from amongst

these contents.
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In campaign practice, sometimes when a situation is unclear, it is necessary for one to

first determine a macroscopic and outline concept, and then after that, as the situation

gradually gets clearer, set the campaign resolution; sometimes a commander is able to

quickly and completely grasp the battlefield situation and under these conditions, he is

able to directly set the campaign resolution. Consequently, in campaign practice, one

must not necessarily first determine the campaign concept in each operation and then set

the campaign resolution, but one should flexibly grasp [the situation] based on the actual

situations for each campaign.

2. The main issues that should be grasped in determining the campaign concept

(i) Mastering the bases. The main bases for determining the campaign concept

include higher level intent, the enemy’s situation, our situation, the battlefield

environment, etc. Amongst these, the higher level intent is the main basis for a campaign

commander in determining the campaign concept. Therefore, a campaign commander

must correctly and profoundly understand the higher level intent and grasp its spiritual

essence. A campaign under informationized conditions affects the national political and

diplomatic struggles and affects the overall situation of national economic construction,

so a campaign commander must determine the campaign concept based on the intent of

the supreme command and needs-requirements of the national political and diplomatic

struggles. The enemy’s campaign intention, force-strength task organization, operational

characteristics, weapons and equipment and posture, the PLA’s campaign task

organization, the military-political quality of the force-units as well as the situations such

as military geographical environment, weather, social conditions within the theater are all

important bases for determining the campaign concept. Therefore, when determining the

campaign concept, one must also thoroughly and completely analyze these issues.

(ii) Focus on the overall situation. The campaign concept is the general outline for

operational guidance, so one must focus on the overall situation and macroscopically

stratagem-plan. One must fully understand the status and role of the campaign in the

overall situation. [One must] accurately grasp internal relationships within the campaign

overall situation and focus on the strategic and campaign overall situations and full

process. [One must] conduct macroscopic stratagem-planning and correctly determine the

important issues in the campaign, such as the campaign goal, the operational direction,

the main bushu-disposition and main fighting methods, etc.

(iii) Scientific forecasting. A campaign commander should forecast the possible

changes in the enemy situation and activities in each campaign phase on the basis of

correctly analyzing the objective situations, and [he should] conceive the PLA approach,

measures to be adopted and possible final results of operations.

(iv) Capturing the critical [issues]. Because the situations of each operation are

different, the critical issues are also different. In a campaign, the campaign goal,

operational direction, operational objectives, fighting methods, the use of operational

strengths, and time opportunities for campaign phase transitions, etc, can all be critical
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issues in operations. One must capture the critical issues of operations in determining the

campaign concept and make clear stipulations.

(2) Setting the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution is the final decisive resolve made for the main issues of

operations in accordance with further mastering the situation and on the basis of the

campaign concept. It is the basis for formulating campaign plans, organizing campaign

coordination and implementing the campaign.

1. The main contents of the campaign resolution

The main contents include: the campaign goal; the main operational direction; the

campaign bushi-disposition, the basic fighting methods; the campaign phase divisions,

and campaign initiation time, etc.

The campaign goal – is the ultimate outcome of campaign one must reach. The goal of a

campaign under informationized conditions is subjected to fairly large restrictions of

political and diplomatic struggles. When determining the campaign goal, one must

conform to higher level intent. When contradictions occur between higher level intent

and the root-level operational capabilities and battlefield actual situations, the

commander should have the courage to reflect the real situation to the higher level

authority and put forth one’s own recommendations by seeking the truth from fact. One

must set out from objective realities; not only can one not determine an excessive

campaign goal that surpasses PLA operational capabilities and is difficult to attain, but

one cannot be too conservative and go as far as to influence the bringing into play of

latent capabilities and delay war progress.

The main operational direction – in selecting the main operational direction, one should

determine this based on situations such as the enemy situation, the higher level intent, the

campaign goal, the campaign task organization, the battlefield environment, etc. For one

campaign, one should only select one main operational direction. The main operational

direction selected by a commander should benefit the realization of higher level intent,

benefit the reaching of the campaign goal, benefit the requirement to win the initial battle,

benefit later development {fazhan}, and benefit a favorable battlefield environment, these

are the general requirements. In actual operations, the situation of having all these factors

being favorable is in the minority; often only some of them are favorable and some are

not. A commander must focus on the most important factors, weigh the pros and cons and

make scientific decision making.

Campaign bushi disposition – is the mission differentiation {renwu qufen}, the organized

grouping {bianzu} and the positioning {peizhi} accomplished for the strengths within the

campaign task organization. Correct campaign bushi disposition has important

significance for the course and conclusion of the campaign. Campaign bushi disposition

should be determined according to the enemy situation, the terrain, campaign type and
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patterns, etc. Normally, one establishes a group (a concentrated grouping) bushi

disposition whose mission differentiation should allow the various participating strengths

to be clear in its responsibilities and achieve the common campaign goal through

consistent adjusting-coordination; the campaign organized grouping should be flexibly

organized based on different operational needs, and one can adopt the forms of organized

grouping of mission and organized grouping of organized system. The rank levels for the

organized grouping of various services and arms force-strengths in general are the joint

concentrated group {lianhe jiqun} – the campaign large formation – the force-strength

group {bingtuan jituan} – the tactical formation-unit {zhanshu biandui} – the tactical

grouping {zhanshuqun}; force-strength bushu disposition {bingli bushu} is the

positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space on the basis of

mission differentiation and the organized grouping of campaign and in accordance with

operational conditions and the enemy’s possible activities. In certain campaign patterns,

one can also establish echelon bushi disposition {tidui bushi} or a combination of group

and echelon bushi disposition {jituan yu tidui xiangjiehe de bushi}. Echelon bushi

disposition {tidui bushi} is normally organized grouping of first echelon, second echelon

(sometimes one can form a third echelon), campaign reserve forces, reserve forces of all

arms, campaign logistics, and equipment support force-units, etc. according to the

precedence for commitment into engagement. The bushi disposition of a combined group

and echelon {jituan yu tidui xiangjiehe de bushi}, namely one based on the situation of

different operational directions or phases of a campaign, respectively adopt group-model

and echelon-model bushi dispositions. If the campaign type and patterns are different,

then the form and content of campaign bushi disposition will also be different. The

general requirements are: the campaign bushi disposition should conform to the

campaign intention, use the main strengths in the main operational direction and at

important time segments, and focus on forming an integrated pooled strength and

creating favorable posture; establish campaign bushi disposition with depth, full

dimensions, flexibility and key points; strive for a type of bushi disposition which is able

to adapt to multiple courses of action; participating strengths not only must be positioned

with dispersal and concealment, but it must also be beneficial for concentrating

operational effectiveness and facilitate command and coordination; it has the capability

for independent operations and sustained operations; it can fully bring into play the

integrated might of all services, arms and every force-unit, etc.

Basic fighting method – is namely, the process of activities for applying participating

force-strengths, following operational sequences and adopting active and effective

operational means in order to reach the campaign goal[s]. Clarifying the basic fighting

method should be beneficial for macroscopically guiding the campaign towards smooth

achievement of the established goal, it should be beneficial for bringing the

comprehensive superiority and specialty the various services and arms into play, it should

be beneficial for containing the enemy’s superiority, and it should be beneficial for

implementing joint strikes against the enemy.

Campaign phase – a campaign is divided into phases in order to adjust-coordinate the

operational strengths and allow the strengths of the participating services and arms to

complete their operational missions with planning and in separate steps. The campaign
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phase should be determined according to the operational missions as well as the possible

progress and development. In a large scale campaign, one must frequently undergo a

certain number of operational activities before being able to reach the campaign goal;

thus, based on the missions, the annihilation targets or the main operational activities of

the operational strengths, divide up the entire campaign progress into a number of close

together and linked phases according to implementation sequence. A previous phase

should create favorable conditions for a subsequent phase, and a subsequent phase should

consolidate and develop the results of the previous phase, allowing the campaign to

smoothly develop with tempo.

Campaign initiation time – in joint offensive operations, one should clarify the campaign

initiation time; in defensive operations, one should clarify the time limit for completing

operational preparations. Determining campaign initiation time or the time limit for

completing operational preparations, one must adhere to the needs-requirements of the

overall situation, strive to fully utilize favorable conditions of aspects such as political,

diplomatic, battlefield posture and geography, catch the enemy unaware, attack where the

enemy is unprepared, and achieve a sudden quality.

2. Procedure and methods for setting the campaign resolution

The setting of the campaign resolution is the process by which a commander conducts

analysis, assessment and repeated reflections for the objective essential elements of

operations, the anticipated operational activities and relevant situations, and it is the

process by which he conducts assessments and deductions for objective situations. Its

basic procedure is: understanding the mission, assessing the situation, listening to reports

and recommendations, organizing operational calculations, and being decisive {zuochu

jueduan}.

(i) Understanding the mission. One must correctly understand the strategic intent

of the higher level authority and the general mission of the higher level authority;

understand the national political and diplomatic struggle concepts {fangzhen}, policies

{zhengce} and goals {mudi}; understand the mission that the higher level entrusts the

root level as well as the status and role within the overall situation of the war; understand

the missions of friendly forces and the coordination relationships with friendly forces,

etc.

(ii) Assessing the situation. This is mainly conducting comprehensive analysis 

and assessment of the enemy situation, our situation, and battlefield environment, etc. and

obtaining a correct conclusion in order to provide an objective basis for setting the correct

campaign resolution.

Enemy situation. This is mainly to ascertain the enemy’s intention, unit designators and

force-strength task organization; their operational bushu disposition; their main

operational direction; the quantities of high-tech weaponry, their position locations, the

potential time opportunities for employment and the threats they may generate against us;
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the situation of the possibility to obtain assistance during the operational course; activities

they could possibly adopt, etc.

Our situation. This is mainly to completely and correctly evaluate the specialties and

comprehensive operational capabilities of all operational groups within the campaign task

organization so as to correctly determine the campaign intention and properly entrust the

missions of each force-unit.

Battlefield environment. This is mainly ascertaining the effects of the natural

environment such as terrain characteristics, road conditions and weather-meteorology of

the operational area on operational activities; as well as the social and economic

conditions within the theater and manpower, materials, science and technology, and

financial assistance, etc. available to us.

(iii) Listening to reports and recommendations. For the purpose of completely and

accurately understanding the situation, the campaign commander sets the correct

campaign resolution, [but] before setting the resolution, he should listen to the situation

reports from headquarters and various services and arms. The modes for this are: one can

centralize the listening and one can individually listen; one can listen completely, and one

can only listen to certain situations one needs; one can get reports separately from each

organizational-unit or department, and one can also allow the chief of staff to make a

comprehensive report.

(iv) Conducting campaign calculations. On the basis of listening to reports and

recommendations, the campaign commander and his command organ should organize

campaign scientific calculations. In accordance with operational needs-requirements:

they should rationally determine the quantities of operational strengths that the various

services and arms should commit; they should scientifically select weapon types based on

the target destruction indices of each campaign phase, and the technical tactical

characteristics of the weaponry for the various services-arms; and on this foundation,

based on the indices of various services-arms weaponry such as the hit probabilities, the

penetration probabilities, and success probabilities, they should calculate the needed

weaponry quantities to strike targets; and they should utilize computer aided decision

making systems {xitong} to conduct simulation evaluations of the calculation results in

order to provide a reliable basis for setting the campaign resolution.

(v) Being resolute {zuochu jueduan}. After understanding the mission, assessing

the situations, listening to reports and recommendations, and organizing operational

calculations, the campaign commander should r {zuochu jueduan} about the campaign

goal and activities. Because the situations of each operation are different, the time

opportunities for being finally resolute {zuochu zuihou jueduan} are different.

Sometimes the situation is not sufficiently clear enough, especially in land mobility

operations, and the two sides engaged in battle are both maneuvering with the situation

not clear, so one can first set a preliminary resolution {dingxia yuxian juexin} and then

set the final resolution {dingxia zuihou juexin}. Sometimes, even if the situation is
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relatively clear, the campaign commander should put forth the various resolution courses

of action from different perspectives, comparing them with each other, weighing any two

benefits and selecting the more favorable and weighing any two harms and selecting the

least harmful, and then select the optimum course of action and set the final resolution.

When possessing the right conditions, one can, through computer simulation or by

organizing live force exercises on similar terrain, further revise and improve the

operational course of action in order to set the correct campaign resolution.

The setting of the campaign resolution is one of the most important jobs [work] of the

campaign commander in conducting operational preparations. Whether or not the

campaign resolution is correct directly influences the success or failure of the operations.

Therefore, this requires that, when the campaign commander is setting the resolution, he

must thoroughly comprehend the higher level intent, master the five basic essential

elements of the mission, the enemy situation, our situation, location and time, and with

the mission as the core, the enemy situation as the key point, with the location and time

as the basis, set the resolution. At the same time, one should fully bring the collective

wisdom of the command team into play, broadly listening to various ideas and pooling

the wisdom to allow the set resolution to better conform to the objective reality and to be

more perfect and correct.

II. Formulating the Campaign Plan {jihua} and Organizing Campaign

Coordination...107

After determining the campaign concept and setting the campaign resolution, the

campaign commander and the command organ should quickly formulate the campaign

plan {jihua} on the basis of the established concept and resolution, and thoroughly

organize campaign coordination.

(1) Formulating the campaign plan {jihua}

The campaign plan3 is the basic document for achieving the campaign goal and

formulating the campaign bushi disposition, basic fighting methods, campaign phases,

and various supports. It includes the campaign activities plan and the support plan and it

is the basis for organizing the command of force-units and implementing the campaign.

The operational activities plan can be divided into the general plan {zongti jihua} and the

sub-plans {fenzhi jihua}. The content of the general plan mainly includes: situational

assessment conclusion, higher level intent and operational missions, friendly force

missions and combat boundaries, the task organization {biancheng}, the positioning

{peizhi}, and missions of each force-unit, the division of campaign phases, the situational

scenarios for each phase and the courses of action for dealing with them, the organizing

of command, the time limit for completing operational preparations, and the predetermined times for initiating and concluding the campaign. The sub-plans normally

include: the anti-reconnaissance plan, the seizing air and sea dominance campaign plan,

3 Plans are jihua unless otherwise noted.
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the main direction operational activities plans, the anti-air raid (air defense) plan, the

firepower plan, the special operations plan, the psychological warfare plan, and the rear

area defense plan.

The campaign commander should instruct the chief of staff to take charge of formulating

the campaign plan, [apply] key points to the situational assessment conclusion, the

campaign concept, the operational bushu disposition, the main fighting methods and the

divisions of the campaign phases, and further clarify the important problems such as the

predictions for each phase situation and counter-moves to be adopted. [The campaign

commander should] specifically guide the command organ in formulating the campaign

plan.

The basic requirements for formulating the campaign plan are: be thorough and strict, be

clear and specific, and allow for unforeseen situations. One must correctly analyze the

situations of both sides, scientifically forecast the developing changes over the whole

course of the campaign, and conduct unified-overall-planning and arrange the operational

activities and various supports for participating services and arms; [one must] set out

from the most complex and most difficult situations that could appear on the battlefield of

each phase of the campaign and conceive various activity courses of action; centering on

the campaign centers of gravity, [one must] properly handle the relationships between

each battlefield, each operations direction, and each operational activity.

After the campaign commander guides his command headquarters in successfully

formulating the campaign plan, he should also instruct relevant departments and various

operational groupings to formulate the operational support plans, logistics support plans,

equipment support plans, and political work plans of the campaign in accordance with the

operational activity plans. When formulating the campaign plan, the various organs

should shorten the amount of time as much as possible and strictly maintain secrecy.

(2) Organizing campaign coordination

Campaign coordination is the adjusting-coordination and complementing {xietiao peihe}

according to a unified plan conducted by all services and arms participating in a

campaign. Organizing campaign coordination allows for participating services-arms,

People Armed Police, reserve force-units and militia to implement campaign activities

with consistent adjusting coordination in accordance with unified planning.

Organizing campaign coordination should be directed at the potential activities of the

enemy, and in separate phases, stipulate the missions, activity methods, sequences and

coordination requirements of subordinate force-units based on direction, goals (and

objectives), time and locations. Because the situations are different for each operation,

the various types of operational requirements are different and consequently, the key

point issues of each operation are also different. One should grasp the key points and

strive to successfully organize the coordination for the main battlefields, main directions,

main campaign phases, main operational patterns, and critical operational activities that
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affect the overall strategic and campaign situations. The organizing of campaign

coordination can be conducted on charts and on sand tables, or one can utilize command

automation networks to organize coordination and fully apply computer simulation

technology to conduct simulation exercises in campaign coordination. When the situation

needs deem possible, one can also organize on-site coordination in a certain phase or a

certain direction of operations. When time is urgent, stipulate relevant coordination

matters at the same time as issuing operational orders.

An agile and reliable command information network system {xitong} is the basis for

organizing coordination. Fully utilizing data link technology to achieve lateral organic

linking of operational organizational-units is the crux for organizing coordination. The

basic requirements for organizing coordination are be quick, be precise, and be

continuous.

III. Organizing Campaign Support...109

Campaign support includes operational support, logistic support, equipment support and

political work. Organizing complete and effective operational support plays a very

important role in increasing the operational capabilities of participating strengths and in

smoothly accomplishing operations missions.

When organizing operational support, a campaign commander should adhere to the

principles of be prepared in advance, unified overall planning considering all factors, full

scale support, and give prominence to key points, and in consideration of the most

difficult and complex situations, thoroughly organize the various supports. [The

campaign commander] should provide clear instructions to the joint headquarters,

political departments, logistics departments, and equipment departments, and give

specific guidance to critical supports such as the main operational direction, main

operational area, and main operational activities. Instruct the various functional

departments to formulate various, detailed support plans, and conduct supervision and

inspections so that the various support plans are practical.

IV. Assembling the {diaoji} Campaign Strength...109

The campaign strength is normally assembled in the theater. When conducting a largescale campaign, one must also, on the basis of the instructions of the supreme command

{tongshuaibu}, assemble the crack strengths from across the PLA. Moreover, with help

from relevant theater and service leadership organs and local civilian governments, [one

must] organize the participating strengths to maneuver towards the operational area and

unfold.

The assembling of the campaign strength should be thoroughly planned, painstakingly

organized, and arrive in position on time. Its basic requirements:
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(1) Meet the needs of precision operations

Assembling the campaign strengths should be determined on the basis of the needs of the

operational missions and operational scale. One must scientifically determine the

operational strengths of each service and arm that should be committed on the basis of the

needs of accomplishing the general operational mission, and in accordance with the

operational effectiveness of the weapons the services and arms, [one must] calculate the

force-strengths and weaponry necessary for carrying out the various operational missions;

one must conduct precise calculations for the operational space and times of the different

operational groupings based on the operational characteristics of the different service

strengths, People’s Armed Police and militia, and ensure the achievement of precision

operations. When necessary, one can also assemble newly organized force-units and

advanced science and technology support-the-front strengths during imminent battle in

order to benefit the achievement of the campaign goal.

(2) Adapt to the battlefield environment

Assembling the campaign strengths must conscientiously analyze the battlefield

environment and fully consider the protection conditions for maneuver and concealment,

and support conditions such as manpower and material supplies. One must assemble

strengths that are adaptable to the battlefield environment and able to fully bring their

operational effectiveness into play within the battlefield in order to enhance integrated

operational might.

(3) Achieve superiority against the enemy

In assembling the campaign strength, while directed at situations such as strengthsweaknesses and quantity of the object of operations, one should assemble sufficient crack

forces and cutting weapons, achieve superiority against the enemy, favorably form a

material basis for victory, and accomplish the campaign mission with full mastery.

(4) Respond to developing changes in a campaign

In assembling the campaign strength, one should fully consider the rapid force

augmentation that may appear during the course of implementing operations, or the

various complex and difficult situations that might appear such as a powerful enemy’s

intervention or a regional military alliance conducting interference. [One must] ensure

there are sufficient operational reserve strengths to deal with the occurrence of various

unexpected situations.

In assembling the campaign strength, one must rely on the campaign resolution,

thoroughly organize the pre-determined participating strengths to quickly maneuver and

unfold in the operational area, and reach the designated location on time. When the

assembled campaign strength is maneuvering and unfolding, one should strictly organize
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anti-air cover and information operations and as much as possible reduce operational

casualties and losses during maneuver.

V. Conducting Political Mobilization and Imminent Battle Training...110

After a campaign commander accepts the operational mission, he should fully utilize the

various modes and all dissemination media, promptly and thoroughly conduct political

mobilization, organize subordinate force-units, earnestly transmit and study the higher

level campaign concept, orders, and instructions, and deeply understand the higher level

intent. [He should] clarify the campaign goal, mission and significance, the favorable

elements and unfavorable conditions of the operational mission as well as the methods

for overcoming the enemy and gaining victory. [He should] use the campaign concept of

the Central Party and the Central Military Commission to unify the thought and activities

of the force-units. While directed at the realities of officer and soldier thought and the

pre-determined operational mission, thoroughly conduct education on patriotism,

collectivism, revolutionary heroism and revolutionary integrity and ethnic nationality

integrity. Stimulate the combat-participating enthusiasm of the officers and soldiers and

the spirit of heroic operations and no fear of sacrifice. Establish overall situation

perspective, active cooperation, close coordination, and a concerted effort for seizing

campaign victory.

Imminent battle training is a directed-quality training conducted as war is close to

breaking out or after the operational mission is accepted. Directed at the objects of

operations, operational missions that are compactly mixed and the characteristics of

theater terrain, one normally selects the urgently needed items and conducts training with

a sudden-attack mode. The training content can include: review training and

supplemental training on tactical and technical subjects urgently needed for operations;

living and physical training conducted for adapting to the environment such as terrain and

weather of the operational area; live-force and live-fire campaign training conducted on

similar terrain in accordance with pre-determined operational preliminary courses of

action; and gaming exercise training in a room on a sand table or with charts and exercise

training utilizing computer simulation of real battle situations conducted by the senior

officer’s organ according to the operational preliminary courses of action. Imminent

battle training possesses the characteristics of short training time, many contents, large

degree of difficulty, strict requirements and high standards. When a campaign

commander conducts imminent battle training, he should carefully plan and tightly

organize it on the basis of these characteristics. In order to ensure that the participating

force-strength groupings know the theater well, and know the operational activities and

coordination methods well, he should improve the capability of the various levels of

commanders and command organs to organize command, and further examine and

perfect the operational preliminary courses of action and achieve the best results.

Imminent battle training is normally conducted covertly; if necessary, one can also

combine the organizing and implementing of deterrence and feints, but one must conceal

the campaign intention.
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VI. Supervising and Inspecting Force-unit Rapid Completion of Campaign

Preparations...111

During the process of conducting operational preparations and after basic completion of

operational preparations, the campaign commander and command organ should, at the

appropriate time, inspect the situation of completing operational preparations by

subordinate participating strengths.

(1) The main content of inspections

[This is:] the networked linking of subsystems such as intelligence information,

command and control, firepower strike, maneuver sudden-attack, full dimensioned

protection, and comprehensive support within the campaign system {tixi} and their

operating situation, that is, inspecting the situations of split-second response, integrated

joint operating, self-adaptive reconstituting, and independent loops; the times for each

force-strength grouping to receive-accept the advance orders, operational orders and

various instructions as well as the level of comprehension; inspecting the understanding

and level of familiarity of the coordination plans for each force-strength grouping; and

the preparation situation of important military facilities, weapons and equipment, and

physical materials.

(2) The main methods of inspections

[These are:] send personnel to go deep into the force-units to conduct inspections;

conduct inspections via operational simulation tests; conduct inspections via imminent

battle training exercises; and listening to situation reports of relevant personnel.

Inspectors should conscientiously and responsibly carry out their duties and reflect the

situation of seeking truth from facts. When problems having a relatively large effect on

the operational activities are discovered during inspections or when the resolution and

campaign plan are discovered to not conform to realities, the inspectors should promptly

report and resolve it, supervising and helping the force-unit to quickly complete the

various items of operational preparation.

VII. Organizing Joint Defense Operations...112

At the same time as the campaign commander is leading the completion of operational

preparations work, he should guide the command organ in organizing joint defense

operations {lianhe fangwei zuozhan}, putting emphasis on clarifying the missions, forcestrengths, assisting-support strengths, and relevant requirements of joint defense

operations.

In organizing joint defense operations, one must put into effect the principles of militarycivilian integration, integrated defense, give priority to defense, and combining defense

and strike. [One must] fully bring the roles of all services and arms, the armed police
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force-units, the local people’s government and masses into play, and with important

targets, important areas and communication and transport lines as key points, thoroughly

organize operational activities such as anti-air raids, anti-airborne assault, antiinfiltration, anti-psychological warfare, and anti-sabotage and ensure the smooth conduct

of campaign preparations.

Section 2: Campaign Implementation...112

The campaign implementation phase is the phase for applying the campaign strengths,

carrying out and adjusting the established resolution, striking the pre-determined targets,

and realizing the campaign goal. The commanders at each level scan the overall situation,

examine the time and measure the circumstances {审时度势 shenshi duoshi}, command

decisively, calmly handle situations, and maintain the initiative of the campaign from

beginning to end. The command organs at each level should completely assess the

developing dynamic state of the enemy situation, actively and with initiative provide

various data for the correct decision-making of the campaign commander, and put forth

valuable recommendation reports at the appropriate times. When certain discrepancies

exist between the campaign resolution and courses of action with the changes in the

enemy situations, necessary revisions may be made on the basis of the original campaign

resolution and courses of action in order to adapt to the situation of developing changes

in campaign implementation; when very large discrepancies exist between the campaign

resolution and courses of action with the campaign activities, the campaign commander

and the command organ should quickly assess the situation, decisively set a new

campaign resolution and quickly organize the force-units to implement the new campaign

activities.

I. Initiate the Campaign at the Appropriate Time...112

Initiating the campaign is a critical activity of the campaign. The time opportunity {shiji}

for initiating the campaign should be decided in accordance with higher level intent, the

campaign resolution and plan, the actual situations of both sides, and the situations such

as weather and meteorology. Operational activities normally start from the information

domain with seizing information dominance as the precursor to safeguard the smooth

conduct of follow-up operational activities.

(1) The time opportunity for initiating the campaign

Under normal situations, the campaign initiation time is specifically grasped by the

campaign commander on the basis of higher level intent in view of the situation.

However, in a large scale operation, because of its strong strategic quality, its initiation

time is generally determined by the supreme command headquarters {tongshuaibu}. The

time opportunity for initiating the offensive campaign should be selected during the time

opportunities when the enemy is caught unaware, when the enemy has a weakness that

can be exploited, or whenever we have already fully prepared and can commit to

operations at any time. As much as possible, allow for situations that favor us and not
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favor the enemy, ensure we have a grasp and avoid by all means hastily initiating the

campaign. Initiating defensive operations generally depends on the time opportunity the

enemy starts attacking. Under modern conditions, this campaign is initiated under the

situation of encountering the enemy’s sudden raid-attack. Thereby, a campaign

commander and the command organ must apply various means to ascertain the enemy’s

time for commencing combat, its force-strength bushu disposition, the main activities

direction, and the adopted fighting methods. [The campaign commander and command

organ must] also command force-units to frustrate the enemy’s first attack with active

activities in order to lay a foundation for seizing operational victory. When the situation

is possible, in order to seize the benefit of first opportunity, when the enemy is directed at

our conduct of operational preparations, we can disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations

{jin’gong zhunbei} with offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} and force the enemy to

be able to initiate the campaign according to their pre-determined plan {jihua}. In

summary, no matter whether it is joint attack operations or joint defensive operations,

both should be based on a thorough comprehension of higher level intent and an accurate

grasp of the situations of both sides and the natural geographical environment of the

theater. [We should] ensure that the operations are initiated at the right time in

accordance to the plan {jihua}, avoid by all means indecision and avoid losing the time

opportunity for favorable commencement of combat.

(2) Some situations for initiating a campaign

1. Initiating with information warfare

A campaign is normally initiated from information warfare, permeating from beginning

to end [of the campaign], and sometimes, information warfare can become an

independent phase. When initiating a campaign with information warfare, generally, this

is for creating conditions for follow-on operations such as seizing air dominance and sea

dominance, and, on the basis of accomplishing information system {xitong} protection

and strengthening the secrecy of information security, it is normally initiated with the

mode of information attack. We can concentrate the use of electronic attack strengths,

implement full-scale and key point electronic jamming against the vital area electronic

targets {yaohai dianzi mubiao} of the enemy’s information systems {xitong}, weaken the

enemy’s “ability to hear” and “ability to see,” and render the enemy with no way to

command and be blind in their activities; conduct electronic deception, install false

electronic targets, transmit false information and lure the enemy to make mistakes.

Conduct network warfare and paralyze the enemy’s C4KISR [sic] systems.

2. Initiating with seizing information dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance

Sometimes, in order to increase the suddenness of campaign initiation, one can also

initiate a campaign at the same time as seizing information dominance, air dominance

and sea dominance. In this instance, seizing information dominance is mainly as a service

to seizing air dominance, one achieves superiority in the electromagnetic battlefield;

seizing air dominance is mainly to create conditions for sea and land operational
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activities; in seizing sea dominance, one must seize air dominance at-sea, otherwise, atsea superiority cannot be brought into play due to the air threat, so the so-called sea

dominance should include air superiority at-sea.

To seize air dominance, first is assaulting [sudden-attack] the enemy’s air combat

strength support systems {xitong}. Concentrate the use of strengths such as aviation

force, Second Artillery force, army campaign tactical missile and naval submarinelaunched missile to assault enemy airfields and aircraft carriers and to smash the enemy’s

reliance on air operations. Second is aerial engagement. Concentrate the use of fighter

aviation forces to unfold air combat with the enemy’s raiding aircraft, or penetrate the

enemy area to seek and annihilate the enemy’s aircraft with initiative in order to seize and

maintain air superiority. Third is implementing ground-to-air resistance. Rationally bushu

dispose ground air defense strengths to implement strikes against raiding enemy aircraft

and other air targets so as to ensure the security of the main air [tactical] zones {zhuyao

kongyu}. Fourth is suppressing and smashing the enemy’s ground air defense systems.

Concentrate firepower to suppress and smash the enemy’s ground-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery positions, and air defense command systems {xitong} in order to assure

freedom of activity for one’s own aviation forces.

To seize sea dominance, first is using force-strengths of aviation forces, conventional

missile force-units, and naval submarines and surface ships, adopting the method of

combining firepower and obstacle blockade, implementing sea and air blockades against

the enemy navy’s ports, bases (anchorages) or sea areas they need to cross, and restricting

the freedom of activity for the enemy navy’s force-strengths. Next, comprehensively

apply aviation force, surface ship and submarine force strengths, through extensive

maneuvers, create and capture the combat opportunities, and annihilate the enemy’s atsea effective strengths. Next, comprehensively implement firepower assault with aviation

force, campaign tactical missile, and naval submarine force-strengths against the enemy’s

ports, bases and anchorages, and disrupt the enemy’s reliance on naval operations.

3. Initiating with comprehensive firepower assault

When the locations such as the enemy’s heavy force groupings {zhongbing jituan}, hightech weapon systems, command and control systems and logistics support systems have

been accurately ascertained prior to battle, we can concentrate the aviation firepower,

missile firepower and artillery firepower of all the participating services and arms to

implement precision, comprehensive firepower strikes {daji} against the enemy, to smash

and paralyze the enemy’s operational system {tixi} and weaken their operational

capability in order to create conditions for follow-on operations.

Initiating the campaign with comprehensive firepower assault {tuji} is generally

implemented under the support of information warfare. The main body of comprehensive

firepower assault should be aviation force firepower and missile firepower and [with that]

we conduct an integrated planning {guihua} based on the operational characteristics of

the various firepower strike systems of all of the services and arms in accordance with
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their operational characteristics and achieve an optimized composition. We must

formulate thorough firepower destruct {huishang} plans {jihua}, unify and regulate the

application of the various destruct weapons {bingqi}, and adopt a combination of

centralized and dispersed, flexible command mode, allowing the various destruct

strengths to be able to form an integrated pooled effort {zhengti heli} with initiative and

flexibility in accordance with the general requirements of campaign initiation and achieve

sudden and fierce results.

4. Initiating at first opportunity from within the joint defensive operations

In joint defensive operations, in order to strive for first opportunity, during the initial

period of operations when the enemy implements long range force-strength delivery

{yuanjuli bingli tousong}, conducts operational preparations, and has not yet formed its

combat power, we can conduct counter-preparations against the enemy with

comprehensive firepower assault {tuji} or other means and strike {daji} the enemy’s

high-tech weapon systems, transport systems, C4ISR command systems, heavy force

grouping areas and logistic supply bases, etc. [We can] weaken the enemy’s high-tech

superiority, disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations, change the passivity of defensive

operations into initiative, and by forming superiority in the beginning of the match, we

create conditions for later operations.

II. Pushing Forward Campaign Development...115

After campaign initiation, at the same time that they are maintaining a desirable

beginning of the match, the campaign commander and the command organ must

completely and accurately grasp the battlefield situation, scientifically predict {yujian}

the developing trends of the war situation, firmly master the campaign centers of gravity,

closely adjust-coordinate joint activities, take advantage of momentum {chengshi} to

push forward campaign activities in accordance with the pre-determined resolution and

plans {jihua}, and develop towards a direction favorable for us.

(1) Grasping the battlefield situation

Tracking and grasping the battlefield situation is a prerequisite and basic reliance for

pushing forward the campaign development. The modern campaign battlefield is

multidimensional and the situation is complex and variable. The campaign commander

and organ must be adept at applying various methods and means to promptly grasp the

battlefield situation.

1. Employing various methods to grasp the battlefield situation

The main method for grasping the battlefield situation is to comprehensively master the

intelligence obtained by higher levels, root level, lower levels, and friendly forces

{youlin} via the battlefield information network. For important intelligence, one must

conduct verification and demonstration-proof {lunzheng} through multiple channels and
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applying a variety of means. On the basis of fully mastering the situation, conduct

proceed from one point to the other, proceed from outside to inside, discard the bad and

select the good, and eliminate the false and keep the real, so as to establish a foundation

for correct decision-making.

2. Accurately forecast {yuce} changes in the battlefield situation

First, one must forecast the possible changes in the enemy’s situation, including changes

in the force-strengths the enemy might commit, the operational directions, and the

activity patterns. Second, one must forecast the changes in the battlefield environment,

including weather and hydrological, etc. Third, one must forecast the results of the

enemy’s and our operational activities, including the possible outcome of seizing “three

dominances” operations, changes in the postures for the enemy and ourselves, and

possible transitions between attack and defend. In particular, one must forecast the

potential military intervention of a powerful enemy and prepare for it in advance in order

to facilitate pushing the campaign forward to develop in a direction favorable for the

nation’s highest strategic interests.

(2) Mastering a campaign’s center of gravity

The center of gravity refers to a critical link connected to various aspects of the campaign

and has a decisive significance for operational success or failure. It is the combined force

point {helidian} of the participating strengths of all services and arms. It is the focal point

{jiaodian} of all operational activities and it is also a central issue that the campaign

commander pays high attention to and should be resolved. A campaign can have one or

multiple centers of gravity, but there is only one within one time period and phase.

Thereby, the campaign commander must center on the realization of the general goal of

operations and, in accordance with the developing changes in the battlefield situation,

successfully master the center of gravity from start to finish and push forward the

development of a campaign with all one’s strength.

1. Accurately find the campaign center of gravity within the dynamic state

A campaign is a complex system and each activity has the possibility of producing an

effect success or failure on the entire activity. Particularly after campaign initiation, in

order to seize and obtain the early period initiative, it is very possible that we must adopt

various reactive measures directed at the opponent’s activities, and changes may

continuously occur to the campaign center of gravity during the confrontation of both

sides. Therefore, it is relatively difficult for a campaign commander to accurately find

and push forward the center of gravity in campaign development within a dynamically

complex system. [The campaign commander] must have the overall situation in his heart

and, through analysis of the many contradictions in operations as well as their

interplaying relationships, find the crux for pushing forward the development of the

whole campaign.
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First, in accordance with the higher level intent, one must find the primary contradictions

that play a decisive role in pushing forward campaign development or the problem that

must first be resolved from within the strategic goal and the operational objectives the

higher level requires to be reached and the explicit missions given to the root level. Next,

one must accurately find the center of gravity from within the inter-connected operational

systems {xitong}. After campaign initiation, operational activities will unfold in the

multi-dimensional battlefield from strengths of all services and with a variety of modes.

The struggle between the enemy and us will also generate many focal points in many

domains and this requires the campaign commander, depending on developments on the

battlefield, to analyze the role played by each focal point within the operational system

{xitong} and to find the given focal point that is able to effectively push forward the

development of the overall operational situation. Normally, this focal point of struggle

{douzheng jiaodian} is the center of gravity for that phase.

During a campaign, for the operational groupings of different services, different

campaign types and different operational missions, the manifested form of their campaign

centers of gravity will also be different. Some will be manifested as attacking cities and

seizing of territory, namely the capturing and occupying of important cities and strategic

vital sites; some will be manifested as annihilating the opponent’s heavy force groupings;

and still some will be manifested disrupting the opponent’s command or the paralysis of

the opponent’s operational system {tixi}. This requires the campaign commander to

combine realities and accurately find the center of gravity for pushing forward campaign

development from within intricate and complex battlefield situations.

2. Forming the campaign center of gravity

After the campaign commander accurately finds the campaign center of gravity, he

should concentrate strengths, form the center of gravity and ensure operational victory.

First, he must put his main energy onto resolving the central issues related to operational

success or failure, and the campaign commander must personally command and adjustcoordinate the critical quality operational activities. Next, he must center on the center of

gravity to coalesce the strengths of the operational groupings of the various services, and

concentrate the main strengths to successfully resolve the main contradiction. Then, he

should also pay attention to center on the center of gravity to successfully resolve other

issues related to the center of gravity in order to push forward and promote the

development of the entire operational situational momentum {jushi}.

(3) Actively creating combat opportunities

Creating combat opportunity is utilizing various means to force the enemy to expose their

center of gravity, lose coordination effectiveness, interrupt support, and lose command

effectiveness, to create a fighting momentum beneficial to us, and push forward the

combat situation to develop towards a favorable direction.
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There are two categories of methods for creating combat opportunity. First, create

opportunity according to plan {jihua}. When the development of the operational course is

basically smooth and there are no fundamental changes occurring to the battlefield

situation, one should persist in the original campaign plan {jihua} and objectives,

supervise and urge the various operational groupings to resolutely implement in

accordance with the established resolution and plan {jihua}, and create favorable time

opportunities for pushing forward campaign development. Second, create opportunity

based on the situation. When the battlefield developments deviate from the campaign

plan {jihua} and the original campaign plan {jihua} is already not suited to the new

situation, one should promptly accomplish a new emergency approach, adjust the bushu

disposition and activities of force-units in order to adapt to the new situation; when major

changes occur in the battlefield situation requiring changes to the pre-determined

operational objectives, one should, on the basis of higher level requirements, revise the

resolution and plan {jihua} at the right time, adjust the missions of each operational

grouping, and actively create favorable combat opportunities.

(4) Committing maneuver strengths at the right time

After campaign initiation, the developing changes on the battlefield change along with

the decline and growth in the strengths of both sides. In a campaign under

informationized conditions, because of improvements in the operational capabilities of

both sides, the acceleration of the operational tempo and the rapid changes to the ratio of

both sides’ strengths on the battlefield, once the time opportunity to push forward

campaign development appears, a specific strength is needed to be committed at any time

to achieve this. Thereby, grasping and at appropriate times committing powerful,

maneuver strengths is the material foundation for pushing forward campaign

development.

III. Conducting Campaign Transitions...117

During the course of implementing a campaign, there exists transitions of campaign

phases, transitions of attack and defend operations, and transitions of operational

directions. On the basis of the campaign goal and specific circumstances {xingshi} of the

battlefield, a campaign commander should seize the favorable time opportunities, adopt

forceful means, and push forward the campaign to transition towards a favorable

direction.

(1) Campaign phase transitions

1. Predicting transition trends

A campaign commander must stand at the height of the strategic overall situation to

analyze the direction of campaign development and thereby predict the trend of campaign

phase transitions. Generally, he must master the following few aspects.
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First is the level of the progress in the current campaign phase’s objective. Each

campaign phase has an objective. Generally speaking, basically reaching the operational

objective indicates that the current campaign phase will conclude.

Second is the level of change in the enemy’s strengths. During operations, changes in the

enemy’s strengths will lead to changes in the overall battle situation. If an enemy’s

strengths gradually weaken and its campaign bushi disposition tends to be collapsing, it

will undoubtedly force the enemy to transition into a state of defeat; if an enemy’s

strengths is quickly enhanced and it adopts new operational activities, this indicates that a

new campaign phase will soon arrive.

Third is the level of change in the battlefield posture. When the PLA grasps battlefield

initiative and the enemy has already completely slipped into passivity, we should seize

the favorable combat opportunity, transition into a new phase and strive for a complete

victory; when the PLA has slipped into an unfavorable position and lost its initiative, this

also indicates that another campaign phase will soon begin.

2. Grasp the transition time opportunity

A campaign commander must correctly grasp the transition time opportunity, fully utilize

the current phase’s operational results and advantageous conditions, and at the right time,

conduct the transition to allow the operations of the next phase to be smoothly

implemented. If the transition is too early, it is not only unfavorable for successful

completion of the current phase’s missions, but it is also not beneficial for the operations

in the next phase. If the transition is too late, then it is possible to miss a favorable time

opportunity, to the point of unfavorable conditions appearing and this is not beneficial for

the unfolding of the combat situation in the new phase. Under normal situations, the

favorable time opportunities for transitioning campaign phases include: our current

operational objectives have been basically realized and transition preparations have been

completed; the enemy’s intention for the next phase has been ascertained and the enemy

has not adopted the measures, etc. Conducting the phase transition at such times can

allow the PLA to seize the first opportunity and enter a new campaign phase, placing us

in a position of initiative.

3. Meticulously organize transitions

Before implementing campaign phase transitions, on the basis of the changing situation,

one should revise the operational objectives and the campaign plan {jihua}, unify the

operational thought, and for all of the operational groupings to be able to accomplish

transition preparations in the various areas such as in thought, in organization, and in

operational strengths. One must be directed at the enemy’s intentions in the next phase

and determine the new operational patterns and methods; one must promptly adjust the

missions and bushu dispositions of the various services and groupings, successfully

organize coordination according to the new operational objectives and plans {jihua}, one
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must continue to organize and complete the wrap-up work of the current missions and

cover our adjustment of the bushu dispositions and begin the new campaign phase.

During the transition, the campaign commander must have the overall situation on his

mind, and based on the different battlefield environments each operational grouping is

located in, complete the transition to the new phase. Under general situations, the main

operational strengths and critical operational groupings are the first to transition and

create conditions for the transition of other operational groupings; after the other

operational groupings cover the transition of the main operational grouping, they will

progressively achieve transition, allowing the entire transition to go methodically.

(2) Attack and defense campaign transitions

In a campaign under informationized conditions, attack and defense operations

interweave and transition frequently. When we need to achieve attack and defense

campaign transitions from an overall situation, a campaign commander must conduct an

integrated overall planning {zhengti chouhua}, and successfully adjust-coordination in

the operational activities of the various service operational large formations and between

the battlefields to allow the activities of the entire transition to go methodically, forming

a chessboard. When we need to achieve attack and defense transitions from a localized

situation, a campaign commander must successfully adjust-coordination in the strengths

and operational activities from the height of the overall situation in order to successfully

accomplish a localized attack and defense transition and [thus] drive the development of

the entirety of operational activities.

When transitioning from attack to defense, the land battlefield must have the backstop of

favorable terrain, the ground operational strengths must promptly occupy their positions,

and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery operational strengths must

correspondingly adjust their bushu dispositions and successfully organize campaign

cover to ensure the smooth implementation of the transition.

When transitioning from defense to attack: one must have favorable circumstances

{xingshi} in political and diplomatic struggles; the battlefield posture is unfavorable for

the enemy and favorable for us; the enemy’s follow-on strengths are interrupted; the

enemy loses battlefield dominance and the logistics support is difficult; and our forcestrength assembly is complete, the strengths ratio is favorable for us and unfavorable to

the enemy, and we posses the capability to attack the enemy. During the transition, one

must implement fire support, one must concentrate the main strengths to be used in the

main attack direction, and the force-units shouldering the defense missions cover the

attacking force-unit’s unfolding with active operational activities, allowing a consistent

adjusting-coordination in the transitions of the entirety of operational activities.
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(3) Operational direction transitions

In a campaign under informationized conditions, operational strengths are flexible in

maneuver and fast in speed and the operational direction changes frequently. Moreover,

changes in operational direction both restrict and affect issues such as the operational

methods and the employment of participating strengths. Therefore, successfully

accomplishing operational direction transitions at the right time plays an important role in

realizing the strategic and campaign intentions. In order to successfully accomplish the

main operational direction transition, one generally should grasp the following points.

One must conform to the strategic intent. Changing the operational direction directly

affects the development of the entire battlefield situational momentum {jushi}, and it

even affects the outcome of operations. Consequently, one should, based on the strategic

intention, determine a new operational direction.

It must be beneficial for developing victory. The changing of the operational direction

often presages the arrival of the operational turning point. The campaign commander

must treat the operational direction transition as the prelude to the turning point and push

forward operations to develop in the direction of victory.

It must focus on striking and disrupting the enemy’s integrated structure {zhengti

jiegou}. The operational direction transition must focus on paralyzing the entire

operational system {tixi} of the enemy, on striking the advanced weapon systems

{xitong} maintaining that integration, such as the C4KISR systems {xitong}, rear area

supply systems, etc., and thus weakening their operational capability and breaking the

integrated structure of the enemy.

After the transition of the main operational direction, immediately make relevant

adjustments to the main battlefield, participating strengths, and campaign fighting

methods in order to allow all of the activities to be able to unfold by centering on the

main operational direction.

IV. Decisively Concluding a Campaign...120

Selecting the appropriate time opportunity to conclude a campaign is an important

problem that a campaign commander must follow with interest.

When operations progress smoothly and the campaign goals have already been reached or

have basically been reached and the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi} are

extremely favorable for us, we can, after taking advantage of the victory to develop and

expand the results of battle, conclude the campaign.

When the campaign goals have not yet been realized but, because of political or

diplomatic needs-requirements, even if it is very favorable militarily, one should also

decisively conclude the campaign.
135

When a campaign does not develop smoothly and the campaign goals have not yet been

realized and the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi} have become a stalemate,

and continuing operations not only cannot achieve the pre-determined missions, but it

may possibly cause the overall situation to fall into passivity, in order to seize the

initiative, one should also decisively conclude the campaign.

When operations fall into passivity and a crisis situation appears, the armed forces have

lost initiative, they are in a passive status on the battlefield, in an extremely unfavorable

posture, and they are in danger of being wiped out or defeated; when the campaign has no

way to develop in accordance with the plan {jihua}, when operational command and

control has lost effectiveness, and when all services and arms cannot adjust-coordination

of operations, the campaign commander must face squarely the serious effects that may

be created and he should decisively shake off the enemy and conclude the campaign.

In order to smoothly conclude a campaign, first, the campaign commander should, at all

times, master the operational progress and changes in the battlefield situation and

accomplish precise assessments of the campaign developing trends. Simultaneously, [the

campaign commander] should instruct his command department {silingbu} to formulate

the battlefield withdrawal plan {jihua}, and put forth the recommendation for concluding

the campaign to higher levels at the right time on the basis of the mission completion

situation. Next, when organizing the conclusion of the campaign, one should clarify the

missions, the withdrawal sequence, and the return-to-area or to a new area of deployment

{peizhi diyu} of each operational grouping; correspondingly adjust bushu disposition,

stabilize posture, and as much as possible maintain the already obtained battle results;

organize reliable air and at-sea cover, support the safe withdrawal of the main operational

strengths, and strictly defend against the enemy’s sudden raid-attacks. When withdrawing

from the battlefield under situations of contact with the enemy or confrontation, one

should adopt the mode of alternating cover in order to block the enemy’s pursuit from the

rear with sufficient force-strengths or monitor the enemy’s direction of movement, and

defend against enemy retaliation. When concluding a campaign with the mode of

transitioning operational missions based on the strategic need-requirements, the campaign

commander and the command organ, on the basis of higher level instructions, organize

the withdrawal from the battlefield of each operational grouping under the situation of

concealing the intention and successfully accomplish the preparations for carrying out the

next operations. In sum, no matter under what situation a campaign is concluded, it must

be carefully organized to ensure smooth implementation.
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Chapter 5

Campaign Command and Coordination...122

Section 1: Campaign Command...122

Campaign command is a campaign activities-oriented organizational/leadership activity

of the campaign commander and his command organ. It permeates the entire process of a

campaign. The correctness or incorrectness of campaign command directly impacts the

success or failure of a campaign.

The basic missions of campaign command are as follows: based on a high-level intent, to

organize and to overall-plan {chouhua} a campaign, and command the campaign’s

implementation; to flexibly use forces and to vary the strategies and tactics of war; and to

guide the campaign toward victory. The goals of campaign command are: to unify will

and unify activities; to the greatest extent bring into play the overall power of the

campaign large formation, as well as that of the regional forces and militia; to most

effectively eliminate the enemy while protecting friendly forces; and to strive for the

campaign victory. With the high-speed development of science and technology, and the

constant emergence of many kinds of high-tech weaponry, the modern campaign has

assumed many new features, and campaign command appears more complex than in the

past.

I. Basic Requirements of Campaign Command...122

Campaign command requires good knowledge of all aspects of the opposing sides’

situation, finding the patterns of its activities, and utilizing these patterns to guide one’s

own activities, while avoiding blind and subjective free rein, so that subjective guidance

conforms to objective reality. These are the basic requirements and basic methods for

realizing campaign command.

(1) Scientific prediction

Campaign command is both a contest of efficiency and time, and a competition between

commanders in their ability to predict a campaign’s development. Scientific prediction of

campaign development is a prerequisite for implementing correct command; only by

correctly predicting a campaign’s development changes, and by promptly ascertaining the

enemy’s activity {xingdong} intention and the campaign development trend, can one

control the enemy {zhi di} at the first opportunity, seize the initiative, and guide the

campaign toward a direction advantageous to one’s own side.

Correct prediction of campaign development changes requires knowing oneself as well as

the enemy. An overall understanding and objective analysis of all aspects of the situation

of both opposing sides are prerequisites for correct prediction of campaign development

changes. Knowing both sides first of all requires knowing the enemy. A campaign
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commander and command organ must: fully utilize intelligence collection systems;

acquire a variety of intelligence collection means; conduct omnibearing, omnilayer,

continuous reconnaissance; and in overall terms grasp the enemy’s operational intention,

features, and patterns. In a modern campaign, the campaign commander must also know

himself; only by knowing well the participating forces’ combat power {zhandou li} and

the strategies and tactics of war in which they are skilled, by knowing well the quality of

lower-level commanders and the performance and campaign uses of the major weaponry

participating in the combat, and by having an accurate estimate of the forces’ overall

combat power, can a campaign commander rationally employ the various kinds of

operational forces, bring into play the strong points of the participating forces, and form

an overall operational capability.

In knowing both sides, one cannot only know the past and the present, one must also

know its possible development. The situation understood by a campaign commander

through a variety of means is quite often partial (or localized) and superficial; instead,

they need to completely master the essence and inherent laws of campaigns, and to

employ sensitive materials so as to conduct an analytical assessment which discards the

coarse and grasps the precise, discards the false and retains the true, moves from one

point to another, and moves from the exterior to the interior. Finally, they draw correct

conclusions, and thus adopt the corresponding measures; in such a way they can then

control the enemy and dominate the battlefield. Since campaign operations have very

large probability {gairanxing} and uncertainty, accurate prediction of campaign

development changes is not simple. Hence, a campaign commander must set out from the

most difficult, most complex situations, and must make many manual preparations; i.e.,

before fighting the first battle, they should predict the tactics to be used in several later

battles. When the campaign circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are favorable to our side, we

must prevent the possible appearance of unforeseen situations, adopt effective measures,

and develop the favorable circumstances {youli xingshi}. When the campaign

circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are unfavorable to our side, we must adopt all means and

alter the unfavorable posture {buli taishi}, so that the campaign direction changes toward

a direction favorable to us.

(2) Keeping an eye on the overall situation

Any war or campaign always presents the problem of the relationship between the overall

situation and the localized situation, between the whole and the parts. Keeping a good eye

on a campaign’s overall situation is the key to driving the development of a war situation

and to control of the battlefield posture. Mao Zedong pointed out: “The main and first

problem in victory or defeat in a war is the good or bad eye one keeps on the overall

situation and on every phase.” The words of the ancients, “From ancient times, something

not planned for generations is not worth planning at one point in time; an overall situation

not planned is not worth planning in one of its areas,” also showed this principle. Hence,

a campaign commander should focus his attention on commanding problems involving

the overall situation, and should put priority on the overall benefits for the overall

situation. First, they must deeply comprehend the strategic overall situation, and all along
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put priority on the benefit for that overall situation. The strategic overall situation is the

general trend in war, and is also the general direction and overall requirement for the

campaign. Hence, formulating a campaign concept and setting campaign resolution both

require taking the strategic intention as the basic criterion; even if it is not advantageous

to the localized (or partial) situation but is advantageous to the overall situation, the

strategic intention still must be subordinated to the requirements of the overall situation.

Next, they must keep a good eye on the campaign’s overall situation. A modern

campaign is joint operations, and is 3-dimensional warfare and integrated warfare; only

with overall planning for the overall situation, and fully bringing into play overall power,

can one achieve a campaign victory. Any issues bearing consideration for all aspects of a

campaign and for the nature of all campaign phases are [part of] the campaign’s overall

situation; a campaign commander must set out from the strategic heights and the

campaign’s overall situation, and keep a good eye on all aspects and all phases of the

campaign.

In keeping an eye on the overall situation, one should be skilled at getting good control

over the campaign links. The campaign links mean the parts and activities having a

decisive effect on the campaign overall situation; good control over the campaign links

can rapidly propel the overall situation to develop in a direction favorable to one’s own

side, and even become a key to deciding victory or defeat in the campaign. Mao Zedong

pointed out: “Commanders at any level should focus the core of their own attention on

those issues or actions having the most important and most decisive significance for the

overall situation they command, and should not focus it on other issues or actions.”

Generally speaking, campaign links mainly include the following: selection of

operational objectives, determination of the main offensive direction and defensive

direction, use of reserves, the major operational activities in the campaign, and the

campaign’s initiation. However, due to differences in each campaign’s patterns and

missions, as well as in the situations of the campaign’s various phases, a campaign’s

main links are each different; the campaign commander must – based on the specific

situation on the battlefield – take all things into consideration, and grasp and resolve well

the links.

(3) Centralized and unified

Operations have always stressed “military power is the most valuable thing.” A modern

campaign is a comprehensive confrontation of a variety of operational patterns and means

that are conducted with an enemy on many battlefields, in many domains, with a variety

of participating strengths. Only by implementing unified command can one cause the

various participating strengths to form an interdependent, mutually complementary,

mutually supporting, indivisible organic whole while centering on the unified operational

intent. To implement unified command, one should grasp the following few points: the

first is unified operational thought. The operational thought is a rational understanding 

for the campaign’s objective laws. It is mainly manifested in the campaign guidance

thought {zhanyi de zhidao sixiang} and basic principles {jiben yuanze}, and it is also

manifested in the understanding of the operational objective laws for a given specific
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campaign. The unified operational thought not only is the soul of campaign operations, it

is also the leading and basic reliance for a commander to overall plan {chouhua} and

organize-implement a campaign. A modern campaign is mainly a joint campaign, and if

one doesn’t have a unified operational thought, it is difficult to implement a joint

campaign of real significance. A unified operational thought, in a general sense is

precisely establishing an integrated-whole operational thought, persisting in integration of

military-civilian and integration of all services and arms, and forming the might of an

integrated-whole; it is establishing a thought of precision strike to control the enemy,

persisting in concentrated crack strengths {jingrui liliang}, meticulously selecting and

attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical nodes, disrupting the enemy’s

integrated-whole structure, and paralyzing the enemy’s operational system {tixi}. The

second is to establish an integrated all-services joint command institution. This command

institution should possess a high degree of authority and combined quality

{hechengxing}, not only with the authority to give orders {haoling} to the “tri-services”

and the capability to command the “tri-services;” but at the same time, it also must be

sharp and capable, highly effective and combined peacetime and wartime [institution].

The third is the command mode gives priority to centralized command and is

supplemented by other command modes. This is decided by the modern campaign’s

integrated-whole adjusting-coordination quality and the characteristics of a unifiedquality of goals.

Centralized command is reflected during campaign organization/planning {jihua}. A

commander must conduct stratagem planning of the unified overall planning {tongchou

mouhua} for the major problems related to the campaign overall situation such as the

campaign concept, force-strength task-organization, mission differentiation, main

direction, basic bushu disposition, coordination actions, time limit to complete

preparations, and time to start activities. During the campaign implementation process, [a

commander] implements centralized command and control for adjustments of the mainsecondary directions, campaign phase transitions, and adjusting-coordination of

important operational activities, etc. In particular, they should even more master

concentration and unified use of those force strengths and weaponry which can directly

impact the campaign course, such as high-tech weapon systems, long-range ordnance,

and campaign maneuver forces. At the same time, they should also see that

characteristics such as the expansiveness of the modern campaign battlefield space, the

multi-varied qualities of strengths, and fast-changing situations depend on centralized

command and cannot encompass all command; rather, under the premise of centralized

command, they should adopt a mode of decentralized command over non-overall

segments and over activities along a secondary campaign direction. Moreover, so as not

to lose combat opportunity and rapid reaction, they should also conduct bypass command

[skip echelon] {yueji zhihui}. Establishment of an integrated command automation

system (CAS) is the basic means for ensuring unified command. Without an integrated

CAS, it is difficult to implement unified command. This system {xitong} must be

adaptive with the modern campaign command system {tixi}, and every effort toward

forming an organic whole of the intelligence sharing, information exchange, and

communications compatibility among all service arms; at the same time, it also requires a

very high time effectiveness {shixiaoxing} and battlefield survivability.
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(4) Steadfastness and flexibility {jianding linghuo}

Steadfastness is a quality that requires firm conviction, a tenacious will, and a resolve

toward certain victory; it requires incisive judgment, and [the ability] to not be confused

and wavering by the complex changing situations on the battlefield. When force-units

suffer severe setbacks and major casualties, steadfastness is the ability to withstand

enormous psychological pressure, to persevere in tenacious efforts, and to dare to

overcome difficulties. When the situations have not undergone fundamental changes, one

must firmly and unshakably carry out the established resolution, and at times a

campaign’s victory often propels one into the midst of a “persevere further” {“zai jianchi

yixia”} effort. When the battlefield situations have truly undergone fundamental changes,

one should adroitly break off a stand {ji li duan}, resolutely adjust the plan {jihua}, and

push forward changes in the battle situation.

Flexibility requires using cleverness to control the enemy. The battlefield situation is

constantly changing, and the opposing sides’ operational activities are dynamic and

indeterminate; even the most brilliant commanders cannot completely predict all

situations and development changes occurring in a campaign. Hence, the campaign

commander must flexibly maneuver, and adjust to changing situations. In a campaign

plan {jihua}, he must have a variety of courses of action, and sometimes one course of

action must be adaptable to a variety of situations; in command implementation, he must

flexibly employ various operational strengths and fighting methods, and flexibly handle

various situations. Flexibility is prominently reflected in the ability to rapidly react to

changing situations, and in the shortest time to set the resolution and handle it. Pursuit of

gain and avoidance of harm are the direct goals of flexible command. A campaign

commander must accurately grasp the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi}, be

flexible in initiative, avoid and shake off from passivity, and ensure the war situation

continuously develops in a direction that favors one’s own side.

Steadfastness and flexibility are the concentrated embodiment of campaign command

skill. Firmness and flexibility are a unification of a contradiction. Steadfastness is not

equal to mechanical rigidness or to inflexibility stemming from disregard for the main

objective conditions, and flexibility is not equal to rash and unconsidered action, or to

doing as one pleases. Only with the two complementing each other and organically

combined can one realize correctly campaign command.

(5) Adept use of stratagems

Campaign operations use of stratagems is precisely fully bringing into play a campaign

commander’s highly subjective dynamic quality and the schemes and tactics used to

achieve campaign goals. A modern campaign not only is a test of strength between the

real strengths of both sides, it is also a contest in the application of stratagems. Campaign

operational practice has proven that there hasn’t been a war where stratagems weren’t

used, a war that victory was gained without stratagems, and a defeat that wasn’t lost to

stratagems. Future PLA campaign operations still have a foothold in defeating an enemy
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with equipment superiority with equipment inferiority, and through emphasis on

implementation of schemes and use of stratagems, we can remedy PLA inferiority and

weaken the enemy’s superiority. The adept use of stratagems first of all requires using a

variety of means to conceal the real and show the false, deceiving the enemy, and

creating misconceptions by the enemy, which results in mistakes in assessments and

command. PLA traditional campaign deception – such as attack where the enemy must

rescue, and move the enemy to assist; surround three sides and leave one side open, relax

the enemy and suddenly surround; conceal strength and display weakness, make the

enemy arrogant and willful; and luring the enemy deep, and force the enemy to stick out

– still have practical guiding significance in modern campaigns. Modern campaign

deception should also pay attention to apply information operations; conduct electronic

demonstrations {yangdong}, jamming, confusion {mihuo} and deception against the

enemy; and use computer viruses to invade and harass the enemy’s command and control

(C2) system, thus putting the enemy in an unfavorable position. Second is the use of

conventional operational activities combined with special operational activities, and

strike the enemy to catch them unaware. As Sunzi (Sun Tzu) said, “In all battles, join the

battle with the orthodox, but win with the unorthodox. Thus, one who is adept in the

unorthodox is unlimited as the sky and earth and inexhaustible as the river.” The

“unorthodox-orthodox” stratagems of a campaign are mainly the fighting methods for

gaining victory with the unorthodox such as we attack when the enemy attacks {dijin

wojin}, leap forward operations {chaoyue zuozhan}}, decapitation assault {zhanshou

tuji}, scoop out the heart and attack {taoxin gongji}, etc. One should flexibly apply these

during campaign command on the basis of the battlefield situation.

II. Campaign Command Systems...127

(1) Campaign command institution types and the command post system {tixi}

1. Command institution types. Campaign command institution, based on campaign

scale, can be divided into three types: theater command institution, army group {jituanjun

qun} campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution), and group

army {jituanjun} (corps) command institution.

A theater campaign command institution normally applies to a large scale campaign; it is

composed of the theater Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders, the campaign tactical

missile force-units commander and associated staff officers and institutions, and it is

normally established on the basis of the existing theater organ. Under modern conditions,

the theater campaign command institution has many joint campaign command institutions

subordinate to it. Its military command senior officer can be assumed by the theater

commander, or it can also be appointed by the supreme command. The theater campaign

command institution mainly commands the campaign operations of its own theater. It is

subject to the command of the supreme command and it can downward-command the

army group campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution) or all

subordinate group army (corps) command institutions and special operations group

command institutions. The missions of the theater campaign command institution are as
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follows: based on the supreme command’s intent, set the campaign resolution, formulate

the campaign operational plan {jihua}, formulate the service coordination plan {jihua},

organize imminent battle training, and assume responsibility for organizing and guiding

campaign implementation.

An army-group campaign command institution (theater-direction command institution)

normally applies to a medium-scale campaign. This campaign is independently

implemented by an army group {jituanjun qun} composed of a number of group armies

(corps) in one strategic direction or several campaign directions. The command

institution can be independently established from the theater, and it can be established by

relying on a given army group or a given service in the theater with the theater sending

representatives and assimilating the participation of other service commanders

participating in that direction. It is composed of the theater commander, associated

service commanders and their corresponding command organ personnel. Under normal

conditions, an army group campaign command institution (theater-direction command

institution) can command the several campaign large formation strengths. Such a

command institution is subject to command of the theater command institution, and

sometimes it can also be directly commanded by the supreme command.

A group army (corps) campaign command institution applies to a small-scale campaign

or to a sub-campaign in a medium-to-large campaign. The command organ of the various

service large formations participating in combat, namely, the campaign command

institutions, the provisionally organized campaign large formations and their command

institutions can be organized-established thus: dispatched from higher-level,

provisionally organized-established, or with a given established organized [structure]

large formation command institution as the basis. It can be divided into the Army group

armies, Air Force group army, Navy formation, and conventional missile force base

campaign command institutions. These are the most basic campaign command organs

and directly command the tactical strength of their respective services. They are normally

subject to the command of the theater campaign or the theater direction command

institution.

2. The command post system {tixi}. In order to safeguard prompt, stable and

uninterrupted command, one must establish an interconnected command post system

{tixi}. Normally, one should establish a main command post, alternate command post, a

rear command post, and based on needs-requirements, one can also establish a forward

(direction) command post in the main campaign direction.

The main command post is a campaign’s basic command institution. It supplies the main

site employed by the campaign commander and the basic members of the command

organ and is the center for implementing campaign command. It is normally composed of

the superior officer or higher-level directly assigned campaign commander, a chief of

staff and main members of headquarters {silingbu}, political, logistical, and equipment

organs, participating associated personnel of various services and arms as well as the

communication system[s] {xitong} and command automation system[s] {xitong}. It also
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is allocated with fairly strong services support strengths {qinwu baozhang liliang} such

as security {jingwei}, engineering, and chemical defense. In order to safeguard the

command institution’s concealment quality and maintain a high level maneuver quality,

the personnel of the main command post should strive to sharp and capable, and should

be in a dispersed deployment {shusan peizhi}.

The alternate command post is the alternate command institution established in

preparation of taking over command from the main command post. Normally, it is

composed of a deputy-position senior officer and necessary staff, political, logistic, and

equipment technical personnel, as well as the necessary CAS and communications

system(s). It is also allocated with necessary service support elements {qinwu baozhang

fendui}. The alternate command post should maintain a close relationship with the main

command post, receive situation reports, and at all times understand and grasp the

developmental situations of the campaign. Once the main command post is disrupted or

cannot implement command of campaign activities, then [the alternate command post]

immediately takes over command so as to ensure continuous campaign command.

The rear command post is an alternate command institution established for a unified

organizing and implementing of rear command. Normally it is composed of one

campaign deputy commander/commander, logistic and equipment departments of

participating services as well as associated personnel of local support-to-the-front

institutions. It is also allocated with necessary CAS, communications system(s) and

support strengths such as security. It is mainly responsible for the bushu disposition of

force-units, implementation of logistical and equipment technical support, and

coordination of all logistical and equipment technical organizational-units. [It is mainly

responsible for] organizing and commanding signal communications and rear defense,

and as necessary at anytime be prepared to assume command of rear area air defense and

NBC weapons, and prevent raids by enemy ground force-units, as well as [being

responsible for] campaign rear area work such as rear area anti-airborne operations.

The forward (direction) command post is an auxiliary command institution established to

enhance command in the campaign’s main direction. It is normally composed of a

deputy-position senior officer, a small number of staff personnel and a communications

element, and it is allocated with needed service support strengths {qinwu baozhang

liliang}. The forward (direction) command post mainly assists the main command post in

implementing command and its established position is more forward than the main

command post. Sometimes, one can utilize a lower-level main command post, and hence

it is also called an auxiliary command post or forward area command post.

The composition of the various campaign command posts should be rationally

determined according to the campaign command missions and possible conditions. A

main command post’s command center is normally composed mainly of a planning

adjusting-coordination center {jihua xietiao zhongxin}, intelligence center,

communications center, electronic countermeasure (ECM) center, and firepower center.

The command center is the heart of campaign command.
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One does not necessarily need to entirely organize-establish the various command posts

for one campaign. Just in terms of one campaign, exactly what sort of command post

system {tixi} should be flexibly grasped on the basis of actual requirements and

battlefield possibilities.

The command post can be divided into two types: fixed and mobile. Fixed command

posts are set up within various defense works having fairly high concealment and

stability, as well as certain defensive equipment. Mobile command posts can be set up in

mobile vehicles, airplanes (helicopters), ships, and trains.

The location of each command post should be chosen in places: favorable to the

command’s main-direction operations; favorable to launching of work; favorable to

maneuvers; favorable to decentralization, concealment and camouflage; favorable to

defense against the enemy’s high-tech weapons, especially precision guided munitions

(PGMs) and against enemy raids with NBC weapons; favorable to organizing a CAS and

communications system(s); and making full use of favorable terrain and existing

engineering facilities. The time and location main command post set up is normally

determined by a higher-level senior officer {shouzhang}, but when they are determined at

the root-level, it should be immediately reported to the higher level. The times and

locations for setup of other command posts are determined by the root-level senior officer

{shouzhang}. In order to ensure the command posts’ security and the stability of

command, the commander should guide his headquarters {silingbu} to closely organize

the defense of the command-post.

(2) Personnel composition of the campaign command institution

The campaign command institution is composed of a campaign commander and a

specific number of staff personnel {canmou renyuan} and support personnel.

The campaign commander is the military superior officer responsible for campaign

command. Within the command institution, he occupies the core position, and plays a

leading and controlling role. This kind of commander responsibility and authority

determines that the campaign commander has a major effect on operational success or

failure, and even on the survival or downfall of a nation. The role played by a campaign

commander in the campaign command activity depends on the degree of his mastery of

campaign operational laws, on the strength of his subjective guidance capability, and on

the level of his psychological quality. Different campaigns show variance in their

command features, and also levy varying requirements on a campaign commander. A

joint-campaign commander normally is a commander appointed by a theater commander

or by the supreme command, and can also be a campaign commander in the Army, Navy,

or Air Force; combined campaigns normally are led by a combined-armed-forces

{hecheng jundui} commander. Among commanders, the principal commander is mainly

responsible for the command of the campaign overall situation and important campaign

activities, while the deputy commander assists command of the principal commander, or

– in division of labor fashion – has individual responsibility for one services’ operations
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and for command of the campaign’s secondary direction and support matters, and

assumes campaign command when the principal commander is not present. The chief of

staff is also one of the commanders, and – besides participating with the [campaign]

commander in command activities – is mainly tasked with internal adjusting-coordination

of the headquarters organ and with execution of campaign decision making, planning

{jihua}, and controlling, as well as with guiding the work of the logistical and equipment

organs.

Campaign staff personnel mainly {zhanyi canmou renyuan} refer to the staff personnel of

the command organ at campaign large formation and above and is should be shouldered

by personnel having undergone specialized campaign training. Their main duties are as

follows: to provide data and recommendations for the senior officer {shouzhang} to set

the resolution; formulate the operational documents such as the campaign plans {jihua}

and orders based on the senior officer’s {shouzhang} resolution; and to participate in the

specific work of organizing the coordination actions and implementing battlefield

control. Because a modern campaign is increasingly becoming high-tech, the

requirements on the staff personnel quality are also continuously increasing. Besides

needing to be proficient in grasping general staff duties, and having specified campaign

organizing and planning {jihua} capabilities and higher skills in stratagems, they must

also have higher science and technology qualities. In a joint campaign, the staff personnel

of the various services are normally a joint organized grouping and compose a joint

command institution.

In order to safeguard-support the continuous conduct of the command activity

{huodong}, the internal command institution must also be organized-assigned with a

specified number of command safeguarding-support personnel, such as communications

personnel, confidential-security personnel {jiyao renyuan}, graphic reproduction

personnel, microcomputer operators, survey-mapping personnel, electrical power

personnel, equipment maintenance personnel, vehicle drivers, and guarding-security

personnel {jingjie renyuan}. These similarly must have undergone specialized training

and must possess very high qualities.

(3) Campaign command information systems

A campaign command information system (CIS) refers to, among campaign command

systems, a “man-machine system” that comprehensively uses a variety of technical

equipment with electronic computers as the core; realizes automation of operational

information acquisition, transmission, and processing; and ensures that commanders

achieve command and control over the objects of command. In a modern campaign,

weapons and equipment and its assisting-support and safeguarding-support systems are

becoming ever more complex, the specialized division of labor among the services and

arms are becoming increasingly detailed, the command-associated essential elements

{yaosu} are increasingly growing in number, and the complexity of command and

control is increasingly rising, all of which levy more stringent requirements on the means

of command. Without a stable, highly effective, integrated CAS, one cannot achieve
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interconnectivity between the various operational organizational-units {danwei} and the

command systems {xitong} at each level, between the command systems {xitong} at the

same level, between weapon systems and between the various subsystems within the

weapon systems and one cannot be tightly complementary so as to form an organic

whole.

1. Functions of a campaign CIS. In campaign CISs, humans and automated

equipment are fused into one and jointly participate in command. Staff personnel utilize

intelligent systems or expert systems to aid the campaign commander in completing

campaign decision making, and they utilize the command network system {xitong} to

issue orders, thus combining into one the work completed in the past by three

departments – operations, confidential-security {jiyao} and communications. The

commander in a command center can utilize various display terminals to continuously

observe the situations of campaign operations, to at any time grasp the battlefield posture

and relevant intelligence, and to implement real time command. CASs mainly have four

major functions: information collection, information processing, aided decision-making,

and command and control (C2).

Information collection {xinxi shouji}. This normally includes the following: the

situations such as the enemy’s activities intention, force strength task-organization

{bingli biancheng}, weapons and equipment, and operational activities; and our

engineering facilities, transportation, communications, air cover, assisting-support and

materiel preparations, as well as logistical supply, force-unit {budui} operational

preparations, and operational area social and natural conditions. There are mainly two

types of common-use {changyong} information collection equipment. One type is remote

sensing (RS) equipment, mainly used for detection of long-range targets. Common-use

RS equipment includes visible RS equipment, ultra-low-light night vision equipment,

infrared RS equipment, multispectral RS equipment, microwave RS equipment, acoustic

RS equipment, and a variety of radio communications equipment. These kinds of

equipment are respectively carried on satellite, aircraft, vehicle, or ship platforms, to

perform information detection and acquisition. The other type is various kinds of sensors;

their operating mode uses several sensing elements near a target, and when these sensing

elements acquire certain physical traits of the target, they will transmit a signal, providing

target data. Different reconnaissance systems have different means of information

collection. Common-use information collection means are radio reconnaissance, radar

reconnaissance, and satellite reconnaissance. Information processing mainly includes text

processing, graphics processing, and intelligence synthesis processing. Information

processing mainly adheres to the information needs of campaign command, and over

various information channels, distributes the data of all information sources into a central

processor to form the initial data {chushi xinxi}, and then via information screening

filters form integrated intelligence information that has a certain degree of confidence and

specification requirements. On this basis, it performs an analysis of the campaign posture

and formulates as well as evaluates pre-selected courses of action {yuxuan fang’an},

enabling it to become information providable for use in decision making; finally, the

decision making is performed by the commander and it forms the decision making

information [data] {juece xinxi}; the staff personnel, based on the decision making
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information [data] {juece xinxi}, operate a CAS to formulate orders, instructions, and

plans {jihua}, generate control information {kongzhi xinxi}, and transmit the control

information such as orders, instructions, and plans {jihua} via a transmission network to

the objects of command.

Assisted decision-making. In a campaign CIS, there are mainly three decision making

modes: the first is the expert system. This uses a computer to emulate an expert’s

thinking; it is a program system to resolve complex problems. At the time of use, relevant

intelligence on the battlefield is used as initial data {chushi xinxi} input into the system;

the expert system performs inference and analysis of the various kinds of intelligence,

and puts forth the decision making courses of action [COA] {juece fang’an}. The

commander, based on his own experience and the expert system’s put forth COAs, makes

the final decision. The second is operational simulation. Operational simulation is

precisely the construction of the battlefield model and with this, derivation {tuiyan} of

the campaign course and the campaign outcome under given conditions. At the time of

use, the initial data is input into the previously constructed model, and then the feasible

decision making COAs are separately input into a computer and simulation derivations

{moni tuiyan} are performed, and an optimum COA is selected from amongst these. The

third is preliminary COA [P-COA] retrieval. In peacetime, based on a preset battlefield

and operational activity forecasts and directed at every kind of potentially occurring

operational posture, a variety of corresponding COAs are formulated as well as evaluated

and optimally selected. Finally, the optimally selected COAs under different postures

along with the full-complement [complete set] computer control programs and the

fabricated software products are loaded into the software database to form the P-COA

software system {tixi}. In wartime, the corresponding P-COA is retrieved on the basis of

actual situations, and is provided for a commander’s direct use or used after

modifications.

Command and control (C2). C2 is the core function of a command center. The command

center is responsible for automated gathering and synthesized processing of a variety of

intelligence information and providing this to a commander. With this as the basis, the

commander implements C2. C2 systems {xitong} are composed of two major parts:

hardware and software. Hardware is computers, the core equipment of C2, display

systems, the equipment that displays posture intelligence and actual battlefield

conditions, and C2 stations, the various control equipment where the commander

conducts campaign calculations {zhanyi yunsuan}, issues orders, and checks on order

execution situations.

Software includes two types: systems software {xitong ruanjian} and application

software for command automation.

The essence of the campaign C2 process is the process of uninterrupted feedback of

information flow. The chief links in campaign command are collecting and processing of

intelligence. All types of reconnaissance equipment and all kinds of data terminals used

by the various forces, from all around continuously transmit intelligence information to
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the command center; the center’s equipment promptly performs analysis and editing of

this intelligence and then stores it for future reference or transmits it to the proper

commanders. A command center’s intelligence database also includes a large amount of

previous information; when a commander needs to search for data, he uses the

intelligence retrieval system to retrieve the necessary information from the intelligence

database. The commander, based on his grasp of the needed intelligence, utilizes an

assisted decision making system to perform COA selection, and via creative thinking

ultimately determines the optimum COA (campaign resolution). After the campaign

COA (resolution) is determined, the operational orders are formed, and the command

personnel will transmit the operational orders via the information transmission system

{xitong} to the network terminals of the individual force-units {budui} and is provided to

the objects of command to execute.

2. The establishment of the requirements of campaign CIS. A campaign command

institution must, based on operational needs-requirements and conditions, organizeconstruct a CAS with a rational structure, nimble to use, strong survivability, and a high

degree of integration, and ensure the implementation of effective command for the

various participating strengths. The establishment of a campaign CIS should be suited to

the campaign command system {tixi} and to the task-organization of the command

institution. Based on the requirements of being centralized and unified, proceeding from

top to bottom, separate levels and separate categories, giving prominence to key points,

and dealing with more than one thing in unified overall planning, unfold the organizing

work for systems {xitong}. [The command institution must] fully utilize existing

equipment within the operational areas and with the CAS of the various participating

force-units {budui} as the backbone, fully bring into play the role of existing equipment

and implement system synthesis and integration. Simultaneously, [the command

institution must] carefully organize the system’s concealment and protection and ensure

the high effectiveness, stability and reliable operation of the system.

All functions of the CAS should form a synthetic integration. This is both a requirement

of a modern campaign and an intrinsic requirement of a CAS. One must organically

blend together all of the functions of C2, intelligence and reconnaissance,

communications, and ECM {cianzi duikang}.

The campaign CIS should be integrated with the automated systems of all the services.

The campaign command institution s must acquire all-source information from the

“multidimensional” battlefield and from all the services; and a CAS must be an organic

integrated-whole, with intelligence sharing and information interflow, in order to be able

to ensure the execution of smooth command over all of the participating services. To this

end, a campaign CIS must realize “technical integration;” the campaign command

institution [must] achieve equipment compatibility, command interface interflow, allsubsystem interconnectivity, and highly effective operation with all of the services and

with the command means between all of those services.
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The campaign CASs should be integrated with the CASs of the strategic command at all

levels. By way of measures such as development of an Area Synthetic Communication

System {quyu zonghe tongxin xitong}, [one must] achieve interconnectivity and

interflow of the CAS at the strategic and campaign levels, and enhance the time

effectiveness, flexibility, and stability of the CAS.

III. Campaign Command Modes...133

The command mode is the method and form of implementing command by a commander

and his command organ. Whether or not the selection and application of command mode

are appropriate directly affects the level of campaign command effectiveness and quality.

(1) Centralized command and decentralized command

In operational command, due to differences in the centralization level used in command

functions and authority, the two main command modes to be formed are centralized

command and decentralized [dispersed] command.

1. Centralized command. Centralized command, also called unified command, is the

implementation of centralized control and unified adjusting-coordination command of

subordinate force-units, and it is the basic mode of campaign command. This command

mode essentially is the command authority to maintain a high degree of centralization

and unification of the force-units. Generally, a campaign’s highest commander directly

grasps and controls the command authority, and also has a clear command relationship

with attached and assisting-support force-units. The main characteristics of centralized

command are: not only does the higher level provide clear missions for the lower level,

but it also stipulates the specific method(s) and steps to fulfill the mission. Under

ordinary conditions, only the higher level commander has the authority to change the

operational bushu disposition, missions, and the time opportunities and direction of

activities, and the lower-level commander may not arbitrarily vary an action without

approval. During the operational process, the higher level commander has the authority to

intervene and correct the lower level commander’s resolution and plans {jihua}. At the

same time, the lower level commander, in organizing and implementing command, must

standardize his own activities on the basis of higher level intent and missions. During the

entire operational process, the higher level commander maintains a relatively centralized

command authority.

The centralized command mode has the following advantages: first, it facilitates the

unified organization of campaign operational activities, [facilitates] the formation of an

integrated-whole composite power and the consistent adjusting-coordination achievement

of the operational goal. A commander can, based on higher level intent and their own

level’s campaign intention, make unified arrangements for the campaign bushi

disposition, operational direction, and main coordination matters and allow all activities

to be conducted by tightly centering on achieving the general objective[s]. He can fully

bring into play the strong points of each of the operational strengths and the various
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weaponries so as to form a powerful operational effectiveness from an integrated-whole

perspective. Second, this mode facilitates a commander in keeping an eye on the overall

situation and in grasping the operational links. A commander applying centralized

command mode can take in the campaign’s overall situation, grasp the operational

centers of gravity, and strictly require all operational strengths to resolutely execute their

orders and conduct activities per the unified plan {jihua}, and better accomplish their

missions. Third, it facilitates the lower level to better accomplish their operational

missions. Because the higher level conducts unified planning {jihua} and bushu

disposition for the entirety of operational activities, this reduces the work load on the

lower level commander in organizing and planning operational activities, and particularly

at the critical occasions of the campaign, he can obtain the powerful support of the higher

level.

The centralized command mode also has certain drawbacks: one is that command

authority is highly centralized, which is often unfavorable to bringing into play the

initiative and creativity of the lower level commander, even to the point where it can

reduce the lower level commander’s sense of responsibility. The second is that the lower

level commander, in handling some important situations, must get higher level approval

and this reporting to a higher level or sending down of the approval wastes time, which is

unfavorable to seizing a fleeting combat opportunity. The third is that centralized

command requires the higher level commander to relatively explicitly differentiate

missions and comprehend the situation, and this is bound to increase the work load,

thereby affecting a commander’s creative thinking. Fourth is that centralized command is

highly dependent on command tools, and once communications are blocked and

connectivity is interrupted, that could cause the entirety of campaign activities to be

exposed to unfavorable effects.

Centralized command, no matter whether in the past or in the present, has always been

the most basic mode of campaign command. The secret of Napoleon’s campaign

command lay in centralized command. Mao Zedong was a commander in chief even

more adept at applying centralized command. During the War of Liberation, he

concentrated force-strengths over various theaters for use on the main battlefields, and

commanded the famous “Three Great Campaigns.” In modern campaign operations, the

application of the centralized command mode is even more common.

The centralized command mode generally should be adopted based on campaign

command requirements and on whether they will be determined in the future. When the

enemy situation is fairly clear, when the root-level operational activities have a decisive

effect on the campaign’s overall situation, when the campaign preparations time is

relatively ample and the terrain favorable, when the operational patterns and area are

relatively stable, when an operation is in a critical direction and time, when organizing a

joint campaign involving all the services, and when communications support is possible –

in all of these cases the centralized command mode can be employed.
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2. Decentralized command. Decentralized command, also called directive

{xunlingshi} command and delegated {weituoshi} command, is a command mode which

appropriately transfers command authority to a lower level commander. It is an important

mode of campaign command; its essence is that the lower level commander shares

relatively large command functions and authority. Liu Bocheng, in his 1947 summary of

the lessons from the Ju-Jin-Yu Campaign, devoted a high degree of effort to

summarization of its features: he wrote that directive command in fact “shows that

because of the mission – and not because of the means – lower level commanders are

enabled to act promptly at their own discretion.”4 When conducting decentralized

command, a higher level commander only assigns to the lower level commander a clear

mission and a time limit for fulfilling the mission, issues principle-quality instructions,

and provides the force strengths and weaponry needed to fulfill the mission; but he does

not stipulate the specific method(s) and steps for fulfilling the mission. The lower level

commander can, based on the higher level commander’s general intent and the actual

situation on the battlefield, independently perform C2. For example, a large scale joint

campaign is normally unfolded in many directions, and the joint campaign command

institution normally implements centralized command over the operational groups in the

main campaign direction, while in the other directions they can observe the situations and

at the necessary time dispatch a forward command {qianzhi}, or delegate the campaign

direction joint command institution to implement command.

Decentralized command has the following advantages: the first is that one can fully bring

into play the initiative and creativity of the lower level commander. This mode enables a

lower level commander to be nondependent on the higher level, and instead to rely on his

own cleverness to find an effective method for defeating the enemy, enhance his sense of

responsibility for fulfilling the mission, and raise his capability for independent command

of operations. The second is that it facilitates seizing combat opportunity. Decentralized

command enables a commander to independently and autonomously handle some major

situations, and decrease the series of procedures such as requests for instructions, reports,

and replies to subordinates. This decreases the command hierarchy, enabling lower level

commanders to act promptly at their own discretion and have autonomy in terms of

command. The third is that it not only can lighten the higher level command load, but

also enables better command of the root-level operational activities. Decentralized

command in one respect can shorten the command span, reduce the number of troops

commanded, and lighten the command load; in another respect, lower level commanders

are more familiar with the bushu disposition and more informed of their own battlefield

environment, which facilitates their completion of a mission. Fourth is that decentralized

command, due to a reduced flux in the flow of information between the higher and lower

levels, has eased the requirements on communications support, and can effectively reduce

leaks of classified command information, and enhance the survivability of the command

institution.

4 Liu Bocheng junshi wenji [Collected Military Works of Liu Bocheng], Zhanshi [Soldiers’] Publishing

House, 1982, p. 481.)
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Decentralized command also has certain drawbacks: first, commanders acting alone often

cannot obtain high-level timely coordination and support, making for fairly high

difficulty in adapting to operational activities of the campaign’s overall situation. Second,

it levies fairly stringent requirements on the quality of the lower-level commanders; these

commanders must have the capability for independent operations and for dealing with

dangerous environments. Third, it requires obtaining more force strength and weaponry

reinforcement, which to a certain degree creates a certain dilution of the high-level

operational strengths. The concept of decentralized command was first proposed and put

into practice by the 19th- century commander in chief, old Marshal Blücher. The old

marshal in command practice proposed a new concept called “directives;” in issuing

directives to group armies, he normally only specified the overall operational direction

for those armies, and permitted the army commanders, based on the overall mission, to

act independently. The old marshal used such directives to command military operations,

and won many victories in wars against Denmark and Austria and in the Allies’ wars

with France. This command method later came to be called the “detailed command

method.” After World War II, the importance of the detailed command method was

increasingly recognized. Liu Bocheng was an active practitioner and proponent of

detailed command; during the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation, he used the

directive command mode to conduct command, and won many brilliant victories.

Detailed command was also the command mode adopted by the UK during the BritishArgentinean Falklands War.

Decentralized command is normally appropriate for the following: campaign command

under special conditions; command of force-units solely conducting an operational

mission in an independent direction; command of force-units shouldering maneuver

operations, insertions and infiltrations, airborne landing, anti-airborne, independent

holding operations, depth, and special operations; and command when the battlefield

situation has shown unanticipated changes and the means of communications have been

damaged or destroyed.

3. Combination centralized command and decentralized command. A campaign’s

integrated-whole adjusting-coordination nature and the unified-nature of campaign goals

require the implementation of a highly centralized and unified command. At the same

time, features such as the expansiveness of the campaign battlefield space and the

multiplicity of strengths, as well as the rapidity of situational changes, also require that

one must attach importance to decentralized command. Each of the two modes –

centralized command and decentralized command – has its advantages and

disadvantages, and during operations one should, based on the specific conditions, deal

with each case on its merits, flexibly apply them, avoid indiscriminate copying, and truly

achieve a “unified-dispersed combination, and a good fit between concentration and

separation” {tong fang jiehe, ji fen shidu}. Any of the major problems involved with the

campaign’s overall situation – such as the campaign concept, operational objectives, and

selection of time; application of campaign strengths; and the adjusting-coordination

between the various battlefields, service large formations and the various campaign

patterns – all of these require a high degree of centralized and unified command realized

by the campaign commander. As regards the specific bushu disposition and use of
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operational methods for any tactical formation, all of the services’ commanders should be

given the authority to act promptly at their discretion and to make emergency decisions,

and excessive intervention by the campaign commander is inappropriate. For campaign

operational activities having high mobility, one should primarily employ decentralized

command, while for campaigns with little mobility, centralized command should be

primary. For campaigns having ample time for preparations, centralized command is

mostly adopted; otherwise, decentralized command is mostly adopted. For campaign

large formations assuming the main campaign mission, centralized command is primary,

while for the campaign large formations assuming a secondary mission(s), decentralized

command is primary. When the bushu disposition has a relatively strong independent

command capability, decentralized command can be adopted; otherwise, centralized

command is primary. When the command means of communications are advanced,

centralized command can be primary; otherwise, decentralized command can be primary.

When adopting centralized command, a campaign commander may not exercise rigid

control, or take care of everything by themselves; they must give the lower-level

commanders the power to act on their own judgment under special situations. Finally,

when adopting decentralized command, a campaign commander should specify the range

over which the lower-level commanders may exercise authority; and when the latter

exceed their authority, the former must request instructions from their superiors, and

guard against letting the latter do as they like, and thus losing control.

(2) Command according to level {anji zhihui} and command bypassing the immediate

chain {yueji zhihui}

Campaign command, based on the hierarchy of command span, can be divided into

command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain.

1. Command according to level. Command according to level is command relying on

a system of administration with level-by-level implementation, and is also stepped

command according to the order of establishment of operations and implemented from

top to bottom, so as to maintain the normal command relationship. Under the usual

conditions, campaign operations do not damage this command relationship.

The basic mark of this command mode is as follows: level-by-level control, with each

level assuming its own responsibility for effecting command. Its advantages are

expressed as follows: on the one hand, the orderliness of command facilitates giving play

to the effects of command functions and powers at all levels. The command system is an

organizational system composed of many levels. Each organizational level has its own

command functions and powers; this authority relationship in peacetime is clearly

specified, while in wartime additional specific decisions are handed down, and

commanders become intimately familiar with their own level’s authority, which

facilitates giving play to effects level by level, and formation of a command composite

strength {heli}. On the other hand, the reliability of command is advantageous to

fulfilling a mission. Since this type of command is implemented within the normal order

of establishment, commanders are quite knowledgeable about the command relationship
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at their own level, at the high and low levels, and at the adjacent levels. Even if

temporarily there are several changes, commanders do not make fundamental changes to

the overall command system, but only make certain shifts in the system of administration,

which generally do not create chaos for command. Its drawbacks are as follows: one is

that it is easy to form rigidly orthodox command customs, which restrict command

initiative and flexibility; second, the command links are too numerous, so that orders

transmitted from above must go through layer after layer, which easily affects the time

efficiency of command. Under special situations, one command link raising a problem

could cause a chain reaction, easily creating an interruption in C2. Command according

to level is one of the basic categories of command modes, and is also a commonly seen

command method.

2. Command bypassing the immediate chain. This is command where the

commanders bypass the subordinate level. It is a special command mode, whose essence

is – due to the need to break the normal command relationship because of special

situations – to achieve the goal of dealing with those special situations.

The advantages of command bypassing the immediate chain are expressed as follows: it

can form a rapid command relationship with the subordinate forces, and implement

effective command, so that one may save time, reduce the command layers, seize an

opportunity for battle, and realize the goal of dealing with emergency situations. This

mode’s drawbacks are as follows: command bypassing the immediate chain disrupts the

normal command order, which requires reestablishing a command relationship. At the

same time, to a certain degree it increases the load on the high-level commanders, and

thus under ordinary conditions is not suitable for too much use. Command bypassing the

immediate chain is normally adopted when: a situation is critical, and it is mainly suited

to influencing the main direction of a war’s or campaign’s overall situation, and the

actions of a campaign or battle; critical situations, and fleeting opportunities for battle,

when there is not enough time for level-by-level command; and when there are command

and communications interrupts, so that normal command according to level cannot be

effected. When implementing command bypassing the immediate chain, the commanders

at this higher level should promptly inform the bypassed lower level(s) of their orders or

instructions, and – based on the commanders of the forces being commanded, depending

on the possible situations – they must also promptly report to their immediate higher level

the situation involving receipt of the mission.

3. Combination command according to level and command bypassing the immediate

chain. Command according to level and command bypassing the immediate chain are

related in a “unity of opposites.” The so-called “opposites” here means that the two in the

command hierarchy have different requirements. However, no matter whether in levelby-level command or in command bypassing the immediate chain, the focus of attention

is always what is advantageous to fulfillment of the operational mission. The so-called

“unity” part here means that without command according to level, there is no command

bypassing the immediate chain, and vice versa. In command, command according to level

and command bypassing the immediate chain sometimes are also used interchangeably,
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and are mutually inclusive. Any command mode cannot be the only existing mode. This

then requires that a campaign commander not only must not confound the features and

range of applications possessed by the two, but also must oppose any kind of action

purely using only one command mode. They must focus on battlefield realities, and

integrate use of the two, with command according to level as the primary mode, and

command bypassing the immediate chain as the supporting mode.

Section 2: Campaign Coordination...139

Campaign coordination refers to the coordination and cooperation among all the service

arms and the various other forces participating in the campaign operations, per the unified

plan {jihua} of the campaign commander and command organ, and implemented in all

areas of campaign operations. Its goals are to form an organic whole of a series of

operational activities conducted in the multidimensional battlefield space by the various

campaign forces, to closely coordinate per the unified plan, to mutually cooperate, to

bring into play the overall power, and to coordinate in unison to achieve the campaign’s

final goal.

In a modern campaign, owing to the complex composition of the campaign operational

essential elements, the status and role of campaign coordination seem to be increasingly

prominent. From the viewpoint of the force composition, a modern campaign is an

integrated trial of strength of all the service arms’ operational systems; it requires that all

forces form a composite strength {he li}, which requires relying on coordination of this

link, and joining together the campaign’s many forces. From the viewpoint of the

battlefield space and campaign activities, the various operational activities of a modern

campaign are simultaneously or successively unfolded in the land/sea/air/space/electronic

multidimensional space, and the various operational modes and means are synthetically

applied; one must fuse into a whole the campaign activities of many battlefields and a

variety of patterns, and unquestionably one must inter-coordinate all of the battlefields

and activities in order to achieve this. In a certain sense, under modern conditions, the

quality and operational capabilities of the troops are mainly expressed in the close

coordination among the participating forces and arms, in the close coordination among

the various battlefields, and in the close coordination among the various campaign

patterns and activities. The degree of campaign coordination not only affects the

realization of all the service arms’ overall combat effectiveness, but also has a major

impact on the campaign course and even on the outcome of the campaign and war. In the

British-Argentinean Falklands War (1982), the two sides’ entirely different methods of

coordination of operational activities led to two different results. The Argentinean

military – despite having numerical superiority in terms of “favorable climate,

geography” and force strength and weaponry, and despite its Air Force’s flexible,

courageous and resolute operations, which achieved major combat successes –

nevertheless lacked coordination and cooperation among the three services, due to their

Navy’s and Army’s passive avoidance of battle, which led to defeat in that war. The

British military – although having troops tired from the long expedition, locked in a

desperate fight against fortified positions, and not at all possessing superiority in
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personnel and arms – nevertheless had extremely close triservice coordination and

cooperation, and finally scored a victory in that war. Hence, in campaign operations

under modern conditions, militaries must rely on the joint efforts of all the service arms,

thoroughly organize the coordination, form a composite strength, and coordinate

uniformly the strikes against the enemy – then they can win a victory in a campaign or

even a war.

I. Characteristics of Campaign Coordination...140

The multiplicity of modern campaign forces, the multidimensionality of the campaign

battlefield, and the diversity of campaign activities have caused a campaign’s coordinated

operations to assume several new characteristics.

(1) Wide scope of coordination, with abundant content

First, from the battlefield space viewpoint, the campaign battlefield under high-tech

localized war conditions is a 3-D battlefield comprised of a multidimensional space. The

battlefield scope involves several domains – land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic –

and campaign coordination requires organization within a vast, multidimensional spatial

scope, and objectively requires that the campaign commander and his command organ

must control coordination of all domains involved with covering operational activities.

Next, from the campaign forces viewpoint, due to the many participating service arms,

campaign coordination in a modern campaign includes not only coordination among the

many services, but also coordination between the regular forces and the regional People’s

Armed Police and militia. Third, from the viewpoint of campaign patterns and activities,

in a modern campaign – and especially in the joint campaign – one campaign often

includes coordination among several different sub-campaigns. For example, in an

amphibious landing campaign, normally required is coordination among campaign

patterns – organization of an air defense campaign, an air offensive campaign, and a

naval blockade or offensive. This inevitably requires that the campaign commander must

both organize the coordination among many campaign patterns and activities, and

coordinate activities among all of the services. In addition, also required is organization

of coordination between operational forces and support forces; coordination between

regular forces and the regional forces, as well as irregular forces; and coordination among

specialized arms and special operations and the various campaign activities; etc. In sum,

modern campaign coordination has increasingly assumed the notable characteristics of

extensiveness, diversity, and complexity.

(2) Frequent transitions in the coordination relationships, and high time effectiveness

In a localized-war campaign under information technology (IT) conditions {xinxi jishu

tiaojianxia}, due to the rapid transitions between the various operational phases, the

various campaign patterns exhibit frequent transitions, and the coordination relationships

inevitably also change with the constant adjustments. In the campaign development

process, the status and roles of the various services in the different campaign phases and
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different campaign patterns show differences, added to which are differences in the

operational goals and centers of gravity of the campaign’s various phases; the services

assuming the main mission are also constantly shifting, causing the overall status of each

service during a campaign to constantly undergo changes, and the coordination

relationships to be constantly adjusted. The primary-secondary relationship of the various

services in coordinated operations constantly shifts, following the transitions between

campaign phases and shifts in campaign patterns, so that sometimes the Army has the

primary status, while at other times the Navy, Air Force, or Missile Forces will be

primary. For example, in the early operational phase of an amphibious landing campaign,

the campaign’s primary mission is to seize battlefield information superiority, air

superiority, and command of the seas, and to paralyze the enemy operational system.

During this phase, one should respectively organize the coordination with the Missile

Forces and Air Force, as well as the Navy, as primary. During the crossing phase, the

campaign’s primary mission is to safely and smoothly cross the Strait, so that the Navy

should be primary in organization of coordination. Then, during the amphibious landing

operational phase, the campaign’s primary mission is to seize a landing site, so that the

Army should be primary in organization of coordination. The course and tempo of a

campaign under IT conditions are constantly accelerating, and the various coordination

relationships form rapidly and dissolve just as rapidly, causing the shifts in the various

coordination relationships of modern campaign operations to trend even more toward

greater frequency.

High time effectiveness is another important characteristic of campaign coordination

under IT conditions. With the widespread use of high-tech arms – especially information

weaponry and IT – in operations, the military operational preparation and long-range

maneuver time has greatly decreased, campaign C2 and rapid response capability have

greatly improved, and the time for the entire campaign’s operations has greatly shortened.

One campaign, and even one war, lasts from several days to several tens of days;

campaign battles are instantaneous, and can even determine the winning or losing of the

entire war. Added to this are the fast changing battlefield situation and fleeting

opportunities for battle. Hence, in a modern campaign, the time usable for organizing and

implementing campaign coordination has decreased even more. If all activities of

coordinated operations cannot be completed in good time, or even are slightly delayed, it

could bring about enormous harm to the entire operation’s activities. Therefore, one must

within a finite time simplify the coordination procedures and links, clarify the documents,

and as much as possible adopt automated means of coordination and control, achieve

effective use of every second, and rapidly and precisely organize and coordinate well

each campaign activity; otherwise, the situation could lead to loss of the entire campaign.

(3) Stringent requirements on coordination, and a high degree of difficulty

In a modern campaign, especially the joint campaign, coordination is not only

coordination between one service and another service, but also often involves issues of

cooperation and coordination in many fields, such as national politics, foreign relations,

and economics. Hence, campaign coordination is not only a matter for headquarters
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officers, but also an important matter that must be personally organized and followed

with interest by a campaign commander at each level. Moreover, modern campaign

coordination not only has much content, but also a complex relationship composition.

The operational activities in a certain service or a certain area are compositionally

interrelated to the operational activities of the many other services and many other fields,

and have a cross-coordination relationship to them. In particular, the application of large

numbers of high-tech weapons in campaign operations, and the omnibearing, highly 3-D,

all-day modernized reconnaissance systems and precision guided munitions (PGMs) have

accelerated campaign operational tempos, have greatly improved precision strike

capabilities, have caused myriad changes in the battlefield situation, and have created

fleeting opportunities for battle. Campaign coordination must achieve precision,

timeliness, flexibility, and continuousness, in order to ensure the smooth execution of

campaign operations. In the early 1980s, the U.S. military compiled statistics on the

reasons for accidental injuries caused during its major conflicts; 45% of these injuries

were caused by coordination problems, and 26% were caused by target identification

mistakes. Target ID in fact also belongs among coordination problems, so that we can

take the total of these two factors, 71%. During the Gulf War, accidental casualties from

coordination represented 29% and accidental casualties from target ID represented 39%,

thus reaching 68% for the total of the two factors.

(4) Intense countermeasures to coordination, and its easy sabotage {pohuai}

In a modern campaign, the opposing sides not only fully emphasize the overall power

that can be brought into play on their sides by operational coordination, but at the same

time also extraordinarily stress use of a variety of means and adoption of a variety of

methods to sabotage the enemy’s operational coordination, and thereby disrupt the tempo

of the enemy’s activities, and cripple or reduce the enemy’s operational capability. In

future campaign operations, the opposing sides will launch intense countermeasures

centering on coordination and counter-coordination operations, and the two sides’

operational coordination at all times has the possibility of meeting with sabotage. In

particular, when there is a wide gap between the opposing sides in high-tech weaponry,

the enemy’s counter-coordination facing the side in the weaker position will be more

prominent, and the difficulties will be greater. If one does not adopt practical and

effective measures to overcome the enemy’s counter-coordination, one’s own

coordinated operations will be difficult to execute; and this point was driven home in

extremely prominent fashion during the Gulf War.

Due to the use in war of large numbers of high-tech weapons – especially the

omnibearing, highly 3-D, all-weather modernized reconnaissance systems – one can over

all battlefield spaces seek out and find C2 systems. Adding to this is the increased strike

range of modern PGMs, with a precision that has now risen to the meter level. All this

enables one to conduct precision strikes against point targets in the full depth of the

battlefield. Once command organs and coordination and communications facilities are

discovered, they in fact are faced with the danger of being destroyed. The opposing sides

can also employ devastating campaign firepower, to effect battlefield interdiction, cut
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apart the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, block the enemy’s rear support for his

forward forces, and sabotage their mutually coordinated operations. In addition, modern

campaign coordination mainly is accomplished via signal communications, especially

radio communications, while a major deficiency of technically complex, variegated

communications equipment is that it easily meets with jamming and damage. The use of

large quantities of electronic warfare (EW) weapons has exposed campaign coordination

to greatly increased jamming and threat levels from soft-kill means. High-intensity, longduration, large-area electronic suppression and jamming will cause command and

communications equipment to lose effect, and even if it is not destroyed, it will have

practically no effect. Hence, in the intense EW environment, C2 and coordinated

communications will appear totally vulnerable.

II. Principles of Campaign Coordination...143

A modern campaign operations system is a huge and complex system. One must comply

with the principles of system theory, and must scientifically, thoroughly, and

meticulously organize campaign coordination, so that all of the “components” in this

system mutually cooperate, mutually coordinate, functionally complement one another,

and produce a synergistic effect where “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.”

To achieve this synergistic effect, when organizing campaign coordination, one must

adhere to the following principles.

(1) Integrated-whole adjusting coordination {zhengti xietiao}

Integrated-whole adjusting coordination refers to the campaign commander and his

command organ, by setting out from the campaign overall situation and centering on the

general campaign missions, the macroscopic adjusting coordination and control

conducted over the entire course of a campaign for the activities of the campaign

strengths of all services and arms, the various campaign patterns, each campaign

battlefield, and each campaign direction. Integrated-whole adjusting coordination is the

first principle of modern campaign coordination. Hence, in campaign guidance, one must

seek overall effects, and combine forces to subdue the enemy. If overall one cannot

achieve thorough, effective coordination, then even if one achieves good coordination

over individual activities, one will be unable to produce a decisive effect on the overall

situation-– partial or localized coordination cannot replace coordination over the overall

situation. What is stressed in the word “integrated” {yiti} in the U.S. military’s new

operational theory “air/ground/sea/space integrated operations” is the overall problem;

“integration” {yiti} is achieved via close coordination. Also, the Russian military’s

combined operations principles point out: “Coordinated actions which coordinate

uniformly the use of all services and specialized forces, and which ensure that their

mutual coordination is maintained, are one of the basic conditions for seizing victory in

modern operations.” The PLA has always stressed integrated-whole coordinated

operations {zhenti xietong zuozhan}, and under modern conditions, the PLA campaign’s

basic guidance thought with respect to emphasis on “integrated-whole” {zhengti} has

become more prominent.
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To implement integrated-whole adjusting-coordination, first, based on the general

campaign mission, one must make unified overall planning arrangements for all

campaign activities over the campaign’s entire course. One must scientifically and

rationally assign missions to many types of strengths – the participating Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Missile Forces, as well as the local People’s Armed Police and the masses –

according to the characteristics and strengths of each, and based on the overall campaign

objective. Secondly, one must conduct unified overall planning of the guihua planning

{tongchou guihua} for the campaign phases and determine the coordination relationships

among the various campaign strengths. One must proceed from the actual requirements of

the campaign’s overall situation and course, carefully divide the campaign phases, and

clearly determine the main-secondary status for all campaign forces in each operational

phase, and their coordination relationships. Normally, one should organize and

implement adjusting coordination mainly of the campaign strengths or groupings

assuming and executing the main missions. Third, one must organize full-course

regulating and controlling. This means that during the entire course of the campaign, the

campaign command organ must, based on the coordination plan, supervise and push

forward all of the participating forces in their execution and fulfillment of the

coordination plan {jihua}, so as to maintain overall adjusting coordination of all

battlefields and of various operational activities. When a major disaster appears in

campaign development, the campaign commander and his command organ must adhere

to the changing situation, center on the general campaign intention, and conduct adjusting

coordination at the right time for the various operational activities by all strengths in each

of the battlefield spaces in order to form a new integrated-overall coordination.

(2) Give prominence to key points

Giving prominence to key points is coordination organized and implemented on the basis

of an integrated overall coordination, and tightly centering on the campaign operational

centers of gravity. Modern campaign coordination has a wide content and many layers;

only by distinguishing the primary and secondary, concentrating on links and prominent

key points, and placing the coordination centers of gravity in activities which have the

most decisive significance for the campaign’s overall situation, can one see that the

overall campaign will maintain orderly, high-efficiency operations, and thus ensure the

campaign’s smooth development.

To implement key-point coordination, first, one must organize coordination with a

campaign operation’s main mission as the key point. The general mission {zong renwu}

in a single campaign operation contains various different specific missions. Some of

these different specific missions {juti renwu} play a critical role in achieving the general

mission. These specific missions that have a major effect on a campaign’s overall

situation should become the focal points {jiaodian} to be followed with interest and the

key points {zhongdian} for organizing coordination by a campaign commander and

command organ. Only by centering on the main missions and successfully organizing the

coordination between the campaign strengths, battlefield spaces and campaign activities,

allowing the participating services and arms or the groupings to standardize their own
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activities by centering on the campaign’s main missions, and undergoing the completion

of predetermined missions by the respective services in order to ensure the campaign

activities of the other services, can one ultimately achieve the campaign general goal

{zong mudi}. Second, one must organize coordination by centering on the service or

group playing the leading role in campaign operations as the key point. Modern campaign

operations normally are joint operations conducted by all services and arms. Although all

the services in a campaign are on an equal footing and none are subordinate to the other,

the status and role of each service – in the various patterns, phases and times of campaign

operations – are distinguished as primary or secondary. Only by organizing and

implementing key-point coordination with the service playing a leading role in a

campaign operation as the key point, can one bring into play the optimal effectiveness of

this coordination during an operation, and better realize the optimal overall effects of the

various forces. Third, one must organize coordination with the main battlefield and the

main campaign activity as the key points. Modern campaign battlefields normally include

a land battlefield, sea battlefield, air battlefield, electromagnetic battlefield, and space

battlefield; and during an entire campaign operation, although they are an indivisible

organic whole, the status and role of each battlefield and each campaign activity in the

different campaign patterns show differences. For example, when waging a naval

blockade campaign, the sea battlefield and sea-campaign operational activities will

become key points for coordination; when conducting urban offensive and border

counterattack campaigns, the land battlefield and land-campaign operational activities

become key points for coordination. Hence, doing well in coordination must be based on

the campaign’s actual requirements, and must all along be centered on the main

battlefield and the main campaign activity. Fourth, one must organize coordination with

the campaign’s main phase and key times as the key points. Different campaign phases

and operational times play different roles in a campaign’s overall situation, so only by

organizing coordination centering on the main operational phase and time key points can

one forcefully promote the campaign’s smooth development. Fifth, one must organize

coordination centering on special lethal, destructive {shashang pohuaixing} weapons. In

a modern campaign, large numbers of special lethal, destructive weapons will have

widespread applications on the battlefield, which will have a major impact on a

campaign’s course and outcome. With special lethal, destructive weapons as primary, one

should do a good job of coordination and cooperation with and among the other

campaign activities, in the areas of the order of activities and exploitation of operational

results.

(3) Precise plans {jihua}

Precise plans are the precise calculations and arrangements made for the participating

force strengths and weaponry by the campaign commander and command organ, based

on the modern campaign characteristics of fast operational tempo, surprise activities, and

precision firepower strikes. In campaign operations under IT conditions, the application

of the various operational forces is becoming finer and finer, and only when the mutual

coordination among the various activities in an operation is right on the mark can

coordination be truly achieved. In particular, the use of precision-strike munitions places

more stringent requirements on the degree of precision of coordinated operations. If all of
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the activities in a coordinated operation cannot attain a high degree of precision, the

realization of the superior performance of high-tech weaponry could be severely

impacted.

Implementation of precise-plan coordination first requires that a campaign commander

and his command organ, based on the operational characteristics of the various service

arms and on the different functions and requirements of the weaponry, must precisely

plan and organize the coordination among the various campaign forces, and see that the

coordinated activities of all weapon systems and all operational forces in the different

operational spaces are right on the mark. Second, it requires full use of IT means and

CASs to effect coordination, so as to improve the precision of coordination. Third, it

requires that via coordinated drills among the various campaign forces, so that the

operational characteristics and requirements are mutually understood among all of the

services’ participating forces, the commanders can master mutually coordinated

operational procedures and methods, see that all coordinated activities achieve a high

degree of precision and consistency, and ensure the high effectiveness of coordinated

operations.

Organizing modern campaign coordination, besides upholding the above principles, also

requires that – via strict campaign coordination discipline to ensure the thorough

execution of the orders, instructions, and coordinated plans of the campaign commander

and their coordination elements – the smooth realization of a coordinated operation

among all the service arms is assured.

(4) Continuous {bujianduan} flexibility

Continuous flexibility means that under informationized conditions, several

characteristics – a changeable campaign battlefield situation, a frequently varying

coordination relationship, and poor coordination stability – not only require efforts to

overcome all difficulties and obstacles, and to achieve firm and unshakable coordination

per the plan, but also require that when the situation undergoes a major change, ad hoc

{suiji} coordination is flexibly and constantly effected, so as to maintain stable and

uninterrupted coordination. Whether a campaign commander, based on developing

changes in the battlefield situation, can effect flexible and continuous coordination is of

the utmost importance to a campaign’s smooth execution and even to the accomplishment

of the predetermined campaign objective(s).

Implementation of flexible, continuous coordination in one sense requires embodying

flexibility toward adjustment of campaign coordination. Thus, when drafting a

coordination plan in advance, one should as much as possible conduct a comprehensive

analysis and estimate of major situations that may arise during the campaign course, as

well as of coordination changes that may occur, and should formulate a variety of

coordination proposals, so that the coordination plan {jihua} has a certain capacity to

meet an emergency. However, since there is always a certain disparity between the

subjective and the objective, added to which is the complex and changeable battlefield
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situation under informationized conditions, coordination plans drafted in advance, even if

they are numerous, cannot exhaust all situations that arise in the full course of a

campaign. Hence, coordination for the various situations in the plan cannot be specified

to death; one must leave some room for adjustment and alteration, and prevent an

excessive disparity between the changes in the actual situation and the advance plan,

since such a disparity introduces difficulty in adjustment of the coordination plan. In

another sense, this implementation requires embodying timeliness toward the regulation

of ad hoc coordination. This means implementing timely and effective coordination and

control over the operational activities of all participating forces, based on the situation

suddenly arising on the battlefield. Under IT conditions, even with a coordination plan

carefully prepared before battle, it is difficult to anticipate every fast-changing situation

on the battlefield. Hence, the campaign commander and his command organ certainly

must enhance battlefield monitoring, promptly acquire battlefield information, resolutely

make decisions based on the developing changes in the battlefield situation, rapidly make

new decisions, promptly adjust or organize new coordination, assure the uninterrupted

coordination of activities among all the campaign forces, and ensure the smooth conduct

of the campaign.

(5) Complementary initiative

Complementary initiative means bringing the subjective dynamic nature of participating

force-units into play by setting out from the overall situation and centering on unified

campaign objectives to actively complement each other and in close coordination. A

modern campaign normally is a joint operation that is implemented together by

provisionally organized all-services and arms. Since all of the services have equal status,

and since operations have a relatively independent nature, there isn’t a leading or being

lead relationship amongst them. Adding to this is the intense confrontation between

coordination and counter-coordination in campaign engagements, the coordinated

operations are easily disrupted, thereby if all of the participating strengths cannot

coordinate with initiative and closely complement one other, it will be very difficult to

form and maintain a consistent adjusting-coordination of campaign activities.

In implementing coordination with initiative, first one must strengthen the sense of the

overall situation. In a localized war campaign under informationized conditions,

enhancing the sense of the overall situation is extremely important to coordinated

operations. This is because the modern campaign normally are joint operational activities

of all the services, and in such joint operational activities there is no single service or arm

which can fulfill the mission by itself; one must rely on the close cooperation of all the

service arms in order to be able to win victory. Hence, the commander of the

participating services and arms and his force-units cannot observe and handle the

problem of coordinated operations solely from the viewpoint of their own service or their

own arm, but instead must set out from the campaign’s overall situation, so that the

overall situation’s benefit is their own service’s benefit, so that triumph in the overall

situation is the triumph of their own service. Second, one must strengthen the awareness

coordination with initiative. Participating services and arms still with only an insufficient
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sense of the overall situation must also promptly and accurately fulfill their own mission

per the requirements of the coordination plan, and simultaneously must with active

initiative closely cooperate with the force-units of the other services and arms; in

particular, during major activities affecting victory or defeat in the campaign, they must

call forth all their energy, must have no fear of sacrificing their own local benefit, and

must have the courage and resolve to ensure that the entire campaign’s activities are

smoothly conducted. Third, one must restore coordination with initiative. In campaign

operations, cutting off of command communications and disruption to coordination are

commonly occurring events, so restoring coordination with initiative is an important

assurance for maintaining uninterrupted coordination. When command communications

are cut-off and coordination is disrupted, all force-units should take the initiative to

conduct inter-connectivity according to the coordination plan, actively adopt various

measures and flexibly apply various modes and methods to restore coordinated activities

with initiative.

III. Content, Procedures, and Modes of Campaign Coordination...147

(1) Content of campaign coordination

The content of modern campaign coordination is quite large, but mainly has the following

six aspects:

1. Coordination among all of the campaign groups (large formations). Examples

include coordination between a campaign’s main attack group and holding group {zhu

gong jituan}, between a ground offensive group and an airborne assault group, between a

fighter group and a group holding off enemy reinforcements, between an Army campaign

large formation and an Air Force campaign large formation and Navy campaign large

formation, as well as with a 2nd Artillery Corps campaign large formation (land-based

forces). The campaign commander should clarify the missions of all campaign groups

(large formations) and the coordination relationships among all campaign groups (large

formations).

2. Coordination among the various campaign patterns. In particular, this is

coordination in a large-scale joint campaign, and includes a series of sub-campaigns, such

as the theater-direction joint campaign and service (combined) campaign of all the

services, as well as the campaign conducted in an independent direction. The campaign

commander and campaign command organ should successfully organize and implement

the coordination of the direction, time, and forces used among this series of campaigns,

so that all of the campaign patterns are tightly linked, and form an integrated-whole

composite strength {zhengti heli}.

3. Coordination among all battlefields and among the different campaign directions.

Modern campaign battlefield spaces are expansive; the battlefield scope includes the land

battlefield, air battlefield, sea battlefield, and even the space battlefield. The land

battlefield also includes the frontline battlefield, depth battlefield, flank battlefield, and
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enemy rear battlefield. A single theater-level joint campaign also includes several

campaign directions. Hence, the campaign commander, setting out from a focus on the

campaign’s overall situation, should successfully organize and coordinate the campaign

activities on all battlefields and in the various campaign directions, see that they can

mutually cooperate, assist one another, and center on conducting the coordinated,

uniform activities of the campaign’s overall goal.

4. Coordination among the various campaign phases. In a modern campaign, due to

its huge scale, the many participating service arms, the many campaign patterns, the

expansive battlefield, and its relatively long duration, the campaign is normally divided

into several campaign phases for execution. The campaign commander should organize

and coordinate well the various campaign phases, especially the activities of all the

service arms’ various forces during the transitions between campaign phases, so that a

previous phase will create favorable conditions for activities in a later phase, and should

tightly interlink the later phase with the earlier phase, so that the entire campaign’s

operations can smoothly move forward according to the plan, divided into steps, and in

rhythmic fashion.

5. Coordination among special weapons, special operations, and the various campaign

patterns. A campaigns under informationized conditions will widely employ several

special weapons and special forces to execute special operations, striking at the enemy’s

key links (command systems, firepower systems, logistics systems, EW systems, etc.), so

as to weaken and paralyze the enemy. Hence, the campaign commander should

emphasize coordination among special weapons and special operations and the various

other campaign activities, and see that the use of special weapons and special operational

activities not only can bring into play the maximum combat effectiveness, but also can

maintain close coordination with the various operational activities.

6. Coordination between operations and various types of support. In a modern

campaign, due to the intensity of high-tech countermeasures and the enormous depletion

of various kinds of materiel and equipment, the fulfillment of an operational mission

increasingly relies upon timely, stable support. The campaign commander must show

concern for coordination between operations and the various types of support, carefully

organize well the coordination between campaign operations and campaign support, and

see that the various types of support can fit with and satisfy the requirements for

campaign operations, so as to ensure the smooth execution of the campaign.

(2) Procedures and modes of campaign coordination.

1. Coordination procedures

Coordination procedures mean the steps taken for all the campaign-participating services,

under a unified plan, in order to achieve coordinated cooperation in their mutual

operational activities.
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Coordination in a modern campaign, especially the joint campaign, is hierarchically

arranged, and generally includes two administrative levels: overall situation quality

{quanjuxing} coordination and localized quality {jubuxing} coordination. Hence, when

organizing modern campaign coordination, one must distinguish these administrative

levels, and carry out [the coordination] from top to bottom, and level by level.

Overall situation quality coordination refers to the overall-situation quality and full

course-quality integrated-whole {zhengti} coordination implemented over the campaign

by the campaign’s highest commander and his command organ. The content of this

coordination includes coordination among all campaign phases, among all battlefields,

among all campaign forces, among all campaign patterns or activities, and between

operations and support. To use the joint campaign as an example, methods for overall

situation quality coordination normally take the campaign phases (course) as the axis and

the campaign mission as the core, and combine certain spaces and times to organize the

overall-planning {chouhua} and what is specifically implemented. Overall situation

quality coordination plans are the joint consultations and deliberations {yanjiu nizhi}

between the campaign large formation’s Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of all the

participating services with associated personnel, conducted after the campaign

commander sets the campaign resolution, and clearly stated to all the participating service

commanders called together by the campaign’s highest commander. A campaign

commander and command organ must concentrate energy on grasping overall situation

coordination. They must focus on clearly differentiating each of the campaign phases,

and on the main missions of each service’s campaign forces in each phase; they must

clearly specify the status and coordination relationship of all campaign forces in each

operational phase; and they must clarify the principles, requirements, and methods of

mutual coordination.

Localized coordination refers to coordination organized and implemented for a specific

phase, a specific battlefield or direction, and/or a specific activity of the campaign.

Normally, after the campaign commander makes the campaign resolution, appoints the

campaign coordination staff, and clearly states the overall situation-coordination plan, a

delegate(s) sent from the campaign large formation – or the service commanders

appointed responsible for one phase, one battlefield or one direction, or one activity’s

major operational mission – will assemble the commanders of the services involved with

supporting and coordinating the operation, plus related personnel, for joint consultations

and deliberations to formulate a specific local coordination plan. The local coordination

must specifically make clear the activities’ sequence, area(s), and method(s), for each

participating force in each operational time, as well as the targets for the activities’

results; at the same time, it must also clarify each type of support measure, as well as the

command relationship, the methods for signal communications, mutual identification, and

mutual support and coordination, and the measures for adjustment and recovery when

coordination is lost or disrupted, and also fix the associated coordination signals (signs).
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A campaign commander and command organ, at the same time as they are overall

planning and organizing the implementation of campaign overall situation coordination,

the following steps are performed:

First is partitioning of the coordination phases. Campaign coordination phases are the

phase partitions made for the course of a coordinated operation. In partitioning

coordination phases, the goals are – based on the laws of a campaign operation’s own

development – to have focused coordination of campaign forces, to control campaign

tempo, to have orderly step-by-step organization of campaign coordination, and to

gradually realize the campaign’s overall objective. A campaign coordination phase

generally is mutually consistent with a campaign operational phase, and the mission of its

coordination is mutually consistent with the operational goal of that phase. Partitioning of

campaign coordination phases is not fixed unchangeably; when a campaign commander

is overall planning the campaign and setting its resolution, he must – based on estimates

conducted over the campaign’s full course of development, and according to the

campaign intention, the enemy situation, the battlefield posture, and the conditions of the

troops – determine the differentiation of the campaign coordination phases. Different

conditions can have different partitions [of coordination phases]; the amount does not

matter, nor does the level of detail. To make the coordination clearer and more specific,

normally one can also further partition each phase of campaign coordination into several

operational times, but such partitioning generally is only suited to a campaign’s local

coordination. In a modern campaign, and especially a joint campaign, the participating

forces are numerous, the scale is relatively large, and the battlefield situation is

changeable; so, in order that a campaign can have a relatively strong basing in principle

{yuanzexing} and flexibility, during overall planning {chouhua} of campaign overall

situation coordination, generally one does not further partition the coordination phases or

times into smaller segments. Hence, based on the requirements of different coordination

levels, good partitioning of the campaign coordination phases is the basis and a

prerequisite for maintaining close coordination among all the service arms and ensuring

that a campaign operation is smoothly executed.

Second is specification of a coordinated mission. An operational mission or objective is

the basic foundation for a campaign commander and command organ to formulate a

campaign plan {jihua} and organize campaign coordination. An operational mission is

the core of campaign coordinated operations; it not only has a major constraining effect

on the various operational activities of all the participating forces in each space, but also

determines the status of all the forces in the campaign operation, as well as the mutual

coordination relationships among them. Hence, no matter whether in a campaign’s

overall situation coordination or in its localized coordination, only by implementing it via

tight centering on the operational mission can it be advantageous to a clear statement of

the coordination relationship, advantageous to formation of an integrated-whole

composite strength {zhengti heli}, and advantageous to realization of the campaign goal.

Campaign missions include the overall mission and specific missions. The overall

mission is the overall goal that must be reached in the overall campaign, and is the core in
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organizing campaign overall situation coordination. The specific missions signify the

results or targets that must be reached in the operational activities of each campaign

phase. Specification of coordinated missions means that – based on partitioning of the

campaign coordination phases – the campaign large formation commander and command

organ will, according to the campaign’s overall mission, unify and clarify the specific

missions of each service in each campaign phase. First, they must clearly state the

specific missions of the services executing the main campaign missions in each campaign

phase, and, based on a campaign objective that must be reached in a certain campaign

phase, centering on the requirements of the operational activities of the services

supporting and cooperating in the execution of the main mission, clearly state the specific

missions of the other services, so that the missions of all services will – in terms of

targets, spaces, and times – form a mutually complementary supportive and cooperative

relationship.

Third is clarification of the coordination relationship. This means determination of the

mutual support/cooperative relationships among all the services in each campaign phase.

In the relatively large-scale campaign operations executed under modern conditions, each

campaign coordination phase’s operational activities cannot be conducted completely by

a single service. Some can be conducted primarily by one service, with the other services

cooperating in conducting a combined operation; but what normally occurs will be a joint

campaign mutually conducted by all the service arms. Thus, not only is there the problem

of how to coordinate the other services’ operations when one service is primary, there is

also the coordination problem during activities in which a variety of forces center on a

unified objective. When organizing overall situation coordination, one must – with a

focus on clarifying the coordination relationship – make a unified clear statement and

specification of each service’s activities. Campaign directors should, based on the

coordinated objective of each phase of the campaign, determine which services and how

many forces will participate, and which service will assume the main operational mission.

On this basis, with the service executing the main mission as primary, they then make

clear the primary-secondary relationship for coordination of all participating services.

Taking island and coastal-area operations as examples, under the usual conditions, in the

blockade and counter-blockade operational phases, with the Navy as primary, the other

services cooperate or assist in the operation; in the air-raid and counter-air- raid

operational phases, with the Air Force as primary, the other services similarly will assist

[or] cooperate in the operation; in the amphibious-landing and on-island maneuver

operational phases, with the Army as primary, the other services will assist [or] cooperate

in the operation. After the coordination relationship is clarified, the campaign commander

should authorize the service that will assume the main campaign operational mission,

present a specific operational activity COA for the phase, and be responsible for specific

planning, preparation, and organization of the operational coordination for that phase. At

times, even though the primary and secondary services do not at all comprise a

commanding-to-commanded relationship, once the coordination relationship and plan

{jihua} are formed, the secondary service must – per the overall coordination objective

and requirements – actively and initiatively center on the primary service’s launching of

the activity. Thus, having established the top-to-bottom coordination relationship, and

having clarified the mission of this coordination relationship, the opportunity and
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methods for coordination are relatively principle-based; a fairly large selection margin

and flexibility remain for localized coordination, which is advantageous to strengthening

the coordinated activities of all the participating services, and advantageous to arousing

the subjective initiative and enthusiasm of commanders at all levels.

Fourth is partitioning of the operational areas and sequence of activities. This means the

specification made by campaign commander and command organ – based on partitioning

of the coordination phases, clarification of the coordination mission, and specification of

the coordination relationship – for the spatial range and time of each phase’s activities for

each service or group. Partitioning of the spatial range for the operations of a service or

group should involve – based on the requirements for 3-D operations and the

characteristics of each service – rational partitioning of each service’s or group’s

operational area, as much as possible avoiding the creation of accidental injuries and

interplay, fully bringing into play the strengths of each service in the different battlefield

spaces, and forming from the activities of each space’s battlefield a good relationship

marked by mutual assistance, mutual cooperation, and mutual complementarities. Since a

modern campaign fuses the various operations into a whole, the times for the activities

often have an intersecting quality; this requires – via scientific calculation and

specification of a prioritized sequence for each service’s or group’s execution of an

operational mission, and of a time limit for completing the mission – achieving mutual

coordination and close linkup among the various operational activities, and preventing

the occurrence of deviation. Specification of the times for each service’s or group’s

activities should – based on the characteristics of each service and the requirements for

target strikes – be implemented in an ordered, tightly interlinked way. At the same time,

it requires having remedial measures when a loss of coordination occurs, and requires

enhancement of ad hoc coordination and command during activities, so as to prevent

accidents or the unexpected.

Fifth is organization of coordination transitioning. Coordination transitioning refers to the

process of changes and linkup in the coordination relationship. During the campaign

execution process, transitioning of campaign coordination in a planned, smooth fashion is

of the utmost importance to the initiative-oriented, planned use and transport of forces,

and to the development of a campaign victory. Hence, good campaign coordination

transitioning has become a critical link in campaign execution and coordinated

operations. A commander and command organ at each level, when organizing campaign

coordination transitioning, must fully grasp the following three points:

First, they must anticipate trends in coordination transitioning. The sufficient and also

necessary anticipation of transitioning of operational coordination means that, with this

anticipation, they can in a prepared and organized fashion realize this change, promptly

convert to new campaign coordination, and strive for the battlefield initiative. First of all,

they must accurately analyze and decide whether the campaign’s current mission has

been basically completed, and whether the objective basically reached. In general terms,

a campaign objective that is basically reached refers to that the current operational

coordination is about to end. Next, they must accurately analyze and decide whether the
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enemy forces have undergone a fairly large change. In a campaign, if the enemy forces

suffer major losses, or the campaign bushi disposition has been disrupted, it is very

difficult to continue countermeasures, and the situation inevitably turns into a rout.

Conversely, if the enemy is tending toward an advantageous situation, he will surely

adopt a new major activity. No matter what kind of situation appears, it always presages

the arrival of a new operational phase or coordination. Then, they must accurately

analyze and decide whether the war situation has undergone a qualitative change. This

means whether the posture assumed by the opposing sides in the campaign’s overall

situation and the contradictory leading aspects have undergone fundamental changes, and

whether the opposing sides have fallen into a passive, unfavorable position – these will

presage that a new operational phase and a new coordinated activity will soon begin.

The second point is that they must fully seize the opportunities for coordination

transitioning. An opportunity for campaign coordination transitioning should not be too

early or too tardy. If too early, the requirements are not satisfied, and preparations will be

insufficient; this is unfavorable both to fulfillment of the previous coordination phase

mission and to the unfolding of the next coordination phase mission. If too tardy, then the

effective value of the favorable conditions will have already fallen, even to the point

where new unfavorable factors can appear, and this is precisely the lost opportunity for

battle we often talk about. In general terms, a favorable opportunity for transitioning

coordinated operations is the following: our side has basically completed the current

mission and has basically done a good job of preparing the transition, and simultaneously

has basically ascertained the intention of the enemy’s next phase. At such time, if our

side can promptly transition the campaign coordination relationship, then we can strive

for the advantage of the first opportunity, and find ourselves in a favorable position.

The third point: they must meticulously organize the transitioning of coordination. First,

the campaign commander – based on the latest trend in the current war situation’s

development – must study, adjust, and revise the operation and the coordination plan

{jihua}; be able at the necessary time to convene an operations conference; formulate a

new operational coordination plan; and see that all the participating services and arms or

campaign groups can properly carry out well all the preparatory work for transitioning a

coordinated operation – in terms of thought, organization, and operational strengths.

Next, they must promptly adjust the mission and bushi disposition of each service arm

and campaign group, further specify and clarify the new operational objective and

coordination relationship, and use a small part of the forces to continue execution of the

current mission, pin down the enemy, cover the main groups’ rapid bushu disposition and

begin to enter a new coordinated operation phase. Then, they must scientifically

determine and carefully organize the precedence for every service arm’s or group’s

coordination transition, do well in the linkup of campaign coordination, gradually

complete the transition into the new coordination relationship, and see that the

coordinated transitioning activities for the entire campaign’s overall situation are

conducted all in good order without confusion.
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2. Coordination modes

In campaign operations under IT conditions, mastery and good use of the modes of

coordination, and a thorough understanding of the procedures and methods of

coordination, have effects of the utmost importance on improving operational command

effectiveness, and giving full play to the overall power of all the participating service

arms. Coordination modes signify the organizational forms {zuzhi xingshi} adopted by

all the campaign participating services, under a unified plan {jihua}, for the purpose of

achieving coordinated cooperation in their mutual operational activities. The coordination

modes of a modern campaign mainly include three types: conference coordination, plan

coordination, and ad hoc (emergency) coordination.

(i) Conference coordination is coordination organized in conference form by the

campaign commander using maps or sand tables. Conference coordination normally is

personally organized by the campaign’s highest commander, who assembles each

participating service’s or group’s principals, and, based on the campaign resolution,

clarifies on the spot the coordination relationship in the major operations. On this basis,

the commanders of each service and group further propose views and recommendations

for coordination. Then, after joint coordination, the final verdict is given by the campaign

commander. Conference coordination has the quality of key-point coordination, and

mainly resolves key-point and difficult-point problems in coordination.

(ii) Plan coordination is when the campaign Chief of Staff, based on the campaign

commander’s resolution or the coordination key points, assembles the Chiefs of Staff

from all participating services and associated personnel for joint consultation on, and

study and formulation of, a specifically detailed campaign coordination plan, which, after

approval by the campaign commander, is transmitted to the troops for execution. A

coordination plan normally – with the campaign phase (course) as the axis and the

campaign mission as the core – is drafted by combining the corresponding spaces and

times. The content of a coordination plan normally includes the following: partitioning of

the campaign coordination phases (times) and the expectations of situations; the missions,

order of activities, and activity spaces for each participating service and the region’s

various campaign forces in each operational phase (time), as well as targets for the

activity results; the mutual coordination relationship and support measures among all the

services; linking and transitioning of the coordination phases; and specification of

coordination communications, identification, and signals (signs), as well as measures and

methods for readjustment and recovery when coordination meet with disruption. Plan

coordination modes are of two types: one is the tabular style (i.e. a coordination plan

table), while the other type is the map notation style, which means plotting of the

coordination plan on maps, and adding the corresponding written notes. A coordination

plan should anticipate various COAs with respect to the enemy situation, but should have

one basic COA among these.

(iii) Ad hoc (emergency) {lin ji} coordination is, during the campaign execution

process, coordination organized at the time by the campaign commander and his
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command organ on the basis of the battlefield situation. Ad hoc (emergency)

coordination is a further perfection of and complement to the plan coordination. When

the battlefield situation undergoes a major change, and when the originally set

coordination plan no longer suits the new battlefield situation, one must resolutely alter

the original coordination plan, and reorganize a new coordination. Organization of ad hoc

(emergency) coordination requires having relatively strong foresight; when the battlefield

shows a fairly large discrepancy from the anticipated situation or a change, the campaign

commander and his command adjusting-coordination institution must then as much as

possible and as early as possible implement ad hoc (emergency) coordination, and

prevent the emergence of a passive [state]. The mode of organizing ad hoc (emergency)

coordination is the instruction – via the battlefield ad hoc (emergency) command – to

instruct each service and each group to adjust the original plan, and make clear the new

coordinated activities and methods.
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Chapter 6

Important Campaign Activities...155

In a modern campaign, the content of campaign activities is very broad. Of which the

more important ones are: campaign information warfare, campaign firepower assault,

campaign maneuver, campaign special operations and campaign psychological warfare.

They exist in various campaign types and campaign patterns and permeate campaign

operations from beginning to end. They have a significant effect on the progress and

outcome of the campaign and they occupy an important position within the campaign.

Section 1: Campaign Information Warfare...155

Campaign information warfare refers to the comprehensive quality operational activities

on the battlefield directed at the enemy’s information detection sources, information

channels and information processing and decision-making systems {xitong} and adopted

with the aim of seizing and maintaining information superiority, disrupting the enemy’s

information control capabilities and at the same time maintaining one’s own information

control capabilities.

Information warfare is a new kind of comprehensive quality operational activity which is

gradually forming along with the development of information technology under modern

conditions. Since the 1970s, along with the massive military application of information

technology, many new systems have emerged, including informationized operational

platforms, precision guidance munitions, advanced electronic warfare weapons, night

vision instruments, all-aspect, all-times of the day and all-weather reconnaissance,

surveillance, detection, navigational guidance, and positioning systems, and especially in

the use of C4I systems, which has integrated the intelligence, reconnaissance,

communications, command, control and strikes on the battlefield, causing a qualitative

leap forward in the status of information in warfare and becoming one of the decisive

factors governing operational activities. Just as with materials, energy and information

constituting the three main pillars of modern society and culture, under modern

conditions, information together with campaign strengths, campaign time and campaign

battlefield already constitute the four basic objective factors of a modern campaign.

Among these four basic objective factors, battlefield information is the critical link that

connects the campaign strengths and the other two factors. Only through having a grasp

of battlefield information can the campaign director be able to govern the campaign

strengths and utilize the time and space of battlefield. As demonstrated by the practice of

localized wars that have erupted since the 1970s, whichever side is able to more timely,

more accurately and more effectively gather, transmit, and utilize information will have

more possibility in winning the war. Moreover, the side holding information dominance

can also obtain an even higher operational cost-effectiveness ratio than in previous wars.

Thus, seizing information superiority and depriving the enemy of its ability of controlling

information has become the foremost mission of modern campaign operations.
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Information warfare itself is not a goal but a means. Its objective is in the overall

situation of campaign operations or at critical occasions and area, depriving the enemy of

its right of gathering, controlling and using information to influence, weaken or even

totally disrupt their capability for observing, decision-making, and commanding and

controlling force-units, and maintaining one’s own ability to command and control,

seizing information superiority and thus forming strategic and campaign superiority in

order to create conditions for winning a decisive engagement.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Information Warfare...156

(1) Information operations permeates through all domains and the entire course of a

campaign

Activities of information operations affect and govern all domains of a modern campaign.

In a modern campaign, because armed forces’ weapons and equipment have basically

already achieved becoming electronic, computerized, networked and systemized, the

decision-making of the armed forces and all kinds of operational activities are highly

dependent on prompt, accurate and uninterrupted information; if the campaign activities

in any battlefield space are separated from the assisting-support and safeguarding-support

of information, then one will not be able to gain success. Thus, the effect and control of

information operations on a modern campaign is a cross spectrum quality, without

information dominance, there is no space-, air-, sea- and land-dominance, and there is no

campaign initiative.

Activities of information operations permeate the campaign from start to finish, and

information warfare is the precursor in modern campaign activities. In past wars, the

initiation of a campaign normally began with firepower strike, but under modern

conditions, information attack has already become the indicator of the initiation of all

campaign activities. A modern campaign frequently pulls open the curtain with

electromagnetic — firepower assault with electronic warfare in the lead; the first strike

targets of a campaign are no longer the enemy’s heavy force groupings and artillery

positions, but rather the enemy’s information systems such as its detection, command and

communications, to strive to deprive or weaken their capability of information control in

one blow and create conditions for subsequent force-strength and firepower engagements.

Information warfare during the campaign implementation process cannot be interrupted.

Seizing and maintaining information dominance is a continuous process. On the one

hand, all campaign activities must be conducted under the assisting support and

safeguarding support of information operations; on the other, in order to resist the

information attack of the enemy, one must implement uninterrupted information defense

so as to ensure one’s own side to have the capability to effectively gather, transmit, and

use information until one gains victory in the entire campaign. Information warfare is

also an important safeguarding-support for a smoothly and safely concluding a campaign.

It is evident that information warfare exists in all times and domains of modern campaign

operations.
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(2) Information systems have become the foremost strike targets

Information systems mainly refer to the information detection sources, the information

channels and information processing and decision-making centers of the armed forces.

These constitute the three most basic links for gathering, distributing and using

information, and they are also the foremost strike targets of information operations.

Information systems having become the foremost strike target of information operations

mainly depends on the following three reasons: First, information systems are the “ears,

eyes, brain and nerve center” of the modern armed forces and they are also the most

vulnerable part of the entire operational system. Striking the enemy’s information

systems genuinely carries out the war principle of avoid the strong and attack the weak.

Secondly, the development {fazhan} of weapons and equipment provides ample

conditions and means for striking the information systems of an armed forces. In the

latter period of World War I, the British military theorist Fuller explicitly put forth the

fighting method of “paralysis attack” (also called “decapitation attack”) with the enemy’s

command system as the foremost attack target. However, due to the limitations of

weapons and equipment technical levels, wanting to first attack the enemy’s information

systems in past wars, particularly the command and communication system bushu

disposed in the enemy’s campaign and strategic depth, was often a kind of wishful

thinking. Under modern conditions, due to the rapid development of weapons and

equipment and military information technology, on the one hand, the high-degree of

becoming electronic by armed forces’ reconnaissance, communication and command

systems has allowed military command and communication systems to be completely

exposed to an opponent’s electromagnetic spectrum detection and attack and causing the

past layer-by-layer protection formed by heavy force groupings to be defunct. On the

other hand, the armed forces not only have all kinds of long-range reconnaissance

systems and high-precision, long-range and high-lethality strike systems, but they are

also equipped with a large quantity of new types of attack weapons—electronic warfare

weapons. This allows for the armed forces to be able to directly attack the information

systems in the enemy’s campaign and strategic depth during campaign operations

completely without contacting the enemy’s operational force-units. A modern campaign

starting with strikes on an opponent’s information systems has truly become a reality.

Thirdly, first attacking the enemy’s information systems has become an operational

method with most effectiveness, least losses and shortest consumption time. This method

has changed the strike sequence against an enemy’s operational systems in the past from

fighting from outside to inside to from inside to outside, and by directly striking the

enemy systems’ “ears, eyes, brain and nerve center,” the enemy’s powerful force-strength

groupings are paralyzed or deprived of its capability to organize resistance, thereby

greatly reducing operational loss and campaign duration.

(3) High level of synthesis of operational modes and operational means

Information warfare is a highly synthesized operational activity. It contains a variety of

operational modes such as intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, C4I countermeasure
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warfare, special operations, psychological warfare, firepower warfare, etc., and a variety

of operational means such as campaign deception, campaign feint, etc. It can be said that

information warfare is a campaign operational activity with the strongest synthetic

quality and widest coverage as well as one using the most operational modes and

operational means.

Synthetic quality is one of most distinctive characteristics of information warfare because

synthesis is a necessary condition that information warfare relies on to form and to exist.

Information warfare is a new operational pattern put forth after the 1990s, but most of the

operational factors it contains have existed since the localized wars of the 1970s, and

some of the operational factors (such as intelligence warfare and operational deception,

etc.) even appeared in ancient wars. However, these operational factors did not form

information warfare for a long time, and the main reason for this is not because there

weren’t operational means and technical conditions for it, but rather because these

operational factors did not center on the core of seizing battlefield information dominance

to form synthesized, unified, and adjusting-coordinated operational activities. In past

wars, they were often relatively and independently brought into play in a scattered state.

The viewpoint of system theory acknowledges that the different composition of similar

factors may form new systems and functionalities. Information warfare precisely

synthesized the functionalities of operational factors in the past which already existed,

those being to strike the enemy’s information systems and to protect one’s own

information systems, all to form a kind of new synthetic quality operational pattern with

seizing battlefield information dominance as its direct goal.

(4) Tightly combining information attack and information defense, and attack occupies

the leading position

Information warfare is divided into the two categories of information attack and

information defense. They are mutually supporting, mutually dependent, and one cannot

have one without the other. Without information attack, one cannot deprive and weaken

the enemy’s ability for information control, and information defense will ultimately lose

its function; similarly, without information defense, information attack cannot be

smoothly implemented and one’s own ability for information control will be lost.

Therefore, in information warfare, one must tightly combine information attack and

information defense and one cannot do one and neglect the other. This is different from

traditional operational modes because information attack and information defense are not

operational activities that are mutually replaceable and continuously transitioning. They

accompany each other from start to finish and cannot be separated even for an instant.

Information attack occupies the leading position in the struggle for seizing information

dominance. Information attack is an attack with initiative implemented against the

enemy’s information systems with means such as electromagnetic suppression, network

attack, and firepower and force-strength assault. Information defense, on the other hand,

is mainly the application of means such as secrecy and technical protection to protect

one’s own information systems from the enemy’s interference and disruption. If it is
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separated from information attack, information defense will play nearly no role against

the enemy’s information systems. Thus, only with information attack can one have the

functionality of depriving and weakening the enemy’s collection, transmission and use of

information on the battlefield. This, therefore, decides that information attack has a

decisive role in the struggle for seizing and maintaining information dominance.

II. Basic Categories and Patterns of Campaign Information Warfare...159

Information warfare is divided into two basic operational types: information attack and

information defense.

(1) Information attack

Information attack is an operational activity to weaken and deprive the enemy of the

ability for information control by attacking with initiative the enemy’s information

systems with various means. It is the main operational type for winning battlefield

information warfare and seizing battlefield information dominance.

There are mainly four basic patterns of information attack, namely, electromagnetic

attack, network attack, psychological attack and physical destruct (psychological attack is

individually listed; please see campaign psychological warfare.)

Electromagnetic attack refers to applying electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress,

jam and deceive the enemy’s electronic equipment in order to cause their information

systems and weapon systems to lose effectiveness {shiling} or to mislead them to make

mistakes in judgments. Electromagnetic attack is not just limited to radio or radar

frequencies as it also includes bringing into play the role of domains of optical, infrared

and audio frequency weapons. Electromagnetic attack mainly has three operational

activities: first is electronic reconnaissance. This is applying various electronic

reconnaissance equipment and means in combination with other reconnaissance means to

collect and ascertain the electromagnetic radiation signals from enemy’s electronic

equipment in order to gather intelligence such as technical parameters, locations and

types, usage and working laws {guilyu} and to provide necessary information for

electromagnetic attack. Second is electromagnetic suppression and jamming. Namely,

this is, in a decisive direction and time, concentrating the use of electronic warfare forcestrengths and instruments, releasing high-powered electromagnetic energy or jamming

signals and conducting forceful suppression and jamming against the enemy’s electronic

equipment so as to render their electronic equipment functionality to be softened, lose

effectiveness, or be paralyzed. Third is electromagnetic deception. This mainly is a

comprehensive application of various electronic techniques and tactical means to provide

false electromagnetic signals to the enemy and to mislead them so as to cause erroneous

recognition and assessment of battlefield posture. Under modern conditions, in reality,

electromagnetic attack has a disguised assault pattern, and to a certain extent, it has

resulted in similar results as firepower assault. Electromagnetic attack is a main
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operational pattern for seizing electromagnetic dominance and after that, for seizing

information dominance.

Network attack refers to the invasive and disruptive activity of applying computer

software technology and other network means against the core of the enemy’s

information systems — the computer and computer network systems. The command and

control system of modern armed forces is actually a large computer network system that

blends together all kinds of information detection, information transmission and

information processing systems into one entity and is connected to civil networks, thus

this objectively creates conditions for implementing network attack. There are two basic

modes for implementing network attack: first is computer virus attack. Mainly, this is

applying various modes to inject computer viruses into the enemy’s computers and

computer networks to attack the enemy’s information system, contaminate useful

information, barrage information channels and destroy system functionality at critical

time opportunities and in critical parts. The second is “hacker” invasion. “Hacking” refers

to computer experts who specialize in advanced code techniques. Through certain nodes

of computer exchange networks, they can hopefully, with effort, enter encrypted level

military or civilian information system and relevant databases. The biggest threat of the

“hackers” to the enemy’s command and control systems is in their ability to directly

modify and use the enemy’s information, resulting in putting the enemy in an extremely

passive and unfavorable place: for example, stealing their information, and controlling

the arteries of their activities; modifying their instruction information and making it

follow one’s own orders; revising critical data in the enemy’s databases; destroying the

enemy’s command center and high-tech weapon systems, etc. Compared with other

patterns of information attack, the objectives of network attack are more direct, more

effective, less losses, and higher degree of concealment. The appearance of network

attack puts information technology-developed countries in two difficult dilemmas. On the

one hand, they must vigorously develop information technology to maintain their military

superiority; but on the other hand, the more developed their information technology, the

more tightly connected with the information of the whole world, which makes the

protection of their information system weaker. Network attack will be one of the most

effective means for armed forces in general terms of weapons and equipment inferiority

to counter a strong military.

Physical destruction refers to employing “hard kill” means such as force-strengths,

firepower and high energy weapons to destroy the enemy’s command headquarters and

command posts as well as the various kinds of hard facilities constituting military

information systems. Compared with “soft kill” means such as electromagnetic attack and

network attack, the strike results of physical destruction of the enemy’s information

systems are permanent unless the enemy re-organizes its command institutions or

rebuilds its information systems. However, the organization and support of physical

destruction operational activities are more complex and the manpower and material

resources and costs are also very big. Based on the nature of the employment means,

physical destruction is divided by mainly three modes: first is force-strength sudden-raid

{tuxi}. This is organizing appropriate force-strengths to penetrate the enemy’s campaign

depth to demolish the enemy military’s command institutions and C4I systems through
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the mode of unorthodox raids or damage the enemy’s information facilities. The most

suited to shoulder the sudden-raid mission are special operations force-units and armed

elements acting in the enemy’s rear. Second is firepower assault. This is using artillery

firepower, aviation force firepower and missiles to destroy the enemy’s information

systems. Campaign firepower under modern conditions possesses characteristics such as

long range, high precision, high lethality, rapid response and small combat losses, and for

this reason, it is the main mode for implementing physical destruction against the

enemy’s information systems. Third is physical destruction by high energy weapons,

especially by precision guidance munitions (including anti-radiation missiles). This is

mainly using electromagnetic pulse weapons, laser weapons, microwave radiation

weapons, and particle beam weapons, etc. Through release of high energy, they puncture

or burn-destroy the enemy’s information systems or the electronic equipment components

within the weapon system and thus causing the loss of work effectiveness.

(2) Information defense

Information defense is an operational activity of using all kinds of means to prevent one’s

own information systems from being gathered and used by the enemy, to protect one’s

information systems from being sabotaged by the enemy, and to maintain one’s own

ability for information control. Information defense is an important operational type for

winning battlefield information warfare and seizing battlefield information dominance.

There are four basic patterns of information defense: electromagnetic protection, network

protection, physical protection, and information intelligence protection.

Electromagnetic protection is the measure and activity adopted to withstand the enemy’s

implementation of electromagnetic attack and to safeguard bringing into play the

effectiveness of one’s own electronic equipment. Its main modes of activity are: the first

is counter-electronic reconnaissance. It prevents the electromagnetic signals of one’s own

information systems from being acquired by the enemy or renders the enemy to be unable

to obtain useful information. The second is counter-electronic jamming. This is adopting

various kinds of tactical and technical means to maximally eliminate or weaken the

harmful effects of the enemy’s electromagnetic attack against one’s own electronic

equipment and safeguard the smooth operation of one’s own information systems. At the

same time, this avoids mistaken entry into the “information trap” set by the enemy’s

electromagnetic signals.

Network protection is the series of measures and activities adopted to defend against the

enemy’s network attack. Its main activities: the first is to defend against virus

contamination; and the second is to defend against “hacker” invasion. This is mainly in

terms of organization, in terms of a system, and in terms of technology, adopting a series

of measures to prevent and weaken the disruption and harm caused by the enemy’s

network attack on one’s own information systems. Because the application of computers

and interactive networks in armed forces information systems and weapons systems has

expanded on a daily basis, while at the same time, because network attack possesses the
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characteristics of being highly dispersed and concealed, therefore, prevention against

network attack is correspondingly difficult. It may be said that network protection is one

of the most important and arduous missions in information defense.

Physical protection is the series of measures and activities to ensure that the physical

entity of one’s own command institutions and information systems are free from

destruction by enemy’s force-strengths and firepower. If divided in terms of the nature of

activities, physical destruction can be divided into two basic types: the first type is

operational quality protection which mainly refers to physical protection conducted with

force-strengths and firepower. For example, this refers to dispatching force-units to

reinforce the defense of command institutions and information systems and frustrate the

enemy’s raid-attacks implemented by force-strengths, or [this refers to] destroying with a

portion of firepower the enemy targets posing a threat to one’s own information systems.

The second type is non-operational quality protection. This mainly refers to adopting

various engineering and technical means and other measures to improve information

system anti-destruct ability and survivability. For example, this is building underground

and mobile command posts, storing backup systems and equipment, establishing

networked information systems with multiple systems, multiple nodes, multiple pathways

and multiple frequencies, and dispersing the deployment {peizhi} of centers, nodes, and

signal radiation sources of information systems. Precision guidance munitions, antiradiation missiles, and high energy weapons pose a big physical threat to information

systems, and they should be the key points of physical protection.

Intelligence information protection is the important intelligence information activities and

measures that do not allow the enemy to obtain one’s own operational intent and

operational capabilities. Its main modes are: anti-reconnaissance, anti-espionage,

prevention of divulging secrets, etc. The meaning of intelligence information protection is

to lower the effectiveness of the enemy’s information systems by not allowing the 

enemy to gain useful intelligence. Not only is this one of the important patterns of

information defense, it is also an indispensable “partner” to information attack. This is

because any excellent stratagem and skillful deception, if separated from the assistance of

intelligence information, would completely lack any hope for success.

Information warfare is a form of highly synthesized pattern of operational activity.

Information attack and information defense as well as the various activities included in

them are mutually dependent, mutually supporting and mutually supplemental and they

constitute a robust operational system {tixi}. Information warfare has an extremely

strong integrated quality, and the absence of any of the various operational types and

activity patterns within it will affect the results of information confrontation and even

lead to defeat in information warfare.
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III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Information Warfare...162

(1) Active attack

Active attack is the most important basic requirement in implementing battlefield

information warfare. It reflects the vitality of attack with initiative {zhudong jin’gong} in

the principle of modern campaign operations. In a definite sense, the technical and

tactical characteristics of battlefield information warfare decide that it emphasizes more

on attack than traditional land, sea, and air warfare.

Seizing battlefield information dominance mainly relies on information attack. The most

effective way to seize information dominance is to destroy and jam (deceive) the

opponent’s information systems and to completely suppress and disrupt their ability to

obtain, transmit, process and use information. Obviously, this objective must undergo

active information attack with initiative in order to be realized.

Information defense can only bring into play its active role by combining with

information attack. Although traditional defensive operations have a certain negative

sense, in the process of defense, however, it can still massively expend the enemy’s

effective strength and directly enable the enemy military to encounter strikes. Information

defense in information warfare does not have this function, and simple information

defense not only is helpless for seizing information superiority but can only lead to the

passive situation of being suppressed, jammed and deceived, and this ultimately loses the

significance of information defense. Thus, in information warfare, it is only through

information defense relying on information attack that one can play an active role in the

struggle for seizing information dominance.

Seizing information dominance more depends on having the benefit of first opportunity.

This is decided in the characteristics of information warfare. First, information attack is

mainly implemented with the modes of long-range warfare and in concealment so as to

more facilitate achieving the sudden quality of attack. Second, the manpower and

material resources expended in information attack are considerably less than traditional

force-strength engagements, so it has a fairly strong sustainability, and once attack starts,

it can be continuously implemented for a long period. Third, the operating of information

systems cannot be separated from the spatial passage through the electromagnetic

spectrum. Therefore, on the battlefield, any operating information system is exposed.

Theoretically speaking, an operating information system cannot conduct complete

protection against the enemy’s information attack. Besides, the physical destruction in

information attack will normally render the defender difficulties in restoring for a longer

period. These characteristics of information warfare demonstrate that the side having the

benefit of first opportunity can more easily or possibly seize battlefield information

dominance in one blow and obtain a fairly larger operational benefit. When speaking in

this sense, the requirement for active attack not only refers to that we must give priority

to attack, but it even more refers to that “the one striking first is stronger.”
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The requirement for carrying out active attack should grasp the following points: first is

to have ample intelligence information safeguarding-support. This is the basis for

implementing effective information attack. Second is concentrating the information

attack strengths and placing resources at the critical occasions and directions. Third is

striving to implement information attack before the enemy and strive for the benefit of

first opportunity. Fourth is implementing uninterrupted information attack and

maintaining and expanding the information superiority already achieved.

(2) Nodal attack

A node refers to a critical part of the armed forces information systems. It is the core of

operational systems {xitong}. Its function and composition decide that it is the most

concentrated portion of the intellect, technology and information in the entirety of

operational systems, but it is also the weakest portion of operational capability and selfprotection capability.

The implementation of nodal attack refers to, as soon as the campaign starts,

concentrating the information attack strengths and directly striking the vital area parts and

critical links of the enemy’s information systems, first to destroy the enemy’s information

systems, and then leading to paralysis of the entirety of the enemy’s operational systems,

and thus striving to obtain a maximum victory with minimum cost.

Directly attacking the enemy’s critical links and vital area parts is a kind of operational

method with highest effectiveness, minimum losses and shortest consumption of time. In

the Gulf War, the multi-national force-units started with striking the critical links and

vital area parts of the Iraqi military’s operational systems, first by paralyzing the Iraqi

military’s information systems, creating very favorable decisive battle conditions, and

then within a very short time, achieving victory in the attack campaign with very small

cost and subsidiary destruction as well as very high operational effectiveness. This

showed a distinctive contrast to past wars.

The main reasons for directly attacking the critical links and vital area parts of the

enemy’s systems in order to be able to obtain the highest operational benefits are: first,

this method truly carries out the “avoiding the strong and attacking the weak” principle of

war, and the foremost selected attack target is the weakest and the most vital area parts in

the enemy’s systems. Secondly, it reflects the pursuit of the operational guidance thought

of “low cost but high effectiveness,” discards the operational methods of successive

attack and layer-by-layer peeling universally used in past wars, and through direct attacks

on the enemy’s “brains, heart and nerve centers” of the enemy’s systems, it causes the

enemy’s powerful force-strength groupings to fall into paralysis and collapse on itself,

thus greatly reducing personnel casualties and campaign duration. Thirdly, nodal attack

demonstrates the optimum combining of weapons and tactics under modern conditions.

As theory and practice have fully proven, directly attacking the enemy’s critical links and

vital area parts have an extremely high value in a modern campaign, and one can say that
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regardless of how one valuates it, its value is not enough. And this is also a fundamental

reason why information warfare has become a new mode of operational activities.

Attacking the critical links and vital area parts of the enemy’s systems should mainly take

the three basic chain links of the enemy’s information systems as the main targets.

Namely, information detection sources, information communications, and information

processing centers. The information detection source is the “eyes and ears” of operational

systems, the information communication channels are the “central nerves” of the

operational systems, and the information processing center is the “brains and heart” of the

operational systems. It is not difficult to see that these three chain links are the critical

links for ensuring the normal operations of the information systems and even the entirety

of the operational systems. Attacking the three basic chain links in the enemy’s

information systems should be a unified and adjusting-coordinated entity. Through the

activities of “blinding,” “paralyzing” and “killing” the enemy’s systems, we create

favorable conditions for decisive quality engagements and we can directly reach the goal

of causing the enemy to surrender.

(3) Synthesis and adjusting-coordination

Synthesis {zonghe} refers to implementing a full-scale {quanmian} information

confrontation with the enemy by as much as possible simultaneously or successively

applying a variety of means for information attack and information defense; adjustingcoordination refers to forming the kind of desirable relationships that are mutually

assistive, mutually enhancing, mutually supplemental, with no conflicts nor dissension,

that are centered on a unified objective between the various activities of campaign

information warfare and between campaign information warfare and other campaign

operational activities. Synthesis and adjusting-coordination are another essential

requirement for campaign information warfare.

Synthesis is a necessary requirement for overall seizing battlefield information

dominance. Only by synthetically applying various means can the enemy’s information

systems encounter full-scale strikes, only then can one’s own information attack and

information defense obtain operational results that are mutual assistive and enhancing,

and only then can one ultimately obtain a full-scale information superiority. For example,

combining a large-area electromagnetic attack and precision physical destruction can

fundamentally disrupt the enemy’s information systems; deception-quality network attack

complemented by deception-quality electromagnetic attack can more easily dupe and

mislead the enemy commanding officers; only an active attack aided by tight defense can

achieve the goal of both disrupting the enemy’s ability for information control and

maintaining one’s own ability for information control. Campaign information warfare is a

full-scale, synthesized information confrontation activity. Individual and dispersed

information weapons, information systems or activities of information confrontation may

have information superiority in a given localized domain, but they cannot have full scale

information superiority on the battlefield. In the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had an

extremely large superiority in electronic weaponry, ground sensors, night vision
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instruments, communication equipment and tactical command and control information

systems, but for the most part, they were employed dispersed or individually used. This

resulted in the U.S. military not being able to seize full-scale information superiority in

the Vietnamese battlefield from start to finish. As attested by practice of war, only by

synthetically applying various information confrontation means centered on a unified

goal and intent, conducting full-scale information attack and suppression against the

enemy and conducting full scale information defense for oneself can we obtain

information superiority of the overall situation quality.

Adjusting-coordination is a “twin brother” to synthesis. The function of synthesis without

adjusting-coordination could be cancelled or even generate negative effects. If synthesis

is said to improve strike intensity and scope by increasing operational means, then

adjusting-coordination improves strike results by rationally ascertaining the relationships

between the various means and eliminating the conflicts and dissension that may be

created between them. Therefore, synthesis and adjusting-coordination have equal

significance. In campaign information warfare, adjusting-coordination is mainly reflected

in two aspects: first is the adjusting-coordination of the internal activities of campaign

information warfare, such as the adjusting-coordination between electromagnetic attack

and psychological attack, the adjusting-coordination between “soft” kill and “hard”

strike, and the adjusting-coordination between information attack and information

defense. Second is the adjusting-coordination between information warfare and other

basic operational activities in a campaign. These adjusting-coordination relationships

mainly are: the adjusting-coordination between campaign information warfare and

campaign firepower assault; the adjusting-coordination between campaign information

warfare and land, sea, air, and space engagements; the adjusting-coordination between

information warfare and special operations; and the adjusting-coordination between

information warfare and the assembly, delivery and bushu disposition of the campaign

large formation. As attested by recent local wars under informationized conditions, from

the perspective of the basic content of operations, a modern campaign is actually a

synthesized application of information warfare, firepower warfare, and land, sea, air and

space engagements. These most basic operational activities have already become an

inseparable organic integrated entity, and whether or not there is a desirable adjustingcoordination relationship between them bears much importance to the victory of the

entire campaign.

(4) Tight protection

Information attack and information defense are the dispensable operational modes of

information warfare.

Since active attack is the most important basic requirement for implementing campaign

information warfare, this inevitably is a principle both sides mutually adhere. This,

therefore, decides that at the same time when one’s own side is implementing information

attack, one will encounter the enemy’s information attack. Hence, at the same time when
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one is actively implementing information attack, one must also attach importance to

accomplish tight information defense.

In information warfare, when comparing information defense to information attack, the

degree of difficulty in its [information defense] organization and implementation is

greater and its missions are more strenuous. This is because: first, the extensive reliance

by armed forces information systems on electronic technologies and computer and

network technologies is the most exposed and vulnerable part in the entirety of

operational systems. Secondly, the strike targets selected in information attack are

frequently only a certain number of points, while information defense has to defend the

entire system, and it is an all-aspect protection of the entire information system. It could

fall into a very delicate situation when facing information attack which is becoming

manifold and synthesized everyday. Thirdly, comparing the activities of information

attack with traditional operational activities, [information attack activities] possess even

more sudden quality and better concealment quality, and furthermore, the latent threats

on this kind of attack are more difficult to assess, early warning is difficult to achieve,

and the results of defense are difficult to predict, thereby increasing the difficulty of

defense. As shown by the characteristics of information defense, successfully

accomplishing tight information defense, protecting the normal operating of one’s own

information systems, maintaining the one’s own capability for information control, and

ensuring that one’s own important intelligence and information isn’t obtained by the

enemy all similarly have very important significance for seizing information dominance.

The scope touched upon by information defense is very broad; therefore one must be

tight and have key points and not leave the enemy an opportunity to take advantage.

Section 2: Campaign Firepower Assault...167

Campaign firepower assault is the synthesized firepower strike jointly implemented by

the aviation forces, artillery forces and missile forces of all participating services under

the assisting-support of information warfare. The firepower used in campaign firepower

assault is mainly the aviation firepower, artillery force firepower (includes naval ship

artillery firepower) and missile firepower that the campaign commander directly controls

and is able to push forward and affect the campaign progress. Thus, firepower warfare

belongs at the campaign level. The main goal of firepower warfare is to control

battlefield space, to destroy the enemy’s war potential and important infrastructure, to

demolish and paralyze the opponent’s operational system {tixi}, and to weaken the

opponent’s operational capability in order to create conditions for decisive quality

engagements or independently achieve specified campaign and strategic goals.

The effectiveness of modern campaign firepower has greatly improved, causing the status

of firepower warfare in campaign operations sharply ascend. This is mainly manifested in

firepower warfare having become a relatively independent phase of a modern campaign;

not only does it create favorable conditions for campaign engagements and combat, but it

can also directly push forward and affect or even decide the progress and conclusion of a
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campaign. For example, in the 42-day Gulf War, the U.S. military conducted 38 days of

campaign firepower assault, accounting for 90 percent of the progress of the campaign,

and creating very favorable conditions for ground engagements; the “DESERT FOX”

operation and the War of Kosovo were completely constituted by air assault and long

range firepower strike activities. This illustrates that campaign firepower warfare has

already shaken the shackles of its subordinate position of being attached to ground

engagements in a traditional war and has become a basic operational activity directly

pushing forward and affecting campaign progress and conclusion and even being able to

independently accomplish specified campaign and strategic missions.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Firepower Assault...168

(1) Large in-depth quality

Modern campaign firepower systems already possess the capability to simultaneously

strike the enemy’s full depth on the battlefield, which is a change from the past of

sequential firepower strikes from front to back and close to far. Now, at the start of a

campaign, the attacking side can strike any part of the enemy’s full depth, assault the

enemy’s command and communication systems, traffic hubs, energy facilities, and

important military works production bases, etc., and paralyze the entirety of the enemy’s

military systems and operational systems {xitong}. The greater in-depth quality of

modern campaign firepower has caused the centuries-old clearly defined divisions of

boundaries on the battlefield between the operational front, the engagement zones, and

rear areas to start to become fuzzy. Under modern conditions, operational tanks on the

front engagement lines and the important strategic targets in the battlefield depths can

both be assaulted simultaneously by campaign firepower.

(2) Full course quality

The full course quality is mainly reflected in the firepower of a modern campaign being

able to penetrate the full course of campaign operations based on needs-requirements. In

the Gulf War, from the first laser guided bomb dropped overhead Baghdad on the Iraqi

telecommunication building, the comprehensive firepower assault on the Iraqi military by

the multi-national forces nearly never stopped. In the air campaign, large-scale, highintensity comprehensive firepower assault continued round-the-clock for 38 days to

greatly weaken the Iraqi army‘s overall operational capability. During the ground attack,

armed helicopters and artillery directly supported the attack activity of the ground forces.

At anytime, there were fixed-wing planes standing-by in the air to wait for call to support

ground operations; therefore, they strongly supported the ground troops to accomplish

their objectives with high efficiency and low consumption. Firepower assault in the full

course was made the main means with maximum advantage of the effect of suddenness to

continuously keep strike pressure on the enemy.
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(3) High effectiveness quality

The high effectiveness quality of modern firepower warfare is mainly reflected in: first is

being able to quickly achieve the specified operational goal in a short time. For example,

in the US military’s air raid on Libya, “ELDORADO CANYON” operation, they only

used 11 minutes to drop 150 tons of bombs and accurately destroying five designated

targets and accomplished all other objectives, except killing al-Gaddafi. The actual

operational time spent by Israel on the strike of the Iraqi atomic reactor, air raid of the

PLO headquarters, and destruction of 19 Syrian air defense position in the Becca Valley

was only 2, 3 and 6 minutes, respectively. Ground force-strength engagements cannot be

compared with this high effectiveness quality of campaign firepower. Second is the very

high destructive lethality on targets. The great improvement of weapon and equipment’s

kill lethality and hit precision has enormously enhanced the destructive lethality of

campaign firepower on targets. According to relevant data reports, the yield of a one-time

bomb drop by three B-1Bs is equivalent to 1.2 times the total volley fire of a whole

Soviet motorized infantry division in the 1980s, and one heavy bomb precision guidance

bomb can produce the effectiveness that could be reached by the bombs dropped by

hundreds of planes in WWII. Thirdly, one can greatly reduce personnel casualties.

Especially during implementation of beyond visual range strikes, the personnel casualty

rate can be even lower. Not only that, the damage results of campaign firepower can

create conditions to tremendously lower the casualty rates in ground attack.

(4) Diverse quality

The diverse quality feature of campaign firepower includes three connotations: first is the

diverse quality of strike means. The diversification in modern weapons and equipment

development {fazhan} has allowed for modern campaign firepower to form an integrated

multi-dimensional battlefield of land, sea, air, space and electromagnetism, [allowed for]

the comprehensive application of aviation firepower, missile firepower and artillery

firepower combined with high-, medium- and low-altitudes and long-, intermediate- and

close-ranges, and the diversified strike means of dual “soft-hard.” The most outstanding

feature of a modern firepower strike is the close coordination of electronic suppression

and firepower strike, which plays a critical role in attaining campaign victory. Next is the

diverse quality of strike targets. The diverse quality of strike targets is the natural result

of the diverse quality of firepower strike means. As the degree of restriction of battlefield

environment on the modern campaign has already been greatly lowered, one can strike

various different qualities of targets under various conditions according to campaign

operational needs-requirements. Third is diverse quality of styles {shiyang}. Under

modern conditions, the styles for implementing fire strikes have obviously increased,

such as: the jointly implemented joint air raid by firepower strike strengths of all services

and arms; high-performance operational aircraft for implementing long-range raids;

land-, sea-, and air-based campaign tactical missiles for implementing beyond visual

range strikes; precision guidance weapons for implementing nodal strikes for the goal of

“paralyzing” the enemy’s operational systems; and ground artillery strengths in the lead

for implementing large-scale artillery warfare, etc. The diverse quality of modern
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campaign firepower gives the application of firepower warfare to have very large

flexibility and adaptability, as not only can one complete even more campaign

operational missions but with the use of firepower warfare, one achieve some operational

goals that cannot be achieved with other operational patterns.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Firepower Assault...170

In a modern campaign, there are three basic patterns of campaign firepower assault,

namely, air raid, missile assault and artillery assault

(1) Air raid

Air raid is firepower assault from the air implemented against ground (sea surface)

targets with aviation forces as the main body. It played a brand new role in the First

World War, and was expansively employed in the Second World War to become an

indispensable part of war. Since the 1970s, the development of aviation technology,

especially the wide military application of high and new science and technology led by

the information revolution, has enabled air force weapons to complete the transformation

from “mechanized operational platforms” to “informationized operational platforms” and

is gradually moving toward “intelligent operational platforms.” Not only have the types

of aviation munitions remarkably increased, but we have also experienced going from

“not guidable after firing” [unguided] to “fire and guide” [guided] through “fire and no

need to guide,” [fire and forget] and is gradually developing toward complete

informationization of munitions. The leap forward jump in quality of aviation weapons

and munitions has significantly enhanced the killing and destructive results of air raids,

thereby tremendously elevating the position of air raid in war. As fully attested by the

practice of recent wars under informationized conditions, the air raid is a basic

operational pattern in campaign firepower assault and it has a very important role in

attaining victory in an attack campaign to the point of directly determining the victory or

defeat in a war.

Due to the high level of development in air operational strengths, the modern air raid

already possesses the capability for implementing strikes against multiple targets with a

variety of operational means and in full depth, at all altitudes, in all aspects, and in all

weather. The methods for implementing air raids have also certainly had revolutionary

changes as it this was taking place. In a modern campaign, the main modes of air raids

are:

The joint air raid refers to an air firepower assault jointly implemented with multiple

services, multiple aircraft types and multiple aircraft group formations. The operational

task organization {zuozhan biancheng} of a joint air raid is normally composed of air

early warning command aircraft (formation), escort cover formation, target assault

formation, suppression of air defense weapons formation, electronic warfare formation,

air refueling formation, and air rescue formation, etc. They form with the early warning

aircraft as the command center, with the target assault formation as the main assault
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strength, and with other formations functioning as assisting-support, cover and

safeguarding-support strengths to form a complete, organizationally matched and rational

operational integrated whole. Because the joint air raid gathers the reconnaissance,

command, jamming and destruction into one entity, the collective functions of air

operations is complemented and enhanced. Thus, the joint air raid’s penetration

capability is strong, its assault results are good, its combat losses are few, and it is the

main mode of modern air raid operations. It is worth pointing out that in the Gulf War,

the joint air raid has developed from the small joint [ness] of the various aircraft types of

the single service of the Air Force to a large joint [ness] through joint participation of the

Air Force, Navy, Army and missile force-units using various types of weapons and

equipment (including various space systems) and operational strengths. It foretells that

the large joint air raid of air, ground, sea, space in the modern offensive operation will

become the basic mode of air raids.

Long-range raids refer to aviation weapons taking off from bases distant to the theater,

undergoing a long distance air maneuver, and after arriving at the effective range of their

air-launched munitions, conducting air assault against the enemy’s targets. Due to the

unprecedented improvement of the flight range of modern aviation weapons, especially

under the assisting- and safeguarding-support of refueling aircraft and space positioning

systems, some already have “global reach and global operations” capabilities, and this

makes long-range raid a reality. During the U.S. “ELDORADO CANYON” operation, F111 fighter-bombers took off from the British Isles to long range raid Libya, along the

way refueling six times for a round trip of 10,380 km. During the Gulf War, B-52

bombers based over 10,000 km from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti battlefield on American soil

implemented international maneuver for a round trip flight of 35 hours to conduct air

strikes against Iraqi depth targets joining with aviation weapons positioned in theater and

fully demonstrating the capability of its air force for long-range raid. The appearance of

the operational mode of beyond visual range long range air raid was a breakthrough in

the traditional battlefield view. This manifested to the greatest extent the principle of

dispersed bushu disposition and concentrated use of air strengths, greatly extending the

depth of air strikes, amplifying the suddenness of air raid operations and improving the

survivability of air strengths.

Stealth sudden-raids {yinxing tuxi} refers to implementing stealth penetration with

stealth combat bomber aircraft utilizing their characteristics of being difficult to be

detected by opponent air defense early warning systems to penetrate the enemy’s

campaign and strategic depths and suddenly conducting air strikes against enemy vital

area targets. The superior quality of stealth sudden-raids are: first, the stealth sudden-raid

does not need to open up a penetration corridor on the enemy’s tight aerial defense line,

which is that it can directly penetrate enemy’s defense depth to implement air assault.

Therefore, it breaks the traditional mode of the aerial linear battlefield, causing the

enemy’s multi-layered air defense strike rings composed of air defense fighters, ground

to air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to lose function, thereby greatly enhancing the

sudden quality of air raids. Second, stealth sudden-raids possess the capability of directly

attacking the most critical parts in the enemy’s air defense system that are the most

tightly protected, so that one can one can disintegrate or even paralyze the enemy’s entire
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air defense system with one blow. Third, stealth sudden-raids can greatly simplify the

operational task organization of the air raid strengths and maximally reduce the amount

of combat losses. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military’s first air raid used 30 F-117As

stealth combat bombers, and under the conditions of Iraqis not being aware of anything,

directly attacked critical targets in Baghdad, effectively achieving the sudden quality of

the air raid which resulted in the Iraqi air defense systems suffering serious destruction at

the very start and losing the capability to organize any resistance. In the entire air raid

operations, there were over 2,000 sorties of stealth aircraft. In the absence of any support

from electronic warfare aircraft and other escort aircraft, many times they penetrated

Baghdad’s airspace with the densest air defense firepower without a single loss. It can be

anticipated that along with the increase in the number of stealth aircraft, stealth suddenraids will become one of the main modes of modern air raid warfare.

(2) Missile assault

Missile assault is a new kind of firepower warfare pattern using guided munitions newly

developed since the 1970s.

Along with the development of precision guidance technology and weapons, the missile

has become the main combat weapon in modern firepower warfare. The missile has

superior qualities that cannot be compared with other weapon. It has strong long-range

capabilities, high penetration effectiveness, fast activity tempo, good strike results and

low combat consumption; thus it is the campaign commander’s main firepower club for

pushing forward and affecting the campaign course. The missile assault has also become

one of the main patterns of firepower warfare. The combination of the missile with

remote sensing technology and electronic warfare suppression technology has formed a

new firepower assault pattern. The missile has fundamentally changed the nature of

traditional firepower warfare and it has also generated a series of transformations to the

methods of campaign operations.

Missile assault is normally a style of firepower assault jointly implemented by various

services. Division based on the spatial relationship of each service carrying out the

missile assault, the main modes of missile assault are:

Ground-to-ground assault mainly refers to firing of campaign missiles from land surface

to attack important enemy land surface targets. This pattern is the Army’s main mode for

implementing missile assault. Ground-to-ground missiles have the characteristics of long

strike distances, strong penetration capability, nimble ballistic maneuver, concealed and

dispersed firing positions, simple and fast operational process, little meteorological

effect, and easy to achieve suddenness. One long-range precision guidance missile can

replace depth attack results of several modern operational aircraft and it has a very high

cost-effectiveness ratio. Thus, the ground-to-ground assault is one of the main modes for

implementing depth strikes against targets deep in the enemy’s rear.
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Ground (ship)-to-air assault mainly refers to firing missiles from land surface or sea

surface ships to attack the enemy’s air targets. This mode is the main mode for

implementing air defense operations by the Army and Navy, for complementing the Air

Force’s seizing of air dominance or for implementing a sea and air blockade. Combining

of modern ground (ship)-to-air missile with AAA can constitute a high-, medium-, lowaltitude, and long-, intermediate-, and close range, all-aspect multi-layered three

dimensional air defense firepower net which is capable of achieving optimum anti-air

strike results.

Air-to-ground (ship) assault refers to firing missiles from an aviation flying craft to attack

the enemy’s land surface or sea targets. This mode is the main mode for aviation forces

participating in the campaign firepower assault. The air-to-ground (ship) assault

possesses characteristics such as broad operational space, good missile launch platform

maneuver quality, high precision in adjacent airspace assault, and strong adaptability to

the assault target. It also has stronger strike capability against strategic and tactical targets

as well as both fixed and moving targets. In particular, it has a good strike results against

moving targets deep in the enemy’s depth, and in this respect, the ground-to-ground

assault pattern cannot match this. The emergence of the air-to-ground (ship) missile

assault mode has caused an important change to take place in ground (sea surface)

operations by air strengths. In the past, the method of aviation weapons penetrating the

enemy’s anti-air defenses, then entering overhead the target and using aviation bombs to

conduct adjacent airspace bombing has gradually been replaced with the mode of long

distance launching of missiles mainly outside the enemy’s “defense rings.” The massive

employment of the long distance launching of missile method has greatly improved the

attack capability of Air Force strengths against ground targets as well as the transport

aircraft’s survivability.

Air-to-air assault refers to the firing of missiles from aviation flying craft and attacking

the enemy’s air targets. This mode is the main operational method for the aviation force

to wipe out the enemy’s air strengths and seize air dominance under modern conditions.

The assault characteristics of air-to-air assault are long distance engagements, fast attack

speeds, and high precision. At the same time, there are fairly high requirements on the

maneuver capabilities of operational aircraft, onboard radar detection systems, fire

control systems and missile performance. Along with extension of air-to-air missile

ranges and improvement of guidance performance, the air-to-air assault mode has

changed the traditional mode of giving priority to conducting tail attacks and close range

combat with reliance on aerial guns and close-range missiles between aircraft engaged in

air combat, and replaced it with the mode of giving priority to beyond visual range air

combat.

Ground-to-ship assault refers to firing missiles to attack the enemy’s sea surface targets

from land surfaces, and it is one of the main modes for the Army to implement firepower

assault against sea surface targets. It is mainly used to complement the Navy’s

implementation of seizing sea dominance operations, control important strategic straits
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and waterways, protect one’s own sea lanes of communications and disrupt the enemy’s

sea lanes of communications.

Ship (submarine)-to-ground assault mainly refers to firing missiles from sea surface

(underwater) to attack the enemy’s land surface targets, and it is one of the main modes

for the Navy to implement firepower assault towards the land. Ship to ground assault

mainly employs cruise missiles and submarine launched missiles, and its attack distances

are far, precision high, lethality strong; especially the concealed nature and sudden

quality of submarine-launched attacks is for the most part higher than that of other

missile assault modes. Therefore, a ship-to-ground assault has a very strong penetration

capability and depth attack capability, and it is an important mode of modern missile

assault. Under modern conditions, the Navy emphasizes more its support to land attack

operations in order to fully bring the integrated might of the all-services joint operation

into play. This foretells that in future campaign operations giving priority to the joint

campaign, the ship-to-ground assault mode will have a more and more important

position.

(3) Artillery assault

Artillery assault mainly refers to army artillery firepower assault, and at the same time, it

also includes naval surface ship gun firepower assault. Here, we expound with key points

on army artillery firepower assault. Artillery is the main firepower assault strength of

army operations. In WWII, it had the complimentary name of “god of war.” Under

modern conditions, despite the fact that the firepower of air force and missiles has had

huge development and is expansively applied on the battlefield, artillery firepower,

however, still holds an important position in campaign operations and is an indispensable

component of firepower warfare.

First, artillery firepower is the assault strength with strongest sustained operational

capability in campaign firepower. Although the modern air force has the capability of

operating in night and complex meteorological conditions, to a certain extent, however, it

is still subject to the restriction of climate, capability of flight endurance, and pilot

physical limitations, plus the limited number and high cost of strategic, tactical missiles;

therefore, it cannot keep a long-time and continuous firepower assault. Artillery guns

have a large quantity, abundant ammunition, and low manufacturing cost. At the same

time, artillery operations have a low requirements for battlefield conditions, can be easily

operated and have little physical consumption from the operators; thus, they have a

stronger capability for sustained operations when compared with other types of

firepower. Second, artillery firepower has the fastest speed of response. Modern guns

have materialized integration of “reconnaissance-firepower” to enable the artillery gun

system to directly receive and process the information on a target provided by all types of

reconnaissance and tracking, telemetry and control systems to automatically complete

command and launch missions at real-time or near real-time. In the Gulf War, when the

Iraqi artillery fired one shot, it was immediately responded to by the U.S. forces with 5-6

shots. Claimed by an Iraqi battalion commander, his artillery guns had the right of firing
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only one shot as the opposite side would pour their gunfire like a downfall after that shot.

This speed of response is incomparable by other firepower. Third, artillery has excellent

accompanying support capability. Modern guns have basically achieved automation and

motorization. Tracked self-propelling guns have the same cross-country capability as

ground units to attack simultaneously with them, and at the same time, they, as a

component of the operational formation, have the convenience to coordinate with them;

thus, they can provide timely and reliable support firepower to ground units. In addition,

along with the improvement of their performance and increase of their quantity, artillery

already possesses the capability to independently conduct fire warfare. Due to the

extension of its firing range and improvement of its precision, as well as increase of its

ammunition and enhancement of its power, artillery has elevated its attacking capability

from general suppression in the past to the degree of directly destroying enemy targets

and also being able to carry out various firepower assault missions. The strike targets of

artillery warfare have been expanded from general battlefield military targets to enemy

strategic targets of war potential. Thus, in order to accomplish a specified strategic and

tactical goal, artillery can not only complement aviation forces and missile forces to

implement firepower assault, but it can also independently carry out firepower warfare.

The main modes of modern firepower warfare are:

Intensive assault refers to concentrating a superiority of artillery firepower to implement

an intensive assault that is high-density, powerful, sudden, and fierce against important

targets (normally targets with a fairly large area shape) in the enemy’s defensive depth,

striving to heavily damage the enemy. The intensive assault is one of the main modes of

firepower warfare, and it normally generates fairly good firepower assault results.

Firepower interdiction refers to establishing several thick firepower screens in the

enemy’s campaign depth or implementing rapid long distance mine-laying with medium

and long range artillery firepower in order to split the enemy’s campaign bushi

disposition, seal off the localized battlefield, interdict the moving forward of their tank

groups or follow-up force-units and reserve forces, and cut off its logistics supply.

Firepower point-uprooting {拔点 badian} refers to implementing a resolute

extermination quality strike against vital area targets within the enemy’s campaign depth

that play a core and pillar role with concentrated, accurate and fierce artillery firepower

in hope of attaining the effect of shaking their campaign bushi disposition by uprooting

one or several points. Firepower point-uprooting can thoroughly cause damage to the

struck target or even completely lose its operational capability.

Firepower counterattack refers to fully utilizing the characteristic of rapid artillery

firepower response and immediately conducting prompt and forceful counterattack

operations when the enemy has already implemented firepower assault or firepower raids

in order to destroy and suppress the enemy’s firepower strengths and safeguard one’s

own operational activities.
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Firepower blockade mainly refers to implementing uninterrupted firepower blockade

against targets in the enemy’s depth such as transportation thoroughfares, bridges, ports,

piers, and airfields with medium and long range artillery firepower in order to cut off and

control the enemy rear transport, stop the enemy force-strength maneuver, destroy the

enemy’s military infrastructure, and disrupt and weaken the enemy’s integrated

operational capability.

Firepower feint mainly refers to skillfully using artillery firepower to create false

appearances, to cause misconception by the enemy or to lure the enemy to give in order

to create favorable battlefield posture.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Firepower Assault...176

(1) Unified control

Unified control refers to the campaign command organ’s implementation of command

and adjusting-coordination for the firepower strike strengths of all participating services

and arms that can be brought into play at the campaign-level to ensure maximally

bringing into play the synthesized strike effectiveness of the campaign firepower systems.

The necessity for implementing unified control mainly lies with: first, the implementation

of unified control is able to maximally concentrate the employment of campaign

firepower resources and maximally bring strike effectiveness with limited firepower

resources into play. Second, campaign firepower assault is a synthesized operational

activity mode implemented together with multiple services and arms and multiple

weapon systems, so through integrated guihua planning, one can conduct unified control

of campaign firepower systems, seek the optimum firepower composition mode so that

various firepower assault systems form an integrated effect that is mutually remediable

and mutually strengthening, and at the same time, [one can] form a multi-layered, multiecheloned firepower strike bushu disposition with multiple dimensions and multiple

layers against the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition. Third, one can fully bring into

play the integrated role of strategic- and campaign-level reconnaissance systems. Because

a campaign firepower assault’s strike precision is high, its delivery range is far, the

number of assault targets are many, and its operational duration is long, the requirement

for obtaining strike target intelligence and information in real-time and near real-time is

very high, so it is difficult for the reconnaissance strengths of any single service and

subordinate campaign large formation to satisfy the intelligence support of its own

participating campaign firepower assault. Implementing unified control benefits the

synthesized use of the strategic and campaign reconnaissance systems and brings into

play the integrated strengths of high level reconnaissance systems, thus maximally

ensuring the needs of campaign firepower assault for intelligence information.

In order to achieve unified control of campaign firepower assault, one should mainly

grasp the following three points: first, one should establish a unified and synthesized

firepower adjusting-coordination institution and from the perspective of organizing the
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mechanism, ensure the implementation of unified control for the application of various

campaign firepower strengths. Second, by adopting the flexible command and control

mode of a combined centralized and dispersed command, not only ensure that the entirety

of the campaign firepower systems is able to form a pooled strength by centering on the

general campaign intent, but also allow all firepower systems to be able to maintain a full

initiative nature and an agile response capability. Third is to formulate a thorough

firepower coordination plan, establish an effective firepower coordination mechanism,

and through stipulating and controlling the coordination actions of various firepower

systems, achieve unified control of the entirety of campaign firepower systems.

(2) Ensure key points

Ensuring key points refers to concentrating the main campaign firepower assault strengths

and ensuring the implementation of key point strikes against the enemy.

Concentrating the main strengths and implementing key point strikes against the enemy is

a traditional operational principle. However, due to limitations encountered in the level of

weapons development, in past wars, carrying out the principle of key point strike

frequently had fairly large restrictions because many important targets were placed in the

opponent’s campaign and strategic depths and were too far to reach or will tire troops and

waste time; they were hard to quickly destroy. Under modern conditions, campaign

firepower has had unprecedented development in strike precision, delivery range and

lethality and has given armed forces the capability to conduct strikes against any

important target in the enemy’s depth. Therefore, one can even more effectively carry out

the principle of key point strike while the advantageous qualities of key point strike are

even more amply manifested.

To ensure key point strike in campaign firepower assault, one should mainly grasp the

following points: first is concentrating firepower in the main direction. In operations

under modern conditions, the enemy campaign bushi disposition is dispersed, the targets

forming threats against us have greatly increased, the reliance and needs of the offensive

campaign on firepower have obviously grown, and therefore, we should even more

resolutely concentrate our main strengths in the main direction and bravely economize

firepower in the secondary directions. In a modern campaign, the concentration of

integrated firepower is no longer formed from a dense bushu disposition, but mainly

through forming the implementation of “maneuver of ballistics.” Second is concentrating

firepower at critical time occasions {guanjian shijie}. The operations of critical time

occasions are able to produce major effects on the campaign progress and therefore one

must concentrate the use of firepower. Worth pointing out is that under modern

conditions, the first assault of the campaign firepower assault has important significance.

The first strike normally has a fairly large sudden quality, is able to obtain fairly large

assault results, and is able to immediately produce an important effect on subsequent

operational activities. Therefore, the first assault should maximally concentrate superior

firepower, strive to paralyze the enemy’s operational systems in one blow, and attain

battlefield initiative as soon as possible so as to create conditions for subsequent
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operations. Third is concentrating firepower on important targets. Important targets refer

to targets that pose the biggest threat against us and affect the enemy’s entirety of

operational systems and operational capabilities the most. These targets are mainly: the

enemy’s information systems and command systems {xitong}, high-tech weapon

systems, air defense systems, important harbors, airfields and traffic hubs, and the

enemy’s force strength groupings. In the situation of limited campaign firepower

resources, one should determine the priority order of strike targets, concentrate firepower

sequencing and assault the most important target; if we strive for one batch, then ensure

we thoroughly destroy one batch, and thus immediately generate a positive effect on

campaign progress.

(3) Full course suppression

Full course suppression refers to implementing continuous firepower strikes against the

enemy over the full course of campaign implementation, maintaining strong firepower

suppression and continuously destroying newly emerged or revived targets all the way

until the enemy’s operational system {tixi} is thoroughly paralyzed. Full course

suppression does not refer to uninterrupted continuity in the astronomical sense of time,

but it refers to, through continuous firepower strikes, not permitting the enemy to recover

and form organized resistance.

In past offensive operations, due to the restrictions of the level of weapons and equipment

development, one had no way of implementing full course suppression as firepower

normally appeared in the state of attacking in daytime and resting at night, firepower

assault might also be greatly reduced in inclement weather, and the enemy took

advantage of night darkness or poor climate to organize its defense, thereby weakening

the effect of campaign firepower assault and extending the course of the campaign. Under

modern conditions, campaign firepower has the capability to make all-weather, all-time

and round-the-clock strike a reality. Besides, because armed forces have enhanced their

mobility without precedence, the force-units who have not been killed in the enemy’s

campaign and strategic depths can in an extremely short time enter a designated

operational area and restore the original campaign bushi disposition; an armed forces’

capabilities to protect, camouflage and revive targets have also been greatly strengthened,

so some important targets have very strong survivability. For example, in the Gulf War,

despite the multi-national force units having absolute firepower superiority and

concentrating their full effort to seek and destroy Iraq’s “SCUD” missile launchers, they

were still unable to achieve all expected goals. It is evident to see that only by

implementing uninterrupted full course firepower suppression against the enemy can one

ensure achieving firepower assault results and creating favorable conditions for

subsequent decisive quality engagements.

To achieve the requirements for full course suppression, first, we should conduct ultra

conventional reinforcement of the theater and large formations carrying out the offensive

campaign so as to ensure that there are sufficient firepower resources for implementing

continuous strikes against the enemy. Second, we must unify-plan the application of
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firepower resources, thoroughly organize the planning of firepower assault activities,

rationally select targets, [rationally] allocate missions, [rationally] differentiate batches

{pici}, [rationally] control tempo, [rationally] grasp intensity {qiangdu}, do not

unilaterally pursue the extendibility {yanxuxing} of, and strive not let the enemy have a

way to recover from receiving uninterrupted strikes. Third, we must, within the allowable

scope of the physical conditions of operational personnel and the technical conditions of

weapon systems, improve the employment intensity {qiangdu} of campaign firepower

systems. On the basis of needs-requirements and what is possible, continuously reallocate and reorganize groupings for limited campaign firepower and implement restrikes so as to seek to amply bring into play the effectiveness of campaign firepower

resources. Fourth, strengthen reconnaissance against strike targets and [strengthen]

estimates of assault results, ensure that we have definite targets, reduce duplicating

strikes, and avoid creating waste of firepower resources. Fifth, successfully accomplish

the various operational and logistical equipment supports and ensure that campaign

firepower systems are able to receive effective operational support and have sufficient

operational materials. [Ensure] damaged weapons and equipment are able to receive

prompt repairs and operational personnel are able to obtain prompt replenishment so as to

enhance a sustained operational capability.

(4) Rapid maneuver

Rapid maneuver refers to utilizing superior qualities of rapid, flexible and beneficial

firepower maneuver to rapidly and flexibly shift and concentrate firepower in the

campaign firepower assault to strike the enemy without losing time opportunity.

Under modern conditions, the rapid maneuver of firepower is having a more and more

important position in operations. Modern operational theory emphasizes the 

concentration of firepower and only when absolutely necessary to concentrate forcestrengths, so the rapid maneuver of firepower maneuver is a necessary means for

achieving firepower concentration. Transparency has increased on the modern battlefield

and it is very difficult to conceal the intention of force strength maneuver; consequently,

sudden quality of a modern campaign is mainly formed through the rapid maneuver

quality of firepower strike. Rapid firepower maneuver can make a flexible response to the

full depth posture of the battlefield, and it can promptly seize combat opportunity so as to

quickly control the development of the battlefield posture or alter the strength ratio in a

given direction. For example, according to Russian military calculations, an advancing

motorized infantry division will undergo a seven minute assault of 50-70 tactical fighter

aircraft and suffer 40-50% losses, which is almost on the verge of a total loss of its

operational capability. Rapid firepower maneuver can even better adapt to the

requirements for the high speed quality of modern warfare and thus it is more beneficial

than force strength maneuver for seizing battlefield initiative.

The factors for ensuring campaign firepower rapid maneuver are mainly: real-time or

near-real-time intelligence information support; establishing a reliable and flexible

synthesized system of implementing command, control and communications for
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campaign firepower; ensuring close and accurate coordination between the campaign

firepower systems and between the campaign firepower systems and the maneuver

operational and information warfare systems; and having a grasp of the specified

campaign firepower reserve strengths.

(5) Tight protection

A modern war will first be a contest of fierce firepower between two sides engaged in

battle with the campaign firepower systems as the important targets in the assault of both

sides. Therefore, it is necessary to tightly protect the campaign firepower systems,

especially the high-tech weapon systems, to improve their battlefield survivability. Only

then can one guarantee the smooth conduct of the campaign firepower assault and only

then can one gain victory in campaign operations. Maintaining campaign firepower

system survivability and combat power under the conditions of massive employment of

high-tech weapons and equipment by the enemy has become the basic content of a

modern campaign. The basic measures for implementing tight protection of campaign

firepower systems are summed up mainly in three areas: first, actively seek and destroy

the enemy’s firepower assault systems. This is wiping out the enemy first with active

initiative attack activities or suppressing the enemy’s firepower systems, especially the

biggest threat high tech weapon systems. In a contest of firepower systems, the side that

first shoots down the other side’s assaulting weapons will gain the initiative, and will thus

be more able to effectively preserve themselves. Other than the necessary firepower

assault, one should also widely use methods such as force strength raid-attacks, special

strikes, and guerrilla sabotage, etc. to strike the enemy’s firepower systems. Second is to

establish a robust air defense system. The biggest threat on campaign firepower systems

is the modern air raid; therefore, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive air defense

system {tixi} in the entire theater, to concentrate the air and ground air defense weapons

of all services and arms in the entire theater, and to maximally crush the air raid activities

or weaken the enemy’s air raid results. Third is to adopt effective early preventive

measures, for example: implement skillful camouflage; fully utilize terrain and

fortifications and disperse the positioning of firepower systems; and strengthen the

warning and defense of the firepower systems.

Section 3: Campaign Maneuver...180

Maneuver is the activities of shifting force strengths and weapons and moving firepower

in an organized manner in order to seize the initiative or form a favorable posture.

Campaign maneuver is maneuver conducted by the armed forces to achieve a specific

campaign goal. Not only is it the main content of campaign activities, it is also an

important way to seize initiative position, to create favorable posture, to achieve sudden

quality of the campaign, or even to gain campaign victory.

Maneuver is one of the basic activities of a campaign. Basically speaking, a campaign is

conducted and accomplished in uninterrupted maneuver. Napoleon once said, “A

marching army is precisely warfare,” “the talent and ability of warfare is precisely the
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talent and ability of movement,” and “an armed forces adept in movement will gain

victory.” Campaign maneuver is not only the movement of force strengths and weapons

before the battle, but it is even more prominently manifested within campaign operations.

The penetration, thrust, cutting off, outflanking, envelopment, pursuit and retreat in a

campaign are all specific manifestations of maneuver. It may be said that there is no

campaign if there is no maneuver, and maneuver is the most important operational

activity for constructing a campaign.

Maneuver is the main way in war to seize initiative and shake off the shackles of

passivity. On the battlefield, the crux for seizing initiative is to form superiority of

strengths, and superiority can only be formed through maneuver; a campaign is particular

about seeking to locally create momentum, but creating momentum cannot be separated

from maneuver; a campaign normally has many operational missions, many operational

directions and many operational phases, and maneuver is the basic means for

accomplishing the various transitions; battlefield situations are rapidly changing, the

armed forces frequently fall into passivity, and maneuver is again the main method to

shake off the shackles of an unfavorable position and to deal with unexpected situations.

Maneuver is an important means for achieving suddenness. Maneuver can result in an

armed force to appear at a time and place the enemy did not expect and strike the enemy

to catch them unaware; maneuver can move, disperse and tire the enemy so as to create

favorable conditions for us to implement sudden attack; and maneuver is also an effective

method of implementing campaign deception so as to attain the goal of hiding the real

and showing the false, and sounding in the east but attacking the west.

Under modern conditions, due to the tremendous enhancement in reconnaissance

capability, firepower, mobility, and assault capability of the armed forces, the operational

space has drastically expanded and the non-linear battlefield has become a basic

battlefield form-state {xingtai}. Therefore, the position and role of campaign maneuver

has elevated without precedent while autonomous, flexible, and rapid maneuver have

become the factors for gaining victory in the modern campaign.

I. Characteristics of Campaign Maneuver...181

(1) There are many maneuver modes and means, and three-dimensional maneuver

becomes the basic mode of maneuver

Along with the development of military technology and weapons and equipment, the

maneuver capability of the armed forces has been enhanced without precedent, and the

modes and means of maneuver have obviously increased. The space of maneuver has

developed from the past when ground maneuver had the lead to a three dimensional

maneuver in multi-dimensional space on land, on sea (underwater) and in the air; the

means of maneuver have developed from the past of maneuver on foot and riding

ordinary transport vehicles to mechanized and motorized maneuver with tanks, infantry

combat vehicles and standardized transport vehicles in an organized system in the lead, to
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aerial maneuver with large type transport aircraft, transport helicopters and various

operational aircraft and combat helicopters in the lead, and to sea maneuver with oceanic

transport ships, specialized landing ships (boats), hover crafts and all kinds of operational

vessels in the lead; and the content of maneuver has developed from the past where force

strength maneuver was in the lead to a combination of force strength maneuver and

firepower maneuver, with the proportion of firepower maneuver continuously growing.

The enhancement in armed forces maneuver, especially in the massive use of military

helicopters, has led to the taking place of a qualitative leap in campaign maneuver modes.

Currently, about 120 countries have a total of over 20,000 helicopters, of which the

United States has more than 10,000. Meanwhile, the armies of every nation have

universally established army aviation force units, giving ground force units the potential

to implement maneuver and operations in the air. Aerial maneuver not only is fast in

speed but it also has superior quality for directly leaping over the enemy’s defensive

positions. Thus, since the 1970s, the trend of army maneuver and taking operations into

the air {zuozhan kongzhonghua} has developed extremely fast. The aerial maneuver

capabilities of campaign operational strengths have continuously improved, and there

have appeared within the campaign task organization new types of aerial maneuver and

assault force units who can maneuver in the air as well as be able to alternatively

maneuver in the air and ground. And the result of this is that the maneuver and operations

in a modern campaign have a more and more three dimensional integrated ground and air

quality, with three-dimensional maneuver already becoming a basic mode of modern

campaign maneuver.

(2) Maneuver is large in scale, fast in speed, and long in range

1. The scale of the modern campaign maneuver has become larger. The degree of

motorization of the modern army is already approaching 70%, enabling a campaign large

formation in an organized structure {cheng jianzhi} to be able to conduct large-scale

rapid maneuver on the battlefield. The largest aircraft-landed vertical envelopment

occurred in the Gulf War when air assault force units of entire divisions and brigades

rode military helicopters to implement aerial maneuver on the battlefield. At the same

time several ten thousands and several hundred thousands of armed forces implemented

transoceanic and transcontinental maneuvers.

2. The speed of modern campaign maneuver has accelerated. The highest speed of

modern advanced tanks has reached 70-some km, and the attacking side can maneuver to

an area over several hundred kilometers away within ten hours. A modern ship has

increased its speed to 30-50 knots from the 10 knots in the early periods. During the War

of the Malvinas Islands, the advanced detachment of the British special task fleet crossed

the Atlantic Ocean at an average daily speed of 684 km to arrive in the theater of war in

only 19 days and nights. Aerial maneuver has an even faster speed as the speed of

operational aircraft has reached 3 mach (1000 m/sec). Advanced main combat aircraft

can fly over 10 hours to participate in fighting on a battlefield over 10,000 km away. In

the “ELDORADO” operation, 48 U.S. combat aircraft separately flew from three air
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bases in the U.K. homeland at a speed of Mach 2 going around the west of France and

Spain and via the Strait of Gibraltar to make a long-range intercontinental raid. In less

than 6.5 hours, they flew 5,180 km to amply display the high speed nature of modern

campaign maneuver.

3. The distance of modern campaign maneuver has expanded. Along with the

continuous enhancement of armed forces maneuver and transport capabilities, the long

range delivery capability of the armed forces has increased without precedence. In the

War of Malvinas Islands, the maneuver distance of the British fleet was 13,000 km. The

maneuver distance in the Gulf War was even longer as the airlift was 11,000 km, the

eastern line of sea transportation was 15,000 km, and the western line was 22,000 km.

During the ground offensive operations in the Gulf War, the U.S. 24th Mechanized

Division spent only one and one half days to push 320 km forward. The 101st Airborne

Assault Division implemented two airborne assaults towards the Iraqi military’s

campaign depths and leapt forward 150 km and 280 km, respectively. In the Iraq War, the

maneuver speed of US forces was even faster. In modern campaign maneuver, the

obvious changes in aspects such as scale, speed and distance have greatly improved the

maneuver effectiveness of the armed forces.

(3) Confrontation between maneuver and counter-maneuver is fierce

In a modern campaign, the confrontation between maneuver and counter-maneuver will

be extraordinarily intense. On the one hand, because maneuver is growing in significance

for seizing campaign victory, counter-maneuver operations on the battlefield will receive

a high level of attention. Counter-maneuver operations can delay the speed of an

opponent’s advance, disrupt their operational plans, kill their effective strengths, and

weaken the sharp momentum of their attack. Highly effective counter-maneuver

operations can even directly alter the force strength ratio between ours and their sides,

and gain battlefield initiative. Thus, counter-maneuver operations are critical for winning

a victory in a modern campaign. On the other hand, campaign maneuver under modern

conditions will be implemented on a battlefield of unprecedented “transparency,” and

concealing the intention and activities of maneuver will be very difficult. At the same

time, the means of modern operations and strikes will increase and firepower system

assault will have high precision, long range, and large lethality. This will result in

maneuver to encounter at any time an opponent’s strikes and damage from the battlefield

spaces such as air, ground, water surface (underwater) and various operational means.

Hence, in a modern campaign, as both sides engaging in battle strive for and maintain

battlefield initiative, not only must they implement initiative and flexible campaign

maneuver, they must also adopt active and effective measures to oppose the countermaneuver activities of the enemy. Maneuver and counter-maneuver have already become

an important content of modern campaign confrontation and the struggle between

maneuver and counter-maneuver will very intense.
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(4) Firepower maneuver occupies an important position

Firepower maneuver refers to the activity of changing strike targets via altering fire

direction or firing distance under the condition of not changing firing position or location.

In past wars, due to the close range and low strike effectiveness of firearms, the maneuver

of firepower, to a large extent, was achieved via firearm maneuver, while the speed 

and scope of firearm maneuver were very limited. Thus, in terms of campaign leve 

l, it was very difficult to achieve effective firepower maneuver, and firepower 

maneuver was mainly applied in a tactical scope. Under modern conditions, the maneuver

characteristics of firearms themselves have improved while the speeds and distances of

maneuver have developed without precedence, particularly in the increase of firepower

range and improvement in precision. This has enabled firearms to be able to control the

entire depth of the campaign battlefield without changing their deployed locations as well

as be able to accurately strike nearly all detected targets. Therefore, firepower maneuver

has easily become an important component of modern campaign maneuver. Firepower

maneuver not only is able to quickly and effectively wipe out and suppress the force

strength and weapons of an opponent, restrict the freedom of their activities, and weaken

and destroy their operational capability, but it can also gain even more freedom of

activities for oneself, strive for more time and space, and under certain conditions, it can

even directly attain specific campaign and strategic goals. Under modern conditions,

along with the significant improvement of firepower strike and mobility, firepower

maneuver will occupy a more and more important position in campaign operations.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Maneuver...184

In a modern campaign, correctly selecting and applying maneuver patterns has important

significance for striving for campaign victory. In a modern campaign, campaign

maneuvers with the shifting of force strengths and weapons as the main content mainly

are the following patterns:

(1) Moving-in

Moving-in is the maneuver activity by a campaign large formation, based on a unified

plan {jihua}, of organizing subordinate force-units to advance from an assembly area

towards an area for preparing to carry out campaign missions. The goal of moving-in is to

approach the enemy in order to create conditions for conducting campaign concentration

and unfolding at the right time. When force-units are far from their attack targets or the

defense areas, the moving-in is an indispensable maneuver pattern in implementing a

campaign.

The modes for moving-in, if divided based on maneuver instruments, are moving-in on

foot, motorized moving-in, mechanized moving-in, rail transport, air transport and sea

transport, etc.; if divided based on maneuver spaces, there are moving-in by ground,

moving-in by air, and moving-in by sea, etc. Under modern conditions, massive
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application of modern means to conduct rapid transport is the main mode of campaign

moving-in.

The characteristics of modern campaign moving-in are: a diversity of moving-in modes

and means; the distances of moving-in are far, its speed is fast and time effectiveness is

strong; during moving-in, it is normally difficult to avoid the enemy’s reconnaissance and

surveillance, the threat of encountering enemy raids, blockades, and sabotage is great;

moving and fighting are frequently blended into one; and organizing command and

organizing support missions are arduous and complex.

Campaign moving-in relates to the important operational activities of whether or not

force-units are able to be used and successfully fight, whether or not they can preserve

their military strength and fight to win, whether or not they can conceal the campaign

intention and achieve campaign suddenness, and whether or not they are able to grab the

battle opportunity and form the favorable postures at the right times. Thus, based on the

threat level of the enemy situation and mission needs, we should implement campaign

moving-in at the right time, quickly, covertly and safely.

(2) Depth envelopment

Depth envelopment {zongshen baowei} refers to the implementation of long-range,

enveloping-form maneuver attack from the enemy’s weak flank and against the enemy’s

remote depths and rear area by the main attack strength and complemented by frontal

attack force-units. Its main goal is to first form an enveloping momentum against an

enemy one is preparing to annihilate, and then, complemented by the frontal attack forceunits, annihilate them. Great depth envelopment {dazongshen baowei} is one of the main

patterns of campaign maneuver assault.

Great depth envelopment methods can be divided into two types according to maneuver

assault modes:

The first type is flank envelopment. This includes two kinds of methods. The first is twoflank envelopment. Namely, this is to implement a pincer envelopment assault along a

centripetal direction from two flanks towards the enemy’s campaign depth. The

characteristics of this type of method are that, by implementing maneuver assault from

two directions, one can form a favorable posture of a two-flank complementary and

pincer assault while at the same time one can force the enemy to disperse their resistance

strengths so that it would be difficult to gain an advantage from both sides and this is

beneficial for the attacking side to attain the envelopment goal. The second is single-flank

envelopment. Namely, this is the implementation of an outflanking assault from one flank

of the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, pressing the enemy towards a natural or manmade obstacle difficult to scale, and one’s own friendly groupings or a prearranged

“pocket” so as to annihilate the surrounded enemy. The characteristics of this type of

method are: by implementing maneuver assault from one direction, the attack strength is

fairly concentrated and command coordination is relatively simple; by drawing the aid of
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natural and man-made obstacles, one can economize on force-strengths; and maneuver

distances are normally far, the resistance encountered is stronger, and one needs to have

corresponding objective conditions.

The second type is separating envelopment. It also includes two types of methods: the

first is to implement a separating envelopment from one direction. Namely, this is

implementing assault from a weak direction at the front of the enemy’s campaign bushi

disposition towards the depth, then wrapping into a fist to attack from two flanks, and

separating and enveloping the enemy one is preparing to annihilate. The characteristics of

this mode are that the initial assault strengths are concentrated, and one can separate the

enemy’s campaign bushi disposition after entering the enemy’s depth, but when wrapping

into a fist to attack from two flanks, the strengths are weakened; furthermore, maneuver

distances are far and the requirements are high for sustained operational capability.

Implementing this envelopment method has a high requirement on the complementary

activities of aerial assault force units (airborne landing force units) and other insertion,

long range raid force-units (elements). The second is implementing separating

envelopment from multiple directions. Namely, this is implementing a number of

mutually adjusting-coordinated assaults either from multiple directions simultaneously

along the front of the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition or successively towards the

enemy’s depth, and then separately implementing deep separating envelopment from

along centripetal or centrifugal directions so as to one by one annihilate the surrounded

enemy. The characteristics of this mode are that: implementing maneuver assault in

multiple directions is more beneficial for achieving suddenness of attack and does not

allow the enemy to promptly maneuver campaign reserve forces towards the direction

that is greatly threatened; and after entering the enemy’s depth, one can first dismember

the enemy’s entire campaign bushi disposition, cut off the mutual connectivity between

the operational groupings, and facilitate subsequent separating and annihilating.

However, this normally requires that the attacking side have absolute strength superiority

and for the whole theater to have terrain and road conditions convenient for passage;

command and coordination are also very complex.

Regardless of whether it was in past wars or under modern conditions, envelopment is the

most effective maneuver pattern for annihilating the enemy’s effective strength. The role

of envelopment is even more reflected in its ability to generate huge psychological strike

effect on enemy forces. Not only does envelopment cut off the connectivity between the

enemy’s surrounded groupings and the outside, which forms a favorable posture for

annihilating the enemy, but even more important, this results in the enemy receiving an

intense shock to their spirit, creating fear and confusion and even directly resulting in

paralysis of the entirety of operational systems, and thereby obtaining higher operational

benefits.

(3) Outflanking {yuhui}

Outflanking refers to force units avoiding or bypassing the front of the enemy’s campaign

bushi disposition and conducting maneuver attack from the flank towards the enemy’s
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rear area. Its goals are mainly to attack the important targets in the enemy’s depth, to

seize important areas (or sites) along the lines of communications, to sever the

connectivity between the enemy’s current grouping with the campaign and strategic

depth, to force the enemy to abandon its pre-established defensive positions or change its

operational direction, and to form a favorable posture to annihilate the enemy. Like

envelopment, outflanking is also one of the important patterns of campaign maneuver.

When weak parts appear in the enemy campaign bushi disposition flanks, and important

targets or important areas (sites) related to the vital area of the enemy’s campaign overall

situation {di zhanyi quanju yaohai} are discovered in the enemy’s depth, in order to

accelerate the campaign progress and quickly form favorable posture to annihilate the

enemy, one can adopt the mode of outflanking. The main characteristics of outflanking

are: employment of crack rapid maneuver force-units; activity initiation possesses fairly

large suddenness, and requires rapid, prompt, and accurate arrival at the outflanking

terminal points, and actively and quickly accomplishing designated missions; and the

outflanking distances are normally far, the operational intensity at the outflanking

terminal point areas are high, and contention is fierce. Therefore, outflanking force-units

must have stronger independent operational and support capabilities, and additionally,

they still need to obtain powerful assisting support from aerial assault force units

(airborne force units) and firepower.

Outflanking can be regarded as a modified form of envelopment. Outflanking and

envelopment have one important difference, namely, that envelopment pays attention to

mainly the enemy’s force strength groupings, and as long as one is able to achieve the

envelopment of the enemy one is preparing to annihilate, then in terms of operational

space, one is permitted to make a large degree of movement, while outflanking lays even

more attention on geographical position and the attack on a designated target. The role of

outflanking is that it can “utilize the freedom of maneuver to create a decision point at a

place the enemy has not made preparations.” And this “decision point” is normally the

enemy “fatal point” represented by a geographical location and important target. By

attacking the enemy’s “fatal point,” outflanking can attain operational results similar to

that of envelopment. During the ground offensive campaign of the Gulf War, The US

military’s 18th Airborne, complemented by aerial assault forces, implemented deep

outflanking from a weak area on the Iraqi military’s defensive right flank, and cut off the

highway from Kuwait to Basra. It was the main reason causing a total collapse of the

Iraqi defense system. This highway was also called the “Road of Death.”

(4) Insertion

Insertion refers to crack force-units utilizing the gaps and weak parts in the enemy

campaign bushi disposition to insert into the enemy’s campaign depth and implement

maneuver attack against their important parts. Its goals are mainly to raid the important

targets in the enemy’s depth, seize and occupy the vital points in the depth, disrupt the

enemy’s integrated whole bushi disposition, and block and separate the enemy’s depth

operational activities. The modes of insertion, based on the methods of entering the
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enemy’s depth, can be divided into secret insertion and forced insertion; based on the

time of entering the enemy’s depth, it can be divided into advance insertion and incombat long-range raid insertion; and based on the direction of entering the enemy’s

depth, it can be divided into vertical insertion, outflanking insertion, single-direction

insertion and multi-direction insertion.

The main characteristics of insertion are: employing crack force-units, fully utilizing the

gaps and weak parts in the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, and sudden, swift and

violent, flexible and tenacious operational activities; its operational missions have a very

strong directional quality and time effective quality, and it emphasizes avoiding

entanglements with the enemy; its assault targets normally have fairly high campaign

values and one can attain fairly high operational benefits with a fairly small amount of

force-strengths; with mission-oriented command in the lead, it stresses active initiative

and prompt execution; and it is separated or remote from the main force operations, it

cannot easily receive prompt and effective assistance-support, and the degree of difficulty

for survival and safeguarding-support is high.

Regardless of in a past or a modern campaign, insertion assault has an important position.

Practice has proven that in the course of an attack, it is often impossible for all of the

main force to attack and advance at the same high-speed at the same time. Moreover, its

task organization is not large, its maneuver quality is strong, and insertion force-units

also have independent operational capabilities, so they can leave the main force activities,

and quickly wedge into the enemy’s campaign depth. Utilizing the gaps and openings in

the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, they can broadly implement maneuver, bypass

the enemy’s strong points and not become entangled with the enemy. Thereby, they can

even more quickly enter into a designated location, attack the important targets, support

the smooth advance of the main attacking force-units, or achieve a favorable posture for

annihilating the enemy. In addition, the implementation of high speed insertion assault is

also an effective means for fully utilizing and expanding battlefield information warfare

and integrated firepower warfare assault results. Under modern conditions, because there

are no forever-stretching defensive zones and positions, the armed forces positioning on

the battlefield is very dispersed and there are a large number of gaps and openings in the

enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, it is even more beneficial to implement insertion

assault operations.

(5) Vertical envelopment

Vertical envelopment refers to a kind of maneuver attack pattern of employing aerial

assault force-units and airborne landing force-units to leap over the enemy’s campaign

bushi disposition from the air and establish an internally-facing and externally-facing

front in the enemy’s campaign depth and rear area. Its goals are mainly to utilize the

superiority of aerial maneuver, to seize the important areas and vital points in the

enemy’s remote depths and rear areas, to sever the enemy’s retreat routes, to block the

enemy’s reinforcements, to complement force-units attacking the front or outflanking the

side flank, and to quickly achieve a momentum of besieging an enemy one is preparing to
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annihilate. Vertical envelopment is one of the campaign maneuver patterns that most

possesses modern features and it is an important marker of three-dimensional maneuver.

The modes of vertical envelopment, based on airborne landing methods, can be divided

into aircraft airborne landing, parachute airborne landing, and a mixed aircraft-parachute

airborne landing, with the implementation of vertical envelopment with aircraft airborne

landing receiving more and more attention. Based on the method of leaping into the

enemy’s depth from the air, one can divide it into direct mode, meaning to arrive at the

position in a one-time maneuver, normally used in situations of relatively short distance

aerial maneuvers or when the misgivings on the enemy situation in the enemy’s depth is

not bad; alternating mode, which is two or more aerial maneuver echelons successively

alternating and maneuvering towards the designated area, and this is mainly used in

situations of longer distance maneuvers or when there are greater misgivings for the

enemy situation in the enemy’s depth. For example, when the U.S.101st Airborne Assault

Division implemented vertical envelopment in the Gulf War, they used this mode; and

frog-leap mode, meaning the same aerial assault force-unit uses the mode of gradual

forward leaps to implement aerial maneuver, and this usage situation is basically the

same as the alternating mode. Based on the vertical envelopment direction, it can be

divided into single direction and multi-direction vertical envelopment. Based on the

nature of the enemy one is preparing to annihilate, it can divided into vertical

envelopment of a face-to-face defensive enemy, of a retreating and fleeing enemy and a

maneuvering enemy.

The main characteristics of vertical envelopment are: it needs to employ aerial assault

force-units and airborne (parachute) landing forces at a fairly large scale; aerial maneuver

speed is fast and distance is long, so that one can jump over the enemy’s campaign bushi

disposition and natural obstacles and quickly achieve envelopment momentum against

the enemy one is preparing to annihilate; it must be implemented under the condition of

mastering air dominance (or localized air dominance); it must have strong and powerful

air-to-ground firepower assisting-support and security safeguarding-support during the

course of loading, unloading and aerial maneuver; it is far from the main force

operations, its assisting support and safeguarding support are difficult, and it has limited

sustained operational capability; and it emphasizes adjusting-coordination and

complementing from frontal attack force-units and long-range campaign firepower.

The important significance of implementing vertical envelopment lies in the fact that

force-units implementing envelopment can fully utilize the superiority of aerial

maneuver, and by not undergoing the intense engagements of ground, layer-by-layer

penetration and overcoming the long distance maneuver of heavy obstacles, they can

quickly arrive at the designated area. They can form a favorable besiegement posture and

thereby immediately be able to shake the entirety of the enemy’s campaign bushi

disposition and tremendously accelerate the course of the campaign. This kind of

campaign value possessed by vertical envelopment cannot be compared to other

maneuver patterns. Exactly because of this reason, the Russian military considers vertical

envelopment to have become a very important pattern of maneuver [mobile] operations
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and a modern offensive campaign cannot be implemented without the coordination of this

type of maneuver operations pattern. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military implemented the

largest scale and longest distance airborne-landing vertical envelopment in the history of

warfare. The 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Assault Division, only in about 3 hours on

the second day of the ground offensive, conducted a one-instance long range raid of 175-

miles to the north, and established a blocking position on the south bank of the Euphrates

River, cutting off the connectivity between the Iraqi frontal defense force-units and the

strategic depth, quickly forming an enveloping posture against the Iraqi military, and

fully displaying the important position of vertical envelopment in a modern campaign. In

the Iraq War, the US military’s vertical envelopment activities also played an active role

in its operations for quick decision.

(6) Retreat

Retreat, which is also known as withdrawal, refers to the maneuver by a campaign large

formation giving up occupied areas and targets in an organized backwards transfer. The

goals of retreat is to seize initiative, create combat opportunity and wait for defeat of the

enemy, or to shake off the shackles of passivity, separate from the enemy and preserve

military strength.

The types of retreat, based on its nature, can be divided into active retreat and passive

retreat. Active retreat means to implement retreat when there is no or little enemy

pressure and one’s own side still enjoys battlefield initiative; passive retreat means to

implement a forced retreat when enemy pressure is greater and one’s own side is in an

unfavorable position or perilous environment. If divided based on the relationship with

the enemy, it can be divided into retreat while maintaining contact with the enemy and

retreat while separating from the enemy. Retreat while maintaining contact with the

enemy is retreat with partial force strengths entangled with the enemy, step by step

resisting, and fighting and retreating at the same time. It is normally used in: blocking the

enemy’s rear pursuit, and covering the main force retreat; blocking the enemy’s

reinforcement, and supporting the main force’s annihilation of the enemy on its route

(partial); and luring the enemy in deep so as to create combat opportunity for the main

force to annihilate the enemy. Retreat to separate from the enemy is maneuver

implemented to achieve the goal of separating from contact with the enemy, and this is

normally used when withdrawing from the battlefield or shaking off an unfavorable

position. Under the situation when the enemy pressure is fairly large, in order to quickly

shake off the enemy, sometimes it is necessary to step by step resist, block-intercept and

pursue the enemy forces with partial force strengths. However, once the main forces enter

the safe area, the covering force-units should also quickly separate contact with the

enemy and discontinue entangling with the enemy.

The characteristics of retreat are: the force-units are often in an unfavorable position, time

is urgent, circumstances {xingshi} are severe and missions are arduous; the enemy

situation threat is serious, easy to encounter enemy intercept-attack, pursuit-attack, and

firepower assault; under modern conditions, the intention of retreat is difficult to conceal,
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and the requirements on campaign deception and operational secrecy are high; moving

and fighting are tightly combined, and the operational missions of the covering forceunits are heavy; correctly selecting the retreat route and controlling critical parts have

important significance; it faces dangerous situations, retreat is easily thrown into

confusion, control and adjusting-coordination of force-unit activities are difficult, and the

requirement on a commander’s psychological quality and command capability is high.

As an important campaign maneuver pattern, when compared to other maneuver patterns,

one can say that retreat is harder to master and apply. Especially when forced to retreat

under the situation of operational defeat or strong enemy pressure, it even further relies

on a commander’s courageous spirit, superb command skill and excellent quality of

force-units. Just as what famous military theorist Jomini once said, “One should give an

award for a skillful retreat the same as given to a most glorious victory.”

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Maneuver...190

(1) Avoiding the solid and attacking the void

Avoiding the solid and attacking the void is where the essence of campaign maneuver

lies. Under modern conditions, because of the unprecedented improvement in military

reconnaissance, firepower and maneuver, and in order to provide even more favorable

conditions for identifying, creating and quickly utilizing the enemy’s weak parts during

operations and implement campaign maneuver, the thought of avoiding the solid and

attacking the void can attain even more ample embodiment in campaign maneuver attack.

First, one must accurately identify and actively create the weak parts the enemy exposes.

On the battlefield, the enemy military’s weak area normally does not directly expose

itself. Therefore, one must undergo thorough reconnaissance and comprehensive analysis

of the battlefield situation and accurately identify the enemy’s most weak points

{ruodian}. When its campaign bushi disposition does not have an obvious exploitable

utility weak part, one must manufacture an exploitable utility weak part in the enemy’s

campaign bushi disposition with campaign information warfare, campaign firepower

warfare and other necessary operational activities, aided by measures such as deception

and feint, and through striking, relocating and holding up the enemy.

Second, we must quickly employ the main attack strength on the enemy’s exposed weak

points. Normally, we should make the enemy’s weak flanks and rear area as the main

direction of campaign maneuver. On the modern battlefield, the weak parts cannot remain

static and unchanged for a long time because the enemy has the capability for high speed

maneuver and in a very short time, their weak point can become a strong point. This

requires a campaign commander to have sharp insight ability and rapid decisiveness to

promptly ascertain and seize the weak parts appearing in the enemy’s campaign bushi

disposition, and not lose the time opportunity for implementing campaign maneuver. At

the same time, one should think of ways to maintain and expand the enemy’s weak parts.
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Third, one should connect together the attacking of the enemy’s weak points to striking

the enemy’s centers of gravity {zhongxin}. Attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity can

quickly and fundamentally disrupt the stability and synchronization of the enemy’s

operational systems and collapse the enemy’s operational capability. Therefore, one

should select the weak parts that can lead to or directly threaten the enemy’s centers of

gravity to implement the main maneuver attack. The weak parts of the enemy’s center of

gravity that cannot be quickly attacked normally do not have important utility value. This

requires one to thoroughly comprehend the internal situation of the enemy’s operational

system {tixi}, accurately identify the centers of gravity of their strengths, and fully utilize

the enemy’s exposed weak points. [This also requires one to] strive to implement quick

attack and key point strike against given core parts or critical factors having a holdingtogether and bracing function on the entirety of the operational systems so they lose

balance, thus accelerating the victory in the overall situation.

Fourth, one must make envelopment and outflanking as the basic campaign patterns. The

main goal for implementing campaign maneuver is to annihilate the enemy’s effective

strengths, and envelopment and outflanking are the basic means for annihilating the

enemy. Envelopment and outflanking are also the most suitable patterns for attacking the

enemy’s weak flanks or rear areas. Under modern conditions, the campaign patterns of

envelopment and outflanking have had new development in their contents. Not only do

they employ ground force-units to implement high speed maneuver against the enemy

rear flanks, they also as much as possible broadly use patterns such as vertical

envelopment and three-dimensional outflanking to quickly achieve envelopment and

front-rear pincer momentum against the object [target]5 one is preparing to annihilate. At

the same time as conducting envelopment and outflanking with one’s main strengths, one

should also implement frontal suppression, flanking feint attacks (movements) and small

scale insertion assaults with partial force-strengths, and ensure that one smoothly

achieves the main attack goals.

(2) Rapid advance-attack

Rapid advance-attack is the essential requirement of campaign maneuver. Suvarov once

said, “Rapid and fierce attack is the real soul of war.” Rapid advance-attack helps achieve

suddenness of maneuver; it can maintain and enhance the sharp momentum of attack and

render the enemy unable to recover from the first initial strike and organize an effective

resistance; it can confuse the enemy’s activity tempo and cause them to lose their

freedom of activity; and it can allow the enemy to suffer heavy psychological strikes and

lose the will to resist. Campaign maneuver seeks, through rapid advance-attack, to render

one’s own operational activities from beginning to end to be faster than the enemy’s

5 Translator’s note: the Chinese term, duixiang - 对象, is rendered as “object” with the [target] appended

because “target” alone does not fully capture the Chinese meaning. Duixiang is dui, mutual or opposite and

xiang is appearance or resembling, as if one is studying something in a mirror. It is a partner, target,

opponent, object or subject of interest, depending on usage. The use of this term reflects a distinctively

Chinese dialectic view of a relationship between the “object” and observer or subject.
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response, to not allow the enemy’s effective response to be able to avoid falling behind

one’s own continuously implemented decisive quality activities, and thus to realize the

operational effects brought about by a rapid quality, ensuring that one seizes and

maintains battlefield initiative.

To realize rapid advance-attack, we should grasp the following aspects:

First is to fully bring into play the function of suddenness. Suddenness and rapid quality

complement each other. Suddenness can allow the enemy to be taken by surprise, be

panic-stricken, and lose their capability for organized resistance, even being able to

decisively alter the combat power ratio, thus reducing the obstruction to attack and

improving attack speed. To this end, during maneuver, one must unify the overall guihua

planning and implement effective campaign deception activities. [One must] also give

support with information warfare, increase the weight on the enemy’s “fog of war,” and

diligently achieve campaign and tactical suddenness so as to ensure high speed of

maneuver. At the same time, high speed maneuver will also continuously disrupt the

enemy’s command cycle, continuously manufacture new suddenness, and further

accelerate the tempo of maneuver attack. The campaign commander should fully utilize

the direct relationship of the mutually facilitating and each shining brightly together

relationship of suddenness and rapid quality, resulting in suddenness becoming the

accelerator for rapid advance-attack.

Second is to implement three-dimensional, multi-route and multi-direction maneuver.

Three-dimensional maneuver is the most effective means for improving maneuver speed.

Realistically, modern campaign firepower can implement assault against the full-depth of

the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, but the capability of the ground maneuver forceunits to immediately utilize these assault results are still very limited as before. Thus,

aerial maneuver is the only maneuver mode able to be maximally matched with modern

firepower. Consequently, one should concentrate and use army aviation forces and

airborne landing forces in the most important direction and time opportunity to

implement rapid maneuver so as to accelerate the campaign course. Moreover,

implementing multi-route and multi-direction maneuver can disperse and contain the

enemy’s strengths, enlarge the space and intensity of strikes against the enemy, and

similarly be beneficial to the speed of maneuver attacks.

Third is to maintain a sharp momentum and continuity of maneuver. Once maneuver

attack starts, one must make full effort to carry it through round-the-clock, not let the

enemy recover from the shock of the first assault and not let the enemy have time to

ascertain the main direction of our attack. More importantly is to not provide the enemy

the opportunity to concentrate its force strengths and firepower to deal with one’s own

main maneuver force-units and to reorganize their resistance. We must from start to

finish maintain the pressure of the maneuver attack, as well as form and maintain an

irresistibly sharp momentum.
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Fourth is to only conduct operations with an enemy having an effect on achieving

maneuver goals. All combat, even though it can annihilate enemy forces, consumes time,

which slows down maneuver speed. Therefore, one must resolutely avoid unnecessary

tactical activities. In maneuver, one must maintain the attack direction and strive to

conduct operations only with a previously selected enemy at the necessary time and

place. When one encounters an unyielding enemy strong point, one should decisively

bypass it and avoid entangling with the enemy force units so as to facilitate leading the

attack activities to the enemy’s far depth as quickly as possible and fundamentally disrupt

the balance of the enemy’s operational system {tixi}.

(3) Lay equal stress on fighting and “moving”

Under modern conditions, the maneuver of armed forces faces severe challenges. On the

one hand, since maneuver has become more important to attaining victory in operations,

counter-maneuver operations are getting more attention everyday; on the other, the

development of modern weapons and equipment has formed a huge threat for maneuver

causing modern campaign maneuver to be conducted in the high intensity countermaneuver operations of the enemy from the very start. Force-units will promote

“moving” with fighting and protecting “moving” with fighting, and not only must one

resist the enemy’s counter maneuver, but one must implement counter maneuver against

the enemy. The practice in past wars of move first and then fight or fight first and then

move, and the conditions of alternately separating fighting and moving no longer exists.

Fighting has already become an indispensably intrinsic essential element of “moving,” if

one does not successfully fight, then he cannot “move,” and only being able to fight and

win can one smoothly “move.” Additionally, “moving” also achieves a more effective

“fight.” Not only can “moving” achieve a favorable posture for annihilating the enemy,

but it can also gain a more favorable launch position. It can also approach the enemy and

create considerations for implementing long range strikes against the enemy. The new

publication of the US Army’s “Operational Outline” [Operations] also acknowledges: “If

the enemy holds a clear superiority from a long distance, the confrontation method may

be to approach the enemy so that it does not dare to use its firepower might to possibly

endanger its own forces.” Hence, laying equal stress on fighting and “moving” is a

necessary requirement for implementing campaign maneuver under modern conditions.

To abide by the requirements of laying equal stress on fighting and “moving” in a

modern campaign one must mainly grasp the following aspects:

First is seizing and maintaining localized air dominance. Under modern conditions, there

is no freedom of maneuver if there is no air dominance. In this regard, when

implementing campaign maneuver, one must maximally concentrate the main aviation

forces and air defense strengths, form a tight air defense firepower system {tixi} in the

main maneuver direction, build a safe maneuver corridor, and seize and maintain a

localized air dominance for a specific time and space. At the same time, relying on their

own air defense firepower weapons, the maneuver grouping’s strikes on the enemy’s
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incoming aerial raid is also one of the main methods for safeguarding anti-air security

during maneuver.

Second is attaching importance to protecting the security of the flanks. Along with the

expansion of the depth for entering the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, the

maneuver force-units will form totally exposed flanks. These are the “weak windows” of

maneuver force-units most easy to encounter strikes; thus safeguarding the flank security

of the attack force-units is an important content of fighting during “moving.” In order to

reliably safeguard the flanks, one must: dispatch guarding elements {jingjie fendui} to the

flanks; position strong flank safeguarding force-units in the direction receiving threats;

especially position anti-tank and anti-helicopter reserve forces so as to prevent 

enemy tank and armored raids; allow second echelon (reserve forces) to follow the rear of

the most threatened flanks; and when necessary, one can pluck partial force strengths to

occupy areas having important significance for flank protection.

Third is implement counter-maneuver against the enemy. Maneuver and countermaneuver complement each other because often it is difficult to be successful with

maneuver alone. It is only through uninterrupted disruption and restriction of enemy

maneuver that one can effectively safeguard one’s own maneuver because the enemy’s

maneuver is frequently on account of one’s own maneuver. For this reason, one should

implement powerful counter-maneuver operations against the enemy with modes such as

firepower strikes, long range rapid set-up of obstacles, aerial leap-over assaults, etc.,

throwing the enemy’s plans {jihua} into confusion by delaying the enemy’s activities,

weakening the enemy’s combat power, and even completely smashing the enemy’s

maneuver so as to create favorable conditions for one’s own side to smoothly implement

maneuver.

Fourth is multi-route, multi-direction and multi-mode maneuver. One should fully utilize

various road and transportation conditions inside the area of maneuver and strive to adopt

multiple modes while simultaneously implementing multi-route, multi-direction wide

maneuver. The superior qualities of this kind of method are: First is to be able to in

general terms improve maneuver speed and reduce maneuver time. Second is to be able

to increase the degree of difficulty for the enemy to accurately assess one’s own

maneuver intention and main maneuver columns, and even cause the enemy to generate

mistakes and delay the time for the enemy to correctly respond. Third is to be able to

disperse the force strengths and firepower the enemy uses for counter-maneuver, making

it difficult for the enemy to simultaneously obstruct the various directions of our

maneuvering columns, as well as clearly lowering the effects of firepower intercepting

attacks. Even if a certain number of force-units encounter the enemy’s blocking attacks or

gets heavy losses, other force-units will still be able to accomplish their maneuver

missions according to the predetermined plans {jihua}.

Fifth is to adopt multiple measures of deception, concealment, camouflage and

safeguarding-support. One is actively implementing feints, deceiving and bewildering the

enemy, and concealing our main maneuver bushu disposition and main attack directions.
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Second is enhancing concealment and camouflage, blinding the enemy’s long-range

remote sensing reconnaissance, and weakening the assault results of their aerial and longrange firepower. Third is successfully completing various safeguarding support measures

such as: organizing and allocating sufficient road safeguarding support strengths for the

maneuver force-units; dispatching advance elements to the bridge, crossings and narrow

passages, etc. in the maneuver direction to control them in advance; raid attack and

disrupt the enemy’s information systems and long range firepower strike systems with

special operational force-units and local force-units; ensuring technical and logistical

safeguarding support during maneuver; and implementing uninterrupted command and

coordination.

(4) Attach importance to creating momentum

The basic goal of campaign maneuver is to create a type of favorable battlefield posture

that allows for an attacking armed forces to obtain or maintain superiority at their

location and in the aspect of strengths, allows for decisive quality engagements to be

implemented under the most favorable conditions, or even directly achieves a decisive

quality outcome through maneuver and thus greatly reducing the combat coefficient and

sustained time. During the Liao-Shen Campaign, the PLA’s southern move to Jinzhou by

the Northeastern Field Army formed the momentum of shutting the gate and beating the

dog. Also, McArthur’s Inchon landing [created momentum]. These are representative

examples of gaining superiority in terms of location to generate a significant effect on the

entire campaign and even the overall war situation. In the words of Lidell Hart, “one

doesn’t have to undergo a significant engagement to achieve decisive quality results.” In

this sense, the real goal of campaign maneuver rather than explained as seeking out

engagement is better explained as seeking to create a favorable battlefield posture. Even

though this type of superiority itself cannot lead to a decisive quality battle results, one

can achieve the entirety of campaign goals through subsequent engagements and battles.

In order to achieve the goal of creating momentum through maneuver, one should grasp

the following points:

First is to prudently await opportunity [stand by], remain still, and move later. Under

modern conditions, battlefield transparency has greatly improved, so although one would

create desirable combat opportunities by continuing to use the mode of large scale and

long distance maneuver with main force units from previous warfare periods to shift,

disperse and exhaust the enemy and form favorable posture, one could not achieve the

anticipated goals and even cause the maneuver force-units to become the targets for

enemy aerial and long range precision strike firepower. To this end, the main force forceunits should be at a campaign depth location convenient for maneuvering forward,

selecting favorable terrain, be concealed and awaiting opportunity. Wait for when the

enemy’s weak part is completely exposed, when the conditions for implementing

maneuver attack are already mature and the operational goals are a hundred percent clear;

then the main force force-units will implement sudden and quick maneuver.
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Second is boldly maneuver, and try hard to avoid tactical quality operations. As soon as

the maneuver starts, we must fully utilize the enemy’s weak parts, without regard for

anything, directly inserting into the campaign center of gravity of the enemy’s furthest

depth. [We must] not excessively have misgivings about the security of the flanks, not

pursue localized tactical victories, strive for the fastest speed to enter the enemy’s rear,

and achieve favorable operational posture. Although this bold maneuver seems to be

risky, the decisive quality effects it brings will quickly be revealed as we approach the

enemy’s campaign center of gravity, as well as immediately being reinforced. In 1940,

the German army conducted a blitzkrieg against France. Its main characteristic was

deliberately avoiding fierce engagements and penetrating the French rear, not pursuing

significant tactical victories and instead directly outflanking to the rear of the Maginot

defense line along the weak parts where the French army did not set up defenses, and

immediately and totally collapsing the French defense

Third is applying various patterns and means to quickly achieve favorable battlefield

posture. Great depth envelopment and outflanking are the most basic patterns for

achieving favorable battlefield posture. At the same time, one must apply as much as

possible patterns such as vertical envelopment and aerial leap-over attack, improve

maneuver attack speed, and shorten the time for forming favorable posture.

Fourth is forming favorable posture by centering on strikes to the enemy’s center of

gravity. What is called favorable posture refers to the posture formed when the main

force force-units can enter a location where they can most directly or indirectly strike the

enemy’s center of gravity. Consequently, the terminus of campaign maneuver should be

selected at the vital area that holds together the entire campaign bushi disposition and that

plays a supporting function for maintaining the operational capability of the enemy.

Approaching and striking these parts not only results in being unable to immediately

obtain overall campaign situation victory, but it also creates favorable conditions for

subsequently and ultimately smashing the enemy’s center of gravity.

Section 4: Campaign Special Operations...196

Campaign special operations refers to the irregular operational activities implemented by

specially formed, trained and equipped crack force units (element) using special warfare

in order to achieve specific campaign and strategic goals. Its goals are mainly to raid the

enemy’s vital area targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational systems {tixi}, reduce the

enemy’s operational capability, and interfere, delay and disrupt the enemy’s operational

activities in order to create favorable conditions for the main force force-units. Campaign

special operations are important operational activities in a modern campaign for affecting

battlefield posture and pushing forward campaign progress.

Modern special operations emerged in WWI and received full development after the war.

The main reason for this is because in a long period of non-warfare state, a party

implementing special operations normally can effectively achieve certain limited

military, political and diplomatic goals under the conditions of not undertaking great
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political risk and not creating large human and material expenditures. Consequently, this

mode of specialize operational activities easily has become the commonly used means for

some countries to externally prosecute their military force, express their political will and

resolve major disputes during a non-warfare state. Because of this, it has received high

attention.

Along with the continuous development in the scale, weapons and equipment and

training levels of special force-units, the application of special operations has broadened

on a daily basis. Recent localized wars have shown that special operations serve as an

effective operational means and during a modern campaign, bring a more and more

important function into play. For example, in the Malvinas Islands War between the

Britain and Argentina, the British military organized 15-member special task teams to

sneak into Argentine territory and blow up all “Super Etendard” aircraft at Rio [Grande]

and [Rio] Gallegos Air Base to remove the greatest threat to British Special Task Force.

In the Iraq War, the multi-national force headed by the United States implemented the

largest scale special operation in the history of warfare. The multi-national force sent

various types of special force-units (elements) composed of up to ten thousand personnel

to infiltrate into the rear of the Iraqi army for special operations such as reconnaissance,

jamming, sabotage, deception and feints to provide a powerful complement to the aerial

and ground main offensive activities. The practice of war has proven that special

operations have become an important, indispensable operational activity of a modern

campaign.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Special Operations...197

(1) Special quality

Special quality refers to campaign special operations having many special parts when

compared with other regular operational activities. They are mainly manifested in: the

strengths of special operations normally undergo special equipment, special training and

special organizational groupings, and they possess very strong special operational

capability, survivability and self-sufficiency; special operational activities are flexible,

covert, sudden, and quick, and they are difficult to be on the lookout for because it is a

“hidden arrow” against an “open gun;” it can execute a variety of operational missions

with special qualities, and it can satisfy the needs-requirements of a variety of operational

goals; and with the vital part targets in the enemy’s campaign systems {xitong} as the

main objects of attack, one can obtain the results of “extracting a 1,000-pound effect from

4-ounces;” implement “precision strike” against the enemy with force-strengths, and be

able to accomplish many complex missions unable to be achieved with firepower

precision strikes. In addition, owing to the continued emergence and the application on

the future battlefield of high and new technology equipment such as space warfare

weapons, meteorological weapons, biological weapons and non-lethal weapons, the

missions of special operations will increase and their scope will grow. Space warfare,

meteorological warfare, environmental warfare, and non-lethal warfare, etc. will possibly
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become the content of special operations and this will result in the position and role of

special operations to become even more prominent.

(2) Flexible quality

Flexible quality is one of the biggest characteristics of special operations. First, the

operational organizational groupings are flexible. Normally, this is being forthright and

capable [crack], having the goal of accomplishing the mission, and not having a fixed

model. Second, the operational missions are flexible. The entrusted operational missions

have a fairly large degree of freedom and selectable quality and can be nimbly

determined according to needs-requirements; outside of missions that must be

accomplished, during the operational course, one can nimbly make changes by centering

on the general operational goal to be achieved. Third, the operational activities and

methods are flexible. Special operations will have great flexible quality in all aspects

such as the entry-exit routes, maneuver modes, strike time-opportunities, and operational

means, etc. This is the core embodiment of the flexible quality feature of special

operations. Last, the command mode is flexible. Normally, mission-oriented command is

used, whereby the commander of a special operations element or team makes his own

decisions and command based on actual situations of the battlefield in order to achieve

the goals of exchanging for optimum operational results and maximum victory with the

most beneficial modes and minimum costs.

(3) Concealment [covert] quality

Campaign special operations are the operational activities implemented with crack

strengths for penetrating the enemy’s campaign depths. Thus, concealment quality is a

necessary condition relied upon by special operations strengths for survival and

accomplishing designated missions. One must strive to implement all the activities of

special operations in a concealed state. The time opportunity for special operations is

mainly utilizing night, inclement weather and when the enemy is careless in guarding; the

activities of special operations mainly adopt indirect confrontation modes such as

deception, surprise raids, sabotage, enemy captures, and assassinations, as well as special

tactics and psychological warfare; the basic means of special operations are unorthodox

raids, the use of fighting methods and means to catch the enemy unaware at a time and

place the enemy does not expect, and swift and violent strikes to catch the enemy

unprepared.. It is worth pointing out that newly emerging computer “hacker” warfare

possesses even greater concealed quality. This kind of broadly distributed, simple to use

equipment and completely invisible logical attack will cause an armed forces which is

developed in information technology and broadly using information equipment to suffer

attacks that are difficult to guard against. Consequently, computer “hacker” warfare will

also become an important means of special operations. Concealment quality can bring the

important role of special operations into play during a modern campaign, and it is a main

factor for creating tremendous psychological deterrence for the enemy.
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(4) High effectiveness quality

High effectiveness quality refers to special operations having a very high costeffectiveness ratio. Special operations normally only requires very few campaign

strengths and operational resources, and special operation activities often are small-scale

tactical-grade activities, but due to its adoption of all kinds of special fighting methods

and means and its main objects [targets] of attack being the vital parts and critical targets

in the enemy’s operational systems {xitong}, it can gain very high operational benefits.

For example, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the USSR dispatched a

special assault team to secretly infiltrate into that country and assassinated President

Amin to cause chaos in that country, and then occupied the country almost without any

resistance. In the Gulf War, before the air strike of the multi-national force, a special

operational detachment was sent in to guide armed helicopters to destroy the border radar

stations of Iraq’s air defense system to turn the huge air defense system defunct before

the first ground attack by the multi-national force. Along with the enhancement of their

operational capability and further development of their operational theory, special

operations force-units will possibly employ small-scale activities to directly achieve some

specified campaign and strategic goals and their activities develop higher operational

effectiveness.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Special Operations...199

Campaign special operations have broad adaptability and flexibility; thus this emphasizes

flexibly selecting operational modes based on operational missions and specific situations

of the battlefield. This has resulted in the appearance of obviously diverse features for the

operational patterns of special operations. When seeing them as a whole, its main

operational patterns can be divided into the following types:

1. Special reconnaissance. This is penetration of the enemy’s campaign depth and

rear area, the implementation of strategic and campaign reconnaissance, indicating targets

for one’s own precision strike weapons, and verifying strike results, etc. Using special

operation force-units to implement reconnaissance operations is an important method for

remedying the shortage of high-tech reconnaissance means under modern conditions.

Campaign special operations are normally implemented by adopting unorthodox raids

and clandestine sabotage methods and as much as possible avoids face-to-face

confrontation with the enemy; but under very necessary situations, one can concentrate a

certain number of special operations force-units to seize-occupy important targets and

vital points in the enemy’s depth and directly complement the attack of main force forceunits.

2. Special raid-attacks. This is mainly eliminating enemy command personnel or

capturing the important military-political heads with the method of unorthodox raids and

attacking enemy strategic and campaign command institutions. The goal is to cause the

enemy’s government and armed forces to lose control and cause chaos without fighting.

This also includes capturing and eliminating the enemy’s important secrecy, intelligence
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and technical support personnel, and raiding-wiping out small force-strength groups in

the enemy depths that are careless on guard.

3. Special sabotage-attacks. This is mainly adopting “hard” destruction means such

as demolitions and destroying the enemy’s high-tech weapon systems {xitong}, C3I

systems {xitong}, radar detection systems {xitong}, airfields, piers, bridges, traffic hubs,

large rear area bases and warehouses, and weakening the enemy’s capability for

information control, operations, maneuver and logistics support.

4. Special raid-harassments. This is, in the enemy’s expansive campaign depth and

rear, the adoption of methods such as breaking the whole into pieces, going east now and

then going west, promptly striking-promptly leaving, spreading flower petals in all

directions, or [this is] the raid-attacks and capturing and killing, or blowing up, or

harassing, [this is] the putting of the enemy constantly in an air of fear, worry, uneasiness

and tiresomeness and in a difficult situation to deal with matters; and [this is] forcing the

enemy to have difficulty in concentrating its energy and force strengths to counter the

attack of one’s own main force force-units.

5. Special technical warfare. This is fully utilizing various technical means provided

by modern science and technology and achieving specific operational goals. For example,

pouring computer viruses into the enemy’s computer network systems {xitong}; applying

information technology to alter the content of command and control instructions

transmitted within the enemy’s information systems; inserting one’s own manufactured

broadcasts and images in the enemy’s radio and television stations; applying technical

means to cause deviations to occur in the enemy’s positioning and navigational systems

or cause their high-tech weapons to lose effectiveness, etc. Along with the progress of

military-use high technology, the content and methods of special technical warfare will

be further substantiated and expanded.

III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Special Operations...200

(1) Flexible organizational grouping, multi-functional capable [crack] troops

The basic requirements of campaign special operations are: small grouping, capable, and

multi-functional. “Small grouping” is the requirement in terms of scale for a special

operations organized grouping. In order to adapt to the characteristics of being flexible,

concealed and sudden, one special operational team (group) is normally organized with

several to several tens of people, and the specific number of people should be flexibly

determined on the basis of the needs-requirements for accomplishing the mission.

“Capable” is the qualitative requirement for the special operations organized grouping.

Since a special operations team (group) is normally in the enemy’s campaign depth, is far

from the main force, operates independently, and accomplishes missions with campaign

or even strategic significance, they must possess rapid infiltration capability, independent

operations capability, ad hoc variable capability, and battlefield survival capability. This

requires the composition of special operation teams [groups] from sharp solders and
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special technical personnel undergoing special training. They are also equipped with

superior weapons and equipment and special technical instruments in order to ensure the

needs-requirements of special operations. “Multi-functional” is the functional

requirement for a special operations organized grouping. The missions of special

operations have very strong flexibility and diversity and the special operation teams

[groups] must have the capability to accomplish multiple missions, so they must have a

variety of functions in terms of task-organization. The organized grouping of special

operations under modern conditions must possess a very high combined quality. Within

an operational team, not only should it be organized with experts of general-use weapons,

experts of communication and electronics, experts in engineering and explosives, and

experts in health, etc., but it should also be matched with specialized special experts

based on mission needs-requirements. At the same time, the members participating as

special operations teams should also have specialties and skills in many areas so that the

organized grouping of the special operations teams [groups] is based on the principles of

small grouping and capable troops, and possesses the function of accomplishing variously

different missions.

(2) Select vital areas to attack, give priority to unorthodox raids

Selecting vital areas to attack is the basic principle for selecting operational targets in

special operations. Special operations serves as the implementation of “precision” strike

by force strengths, and one should persist in selecting the vital area parts holding together

and propping up the enemy’s operational system {tixi} and overall operational capability

as the main objects [targets] of strikes. These vital area targets are mainly concentrated in

the enemy’s information systems {xitong}, high-tech weapon systems {xitong}, logistic

support bases and communication and transportation systems {xitong}. One should select

from amongst these systems {xitong} the vital area targets having the most strike value,

concentrate special operation strengths to give key point strikes, so as to get the effect of

“pulling one hair to move the entire body” and “attack one node and all nodes become

useless,” maximally paralyze and dismember the enemy’s operational systems {xitong},

and weaken their operational capability.

Unorthodox raid is the main operational method of campaign special operations.

Unorthodox raid can change the strength ratio of the two sides in the twinkling of an

attack, and greatly improve the relative operational strength of the special operations

team (element); it can effectively achieve suddenness and reinforce the assault results; it

can avoid the face-to-face confrontation with the enemy’s superiority force-strengths, and

improve the special operations team’s (element’s) survivability and sustained operational

capability. Consequently, one should fully bring into play the characteristics of small,

capable and flexible for the special operations team (group), [one should] utilize the

opportunities of nighttime, bad weather and careless enemy guarding, [one should] adopt

measures such as camouflaging (disguising), deception and feints, and [one should]

implement surprise raids and various sabotage activity against the enemy’s vital area

targets via concealed, sudden and fierce operational activities. Strive to attack what is not

prepared, subdue the enemy with speed, seek victory in the midst of confusion, fight fast-
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leave fast, and avoid falling into an unfavorable position of face-to-face confrontation.

Only in the situations of when absolutely necessary or as a last resort should one use the

fighting method of forced attack.

The relationship between selecting vital areas to attack and giving priority to unorthodox

raid is the relationship between goal and means. The enemy’s vital area targets are often

tightly guarded, so one can only have the possibility of achieving one’s goals by adopting

unorthodox fighting methods. The unorthodox raid is a necessary means for

implementing selecting vital areas to attack.

(3) Independent operations, dispersed in form but combined in strengths

Independent operations are the basic activity mode of the special operations team

(group). The teams (or groups) executing special operation missions separately enter the

depths of the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, each following their respective

missions, independently operating, and normally infrequently receiving any direct

assistance from other teams (groups) and main force force-units. This requires the special

operations team (group) to have a very strong capability for independent operations, and

be able to completely rely on their own strengths to accomplish the pre-determined

missions.

Separated in form and combined in strength refers to a highly independent operational

activity in terms of activity modes for special operations, and it is not fighting on one’s

own and each doing their own thing separate strikes implemented against the enemy but

rather an important component forming an organic whole with the entirety of campaign

activities that is tightly centered on the unified campaign operational intent. Although it is

difficult to form in terms of tactically, a direct complementing of each other between the

various special operational teams (groups) and between the other campaign operational

activities, they must form complementing of each other in terms of the campaign and

even the strategic level. This high level complementation is mainly manifested through

the function created from achieving the unified campaign goal. For this reason, one

should stand at the campaign and strategic height in selecting the targets of special

operations. “Good to strike” is not the main criterion for selecting targets for special

operations. The main criterion is the campaign or strategic value possessed by the target.

In order to achieve a specific campaign or strategic goal, special operations frequently

adopt activities in the enemy’s strong point parts. In this regard, this is a very large

difference between special operations and guerilla warfare. Campaign special operations

even further emphasizes bringing into play the role of achieving the general campaign

intent, and further emphasizes a campaign quality complementing of the offensive

activities of regular operational force-units. This results in each operational activity of

each special operations team (group) being able to directly or indirectly play an active

role in directly or indirectly pushing forward and affecting the entire campaign progress.

Thereby, this allows the special operations activities separately implemented in the

enemy’s great depth to form a tremendously combined strength at the campaign and even

at the strategic level.
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(4) Centralized control and dispersed command

Due to the unique qualities of special operations, the teams (groups) responsible for

special operations should be under the centralized control of the group army, service and

theater command institutions. This not only allows the campaign commander to directly

control specialized strike means and strike targets, but it also unifies the overall planning

and employment of the limited special operations strengths in the campaign’s most

important direction and on the most valuable strike targets so as to ensure the organic

adjusting-coordination of special operations activities with the activities of the entire

campaign. One should mainly adopt the mission-oriented command mode for the specific

activities of the special operation team (group), and carry out dispersed command. The

commanders of the special operation team (group) will, based on the actual battlefield

situations, handle affairs according to one’s own judgment, flexibly dispose of affairs,

and conform to all the characteristics of independent, rapid and flexible qualities of

special operations. When the battlefield situation undergoes major changes or contact

with higher levels is lost, the special operations team (group) commander should

consciously adhere to the general campaign intent and fully bring into play initiative and

creativity to try every means to accomplish the predetermined missions or diligently

create conditions and seize combat opportunities to independently organize ad hoc

operational activities and actively center on the general campaign goal in implementing

effective special operations.

Section 5: Campaign Psychological Warfare...203

Psychological warfare refers to a specially synthesized operational activity in which two

sides engaged in battle, with information and media as weapons and psychological

factors such as human thought, awareness, spirit and emotions as operational objectives,

bring to bear stimulating effects through various means and create a psychological state

favorable to us but unfavorable to the enemy, thereby solidifying one’s own

psychological defense line and maintaining high morale, splitting up and collapsing the

enemy forces, and exchanging for as small a price as big a victory as possible.

Along with the rapid development of scientific technology and continuous innovation of

weapons and equipment, the psychological warfare built on the foundation of strong

military and real economic strength will have more deterrence power and cohesive

strength than at any time of the past. Speaking from a certain sense, it can even surpass

material strengths and restrict the progress and conclusion of a war. On the one hand,

psychological warfare has powerful “soft kill” ability in war as it can achieve effects

other operational activities cannot. During operations, [we should] seriously study and

analyze the psychological characteristics and changing laws of enemy personnel,

implement psychological attack with definite aim points, adopt various means such as

propaganda, threats, deception, temptation, and bribes to induce psychological activity

and collapse their will to resist. This kind of special operational form that is completely

different from military strike will often achieve unimaginably amazing results. During the

period of the Liberation War, with the aim of shaking the enemy army’s faith, the PLA
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utilized various forms {xingshi}, leading with propaganda, to influence the reasoning and

awareness of the enemy personnel, conquered their hearts in terms of thought and

politics, caused the enemy to put down their weapons and surrender, and achieved

brilliant battle results. On the other hand, psychological warfare has powerful cohesive

function which can extremely elevate combat power during operations. War is famous for

its fierceness, tension, hardship, bloodiness and cruelty, and all personnel participating in

operational activities suffer tremendous psychological pressure. Under these situations,

we should adopt various effective methods for conducting psychological protection,

raising our own personnel’s psychological endurance capability, and weakening the

enemy’s psychological effects. All of these enable one’s own personnel from start to

finish for maintaining the conviction of must win, maintaining the optimism for defying

hardships and dangers, and thus maintaining a vigorous combat power.

In short, psychological warfare has become an indispensable operational form in a

modern campaign. The fighting methods and application scope of psychological warfare

also continuously develop along with the development of warfare. In a modern war,

psychological warfare is called “one of the various operational modes on the integrated

battlefield” and “the fourth operational mode as distinguished from land warfare, air

warfare and sea warfare.” The development of informationized war has decided the

inevitable enlarged role of psychological warfare and that objectively requires placing

psychological warfare in a more important position.

I. Main Characteristics of Campaign Psychological Warfare...204

(1) Psychological warfare possesses a distinctive strategic quality feature

Psychological warfare under modern conditions is the highest phase as well as the highest

form-state of psychological warfare development up to today. In the era of

informationized wars, psychological warfare has been included in the category of national

strategy and has become an important operational form for achieving national strategic

objectives. Psychological warfare is no longer an auxiliary means in military struggle 

but rather an important campaign activity possessing strategic significance. The

macroscopic instigating hierarchy of psychological warfare has already been elevated to

the highest national and military strategic decision-making levels and the foremost attack

targets of psychological warfare also directly aim at the opponent’s highest strategic

decision-making level. The localized war under modern conditions, due to the restrictions

of various factors and the strength, scope and time of military strikes, can be restricted as

much as possible within the scope of what is permitted politically. For each military

activity, one must not only consider its military value but also its political and

psychological value. For every phase of the campaign, one must evaluate the

psychological effects achieved on the enemy and then decide the strength of the next

phase’s military strike in order for military objectives and political-psychological

objectives to highly coincide. In modern wars, the criteria for measuring success are no

longer solely the material factors such as personnel casualties, property losses and loss of

territory. Conquering the spirit has become a fundamental goal and symbol for conquest
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and victory. The ultimate objective of military activities is also the conquest of national

will and social psychology. The high tech quality of campaign activities under modern

informationized conditions has given psychological warfare solid materialistic technical

foundation and means, thereby enabling its development to become an even more active

and important role. The implementation of high intensity psychological warfare against

the enemy has already become an importantly indispensable component in military

strategy. It is already difficult to distinguish the strategic, campaign or tactical levels of

psychological warfare activities in integrated joint operations, and the psychological

warfare campaign scale and even the tactical scale frequently can bring about an

important strategic role.

(2) The characteristics of diverse psychological warfare methods and concurrent

implementation of soft and hard are prominent

The unfolding of psychological warfare itself is directed against human psychology, and

it has all along been traditionally regarded as a mode of soft strike, but in modern wars,

because “psychological warfare” and “military warfare” have been tightly combined, and

many methods are synthetically applied in psychological warfare, mutually

complementing each other and concurrent implementation of soft-hard, the effectiveness

of psychological warfare has been greatly enhanced. The so-called hard generally refers

to physically conducting real kills against humans via weapons; the so-called soft refers 

to creating an effect against human reasoning, emotions and will via psychological

methods, achieving the goal of depriving or changing the mental spirit, morale and will of

enemy personnel, not harming the physical body of the opponent and “attacking the

enemy without form.”

The soft quality strike of modern psychological warfare will achieve hard kill by creating

psychological damage. The high-tech weapons used to conduct armed strikes is precisely

the effective means of psychological warfare, and their display and employment are able

to achieve the actual results of psychological warfare. The soft quality strike of

psychological warfare itself has no form and must have the help of carriers and delivery

instruments to achieve the effectiveness and function of a weapon, which is also to say

that soft-quality weapons must be attached to hard-quality weapons before it can become

a weapon. For example, the microwave weapon, the hypersonic weapon and the

infrasonic weapon currently being vied for by the countries of the world, there are major

differences between their ways and means of killing and that of conventional weapons,

but what must be paid attention to is not the human flesh and body to be destroyed but the

human will. Thus it may be said that the means used by psychological warfare themselves

are both soft and hard.

Additionally, the traits of a highly blended “military warfare” and “psychological

warfare” in modern integrated joint operations have decided that the fighting method of

psychological warfare is definitely a concurrently implemented soft and hard. Deterrence

concurrently exists with reason and comfort, and the implementation of both a hard

contest of strength and a soft-quality lure for gain extremely enriches the content of
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psychological warfare activities. In terms of operational results, the physiological hard

wounds caused by firepower kill will also bring about a psychological soft kill, while the

slight decrease in enemy personnel combat power created by psychological soft kill is

also exactly the operational results pursued by hard kill.

(3) The time domain of psychological warfare activities has an extended quality

Under modern conditions, psychological warfare often has already been implemented

before the campaign is initiated. It also permeates the entire campaign course and its

effectiveness can still be brought into play after its operational activities have concluded.

Its implementation is manifested in a phase quality, it is unfolded over the full time, and

it has an extended quality in terms of time domain. Although the content, object [target]

and pattern of activities in its different phases are not all the same, its general objective is

consistent. In the Gulf War, the U.S. military psychological warfare units were took the

lead in their bushu disposition and arrived in place five months before the war erupted to

unfold prior to battle psychological warfare activities. On the one hand, they played up

that U.S. forces and a large quantity of new-type weapons and equipment had arrived in

the Gulf with the intention of creating a huge psychological deterrence for the Iraqi

people and creating momentum for a big war; on the other hand, they were helped the

media to continuously issue “authoritative” news-information with which to confuse the

Iraqi forces and manufacture the false image that the multi-national forces would not start

the war until February. During the course of operations, the U.S. psychological warfare

units actively unfolded their activities to fool, mislead, and deceive the Iraqi public and

military, collapsing their will, slackening their sentiments and effectively complementing

the military offensive activities. After the end of the war, the psychological warfare

personnel continued to execute missions in the northern Iraq. Another example is after

the end of the Kosovo war, NATO continued to publicize through various means the “just

quality” of their activities, made accusations on the “crimes” of Yugoslavian leaders, and

augmented the achievements of their military strikes through psychological warfare with

the intent of ultimately conquering public sentiments. In this sense, psychological warfare

activities played a vanguard role in war, catalyzed the war results and also did its utmost

to consolidate and preserve the war results. Because psychological activities are often

somewhat covert [concealed] at the beginning of initiation, campaign initiation and

conclusion still start and end with military strikes, but in fact, due to the participation of

psychological activities, the start and end of campaign activities under modern conditions

has also changed to a concealed quality and has a relatively extended quality in terms of

time-domain.

(4) The functional scope of psychological warfare is vast without precedent

When comparing the operational domains, objects [targets] and spaces of psychological

warfare with other operational activities, there is an even more prominent extended

quality. From the perspective of operational domain, a modern war is not simply confined

to the violent confrontation on the battlefield any more, and it has expanded to an even

broader sense of the contest of strength to comprehensive national power and national
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potential, etc. Psychological warfare is not only a contest of strength and competition in

the military domain but one can also fully bring into play the functions of all domains

such as the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and religious.

From the perspective of the object [target] of operations, psychological warfare activities

are not restricted by personnel and departments, but it can psychically influence any

organization and individual, including political heads, military leaders, ordinary soldiers

and even the people and masses in the rear. The objects [targets] of psychological warfare

can even refer to the countries and regions participating or not participating in fighting, as

well as the friendly countries, international organizations and even the entire international

society. The implementation of effective psychological warfare activities against these

different objects [targets], one can also achieve maintaining an exalted will to fight of

one’s own personnel and stabilize one’s own front; it can cause the enemy’s personnel to

be weary of war, be fearful of war, be anti-war, and collapse their front; and cause neutral

parties to sympathize with and lean to one’s own goals.

From the perspective of operational space, the battlefield of a modern war has broken

through the boundaries between front and rear and between theater and non-theater. The

battlefield itself has the dynamic-state non-linear quality of you are amongst us and we

are amongst you. The unfolding of psychological activities directed at psychological

defensive lines without form has long discarded the traditional battlefield boundaries, and

the unfolding is in all directions of the domain of vast space.

II. Basic Patterns of Campaign Psychological Warfare...207

The basic patterns of campaign psychological warfare can be divided into psychological

attack and psychological defense:

1. Psychological attack. It is a non-kill-quality attack activity implemented against the

enemy’s psychologies of understanding and conviction. Its goal is to weaken the enemy’s

combat power through controlling the enemy’s awareness and spirit so as to create

favorable conditions for campaign operations. Inclusion of psychological attack in the

scope of information warfare further elevates the direct effectiveness of information

operations. On the battlefield, implementing attack against the enemy’s psychologies of

understanding and conviction is a critical link for winning battlefield information

warfare. According to its nature, psychological attack is divided into mainly two modes:

One is attacking the enemy’s psychology of understanding. This is, on the basis of the

needs-requirements of campaign operations, adopting various operational deception

activities with goals and planning and not allowing the enemy’s command officers any

way to attain a correct understanding of the current situations and future developments on

the battlefield or to be led into the attacking side’s pre-established “information trap” and

thus make mistakes in decision making and adopt erroneous activities. The essence of

deceptive psychological attack is cause the loss of ability for correct analysis and

assessment of the battlefield posture, through attacking the understanding systems

{xitong} of the enemy command personnel. Its main object [target] of attack is the
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various levels of the enemy’s command decision-making personnel, and from the

perspective of campaign operations, this mainly refers to the enemy’s campaign/strategic

command officers and command organs. These are the concentrated manifestation of

battle of wits and stratagems by commanders of both sides on the battlefield. During

campaign operations, the main methods for attacking the enemy’s psychology of

understanding are campaign feint, campaign camouflage and intelligence deception.

Second is attacking the enemy’s psychology of conviction. This mainly is striking the

enemy’s psychology of conviction with various open psychological attack modes in order

to achieve the goals of collapsing the enemy military’s will to fight and morale and

weakening the enemy military’s combat power. This main object [target] of this kind of

psychological attack is the broad mass of soldiers and the grass roots officers of the

enemy’s military. It main methods are to let the enemy military comprehend their own

real plight through open propaganda of various forms, or cause the negative sentiments

such as being weary of war, anti-war, fear, and homesickness until they finally give up

resistance and make it very difficult for commanders to implement command and control

of their bushu disposition according to their own desires.

2. Psychological protection is the series of activities {huodong} directed at the

enemy’s psychological attacks and adopted with the aim of seeing through the enemy’s

military deception, dispelling the undesirable effects of harmful propaganda, stabilizing

the force-units and raising morale. Psychological protection can roughly be divided into

three categories: first is psychology of understanding protection. Namely, these are the

various campaign activities {huodong} that can be implemented against the enemy, the

establishment of a high level of being psychologically on guard, the simultaneous

implementation of thorough and prompt battlefield reconnaissance, the correct analysis

and assessment of battlefield situations, and seeing through the enemy’s tricks. Second is

psychology of conviction protection. This mainly refers to the activities {xingdong}

adopted for maintaining the force-units’ will to fight, morale and cohesive power.

Conviction psychology protection has a strong synthesized quality. Not only does it

include adopting psychological confrontations such as anti-propaganda, anti-instigation,

and anti-temptation directed against the enemy’s psychological attack, but it also includes

conducting of thought education such as unified thought, enhancing unity and inspiring

morale for one’s own force-units. It also includes various assisting-support work having

forms, such as maximally safeguarding the living needs-requirements of force-units on

the battlefield so as to promptly replenish troops and weapon munitions for the

operational force-units. Third is the psychology of spirit protection. This mainly refers to

preventing operational personnel from suffering tremendous pressure on body and mind

and creating an epidemic in the psychology of spirit (the phenomenon of pathological

psychology of spirit). The scope touched upon by psychological protection is very broad

and permeates from start to finish of campaign operations, thus the basic principles for

implementing psychological protection are having a directed quality, prompt quality and

flexibility.
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III. Basic Requirements of Campaign Psychological Warfare...208

(1) Active initiative and combined attack and defense

Active initiative is, during the organization and implementation of psychological warfare

activities and with an attitude of active initiative, adopting active initiative activities,

firmly grasping operational initiative, mastering battlefield posture, dominating the

campaign progress and development direction, achieving psychological superiority over

the enemy, and ensuring campaign victory. Its core is seizing initiative.

One must grasp initiative in psychological warfare and one must strengthen one’s

scientific foresight. [One must] capture combat opportunity and grasp key points in

unfolding fierce attack against the enemy. One must actively find the breakthrough point

of psychological attack, give enemy fatal strikes and collapse their entire psychological

defensive line. At the same time, we should concentrate our strengths, rationally apply

warfare methods, strike the enemy’s vital parts, and achieve the goals of attacking the

solid and wresting their will {攻坚夺志 gongjian duozhi}. Only in this manner can we

genuinely achieve the requirement of active initiative.

Like all other operational activities, psychological warfare always has both attack and

defense, so even under the conditions of maintaining an attack posture, one will be

attacked. Therefore, psychological warfare must persist in active defense during attack

with initiative and accomplish a combined attack and defense. In psychological warfare

under informationized conditions, stopping the enemy’s implementation of psychological

attack with the negative modes of being divorced from reality and shutting the doors and

windows is fundamentally useless. Therefore, on the one hand, one must strengthen

protection and guidance, and open up information, allow one’s personnel to gather data

one can distinguish the real from the false. One must also guide people with real

information, inspire people with firm conviction, and taking initiative in the defense of

the enemy’s psychological attack. At the same time, one must conduct counterattack with

initiative. In order for this kind of counterattack to produce results, then one must have

the foresight to conduct psychological protection, and in order to have direct

counterattacks with a directed-nature, one must utilize the enemy’s existing weak points

and concentrate counterattack with key points. Counterattack activities must firmly

implement effective counterattacks by paying attention on seizing the issues having a

relatively large effect on our military and people and the issues most easily poisoning

their sentiments. One must not take all matters the same and immediately counterattack

when attacked. By doing this, we will only create the situation of being too tired to deal

with matters and have no way to achieve the core goal of mastering psychological

warfare initiative.

(2) Specialization of strengths and unified adjusting-coordination

In a modern campaign, in order to more effectively implement psychological attack and

defense, one must attach importance to establishing specialty psychological warfare
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strengths to open-up-development in psychological activities under informationized

conditions. First is one must establish a scientific and effective organized leadership

institution. Within the joint operational command headquarters {lianhe zuozhan

zhihuibu}, one should set up a special psychological warfare department or designate a

given department to specially be responsible. [This department] would be responsible for

conducting planning and guidance of the psychological warfare activities in the theater or

a given direction. Second is to establish specialized psychological force-units and

cultivate specialty talent for psychological warfare. Currently, many counties have

established specialized psychological warfare force-units. For example, the psychological

warfare force strengths of the U.S. military account for 5% of the total force strengths,

they are assigned to force-units of all services, and are able to execute broad

psychological warfare missions.

The integrated feature of joint operations under informationized conditions has decided

that the strengths used for implementing psychological warfare activities are also a multielement and integrated. Not only are there specialty psychological warfare force-units,

but non-specialty ordinary serviceman and masses are also included as well as various

armed forces organizational-units, government department, and social organizations and

groups, etc. are included. Specialty psychological warfare strengths themselves also have

many departments such as operations, intelligence, communications, propaganda,

electronic warfare, people-masses work and liaison work, etc. In operations, one must

adjust-coordinate these strengths together and from a combined joining of strengths, with

unified bushu disposition, unified command, and unified employment so as to bring the

integrated operational might of various strengths into play. One must unify together the

activities of these personnel and departments, and avoid contradicting each other and

interfering with each other.

Another important aspect of unified adjusting-coordination is to successfully adjustcoordinate the interrelationships of various different levels and links of psychological

warfare activities, strategically, in a campaign, tactically as well as peacetime and

wartime so as to form a structurally robust system {xitong} and bring a maximum effect

into play. In short, in order to strive for initiative in a future war and win a complete

victory in psychological warfare, one must strengthen the unified adjusting-coordination

in each area and at each level.

(3) Be objective and rational, and have definite goals

The requirement for being objective and rational refers to psychological warfare activities

must set out from realities, respect objective facts as well as be based on facts, it allows

the object [target] of psychological warfare to sense a factual nature for information, it is

easy to generate a psychological identity, and it avoids creating a sense of exclusion;

moreover, psychological warfare must also possess a rational quality in terms of time-,

area-, conditional- and specific- activities, namely, conform with conventional thinking,

conventional standards, and conventional situations. Under modern conditions,

information sources have expanded without precedence and there are more favorable
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assessment conditions for people’s assessments on the authenticity of information,

therefore, the information weapons utilized in psychological warfare must be first

established on the basis of objective facts. Completely not conducting fabrications

accordingly causes someone to easily know what’s real and false in one glance, and

obviously one is unable to achieve the goals of psychological warfare. Along with the

broad employment of modern high-tech means in the psychological warfare domain, has

also resulted in information weapons being able to perform “creation” through these

high-tech means. However, one must note that this kind of creation must have a factual

basis, and it must also have a real basis. In recent localized wars, each side of a war

utilized terrain, etc. to successfully implement psychological warfare of military

deception only because its “creation” had considerably high realness.

In the psychological warfare under informationized conditions, if information

transmission is rational, then people will believe it and thereby the goal of psychological

warfare is achieved. This information must conform to the general understanding of

things by people, conform to the basic laws of warfare development, conform with the

understanding of the laws happening to things, and they appear as basic laws and

common knowledge. In order to have rational transmission of information, first, one must

select the appropriate time opportunity and give information a rational time opportunity,

meaning the things expressed in the information of psychological warfare should happen

at the appropriate time. Second, one should select an appropriate object [target] to

implement suitable psychological warfare against. One must have a definite goal, for

example, in implementing religious psychological warfare means against Islam, one

absolutely cannot use what is used for Catholicism. Third, one must select the appropriate

location and lend a rational quality to the location of something happening. Fourth, one

must properly process information by not excessively overstating and causing someone to

generate doubt, so one must allow information to only be natural but factual. Fifth is one

must allow the information to technically or in principle conform to basic principles and

rules. Implementing psychological warfare in a modern campaign, concealing the real

and showing the false, and confusing the real with the false are both very good methods,

but they must be rational, if an irrational spot appears in their use would run counter to

what is desired.

(4) Be concealed and sudden, and be strict in secrecy

The requirement for being concealed and sudden means that in course of implementing

psychological warfare, one must conceal the true intention of the one implementing and

cause the object [target] to unknowingly receive the psychological effect. In

psychological warfare activities, if one wishes to conceal one’s own intention without the

object’s [target’s] perception, we must first stand in the position of the opponent6 to

observe the problem and understand things. We must use the psychology of the opponent

6 Translator’s comment: please note that here the “object” {duixiang} changes to “opponent” {duifang} in

mid-paragraph. The difference between the terms is the xiang and the fang. The difference in meaning is

subtle and the change is from the meaning of “opposite image” to “opposite side”.
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to feel things and comprehend the problem, and in this manner the ascertained content

and means of psychological warfare will also be accepted by the opponent. In a modern

campaign, one must establish and maintain a relationship of a certain association with the

opponent at a specific level and establish and maintain a specific communication [with

the opponent]. Only by doing this are the effects of psychological warfare covertly

[concealed manner] exerted on the opponent and thus the operational goal is achieved.

Ensuring psychological warfare planning {jihua} and implementation through measures

of strictly maintaining secrecy is a requirement that must be satisfied for any form of

psychological activities without which psychological warfare will lose its significance.

As the true-false and nominal-real of psychological warfare becomes more complex and

difficult to identify, one needs to maintain secrecy even more, and furthermore, strictly

maintaining secrecy itself is a kind of psychological warfare measure. The main goal of

maintaining secrecy is to cause the enemy to be unable to know what is nominal or real,

to have no way of correctly making assessments, to have difficulty in seizing the combat

opportunity, and even to lure the enemy into making mistakes in their decision making.

In organizing and implementing psychological warfare activities, one must strictly

control the scope of the knowledge of classified [information], strengthen the

management of maintaining secrecy, and promptly detect and stop leaks. Psychological

warfare itself has a hierarchical quality and is a system {xitong} implemented in multiple

domains, from multiple angles and in multiple modes. Its command, organization and

specific implementation has a scope of strictly secret [cleared] personnel, so maintaining

secrecy must be workable within the corresponding scope [where] everyone knows their

own missions without exceeding their hierarchy or leaping over their boundaries. To this

end, one must then formulate a corresponding secrecy [classification] zhidu system and

conduct standardization {guifan} and management with laws-regulations {fagui}, as well

as strictly execute them. Under modern conditions, the complex nature of psychological

warfare makes this point particularly important. In addition, psychological warfare needs

a corresponding inspection and control system {tixi} that not only inspects-controls the

plan {jihua} implementation situation, promptly performs adjustments and ensures the

results of psychological warfare information, but it also ensures security through

inspection-controls, so when one discovers a security leak situation, one promptly adopts

remedial measures and enables the continued conduct of psychological warfare.]
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Chapter 7

Campaign Operational Support...212

Campaign operational support7 is a general designation referring to various support

measures unified-planned and organized by the campaign command organ in order to

ensure that the campaign large formation safely and smoothly carries out campaign

missions. Campaign operational support is an important basis for fully demonstrating the

capabilities of weapon systems and for the smooth execution of a campaign. Thus it is an

important factor in the formation of campaign operational capabilities. Organizing

campaign operational support in a comprehensive and meticulous manner is of vital

importance to enhancing the operational capabilities of various services and arms and to

safely and smoothly accomplishing campaign missions.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...212

I. Characteristics...212

(1) Heavy support tasks, multitude of contents and high requirements for integratedwhole

A modern campaign is an all services and arms joint operation implemented in the five

integrated dimensions of land, sea, air, outer space and electromagnetic fields. It covers a

multitude of battlefields and areas and it is a large and complex system. Campaign

operational support is an arduous task. Campaign operational support not only involves

various participating services and arms, various campaign battlefields and various

operational activities, but also runs through the entire course of a campaign from

organization to execution. Any specific support strength or means has its characteristics

as well as limitations. By relying on any single support strength and means, one

obviously can not expect to comprehensively carry out campaign operational support

missions. Only by making support strengths and means complement and support each

other can one take advantage of the collective power and achieve excellent results.

Therefore, in the organization of campaign operational support, to maintain integrated

support is even more prominent. It is necessary to set up a comprehensive in categories

and types, well coordinated and integrated operational support system with detailed

division of labor and in accordance with the needs of multi-service, multi-arm joint

operations as well as with specific characteristics of various services and arms.

7 Translator’s note: in all cases unless otherwise noted, the support referred to in this chapter refers to

safeguarding-support {保障 baozhang}, which is contrasted with another type of support – assistingsupport {支援 zhiyuan}, which is also translated as support.
236

(2) High degree of fusion between campaign operational support and operational

activities

With wide introduction of high-tech weapon systems and equipment in modern warfare,

new requirements are raised on operational support. To bring into play the capabilities of

high-tech weapon systems and equipment, one must rely on support in various aspects.

Without timely and reliable support, it is very difficult to maximize the effects of such

weapon systems and equipment. As a result, operational support and operational

activities have increasingly demonstrated a high degree of fusion. On the one hand,

support operations such as reconnaissance and intelligence gathering and communication

have already been well integrated into operational activities. These operations have a dual

role in operational support and operational activities. On the other hand, operational

support is, at any given time, indispensable to operational activities. Successful support is

a pre-condition and basis for the smooth execution of operational activities. Without

support, there can be no operations. The two are inseparable from each other.

(3) Highly technical and time sensitive

Campaign operational support has developed alongside campaign development. The

rapid development in science and technology and their application in the military field

have had a direct impact on campaign operational support, making it more and more

technical. This is not only due to the fact that campaign operational support itself has

adopted a large amount of high-tech equipment and means, but also because, more

importantly, the objects, scope and extent of campaign operational support have

undergone profound changes. For the moment, micro-electronic technology is widely

used in battlefields and space; infra red, laser, high-energy rays, artificial intelligence,

super- conductor and stealth technologies have been developed and put to use.

Operational activities now possess a characteristic high-tech nature. As a result, 

campaign operational support must similarly have a high-tech nature. At the same time,

in a modern campaign, the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery force themselves

are highly technical services. As a result, the operational support for their campaign

missions is also very technical.

In a modern campaign, the characteristic of time sensitivity has become more and more

pronounced. The introduction of various advanced weapon systems and equipment and

technologies make it imperative for various campaign systems to operate at a fast clip and

high speed. Battlefield conditions can change instantaneously. They are dynamic and

fluid, changing drastically and constantly. Whether it is campaign command and

coordination, or it is a large formation maneuver, assault and engagement, or other

activities, they are all conducted with an emphasis on speed, timeliness and surprise.

Therefore, campaign operational support must be highly time sensitive.
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(4) Conducted in an environment of intense confrontation, large degree of difficulty for

support

The wide use of advanced C4I systems and long-range, high-precision and powerful

weapons in modern wars has made campaign operations more tense and ferocious, and

conflict far more intense than in the past. Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance,

strikes and counter-strikes, maneuvers and counter-maneuvers, blockade and antiblockade, sabotage and anti-sabotage, jamming and anti-jamming operations intertwine

with one another. The two sides would seek to quickly degrade and debilitate the other

side through various actual or invisible attacks. Campaign large formation safety is under

constant threat. At the same time, the conflict between the two sides over campaign

operational support systems is also highly intense. The two sides would wage an intense

contest aimed at enhancing one’s own support capabilities while degrading the

capabilities of the other side. Hence, in high-intensity conflicts, campaign operational

support faces some grave challenges, and provision of such support would be a highly

difficult task.

II. The Requirements of Campaign Operational Support...214

(1) Support capabilities compatible with operational activities

Campaign operational support capabilities are an important component of campaign

operational capabilities. Campaign operational activities depend on the backing and

complement of operational support. In a certain sense, the capabilities of operational

support would have a direct impact on the modes, scales, fighting methods and duration

of campaign operations, or even on the outcome of the campaign. Therefore, one should

correctly manage the relationship between operational support capabilities and

operational activities. On the one hand, one should, based on the needs of operational

activities, fully utilize operational support capabilities, making them serve the operations

as much as they can. On the other hand, one must also take into consideration the limit of

such capabilities so as to avoid the situation under which the operational activities exceed

operational support capabilities. Only by making the two suited to and coordinated with

each other can one ensure a smooth progression of the campaign. To achieve this goal, in

the course of campaign overall-planning and command, the campaign commander should

try his best to pay enough attention and give his backing to support strengths in various

aspects. That is to say that the campaign commander should be willing to spare and

devote the necessary manpower to enhancing operational support capabilities. At the

same time, he should pay attention to mobilizing all possible support strengths,

meticulously organize reliable operational support and bring into play its capabilities so

as to meet the needs of operational activities.
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(2) Timely and reliable

To enhance the timeliness and reliability of campaign operational support is not only a

basic requirement of campaign operational support, but also critical to the smooth

completion of support missions.

Timely support refers to the requirement that the acquisition, transmission and processing

of intelligence must be conducted in a speedy manner; command and coordination must

be smooth; and various support measures must be adopted by seizing the time and seizing

the opportunity so as to bring them into play at the most needed junctures of the

campaign. In a modern campaign, the element of surprise has greatly increased. The pace

has been greatly accelerated with fast transitions and drastic changes in the campaign

situation. The timeliness in campaign support has become an important factor in

shortening command cycles, enhancing command efficiency, and in strengthening rapid

response and self-protection capabilities of force-units.

Reliable support means that the intelligence acquired must be true, the transmission of all

information must be accurate, the various support measures and means must be truly

effective, and they must ensure bringing into play the functions. Under modern

conditions, particularly under informationized conditions, the struggle between

reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, between deception and anti-deception is

intense. There are a lot of uncertainties regarding the truthfulness of intelligence, as one

can lose control of a lot of factors and accurate transmission of information can be

difficult. The struggle between jamming and counter-jamming and between sabotage and

anti-sabotage is also very intense. Support is characterized by its repetitiveness,

continuity and militancy. There are high qualitative requirements. The heavy toll on

personnel and materiel is difficult to replenish. All these factors have highlighted the

importance of support reliability.

In order to ensure timely and reliable support, one must strive to enhance the quality of

support strength personnel and their equipment. On this basis, one should meticulously

draw up plans and make full preparations in accordance with concrete campaign

conditions. To this end, prior to the launching of a campaign, one should widely collect

relevant information, anticipate possible support missions, draw up multiple advance

support plans and conduct well targeted training and preparations so as to enhance

support’s adaptability and emergency response capabilities. In the course of a campaign,

based on campaign developments and campaign needs, one should rationally divide up

and employ support strengths, make quick response and flexible execution, and seize

time to provide effective support. At the same time, one should pay attention to checking

the results through collecting feedback and promptly adjust support methods and key

points. In addition, in order to cope with emergencies in a fluid battlefield environment,

one should also maintain an appropriate and sizable support reserve strength so as to

strengthen the capabilities for quick support and sustained support and to enhance support

stability.
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(3) Comprehensive and with key points

Modern campaign operations are trials of overall strength between two opposing sides.

Only by maximizing various factors can one win campaign victory. Therefore, campaign

operational support should not only take into consideration the needs of any one

particular aspect of the campaign (such as the needs of one particular service or arm, one

weapon system, one operational pattern, one battlefield direction or one point of time).

Instead, one must take the entire campaign, the overall situation and the needs of various

aspects as the point of departure, look after all aspects of the entire campaign system and

provide comprehensive support. One must avoid attending to certain aspects while losing

sight of other aspects. To this end, in terms of space, one should look well after the

frontal battlefield as well as the flanks and depth and provide all aspect support on the

ground, the sea and in the air. In terms of time, one should look well after various phases,

points of time and the entire course of the campaign and provide sustained and

uninterrupted support. In terms of support objects, one should look well after various

participating services and arms in a way that is suited to their respective characteristics

and special needs.

Comprehensive support does not mean not differentiating main and secondary, nor does

it mean evenly using support strengths without key points. This is because in an actual

operation, campaign support requirements vary with different campaign directions and

areas, at different phases and different points of time, and with different large formations

(formations) and different force-units. Only at the same time as taking care of the

comprehensive, having a grip on the key links and main contradictions and implementing

comprehensive support with key points can one better satisfy the needs for campaign

operational support. To this end, the campaign commander should, based on campaign

missions, the enemy conditions, battlefield conditions and support strength conditions,

and in anticipation of possible campaign developments, make unified-overall-plan

arrangements and comprehensive planning, differentiate what is important and urgent and

what is not, give prominence to the key points and correctly implement various campaign

operational support. One should rationally organize and deploy various support strengths.

Give priority to supporting the services and arms and force-units of the main battlefield,

the main direction and areas, the critical time occasions, and the ones executing the main

missions, so as to ensure the accomplishment of the key missions. Particularly in cases

when one faces a heavy support task and an inadequacy in support strengths, it is even

more important to stress the key points in providing support. At the same time, care

should also be taken to provide support to the needs of other directions and areas, at other

points of time and to the needs of other force-units so as to maximize support’s effect on

the entire campaign.

(4) Enhancing the overall function

To enhance campaign operational support functions is a basic requirement on campaign

operational support under informationized conditions. It is also an effective way to carry

out campaign operational support. To this end, one must adopt the concept of collective
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support, turning one’s attention from single service support to multi-service, multi-arm

support, from single campaign support to support for a series of campaigns, and from

emphasizing single dimensional and linear support to multi-dimensional support and key

point, multi-directional and full depth support, so as to develop an organic whole that

combines support strengths and means, support space and time. One must strengthen the

support functions of the commanding organ, taking into consideration support operations

together with operational activities and making comprehensive arrangements. Based on

the general needs of campaign activities, one should unify the task organization of the use

of support strengths, unify the formulation of the support plan, unify-overall-plan the

differentiation of support missions, and unify the control and adjusting-coordination of

various support activities so as to form an organic whole. One should comprehensively

employ various support strengths and means. That is, in the employment of strengths, one

should rely on the specialized support strengths of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force

as the backbone while at the same time actively seeking to mobilize the support strengths

of the masses of people in playing supplementary support roles. Various specialized

support units possess special technical equipment and have undergone special technical

training. Thus they have relatively strong support capabilities and should be regarded as

the backbone for carrying out operational support. The people are also a support strength

that should not be overlooked, and they can be assigned to carry out some support

missions within their abilities. In terms of means, one should try to make various

supports, such as reconnaissance, communication, engineering, disguising and protection

etc., complement and co-ordinate with each other so as to bring into play a collective

effect of the entire support system. To this end, one should, based on battlefield

conditions and campaign operational needs, combine planned support with ad hoc

support, unified collective support of various services and arms with independent

supports of various service and arms, specialized strength support with support of the

masses, military support with local civilian support, and high-tech means with mediumlevel and low tech means.

(5) Strengthening self support

In modern campaign operations, various participating services and arms, and various

large formations (formations) and units should also establish a consciousness for selfsupport. They should, through utilizing their own personnel and equipment, organize

operational support so as to enhance self-support capabilities and meet part of their own

support needs-requirements. The implementation of self-support is an effective method

for resolving insufficiencies in specialized support strengths and it is an objective

requirement of a modern campaign. As far as a campaign large formation is concerned,

due to limits in supports provided by specialized force- (element-) units, total reliance on

specialized force- (element-) units to provide campaign operational support would

inevitably come into conflict with the objective reality of a modern campaign

characterized by varied support contents and heavy support duties. It thus would affect

the timeliness and reliability of support. In cases where battlefield conditions are

changing drastically, in particular, it is very difficult to completely rely on specialized

support force- (element-) units to undertake some temporary or urgent support missions.

In view of this, it is even more necessary to adopt the concept of establishing self-
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support. To this end, various large formations (formations) and units should strengthen

operational support training in peacetime and carry certain quantities of support

equipment and instruments in order to enhance self-support capabilities. And they should

try their best to be self-reliant in support capabilities without relying on specialized

support force- (element-) units.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...217

The main contents of campaign support include reconnaissance and intelligence support,

communication support, engineering support, camouflage, transport support, protection

from nuclear, chemical, biological and other specially lethal and destructive weapons,

meteorological and hydrological support, surveying and mapping support and battlefield

control etc.

I. Reconnaissance and Intelligence Support...217

Campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support refers to various activities carried out

by campaign large formations to acquire and provide campaign intelligence by

employing various reconnaissance and intelligence strengths and through various means.

The basic mission of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support is to promptly,

accurately, and continuously acquire information needed in campaign operations. In order

to provide the necessary intelligence data to the command institutions of the participating

services and arms and the force-units, such information should be centered on the enemy

situation but should also include political, economic, military, geographical,

meteorological, hydrological etc. conditions of the region of operation. The basic

requirements of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support are: integrated

application, give prominence to key points, prompt and accurate, and sharing of results.

The main measures of campaign reconnaissance and intelligence support include the

following points:

(1) Setting up a multi-dimensional reconnaissance system

In order to ensure multi-domain, around the clock air and ground intelligence collection,

the campaign command organ should follow the instructions given by the commander

and higher authorities and deploy reconnaissance strengths comprehensively and with key

points. There should conduct unified and rational bushu disposition and employment of

various high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance equipment and instruments such as

reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance (early warning) aircraft, reconnaissance ships,

ground advanced reconnaissance equipment etc. They should organically combine the

reconnaissance of outer space, air, ground, sea (underwater) front, flank depth and rear

area and the reconnaissance of the armed forces and locals to form a three dimensional

intelligence and reconnaissance distribution system. [They should] form a threedimensional intelligence and reconnaissance distribution system that is multi-directional,

multi-domain, multi-tiered, all weather, and that combines long-, medium and short-range

reconnaissance, and a mutually complementary high-, medium- and low altitude. [They
242

should] ascertain the enemy’s land, sea and air operational intentions, force-strength

bushu disposition and activity characteristics, and promptly acquire the damage situation

of the enemy’s command and control, reconnaissance and communication, supply and

support systems, heavy forces concentrations, airfields, ports, and high-tech weapons

after suffering our strike.

(2) Expanding ways to acquire intelligence

One should comprehensively utilize various reconnaissance methods and means to widen

intelligence sources. For instance, one should comprehensively utilize technical

reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, secret reconnaissance, space reconnaissance, aero

reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, sea surface (underwater) reconnaissance,

wireless technical reconnaissance, infrared reconnaissance, remote sensing

reconnaissance, special reconnaissance, espionage reconnaissance, enemy rear

reconnaissance, and reconnaissance by masses of people and various other ways and

means. One should pay attention to gathering and studying the enemy’s documents and

material, rationally use the intelligence provided by the strategic intelligence system,

fully exploit intelligence provided by friendly forces, strengthen analyses and study on

strategic locations and on the topography of the operations area, and timely and

comprehensively analyze, process and treat tactical intelligence that has strategic value so

as to make it serve campaign operations.

(3) Setting up unhindered and speedy intelligence transmission networks

The campaign command organ should establish an unhindered intelligence

communication network between higher authorities, the force-units of subordinate

services and arms, the intelligence institutions of friendly and locals and directly

subordinate reconnaissance force- (element-) units, comprehensively using many kinds of

transmission modes and promptly and rapidly transmitting intelligence; when conditions

permit, it [campaign command organ] should strive to allow intelligence communications

to form independent intelligence networks and establish automated intelligence

transmission systems; the communication networks of subordinate force-units should

give priority to the transmission of support intelligence, while for important intelligence,

it should adopt two of the above supports as communication means; for the main

reconnaissance direction and reconnaissance organizational-units, it should do one’s best

to establish dedicated lines, routes or networks and give key point support; it should also

plan and conceive in advance a method for intelligence transmission once

communications are broken, and make transmission preparations for special situations.

(4) Handling intelligence accurately, highly efficiently and comprehensively

Processing intelligence is an important link in exploiting intelligence information. Since

both sides would try to keep secret and adopt deceptive measures, under normal

situations a substantial part of intelligence gathered is self-contradictory, disparate and

uncertain. Only by making necessary processing of such intelligence can one exploit it.
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Thus, the campaign command organ should set up intelligence processing centers and by

taking full advantage of modern technical means and equipment, categorize, analyze,

study, and sort intelligence gathered from various sources and file them in proper

categories. Coming to grip with key issues, one should conduct comprehensive analysis

on the intelligence by discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the

false and retaining the true, going from one point to another, from superficial to depth.

When one reaches a conclusion, he should report in a timely fashion to the superior

authorities and notify other units and friendly forces. In the case of major but suspicious

intelligence, one should organize timely verifications through various sources. In the case

of developmental intelligence, one should try to keep track of it and keep it under control.

Intelligence centers of various services and arms should maintain constant

communication with each other and share intelligence with each other so as to enhance

the timeliness and utilization ratio of intelligence gathered.

(5) Actively engaging in counter intelligence operations

At the same time one strives to enhance his own capabilities in timely and accurately

gathering of intelligence, he should take steps to actively engage in counter intelligence

collection, carefully organize campaign counter reconnaissance operations and prevent

the enemy side from acquiring intelligence. One should also meticulously organize

protective measures so as to enhance the battlefield survivability of one’s intelligence and

reconnaissance systems. One should employ various deceptive and disguising means to

create false intelligence and disinformation, deftly exercise feint intelligence

maneuvering, and widely practice campaign disguises. One should also strengthen

security and counter-espionage work and should take advantage of mounting operations

on, or based on, one’s own country’s territories by organizing masses of people to stage

counter reconnaissance activities. Finally, one should widely adopt destructive and

crippling means to strike, through firepower assault or force-strength raid-attacks, at the

enemy’s important reconnaissance and surveillance platforms so as to degrade its

reconnaissance capabilities.

II. Communication Support...219

Campaign communication support refers to all communication operations mounted by a

campaign large formation in organizing and employing various communication facilities,

instruments and means to ensure transmission of various types of campaign information.

The basic missions of campaign communication support are: organizing and executing

communication to ensure transmission of information concerning campaign command,

coordination, intelligence, warning, notification and rear command etc.; and carrying out

effective counter-interference measures to ensure the functioning of the communication

system. The central mission is to ensure operational command. The basic requirements

for campaign communication support are: fast, accurate, confidential and uninterrupted.

The main measures of campaign communication support are as follows:
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(1) Setting up stable and reliable campaign communication networks

The campaign command organ should, based on campaign operation needs-requirements

and in view of the realities of communication strengths and existing communication

facilities, uniformly plan, organize and adjust-coordinate the communication units of

various participating services and arms. At the same time, it should fully utilize the local

communication infrastructure and constitute an overall whole of the military

communication system and the civilian communication system. It should complement the

field communication equipment with the fixed communication infrastructure and form a

comprehensive communication bushu disposition with key points. [It should] establish a

crisscrossed, linked, multi-path, and circuitous full-dimensional campaign network with

the campaign command communication system as the main body and complemented with

coordination, intelligence, alert notifications as well as rear area communications. This

guarantees unimpeded information between land, sea, air and space.

(2) Comprehensive employment of various communication means

The electronic struggle of a modern campaign is extremely intense and complicated. The

interference on communication is particularly grave. In view of the strength and

limitation of various communication means, the campaign command organ should, based

on the concrete requirements of various campaigns and campaign phases, employ wire,

wireless, satellite, micro-wave, fiber-optic, mobile and simple signal communication

methods at appropriate times and in a flexible manner. Modern communication methods

should be combined with traditional communication methods. And by flexibly using wire

and wireless communication methods, field communication equipment and fixed

communication facilities, one can ensure timely, accurate, stable, confidential and

uninterrupted communications.

(3) Attaching importance to mobile {jidong} and coordination communications

Mobility is a salient characteristic of a modern campaign. In communication support, one

should take care to use various means to ensure communication in the midst of frequent

and fast pace mobility. One should take full advantage of communication equipment with

strong counter-interference capabilities and effectively resolve the issue of

“communication on the move.” Coordinated communication is a necessary element in

fully realizing the collective power of various participating services and arms in a modern

campaign. One should strive to make use of those universal communication instruments

of various services and arms, unify the formulation of a meticulous coordination

communication plan, set up not only a communication network that can unify the

activities of the various services and arms, but also conform with the communication

network of the communication needs-requirements of all services and arms, and

formulate the coordination communication contingency measures under special

situations.
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(4) Strengthening communication counter-measures and protection

Communication is a key target of the enemy’s reconnaissance, interference and damage

efforts. It is thus imperative to strengthen communication counter-measures and

protection. The campaign command organ should pay attention to concentrating strength

in order to seize and maintain command of the electro-magnetic field, and strengthen

communication management by controlling the use of electro-magnetic frequencies and

channels. Important communication facilities should be set up in dispersed locations, well

disguised and placed underground as much as possible. At the appropriate time,

electronic feint operations should be organized and false electro-magnetic radiation

targets set up to deceive and confuse the enemy. Communication local support and

electronic counter-measures should also be meticulously coordinated so as to avoid

mutual interference. One should strengthen communication network security and

protection, and in the case of enemy sabotage, one should immediately repair and restore

the network. At the same time, one should actively jam, suppress and sabotage the

enemy’s communication and enhance one’s own communication counter-measure

capabilities.

(5) Meticulously organizing communication equipment reserve, supply and technical

support

Communication equipment is the main material basis of the communication network. The

campaign large formation should have unified planning and tightly organize reserve,

supply and technical support. To this end, one should rationally determine the types,

quantities of, and places to hold, communication equipment reserves, and well organize

timely supply and replenishment of such equipment so as to meet various needs. There

should be a regular check-up and repair of communication equipment so as to keep such

equipment in good condition. There should also be well-organized field repair service in

an effort to carry out battlefield emergency repairs as much as possible and to minimize

the amount of equipment sent for repair in the rear. Related personnel should be trained

on how to properly use, maintain and service communication equipment.

III. Engineering Support...221

Campaign engineering support is a generic term referring to all engineering works

undertaken to ensure operational activities of the campaign large formation. The basic

missions of campaign engineering support are as follows: set up and perfect a protective

engineering system to ensure the stability of campaign command and the safety of the

main bushu disposition; build and maintain facilities such as roads, bridges, airfields, and

piers to support force-unit mobility; build engineering obstacle systems to limit and

degrade the enemy’s mobility; and create engineering disguise and provide water supply

support. The basic requirements of campaign engineering support are as follows:

comprehensive guihua planning, combine peacetime use with war time use, integrated

adjusting-coordination, give prominence to key points, integrate military with civilian,
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and combine the ingenuity of the masses of people with experts’ knowledge. Campaign

engineering support measures mainly include the following points:

(1) Organizing battlefield engineering reconnaissance

One should comprehensively employ various methods to carry out engineering

reconnaissance, and meticulously collect and timely control intelligence and data

concerning the operational theater, particularly those needed for engineering support in

the main operational directions and regions. [One should] find out with key points the

operational area states such as terrain, road (water) ways, bridges, airfields, ports (ferry) ,

navigation channels, and hydrology and one’s own engineering facilities and the enemy’s

engineering preparation situation. Engineering reconnaissance can be carried out

independently or can be conducted jointly with other reconnaissance operations.

Engineering intelligence acquired should be analyzed and judged in a comprehensive

manner. Suggestions concerning engineering support should be put forward at the

appropriate time so as to provide the basis for commanding officers to make decisions

and to organize engineering support.

(2) Building a protection engineering system possessing a comprehensive resistance

capability

Building various fortifications is one of the main contents of campaign engineering

support. It is of vital importance to enhancing the survivability of the campaign large

formation and the efficiency of campaign command and to making effective use of

weapon systems and equipment. To this end, an engineering system should be

constructed with protective engineering works as the main body, and construct with key

points the protection engineering projects for the campaign command institution,

important ports, airfields and positions. The layout of various engineering works should

be rational and in complete sets. They should have all necessary functions. They should

be aimed at both providing effective protection and optimizing firepower. Best effort

should be made to closely integrate fortifications for combat with those for covering,

maneuvering and obstruction, and to improve such works and make them into complete

sets, so as to meet the needs of both combat and living. It is also necessary to pay

attention to the use of new material and new technologies. Special units should be

organized for the construction and maintenance of key engineering works and for

providing them with excellent disguise.

(3) Building a campaign mobility engineering system

In campaign operations under modern conditions, force-strength mobility is frequent, and

the transport volume of various support operations may reach unprecedented levels. Thus

higher requirements are made on the engineering support work for campaign mobility.

Thus strengths should be organized to construct, repair, maintain roads, bridges, ferry

station (ports), piers, and field airports (heliports) in the theater, and to dredge

navigational channels, clear various obstacles so as to ensure smooth mobility and
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unimpeded keep transport lanes. Constructing new roads must be based on existing roads

and constructing the necessary connecting roads and circuitous roads so as to form a

crisscross road network. The emergency repair and maintenance of roads and other

transport engineering works should be carried out with the engineering corps as the

backbone while making full use of force-unit and civilian strengths. Support should be

conducted in a way that combines fixed points and fixed lines support with

accompanying support.

(4) Adopting counter-mobility engineering measures

Based on operational missions and the enemy conditions, one constructs and sets up

ground (water, air) obstacles with key points in the direction of an enemy may attack or

maneuver, or in area for a potential airborne landing or in the direction of low-altitude

helicopter entry. And based on the terrain and obstacles, one should carry out necessary

demolition work. In placing obstacles, one should strive to combine natural obstacles

with man-made obstacles, explosive obstacles with non-explosive obstacles, ground

obstacles with water surface, underwater and aerial obstacles, pre-positioned obstacles

with pro-tem obstacles, and combine obstacles with firepower, so as to truly achieve the

goal of restricting enemy mobility, breaking up its battle formations and depleting its

strengths.

(5) Setting up a battlefield water supply system

In a modern campaign, because of the high mechanization level of the armed forces and

the complex battlefield environment, supporting force-unit use of water is a major issue

that must not be overlooked. To this end, the command organ of a campaign large

formation should organize strengths to carry out reconnaissance over water sources,

construct battlefield water supply works, and set up water supply stations and water

supply networks; it should also strengthen water source protection to prevent the enemy

from sabotaging and polluting water sources, and should carry out timely emergency

repair and maintenance of water facilities so as to ensure normal water supply.

IV. Camouflage...223

Campaign camouflage is a generic term referring to various measures adopted by a

campaign large formation to deceive and confuse the enemy. The basic missions of

campaign camouflage are: comprehensively employ various measures to conceal

campaign intentions and important targets so as to preserve campaign strength; and

deceive, confuse and mislead the enemy so as to create conditions for realizing surprise

in operational activities and for seizing campaign initiative. The basic requirements of

campaign camouflage are: set out from the needs-requirements of the overall campaign

situation, and unify planning and organize the implementation; comprehensively apply

many measures, be systematic, have adjusting-coordination, be visual; be distinct;

strengthen supervision, inspect and manage. Campaign camouflage measures mainly

include the following:
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(1) Understand the characteristics and capabilities of the enemy’s reconnaissance and

surveillance systems

The command organ of a campaign large formation should organize strengths to find out,

through various means and as much as possible, the bushu disposition of the enemy’s

reconnaissance strengths and their reconnaissance means, methods, characteristics and

the patterns of their activities in order to make well-informed selection and employment

of various camouflage measures.

(2) Actively conceal the real

The campaign command organ should guide force-units to widely apply new material,

new technologies and use various methods and means to meticulously conceal the real

equipment and facilities. One should apply necessary engineering technical camouflage,

construct various types of concealed fortifications and place important weapons and

equipment underground or semi-underground. One should use standard and simple

camouflage equipment to cover up, camouflage, and change the shape of important

targets and fixed facilities, or to create smoke screens. One should take full advantage of

night time darkness, bad weather conditions, natural vegetation and other natural

conditions to provide cover for force-unit activities, and conceal the deployment {peizhi}

of force-units or weapons and equipment.

(3) Widely organize deceptions

This includes creating fake targets, disinformation, and organizing various feint

maneuvers etc. One should spread false information and leak fake intelligence through

the media, or in political, economic and diplomatic activities, as well as by way of

espionage, and should issue false orders through the command communication system. In

campaign operations, one should at appropriate times carry out feints with firepower,

force-strength and electronic strengths, and should alter bushu disposition at appropriate

times and organize deceptive maneuvers in the battlefield. One should also plan the

construction and the setting up of fake assembly sites, fake airports, fake ferry docks,

fake positions and fake command headquarters and strive to give them the characteristics

of real targets.

(4) Tighten camouflage activities

Campaign camouflage plans should be drawn up in a uniform manner. Such plans should

strictly lay down the camouflage missions, areas and scopes, methods, completion

deadlines and other requirements for the force-units of various services and arms, so as to

achieve unified camouflage effects. Moreover, one should conduct inspection on the

conditions and effects of camouflage by various means and from various angles – the air,

the sea and the ground – so as to make timely discovery of problems and make

improvements in camouflage methods.
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V. Transport Support...224

Campaign transport support is a generic term referring to various measures undertaken by

the campaign large formation in transport preparation, and in maintaining, restoring, and

enhancing transport capabilities. The basic missions of transport support are: differentiate

in the use, management, emergency repair and maintenance of transport networks; and

organize transportation and transport material reserves so as to ensure transportation lines

stay open and transport missions be accomplished. The basic requirements of campaign

transport support are: unified guihua planning, comprehensive organization, scientific

management, giving prominence to key points, combining construction with

maintenance, emergency repairs with protection, peacetime use with war time use, and

military force with civilian force. Main campaign transport support measures are as

follows:

(1) Build a joint command institution and implement a centralized and unified command

To provide campaign transport support, one should form a joint campaign command

institution composed of the campaign command organ and local transportation agencies

to exercise centralized and unified command over campaign transport support. An

operational theater transport network should be built under a unified guihua plan; unified

transport support courses of action and plans should be drawn up; means of

communication and transport should be requisitioned in a unified way; theater transport

strengths should be deployed and employed in a unified manner; the use and management

of transport lines should be uniformly differentiated; and emergency repair and protection

of transport lines should be uniformly organized.

(2) Set up all-aspect, multi-dimensional transport networks

One should take full advantage of existing transportation lines and comprehensively

utilize railways, roads, water ways, air routes and pipelines in an effort to develop multiroute, multi-directional, multi-channel, and multi-dimensional communication and

transport networks with a complex web linkage of transport lines. Based on operational

needs, one should: make emergency repairs or construction of necessary connecting

routes, dedicated routes and roundabout routes; renovate, expand low capacity road

segments and upgrade poorly equipped train stations, docks (ports) and airports; dredge

and improve water navigation channels; and construct airfields, docks and heliports etc so

as to raise transport and shipping capabilities.

(3) Rationally employ transport support strengths and ensure key point transports are

unimpeded

Based on campaign conditions and developments and on the needs of force-units of

various services and arms, their missions, bushu disposition, directions of maneuver and

their time requirements, on their war material needs, and on the distribution of rear bases

and conditions of transport networks, one should, by differentiating what is urgent and
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what is not so urgent, rationally employ transport support strengths, make separate use of

transport routes and ensure the accomplishment of key transport missions. While taking

engineering corps and civilian transport technical strengths as the backbone, one should

also rely on the energetic support of local governments and masses of people. Priority

should be given to supporting the main direction and the operations of force-units

carrying out main operational missions. The main support strengths should be directed to

ensuring the opening of key links. Capable transport controllers should be sent to man

important bridges, ferry docks (ports), and key transport hubs to maintain traffic order.

(4) Meticulously organize emergency repairs and protection of transport lines

The organization and execution of emergency repair and maintenance of transport lines

should be carried out by dividing up the lines into areas and segments for which units are

separately given responsibilities. Emergency repair and maintenance schemes should be

drawn up in advance and reserves of various equipment and material should also be

made. Specialized units should be sent to key transport trunk lines, transport hubs,

airports, seaports, bridges etc to carry out fixed-spot maintenance. Emergency repairs

should be carried out in accordance with the principles of tackling the main parts first and

accessories later, urgent tasks first and non-urgent tasks later, easier jobs first and

difficult jobs later, and opening the line first and perfecting it later.

One should attach great importance to the protection of transport lines and draw up

unified protection plans. The anti-air protection of the main transport lines and important

targets should be included in the anti-air raid plan {jihua}. Position the air defense

strengths, and when necessary, set up an air defense corridor along the important road

segments (navigational routes). In the protection of sea lanes, submarines and surface

ships should be organized to carry out fixed-spot protection and mobile escort (area

escort). Attention should also be given to tapping into the initiative of the masses of

people along transport lines and water ways and to setting up integrated military-civilian

networks for the maintenance of transport lines.

VI. Protection from Weapons of Mass Destruction...225

Protection from weapons of mass destruction is a generic term referring to various

protective measures adopted to avoid or reduce casualties and damage inflicted by the

enemy’s weapons of mass destruction. The basic missions in the protection from

weapons of mass destruction are to: verify and report in a timely manner the enemy’s

preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the results of such attacks;

meticulously organize protections from such attacks and cleanups of such attacks, so as to

maximally avoid or reduce the effects, in terms of personnel casualties and physical

damage, of such special weapon attacks from the enemy; and ensure that force-units

maintain sustained fighting capabilities and smoothly accomplish their campaign

missions. The basic requirements for protection from weapons of mass destruction are:

combine strict protection from such weapons with actively destruction of such weapons;

combine protective efforts by the masses of people with support by specialized arms;
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integrate the employment of technical equipment with wide use of simple protective

measures; and stress extensiveness, collectivity and timeliness in such protections. Main

measures in the protection from weapons of mass destruction include the following:

(1) Timely detect and destroy the enemy’s special weapons

The campaign command organ should organize various strengths to timely detect and

verify the enemy’s bushu disposition of weapons of mass destruction, and earnestly

analyze and assess likelihood of their use, as well as the intention, the time opportunities,

the sites, the scale, the modes and their preparation situation. And the campaign

command organ should choose appropriate times to organize various types of firepower

to actively seek to destroy such weapons. At the same time, special force-units can also

be organized to carry out reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear and to carry out sabotage

against such targets so as to foil the enemy’s intention to use such weapons.

(2) Set up tight monitoring and surveillance systems and issue alarm signals at

appropriate times

In the operational area, the campaign command organ should set up the monitoring,

surveillance, warning networks and notification services that combine the higher-level

with the subordinate, the military with civilian, and all services and arms. It is especially

important to set up and perfect nuclear and chemical weapon monitoring (observation),

surveillance, alarm and report networks so as to detect in advance signs of the enemy’s

intention to launch an attack and to issue early reports and warning signals.

(3) Solidify protective preparations

Mainly accomplish the following work: thoroughly conduct thought mobilization;

carefully formulate protection plans {jihua}; establish various protection organizations;

organize imminent battle protection training; successfully accomplish the reserve and

supply of protective equipment and materiel; strengthen hygiene, disease, and

pharmaceutical protection. In particular, one should make proper preparations for the

protection of such important targets as weapons and equipment, instruments, foods, water

sources, airports, seaports, and command institutions.

(4) Swiftly verify the results of the enemy’s attack and clean up the aftermath of the

attack in a timely manner

After suffering from an enemy attack, one should organize specialized strengths to

swiftly verify damages and contamination situation, report in a timely manner the

conditions to the superior and notify military and civilian personnel in the theatre, and

adopt effective measures of protection. One should at appropriate time adjust operational

bushu disposition, continue to carry out operational missions; organize emergency rescue

and repairs, fire extinguishing and cleaning up to neutralize the effects of enemy attack;
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and carry out timely sanitary quarantine and processing of suspected or actually polluted

food and water source.

(5) Correctly command force-units to carry out activities in contaminated land, air and

sea zones

When the land, air or sea zones in which force-units operate are seriously contaminated,

one should, based on actual conditions, consider organizing the speedy rotation or

withdrawal from contaminated zones. When encountering contaminated land, air or sea

zones in maneuvering, try one’s best to avoid such zones or secure passage by adopting

other effective means. After withdrawing from and passing through contaminated land,

air or sea zones, one should organize timely rescue, treatment and clean up operations.

VII. Meteorological and Hydrological Support...227

Campaign meteorological and hydrological support refers to various service actions taken

by meteorological and hydrological agencies and military units to provide support to

ensure campaign operations. The basic missions of campaign meteorological and

hydrological support are: provide meteorological and hydrological forecasts, information

and data as required by the campaign; and put forward suggestions on how to take

advantage of meteorological and hydrological conditions and avoid disadvantageous

conditions, so as to ensure that the campaign large formations successfully carry out the

campaign missions. The basic requirements of campaign meteorological and hydrological

support are: timely and accurate, meticulous and reliable. The main measures of

campaign meteorological and hydrological support include the following points:

(1) Set up meteorological and hydrological networks

Based on the requirements of the campaign, the campaign command organ should draw

up campaign meteorological and hydrological support plans, and uniformly organize and

rationally deploy meteorological and hydrological stations of various services and arms,

and those belonging to civilian authorities, so as to develop unified meteorological and

hydrological support networks that not only are suited to the needs of joint operations,

but also would satisfy the special needs of various services and arms. The campaign

command organ should also carry out uniform observation, monitoring, forecasting,

information processing, analysis and transmission regarding meteorological and

hydrological conditions in the operational theaters, and should ensure that campaign

meteorological and hydrological information are precise and reliable.

(2) Continuously collect and analyze data and timely provide meteorological and

hydrological forecasts and related suggestions

Meteorological and hydrological agencies and military units should tap into wide

meteorological and hydrological sources of information, and employ all possible methods

and means to carry out round-the-clock and comprehensive collection of various
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meteorological and hydrological data. They should carry out comprehensive analysis

study of the data collected and make good judgments and forecasts. Based on earnest

studies of changes in meteorological and hydrological conditions and their impact on

operational missions undertaken by various services and arms, particularly the Navy and

Air Force, they should make timely suggestions on how to take advantage of favorable

meteorological and hydrological conditions as well as on measures to guard against

dangerous and major disastrous meteorological and hydrological conditions.

(3) Implement support with key points

At the same time as organizing comprehensive overall support, one should concentrate

main meteorological and hydrological strengths and collect meteorological and

hydrological situation and data in the main operational direction as well as for the

campaign critical time occasions in ground, air and sea areas of main operations. Based

on operational needs, one should flexibly determine the support key points and provide

key point support to force-units of services and arms undertaking main operational

missions. At the same time, one must accomplish support with a directed-quality for

special requirements of meteorological and hydrological conditions based on the different

services and arms, the force-units executing different missions and different operational

activities.

(4) Actively engaging the enemy in struggles over meteorology and hydrology

One should actively organize interception and deciphering of the enemy’s meteorological

and hydrological intelligence, and pay due attention to the possibility that the enemy

would artificially alter local meteorological and hydrological conditions. To this end,

reconnaissance should be strengthened and necessary safeguards should be taken. One

should keep one’s own meteorological and hydrological intelligence strictly confidential.

Depending on the situation, one may also stage feint meteorological and hydrological

maneuvering in order to deceive or confuse the enemy. If and when conditions permit,

one may also artificially influence local meteorological conditions to create a local

meteorological and hydrological environment that is advantageous to one’s side and

disadvantageous to the enemy side.

VIII. Surveying and Mapping Support...228

Campaign surveying and mapping support is a generic term referring to various support

measures taken to meet the need of military surveying and mapping in large formation

campaign operations. The basic missions of campaign surveying and mapping support are

to: provide accurate and reliable surveying and mapping products to ensure that the

campaign commander and the command organ are familiar with the geographical

conditions of the operational theaters and have a good grasp of battlefield terrain; and

ensure that in an operation, the campaign large formation is able to correctly make use of

the terrain, and technical weapons systems can make accurate fixing so as to fully realize

the effects of their fire power. The basic requirements of campaign surveying and
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mapping support are: timely, accurate, meticulous and highly efficient. The main

campaign surveying and mapping support measures are as follows:

(1) Uniformly organize surveying and mapping strengths and form highly efficient and

strict campaign surveying and mapping support systems

Although campaign surveying and mapping support demands a relatively high degree of

specialization, its contents and scope are relatively wide. In order to smoothly carry out

campaign surveying and mapping missions, a campaign large formation should, based on

actual operational needs, set up highly efficient and strict surveying and mapping support

systems with specialized surveying and mapping strengths of various services and arms

constituting the core, supplemented by specialized technical strengths of civilian

surveying and mapping agencies. In such systems, under the unified organization by the

campaign command organ, there should be a clear division of labor and active

coordination in efforts to accomplish surveying and mapping support missions. Under

normal situations, campaign level surveying and mapping support and common

surveying and mapping support shared by various participating services and arms should

be the responsibility of the campaign surveying and mapping body; specific surveying

and mapping support as required by individual services and arms, such as maritime water

way surveying, mapping and charting etc for the Navy, aviation charting and collection

of surveying data for the Air Force, and geodesy of position areas for the Second

Artillery, should be carried out by the respective services and arms. If and when

necessary, within the scope of the campaign, surveying and mapping strengths can be readjusted so as to strengthen surveying and mapping support for the main services and

arms.

(2) Diligently collect, reserve, supply and manage various maps, surveying and mapping

data and equipment

One should organize surveying, drawing and collecting various maps (maritime charts),

as well as gathering data and information on main areas of the country and military

control points, and study and collate data on the military geography, strategic locations,

features and terrain. One should pay attention to collecting and capturing the enemy’s

military maps, charts and other surveying and mapping data. Based on operational

missions and the senior officer’s resolution, one should clearly lay out the quantity, types

and scopes of reserves of various surveying and mapping material and equipment and

should continuously replenish and perfect such reserves. Based on operational needsrequirements, one should make secret the military large-area control points and the resurveyed maps, and promptly provide the necessary survey-mapping results to the

campaign commander, the command organ and force-units. In addition, one should at the

appropriate time start using and distributing the readiness maps to force-units and at the

same time, adjust and replenish various maps, survey-mapping material and equipment so

as to meet the needs for continuous operations.
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(3) Earnestly analyze and study terrain and put forward suggestions on the use and

transforming of terrain

One must fully apply advanced technical means such as computer-aided terrain analysis

via measures such as gathering various terrain data, organizing terrain reconnaissance and

interpreting aviation photographs to earnestly investigate and analyze the terrain of the

operational area. [One must] ascertain the effects of various terrains on campaign

activities and on the use of technical weaponry and promptly put forth recommendations

to the campaign commander for utilizing and transforming the terrain.

(4) Draw up various key maps and make terrain models

Based on needs-requirements of command and operations, one should at the appropriate

time organize surveying and mapping support personnel to draw up various essential

charts regarding the senior officer’s resolution, the enemy situation, the coordination

plans, force-strength bushu disposition, fortifications, firepower distribution, obstacle

placement and the campaign process. At the same time, one should also organize the

making of the operational area terrain model to assist the campaign commander and the

command organ in their study of the terrain.

(5) Strengthen technical guidance to force-units on surveying and mapping

Surveying and mapping support units should, based on the requirements of campaign

operations, organize personnel to provide the force-units with necessary guidance

concerning surveying and mapping support. It is particularly important to well organize

and guide imminent battle training in military topography for the force-unit.

IX. . Battlefield Management...230

Campaign battlefield management is the general designation referring to various

battlefield service activities and management on the ground, the sea, in the air and

electro-magnetic battlefields organized by the campaign large formation for the purpose

of providing combat support. The basic missions of campaign battlefield management are

to exercise compulsive management over ground, sea and air battlefields and over the

electro-magnetic field in order to maintain battlefield order and to ensure smooth

execution of the campaign. The basic requirements of campaign battlefield management

are: unified rules, joint execution, strict actions, supervision and inspection. The main

measures of campaign battlefield management include the following points:

(1) Strengthen position management

Various facilities, weapons and equipment at various positions should be effectively and

well managed and maintained. Clear and concrete requirements should be stipulated

regarding battlefield order, duty and service schedules, vehicle and vessel control,

communication control, health and prevention, light and sound control, confidentiality,
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camouflage etc., and supervision and inspection should be strengthened. Relevant

services and arms and specialized force- (element-) units should also put forward special

management requirements regarding operational sea and air space and the electromagnetic field. The management of operational sea space should also be conducted by

dividing up the space into maritime operational zones, by setting up navigational

waterways, sea blockade zones, and selective obstacle areas, and by organizing flood

prevention and typhoon damage control, as well as navigational guidance and piloting.

The management of operational air space should be conducted by dividing up the space

into air operational areas, by setting up air corridors, flight control zones and no fly

zones, and by organizing navigational guidance and flight monitoring and control. In the

management of the electromagnetic domain, clarify the allocation, working methods,

working frequencies, work times of the electronic equipment and the camouflage secrecy

measures.

(2) Meticulously organize battlefield traffic control

Land, sea and air traffic control should be well and uniformly coordinated. Traffic

controllers should be sent to important transportation hubs, bridges, airports, seaports,

ferry docks etc. to strengthen supervision, inspection and coordination of battlefield

traffic and ensure that transport lines such as theater highways, railways, navigational

channels and air routes remain open. At the same time, civilian traffic in the battle zones

should also be well coordinated and controlled, and clear rules and regulations should be

established in this regard.

(3) Strictly enforce battlefield discipline

It is necessary to educate all the participating personnel to conscientiously follow various

rules, regulations and orders, and to educate masses of people in the battle zone to jointly

follow battlefield disciplines and maintain battlefield facilities. There should also be

respect for the ethnic habits and customs in the battle zone, and strengthening of unity

between the military and the government, and the military and the people. Wounded

should receive timely rescue and treatment while the bodies of killed martyrs should be

properly handled. The policy of well treating captives should be implemented and they

should be well managed and educated.

(4) Comprehensively strengthen battlefield security and protection

There should be unified planning and unified bushu disposition in battlefield security and

protection. Responsibilities should be clarified and there should be correct division of

responsibilities among various services and arms and force-unit units in security missions

and for land, air and sea areas. Special attention should be devoted to strengthening

security and protection in the air, sea and electro-magnetic field, for which meticulous

advance protective plans should be drawn up. Together with local party and government

authorities, one should strive to mobilize masses of people to guard against traitors and
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spies, and to conduct information blackout and to control enemy activities in the battle

zones so as to ensure the security of the battlefield.
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Chapter 8

Campaign Logistical Support...232

Campaign logistical support is the activity of applying logistical support strengths by a

campaign commander in implementing manpower, material and financial support for

force-units of campaign operations in order to achieve the capability of backing forceunits to maintain sustained operations. It is an important support for consolidating and

improving force-unit combat power and realizing campaign goals. In a modern campaign,

there are many types of high and new tech equipment of those participating and the

confrontation is fierce. Consumption is tremendous and the reliance by the front on the

rear is great and requirements high. Logistic support thus has a very significant influence

on seizing campaign victory.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...232

I. Characteristics of Campaign Logistical Support...232

Under informationized conditions, the development in weapons systems and equipment

and the change in modern campaign operations characteristics have led to the

development of many new characteristics in modern campaign logistical support.

(1) Heavy Support Tasks, High Degree of Difficulty and High Intensity

In a modern campaign, the opposing sides would concentrate their respective elite

strengths of various services and arms and devote large quantities of high-tech weapons

systems and equipment to wage high intensity confrontation in a broad, multidimensional battlefield. The factors capable of consuming, inflicting casualties and

destruction have increased. The huge consumption of war materiel, the destruction of

large quantities of equipment, and the cause of a large number of personnel casualties

within a short period of time, all place a high and heavy demand on logistical support

missions.

The first is the huge consumption of war materiel. Although a modern campaign is

limited in scale and has a shortened duration, the introduction of a large amount of

various high and new technology weapons systems and equipment in the battlefield has

greatly increased the total consumption and unit time consumption levels. At the same

time, the consumption structure has also undergone some changes. The ratio of

consumption in fuel, maintenance equipment and electronic equipment in the overall war

materiel consumption is on the steady increase. Also on the increase is consumption of

special materiel and dedicated materiel. The increased complexity of the material

structure has made it more difficult to gather, store, manage and supply war materiel.

The second are the changes in casualty distribution and forming of injuries, and the

increased difficulty in rescuing and treating the wounded. A modern campaign is waged
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simultaneously or consecutively in a multitude of battlefields on the ground, the sea, in

the air, the front and the rear. The distribution of casualties would thus cover the entire

campaign space, and in terms of time, the entire campaign process through its different

campaign phases. Furthermore, the combination of the elements of “hard kill” with “soft

kill” in information weapons systems has been increasing the ways and means to cause

casualties as well as the complexity and diversity of casualty conditions. The introduction

of information weapons systems would also increase the level of brutality in battlefield

environment and would be more likely to cause mental and physical illness and noncombat depletion of personnel. With the introduction and development of non-lethal new

concept high-tech weapons systems, the number of dead is expected to fall in combat

personnel depletion while the number of wounded is expected to increase.

The third are heavier and more urgent transport missions and an increased complexity in

organizing transport support. The outbreak of a future war is likely to come all of a

sudden. The advance war reserves in materiel would be hard pressed to meet the expected

demand. On the eve of a war, it is imperative to provide necessary support for the speedy

mobility and concentration of force-strengths, weaponry and materiel. This would greatly

increase the burden on pre-war transport missions. During the campaign, the volume of

transport regarding materiel and the wounded will be huge, and the mobility of forceunits will be great, while transport capabilities will be limited. All these would place a

heavy burden on transport missions. The transport organization has also become very

complex since during operational activities, it is necessary to organize not only ground,

air and sea (water) transportation, but also transport line defense, control, and provision

of services, medical care and various other supports.

(2) Three-dimensional and diverse support modes

In a modern campaign, operational space is broad and various operational patterns and

activities are conducted in a comprehensive way. The trend in the modes of logistical

support is toward multi-dimensionality and diversity.

First, ground-based one dimensional mode of support will be replaced by multidimensional mode of support. Since campaign activities will be launched simultaneously

in a multi-dimensional space that includes the ground, the sea and the air, traditional

ground-based one-dimensional form of support can no longer meet the campaign needs.

Thus, a comprehensive and multi-dimensional mode of support that encompasses the

ground, the air, water surface and under water will be more widely applied.

Secondly, a multi-linked, level-by-level support mode will be integrated with a bypass

support mode. Implementing level-by-level support on the basis of support links is a

basic campaign support mode. But if there are many intermediate links, then support time

effectiveness is low, and this does not meet the needs of a modern campaign requiring

better support time effectiveness. Hence, bypassing support links and implementing

bypass support will become a widely utilized and important support mode.
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Thirdly, back to front one-way support mode will be combined with all aspect and multidirectional support mode. To provide vertical, one-way, back-to-front force-unit support

that relies on logistic bases located in the campaign depth is a traditional way of support.

In a modern campaign, however, the front and rear are vulnerable to be separated by the

enemy and thus the one-way, back-to-front flow of support mode is susceptible to

disruption. Hence, in addition to adopting the mode of one-way, back-to-front support,

one should also adopt a variety of support modes such as horizontal support, regionalbased point-radiating support, and when necessary, a reverse direction support. Only in

this manner can one meet the needs of modern campaign operations.

Fourthly, the mode of fixed base point support should be combined with the mode of

flexible mobile {jidong} support. Maneuver operations has become a main operational

pattern in a modern campaign. Force-units not only have wide scope, high speed and high

frequency maneuver, but also conduct maneuver in wide land, sea and air areas. Relying

solely on fixed base point support is no longer sufficient to meet the needs of a modern

campaign. Hence, to provide multi-directional, multi-fields and high speed mobile

{jidong} support has already become a very important support mode.

(3) Organizing command is complex and difficult

First, the strength composition of a modern campaign is diversified and the support

relationships are highly complex. The PLA’s modern campaign strength composition

includes not only organized units within the operational theater but also various extratheater ad hoc attached and assisting-support strengths; it includes not only the infantry

but also the Air Force, the Navy and the Second Artillery; it includes not only field

operational large formations but also local force-units. Campaign logistics have to

organize not only general support for various operational strengths but also specialized

support for various services and arms. The support service objects are multiple in types,

wide in their spans, and the support relationships are highly complex.

Secondly, the support strength composition is also diversified and command relationships

are complex. Campaign logistics would have to command not only general support

strengths but also specialized support strengths of various services and arms; it would

have to command not only support strengths within campaign logistic organizations, but

also ad hoc reinforcement support strengths; it would have to command not only military

logistic strengths, but also local support the front support strengths; and it would have to

command not only relatively fixed regional support strengths, but also cross-regional

mobile {jidong} support strengths. The pluralistic support strength composition has made

campaign logistic command relationships even more complex.

Thirdly, there is great uncertainty in support mission estimates, thus making organizing

and planning support even more difficult. Since every campaign is different in such

factors as strength participation, operational area, operational scale and duration,

logistical support mission workloads for different campaigns can vary greatly.

Furthermore, the fluidity of the battle situation has also made it very difficult to
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accurately predict the level of materiel consumption, personnel casualty, and equipment

damage etc in each campaign. These factors have made it very difficult to make support

mission estimates, and to organize and plan logistical support.

Fourthly, support is conducted simultaneously with protective defense, making logistic

command even more intense. Modern campaign logistics are under the full time threats of

the enemy’s informationized weapons. Logistic commanders and organs would not only

have to organize uninterrupted support for the force-units, but also have to command

logistic strengths to fight against enemy strikes and sabotage. To organize support and

command defensive operations simultaneously has made campaign logistic organization

and command even more intense.

Fifthly, the enemy’s electronic interference will make it difficult for logistic command to

effect smooth and highly efficient implementation. In a modern campaign, the struggle in

the electro-magnetic field is extremely intense; a multitude of “soft” and “hard” kill

measures are employed; and command communication systems are vulnerable to

interference and sabotage. Thus it is difficult to ensure the opening of communications

between logistic command organs and campaign command organs, between different

logistic command organs, and between logistic command organs and various logistic

units. There also exists the possibility of even paralysis in logistic command.

(4) Survivability under grave threat

In campaign operational activities under modern conditions, to strike at and degrade the

enemy’s logistics has become one of the important means to accomplish campaign goals.

The wide use of informationized weapons systems and equipment has made means of

strike and degradation more and more varied and with increasing precision, as well as

more widespread and destructive. Logistics faces at all times and in all space a grave

threat from the enemy.

First, the concealment and camouflage of logistics bushu disposition have become even

more difficult. Various modern high-tech reconnaissance means can provide wide, multilayered, speedy, and accurate surveillance over the battlefield in real time. This has

greatly enhanced battlefield transparency. As a result, the concealment and camouflage of

logistics bushu dispositions have become more and more difficult.

Secondly, logistics would come under attack and destruction from the enemy’s

comprehensive firepower. Logistics in a modern campaign is one of the main objects of

the enemy’s firepower strikes. The enemy can launch from the ground, the air and the sea

sustained, large-scale, all aspects and full depth comprehensive firepower strikes at

logistics.

Thirdly, logistics would come under attack from the enemy’s in-depth mobile {jidong}

force-units. The increasing quantitative and qualitative enhancement of informationized

equipment has enabled larger formations to exercise maneuver {jidong} operations in the
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enemy’s rear. Informationized ground, surface (submarine) and air mobile equipment can

leapfrog frontal obstacles and execute high-speed mobility toward the campaign rear.

Logistics would not only be the targets of attack and harassment by small groups of

enemy special units or infiltration force-units, but also become the object of attack by the

enemy’s integrated air and ground (sea) in-depth maneuver force-units.

Fourthly, transport lines in the rear would suffer seriously from the enemy’s blockade and

disruption. In modern campaign operations, the enemy would employ various

informationized weapons systems to stage full-length, multi-layered blockade and

disruptive actions against our transport lines in the rear. The enemy may also use various

mobile force-units to take control of our in-depth transport hubs, which could cause

serious obstruction in logistical support.

II. Requirements...236

The new characteristics that have emerged in modern campaign logistics have made

higher requirements on campaign logistical support.

(1) Combine peacetime with wartime work and be prepared in advance

Characterized by suddenness and fast pace, a modern campaign requires campaign

logistics to respond and conduct support in a short period of time. Under such situations,

only relying on imminent battle preparations is not sufficient to complete a great deal of

preparations. Hence, one must rely on peacetime preparations in advance. Only by

organically combining peacetime preparations with imminent battle preparations and

with during battle preparations can one meet campaign needs.

Peacetime preparations are the basis for implementing support in wartime. One should

formulate and improve various readiness courses of action and preliminary support plans

based on the potential campaign scale and operational courses of action, and with a

directed-quality, conduct the work that would be difficult to complete in the imminent

battle preparation phase. These preparations include, for example, the construction of

backbone logistics engineering projects and facilities, the building up of reserves of

certain necessary materiel, the organization of necessary logistics exercises,

familiarization of battlefield conditions, support missions and support courses of action

and comprehensive enhancement of contingency support capabilities.

Imminent battle preparations are the crux to realizing speedy transition of logistics work

from a peacetime footing to wartime footing. One should speedily organize logistics

mobilization and expansion, perfect command and support institutions, revise and draw

up support courses of action, adjust and replenish materiel reserves, perfect rear

engineering facilities and timely deploy logistic strengths.

Preparations during battle are a supplement to peacetime preparation and imminent battle

preparation. They are an important measure in seizing and maintaining support initiative.
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After a campaign begins, logistics should, on the one hand, continue to strive to complete

preparation work that is could not be completed in imminent battle preparations, and on

the other, make correct estimates based on the most difficult and most complex scenarios,

actively seek to get updated on campaign development and changes and potential

progression, get prepared in advance to provide support for changes in campaign patterns

and phase transitions, and draw up various contingency plans so as to ensure the

sustainability, timeliness and reliability of combat support.

(2) Integrated overall-planning, give prominence to key points

Integrated overall-planning requires the organization of various logistics strengths into an

organic whole based on the overall campaign and even strategic situations. It requires the

comprehensive employment of various support means and modes to provide

comprehensive, adjusting-coordinated, prompt and forceful logistical support to various

operational strengths and various operational activities in the full course of the campaign

and in its entire battlefield space. First of all, one should, based on the overall strategic

situation, organize strategic logistics departments, relevant theater logistics departments

and various relevant civilian departments to conduct high-level general operations

research so as to ensure powerful logistical assisting-support. Secondly, based on the

overall situation of the campaign, one should organize various campaign logistics

strengths gathered at the operational theater into a campaign logistical support system

that integrates the military units with civilian units, the infantry logistics units with air

and naval units, and support units with defense units. Thirdly, one should

comprehensively and rationally differentiate support missions. In terms of support

objects, one should conduct unified support to all participating services and arms and the

three types of armed strengths. In terms of support scope, one should not only provide

support to ground battles, but also provide support to naval and air battles and should

well co-ordinate support for various campaign patterns. In terms of support space, one

should not only provide support to the operations in the front, but also look after and

meet the needs for operations in in-depth battlefields and in the enemy rear. In terms of

support time, one should provide support not only to the preparation and beginning of a

campaign, but also to the full course of the campaign. In terms of content, one should

achieve comprehensive support that includes materiel, transport, engineering and medical

care etc. Fourthly, one should comprehensively utilize various support modes. One

should comprehensively utilize general support with specialized support, regional support

and organizational support, level by level support with bypass support, vertical support

with horizontal support, and one dimensional support with three-dimensional support, so

as to bring into full play overall support capabilities.

Comprehensive support must give prominence to key points. Modern logistical support

has a multitude of objects, wide scope, heavy missions, and high requirements. The

contradictions between support capability and operational needs are very prominent.

Hence, at the same time as integrated overall-planning and full-scale dealing with both,

one must employ logistics strengths with concentration and flexibility and promptly and

fully support the key points. The key points of support mainly are: in terms of space, this
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is normally the main battlefield, the main operational direction and important operational

areas; in terms of time, this is normally the main operational phase and critical time

occasions of the campaign; in terms of objects of support, this is normally the services

and force-units undertaking the main operational units in each phase and each direction;

and in terms of support content, this is normally the materials of the main operations.

However, due to the rapid change in battlefield conditions under informationized

conditions, the operational center of gravity frequently shifts. The logistics commander

must be adept to promptly and correctly master the changes to the key points, to adjust

the logistic strengths and support plans at the right time and to quickly form new support

key points.

(3) High speed and high efficiency, taking the initiative

One should strive to the best of his ability to forcefully provide support for the force-units

in fast pace, by one’s own initiative and at appropriate time. A modern campaign is often

launched in surprise and conducted at a fast pace. It consumes large quantities of war

materiel and causes huge casualties. It places a high requirement on time effectiveness in

support and requires campaign logistics to respond in a very speedy and accurate manner.

It requires campaign logistics to be able to gather in a short period of time a sizable

logistics strength to synchronize with force-unit activities, so as to ensure operational

needs. Hence, one must strengthen the logistical support forecast and make advance

estimates of support missions and make necessary preparations. One should also, based

on the most difficult and complex scenarios, draw up various contingency plans. It is

necessary to be pro-active in logistical support by getting to know in a timely manner,

and keeping informed of, the force-unit logistical support needs, and by taking the

initiative to send materiel and take delivery of the wounded. It is necessary to enhance the

timeliness in organizing support, to simplify command procedures, to make resolute

decisions, to take full advantage of various automated means and to speed up the

transmission and feedback of various kinds of information. In providing support, one

should also strive to reduce the number of links, to place support organs closer to the

front, to comprehensively employ various support means and to organize speedy support

operations.

(4) To be cost effective and to take advantage of one’s strength while avoiding one’s

weakness

To be cost effective is to provide, at appropriate times, in appropriate places and

quantities, effective support to force-units, and to achieve the best support effect by using

as little as possible personnel and materiel and as little time as possible. To be cost

effective requires that one pay attention not only to military effects but also economic

effects. This is especially true in campaign operations under informationized conditions

when there is a high consumption of war materiel, high rate of personnel casualties, and a

large amount of equipment damage. Because of the many needs for high-tech equipment,

the high cost of war materiel, and limited reserves, there is a sharp contradiction between

supply capabilities and needs. Hence, in paying attention to support time effectiveness,
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one should, while meeting the basic needs-requirements of force-units, also pay due

attention to economic effects. For this purpose, one should make scientific estimates and

correct decisions, and should try to avoid and reduce mistakes. Based on the needsrequirements of various units and support capabilities, one should make precise

calculations and thorough planning, and should strengthen management, control

consumption, and prevent abuse and waste, so as to ensure campaign victory at the

shortest period of time and lowest cost.

To take advantage of one’s strength while avoiding one’s weakness is to fully exploit

one’s various strong points to make up for the deficiencies in backward logistics

equipment and in financial strength as well as for the lack of professional support

personnel, so as to improve support cost effectiveness. For this purpose, one should take

full advantage of the benefits of fighting on home territory and of fighting a people’s war.

And one should perfect the logistics mobilization system, strengthen logistics reserve

strength construction, and bring into full play the effect of the large-scale logistic of a

people’s war. One should carry out battlefield logistics construction in advance, improve

the support environment, and make predictions on battlefield materiel needs, so as to

reduce in-battle replenishment, take advantage of familiar terrain and use various flexible

ways and means to organize logistical support. While taking full advantage of present

conditions, one should also adopt various measures to overcome deficiencies and to focus

on the development of certain advanced logistics equipment and on improving present

logistics equipment. One should, furthermore masterfully integrate limited advanced

support means with traditional means of support.

(5) Strengthen defense and enhance survivability

Campaign logistics is one of the key targets of the enemy’s focused attack and sabotage

efforts. Logistics survivability and support activities will face unprecedented and grave

threats. The security of logistics has a direct bearing on the accomplishment of logistical

support missions and may also have a direct effect on the progression and conclusion of a

campaign. Hence it is imperative to strengthen logistics defense and enhance logistics

survivability by closely integrating support with defense. For this purpose, it is necessary

to include logistics defense in the overall campaign defense plan to be implemented

under the unified organization of the campaign commander and headquarters. One must,

with the logistic deployment area {peizhi diyu} and defense of the transportation line as

key points, with the specialized duty defense strength as the backbone, and in

combination with the special services strength and local militia, form a defense

organization that is united in defense and a joint defense of military and civilian.

Adhering to the principle of “combining defense with strike and giving defense priority,”

one should adopt a multitude of measures that integrate “concealment” with masterful

“deception,” point defense over individual logistics targets with area defense over support

zones, reliance on self-defense by logistics strengths with cover by operational strengths,

and “hard” defense that strikes at the enemy with firepower force-strengths with “soft”

defense aimed at deceiving and interfering with the enemy reconnaissance and

operational systems, so as to enhance logistics survivability. One should accomplish not
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only being able to effectively preserve strengths, but also being able to continuously

implement logistic support in a harsh environment.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...239

The essential function of campaign logistics is to provide direct or indirect materiel

support for the personnel and weapon and equipment systems of the campaign large

formation. The basic mission is to bring into full play the functions of various campaign

logistics strengths, and to strengthen and enhance the force-units’ operational capabilities

through providing materiel, financial, medical, transport etc. support, so as to ensure the

accomplishment of campaign missions. The main contents include materiel support,

medical service support, transport service, financial support and logistics protection.

I. Material Support...239

Material support is a generic term referring to securing, reserving, replenishing and

managing operational and living materiel for the force-units. It is an important 

component of logistical support. It mainly includes ammunition, fuel, provisions, bedding

and clothing, medicine, and equipment support. Material consumption of a modern

campaign is huge: it involves a wide variety of goods; the scope of supply is wide; and

time is demanding. Thus support missions are highly difficult. The extent to which

support missions are carried out would have a major impact on the progression and the

outcome of a campaign. Campaign logistics must be scientifically planned, fully

prepared, and comprehensively organized in accordance with campaign missions,

participating force-strengths, campaign duration, materiel consumption and the degree of

difficulty in replenishment. The focus should be placed on the four links of securing,

reserving, supplying and managing support, so as to ensure the accomplishment of

campaign missions.

(1) Securing Material

To secure campaign materiel is the primary link in campaign materiel support. In

accordance with reserve standards stipulated by the superior authority and with campaign

consumption plans, one should secure materiel needed in a campaign through various

ways and means. Rear supply should be the primary channel for securing materiel. In

addition to relying on rear supply, in a modern campaign, one should also try to secure

materiel through various other ways and means such as drawing on local resources,

mutual support between campaign large formations, using captured materiel, etc.

Rear supply of campaign materiel refers to supplies provided by strategic logistics to

theater logistics and supplies conducted within a theater in accordance with the

established support system. Campaign large formation logistical support is supplied from

the top through dual support channels of organizational support and regional support. The

supply of general materiel should be uniformly organized by united theater logistics and

service organs and conducted in accordance with the established regional support
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relationship. Specialized materiel support should be supplied in accordance with

organizational relationships in the Navy, the Air Force, the Second Artillery and other

arms. In order to maintain smooth supply relationships, the rear supply is normally

conducted by higher level logistics according to plan, and the campaign large formation

logistics should take the initiative to make requests on the basis of the multi-service and

multi-arm joint operation material consumption plan and campaign reserves.

To draw on local resources is an important channel for securing campaign materiel. It is

to secure within the operational theater or designated area materiel from local sources

either under a unified plan from the superior or on one’s own initiative. When one is

unable to get supply from the superior organs due to a disruption in transport lines by the

enemy or due to maneuvering of force-units to locations distant from the rear, one should

try to draw on local resources, mainly dual use materiel and war materiel that can be

produced locally such as provisions and fuel. Supply from local sources should be

secured under unified control by theater logistics or campaign large formation logistics

together with the local government. In regions where resources are unbalanced, supply

should be allocated and managed jointly by theater command in coordination with local

government.

Mutual help and assistance between operational theaters or campaign large formations is

another important channel to secure materiel. In local war in particular, because of

different locations of various operational theaters and different resource conditions with

each theater, and because of differences in materiel possession and consumption, some

theaters may have acute problems between supply and demand while others may enjoy

relative ease in supplies. The same can happen to different campaign large formations

within an operational theater. Hence, it is necessary for neighboring theaters and units to

provide help and assistance to each other in materiel supply. This should generally be

conducted under a unified plan drawn up by the superior logistics organ. In time of

emergencies, each unit may also initiate contacts with neighboring units, directly

requesting support and assistance.

Make use of captured materiel to replenish oneself is a supplementary channel in a

modern campaign that should not be overlooked. Specialized logistics departments

should, under the organization and assistance by the relevant department of the

headquarters, make timely organization of a sweep of the battlefield and collect, sort and

examine captured materiel and include those usable materiel in the supply plan so as to

make unified allocation and rational use of such materiel.

(2) Material reserves

Campaign materiel reserves refer to the establishment of a certain quantity of materiel

reserves for the purpose of meeting campaign materiel needs. They are the basis of

campaign materiel supply and thus an important link in campaign materiel support.
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Campaign materiel reserves generally should be held separately by logistics units of

theater command, combined group army, provincial military districts and participating

services in accordance with the division of labor in the support system. Theater logistics

is responsible for general-use materiel reserves of the force-units of the services-arms

formed within its organizations and the operational missions executed in the theater.

Campaign large formation logistic units should be responsible for materiel reserves for

the combined group army. Theater Air Force, Naval bases, Second Artillery bases, etc.

should be separately responsible for their respective specialized materiel reserve and

some general materiel reserve. Campaign materiel reserves generally should be

implemented by the theater command and provincial military command in accordance

with the expansion course of action. Light equipment reserves generally should be stored

at the established force-units and in their vicinity while heavy equipment reserves

generally should be warehoused in the vicinity of force-unit concentrations. When

campaign materiel reserves are large in quantity and the reserve facilities of the military

are limited, the military should consult the civilian authorities over divisions of labor in

holding such reserves. The military should mainly be responsible for reserves in

weapons, ammunition, fuel, field food supplies, technical equipment and other materiel

that is urgently needed to operations and difficult to secure from local sources during

wartime. The military can ask local governments to hold in custody dual-use materiel

reserves in order to reduce its own reserves of such materiel.

Material reserve standards are generally drawn up by superior commanding officers.

Sometimes the subordinate may also submit applications or suggestions to be approved

by superior commanding officers. The main criteria in formulating materiel reserve

standards are the intention of the campaign large formation commander, the superior’s

logistics instructions or rear orders, force-unit missions, amount, and materiel

consumption patterns, campaign duration, logistical support capabilities and transport

capacity, the degree of difficulty in replenishing during the battle, the reserve capacity of

the force-units and the support potentials of local resources.

The basic requirements of materiel reserves are: rational in quantity, structure, and

distribution, easy access and transport, and secure. In concrete terms, reserve quantity

should be appropriate. While sufficient to meet the campaign needs, it should not lead to

overstock which could hinder force-unit’s mobility. In terms of types of goods, the

reserves should be complete and in sets. One should make reserves of various types of

goods in accordance with mission needs. The reserves should be complete in types,

correct in specifications, comprehensive in sets and rational in distribution and

classification. The allocation of reserves should have a hierarchical structure as well as a

focus. On a macro level, it should be dispersed, while on a micro level, it should be

concentrated. It should have a full depth, multi-layered layout so that from operational

force-units to theater and all support links would have materiel reserves appropriate to the

relevant support missions.
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(3) Material replenishment

Material replenishment refers to the prior to battle distribution and during battle

replenishing activity based on securing materiel and materiel reserves and in accordance

with a unit’s strength and supply standards, consumption limit or allocation quota. It

constitutes an important link in materiel support. Only by timely and continuously

providing replenishment can one safeguard campaign operational consumption, and

maintain force-units’ sustained fighting capabilities. The core issue of materiel

replenishment is the direction of materiel flows. Whether the direction of materiel flows

is rational depends mainly on if materiel distribution plans are scientific. The speed of

materiel flows is mainly influenced by a combination of factors including the reception

and supply systems and methods.

The material distribution plan is the main basis for materiel replenishment. The plan

should be drawn up during the campaign preparation phase in accordance with the

campaign commander’s operational resolution, the force-unit operational missions,

supply standards and consumption limits. Campaign materiel replenishment is generally

based on a plan. However, when battle conditions have changed in the course of an

operation and the original plan can no longer meet operational needs, one should make

timely adjustments.

Perfecting and rationalizing materiel supply systems are the basis for conducting highly

efficient replenishment exercises. Such a system is generally made up of theater logistics,

combined group army logistics and service campaign logistics organs, and is linked to

strategic and tactical materiel supply systems. Hierarchical replenishment methods should

be combined with methods that bypass the normal chain of replenishment. The

replenishment of general materiel is generally conducted by the theater to supply to the

support organs of the campaign large formation of various services based on designated

support regions. Sometimes, replenishment of general materiel may also be effected to

directly supply divisions (brigades), naval attachments or district garrisons, independent

divisions, regiments and aviation air stations. Under the campaign large formation level,

replenishment should be organized in accordance with the established structure.

Replenishment of specialized materiel for various services and arms should be carried out

in accordance with their respective established structures.

There are a variety of modes of materiel replenishment. They should be employed in a

flexible way based on the characteristics of different types of campaigns. The main ones

are: in terms of links and structures, one may carry out hierarchical replenishment or

bypass the chain of command in supplying replenishment; when normal replenishment

can not be carried out, one may also organize mutual support and assistance between

campaign large formations; in terms of replenishment procedures and division of labor,

one may carry out planned replenishment or the subordinate unit may make

replenishment requests; in terms of operating methods of materiel replenishing strengths,

one may carry out fixed point replenishment, intercept replenishment, follow-up
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replenishment etc.; in terms of replenishment space, one may carry out ground

replenishment, sea replenishment and air replenishment.

The timing of materiel replenishment should be determined flexibly on the basis of the

needs of the force-units, battlefield conditions, and the degree of enemy threats as well as

the means and capabilities of logistics replenishment units. One should, in particular, take

full advantage of the lull in campaign execution or gaps in the enemy’s blockade, or

should carry out replenishment after seizing control of the air or the sea, or by taking

advantage of favorable hydrological or meteorological conditions, or other good

opportunities such as when operational activities have achieved good results.

Material replenishment should follow the principle of main objects first, secondary

objects later, urgent needs first, secondary needs later, and key support units first. It

should generally follow the order of the main campaign direction first, secondary

directions later; front line force-units first, second line force-units and campaign reserve

forces later; remote distance force-units first, nearby force-units later; urgently needed

materiel first, general materiel later.

(4) Material Management

Campaign materiel management is a generic term referring to storage and control

measures adopted for the purpose of bringing into full play the utility value of campaign

materiel. It is an important measure to minimize non-combat materiel loss. Wartime

materiel support is carried out under a serious threat from the enemy. Furthermore,

facilities of some ad hoc supply organs are relatively simple. As a result, the time limit on

materiel storage and care-taking would be greatly affected by field operation’s natural

conditions. Hence, materiel management should mainly focus on supervising and

inspecting the force-units in the use and management of carry-on materiel, materiel

management in transportation, materiel management in warehousing.

II. Medical Services Support...243

Campaign medical service support refers to the organization of medical service strengths

to rescue and treat the wounded and to send them to the rear, and the organization of

medical prevention and protection services in the campaign large formation. The basic

missions of wartime campaign medical service support include: organizing the medical

service strengths in the campaign rear to rescue and treat the sick and wounded;

providing them with medical care and sending them to the rear; and carrying out medical

prevention and protection and maintaining the health conditions of participating

personnel so as to strengthen and enhance the force-unit combat power. In a modern

campaign, the increased lethality and destructiveness of weapons may create a large

number of wounded in action, and at the same time, the significant change in the killing

mechanism of many high-tech weapons will increase the forms and types of the

wounded, making casualty conditions even more complex. Furthermore, the pace of a

modern campaign is greatly accelerated, and the battlefield space widened; personnel
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casualties will be more concentrated in time but more dispersed in space, making medical

service support missions more burdensome; and the battlefield conditions would be

seriously degraded in a high-tech campaign, making medical service support missions

even more difficult. Hence, campaign logistics must make scientific planning and

thorough organization so as to ensure the successful accomplishment of medical service

support missions.

(1) Make an estimate of the medical depletion of personnel numbers

Making an estimate of the campaign medical depletion of personnel numbers provides an

important basis for correctly drawing up campaign medical service support plans and for

rationally organizing and employing medical service strengths. In the campaign

preparation phase, the campaign commander should make an estimate of the overall

medical depletion of personnel numbers in the campaign. The causes for campaign

medical depletion of personnel numbers can vary. In making an estimate of medical

depletion of personnel numbers, one should make a comprehensive analysis over the

various factors that would cause depletion of personnel numbers, and based on references

drawn from experiences and data in similar campaigns in the past try to make such an

estimate as close as possible to the actual depletion of personnel numbers. Generally

speaking, the total depletion of personnel numbers is higher in a defensive campaign than

in an offensive campaign; in a naval campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel

numbers in the main assault group is often higher than in auxiliary assault groups; in an

air force campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel numbers is often higher in

the phase of large scale enemy air strike than in other phases and it is also often higher

when the aviation forces is operating in the enemy air space than in one’s own air space;

in the Second Artillery campaign large formation, the depletion of personnel numbers is

often higher in preparatory positions than in established positions and it is often higher in

guided missile mobile {jidong} operations than in positional warfare operations. The

general law on campaign average daily depletion rate is: the offensive campaign

depletion is higher than the defensive campaign depletion, the depletion in the main

operational direction is higher than in secondary directions, the depletion in the front line

unit is higher than in secondary line units, and the initial one to three days of a campaign

is higher than in later operational days.

(2) Organization and employment of medical service support strengths

Campaign logistics should: uniformly deploy subordinate and reinforcement medical

service strengths of various services and arms, as well as local support medical service

strengths provided by the superior; rationally differentiate general medical service

strengths and specialized service and arm medical service strengths; divide up the scope

of rescue and treatment operations between medical service strengths for regional-based

rescue and treatment and those for organizational-based rescue and treatment; ensure the

connections between various links in the scope of rescue and treatment and between

various contents of rescue and treatment; and establish a medical service support system

that is based on established military medical service strengths as the backbone and one
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that combines the military with civilian. The basic way of campaign rear medical rescue

and treatment is to combine regionally based rescue and treatment with organizationally

based rescue and treatment. Regionally based rescue and treatment is to receive, rescue

and treat the sick and wounded of all services and arms according to designated regions.

This is mainly carried out by theater rear hospitals (logistics field hospitals and base

hospitals). Organizationally based rescue and treatment is to receive, rescue and treat the

sick and wounded according to their designated organization and subordinate

relationships. This is carried out by medical institutions of various military units. In order

to ensure timely and good treatment for the sick and wounded, medical service strengths

should be deployed appropriately close to the front, and special medical units should be

sent to strengthen support to the main operational directions, to regional units, and to

units carrying out independent operations, so as to enhance their rescue and treatment

capabilities.

(3) Transport the sick and wounded to the rear

In order to reduce the death rate and disability rate among the sick and wounded, and to

preserve effective strength, one should minimize the time it takes to transport the sick and

wounded to the rear. In transporting the sick and wounded, one should adhere to the

principle of combining forward reception by the superior organs with back transport by

the subordinate units. The focus, though, should be placed on forward reception.

Hierarchical forward reception and back transport should be combined with bypassing

forward reception and back transport. The focus, though, should be placed on hierarchical

forward reception and back transport. At the same time, one would take full advantage of

various means of transport, combine military transport with civilian transport, and

designated transport with return transport, so as to enhance the pace of transportation to

the rear.

(4) Medical prevention

Medical prevention is to adopt various medical preventive and managing methods to

realize the goal of preventing disease from occurring and epidemic from spreading. One

should carry out the policy of prevention first, and a mass campaign against disease and

of epidemic prevention. At the same time, one should adopt active and effective

preventive measures so as to reduce instances of disease. For this purpose, one should do

a good job of public education over health and disease prevention, strictly enforce

medical regulatory systems and place emphasis on preventing the occurrence and spread

of contagious diseases and regional epidemics.

(5) Medical protection

To guard against and reduce the harm of the enemy’s weapons of mass destruction on

force-units, one should construct protection works and provide necessary protective

equipment, set up rescue organizations with the participation of chemical and medical

service strengths, and designate hospitals to carry out special missions of rescue and
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treatment of personnel. When there is a possibility that the enemy may use biological

weapons, the medical departments should organize strengths to carry out the medical

reconnaissance and quarantine work according to quarantine regulations. When the forceunits come under weapons of mass destruction attacks, campaign logistics should

organize timely rescue and treatment of the wounded in the affected areas and carry out

decontamination treatment of the affected areas.

III. Financial Support...245

Financial support refers to the planning, allocation, replenishment and supply of

expenditures of the military. The main missions are: preparing and examining the

campaign operational budget and final accounting of expenditures; organizing various

normal provision of funds; accurately controlling provision capabilities; timely handling

the receipt and transfer of supply and demand relationships; organizing the provisions of

funds for the surrendered and captives; collecting, keeping and processing captured

money and other valuables; and organizing the custodian provision of military family

living allowances etc. In order to financially support the accomplishment of campaign

missions, one should follow the principles of taking the interest of the whole into account

while giving due considerations to area interest, ensure the support for the key areas

while giving due consideration to general areas, manage according to plans, be frugal,

keep expenditure within the limits of available funds, and allow for unforeseen

circumstances, so as to be fully cost effective in using funds.

(1) Provision of funds

The provision of funds is to supply force-unit needed funds through bank transfer, cash

provision and local fund-raising. The regular funds needed in a campaign should be

obtained by the finance department of campaign large formation logistics from superior

organs on a monthly basis based on supply capacity and supply standards, and should be

distributed to the subordinate units accordingly. Operational expenditures should be

obtained and distributed in a timely manner and in accordance with the budget

(expenditure plan) approved by the superior organs. The provision of funds should

generally be timed to occur in the campaign preparation phase and during battle intervals.

In case of contingency, or of a need for big expenditures that can not be met by preallocated funds, one may also provide support by adopting ad hoc funding measures.

(2) Acceptance and transfer of fund provision relationship

There is a high degree of mobility during wartime and command and subordinate

relationships changes quickly. Campaign logistics should accept and transfer fund

provision relationships and accurately organize provision of funds in a timely fashion.

The acceptance and transfer of provision relationships regarding subordinate units should

be determined by the duration of such relationship. If the command and subordinate

relationship lasts only a short period of time, in principle no transfer of provision

relationship is needed. However if the relationship lasts a relatively long time, transfer
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may be done based on command relationship, or by a unit designated by large formation

logistics to provide funds. For units located far away from their established units, units in

the vicinity maybe designated by large formation logistics to provide funds. When

established units are moved, new provision organs should organize fund provision upon

receipt of letters of introduction. As for personnel, horses, vehicles and boats provided by

civilian authorities for the front, military units should start providing funds on the day of

acceptance of letters of introduction from civilian authorities, name lists and other

certifications.

(3) Fund management

Fund management should be focused on managing such links as application, allocation,

designation, payment, release, reimbursement etc. In addition, there should also be

careful management of settlement, auditing and supervision, and of captured money and

other valuables. Settlement should be mainly based on provision relationship, provision

capacity, provision standards, operational budget approved by the superior organs,

expenditure plans of functional departments, commanding officers approval memos and

various receipts. It should be conducted in a time sensitive manner during campaign

intervals and, as much as possible, on a daily and monthly basis. One must strengthen

auditing and supervision over various links concerning finance such as planning,

expenditure, settlement etc so as to ensure the funds are spent in accordance with

provision standards and relevant regulations. Financial departments at various levels

should have designated officers to take charge of captured money and other valuables.

They should make timely request for force-units to hand them in, and should have them

registered, well kept, and handled in accordance with relevant regulations drawn up by

superior authorities.

IV. . Transport Service...246

Campaign transport service is the basic means to carry out armed forces mobility support,

transportation of materiel supplies and movement of the sick and wounded personnel and

damaged equipment to the rear. It is a central link for campaign logistics to accomplish

support missions. In a modern campaign, force-unit mobility is frequent; forward and

backward transport tasks are heavy; the transport volume is huge; directions of transport

flows are multiple and the space is wide; and transport lines are under grave threats from

enemy attacks. Hence, campaign logistics should bring into full effect the power of

integrated military-civilian support strengths and well organize multi-layered and multidimensional comprehensive transport that includes ground, water and air transport.

(1) Unified Organization and Command

Campaign transport is rich in content. It involves many areas. And command and

coordination relationships are complex. Hence it is imperative to set up unified transport

command organs to exercise unified organization and direction. For this purpose, on the

basis of a peacetime communication and transport strategic leading small group, a
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communication and transport leading small group should be set up that would be made up

of theater and local party and government leaders and leaders of military and civilian

communication and transport departments. Under the leading small group, lean executive

organs should also be set up. Their main missions are: unified guihua planning of

communication and transport and conducting guidance for various functional transport

departments; making uniform arrangements for military and civilian transport; uniformly

dispatching various transport strengths; organizing emergency construction and repairs

and maintenance of communication and transport lines; directing struggles against the

enemy along communication and transport lines; organizing communication adjustments;

and maintaining traffic order so as to ensure that communication and transport lines stay

open.

In order to accomplish well multi-dimensional and comprehensive transport, one should

have a foothold in the campaign overall situation, conduct thorough planning and make

arrangements for unified-overall-planning. In the division of transport missions, one

should give priority to higher-level transport to the front, while subordinate levels should

organize self-shipments; transport to the front should give priority to level-by-level

transport to the front, and then organize skip-echelon transport to the front based on

needs-requirements. In planning transport to the rear missions, in addition to using

specialized back transport vehicles, one should also take full advantage of return trip

transport vehicles. Furthermore, one should keep a certain amount of reserve transport

capabilities in preparations for eventualities.

(2) Comprehensive employment of various transport capabilities

Railway and highway transport are the main transport means in campaign logistics

transport. Such transport lines should be extended as far as possible to the front, so as to

carry out more transport missions. Oil pipelines are the main means for campaign

logistics fuel transport. The supply of fuels to naval (air) bases and stations should mainly

be carried out through pipelines. Air transport, particularly helicopter transport, is more

flexible and speedier. One should take full advantage of such forms of transport. In

coastal areas and areas where an extensive network of waterway transport exists, one

should devote much effort to organizing sea and river transport. In special regions, units

under group army level should organize manual and animal auxiliary transport. In

comprehensive employment of transport strengths, one should also organize connections

between various forms of transport. For instance, when rail transport is disrupted, one

should organize auto transport relay. When auto transport is under capacity, rail transport

should extend as much as possible to the front. Air transport should also be organized so

as to ensure all-time uninterrupted transport

(3) Building multi-dimensional transport system

Based on campaign bushi disposition and transport missions, in the campaign rear, a

multi-route, multi-layered and multi-dimensional transport network should be constructed

with railway and highways as the backbone and including waterways, oil pipelines, and
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air routes. For this purpose, on the basis of peacetime transport construction, one should

quickly improve and add transport trunk lines, feeder lines, dedicated lines and bypass

lines, and open up new routes and air routes etc. In transport network repair and

maintenance, engineering corps and local specialized technical strengths should form the

backbone. The military should be joined by civilian strengths. Transport lines should be

divided up into regions and sections for designated units to meticulously organize and

carry out repair and maintenance.

(4) Meticulously organize protection of transport lines

In order to ensure smooth communication and transport, the campaign commander should

include the protection of the transport network in the theater and campaign large

formation rear protection plan, and organize aviation force-units, surface-to-air guided

missile force-units and anti-aircraft artillery force-units to provide protective cover

against air attacks, and rear ground defense force-units, frontier force-units and militias

along transport lines to carry out ground safeguard and defense tasks. Campaign logistics

should be centered on transport. It should meticulously organize the coordination between

transport and repairs and protection. Transport and repairs should be carried out under

protective cover. And taking full advantage of the protective cover, transport and

emergency repairs should be carried out racing against time.

V. Logistics Defense...248

Campaign logistics defense refers to alert and protection measures and operational

activities adopted to prevent and defeat the enemy’s raid-attacks and destruction against

logistic targets. Logistics has always been a key target of enemy’s strike destruction.

Various items of logistic work in a modern campaign are unfolded and conducted in an

environment of encountering enemy threats and intense struggles with the enemy; thus

the campaign and logistics commanders must adhere to the principles of combining

defense with strike giving defense priority, combining military with civilian giving

military priority, combining points with areas giving priority to points, and tightly

organizing logistics defense. The basic missions of logistics defense are: accomplish well

the concealment and camouflage of logistics organs, force-units and facilities against

various kinds of enemy reconnaissance; actively open-up-development of anti-air raid,

anti-air landing, anti-harassment, and anti-destruct operations, safeguarding the security

of logistics personnel, materiel and equipment; coordinate the headquarters departments,

accomplish the transport line struggle against the enemy, and safeguard the unimpeded

security of communication and transport lines.

(1) Logistics defense command

Campaign logistics defense is an important component in campaign logistic defense. It

must be carried out under the unified command of the campaign commander and the

command organ. Defense of the logistic deployment area {peizhi diyu} should be carried

out by various defense zones under the unified command of the logistics commander. The
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defense of logistical support strengths deployed in defense zones, including engineering,

telecommunication, anti-chemical warfare force- (element-) units and civilian assistingsupport strengths, should be brought into the overall campaign logistics protection plan

and executed under the unified command of various defense zones. The defense of

logistics organs and force- (element-) units deployed at strategic and campaign vital sites

should be brought into the vital-site defense plan {jihua} and is the unified responsibility

of the vital-site commander. In the defense of rear communication and transport lines, the

logistics should be jointly implemented in coordination and cooperation with the

headquarters and the communication and transport command institution. There should be

close coordination and mutually assisting-support between the defense zones and the

force-units under the responsibility principles of unified command and division of effort,

ensuring the safety of logistics.

(2) Bushu disposition of logistics defense strengths

Logistics defense forces include those units within the logistics organized structure, the

higher-level reinforcement defense force- (element) units, and local armed and logistical

support personnel. The bushu disposition of the defense strengths should be deployed in

line with the key points and correspond to the principle of concentrated employment. It

should be determined on the basis of essential elements such as the defense missions, the

importance, terrain conditions, and enemy threat level of the defense targets, and the

currently existing defense strengths. Specialized logistics defense force- (element-) units

should mainly be responsible for the defense of the logistics command organ and the

areas where important logistic institutions are deployed, and generally deploy them in the

vicinity of the defended target. Task-organized with the support organizational-unit as its

basis, the defense strength in the defense zone shoulders the dual missions of defense and

support. Outside of special-duty defense strengths selecting points to set up defense and

controlling vital points and thoroughfares, the surplus strengths will be separately

dispersed and deployed according to the task-organization within the support unit’s area,

conducting both support and defense. One should also control a specific special-duty

defense strength that is deployed at a location convenient for assisting-support in order to

enhance the contingency capability of defending.

(3) Organizing united military-civilian defense

Organizing united military-civilian defense should be carried out on the basis of

peacetime preparations. In peacetime, the military should, in line with the principles of

on-the-spot and close-at-hand, and combining military and civilian giving priority to the

military, take the initiative to contact, share studies and unify and organize command

with departments such as provincial military area commands and military sub-commands.

Such united defense should be organized locally in view of the deployed location of

logistic organs and units. The military should play the leading role. The backbone role

played by logistic defense strengths should be fully exploited. It is necessary to set up, in

a timely manner, defense organizations, and to clarify command relationships and

missions of joint defense, means of communication and various joint defense measures. It
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is also necessary to organize united defense exercises so as to enhance coordinated

defense capabilities.

In addition, campaign logistics work also includes the mobilization of logistics

engineering support and local support-the-front strengths, along with employment and

clean-up of the battlefield and handling prisoners of war, etc.
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Chapter 9

Campaign Equipment Support...250

Campaign equipment support is the service activity for servicing, upkeep, inspecting,

repairing and modifying in order to ensure the weapons and equipment of the campaign

large formation stay in good technical condition. In a modern campaign, the technical

equipment employed is both numerous in type and large in number, and the intensity of

its usage is very high. Its role in the campaign is much more prominent than in the past.

Modern weapons and equipment are also costly, and thus peacetime reserves of such

weapons and equipment are relatively small. Their wartime production is also under

constraints. Replenishment of such weapons and equipment during the war is more

difficult. Weapons and equipment are also the key point for enemy strike and destruction.

As a result, the rate of damage is high and replenishment is very difficult. This is likely to

have a major impact on the combat power of force-units. Hence, to be able to organize

effective equipment support is of very important significance for maintaining and rapidly

restoring the good technical conditions of weapons and equipment, and for maintaining

and strengthening the combat power of campaign large formations in order to achieve

campaign victory.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...250

I. The Characteristics of Campaign Equipment Support...250

Because of the development and widespread use of informationized weapons and

equipment on the battlefield, not only has this caused very major changes in operational

ideologies, operational patterns, and fighting methods, but it has also caused the

appearance of many new characteristics of equipment support.

(1) Complex weapons and equipment structure and the broad equipment support content

First, the types of weapons and equipment have greatly increased, and the objects of

equipment support have been broadened. For a considerably long period of time in the

future, a large number of traditional conventional weapons and equipment will still be in

use, but at the same time, many high-tech weapons and related equipment will be added.

As for weapons and equipment, the new and the old will co-exist, and high-, medium-,

and low-tech weapons and equipment will be possessed together. The types of weapons

and equipment will greatly increase and equipment support departments will have to

provide technical support for all kinds of weapons and equipment, thus greatly

broadening the objects of support. Second, weapons and equipment structures are

complex and the contents of equipment support are numerous. Modern informationized

weapons and equipment are extremely complex. For instance, at the time when the

operational aircraft was first introduced, one had only some 1000 parts, but now one has

more than one million parts. Equipment support has also been transformed from mainly

mechanical maintenance in the past, to precision machine tools and electronic and optical
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instruments, and other high-tech maintenance. The contents of such support are very

broad. Third, the transport, storage and upkeep, and replenishment of expendable hightech weapons and equipment maintenance materials, and the technical preparation of

high-tech weapons and ammunitions, all require appropriate technical support, thus

making support missions larger and larger and technical requirements higher and higher.

From this it can be seen that the development of weapons and equipment, particularly the

increase in high-tech weapons systems and equipment, has broadened the content of

equipment support.

(2) More equipment damage mechanisms and increased degree of difficulty in equipment

support

In a modern campaign, the mechanisms of weapons and equipment damage are varied.

Not only is the threat of traditional “hard” destruction becoming greater and greater, as it

can cause many types of physical damage to weapons and equipment, but also, various

new forms {xingshi} of “soft” destruction will form many brand new mechanisms of

destruction, like the disorder or malfunction of control procedures and the devouring or

falsification of data by “viruses,” as well as the structural and qualitative changes that

appear in weapons and equipment materials. At the same time, the inter-combination of

the two types of destruction mechanisms, “soft” and “hard,” and their synthesized use,

makes the types of weapons and equipment damage complex and varied. In addition,

informationized weapons and equipment structures are more and more complex and

precise. Often, they are the product of a combination of many new, advanced

technologies. Any piece (or set) of new high-tech weapons or equipment has a high

concentration of technology. For example, precision-guided missile weapons are the

synthesized products of a combination of micro-electronic technology, sensor

technology, computer technology, signal processing technology, propulsion technology,

and other advanced technologies. The implementation of support for any one piece of

such weapons or equipment requires the resolution of several tens or even several

hundreds of issues with new, advanced technologies. This makes the degree of difficulty

for testing and repairing damaged equipment more and more difficult, and the

requirements of equipment support higher and higher.

(3) Tremendous consumption of weapons and equipment and strenuous equipment

support missions

Along with an increase in the tactical, technical functionality of weapons and equipment,

and their greater role in a campaign, the two sides participating in battle will consider

striking at the other side’s weapons systems as an important means of weakening the

opponent’s operations capabilities. In addition, the destructive power of informationized

weapons and equipment has increased, making the rate of battle damage for weapons and

equipment very high. For example, in the fourth Middle East war, of the 3,730 100-mmplus artillery pieces of the Egyptian army participating in battle, 1,100 were damaged, for

a damage rate of 29.5%. In the Gulf War, for the Iraqi force-units in southern Iraq and in

Kuwait, the damage rate to their heavy equipment reached 30% and above, and among
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that, 45% of their artillery was destroyed. According to statistics, the rate of damage to

weapons and equipment in one campaign of a modern war will be 30% or greater. Such a

high rate of battle damage greatly increases the load for support, making equipment

support missions extremely strenuous.

(4) Accelerated campaign tempo and strong time effectiveness quality of equipment

support

A modern campaign is often launched suddenly and the tempo of operations fast. This not

only causes the time to service weapons and equipment and to make technical

preparations before the launching of the campaign to be short, and the time for repairing

equipment damaged during battle obviously short, but also, because an enemy on the

offensive will carry out all-depth, all-position, anytime strikes over the whole battlefield

during the course of operations, it will be difficult to send damaged weapons and

equipment to the rear in a timely manner. One must primarily depend on campaign and

tactical equipment support mechanisms to carry out battlefield repairs. This leads to the

effective usable time for battlefield repairs and rear repairs to damaged equipment to be

greatly shortened, thereby making repair missions strenuous and their level of difficulty

great, and making the contradiction between urgent need and the short amount of usable

time very prominent. This will increase the need for the effective use of time for technical

support. Only by quickly completing maintenance and upkeep and technical preparations

within rather short campaign preparations, and only by repairing and restoring a large

amount of damaged equipment in a quick and timely manner during the execution of a

campaign, can the combat power of the force-units be maintained and quickly restored.

II. The Requirements of Campaign Equipment Support...252

(1) Combine military-civilian and integrated support

For a modern campaign, both the amount of equipment damage will be large and the

types of equipment damage will be numerous. Solely depending on the support strengths

of the armed forces themselves, it will be difficult to complete support missions. Along

with the informationization of weapons and equipment and the continual increase in the

level of military-civil interoperability, the integration of military-civilian support for

equipment has become possible. Because of this, the superiority of people’s warfare must

be brought to bear and a support system combining and integrating military and civilian

must be established to be able to complete the important missions of equipment support.

To organize and implement combined and integrated military-civilian equipment support,

not only must equipment resources and materiel storage during peace time employ a

combination of the armed forces, the state, and the local, but also, the local front support

strengths must be mobilized and used during wartime. The contents and scope of this

primarily include: mobilizing local scientific research, industrial, enterprise, and other

institutions to transform into campaign equipment support institutions; mobilizing local

technical personnel and using their technical equipment and facilities to implement the
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organization and expansion of campaign equipment support institutions; and

requisitioning and modifying civilian-use ships, aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment

and their materials, facilities, maintenance institutions, and tools to strengthen the support

capabilities. To organize and implement combined and integrated military-civilian

equipment support, one must do the following: in accordance with the campaign support

missions and the actual situations of the support strengths, formulate detailed plans

{jihua} for utilizing the local strengths and, in accordance with the advance plans for

integrated support, establish a special coordination and liaison institution that is

integrated with the local front institution; unify arrangements, rationally allocate,

collectively utilize, and specially manage the local front strengths to incorporate the

equipment and resources and materials mobilized into the unified use within the

campaign equipment support plan {jihua}.

(2) Scientific organized grouping and rational deployment {peizhi}

Modern campaign weapons and equipment structures are complex, of numerous types,

and are great in number. The contradiction between arduous support missions and

insufficient support strengths is very prominent. Because of this, scientifically

organizing, rationally deploying and employing equipment support strengths are

necessary requirements for equipment support in a modern campaign.

Campaign equipment support strengths are primarily made up of the equipment support

strengths within the organizational system, high-level reinforcement equipment support

strengths, and the equipment strengths of local support. The equipment support strengths

within the organizational system are the basic strengths for carrying out campaign

equipment support missions. Except for a small amount of subordinate reinforcements,

these strengths are rationally composed of force- (element-) units in accordance with their

specialized skills. In principle, high-level reinforcement equipment support strengths are

integrated into them in line with their special skills. When the reinforcement specialized

strengths are rather large, they can also be arranged independently in accordance with

their specialties to carry out missions under unified command. Local strengths are

important strengths for carrying out campaign equipment support missions. It can be seen

as to whether to separate them into related organizational-units, or to arrange them

independently and to assign them suitable missions. Along with equipment support

strengths sent to reinforce large formations (or force-units), reinforcement force-units are

normally used as direct accompaniments for carrying out support and they can also be

arranged and used in a unified manner.

The deployment {peizhi} of equipment support strengths can have an important effect on

the execution of equipment support missions. As such, the equipment commander should

carry out rational bushu disposition in line with the principles of facilitating support and

benefitting security in accordance with the campaign missions, operational bushu

disposition, support missions, and the level of threat from the enemy and the natural

geographic conditions of the operations area and other factors affecting support strengths.

Its bushu disposition should conform to the campaign bushu disposition; not only must it
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consider each space, each direction, and the whole course of the campaign, but it also

must consider the main direction, the critical time occasions, and the large formation

(force-units) executing the main missions, and it must also reserve a specific maneuver

strength in order to maintain the stability and contingency capability of the equipment

services bushu disposition; it must use the main lines of communication as the axis to

construct a dovetailed, top-down, front-to-rear, deep, hierarchical support system {tixi}

with a clear division of labor. One must fully utilize the natural geographic conditions of

the operational area, adopt measures that suit local conditions, and exploit advantages

while avoiding disadvantages.

(3) Unified organization and implementation by classifications

Modern campaign equipment support strengths are a complex system of many services

branches, many systems, many specialties, and many types. Equipment support must start

from the overall situation of the campaign. And implement unified command over the

various equipment support strengths and their support activities, so that the various

support strengths constitute a single whole and so that support is implemented for the

force-units in a coordinated manner. The equipment command mechanisms from each

service and branch participating in battle should set up unified raising, organizing, and

deploying of the equipment support strengths participating in battle on each front, they

should set up unified decision-making, planning {jihua}, coordination, and control for

equipment support activities, and they should unify command of the defense of

equipment support mechanisms, in order to fully bring the overall superiority of

campaign equipment strengths and the most effective support to bear.

In a modern campaign, the types of weapons and equipment participating in battle are

numerous, the specialization of technology is strong, and great discrepancies exist in the

use management, servicing and upkeep, repairs, and other specific methods for the

equipment. In addition, the specialization of support personnel is strong and it is difficult

for them to be replaced. Because of this, when concretely implementing equipment

support, it should be organized and implemented by classifications. Normally, support for

general-use equipment should carry out regionalized support under the unified

organization and command of campaign equipment command mechanisms and in

accordance with the support mechanisms issued for the direction and the area. Support

for special-use equipment should be organized and carried out separately in light of

differences in organizational systems and in accordance with the division of labor for

each service and branch participating in battle.

(4) Numerous modes and comprehensive application

The modes and means for scientifically and rationally applying equipment support are

important for completing equipment support missions. Because of this, campaign

equipment departments and commanders should, in accordance with campaign missions,

equipment support missions, equipment support strengths, and the actual situations of the

battlefield, rationally select the modes of equipment support.
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First, combine integrated support with key point support. In a modern campaign, in terms

of force-strength and weaponry deployment {peizhi}, one generally forms a bushu

disposition with great depth, in all directions, in echelon, and with key points. In order to

conform to this, equipment support must carry out full-scale integrated support. At the

same time, because the missions undertaken by the various weapons and equipment are

different in the course of operations, and because the degrees of damage are different, the

needs of equipment support are also different. Because of this, when organizing

equipment support, one should also separate levels, seize on what is critical, and

implement key point support in the main direction, the main phases, the important

activities, and the important equipment, allowing equipment support to maintain

consistency from start to finish with main operational missions.

Second, combine mobile {jidong} support with fixed point support. When there are no

support strengths and usable facilities in an operations area, mobile support is the transfer

of personnel from the theater and in each service branch’s campaign large formation’s

equipment maintenance force- (element-) units and materiel storehouses, and the

allocation of advanced command tools and mobile support equipment, to constitute a

number of small, comprehensive, multi-functional, equipment support groups with

independent support capabilities. They should be allocated to appropriate positions in the

battle formations or rear of the main operations fronts to carry out developing support.

Fixed point support is carried out from the starting point of an operations area base,

force-unit {budui} station, or other fixed support. It is the opening of field repair posts

along the force-units’ operations lines and the formation of multiple equipment support

entities for fixed point rush-repair of damaged weapons and equipment. A modern

campaign will have mobile operations in the lead and with large operational scope will

require that equipment support organizational-units must possess relatively strong mobile

capabilities and be able to support mobile operations force-units as they act. Because of

this, fixed point support and mobile support must be combined. Namely, this involves

regarding mobile support equipment as the carrier, with a starting point mobile axes more

or less linking up to support a laterally connected and vertically linked network of bases,

depot stations, and maintenance stations.

Third, combine accompanying support with self support. Accompanying support is the

allocation of equipment support strengths reinforced from higher-levels to operational

force-units on the basis of operational mission requirements, and during the course of

operations, one can carry out prompt equipment support. When organizing this

reinforcement-type equipment support, one must clearly separate the main and the

secondary and support key points. Under normal situations, support with key points the

force-units shouldering the main operational mission. Self support depends on the

personnel of operational force-units to self-repair and self-restore rather lightly damaged

weapons and equipment. In this way, not only can one implement accompanying support

and ensure key points, but one can also self-repair and self-rescue and improve the speed

of rescue and rush repair for weapons and equipment as well as suit the needsrequirements of modern campaign operations.
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Fourth, combine level-by-level support with level-skipping support {yueji baozhang}.

For a modern campaign, the modes of equipment support must possess a high level of

flexibility. On the one hand, a complete, level-by-level support system must be

established. On the other hand, level-skipping support must be carried out as much as

possible to increase the efficiency of support. As such, at the same time as one is

adhering to the chain of command and carrying out level-by-level support according to

the responsibilities of each level, the closest, most direct, level-skipping support must be

carried out for the force-units shouldering the main missions in order to increase the

efficiency of equipment support to the greatest extent possible.

(5) Strengthen defense and ensure security

Campaign equipment support strengths are one of the targets of the enemy’s focal point

attacks and destruction. Guaranteeing the security of equipment support strengths and

support activities is a prerequisite condition for completing campaign equipment support

missions. Because of this, campaign equipment support defense must be placed into the

overall campaign defense plans {jihua} and must be carried out under the unified

organization of the campaign commander and the command institution. A defensive

organization must be set up that regards the areas for defense where equipment support

strengths are deployed as its focal points and that regards special-duty defensive strengths

as its backbone. It must combine professional service strengths and local militias. It must

integrate defense with support, and link military and civilian defense. It must adhere to

the principles of “regarding defense as the most important and combining defense with

attack.” It must combine concealment with deceit, it must combine the point defense of

support objectives and the defense of support areas, and it must combine the self-defense

of the support strengths with coverage of the operational force-units, all to increase the

survivability of the equipment support strengths. With respect to command, it must both

persist in unceasingly organizing support for each force-unit and it must command the

defensive operations of the campaign equipment support mechanisms. In terms of

activities, it must both conceal as much as possible and it must complete support missions

in a timely manner. In terms of the selection of deployment areas {peizhi diyu}, it must

both consider security and it must also facilitate the launching of support strengths. In

addition, defensive training for support personnel should be strengthened to allow them to

be able to carry out continual support in harsh operational environments.

Section 2: Contents and Methods...256

In accordance with the objects of support and the nature of the specialties, equipment

support can generally be divided into general-use weapons and equipment support and

special-use weapons and equipment support.

The modes of equipment support primarily include joined duty support, organizational

system support, and partial joined duty support. Joined duty support is support of a

regional nature, namely the unified organization of general-use military machinery,

engineering mechanics, and materiel and other maintenance and supplies in the theater
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based on delimited areas. Organizational system support is namely the self-support of

each service, which is separately organized and implemented by each service’s campaign

large formation’s technical support mechanisms and which is primarily responsible for

the inspection and maintenance of special-use weapons and equipment. Partial joined

duty support refers to joined duty support organizing parts of a service and parts of the

contents in certain specially-determined areas. For example, in a coastal area, the

maintenance and materiel supply of ships can implement a joint-service support between

the navy and army with the navy being responsible for organizing it. In areas where army

aviation forces are deployed near air force aviation forces, aircraft maintenance and

aviation materiel supply can carry out an army-air force joint-service support, with the air

force being responsible for organizing it. In an area where navy aviation forces and air

force aviation forces bushu dispositions overlap, aircraft maintenance and aviation

materiel supply can carry out navy-air-force joint-service support, and based on the

support capability of the joint-services for both sides in that area, designate one side to

take responsibility for organizing it.

The contents and methods of equipment support are very numerous. They primarily

include organizing the servicing-upkeep and inspection of weapons and equipment, the

conduct of weapons and equipment damage estimates, the organization of repairs for

weapons and equipment, the supplying of ammunition, and the replenishment of

equipment, etc. The key points amongst these are damage estimates and repair of

weapons and equipment.

I. Damage Estimates for Weapons and Equipment...256

In order to correctly formulate equipment support plans {jihua}, scientifically arrange

repair missions, store the maintenance materials, and rationally organize and utilize repair

strengths, the campaign commander and the equipment support institution should make a

forecast for the situation of weapons and equipment damage for each campaign (or for a

day of battle). This primarily includes the amount of weapons and equipment damaged,

the degree to which the weapons and equipment are damaged, and the proportion of

weapons and equipment that can be restored.

(1) The factors affecting weapons and equipment damage

The factors affecting weapons and equipment damage are very numerous. The basic

factors include: the types of campaign and the patterns of the campaign; operational

missions, the comparative force-unit {budui} strength and weapons between the enemy

and us and the time the campaign lasts and its degree of ferocity; the needs of the tactical

and technical functions and uses of the weapons and equipment and the level of technical

and operational experience of the personnel; the means and degree of the enemy’s strikes

and destruction, as well as one’s own defensive capabilities and the natural environment

of the operations area. Because of differences in the function and use of weapons and

equipment and because of differences in the locations, times, and amount of strength of

use, the degree of effect of the above-mentioned factors on the various weapons and
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equipment damage also varies. Artillery damage is mainly determined by comparing the

long-range firepower of the enemy and us, the degree of concealment and protection of

launch positions, and the speed of launch. Vehicle damage is primarily determined by the

degree of destruction to transportation lines and our defensive conditions, the situation

for the terrain and roads, and the qualities of the drivers. Tank damage is primarily

determined by the tank force-units’ operational missions, the operations and defensive

capabilities, how close together the tanks are used, and the terrain conditions and the

amount and functions of the enemy’s anti-tank weapons. Aircraft and ship damage is

primarily determined by comparing the function and amount of equipment of the enemy

and us, the operational missions to be carried out, the frequency of takeoffs, the

operational capabilities, the situations of the weather on the sea and in the air, and the

enemy’s air defense and anti-ship capabilities. Nuclear weapon and conventional missile

equipment damage is primarily determined by the concealment and degree of protection

for launch positions and by comparing our and the enemy’s raid and anti-raid capabilities.

Electronic equipment damage is primarily determined by counter-reconnaissance and

counter-destruction capabilities. Engineering defensive equipment damage is primarily

determined by its protective function and by how much it is used. Because of this,

estimating equipment damage should be based on the main factors affecting the damage

for each type of equipment, combined with other relevant factors, to carry out

comprehensive, complete, and specific analyses.

(2) The general laws of weapons and equipment damage

Normally and under normal conditions, the average rate of daily damage to equipment in

an offensive campaign is greater than that in a defensive campaign; but the total rate of

equipment damage in a defensive campaign is greater than that in an offensive campaign.

For the same campaign types, the rate of equipment damage for different campaign

patterns will differ. For example, the rates of equipment damage in an amphibious

landing campaign and in an airborne [drop] campaign are greater than in other campaigns

and the rates of equipment damage in a counter-amphibious landing campaign and urban

defense campaign are higher than that for other defensive campaigns. For the same

campaign patterns, the rate of equipment damage for the campaign large formation or

force-unit of the main operational direction will be higher than the rate of equipment

damage for the campaign large formation or force-unit in a secondary operational

direction. As for types of equipment, the rate of damage for heavy equipment will often

exceed the rate of damage for light equipment. For equipment with similar technical

conditions, the rate of damage in the early phase of the campaign will often be higher

than the rate of damage in the follow-on phase of the campaign. Along with the ever

more prominent role for high-tech weapons and equipment in operations, high-tech

weapons and equipment has become a focal point of attack and destruction for enemies,

so its rate of damage could become higher and higher and the ration of high-tech

weapons and equipment within the total amount damaged greater and greater.
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(3) Methods for estimating weapons and equipment damage

The factors affecting the rate of weapons and equipment damage are many and varied and

the degree of effect that the various factors have on weapons and equipment are different

in different campaigns. Equipment damage is the result of many factors and effects, so

the degree of difficulty in estimating the rate of equipment damage will become greater

and greater. In normal situations, in addition to referring to data from previous, similar

campaign battle example experiences, the actual situations of each campaign should also

be concretely analyzed and an estimate should be carried out on the foundation of

separately determining the main and secondary affecting factors for each damage to the

equipment. The rate of equipment damage can then be estimated for the whole campaign

in light of the different types of equipment, for example, light weapons, heavy weapons,

anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, campaign and tactical missile launch systems,

aircraft, ships, etc. One can also add up estimates made for different campaign phases to

come up with a total rate of damage. For vehicles, tanks, and other equipment, in addition

to estimating operational damage, one should also estimate damage caused by natural

wear and tear. Especially when mobile and operational distances are long, or when a

campaign lasts for a relatively long time, one should make budgetary estimates of the

damage caused by natural wear and tear in light of the distances driven or the motor

hours, by combining the actual and reserved distances driven or motor hours for the

vehicle.

II. Weapons and Equipment Maintenance...258

Equipment maintenance is the servicing and upkeep activity carried out to maintain

equipment in and restore equipment to good technical functioning. For a modern

campaign, the technical equipment participating in battle is numerous, intensity of use is

large, and the rate of equipment damage is high. Add to this, the unstable conditions dealt

with by the repair institutions, and the equipment maintenance missions are extremely

arduous. Under normal conditions, the rate of possible restoration for damaged

equipment is around 70%. The restorable equipment can be divided into lightly damaged,

medium-degree damage, and heavy damage. Among these, the most important for

campaign technical support restoration is heavy equipment with medium-degree damage

and light equipment with heavy damage. Repair missions should be scientifically divided

in this way and repair strengths should be organized and used in a unified manner,

comprehensively applying the various modes of repair to “resurrect” the weapons and

equipment to the greatest extent possible, to restore the operational capabilities of the

force-units in a timely manner, and to support the smooth execution of the campaign.

(1) The differentiation of repair missions

A theater is normally divided into support areas according to the situations of the repair

strengths. Unified repair is carried out for the general-use equipment in a support area

and the repair of service and branch special-use equipment is carried out by each service

and branch in accordance with the organizational system. Equipment repair under the
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basic campaign large formation is carried out in accordance with the organizational

system.

The theater is primarily responsible for accepting the damaged equipment sent back by

the combined group army. It carries out major repairs of weapons, vehicles, tanks, etc.,

and it maintains the general-use equipment sent back by naval bases, theater air forces,

and Second Artillery bases. To increase the time effectiveness of technical support, at

appropriate times, the theater should dispatch mobile support strengths to implement

forward support for force-units in the main operational direction and the force-units

responsible for the main operational missions.

The combined group army primarily accepts the equipment sent back by subordinate

force-units. It particularly conducts partial medium repairs of heavy equipment and major

repairs and replacements of vehicles; the repair of radar, precision instruments and other

special equipment, because of its greater degree of difficulty and higher technical

requirements, can be appropriately reduced to the scope of minor repairs in order to

guarantee the quality of repair. Besides opening up relatively fixed repair structures, a

combined group army should dispatch mobile support strengths to implement forward

support for force-units in the main operational direction and for force-units responsible

for the main operational missions.

The repair strengths of theater air forces, navy bases and Second Artillery bases should

primarily carry out medium-level repairs and partial major repairs of aircraft, ships,

guided missile launch systems and other special equipment. At the same time, they

should also separately bear medium-degree repairs and major repairs of helicopters and

army ships. When concretely organizing maintenance support, they also should organize

some mobile support strengths to be dispatched to key point force-units and implement

forward assisting-support {zhiyuan}.

(2) Organization and use of repair strengths

Theater repair strengths are made up of the repair element-units of theater repair factories

and logistic sub-departments, and local front-support repair strengths. The group army

repair strengths are made up of repair element-units of the group army organizational

system, higher-level reinforcement repair element-units, and local front-support technical

support strengths. Navy, air force, and Second Artillery repair strengths are made up of

the repair factories and repair subgroups subordinate to each service or branch and local

front-support strengths.

In light of the repair missions and the state of the repair strengths, theaters and each

service’s campaign large formations should unify the organization of armed forces and

local repair strengths, rationally group them and divide up the labor, and establish a repair

system with multiple elements and multiple tiers. In accordance with the campaign bushi

disposition, campaign strengths should be unfolded level-by-level and should be 

allocated to the front to the greatest extent possible, to constitute a repair network
292

combining top and bottom and military and civil. The use of local front-support strengths

should strive to maintain their original organizational system, should allocate a certain

amount of repair missions to them, and should also be able to use them in a combined

manner with the force-unit repair institution.

(3) On-the-spot repairs

The modes of repair for damaged equipment are very numerous. Based on time, they can

be divided into repairs before the campaign execution, repairs during the campaign

execution, and repairs after the conclusion of the campaign. Based on the use of technical

support strengths, they can be divided into accompanying repairs, making-the-rounds

repairs, and fixed point repairs. Based on repair spaces they can be divided into rear area

(or transported-to-the rear) repairs and on-the-spot repairs. On-the-spot repairs are an

important mode of repair. Not only can it reduce the equipment sent to the rear, saving

manpower and materials, but also it can restore the tactical and technical function of the

equipment in a timely manner, allowing it to rapidly be re-invested into operations and

thereby playing an increasingly important role in maintaining and restoring force-unit

combat power.

One must employ different methods for carrying out on-the-spot repairs in light of the

operational missions, the amount of equipment to be repaired, the repair strengths, and

other situations. In the campaign preparation phase, technical support strengths should be

organized to go into the force-units and survey and make emergency repairs to increase

the rate of good equipment for the force-units. During force-unit mobility, for the forceunits that are bearing the main operational mission, or coming under the greatest threat,

or moving over relatively bad roads, the technical support strengths should be

appropriately reinforced. The amount of repair materials carried should also be increased

to heighten their on-the-spot, self-repair capabilities. Some of the equipment support

strengths dispatched should organize accompanying support or open up temporary

support points along routes of mobility to organize fixed point support. During the course

of the campaign execution, some equipment support strengths should be sent to reinforce

the force-units in the main operational direction or to organize a number of mobile repair

force- (element-) units to carry out forward, emergency repairs. When the situation

allows, one can organize fixed point emergency repair for damaged operations ships in

certain areas of the sea. The Air Force should organize equipment support strengths to go

into field stations and positions to assist force-units in carrying out on-the-spot,

emergency repairs. The Second Artillery should organize equipment support strengths to

carry out accompanying support for mobile missile force-units or ones implementing

mobile operations. When the positions of the missile force-units are relatively fixed, it

should organize mobile equipment support strengths to carry out mobile, making-therounds support for each missile force-unit.

In order to increase the speed of on-the-spot repairs, in terms of the methods of repair,

part replacement repairs should be the most important and original part repair should be

supplementary. When necessary, one can also disassemble and reassemble equipment.
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When concretely organizing on-the-spot emergency repairs, one should adhere to the

principles of doing the important repairs first and doing the less important repairs later,

doing emergency repairs first and general repairs later, and doing the easy repairs first

and the difficult repairs later. One should strive to meet the needs of the main operational

activities and the main operational force-units within the shortest amount of time possible

and one should strive to “resurrect” as much damaged equipment in the shortest amount

of time as possible.
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Chapter 10

Campaign Political Work...261

The theory of campaign political work is an important content of PLA campaign science

and it is a special distinguishing feature of PLA campaign science.

Political work is the lifeline for our military and it is a critical factor in uniting ourselves

to defeat the enemy in battle. The fundamental goals of wartime political work are to

make an optimal combination of people that are highly politically conscious with

modernized weaponry and equipment to more effectively bring to bear the total might of

modernized people’s warfare and to defeat the enemy and win victory.

Campaign political work directly serves the goal of realizing the goals of a campaign. It

strongly has the natures of the overall situation, politics, and policy. The scope of the

work is broad, its contents are numerous, it carries through the whole course of a

campaign, and it touches on each level and realm of a campaign. Add to this the

exceptional intensity and brutality of campaign resistance under informationized

conditions and the sudden changeability of battlefield situations, and the missions of

political work became more arduous and their organization and implementation become

even more complex and difficult.

The campaign large formation Party committee and political organ must strive to

strengthen leadership of campaign political work, persist in our military’s basic theories

and principles of political work, and inherit and further develop our military’s excellent

traditions of wartime political work. They must strive to bring the roles of each level of

Party committees, political organs, and political work cadres to bear, strengthen overall

concepts and the consciousness of service and support, and strengthen the predictability

of the work, to master the rules and improve the methods. They must strive to seize

opportunities, make focal points prominent, make changes flexibly, and rapidly respond.

They must strive to aim at the characteristics of the PLA campaign under informationized

conditions and the actual situations of wartime. They must strive to accord with the

tactics of national politics and diplomatic struggles, closely revolve around campaign

goals and missions, carefully carry it out throughout the entire course of the campaign,

fully bring the broad, subjective initiative of the officers to bear, mobilize all of the

strengths, and coordinate the struggle to win victory in the campaign.

Section 1: Missions and Contents...262

The basic missions of campaign political work are: to strengthen the Party’s unified

leadership of the campaign large formation in terms of thought and organization; to

protect the high centralization and unification of the various strengths participating in the

campaign; to ensure the carrying out and execution of higher level operational concepts,

orders, and instructions, as well as the realization of the campaign large formation senior

officer’s resolution; to educate the force-units in further developing patriotism,
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internationalism, and the spirit revolutionary heroism; to improve the political

consciousness of commanders, and to enhance their will to fight and their confidence in

certain victory; to guarantee force-units have from beginning to end command that has

sound organization and strength, and to solidify and improve force-unit combat power; to

strengthen internal and external military unity, to ensure consistency of military-civilian,

consistency in military-government, consistency in officers-soldiers, and consistency

across the PLA; to strengthen the discipline-quality of force-units, to guarantee that

force-units resolutely follow orders, and strictly execute policies; to actively open-updevelop psychological warfare and to collapse the enemy’s military.

I. Thought Work...262

Campaign thought work refers to the educational work carried out from the aspect of

political thought to unify the political understanding of all the personnel participating in

battle, to stimulate their enthusiasm and their combat spirit for participating in battle. It is

an important content of campaign political work. Its basic work involves the following

three items:

(1) Educate the force-units to be established in the correct view of warfare

The first question that campaign political work must resolve is for the personnel

participating in war to correctly separate just warfare and unjust warfare, to objectively

analyze the circumstances {xingshi} of a war, to believe in the bright future ahead and

the present difficulties, to correct the attitudes about a war for the personnel participating

in battle, and to educate the force-units to fight for justice with a highly patriotic spirit.

(2) Unify thought understanding and strengthen the view of the overall situation

The Party committees and political organs should widely and thoroughly disseminate the

campaign concept and clarify the campaign guidance thought and the campaign goals for

the personnel participating in battle, as well as their own missions, to ensure that all

personnel participating in battle have a unified thought understanding of the critical

questions for the campaign. Each force-unit should be educated to firmly establish the

view of the overall situation, to bravely shoulder the most difficult and the most

dangerous missions, to fully foster a spirit of unity and mutual assistance, to initiate

cooperation and support with one another, and to prevent and overcome the tendency

toward compartmentalism. The education of cadres must be strengthened, and especially

the education of high-level and mid-level cadres in the campaign large formation, to

unify their operational ideology and to deepen their spirit of comprehension of the

campaign concept so that they comprehensively understand the general intention of the

campaign and the missions of their own force-units, consciously conform to the

requirements of the campaign concept and the instructions of the campaign large

formation commander, and lead their own force-units to earnestly carry them out and put

them to effect, following centralized and unified command and closely coordinating the

campaign activities.
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(3) Stimulate the force-units’ will to fight and overcome psychological barriers

Future campaign activities under informationized conditions will be highly tense and

fierce, and the need for a will to fight and a spirit of bravery for the personnel

participating in battle will be put to the forefront. Party committees and political organs

must educate the force-units to establish an ideology of strategically hating the enemy

and tactically focusing on the enemy, in order to allow the force-units to both dare to

contest an enemy military with superior weaponry and equipment and bring a heroic

spirit to operations against all enemies and fully appraise the arduousness and complexity

of campaign missions, starting from the most difficult situations and completing the

spiritual preparations for fighting the hard fight and fighting the terrible fight. They must

reveal the enemy’s war crimes, and teach to hate, disdain, and despise the enemy to

stimulate hatred of the enemy and to encourage the will to fight. They must aim at the

possible negative spiritual factors that might arise in a campaign in carrying out

education and obstacle removing work, eliminating psychological barriers for the

personnel participating in battle and increasing their ability to psychologically endure

under harsh operational environment conditions.

II. Organization Work...263

The Party committee and political organs should attach importance to strengthening the

construction of the force-unit Party and [Youth] League organizations and other

servicemen organizations, and fully bring into play the core role of Party organizations of

all levels and the condensed role of organization of all categories so as to allow forceunits to maintain vigorous combat power from start to finish. Grasp with key points the

following two points:

(1) Strengthen construction of the organization

The Party committee and political organ must promptly comprehend the situation of the

subordinate force-unit Party and the Youth League organizations. They must put forward

the requirement for strengthening the construction Party and the Youth League

organizations, master the implementation and execution situation of instruction items by

lower-level Party committees, and guide and help each force-unit to fully bring the core

leadership role of the Party committee, the combat bastion role of the Party branches, and

the exemplary vanguard role of Party personnel to bear. During the course of a campaign,

they must coordinate with relevant departments to guide the force-units in promptly

accomplishing operations, construction, replenishment, and organizing work all at the

same time, and allow each level of Party and Youth League organization to be sound and

strong from start to finish.

(2) Safeguard the discipline of the organization

The Party committee and political organ should attach importance to conducting

education in the area of organizational discipline for the force-units: [they should]
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strengthen the dissemination of Party policy discipline and raise the view of policy

discipline for all personnel participating in battle; they should perfect and safeguard the

Party organizational system; they should, in accordance with the Party and Youth League

constitution, the relevant rules and regulations, as well as other policy discipline

stipulations, combine campaign missions and situations, and formulate supplemental

stipulations; and they should seek truth from facts and conduct punishment work

correctly and promptly.

III. Cadre Work...264

For cadre work in a campaign, the missions are arduous and the requirements are very

high. Party committees and political organs should have planned {jihua} out the

selection, cultivation, and retention of cadres in accordance with the needs of a campaign

and the stipulations of relevant policies. They should assign and replace cadres in a

timely manner. All of this is to maintain the soundness of every level of leadership team

and cadre ranks in the force-units from start to finish.

(1) Adjust the leadership and command team

Each level and each type of leadership and command team in a campaign should be

strong and structurally rational. Party committees and political organs should select good

officers at each level of the military and government, allocate them among leadership and

command bodies, and replace leadership and command cadres in a timely manner, and

they should replace in a timely manner those who cannot carry out their duties to

guarantee that each level of leadership and command bodies are, from start to finish, in a

sound state and able to meet the needs of strong, uninterrupted organization and

command.

(2) Investigate, select, and assign cadres

Party committees and political organs should focus on investing and identifying cadres

during operations. The political organs should thoroughly understand and grasp a cadre’s

situations to provide good advice on the cadre to the Party committee. They must

properly identify the best cadres who complete missions well during operations, who are

brave and tenacious, and who have both ability and integrity, to boldly promote them to

critical, important positions. The Party committees and the political organs must be good

at assigning, replacing, and retaining each type of cadre in accordance with the needs for

large numbers, many types, and high technical specialization for modern campaign

cadres. For force-units shouldering the main missions in the campaign, with respect to

cadre assignments, they must be reinforced with key points.
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IV. . Safeguard-Defend Work...264

Party committees and political organs must attach importance to strengthening safeguarddefend work {baowei gongzuo}8

and effectively prevent and strike the enemy’s covert

activity. In terms of politics, thought, and organization, they must guarantee the purity

and stability of force-units and solidify the combat power of the force-units.

(1) Master the situation comprehensively and promptly

Along with mastering the state of affairs for force-unit safeguard-defending work, the

political organ must at all times strengthen its investigation and study into the social

situation, the civil situation, and the enemy situation of the battle area; [it must] inspect

and control the enemy’s covert activity and promptly report relevant situations to the

force-units.

(2) Broadly open-up-develop anti-psychological warfare, anti-infiltration, anti-instigating

defection, and anti-information stealing work

The Party committee and political organ should, in accordance with the higher-level

safeguard-defending work concept, policies, and instructions, conscientiously command

the force-units to carry out defending against traitors and counter-espionage education,

military laws and regulations education, revolutionary spirit education and antipsychological warfare education. They should raise the total political vigilance of all

personnel participating in battle and solidify the psychological lines of defense. They

should guide force-units to strengthen the work of keeping secrets and strictly keep

military secrets. They should seriously handle those who create rumors and leak secrets

and punish those that flee the front and defect to the enemy in accordance with the law.

(3) Ensure the security {anquan} of the senior officer, the leadership organ, and the vitalarea critical departments

Under the unified leadership of the Party committee and political organ, special personnel

should be organized to conduct a widespread and strict examination of internal personnel

to ensure that internal personnel are pure and reliable. At the same time, coordinate with

relevant departments, strengthen the security {anquan} and guarding {jingwei} work of

the senior officer, the leadership organ, and the vital-area departments on station and in

the activity area, and ensure absolutely no slips.

8 Translator’s note: this term, 保卫 baowei, is a problem term because it can be translated as “defense” and

“security.” The term, when combined with work generally forms a phrase that is widely recognized as

“security work,” but this term should be distinguished from security, 安全 anquan, which is used in

nationalsecurity.
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(4) Establish a Joint Defense of the Military, Armed Police and Civilians

With the cooperation of the local government, the [people’s] armed police, the public

security [bureau], and the people, open-up-develop the defending against traitors and

anti-espionage struggles, strike the sabotage activity of enemy spies and other criminal

elements, and safeguard the public security of the battle sites.

V. Masses Work...265

Fostering the enormous might of people’s warfare to ensure victory in a campaign is a

characteristic of our military’s campaign theory and practices and is one of the important

contents of campaign political work. Party committees and political organs should guide

the force-units working together in accomplishing the work of the militia and civilian

workers participating-in-fighting and of the in-theater masses [people] with cooperation

from local governments.

(1) Close relationships with local governments

Party committees and political organs should maintain a close relationship with local

Party and government organs, exchange intelligence in a timely matter, consult with each

other, closely coordinate, and resolve the problems that fall on both the military and the

locality. In accordance with the instructions from higher-ups, constitute a joint Party

committee and joint leading organs with the collective leadership of the armed forces and

the locality to unify leadership and coordinate military-civilian operations.

(2) Accomplish the political work of the militia and civilian workers participating in

fighting

Political organs should help localities set up sound Party and Youth League organizations

for the militias and civilian workers participating in fighting. For the militias and civilian

workers participating in fighting, there should be tight organization, centralized

management, and proper resolution for various problems. At appropriate times, dispatch

backbone cadre to conduct political mobilization and strengthen thought education and

policy discipline education for them. [They should] introduce common military

knowledge and combat experiences. [They should] care about their lives, bring their

strengths to bear, and lead them to complete missions together.

(3) Accomplish well masses work in-theater

The victories of our military should be spread among the masses of people to broaden the

influence of our military and reveal the enemy’s war crimes and the nature of its

invasion. The masses should be motivated and organized to actively participate in battle.

Weapons for self-defense should be organized for the masses to defend against traitors, to

counter espionage, and for other struggles. Social order should be maintained. Education

force-units must strictly abide by the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points
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for Attention, and self-consciously respect the leadership of the local government to

preserve the interests of the masses.

VI. Enemy Military Work...266

Political organs should strengthen their investigation and study of the enemy military

situation, and, in accordance with the special characteristics for enemy military work in

local wars under high-tech conditions, draw up plans {jihua} for crumpling the enemy’s

military and promulgating requirements for achieving enemy military work. They must

provide timely intelligence information to the force-units, along with various propaganda

materials and tools. They should pay attention to cultivating, training, and retaining a

backbone cadre in enemy military work, with special attention for translation personnel.

They should guide the force-units to utilize various contradictions and weaknesses within

the enemy and seize favorable time-opportunities. [They should] employ various modes

and open up powerful psychological warfare offensives to crumple the fighting will of

the enemy. They should guide the force-units to study and observe the relevant policies

of the Party, as well as the relevant international laws.

They should carry out the policies and be good at prisoners of war work. They should

educate the troops to strictly carry out prisoner of war policies. Prisoners of war cannot

be beaten or cursed, they cannot be humiliated, and their personal property cannot be

confiscated. The execution of prisoners of war is strictly forbidden. Wounded and sick

prisoners of war are given medical treatment. The examination and management of

prisoners of war should be conscientiously done well. Attention should be paid to

splitting and crumpling prisoners of war. The occurrence of accidents should be

prevented.

VII. Application and Control of the News Media ...266

Political organs should strengthen the application and control of the news media by

designating special responsibilities to relevant departments and returning them to unified

management. In accordance with the political, diplomatic, and operational requirements,

propaganda guiding concepts and principles should be formulated to unify propaganda

specifications and to fully apply the armed forces and local news media to correctly carry

out propaganda reporting. The management and news examination of battle area reporters

should be actively strengthened to strictly defend against leaks, and to strictly prevent

negative propaganda reports. Various measures should be employed to struggle against

the distortions and rumors of the enemy.

Section 2: Organization and Implementation...266

Under informationized conditions, the missions of campaign political work are difficult,

have many contents, touch on all aspects, and run through each link throughout the whole

course of a campaign. Campaign large formation Party committees and political organs

should integrate overall-planning, comprehensively deploy, give prominence to key
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points, and grasp the crux of campaign political work. [They should] guide and urge all

levels of Party committees, their political organs and political work personnel to

conscientiously organize and implement all political work, ensuring campaign political

work fully brings its enormous role to bear and ensuring victory in the campaign.

To organize and implement campaign political work, one must rely on complete

leadership systems and organizational systems, as well as the correct work procedures

and scientific working methods.

I. Organize the Leadership System {zhidu}...267

The system for organizing leadership in campaign political work includes the Party

committee system {zhidu}, the political commissar system {zhidu}, the political organs

system {zhidu}, etc. In order to carry out this system {zhidu} for organizing leadership,

not only fully manifests the absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces, but it

also they also reflects the fundamental requirement of campaign political work; not only

is it related to organizing the leadership of campaign political work, but it is also related

to organizing the leadership of the entire campaign. Campaign political work will be

under the direct leadership of the campaign large formation Party committee and the

political commissar, and it will be specifically organized and implemented by the

campaign large formation political organ and political work personnel.

The composition of the campaign large formation Party committee. The campaign large

formation Party committee must be composed based on the decision {jueding} of the

higher-level Party committee and adhere to the requirements of being a capable

institution and facilitate work. The membership of the Party committee generally are

assumed by the campaign large formation military-political senior officer and responsible

persons of his headquarters, political department, logistics department, and equipment

department, the various campaign group army (large formation) military-political lead

officers as well as relevant leadership in the local area of operations.

The leadership of the campaign large formation Party committee on the campaign. The

campaign large formation Party committee is the core of unified leadership and unity for

the campaign large formation and it is the core of unified leadership for the various

campaign strengths participating in battle. It is the highest leadership institution of the

campaign and it carries out unified leadership of the entire campaign. The major issues

relevant to a campaign, situation permitting, normally must be studied and decided upon

by the Party committee or the standing committee. These major issues normally include:

implementing and executing the higher level intent, their decisions, orders, and

instructions; determining campaign concept; organizing and leading the arrangement of

campaign work; the cadre assignment and employment preliminary plans within their

appointment; and dismissal jurisdiction and important awards and punishments for

organizational-units and individuals.
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The campaign large formation carries out a senior officer division of effort responsibility

system unified under the collective leadership of the Party committee. After the Party

committee undergoes discussion and decision of a major issue and makes a decision, the

campaign large formation military and political senior officers divide the work and

responsibility to organize and implement it. Within the Party, the campaign large

formation senior officer presides as the principal/deputy secretary of the day to day work

of the Party committee, and administratively, he is also in charge of military-political

[affairs]. Affairs belonging to the area of military work, such as setting the campaign

resolution and organizing and commanding the campaign are the responsibility of the

military commander. Affairs that fall under the areas of political work are the

responsibility of the political commissar. The political commissar coordinates with

military commanders to command a campaign. The deputy helps with the work of the

principal and is responsible to the principal. Under emergency situations, the campaign

large formation senior officer can make decisions on important issues on the spot, and

report to the Party committee and the higher-levels later.

The political commissar system. Improving and solidifying the political commissar

system within the campaign large formation guarantees that the instructions of the higherlevel Party committee are implemented and executed in the campaign large formation, it

guarantees the smooth conduct of campaign political work, and it guarantees the full

accomplishment of campaign missions. Campaign large formation political commissars

are the leaders of campaign political work, are subordinate to the directly higher-level

senior officer, and conduct work under the leadership of the Party committee at the same

level. In terms of political work, they obey the higher-level political commissar and

political organ; in terms of military work, they obey the higher-level military commander

and military organ. At their root level of the large formation, together with the military

commander, they are responsible for leading campaign preparation and implementation.

The political organ system. The campaign large formation political organ is the

management organ of the Party committee at the campaign level and it is subordinate to

the leadership organ of force-unit political work. It is responsible for specifically

organizing and implementing each mission for campaign political work. The political

organ should be composed of the relevant political work personnel of the various

campaign strengths participating in the campaign. The political organ should, based on

the missions and requirements entrusted by the higher-level Party committee, senior

officer and political organ and under the leadership of the large formation Party

committee and political commissar, participate in the collective decision-making of the

large formation Party committee, formulate and implement measures, and organize the

force-units in carrying them out; it should conduct specific guidance, supervision and

inspection of subordinate force-unit political work; it should accomplish well the various

duty work within the scope of its root level responsibilities; and it should promptly

summarize experiences and resolve the actual problems political work will encounter in a

campaign.
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II. Work Procedures and Methods...268

Campaign political work must employ the correct work procedures and scientific work

methods to be able to smoothly and effectively complete each mission. The basic

procedures and methods are:

(1) Putting forward the guidance concept of campaign political work

The guidance concept of campaign political work is the macroscopic overall-plan

{chouhua} and guidance for campaign political work and it is the basis for organizing

and implementing campaign political work. It is normally put forward by the political

organ and determined via collective discussion of the Party Committee. The contents of

the guidance concept normally include the guidance thought of campaign political work,

the basic missions of campaign political work and the main missions for each phase, as

well as the principles, the requirements, methods, etc., that must be applied to accomplish

the missions.

(2) Issuing the campaign political mobilization instruction

The campaign political mobilization instruction is the basic starting point for conducting

political mobilization of the units. Generally, it is issued in the form of a political

mobilization order, the essential points of the mobilization instruction, a mobilization

outline, a written appeal, a political training order, etc. The campaign commander and

political organ should, in accordance with the campaign missions and the instructions of

higher ups, send down campaign political mobilization instructions at the appropriate

time in order to facilitate the speedy organization and implementation of political

mobilization of the subordinate force-units. In general, the contents of political

mobilization instructions mainly include: the current circumstances {xingshi} of war, the

campaign missions and significance, the favorable conditions and difficulties for

completing campaign missions, the methods and measures for overcoming the difficulties

and resolving the issues, and the different requirements put forward for force-units in

different areas and carrying out different missions, etc. After the political mobilization

instruction is sent down, one should guide each subordinate level Party committee and

political organ to quickly organize force-unit officers and cadres to disseminate them and

to guide the grassroots organization and implementation of combat political mobilization,

on the foundation of campaign political mobilization.

(3) Formulating the campaign political work plan {jihua}

A campaign political work plan {jihua} is separately drawn up by the professional

department of the campaign large formation political organization in accordance with the

instructions of the campaign large formation Party committee and commanders and

higher-level political organs, combining the actual situations of that large formation and

in accordance with the contents of the work. After it goes through the review and

approval of the director of the political department, it becomes the fundamental basis for
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organizing, implementing, inspecting, and evaluating campaign political work. The

content of the plan {jihua} mainly includes: the basic missions of campaign political

work, the main missions and requirements of each phase of political work in the

campaign, the key points of political work for the important time-occasions of the

campaign, the task organization and bushu disposition of the main political work team,

the support for physical materials, the basic measures and time limits for completing

missions, and the relevant policies and stipulations.

(4) Arranging the main activity of campaign political work

The campaign large formation political organ should, based on the instructions of the

campaign large formation Party committee and the senior officer and centered on the

central missions of campaign operations, unify, guihua plan and arrange the political

work of the Party committee and political organ as well as the relevant political work

activity of subordinate force-units. The activities of Party committee and political organ

political work include routine activities {huodong}, major activities {huodong},

important meetings, etc. Normally, one arranges the political work activity based on the

campaign phase, and the specific activity content, the personnel participating, the goals to

be achieved, the time limits and the items of attention are determined in accordance with

a schedule. For the subordinate force-units, one must frequently examine the progress

situation of each activity, summarize the experiences for training, and guide the smooth

conduct of each political work activity.

(5) Organized grouping of the campaign political work strengths

The political organ should scientifically organize the political work strength and conduct

a rational bushu disposition based on the set up situation of the campaign command

institution and the needs-requirements of campaign missions and in accordance with the

principles of unified use, clear divisions of effort, flexible and light, and support key

points. Normally, they are grouped and assigned in the following teams: a basic

command post political work team, alternate command post political work team, rear area

command post political work team, subordinate force-unit work team, etc. Depending on

the situation, group-assign a capable political work team to participate in the campaign

command institutions such as a forward command post, direction command post, service

command post, etc., to participate and help with the activity of organizing command.

(6) Organize the relevant support for campaign political work

Political organs should promptly and fully accomplish various relevant supports in

accordance with the needs-requirements of campaign political work. They should

formulate the support plan {jihua}, actively acquire the necessary funds, resources,

materials, and equipment, and ensure the smooth implementation of all political work.
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Part II: Joint Campaigns...271

Chapter 11

Overview...271

The joint campaign is developed based on the service (combined) campaign. The

development of the joint campaign brings about a series of major changes to campaign

operations and pushes forward the development of campaign theory and practice. The

joint campaign is the main campaign pattern of campaign operations in future wars.

Section 1: Definition, Categories, and Features of a Joint Campaign...271

I. Definition of a Joint Campaign...271

A joint campaign is a campaign undertaken by the large formations from two or more

services (under special conditions, it can be a campaign large formation that consists of

some tactical forces from two or more services) under the unified command of a joint

campaign command. It normally consists of some service (combined) campaigns.

There are four factors in a joint campaign:

Participant strengths. The basic indicators of the joint campaign are: number one, “two or

more services;” number two, “campaign large formation.” If there is only one service

participant, it is not a joint campaign, even if its scale is very large. For example, “the

Three Big Campaigns” in the Liberation War and the five campaigns in the War of

Resisting the U.S. and Supporting Korea, though they were large-scale campaigns, were

all combined campaigns. The “campaign large formation” is the task-organized

organizational-unit of campaign strengths. It normally refers to an Army group army, a

Navy campaign formation {biandui}, a theater Air Force, a Second Artillery base, etc. “A

large formation of two or more services” refers to the campaign large formation of two or

more different services, for example, an Army group army and a Navy campaign

formation {biandui}, etc. A campaign large formation of two or more services taskorganized together into a “joint campaign large formation” is the basic indicator in terms

of composing the joint campaign strength. When a campaign is relatively small, the joint

campaign large formation can be a task-organized tactical formation {zhanshu bingtuan}

of two or more services.

There is a command institution. A joint campaign is under the unified command of a

“joint campaign command institution” that is independent of all services. The joint

campaign command consists of commanders of services and organs of the command

institutions. It is responsible for making campaign plans, decisions, command and

control. The commander of the joint campaign is normally appointed by the supreme

command or theater, and possesses command authority.
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There is a relationship among the services. All the participating services are parallel to

each other and not subordinate to each other. Some call it “partnership.” Each service

accomplishes its own campaign missions and brings into play their irreplaceable unique

role in order to achieve the campaign objectives according to a unified plan {jihua}.

Although assisting and cooperative relationships exist in a given phase and a given

direction of a joint campaign, generally speaking, the inter-service coordination

relationships and the inter-service assisting and cooperating relationships in a joint

campaign are also under unified organization and implementation by the joint campaign

command institution. This is unique to the joint campaign and it is decided by the

characteristics of the modern campaign.

There is a composition of campaigns. A joint campaign normally consists of a series of

sub-campaigns related to each other. They are mainly the air offensive campaign, the

ground offense and defense campaigns, the sea blockade campaign, the landing and antilanding campaigns, the air raid and anti-air raid campaigns, the airborne and anti-airborne

campaigns, the conventional missile raid, information warfare, special warfare, etc. When

a campaign is relatively small-scale, the joint campaign is composed of campaign-quality

operations {zhanyixing zuozhan} conducted through a series of interconnected interservice coordination.

A joint campaign is relative to a service (combined) campaign. Not only is it connected to

a service (combined) campaign, it also has differences. The main differences are:

Difference in terms of service strengths. A service campaign is a campaign implemented

independently by a given service or by a given service in the lead with the assistance and

cooperation of some force-strengths {bingli} of other services, but this is mainly

coordinated operation[s] {xietong zuozhan} between the various arms within the

respective service. A joint campaign is then a campaign implemented together by the

strengths of all-services participating in the campaign and it is inter-service coordinated

operations.

Difference in terms of the command system {tizhi}. A service campaign is command

conducted by a commander through the command institution of the respective service,

and the attached and assisting force-units of other services receive the command of the

service campaign commander. A joint campaign is then a unified command implemented

by the joint campaign commander through the joint campaign command institution.

Difference in terms of service relationships. The service relationship in the service

campaign is not a parallel [one], but a subordinate [one]. It is a principal to subordinate

relationship between the service campaign large formation executing the main missions

to the service force-units responsible for the assistive and cooperative missions. The joint

campaign, in terms of the integrated-whole of the campaign, is a parallel relationship

between all services, not a principal to subordinate relationship, thus there is a

coordinated relationship of mutual assistance and cooperation.
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Difference in terms of spatial scope. The battlefield of a service campaign is mainly in

one space, with other spaces as auxiliary spaces. For example, in a ground maneuver

campaign, the main battlefield is land and the Army mainly conducts it. The air

battlefield can provide support, functioning as help. A joint campaign, however, is a

campaign conducted by two or more services together. It is conducted in two or more

battlefield spaces. For example, a sea blockade campaign conducted by the Navy and the

Air Force is conducted in two battlefield spaces concurrently, namely on sea and in the

sky, and there is no clear difference between the main battlefield and the subordinate

battlefield.

In future local warfare under informationized conditions, a service campaign will mainly

be a sub-campaign of a joint campaign, becoming the basis of the joint campaign.

Meanwhile, we cannot exclude the existence of the service campaign.

II. Categories of Joint Campaign...273

A joint campaign is a campaign type {leixing} (some call it a form-state {xingtai}).

According to different situations, we can further categorize the joint campaign.

(1) Based on operational nature, it can be divided into the joint offensive campaign and

the joint defensive campaign.

A joint offensive campaign is a campaign conducted by a joint campaign large formation

that is mainly offensive. Its purpose is to massively destroy effective enemy strength, to

seize and occupy important regions and targets, and to accomplish strategic offensive

tasks.

A joint defensive campaign is a campaign conducted by a joint campaign large formation

that is mainly defensive. Its purpose is to massively consume enemy strength, to defend

important regions and targets, to foil the enemy offensive and to accomplish strategic

defensive tasks.

(2) Based on campaign strength composition, it can be divided into an Army and Air

Force joint campaign, a Navy and Air Force joint campaign, and an Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Second Artillery joint campaign.

An Army and Air Force joint campaign refers to a joint campaign conducted by the Army

and Air Force campaign large formations.

A Navy and Air Force joint campaign refers to a joint campaign conducted by the Navy

and Air Force campaign large formations.

An Army and Air Force joint campaign and the campaign force from the Second Artillery

sometimes join the Navy and Air Force joint campaign.
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An Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery joint campaign is a joint campaign

conducted together by the campaign large formations from all these services.

(3) Based on campaign missions, it can be divided into the blockade campaign, the

landing campaign, the anti-landing campaign, the border retaliation campaign, the urban

offensive and defensive campaigns, the anti-air raid campaign, etc.

The blockade campaign is an at-sea {haishang} and air blockade offensive campaign

implemented against an enemy entrenched {jushou} on an island or on shore. A largescale blockade campaign is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander

and his command organ, with a Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large

formation in the lead and implemented with cooperation from Army and Armed Police

force-units and militia.

The landing campaign is a sea crossing offensive campaign implemented against an

enemy entrenched {jushou} on an island or on shore. The landing campaign is normally a

unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ, with an

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and

implemented with cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia.

The border area counterattack campaign is an offensive campaign implemented against

an enemy’s localized invasion on our border area. A border area counterattack campaign

is normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ,

with an Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead and

implemented cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia (during coastal area

operations, naval force-strengths may also participate).

The anti-landing campaign is a defensive campaign to resist an enemy sea crossing

landing relying on coastal areas, islands and other sea areas. The anti-landing campaign is

normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ

with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the

lead and implemented with cooperation from Armed Police force-units and militia.

The urban offensive campaign is an offensive campaign against an enemy entrenched in a

city. The urban defensive campaign is a defensive campaign to resist an enemy’s attack

relying on a city and its surrounding areas. The urban offensive and defensive campaigns

are normally a unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ

with an Army, Air Force, and Second Artillery campaign large formation in the lead 

and implemented with the cooperation of Armed Police force-units and militia 

(during coastal area operations, naval force-units may also participate).

The anti-air raid campaign is an integrated defending and countering defensive campaign

implemented against an air raiding enemy. The anti-air raid campaign is normally a

unified command by a joint campaign commander and his command organ with an Air

Force campaign large formation in the lead and implemented together with an anti-air
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raid force-strength of a joint Army, Navy and Second Artillery led by the Air Force

campaign large formation and implemented together with the anti-air raid forces of a

joint Army, Navy, and Second Artillery campaign large formations and the civilian air

defense strengths.

The joint campaign can also be categorized in other ways.

III. Features of a Joint Campaign...275

The joint campaign in a local war under informationized conditions has, apart from all

the common features of a modern campaign, the following three outstanding features:

(1) Stronger strategic nature

A general campaign also has a strategic quality. Nevertheless, the strategic quality of a

joint campaign is more obvious. The goal of a joint campaign in a future local war is to

defend territorial and sovereignty integrity and ocean rights, to resist enemy local

invasion, to protect strategic vital sites, etc. Sometimes, one campaign is a war, so the

campaign goal and the war goal are the same to a certain extent. For its influence, the

joint campaign involves military, political, economic, and diplomatic areas, the campaign

process and result are tied in to the national interest and peace, and its result has a great

impact on the realization of national strategy and military strategy.

(2) Higher command level

The higher command level shows in two ways: number one, in the higher decisionmaking level. In a joint campaign of future local wars, the important issues, such as the

campaign goals, scale, time limit, strike targets, methods, and means will be decision

making made by the supreme command, or direct intervention by the supreme command.

This is decided by the strict constraints of modern campaign factors such as political,

economic and diplomatic. Number two, the organization and implementation of a

campaign is normally a joint campaign headquarters command is higher than the

command level of a respective service campaign large formation. The joint campaign

headquarters is responsible for the overall-planning {chouhua} and preparing of the

campaign, and [responsible for] the adjusting-coordination of the operational activities of

the various services, battlefields and phases according to the intent of the supreme

command.

(3) Fierce high-tech confrontation

Fierce high-tech confrontation is another important feature of a future joint campaign. On

the one hand, we will face the threat of high-tech enemy weapons and equipment, such as

satellite reconnaissance, detection, electronic jamming, precision-guided weapon strikes,

etc. On the other hand, because there will be a massive employment of participating

services such as Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery, the technology volume of the
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battlefield will be expanded and the technological confrontation of both operational sides

will be more fierce. The air warfare, sea warfare, information warfare and even space

warfare jointly implemented all services and its directly manifested form-state {xingtai},

from a given sense, is precisely the confrontation of high tech weaponry. One can see that

in a joint campaign, the scope of high tech confrontation will be broader, its intensity

higher, and features more distinctive.

IV. . Historical Development of the Joint Campaign...276

The joint campaign is a product of human military development. As science and

technology progress, weapons and equipment develop and the structure of the campaign

force changes; specifically, the service forces enlarge, their combat capability enhances,

and the joint campaign goes through the historical process of birth, formation, and full

development. Under modern conditions, the joint campaign has become the main form of

carrying out a campaign in local warfare under informationized conditions.

(1) Birth of the joint campaign

The Army and Navy are the two oldest military services. The earliest joint campaign

dates back from coordinated combat by the Army and Navy in regions bordering on the

sea (water).

From the late 18th Century to the late 19th Century, the major western capitalist countries

established armies and navies with modern characteristics after they went through the

industrial revolution. The artillery force, engineering force, and communication force in

the army made great progress. Their navies also finished the transition from sailboat fleet

to armored steamboat fleet. The development of army and navy forces and the

enhancement of their combat capabilities laid the material basis for not only their

independent ground and sea campaigns, but also the joint campaign of the two services in

a coastal region.

In this period of time, the combat relationship of ground combat and sea combat was

enhanced in order to meet the needs of combat in a coastal region, and the coordination

of the army and navy became very important. Thus, there appeared some prototypes of

joint campaigns by the Army and Navy. The representative examples are: the Battle of

Yorktown in the American Revolutionary War, the Battle of Vicksburg in the American

Civil War, the Battle of San Diego in 1898 between America and Spain, the battle

conducted by the Japanese forces to seize and occupy Qingdao under the occupation of

the German forces, the anti-landing campaign by the Russian forces in the Sumining area,

etc. Among them, the earliest, the Battle of Yorktown in the American Revolutionary

War, can be seen as the landmark of the birth of the joint campaign.

The Battle of Yorktown was an Army and Navy joint combat conducted by the allied

troops of the U.S. and France. In October 1780, the U.S. forces had begun to

counterattack in the Independence War. The British Commander-in-chief Cornwallis was
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forced to withdraw his left troops into the port city, Yorktown, Virginia. They built up

positions around the city and resisted firmly, waiting for reinforcements from sea. In

early September 1781, the French fleet with 36 ships under the command of French

Admiral de Grasse fought the British Navy coming to reinforce from outside of the port

of Yorktown. The French won, and they cut off the sea supply line of the British forces.

George Washington, the Commander-in-chief of the American Continental Army, seized

this favorable opportunity and attacked Yorktown together with the French Expeditionary

Force under the command of General Rochambeau. After fierce fighting, the British

commander Cornwallis finally surrendered with his 8,000 troops on October 19th. The

American forces won the Independence War. The Battle of Yorktown is the first joint

combat of the allied forces in the history of the U.S. armed forces, and it is also the first

joint combat with the essential characteristics of a joint campaign in the military history

of mankind.

In that time, with the limitations of weapons and equipment and the combat capabilities

of the military services, joint combat by the Army and Navy was fairly loose, and the

coordination operation was simple. The services still fought independently in their

respective fields, and the support and help between them was very limited.

(2) Formation of the joint campaign

World War I is the first large-scale world war in human military history, and it is also the

formation period of the joint campaign.

The second industrial revolution ushered in further development of weapons and

equipment and the size and structure of the armed forces. The armies of the nations in

war formed strategic campaign large formations, front armies and army groups. The

strength of the artillery was greatly enhanced, and there came new service arms such as

the tank and anti-chemical forces. The motorization and mechanization of the armed

forces were also greatly enhanced. The Navy was equipped with not only large ships such

as battleships and battle cruisers, but also with a large number of new ships such as

destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, torpedo ships, and submarines, developing into a sea

combat force with many types of ships and several joint sub-fleets. What attracted

people’s attention was the appearance of an aviation force and its use that gave war new

dimensional characteristics. The size and quality of the army and navy developed rapidly

and their combat capabilities enhanced greatly. It made deep changes in the scale of

campaigns, combat models and combat methods. Also, it created the conditions for the

formation of a real joint campaign.

During World War I, there were several large-scale Army and Navy joint campaigns. In

these campaigns, the number of troops of the participating services, the scale of the

campaigns, the sustained time, and the coordination among the services all reached a

considerable level. The most representative and the largest of them is the Strait Landing

Campaign, which was launched by the British and French forces in 1915. They wanted to

control the Dardanelles Strait and the Bosphorus Strait, and to occupy Constantinople, the
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capital city of Turkey. In this campaign, the British and French forces put in 570,000

Army and Navy troops and Turkey put in 700,000 troops to resist the landing. With the

support of the allied fleet, the British and French forces sent in about 12 divisions, trying

to seize and consolidate the beachhead. The Turkish forces sent in about 14 divisions to

block the British and French effort to expand the beachhead. The combat was very fierce.

The campaign lasted for 259 days and ended with the failure of the British and French

forces. The British and French forces lost about 140,000 soldiers, while the Turkish

forces lost about 180,000 soldiers.

Though the Battle of the Dardanelles Strait was not a successful landing campaign, it

already had the basic characteristics of a modern joint campaign. The Army and Navy

fought together to accomplish a common campaign intention. The size of the

participating forces from the military services reached the scale of a campaign large

formation. The support and help provided by the Navy to the Army was no longer limited

to “non-combat loading and unloading;” instead, it used the powerful firepower of ship

guns to support Army troops landing and seizing beachheads. Meanwhile, the Army

troops attacked and occupied the region bordering the sea to protect the operation of the

Naval fleet in the strait. Their coordination was already fairly close. The Battle of the

Dardanelles Strait also showed that a landing campaign is a most complicated campaign

model, and the average campaign commander of the time was far from mastering this

campaign model. There were many problems in campaign command, campaign

coordination, and combat methods in this campaign. It had a profound influence on the

campaign operations, especially landing operations later on. The Battle of the

Dardanelles Strait can be seen as the landmark of that time for the formation of the joint

campaign.

(3) Development of the joint campaign

World War II is the most important historical period in human military development.

This unprecedented large-scale world war and its bumper campaign experiences greatly

pushed forward the development of various campaign forms and patterns. The joint

campaign, as an important campaign form-state in World War II, made great progress

during the war.

In World War II, the basic models for a joint campaign were the landing and anti-landing

campaign and the airborne campaign. In the offensive and defensive combat operations

on the battlefield on the European Continent, there were also some characteristics of

Army and Air Force joint campaigns. In WWII, the most important impact of the full

development of the joint campaign is that mankind experienced landing and anti-landing

combats that were the largest in scale, the most numerous, the most dimensional, and the

most advanced of all joint combats of services and branches in world military history.

According to statistics, the belligerent states launched about 600 landing combats of

various scales, of which several dozen were at the scale of a campaign. Compared with

the previous world war, the great development of the joint campaign showed mainly in

the following. Number one, the scale of the campaigns was large. In the war, there were 6
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strategic landing campaigns, with the Landing Campaign of Normandy being the largest.

The participating troops were 2,880,000 soldiers. Among them was an army group,

commanding 3 group armies, totaling 36 divisions with 1,530,000 soldiers. There were

over 9,000 ships and over 13,700 planes. The campaign lasted over one month. Number

two, the position of the joint campaign was greatly enhanced. In the war, the joint

campaign played an important role, whether it was on the strategic level or on the

campaign level. The landing campaign of the British and American forces in Northern

Africa forced the army corps of Erwin Rommel to withdraw from Africa. The Normandy

Campaign opened a second battlefield in Europe, accelerating the collapse of Germany.

In the latter period of the Pacific War, the American troops launched a large-scale

amphibious combat operation, which not only extended the war onto Japanese territory,

but also hit the Japanese Navy and Air Force with a destructive force, eventually forcing

Japan to surrender unconditionally. Number three, it established a new model for a joint

campaign with the coordinated combat of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In a largescale joint campaign, there was normally an independent campaign by a single service, as

well as a coordinated campaign by the various services together. The Army, Navy, and

Air Force coordinated closely to fight, establishing a new type of joint campaign model

for dimensional combat on ground, air, water and underwater. Number four, the joint

landing campaign had a very high success rate. In World War II, the large-scale landing

campaign had an almost 100% success rate. All six strategic landing campaigns were

successful. This makes a sharp contrast with World War I. The bumper experiences of

joint campaigns also pushed forward the great development of the theory of joint

campaigns.

In over 60 years since the end of World War II, the rapid development of science and

technology has led to great changes in the military field, with many new high-tech

weapons, equipment, services and branches coming into campaign practices; compared

with the joint campaigns of World War II, the model, force, space, combat method, and

command all made new developments and changes. These developments and changes

showed in recent four local wars, and it was especially obvious in the Gulf War of 1991.

As far as the combat model was concerned, information warfare bore the brunt of the

effort which lasted throughout the whole campaign. It became the key to grasping the

initiative on the battlefield to seize control over information. And the air raid went on for

38 days, becoming an independent combat phase, creating favorable conditions for

winning the whole campaign by multi-national forces. The ground maneuver warfare

conducted mainly by mechanized forces, the largest-scale airplane attack in the world

history of war conducted by air attacking troops, and the special warfare conducted in the

deep area of Iraq all played important roles. As far as force was concerned, the air force,

navy, missile force, special warfare force, and electronic warfare force gradually took

important positions in the joint campaign. As far as space was concerned, as space

technology developed and various military spacecrafts increased, outer space began to be

seen as a battlefield as important as traditional battlefields on land, sea and air. Combat in

space is changing from single supportive operations into an important part of a joint

campaign. As far as command method was concerned, information technology, which

centered on micro-electronic technology, developed rapidly and was used widely in the

military field, greatly enhancing the capability of command, control, communications,
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information collection and transmission on the campaign battlefield and providing

reliable guarantee for the effective coordination and control of the services in a joint

campaign.

(4) Development of the joint campaign of the People’s Liberation Army of China

Limited by historical conditions and the level of military technology, the People’s

Liberation Army of China has little practical experience in joint campaigns, and its

theoretical study also started late.

Looking back into history, the 400 plus campaigns conducted by the People’s Liberation

Army of China, including the large-scale strategic campaigns conducted together by

several field armies, were mainly combined battles conducted by infantry and artillery

forces. Therefore, they do not have the characteristics of the joint campaign. In January

1955, the landing campaign of the People’s Liberation Army of China to liberate

Yijiangshan Island was the first successful joint campaign conducted by the Army, Navy,

and Air Force against the enemy-occupied offshore islands. Though the scale of the

campaign was not large, it offered practical experience in the joint campaign.

As weapons and equipment developed and the Air Force and Navy strengthened, the

People’s Liberation Army of China strengthened the training for the joint campaign and

the continuous study of the laws of joint campaigns. In November 1955, we had largescale joint landing campaign exercises by the Army, Navy, and Air Force on the

Liaodong Peninsula. They provided good experiences for the command, coordination

principles, and an operation model for a large-scale joint campaign. In 1980, we

conducted unprecedented large-scale Army and Air Force “801” and “802” exercises in

Northern China. Since the 1990s, we conducted a series of joint campaign exercises of

various scales, levels, and patterns including the 2005 Sino-China Joint Military Exercise,

according to future potential war threats, fully displaying the capability of the People’s

Liberation Army of China under high-tech conditions for conducting a joint campaign of

services.

In the theoretical study of joint campaigns, the People’s Liberation Army of China also

achieved bumper results. In the late '80s, we made the joint campaign one of the

important campaign models of our armed forces for the first time, and made a definitive

description of the joint campaign. In recent years, the study of the joint campaign is

moving on to systematic study, providing some results of theoretical studies and

establishing primary basic theory and a practical theory system of the joint campaign.

Section 2: Joint Campaign Command...281

Joint campaign command refers to the activities {huodong} of operations researchdecision making, planning {jihua} and organizing, and adjusting-coordination control

conducted by a joint campaign commander and his command organ for the operational

activities of all subordinate force-units. It is the important link for transforming the
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campaign strength potential {zhanyi liliang qianneng} into real operational capability. In

carrying out a joint campaign under informationized conditions, [there are] many

command objects, high requirements, a large degree of difficulty and intense

confrontation.

I. Command Institution...281

Building a sound joint campaign command institution is an essential condition for

organizing and implementing a joint campaign.

(1) Command system

Based on the joint campaign’s force strength, formation, and mission, the structural

system of the joint campaign command institution may be divided into the following

three patterns:

First type: Three-level command system {tizhi}

The large scale joint campaign normally establishes a three level command system.

Based on the specific situation, it can be divided into two models. Model 1: the first level

is a multi-theater joint campaign headquarters, the second level is a theater direction

headquarters, and the third level is the campaign large formation headquarters. Model 2:

The first level is the joint campaign headquarters, the second level is the service

campaign headquarters, and the third level is the campaign large formation headquarters.

Each level of the institution follows:

Level 1 – The joint campaign headquarters is normally jointly composed of the

commander of each theater and service and the command organ with relevant personnel

included. When required, the supreme headquarters may also designate the participation

of representatives. The joint headquarters is the highest command institution of the

campaign; it receives supreme headquarters guidance and it is responsible for organizing

and implementing the campaign.

Level 2 – Theater direction headquarters or service campaign headquarters is normally

composed of the theater or relevant service commander and his command organ; it

receives command from the joint campaign headquarters or the supreme headquarters and

is responsible for organizing and implementing the operations in its direction or its

service’s operations.

Level 3 – The campaign large formation headquarters is normally composed of the

commander of each campaign large formation of that service and his command organ,

and is responsible for the specific organization and implementation of the campaign. One

large scale joint campaign normally has a given number of campaign large formation

headquarters for each service.
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Second type: Two-level command system

The intermediate scale joint campaign normally establishes a two-level command system.

This is namely a joint campaign headquarters – a service campaign large formation

headquarters.

The joint campaign headquarters is normally composed of the theater and service

commander, as well as the command organ. It can directly command the campaign

operations of the campaign large formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The

campaign large formation headquarters of the Army, Air Force and Navy receive

commands from the joint campaign headquarters, and each is responsible for the specific

organization and implementation of the campaign operations for its own service

campaign large formation.

Third type: Single-level command system

The small scale joint campaign, namely the group army-level joint campaign, normally

establishes a single-level joint campaign command system. The single-level joint

campaign headquarters is normally jointly composed of the campaign large formation

command institution of the participating service as lead, and with the absorbed

participation of relevant commanders and command organ personnel of other

participating combatant services. It is responsible for campaign organization and

implementation, and the unified command of operational activities for the forces of all

subordinate services.

(2) Command institution

The structure of the command institution of the joint campaign, according to the

participating strengths and missions, normally has the following four parts:

There is an operations center. It is composed of the chief of headquarters and relevant

personnel of the operations department. It is responsible for organizing and planning the

joint campaign, assisting the commander’s decision making and command and control. It

is the core of the command institution.

The intelligence center is composed of the chief of the headquarters and relevant

personnel of the intelligence department. It is responsible for battlefield reconnaissance,

information and intelligence gathering, processing and analysis, and providing the

campaign commander with the foundation for decision making and command and

control.

The communication center is composed of relevant personnel from the communication

system. Its mission is to establish the connections between the campaign command

institution departments, and safeguard smooth command instructions and orders.
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The support center is composed of various command support personnel and it carries out

operational command of support missions.

When necessary, we can also establish a special coordination institution, such as an

integrated firepower coordination center, an information operation center, etc.

(3) Command relationship

There can be three situations in the command relationship of a joint campaign:

There can be a relationship of subordination. It is the basic relationship in joint campaign

command. A joint campaign normally conducts level-by-level command, according to the

relationship of subordination. The joint command reports to the supreme command or a

designated command institution and conducts unified command of the operational

activities of its subordinate forces. The theater direction command or the campaign

service command receives command from the joint command and is responsible for

command of the activities of the operational strengths within its formations. The

campaign large formation headquarters receives commands from the direction or service

headquarters and is responsible for the operations of its own large formation. When there

is a need for bypass level command, the supreme command and joint command can

directly command the operational activities of the service campaign large formation.

There can be a relationship of guidance. The commanding institutions of all levels in a

joint campaign can universally direct rear area service work, technical work, and

battlefield control within their regions. They can also give guidance to a combat force

that does not report to them, but is carrying out tasks in their regions, according to the

order and instructions of the superior.

There can be a relationship of control. The commanding institutions of all levels in a joint

campaign conduct combat control over the support and help troops according to plan or

the authorization of the superior. Combat control is a limited command authority. It only

commands the combat operation of the troops, but it does not have command authority

over the formation and logistical and technical safeguarding of the troops.

II. The Command Activity...283

The command activity is a general term for all the activities a joint campaign commander

makes when organizing and conducting a campaign. Its main contents are:

(1) The operations research and decision-making activity

The operations research {yunchou} and decision-making activity {huodong} in a joint

campaign is the overall planning {chouhua} and decisiveness a commander of a joint

campaign accomplishes for the campaign intention, objectives (direction), fighting
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methods, campaign bushi disposition, support, etc. It is the core content of campaign

command activity and the central mission and basic responsibility of the campaign

commander. Its basic contents and processes are: analyzing the war situation

circumstances {zhanju xingshi}, understanding the campaign missions, assessing the

situations, putting forth the campaign concept, determining the campaign goals,

formulating the campaign courses of action, and selecting the best and being decisive.

The campaign courses of action mainly includes the campaign guidance thought,

campaign intention, operational direction, operational objectives, main fighting method,

employment of campaign strengths, division of campaign phases, campaign time limits,

etc.

(2) Planning and organizing activity

The planning and organizing activity {huodong} of a joint campaign is the arrangements

made towards the content and methods of campaign activities {xingdong} by a joint

campaign commander and his command organ in order to guide force-unit {budui}

operational preparations and operational implementation. It is also the further

specification [making concrete] of the campaign courses of action and resolution. It is the

basis for command and control. It is even more important to carefully formulate the joint

campaign plan {jihua} and bring numerous participating strengths implementing a

variety of operational activities in multi-dimensions of space into a unified and orderly

plan {jihua}. The content of the campaign planning and organizing activity mainly

includes: formulating the campaign operational plans, organizing campaign coordination,

organizing various campaign support items, organizing the campaign command

institution, organizing the force-units to complete campaign preparations, organizing

campaign maneuver, and organizing campaign training, etc.

(3) The command and control activity

The command and control activity {huodong} in a joint campaign is the command

activity {huodong} of submitting campaign decision making into practice by the joint

campaign commander during the process of campaign implementation. It is the grasping

and controlling of the campaign activities {xingdong} and it is the basic activity

{huodong} for pushing forward and mastering the campaign course and conclusion. The

command and control in campaign implementation, from campaign start to campaign

finish, is the continuation of a number of command cycle loop processes {zhihui zhouqi

xunhuan guocheng} – each cycle normally containing the four links {huanjie} of

situational assessment, issuing orders, tracking feedback, and correcting deviations. The

campaign commander must be focused on the modern joint campaign’s characteristics

and battlefield reality situations and from start to finish have a grasp of the campaign

centers of gravity. [He must] tightly seize upon the campaign’s most prominent and

critical problems and implement steadfast, flexible and uninterrupted command. [He

must] adopt methods such as target control, plans {jihua} control and ad hoc control, etc.

and push forward the campaign to achieve the predetermined goals.
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Section 3: Joint Campaign Coordination...285

Joint campaign coordination is the unified-overall-planning arrangement and adjustmentcontrol activity {huodong} conducted for the operational activities {xingdong} of

participating strengths by the joint campaign commander and his command organ in

accordance with the campaign resolution and campaign plan[s] {jihua}. Its purpose is to

allow a high level adjusting-coordination of the operational activities by the campaign

large formations and formations {bingtuan} of all services in multiple dimensions of

space, [allow] their close cooperation, [allow] bringing into play the might of the

integrated-whole and [allow] achieving of campaign goals.

In a joint campaign under informationized conditions, the strength composition is

complex and operational activities are varied. Various operational activities will unfold at

the same time or successively in multiple dimensions of space, such as land, sea, air,

space, and electromagnetic. There will be a combination of various operational patterns

and means such as air raids and anti-air raids, maneuver and anti-maneuver, blockade and

anti-blockade, as well as information warfare, firepower warfare, special warfare, and

psychological warfare. Operational activities are complex, transitions are frequent,

situational changes are rapid, and difficulty for unified activities are great, so it is even

clearly more important to successfully accomplish campaign coordination.

I. Characteristics of Coordination...285

The coordination of a joint campaign has characteristics that are different from the

service (combined) campaign. They are shown mainly in the following areas:

(1) Higher level of coordination

Higher level of coordination has three meanings: number one, it means the objects of

coordination are at a higher level. A joint campaign is normally a campaign of a strategic

nature conducted together with forces from all services. The levels of the forces of the

participating service are normally more complete campaign large formations or

formations. Number two, the type of coordination is at a higher level. As far as

operational coordination is concerned, it can be the internal coordination within a service

arm, between service arms, and between services. The coordination of a joint campaign is

mainly the coordination between services. Therefore, it is the coordination of the highest

level. Number three, it means a higher level of coordination activities. The coordination

of a joint campaign is mainly the coordination of operational activities between different

sub-campaigns, different battlefield spaces, and different campaign directions. These

coordination activities are all activities on the campaign level. Some of them even reach

the strategic level. Their coordination is the main body of joint campaign coordination.

The characteristics of higher level coordination show that macro-coordination and overall

coordination should be the focus of joint campaign coordination.
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(2) Many essential elements of coordination

The essential elements of coordination {xietong yaosu} mainly refer to the force-units

{budui}, operational activities, and battlefield spaces that need to establish the

relationship of coordination. A joint campaign are the joint activities {xingdong} of

multiple campaign patterns and multiple operational modes implemented by the

campaign groupings and force-units of all services in multi-dimensional space and in

different campaign directions, and its coordination essential elements are by far much

more than in a general service campaign. They include: the coordination between various

armed strengths, the coordination between campaign groupings and forces of all services,

the coordination of different battlefield spaces, the coordination of different campaign

directions, the coordination of different campaign patterns, and the coordination of

different operational modes. There are many joint campaign coordination essential

elements and their most direct influences are bringing about a more complex coordination

and increasing the degree of coordination.

(3) Wider coordination space

In a joint campaign, the operational activities of the various services will be conducted

simultaneously or consecutively in the multi-dimensional battlefield of land, sea, air, and

sky, with the battlefield space greatly enlarged. In the Gulf War, the battlefield ranged

from the Gulf in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and the Red Sea in the south to

Turkey in the north, with a total area of 14,000,000 square kilometers. As for operational

patterns, long-range raid, out-of-sight precision-guided attack, and maneuver attack in

deep areas further expanded the battlefield space. The U.S. B-52 bombers took off over

10,000 kilometers away on U.S. territory and reached the Mediterranean about 800

kilometers from Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, where they launched cruise missiles against

the key targets in Baghdad. Since the joint campaign is conducted in such a wide

battlefield space, it makes the space of campaign coordination not only wide enough to

cover the whole strategic campaign deep area, but also to go beyond the traditional

strategic limit.

(4) Unstable coordination

The main causes of unstable coordination in the joint campaign are: number one, the

coordination of a joint campaign is dynamic. Since the joint campaign has a strong

strategic nature and many restricting factors, and different campaign patterns, operational

modes, and campaign phases that frequently interchange, it has to require the services

and branches to establish different coordinating relationships according to the changes of

campaign patterns, operational modes, and campaign phases. This causes frequent

changes of coordinating actions among the coordinating factors of a joint campaign and

its coordinating relationships. So, the instability of joint campaign coordination is first of

all decided by the high dynamics of campaign activities and campaign phases. Number

two, under modern conditions, the accuracy and destructive power of weapons are more

enhanced than ever, and the rapid maneuver capability of troops is greatly enhanced, too.
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It makes the battlefield change dramatically. Meanwhile, because of the expansion of

combat space, real-time or near real-time collection of battlefield information and the

control and coordination of troops are harder, so it is harder to maintain the stability of

campaign coordination. Number three, the confrontation of coordination and anticoordination on both sides is fierce. In a joint campaign, to damage the enemy’s

coordination means to reduce the overall combat effect of the enemy. It can even collapse

the whole combat system of the enemy. Therefore, to damage enemy coordination will be

a combat goal for both sides in a joint campaign. And this will certainly make a fierce

confrontation of coordination and anti-coordination by both sides, so the coordination of

the joint campaign will be unstable.

(5) Complex coordination mechanism

It is shown mainly in two ways: number one, the organization system of joint campaign

coordination is complex. On the campaign level of joint force-units, every command

level has a joint command coordination institution consisting of the commander and

command organ with a parallel suitable grade from the services. On the tactical level of

joint force-units, every service will send out a coordination group or officer to other

services. Meanwhile, we should establish crisscross command, control, and coordination

relationships. Number two, the methods and process of organizing and conducting joint

campaign coordination are complex. A joint campaign often consists of multiple

campaign patterns and a variety of operational modes by the services at the same time or

one after another. In different campaign patterns and operational modes, the services have

different positions, functions, coordination actions, and coordination relationships with

each other. This makes coordination methods complex. Besides, in a campaign, as

campaign phases, campaign patterns, and operational modes change all the time, the

coordination relationships between services and coordination methods are changing all

the time, too. Plus anti-coordination combat by the enemy makes some damages and

disturbs us. So the coordination of a joint campaign needs to seek stability in continuous

change, continuous restoration and maintenance in continuous enemy damage, and

continuous new coordination in a battlefield posture that changes rapidly. This

complexity of coordination is more prominent than in any other campaign situation.

The above characteristics show that, in a joint campaign, organizing coordination is even

more complex, maintaining and restoring coordination actions are even more difficult,

and the ad hoc coordination missions are even more important. So there are more

stringent requirements for the capability and methods for the joint campaign commander

and command organ to organize force-unit coordination.

II. Coordinating Principles...287

When organizing and conducting a joint campaign, apart from the general principles of

the modern campaign, there are several main principles to follow:
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(1) Integrated-whole coordination

Integrated-whole coordination {zhengti xietong} is the coordination of all situations, all

directions, and the whole process of the operational activities of service campaign

groupings and forces in order to accomplish the general campaign intention. Integratedwhole coordination is the first principle for joint campaign coordination. This is decided

by the following: the multi-variant quality of the joint campaign participating strengths,

the multi-dimensional quality of the battlefield space, the variety of campaign patterns

and operational modes, and the multi-phased quality of the campaign course. In a joint

campaign, we can only fully bring into play the synthesized effectiveness of joint

operations by first coalescing the various winning essential elements into an adjustingcoordinated and unified integrated-whole from the perspective of the overall situation,

When applying the principle of integrated-whole coordination, we should pay attention to

the following: number one, we should have good integrated-whole coordination among

service campaign groupings and force-units. This is the most important integrated-whole

coordination in a joint campaign. We should center on the unified campaign goal, and

based on the characteristics of all of the services, [conduct] unified-overall-planning

{tongchou} of the organization and determine the coordination actions and coordination

relationships of each service campaign grouping and force-unit. We should pay attention

to fully realizing the advantages of all the services and branches. Also, we should make

sure that all of the joint force-units form the optimum integrated-whole operational

strength. Number two, we should have good integrated-whole coordination of battlefield

spaces and campaign directions. We should make sure that the operational activities of

services and branches fully unfold in multi-dimensional battlefield spaces and campaign

directions. At the same time, we should make sure that there are good coordinating

relationships among the battlefields and directions. This can destroy the enemy on multidimensional battlefields at the same time or one after another. Number three, we should

have good integrated-whole coordination of campaign patterns and operational modes.

The major advantage of the joint campaign is that it can fully realize the operational

capabilities of all the services and branches to conduct an integrated attack against the

enemy. Therefore, we should make sure that there are good relationships of mutual

support, mutual help, and mutual enhancement among the different campaign patterns

and operational modes in order to enhance the integrated attacking power against the

enemy. Number four, we should have good integrated-whole coordination of the total

campaign process. In a service (combined) campaign, integrated-whole coordination is

crucial only in the important campaign phases and at critical occasions. But in a joint

campaign, integrated-whole coordination is important throughout the campaign.

Therefore, we should maintain the integrated-whole coordination of campaign phases

incessantly. In particular, we should pay attention to maintaining the stability of the

integrated-whole coordination of campaign phase transitions, and we should have good

coordination of the coordinating actions of phases, making the coordination of an early

phase the favorable condition for the coordination of later phases.
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(2) Key point coordination

Key point coordination means that coordination must stress key points, grasp the key

links, draw a distinction between the main and the secondary, and organize and

implement from start to finish by centering on the campaign centers of gravity. The

problems involved with joint campaign coordination are many, scope is broad, and

relationships are complex. The joint campaign commander and command organ cannot

take care of and grasp all the coordination issues, so they must carefully organize the

coordination of key point problems.

We should pay attention to the following when carrying through the principle of key

point coordination: number one, focus on the key point of organizing the coordination of

the service campaign groupings that play a main role in campaign operations. In a joint

campaign, generally speaking, all the service campaign groupings and force-units have an

equal relationship when standing next to each other, but in specific campaign activities,

they have main and secondary positions and roles. Only by organizing the service

campaign groupings and force-units that play main roles as key point coordination and

letting the force-units of other services be adjusting-coordinated and complementary can

an optimum integrated-whole operational effectiveness be brought into play in campaign

operations. Number two is to key-point organize coordination by centering on completing

the main missions of campaign operations. Number three is to key-point organize

coordination by centering on the main battlefield, main direction, and main areas of

campaign operations. Number four is to key-point organize coordination by centering on

the main patterns and main operational activities of campaign operations. Number five is

to key-point organize coordination by centering on the main phase and critical occasions

of campaign operations, etc.

Being adept at centering on the campaign centers of gravity and successfully adjustingcoordination of the activities and relationships in each aspect is the art of organizing joint

campaign coordination. Especially in the process of implementing a campaign when

campaign coordination is disrupted or in situations when significant changes occur, we

should even more first center on the campaign centers of gravity to restore or re-establish

coordination so as to ensure that the service campaign groupings and force-units are able

to consistently adjust-coordinate activities in terms of the most important problems and at

the most critical operational occasions.

(3) Coordination by separate levels

Coordination by separate levels means that each campaign command level is mainly

responsible for organizing the operational coordination of the groupings or force-units of

one subordinate level according to its direct command authority. For the important

operational activities of the main direction and critical occasions, they can organize it for

two subordinate levels.
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We should pay attention to the following when carrying through the principle of

coordination by separate levels: number one, the coordination authority is consistent with

the direct command authority. That is, the campaign command institution of each level

should be mainly responsible for organizing the coordination activities of the campaign

grouping and force-units under its direct command. Number two, in principle, each level

only coordinates the operational activities of one subordinate level of campaign

groupings and forces. When necessary, one can organize the important operational

activities of the main direction and critical occasions down to two subordinate levels.

Number three, coordination of one level higher must stipulate the tasks and create the

conditions for coordination of one level lower, while the one level lower coordination

must provide powerful support and safeguarding for achieving the one level higher

coordination. Number four, coordination by separate levels must accomplish clear

distinctions of responsibilities of each level, closely linking them vertically and

coordinating the relationships horizontally in order to form an organically connected

integrated-whole coordination.

(4) Flexible coordination

Flexible coordination means that under the premise of firmly and unswervingly executing

the coordination plan, we must flexibly and with initiative implement ad hoc coordination

on the basis of new situations appearing on the battlefield in order to ensure stable and

uninterrupted coordination.

The operational activities of a joint campaign are highly complex. That determines that

coordination according to plan is the basic method of organizing campaign coordination.

It is also the main task of the campaign commander and command organ to achieve

coordination in the course of a campaign. Therefore, in implementing a campaign, the

campaign commander and command organ must firmly overcome all the difficulties and

obstructions, not be wavered by localized sacrifices and setbacks, try hard to restore

destroyed coordination and firmly and unswervingly carry out the established

coordination plan. But at the same time, we have to flexibly implement ad hoc

coordination on the basis of developing changes to the battlefield situation. Ad hoc

coordination is an indispensably important mode in joint campaign coordination, and it is

an important supplement to coordination according to plan. In a joint campaign under

modern conditions, the posture and operational activities of both sides are in constant

change, and there are many unpredictable situations. It is impossible for service campaign

groupings and forces to follow the coordination plan line by line. When the battlefield

situation changes greatly, the original coordination plan can even lose its function

completely. Therefore, it is very important for maintaining stable and uninterrupted

campaign coordination that we flexibly implement ad hoc coordination on the basis of the

changing battlefield situation. The flexibility of coordination manifests itself mainly in

two areas: number one, when localized changes occur in the battlefield situation, we

should promptly make the corresponding corrections, adjustments, and replenishments of

the coordination actions of forces on the basis of advance coordination. Number two,
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when there are major changes in the battlefield situation, we should quickly and

decisively organize new coordination as the occasion requires.

III. Coordination Methods...290

(1) Coordination by task

Coordination by task means to coordinate the operational activities of each campaign

strength by stipulating the time, space and relevant requirements for each campaign large

formation to execute its tasks. First of all, the joint campaign commander and

coordination institution should scientifically and reasonably decide the coordination

activities of various campaign strengths, closely following the general intention of the

campaign, coordinating various campaign strengths closely, mutually assisting one

another, and completing the campaign tasks together. Secondly, we should organize

coordination around the main tasks of the campaign. The tasks of various campaign

strengths are different. The joint campaign commander and command organ should

organize coordination according to the main tasks of the service campaign large

formation and formations. When there is a problem, we should make a quick adjustment

to ensure the smooth accomplishment of the main tasks of the campaign.

(2) Coordination by phase

Coordination by phase means to stipulate the tasks and centers of gravity of each

campaign large formation and organize the coordination of various campaign strengths

according to the phase of campaign operations. On the basis of coordination by campaign

phase, we must grasp the following points: number one, we should rationally divide the

campaign phases. The division of campaign phases should conform to campaign progress

to facilitate organizing campaign coordination. If a joint campaign is a large-scale one

that consists of a series of campaigns, we can divide the campaign phases according to

campaign sequence. Number two, we should clarify the operational tasks and

coordination issues among the services and branches in various campaign phases, and

focus on the coordination activities of the main operational occasion of the main

operational phase. Number three, we must accomplish the coordination for each

campaign phase transition. The coordination at campaign phase transitions is extremely

important. If the links are not good, being out of tune in the coordination activities of the

previous phase can bring difficulty to the coordination of the later phase and affect the

accomplishment of the general campaign task.

(3) Coordination by space

Coordination by space means to stipulate the spatial scope of each service campaign large

formation to fully bring into play the superiority of various services in different spaces,

and to allow the variety of campaign activities of each space and domain to form an

integrated-whole that is mutually assisting, mutually enhancing and mutually adjustingcoordinated. In organizing of coordination based on space, one must first perform general
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guihua planning for each battlefield and campaign direction and set strict stipulations for

the time, scope, and missions of the operational activities in each battlefield space for

each campaign strength, making the operational activities of various battlefield spaces

orderly and preventing chaos and conflict in the same space. Secondly, the operational

activities in each battlefield space must center on the main battlefield to form the

integrated-whole. As far as achieving the general goals of the campaign is concerned,

there is the difference of main and secondary in the various battlefield spaces and

campaign directions, and they change with campaign phase transitions. Therefore, under

the prerequisite of looking after the total campaign operational space, we must center on

the main battlefield and main direction, meticulously organize coordination and

consistently adjust-coordinate the conduct of campaign activities in the full depth, in all

aspects, at all levels and in all domains of the campaign.
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Chapter 12

The Joint Blockade Campaign ...292

The joint blockade campaign is an offensive campaign that is implemented by Navy-, Air

Force-, Second Artillery- and Army campaign large formations with the assistive

concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia, and is implemented under unified

intention and command, in order to sever enemy economic and military connections with

the outside world.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...292

I. Characteristics...292

In addition to having the general characteristic of being an offensive campaign, the joint

blockade campaign also has the following primary characteristics:

(1) There are multiple constraints on campaign decision-making and campaign activities

and they are strongly policy-oriented

The battlespace of a joint blockade campaign is vast, the scope of the blockade involves

international public waters and airspace; the objects limiting the campaign do not merely

consist of the hostile side, they also include any third party ships and aircraft that enter

into or have the intention to enter into the blockade area, thereby inevitably involving the

political, economic and military interests of several nations and areas. In addition,

international societies touch upon blockade operations to formulate and create various

international laws and international conventions to provide specified restrictions on

blockade activities. As a consequence, there is an augmented quality to operational

guidance and activity policy. This requires that the campaign commander should have a

foothold in the overall situation when decision making on the significant campaign issues

such as the goals, fighting methods, activities, course, time and space, and be circumspect

and farsighted with regard to taking the initiative in the two major aspects that consist of

politics and diplomacy in view of their benefits to the military.

(2) The operational intensity is relatively low and there is a protracted campaign

sustainment period

Normally, the main goal of the joint blockade campaign is not to annihilate the effective

strength of the enemy in great quantities but to cut off the sea and air connections that the

enemy side has with the outside world. As a result, in comparison with the other

campaign patterns, the campaign intensity is generally lower. Owing to the comparatively

stronger economic and military sustainment power of the enemy, it is not possible to

achieve the goals of the blockade in a single action, and generally a longer period of

sealing off and isolating [the enemy] is required before it is possible to achieve the

depletion of enemy goods and materials, to cause public sentiment to weaken, and to se
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vacillation in political arenas, thereby successfully compelling the enemy to submit to the

campaign goals.

(3) Non-combat military activities hold a prominent status and the complexity of the

campaign is broadened

In the joint blockade campaign, in addition to achieving military activities of a combat

nature, one should also achieve a great majority of military activities that have a noncombat {非战斗 fei-zhandou} nature; not only must one implement attacks against the

various military targets from the side being blockaded that are entering the blockade area,

but one must also implement boarding and seizure and confiscation of civilian shipping

vessels associated with the side that is being blockaded. Such non-combat activities as

interceptions, boarding, expulsions, seizure and confiscation, and the like, comprise a

great proportion of the overall campaign activities. Moreover, these activities: are highly

policy-oriented; they extend through a protracted period; and, without a doubt, they have

added to the complexity and arduousness of the implementation of the campaign.

(4) Offensive and defensive postures are intertwined and the struggle to seize the

campaign initiative is intense

In a joint blockade campaign: the battlefield scope is extensive and the blockade forcestrength bushu disposition is relatively dispersed; the main battlefield is a broad and

boundless expanse of ocean as well as the skies overhead, and thus the blockade activities

of the force-strengths are easily exposed; and there is a “high threat area” {高威胁区 gao

weixie qu} that stretches forward to the enemy coast within which the mission is

accomplished, not only making it difficult for us to strategically transform our overall

superiority into battlefield superiority, but also intertwining offensive and defensive

postures on the battlefield, making the ensuing campaign rivalry extraordinarily intense.

(5) There are multiple factors to “imbalance” the campaign and great degree of difficulty

in commanding and coordinating the campaign

The joint blockade campaign is a campaign composed of multiple campaign strengths

that not only consist of Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery and Army strengths that

comprise the main body strengths; there are also a great quantity of local force-units,

armed police force-units, militia and the general populace that participate in the

campaign. There is great complexity in the composition of campaign activities; military

activities of a combat nature coexist with a great quantity of military activities of a noncombat nature; offensive activities coexist with defensive activities; near-shore- and air

operational activities coexist with operational activities that extend to distances that are

far from the mainland; sea blockade- and air blockade operations coexist with shore

defense- and outer island operations; and general military activities coexist with special

operations activities. In addition, the following factors of “imbalance” exist: there is

widespread use of highly-technical weapons; there is a complex electromagnetic

environment; offensive operations are intertwined with defensive operations; and there
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are rapid changes in the battlefield situation. All this results in an expansion of the

difficulty in commanding and coordinating the campaign, thus requiring that [those who

provide] campaign guidance be adept at judging the timing and sizing up the situation,

adapting themselves to changing situations, and making resolute decisions.

(6) The prominence of the contradiction of an unfavorable area of operations creates a

greater dependence on comprehensive support for campaign activities

In the joint blockade campaign, not only is there a protracted period that should be

sustained, but it is also necessary for us to extend forward into the “high threat area” to

execute the operation, so it is necessary to have such things as timely and reliable

intelligence support, uninterrupted communications support, reliable nautical and aviation

support, durable and sturdy engineering support, as well as campaign protection support

and support for the protection of life, and the like, before it is possible to ensure the

smooth execution of the campaign activities. At the same time, the battlefield is broad;

the force-units from the Navy and Air Force will take turns executing missions in seaand air spaces that are remote from the shore; there are a multitude of participating forceunits and many services that participate; there is a multitude of highly technical weapons

and equipment; and the time period for the blockade operation is protracted. As a

consequence, there is an increase in the normal consumption and combat loss rates for

materials and highly technical equipment, which has not only caused greater difficulty in

supplying logistics and equipment technical support, but has also caused an

unprecedented increase in dependence on logistics support and equipment technical

support for campaign activities. Campaign commanders, especially logistics and

equipment commanders, should recognize these characteristics, have multiple means of

preparation, have the flexibility to meet any emergency, and ensure the timeliness and

reliability of campaign support.

II. Requirements...294

In organizing the execution of a joint blockade campaign, it is essential to abide by the

following basic requirements.

(1) Have political initiative and benefits for policy

In a joint blockade campaign, the time period for sustaining the operation is protracted,

there are great restrictions posed on it per international law, there are many factors of

uncertainty, and they are highly politically- and policy oriented. As a result, it is

necessary to lay prominence on the dominance of political struggles and closely

coordinate military struggles with political, diplomatic and economic struggles in order to

seize the strategic initiative for blockade operations. One should: be eager to transform

policy into the guiding nature of campaign activities; comprehensively implement

policies and approach {政策和策略 zhanlüe he celüe} in struggles associated with

foreign affairs; make flexible use of the stipulations associated with international laws

concerning blockade operations; pay particular attention to the art of the struggle; and
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prevent ourselves from merely looking at things from the partial viewpoint of their

benefit to the military while neglecting their inclination toward political affairs and

policy.

(2) Thorough planning and abundant preparations

Making thorough plans and abundant preparations is the foundation and assurance for

carrying out the joint blockade campaign. When carrying out the joint blockade

campaign, we encounter complex strategic backdrops, ever-changing battlefield

situations, a multitude of participating strengths, and multiple operational activities. As a

consequence, one should: see things from the overall strategic situation; objectively

analyze the state of the battlefield as well as those beneficial and detrimental conditions

for ourselves and our enemies, as well as other factors; revolve closely around the goals

of the campaign; and thoroughly plan the campaign activities. During the course of

campaign preparation, it is essential to: scientifically predict changes that develop in the

state of the battlefield and other situations that may emerge, in order to gain a foothold in

formulating an operational course of action {作战方案 zuozhan fang’an} for the most

complex and the most difficult battlefield environments; covertly and rapidly concentrate

campaign strengths and carry out battlefield preparations; effectively carry out political

mobilization and training for imminent war {临战训练 linzhan xunlian} and educate

[associated personnel] in relevant policies and international laws; comprehensively

organize material reserves; mobilize sufficient reserve strengths; scientifically calculate

and make use of time; and rapidly implement each item of preparation. Moreover, one

should also adopt various measures to carry out the concealed execution of these

preparations and prevent the enemy from coming in to destroy them.

(3) Centering on the key points {围绕重点 weirao zhongdian} and concentrating the use

of forces {集中用兵 jizhong yongbing}

In a joint blockade campaign, according to the campaign guidance, it is necessary to

stress the concentrated use of force strengths, weaponry, and the seizure of important key

points; attack enemy vital areas; and implement a key point blockade {重点封锁

zhongdian fengsuo}. It is for this reason that in employment of strengths, it is essential to

be adept at having a grasp of the centers of gravity, the important blockade directions and

campaign crucial time segments that directly effect whether we achieve our campaign

goals, concentrate crack force-strengths and weaponry, and form partial absolute

superiority {局部上的绝对优势 jubushang de jiedui youshi}; from the perspective of

blockade objectives, one should give prominence to the fulcrum objectives {支点目标

zhidian mubiao} within the enemy anti-blockade system {tixi}, [and give prominence to]

the important ports and sea-air passages that form the enemy’s military and economic

lifeline; from the perspective of blockade activities, it is essential to correctly manage the

relationships between key points and non-key points, and pay attention to economizing

the use of force in non-key point blockade directions and blockade objectives.
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(4) Establishing ourselves in protracted periods and vying for quick decisions

The time period involved in sustaining a joint blockade campaign is protracted, and as a

consequence, it is necessary to establish and implement the principle of “firmly

establishing ourselves in protracted periods and vying for quick decisions” {立足持久,

力争速决 li zu chi jiu, li zheng su jue}. One should view campaign preparations from the

standpoint of the [preparations] that are most difficult and the most complex, and stress

the capture of successfully preparing campaign strengths and materials. During the

execution of the campaign, it is necessary to: persist in protracted operations; integrate

the act of attacking with the act of isolating; create beneficial combat opportunities to

destroy the enemy; accumulate several small victories to bring about a great victory; and

gradually attrite {消耗} the enemy’s latent capacity for war {敌战争潜力 di zhanzheng

qianli}. In order to prevent the overall war situation from becoming one that is long

drawn-out and not decisive {久拖不决 jiutuo bujue}, there are certain operational

activities that should be quickly fought and quickly decided, so one should try to the best

of our abilities to achieve the campaign goals within as short a time as possible through a

series of rapid or effective operational activities, under the prerequisite of establishing

ourselves in protracted operations in the situation as a whole.

(5) Preventing anti-integration [activities] and frustrating enemy counter superiority

Although the joint blockade campaign is a campaign that is offensive in nature, it is

possible that [the enemy] may direct efforts to deny control at us during the overall

process of the campaign by way of weakening and pinning down our blockade forcestrengths, thus disrupting our blockade activities. As a consequence, when organizing the

joint blockade operation, it is essential to attach a high degree of importance to:

augmenting the defense of the near shore sea areas and campaign vital sites {战役要地

zhanyi yaodi}; widely adopt measures such as camouflage and engineering support:

increase protective capabilities; and be on guard for enemy counter superiority operations

{敌反制作战 di fanzhi zuozhan}. In this way, we can ensure the smooth execution of the

campaign. When we differentiate missions, it is essential to marshal the operational

strengths that will muster responsibility for the defensive operational mission. From the

standpoint of the campaign bushi disposition, one should: have a one kind of bushi

disposition with many functions and establish as well as maintain strong reserve strengths

in order to handle unexpected situations when it becomes necessary; and make ports,

bases and airfields into the main targets for protection and defend them against enemy air

raids. At the same time, it is essential to: pay particular attention to the battlefield

environment and integrate defensive operations with counterattack operations; rapidly

react, and amend or change our original resolution at the right moment, based on

developing changes in the situation on the battlefield; and suit measures to the enemy, the

timing and the local conditions and make adept use of our strengths and operational

methods and means. In this way, we can adeptly handle various situations. It is essential

to: comprehensively make use of the various means of reconnaissance; promptly capture

the indications of enemy counter superiority activities; make every effort to preemptively

control the enemy {xianji zhidi}; apply the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti
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heli} of all of our services and arms; take the initiative to attack enemy strategic and

campaign centers of gravity as well as counter superiority force-strengths; and crush the

enemy’s counter superiority operational intention. In this way, we are safeguarding the

security of our campaign strengths and the smooth execution of our campaign activities.

(6) Unified command and close coordination

With regard to the joint blockade campaign there are multiple strengths that participate,

the scope of the battlefield is broad, there are many activity patterns {行动样式 xingdong

yangshi}, and the battlefield situation can change suddenly, so one should form the

campaign integrated-whole composite strength {战役整体合力 zhanyi zhengti heli}, and

it is necessary to deepen the implementation of centralized, unified command. To this

end, we need to rationally establish a highly-trained and capable campaign command

institution {战役指挥机构 zhanyi zhihui jigou} that is highly effective and wields the

authority to execute unified command over all the participating strengths. It is on this

basis of unified command that we can adopt flexible command modes to deal with

specific situations for certain operational activities as they are directed against the

different phases of the campaign while clarifying rational command relationships and the

timing opportunities and methods for transitioning [between phases]. It is essential to:

unify operational thought; unify operational intentions; meticulously formulate the

campaign plan; and strictly command discipline. It is essential to: make full use of

modernized command facilities and means all the while establishing rapid, smooth and

stable systems for command communication and coordination communication; enhance

the effectiveness of command and coordination while adopting various measures; and

increase the existing command coordination capabilities and regeneration capabilities {再

生能力 zaisheng nengli}. During the process of executing the campaign, one should

tightly capture the key activities that have a major influence on the campaign and

exercise effective and uninterrupted control over synchronization {调控 tiaokong};9 and

when command is suspended or when there is damage to coordination, one should adopt

effective measures to rapidly act to renew it without delay.

(7) Combining multiple methods with their application and comprehensive support

In a joint blockade campaign there are multiple branches of the service and service arms

participating, the sustainment period is lengthy, there is a highly intensive role for the

forces, and there is a great amount of campaign attrition, so operations have

comprehensive and close logistics and equipment technical support, which serves a vital

role in winning a victory in the campaign. Therefore, from a support strength standpoint,

it is necessary to implement organic military support. Not only should we fully exploit

the individual support capabilities of each of the branches of the service and service arms

participating in the campaign, but one should also fully make use of local ports, airfields,

9 Translator’s note: 调控 {tiaokong} is most likely an abbreviated form of 协调控制 {xietiao kongzhi},

“[to exercise] control over adjusting coordination.”
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and warehouse facilities, and mobilize local human resources, financial resources,

material resources, and more particularly, technical support capabilities. From a support

mode standpoint, it is necessary to establish area or specified local support that is

integrated with mobile convoy support based on the features of a blockade campaign, and

integrate it into the ground, navigational support systems, while meticulously formulating

support plans and successfully making each preparation in advance. In the support bushu

disposition, it is essential to correctly divide and arrange in echelon the deployment

[positioning] {peizhi} and sufficiently capture the reserve support strengths {yubei

baozhang liliang}, while, from a basis of full-scale {quanmian} support, implementing

key point support {zhongdian baozhang} for main operational activities such as striving

to gain campaign dominance, countering enemy penetrations, and resisting enemy

counter superiority in the main blockade direction and for the main blockade grouping {

主要封锁集团 zhuyao fengsuo jituan}.

In addition, in order to ensure the reliability and stability of rear area support, one should:

adopt effective measures and channel security and defense for rear area defense and

reinforcement of the fleet into the defensive system for the overall campaign. In addition

to establishing effective rear area air defense defensive systems and stable and highly

effective defensive command hierarchy, one should also augment our own defense

capabilities with reinforcement and support strengths, and, when necessary, one should

send naval and air force forces to provide [the fleet] with protection and augment [the

fleet’s] existing capabilities.

Section 2: Main Activities...297

The implementation of the joint blockade campaign is the process by which the campaign

strengths under the joint campaign command directorate carry out campaign missions in

accordance with the campaign resolution and the campaign plan {jihua} in order to

achieve the blockade campaign goals. This [process] generally begins with force-strength

unfolding and concludes with campaign conclusion. Its main activities are: campaign

unfolding and establishing the blockade system {tixi}; seizing and maintaining campaign

dominance {zhanyi kongzhiquan}; implementing sustained and full-dimensional

blockade operations; and concluding the campaign.

I. Unfolding the Campaign...297

The unfolding of the campaign refers to the activities whereby each campaign large

formation maneuvers from the campaign assembly area {战役集结地 zhanyi jijie diyu}

(sea or air) towards the operational area (sea or air) and whereby the campaign bushi

disposition is completed according to the campaign plan {jihua}. Based on the orders

from the supreme command or in accordance with the pre-determined campaign plan

{jihua}, the campaign commander must promptly issue his orders for unfolding the

campaign, and command each of the force strength groups {兵力集团 bingli jituan} to:

enter into their respective campaign areas (or sea area or air zone) according to plan;

quickly establish the blockade system {tixi}; and form a favorable campaign bushi
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distribution. Once they receive their orders to unfold the campaign, each of the force

strength groups must rapidly organize unfolding for all force-units subordinate to them,

and ensure that they assume their positions punctually. In general situations, the naval

ship force-units {舰艇部队 jianting budui} should covertly maneuver towards the predetermined operational sea areas or nearby stand-by sea areas from the assembly site[s]

or sea areas in small formations {xiao biandui}; the aviation force-units should, with the

regiment as the organizational-unit, transfer from depth airfields to departure standby

airfields and a portion of force-strengths entering the air operations and patrol standby

areas; the campaign tactical missile force-units should, using the mode of highway

motorized march {公路摩托化行军 gonglu motuohua xingjun}, enter into the

operational area and standby under cover; ground force strengths should, with the

operational group {zuozhanqun} as the organizational-unit, adopt a mode such as

motorized moving-in, on-foot moving-in {徒步开进 tubu kaijin}, rail transport {铁路输

送 tielu shusong} or water transport {水路输送 shuilu shusong}, enter the predetermined

operational area and successfully accomplish operational preparations. When the sea and

air force strengths are unfolding towards the blockade area and interdiction-inspection

area {拦检区 lanjian qu}, the unfolding sequence is normally: first unfold the

reconnaissance force strengths and establish a reconnaissance patrol distribution system

{peixi}; unfold the mine laying force strengths to implement mine laying and establish an

obstacle blockade distribution system; then gradually unfold the naval- and air blockade

force strengths and screening force strengths in sequence of first the air, then the sea, first

under water and then the surface, and establish an air blockade distribution system, a sea

blockade distribution system and a assisting-support screening distribution system.

Based on strategic needs-requirements, it is also possible to first establish a

reconnaissance patrol distribution system, then establish a firepower strike distribution

system {火力打击配系 huoli daji peixi}, to implement integrated firepower strikes

against the enemy. When organizing integrated firepower strikes, it is necessary to

painstakingly choose those valuable military targets that greatly influence the overall

campaign situation and targets that pose a threat to our blockade forces, based on the

needs-requirements of the blockade force activities and the actual situation on the

battlefield. At the same time, one should make full use of the effects of integrated

firepower strikes, and make full use of the aviation force strengths and submarines that

can force their way into enemy ports and shipping lines to carry out mine laying on a

grand scale. Other blockade forces on the water can determine the time in which they will

enter the advance unfolding sea area {预先展开海域 yuxian zhankai haiyu} based on the

comprehensive firepower strike period, for the purpose of unfolding on time, and

progressively forming the blockade posture {封锁态势 fengsuo taishi}.

During the process of unfolding the campaign, the campaign commander and his

command organ should thoroughly organize such support such as feints, screening and

road guidance [directing traffic] and ensure all force-strengths unfold safely and on time;

accurately grasp the campaign unfolding and the entire battlefield situation, and

continuously issue reports to force-units on the enemy situation and the hydrological and

meteorological conditions; promptly handle problems that occur in unfolding, and
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command the force-units to adopt relevant countermeasures. Each force-unit should

adopt all effective measures to conceal their activities so as to not expose their intention;

[they should] rapidly maneuver so as to shorten the unfolding time; and augment

reconnaissance, observation and the organization of a good defense and prevent the

enemy from conducting counter-maneuver raids.

II. Seizing Campaign Dominance...298

Seizing campaign dominance is the general designation for seizing information

dominance, air dominance and sea dominance in the overall campaign space or in

important directions during the overall course of the campaign or during important

phases. Normally, information dominance is the precursor, air dominance is the most

important, and sea dominance is the objective. Seizing and maintaining campaign

dominance typically consists of all the various seizing and controlling activities

interwoven in their execution with sudden changes in the situation and frequent shifts

from attack to defense and back, The determination of the form of the operation as well

as the targets and scope of the attack is restricted by multiple factors, and [seizing and

maintaining campaign dominance] permeates the entire course of the campaign and has

the characteristic that the struggle [for dominance] might repeatedly crop up. Hence, the

campaign commander should: stand at a height of the overall situation from start to

finish; examine the time and weigh circumstances {shenshi duoshi}; grasp what is

critical; rationally apply force, and implement steadfast and correct, but flexible

command.

(1) Seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance

Seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance is commonly implemented by

forces that consist of the information operations grouping that has been given the lead

over the relevant forces from the other operational groupings. The launch time [for the

activities associated with seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance] is

typically chosen prior to the campaign unfolding time. Its basic mission consists of:

furnishing our own side with all the various kinds of information both timely and

accurately and safeguarding that we “know detailed information about our enemy,” while

at the same time making use of the various means to eliminate enemy capabilities for

“knowing detailed information about us.” During the course of the campaign, the joint

blockade campaign headquarters must closely relate the struggle and maintenance of

campaign information dominance to other major campaign activities and make every

effort for each to complement the other to the furthest extent possible.

1. Implementing campaign information reconnaissance

Information reconnaissance for the joint blockade campaign consists of conducting

supplementary reconnaissance and real time reconnaissance built on a basis of peacetime

reconnaissance. Its goals are to have a directed quality, and with key points, detect,

search, intercept and capture enemy electromagnetic emanation signals and electro-
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optical spectrum information. [Its goals are] through recording, locating, analysis and

identification, further ascertain the tactical features and tactical parameters of enemy

information warfare systems {xitong}, as well as the bushu disposition situations and

activity laws {huodong guilyu} of the enemy information targets, in order to provide the

conditions for implementing information attack and defense operations.

In implementing campaign information reconnaissance we want: firstly, to form an

organic link between peacetime and wartime information reconnaissance to enable

continuity in information gathering; secondly, to unite multiple means of reconnaissance

such as reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, reconnaissance vessels and

radar, and observation posts, while at the same time paying attention to exploiting the

effectiveness of the reconnaissance facilities subordinate to each of the participating air,

water, and underwater forces, allowing information gathering to have a wide-ranging

nature in order to expand the sources of information; thirdly, to give prominence to key

points and conduct uninterrupted information tracking directed against both enemy

command and control systems and significant information targets in the main blockade

direction to increase the quality of information reconnaissance.

2. Implementing campaign information attack

Campaign information attack refers to the activities adopted in order to disrupt and

weaken the enemy’s capability to gather and control information, and it is the main

means for seizing and maintaining campaign information dominance.

During the joint blockade campaign, the implementation of campaign information attack

normally is not an isolated activity, but it is conducted with adjusting-coordination with

other campaign activities and they absolutely cannot be separated from one another. The

joint blockade campaign headquarters should: start out from the needs-requirements of

the overall situation, center on the major campaign activities for each campaign phase;

and rationally determine the time-opportunity and methods, etc. for implementing

campaign information attack.

During the initial period of the operation, the associated force-strengths from the

information operations groups must do the following. They must begin a concealed

unfolding to their appointed sea areas and air zones prior to the unfolding of the other

forces and immediately carry out the activities of the campaign information attack, first

ensuring that the blockade force strengths are capable of unfolding to their positions

rapidly and covertly, and initially establish a joint blockade system {tixi}. Then they, in

conjunction with the information attack strengths subordinate to the other operational

groups, must: center on the major activities such as important outer island operations

against the enemy, seizing air dominance operations, seizing sea dominance operations,

and smashing the enemy’s counter superiority operations, and [center on] key point

jamming and disrupting information targets such as enemy observation, early warning,

electronic warfare and precision guidance weapons systems.
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In the sustained blockade phase, joint blockade campaign headquarters must: unify

command and coordinate information operation groupings with the associated operational

strengths from the other operational groupings; comprehensively use the various

operational methods; and conduct information offensive activities throughout the entire

course [of the campaign]. Normally, the headquarters must adopt modes to integrate

regional operations with operations that are associated with them, and to integrate the

differentiation of targets with the differentiation of regions based on the information

attack capabilities of the various operational groups; and key point jamming and

disruption of such information targets as the enemy command net, coordination net,

electronic warfare systems, precision guidance weapons systems, and the like. [The

headquarters] must: make active use of the means to infiltrate computer networks; break

enemy information security codes; steal intelligence; or implement encroachment by

computer viruses; destroy enemy network operations processes; and paralyze enemy

command- and information systems. It must expand the unfolding of special operations;

adopt multiple means for ‘destruction,’ ‘jamming’ and ‘severing;’ actively destroy

important enemy information facilities on the ground; disrupt enemy satellite orbits and

electronic channels; and sever enemy electronic and fiber optic cables laying on the sea

floor. In this way, the headquarters must continuously weaken enemy information

operations capabilities. When conditions permit, the headquarters must: organize longrange firepower at the right time to execute abrupt, accurate and vigorous firepower

strikes directed against crucial positions {关键部位 guanjian buwei} in enemy

information operations systems; sabotage enemy information systems; and deny the

enemy its information operations capabilities.

3. Implementing campaign information defense

The goals of the campaign information defense are to defend against the enemy’s

implementation of reconnaissance, jamming, and destruction of our information systems,

and ensure our normal conduct of information collection, transmission, processing and

employment.

The implementation of campaign information defense should permeate the entire course

of the blockade campaign. The campaign commander and his command organ should

unify the organization of counter reconnaissance, anti jamming and counter destruction

activities based on the capabilities the enemy has for adopting activities and means for

information attacks in each of the phases of our campaign. The first [defensive] is the

broad use of the various measures such as the use of standard- and non-standard

materials, concealment and camouflage, concealing what is real while displaying what is

false, maneuver evasion, dispersed deployment {shusan peizhi}, and the reduction of

electromagnetic radiation; and weakening, to the furthest extent possible, the

effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance, jamming and destruction that is directed against

our information systems. The second is that one should strengthen ground defenses and

take precautions against enemy espionage agents and saboteurs. The third is to augment

security measures and measures to maintain secrecy; and avoid and reduce information

leaks {信息泄漏 xinxi xielou}. The fourth is that one should: unify the processing of all
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the sources of information; establish a thorough and reliable information transmission

network; comprehensively make use of all the available means; and ensure that we have

the capability to collect and control information from start to finish. The fifth is that one

should adopt technical and tactical measures; take precautions to prevent the enemy from

infiltrating our computer networks or inserting viruses into them; and safeguard the

normal function of information systems. In addition, each of the operational forces that

move forward into the blockade sea area or air zone to fulfill their mission should also

actively adopt all the various measures of prevention and weaken enemy capabilities to

carry out the information offensive, thus safeguarding the normal rotation of their

subordinate information assets {信息设备 xinxi shebei}.

(2) Seizing and maintaining campaign air dominance

Operations for seizing and maintaining campaign air dominance is jointly implemented

with Air Force force-strengths in the lead with participation from relevant force-strengths

of other services (groups). Normally, it is specifically organized and implemented by the

Air Force (air operations group) command headquarters under the unified command of

the joint blockade campaign headquarters. The time-opportunity for its initiation [start] is

generally selected to coincide with campaign unfolding or slightly afterwards. The main

methods are: air fighter attacks {空中歼击 kongzhong jianji} and ground intercept strikes

{地面拦打 dimian lanji}. When we are permitted to strike enemy military targets on the

shore, one should actively adopt air assault {空中突击 kongzhong tuji} and strive to

destroy the enemy on the ground.

1. Air fighter attacks and ground intercept strikes

Air fighter strikes refer to the operational activity {作战行动方法 zuozhan xingdong

fangfa} method in which the fighter aviation forces {歼击航空兵 jianji hangkongbing}

are used for aerial elimination of enemy aircraft. The basic requirements for this method

are as follows: to control the scope of air intercept strikes to a moderate degree, taking as

the prerequisite the capability to effectively achieve the operational goals not only

requiring force-unit {budui} superiority to be formed against the enemy, but also

requiring the prevention of excessive losses of our force-strengths, and the retention of

leeway to continue to have force-strengths remaining for use; to flexibly make use of the

various air warfare fighting methods {空战战法 kongzhan zhanfa} and the tenet that if

we have to fight, then we must fight to win; and to organically integrate the two modes –

aerial standby and airfield standby – to maintain continued operational capabilities in

order to handle such complex situations on the battlefield such as capturing, losing and

regaining [a target or object] repeatedly that can unexpectedly occur on the battlefield.

Ground intercept strikes refer primarily to the operational activity method of primarily

making use of ground-to-air missile cells to intercept enemy aircraft. The basic

requirements for this method consist of: allowing air-to-ground missiles to play the lead

and combine the adoption of a mixed bushu disposition {搭配的混合部署 dapei de
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hunhe bushu} of high-, medium- and low grade [missiles] with high-tech weapons that

are fully forward deployed, in order to increase the effectiveness of ground intercept

strikes; carefully organizing coordination between aviation forces, preventing the

fratricide of our air operations craft; and shifting positions and organizing maneuver

ambushes in order to increase the element of surprise for intercept strikes.

During the course of the operation, one should organically integrate air fighter strikes and

ground intercept strikes. Typically, when the distance between the airspace and our

shoreline is relatively close, we take ground intercept strikes as the primary, and when

there is a greater distance to the airspace, we take air fighter strikes as the primary.

2. Air assault

Air assault consists of the use of bombers, fighter bombers and ground attack aviation

forces who execute air strikes either independently or as a cooperative effort with

campaign tactical missile force-units against such valuable enemy targets as airfields,

ground aviation facilities and early warning command systems, and they are the most

effective method for seizing campaign air dominance.

With air assault, one should: conform to the principles of concealment and surprise,

careful target selection, integrated-whole application of force, and appropriate scale;

execute key point assault against the enemy’s main airfields and important command

institutions of the air force and ground-to-air missile positions; strive hard to effectively

weaken and contain the enemy’s air superiority strengths; rapidly change our own air

posture; and closely organize air cover and support for electronics, reconnaissance, and

guidance {引导 yindao}. In this way we can ensure that assault force strengths smoothly

penetrate {突防 tufang} and implement precision strikes {准确打击 zhunque daji}.

With regard to the afore-mentioned methods, in applying them to different situations, it is

essential for the commander to flexibly make use of them based on each of the aspects

relating to the enemy situation as well as our own at the immediate time and in the

immediate place. During the course of implementing them specifically, [the commander]

should also: carry out tight protection for such valuable targets as our one- and two-strip

airfields, command institutions, and the like; prevent the enemy from denying us

dominance; and ensure the stability of air operation systems.

(3) Seizing and maintaining campaign sea dominance

Operations to seize and maintain campaign sea dominance are collaborative efforts on the

part of the naval force-strengths who take the lead, and other related force-strengths from

the branches of the service (or groupings) that are participating. Normally, they fall under

the unified command of the joint blockade campaign headquarters and are specifically

organized and implemented by the headquarters of the Navy (or naval operations

grouping). The start time for this operation is generally chosen at the same time or just

after the start of the campaign to seize air dominance. Its main methods consist of ocean-
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based search and destroy [activities] {海上寻歼 haishang xunjian} and sea blockade.

When we are permitted to strike enemy shore-based targets, one should lose no time in

striking the navy’s main ports and bases.

1. Ocean-based search and destroy [operations]

Ocean-based search and destroy [operations] refers to the fighting method characterized

by the comprehensive use of aviation forces, surface ships {水面舰艇 shuimian jianting}

and submarine force-strengths that create and seize opportunities for combat to destroy

enemy effective strength on the water through wide mobility. Its main targets for strike

are enemy surface-based anti-submarine patrol force-strengths {海上反潜巡逻兵力

haishang fanqian xunluo bingli}, mobile ship formations {biandui}, countermining and

submarine force-strengths.

It is because of the enemy’s emphasis on concealed dispersal and preservation of fighting

power during operations to seize and maintain campaign sea dominance that the crux of

the success of ocean-based search and destroy [activities] lies in the combat opportunities

for search and destroy [activities]. As a consequence, one should comprehensively utilize

various surveillance control strengths and various reconnaissance means to establish an

integrated sea-air surveillance control system {tixi} that conducts around the clock air

surveillance control for the entire blockade sea area and promptly grasps the enemy’s sea

dominance [superiority] force-strength activity {huodong} situation; [one should] make a

rational arrangement of force-strengths, select a main battlefield for search and destroy

operations where we possess air dominance as well as a key-point penetration sea area of

the enemy’s counter-blockade operations or an important sea area where of the enemy’s

sea dominance operations, and [with this arrangement] unfold the bushu disposition of

surface ships and submarine force-strengths, adopting the division of responsibility

method while pushing forward the bushu disposition of aviation forces at the right time

so as to facilitate making prompt and rapid reaction; [one should] broadly apply

stratagems, lure the enemy to move forward, and create battle [combat] opportunities.

Once we seize upon these combat opportunities, we should quickly organize the forcestrengths and implement annihilation attacks against the enemy.

The main method of search and destroy operations is at-sea raid-attacks [raids]. The basic

requirements for this are: concentrate force-strengths and weaponry, form localized

superiority, and covertly and suddenly implement attacks; dispersed deployments

{shusan peizhi}, moving-in along multiple routes, close coordination, and implement

saturation attacks {饱和攻击 baohe gongji} against the enemy from multiple directions,

while at the same time creating supplemental orthodox-unorthodox momentum {奇正相

辅之势 qi-zheng xiangfu zhi shi} against the enemy with cooperative feints; and flexibly

apply forces based on the situation, enemy, and location. In sea areas closer to the enemy

shore, the enemy’s anti-submarine patrol, minelaying and submarine force-strengths

constitute a threat to our maritime obstacle-blockade distribution system and submarine

force-strengths, and we should concentrate our aviation force and submarine forcestrengths to implement concentrated assaults against them; in sea areas further from the
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enemy shore, the enemy’s naval maneuver {jidong} ship formations constitute the main

threat against us, so with the direct aid of the battlefield surveillance control system, we

should concentrate the aviation force and surface ship force-strengths to implement

annihilation attacks against them so as to facilitate our advantages in attacking their

shortcomings and exchange small losses for large combat results.

2. Blockading enemy naval ports and bases

Blockading enemy naval ports and bases consists of a kind of traditional but effective

operational method for striving to gain sea dominance. The main goal is to block the

enemy’s operational strengths on the sea from unfolding, rendering them incapable of

exploiting their proper effectiveness.

Blockading enemy naval ports and bases is implemented normally by adopting a

combined method of obstacle blockade, a firepower blockade and force-strength

blockade by the aviation force, conventional missile force-units, submarine forcestrengths, and surface combat ship force-strengths. First of all, we implement minelaying

and setups to sink ships {shezhi chenchuan} and establish an obstacle blockade

distribution system {障碍封锁配系 zhang’ai fengsuo peixi} that possesses a specified

width and depth in the main exit and entry points of the enemy’s naval ports and bases or

navigational routes they must pass; and then, at the important sea areas or navigational

routes outside of the obstacle blockade distribution system, separately setup and establish

a firepower blockade distribution system and submarine blockade distribution system,

and deploy surface combat ship force-strengths in open waters and sea areas outside the

range of enemy shore-based firepower strikes to conduct mobile patrols {jidong xunluo}.

In blockading enemy naval ports and bases, we should give prominence to key points,

and we should concentrate force-strengths against targets of enemy ship force-strengths,

for the most part anchored, as well as comprehensively apply multiple means to

implement key point blockade; and against targets of a general nature, we can just adopt

obstacle or submarine blockade.

3. Assaulting enemy military ports and bases

Conducting firepower raids against enemy ports and bases is an effective method for

seizing campaign sea dominance. Their main goal is to annihilate enemy naval

operational strengths at port and in bases while destroying enemy operational backing.

Raids against enemy ports and bases are normally implemented by aviation forces and

campaign tactical missile and submarine force strengths. In terms of target selection, the

main assault targets are normally the ports and bases with enemy main combat ships {主

战舰艇 zhuzhan qianting} at anchor. In terms of specific fighting methods, we should

broadly adopt various deception measures, and strive to achieve suddenness {turanxing};

[we should] concentrate force-strengths, form localized superiority, implement

concentrated and dense assaults against the enemy, strive for being effective at first

penetration, and substantially annihilate the enemy’s effective strength; and [we should]
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thoroughly organize support activities such as reconnaissance early warning, electronic

jamming and air cover so as to safeguard the smooth penetration and precision strikes by

the assault force-strengths.

III. Implementing a Sustained Blockade...304

The campaign commander should, either at the same time or just after seizing campaign

superiority, organize sustained, three-dimensional blockade operations against the enemy

at the right time and sever the enemy’s sea-air lanes of communication. The main

operational activities are: blockading enemy ports as well as adjacent navigational routes;

implementing monitoring, spot inspections, seizure and attacks on the sea; and implement

airborne monitoring, expulsion, intercepts and attacks.

(1) Blockading enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes

The main goal in blockading enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes is to impose

restrictions on the mobility of enemy anti-blockade force-strengths, and to block enemy

transport vessels from entering the port for loading and unloading. Generally this is

commonly implemented by the Navy, which is given the lead over the participating

forces from the Air Force, Second Artillery, and Army campaign tactical missile units as

well as the Navy Militia. Command is specifically organized by the Navy (or naval

operational grouping) headquarters based on the unified intent of the campaign

commander. The basic method for this consists of mutually integrating the obstacle

blockade, firepower blockade and submarine blockade.

1. Obstacle blockade

The obstruction of enemy ports and adjacent navigational routes mainly consists of laying

a water mine obstacle area.

In order to ensure that the minelaying activities are carried out smoothly, the campaign

commander and his command organ should: organize meticulous minelaying

reconnaissance, promptly ascertain the enemy situation as well as the natural

geographical-, hydrological- and meteorological situation in the minelaying sea area;

organize reliable cover for minelaying, and keep an effective look out and suppress

enemy counter minelaying force-strengths; mix the distribution of water mines that are of

differing classes, differing detonation, differing timing, and differing [detonation]

sequence in order to increase the counter-sweeping capabilities of mine obstacles; expand

the adoption of such measures as decoy minelaying and camouflage as well as electronic

jamming in order to ensure the concealed nature of minelaying activities; in closely

integrating the seizure of campaign dominance operations, fully making use of its effects;

hold a specified number of mobile high-speed minelaying force-strengths and reserve

mines throughout [the course of the blockade] in order to carry out replenishment

minelaying based on the reconnaissance situation. During the minelaying process, when

enemy sea-air force-strengths have the intention to block us from laying mines, one must
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promptly command screening forces to implement intercepts against the enemy, and

make every effort to destroy the enemy before they can make use of their weapons. One

must conduct close monitoring of our own mine obstacles that have been set up. When

the enemy conducts minesweeping, we should organize force-strengths to wipe out their

minesweeping force-strengths and safeguard the integrity of blockade obstacles; and

when our blockade mine obstacles are destroyed or dispersed, we should promptly

dispatch fast mobile minelaying force-strengths to conduct replenishment mine laying.

2. Submarine blockade

The submarine force-strengths that blockade enemy ports and adjacent navigational

routes commonly conduct them in the sea area outside enemy ports where the antisubmarine [activity] is relatively weaker but the shipping activities are relatively more

frequent by employing positional ambushes or area hunting methods and dispersed and

covert assaults against enemy ships using single vessels or small vessel groups.

In order to achieve the goal of the submarine blockade the campaign commander and his

command organ should: adopt all measures to ensure the concealed nature of the

submarine force-strength activities; augment intelligence support and promptly report the

enemy situation; and thoroughly organize coordination between the submarines and other

force-strengths.

3. Firepower blockade

The firepower blockade consists of the implementation of firepower control with

conventional guided missiles and other remote warfare directed at enemy ports and

shipping lines, deterrence of the enemy fleet from entering or exiting the port,

annihilation of enemy transport ships and anti-blockade force-strengths, and a method to

seal off enemy ports and sever the navigational routes close by.

In order to fully bring into play the effectiveness of a firepower blockade, the campaign

commander should carefully organize reconnaissance, promptly grasp the enemy activity

situation {敌活动情况 di huodong qingkuang}and ensure the provision of reliable

intelligence support to firepower blockade force-strengths. At the same time, [the

commander should] command each firepower cell to implement firepower strikes strictly

based on the predetermined firepower blockade area so as not to influence the stability of

our water mine obstacles and other blockade force-strength activity {huodong}. When

adjusting the firepower blockade area and implementing firepower mobility, [the

commander] should notify the force-strengths concerned without delay and clarify their

coordination relationships.

(2) Striking the enemy who has made a localized penetration

During the sustained blockade phase, it is possible that the enemy may implement

localized penetration operations and the intention to restore connections with the outside
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world. The campaign commander should: carry out uninterrupted reconnaissance with all

means against the enemy; realistically grasp the trends of the enemy anti-blockade forcestrengths; promptly ascertain the enemy’s penetration intention, direction, timing, scale

and possible activity modes, appropriately set the resolution for smashing the enemy’s

penetration, covertly and quickly maneuver force-strengths and weaponry, and resolutely

prevent the enemy’s penetration.

When enemy minesweeping and anti-submarine force-strengths open a penetration, the

campaign commander should organize the aviation force to strike enemy minesweeping

and anti-submarine force-strengths at the right time, and the blockade force-strengths that

have already unfolded out on the sea and in the air must adopt all effective measures to

struggle with the enemy to ensure the integrity of the blockade system {tixi}. For

blockade mine obstacles that have been dispersed by the enemy, [the commander] should

promptly carry out replenishment minelaying.

When one discovers concentrating, loading or screening force-strengths assembling to

rendezvous with transport convoys in open seas, the campaign commander should

organize conventional missile force-units at the right time to strike enemy vessels that are

in the state of concentrating, loading and assembling formations; and he should organize

high performance operational aircraft to conduct long range raids against concentrating

and assembling formation. At the same time, [the commander] instructs the blockade

force-strengths that have already unfolded on the adjacent water and air zones to: rapidly

maneuver in the direction of the enemy penetration; promptly determine and report the

situation; form a multi-layer and mutually integrated intercept bushu disposition

underwater, on the surface and in the air; standby [alert] force-strengths within the base

should quickly set out and implement assisting-support operations {支援作战 zhiyuan

zuozhan}, and strengthen the blockade and strike intensity in the direction of the enemy

penetration.

When the enemy transport fleet on the sea or in the air directs a penetration from open

water toward the ports or directs a penetration from the ports toward the open water

under cover, the campaign commander should: examine the time and measure the

circumstances {shenshi duoshi}; strive hard for the initiative; promptly confirm the

enemy shipping lines and whether it is possible for the enemy to circumvent the channel;

instruct the blockade force-strengths that have already unfolded onto the sea and into the

air to implement active intercept-attacks {积极拦击 jiji lanji}; organize the aviation and

submarines as well as partial guided missile ships to grab hold of beneficial timing

opportunities; and select beneficial sea areas, taking enemy transport shipping vessels as

the main targets and carrying out multi-layered attacks. Based on strategic need, [the

commander] can also: make use of campaign tactical missiles and long-range aviation

forces; make sudden attacks against bases, loading and unloading and transport ports

situated in the direction of the enemy penetration as well as traffic arteries on the ground;

and resolutely crush the intentions of the enemy to penetrate using enemy escort convoys.
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(3) Implementing monitoring, spot-inspections, capture-arrest and attacks on the sea

Monitoring, spot-inspections, capture-arrest and attacks on the sea are the campaign

activities that are conducted by the sea blockade force-strengths to sever the enemy’s

maritime contacts with the outside world. Normally, this is a unified command by the

joint campaign commander, and it is specially organized and implemented by the

commander of the naval campaign large formation.

The Navy campaign large formation commander and his command organ, once the

campaign has been initiated should, in accordance with the intent and orders of the joint

campaign senior officer, either at the same time as or just after implementing the

blockade against the enemy port and approaching the navigational routes, promptly

command his blockade force-strengths to quickly establish an at-sea mobile strike

distribution system {jidong daji peixi} and a reconnaissance patrol distribution system

{zhencha xunluo peixi} based on the predetermined plan {jihua}, conduct strict

monitoring-control of the sea intercept-inspection areas {拦检区 lan-jianqu} and

blockade areas. [They should] monitor, capture-arrest or attack the vessels entering into

the intercept-inspection area and blockade area depending on the situation.

When we discover ships that are not from our side entering into the sea interceptinspection area, the sea blockade force-strengths must rapidly react and decisively adopt

activities. In normal situations, one must resolutely launch attacks against enemy

operational ships and transport ships that are grouped together. One should seize enemy

unprotected ships and independently navigating civilian ships; if they resist, one should

implement cautionary strikes {警告性攻击 jinggaoxing gongji} and compel them to

submit. With regard to third party vessels {第三方船只 disanfang chuanzhi}, those that

are sailing away from the blockade area toward open waters may be allowed to pass;

those that are sailing into the intercept-inspection area, and have the intent to enter into

the blockade area, should promptly be warned against continuing forward or prevented

and ordered to change course. When the third party vessels do not heed the prevention,

and have the intent to force their way into the blockade area, one should force them to

immediately stop the vessel and sail toward an appointed sea area or port to be inspected;

and when necessary, one can implement strikes against them, but the strikes must be

implemented to the appropriate degree of intensity, and generally one should make every

effort to avoid shipwrecking the vessel.

When ships that are hostile to our side are discovered entering the sea blockade area,

those other than ships that enjoy special protection, the sea blockade force-strengths

should promptly and resolutely be allowed to capture-arrest or attack them. Targets for

capturing-arresting are mainly unescorted merchant ships {无护航的商船 wuhuhang de

shangchuan}; this activity is carried out in a wider sea area by the surface ship forcestrengths. It is permissible to destroy the ships that are difficult to send back to port once

they have been stopped and seized on the water. Attacking ships whose activities are in

violation of the blockade within the blockaded area is mainly the duty of submarines and

aviation forces as well as surface guided missile vessel force-strengths. Submarine force-
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strengths typically apply positional ambush {阵地伏击 zhendi fuji} and area hunting {区

域游猎 quyu youlie} methods, covertly and suddenly implementing attacks; the aviation

force is typically an aerial formation of multiple aircraft types composed of early

warning, assault, cover and support aircraft integrated into one covertly approaching the

enemy and implementing multi-directional and multiple wave attacks; and water surface

guided missile ship force-strengths typically implement guided missile strikes in

advantageous sea areas in multiple directions and at long distances following the aviation

forces, or independently implement guided missile strikes against ships that violate the

ban.

With regard to sea monitoring, spot-inspection, capture-arrest and attack activities, they

are sustained for a long period, they are strongly policy-oriented, and they exist in a

critical time in the overall campaign situation. As a consequence, the campaign

commander and the naval campaign large formation commander should augment

command and adjusting-coordination, and allow them to flexibly turn around and form a

composite strength; instruct the force-units to strictly execute relevant policies and

international laws and conscientiously carry out operating procedures and methods for

spot-inspections and capture-arrests; painstakingly organize the shift-changing of support

and blockade force-strengths and maintain a sustained and uninterrupted blockade.

(4) Implementing air monitoring, -expulsion, -interception and -attacks

Air monitoring, -expulsion, -interception and -attacks are the major campaign activities to

sever enemy air contacts with the outside world. Normally under the unified command of

the campaign commander, it is the commander of the Air Force campaign large

formation, specifically, that organizes implementation.

The campaign commander, at the start of the campaign and once it has been affirmed that

the situation has not significantly changed, should issue orders decisively and promptly to

initiate the air blockade. The Air Force campaign large formation commander should

promptly command the early warning aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft responsible for

air monitoring to enter into the predetermined area to carry out reconnaissance and early

warning based on the intentions of the joint campaign commander; the ground (or naval)

aircraft warning radar and technical reconnaissance forces turn the machine on to

implement search reconnaissance {搜寻侦察 souxun zhencha}; ground-to-air missile

forces rapidly assume combat status {zhandou zhuangtai 战斗状态} and implement the

tracking of suspicious targets in the air; and a multi-functioning group of aircraft with

early warning command aircraft as the nucleus and high-functioning operational aircraft

as the backbone enters the intercept zone to conduct security patrols {警戒巡逻 jingjie

xunluo}. [The commander should] rapidly erect an air blockade system to implement

continuous and uninterrupted monitoring control over the intercept zone and blockade

area.

When aviation craft that are not from our side enter into the air intercept zone, groundbased radar and technical reconnaissance forces should rapidly conduct judgment and
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recognition of them and aircraft groupings should promptly conduct tracking recognition

in order to ascertain their nationality and attributes as early as possible. For enemy

transport aircraft and other non-operational aircraft, one should promptly organize air

blockade forces to carry out interception and affect a forced landing at a designated

airfield where they can be detained; for those that refuse to land, it is permitted to attack

out in warning. For enemy operational aircraft or for transport planes escorting

operational aircraft, one should rapidly organize aviation forces and ground-to-air missile

forces to resolutely shoot them down. For verifying third party aircraft, if they show the

intent to enter into the blockade area, air blockade aircraft should implement interception

and warning against them and order them to alter their course; if they try to force their

way into the blockade zone, one should force them to land at a designated airfield and

conduct a ground inspection.

When an aircraft that is not from our side is discovered intruding into the air blockade

zone, the air blockade forces should rapidly implement interception and, based on the

situation, either attack, expel, or force them to land and detain them. For enemy transport

aircraft and other non-operational aircraft, one should force them to land at a designated

airfield and detain them; and for any that resist a forced landing, resolutely carry out

attacks against them. For enemy operational aircraft, one should rapidly initiate attacks to

resolutely shoot them down. For third party aircraft, one should implement expulsion

away [from the area] or forced landings and detention; and for those with the intent to

penetrate the blockade area, one should resolutely attack them.

With regard to air monitoring, expulsion, interception and attack activities, the duration in

which they are sustained is long; they are highly policy-oriented; moreover, it is 

required that one reacts within an exceedingly short period of time. As a consequence, the

commander and his command organ must: comprehensively make use of each kind of

intelligence and make an accurate judgment and promptly determine a decision of how to

manage [these activities], while the command cell {指挥部队 zhihui budui} reacts

rapidly; strictly execute related policies and international laws and regulations;

painstakingly organize support, coordination and the rotation of blockade forces {封锁兵

力的换班 fengsuo bingli de huanban}; mutually integrate air patrols with airfields

servicing the operation, mutually integrate air intercept with ground-based firepower

intercept strikes, and multiple methods to control the enemy.

IV. Concluding the Campaign...309

The conclusion of the campaign consists of the final phase in the joint blockade

campaign, and is the campaign activity process that is driven to be executed when the

campaign goals have already been achieved, or when a change in campaign patterns is

necessary.

The time-opportunity for concluding the campaign is, on one hand, dependent on the

condition of having completed the campaign mission, and on the other hand, depending

on the objective conditions and the basic requirements in the development of the
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campaign. The joint blockade campaign commander should at all times grasp the

situation of achieving the campaign goals as well as the developing changes to the

battlefield situation, make accurate judgments of the final result of the campaign and

developing trends, and at the right time, make the recommendation to the higher-level

authority to conclude the campaign. In order to smoothly conclude the campaign, the

campaign commander should meticulously conduct overall-planning and thoroughly

organize. At the same time, he should adopt all measures at the time when the campaign

is about to conclude to consolidate and expand the victory and create more favorable

conditions for political and diplomatic struggles.

In situations where the joint blockade campaign goals have already been achieved,

organizing the withdrawal of the units from the battlefield is the main activity in

concluding the campaign. The campaign commander and his command organ should

tightly organize campaign reconnaissance, promptly grasp the battlefield situation, and

especially pay attention to indications of enemy counterattack; [they should] clarify each

operational grouping’s missions, the sequence of withdrawing and gathering {撤收顺序

cheshou shunxu} and assembly standby area after returning [to base]; organize

dependable air cover and sea screening, and take strict precautions against unexpected

assaults implemented by the enemy; organize the controlling-directing of force-strengths

returning to base, as well as search and rescue for injured force-strengths {搜索救援

sousou jiuyuan}; organize mop-up of the battlefield, correctly dispose of mine obstacles,

and the like for such problems that persist; organize adjustments to replenishment and

quickly restore combat power; sum up, verify and report combat results to higher-level

authorities, summarize operational experiences, and provide a detailed report of the

campaign; make recommendations regarding the timing for announcing the report of the

cessation of the blockade based on the course of the campaign activities; and organize the

force-units to conduct operational summaries.
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Chapter 13

The Landing Campaign...310

A landing campaign signifies sea-crossing offensive operations conducted by Army,

Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps troops – with the assistance and cooperation of

the People’s Armed Police troops and the Militia, as well as regional forces – according

to a unified plan {jihua} and command, against the enemy’s defended seacoasts and

islands. This is one of the basic patterns of a joint campaign. A landing campaign

normally is implemented primarily by a campaign large formation of the Army, Navy,

Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, with assistance and cooperation from the other

strengths. A landing campaign against large islands [or island groups] is composed of a

series of sub-campaigns on land, at sea, and in the air. Their main missions are to disrupt

the enemy’s counter-amphibious-landing defense, to eliminate the enemy they face, to

seize the campaign landing site (beachhead) or outer islands possessing strategic or

campaign significance, and to create favorable conditions for follow-on activities.

In a landing campaign, the missions are arduous, and it has a strong overall situation

quality {quanjuxing}. The campaign commander must carefully plan {jihua}, fully

prepare, adopt the fighting method of “multiple means, integrated destroy and paralyze

{hui tan}, strive for the ‘three dominances’ {san quan}, three-dimensional cutting up

{fenge} and assault in multiple directions and with key points, and full-depth seizeoccupy the campaign landing site (or surround the outer islands),” and under the

conditions of effectively paralyzing the enemy’s defensive system {tixi}, accelerate the

speed of the onto land speed of the landing force, so as to rapidly achieve the campaign

goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...310

I. Characteristics...310

(1) Unfolding before the enemy, and threats facing campaign preparations

In a landing campaign, all preparatory work will unfold in front of enemy. In one respect,

concealing an activity’s intention is extremely difficult; in particular, in operations under

informationized conditions, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are constantly

improving, on top of which landing preparations are fairly long in duration, and forceunit {budui} and ship concentrations and maneuver objectives are large, which easily

reveals the activity’s intention. In another respect, modern operations emphasize

restraining the enemy at the first opportunity; in particular, with the continuous

development of weaponry, long-range precision strike capabilities have continuously

improved, so that the campaign preparations phase has the possibility to meet with strikes

from the enemy’s Navy and Air Force, as well as long-range firepower, which cause

amphibious-landing campaign preparations to face a greater threat.
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(2) The arduous tasks of strengthening the sea-crossing area and of seizing and

maintaining the “three dominances”

In a landing campaign, operational activities unfold in an area with five dimensions:

information, and land, sea, air, and space. In particular, large forces conducting seacrossing operations are greatly dependent on information dominance, air dominance, and

sea dominance; only by seizing and maintaining these “three dominances” can one truly

gain the initiative in a landing campaign. In a future landing campaign, the opposing

sides, in order to strive for the initiative in operations, surely will be involved in a sharply

unfolding contention for seizing and maintaining the “three dominances.” In particular, in

operations conducted in very large battlefield spaces, and also when waging a landing

campaign confronting an enemy with very strong capabilities for information warfare

(IW) operations and for control of the air and control of the sea, the task of seizing and

maintaining the “three dominances” becomes more arduous.

(3) Assault on a fortified position with one’s back to the sea, and sharp fighting for

seizure and establishing the landing site (beachhead)

The landing campaign is fortification-attack warfare with one’s back to the high seas,

whether or not one can establish a landing site on the enemy shore, and obtain support for

developing the attack onto the island, is the key to the campaign’s success or failure; the

fighting for the landing sites has become a focal point of the opposing sides’

countermeasures. During operations, the defending side can use a sea area’s natural

obstacles, resort to strategically located places difficult to access, stand fast, and wait at

its ease for the fatigued [enemy]; the attacking side then must overcome the sea area

[obstacles], assault the fortified position with its back to the water, surmount the waves,

and land. The opposing sides will develop sharp fighting – in offshore and coastal waters,

in the water-margin beachhead and littoral area – revolving around approach and counterapproach, landing and counter-landing, gaining a foothold and the counter-foothold, and

capture and counter-capture, causing the assault onto land and the struggle for seizing and

establishing a landing site to become abnormally arduous and sharp.

(4) The complexity and difficulty of joint operations and command coordination

A landing campaign normally is a joint campaign in which all the services and arms

participate. Among the participating strengths, not only are there the main large

formations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, there are also the local

strengths participating in the combat. Among battlespaces, not only are the land, sea, and

air involved, one’s own shore and the enemy’s shore are also involved. Among

operational modes, not only are there the large-scale regular battles on land, at sea, and in

the air, there are also unequal-scale [i.e. asymmetric] irregular operations. In weaponry,

not only are there large quantities of ordinary-technology arms and equipment, there are

also certain numbers of high-tech weapons and equipment. In addition, during an

operation’s course, the command institution will mostly be in a state of motion and in an

electromagnetic threat environment, and command countermeasures will be sharp; thus,
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the difficulties and complexity of command and coordination will have been additionally

increased.

(5) The onerous tasks of a sea-crossing offensive and all its support measures

In a landing campaign, all of its support [measures], owing to the effects of the marine

environment, will be more complex and difficult than ground offensive operations. On

one hand, in order to support a large force’s sea-crossing operation, one not only needs to

use ordinary transport vehicles such as landing ships, but also needs to use vertical

landing craft, such as transport planes and helicopters, enabling the support mission not

only to be large in scope, but also powerful technologically. On the other hand, materiel

depletion in landing campaign operations is enormous; support is simultaneously

performed on land, at sea, and in the air; there are many stringent requirements on the

loading and transfer nodes for materiel and equipment, and the support modes rapidly

shift over the course of the operation, which make the logistic and equipment support

tasks extremely arduous and complex. In addition, support activities are also subject to

the restraints of natural conditions and to the effects of enemy blockade strike activities,

thus making all of the support tasks more onerous and difficult.

II. Requirements...312

A landing campaign under informationized conditions possesses several new

characteristics, which levy more stringent requirements on a campaign’s organization and

implementation.

(1) Focus on the strategic overall situation, and meticulously overall-plan the preparations

{chouhua zhunbei}

A landing campaign has a strong strategic quality, and is constrained by many factors;

moreover, its operational scale is large, the difficulties and risks are great, the operational

activities are complex, and countermeasures are abnormally sharp. Whether or not the

campaign overall planning {chouhua} is correct and whether or not the preparation work

is adequate, have a direct bearing on the campaign’s success or failure. Thus, one must

pay attention to the strategic overall situation, and meticulously conduct overall-planning

and – under conditions which are truly assured (or well understood) – how one can act.

This first requires achieving resolute subordination to and service to the strategic overall

situation. Setting out from an assurance of reaching the strategic goal and gaining the

strategic initiative, one establishes the landing campaign’s goal, the scale of the forces,

the start and stop times for operations, the spatial scope, the strike targets, and the main

operational activities. Second, this requires keeping an eye on the overall situation, and

grasping the centers of gravity. On the basis of unified overall planning and consideration

for every aspect of the campaign and the full course of the campaign, seize upon the key

links having major influences and decisive significance on the strategic and campaign

overall situations to overall plan and bushu disposition the campaign. Third, this requires

fully bringing into play overall power. The essential elements in subduing the enemy –
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the campaign strengths, operational space, operational methods, and campaign guidance,

as well as political offensives and the abundant war potential of one’s own side – are

meticulously integrated into a powerful, coordinated operational system. Fourth, this

requires overall-planning and preparing for the campaign by setting out from the most

difficult, most complex conditions. One must formulate a variety of courses of action,

and have in advance many preparations; ensure that the preparations for the strengths,

equipment, materiel, and battlefield are adequate; and basing oneself on operations under

the most difficult conditions and on reversals in the war situation in an unfavorable

posture, strive for victory in the campaign. In addition, campaign preparations must be

conducted in a careful, concealed manner; one must not only prevent sabotage from the

enemy, but also actively adopt activities to sabotage the enemy’s preparations.

(2) Concentration of elite strengths, and formation of superiority to defeat the enemy

Concentration of elite strengths is a law for defeating one’s opponent in a localized war

campaign under informationized conditions, and is also an important material basis in

striving for victory in a campaign. In a future landing campaign, under conditions where

the enemy has superiority in high-performance naval and aerial ordnance and in advance

development of the battlefield, if one wants to break through the enemy’s defenses and

win a victory in the campaign, one must concentrate elite strengths – Navy, Air Force,

and 2nd Artillery Corps force-units, and the landing assault force-units – to form a

dominant position over the enemy. First, in the composition of the landing campaign

strengths, one must achieve concentration. This means concentration of weaponry with a

relatively high-tech content, especially “trump-card” {sashoujian} weapons;

concentration from the entire PLA of troops with high character and high quality; and

concentration of the needed national and regional manpower and material resources,

especially high-tech talent and commercial ships, civil aircraft, space systems,

communications systems, and other technical equipment. Via the “three concentrations,”

all of the various strengths within and outside of the military are congealed into a

powerful People’s War strengths system with the optimal make up, which forms a

sufficiently dominant position for the landing operation in overall terms. Next, one must

achieve concentration in strength application, i.e., concentrated use of elite strengths in

the main direction and key-point area(s) of the landing operation; concentrated use of

elite strengths at critical times, especially in the first battle, where one should to the

maximum degree commit elite strengths and strive to gain campaign initiative in one

blow; and concentration of the elite [strengths] for resisting and defending against an

enemy’s military intervention. Through “employment of the three concentrations,” at

critical-natured times and spaces when campaign victory or defeat is decided, one can

form a relatively powerful localized superiority or even absolute superiority and ensure

victory.

(3) Adoption of a variety of means to seize and maintain the “three dominances”

In a landing campaign, operational activities will simultaneously develop in the multidimensional space of information, land, sea, air, and space. Seizure of information
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dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance is of decisive significance; in particular,

the complexity and difficulty of a landing campaign has determined that the struggle for

the “three dominances” not only is the main operational activity in the early operational

phase of a landing campaign, but also permeates the entire course of the campaign.

Whether one can seize and maintain the “three dominances” directly affects the

campaign’s course and outcome. In a future landing campaign, seizure and maintenance

of the “three dominances” must employ a variety of means to restrain the enemy. First,

one should: concentrate superior campaign tactical missile strengths, Air Force strengths,

special operations strengths, and air defense strengths, and integrate them and alternate

them with activities such as missile assaults, air attacks, special [forces] attack, and antiair strikes; strike against enemy targets, such as early warning detection systems,

command and communications systems, air defense systems, air fields and hangars; and

focus on damaging enemy air fields and runways, to prevent the enemy’s early warning

aircraft and main battle aircraft from being able to take off, and do all one can to keep the

enemy’s Air Force on the ground. Simultaneously, one should strike against the enemy

aircraft lifted off, strive to first destroy the enemy Air Force, and achieve at one stroke

both air dominance and information dominance. After this, one should employ activities

such as strikes against enemy harbors and bases, blockades of enemy anchorage areas,

efforts to keep the enemy Navy in port, and adoption of sea blockades and sea battles,

and combine the blockades with the strikes, to seize sea dominance. By seizing and

maintaining the “three dominances,” one creates favorable conditions for completely

paralyzing the enemy’s defensive system, and for grasping victory in a landing campaign.

(4) Rapid and continuous assaults, and improve speed of going onto land

The landing force, when assaulting onto land on an enemy shore, is both in a struggle

between the opposing sides and in a contest of the speed with which the opposing sides

commit force-strengths and weaponry toward the landing area. The landing side can

create the important conditions for seizing victory in the landing campaign only by

delivering as many of its troops as possible to the enemy shore within a fairly short time,

and by forming in the initial landing period a superiority in force-strengths over the

enemy countering the landing. In a landing campaign conducted in the future, the enemy

not only will have a solid defensive shell, it will also conduct layered resistance along the

beach and shore areas, and will have a fairly strong mobile strike strength in a simplified

depth bushu disposition. [The enemy] will take advantage of when the landing force-units

come onto land and have yet secured a foothold to implement continuous counterattacks,

with the intention of annihilating the landing force-units on the beach and shore areas so

as to stabilize their defensive posture. Hence, exerting all one’s efforts to accelerate the

speed of coming onto land during the initial period of the landing, and continuously

maintaining strength superiority is clearly especially important. This first requires

simultaneous use of a variety of means to amplify the first assault strengths. Based on the

maximum effort to achieve surprise in landing, one must employ a variety of amphibiouslanding means of transport, accelerate the landing speed of the 1st-echelon [1st-wave]

division(s), be able to use standard amphibious-landing means of transport and

amphibious vehicles to directly land on the beaches, use hovercraft and other fast landing

craft to land, use helicopters and surface-effect craft to execute vertical and over[-the-
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beach] {chaoyue} landings, and also be able to use airborne-force cooperation in the

landing operation. By adopting this variety of means, one can thus accelerate the landing

speed. The second need is adoption of a variety of measures to improve the landing speed

of the follow-on echelons. One must collect enough amphibious-landing means of

transport to ensure that the follow-on echelons are rapidly embarked for crossing; one

must tightly organize sea and air cover, to foil the enemy’s sea-air interception of the

follow-on echelons; and one must as early as possible seize critical targets such as air

fields and harbors, and open up channels for three-dimensional landing, thus accelerating

the landing speed of the follow-on echelons. The third need is use of a variety of means

to crush the enemy’s counterattack. One must use the means of head-on resistance,

flanking assaults, raids in depth, and airborne strikes to thwart the land/sea/air joint

counterattack activities conducted by the enemy in order to create favorable conditions

for seizing and building a landing site.

(5) Emphasis on psychological attacks on the will, on splitting up and collapsing the

enemy

Localized wars under informationized conditions fully emphasize strikes on the enemy’s

psychology: by striking at psychology, so that the enemy loses the will to resist, the

course of operations is thus accelerated, and a victory in the campaign is finally won. A

landing campaign waged in the future will be conducted on a background of special

operations. This has determined that one should – based on executing an awesome

military strike, and by enhancing political offensives: isolate, split up, and collapse the

enemy; weaken the enemy’s operational capability; decrease the intensity of the enemy

resistance; make a great effort to reduce both sides’ casualties, especially an operation’s

collateral casualties and damage; and strive to achieve the campaign goal at the least

price. First is the need to split up and collapse [the enemy]: one must fully utilize the

various contradictions internal to the enemy; enhance by a variety of channels the work

of splitting up and collapsing; actively support improving influences {势力 shili},

vigorously strive for the intermediate strengths; isolate and strike at the die-hard

elements; and promote the splitting up of hostile influences. It is especially necessary to

give aid to [reactionary] arms-controlling strengths within the enemy, and as much as

possible to join with them in political offensives and operational activities. Second is a

need for wide-scale launching of psychological warfare. One must employ all means of

propaganda to arouse the sense of justice and anti-war sentiment of the enemy masses

and soldiers, disintegrate the enemy’s heart, struggle for its popular feeling, deprive or

modulate the enemy’s will to resist, decrease the intensity of its resistance, and strive to

achieve the campaign goal as quickly as possible. Third is the need for careful selection

of strike targets. One must as much as possible avoid striking and destroying civilian key

facilities; as for those military targets intermixed with civilian facilities, when they are

really identified and when there is a real need, they should be destroyed or damaged by

precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and other highly controllable mean, thus reducing

rank-and-file casualties and damage to civilian facilities, and facilitating acquisition of

more understanding and support.
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(6) Simultaneous application of a variety of means, timely and effective support

In a landing campaign, operational activities are highly dependent on all kinds of support.

Whether or not thorough, timely, effective campaign support can be organized is

extremely important to winning a victory in the campaign. The participating strengths in

a future landing campaign will be numerous and the battlespace will be expansive; only

be adopting a variety of means will one be able to realize timely, effective support. First

is one must implement integrated-whole support {zhengti baozhang}. Based on the

reality of a landing campaign’s stringent requirements on campaign support strengths and

means, [one must] fully utilize the manpower and material resources of the armed forces

{jundui} and local area; establish a sound integrated support system {tixi}; conduct

unified-overall-planning and formulate the support plan {jihua}; unify and organize the

support strengths; unify and differentiate the support missions; form an optimally

combined integrated-whole support capability; and implement the integrated-whole

support of military-civilian integration, tri-service joint logistics, and a combination of

unified and separate. Secondly, one must give prominence to support key points. On the

basis of paying attention to full-scale support {quanmian baozhang}, concentrate the

main strengths to key-point support the operational activities having a major effect on the

campaign’s overall situation, giving priority to support the campaign activities in the

main direction, for the main operational groups, for the important operational phases and

critical occasions, not only preventing the inability to attend to all things at once, but

doing one’s best to avoid equal use of support strengths and resources. Third is the need

for flexible support modes. According to the different situations, one should adopt

different support modes; in particular, one must comprehensively employ all types of

support means to implement integrated support for friendly coasts, the enemy shores, and

the seas between them. Integration of our coastal fixed support with a 3-D maneuver

support at sea and at enemy shores, integration of land transport with sea and air

projection, and integration of step-by-step support with support bypassing the immediate

chain, will form a coast-to-sea-to-coast interlink and a land/sea/air mutually coordinated

overall support mechanism. Simultaneously, one must adopt a variety of measures to

enhance defense of the support strengths, support resources, and support hubs, as well as

their maneuver routes, and to ensure the implementation of full-course, full-depth, omnibearing support for the landing campaign.

Section 2: Main Activities...316

A landing campaign, and especially a landing campaign of a large island, normally can be

divided into three major phases: advance operations, assembly onto the ships and the sea

crossing, and the assault onto land and establishment of the campaign landing site.

According to the sequence implemented in the campaign, each phase has major activities

suited to its campaign mission and goal.
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I. Advance Operations...316

Advance operations is the first phase implemented in a landing campaign. Its goals are to

paralyze the enemy operational system and to seize the battlefield initiative in order to

create the conditions for landing operations. During operations, the campaign commander

must keep the focal centers of gravity on operational activities of decisive significance,

such as great reduction of the enemy’s resistance capability and seizure of battlefield

initiative, and must carefully coordinate operational activities on all battlefields and in all

areas, so that the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli} can strive for

success in the operation.

(1) Seizing information dominance

Seizing information dominance in a landing campaign is the crux to seizing air

dominance and sea dominance and to having the initiative in one’s hands, and is a critical

assurance of winning victory in the campaign. The goals in seizure of information

dominance are to greatly reduce the operational effectiveness of the enemy’s electronic

equipment, and to ensure the full realization of the operational effectiveness of friendly

electronic equipment. It normally begins before or at the same time as an integrated

firepower strike, and permeates throughout the campaign.

The basic principles of seizing information dominance are integration of soft and hard;

combination of offense and defense, with offense as primary; and – based on careful

organization of information protection – adoption mainly of the following methods: first

is implementation of information reconnaissance. Use of friendly electroniccountermeasures reconnaissance equipment to detect, search for, and intercept the enemy

electronic equipment’s electromagnetic (EM)-wave signals, and – via recording,

positioning, analysis, and identification – acquisition of the enemy electronic equipment’s

relevant parameters, bushu disposition, and patterns of use provide a basis for executing

jamming and firepower destruction. Implementation of information reconnaissance

requires unified application of electronic reconnaissance strengths to execute joint

reconnaissance, and should be integrated with other campaign reconnaissance, to achieve

as much as possible the integrated application of a variety of reconnaissance means, so as

to expand intelligence sources and improve the availability of intelligence data. Second is

implementation of information suppression. The main goal of information suppression is

reduction of the enemy information systems’ functions via concentrated and thus keypoint implementation of “soft” strikes, so as to later create conditions for executing

“hard” strikes on the enemy information systems. The main activities of information

suppression are electronic attacks and network attacks, normally employing anti-radiation

weapons, EM bombs, graphite bombs, etc., and key-point implementation of blanket

jamming and sabotage against the enemy strategic and campaign information systems’

information processing and decision centers, information detection sources and

information channels, navigation and positioning systems, communications systems,

early-warning detection systems, and antimissile interception systems; this causes their

system functions to be seriously degraded, and via the network attacks achieves the goal
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of paralyzing the enemy’s high-tech weapons and C4ISR system. Third is execution of

firepower strikes. Use of long-range PGMs and high-performance operational aircraft to

execute strikes against key targets – near-depth preselected command and control (C2)

centers, communications hubs, information warfare (IW) operations centers, radar

positions, computer network stations, and surface-to-air missiles – and paralysis of the

enemy information systems and air defense systems via nodal damage (sabotage), system

paralysis, and physical destruction, ensure the normal operation of one’s own information

systems. Fourth is implementation of information deception. Use of deception

transmitters to provide the enemy electronic reconnaissance with false intelligence, and

setting up false electronic targets or setting up simple radiation sources to transmit false

signals will attract the enemy’s attention and disperse his electronic reconnaissance

strengths; use of jamming aircraft and ships to perform feinting reconnaissance and

interference activities will lure the enemy into switching on his hidden radar and thus

revealing it. Fifth is organization of electronic defense. Seizure of information dominance

in a landing campaign is accomplished in a complex EM environment. Hence, while

executing an electronic offensive, one must also adopt a variety of electronic-defense

measures: to prevent the EM signals radiated from friendly electronic equipment from

interception, identification, direction-finding, and positioning by the enemy; to defend

against the jamming and destruction of one’s own electronic equipment by the enemy

jamming and firepower systems; and to ensure the normal effectiveness of one’s own

various electronic systems. Information defense requires laying stress on key points,

integrated adoption of technical and tactical measures, stringent [control over] all

systems, and ensuring the safety (or security) of the campaign’s core information and

critical information systems and nodes. Information defense mainly includes such

activities as electronic defense, network defense, physical protection, and information

security; its main methods are control of EM-wave radiation, rational layout of radar nets,

and careful organization of radio communications networks, as well as setting up EM

shielding.

(2) Advance integrated firepower assaults {tuji}

Advance integrated firepower assaults signify – at the launch of a landing campaign, with

missiles and aircraft firepower as primary, and adopting a surprise, fierce, continuous

mode – the execution of comprehensive and key-point strike activities against critical

targets, such as the enemy’s command institutions, air and naval bases, missile positions,

and air defense systems. Their goals are to destroy and damage the enemy’s critical

targets, paralyze the enemy operational system, weaken the enemy’s comprehensive

operational capability, and to achieve battle surprise – in order later to seize information

dominance, air dominance, and sea dominance, as well as to create favorable conditions

for follow-on operational activities. Advanced integrated firepower assaults are normally

under the unified command of a campaign commander, and specifically organized and

implemented by all the service commanders. Their duration should be set based on the

campaign intent, the assault goal, the participating force-strengths, and the assault

objectives. Advance integrated firepower assaults are comprised of a series of firepower

assault activities, and generally can be divided into a first (initial) assault and follow-on

assaults.
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The first assault is the most critical assault activity among the advance integrated

firepower assaults, and is jointly executed mainly by a missile strike group and an air

operations group. Its main missions are: by use of surprise, fierce, continuous firepower,

to execute comprehensive and key-point paralysis and suppression of the enemy’s major

targets, and to the maximum extent, to weaken the enemy’s operational capability, so as

to create favorable conditions for later strike activities. The first assault’s major targets

are vital targets: the enemy’s military and political heads and organs, electronic warfare

(EW) centers, Air Force bases, naval bases, air defense system, and surface-to-surface

missile positions. The first assault must be fully prepared, be launched stealthily and

suddenly, and strive at the first opportunity to restrain the enemy. Before the assault, the

campaign tactical missiles, high-performance operational aircraft and other elite strengths

participating in the assault activities must be scientifically organized into groups, and

missions rationally assigned to them, so as to magnify the first-assault effects. During the

assault, normally with the cooperation of electronic suppression activities, one carefully

coordinates the firepower of the missile force-units and the aviation force, so as to

execute a concentrated assault of high intensity and high density; correctly selects the

assault methods on the basis of the target conditions and assault goals; determines the

number of attack waves based on actual requirements, and unifies, coordinates, and

carefully plans, to ensure the continuity of firepower; and adopts all effective measures to

restrain the enemy at the first opportunity and to take the initiative. Once the goals are

achieved, then do not lose the time-opportunity to command the force-strengths to

implement follow-on assaults, expand the first assault’s results, and achieve the goal of

greatly reducing the enemy’s operational capability.

Follow-on assaults are the various firepower assault activities continually executed –

based on the first assault – against the enemy, in order to achieve the preset operational

goal. They are normally conducted close upon the first assault, and are jointly executed

by conventional missile force-units, and Air Force and Navy strengths, per the integrated

firepower assault plan, until the integrated firepower assault goal is achieved. When

executing follow-on assaults, the conventional missile force-units should – based on the

first assault: timely conduct force-strength and firepower maneuvers; focus the assaults

on targets for which the first assault failed to prove effective, and on newly identified

targets inconvenient for aviation forces to attack; and ensure reaching the required kill

degree. Simultaneously, implement a key point supplemental assault against enemy air

force and naval bases with some missile force-units complementing Air Force and Navy

operational strengths. Air Force and Navy aviation forces should utilize the missile

assault’s results, and, close upon the first assault, concentrate forces to assault the

enemy’s major targets. Naval ship force-strengths should – based on the missile

firepower and aviation firepower assaults – seize a favorable opportunity and assault

enemy targets, such as seacoast radar stations, port facilities and ships moored in port,

and shore-to-ship missile positions. In the course of the follow-on assaults, the campaign

commander should at all times analyze and assess the battlefield circumstances

{zhanchang xingshi}, promptly adjust the assault targets, and at the right time commit a

portion of reserve strengths; he conduct unified-overall-planning of the overall situation,

rationally employ strengths and differentiate missions, and successfully accomplish the

preparations for the advance integrated firepower assault and the link-up with seizing air
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dominance and sea dominance and other activities; they must coordinate the firepower

assault activities of all services, and maintain the intensity of the follow-on assault

firepower and the continuity of the assaults; and they must make full use of the first

assault’s effects, take the enemy at a time of confusion in command and activities, seize

all kinds of favorable opportunities to execute assaults, and boost the effectiveness of the

follow-on assaults.

(3) Seizing air dominance

Seizing air dominance in a landing campaign means – over the entire course of the

landing campaign, or during important campaign phases – the air battlefield initiative

acquired over the entire campaign zone or over major operational areas (sea areas). Its

goals are to support the main bushu dispositions and major targets of our Army, Navy,

Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps, and the in-air safety of important operational

activities, so as to create the conditions for the landing force to assemble, embark, make

the sea crossing, and strike onto land. Seizure of air dominance normally begins in the

later stage of the advanced integrated firepower strike or slightly after, with the Air Force

units as primary, but with the participation of some force-strengths from the Army, Navy,

and 2nd Artillery Corps; it adopts restraint of the enemy on the ground as the primary

method, along with the method of integrating restraint of the enemy on the ground with

annihilation of the enemy in the air, to execute surprise, fierce, continuous, precision

strikes against the enemy’s air superiority strengths.

Controlling the enemy on the ground means the comprehensive use of a variety of

strengths and means to execute surprise, fierce attacks on the enemy Air Force’s

important targets, via powerful offensive operational activities, and doing all one can –

within a relatively short time – to destroy and paralyze on the ground most of the

enemy’s aviation strengths. The main activities are air assaults and sabotage raids in the

enemy rear. Air assault means the use of long-range warfare air raid weaponry, such as

bombers, fighter-bombers, and ground-attack aviation forces, with the cooperation of

campaign tactical missile force-units, the application of methods such as concentrated

assault combined with simultaneous assaults on multiple targets, first assault combined

with follow-on continuous assaults, and aviation firepower assault combined with

ground-to-ground missile firepower assaults, and the assault on important targets such as

enemy airfields, radar stations, air defense weaponry, and communications and command

centers. When implementing air assault, one must accurately ascertain the locations of

assault targets, fully utilize the results of integrated firepower assault and IW, and, under

the cover of fighter aviation forces and with the suddenness of a thunderbolt, rapidly

organize the aviation-firepower assault activities. Sabotage raids in the enemy rear mean

sabotage-raid operations executed by elite special operations units – penetrating deep

behind enemy lines – against key targets, such as enemy airfields, radar stations,

command posts, and ammunition depots. Sabotage-raid activities normally occur after air

strikes achieve certain effects, in the intervals between air-strike waves, and adopt the

methods of airborne and maritime infiltration to stealthily enter the enemy rear, and
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execute the sabotage raids on targets against which it is difficult for air strikes to prove

effective, so as to achieve the effect of defeating one’s opponent by a surprise move.

Annihilating the enemy in the air means rigorous organization of air combat and anti-air

operations, and comprehensive use of a variety of strengths and means, to resolutely

eliminate enemy aircraft raiding by air. The main activities are air interception, air

blocking, and anti-air counterattacks. Air interception means the use of fighter aviation

forces, under the command guidance of a command post, to realize interception of

raiding enemy aircraft in the air and of other air targets. Normally, this should be

implemented with airfield alert as primary, and aerial alert as auxiliary. To improve the

air interception effects, one should begin from as long a range as possible, execute tiered

interception, and – with the close cooperation of ground air-defense firepower, such as

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) – construct a

long/medium/short-range and high/medium/low-altitude integrated anti-aircraft firepower

distribution system, which improves the air interception effects. Air blocking means the

use of relatively many fighter aviation force force-units, within a designated time and air

[tactical] zone {kongyu}, per a layered deployment {peizhi} for the different altitudes, to

form an air screen, and to block and annihilate the raiding enemy aircraft and other air

targets. Such a method has a relatively strong deterrent effect and reliable screening

effect; but if not well controlled, force-strengths are easily wasted, so it is normally used

during the most critical operational times and in the direction of the gravest threat from

the enemy situation. An anti-air counterattack means the use of ground air defense

strengths such as AAA and SAMs to implement strikes against raiding enemy aircraft

and other air targets. It is an important method for annihilating the enemy in the air.

When organizing implementation of this activity, one must take care to combine together

the various strengths of the vital-site air defense, field air defense, and People’s air

defense and combine together the anti-air resistance and air intercepts, so as to fully bring

into play an integrated-whole operational might; one must successfully bring into play the

role of high-tech weaponry, adopt flexible and mobile fighting methods, and strike the

enemy to catch him unaware; one must tightly successfully organize land-air

coordination and guard against mistakenly damaging one’s own combat-opportunities.

(4) Seizing sea dominance

Seizing sea dominance in a landing campaign is a maritime offensive operation executed

primarily by naval force-strengths, with the participation of some Army, Air Force, and

2nd Artillery Corps force-strengths. Its goals are to control the entire campaign sea area or

the main operational area(s) within the campaign sea battlefield, and to ensure the

maritime security of activities such as the landing force’s assembly/boarding, sea

crossing, and assault onto land, as well as minesweeping/obstacle destruction and

maritime transport. The main activities in seizure of sea dominance are naval blockades

and naval strikes. Naval blockades mainly are blockades of the enemy’s bases, harbors,

straits, and outer islands. For naval strikes, the main methods are joint assaults,

ambushes, maneuverable mine laying, and amphibious sabotage raids.
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The joint assault is the joint-attack method implemented in concealed, sudden fashion

against the enemy, primarily by naval force-strengths, with the participation of some Air

Force, 2nd Artillery Corps, and Army force-strengths. A raid-attack {xiji} against enemy

bases and harbors normally should be based upon concealment and suddenness, effective

unorthodox raids, unfolding along multiple routes, separate entry-combined attack and

combining “soft kill” with “hard destruction.” First, via intense electronic attacks, one

creates confusion within the enemy, and then executes firepower and force-unit {budui}

strikes; in particular, during the first strike, one definitely must in sudden and fierce

fashion attack the enemy and take him by surprise, placing him in a paralyzed state over a

relatively long time. Strikes against the enemy’s maritime ship formations should adopt

all effective measures, strive for concealment and suddenness, restrain the enemy at the

first opportunity, concentrate force strengths and weaponry, form localized (partial)

dominant positions, and strive to fight a quick battle and win a quick decision. When

anticipating possibly emerging opportunities for battle, and when one’s own raid forcestrengths are relatively distant, one should as much as possible organize long-range raids,

suddenly occurring at the enemy’s sea areas of activity and striking at the enemy forces,

taking them by surprise.

Ambush is the operational method whereby one in advance deploys naval force-strengths

in channels which the enemy must traverse, on communications lines, or in their adjacent

sea areas, to await times for an enemy ship formation’s passage, and then suddenly

launch an attack and rapidly annihilate the enemy as it navigates. The ambush forcestrengths must make full use of natural conditions such as the darkness of night or low

visibility to act, and strictly adopt measures such as radio silence and blackout. The

opportunity for entering the ambush point should be determined by viewing the specific

conditions; one can move up the entry, await the enemy ships or lure them into the

ambush zone and wipe them out, but one can also enter before the enemy sails through

the ambush zone, and then sail away after the strike.

Mobile minelaying {jidong bulei} is normally conducted ad hoc in the enemy’s forward

direction of sail, after one grasps the activity intention of the enemy ship formation, so as

to impede or destroy an enemy ship formation as it sails, to delay the enemy ship

formation’s activity, and to create favorable conditions for force-strength and firepower

assault. Maneuverable mine laying is normally assigned to submarines and aviation

forces with relatively good concealment, and to surface ships with fast maneuvering

speed, but privately owned boats can also assume maneuverable mine-laying missions.

Amphibious sabotage raids are operational methods employing sea-going amphibious

special operations force-strengths, which steal into an enemy ship anchorage and raid the

enemy’s ships, or stealthily land on an enemy shore and raid a target such as an enemy

base, harbor, airfield, coastal observation and communication post, or command organ.

Amphibious sabotage raids in the advance operations phase normally are tactical scale.
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(5) Advance firepower preparations

Advance firepower preparations in a landing campaign are the firepower assault activities

implemented with key points against the enemy’s coastal defensive area by Air Force

assault force-strengths in the lead with the participation from associated force-strengths

of the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery, on the basis of the advance integrated

firepower assault prior to the landing force comes onto land. Their goals are: to destroy

the major defense works and artillery within the enemy’s coast defensive areas, as well as

missile launch positions, command institutions, communications hubs, radar stations,

etc.; to attack the massive-forces groups and communications hubs in the enemy’s depth

of defense; and to damage the enemy’s rear bases and supply system, and thus weaken

the enemy’s defense forces, block the enemy maneuvers, and isolate the landing site, so

as to create favorable conditions for the landing force’s landing. Their main activities are

as follows: missile firepower assault, aviation firepower assault, and ship-gun firepower

assault.

The missile firepower assault is jointly implemented by the 2nd Artillery Corps’

conventional missile force-units and the Army’s campaign tactical missile force-units,

and is an important component in advance firepower preparations. The missile firepower

assault normally is closely complemented by aviation firepower assault, and mainly

assault missile launch positions within the enemy coast depth of defense, and at important

targets such as the enemy’s air defense system, communications hubs, command posts,

rear bases, and supply systems {xitong}, so as to create the conditions for the follow-on

firepower assaults.

The aviation firepower assault is jointly implemented by Air Force aviation assault forcestrengths and naval aviation assault force-strengths, and it is the main assault activity in

the advance firepower preparations. They are normally conducted after the missile

firepower assault, and mainly assault important targets such as the artillery, missile

launch positions, heavy force groups, communications hubs, command institutions, and

radar stations outside of ship gun firepower and within the enemy coast defensive area’s

simple depth. Ship-gun firepower assaults are implemented by integration of naval

surface ship force-units with land gunboats, under conditions of assured air dominance

and sea dominance. They mainly assault surface area state targets {面状目标

mianzhuang mubiao}, such as artillery positions and defense facilities on the enemy’s

coastal first-line defense zone.

(6) Advance minesweeping and obstacle destruction

Advance minesweeping and obstacle destruction is an activity conducted by Navy, Air

Force, and Army engineers, per a unified plan {jihua}, for advance destruction and

clearing of all kinds of obstacles erected by the enemy in the water and on the water

margin and beachhead. Its goals are to ensure ship navigation safety and to create

favorable conditions for the amphibious-landing means of transport to approach and land

against the beach.
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In advance minesweeping, the main missions are to sweep channels and development

(transfer) zones for the landing formation, channels for the landing force’s landing, and

maneuver zones for the firepower support ships, in mine and obstacle zones set up by the

enemy. To ensure the smooth progress of advance minesweeping, one should: organize

thorough minesweeping observation, and timely ascertain the range and types of mines

laid by the enemy; concentrate the main force-strengths and weaponry in the main

landing direction; and organize reliable minesweeping cover and minesweeping support.

During minesweeping, if one discovers enemy naval and air forces executing antiminesweeping activities, one should promptly organize covering force-strengths to

intercept them; when the enemy using coastal defense firepower blocks minesweeping,

one should swiftly organize firepower to suppress the blocking; when one finds that the

enemy is about to use ships and aircraft to relay mines, one should promptly organize

Navy and Air Force units to conduct strikes; and one must maintain close surveillance

over already cleared sea areas.

In advance destruction of obstacles, the main missions are to execute key-point

destruction of anti-amphibious-landing obstacles laid by the enemy in the water margin

and on the beachhead, so as to reduce the density of the obstacles, in order to create the

conditions for follow-on direct destruction of obstacles. Under the usual conditions,

advance destruction of obstacles is specifically performed by Air Force and naval

aviation force-units and Army engineering force-units. The Air Force and naval aviation

force force-units use aviation blasting cartridges to bomb the obstacles on the enemy

water margin and beachhead, and against relatively solid obstacles such as tracked

bulwarks and blocking walls, they should execute key-point destruction. Army engineers

or obstacle-destruction units organized by the other service arms, with the Navy’s

support, stealthily approach the enemy’s water-margin and beachhead obstacle zones, and

execute key-point destruction of relatively solid obstacles.

II. Embarkation and Sea Crossing...323

Embarkation and sea crossing are conducted on the basis of the advance operations.

(1) Embarkation (assembly and boarding)

The main missions of embarkation are as follows: To organize the landing force-units

and the equipment needed for their landing operation, and to safely and in ordered

fashion load all types of materiel onto the ships. This mainly includes the following:

handling of transport-vessel preparations, selection of the boarding area {diqu},

establishment of the boarding-area command institution, perfecting the boarding area’s

various facilities, and organization of the boarding-area defense, as well as realization of

boarding and loading. Embarkation normally is specifically organized and realized under

the unified intent of the campaign commander, by the boarding-area command post,

under the coordination of joint landing group (formation) command institution.
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Vessel preparations: In a landing campaign, one must transport to the enemy shores a

large number of landing force-units and equipment and supplies, and also ensure their

uninterrupted supply. This requires that one must have sufficient amphibious-landing

means of transport. Vessels are the mainstay of amphibious-landing means of transport;

they are the material base for a sea-crossing landing and an essential condition for

conducting a landing operation. The quantity and types of vessels should be determined

based on several factors: the campaign intention, the landing mode, the landing and

bushu disposition of the landing force, the vessel situation (quantity and quality), and the

landing sea area’s natural conditions. The main content of vessel preparations are as

follows: recruitment of vessels, refitting, classification by use, training, and assembly. In

general situations, first one should concentrate the use of landing ships (craft), transport

ships (boats), and hovercraft within the force-unit task-organization. When recruitment of

civilian vessels is required, it: must be based on such requirements as sufficient numbers,

defense of key points, and attention to maintaining secrecy; must be under the campaign

commander’s unified bushu disposition and leadership, with the responsibility for

specific implementation jointly held by the mobilization authorities and the regional

authorities concerned; and must be completed within the campaign’s preparation phase,

on the basis of peacetime preparations. The preparatory work for the civilian vessels

mainly includes the following: establishment of the command institution and of a unified

plan {jihua}, timely recruitment and correct use [of the vessels], reequipment in light of

the mission, strict organization of civilian vessel training, and organization of the

assembly and grouping of the vessels.

Selection of the boarding area: The boarding area means the littoral zone for the landing

force’s holding and boarding, as well as its adjacent sea area, and is comprised of the

holding area (sea area) for the landing force and for the amphibious-landing means of

transport, and the boarding zones. Normally, the boarding area is determined via joint

reconnaissance by the joint landing group commander and the Navy’s concerned leaders.

The selected boarding area must be fairly close to the landing area, shorten the passage as

much as possible, and reduce the crossing time as much as possible, so as to lighten the

degree of threat from the enemy. Good landing terrain conditions and convenient

transportation favor the landing force’s concealed dispersal, holding, and maneuvering.

Suitable conditions in the shoal and good handling facilities favor the safety and rapid

loading of materiel and personnel, and the boarding. Also, maneuvering difficulties on

the part of the enemy Navy and Air Force favor our organization of effective air defense

and sea defense, ensuring the safety of the holding and boarding areas for the landing

force and amphibious-landing means of transport. Good mass conditions facilitate

concealment of the intention, and favor organization of military-civilian joint defense,

enabling the acquisition of the energetic support of the local manpower and material

resources.

Establishing the boarding-area command institution and improving various facilities:

Normally, a boarding-area command post is set up using the boarding area as the unit,

with several boarding zone {diyu} command posts under it. The boarding-area command

post should perform the set-up and transformation of the boarding area and the perfection

of all facilities per the orders of the campaign commander and the requirements of the
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loading and boarding work. Here, the main contents are as follows: perfection and

enhancement of command communications facilities, facilities for land transportation,

maritime navigation and support facilities, boarding and loading facilities, and rear

supply facilities, as well as construction of defense facilities. Establishment of a boarding

area is a topic in battlefield construction, and generally the overall planning for its

arrangements is handled by the theater and the regional government.

Organization of the boarding area’s defense: Defense of the boarding area should have

the boarding zones as the basic units, comprising an independent defensive system, and

should be brought into the campaign’s rear defense system. Its main missions are as

follows: to block and crush enemy activities such as air raids, maritime sneak attacks, and

special-forces harassing attacks, and to support the safe assembly of the amphibiouslanding transport vessels and the landing force, and the latter’s boarding. To this end, one

should adopt thorough measures for air defense, naval defense, and countering the

enemy’s special operations. The boarding zones, using civilian vessels as the primary

means of transport, should be situated within the range of effective defenses; the

personnel boarding points can, based on the distribution situations, as much as possible

be situated within the range of the boarding zone defenses. If difficulties arise, one should

use the local boarding-point force-unit’s own strengths to independently organize a good

defense. The boarding zones and boarding points with independently organized defenses

must establish a unified command institution, and in a unified manner coordinate the

operational activities of all the service arms and militia within the range of the boarding

area and boarding points.

Loading onto the ships: Loading of the landing force onto the ships should be under the

unified orders of the campaign commander, with the boarding area (zone) commanders

having specific responsibility for its execution. The boarding-area loading should be

stealthy, rapid, on schedule, and safe, and as much as possible should maintain the

integrity of the organizational system of the troops. To this end, one must correctly select

the loading method, arrange well the procedures for loading onto the ships, and execute it

strictly according to the sequence for loading onto ships. When one discovers an enemy

incoming raid from the air and/or sea, one should at the right time conduct intercepts by

organizing anti-air and anti-sea cover force-strengths. As soon as one encounters an

enemy raid-attack, one should quickly ascertain the situation, and clear up the raid’s

consequences. In order to confuse and deceive the enemy, and to conceal the landing’s

intention and true activities, the campaign commander also should – based on the feint

plan {jihua} – command feinting units to actively conduct feints in a predetermined false

boarding area. In addition, the ships, after they have completed loading of their landing

units, should rapidly bear off the boarding points, and sail to the designated sea area,

disperse in concealed fashion, and await orders, or directly set sail in formation toward

the staging area {huihe qu}.
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(2) Sea crossing

The sea crossing means the activities of all the landing formations sailing from their

respective staging areas to their respective unfolding zones {zhankai qu}. It should be

specifically organized and implemented by the landing transport group and formation

{bianduui} commander on the basis of the campaign commander’s intent and under the

unified command of the joint landing group commander.

Formation assembly {huihe biandui} refers to, after completing the loading of the landing

transport vessels, the minesweeper fleet, firepower support fleet, the direct cover

formation, the landing transport formation, etc. all belonging to the landing formation

enter the assembly area and compose the getting underway sequencing activity {hangxing

xulie de xingdong}. Formation assembly is extremely complex; the ships are

concentrated, their maneuvering is restricted, and they easily fall into chaos, so this is one

of the best opportunities for the enemy to attack. To this end, first one must successfully

select the assembly area {huihequ}. Its location must be just right, as much as possible

central to of each boarding zone’s staging area, in order to facilitate formation assembly;

the sea area must be expansive, with no underwater obstacles to navigation, so as to

ensure the navigation safety of the formation assembly’s ships; the vicinity must have

prominent identification markings, so as to ensure that the formation assembly’s ships

correctly arrive at their designated positions, and form into formations in order; and

friendly coastal-defense firepower and effective screening for sea and air force-strengths

must be obtainable to ensure the safety of formation assembly. Secondly, one must 

clarify the assembly method. Normally there are two assembly methods: concentrated

assembly {jizhong huihe} and dispersed assembly {fensan huihe}. Concentrated

assembly is simultaneous arrival at the assembly area with the [single file] formation {队

dui} as the organizational-unit {danwei}, then the underway sequence is composed

{zucheng} in accordance with the assembly plan {jihua}, and then the formation

{biandui} begins to get underway at sea under a unified order {haoling}. Dispersed

assembly means that each [single file] formation {dui}, per the assembly plan,

successively passes through the designated locations on time and begins to sail [get

underway], and during sail, they form the underway sequence. In general terms, one

should compose an underway sequence that is broad in front, has key points, and

simultaneously advances along multiple routes so as to facilitate maneuver, avoid

collisions, one artillery shell cannot damage several vessels, and allows maintenance of

close contact between each of the ships.

The sea crossing should be based on the unified campaign plan {jihua} and organized

and implemented by all of the joint landing groups. The campaign commander, after they

have determined that the situation has had no major changes, should resolutely and

punctually issue the order to set sail. After the formations set sail, they must make the sea

crossing strictly according to the predetermined sailing sequence and formations, and

organize well the defenses during the sea crossing. The accompanying screening forces

should rapidly deploy in the direction of the greatest threat posed by the enemy, and seek

out and annihilate surprise-attack enemy forces; the rest of the forces should organize
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close observation/lookout and strict radio silence and blackout, and should thoroughly

and ably make preparations for counterattack, evading an enemy surprise attack, and

clearing up the consequences of an attack. When all formations in the campaign’s 1stechelon spearhead are gradually approaching the enemy shores, the commanders should –

according to the plan and the development of the actual situation – promptly issue the

orders for the vertical landing forces to embark, command the campaign screening forces

to enhance the cover for the landing area and adjacent sea areas, and command all

advance formations to accurately advance toward the development line.

III. Assault onto Land and Establishment of a Landing Site...326

The assault onto land and the establishment of landing sites are operational activities

conducted primarily by all the joint landing groups, in coordination with the operational

and support groups of the other service arms, and are the most important operational

phases for achieving the campaign goal.

(1) Assault onto land

The assault onto land is the tensest, most intense, most difficult operational time in a

landing campaign, and its success or failure has a decisive effect on victory or defeat in

the campaign. To this end, the campaign commander should enhance command and

coordination, fully bring into play the overall power of the joint operations of all service

arms, and adopt all effective methods to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds in one

stroke.

Continuous maintenance of the “three dominances:” In the assault-onto-land phase, the

enemy, in order to block the landing force’s assault onto land and to maintain the stability

of its anti-amphibious-landing defensive system, certainly will want to concentrate

application of EW forces, and Air Force, Navy, and Coastal Defense forces to execute

intense jamming and fierce 3-D firepower strikes against the 1st-echelon landing groups.

At this time, whether or not one can maintain information dominance, air dominance, and

sea dominance has a major bearing on the success or failure of the assault onto land. To

this end, first one must concentrate the use of jamming and attack aircraft and of the

jamming forces within the landing force’s 1st echelon, in the major areas of the assault

onto land by all of the joint landing groups, to suppress and destroy the reconnaissance

and fire control systems at the forward position of the enemy they face, to jam the enemy

communications systems, and to damage and paralyze the enemy’s military command.

Second, using campaign tactical missiles and aviation forces, one must execute

continuous strikes against enemy airfields and harbors threatening the assault onto land;

make every effort to destroy the enemy’s operational aircraft or ships, or restrain them on

the airfields or harbors; and strive to ensure that they cannot take off or set sail during the

assault-onto-land phase. Third, one must organize fighter aviation force force-units and

the Navy’s and Army’s air defense operational force-units to establish a screening

airspace in the area of the assault onto land, and to intercept surprise-attack enemy planes

and ships. Fourth, adopting methods such as submarine ambushes, swimming hunts {you
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lie}, and surface-ship key point patrols, one must enhance the naval blockade of the

landing operation’s sea area. Fifth, using special operations strengths behind enemy lines,

one must assault and damage the reconnaissance, early warning, and C2 facilities of the

enemy Air Force and Navy, and sabotage the enemy airfields, hangars, and major port

facilities, so as to complement the main force’s maintenance of the “three dominances.”

Execution of direct firepower preparations and straightforward minesweeping and

obstacle destruction: In order to support the 1st-echelon landing force’s smooth assault

onto land, all the landing groups, normally before the 1st-echelon landing force’s assault

onto land, and just after the advance firepower preparations, will execute the direct

firepower preparations and straightforward minesweeping and obstacle destruction. The

direct firepower preparations, in which relevant force-strengths from the aviation force,

missile and Navy participate, mainly strike at the enemy’s first-line defensive position,

damage its defense works, destroy its firearms, wipe out its effective strength, destroy its

coastal-defense command institution, and weaken the enemy’s capability for resistance;

the screening aviation force, Navy minesweepers, and Army engineers perform

straightforward minesweeping and obstacle destruction, open up or enlarge channels and

highways, and support the campaign 1st-echelon landing force in conducting the tactical

development and the assault onto the beach and land. The direct firepower preparations

should first strike at targets posing a fairly large threat to the landing force, and then

strike at other targets. They must concentrate the application of PGMs to strike at the

enemy defense forward edge’s coast-to-ship missiles and long-range artillery

fortifications, as well as major support points; simultaneously, using large quantities of

ordinary bombs and artillery shells, they must strike at relatively exposed planar targets,

such as force-unit {budui} assembly areas, artillery positions within simple depth, and

transportation hubs. Straightforward minesweeping is assumed by the minesweeper

squadrons within the landing formations; its main missions are to conduct mine

inspection and clearing from ship-gun and shipborne land-gun maneuver areas, waterarea early warning squadron maneuver areas, landing transport ship development areas,

and their channels leading to the shore side, and also to set up markers on both sides of

the channels, to open up paths among the obstacles on the enemy coast water margin and

beachhead, and to support the 1st-echelon landing force to rapidly make the assault onto

the beach and land.

Each landing formation conducts tactical unfolding. When the landing formations sail to

the unfolding line, under the cover of the direct aviation firepower preparations, they

successively conduct tactical unfolding normally according to a sequence of minesweeper

ship formations, firepower support vessel formations, and landing transport formations.

The minesweeper formations first enter the landing area and sea area, conduct

minesweeping of all mooring (maneuver) areas and channels, and perform marking; the

firepower support formations successively take up their respective positions, and screen

the landing transport formations’ unfolding; the landing transport formations should, per

the landing corps’ operational requirements, move from the development line to the

assault line, and gradually develop into a landing sequence and formations; the direct

screening formations and water-area early warning formations develop on the two flanks

and rear flanks of the landing sequence, and as rapidly as possible form an amphibious-
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landing-area water-area early warning line. When adopting the transport mode of “from

ship-to-shore”, quickly conduct the transfer in accordance with the predetermined plan

{jihua} and the specific situation. The landing transport ships having completed the

transfer should promptly bear off from the transfer area to facilitate the ingress of the

follow-on landing transport formations.

The landing force’s assault onto land: After the landing craft in waves traverse the assault

line, under the support of powerful firepower screening and other force-units, the coastal

beaches are assaulted at full speed. In order to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds

in one stroke, the campaign commander should proceed from reality, give full play to

initiative and flexibility, and adopt a variety of means to increase the speed of the assault

onto land. The first [means] is combining key-point assault with coming onto land along

many directions. One should implement coming onto land along many directions on a

broad front, so as to confuse and scatter the enemy, make it difficult for him to determine

the main direction of the landing, and prevent him from concentrating force-strengths for

key-point resistance. Coming onto land from many directions must have key points, so as

to form a fairly large superiority of force-strength. Second is combining sea landing with

vertical and bypass landings {chaoyue denglu}. In a future landing campaign,

simultaneously with the main force strength landing from the sea, [one must] as much as

possible expand the scale of the vertical and bypass landings, i.e., implement

complementary vertical landing with some force strengths traveling by helicopters, and

[some force-strengths] traveling by surface-effect craft to implement a sea-skimming

bypass landing. The vertical and bypass landings should be focused in the main direction.

First, while one keeps an eye on the race for control of favorable terrain and coordinating

with the sea landing, simultaneous attention should be given to prompt seizure of the

harbors, docks, and coastal airfields within the landing area, and to open up full

dimensional landing channels and docks (havens), to create the conditions for bringing

follow-on force-units and important materiel onto land. Third is combining force-strength

assault with firepower interdiction. The landing force, in the process of implementing its

full dimensional assault, will inevitably meet with a tenacious counterattack by the

enemy in the 1st-line defense, and layer upon layer of counterattacks by the reserves in

the enemy’s depth. To this end, normally one should concentrate superior firepower on

the landing area to effect firepower interdiction, isolate the enemy of the 1st-line defense,

and at the same time conduct strikes on and restraint of the enemy’s reserves and smash

or delay their counterattack activities. Fourth is combining landing assault with task force

raids. This means use of unequal-scale special operations groups to conduct raiding

operations on the flanks of the enemy’s fortified areas or in the enemy depth, to actively

harass and sabotage the enemy’s major targets, and to pin down and scatter the enemy’s

operational strengths, so that they fall into the passive position of being unable to attend

to one thing without neglecting the other. Fifth is combining campaign airborne landing

with frontal assault onto land. In order to ensure that the assault onto land succeeds in one

stroke, one should give full play to the strong points – flexibility, speed, and suddenness

– of airborne [landing] operational maneuvers, and at the right time implement campaign

airborne landing in predetermined areas, so as to assist and complement landing force

operations with active activities. When implementing campaign airborne landing, one

must successfully select the targets and successfully grasp the time-opportunities; in
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particular, one must fully utilize the results of firepower assault and in accordance with

the predetermined plan {jihua} and missions, adopt fighting methods such as storming

attacks or raid-attacks. [One must] immediately initiate attacks against the predetermined

targets, taking advantage of the situation when the enemy situation is unclear and they

cannot organize effective resistance in time and the airborne landing force-units have not

arrived, to quickly seize-occupy objectives, actively complement landing force operations

and accelerate the speed of the assault onto land, ensuring that the assault onto land

succeeds in one stroke.

(2) Capture and construction of campaign landing sites

After the landing force’s 1st echelon goes ashore, the battlefield posture is jagged and

interlocking, and the situation is complicated and confusing; whether or not one can

resolutely crush the enemy’s counterattacks, as well as counter-amphibious-landing and

counter-airborne operations, and – based on consolidation of the effects of the assault

onto land – rapidly develop in depth and capture the campaign landing sites, is one key to

creating favorable conditions for follow-on activities.

Crushing the enemy’s land/sea/air joint counterattack: When the landing force’s 1st

echelon has broken through the enemy’s 1st-line defensive position, or has penetrated this

position and is advancing toward the 2nd-line defensive position, with the follow-on

echelon still not landed, the enemy can take advantage of our still unstable foothold,

employ reserves under the support of aviation firepower and missile firepower, use

armored forces and armored helicopters as a backbone, adopt mutual coordination among

ground assaults, airborne operations, and counter-amphibious-landing operations, and

execute a land/sea/air joint counterattack, in an attempt to blockade and isolate the

landing site, sever the connection between the landing units and the sea, pincer-attack the

already landed landing force, and restore its defensive posture. From the viewpoint of

past military history, a landing campaign’s crushing of an enemy’s joint counterattack

normally adopts the following measures: first is multiple measures, simultaneously taken,

to weaken the enemy’s counterattack strengths, to disorganize the enemy’s counterattack

bushu disposition, and to delay the activities of the enemy’s campaign reserves. Second is

the use of captured beaches, harbors, docks, and airfields, and of erected floating docks,

to ensure that the 2nd-echelon landing force rapidly lands. Third is integration of frontal

counterattacks with flank attacks and air strikes to foil the enemy’s ground counterattack.

Fourth is synchronized execution of ground, sea, and air strikes which, while foiling the

enemy’s ground counterattack, simultaneously crush the enemy’s counter-amphibiouslanding and airborne operational activities.

Bold and powerful strikes to interlink and expand the landing sites: During the

operational process of crushing the enemy’s land/sea/air joint counterattack, the 2ndechelon campaign large formation should land soon after the 1st-echelon campaign large

formation. After landing, while coordinating the 1st echelon to crush the enemy’s

land/sea/air joint counterattack or strategic reserves’ counterattack, one must employ the

main force to strike at the rear flank of the counterattacking enemy, cut up the
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counterattacking enemy’s bushu disposition, with the support of the 1st echelon form an

encircling posture toward the counterattacking enemy, and sever the connection between

the counterattacking enemy and other operational groups. After most of the strengths

have landed, one should promptly organize and execute cutting up, surrounding, and

annihilation of the enemy’s coastal defense groups, and establish and expand landing

sites for the joint landing group. During the operation to interlink and expand the landing

sites, one should first attack and occupy key points for checking the advance of reserves

in the enemy depth, sever the connections among the enemy coastal defense’s various

force-units, and then execute a rolling attack in the enemy’s simple depth, gradually

annihilate the enemy’s coastal defense strengths, and interlink and expand the scope of

the landing sites. Simultaneously, one should command the aviation force and the

campaign tactical missile force-units to strike at the maneuvering enemy, and also

command the special operations forces, adopting means such as raids and sabotage, to

harass and damage the enemy’s maneuvers, and to coordinate with the main force in

establishing the landing sites, so as to create the conditions for a later offensive.
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Chapter 14

The Anti Air Raid Campaign...331

The anti air raid campaign is, under unified command of a joint campaign commander

and his command organ, participated in by Air Force, Army, Navy, and Secondary

Artillery campaign large formations, and under support and coordination of armed police

forces and people air defense strengths, an offensive-defensive integrated campaign for

defeating enemy anti air raids according to a unified objective and plan. The basic

missions of the anti air raid campaign are to crush the enemy’s air raid intention, and

defend the anti-air security of the main bushu disposition, key point targets, and people

and masses in the campaign area. The practice of recent local wars indicates that the air

raid has become the enemy’s primary means of achieving a strategic and campaign goal,

and it is one of the biggest threats that our military faces in the future for organizing and

implementing joint operations. Therefore, the anti air raid campaign is an important

campaign pattern of our military and its status and function are prominent. Its success or

failure is involved in the gain and loss of the operational initiative and even national

security and danger.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...331

I. Characteristics ...331

The high-tech weapons and equipment, diversified operational strengths, and multiple

operational modes and methods of both warring parties in a future anti air raid campaign

make many new characteristics appear in an anti air raid campaign.

(1) The success or failure is involved with national security and danger and the strategic

quality is prominent

With the application of a large quantity of advanced aviation weaponry, the operational

center of gravity in modern warfare is moving from the ground and sea to the space and

air. The air and space battlefields have become the main battlefields that both warring

parties contend for. The experiences of recent local wars indicate that using the air and

space strengths in the first place and throughout the entire course is a strategic activity for

winning the war initiative and even deciding the war victory or defeat. From the

perspective of position and role, its success or failure is involved with national security

and danger. The anti air raid campaign is a strategic quality defensive campaign. Its

success or failure involves major issues such as territorial integrity, sovereignty dignity,

and national security and danger. The participating strengths involve the whole people. A

future anti air raid campaign will be joint operations that various services and arms

participate in and involve the party, government administration, armed forces, and

people. National mobilization will be needed for all soldiers and civilians entering the

war together. As for operational command, the level of decision-making is high. The

decision-making of many major issues in an anti air raid campaign has obviously
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exceeded a campaign commander’s decision category, requiring a higher level of

leadership for decision-making. Looking at operational activities, the strategic activities

are prominent. When the enemy initiates air raids, the strike center of gravity will focus

on important military, political, and economic strategic targets including the capital. It is

obviously strategic to unfold resistance, counterattack, and protection activities for

surrounding and defending these important targets.

(2) It is obviously asymmetric to confront the powerful enemy

In a future anti air raid campaign, our main objects of operations will be powerful

enemies with high-tech superiority. When power enemies launch an air raid against us,

they will concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons to implement continuous and high

intensity asymmetric operations against us with superior air strengths. Our anti air raid

operations will face stern challenges. The powerful enemies have strong information

attack, stealthy penetration, long-distance attack, and precision strike capabilities and can

implement non-stop air assault against us for the entire time under all kinds of weather

conditions. Compared with the power of the enemies, our anti air raid operational

capabilities are seriously unbalanced. In areas such as command and control, anti

jamming, counter-stealth assault, anti nighttime assault, and counter-strike outside the

defense area, our capabilities are limited, and we are seriously in a circumstance of

defeating the superior with the inferior.

(3) The operational space is broad and the offensive and defensive confrontations are

intense

In the future, what our anti air raid campaign will deal with is that the enemy will use

aviation and space strengths to implement a broad-scope integrated air raid that is omnidirectional, from all altitudes, and in total depth. The range of air raids in vertical height

is from the ultra low altitude of several meters and dozens of meters to the ultra high

altitude of several thousands of meters and even space. The range of air raids in the

horizontal scope, due to the development and application of tanker aircraft, is not limited

by geographic coordinates anymore, meaning that the air raids can be from

intercontinental to worldwide. The front and rear demarcation lines of the anti air raid

battlefield obviously are fading. In a future anti air raid campaign, both warring parties,

in order to achieve operational goals, will concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons to

unfold fierce confrontations in information warfare, electronic warfare, firepower

warfare, etc. in the broad battlespace. In an anti air raid campaign, we need to use means

such as air intercept and ground-to-air attack to resist the enemy air raids, organize

offensive strengths to counterattack the enemy air raid sources, surround and defend key

point targets to organize military-police-civilian integrated protection operations,

counterattack and attack at the same time, integrate offense with defense, and present an

intense and fierce contention.
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(4) Air raids are destructive, making it difficult to protect targets

With the widespread application of high technology in the aviation sphere, numerous

precision guidance munitions such as cruise missiles, laser guided bombs, fuel-air

explosives, graphite bombs, and electromagnetic bombs continue to emerge, which

increase the accuracy and destruction of the air strike a great deal. It is reported that the

hit probabilities of cruise missiles, anti radiation missiles, and laser guided bombs are

75%, 87%, and 86%. The shock wave of explosion of a 500 kilogram precision guided

bomb is equal to that of the explosion of a small nuclear bomb. 1 to 2 precision guided

bombs are sufficient enough to destroy a big tall building. Electromagnetic bombs can

destroy electronic parts of command and control, communication, computer, radar, and

missile guidance systems within dozens of kilometers instantaneously. According to the

statistics, modern aviation fire intensity is 70 times that of WWII. Recent local wars have

indicated that in high-tech air raids, no matter whether they are military, political, or

economic targets, they will be destroyed once detected. At present, with the rapid

development of our economy, the economic and political targets with strategic value are

increasing day by day. We are in lack of effective means for protecting these huge targets

which are easy to destroy in wartime. If some nuclear power plants and chemical plants

are destroyed, this will lead to a secondary disaster. This not only makes protection

operations more difficult but also raises a higher requirement for resistance operations

and counterattack operations.

(5) Become more passive in campaign operations

With the widespread application of a large quantity of high-tech air raid weapons, the

surprise of air raids is increased, making it easier to be passive in anti air raids. Since the

air raiding side normally holds the initiative of campaign initiation, it can prepare air raid

activities in advance, decide air raid means and modes and force-strengths and weaponry

for itself, select the operational space domain advantageous for itself, and the attack

opportunity and strike targets, and implement stealthy penetration and long-range

precision attack. However, in an anti air raid campaign, we normally await the enemy to

move, and rely on the situations we grasp in peacetime and the situations we acquire

before an imminent war to analyze and make assessments, making it difficult to make an

accurate judgment on the scale of enemy air raid strengths, primary air raid direction, air

raid opportunity, and key point strike targets. With the strengthened maneuvering

performance of air raid weaponry, the enemy does not have to mass or transfer a large

scale of force-strengths before air raid activities. The enemy grasps information

superiority and the battlefield is one-way transparent to the enemy. It is difficult for us to

be aware of the sign of air raid activities. In addition, the enemy has advanced air raid

weaponry and multiple air raid means for implementing stealth assault and strike outside

the defensive area against us. By using traditional means, it is difficult for us to detect an

enemy who initiates air raids and organize effective resistance. This will definitely make

us more passive in the anti air raid campaign.
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(6) Integration of air defense and space defense is getting distinct day by day

With the development of space technology, the air battlefield and the space battlefield are

more closely related to each other. The air strength and the space strength mutually

depend, affect, and restrict. At present, the world military powers are speeding up the

development of safeguarding support space strengths to the development of operational

space strengths. Looking at the development and operational use of air strengths, the

influence has expanded to the space battlefield. In recent years, the world military powers

have organized several space warfare simulation exercises, intensified their development

of aerospace aircraft with freedom of activity in air space and outer space, and formulated

integrated air-space operational theory that can effectively bring into play the operational

effectiveness of air strengths and space strengths. Based on this theory, the organizational

structure and the structure of military strengths can be adjusted. This indicates that the

curtain of space warfare has unveiled. This means that in an anti air raid campaign, it is

more difficult for our military to deal with the threats from the air and the space. We can

say with certainty that the integration of air defense and space defense will have an

important influence on the course and outcome of our anti air raid campaign.

II. Requirements...334

(1) Full preparation and rapid reaction

Under informationized conditions, the surprise of air raids unprecedentedly increases.

The preparation time of early warning and imminent battle in our anti air raid operation is

very short. The success or failure of a campaign depends on whether to have full

preparation and rapid reaction to a large extent.

Full preparation means to successfully accomplish the various items of preparation work

before the imminent battle of an anti air raid campaign so as to establish a good

foundation for improving rapid reaction capability and ensuring the smooth

implementation of an anti air raid campaign. For this purpose, in order to establish and

strengthen each system of combat readiness, reinforce combat readiness education,

intensify the idea of combat readiness, and always be on the alert, we need to: establish

and strengthen the anti air raid campaign system; continue to perfect intelligence early

warning networks, command and communication networks, airfield position networks,

service support, and engineering protection facilities of complementary parts; formulate

each kind of plan and proposal for anti air raid operations in advance; reinforce the study

and drill of anti air raid operations under informationized conditions; and increase the

campaign commander’s and the command organ’s capability of organizing command and

the forces’ fast reaction capability and supportability of carrying out operational missions

in emergency situations. After the anti air raid prior order is issued, we need to rapidly

complete each kind of preparation for imminent battle within a scheduled time.

The essence of rapid reaction is controlling speed with speed {yikuai zhikuai}. Namely,

this is rapidly discovering situations, rapidly and decisively commanding, rapidly
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disseminating orders, and force-units rapidly reacting. Only by controlling speed with

speed can we prevent being suppressed and destroyed on the ground by the enemy, can

we seize and keep the initiative in the initial period of the campaign, and ensure that

participating strengths can go into resistance, counterattack, and protection operations by

the fastest speed. For this purpose, we need to establish and strengthen rapid reaction

mechanisms needed by anti air aid operations under informationized conditions including

the command system, the change of combat readiness levels, etc. The participating

strengths cannot lower their guard. After accepting missions, the participating strengths

must be in combat readiness immediately, closely pay attention to the enemy’s dynamic

state of air situations, and immediately report to the leadership after discovering

situations. According to the characteristics of urgent preparation for imminent battle, we

need to arrange time rationally, take scientific preparation methods, increase the time

availability to the maximum, snatch time and fight for speed with the enemy, and make a

full preparation before the enemy launches air raids.

Full preparation and rapid reaction are the objective requirements for seizing campaign

initiative in an anti air raid campaign. Full preparation is the basis for rapid reaction.

Rapid reaction is the fundamental start point and goal of full preparation.

(2) Take the initiative and be offensive in operations

To strive to take the initiative and try best to avoid being passive are the general rules we

should follow in campaign operations. The anti air raid campaign is an offensive

campaign. We await the enemy to move and emphasize seizing the campaign initiative

with active operational activities. The practice of recent local wars indicates that in the

face of the enemy high-tech and high intensity continuous air raids, defending without

striking and resisting without counterattacking will make us come under attack passively

and make it difficult to crush the enemy’s air raid intention. Only by taking the initiative

to create favorable conditions and grabbing favorable combat opportunity to implement

offensive activities against the enemy can we destroy the enemy’s air raid plan,

effectively weaken the enemy air raid strength, and seize the campaign initiative.

To take the initiative means to seize the campaign initiative with positive and subjective

efforts based on certain campaign strengths. A certain material basis is an important

condition for seizing the initiative, but it is not the only condition. The side with inferior

weapons and equipment can bring into play a subjective dynamic quality to seize the

campaign initiative. This is especially the case in the anti air raid campaign. Therefore,

every officer and man must firmly establish campaign awareness to strive for initiative,

run it through the entire process of an anti air raid campaign, and infiltrate it to every

aspect of campaign activities and every step of operational activities. This kind of

campaign consciousness is reflected not only in combat spirit but also in campaign

decision-making and the application of fighting methods. The campaign commander

needs to seek momentum {moushi} and create momentum to strive for the campaign

initiative. When there is a favorable opportunity, we should take the initiative to

annihilate the enemy. When there is an unfavorable opportunity, we should positively
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create conditions, take the initiative to seek the combat opportunity, and strive for the

initiative. When we are passive, we need to take measures resolutely, get rid of being

passive, and resume the imitative.

The offensive operation means to concentrate crack [elite] long-range strike strengths,

grasp the favorable combat opportunities to fiercely counterattack the enemy air raid,

destroy the enemy air raid plan {jihua}, weaken the enemy air raid capability, decrease

our pressure in resistance operations and protection operations, and conduct effective

defense based on positive defense in an anti air raid campaign. It is an important means

for changing from being passive to being active in the anti air raid campaign, and it plays

a crucial role in the course and outcome of a campaign. Therefore, we need to: increase

the understanding of the importance of offensive operations, reinforce awareness of

offensive operations, launch an attack from exterior lines to force the enemy to defend,

and decrease the pressure of resistance from interior lines; apply means such as public

opinion deception and tactical diversion , and positively create a favorable combat

opportunity; according to the enemy situations, our situations, and the development of

war situations, promptly seize the combat opportunity and rapidly counterattack the

enemy when the enemy is negligent of taking precautions and exhausted, and the rear

defense is weak; and grasp the most valuable objective to achieve the anti air raid

campaign intention, concentrate the use of strengths, flexibly apply fighting methods,

hammer the enemy and attack fiercely, and ensure to hit the enemy deeply.

To take the initiative is a kind of campaign awareness reflected in the combat spirit,

campaign decision-making, campaign activities, etc. The offensive operation is the most

effective means for seizing the campaign initiative. Only when paying attention to the

offensive and attacking the enemy vital areas {yaohai} can we seize and keep the

campaign initiative.

(3) Unify command and subarea responsibility

In the anti air raid campaign, the participating strengths are various, the battlefield is

broad, the forces and weapons are scattered, and the operational activities are complex

and diversified. We must have unified command and subarea responsibility so that

participating strengths can bring into play their initiative and creativity to form as an

organic whole to bring into play the biggest power.

Unified command means to establish and perfect the operational command system of the

anti air raid campaign and have smooth command relationships, enabling various

participating strengths to operate under the unified command of the campaign

commander and command organ. We need to: formulate an anti air raid campaign

operational plan {jihua}; unify the bushu disposition of various anti air raid forcestrengths and weapons; unify intelligence support; and unify and adjust-coordinate the

operational activities each campaign direction, each service and arm, and the people’s air

defense strength so that the participating strengths can adjust-coordination of activities

under a unified intent.
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Subarea responsibility {fenqu fuze} means to organize anti air raid operations based on

unified command. The campaign commander should determine limits of authority for

handling urgent situations for each air defense subarea (unit) and have delegation mode

of command for anti air raid activities of each air defense subarea (unit). In order to

strengthen independent operational capabilities of each air defense subarea (unit), the

campaign commander needs to decentralize authority, give each air defense subarea

commander more autonomy, and fully bring into play the commander’s subjective

dynamic quality. Based on the principle of integrating departments and regions at

different levels and relying mainly on the local leadership, we can build each air defense

subarea (unit) into a more complete fire distribution system with independent command

and operational capabilities. Each air defense subarea (unit) commander should,

according to the higher level’s unified intent, command and coordinate the resistance

activities, strike the enemy air raid weapons, protect against the air raid in this subarea,

and prepare for counterattack operations in this subarea. Each air defense subarea (unit)

needs to fully bring into play its activeness, initiative, and creativity to actively,

immediately, and resolutely implement independent command without violating the

campaign intent and strike the air raid enemy without losing the opportunity.

Unified command is needed in the entire anti air raid campaign operation and subarea

responsibility is need for increasing the campaign operational time effectiveness.

(4) Concentrate strength and apply force with key points

There are many targets to cover and protect in an anti-air-raid campaign operation under

informationized conditions, but the number of anti air raid strengths is limited. There is a

contradiction between needs and possibilities. Therefore, when applying force, we must

have overall planning for the overall situation, concentrate force, and give prominence to

key points.

To concentrate strength means to strike vital targets or crucial parts that will influence the

course and outcome of a campaign the most. In resistance operations, we need to apply

force with key points to strike the enemy airborne early warning aircraft, electronic

jammers, precision guided munitions carried on the aircraft, and cruise missiles, and

damage the entire structure of air raids. In counterattack operations, we need to apply

force with key points to strike important targets such as the enemy air raid takeoff

(launch) platforms, C4ISR systems, and oil depots (ammunition storage), and damage,

destroy, and weaken the enemy air raid potential. In protection operations, we should

have protection with key points for vital military, political, and economic targets such as

command institutions, main airfields, harbors, traffic hubs, and water and electricity

facilities.

Concentrating strength and applying force with key points are the important measures for

winning a victory in an anti air raid campaign. Concentrating strength is an important

prerequisite for applying force with key points and applying force with key points is the

stay point for concentrating strength.
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(5) Thorough organization and close coordination

In an anti air raid campaign, the confrontation between both sides is intense, the

campaign strength composition is complex, the campaign form-states are diverse, and the

battlefield situations are constantly changing. We must thoroughly organize and closely

coordinate before we can form an integrated-whole combined strength and ensure the

smooth implementation of the anti air raid campaign.

To organize thoroughly means to have a meticulous plan and a thorough organization for

preparing and implementing the anti air raid campaign. In the phase of campaign

preparation, we need to: have careful overall planning; prepare multiple plans for each

one situation, multiple proposals for each one plan, multiple fighting methods for each

one proposal, and multiple types of support for each one fighting method; closely

organize campaign bushi disposition of forces, campaign maneuver and unfolding,

campaign coordinate, and imminent battle training. In the phase of campaign

implementation, we need to organize important operational activities closely such as

information operations, resistance operations, counterattack operations, and protection

operations.

Close coordination requires that each participating strength in the anti air raid campaign

mutually coordinate and organically integrate as a whole to bring into play the power of

the entire operation. Therefore, the command commander and command organ must:

have a unified operational thought; promptly make clear the operational missions,

operational patterns, activity time opportunities, and methods for each service and arm

and civil air defense strengths so that the various strengths will have consistently

adjusting-coordinated activities under a unified intent; they must establish a sound

coordination institution and tightly formulate a coordination plan; they must fully

understand the situations of participating strengths; they must fully consider objective

conditions that will influence operational activities; and determine the coordination

principle and method for each strength according to the predetermined course of a

campaign and operational missions of each anti air raid strength. In the process of

campaign implementation, the campaign commander and command organ need to grasp

the changes of battlefield situations and organize coordination continuously. When the

enemy disrupts coordination, we should promptly restore it. When fundamental changes

occur to the situation, we must organize new coordination based on the changing

situation so as to ensure that the various participating strengths will have consistently

adjusting-coordinated activities.

Section 2: Main Activities...339

In an anti air raid campaign, the commander and command organ at each level should, on

the basis of the characteristics of the various participating strengths, appropriately

delegate operational missions, thoroughly adjust-coordinate the activities of all

participating strengths, adopt flexible operational methods, and push forward the

development of the war situation. The main operational activities of the anti air raid
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campaign include: organize intelligence early warning, information operations, resistance

operations, counterattack operations, and protection operations.

I. Organize Intelligence Early Warning...339

To thoroughly organize intelligence early warning and promptly and accurately grasp the

dynamic state of air raids are important prerequisites for seizing the anti air raid

campaign initiative.

(1) Construct an integrated intelligence early warning system

In order to smoothly implement an anti air raid campaign, we should establish an

integrated intelligence early warning system in the land, sea, air, and space spheres to

ensure that command institutions and forces at each level can promptly and accurately

grasp the dynamic state of the enemy air raids. First, we need to establish an integrated

air-space strategic early warning information system. In order to provide early warning

for ballistic and cruise missile attack, we should bushu disposition the skywave over-thehorizon radar, balloon-borne radar, bistatic/multistatic radar, phased array radar, passive

radar, and strategic infrared early warning satellites to form a strategic intelligence early

warning system based on air defense early earning and space defense early warning.

Second, we need to establish a conventional early warning system based on conventional

radar, reconnaissance technical means, and early warning and guiding aircraft, and solve

the problems of anti strong electronic jamming and early warning of low-altitude and

stealth targets. In the meantime, we should have network integration of radar intelligence

systems of each participating service and arm, achieve the rapid intercommunication of

intelligence, and increase the air defense early warning capability.

(2) Establish a three-level intelligence reporting system

In order to increase the time effectiveness of transmitting intelligence and information,

we should reinforce overall planning for the early warning force of each service, change

the independency and self-sufficiency of the three armed services, complete the

networking of intelligence and information, and establish one source with multiple

channels and information sharing. Based on a radar intelligence reporting system, we

should establish a three-level strategic, campaign, and tactical intelligence reporting

system. The intelligence main station (substation) at each level directly provides

intelligence it collects to commanders in corresponding operational units and decreases

the levels of intelligence transmission. The information and other important air situations

about ballistic missiles and space targets will be reported to an early warning intelligence

institution at a strategic level located in an air force command post. An early warning

intelligence institution at the campaign level located in a theater air force command post

mainly collects air intelligence information reported by its subordinate radar brigades

(regiments), tactical missile early warning phased-array radar stations, airborne early

warning aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and mobile radar units. It also receives the

information reported by the early warning intelligence institution at the strategic level.
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An early warning intelligence institution at the tactical level located in a forward

command post or an air force unit command post mainly collects the information

reported by its subordinate radar regiments, large guidance stations, and mobile radar

stations, and receives the intelligence information of the early warning reconnaissance

institution at the campaign level at the same time.

(3) Closely monitor the dynamic state of enemy air raids and immediately issue air raid

alarms

We should apply all kinds of reconnaissance and early warning means in the land, sea,

air, and space spheres, have continuous and strict reconnaissance and surveillance for the

air raid enemy, and immediately investigate the enemy air raid situation. From the enemy

frequent reconnaissance activities, the unusual changes of radio communications,

electronic jamming key point areas and intensity, and the exercises and transfers of air

raid forces and weapons, we need to investigate the following as early as possible: the

composition and number of enemy air raid forces; the air raid intention and scale; the air

raid weapon bases; missile launch bases and naval cruise missile launch platforms; air

raid directions; assault opportunities; air raid targets; penetration means; air raid routes;

and flight altitudes. After making an accurate assessment of the enemy air raid activities

and obtaining a conclusion, we should issue air raid forecasts to each unit and people’s

air defense organizations at the right moment.

II. Information Operations...340

A future anti air raid campaign will be conducted with highly informationized weapons

and equipment. The information system, as a main body of an integrated C4ISR system

and an important information source and information channel, plays a decisive role in

confrontations in the information sphere. Information confrontational activities for

seizing information superiority, such as reconnaissance and anti reconnaissance, jamming

and anti jamming, destruction and anti destruction, will penetrate through the entire

process of operations and become important contents of an anti air raid campaign.

(1) Information reconnaissance

Based on reconnaissance in peacetime, information reconnaissance means to have

additional reconnaissance and real-time reconnaissance to investigate the technical

parameters, number, bushu disposition, and possible information attack and defense

activities of the enemy electronic information equipment, and provide intelligence

information support for us to implement information attack and defense activities. The

information reconnaissance strengths {xinxi zhencha liliang} include: the space

reconnaissance strength composed of reconnaissance satellites and early warning

satellites; the aviation reconnaissance strength composed of early warning aircraft and

electronic jammers; and the ground reconnaissance strength composed of ground radars,

technical reconnaissance, and reconnaissance units. The main activities include:
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Detect intelligence and information of the enemy air raid information system. This

mainly investigates the number of information sources, channels, and sinks, structure,

technical parameters, bushu disposition, and usage of the enemy information system and

provides comprehensive and accurate intelligence and information for us to organize and

implement information attack and defense activities. The main means include: use aerial

electronic reconnaissance and imaging reconnaissance to investigate the bushu

disposition, deployment {peizhi}, frequency band, operating system, and detection areas

of the enemy early warning radar networks, location, communication methods, and

communication frequencies of the communication centers, and the jamming capability,

type of platform, and number of the enemy electronic jamming equipment; use space

electronic and imaging equipment to investigate the structure and frequency distribution

of the enemy space information links, space instrumentation and command, and the

number, distribution and change of communication stations; and use ground radars,

technical reconnaissance, and network reconnaissance to investigate the tactical technical

characteristics and bushu disposition of the enemy electronic equipment, the computer

network gateway nodes in the C4ISR system, the type, number, guidance method, and the

position of the main information weapons.

Detect intelligence and information of the enemy information attack and defense

activities. This mainly uses space-based, air-based, and ground-based (sea-based)

reconnaissance strengths to investigate intelligence and information about the enemy

information attack against us and the information defense activities that the enemy takes

for dealing with our information attack, and provide intelligence and information for us to

organize and implement information attack and defense activities. When detecting the

enemy information attack activities, we should investigate the equipment, number,

battlefield deployment {peizhi}, attack targets, means, and possible time of the enemy

information attack. When detecting the enemy information defense activities, we should

investigate the means and measures that the enemy uses for information defense so that

we can adopt measures for information attack and information defense.

(2) Information attack

Information attack means to apply all kinds of information attack operational weapons

and equipment to jam, suppress, damage, and destroy the enemy air raid information

system. The strengths include: electronic jamming strength, network attack strength, and

physical attack strength. The main activities include:

Electromagnetic jamming and suppression. This means to use land-based, sea-based, airbased, and space-based electronic jamming equipment to disturb the enemy air raid

information system with “soft” kill. The main methods include: organize suppressed

jamming, meaning to take communication jamming, radar jamming, electro-optical

jamming, guidance jamming, navigation jamming, fuse jamming, and identification

friend-and-foe jamming to jam the enemy airborne warning and command system,

airborne radars and fire control systems, and precision guidance/weapon guidance

systems; and organize deceptive jamming, meaning to use false information sent out from
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our electronic equipment or camouflage equipment to deceive or confuse the enemy in

the electromagnetic sphere.

Computer network attack. This means to apply network attack strengths to steal, diddle,

delete, deceive, and block information and disturb information attack of the enemy air

raid information system computer networks. The main methods include: computer virus

attack, meaning to use computer viruses, such as a time bomb virus, a worm virus, a

Trojan horse virus etc, to spread across the enemy computer network system through

network transmission, virus implantation, and transmission via radio so that the system

cannot operate; and invasion by “hackers,” meaning to have computer professionals to

invade the enemy computer network system through computer networks, browse, exploit,

and change data in computers, and disturb the enemy network system operation.

Fire physical destruction. This means to apply all kinds of precision guided munitions to

paralyze the enemy information platforms, information links and nodes, and ground

infrastructure with “hard” destruction. The main methods: anti-radiation attack, meaning

to use anti-radiation aircraft and missiles to attack the enemy targets such as radars, early

warning aircraft, and command and control systems; electromagnetic pulse attack,

meaning to attack the enemy information system with electromagnetic pulse weapons;

and precision missile attack, meaning to use air-based, sea-based, and land-based missiles

to have hard fire destruction at the enemy information platforms and ground

infrastructure.

(3) Information defense

Information defense means to take all kinds of measures and activities including anti

reconnaissance, anti jamming, anti destruction, and anti network attack for resisting the

enemy attack against our information system and supporting the operation of our

information system. The information defensive strengths include the information

defensive operational strengths such as information camouflage and network defense, and

the electronic and network defensive strengths of each operational unit. The main

activities include:

Anti enemy information confrontational reconnaissance. We should apply all kinds of

active and passive measures to prevent the enemy information confrontational

reconnaissance and decrease the enemy information reconnaissance system effectiveness

to a maximum degree. The main methods include: take stealth technology and other

camouflage measures for all kinds of weapons and equipment and use radio silence to

make it more difficult for the enemy reconnaissance and surveillance system to detect,

track, and identify; reinforce the management of the electromagnetic spectrum, use

hidden frequencies or communication equipment with the low probability of intercept,

strictly control electromagnetic radiation and time, and compress and encrypt signals to

prevent our information links and signals from being intercepted. Even though the signals

are intercepted, it is difficult for the enemy to get useful information. And place a large

number of false targets to have electromagnetic diversion and deception, making it
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difficult for the enemy to accurately locate our information platforms and ground

facilities.

Anti enemy electronic jamming and suppression. We should integrate and apply all kinds

of tactical and technical measures to fully bring into play the equipment anti jamming

capability and decrease the losses caused by enemy jamming to the minimum with a

rational deployment {peizhi} and careful use. The main methods include: enlarge radar

power, use a radar system with strong anti jamming capability, and reasonably dispose

radars with different frequency bands and in different systems to resist the enemy

jamming and suppression to reconnaissance and early warning systems; use secure

communication and laser communication with strong anti jamming capability, use

frequency hopping, and establish a covert communication network to resist the enemy

jamming and suppression to radio communication systems; and increase the anti jamming

capability of optical electronic equipment and use composite guidance technology to

resist the enemy jamming to optical electronic equipment.

Anti enemy computer network attack. The main methods include: anti virus, meaning to

reinforce network system management, scan and kill viruses periodically and nonperiodically, insert antivirus hardware, install antivirus chips, use antivirus software, and

prevent viruses from invading our own computer network system; and anti network

infiltration, meaning to take firewall technology to set up a protective screen between the

network and the external world and prevent the enemy possible destructive invasion.

Anti enemy fire physical destruction. This means to take all kinds of protection activities

to avoid information system destruction by the enemy or decrease the chances of the

information system being destroyed by the enemy. The main methods include: take

means such as controlling radar transmission power, using frequency agility, developing

a network of bistatic or multistatic radar and multiple sets of radar, decreasing the

computer operating time, and preventing the enemy radiation attack; and take measures

such as putting the core equipment of the information system underground, reinforcing

the camouflage of the information system, reinforcing maneuver and evasion, reinforcing

fire cover for information platforms and equipment, and resisting the enemy fire attack.

III. Resistance Operations...343

The resistance operation is the most complex and fiercest operational activity. We should

concentrate and use all kinds of air defense strengths such as the air force and naval

fighter aviation forces, the anti-aircraft artillery force and the surface to-air missile force

of each service, and the militia and reserve anti-aircraft units to have bushi disposition in

large areas and with dynamic resistance in the enemy main air raid direction and start to

intercept the enemy from the farthest long distance level by level.
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(1) Integrate three areas and resist level by level

In an anti air raid campaign, the enemy mainly uses a nonlinear and long-range precision

strike mode. To deal with this kind of air raid mode, we can organize resistance

operations based on the farthest intercept area, the air-land attack area, and the deep antiannihilation area.

The farthest intercept area is located in the front of the enemy air raid operational

battlefield. It is the area where the fighter aviation force resists the enemy. The high

performance interceptors and long-range surface-to-air missiles are deployed in the area.

In order to expand the intercept range, the interceptors and surface-to-air missile units

should be disposed forward as much as possible. In the coastal direction, we try to

depend on the surface-to-air missile force disposed on protruding sections of shore and

near-shore islands and send out the naval ships with more powerful air defense firepower

to move the intercept area to the sea as much as possible. When the enemy aircraft air

raids, the interceptors in the forward airbase rapidly take off to farthest intercept the

enemy aircraft and cruise missiles with the coordination of long-range surface-to-air

missiles and air defense firepower of naval surface ships. We strive to: destroy the enemy

air raid; force the enemy to have a dispersed formation; and create conditions for

following operations.

The air-land attack area is located in the middle of the enemy air raid operational

battlefield. This area has better battlefield conditions and it is the primary operational

area that applies the fighter aviation force, surface-to-air missile force, and anti-aircraft

artillery force to annihilate the enemy. We should dispose the primary military strengths

of the fighter aviation force, surface-to-air missile force, and anti-aircraft artillery force to

have an air-land attack against the enemy air raid weapons and intercept with key points.

When the air raid enemy penetrates our farthest intercept area and enters the air-land

attack area, our air defense force disposed in this area should take fighting methods such

as airborne intercept and surface-to-air strike, form a concentrated firepower network,

intercept the enemy air raid weapons with key points, block the enemy surprise raid

passageways, and stop the enemy from advance in depth.

The deep anti-annihilation area is located in the end of the enemy air raid operational

battlefield and it is the last defensive line to resist the enemy air raid. The mid-range and

near-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-aircraft machine guns, with

the coordination of the fighter aviation force, can form a three-dimensional ring-like

firepower protective screen and set up all kinds of air float obstacles in different heights

and distances to form an omni-directional and all-height closed momentum against the

enemy. When the air raid enemy penetrates this area, all kinds of air defense weapons

deployed in this area should concentrate firepower to intercept the enemy air raid

weapons continuously, keep them off protected targets, and ensure the security of

important targets.
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(2) Widespread maneuver and dynamic resistance

The anti enemy air raid operation is an operational pattern in which the enemy is active

and we are passive. Since the enemy can fully make use of aviation weapons with rapid

maneuver and flexibility, flexibly change the air raid direction and strike targets, and

flexibly use strike means, we must await the enemy to move in resistance operations. In

order to effectively resist the enemy air raid, we must maneuver the air defense force and

weapons to have dynamic resistance against the enemy. According to the characteristics

and laws of enemy air raid operations and on the basis of accurately grasping and making

assessment of the dynamic stage of enemy situations, we should correctly apply

maneuver forces, choose a favorable maneuver opportunity and space, and strike objects.

This is especially so that when we grasp the information about the enemy air raid, we can

rapidly organize air defense strengths to maneuver to where the enemy must pass and

spare no efforts to intercept the enemy that air raids or the enemy that returns to base.

The main operational methods include:

Maneuver guerrilla warfare. This means to broadly maneuver air defense force-strengths

and weaponry with unpredictable guerrilla operations and annihilate enemy aircraft to

catch the enemy unaware in favorable areas. If it is difficult to determine the air raid

direction of the enemy weapons, we can organize a guerrilla air defense formation

composed of manportable air defense missiles and small anti-aircraft guns to have a fullscale guerrilla operation and destroy the enemy. If we can determine the air raid direction

of enemy weapons, we can rapidly assemble nearby air defense formations to maneuver

to the direction, form a continuous resistance posture in far, mid, and near depth, and

have a multi-level attack against the enemy. When our air defense system is suppressed

by the enemy and there is a gap, we should rapidly mobilize guerrilla air defense

formations to close the gap immediately.

Lure the enemy and ambush. This means to use camouflage, showing signs of false

targets, and diversion to strike the enemy with the ambushed air defense force. We can

take the following means: show signs of false targets and ambush. This means to set up

false airfields, false positions, false aircraft, false missiles, and false radars to lure the

enemy in order to attack and annihilate the enemy with ambushed air defense units,

diversion, and ambush. This means to take electronic diversion and force diversion to

lure the enemy to attack and wipe out the enemy with ambushed air defense units; and

lure and strike the enemy with the air defense force. This means to dispose part of the

ground air defense force in the battlefield, and a small number of aviation forces lures the

enemy into the ambush area and annihilates the enemy with surface-to-air firepower.

Air route ambush. According to the activity laws of the enemy air raid weapons, part of

the air defense force is ambushed on the flight route of the enemy air raid weapons,

waiting for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy. The ambush sites are normally close

to enemy aircraft route checkpoints, air-to-surface missile launch positions, cruise missile
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routes, and the space domain of enemy airborne early warning aircraft, air-to-air tanker

aircraft, and electronic jammers.

(3) Concentrate strengths and resist with key points

In anti enemy air raid operations, we resist superiority with inferiority. The contradiction

between operational needs and actual operational capabilities is prominent, and we must

concentrate our strengths, strike key point targets, and resist with key points. The enemy

early warning command aircraft are the center of gravity for the air formation to acquire

information and coordinate command. The electronic warfare aircraft are the main force

that the enemy uses to implement electromagnetic suppression. The stealth aircraft and

cruise missiles are the enemy long-range precision strike weapons with the best

penetration capability. Therefore, these “three aircraft and one missile” should become

our key-point strike targets in resistance operations.

Strike the enemy early warning command aircraft. We normally strike the enemy early

warning command aircraft when it changes shifts, refuels, and neglects to be on the alert,

or implement attacks of the selected strikes on enemy early warning [EW] command

aircraft during the time opportunities of their air raid wave transitions {boci zhuanhuan}

and when they are busy with their mission. Normally, under cover of electronic jammers,

the interceptor attack unit remains in cover from multiple directions, part of the

interceptors tie down the fighters that cover the enemy early warning command aircraft,

and the rest of the force surrounds and annihilates the enemy early warning command

aircraft.

Strike the enemy electronic warfare aircraft. The enemy electronic warfare aircraft have

strong electronic jamming capability. They are difficult for our radar to detect and our

missiles are easy to lose control. Therefore, in order to strike the enemy electronic

warfare aircraft, we should deploy early warning command aircraft, balloon-borne radars,

and ground radar to form an integrated three-dimensional radar detection network. When

the enemy electronic warfare aircraft enter the network, each type of radar starts to

operate to detect from different directions or report the location of enemy aircraft from

observation posts. When the enemy jams our detection system, we should apply multiple

tactical means such as radar cross section to determine the location of the enemy

electronic warfare aircraft. After determining the location of the enemy electronic warfare

aircraft, we should immediately guide the interceptors to intercept and attack with

infrared air-to-air missiles and aircraft guns. When the enemy electronic warfare aircraft

enter the ground air defense position, the surface-to-air missile units should attack the

aircraft with the primary jamming direction that has been deviated and has less jamming

intensity in the opposite direction or side direction, and the anti-aircraft gun units should

use their strong anti-jamming capability to block and fire at the enemy electronic warfare

aircraft to destroy them at one stroke.

Strike the enemy stealth aircraft. The stealth aircraft has better stealth effectiveness for

the centimeter wave radar and worse stealth effectiveness for the meter wave radar and
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millimeter wave radar. The front, side, and top of stealth aircraft are easy to detect. When

the aircraft opens the hatch door or flies in low attitude, the stealth effectiveness will also

decrease a great deal. According to these weaknesses, we should use the equilateral

triangle method to dispose radar positions near the enemy possible air raid routes and

ensure that no matter from which direction an enemy stealth aircraft enters the radar

position, we have two or more radars for detection. In the meantime, we can deploy meter

wave, millimeter wave, and long meter wave radars, and early warning command aircraft

to detect and track the enemy stealth aircraft. In order to prevent visual detection, the

enemy stealth aircraft normally air raids at nighttime. Our high-performance interceptors

should detect and aim at the target with an airborne infrared search/tracer and a laser

range finder under the guidance of an early warning detection system and attack the

stealth aircraft with missiles.

Strike the enemy cruise missiles. The cruise missile normally takes low-altitude

penetration, making it difficult for us to detect and track. However, its velocity is slow,

flight time is long, and air route is fixed, and it will not maneuver after being attacked.

This creates favorable conditions for us to intercept. In order to strike the enemy cruise

missiles, we should first apply multiple means such reconnaissance satellites, radars,

laser, infrared, acoustics, and vision to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy cruise

missiles. Second, according to the activity laws of enemy cruise missiles, we can set up

defense with key points and intercept level by level. The flight route of enemy cruise

missiles is more fixed so that we can roughly figure out the direction of cruise missiles

based on the launch platform of enemy cruise missiles and the targets that the missile

may strike and deploy air defense weapons. When the enemy launches a cruise missile

attack, our interceptors in air patrol will intercept cruise missiles right away and the

ground air defense force will organize a multi-channel, multi-belt, and multi-level fire

network to intercept cruise missiles level by level.

IV. Counterattack Operations...347

The counterattack operation is the offensive activity in the anti air raid campaign. It also

carries out “offensive air defense” and has a significant influence on the course and

outcome of the campaign. According to the higher level’s intent, the development and

needs of war situations, and the counterattack capability, we should make decisions

carefully, choose an opportunity properly, select targets meticulously, use one’s own

forces according to the enemy situations, use fighting methods skillfully, and take the

initiative to counterattack the air raid enemy flexibly. In general situations, we can

choose the following favorable opportunities in counterattack operations: when the

enemy air raids and we are ready to counterattack; when the enemy’s first sortie of air

raid aircraft return to base or get ready to dispatch again after landing; after we resist, the

enemy air raid force is obviously weakened; when most of the air raid force dispatches,

the rear is empty; when the enemy continuously dispatches, feeling tired and slack and

being neglectful to be on alert; when the enemy dispatched base force is more

concentrated and exposed; and when the weather and climate conditions are bad for the

enemy. According to the level of importance of the enemy targets and our counterattack
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capability, we should regard the air force base as a primary target for counterattack. For

the scale of counterattack, we should act according to our capability. For the use of

strengths, we should concentrate crack troops and sharp weapons of each service to

implement joint counterattack, ensuring starting no counterattack unless one can win.

The aviation force should be the priority force to attack the enemy air force base and the

ship force, conventional missile force, and special operations force coordinate with the

aviation force to implement a full-scale continuous, fierce, and surprise joint fire

counterattack from different ranges, different directions, different altitudes, and with

multiple batches and sorties against the enemy air force bases and destroy the enemy air

raid system. The main methods include:

First, the missiles lead the way and integrate jamming with deception. When the enemy

has a compact air defense system, we should concentrate fire assault in the first sortie

against the enemy air force bases and strive to suppress the enemy airfield runways and

air defense system effectively now that conventional missiles and cruise missiles have

strong penetration capability and a long strike range, and the weather and climate

conditions have little influence on the missiles. In the meantime, we should use

unmanned electronic jammers and unmanned attack aircraft to implement strong

electronic jamming and deceptive attack against the enemy air force bases, force the

enemy air defense system to unfold and go into operations in advance, find out the

tactical technical indices of the enemy air defense system, use anti radiation unmanned

aerial vehicles to attack the enemy early warning radar system, and create conditions for

aviation force penetration thereafter.

Second, penetrate in multiple directions and destroy with key points. The enemy has

better air defense capability and our aviation force should penetrate at low altitude and

ultra low altitude, penetrate in the blind area or the weak area of the enemy radar

detection, penetrate with small formations, in multiple directions, with multiple batches,

and with diversion and cover, and open up penetration passageways to quickly penetrate

the enemy air defense distribution system. After the assault formation penetrates the

enemy air defense distribution system, we should concentrate firepower on vital parts to

destroy the structure, strike the enemy’s crucial targets with key points such as command

and control centers, airfield runways, airfield parking areas, and oil depots, and

effectively weaken the enemy air raid capability. We should scientifically and rationally

divide the time and space for the aviation force, conventional missiles, and naval ships

(submarines) to attack and strike the enemy nonstop with high intensity in a shorter time.

V. Protection Operations...348

In an anti air raid campaign, we face serious air threats and need to protect many

important targets. Whether to effectively preserve combat power and decrease the

personnel casualties and property losses is very important to stabilize the war situations

and society. Therefore, we must think highly of this and meticulously plan and prepare

protection operations.
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(1) Integrate the military with the people and protect with key points

First, in order to fight in protection operations, we must place emphasis on playing the

role of professional protection strengths such as military protection strength and people’s

air defense strength, fully mobilize the masses to participate in protection, and combine

the military with the people for joint defense as an organic whole to obtain good

protection effectiveness. Second, we should give prominence to the protection of key

point targets on the basis of organizing overall protection. The practice of recent local

wars indicates that the targets under air raids include party, government, and army head

institutions, strategic command systems, air defense and space defense systems, water

and electricity and energy targets related to the national economy and people's livelihood,

and military, political, and economic targets with war potential. Therefore, we should

concentrate our strengths on protecting these targets.

(2) Reinforce control and ensure battlefield order

When detecting the signs of an enemy air raid, we should immediately release an air raid

alarm. When the enemy air raids, we should: reinforce the control of city lights,

electromagnetic spectrums, and the flow of crowds and decrease the probability of being

detected by the enemy; reinforce traffic management and keep good traffic order;

reinforce the control of media such as news, broadcast, etc. and stabilize popular feelings

and morale; play the role of forces, armed police, public security, militia, and local

governments; reinforce social order management; and keep good social order.

(3) Multiple means and integrated protection

In order to have good protection effectiveness, we should integrate traditional protection

means with high-tech means and apply multiple means. The main protection means

include the following. Camouflage: utilize vegetation and terrain to camouflage fixed

facilities such as main engineering projects, positions, communication and transport hubs,

and energy bases and the force-unit heavy equipment, and apply means such as natural

shielding, color changing or form-changing to decrease or eliminate the features of

targets to prevent the enemy from detecting and striking. Show the false: utilize the

terrain and environment and all kinds of standard and expedient equipment to set up false

positions, weapons, and facilities, and use simulated light sources, heat sources, and

electromagnetic sources to launch false signals to lure the enemy to strike and bomb the

false targets so as to decrease the air raid effectiveness. Set up obstacles and defilades

{shezhang zhebi}: for large fixed targets such as hydroelectric power stations and energy

stations, use loop, multilayer, and cross obstacles such as floating mines, balloons,

parachute cables, and smoke screens to block and interfere the enemy’s air raid weapon

strike. Be modest in concealment: implement concealment for personnel, weapons and

equipment and operational materiel, etc. by utilizing currently existing protection

engineering projects and provisionally constructed protection works. Disperse

deployment {shusan peizhi}, namely utilize terrain and surface features to disperse the

deployment of force-strengths and weapons and to disperse the concealment of personnel
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and materiel, so as to lower enemy air raid effectiveness. Maneuver at the right time:

utilize the time gap between the enemy’s reconnaissance of the target and attack of the

target to maneuver force-strengths and weaponry at the right time, change position arrays

and disrupt the position fix of the enemy’s original information, so as to evade the enemy

air strike and improve survivability.

(4) Rapidly clear up the air raid aftermath

After the enemy air raid, we should immediately investigate the damage through all

channels. According to needs, we immediately organize each kind of professional

protection team to rescue and repair. First, we should immediately organize the armed

forces and local rescue strengths to rescue personnel and material resources and decrease

the casualties and property losses to the maximum degree. Second, we should

immediately organize strengths to repair targets under enemy assault. For the repair of

military targets, the military professionals are the primary repair strength and the people

are the secondary under the guidance of military engineering technical personnel. Non

military targets should be repaired primarily by the people under the guidance of local

governments. Third, we should immediately clear up secondary nuclear, biological, and

chemical disasters. For targets with secondary nuclear, biological, and chemical disaster,

we should: organize rescue and decontamination activities based on the several key links

of “control, detection, rescue decontamination,” meaning to control toxin and

contaminated areas, immediately organize detection and chemical examination to

investigate the pollution and rapidly notify, immediately rescue the personnel that are

poisoned, and immediately decontaminate the contaminated regions, personnel, and

equipment. In addition, if the enemy air raid causes fire, we should organize professional

fire fighters and the people to put out the fire.
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Part III: Army Campaigns...351

An Army {陆军 lujun} campaign is a campaign conducted by an Army large formation

either independently or assisted by and complemented by other service force-units

(elements).

The difference between an army campaign and campaigns of other services are: its main

body strength is the army campaign large formation, its main battlefield is the ground

battlefield, its main activities are army operations, it’s a unified command of the army

campaign large formation command institution, and its main goal is to gain victory of

ground operations. An army campaign under informationized conditions normally must

obtain assistance from and be complemented by other services and arms; it is a “subcampaign” within a joint campaign; and it is sometimes implemented independently by

an Army large formation.

Chapter 15

Overview...351

The essence of an army campaign under informationized conditions is a series of

operational activities for the purpose of achieving a predetermined campaign goal. With

development of the integrated {yitihua} joint campaign, the roles of sea, air, and space

strengths have gained more prominence, but the status of the army campaign has not

diminished and its success still has a decisive quality effect on the overall war. The army

campaign not only can achieve a war’s localized quality goals, it can also achieve a war’s

overall situation quality goals.

When organizing army campaigns under informationized conditions, one must

thoroughly carry out the campaign’s basic guidance thought, comprehensively apply the

operational strengths of all services and arms, combine regular operations with irregular

operations, combine contact operations with non-contact operations, combine linear

operations with non-linear operations, combine annihilation warfare with paralysis

warfare, and form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}; one must

concentrate the main strength in the campaign main direction and critical occasion, keypoint strike the vital area targets {yaohai mubiao} that play a supporting role in the

enemy’s operational system {tixi}, and implement system destructive-attack warfare

{xitong pohuai zhan}; one must actively attack, combine offense and defense, agilely

maneuver and strike the enemy, and strive to gain campaign victory at lesser cost.

Section 1: Definition, Status, and Classification of Army Campaigns...352

The definition, status, and classification of army campaigns are the primary content and

basic problems of the essential theory of army campaigns, and thus they are the important

components of the essential theory of army campaigns.
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I. Definition of Army Campaigns...352

An army campaign is a campaign organized and implemented by an army campaign large

formation, either independently or with the army campaign large formation in the lead. It

can be implemented from within the task-organization of a joint campaign, or it can be

implemented individually.

The above definition is a conceptualized expression of the essence and attributes of an

army campaign, and is a logical starting point to study army campaigns. This definition

includes the following five aspects. First, it makes clear that an army campaign serves as

a ranking of armed struggle, it is a layer situated between war and combat, and it is a

form-state {xingtai} of the campaign. Second, it makes clear that the basic strength of an

army campaign is an army force-strength within the task organization of an army large

formation or reinforced by higher level {shangji}. Or, with this former in the lead, it is

complemented by various strengths of other services. Third, it makes clear that the main

body of army campaign command is the army campaign large formation commander and

his command organ. Fourth, it makes clear that the land battlefield is the army campaign

battlefield, or with the land battlefield in the lead, it is assisted and complemented by

other battlefields. Fifth, it makes clear that the army campaign not only can be

individually applied, but it can be conducted within the task-organization of a joint

campaign, forming a “sub-campaign” of the joint campaign and subordinate to and in the

service of the overall joint campaign situation .

The features {tezheng} of an army campaign are an outward expression of the essence of

the army campaign and the special attributes of the army campaign. In addition to having

the general features of a campaign, the army campaign also possesses its own unique

features. These unique features are expressed in the three aspects of army campaign

strength, campaign battlefield, and campaign command.

(1) The campaign strength {liliang} is task-organized with is an army campaign large

formation in the lead

The campaign strength {liliang} is the physical basis for implementing the campaign

mission and is one of the basic essential elements {yaosu} in forming a campaign. With

which service strength to task-organize the campaign large formation is one of the basic

indicators distinguishing the campaign form-state {xingtai}. The most essential feature of

an army campaign is that the campaign strength of an army campaign is task-organized

with an army campaign large formation in the lead. Its basic expression is that the main

body portion of the campaign task-organization is an army campaign large formation, and

other services and arms are supplemental and secondary. This is because in a modern

war, one needs[-requires] {xuyao} to wipe out a defensive enemy or defend-hold

important targets and areas, and for these, one must task organize the campaign strength

with an army campaign large formation as the main body in order to ensure the

accomplishment of campaign missions and the realization of campaign goals. Even

though informationized weapons and equipment are massively applied on the battlefield,
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and under the informationized conditions of war form-states {xingtai}, goals, operational

thought and means having undergone fundamental-quality changes, in order to

accomplish campaign missions such as attacking cities-seizing territory {gongcheng

luedi} or massively annihilating the enemy’s effective strength {yousheng liliang}, one

still needs-requires {xuyao} to task-organize a campaign strength with an army campaign

large formation in the lead and carry out various land campaign activities complemented

by the strengths of other services and arms. One can see that the objective needsrequirements {xuyao} of war decides the objective existence where one must taskorganize an army campaign with an army campaign large formation in the lead.

(2) The main battlefield is the land battlefield

The campaign battlefield is the spatial arena where both sides conduct a contest of

strengths. It is an objective condition for implementing a campaign and it is one of the

basic essential elements {yaosu} of a campaign. Generally speaking, the altitude and

location of the battlefield space is an important indicator for distinguishing the campaign

form-state {xingtai}. A campaign implemented on the land battlefield is an army

campaign, a campaign implemented on the air battlefield is an air force campaign, and a

campaign implemented on the sea battlefield is a navy campaign. Thus, a battlefield

space with the land in the lead is a clearly essential feature of an army campaign and is an

important indicator that differentiates the army campaign from other campaign formstates {xingtai}.

The battlefield of the army campaign is mainly on the ground. This is determined by the

mission of the army and its authorized equipment. But, army campaign battlefields are

not limited to the ground alone. It means while the main area is on the ground, it also

includes associated air space, and sometimes it also includes associated sea area. The

reasons are as follows. First, modern army campaigns cannot be without the support of

the air force. To seize and maintain air dominance is critical to winning the army

campaign. Secondly, some of the army campaigns must be expanded to the sea area and

must have support of the navy. For example, when an army campaign large formation is

carrying out amphibious landing operations or anti-landing operations, the operational

space includes the sea area and the operational activities must be supported by the navy.

Thirdly, in many countries, the army now has various flying crafts in its inventory, which

can be used to directly support and coordinate with land operations in the associated air

space. Fourthly, under informationized conditions, when operational activities are carried

out on the land battlefield, these activities must by supported by the air, sea, space, and

electromagnetic domain. However, even though army campaign battlefields include

associated air, sea, space, and electromagnetic domains, fundamentally the battlefield of

army campaigns is on the ground and the main campaign activities are carried out on

land. Operations in associated air and sea domains are to support and coordinate with

land operations, and to serve land operations.
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(3) Campaign command is implemented with the army campaign large formation

command institution in the lead

Campaign command refers to the activity {huodong} for organizing and leading

campaign activities by the commander and his command organ {zhihui jiguan}. It is the

foremost main subjective factor in campaign victory. In an army campaign, the main

body strength for accomplishing missions is the army campaign large formation, and the

main campaign activities are conducted on the land battlefield. Therefore, the organizing

and leading activity {huodong} must be the unified responsibility of the army campaign

large formation commander and his command organ. Under informationized conditions,

it is the unified responsibility of the army campaign large formation command institution

to command, and in a non-army-only command with an army campaign large formation

campaign command institution in the lead absorbs the participation of relevant command

personnel of other services and arms to form an army campaign command institution

together and unified implementation of the army campaign command. Because of the

increase in services and arms assisting and complementing army campaign operations,

the lead in command is complex. Thereby, in order to even better bring into play the roles

of the services and arms, not only must one stress the unified responsibility of command

by the army campaign large formation command institution, one must also attach

importance to bringing into play the roles of the commanders of other participating

services and arms, and ensure a consistent adjusting-coordination of activities amongst all

services and arms so as to defeat the enemy with an integrated-whole composite strength

{zhengti heli}.

II. Status of Army Campaigns...354

Historically, the army campaign has always been the main campaign form-state

{xingtai}. As science and technology develops {fazhan}, the campaign basic form-state

has transformed from the traditional army campaign to the all-services joint campaign,

and the status of the army campaign is in the midst of changing. With this background in

mind, it is very important to clarify [make clear] the status of the army campaign in a

future war in order to correctly understand the army campaign and to correctly apply the

army campaign large formation.

(1) The army campaign is normally a "sub-campaign" within a joint campaign

The history of human warfare is almost a history of army wars. Because man's

productivity level has always been quite low, military operations have been constrained

more often by factors on the ground. During many historical periods, the army campaign

has all along played the lead role. After WWII, as the operational capabilities of the air

force and navy rapidly improved and were widely used, the status and function of ground

operations began to change. The enormity of the army campaign large formation system

{tixi} and the weak points of weaponry technological content started to become obvious

weaknesses. Both in terms of operations and various items of safeguarding-support, the

gradually could not be separated from assisting and complementing the other services,
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and the campaign form-state started to develop from the single-service army campaign to

a combined campaign involving the participation of various services. In recent years,

under the backdrop of the massive application of high-tech weapons and equipment in

operations, especially in the combination of airborne strike strengths with precision

guided weapons, as well as the considerable developments {fazhan} in naval ship and the

strategic missile force-units, the operational activities of striking ground targets from sea

and air are being ever universally applied, and thus this has resulted in profound changes

to the status and role of the army campaign large formation in a campaign. A series of

local wars have demonstrated that services such as the Navy and the Air Force have

moved away from playing a supporting role to becoming main players, and the allservices joint campaign implemented together with an equal status has become the basic

form-state of a campaign. In a future local war under informationized conditions, a

situation whereby the army campaign large formation independently accomplishes

campaign missions will gradually diminish, and in some joint campaigns, the army

campaign large formation may even play a subordinate role.

(2) The army campaign is still an important and irreplaceable campaign form-state in

local wars

Under informationized conditions, campaign operations will unfold in multiple

dimension spaces, including the land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic domains. Army

campaigns will need-require the participation and assistance {zhiyuan} of the Navy and

the Air Force, while the Navy and Air Force campaigns will also need-require the support

{zhichi} and cooperation of the Army. Though army campaigns will no longer be in the

lead role in wars, all operational activities must have support from the ground and the

final conclusion of the war will still be fought on the ground. At the same time, because

the Navy and Air Force operational strengths are easily affected by terrain or weather

factors, in many situations, their operational capabilities cannot be easily brought into

play. The army, on the other hand, is a service that is less affected by the environment.

Thus, in many situations, army campaigns will have a positive stabilizing effect on the

war or on the overall situation of joint campaigns. From the perspective of the military

struggle circumstances {军事斗争形势 junshi douzheng xingshi} faced by China at the

beginning of the 21st century, annihilating or expelling an enemy, and defending or

restoring motherland territory via army campaign activities are still an irreplaceable

military struggle form {军事斗争形式 junshi douzheng xingshi}. In particular,

compared with more powerful enemies, the overall level of our weapons and equipment

is inferior. By effectively organizing ground operations, fully utilizing advantageous

terrain and weather, relying on the support of the masses, demonstrating the People's War

tradition, and flexibly applying fighting methods, we will be able to demonstrate the

advantage of fighting on our home territory and make up the difference between the

capability level of weapons and equipment. Thus in future wars, army campaigns will

still occupy an important status and will have an important function. For example, in a

future border area counterattack campaign and island offensive campaign, army

campaigns may be the decisive-quality campaigns to gain ultimate victory in the war.
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III. Classifications of Army Campaigns...355

The classification of army campaigns is based on the attributes and characteristics of

army campaigns. Classification is an important part of the theory of the science of army

campaigns, and is an important step in the study of the theory of the science of army

campaigns.

(1) Classification based on campaign nature {xingzhi}

Based on the nature of the campaign, an army campaign can be divided into an army

offensive campaign and army defensive campaign. The army offensive campaign and the

army defensive campaign are two different types of operational activities implemented by

a campaign large formation on the land battlefield. Amongst these, the main goal of the

former is to annihilate enemy groups and attack-occupy important areas or targets; the

main goal of the latter is to expend and kill the enemy, frustrate the enemy's offensive, or

gain time so as to create conditions for transitioning to counterattack or attack. From the

perspective of the general and overall situation of the war, an offensive campaign is the

main means for achieving a war’s localized or overall-situation quality goals, while a

defensive campaign is a supplemental means. It should be pointed out that pure offensive

or defensive does not exist, and offensive and defensive operational activities are

mutually intertwined. In the offensive, there are defensive postures; in the defensive,

there are offensive postures, but in terms of the general nature, the offensive and

defensive attributes of an army campaign are clearly recognizable.

(2) Classification based on campaign pattern {yangshi}

Based on campaign patterns {yangshi}, the basic type {leixing} of army campaigns can

be further divided. Because the missions and operational conditions undertaken in each

army campaign can be different and the requirements of strategy on campaign in different

historical periods are different, the patterns of the army campaign are also very different.

Under informationized conditions, army campaign patterns mainly include: positional

offensive campaign and positional defensive campaign, urban offensive campaign and

urban defensive campaign; landing campaign and anti-landing (or coastal defensive)

campaign, and maneuver offensive campaign and maneuver defensive campaign, etc.

(3) Classification based on the scale of the campaign

Based on the scale of campaigns, army campaigns can be divided into group army

campaigns {集团军战役 jituanjun zhanyi} and army group campaigns {集团军群战役

jituanjunqun zhanyi}. Army campaigns can also be divided into small-scale army

campaigns and large-scale (medium-scale) army campaigns.

Campaigns conducted primarily by a single group army are a group army campaign, i.e.,

a small-scale army campaign. The group army is the basic campaign large formation and

has the capability to carry out the basic mission of the army campaign. Campaigns
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conducted by the provincial military command {省军区 sheng junqu} also belong to the

group army-level campaigns. Group army campaigns are normally carried out within the

structure of the joint campaign large formation or the structure of the army group.

Sometimes, they can also be conducted independently.

Campaigns that are mainly executed by several group armies are called army group

campaigns, i.e., large-scale (or medium-scale) army campaigns. An army group is a

higher-level campaign large formation organized temporarily based on operational needs.

An army group consists of two or more group armies. It is responsible for strategic

missions or operational missions directly assigned by the superior. Army group

campaigns are normally conducted within the structure of the joint campaign large

formation, or they can also be organized independently.

(4) Classification based on the geographical environment

The two basic types of army campaigns can be further divided based on the geographic

environment. Normally there are: plain offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns;

hilly area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; mountain offensive campaigns

and defensive campaigns; desert and steppe offensive campaigns and defensive

campaigns; plateau and cold region offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns;

tropical mountain and jungle area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; river

and water network area offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns, etc.

It should be noted that the spatial areas of army campaigns are large and the geographic

environments often intersect with diverse topography. Thus, this classification is

conceptually relative. As long as the main operational activities of an army campaign are

carried out under a particular geographic environmental condition, we can classify it as a

campaign under that geographic condition.

Because classification is based on diverse emphases and methods, the classification of

army campaigns can be even more numerous. For example, classification based on the

form-state of war, we can divide it into an army campaign under full-scale war

{quanmian zhanzheng} conditions and an army campaign under localized war {jubu

zhanzheng} conditions. Division based on the backdrop of war, we can divide it into an

army campaign under nuclear conditions and an army campaign under conventional

conditions. If conducting division based on campaign task-organization, we can divide it

into an army campaign within a joint campaign task-organization and an army campaign

independently implemented by an army campaign large formation, etc.

Section 2: Origin and Development of Army Campaigns...357

The origin of army campaigns and their development is one of the important topics in the

theoretical study of army campaigns. Studying the origin and development of army

campaigns can help people understand the fundamental causes of army campaigns,
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accurately understand the objective patterns of army campaign development, and

scientifically predict the future development trend of army campaigns.

I. Origin of Army Campaigns...357

Army campaigns are a historical and social phenomenon. They were not present in time

immemorial, but were born in the historical process and developed as a product of

historical development. As a specific historical and social phenomenon, army campaigns

are the product of history when human warfare reached a certain historical stage.

In the later part of primitive societies, due to the rise of private properties, war appeared

in the history of mankind. At that time, war was only a method of struggle for the means

and ends of production. War was violent confrontations with simple contents, simple

forms, and small in scale. Combat {战斗 zhandou}10 was the first method of struggle of

violent confrontations. During that time, combat was the most fundamental expression

and content of war.

After man moved into class-based society, war became "the highest form of struggle in a

certain stage of development to solve conflicts between classes, races, nations, and

political groups." New means and modes of war developed. For a rather long period of

time, combat was the basic means to realize the goal of war. As social history developed

and war implemented, a phenomenon occurred: In a war, several large-scale engagements

{交战 jiaozhan} needed to occur before the mission of the war could be accomplished;

during each large-scale engagement, there were several combats, either consecutively or

simultaneous, before the goal of the operation could be accomplished. Thus, an

operational level that is between war and combat appeared. That level is the army

campaign.

II. Basic History of Development of Army Campaigns...358

During the long history of war, as productivity of society improved and various war

factors developed, the army campaign underwent a development process where its scale

went from small to large and its types and patterns went from simple to complex.

(1) Army campaigns in ancient times

Ancient Chinese army campaigns began in the 6th century BC and went through a long

history of more than 2,300 years, from the late Spring and Autumn period, the Warring

period, the Qin, Han, Sui, Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasty, to the 1840 Opium war.

The Wu-Chu Battle at Boju in 506 BC was considered by historians as the first more

complete army campaign. The main reasons are: First, engagement became an

intermediate activity of war. One engagement required several combat activities {战斗行

10 Translator’s note: Combat or it can be translated as battle or fight.
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动 zhandou xingdong} to complete. Secondly, the scale of the engagement expanded.

The forces involved in an engagement could be more than 200,000 persons. In an

engagement, the number of combats increased, mobility improved, and operational

offensive-defensive switching became more frequent. Thirdly, the duration of an

engagement was longer. Chinese army campaigns in ancient times could be divided into

two periods with the Song dynasty as the dividing boundary. There were the cold

weapons period, and the cold and hot weapons period. Weaponry, strength scale,

operational form-states, patterns and methods, the command system {tizhi} and means,

and operational guidance all witnessed continued advancement. The operational guidance

theories with unique ancient Chinese army campaign characteristics gradually

established.

In foreign countries, ancient army campaigns began in the 5th century BC and ended

during the Bourgeois Revolution in England in the mid 17th century, a development

history that lasted for more than 2,100 years. Historians believe that army campaigns

originated during the Greek-Persia war from 491-449 BC. Campaigns such as the battle

of Marathon, the Thermopylae campaign, and the Salamis campaign all possessed the

essential attributes and basic essential elements of army campaigns. From 490 BC to the

5th century AD was the developmental period of ancient army campaigns in foreign

countries. That was at the peak of the slave trade between Europe and the west Asian

continent. Alexander's expedition to the East, the Punic Wars, and the Roman civil war

occurred during this period. The scale, patterns, operational methods and operational

guidance of army campaigns acquired different characteristics and innovations. From the

5th century to the 14th century was the stagnation period of ancient army campaigns.

Europe just experienced the rise of the feudal society and was in a state of racial

segregation and feudal division. Many small countries were established. It was difficult

for these small countries to organize large-scale unified military activities. As a result,

army campaign operations stayed at a standstill. From the 15th century to the 17th

century was the rejuvenation period of army campaigns. The appearance of fire arms

gave the army campaigns a new boost on the road to further development. The Orleans

campaign of the England-French hundred year war, the Granada campaign in the

Byzantium-Turkey war, and the Spanish Naval Expedition against England all showed

new innovations and development. In particular, research in firearms, and improvement

in military organizational systems and operational methods paved the way for weapons

and equipment and campaign operations development during the recent times.

(2) Army campaigns in recent times

The history of Chinese modern army campaigns began in 1840 during the first Opium

war, and ended in 1919 during the "May 4th" movement. This period was close to 80

years in length and witnessed more than 50 campaigns, large and small. Army campaigns

that had major impacts on the development of army campaigns in recent times include the

following: the Yong'an campaign of the Taiping revolutionary war (January 1851-

February 1866), the Hukou campaign, the Sanhezhen campaign, the Pingrang campaign

of the Tianjing defensive campaign, the Sino-Japan war (July 1894 to April 1895), the
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Shandong peninsula defensive campaign, the Sichuan campaign of the Self Defense war

(December 1915 to December 1916), the Xiangxi [West Hunan province] campaign, the

Diangui [Yunnan Guangxi] border campaign, etc. During this period, the development of

army campaigns can be broadly divided into three phases. Phase one, from the Opium

war in 1840 to the defeat of the Taiping revolt. This was the extension of the ancient

army campaigns and the beginning of the modern army campaigns. The second phase

began in 1866 and ended in the Sino-Japan war in 1895. During this time, army

campaigns evolved and modernized. The third phase was from 1895 to 1919. During this

period, the army used modern methods to conduct army campaigns.

In foreign countries, army campaign development in the recent times began in 1640

during the Bourgeois Revolution to 1917 on the eve of the Russian Socialist Revolution,

a period of close to 280 years. During this period, the Bourgeois Revolution greatly

unleashed productivity of society, and industries developed by leaps and bounds. This

greatly raised the combat capabilities of army operations. The scale of the army began to

expand, and the authorized strength system was established. Many countries implemented

the compulsory military service system. Development in weapons and equipment in

particular advanced in great strides. As a result, the scale and ferocity of army campaigns

in foreign countries experienced unprecedented growth. Military theories also blossomed.

During this period, several tens of wars happened, and more than 20 of them were

influential. The more famous of the army campaigns included the following: campaigns

during the Independence Wars of the U.S., campaigns in the Napoleonic Wars,

campaigns in the Crimean War, and campaigns in the Sino-Russian War.

(3) Contemporary army campaigns

Contemporary army campaigns refer to army campaigns that occurred during and after

the two World Wars. Their development went through several important historical

periods.

The WWI period. During this period, there were significant changes in the structure of

the army campaign large formation. Operational capabilities improved greatly. The

importance of service arms such as the tank force and the engineering force increased

continuously. Radios were common and were deployed to the division-level operational

units. Chemical agents were used in large quantities. The birth of the Aviation force in

particular caused the structure of the army campaigns to experience revolutionary change.

To a certain extent, army campaigns began to become three-dimensional. These changes

directly led to the expansion of the scale of the army campaigns. Army campaigns of the

front army-level {方面军 fangmianjun}11 appeared. In one engagement, each side may

deploy several tens of group armies.

11 Front army: According to PLA Military Terms (1997), p. 151, "A level of military organization in

wartime composed of a number of group armies or corps. Ordinarily under the jurisdiction of the supreme

headquarters. It is composed of leadership staff and has jurisdiction over a certain number of combat units
405

The WWII period. The Second World War is a contemporary war of the largest-scale in

human history. During this period, contemporary army campaigns went through

unprecedented growth. The army campaign patterns diversified and operational methods

became more flexible. Encirclement {hewei} became the basic means of the army

offensive campaign. The status and function of mobility {jidong} in army campaigns

markedly improved. Army campaign command put more emphasis on overall planning

{chouhua} and stratagem application {moulue yunyong}. Army campaign theory came to

have a more obvious and direct guidance role in army campaign practice.

The local wars period after the World Wars. During the second half of the 20th century

after the two World Wars, local wars occurred frequently. The most notable are the

Vietnam War and the Middle East War. During the Vietnam War period, helicopters as

an important operational means were widely used and expanded from in the tactical areas

to the campaign level. The theory of combined operations12 involving multiple service

arms [or branches] further developed, new methods of coordination between branches

such as Army Aviation and Infantry Artillery appeared, and special operations became an

important part of army campaign operations. During the Middle East War, because a

large amount of advanced weapons and equipment were used, new army campaign

patterns appeared. The element of suddenness was valued unprecedentedly, and

innovative means and methods to achieve army campaign suddenness developed. The

duration of army campaigns tended to shorten, but consumption of war material tended to

increase.

The high-tech local wars period. After the end of the Cold War, global strategic scenarios

markedly changed. In certain areas, "cold peace" under the previous bipolar arrangement

collapsed and local wars became frequent. During this period, major wars that had

tremendous impact on the development of army campaigns included the following: the

Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. During the Gulf War period, electronic

warfare began to be an important operational method of army campaigns. Electronic

warfare was used throughout the war and applied to different aspects of engagement. The

strategic status of air defense operations improved and became an important army

campaign pattern. Traditional night combat and close combat were no longer the

'umbrella' protecting the technically inferior. Under high-tech conditions, the contents of

night combat and close combat were further enriched. During the Afghanistan War and

the Iraq War, the strategic status and function of the army gained new recognition. Army

battlefields remained to be an important battlefield in the war. The status of special

operations was more prominent. Cooperation between airborne firepower and special

operations activities on the ground became closer. The fusion of information, firepower

and land operational activities became even more intense, and the degree of integration

continues to improve.

and service support unit. It is a strategic campaign large formation composed of combined services and

branches/service arms." 12 Combined operations involving multiple service arms {诸兵种合同作战 zhubingzhong hetong zuzhan}.
406

(4) PLA army campaigns

Beginning with the Nanchang Revolution on 1 August 1927, the Chinese PLA has gone

through the Agrarian Revolutionary War, War of Resistance against Japan, War of

Liberation, War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, and struggles to protect the

border territories of the motherland, a total of more than 400 army campaigns. These

army campaigns were all different due to historical conditions and situations.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War. As the Chinese army grew from small to large,

from weak to strong, and from the initial creation to growing to a considerable size,

Chinese army campaigns also went through a transformation from guerrilla warfare {游

击战 youjizhan} to guerrilla mobile warfare {游击性运动战 youjixing yundongzhan}.

The establishment of the active defensive operational thought {积极防御作战思想 jiji

fangyu zuozhan sixiang}13 in particular gave unique operational characteristics to

Chinese army campaigns.

During the War of Resistance against Japan. During this period, because the contrast of

force strength between China and the adversary was very sharp, development of Chinese

army campaigns went through some hardship. As the Chinese army campaign strength

developed and campaign operational capabilities improved, the operational forms of the

army campaign transformed from primarily guerrilla warfare to primarily mobile warfare

{运动战 yundongzhan} and positional offensive warfare {阵地进攻战 zhendi

jingongzhan}. Guerrilla warfare began to transition into conventional warfare. Army

campaign theory was developing at an unprecedented pace.

During the War of Liberation. During this period, the Chinese army campaign force

developed by leaps and bounds. At the end of the War of Liberation, the total force

strength reached 6 million. In terms of structure, the development process was from a

single infantry with a small number of other service arms to a combination of multiple

services and service arms. The scale of army campaigns further expanded. An army

campaign generally involved more than 100,000 persons. For a river crossing army

campaign, it could involve a force of 120,000 persons. Campaign patterns diversified.

Mobile warfare, position warfare, and guerrilla warfare were alternately used. The art of

campaign command was greatly enriched.

During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. On the narrow battlefields of

the Korean peninsula, facing a U.S. military with absolute superiority in weapons and

13 Active defense operational thinking: According to PLA Military Terms (1997) active defense: Defense

that actively initiates offensive operations to counter an offensive enemy. Usually embodied in the active

campaign and battle offensive operations adopted in a strategic defense, or various types of offensive

operations adopted in campaign and tactical defenses, such as sallies from the first line defense position,

counter-attack by fire, counter-attack, counter-strike, anti-airborne defense, and deep attack, along with

using attrition and annihilation of the enemy to create the conditions for a shift to a counter-offensive.
407

equipment, the Chinese Volunteer army won five offensive campaigns consecutively and

gained valuable experience in mountain operations under modern conditions when

encountering an enemy with superior weapons and equipment. This prompted the army

campaign large formation to develop in order to meet the operational needs of modern

army campaigns.

The period after the founding of New China. During the defense of the security of the

motherland’s borders and operations to resist enemy local invasions, [the PLA] also

conducted a series of campaigns and operations that included the scale of the army

campaign and the nature of the army campaign. Generally speaking, each event

{yichang} of a war was one army campaign. Their main characteristics were: first were

the strategic quality of the army campaign and high level overall situation quality. Second

were the counterattack quality of the army campaign and their offensive, quickly decisive

and decisive battle qualities of the army campaign. Third were the complexity of the

army campaign and the arduous quality of the missions. Fourth were the regional quality

of the army campaign and their relative independent quality.

From the development process described above we can see the basic laws of army

campaigns: the military technology development pushes forward and props up army

campaign development; economic and natural conditions affect and constrain pulls along

campaign development; military strategy and war goals stipulate and limit army

campaign development; the development of military thought guides and tows army

campaign development; the real practices of army campaigns and their experiences

promote army campaign development.

III. Development Trends of Army Campaigns...363

New development trends of the future army are bought about by advancement in science

and technology, their application in the military domain, changes in the form-state of war,

development in military strategy and military thought, the widespread use of long-range,

rapid maneuver speed, high-lethality and high-precision weapons in particular, and

transformation of military internal structures and operational methods.

(1) The space of land battlefields is expanding, becoming full-depth and multidimensional.

As a result of development of long-range weapons and space weapons and improvement

in the long-range military transport capability, the area of army campaign activities and

the range of attack are expanding. The battlefield space is enlarging and the domains of

army campaigns are increasing. Most notable is the fact that the army campaign large

formation can make use of capabilities in the air, at sea, in space, and in the information

domain to support the land battlefield. As a result, this greatly expands the army

battlefield in battlefield depth and dimensions. For example, the army campaign large

formation can use multiple methods of transportation in the air, at sea, and on land to

cross oceans or implement long-range mobility. The army campaign large formation can
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cross theaters, mass forces, and deploy in a very short time. The army campaign large

formation, supported by strategic weapons, can launch large-scale operations and execute

full-depth multi-dimensional attacks in the full campaign depth and even the strategic

depth. Army campaign tactical missiles and all kinds of armored ground weapons can

mount a multi-direction, multi-layer and multi-dimensional surprise force and firepower

attack. Etc.

(2) In future army campaigns, the integrated-whole quality {整体性 zhengtixing} and the

level of integration will intensify.

As a result of advancement in weapons and equipment, the components of the army

campaign large formation will increase, the operational modes, methods, army campaign

types and patterns will further diversify, and battlefield space will further expand. These

will make the composition of future army campaigns more complex. Future army

campaigns are no longer a strength contest between single strengths, but a confrontation

of strengths of an integrated-whole {zhengti liliang}. They will be integrated operations

{yitihua zuozhan} conducted by all services and arms in even broader space domains,

employing more and more advanced weapons and equipment, applying a variety of

operational modes and patterns, and with more consistent adjusting-coordination.

(3) Weapons and equipment will continue to improve. High-tech contests will be more

intense.

As science and technology advances, all countries are emphasizing applying the latest

results of modern science and technology to transform weapons and equipment of the

military. In the army, continued employment of a large number of informationized

weapons and equipment that contain mainly precision guidance and information

technology has a direct impact on the progression of army campaigns and even on the

outcomes of the army campaigns. Continued transformation of weapons and equipment

enables weapon systems to be high-energy, diversified, automated, and intelligent.

Lethality is higher, firing range is longer, precision is better, and their impact on army

campaign operations is greater. The widespread use of these informationized weapons

gives army campaign activities a rich flavor of informationization. As a result, the

proportion of confrontations that involve high-tech weapons is higher. High-tech

weapons will become an important pillar for military survivability and victory. Thus, we

can predict that the battlefield of future army campaigns will be filled with high-tech

confrontations. The personnel-centric army campaign will be replaced by a technologycentric army campaign. The outcomes of high-tech contests between the opposing sides

will have a profound impact on the theory and methods of army campaigns.

(4) Campaign patterns and operational methods will trend towards diversity and

gradually become multifaceted and serialized.

Development in weapons and equipment will certainly bring about changes in campaign

patterns {zhanyi yangshi} and operations methods. Following the large-scale air warfare,
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amphibious landing, airborne, and tank warfares of two world wars, new operational

patterns and methods such as electronic warfare, missile warfare, firepower warfare, and

raid and long-range surprise raid {yuancheng benxi} operations, etc. have been widely

used in the subsequent local wars and have gradually developed towards [being] multifaceted and serialized. In future wars, as a result of the new military revolution and the

development and implementation of army campaigns, and the appearance and use of new

weapons and equipment, all types of new operational methods and patterns will emerge.

In future army campaigns, diversification in operational methods and patterns will

certainly become more pronounced.

(5) The tempo of campaigns will accelerate. The role of maneuver {jidong} will be more

notable.

In a future army campaign, because of improvements in the Army’s own maneuver

capability and its capability to utilize various information resources, the speed and tempo

of army campaign activities have accelerated, and this has caused status of the

“mobility”14 factor in campaign operations to further elevate. On the other hand,

maneuver can quickly concentrate force-strengths, enhance suddenness, strive for

initiative-shake off passivity, spur the army campaign large formation to put forth effort

in improving its own mobility, and subsequently result in continuous elevation of

maneuver’s status in the army campaign. In a future army campaign, the struggle

between maneuver and counter-maneuver {jidong yu fanjidong} will be extraordinarily

fierce.

(6) Offensive and defensive activities are closely connected. The status of offensive

activities will be more prominent.

Under informationized conditions, new weapons that have faster rate of fire, longer

range, higher precision, better lethality, and agile mobility provide advantageous

conditions to ground operations. Pure defense no longer exists. The key to operational

success is for the opposing sides to use all types of offensive activities to fight for

battlefield initiative. Though it is still necessary to organize necessary defensive activities

in a campaign, the offensive is taking the lead and plays a critical role. In a campaign,

during defensives there is offense, and during offensives there is defense. The switch

between offensive and defensive becomes quite frequent. Thus, taking the initiative and

seeking opportunities to launch offensive operations has become one of the important

principles of army campaigns. In future army campaigns, whether it is a defensive or

offensive campaign, a necessary option and the development trend is to use aggressive

offensive activities to achieve the goal of the campaign.

14 Translators note: the term jidong is interchangeable as maneuver and mobile. When used to indicate

movement or action to gain advantage over the enemy, the term is best rendered as maneuver.
410

(7) The status and function of campaign command will stand out. Requirements on the

quality and skills of command personnel will be higher.

Under informationized conditions, informationized command systems are widely used. A

necessary trend of operational command is automation and intelligent-ization. Speaking

of army campaign command in the future, because the battlefield is wide, there are

multiple points, long lines and broad fronts. Many aspects need to be taken into

consideration, and blind spots and blind angles may be a source of failure. Situations on

the battlefield change drastically, and the progress and tempo of army campaigns hasten;

consequently the time effectiveness of decision-making becomes more important. The

amount of information input and output is huge and the variables that may affect

command decision-making are numerous; consequently there is more uncertainty. The

above situation poses greater demand on army campaign command. A commander not

only must have superior command skills and solid stratagem depth, but also must be

familiar with and able to use advanced command means and tools so as to have the ability

to exercise highly effective and high-quality decision-making and command control. The

basic quality of the commander and the level of command ability and command skills

will directly affect the progress and outcome of the campaign. Thus, there is an urgent

need to improve the quality of the campaign commander and his command skills so as to

meet the needs of future army campaign operations.

(8) Army campaign's support needs are complex and confrontations are fierce.

In future army campaigns, the opposing sides will concentrate sharp weapons of all

service arms in fierce confrontations on the broad and multi-dimensional battlefield. In a

short period of time, the amount of consumption, casualties, and damage will increase. A

large amount of war material consumption, equipment damage, and personnel causalities

will pose a grave challenge on operational support. The campaign support mission

becomes more difficult and support structure will encounter change. This is particularly

difficult if the opposing sides consider destroying the opponent's support systems as an

important means to achieve the strategic and campaign goal. The widespread application

of high-tech weapons and equipment not only provides the material conditions for

attacking the opponent's support systems, but also makes the means of attack more

diversified. As such, the coverage of campaign support expands in an unprecedented

manner, the mission of support becomes extremely difficult, the contents of support

continue to increase, and the requirements for comprehensiveness and time effectiveness

becomes greater. The contest nature becomes prominent, the demand on technology is

evident, and the organization work is extraordinarily complex.

Section 3: Characteristics and Principles of Army Campaigns...366

The premise and foundation of studying army campaigns under informationized

conditions is to master the characteristics of army campaigns. Correctly determining and

adhering to the principles of army campaigns has very important significance for unifying
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army campaign thought, understanding army campaign laws, deepening army campaign

theory studies and guiding army campaign operational training and practice.

I. Characteristics of Army Campaigns...366

(1) The strategic quality of a campaign is strong and it possesses a decisive ground battle

nature

In local wars under informationized conditions, the Chinese military's strategic goal is

mainly to realize motherland unity and protect territorial integrity and ocean rights. The

main activities to achieve the goal of the local wars are to annihilate the enemy's effective

strength and capture the territories occupied by the enemy. The outcomes of the local

wars directly affect the fundamental interest of our country and our national dignity.

Though army campaigns are mostly carried out within joint campaigns, army campaigns

play a lead role in the eventual accomplishment of the strategic mission. The success of

army campaign activities directly affects the final outcome of the entire war, and as such

army campaigns are highly strategic in nature. In offensive operations, the enemy will not

be willing to give up without a fight. Most likely, the enemy will use the occupied

advantageous terrain and important cities or townships to fight a final battle. Under such

conditions, we must use army campaigns to annihilate the enemy and capture the

occupied territories in order to accomplish the strategic mission. In this sense, army

campaigns have the attributes of a final decisive attack. Similarly, in defensive

operations, the ability of army campaigns to stall the enemy's offensive and turn the

situation around will directly affect the progress of the local war and its final outcome.

(2) Campaign battlefields are more "transparent," and suddenness is harder to achieve

On the future informationized battlefield, an enemy that possesses informationized

weapons will use various high technologies in battlefield reconnaissance and

surveillance. The enemy's various platforms and technical reconnaissance and

surveillance equipment will form a multi-dimensional reconnaissance system that is

omni-directional, full-depth, and multi-layered, and has all-weather, high-resolution and

real-time reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Battlefields become more

"transparent," which poses great challenges to our campaign intention of concealment

and suddenness. Firstly, our operational activities will be under the enemy's continuous

surveillance. The enemy will be able to detect our targets and activities sooner and in a

broader space area. If we do not take effective denial and deception measures, it is very

difficult not to be detected by the enemy. Secondly, our army campaign large formation

has limited capabilities to resist the enemy's high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance

measures. The effectiveness of some of our traditional concealment and camouflage

measures is greatly diminished. It is very difficult to resist the enemy's high-tech

reconnaissance measures. Thirdly, our army campaign large formation's personnel,

equipment and logistics support force is immense in size. Our mobility is slow, and our

activities are easily exposed. It is very difficult to achieve "stealthiness." Therefore, a

problem army campaigns under informationized conditions must deal with is how to fully
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utilize stratagem and various measures to conceal our operational intentions and achieve

campaign suddenness, and how to achieve the campaign goal if our intentions are

exposed.

(3) Facing multiple enemy threats, battlefield protection becomes difficult

In the campaign operational area, the enemy that has high tech superiority has deployed

attack systems that cover different ranges, use different platforms, and possess different

attributes. The enemy also stresses early, long-range, and precision attack activities. Our

army campaign large formation will encounter serious threats of enemy attacks that are

from the air and on land, long-range and short-range, large area and precision, and hard

attack and soft destruction combined. Battlefield survival is difficult and battlefield

protection becomes a serious problem. Firstly, the enemy's attack area is wide, attack

range is far and attack precision is high. And the attack persists throughout the campaign.

From the time of combat ready to campaign execution, our army campaign large

formation is persistently under the threat of the enemy's long-range precision attack.

Secondly, the army campaign large formation has a huge number of personnel and

weapons and equipment, and the operational scale is large. It is very difficult to have a

keen grasp of the enemy's timing, scale, and target of attack timely and accurately. As a

result, it is easy for us to suffer from the enemy's unexpected attack, causing us to lose

operational capabilities. Thirdly, our self-defense capabilities are weak and our "arm" is

short. When we engage an enemy in a long-range precision attack, we are clearly at a

disadvantage. Thus, for the army campaign large formation, an important prerequisite to

win campaign victory is to adopt various effective measures to improve field

survivability and have close land-air coordination.

(4) Campaign patterns and operational methods are diverse. The proportion of high-tech

confrontations is significantly higher

Under informationized conditions, our army campaign large formation is composed of

multiple service arms. The degree of combine-ness is high; and multi-dimensional

maneuverability, fire attack, rapid assault, and support capabilities are better. In

campaign operations, our army campaign large formation can carry out operations of

different types, patterns and different nature. Our campaign large formation can

implement offensive and defensive, and the transition between offensive and defensive

can be very swift. Our army campaign large formation can carry out positional defensive

operations and maneuver defensive operations, using multiple depth attack means to

unfold the attack against the enemy's full depth simultaneously or alternately. Our army

campaign large formation can carry out offensive and defensive operations on land as

well as air defense operations. Our army campaign large formation can carry out

operations in tangible spaces and offensive and defensive operations in the formless

electromagnetic domain. As high technologies are more widely applied to army weapons

and equipment, the proportion of operational measures and activities with high

technology contents will increase day by day. For example, information operations, air

defense operations, precision firepower operations, and command control operations will
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persist from beginning to end. They will have direct impact on the survival of the army

campaign large formation and success of the campaign.

(5) Campaign activities are more affected by geographic environment

Under informationized conditions, army campaigns will be mainly conducted along the

coast and in border areas. Complex battlefield environments will bring about adverse

effects on campaign activities. First, the battlefield is in remote areas and the delivery of

campaign forces will be difficult. Secondly, the capacity of the battlefield is small, which

makes force-strength commitment difficult. Thirdly, the terrain is unfamiliar and the

socio-environment is complex. Fourth, the natural environment is unfriendly, which

makes it difficult to demonstrate operational effectiveness. Thus, when organizing and

implementing army campaigns, we must take into full consideration the influence and

constraints of the battlefield environment, and make campaign preparations carefully and

thoroughly.

(6) Land warfare modes are changing, command coordination requirements are higher

Under informationized conditions, army campaigns will be supported by multiple

services and service arms and will be enhanced by high-tech weapons and equipment.

The long range maneuverability of the troops and long-range attack capabilities has

improved. Modern land warfare modes have transformed from mainly horizontal and

linear operations to full-depth, multi-dimensional, and non-linear operations, which poses

greater requirements on campaign command coordination. First, the battle space is multidimensional and wide open. Command coordination areas have expanded from the

ground and the forward edge {前沿 qianyan} to include the ground, air, sea,

electromagnetic domain, and even the space domain. Secondly, the services and service

arms taking part in the campaign have multiplied and the number of command objects

{zhihui duixiang} has increased drastically. Command coordination not only includes

different arms of the army and their weapon systems {xitong}, but also other services and

arms and local armed strengths. Thirdly, force strength bushu disposition is more

dispersed. Operational activities occur at the front and on the flank, on the forward and in

depth, on the ground and in space, either simultaneously or alternately. This requires the

implementation of precise and highly effective adjusting-coordination between all

operational activities as well as between various systems {xitong}. Fourthly, struggle in

the electromagnetic domain is getting more intense and command confrontation is getting

more ferocious. Coordination actions can be easily disrupted and survival of the

command institution faces serious threats. This requires the adoption of various active

and effective measures to ensure the stability, promptness and effectiveness of command.

(7) Campaign support mission is arduous

Army campaign support includes operational support, logistical support and equipment

support. Under informationized conditions, because of the widespread use of new

technology weapons, attack precision has improved and damage level increased.
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Operations are more ferocious, and war material consumption has increased

unprecedentedly. The status of campaign support becomes more prominent, and the

support mission is difficult and arduous. First, the support objectives have increased and

the support range widened. Secondly, the mission of technical support is more

substantial. Thirdly, the difficulty level to stabilize the support system in the rear has

increased. Fourthly, the complexity of the battlefield environment poses many special

demands on campaign support. Thus, whether we can maintain the integrity of our

support system and ensure the smooth going of campaign support becomes an important

factor in determining the success or failure of a campaign.

II. Principles of Army Campaigns...369

Under informationized conditions, focusing on PLA’s campaign basic thought, new

characteristics of army campaigns, operational capabilities and possible development of

the army campaign large formation, situations of the main operational objects, as well as

heritage and development of PLA army campaign principles, we firmly establish the

following campaign principles:

(1) Know the enemy and know oneself. Match the subjective guidance with objective

realities

The foundation of correct decision-making is to gather a large amount of accurate

information. Correct decision-making is the condition to guide the campaign large

formation to win victory. In particular, under an operational condition where the enemy is

superior to us, this principle becomes more critical. On a certain material level, the

correctness of the subjective guidance is a decisive factor in campaign outcomes. Actual

war experience gave us the proof that knowing the enemy and knowing ourselves and

matching the subjective guidance with objective realities is a general principle for all

operational activities and is the basic principle that must be obeyed by army campaigns.

On land battlefields in the future, swift and accurate information and decisions has a

tremendous impact on the progress and outcome of campaigns. Firstly, the means to

capture and conceal information have increased, and the struggle between reconnaissance

and counter-reconnaissance is fiercer. Information warfare is present throughout the

entire campaign process and has decisive influence on the campaign. As a result,

battlefield confrontations {duikang 对抗}15 are often expressed as command

confrontations. Secondly, campaign situations change rapidly, which poses greater

demand on the timeliness of battlefield information gathering and correctness of

decision-making. Whichever side can capture the opposing side's information correctly

and whichever side can match the subjective guidance with objective realities will gain

the initiative. Otherwise, it will be forced into a passive state. Facing these new

situations, the difficulty level of knowing the enemy and knowing ourselves and of

15 Translator’s note: Can also be translated as countermeasure, resistance, warfare.
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implement correct campaign guidance will double and quadruple, and their impact on the

campaign will also increase.

(2) Wipe out {xiaomie} the enemy. Preserve ourselves

The prerequisite condition for effectively preserving ourselves is to wipe out the enemy.

Thus, wiping out the enemy comes first, preserving ourselves comes next. In particular,

when an overall situation calls for a sacrifice, the part being considered must absolutely

not preserve itself and affect the interest of the overall situation. In the campaign process,

sometimes it would be necessary to preserve the force. But this must be done from the

perspective of the interest of the overall situation, and wiping out the enemy is always of

primary importance. There is no exception in wars in the past, present, and future. Under

informationized conditions, army campaign operations rely very heavily on weapon

systems {xitong}. Military information technology-based high technologies have become

the pillar that sustains operational capabilities. Consequently, the meaning of wiping out

the enemy has broadened. It is no longer limited to wiping out the enemy’s effective

strength, but it attaches more importance on striking the enemy's high-tech weapons and

equipment and disrupting the whole operational system {tixi}. At the same time, the

ways to wipe out the enemy also has changed, not only can it be achieved by eliminating

their weapons and equipment and wiping out their effective strength, it can also be

achieved by destroying their weapon systems {xitong} and paralyzing their operational

system {tixi}. From the perspective of development, the latter can achieve the operational

goal of wiping out the enemy and preserving ourselves more easily. Thus, in a future

army campaign, we should consider the enemy's ground operational groupings, command

and control systems {xitong}, weapons and equipment systems {xitong}, electronic

communications systems {xitong}, and assisting- and safeguarding-support systems

{xitong} as the main strike targets. The operational activities of seizing cities, seizing

land, holding cities, and holding land should be conducted centering on these targets.

(3) Concentrate strengths and break the enemy one by one

The material basis and the basic method to gain victory in an army campaign are to

concentrate superiority of strengths at the right time and annihilate {jianmie} the enemy

one by one. To speak more plainly, military struggles are basically confrontations and

contests of strengths. Having superiority of strength increases the probability for gaining

victory. Concentrating strengths means to form an overwhelming material basis against

an opponent by quickly gathering a localized strength and creating superiority in a

specified time and space. This is one of the important methods for the PLA to overcome

the enemy and gain victory. In a future army campaign, to defeat an enemy, one must still

persist in the principle of concentrating the use of campaign strength. What should be

noted is that under informationized conditions, the meaning of concentrating strengths

has changed. The concentration of force-strength quantity is no longer the only sense of

concentrating strengths, and in a certain sense, qualitative concentration [of strengths] has

already ascended to an even higher position. Thus, in a future army campaign, at the
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same the PLA carries out the principle of concentrating strengths, it must attach

importance to concentrate the use of crack forces and cutting-edge weaponry, and attach

importance to concentrate strike effectiveness. It must also correctly grasp the

relationships between quantitative concentration and qualitative concentration, using this

to remedy deficiencies and reduce the gap the superiority and inferiority gap between our

two sides.

(4) Full preparations and rapid response

The prerequisite for ensuring army campaign victory under informationized conditions is

full preparations centered on mission needs-requirements and rapid response in

accordance with activity {xingdong} requirements. In the course of the army campaign,

there is an inseparable relationship between full preparations and rapid response. Only

when one is fully prepared will one be able to give rapid and correct response under

different situations. Moreover, rapid and correct response is an important factor for

seizing initiative and preventing passivity. An army campaign under informationized

conditions puts forth even higher requirements on campaign full preparations and rapid

response. Firstly, unanticipated factors and abruptly occurring reasons that may lead to a

campaign are increasing, which requires that the army campaign large formation maintain

a high readiness state so that the army campaign large formation can respond rapidly

when an incident abruptly occurs. [In this manner,] one can accomplish imminent battle

preparations in the shortest time and enter into a combat alert state. Secondly,

reconnaissance capabilities have improved and battlefield environment is more

transparent. This demands that preparation work of the army campaign large formation

must be done in a more concealed manner. Thirdly, operational systems are more

complex and essential elements are more numerous. This requires that the army 

campaign large formation must strengthen its planning quality, apply various effective

modes, and even more carefully and fully successfully accomplish campaign

preparations.

(5) Conceal and sudden. Take the enemy by surprise

If we can launch a sudden attack at the enemy at an unanticipated time and place, we can

achieve the goal of paying a small price to obtain a greater victory. Thus, this is an

important principle in army campaign operations. The core of this principle is to take the

enemy by surprise and launch a fierce attack against the enemy suddenly, catching the

enemy off guard and unable to develop its operational effectiveness. Future army

battlefields are more transparent, and operational activities will be more difficult to

conceal. However, advanced technical equipment and means have their shortcomings and

weaknesses as well. If we can make full use of the complex battle environment, utilize

standard denial and deception equipment and expedient camouflage equipment, as well as

agile maneuver tactics, we can very effectively weaken the enemy's reconnaissance

capabilities, and cause the enemy to make judgmental errors. Therefore, as long as we use

the right measures and methods, it is totally possible to achieve operational
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suddenness under informationized conditions and launch unexpected sudden attack

against the enemy.

(6) Agile maneuverability. Strive to gain the initiative

Capturing and sustaining the initiative is the key to campaign victory. In the past and at

present, in China and in foreign countries, the campaign process is always a process of

switching between being active and passivity. Whoever can win the initiative will be able

to win final victory. Thus, the initiative is the right to freedom of movement of the

military. Freedom of movement is the lifeline of the military. In future army campaigns,

the impact of informationized weapons and equipment on operational activities will far

surpass the impact of weapons and equipment of the past. Generally, which ever side that

has superiority in weaponry will have control of the initiative. On the contrary, which

ever side that is inferior in weaponry will be difficult to get away from being passive.

War experiences in the past demonstrated that superiority or inferiority of the operational

strength alone cannot completely determine the outcome of operations. The side that has

inferiority of strength can turn the inferior state to superiority and even gain the initiative

if it works hard, and is able to flexibly handle situations, employ force-strengths and

change fighting methods. Thus, in future army campaign operations, the struggle

centering on seizing initiative will be fiercer and will dominate the entire process of the

campaign.

(7) Full depth operations. Strike the enemy's vital areas {yaohai}

This means conducting effective strikes in all parts of the campaign battlefield where the

key points of strikes {daji de zhongdian} are the key-link points {guanjiedian} and vital

area targets {yaohai mubiao} involving the overall campaign situation. Persisting in

depth full-dimensional operations, attaching importance to striking the enemy’s vital

areas, effectively disrupting the structure of the enemy’s integrated-whole operations {di

zhengti zuozhan jiegou}, and quickly paralyzing the enemy’s operational system {tixi}

[all] have important significance for decisive annihilation of the enemy. In an army

campaign under informationized conditions, in particular, the distance of attack of the

campaign large formation has extended greatly, and the demarcation line between the

forward and the rear has blurred. The fighting method of pushing forward layer-by-layer

{ceng ceng tuijin 层层推进} is out-dated. Conducting effective strikes with key points

against the enemy's full-depth and in all directions can cause the enemy to be pressed

from the front and from the rear, thus unable to guard its head and tail at the same time. It

can also disrupt the enemy's command and paralyze the enemy's system {tixi}. At the

same time, this can give a powerful shock to the enemy, interfere and disrupt the enemy's

campaign resolution {zhanyi juexin 战役决心}, and cause changes to the enemy’s

campaign tactics. As a result, this may create a favorable situation for our side, or even a

total change in the enemy's strategic resolution or abandonment of its defensive and

holding intention.
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(8) Unified command. Close coordination

Centralized and unified command and consistently adjusting-coordinated activities are

the objective requirements for ensuring the formation of an integrated-whole composite

strength {zhengti heli} of all participating services and arms and other campaign

strengths and [the objective requirements] for winning campaign victory. The army

campaign is a complete operational system {xitong} constituted from a variety of factors.

Its strength structure is complex, its operational forms are diverse, and its battlefield

situations are varied. Not implementing unified command and effective control and

adjusting-coordination will result in not being able to form an integrated-whole

composite strength {zhengti heli}, and even worse, it can create internal frictions or the

situation of a plate of loose sand {一盘散沙 yipan sansha}16 may emerge. In an army

campaign under informationized conditions, in particular, a series of new situations occur

in operational command. For example, there are more technical arms and thus

constituting the campaign strength is complex; there is an increase in science-technology

content of command systems {xitong}, and thus there is stronger reliance on technology;

command confrontation grows more acute every day; and the degree of difficulty in

unified command and close coordination enlarges daily. These [new situations] puts forth

even more requirements on campaign command and coordination. Thus, carrying out

unified command and close coordination are requirements of the basic law of army

campaigns.

(9) Full scale support, give prominence to key points

In campaign support, one must give prominence to the integrated-whole quality, and by

setting out from the overall campaign situation, [one must] fully mobilize and organize

various strengths, comprehensively apply various support means, form an integratedwhole support setup {zhengti baozhang geju}, and implement integrated support {yitihua

baozhang}. At the same time, one must give prominence to key points {tuchu zhongdian}

so as to ensure that support of the campaign’s critical-quality activities and links can keep

up. War experiences have shown that implementing full-scale and key point support are

important conditions for the smooth conduct of a campaign. Especially under

informationized conditions, war materiel consumption is immense, and the degree of

reliance of operational activities on various types of support has become greater. All

support systems {xitong} have become important targets for both sides to strike. Thus,

implementing a full scale support as well as with key points becomes particularly

important. In this regard, first, we must establish a flexible and reliable support system

{tizhi} and support bushu disposition; secondly, we must unify and organize all support

activities and ensure that the support activities fit the operational activities; thirdly, we

must key point support the needs-requirements of the main operational direction, main

operational strengths, main operational activities and special technical equipment;

fourthly, we must fully mobilize and apply the local assisting-support and safeguarding16 A plate of loose sand: An expression often used to describe a lack of cooperation and coordination, with

each element caring for its own interest.
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support strengths, combine military and civilian, safeguard the smooth conduct of the

campaign and ensure the security of the campaign rear.

(10) Bring into play political superiority. Demonstrate our superior attitude

[We must] bring into play the PLA’s political superiority, demonstrate our superior

attitude, and strengthen campaign political work. We must use our strength to attack the

enemy's shortcomings in order to guarantee our campaign victory. It is our military's

magic weapon to use our political dominance to overcome the enemy. It is also our

military's honored tradition to emphasize the human factor, unite ourselves, crumble the

enemy, and conquer the enemy. In future army campaigns, the impact of informationized

weapons and equipment on the progress and outcome of the campaign will be greater.

However, because we still use people as the main body for the operations, the

fundamental factor that determines victory is still people, not materiel. Our military has

powerful political work and demonstrates superior bravery and resolve to win. This will

play an even more important role on highly informationized modern battlefields. Because

of this, firstly, we must use various means to raise the morale of our military and

stimulate their patriotism and heroism so as to from powerful combat capabilities.

Secondly, we must persist in the unified leadership of the party committee towards the

campaign, and ensure a high degree of unity campaign strength thought and activities.

Thirdly, we must thoroughly open-up development {kaizhan} in political mobilization;

educate force-units to establish the confidence for courage to fight-be sure to win {ganda

bisheng}; establish the perspective of overall situation and the thoughts of complement

with initiative and closely coordinate; promote the combat style of being heroic and

indomitable, not afraid of sacrifice, continuous operations. Fourthly, we must adopt

effective measures, successfully accomplish masses work {qunzhong gongzuo} and

strengthen the unity of military-political and military-civilian. Fifthly, open-updevelopment {kaizhan} of public opinion warfare {yulunzhan}, psychological warfare

and legal warfare against the enemy with a variety of modes and channels, collapse the

enemy military’s will to fight, and divide and the enemy’s military strengths {liliang} so

as to cause them to weaken or lose their combat power.

Section 4: Army Campaign Preparation and Implementation...374

Army campaign preparation and implementation is, in accordance with higher level

intent, the unified overall-planning and organizing of the campaign, the correct

application of the campaign strengths, the flexible application of fighting methods and

operational means, and on the basis of objective materialism, the fully bringing into play

of subjective dynamic quality to seize campaign victory.

Under informationized conditions, army campaign preparations and implementation are

constrained by factors such as the overall situation of the joint campaign and politics, etc.

The organizing and planning {jihua} work is arduous and the command cycle is

shortened. Campaign activities are diverse and control and adjusting-coordination are

difficult. Command domain confrontation is intense, and command stability and
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command system survival face serious threats. Thus, in the preparation and

implementation process, the commander and command organ specifically must: have a

footing on the overall situation and meticulously overall-plan; scientifically forecast and

have multiple preparations; be adept in stratagems and flexibly apply force; nimbly

respond and effectively command; unified control and integrated-whole adjustingcoordination; carefully support and ensure stability.

I. Army Campaign Preparations...374

In army campaign preparation under informationized conditions, the work is complex,

the work load is heavy, the time effectiveness quality is strong, and the requirements are

high. The campaign commander and his command organ must understand the battlefield

situations at all times, have full control of the overall situation, full scale unified overallplanning, look after the key points. They must improve work methods and means, raise

command effectiveness, and accomplish meticulous operations research {yunchou}, be

prudent in decision-making, and carefully organize.

(1) Establish the campaign command system {tixi}

The campaign command system {tixi} is an organic integrated-whole that is constituted

of command institutions at each level and each type in the army campaign. It is the

organizing basis for achieving campaign goals, unified will, unified activities and unified

command, and it is a necessary condition for effectively implementing campaign

command.

Under informationized conditions, battlefield situations are complex and changing

constantly. The command system model {zhihui tixi moshi} should be combined with

realities to conduct a scientifically constructed structure. From the perspective of army

campaign scale, the command system can be divided into two types. The first is the Army

army-group campaign command system {jituanjunqun zhanyi zhihui tixi}. Normally one

establishes two levels of campaign command institutions {zhanyi zhihui jigou} – Army

army-group level and the Army group-army level. This can be independently established

by the theater {zhanqu} or established based on a given Army group-army. The theater

sends representatives, incorporating and augmenting the participation of service forceunit {junzhong budui} commanders. It normally receives the command of the joint

campaign command institution of its operational direction, and sometimes, it can directly

receive the command of the Supreme Command {tongshuaibu} and command an Army

basic campaign large formation below it. The second is the group-army campaign

command system {lujun jituanjun zhanyi zhihui tixi}. Normally, one establishes a group

army first-level campaign command institution {jituanjun yiji zhanyi zhihui jigou} that

commands the force-units within its campaign task-organization based on organizational

system relationships.

The task organization of the command institution refers to composing an organic

integrated-whole from Army campaign command strengths on the basis of the needs-
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requirements for carrying out different operational command functions. The form of its

task organization should combine operational realities and be rationally determined

Normally, one establishes a main command post, an alternate command post, and a rear

command post. When necessary, one can establish a forward command post, a directional

command post, etc.

—The main command post {jiben zhihuisuo} is normally composed of the command

center, intelligence center, communications center, information warfare center, firepower

center, etc. The command center is the core of the main command post. It is composed of

the army campaign large formation commander, the augmented service commander

{jiaqiang junzhong zhihuiyuan}, operations, confidential-security, and other relevant

departments and personnel such as military affairs, political, logistics and equipment. It is

mainly responsible for conducting campaign decision making, formulating the campaign

general plan {jihua} and associated sub-plans {fenzhi jihua}, issuing operational orders

and instructions, grasping [understanding] the operational postures, adjustingcoordination of operational activities, and guiding and adjusting-coordinating the

planning {jihua} and organizing work of the entire command post. The intelligence

center is composed of the reconnaissance office of the campaign large formation and

relevant intelligence personnel. The intelligence center is mainly responsible for unified

planning and coordination of intelligence reconnaissance of the army forces and forces of

other services and service arms that support the operation. It is also responsible for

centrally processing the intelligence collected from various sources. The communications

center is composed of the communications office of the campaign large formation and

relevant personnel of other forces that are responsible for communications and command

automation. The communications center is responsible for unified planning and

coordination of communications support and organizing and directing the use of the

command automation system. The information warfare center is composed of the

commander responsible for information warfare and technical engineering personnel. The

information warfare center is responsible for unified planning and coordination of the use

of various information warfare forces of the campaign large formation and their

operational activities. The firepower center is composed of relevant personnel of the

artillery, air defense, and army aviation force and relevant personnel of the operational

teams [xiaozu] of the services that support the operation. The firepower center is mainly

responsible for the unified planning and coordination of ground fire support and groundto-air operations. The firepower center also supervises and coordinates the use of the air

space over the operational area.

—The reserve command post {预备指挥所 yubei zhihuisuo}.The reserve command post

is established based on the operational need to ensure stability of campaign command. It

is normally composed of the deputy commander of the campaign large formation and

other essential personnel. The reserve command post is equipped with the necessary

command automation system and communications equipment. The reserve command

post is established at the same time the basic command post is established. When

necessary, it can take over command from the basic command post. The location of the
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reserve command post should maintain a certain distance from the basic command post to

ensure that the two command posts will not be destroyed simultaneously.

—The rear command post {后方指挥所 houfang zhihuisuo}.The rear command post is

the command structure that provides unified command of logistical and equipment

support and is responsible for the defense of the rear. The rear command post is normally

composed of the deputy commander of the campaign large formation who is responsible

for logistics and equipment, logistics and equipment office(s), local personnel responsible

for supporting the frontline, and representatives from the headquarters and political

department. The rear command post is equipped with the corresponding command

automation system or communications equipment. The rear command post can be

organized into the rear command center, the logistics and support center, the equipment

support center, and the rear defense center.

—The forward (directional) command post {前进(方向)指挥所 qianjin {fangxiang}

zhihuisuo}. This is a supporting command structure to enhance the command of the main

operational direction of the campaign. Normally, it is led by the deputy commander of

military affairs of the campaign large formation and supported by the staff personnel for

operations and administration, and staff personnel of the engineering and artillery force.

The advance command center is equipped with the command automation system or

communications equipment. Based on the situation, the advance command center can be

organized into the command center, the firepower coordination center, and the support

center, etc.

(2) Determine the campaign concept {战役方针 zhanyi fangzhen}

The campaign concept is the basic intention of the campaign and the principle formulated

to achieve this intention. It is an important content of campaign overall planning and the

fundamental basis for organizing and implementing the campaign. The process for

determining the campaign concept is in effect the general stratagem-planning process for

the activities of the entire campaign. Normally, it is determined according to higher level

intent, campaign strengths and missions, battlefield environment, and enemy situation,

etc.

Determining the campaign concept is a feature of PLA campaign command, and is the

traditional way for the PLA to overall plan a campaign. Historical experiences show that

whether the campaign concept is correct or not has a direct effect on the success or failure

of the campaign. There are generally three situations for determining the army campaign

concept. First, if the army campaign large formation is carrying out a campaign mission

within the task-organization of a joint campaign, its campaign concept is normally

determined by higher levels. Secondly, if the army campaign large formation is

independently carrying out campaign missions, the army campaign commander puts forth

the campaign concept and reports it to higher levels for approval. Thirdly, the army

campaign commander is formulated through consultations between the campaign

commander and higher levels.
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The contents of the campaign concept mainly include the campaign goal and the basic

methods to attain this goal. Because situations under which a campaign is implemented

may differ, there is no fixed content of the campaign concept.

1. Campaign goal

The campaign goal is the anticipated outcome of the army campaign. It is the core

content of the campaign concept. Among all the contents of overall planning the

campaign, it is of primary importance and plays a lead role. If there is no clearly defined

campaign goal, the entire campaign operation will lose its general objective[s]. Thus, the

army campaign commander must pay special attention to this problem and focus on

solving it. When determining the campaign goal, one not only must take into

consideration the military goal, but also the effects on politics, diplomacy, and

economics, etc. One must begin with the main objective conditions and rationally

determine the campaign goal. If the campaign goal is too high or too conservative, it may

bring about undesirable outcomes. If the campaign goal is in conflict with higher level

intent, the campaign commander should put forth his own recommendation by seeking

truth from reality.

2. Operational direction {作战方向 zuozhan fangxiang}

The operational direction is the direction of activities (or the target area} where the army

campaign large formation carries out the operational mission. The operational direction

includes the operational direction of the offensive campaign and the operational direction

of the defensive campaign. When selecting the operational direction, one should take into

consideration the following: The direction must be advantageous to the swift

achievement of the overall goal of the campaign. It must be an operational target that

facilitates achieving the campaign intention. It must have battlefield conditions that are

beneficial to the deployment of the campaign large formation for operational activities. It

must allow easy coordination of multiple operational directions. Etc.

3. Operational target {mubiao}

In an army campaign operation, the operational target is the main object selected for the

annihilating attack or the location selected to capture or defend. Selecting the operational

target is the most important aspect when determining the army campaign concept. The

campaign operational target is a hierarchical system which includes the overall target and

sub-targets, the current target and follow-on targets, etc. When making target decisions,

normally there are three situations. First, if the higher level has already determined the

respective level’s operational target, the commander of the respective level should divide

the operational target determined by the superior into several sub-targets and assign these

sub-targets to the subordinating forces rationally. Second, if the higher level has only

stipulated the operational area and an outline of the operational mission, then the

campaign commander should select the operational targets. Third, if a sudden change

occurs on the battlefield and the operational target determined during the initial phase of
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the operation is no longer suited to meet the need of the current operation, and time is

pressing, at this time, if the higher level has clarified in outline the operational mission

and the operational direction, or the higher level did not clarify it in time, the operational

target will be provisionally determined by the campaign commander at the respective

level. When choosing operational targets, the commander should focus on the needsrequirements of the strategic and campaign overall situation and select targets that are

most beneficial to achieving the general goal[s] and that are easy successful and are

advantageous to the follow-on development of the campaign. Special attention should be

given to the selection of initial battle targets. Normally, the commander should follow the

principle of capturing the weaker first before capturing the tougher, gaining operational

experience first before gradually expanding the scale of the attack. The commander

should take into consideration the enemy's campaign bushu disposition and the multidimensional nature of the battlefield space, and pay attention to possible change of the

targets. In specific, the commander should pay special attention to the high-tech weapon

systems that pose the greatest threat to us and consider those as the campaign targets and

attack them first.

4. Basic fighting methods {战法 zhanfa}

Basic fighting methods of the army campaign operations refer to general fighting

methods. Under informationized conditions, the operational space is wide, and forms of

activities complex and diversified. In one campaign, there are often multiple operational

forms, methods and means. The campaign commander must start with the actual situation

of the battlefield and focus on the overall situation of the campaign and the total process

when choosing operational forms and methods. These fighting methods should be most

advantageous to overcoming the enemy and demonstrating the strength of the Chinese

military. These fighting methods make use of our strength and attack the shortcomings of

the enemy. The commander should take care of all domains and all phases, and at the

same time put the emphasis on the main operational form that is decisive to the progress

and the outcome of the campaign. The campaign commander should use multiple

operational methods comprehensively in conjunction with the main operational form and

method. He should combine offensive with defensive, integrate the air with the ground,

and connect forces with firepower, striving to use a combination of forms and methods to

overcome the enemy. The campaign commander should put stratagem into applying

fighting methods, striving to win by using surprise methods and obtaining the greatest

success with the least price.

5. Campaign steps {buzhou}

Campaign steps {buzhou} are the phase differentiations {jieduan huafen} accomplished

for the course of the army campaign. It is an important content in determining the

campaign concept. There are differences in differentiating the campaign phases for

different campaign types {leixing} and campaign patterns {yangshi}, so the campaign

commander should focus on organizing beneficial campaign activities, adjustingcoordination for campaign strengths, and having a grasp of the campaign tempo in
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conducting scientific differentiation [of the campaign phases]. In determining the

campaign steps, one must pay attention to conform to the course of the campaign, center

on the campaign general goal[s] and correctly determine the operational targets that the

goals one must reach in every phase; one must closely link each of the campaign phases,

look after each from beginning to end and form an integrated-whole; the activity essential

elements included in each phase must be appropriate with facilitating organizing

command as the principle.

6. Employment of campaign strengths

The employment of campaign strengths is the general vision for applying army campaign

strengths. In determining the employment of campaign strengths, one not only should

fully bring into play the integrated-whole might {zhengti weili} of all services and arms,

but one must also broadly mobilize people and masses in the theater to carry out militarypolice-civilian integrated operations and to the greatest extent unearth the campaign

potential; one must give prominence to the key points of strength employment,

concentrate strengths in the main direction, main battlefield, main phases and timeopportunities, form localized superiority against the enemy, push forward the smooth

development of the campaign so as to facilitate quick opening of the battle situation; one

must focus on the strong points of each force-unit, correctly select and employ

operational strengths, and appropriately delegate operational missions; one must have

grasp of powerful campaign reserve strengths, maintain sustained operational capabilities

and respond to unexpected situations.

In army campaign operations, it is not necessary to put forth a contextually complete

campaign concept for each campaign. Sometimes, one can focus on the important aspects

described above and select the most prominent aspect and the most critical issue to

formulate the campaign concept. Based on the different situations, one can emphasize

campaign goals, campaign fighting methods, or campaign steps {buzhou}, as well as

adding a simple and to the point formulation. Other times, one can consider combining

the determination of the campaign concept and setting of the campaign resolution.

(3) Setting the campaign resolution

[Setting] the campaign resolution is the process of choices made by an army campaign

commander for the series of major issues relating to the campaign concept, and [made]

on the basis of fully comprehending and grasping the situations such as the enemy

situation, our situation, geographical environment, etc. The campaign resolution is the

fundamental basis for the planning {jihua} and organizing a campaign.

1. Content of the campaign resolution

The content of the campaign resolution mainly includes: campaign intention, main

operational direction and area, basic means, campaign bushi disposition, campaign

initiation [start] time, and command post set up, etc.
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—The campaign intention {战役企图 zhanyi qitu} is the goal to be achieved in a

campaign. When the higher level has already determined the campaign intention, the

resolution should then clarify how to realize the intention. The campaign intention must

conform to the higher level intent. Its expression should be concise and to the point, easy

to understand and fulfill, and it should not be ambiguous.

—The main operational direction and operational area {主要作战方向和地区 zhuyao

zuzhan fangxiang he diqu}. The main operational direction and operational area is the

direction for concentrating and employing force-strengths and weaponry and the area for

implementing the main campaign activities. The main operational direction and

operational area should be determined in accordance with higher level intent, enemy

situation, our situation, geographical environment characteristics, etc. In one army

campaign, there can be many operational directions, but at any one time there should be

only one main direction and area. In an offensive campaign, it is called the main

offensive direction and area to be seized-occupied. In a defensive campaign, it is called

the main defensive direction and area to firmly defend. Under informationized

conditions, the main operational direction is more likely to change. When determining the

main direction, the campaign commander should take into consideration the method to

switch the main direction when a situation is fundamentally changed.

—Basic means {基本手段 jiben shouduan}. These are the basic operational modes and

methods to conduct army campaigns. Different campaign types {leixing}, campaign

patterns, and operational environments and objects have different operational modes and

methods. It should be determined on the basis of the campaign intention, force-strength

organization, enemy situation, terrain, etc., and it should be flexibly changed during the

campaign course on the basis of changes to missions and the enemy situation.

—Campaign bushi disposition {战役布势 zhanyi bushi} refers to the mission

differentiation, organizational grouping and deployment accomplished for the campaign

strengths. The army campaign large formation normally adopts the group-style campaign

bushi disposition {集团式战役布势 jituanshi zhanyi bushi} or the echelon-style

campaign bushi disposition {梯队式战役布势}, or a combination of both of the above.

The group-style campaign bushi disposition means the forces are divided according to the

mission. For example, during an offensive, the forces can be divided into the forward

attack group {qianyan gongji jituan}, the deep attack group {纵深攻击集团 zongshen

gongji jituan}, the delay reinforcement group {阻援集团 zuyuan jituan}, the ground fire

group, etc. During a defensive, they are divided into the defense-hold group and the

maneuver operations group, etc. The echelon campaign bushi disposition is normally

differentiated according to the ordering sequence for entry into campaign engagements,

and they are generally divided into first echelon, second echelon, reserve {yubeidui} and

all-services reserve forces, etc. The organized grouping of the campaign strength should

have a rational structure and proper grouping-allocations {bianpei}. The deployment of

the campaign strengths should have a rational arrangement, not only must one consider

the inter-linking of various organized groupings, but one must fully consider the survival
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issue. The campaign bushi disposition must facilitate being able to respond to a variety of

situations.

—Campaign initiation time {zhanyi faqi shijian}. This means to make clear when a

campaign starts. In an army offensive campaign, one should clarify the time for

completing offensive preparations and the time for initiating attack. In a defensive

campaign, one should clarify the time limit to complete defensive preparations.

—Setting up the command post. This is mainly clarifying the composition of each

command post at their respective levels, their set up time and their locations.

2. Process of setting the campaign resolution

Setting the campaign resolution is a process whereby the army campaign commander

analyzes, evaluates, and reconsiders the factors that may affect the campaign. It is a

process whereby the campaign commander makes logical inferences of the objective

situation. The correctness of it directly relates to campaign success or failure. The basic

process is as follows:

—Understand the mission. It is mainly to understand the intent of the superior and to

clarify the mission of the campaign. Understanding the intent of the superior mainly

refers to understanding the operational mission and goal of the superior. Some times it

also includes the timing and means of the operational activities the superior has in mind.

Normally we should gain an understanding of the mission based on the following: Gain

an understanding based on the campaign concept defined by the superior. Gain an

understanding based on the political, economic, and diplomatic struggle at the time. Gain

an understanding based on the instructions given by the superior and change in the

enemy's intelligence. And gain an understanding based on objective realities on the

battlefield. Clarifying the campaign mission means understanding the campaign mission

at one’s respective level and the status of carrying out the mission. If the higher level has

already stipulated the operational mission of one’s respective level, one should

completely comprehend the mission delegated by the higher level. If the higher level has

not clarified the operational mission of one’s respective level, then one should actively

put forth the mission[s] higher level intent and the objective realities and situations of the

battlefield and execute after it is reported and approved by higher levels.

—Assess the situation. It mainly means making a comprehensive analysis and assessment

of the situation based on enemy situation, friendly force situation, geographical

environment, etc. Assessing the enemy situation is mainly to ascertain the enemy's

campaign intention, force task-organization, main operational direction, strengths and

weaknesses, possible employment time-opportunities and directions of high-tech

weapons, time-opportunities and modes of electronic interference, etc. Assessing our

situation is mainly to analyze and assess one’s own operational capabilities, the strengths

of various services and arms, and the capability to complete the campaign mission, etc.

Assessing the geographical environment mainly involves analyzing and assessing the
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social, economic, and natural conditions of the operational area and their possible effect

on our campaign activities. When assessing the various situations, we should pay

attention to comprehensive analysis, identify the advantages and avoid the disadvantages,

and obtain correct conclusions.

—Listen to recommendations. In order to completely and correctly comprehend

situations, during the course of considering the campaign resolution, the army campaign

commander should listen to situation reports and recommendations of the campaign

command organ and the commanders of subordinate services and arms. The campaign

commander not only can concentrate all and listen, he can also listen separately; not only

can he listen completely, he can also only listen to the necessary portions; not only can he

separately listen to reports from organizational units and departments, he can also have

the chief of staff to make a comprehensive report.

—Make a decision. On the basis of the aforementioned process, the army campaign

commander should form the campaign resolution step-by-step. If time is pressing and the

situation is not quite clear, the campaign commander can first set a preliminary

resolution, and then on the basis of developing changes in the situation, step-by-step

perfect the resolution proposal {juexin fang’an}. Even when the grasp of various

situations become more clear, the campaign commander should still set out from the most

difficult and most complex situation, formulate a variety of resolution proposals, compare

them and select the optimum proposal. When necessary, he can conduct demonstrations

{lunzheng} via computer simulation or various real exercises, and further make

modifications and improvements in an attempt to set down a correction resolution.

(4) Formulate the campaign plan {jihua}

The campaign plan {jihua} is a plan formulated to guide campaign preparations and

campaign activities in order to accomplish campaign missions. It is the specific reflection

of the army campaign commander resolution, and it is the basis for organizing and

commanding operational preparations and activities. It is also the most important work of

the campaign command organ during the campaign preparations phase. Generally, it

includes the campaign operational activity plan {jihua} and the campaign support plan

{jihua}.

1. The campaign operational activity plan

The campaign operational activity plan is the core of the entire campaign plan. It can be

divided into the general plan {zongti jihua} and the sub plans {fenzhi jihua}.

—The general plan is the army campaign commander's general arrangement and

considerations for the campaign operational activities, and it is also the basis for

formulating the sub plans {fenzhi jihua}. The main contents include: situation assessment

conclusions; higher level intent; campaign concept and principles; campaign missions,

friendly force's mission and boundary lines; campaign bushu disposition; campaign phase
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divisions, situation scenarios, and contingency proposals {chuzhi fang’an};

predetermined campaign initiation time and time to complete campaign preparations and

organizing of command, etc. Normally, the chief of staff is in charge of the general plan

{zongti jihua}, and with the operational department in the lead, it is jointly formulated

with participation from the relevant administrative department and relevant personnel

from force-units of augmented reinforcement services and arms.

—The sub plans are concrete arrangements and plans for a particular part of the

campaign operational activities. They provide necessary details and supplemental plans

to the general plan. The sub plans normally include the following: counterreconnaissance plan, information warfare and network warfare plan, air defense plan,

firepower plan, special operations plan, rear defense plan, etc. The actual contents of the

sub-plans vary according to the situation. The sub plans are normally prepared by the

command structure (center) in charge of the subject matter area in accordance with the

general plan and under the direction of the chief of staff. When time is pressing, the sub

plans can be prepared together with the general plan.

2. The campaign support plan

The campaign support plan is a plan and arrangement prepared in advance for various

support measures. It is an important part of the campaign plan. The campaign support

plan normally includes the following: intelligence support plan, communications support

plan, engineering support plan, denial and deception plan, traffic support plan, WMD

protection plan, meteorological and hydrological support plan, logistics and equipment

support plan, political work plan, etc.

(5) Organize campaign coordination

Campaign coordination refers to coordination and cooperation of activities in the various

domains of the campaign operations among all participating services and service arms

and other forces taking part in the army campaign in accordance with the unified plan of

the army campaign commander and his command organ. The goal is to form an organic

whole of all operational activities of the various campaign strengths in the multidimensional battlefield space. Based on the unified plan, the participating forces will

cooperate and coordinate closely, complement each other's function, demonstrate the total

might, and work together to achieve the campaign goal. Normally, after the campaign

resolution is set, [campaign coordination] is organized in accordance with the resolution

of the army campaign commander and higher level coordination instructions.

Under informationized conditions, the elements of the operations are complex, the

battlefield space is wide, and the forms of campaign operations numerous. This raises the

prominence of the status and function of campaign coordination. Campaign coordination

has the following characteristics: covering a wide range, having rich contents, posing

high requirements, requiring time effectiveness, and having fierce confrontations, etc.

Thus, when organizing campaign coordination, we must accomplish the following:
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scientifically forecast and prepare multiple proposals; focus on the overall situation and

integrated-whole adjusting coordination {zhengti xietiao}; give prominence to key points

and seize key links {guanjie}; maintain continuity and precision and high effectiveness.

1. Contents of organizing campaign coordination

The contents of army campaign coordination cover a very wide range. They mainly

include the following: First, coordination among all operational groups {作战集团

zuozhan jituan} (juntuan), for example, between the main attack group (juntuan) and the

supporting attack group (juntuan) {主攻集团与助攻集团 zhugong jituan yu zhugong

jituan}, between the annihilating attack group {歼击集团 jianji jituan} (juntuan) and the

impeding reinforcement group (juntuan), between the ground attack group and the

airborne attack group, and between the army large formation and the forces supporting

the operations such as the Air force, Navy, Second Artillery, etc. Secondly, coordination

among the various battlefields and campaign activities, for example, coordination among

the frontal battlefield, depth battlefield, flank battlefield, and enemy rear battlefield, as

well as campaign activities on the associated space battlefield, sea battlefield,

electromagnetic battlefield, etc. Thirdly, coordination between campaign phases. The

campaign commander must divide the campaign phases rationally, but also coordinate the

activities of different forces during each phase, in particular during the transition of the

phases. Fourthly, coordination of special weapons, special operations, and various

campaign activities. Fifthly, coordination between operations and various support as well

as coordination between military and local support departments.

2. Method of organizing campaign coordination

The basic mode of army campaign coordination is combination of planned {jihua}

coordination and ad hoc coordination {suiji xietong}.17 Planned coordination is

conducted with planning and organization according to the targets [objectives], time, and

content of campaign coordination. Ad hoc coordination refers to a method of

coordination adopted when significant changes occur to the battlefield situation and the

original coordination plan cannot be executed or when coordination is encounters severe

disruption. Normally, planned coordination has priority, and ad hoc coordination is

supplemental. When organizing campaign coordination, the army campaign commander

and his organ should conduct it with the following steps and methods:

—Divide coordination phases. Dividing coordination phases is the phase differentiation

made for the course of the army campaign. The goal is to adjust-coordinate campaign

strengths with key points, control campaign tempo, and organize campaign coordination

with order and in separate steps. A campaign coordination phase generally coincides with

a campaign operational phase, and the coordination missions also coincide with the

operational goals of that phase. In order to make coordination more specific and clear,

17 In a later section, it is called linji xietong 临机协同.
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normally we further divide the campaign coordination phases into a number of

operational periods {zuozhan shijie}18 based on operational needs-requirements. During

each phase (period), one also accomplishes anticipated scenarios to respond to major

changes in the enemy situation and main activities. The division of the campaign

coordination phases is not fixed and unchangeable. The campaign commander, on the

basis of scientific forecasts, should accomplish division for the full course of campaign

development in accordance with the different campaign intentions, campaign patterns,

battlefield postures, enemy situation, our situation, etc.

—Clarifying the coordinating relationships. Clarifying the coordination relationships is

the determination of the mutual assisting and complementary relationships {zhiyuan

peihe} for all participating strengths in each phase of a campaign. An army campaign

under informationized conditions is coordinated operations implemented by all services,

arms and other strengths mutually complementing each other, and in objective terms,

there exists a relationship of which strength is in the lead and a main-and-secondary

relationship {zhuci guanxi} of which strengths are complementing. Only by defining the

main and secondary relationships between the participating strengths will we be able to

strengthen coordination between operational forces that do not have an existing

command-and-subordination relationship, and only then will we be able to fully utilize

and bring into play {调动 diaodong}19 the subjective and assertive role of the

commander of different levels. Normally, for the coordination between army force-units

and force-units of assisting operational services, one should organize it with the activities

of the Army force-units executing the main missions in the lead. For the coordination

between each operational group, one should organize it with the operational group

executing the main missions in the lead. For the coordination between each operational

activity, one should organize it with the main operational activity in the lead. For the

coordination between the employment of WMD and other campaign activities, one

should organize it with the activities employing WMD in the lead.

—Differentiate operational missions (targets), activity areas (locations) and the sequence

of activities. Differentiating operational missions (targets), activity areas (locations) and

the sequence of activities means to specify the operational mission, spatial area and time

of the activity of the various campaign strengths during each phase (period) of the

campaign. The operational mission (target) determines the status of various strengths in

the campaign operation and the coordination relation between the forces. This is the basis

upon which the army campaign commander and his command organ organize campaign

coordination and make campaign coordination plans. Organizing coordination according

to the operational mission (target) means we achieve coordination by rationally assigning

the operational mission (target). The activity area (location) and the sequence of activities

are two basic essential elements in organizing campaign coordination, and they determine

18 Operational periods: According to PLA Military Terms (1997), "The period of time between the

beginning and the end of certain combat activity during a certain phase of a campaign or battle. Examples

include fire preparation periods and fire support periods."

19 Translator’s note: Use and bring into play. Also, maneuver.
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the spatial area and timing of the activities of the participating strengths during different

phases of the campaign. Organizing coordination based on the spatial area means we

rationally organize the operational activities of force-units in different areas and different

directions so as to enable them to cooperate closely and support each other. Organizing

coordination based on time means we clearly define the time different forces start the

operational activities and the duration of the operational activities so as to achieve close

coordination. Some times, we can use time and space as the basis to organize

coordination. This means we rationally determine the activity area, starting time, or the

time limit to accomplish a certain operational time-occasion according to the campaign

needs-requirements and the operational capabilities of the force-units. For army

campaigns under informationized conditions, all operational activities are fused and

activity spaces often intersect. When organizing campaign coordination, we should

rationally differentiate the spatial area where each participating strengths carries out the

mission, the sequence of activities and the time limit to accomplish the mission based on

the requirement of multi-dimensional depth operations and the characteristic of all

services and arms. That is, we should fully bring into play the special merits of all

services and arms, at the same time avoid accidental casualties and unanticipated ill

effects, allowing the activities in each space and battlefield to form outstanding

relationships that are mutually adjusting-coordinated and closely linked.

3. Campaign coordination support

Army campaigns under informationized conditions have fast pace and tempo, short

process, and fierce confrontation. When organizing campaign coordination, we must

ensure correctness, timeliness, and continuity. For this reason, we must establish a

complete campaign coordination support system to guarantee that coordination is smooth

and efficient.

—Establish a sound campaign coordination mechanism. At the army campaign command

center, one should establish an operational adjusting-coordination institution composed of

relevant personnel from the various services and arms to be responsible for formulating

the coordination plan and supervising the execution of the coordination plan, and to assist

the campaign commander to adjust at the right time or restore disrupted coordination.

When implementing an Army army group campaign, one can set separately set up a

coordination institution at the army group and the basic campaign large formation

command center. During campaign implementation, normally one should exchange

coordination command or liaison teams between all force-units of services having

coordination relationships responsible for putting into effect the support coordination

plan {baozhang xietong jihua} as well as conducting effective ad hoc coordination {linji

xietong}.

—Establish multi-function integrated coordination control automation systems {xitong}.

We should use the computer as the basis to establish operational coordination databases

for all levels. We should save all coordination plans in the databases in advance and use

expert systems to conduct simulation and optimization in order to provide assistance to
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the commander of all levels and the command organ in command, control, and

coordination. We should establish a firepower coordination system which is closely

connected to the various fire control systems so as to realize automation of fire control

through the computer network. At the same time we should establish battlefield

command coordination information terminals at all levels, which should be connected to

the campaign monitoring system to facilitate timely transmission of battlefield

coordination information.

—Establish an all-services and arms campaign coordination communications network.

Coordination communications is a basic condition for achieving consistent adjustingcoordination of activities for the strengths of all-services and arms. We must carry out the

principles of shared use by each service and arm, compatibility between military-civilian,

freely linked up-and-down. We must fully utilize all of the various communication

strengths and resources in the operational area and form a stable, reliable, and

unobstructed integrated-whole support capability.

—Establish information and network warfare systems {xitong} that are both offensive

and defensive. During campaign implementation, the enemy will certainly rely on their

superiority of information warfare strengths and implement key point strikes against our

critical parts such as coordination communications. We should establish a corresponding

command institution on the basis of the campaign large formation information and

network warfare capabilities and campaign needs-requirements. [We should] implement

centralized and unified command all information warfare strengths and apply information

offensive and defensive means to safeguard smooth coordination.

(6) Organize campaign support

Army campaign support is a general term referring to various assurance measures and

corresponding activities employed to ensure that the army campaign large formation can

smoothly carry out the campaign mission. Army campaign support is an important

element of the army campaign operational capabilities and is an important part of army

campaign activities. Under informationized conditions, reliance of army campaign

operational activities on campaign support has further increased. Progress of the

campaign and final outcome of the campaign sometimes are constrained by critical

campaign support activities. The contents and methods of campaign support vary as

campaigns develop. Strong campaign support is an important basis to win campaign

victory.

The army campaign support plan is the basic reliance for implementing campaign

support. After setting the resolution, we should quickly organize all relevant departments

and separately formulate it [support plan] on the basis of the requirements of higher level

intent, senior officer {shouzhang} resolution and the campaign operational activities plan

{jihua}, as well as issue the support instructions at the right time so as to completely,

thoroughly, and systematically organize the various supports.
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(7) Inspect campaign preparations

To inspect force-unit campaign preparations is an important content of overall-planning

{chouhua} and organizing a campaign. The campaign commander should give the forceunits as much operational preparation time as possible as well as pay attention to

concealing the campaign activity intention. The contents of operational preparations

should be determined by the operational mission. Normally, these include: organizing

preparation work; preparing war materials, weapons and equipment; political

mobilization; training for imminent battle; battlefield preparation; maneuver preparation;

etc. After each item of preparation is completed, the campaign commander should

promptly organize the command organ to conduct inspections on the force-unit

preparations situation with key point inspection of subordinate force-unit level of

understanding of higher level orders and instructions, whether their resolution and plan

{jihua} conform to higher level intent, as well as the completion situation of all

preparations work. It [command organ] should promptly resolve problems that are

encountered during force-unit preparations work and practically settle each item of

campaign preparations work.

II. Implementation of Army Campaigns...387

The implementation phase of the campaign is the process whereby the opposing sides

carry out continuous and ferocious confrontations involving force and stratagem. It is

also the most important and most critical period of campaign command. During the

campaign implementation phase, the commander and his command organ should focus

on the following:

(1) Have a full grasp and make predictions of battlefield situations

Having a correct grasp of the battlefield situation is the objective basis for the campaign

commander to implement command. Under informationized conditions in particular, the

status and function of information becomes more prominent. Thus the campaign

commander and his command organ must fully utilize all capabilities and measures to

have a full grasp of the development and change of battlefield situations in a timely,

correct, comprehensively, and continuous manner, striving to gain battlefield information

superiority.

Situations that the commander should have a full grasp of mainly include the following:

First, change in the enemy's posture and predetermined operational targets, location of

the command structure, disposition of high-tech weapons and their use, direction of

activities of the follow-on echelon, etc. Secondly, the location of our force-units and the

force-units of the assisting services and arms, the progress situation of the main

operational direction, the situations of the air and air defense operations, the situation of

personnel casualties and weapons equipment losses, activities of campaign reserves, and

in particular the situation of the force-units that are developing {fazhan} smoothly and
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those encountering difficulties. Thirdly, the situations of the operational areas, especially

situations undergoing changes.

To grasp battlefield situations we must be focused on the key aspects. One should always

focus on the areas and troops that have important impact on the overall situation of the

campaign. For those situations where one already has a grasp, the campaign commander

should use different means to verify the information, and take necessary actions

according to the urgency of the situation. If possible, the campaign commander should go

to the front line personally to observe the battlefield and obtain intelligence. At the same

time, he should take effective measures to actively interrupt enemy's intelligence

capturing activities.

Uninterrupted forecasting of the battlefield situation is an important aspect for

maintaining an initiative position in campaign command. Because battlefield situations

are complex and change frequently, prior to battle forecasts often differ greatly from the

actual situations during the battle. New intelligence and information is necessary to

enable us to make new forecasts on possible development, and provide correct response

based on new assessments. We should strive to adopt effective measures and seize the

initiative position before the enemy acts.

(2) Controlling and adjusting-coordination of campaign activities

Controlling and adjusting-coordination of campaign activities is the process of adopting

various adjusting-controlling means and modes on the basis of the campaign plan {jihua}

and battlefield feedback information and adjusting of subordinate force-unit operational

activities at the right time by a campaign commander and his command organ. The goals

are to bring into play one’s own integrated-whole operational might and constrain the

enemy’s activities, drive the war situation to develop in the direction favorable for us and

unfavorable for the enemy, and thus achieve the campaign goals. One should grasp with

key points the following.

First, adjusting-control {tiaokong} at the right time. During campaign operations, it often

happens that a part of or the entire plan may have to change. It is extremely important to

the success of the campaign to adjust-control the activities of force-units at the right time.

To do this, the campaign commander should strengthen battlefield information feedback,

continuously grasp and evaluate the conformity between the original resolution and

campaign progress and at the right time, make revisions or set a new resolution. Under

normal conditions, as long as battlefield conditions do not change fundamentally, we

should insist on thoroughly carrying out the already-made decision even if we encounter

some frustrations and urging the troops to act according to the original plan. Thus, the

main mission of campaign control and adjusting-coordination should give priority to

improving and modifying the original operational plan and realizing the original

resolution. Only when significant changes actually occur on the battlefield can a new

resolution be set down.
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Secondly, key point adjusting-control {tiaokong}. Campaign control and adjustingcoordination needs-requires one to look after many points, a wide area, and complex

objects [targets] {duixiang}, and at the same time that the campaign commander and his

command organ should be looking after the overall situation and full course of the

campaign, they should give prominence to successfully adjusting-controlling the main

operational direction, main operational grouping and critical quality operational

activities. They should tightly center on the adjusting-control key points, thoroughly

organize the various assisting, complementing, and support activities. At the same time,

they should adopt effective measures to excite and consolidate the operational will of

subordinate participating strengths, and to the greatest extent bring into play the

integrated-whole operational might of the campaign large formation.

Thirdly, flexible adjusting-control. Army campaign operations involve a vast space and

their operational activities are complex and diverse. In a situation when stable and

uninterrupted communications is difficult to maintain, it is hard for campaign control and

adjusting-coordination {kongzhi yu xietiao} to take care of all aspects. Thus, the

implementation of campaign control and adjusting-coordination must fully bring into

play the role of plan {jihua} adjusting-coordination and combine directive-quality

adjusting-control {zhilingxing tiaokong} with adjusting-control according to plan {an

jihua tiaokong}; it must fully bring into play the subjective dynamic qualities of

subordinate level commanders, combine macroscopic adjusting-control with subordinate

level commander’s self-adjusting-control under a unified intent, and achieve campaign

goals with flexible and diverse adjusting-control methods and means. The long-range

strike firepower and campaign reserve strengths that are directly under the control of the

campaign commander are critical quality strengths that affect the campaign course. They

should be strictly controlled and they should be concentrated and employed at timeopportunities and directions of decisive significance.

Fourthly, "bi-directional" adjusting-control. Campaign control and adjustingcoordination includes adjusting one’s own activities and restricting the enemy's activities.

Only through effective restriction of the enemy's activities will we be able to create

favorable conditions for adjusting our own activities. In restricting the enemy's activities,

it is crucial to apply stratagems. One must be adept at forcing the enemy to generate slips

and trapping the enemy in operations under unfavorable conditions through ingenious

application of campaign strengths and campaign deception measures. As a result, we can

gain favorable combat opportunities and be in a position of initiative.

(3) Organize transition between campaign phases

A campaign is normally divided into several campaign phases and each phase has a given

operational mission to accomplish. To organize campaign phase transition at an

appropriate time according to the development of the campaign situation is an important

aspect of the command of campaign activities and is a concrete expression of the superior

command art [skill] of the campaign commander. Organizing campaign phase transition
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carefully has a significant effect in gaining an upper hand over the enemy, in continued

development of campaign victory, and in hastening the campaign process.

It is of utmost importance to have a good grasp of the timing of the transition of the

campaign phases. The army campaign commander should be good at examining the

developmental trend of the battlefield posture from the perspective of the overall

campaign and capture an opportune time for the transition. Generally there are several

situations: One situation is when the operational mission of the current phase has been

accomplished, preparations for the next campaign phase have also been done, and the

battlefield posture is favorable. The campaign commander should take the opportunity to

transition to the next campaign phase in order to develop the advantage of the success

and hasten the progress of the campaign. A second situation is when the operational

mission of the current phase has been accomplished, the next phase's preparation work

has not been completed, and a favorable opportunity for battle arises on the battlefield. In

this situation, the campaign commander should grab a favorable opportunity and

decisively transition to the next campaign phase. A third situation is when the operational

mission of the current phase has been accomplished, the preparation work for the next

phase has not been completed, and the battlefield posture is favorable to the enemy and

unfavorable to us. At this time the campaign command should aggressively and rapidly

continue the preparation work. On the other hand he should employ various measures and

means to change the battlefield posture and create favorable opportunities. At an

appropriate time, the campaign commander can implement campaign phase transition. A

fourth situation is when the overall strategic situation requires a delay or an early

implementation of campaign phase transition. The campaign commander must look at the

interest of the overall situation and execute the order of the superior decisively. No matter

which situation calls for a campaign phase transition, the campaign commander should

pay attention to the main direction and the completion of the main campaign mission.

Once the main direction or the completion of the main campaign mission offers an

opportunity for campaign phase transition, the campaign commander should decisively

make a decision for campaign phase transition.

During the campaign phase transition, there are big adjustments to operational bushu

disposition. Often it is necessary to redefine the mission, re-organize coordination, and

change command relations. Also, since the transition time is finite, there is a greater

requirement on the time effectiveness of force-unit {budui} activities. Thus, the army

campaign commander must carefully organize, strengthen control and coordination, and

strive to organize the campaign phase transition swiftly and in a concealed manner. The

campaign commander must calculate the available time accurately, striving to complete

troops repositioning rapidly within the available time. The commander must focus on the

main direction when coordinating all forces for the transition, and promptly clarify the

operational mission of each of the operational groups during the new phase and the basic

methods to carry out the operational mission so as to ensure that the main operational

groups will smoothly transit into the operations of the next phase. The campaign

commander must organize reliable cover according to the level of the enemy threat.
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(4) Organize conclusion of the campaign

Concluding a campaign refers to the campaign activities when the campaign goal is

basically achieved or when the campaign mission needs to change. Concluding a

campaign affects the campaign or even the overall strategic situation. Whether a

campaign is concluded appropriately not only affects the transition into the operational

mission of the next phase, but also directly affects the operational outcome of the

previous phase, or even affects the important question of whether it will create favorable

conditions for the political and diplomatic struggle.

The timing to conclude a campaign must be appropriate. Normally, under the condition

that the campaign goal has been achieved or has basically been achieved, the campaign

should be concluded at an appropriate time. If the battlefield posture is very favorable to

us, we can go along with the favorable posture, further develop our success and conclude

the campaign after we have expanded the outcome of our victory. If the original

campaign goal has not been achieved but the battlefield posture faces significant change

which is disadvantages to us, and continued operations will be difficult for us to

accomplish the original campaign goal or even lead the overall situation into a passive

state, at this time the campaign commander should decisively conclude the campaign in

order to preserve our capabilities and regain the initiative.

The method to conclude a campaign is determined according to the posture of the

battlefield. When the battlefield posture is favorable, we can adopt the active pull out of

the battlefield [主动撤离战场 zhudong cheli zhanchang} method to conclude the

campaign. At this time, we should carefully organize the pull out of the troops, clearly

specify the sequence, direction and route of the pull out, and organize cover and all types

of support. When concluding a campaign between the transition from an offensive

operation to a defensive operation, we should carefully organize battlefield cover based

on the actual situation of the enemy threat, promptly re-disposition the troops, and make

preparation for continuous fight. When concluding a campaign while in a stalemate, we

should, as much as possible, maintain the result of the campaign already achieved and

safeguard the safety of the main operational group. We should form a battlefield posture

that will be beneficial to follow-on operations.
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Chapter 16

The Maneuver Warfare Campaign...391

The maneuver warfare campaign {机动战战役 jidongzhan zhanyi} is an offensive

campaign by an army campaign large formation being assisted and complemented by the

force-units of other services and arms and implemented against an enemy that is either on

the move or has not yet established a foothold. They are a development from traditional

mobile campaigns {运动战战役 yundongzhan zhanyi} conducted under informationized

conditions. The maneuver warfare campaign is one of the main forms of future offensive

campaigns to be waged under informationized conditions. Its main mission is to wipe out

or wear down the enemy’s force groups so as to alter the balance of campaign forces,

change the battlefield posture and develop campaign victory.

To accomplish campaign goals, a maneuver warfare campaign often adopts the following

as its basic fighting methods: creating conditions through maneuvering, concentrating

forces at the appropriate time, and wiping out the enemy through battles of quick

resolution. That is to say, we create advantageous battlefield postures and capture

campaign initiative through the wide use of campaign maneuvering by stratagem and

actively create opportunities for battle. We concentrate forces at the appropriate time to

develop a force that is superior to the enemy’s force in absolute terms. We launch sudden

and ferocious assault against the enemy's critical points and key junctions, fight a quick

battle to force a quick decision and annihilate the enemy forces one by one.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...391

I. Characteristics...391

(1) High level of force-unit {budui} mobility. Difficult to conceal operational intention.

Maneuver is an essential feature of maneuver warfare {机动战 jidongzhan}. Through

wide maneuvering of forces and firepower, a maneuver warfare campaign provokes the

enemy to be on the move, so that we can create and seize combat opportunities, develop

situations that are advantageous to us, and annihilate the enemy while in motion. In future

local wars under informationized conditions, the opposing sides will widely apply various

types of high-tech methods such as space technology, remote sensing and telemetry, and

opto-electronic technology on the battlefield to create an all time and space, all azimuth,

and full-depth reconnaissance and surveillance system with all-weather, high-resolution

and real-time reconnaissance capability. This decreases the effect of the traditional denial

and deception methods and increases the transparency of the battlefield. In addition, the

troops executing the maneuvering operation missions are often exposed to the scrutiny of

the enemy's reconnaissance system. With our limited counter-reconnaissance ability and

the large scale of the operations, the opportunities for us to be exposed are many and the

difficulty level of concealing our operational intention is more difficult.
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(2) Enemy has strong attack capabilities. High requirement on offensive and defensive

operations.

The core of a maneuver warfare campaign is to attack. Maneuver warfare campaigns are

an operational form of active attack. Only by way of aggressive and active attack will we

be able to find operational opportunity on the battlefield, continue to annihilate the

enemy, and create conditions for eventual victory. Under informationized conditions, the

offensive nature of the maneuver warfare campaign has not changed. However, with

continuing advancement in information technology and weapons and equipment, the

enemy's attack capability will continue to improve. In a campaign, the status of defensive

activities becomes more significant. On one hand, the enemy's reconnaissance and early

warning capabilities continue to improve, and the enemy's fire attack system has better

ability to conceal, faster operational response rate, longer attack range, higher hit

precision, and greater destruction power. This poses a serious threat to the troops carrying

out the maneuvering operation mission. On the other hand, the enemy has many ways to

deliver forces and has strong operational support capability. The enemy can rapidly alter

the balance of force in a local area in a very short time, creating disadvantage posture for

the opponent. This indicates that in future maneuver warfare campaigns, we will

encounter enemy's threat at all time, and the requirement on defensive activities becomes

much higher.

(3) Integrate maneuver with attack. Struggle between maneuver and counter-maneuver is

intense.

In maneuver warfare campaigns, both opposing sides conduct operations under maneuver

conditions, and this results in a blending together of maneuver and operations. On the one

hand, when selecting the operational target, the attacking side strives to attack an enemy

that is in the process of being mobile or is stopping temporarily. When engaging a

defensive enemy that is firmly defending an urban area or a position, the attacking side

would lure or force the defensive enemy to leave the city or the position, striving to

annihilate the enemy while it is on the move. In order to create advantageous battlefield

posture and capture the opportunity for battle, the troops responsible for the maneuvering

mission normally would actively maneuver their force or firepower to lure the enemy to

reposition, striving to create and capture the opportunity for battle while maneuvering.

On the other hand, on local war battlefields under informationized conditions, the

opposing sides' battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance ability, force and weapon

mobility, and long-range precision attack ability have greatly improved. This makes it

more advantageous for our side to annihilate the enemy while it is on the move, but it

also means we would face the same threat from the enemy. Thus, maneuvering

continuously and changing locations continuously has become an important method to

preserve ourselves and wipe out the enemy. In order to realize the campaign goal, each

side will employ ways to limit the opposing side's battlefield maneuverability. This will

make the struggle between maneuvering and counter-maneuvering more intense.
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(4) Battlefield situations change rapidly. It is highly difficult to create and seize

opportunities for battle.

In maneuver warfare campaigns, operational activities normally occur on the ground, in

the air, at the front and in the rear. They could even occur simultaneously in space and in

the electromagnetic domain. The battlefield space is very wide. In the campaign process,

the switching between offensive and defensive and concentration and dispersion is very

frequent and battlefield situations change rapidly. The uncertainty of opportunity for

battle greatly increases. The force of the opposing sides rapidly concentrates and spreads

out, and the balance of force may shift at any time. The process of the campaign

progresses rapidly. With full-depth, high-pace, and multi-dimensional overtaking attack,

the operational goal can be quickly achieved. All these factors cause the battlefield to

change drastically. Opportunity for battle comes and goes instantaneously, which makes

it very difficult to seize the opportunity for battle. At the same time, under

informationized conditions, the battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance capability of

the opposing sides continue to improve, making the traditional way of widespread

mobility to create opportunity for battle less effective on a modern battlefield. Thus, in

future maneuver warfare campaigns, it will be more difficult to create and seize

opportunities for battle.

II. Requirements...393

(1) Conceal campaign intention. Launch sudden attack against the enemy.

Historically, concealed and sudden attack of the enemy is an important principle and a

requirement to win campaign victory. This is especially so for maneuver warfare

campaigns under informationized conditions. Battlefield transparency is high, the forces

participating in the campaign are numerous, maneuver exposure time of the forces and

firepower is long and the targets are large. To conceal operational intentions and

activities becomes difficult. Thus, all the more we need to meet the requirement of

concealment and sudden attack. In order to realize concealed and sudden attack, we

should do the following. The first one is to correctly predict the possible development of

the campaign and carefully formulate campaign operational plans. In particular, we

should formulate multiple operational contingency plans based on the possible

development and change so that even in a complex and unpredictable campaign process,

we can be well prepared and be one step ahead of the enemy, and able to launch attack

against the enemy in a concealed and sudden manner. The second one is to make full use

of stratagem and campaign denial and deception. We should use electronic deception,

feigned activities of the forces, smoke screens, etc. to deceive the enemy. We should use

a series of denial and deception activities to achieve the goal of campaign suddenness.

The third one is to choose favorable maneuver opportunities. We should, as far as

possible, take advantage of unfavorable weather conditions and make use of the

reconnaissance surveillance gaps of the enemy's high-tech equipment and rapidly

maneuver. The fourth one is to employ correct maneuver forms and methods and increase

the maneuver pace in order to ensure that the troops can reach the designated area rapidly
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to develop the attack. The fifth one is to conduct operations continuously, use force

extraordinarily, and attack the enemy unexpectedly.

(2) Implement activities agilely and decisively, striving to gain campaign initiative.

For a maneuver warfare campaign, without agility and flexibility means losing the

initiative. In future local wars under informationized conditions in particular, the

campaign commander must be able to judge the hour and size up the situation. He should

evaluate the situations on the battlefield and respond accordingly. He should be flexible

and responsive, continue to make use of new measures and methods to win victory. In a

campaign, agile and decisive actions must be grounded on the following two aspects:

Firstly, we should firmly and resolutely carry out the decision. When serious problems

occur, as long as the battlefield situation does not change fundamentally and there are still

possibilities to win the campaign, we should firmly work towards the target to realize the

operational goal. If there are major changes in the situation, we should promptly modify

the decision and adjust the objective guidance according to the subjective situation. 

If the situation changes fundamentally, we should use the superior's overall intent 

as the basis and agilely and flexibly accomplish our operational mission. Secondly, 

we should be good at predicting the development trend of the campaign under complex

battlefield conditions. We should give priority to assessing and containing the enemy. If

we are in a passive state in particular, when making a decision to retreat or to fight, to call

for reinforcement or to reposition, or to change the fighting method, we should be

decisive in making a quick choice.

(3) Take the initiative to aggressively attack. Firmly commit to an offensive and

defensive combined method.

Offensive is the essence of a maneuver warfare campaign. Without aggressive offensive

actions, it will be difficult for us to wear down the enemy or realize a switch from

defensive to offensive, and it will be hard to win campaign victory. In maneuver warfare

campaigns under informationized conditions, the enemy's attack capabilities continue to

improve and our troops executing the mission face serious enemy threats. Thus, while we

stress aggressive and active attack, formulate plans with offensive activities as the core,

and execute the campaign plan, we must firmly commit to the principle and requirement

of combining offensive operations with defensive operations. We should use effective

defensive activities to augment offensive operations so that we can better achieve the

goal of the campaign. To combine offensive and defensive operations in future maneuver

warfare campaigns, we should do the following. First, we should do a good job in

combining holding {jianshou} defensive operations with the maneuver warfare

campaign. Holding defensive operations should be become the powerful basis of the

maneuver warfare campaign. With [holding defensive operations], we can inflict heavy

enemy casualties, expend the enemy, divide and separate the enemy's campaign bushu

disposition, and aggressively create conditions for the maneuver warfare campaign. The

force-units {budui} implementing the maneuver warfare campaign should aggressively

accomplish the mission of annihilating the enemy while maneuvering and fundamentally
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achieve the campaign operational goals. Secondly, we must successfully accomplish the

combining of offense and defense by the campaign strengths implementing maneuver

warfare. Firstly, during the same operational time, the campaign strengths must

separately undertake offensive and defensive (mainly to create momentum) operational

missions. Secondly, one must successfully accomplish for oneself the thought for

transforming from offense to defense and its organizing preparations. In particular, in the

areas of the organized grouping of campaign maneuver and campaign operational bushu

disposition, etc., they should all have the operational functionality of having both offense

and defense so as to adapt to the needs-requirements of objective situations.

(4) Perfect the command mechanism, attend to close operational coordination

In operations under informationized conditions, the battlefield space is wide, the

participating strengths are numerous, the operational activities are sudden, and the

situation changes drastically. Without highly effective organization of command and

adjusting-coordinated operational activities, it is very difficult to bring into play an

integrated-whole operational effectiveness. In future maneuver warfare campaigns, in

order to realize effective adjusting-coordination and control of the participating strengths

of all services (arms), firstly, we should perfect our command mechanism. We must

establish an authoritative campaign command institution and implement centralized and

unified command to all participating services (arms) and local strengths. We must

establish a sound command communication and coordination communication systems

{xitong}, and make full use of advanced communications equipment and methods to

raise command coordination effectiveness. We should formulate a thorough campaign

coordination plan and closely organize campaign coordination. We should use flexibly

apply command modes and adopt a method of combining centralized command and

dispersed command. Secondly, we should give prominence to coordination key points. In

coordinated operations with many services (arms), one should give priority to the service

(arm) that plays the lead role in the campaign. In multi-direction operations, one should

give priority to the activities in the main operational direction. In terms of time, one

should give priority to the decisive-quality time or critical time opportunities. In

operations on each battlefield, give priority to the main battlefield. When implementing

firepower warfare, one should give priority to the main firepower in conducting

adjusting-coordination. Thirdly, one must master force-unit situations. The campaign

commander should be familiar with all subordinate force-unit situations, comprehend

force-unit operational characteristics, operational capabilities, and main weapons and

equipment performance {xingneng}, etc. We should strive to achieve accuracy and timeeffectiveness in campaign adjusting-coordination. Fourthly, we must accomplish

provisional adjusting-coordination {linshi xietiao}. During the operational process, based

on developing changes in the situations, the commander must promptly conduct ad hoc

adjusting-coordination {suiji xietiao}. Particularly, the commander should establish

active adjusting-coordination awareness. Under difficult or dangerous situations, the

commander should not wait for orders from the higher level. He should be adept in

following the higher level general operational intent, actively accomplish adjustingcoordination with the higher level and friendly forces, and actively complement

operations.
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(5) Be well prepared. Use a quick battle to force a quick decision and annihilate the

enemy.

In operations under informationized conditions, the operational effectiveness of weapons

and equipment has improved unprecedentedly, campaign duration has shortened greatly,

and the operational tempo has hastened notably. In maneuver warfare campaigns in

particular, only through fighting a quick battle for a quick decision {速战速决 suzhan

sujue} will we be able to: better respond to sudden situations and seize the battlefield

initiative; avoid the enemy's reinforcement and fight a quick and decisive fight.; avoid

enemy's retaliation; and avoid a situation whereby we "win the initial fight, but lose the

battle." In order to implement fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision, we should

do the following: The first is to be fully prepared and combat ready. Under the condition

that we have gained local electromagnetic and air dominance, we should concentrate

superior force-strengths, especially campaign elite strengths, and, at a favorable

operational moment, employ an effective operational method, select an appropriate target

and battlefield, and launch a sudden attack against the enemy. The second is to

implement rapid and effective support. We should fully demonstrate the comprehensive

support effect of all services (arms), and, in particular, we should fully utilize the local

manpower, material, and technical support strength to implement a military-civilian

integrated holistic support. We should establish a joint logistic command and support

system that is fitting with maneuvering operations, and we should carefully formulate

various support plans and be well prepared. In the main operational direction, for the

main operational groups and main operational activities we should emphasize supporting

the key points in order to improve time-effectiveness of the support. We should

implement agile and correct support command and control and provide continuous

support. We should pay attention to protection activities during support operations and

use effective methods to raise battlefield survivability of the support strengths. We should

use rapid and effective support activities to ensure that campaign activities can be carried

out successfully.

Section 2: Main Activities...396

I. Creating and Capturing Opportunities for Battle...396

Opportunities for battle are combat opportunities that are advantageous to us and

disadvantageous to the enemy. Opportunities for battle have special functions in

maneuver warfare campaigns. They are the pre-requisite and basis for formulating the

campaign resolution, and the fundamental assurance to realize fighting a quick battle for

a quick decision. Creating and capturing opportunities for battle is an important part of

implementing the maneuver warfare campaign. The activities are executed through out

the entire process of the maneuver warfare campaign. Based on objective conditions, the

commander must make use of his subjective initiative, exercise stratagems, and actively

create and capture combat opportunities so as to ensure that we will engage the enemy

under favorable conditions.
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(1) Create opportunities for battle [or combat opportunities]

To create opportunities for battle refers to the operational activities of the campaign

commander who takes the initiative to apply various strengths and means to force the

enemy into a disadvantageous position and create opportunities to annihilate the enemy.

In operations under informationized conditions, the enemy has better reconnaissance and

surveillance capability, rapid maneuverability, and command control capability, which

increase the difficulty level for us to create opportunities for battle. The campaign

commander must have the campaign total situation in mind and comprehensively use

measures such as electromagnetic, firepower, force-strengths, etc. The commander

should rely on superior command skills and integrated-whole strengths to aggressively

and actively create opportunities for battle.

The main methods to create opportunities for battle include the following: Use blockade

and attack alternately to force the enemy to be exposed; forcefully divide and separate,

forcing the enemy into isolation; retreat and lure the enemy into depth; attack the enemy

to lure the enemy's reinforcement; encircle three sides and leave one side unguarded,

prompting the enemy to breakout the siege; use diversionary tactics to prompt the enemy

to disperse; use diversionary tactics to weaken the enemy; attack the enemy from the rear

and attack vital points; use fire assault to weaken the enemy; use electronic deception to

lure the enemy; block and divide the key point, causing the enemy to disperse, etc. When

employing the above methods, we must strive to achieve the following: The first is to

integrate modern technologies with traditional methods and use diverse methods

simultaneously. When we create opportunities for battle, in addition to using traditional

methods, we should pay attention to modern technical methods such as electronic

technology, stealth technology, simulation technology, etc. to diverse, deceive, and

confuse the enemy, making the enemy unable to guard against them thus creating

advantageous opportunities to wipe out the enemy. The second is one must consistently

adjust-coordinate various operational strengths and jointly create favorable opportunities

for battle. We must have unified overall planning {tongyi chouhua} for the various

operational strengths so that there is an integrated-whole battlefield working in concert,

and the various activities are consistently adjusting-coordinated. Based on the overall

operational intent and addressing the main operational goal, we actively create

advantageous opportunities to annihilate the enemy. The third is to closely combine

advance overall-planning {yuqi chouhua} and ad hoc creation of combat opportunities,

and be flexible and responsive. In order to seize initiative, we must scientifically forecast

possible operational activities of the campaign and carefully and painstakingly

accomplish the advance planning {jihua} and courses of actions {fang’an} to create

combat opportunity. At the same time, facing battlefield conditions that are constantly

changing, we must be able to be mentally ready to do a good job in creating opportunities

for battle at any given moment. Once a situation has essential or critical changed, we

should resolutely and decisively make a decision based on the new situation. We should

quickly modify or employ new methods to create opportunities for battle, and we should

combine the pre-prepared decision with the contingent decision so as we could capture

battlefield initiative at any given time.
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Creating opportunities for battle is a very complicated process. One favorable opportunity

for battle may often call for multiple methods and multiple tries. The campaign

commander should be flexible and adaptable, not be constrained by a single mode, and

should apply multiple methods to weaken the enemy's strength. In terms of command, he

should use obvious methods and obscure methods; in terms of format, he should adopt

static format and dynamic format; and in terms of formation, he should vary between

converged and dispersed so as to create conditions for maneuvering and annihilation of

the enemy.

(2) Capture opportunities for battle

Capturing opportunities for battle is a major decision the campaign commander must

undertake to turn the possibility of victory into reality based on the already created

opportunity or a pending opportunity. In operations under informationized conditions, the

enemy possesses advanced weapons and equipment, which allows the operational

activities to have high maneuverability, the assaults to be ferocious, the attack range to be

far, and the reaction ability rapid. As a result, in a maneuver warfare campaign, the time

effectiveness requirement of combat opportunities is much higher. Once an opportunity

occurs, it becomes a critical problem for the commander to determine how to fight for

time, how to beat the enemy in speed, and how to rapidly capture the opportunity and

annihilate the enemy.

In trying to capture opportunities for battle, the campaign commander should pay

attention to the following points: First, we should be able to make scientific estimates and

be fully prepared. With preparation, all matters can be accomplished; without

preparation, all matters will be wasted. For maneuver warfare campaigns under

informationized conditions, even though situations change drastically and opportunities

occur randomly for a short duration, they do have a certain pattern and have observable

signs which can be detected. Therefore, the operational activities to capture opportunities

for battle should be established on the foundation of our advance preparation. First, we

must get a grip on the intention of enemy's activities. This is the foundation of making

scientific predictions. Next, we must have foresight on the possibilities of the

development of the situation and be able to formulate multiple activity scenarios. Finally,

we must use the scenarios to formulate detailed plans, and we must make meticulous

preparation accordingly. Secondly, we should step up reconnaissance and stay on top of

enemy conditions. Stepping up reconnaissance and staying on top of enemy conditions

are important pre-requisites to allow the contingency plan to be more objective and

practical so that we can detect and capture the opportunities for battle at the right time.

During the campaign, we should employ various ways and means and use different

channels to reinforce battlefield reconnaissance. We should make full use of modern

technologies to rapidly analyze and retrieve enemy intelligence in order to ascertain the

enemy’s true intent by eliminating false intelligence and discovering the truth. We should

use newly acquired information to modify, supplement and improve, or even reformulate

a preliminary operational course of action {zuozhan yu’an}. Thirdly, we should seize the

combat opportunity and be decisive at the opportunity. In capturing combat opportunity,
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be decisive at the opportunity, do not be too early and do not be too late. Being too early

will result in the combat opportunity not maturing, not only making it easy to disrupt the

combat opportunity but possibly exposing one’s own operational intention; being too late

will cause one to lose the combat opportunity altogether. Normally, if the overall

situation is advantageous to us and the condition for us to wipe out the enemy is present,

we should act resolutely. Fourthly, one must rapidly maneuver and quickly capture

[combat opportunity]. Once a combat opportunity appears, the campaign commander

should command force-units to rapidly maneuver and annihilate the enemy in the

predetermined enemy annihilation area. In order to ensure one grabs the combat

opportunity, we can adopt methods such as combining ground maneuver with air

maneuver, combining force strength maneuver with firepower maneuver, and combining

nearby force application with accelerated maneuver, so as to strive to seize the benefit of

first opportunity in front of the enemy. Fifthly, we should adapt to changing conditions

and continue to capture opportunities. Opportunities are not fixed and they change as

battlefield situations change. In light of changing battlefield conditions, the campaign

commander should be adept in seeking and detecting new opportunities and continue to

maintain and seize advantageous posture, striving to maintain the campaign initiative.

Once the new conditions are favorable and timing is opportune, the commander should

strive to capture combat opportunities so as to rapidly wipe out the enemy.

Creating and capturing opportunities for battle are different yet connected. They are an

organically connected whole. The campaign commander should be good in creating

opportunities for battle, as well as good at detecting and capturing opportunities for

battle. He must avoid waiting passively or hesitating and letting the opportunities slip. He

should guard against seeking small gains while spoiling the overall outcome.

II. Advancing and Unfolding...398

Advancing and unfolding refer to the activities of the campaign large formation as it

moves from the assembly area towards the operations area and completes its operational

standby for deployment. Once the campaign commander makes the maneuver warfare

campaign resolution, he should immediately organize the force-units {budui} for

advancing and unfolding.

(1) Campaign advancing

Advancing is a very important campaign activity that will encounter various modes of

obstructions and restrictions. In order to ensure that the campaign large formation can

advance swiftly and in a concealed manner, the campaign command institution should

formulate the advance plan in accordance with the resolution of the commander. The

contents of such plans should mainly include the following: the enemy situation, the

advance zone (routes), the advance bushu disposition, order of advance, set-out time,

deadline for arrival, unfolding area, communications, the command organization during

the advance, as well as various support measures, etc. The advance areas should be

determined on the basis of the terrain and road conditions of the campaign unfolding area
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and the location of the force-unit assembly area. The mode of advance should be a

flexible use of the many kinds of mobility modes such as motorized advance, on foot

advance, airborne transport, rail transport and waterway transport, based on situations

such as the operational mission, equipment conditions, the communication situation and

the transportation tools. Campaign maneuvers should be carried out rapidly and in a

concealed manner. In terms of methods of advance, the multi-directional, multi-route,

multi-echelon and dispersed method is often adopted. During the advance, units assigned

with missions to carry out attack and blocking (containing) of the enemy’s reinforcement

normally should advance separately along different directions, using multiple routes and

in multi-echelons. Campaign reserve and attack forces should advance at the same time

or after each other. Reserve units of various services and arms should follow behind the

attack units. Campaign support units (fendui), except for those responsible for advance

support, normally move in after the attack units. The timing of the advance should be

selected in accordance with weather conditions, battlefield postures, etc. At the same

time, we should also do a good job in providing various supports during advancing.

(2) Campaign unfolding

Campaign unfolding must be conducted according to plan and in an orderly and

concealed manner. The distance between the area of campaign unfolding and the enemy

annihilation area should be determined on the basis of campaign intention, the mission of

each force-unit, mobility conditions, battlefield conditions, operational patterns,

operational methods, mode of advance, and the predetermined attack initiation time. The

distance should facilitate a concealed and sudden initiation of attack. When conditions

are favorable and the situation permits, we can directly enter the annihilation area {歼敌

地区 jiandi diqu} from the assembly area. After a short stay there we initiate the attack.

After campaign unfolding, the campaign commander should be on top of developing

changes in the battlefield situation and correctly seize the opportunity for battle. If the

target of annihilation is advancing towards or approaching the pre-determined

annihilation area, that is, we should conduct tactical unfolding at the right time on the

basis of the adopted campaign fighting method.

III. Initiating the Attack {faqi gongji}...399

When the target enters the pre-determined annihilation area, one should launch an attack

at the appropriate time. Normally, we should first implement fire strikes, and afterwards,

taking advantage of the result of the fire strikes, swiftly launch campaign assaults.

(1) Fire assault

To stage a fire assault is to concentrate army artillery, campaign tactical missiles, and the

firepower supporting the operation, including aviation, conventional missile, and naval

firepower (during coastal operations) to carry out fire attacks on pre-determined

annihilation targets. The focus of the attack should be directed at the enemy’s command

system, high-tech weapon systems, rapid maneuver force-units, campaign reserves,
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artillery and missile positions, and other important targets. The objective is to disrupt the

enemy’s operational deployment, to take the edge off the enemy’s attacks, and to achieve

to a certain extent the goal of annihilating the enemy. When necessary, we can conduct

repeated strikes against important targets so as to create advantageous conditions to

annihilate the enemy.

(2) Force-strength attack

After the fire assault, the attacking force-units should take advantage of its results and

launch, wherever appropriate, swift attacks by way of rapid raids {急袭 jixi} (namely, a

sudden, rapid, and violent raid on the enemy), an ambush (namely, pre-dispose forcestrengths along the route the enemy must pass through and launch sudden attacks when

the enemy either enters the ambush area by itself or is lured into it), a diverging advance

and converging attack {分进合击 fenjin heji} (namely, attack a common target in

multiple columns and from different directions), etc. Under the cover of the support fire

of the aviation and artillery forces, various assault groups should attack ferociously and

vigorously and penetrate and cut up the enemy forces boldly. Units with outflanking and

inserting [penetrating] missions should make use of the gaps in the enemy’s forces and

resolutely, swiftly, and boldly cut up and divide the target. The force-units operating at

the enemy's rear should, working in cooperation with the militia or airborne force, seize

the vital points and disrupt the enemy's bushu disposition, and resolutely encircle the

enemy, not allowing the enemy to escape. If the enemy's maneuver force-strengths

outflank our flank rear and carry out counter encirclement {反包围 fanbaowei}, or use

air firepower to assault our attack force-units, command posts, and reserves, we should

use aviation and artillery firepower to block the enemy's reinforcement, cut off their

retreat routes, and crush the enemy's counter-encirclement.

IV. Annihilating Operations...400

(1) Rapidly annihilate the besieged enemy

Upon completing encirclement of the enemy, we should take advantage of the moment

when the enemy is confused and dislocated, the enemy's command is disrupted and its

firepower is suppressed and strengthen our attack activities and boldly penetrate and cut

up the enemy in an effort to prevent the enemy from making adjustments in force-unit

{budui} deployment, regain coordination, break out of the encirclement, or organize its

defense. Various attack groups should coordinate and work in concert to seize the

advantageous moments and penetrate and divide the enemy, striving to fight a quick fight

for a quick decision. If the enemy switches to defense on the spot, we should seize the

opportunity when the enemy has not taken a solid foothold to swiftly strike the enemy.

Before the attack, we should concentrate firepower of the artillery, campaign tactical

missiles, and aviation to launch brief, sudden, and violent fire assault and suppression.

The attack units should take advantage of the result of the fire assault and use agile

fighting methods to launch targeted attack from multiple directions and multiple routes,

and bravely penetrate and cut up the enemy's formation before annihilating the divided up
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enemy one by one. If our besiegement of the enemy goes smoothly and if the enemy

loses hope in receiving reinforcement, we should anticipate the probability of the enemy

breaking the siege. We should evaluate the signs of enemy's intention to break out from

the encirclement, possible breakout time and direction, and make preparations to prevent

the enemy from breaking out. Normally, we reinforce the force-strengths in the direction

where the enemy is likely to break out, especially reinforcing antitank fire and surface-toair fire, so as to block the enemy's retreat route. If the enemy begins to break out the

encirclement, we should use firepower to firmly block the escape. The maneuvering

force-strengths should rapidly annihilate the escaping enemy. If the enemy attempts to

escape by way of airborne means, we should use aviation firepower and surface-to-air

firepower to block the airspace. We should resolutely stop the enemy's aircraft from

coming overhead, landing, or taking off. When we are annihilating the besieged enemy,

we should also organize aviation, artillery, and campaign tactical missile firepower to

attack important targets in the enemy's campaign depth, such as missile positions,

advance airfields, and follow-on echelons, etc., to work together to annihilate the

besieged enemy. During the siege and annihilation operations, if for some reasons a

stalemate situation occurs, the campaign commander should correctly reassess the

battlefield situation. As long as there is still a possibility to win, we should resolutely

carry out the annihilation decision. We should take effective measures to break up the

stalemate situation and not easily let go the opportunity to win. If significant change

actually occurs, we can change the decision in accordance with the intent of the superior

and seek other opportunities for battle.

(2) Resolutely blocking and attacking the enemy reinforcement

When we encircle the enemy in one route or one area, the enemy at other routes or areas

must quickly maneuver and provide reinforcement on the ground or in the air. They may

also carry out counter-encirclement. When the campaign commander is ordering the

troops to annihilate the besieged enemy, he must also resolutely block and attack the

enemy's reinforcement. The methods to block and attack the reinforcement should be

determined according to the enemy's possible reinforcement direction, force-strengths,

distance, terrain, and the operational capabilities of our forces. Normally, we can use

methods such as positional defense or mobile defense. If the conditions are right and the

situation is advantageous, we can also employ offensive activities or use long-range

artillery and aviation firepower to attack the enemy's reinforcement. No matter which

method is employed, the units responsible for blocking and attacking the enemy

reinforcement must use aggressive and active actions to block the enemy from the ground

or in the air in a pre-determined area in order to stop the reinforcement to converge with

the besieged enemy, and to support the main force to annihilate the besieged enemy.

During the operation, in order to wipe out the besieged enemy, the campaign commander

should, at an appropriate time, employ the reserves to enter the engagement. He should

clearly define the reserves' direction, mission, time, area of engagement and coordination

relationship with other units, etc.
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V. Anti-airborne Operations...401

The airborne operation is an important method in modern operations. In a maneuver

warfare campaign, possible moments the enemy may implement airborne operations

include the following: When the enemy wants to increase the pace of the offensive to

cooperate with the ground troops to attack the depth; when the enemy wants to work with

the ground troops in counter-encirclement and break out of the encirclement; when the

enemy launches assault against the groups blocking reinforcement and breaks into the

position where reinforcement has been blocked, etc. To address the enemy's airborne

operations, the campaign commander should detect the opponent's signs of airborne

operations as early as possible. He should assess the force strength, timing, area, and

intention of the airborne operations and quickly make the decision, as well as organize

and complete the preparation for anti-airborne operations. If the enemy's airborne forces

are flying overhead, we should use the aviation and ground air defense capabilities that

support the operations and adopt the divided airspace method {区分空域方法 qufen

kongyu fangfa} to intercept the enemy layer by layer. At the same time, we should

maximize all ground-to-air firepower to target and destroy the enemy's transport aircraft,

armed helicopters and to inflict massive casualties on the enemy's effective strength. At

the same time, the anti-airborne units should use multiple routes and multiple directions

to rapidly advance towards the airborne area and to lay mines or to capture operational

key points preemptively in order to restrict the enemy's converge and seize advantageous

terrain, as well as create conditions to annihilate the enemy's airborne forces. If the

enemy's airborne forces land on the ground, we should concentrate firepower to attack the

targets that pose the greatest threat to us, seize advantageous terrain and key points, block

the enemy's airborne forces from converging, crush the enemy's intention to meet with

the frontal operational force on the ground, as well as to safeguard our main force in the

anti-airborne operation. If the enemy's airborne forces have captured the position and

transitioned into defensive, we should reposition the deployment promptly and

implement storming attack {强攻 qianggong}.20 We should first use rapid and violent

firepower to attack and suppress and destroy the enemy's temporary works as much as

possible. Afterwards, we should rapidly organize our forces to penetrate its defense and

separate and divide the enemy before annihilating the enemy.

VI. Continuing Operations...402

Initial battle victory often may cause drastic change in the war situation and could

quickly generate new combat opportunities. The campaign commander should be good at

making use of the advantageous conditions created by the initial battle and turn local

victory into campaign victory. Thus, when the initial battle victory is certain, the

commander should, in light of the battlefield development, assess possible intention and

20 Storming attack: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, "Combat operations in which concentrated,

superior forces and firepower undertake a forceful attack against a defensive enemy. Mainly used in

offensive combat against defensive enemies in fortified positions, defensive enemies in field positions, and

urban defensive enemies."
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activities of the enemy nearby and formulate the operational course of action for the next

phase. Once the initial battle ends, the commander should capture the opportunities for

battle and rapidly shift force-strengths {转移兵力 zhuanyi bingli}21 to wipe out the

enemy in other areas and to realize the campaign mission. The timing for shifting forces

can take place at the following junctures: after wiping out part of the enemy force and

seeking to wipe out the rest of the enemy force; after wiping out an encircled enemy force

and seeking to wipe out enemy reinforcement; after wiping out the enemy reinforcement

and seeking to wipe out a besieged enemy force; after wiping out the enemy’s ground

forces and seeking to wipe out the enemy's airborne forces that have just landed on the

ground; and pursuing the retreating and escaping enemy, etc. During the process of

shifting forces and continuing operations, the campaign commander should constantly

analyze and assess the situations, make predictions of enemy's development, and

aggressively create and capture new opportunities for battle. He should, at the appropriate

time, conceal the maneuvering forces, change fighting methods agilely, and coordinate

with the troops of all services and arms and local forces in activities. He should also

repeatedly conduct political mobilization {政治动员 zhengzhi dongyuan} to maintain

heightened fighting enthusiasm.

In achieving continuing operations, during campaign planning, the campaign commander

must take into consideration the interconnectedness of and switching between campaign

phases, as well as do a good job in organizing coordination and support. The commander

must pay attention to conserving the use of forces and bring into full play the total effect

of the campaign force. He should aggressively and actively create opportunities for battle,

capture opportunities for battle promptly and correctly, and realized the total success of

the campaign operations. Unafraid of fatigue and appropriate adjustment are two

indispensable aspects of continuing operations. The duration of a campaign is long and

the struggle is punishing. Personnel, ammunition, food supplies, and POL, etc. all need to

be adjusted and replenished promptly. While we emphasize the spirit of bravery,

sacrifice, unafraid of fatigue, and continuing operations, we should make use of gaps and

any other down time to rest and adjust the troops so that they will recover and strengthen

their operational ability. In future campaigns, battlefield switching will be fast and the

requirement for continuing operation will be high. The campaign commander should be

good at adjusting and use of forces so that during the entire campaign process the troops

will always maintain vigorous assault vitality.

21 Shift force-strengths: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, "Operations in which the operational

direction or operational area are switched. Its basic requirements are suitable timing, speed, and

concealment."
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Chapter 17

The Mountain Offensive Campaign...404

The mountain offensive campaign is offensive operations conducted by an army

campaign large formation, complemented by other armed strengths and implemented

against an enemy in a mountain defensive. The campaign goal is to annihilate an enemy’s

effective strength, seize the targets occupied by the enemy, and create conditions for

achieving strategic goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...404

In a mountain offensive campaign, imminent battle preparation time is hasty, its

battlefield is unfamiliar, and in particular, the complex terrain poses great influence on

offensive operations. Its unfavorable factors are: first, it is not easy for a large force-unit

maneuver and unfolding, and it is especially not easy for heavy equipment force-unit

activities such as tanks. Secondly, it is not easy for observation and fire, and it is

especially not easy for bringing high tech weaponry effectiveness into play. Thirdly, it is

not easy for penetration and developing the offensive, and it is especially easy for the

campaign bushi disposition to be separated by terrain. It is difficult for each offensive

direction to mutually assist the other, and it is difficult to form a composite strength

against any given point. Fourthly, it is difficult to organize logistical, equipment and

operational support. The advantages include the following: The favorable aspects: firstly,

it is easy for us to conceal our operational intention and suddenly initiate sudden-attack

[assault]. Secondly, it favors our organizing of small elements {fensdui} to implement

insertion {穿插 chuancha}, outflanking {迂回 yuhui}, infiltration, and special operations,

and annihilate the enemy via close combat.

I. Characteristics...404

(1) Main operational activities are around the mountain accesses {通道 tongdao} and key

points {重点 zhongdian}

In order to ensure stability of mountain defense, the enemy will stress the defense of key

points, control of mountain accesses, and prevention of enemy outflanking. Normally, the

enemy will deploy the main forces and equipment in advantageous terrain such as river

valleys or narrow mountain-passes to form a gateway to control the valleys and the

defensive system of the mountain accesses and key points. For our troops to achieve the

campaign goal, we must first capture the key points at the enemy’s forward, open the

gateway to the passes, capture advantageous terrain on either side of the passes, and

control important traffic routes. Only then can we rapidly penetrate the enemy depth and

divide and break up {割裂 gelie}22 the enemy’s defense, and create conditions for our

forces to annihilate the enemy who are defending the key points. Thus, the main activities

22 Divide and break up or separate.
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of the campaign will always focus on the mountain passes and key points; and the focal

points of the struggle between two sides are capturing the key points and controlling the

mountain passes.

(2) Offensive directions are independent

In the mountainous area, the terrain is undulating, mountain cliffs are steep and valleys

intersect. Offensive activities are often forced into areas broken up by the terrain. Troops

carrying out the same mission may be divided into several directions due to the ridges

and valleys, and they often have to carry out activities independently. Thus, mountain

offensive operations are normally carried out in separated directions and areas and the

campaign large formation normally is organized into several offensive groups {攻击集团

gongji jutuan} with independent operational capabilities. They follow a unified plan and

carry out the offensive operational mission independently in different directions to realize

the same campaign intent. Each offensive direction is highly independent.

(3) Difficulty level of assault to penetrate enemy’s fortifications is high

The defensive enemy in the mountainous area uses the advantageous terrain as the

backdrop to firmly defend. They are often well prepared and have a well fortified

defensive system. At those highly contested key points, in particular, the enemy normally

disposes stronger forces and provides them with more fire support. The enemy’s main

positions are normally set up in complex and strategic terrain. They form a circularshaped defense and deploy large forces with high density of fire and obstacles. For our

troops to seize the enemy’s forward key points and penetrate the enemy’s defense, we

must concentrate our excellent forces and implement multi-directional and multi-route

assault to forcefully attack the enemy’s strong defense. The mission is very difficult and

the operations are extraordinarily intense.

(4) Depth attack gains significance

During mountain operations, when organizing defense, the defensive side can make full

use of the advantageous terrain and natural obstacles and has excellent conditions to

conceal. Thus, it is more difficult for the offensive side to launch a forceful frontal assault

or push forward in a line. On the other hand, the defensive side’s force deployment and

firepower systems are easily constrained or even isolated by the terrain. This provides

advantageous conditions for the offensive side to implement outflanking, inserting,

infiltration, enveloping, and to develop its firepower and annihilate the enemy. Thus, in

mountain offensive campaigns, in order to penetrate the enemy’s defense, it is not only

possible but necessary to implement non-linear operations and attack and capture

important targets in the enemy’s depth. The offensive side often uses long-range fire of

the aviation, missile, and artillery force to conduct comprehensive assault. At the same

time, the offensive side can use airborne and airlanding units and the special operation

units to work in cooperation with the ground troops to implement outflanking, inserting,

encirclement, and infiltration activities. The offensive side can also implement multi-
455

dimensional and overtaking {超越攻击 chaoyue gongji}23 attack. This way, the offensive

side can coordinate forward attack with depth attack, ground attack with airborne attack,

and force attack with firepower attack. The offensive side can take advantage of the

advantages and avoid the disadvantages, and take control of the campaign initiation. Here

we can see that depth operations and multi-dimensional attack are important measures to

win victory of mountain offensive campaigns.

(5) Command and coordination is complex and difficult

In mountain offensive campaigns, the operational space is wide, the participating forces

are many, the organization is complex, and the campaign deployment is dispersed. The

attack groups are normally separated in different directions and areas while they organize

campaign activities. Thus, the requirement for campaign overall control and coordination

is high and the difficulty level is great. In the campaign process, the progress of activities

in different offensive directions and during different operational phases is not balanced.

Battlefield situations are complicated, change can be drastic, and communications and

command coordination can be interrupted easily. During battles, the requirement for

contingent coordination {随即协同 suiji xietong} is high and the complexity and difficult

level of command is great.

(6) Support mission is arduous and difficult

In mountain offensive campaigns, the enemy makes use of a large amount of high-tech

weapons and equipment and implements both “soft” and “hard” attack. The level of

damage will increase and our communications support and our command system will

suffer serious threat from the enemy. In mountain offensive campaigns, the terrain is

complex and the enemy’s fortifications are strong. Thus, our tasks to overcome terrain

obstacles and destroy enemy’s defensive installations are arduous. Mountainous terrain

makes reconnaissance, observation and getting hold of enemy’s intelligence and intended

direction of movement very difficult, and battlefield intelligence support is hard. Hightech equipment is widely applied to the battlefield. With a higher degree of automation

and better technology, technical support work becomes extremely complex. During

assault operations, there are high personnel casualties, high war material consumption,

and high damage rate of equipment. In the mountainous area, population density is low

and socio-cultural complexity is high. It is difficult to secure provisions and supplies. We

have to rely mainly on support of the campaign large formation, and thus the logistical

and equipment support tasks are arduous. In sum, in mountain offensive campaigns, the

23 Overtaking attack: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, overtaking operations are combat

operations in which a unit overtakes the enemy in front of it or one's own combat formation. For example,

combat operations which take advantage of a gap in enemy forces or an exposed flank to penetrate the

enemy's rear; in pursuit combat, operations to overtake or bypass enemy covering units; combat operations

to block the path of a retreating enemy force; the second echelon in combat operations which overtake the

first echelon; etc.
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necessary support items are many, the range of support is wide, the requirement is high,

and the support mission is thus especially difficult.

II. Requirements...406

In mountain offensive campaigns, we must concentrate our excellent forces and sharp

weapons to create overall superiority over the enemy, both quantitatively and

quantitatively. We must use multiple operational measures agilely and implement fulldepth and focused attack. We must use resolute and ferocious assault activities to

annihilate the enemy’s effective strength in the shortest time possible and capture the area

occupied by the enemy. To do this, in campaign guidance we must grasp the following

points:

(1) Concentrate superior forces. Together overcome the enemy.

An enemy that is defending a mountainous area has advanced preparation and can afford

waiting at ease for an exhausted opponent. The enemy makes use of the advantageous

terrain to build a closed defense system. We must concentrate our superior forces and

jointly overcome the enemy. That is, we must concentrate the forces of all participating

services and arms under a unified command. We must have superiority both in quantity

and quality. We must strengthen command coordination among the services and arms so

as to form a total power to overcome the enemy and win victory.

Force concentration mainly refers to concentration of forces and weapons in terms of

time and effectiveness. To do so, we must concentrate the use of reinforced aviation,

airborne, naval, air defense, campaign tactical missile, support artillery, electronic

warfare, and special operations force, etc. During the entire campaign or part of the

campaign process, we must maintain quantitative and, especially, qualitative superiority.

Under normal situations, we must use the combined operational capability of the attack

groups to respond to the enemy and build a strong advantageous force. In the main attack

direction of the campaign, we must form even greater superiority in order to sustain

powerful attack capability.

To concentrate forces does not mean we should employ the method of concentrated

deployment. Instead, we should concentrate forces dynamically, that is, we should use

battlefield maneuver to concentrate operational forces during the operational process.

Mainly, we should swiftly concentrate force-unit {budui} force, fire power, and

information capability in order to create campaign total or local superiority. We should

break up the enemy’s defensive system with a single blow, disrupt the enemy’s

disposition, and frighten the enemy’s psychological state, thus pushing the development

of the combat situation.

In mountain offensive campaigns, there are many participating services and arms. We

must strengthen the concept of integrated operations, strengthen command coordination,
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and use the forces scientifically in order to create a combined total force and launch

comprehensive attack against the enemy.

(2) Launch multi-route multi-dimensional attack. Penetrate key points.

The enemy that is defending a mountainous area has already established a complete

position, and its defensive system consists of a fortified strong position and various

protective works and obstacles. When launching a mountain offensive campaign, we

must focus on special attributes of the enemy’s defensive disposition and choose its

defensive weakness such as defensive gaps, defensive connecting parts, and flanks. We

must launch multi-directional, multi-dimensional, targeted attack in order to force the

enemy to disperse its forces. Implementing multi-route, multi-directional and multidimensional attack can help us conceal our campaign intention and allow us to

simultaneously penetrate the enemy’s defense from several directions. It enables us to

implement inserting and outflanking, dividing and encirclement, and to annihilate the

enemy that is defending the mountain position.

When implementing multi-route multi-dimensional attack, we must target key points. We

should concentrate the main force and weapons in the main attack direction to penetrate

the enemy’s key points, and at the same time, we should at the same time choose several

support attack and diversion directions {助攻和牵制方向 zhugong he qianzhi

fangxiang}. We should concentrate the use of the air, campaign tactical missile, and

ground artillery force in order to implement a focused firepower assault. The attack force

should make full use of the firepower assault effect and swiftly penetrate the enemy’s

defense forward at a decisive time and in a decisive sector. The attack force should attack

and encircle the enemy’s forward key points, divide and break up the enemy’s defensive

system and control the main access passageway. The follow-on troops should make use

of the forward attack effect to rapidly expand the outcome of the operation and maintain a

strong offensive posture. If the main offensive direction is frustrated, we should 

carefully analyze the battlefield posture and decisively change the disposition according

to the battlefield situation, rapidly maneuver the forces, and continue to develop along the

direction where the offensive is successful.

(3) Full-depth comprehensive attack. Multi-dimension dividing and annihilation.

The main operational measure to rapidly and decisively annihilate an enemy that is

defending a mountainous area is to implement full-depth comprehensive attack and

multi-dimensional dividing and annihilation. That is, we launch a comprehensive force,

firepower and electronic attack against the targets in the full-depth of the enemy’s

defense system, and use multiple methods to divide, encircle, and annihilate the enemy.

When we launch full-depth comprehensive attack, we must fully demonstrate the power

of high-tech long-range force and weapon capabilities, especially the operational

capabilities of the Second Artillery, aviation, and special operations force. We must strive

to overcome the enemy’s full-depth with one blow and achieve high-intensity firepower

effectiveness within a short time. We should fully utilize all operational forces, methods
458

and measures to implement multi-dimensional blockade and dividing in order to create

conditions to annihilate the enemy. To achieve this, we must concentrate our firepower to

target important targets, traffic hubs, and key points along the passageways in the

enemy’s defensive depth. We must employ firepower blockade, force-unit {budui} force

inserting, and electromagnetic interruption to block part of the battlefield and prevent the

defensive enemy from establishing contact with the outside. The assault group {强击集

群 qiangji jiqun} should make full use of the firepower effect and swiftly and bravely tear

an opening in the enemy’s forward and resist enemy’s counterattack. The depth assault

group {纵深突击集群 zongshen tuji jiqun} should rapidly implement inserting,

outflanking, and infiltration to divide and break up the defensive enemy. The special

operations and airborne force should aggressively sabotage critical targets in the enemy’s

depth, disrupt enemy’s disposition in the depth, and work in conjunction with the frontal

main force to attack and annihilate the enemy.

(4) Scientific and rational bushu disposition. Command nimbly.

In mountain offensive campaigns, we must rationally determine the campaign bushi

disposition in light of the characteristics of campaign operations and battlefield

environment under informationized conditions, as well as the campaign mission, strength

task-organization, operational capabilities, fighting methods, and the enemy’s defensive

posture. We should establish a multi-directional, focused, and multi-dimensional attack

disposition. We should ensure that we have strong assault capabilities in the main attack

direction, and at the same time we should make sure that the attack troops in all

directions also have strong independent operational capabilities. When we organize

operations, we should follow the principle of joint operations of all services and

concentrated efficiency {军种联合,集中效能 junzhong lianhe, jizhong xiaoneng} so as

to demonstrate the integrated-whole might of all services. We should give special

emphasis to the functions of the special operations force and organize several operational

forces with special capabilities to implement inserting, outflanking, and infiltration, and

to carry out the mission of seizing points, controlling passageways, and dividing,

encircling and annihilation.

In mountain offensive campaigns, the campaign bushi disposition is rather dispersed and

all offensive directions are independent. Battlefield situations are complicated, change

can come suddenly, and our command and coordination can easily be disrupted by the

enemy. Thus, while stressing concentrated unified command {集中统一指挥 jizhong

tongyi zhihui}, we can also employ the dispersed command {分散指挥 fensan zhihui}

mode or the delegated command {委托指挥 weituo zhihui} mode to nimbly command.

In the main attack direction and during important periods, we should practice primarily

unified command and use dispersed command as a secondary mode. In other directions

and areas and during other critical periods, we should use dispersed command as the

primary mode and use unified command as the secondary mode. We should be able to

combine unified command with dispersed command and practice concentrated and

dispersed command appropriately. When assigning missions and organizing coordination

before combat, the campaign commander should not be too rigid or too inflexible. He
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should leave room for flexibility. During combat, when dealing with situations, the

campaign commander should give a certain degree of autonomy to lower-level

commanders, allowing them to develop their own initiative and creativity and use their

own intelligence and talent to find effective ways to overcome the enemy and win

victory, and to command decisively and nimbly. In addition, the campaign commander

should centrally manage the total situation, strengthen coordination and closely organize

coordinated activities of all operational directions, during all operational phases, and

among all services and arms. This is to ensure that all services and arms form a joint

force, and act cooperatively and in unison in attacking the enemy.

(5) Implementing full scale campaign support and [campaign support] having key points.

In mountain offensive campaigns, all operational activities rely heavily on operational

support and logistical and equipment support. Effective support has a great impact on the

campaign course and conclusion. At the same time, the support strengths are limited, the

support missions are arduous, and the support requirements are relatively high. Thus, we

must implement both full scale campaign support and [campaign support] having key

points.

Full scale support {全面保障 quanmian baozhang} is the base and foundation of good

campaign support. It means we should provide support in light of the support objectives,

to all battlefields, and during the entire course of the campaign. In terms of the support

space, we should take good care of the battlefield’s frontage and flank, the depth, on land,

at sea, and in the air, and implement all-direction support. In terms of time, we should

pay attention to the full course of the campaign, as well as provide continuous support

during all phases and periods. In terms of support objectives, we should provide support

to all participating services and arms and make adjustment to their unique characteristics

and requirement.

Key point support {重点保障 zhongdian baozhang} is to reinforce support with key

points on the basis of full scale support. It means based on the situation of battlefield

realities, we must conduct unified overall- and guihua planning for campaign support,

rationally organize and bushu disposition various support strengths, and concentrate the

main strengths to support the operational activities that have a major effect on the

campaign overall situation; give priority to supporting the main direction and area,

critical time occasions, and operational groups executing the main missions so as to

ensure the completion of key point missions.

Section 2: Main Activities...410

Based on the campaign mission and actual situation, in mountain offensive campaigns,

we can normally achieve the campaign goal by employing operational activities such as

seizing campaign information superiority, seizing local air superiority, comprehensive

firepower attack, multi-dimensional penetration, crushing enemy’s counterattack, depth

dividing and annihilation, etc.
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I. Seizing and Maintaining Campaign Information Superiority and Air

Superiority...410

In mountain offensive campaigns, seizing and maintaining campaign information and air

superiority is critical to getting hold of the campaign initiation and can have major

consequences to the process and outcome of the campaign. Thus, we should focus on

organizing and implementing seizing and maintaining campaign information and air

superiority in light of the battlefield environment and the offensive and defensive

capabilities of the opposing sides.

(1) Seizing and maintaining campaign information superiority

Seizing and maintaining information superiority is the prerequisite and foundation of

getting hold of the campaign initiation. The main mission is to block the enemy from

obtaining information, weaken, interrupt and damage enemy’s information transmission,

and destroy the enemy’s information basic facilities; at the same time, we protect our

information capturing, transmission, and processing so as to have information superiority.

For the campaign large formation, the core of seizing and maintaining information

superiority is to seize and maintain electromagnetic superiority. The main operational

methods are network warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.

1. Organizing battlefield information reconnaissance

Battlefield information reconnaissance means using various reconnaissance measures to

conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities against the enemy’s information

operation systems. The focus is on finding out the structure and disposition of the

enemy’s information operation systems and equipment, their tactical characteristics,

technical parameters and patterns of use.

In mountain offensive campaigns, due to the influence of terrain, reconnaissance

activities and methods are to a certain extent restricted, and information systems’

direction finding and positioning are difficult. To address this, we should establish a

multi-dimensional, multi-layered, and all-directional reconnaissance and surveillance

system. We should apply various information reconnaissance capabilities and conduct

multiple means, multiple methods, and multiple spectral reconnaissance activities. In

terms of reconnaissance methods, we should combine close-in reconnaissance with

enemy-rear reconnaissance, and ground reconnaissance with aerial reconnaissance,

striving to comprehensively obtain accurate information of the enemy information

systems. When organizing and implementing reconnaissance, the reconnaissance fendui

should approach the enemy as close as possible and position at different points to conduct

comprehensive reconnaissance on the enemy signal source’s technical parameters,

operating methods, disposition, and command relationships. In terms of the emphases of

reconnaissance, we should focus on the deployment area of the enemy’s command and

control system, distribution of nodes of the information systems, the disposition of the

information systems, such as the weapon control system, guidance system, and early
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warning system, and their technical parameters. We should ascertain the key targets, key

systems, and the key users, and employ technical means to implement all-time

surveillance and learn the characteristics of their activities and change pattern so as to lay

a solid foundation for information offensive and hard destruction.

2. Organizing the campaign information offensive

The campaign information offensive is attack operations for the purpose of weakening

the enemy’s information operation capabilities and reducing the enemy’s information

capturing and control ability. The key targets of the information offensive include the

enemy’s operational command communications network, early warning, detection and

vectoring radar network, and command control computer network, etc.

In mountain operations, the terrain can be very complex, which poses a certain degree of

constraint on the information attack equipment and methods. Our troops’ information

attack capabilities are limited. Constrained by the terrain conditions, it is difficult for our

information capabilities to attack and destroy all the enemy’s information systems. The

Chinese military possesses preliminary “soft destruction” and “hard destruction”

capabilities and has diversified our technical means. Thus, when organizing and

implementing the information offensive, we should focus on the following issues:

The first is close-in attack. We should approach the enemy’s information systems as close

as possible. We should make use of ground and airborne attack equipment to suppress

and jam the enemy’s information systems in order to achieve the goal of paralyzing the

enemy’s information system.

The second is key point attack. We should concentrate all information attack forces and

weapons of all participating forces on the main attack direction, important areas, and

during critical periods. We should implement key point jamming of important enemy

electronic equipment such as the radio communications network (stations) and radars in

order to delay the enemy’s command, reduce system effectiveness, weaken the enemy’s

ability to conduct battlefield reconnaissance, operational command, communications, and

weapons control, and to seize battlefield information superiority.

The third is employing multiple methods. We should follow the principle of “combining

the soft and hard method, attacking networks and electronic equipment” and conduct

“soft paralysis” and “hard destruction” against the enemy’s information systems. In terms

of “soft” measures, the key is to carry out electronic jamming and electronic deception

against the enemy’s wireless information systems, and use high power jamming

equipment to conduct suppression jamming against the enemy’s wireless command

networks and radars, etc. In terms of “hard” measures, in light of the characteristics of the

mountain terrain, we should use precision-guided weapons, airborne assault firepower

and ground artillery firepower to launch comprehensive attack at the enemy’s

information warfare systems. We should paralyze and destroy the enemy’s information
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capturing and information control capability so as to ensure our seizing and maintaining

information superiority.

The fourth is emphasizing effective psychological attack and special operations surprise

attack. We should bring into full play the deterrence and destruction function of

psychological warfare and special operations warfare {特种战 tezhongzhan} in

information operations. We should use psychological attack to shatter the defensive

enemy’s will to resist. When implementing psychological warfare, we should use

propaganda attack methods such as positional broadcasting, launching propaganda

bombs, and airdropping of propaganda papers in an effort to increase the enemy’s antiwar sentiment. By using special operations surprise attack and enemy rear sabotage, we

destroy the enemy’s important information systems such as the command control, early

warning detection, information transmission and processing system in order to weaken

the enemy’s information control and information dominance capabilities.

3. Organizing the campaign information defensive

The campaign information defensive is activities employed to prevent the enemy from

conducting reconnaissance, jamming, damage, and destruction of our information

systems. The key points to defend include the operational command communications

network, early warning, detection, and vectoring radar network, and command

automation network, etc.

In mountain offensive campaigns, for the information defensive we should pay attention

to the terrain conditions and scientifically use the natural environment to organize denial

and deception. Denial and deception should be set up in a dispersed manner so that it will

not attract the attention of and be detected by the enemy. We should employ radar and

anti-electronic detection measures and concealment and deception methods. By setting up

fake positions, decoys, and fake communications hubs, we deceive and confuse the

enemy. We should strictly control electromagnetic radiation, and employ technical and

tactical measures to reduce the possibility of being detected and jammed. In particular,

we should use information equipment that resists jamming technology for information

transmission. When necessary, we should practice radio silence. For the command

automation network, we should apply physical insulation, system for itself {自成系统

zicheng xitong},24 fire wall, and identification certification technology to prevent enemy

intrusion and virus attack. We should enhance air cover and ground warning to prevent

the enemy’s precision attack and depth special operations surprise attack against the

information systems in order to ensure that our information systems are secure and

reliable.

24 System for itself or independent system, stand alone system.
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(2) Seizing and maintaining campaign air superiority

Seizing and maintaining air superiority is normally uniformly organized by the superior,

with the superior’s assigned force being the main force. The campaign large formation

can use its own air defense force with assistance from the air force to implement focused

ground-to-air operations and to destroy and suppress the enemy’s air defense force on the

ground. The goal is to protect important targets within our operational area from the

enemy’s airborne assault, reduce possible damage caused by enemy’s airborne assault,

and create conditions for our operations on the ground and in the air. Campaign air

defense operations should do well both in having tight protection and in aggressive

attack. The operations should strive to reduce loss caused by enemy air raid to the

minimum and allow our troops to maintain strong and sustained operational capabilities.

II. Comprehensive Fire Assault...413

Comprehensive fire assault means that the campaign large formation uses its won

firepower and various enhanced firepower to launch full-depth, key-point, multiple-wave

{多波次 duo boci}, and high-intensity fire operation activities against the defensive

enemy. The main forces the campaign large formation employs to capture the enemy’s

position are the subordinate suppression artillery and armed helicopter units. The

campaign large formation also should utilize the superior’s supporting Air Force aviation

and the Second Artillery’s conventional missile force. The goal is to suppress the

enemy’s firepower operational units, destroy the enemy’s important operational targets,

paralyze the enemy’s overall defensive system, and cause casualties to a large number of

enemy’s effective strength so as to constrain the enemy’s battlefield activities and

provide support to our own campaign assembly, maneuvering in the assault area, and

multi-dimensional penetration in order to create advantageous conditions.

There are diverse forms and types of comprehensive firepower assaults. They can be

organized in batches based on time sequence, divided into service-based fire plans based

on the characteristics of the target, or implemented according to the importance of the

sectors. No matter which type of organization is employed, we should make sure that the

fire assault is closely connected in terms of timing and space so that we afford the

defensive enemy an all-time, all-space, full-depth, and all-domain destructive attack and

give the enemy an awe-inspiring mental and psychological shock.

(1) Full-depth comprehensive assault

Full-depth comprehensive assault means that in a relatively short period of time we

concentrate the Army’s long-range artillery, the Air Force’s assault aviation, and the

Second Artillery’s conventional missile force and electronic warfare force to launch fulldepth, multi-layer and high-intensity continuous assault. The goal is to destroy and

damage the enemy’s critical targets that pose great threat to our offensive operations and

support the enemy’s overall defense, annihilate part of the enemy’s effective strength,

and weaken the enemy’s comprehensive resistance capabilities.
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The targets of attack of the full-depth comprehensive assault normally include the

enemy’s command center, communications hub, electronic warfare facilities, traffic hubs,

firepower operations system, air defense system, logistics supply system, heavy force

concentration, defensive key points in the shallow depth, and important targets along the

main passageways, etc. Suppression artillery is used mainly to suppress important targets

within effective range such as defensive key points at the enemy’s first line and shallow

depth, command control centers, communications hubs, firepower operations systems,

etc. The Army’s aviation unit is mainly used to strike enemy’s armored vehicles, etc. Air

Force’s assault aviation unit (fighter-bombers) is mainly used to assault important plane

targets such as the enemy’s air defense system on the ground, command control system,

electronic warfare system, firepower operations system, etc. The Air Force’s bomber

aviation unit is mainly used against large plane targets such as to block the enemy’s

traffic hubs, and strike the enemy’s firepower system, field helicopter air fields, and

heavy force concentrations, etc. The Second Artillery’s conventional missile unit is

mainly used to attack important campaign targets such as the enemy’s firepower system

in the enemy’s depth, heavy force concentrations, logistics supply system, field helicopter

air fields, etc.

Full-depth comprehensive assaults are normally implemented by waves according to the

type of the target. The duration of each wave should vary and firepower should be closely

connected. The transition between waves is normally executed according to the predetermined fire plan. Normally we employ saturation assault {饱和突击 baohe tuji}

(suppression). That is, we use electronic warfare as the lead, using jamming and

suppression first to destroy the enemy’s C3I system. We use the artillery unit and the

Second Artillery’s conventional missile unit to strike the enemy’s reconnaissance, early

warning and air defense system on the ground in order to open up a corridor for

penetration. Afterwards, the missile unit uses the convergent assault {集中突击 jizhong

tuji}25 and the collective assault {集群突击 jiqun tuji} method, the aviation unit uses the

concentrated strike {集中射击 jizhong sheji} and the simultaneous strike {同时射击

tongshi sheji} method, and the artillery force uses the massed fire {密集射击 miji sheji}

and the concentrated fire method to launch assault, and employ time-based or targetbased coordination to jointly destroy the enemy’s firepower operations system, command

system, electronic system, etc. in order to suppress the enemy’s full-depth. They execute

a high-intensity comprehensive fire to suppress the enemy in a relatively short time and

give the enemy a psychologically shock.

25 Convergent assault or concentrated assault: According to the 1977 PLA Military Terms, it refers to

“concentrated air raid by aviation units using comparatively large amounts of forces against a single target

or a group of targets on land or on the water within a short period of time. It is used to destroy thoroughly

or seriously damage targets, while shaking the enemy's morale.”
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(2) Forward key point assault

Forward key point assault means we use the forward attack group’s direct fire and

suppression artillery unit as the main force and Army Aviation’s armed helicopter as the

supportive force to launch a high-density saturation attack against the enemy’s important

fortified point targets in the first line position so as to ensure that we can thoroughly

paralyze the enemy’s defense. Normally, forward key point assault is implemented after

the concentrated full assault {集中全面突击 jizhong quanmian tuji} or at the same time

as the concentrated full assault.

Prior to or at the same time of the concentrated full assault, in an appropriate time, we

should order the direct fire and suppression artillery unit to begin developing and swiftly

capture the predetermined firing position {发射阵地 fashe zhendi}. When we begin the

key point assault, we should use large-caliber direct fire to attack the already identified

fortified pillar points of the enemy and accurately destroy them. We should use vehicleborne antitank missiles and terminally-guided precision artillery shells to perform

precision attack at the enemy’s exposed armored targets. We should use different types of

indirect fire to conduct key point suppression firing against the enemy’s command and

communications facilities and artillery positions. We should use the Army Aviation’s

armed helicopters to track and strike the enemy’s dynamic targets such as the vehicleborne firepower operations system and the vehicle-borne electronic warfare system.

When carrying out key point assault, we should be swift, accurate, and ferocious, so as to

damage the enemy’s defense system in the forward and forward depth {前进纵深 qianjin

zongshen}.

(3) Depth precision attack

Depth precision attack means we use the Air Force’s assault fighter bomber aviation unit

as the main force and the Army Aviation’s armed helicopters and long-range precision

attack weapons such as terminally-guided artillery projectiles to implement destructive

attack against the enemy’s important point targets in the depth, including the command

control system and the electronic warfare system, etc. Normally, this is conducted

simultaneously with forward assault activities.

When implementing depth precision attack, Air Force’s assault aviation is mainly used to

strike the enemy’s command control and information warfare system, and bomber

aviation is mainly used to carry out precision attack against the logistics supply facilities

and traffic facilities such as bridges and tunnels in the enemy’s depth. Army Aviation’s

armed helicopters and guided artillery projectiles are mainly used to launch precision

attack against targets such as armed vehicles and all types of radar in the enemy’s depth.

Supported by our special operations unit in the enemy’s rear, the terminally laser-guided

artillery projectiles should be actively used to launch precision attack against small point

targets in the enemy’s depth. The Second Artillery’s conventional precision attack unit is

used to implement precision destruction of important fixed facilities such as electrical

facilities and large cave depots.
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(4) Battlefield local blockade

In order to create conditions in local areas at critical periods for the ground attack force to

annihilate the mountain defensive enemy, at the same time or after the various

operational groups launch attack, we should organize various firepower to implement

battlefield local blockade. The main activities include the following:

One of the activities is to launch assault against the enemy’s reserve force and block the

enemy’s reinforcement. During the campaign, the enemy will engage the reverse force in

combat at an advantageous moment, or reposition forces to reinforce in order to improve

or recover the defensive posture and seize the battlefield initiative. We should

concentrate our main forces and weapons and launch assault while the enemy is

maneuvering. The timing of the assault is most advantageous when the enemy is

maneuvering on bridges, at ferry points, and along narrow paths and mountain passes. In

terms of use of force, we should fully demonstrate the strength of the weapons, and we

should combine blockade and attack organically so as to resolutely crush enemy’s

reinforcement.

Another activity is to launch assault against the enemy’s traffic and transport route and

war material support system, and block the enemy’s forward delivery and rear transport.

The mountain defensive enemy has strong defensive capabilities. But the enemy’s

defensive capabilities can be divided and broken up easily, and the enemy has limited

ability to sustain the operations. Thus, we should concentrate our forces and launch

assault against the enemy’s traffic and transport routes and war material support system,

in particular, against important targets such as traffic hubs, ferry points, train stations,

bridges, tunnels, narrow paths, ammunition depots, POL depots, oil transportation pipes,

and war material collection and distribution centers, etc. We should block the enemy

from forward delivery and rear transport, interrupt its supplies, and weaken its resistance

capability.

The third activity is to blockade key points, narrow paths and block the enemy’s

maneuver. In order to support the airborne force’s multi-dimensional maneuver and the

attack troops’ dividing and separating activities, we can organize various types of

firepower and use firepower to block the key points and narrow paths, and to block and

intercept enemy’s anti-airborne and counterattack operations, to assure that our airborne

force can rapidly assemble and capture key points, and to support our attack troops to

divide and annihilate the defensive enemy.

The fourth activity is to attack the enemy’s massive force groups {重兵集团 zhongbing

jituan} and stop the enemy from launching counterattack. When our attack troops

penetrate the enemy’s defense, break into the enemy’s depth and seize advantageous

terrain and key points, the enemy may use maneuver forces to launch force or firepower

counterattack in order to improve or recover its defensive posture. We should employ the

fighter bomber and assault aviation unit, working in conjunction with the Army Aviation

and the Artillery force, to launch surprise and ferocious attacks when the enemy’s reserve
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unit is developing so as to block its development. At the same time, we should resist the

enemy’s counterattack by fire. We can ask permission from the superior to use the fighter

aviation unit to work in cooperation with the ground air defense force to resist the

enemy’s fighters and armed helicopters’ fire assault against our ground troops and

important targets within the campaign area. When necessary, we can also use the fighter

bomber and assault aviation unit to assault the enemy’s airfield, using the “taking away

the firewood from under the cauldron” {釜底抽薪 fudi chouxin}26 fighting method to

stop the enemy’s counterattack by fire.

III. Multi-dimensional Penetration...416

Multi-dimensional penetration refers to operational activities whereby the subordinate

and enhanced forces and firepower launch attacks simultaneously against the defensive

enemy from the air and the ground to breach an opening in the enemy’s first line position.

The goal is to swiftly annihilate the enemy, control important campaign passageways,

first line key points, and strategic places so as to create conditions for the follow-on

attack units to engage in the operations as soon as possible. Normally, multi-dimensional

penetration is implemented when the campaign large formation has basically

accomplished the offensive campaign arrangement and the advanced comprehensive fire

attack has basically achieved or almost achieves the predetermined effect. Normally, it

can start when the forces are stationary or when the forces are traveling.

Multi-dimensional penetration is the most intense and critical set of operational activities

in a mountain offensive campaign. We must concentrate superior forces and firepower

and launch full-depth, multi-directional, and focused multi-dimensional penetration from

the main attack direction. On the basis that we have effectively captured air and

information superiority, we should make full use of the operational effect of the

comprehensive fire assault and employ the main offensive force to launch ferocious

assault in several predetermined attack directions and penetration sectors. We should use

a part of the forces to boldly implement inserting and outflanking. We should also

implement airlanding operations in the enemy’s shallow depth, and use airborne multidimensional penetration to support front attack. With support from the Air Force’s

aviation unit and suppression artillery and conventional missile firepower, we can rapidly

penetrate the enemy’s defense. When implementing multi-dimensional penetration, we

should combine force penetration with fire assault, ground penetration with airborne

penetration, and frontal attack with flank insertion and outflanking.

(1) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation means that before launching the attack, we implement highintensity dense fire assault against the enemy defending the first line. Normally, direct

fire preparation is organized and executed by the unit responsible for the forward attack

26 Taking away the firewood from under the caldron or eliminating the threat by removing the source of the

threat.
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penetration mission when the other forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan

gongjiqun} are capturing the offensive departure position {进攻出发阵地 jingong chufa

zhendi} and right before the obstacle removal teams {障碍排除队 zhang’ai paichudui}

are about to implement mine clearing and obstacle removal. Normally, we use the direct

fire of the forward attack groups as the main weapon to launch annihilation fire and

destructive fire. The direct fire weapons are supported by the large-caliber suppression

artillery to destroy and damage the enemy’s defensive works and armored targets at the

penetration point, annihilate the enemy’s effective strength, suppress the enemy’s

technical weapons and firepower operations systems, destroy the enemy’s forward

obstacles, and provide cover to the mine clearing and obstacle removal activities of the

forward attack troops.

The duration of direct fire preparation should be determined flexibly according to the

degree of fortification of the enemy’s defensive works at the penetration point, remnant

obstacles, and attack readiness level of our attack groups (teams). Normally, it is no less

than several tens of minutes. This time should be as short as possible on the condition

that we have provided the enemy sufficient suppression.

(2) Multi-direction multi-dimension attack

All attack troops should either take turns or simultaneously launch attack according to the

predetermined attack starting schedule. Under normal conditions, the various forward

attack troops should simultaneously launch attack, giving the defensive enemy intense

psychological shock and awe in a very short time. If the terrain variation is marked and

the effect of comprehensive fire attack is not sufficiently good, or there is greater concern

about the enemy’s counterattack firepower, or due to stratagem, we can also launch

attack at appropriate times based on need.

1. Fire extension {延伸射击 yanshen sheji}27

The artillery’s suppression fire should implement fire extension at a suitable time. The

artillery suppression fire, working in cooperation with Army Aviation’s armed

helicopters and the supporting Air Force aviation, and the Second Artillery conventional

missile unit, should continue to implement effective suppression against important targets

in the enemy’s depth such as the command control system, the information warfare

system, and mass force groups. When necessary, a fire interdict area {火力遮断区 huoli

zheduanqu} can be established between the enemy’s depth and the forward to block and

attack the enemy’s maneuvering attack and to support our attack troops at the forward so

that they can successfully penetrate the enemy’s defense.

27 Fire extension or to extend the range of artillery fire, lift fire.
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2. Multi-direction ground attack

After the attack is launched, all attack troops should take full advantage of the destruction

effect of the comprehensive fire assault and the result of direct fire preparation, and

resolutely and fiercely launch attack. We should combine force assault with firepower

assault, frontal assault with outflanking insertion, and horizontal push forward {平面直

推 pingmian zhitui} with overtake attack {越点攻击 yuedian gongji or 超越攻击

chaoyue gongji}, using multi-dimensional, multi-directional attack to create a wellcoordinated campaign offensive posture.

The forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan gongjiqun} should effectively organize

fire assault to provide cover. The first echelon should resolutely penetrate the enemy

position, seize and control advantageous terrain, divide the defensive disposition of the

enemy’s first-line defense and annihilate the defensive enemy inside the penetrated

sector. The follow-on echelon should rapidly follow and be combat ready at all time.

The rapid insertion groups {快速穿插集群 kuaisu chuancha jiqun} should take

advantage of the penetration effect of the forward attack groups or implement small

group, multiple-route, multiple-direction maneuvering along advantageous terrain such as

the enemy’s defensive gap and flank, and rapidly break into the enemy depth along

predetermined routes. They should also be combat ready so as to implement sudden

attack against assigned target or be ready for action.

Prior to or at the same time as the launch of the attack, the special operations groups {特

种作战集群 tezhong zuozhan jiqun} should resolutely, stealthily, and swiftly enter the

designated position in the enemy’s depth either along a predetermined route or from the

air. [The purpose is] to find out enemy’s defensive disposition and detect change in

intelligence information, to provide guidance to the fire assault activities of the precision

guidance weapons, large-caliber suppression artillery, and Air Force Aviation, as well as

to harass the enemy’s critical targets with weak defense such as the enemy’s command

control system, artillery positions, logistical system, etc.

3. Airborne and airlanding operations

After the suppression artillery implements fire extension, the airborne28 (airlanding)

attack groups {空降攻击集群 kongjiang gongji jiqun} should fly at low altitude to enter

the designated area along the route where the enemy’s ground-to-air fire is weak. They

implement airborne or airlanding operations at the flank rear of the enemy’s first-line

defense key point and launch attack at the defensive enemy from the flank or flank rear.

[The purpose is] to block the enemy’s battlefield maneuver and work in concert with the

28 Airborne operations include paratrooper landing and airlanding by aircraft or helicopters.
470

forward main attack groups to penetrate the enemy, as well as to ensure that the

penetration point on the main attack direction can be secured.

(3) Expand and solidify penetration point

Expand and solidify the penetration point means that after the forward attack groups

breach the penetration point of the enemy’s first-line position, the follow-on force

implements flank roll up at a suitable time to wipe out the remnant enemy and firmly

block the enemy’s counterattack in order to secure the penetration point and expand

operational activities.

After breaching the penetration point, we should maintain strong attack pressure on the

penetration point and order the troops to continue to develop and launch attack towards

the enemy’s depth. We should increase the follow-on pace, shorten the time troops must

spend at the penetration point, rapidly capture the enemy’s defensive key points in the

vicinity of the penetration point, aggressively expand the width and depth of the

penetration point, and implement flank roll up at a suitable time. The main direction of

flank roll up should be towards the other flank of the campaign passageway {朝向战役通

道另一侧 chaoxiang zhanyi tongdao lingyice}, or the most successful supportive

direction, or the direction where the terrain is most advantageous for us to solidify the

penetration point.

1. Reinforce the penetration point. Maintain attack vigor.

After breaking through the penetration point, under the condition that it will not affect the

follow-on troops, the engineering fendui should quickly widen the passageway and give

priority to supporting the rapid passing through of the follow-on force. The main force

should be concentrated in the main operational direction. As far as possible, do not

disperse the forces in several directions. We can also deploy a part of the force to take

control of advantageous terrain. We should maintain the attack intensity and vigor.

2. Rapidly capture and control campaign key points.

After the follow-on troops enter the penetration point, they should place priority on

capturing the key points inside the penetration point that have significant campaign

values. Normally, we do not pay too much attention to the harassing enemy scattering

about, but as far as possible, let the main force capture and control the campaign key

points. After capturing and taking control of the key points, we then organize forces to

wipe out the remnant enemy.
471

3. Block enemy’s counterattack. Prevent the enemy from blockading the penetration

point.

After we break through the enemy’s defense forward, the enemy must organize its force

to launch a powerful counterattack to re-capture its lost ground and regain its defensive

posture. To address this, while we implement fire assault, we should at the same time

develop the attack formation, expand the penetration point, and increase the intensity of

fire to stop the counterattack. The attack groups should maintain a multi-route, multidimension, multi-direction and sustained campaign penetration posture, and maintain

high speed and high pressure against the defensive enemy at the first line position. The

attack groups should launch attack towards the enemy’s shallow depth. They should

coordinate their attack direction and attack tempo and, working in conjunction with the

airborne force, capture the campaign key points. The follow-on force should increase the

follow-up pace to enter into the predetermined deployment position as soon as possible to

engage the enemy. The main suppression artillery force should launch attack against the

command control system and artillery positions in the enemy’s depth, and part of the

force should establish a fire interdiction area to attack the enemy’s counterattack force.

The air defense group, the Army Aviation’s armed helicopters, and the supporting Air

Force fighter aviation are mainly to attack the enemy aircraft in the air. The Air Force’s

bomber aviation and the Second Artillery’s conventional missile force should continue to

assault enemy’s massive force groups and field airfields in the enemy’s depth.

If the penetration point is blockaded by the enemy and cannot be broken through in a

short duration, and if the counterattack force in the enemy position appears to be stronger

than ours, the forward attack groups should, depending on the situation, disperse to seize

advantageous terrain in the vicinity of the penetration point and create a mutually

supportive defensive posture. The airborne force should work with the penetration force

as closely as possible. The follow-on force should increase its attack tempo and, under

the cover of fire, work in coordination with the friendly force that has breached the

enemy position to create a sandwiched attack posture in order to ensure that the

penetration point can be re-breached as soon as possible.

IV. Crushing the Enemy’s Counterattack...419

While we are penetrating the enemy’s defense and developing attack to the enemy’s

depth, and while we are seizing key points, taking control of the passageway, and

dividing and breaking the enemy’s defensive disposition, we may encounter ferocious

counterattack by the enemy’s air and artillery firepower, or counterattack by the enemy’s

maneuver force such as the depth reserve force and the airborne force, etc. Thus, after we

breach the enemy’s defense, we should employ various measures and methods to conduct

reconnaissance of the enemy’s defense full-depth, and take immediate control of the

movement of the enemy’s depth attack force. We should correctly determine the enemy’s

counterattack intentions, direction, timing, scale, and possible activities, and then use

various effective methods to crush the enemy’s counterattack at a suitable time.
472

(1) Resist enemy’s counterattack by fire

When we discover that the enemy is repositioning its forces and may launch

counterattack by fire, we should use the suppression artillery force as the main force and

the Air Force and Second Artillery’s conventional missile fire as the supportive force to

organize strong and powerful comprehensive fire assault activities. [The purpose is] is to

annihilate the enemy’s counterattack effective strength, suppress the enemy’s air-toground fire, disperse the enemy’s maneuver formation, disrupt the enemy’s command

control, and interrupt the enemy’s fire cover. At the same time, the air cover group {对空

掩护群 dui kong yanhuqun} should provide air intercept over the local battlefield where

we penetrate and divide to destroy enemy’s airborne weapons and provide air security to

our ground troops. The troops that penetrate the enemy position should quicken their

attack pace. When engaging the enemy in close combat, they should make full use of the

natural geographic conditions of the mountains such as deep gullies and thick woods to

practice denial and deception in order to lessen the power of enemy’s high-tech weapons.

If the attack groups encounter the enemy’s counterattack by fire, they should promptly

diminish the results of the enemy counterattack by fire, replenish war materials, rescue

casualties, repair weapons and equipment, reposition the troops, and continue to develop

and attack the enemy’s depth. If the casualties are too severe, we should promptly

reinforce the attack group or employ the maneuver attack group (reserve forces) to enter

into combat and continue to divide and annihilate the defensive enemy. The attack groups

that are not encountering the enemy’s counterattack by fire should actively coordinate

with the other groups in order to hasten the pace of attack and expand and solidify the

result of dividing and annihilation.

(2) Crush the enemy’s counterattack by reserve forces

If we discover that the enemy’s depth reserve force is maneuvering forward, we should

first use firepower to furiously strike the enemy’s reserve assembly area and formation of

development, cause great casualties to the enemy’s effective strength, interrupt the

enemy’s combat readiness for counterattack, and at the same time order the attack troops

to be combat ready for the enemy’s counterattack. When necessary, we can use part of

the force to land by air ahead of time in the direction where the enemy may launch

counterattack, to seize important targets such as mountain paths where the enemy must

go through or traffic intersections to stop the enemy reserve force from maneuvering and

developing. If the enemy’s reserve force launches attack at our attack troops, we should

correctly determine the target of our resistance based on the scale of the enemy’s reserve

force and the form of counterattack, and flexibly select the method to resist the enemy’s

counterattack. If the enemy launches a frontal counterattack and the enemy’s force is not

very large, our attack groups should employ fighting methods such as rapid raid {急袭

jixi}, meeting engagement {遭遇 zaoyu}, and ambush to annihilate the enemy in the

process of advancing the attack. If the enemy launches counterattack from our flank and

the force is relatively large, the attack groups should, under the cover of firepower, use a

part of the force to block and hold down the enemy and use the main force to outflank the

enemy’s flank rear and launch attack in order to divide and encircle the enemy and
473

annihilate the enemy. If the enemy comes upon us rapidly and the force is very powerful

and the attack troops cannot rapidly annihilate the enemy, we can first occupy

advantageous terrain and organize temporary defense to resist the enemy’s counterattack

and delay and wear down the enemy; and when the follow-on echelon enters into the

battle, we then divide, encircle, and annihilate the enemy or defeat the enemy. If the

enemy launches multi-route, multi-direction counterattack, we can employ methods such

as blocking several routes {阻数路 zu shulu}, annihilate one route {歼一路 jian yilu}29

or blocking first then annihilate {先阻后歼 xianzu houjian} to crush the enemy.

(3) Wipe out the enemy’s airborne force

If we discover that the enemy’s airborne force is assembling and boarding, we should

concentrate our air and artillery fire to assault the enemy’s assembling and boarding zone,

striving to annihilate the enemy on the ground. If the enemy’s transport helicopters are in

the air overhead, we should order the air cover group to concentrate all fire to assault the

enemy’s helicopters, striving to annihilate the enemy before the enemy lands on the

ground. If the enemy’s airborne force lands on the flank rear of our attack troops, we

should rapidly maneuver our forces and firepower to attack the enemy. If the enemy’s

airlanding force is relatively small, we can use the forces nearby to rapidly divide,

encircle, and annihilate the enemy. If the enemy’s airlanding force is relatively large, we

can use a part of the force to capture advantageous terrain and stop the enemy from

expanding, and at the same time divide and encircle the enemy. When the follow-on

troops enter into combat, we then annihilate the enemy.

V. Depth Dividing and Annihilation...421

Depth dividing and annihilation {纵深割歼 zongshen gejian} means that we use various

attack groups to launch campaign dividing and separation in the enemy’s defensive full

depth to force the enemy in the operational area into several isolated groups that are

unable to support one another and then annihilate the isolated groups one by one. The

goal is to annihilate the enemy as quickly as possible, seize important areas, breach the

campaign passageway, and accomplish the mission of the mountain offensive campaign.

(1) Campaign dividing {战役分割 zhanyi fenge}30

Breaking up and dividing the enemy’s defense system is an effective method and activity

to rapidly annihilate the enemy. After penetrating the enemy’s defense, the various attack

groups should use multiple methods and measures to continue to develop and advance

into the enemy’s defense depth, seize important targets or advantageous terrain in the

29 Annihilate the enemy along one route.

30 Campaign dividing or separation, breaking up: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, it refers to

“combat operations to cut the enemy's combat disposition up into several pieces.”
474

enemy depth, control strategic traffic routes, disrupt the enemy’s defensive disposition,

and forcefully divide and break up the enemy’s defense system.

The method to divide and break up should be flexible depending on the terrain, the

enemy’s defense disposition and our campaign organization. If the enemy defensive front

has several routes going into the depth, we should use several attack groups to launch

parallel assault. If the battlefield front has complicated terrain and the enemy defensive

flank has passageways going into the hinder land, we should launch assault at one flank

or both flanks. If the enemy employs a circular group defense disposition, we should

employ multi-route converging attack {向心攻击 xiangxin gongji}. At the same time, we

should make full use of the result of assault penetration and the effect of fire assault, and

fully develop the total might of joint cooperation of the services and arms. We should

employ force dividing and firepower dividing and combine horizontal dividing with

multi-dimensional dividing, and agilely use multiple measures such as forceful

breakthrough, inserting and outflanking, airborne and airlanding operations, special

operations assault, fire blockade, electromagnetic interruption, etc.

1. Frontal assault, breakthrough and dividing

The depth attack groups {纵深攻击群 zongshen gongjiqun} should take advantage of the

fire assault effect and use strong forces to forcefully penetrate the enemy’s defense

system. After that, the depth attack groups should promptly strengthen the offensive and

swiftly penetrate into the enemy’s defense depth from multiple directions. They should

resolutely capture key points along the passageways and advantageous terrain in order to

take control of the passageways and create conditions for dissecting and dividing the

defensive system in the enemy’s depth. When this is achieved, they can roll up on both

flanks or on one flank depending on the situation and divide and breakup the enemy.

When executing frontal assault and breakthrough and dividing, we should first use

fighting methods such as single-point penetration {一点突破 yidian tupo}, pincer-like

penetration {钳形突破 qianxing tupo}, and multi-direction simultaneous penetration {多

向并肩突破 duoxiang bingjian tupo} to break through the enemy’s outer defense. To

achieve this, the various breakthrough groups {突贯集群 tuguan jiqun} should make full

use of the fire assault effect of the aviation force, long-range artillery, and campaign

tactical missile fire, and advance in small groups from multiple directions and penetrate

into the enemy’s positions boldly and swiftly in order to breach a path in the enemy’s

position. Next, they should aggressively implement campaign insertion to thrust widely

and rapidly into the enemy’s depth in order to divide and encircle the enemy’s defense

system. During the process of dividing, we should take advantage of all opportunities to

develop into the depth as well as expand to the flanks. We should make full use of the

terrain, striving to advance and attack from opposite directions {对进突击 duijin tuji}. If

the enemy occupies a mountain protruding point, its depth is firmly protected, and the

terrain in the enemy’s front is strategically located and is difficult to attack, the attack

groups {攻击集群 gongji jiqun}, in order to achieve penetration and breakthrough,
475

should develop and attack simultaneously along the passageway or valley on both flanks

into the enemy’s depth in order to achieve a dividing, breaking up, and enveloping

posture to facilitate annihilation of the enemy in the depth. We should employ different

methods according to the situation. If the enemy’s force is relatively small and the terrain

is to our advantage, we can use the main force to attack and capture [the enemy’s

position] while advancing. If the enemy’s force is relatively strong and the terrain is

unfavorable to us, we can use a part of the force to contain the enemy from the front and

use the main force to attack the enemy from the flank and capture [the enemy’s position.]

2. Outflanking, inserting, and dividing

The attack troops should avoid the enemy’s defensive strong points. Instead, they should

look for gaps in the enemy’s defense disposition, flank, or weak spots. After penetrating

the enemy’s depth or flank rear, the attack groups should ride their success and annihilate

part of the enemy’s effective strength, and from multiple directions divide and cut off

contact between enemy’s forward and depth and between the defensive troops and

maneuvering troops. This will topple the overall balance of the enemy, thus allowing us

to wipe out the divided enemy groups one by one.

Normally, we use the rapid insertion group {快速穿插群 kuaisu chuanchaqun}31 (team)

to secretly penetrate the enemy’s depth or rear through a weak point in the enemy defense

flank or gap or a direction unanticipated by the enemy. Some times, we can also make

use of the advantageous conditions created by the penetration of the attack groups and

rapidly penetrate into the enemy’s defensive depth. After penetrating and reaching the

anticipated location, we should quickly attack and wipe out the defensive enemy, seize

advantageous terrain, and get ready to resist the enemy’s counterattack, as well as work

together with the main force to encircle and annihilate the defensive enemy.

3. Fire interdiction and dividing

While the ground troops are implementing dividing, we should formulate a centralized

plan for the air and artillery firepower. We should establish multiple layers of fire attack

and blockade area at gaps of the enemy’s key point or important areas such as the

passageway the reserve force must go through or traffic hubs, and at strategic locations

that facilitate the attack groups to implement dividing such as narrow paths. [The purpose

is] to destroy the enemy’s important targets, limit the enemy’s depth maneuver, and

restrict the enemy from communicating with one another. We should divide and separate

the enemy’s depth deployment and support the dividing activities of the assault groups. In

particular, when we discover that the enemy shows signs of grouping together, we should

quickly use air and artillery firepower to implement fire blockade on one flank of the

31 Rapid insertion group: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, 穿插 refers to combat operations that

use a gap in the enemy's deployment or a weakness in its position to penetrate its depth or rear.
476

passageway where the converging troops might pass through in order to firmly stop the

enemy from converging.

The characteristics of fire interdiction and dividing include rapid reaction pace, high

assault precision, large power, good effect, and little threat from the enemy. The goals of

the fire interdiction and dividing activities include the following: Firstly, to block the

enemy reinforcement and counterattack. Secondly, to severe the enemy’s follow-on

replenishment. The assault methods are: The first is to use concentrated fire to

simultaneously attack different targets. The second is to converge and concentrate fires to

attack one important target. The third is to provide continuous attack at a certain number

of targets during a relatively long period of time. The fourth is to implement periodic and

irregular attack of a surveillance nature against a certain number of targets according to

the pattern of the enemy’s activities.

4. Airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing

If the terrain in the enemy’s defensive depth is complex and if we are in control of the

battlefield air superiority, based on the operational need, we normally use the airborne

operational groups to land unexpectedly in the enemy’s defensive depth. The goal is to

capture mountain passes, vital traffic routes, entrance to a valley, or vital targets along the

passageway in order to strike and contain the enemy, as well as work in concert with the

attack groups or rapid insertion groups to divide and separate the enemy’s defensive

system.

The methods to implement airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing include the

following: The first is to implement paradrop operations so as to capture key points in an

important area. The second is to implement airlanding operations so as to continuously

capture multiple points. The depth of the airlanding points in the enemy depth depends on

the enemy intelligence, terrain and operational need. Normally, the principle is that the

depth should be advantageous for us to work in conjunction with the frontal attack or

flank attack. We should avoid landing too deep and fall into a passive situation whereby

we are unable to receive support and reinforcement, unable to establish a firm foothold or

we encounter the enemy’s attack from both sides.

The characteristics of airborne (airlanding) blockade and dividing are concealed, sudden,

rapid, etc. It often can achieve an extraordinary effect.

5. Special operations sabotage and dividing

We should use special operations units to secretly infiltrate into the enemy’s rear to

destroy, damage, or seize some of the vital targets in the enemy’s defensive depth so as to

interrupt the enemy’s deployment, weaken the enemy’s defensive capability, as well as to

collaborate with and support our own dividing and annihilation operations.
477

Special operations’ sabotage and dividing methods include the following: The first

method is using small groups to infiltrate in order to attack and harass. That is, we

employ crack sabotage groups {破袭群 poxiqun} that are combined {合成 hecheng}32

and nimble to infiltrate into the enemy’s hinterland from the enemy’s defensive front and

flank or from the air, and use different methods to actively disrupt the enemy’s defensive

deployment, attack the enemy’s vital targets, contain the enemy’s initiation, interrupt the

enemy’s operational command, harass the enemy’s transportation lines and create

confusion and terror. The second method is capturing key points and seizing the

“springboard.” That is, we use the special operations sabotage groups (teams) to seize the

key points and vital locations inside the enemy’s defense area in advance, and use these

as the bases to penetrate the enemy, harass the enemy, and support our main force in

depth separation and dividing. These places thus become the “springboard” for depth

operations.

6. Electromagnetic blocking and dividing

Electromagnetic blocking and dividing means we use the information operations groups {

信息作战集团 xinxi zuozhan jituan} as the main force, and working with part of the

other operational groups, to implement electronic blocking, to damage the enemy’s C3I

system and destroy the enemy’s command control system in order to isolate the enemy

and severe any information contact with the outside world.

The methods of electronic blocking and dividing include the following: The first is

electronic jamming and blocking. That is, we use jamming equipment on the ground to

create a jamming zone and implement ground electromagnetic blocking; and we use

jamming equipment in the air and at sea (coastal mountains) to implement air and sea

electronic blocking. This way we create effective multi-dimensional electromagnetic

blocking. The second method is to actually destroy the enemy’s information system. That

is, we use various types of firepower, including anti-radiation missiles, anti radiation

UAVs, electromagnetic pulse bombs, etc to implement actual destruction of the enemy’s

important information systems in order to severe the enemy’s communications, cause

breakdown of their command system, and disrupt their troops’ activities. The third

method is to damage nodes. That is, we employ special operations troops to enter deep

into the enemy rear. Through “hard” attack and “soft” destruction of the enemy’s

important information systems and facilities, we cause their normal operations to

breakdown so as to divide and separate the enemy’s command control system.

32 Combined: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, “A force made up of multiple services or

branches/service arms. Also refers to units and elements which are organized with a branch/service arm as

the main body, together with other branches/service arms and technical forces, including organic work

units and combat organizations at the level of battalion and above.”
478

(2) Encircling and wiping out the enemy

Encircling and wiping out the divided and isolated enemy is an important activity in

mountain offensive campaigns. Based on the characteristics of the terrain in the theater,

present enemy defensive posture, and our dividing and separating status against the

enemy, as well as the operational capabilities of the attack troops, we should

appropriately determine the operational goal and agilely choose the operational methods.

We can use military assault to wipe out the enemy and seize their position, or use

political force to demoralize the enemy and persuade the enemy to surrender; or we can

use maneuvering forces to attack and annihilate the enemy, or use converging fire to

destroy and annihilate the enemy.

1. Surround and suppress the resisting enemy

If the separated and isolated enemy relies on the strategic terrain and fortified works to

stubbornly resist, making it difficult for us to quickly surround and annihilate the enemy,

we should converge all firepower to implement ferocious assault in order to destroy the

enemy’s defensive works, kill the enemy’s effective strength, weaken the enemy’s

resistance, and then use maneuver forces to seize the enemy’s position. If the enemy

enters into underground tunnels to resist, we should use methods such as blocking,

smoking, fire attack, and detonation to block the enemy in the underground facilitates and

wipe out the enemy.

If the enemy firmly resists and waits for reinforcement, and the reinforcement has already

departed and is on its way, we should hasten the pace of encirclement and attack, striving

to annihilate the enemy before the enemy’s reinforcement arrives. At the same time, we

should employ all types of effective methods to delay and destroy the enemy’s

reinforcement activities, to crush the enemy’s intention and accomplish our encirclement

and annihilation mission. If conditions allow, we can wipe out the enemy’s reinforcement

first, or we can attack the enemy and simultaneously attack the enemy’s reinforcement. If

the defensive enemy has no hope to breakthrough the encirclement to escape, we should

enhance the encirclement and the attacking force to firmly block the enemy from

breaking through, striving to contain the enemy inside the encirclement and annihilate

them. If the terrain condition is favorable, and if our operational capabilities allow, we

can also employ the method of encircling three sides and leave one side unguarded. We

can set up ambush in the direction where the enemy may breakout the encirclement in

order to wipe out the enemy while they are escaping.

2. Pursue and annihilate the escaping enemy

If the divided and isolated enemy abandons the position and escapes, we should

resolutely pursue. First, we should use air and artillery firepower to block and strike the

escaping enemy, delay the enemy’s actions, and incur casualties to the enemy’s effective

strength. After that, we should use the maneuvering force to follow and pursue the

enemy. When necessary, we can also use part of the forces to implement airlanding
479

operations in front of the enemy, to seize advantageous terrain and, working in

cooperation with the pursuing troops, to sandwich and annihilate the escaping enemy. If

the enemy’s force is stronger than ours, and it is difficult for us to quickly wipe out the

enemy, we should first contain the escaping enemy and at the same time quickly

reposition our troops and strengthen the attack force. We then attack and wipe out the

enemy.

3. Political offensive to demoralize the helpless enemy

If the divided and isolated enemy is waiting for reinforcement or if the enemy has lost

hope to breakout of the encirclement and its fear is shaking the morale, we can

temporarily stop military attack activities. Instead, we should launch a strong political

offensive to carry out political propaganda warfare, forcing the enemy to disintegrate and

persuading the enemy to surrender. The methods include the following: The first method

is to apply military force. That is, we use strong military attack as the backing to create

powerful deterrence, forcing the enemy to give up the attempt to resist. The second

method is to use propaganda to create invincibility. That is, we employ various news

media to carry out political propaganda offensive and information infiltration in order to

induce psychological crisis and speed up collapse of morale of the remnant enemy. The

third method is to soften the enemy emotionally. Aiming at the emotional need of the

enemy, we carry out a propaganda offensive and use persuasion and brain washing to

soften enemy resistance.
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Chapter 18

The Positional Offensive Campaign...426

Positional offensive campaigns are offensive campaigns undertaken by campaign large

formations {战役军团 zhanyi juntuan} against an enemy which is mounting a positional

defense. Positional offensive campaigns can be divided into two types: offensive

campaigns against an enemy that is defending field positions and offensive campaigns

against an enemy that is defending fortified positions. The main mission of a positional

offensive campaign is to attack the enemy that is mounting a positional defense for the

purpose of seizing strategic areas and objectives. Under informationized conditions, the

army campaign large formation can either mount a positional offensive campaign within

the established organization of the higher command, or organize its own execution in an

independent direction. The scale of a positional offensive campaign should be determined

by the enemy's conditions, the terrain, and the combat capabilities of the army campaign

large formation.

Positional offensive campaigns normally employ basic combat methods such as

paralyzing the enemy's defensive operational system, multi-dimensional penetration,

dividing and encircling, and annihilating the divided enemy one by one. That means,

concentrate the army campaign large formation's forces and firepower to mount full indepth, full-dimensional targeted attacks in order to paralyze the enemy's defensive

operational system, and mount multi-directional but targeted penetrations in sectors that

are closely associated with strategic areas but weakly defended. At the appropriate time,

introduce rapid strike groups {快速突击群 kuaisu tujiqun} and the follow-on echelon {

后续梯队 houxu tidui}, using swift and ferocious operational activities to divide up the

enemy's defensive system, and encircle and annihilate the divided-up enemy.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...426

I. Characteristics...426

(1) Increasingly difficult to penetrate fortified defense

The positional defensive enemy uses advantageous terrain as the basis for defense and is

sufficiently ready. The enemy has strong defensive works, a full range of obstacles, and a

complete ensemble of firepower. Its main position normally is constructed on difficult

and strategic terrain, forming a circular defense system centering on the fortified core

position. The outer layer of the multi-dimensional defense system is not only strong, but

also flexible and malleable. During operations, the enemy's position can receive fire

support and coordination from the air or other domains. If the offensive side wants to

divide and encircle the enemy's defensive position, the offensive side must open up one

or several points of penetration in the enemy's defensive system. Only through

penetrating the enemy's defense would the offensive side be able to continuously

introduce fresh forces and ensure the accomplishment of the campaign missions. On the
482

other hand, in order to maintain stability in its defense, the enemy will concentrate its

forces and firepower to mount counterattacks at the sectors of penetration to block the

opponent's offensive. Thus, the fight at the points of penetration will be extraordinarily

ferocious, and the difficulty level of positional offensive campaigns to make penetrations

is increasing.

(2) Heightened importance of deep operations {纵深作战 zongshen zuozhan}

In order to raise the tenacity of defense, the enemy normally will use deep maneuver

forces {纵深机动部队 zongshen jidong budui} to mount continuous counterattacks

against the strike forces. For the offensive side, in order to achieve the goal of wiping out

the enemy, while making a penetration of the enemy's forward line, the offensive side

will also deploy rapid insertion units {快速穿插部队 kuaisu chuancha budui} and deep

attack groups {纵深攻击群 zongshen gongjiqun} to mount a full in-depth multidimensional attack {全纵深立体攻击 quanzongchen liti gongji}. With good coordination

between forward line attacks and deep attacks, between ground offensives and air

offensives, between force attacks and fire strikes, the offensive side simultaneously

mounts full in-depth attacks in the enemy's defensive area. By developing its strength and

avoiding any pitfalls, the offensive side will be able to take control of campaign initiative.

Thus, the enemy's defensive depth has clearly become the main battlefield for decisive

struggles. The status and the role of deep operations will become more and more

significant.

(3) More complex command and coordination

In positional offensive campaigns, the battlespace is vast, participating strengths are

numerous, operational task-organization is complex, and campaign bushi disposition is

dispersed. Attack groups normally organize campaign activities in different directions

and areas. In the complex electromagnetic environment under informationized conditions

in particular, electronic countermeasure struggles have become more intense. Thus, when

organizing and commanding positional offensive campaigns, the requirements on overall

control and coordination is greater and the difficulty level much higher. During the

campaign process, activities in different offensive directions and operational phases

progress at an uneven pace, battlefield situations are complicated, and changes are often

drastic. Communications and command coordination can be easily disrupted. Thus, the

requirement on instantaneous battlefield coordination is greater and command

coordination more difficult and complex.

(4) Greater requirements on campaign preparations

In positional offensive campaigns, the defensive opponent one faces is fully prepared.

The defensive side may rely on their pre-constructed and well-prepared fortified positions

or field positions and advanced weapons and equipment, and use aggressive offensive

activities to resist us stubbornly. Thus, the offensive operations will become
483

extraordinarily brutal and intense. In the positional offensive campaign under

informationized conditions in particular, the status of joint operations will be more

prominent and operational measures more numerous. Army ground forces of the

offensive side normally will be supported by other services. As a result, for positional

offensive campaigns, the operational missions are arduous; support, command and

coordination of joint operations are more complex; and the requirements on campaign

readiness is much greater.

(5) Exceedingly heavy support missions

Positional offensive campaigns often occur in complex terrain conditions.

Reconnaissance and observation is not easy and grasping enemy's situation and intent is

harder. Thus, it is difficult to obtain battlefield intelligence. Command control systems

often suffer from serious "soft suppression" and "hard destruction" threat of the enemy.

Thus, to provide campaign communications support is formidably difficult. The

defensive works of the enemy are fortified and obstacles are numerous. Thus, to provide

engineering support when we sabotage the enemy's defensive facilities is hard. With

more high-tech equipment on the battlefield and because the technology level is high,

technical support work on the battlefield is more complex. During the offensive

operations against fortifications, higher personnel casualties are expected. Thus, it will be

difficult to provide medical support. The operational resources consumption level will be

huge, and the equipment damage rate will be high. Thus, logistical equipment support

will be more difficult. Because operational directions are dispersed and the battlespace

wide open, various types of support are primarily carried out according to zones, or

organized by oneself or organized by accompanying support groups. In sum, the types of

support are numerous, the range of support broad, the requirement of support high, and as

a result the support missions are very difficult.

II. Requirements...428

(1) One must meticulously overall-plan campaign activities, and fully accomplish

operational preparations.

In the positional offensive campaign, one faces a defensive opponent that is fully

prepared. The enemy will rely on fortified positions that are constructed ahead of time or

field positions. The enemy will use advanced weapons and equipment and aggressive

offensive activities to stubbornly resist. The offensive operations will be exceedingly

brutal and intense. At the same time, under informationized conditions, the positional

offensive campaigns are joint operations {联合作战 lianhe zuozhan} involving multiple

arms and services, and campaign command coordination and support are becoming more

complex. Thus, one must carefully make plans and be fully ready. First, one must

understand the current situation thoroughly. One must use various reconnaissance

measures to fully understand the enemy situation and the terrain in the operational area.

With regard to the enemy defense situation in the main penetration area, one must carry

out continuous reconnaissance and conduct analysis and assessment. Secondly, one must
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carefully devise an operational plan. Based on the operational missions, available enemy

information and terrain, one must correctly define the campaign resolution and carefully

prepare the operational plan. Also, based on changing situations, one should revise and

modify operational contingency plans in a timely manner. Thirdly, one should carefully

organize campaign coordination. While one carefully organizes campaign coordination of

troops under one's own command, one must also carefully organize campaign

coordination activities of the supporting forces of other arms to ensure that together a

total mighty force is formed to fight the enemy in unison. Fourthly, one must organize

preoperational training. According to the operational missions, enemy situation and the

terrain of the operational area, one must select an area with similar terrain to set up

lifelike targets and possible scenarios to conduct simulation training. The purpose is to

familiarize the operational troops with the operational characteristics of the opponent, the

operational plan and main combat methods, and the battlefield environment so that the

operational troops will be fully operation ready.

(2) Well-selected main offensive direction and points of penetration. Rapid and targeted

penetrations.

During the positional offensive campaign, one must correctly select the main offensive

direction {主攻方向 zhugong fangxiang} and points of penetration {突破口 tupokou}.

This is significant for successful penetration of the enemy's defense and for dividing and

encircling the positional defensive enemy. Under normal situations, the main direction

should be chosen in a direction that is beneficial for the friendly forces to penetrate and

develop into the enemy’s depth, a direction that is advantageous for the friendly forces to

divide the enemy's overall disposition, a direction where we can rapidly paralyze the

enemy's defense system, and a direction where the enemy's defense is relatively weak. [In

this direction,] we can mount targeted attack at the enemy's strategic objectives such as

the command control center and high-tech weapons. The points of penetration should be

selected in the main offensive direction and secondary offensive directions. In the main

offensive direction, one should select a primary point of penetration and concentrate

absolute superior forces and weapons to mount decisive offensives at this primary point

of penetration. The number of points of penetration is mainly determined by the terrain,

enemy situation and enemy operational methods, and the offensive directions. The

location of the points of penetration should, as far as possible, be at the enemy's defensive

gaps, flanks, or linking points, where firepower, defensive works and obstacles are

relatively weak. The terrain at the location of penetration should facilitate concealment of

deployed troops and should have favorable places for offensive departure positions. After

penetration, the location should be easy to solidify, expand and develop offensives into

the enemy's depth. Because there are multiple factors that constrain the selection of the

main offensive direction and primary point of penetration, the campaign commander

should use the actual situation as the starting point, conduct comprehensive analysis and

assessment, study the pros and cons, and then make a selection based on the most

fundamental condition and requirement. After the main offensive direction is determined,

the campaign commander should immediately take active actions to create conditions in

order to ensure the establishment of the main offensive direction. During the process of
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the campaign, when fundamental changes occur, the campaign commander should review

the situation and make a determination, and decisively readjust the deployment in a

timely manner. He should either revise or change the main offensive direction to facilitate

concentration of forces and weapons and develop an offensive in the direction and

accomplish the defined campaign missions.

(3) Nimble application of operational methods. Rapid annihilation of the enemy.

During the positional offensive campaign, one should focus on the enemy's defensive

operational characteristics and apply the operational methods in a nimble manner,

striving to rapidly wipe out the enemy. First, concentrate firepower to mount paralyzing

attacks. That means one should focus on the enemy's defensive characteristics and

concentrate one's firepower. One should nimbly apply attack methods such as

concentrated all-round strikes {集中全面突击 jizhong quanmian tui}, targeted assaults

of the forward line {前沿重点强击 qianyan zhongdian qiangji}, and precision attacks in

the depth {纵深精确打击 zongshen jingque daji}. Secondly, mount multiple-point

assaults {多点强击 duodian qiangji} and targeted penetrations {重点突破 zhongdian

tupo}. That means one should address the enemy's defensive characteristics and select

weak locations such as defensive gaps and defensive linking points to mount multipleroute offensives in several directions in order to distract and disperse the enemy's forces.

At the same time, one should mount targeted penetrations in the main direction and

strategic sectors. Thirdly, mount overtaking offensives {超越攻击 chaoyue gongji}.33 At

the same time or around the time when mounting multiple-point assaults and targeted

penetrations, one should apply more powerful forces to pass over the enemy's first-line

defensive positions on the ground or in the air and rapidly insert directly into the enemy's

defensive depth in order to seize strategic and critical points in the enemy's depth in order

to introduce offensive activities and attack forces to the strategic locations of the enemy's

defensive depth. This way the enemy faces simultaneous or near simultaneous strikes in

the full depth, which will result in the enemy losing its defensive flexibility and overall

methodically-arranged defensive capabilities. This will create conditions for the friendly

forces to breakup the enemy in the depth and divide up the enemy's defensive system.

Fourthly, mount multi-dimensional dividing and isolation, and then wipe out the divided

enemy one by one. This means that on the foundation of having penetrated the enemy's

defense, one should apply multiple forms and measures in a comprehensive way to divide

and isolate the enemy's defensive disposition. [One should] rapidly divide the enemy into

several isolated groups, cut off their campaign and tactical contacts {战役战术联系

33 Overtaking offensives: According to the 1997 PLA Military Terms, overtaking operations: "Combat

operations in which a unit overtakes the enemy in front of it or one's own combat formation. For example,

combat operations which take advantage of a gap in enemy forces or an exposed flank to penetrate the

enemy's rear; in pursuit combat, operations to overtake or bypass enemy covering units; combat operations

to block the path of a retreating enemy force; the second echelon in combat operations which overtake the

first echelon; etc."
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zhanyi zhanshu lianxi}, and surround the enemy from all sides. After that, one should

concentrate all forces and firepower to wipe out the divided enemy one after the other.

(4) One must rationally determine the campaign bushi disposition, and implement

decisive and flexible command.

In the positional offensive campaign, one should focus on characteristics of campaign

operations under informationized conditions and the battlefield environment, and

rationally determine the campaign bushi disposition based on the campaign missions,

strength task-organization, operational capabilities, fighting method application, and the

enemy's defensive posture. One should establish a multi-directional, key-point, full

dimensional attack bushu disposition. At the same time as ensuring that there is a strong

enough assault power in the main attack direction, one should strive to allow the

attacking force-units in the various directions to have fairly strong independent

operational capabilities. One should pay a high degree of attention to bringing into play

the role of special operational strengths {特种作战力量 tezhong zuozhan liliang} and

compose an operational strength with certain special functions to facilitate the

implementation of insertion, outflanking and infiltration and the carrying out of seizing

points, controlling routes, breaking up and surround and destroy missions. In the

positional offensive operation, the campaign bushi disposition is dispersed and offensive

directions are relatively independent. Battlefield situations are complicated, situations can

change drastically, and command coordination can be easily disrupted. Thus, while one

stresses centralized and unified command, one should also consider the dispersed

command method {分散指挥 fensan zhihui} or delegated command method {委托式指

挥 weituoshi shihui}, when necessary. One should be able to combine centralized

command with dispersed command when appropriate. Before the operations, when

assigning missions and organizing coordination, the commander should not be too

meticulous and too rigid. The commander should leave ample room for change. During

the operations, the campaign commander should give a certain amount of autonomy to

lower-level commanders to handle situations, to let them develop initiation and creativity.

Let them use their own wisdom to find effective ways to overcome the enemy and win

victory. The campaign commander should command decisively but flexibly. In addition,

the campaign commander should conduct overall planning, strengthen coordination, and

rigorously organize coordinated activities in all operational directions, at all operational

phases, and among all arms and services. He should ensure that all forces form a total

might to cooperatively and uniformly attack the enemy.

(5) Comprehensive support forces. Effective campaign support.

In operations under informationized conditions, the effect of support on the progress of

campaigns is more important and the status of support is more prominent. This is

particularly so in future positional offensive campaigns. Future positional offensive

campaigns will be joint operations {联合作战 lianhe zuozhan} involving multiple arms

and services. Support objectives will increase, and support space is wide open. The types

of support are numerous, the amount of support is massive, and the requirement for
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support is huge. The composition of the support strength is complex and the support

missions are arduous. Thus, there must be close coordination among all campaign support

forces to ensure effective support. During the process of providing support, one must look

at the actual situation of the battlefield when carrying out overall planning of 

campaign support, organizing and deploying various support forces, and executing

concentrated and unified command. One must concentrate the main support strength to

support operational activities that have critical impact on the overall success of the

campaign. Give priority to supporting the main direction and area, critical transitions, and

troops executing the main missions to ensure the accomplishment of key missions. In

terms of support space, one should take care of the front and flanks of the battlefield, the

depth, the ground and the air, and provide all-dimensional support. In terms of support

time, one should take care of all phases, all transitions, and provide continuous support.

In terms of the objectives of support, one should take care of all participating arms and

services and provide support that is appropriate to the characteristics and requirements of

the arms and services.

Section 2: Main Activities...431

I. Moving In and Unfolding {开进展开 kaijin zhankai}...431

In positional offensive campaigns, the campaign large formation normally moves in from

the assembly area, deploys, occupies the offensive departure position first, and then

mounts an offensive against the defensive enemy. Sometimes, one can also initiate an

offensive while on the march or during a force-on-force confrontation. When initiating an

offensive from an offensive departure position, under the premise that there is not yet

direct contact with the enemy, the troops responsible for the offensive mission occupy the

offensive departure position on the same night or the night before the initiation of the

offensive under the cover of the forward line detachments and troops of other relevant

arms and services. Under the premise that there is direct contact with the enemy, one

normally takes advantage of darkness of the night or inclement weather in making

adjustment in bushu disposition. Or the troops can occupy the offensive departure

position during the time when changing shifts with the original defense unit.

The campaign commander and command organ should devise detailed and thorough

moving-in and unfolding plans based on the enemy's conditions, road situations and

schedule. At an appropriate time, [the campaign commander] should organize the troops

according to the plan to move in the offensive departure position from the assembly area

and deploy. When moving in, the troops should take full advantage of darkness of the

night and inclement weather to conceal their activities. [The moving-in and unfolding]

should be well timed based on the distance to keep the time the troops need to stay at the

offensive departure position to the minimum. During moving in, the troops should tighten

up the organization, enhance protection and camouflage, pay attention to concealment,

and use various support measures to carefully guard against enemy's surprise attacks

from the air and from the ground. To conceal force-unit {budui} activities, one can

organize part of the electronic warfare force to mount information offensives or make
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feint movements to deceive and confuse the opponent. When necessary, one can also

organize part of the forces and firepower to launch surprise attacks with cooperation from

the supporting arms and services. The air defense units can adopt the follow-on cover {跟

进掩护 gengjin yanhu}or fixed point cover {dingdian yanhu 定点掩护} method to

directly cover the activities of the troops. Various levels of command organs should enter

into the command post ahead of time. After the various forces enter the offensive

departure position, they should strengthen their defenses and construct necessary cover

works.

In local wars under informationized conditions, in order to seize the combat opportunities

and achieve campaign surprise, one should strive to launch an offensive in the course of a

march. While launching an offensive in the course of a march, the troops responsible for

the offensive should rapidly unfold in accordance with the attack alignment to facilitate a

timely initiation of the attack.

II. Multi-dimensional penetrations...432

Multi-dimensional penetrations refer to operational activities that involve flexible use of

all subordinate forces to mount full in-depth, full-dimensional, multi-directional

offensives. Multi-dimensional penetrations are normally implemented when the

campaign large formation has completed the offensive campaign arrangements and when

advanced comprehensive fire attacks have achieved or are approaching the anticipated

effectiveness. The goal is to rapidly wipe out the enemy one is facing, take control of the

important campaign corridors {战役通道 zhanyi tongdao}, and create conditions for the

higher-level follow-on forces to enter into the operations.

Penetrations are the most critical operational activities of positional offensive campaigns.

One must concentrate absolute superior forces and firepower in the main offensive

direction and implement full in-depth, multi-directional, targeted multi-dimensional

penetrations. On the foundation of effective capturing of local air and information

dominance and taking full advantage of the operational effect of paralyzing fires, one

should apply the main offensive forces to mount bold and ferocious assaults in the

predetermined offensive directions and penetration sectors. At the same time, one should

use a part of the forces to apply bold insertions and turning movements, and carry out

airlanding operations in the enemy's shallow deep and execute overtaking operations.

With close coordination with the frontal attacks, and with support from the aviation force

of the air force, neutralizing artillery firepower, and conventional missile firepower, one

achieves rapid penetrations of the enemy's defense. One should make sure to combine

ground penetrations with air penetrations, frontal attacks with insertions and turning in

the flanks, and forward line penetrations with attacks in the enemy's depth.
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(1) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation refers to high-intensity and high-density fire assault operational

activities implemented against an enemy’s first line defense with the annihilation fire {歼

灭射击 jianmie sheji} and destruction fire {破坏射击 pohuai sheji} of the main direct

fire weapons of forward edge attack force-units in the lead and supplemented by a portion

of the campaign large formation’s large caliber artillery force with suppression fire {压制

射击 yazhi sheji} and interference fire {妨害射击 fanghai sheji}. It is normally

synchronously unfolded with the latter period activities of the campaign large formation

integrated fire strike when the forward edge attack force-units have occupied the

unfolding area and just as the obstacle elimination forces are about to implement

minesweeping and obstacle breaching. Under the unified plan of the campaign large

formation, [direct fire preparation] is organized and implemented by the force-units

responsible for the forward edge attack and penetration missions. Its main missions are to

smash and destroy the enemy's defensive works and armored targets at each breach point;

to wipe out the enemy's effective strength; to suppress the enemy's technical weaponry

and firepower warfare systems {xitong; to destroy the enemy's forward edge obstacles;

and to cover the forward edge attack force-unit minesweeping and obstacle breaching

activities.

When executing direct fire preparations, the campaign commander should have a full

grasp if any change in the enemy's defense in each of the offensive directions and main

penetration sectors occurs. The campaign commander should have a clear grasp of the

effectiveness of direct fire preparation in the main offensive direction, and when

necessary should give guidance to adjust the fire plan. The campaign commander should

urge the attack groups to enter into predetermined positions and finish attack preparation

as soon as possible. The campaign commander should pay full attention to any

adjustment of enemy maneuver attack forces in the depth and, when necessary, should

transfer a part of the neutralizing artillery forces to launch interfering fire. He should

aggressively implement comprehensive protective works and prevent the enemy's

counterstrikes by fire and harassing activities.

(2) Multi-route multi-dimension strikes

The offensive forces should initiate attacks according to the pre-defined time, either in

sequence or simultaneously. Under normal situations, all forward line attack units should

initiate an attack simultaneously to give the defensive enemy a powerful mental shakeup

within a short period of time. If the terrain conditions are more varied, effectiveness of

the comprehensive firepower is not ideal, when there is greater concern regarding the

enemy's counterattacks by fire, or due to application of stratagem, one can also mount

separate attacks at appropriate times based on need.

After the attacks have been initiated, each attack unit should take full advantage of the

paralyzing effect of the advanced fire and execute attacks firmly and boldly under the

cover and support of firepower provided by the ground artillery force, combat helicopters
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and aviation force. One should strive to combine formation speed with fire assaults,

frontal assaults with inserting and turning movements, and horizontal push forward

attacks {平面直推 pingmian zhitui} with overtaking attacks {越点攻击 yuedian gongji}

in order to form a well-coordinated campaign offensive posture that is multi-dimensional,

orderly, and multi-directional. The forward attack groups {前沿攻击群 qianyan

gongjiqun} should form the first echelon to storm into the enemy's position, capture and

control favorable terrain conditions, divide up the enemy's first line defensive

arrangements, and annihilate the enemy that is defending the penetration sector. After

that, the follow-on echelon {后续梯队 houxu tidui} should rapidly follow and be ready

to enter into operations at any moment. The rapid insertion groups {快速穿插群 kuaisu

chuanchaqun} should take advantage of the penetration effect of the forward line attack

groups or take advantage of the terrain features and execute small-group, multi-route,

multi-directional maneuvers in the enemy's defense gaps and flanks, and move forward

along the pre-assigned routes to rapidly insert into the enemy's depth and divide and

encircle the enemy in the depth. For the special operations groups {特种作战群 tezhong

zuozhanqun}, before or at the time of the initiation of the offensive, the special

operations groups should resolutely, stealthily and rapidly follow the pre-determined

routes on the ground or in the air to enter into the assigned locations in the enemy's depth

to investigate the enemy's disposition in the depth. [The special operations groups] should

guide the long-range firepower to apply precision attacks. [The special operations group]

should also harass critical targets in the enemy's depth. For the airlanding strike groups {

机降突击群 jijiang tujiqun}, after the neutralizing artillery force has mounted fire

extensions, the airlanding strike groups should fly in low-altitude along routes where the

enemy's ground-to-air fire defense is weak and land in the assigned area. [The airlanding

strike groups] should mount attacks in the enemy's flanks or flank rear or capture

advantageous terrain features, obstruct enemy's airfield maneuver operations {机场机动

jichang jidong}, and support the penetration activities of the forward line main attack

groups.

During the operation, the campaign commander should have targeted understanding of

the development on the main attack direction. If the forward line main attack groups

suffer from a defeat and it appears that the attack groups will be unable to make a

penetration in a short time, the campaign commander should promptly direct part of the

maneuver attack groups {机动攻击群 jidong gongjiqun} to enter into combat in order to

reinforce the penetration strength of the main attack groups and open up a point of

penetration as soon as possible. The forward line attack groups of other directions should

increase the attack speed and intensity and use active actions to support the main attack

groups to make the penetration. If the forward line main attack groups suffer from sever

defeat and it appears to be difficult for them to make a penetration, the campaign

commander should decisively modify the offensive resolution and readjust the attack

arrangements. He should reinforce the strike strength in the direction which is closer to

the main attack direction and easy to develop and resolutely penetrate the enemy's first

line defense. The campaign commander should also promptly transfer fire cover and

comprehensive support to the newly established main attack direction.
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At the same time, [the campaign commander] should have a comprehensive

understanding of the development of offensives in each of the offensive directions and

the locations of the follow-on maneuver attack forces and deep attack forces. He should

pay attention to the maneuver locations of the operational forces that are entering into the

enemy's depth and the airlanding attack forces. The campaign commander should work

hard to coordinate the tempo of attack of the various forward line attack groups and

maintain powerful strikes by fire and high-velocity multi-dimensional attacks. He should

pay attention to readjustments of the enemy's defensive disposition in the depth, promptly

discover possible enemy counterattack activities, and destroy enemy's counterattacks by

way of battlefield intercepts or sabotage raids. He should actively and effectively

organize ground and air warning and protection activities in order to assure air safety of

all attack groups and assure normal operations of rear disposition. He should diligently

organize all types of campaign support, in particular equipment maintenance support, to

ensure that damaged equipment can be repaired, recovered and regain operational

functions as soon as possible. The campaign commander should view successful

penetration as the basic starting point. He should actively coordinate the operational

activities of all forces and make sure the forward line attack groups are able to rapidly

and fearlessly penetrate the enemy's position.

(3) Expanding and solidifying points of penetration

When the forward line attack groups open up a point of penetration at the enemy's first

line position, [the campaign commander] should keep the attack pressure high at the point

of penetration and command the troops to continue to develop and attack towards the

enemy's depth. He should command the follow-on forces to hasten their follow-up speed.

The campaign commander should make sure that the speed to enter into the enemy's

position is hastened up, and the time to stay at the point of penetration is shortened. The

[attack groups] should rapidly capture the enemy's key defensive points in the vicinity of

the points of penetration, actively expand the depth and width of the point of penetration,

and at an appropriate time, mount roll up the flanks attacks. The main direction of the

flank roll up attacks {翼侧卷击 yice guanji} should be on the other flank of the attack

direction of the campaign large formation, or a secondary attack direction that is

developing most successfully, or the direction where the terrain is most advantageous for

the friendly forces to solidify the point of penetration.

When expanding and solidifying the points of penetration, one should firmly follow the

four principles given below. First principle: Reinforce the force strength inside the point

of penetration first and expand the width of the corridor next. After penetration, regarding

the use of the corridor in the obstacle area, priority should first be given to supporting the

follow-on operational forces to rapidly pass through. The engineering force responsible

for widening the corridor should then work along the outer edge of the path and gradually

clear outward. Make sure that engineering work will not hamper the main operational

forces from entering the point of penetration. Second principle: Maintain attack

momentum first and take control of advantageous terrain features next. In order to

maintain a high-speed high-pressure offensive momentum, one should concentrate the
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main forces in the critical operational direction after penetrating the enemy's defense.

Make every effort not to disperse the forces to multiple directions or transfer a part of the

forces to control advantageous terrain features. Ensure that the momentum and intensity

of the offensive is not weakened. Third principle: first capture-control campaign vital

points {yaodian}, and then annihilate the enemy's effective strength. With regard to

selecting targets of attack, priority should be given to key points inside the points of

penetration that have campaign significance. Generally, attention is not given to those

dispersed enemy who are conducting harassing activities. As much as possible,

concentrate the forces on capturing and controlling campaign vital points. After the vital

points are secured, then organize the forces to wipe out the remaining enemy. Fourth

principle: first control-counter {制反 zhifan} with firepower, and then resist-counter {抗

反 kangfan} force-strength choke points. If the forward line attack groups that penetrate

into the enemy's position are encountering enemy's multi-layer counterattacks, one should

mount a concentrated attack at the enemy's counterattacks using neutralizing artillery

firepower in the rear as the primary firepower and direct firepower that has penetrated the

enemy position as the secondary firepower. Try to apply maximum firepower to quell the

enemy's counterattacks in the shortest time possible, striving to annihilate the enemy

while they are still on the march. In sum, one should simultaneously apply firepower

strikes, deploy the attack formation, expand the space inside the point of penetration, and

increase firepower intensity against the enemy's counterattacks. One should avoid having

too high a density of forces inside the point of penetration, which could cause the speed

of attack to slow down or increase casualties when the enemy increases firepower to

blockade the point of penetration.

During the operations, the campaign commander should command all forward line attack

groups to continue their attack in the enemy's shallow depth, as well as coordinate the

attack directions and tempo with the airborne force to capture key campaign points. The

campaign commander should command the neutralizing artillery force to attack the

enemy's command control system and artillery positions in the enemy depth, and use a

part of the forces to establish a firepower blocking area {火力拦阻区 huoli lanzuqu} to

prevent the enemy's maneuver attack force from mounting counterattacks. The campaign

commander should command the maneuver air defense groups, combat helicopters, and

air force aviation fighters that support the operations to attack enemy's aircraft flying

overhead. The campaign commander should coordinate the air force aviation bombers

and Secondary Artillery's conventional missile units to continue to strike the massive

forces in the enemy's depth and at the airfield. The campaign commander should pay

attention to the follow-up speed and the location of the deep attack groups. He should

hasten the operational speed of the engineering force to widen the path in the main

direction. He should increase the attack speed and force density of the forward line attack

groups that are penetrating the points of penetration.

During the activities to counter the enemy's blockade of the points of penetration {封闭

突破口 fengbi tupokou}, the campaign commander should emphasize overall

coordination and comprehensive use of firepower. As long as the point of penetration is
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not effectively blocked by the enemy, one should not sacrifice the friendly forces' attack

momentum. One should maintain a multi-route, multi-dimensional, multi-directional and

sustained campaign penetration posture. To the positional defensive enemy on the first

line, we should maintain high speed and high pressure. The follow-on forces should

increase their follow up speed and enter into the pre-determined deployment position to

engage the enemy as early as possible. If the enemy is able to successfully blockade the

point of penetration and the point of penetration cannot be re-opened in a short time, and

the enemy's counterattack forces inside the position are comparatively strong, depending

on the situation, our forward line attack groups that have penetrated the enemy position

should spread out and seize advantageous terrain features near the point of penetration

and form a mutually dependent and mutually supportive defensive posture. The airborne

force should work in cooperation with the forces that have penetrated the position. The

follow-on forces should hasten their attack tempo, and, under firepower cover, work in

conjunction with the friendly forces that have penetrated the enemy position to form a

sandwiched attack posture to ensure that the point of penetration can be re-opened as

soon as possible.

III. Crushing Enemy's Counterattacks...436

When the forward line attack groups are about to capture the enemy's first-line position

or are mounting an attack against the depth of the enemy, the friendly forces' attack

groups will definitely encounter the enemy's joint counterattacks from the air and from

the ground, involving both forces and firepower. Normally, the enemy's counterattack

activities are led by short and rapid firepower strikes. The enemy's main counterattacks

are ground maneuver attacks, and the enemy's secondary counterattacks come from

airlanding attacks of the flank rear. These counterattacks are multi-dimensional, rapid and

ferocious. Thus, after penetrating the enemy's defense, the campaign commander should

take aggressive measures to gain an overall understanding of the directions of movement

of the enemy's maneuver attack forces in the depth. The campaign commander should

promptly determine the enemy's disposition and predict possible timing, routes, scale and

direction of the enemy's counterattacks. The campaign commander should take actions

before the enemy does, using primarily firepower to neutralize the enemy, which is

coordinated with additional troops harassment. If the enemy develops strong and

powerful counterattack activities, the campaign commander should give priority to

organizing targeted counter-counterattack activities. He should firmly use firepower to

counter the enemy's counterattacks. He should strengthen overall coordination, striving to

wipe out the enemy while they are on the march. He should pay attention to overall

protection and use aggressive offensive activities to decisively crush the enemy's

counterattacks.

(1) Controlling the overall situation. Destroying enemy counterattacks as soon as

possible.

Based on information gathered from enemy intelligence bulletins from higher levels and

satellite photos (aerial photos), the campaign commander should instruct the special
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operations forces deep in the enemy's rear to investigate areas in the enemy depth that

provide good concealment conditions and can be used for rapid assembly and moving

forward. He should instruct the special operations forces to conduct targeted investigation

of the deployment location of the enemy's maneuver attack forces, their scale and

equipment, and to perform real time monitoring in order to understand the enemy's

movements promptly. The main criteria used to assess the enemy's counterattack

activities are as follows. The enemy's maneuver attack forces in the depth are rapidly

moving away from dispersed and concealed deployment to concentrated deployment

along the main corridors. The enemy's transport helicopters are seen in large formations

in the air. When the friendly forces' forward line attack groups penetrate the enemy's

position and are engaged in close combat, they encounter the enemy's organized largescale ground and air assaults by fire. The enemy's armed helicopters and surveillance

helicopters are encircling over the area near the enemy's first line defensive position and

have the potential for airlanding, and the enemy is using artillery fire to open a landing

site. The enemy's radio communications are abnormally busy. After discovering signs

indicting that the enemy is planning on counterattacks, the campaign commander should

order part of the neutralizing artillery force to be responsible for monitoring and firing.

This neutralizing artillery unit should conduct targeted harassment of the enemy's

maneuver attack forces and monitor areas that the enemy's airlanding units are most

likely to take advantage of. This is to ensure that when the enemy's assembled forces are

getting ready to mount counterattacks, we are able to grasp the most advantageous

opportunity to mount surprise fire attacks at areas where the enemy's forces and weapons

are concentrated but defense capabilities are weak in order to kill a large number of the

enemy's effective strength and destroy their counterattack activities as early as possible.

(2) Lead with firepower, and control counterattack over the full course.

In order to crush the enemy's joint counterattack activities, one should use the fire of the

neutralizing artillery force {压制炮兵 yazhi paobing} as the primary fire and the Air

Force and Second Artillery's conventional missile firepower as the secondary fire when

organizing powerful integrated fire assault activities. When applying other operational

measures, one should also use firepower as the core. In selecting attack objectives, one

should first wipe out the effective strength of the enemy's counterattacks, and then

neutralize enemy's air and ground firepower. In structuring attack formats, one should use

neutralizing fire as the primary format, and precision attacks as the secondary format. In

assigning attack missions, one should use the neutralizing artillery force as the primary

attack force when mounting counterattacks against enemy's effective strength, and use the

firepower of the supporting arms and services as the primary attack forces when

counterattacking the enemy's air and ground firepower. In terms of strike times,

accomplish strike before the enemy {xiandi daji}, strike as early as possible, and strike

over the full course. With the function of integrated fire assault over the full course on the

enemy’s counterattack activities, disperse the enemy's mobile formations, throw into

disorder the enemy's command and control, disrupt the enemy's fire cover, and kill the

enemy's effective strength.
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After the campaign commander has made a determination of the enemy's general

counterattack intention, he should promptly determine the scale, route and direction of

the enemy's counterattacks. The campaign commander should command the maneuver air

defense groups to quickly move forward. Supported by the air defense firepower of the

various attack groups and with help from the Air Force fighter aviation unit, [the

maneuver air defense groups] should aggressively launch attacks against the enemy

aircraft overhead and secure air safety of the units under attack. The campaign

commander should command the neutralizing artillery force to mount high-intensity

follow-on strikes by fire, taking full advantage of advantageous moments such as when

the enemy is maneuvering and assembling or when the enemy formation is moving in to

mount attacks. The campaign commander should instruct the obstacle construction unit to

rapidly construct obstacles along the route the enemy must pass through in order to delay

enemy's maneuver. The campaign commander should coordinate the efforts of Air

Force's bombers and fighter-bombers and the Second Artillery's conventional missile

units, and use long-range strike firepower to attack enemy's firepower operational units

such as the enemy's artillery positions and airfields in the depth in order to reduce the

pressure of enemy's strikes by fire. The campaign commander should command the

information warfare force to take proper actions to destroy communications between the

enemy who is mounting the counterattacks and the enemy's command control center and

fire operational systems. He should also actively adjust firepower to mount attacks

against the enemy's counterattack groups nearby so that from the very beginning the

enemy that is mounting counterattacks will be under multi-dimensional attacks, and the

enemy's command is unsuccessful and coordination not working.

(3) Combine offense with defense and integrated-whole resistance {zhengti kangji}.

Because the enemy's general counterattack activities are well organized and the enemy

force strength is superior to ours, we must strengthen the thoughts of combining offense

with defense {gongfang jiehe} and integrated-whole resistance {zhengti kangji}. One

must not only diligently organize effective resistance activities, but also implement bold

offensive activities in the enemy's full depth. In counter counterattack operations, one

must put the priority in organizing resistance activities. As soon as the enemy's

counterattack activities are detected, the campaign commander should promptly organize

integrated firepower to counterattack the enemy, and at the same time command those

attack groups that have penetrated the enemy position to take cover using advantageous

terrain to reduce possible casualties caused by the enemy's air and artillery surprise

attacks. [The campaign commander] should command the forward line attack groups

close to the enemy's main counterattack direction to rapidly occupy advantageous terrain

to resist enemy's counterattacks. If the scale of the enemy's counterattacks is relatively

large, [the campaign commander] can also command the forward line attack groups or

maneuver attack groups from other directions to implement ferocious attacks from the

flank or flank rear of the enemy, with offense controlling their movement {yigong

zhidong} and active complementation of integrated fire strike activities. If the enemy

separates into several routes and mounts separate counterattacks, [the campaign

commander] should give priority to attacking the route that poses the greatest threat.

After wiping it out, then attack the remaining routes. If the enemy complements general
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counterattack activities with aircraft activities {jijiang xingdong}, [the campaign

commander] should grasp advantageous opportunities such as when the enemy's airborne

units are boarding the aircraft, forming formations in the air or are about to execute

airlanding when the forces and aircraft are concentrated but command is relatively

chaotic to mount integrated firepower attacks. [The campaign commander] should

command the deep attack groups to hasten the follow-up speed and get ready to

participate in the counter counterattack operations at any given moment. At the same

time, [the campaign commander] should instruct the integrated support forces to rapidly

move forward to provide battlefield rescue and repair, as well as to replenish operational

materials.

At the same time, the campaign commander must actively organize offensive activities. If

the situation indicates that without introducing deep attack groups one is able to crush the

enemy's counterattack activities, the campaign commander should command the deep

attack groups to hasten their maneuver speed, avoiding the main corridor of the enemy's

counterattacks, and pass over the forward line attack groups. At an appropriate location,

[the deep attack groups] should deploy and mount ferocious attacks against pre-assigned

operational objectives in order to wipe out the enemy's effective strength in the depth and

enemy's critical targets. The campaign commander should command the special

operations units in the enemy's depth to mount targeted sabotages against enemy's

command control system. The campaign commander should command the neutralizing

artillery units to transfer a part of the firepower to support the deep attack groups and

special operations groups in their attack activities against critical targets in the enemy's

rear. If it is necessary to introduce deep attack groups into counterattack activities, the

campaign commander should order the forward line attack groups on the front of the

counterattacks to rapidly transit into a defensive mode to resist enemy's frontal

counterattacks. The campaign commander should order the deep attack groups to rapidly

deploy while on the march and enter into the operations from both flanks of the forward

line attack groups that are responsible for blocking the enemy. [The deep attack groups]

will use multiple routes to mount attacks towards the core of the enemy from the two

flanks. The campaign commander should command the maneuver attack groups to deploy

at the front of the enemy and mount strikes by fire first. When the friendly force's

neutralizing firepower is transferring, the maneuver attack groups should mount ferocious

assaults to engage the enemy in close combat. In coordination with the deep attack

groups, the maneuver attack groups quickly annihilate the enemy.

IV. Dividing and Wiping Out the Enemy in the Depth...439

Dividing and wiping out the enemy in the depth means using various attack groups to

mount campaign dividing operations in the enemy's full defensive depth to isolate the

enemy into several operational areas that are independent and unable to provide mutual

support. After separating the enemy, the attack groups will wipe out the enemy in their

isolated areas one after the other. The goal is to annihilate the enemy as soon as possible

and ensure that the higher level follow-on operational forces can enter into the operations

as early as possible. The campaign commander should choose the appropriate campaign
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dividing methods flexibly based on actual terrain features and the campaign posture of

the two sides in order to ensure that dividing and annihilation activities can be executed

quickly.

(1) Campaign dividing and isolation

Campaign dividing and isolation {战役割裂 zhanyi gelie} refers to the campaign

activities that structurally destroy the enemy's defensive system. The goal is to create

advantageous campaign posture for wiping out the enemy area by area. Campaign

dividing and isolation are normally carried out when the friendly forces have basically

crushed enemy's counterattacks activities and the enemy's higher-level counterattack

activities have not yet begun. On the premise that the friendly forces have penetrated the

enemy's defense, the various attack groups should use multiple forms and measures to

continue to deploy and attack toward the enemy's depth, capture important objectives or

advantageous terrain features in the enemy's depth, control critical traffic and

communication corridors, disrupt the enemy's defensive disposition, and forcefully divide

and isolate the enemy's defensive system. The method of dividing and isolation should be

flexibly chosen based on the terrain, enemy's defensive disposition, and friendly forces'

campaign organization. If the enemy's defensive front has several roads leading into the

depth, the campaign commander should mount parallel strikes using several attack

groups. If the terrain of the battle front is more complicated and there are several roads

going past the enemy's defensive flank to the hinterland, the campaign commander

should mount one flank strikes or two-flank strikes. If the enemy's defensive disposition

is of a circular shape, then the campaign commander should mount a multi-route attack

towards the center {多路向心攻击 duolu xiangxin gongji}.

When implementing dividing and isolation operations against the enemy's positional

defense, one should take advantage of the results of assaults and penetrations and the

effects of fire strikes and develop the total might of the arms and services to the fullest

extent. One should simultaneously use the forces to divide and use firepower to isolate;

one should combine horizontal dividing with multi-dimensional dividing and combine

campaign dividing with tactical dividing. One should flexibly apply fighting methods

such as frontal penetration and isolation {正面突贯割裂 zhengmian tuguan gelie}, flank

turning and dividing {翼侧迂回割裂 yice yuhui gelie}, or multi-dimensional dividing {

立体阻断割裂 liti zuduan gelie}, and fire blockade dividing {火力封闭割裂 huoli

fengbi gelie} to actively divide and isolate the enemy's defensive disposition.

In the process of the dividing and isolation operations, the campaign commander should

fully understand the battlefield situation, promptly take control of the dividing posture of

the various attack groups and the rapid insertions of the airborne operational groups. The

campaign commander should command the electronic countermeasure units to mount

powerful real time electromagnetic interceptions throughout the entire course of the

dividing and isolation activities. He should promptly readjust and redefine the directions

and objectives of the dividing and isolation operations, and coordinate all operational

activities in a timely manner.
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(2) Wiping out the divided enemy

When the friendly forces have basically achieved the campaign posture of total isolation

of the enemy, the campaign commander should organize the forces to annihilate the

enemy in a timely manner. When encircling and annihilating the divided enemy, the

campaign commander should correctly define the operational goal and nimbly choose the

appropriate operational methods based on the terrain features of the operational area,

enemy's defensive posture, results of dividing and isolating the enemy, as well as the

operational capabilities of the attacking troops. The campaign commander can use troops

to mount assaults to kill the enemy and capture the position. The campaign commander

can also use political measures to disintegrate the enemy morale and persuade the enemy

to surrender. The campaign commander can use the maneuver forces to strike and wipe

out the enemy. The campaign commander can also apply concentrated firepower to wipe

out the enemy.

If the enemy that has been divided decides to rely on strategic terrain and fortified

defensive works to stubbornly resist and it seems difficult for the friendly forces to

rapidly encircle the enemy and wipe it out, one should first apply concentrated firepower

to fiercely strike the enemy to destroy their defensive works, kill their effective strength,

and weaken their ability to resist, followed by the maneuver forces to capture the

defensive position. If the enemy hides and takes protection in trenches and tunnels, one

should apply methods such as using troops to block the entrance, using smoke to smoke

out the enemy, or using fire to burn or explosives to bomb so that one can wipe out the

enemy that is blocked inside the tunnels. If the enemy decides to firmly defend the

position and wait for reinforcement to come, and the reinforcement has set off, one

should hasten the speed of encirclement and attack, striving to wipe out the enemy before

the reinforcement arrives. At the same time, one should employ various effective

methods to delay and destroy the enemy's reinforcement activities in order to crush the

enemy's intent and accomplish the encirclement and annihilation mission. If the

conditions permit, one can wipe out the reinforcement first, or one can simultaneously

mount attacks as well as fight the reinforcement. If the enemy decides to firmly defend

but has little hope to penetrate the encirclement, one should strengthen the attack forces

and firmly block the enemy from penetrating the encirclement, striving to suppress the

enemy in the circle and kill them all. If the terrain is advantageous to the friendly forces

and the operational capabilities permit, one can also adopt a strategy to encircle the

enemy on three sides but leave one side open intentionally for the enemy to escape, and

set up ambush in the direction the enemy may penetrate the encirclement in order to wipe

out the enemy while they are trying to escape. If the enemy decides to abandon the

position and escape, one should firmly implement the follow and pursue operation. One

should first use air and artillery firepower to interdict and strike the escaping enemy to

delay their activities and kill their effective strength, then use the maneuver forces to

follow and pursue. When necessary, one can use a part of the forces to implement

airlanding in front of the escaping enemy, to seize advantageous terrain features and, in

collaboration with the pursuing troops, to sandwich the escaping enemy in between and

attack the enemy. If the escaping enemy's force strength is stronger than the friendly

forces and it seems difficult for the friendly forces to rapidly wipe them out, one should
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contain the escaping enemy first, and at the same time rapidly readjust the deployment

and reinforce the attack forces before attacking and wiping out the enemy. If there is little

hope for the divided enemy to receive reinforcement or to penetrate the encirclement, and

the fear to be killed has shaken their morale, one can temporarily stop the attack activities

and launch strong political offensives and propaganda offensives to divide and

disintegrate the enemy, and put pressure on the enemy to surrender.

V. Intercepting Enemy's Reinforcement...441

When annihilating the encircled enemy, in order to capture battlefield initiatives or rescue

the encircled troops, the enemy may bring in reinforcement or implement counter

encirclement. Thus, during encirclement and annihilation, one must be ready at any

moment to resist the opponent's multi-dimensional sustained reinforcement in order to

ensure that one will be able to completely annihilate the encircled troops and achieve the

campaign goal.

When blocking and attacking opponent's reinforcement, one should apply reinforcement

blocking deployment according to the direction of the reinforcement, strength of the

enemy's reinforcement, distance of the reinforcement, whether airborne support is

present, and terrain conditions, as well as one's own force strength and intent. Normally,

one can employ the positional defensive format or maneuver defensive format, using a

combination of force strength and firepower to resolutely block the opponent's

reinforcement. If the encircled enemy forces are basically annihilated, and the conditions

are right to continue to fight and kill the enemy's reinforcement, the friendly side's

reinforcement blocking forces should rapidly engage the enemy's reinforcement or

deploy to a pre-determined area and rapidly maneuver to encircle the enemy

reinforcement and wipe it out. If not wiping out the enemy reinforcement means the

friendly forces will not be able to wipe out the encircled enemy, and if the condition is in

our favor, then we can also concentrate all forces and wipe out he enemy reinforcement

first before wiping out the encircled enemy.
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Chapter 19

The Positional Defensive Campaign...442

A positional defensive campaign is a defensive campaign conducted by an Army

campaign large formation {lujun zhanyi juntuan} complemented by other operational

strengths in a pre-constructed position. A positional defensive campaign can be divided

into fortified positional defensive campaign {jiangu zhendi fangyu zhanyi} and field

positional defensive campaign {yezhan zhendi fangyu zhanyi}. The main missions of a

positional defensive campaign are: to hold and set-up defense areas {eshou shefang diqu}

and important targets and frustrate the enemy’s attack; to cover the main force maneuver

and implement attack operations; to consolidate already occupied areas and resist the

opponent’s counterattack; and to complement operations in the other directions.

Under informationized conditions, especially in border area local wars, the positional

defensive campaign has a very important role in holding {eshou} a specified area,

crushing the enemy's attack intention, effectively checking the enemy's incursion,

safeguarding the security of the border area and territorial integrity, gaining time, and

covering the main force’s forward advance, maneuver, and implementation of attack

operations, etc.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...442

Positional defensive campaigns are one of the basic patterns of defensive campaigns.

Under informationized conditions, the operational thought, operational measures, and

operational modes have all experienced profound change. Many new characteristics have

emerged and at the same time these new characteristics have posed many new

requirements for operational guidance.

I. Characteristics...442

The basic characteristics of positional defensive campaigns include the following: the

operational mode is relatively passive, the operational area is relatively fixed, the

defense-hold target {fangshou mubiao} status {diwei} is important, the operational

activities have a holding quality {jianshouxing}, and the duration of the operation is

relatively long; preparation time is relatively ample and with an excellent position as the

base, the protection conditions are good; in waiting for the enemy to exhaust himself and

controlling movement through stillness, our strength expenditure is fairly low; and the

defense system {fangyu tixi} is fairly robust when organizing operations on a preconstructed battlefield {yushe zhanchang}, etc. Under informationized conditions and

along with improvements in weapons and equipment, the elevation of information power

{xinxili}, firepower, maneuver power {jidongli}, and support capability {baozhang

nengli}, and the changes in the thought, principles, and methods of attack operations,

many new characteristics will appear in the positional defensive campaign.
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(1) The depth and multi-dimensional qualities of defensive operations has grown more

evident.

Under modern conditions, as weapons and equipment advance, the ability of the military

to implement full-depth, all-directional, multi-dimensional attack has also improved. The

attacking side does not need to adopt the methods of going from far to near and gradual

attack to implement a layered attack against the defending side. Rather, the attacking side

can rely on its equipment technical superiority and comprehensively apply various types

of force-strengths and firepower to implement full-depth firepower kill, all-direction

multi-point attack, and multi-dimensional simultaneous penetration against the defending

side from the ground and air. This way, from the very start of the campaign, the attacking

side immediately expands the engagement area to the full-depth, all directions, and all

domains of the battlefield. The attacking side thus forces the defensive side into a passive

state {beidong jingdi}, having to deal with the opponent from all directions. The intention

is to dissolve and paralyze the opponent's defense system {tixi} with one blow and

achieve the goal of the attack. This kind of full-depth, all-directional, and multidimensional attack method will completely change the traditional linear defense modelform {moshi}. The opposing sides will engage on the ground, in the air, at sea; at front,

on the flank or flank rear, either simultaneously or one after the other. Throughout the

entire campaign course, we will see paralysis {tanhuan} and counter-paralysis operations,

penetration and counter-penetration operations, assault and counter-assault operations,

envelopment and counter-envelopment operations {baowei yu fanbaowei}, outflanking

and counter-outflanking operations, airborne [landing] and counter-airborne [landing]

operations, encirclement and counter encirclement {hewei yu fanhewei} operations, etc.

Under such conditions, the status of depth and multi-dimensional defense will be much

more significant, the contest with the enemy's long-range weapons and depth attack

force-strengths will be critical to defense stability, and anti-air raid operations will

become an important content of campaign activities and an important factor that affects

campaign progress and conclusion.

(2) Offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} are broadly applied and their status more

prominent.

Defensive operations are to a certain extent passive {beidong} in nature, and thus their

methods and means are often defined by the course and tempo of the attack. In the

defensive campaigns of the past, even though emphases were placed on using active

offensive activities {gongshi xingdong} in conjunction with defensive activities,

defensive campaigns were only activities of a passive nature {beidongxing}. Under

informationized conditions, because of improvements in armed forces {jundui} longrange assault capabilities, battlefield mobility and rapid reaction capabilities, the

application of offensive activities {yunyong gongshi xingdong} by the side defending has

provided favorable conditions for resisting an enemy’s attack. [As] the means of attack

{gongji shouduan} become more varied, the application of offensive activities {gongshi

xingdong de yunyong} will be even more extensive and its status will be continuously

raised.
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(3) The variable quality of the center of gravity {zhongxin} of defense increases, and

operational modes are more flexible.

In defensive operations in the past, the battle line was relatively fixed, the center of

gravity {zhongxin} of the defense was relatively stable, and the use of operational means

followed a certain formula. Under informationized conditions, the center of gravity of

defensive operations becomes more variable. The main reasons include the following:

First of all, the attacking side {jin’gong yifang} possesses the capability for conducting

full-depth simultaneous attacks, [the attacking side] has the capability and conditions for

carrying out "non-linear style" attack {jin’gong} operations, and the sudden and

maneuver qualities of attack have drastically increased; for the defensive side, the predetermined {yuxian panding} main attack direction {zhuyao jin’gong fangxang} may

change at any time; for the main defensive vital points {yaodian} selected prior to battle

{zhanqian xuanding de zhuyao fangyu yaodian}, the attacking side has the capability to

outflank and bypass them and implement aerial leapfrog {kongzhong chaoyur}. Next, the

enemy’s equipment has advanced reconnaissance technology equipment and has strong

battlefield reconnaissance capability, so the attacking side has the capability to detect the

defensive side's force-strength key points {zhongdian} of bushu disposition, avoid the

opponent's main direction of defense and implement attack from a direction or place

where the defense-holding is relatively weak, thus putting the opponent’s pre-determined

defensive key points in a place of no regard. Additionally, under informationized

conditions, the attacking side has strong concealment and camouflage capabilities and

emphasizes initiating an attack {gongji} through rapid maneuver on the ground or in the

air. The defensive side has very limited time to organize defense and finds it very

difficult to ascertain the attack key points of the attacking side, further increasing the

variability of the defensive center of gravity. Under such conditions, the establishment of

the defensive system {tixi} should inevitably possess all-directional and variable qualities

and [both] the employment of strengths and application of fighting methods should be

even more flexible.

(4) The mission of resisting enemy's information attack {jin’gong} and fire assault is

more arduous.

Under informationized conditions, the enemy will emphasize implementing full-depth,

all-directional, and high intensity comprehensive firepower attack against the defensive

opponent in the air, on the ground and at sea, as well as launching powerful information

attack. This kind of attack will be a relatively independent operational phase. As soon as

the attack begins, first concentrate all types of aircraft, ships, missiles, and artillery

firepower, implement large-scale, high-intensity, long-duration full-depth fire assault and

various forms of information attack, and the intention is, prior to the attacking force-units

making contact with the opponent, to paralyze {tanhuan} the opponent's defense system

{tixi} with one blow and massively annihilate the opponent's effective strength. After the

attack is initiated, still emphasize assisting and covering the attack activities of the 

ground force-units without pause and with various soft and hard strike means, and

permeate the operational course with information operations and firepower warfare
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assaults. Thus, we can see that in the positional defensive campaign under

informationized conditions, firepower threats and information threats will increase

without precedence, favorable terrain superiority and position protection functions will

become less significant, personnel casualties and war material consumption will increase

without precedent, and especially the battlefield survival problem of the various types of

information systems and facilities that rely on informationized weapons and equipment

becomes more prominent. It will be extremely arduous for the defensive side to adopt

effective measures and means, successfully accomplish comprehensive protection and

ensure the missions of battlefield survival.

II. Requirements...444

In positional defensive campaigns under informationized conditions, we should bring the

integrated might into full play, implement full-depth multi-dimensional defense with key

points, organically combine tenacious holding [standing fast] {wanqiang jianshou} with

active resistance-attack {jiji kangji} and counterattack with initiative {zhudong fanji},

and strive to crush the enemy's attack {jin’gong} intention with active offensive

{gongshi} activities. To achieve this, the positional defensive campaign should

accomplish the following points.

(1) Rapid reaction {kuaisu fanying}, quickly accomplish imminent battle preparations.

Under informationized conditions, the attacking enemy's activities are concealed and

variable, and the enemy's fighting methods are full-depth and all-directional. This puts

forth even higher requirements on the rapid reaction ability of the defensive side. In

addition, the campaign large formation that is responsible for the defense mission may

enter into defense under the situation of advance preparations or it can transition into

defense in the situation of encountering the enemy’s sudden raids. Thus, defense

preparations must be completed within a very short time, and sometimes, one can only

fight and prepare at the same time. In a positional defense campaign, one must have a

foothold in the most difficult and complex situations, give prominence to key points,

tightly seize time, closely organize and quickly accomplish campaign preparations.

In rapid reaction {kuaisu fanying}, we must accomplish change when the enemy changes

{dibian wobian} based on changes in the battlefield situation, flexibly react at the right

time, and master battlefield initiative. To do this, aside from fully accomplishing

operational preparations and rapidly bushu-dispose force-strengths, we also should

promptly master all of the reliable intelligence, and establish smooth communications.

The commander should keenly observe the development of the operations and decisively

and agilely command. The force-units must be familiar with technical weapons and

maintain a constantly alert will-to-fight and the ability for rapid activities. In terms of

operational activities, we must accomplish rapid protection and concealment, rapid

firepower counterattack, rapid force-strength maneuver, rapid operational center of

gravity {zhongxin} transitions, quick mutual assistance-support, and accurate

coordination movements.
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Preparation for positional defensive campaigns can be divided into peacetime

preparations and imminent battle preparations {linzhan zhunbei}. When organizing

defense, no matter what the condition is, we must carry out preparation rapidly and

orderly according to the intent of the superior, the mission of the campaign, current

enemy intelligence, geographical environment of the operational area, campaign

organization, and possible campaign development, etc. In positional defensive campaigns

under informationized conditions, we must especially stress doing a good job of

preparation for imminent battle, which is normally carried out on the foundation of

peacetime preparation. The basic mission is to correctly understand the decision and

carefully plan the campaign activities. The main contents [of preparation for imminent

battle] include the following: Comprehensively understand the intent of the superior, use

multiple reconnaissance means to find out enemy intelligence, correctly analyze and

evaluate enemy intelligence, our intelligence, and terrain, etc. in order to make the

campaign decision in a timely manner; carefully formulate the campaign plan and

organize campaign coordination; and carry out political mobilization {zhengzhi

dongyuan} and organize various types of support comprehensively, etc.

(2) Tenaciously holding {wanqiang jianshou} and independent protracted operations.

Not only is tenaciously holding and independent protracted operations a basic

requirement put forth for defensive operations, it is also the essential combat spirit of

defensive operations, and it even more so is a need-requirement for realizing the

objectives of defensive operations.

The basic mission of a defensive campaign is to hold [stand fast] the defensive area so as

to contain enemy attack. Thus the basic standard of measuring mission accomplishment

is holding a specified area for a stipulated time. If we give up the defensive position too

early, even if we cause a huge amount of casualties in the enemy, it is still considered not

accomplishing the mission. Using this definition, defensive operations must grow out of

tenaciously holding and protracted operations. In addition, defensive operations normally

have specified defensive areas {fangqu}, and the defensive areas are independent but

mutually supportive. Together they form a complete defensive system {tixi}.

Furthermore, in each defensive area, it is very easy to encounter being divided {fenge}

and encircled {baowei} by an attacking enemy during operations. In this sense, each

defensive area must tenaciously hold and [conduct] independent operations.

The relationship between tenaciously holding and independent protracted operations is

one of mode and goal. Only through tenaciously holding and inflicting high casualties

and expenditure to the enemy attack strength can we realize independent protracted

operations. Conversely, in order to realize independent protracted operations, we must

tenaciously hold.

In order to be effective in tenaciously holding, we must first establish the holding thought

of where there is person, there is a position {renzai zhendi zai}, and through powerful

thought political work, we muster all favorable factors, fully bring into play the thought
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superiority of force-units of all participating services and arms, and establish a solid

foundation for tenaciously holding. Secondly, we must do a good job in the various

preparations of defensive operations. This includes formulating the defensive operations

plan, establishing the defensive system {tixi}, and storing of various operational materiel,

etc. so as to create favorable material conditions for tenaciously holding and protracted

operations. Next, we must have a grasp on powerful maneuver strengths and with a focus

on protracted operations, rationally separate the garrison duty strengths and the maneuver

strengths {shoubei liliang he jidong liliang}. Not only must we have sufficient strengths

to hold [stand fast] positions, but we must also have powerful maneuver strengths as

backup, so as to facilitate the basis for campaign progress and needs-requirements, and at

the right time augment vital point defense-holding {yaodian fangshou} or implement

offensive operations {gongshi zuozhan}, enhancing the flexibility and toughness of

defensive operations. In addition, we must flexibly apply fighting methods, fight the

enemy with intellect and with courage, fully utilize the favorable conditions of defensive

operations, combine offense and defense, and annihilate the enemy one by one; and

through various localized tenacious holding, we must achieve protracted operations in the

campaign overall situation.

(3) Construct a full-depth, multi-dimensional defensive system with key points.

In operations under informationized conditions, the enemy has the capability to

implement full-depth, all-directional, and multi-dimensional attacks {gongji}. The

enemy's emphasis is on simultaneous full-depth attack. The enemy's attacking bushu

disposition is established on the foundation that it can apply constant pressure on the

opponent's defense full-depth. And the enemy emphasizes combining frontal penetration,

flank penetration, vertical penetration, and depth attack. The attack is always aiming at

the opponent's target in the depth in order to achieve the goal of depth encirclement. In

spite of this, because the attacking enemy is subjected to constraints of various factors,

they may not be able to bring into play its operational effectiveness in the direction and

area as they wish but they may only be able to implement with key points. Thus, when

we organize the defensive campaign, we should rationally bushu disposition our force

strengths and weapons and build a defensive system {fangyu tixi} that is full-depth,

multi-dimensional and has key points. With this [defensive system] as our backing, we

[should] implement resistance with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points. What is

called with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points is precisely the campaign bushu

disposition {zhanyi bushu}, position task organization {zhendi biancheng}, firepower

distribution system {huoli peixi}, obstacle distribution system {zhang’aiwu peixi},

information operations distribution system {xinxi zuozhan peixi}, and the various support

systems within the defensive system. They should all focus on being able to effectively

resist the enemy's full-depth, multi-dimensional and key point attack, and form a

defensive system with full-depth, multi-dimensional and key points. Not only should the

defensive system be able to resist the enemy's implementation of fire power and force

strength attack from the ground but also be able to resist the enemy’s implementation of

fire power and force strength attack from the air; not only should the defensive system be

able to resist the enemy's implementation of attack from the front but also be able to 

resist the enemy's outflanking attack from the side flanks and rear flanks; not only should
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the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's implementation of a frontal attack from

the forward lines but also be able to annihilate the enemy penetrating the depths or in

airborne landing; not only should the defensive system be able to resist the enemy's "hard

strike" from the ground, sea, air, and space domains but also be able to oppose the

enemy’s “soft strike” coming from the electromagnetic domain; not only should the

defensive system be able to resist-hold the enemy's full scale strike from the different

space domains and directions using integrated means, but also be able to resist-hold

enemy's key point strikes in a given space domain and direction.

(4) Utilizing favorable conditions and strengthening comprehensive protection.

Under informationized conditions, the attacking side often concentrates their crack forces

and weapons {jingbing liqi} and possesses comprehensive firepower superiority. The

attacking side can mount large-scale, all-time and space, high intensity firepower assault

against the defensive side. For the defensive side, the most important question related to

defense stability and achieving the defensive campaign goal is whether it can effectively

conserve its effective strength and operational potential. Thus, for the defensive

campaign large formation, one of the most important methods to effectively conserve

one's effective strength and operational potential is to make full use of the defensive

position which has a designated location on favorable terrain and the advantageous

condition of being able to wait for a tired enemy, and to strengthen one's comprehensive

protection against the enemy's comprehensive firepower assault. To do so, the basic

measure is: combining defense with attack, using attack to support defense and using

defense to support attack.

"Strike" {da} is the most active measure to improve survivability. In defensive

operations, we must have a good grasp of favorable time opportunities and make full use

of various strike means, especially the capability of high-tech weapons and long-range

strike weapons, striving to implement preemptive strike, destroy the enemy's attacking

{jin’gong} capability, and weaken the enemy's threat to our survivability. To achieve

this, the campaign large formation can use the aviation force {hangkongbing}, campaign

tactical missiles {zhanyi zhanshu daodan} and long-range artillery {yuancheng paobing}

to implement sudden strikes with key points against targets such as enemy airfields,

missile firing positions, and the command control systems. [The campaign large

formation] can also organize crack force element-teams {jinggan xiaofendui} or special

force units {tezhong budui} to penetrate deep into the enemy rear to carry out special

operations, damage the enemy's firepower attack systems, weaken the enemy's fire attack

superiority, and transform our passivity to gaining the initiative.

"Defense" {fang} is still the main measure to maintain survivability. We should use a

wide range of means to improve the results of defense. One is to emphasize firepower

resistance. We should pay attention to the protection of important targets such as

command hubs, communications hubs, airfields, ports, missile and artillery firing

positions, and logistical and technical support bases, etc. We should establish a fulldepth, multi-dimensional, network-like bushu disposition to resist enemy's strike. The
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second is making use of the terrain to enhance concealment. We should fully utilize

terrain features such as terrain creases, valleys, rain crevices, and vegetation cover,

deploy [position] {peizhi} force-strengths and weapons under concealment, and reduce

personnel and equipment exposure indicators in order to increase the difficulty level for

the enemy to assess our force-strength bushu disposition and lower the accuracy of the

enemy's fire assault. The third is to emphasize protective works. When organizing

defensive campaigns, as long as conditions allow, we should by all means possible, build

a few sheltered fortifications able to be hidden {neng cang}, able to strike {neng da},

able to maneuver {neng jidong} and able to live in {neng shenghuo}. As much as

possible, hide personnel, equipment and war materials underground in order to reduce

and weaken the might of the enemy's fire assault. At the same time, we should utilize the

advantageous conditions of our pre-designated battlefield and already-established

position to enhance the effectiveness of comprehensive protection. The fourth is to

implement dynamic state bushu disposition {dongtai bushu}. When establishing

campaign bushi disposition, we must properly increase the dynamic-state quality

{dongtaixing} of the target. By way of appropriately and cleverly changing the

positioning location, we can increase the difficulty level of enemy's reconnaissance

detection and fire assault. The fifth is to strengthen battlefield reconnaissance and

surveillance, promptly detect the signs that the enemy is to launch fire assault, and do a

good job in concealment and protection preparation in order to reduce the effect of

enemy's fire assault to the minimum.

(5) Comprehensively apply operational strengths and implement integrated resistance.

In defensive campaigns under informationized conditions, the integrated confrontation of

both sides is very prominent. When organizing a defensive campaign, the crux to gaining

campaign victory lies in whether one can bring into full play the integrated might

{zhengti weili} of one’s own strengths and whether one can try its utmost to disrupt the

formation of the integrated combined strength {zhengti heli}. When encountering the

enemy's full-depth, all-aspect multi-dimensional attack, we must comprehensively use

our operational strengths and means to form an integrated combined strength {zhengti

heli} to resist the enemy's full scale strikes and key point destruction, as well as to

destroy the overall structure of the enemy's attacking {jing’gong} system. The basic

measures are to improve the operational system {tixi} and strengthen battlefield

adjusting-coordination.

First of all, we must unify the bushu disposition of the operational strengths and establish

a robust {wanshan} defense system. In an Army defensive campaign, in addition to the

various arms subordinate to the root service {junzhong}, normally there will also be

assisting-support and cooperation received from the force-units of the Air Force, Navy,

and Second Artillery {kongjun, jaihun he di’er paobing budui}. The operational space

includes the ground, air, and sea. To address this, first we must reasonably assign the

operational mission to the participating services and arms based on campaign needs, and

technical equipment, operational capability and principle of use of the services and

branches in order to bring into full play overall resistance superiority. The second is that
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we must establish a robust defense system and form ground, air, and sea integrated multidimensional battlefields that are mutually supportive. The third is that we must carefully

formulate an adjusting-coordination plan {xietiao jihua} and organize all operational

groups {zuozhan jituan} to conduct exercise training according to the adjustingcoordination plan prior to the start of war {zhanqian} in order to modify-improve and

become familiar with the adjusting-coordination plan, and thus establish integrated

adjusting-coordination on a practical and reliable foundation. Through the above

measures, we form the might of a "one plus one is greater than two" system {xitong} and

its integrated function on the enemy.

Secondly, we must strengthen battlefield adjusting-coordination. The battlefield situation

is complex and variable. In order to achieve an integrated resistance {zhengti kangji} of

the various operational strengths, we should also pay attention to the adjustingcoordination for the various operational strengths during the course of the campaign. And

relying on new battlefield situations, we [should] promptly adjust the mission[s] and

activities of the various operational groups {zuozhan jituan}, establish new adjustingcoordination relationships, and ensure the smooth implementation of the campaign. We

must conscientiously strengthen the adjusting-coordination between the strengths

{liliang} of the various services and arms so that we maintain a robust strength system

{wanzheng de liliang tixi} from beginning to the end; we must strengthen the adjustingcoordination for the various operational patterns and means so as to bring into play a

maximum operational effectiveness; we must strengthen the adjusting-coordination for

the activities of the various battlefields, directions, spaces {kongjian}, and domains so as

to maintain desirable operational results.

(6) Combining attack and hold, dominate the enemy with a variety of means.

In defensive operations under informationized conditions, we should seize all favorable

time-opportunities and actively adopt offensive activities {gongshi xingdong}. We

should build attack into defense, simultaneously use multiple means and thus seize the

initiative of the defensive campaign.

Firstly, we must establish the awareness in an offensive defense {gongshi fangyu yishi}

in terms of campaign guidance. From the time we begin to organize a campaign to the

conclusion of campaign implementation, not only must we plan {jihua} how to conduct

defensive-holding activities {fangshou xingdong}, but we should also [conduct]

operations research {yunchou} on how to implement offensive activities {gongshi

xingdong}, and in a defensive campaign, from formulating the jihua plans to

implementing the operations, [we should] allow offensive operations to permeate

throughout as important activities in defensive operations, as well as accomplish the

various necessary preparations. This way, only through the implementation process are

we able to smoothly handle everything {dexin yingshou} and for it to be an integral

whole {hunran yiti}.
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Secondly, we must build a defensive system that is adaptable to attacking and hold

operations {gongshou zuozhan}. No matter if it is campaign bushu disposition, position

task organization {biancheng}, firepower distribution-systems {peixi}, obstacle

distribution systems, various support systems {xitong}, not only must it be beneficial for

defense-holding, it must also be beneficial for attacking {jin’gong}. It must form a

defensive system that simultaneously attacks and defends {gongfang jianbei}, is able to

attack and able to hold {nenggong nengshou}, is flexible and variable, and concentrates

multiple functions into one.

Next, in terms of means application, we must give priority to defense, and simultaneously

carry on attack and defense. On the basis of tenaciously resisting and holding the position

{wanqiang kangji, jianshou zhendi}, we should fully utilize the favorable conditions

created by defense-holding operations {fangshou zuozhan}, seize the favorable timeopportunities such as when the enemy's attack is foiled, when their formations are in

chaos, when their activities are out of adjustment, and when there are voids in their rear,

at the right time organize the implementation of operational activities such as launching

attacks in front of the position {zhenqian chuji}, ambushing the interior of the position

{zhennei fuji}, guerilla attack to the enemy rear {dihou youji}, maneuver annihilation

attack and force-strength and firepower counterattack not far from the position {buyuan li

zhendi de jidong jianji, bingli huoli fanji}, as well as air and naval assaults, etc., actively

strike the enemy with initiative {jiji zhudong de daji diren}, truly accomplish combining

attack and hold {zhenzheng zuodao gongshou jiehe}, control the enemy with multiple

means {duozhong shouduan zhidi}, and realize the goal of gaining victory with an

integrated whole {zhengti zhisheng}.

Section 2: Main Activities...450

In the positional defensive campaign, operational activities normally are conducted on the

foundation of campaign preparations. During the campaign course, various activities will

be unfolded over the entire defense space in succession or simultaneously, and some of

the activities may have to be conducted repeatedly.

I. Preemptive strike {xianqi daji} against the enemy...450

A preemptive strike against the enemy is the pre-planned fire strike activities

implemented against the enemy before the enemy initiates attack. Its basic goal is to

disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations, inflict casualties on the enemy’s effective

strength, weaken the enemy’s operational capabilities, delay the enemy’s attack activities,

and gain time for further accomplishing defensive preparations.

Preemptive strike against the enemy should be implemented by seizing upon the

favorable time opportunities before the enemy’s initiation of attack. These time

opportunities are: first is when the enemy is in the standby area conducting attack

preparations. At this time, the enemy’s force-strengths and weapons are normally

positioned in groups, and targets are exposed and in a relatively static state. Second is
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when the enemy is moving-in and unfolding. At this time, because of terrain and road

restrictions, the attacking enemy is normally in a moving-in column and maneuvering

along several roads. Their advancing formations are long, targets are relatively

concentrated and it is difficult to effectively conceal them. If we can get seize these two

time opportunities to implement strikes, it will be easy to achieve the anticipated results.

Preemptive strike against the enemy should be directed at vital areas {yaohai} and strike

with key points. Its specific targets are: first are the enemy’s command system, radar

positions, and communication systems. Second are the enemy’s traffic lines, fuel

transport pipelines, missile and artillery positions, and logistic facilities. Third are the

enemy’s heavy force group deployment [positioning] {peizhi} areas. Fourth are the

enemy’s aerial support weapons, especially the attack helicopters, etc.

When implementing preemptive strike, we should bring into full play the integrated

superiority {zhengti youshi} of various firepower and ground force-strengths, combine a

variety of means, and implement integrated strikes. The first is to implement a

comprehensive fire strike against the enemy. As long as conditions permit, we should

seize the favorable time opportunities, use aviation and campaign tactical missile force

units {hangkongbing, zhanyi zhanshu daodan budui}, long-range artillery forces and

army aviation forces {yuancheng paobing, lujun hangkongbing}, implement sudden,

fierce, and short duration assaults against enemy’s vital area targets {yaohai mubiao},

and inflict heavy casualties and expend the enemy’s attack strengths. The second is to

implement guerrilla warfare and special operations against the enemy. We should fully

bring into play the function of the militia and guerrilla forces which we planted in

advance in the enemy’s rear to implement raid-attacks, harassment, and sabotage against

the enemy; at the appropriate time, we should organize special operations force-units

{tezhong zuozhan budui} or secret infiltration force-units {mimi shentou budui}to

implement reconnaissance and special operations in the enemy rear and sabotage

important targets in the enemy depth and rear in order to inflict heavy damage on the

enemy. The third is to implement information operations against the enemy. While we

implement firepower and force-strength strikes, conduct powerful information attack

operations, disrupt the normal operating of the enemy’s information system, weaken their

information operations capability, and create conditions for more effectively

implementing preemptive strikes.

II. Resisting the Enemy’s Firepower Assault...451

In positional defense campaigns, the crux to accomplishing the defense campaign

missions is to actively resist the enemy’s powerful comprehensive firepower assault and

preserve our effective strength and campaign potential. Thus, the campaign large

formation must persist in the principle of combining tight protection and active strike,

[must] apply various effective means, [must] resist the enemy’s comprehensive firepower

sudden-raids, and [must] ensure defense stability.
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(1) Full scale protection

Full scale protection refers to activities that evacuate, conceal, camouflage and protect the

personnel, equipment, and key targets in the defensive area. It is an important measure to

preserve combat capability and an important means to resist enemy’s firepower assault.

In order to raise protection effectiveness, we can use the following activities:

The first is to strengthen battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. With the prerequisite that we make full use of strategic intelligence and information, we should

organize the participating reconnaissance strengths, adopt various reconnaissance and

surveillance technical means, strengthen battlefield intelligence collection, promptly

detect and accurately ascertain the indicators, intention, scale and patterns in the enemy’s

implementation of firepower sudden-raids {huoli tuxi}, [detect and ascertain] the main

direction of the sudden-raids and possible targets of the sudden-raids, and further

accomplish the preparation work of resisting the enemy’s firepower sudden-raids.

The second is to utilize terrain and fortified works protection. When we detect that the

enemy is about to implement firepower raid-attacks {xiji} or when we receive a warning

from higher levels concerning to defend against the enemy’s firepower raid-attack, we

should promptly inform the force-units to enhance observation and pay close attention to

the enemy’s dynamic posture, as well as order the ground-to-air operational force-units

{duikong zuozhan budui} to rapidly unfold according to plan and accomplish resistance

preparations. Other force-units should quickly utilize favorable terrain and covered works

to disperse and conceal. As much as possible, “hide” force-units and weapons

underground and reduce the probability of enemy detection.

The third is to conduct interior-position maneuver {zhennei jidong} at the right times. In

order to resist the enemy’s firepower assault, we should appropriately increase the

dynamic state nature of the defensive bushu disposition. For those force-units with

stronger maneuverability, such as combined reserve forces {hecheng yubeidui}, artillery

and missile force (elemental)-units {paobing, daodan bu (fen) dui}, etc., depending on

the situation, appropriately conduct maneuver, continuously change positioning locations

{peizhi weizhi}, vary activity modes {xingdong fangshi}, and cause the enemy to not

easily acquire the target and be unable to implement precision strike.

The fourth is to implement campaign camouflage. On the basis of making full use of

favorable terrain and adverse weather conditions, we should use a variety of camouflage

and deception means, implement campaign camouflage, set up decoy targets, adopt false

activities, combine the real with the false, hide the real and show the false, and cause the

enemy difficulty in distinguishing the real and the false, thus achieving the goals of not

only concealing the force-units but also hiding the operational intention.

The fifth is to promptly rescue, repair and replenish. When we encounter the enemy’s

firepower assault, we should promptly rescue casualties and repair damaged position

works, communications facilities, important roadways, bridges, rear facilities, etc. At the
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same time, we should replenish various operational materials and equipment in a timely

manner in order to ensure the smooth progression of the campaign. We should also take

necessary electronic warfare measures to ensure continuous communications and

uninterrupted command.

(2) Tenaciously resist

Tenaciously resisting refers to using various strike weapons of defensive operations to

implement active strike activities against the enemy’s raids. While we practice complete

protection, we should concentrate fire assault against important targets posing the greatest

threat against us such as enemy missile and rocket firing positions, artillery position,

forward airfields and command control systems, [and we should] weaken enemy

firepower as much as possible and decrease defensive system losses. To achieve this, we

can adopt the following activities:

The first is electronic jamming. This is employing electronic equipment and materials

and actively conducting reconnaissance and jamming of the enemy’s radio

communications, artillery reconnaissance and fire correction radars {paobing zhencha

jiaoshe leida}, fire control radars and navigational guidance radars so as to cause the

enemy’s firepower strike weapons to lose control and lower their firepower sudden-raid

effectiveness.

The second is counterattack on the ground. This is employing ground long-range strike

strengths to implement sudden-raids against important targets in the enemy’s depth, such

as radar stations, forward airfields, missile firing positions, artillery firing positions, etc.

The goal of this is to destroy important weapon systems and important facilities the

enemy relies on to initiate attacks, to disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations, and to

shock the enemy.

The third is joint interception. This is, under the situation of our seizing localized air

dominance, employing fighter aviation supporting operations and ground air defense

weapons to intercept enemy aircraft and other sudden-raid weapons from the farthest

distance and providing continuous strikes and layered intercepts.

The fourth is setting up obstacles and obstructions {shezhang lanzu}. This is utilizing the

various airborne obstacles setups in advance {yuxian shezhi} and mobile setups {jidong

shezhi}, such as air burst balloons {kongbao qiqiu} and high altitude cables, etc. to

effectively block the enemy’s raid and complement other resisting activities.

The fifth is sabotage-raids in the enemy’s rear. This is, at the right time, organizing

special operations force-units {tezhong zuozhan budui}, secretively infiltrating the

enemy’s rear, comprehensively utilizing a variety of raid-attack modes, and sabotagingraid with key points main targets such as the enemy’s firepower systems {xitong}, rear

area ammunition and POL supply lines, and helicopter assembly (standby) areas. [This is

also] weakening the enemy’s firepower strike strengths, harassing the enemy’s fire strike
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plan, delaying the enemy’s fire strike activities, and lowering the operational

effectiveness of the enemy’s fire strike systems {xitong}.

III. Block the Enemy’s Full-Dimensional Penetration {tupo}...453

These are the critical activities of resisting the enemy’s attack activities, frustrating the

enemy’s attack intention, and ensuring a defensive stability. We must promptly find out

the enemy’s main attack direction and activities situation and his intention. At the

appropriate time, [we must] command the force-units to rely on their positions, make the

most of their firepower, resolutely defend vital sites {yaodi} and vital points {yaodian},

combine tenacious resistance and active offensive {gongshi} activities, resolutely

frustrate the enemy attack, and crush their attack intention.

(1) Security and screening area operations {jingjie yanhuqu zuozhan}

Force-units responsible for the security and screening {danren jingjie yanhu renwu de

budui} mission should, at the appropriate time, occupy the pre-established positions or

temporary positions, block-attack and raid-attack the attacking enemy in order to gain

needed time, screen the main force to complete defense preparations, and promptly find

out the enemy’s force-strength and activity situations in each direction of attack.

If the enemy enters our security area {jingjie diqu}, the security and screening force-units

should quickly occupy favorable terrain and resolutely block the enemy attack and

quickly find out the enemy situation.

If the enemy enters our screening area, we should rely on the favorable terrain and the

pre-established positions, adopt fighting methods such as ambush the enemy in front of

the position {zhenqian fuji}, and block-attack one after the other {jiejie zuji}, etc., block

and delay the enemy attack, force the enemy to unfold ahead of time, and win time for

our main force to complete defense preparations.

If the enemy attacks our main defense area, we will shift to force-units in the enemy rear,

and we should rely on the guerrilla area {youjiqu} to develop guerilla warfare and adopt

methods such as raid-attack, raid-harassment and sabotage-raids to complement main

force in operations.

(2) Hold vital points operations {jianshou yaodian zuozhan}

Defense vital points {fangyu yaodian} are important places that function as pillars in the

defense system {fangyu tixi}. Holding vital points {jianshou yaodian} is the crux to

checking the enemy’s penetration and is the number one operational activity for checking

the enemy’s penetration.
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Holding vital points {jianshou yaodian} should successfully deal with the following three

relationships: the first is the relationship between “putting” {bai} and “stationing” {tun}

of force-strengths at the vital point. We must persist in the principle of “putting less and

stationing more, gradually apply force” {shaobai duotun, zhuci yongbing}, namely

deploy [position] {peizhi} a smaller portion of force strengths in advance, and enter a

larger portion of force-strength into covered fortifications, concealed and on standby.

Depending on the situation on the battlefield and operational needs-requirements, adopt

the tactic of “adding fuel” {tianyou}, gradually committing to the resistance-attack and

maintaining from start to finish the capability of sustained resistance of the enemy attack

at the vital point. The second relationship is between “holding” {shou} and “countering”

{fan}. On the one hand, with the vital point as the reliance, adopt a variety of methods,

inflict heavy casualties and expend the enemy attack strengths, and tenaciously resist the

enemy attack; on the other hand, with active offensive {gongshi} activities, implement

powerful force-strength and firepower counterattacks against the enemy penetrating the

positions, striving to inflict heavy casualties to the enemy at our defensive forward line,

frustrate the enemy’s attack intention and maintain a robustness in the vital point defense

system. The third relationship is between the vital points. The defense vital point is an

important component of the defense system. Each vital point acts as a corner able to

mutually assist and complement each other; thereby, when the enemy implements attack

against any given vital point, each vital point will closely work together and mutually

assist each other. Together they form concentrated intersecting firepower and an attack

posture of different angles against the enemy and bring into play the integrated

effectiveness of vital point resistance.

(3) Fire blockade operations

Under informationized conditions, the maneuver power and assault power of the armed

forces are very strong, and the rapid and full dimensional qualities for penetration are

very fast. Thus, in order to check the enemy’s penetration, the crux is to seize and capture

the first opportunity {qiangzhan xianji}. To achieve this, when checking the enemy’s

penetration activities, one should put various firepower applications in first place, attach

importance to bringing the various superior merits of rapid firepower response and

powerful assault into play, implement ground surface blockade against the enemy,

prompt assaults on the enemy’s attack formations, and delay the enemy’s penetration

activities.

If the enemy’s intention is to penetrate from the air, we should employ ground air defense

strengths {hangkong liliang}, and depending on the situation, employ fighter and ground

attack aviation forces {jianji, qiangji hangkongbing} to implement air blockade and

checking enemy aircraft entry.

When the enemy force-units break open a penetration point and the follow-on echelon’s

intention is to follow in, we should use campaign tactical missile force-units {zhanyi

zhanshu daodan budui}, long-range artillery forces {yuancheng paobing} and air-tosurface attack strengths {kongduidi gongji liliang} to assault the enemy inside the
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penetration point and close off the penetration point. At the same time, implement

concentrated fire suppression against the enemy’s follow-on echelons, delay their

activities, sever the communications between penetrated enemies, and divide and separate

the enemy attack formation. During coastal area defense, we should stress bringing the

roles of all naval firepower into play, match the varieties of firepower, and ensure the

effective implementation of fire blockade.

(4) Operations to seal off the penetration point

If the enemy opens a penetration point in our defense position and is complemented at the

same time by airborne landing forces, first concentrate aviation force and artillery force

firepower {hangkongbing huoli, paobing huoli} to prevent the enemy ground force

strengths and airborne forces from entering or expanding the penetration point and

actively impede the enemy’s follow-on echelons. Next, quickly maneuver a portion of

the strengths of campaign reserves {zhanyi yubeidui}, antitank reserves {fantanke

yubeidui}, and obstacle setup forces {zhang’ai shezhidui} to seal off the penetration

point. Thirdly, command the defense-holding force-units {fangshou budui} flanking two

sides of the penetration point to actively complement and maneuver force-strengths to

quickly extinguish the enemy’s airborne landing. If it is too late to seal off the penetration

point, we should decisively occupy the favorable terrain and pre-established positions at

the rear flank of the penetration point with reserve forces {yubeidui} and hold [stand fast]

to prevent the enemy from advancing towards the depths and expanding to both flanks.

If the enemy penetrates the tactical sectors and engages in combat with their follow-on

echelons, complemented by airborne forces and advancing into the campaign depth, we

should concentrate artillery and aviation force firepower to assault penetrating and

airborne landing enemy; blockade the narrow paths, ferry points, traffic hubs, and destroy

bridges and road, lay mines and obstacles, and delay and contain the activities of the

enemy’s follow-on echelon; quickly reinforce the defense, resolutely hold the vital

fortifications {yaosai} and vital points {yaodian} in the depth, and prevent the enemy

from penetrating into the depth; organize firepower to continuously support the

operations of force-units holding the vital points; and whenever necessary, be prepared to

use mobile force-units and nearby force-units to wipe out the enemy’s airborne landing

forces and crush their intention to complement the ground assault.

If one part of the enemy group enters the depth but has not established a stable footing,

we should seize favorable time opportunities and concentrate force-strengths to suddenly

implement counterattacks, wipe out the penetrating enemy and restore the defensive

posture; our first line garrison groups {shoubei jituan} or first echelon {diyi tidui} should

hold the existing positions and vital points, tightly hinder the enemy, inflict heavy

casualties and expenditures, and disperse enemy force-strengths; at the right time, employ

mobile strengths to implement counterattack and anti-airborne landing, and improve or

restore the defense posture with mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy.
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(5) Enemy rear sabotage-raid operations

Sabotage-raid in the enemy’s rear is an important measure to stop enemy’s penetration.

When the attacking enemy initiates attacks against our defensive position, our guerrilla

forces and militia {youjidui he minbing} in the enemy’s rear should, using various active

activities, open-up extensive sabotage-raid activities in the enemy’s rear, strike the

enemy’s follow-on echelons, sabotage-raid their command and communications systems

{xitong}, destroy their firepower firing positions, delay the enemy’s attack speed, disrupt

their coordination, and lighten the pressure for our battlefield front.

IV. Disrupt the Encirclement in the Enemy’s Depth...455

In the defensive campaign under informationized conditions, because of enhancement to

armed forces maneuver and assault capabilities, the possibility of enemy encirclement of

the main bushu disposition {zhuyao bushu}, strategic fortifications {zhanlue yaosai} and

campaign vital points {zhanyi yaodian} in the depths is very high. In order to effectively

counter the enemy’s encirclement activities, the campaign large formation should

promptly ascertain the enemy’s encirclement intention, quickly adjust the operational

bushu disposition, capture and control the vital points, adopt the method of combining

holding {jianshou} and offensive {gongshi}, and break the enemy’s encirclement

activities.

(1) Capture and control vital points, prevent the enemy’s outflanking and encirclement

If the enemy penetrates our defensive position, depending on the situation, we should

first organize holding vital point groups {jianshou yaodian de jituan}, continue to hold

existing positions, bring into play the “nail” {dingzi} role and actively contain the enemy

force-strength maneuvering {di bingli jidong}. Quickly organize our maneuver strengths

{jidong liliang}, capture vital points in the direction of the enemy’s penetration or

outflanking and encirclement, implement maneuver defense {jidong fangyu}, and

resolutely prevent the enemy’s compression encirclement {yasuo hewei} and carving up

our defensive bushu disposition.

(2) Combine holding and offensive {gongshi} activities, break the enemy’s encirclement

When the enemy forms an encirclement posture against any given defense-holding

groups, the defense-holding group {fangshou jituan} should persist in independent

protracted operations, resist the enemy’s encirclement attack and ensure stability of the

vital points {yaodian} or vital sites {yaodi}. At the same time, concentrate the

employment of campaign maneuver strengths {zhanyi jidong liliang} to implement

counter-charge-attacks and counter assault operations, and implement powerful strikes

against the weak spots of the encircling enemy. Complement interior and exterior {neiwai

peihe}, mutually benefit between attack and hold {gongshou xiangji}, and quickly

collapse the enemy’s encirclement.
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(3) Integrate air and ground, prevent the enemy’s vertical encirclement

The attacking enemy normally implements a strategic or campaign airborne landing to

complement other ground encirclement activities. Thus, we must make anti-airborne

landing operations an important content of our counter-encirclement activities. While we

are preventing the enemy’s expansion on the ground, promptly wipe out the enemy’s

airborne landing forces, mutually benefit between ground and air {kongdi xiangji}, and

implement full-dimensional counter-encirclement operations. At this time, we should first

adopt the fighting method of a combined blocking and encircling. That means that we

block and fight the ground enemy, surround and annihilate the airborne (aircraft) landing

enemy, and sever the contact between the airborne (aircraft) landing enemy and the

ground attacking enemy, rendering them unable to join together, and subsequently

annihilate them one by one. If our strengths are not sufficient and it is difficult to

simultaneously annihilate the airborne (aircraft) landing enemy and the ground

penetrating enemy, we should, based on the severity of the threat to us by the ground and

airborne (aircraft) landing enemy, annihilate the greatest threat enemy first, and then shift

force-strengths to annihilate the less threatening enemy, annihilating them one by one.

V. Anti-Airborne and Aircraft Landing...456

In a defensive campaign, the enemy’s airborne landing operations are normally

implemented to complement other ground force-unit penetration and encirclement. Its

goal is to seize important targets within the opponent’s defensive depth and to form a

pincer attack posture {jiaji taishi} with frontal attack force-units, and speed up the

progress of the campaign. One can see that whether we can promptly annihilate the

airborne landing enemy and whether we can effectively prevent the joining up of the

airborne landing enemy and the ground attacking enemy will directly affect the stability

of our defense. Thus, while the campaign large formation is annihilating the enemy

airborne landing forces, we must closely pay attention to the enemy’s ground attack

situation, adopt resolute measures to block the ground attacking enemy, and divide,

surround and annihilate the enemy airborne landing forces as quickly as possible.

(1) Closely monitor the dynamic state of the enemy airborne landing forces and promptly

gather the enemy’s airborne landing information.

In a defensive campaign, anti-airborne landing operations possess a definite passive

quality {beidongxing}. Therefore, the campaign large formation should attach

importance to, through various reconnaissance means, closely monitoring situations such

as the transfer and assembling of airborne landing forces and transport aircraft, promptly

detecting and ascertaining the enemy’s airborne landing intention, force-strengths, timeopportunities, navigation routes and areas as early as possible adopting relevant

measures, accomplishing anti-airborne landing preparations, and striving for initiative in

anti-airborne landing operational activities.
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(2) Actively strike the air transport and overhead enemy.

The most favorable time opportunity to strike the airborne landing enemy is before the

enemy airborne landing touches the ground. At this time, firstly, we can take advantage

of when the enemy airborne landing force-strengths and transport aircraft groups are

assembling and implement firepower assault against the enemy with long range weapons

such as aviation forces and campaign tactical missiles {hangkongbing, zhanyi zhanshu

daodan}. We can also command enemy rear force units to raid-attack the enemy, smash

the enemy’s transport instruments, upset the enemy’s airborne landing bushu disposition,

and delay the enemy’s airborne landing time. Secondly, we can take advantage of when

the enemy’s transport aircraft groups are in flight, and promptly employ air defense

forces and aviation forces {fangkongbing he handgkongbing} to start implementing

layered intercept against the enemy from long distances and annihilating the airborne

landing enemy during air transport. Thirdly, when the enemy airborne landing transport

aircraft are overhead, we can organize nearby force-units and militia {minbing}, occupy

favorable terrain, concentrate the use of various firepower especially air defense

firepower to implement fierce strikes, and annihilate the enemy before touching the

ground.

(3) Resolutely annihilate just touched ground enemy.

After the enemy airborne force lands on the ground, normally there is an assembly and

organizing process. During this time, the enemy’s forces are dispersed and disorganized,

and its command and coordination is confused. This is the best time to attack the enemy.

Firstly, we should use aviation fire, campaign tactical missiles, and artillery fire to mount

rapid fire assault against the enemy that has just landed on the ground in order to inflict

casualties on its effective strength, and prevent it from assembling, maneuvering and

expanding. Next, we should bring into full play the capabilities of the nearby troops,

militia, and the masses. We should first occupy advantageous terrain and deploy our

forces before the enemy could and fire at the enemy before the enemy could fire at us,

striving to annihilate the enemy one by one while the enemy is in a confused state. If we

are not ready or are unable to wipe out the enemy, we should capture advantageous

terrain, prevent the enemy from retracting or expanding, and encircle and divide the

enemy in order to create conditions for the main force to annihilate the enemy airborne

force. Next, the anti-airborne reserves or campaign reserves should rapidly maneuver

toward the airborne area and rapidly deploy, taking advantage of the time when the

enemy has not established a steady foothold to attack and fight a quick battle for a quick

solution. If the conditions allow, depending on the situation, we can use helicopters to

transport the advance unit to the airborne area ahead of time and control the key points

and advantageous terrain. After the anti-airborne force reaches the location, it should

assess the posture of the enemy airborne force and employ various fighting methods to

kill the enemy. We should annihilate the enemy that posses the most threat to us first, and

then annihilate the remaining enemy.
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VI. Implementing Campaign Counterattack Against the Enemy...457

Campaign counterattack is an important offensive activity {gongshi xingdong} in the

defensive campaign. Its goal is to stabilize the defense posture with attack to assist

holding [standing fast]. Normally, its specific goals are to: annihilate the penetrated

enemy and stabilize the defense; recapture lost ground and restore or improve the defense

posture; kill, expend and delay the enemy, lighten the pressure on the defense vital points

or the main defense-hold area; and counter cutting-apart and counter-siege operations,

etc. Campaign counterattack in a defensive campaign has a decisive battle nature. Its

success or failure has a decisive significance for frustrating the enemy attack, for

transforming an unfavorable posture, and for striving for initiative from passivity. Thus,

in the course of the defensive campaign, the campaign large formation should set out

from the interests of the campaign overall situation, examine the time and measure the

circumstances {shenshi duoshi}, successfully grasp the three links {guanjie} of timeopportunity, location and force-units, assess situations completely and with key points,

and actively and carefully organize the implementation of counterattack operations.

The time-opportunity for implementing campaign counterattack is very critical. Being too

early or too late does not benefit the realization of the goal. Based on past operational

experiences, the favorable time-opportunities generally are: the penetrated enemy is

encountering tenacious resistance and suffering major losses; coordination is disrupted,

rear support is interrupted, and the offensive {gongshi} is foiled; or the penetrated enemy

rashly protrudes in one part (one route) and is in a dispersed and isolated position, etc.

When the penetrating (coming onto land) enemy seriously threatens the stability of the

overall defense situation, or in order to complement operations in other strategic

campaign directions, or in order to complement the political struggle, we also need to

resolutely and decisively implement counterattack. Normally, the favorable time

opportunities of counterattack are gradually formed during the course of the campaign,

but one even more needs to bring subjective dynamic quality into play, so they [favorable

time-opportunities] are created by relying on the development of the campaign, by

favorably guiding based on circumstances {yinshi lidao}, and by having plans and stepby-step. Once a favorable time opportunity appears, the campaign large formation

commander should be decisive and resolutely implement counterattack. Counterattack

targets should be determined according to the battlefield situation and the counterattack

goals. Generally, we should select the enemy that poses the greatest threat to our defense

stability, benefits crushing the enemy’s attack intention, and stabilizes the defense.

The target, area, and main direction of the counterattack should be determined according

to the specific situation of campaign development and the goals of the counterattack.

Normally, select counterattack targets which pose the greatest threat to us and which may

force the enemy into an unfavorable position, for example: a protruding and rash enemy,

a dispersed and isolated enemy, and an enemy whose coordination is out of adjustment,

whose follow-on is interrupted and whose flanks are exposed, etc. Normally select a

counterattack area where terrain is favorable for us. It is best to select an area setup in

advance to annihilate the enemy, an area to facilitate our maneuver and unfolding, where
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there is powerful fire support, and where we are able to obtain effective complementing

from defense-holding force-units. One should select the main direction of counterattack

on the flank or rear flank of the target of annihilation, and in order to facilitate severing

the contact between enemy front and the rear, cut off and annihilate the penetrated

enemy.

The operational bushu disposition of campaign counterattack should be determined

according to the size and strength of the penetrated enemy. We can adopt a one-echelon

bushu disposition or we can adopt a two-echelon {tidui} bushu disposition. In order to

ensure a rapid quality of counterattack activities, we should, as much as possible, employ

armored force-units {zhuangjia budui} in the first echelon. During counterattack,

normally we should point the main counterattack strength {zhuyao fanji liliang} towards

the penetrating enemy’s flank or rear flank. Simultaneously, complement from another

direction with a portion of force-strengths and form a pincer-form assault posture. If the

enemy’s penetration front is relatively wide and the depth is relatively shallow, or if our

activities are restricted by the terrain and the counterattack direction is not suited for

pointing towards the enemy’s rear flank, we can implement multi-routed and key point

assault from the front. Under the complement of the defense-holding group {fangshou

jituan} or the first echelon {diyi tidui}, divide, surround-annihilate the penetrated enemy.

Campaign counterattack implementation should strive for concealment [covertness] and

suddenness, and quick battle-quick decision. To achieve this, from the very start of the

counterattack we should first concentrate the use of firepower from aviation forces

{hangkongbing}, campaign tactical missile {zhanyi zhanshu daodan}, and artillery

{paobing} and implement intense assault against counterattack targets. After that, under

firepower support and cover, the counterattack force-units {fanji budui} covertly and

quickly approach the enemy and initiate unexpected attack, striving to take advantage of

the enemy’s movement or unstable footing, boldly weaving and dividing, upsetting their

bushu disposition, and annihilating the enemy one by one. In order to safeguard-support

the smooth implementation of the counterattack, we should carefully organize anti-air

defense and cover the maneuver, unfolding, and attack of the counterattack force-units;

the holding force-units {jianshou budui} and the enemy rear guerilla force-units {youji

budui} should actively complement each other; at the same time, we should also organize

the various safeguarding-supports, especially communications and road safeguardingsupport, and ensure the smooth implementation of counterattack operations. When the

counterattack is successful, or if the counterattack is defeated and cannot continue to be

implemented, we should quickly adjust the bushu disposition and at a suitable time

organize the counterattack main force force-units {fanji zhuli budui} quickly to withdraw

from the counterattack area, rigorously defending against the enemy fire retaliation.
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Chapter 20

Anti-terrorism Maintaining-stability Operations...460

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are operational activities which involve

armed strength such as the armed forces, armed police, and militia, and are supported by

the people. These operational activities are to deter and attack terrorism activities based

on law for the purpose of maintaining national unity, societal stability, and security of

people's lives and properties.

Based on the scale, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations can be divided into

anti-terrorism wars, anti-terrorism campaigns, and anti-terrorism battles. Based on the

form, they can be divided into quelling armed riots, area blocking, counterassault and

destruction, counter-armed hostage taking, and attacking terrorists' base {营地 yingdi},

etc. Based on operational intensity, they can be divided into support and rescue activities,

terrorism prevention activities, and attacking terrorism activities.

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are the highest form of anti-terrorism

struggles, and are an important part of military struggle preparation. They are important

measures to assure national security, societal stability and personal and property safety.

Thus, they are important contents of military struggles in the new military era. The main

missions of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations include the following: First, to

prevent terrorism activities. That is, use measures such as rigorous reconnaissance and

surveillance, warning and safeguard forces, and armed deterrence to contain and prevent

terrorism activities from happening. Secondly, to attack terrorism activities. These mainly

include quelling armed riots, countering terrorists' assaults and destruction, countering

armed hostage-taking, attacking terrorist base, and area blocking. Thirdly, to provide

rescue and assistance. In light of personnel casualties, facility damages, NBC

contaminations, and fire damages as a result of the terrorists' sabotage and attacks,

provide support to treat personnel casualties, repair and recover destroyed facilities, and

remove and eliminate the outcomes of terrorist attacks in order to reduce the harm to the

minimum and assist local governments and the people to cope with the aftermath.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...460

Presently, terrorism organizations that pose threats to China's national security and area

stability mainly include the following: the "East Turkistan' terrorism organization, the

aggressive posture of the Dalai Lama group, and international terrorism organizations. As

a result of expansion of these terrorism organizations, development of forms and methods

of terrorism activities, and increase in terrorism activities and scale, many new

characteristics of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations have emerged, which in

turn pose new requirements on anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations. To

understand these characteristics and these demands is the basic premise of studying antiterrorism maintaining-stability operations.
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I. Characteristics...461

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are a brand new type of operational

activities. Compared with the Chechen war, Afghanistan war, and our own experience in

quelling armed riots, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations have the following

noticeable characteristics with respect to timing, influence, strength, measures and

methods:

(1) Urgency of the mission

Terrorism activities are rigorously organized, secretly carried out, and abruptly executed.

The purpose, timing, location, measures, methods, targets of assault, and scale of the

activities are difficult to predict and grasp. This gives great uncertainty to the concrete

mission, timing, form and location of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations.

Troops are assigned the mission in haste, preparation for imminent operations are hurried,

time for the action is pressed, and as a result the difficulty level of execution increases.

For example, three days after the "9-11" terrorism event, the U.S. military dispatched the

special operations fendui {特种作战分队 tezhong zuozhan fendui} to Pakistan and began

to enter Afghanistan to search for Bin Laden. Nine days after the terrorism event, on 20

September, the U.S. assembled elite Army, Navy, and Air Force forces from different

parts of the world and completed the initial deployment of attack forces to Afghanistan.

Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability troops must strengthen their readiness and

training to achieve rapid reaction and rapid action, and be available to attack any sudden

occurrence of terrorism activities.

(2) Complexity of the situation

Terrorism activities are normally planned out secretly, using various measures and of

varying scales. They have a high degree of randomness in timing and frequency of

execution. As a result, the battlefield of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations

is complex and changeable. For example, terrorists often use ethnic and religious interests

as an excuse to carry out terrorism activities. They also agitate and coerce innocent

masses that do not know the truth and use them as human shields. The anti-terrorism

operational troops have to not only attack the terrorists, but also protect the masses,

facing an extremely complex situation. Terrorists may launch different forms of terrorism

activities simultaneously in multiple areas. Anti-terrorism operations will also use

different forms and are carried out simultaneously in multiple areas. Terrorism

organizations are often clad under the cloak of religious freedom, democracy, and human

rights. They use religious activities as the front, and ethnic survival and development as

the excuse. They may obtain support from some western countries or from individual

countries in our border area. Because anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations often

involve ethnic and religious problems, they arouse the close attention of the world.
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(3) Significance of the effect

Terrorism activities seriously threaten the lives and properties of the people, disturb

societal peace and stability, affect normal productive lives, cause extreme anxiety to

society, and bring about severe psychological pressure and high degrees of nervousness

to the people. Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are closely tied to the

interests of the people. Every move of the government and the military is closely watched

by society domestically and internationally. If the operations fail, it not only will

endanger the interests of the people, but also damage the trust of the people of their

government and military. In addition, the image of the country in the international arena

will be severely affected. On the other hand, the terrorists might double their efforts and

become more rampant. Consequently, regional stability worsens, and societal

development, even national unity and stability of the political power will be affected.

Thus, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations not only touch on ethnicity, religion,

diplomacy, internal affairs, but also are related to the lives and properties of the people,

image of the government and military internationally and domestically, long-term peace,

prosperity, and development of the society, even stability and consolidation of the

political power.

(4) The joint nature of the activities {行动联合 xingdong lianhe}

The joint nature of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations is demonstrated not

only in the jointness of the military, police and civilian forces inside the country, but also

the jointness of armed forces among countries, as well as coordination of the application

of multiple methods of struggle.

First, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are joint activities among the

military, police, and civilians within the country. Because the activities touch on a broad

area and are not ordinary, they require coordination and collaboration of various services

and service arms of the military, and also support and collaboration of public security,

armed police and relevant local specialized forces.

Secondly, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are joint efforts of armed forces

among countries. As terrorism organizations become networked, dispersed, and

internationalized, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are no longer the affairs

of one country or one locality. They demand broad international cooperation and joint

activities of armed forces among countries. Only then will they be able to effectively and

thoroughly crush the terrorists, remove terrorism power, and uproot the threat of

terrorism. For example, in the Afghan war, the U.S. received military assistance of 136

countries and force participation of scores of countries, forming a world-wide antiterrorism coalition.

Thirdly, anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations also demand integration of

political, economic, and diplomatic means. Due to the complexity of anti-terrorism

maintaining-stability operations and interconnectedness of societies, the operations not
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only demand firm and decisive military attacks, but also close collaboration of political,

economic and diplomatic measures. For example, at the same time the U.S. military was

attacking Afghanistan, the U.S. also applied comprehensively political, economic,

diplomatic, legal and financial measures to cut off all connections of the Al-Qaeda with

the outside world and their financial resources, to totally isolate the Taliban regime and

Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization. These actions played an important role in hastening

the progress of the war.

(5) Asymmetric nature of the operations

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations are classic asymmetric operations. The

operational force, operational measures, and operational methods are highly asymmetric

in nature.

First, the operational force is asymmetric. The anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side

uses military and armed police as the basic operational force, which is collaborated with

public security, militia, and other relevant forces. This force has gone through formal and

rigorous military training, has unified operational ideology, operational activities and

fighting methods. It is equipped with standard weapons and equipment and has a

complete command system and comprehensive support capability. On the other side,

terrorist organizations often mainly rely on illegal and temporarily recruited personnel.

They generally have not gone through formal training, and have a low level of combat

skills, without any uniformed operational activities and fighting methods and without a

professional support force.

Secondly, the operational measures are asymmetric. Terrorists often use small arms such

as rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, mortars, and explosives. The quality is poor,

precision inferior, weapon models incomplete, and weapon types few. Sometimes, they

may possess a small amount of advanced weapons such as portable missiles. On the other

hand, the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side possesses a complete assembly of

modern high-tech weapons and equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, and precision

guided weapons. The operational measures are clearly asymmetric.

Thirdly, the operational methods are irregular. Terrorists often take advantage of terrain

and emotions of the people and society to fight irregular guerrilla wars such as sabotage

raids, sneak attacks, harassing attacks, ambushes, and sniper attacks. They fight and run,

and fight and hide. Their activities are highly irregular. In light of the characteristics of

the activities of the terrorists, the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability side must also adopt

various flexible and unusual operational methods to the extent of giving up regular

operational methods. These methods may include counterassaults, counter ambushes,

counter sniper attacks, counter hijacking, blocking, and search and annihilate in order to

raise operational effectiveness.
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II. Requirements...464

Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations must be rooted in the most difficult, most

complex, and most severe situations. Based on relevant laws and regulations, antiterrorism maintaining-stability operations requires unified command of a joint military,

police, and militia force, and comprehensive application of multiple measures such as

political offensives, military deterrence, and armed attacks. Anti-terrorism maintainingstability operations must strive to contain terrorist activities at their embryonic stage, and

implement a rapid, decisive, and thorough attack in order to safeguard societal stability

and secure people's lives and properties. Thus, the following requirements are put forth

for anti-terrorism maintain-stability operations:

(1) Active prevention

Active prevention means that during the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations

one must pay high attention to prevent terrorism activities from happening. One should

apply multiple containment measures comprehensively to maximally reduce the

probability of occurrence of terrorist activities and intensity of the terrorism activities if

they erupt.

Terrorism activities are highly dangerous to a country, society, and people. Once they

erupt, their disastrous consequences can quickly spread in a short time. They cause great

damage to the country, society and people's lives and properties and increase the

difficulty level of attack and rescue. Targeted preventive measures should be taken to

effectively prevent the occurrence of the terrorism activities or reduce their intensity, if

they occur, in order to maximally reduce the loss of lives and properties. Thus, for antiterrorism maintaining-stability operations, active preventive activities are equally

important as effective attack activities, and they should be applied together.

For this reason, participating force-units must attach a high degree of importance to the

prevention of terrorism activities. They should study the characteristics, laws and

measures of terrorism activities, and collaborate with other participating strengths to

closely track the activities of terrorism organizations. They should: strengthen the

security of possible targets of terrorist attack and important areas; formulate and

implement a variety of security prevention preliminary course of action {yu’an} and

specific measures; and leave terrorists no opportunity to exploit. As soon as any

indications or clues of terrorism activities are discovered, they should rapidly organize

troops and employ multiple methods to capture the terrorists, and destroy their base,

striving to eliminate the terrorist activities at its embryonic stage.

(2) Rapid reaction

Rapid reaction means drawing up operational plans ahead of time based on the

characteristics and patterns of the terrorism activities. As soon as terrorism activities

occur, the participating troops will be able to rapidly react and reach the assigned position
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immediately, quickly deploy and develop and control the posture in order to gain

initiative of the situation.

Terrorism activities occur suddenly. In particular, when terrorism attack occurs, the

terrorists involved will quickly escape from the scene. If reaction is not timely, one may

easily lose the optimal time of attack and become passive. Thus, one must rapidly act

{xingdong}, reduce the participating force-unit's reaction time to the minimum, grasp the

favorable moment of fighting back, take the initiative, contain the terrorist activities and

intensity in the shortest time possible, and create favorable conditions for the complete

elimination of the terrorism activities.

For this reason, based on the mission, enemy intelligence, and environmental

characteristics of the operational area, the participating force-units should carefully draw

up several operational courses of action {zuozhan fang’an} to lay the foundation for

taking the operational initiative. The troops should store supplies and equipment,

including special materials and equipment to meet the operational needs of anti-terrorism

maintaining-stability operations. Once terrorism activities such as armed riots and

hostage taking occur, the troops should quickly revise the preliminary course of action

based on the situation and send troops close by the incident site and forces with better

mobility to quickly enter the operational area to control the situation and create favorable

conditions for the attack. If terrorist assaults and destructive activities occur, the troops

should quickly command nearby engineering, fire extinction, and chemical defense

fendui to rapidly enter the site and, according to the possible outcome of the terrorist

activities, take effective and targeted rescue activities to control the scope of destruction

and reduce losses and damages.

(3) Quelling the enemies with joint effort

Using joint effort to quell the enemy means to assemble multiple forces including

military troops, public security, armed police, and militia, and act jointly under unified

command, using the advantage of a unified force to attack the terrorist activities.

Terrorist activities have a higher level of uncertainty with respect to their nature, scale

and area. The situation can be complex and the involved areas and aspects can be broad.

On the other hand, the participating forces are constrained by their own characteristics. If

only one type of operational force is used, it is difficult to effectively control the posture

and implement offensive activities. Assembling multiple forces to launch a joint activity

can fully develop the strength of each force in terms of information and intelligence,

mobility, and assault capability and form a powerful unified force against the enemy. In

addition, when carrying out anti-terrorism operations in special areas, local social and

environmental conditions may influence the situation. Being able to utilize public

security and armed police force in the early stage will reduce the sensitivity of the antiterrorism activities to a certain extent. It will play an important role in avoiding negative

effect and ensuring smooth implementation of the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability

operations.
529

For this reason, a coordination mechanism should be established to coordinate multiple

forces. A joint command institution that can coordinate military and local operational

forces should be established to provide concentrated and unified command and control of

military, police, and civilian forces, to enable all forces to fully develop their capability in

deterrence, attack and rescue. Anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations that have

the military as the main force should use the military for the primary activities, and

should have a joint command to provide command and coordination to develop unified

actions. For anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations that involve the military in

coordination with other forces, all participating forces should follow the command of the

joint command institution and aggressively and actively accomplish the operational

mission. All participating forces should act in support of the main attack force, and

carefully organize and coordinate activities to carry out unified activities. All

participating forces should take the initiative to cooperate closely with each other and

launch abrupt, fierce and concentrated attacks against the terrorists. They should ensure

that among the military, police, and civilian forces, and among all troops, the activities

are coordinated and unified. They should launch firm, decisive, and rapid attacks against

the terrorism activities.

(4) Acting according to law

Acting according to law means that all activities must strictly abide by the relevant laws,

decrees, rules, and regulations. When dealing with a situation, all relevant laws must be

followed. Use different measures for different persons.

The hotspots of terrorist activities are often religious and ethnic areas that enjoy special

policies. They often have special customs and culture. Compared with other areas, the

people and society may have less social and psychological tolerance. At the same time,

terrorist organizations often use religious activities protected by the national law as a

cover, and use similar characteristics shown during heightened religious or ethnic

conflicts to hide the actual intention of the terrorism activities. These activities are highly

deceptive. Some of the masses may be coerced or deceived to take part in the terrorism

activities. Furthermore, terrorism organizations may also carry out activities or take cover

in highly sensitive areas such as foreign diplomatic organizations in China or arenas that

involve foreign affairs. This may link anti-terrorism operations and activities directly

with international relations and foreign policies. Thus, anti-terrorism maintainingstability operations must be particular about strategies and act according to law.

For this reason, all participating troops must vigorously abide by relevant laws and

regulations and military rules and regulations and should correctly use their legal

authority. They should rigorously differentiate between the terrorists and the masses that

have been deceived, and between the backbone elements of terrorist organizations and

ordinary terrorists. This is to ensure that the attack is concentrated on the critical point,

and that all possible personnel casualties and property losses will be minimized. When

carrying out anti-terrorism maintaining-stability missions in areas or arenas that touch on
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foreign affairs, close coordination with relevant units must be maintained and diplomatic

policies and diplomatic disciplines must be strictly followed.

(5) Combining deterrence with attacks

Combining deterrence with attacks means that in the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability

operations, one should use political offensives, military deterrence, or military attacks in

light of the objective, or one should combine the above measures with other methods to

accomplish the operational mission.

The composition of terrorist organizations is unique. It includes diehard elements as well

as fence-sitting elements and masses that have been coerced. Using measures such as

divide and disintegrate, psychological offensive, and warning and attack, one may be able

to win back the deceived masses, divide and disintegrate the terrorist organization, and

isolate the minority diehard elements. On the contrary, if one only uses military attack,

greater collateral casualties and losses may occur, resulting in unnecessary and negative

impact. By combining deterrence with military attack, one can reduce the size of the area

of attack, target the critical points of attack, and avoid or minimize collateral losses.

To this end, when quelling armed riots and countering hostage taking operations, one

must insist on applying deterrence first, followed by military attacks, and combine

deterrence with attack. First, work through political offensives to apply propaganda and

division and disintegration, striving to separate the diehard elements from the coerced

general public. When applying armed measures against the terrorists, one should try to

reduce the collateral losses to the minimum.

(6) Removing the roots of all evil

Removing the roots of all evil is in respect to the diehard elements of the terrorist

organization. All roots of evil must be eliminated to prevent all future troubles.

The diehard elements of the terrorist organizations, especially the leaders, are highly

obstinate and ready to die for the cause. If they ever escape during the anti-terrorism

maintaining-stability operations, they will rise up again when the time is mature and

launch fanatical revenge against the country and society. Thus, anti-terrorism operations

must use heavy force to hammer down all evil elements, striving to annihilate them

completely. At the same time, we must capture or kill the leaders. This will produce

powerful deterrence and shock and awe effect on other terrorists.

To this end, all participating troops must concentrate absolute strength, using multiple

measures such as blocking, attack, search and annihilate, pursue and annihilate

comprehensively to quickly and thoroughly annihilate all terrorists. All participating

troops should correctly select the targets of attack, find out the hiding places of the

backbone elements of the terrorist organizations, and implement key point attacks. They

should stress the use of firepower. Against critical targets firmly defended by the terrorist
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organization, the troops should implement lethal fire assaults after encircling the target,

striving to wipe out the terrorists on the spot.

Section 2: Main Activities...468

Troops participating in the anti-terrorism maintaining-stability operations should abide by

the order of the higher level. In light of the situations, they should rapidly conduct

targeted preparation for imminent operations. They should mobilize to the operational

area in a timely manner and use resolute and nimble maneuver activities to quell armed

riots, attack terrorists' assaults, destructions and hostage taking activities, and annihilate

the terrorists in order to assure people's safety of lives and properties and societal

stability.

I. Quelling Armed Riots...468

Quelling armed riots is an important mission of anti-terrorism maintaining-stability

operations. The success and failure directly affect national security and societal stability,

as well as the safety of the lives and properties of the people. One must comprehensively

organize all forces, plan and prepare all operational activities, and employ nimble

maneuver operational methods to thoroughly annihilate the terrorists in order to win

victory.

To quell armed riots, generally the following disposition should be established: First, the

periphery blocking and control force. The periphery blocking and control force consists

of part of the infantry, electronic warfare troops, as well as public security, armed police

and militia. They are deployed on the periphery of the armed riot area and area the

terrorists may infiltrate to take up the blocking and control responsibilities such as

safeguarding and checking so as to cut off the avenues through which the terrorists could

infiltrate or establish connection with the outside. Second, the strike force. The strike

force consists of the main operational troops and is deployed based on methods such as

multi-approach encircling {多路合围 duolu hewei}, multi-approach converging attack {

多路向心合围 duolu xiangxin hewei}, and advancing and encircling from opposite

direction {对进合围 duijin hewei}. The main missions include striking the terrorists'

base or concentration area, disperse the terrorists, or attack the terrorists. Third, the

search and annihilate force. It consists of part of the operational troops and the public

security, armed police and militia. They are placed at the rear of the strike force or within

the encircling and attack disposition. Their main missions are to safeguard, support, and

search. Fourth, the fire attack force. It consists of the firepower troops of aviation and

artillery fire. They are deployed in areas that facilitate maneuvering and unleashing

firepower. Their missions include launching fire attacks against the terrorists, supporting

ground troops in their operational activities, and blocking and controlling areas that are

difficult for the force to control. Fifth, the maneuver force. The maneuvering force

consists of part of the infantry and armored forces, and is deployed in the vicinity of

important targets that terrorist activities may occur or in areas that facilitate maneuvering.

They are mainly to handle secondary terrorist events. Sixth, the comprehensive support
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force. The comprehensive support force is composed of the engineering force, chemical

defense force, communications force, and logistics and weapons and equipment. They are

deployed in areas that facilitate support rendering based on their duties. Their main

responsibility is to provide comprehensive support.

(1) Blocking and control {封锁控制 fengsuo kongzhi}

Blocking and control is the primary activity of quelling armed riots. It is the key step to

cut off the terrorists' connection with the outside and their escape route in order to create

a situation whereby the bad elements are confined within an area to be completely wiped

out. To implement blocking and control, one should be based on the terrorists' main area

and the scale and method of activities, as well as their avenue to connect with the outside,

and the surrounding terrain. One should comprehensively use the military, public

security, armed police and militia forces, and apply force strengths, firepower and

electronic jamming, combined with local and social control methods and measures. One

should implement activities such as firepower blocking, force blocking, port control, and

information blocking in the periphery of the armed riot area to establish a multidimensional multi-layer blocking and control line in order to rigorously block and control

the terrorists.

Blocking and control is applicable throughout the entire process of quelling armed riots.

During the entire operations, high degree of attention must be given to the blocking and

control activities. One should have a good grasp of the terrorists' activities both inside

and outside the immediate area, and make necessary adjustments on the blocking

deployment when necessary. During the height of intense operations in particular, one

should strengthen the blocking and control of the periphery to prevent the terrorists from

escaping and outside terrorists from providing reinforcement. This will create the

condition for a total wipeout of the terrorists.

(2) Fire attacks

Fire attacks rely mainly on the fire attack force of the aviation and artillery to implement

fire strikes against important targets of the terrorists. Fire attacks are an important activity

to quell armed riots. They can be a method for the advanced phase of the operation, and

also a method for the independent phase of the operation. It can even be a sole

operational form, i.e., using fire attacks to achieve the operational goal.

Fire attacks should be timely, accurate, continuous, and effective. They aim to wipe out

the effective strength of the terrorists, destroy their operational capabilities, and create

conditions for our follow-on operations.

Fire attacks can be divided into several phases. For the initial phase of attack, normally

one should look at the operational capabilities of the armed groups of the terrorist

organization and destroy targets that have operational potential, targets that have air

defense capability and targets that can affect public opinions and have propaganda value.
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Based on operational needs, sometimes one can choose targets for the purpose of shock

and awe. For the follow-on targets of attack, one should be flexible based on the

persistence of the fire attacks, reaction of the terrorists, and progress of the operations.

In order to raise attack effectiveness, fire attacks should be reasonably planned and

appropriate weapons and ammo be selected based on the value of the target, available

equipment, and terrain. Normally, precision guided weapons are used to attack the

terrorists' strategic targets, conventional ammo is used to attack the terrorists' general

targets, the artillery force is used to attack the terrorists' area targets, and the aviation

force is used to attack the terrorists' point targets.

The methods of fire attack are generally as follows: One method is sudden strikes.34 As

soon as the terrorists' riot erupts and before full-scale development happens, we use the

aviation and artillery fire to rapidly launch a sudden and ferocious fire attack against their

massing area, command center and main positions. The purpose is to disrupt their riot

plans, consume their effective strength, destroy their will power and create conditions for

our follow-on activities to quell the armed riot. The second method is persistent strikes {

突然闪击 turan sanji}. It means we consider fire attacks as an independent operational

phase or the sole operational form to organize firepower and implement it persistently.

We should look at change in the terrorists' activities and operational needs to constantly

modify the means and method of the fire attack. We should have a good grip of the best

opportunity to attack; attack ferociously when it is called for, and attack slowly when it is

called for. We should combine fire attack closely with military deterrence, political

offensives, and diplomatic struggles. At the same time, don't let the terrorists learn the

pattern of our fire attacks. We should use our firepower to continue to kill and waste their

effective strength. We should continue to apply strong military pressure to destroy their

will power and achieve the goal of using fire to win victory. The third method is

precision attacks. Very often terrorists hide among the people. On the battlefield, there

are not only terrorists' positions, weapons equipment and facilities, but also places where

the general public conducts their basic livelihood and daily activities. Thus, when

applying firepower, one should use precision firing techniques and precision guided

ammunition as much as possible. If one does not have enough precision firing platforms

and precision guided ammunition, one should focus on attacking the main and necessary

targets. Avoid harming the general public and reduce collateral damages to societal and

public facilities as much as possible.

(3) Ground attacks

Ground attacks use powerful ground assault troops to attack the terrorists and is a main

phase of quelling armed riots. Ground attacks mainly include: encircling and advancing;

dividing, encircling and annihilating; and pursuing and destroying enemy remnants.

34 Sudden strike
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1. Encircling and advancing

Encircling and advancing means we use concentrated force strength and firepower to

attack and encircle the area occupied by the terrorists, and gradually advance to the

center. This is an important step to totally annihilate the terrorists.

The encircling activity should consist of a combination of two-dimensional advancing

and three-dimensional maneuvering. Use the "road roller" method to encircle the

terrorists from multiple approaches on the ground and compress the terrorists into a

predetermined annihilation area. Use the "leapfrog" method such as airlanding and

paradrop to rapidly pass over natural obstacles and enter the enemy's depth and cut off

the enemy's escape route. In coordination with the ground troops, they attain the goal of

encirclement.

Encircling and advancing must be safe and reliable. At the same time one advances, one

should also firmly defend and wipe out the enemy. Fight steadily and strike surely; fortify

at every step and consolidate as we advance. Avoid advancing in isolation and being 

rash; avoid being defeated by the enemy one by one, and avoid leaving gaps for the

enemy to escape or leaving spaces for enemy activities. Use multiple measures. Mobilize

and organize civilians in the area occupied by the terrorists to leave in order to ensure

their safety. At the same time, prevent terrorists from hiding among the civilians.

2. Dividing, encircling, and annihilation

Dividing, encircling and annihilation is the most ferocious and most critical phase of

battle in quelling armed riots. At this time, psychologically the terrorists are panicking.

On the other hand, under their leader's deception and coercion, the terrorists demonstrated

determination to die for the cause. Their actions could be rather cunning. 

Thus, the strike force should take advantage of the weakness of the terrorists and launch

assaults abruptly, using agility and maneuver to divide, encircle, and annihilate, and using

a quick and decisive fight to annihilate all the terrorists.

When attacking the targets defended by the terrorists, one should examine the enemy's

situation, the targets of attack, surrounding terrain, and our force strength and weapons,

and then use storming assault {强攻 qiang gong}, surprise attack {袭击 xiji} or a

combination of the both in a flexible manner. At the same time, one should knit military

attacks closely with political offensives. Pay close attention to using methods such as

frontal clamp down and suppress and feint and diversion {正面钳制, 佯动欺骗

zhengmian qianzhi, yangdong qipian} to divert the enemy forces and distract their

attention in order to achieve the goal of flank and rear flank attack.

After penetrating the terrorists' defensive position, one should take advantage of the

moment when the terrorists are in shock and their deployment is in chaos to boldly and

rapidly insert and divide. After dividing the enemy into several blocks, encircle the

blocks one by one to isolate them into areas, hamlets, street blocks, or buildings with no
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reinforcement available to them. Then concentrate all force strength to wipe out the

blocks simultaneously or one after the other.

3. Pursuing and destroying enemy remnants

If the terrorists breakthrough our encirclement and escape, one should first utilize the

firepower of the aviation or artillery force to annihilate the escaping terrorists. One

should use multiple reconnaissance measures to grasp the directions and routes of the

escapees, their number and their positions, and immediately pass on the information to

the pursuing troops. One should rapidly organize all forces and deploy them threedimensionally on the ground, in the air and on water for the pursuit. Pursue all the way

until the escaping enemy are thoroughly wiped out. Under normal conditions, one should

use a large portion of the forces to pursue in parallel and use a part of the forces to track

down the escapees, and use a portion of the forces to pursue vertically onboard

helicopters.

The budui and fendui that are conducting parallel pursuit should follow the roads on the

flank and use the fastest pursuit method. They should move from the flank or the gap in

between and advance to advantageous terrain on the side of or in front of the terrorists to

attack them or block the escaping enemy. The pursuing troops should work in

coordination with friendly forces to divide and encircle the escaping enemy.

The budui and fendui that are conducting tracking and pursuing attacks should use a

combination of the fire pursuit and force pursuit method to go after the enemy closely

from behind. When necessary, they should call on fire support to help block the retreat

route of the terrorists. When the terrorists put up resistance from a newly captured area,

the pursuing troops should take advantage of the timing when the terrorists have not

established a sure footing to attack them. They should work in coordination with friendly

forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy on the run. The airborne fendui that are

conducting vertical pursuit should rapidly land from the air in front of the escaping

terrorists, quickly capture advantageous terrain and control critical points to cut off the

enemy's retreat route. They should work in coordination with the parallel pursuit and the

tracking and pursuing budui and fendui to annihilate the escaping enemy and prevent the

terrorists from slipping out of the area. Or, they should lay ambush along the corridor

where the terrorists must pass through, waiting for the terrorists to come into the ambush

area. They should adopt methods such as blocking from the front, cutting off the rear, and

attacking the flank, and use sudden and ferocious firepower to annihilate the terrorists.

(4) Searching and eliminating all enemy remnants

Search and eliminate enemy remnants is an important step to thoroughly quell armed

riots. It normally involves attacking the front and searching the rear. That is, when the

troops responsible for the search and elimination mission have captured the area (target)

occupied by the terrorists, the troops should immediately develop and search and

eliminate the terrorists in that area (target). Or, the first echelon launches the attack, while
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the second echelon or the reserve force immediately develops to search and eliminate the

enemy in that area (target). One can also conduct attack and search simultaneously. That

is, after the first echelon has captured the area (target) occupied by the terrorists, the first

echelon immediately transitions into the search and elimination mode, whereas the

follow-on echelon rapidly passes over the first echelon and goes into the enemy's depth to

develop and attack in order to expand the successful outcome of the operation. The

method of search and elimination should be based on force strength, terrain and

characteristics of the target. One can employ the total net casting method, the dividing

and sectoring method, and the "fine combing" method {整体拉网式, 分片划段式, "梳篦

"式 zhengti lawangshi, fenpian huaduanshi, "shubi" shi} to search and eliminate enemy

remnants. If the force is large, terrain is continuous, and buildings are concentrated, use

the total net casting method. Adopt an all-azimuth deployment {全方位部署

quanfangwei bushu} mode and move from the outside inward. One can use a one-line

push-forward method or multiple-approach toward the core method {一线平推, 多路向

心 yixian pingtui, duolu xiangxin} to apply "compressed" search to eliminate enemy

remnants. If the force is small and terrain is fragmented, employ the dividing and

sectoring method. That is, divide the search area into several pieces or sectors, assign

missions, and define coordination and signals. Then "fine comb" each piece or sector one

by one for the search and elimination operation, leaving no crevices unchecked and blind

spots unturned. For areas not searched and cleared, the search and elimination budui

should dispatch warning and survey troops to watch carefully.

All search and elimination activities should be carried out without warning. While the

terrorists are unaware or unsuspected, approach the location suddenly and capture the

terrorists at one go. If the terrorists escape, then one should rapidly track and pursue or

kill them. During the search and elimination operation, if one encounters suspicious

personnel, one should use various methods to carefully investigate to prevent any

terrorists from slipping through the net.

(5) Counter guerrilla activities

When quelling armed riots, the terrorists often break up into small groups. They have the

advantage of having light weapons, and are familiar with the terrain, people, and social

and culture matters. They are easily mobile and are skilled in small group combat. They

often carry out guerrilla warfare such as sniper attacks, sneak raids, sabotage raids, or

ambushes at our forward position or rear. To address those, we must know how to apply

nimble counter sniper attacks and counter assault tactics to crush the enemy's intention.

1. Counter sniper attacks

After the area occupied by the terrorists is captured by us, the terrorists often organize

several sniper attack teams {狙击小组 juji xiaozu} to fire at us suddenly from concealed

locations using sniper rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, or
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antitank missiles, causing us greater casualties. To address that, we can employ the

following fighting methods.

One method is to overcome the enemy's sniper attacks from a distance. Before sending

the troops in to launch an attack, one should first use bombers, armed helicopters, and

guns and artillery to apply focused strikes against targets such as buildings the enemy

might seize in order to destroy the firing platforms the enemy snipers could use. During

the activity, if enemy snipers are discovered, one should quickly call for support

firepower to launch precision attacks at the actual location of the enemy snipers. One

should make every effort to use an attack method from a distance and avoid close

engagement with the enemy.

The second method is to use sniper attacks to counter sniper attacks. Place counter sniper

attack teams among the offensive formation. The counter sniper attack teams are formed

by the infantry firing backbone, and are equipped with advanced sniper rifles, light

communications and observation equipment. They follow the movement of the offensive

fendui closely and are responsible especially for the attack of enemy snipers. During the

quelling armed riot operations in urban areas, we can deploy a part of the sniper teams on

either side of the street to fight against the enemy snipers in the underground facilities

and inside buildings along the street. We can also deploy part of the sniper teams on each

floor of the buildings or in other constructions. They are responsible for killing terrorists

inside the buildings or in the surrounding buildings. We can also deploy part of the sniper

teams on the roof of buildings we just captured to fire at enemy snipers hiding on the roof

or inside the buildings across the street.

The third method is to vigorously search and eliminate the enemy's snipers. During

combat, we should conduct a comprehensive search and elimination of the captured area,

especially the buildings in the neighborhood and leave the enemy snipers no room for

activities. When the enemy's snipers are discovered, the search fendui should apply

rigorous blocking and control of their hiding area and use all kinds of methods to capture

or kill the enemy. If the terrorists use firepower to counterattack us, we can use

flamethrowers to drive them out of the hiding places, and then use firepower to wipe

them out.

2. Counter sneak raid

Very often, the terrorists will take advantage of opportunities when our deployment is

dispersed and our alertness is lagging to launch sneak raids or sabotage raids to disrupt

our activities, divert our forces, waste our effective strength, and cause us to be passive

militarily and politically. To address this, we can employ the following measures.

One measure is to accomplish counter sneak raid preparations. After our force-units have

captured a particular area, they should maintain a high degree of alertness, pay attention

to tracking and grasping the movements of enemy remnants, checking the terrain of the

surrounding area, formulating thorough counter sneak raid activities, bushu
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dispositioning counter sneak raid operational strengths, designating counter sneak raid

contingency force-units {budui}, clarifying their activity methods, coordination actions

{dongzuo}, and items to pay attention to, etc. particularly the assisting counter sneak-raid

activities of the aviation and the artillery forces and successfully accomplishing the

various counter sneak raid activity preparations with a directed quality.

The second measure is to correctly bushu disposition operational strengths. In order to

force-unit bushu disposition from being dispersed and the flanks exposed, allowing the

terrorists to approach us stealthily and raid us, we should do everything possible to

concentrate the bushu disposition of operational strengths and deploy {peizhi} them on

terrain that is open, with good visibility and easy to protect. At the same time, along the

approaches where the terrorists may easily get near, we should deploy ambush force in a

concealed manner and set up obstacles to impede the movements of the terrorists,

forming a multi-route, multi-point counter sneak raid bushu disposition.

The third measure is to strengthen alert and patrol. After setting up the quartering area or

after capturing an area, the troops should bushu disposition alert forces circling around

the station and important targets according to the degree of threat of the enemy. They

should also strengthen patrol of the surrounding area. When conditions allow, they should

also organize three-dimensional alert and patrol. In the main direction that the terrorists

may infiltrate and assault and critical targets, they should set up multi-layered in-depth

alert and patrol deployment. In the main direction and important sectors, they should

make full use of advanced technologies such as ground reconnaissance radar and sensors

to raise the effectiveness of reconnaissance and alert. They should strength

communications among all alert and patrol points, to have continuous situation reporting

and to form a complete protective bushu disposition. Once terrorist infiltration is

discovered, the alert and patrol fendui should immediately report to the higher authority,

and employ nimble activities to strike the enemy.

The fourth measure is to rapidly organize counterattack activities. When the terrorists

infiltrate into our area and implement sneak raids and sabotage raids, the commander

should quickly find out the force strength of the attacking terrorists, their targets and the

degree of damage. The commander should command the counter sneak raid rapid

reaction budui to launch an attack against the enemy. The commander should use the

troops nearby to block and control the area under attack and cutoff the enemy's escape

route. The commander should use the long-range firepower of the aviation and artillery

force and apply precision attacks against the enemy and assist our counter sneak raid

force-unit activities. The commander should organize a full-scale counter sneak raid,

striving to totally, completely and rapidly wipe out the enemy.

3. Counter ambush

When quelling armed riots, the operational area is wide, combat lines are fuzzy, enemy

threat is grave, and maneuvering on the battlefield is easily ambushed by the terrorists.

To address this, we should take the following measures:
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The first measure is to devise thorough counter ambush plans. Prior to force-unit

maneuver, carefully formulate the counter ambush activity plan. Based on the missions

and terrain of the maneuver, and the laws of terrorist element activities {huodong}, we

should analyze the areas, force strengths and modes one may encounter terrorist element

ambush. We should define the safeguarding-support measures such as the main activity

methods, reconnaissance and firepower assisting-support, etc. for force-unit counterambush, as well as coordination methods. Particularly, we should specifically stipulate

the preliminary course of action for handling various situations. With this as the basis

during activities, and in accordance with the changing situation, flexibly apply them.

The second measure is to strengthen reconnaissance and alertness during maneuvering.

When troops implement battlefield maneuvering, they should reinforce alertness at the

front, in the flank and rear of the maneuver formation and strengthen reconnaissance. If

the enemy threat is grave, terrain is complex and the distance of maneuvering is farther

away, the higher level should dispatch armed helicopters and armored vehicles to escort

them on the ground and conduct aerial reconnaissance. When passing through risky

sectors, the helicopters and armored vehicles should go ahead of the troops to conduct

repeated reconnaissance before the troops pass through the sector. When necessary, we

should use the higher level firepower to implement fire attacks against the possible

ambush positions of the terrorists.

The third measure is to launch rapid and nimble counterattacks. When encountering

terrorist ambush, the commander should quickly command the escort force or the fendui

being ambushed itself to organize defense on the spot and use firepower to strike the

enemy. The commander should ask troops responsible for air cover, such as armed

helicopters, to implement ferocious firepower to strike the enemy. The commander

should nimbly command force-unit {budui} activities based on the outcome of the

ambush.

II. Counter Surprise Attacks and Destruction...475

Counter surprise attacks and destruction can be an independent operational activity or can

be composed of several operational activities of similar nature. They can also occur while

quelling armed riots or during offensive operations against the terrorists' base. They

normally include the following activities: preventive activities against the terrorists'

surprise attacks, attacking the enemy's surprise attack and destructive activities, and

rescue activities.

(1) Preventive activities against terrorist surprise attacks and destruction

After we have verified the indication or intention of a terror attack, or based on the

characteristic patterns of terrorist activities, before major holidays or important events we

should take the initiative to implement preventive activities against possible terrorist

attacks and destruction. This can effectively deter the terrorists, prevent the inevitable,

and reduce loss in lives and properties.
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1. Unfold preventive bushu disposition

Based on the force strength, terrain, socio-cultural situations of the mission area and

situations of the possible targets of terrorist attack, and the means of attack, timing, and

goal of the terrorists, we should establish vigorous alert disposition, allot reasonable

amount of forces, and define responsibilities and preventive measures. We should

establish a bushu disposition that has targeted vigilant points and overall control, and is

mutually supportive and provide comprehensive prevention in order to ensure security of

critical targets and prompt reaction to deal with sudden outbreak situations.

With regard to protection of critical targets on the ground, we normally establish a

protective deployment which consists of internal security {内卫 neiwei}, external

security {外卫 waiwei} and maneuver support {机动支援 jidong zhiyuan}. Internal

security can consist of several fixed and roaming sentry posts. During important times

there can also be secret sentry posts, and the area of alert may be expanded to include

posts in plain view and secret posts, fixed posts and roaming posts to assure security of

the protected target. External security can consist of several roaming sentry posts,

observation points or check points to prevent the terrorists from approaching the critical

target. The maneuver fendui are normally deployed in the vicinity of the critical target, at

a position that facilitates maneuvering in multiple directions. The maneuver fendui is

ready to provide support to internal security or external security at any given moment in

pursuit of and to capture the terrorists.

With regard to air protection, normally when it is discovered that the terrorists intend to

use aerial vehicles to attack national or regional landmark buildings or political,

economic and military targets, we should promptly organize the aviation units of the

army, navy, and air force to carry out aerial patrol and alert in the air space over the

critical target or area to prevent the aerial vehicles controlled by the terrorists to enter the

alert airspace.

With regard to sea (water) protection, normally when it is discovered that the terrorists

intend to carry out surprise attacks at sea (or over a large body of water), we should

organize naval and army ships to patrol the waters at sea, in the river or lake in the

vicinity of the critical target to prevent terrorist attacks.

2. Organizing patrol and checks

Patrol and checks normally involve a combination of methods including check points,

observation sentry posts, and patrolling. The purpose is to monitor all aspects and check

layer by layer so that the terrorists will not be able to slip through the cracks. Along the

roadways, at traffic hubs and in air and sea space at or near the critical target, we should

carry out day-and-night, multi-dimensional patrol so that we have total control of the

flow of personnel in the area. In the airspace over the critical target or on important days,

we should set up no-fly zones to ensure security of the critical target or important events.

We should set up check points at main crossroads, train stations, and airfields, and
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observation posts at commanding heights to rigorously check and verify the identity of

personnel and vehicles in order to prevent terrorists and hazardous commodities from

entering the target area. We should isolate and screen suspicious elements.

3. Reinforcing protection of critical facilities

One of the important measures to ensure safety of a critical area and target is to

strengthen the protective facilities based on the characteristics of terrorist attacks.

Examples of the measure include the following: Install all-time all-space monitoring and

detection equipment in the vicinity of the critical target in order to monitor terrorists and

detect explosives. Set up automated obstacles at the entrance of the critical target. Set up

a buffer zone around the critical target and deploy a certain number of anti-riot vehicles

and anti-armor weapons so that during emergencies these weapons and equipment can be

used to intercept and kill the approaching terrorists.

4. Launching preemptive searches

The most aggressive and most effective measure is to take the initiative to attack in order

to wipe out the terrorists before they can conduct any terror activities. Thus, first of all,

the anti-terrorist operational budui should strengthen their relation with the intelligence

element of public security, armed police, intelligence and law enforcement to establish a

joint intelligence reconnaissance system. In addition, they should pay attention to and

utilize the intelligence network of the masses. Through these channels, one will be able to

detect the overall movements of the terrorists and achieve the goal of "knowing the

enemy before the enemy acts, and taking actions before the enemy does." If it is

discovered that the terrorists have infiltrated our target area and the moment is ripe, we

should concentrate all our forces and launch a surprise attack at the terrorists' hiding place

unexpectedly in order to crush their intention to attack and destroy us.

If it is difficult to obtain intelligence of terrorist movements, we can use the characteristic

pattern of terrorists launching attacks before important holidays or important events and

organize our forces to conduct full-scale check of personnel and vehicles in the critical

area. At the same time, we should conduct searches of security blind spots such as

underground facilities and warehouses.

(2) Attacking the terrorists' surprise attack and destruction activities

If the terrorists' surprise attacks and destruction occur in a certain area, we should use the

preliminary activity course of action {xingdong yu’an} as the base and apply forces

nearby, striving to promptly reach the incident site. We should quickly take control of the

development of the incident to stop the terrorist activities from further expanding, and

securely block and control the border area in order to reduce the risk to the minimum.

Normally, we apply a part of the forces to block and control the periphery, use the main

forces to conduct search and pursuit, and use the special operations and political units to
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launch psychological operations. Whichever unit arrives at the scene first shall deploy

first, conduct search first, and attack first to ensure time effectiveness of the operation.

1. Block the incident site

When a terrorist attack occurs, the first group of forces reaching the incident site should

rapidly investigate and report the location, nature, scale, cause and result of the terrorist

incident to the higher level. At the same time, they should remove and demolish

inactivated explosives as fast as possible. They should block the incident site, isolate the

terrorists' activity area, rigorously guard other targets that might be attacked, and prevent

the terrorists from escaping or expanding the situation until the follow-on troops arrive at

the scene.

When the follow-on troops arrive at the scene, based on the results of the work of on site

personnel or deployment of the troops on site, they should establish a secure deployment

to further block the incident site. They should investigate the nature of the incident and

protect evidence. They should organize searches, [interrogate] captives, and disperse

people from the threat area. When blocking the area, normally the main forces are used to

encircle the area and push inward and checkpoints are established to block the road. A

part of the forces are used to capture commanding heights such as high buildings in order

to observe and monitor the terrorists from high points. Helicopters are used to carry out

aerial patrol, and advanced reconnaissance measures are used to find out the locations of

the terrorists and to monitor them closely. Electronic jamming is used to suppress

different communication methods of the terrorists. A part of the forces with strong

maneuver capabilities are chosen as reserve to be deployed on the periphery of the

blocked area at a concealed and easy to maneuver location. They are ready to provide

reinforcement to the blocking force at any direction or area at any given time, to kill the

terrorists and handle any outbreak situations. By way of multi-dimensional total blocking

of the terrorist activity area or area occupied by the terrorist, we can cut off all escape

routes of the terrorists and control people from entering or leaving the area.

2. Search and arrest, pursue and exterminate {搜捕追歼 soubu zuijian}

When conducting search and arrest and pursue and exterminate the terrorists during the

counter surprise attack operations, the area of search and arrest is small and the distance

of pursuit and exterminate is short. There are great time constraints and high

requirements. Thus, the bushu disposition and activities of search and arrest and pursuit

and exterminate should be refined and carefully organized. In the area of terrorist attacks

and destruction, we should establish a multi-layer net-casting search and arrest

deployment. We should allot the search and arrest tasks by layer and by sector. We

should move gradually from the outside to the center to search and exterminate the

terrorists. The further inward, the more intense the search and extermination should be.

We should emphasize and enhance support in areas where different layers meet and

totally and thoroughly exterminate all terrorists.
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During the terrorists' attack and destruction activities, normally the targets are dispersed

and the exposure time is short. While the terrorists escape, they try to hide. Thus, the

search and arrest and purse and extermination forces must have a clear grasp of the

number of terrorists, how they look, which direction they are escaping, and the time and

method they escape. We should use such methods as overtaking pursuit and

extermination {超越追歼 chaoyue zhuijian}, exterminating while pursuing {边追边剿

bianzhui bianjiao}, relay search and extermination {接力搜剿 jieli soujiao}, and multidimensional surveillance. We should strive to achieve the goal of pursuing and

exterminating at one blow. The leapfrog pursuit and extermination fendui should ride

rapid maneuver vehicles and intercept at the front of the escaping terrorists on

advantageous terrain to prevent the terrorists from expanding their activities areas. When

necessary, they can ambush the terrorists along their escaping route. The tracking and

pursuing fendui should hotly pursue. If the escaping terrorists suddenly vanish on

complex terrain, the tracking and pursuing fendui should immediately stop the pursuit

and should conduct vigorous search of the surrounding targets in order to exterminate the

terrorists. The tracking and pursuing fendui of the follow-on echelon should take over

from the previous echelon from this point onward, and continue the search and pursuit

and prevent the terrorists from escaping. The multi-dimensional observation and

surveillance fendui should board the helicopters to seize high-rise buildings or

outstanding terrain features to observe and monitor the terrorists while they try to escape.

They should promptly report to the commander of their findings, or they can directly

inform the pursuit and extermination fendui and create favorable conditions for the latter

to implement rapid pursuit and extermination.

(3) Post-terrorist attack rescue

An effective measure to reduce the outcome of a terrorists' attack and minimize damage

is to rapidly deploy the rescue forces and carry out effective rescue activities. To do this,

we must use scientific methods and employ multiple forces and measures, count every

second to rapidly and effectively carry out the rescue mission so that human casualties

and property losses can be minimized as much as possible.

1. Rapidly deploy the rescue forces

When a terrorist attack and destruction event occurs, the commander should immediately

deploy and develop the rescue forces. The commander should rationally assign missions,

closely coordinate, and intensify on site emergency rescue in order to raise rescue

effectiveness. Normally, the chemical defense force is used as the main force to form the

decontamination team to eliminate the outcomes of the attack of NBC weapons. They

perform detection and decontamination of nuclear, chemical, biological attacks and

provide guidance to the decontamination work of the masses. The engineering force is

used as the main force to form the ordnance disposal and engineering maintenance and

repair team. They are responsible for disposal of unexploded ordnance and ensure

roadways are available. The logistical and transport force is used as the main force to

form the transport team, which is responsible for delivering goods and personnel to the
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frontline and to the rear. The medical force is used as the main force to form the on site

medical rescue team, which is responsible for emergency rescue and rear delivery of

casualties in critical state. The equipment maintenance fendui should work in conjunction

with the local technical maintenance force and be responsible for repairing damaged

facilities. The fire rescue fendui of the armed police is the main force responsible for fire

extinguishing and control.

2. Promptly investigate the situation and provide rescue

All participating specialized fendui such as the engineering, chemical defense,

maintenance, and medical fendui should promptly investigate and find out personnel

casualties, property losses, NBC contamination, and secondary damages to the attack

area, as well as the degree of damage to the critical target. They should promptly develop

rescue activities based on the principle of saving live first, helping the most critical first,

assisting the most urgent first, and dealing with the simplest first.

With respect to rescuing after an explosive attack, normally the engineering force and the

medical units are deployed. Personnel in the affected area are dispersed, and the area

within a certain range surrounding the explosion site is blocked. Manual search, technical

search, and police canine search methods are used to search the casualties and suspicious

items, to clear any danger and assure the safety of the rescue personnel. Technical

methods and simple and quick mechanical methods such as hoisting, propping, prying,

lifting, sawing are used to rescue trapped personnel. For those trapped persons that

cannot be rescued right away, ventilation ports should be created to prevent the trapped

personnel from suffocating. When rescuing victims of NBC attacks, normally the

chemical defense force and the medical force are utilized. They should use methods such

as chemical defense reconnaissance, sample testing, washing and radiation neutralization

to decontaminate and control the spread of chemical agents, provide treatment to victims,

and ensure safety of the lives of the masses.

3. Take care of the aftermath, reinforce social order

Terrorists' attacks in public places often cause psychological fears and social disarray,

which affect the productivity and livelihood of the people. Thus, the troops carrying out

anti-terrorism missions should promptly engage in calming the people and recovering

social order. To begin with, they should engage in propaganda work, calling the masses

not to panic and have faith in the government and armed forces to exterminate the

terrorists and safeguard citizen's lives and properties. At the same time, they should

persuade the people to actively participate in the anti-terrorism struggle and work

together with the armed forces. Secondly, they should obey the order of the higher

authorities and implement strict curfew in the "disaster area," reinforce social order, and

prevent the terrorists from attacking again. Thirdly, they should actively assist the public

in the recovery effort, to engage them in production and rebuilding, and to ensure

stability of people's lives and society.
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III. Counter-Hostage Taking by Terrorists...480

Counter-terrorist hostage taking operations not only affect the safety of the hostages, but

also the reputation of the country and its military, and affect the ability of a country to

implement its national strategies. Since counter terrorist hostage taking operations impact

the overall situations and have major consequences, they have extraordinary significance

and are a major concern of the world and our society.

(1) Unfolding the strength bushu disposition

Based on the nature of the hostage taking by the terrorists, its scale, and terrain situation

in the vicinity of the location seized by the terrorists, as well as the strength of our

counter-hostage taking forces, we normally form units such as the periphery blocking

unit, assault unit, reconnaissance unit, psychological warfare unit, and rescue unit.

The periphery blocking unit {外围封控队 waiwei fengkong dui} normally consists of the

infantry, armored force or special operations force {特种兵 tezhongbing}, and electronic

warfare force. Based on need, it can also be formed by the aviation force and naval

shipmen. The periphery blocking unit is deployed some distance on the periphery of the

location (sea area) where the hostages are being taken. The periphery blocking unit forms

several blocking lines to control the hostage taking site and prevent the terrorists from

escaping. It also disperses the onlookers and cuts off any contact the terrorists may have

with the outside in order to create conditions for the counter terrorist hostage taking

operations.

The assault unit {突击队 tujidui} normally consists of the special operations force and

relevant professional troops. It is organized into the assault team (group), cover team

(group), and reserve team (group). Based on operational needs, several sniper teams can

be organized as well. The assault team (group) should consist of the most nimble budui or

fendui or personnel with the best combat capabilities. It is primarily responsible for

launching assaults, rescuing hostages and capturing terrorists. The cover team (group)

should consist primarily of armed helicopters with precision attack capabilities and

artillery or infantry fendui. It is responsible for seizing locations to cover the activities of

the assault team (group). The reserve team (group) is formed by a part of the forces and is

deployed at locations that facilitate maneuvering to handle incidental situations. The

sniper groups consist of snipers, observers and liaison persons. The sniper groups take up

advantageous terrain or locations that facilitate firing. They also take up several reserve

sniper positions to form a multi-direction, multiple-point cross-firing deployment. The

target area of each sniper group is clearly assigned and missions are clearly defined.

The reconnaissance unit {侦察队 zhenchadui} normally consists of military

reconnaissance personnel and relevant personnel from public security and [national]

security elements. Based on need, they are in disguise as different elements and try to

approach the terrorists using different methods in order to have a grasp of the number,
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location, weapons and activities of the terrorists. This information provides reliable

intelligence support to the command personnel so that the commander will be able to

devise the counter-hostage taking resolution and the troops will be able to launch

effective counter-hostage taking activities.

The psychological warfare unit {攻心队 gongxindui} normally consists of the political

department and relevant local forces. The psychological unit is primarily responsible for

propaganda and loud speaker communication. It launches psychological offensives in an

attempt to break the will of the terrorists.

The rescue unit {救护救援队 jiuhu jiuyuandui} is mainly composed of the chemical

defense force, engineering force, transport force, and medical force. The rescue unit is

primarily responsible for rescuing and transporting the hostages, carrying out chemical,

biological and engineering rescue, transporting material supplies, and offering medical

support.

(2) Encircling and blocking the periphery

The goal of the counter terrorist hostage taking activities is to completely shut off the

terrorists' contact with the outside and prevent them from escaping. The following

methods are normally used: One of the methods is secret blocking. During the initial

phase of a hostage-taking event, the terrorists tend to be nervous, sensitive, impulsive,

and anxious, and they are highly guarded. Our intensive blocking activities may cause the

terrorists to escape or harm the hostages. Thus, we may use the secret blocking method to

encircle the incident site or to have plain clothes personnel to monitor their activities.

This is to stabilize the terror situation, conceal our intended activities and create

conditions to mount a surprise attack on the terrorists. Another method is plain view

blocking. Normally, it is used when our intended activities are exposed. It may also be

transitioned from secret blocking to plain view blocking. This demonstrates our firm

intention to struggle with the terrorists, to coerce the terrorists, and create conditions for

psychological warfare and negotiation. The third method is a combination of secret and

plain view blocking. That is, if we apply deception, we can openly block a certain

direction or sector in plain view, but we apply secret blocking in other directions and

sectors to entice the terrorists to escape, thus achieving our goal of ambushing the

terrorists and capturing and killing them.

To ensure success of our blocking activities, we can adopt the following methods: One

method is targeted blocking. That means we use advantageous terrain features such as tall

buildings around the hostage-taking site and traffic hubs to monitor and control the

terrorists' activities. This is normally conducted secretively. Another method is overall

blocking. That means we implement comprehensive encirclement to control the area

occupied by the terrorists. When implementing overall blocking, we must make use of

critical points in the surrounding area and the commanding height, striving to form a

multi-dimensional blocking posture. At the same time, we must strengthen coordination

among all blocking fendui to ensure that the blocking activities are rigorous and uniform.
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If blocking takes place at night, the area to be blocked should be as small as possible, and

the methods should include primarily warning and alert, observation, and ambush. We

should make fully use of the capabilities of the night vision and night aiming devices, we

should enhance our surveillance of the terrorists, control of lights, and coordination and

communication. We should be ready for combat at any given moment. Along the

corridors, sectors and intersections where the terrorists might use as the escape route in

darkness of the night, we should dispatch our ambush fendui to wait and exterminate

them.

(3) Negotiation and psychological warfare

Negotiation and psychological warfare is an important phase and are important activities

in counter-hostage taking operations. They play an important role. In light of the complex

psychological and emotional reactions of the terrorists such as fate, fear of death, as well

as their demand and actions, we should carefully examine the situation and aggressively

engage them in negotiation and psychological offensives. We should explain our policy

to them, persuade them to surrender, and rouse their deep-seated desire to live. We

should aim at changing their willful attitude, swaying their will to resist, and pressuring

them to release the hostages. Or, we should create in them illusions and confusions,

entice them to surrender, or break their relation with fellow terrorists. Or, through

negotiation, psychological work, and negotiate with the terrorists, we gain time for our

troops to be fully ready for favorable opportunities to attack.

Negotiations are mental games to bargain with the terrorists and offer conditions for the

release of the hostages. Regardless of the nature of the hostage taking event, during the

initial phase of the operation, one must have a positive attitude to conduct negotiations,

using negotiations to seek the possibility of a peaceful resolution, to slow down the pace

of the event, to smooth the sharp edge of differences, and to gain time. During the

negotiation, one must stick to principles but also be flexible. Through negotiations, we

attain the effect of psychological warfare. Through talks and discussions we achieve the

goal of dividing and disintegrating the enemy. At the same time, negotiations should be

backed by strong military strength so that the terrorists will be under psychological

pressure. While the negotiation is going on, we should aggressively get ready for military

operations. Once the negotiation cannot achieve the expected results or if there are signs

that armed struggles are inevitable, we should firmly launch decisive attacks against the

terrorists, to organically combine negotiations with armed attacks. The content of the

negotiation should abide by relevant laws and regulations. For example, in the "Law of

Fighting Terrorism of the USSR," it is clearly specified that no negotiation shall involve

personnel or weapon exchange and other issues that may threaten the lives, health,

security, and food supplies of the personnel. And, no negotiation shall be conducted to

meet the political demand of the terrorists.

Psychological warfare is a psychological tactic using powerful political offensives to

break the will of the terrorists, to psychologically disarm their resistance so that the

hostage taking event will have a peaceful resolution. The goal is to use Party and
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government policies and laws to persuade the terrorists, to awaken their conscience and

give up their opposing stand. At the same time, armed methods are used to win time and

create conditions. Psychological warfare activities are adopted according to the attitude of

the terrorists and their state of mind. Different methods and contents can be employed to

target the terrorists. One method is to use reasoning to persuade. We can use policy

propaganda and reasoning to make the terrorists have an understanding of what is right

and wrong before they make a choice. Another method is to use emotion to persuade. We

can mobilize the terrorists' families, friends, teachers and students to jointly persuade,

guide and change them. We use emotion to excite the mental state of the terrorists,

calling on their love for their families and friends to willingly give up resistance. A third

method is using power to coerce. We use powerful armed blocking and use the might of

the military to coerce. At the same time we use psychological offensives to force the

terrorists to give in.

(4) Sudden raid-attacks

Sudden raid-attacks are sudden, precise, and ferocious strike activities adopted against

the terrorists when negotiations and psychological offensives are not effective and the

lives of the hostages are severely threatened. The goal is to instantaneously overcome the

terrorists and achieve the mission of rescuing the hostages and exterminate the terrorists.

1. Approaching the target stealthily

The assault unit should take advantage of the opportunities when the terrorists are

exhausted, negligent, and careless, or make use of darkness of the night, inclement

weather, or results of deception or jamming to rapidly approach advantageous terrain

near the target in a concealed manner. The assault unit should seize the assault departure

location and get ready for the assault. At other times, the assault unit can use the disguise

or infiltration method to approach the target secretly and in concealment. Or, the assault

unit can launch the attack directly without seizing the assault departure location first.

2. Suddenly initiating attack

Under the cover of other budui or fendui, the assault unit should abruptly launch an attack

according to the preliminary activity course of action {行动预案 xingdong yu'an}. The

assault unit should attack the location of the terrorists, fire at the terrorists before the

terrorists can fire back, and hit the enemy right on with the first round. They should

instantaneously control the enemy and rescue the hostages. If the terrorists seize the

hostages indoors, in the car, aircraft cabin, or boat cabin, the assault unit can first throw

flare or shock rounds into the enclosed space, using the flash and loud noise as a cover to

rapidly and bravely act. If several arms of the services and forces are participating in the

counter-hostage taking operations, before the actions, these participants should learn the

mission and method of attacking the terrorists and rescuing the hostages and casualties,

the timing of the activities, coordinated actions, signals, and issues that need to pay

attention to. During the operation, the various assault forces should use the preliminary
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course of action as the basis and act at the precise time and coordinate closely in order to

achieve the effect of the surprise attack. In a small-scale counter-hostage taking battle,

the assault in disguise {化装袭击 huazhuang xiji} method can also be adopted to achieve

the goal. According to the situation on site, special operations personnel can use specified

identities as a cover to contact the terrorists. They can take advantage of the condition

and opportunity to suddenly launch an attack while the enemy is inexpectant and

overcome the terrorists instantaneously.

3. Accurate sniper attacks

The sniper groups should take advantage of denial and deception of the cover team

(group) and rapidly seize the sniper positions in a concealed manner and get ready. They

should also pay close attention to the activities of the terrorists. Once an opportunity for

combat is available, they should follow the predetermined course of action or

commander's order to fire resolutely. The method of sniping is based on the number of

the terrorists, their location, and the strength of the sniper groups. The following methods

can be considered: One method is to use concentrated fire on one target. That is, for the

most dangerous terrorist, we should concentrate fire of several sniper groups from

different directions and from multiple locations to simultaneously attack the terrorist on

different parts of his torso. Another method is to fire simultaneously at several targets.

Based on the number of the terrorists, their locations and the disposition of the snipers,

we decide on the target of each sniper group and coordination among the groups. Then,

according to the order of the commander or the prepared plan, the sniper groups

simultaneously fire at several terrorist targets from different directions and locations. The

third method is to set up ambush and snipe. In a situation when observation and direct

firing from concealed locations are difficult, the sniper groups can hide in several

directions and locations and set up ambush. As soon as the terrorists are exposed or

during their transition time, the sniper groups can rapidly take up firing positions and

quickly fire at the terrorists.

IV. Attacking the Terrorists' Base {yingdi 营地}35...485

Attacking the base of the terrorists is an important activity to wipe out the source of

terrorism. This activity directly affects the final outcomes of anti-terrorism operations and

long-term security of the country. During the operation, the terrorists often rely on

protective works to stubbornly resist. Our offensive troops should be prepared to fight a

battle against fortifications, to fight guerrilla battles, search and confiscate battles {搜缴

战 soujiaozhan}, and pursue battles. Thus, in order to attack the terrorists' base we must

be fully prepared, use forces extraordinarily, and respond nimbly.

When launching an offensive against the terrorists' base, one must establish an in-depth,

echelon-based, multi-dimensional and targeted offensive disposition in accordance with

35 Translator’s note: this term can also be translated as the "camp."
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the target base's nature, area, force strength, terrain, etc. Normally, two echelons and a

reserve unit are organized, and sometimes the airlanding fendui can also be included.

Based on need, each echelon can organize the assault zhidui {强击支队 qiangji zhidui}

or assault groups (teams) {强击群(队) qiangji qun (dui)}. They are primarily used to

launch assaults against the terrorists' fortified support points. The assault zhidui is

normally formed by an infantry battalion and is supported by part of the tank, artillery

and engineering troops. The assault group (team) is formed by an infantry company and

infantry platoon and is supported by part of the firearms fendui {火器分队 huoqi fendui}.

There can also be the firing teams {火力队 huolidui} and blasting teams {爆破队

baopodui}. The firing team may be supported by part of the tanks and guns, and its

primary mission is to damage or destroy the terrorists' permanent works and firepower

points, kill the terrorists' effective strength, as well as support and cover the activities of

other groups and teams. The blasting team is formed by part of the infantry and

engineering troops. Its primary mission is to breach a lane among the enemy's obstacles

and demolish the enemy's fortified targets.

(1) Capturing the peripheral area

The periphery area of the terrorists' base normally has more complex terrain and social

background. The terrorists may take advantage of the terrain and construct defensive

works either in plain view or secretively. They may deploy some personnel as residents

or businessmen to provide warning alert and defense from the periphery and to control

the corridor going into the base. In some ethnic minority areas, for a long time some of

the residents have been under the influence of ethnic separatism and religious extremism

promoted by the terrorists. They may become the cover of the terrorists, which is

disadvantageous to our operational activities. We should rigorously block and control the

periphery. At the same time, we should adopt multiple measures to strengthen our

activities to eliminate the terrorists and create favorable conditions for eventual

annihilation of the terrorists inside the base.

One way to do that is to strengthen political propaganda to win the support of local

residents. Our military should use preliminary operations to strengthen legal and political

propaganda activities among the people living inside the terrorists' base area and around

the periphery in an attempt to reveal the crimes and aims of the terrorists to generate

terror activities, educate the people to separate themselves from the terrorists, and leave

the area controlled by the terrorists. At the same time, urge the people to actively take

part in the struggle against the terrorists.

A second way is to seize critical points and create favorable conditions for future

operations. If the terrorists seize advantageous terrains such as commanding heights,

mountain passes or narrow passages to control the roadways leading to and from the base,

we should dispatch an advanced zhidui or part of the forces and firepower to launch a

sudden and ferocious fire assault at the terrorists who are defending the critical points in

an attempt to capture the advantageous terrain and create favorable conditions for our

offensives against the terrorists' main base. If the terrain and forces permit, we should use
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an encircling deployment to cut off the retreat routes of the terrorists who are defending

the critical points and to block reinforcement from the terrorists' base, striving to

annihilate the enemy who are defending the critical points.

A third way is to clean up the terrorists in the periphery area to ensure safety of the

operational activities. After our troops have captured advantageous terrain features on the

periphery of the terrorists' base, we should immediate begin the clean up activities. Use a

net-casting method to thoroughly eliminate the terrorists in hiding and other suspicious

elements, cut off all connections between the terrorists inside the base and the outside,

prevent the remnant terrorists from attacking our offensive disposition from our rear, and

ensure safety of our offensive troops.

If the situation is urgent or if there is not much concern with the situation on the

periphery, we could forgo the periphery operations and directly mount an offensive

against the terrorists' base.

(2) Attacking critical points of the base

To attack the critical points of the terrorists' base, one can employ the storming assault {

强攻 qiang gong} or the surprise attack {袭击 xiji} fighting method to quickly penetrate

the base defense and divide, encircle and annihilate the terrorists.

If the defensive forces of the terrorists' base are stronger and defensive works are

fortified, we should use the storming assault fighting method. We should fully develop

our strength of having more firearms to attack the fortification, more equipment to clear

the obstacles. We should use our ferocious firepower, long firing range, and high

precision to destroy the terrorists' fortified works, and cover and support our storming

assault fendui to penetrate. Normally, we use measures such as firepower and blasting

power to attack and destroy the critical targets and fortified defensive works such as

permanent works on either side of the critical target and firepower points. We use

firepower and blasting power to cover our storming assault fendui to rapidly penetrate the

terrorists' base, wipe out the enemy on the surface of the position, and divide, encircle

and annihilate the terrorists inside the permanent works. If the defensive forces at the

terrorists' base are relatively weak and the time for preparation is short, we should adopt

the surprise attack fighting method. We should take advantage of the terrain and

inclement weather, and use technical measures to enhance concealment and camouflage

in order to rapidly and stealthily approach the terrorists' base. We should mount a surprise

attack to rapidly and ferociously penetrate the enemy's defense, insert and divide, striving

to annihilate the terrorists inside the base at one blow.

If the area of the base is large and the terrain is advantageous, we could implement

airlanding operations. We could use the parachute drop or airlanding method to mount a

surprise attack at important targets such as the terrorists' vital points and command

institution in order to capture their leaders and disrupt their command. At the same time,

we use the airborne operations to support offensive activities on the ground.
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(3) Eliminating the enemy who are fighting stubbornly with their back to the wall

When terrorists use villages and township or small cities as the base to put up a stubborn

fight, they often construct firing, protective and maneuvering works on the periphery of

the residential area or inside strong buildings. Or, they may set up obstacles in streets or

at road crossings where maneuvering can be carried out easily and set up sniper positions

to resist our offensives. To counter these activities, we should first investigate the terrain

of the residential area and defensive disposition of the terrorists, and then adopt fighting

methods such as rigorous blocking, targeted penetration, dividing and encircling, and

annihilating the divided enemy one by one. That is, we use heavy forces to first encircle

and tightly block the residential area occupied by the terrorists to prevent them from

escaping. Then, we apply targeted penetration at directions that have weak defenses or

fewer residents. The goal is to disrupt the defensive disposition of the terrorists and break

the enemy into isolated targets. Then we concentrate our forces and eliminate the isolated

enemy groups one by one. If there are hidden tunnels or complex constructions in the

residential area, we can use the multiple-approach suppression and layer-by-layer pealing

fighting method {多路挤压层层剥皮 duolu jiya cengceng bopi}. That is, we press

inward from the outside to seize the targets one by one until all terrorists are eliminated.

If the terrorists temporarily seize the residential area, we can use the besiege disposition

of encircling three sides and leaving one side unguarded {围三阙一的围攻部署 wiesan

queyi de weigong bushu} in an attempt to force the terrorists to break the encirclement in

order to achieve the ambush goal. One should note that if we launch attack in the

residential area, we should make every effort to ensure safety of the residents and

minimize collateral damages to the buildings of the residents. We should use different

ways to mobilize the residents to leave the residential area within a specified time to

retreat to the safety zone. We should consider safety of the residents when selecting the

main penetration point and applying firepower.

Terrorists may use multi-story buildings as the backdrop to stubbornly resist. We know

that multi-story buildings are better integrated and have better resistance to destruction.

The terrorists may rely on a group of multi-story buildings as a fortified defense system

and form a multi-dimensional firepower network. On the other hand, in order to defend

large multi-story buildings, one has to set up a story-by-story defense; consequently the

forces are dispersed. In addition, it is hard to coordinate and command and thus easy to

be divided and encircled. To address this, we should establish a storming assault {强攻

qianggong} deployment, and adopt a method that calls for encircling first and fighting

later, from the outer layer towards the inner layer, and from both the top and the bottom

to seize the building story-by-story and wipe out the enemy in close combat.

When the offensive troops close in on the terrorists who have seized the large multi-story

building, we normally use a small amount of forces to mount a frontal attack at the

building, use a part of the forces to turn to the flanks or flank rear to encircle the building

and eliminate any terrorists that are on guard, and seize adjacent buildings to form a

besieged posture. After that, we use firepower to provide cover to the storming assault

fendui {强击分队 qiangji fendui} to mount a multi-approach assault. The firing team {火
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力队 huolidui} should utilize advantageous terrain features and adjacent buildings to

block the doorways, windows and firing ports of the building, destroy the terrorists' midand lower-story firing points and periphery targets, carve out an opening on the walls of

the lower story of the building, suppress the enemy on the roof top and behind covers, as

well as launch blinding fire {迷盲射击 mimang sheji} against the terrorists. The blasting

team {爆破队 baopodui} should rapidly remove the obstacles surrounding the building,

blast an opening on the building, and destroy hidden firing points. The various assault

teams {强击队 qiangjidui} should make full use of the advantageous terrain features and

firepower cover to rapidly approach the building and charge into the building through

doorways, windows or the openings on the wall. The fighting method against the

terrorists inside the building is as follows. Normally, we first eliminate the enemy on the

bottom floor, block the entrance to the basement, elevators and stairways, then adopt a

fighting method that is form bottom to top, from top to bottom, or a combination of the

two to eliminate the defensive enemy floor by floor. If the building is rather tall, we can

adopt a top-and-down sandwiched fighting method. That is, we first use a part of the

forces to enter into the building and to block the entrances of the bottom floor. These

troops then work in close coordination with the storming assault fendi that has climbed

into the building from the top floor or airlanded on the roof top to sandwich the enemy.

The terrorists may use underground construction and facilities in the cities to resist. There

are a large number of underground facilities such as large pipes, tunnels, people's

defensive projects, and subways. These underground facilities occupy a large area and are

dispersed and well hidden. They are hard and sturdy and can be used for force-unit

{budui} massing, maneuvering, defense, and storing ammunitions and supplies. We can

use fighting methods such as blocking, plugging, blasting, attacking, burning, smoking,

flooding, ambush, searching, and psychological offensive according to the nature of the

underground facilities and the characteristics of the terrorist activities. Blocking {封锁

fengsuo} means we rigorously block the entrance, cut off any contact of the terrorists

underground with other element above ground and cut off water, electricity, and gas in

order to restrict the terrorists' activities and exhaust the enemy. We can then use various

measures to attack the enemy, weaken their determination, break their will to fight, and

then thoroughly eliminate the enemy. Plugging {堵塞 dusai} means we use a part of the

forces and firepower to plug up the entrance to the underground facilities. We then

organize the engineering force fendui to apply explosives to blast and collapse the

entrance of the underground facilities, or use tanks or bulldozers to pile rubbles to block

the entrances and isolate the terrorists from making any contact with the above ground.

At the same time, we can effectively apply electromagnetic jamming to break the

communications between the terrorists and the outside world. As a result, they will die

without having us attacking them. Blasting {爆破 baopo} means we organize the blasting

team and choose weak but critical locations to apply explosives in order to attain the goal

of damage and destruction. Attacking {攻打 gongda} means we send several attack

fendui along the two flanks or sides of the underground facilities to move forward

alternately, gradually moving to the enemy depth and launch an attack in order to

completely wipe out the defensive enemy. Flaming {喷烧 penshao} means at the

terrorists' underground facilities such as their hidden administrative areas, force-unit
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{budui} stations, ammunition depots we use our flame throwing fendui to throw flames

or pour inflammable fuel or pump inflammable gas to set fire to the underground

facilities in order to destroy the terrorists in these facilities as well as their weapons,

ammunitions and supplies. Smoking {烟熏 yanxun} means at the terrorists' defensive

tunnels or underground facilities that have poor ventilation, we first use a part of the

forces to block the entrances, and then throw suffocating smokes or fire smoke rounds

into the underground facilities to suffocate the terrorists or force them to escape to the

surface before wiping them out. Flooding {水淹 shuiyan} means at small or medium

underground facilities, we pump water into the facilities from the entrance in order to

destroy the equipment, weapons and ammunitions inside the facilities and drown the

terrorists. Ambush {伏击 fuji} means we intentionally leave an entrance to the

underground facilities unguarded and hide a part of the forces nearby in waiting. We then

send another part of the forces underground to attack the terrorists from other entrances,

forcing the terrorists to escape. While they escape, we ambush them. Psychological

offensives {攻心 gongxin} means we take advantage of the terrorists' psychological

vulnerability when being isolated and waiting to die and use measures such as

propaganda using loud speakers, broadcasting, and distributing propaganda pamphlets to

put psychological pressure on the terrorists, to sway their morale and break their will to

fight, cause them to collapse mentally and spiritually and lose their will to struggle, and

force them to surrender.

V. Border Closure and Control {封控 fengkong}36...489

Border closure and control is an important measure to prevent terrorists' assaults and

ensure security and stability of the country or of a certain area. It is also an important

operational activity in other anti-terrorism operations. The goal is to firmly block the

terrorists outside the border or within an area before the terrorists could take actions or

before they become a threat to us.

When countries or areas bordering China have terrorist activities or conflicts, we can

implement border closure and control operations. We normally use forces on the ground

to close border corridors and areas that personnel can easily carry out maneuvering. We

use force in the air to conduct border area aerial reconnaissance and patrol and to close

and control areas that are difficult to close and control by forces on the ground. We use

forces such as public security and armed police to enhance port control. We use

electronic warfare forces to jam communications of the terrorists within and without the

border. When China or a local government organizes important events and needs to apply

multi-dimensional border closure and control to the area where the events are taking

place, we normally use a part of the aviation force and naval ship forces to take up aerial

or sea (water) patrol, and use a part of the aviation forces, surface-to-air missile force and

anti-aircraft gun forces to be responsible for air operation duties. We use the infantry and

armed police and public security personnel to be responsible for periphery warning and

36 Note that the Chinese characters are the same as for blocking or blockade.
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alert, patrol and checking missions. We use specialized forces such as chemical defense

and engineering to be responsible for inspection and removal of suspected MBC

materials and in rescue missions. We use the technical reconnaissance and security forces

to be responsible for the reconnaissance missions in order to have a grasp of terrorist

activities in a timely manner. When applying border closure and control during a terrorist

offensive, we normally use long-range firepower to block and control remote areas that

are difficult to be controlled by forces on the ground. These could be uninhabited

mountains and dense forests, remote roadways, mountain passes and narrow passages. If

the situation is urgent and our forces cannot reach the area in time, we can first use longrange firepower to block the corridor the terrorist may use to contact the outside world or

to escape. Then we use forces to form an enveloping ring on the periphery of the terrorist

activities area and set up checkpoints to prevent the terrorists from slipping out of the

area. We use public security and armed police to strengthen port and control. We use

electronic warfare forces to jam the communications equipment of the terrorists to cut off

the terrorists' contact with the outside world.

(1) Border closure and control on the ground

Ground closure and control is the primary activity of the border closure and control

operations. It mainly involves the use of firepower and forces to implement effective

closure and control of critical traffic corridors and critical areas along the border, using

this as the basis to strengthen control of the border and ports.

Border closure and control by fire has the characteristics of rapid reaction, suddenness

and poses powerful deterrence. It is normally adopted to block and control armed riot

areas. Once we discover that the terrorists are organizing armed riots, we should use

long-range firepower of the aviation force or the artillery force to rapidly apply fixedpoint, fixed-time or irregular fire attacks at traffic hubs such as roadways, bridges and

mountain passes where the terrorists may expand outward, build contacts with the outside

world, or escape in order to form a targeted dense firepower area or firepower obstacles.

When necessary, one can use the engineering force and the aviation force to lay land

mines in critical sectors or set up obstacles in order to firmly pin the terrorists inside the

rioting area.

Border closure and control by forces is a main closure and control activity on the ground

and plays an important role in various types of closure and control operations. Because

the objective, goal and terrain of closure and control vary, the methods are different as

well. When we implement border closure and control or apply closure and control during

our offensive operations against the terrorists, the closure and control troops on the

ground should use rapid maneuver measures such as ground maneuvering, airlanding or

paradrop to rapidly capture advantageous terrain where the terrorists may use to infiltrate

into or escape from the area. The closure and control troops on the ground should

establish a rigorous closure and control disposition with multiple closure and control

lines. Normally we use the main forces to form the first blocking line along the outer

edge to prevent the terrorists from infiltrating in or escaping out. We use a part of the
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forces, supported by other forces such as the armed police, and place them behind the

main forces along the corridor where the terrorists may be maneuvering to form the

second blocking line. We set up checkpoints and carry out patrols along the second

blocking line in order to attack the terrorists that may be infiltrating in and escaping out.

We use forces such as the public security and armed police to form the third blocking line

some distance behind the second blocking line or along the dividing line in the

mountainous area or between cities or townships. We check the people and materials

going in or out of the border or the terrorist activity area. We monitor the area, maintain

societal security and safety, and attack the terrorists that may slip through. When

applying closure and control to border areas where important events are taking place, we

should act in accordance with the instructions of the higher level and situations related to

force strength, location of closure and control and possible infiltration and attack of the

terrorists. We should uniformly organize various closure and control forces and establish

a multi-dimensional closure and control disposition. We should combine force control

and technical inspection methods to strengthen patrol and inspection in order to ensure

security of the important event.

Port control means that in light of the characteristics and patterns of terrorists importing

and exporting weapons, ammunitions and equipment through customs and ports, we

promptly deploy forces such as public security and armed police to strengthen patrol and

alert and control of the border customs and ports in order to block the terrorists' intentions

to pass through the ports and corridors through which the terrorists intent to contact the

outside world. When necessary, we should also dispatch troops to reinforce the activities.

(2) Border closure and control in the air

In light of terrorists' use of civilian aircraft to strike landmark buildings in metropolitan

areas and political, economic and military targets, when we apply closure and control of

important event sites or important targets, we should strengthen closure and control in the

air and apply vigorous aerial control.

First, we should set up no-fly zones. We should set up no-fly zones in a certain range

over important targets to protect the targets. We should restrict entry of any aircraft.

Those that must gain entry to the no-fly zone should apply permission from air-control

organizations to be included in the daily air defense operational plan.

Secondly, we should adjust the course of civilian airlines. As far as possible, we should

adjust the course of civilian airlines to areas further away from the important targets.

Thirdly, we should change the civilian departure reporting method. We should bring the

civilian flight departure reporting system directly into the intelligence automatic

processing system of the radar force. We should improve the computer automatic

analysis and evaluation software, raise the capability of the computer-aided decisionmaking system, and create conditions for the commander to effectively monitor and

control.
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Fourthly, we should expand the power of the air control management. Whenever an aerial

vehicle such as the hot air balloon, airship, glider, rotary wing, and powered parachute is

taking off, it should seek permission from the air control element.

(3) Border closure and control at sea (water)

If the terrorists conduct terror activities at sea (over water) or escape by sea (water) or

infiltrate into the inland, we should strengthen closure and control at sea (water). We

should establish a multi-layered closure and control disposition from the coast to the

coastal waters [and from the coast] to the depth.

First, we should establish the coastal warning and surveillance system. In order to prevent

the terrorists from coming onshore and escape and carry out terror activities, we should

establish public security, armed police, and border defense stations (posts) along the

shoreline to a certain depth, as well as establish an integrated warning and surveillance

system involving surveillance radars of the army and the navy, etc. At the same time, we

should establish communications in order to report and inform situations promptly. We

should form a unified military, police, and civilian reconnaissance and surveillance

network to rigorously monitor and control all avenues by which the terrorists may come

on shore.

Secondly, we should establish the reconnaissance and warning system at sea (water). We

should organize various specialized technical forces, mobilize and organize different

kinds of official vessels, and use all types of reconnaissance, observation and

communication equipment to build a unified military-police-civilian reconnaissance and

warning network. On the basis of this network, we can divide the sea area into several

reconnaissance and warning zones, and deploy reconnaissance and warning forces to

implement all-time all-space reconnaissance and warning. At the same time, we should

carefully coordinate activities among the reconnaissance and warning forces in order to

detect terrorist activities as early as possible, report the goal, method and characteristics

of the terrorist activities at sea (in water), and promptly coordinate anti-terror activities

among the military, police force, and civilians. Once suspicious vessels are discovered,

we should promptly embark and investigate. When embarking and investigating vessels,

the vessels in the surrounding area should enhance their warning and alert and be ready

for combat. The personnel embarking on the suspicious vessels should be highly alert and

thoroughly examine all compartments of the vessel so that no terrorists will be slipped

away. With respect to foreign vessels and vessels with unknown nationalities, we should

act in accordance with relevant international laws.

Thirdly, we should implement interception and search and arrest at sea (water). We

should organize maneuver forces in the air and in water that can easily execute the

interception and search and arrest missions. These forces should be deployed in a

concealed manner in complex sea areas (water), to be ready to intercept, search and arrest

terrorists. Once terrorists are discovered, they should rapidly launch an attack and jointly

carry out the mission from the air and from the sea (water). They should use multiple
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measures and encircle and intercept from the periphery to the center. They should cutoff

the terrorists' avenue to retreat, and prevent the terrorists from escaping from the scene.

(4) Information blockade

In anti-terrorism operations, we should uniformly organize and command the electronic

warfare force and local telecommunications and radio and TV broadcasting departments

to jam the means of communications of the terrorists, cut off their wired and wireless

communications systems and radio and TV broadcasting channels. When necessary, we

should command the aviation and artillery forces to use precision guided munitions to

destroy communications facilities and equipment such as the radio and TV stations and

radio relay transmissions to make the terrorists deaf and blind.

VI. Anti-terrorism Special Operations...493

Anti-terrorism special operations {特种作战 tezhong zuozhan} refer to the use of special

operations troops or other troops that have undergone special trainings to achieve

political, diplomatic, and economic goals in anti-terrorism operations. These troops apply

unique means and methods to implement irregular military activities in the depth of the

terrorists' activity area. Anti-terrorism special operations occur throughout the antiterrorism and maintaining-stability operations, and they are the “Assassin's Mace” {撒手

锏 sashoujian} of our military's anti-terrorism operations. These operations include

special operations reconnaissance, search and arrest in the enemy's rear, sabotage

operations, using firepower to lead the way, psychological offensives, battlefield rescue,

etc.

(1) Special operations reconnaissance {特种侦察 tezhong zhencha}

Special operations reconnaissance is a unique type of manual and technical intelligence

reconnaissance activities implemented in the area occupied by the terrorists or where the

critical targets are located. This is one of the important forms of anti-terrorism special

operations. It is critical to ensure that the commander can correctly organize command

and the troops can smoothly implement operational activities. The main missions include

the following: Collect intelligence on the terrorists' force composition, disposition, main

direction of activities and intention of activities, as well as situations such as terrain,

weather, ethnicity and societal situation of the area occupied by the terrorists. Investigate

and find out the command institution and leadership of the terrorists, the amount and

location of their weapon and supply depots and their main firearms, and the pattern and

methods of terror activities. Investigate and find out the property, precise location, and

protective measures of the terrorists' important targets and configuration of the key

components.
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1. Maneuver reconnaissance

Maneuver reconnaissance {机动侦察 jidong zhencha}37 means using aerial

reconnaissance or using long-distance delivered reconnaissance forces to implement

rapid and effective reconnaissance of long-distance targets. The methods of

reconnaissance include the following: One method is to use aerial reconnaissance

measures such as unmanned reconnaissance aerial vehicles or helicopters to implement

rapid reconnaissance in the terrorists' depth or rear. Another method is to use longdistance delivered special operations reconnaissance fendui. The special operations

reconnaissance fendui secretly infiltrates to the reconnaissance area to conduct

reconnaissance and surveillance of a certain area or target. After the mission is

completed, the fendui moves on to another area or target, or the fendui quickly retreats.

2. Alternating reconnaissance

Alternating reconnaissance {交替侦察 jiaoti zhencha} means we divide the

reconnaissance region, time and mission based on the nature and characteristics of the

various reconnaissance forces and reconnaissance measures in order that the intelligence

obtained can complement each other and verify each other. If we divide the

reconnaissance mission in one reconnaissance region, we can ask the technical

reconnaissance force to be mainly responsible for general search over a large area and

targeted reconnaissance of important areas. We can ask the armed reconnaissance force

to use the information captured by the technical reconnaissance to approach the important

areas or targets, and use the observation or photography method to further verify the

intelligence provided by the technical reconnaissance force and find out the precise

location of the target, its nature, and intentions. This way various forces can complement

each other, and errors and omissions can be prevented.

3. Surveillance reconnaissance

Surveillance reconnaissance {监控侦察 jiankong zhencha} is a reconnaissance method

that applies rigorous monitoring and control of the reconnaissance target. Normally it

includes fixed-point surveillance, alternating surveillance, and tracking surveillance.

Fixed-point surveillance means the surveillance personnel use visual observation and

technical equipment to monitor and learn the activities of the target, as well as record the

information. At an appropriate time the surveillance personnel report the findings to the

higher level. Alternating surveillance is used when change of battlefield targets is fast,

but the forces to execute reconnaissance missions are limited or the mission range is

relatively broad. We can use the surveillance plan as the basis and implement alternating

surveillance of a certain mobile target in a systematic manner. Tracking surveillance uses

the aerial or electronic reconnaissance method to track the enemy's target, or special

operations personnel are sent to approach an important target such as the terrorists'

37 Maneuver reconnaissance or mobile reconnaissance.
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formation or their command institution to conduct surveillance, or the special operations

personnel find ways to infiltrate the terrorists and conduct follow-on surveillance {跟随

监视 gensui jianshi} from within.

(2) Search and arrest in the enemy's rear

Search and arrest is a unique combat activity whereby concealed special operations

troops perform a sudden search and arrest of an important target in the terrorists' depth or

of their personnel. This is an important means to strike the leadership of the terrorists,

destroy their organization and command, and shock and deter the terrorists. The main

missions include the following: Capture the leaders or important personnel, search an

important target, and capture valuable intelligence or equipment. Disrupt the terrorists'

activity plan, break their will to fight, and crush their morale.

1. Fixed-point search and arrest

Fixed-point search and arrest means that the special operations force uses the air mobile

or ground infiltration method to stealthily enter a specified area or location in the

terrorists' depth in order to investigate a suspicious situation or capture their key

personnel. It is an activity implemented to catch someone unaware. During the activity,

one must act upon seeing the opportunity {见机行事 jianji xingshi} in accordance with

the current situation and flexibly subdue the enemy, and with the momentum of not

covering the ears in time for a thunderclap, achieve the goal of search and arrest. One

should not hesitate to break off the combat, fight quickly and retreat rapidly. Regardless

whether the mission is achieved or not, the troops should rapidly leave the site according

to the set time or the instruction.

2. Tracking search and arrest

Tracking search and arrest is the activities the special operations force uses in the

terrorists' depth to track the target, search and investigate its situation, and choose

advantageous terrain and timing to rapidly capture or destroy the target.

3. Luring search and arrest

If the target of search is inside a well-protected location or is frequently moving from one

location to another and thus is difficult to capture, we can use multiple methods to

capture the enemy target at one blow. These methods include using force maneuver to

create situations, using firepower to attack, or spreading false intelligence to lure and

coerce the enemy target to enter the capture area we set up beforehand. When using

luring search and capture, we must carefully plan and organize. We must have correct

information on the characteristics of the target and know his mental state, pattern of

activities, as well as the terrain in the surrounding area and protective measures. We must

correctly devise a luring plan and stealthily deploy forces in the designated area of
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capture, and enhance camouflage and disguise to avoid being detected. When executing

the luring activities, we should use the battlefield conditions as the basis and flexibly

adopt methods such as deception luring or armed luring. We could use avenues such as

telephone or fax, or the command communication network to issue false orders and

spread false information. Or we can use forces or firepower to strike the enemy target,

lure the target to leave the place and enter our ambush area.

(3) Special operations sabotage

Special operations sabotage is a surprise attack activity by the special operations forces

against the terrorists' important target or critical position. The main missions are:

Sabotage the terrorists' command, communications, control and intelligence system to

achieve the goal of hitting one spot and paralyzing the whole. Sabotage the terrorists'

main weapons and equipment, large mobile equipment, and information technology

facilities such as radio and TV broadcast station in order to weaken their combat

capabilities and create psychological shock. Sabotage rear support systems such as the

terrorists' weapon, supply and equipment depots, oil and fuel pipes, and electrical plants

in order to paralyze the terrorists' ability to continue the operation.

1. Simultaneous sabotage of multiple targets

When sabotaging relatively isolated point targets such as the terrorists' command organ,

ordnance position, and airfield, we normally use a part of the forces to clamp down or

eliminate the alert forces on the periphery of the targets. At the same time we divide the

main force into several assault teams. Based on the mission, we use a multiple-route,

multiple-direction offensive formation to rapidly insert into the target of the mission. At

the same time, we can implement multiple-point surprise attacks to destroy the critical

position of the target, striving to paralyze the target in a short time and achieve the

surprise effect of the sabotage.

2. Rapid maneuver sabotage {快速机动破袭 kaisu jidong poxi}

If the operational area is relatively large, the sabotage targets are numerous and the force

to carry out the sabotage is small, we can use a rapid and nimble maneuver method to

selectively sabotage the target. For maneuver sabotage, we normally use those personnel

capable of carrying out multiple types of sabotage to form an elite combat team. After

sabotaging one target, the team quickly moves on to the next target by helicopter or rapid

maneuver vehicle on the ground, or they can take advantage of the terrain and stealthily

walk. For maneuver sabotage, we should correctly choose the maneuver routes, methods,

the sequence of the sabotage targets, and the appropriate timing. Never follow a fixed

pattern so that the opponent will find it difficult to assess and take up protection.
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3. Air and ground multi-dimensional sabotage

If the enemy threat is relatively high and it is difficult to use forces to sabotage, or if

using forces cannot easily achieve the goal of thoroughly destroy the target, we should

organize surface-to-air long-range firepower to support the sabotage fendui in combat, to

clamp down the terrorists, and cover our sabotage activities. Or, we can use the longrange precision attack firepower to directly destroy the enemy target and achieve the

sabotage goal. Or, after the sabotage fendui has carried out the surprise attack, we again

use long-range firepower to destroy the enemy target and eliminate the tracks of the

sabotage. When using multi-dimensional sabotage, we must be fully prepared and

coordinate the activities of the surface-to-air firepower and the sabotage fendui carefully

so that we avoid damage by friendly forces and avoid fighting independently.

(4) Guiding the Firepower

Guiding the firepower {火力引导 huoli yindao} is the activity the special operations

force uses to guide long-range strike weaponry such as aerial vehicles, artillery and

missiles to implement precision attack against the terrorists' targets in the depth. At the

same time, the special operations force makes an evaluation of firing effectiveness and

performs firing recalibration. The main missions include the following: Investigate and

find out the precise location of important targets and the core position in the terrorists'

depth in order to provide accurate intelligence to the long-range precision attack

weapons. Provide firing data or guidance to the long-range precision attack weapons to

launch precision attacks at the enemy's target. Use the terminal guidance method to guide

the long-range precision attack weapons for precision attack. Intercept and identify the

radio signals of the terrorists in the depth, determine the direction of the transmitting

source and provide technical data for our electronic warfare unit to perform jamming.

Investigate and find out enemy intelligence and terrain situation at the airlanding site and

set up clear markings to guide the airborne force to land. And, provide alert and warning.

1. Observation and positioning, guide by data

The special operations budui should stealthily approach the target. At a certain distance

from the target, they should use advanced observation, positioning and calculation

equipment to measure the precise position of the enemy target or the frequency or

frequency spectrum of the enemy's electronic equipment. Then they should transmit

guidance command and provide timely error correction to the fire attack budui in order to

guide the attack budui to launch precision firing.

2. Laser illumination, terminal guidance

The firepower guiding personnel should use the laser illumination device to illuminate

the center of the target or critical point at a suitable location from the target of attack or

from an advantageous terrain feature. The terminal guidance system of the missile
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receives the echo signals of the illumination, which guide the missile to accurately attack

the target.

3. Continuous surveillance, tracking guidance

Based on the requirements of the higher level or based on the movement of the target, the

special operations force should conduct surveillance of the designated target of attack

continuously to understand the movement of the target. The special operations force

should continue to perform tracking guidance. When providing tracking guidance of a

particular target, the guiding fendui {引导分队 yindao fendui} not only must provide

accurate reconnaissance and report relevant data of the target before the attack takes

place, but also conduct continuous observation and report the results of the effectiveness

of the attack during the attack. After the attack, they should continue to observe any

change and provide timely and continuous intelligence to the firing budui in a timely

manner.

(5) Psychological offensive

Psychological offensives are a special type of operational activities that use methods such

as propaganda and deception to attack and break up the fighting spirit of the terrorists

mentally. The main mission is: Using measures such as psychological propaganda, in

conjunction with anti-terrorism military attacks, political offensives, and economic

battles, to disrupt the organization and command of the leaders of the terrorists, destroy

the psychological equilibrium of the terrorists, break up their organization, weaken their

combat capability, and win over the hearts and minds of the people in order to create

advantageous conditions for the higher level's overall operations.

1. Psychological propaganda

The special operations force can stealthily slip into the area of the armed riot, secretly

distribute propaganda leaflets, deliver letters, books and magazines, or drop radios,

recorders, audiotapes and videotapes; or use technical means to insert into radio and TV

broadcast networks, Internet, or the communication network of the terrorists. They can

use these methods to spread information, rebut rumors, weaken the will of the terrorists,

and win the hearts of the people. Psychological propaganda must employ different

methods based on the environment or customs of the place where the target is in. To

address the leadership of the terrorists, methods such as letters, telephone calls, faxes,

electronic mails and voice messages can be used. To address the terrorists in general,

methods such as the following can be used: distributing propaganda leaflets, photos,

newspapers and magazines; dropping off radios, recorders; and breaking into their

communication network, etc. To address the local residents, methods such as the

following can be used: posting slogans, distributing propaganda leaflets and photos,

establishing secret broadcasting stations, and inserting into local radio and TV stations,

etc.
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2. Psychological deterrence

In the enemy's depth, the special operations force can use different formats and methods

to disseminate words about the powerful force strength of our military's anti-terrorism

operations, especially how powerful our high-tech weapons and equipment are, as well as

our determination to win and favorable news from the battle front in order to impose

psychological threats to the terrorists. On the other hand, the special operations force can

use anti-terrorism operational activities such as surprise attacks, search and arrest, and

destruction to create a tense atmosphere and impose psychological pressure on the

terrorists, making them panic, fearful and weary, disrupting their psychological

equilibrium, breaking up their morale, and weakening their fighting capabilities.

3. Psychological deception

The special operations force can use means such as disguise to spread rumors among the

local residents about our military activities in an attempt to influence the judgment and

thinking of the leadership of the terrorists, causing them to hesitate or make wrong

decisions. The special operations force can also use activities such as transferring forces

at the enemy's forward position or in their depth, radio deception, and surprise attacks to

deceive the enemy, leading the enemy into our traps and creating conditions for our

operational suddenness. Psychological deception must be as close to reality as possible

and fit the logical thinking of the opponent, making the opponent believe it is true or

causing the opponent to confuse truth from falsehood. Only then will we be able to

achieve the goal of deception.

(6) Battlefield rescue

Battlefield rescue is rescue activity the special operations force conducts in the terrorist's

activity depth, using sudden assault methods or measures to rescue specified targets in

difficult situations. The main mission is: Rescuing hostages, small groups of besieged

targets, or personnel in dangerous situations; recapturing high-tech weapons and

equipment, highly secret documents, technical materials, and advanced materials and

devices taken by the terrorists.

1. Penetrate from the air, multi-dimensional rescue

If the targets to be rescued are located in the enemy's depth and are isolated, the rescue

fendui {营救分队 yingjiu fendui} can use helicopters or transport aircraft. Under the

support and cover of the aviation force and electronic warfare force, the rescue fendui can

use the airlanding or parachute drop method to directly enter the rescue target point or

advantageous terrain features nearby to rapidly eliminate the warning and alert enemy

nearby and control the surrounding situation. Then they can use a part of the force to

directly approach the target point and quickly carry out the rescue activities. They can use

a part of the force to seize advantageous terrain features to prevent the enemy's
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counterattacks and block the enemy's reinforcement. After the mission is accomplished,

they should immediately retreat according to the specified method.

2. Surface infiltration, surprise attack and rescue

If the target to be rescued is closer to our forward position and the defensive gap of the

terrorists is relatively large, the rescue fendui can use concealment and camouflage,

taking advantage of inclement weather or the effect of faint movements to secretly

infiltrate on the ground to the vicinity of the target of rescue to launch a surprise attack

against the enemy's warning and alert fendui or personnel and achieve the rescue mission.

3. Denial and deception, seize the opportunity to rescue

When rescuing a terrorist besieged point or rescuing our fendui that is inserting or turning

or in the enemy's depth, before we carry out the rescue activities, we should employ

various feint and deception measures such as purposefully transferring forces,

transferring firepower, and radio deception. When necessary, we should launch a

storming assault at the enemy's critical point from the vicinity of the terrorist besieged

point. By putting more pressure, we force the terrorists to transfer their troops and

disperse their besiege force. Then, taking full advantage of the results of feint and

deception and the results of the assault performed by the higher level, the rescue fendui

should take the opportunity when the enemy is not on guard or when their force strength

is weak to quickly launch an assault. The rescue fendui should work in conjunction with

the besieged fendui within to breach a path to rescue the besieged fendui.

4. Conceal and ambush, intercept and rescue

If the terrorists are getting ready to deliver to the rear the captured hostages or seized

high-tech weapons and equipment, the rescue fendui can set up ambush at advantageous

terrain features along the corridor where the terrorists must pass through to intercept and

rescue. The rescue fendui should correctly select the area for ambush, set up reasonable

ambush deployment, and practice concealment and camouflage. At the same time, the

rescue fendui should dispatch several observation posts to get a clear understanding of the

movements of the terrorists and prevent the terrorists from changing their course. When

the terrorists enter into the ambush position, the firing fendui should first isolate the

escorting terrorists from the targets to be rescued. Then the main force should encircle the

terrorists, and a part of the force should rapidly rescue the personnel or materials.
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Part IV: Naval Campaigns...500

Chapter 21

Overview...500

Section 1: Definition of a Naval Campaign, Classification of Naval Campaigns...500

I. Definition of a Naval Campaign...500

A naval campaign is the sum of a series of interconnected battles and support activities,

conducted by a Navy campaign large formation alone, or with the coordination and

cooperation of the other service arms, in order to achieve a certain strategic or campaign

goal, per a unified intention and plan {jihua}, within a certain sea area or certain time.

This definition makes clear that the attribute of a naval campaign mainly is a campaign

organized and waged by a Navy campaign large formation. Its basic connotation includes

essential elements such as the naval campaign’s goal, armed strengths, times, battlefields,

and means.

A naval campaign is subject to the guidance of national military strategy, and subject to

the restraints of naval strategy. It can be independently organized and waged, and can

also be organized and waged within the composition of a joint campaign. In localized

wars under high-tech conditions, a naval campaign normally is a critical component of a

joint campaign; it is a major means for executing naval operational missions, and plays a

major role in the struggles for strengthening national defense, resisting invasion,

preserving the unity of the homeland, safeguarding territorial sovereignty, and preserving

maritime rights and interests.

II. Classification of Naval Campaigns...500

Naval campaigns are a macroscopic systems concept; based on the differences in

operational nature, command relationships, operational goals, and operational scale, they

can be divided into different campaign types and patterns {yangshi}. The campaign type

is the basic classification of campaigns; the campaign pattern is a further division of the

campaign type.

(1) Based on operational nature, naval campaigns can be divided into offensive

campaigns and defensive campaigns.

A naval offensive campaign grasps the initiative, with a choice of the campaign launch

opportunity and mode, operational time, operational sea area, and operational objective,

which is favorable to the campaign’s suddenness. Its goals are to seize the initiative on

the sea battlefield, to control a specified sea area and objective, to wipe out the enemy’s

effective strength, to destroy the enemy coast’s major facilities, to deprive the enemy of
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his freedom of sea activities or limit it, and to capture key seacoasts or islands. The main

patterns of naval offensive campaign follow: naval blockade campaign; an offensive

campaign against the enemy’s sea forces groups; a campaign of surprise attacks on the

enemy’s bases, harbors, and coastal key targets; an offensive campaign in a coral

island/reef area; a campaign of sabotage of sea lines; a sea-going nuclear counterattack

campaign; etc.

A naval defensive campaign is one means for resisting an enemy offensive campaign. In

overall terms, it is a passive position; but, based on peacetime preparations, one can

develop in advance a favorable battlefield, and be rested and ready to face the fatigued

enemy’s attack. Its goals are to thwart the enemy’s naval offensive activities, to provide

cover for the security of major strategic campaign objectives, to hold coastal key areas

and islands, and to strive for freedom of one’s own sea activities, so as to create the

conditions for changing over to a counterattack. Based on different campaign goals and

campaign missions, the main patterns of a naval defensive campaign are as follows: a

naval base defensive campaign, a campaign to safeguard sea lines, a naval counterblockade campaign, etc.

(2) Based on the campaign scale, they can be divided into large-scale campaigns and

small-scale campaigns.

A naval large-scale campaign is a large-scale campaign which has a decisive influence on

the war’s overall situation, or assumes a key role during the war. It generally employs the

Navy’s main force or even its entire armed strength, and is directly organized by a Navy

led institution. It has features such as numerous participating strengths, an expansive

battlefield space, diversity in operational methods, a fairly long duration, the

interweaving of attack and defense, and greater complexity in organization of command

and coordination.

A naval small-scale campaign is a relatively small-scale campaign which changes the

campaign situation in a certain direction, in order to achieve a war’s localized (partial)

goals, and has a certain effect on the war’s overall situation. It is normally organized and

waged by a Navy campaign large formation along a certain sea direction. Based on the

mission requirements, it can be independently waged, and can also be carried out within a

joint campaign formation.

(3) Based on the campaign command relationship, naval campaigns can be divided into

naval independent campaigns, or naval campaigns within joint campaigns.

A naval independent campaign is a campaign organized and waged by a Navy campaign

large formation alone, or with Navy forces as primary. It is commanded by a Navy

campaign commander, and its campaign basic mission is fulfilled by Navy forces.

A naval campaign within a joint campaign is a campaign waged by a Navy campaign

large formation within the joint campaign composition, for the purpose of accomplishing
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a naval operational mission assigned by a high level. It is characterized by subordination,

firmness of goal, and complexity of command and coordination.

(4) Based on the campaign space, they can be divided into sea campaigns and littoral

{binlu haiqu} campaigns.

A sea campaign normally is a campaign waged over a vast sea area far from an island or

coast. Its operational activities mainly are conducted on the sea surface, below the

surface, and in the airspace above those waters. Since the battlefield is the vast and

boundless sea and the effects of force maneuvers are greatly enhanced, the campaign

support mission is arduous, the difficulty of campaign command and coordination is high,

and the requirements are stringent.

A littoral campaign is a campaign waged in a sea area bordering dry land. Its operational

activities normally are conducted on the coasts and sea areas with a common land-sea

border. The participating forces are numerous; besides forces for sea maneuver

operations, the Navy coastal defense forces and the Marines – as well as the Army, Air

Force, 2nd Artillery Corps, and People’s Armed Police Force – all can participate;

geographic conditions in the area of operations are complex, and the application of forces

and arms and the operational activities are somewhat affected.

Section 2: Birth and Development of the Naval Campaign...502

I. Birth of the Naval Campaign...502

Naval campaigns have gradually formed and developed in the wake of the continuous

development of social productive forces, and especially that of science and technology

(S&T) and naval warfare. They are a product of the development of social productivity

and S&T standards to a certain stage.

In human history, the earliest naval battles were the 1210 BCE Cyprus Sea Battle and the

549 BCE Wu-Chu Sea Battle during China’s Spring and Autumn Period. However, since

productivity standards in the handicrafts era were low, the navigability of the sea battle

platforms – flat-bottomed oared ships – was poor, and the sea battle arms – bows and

arrows and other cold-steel weapons – were simple and crude, the means of naval warfare

were extremely backward, and the scale of naval warfare was greatly restricted. The main

method of naval warfare was to line up the ships into a row, to rapidly row toward the

enemy, and then use the hard bows to ram the flanks of the enemy ships, in order to

destroy the enemy ships by these collisions, and thus to seize victory in the naval battle.

A secondary method was to get close to the enemy ships, and engage in flank-to-flank

combat and swashbuckling combat, so that the grappling between the combatants would

determine victory or defeat in battle. After the 5th century BCE, with the continuous

development of social productivity, the forms and scale of naval warfare also

continuously and correspondingly developed, as evidenced by the oared-ship era’s

relatively large-scale naval battles such as China’s Wu-Qi Yellow Sea Naval Battle and
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the Naval Battle of Salamis between Greece and Persia. However, due to limitations in

weaponry, the opposing sides very rarely conducted long-range force-unit {budui}

maneuvers and evolution; the battlespace was limited to the range of what the eyes could

see and ears could hear. In the mid-14th century, ships were equipped with smoothbores,

and the naval warfare space began to expand; but its war tactics – other than cannon

warfare – still consisted of short-range ramming warfare and flank-to-flank warfare.

Operational guidance often lay in spontaneous states, and naval warfare was understood

to only involve the most basic operational factors such as allocation of forces, methods of

attack, and battle formations. In the 16th century, with the emergence of sailing ship

fleets, cannons came into wide application in naval warfare, and gradually became the

major weapon determining victory or defeat in naval warfare. By the mid-17th century,

the transition from oared-ship fleets to sailing-ship fleets had basically been completed,

and battle-line tactics gradually became the main tactics in naval warfare. The status of

naval warfare in war had somewhat risen, and there gradually emerged sea battles

independently fought for specific strategic goals. However, due to the feudal separationist

rule in the politics of that time, self-sufficiency in production, and limitations on

handicrafts production standards, naval battles remained the only form of naval

operations at that time, almost all forces in the fleets were thrown into battle at once, and

via a single battle or a few battles one could achieve naval operational goals. Naval

warfare command was still based on visual observation, and was implemented via

conventional signals (flags); this combined strategic command with battle command into

a whole, with no intermediate-level linkup. The Industrial Revolution of the 2nd half of

the 19th century propelled naval warfare into the era of steam power and hot arms. By the

time of the First World War, navies had already developed to become composite services

comprised of all types of service arms: surface ships, submarines, and aviation forces.

The application of each new technology in naval equipment and the continuous

development of all the service arms in the Navy enabled sea operational activities to

center on a unified goal, and to be simultaneously or successively conducted along

several different directions; the patterns of naval warfare multiplied, the scale of forces

and the spatial range of sea operations expanded, capabilities for protracted operations

were enhanced, and command and coordination became more and more complex. Sea

operational activities – no matter whether from the viewpoint of goals, scale, or even

means – clearly always exceeded the scope of sea battles. Hence, between naval wars and

naval battles, there arose in response to the times a new form of naval military conflict:

the naval campaign.

II. Development of Naval Campaigns...503

Naval campaign practice during the First World War did not at all immediately arouse the

attention of the military theory circles of that time. Many essential elements of naval

campaigns, over a very long period, only spontaneously came into existence. After World

War I, the Soviet Union began to seek the Navy’s best organizational authorized strength,

and to prepare to realize various objective conditions of naval campaigns. In the late

1930s, in the wake of Soviet development of total campaign theory, the Soviet Navy

formulated naval campaign principles, and in 1940 issued “Provisional Instructions for
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Conducting Naval Campaigns,” signifying the formation of Soviet Navy campaign

science.

During the Second World War, the scale of sea battles unprecedentedly expanded; naval

campaign practice exhibited a previously unknown development. The opposing sides

threw into battle more than 6000 ships of all types and tens of thousands of aircraft, and

waged 36 fairly large-scale naval campaigns. These had an enormous influence on the

course and outcome of the war. The abundant practical experience of naval campaigns

drove the in-depth development of a naval campaign theory system. Naval campaign

technique – in regard to the struggle for sea lines, amphibious operations, and surprise

attacks, and the theory of base and harbor defense, campaign maneuvers, and the fleet’s

routine battle actions – was very greatly enriched in this period.

After World War II, the rapidly advancing development of technical equipment, and the

widespread application in navies of advanced technology and equipment – as represented

by precision guided munitions (PGMs), nuclear power plants, and automated command

and control (C2) [systems] – caused the modes of application of naval forces and the

patterns of sea battles to undergo totally new changes. In particular, warfare since the

1960s – Middle East sea warfare, Indian-Pakistani sea warfare, the Falklands sea warfare,

the Gulf War, Afghanistan War, and Iraq War – has further demonstrated the totally new

feature of modern localized-war sea warfare. This not only infused completely new

content into naval campaign theory, it simultaneously also promoted the development of

naval campaign practice.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), since its founding in 1949,

independently or in coordination with the [PLA] Army and [PLA] Air Force has executed

more than 1200 naval operations of varying scale, and has amassed relatively abundant

naval warfare experience. PLAN campaign theory is based on the general principles of

Army campaign science; following upon Navy building and the course of operational

training practice, as well as the beneficial experience from selective assimilation and use

of foreign naval experience, via the gradual enrichment and perfection arising in the

process from practice to familiarity, and in the repeat process of further practice yielding

further familiarity, a complete naval campaign theory system having special

characteristics had been formed by the 1980s.

Section 3: Naval Campaign Characteristics and Principles...505

I. Naval Campaign Characteristics...505

With the rapid development of S&T and the social productive forces, various high and

new technologies have seen more widespread application in the military field; naval

campaign forms {xingtai} are now undergoing hitherto unknown changes, and have

assumed the following major development trends and characteristics.
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(1) Campaign strengths’ grouping for integration and versatility (multifunctionality)

In future wars, in one respect, the joint campaign will become the main campaign form

{xingtai}, and a naval campaign will normally be waged within the joint campaign

composition; hence, the composition of naval campaign strengths will tend toward a

multi-elemental quality, and the campaign mission will be executed often with naval

forces as the main body, with the support or enhancement of forces from the other service

arms. In another respect, with the development of S&T, new components in the naval

force structure will constantly spring up: seagoing information warfare (IW) operational

units, special operations units, and psychological warfare units will see widespread

application in operations. In yet another respect, naval campaigns under informationized

war conditions will no longer be simple confrontations {duikang} involving a certain

strength or a certain arm, but instead will be overall contests of all operational strengths

and of all weapons systems. The characteristic of multi-elemental, integrated overall

warfighting {duikang} in the strength structure assumed by naval campaigns will cause

naval campaign strengths grouping to further emphasize integration and versatility

(multifunctionality). This will require having operational elements with a variety of

functions, and – based on operational requirements and changes in the battlefield

situation – will require flexible grouping, to form an overall structure combining multiple

functions into a whole.

(2) Battlefield spatial depth and 3-dimensionality

The continuous emergence and wide application of high-tech weaponry have caused

constant improvements in naval campaign strengths’ reconnaissance and surveillance

capability, long-range precision strike capability, and battlefield maneuver capability, and

constant expansion of the battlefield’s depth. The naval-campaign battlefield space under

informationized conditions not only includes the traditional surface, underwater, and air

[domains], it has also expanded into new areas: space, land, and the electromagnetic,

network, and psychological areas. In particular, the status of the “bipolar” battlefield will

become more prominent. First, the status of the space battlefield has become more

prominent. With the continuous development of space technology, space reconnaissance

platforms, with their characteristic advantages, will further increase the transparency of

the sea battlefield. The wide application of various kinds of space arms and space

weapons will give naval conflicts their first successes in space, and will make clearer the

constraints and effects of the space battlefield on the sea battlefield. Second, the status of

the underwater battlefield has become more prominent. With the continuous development

of underwater forces and arms, various deep-dive submarines and underwater weapons

will bring into play greater effects. The expansion of the naval campaign space into new

areas, and the rise in the status of the “bipolar” battlefield, without question will cause the

naval campaign battlefield space to become further expansive and 3-dimensional, and to

assume the features of a “great battlefield.”
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(3) Greater rapidity in the course and tempo of a campaign

In future naval campaigns, the wide application of high-tech weaponry, and IW and

missile warfare will become the major means to subdue the enemy. Due to great

enhancement in the maneuver capability of forces and firepower and in the hit accuracy

and destructive power of weapons, unprecedented improvements in the operational

effectiveness of the opposing sides, and the discovery of a target meaning the destruction

of that target, the duration of campaigns has thus sharply shortened, and the campaign

course and tempo will further accelerate. With further acceleration in the course and

tempo of campaigns, the status of time factors in naval campaigns will become more

prominent. In any battle, the side that cannot rapidly adopt effective measures may find it

impossible to retrieve a loss. With several past operational methods which exchanged

time for space, it will be difficult to reproduce the effects of former days; use of time to

contend for space will become the inevitable choice in naval campaign development.

(4) Greater flexibility and diversity of campaign patterns and means

The continuous development of high-tech weaponry and its wide application on the sea

battlefield are now causing naval campaign means to undergo deep changes. The

essential elements for winning victory in naval warfare no longer only depend on

intelligence, maneuvers, and firepower; instead, operational patterns such as IW,

aerospace warfare, firepower warfare, maneuver warfare, network warfare, psychological

warfare, and special warfare will simultaneously or alternately be employed, synthesizing

and combining superiorities to subdue the enemy. Naval battles will no longer only be

grapples between arrays and firepower counterattacks; nonlinear operations, noncontact

operations, asymmetric operations, and 3-D surmounting operations will become the

main war tactics in naval campaign operations. How to select the most advantageous

operational patterns and means, and how to the greatest extent to create unequal

conditions on the battlefield, will become the centers of gravity present in campaign

guidance.

(5) Greater arduousness and complexity in campaign rear support missions

In future naval campaigns, the participating strengths will be numerous, the technical

equipment complex, and the battlefield scope expansive; on top of this are sharp

countermeasures, high casualty and equipment loss rates, heavy depletion of materiel,

and a rapid and highly continuous campaign tempo – all of these will cause the

operational activities’ degree of dependence on support to be unprecedentedly increased.

The magnitude of rear support capabilities and the highness of the degree of support will

directly impact the realization of campaign operational (combat) effectiveness, and on the

course and outcome of the operations. The prominence of the rear support status will

cause it to become one of the focal points of operations; both opposing sides will spare no

effort to ensure the security of their respective campaign’s rear and to smoothly execute

rear support, and simultaneously will also make every attempt to strike at and damage the

enemy’s various rear support facilities and transportation lines. Hence, naval campaign
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rear support not only will have a wide range, abundant content, and stringent

requirements on time effectiveness, but will also assume a tendency toward high

difficulty and high intensity. These factors will thus cause the maritime support

environment to constantly deteriorate, and the support missions to be more arduous and

complex.

II. Principles of Naval Campaigns...507

The basic principles of naval campaigns are the norms guiding naval campaign

preparations and operational activities. They are the code of conduct and the overall

requirements for a naval campaign commander to correctly realize operational guidance

and battlefield control, and to seize the battlefield initiative. Under high-tech conditions,

organization and execution of a naval campaign should abide by the following basic

principles:

(1) Full preparations

Full preparations are an important condition for obtaining initiative and victory in a naval

campaign. Having superiority without preparations, the side taking up battle in haste on

the spot will inevitably fall into a passive position and lose superiority. Having inferiority

with preparations, quite often one can defeat an enemy with superiority but lacking

preparations. In naval campaign operations under high-tech conditions, situations are

complex and rapidly changing, with greater suddenness and destructiveness; only by

having full preparedness can one subdue the enemy. The main content of naval campaign

preparations are as follows: uninterrupted reconnaissance and intelligence collection,

accurate analysis and assessment of situations, and meticulous planning and organization

of the campaign; stealthy assembly of troops and conducting of battlefield preparations;

highly effective conduct of political mobilization and imminent battle training; and

comprehensive organization of operational support and materiel reserves. The basic

requirements of operational preparations are as follows: unified-overall-planning of the

overall situation, giving prominence to key points, and successfully resolving the key

point issues affecting the overall situation; take into consideration starting from the most

complex and most difficult situations, formulate a variety of courses of action, and have

in advance many preparations {zhunbei}; scientifically employ time, and tightly grab

onto all preparation work; not only must one secretly and covertly conduct preparations

and prevent the enemy’s disruptions, but one must also actively adopt measures to

ascertain and disrupt the enemy’s operational preparations.

(2) Active offensives

Naval campaigns are characterized by shifting battle lines, as well as by high

maneuverability and high offensiveness of naval forces, and the unmeasured vastness of

the seas, with their lack of a tenable base. Hence, naval operational goals often must be

realized by offensive means, via destruction of the enemy ships and other campaign

tactical targets. Active execution of offensive operations both is required for giving full
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play to the characteristics of naval forces, and is an objective requirement for large-scale

elimination of the enemy and effective preservation of friendly forces, and thus for

seizing the battlefield initiative. Hence, during naval offensive campaigns, one should –

based on the campaign goal and sea battlefield posture – flexibly employ force-strengths,

cleverly apply and change the various fighting methods, fully use initiative to initiate

campaign superiority, implement effective strikes against the enemy to catch him

unaware, and strive for the advantage of first opportunity. During naval defensive

campaigns, one should also see that the offensive spirit permeates from start to finish; via

attacks with active initiative, expose the enemy’s weak points and throw into chaos the

enemy’s disposition; and achieve the goal of a stable defense by using attack to aid

defense.

(3) Concentration of strengths

Concentration of strengths is a general rule in the military. Naval campaigns on a

background of high-tech localized war have a highly strategic quality and firm

operational goals, require fighting a quick battle to reach a quick decision and thus realize

the campaign intention as fast as possible, and even more require concentrated

application of strengths to form the momentum of a heavy blow on the enemy. In

particular, in the situation of weapons and equipment being in an inferior state,

concentration of strengths even more is an important magic weapon for overcoming the

enemy and winning victory.

In naval campaigns under informationized conditions, battlefield transparency is high,

weapon lethal destructive power is great, and situations change rapidly; concentration of

strengths will be faced with several new difficulties. Hence, one must take note of the

following few points: the first is to lay stress on the quality of the concentration. Only by

having the superiority of quality can one truly have the superior position. Concentration

of strengths should be based on sea operational requirements; while ensuring sufficient

numerical superiority, one should also stress concentrated application of limited hightech, high-quality elite forces and weapons, so as to use friendly strong points to attack

the enemy’s shortcomings. Second is to grasp the scale of the concentration.

Concentration of strengths requires paying attention to science, calculating the troops to

use against the enemy, and establishing a reasonable superiority in relative strength. On

the premise of ensuring superiority over the enemy, one must strive to save on troops,

reduce senseless waste, and increase operational benefit. Third is to emphasize the

methods of concentration. Concentration of strengths should be covertly and quickly

achieved on the basis of maneuver and camouflage. One must achieve mutual integration

of force strength concentration and firepower concentration, mutual integration of space

concentration with time concentration, and mutual integration of pre-established

concentration with mobile concentration. Simultaneously, one must be skilled at

sabotaging the enemy’s concentrations, and forcing the enemy into a dispersed and

unfavorable posture, so as to favor our rapid attainment of superiority over the enemy.
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(4) Strike the enemy’s vital areas

Striking the enemy’s vital areas means concentration of strengths to attack critical quality

targets affecting the course and outcome of a campaign, so as to achieve the

predetermined campaign goal. Naval campaign operations under high-tech conditions –

due to their having the qualities of system confrontation {duikang} and overall

confrontation – are good for attacking the enemy’s vital areas {yaohai} and critical parts

{guanjian buwei}, enabling one to rapidly paralyze the enemy’s entire operational

system, fundamentally alter the confrontation between the enemy strengths and ours, and

achieve the operational effect of yielding twice the result with half the effort. Striking the

enemy’s vital areas requires achieving an organic unity of key-point force application and

selection of vital areas, but the crux lies in precisely selecting the vital areas. When

selecting vital areas, one cannot proceed from general and abstract concepts, but must –

based on the campaign’s nature and the specific conditions in all phases of the campaign,

and bearing in mind the strategic and campaign overall situations – assiduously analyze

the status, effects, and interrelationships of all types of enemy targets in the campaign,

and find out which key links playing a supporting role in the enemy’s operational system

serve as vital-area targets. Key-point force application requires daring to and knowing

how to concentrate and apply forces against vital area targets, comprehensive use of

many kinds of strengths and means, selection of favorable opportunities for battle,

adoption of the war tactics of flexible maneuvers, implementation of key-point strikes,

proving effective at one stroke, and driving the development of the campaign overall

situation.

(5) Concealment (stealth) and suddenness

Concealment and suddenness are critical conditions for seizing battlefield initiative and

striving for gain at the first opportunity for battle. Concealed, sudden activities enable

one to take the enemy by surprise, and thus to create chaos in his command and mistakes

in his activities, reduce his weapon effectiveness, sharply weaken his combat power, and

moreover enable one to generate intense psychological shock, which is favorable to our

winning a relatively great victory at a relatively low cost. In naval operations under hightech conditions, the tempo of strikes is extremely fast; the side which meets with a

sudden strike has very little time to restore the balance and organize a counterattack. This

makes the effects of suddenness in naval operations even more prominent, and the

struggle to contend for suddenness will become abnormally intense. On one hand, the

high-speed maneuver capability and long-range strike capability of modern naval forces

have created favorable conditions for achieving suddenness; on the other hand, the use of

various kinds of advanced reconnaissance technology has made it more difficult for naval

forces to execute stealthy maneuvers. The technical conditions for bringing into play

suddenness and limiting suddenness develop almost simultaneously in naval operations,

which has caused the struggle for and creation of suddenness in naval operations to

become ever more dependent on command skill. In order to strive for and create

suddenness, when organizing and waging a naval campaign, one must have thorough

overall-planning and full preparations; accurately understand and grasp the enemy
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situation, and promptly discover and utilize the enemy’s misconceptions and being

unaware; strictly guard military secrets and assiduously conceal the campaign intention;

make full use of modern means of camouflage and favorable climatic and geographical

conditions, to ensure the concealment qualities of force strength activities; be adept at

selecting time-opportunities, cleverly feint, and suddenly initiate the campaign at a time

and a sea area unexpected by the enemy; and be adept in employing new weapons and

new fighting methods, and suddenly strike the enemy. At the same time, one must also

adopt effective being on guard measures, and realistically prevent the enemy’s possible

sudden raids.

(6) Flexibility and multiple stratagems

Flexibility and resourcefulness are the concentrated embodiment of command skill. If one

wants to control a war, one must have resourceful and decisive command. The victory of

the resourceful and decisive, and the defeat of the brave lacking resourcefulness, is a truth

repeatedly verified in the practice of war. Under given material conditions, advanced

military thought and its embodied stratagems are levers for accumulating and

transforming operational capabilities; the more a military’s forces are weakened and its

equipment in an inferior state, the more one must to the maximum degree bring into play

the wisdom of commanders at all levels, and transform spiritual factors into material

forces, so as to create conditions for seizing victory in the campaign. In future naval

campaign operations, China has the possibility of operations against a naval great power,

under conditions where the enemy is strong and we are weak, on top of which are

complex and rapidly changing sea battlefield conditions; these will require commanders

to bring into play superb combat skills, to widely apply military strategy, and to artfully

formulate clever stratagems. Being flexible means one must flexibly employ forcestrengths, flexibly vary fighting methods, flexibly apply firepower, and flexibly change

plans {jihua}. Resourcefulness means the need to discern what others cannot, to have

acute insight, to be able and resourceful, to be courageous and knowledgeable, and to

make decisions on the spot. Flexibility and resourcefulness are established on the basis of

a comprehensive grasp of the situations, and an understanding of the peculiarities of both

sides and of the natural geographic conditions in the operational sea area. They require

commanders to have very good character of thinking and relatively high campaign

tactical accomplishment, to fully grasp the battlefield situation, to be favorably guided by

circumstances {yinshi lidao} in dealing with activities, and to flexibly employ forcestrengths and fighting methods.

(7) Integrated-whole adjusting coordination

In future naval campaigns, the participating strengths will be numerous, the weaponry

unusual, the battlefield spaces intersecting and overlapping, and the operational means

multiple and diverse; only by tightly combining the various strengths participating in a

campaign, comprehensively using the various operational forms and operational means,

and fully bringing into play overall power, can one realize the superiority of system

countermeasures and seize the battlefield initiative.
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The principle of overall coordination is applicable to the operational and support

activities of the Navy’s various participating service arms, and also to the same activities

of the Navy together with the other service arms participating in the campaign. As for the

main measures for achieving overall coordination, one is unified operational thought.

Commanders at all levels must comprehensively and deeply grasp the higher levels’

intent, and resolutely maintain the centralized unified command of the campaign

headquarters. Second is scientific conducting of force grouping. The various forces

participating in operations must be scientifically grouped, based on the operational

mission requirements and the features of the various forces, to strive for the maximum

operational effectiveness of the entire sea operational force. Third is establishment of a

rational, integrated battlefield structure, plus proper handling of the different operational

areas and of the relationship between the main and secondary operational directions, to

facilitate to the maximum degree the realization of the overall superiority of sea

operational strengths. Fourth is the need to adopt coordinated, consistent activities. Clear

and definite specification of the sequence of activities for all forces and of the methods

for their mutual coordination ensures that the campaign strengths will act in coordinated,

consistent fashion. Fifth is the need for comprehensive adoption of all kinds of

operational modes and operational means. Soft- and hard-kill means such as missile

warfare, IW, mine warfare, air raid warfare, meteorological warfare, and psychological

warfare, based on the battlefield’s different situations, must be comprehensively

employed to form a comprehensive strike power. Sixth is close attention to the

campaign’s evolving situations, timely supervisory guidance and coordination of the

activities among all participating forces, mandatory strict coordination of discipline, and

prevention of coordinated activities from encountering interference and sabotage. In case

coordinated activities undergo a departure, one must immediately perform adjustment

and recovery, to ensure that the campaign system is balanced and stable.

(8) Comprehensive support

Comprehensive support in a campaign includes several categories, such as operational

support, logistic support, and equipment technical support. The goal of comprehensive

support is to ensure that the participating forces can smoothly execute the operational

mission and maintain continued operational capability. In naval campaigns under modern

high-tech conditions, the support scope is broad, the varieties are numerous, the missions

are crucial, and the organization and execution are complex. Moreover, the Navy’s

specialized support units are small in number and limited in capabilities; the

contradictions between requirements and possibilities are exceptionally prominent. To

this end, one must – based on the campaign mission and battlefield situations:

comprehensively plan {guihua}, unify, adjust, and allocate the campaign support

strengths; lay stress on key points, and prioritize the operational requirements for the

support’s main direction, main forces, critical areas, and key times, avoid by all means

dividing one’s forces evenly, and make decentralized use of support strengths; do a good

job of mobilization and requisition of regional manpower and material resources, and of

organizing the coordination work; flexibly employ all types of support strengths and

material sources, comprehensively use all kinds of support modes, and enable support

activities via various routes to be mutually complementary and supportive, to ensure that
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the campaign is smoothly conducted; and pay attention to economic use of support forces

and materiel, and leave the corresponding reserve support strengths, in order to deal with

suddenly emerging unexpected situations, enhance battlefield construction, and expand

various kinds of operational materiel reserves, to ensure having sufficient potential. In

addition, one must constantly increase the support system’s self-protection capability and

survivability, and adopt a variety of measures to reduce the enemy’s surprise-attack

effectiveness and destructiveness against the support system.

Section 4: Naval Campaign Preparations and Execution...511

I. Naval Campaign Preparations...511

Naval campaign preparations are the process for conducting campaign overall-planning

and organizing by the naval campaign commander, and the basis for the activity

{huodong} of the naval campaign. Its work includes materiel preparation and spiritual

preparation. Of these, the most basic contents are setting of the campaign resolution,

determination of the campaign bushi disposition, formulation of the campaign plan

{jihua}, organization of campaign coordination, and conducting the imminent battle

preparations.

(1) Setting the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution is the basis for organization and command of a campaign and

the foundation for the forces’ activities. Setting the campaign resolution is a decisive

activity {huodong} of the campaign commander made for the operational goals and main

activities, and is a central link of naval campaign command. The general procedure and

main operating content in setting of the naval campaign resolution are as follows:

1. Understanding the mission, and grasping the intent

Understanding the mission means getting a clear understanding of what the high-level

commanders are requiring the Navy to do, and what goals and benchmarks are to be

reached. Grasping the intent means getting a clear understanding of the overall intent of

the high-level commanders for the campaign’s overall situation, to facilitate keeping the

overall situation in mind, and planning and preparing the naval operational activities

tightly centering on an operation’s overall situation. Understanding the mission and

grasping the intent mainly proceed from four respects: one is understanding and grasping

the overall mission and overall intent of the current operation. Second is understanding

and grasping the naval campaign’s mission and nature, goals, and requirements. Third is

understanding and grasping the status and role of a naval campaign in an operation’s

overall situation, as well as the campaign’s interconnection with and constraints from

political and diplomatic struggles. Fourth is understanding and grasping the missions of

friendly forces and their relationship to the naval campaign.
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2. Analyzing and assessing the situation

Analyzing and assessing the situation is the activity {huodong} of conducting

comprehensive analytic study on all aspects of situations related to carrying out a naval

campaign, and the activity {huodong} of obtaining conclusions. Its goal is to make clear

the operational environmental factors – the enemy, friendly forces, and the sea – faced in

achieving the predetermined campaign objective. The main contents for analyzing and

assessing the situation and the conclusions that should be obtained are as follows. First

are: the enemy navy’s operational intention, task-organization and bushu disposition of

strengths, operational capabilities and strong and weak points; the firepower warfare,

electronic warfare (EW), intelligence warfare {qingbaozhan}, psychological warfare, and

camouflage and deception methods and means which the enemy navy can employ; the

types, quantities, and directions of high-tech arms that can be employed by the enemy

navy; and the assistance and support which the enemy navy may obtain during

operations. Second are: the quantities, quality, and operational capability of the PLA

Navy force-strengths and arms; the capabilities of the other services’ assisting forcestrengths carrying out missions, and their activity {xingdong} characteristics; the state

and capabilities of the PLA Navy’s operational logistic support and technical support; the

methods of friendly forces carrying out missions and their [methods’] relationship to

naval operations; and the favorable and unfavorable factors for the PLA Navy to

complete pre-determined missions, as well as problems that need to be resolved. Third

are: the natural environmental characteristics such as the geographical, hydrological,

meteorological, day-night light and darkness, and land areas of the operational sea areas

and interrelated sea areas, and the effects they may produce on the naval operational

activities of both sides; the social environment characteristics of the operational sea area;

and the material and technical conditions that can be provided for exploitation, as well as

the assisting operational capabilities of the masses. Fourth are: the sustainable time and

developing trends of sea operations; the constraining degree of factors such as political,

diplomatic, international laws and regulations, etc. on naval operational activities.

3. Hearing reports and recommendations

The naval campaign commander, in the process of considering the resolution, should hear

situation reports from the headquarters and from all professional departments. As for

modes, these reports can be heard in a concentrated fashion, and can also be heard

individually; they can be respective reports from all the professional departments, and

can also be a composite report from the Chief of Staff; they can be oral reports, and also

can be written reports.

4. Forming decisions

The campaign commander – based on understanding of the mission, grasp of the intent,

analysis and assessment of the situation, and hearing of reports and recommendations –

should promptly form optimized decisions on the naval campaign goals and on a series of
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major problems in achieving those goals, and form decisions. The main contents are as

follows:

(i) Determining the campaign intention

The campaign intention is the core part of the campaign resolution, and in concentrated

fashion reflects the goals and means which the campaign commander requires to be

achieved. The campaign intention normally includes factors such as the campaign goals,

operational objectives, main direction, and basic war fighting methods.

—Determining the campaign goals

The campaign goals are the anticipated results that must be achieved by the Navy

campaign large formation in order to accomplish the mission assigned by higher levels.

The basic requirements in determining the campaign goals are conformance to the highlevel intent, conformance to objective reality, and having succinct and clear content.

Under ordinary situations, the goals of a naval offensive campaign are to wipe out the

enemy’s effective strength, or seize enemy-occupied areas (objectives); the goals of a

naval defensive campaign are to defend a given area (objective) and to thwart the enemy

offensive’s intention. In terms of a specific campaign, one should – based on the differing

goals, natures, and forms – determine the corresponding campaign goals.

—Determining operational objectives

Operational objectives are the enemy’s effective strength, areas, and facilities against

which one must execute strikes, in order to achieve the campaign targets. A naval

campaign’s operational objectives mainly are the enemy navy’s force formations, as well

as important military facilities – naval bases, harbors, airfields, etc. In a single campaign,

one normally selects one main operational objective and several secondary operational

objectives. The main operational objective should have a great effect on the strategic

campaign, play a supporting role in the enemy’s sea operational system, be advantageous

to one’s own rapid achievement of the campaign goals, be appropriate to the campaign’s

specific conditions, and facilitate the objective of the campaign’s smooth development.

The secondary operational objectives are the targets against which one must execute

strikes in order to complement the activities of the main operational objective. One

normally selects as secondary operational objectives those objectives which are closely

linked to the main operational objective or which pose the greatest or most direct threat to

the main operational activities.

—Determining the main operational direction

The operational direction is the directional activities area where the campaign large

formation executes missions. Selection of the operational direction is the key to forming a

favorable campaign posture, and is also the main basis for a campaign large formation’s

division of missions and organization of campaign coordination. The main operational
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direction normally is the activities area for the campaign large formation’s main

operational force, or the area occupied by the main operational objective. In order to

concentrate the application of campaign strengths, there should only be one main

operational direction in a single campaign and within the same time. The main

operational direction should be: advantageous to direct, rapid achievement of the

campaign goals; have a spatial range adapted to the scale of the forces thrown in and to

the operational activities, and sea-area natural conditions as much as possible satisfying

the features of the activities of all participating forces; and, within the composite

operational radius of the main forces and the campaign command and control (C2) range,

facilitate maintaining links to all other operational directions, and adapt to possible

changes in the battlefield situation.

—Determining the campaign’s basic fighting methods

The campaign’s basic fighting methods are the main methods and forms of the various

battle patterns adopted by the campaign large formation in the course of campaign

execution. Their contents normally include the following: a campaign development

phase; the campaign’s arrangement of the various battle patterns, and the order and

methods for their application; linkup and coordination among the various battle patterns;

and adoption of the times, directions, sea areas, and objectives corresponding to all kinds

of battles. Determination of the campaign’s basic fighting methods should be based on

the nature and requirements of the naval campaign mission, and should bear in mind what

is advantageous to attacking the enemy’s weak points and leveraging one’s strong points,

and what is advantageous to seizing the campaign initiative.

(2) Determining the campaign bushi disposition

The campaign bushi disposition is based on the campaign intention and the battlefield

conditions, bears in mind creation of a favorable battlefield posture, and performs

operational grouping and deployment {peizhi} of the campaign strengths.

1. Organized grouping for operations

A naval campaign, based on the mission, normally divides the participating force

strengths into groupings – as several force strength groups and reserves. Each force

strength group can be composed of an unequal-scale single service arm, or a combined

formation {hecheng biandui} of all service arms. The general division of the organized

grouping is as follows: main operational force strength group, advance operational force

strength group, auxiliary operational force strength group, screening force strength group,

support force strength group, and campaign reserves.

The campaign’s main operational force strength group is the main body of the campaign

bushu disposition, and accomplishes the campaign’s main missions. It is normally

composed of the main strengths participating in the campaign.
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The campaign’s advance operational force strength group is the force strength group

within the campaign bushu disposition which creates the conditions for the main

operational activities. Its mission is to soften the main operational objective in advance,

or to hinder the enemy’s main operational force strength group’s activities. Force strength

task organization is normally determined according to the needs-requirements for

accomplishing the mission and battlefield situations.

The campaign’s auxiliary operational force strength group is the force strength group

within the campaign bushu disposition used for assisting and supporting in coordination

with the main operational activities. Its missions are to complement the main operational

force strength group and to conceal the operational intention so as to create conditions for

the smooth development of the main operational activities. Examples include

diversionary groups and feinting groups. Force strength task organization normally is

determined based on the needs-requirements of the main operational force strength group

and on the battlefield situation.

The campaign screening force strength group’s main missions are to block the enemy

surprise attacks on our campaign large formation’s force strengths, to ensure that the

campaign is smoothly conducted. Force strength task organization normally is

determined by looking at the nature, degree, and scope of the enemy threat that may be

faced by the main operational force strength group.

The campaign support force strength group’s main mission is to carry out various

campaign specialized support. This group is composed of corresponding support

strengths.

The campaign reserves’ main mission is to handle unexpected situations that may arise in

the course of a campaign, and to ensure that the preassigned mission is smoothly fulfilled.

They are normally task organized with rapid assault strengths.

2. Force strength deployment {peizhi}

Campaign force strength deployment is the arrangement of participating force-strengths

within a certain time and space, and on the basis of the operational organized grouping, it

adheres to factors such as the operational phases, the sequence of activities, the situation

in the operational sea areas, the force-strength stationing conditions, and the possible

activities of the enemy.

Under ordinary situations, all operational force strengths should be near their main

activities’ sea areas to conceal the deployment {peizhi}, the support force strengths must

be allocated according to the corresponding operational force strengths, and the campaign

reserves are allocated in a maneuver position convenient to support of all operational

directions; long-range force strengths are allocated in depth, short-range force strengths

are allocated at the forward edge, and maneuver force strengths are allocated from their

original main bases and ports. The requirements of force strength deployment are being
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advantageous for accomplishing predetermined missions, being advantageous for

concealment and security, and being advantageous for employing maneuver and

concentration.

(3) Formulating the campaign plan {jihua}

The campaign plan is the specific embodiment of the campaign commander’s resolution,

and is the basis for organizing and commanding the campaign activities. Hence,

formulation of the campaign plan is a critical link in organizing and preparing the

campaign, and is also one of the basic duties of the command organ.

The campaign plan includes the following: the campaign operational plan, the campaign

rear support plan, and the campaign political work plan. The campaign operational plan

also includes the campaign operational activities plan and the campaign operational

support plan. Among these, the campaign operational activities plan is the core and main

part of the campaign plan.

After the naval campaign commander sets the resolution, they should immediately

instruct the Chief of Staff to take charge over formulation of the naval operational

activities plan, and issue clear guidance on several major issues related to the overall

situation; examples include assessment of and conclusions on the enemy situation, the

basic operational resolution, operational bushu disposition, division of operational

phases, the main objects {duixiang}, sea areas and time-opportunities for strikes, and

predictions for the main situations in each phase, as well as [gaming-] approach {duice}

to be adopted. The campaign operational activities plan should make clear the following:

the assessment and conclusions on the enemy navy’s situation; the higher-level intent and

the Navy’s operational missions; the operational bushu disposition and the methods,

means, and steps for completing the pre-determined missions; relationships with friendly

force-units, and mutual responsibilities; the initiation time for pre-determined operational

activities and the time limit for completing preparations; anticipated situations in each

phase of the campaign and activity courses of action {xingdong fang’an}; and content

such as the organizing and modes of command, as well as measures for controlling and

adjusting-coordination of force-unit activities under various situations.

After guiding his command headquarters to successfully formulate the campaign

operational activity plan {jihua}, the naval campaign commander should also instruct the

concerned organs and concerned departments to formulate the naval campaign

operational support plan {jihua}, the campaign rear support plan, and the campaign

political work plan, and provide the necessary guidance.

The basic requirements for formulating a naval campaign plan are as follows: being

thorough and detailed, being clear and specific, scientific and rigorous, and allow for

unforeseen situations. One must plan in detail for the basic COA, the main direction, and

the current mission; the remaining reserve COAs, secondary directions, and follow-on

missions can be planned in outline form {gailüe jihua}. The mode of formulation of a
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naval campaign plan should be somewhat differentiated based on differences in the

campaign nature. Under ordinary situations, an offensive campaign is planned according

to the mission-fulfillment phases; defensive campaigns are planned according to the

operational directions and the operational COA. Their basic forms are: sea-chart

notational form, network chart form, tabular form, and written form.

(4) Organizing campaign coordination

Organization of naval campaign coordination normally is transmitted to lower levels by

instructions from the naval campaign commander; the Chief of Staff organizes the

headquarters and specifically plans and prepares jointly with the subordinate force-group

commanders, as well as with the commanders of the service arms concerned. The basic

steps in organizing naval campaign coordination are as follows:

1. Issuing the instruction for organizing campaign coordination

When the naval campaign commander is determining the campaign resolution, he should

issue the instructions for organizing naval campaign coordination and determine the

coordination principles and requirements.

2. Formulating the campaign coordination plan

The naval campaign command organ, based on the senior officer’s resolution and the

instructions for organizing naval campaign coordination formulates the naval campaign

coordination plan under the leadership of the chief of staff. Its contents normally include:

division of the campaign phases; the enemy’s bushu disposition in each phase and

possible activity scenarios {xingdong shexiang}; the missions of each force strength

groupings and the activities sequence and methods; friendly force missions and methods

for coordinating with them; standard criteria {jizhun} force strengths for campaign

coordination or standard criteria activities; command relationships and command post

locations; and relevant stipulations for adjusting-coordination and control.

3. Convening the campaign coordination meeting

With the campaign commander in charge, convene the campaign organ leadership, force

strength grouping commanders and force-unit commanders of other participating

services, and hold a campaign coordination meeting to make clear the campaign

coordination plan and specifically study and resolve relevant issues in campaign

coordination. Clarify the relevant stipulations of position and role, activities sequence and

adjusting-coordination and control for the respective force-units (departments) of

participating force strengths in campaign coordination.
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4. Implementing simulation inspection-testing for campaign coordination

Employ command automation systems {xitong} to perform computer derivations {weiji

tuiyan}, conduct chart derivations, or conduct live force exercises to inspect-test the

naval campaign coordination plan, and to obtain substantiation and improvements; at the

same time, familiarize participating force strengths with the naval campaign coordination

plan.

5. Issuing the campaign coordination instructions

As soon as the naval campaign coordination plan is determined, it is signed by the naval

campaign large formation Chief of Staff. After it is approved by the naval campaign

commander, the campaign command organ immediately issues it the naval campaign

coordination instructions, and makes the naval campaign coordination plan serve as an

attachment to the operational plan, and sends it to all participating force strengths.

(5) Conducting imminent battle preparations

Imminent battle preparations are an important work in the campaign organizing and

preparation phase, and are a prelude to campaign implementation. The content of naval

campaign imminent battle preparations mainly are: battlefield preparation, campaign

strength preparation, and organizing the campaign’s preparatory [advance] unfolding

{yuxian zhankai}.

1. Battlefield preparations

The content of battlefield imminent battle preparations includes battlefield reconnoitering

{zhanchang kancha}, battlefield construction, and adding equipment {bujia shebei}.

—Battlefield reconnoitering {kancha}

Battlefield reconnoitering is conducting actual site survey {shidi diaocha} of the

predetermined operational area. This is mainly ascertaining the terrain, transport,

engineering, and rear facilities, the capabilities for manpower and materiel power

mobilization, the situations of harbors and navigational routes, the hydrological and

meteorological situations, and assessment of the advantageous and disadvantageous

factors on campaign activities.

—Battlefield construction

Battlefield construction is partial (localized) reconditioning and construction performed

on the basis of peacetime construction, and according to operational requirements. This

mainly involves construction of the necessary observation and communications positions,
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coastal defense positions, ship and aircraft stationing system, rear support bases and

hangars and supply points, and coastal command posts at all levels.

—Battlefield addition of equipment

Battlefield addition of equipment means the necessary replenishment and enhancement of

the original battlefield equipment, performed according to campaign mission

requirements. This mainly includes the following: arranging-set up {布设 bushe} and

strengthening of various obstacles; augmenting-set up {增设 zengshe} or strengthening

sea navigation and channel facilities; unfolding mobile observation communication

equipment and radio beacons; setting up temporary mooring and resupply points;

repairing-building or modifying addition of equipment such as pipelines and

communication lines.

2. Preparations of campaign strengths

The campaign strengths’ organizational and preparatory work normally includes political

thought preparation, force strength and weaponry preparation, and organizing imminent

battle training.

—Political thought preparation

The main contents of political thought preparation are: conducting campaign political

mobilization, and enhancing the sense of honor and sense of duty for force-units to

complete missions; strengthening education in patriotism and revolutionary heroism, and

elevating the battle-seeking sentiment and battle will of the force-units; strengthening

education in the collective view and policy discipline, and elevating the force-units’

awareness of joint operations, awareness of coordination, awareness of obedience, and

policy standards.

—Force strength and weaponry preparation

Force strength and weaponry preparation means adjusting the organization of

participating force strengths and weapons and equipment and suit them to operational

requirements. First, on the basis of the campaign bushi disposition, differentiate and

adjust participating force strengths, compose the various force strength groupings, and

perfect their organizational systems {xitong}. Second is: successfully accomplish

technical and materiel replenishment; improve availability rate of ships, aircraft, and

other weapons and equipment; accomplish complete equipment at full strength; and be in

a state of readiness.
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—Organizing imminent battle training

Imminent battle training is enhancing the operational adaptability of participating force

strengths and elevating the effective measures of combat power. Imminent battle training

must suit [adapt to] the campaign missions and conditions, and must be conducted in a

focused manner on the basis of the specific missions undertaken by each force-unit and

the battlefield environment. Imminent battle training should be covertly conducted so as

to avoid revealing the campaign intention and being subjected to enemy disruption.

3. Organizing the campaign’s advance [preparatory] unfolding

Campaign advance unfolding is precisely commanding all participating force strengths to

enter on-station to their getting underway standby sea (land) area from their original

station-anchorage sea (land) area so as to prepare to initiate the campaign. Organizing the

naval campaign’s advance unfolding should pay attention to successfully mastering the

following issues:

—The time-opportunity for advance unfolding must be appropriate. Normally one should

implement unfolding when the campaign strengths have basically completed the

operational preparations, and one has assessed that the enemy situation – especially the

enemy situation in the main operational direction – will not have any fundamental

changes.

—The position of the getting underway standby sea (land) area of readiness must be

suitable. Normally one should select a sea (land) area beneficial for maneuvering towards

the pre-determined operational area and beneficial for concealment and safety.

—Strive for concealment, speed and security of the activities of force strength unfolding.

Normally, it is conducted utilizing the dark of night and adverse weather conditions, and

maintain strict secrecy measures, as well as implement radio silence and blackouts.

Carefully organize screening, guarding and various support measures. When necessary,

organize feints, and create misconceptions on the enemy side.

—After the force strengths enter the standby sea (land) area, one must strictly perform

camouflage, augment protection, and tightly grasp the accomplishment of the operational

start-up preparations so as to not lose the time-opportunity to commit forces to combat.

II. Implementation of a Naval Campaign...519

Campaign implementation is the process wherein a naval campaign large formation

fulfills campaign missions to achieve the campaign goals, according to the campaign

resolution and the operational plan {jihua}, under centralized unified command.
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In the naval campaign implementation phase, the campaign commander should: closely

monitor the battlefield, and at all times grasp the actual situations of an operation’s

progress; constantly perform forecasts and maintain an initiative position with control

and adjusting-coordination; rigorously supervise and guide force-units in carrying out and

executing their orders; closely adjust-coordination of force-unit {budui} activities so that

the at-sea force-strengths from start to finish maintain the forming of an operational

center of gravity, a sharp offensive momentum, a favorable posture and an integratedwhole power; examine the time-measure the circumstances {shenshi duoshi} and at the

appropriate time, modify the operational bushu disposition so as to accelerate the course

of operations.

(1) Initiation of a campaign

The naval campaign commander should – based on the resolution and plan already set –

anticipate, create, and grasp favorable opportunities, and at the proper moment launch the

campaign. An offensive campaign in the initial phase is in an active status; based on the

campaign plan and battlefield situation, one can autonomously determine the launch time

and mode. Normally one employs the mode of an electronic attack integrated with

firepower strikes, stealthily and suddenly launched, to seize a victory in the first battle. A

defensive campaign in the initial phase is in a passive status; hence, one must do a good

job of fully preparing, promptly discover signs of an enemy attack, adopt vigorous

activities to thwart the enemy’s first strike, throw into chaos his offensive disposition,

and struggle for the campaign initiative.

(2) Critical-quality combat [battles]

Critical-quality combat is combat in a campaign which has a decisive battle nature, and

which fulfills the main operational missions. It is of major significance for propelling a

campaign’s development and affecting a campaign’s course and outcome. A campaign

commander should pay relatively great attention, and at the necessary time even go so far

as to directly organize and command the critical-quality battles in the campaign, so as to

turn around the war situation or to inflict major damage on the enemy.

In organizing a critical battle, one should – based on the campaign intention, balance of

strengths, and battlefield posture: promptly ascertain the situation, and create

advantageous conditions; correctly select the strike targets, opportunities, and sea areas;

concentrate force strength and weaponry; enhance control of the battlefield and support

for operational activities; and coordinate relations with other battle activities, so that they

are established on the basis of conforming to the campaign’s overall situation and really

having an assurance of winning a victory. In a critical battle, one should: strive for

implementation according to the assigned time, sea area, and mode; resolutely achieve

the assigned battle goal; and not waver due to temporary difficulties and local (partial)

losses. Simultaneously, one must adopt all measures for timely blocking and overcoming

the occurrence and development of unfavorable situations, and ensuring the success of

the key battle.
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(3) Campaign phase transitioning

Campaign phase transitioning is the process, via force strength and weaponry maneuvers,

of adjusting or modifying the bushu disposition and achieving transition-quality changes

of each campaign phase and their interlinking. Campaign phase transitioning is conducted

during the course of campaign implementation and in accordance with the operational

plan and the developing trends on the battlefield, and is an important key-link {zhongyao

guanjie} in commanding campaign activities. The naval campaign commander should

anticipate the campaign’s developing trends, grasp the favorable time opportunities, and

at the right time, transition the campaign phase. The time opportunity for campaign phase

transitioning is normally when the previous phase’s operational missions are basically

completed, and the next phase’s operational preparations are by and large ready; at such

time, the battlefield’s general posture is favorable for the next phase’s operations. Hence,

one should strive to smoothly complete the current phase’s missions, to create desirable

conditions for transitioning into the follow-on phase, and to organically interlink each

campaign phase. Organization of campaign phase transitioning must be based on the

campaign’s developing trends, prompt adjustment of force strength bushu disposition,

stipulated operational missions of subordinate force strengths in the follow-on phase and

new coordination and support relationships; determination of the transitioning sequence

for campaign activities, and prevention of disjointedness in campaign activities; and

mandatory adoption of various kinds of camouflage and screening measures, ensuring the

concealment and safety of phase transitioning.

(4) Use of campaign reserves

Campaign reserves are the mobile force strength groups, within the campaign

composition, that are directly controlled and employed by the campaign commander; they

are an important component of campaign bushu disposition.

Opportunities for use of campaign reserves normally are: when one enhances the

strengths for main battles in order to seize a decisive victory; when victory has

developed, to exploit the victory; for missions replacing force groups whose combat

power has been severely weakened; when restoring or readjusting the campaign

disposition; when striking against an enemy that seriously threatens the overall situation’s

stability, stabilizing the battlefield situation, and maintaining an active status, so as to

ensure the campaign’s smooth development; and when handling other unexpected

situations.

Requirements on use of campaign reserves mainly include the following: concentrated

application, so as to form a local (partial) superiority, and reliably fulfill a mission having

decisive significance; close coordination with other forces, to form an overall power and

to make full use of a favorable posture, created by other forces, to enter battle; creation

of, and striving for suddenness, and, catching the enemy unawares, employment of

reserves to strike at the unprepared enemy; and tight organization of support, to ensure

that the reserves rapidly, stealthily, and safely execute maneuvers, and at the proper time
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enter the battle. Also, once the reserves are used, one must promptly reestablish, so as to

adapt to situations that may occur later.

(5) Concluding a campaign

Concluding a campaign is the operational activity of ending a campaign when one has

achieved the campaign goals, or when conditions are not advantageous and require

changing the operational mission, in order to preserve the initiative, consolidate the

results of battle, and preserve forces. The naval campaign commander should ascertain

the battlefield situation, anticipate the campaign course, correctly seize an opportunity,

and at the proper time conclude the campaign, while avoiding being satisfied with the

existing state of affairs or blindly taking risks. The campaign conclusion is executed after

it is reported to higher levels and approved; under emergency situations, one can

decisively conclude the campaign, and then report it to higher levels.

The main activities in concluding a campaign include the following: organizing tight

reconnaissance, realistically grasping the battlefield situation, and close surveillance of

the enemy activities’ intention; timely discovery of signs of an enemy attack or

counterattack, organizing strengths to execute reliable guidance and screening, and

strictly guarding against enemy surprise attacks; commanding the units to rapidly, safely,

and stealthily move along the assigned routes and in proper order withdraw from the

battlefield; clearing the battlefield and emergency rescue; checking on, and reporting to a

higher level the results of battle and the battle losses, and proposing recommendations for

follow-on activities; replacing personnel losses and materiel/equipment, and repair and

maintenance of weaponry; based on the high-level intent, quickly adjusting or modifying

the bushu disposition, and forming a new advantageous posture.
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Chapter 22

The Sea Force-Group Campaign to Eliminate the Enemy...523

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy are offensive campaigns of sea force

groups, comprised of heavy surface ships at the core, to eliminate the enemy on the sea

battlefield or to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. Their main missions are to wipe out or

weaken the enemy’s seagoing main operational strengths, to alter the balance of forces in

the sea theater or within the campaign zone, to seize sea dominance in a certain sea area,

and to improve the sea battlefield posture, in order to create favorable conditions for the

smooth execution of follow-on campaigns.

Sea force groups mainly signify seagoing large formations or battle groups, assuming

maneuver operational missions, and comprised of the Navy’s medium and heavy surface

ships, submarines, and shipborne aviation forces. These heavy-ship formations or battle

groups have very strong offensive and defensive operational capabilities and maneuver

capability, and are the main strengths for sea dominance within the naval control

campaign zone and for fulfilling sea campaign missions. Hence, all naval powers attach

extreme importance to construction of their own heavy-ship formations or battle groups,

and employ enemy-elimination, heavy-ship formations as the main means in wartime for

seizing campaign sea dominance.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...523

I. Main Characteristics...523

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, besides having the general features of

naval offensive campaigns, also possess the following prominent characteristics:

(1) The enemy’s strong maneuver capability, and the relative difficulty of seizing a

favorable opportunity for battle

The enemy sea force groups normally are comprised of medium-to-heavy ships and

attack nuclear submarines. Their maneuver speed is high and active range is wide; a

formation’s navigation speed is generally 15-24 knots, and its 1-day maneuver range is

360-576 nautical miles. Normally, the equipment includes a variety of reconnaissance

and early warning (R&EW) systems, electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems,

command and control (C2) systems, and firepower systems – all with a complete range of

models (types) and all having advanced performance. These systems are able to form

core-ship-centered, long/medium/short multi-layered anti-air/anti-surface-ship/antisubmarine R&EW and offensive/defensive operational capabilities. The attacking side’s

search for and seizure of favorable opportunities for battle are relatively difficult.
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(2) The sea area for enemy actions is remote, making difficult the formation of a

favorable offensive posture

The enemy’s sea force groups have a long R&EW range and a large control range, and

normally all carry fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, as well as medium-range ship-tosurface, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-air missiles. Hence, in the operational disposition, one

normally stresses avoiding the enemy’s shore-based threatening actions; in operational

means, one emphasizes execution from a long range of beyond-visual-range (BVR)

precision strikes against targets; and in operational posture, one stresses avoiding shortrange contact, and control of personnel, rather than being constrained by personnel.

When executing attacks against these enemy groups, one’s forces must protractively

maneuver far from the coast, and penetrate in great depth; the endless expanse of the

battlefield lacks usable cover, so that activities are easily revealed; grasping the situation,

and command, coordination and support, are all complex. Hence, formation of a

favorable offensive posture is difficult.

(3) Confrontations are sharp, and initiative is easily shifted

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the attacking side holds the

initiative to launch operations; it can fully conduct campaign preparations, and flexibly

choose relatively favorable operational sea areas and opportunities. However, since

operational target early-warning capabilities are strong, offensive/defensive capabilities

are high, and maneuver speed is high, the attacking side, in the process of closing with

the enemy, can easily meet with the enemy’s counterattack and resistance. On top of this

are many factors – high-tech confrontations, the great destructive power of weapons, and

imbalances in activities – which cause the situation on the battlefield to change rapidly,

and the initiative to very easily be shifted.

II. Basic Requirements...524

(1) Meticulous organization of the plan {jihua}, and enhancement of intelligence support

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy require assiduous analysis and study

of the patterns and possible changes of the enemy’s activities, getting a foothold in the

most difficult and most unfavorable situations, and formulating a variety of proposals

{yu’an}; they also require compact organization of every support activity, so that it meets

the requirements of battlefield situation changes, and in particular require enhancement of

surveillance intelligence support, for a real-time grasp of the battlefield situation. Since

the enemy sea force-group activities’ sea area is far from our shores, whether one can

promptly and accurately discover the enemy force groups is the key to execution of

effective strikes against the enemy. One must comprehensively employ a variety of

reconnaissance strengths and means, and timely and accurately grasp the changing

situation of the enemy’s force groups.
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(2) Simultaneous use of multiple means, and creation and seizure of opportunities for

battle

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the enemy situation changes

rapidly, and favorable opportunities for battle are fleeting; one must adopt multiple

means, and – via methods such as maneuvers, harassment, and feints – constantly move

troops, deplete and exhaust the enemy, and cause the enemy to reveal his weak links in as

many places as possible. Once a favorable opportunity for battle appears or is about to

appear, one must resolutely make up one’s mind, and immediately act.

(3) Correct selection of strike targets, times, and sea areas

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, one should – based on a full grasp

of the situation – determine the strike’s targets, times, and sea areas. The strike’s targets

should be determined based on several factors: the high-level intent, the role played by

those targets in the campaign’s overall situation, and our strike capability and support

capability. Normally, one should select the main ships in the enemy formations as the

targets for key-point strikes. The strike times and sea areas should be based on the

situation of the enemy’s possible maneuvers, and keep in mind times and sea areas

unimaginable by the enemy to execute against him unexpected surprise attacks, which

make it difficult for the enemy to organize effective resistance, and thus wipe out the

enemy in one fell swoop.

(4) Use of elite strengths, and doing all one can to prove effective in one stroke

The enemy sea force groups’ weaponry is excellent, their operational patterns change

rapidly, and they can timely obtain naval air support. In order to ensure the success of a

strike, when executing it, one must concentrate application of elite strengths – highperformance strike aviation forces, and submarines equipped with long-range torpedoes

(missiles) – to form a localized (partial) superiority, to execute a multi-directional, multilayer concentrated strike, and to do all one can so that the main strike proves effective in

one stroke.

(5) Laying emphasis on integration of offense and defense, and reduction of losses as

much as possible

In sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy, the opposing sides always strive –

via energetic offensive activities – to seize the initiative. The side which attacks at the

first opportunity may immediately encounter a strong counterattack, and the defending

side can also have the possibility to very rapidly shift into an offense. Hence, when

organizing an attack, one must actively adopt tight defensive measures, prevent the

enemy from striking before we strike, and also prevent his follow-on counterattacks. At

the same time, one must enhance assistance, screening, and support for the strike forces.

Also, one must make every effort to seize victory with the least possible losses.
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Section 2: Main Activities...525

I. Executing Campaign Unfolding...525

Campaign unfolding is an activity that begins with basic force-strength unfolding, and

lasts until the basic forces reach the sea area(s) for executing their mission.

Sea force-group campaigns to eliminate the enemy normally are based on the specified

main-strike time, and use the time for the campaign’s low-speed forces to execute a strike

as the benchmark for conducting unfolding. All of the force groups should – based on

their assumed missions, the times and order in which they are thrown into battle, and via

thorough campaign tactical computations – determine the times for their execution of

unfolding, so as to create conditions favorable to enveloping or outflanking the enemy,

and to form a favorable posture for attacks on the enemy. In order to enable the campaign

unfolding to smoothly proceed, one must organize reliable guidance, screening, and

information support; organize air and sea feints; actively conduct a fight with the

enemy’s reconnaissance; implement strict electromagnetic silence and blackouts; and

enhance camouflage and protection. In order to support the unfolding activities of the

main strike force groups, the auxiliary strike force groups should promptly execute

strikes against the enemy force groups which can impede the activities of the main strike

forces.

II. Implementing the Advance Assaults...526

The goal of the advance strikes is to weaken the enemy force groups’ combat capability

so as to create favorable conditions for the main strike. The objectives of the advance

strikes are as follows: one is to directly attack the core ships in the enemy formations to

reduce their overall capability; a second is to strike against the warning forces within the

[enemy] sea force groups to weaken the enemy formations’ protection capabilities; and

the third is to strike at the enemy’s command and communications facilities and support

forces to sabotage the enemy’s command and to isolate the enemy formations. The

method for the advance strikes normally is small force-group harassment. Using constant,

uninterrupted harassment, one weakens, paralyzes, and wears out the enemy, and

disorders the enemy’s operational tempo and disposition, in order to create the conditions

for the main strike.

III. Implementing the Main Assault...526

The main strike is the tensest, and most complex, most important activity in the

campaign. Its mission is to destroy the enemy’s main targets. In order to ensure the

success of the main strike, one must comprehensively grasp the situation, judge the hour

and size up the situation, and correctly select an advantageous strike opportunity and

strike modes. Strike modes are of two kinds: concentrated strike and successive strikes.

When using the successive strikes mode, if the enemy has already entered the submarine

forces’ strike position, then one should use the submarine forces in the first strike; while
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if the enemy is situated near the submarine forces’ strike position, the submarines for a

time cannot strike, so one can then employ aviation forces for the first strike; surface

ships able to view the situation will develop a victory after the strikes by submarine and

aviation forces. For a concentrated strike, one should avoid simultaneous selection of

multiple main targets, so as not to disperse one’s troops and firepower. Since the enemy’s

defensive capability is strong and his means of resistance numerous, one should as much

as possible adopt a multi-directional multi-layer concentrated strike. To ensure that the

main strike succeeds, one must enhance coordination and support. A campaign

commander, when organizing coordination and support, must at the proper time dispatch

interception forces in the directions where the enemy can effect support, and must block

that support; he must within a specified time seize and maintain sea superiority and

electromagnetic superiority in the theater, and sabotage and jam the enemy’s C2 system;

they must accurately guide their forces into an attack position; he must suppress the

resistance of the enemy’s early-warning screening forces to ensure that the main strike’s

activities are smoothly conducted; he must implement uninterrupted surveillance over the

battlefield, grasp the operational course, timely handle the situation, and coordinate the

activities in all directions; and he must seize opportunities and directions for use of the

campaign reserves, at the right time enhance the strike strengths, and strive to ensure that

the main strike is effective in one stroke.

IV. Developing the Victory...527

After the main strike, the campaign commander should immediately ascertain the strike’s

results and analyze the posture. When the enemy’s core ships have suffered damage, their

operational capability is reduced, and the campaign circumstances {zhanyi xingshi} are

advantageous to us, one should decisively throw in the follow-on forces to execute a

second strike, and make every effort to wipe out the enemy; and when the enemy’s core

ships are destroyed, the circumstances are favorable and moreover one’s forces allow it,

one should organize forces to conduct strikes against the enemy’s early-warning

screening ships so as to expand the results of the battle to the maximum extent and

develop the victory.

V. Concluding the Campaign...527

When the campaign goal has been achieved, or when the situation undergoes a sharp

change so that a continued operation will fall into an unfavorable position, the campaign

commander should at a suitable time make the decision to conclude the campaign, issue

the orders to withdraw the forces, and command the participating forces to transfer or to

return to base.

Withdrawal of forces should be conducted in step-by-step fashion. First, [one should]

withdraw the feinting forces and those forces situated in a salient and possibly exposed to

a threat; after this, [one should] withdraw the main force. During the withdrawal process,

besides requiring that each force enhance its own self-defense, at the necessary time one
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should dispatch covering forces to ensure safety; also, one must organize strengths to

rescue the damaged ships and to land their personnel.

The withdrawn forces according to plan {jihua} should be dispersively allocated or

redeployed, forces rapidly made up to full strength and readjusted, ammunition and

materiel/equipment replenished, damaged ships and weaponry repaired on a rush basis,

and a deadline set for recovery of operational capability. Conclusion of a campaign

should be concealed and sudden to make it difficult for the enemy to judge our intention.
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Chapter 23

The Sea-Line Interdiction Campaign...528

Sea lines are the navigational system for organizing and implementing sea transport.

They are a complete system comprised of loading harbors, unloading harbors, transport

ships, and their routes. Campaigns to interdict sea lines are sea offensive campaigns to

block and interdict the enemy’s seagoing military and economic transport. Their main

missions are to interdict the enemy’s sea transport and to weaken his military and

economic strengths and war potential.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...528

I. Main Characteristics...528

(1) A long duration

Sea-line interdiction campaigns normally are fairly long in duration. The main reasons

follow: one is that the enemy’s sea transport has a certain sustained quality

(continuousness). That is, the enemy, in terms of a single, specified sea crossing,

generally requires going through multiple links – loading, assembly of ships into

formations, the sea crossing, and unloading; however, sea transport generally involves a

relatively long voyage and a limited formation navigational speed, and fulfillment of a

mission often requires a specified duration. A second is that the enemy, in order to

safeguard the security of the sea lines, will adopt different transport modes and escort

modes, and at times will even be able to seize localized sea superiority, so that we will be

unable to achieve the campaign goal via the activities of one or two strikes. A third is that

a sea-line interdiction campaign normally acts as a joint campaign’s sub-campaign

implementation, coordinated with other campaign activities on land or at sea. This

requires that a sea-line interdiction campaign must begin before other campaigns, and

conclude after other campaigns; it permeates a joint campaign from start to finish.

(2) An expansive space

Sea-line interdiction campaigns have an expansive battlefield space. In one respect,

enemy sea lines generally are fairly long; sea-line interdiction campaigns often conduct

sabotage-raid operations along the enemy’s transport lines, and against the enemy’s

unloading harbors, transport ships, and transport-navigation sea areas. These campaigns

have fairly great flexibility and mobility, with fluid battle lines, and operational activities

that must be launched over an expansive sea area. In another respect, the enemy can

simultaneously possess many sea lines, spread over individual sea areas, and with a wide

distribution range. Thus, in terms of any one sea line, in order to defend against sabotage

raids, one quite often can make relatively large-scale readjustments, thus causing a sealine interdiction campaign to normally require being waged over an expansive sea area.

From the viewpoint of a sea-line interdiction campaign’s requirements, the interdiction
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activities may involve the littoral and the high seas, and sometimes also require strikes

against targets such as the enemy’s loading/unloading harbors and escort vessels, as well

as coastal air fields and observation and communications stations. These subjective and

objective conditions all cause a sea-line interdiction campaign’s operational space to be

relatively expansive.

(3) Constraints from the enemy’s transport activities and sea-line guarding activities

Sea-line interdiction campaigns serve as naval offensive campaigns, and in overall terms

hold the initiative; but in specific operational activities, they are subject to fairly large

constraints from the enemy’s transport activities and sea-line guarding activities. In one

respect, the enemy’s organization of transport activities has a certain autonomy

{zizhuquan}, so that the beginning and duration of a sea-line interdiction campaign

depend on, and are constrained by, the enemy’s transport activities. In another respect,

the enemy in order to safeguard his sea transport activities will spare no effort to choose

sea areas and routes advantageous to them, so that our operational sea areas are fairly

greatly limited to the enemy’s transport routes. Moreover, the enemy can adopt different

modes of transport activities: he can transport in dispersed, sustained fashion, and also

can transport in discontinuous, concentrated fashion; he can adopt a sea-area screening

mode, and can also adopt an accompanying escort mode; he can weaken our sea-line

interdiction capability by offensive activities which strike first to gain the initiative, but

can also draw in and pin down our sea-line interdiction forces along other directions.

Hence, sea-line interdiction campaign activities are subject to fairly heavy constraining

effects of the enemy’s transport and sea-line guarding activities.

II. Basic Requirements...529

(1) Timely and comprehensive grasp of the situation

Sea-line interdiction campaigns are faced with expansive sea battlefields and rapidly

changing enemy situations. If one wants to promptly seize a favorable opportunity for

battle, one must first have a timely and comprehensive grasp of the battlefield situation.

To this end, one must carefully organize campaign reconnaissance, and accurately

ascertain the enemy’s transport intention. Based on the battlefield posture and on the

basic situations of the enemy’s loading and unloading ports, transport ships, and escort

forces, one analyzes the enemy’s transport intention, the basic flow direction and flow

amount of materiel, and judges possible changes in the enemy’s transport organization

and defense, in order to lay the foundation for making the correct decisions. In addition,

the enemy, to safeguard his transport ships, can adopt deception and feinting measures, so

as to avoid attacks. The campaign commander must – based on the viewpoint of the

enemy’s sea-line guarding operation and on the intelligence data acquired by one’s own

reconnaissance – conduct a comprehensive analysis, to facilitate from within the

changing conditions the prediction of the campaign’s development, and to adopt the

corresponding countermeasures.
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(2) Give prominence to the main sea area and direction

Sea-line interdiction campaigns have an expansive space; in orderly to effectively apply

forces, one give prominence to the campaign’s main sea area and main direction. Based

on the campaign’s specific situations, the main operational sea area can be one among

several sea lines, can be a certain loading/unloading harbor, and also can be a certain

strait channel. Each sea area often also has several directions, and multiple sea lines

coexisting; one must distinguish between main and secondary, and grasp that main

direction. The campaign’s main direction must be toward the enemy sea-line transport’s

dense points, towards the vital areas, and towards the weak points. Based on the

operational sea area’s size and features, it can be one section of an enemy sea line, or can

be one of several sea lines; it can be a loading harbor or an unloading harbor, and can

also be a sea-route intersection point, a certain strait channel, or ship assembly point.

(3) Focused application of campaign strengths

Since campaigns have a long duration and an expansive battlefield space, a campaign

commander when organizing and implementing a sea-line interdiction campaign must –

based on requirements of the campaign’s overall situation – apply forces in planned

{jihua}, focused fashion, so as to ensure the requirements of the main direction, key

times, and sustained use of troops. When planning the use of forces, one must not only do

a good job of detailed planning for current-phase use of forces, but also roughly arrange

the follow-on phases’ use of forces, and prevent the occurrence of the problems of

excessive depletion of earlier-stage forces and of insufficient later-stage forces for use.

While assuming responsibility for the campaign’s overall situation, one must

simultaneously grasp the campaign’s key phases and times, and use troops in a focused

way, so as to seize a victory in the campaign. When the campaign has several directions,

with several sea lines coexisting, a campaign commander must be skilled at

distinguishing the primary [thrust] from among numerous and very complex

circumstances, and tightly grasp that main direction. One must firmly and unswervingly

concentrate the main forces in the main direction, organically integrate the main

direction’s key-point strikes with widespread harassment along the secondary direction,

and use some forces in the secondary direction’s sabotage-raid operation coordinated

with the main direction’s operation.

(4) Correct selection of the main strike’s targets

In a sea-line interdiction campaign, the strike targets one can choose are as follows:

transport ships, loading and unloading harbors, intermediate harbors, and stevedoring and

navigation-aid facilities, as well as sea-line guarding forces. Among these, the mainstrike targets normally are transport ships and loading/unloading harbors. Transport ships

are the effective strengths tasked with sea transport; they constantly eliminate the

enemy’s transport ships, and can cause the enemy sea-line transport vehicle links to

suffer ruptures, and thus to lose or have reduced transport capability. Loading/unloading

harbors are hubs for sea transport; they are the assembly and dispersal points for the
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means of transport and for materiel and personnel. Raids against and blockades of enemy

loading/unloading harbors will in general make it difficult for the enemy to promptly

recover, and will cause relatively great damage to the enemy’s entire sea transport

system, with significant results. At the same time, since the locations of harbors are fixed,

raids and blockades will also facilitate our grasp of the situation and organization and

implementation of operational activities.

(5) Flexible use of operational methods

The process of a sea-line interdiction campaign is the process of engaging in a sharp

confrontation – over a vast tempero-spatial range – with the enemy’s sea-traffic activities

and with their protective activities. Based on the specific circumstances, methods for

correctly and flexibly choosing combat are the basic conditions for achieving victory in a

sea-line interdiction operation. In a sea-line interdiction campaign, one must – in view of

differences in situations, such as the scale and mode(s) of the enemy’s sea traffic, means

for defensive screening, and passage times and regions – correspondingly apply different

forces and different arms, strike means, maneuver methods, and command modes; one

must integrate underwater, surface, and air assaults; one must integrate attacks at sea with

attacks against the coast; one must integrate large-scale concentrated strikes, blockades,

and widespread harassment; and one must thoroughly organize reconnaissance support,

so as to promptly discover changes in the enemy’s actions and correspondingly adjust

one’s own operational method.

(6) Thorough organization of command and coordination

In order to ensure the smooth fulfillment of the sea-line interdiction mission, one must

thoroughly organize the campaign’s command and coordination. First, one must establish

an authoritative, highly effective campaign command institution: to facilitate in general

terms the overall planning for grasping the campaign’s overall situation; to decide upon

the major activities, such as the campaign’s launch and conclusion, and the transitioning

between the campaign’s various phases; to coordinate the coordinated actions among the

various force groups; and to assure the use of the campaign reserves. Next, one must

flexibly employ command modes. When executing concentrated sea-line interdiction, one

must implement a high degree of centralized command, with the campaign command

posts directly commanding the operational activities of the main sea-line interdiction

force groups. When conducting systematic sea-line interdiction, one can adopt the

delegated {weituoshi} command mode, and transfer the operational principles and

requirements to the various participating force groups or to a single ship, while only

specifying their respective operational ranges, with the specific operational activities

directed by the individual groups or ship. When executing zoned sea-line interdiction, the

campaign command posts are mainly responsible for ensuring coordination and

cooperation of operational activities among the different directions. The command

mission for the specific operational activities along each different direction can be

assumed by the command post in a specially established direction. Next, one must

thoroughly organize the coordination. Coordination among the activities of all forces in a
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sea-line interdiction campaign is organized by the sea-line interdiction campaign

commander. The main coordination content is to organize and coordinate well the mutual

coordination among sabotage-raid activities, screening activities, and support activities.

Coordination among a sea-line interdiction campaign and other campaigns is organized

by higher levels. The sea-line interdiction campaign commander should strictly follow

the coordination stipulations, and actively handle well the relationship with the other

associated campaigns. They must take note of and exploit a favorable posture created by

the associated campaigns to conduct the sea-line interdiction campaign, and also must

take note of creating favorable conditions for the development of the other associated

campaigns. The coordination method for a sea-line interdiction campaign normally is

based on the differences in the campaign’s basic plays, and involves flexible adoption of

the methods of partitioning the time, partitioning the sea area, partitioning the mission,

and partitioning the direction, to implement the organization.

Section 2: Main Activities...532

I. Campaign Unfolding...532

The launch of a sea-line interdiction campaign normally is conducted under the condition

of an accurate grasp of the enemy’s sea transport activities. When the reconnaissance

forces find enemy transport ships loading at a dock or in a staging-area formation, the

campaign commander then should promptly command all of the strike forces to execute

the launch of the campaign. All of the force groups and formations immediately and

according to plan {jihua} depart from their holding areas or stationing areas, and enter

into their operational positions.

When the original mooring area is fairly far from the operational sea area, one generally

first conducts an advance launch by commanding all of the forces to enter into and be

stationed in their respective departure holding areas. Submarine forces normally stealthily

launch from holding areas near the operational sea areas. Surface-ship forces normally

launch from frontier islands or havens (docks and harbors) fairly close to the operational

sea areas. Strike aviation forces normally launch from airfields in depth toward frontier

airfields. Mobile shore-guided forces normally launch from relatively protruding

seacoasts and capes. After these, at the proper time, one commands all forces to enter

their respective tactical launch sea areas.

In order to avoid disclosing the campaign intention, a campaign launch requires striving

for concealment, speed, and timeliness, plus adoption of measures such as feints and

electronic countermeasures (ECM). The campaign commander must enhance the cover

(screening) for the sea-line interdiction forces, ably organize various kinds of defense,

and also prevent the occurrence of severe losses from the enemy striking first. Launch

requires having many kinds of proposals, so as to adapt to changes in specific conditions,

and ensure the timeliness of the launch. Under the necessary circumstances, one should

also organize campaign feints to attract and scatter the enemy’s attention, and do all one

can to see that the campaign’s launch has a sudden quality.
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II. Raids On, and Blockades of the Enemy’s Loading/Unloading Harbors...532

When one discovers that the enemy transport ships are conducting concentrated

loading/unloading in a harbor, the campaign commander should – based on the

requirements and possibilities of campaign development – according to plan {jihua}

organize strike forces to execute a raid against and blockade of the enemy

loading/unloading harbor.

Enemy harbor defensive systems generally are always tight. Hence, for a raid on an

enemy loading/unloading harbor, one should concentrate strengths to form a relatively

large superiority; and one must adopt a variety of measures to implement concealment,

and do all one can to achieve suddenness in the raid. When the enemy is simultaneously

conducting loading/unloading dispersed over several harbors, one should concentrate the

main forces in a raid on a key harbor among those harbors, while using some forces to

raid the other harbors. In executing raids on enemy harbors, one should take the in-harbor

loading/unloading facilities, materiel depots, and ships as the main strike targets.

The main strike strengths for a raid on an enemy loading/unloading harbor are strike

aviation forces and attack submarines. While the aviation forces are raiding the enemy

loading/unloading harbor, one normally first employs some forces to suppress and

damage the enemy’s air-defense radar system; simultaneously, one uses some forces to

execute auxiliary strikes against the enemy airfields and reconnaissance and observation

systems which can impede the activities of one’s own main strike forces, and later

concentrates the main forces to strike at the enemy docks, loading/unloading facilities,

and transport ships. The submarine forces, normally simultaneously with the aviation

forces’ raids, will charge into the enemy’s harbor area to execute an underwater attack

and to conduct offensive mine-laying at the enemy harbor’s entry and exit channels, and

blockade the enemy harbor.

III. Raids on the Enemy’s Transport-Escort Units...533

Raids on the enemy’s transport-escort units require ascertaining various circumstances –

the enemy transport’s opportunity to commence, transport routes, transport mode, and

screening mode, as well as the composition of the transport-escort units – so as to

facilitate adoption of the corresponding measures.

After reconnaissance forces discover the enemy’s transport-escort units, the campaign

commander should organize reconnaissance forces to: conduct continuous tracking

reconnaissance and surveillance of the transport escorts; promptly command strike

forces, under information guidance, to execute strikes against the enemy escort

formations, and weaken the defensive capabilities of the enemy formations; and then

concentrate the main forces to launch the main strikes on the enemy’s transport-escort

units. In order to increase the operational effects, the various ship formations and force

groups tasked with the main strike mission should effect coordination strictly according

to the specified sea areas and the time and sequence of the strikes, and restrain the enemy
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with the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}. In order to expand the main

strikes’ effects, the campaign commander may command the campaign reserves to be

thrown into battle.

During the process of strikes on the enemy’s transport-escort units, to prevent their entry

into third-party territorial waters or hiding in intermediate harbors, one should organize a

small force group to conduct mobile mine-laying along possible maneuver routes of the

enemy’s transport-escort units. To ensure the safety of the campaign’s main strike forces,

one should organize fighter aviation forces to seize air superiority in the main operational

sea areas, and enhance sea-air screening and support.

IV. Concluding the Campaign...534

After the strike forces have fulfilled the sea-line interdiction campaign’s assigned

missions, or when fairly large changes in the enemy situation have occurred in the

campaign execution process, and when reliance on use of campaign reserves proves

difficult to turn around the war situation, the campaign commander should command the

participating force strengths to conclude the campaign in planned {jihua} fashion.

When concluding a campaign under the conditions of having fulfilled the campaign

mission and achieved the campaign goals, the campaign commander normally should

command all of the force strength groups to conduct the withdrawal – according to plan

{jihua} and in ordered fashion – and to return to their designated base ports. In order to

prevent the enemy’s raids and retaliation, the campaign commander should ably organize

screening, rescue, and other types of support for the withdrawing forces. All force groups

should enhance their vigilance, and especially should do a good job of preparations to

defend against enemy raids.

When the campaign’s conclusion is forced under unfavorable conditions, the campaign

commander should organize seizure of partial (localized) air superiority, and command

the campaign reserves to be thrown into battle, to screen and support all of the force

groups’ ordered withdrawal from the battle, and to prevent great losses suffered from the

enemy’s retaliatory raids.

After [all] forces have returned to their bases, one should promptly conduct

replenishment of their materiel, reorganization of personnel, and equipment

repairs/maintenance, to rapidly return the forces to combat power, so that they can

execute new missions.
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Chapter 24

The Offensive Campaign against Coral Island Reefs...535

Offensive campaigns against coral island reefs consist of having the naval forces take the

lead and, with the assistive cooperation from the other branches of the service and service

arms as well as from maritime civilians {海上人民 haishang renmin}, carry out an

offensive campaign against coral island reef areas {珊瑚岛礁区 shanghu dao jiaoqu} that

are far removed from the mainland shore {远离陆岸}. The main mission of offensive

campaigns against coral island reefs consists of: serving to drive offensive activities;

recapturing enemy-occupied island reefs; improving the state of the military on coral

island reef areas; protecting the national sovereignty; and upholding oceanic rights and

interests.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...535

I. Main Characteristics...535

(1) Complex operational environments and highly policy-oriented nature

Coral island reef areas are commonly located in the center of international maritime

channels {国际海上航道 guoji haishang hangdao}where the interests of politics and

reason are mutually intermingled, thereby creating an environment of extreme

complexity that the campaign is faced with, and creating campaign guidance and

activities that are highly policy-oriented and are highly tactically-oriented. Thus,

organizing the implementation of offensive campaigns against coral island reefs

necessitates the rigorous execution of the associated policies and laws {政策和法规

zhengce he fagui}; [the implementation] is subordinate to and serves the needs of

national political- and diplomatic struggles and averts or decreases unnecessary

international disputes and international incidents to the extent possible. In this way, the

smooth implementation of the campaign can be guaranteed and so that the predetermined

campaign goals can be achieved.

(2) Battlefields are far removed from the mainland shore; and command, cover and

support are difficult

Coral island reef areas are far removed from the mainland shore and campaign strengths

must elongate their maneuver operations forward {前伸机动作战 qian-shen jidong

zuozhan} bringing about a series of disadvantageous effects on organizing the

implementation of the campaign. The first [of these] is that it inconveniences the

organization of command; the second is that organizing the implementation of campaign

cover {战役掩护 zhanyi yanhu} is more difficult, particularly with regard to air cover;
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and the third is that the transport distances are remote [requiring] a long duration of time

{周期长 zhouqi chang}, and making the campaign logistics- and equipment support

missions arduous and complex.

(3) The natural conditions on the battlefield are complex, bearing formidably on the

operational activities

The weather in the coral island reef areas is damp and hot; there are blowing winds all

throughout the year with even more forceful winds at times; island reefs are scattered

through the sea as are stars in the sky; and the formations that rise out of the seabed are

complicated. In addition, the area of the island reefs is narrow and small; the topography

is indented and sunken; and reefs twist and circle in all directions. Such a complex

natural environment can have enormous implications for campaign operational activities.

These [implications] primarily manifest themselves as: multiple areas of dangerous

navigation, limited leeway for maneuvering and restricted movement for the forces

aboard the vessels; difficulty for the landing implements {登陆工具 denglu gongju} and

landing forces {登陆兵 denglu bing} to ascend the reef; narrow reef width; the absence

of reliable access; greater difficulty in organizing defenses; fierce struggle between

seizing and occupying and preventing seizure and occupation; and aspects of [these

same] facets that can emerge again and again as a point of contention.

II. Basic Requirements...536

(1) Careful planning and full preparations

In offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, it is essential to insert strengths

delivered from long distances, and because of the complexity of the operational

environment and the many factors of uncertainty {不确定因素多 buqueding yinsu duo},

only when there are full preparations can it be possible to gain a campaign victory. The

preparation work for offensive campaigns against coral island reefs involves myriad

aspects and has various components {内容繁多 neirong fanduo}, necessitating that they

be carried out first in whole and then by each key point. Based on the operational

characteristics, the environment and the factors, it is necessary to first of all: carefully

organize the overall planning of the campaign {筹划战役 chouhua zhanyi}; correctly

determine the campaign intention {战役企图 zhanyi qitu}, the campaign disposition {战

役布势 zhanyi bushi}, the operational targets {作战目标 zuozhan mubiao} and the

fundamental fighting methods {基本战法 jiben zhanfa}; and conceal the concentration of

forces {集结兵力 jijie bingli} and conduct focused prewar training {临战训练 linzhan

xunlian}. It is then necessary to start out from the situation of the greatest difficulty and

the most complexity, and from there strengthen reconnaissance, leadership {引导

yindao}, logistics organization and material stores {物资储备 wuzi chubei}. Campaign

preparations must be thorough and carried out covertly; necessitating not only the

prevention of destruction by the enemy, but also positive actions to destroy enemy

preparations.
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(2) Unified planning and close coordination

With regard to offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, the battlefield is far

removed from the mainland shore, there are many types of combat-participating forces,

and there are multiple patterns of operational activities, thus necessitating the

implementation of centralized, unified command and the organization of close

coordination {周密协同 zhoumi xietong}. In order to conform to the requirements of

offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, it is essential to: establish a highlyeffective campaign seaborne forward command post {战役海上前进指挥所 zhanyi

haishang qianjin zhihuisuo}; implement integration between “shore” and “sea;” and make

the “sea” into the lead over command modes {指挥方式 zhihui fangshi}. It is essential

to: accurately estimate how each of the objective conditions {客观条件 keguan tiaojian}

will influence the operational activities; carefully organize campaign coordination;

accurately calculate the times and speeds of the predetermined operational course; give

the lead to the force groupings {兵力集团 bingli jituan} that are accomplishing the main

operational mission and the main operational phase {主要作战阶段 zhuyao zuozhan

jieduan}; and clarify and stipulate the concrete missions {具体任务 juti renwu} and

activity patterns {行动程式 xingdong chengshi} for the various forces as well as

methods for them to contact and recognize each other.

(3) Organizing reliable support

Implementing offensive campaigns against coral island reefs necessitates keeping their

characteristics in view. In addition to the requirements placed on the operational activities

by the special operational environment, [offensive campaigns against coral island reefs

requires] the close organization of the various items of campaign support. It is

particularly essential to focus on organizing such kinds of support as successful

intelligence and reconnaissance, signals, hydrology and meteorology, protection, rescue

and lifesaving, and the like. It is essential to synthesize the use of the various means of

reconnaissance, and establish a perfected intelligence and reconnaissance architecture {

情报侦察体系 qingbao zhencha tixi} in order to provide real-time intelligence {实时情

报 shishi qingbao} for campaign operational activities. Furthermore, it is essential to:

synthesize the use of multiple signals connectivity measures; establish a single organic

vessel-, aircraft-, island- and shore signals network body; hold in reserve signals troops as

well as a specified quantity of spare signals materials parts; and safeguard the speed,

accuracy, secrecy and continuity of campaign communications. Additionally, it is

essential to: promptly and accurately carry out hydrological and meteorological

forecasting; establish improved navigational guidance systems {航海导航系统 hanghai

daohang xitong}; and safeguard the secure navigation and mobility of ships. And lastly, it

is essential to: employ support that mutually integrates accompanying support on the sea

with regional support; flesh out an aid [structure], on a backbone of specialized defensive

aid, that mutually integrates self-aid with mutual aid and specialized defensive aid;

decrease losses; and maintain and renew the combat effectiveness {战斗力 zhandouli} of

the forces. Campaign logistics and equipment support should be led by sea-borne mobile
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support {海上机动保障 haishang jidong baozhang} and should mutually integrate seaborne mobile support with shore-based support. And when necessary, it should open

advanced support bases {前进保障基地 qianjin baozhang jidi} on islands in forward

positions.

(4) Strictly implementing policy stipulations

With regard to offensive campaigns against coral island reefs, the operational area and its

peripheral surroundings are complex and military struggles follow along with complex

political and diplomatic struggles. As a result, during the campaign, the related policy

stipulations from the higher-level authority should be strictly implemented; flexible use

should be made of international law; and international incidents that break out should be

appropriately handled. When the military of a powerful external force intervenes that

ignites a chain reaction of other incidents, the handling of them should be based on the

principles of rationality, advantageousness, and moral integrity in order to effectively

control the war situation and to guarantee that the main campaign goals are implemented

smoothly.

Section 2: Main Activities...537

I. Striving for Campaign Superiority...537

Dominance over the operational sea area is a prerequisite condition for being successful

in an offensive campaign in the coral island reef areas. The main measures for gaining

and maintaining dominance in the operational sea area [are as follows]. The first

[measure] is to seek and destroy the enemy’s main force {主力 zhuli} in the sea and air.

It is essential to actively seize and create opportunities for combat {积极捕捉和创造战

机 jiji buzhuo he chuangzao zhanji} to annihilate the enemy effective strength on the sea

and in the air. When necessary and when possible, assault and blockade the enemy sea

and air military strengths in the areas where they are stationed or at anchor, and restrict

the enemy’s freedom to move about in the air or on the sea in order to weaken their

operational capabilities. The second [means] is to sever the connection between the

enemy and the island reef areas. Generally this is done by giving the lead to submarine

forces and integrating them with the use of underwater mines and some of the surface

vessels, and deploying [this strength] in shipping lines that can be reinforced by enemy

troops as well as the neighboring sea areas to: intercept enemy naval reinforcement

troops; conduct battlefield interdiction {遮断战场 jieduan zhanchang}; and isolate the

operational sea area. The third [means] is to assault enemy-occupied island reefs. Assault

enemy-occupied island reefs by using naval gun firepower and aviation firepower and by

focusing on assaulting enemy-occupied island reefs that have been designated in advance

for recapture and destroying the enemy vessels and troops that are stationed on- or

moored there as well as command centers and defensive infrastructure, in order to create

the conditions for recovering the enemy-occupied island reefs. The fourth [means] is

sealing of the disembarkation sea area. Sealing off the disembarkation sea area consists of
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activities to completely seal off the reefs of the islands that have been pre-designated for

recapture as well as their sea areas adjacent to them, and its goal is to sever the

connection between the enemy-occupied islands and the rest of the world in order to

create the conditions for recapturing the reefs of the enemy-occupied islands.

II. Attacking and Occupying Island Reefs...538

Once the island embarkation operational grouping {登岛作战集团 dengdao zuozhan

jituan} completes loading onto vessels, it should select the shipping line that is the least

threatened by the enemy in which to implement the navigational crossing and standby in

the sea area in the vicinity of the island reef prior to launching. Once we have gained

campaign dominance, the campaign at-sea commander {战役海上指挥员 zhanyi

haishang zhihuiyuan} should, at the right time, issue the operational order to attack and

occupy the island-reefs, commanding the island embarkation operational grouping to

attack and occupy the enemy-occupied island-reefs by initiating an amphibious landing

offensive {liangqi denglu jingong} from the sea area to the enemy-occupied island-reefs.

The island embarkation operational grouping should: rapidly move from the standby sea

area {待机海域 daiji haiyu} to the island embarkation sea area {登陆海域 denglu haiyu}

while at the same time implementing unfolding based on the landing deployment fixed in

advance; employ “paralyze first and attack later” {先瘫后攻 xiantan hougong}; use the

‘encircle the island three-dimensionally’ {环岛立体 huan dao liti} pattern to embark on

the island; and initiate operations to capture and occupy the island reefs. During the

process of seizing and occupying island reefs, it is necessary to: promptly organize

firepower support {火力支援 huoli zhiyuan}; suppress the remaining firepower on the

enemy-occupied island reefs; maintain dominance over the embarkation sea area; prevent

enemy reinforcement; and ensure that activities to seize the reefs are successful in one

blow.

III. Consolidating the Defenses {巩固防御 gonggu fangyu}...538

Once the enemy-occupied island reefs have been seized, it is essential to: rapidly adjust

the forces; organize defenses for the island reef areas; prevent the enemy from raiding

and taking the reefs by force; and consolidate the achievements of the operation.
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Chapter 25

The Sea-line Guarding Campaign...539

Campaigns to guard sea lines, or sea-line guarding {bao jiao} campaigns, are defensive

campaigns waged to ensure the safety of, and free passage {changtong} along sea lines

having strategic campaign significance. Their main missions are to ensure the safety of

loading/unloading harbors, sea routes, and transport activities, and to assure free passage

along the sea lines.

Sea-line guarding campaigns, based on the differences in their goals, can roughly be

divided into two types: the first revolves around a launch due to one specific, major

transport activity, with the goal of guarding the transport safety of a certain major,

strategic asset {wuzi}. This type of sea-line guarding campaign has a relatively short

duration, and normally ends with the conclusion of that major transport activity. The

second type revolves around a launch due to a certain sea line possessing strategic

campaign significance, with the goal of guarding the continuous free passage of this

major sea line’s channel(s). This type of sea-line guarding campaign normally has a fairly

long duration, and can permeate through the full process of the entire war.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...539

I. Main Characteristics...539

(1) Wide space, long times, and numerous objectives

In sea-line guarding campaigns, the enemy holds the initiative for a sea-line offensive;

and in particular, owing to the development of modern weaponry, the modes and means

of enemy sea-line interdiction operations have become more diversified. The enemy not

only can execute strikes against loading harbors, intermediate harbors, and unloading

harbors along the sea line, but can also effect a blockade and control of the sea areas

crossed along the sea route, and execute strikes against transport ships along the route; he

not only can respectively choose the sea-line interdiction mode – concentrated strikes,

scattered raids, force blockades, or mine blockades – but also can also employ a variety

of forces to execute 3-D, multi-directional, integrated strikes in great depth against the

transport activities. In order to effectively guard sea traffic, one must organize a tight,

stable defense. From the viewpoint of activities, a sea-line guarding campaign must

protect an entire sea line; at times it also requires first conducting offensive operations –

using offense to aid defense – against enemy bases and airfields, and the battlefield space

involved has a vast scope. From the viewpoint of operational time, sea transport has a

sustained quality (continuity); the struggle between guarding a sea line and interdicting a

sea line often must be sustained over a relatively long time, making it difficult to achieve

the operational goal in one step. From the viewpoint of protecting a target, a sea-line

guarding campaign requires both protecting fixed targets – loading/unloading harbors and

intermediate harbors – and protecting sea dynamic targets (transport ships), which makes
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protection of a target in a sea-line guarding campaign relatively complex. Since in a sealine guarding campaign the enemy-situation threats are serious, the operational spatial

scope wide, the time long, and the targets numerous, the scale of the forces that must be

thrown in during the creation of a sea-line guarding campaign is relatively large, and the

operational effective strength of the participating forces will be greatly increased, which

makes sea-line guarding campaign operational missions especially arduous and

strenuous.

(2) High operational intensity

In modern sea-line conflict, the sea-line interdiction means selectable by the interdicting

side have increased; and, in light of the sea-line guarding side’s force disposition

situation, the sea-line interdicting side can select an advantageous sea area and

opportunity to concentrate effective strengths to execute key-point sabotage. However,

for the sea-line guarding side – due to the long transport line(s) and transport times, the

wide scope of the battlefield space, and the numerous targets to be guarded – the

operational patterns almost contain all of the aspects of modern sea warfare: air defense

operations, anti-surface-ship operations, antisubmarine operations, anti-mine operations,

and information warfare (IW) operations. Hence, the quantity of force strength needs is

large, and their employment intensity is high. This places even more stringent

requirements on scientific, rational application of sea-line guarding operational force

strengths, and on maintaining sustained sea-line guarding operational capability.

(3) Seizure of a certain initiative

A sea-line guarding campaign, although by its nature a defensive campaign, since a sealine guarding campaign’s protected targets are certain specific sea transports, while the

transport fleet is comprised and appears on an ad hoc basis, loading/unloading harbors

only tasked with loading/unloading missions possess significance for the campaign. This

means that the enemy’s sea-line interdiction activities can only be conducted after our

transport activities have commenced and been discovered, and thus causes the sea-line

guarding side to seize a certain campaign initiative; it can actively select a materiel

loading/unloading harbor and loading and unloading opportunities, as well as select a

transport line, set-sail opportunity, sailing time, and transport mode. This characteristic of

a sea-line guarding campaign both reflects the main distinction between a sea-line

guarding campaign and other defensive campaigns, and explains how the struggle for

victory in a sea-line guarding campaign has its basic favorable conditions.

(4) Great restraints on transport activities

In order to ensure the safety of sea traffic, sea-line guarding operational forces during the

campaign must adopt their own activities, based on the requirements for protecting

transport activity safety; sea-line guarding activities are subject to the tempero-spatial

constraints of the harbors along the sea line, the distribution and positions of sea routes,

and the navigation of sea transport ships. Regardless of whether the time and space at
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these harbors, routes, and transport ships are advantageous to one’s own side, sea-line

guarding forces all must center on the activities of these several guarded targets. In

addition, the navigation speed of sea transports is fairly slow, transport cycles are

relatively long, and targets are exposed; in particular, large transport fleets have difficulty

maneuvering and weak self-defense capability. All of these factors constrain the

effectiveness of the sea-line guarding forces’ weaponry and the realization of operational

capability, and limit the sea-line guarding forces’ use of operational means. For example:

the strike forces’ opportunity for strikes and the degree of strikes must be determined

according to the requirements on transport activities; the time(s) for the area screening

forces’ seizure and control of air superiority and sea superiority in the sea areas under

their jurisdiction must be determined according to the time when the transports transit

those areas; and the direct warning forces must – based on the transports’ navigation

speed and navigation mode – formulate the corresponding plan {jihua}, and maintain

their line positions throughout. This characteristic of a sea-line guarding campaign not

only explains the major differences in terms of application of forces between a sea-line

guarding campaign and other campaigns, it also refers to the more stringent requirements

on use of sea-line guarding operational forces.

II. Basic Requirements...541

(1) Taking transport activities as the center

Ensuring the safety of sea transport activities is a basic goal of sea-line guarding

campaigns, and is also where the benefit resides in the campaign’s overall situation.

Hence, one must establish a campaign guiding ideology entirely focused on transport

activity safety, and – taking transport activities as the center – organize and carry out the

campaign. One must take the degree of safety in the transport-protection activities as the

benchmark for measuring the campaign’s degree of success. One must center on the

entire process of the transport activities, unify operations research {yunchou}, and plan

{jihua} the various operational activities in the campaign. When conducting a sea-line

guarding campaign’s overall planning, one should – based on the distribution of

loading/unloading harbors and sea lines – assiduously analyze the enemy’s sea-line

interdiction operational capability and possibly adopted sea-line interdiction means and

modes, and make a correct assessment of the main threatened directions of friendly sea

lines, and then from this assessment reach a basic decision on execution of the sea-line

guarding operations and on the optimal course of action (COA), so as to ensure the

smooth execution of the sea-line guarding operations. When determining the sea-line

guarding campaign resolution and the various defensive and screening COAs, one must

especially lay stress on defense of loading harbors, unloading harbors, and intermediate

harbors. In particular, one must give prominence to anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and antimine defenses of harbors lying within the enemy strike aviation forces’ operational radius

and within range of the enemy’s mid-to-long-range missiles, and ensure the security of

the harbor facilities and free passage along the sea routes. One must – based on the

enemy’s sea-line interdiction operational characteristics, capability, and possible sea-line

interdiction mode(s) – flexibly select an escort mode for the sea line and the transports.
616

(2) Use of forces with key-points

A sea-line guarding campaign has a wide space, long times, and numerous targets;

unfocused (non-key-point) application of forces inevitably creates a passive situation

where it is impossible to defend effectively. Hence, one must – based on a correct

assessment of the directions, times, and sea areas of the main threats posed by the enemy

to transport activities, as well as the use of forces and arms and the strike method(s) –

determine the main defensive direction and main operational targets, key screening

objectives, and screening times, and on this basis assign the different missions and

allocate the sea-line guarding forces, so as to establish and maintain a favorable campaign

posture. Under the conditions of insufficient sea-line guarding forces, one must also

concentrate forces, and in key-point (focused) fashion apply them to the critical times and

sea areas, to deal with the main threats and to protect key targets. When the situation

undergoes a change, one must also lay stress on the key points for application of forces,

and at the proper time revise the operational disposition.

(3) Integrated use of a variety of means

The characteristics and historical experience of sea-line guarding campaigns have shown

that it is very difficult to achieve campaign goals by use of a single means; one must

implement the operational ideology of active defense, and integratively use a variety of

means, to deal with a variety of threats from the enemy, and to ensure the safety of sea

transport. First, one must establish a tight reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW)

system, organize and implement sea-air R&EW in great depth, continue to grasp the

dynamic situation of the enemy’s sea-line interdiction forces, and promptly discover the

enemy’s offensive operational intention. Next, one must integrate defensive activities

with offensive activities. Sea-line guarding campaigns in overall terms are campaigns of

a defensive nature. Defense is the most basic means in a sea-line guarding operation; one

should – with a focus on the enemy’s main threats – organize for the protected targets a

3-D, multi-directional defense in great depth, so as to avert the enemy’s raids or to reduce

the effects of enemy raids. Simultaneously, one must fully utilize all exploitable

conditions and means, and not lose the opportunity to adopt offensive operational

activities, so as to sabotage the enemy’s sea-line interdiction preparations, disorganize the

enemy’s sea-line interdiction disposition, weaken the enemy’s sea-line interdiction

capability, alter a passive situation for sea-line guarding operations, and strive for the

initiative in sea-line guarding operations. Third, one must integrate screening activities

with transport activities. Based on a campaign’s specific conditions, sea transport

activities should adopt the corresponding transport mode and passage mode, as well as

the scale of grouping. The activities of the sea transport-screening ships should – based

on the characteristics of the assigned transport activities – flexibly employ a variety of

modes, and – according to the time, place, and enemy situation – integrate the directpassage and segmented-passage modes with the accompanying-escort, area-escort, and

integrated-escort modes of escort, so as to obtain the optimal sea-line guarding effects.
617

(4) Maintaining the concealed quality of transport activities

Maintaining the concealed quality of transport activities is a basic requirement of wartime

sea transport. Achieving this point not only enables the transports to avoid the enemy’s

raids during a certain phase of the campaign or even over the entire course of the

campaign, and to improve the degree of safety in sea traffic, but also can increase

transport effectiveness. The sea-line guarding side can adopt measures in various respects

– selection of the transport line, opportunity, and mode – and, via mutual coordination

between active feints and camouflage activities, confuse and deceive the enemy, in order

to conceal the transport intention and activities; or it can cause the enemy to reach a

mistaken judgment, and undertake mistaken activities, so as to assist the execution of a

[friendly] sea-line guarding operation, and thus achieve the goal of increasing sea-line

guarding operational effectiveness.

When determining the transport COA, one should break with convention, and flexibly

change the loading/unloading harbors, lines, and transport mode, so as to make it difficult

for the enemy to grasp one’s own transport pattern. One must as much as possible choose

multiple loading harbors and unloading harbors, as well as intermediate harbors, so as to

conceal materiel loading and unloading activities, and increase the probability that the

enemy judgment is incorrect. One must as much as possible select a transport line(s) in a

sea area where enemy control is weak, but also near friendly [shores], so as to lower the

possibility that transport activities and sea shipping of materiel will encounter enemy

raids. One must as much as possible arrange materiel loading and unloading times, as

well as sea transport times, to be placed within times unfavorable to the enemy’s

execution of reconnaissance and sea-line interdiction operations, so as to increase the

difficulty of the enemy’s sea-line interdiction operations. One must – with a focus on the

transport sea areas, the enemy situation faced, one’s sea-line guarding capabilities, and

the nature of the transport mission – flexibly select the transport mode; or break up the

whole into parts, and decentralize transport; or aggregate the parts into a whole, and

centralize the transport; or travel by night and conceal oneself by day, and segment the

passages; or travel by both day and night with all possible speed, for rapid arrival.

Flexible and rapidly changing transport modes must be employed to deal with the

enemy’s sea-line interdiction activities, so as to reduce the possibility that the transport

activities will encounter enemy strikes.

(5) Thorough organization of coordination

When conducting a sea-line guarding campaign, one must assiduously organize well the

coordination among the activities of all forces. First, one must organize well the

coordination between the sea-line guarding campaign and the associated campaigns. One

must – based on the status and function of the sea-line guarding campaign in the

operation’s overall situation – manage well the relationship to the previous campaign and

to the next campaign, as well as to the campaigns of friendly forces. This requires not

only paying attention to creating favorable conditions for the waging of friendly force

campaigns or follow-on campaigns, but also paying attention to favorable postures
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created by previous campaigns and friendly force campaigns in order to launch and

conduct the sea-line guarding campaign. Second, one must organize well the coordination

among all forces within the sea-line guarding campaign. In particular, one must organize

well the coordination between strike activities and transport activities, the coordination

between area screening and accompanying screening, and the coordination among the

various area screening [forces]. When the sea-line guarding campaign has the

participation and support of the Air Force and 2nd Artillery Corps, one should also

organize the operational coordination between the Navy and the Air Force and 2nd

Artillery Corps.

The various types of coordination in a sea-line guarding campaign should be organized

by taking transport activities as the center. All participating forces must coordinate their

mutual activities according to the lines and times of the transport activities, as well as the

transport activities’ requirements on all types of support. To enable the active, close, and

rapid coordination among the activities of all forces, the campaign commander – besides

making clear the missions of all force groups – should also make clear the basis for

coordination among the activities of all forces, on the basis of the differences in

operational directions, times, and sea areas. Situations in sea-line guarding campaigns

change unendingly; one must anticipate the many situations that can possibly occur, and

formulate corresponding coordination proposals, to facilitate all participating forces’

maintenance of close coordination according to the proposal.

Section 2: Main Activities...544

I. Initiating the Campaign...544

The campaign commander should at the proper time resolutely launch the campaign on

the basis of the enemy situation faced, the set-sail time for the transports, and the

campaign preparations situation.

Modes for a sea-line guarding campaign’s launch are of two types: forced launch of the

campaign, and concealed launch of the campaign.

When the balance of forces [shows that one] occupies a relatively greatly superior

position, one can have a forced-launch campaign that actively strikes at the activities of

the enemy’s sea-line interdiction forces, to facilitate – via sudden, fierce strikes and

effective blockade activities – eliminating the enemy’s sea-line interdiction forces, or

blockading them in their bases, airfields, or preassigned sea areas, and seizing air

superiority and sea superiority in the campaign sea area(s), so as to create an extremely

favorable initial posture for the sea-line guarding campaign.

When the conditions for executing an active strike against the enemy are not present, one

should employ the hidden-launch mode for the campaign. In particular, one must:

enhance efforts to maintain secrecy; adopt a variety of measures for camouflage,
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concealment, and feints; seize a favorable opportunity; and suddenly launch the sea

transport activities.

II. Organization and Screening of Transport Loading and (Port) Clearance...544

The campaign commander, after determining that no major changes in conditions have

occurred, should at the proper time pass down the order to begin loading. The loadingharbor commander, after receiving the order, should immediately assemble the materiel

and ships, per the pre-designated loading plan {jihua}, and – based on the principles of

screening and dispersal – rapidly organize loading at all pre-designated points. Transports

that have completed loading should stealthily clear the port or await an opportune

moment within port. After all transports have completed loading, they should according

to plan {jihua} conduct the assembly into formations, compose the transport fleet, and

form a certain sailing sequence.

To ensure the safety of the transports’ loading, clearing [or] awaiting an opportune

moment to clear, and formation time, first one should adopt a variety of camouflage

measures, deceive and paralyze the enemy, and do all one can to see that the loading,

clearing, and assembly into formations are not discovered by the enemy. Next, one

should enhance vigilance, at the proper time deploy the loading harbor’s operational

forces, do all one can to find the raiding enemy as soon as possible, and eliminate them or

rout them outside the harbor area, or before the enemy adopts activities against us.

When the transports encounter enemy raids, one should: actively organize various kinds

of protection and resistance; promptly make urgent repairs to, and replace damaged

transports and loading facilities; and, for channels blockaded by enemy mines, promptly

organize minesweeping forces for clearing, or start using reserve channels, and ensure

that the transports set sail on time.

When loading harbors cannot be used due to having suffered heavy damage or being

blockaded by the enemy, one should promptly employ reserve loading harbors, and make

the necessary adjustments to all transport activities.

III. Organization and Screening of Transports During the Sea Crossing...545

After the transports are assembled into the sailing formation, one should commence the

sea transport, per the time(s), line(s), and speed(s) specified in the plan {jihua}. During

the transport, one should effect tight camouflage, and enhance air and sea surveillance.

When the enemy attacks, one should in organized fashion conduct resistance and evasion.

When evading enemy attacks, one should take care to maintain the formation(s), and

avoid the creation of chaos. During the sea transport, the direct warning forces should be

launched per the specified positions, and – based on the differences in the enemy

situation’s degree of threat – should maintain the corresponding degree of combat

readiness. The accompanying screening forces should launch searches along directions

from which the transports are subject to enemy threats. The area screening forces should
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– based on maintaining control over the screening area – enhance sea/air patrol warning

for key directions. Any screening force finding enemy sea-line interdiction should

immediately execute an attack, and at the necessary time the screening forces can call

each other and jointly execute an operation.

The transport fleet should alter formation at any time, based on different threats:

normally, a very wide, short-depth formation is used in enemy submarine threat areas;

when traversing a mined area, a single-line {danzongdui} or double-line formation is

employed; to resist enemy conventional-weapon strikes, under the premise of ensuring

navigation safety, one should reduce the formation(s); during a nuclear-strike threat, a

dispersed formation should be adopted.

When the enemy-situation threat is severe, the campaign commander should – based on

the battlefield situation – promptly dispatch supporting forces coordinating with the

escort forces’ and screening forces’ operations. At the required time, they should at the

right moment throw in the reserves, and resolutely annihilate or drive off the enemy sealine interdiction forces present.

When some of the ships have suffered damage from enemy raids, the campaign

commander should organize strengths to tow and repair damaged ships that cannot steam

by themselves. Ships that have completely lost the possibility of rescue, after their

personnel are withdrawn, should be self-destroyed to avoid their falling into enemy

hands; and for ships that cannot navigate persistently, some forces should be designated

to escort them to a nearby harbor. When one has ascertained that it is difficult to ensure

navigation safety, due to enemy-situation threats or to sudden changes in weather,

commanders should promptly instruct the escort formation to alter the route or steam

toward a port of refuge.

IV. . Organization and Screening of the Transports’ Entry into Port

and Unloading...546

The unloading harbor’s defensive forces, before the transports’ arrival, should take

special care to organize mine-defense observation and to inspect channels in order to

ensure free passage through the channels. When the transports arrive at the unloading

harbor, they should disband the sailing sequence per the preassigned procedure, enter the

harbor in order, steam to their respective unloading points, and rapidly unload. As the

transports are conducting unloading, special care should be taken to enhance anti-aircraft

defenses. The direct warning forces or accompanying screening forces can be used as

strengths to enhance protection of the unloading harbor, or per orders can assume a new

operational mission.

V. Concluding the Campaign...546

After the campaign goal is achieved, the campaign should be concluded at the proper

time. To ensure the safety of the forces’ withdrawal, one must tightly fix an eye on the
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enemy’s dynamic state, and enhance protection for the returning transports and

operational forces; at the required time, one can dispatch specialized forces to welcome

and escort them. One should pay close attention to ship resupply and repair tasks, and

rapidly and ably continue the transport preparations. Based on experience and lessons in

operations, one should further revise and perfect the operation plan {jihua}, and at the

required time one should readjust the disposition, so as to prepare for further battle.
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Chapter 26

The Naval Base Defense Campaign...547

A naval base defense campaign is a defensive campaign conducted to resist an enemy

offensive against a naval base; to smash the enemy’s intention to destroy, blockade, and

seize the naval base; to guard the safety of the forces stationed on the base and of its main

facilities; and to ensure the normal realization of the base support functions. The missions

of naval base defense are to protect the safety of the base system, stationed forces, major

facilities, and the sea maneuver forces’ freedom of movement into and out of the base, as

well as the free passage of sea transport; and to smash the enemy’s intention to paralyze

or capture the naval base. This includes antisubmarine defense, anti-surface-ship defense,

anti-mine defense, antiaircraft defense, anti-ground defense, and defense against attacks

using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. A naval base defense campaign

can be an independent naval campaign, and also can be a major component of a joint

campaign, and is normally organized and conducted independently or primarily by the

Navy.

A naval base is the institution and site providing comprehensive security especially for

the stationing, training, and operational activities of naval forces. Most naval bases are

situated at important sectors on the coast, or on large islands, and are the forwardmost

military bases along State maritime strategic campaign directions. A naval base generally

has a certain coastal land area, offshore sea area, and adjacent islands, and possesses

fairly complete ship berthing, supply, and defense facilities; most naval bases have also

constructed nearby a certain number of airfields, as well as a Navy or Fleet operational

command institution. In peacetime, naval bases provide naval forces with excellent

garrison and training facilities. In wartime, naval bases are the major supports and base

areas for naval forces to execute sea offensive operations, and are also major strongholds

for naval forces to execute sea-direction defensive operations; they have extremely

significant strategic campaign status. Thus, in future military conflicts on the seas, naval

bases normally will be the main targets for enemy raids. Hence, organization of an active,

staunch naval-base defense – ensuring our naval forces’ survival and capability for

sustained operations – are important conditions for seizing the sea battlefield initiative,

and are important measures for ensuring the security of the land battlefield’s littoral

flanks.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...548

I. Main Characteristics...548

Naval base defense campaigns have the qualities and features of a typical strategic-point

war to hold and defend a position. Under modern high-tech conditions, due to the fullspeed development of offensive operational weaponry, offensive operations against naval

bases have undergone major changes. Naval base defense campaigns under modern

conditions have the following main characteristics:
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(1) Strongly sudden quality {tufaxing} of operations, and the extreme ease of falling into

passivity

In naval base defensive operations, the enemy has an active, offensive status, and can

flexibly choose the targets, opportunities, modes, and forces/arms for the attack. At the

same time, [the enemy] fully emphasizes the adoption of a variety of deception measures

– secrecy, camouflage, feints, etc. – and strives to achieve suddenness {turanxing} in the

attack. Confronted with the enemy’s concealed, sudden attack, which strikes first to gain

the initiative, base defense will be faced with a variety of unimaginable difficulties, and

very easily falls into passivity. This requires that naval bases must have very strong

information warfare (IW) operational capability, rapid response capability, and

emergency handling capability.

(2) Complex and rapidly changing situations, and sharp combat

In a naval base defense campaign, the enemy will be able to make integrated use of a

variety of forces and arms, and many kinds of means and forms, and will launch the

attack from different layers and directions: air, sea surface, underwater, and ground. The

enemy can employ conventional mine weapons to effect a blockade of the naval base, so

that it loses the necessary operational and support functions; he can simultaneously use a

variety of long-range, very powerful high-tech precision guided munitions (PGMs) to

execute “surgical” precision strikes against major targets within the naval base, so as to

rapidly paralyze our defensive system, destroy the base’s main facilities, and wipe out the

forces stationed on base. Simultaneously, the enemy also will certainly adopt a variety of

activities such as IW and feint deception activities in order to: support, assist, and

coordinate with the attacking forces’ operational activities; to the maximum extent

weaken our defensive capability; and improve offensive operational effectiveness. The

diversity of the enemy’s offensive means will make the future battlefield situations

complex and rapidly changing. Surprise attacks and counterattacks, blockades and

counter-blockades, capture and counter-capture, jamming and counter-jamming will be

simultaneously or alternately conducted in the multi-dimensional space, and the struggles

will be abnormally fierce.

(3) Special operational space, limitations on force strength bushu disposition

The battlefield space in a naval base defense campaign normally is a relatively

concentrated, fixed land area or offshore sea area, with important targets within the naval

base as the center. This area faces the sea, backs against land, has a broad defense front

but a shallow depth, and has numerous targets. For a special operational space such as

this, although it is advantageous for supporting island and coastal defenses, it is

beneficial for obtaining the assistance and complement of the masses. However, it also

presents a certain unfavorable effect for force strength bushu disposition in base defense

operations. One is the shallow depth, making it difficult to form a relatively large defense

in depth; the second is that the battlefield capacity is limited, making it difficult to bushu

disposition more defensive force strengths and weaponry to form a powerful superiority.
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(4) Support for island and coastal operations, and ease of obtaining support/assistance

Operations supporting one’s own islands and coasts are major features of naval base

defense campaigns, and are favorable conditions richly endowed by nature. In one

respect, there are fairly many established defensive facilities that one can use. Naval

bases generally always have constructed a fairly complete observation and early warning

system, an anti-ship and antiaircraft defensive firepower system, a force garrison system,

and an operational command system. All of these are favorable battlefield conditions that

can be exploited to conduct a naval base defense campaign. In another respect, they

support island and coastal operations, which can obtain the widespread support of, and

coordination with friendly force units, [People’s] Armed Police, militia, and the broad

masses, to hold fast for long periods, and to execute sustained operations.

II. Basic Requirements...549

(1) Integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations

In waging a base defense campaign, one will be confronted with the enemy’s multi-layer,

multi-directional, multiple-means, high-intensity integrated attack. Under these

conditions, with any single operational strength, operational means or weapon system,

and in any single-area, single-layer battle, it will be difficult to effectively crush the

enemy attack. One must establish the thought of “integration of military-civilian, and

integrated-whole operations” {junmin yiti, zhengti zuozhan}

In “integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations,” one must

emphasize a high degree of centralized, unified command. A naval base defense

campaign normally is organized and conducted mainly by a naval campaign large

formation, but can also acquire the support of, and coordination with other service

branches, [People’s] Armed Police forces, and the militia. As for the various strengths

within the task-organization, they must – based on a unified campaign intention – realize

consistently adjusting-coordinated activities, so that each part of the campaign is

subordinated to the overall situation, serves the overall situation, and brings into play the

integrated-whole might {zhengti weili}. As for the other various strengths within the

operational area, as well as all related factors, they should all be incorporated into the

campaign’s general plan {guihua}, so as to ensure the smooth implementation of the

campaign.

In “integration of military-civilian, and integrated-whole operations,” one must form a

complete, integrated defensive system {tixi}. This is critical for base defensive

operations. Only by emphasizing the organic combination and advanced-level cohesion

of each campaign essential element can one enhance the integrated-whole might of

defensive operations. First, one must tightly combine all battlefield spaces – air, water

surface, underwater, and land – in campaign operations, so that they are joined into one,

and can support one another, forming an integrated-whole structure. Second, one must:

unify the organization of the participating naval strengths and the assisting and
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complementing strengths of other services and arms, Armed Police and militia; conduct

unified-overall planning of the bushu disposition, so as to form an integrated-whole

defensive strength structure of tri-services as one body, and integration of militarycivilian; and establish a scientific integrated-whole defensive posture. Third, one must:

comprehensively apply various operational means and forms; organically combine

together the naval base defense campaign with coastal defense, urban defense, and island

defense; and – taking counter-raid, counter-blockade, and counter-capture as the main

line – fuse the various operational means and forms into one, to strive for obtaining the

optimal operational effects.

(2) With defense in the lead, combine offense and defense

“With defense in the lead, combine offense and defense” is a specific embodiment and

application of the active defense ideology in a naval base defense campaign. Faced with

an enemy large-scale sudden attack, the desire to fully achieve resistance of the enemy

outside the guarded areas and targets is unrealistic. One must persevere in organizing

tight protection and active resistance, with defense as primary; thus, when the enemy

attacks, one can to the greatest extent preserve one’s forces and reduce losses, and also

decrease the operational effects of the enemy attack. “With defense in the lead, combine

offense and defense” is not passive, waiting, pure defense. With the continuous growth in

the number of defensive means, offensive activities in defensive operations will

significantly increase, with attack aiding defense, and offense integrated with defense;

and they have already become important contents of modern defensive operations. The

campaign commander must firmly establish the concept and awareness of active defense,

and – based on the campaign missions and the compositional circumstances of the

campaign strengths – organically fuse offensive activities into the base defense campaign,

not losing the opportunity to conduct active-initiative offensive operational activities

against the enemy, and – catching the enemy unaware – actively striking against the

critical links in the enemy’s offensive bushu disposition.

(3) Comprehensive defense, and key-point bushu disposition

Under modern conditions, the enemy will employ a variety of means to execute

multidirectional, multilayer, key-point-based sudden attacks. Hence, a naval base defense

campaign must be firmly grounded in the complex situation of the threats which can be

simultaneously posed – leading edge and in depth, frontal and flank, sea and ground, as

well as air; it must correspondingly organize an all-around, 3-D, in-depth, echelon-type

comprehensive defensive system centering on the base area, including all screening

targets. Simultaneously, the campaign must grasp the key points of defense, tightly center

on the main guarded targets and areas, dispose forces and arms in key-point fashion,

concentrate the main forces and firepower to cover the main targets, and strike at the

enemy along the main direction of his attack. First, one must correctly distinguish the

main screening targets from the secondary screening targets. For targets having critical

value and significance, one certainly must bushu disposition defensive force strengths

and weaponry with key points and provide them with key-point warning and guarding, to
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ensure their security. For ordinary targets, one can appropriately give them consideration

– while concentrating strengths to guard key-point targets – avoiding by all means a lack

of key points and an equal division of forces. When the guarded targets are relatively

concentrated, one can also organize an area defense with key points, so as to improve the

operational effectiveness of the defensive forces, and optimize the make-up of the

defensive system. Second, one must – based on the compositional features of the enemy’s

campaign strengths and on the enemy’s operational intention – analyze and determine the

enemy’s main attack forces, main attack means, and main attack direction, and thus

determine the targets, main-defense direction, and main-defense mode for the key-point

defense required by the base defense campaign. One must: dispose multiple lines of

defense; execute multilayer interception and strikes in great depth against the invading

targets; and ensure the effective interception of, and strikes on the [enemy’s] main

defensive targets. One must defend against air strikes by the enemy’s missile weapons

and aviation forces, treating this as the main mode of defense, while simultaneously

giving consideration to defense against the enemy by means of mines and missile

firepower, and by blockades of the various forces arrayed against the naval base. One

must – based on conditions in the operational sea area and the relative position between

the enemy and us, and with key-point guarded areas as the center – determine the

enemy’s most likely direction of raiding, and bushu disposition force strengths with key

points along this direction, to increase interception and strikes in depth. Simultaneously,

one should appropriately enlarge the defense sectors, and give consideration to defense

along the secondary raiding direction.

(4) Full preparations, and holding fast for the long term

Full preparations are basic assurances of gaining the campaign operational initiative and a

victory. Naval base defense campaigns are conducted on the basis of a naval base’s

routine defense and peacetime operational preparations. Serving as permanent stationing

areas for naval forces, naval bases are built over long periods, and their defensive systems

and various operational facilities are fairly complete; this has laid a certain foundation for

our completion of campaign preparations within the shortest possible time. However, in

naval base defense campaigns under modern conditions, the suddenness of the enemy

attack is great, the tension in operational activities is sharp, and the battlefield is complex

and rapidly changing. Hence, the mission of campaign preparations is extremely arduous,

and their content is broader. Doing a good job of full campaign preparations requires

establishing the ideology of being constantly prepared, of maintaining at all times a high

degree of vigilance, and of regularly doing a good job of battle preparations, so as to

facilitate effectively crushing the enemy’s sudden attack. One must lay stress on

analyzing and studying the enemy situation, promptly discovering and discriminating

among the signs of an enemy attack, at the right time improving the units’ degree of

combat readiness, and constantly improving the rapid response capability. One must: be

firmly grounded in the most complex, most difficult situations; formulate in advance a

realistic operational course of action (COA); do a good job of multiple preparations; and

– according to the situation’s development and changes – constantly perfect the

operational COA, and make great efforts to improve the emergency response capability.

One must integrate peacetime battlefield preparations, and further readjust, enhance,
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complement, and perfect various types of facilities; simultaneously, one must build up the

stores of various kinds of materiel so as to ensure the requirements for long-term holding

defensive operations.

Section 2: Main Activities...552

I. Implementing the Campaign Initiation...552

When one has already found signs of an enemy attack on the base, the campaign

command post should sound the alarm to all staff and force groups within the base and to

the protection system, and organize and push forward the [campaign] launch as fast as

possible per the operational COA. The fighter aviation forces and ship units assuming the

resistance mission should raise their degree of combat readiness, and organize all forces

on airfields, in the air, and at sea holding points, ambush positions, and roving/hunting

areas to go on alert. Ground air-defense forces and coastal sea-operations forces should

enter their pre-established positions and complete their firing preparations. All units not

tasked with a resistance mission should per the plan {jihua} be dispersed, concealed, and

camouflaged; and commanders at all levels and command post personnel should enter

battle positions and commence their work.

II. Resisting the Enemy’s Sea/Air Assault...552

The enemy’s sea/air-raid operations normally are wide-front, multi-bearing, multilayer,

multi-batch penetrations, which execute key-point-based comprehensive strikes against

critical targets within the base. The base-defense campaign commander must concentrate

superior forces and firepower along the main direction and at critical times, and strike at

the enemy posing the greatest threat; in particular, he must strike at the aviation forces

carrying high-precision, massively powerful weapons.

When resisting the enemy’s sea/air surprise attacks, one must take care to first organize

some forces to wipe out all of the enemy’s operational support forces, such as AWACS

planes, jamming aircraft, and radar sentry ships, and then use the main resistance forces

to attack all of the enemy’s strike force groups. When the enemy raid forces approach the

base’s anti-aircraft/anti-ship firepower range, one should correctly organize all firepower

groups in the selection of their strike targets, rationally allocate the missions, and flexibly

employ firepower. The basic requirement is to concentrate firepower strikes against the

highest-threat targets, such as aviation forces carrying air-to-ground missiles or ships

carrying cruise missiles – these must be annihilated at any cost. In order to more actively

and effectively wipe out the invading enemy, one may organize some ground defense

forces – such as surface-to-air missile (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and mobile

coastal-defense missile and coastal artillery forces – to execute maneuver operations

within the base area; in the first phase, these should be shifted toward ambushes along the

enemy’s possible invasion route(s) or direction(s), toward seeking opportunities for

battle, and toward elimination of the enemy. At the right time, one should modify the
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bushu disposition, and avoid suffering major losses in the enemy strikes, in order to

maintain sustained operational capability.

The aviation forces stationed at [nearby] airfields and the ship forces berthed at the base’s

harbor and mooring sites should at all times: ably conduct the preparations for resisting

the enemy strikes; continuously receive and analyze the enemy situation; organize tight

antiaircraft and anti-ship reconnaissance; improve their reserve channels {beihang} and

degree of combat readiness; and enhance the on-duty system. After receiving the alarm of

an enemy strike, one should immediately conduct dispersed or local

camouflage/concealment, per the predetermined plan {jihua}. When a direct threat is

received, the ship formation commanders can command ship weapons to fight off those

targets that have posed the greatest threat, and [must] strive to wipe out the enemy before

he can use his weapons.

III. Countering the Enemy’s Sea Blockade...553

In countering an enemy’s sea blockade of a naval base, the major activity is to crush the

enemy’s mine blockade and forces’ blockade.

(1) Crushing the enemy’s mine blockade

To crush the enemy’s mine blockade, first one must actively wipe out the enemy’s minelaying forces. This means organizing various forces and arms, and promptly discovering

and actively eliminating the enemy mine-laying forces (aviation forces, submarines, and

surface ships), while making every effort to eliminate them before they lay mines or

while they lay mines. Next, one must actively eliminate the enemy’s already laid mine

obstacles. Under ordinary circumstances, one should first concentrate minesweeping

forces and equipment; clear the key sea areas, harbors, and channels of the mine obstacles

impeding us the most; and then, depending on the situation observed, gradually expand to

comprehensive clearing. Since minesweeping activities normally are conducted under

enemy sea and air threats, when organizing minesweeping, one should thus conceal the

intention, enhance camouflage, and adopt a variety of defensive measures, to ensure that

the minesweeping forces fulfill their mission according to plan {jihua}. The basic method

for clearing enemy mine obstacles is – based on the enemy mines’ performance and the

sea area’s hydrological/geological conditions, and adopting measures suiting local

conditions – to make integrated use of a number of means, such as sweeping, explosion,

disposal, hunting, detection, and avoidance, to bring into play composite effectiveness.

Next, depending on the situation observed, one should force a path through the mine

obstacles. A forced crossing of mine obstacles is an emergency measure adopted when

time is pressing and the mission critical, and when one cannot dredge a channel and at the

same time has no reserve channel that can be used. The ship formations can – under the

direct guidance of the minesweepers and mine-disposal ships – force a path through the

mine obstacles. When forcing through a mined area, one should as much as possible

choose a line through a mined area with relatively short depth, or as much as possible

choose from the excessively thinned mined areas a deep-water point to pass through, and
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as much as possible going within the screening and observation range of our coast-based

air defense and coastal defense forces and observation and communication posts.

(2) Crushing the enemy forces’ blockade

Crushing the enemy forces’ blockade means crushing a blockade of a PLA Navy base by

enemy aviation forces, submarines, and surface ships. This mainly includes the following

activities:

1. Organizing sea patrol searches

In order to ensure that the counter-blockade forces in a relatively remote sea area strike

the enemy blockade forces, one should organize maneuver forces to conduct sea patrols.

The forces employed mainly are early-warning planes, antisubmarine patrol planes,

antisubmarine helicopters, surface ships, and submarines. The above forces – centered on

the base’s main harbor, and according to their respective performance, characteristics,

and missions – comprise a multilayer patrol system in great depth along the sea direction.

When organizing sea patrols, one should integrate antisubmarine patrols with antisurface-ship patrols, and – according to the varying circumstances – place particular

emphasis on some of them. The sea patrols should be able to ensure that our strike forces

perform the launch and execute the strike(s) in the predetermined sea area(s). The patrol

lines should be able to control the entire sector over which the enemy blockade forces can

operate, and be able to obtain fighter aviation forces’ cover and timely support from the

strike forces.

2. Emplacing (under)water obstacles

The goal in emplacement of (under)water obstacles is to block or restrict enemy

submarines and surface ships from approaching our base’s harbor and mooring sites. The

naval base should – based on the sea area’s natural conditions, using mine obstacles as

the mainstay, and with the base harbor as the key point – emplace (under)water obstacles

of various types and in multiple layers, along the sea direction. The (under)water

obstacles should have a certain depth, width, and density, and a fairly high obstructing

efficiency and anti-sweeping capability; [they should be placed so as to] strive to restrict

the enemy outside the range where he can use torpedoes and ship gun weapons to strike

at the base’s targets. At the same time, one should unify the planning {guihua} for

emplacement of the (under)water obstacles, so that the emplacement does not impact the

security and operations of friendly ships, and so that the main obstacles and inter-obstacle

passages are positioned within the range of our coastal observation and firepower control.

3. Annihilating the blockade forces

In naval base counter-blockade operations which only rely on coastal defense firepower

and sea patrol forces, it is difficult to resist the blockade activities of the enemy
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submarines and surface ships. To fulfill the mission of countering the enemy forces’

blockade, one must concentrate strikes against the enemy’s blockade forces.

Strikes on the enemy surface ships are normally executed by combined forces: strike

aviation forces, surface combat ships, coastal defense force groups, and submarines. The

basic requirements are as follows: to concentrate forces so as to form a superior position;

to deploy along multiple paths and from many directions in a converging attack; and to

strive for concealment and surprise, in order to constrain the enemy at the first

opportunity. For strikes on the enemy submarines, normally the attacks are executed first

by search strike groups of antisubmarine planes or helicopters, while later attacks are

executed by surface-ship strike groups or combined sea-air strike groups. Combined

strikes on the enemy’s blockade forces must ably organize coordinated actions – not

losing the opportunity for battle, and at the same time not causing accidental casualties to

one’s forces – and must strive by using the integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti

heli} to restrain the enemy.

IV. Defending Against the Enemy’s Surprise Attacks Using Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical (NBC) Weapons...555

(1) At the first opportunity, striking against the enemy’s NBC operational strengths

When one discovers signs of the enemy’s use of NBC weapons in a surprise attack on a

naval base, the campaign commander – possibly based on the actual capabilities of the

naval-base force composition, or by requesting higher levels to order the necessary

activities – [must] strive to execute effective strikes on the enemy before he can use NBC

weapons. The targets of these strikes mainly are the storage sites, launch positions, and

launch vehicles for the enemy’s NBC weapons; the strike means are long-range strike

forces, airborne units, and special-forces units, and one can also employ electronic

warfare (EW) forces to jam the enemy’s weapons guidance and control systems. The

opportunity for the strikes as much as possible [should be] before the enemy uses his

weapons, or during their launch. When resisting the enemy strikes against the naval base,

in particular one should identify – and lay stress on resistance against – the enemy’s

aircraft, ships, and missiles which carry NBC weapons.

(2) Ascertaining the circumstances of an enemy raid using NBC weapons

After a naval base has suffered an enemy raid using NBC weapons, one should

immediately organize radiological, chemical, and biological reconnaissance. Its missions

are as follows: to determine the areas, yields, modes, and degree of

lethality/destructiveness of the enemy raid with NBC weapons; to ascertain the scope of

the contaminated sea area and land area, the types of radiological clouds, contaminants,

and biological weapons, and the scope of the possible threats, and to mark their

boundaries; and to open up detours around and channels through the [contaminated] sea

area and land area. The campaign command organs should rapidly report the

reconnaissance results to a higher level and transmit them to all units.
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(3) Eliminating the consequences of an enemy raid with NBC weapons

After a naval base has suffered an enemy raid using NBC weapons, it should rapidly

adopt measures to eliminate the raid’s consequences. The missions of this activity are as

follows: to restore the command system and campaign coordination; to ascertain the

circumstances of the damage; to adjust the operational bushu disposition; to organize

emergency repairs, fire extinguishing, and disinfection/sterilization; to perform

decontamination of contaminated personnel and weapons; to blockade key contaminated

areas and infected areas; and to conduct inspections and sanitary processing of military

supplies and water supplies.

After the consequences of the enemy raid are eliminated, all units should organize self

and mutual medical aid. The specialized units (elements) directly controlled by the

campaign command organ are mainly used for supporting the command organ, critical

targets, and the main direction’s force groups. Units in the process of operations should

continue to fulfill their assigned battle missions, and must not break off from battle

because of the elimination of the raid’s consequences.
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Part V: Air Force Campaigns...557

Chapter 27

Overview...557

Section 1: Definition and Classifications of the Air Force Campaign...557

I. The Conceptualization of the Air Force Campaign...557

The Air Force campaign is a series of operational activities conducted by an Air Force

campaign large formation in order to achieve specific strategic and campaign goals in

accordance with a unified intention and plan {jihua} and within a specific time and

space.

The Air Force campaign is normally an important component of the joint campaign, and

it is normally conducted with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and in

coordination with other services and arms. Under special situations, it can also be

independently implemented by an Air Force campaign large formation.

The Air Force campaign is guided by the national military strategy and restricted by the

Air Force strategy. It achieves specific military goals through a series of air-to-air, air-toground, and ground-to-air operational activities. It determines the nature, goals, missions

and activities of combat, and it directly serves a given part of the war or even the overall

war situation. Its success or failure directly affects the war’s course and conclusion.

II. The Classifications of the Air Force Campaign {kongjun zhanyi fenlei}...557

The Air Force campaign is the general designation of the Air Force’s various campaign

types and patterns. The PLA’s Air Force campaign is normally divided into the air

offensive campaign {kongzhong jingong zhanyi}, the air defense campaign {fangkong

zhanyi}, the air blockade campaign {kongzhong fengsuo zhanyi}, and the airborne

campaign {kongjiang zhanyi}, etc. Of these, the air offensive campaign and the air

defense campaign are the basic patterns of the Air Force campaign. The air force

campaign large formation supports the campaign operations of the Army, Navy, and

Second Artillery with various operational activities. It possesses campaign operational

qualities and it generally is brought into the category of Air Force campaign research.

The air offensive campaign is series of airborne sudden-attack activities {tuji xingdong}

implemented by an Air Force campaign large formation in coordination with other

services and arms against an enemy within a fixed space and time. The air offensive

campaign in a joint campaign is normally a unified command by an Air Force campaign

large formation commander based on the intent of the joint campaign commander; an

independent air offensive campaign is a unified command by an Air Force campaign

large formation commander based on the intent of the supreme headquarters. The basic
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missions of the air offensive campaign are: wipe out or weaken the enemy’s aviation

forces and ground air defense forces [in order to] seize air dominance; wipe out or

weaken the enemy’s heavy force groupings; destroy the enemy’s communications and

transport systems in order to create conditions for ground and sea campaigns; and

sudden-attack the enemy’s political, military and economic targets [in order to] weaken

the enemy’s war potential or obtain specified strategic goals.

The air defense campaign is a series of operational activities implemented by the Air

Force campaign large formation in coordination and cooperation with other services,

service arms, local force-units and people’s air defense strengths, in accordance with a

unified intention and plans, and in order to frustrate the enemy’s air raids. Its basic goal is

to smash the enemy air raid intention and safeguard the security of important targets. Its

basic missions are: closely monitor the dynamic state of the enemy air raid, promptly

discover and ascertain the enemy’s implementation of air raid activities and time

opportunities, as well as notify various force-units and people’s air defense organizations;

resist-attack {kangji} the enemy’s air raid against our military, political and economic

targets and reduce the harm of the enemy’s air raids; organize the counterattack

operations and wipe out and weaken the enemy air raid strengths; organize information

warfare and seize information dominance; and organize the protection work and reduce

the losses of personnel and war resources {zhanzheng ziyuan} brought about from

encountering enemy air raids.

The air blockade campaign is a series of offensive operational activities implemented

with the Air Force campaign large formation in the lead and in coordination {xietong

xia} with the strengths of other services and service arms in order to disrupt and restrict

the enemy’s external economic and military relationships {lianxi}. The basic missions

are: seize and maintain air dominance; implement deny of flight {kongzhong jinfei} and

sever the enemy’s air passages with the outside world; sudden-attack the enemy’s antiblockade operational system and weaken their anti-blockade operational capability; and

blockade the enemy’s sea, land (island) traffic from the air.

The airborne-assault campaign is an operational activity conducted by airborne landing

forces in the lead and in coordination with aviation forces and the force-units of other

services and arms; [it is conducted] via air mobility to directly arrive at the enemy’s

depth areas in order to achieve specific strategic or campaign goals, and in accordance

with a unified intention and plans. Its basic missions are: seize and occupy enemy

political, military, and economic centers or other strategic vital areas and implement

operations in the enemy’s rear; seize and occupy important areas and targets in the

enemy’s campaign depth, separate the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition, cut-off the

enemy’s retreat route, block enemy reinforcement, and complement frontal force

operations; implement rapid reinforcement, and alter the enemy-to-friendly strength ratio

and battlefield posture, etc.

Air Force operations in coordination with Army, Navy and Second Artillery campaigns

are an important component of the joint, Army, Naval and Second Artillery campaigns.
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They [Air Force operations] appear as combat- [battle] scale, permeate the entire course

of the campaign, and possess campaign qualities. Their basic missions are: seize and

maintain local air dominance, and cover {yanhu} the main bushu-deployment of Army,

Navy and Second Artillery and important operational activities; implement in-depth air

sudden-attacks, smash and destroy the important targets within the enemy’s campaign

depth, and promote the development of the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery

campaigns; implement close-in aviation fire support and sudden-attack enemy shallowdepth battlefield targets in order to create favorable conditions {wei...chuangzao youli

tiaojian} for Army and Navy offensive and defensive activities; implement airborneassault operations and complement {peihe} the critical operational activities of the Army

and Navy campaigns; implement aviation reconnaissance and help the Army, Navy and

Second Artillery to promptly grasp the battlefield situations; implement electronic

warfare and participate in the struggle to seize electromagnetic dominance; and

implement air transport and safeguard-support38 air mobility, supply and rescue of Army,

Navy, and Second Artillery forces.

Section 2: The Main Characteristics and Principles of the Air Force

Campaign...559

I. The Main Characteristics of the Air Force Campaign...559

(1) A compatible coexistence between seizing information dominance and air dominance,

and both permeating from start to finish

Speaking from a certain sense, Air Force campaign operations under informationized

conditions are first a contest between the information warfare strengths of both sides. The

sudden quality of Air Force operational activities, the effective quality of operating

operational platforms, the precision quality of precision guided weapons, the continuity

of command and control, and the timeliness of various campaign supports all rely {jun

yilaiyu} on the effective control of battlefield information superiority; [thus]

“information” has already penetrated to all links of Air Force campaign operational

activities. In future Air Force campaign operations, there will be a consistent coexistence

of seizing information dominance and air dominance, and it will permeate the Air Force

campaign from start to finish. Only by seizing information dominance can we safeguardsupport fully bringing into play weapons system effectiveness and seize air dominance.

Moreover, losing information dominance means losing air dominance.

38 Translator’s note: the Chinese term baozhang {保障} is often translated as support, but it also carries

with it a connotation of ensure or safeguard, or in other words, ensure something is achieved through

support means. Because there are other terms for safeguard, ensure and another term that is also translated

as support - assisting-support {支援 zhiyuan}, safeguard-support should be distinguished from these other

terms.
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(2) Unprecedented improvements in operational effectiveness and increases in the quick

decision quality of the campaign

Along with the continuous application of high and new technologies {gaoxin jishu}, Air

Force operational effectiveness has notably strengthened and campaign tempo has clearly

accelerated. So, now and then, an Air Force campaign of a not too big scale can not only

achieve specific strategic goals, but in a short period of time, a relatively large-scaled Air

Force campaign can disrupt or wipe out an enemy’s defense system and war capabilities.

It is for this reason that first, the widespread use of integrated intelligence early warning

systems and long range precision guided weapons on the battlefield greatly improve the

precision quality and destructive strength of air strikes, and constitutes a severe threat

against any important target within the scope of the entire battlefield depth; secondly, it

improves the mobility performance {jidong xingneng tigao} of aviation force weapons, it

continuously improves penetration means, and increases the suddenness quality of the

campaign; third, continuous increases to aircraft bomb loads result in notable increases to

operational kill and destruct might. Thus, the time period of Air Force campaign

activities has greatly shortened and quick decision quality has increased.

(3) The diversity of campaign activities and interwoven attack and defense

The future campaign conducted {weilai jinxing de zhanyi} by the PLA is mainly the joint

campaign. Its geographical environment is special, not only are there high plains frigid

areas, but there are coastal areas; its operational objects are multi-variant; its main pattern

can be an island blockade campaign, an island offensive campaign, a border area

counterattack campaign or an anti-air raid campaign, etc. The Air force campaign large

formation normally carries out campaign operational tasks under these kinds of

backdrops. Not only must {yao} it [campaign large formation] organize and implement

the Air Force campaign, it must also {youyao} assist-support and cover the full course of

operations of the Army, Navy and the Second Artillery. These operational activities may

include air situation early warning, seizing and maintaining air dominance, air cover

{kongzhong yanhu}, air sudden-attack {kongzhong tuji}, anti-air resistance-attack

{duikong kangji}, aviation fire support, air transport, electronic warfare, etc.

Furthermore, the aforementioned activities are organized and implemented under a

definite air situation threat, so attack will have defend, defend will have attack, and attack

and defense are interwoven. Thus, the missions [tasks] of the Air Force campaign large

formation in a joint campaign are extremely strenuous.

(4) The airspace of the campaign operations is exceedingly broad

The air strengths possess special qualities of high speed mobility and long range

operations, so along with the development of aviation technology, the air battlefield has

rapidly expanded and already possesses the qualities {juyou...de xingzhi} of full depth,

omni-directional, all-altitude and integrated air and space {kongtian yiti}. In terms of a

horizontal scope {shuiping fanwei}, at present, the operational radius of third generation
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aircraft has universally reached over a thousand kilometers and bombers have reached

several thousand to nearly {shang} ten thousand kilometers; advanced medium- and

long-range air-air missiles can be launched from several tens of kilometers to several

hundred kilometers out, and air-to-ground missiles and air-launched cruise missiles can

implement precision attacks from nearly 100 kilometers to even several thousand

kilometers. In terms of vertical scope, from the development and use of space weapons

and helicopters, the activity height {huodong gaodu} of Air Force campaign activities

can be from “tree-level” all the way to cosmos space. This has resulted in the campaign

battlefield having multi-layered full-dimensional forms such as outer space, super high

altitude, high altitude, medium altitude, low altitude and super-low altitude, and the trend

of integrated air-space is already very evident.

(5) The missions of campaign support are arduous

The elevation in status of the air battlefield has resulted in more and more missions and

more strenuous [work] shouldered by the Air Force, and this has increased the

arduousness and difficulty of Air Force campaign support missions. The tremendous

materiel depletion and rapidity of campaign progress requires that logistics and

equipment support be fast and prompt and for the Air Force campaign large formation to

have sufficient support strengths and flexible support modes. The total aviation munitions

input amount in a near-future local war has already reached most of the total depletion

amount of the war. Along with the continuous increases to the technical content of Air

Force weapons equipment, the dependence on technical support in Air Force operations

will also increase daily. Without good technical support, the Air Force will not have

higher failure-free rates {lianghaolyu} and sortie rates {chudonglyu}. The quality level of

Air Force mission accomplishment is a concern for {shiguan} the overall war situation.

Therefore, in order to better adapt to high intensity {gao qiangdu} continuous operations

and ensure the Air Force has a higher campaign sortie intensity, not only is it necessary

for the Air Force campaign large formation to closely plan and organize for itself, but it is

also necessary to make unified acquisitions from across the PLA {cong quanjun tongyi

choucuo}.

II. Basic Principles for Air Force Campaigns...561

(1) Focus on the overall situation, be prudent in decision-making

The Air Force campaign commander should stand at the strategic height, focus on the

overall war situation and the overall campaign situation, deeply comprehend higher level

strategic intent and the requirements of political, diplomatic, and military struggle

circumstances on campaigns, and fully recognize the status and role of the Air Force

campaign in the overall war situation. On the basis of complete mastery of the enemy

situation, our situation and the battlefield situation, seize upon the main problems of

campaign overall planning {zhanyi chouhua} and be prudent in decision-making.

Correctly select the campaign’s main operational direction and strike targets, accurately

grasp the campaign launch time opportunity and campaign phase transitions,
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scientifically use force-unit {budui} strengths, and ensure the set campaign goals are

reached.

(2) Carefully plan, fully prepare

The situations of an Air Force campaign are sudden, have high intensity and large

depletion, and the initial battle {shouzhan} can be the decisive battle {shouzhan}.

Campaign success or defeat to a large extent depends on full campaign preparations

{chongfen de zhanyi zhunbei}. The campaign commander must, on the basis of the

missions entrusted from higher levels, take into consideration the situations from the

most complex and most difficult, carefully plan, and fully prepare. In peacetime, he must

attach importance to grasping and accumulating various intelligence data and strengthen

the study against the operational object {zuozhan duixiang}; on the basis of developing

changes in the situations such as the enemy situation and the battlefield environment, at

the right time revise and improve the operational preliminary scenarios {zuozhan yu’an};

with key points conduct battlefield construction and materials storage; strengthen

adaptability training {shiyingxing xunlian}, know well the plans, preliminary scenarios,

and the battlefield environment. Prior to imminent battle, conduct necessary adjustments

according to the missions and situations, and accomplish all preparations with

concealment and speed {yinbi xunsu} within the stipulated time.

(3) Attach importance to the offensive, combine offense and defense

The offensive is the most basic and most effective means and mode for winning and

maintaining initiative in the Air Force campaign. Air Force campaign operations must

diligently create and capture combat opportunity and strike the enemy with active

initiative. During the offensive campaign, one must implement a powerful and fierce first

sudden-attack {shouci tuji} against the enemy as well as continuous offensivemomentum activities {lianxu de gongshi xingdong} and render [the enemy] no way to

organize an effective return attack {youxiao huanji}. At the same time, one should

organize an effective anti-air defensive {duikong fangyu}, to assist offense with defense

{yifang zhugong}, and ensure the stability of the offensive posture {gongshi taishi}.

During the air defense campaign, one must establish the thought for offensive-momentum

air defense {gongshi fangkong}, actively organize counterattack activities of unequal

scales {guimo budeng}, and with offense assisting defense {yigong zhufang}, thoroughly

crush the enemy’s air raid intention.

(4) Integrated operations, close adjusting-coordination {miqie xietiao}

In an Air Force campaign, each of the campaign strengths, each of the operational

directions, and each type of operational activity must be closely complementary {miqie

peihe}; only if we scientifically organize the allocation {kexue bianpei} and rationally

deploy the various force-units of the service arms and various weapon systems in

accordance with mission needs-requirements and operational effectiveness under a

unified intent can we form an integrated net strength {zhengti heli}. In order to ensure a
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consistent adjusting-coordination of participating force-units, one must implement a

unified command of the campaign strengths, carefully formulate the coordination plan,

appropriately differentiate the operational missions, clarify the coordination relationships,

and strictly organize {yanmi zuzhi} campaign coordination; [one must] establish the

institution for adjusting-coordination {xietiao jigou} and strengthen the coordination

safeguard-support {xietong baozhang}; [one must] strictly monitor the battlefield

situation and promptly adjust and adjust-coordinate {xietiao} the operational activities of

the various strengths within the campaign task organization {zhanyi biancheng}; the

various force-units must establish the view of integration {zhengti guannian}, set out

from the benefit of the overall campaign situation, submit to the unified command,

resolutely execute the campaign plan, support each other with confidence, and closely

complement each other with initiative.

(5) Concentrate crack [troops], strike enemy vital areas {yaohai}

In Air Force campaign operations, one must firmly establish the thought of concentrating

the use of force-unit {budui} strengths. [One must] use crack forces and high-new

technical equipment offensively in the main direction and defensively in the direction

encountering the biggest threat. In the critical phases of carrying out the missions that

play a decisive role for the overall situation, [one must] emphasize strikes on the enemy’s

vital targets, implement structural destruction {jiegou pohuai}, and strive for superiorities

to subdue the enemy {zhidi}. In concentrating campaign strengths, one should not only

stress {bujin yingdang qiangdiao} the concentration of quantities, but stress more

{gengying qiangdiao} the concentration of crack troops and cutting-edge weapons

{jingbing liqi}, the concentration of firepower and information warfare strengths and to

the greatest extent possible, enhance the capability to confront a powerful enemy.

(6) Conceal suddenness, gain victory with the unorthodox

Concealed and sudden activities can result in an enemy not being able to quickly make an

effective response. They can remedy the inferiority of our equipment technology and

before the enemy’s superiority has yet to be effectively brought into play, with one blow

[we can] achieve operational goals and win fairly large battle results at a relatively small

price. In terms of guidance and force-unit {budui} strength application, the campaign

commander should use all means and fighting methods and strive to achieve suddenness

and gain victory with the unorthodox. [The campaign commander] must organize

campaign preparations and campaign mobility with concealment, ingeniously select the

time-opportunities, direction and locations for activities, broadly implement electronic

jamming, organize campaign diversions, fully utilize natural conditions such as weather

and terrain, and strike the enemy with surprise.

(7) Rapid flexibility, preemptively {xianji} subdue the enemy

The Air Force campaign is intense and violent. It is only through rapid response and

mobile flexibility can one capture favorable time-opportunities, preemptively subdue the
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enemy, and seize campaign initiative. To this end, the campaign commander should

accomplish: rapid gathering of intelligence, rapid setting of the decision, rapid organizing

of the plan, and rapid implementation of activities. [He should] also be adept at relying

on the battlefield situation, fully bring into play a subjective dynamic quality, study and

weigh circumstances, flexibly use and alternate fighting methods, at the right time select

and revise the operational directions and strike targets, and compel the enemy into being

passive.

(8) Full scale support and give prominence to key points

The operational intensity {zuozhan qiangdu} of the Air Force campaign is high and there

are frequent mission transitions {renwu zhuanhuan pinfan}. Material expenditure and

personnel/equipment battle losses are great and support is extremely complex. It is

necessary to take all factors into consideration and organize all matters of support on a

full scale. Establish a scientific support system {baozhang tixi} and rationally employ the

various support strengths. Comprehensively utilize various support means and promptly

provide the information, materials and technology needed in campaign operations.

Safeguard-support [or ensure] campaign command and force-units to safely and smoothly

accomplish the campaign missions. At the same time as full scale support, it is necessary

to give prominence to the key points, concentrate the main support strengths and the

superior support equipment, and support with key points the main operational force-units

in operational activities in the main direction and critical time-occasions.

(9) Strengthen political work and bring good traditions into play

The superiority of our military and politics and our fine traditions are the fundamental

support for vanquishing the enemy. During a campaign, it is necessary to enhance the

strategic awareness {zhanlue yishi} of the combat-participating forces during the

campaign, to resolutely implement the orders and instructions from higher-levels, to

uphold the absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces, and to ensure the

command and the activities of participating force-units are highly centralized and unified;

[it is also necessary to] thoroughly conduct education in patriotism, revolutionary

heroism, and the necessity of winning a just war, enabling all personnel to establish the

confidence and the resolution of winning if you have the courage to fight and to make full

use of the fine style of combat with bravery, selfless sacrifice and continuous operations;

[it is necessary to] fully exploit the role of condensed power of political work, to firmly

establish the view of the overall situation and the integrated operational thought of

complement with initiative, mutual assistance, and close coordination; [it is necessary to]

combine together the roles of political education and the vanguard model of various

levels of leadership and party members, promote the unity between internal portions of

force-units and the military-civilian side, and stimulating an intense combat passion; [it is

necessary to] direct-guide the officers and soldiers in studying their professional work in

depth and proficiently grasping the weapons at hand; [it is necessary to] make full use of

democracy in military affairs, continuously study and be innovative in new fighting

methods; [and it is necessary to] resolutely struggle against the enemy’s psychological
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warfare, and actively open-up-develop a political offensive and disintegrate the morale of

the enemy military.

Section 3: Air Force Campaign Command and Coordination...564

I. Air Force Campaign Command...564

(1) The command system {zhihui tixi}

Based on different missions and actual situations, the Air Force campaign large formation

should adhere to the principles of unified command, reducing the administrative levels,

and beneficial coordination to organize and build the command system. One normally

builds a bi-level command system of a campaign large formation command institution

{zhanyi juntuan zhihui jigou} and a campaign direction (air defense sub-area {fangkong

fenqu}) command institution. In a joint campaign, the Air Force campaign command

system {kongjun zhanyi zhihui tixi} is an important component of the joint campaign

command system, the Air Force campaign large formation commander commands the Air

Force campaign activities based on the intent of the joint campaign commander. The Air

Force campaign large formation command institution establishes coordination

relationships with the relevant service campaign large formation. When independently

carrying out an Air Force campaign, the Air Force campaign large formation commander

and the command organ command the operational activities of the Air Force campaign

large formation based on the intent of the Supreme Command.

The Air Force campaign large formation commander and the command organ [conduct]

unified command of the various operational strengths within their formation {biancheng

nei} and [conduct] unified organization of various campaign supports; they put forth the

assisting-support needs of the other service campaign large formations assisting in

operations and they adjust-coordinate the assisting-support activities of the air strengths

of other services and air defense strengths.

The campaign direction (or air defense sub-area) command institution [conducts] unified

command of the operational activities and various supports of subordinate and attached

force-strengths based on the orders and instructions of the campaign large formation

command institution.

In order to facilitate command and maintain the stability of command, the Air Force

command headquarters {kongjun zhihuibu} will normally set up a main command post

{jiben zhihuisuo}, an alternate command post {yubei zhihuisuo}, and based on needs and

requirements, it can set up a forward command post {qianjin zhihuisuo}, a direction

command posts {fangxiang zhihuisuo}, and an airborne command post {kongzhong

zhihuisuo}, etc.

The main command post is the Air Force operation command center for the joint

operation. It is normally set up with the commander, general duty personnel, and
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departments such as operations, intelligence, communications, classification-security,

navigational, electronic warfare, ground air defense, aviation monitoring, weather, and

radar departments. Personnel are normally composed of the commanding officer of the

Air Force campaign large formation, the political commissar, the chief of staff, the

leadership of the command, political, logistics, and equipment departments and the

commanders of other services and arms deployed and in support of or representatives for

adjusting-coordination and liaison. Also attached are the necessary services support

personnel {qinwu baozhang renyuan}.

The main command post is responsible for mastering the complete situation and the

activities of a unified command of force-units. The main duties are: mastering and

reporting on the complete situation of the joint operation; based on the intent of the joint

command headquarters {lianhe zhihuibu} and operational resolution {zuozhan juexin},

command the unfolding of the various subordinate force-units; determining the

operational mission for all force-units; implementing effective control of the operational

activities of the various Air Force force-units {budui}; commanding the reserve forces to

enter the operation at the appropriate time; commanding and controlling the transition

between offensive and defensive operations at the right time; adjusting-coordination

between the operational activities of other services; and organizing the various supports.

The alternate command post {yubei zhihuisuo} is a spare command institution

established to replace the command of the main command post, and it can be unfolded

[deployed] at the same time as the main command post. It is normally composed of the

deputy commander {fuzhihuiyuan} of the Air Force campaign large formation and other

essential personnel, and it is allocated with essential service and support strengths {qinwu

baozhang liliang}. Prior to replacing the main command post, it normally only receives

situation reports {qingkuang tongbao}, so at all times, there is an understanding in the

progress situation of the operation in order to facilitate taking over command as

necessary. If there is excess command capacity {zhihuiliang} at the main command post

or in other situations, it is also possible for it to shoulder certain partial command

missions in accordance with the instructions of the main command post.

The forward command post {qianjin zhihuisuo} is a command institution established to

strengthen the command of the main direction or to facilitate command of Air Force

force-units assisting in ground (sea) armed forces operations. It is normally deployed in

the main direction fairly close to the forward positions or in the vicinity of army or naval

forward command posts coordinating operations. It can also be replaced by subordinate

level command posts based on needs and requirements. Generally it is composed of the

deputy commander of the Air Force campaign large formation leading the necessary

personnel.

The air command post {kongzhong zhihuisuo} is a command institution set up aboard an

aircraft. The airborne early warning command aircraft has good mobile performance and

its radars and communication equipment receive little effect from the ground. It has a

long functional range and it can implement complete airspace surveillance from a fairly
643

long range. It can promptly discover enemy air targets and command and control-guide

our own aircraft and it can independently assume command of a specific area. Thus, the

air command post is generally established aboard an airborne early warning aircraft. The

airborne early warning aircraft {kongzhong yujing zhihuiji}is mainly under the control of

the Air Force campaign large formation commander and normally the deputy commander

or deputy chief of staff leads a small amount of command and control and specialized

personnel to implement command. Based on the performance and number of airborne

early warning command aircraft, the area and extent of early warning command is

normally divided according to operational direction or operational mission. In order to

implement uninterrupted air surveillance and command, the airborne early warning

command aircraft must normally take turns in the air to conduct its activity.

(2) Command mode {zhihui fangshi}

Air Force operations in a joint operation {lianhe zuozhan kongjun zuozhan} normally use

directive-style command {mingling shi zhihui} and delegation-style command {weituo

shi zhihui} modes. Directive-style command is also called directive-quality command

{zhilingxing zhihui} or procedural-style command {chengxu shi zhihui}. Based on its

nature, directive-style command can be divided into centralized command {jizhong

zhihui} and dispersed command {fensan zhihui}. Centralized command is the main mode

and basic requirement of Air Force operational command. Dispersed command is when

Air Force force-units are in dispersed activities and the commander independently

implements command based on the intent of the higher-level authority. When Air Force

aviation forces carry out missions to assist ground- and sea operations, this command

mode is generally adopted.

Directive-style command, based on its methods, can be divided into level-by-level

command and skip-echelon command. Level-by-level command refers to Air Force

combat-participating force-units implementing a level-by-level command based on

subordinate relationships and issuing the employment force-strengths, dispatch timeopportunities, strike targets and coordination stipulations, etc., from subordinate level to

subordinate level to all subordinate force-units. Skip echelon command is implementing

command by skipping a level or several levels. The skip echelon command of the Air

Force is being extensively applied in a localized war. A high-level decision-making organ

{gaoceng juece jiguan} will sometimes directly command the activities of a small

formation of aviation force.

The main characteristics of directive-style command are: clear and specific orders, and

higher-level authorities not only give detailed stipulated missions to subordinates, but

they also specifically stipulate the methods and time for accomplishing the missions as

well as associated coordination matters. This command mode is able to effectively

safeguard-support the implementation of the operational intent and benefit the

safeguarding-support of a balanced overall situation and the consistently adjustedcoordination of operational activities. It is a basic mode for implementing operational
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command under modern conditions, and it is also a frequently used command mode by a

campaign commander during Air Force operations.

Delegation-style command is also called guidance-quality command. The main

characteristics of this kind of command mode are: the higher level authority normally

uses summary-quality instructions to implement macroscopic command over

subordinates. When entrusted [delegated] with a mission, one mainly stipulates the major

problems of the operations such as the basic operational intent {jiben zuozhan yitu}, the

operational target {zuozhan bubiao}, the main operational direction, the force-strengths

and weapons, etc. to be reinforced, the specific methods and steps, etc. to accomplish the

mission, and then allows subordinate commanders to independently on their own conduct

decision-making according to higher level commander intent. When there are two are

more operational directions, the Air Force senior officer {kongjun shouzhang} can

delegate a subordinate commander in a given direction to implement a unified command

of the Air Force force-units in the aforementioned direction based on a general

operational intent {zong de zuozhan yitu}. This kind of command mode is favorably

suitable for various complex environments and is able to fully bring the initiative,

flexibility and creativity of a subordinate commander into play. [Delegation-style

command] is an important mode for implementing operational command under high-tech

conditions.

II. Air Force Campaign Coordination {kongjun zhanyi xietong}...566

(1) The main content of campaign coordination

Air Force campaign coordination is precisely the adjusting-coordination of

complementary activities conducted by the various strengths participating in an Air Force

campaign, [conducted] in the various domains of campaign operations and in accordance

with the unified plan of a campaign commander and command organ. The main contents

include: the coordination of force-strength activities {bingli xingdong} in the campaign

main direction and auxiliary directions {fuzhu fangxiang}; the coordination of forcestrength activities for each phase of the campaign; the coordination between air offensive

force-strengths and force-strengths of air defense operations; the coordination between

information operation force-strengths and firepower strike force-strengths; and the

coordination between campaign operations and campaign support, etc. Not only is there

campaign coordination, there is also tactical coordination {zhanshu xietong}; not only is

there internal coordination of the Air Force campaign large formation, there is also the

coordination between the other services and arms supporting operations {zhiyuan

zuozhan}; not only is there coordination according to the plan, there is also ad hoc

coordination. During the course of organizing the implementation of the campaign, the

campaign commander and the command organ must correctly and successfully handle the

various coordination relationships. In principle, one should: give priority to campaign

coordination with tactical coordination as subsidiary; give priority to planned

coordination with ad hoc coordination as subsidiary; give priority to the main campaign

direction with the secondary direction as subsidiary; establish coordination relationships
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by giving priority to the activities of force-units carrying out the main mission and with

the activities of force-units carrying out complementing and assisting missions as

subsidiary. Also specifically conduct adjusting-coordination in the operational areas (air),

strike targets, activity times and methods, etc. of the force-units of various formations

{bingtuan}.

(2) The basic methods of campaign coordination

The basic methods commonly used in Air Force campaign coordination are: coordination

based on mission, coordination based on target, coordination based on time, coordination

based on space {kongjian}, coordination based on phase (time segment), etc.

Coordination based on mission is the conduct of coordination to achieve mission

sequencing on the basis of conducting a rational allocation of campaign missions. This

normally includes the two situations of the prioritization of accomplishing different

operational missions by various groupings (force-units) and the accomplishing of the

same mission at the same time by various groupings (force-units). In coordination based

on mission, first divide the general mission of campaign operations into missions for each

phase (time segment), then rationally allocate the missions of each phase (time segment)

to the relevant force-units, while clarifying the coordination methods between each

grouping (force-unit) and other groupings (force-units).

Coordination based on target refers to adjusting-coordination of the operational activities

of each grouping (force-unit) according to strike targets. In a campaign, sometimes the

targets one wants to strike are relatively concentrated and sometimes they are relatively

dispersed, so in coordination based on target, the key point is to clarify the main targets

each grouping (force-unit) will strike and the degree of destruction. When implementing

a repeat strike against a given key point target {zhongdian mubiao}, one can clarify the

strike time, the altitude and entry direction {gaodu he jinru fangxiang} for each grouping

(force-unit).

Coordination based on time refers to conducting coordination in accordance with the

initiation time, the sustained period and activity sequence for each grouping (force-unit).

This is generally adopted when organizing the coordination of carrying out strikes on the

same targets in the same space by various operational groupings (force-units). Based on

the enemy situation, the operational characteristics of the various groupings (force-units),

the battlefield environment, etc., clarify coordination relationships, centering on the main

battle groupings {zhuzhan jituan} (force-units), organize the coordination actions, and

accurately grasp the activity speed {xingdong sudu} and the operational results {zuozhan

xiaoguo} of each of the operational groupings (force-units). Based on changes in the

battlefield situation and campaign progress {zhanyi jincheng}, adjust the sequence and

time of activities and ensure that the time for the activities of the various operational

groupings (force-units) are tightly linked in terms of time.
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Coordination based on space refers to conducting coordination according to the

operational area (air zone), operational direction and operational altitude {zuozhan

gaodu}. Generally this is adopted when organizing the implementation of simultaneous

operations by various operational groupings (force-units). The campaign commander and

command organ should conduct rational division of the activity space for each

operational grouping (force-unit), and clarify with key points the operational missions for

each operational grouping (force-unit) in different battlefields, different directions,

different areas (air zones) and different altitudes based the operational missions,

characteristics, battlefield environment, etc. of the operational groupings (force-units).

Coordination based on phase (or time segment) refers to clarifying the basic mission of

each operational grouping (force-units) in each phase and stipulating the content and

methods of coordination based on the different phases of the campaign progress.

Coordination based on phase (or time segment) is precisely a further differentiation of the

various campaign phases and an organization of coordination based on every small phase

and activity step. Coordination based on phase (time segment) must: grasp the center of

gravity of each phase (time segment) of the operation {zuozhan de zhongxin}, and while

centering on the center of gravity, employ the campaign strengths and assign operational

missions; and closely pay attention to the situation of accomplishing the operational

mission in each phase (time segment), and at the right time, transition to the next phase

(time segment) of the operation in order for each phase (time segment) of the operation to

be closely linked and each loop be closed, ensuring smooth implementation of the

campaign.

Section 4: Air Force Campaign Preparation and Implementation...568

I. Air Force Campaign Preparations...568

Air Force campaign preparations refer to the process of the Air Force campaign

commander conducting overall planning {zhanyi chouhua} and organization of the

campaign, and it is the basis for the activity of the campaign {zhanyi huodong}. Its main

contents are: setting the campaign resolution; formulating the campaign plan; organizing

campaign coordination; organizing the various kinds of support; concentrating the

campaign strengths; guiding and inspecting the campaign preparations; and organizing

the training for imminent battle {linzhan xunlian}.

(1) Set the campaign resolution

The campaign resolution {zhanyi juexin} is the basic decision {jiben jueding} made by

the Air Force campaign commander for the goals and activities of the campaign. Setting

the campaign resolution is normally determined according to higher level intent, the

campaign concept {zhanyi fangzhen}, the operational mission, the enemy situation, our

own situation and the situations such as the battlefield environment and weather, and

[determined] on the basis of correct situational assessment. Its main content includes: the

campaign intention, the main operational direction, the campaign bushi disposition, the
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basic fighting methods, the coordination actions {xietong dongzuo}, the setting up of

command posts, campaign initiation and the time limits for accomplishing campaign

preparations, etc.

The campaign intention is namely the goal that the campaign must achieve. Determining

the campaign intention must adhere to higher-level intent, the campaign mission, the

enemy situation, the battlefield environment, etc. The expression of the campaign

intention should be concise and accurate; and it must avoid ambiguity and being difficult

to understand and grasp.

The main operational direction is namely the direction for implementing the Air Force

main campaign direction. In selecting the main operational direction, one must focus on

the overall situation of the campaign and what is beneficial for direct strikes against the

enemy’s campaign centers of gravity and effectively defending the security of our own

main targets. During the Air Force campaign, there are several operational directions

{shuge zuozhan fangxiang}, but during any given phase, there should only be one main

operational direction. Once the main operational direction has been chosen, it cannot be

changed rashly. During the process of implementing the Air Force campaign, when

changes of a fundamental nature occur in the battlefield situation, only then should one

resolutely make a change, and quickly adjust the main operational direction.

The campaign bushi disposition is namely the division, task-organization and deployment

{qufen, bianzu yu peizhi} conducted for the operational strengths. To determine the

campaign bushi disposition, one must focus on creating favorable postures and

concentrating strengths in the main direction, in the key point areas and at the critical

time segments based on the battlefield conditions.

The basic fighting method {jiben zhanfa} is namely the basic means and ways {jiben

shouduan he tujing} for carrying out the campaign. Determining the basic fighting

methods should adhere to situations such as the campaign intention, the forming of the

force-strengths, the enemy situation, the military geographical environment, etc. It should

benefit the development of our strong points and attack the enemy’s shortfalls, and it

should benefit the seizing of campaign initiative. During the process of the campaign, one

should flexibly alter fighting methods according to changes in mission and the enemy

situation, etc.

Coordination actions {xietong dongzuo} are the consistent adjusting-coordination

activities of force-units carrying out campaign missions based on mission, time and

location. One should clarify the coordination relationships and coordination actions, and

put forth the principles and requirements of coordination.

For setting up the command posts, this is mainly clarifying the location and time, etc. for

composing and setting up each command post at the root level.
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For campaign initiation time, the offensive campaign should clarify the time limits for

accomplishing offensive preparations and the initiation time; the air defense campaign

should clarify the time limit for accomplishing air defense preparations.

(2) Formulate campaign plans

The campaign command organ should adhere to the campaign commander’s resolution

and promptly formulate the campaign plan. This mainly includes: the general plan for

campaign activities {zhanyi xingdong zongti jihua}, the branch plans {fenzhi jihua}, the

coordination plans {xietong jihua}, as well as the campaign operation safeguardingsupport plan {zhanyi zuozhan baozhang jihua}, the logistics safeguarding-support plan

{houqin baozhang jihua}, the equipment safeguarding-support plan {zhuangbei baozhang

jihua}, and the political work plan {zhengzhi gongzuo jihua}.

The content of the campaign plan mainly includes: situational assessment and conclusion,

the higher-level intent and root-level operational missions, the friendly force missions,

the organization, deployment and mission of each operational grouping, the divisions of

the campaign phases and the expected situations in each phase, the activity courses of

action for each operational grouping in each phase, the coordination events {xietong

shixiang}, the organizing of command, the predetermined campaign initiation and

conclusion time, and the time limit for accomplishing preparations.

To formulate the campaign plan, one must carry out the commander’s operational intent,

[one must] establish a footing in handling the most difficult situations, [one must]

formulate multiple activity courses of action, and one must make detailed planning

{xiangxi jihua} for the initial battle phase and the main operational direction while the

follow-up phases can be outline planned {gailue jihua}; centering on the campaign

goal[s], look after the relationships between the various campaign directions, campaign

phases and campaign activities; as much as possible, use advanced means such as

computers, integrate the use of a combination of methods such as parallel exercises, joint

exercises and sequential exercises, and to the greatest extent possible, reduce the time for

plan formulation while strictly maintaining secrecy.

After the Air Force campaign plan has been formulated, one should conduct simulation

derivations {moni tuiyan} on maps or sand tables. One can also utilize computer

simulation systems {jisuanji moni xitong} to conduct testing and optimize an optimum

course of action.

After the Air Force campaign plan has been formulated, the campaign commander and

command organ should promptly adjust and deploy {bushu} the campaign strengths

based on the campaign plan. Adjusting the bushu disposition of campaign strengths

should be conducted in an ordered fashion. Normally, one first adjusts and positions the

air defense operational strengths and campaign safeguarding-support strengths, and then

adjusts and positions the other campaign strengths. When organizing campaign maneuver

{zhanyi jidong}, the campaign commander should select the time opportunity for
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maneuver, determine the mode of maneuver as well as the routes and navigational routes

for maneuver based on the operational mission, operational conditions, transport support

capabilities and maneuver capabilities of each of the force-units. In normal situations,

one should use multiple kinds of traffic implements and quickly, safely and covertly

implement maneuver from different directions; aviation forces possessing long-range

maneuver capabilities {yuancheng jidong nengli} may directly implement maneuver

from the depths forward during campaign implementation.

(3) Organize campaign coordination

The campaign commander should promptly guide his command organ to organize

campaign coordination based on higher-level relevant coordination instructions and the

Air Force campaign activity plan, and [guide his command organ] to clarify the key

points and requirements of coordination. When time is pressing, one can clarify the

relevant events of campaign coordination at the same time as issuing the operational

orders. In organizing campaign coordination, one normally formulates the campaign

coordination plan, convenes the coordination meeting, issues the coordination

instructions, and organizes the conduct of the basic sequence of coordination drills, [all]

on the basis of organizing the important coordination events.

(4) Organize campaign safeguarding-support

The Air Force campaign commander should carefully organize the various support items

of the campaign. The campaign command organ should thoroughly formulate the various

safeguarding-support plans, promptly issue the safeguarding-support instructions to lower

levels, and tightly organize the various safeguarding-support items based on the

commander’s resolution and the campaign plan.

To organize campaign safeguarding-support, one must actively create and fully utilize

various favorable conditions, bring into play the overall combined power of the armed

forces and local safeguarding-support strengths, and comprehensively utilize the various

safeguarding-support modes and methods. [One must] prepare in advance, [have] unified

planning for all considerations, [have] total adjusting-coordination, organize at a fullscale organization, and safeguard-support key points.

(5) Organize imminent battle training {linzhan xunlian}

The campaign commander and the command organ should thoroughly organize imminent

battle training. Organize the formation and force-units to gain familiarity of the battlefield

environment, activity methods and coordination methods. Raise the capability to organize

command by the commander and command organ at each level and further 

test and improve the operational preliminary courses of action {zuozhan yu’an}. Prewar

training is normally conducted under concealment, and when necessary it is possible to

organize its implementation by combining deterrence and feints, but one must conceal the

campaign intention.
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(6) Inspect campaign preparations

The campaign commander and the command organ should inspect and guide the

campaign preparation situation of the subordinate units at the right time. The key points

are: the level of comprehension of higher-level orders and instructions by force-units;

whether the resolution, bushu disposition of subordinate commanders and the operational

plans are correct; whether [everyone] is familiar with the coordination plan; the

preparation situation of the various items of campaign support; and problems needing to

be clarified and resolved.

II. Campaign Implementation...571

Air Force campaign implementation is the entire process of conducting operations by the

Air Force campaign large formation in order to accomplish campaign missions. From

campaign initiation to campaign conclusion, the main links {zhuyao huanjie} include

initiating the campaign, pushing forward the development of the campaign, the

transitions of the campaign phases, concluding the campaign, etc.

(1) Initiate the campaign

The Air Force campaign commander should determine the time opportunity for campaign

initiation based on the higher-level intent, the campaign resolution and plan, and the

actual situation of both sides as well as situations such as weather {tianhou} and

meteorological {qixiang}. When organizing the offensive campaign, one should closely

attend to the dynamic state of the battlefield {zhanchang dongtai}, conscientiously

analyze the weather situation, grasp favorable combat opportunities {zhanji}, and initiate

the campaign at the right time based on the campaign mission conferred by the higherlevel authority. When organizing the defensive campaign, one must use all measures to

the extent possible to ascertain the time, force-strengths, main air raid means and targets

of the enemy air raids. For example, when the situation permits, one should act before the

enemy acts, upset the enemy’s air raid plan and strive for the campaign initiative.

The activities of the Air Force campaign normally start from information warfare {xinxi

duikang}; sometimes the seizing of information dominance, air dominance, and sea

dominance are initiated simultaneously.

(2) Master the battlefield situation {zhangwo zhanchang qingkuang}

The Air Force campaign battlefield is multi-dimensional and the situation is intricate, the

Air Force campaign commander and command organ must rigorously master the

battlefield situation and promptly adjust-coordinate campaign activities. When there are

no fundamental changes occurring in the battlefield situation, they must supervise and

urge each of the formations and force-units to implement operations based on the already

established resolution and plan. When major changes occur in the battlefield situation and

in accordance with specific situations and the requirements of the higher-levels, they
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should appropriately adjust the resolution and revise the plan, issue new missions, adjust

and re-organize the coordination actions, and ensure the achievement of already

established goals.

The methods for mastering the battlefield situation mainly consist of: first, fully utilize

intelligence networks {qingbao wangluo} to obtain the battlefield situation; second,

utilize battlefield surveillance systems {zhanchang jianshi xitong} to master the

battlefield situation; third, obtain battlefield situations via higher level briefs; fourth,

adopt means of reconnaissance in the enemy rear area {di hou zhencha de shouduan} to

obtain changes to the situations in the enemy depth.

(3) Grasp the campaign centers of gravity {bawo zhanyi zhongxin}

Air Force campaign centers of gravity refer to the critical links {guanjian huanjie} that

have decisive significance on the success or failure of the campaign, and are also the

central problems that the Air Force campaign commander pays a high level of close

attention to and should resolve. The Air Force campaign centers of gravity change along

with the development of the campaign. The Air Force campaign commander must firmly

grasp the campaign centers of gravity and strengthen command of the critical operational

activities that influence the overall situation. [He must] pay close attention to the

developing trends of the critical operational activities and promptly adjust unit-force

activities or commit new operational strengths. [He must] concentrate force-strengths to

the maximum degree, and strengthen support for the main force-units {zhuyao budui}

and the main operational activities, ensuring the accomplishment of the critical-nature

operational missions {guanjianxing zuozhan renwu}.

After the Air Force campaign commander accurately finds the campaign centers of

gravity, he must center on the centers of gravity to coalesce the various participating

strengths and concentrate the main strengths to successfully resolve the main

contradictions {zhuyao maodun}; [he must] conduct adjusting-coordination with critical

operational activities as the core and allow a tight fit between the main battlefield and

other battlefields, the main direction and other directions, and between the strengths

executing the main mission and other strengths, melding them into a single body and

forming a single board of chess. At the same time, in order to push forward and promote

the development of the entire war situation, [the commander] should also center on the

centers of gravity and successfully resolve other problems related to the centers of

gravity.

(4) Actively create and seize combat opportunities

The Air Force campaign commander must tightly grasp the battlefield situation, seek and

create combat opportunities {zhanji} with active initiative, and push forward the

development of the overall war situation. First and foremost, one must be adept in

seeking out and grabbing combat opportunities. During Air Force campaigns under

informationized conditions, the battlefield situation is ever-changing, all the services
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(arms) of both sides unfold the confrontation in a multi-dimensioned battlefield and

operational activities are exceedingly complex. During the course of the campaign, a

mistake by the enemy {diren de shiwu} provides us with a weakness to exploit. The

campaign commander should courageously and resolutely seize the favorable time

opportunities, concentrate the strengths to give towards strikes, expand on any slips by

the enemy, trap the enemy in unfavorable conditions, and thereby grasp the initiative in

campaign development. Secondly, one must create combat opportunities. The campaign

commander must adopt various methods, create enemy mistakes {diren de shiwu} by

hook or by crook, and force the enemy into disadvantage. For example: through

campaign deception, create enemy mistakes in judgment; implement extensive

maneuvers to shift the enemy and force the enemy into a disadvantageous position; strike

the enemy’s main operational systems; disrupt the enemy’s capabilities for integrated

operations; and actively create favorable time opportunities for promoting campaign

development.

(5) Conduct transitions of campaign phases and campaign patterns

The Air Force campaign must achieve the current objectives and subsequent objectives

with separate steps; thus campaign progress appears as a certain number of compactly

linked phases. There are fairly large differences in the specific objectives in each phase,

the main battlefield and operational direction, and the use of strengths {shiyong liliang}.

There are also notable differences in the operational patterns {zuozhan yangshi} and

operational methods {zhanfa}. The Air Force campaign commander should master the

campaign progress, grasp the time opportunities, and promptly organize the transitions of

campaign phases.

The time opportunities of campaign phase transitions are typically: when the goals of the

preceding phase of the campaign have basically been achieved; the conditions for the

next phase of the campaign already exist; the combat opportunity for operations in the

next phase has already emerged; and not transitioning to the next phase of the campaign

may result in the appearance of an unfavorable situation for us.

Campaign phase transitions indicate shifts in campaign centers of gravity, so one must

meticulously organize [them], act before the enemy acts and prevent disjointed campaign

activities during the transition process. Thus, the campaign commander must promptly

organize the replenishment or rotation of force-strengths and weapons based on the

situation of the progress of the previous phase and based on the needs and requirements

of the follow-on campaign mission; [he must] adjust the missions and campaign bushi

disposition of the relevant force-units, stipulate new coordination relationships, and he

must especially clarify ad hoc command relationships and methods to handle unforeseen

situations during the course of transitions; [he must] scientifically determine the sequence

of the transition to benefit the adjusting-coordination activities of the overall situation;

and adopt the various types of camouflage and deception measures and conceal the

intention. When the transitions between campaign phases cannot be implemented as

preplanned, it must be reported to the higher-level authority.
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(6) Organize the conclusion of the campaign

The campaign commander should promptly set the resolution for concluding the

campaign based on the needs and requirements of the overall situation, the situation of

campaign mission completion, the battlefield circumstances {zhanchang xingshi}, as well

as the development trends, etc., and then report to the higher levels for approval. The

basic requirement is to make every effort to conclude the campaign under a situation

favorable for us and unfavorable for the enemy.

The time opportunities for concluding the campaign are normally: when the campaign

goal has already been reached or already essentially reached; when the originally set

campaign goal has not been reached but the development of the campaign has already

reached an impasse; and when combat losses are excessive and there is no way to

complete the originally set campaign mission. [In this latter case] one should resolutely

conclude the campaign in order to preserve force-strength and strive for initiative.

When organizing the campaign conclusion, one must consolidate the battle results

already achieved, closely monitor enemy activities, promptly organize the adjustments to

force-strengths, and accomplish combat preparations or maintain the stipulated readiness

states.
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Chapter 28

The Air Offensive Campaign...575

An air offensive campaign is a campaign conducted per a unified intention and plan

{jihua} by an Air Force campaign large formation independently or with the coordination

of other service arms, primarily employing air strikes, in order to achieve strategic and

campaign goals. An air offensive campaign is a campaign pattern with extremely strong

initiative, and is also the campaign pattern most able to bring into play the strong points

of the air strengths’ rapid long-range maneuvers and awesome precision firepower

strikes. In localized war under informationized conditions, an air offensive campaign is a

major means whereby our Army seizes the initiative in war, and achieves strategic and

campaign goals. According to the operational mission and goal, air offensive campaigns

can be divided into several patterns: air offensive campaigns to seize air superiority, air

offensive campaigns for weakening the enemy’s war potential, air offensive campaigns to

isolate a battlefield, air offensive campaigns to annihilate the enemy’s massive-force

groups, and air offensive campaigns to achieve special goals.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...575

I. Characteristics...575

The rapid development of air raid arms, the diversification of air raid means, and the

gradual perfection of antiaircraft defensive systems have caused modern air offensive

campaigns to assume new characteristics.

(1) Strong policy, highly hierarchical decision-making

In localized wars under informationized conditions, air offensive campaigns normally are

not purely for achieving military goals, but quite often are for achieving political

objectives pursued by the State. The politically sensitive nature of campaign activities is

very strong, the areas affected are large, and decision-making authority for many major

problems in campaigns often is held in the hands of the strategic decision-makers. For

example, the campaign intention, campaign scale, campaign launch opportunity, and the

designation of strike targets, as well as the requirements on destruction of targets, all

must be carefully decided – based on the requirements of political and diplomatic

struggles – by the highest command decision-making level.

(2) Seizure of the initiative for operations, facilitating grasping the first opportunity for

gain

An air offensive campaign is a kind of active offensive operational activity, which grasps

the initiative in a number of areas: the campaign scale, the application of forces and arms,

the operational direction, the operational opportunities, the strikes on targets, and the

degree of damage. This provides favorable conditions for the campaign commander and
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command organ to organize, plan, and prepare the campaign. A campaign commander

and command organ will use the relatively sufficient time available to: analyze the enemy

situation, our situation, and the battlefield circumstances; painstakingly plan and prepare

the campaign; select the most favorable opportunity and direction; employ the most

appropriate forces and arms; adopt the most effective war strategies and tactics; execute

strikes on targets in the enemy’s vital areas; and seize the first opportunity to restrain the

enemy.

(3) Operations penetrating into the enemy’s depth, and complex battlefield situations

Air offensive campaigns are air operational activities conducted by penetrating into the

enemy’s strategic campaign depth. Since our reconnaissance strengths and means are

limited, and since the enemy in order to protect his own safety inevitably must adopt a

variety of measures for concealing the true and displaying the false, we will thus find it

difficult to accurately grasp information on the enemy area’s terrain, meteorology, air

defense bushi disposition, and operational posture, and also find it difficult to make

accurate, comprehensive forecasts of changes in the battlefield situation – all of which

have increased the difficulties of for a campaign commander and command organ to

organize, plan, and prepare a campaign.

(4) The enemy’s tight antiaircraft defense, highly difficult to penetrate

The targets that must be struck in air offensive campaigns mostly are situated in the

enemy’s strategic and campaign depth. The enemy possesses high-tech superiority, and

not only has powerful air offensive capabilities, but also has established a tight

antiaircraft defensive system. The enemy has constructed a high-efficiency, tight

reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) system comprised of many kinds and forms

of radar, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes, and early-warning

satellites; and by using a tight air-defense firepower system comprised of various models

of fighters, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and

employing a computer-based command and control (C2) system with a very high degree

of automation, the enemy has greatly boosted the overall effectiveness of his air defense

operations, which has made the task of operational penetration extremely arduous. Faced

with a structurally complex, functionally powerful, highly resistant modernized air

defense system – under conditions where our Army’s high-tech content in air offensive

weapons is still not high, the informationized degree still relatively low, the equipment

complement not strong, and the means of penetration basically single – the need to

smoothly penetrate the enemy’s antiaircraft defenses will have an [associated] extremely

high difficulty.

(5) High operational intensity, great depletion, and arduous support missions

Air offensive campaigns have expansive battlefields, a wide distribution of strike targets,

many quantities, and extremely arduous missions. In order to fight a quick battle to form

a quick decision, to achieve the operational goals as fast as possible, to emphasize
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execution of a powerful first strike against the enemy, to seize control over the battlefield,

and thus to execute high-intensity and continuous strikes against the enemy, the 

campaign from first to last is conducted with a rapid tempo, amid high-intensity, sharp

confrontations; campaign consumption/depletion is enormous, which makes the

campaign support missions extremely arduous.

II. Requirements...577

(1) Full preparations

“A superior position without preparedness is not true superiority, while an inferior

position with full preparedness often can defeat an enemy with the superior position.”

Although an air offensive campaign in respects such as the launch opportunity and the

selection of the main attack direction seizes a certain initiative, nevertheless – owing to

fairly distinct uncertainties in operations penetrating into enemy areas and in the

battlefield situation, and to a greater number of chance factors impacting operational

activities – one thus must carry out full preparations. To this end, in peacetime one must

lay stress on acquiring and accumulating data, and enhance research on the enemy

targets; one must formulate a scientific, thorough, feasible campaign plan {jihua}, and at

the proper time revise and perfect it, according to the enemy situation and the developing

changes in the operational environment; one must in key-point fashion perform battlefield

construction and storage of materiel; and [one must] enhance adaptive training, 

conduct repeated drills, become intimately familiar with the operational plan {jihua}, and

seek effective methods for vanquishing the enemy.

(2) Concealment and suddenness (surprise)

Concealment and suddenness are critical means for achieving surprise attacks, and for

seizing the operational initiative. In air offensive campaigns, fulfilling the requirements

for concealment and suddenness enables one to shorten the enemy’s early warning time,

increase his difficulty in organizing antiaircraft defenses, limit his realization of the

effectiveness of high-tech weaponry, create chaos among the enemy, minimize our

losses, and achieve the ideal operational effectiveness. In particular, under conditions

where the enemy’s antiaircraft defensive system is fairly tight, the means for friendly

penetration scarce, and the capabilities insufficient, one should even more stress

suddenness in campaign activities. In order to achieve concealment and suddenness, one

must adopt a variety of measures to contend with the enemy’s various reconnaissance

activities, and to see that one’s own various activities are conducted in a state of secrecy,

and not discovered by the enemy; one must strictly limit the personnel in contact with the

operational plan {jihua}, as much as possible shorten the campaign preparation time, and

enhance camouflage for materiel and equipment; one must [enforce] strict

communications discipline, so as to avoid disclosing the operational intention; one must

enhance research on the enemy’s operational patterns, and seek out enemy defects that

can be exploited; and one must formulate a plan {jihua} for lifelike feints and deception,

conduct large-scale force-unit {budui} feints and electronic feints, employing a variety of
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methods and means such as the news media to deceive, paralyze, and confuse the enemy,

and to create “time differences” and “spatial differences” in the enemy’s judgment, so as

to achieve the goal of concealing the intention.

(3) Active initiative

Initiative is a freedom of military activities; it is the most effective means for gaining and

maintaining the initiative. The campaign commander must, based on objective

conditions, want to bring into play subjective initiative actions and create the spirit –

amid the complex rapidly changing air battlefield environment, particularly under

conditions where weaponry is in an inferior position – for active initiative, for boosting

one’s strong points, and for attacking the enemy’s weak points. One must focus on the

differing situations, judge the hour and size up the situation, grasp the key links, seize

opportunities for battle, and actively attack. One must integrate offense with defense, and

simultaneously with the active offensive, skillfully make preparations for defending

against an enemy counterattack, and all along seize the campaign initiative.

(4) Striking vital areas

Striking vital areas is the main way to gain the upper hand in an air offensive campaign.

In the air offensive campaigns we organize and wage in the future, what we will contend

against will be a large-scale system, organically comprised of a reconnaissance and

detection system, a firepower strike system, and a C2 system; and the enemy’s realization

of operational capability mainly will be dependent on the coordinated operation of this

large-scale system. In this large-scale system are present many strategic-point targets for

which “pulling out one hair affects the whole body,” and which involve the overall

situation. Examples include communications hubs, reconnaissance and early warning

systems, Air Force bases, C2 centers, the industrial and energy facilities supporting the

nation’s economy and war potential, etc. Concentrated strengths executing key-point

strikes against these targets can exert the effect of yielding twice the result with half the

effort, rapidly leading to the collapse of the enemy’s operational system, shaking his

force-unit {budui} morale and popular sentiment, and accelerating the operational course.

Hence, if one wants to rapidly achieve the goals of an air offensive campaign, one must

adhere to the principle of striking vital areas. To this end, first, one must precisely select

the strategic-point targets. One should meticulously select strike targets which occupy the

strategic commanding heights and those of the campaign overall situation, and which

center around realizing strategic and campaign goals; one must precisely select the strike

targets from the starting point of sabotaging the enemy’s operational architecture; based

on one’s own operational capability, one must precisely select the strike targets, ensuring

that the strikes will yield results, and that they cannot fail; and one must at the proper

time shift the key-point strike targets, according to the developing changes in the war

situation. Next, one must apply forces with key-points. One should concentrate the

application of a variety of airborne long-range precision strike strengths along the main

direction, in the key point areas, and at the critical occasions; strive for forming
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superiority against the enemy’s vital area targets; and ensure that the destruction is

achieved.

(5) Fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision

Fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision is a characteristic of localized wars under

informationized conditions, which is an objective requirement for air offensive

campaigns. Operations in localized wars under informationized conditions are subject to

constraints from many factors, have a strong politically sensitive nature, involve

enormous depletion, and require fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision, so as to

strive for the initiative in strategic and campaign respects. To this end, the first need is to

do a good job of full preparations. A campaign commander and command organ should –

based on the enemy’s operational intention and possibly adopted activities, and on our

side’s operational missions and capability, as well as on possibly developing changes in

the battlefield situation: organize their subordinate units in timely and concealed fashion

to ably carry out all the preparatory work; achieve the issuing of orders at one stroke; be

able to immediately throw the forces into operations; and not fight a battle without

preparations. The second need is to strive for fighting the first battle well. The goals of

future air offensive campaigns will be limited, and operational times will be brief; the

enemy side and our side, in order to seize the initiative, both will devote extreme

attention to the first battle, so that this opening battle will have a decisive nature, and will

have a major impact on the course and outcome of operations. To this end, one must

meticulously plan, meticulously prepare, grasp well an opportunity for battle, concentrate

strengths, execute a powerful first strike, accomplish the whole task at one stroke, and

strive for a first battle one will certainly win. The third need is to concentrate elite troops

and efficient weapons. One should concentrate application of various types of elite air

strengths, strive to form an overwhelming superiority over the enemy along the main

direction and in key areas, and execute nodal strikes on the enemy’s strategic-point

targets, to paralyze the enemy’s operational system in one stroke. The fourth need is to

grasp well the inherent links among the various battles. One should cleverly, rationally,

and capably arrange the ties and coordination between battles, and see that all of the

battle activities are mutually coordinated and mutually complementary; this boosts

overall operational effectiveness, accelerates the course of the campaign, and achieves

the goal of fighting a quick battle to form a quick decision.

Section 2: Main Activities...579

In an air offensive campaign, the confrontations between the enemy and us will be tense

and sharp; a campaign commander and command organ should correctly understand the

higher level intention, accurately predict the war situation’s development, grasp the

campaign’s center(s) of gravity, implement the correct guidance, and ensure the

realization of the campaign goals.
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I. Organizing Information Operations...579

Information operations in an air offensive campaign normally are launched before air

offensive activities, but permeate through the entire course of the campaign; at times in

the early stage of the campaign they also can become a relatively independent phase.

(1) Organizing information reconnaissance

Information reconnaissance is a prerequisite for the smooth execution of information

operations, and should be launched [per] a unified plan {jihua}, as early as possible. A

campaign commander and command organ should use all reconnaissance strengths –

space, air, sea, and ground – and adopt various means and measures to widely collect

intelligence information on the enemy’s information operations, and to ascertain the

composition and allocation of enemy information systems, the enemy’s main means for

executing information operations, and the enemy information systems’ command hubs

and computer network nodes, as well as the quantities and performance of information

weaponry. In particular, they should devote attention to properly organizing information

reconnaissance activities prior to the launch of the campaign, and lay stress on

ascertaining the target parameters of the enemy early-warning system, antiaircraft

command guidance system, SAM and AAA guidance systems, airborne fire control

system, and command communications system, in order to create favorable conditions for

attacking well in the opening of the campaign.

(2) Organizing an information offensive

An information offensive means the application of a variety of information operation

weapons in “soft”-“hard” integrated assault activities conducted against the enemy’s

information systems. Its goal is to sabotage (damage) or interrupt the pathways of enemy

information systems so as to create the conditions for seizing information superiority.

Jamming and deception. Under conditions where our jamming strengths and means are

limited, jamming activities normally are conducted in combination with air offensive

activities. One should: concentrate various jamming forces along the main direction of

the air offensive, at key times such as the air strike formations’ departure, penetration,

and strikes; conduct intense jamming suppression of the enemy’s electromagnetic (EM)

targets; emphasize jamming of targets such as the enemy’s R&EW satellites, AWACS

planes, ground-based long range early warning radar, interception and guidance radar,

and SAM guidance radar, as well as command guidance system; and weaken the enemy’s

information operations capability, so as to create favorable conditions for the penetration

and strike activities of the air strike formations. Simultaneously, one must actively adopt

a variety of electronic feint measures, and conduct electronic deception against the

enemy, to confuse and move the enemy troops, and to create misconceptions among the

enemy, causing him difficulty in distinguishing between the true and the false.
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Firepower destruction. The main means are as follows: (a) using anti-radiation unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-radiation ballistic missiles, anti-radiation cruise missiles, and

airborne anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to execute anti-radiation strikes on the enemy’s

important EM targets, such as early warning radars and missile guidance radars, and to

cripple and blind the enemy’s air defense system; (b) before the strike formation takes

off, using some of the strike forces with high penetration capability to first execute strikes

against the enemy’s C2 centers, R&EW system, and nodal targets in his air defense

firepower system, thus opening up gaps in the enemy’s air defense system and causing

the enemy difficulty in organizing effective interception activities; and (c) using some

high-performance fighters, taking off in concealed fashion, to execute sudden (surprise)

attacks on the enemy’s AWACS planes, and [thus] sever the enemy’s major information

support.

Computer network attacks. This means use of computer units (elements) – adopting

methods such as information theft, tampering, deletion, deception, and blocking – to

execute attacks against the computer networks of the enemy’s information system, and

thus paralyze them and weaken the enemy air defense operational capability so as to

create the conditions for the air strike operations.

(3) Organizing information defense

Simultaneously with execution of an information offensive against the enemy, a

campaign commander and command organ must also tightly organize a good information

defense and ensure the security of one’s own information system.

Defending against enemy information reconnaissance. A campaign commander and

command organ should comprehensively and in key-point fashion organize counterenemy-information-reconnaissance activities which center on the concealment of the

campaign intention and critical targets. They must make integrated use of many methods

and means – such as defilades, dispersion, camouflage, establishment of dummy targets,

release of false information, feint deception, maintaining secrecy to defend against

traitors, control over the news media and EM radiation sources, and protection for

computer network security – to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s reconnaissance.

Countering enemy jamming [i.e. ECCM]. Countering enemy jamming is a core element

in organizing information defense. One should – with radar counter-jamming and

communications counter-jamming as the key points – make integrated use of a variety of

counter-jamming (anti-ECM) tactics and technical means to resolutely defeat the enemy’s

execution of jamming activities against us, and to ensure the normal operation of our

information system.

Countering enemy firepower destruction. When the enemy executes firepower strikes

against our information system, one should make integrated use of several methods and

means – control of radiation, multi-station interchange of operations (or “shuffling,”
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{jiaohuan gongzuo}), mobile evasion, and firepower cover – to evade or lessen the

enemy firepower’s destruction or sabotage of our information system.

Defending against enemy network attacks. One should rigorously enforce computer

network management, especially management of core network stations. One must strictly

limit privilege (access) at all levels, and must take strict precautions against theft of

network codes, passwords, and addresses; one must wall off (compartmentalize)

computer operations, and as much as possible reduce or not set up external interfaces, in

order to defend against enemy network intrusions; and one must enhance defense of

network systems, to prevent enemy agents from conducting physical sabotage or virus

sabotage against [our] networks.

II. Implementing Air Penetration...581

Air [i.e. airspace] penetration is an activity in which an aviation forces strike group

(formation), executing an air offensive operation, breaks through an enemy air defense

system. Penetration of the enemy’s antiaircraft defense is a prerequisite for conducting an

air offensive campaign, and its success or failure has a major impact on the campaign’s

course and outcome. At present, for our main operational targets, we have established a

long/medium/short-range, high/medium/low-altitude integrated tight air defense system;

but our high-performance attack aircraft are limited in numbers, have weak overall

penetration capability, and have relatively great difficulty if they must penetrate the dense

resistance of the enemy aircraft bombs/missiles and cannon. Hence, one must flexibly

employ a variety of penetration modes and means to ensure that the strike forces

smoothly break through the enemy’s antiaircraft defense.

(1) Concealment of the true and display of the false, and stealthy penetration

Stealthy penetration, also called surprise penetration, means an unexpected penetration of

an enemy air defense system by an aviation forces strike formation adopting a variety of

measures to conceal the true and hide the false, and to confuse and move the enemy, with

the aid of secret activities. This penetration method has the advantages of high

concealment, low losses, a high success rate, and economy of force. If this method is

adopted properly, one can often achieve the effect of yielding twice the result with half

the effort. In localized wars under future informationized conditions, the enemy will have

established an advanced intelligence and early warning system, and will be able to realize

omni-bearing, omni-tempero-spatial reconnaissance and surveillance over battlefield

targets, with unprecedented enhancement of battlefield transparency, which will magnify

the difficulty of our execution of stealthy penetration. Hence, if one needs to achieve

stealthy penetration, one must – while keeping the character “qi” [surprise] always in

mind – defeat the enemy with a surprise raid.

First, one must select a stealthy route for the penetration. In order to achieve stealth in the

penetration activity, the air strike formation’s route should as much as possible avoid the

enemy’s tight areas of air defense firepower, and penetrate from the relatively weak areas
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of air defense firepower – the enemy air defense bushu disposition’s fringes and sparse

areas. By exploiting blind zones in the enemy radar and detecting weak spots, one

reduces the probability of being discovered by the enemy. One may also adopt a route

full of twists and turns, and be constantly changing, causing the enemy difficulty in

accurately ascertaining the intention of our activity.

Second, adopt an advantageous flight profile for penetration. If conditions permit, the air

strike formation normally should adopt a flight profile with low-altitude/ultralow-altitude

flight toward the target, to shorten the detection range of the enemy’s early warning

system and reduce the enemy antiaircraft system’s probability of resistance. When the

strike target range is relatively long, one may also adopt a medium/ high-altitude profile

when taking off, switch to low altitude and ultralow altitude when approaching the target,

and switch back to a medium/high-altitude flight profile for the return flight after the

strike on target is completed, so as to increase the attack radius of the strike formation.

Third, exploit favorable meteorological conditions for penetration. Since our aviation

forces’ night operational capability is not high, air strike formations normally take off

before dawn, strike at daybreak, exploit an opportunity when the enemy easily relaxes its

vigilance and neglects to take precautions, and thus damage the enemy air defense

system.

Fourth, adopt deception measures to execute the penetration. One may use various means

for concealing the true and displaying the false, such as feints and false communications;

this confuses and moves the enemy, creates distortion of enemy intelligence, causes the

enemy faulty judgment and mishandling, draws the enemy air defense firepower toward

other directions, and screens the main strike formation’s smooth penetration of the enemy

air defense system.

In addition, one may also adopt technical and tactical measures such as control of the

strike formation’s use of airborne electronic equipment, and use of stealth techniques, to

improve the air strike formation’s penetration capability. The above penetration measures

each have their advantages and disadvantages; a campaign commander and command

organ should – setting out from the actual circumstances of an operation – weigh these

advantages and disadvantages, pursue gain while avoiding harm, and apply in integrated

fashion many types of penetration methods and means, so as to obtain the optimal

penetration results.

(2) “Soft” suppression with “hard” destruction, for storming penetration

Storming penetration means integrating electronic “soft” suppression with firepower

“hard” destruction, forcing and breaking open gaps in the enemy’s air defense system,

and opening up air penetration corridors, ensuring that the strike forces smoothly

penetrate the enemy air defense system and execute the strike on the preassigned

target(s). The strong points of storming penetration are little effect from external factors,

the ability to directly destroy the enemy’s effective strength and damage the enemy’s air
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defense system, and the ability to create favorable conditions for follow-on strike

activities. During storming penetration, one should – based on circumstances such as the

scale of the strike forces and the position of the strike targets – determine and open up

one or more air defense [penetration] corridors. To ensure that the strike forces smoothly

penetrate, one should organize a joint air fleet comprised of formations for

reconnaissance, jamming, suppression, screening, strikes, and support, to storm and break

through the enemy’s air defense system.

Organizing air reconnaissance. An air reconnaissance formation, before the strike

formation’s activities, conducts detailed reconnaissance of the preassigned penetration

route and target areas, and ascertains the exact positions of the enemy air defense bushu

disposition and targets, so as to create favorable conditions for follow-on jamming

activities and strike activities.

Organizing jamming suppression [blanket jamming]. One should concentrate the

application of air jamming forces, adopt the method of area jamming integrated with

escort jamming, and conduct integrated jamming suppression of the enemy’s EM targets.

Simultaneously, one should execute anti-radiation attacks, using anti-radiation attack

weapons, against the enemy’s major EM targets, such as early warning radars and airdefense missile guidance radars, and open up one or more strong jamming zones in the

enemy air defense system. This creates confusion and blind zones in the enemy radar,

communications interrupts, loss of effectiveness in air defense weapons, ineffective

command, and reduced operational effectiveness in the enemy air defense system.

Organizing firepower suppression. The forces tasked with suppression missions should

make full use of the effects of electronic suppression, concentrate firepower to destroy

the enemy SAMs and AAA positions in the vicinity of the air strike formation’s strike

route, form one or more ground air-defense firepower blank zones, and establish a

penetration corridor(s). For fairly high-threat enemy combat aircraft airfields, one should

watch the situation and suppress and blockade them using firepower. In an operation

where one has the support of the Army, Navy, and 2nd Artillery Corps, targets within the

firepower ranges of Army artillery and Navy ship guns can be suppressed by Army and

Navy support forces tasked, while the 2nd Artillery Corps should fully bring into play its

powerful penetration capability, and mainly use it to suppress targets such as the enemy

airfields and major air defense missile positions.

Organizing assault force strength penetration. The air assault formation should [fly] along

the penetration corridor(s) opened up by the jamming and suppression forces, and using

an advantageous formation, rapidly penetrate the enemy’s air defense firepower zone.

When encountering an air defense firepower block by enemy remnants, the formation

should adopt maneuver measures to evade the block; and when encountering interception

by enemy combat aircraft, the formation must guard against entanglement with the

enemy combat aircraft, and, under the cover of screening forces, should rapidly

disengage and fly toward the preassigned strike target(s).
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Organizing air cover. The air cover formation should adopt the method of area screening

integrated with escort screening, to wipe out or drive away the enemy combat aircraft

posing the highest threat to our strike formation. When the enemy air interception force is

fairly small, not posing a high threat to our strike formation, the air cover formation as

much as possible should avoid engaging that enemy force; but when the enemy air

interception is ferocious, posing a fairly high threat to the strike formation, the air cover

formation should resolutely initiate an air battle with the enemy, and wipe out or drive

away the intercepting enemy. During such a battle, the air cover formation should avoid

too many entanglements with the enemy planes, so as to prevent the strike formation’s

prolonged loss of air cover.

Stealthy penetration and storming penetration are the two basic means of penetration in

an air offensive operation, and each has its strong points. In future air offensive

campaigns, one should integratively apply these two penetration methods, make best of

the advantages to offset the disadvantages, and complement one’s superiorities, so as to

achieve the optimal penetration results.

III. Implementing the Air Assault...584

Execution of the air strikes is the most major, most critical operational activity of an air

offensive campaign, and directly impacts whether the operational goal can be achieved.

The development of air weaponry has maximally enriched the means of air offensive

operations; traditional air strike modes – such as air strikes by a single service and using a

single aircraft type, and close air {linkong} bombing – will be replaced by modes such as

joint strikes by multiple services and aircraft types, long-range air raids, and beyonddefense-area (“standoff”) strikes. At the same time, the destructive capability of air

strikes will also see unprecedented enhancement; one will be able to use precision guided

munitions (PGMs) such as laser guided bombs to execute pinpoint precision strikes on

the enemy, will be able to use surface antipersonnel agents such as cluster bombs to

execute covering strikes on the enemy, and further will also be able to use new-concept

munitions such as EM-pulse (EMP) bombs and graphite bombs to execute incapacitating

strikes on the enemy. In order to achieve the optimal strike effects, one should

integratively apply a variety of strike and destruction modes and methods. Air strikes

include the first strike and follow-on strikes.

(1) First assault

The first assault is the first assault activity conducted against the enemy, within a certain

time in the operation’s initial phase, by concentrated strengths in several waves. Its goals

are – by executing surprise, fierce assaults on key and strategic targets within the

enemy’s full depth – to effectively weaken the enemy’s overall operational capability,

and to paralyze the enemy’s operational system, in order to create conditions for the

follow-on assault activities. In air-raid operations under informationized conditions, the

first battle will in fact have a decisive nature; victory or defeat in the first battle will have

a major effect on the course and outcome of the entire campaign, and if the first battle is
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fought well, sometimes it will be able to exert the effect of setting the tune with one

stroke. For example, the U.S. military’s air raid on Libya and Israel’s air raid on Iraq’s

nuclear reactor both were accomplished with a single assault, thus achieving the

operational goal. In order to fight the first battle well, one must have the resolve to fulfill

the whole task at one stroke, and go beyond the normal use of forces and arms; one

should employ most, or even all of the assault forces in the first assault so as to achieve

the optimal strike effects.

Concentrate strengths to strike at vital targets. The enemy’s air defense system and air

counterattack operational system pose the highest threats to our execution of an air

offensive campaign, and should be attacked in concentrated fashion during the first

assault. One must adopt a method integrating beyond-defense-area (“standoff”) long

range attacks with close air bombing, carpet bombing, and precision assaults, to conduct

concentrated assaults and continuous assaults – in multiple directions and multiple waves

– against critical targets, such as the enemy’s command centers, operational aircraftbasing airfields, early warning radar, SAM positions, and communications hubs, so as to

seize battlefield air superiority. If the scale of the assault forces is fairly large, one can

also execute assaults against: the enemy’s political, economic, and cultural centers; warpotential targets such as those in the enemy’s major energy-resources and hydroelectric

infrastructure; and other major targets, such as military bases and military facilities.

Based on differences in the assault targets and battlefield environments, one should

flexibly apply forces and arms. For targets in the strategic interior, as well as targets in a

tight antiaircraft defense, one mainly employs airborne long-range PGMs to execute

beyond-defense-area (“standoff”) long-range precision assaults, or uses stealth aircraft to

execute stealth assaults. For targets where the enemy antiaircraft defense is relatively

weak, the assault formation, under cover of intense electronic suppression, conducts

close-air bombing or semi-close-air bombing against the enemy. To ensure that the first

assault has fairly high intensity, one can apply methods such as initiating use of reserve

airfields, guard(ed) airfields, and old airfields, and expropriating civilian airports, to

increase as much as possible the number of aircraft takeoff/landing platforms within the

theater; and one can also apply the method of roll-outs of forces inside and outside the

theater to launch an attack, which resolves the problem of not enough airfields and

increases the assault density.

Closely coordinate the activities of all air formations. In order to ensure the smooth

fulfillment of the first assault’s mission, one should closely coordinate the activities of all

air formations. The various air formations should – under the unified command of the

AWACS plane – execute the assaults on targets per the preassigned plan {jihua}. The

jamming formation uses multiple means to conduct jamming and suppression of the

enemy’s various radar and command and communications facilities; the suppression

formation conducts effective suppression and destruction of enemy ground-based air

defense weapons surrounding the target area(s) and of airfields whose combat aircraft

pose a fairly high threat to us, and clears away obstacles so that the assault formation can

smoothly launch the assault activity; the cover formation captures a favorable position in

a direction from which the enemy aircraft are likely to attack, patrols for alert, and at any

time is ready to wipe out the counterattacking enemy. All assault formations, after
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completing their assault missions, should rapidly disengage and fly back along a direction

that will not affect the follow-on formations’ activities.

(2) Follow-on assaults

The follow-on assaults mean the assault activities conducted after the first assault. Their

goals are to execute assaults on targets which the first assault was unable to destroy, on

targets not yet struck, and on newly discovered targets; to consolidate and expand the

gains of the first assault; and to comprehensively achieve the operational goal.

Promptly ascertain the results of the first assault. A campaign commander and command

organ should employ many means – space reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, sea

reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, and radio technical reconnaissance – to promptly

ascertain the results of the first assault and the changing situation of the enemy force

strength bushu disposition, and, on that basis, modify the follow-on assaults’ resolution

and organize units to handle further preparations to be initiated.

Fully exploit the first assault’s gains, flexibly apply war fighting methods, and organize

continuous assaults. In the follow-on assaults, one should fully exploit the gains of the

first assault; as much as possible shorten the time interval after the first assault; before the

enemy has recovered from the shock of having suffered our first assault, concentrate

forces and arms to execute supplemental assaults, concentrated assaults, and continuous

assaults against the enemy’s major targets; and maintain continuous, uninterrupted

pressure against the enemy until the preassigned goal has been achieved. Normally, for

those major targets which have already suffered damage to a certain degree, one should

organize strengths to strike them with priority, strive to thoroughly destroy them, and

then again concentrate forces to assault against the follow-on assault targets within the

plan {jihua} and against newly found targets. The targets that must be attacked in the

follow-on assaults include not only political targets, such as government bodies, [radio]

broadcasting stations, and TV stations, but also economic targets, such as transportation

hubs, energy resources, and hydroelectric infrastructure, and moreover military targets,

such as command centers, Air Force and Navy bases, missile positions, and logistics

facilities. In the end, the kind of targets that serve as key points for the strikes should be

flexibly determined based on the requirements of the strategic and campaign overall

situation and on our assault capabilities. The follow-on assaults normally have a fairly

long duration, and should scientifically and rationally employ forces and arms to enhance

the logistical and equipment technical support and to maintain the capability for

successive strikes.

IV. . Operations to Resist the Enemy’s Air Counterattacks...586

Operations to resist the enemy’s air counterattacks are major operational activities in an

air offensive campaign, and are defensive operations during an offensive. Their goals are

to ensure the stability of the air offensive campaign bushi disposition, the security of

major targets within the theater, and the smooth launch of the air offensive activities. In
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localized wars under informationized conditions, the battlefield has a high degree of

transparency; in organizing and conducting an air offensive campaign, it is difficult to

avoid its activities being discovered by the enemy. Hence, in the process of organizing

and conducting the campaign, the enemy inevitably wants to execute fierce air

counterattacks against us. Enemy air counterattack activities normally can occur at two

opportunities: one is when the campaign preparations are detected by the enemy, who

will then adopt activities to strike first to gain the initiative, and sabotage our campaign

preparations; the other is during the process of executing the strikes, when the strike

forces have still not returned, or [just] after the return landing. As for the targets of the

enemy counterattack, the enemy will first direct its focus toward our airfields for basing

the strike forces, C2 centers, and communications hubs, as well as other major targets. In

order to ensure the smooth execution of the air offensive campaign, a campaign

commander and command organ should attach high importance to, and spare no effort in,

organizing operations to resist enemy air counterattacks.

(1) Actively organize the counterattack operations

In the preparations phase of an air offensive campaign, the campaign commander and

command organ should as early as possible establish a resistance operational bushi

disposition centering on the key-point guarded targets, such as the major airfields,

command institutions, conventional missile positions, and early warning system, and

defend first those targets not yet attacked. When the enemy executes an air counterattack

against us, one should organize strengths to execute a determined counterattack against

the incoming enemy, to ensure the security of our air-offensive operational bushu

disposition and major targets, and to ensure the smooth conduct of the air offensive

campaign.

Air interception. Along the direction of the enemy’s possible counterattack, using some

of one’s fighter aviation forces, one should adopt an air alert mode, capture a favorable

airspace for patrol alert, and when the enemy aircraft attack, rapidly press forward and

intercept them as far away as possible. The fighter aviation forces units on alert at

airfields should fully exploit the gains of the interception as far away as possible, set off

in echelons, execute continuing interception of the attacking enemy aircraft, strive to

annihilate the enemy’s main force strengths in the air, and disorganize the enemy air raid

bushi disposition, so as to create conditions for the ground resistance.

Ground interdiction. One may use some of the mid-to-long-range SAMs in a protrusive

{qianshen} bushu disposition, to execute maximum-range interception of the enemy.

Using the main ground-based air defense forces – centering on the enemy’s main

incoming direction and key-point guarded targets – one should establish a

long/medium/short-range, high/medium/low-altitude integrated resistance bushi

disposition with key points; execute layer-by-layer interception of the attacking enemy

aircraft; strive to annihilate the enemy aircraft before they can drop their bombs; and

intercept the [enemy] cruise missiles outside the area of the guarded targets.
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(2) Tightly organize protective activities

Protective activities mean protective measures – for concealment, dispersion, and

camouflage – adopted to evade or minimize the damage created by the enemy air raids. In

localized wars under informationized conditions, the battlefield has a high degree of

transparency, the destructive capability of air raid arms is extremely high, and protection

missions are extremely arduous; thus one must pay a high degree of attention to tight

organization.

When organizing protective activities, one must unify the organization and application of

the protective strengths of all the service arms and the [People’s] Armed Police, and

widely mobilize the masses; treat defense against the enemy’s high-tech reconnaissance

and PGM strikes as the key points; with planned renovation of various protective defense

works as primary, supplement those works with means such as dispersion, concealment,

and camouflage; achieve integration of defense-works protection with protection

exploiting natural conditions, and integration of concealing the true with displaying the

false; integrate high-tech means with conventional measures; and actively organize

military-civilian integrated rush repairs and rescue crews to treat the wounded as fast as

possible, thus restoring the air-offensive operational capability. Via effective protection,

one ensures the stability of the campaign bushi disposition and the smooth conduct of the

air offensive campaign.
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Chapter 29

The Airborne Campaign...589

Airborne campaigns {空降战役 kongjiang zhanyi}39 are operational activities that are

carried out primarily by the airborne force and are supported by and coordinated with the

aviation force and other military services and arms. Through air mobility, the airborne

force carries out operational activities in the enemy's depth in accordance with unified

intentions and plans in order to achieve specified strategic and campaign goals.

According to the Chinese authorized structure, the airborne force is subordinate to the Air

Force. All aviation units responsible for air transport and support missions are also

dispatched by the Air Force. Thus, airborne campaigns are an important type of Air Force

campaigns. Normally, airborne campaigns are an important component of the joint

campaign, but some times they can be independently organized as well. As operational

capabilities of the Chinese airborne force improves, and as operational methods and

forms such as vertical dividing {垂直分割 chuizhi fenge}, enveloping, encirclement, and

long-distance assault and attack in the enemy's depth are widely used, airborne

campaigns have become an important means for the Chinese military to implement multidimensional offensives under informationized conditions. They have a significant impact

on the joint campaign and on the progress and outcome of a war.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...589

I. Characteristics...589

Airborne campaigns are a special type of campaign with unique characteristics.

(1) Air delivery of force strengths and long-distance attack

In airborne campaigns, the airborne force directly arrives at a predetermined area in the

enemy's depth by way of airborne mobility in order to carry out offensive and defensive

operational missions. Thanks to the fast pace and long distance of modern air transport

vehicles, and their ability to fly over geographical and man-made obstacles and carry out

missions under different weather conditions, the airborne force is able to implement longrange assault in the enemy's campaign depth or against important targets in the strategic

rear, launching sudden attacks at locations unexpected by the enemy. The airborne force

can rapidly arrive at a critical area from a greater distance and promptly bring in fresh

forces so as to form a favorable campaign posture. The airborne force can implement allaspect full-depth mobility and carry out operational missions in areas not easily

accessible to ground forces. On the other hand, air mobility requires the support of a large

number of transport aircraft, and transport aircraft groups become easy targets. Their

operational intentions are difficult to conceal, their self-defense capabilities are weak, and

consequently, they are susceptible to attacks by the enemy's aviation force and surface air

39 Airborne operations include airlanding and paradrop operations.
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defense fire. Thus, it is of vital importance to have accurate information on enemy

conditions in the aviation area, especially on the deployment of the enemy's aviation and

air defense force, and enhance cover of the transport formations in the air in order to

ensure that the airborne force will successfully arrive at the airlanding zone {空降地域

kongjiang diyu}.40

(2) Campaign engagement in enemy's depth, an unstable battlefield environment

The main mission of an airborne campaign is to mount a deep attack. By way of paradrop

{伞降 sanjiang} or airlanding {机降 jijiang}, the airborne operation forces can suddenly

appear in the enemy's strategic campaign depth and swiftly launch attacks. They can

annihilate the enemy's massive forces, hold off the advance of enemy reserves, divide the

enemy's campaign bushi disposition, destroy the enemy's important facilities, and create

strong shockwaves in the spirit and morale of the enemy forces. Because of this, airborne

campaigns play an important role in coordination with the frontal force-units {正面部队

zhengmian budui} in offensive and defensive campaigns or in supporting operations on

the frontal battlefield. They can have a major impact on the progress and outcome of a

campaign. On the other hand, because airborne campaigns are carried out in the enemy's

depth, the battlefield environment is very complex, changes in the enemy's conditions are

hard to keep up with, and threats from the enemy's forces and fire are grave. In addition,

the airborne force is operating independently, being far away from the main force. With

no support from friendly forces nearby and with limited heavy weapons and war materiel,

the airborne campaign forces have relatively weak capabilities for sustained operations.

Thus, it is critical to the success of the campaign to strengthen air cover and fire support.

(3) Complex command and coordination

An airborne campaign has participants from multiple services and arms, involves a wide

area, and possesses high requirements on air cover and materiel support. The organization

of such a campaign is highly complex. From the concentration of forces, standby,

boarding, air transport, and airlanding, to seizing and holding captured targets, the

airborne force cannot operate without the support of and coordination from other services

and arms. Any slip in coordination at any link could impact the activities of the entire

campaign, or even result in the failure of the campaign. Thus it is critical to have good

coordination between the airborne force and the aviation force, the campaign tactical

missile force, and the air defense force, as well as between the airborne force and the

frontal offensive forces. It is critical to the success of the airborne campaign to have

unified coordination of the operational activities of all battlefield spaces in order to

ensure that the overall operational capabilities can be fully developed.

40 This is not the equivalent of a "drop zone."
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(4) No rear area to depend on and difficult to support

In an airborne campaign, the airborne force operates deep in the enemy's area with no

support from friendly forces in the neighboring areas and no rear area to depend on. The

supply channels for war materiel are few. After airlanding, the airborne force has to

swiftly transit between offensive and defensive. The battles are intense, fierce and

merciless, and the losses of personnel and consumption of materials are high. The war

materiel that can be carried is limited, yet the follow-up replenishment mission is very

difficult. During the campaign, the replenishment of war materiel depends primarily on

airdrop. Once the air channel is cut off by the enemy, the airborne force will be forced

into an isolated situation with no food or ammunition. Offensive or defensive activities

cannot be carried out. Therefore, in order to ensure smooth progression of the airborne

campaign, one must be sure to have strong and follow-up support.

II. Requirements...591

(1) Thorough preparation and meticulous planning

An airborne campaign involves multiple participating services and arms, a wide

battlefield, and complex operational activities. The operational goal eventually has to be

realized by the offensive and defensive activities of the airborne force in the enemy's

depth. Because there are an increasing number of unpredictable factors and greater

difficulty level of organizing and implementation, one must be thoroughly prepared and

meticulously devise the campaign plan. For this reason, one should use various means to

collect intelligence, achieving the state of 'knowing the enemy and knowing oneself.' One

should carry out campaign planning based on the most difficult and most complex

scenarios. For those operations that could have a decisive impact on the progression of

the campaign such as air mobility, seizing the command of information and the air,

ground offensive and defensive, one should prepare multiple scenarios. One should

scientifically organize all the participating forces into a whole, with the airborne force as

the core. One should objectively analyze the battlefield situation and scientifically

postulate possible campaign development. One should carefully organize coordination

between the airborne force and the aviation force and other support units. One should

address the high difficulty level in providing support for operations conducted in the

enemy rear and carefully organize various kinds of support, especially logistic materiel

reserves and supplies. In an airborne campaign under high-tech conditions, the time for

imminent battle preparation is short, thus we must give prominence to key points on the

basis of full-scale preparations, and combine this with peacetime readiness work.

(2) Unified command and close coordination

An airborne campaign under high-tech conditions in most cases is jointly executed by

multiple services and arms. Since the composition of campaign forces is complex and

there are multiple links of activities involved, it is of vital importance to campaign
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victory if all participating forces of different services and arms can coordinate with each

other in concerted actions and bring into full play the collective power.

Unified command is an important prerequisite for bringing into play the power of

collective operations. In order to enhance effective and uninterrupted command and

control of various participating service and arm forces, one must set up a unified, joint

and highly effective campaign command institution. In the course of the campaign, in

light of changing battlefield conditions, at appropriate times one should make necessary

adjustments in force-strength and weaponry bushu disposition. Under the principle of

concentration and unity, one should strive to achieve integration between centralized

command and dispersed command, and to bring into full play the initiative and creativity

of commanding officers at various levels.

Close coordination is an objective requirement for bringing into play collective

capabilities. An airborne campaign should be based primarily on the operations of the

airborne force. One should organize operational coordination among various service and

arm forces accordingly. One should closely coordinate operational activities between the

air and ground, and between the airborne units and support and frontal units. One should

carefully organize the connections between various campaign stages and various

activities so that the activities of the preceding stage create conditions for activities of the

following stage, and so that the activities of the following stage can fully capitalize on the

results of activities in the preceding stage. One should keep a tight control of the main

links in activity coordination, and especially should strengthen coordination at the

juncture of loading, air transport, airlanding, and ground operation, so as to ensure that

the airborne force arrives at the operational areas safely and carries out the combat

missions successfully. One should strengthen the monitoring and control of coordination,

make prompt adjustment when coordination appears maladjusted, and restore

coordination in a timely manner when coordination is disrupted.

(3) Concealed and sudden, winning by surprise

Surprise attack is one of the keys to airborne campaign victory. Thus, the concentration

of the airborne force and the preparations of the air transport force must be carried out in

secret. In addition to selecting unexposed locations in the rear for secret concentration

and preparations, one may also set up bogus areas of concentration {假定集结地区 jia

jijiediqu} and carry out deceptive ferry exercises {假转场 jia zhuanchang}, and

implement fire preparation at false airlanding sites as well as electronic diversions, so as

to deceive and confuse the enemy, creating misjudgment on the part of the enemy. One

should, through pre-combat exercises, study and select the best air transport routes and

air transport formations, and familiarize oneself with command and coordination in the

operation. The airborne force should strive to shorten the time spent at departure airfields
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{chufa jichang 出发机场}.41 Air transport should, as much as possible, take advantage of

darkness of the night and inclement weather. The airborne force should conceal its

operation by maintaining radio silence and carrying out electronic jamming and feint

demonstration, so as to ensure safe arrival at the airlanding site. When carrying out

airlanding, one should land as close as possible to the targets so as to reduce the time

needed for assembly before engagement. One should strive to launch swift and sudden

attacks by catching the enemy unprepared, thus realizing the objective of winning

through surprise attack.

(4) Concentrating strengths, attacking enemy's vital points

Concentrating strengths mean forming the largest operational capabilities at any local

time and in any local space throughout different stages of the campaign with the goal of

accomplishing the main mission. To do this, one should scientifically organize the

campaign strength. One should strive to transport the airborne units to the target area

using one single flight, and as far as possible, air land the main force strengths in the

main direction. One should bring into play the mobility capability of the airborne force

and aviation force. One should concentrate the forces and fire power at the main target of

assault, striving to form superiority over the enemy. In airborne campaigns under

informationized conditions, concentrated use of force not only means numerically but

also qualitatively. One should emphasize concentration of the airborne force, but also

concentration of the support and logistical force, particularly various types of firepower.

Striking the enemy’s key-links {guanjie} starts with disrupting the integrated-whole

structure of the enemy's operational system {tixi}, striking with key points the vital area

targets that sustain the campaign progression and outcome. To do so, the campaign

commander and the command organ should take the total situation into consideration.

The commander and the command organ should carefully analyze the internal structure

of the enemy's operational systems, select those vital targets that play a decisive role in

realizing the campaign intention, and launch an attack. The purpose is to shake up the

enemy's defensive system, block the enemy's mobility, tie down the enemy's heavy force

groupings, and hasten the progress of the campaign. The commander should fully utilize

the swiftness and suddenness nature of the airborne operation, and use the vertical bushi

disposition {垂直布势 chuizhi bushi} method to launch a direct attack at the enemy's

vital points. The commander should integrate methods such as force assault and

firepower assault, striving to achieve the goal of the campaign with a single strike.

(5) Comprehensive support, give prominence to key points

Airborne campaign support is an important component that makes up campaign

operational capabilities. Thus one must organize each item of support completely and

41 Elsewhere, "出发 departure" has been translated as "launching" such as in the "airborne launching zone"

[airborne departure area].
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with key points. Airborne campaign support has a rich content, wide scope, and high

requirements, and requires complex organization. The campaign commander and

command organ, on the basis of providing comprehensive campaign support, should

focus on the following tasks. First is to strengthen air cover. One should curb enemy air

reconnaissance, air raids, intercepts and anti-air resistance. At the critical time, one

should seize air superiority of the airborne operation area so as to ensure safety of our

airborne force activities. Second is to strengthen fire support. Before the airborne

operation, one should suppress the enemy air defense weapons along the airborne

operation air route, and open up an air corridor to ensure safe air transport of the airborne

force. Immediately before the airborne assault, one should also carry out fire suppression

against the enemy in the airlanding zone so as to ensure the safe landing of the airborne

force. After the airlanding, one should try to stop the enemy from maneuvering to the

airlanding zone so as to ensure the airborne force complete its designated missions. Next

is to strengthen logistical and equipment support. From the moment the airborne force

lands, one should continuously deliver ammunition and other war materiel in order to

raise persistent operational capabilities of the airborne force. Finally is to strengthen

weather support. One should accurately forecast the weather conditions in the airlanding

zone, and possible changes in such conditions, to ensure that during the planned airborne

operation period, the weather conditions are conducive to the execution of airlanding and

follow-up support.

One should note that the support for the airborne force is almost exclusively dependent

on air channels. Hence among all the supports, the most important is to seize air

superiority of the local air space. Without air superiority, all other support would not only

be difficult to carry out but also much less effective. In a sense, one can say that without

the necessary air superiority, there will not be any victory in an airborne campaign.

Section 2: Main Activities...594

I. Seizing Campaign Information Superiority and Air Superiority...594

Under informationized war conditions, information superiority and air superiority are

basic prerequisites for ensuring the smooth execution of an airborne campaign. Gaining

information and air superiority constitutes important operational activities in an airborne

campaign and run through the entire campaign. The campaign commander should employ

various capabilities and means in an effort to obtain information and air superiority.

(1) Seizing information superiority

The primary means to seize information superiority include information reconnaissance,

information attack, and information defense. Before the launch of the campaign and

during the campaign process, one should fully utilize campaign electronic reconnaissance

equipment and various reconnaissance forces to detect, search for, and intercept

electromagnetic signal emissions from enemy electronic equipment operating in the

airborne operation area or in related areas. One should determine their locations,
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deployment, technical data and patterns of use, in order to create conditions for us to

implement effective electronic jamming and firepower destruction. For the purpose of

disrupting the enemy's command and coordination, weakening and restraining its

information warfare capabilities, and seizing the initiative in the information struggle,

one should concentrate forces and weapons to carry out soft kill and hard destruction

against important nodes in the enemy's information warfare systems. The purpose is to

degrade and disrupt the enemy's operational effectiveness and to break up the overall

structure of the enemy's information warfare systems. In order to guard against enemy

information attacks, one should adopt various effective measures and tightly organize

campaign information defense. The main measures include: tightly control radio

communications, practice electronic camouflage and diversions, conceal networks, vary

the operating mode, and utilize terrain and fortified works to strengthen protection.

(2) Seizing air superiority

To seize air superiority, one should first of all carry out fire assault and sabotage in the

enemy rear in an attempt to control the air from the ground. One should concentrate the

main force of the air assault group {空中突击集团 kongzhong tuji jituan}, with support

from the missile assault group {导弹突击集团 daodan tuji jituan}, and carry out sudden

and fierce fire assault on important enemy airfields, air defense surveillance systems,

command and control systems, and air defense fire systems. In particular, one should

carry out targeted assault on the enemy air defense force and weapon systems along the

designated air routes and in the airborne operation zone. For those key targets that are

difficult to destroy with firepower and yet may pose a major threat on airborne

operations, one may organize sabotage fendui {破袭分队 poxi fendui} to enter the

operational areas through air drop or ground (sea) infiltration and carry out destruction

through raids. Secondly, one should organize air escorts and air blockades. The air cover

group {空中掩护集团 kongzhong yanhu jituan} executing the air escort may opt for

accompanying cover {伴随掩护 bansui yanhu} or zone cover {区域掩护 quyu yanhu}.

The air cover group destroys or expels incoming enemy aircraft in order to ensure safety

of the air transport formation. The emphasis of the air blockade is the airfields of the

enemy combat aircraft. The key is to stop the operational activities of the enemy's

aviation force and reduce or remove enemy aviation threat to our air transport group {空

中运输集团 kongzhong yunshu jituan}. Thirdly, one should organize air patrols {空中巡

逻 kongzhong xunluo} and zone air defense {quyu fangkong 区域防空}. Air patrol is a

cover activity undertaken by the air cover group at a designated time and in a designated

air space to provide cover for the safety of the airborne operation group {空降集团

kongjiang jituan or 空降作战集团 kongjiang zuozhan jituan} and aviation group {航空

兵集团 hangkongbing jituan}. Air patrol can be divided into security air patrol {警戒性

空中巡逻 jingjiexing kongzhong xunluo} and screening air patrol {屏护性空中巡逻

pinghuxing kongzhong xunluo}. In carrying out security air patrol, the air cover group

normally uses a smaller force to conduct security patrol at a stipulated time and air space

to closely monitor the peripheral air space. If an enemy situation is detected, the air cover

group immediately reports the discovery to the command post, and, depending on the
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situation, engages in combat to support ground air defense weapons to destroy incoming

enemy aircraft. When implementing screening air patrol, the air cover group is normally

a larger force that forms an airborne barrier at a stipulated time and air space. The air

cover group destroys and drives away enemy aircraft and clears the air space in order to

form local air superiority and provide reliable cover for ground and air operational

activities. Zone air defense is an anti-air defense activity organized by the airborne

operation group. The airborne operation group should establish a focused zone air

defense support system, using air defense missiles and anti-aircraft guns to form an

integrated air defense fire network. This zone air defense support system works in

coordination with the combat activities of the fighter aviation force to destroy incoming

enemy aircraft and ensure air superiority over the airborne operation zone.

II. Carrying out Fire Preparation...595

Fire preparation is a fire assault operation aimed at clearing obstacles for the airlanding

and entry into battle by the airborne operation group. It includes advance fire preparation

and direct fire preparation.

(1) Advance fire preparation

Advance fire preparation is mainly carried out jointly by the bomber aviation unit,

fighter-bomber aviation unit, and ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with

the support of the missile assault group. Its objectives include the following: annihilate

the enemy massive forces and their supportive weapons; suppress and destroy the

enemy's air defense systems; weaken the enemy's anti-airborne capabilities; and isolate

the airborne operation area. The primary targets of assault in the advance fire preparation

include the following: the enemy's airfields, radar stations and ground air defense fire

support systems that could pose a threat to one’s airborne operations; the enemy's

defensive positions in the airborne operation area, and tank and mechanized units and

force groups in the vicinity of the airborne operation area; and the enemy's command and

control systems, electronic warfare systems, supply and support systems, transport hubs,

and anti-airborne facilities. The duration of advance fire preparation should be

determined by the number of enemy targets located in the airborne operation area, the

level of fortification of these targets, and the capabilities, requirements, and effectiveness

of one’s own fire assault. The duration should range from a few days to a few weeks. If

the enemy's defense in or around the designated airborne operation area is weak, or if

effective damage and suppression of the enemy have been achieved in advance

operations, one may opt not to carry out advance fire preparation so as to achieve greater

surprise.

(2) Direct fire preparation

Direct fire preparation is carried out on the foundation of advance fire preparation and

preliminary isolation and blocking of the airborne operation area. Direct fire preparation

is the fire assault carried out in the designated airborne operation area before the
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execution of airlanding, depending on the repositioning of the enemy's forces and the

recovery of the enemy's defense. The objective of direct fire preparation is to create

conditions for the successful landing of the airborne operation group, for its capturing and

establishment of airborne landing base, and for its ground combat operations. Direct fire

preparation is primarily carried out jointly by the fighter-bomber aviation unit and the

ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with the support of the missile assault

group. The missions of this operation include the following: provide targeted attack and

suppression of the enemy's effective forces and air defense weapons located in the

airlanding area; destroy and damage the enemy's defense works and anti-airborne

operation obstacles; blockade roads and bridges leading to the airlanding area; and attack

the enemy's anti-airborne operation reserves, especially its tank and mechanized units.

The timing of direct fire preparation should be determined by the enemy's conditions, the

nature of the targets, one’s own intention in carrying out the airborne operation, and the

effectiveness of the assault. It is generally initiated a few dozen minutes or a few hours

before the airlanding operation by the airborne operation group, and generally ends

before the advance echelon {先遣梯队 xianqian tidui} of the airborne operation group

reaches the air space over the airlanding area. This is to ensure that the airborne operation

group can fully utilize the outcome of direct fire preparation and land safely with

condensed landing {密集着陆 miji zhaolu}, while avoiding friendly fire. When

airlanding is carried out in coastal areas, naval ships may also participate in direct fire

preparation.

In implementing fire preparation, one should make comprehensive use of air and ground

(sea) firepower to effect continuous, accurate and focused assaults. Direct fire preparation

should be linked with advance fire preparation. The campaign commander should be

continuously informed of developments in fire preparation, and give timely instructions

on enemy targets to the air assault group and to the supporting missile assault group and

naval ships and put forward requirements. The campaign commander should closely

coordinate activities of different units to affect collective strikes. The campaign

commander should focus on and assure the effects of fire preparations in the primary

airlanding area, and, when appropriate, make timely adjustments to fire assault plans.

When necessary, the campaign commander may affect fire feint demonstration and other

deceptive measures to conceal the intention of airlanding operation and mislead the

enemy.

III. Air Transport...596

Air transport is the most intense, most critical and most complex moments of the airborne

campaign, and determines whether the airborne forces can safely and successfully reach

the airlanding area. Air transport should be carefully organized. The main activities

include loading and boarding, opening up air corridor, air transport, and airlanding.
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(1) Organizing loading and boarding

The airborne operation group is normally organized according to organized airborne

units, which enter the waiting areas {待运地区 daiyun diqu}42 and departure airfields in

concealment during the darkness of the night or under favorable weather conditions. The

war materiel, equipment, vehicles, ammunition and heavy equipment of the airborne

operation group are generally shipped directly to the departing airfields for loading.

Loading and boarding of the airborne operation group normally begins 2~3 hours before

taking off and ends 20~30 minutes before taking off. The boarding should be executed in

the following order: advance echelon {先遣梯队 xianqian tidui}, assault echelon {突击

梯队 tuji tidui}, rear echelon {后方梯队 houfang tidui} and follow-on echelon {后续梯

队 houxu tidui}. For each unit, heavy equipment is loaded first, followed by boarding of

personnel. The joint commander of the departure airfield is responsible for organizing

and implementing the loading and boarding according to a unified plan. The campaign

commander should accurately adjust and control the timing of entry into the waiting area

or departure airfield of the airborne operation group and air transport group. The

campaign commander should promptly learn and master the loading situations of all

departure airfields, supervise and foster the close cooperation between the airborne

operation group, the air transport group, and the air station, and execute strictly according

to the loading plan.

(2) Opening up air corridor

In order to ensure that the airborne operation group and the air transport group can

smoothly enter the designated airlanding zone, generally one should open up an air

corridor along the designated air routes based on [the principle of] seizing superiority of

the air. The operation of opening up an air corridor is normally undertaken by the fighterbomber aviation unit and the ground attack aviation unit of the air assault group, with the

support of the campaign tactical missile units of the Second Artillery and the Army. The

primary targets of the assault include the enemy's air defense systems along the air routes,

such as enemy warning radars, guidance radars, gun-fire control radar, surface-to-air

missile positions, and anti-aircraft artillery positions. The operation of opening up an air

corridor can be undertaken in conjunction with fire preparation or independently. The

width of the air corridor depends on the number of air transport routes needed. After the

opening of the air corridor, the campaign commander should closely monitor enemy

conditions along the air corridor and promptly adopt effective measures to prevent the

enemy from shutting it down.

(3) Organizing air transport

In order to ensure the safe air transport of the airborne operation group, its on-time arrival

at the airlanding zone, and the execution of the airlanding, after taking off and before

42 Translator’s note: Also translated as the standby area elsewhere.
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arriving at the starting point of the air route, the various formations should form an air

operation bushi disposition according to their respective missions, with the campaign

transport formation {战役输送编队 zhanyi shusong biandui or 输送编队 shusong

biandui} as the core. In the course of air transport, the reconnaissance formation {侦察编

队 zhencha biandui} should provide weather condition reports along the air routes and

over the airborne landing zone in a timely manner, as well as reports on developing

enemy conditions. The jamming formation {干扰编队 ganrao biandui} should carry out

jamming activities against detected electronic equipment of the enemy's air defense

system. The suppression formation {压制编队 yazhi biandui} should attack and suppress

the enemy's radars, and air defense missile and anti-aircraft artillery positions. The cover

formation {掩护编队 yanhu biandui} should provide accompanying cover and zone

cover, as well as annihilate and expel incoming attacking enemy aircraft. The transport

formation, under the cover and support of various other formations, should follow the

designated air corridor to head for the airlanding zone. The early warning and command

aircraft should direct various formations in their actions from a vantage position in the

air. Before arrival at the starting point of the airlanding air route, the cover formation

should proceed to the air space over the airlanding zone or the direction that may witness

the biggest threat from enemy aircraft and clear up the air space. The suppression

formation should impose air blockade over important enemy airfields, as well as suppress

the enemy's air defense fire in the airlanding zone to ensure the safety of the transport

formation in executing the airlanding. Various tactical transport formations, after

reaching the starting point of the airlanding air routes, should follow the original plan and

fly towards their respective airlanding sites to carry out airlanding. In the course of air

transport, the campaign commander should closely monitor the enemy's developments

and changes in weather conditions, issue timely notices on air and ground conditions,

accurately control the locations of various formations, coordinate uninterruptedly the

activities of various formations, and resolutely carry out the original plan unless there are

other major developments.

(4) Airlanding

Airlanding is the process between the time when the airborne forces leave the aircraft and

the time they land on the ground. This is a critical transition from the air operation to the

ground operation. Thus, the airborne operation group should exploit the element of

surprise and the effects of fire assault, and minimize the duration of the airlanding

operation. In order to assure safety of airlanding of the airborne forces, the various

support groups should strengthen their fire support and air cover for the airborne forces,

and annihilate the enemy's forces in the air and on the ground that are mounting an attack

at the airborne operation group.

IV. Ground Operations...598

Ground operations are main operational activities of the airborne campaign, and are the

critical link to finally achieving the goal of the airborne campaign.
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(1) Capturing airlanding sites

After landing on the ground, the advance echelon of the airborne operation group should

rapidly launch an attack according to the initial plan under the support and cover of the

aviation force. Their missions include: annihilate the enemy's effective strength at the

airlanding site; take control of tactical key points at and around the airlanding site, and

take control of bridges, river-crossings and major traffic routes in order to block the

enemy's mobile units from approaching the airlanding site; swiftly deploy lead

equipment, report weather conditions, mark the location of the airlanding site, remove

obstacles at the landing site that may seriously affect airlanding; provide guidance to the

air formations; and safeguard landing of the assault echelon. If the advance echelon

airlands at an airfield, the advance echelon should rapidly seize ground facilities, air

defense positions, and important targets such as POL and ammunition depots at the

airfield, and take control of the airfield's command and communication facilities. The

advance echelon rapidly organizes focused perimeter defense, removes obstacles on the

runways, and makes preparation to direct and safeguard airlanding of the assault echelon.

(2) Establishing the airlanding base

An airlanding base is set up on the ground of the seized airlanding site. After the assault

echelon of the airborne operation group lands on the ground, the assault echelon, working

in conjunction with the advance echelon, should take swift actions to annihilate the

remnant enemy forces at the airlanding site, control designated area and key points within

the airlanding zone, crush the enemy's counterattacks, consolidate, expand and combine

the landing sites, and rapidly restore the function of the captured airfield or repair and

recover the field airfield. The goal is to set up an airlanding base in the shortest time

possible and safeguard the paradrop or airlanding of the rear echelon and follow-on

echelon. After the airlanding base is established, while setting aside a part of the forces

for defense, the primary forces should follow the initial plan and rapidly transit into

offensive or defensive operations. The rear echelon, after landing, should quickly collect

air dropped war materiel, swiftly set up a forward support base on the foundation of the

airlanding base, and make preparations for forward and backward shipment so as to

ensure the operational activities of various units. The follow-on echelon of the airborne

operation group generally carries out paradrop or air landing after the airlanding base is

established. The follow-on echelon should enter into attack or defense immediately after

landing in accordance with the original plan. When the airborne operation group is tasked

to carry out sabotage operations in the enemy rear, the airborne operation group may

establish the airlanding base after completing the mission, depending on the situation.

In the course of the airlanding operation and while setting up the airlanding base, the

commander of the airborne operation group should swiftly establish communication with

all the units, be well informed about and keep under control the conditions of the units,

and direct and control the combat activities of these units. The airborne campaign

commander should stay on top of combat developments, give additional orders to the

airborne operation group and clarify missions. At the same time, the main force of the air
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assault group, with the support of the guided missile assault group, should carry out

intense fire assault against the enemy's tank and mechanized force in order to weaken the

enemy’s anti-airborne operation capabilities, attack key traffic routes and bridges, and

block the airborne landing zone. The main force of the air cover group should provide

cover for the operations of the airborne operation group.

(3) Implementing ground offensives

After landing, the airborne operation group should rapidly form offensive bushu

disposition, complete preparations for attack, launch an attack at the enemy and seize

important targets or strategic places. Before the first echelon of the airborne operation

group launches an attack, the engineering fendui should use the demolition method or the

manual search and removal method to clear remnant obstacles in the obstacle field. The

attack units of the first echelon, after receiving the order to attack, should immediately

follow the initial plan and start the attack against the designated targets. The commander

of the airborne operation group should give order to the subordinate artillery unit to

destroy the enemy's defensive works and fire points. The air assault group should transfer

firepower towards targets in the enemy's depth such as the command post, artillery

positions, and reserves. The air cover group should, working in conjunction with the

ground air-defense force of the airborne operation group, annihilate the assaulting enemy

and support the first echelon to complete its mission.

When the first echelon completes its mission, or when the enemy engages its reserve

team to launch a counterassault, the airborne operation group should engage its second

echelon or reserve team at an appropriate time to counter the enemy's counterattack and

consolidate the already seized positions. The first echelon should use positive actions to

cover the second echelon in combat. When the counterattacking enemy is annihilated or

defeated, at an appropriate time the commander of the airborne operation group should

organize the troops to deploy to and attack the enemy's depth, to encircle and kill the

enemy in the depth and to seize the designated targets.

In the process when the airborne operation group is deploying for ground offensives, the

airborne campaign commander should pay full attention to the development of enemy

situations at the airlanding zone and promptly coordinate the activities of the various

groups. The air assault group and the missile assault group should use firepower to

intercept or suppress the enemy's massive forces that are maneuvering towards the

airlanding zone. The air cover group should strengthen its air cover over the airlanding

zone, and working in conjunction with the ground air-defense fire, maintain air

superiority of the airlanding zone, and safeguard the air safety of the airborne operation

group. The rear support group should strengthen the replenishment of war materiel for

follow-on operations and to meet the operational needs of the airborne operation group.
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(4) Transition into defensive

Transition into defensive occurs when the airborne operation group has completed the

offensive mission or when the offensive is unsuccessful and the forces are forced into

defensive operations. The operation has the following characteristics: operating

independently, facing grave enemy threats, situations developing rapidly, an incomplete

defensive system, great difficulties in getting support and assistance, and limited

capabilities to sustain long and continuous operations. Its basic missions include: to

stubbornly hold on to the captured areas and targets; to break up the enemy’s operational

bushi disposition and suppress the enemy's mobility; to impede the enemy's maneuver; to

tie down and draw out in-depth enemy forces; and to support frontal operations in

winning campaign victory.

The commander of the airborne operation group should follow superior instructions and

make judgments based on the postures of the two sides as well as terrain conditions. The

commander should make a decisive determination, putting priorities first in the primary

defensive direction and next the secondary defensive direction, first on the periphery and

then the depth, striving to complete defensive preparations in the shortest time possible.

When the enemy is advancing towards the defensive area, the air assault group and the

missile assault group should, working in conjunction with the artillery unit of the airborne

operation group, use the obstacle blocking {设障拦阻 shezhang lanzu} method and the

fire blocking {火力拦阻 huoli lanzu} method to seal the roadways and halt the enemy's

mobility. When the enemy launches an assault, the various units of the airborne operation

group should use the defensive position as the base and bring into play the full force of

firepower to firmly resist the enemy's assault, hold the vital points and maintain the

stability of the defensive system. If the enemy penetrates our defensive position, the air

assault group and the missile assault group should use fierce firepower to seal the

penetration point and block the assault of the enemy's follow-on echelon. Supported by

the aviation firepower and missile firepower, the airborne operation group should launch

a ferocious counterassault against the enemy who has penetrated our defensive position to

resolutely seal the penetrating point and regain and maintain the stability of the defensive

system.

In the course when the airborne operation group makes transition into the defensive mode

and during defensive operations, the campaign commander should organize the air assault

group, the missile assault group, the air cover group, and the rear support group to

provide support, cover and protection in a timely manner in order to ensure that the

airborne operation group can successfully accomplish the defense mission.
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Chapter 30

The Air Defense Campaign...602

An air defense campaign is a series of operational activities conducted by an Air Force

campaign large formation, with the support and coordination of the other service arms,

regional forces, and People’s Air Defense strengths, per a unified intention and plan

{jihua}, for the purpose of thwarting the enemy’s air raid. Its basic goals are to smash the

enemy air raid intention, and to guard the security of major targets. Its main missions are

as follows: tight surveillance of air-raid dynamics, timely detection and ascertainment of

the activities and opportunities for an enemy air raid, and alerting of all units and the

People’s Air Defense organization; resistance against enemy air raids on our military,

political, and economic targets so that we do not suffer or only lightly suffer damage

from the enemy air raid; organization of a counterattack operation to wipe out or weaken

the enemy air raid strengths; organization of information warfare (IW) to seize

information superiority; and organization of protection to reduce the personnel and warmateriel losses created by encounter with an enemy air raid.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...602

I. Characteristics...602

In an air defense campaign under informationized conditions, the widespread application

of informationized weaponry has triggered revolutionary changes in the modes and

methods of air raid and air defense operations, and has also caused the air defense

campaign to assume a number of new characteristics.

(1) Imminent battle preparations are of very short duration, making it easy to fall into

passivity

The very short duration of imminent battle preparations, making it easy to fall into

passivity, is an important characteristic of an air defense campaign as distinguished from

other campaigns. This characteristic is determined by the initiative and suddenness of an

air raid, and by the passive quality of an air defense operation. In particular, in the initial

stage of the campaign, this feature is more prominent. Since the side executing the air

raid normally grasps the initiative during the campaign launch, it can in advance conduct

meticulous preparations for the air raid activities, and can autonomously select the air

raid means, modes, and forces/arms; it can also select an operational airspace,

opportunity, and strike targets favorable to itself, and conduct stealthy penetration and

long-range precision strikes. In particular, the maneuver capability of air raid arms has

improved; the enemy need not conduct large-scale concentration and movement of forces

before the air raid activities, and [if] the enemy seizes information superiority, the

battlefield to the enemy will be unidirectionally transparent, the signs of his air raid

activities will be very difficult to detect, and the suddenness will be greatly enhanced.

The air defense side must seize the initiative in the campaign’s early phase; it must rush
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to do a good job of preparations before the enemy launches the air raid; and in particular,

under conditions where advanced early-warning detection means are lacking, it is more

difficult to timely and accurately grasp the enemy air raid’s direction of movement, and it

extremely limits the time provided to the campaign commander and command organ for

judging the situation and making decisions. Since early warning time is short, all

participating strengths in an air defense campaign have a very short time for imminent

battle preparations; under ordinary circumstances, they will unfold while preparing, while

being thrown into battle, and operational activities [thus] can very easily fall into

passivity.

(2) The defended space is expansive, and the missions are arduous

The defended space in a modern air defense campaign has unprecedentedly enlarged both

in vertical airspace and in horizontal airspace. From the horizontal airspace viewpoint,

the air raid side has powerful long-range strike capability, and possesses

trans/intercontinental and even global air strike capabilities; its strike range will extend

over the entire campaign and the strategic depth. From the viewpoint of vertical airspace,

air raid weapons can be used in actions from “treetop” ultralow altitude up to ultrahigh

altitudes of several 10,000 meters (several tens of kilometers), and continuing directly

into outer space. In order to achieve the operational goal as fast as possible, the air raid

side will employ concentrated long-range strike arms to execute omni-bearing, full-depth,

omni-altitude air raids. Our air defense campaign will be conducted within an expansive

battlefield space; its range can involve several theaters, up to a million square kilometers.

Within this huge battlefield space, the air defense side not only must organize active

resistance and protection activities, and guard the security of key military, political, and

economic targets, but must also organize strengths to execute counterattacks against the

enemy’s air-raid arms takeoff bases and missile launch platforms; it not only must resist

air raid arms coming from the skies, but must also resist ballistic missiles and space

attack arms coming from outer space. This makes the air-defense operational missions

arduous and organization of air-defense operational activities abnormally complex.

(3) Participating strengths are multi-elemental, and coordination is complex

An air defense campaign is a [series of] large-scale campaign operations undertaken by

all of the service arms and the People’s Air Defense strengths. In addition to the Air

Force’s fighter aviation forces, surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces, antiaircraft artillery

(AAA) forces, electronic countermeasures (ECM) forces, and their corresponding support

forces, this campaign normally also has Navy fighter aviation forces, Army and Navy

SAM forces, AAA forces, and electronic warfare units (elements), and People’s Air

Defense AAA forces. These several forces – with different organizational systems and

different natures – are scattered over the entire range of the theater and assume different

operational missions. During operations, not only is there coordination between the Air

Force and the Army, Navy, and People’s Air Defense forces, there is also coordination

between the Air Force’s internal fighter aviation forces and ground air defense forces,

coordination among all fighter aviation forces units, and coordination between hard-kill
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arms and soft-kill arms, as well as coordination between the operational forces and the

various support forces. Moreover, not only is there coordination between theaters, there is

also coordination between air defense subareas (zones); there is coordination of 

resistance operations, and also coordination of counterattack operations, and still more,

coordination of protection operations. Due to the numerous participating service arms,

and the complex composition and subordination relationship of strengths – on top of

which are the passive quality of operational activities, and limited means for cooperation

– unusual complexity has been created in organization of air-defense campaign

coordination.

(4) Contention for the information realm is sharp, and information confrontation

penetrates throughout the campaign

With the improvement in the informationized degree of weaponry, information

confrontation has become a major operational activity in air raid and air defense

operations, and permeates the entire course of an operation; information strength has

become the first essential element in gaining the upper hand in an operation. In future

localized wars under informationized conditions, the enemy will rely on his superiority in

technology, and will first employ IW weapons to conduct an information offensive

against targets such as our intelligence and early warning systems, operational command

centers, and communications networks; then, in integrated fashion, he will use a variety

of soft-kill and hard-kill means to comprehensively blanket-jam our air defense system,

and seize battlefield information superiority. The contention between us and the enemy in

the information realm will be unprecedentedly sharp, and will permeate the entire course

of the air defense campaign. Before battle, we will as early as possible establish and

deploy an integrated reconnaissance and early warning (R&EW) system, and timely

ascertain the enemy’s air raid forces, air raid direction, and air raid opportunities, as well

as the intention that must be achieved. During the campaign implementation process, we

will concentrate the application of various kinds of IW weaponry; simultaneously with

resistance against the enemy’s information offensive, we will execute a determined

information counterattack against key targets in the enemy’s information system, and

strive for seizure of localized (partial) information superiority. The resistance operations,

counterattack operations, and protection activities will all be accompanied by intense

information offensive-defensive confrontations, which will have a decisive effect on the

success or failure of resistance, counterattack, and protection activities.

(5) System confrontations are sharp, and offense and defense are interwoven

With the development of new-technology weaponry, several new service arm units have

emerged as the times require, and have caused the force composition in air raid and air

defense operations to manifest an ever stronger multi-elemental quality and integrated

quality. Future air raid and air defense operations will no longer be confrontations fought

by a single service arm, with a single operational system, and on a single battlefield

space; the warring sides in integrated fashion will employ the various weapon systems of

the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force to launch comprehensive confrontations in
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the land/sea/air/space/electromagnetic (EM) multidimensional space, manifesting a

prominent feature of system confrontation. In this kind of system-versus-system

confrontation, we not only must organize fighter aviation forces, SAM forces, and AAA

forces to execute continued interception of the air raiding enemy, but must also organize

all service arms and protection strengths, as well as the People’s Air Defense strengths, to

implement effective protection of major defended targets, and to eliminate the

consequences of the enemy air raid. Simultaneously, we must also concentrate elite longrange strike strengths, to execute determined counterattacks against the enemy’s Air

Force bases and naval air takeoff (launch) platforms. When that time comes, air defense

operations will take on a quality of offense within defense, defense within offense, and

offense interwoven with defense; combat will have abnormally tense, sharp aspects.

II. Requirements...605

(1) Enhanced vigilance, and rapid response

Recent localized war experience shows that a strong enemy normally exploits

opportunities such as the dark of night or festivals/holidays, and – relying on its high-tech

superiority – stealthily and suddenly launches the air raid. This will greatly reduce our

early warning and imminent battle preparations time, even to the point where we will be

forced to accept battle in haste; and the boundary between air defense operational

preparations and implementation is blurring day by day. One must seize the initiative in

air defense operations, and ensure the smooth conduct of resistance, counterattack, and

protection activities; and one must enhance vigilance, and rapid response. To this end, the

first need is constant vigilance. One should: establish a sound system for all preparations,

enhance education on preparedness, strengthen the concept of preparedness, and maintain

the will to fight with constant vigilance; establish a sound air defense campaign system;

formulate in advance a variety of plans {jihua} and proposals for the air defense

campaign; strengthen drills for air defense operations under informationized conditions;

and enhance the organizational command capabilities of a commander and command

organ, as well as the capabilities of units to fulfill their operational missions in critical

situations. The second need is timely acquisition of battlefield information. This means:

integrated application of the various information detection strengths – land, sea, air,

space, and EM; adoption of various means of reconnaissance and detection;

comprehensive perception of the battlefield posture; and acquisition of operation-related

information. In particular, one must ascertain with key points the enemy air raid

intention, strength task-organization, operational bushu disposition, main air-raid

direction, and possible activities to be adopted, so as to provide a basis for rapid decision

making. The third need is accurate judgment of the battlefield situation. One should use

various means – especially information acquired by automated information processing

equipment – to: sift the true from the false, and to screen the essential from the dross;

compare the information via mutual corroboration and comprehensive analysis; and

arrives at an accurate assessment of/conclusion on the battlefield situation, so as to lay

the foundation for correct decision-making. The fourth need is resolute decision-making.

A campaign commander and command organ should be resourceful and decisive, and
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make full use of command automation systems and computer-aided decision support

systems, to shorten the decision-making process; and they must grasp the main

contradictions involving an air defense operation’s overall situation, make decisions on

the spot, and resolutely make decisions. The fifth need is rapid activities. One should give

full play to the advantages of the rapid and agile activities of airborne strengths, rapidly

unfold, rapidly act, effect changes based on the enemy, make changes before the enemy

does, employ change to control the [enemy’s] changes, and strive for the initiative in the

campaign.

(2) Concentrated application of forces, and system sabotage

In air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions, conditions wherein the

enemy’s weaponry is superior to ours will be relatively prominent. If we want to achieve

victory in a campaign, we must adopt concentrated application of various participating

strengths, strive to form a localized (partial) superiority in the main direction and at key

times, and execute key-point strikes against the enemy to paralyze the enemy’s

operational system.

Concentrated application of forces is a general rule that should be followed in all

campaign operations. Air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions will

assume a number of new features, and have provided several new requirements for

implementing the principle of concentrated application of forces: The first need is to

attach importance to qualitative concentration. One should ably handle the relationship

between concentrated quantity and concentrated quality; simultaneously with emphasis

on numerical concentration and formation of a numerical superiority, one should also

attach importance to concentration of various types of elite forces and high-tech arms to

create qualitative superiority. The second need is to attach importance to concentration of

information and firepower. Information and firepower will be the critical essential

elements in gaining the upper hand in future air defense operations; one should: ably

handle the relationship between concentrated force strength and concentrated firepower,

and especially attach importance to the concentrated employment of various types of air

defense firepower and strive to form firepower superiority; and scientifically combine

various information soft-kill capabilities with hard-kill capabilities, and concentrate their

application, to create an information superiority. The third need is to attach importance to

dynamic-state concentration. One should: give full play to the long-range maneuver and

rapid maneuver advantages of airborne strengths; adopt modes of static-state dispersed

bushu disposition and dynamic-state concentrated employment; and implement ad hoc

concentration and transient concentration along the main direction, in the key areas, and

over major targets, to create a “counterweight” effect. System sabotage means – starting

out from sabotage of the overall structure of the enemy’s operational system – selection

of, and execution of strikes on strategic targets which play a supporting role in the

enemy’s operational system and which have a major influence on the course and outcome

of operations, in order to achieve the operational goal. In system sabotage, the first need

is to select correctly. One must, starting out from the air defense campaign’s overall

situation, analyze in depth the internal structure of the enemy’s operational system,
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ascertain the nature and interrelationship of all types of targets, select those strategic

positions and key links which enable rapid paralysis and dismemberment of the enemy

operational system, and execute precision strikes on them. Counterattack operations

should lay stress on strikes against the enemy’s Air Force bases, aircraft carriers, and

cruise-missile sea launch platforms. The second need is to destroy effectively. This

means concentrated application of various elite forces and high-tech weapons, working

hard to create superiority over the enemy within a local time and space, integrated use of

various operational methods and means, concentration of force against the correctly

selected strategic targets, ensuring an attack against their vital points, paralyzing their

stretches, and rapidly bogging down the enemy operational system into a state of

paralysis.

(3) Unified command, and a composite strength to gain victory

In air defense campaigns under future informationized conditions: the participating

strengths will be multi-elemental, each element having different functions; the

operational range will extend over all of the battlefields – land, sea, air, space, and EM;

all operational activities will be interwoven; without unified command, it will be difficult

to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}; and thus it will also be

difficult to seize the operational initiative in confrontations where the integrated quality is

very prominent. Hence, subduing the enemy with unified command and a composite

strength is a critical principle that must be followed in organizing and conducting an air

defense campaign. To this end, the first need is to establish a highly efficient,

authoritative command system. In air defense campaigns under informationized

conditions, battlespaces are expansive, bushu dispositions are highly dispersed,

operational tempos are fast, and situations are rapidly changing; this levies more stringent

requirements on command efficiency. Thus, one must establish a command system with

few command levels, vertically and horizontally interlinked, with a simple, clear, and

smooth relationship which can flexibly meet emergencies. The second need is to fully

utilize command automation means. One should establish an integrated command

automation system – with a rational computer-based structure, flexibility of use, and high

survivability – to realize faster information transfer and processing, a scientific decisionmaking method, and improved command efficiency. The third need is to ably handle the

relationship between centralized control and decentralized implementation. Considered

from the viewpoint of an operation’s overall situation, in order to closely coordinate the

various participating strengths, all the battlefield spaces, and the various operational

activities, and to form an integrated-whole composite strength {zhengti heli}, one must

realize centralized control over an air defense campaign, and one must – based on the

general intention of the air defense campaign – have unified stratagem-planning

{mouhua} of the various operational activities, realize centralized control over elite air

defense strengths, and unify the employment of the plans {jihua}. At the same time, one

must also consider the features of the multidimensionality of the air-defense campaign

battlefield, the highly dispersed bushu disposition of force strengths and weaponry, and

the complexity and diversity of operational activities and methods. In order to bring into

play the zeal and initiative of the various participating strengths, improve rapid response

capability, and enhance the flexibility of operations, specific missions and activities
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should be conducted in decentralized fashion by the various operational groups and air

defense subareas (zones).

(4) Integration, diversity, and enhanced support

Air defense campaigns under informationized conditions have features of high depletion,

high technology, and high time effectiveness. This makes the support work more

complex, and the relationship between support activities and operational activities closer,

and has an increasingly greater effect on the success or failure of the operation. Hence,

one must ensure the smooth conduct of the air defense campaign, and must carry out the

principle of integration, diversity, and enhanced support. One should lay stress on

grasping the following points: the first need is to implement integrated support. One

should fully exploit favorable conditions for homeland operations and People’s War; rely

on theater scientific/technical and economic potential to establish a unified, highefficiency command system and military-civilian integrated support mechanism; and

form a military-civilian multi-layer support system with the military as primary. The

second need is to implement diversified support. One must – with a focus on the features

of the various types of support targets – develop multiple channels, employ multiple

means, and formulate multiple measures. In terms of support methods, one should

achieve mutual integration of area support and organizational system support, mutual

integration of unified supply with specialized supply, mutual integration of base support

and escort support, and mutual integration of air-transport air drops and ground support.

The third need is to lay stress on the support key points. One should deploy with key

points the support strengths along the main direction and in the main areas to facilitate the

wartime ability to rapidly concentrate the application of support strengths, materiel, 

and equipment at key times, and to ensure the fulfillment of the main missions. As for the

support content, one should focus on information support in the areas of intelligence,

communications, and electronic warfare, and build up stores of camouflage and

protective equipment. The fourth need is to improve rapid support capability. The

campaign commander and command organ should: deliberate in advance on the possibly

occurring changes; formulate a thorough support plan {jihua}, based on missions that

may be assumed by the air defense strengths; and guide the support strengths per plan in

the storage of operational materiel and in execution of drills according to the support

proposal. Simultaneously, they should increase the quantities of transport aircraft,

transport vehicles, and equipment to enhance mobile support capability. The fifth need is

to implement support during battles. In future air defense campaigns, the support-versuscountersupport struggles will be abnormally sharp, and the boundary between these

activities and operational activities will tend to blur. Hence, one should enhance the battle

functions of the support system, and improve the self-defense capability of the support

strengths.
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Section 2: Main Activities...608

I. Grasping the Enemy Air Raid’s Dynamic State, and Issuing Air Raid

Alarms...608

The campaign commander and command organ must: thoroughly plan {jihua}; apply in

integrated fashion the various types (space, air, sea, and ground) of reconnaissance

modes, reconnaissance means, and reconnaissance equipment; and implement omnitempero-spatial, continuous, tight reconnaissance and surveillance of the air raiding

enemy. From various signs – the enemy’s conduct of reconnaissance activities, unusual

changes in radio and signal communications, the initiation of jamming, and air-raid forceunit {budui} movement conditions – they must as early as possible ascertain the enemy

air raid circumstances. The main contents [of this intelligence] are as follows: the enemy

air raid’s force composition, numbers, air raid intention, and scale; the air raid arms’

departure bases, missile launch positions, and sea-based cruise missile launch platforms;

and the air raid’s direction, strike opportunities, targets, and penetration means, as well as

the air raid’s route and flight altitudes. The campaign commander and command organ

should – based on the intelligence acquired by reconnaissance – rapidly make an

assessment of the enemy air raid activities, and, depending on whether the enemy air

threat is constantly intensifying or easing, issue air raid forecasts, air raid alarms, and

[later] all-clear signals to all units, as well as to the People’s Air Defense organization.

II. Integration of Aircraft, SAMs, and AAA, to Resist the Enemy’s Air Sudden

Raids...608

A resistance operation means an operational activity with integrated application of the air

defense strengths of all the service arms and the air defense strengths of the militia and

reserves, along the main direction of the enemy air raid, to establish an

aircraft/SAM/AAA integrated, large-area, dynamic-state resistance bushi disposition, in

order to annihilate or retard the air raiding enemy via air battles and antiaircraft

operations. It is the most important operational activity in an air defense campaign. Based

on the course and goals of the enemy air raid operation, counterattack operations are

normally organized according to resistance against the enemy’s strike on [our] air defense

system, resistance against the enemy’s strike in depth on [critical] targets, and resistance

against the enemy’s continued strikes.

(1) Resistance against the enemy’s sudden attack on [our] air defense system

When the enemy launches an air raid against us, it will surely concentrate its elite

strengths to first suppress or destroy our air defense system, which will cause us to lose

resistance and counterattack capabilities and will ensure the smooth realization of the air

raid intention. Hence, resisting the enemy’s strikes against our air defense system is a

core mission of the first battle in the air defense campaign. Resistance against the enemy

strikes on the air defense system may adopt the following activities.
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First is rapidly pressing forward and interception at maximum range. When the invading

enemy comes within [our] early-warning and maximum interception range, the Air Force

and Navy fighter aviation units assuming the interception mission adopt a method

mutually integrating aerial alerts with airfield alerts, rapidly press forward to engage the

enemy, and strive at the greatest possible range to effect interception of the enemy air

raid formations, and to block the enemy from continuing the invasion. One should: use

some forces to pin down the enemy’s air escort formation; drive away or wipe out the

enemy’s airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes, jammers, and in-air

refueling planes (tankers); sabotage the integral structure of the enemy air raid

formations; and disorganize the enemy air bushi disposition. Simultaneously, one should

concentrate the first-line forces along the enemy’s main air raid direction, attack in

echelons, and carry out sustained interception of the enemy strike forces at the longest

possible range – to disorganize the enemy air raid formation, and to force the enemy to

drop its bombs ahead of time. The ground-based air defense units deployed at the forward

edge and the sea-based ship-to-air weapons should be closely coordinated with the fighter

aviation forces, to wipe out the enemy air-raid arms coming within their firepower range.

Second is continuing to launch attacks, and sparing no effort to blockade. When the air

raiding enemy breaks through our maximum-range interception zone and continues the

raid, one should concentrate mainline fighter aviation forces units to continuously launch

attacks and execute key-point strikes against the enemy air raid arms along the main

direction, and spare no effort to blockade the enemy air-penetration corridor. When these

forces suffer relatively high losses from the enemy air raid, one should rapidly organize

second-line forces or campaign reserves to rapidly press forward and provide support so

as to bolster the main-direction resistance operation. When the enemy alters the main air

raid direction, one should rapidly adjust the bushu disposition, organize mobile force

strengths or campaign reserves to implement resolute strikes against the enemy along the

main direction of the air raid, as fast as possible close off the enemy’s invasion route, and

block the enemy from an invasion into our depth. When some forces of the enemy break

through our first-line defense and implement full scale strikes against our air defense

system, one should organize a fighter aviation forces’ follow-on force strengths to take

off from many points, enter from many directions, complemented by ground-based air

defense firepower, resolutely wipe out the penetrating enemy, protects the stability of our

air defense system, and smashes the enemy’s intention to seize battlefield air superiority.

(2) Resistance against the enemy’s sudden attack in depth on important targets

The air raiding enemy, after breaking through our air defense system, will inevitably

concentrate elite air raid arms to execute high-intensity air strikes on critical military,

political, and economic targets in our depth. In order to smash the enemy air raid

intention, one should – based on resisting the enemy’s strike against our air defense

system – concentrate the resistance forces of all the service arms and the People’s Air

Defense units, flexibly employ war strategies and tactics, and execute layer-by-layer

interception of the enemy, to guard the safety of critical targets in our depth.
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Air-ground integration, layer-by-layer interception. When the enemy breaks through our

long-range interception, and executes an air raid against targets in our depth – command

and control (C2) systems, massive-forces groups, Air Force and Navy bases,

communications hubs, telecommunications facilities, and people’s livelihood facilities –

one should fully exploit the long-range interception effects, apply forces in echelons, and

adopt a method mutually integrating aerial interception with an antiaircraft block, to

effect layer-by-layer interception of the invading enemy. When organizing aerial

interception, one should employ fighters in groups (high-, medium-, and lowperformance), scientifically composed, which along all directions rationally divide the

interception sectors, to ensure the ability to execute sustained interception of the air

raiding enemy. When the enemy breaks through our aerial interception and comes within

firepower range of ground-based air defense forces, the air defense units of all service

arms, as well as of the militia and reserves, should: fully exploit the aerial interception

gains; employ sudden, dense firepower to execute an omni-altitude blockade of the

invading enemy; and strive to wipe out the air raiding enemy at the periphery of the

defended targets. To resist the enemy’s incursion into our depth, one must lay stress on

key points; one should concentrate superior forces and firepower along the main

operational direction, and emphasize strikes on targets posing the greatest threat to us.

The enemy AWACS planes are the centers of gravity for their air formations’ acquisition

of information and command coordination, their electronic warfare aircraft are the main

strength for executing EM suppression, and stealth aircraft and cruise missiles are the

enemy’s long-range precision strike weapons with the strongest penetration capability;

hence, these “three [types of] aircraft and one [type of] missile” should become the

targets for key-point strikes in resistance operations.

Wide-ranging maneuvers, dynamic resistance. The resistance operation is an operational

pattern in which the enemy is active and we are passive; the air raiding enemy can

flexibly alter the air raid direction and strike targets, and flexibly apply strike means,

while our resistance operations must await the enemy action before we act. In order to

effectively resist the enemy’s air raid, on the basis of using fixed bushu disposition air

defense forces to execute layer-by-layer attacks on the enemy, one must also extensively

maneuver the air defense forces and arms to execute dynamic resistance against the

invading enemy. According to the enemy air raid operation’s characteristics and laws,

and based on an accurate grasp and assessment of the enemy situation dynamics, one

should correctly apply mobile forces, select a favorable opportunity and space for

maneuvers, and choose the strike targets. In particular, under circumstances where one

has acquired accurate intelligence on the enemy air raid, one should: rapidly organize air

defense strengths to maneuver into positions which the enemy must cross; adopt war

strategies and tactics such as in-array guerrilla warfare, luring [the enemy] into an

ambush, and set an ambush along the route; and with all one’s strength intercept the

enemy during the air raid or during his return flight to base.
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(3) Resistance against the enemy’s implementation of continuous strikes

The air raiding enemy, after executing the first strike against us, will – in order to exploit

the victory – use organized strengths to execute unequal-scale [i.e. asymmetric]

continued strikes on targets not destroyed in the first strike, and on newly found targets,

until the operational goal is achieved. To this end, a campaign commander and command

organ should fully exploit the intervals between enemy air raids to rapidly complete the

preparations for resisting the enemy’s continued air raids, execute a determined attack

against the invading enemy, and crush his intention.

Enhancement of R&EW, and timely detection of signs of the enemy’s next air raid. After

we repulse the enemy’s first air raid, on the one hand we must continue to organize

strengths to resist the enemy’s small-scale harassing air raids. On the other hand we must:

exploit all exploitable reconnaissance and surveillance means and methods; closely

observe the dynamics of the enemy’s next launched air raid; and lay stress on

ascertaining the circumstances of the enemy forces’ assembly, movements, and

replenishments (replacements), as well as the scale, direction, and targets of, and

opportunities for, the enemy’s next air raid.

At the right time, adjustment of the replenishment strengths. After the enemy’s first air

raid, one should – based on the circumstances of the air defense strengths’ losses – at the

right time conduct adjustment and replenishment. When the main resistance direction

suffers severe losses from the enemy air raid, one should rapidly adjust the strengths in

the secondary direction and other directions, and give them supplementary enhancement,

and one may also adjust the replenishments for the strengths in the forward-lead depth

{qianyi zongshen}, to ensure having sufficient strengths to resist the enemy’s continued

air raids.

Rapid organization of continued resistance. When the air raiding enemy again executes a

strike against us, the campaign commander and command organ should organize

resistance strengths to conduct continued resistance against the invading enemy. When

the air raiding enemy with a small number of forces executes continued strikes against us,

one should concentrate superior resistance forces, execute continued strikes against the

enemy, strive to inflict a lethal strike on the enemy, and force the enemy to abandon the

air raid intention. When the enemy with relatively large forces executes a large-scale,

high-intensity air raid against us, one should concentrate all of the resistance strengths, at

the necessary time throw in the reserves, call forth all one’s energy, and resolutely

repulse the enemy’s continued air raids.

III. Grasp an Opportunity for Battle, and at the Right Time Organize a

Counterattack...611

Counterattack operations are the assault activities implemented with initiative against the

enemy’s air raid weaponry bases and other targets and employing the long range strike

strengths within the campaign task organization. They are offensive operational activities
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in an air defense campaign, and have far-reaching effects on the campaign’s course and

conclusion. The campaign commander and command organ should – based on situations

such as higher level intent, battle situation development needs-requirements and

counterattack operational capability – carefully conduct decision making, be adept at

selecting time opportunities, precisely select target(s), measure the enemy to apply force,

cleverly use fighting methods, and actively and flexibly implement counterattack against

the air raiding enemy.

(1) Careful selection of the counterattack time opportunity

The counterattack time opportunity is an important content which must be made clear in

organizing and executing a counterattack operation. The time opportunity for a

counterattack operation should be carefully chosen based on higher level intent, the

enemy situation, our situation, and the situation of battlefield realities. For a

counterattack operation, one normally can choose the following time opportunities: when

there are clear signs of an enemy air raid, the enemy is making preparations to sortie, and

one’s own side has the conditions for an immediate counterattack; when the enemy

invades from one direction, which is advantageous to one’s own counterattack from a

different direction; when the [enemy’s] main strike formation, after its return flight,

conducts preparations at its base for the next sorties, and [thus] finds it difficult to take

off and meet us head-on; and when the enemy air raid strengths have suffered significant

weakening, their disposition is leaky (has loopholes), and there is a loophole that one can

take advantage of, or when meteorological conditions are favorable for one’s own side

and unfavorable for the enemy.

Favorable counterattack time opportunities and unfavorable counterattack time

opportunities are not static and unchanging; they can be altered. Hence, the campaign

commander and command organ must stand at the height of the campaign overall

situation in order to overall-plan counterattack operations, strengthening the predictability

of counterattack operations. They must actively create and seize a favorable counterattack

time opportunity, and once the time opportunity is ripe, immediately organize the

counterattack.

(2) Careful selection of targets

Determination of counterattack targets is the key to organizing and executing

counterattack operations, and has a direct bearing on the results of a counterattack

operation. Counterattack targets should be carefully chosen based on several factors: the

high-level intent, our counterattack capabilities, and the disposition of the enemy’s air

raid forces and arms. This means one must focus on sabotaging the enemy’s air raid plan

{jihua} and on weakening the enemy’s air raid capability; at the same time, one must

also consider the losses one’s own side can suffer, and strive to win a great victory in

exchange for a small cost. Under ordinary circumstances, in a counterattack operation

one should mainly select the following targets: the enemy’s C2 systems, takeoff and
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launch platforms such as Air Force bases and aircraft carriers, and the enemy’s logistical

and supply systems.

The campaign commander and command organ when choosing counterattack targets

should lay stress on grasping the following: the first need is to firmly abide by the

requirements of national political and diplomatic struggles, to ensure that the

counterattack operation is on just grounds and with restraint; the second need is to

precisely strike vital areas, and to strike with key points against targets which can

generate intense shock among the enemy and which can effectively weaken the enemy air

raid capability, and on the fact that it is inappropriate to attack too many targets in a

single counterattack; and the third need is to select strike targets which are concentrated,

exposed, easy to detect and destroy, and easy to penetrate.

(3) Simultaneous application of multiple methods, and implement counterattacks

Flexible application of fighting methods is an important way for gaining victory in

counterattack operations. The campaign commander and command organ should

rationally determine the counterattack methods on the basis of the battlefield conditions,

the enemy’s anti-air defensive situation, the situations of the counterattacked targets, and

our counterattack operational capability.

Organizing a missile counterattack. A missile counterattack is primarily executed mainly

by the 2nd Artillery Corps’ conventional missile and cruise missile units, as well as by

the Army’s campaign tactical missile units. Under ordinary circumstances, a missile

counterattack should lay stress on strikes against large, planar, fixed targets such as

enemy airfields and C2 systems. When the missile counterattack is jointly executed with

an air counterattack, the missile counterattack should be executed first, to suppress and

destroy the enemy air defense system, so as to create conditions for the aviation forces’

penetration.

Organizing an air counterattack. An air counterattack is primarily executed mainly by

units of the Air Force and Navy bomber aviation forces, fighter-bomber aviation forces,

and ground-attack aviation forces; it lays stress on striking targets such as the enemy’s C2

systems, Air Force bases, aircraft carriers, and logistical/supply systems. When the air

counterattack is jointly executed with a missile counterattack, one should fully exploit the

results of the missile strike, and organize air strike strengths to execute continued strikes

and supplementary strikes on the predesignated targets, to further exploit the battle gains.

In order to ensure the smooth progress of the air counterattack, one should tightly

organize good air penetration. When executing the first air counterattack or a small-scale

harassing air counterattack, one should take stealthy penetration as primary, and storming

penetration as supplementary. One should adopt methods such as deception, jamming,

exploiting time differences, selection of concealed routes, and low-altitude and ultra-lowaltitude invasion; swiftly penetrate the enemy’s air defense system; and execute the

strikes on targets. When organizing a large-scale counterattack operation, due to the

enemy’s advance preparations, it will be difficult to achieve suddenness (surprise); here,
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one should take storming penetration as primary, and stealthy penetration as

supplementary. To this end, one should scientifically group the counterstrike strengths;

construct an air raid armada comprising multiple functions – jamming, suppression,

cover, and strikes – fused into a whole; and, with the coordination of electronic and

force-unit {budui} feints, force open breaches in the enemy’s air defense system to

ensure that the main strike formation smoothly penetrates into the enemy’s depth and

launches the assault on the predetermined targets.

Organizing a sea counterattack. A sea counterattack is primarily executed mainly by the

Navy’s surface ship units and submarine units. Its strike targets mainly are the enemy’s

aircraft carrier battle groups, cruise missile launch platforms, and transport/supply ships.

A sea counterattack normally is integrated with an air counterattack and missile

counterattack, but if conditions are favorable it can also be executed separately.

Normally, one first conducts the missile and aviation firepower strikes to disorganize the

structure of the enemy formation and then concentrates surface ship and submarine forces

to fully exploit the gains of the missile and aviation firepower strikes by executing a

fierce strike on the predetermined counterattack targets. The submarine forces may also

adopt ambush methods to strike against the predetermined enemy sea targets.

Organizing a special counterattack. A special counterattack mainly employs elite special

operations detachments, employing an airborne (parachute-drop) mode or the mode of

directly slipping in and infiltrating from the sea or land to execute a surprise attack on

and sabotage or harass the enemy. The strike targets mainly are targets such as the

enemy’s C2 centers, radar stations, and fuel and munitions depots.

IV. . Tightly Organize Protection, to Minimize Air Raid Losses...614

Protection operations mean various measures, means, and activities adopted to mitigate

the enemy air raid effects, to minimize casualties and target losses, and to maintain the

stability of the war situation and sustained operational capability. The strengths

participating in protection operations are mainly as follows: military protection strengths,

including the specialized protection strengths within the campaign composition, and the

participating units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps; and regional

protection strengths, including the specialized protection strengths under the regional

governments in the various provinces (municipalities) and autonomous regions within the

theater, and the masses. The key-point protection targets include the following: the

leading offices and strategic command systems of the Party, Government, and PLA; air

defense systems; targets associated with the national economy, people’s livelihood, and

war potential, such as power plants, refineries, military-industrial enterprises, and city

water plants; and targets which can easily undergo secondary nuclear, biological, and/or

chemical (NBC) damage, such as nuclear power stations and chemical plants.
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(1) Enhancing battlefield control, to maintain battlefield order

Enhancement of battlefield control and strict battlefield discipline are very important to

ensuring battlefield order and enhancing the protective effects. In particular, the militarycivilian integrated character and mass character of a protection operation place more

urgent needs on enhancing the capabilities for control over protection operations. To this

end, the first need is to enhance urban and EM-spectrum blackouts and control over

crowd flows to maximally reduce the probability of being detected by the enemy. The

second need is to enhance transportation-route control, maintain good traffic order, and

ensure the transport requirements of the military, industry, and society at large. The third

need is to enhance control over the news and broadcast media, and firmly strike at the

spread of rumors and at those who seduce the people so as to stabilize popular sentiment

and morale. The fourth need is to: enhance control over public security in society; fully

bring into play the effects of the troops, [People’s] Armed Police, public security, the

militia, and regional governments; widely mobilize the masses’ strengths to uphold

public security in society; and maintain good social order.

(2) Focusing on the weak points of the enemy’s high-tech air raid arms, integratively

adopting protection means

In air defense campaigns under high-tech conditions, we are confronted with very severe

airborne threats. Organizing a protection operation requires: fully employing various

modes and methods; mutually integrating static protection and dynamic protection;

mutually integrating protection of defense works with concealment, dispersal, and

camouflage; mutually integrating conventional protection and modern protection;

mutually integrating technical protection and tactical protection; and mutually integrating

specialized protection and mass protection, so as to obtain good protection results. The

main measures are as follows. First, one must rely on defense works, to seek survival by

concealment. One should employ modern protection engineering and ad hoc-constructed

protective fortifications to achieve concealment of personnel, weaponry, and materiel,

and to defend against the enemy’s high-precision, high-intensity strikes. Several critical

arms and facilities should as much as possible be hidden in cave depots or transferred

underground for concealment. The second need is to conceal the true and display the

false, to seek survival by deception. Based on the characteristics of the enemy air raid,

one should adopt methods such as natural camouflage, artificial camouflage, spreading of

false information, and creation of dummy targets, to cause the enemy difficulty in

distinguishing the true from the false, to lure the enemy into attacking the dummies and

bombing the dummies, and to reduce the effects of the enemy air raid. The third need is

to maneuver at the right time to seek survival through movement. This means reducing

the effects of the enemy air raid by conducting wide-ranging maneuvers. It means

organizing force-units and weaponry for rapid maneuvers, and modifying the deployment

locations, to evade the enemy’s air strikes. The fourth need is widespread dispersal to

seek survival by dispersal. This means dispersing the disposition of forces and arms, and

dispersing and concealing personnel and materiel, so as to reduce the effects of the

enemy air raid.
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(3) Integrating the military and civilians to eliminate the consequences of the air raid

Eliminating the air raid consequences is a critical element in organizing a protection

operation. After we encounter an enemy air raid, the campaign commander and command

organ should fully bring into play the synergism among the various specialized units and

the masses, and in intense but ordered fashion organize emergency repairs and the rescue

work. They should: organize strengths to ascertain the battle losses situation; rationally

allocate the missions; and lay stress on the losses to airfields, air defense positions,

weaponry, command and communications facilities, and critical operational materiel, and

on the particulars of casualties. For important targets such as airfields, air defense

positions, and intelligence, communications, and command facilities, they should

organize specialized strengths to make repairs as soon as those targets are bombed, and

promptly restore [their functions]. As for the other targets, they should mobilize the

masses to effect emergency repairs and rescue. Equipment that has suffered severe airraid losses and cannot be repaired should be promptly replaced according to the need.

When the enemy air raid uses NBC weapons, or creates NBC leakage, the campaign

commander and command organ should rapidly organize the chemical defense corps and

specialized technical personnel to conduct decontamination, and take strict precautions

against the spread of NBC hazards over a large range. When the enemy air raid causes

fires, the campaign commander and command organ should rely primarily on specialized

firefighting strengths, but also organize and mobilize supplementary units and the

masses, to rapidly cut off the fire paths, launch fire-quenching efforts to save lives and

property, and prevent the fires from continuing to spread and from causing major losses

to the lives and property of the masses.
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Part VI: Campaigns of the Second Artillery...616

Chapter 31

Overview...616

Second Artillery campaigns are an important component of the PLA campaign system

{tixi}. Studying Second Artillery campaign ideas {gainian}, characteristics, principles,

command coordination, and organizing-implementation is beneficial for mastering the

essence of a Second Artillery campaign and thereby promulgating its intrinsic laws.

Section 1: Second Artillery Campaigns, Defined and Classified...616

Accurately defining and scientifically classifying Second Artillery campaigns consists of

the major premises of the fundamental theoretical research of campaigns; it is the

fundamental theory perfecting the campaign and guidance for campaign practice, having

major theoretical significance.

I. The Definition of a Second Artillery Campaign...616

In adhering to the fundamental tenets of our military’s campaign studies and the overall

analysis of the intrinsic properties of a Second Artillery campaign, a Second Artillery

campaign can be defined as: the execution of a series of nuclear strikes or conventional

missile strikes as well as the actions that are associated [with them], by a Second Artillery

campaign large formation, so as to form operational activities in order to achieve the

goals of the war, either in part or overall, based on the operational intentions of the

higher-level authorities.

This definition indicates the essential elements {要素 yaosu} of the strengths, goals,

command and composition of a Second Artillery campaign. From the standpoint of the

campaign strengths, the campaign participating strengths consist of a Second Artillery

campaign large formation, and only if the force grouping is the scale of a missile base

and above, can it be possible to achieve the campaign operational mission. From the

standpoint of the campaign goals {战役目的 zhanyi mudi}, on account of the Second

Artillery’s use of ground-to-ground missile weaponry, the assaults on strategic campaign

targets within the other side’s depth, and the major effects of the operational activities on

the overall course of the war and on the final result, the campaign normally achieves the

goals of the war either partially or overall. From the standpoint of campaign command,

the Second Artillery is a strategic long-range strike strength that directly receives its

command from the highest command authority {最高统帅部 zuigao tongshuaibu}, and it

executes the orders from the highest command authority by applying them extremely

rigidly and exceedingly accurately. As a consequence, a Second Artillery campaign

stresses unified command {统一指挥 tongyi zhihui} to an even greater degree and all

activities must be carried out according to a unified plan {统一的计划 tongyi de jihua}.

From the standpoint of the composition of a campaign, the weaponry that is used by the
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Second Artillery is medium- and long-range and intercontinental missile weaponry {洲际

导弹武器 zhouji daodan wuqi}, and it is a campaign that is composed of a series of

nuclear strikes {核突击 he tuji} or conventional missile strikes {常规导弹突击

changguan daodan tuji}, as well as their associated actions {相关活动 xiangguan

houdong}.

II. The Classifications of Second Artillery Campaigns...617

A Second Artillery campaigns can be differentiated into a certain number of different

classifications based on the nature of the use of weaponry and the scale of the forces

used.

(1) Based on the nature of the use of weaponry, they can be divided into nuclear strike

campaigns and conventional missile strike campaigns

1. Nuclear strike campaigns {核反击战役 he fanji zhanyi}

Nuclear strike campaigns refer to the sum total of the series of nuclear missile strikes and

the associated operational activities of a Second Artillery nuclear campaign large

formation that are strictly carried out under the direct command and control of the

Supreme Command and are carried out based on the intentions of the Supreme Command

in order to achieve specially designated strategic goals. A nuclear counterstrike campaign

{核反击战役 he fanji zhanyi} is a type of major operation for the Second Artillery; not

only can it be implemented independently, but it can also be a major compositional part {

重要组成部分 zhongyao zucheng bufen} of the joint nuclear counterstrike campaign {联

合核反击战役 lianhe he fanji zhanyi}.

2. Conventional missile strike campaign {常规导弹突击战役 changgui daodan tuji

zhanyi}

The conventional missile strike campaign refers to the sum total of the series of

conventional missile strikes and related operational activities implemented by the Second

Artillery conventional campaign large formation under unified command in order to

achieve the goals of the war either partially or completely. Normally the Second Artillery

conventional missile strike campaign is a major compositional part in a joint campaign,

and under special situations, it can also be independently implemented.

(2) Based on the scale of the use of forces, they can be divided into missile base group

campaigns {导弹基地群战役 daodan jidiqun zhanyi}, conventional missile brigade
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group campaign{常规导弹旅群战役 changgui daodan lüqun zhanyi} and missile base

campaigns {导弹基地战役 changgui jidi zhanyi}.

1. Missile base group campaigns

The missile base group campaign refers to a campaign large formation composed of two

(included) or more missile bases under the operational orders from the Supreme

Command or joint campaign headquarters to achieve a series of missile strike campaign

activities, based on the campaign commander’s unified plan {jihua} and his command

institution and under their organized command. Owing to the relatively large scale of this

kind of campaign, it is generally the commanders and the command organs of the

campaign large formations that structure the Second Artillery who organize the command

activities. This type of campaign large formation is also called a high-level campaign

large formation {高级战役军团 gao-ji zhanyi jituan}.

2. Conventional missile brigade group campaign

The conventional missile brigade group campaign is a campaign large formation that is

composed of a certain number of conventional missile brigades that accomplish a series

of missile strike operational activities. These fall under the unified planning {jihua} and

organized command of a Second Artillery campaign commander and his command

institution and are based on the operational orders of the Supreme Command or the joint

campaign headquarters. By virtue of the fact that there are many different models that

constitute the conventional missile equipment of the Second Artillery, their conventional

missile brigades, respectively, are subordinated as different cells within a hierarchy.

Thus, all of the campaign strengths that are used in conventional missile brigade group

campaigns are commonly unitary cells {部队 budui} that are composed of a certain

number of conventional missile brigades that are subordinated to different hierarchies and

can be unitary cells composed of a certain number of conventional missile brigades in the

same hierarchy.

3. Missile base campaigns

Missile base campaigns consist of campaign large formations that are composed of an

individual missile base and that achieve a series of missile strike operational activities

under the concrete planning and organized command of the missile base campaign

commander and his command organ, and are based on the operational orders of the

higher-level authorities. Owing to the fact that this type of campaign is organized and

implemented by a basic organizational-unit of the Second Artillery {第二炮兵基本战役

单位 di’er paobing jiben zhanyi danwei}, this type of campaign large formation is

referred to as the basic campaign large formation {基本战役军团 jiben zhanyi juntuan}.
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Section 2: Characteristics and Principles of a Second Artillery Campaign...618

The characteristics and principles of a Second Artillery campaign consist of the objective

reflection {客观反映 keguan fanying} of the basic laws {基本规律 jiben guilü} of a

Second Artillery campaign. In carrying out conscientious inquiry and study into [these

characteristics and principles], there is extremely important significance with regard to

profound promulgation of the internal laws of a Second Artillery campaign and to

correctly guiding the Second Artillery operations.

I. Characteristics...618

The characteristics of the campaign consist of all of the characteristics and properties of

the campaign itself, and they are the major basis for formulating the campaign principles.

In addition to the characteristics that the Second Artillery has in common with modern

campaigns, they also have several distinctive characteristics of their own.

(1) There is a great overall effect on operational effectiveness and a strong strategic

nature

A Second Artillery campaign is the application of strategic missile nuclear weapons {战

略导弹核武器 zhanlüe daodan he wuqi} and conventional missile weapons {常规导弹

武器 changgui daodan wuqi} in operational activities that consist of striking important

strategic- or campaign targets such as enemy political, economic and military targets

[located at distances] beyond several hundred-, several thousand- and even beyond

10,000 kilometers. The functioning of missile weaponry not only has the power to cause

great physical destruction {巨大的物理摧毁 juda de wuli cuihui}, but it also can cause

far-reaching psychological deterrence {心理威慑效应 xinli weizhe xiaoying} and

sociological effects {社会效应 shehui xiaoying}, directly affecting national politics and

the overall situation of military and diplomatic struggles, and will affect developing

changes in the international strategic circumstances {国际战略形势 guoji zhanlüe

xingshi}. For this reason, the Second Artillery has a strong strategic quality, and in its

operational application, it is strictly controlled in the strategic overall situation. The

goals, scale and timing for the initiation of a Second Artillery campaign, and the like,

must be subordinate to and serve the strategic overall situation and satisfy the needs of

the overall situation of national political and diplomatic struggles.

(2) Strongly integrated operational system and high requirements for a synthesized selfcontained set

The Second Artillery missile forces: apply strategic and campaign missile weaponry;

collect the various kinds of highly technical weaponry into a single body; have weapons

systems that are complex; and are highly technical and highly integrated. Launching a

missile involves dozens of vehicles and dozens of specialized trades, and only if the

activities are consistently coordinated, can it be possible to form an integrated-whole
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composite strength {zhengti heli} and accomplish the operational mission. Speaking from

a personnel standpoint, it is necessary to merge together the launch forces, technical

support forces and logistics support forces; speaking from an operational capabilities and

key factors standpoint, this includes the synthesis of key factors such as command,

support, rapid response, and defense penetration; while speaking from a contents

standpoint, not only do [the Second Artillery missile forces] have technical synthesis,

they also have tactical synthesis, and not only do they have combat force synthesis, they

also have support force synthesis. Thus, the Second Artillery operational system is

complex, the technical content is high, and there is strong synchronization. This raises a

very high requirement for a synthesized self-contained set for the operational system.

Only if the optimal integration is constituted through essential elements, and a continuous

self-contained set is promoted throughout the overall system, can it be possible to form

an integrated system of strengths.

(3) Operations in nuclear conditions {核条件 he tiaojian} or nuclear deterrence

conditions {核威慑条件 he weizhi tiaojian}

Based on the standpoint of our nation’s principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, only

after the enemy implements a nuclear strike against us first can it be possible for the

Second Artillery strategic nuclear strengths to implement a nuclear counterattack against

the enemy upon the orders from the Supreme Command. For this reason, from the overall

standpoint of the nuclear counterattack campaign, it will be implemented in nuclear

conditions. In the event that the enemy implements a nuclear strike against us, the Second

Artillery operational positions and missile weapons systems will inevitably become their

key point targets {重点目标 zhongdian mubiao}. After the Second Artillery operational

area suffers an attack, the battlefield conditions will be abnormally complex, the

environment will be extremely harsh, and our personnel, weapons and equipment,

position engineering, roads and bridges as well as such things as our reconnaissance-,

communications- and command and control systems will suffer serious destruction and

damage. As a result, the battlefield conditions for the Second Artillery nuclear

counterattack campaign will be abnormally arduous and complex.

With regard to the Second Artillery conventional missile strike campaign, it will be

carried out under nuclear deterrence conditions. Despite the fact that future wars

primarily will be conventional local wars, in the global [community,] those that have

nuclear weapons are primarily nations with strong militaries, and have not promised no

first use of nuclear weapons; moreover local wars that erupt in the near future will

implement nuclear deterrence many times. As a result, under highly technical conditions,

the Second Artillery will inevitably suffer the nuclear deterrence of the militaries of the

nuclear powers in completing the conventional missile strike campaign. Regional

conflicts or local wars that can erupt on our periphery pose even more of an actual

nuclear threat.

Consequently, no matter if it is a nuclear counterattack campaign or whether it is a

conventional missile strike campaign, both are seriously threatened by nuclear weapons.
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The Second Artillery must successfully handle preparations for nuclear strike and nuclear

deterrence, and must be rooted in nuclear conditions or operations under nuclear

deterrence conditions.

(4) The battlefield is broad, bushu disposition is dispersed, command is synchronized and

support is difficult

The operational activities of the Second Artillery missile forces are highly dependent on

the battlefield; and the deployment of their strengths is established during peacetime and

is based on the strategic intentions of the Supreme Command. In order to facilitate

concealment and camouflage for the forces and prevent multiple positions from being

destroyed by the enemy at the same time, the deployment of their operational positions is

generally dispersed throughout a broad area within the strategic depth. Although the

many points and broad area of the operational deployment facilitates the increase of

survivability, it brings about a great deal of difficulty in providing campaign command,

[providing] the various items of support and in synchronizing the campaign. A Second

Artillery campaign is a non-contact operation with vast operational space, particularly

when achieving the missile base group campaigns. There is a very great span of

battlefield area, causing abnormal fluctuations in the coordination for the operational

activities in each operational area; and unusual difficulty in each item of support, added

to wartime enemy electronic jamming and firepower destruction, thus making

communications extremely easy to sever and creating even greater difficulty in survival.

As a consequence, missile forces must: be rooted in the most difficult of situations;

successfully make abundant preparations; formulate advance plans for handling each of

the complex aspects; adopt effective measures; and guarantee the smooth implementation

of the campaign.

(5) Achieving campaign goals through missile firepower strikes, and prioritizing

firepower

Long-rage firepower warfare is the prominent characteristic of the Second Artillery

operation. The Second Artillery is the implementation of firepower strikes of a specified

scale at campaign targets at distances greater than several hundred, several thousand and

even over several tens of thousands of kilometers through the use of strategic and

campaign missile weaponry in order to achieve campaign goals. Whether or not they

create a certain degree of damage or destruction to targets is the only standard to judge

the campaign operational effects; commanders at all levels only have to painstakingly

organize missile firepower strike activities and put their main energies into ensuring

strike effects before they can ultimately achieve the goals of the campaign. When

organizing the implementation of the missile firepower strike, scientific decision-making

should be carried out based on strategic intention. Operational intentions should be

established, strike targets should be designated, strengths should be applied, and the

various support strengths should be allocated during [the] decision-making [process], all

revolving around the nucleus of applying firepower. As a result, the overall planning and
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application of missile firepower is the core content of campaign command and decisionmaking.

(6) The campaign defensive operations and information operations permeate the entire

course of the campaign

The Second Artillery missile forces and operational positions are the key point targets

{重点目标 zhongdian mubiao} for enemy assaults. In peacetime, during the process for

establishing positions, there is a lot of machinery and equipment and a great amount of

excavation in rows for engineering projects, especially as regards the clearly evident

traits of launch silos {发射井 fashe jing} and platforms {场坪 changtai}, which makes it

extremely easy for the enemy to detect them with reconnaissance, whereas it creates a

great degree of difficulty in their [own] attempts at concealment; [while] in wartime,

during the course of achieving the operational mission, there is a lot of equipment that the

unitary cell puts to use, that, coupled with the frequent activity {活动 huodong} in the

operational area, makes it easy for the enemy to detect them. In addition, the self-defense

capabilities {自身防卫能力 zisheng fangwei nengli} of the missile forces are weak, and

there is a great degree of difficulty in defending against enemy surprise raids {敌突然袭

击 di turan xiji}, thus posing a serious threat to their survival. As a result, strengthening

campaign defenses and electronic warfare seems to be of particular importance. On one

hand, the Second Artillery is faced with this kind of situation in organizing campaign

activities and it must tightly weave their protection successfully by: synthesizing the

application of various means, and adopting all effective measures and preventing enemy

satellite or aviation reconnaissance; preventing enemy precision guidance weaponry

strikes {精确制导武器打击 jingque zhidao wuqi daji}; and preventing surprise raids by

enemy aviation weaponry. On the other hand, they must also: prevent harassing attacks

by enemy special forces {特种部队 tezhong budui}, and avoid or decrease, to the

furthest possible extent, losses sustained in enemy surprise attacks; and effectively

preserve nuclear counterattack strengths and conventional missile strike strengths. At the

same time, following along with the wide-spread use of information technology as the

core of new high technology in the military, information warfare {信息战作 xinxi

zuozhan} will emerge on the modern battlefield as a complete and new operational form

{全新的作战形式 quan-xin de zuozhan xingshi}; moreover, intense trials will be carried

out in realms such as intelligence reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communications

warfare, photoelectric warfare, computer network warfare, and the like. As a result, the

defensive operations and information operations of the Second Artillery must permeate

through the entire course of a Second Artillery campaign.

II. Basic Principles...621

The basic principles of a Second Artillery campaign consist of the fundamental activity

standards {基本行动准则 jiben xingdong zhunze} for guiding a Second Artillery

campaign activity {第二炮兵战役活动 di’er paobing zhanyi huodong} and are the

concrete incarnation of the guiding thought {指导思想 zhidao sixiang} behind a Second
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Artillery campaign. Based on the guiding thought behind a Second Artillery campaign,

the characteristics of a Second Artillery campaign are integrated, giving rise to the

following campaign basic principles.

(1) Unified command and centralized use

The Second Artillery is a branch of our military’s strategic strike strengths. As such, a

relatively centralized unification must be achieved for the right to use them, for their

policy-making power, and for command authority [over them]. This is the crux of the

strategic goal that must be achieved by the Second Artillery. Regardless of whether it is a

nuclear counterstrike campaign or a conventional missile strike campaign, it typically

falls under the command of the higher-level authorities, and is organized by a Second

Artillery campaign command institution. For a nuclear counterstrike campaign, the

campaign activities must be strictly organized in accordance with the orders from the

Central Military Commission {中央军委 zhongyangjunwei}; [whereas the activities] in a

conventional missile strike campaign must be in accordance with the orders from the

higher-level authorities, through the unified command of the Second Artillery

conventional campaign large formation commander {第二炮兵常规战役军团指挥员

di’er paobing changgui zhanyi juntuan zhihuiyuan}. Commanders at each level must

conduct operational activities such as campaign bushu dispositions, campaign

camouflage, campaign support, campaign coordination and campaign assaults and ensure

that missile force-units and other campaign strengths join together to form an integratedwhole superiority under the unified plans of the General Headquarters or the joint

campaign command institution. In order to guarantee unified command, a perfected

campaign command system {完善的战役指挥体系 wanshan de zhanyi zhihui tixi} must

be established; command relationships and responsibilities must be clarified; unified

campaign plans {jihua} must be formulated; and advanced command measures must be

adopted, all for operation under unified orders and strict controls.

In order to fully exploit the operational effectiveness of missile weaponry, the use of

campaign strengths must be centralized, and for this reason, the marshalling of campaign

strengths must be scientifically combined in accordance with the operational needs and

with the types of missile weaponry. On the basis of the use of strengths, superior

strengths must be centralized for the main direction and for crucial timing opportunities,

and key point strikes against vital enemy strategic or campaign targets {敌战略或战役要

害目标 di zhanlue huo zhnayi yaohai mubiao}. Furthermore, on the basis of firepower, it

is essential to: meticulously plan and prepare; carefully select strike targets; optimize the

course of action for firepower; organize firepower maneuver at the right time; ensure the

coordination of unanimity in strike targets and times; and increase the integrated

operational effectiveness.

(2) Tightly-woven protection and rapid reaction

Tightly-woven protection and safeguarded existence is the prerequisite for the smooth

implementation of missile strikes; without tightly-woven protection, effective
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preservation of strengths cannot be possible, and furthermore, implementation of

effective strikes cannot be possible. Thus, it is essential to allow campaign protective

activities to permeate through the entire Second Artillery campaign from initiation to

completion. In order to increase battlefield survivability, the plan {jihua} (or course of

action {方案 fang’an}) to resist enemy surprise attacks must be perfected, establishing a

tightly-woven protective architecture {防护体系 fanghu tixi}, relying on pre-established

protective infrastructure {既设的防护设施 jishe de fanghu sheshi}, adopting effective

measures for concealment and camouflage, organizing active defense operational

activities {积极的防卫作战行动 jiji de fangwei zuozhan xingdong}, handling the

aftermath of an attack in a timely manner, and preserving and restoring operational

capabilities to the maximum possible extent.

Rapid reaction is a major factor in striving to gain the campaign initiative. Based on the

operational intentions of the higher-level authorities as well as on the state of battlefield

conditions, Second Artillery campaign commander and his command organ must: judge

the hour and size up the situation; fully exploit the subjective dynamic role; be adept at

seizing opportunities; and rapidly determine the campaign resolution. Furthermore, [they

must] rapidly organize the campaign unfolding and complete missile strikes on schedule.

When unforeseen conditions emerge during the course of carrying out the campaign, the

campaign commander should rapidly and decisively handle [the situation] with an

accurate comprehension of the intentions of the higher-level authorities. When

indications of an enemy attack emerge, [commanders] can rapidly organize unit

concealment to effectively protect themselves; and after suffering an enemy surprise

attack, they can rapidly handle the aftermath of the attack and can rapidly restore their

operational capabilities.

(3) Integrated operations and close coordination

Integrated operations {整体作战 zhengti zuozhan} refer to the necessity of standing at

the height of the strategic overall situation and have unified overall-planning and

organizing of the campaign. Close coordination refers to the necessity for successful

internal coordination {内部协同 neibu xietong} and external coordination {外部协同

waibu xietong} for the operational activities of the missile force-units.

Integrated operations and close coordination is a main principle for the independent

operations of the Second Artillery or for joint campaign operations in which they

participate. Coordination for a Second Artillery campaign should adhere to the campaign

resolution and the campaign plan {jihua} and on the basis of the campaign patterns and

phases, it should be organized and implemented by centering on the main campaign

activities and the campaign strengths executing the main missions. When the Second

Artillery participates in a joint campaign, it must successfully achieve coordination

within the other branches of the services and service arms. In the sequence of a firepower

strike, they are closely ranked together with the Army, Navy and Air Force; when

implementing campaign maneuver, it is necessary to coordinate with other maneuvering

forces; and during the entire process of the campaign, not only must they coordinate with
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the air defense strengths {防空力量 fankong liliang}, they must also coordinate with the

electronic warfare forces, communications forces, engineering forces, chemical

protection forces as well as with the local armed police. When the Second Artillery

independently implements a campaign, coordination between each of the various missile

bases must be led by the missile bases that implements the main operational mission;

when coordinating between missile bases {导弹基地 daodan jidi} and warhead bases {弹

头基地 dantou jidi}, coordination must be led by the missile bases; when coordinating

between launch forces {发射部队 fashe budui} and support forces, coordination must be

led by the launch forces; and when coordinating the operations of the other branches of

the service and service arms, it is necessary to successfully coordinate the forces that

drive and execute the main mission.

(4) Having advanced preparations and comprehensive support

Having advance preparations is the basis for organizing the implementation of a Second

Artillery campaign. Owing to the fact that a Second Artillery campaign is technical, is

strongly integrated, has multiple components to the preparations work for operations, and

has a long cycle, it is necessary for the Second Artillery to start out during peacetime

with the most complex and most difficult of situations and to fully make target data

preparations, operational position preparations, weapons and equipment preparations,

operational material storage, combat readiness training and operational course of action

preparations {作战方案的准备 zuozhan fang’an de zhunbei}, while at the same time

accomplishing the corresponding combat readiness requirements. Moreover, once orders

are issued, only with this form can it be possible to give power to-, join-, unite- and

synthesize [everything] together, and strike the targets.

Comprehensive support is an important condition for the smooth implementation for a

Second Artillery campaign. Hence, a Second Artillery campaign must establish and

perfect a comprehensive support system {综合保障体系 zonghe baozhang tixi} and form

an integrated support capability {整体保障能力 zhengti baozhang nengli}. On the basis

of the overall planning and arrangement of the operational mission, it must thoroughly

plan, underscore the key points, and painstakingly organize support at each level. Further,

it must adopt flexible and effective support modes {保障方式 baozhang fangshi}, and

effectively implement support at the right time. And finally, it must: rely on theater joint

logistics support {战区联勤保障 zhanqu lian qin baozhang}; rationally make use of

support strengths; fully exploit its own system for self-support {自身保障体系 zisheng

baozhang tixi}; make use of local support-the-front strengths {支前力量 zhi-qian

liliang}; and increase synthesized support effectiveness.

Section 3: The Preparation for and Implementation of a Second Artillery

Campaign...624

For the operations of the Second Artillery under future high-tech conditions, the

operational missions will be of an arduous nature, with battlefield environments of a
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complex nature, raising the requirements for campaign preparation and implementation

even higher. The campaign commander and his command organ must be rooted in the

most difficult and complex situations, painstaking preparations, and the implementation

of thorough organization.

I. Campaign Preparations...624

With regard to a Second Artillery campaign preparations, they typically start from when

the campaign commander receives the warning order for the operation {作战预先号令

zuozhan yuxian haoling}, and extends through the conclusion of the order to launch the

first batch of missiles. There are many projects for campaign preparations work, a long

period of sustainment, and a great possibility that they [each] may encounter raids by the

enemy; thus the campaign commander and his command organ must attach a high degree

of importance to them, and at the same time thoroughly plan and tightly organize to

achieve safety and reliability with no danger of having anything go wrong.

(1) Receiving and issuing warning orders {预先号令 yuxian haoling}

With regard to the operational warning orders from the Supreme Command or joint

operations headquarters, they are the fundamental basis for the launch of the campaign as

organized by the campaign commander and command organ. Once the campaign

commander receives the warning order, he must correctly understand the operational

intentions of the higher-level authorities. [He must further] comprehend: the mission he is

about to fulfill; the limits and requirements of the operational preparations; the position of

the campaign activities within the overall strategic situation; and the function of the

various items of coordination with other branches of the service and service arms. [He

must also] analyze and judge enemy operational intentions and what activities [the

enemy] can adopt, as well as their influence on Second Artillery operations. [And finally,

he must] analyze the situation of enemy targets and the weapons and [analyze] the

situation that is specific to the equipment, the operational positions, the command

facilities, the various kinds of support, and the various personnel in our own missile

forces. [In this way] he realizes the clarification of intentions, the comprehension of the

mission, knowing the enemy and knowing thyself, and making advance preparations.

In order to launch campaign preparations as early as possible and based on the warning

orders from the higher-level authorities, the campaign commander must issue the warning

order (or operational preparation-grade orders {作战准备等级命令 zuozhan zhunbei

dengji mingling}) to the immediate level, specifically clarifying the mission they are

about to fulfill, and such components as the grade, time limits and requirements for

accomplishing operational preparations.
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(2) Determining the campaign concept {战役方针 zhanyi fangzhen} and defining the

campaign resolution {战役决心 zhanyi juexin}

As a basis for the campaign commander to understand the operational intention and

clarify the operational missions, [the commander] must promptly organize the analysis

and judgment of the situation, formulate the campaign concept, and define the campaign

resolution so as to establish the correct principles for campaign guidance in order to

provide the fundamental basis for organizing campaign activities.

The campaign concept is the creed {纲领 gangling} for guiding {指导 zhidao} the

campaign activities. There are three situations in which a Second Artillery campaign

concept is generally determined: one is that it is determined by the higher-level authority;

the second is that it is jointly determined by the higher-level authority and the Second

Artillery; and the third is that it is determined by a Second Artillery campaign

commander based on the strategic intentions of the higher-level authority and based on

the mission with which [the commander] has been granted. When [the campaign concept]

is determined by a Second Artillery campaign commander, he should: have a profound

understanding of the intentions of the higher-level authority; perform comprehensive

analyses of the enemy situation, our own situation and the battlefield environment as well

as political and diplomatic factors that can produce an effect on the campaign; have a grip

on key problems {关键问题 guanjian wenti} with the campaign; proffer the basic

method for the campaign; and clarify effective ways of achieving campaign goals, among

other things.

The campaign resolution is the basis for implementing the campaign; and it is the

foundation for formulating the campaign plan {jihua}, issuing campaign orders, and

organizing campaign coordination. The campaign resolution must comply with the intent

of the higher-level authority, rendering the campaign activities and political and

diplomatic struggles an inseparable, concerted effort {紧密配合 jinmi peihe}. Fixing the

campaign resolution necessitates a foundation of conscientiously analyzing the enemy

situation vis a vis ourselves as well as vis a vis the battlefield and must be, above all,

based on the strategic intent and proffering multiple courses of action for the campaign

mission and the like. Subsequently [it necessitates] the selection of the optimal course of

action from among those that have undergone full evaluation and verification {评估论证

pinggu lunzheng}. The campaign resolution commonly includes: the campaign intention

{战役企图 zhanyi qitu}, the strike targets {打击目标 daji mubiao}, the campaign

deployment {战役部署 zhanyi bushu}, major fighting methods {主要战法 zhuyao

fangfa}, and the time limits for completing campaign preparations; standing up the

campaign command institution {战役指挥机构 zhanyi zhihui jigou}; and organizing

every kind of support.
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(3) Formulating the campaign plan

Once the campaign resolution has been fixed, the campaign commander should promptly

organize the command organ in formulating the campaign plan {jihua}, with the key

point being the carrying out of clarification for such weighty problems as situational

judgment and conclusion {情况判断结论 qingkuang panduan jielun}, the campaign

concept, and basic fighting methods. A Second Artillery campaign headquarters organ {

战役司令部机关 zhanyi silingbu jiguan} should earnestly grasp the campaign resolution,

and, on the basis of making advance preparations, should: fully consider difficult and

complex situations; scientifically forecast the course of the campaign; appropriately

arrange the activities of each of the phases of the campaign by centering on the campaign

resolution; and carefully draft their plans {jihua}. The campaign plan {jihua} should

include the campaign activity plan {战役行动计划 zhanyi xingdong jihua} and the

campaign support plan {战役保障计划 zhanyi baozhang jihua}. The campaign activity

plan {jihua} serves as the overall plan {总体计划 zongti jihua} and individual event (or

branch) plans {单项(分支)计划 danxiang (fenzhi) jihua}. The primary components of

the overall plan {jihua} include such things as: enemy situation judgment and

conclusions, campaign intentions, campaign missions, campaign arrangement and

deployment {战役编成及部署 zhanyi biancheng ji bushu}, campaign phase

differentiation and main activities {战役阶段划分及主要行动 zhanyi jieduan huafen ji

zhuyao xingdong}, command organization and coordination, and time limits for

accomplishing campaign preparations. Individual event (or branch) plans {jihua} are

divided into firepower plans {jihua}, campaign defense plans {jihua}, electronic warfare

plans {jihua}, and the like. Campaign support plans {jihua} typically include operational

support plans {jihua}, logistics support plans {jihua}, equipment technical support- and

political work plans {jihua} and the like.

(4) Organizing campaign coordination

Once the campaign plan {jihua} has been set, the campaign commander should promptly

instruct the command organ to formulate campaign coordination plans based on the

campaign resolution and the campaign plan {jihua}, carefully organizing campaign

coordination. The campaign coordination plan {战役协同计划 zhanyi xietong jihua} not

only can be formulated independently, but it can also be formulated concurrently with the

campaign plan {jihua}. Its components should primarily clarify: the differentiation

between operational missions, the delineations between operational phases, the

connections in command coordination, the principles of coordination, the substance of

coordination, the timing of coordination, coordination methods, coordination

requirements, and the measures used to reestablish coordination that has been put out of

balance. The key points in organizing campaign coordination are: firepower coordination

between the various assault groupings {突击集团 tuji jituan} and between each of the

assault waves {突击波次 tuji boci}; coordination between [the Second Artillery] and the

other branches of the service and service arms; coordination between the missile bases,

warhead bases and support forces; coordination for the air defensive; coordinating ground
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defense; and reconnaissance coordination between strategic early warning and battlefield

intelligence targets. Organizing campaign coordination requires an overall view, and

emphasis on [the following] points: anticipation of all complex situations and formulating

various courses of action for them; clarification of coordination relationships and

stipulation of the coordination discipline; the careful planning and organization of

coordination support; adoption of various methods for coordination; and the maintenance

of stability in coordination.

(5) Organizing campaign support

There are many items and high requirements in supporting a Second Artillery campaign.

Thus campaign commander should: instruct their command organ at the right time to

promptly organize operational support such as intelligence reconnaissance, targeting, all

the primary calculations, correspondence, engineering, campaign camouflage,

meteorology, logistics support and equipment support; and clarify the support mission,

key points and requirements. In organizing campaign support, from a basis of advance

preparations, it is essential to: fully make use of every beneficial factor; scientifically

marshal support strengths; synthesize the use of the various support modes; under the

assistance of theater joint logistics support and local support strengths, conduct unified

planning with consideration for all concerned; and emphasize the key points.

II. Campaign Implementation...626

The implementation of the Second Artillery campaign begins when the campaign

commander issues the launch order {发射命令 fashe mingling} and concludes when the

campaign missions are completed. The time for the campaign implementation phase {战

役实施阶段 zhanyi shishi jieduan} is tight; the mission is important; there are many

elements that are exposed; and there is a great threat posed by the enemy. Hence, the

campaign commander must grasp the key links {关节 guanjie} and master the centers of

gravity {重心 zhongxin} to guarantee that the campaign develops in the predetermined

direction.

(1) Organizing the implementation of missile strikes

1. Issuing the launch order {发射命令 fashe mingling}

Issuing the launch order is the major indication for initiating the implementation of the

campaign; thus the campaign commander should issue their launch orders at the right

time, based on the operational time limits stipulated in the operational orders from the

higher-level authority. This is to specifically clarify such things as: the times that

operational units occupy launch positions {占领发射阵地 zhanling fashe zhendi}; the

time limit for each unit to launch missiles; and the post-launch activities and

announcements for the units. The campaign headquarters typically formulates the launch

order and it is endorsed and issued by the campaign commander; when necessary, it may
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bypass the immediate leadership to be issued further, while at the same time notice is

given to the command organ of the immediate level that is being bypassed. Transmitting

the launch order requires speed, accuracy, secrecy and timeliness, otherwise the

operational intention could be easily discovered or it could influence the operational

mission being accomplished on schedule by the forces.

2. Organizing missile strike activities {导弹突击行动 daodan tuji xingdong}

Missile strikes are a central link {中心环节 zhongxin huanjie} in campaign activities; the

campaign commander and his command organ must promptly grasp the launch

preparations and implementation situation of the forces. In order to increase the reaction

speed of the forces and the continuous properties of support for missile strikes, at the

same time that the strengths are concentrated to organize first time strikes {首次突击

shouci tuji}, it is essential to make a link between making preparations for continuous

follow-on strikes and successfully organizing each of the strikes. [It is essential] to:

organize the entry of forces into new operational positions following the accomplishment

of the strike mission, while promptly revising force-unit {budui} and material

replenishment; restore operational capabilities; and successfully implement preparations

for follow on strike missions.

When organizing the implementation of missile strikes, it is essential to: pay close

attention to the enemy situation; promptly issue bulletins to the forces; circulate missile

forces conditions to the forces participating in coordination and [circulate notices] of the

enemy situation to operational forces under the greatest threat from the enemy; and

organize security support {安全保障 anquan baozhang} for the air and ground to

guarantee the smooth implementation of the missile strikes.

(2) Organizing strike effect reconnaissance and assessment {打击效果侦察与判定 daji

xiaoguo zhencha yu panding}

The extent of the airspace in which a Second Artillery campaign is carried out consists of

distances from the enemy [that range] from several hundred to over a thousand and even

over ten thousand kilometers. Strike effect reconnaissance and assessment is organized in

order to comprehend and ascertain: whether or not missiles that are fired will be

intercepted by enemy anti-missile defensive systems {反导防御系统 fan-dao fangyu

xitong}; whether or not the missiles will hit the target; as well as whether or not the

degree of damage to targets reaches anticipated requirements. As a consequence, strike

effect reconnaissance and assessment is an important foundation for the campaign

commander and command organ to implement effective command. At the same time that

the campaign commander and his command organ issue missile launch orders, they

should issue instructions for intelligence reconnaissance forces (or elements) to organize

the implementation of missile strike effect reconnaissance and assessment. At the same

time, they should promptly organize the processing, verification, analysis, and assessment

by the intelligence reconnaissance forces (or elements) and furnish strike effect reports of
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missiles to targets based on the survey data {探测数据 tance shuju} provided by the

intelligence reconnaissance department at the higher level and the survey data reported to

the higher levels by subordinate monitoring units (or elements). The main contents [of the

reports] include such things as: actual survey outcomes; analysis, judgment and

assessment; and recommendations for supplementary strikes. The forces (or elements)

that are charged with the strike effect survey mission {打击效果探测任务 daji xiaoguo

tance renwu} should coordinate the unanimous implementation of reconnaissance and

assessment of missile strike effects under the unified organization of the campaign

command organ.

(3) Managing special situations

During a Second Artillery campaign, there is a rapid campaign tempo {战役节奏 zhanyi

jiezou}, a grim battlefield environment, and a great threat of being subject to

reconnaissance and air raids; and during the course of campaign maneuver and firepower

strikes, it is possible to be encounter the threat of such situations as electronic jamming,

precision strikes and special harassing attacks. Furthermore, such special situations as

communication breakdowns and strikes on major targets can occur. In handling special

situations, special situations such as weapon systems failures can occur, missile strikes

can be unsuccessful, and strike targets can change. Thus the campaign commander and

his command organ should: be quick-witted and resolute and organize force activities in

accordance with the regulations and requirements for managing special situations; rapidly

restore operational capabilities; and smoothly complete the campaign mission. Their main

methods consist of the following. One [method] is that they should adopt positive 

and effective methods to implement protection when sustaining enemy sudden surprise

raids {突然袭击 turan xiji} based on advanced plans that have been predetermined. The

second [method] is that they should adopt circuitous correspondence or bypass command

methods {越级指挥的方法 yueji zhihui de fangfa} when communication connection

breakdowns occur, so that they can maintain continuous command over the forces. The

third [method] is that they should adopt the firepower maneuver method {火力机动的方

法 huoli jidong de fangfa} and promptly carry out adjustments to firepower {火力调整

huoli tiaozheng} when there are temporary alterations in the strike direction or temporary

changes in strike targets. The fourth [method] is that they should promptly adjust the

deployment, revise the firepower plan, and issue new launch orders at the right time when

there are temporary changes in operational positions, revisions to the strike time, or adhoc changes to the strike sequence. The fifth [method] is that they should rapidly

organize force evacuation to a concealed area in the event that there is no way to carry

out the launch within the stipulated time limits, meanwhile resolutely applying the

campaign reserve strengths to replace the original operational forces to complete the

missile strikes.
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(4) Concluding the campaign

Once the predetermined campaign goals have been achieved to the satisfaction of the

higher-level authorities, [the higher-level authorities] should issue the order to conclude

the campaign. During the process of concluding the campaign, the campaign commander

and his command organ should: promptly organize the forces in rapidly and covertly

shifting toward predetermined areas; strictly monitor the air; and prevent enemy precision

strikes. At the same time, they must promptly: understand the situation of losses sustained

by the forces; organize the personnel, adjust the replenishment of weapons and

equipment and resources; successfully do rush repairs to launch positions, roads and

bridges; organize the campaign summarization {战役总结 zhanyi zongjie} carried out by

the forces; and draft and submit the report of campaign essentials and the detailed report

to the higher levels.
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Chapter 32

The Second Artillery Conventional Missile Assault Campaign...629

The Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign is a campaign implemented

with the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign large formation in the

lead. Normally a conventional missile strike campaign composes part of a joint

campaign, but it can also be independently implemented by the Second Artillery. This

chapter primarily introduces the missions, characteristics and main operational activities

of the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign.

Section 1: Characteristics and Requirements...629

The basic mission of the Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign consists

of such things as: to independently implement firepower strikes against important enemy

strategic targets within the campaign depth; to coordinate with Air Force operations and

capture campaign air dominance; to coordinate with Navy operations to capture

campaign sea dominance; to coordinate with Army operations and capture dominance in

ground operations; to resist the military intervention of a powerful enemy; and to deter

conventional enemy implemented threats.

The basic mission in a Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign consists

of: jointly implementing a land campaign with the Army- and Air Force campaign large

formations, and strike the vital area targets {要害目标 yaohai mubiao} within the enemy

campaign depth; coordinating with the Navy- and Air Force large formations to

implement sea blockades and island blockades, striking such important targets as enemy

naval bases, ports, air bases, and the like, and capturing localized campaign sea

dominance; implementing amphibious landing and counter amphibious landing

campaigns with Navy-, Air Force- and Army campaign large formations; and jointly

implementing air offensive campaigns with air Force campaign large formations, striking

enemy air fields, ground-to-ground missile forces, air defense systems and other

important targets, and capturing localized campaign air dominance. In addition, based on

need, it can also be to satisfy other special operational missions {特殊的作战任务 teshu

de zuozhan renwu}.

I. Characteristics...629

Owing to the strong points such as long range of fire, flexibility in use, the wellconcealed nature, mobile nature and strong defense penetration capabilities of

conventional missiles, consequently the Second Artillery conventional missile assault

campaign, in addition to having the same general characteristics as a high-tech local war

campaign, also possesses the following main characteristics:
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(1) Strong in-depth strike capabilities and operational capabilities that greatly effect the

overall war situation

All the ground-to-ground campaign tactical missiles used by the Second Artillery

conventional missile forces have such characteristics as long firing range, high degree of

precision, a great threat, rapid reaction speed, strong penetration capabilities, and the like,

and they are an important remote warfare strength {远战力量 yuan-zhan liliang} with

which our military implements modern campaigns. During modern campaigns they are

conventionally used to strike the enemy campaign and even important targets within the

strategic depth. These targets function as an important prop to the enemy operational set

up; implementing strikes against these targets, from a military viewpoint, can not only

directly annihilate or weaken enemy military actual strength, thereby seizing the

campaign initiative and creating the conditions for wining a campaign victory, but they

can also shock the enemy psyche and their will to wage war, in order to speed the course

of the campaign. From a standpoint of making use of timing opportunities, commonly

when Second Artillery conventional missile forces are used first, they act as the

trailblazer and bear the responsibility for the important strike missions, and as a result,

have an important influence on the course and final outcome of the campaign.

(2) There are multiple restricting factors on campaign activities and they are strongly

cohesive

There are multiple aspects of the factors that restrict the operational activities of the

Second Artillery conventional campaign large formations. Firstly, missile weapons

systems are technical in nature and strongly cohesive. The measuring and testing of a

missile launch necessitates different specialized divisions making use of specialized

equipment and materials and strict implementation based on stipulated processes and

regulations. Each of the operations and the parameters for measurement and testing must

conform to tactical and technical requirements {战术技术要求 zhanshu jishu yaoqiu}; a

discrepancy of even the smallest iota can directly effect operational activities and strike

effectiveness. In addition to this, there are high battlefield condition requirements such as

the stockpiling of missile weapons as well as the maneuvering of missile forces to

positions and roads, the timing for operational activities is strongly sequence-oriented,

and there is heavy dependence on such things as operational support, equipment

technology support and logistics support. Only if such operational factors as personnel,

equipment, position, operational command, the various items of support, and the like, are

organically united into a single body, can it be possible to form integrated operational

capability {整体作战能力 zhengti zuozhan nengli}. Moreover, the conventional missile

forces from the Second Artillery commonly participate in joint campaigns, and during

joint campaigns, in addition to each of the items of coordination and support internally,

they also have extremely close coordination and support relationships with the campaign

strengths from the other branches of the service. Therefore, it is essential for the Second

Artillery campaign commander to cultivate an intense “integrated operations”

consciousness, and while organizing command for the campaign, not only must he give
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prominence to the key points, but he must also take note of keeping an eye on the overall

campaign situation.

(3) The battlespace is vast and the environment is abysmal

The campaign battlefield for a Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large

formation is constituted of operational positions of missile units, the trajectory zone {弹

道区域 dandao quyu} of the missiles, and the zone for striking the target. The operational

position for a missile unit is dependent on the range of fire for the weapon {武器的射程

wuqi de shecheng} and the operational direction, and assumes an echelon dispersed

position {梯次疏散配置 tici shusan peizhi} in the campaign depth. The scope of control

for missile firepower extends from several hundred to more than a thousand kilometers.

Normally the flight trajectory of the missile cuts across outer space. As a result, the

battlespace for a Second Artillery conventional missile assault campaign is abnormally

wide, bringing many new characteristics and difficulties for providing operational

command and the various kinds of support.

Owing to the important position and function of the Second Artillery conventional

missile units in modern campaigns, it has thereby been decided that they will be targets

for enemy key point strikes {敌重点打击 di zhongdian daji}; added to the fact that

powerful enemies have advanced highly technical reconnaissance early warning systems

{侦察预警系统 zhencha yujing xitong} and long-range precision guidance weaponry {

远程精确制导武器 yuancheng jingque zhidao wuqi}, these [two factors] will result in an

extremely harsh battlefield environment for the Second Artillery conventional missile

campaign large formations. As a result, it is essential that the campaign commander

attach a high degree of importance to the self-protection of the missile forces.

(4) The complexity of organizing command and the various items of support

Owing to the technical complexity of the weapons systems of the Second Artillery

conventional missile forces, the breadth of the battlespace, and the sequence-oriented

timing of the operational activities, it is necessary to tightly coordinate the operations

between them and other services during the joint campaign, thereby making it

extraordinarily complex to organize command as well as the various items of support

during the campaign. As an example, whether or not targeting data is comprehensively

and precisely captured in its entirety, whether or not the strike effects are reconnoitered

and judged promptly during the operation, how the missile forces implement reliable and

highly effective command and control while maneuvering during the operation, how the

missile units obtain air-to-ground security support from related units from the various

branches of the service and service arms, how the missile forces implement close

coordination and the like with related units from the branches of the service while

implementing the joint operation: all of these questions directly effect the exploitation of

the operational effectiveness of the missile units and the process of the joint campaign.
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As a consequence, it is essential to attach a high degree of importance to the command

of-, coordination of- and support for the conventional missile forces.

II. Requirements...631

(1) Unified command and closely-knit coordination

Unified command in modern campaigns consists of implementing centralized command

and control for major operational issues for Second Artillery conventional missile forces.

On one hand, conventional missile forces are a major remote firepower strike strength {

深远火力突击力量 shenyuan huoli tuji liliang}, the course of their participation greatly

influences the campaign and even in the overall war situation, and only by standing at an

altitude to view the overall campaign situation, and only if the application of the missile

campaign large formation is integrated into the overall planning, can it then be possible to

fully exploit its greatest operational effectiveness. Thus, as an objective requirement, it is

essential to implement centralized unified command over the missile forces. As for

closely-knit coordination, it consists of the necessity to successfully coordinate between

each of the essential elements of the operation for the conventional missile forces and the

other branches of the service. During the joint campaign, there are wide-ranging

coordination relationships that exist between the Second Artillery conventional missile

campaign large formation and the other campaign strengths from the various branches of

the service; only if there is successful campaign coordination between [the missile forces]

and the other branches of the service can it be possible to form comprehensive

operational power {整体作战威力 zhengti zuozhan weili}.

(2) Concentrated employment, and strike the enemy’s vital areas

Concentrated employment [use] {jizhong shiyong} consists of taking the main strength of

the conventional missile campaign large formation and concentrating its employment

[use] in critical time occasions and on critical targets in the campaign. The Second

Artillery conventional missile forces are a high tech arm; owing to the limits on their

quantity and scale {数量规模 shuliang guimo}, it is only if one persists in concentrating

their application can it then be possible to exploit their operational effectiveness to the

maximum extent. Striking the enemy vital areas {打敌要害 da di yaohai} consists of

selecting the most critical, most threatening, most easily effective vital area targets to

implement missile firepower assault in accordance with the needs-requirements of the

joint campaign’s overall situation, the weapon tactical technical characteristics of the

missile and the bushu disposition situation of the missile force-units and on the basis of a

full-scale analysis of the situations such as the enemy’s campaign bushi disposition and

important targets, so as to paralyze the enemy’s operational system {tixi} and create

conditions for seizing a campaign victory.
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(3) The integration of attack and defense and rapid reaction

The integration of offensive and defensive consists of the need to establish and use an

operational mechanism {作战机制 zuozhan jizhi}, with both attack and defense, to

achieve attack within defense-, resistance within defense- and attack-defense integration.

During joint campaigns in the future, attack and defense will alternately predominate and

blend together during different phases and in different directions. As a consequence, it is

essential that missile forces successfully organically integrate attack with defense. Rapid

reaction consists of promptly making the corresponding countermeasures and activities

based on the situation of battlefield changes. Modern campaign battlefield situations are

even more complex and ever-changing, presenting an even greater need for missile forces

to rapidly react. It is essential that the missile forces, from having a basis of having full

preparations in advance, augment their continuous reconnaissance and judgment of the

battlefield situation, resolutely make decisions, and rapidly react and make changes to

match enemy changes.

Section 2: Main Operational Activities...632

In accordance with the mission and characteristics of the Second Artillery conventional

missile assault campaign, its main operational activities include: implementing missile

deterrence operations; implementing missile firepower sabotage raids {导弹火力破袭

daodan huoli poxi}; implementing missile firepower blockades {导弹火力封锁 daodan

huoli fengsuo}; implementing missile firepower harassing attacks {导弹火力袭扰

daodan huoli xirao}; implementing missile forces and firepower maneuver operations,

and the like.

I. Implementing Missile Deterrence Operations...633

Missile deterrence operations are the operational activities to contain enemy strategic

intentions or major military risky operations through the specific use of forces and

firepower from the Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation in

order to demonstrate firm will and formidable actual strength against the enemy side’s

implementation of containment. All the ground-to-ground missile weapons used by the

Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation: present characteristics

of having a long range of fire, being highly accurate, being high-speed, and posing a great

threat; are highly technical strengths that have exceedingly rich deterrent qualities;

implement missile threat operations that are a kind of significant operational form for the

Second Artillery conventional missile campaign large formation; and have a significant

positing and use in future high-tech local wars. In implementing missile deterrence

operations, it is essential to grasp the following several points.

The first necessity is to implement concentrated command. Commonly missile deterrence

operations serve to achieve strategic goals; they are a kind of military operation with

strategic properties; they are closely connected with politics and diplomatic struggles;
724

and at the same time they have a profound influence on politics, diplomacy and military

struggles. As a consequence, with implementing missile deterrence operations, it is

necessary to stick to centralized command. It is essential that the commander, and even

the supreme command, directly implement command and control for such major

questions as the operational methods they adopt, the intensity of the strengths they use,

and the timing for implementation.

The second necessity is coordinating consistency between politics and diplomatic

struggles. Missile deterrence is a kind of significant military means. One should integrate

it with the use of such means as politics and diplomacy; it is essential to submit one’s self

to and give service to the needs of politics and diplomatic struggles, in order to achieve

strict enforcement of orders and prohibitions.

The third necessity is to flexibly apply operational methods. Missile deterrent operations

are permeated with stratagem qualities and artistry. Their essence lies in the ingenious

selection of targets, ingenious choice of timing opportunities, ingenious use of forces and

firepower, and the ingenious application of operational methods. The campaign

commander and the command organ must fully anticipate all the situations that might

emerge during the campaign, while formulating multiple deterrence operational methods

and advance plans. When implementing the missile deterrence operation, one should

flexibly employ deterrence operational methods based on the strategic intentions of the

higher-level authorities and the dynamic state of the enemy side and make every effort to

achieve the goals of deterrence.

II. Implementing Missile Firepower Destruction Raids...633

Missile firepower destruction raids {导弹火力破袭 daodan huoli poxi} consist of using

concentrated and powerful missile firepower to carry out raids of a destructive nature that

occur within a relatively short period of time against enemy vital area targets. The main

characteristics of this kind of operational activity are the concentrated use of missile

forces and firepower and resolute goals, and they are a main operational mode of the

conventional missile forces. This kind of operational activity commonly achieves

important campaign goals, and they are used in crucial phases of the campaign. When

implementing missile firepower destruction raid operations, it is necessary to stress the

grasp of the following several points.

The first necessity is to make full preparations and to painstakingly select targets. For

conventional missile forces [engaged] in missile firepower destruction raids, they face

great demands, arduous missions, urgent timing, and abundant preparations as the basic

prerequisite for making successful strikes in the missile firepower destruction raids. The

conventional missile forces should, from a basis in peacetime advance preparations,

successfully make thorough preparations for all of such aspects as the force strength

bushu disposition, weapons and equipment, operational position, intelligence support,

and the like. At the same time, the missile firepower raid is mainly through destroying the

vital area targets within the enemy operational system {tixi} that they achieve the goal of
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paralyzing the enemy operational hierarchy. As a result, it is essential to want to earnestly

conduct analysis of the enemy situation, analyze and assess the enemy’s important target

systems {xitong}, and scientifically select {科学选择 kexue xuanze} enemy’s vital area

targets {敌要害目标 di yaohai mubiao}.

The second necessity is to concentrate firepower and surprise raids. With missile

firepower destruction raids, the scale of the missile forces that are used is large, there are

many targets to be assaulted, the missions are difficult, and it is essential to maintain

concentrated application {集中使用 jizhong shiyong}, and focal point application {重点

使用 zhongdian shiyong}, to use the main missile firepower in the main time segments-,

main direction- and against the main targets of the joint operation. As a result, the missile

force commander must implement highly centralized control {高度集中的控制 gaodu

jizhong de kongzhi} over missile forces activities, enabling each of the units to

synchronize the sequence of unanimous activities. In addition, due to the great scope of

the strengths applied in the core activities, an easily exposed operational intent, it is

necessary to adopt effective measures to: successfully camouflage the units; guard

against enemy reconnaissance monitoring; conceal the operational intent; implement

surprise raids at times when they are unexpected by the enemy from positions unexpected

by the enemy; and rapidly seize the joint operational initiative.

The third necessity is to intensify support and successive operations. During missile

firepower destruction raids there are many assault targets for the conventional missile

forces, a great rate of missile consumption, and high requirements for each support item,

necessitating intensification for each of the items of support during the operation. It is

necessary to adopt such unorthodox measures as follow on support for multiple missiles

in a single frame and adjacent launches, to reduce to the maximum possible limit the

reload and fire time {装弹再战的时间 zhuangdanzaizhan de shijian} for the missile

units, and increase the succession of missile firepower. While implementing the

operation, it is necessary to organize reconnaissance to judge the results of the assault

without delay; supposing the predetermined degree of damage was not achieved or if new

targets have emerged, it is necessary to organize supplementary assaults without delay. In

addition, missile firepower destruction raids are used in conjunction with other longrange operational strengths. Thus, with the above-mentioned activities in the process of

organizing preparation and implementation, it is essential to necessitate a focus on

successful and interrelated operational coordination for the strengths from the arms of the

services.

III. Implementing the Missile Firepower Blockade...634

The missile firepower blockade {导弹火力封锁 daodan huoli fengsuo} consists of

preventing or destroying the maneuver and supply of enemy troops and materials by

implementing a missile firepower assault of a lower intensity. The goal of the missile

firepower blockade is typically to sabotage enemy ground-, air-, ocean- (or water-)

maneuvering activities. The basic method for the missile firepower blockade consists of
726

implementing missile firepower assault or firepower harassment attacks against important

targets that the enemy depends on for ground-, aerial- or oceanic- (or water-) based

maneuvering. The above-mentioned activities have characteristics such as operational

activities that are strongly time-oriented and intelligence support that is difficult [to

provide]. Implementing a missile firepower blockade necessitates the grasp of the

following several points.

The first necessity is to accurately judge the enemy’s intention to maneuver and

successfully make full preparation for blockade operations. Promptly ascertaining the

enemy’s intention to maneuver is a major prerequisite for implementing a missile

firepower blockade. Once the campaign commander receives his orders to implement a

missile firepower blockade mission, it is necessary for him to: gain a profound

understanding of the operational intent of the higher-level authorities and clarify the

mission he is charged with; conduct comprehensive analysis and judgment of the enemy

situation; focus on grasping the enemy’s intention to maneuver, the maneuver methods,

the routes for maneuver, the timing for maneuver and the scale of maneuver; capture

accurate data for such targets necessary for enemy maneuvering such as airfields, ports,

traffic hubs, bridges, and the like; and conduct overall planning to [develop] a basic

course of action {基本方案 jiben fang’an} to implement a missile firepower blockade.

From this basis, it is necessary to organize rapid revisions to the operational plan {jihua}

for the missile forces and fully make operational preparations.

The second necessity is to accurately seize combat opportunities and implement the key

links {关节 guanjie} of the blockade. To blockade key links at an appropriate

opportunity is an important principle of missile firepower blockade operations. As a

result, it is essential for the campaign commander to: implement thorough reconnaissance

of the enemy; comprehensively analyze such factors as the enemy’s intention to

maneuver, the battlefield terrain, weather, and the like; and determine the beneficial

timing for implementing a missile firepower blockade and crucial targets for the

blockade. It is on this basis that suitable opportunities for action and blockade key link

targets are organized for the forces.

IV. . Implementing Missile Firepower Harassing Attacks...635

Missile firepower harassing attacks are the interruption and destruction of enemy normal

activities, and are missile firepower assaults that are implemented against the enemy on a

smaller scale and of a random nature. The above-mentioned activities have characteristics

such as being highly random operational activities and having a smaller scale use of

strengths. In implementing missile firepower harassing attacks, it is necessary to capture

the following several points.

The first necessity is to flexibly apply firepower against the situation of the targets. In

order to create and apply great psychological pressure to the enemy, based on the goals of

the operation, it is possible to implement multiple sudden and concealed as well as

random missile firepower assaults against the enemy, making flexible and constantly
727

changing missile firepower harassing attacks, and making the enemy [think] that no rules

apply, thereby achieving the maximum effectiveness of the harassing attacks.

The second necessity is to shoulder ballistic missile forces with the responsibility to fix

relatively regular harassing attack missions at regular intervals. Due to the highly random

nature of missile firepower harassing attacks, the capability of forces to rapidly react

must be high, and the stronger reaction capabilities of ballistic missile forces to use their

strengths in normal primary operations satisfy the harassing attack mission.

The third necessity is to strictly control the rate of missile consumption {导弹的消耗量

daodan de xiaohao liang}. Due to the strength of the elements of surprise and shock

associated with missile firepower, by employing only a small number of missile forces

and firepower during a single unit of time, it is possible to achieve the effects of a

harassing attack. Consequently, it is necessary that missile firepower harassing attacks

use as their standard the ability to effectively “control” targets within a specified period

of time; thus it is not easy to adopt a mode of concentrated firepower assaults to reduce

the amount of unnecessary waste of firepower.

V. Implementing Missile Force Strength Maneuver...636

Missile force strength maneuver {导弹兵力机动 daodan bingli jidong} is the

implementation of the regular missile force-unit shifting of force strengths and weaponry

based on the goals and missions of the operation. The maneuvering of missile force

strengths is an effective means to increase the existing missile force-unit survivability on

the battlefield and it is an important measure for adjusting the operational bushu

disposition and creating and maintaining a favorable posture. In implementing missile

force strength maneuver, one must emphasize mastering the following points.

The first necessity is to accurately grasp the timing opportunities for maneuver.

Accurately determining the timing opportunities for maneuver is the crux of

accomplishing the mission for maneuvering. The timing opportunities for regular missile

forces to maneuver toward the operational area are separated into imminent war

maneuvering and wartime maneuvering. When maneuvering during imminent war

[conditions], it is necessary to organize a location for approach by which the forces can

maneuver at one time to the operational area; the operational forces within the depth must

rapidly maneuver to the operational build-up area and successfully make operational

preparations. Based on the operational needs on the battlefield, when maneuvering during

wartime, the commander must: make use of conditions on the battlefield that favor our

side; take advantage of enemy operational power that is of no use, and of timing

opportunities for when it is difficult for them to organize large scale strengths to

implement counter maneuver operations; and rapidly organize maneuver toward the

operational area.

The second necessity is to successfully conduct maneuver support. For the sake of

handling complex situations during maneuvering, it is essential for the commander to:
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adopt multiple support methods to implement uninterrupted support; be adept in basing

himself in the actual situation of maneuver; make flexible use of multiple methods such

as planned support {计划保障 jihua baozhang} and random support {随机保障 suiji

baozhang}, centralized support {集中保障 jizhong baozhang} and decentralized support

{分散保障 fensan baozhang}, fixed point support {定点保障 dingdian baozhang} and

follow-on support {跟进保障 genjin baozhang}, and level-by-level support {逐级保障

zhuji baozhang} and skip-echelon support {越级保障 yueji baozhang}; and increase the

reliability of maneuver support.

The third necessity is to successfully conduct maneuver camouflage. To conduct

camouflage while maneuvering is a meticulous task that involves a broad assortment of

aspects, and has a great and complex influence on maneuvering. Above all, maneuvering

first must adopt measures to maintain strict secrecy and meticulously seal off maneuver

information; secondly, it is essential to organize the wide adoption of measures such as

artificial and technical camouflage and concealment activities among units; next, it is

essential to organize the adoption of multiple kinds of decoy measures among units to

conceal the actual maneuver direction and activities of the units, making it difficult for

the enemy to ascertain our intent.
729

Postscript...637

After The Science of Campaigns (First edition. National Defense University Press, May

2000) was published, the book took the fancy of numerous readers in the internal and

external military and become the most popular basic teaching material for learning and

studying campaign theory.

Six years has passed. In the past six years, profound changes have occurred to the forms

of wars and campaigns with the continuous progress of information technology. In order

to meet the needs of situation development and fully reflect the achievements of teaching

and scientific research of our department in the past six years, our development

recompiled the Science of Campaigns based on original achievements.

During the compilation, we focused on new characteristics of campaigns under

informationized conditions, and did all we could to make this book theoretical,

systematic, epochal, and foresighted.

This book includes 6 volumes and 32 chapters. Major Zhang Yuliang, the Director of the

Campaign Teaching and Research Department at the National Defense University, is the

chief editor. The Deputy Director Major Yu Shusheng and Major Zhou Xiaopeng are the

associate editors. Those who participated in the compilation are: Yu Liming, Yu

Guohua, Ma Xiushan, Wang Yiping, Wang Renzong, Wang Jun, Wang Jiyu, Wang 

Xuejin, Wang Houqing, Liu Xiaoli, Liu Shubin, Liu Shengru, Sun Jingwei, Li Tangjie,

Li Jinglong, Lu Jianfei, Yang Yueqiang, Yang Gongkun, Yang Guochuan, Zhang

Yuliang, Zhang Xingye, Zhang Zhanli, Yu Shusheng, Fan Chengbin, Zhou Guiliang,

Zhou Xiaopeng, Zhou Xinsheng, Jia Junming, Yuan Jingwei, Tao Qian, Xu Jingnian,

Zhan Xuexi, Tang Xuqi, Huang Bin, Cao Xiumin, Peng Xiwen, Dong Lianshan, and

Xiong Jiben.

The compilation of the Science of Campaigns was not an overnight job. It is an outcome

that several generations of people at the Teaching and Research Department made great

efforts to achieve. It is the painstaking work of many leaders and cadres. As successors of

campaign teaching and scientific research, we will always remember them.