ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 1 

Baltics Left of Bang: 

Comprehensive Defense in 

the Baltic States

By Dalia Bankauskaite, Janis Berzins, Tony Lawrence, 

Deividas Šlekys, Brett Swaney, and T.X. Hammes

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Authors

Dalia Bankauskaite is a Lecturer at 

Vilnius University and a Nonresident 

Fellow at the Center for European 

Policy Analysis in Washington, DC. 

Dr. Janis Berzins is Director of the 

Center for Security and Strategic 

Research at the National Defense 

Academy of Latvia. Dr. Deividas 

Šlekys is Associate Professor at 

Vilnius University. Tony Lawrence is 

the Head of the Defence Policy and 

Strategy Programme at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia. Brett Swaney is 

an Assistant Research Fellow in the 

Institute for National Strategic (INSS) 

at the National Defense University. 

Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in INSS.

Key Points

◆ Since regaining independence 

in 1991, the Baltic states’

(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) 

foreign and diplomatic main 

objective has been full integration with the West.

◆ Each state has adopted comprehensive defense to coordinate 

the actions of its military, civilian 

government, private sector, and 

the general populations to deter 

and defeat Russian aggression.

◆ In applying comprehensive defense, each state has improved 

its armed forces, strengthened 

its ability to counter Russian information warfare, coordinated 

security measures with its neighbors, deepened its integration 

with European and international 

organizations, and worked to 

reduce its economic and energy 

dependence on Russia.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

September 2020

S

ponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish 

National Defense University, this paper is the third in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the 

multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic 

states. The December 2017 National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to 

Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and 

governments.”1 The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many 

others, came together in a series of wargames conducted in late 2017 through 

the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing 

the Baltic Sea region. This third installment in the series highlights research and 

gaming insights indicating the value of a comprehensive defense for building 

resilience and resistance capabilities among the Baltic states.

The paper starts by defining comprehensive defense, then looks at the primary threats facing the Baltic states and the resulting strategic situation. Then 

each national author outlines how that state is responding to the threat. The 

paper concludes with policy recommendations for Baltic state governments.

Comprehensive Defense

Modern comprehensive defense, also known as total defense, is a whole-ofsociety approach to national security involving the coordinated action of a state’s 

military, civilian branches of government, private sector, and the general population, thus enhancing conventional defense and deterrence measures. Comprehensive defense is well suited to counter hostile information operations, provide 

for the psychological defense of the population, build the resilience of critical 
2 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

services and infrastructure, enhance military defense, and 

respond to crises.2

This comprehensive approach is particularly beneficial in situations where there is no clear threshold for 

the start of hostilities, making it useful in deterring and 

defending against Russian hostile measures and hybrid 

warfare.3 Furthermore, the commitment to resilience, civil 

preparedness, and civil-military readiness was reinforced 

at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Summit in July 2016 during the meeting of the North 

Baltic Sea Region
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 3 

Atlantic Council.4 It is with this reinforcement in mind 

that the Baltic states have increasingly looked to concepts 

of comprehensive defense in an effort to deter and defend 

against Russian aggression.

The Threat

With a shared Russian border, historic economic and 

energy linkages, and concentrated Russian-speaking populations, the Baltic states are among the most vulnerable 

NATO members to hostile measures and hybrid warfare. 

Russian aggression in Ukraine, military exercises along 

the borders of the Baltic states, and consistent information and cyber operations have all converged to raise fears 

about threats to the security and territorial integrity of 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Russia has instrumentalized local agents of influence, 

namely nongovernmental organizations, informal groups, 

criminal organizations, journalists, academics, artists, 

opinion leaders, and government officials who may or 

may not be aware they are being used. These agents channel inflammatory narratives such as the “resurgence of 

fascism,” “rampant Russophobia,” “the ethnic cleansing of 

local Russian populations,” and “drunk NATO soldiers” 

to slander Baltic governments.5

 The ultimate objective 

is to create and strengthen discontent about the current 

political, cultural, and economic model, thus ultimately 

discrediting Western values.6

Russia’s attempts to influence Baltic politics must 

be divided into four lines of effort. First, maintaining or 

even increasing its political influence over the local population—particularly ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, 

and others who might identify in some way with Russia; 

second, influencing politicians and civil servants, mainly 

at the regional level; third, supporting political organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals 

who favor closer alignment with Moscow or otherwise 

question the Baltic states’ Euro-Atlantic orientation. 

The primary instruments of disinformation include the 

propagation of articles in Russian and national language 

media and the use of social media trolls to spread fake 

news or opinions that usually emphasize discrimination 

against Russian speakers and the decadence of Western 

society. Finally, Russians regularly conduct major military 

exercises near the borders of the Baltics states that serve 

as pointed reminders of its potential use of force.

Current Strategic Situation

Shortly after Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reclaimed their independence, they determined their security could only be assured within NATO. There was 

a general recognition that the armed forces of the three 

states would be unable to resist a large-scale Russian invasion and that their main function was not as an instrument of national power to influence Russia directly, but as 

a tool of integration with NATO.7

While NATO has a substantial advantage over Russia in military capability globally, Russia has a considerable local advantage in the Baltic Sea region. For example, Russia has almost 21⁄2 times the number of combat 

troops as NATO in the Baltic region (including NATO’s 

three battalion-sized battlegroups deployed under the 

Enhanced Forward Presence initiative), almost 6 times 

as many main battle tanks, and over 10 times as many 

self-propelled howitzers.8 There is widespread belief that 

a determined Russia could rapidly seize one or more of 

the Baltic states and use its extensive investments in longrange weapons—for example, the Iskander family of ballistic and cruise missiles, the Kalibr cruise missile family, the 

S-400 air defense system, and the Bastion-P antiship missile system—to threaten NATO forces, seeking to reinforce the region, with unacceptable costs. In other words, 

to execute an antiaccess/area-denial strategy that results 

in a fait accompli.9

 The final deterrent is Russia’s threat of 

using nuclear weapons to “escalate to deescalate.”10

It is no surprise, then, that since the Baltic states’ independence in 1991, their foreign and diplomatic policies’ 

the Baltic states are among the 

most vulnerable NATO members to 

hostile measures and hybrid warfare
4 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

main objective has been full integration with the West. 

This objective has been pursued by joining international organizations, the most relevant being the European 

Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and NATO.

Clearly, these objectives are not aligned with Russia’s interests in the region. Current Russian elites and the 

Russian population more generally tend to believe that 

small states do not have independent foreign policies but 

act at the behest of those Great Powers to whom they 

are subjugated. Russia thus believes that it is worth developing relations only with major powers with which it 

expects to share control over the rest. Small states are to 

be manipulated or, at best, ignored. Post-Soviet states are 

singled out for special contempt as traitors driven by their 

greed for Western wealth.11

In the beginning of his first term, Vladimir Putin 

proclaimed that Russia would reassert its role in a multipolar world. This vision reinforced the idea of Russia as 

a permanent victim of other powers. Although it was not 

the turning point of Russia’s relationship with the West, 

Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference 

was the clearest expression of Russian discomfort with 

Western unilateralism, which has resulted in different 

levels of confrontation. By 2012, Moscow was convinced 

that the West, especially the United States, is at war with 

Russia using instruments of low-intensity conflict, with 

the objective of overthrowing the current regime and imposing a Western political, social, and cultural system.12

Having succeeded at effectively seizing parts of 

Georgia and Ukraine, additional occupation and annexation do not seem to be part of Moscow’s current strategic 

objectives, but this does not mean Russia is not interested 

in the Baltic states. On the contrary, Russia seeks a natural sphere of influence or “near abroad,” encompassing 

the post-Soviet space. Since the Baltic states are firmly 

part of the West, Russia’s main objective is to maintain and increase its influence in the region to achieve 

“Finlandization.”13 Its strategic objective is to push Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from the Western sphere of 

influence back to Russia’s near abroad without a costly occupation. Russian strategy generally attempts to increase 

polarization in society, reduce confidence in Western institutions, alienate allies from each other, and degrade the 

socioeconomic condition of the target state in the hope of 

generating opportunities it can exploit.14 Russia has not 

limited this effort to the Baltics but is applying this strategy globally, as evidenced by its interference in both the 

U.S. and British elections.

Understanding the resistance of the Baltic states’ 

populations to establishing deeper ties with Russia, the 

Russian narrative claims the current alignment with the 

West is impeding the Baltic states’ development. Russia’s 

desired outcome is populist anti-NATO, anti-EU, and 

anti-West politicians being democratically elected.

Baltic States’ Response

Size matters. The Baltic states are small. Estonia has 

a population of 1.32 million and a territory a little over 

45,000 square kilometers (km). Latvia has 1.92 million 

people and 64,500 square km. Lithuania’s population is 

2.79 million living within in 65,200 square km.15 They are 

not just small states, but very small states. While they can 

and do make use of the range of instruments identified by 

the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, 

intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) model to 

counter hostile Russian activities, their actions are inevitably limited by the scarcity of resources they can bring 

to bear and Russia’s ability to quickly overmatch these 

actions thanks to the states’ geographic proximity to Russia and the logistical challenges that NATO would face in 

seeking to reinforce the states if a crisis appeared.

As they are unable to compete in the realm of hard 

power, small states ensure their security in part through 

Russia’s main objective is 

to maintain and increase its 

influence in the region to achieve 

“Finlandization”
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 5 

appeals to the rights and privileges they hold through 

international law and ethics. They are thus compelled to 

complain when others act illegally or unethically because 

such conduct challenges the very basis of their own security. Furthermore, because their options to act alone are limited, small states seek allies with similar outlooks to their 

own within international organizations, often voluntarily 

relinquishing aspects of their sovereignty in the pursuit 

of shared goals. Taking positions similar to those of their 

allies is not the behavior of a subject state, but the selfinterested behavior of a state reflecting the shared values 

and interests of those organizations it has elected to join.

Estonia. Since regaining its independence in 1991, 

Estonia has taken two complementary approaches to leverage its limited resources. Participating in international 

frameworks is one. Within these international frameworks, DIMEFIL instruments are then employed to 

counter Russia in two ways. First, the instruments may be 

targeted directly against Russia in coordination with others (for example, the sanctions imposed by the EU after 

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014). Second, the 

instruments may be used to influence allies with a view 

to enhancing Estonia’s profile and importance within the 

international framework, and thereby increase the chances 

allies will support its own agenda and interests vis-à-vis 

Russia. This is an indirect use of the instruments of power, 

frequently seen in small states’ efforts to “punch above 

their weight” by developing and marketing particular skill 

sets that may be attractive or useful to their allies. Estonia’s ambition to be an example to others in the field of 

e-governance is an illustration of this practice.

The second, more inward-facing approach is resilience-building to insulate Estonians from hostile Russian 

actions—for example, programs that aim to erase uneven 

social and economic development across Estonia’s regions 

and strategic communications policies that endeavor to 

inform and engage the population in the activities of the 

state.16 In this indirect use of the instruments of power, 

the aim is to dissuade Russia from pursuing hostile acts 

by attempting to lower the chances of success should it 

attempt such a course of action.

Resilience-building measures are also intended to increase societies’ abilities to deal with a range of risks, such 

as terrorism, natural disasters, or large-scale technological failures. These measures also make societies adept at 

countering the hostile actions that Russia has practiced 

against the West in recent years. Russia looks for and exploits opportunities that allow for large-scale challenges 

to Western security structures and cohesion, such as its 

2014 (and continuing) aggression against Ukraine, its 

military intervention in the Syrian civil war, and, closer to 

home, its probable orchestration in 2007 of cyber attacks 

against Estonia following the relocation of the “Bronze 

Soldier,” a statue commemorating the Russian military’s 

“liberation” of Tallinn in 1944. These major challenges are 

thankfully rare, but on a day-to-day basis, Russia pursues 

its long-term objective by subjecting Western states to a 

steady drip of low-key antagonistic actions that are tailored to achieve maximum effect in a particular local context and aimed at creating uncertainty and confusion and 

undermining confidence.

The primary document outlining Estonia’s approach 

to national security and providing guidance to the agencies responsible for its implementation is the National 

Security Concept, first published in 2001 and updated 

in 2004, 2010, and 2017. The three later versions of the 

National Security Concept were adopted after Estonia 

joined NATO and the EU in 2004. All versions outlined 

a broader concept of a security threat, which in turn required a broader response. Much of the focus is on the use 

of DIMEFIL instruments to build societal resilience and 

in this indirect use of the 

instruments of power, the aim is 

to dissuade Russia from pursuing 

hostile acts by attempting to lower 

the chances of success should it 

attempt to do so
6 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

on Estonia’s overriding objective of conducting security 

policy within international frameworks.

Successive versions of the National Security Concept 

have also evolved in their depiction of Russia. While the 

2004 concept barely mentioned Russia, and then only to 

cast Estonian-Russian relations firmly within the context 

of NATO-Russia and EU-Russia relations, the 2010 version noted Russia’s use of political, economic, military, 

and energy tools to achieve its goals. Nonetheless, the 

2010 concept remained optimistic about relations with 

Russia and expressed Estonia’s wish for open dialogue 

and pursuit of practical cooperation.17 The 2017 concept, 

however, makes clear that Russia is a source of instability: “Russia’s unpredictable, aggressive and provocative 

activity, for example, airspace violations, offensive military 

exercises, and nuclear threats, is generating instability.” 

While it continues to advocate open dialogue and practical cooperation, this version of the concept also supports 

“continued enforcement of the restrictive measures imposed until their reasons have been eliminated,” explicitly 

recognizing for the first time the value of the direct use of 

DIMEFIL tools to counter Russia.18

Of the instruments of national power that it deploys 

to counter Russia, Estonia probably places greatest value 

on the military. This is one of the few instruments that 

Estonia attempts to directly influence Russia with. But 

the defense forces are also used as a tool of influence toward allies and in resilience-building—Estonia’s system 

of comprehensive defense aims to involve the whole of 

society and thus have an integrating effect. Both roles 

serve to counter Russia indirectly.

The prevalence of military thinking in society is evident in the requirement for all men to serve as conscripts 

from 8 to 11 months before entering the reserve, where 

they continue to have training obligations for several years 

(although in practice, only around one-third of the annual 

cohort is conscripted). The voluntary Estonian Defence 

League has a membership of 16,000, with an additional 

10,000 in its affiliated organizations, the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organisation, the Young Eagles, and the 

Home Daughters.19

There is a strong public consensus on defense matters 

in Estonia. The October 2018 biannual polling showed 

the defense forces are seen as trustworthy by 75 percent 

of the population. A significant majority of the population—60 percent—is ready to participate in defense 

activities if Estonia is attacked, while 91 percent of the 

population believes that conscription is necessary.20

There is an expectation that the Estonian defense 

forces should at least be able to buy the time necessary for 

allied reinforcement. Hence the statement of principle in 

Estonia’s National Defence Strategy that “Estonia’s military defence relies on NATO’s collective defence and an 

initial independent defense capability.”21 Estonia’s aim in 

using the military as a tool to directly influence Russia is 

to ensure that its independent defense capability is credible. This emphasis on independent defense also resonates 

domestically with a large fraction of the population—47 

percent—that does not believe NATO would provide direct military assistance if Estonia was exposed to a military attack.22

The aim of building credibility for independent defense may be seen, for example, in Estonia’s emphasis 

on the size of its military once mobilized and in recent 

attempts to take mobilization more seriously, including 

through the introduction of unannounced call-ups for 

additional reservist training exercises.23 It is also demonstrated in Estonia’s consistent (since 2015, according 

to NATO figures) defense expenditure above 2 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP) and in the use of this 

funding to acquire capability intended to support hard 

defense (for example, self-propelled howitzers, large-

“Russia’s unpredictable, aggressive 

and provocative activity, for 

example, airspace violations, 

offensive military exercises, and 

nuclear threats, is generating 

instability”
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 7 

caliber ammunition for war stocks, the mechanization of 

the 1st Infantry Brigade, and intelligence and early warning assets).24

It is also evident in Estonia’s official declarations of 

its determination to fight to the end. The first paragraph 

of the National Defence Strategy states, “Estonia will 

defend itself in all circumstances and against any adversary, no matter how overwhelming. Should Estonia temporarily lose control over part of its sovereign territory, 

Estonian citizens will still resist the adversary within that 

territory.”25 Later, reflecting the considerable difficulties 

created for the Soviet occupiers by the Forest Brothers, 

a guerrilla movement active between 1944 and 1953, it 

adds that “Military defence planning will incorporate 

paramilitary operations, such as guerrilla activity and resistance movements.”26 And in case any adversary believes 

it might be possible to invade by stealth, using a Ukrainestyle “little green men” hybrid attack, the military command has an answer: foreign undercover operators will be 

considered terrorists and simply be shot.27

A second role of the military as an instrument of 

national power is in signaling to allies through Estonia’s 

involvement in international crisis response operations. 

Estonian and other Baltic officials strongly believe that 

this indirect use of the military instrument has been important in giving them the confidence to pursue their 

own agenda in the Alliance and to steer NATO policies 

in directions favorable to their own interests in countering Russia.28

Diplomatic relations between Estonia and Russia 

are cool, but they are at least stable. Unfortunately, Russian diplomats are not ready to take Estonia seriously; if 

Moscow thinks about Estonia at all, it does so largely in 

the context of the alleged—and thus allegedly broken—

promises of NATO not to station troops there.29

Estonia’s diplomacy toward its allies and partners 

has been considerably more successful as evidenced by its 

joining NATO and the EU in 2004. Alongside traditional 

state-to-state diplomacy, Estonia strives to employ what 

is variously characterized as public diplomacy, cultural 

diplomacy, or soft power. In this area, Estonia’s greatest 

success is its self-promotion as a digital state. Software 

products of Estonian origin, such as Skype and Transferwise, are globally known. Russia’s 2007 cyber attacks 

prompted Estonia’s development of institutions such as 

the Defence League Cyber Unit, a voluntary organization aimed at protecting Estonian cyberspace, and as a 

host to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 

Excellence, which conducts research and provides training in the technological, strategic, operational, and legal 

aspects of cyber defense.30 As an exercise in soft power, it 

has been successful and has been paralleled by Estonian 

efforts to advise and lead in the broader digital discipline 

of e-governance, where it has promoted ideas such as the 

e-state, e-voting, and e-residency.

Global awareness of the importance of the information domain has grown in recent years as high-profile 

cases of Russia’s use of information tools to pursue its objectives in other states, such as its interference in the 2016 

U.S. Presidential campaign and in the British referendum 

on leaving the EU. Estonia faces a somewhat different 

challenge from most other Western states in that it has 

a large (25 percent) Russian-speaking population that 

many observers believe could be manipulated by Moscow’s propaganda to act against it. Such concerns were 

amplified after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, where the 

Russian-speaking population was persuaded by television messaging that they would be treated as second-class 

citizens in Ukraine and should rather favor secession and 

joining Russia.31 Given the resonance of this messaging 

with frequent Russian attacks on the Baltic states’ purported discrimination against, or even oppression of, Russia’s “compatriots” in their countries, it is understandable 

“Estonia will defend itself in 

all circumstances and against 

any adversary, no matter how 

overwhelming”
8 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

that analysts and the media have fretted over the question: “Will Narva be next?”32

While the Balts may worry about military intervention in their Russian-speaking areas and beyond, a scenario that involves Moscow activating Russian-speaking 

populations seems more a concern to states outside the 

Baltic region rather than a concern for the Baltic states 

themselves. RAND researchers have found, for example, 

that while Estonian and Latvian officials were monitoring Russian provocations in their predominantly Russianspeaking areas, they doubted that Moscow could sustain 

a mobilization of the Russian-speaking population. They 

also argued that the threat of NATO’s involvement would 

deter Russia from escalating lower order disruption into 

a full-blown crisis. Furthermore, Estonia and Latvia are 

“well-functioning states” with “effective internal security 

services and border guards that are more capable of protecting their territory than the ones Ukraine had.”33

Estonia’s strategy in the information domain is to 

focus its activity inward—on the building of societal resilience—rather than trying to directly influence Russia. 

Here, the notion of psychological defense—somewhat 

loosely defined in the National Security Concept as “informing society and raising awareness about informationrelated activities aimed at harming Estonia’s constitutional order, society’s values, and virtues”—is relevant.34

In Estonia’s security thinking, psychological defense 

has a more active counterpart, strategic communication, 

which “involves planning the state’s political, economic, 

and defense-related statements and activities, preparing 

a comprehensive informative whole on the basis of these, 

and transmitting it to the population.”35 Strategic communication is aimed at both Estonian society and foreign 

target groups and, in line with broader Estonian thinking 

on comprehensive defense, relies on the support of social 

networks and the media.36 In practical terms, the state 

has attempted to implement strategic communication by 

providing the public with honest, factual information according to guidelines set out in a government communications handbook.37

Another means for presenting unbiased factual information, this time specifically directed at the Russianspeaking population, is the Russian language television 

channel, ETV+, launched in 2015 by the Estonian public 

broadcaster, ERR. Rather than try to compete with Russian entertainment channels or to counter Russian propaganda, ETV+ focuses on local interest stories. The aim 

is to tackle the disengagement of the Russian-speaking 

population by persuading them to feel more connected to 

the state, to Estonian speakers, and also to other Russian 

speakers.38

Finally, in a typical small-state approach, Estonia 

has promoted the internationalization of the disinformation problem. It was among the early supporters of the 

establishment within the EU European External Action 

Service of the East StratCom Task Force that “analyzes 

disinformation trends, explains and exposes disinformation narratives, and raises awareness of disinformation 

coming from Russian State, Russian sources and spread 

in the Eastern neighbourhood media space.”39

Estonia’s booming economy also helps insulate it 

from Russian interference. One sector where this approach is apparent is energy. Estonia is fortunate that 

its oil shale deposits allow it to meet 90 percent of its 

electricity generation needs; thus, it has the lowest energy 

dependency rate in the EU.40 For renewables, Estonia 

presently achieves about twice the EU average percentage 

of gross final energy consumption.41 At the same time, 

Estonia is attempting to integrate its energy infrastructure more closely with that of other EU nations. Estonia, 

along with Latvia and Lithuania, is seeking to desynchronize its grid from the Soviet legacy Integrated Power Sysa scenario that involves Moscow 

activating Russian-speaking 

populations seems more a concern 

to states outside the Baltic region 

rather than a concern for the Baltic 

states themselves
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 9 

tem (IPS)/Unified Power System (UPS)–wide area interconnector and synchronize instead with the synchronous 

grid of continental Europe, a project with geopolitical 

significance.42 Projects are also under way to connect the 

Estonian gas supply systems to the Central European gas 

networks and to construct an additional liquefied natural 

gas terminal in Estonia, again aimed at reducing dependency on supply from Russia.43 Unsurprisingly, Estonia 

has been a harsh critic of the Nord Stream and Nord 

Stream 2 pipelines, which it argues serve Russia’s geopolitical interests in contravention of EU energy policy.44

In a more direct application of the economic instrument of power, Estonia has been supportive of the sanctions implemented on Russia by the EU following the 

annexation of Crimea. These include both economic and 

financial measures. The economies of Estonia and the 

other Baltic states have been damaged more than most 

other EU countries by Russia’s countersanctions against 

agricultural products, notably in the dairy and canned fish 

sectors, and in reductions in tourism volumes. However, 

upholding international law, a vital consideration for small 

states whose sovereignty depends on international respect 

of its principles, far outweighs any economic loss.45

On the financial and legal side, Estonia has also 

proved itself resilient against Russia’s active weaponization of corruption and organized crime. In 2018, it ranked 

21st in the world in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (making it the least corrupt former 

Communist country) and 10th in terms of the costs imposed on business by organized crime in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index.46

Russia has leveraged corruption to capture regional 

elites and establish patron-client political relationships to 

spread influence at home and in the near abroad.47 Clearly, efforts to prevent corruption from spreading westward 

need to be stepped up, not only in Estonia but also across 

Europe.

Latvia. The nonmilitary threats for Latvia’s security 

are the result of the country’s endogenous fragilities and, 

in some cases, the clash between security objectives and 

political/economic interests. Latvia’s main political objective has been joining the West and institutions such as the 

EU, the OECD, and NATO to distance the country from 

Russian influence. Nevertheless, one of the main priorities of its economic policy is to establish Latvia as a bridge 

between East and West in finance and logistics/transit, 

with Russia inevitably being the main partner.

Since economics and politics are deeply interconnected in Latvia, it was inevitable that Russia would 

maintain a certain degree of indirect influence in Latvia’s 

political affairs. While Russia was never successful in diverting Latvia’s plan of politically and economically integrating with the West, it has engaged in many efforts to 

gain influence.

The Latvian government has been closely following 

the developments of these influence operations and countering them by presenting the population with facts and 

critical information. It directly informs them about such 

operations in clear language, stating who the attacker is 

(if known), what its objectives are, what its narrative is, 

and why that narrative is not true.48 It does not prohibit 

the broadcast of Russian television and radio unless there 

are cases of hate speech and incitement for violence.

Another important issue is education. After independence from the Soviet Union, Latvia maintained the 

Soviet dual-language system of education, with schools 

in Latvian and Russian. Each system had its own educational program and material, resulting in some cases 

in a deep divergence of learning outcomes, especially in 

disciplines such as history. Between 2019 and 2022, there 

will be a gradual transition until all disciplines are taught 

in Latvian with the exception of language and literature 

while Russia was never successful in 

diverting Latvia’s plan of politically 

and economically integrating with 

the West, it has engaged in many 

efforts to gain influence
10 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

and disciplines related to the culture and history of the 

minority group.

It is a mistake to consider the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and in the Baltics a fifth column ready 

to support a Russian operation in the region. For many, 

taking Russian citizenship was an economic decision to 

receive a pension earlier to complement the regular income in Latvia and not allegiance and loyalty to Russia.

The analysis of the economic platforms of all Parliamentary parties shows that the key economic sectors 

to be developed were transit, real estate, and finance.49

All three have been highly dependent on money from 

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 

countries, resulting in business interests being a significant conduit for Russian influence. Since part of these 

assets had shadowy origins, this also created a problem 

of reputation for Latvia because of allegations of moneylaundering and corruption.

Favoring finance, real estate, and transit resulted in 

deindustrialization, the shrinkage in the services sector 

through a lack of competitiveness due to the overvalued 

exchange rate, and economic reorganization in favor of 

speculative and/or nonsustainable sectors (for example, 

consumption of durable goods).50 It also resulted in the 

competitiveness of the country being based on low wages. 

First, because of the financial crisis of 2008, absolute living standards decreased. Second, and most important, 

on separation from the Soviet Union, Baltic businesses 

sought to exploit the relatively low cost of their labor 

development manufacturing. Unfortunately, low-wage 

industries also usually have low productivity. Thus, economic growth did not result in improving relative living 

standards. On the contrary, it deepened wealth inequality and consequently increased sentiments of relative deprivation.51 As result, a significant part of the population 

emigrated or developed resentment against the state and 

the political system. These are socioeconomic grievances 

that Russia continues to try to exploit.

Unlike its Baltic neighbors, Latvia has not instituted 

conscription because of the significant necessary financial, personnel, and infrastructure resources that are not 

available at this moment. Only wage expenses for an additional 1,000 conscripts would represent an additional 

cost of approximately 100 million euro. Latvia’s 2020 defense budget is 640 million euro, or 2 percent of GDP. 

Conscription would not solve other problems, either. The 

professional armed forces still lack personnel. Also, since 

modern warfare relies on high-tech systems, it is necessary to modernize and acquire new capabilities instead 

of spending resources with undertrained manpower. Thus, 

Latvia has adopted the concept of comprehensive defense 

of the whole of society for resisting aggression. The Latvian National Armed Forces have 5,000 professional soldiers, 3,000 reservists, and 8,000 national guardsmen.52 It 

is passing through an intensive process of modernization.

Lithuania. The events of 2014 in Ukraine were a 

game changer for Lithuania. Hybrid war and its companion, the “Gerasimov doctrine,” became buzzwords used 

to explain the Russian military approach and to focus 

the Lithuanian response. The Lithuanian Armed Forces 

(LAF) designated two battalions as rapid-reaction units 

ready to act in less than 24 hours. Relevant national laws 

were adopted to provide legal shortcuts to allow crises 

such as Crimea to be dealt with swiftly.53 At the same 

time, Lithuania’s military community and society writ 

large acknowledged the importance of nonkinetic elements of defense. Discussions about information, cyber 

warfare, and strategic communication dimensions entered 

the debates about hybrid conflicts.

From the beginning, members of the military community were skeptical about the novelty of hybrid warfare. 

The military command wanted to follow conventional 

unlike its Baltic neighbors, Latvia 

has not instituted conscription 

because of the significant 

necessary financial, personnel, and 

infrastructure resources that are not 

available at this moment
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 11 

warfighting functions. Similar ideas were circulating in 

other NATO member states. In 2015, Lieutenant General 

Frederick “Ben” Hodges, USA, noted the 60-mile-long 

stretch of the Lithuanian-Polish border is the only land 

connection between the Baltic states and the rest of Europe. Keeping it open became a major task for NATO.54

Thus, the Suwałki corridor scenario temporarily replaced 

the hybrid war concept as a focus of NATO effort. International, regional, and national military exercises, based 

on scenarios defending the corridor, followed one after 

another.55

At the same time, NATO and the EU began to improve the military logistics and mobility system (the socalled military Schengen).56 In Poland and especially in 

Lithuania, it helped put the development of host-nation 

support capabilities at the top of the political priority list. 

The debate promoted the awareness of national politicians and, to some extent, of the military itself, that logistics was essential for any military activity in the corridor. 

However, this fixation on the Suwałki corridor faced its 

own challenges in Lithuania; there was increasing pressure from the defense community itself to engage all 

functions of the defense effort, both military and civilian.

Western analysts prefer to focus on Lithuania’s conventional kinetic capabilities, unconventional warfare, 

and capacity for violent resistance. This approach perceives societal resistance under the occupation scenario. 

In contrast, Lithuanian officials and experts focus their 

efforts on deterrence and defense. This gap in perspectives 

may have been caused by concerns that the Baltic states 

could be occupied by Russia within a certain number of 

hours, or perhaps that the Baltics’ defensibility is doubted, 

or simply that there is a lack of information about the 

region.57 Fortunately, in recent years, U.S. officials began 

paying more attention to the strategic thought circulating 

in the Baltic region and accordingly tailoring operational 

concepts more appropriately. For instance, the Resistance 

Operating Concept was published in the fall of 2019.58

Over the past 6 years, Lithuanian thinking about defense has evolved through three different concepts: hybrid, 

Suwałki corridor, and comprehensive defense. Since the 

end of 2018, debates about comprehensive defense have 

gained importance. It is important to emphasize, however, 

that these different discussions do not replace each other 

but coexist and have their imprint on defense politics.

This conceptual dynamic of defense priorities shows 

that during the past few years, Lithuania has engaged in a 

fluid, diverse, and productive intellectual reflection. It also 

confirms that Lithuania is still searching for its own way 

to defend itself, and, as a consequence, experimentation is 

taking place.

The first major decision made by Lithuania was to 

renew its goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense until 2020. In 2018, the Lithuanian Defence Policy 

Guidelines for 2020–2030 aimed to ensure proper funding for defense by allocating at least 2 percent of the 

country’s GDP and achieving at least 2.5 percent of the 

country’s GDP no later than 2030.59 It also established 

a new commitment to increase public and national resistance, build resilience against hybrid threats among 

state institutions and the Lithuanian public, and further 

enhance the development of national cyber security capabilities. The Lithuanian government launched the National Cyber Security Centre in 2015, which provides cyber security expertise and assists the EU with improving 

its cyber capabilities.60

The second important decision was to reintroduce 

conscription in 2015.61 It was decided that between 3,000 

and 3,500 conscripts per year would serve 9 months. Public approval remains high and should be seen as a major 

success of Lithuanian society.62

Lithuania also never lost sight of international lobbying and concerted action, regarding both as equally 

over the past 6 years, Lithuanian 

thinking about defense has evolved 

through three different concepts: 

hybrid, Suwałki corridor, and 

comprehensive defense
12 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

vital for ensuring national security. Lithuania focused on 

forming diverse bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation agreements to complement Lithuania’s security 

umbrella provided by NATO. However, understanding 

the complex nature of NATO decisionmaking and its 

cumbersome military structure, Lithuania made a strategic decision to diversify its efforts by actively participating in Alliance reforms while also pursuing its military 

cooperation with a number of countries. As one senior 

official of the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania 

stated, Lithuania looked for partners with “teeth and 

claws” that are willing, capable, and experienced in warfighting. Lithuania opted to work with countries that, in 

the event of crisis and war, could be first responders.

This idea manifested itself in closer bilateral cooperation with Poland, namely, the establishment of the Lithuanian-Polish Council of Defence Ministers and affiliation 

of military units; increased compatibility with the United 

States by developing the Lithuania’s Land Force’s divisional headquarters component; special operations forces 

cooperation and training; and multilateral cooperation 

in the joint expeditionary force.63 The joint expeditionary force not only provides actual defense planning and 

training with NATO states but also serves as a bridge for 

deeper cooperation with Sweden and Finland.

These warfighting partnerships were complemented 

by EU initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which is aimed at deepening defense cooperation among the EU member states.64 From the Lithuanian 

perspective, NATO cannot deliver all the necessary tools 

for Baltic regional defense (for instance, smooth military 

mobility [military Schengen]). Some issues require specific legislation that is beyond Alliance jurisdiction but is 

in the EU’s domain. Furthermore, Lithuania was among 

the first nations to initiate and support the European 

Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. The 

latter initiative proves that the nature of conflicts is not 

only kinetic; this center helps to build expertise, consensus on the hybrid threats among EU member states, and 

helps to provide a niche for cooperation with NATO.

Diversity and hybrid threats require a whole-ofgovernment approach with coordinated action among 

state agencies. To execute Lithuania’s National Security Strategy,65 the National Model for Integrated Crisis 

Prevention and Hybrid Threats Management was established.66 This is a legal and procedural framework for national efforts to monitor and assess threats, develop crisis 

plans, and conduct risk management. To monitor the implementation of tasks, it formed the Threat Management 

and Crisis Prevention Bureau (known as the Group).67

Unfortunately, due to bureaucratic resistance, the Group 

remains understaffed and viewed by other state institutions as a competitor, challenging their authorities.

Alongside cyber security, Lithuania is well known 

for its advocacy for energy security. In 2010, Vilnius, following EU membership obligations, closed the Ignalina 

Nuclear Power Plant and lost its status as an electricity exporter, becoming instead an importer (65 percent 

of electricity is now imported).68 Lithuania immediately 

took steps to reduce its dependency. By opening a liquefied natural gas terminal and increasing the capacities 

of its pipeline system, Lithuania eliminated Russia’s decades-old monopoly on natural gas in the Baltic region. 

As a result, the cost of natural gas in Lithuania has gone 

from one of the highest prices in the EU to one of the 

lowest.69

With the completion of the Baltic states’ synchronization with the continental European system in 2025, 

Lithuania will independently manage its electrical grid. 

The Baltic states will be disconnected from the Russiancontrolled IPS/UPS system (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania—BRELL).70 Additionally, to reduce its dependency on electricity imports, Lithuania has 

Lithuania looked for partners with 

“teeth and claws,” that is, willing, 

capable, and experienced in 

warfighting
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 13 

set a strategic goal of increasing the share of electricity 

consumption from renewable energy supplies to 45 percent in 2030 and 80 percent in 2050.71 Until that happens, 

Lithuania’s dependence on Russian electricity remains a 

risk to the country’s security. Even so, the current national 

energy security situation and Lithuania’s efforts to reach 

this level of security deserve to qualify as a major success.

Another success is Lithuania’s strategic communication program. In recent years, Lithuania has accumulated 

extensive experience in monitoring and assessing the risks 

of hostile strategic communication. This includes (but is 

not limited to) the assessment of both physical and electronic environments. The success lies in the way strategic 

communication is organized. This model rests on the decentralized and often informal cooperation between state 

and civil society; the core of this cooperation is mutual 

trust.72 At the state level, government institutions assess 

the information environment according to their areas of 

responsibility and competence.

Civil society is directly engaged in the national information environment by monitoring, fact-checking, and 

strengthening society’s media and information literacy. A 

good deal of work is undertaken by civil volunteers working in information technology, media, academia, education, and business sectors, such as the Lithuanian “elves,” 

the mainstream media fact-checking platform Debunk.

eu, and many others.73 Civil society organizations counter 

disinformation and are active in positive narrative communication. Although the state provides financial assistance to civil society, its major financial support comes 

from international donors. The cooperation between state 

institutions and society set a framework for the wholeof-society approach to become tangible and long lasting.

Even though it is effective, strategic communication 

alone is not sufficient for developing long-term social 

resilience and the ability to cope, adapt, and quickly recover from crises or avoid escalation. Lithuanian experts 

together with Swedish colleagues adapted the concept of 

psychological defense to build up resilient, well-informed 

decisionmakers, institutions, and society. It empowers 

them by providing practical knowledge and tools to ensure their readiness and willingness to act in case of crisis.74 Despite this action, social exclusion and a large gap 

in income remain challenges to societal resilience. In this 

context, it is vital to have a strong national narrative that 

dispels other forms of disinformation and helps to rally 

the nation.

Conscription was only part of the LAF overhaul. 

Lithuania also invested in military hardware to increase its 

warfighting capacities. It initiated a large-scale procurement program. It purchased mobile artillery systems (PzH 

2000), armored fighting vehicles (Boxer), a short-range air 

defense system (National Advanced Surface to Air Missile 

System), tactical combat vehicles (Oshkosh Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle), helicopters (Blackhawk), and other vitally important pieces of tactical equipment.75

During the same period, the number of active personnel within the LAF rose from 13,000 in 2013 to 

around 20,000 in 2019.76 Four new battalions were established, followed by the Second Infantry Brigade. The 

Land Forces grew to such an extent that it was decided 

to develop a division-level command and control capability in 2019. This was a remarkable transformation of 

the LAF. Their increased capabilities and manpower were 

complemented by the deployment of one of NATO’s Enhanced Force Presence battlegroups.

Capable armed forces and international support are 

essential but not sufficient to resist an aggressor. To accomplish this task, it is crucial to involve and empower 

the whole of society. The complexity of implementing 

comprehensive defense, however, still poses many challenges to Lithuania’s political leadership. The key issue is 

a consistent buildup of the structures for civilians to be 

the Baltic states will be 

disconnected from the Russiancontrolled IPS/UPS system (Belarus, 

Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania—BRELL)
14 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

involved in defense. The National Security Strategy of 

Lithuania relies on the concept of civil-based defense.77

When it comes to civilian-based defense of Lithuania, education plays an extremely important role. Better education is key to a resilient society. Critical and informed citizens with a sense of duty are groomed starting 

from primary school. The education includes such topics 

as civic education, national security, and media and information literacy.

In a 2017 public opinion survey, the vast majority (88 

percent) of respondents believe defending the country is 

the duty of every citizen.78 Moreover, according to the 

survey, 6 percent of respondents or 150,000 Lithuanian 

citizens are absolutely determined to fight an aggressor. 

This demonstrates the will and potential for society to be 

a significant reserve for the LAF, on the condition that 

people are properly prepared, trained, and educated.

The major changes that took place in Lithuanian security and defense policy deserve high praise and respect. 

Today, there is a clear understanding that the country’s 

comprehensive defense posture should not be focused 

on only conventional warfighting. Lithuania’s political 

elite, the military community, and wider society have to 

acknowledge the importance of nonkinetic elements of 

defense. The analysis discloses a huge potential of Lithuanian society’s engagement in the country’s defense process.

Defense should be co-owned by a variety of players. 

The government should facilitate this co-ownership by 

drafting new laws and revising old laws, procedures, and 

other legal documents. It should expand and clarify the 

functions of the Threat Management and Crisis Prevention Bureau and transform it into a proper coordination 

center. Local authorities should be engaged in all these 

activities. It is also clear that comprehensive defense is 

most effective when it is compatible with allies’ defense 

concepts and practices. Only then could it achieve a collaborative response to an incursion effectively. Moreover, it 

could prevent misinterpretation of events and mismanagement in case of a crisis. Comprehensive defense is only as 

strong as its weakest domain. How quickly state and regional institutions and agencies meet the requirements for 

comprehensive defense depends on political consistency 

and leadership. Nonetheless, Lithuania is committed to 

comprehensive defense.

Conclusion: Building Baltic 

Comprehensive Defense

In this paper, authors have described their nation’s 

efforts to counter Russian hostile measures and hybrid 

warfare. Clearly, the Baltic states have, since the reestablishment of their independence, begun to embrace the 

defense strategy that their Nordic neighbors employ.79

Going forward, they should continue to leverage this 

comprehensive whole-of-society approach to enhance societal resilience; strengthen the rule of law; weed out corruption in sectors like banking, energy, and rail; integrate 

Russian speaking minorities; and bolster their energy independence and infrastructure linkages to their Nordic 

neighbors and the rest of Europe.

Each author has noted that Russian disinformation 

seeks to alienate ethnic Russians and encourage a belief 

that ethnic Russians are a potential fifth column. U.S. 

analysts are deeply concerned about the internal threat 

presented by ethnic Russians. In fact, there are sharp contrasts between national groups and ethnic Russians on the 

issue of NATO and the threat from Russia. But there is 

little difference when it comes to ethnic Russians willingness to defend their Baltic homelands.80

The policy challenge, then, is in the best way to advance the integration of ethnic Russians in the Baltics and 

combat the disinformation that Russia conveys to them. 

While issues of integration such as citizenship, language, 

in a gray zone conflict, SOF, 

operating in close coordination with 

police and intelligence agencies, are 

crucial to detecting changes in the 

operational environment
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 15 

and education are clearly national prerogatives, the issue of disinformation is an area that regional allies and 

partners can both offer assistance and learn from Baltic experiences. In 2015, the East StratCom Task Force 

within the European External Action Service was set up 

to begin reviewing and debunking the most blatant disinformation spewed by the Russians. Financial assistance 

from EU and Nordic partners to support these local efforts may be the best option. Independently produced 

Western programming is unlikely to be seen as credible, 

and broadcasts such as Radio Free Europe are likely only 

to be marginally influential.

Engaging the entire population in the defense of 

the state is a key element of comprehensive defense. As 

noted, due to recent efforts, the Baltic states can currently 

muster approximately 32,000 active-duty troops and over 

33,000 reserve forces while spending approximately 2 

percent of GDP.81 Scholars have suggested this force is 

insufficient to stop a Russian invasion.82 However, adopting comprehensive defense could be both a tool for increasing the number of military personnel and for a way 

to create a diverse set of problems the Russians must solve 

if they choose to invade.

While by and large the Baltic states are far better 

governed than other post-Soviet states, the transportation sector was historically plagued by corruption, especially in Latvia and Lithuania. This weakness in Baltic 

civil society runs headlong into a powerful tool of Russian statecraft, as the Kremlin often seeks to entrap corrupt institutions and officials of countries on its periphery 

for use in information campaigns aimed at discrediting 

the Baltic states as “failed” and “corrupt.”83 Recognizing 

this threat, Lithuania restructured its rail and air administrations between 2017 and 2019 to create transparent, 

accountable organizations. Both nations must remain 

vigilant against this threat.

Plans to address Baltic rail infrastructure issues are 

in motion. Rail Baltica, the largest EU project in the Baltic states, will eventually connect the capitals of Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania (with additional connections to 

Helsinki via Tallinn) with European-gauge track. This 

will allow for a standardized rail link to NATO Allies 

and partners along a north-south axis. Unfortunately, the 

project is not expected to be completed until 2025.84

Finally, as all authors noted, to bolster comprehensive defense and enhance societal resilience, the disconnection of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian power 

systems from the Moscow-controlled BRELL ring and 

their synchronization with the electrical grids of continental Europe must continue to be a priority initiative.85

With the recent announcement of energy independence 

in Kaliningrad, the other members of the BRELL ring 

remain vulnerable.86 Energy supplies and linkages can 

now be manipulated by Russia without fear of affecting 

the exclave.

The promise of Nordic cooperation on energy in the 

Baltics could be amplified through mechanisms such as 

the EU Baltic Market Interconnection Plan.87 The regional interconnection of Baltic Sea energy grids will 

go a long way toward ending Baltic states’ isolation and 

dependence on the BRELL ring. Energy infrastructure 

projects such as Estlink 1 and 2, connecting Estonia and 

Finland; NordBalt, linking Lithuania and Sweden; the 

LitPol Link, connecting Lithuania and Poland; and others have demonstrated significant progress toward ending 

reliance on Russian energy linkages. The EU has authorized additional funding for next steps, including ending 

power synchronization with the BRELL ring in favor of 

the continental Europe grid.88

Russian pushback to Baltic energy independence was 

on full display in the winter of 2018 as pro-Kremlin media in both Lithuanian and Russian languages sought to 

discredit Lithuania’s independent energy policies after its 

government announced unpopular energy price increases 

of 15 to 20 percent.89 While Russian propaganda will continue to discredit the effort, the real challenge may be the 

slow going and uneven pace of energy disconnection. The 

Nordic states and the EU have been steady partners and 

should endeavor to accelerate these projects with the Baltic states and infuse these projects with good governance 

to inoculate them against Russian propaganda. If properly 

and promptly executed, these efforts stand to significant-
16 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 

(Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 47, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

2 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the 

Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2019), 6, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/

RR2779.html>.

3 Marta Kepe and Jan Osburg, “Total Defense: How the Baltic 

States Are Integrating Citizenry into Their National Security Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, September 24, 2017, available at <https://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/total-defense-how-the-baltic-states-areintegrating-citizenry-into-their-national-security->.

4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Commitment 

to Enhance Resilience,” press release, issued by the heads of state and 

government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, Poland, July 8, 2016, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/

natohq/official_texts_133180.htm>.

5 Aleksander Król, “Russian Information Warfare in the Baltic 

States—Resources and Aims,” The Warsaw Institute Review, July 20, 

2017, available at <https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-informationwarfare-baltic-states-resources-aims/>.

6 See Janis Berzins, “Integrating Resilience in Defense Planning 

Against Information Warfare in the Post-Truth World,” in Drums: 

Distortions, Rumours, Untruths, Misinformation, and Smears, ed. Norman Vasu, Benjamin Ang, and Shashi Jayakumar (Singapore: World 

Scientific, 2018), 117–131.

7 Vaidotas Urbelis, Defense Policies of the Baltic States: From the 

Concept of Neutrality Towards NATO Membership, NATO-EAPC 

Individual Fellowship Report, 2001–2003 (Vilnius, Lithuania: EuroAtlantic Partnership Council, 2003), 5, available at <www.nato.int/

acad/fellow/01-03/vaidotas.pdf>.

8 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance 

in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 7–9, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/

research_reports/RR2402.html>.

9 See, for example, Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, 

“NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 

(2016); Alexander Lanoszka and Michael Allen Hunzeker, “Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in 

the Baltic region,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (2016), available at <www.

tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367>.

10 Kevin Ryan, “Is ‘Escalate to Deescalate’ Part of Russia’s Nuclear 

Toolbox?” Russia Matters, January 8, 2020, available at <www.russiamatters.org/analysis/escalate-deescalate-part-russias-nuclear-toolbox>.

11 Kadri Liik, “Executive Summary,” in The Mentality of the Russian Elite and Society and Its Influence on Foreign Policy (Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2011), 4, available 

at <http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006853/01/ICDS_The-mentality-ofly increase the resilience of the Baltic states. This should 

change Moscow’s decisionmaking calculus regarding its 

ability to use hostile measures and hybrid warfare to create 

the conditions in which a quick territorial land grab might 

be successful.

Notes

the-Russian-elite-and-society-and-its-influence-on-foreign-policy.

PDF>.

12 See A.I. Vladmirov, “NATO in the Paradigm of the General 

Theory of War” [NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny], Kadet.ru, 

2014, available at <http://kadet.ru/lichno/vlad_v/NATO&Obschaya_

teoriya_voiny.htm>; A.A. Nagorny and V.V. Shurygin, eds., Defense 

Reform as an Integral Part of a Security Conception for the Russian Federation: A Systemic and Dynamic Evaluation (Moscow: Izborsky Club, 

2013), available at <www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/1085/>.

13 See Andrey Skachkov, “Russia and the Baltic States: The 

Causes of the Crisis” [Rossiya i Pribaltika: prichiny krizisa Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn], Inter Affairs 9 (2018), 12.

14 Nagorny and Shurygin, eds., Defense Reform as an Integral Part 

of a Security Conception for the Russian Federation.

15 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at 

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

16 Ahto Lobjakas, “Estonia: Fearing ‘Decoding’ by Russia,” in The 

Different Faces of “Soft Power”: The Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood Between Russia and the EU, ed. Toms Rostoks and Andris Spruds 

(Rīga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 217.

17 National Security Concept of Estonia (Tallinn: Government 

of Estonia, 2010), 7, 12, available at <www.eda.europa.eu/docs/

default-source/documents/estonia---national-security-concept-ofestonia-2010.pdf>.

18 Ibid., 4, 10.

19 “Estonian Defense League,” Kaitseliit.ee, available at <www.

kaitseliit.ee/en/edl>.

20 Ibid., 32, 46.

21 National Defence Strategy (Tallinn, Estonia: Ministry of Defense, 2011), 10.

22 Juhan Kivirähk, Public Opinion and National Defence, report 

to the Ministry of Defence, October/November 2019, 78, available at 

<www.kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/sisulehed/avalik_arvamus/report_fall_2019.pdf>.

23 “Estonian Defense Forces,” available at <https://mil.ee/en/

defence-forces/>; Jonatan Vseviov, Challenges of Real National Defense

(Tallinn: International Centre for Defense and Security, 2018), 8, available at <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Challenges_of_

Real_National_Defence_November_2018.pdf>.

24 NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011–

2018),” press release, March 14, 2019, available at <www.nato.int/

nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.

pdf>; Henrik Praks, “Estonia’s Approach to Deterrence: Combining 

Central and Independent Deterrence,” in Deterring Russia in Europe: 

Defense Strategies for Neighbouring States, ed. Nora Vanaga and Toms 

Rostoks (London: Routledge, 2019), 154.

25 National Defense Strategy (Estonia), 8.

26 Ibid., 11.

27 Sam Jones, “Estonia Ready to Deal with Russia’s ‘Little Green 

Men,’” Financial Times, May 13, 2015, available at <www.ft.com/

content/03c5ebde-f95a-11e4-ae65-00144feab7de>.

28 Ibid.

29 Jaanus Piirsalu, “Moscow’s Baltics Expert: Even ‘Good Behaviour’ Won’t Give Estonia the Same Status as Finland,” Diplomaatia, 

March 16, 2018, available at <https://icds.ee/en/moscows-balticsexpert-even-good-behaviour-wont-give-estonia-the-same-status-asfinland/>.

30 “Estonian Defense League’s Cyber Unit,” Kaitseliit.ee, available 

at <www.kaitseliit.ee/en/cyber-unit>; “About Us,” NATO Cooperative 

Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Web site, available at <https://

ccdcoe.org/about-us/>.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 17 

31 Matthew Rojansky and Michael Kofman, Kennan Cable 7: A 

Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War” (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 

2015), 4, available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennancable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war>.

32 Narva, located on Estonia’s northeastern border with Russia, 

has a native Russian-speaking population of 97 percent.

33 Stephanie Pezard et al., European Relations with Russia: Threat 

Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 19–20, available at <www.rand.

org/pubs/research_reports/RR1579.html>.

34 National Security Concept (Tallinn, Estonia: Government 

of Estonia, 2017), 20, available at <www.riigikantselei.ee/en/

supporting-government/coordination-national-security-and-defencemanagement>.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Government Communication Handbook (Tallinn, Estonia: 

Government Office, 2017), available at <www.valitsus.ee/sites/default/

files/content-editors/failid/government_communication_handbook_

eng_13.09.2017.pdf>.

38 Riina Kaljurand, “The Annexation of Crimea and Its Implications for the Baltic States’ Security,” in Fortress Russia: Political, Economic, and Security Development in Russia Following the Annexation of 

Crimea and Its Consequences for the Baltic States, ed. Andis Kudors (Rīga, 

Latvia: The Centre for East European Policy Studies, 2016), 186.

39 “Questions and Answers About the East StratCom 

Task Force,” European Union External Action Service Web site, 

December 5, 2018, available at <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/

headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-theeast-stratcom-task-force_en>.

40 Helle Truuts, “Production of Electricity from Renewable 

Sources is Increasingly Important,” Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics 

Estonia 2 (2018), 45, 47.

41 Ibid., 46.

42 “Baltics Apply to Join Continental Europe Synchronous 

Area,” ERR News, September 19, 2018, available at <https://news.err.

ee/862521/baltics-apply-to-join-continental-europe-synchronousarea>.

43 “Gas Market,” Estonia Ministry of Economic Affairs and 

Communications, March 18, 2019, available at <www.mkm.ee/en/

objectives-activities/energy-sector/gas-market>.

44 “Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline Should Be Halted Says Foreign 

Minister,” ERR News, July 3, 2018, available at <https://news.err.

ee/843954/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-should-be-halted-saysforeign-minister>.

45 Andres Kasekamp, “Are the Baltic States Next? Estonia, Latvia, 

and Lithuania,” in Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, 

Deterrence and Reassurance, ed. Ann-Sofie Dahl (Washington, DC: 

Georgetown University Press, 2018), 66.

46 Brian Whitmore, “Comparative Rankings for Latvia, 40th and 

33rd,” in Putin’s Dark Ecosystem: Graft, Gangsters, and Active Measures

(Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis [CEPA], 

September 2018), 4, available at <https://1f3d3593-8810-425c-bc7f8988c808b72b.filesusr.com/ugd/644196_0e3c5d55af664f8b87d08eb2

047bba54.pdf>.

47 James Greene, “Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement and Outreach,” Chatham House briefing paper, June 2012, 9.

48 Ibid.

49 See Janis Berzins, “Macroeconomic Policy, Business Cycles, and 

Neoliberalism in Latvia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Latvia, 2015).

50 Janis Berzins, “Ignacio Rangel Visits Latvia: Crisis and the 

Political Economy of Duality,” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central 

and Eastern Europe 22, no. 1 (2014), 81–102.

51 Relative deprivation refers to the subjective judgment that one 

is worse off or deprived of some state or thing in comparison to some 

standard. See Robin M. Williams, Jr., “Relative Deprivation,” in The 

Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton, ed. Lewis 

A. Coser (New York: Routledge, 2017), 355–378.

52 Lukas Milevski, “Developments in Baltic Defense since Trump 

Took Office,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 17, 2018, 

available at <www.fpri.org/article/2018/04/developments-in-balticdefense-since-trump-took-office/>.

53 Dovydas Pancerovas, “The Rapid Reaction Force—The Sword 

of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Against Hybrid War” [Greitojo 

reagavimo pajėgos—Lietuvos kariuomenės kardas prieš hibridinį karą], 

15Min.lt, November 15, 2014, available at <www.15min.lt/naujiena/

aktualu/karo-zona/pirmasis-zvilgsnis-i-nauja-lietuvos-ginkla-kurissulauzytu-rusiska-hibridinio-karo-masina-784-466530>; Mindaugas 

Jasckevičius, “Created a Plan to Defend Against ‘Green People’” 

[Sukūrė planą, kaip gintis nuo „žaliųjų žmogeliukų“], Delfi.lt, October 

13, 2014, available at <www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/sukure-planakaip-gintis-nuo-zaliuju-zmogeliuku.d?id=66101804>.

54 Ben Hodges, J. Bugajski, and P. Doran, Securing the Suwałki 

Corridor: Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence, and Defense (Washington, 

DC: CEPA, 2018), available at <www.cepa.org/securing-the-suwalkicorridor>; Jim Maceda, “Why the Suwalki Gap Keeps Top U.S. 

General in Europe Up at Night,” NBC News, November 26, 2015, 

available at <www.nbcnews.com/news/world/why-suwalki-gap-keepstop-u-s-general-europe-night-n469471>; Agnia Grigas, “NATO’s 

Vulnerable Link in Europe: Poland’s Suwalki Gap,” Atlantic Council, 

2016, available at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-svulnerable-link-in-europe-poland-s-suwalki-gap/>.

55 Benjamin Haulenbeek, “Lithuanian KASP and U.S. SOF Train 

Irregular Warfare at Saber Junction 18,” Defense Visual Information 

Distribution Service, September 27, 2018, available at <www.dvidshub.

net/news/294586/lithuanian-kasp-and-us-sof-train-irregular-warfaresaber-junction-18>; Charles Kemper et al., “Design to Execution: Into 

the Suwalki Gap, Military Review ( January 2018), 6–19, available 

at <www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/OnlineExclusive/2018-OLE/Design-to-Execution/>.

56 Justinas Mickus, Lithuanian Grand Strategy and EU Defense 

Integration (Vilnius: Vilnius Institute for Political Analysis, 2018), 

available at <https://vilniusinstitute.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/J.-

Mickus-Lithuanian-Strategy-and-EU-Defence.pdf>.

57 It is also important to emphasize the difference in the military’s 

approach. The Western, especially American, approach is thoroughly 

offensive, while Lithuania’s is defensive. Before moving to any serious 

defense planning, this obstacle is a priority that must be overcome.

58 Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier, eds., Resistance 

Views: Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays on Unconventional Warfare and 

Small State Resistance (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special 

Operations University Press, 2018); Otto C. Fiala, ed., Resistance 

Operating Concept (Stockholm: Swedish Defence University, 2019). 

Yet all these changes should be seen with caution. Mostly these ideas 

originated in the special operations forces and strategic communication community. Considering that these communities are a small part 

of each nation’s armed forces, their voices do not represent mainstream approaches.

59 See “Agreement Among the Political Parties Represented in 

the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on the Lithuanian Defence 

Policy Guidelines,” Vilnius, Lithuania, September 10, 2018, available at 

<https://lrv.lt/uploads/main/documents/files/Partijų%20susitarimas%20

dėl%20Lietuvos%20gynybos%20politikos%20gairių%20EN.pdf>.
18 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

60 Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania, 

“On the Approval of the National Cyber Security Strategy” [Lietuvos 

Respublikos krašto apsaugos ministerija, Dėl Nacionalinės kibernetinio 

saugumo strategijos patvirtinimo], No. 12-01-459 (Vilnius, March 29, 

2018), available at <https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAP/93

1f8e20332711e8a149e8cfbedd2503?jfwid=-g0zrzeq1b>; “Lithuania 

Takes the 4th Position in the Global Cybersecurity Index,” The Baltic 

Word, April 1, 2019, available at <https://balticword.eu/lithuania-takesthe-4th-position-in-the-global-cybersecurity-index/>.

61 Šarūnas Černiauskas, “The Decision Is Made—The Conscripts Return to the Army” [Sprendimas priimtas—šauktiniai 

grįžta į kariuomenę], Delfi.lt, March 19, 2015, available at <www.

delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/sprendimas-priimtas-sauktiniai-griztai-kariuomene.d?id=67473984>; Tomas Jermalavičius, “Reinstating 

Conscription in Lithuania: Bringing Society Back into Defense?” in 

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Realities and Prospects: The Rīga Conference Papers 2017, ed. Andris Sprūds and Māris Andžāns (Rīga: Latvian 

Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 33–53.

62 “Lithuanians Have a Positive View of Conscription Service” 

[Lietuvos gyventojai teigiamai vertina šauktinių tarnybą], Lrt.lt, February 15, 2016, available at <www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/127959/

lietuvos-gyventojai-teigiamai-vertina-sauktiniu-tarnyba>; “Avoiding 

Military Service Is on the Rise: It Is Already Intimidating by Fines 

and and Tightening Search Tools” [Vengiančių karinės tarnybos 

daugėja: jau gąsdina baudomis ir griežtina paieškos priemones], Delfi.

lt, September, 21, 2019, available at <www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/

vengianciu-karines-tarnybos-daugeja-jau-gasdina-baudomis-ir-grieztina-paieskos-priemones.d?id=82285709>.

63 “We Are Entering a New Stage of Cooperation with Our 

Strategic Ally Poland, Minister of National Defense Republic of 

Lithuania R. Karoblis Says,” news release, January 19, 2020, available 

at <https://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/we_are_entering_a_

new_stage_of_cooperation_with_our_strategic_ally_poland_minister_of_national_defence_r._karoblis_says.html>; Saulius Jakučionis, 

“Pennsylvania Guard to Help Lithuanian Army Develop DivisionLevel HQ,” Lrt.lt, September 13, 2019, available at <www.lrt.lt/en/

news-in-english/19/1097218/pennsylvania-guard-to-help-lithuanianarmy-develop-division-level-hq>; Håkon Lunde Saxi, “British and 

German Initiatives for Defense Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary 

Force and the Framework Nations Concept,” Defense Studies 17, no. 2 

(2017), 171–197.

64 For an analysis of the concept, see Jonathan Dunn, The 

European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation: Implications for 

Transatlantic Security, INSS Strategic Forum 302 (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, 2020), available at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/

Documents/stratforum/SF-302.pdf>.

65 National Security Strategy 2017 (Vilnius: Ministry of National 

Defence Republic of Lithuania, May 28, 2002), available at <https://

kam.lt/en/defence_policy_1053/important_documents/strategical_

documents.html>.

66 “The Government Has Established Procedures for Monitoring 

Threats and Crisis Indicators” [Vyriausybė nustatė grėsmių ir krizės 

indikatorių stebėjimo tvarką], Office of the Government (Lithuania) 

Web site, July 19, 2019, available at <https://lrv.lt/lt/naujienos/vyriausybe-nustate-gresmiu-ir-krizes-indikatoriu-stebejimo-tvarka>.

67 In addition to this bureau, an important role in this domain 

falls to the Department of Mobilization and Civil Resistance under 

the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania. This department is 

responsible for management and administration of all institutions, 

including civilian, and in charge of mobilization, home nation support, 

and civil resistance. Yet it is also important to emphasize that the 

area of responsibility for this department is so wide that sometimes it 

leads to conflicting agendas. See <www.mobilizacija.lt/lt/struktura_

ir_kontaktai_563/kas_institucijos_567/mobilizacijos_departamentas_

prie_kam.html>.

68 Romas Švedas, “EU Energy Island – Characteristics, Threats, 

and How to Break Out of It: A Case Study of Lithuania,” Lithuanian 

Annual Strategic Review 15, no. 1 (2017), 179.

69 Dovilė Jakniūnaitė, Ramnas Vilpišauskas, and Romas Švedas, 

Energy Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Regional Coordination and 

Management of Independence (Vilnius: Vilnius University, 2015).

70 Interview with Romas Švedas, former vice minister of energy 

of Lithuania, lecturer at Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.

71 National Energy Independence Strategy (unofficial translation 

from Lithuanian to English), available at <http://enmin.lrv.lt/

uploads/enmin/documents/files/National_energy_independence_

strategy_2018.pdf>.

72 Deborah Haynes, “Lithuanians Train UK Troops to Fight Russian Propaganda,” The Times (London), November 1, 2016, available 

at <www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lithuanians-train-uk-troops-to-fightrussian-propaganda-gclw7jbbc>.

73 Michael Peel, “Fake News: How Lithuania’s ‘Elves’ Take 

on Russian Trolls,” Financial Times, February 4, 2019m available at 

<www.ft.com/content/b3701b12-2544-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf>; 

“Lithuanians Are Using Software to Fight Back Against Fake News,” 

The Economist, October 24, 2019, available at <www.economist.com/

science-and-technology/2019/10/24/lithuanians-are-using-softwareto-fight-back-against-fake-news>. 

74 European Integration Studies Centre, Lithuanian-Swedish 

Roundtable Expert Discussions on Social Resilience and Psychological 

Defence (Vilnius: European Integration Studies Centre, September 

2018), available at <http://www.eisc.lt/uploads/documents/files/EISC_

policy%20brief(1).pdf>.

75 “Lithuania Buying German Boxers for €386m,” Delfi.it, 

August 22, 2016, available at <https://en.delfi.lt/politics/lithuaniabuying-german-boxers-for-386m.d?id=72104106>; “Weapons Deals 

Up Capacity of Lithuanian Army to New Level,” Delfi.lt, December 

28, 2018, available at <https://en.delfi.lt/politics/weapons-deals-upcapacity-of-lithuanian-army-to-new-level.d?id=69960022>; “Lithuanian Air Force Experts Start Testing NASAMS in Norway,” Delfi.

en, October 4, 2019, available at <https://en.delfi.lt/politics/lithuanianair-force-experts-start-testing-nasams-in-norway.d?id=82430473>; 

“U.S. Approves Lithuania’s Purchase of Armoured Vehicles to Replace 

Ageing Humvees,” Lrt.lt, August 28, 2019, available at <www.lrt.lt/en/

news-in-english/19/1092132/us-approves-lithuania-s-purchase-ofarmoured-vehicles-to-replace-ageing-humvees>; Saulius Jakučionis, 

“Lithuania to Buy Six American Black Hawk Helicopters for Around 

€300m,” Lrt.lt, October 18 2019, available at <www.lrt.lt/en/newsin-english/19/1107999/lithuania-to-buy-six-american-black-hawkhelicopters-for-around-eur300m>.

76 “Personnel Facts and Data,” Lithuanian Ministry of National 

Defense Web site, available at <https://kam.lt/lt/personalo_

politika_512/skaiciai_ir_faktai_537.html>.

77 National Security Strategy 2017 (Lithuania).

78 Ieva Petronytė-Urbonavičiene, “Ar esame pasiryžę gintis? Visuomenės nusiteikimo priešintis užsienio agresijos atveju 

apžvalga,” in Ainė Ramonaitė, Ieva Petronyte-Urnonavičiene, Paulius 

Skirkevičius, Eugenijus Vosylius, Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? (Vilnius, 

Lithuania: Aukso zuvys, 2018), 38–72.

79 For a review of Nordic states’ (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) 

total defense concepts, see, Håkon Lunde Xasi, Bengt Sundelius, and 

Brett Swaney, Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications 

for the Baltic Sea Region, INSS Strategic Forum No. 304 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, January 2020), available at <https://ndupress.ndu.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 307 19 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional 

studies and engages in independent and leading-edge research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

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and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

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edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2074166/baltics-leftof-bang-nordic-total-defense-and-implications-for-the-baltic-sea-r/>.

80 Andres Kasekamp, “Are the Baltic States Next?” in Dahl, 

Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region, 64.

81 The Military Balance 2018 (London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, February 2018), 65–164; NATO, “Defense 

Expenditures of NATO Countries (2012–2019),” press release, June 

25, 2019, available at <www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/

pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf>. 

82 Robert M. Klein et al., Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO in 

Denial-Based Deterrence, INSS Strategic Forum No. 301 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, November 2019), 7, available at <https://inss.ndu.

edu/Media/News/Article/2010884/baltics-left-of-bang-the-role-ofnato-with-partners-in-denial-based-deterrence/>.

83 Adam Maisel and Laurynas Keturakis, Baltic Trainspotting: 

Railways and NATO’s Logistics Problem in Northeastern Europe (West 

Point, NY: The Modern War Institute, April 2, 2018), available at 

<https://mwi.usma.edu/baltic-trainspotting-railways-natos-logisticsproblem-northeastern-europe/>.

84 Ibid.

85 The BRELL ring refers Soviet-era electrical power network 

that connects Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. See 

“Baltic Power Synchronization is One of Key Projects for Europe – 

Ristori,” The Baltic Times, July 9, 2019, available at <www.baltictimes.

com/baltic_power_synchronization_is_one_of_key_projects_for_

europe_-_ristori/>.

86 “Putin Declares Exclave’s Energy ‘Independence’ as He Turns 

on LNG Tap,” Moscow Times, January 8, 2019, available at <www.

themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/08/putin-declares-exclaves-energyindependence-as-he-turns-on-lng-tap-a64069>.

87 The members of BEMIP include Denmark, Germany, Estonia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Sweden. Norway participates 

as an observer. See European Commission, Baltic Energy Market 

Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/

energy/en/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/baltic-energymarket-interconnection-plan>.

88 Additional funding was provided by the EU through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The CEF is an EU fund providing for 

pan-European infrastructure investments in transportation, energy, and 

digital projects, aimed at greater connectivity between EU members. 

See <https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/news-events/newsroom/cef-energy323-million-eu-funding-to-support-baltic-synchronisation-project>.

89 Dalia Bankauskaite, “Kremlin Targets Lithuania’s Energy 

Policy” (Washington, DC: CEPA, December 10, 2018), available at 

<https://www.cepa.org/kremlin-targets-lithuanias-energy-p>.
20 SF No. 307 ndupress.ndu.edu

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