MICHAEL PILLS

CHINA 

Debates the Future 

Security Environme
gy 

Contemporary Chinese predictions about Japan's ascendanc

decline will appear famalar but strangely anachronistic to 

the largely discredited American decltntst school of the late 

views will seem less famatar and even more disturbing, e.g., 

high likelihood of fairly large-scale "local wars" in the next fe

the belief that the weaker local p{m2ers can prevaa over strong

ones If the former adopt innovative and active military strateg

--Thomas J. Christensen, Massachusetts Institute of T

"The international politics of the twenty-first century will be s

considerable degree ~. the evolving relationship between t

and the People's Republic" of China. Yet we know surprisingly 

Chtna's top strategists think about us, about themselves, and a

in the world. In this fascinating and disturbing book, Micha

hundreds of recent Chinese books and articles to shed light o

important questions. Essential reading for anyone interested 

l]S.-CHtna relations." 

--Aaron L. Friedberg, Princeton University 

"This volume provides a useful reference for poltcymakers and 

offers an extensive cross-section of Chinese viewpoints and p

map of institutions, individuals, and publications which toge

part of contemporary (Thinese thinking on international secu

--Bates Gill,The Brookings Institution 
agenda critical to a more nuanced understanding of China

different are U.S. and Chinese assessments? How does each co

the other? How do language and metaphor constrain Chine

authoritative and influential are individual Chinese institute 

--Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard University 

"This book illustrates very well that open sources can be use

crucial intelligence issues like Chinese strategic thinking. F

policy of engaging China, we need to understand Chinese 

tions. Mike Ptllsbury's book is a major effort in that direction.

--The Honorable J'. Robert Kerrey, Senate Intelligenc

"Dr. Pillsbury has performed a public service by highlightin

experts are saying about the Middle Kingdom's security poli

tions and-- equally interesting--who they see as a threat to t

(namely, the United States). It is time we stopped pretendi

strategic partner and focused instead on what the Chinese 

selves. This book should be "must reading'for the next Presid

States and his security advisers." 

--The HonorableTrent Lott, Senate Majority Leader 

"Based on the reading of thousands of Chinese documents an

hours of Chinese-language interviews, Palsbury's ingeniou

best book on Chinese military and strategic thinking of recen

--ArthurWaldron, University of Pennsylvania 
Security Environment 
Don't debate... Once debate begins, things become 

--Deng Xiaoping 

Seek truth from facts 

--Deng Xiaoping quoting 

The inferior can defeat the superior 

--Fu Quanyou, Chief of Sta

of the People's Liberatio
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-93
Security Environm

MICHAEL PILLSBURY 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

20O0 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html. Inquiries and com

directed to ndupress@ndu.edu. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views 

Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U

agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permissio

a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appre

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ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to Superintendent 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. You may a

through the GPO website at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Pillsbury, Michael, 1945 - 

China debates the future security environment / Michael Pillsb

p. cm/ 

ISBN 1-57906-024-2 

1. China--Military policy. 2. National security'---China. 3. Wo

politics--1989- I. Title 

UA835.P55 1999 

355'.033051----dc21 

First printing, January 2000 

X 
Revisionist Multipolarity ................................... 

Challenging the Orthodox View ......................... 

The Orthodox Counterattack ........................... 

Techniques for Showing Dissent ........................... 

Differences Within the Orthodox Camp ....................

Post-Kosovo Debate ..................................... 

Shanghai's Elaborate Studies ............................... 

Fifty-Year Structures ............ .......................... 

Future Wars ............................................ 

Rivalries, Struggles, and Local Wars ....................

Sources of Wars ...................................... 

Deng Xiaoping Thought ............................... 

China's Role in Multipolarity ............................... 

Findings ............................................... 

The Basic Framework ................................. 

Debates ............................................. 

Regional Wars ....................................... 

. AaMERICA'S DECLINING ROLE .......................... 

Failure to Implement the RMA ............................. 

Future Military Weaknesses ................................ 

Weakness in Logistics ..................................... 

North Korea Can Defeat America ........................... 

Weaknesses in the Gulf War ............................... 

U.S. Aircraft Carrier Vulnerabilities .......................... 

Overall U.S. Decline ...................................... 

Loss of Allies ........................................... 

Self-Prophecy of Decline .................................. 

xi 
. 

. 

Impact of Militarism ................................. 

He Xin: A Dissenting View ............................ 

Military Development ................................ 

India ................................................. 

A Future Asian Great Power? .......................... 

Instabili9 T in South Asia ............................... 

Historical Rivalries ................................... 

The Enduring Relevance of History ..................... 

Findings .............................................. 

A WEAK RUSSIA'S FUTURE ............................ 

Rely on China .......................................... 

Debates on Russia ...................................... 

Development and Recovery ............................... 

Dangers in the Future Security Environment ...............

Russia's Response ....................................... 

Influence of the Kosovo Crisis ............................ 

Sino-Russian Relations ................................... 

Military Development .................................... 

"Secret" RMA Efforts ................................... 

Implications of the Soviet Collapse ......................... 

American Subversion? ................................... 

Moscow's Own Fault .................................... 

Findings .............................................. 

GEOPOLITICAL POWER CALCULATIONS ..........

Orthodox Versus Reform ................................. 

Origins ............................................... 

xii 
. 

The AMS Index System ............................... 

Foreign Methods .................................... 

The CASS Weighted Index Plan ........................ 

The AMS Dynamic Equation .......................... 

Calculating the Rise and Decline of Nations ............... 

Forecasts: Winners and Losers in 2020 ...................... 

CASS ............................................. 

.~blS .............................................. 

CNP Versus GDP Forecasts .......................... 

Other Predictions .................................... 

Findings .............................................. 

FORECASTING FUTURE WARS ........................ 

\W%ere Will Local Wars Occur? ............................ 

\g'%at Kind of Wars Could Affect China? .................... 

Institutional Affiliations of the Three Schools ................. 

Force Structure and the Three Schools ...................... 

People's War School ................................. 

Local War School .................................... 

The PdvLR Advocates ................................ 

Three Mutually Exclusive Scenarios ......................... 

The R~vLA in China ...................................... 

R_~vL& Forecasts ..................................... 

The R_~vL& and the United States ........................ 

Asymmetric War .................................... 

Advocates .......................................... 

Proposals and Programs .............................. 

National Conferences ................................. 

xiii 
Investments Recommended by RMA Advocates ...

Investments Recommended by Power Projection Ad

Investments Recommended by People's War Advoca

Findings .............................................. 

. CONCLUSIONS ....................................... 

Multiple Debates ........................................ 

The Rate of Multipolarization .......................... 

The Pace of U.S. Decline .............................. 

The Future Powers .................................. 

The Roles of Japan and Russia ......................... 

Future Wars ........................................ 

A Clear Picture ......................................... 

Warring States .......................................... 

Aa'nerica's Decline ....................................... 

Future Nation',d Power ................................... 

Threats from Japan and India .............................. 

Partnership with Russia .................................. 

Forecasting Future Wars ................................. 

Sensitive Debates ....................................... 

ACRONYMS .............................................. 

CHINESE LANGUAGE BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................

APPENDIX 1: THE DEFINITION OF 

STR_&TEGIC ASSESSMENT ............................. 

APPENDIX 2: ASSESSMENT INSTITUTIONS ............

INDEX OF CHINESE AUTHORS ........................... 

ABOUT TI tE AUTHOR .................................... 

xiv 
own unique perceptions, which may be difficult to appreciate. 

The risk of mirror imaging our own views was an issue also 

study of the Soviet Union. ,Andrew Marshall, Director of the 

Assessment, cautioned against assuming that a foreign nat

assessment is merely a reflection of America's: "Soviet calcula

to make different assumptions about scenarios and objectiv

different calculations, use different measures of effectiveness, an

different assessment processes and methods. The result 

assessments may substantially differ from ~American assessment

cautionaD, note also applies to understanding Chinese asses

future. 

This study offers over 600 selected quotations from the w

200 Chinese authors published from 1994 to 1999. Analysis and 

are kept to a minimum so that the Chinese may speak for the

Chinese scholars assisted with this study by providing hard-to-

articles unfamiliar to most Westerners. Half the authors were 

China. They explained some of the viewpoints in recent deb

future securit 3, environment. Debates in China are generally 

frequently authors pretend they do not exist. Conflicting vi

future nevertheless exist and merit attention if we are to u

premises of China's national strateD- and set a baseline from wh

any future change in those premises. 

Chinese policy debates are not easy to understand fully. W

in the past two decades have suggested various approaches. T

Chinese quotations in this study is based on the analytical fou

the pioneering scholarship of A. Doak Barnett, Thomas J

;Andrew W. Marshall, '% Program to Improve .analytic Methods Related to 

Poli~ Ssences (November 1982): 48. 

XV 
University (NDU), and other research organizations affilia

People's Liberation .6a'my (PLA), or civilian analysts from leadin

institutes, such as the China Institute of Contemporary" Internatio

(CICIR). 4 

~A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Poao, in China (Boulder, CO: Hnlt

Thomas j. Cb_fistenseal, UseflIAdversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobiliwtion, 

Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: princeton University Press, 1996). Carol Lee H

the Challenge of the l')¢ture, Changing Political Patterns ('Boulder, CO: kVest~'i

Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy ('New 

University Press, 1996); ,adastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic C

Slrotegyin Chinese Histog' (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Samu

in and Out of the Changing World Order (princeton: Center of Internationa

Kenneth Lieberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (.Ann Arb

Chinese Studies No. 33, 1978); H. Lyman Miller, "Politics inside the Ring R

and Comparisons," in Decision-Makdng in Deng's China, Perspectives from Inside

Ham~ and Suisheng Zhao (Arnlonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Michel Oksen

of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy," The China .Q

(lanuary-March 1974): 1-39; Jonathan D. Pollack, "file Sino-Soviet Riva

Security Debate (Santa Monica: Rand, 1982, R-2907-AF'); Gilbert Rozman, T

About Sotiet Socialism, 1978-1985 (Princeton: Princeton Universily Press, 19

Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Polig', Theo[7 and 

University Press, 1994); David Shambaugh, Beaut~d Imperialist: China Percei

1990 (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Michael D. Swaine, The 

Milita D' in National Seocrit), Poli~makdng (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation

Whiting o China E)'esJapan ('Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)

Zagoria, The Sino-Sodet Cot~ict 1956-1961 (princeton: Princeton Univers

especially "A Note on Methodology." 

"~Background on these institutes is provided in appendix 2. 

*Hxis book's bibliography lists over 300 Cltinese books about filture warfa

security environment. In addition, more than 100 Chinese military and civil

interviewed during eight visits to Beijing and Shanghai from March 1995 t

Forty relevant articles appear in Michael Pillsbury., ed., Chinese Views 

(XVashington: National Defense University.- Press, 1997). 

xvi 
leaders are naturally suspicious of foreign powers. They belie

leaders tend to be reluctant to welcome China's rise in world aff

prefer to delay or obstruct its progress. They fear that many 

world would prefer to divide China if given the opportuni

leaders retain in their minds a strategic map of the points on 

that make them vulnerable to foreign influence. ''6 

Two important influences on Chinese assessments are M

doctrine (though it is seldom mentioned explicitly) and China

particularly its ancient historical statecraft. As will be di

Prologue, Chinese authors are heirs to a 5,000-year-old writ

statecraft that has been distilled into a few classic texts, v Embed

writing about the future are extensive references to this an

These allusions are often mistranslated. If the translator selects 

language phrases, the translation will lose the reference to a sp

meaning that was intended and that would be familiar 

Obviously, this study cannot impart the subtle details of the e

Chinese ancient statecraft and its uses in China today, 

references to it will be pointed out. Indeed, in order to perm

encounter Chinese views without delay, a number of issues ha

in the Prologue and appendixes: appendix 1 defines wha

5William Burr, ed., The Kissinger TranscnNs (New York: The New Press, 19

57. 

6Michd Oksenberg, Taiu.an, Tibet, and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relati

Institute tbr International Studies, Stanford University, 1997), 56. 

'See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realirm, Strategic Culture and C.rand Strate

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 

xvii 
difficult to attain a true understanding of the context and what 

words actually signify to the Chinese. There are at least fou

understanding Chinese views to keep in mind. 

Predse Translation 

Readers unfamiliar with the Chinese language may not appreci

a range of choice an interpreter has in translating Chinese 

ideographic symbols, the semantic content of which has develop

year-old cultural framework. For example, the Chinese word d

translated as "ideology," "thinking, .... thoughts," and "doctrine," 

choices. Chinese verbs have no tense, so tense must be indicat

and Chinese nouns do not indicate singular or plural, again relyin

Some translation issues create only minor misunderstandin

be more significant. An example may help. Chinese writings on 

warfare and the revolution in military affairs (Ra\£~_) frequen

Chinese ideograms to signify something that can be used in a 

surprise and overwhelm the enemy, vital parts of exploiting t

three ideograms (sha shoujian) literally mean "kill," "hand," a

word for club, or "mace." U.S. Government translations have 

term as "trump card," "magic weapon," or "killer mace." N

translations is wrong, but none captures the full meaning. The i

the term can be seen in its continued usage over time, both 

traditional Chinese novels and ancient statecraft texts, as well a

daily military newspaper. Behind these three ideograms may lie 

victory in warfare through possession of secret weapons t

enemy's most vulnerable point (called an acupuncture point), a

decisive moment. This entire concept of how R.~VL& technolo~- 

cannot be fully conveyed by its simple English translation of "

xviii 
p

environment and to disseminate this in confidential Party 

members. The line may be unclear between narrow doctri

scholars are expected to accept uncritically and broad area

debated. Foreign readers, even if they know the Chinese languag

lost in the woods if unfamiliar with Party" context--whi

ideologically mandated and which are open to debate. One clue 

there is extensive repetition by Chinese authors of "boiler plate

describing the future. Such repetition probably signals quotation

Party documents, but to foreign readers such terms may a

uncanny coincidence of the same phrases used by dozens of C

The Party seems ambivalent about open debates. For 

leaders have even debated whether or not to have open deb

anniversary on May 11, 1998, of the publication of the article, 

Sole Criterion of Testing Truth," led to numerous pieces in the 

commemorating the debate over economic reform and openi

ignited by the article. 8 Not only do the), now praise the past d

8.e-,ome policy dehate~ are not disclosed. For example, an article in the .%'e

China's bid to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), reported, 

official, acknowledging for the first time that many lower level Chinese o

nation's proposed entry to the WFO, said in newspaper reports published o

government would begin a broad campaign to try to temper the internal 

now, Beijing's stance has been to pretend no opposition c:dsted, even tho

officials are known to be tmhappy at the prospect of more open competition 

compatfies, one of the consequences of joining the trade organization." S

Seeks to Win Over Dissenters on Joining Trade Group," New York T

Business Section, June 8, 1999. 

Not only do Chinese analysts generally not admit publicly to the existen

usually the)" do not even refer to, let alone criticize, other author's views in 

example, at the end of 1997, the Center for Peace and Development i

conference on the situation in the Asia Pacific in which more than 15 Chi

xix 
review in Ching Pao, the book broke all of the norms of C

debates. "It criticizes people by name in total disregard of 

feelings..~1 parties involved in the sword crossing in the book 

directly by name and by the title of their works rather than b

commenting on people's opinions as was usually the case in t

been calculated that over 100 articles were cited. Even Renmin n

[Par~" Central Committee publications] were cited. It is really c

spearhead is directed against. ''t~ 

a variety of restitutions presented different opinions without direct debate am

See "1997 man Yatai xingshi nianzliong yantaohui" (Die 1997 year-end sy

situation in the Asia-Pacific), Hepmgyufa.'(.ban (Peace and Development), 63

1998): 8-13. A similar conference on the international political situation

analysts, also lacked direct debate. "1997 nian guoii zhengzhi xmgshi yant

deng" (Viewpoints as presented at the seminar on t_h.e international political s

Shifiejinffiy¢ ~heng.~hi (World Economics and Politics) 209, no. 1 ([January 1

~'Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, "Part), Schools Commemorate Debate on 

Truth;' May 14, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-CHI

1998. See also, "PRC Marks 20th ~amniversary of Ideological Debate," 

Domestic Service, May 3, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-123, May 6, 1998, and "Free 

to Reform," China Daily, May 5, 1998, 4. 

l°Ma Licheng and Ling Zhizhun, Jiaofeng (Crossing swords)(Beijing.: China T

House, March 1998). 

HAccording to the Chin A Pao, the editor-in-chief of the Chinese periodical Z

criticized by the book, retaliated by "accusing the authors of 'bullying' 'ba

'breathing strong as a bull,' and 'becoming arrogant and overbearing.' " 

'"Jiaofeng (Crossing swords) Gives Rise to Confrontation, Puts the 

'Dilemma'," Chhg Pa0 (The Mirror), August 12, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-224, 

XX 
know in order to understand what is really meant. 

The Taboo on Open Discussion of Future Chinese Securi

This obstacle can truly confuse foreign readers. China's f

international politics (which Western scholars often assume will b

is seldom mentioned. One explanation is that this sensitive s

dealt with only in secret Pa W documents, not in the open sour

journals upon which this study completely relies. Glimpses of 

documents sometimes come as "leaks" to the press. In 1994, a 

magazine, Cheng Min~ disclosed that a confidential report abo

2000 to 2010, "War to be Won," had been circulated to Part3." me

Policy Research Office of the Chinese State Council, the Po

Office of the Central Military Commission, and the Policy Resea

the Communist Party" Central Committee. The main points are 

Comprehensive National Power (CNP) will be among the top 

world and that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be unif

gross national product (GNP), excluding Taiwan, is estimate

about U.S. $2.5 trillion by 2010. China will have two to four ai

and a PLA of 1.5 million, reduced from today's 3 million. By 2

12The Warring States era (475-221 B.C.), which produced some of the cla

statecraft, was a period when a multistate competition to become "heg

stratagems, small wars, interstate conferences, treaties, and what West

international relations would label "anarchy." 

13According to Professor Allen S. ~qliting, "Although Cbeng Ming is a Hong 

has a good track record of acquiring authentic PRC classified documents." A

"East .Asian Military ,ex'~calrifies Dynamics" Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stan

Februat 3, 1995, 49, footnote 9. 

xxi 
States uses force to meddle in China's sovereignty and inte

China will certainly fight a war against aggression, thus leading 

Sino-U.S. war. China must be prepared for this. With the ch

international situation, the United States will make use of island

space, and resources and will encourage and support Japanese m

provoking a war against China .... China is the U.S. number o

adversary at the turn of this century. China must make 

preparations against the invasive war and military attacks unlea

United States under any pretext] "s 

If authentic, these documents represent rare samples o

confidential forecasts Part T members may be reading about Chin

that cannot be discussed in open books and journals. 

These obstacles need not prevent all understanding, but 

limit the probabili~" of fully comprehending China's assessme

an appropriate attitude to adopt in anv attempt to under

assessments. The need for further research and more extensi

should be kept in mind. 

PREVIEW OF FINDINGS 

The central finding of this study is that China has develope

detailed picture of the future securiD" environment. The conc

provides details about the range of Chinese debates on the 

future. The extent of the debate is very, restricted when co

:~Cheng Ming (May 1994): 1. 

:SLi Tzu-ching. "CPC "Drinks China and United States kVi]l Eventually Go to 

no. 235 (May 1997): 15-16; in FBIS-CHI-97-126. 

xxii 
ideological authors on sensitive issues. These debates are an im

improving U.S. understanding of China) v Western understand

debates has improved since 1949 because of the remarkable e

few scholars, mostly Chinese who have emigrated to the U

Americans. This study highlights veiled debates between 

orthodox authors on: 

• The future world structure in 2010-2030 

• The rate of America's decline 

• The future hierarchy of the major world powers in 2

• Locations and causes of future wars 

• Consequences of the ILMA 

• Prospects for Russia, India, and Japan. 

teFor examples of U.S. debates about the future, see Wendell Bell, Foundatio

(New Brtmswick, N J: Transaction PubLishers, 1987); Joseph k. Coates,John 

Andy Hines, 2025: Scenarios of U.S. and Global Society Reshaped ~ Sd

(Greensboro, NC: Oakhill Press, 1997); and the annual publication, Earl H

World Vie~. The 1998 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (Car

U.S. An'ny War College, February 26, 1998). See also articles in Futures 

published by the World Future Society. 

1VAn example of how differences between reform and orthodox views 

development resulted in "complications" was the debate over political and 

in the late 1980s, leading up to Tiananmen protests in 1989. For a discussio

Benedict Stavis, "Contradictions in Communist Reform: China before Ju

ScienceQuarted)' 105, no. 1 (1990): 31-52. The ~'esteru press reported in 

concenfillg political refoml was once again emerging in China. See Steven 

Blossoms in Beijing Spring, Open Discussion of Reform Spread to Univer

Washington Post, April 19, 1998, A1, A26; and Eric Eckholm, "Chinese 

Refoma Stirs Hopes for More Debate:' The New York Times, August 23, 1

xxiii 
p

Science and the reforrn-minded Chinese Academy of S

According to the military forecast, China's CNP by 2020 will 

that of the United States in a multipolar structure. Russia, Euro

will be "poles" three, four, and five, each with half the power le

the United States or China. According to the "'reform" dd~'a

United States will lose its hegemony not to China but to J

national power will grow equal to that of the United States by 2

closely by Germany. The a'dlians rate China only as number eigh

even one of the top five "poles." China and Russia score only 

the United States and Japan. Given these calculated power s

analysts of the future focus intensively on assessing the inten

and the United States toward China, especially the str

"slanderous" and dangerous "China Threat Theou," in 

Washington. 

China foresees a turbulent mul@olar world. In contrast to 

Western debates about scenarios from the 'long boom" to a mo

world," since 1986, China's Communist Par~" has had an almo

assessment of an "inevitable" multipolar future. .8 This Chine

draws heavily on both Maoist, pre-Gorbachev Marxist-Leninis

Chinese statecraft. It sees a relative decline in U.S. power so 

will be "multipolar," much like the Warring States era. 2u-n

alliances will weaken, the United States will decline to beco

l~For Peter Schwartz' vision to 2020 of "unabashed technological optimism

"Long Boom or Bust for Leading Futurist," ,New York Times, June 1, 1998. A 

is Richard Kugler, Toward a Da*~erous ll~'orld" U.S. National Sec*¢ri(y Strat

T, id~dence (Santa Monica, CA: The tLaiND Corporation, 1995), 101-160. A

includes Melville C. Branch, "Why We Simulate Long-Range Futures," The 

(.April 1998): 52. 

xxiv 
already been adopted by "most countries," including Russia

United States or Japan. m Without a new "system," turmoil like t

Warring States era will continue indefinitely. "Systems" tend to 

years, according to some Chinese authors. 

China calcMates power ratios and predicts American dec~'ne. An

statecraft from the Warring States era emphasizes the need to c

power ratios mathematically. Chinese national securinr research 

quantitatively analyzed the relative power of the nations of this i

"world structure" in which the United States will decline 

socially, militarily, and internationally to become one of five 

"multipolar world." Nothing can save the United States from th

will include serious conflict with its former NATO and Jap

failure to exploit the coming RMA, and a fading away of al

alliances. Orthodox Chinese analysts predict that 15 to 20 

sufficient; reformers argue that it may take longer. U.S. influe

said to be declining because the multipolar power of other nati

U.S. ambition. A domestic Chinese radio broadcast explained, 

the United States is currently the most developed count~, in 

does not mean that it can dominate everything as it please

19Said to date from a 1954 agreement between Cb.hla and India, they are M

Territorial Integrity,, Nonaggression, Noninterference, Equality and Mu

Peaceful Coexistence. India ,iolated them 8 years later and had to be taught a 

as did Russia (1969) and Vietnam (1979). 

Zhongcheng, "Emerging China's Role in World Politics," Contertrpora[y Int

8, no. 2 (February 1998): 16. Li is a Research Professor in the Division for 

Studies at CIC1R. 

XXV 
States may already be maneuvering to prevent ("contain") China 

this new multipolar world in which China's CNP continues to 

closer to that of the United States. Orthodox authors argue that 

for the United States to "contain" China. They say U.S. military 

defeated through ancient strategic techniques known colle

inferior defeats the superior" ~),tm0 shengqiang). Conversely, other 

that the inevitable process of Aanerica's decline has not gon

senior analyst created a probability" chart of alternative policie

pursue in order to delay tbr 10 years any U.S. milita~" actions 

force against a rising China to preserve American hegemony. A

warns that this dangerous threat to China from the United 

arrive until the decade 2020 to 2030, when the United States 

the implications of becoming inferior to Chinese national 

orthodox and reform authors recommend tactical accommoda

partnership) with the United States. However, both fear tha

Threat Theory gains more influence in America, the United Stat

so alarmed by China's rise that Washington will decide t

strategic deception, or even attack China in order to preserve U

China's ancient statecraft urges the development and use of surprise 

to win wars, a theo{y that today @pears to ip~uence China's view of 

~lYuan Bingzhong~ "The Challenges the United States Confronts \X,qtile Ad

Policy," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, December 17, 1997, in F

December 20, 1997. 

22Wu Rusong, "Zhanguo shidai duoji douzheng de zhanlue sLxiange' (M

thought in the Warring States era), Zhongguojumhi kexue (China Military 

('~hater 1994): 126. Colonel Wu stated in an interview with the author in Au

directs the ancient strategy section of the Strategy Department at ,~'vlS m B

suggests parallels to the present. 

xxvi 
and Japan will surpass the United States in exploiting the R

Thus, the effect of the RMA will reinforce the current "ine

toward multipolarig, and the end of ~6a'nerica's superpower sta

Fu#tre Wa~are 

There is some evidence that there are three distinct schools of debate abo

future wa~are China will most probab~, face. There is not a direct d

study labels the different schools of thought the "PcMA" advocat

War" advocates, and the more traditional "People's War,

Defense," advocates. The tLMA advocates complain that C

milita~" modernization is too slow and ought to be aim

leapfrogging the other major powers. Since the mid-1980

advocates have been seeking to reduce ground forces and de

na W and air force. The advocates of continuing Chairman Mao'

Active Defense and People's War focus on ideological training

an-ned infantry, and a national defense mobilization base. 

There may be a tacit ~'nk among these three schools of thought and 

the future security environment. RMA advocates would prevail in a 

if forecasts of the future emphasized that China would face no 

major land invasions but would need to defend itself after two de

a United States bent on dismembering China to prevent it fro

U.S. hegemony. Local War advocates benefit from forecasts t

indeed be challenged in the near term----such as by aggressio

border with India or Vietnam, or in the South China Sea, or by 

of independence by Taiwan. People's War advocates benefit f

that focus on the suspicious intentions of major powers (Japan 

States) to invade or to dismember, justifying a 3-million-stro

militia mobilization base. 

xxvii 
, y p, yy p

States as a future long-term rival and even potential military op

Chinese note, however, that such changes were routine in the 

era. 

There remain untested ideological taboos. One cannot publicly f

scenarios. No Chinese author can today openly argue that the 

will grow relatively stronger than other major powers; U.S

improve with capitalist Europe or Japan;Japan will weaken or r

pacifist nation under its Peace Constitution; "multipolarity

China is unlikely; or it is wrong to suspect the United States of 

hegemon seeking to dismember China's Tibet or Taiwan, becau

to receive 70 percent of China's exports, remains among the to

investors in China, and pledges to reduce arms sales to Taiwa

One taboo prohibits forecasts or debates about China's own future 

sharp contrast to widespread Western interest and writ

consequences of the rise of China, this subject cannot be 

Chinese analysts beyond certain boilerplate phrases used by se

international fora. There is no discussion of alternative scenarios 

of China as a great power. Analysts only repeat platitudes 

never be a superpower, never seek hegemony, and always be a 

and stability, a4 Foreign commenta~, suggesting that China m

22By 1986, an open source article described many of the key tenets of the c

of a multipolar world structure. See Gao Heng, "Shijie zhanlue geju zh

fazhan" (Development of global strategic multipolari~), Guofang dax'u

Defense University Journal), no. 2 (1986): 32-34. 

24For example, see Hu Ping, "Heping fazhan shi Zhongguo de changqi 

(Peaceful development is China's long-term strategic orientation), G

(hltemational Strategic Studies) 46, no. 4 (October 1997): 4-6. Hu Ping is 

at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS). 

xxviii 
challenges are emphasizedY' China's leaders repeatedly war

should be worried about China as a rising military" power. Li P

will take more than 30 years for China to achieve modernizati

the China Threat Theory is not an objective view. It was spread 

:SForeign critics of China may be rebutted by name and accused of "sl

Journals regularly assess the views of U.S. experts on China. The published 

U.S.A.mbassador to China James Lilley has been criticized frequently in p

Coming Confli,.t With China, by Richard Bemstein and Ross H. Munro, was ha

China. For example, see Mi Zhenyu, "Stupid Lies--CommentaD- on 'The 

With China' " (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Sen:ice, April 17, 

article in Clnha Youth, a collecti(m oft_he views of leading analysts at CICIR, N

Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing University., and other instituti

chtmgtu ji jiang daolai maY' (Is a Sino-U.S. conflict coming?), Zbongguo qingni

no. 8 (1997): 8-11. Even Russians must be criticized if they perceive a th

"Some extreme nationalists in Russia also made trouble... [promoting] th

getting weaker and China getting stronger." Shi Ze, "Lun xin shiqi de Z

(Perceptions of Sine-Russian relations in the new era), Guoji wentiyanfiu CInte

60, no. 2 (April 1996): 7. "l'here are also examples of Americans and Brit

discussed a potential "China threat" and were then denied visas in the 199

President of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). 

:~Chen Zhongjing, Guoji .Thanlue ~,enti (problems of international strateg

chubanshe, 1988), 310-311. Chen, born in 1915, is one of the most disti

strategic experts. Chert has been President of the Institute of International 

Director of CICIR, a research institute affiliated with the Ministry" of State S

he served as a vice minister of the Chinese foreign intelligence service. 

2"For example, see/via Hong and Sun Shangqing, eds., Jingii baipishu: Zhong

@anwang: 1995-1996 (Economic white paper. China's economic situation and 

1996)(Beijmg: Zhongguo fazhan cbubanshe, 1996); Shi Bike, Zhot~uo 

megatrends)( Belling: Hualing chubanshe, 1996). For warnings on the 

increasing national power, see Ma Jinsheng, Junshi qipian (Military decept

kexue chubanshe, 1992). 

xxix 
States. They call for maintaining strategic alertness and instit

precautions against China. They fabricate and publish all kin

and stir up all kinds of 'cases' for which there is no factual evid

to create strategic opinion for the 'China threat,' 'alertness again

'precautions against China,' in a bid to attain their strategic and 

in the world, Asia, and China (including Taiwan). ''29 Chinese 

the reaction of countries in the Asia-Pacific region to the deve

milita~" force and a potential China Threat is one reason that 

an aircraft carder was postponed to the 2000-2005 Five-Year Pl

to one officer, '%Ve'e do not want our neighbors to misread the 

we need an aircraft carrier if we are to complete plans to moder

We have no plans to threaten anyone with an aircraft carrier. ''

~'Li Peng on Domestic, International Affairs," Beijing Xinhua Domestic S

1996, in FBIS-CH1-96-002,January 3, 1996. Former Premier Li Peng added, 

practice hegemonism nor seek any spheres of influence. Even when it ge

future, it will, as always, maintain friendly relations with other countries." 

2'~Chu Shulong, "Sino-US Relations Pushed into Perilous Waters," Shijie zhis

1999): 9-10; in FBIS-CHI-1999-0622,June 23, 1999. See also Song Qiang, 

and Qiao Bian, Zbongguo kgi shuo bu----Lengghan hou shidai de zhengzhi yu qingg

say no---post-Cold War political emotional options)(Beijing: Zhonghua 

chubanshe, 1996), 6. The introduction states that "stemming both from 

different ideological xdews, as well as from its ultra-hegemonic efforts to uni

the world, the United States has iucreasingly shown agony and uneasiness 

of China . . . a big conspiracy on the part of the free world directed at Ch

ferment and brew.... It is said to be a conspiracy because what the United 

thing and what it does is another." 

3°Quoted in Patti Beaver, "China WtU Delay .AArc~aft Carrier" Jane's Defen

1998. 

XXX 
Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Adamshin's rhetorical que

injecting ideology into foreign policy so dangerous?... It is no 

to suppose oneself the bearer of historical truth, the possessor 

the future. ''32 Nor has any Chinese yet followed Gorbache

November 2, 1987, which challenged the I,eninist view o

politics by suggesting that capitalist nations can do without 

neocolonialism) 3 Allen Lynch concluded after this speech, "

speak of the emergence.., of a new Soviet theory of internatio

while Sylvia Woodby referred to it as a "new world view. ''34 N

China's commitment to its version of Mar:4sm ruks out the pub

Western international tffations conWots to assess the fi~ture security en

ideology prohibits using certain concepts to assess the future. D

security advisor on the State Council, Huan Xiang, wrote 

"bourgeois theories of international relations" were to serve 

imperialist foreign policies. 3s One well-known Chinese ana

3'Quoted m Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of ldeoloe~ in Semet Fore

CO: West~,iew Press, 1989), 36. 

32Ibid., 16, 17. 

33See Gorbachev's anniversary speech of November 2, 1987, on Moscow te

November 3, 1987. Cited in Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology' in S

~Allen Lynch, Gorbacbev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Poh'lica

York Institute of East-West Security Studies, 1989), 37; and Woodby, Gorba

of Ideology , 23. See also Galia Golan's work on the subject, Gorbachev's 

Tommm (New York: Praeger, 1990; published with the Center for Strategic 

Studies, Washington). 

3SI-luan Xiang, "Preface to the Chinese Translation of Dougherty and Pfaltz

Theories of International Rdations," Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), no. 

xxxi 
Chinese textbooks state that bourgeois states are greedy and constan

intem,'ention; thg' ate blocked from this course one' ~' the sociah'st states, 

and dez.elopment. Students in China from high school on are exam

principles. Liang Shoude headed the commission that drafte

syllabus m international politics for -all universities. Chinese 

rejected Western international relations theo~', including the sch

known as Realism or Neo-Realism, which began to be discus

China. 3s 

In contrast to Western research that suggests miscalculation and m

may be the leading cause of war, Chinese ana~,sts a~;'ert that %rambk

causes war. "Economic factors are.., the most fundamental c

:'%Vang Shuzhong, "The Post-War International System," in As China Sees th

of Chinese Scholars, ed. Harish Kapur (London: Francis Pinter Publishers, 19

S"Liang Shoude and Hong Yimxian, Guoji zbeng~hi.xTce gailun (General theor

politics)(Beijing: Zhongyang bianshi chubanshe, 1994). 

3~See Chu Shulong, "Guanyu guoji guan:dxue xueke lianshe de ji ge went

concerning the establistunent of the subject of international relations), X

(Contemporary. International Relations) 66, no. 4 (April 1995): 59-63; Yang Zh

guanxixue de yanjiu duixiang wenti" (A tentative analysis of the objec

international relations), Xiandaiguojiguanai (Contcmpora D' International l~.

(April 1995): 64-67; and David Shan*baugh and Wang Jisi, "Research on Int

in the Peoples Republic of China." P3" (Fall 1984): 738-64. According to an in

with Wang Jisi in June 1995, the first article on Western theory, was by Ch

"Western International Relations Tlieor)e' in Research on International Proble

CIIS. Chu has a Ph.D. from George Washington University; Wzmg, from O

xxxii 
Will another 25 years of Sino-American "strategic dialogue" 

to-military exchanges eliminate the Chinese misperceptions ide

study? American exchange programs have been effective an

increased in the future. However, China may not be willing to m

dearly held beliefs about traditional statecraft and the future. 

39Liu Mingde, "Changes in the Forms of War and Their Implications After th

of the Bipolar Pattern," International Strategic Stu&'es 24, no. 2 (June 1992): 9. 

Fellow at CIISS. 

4°Chen Feng, "1997 nian di guoji zhardue xingshi" (1~he Strategic situatio

~banlueyanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. l(January 1998): 3

interviews, Colonel Chen served in the Situation Room of the Chinese mi

headquarters in Beijing. He is now at the Chinese mission to the United Natio

xxxiii 
statecraft. The Chinese language is rich in idioms from anci

Moreover, Chinese writing about the future security environment 

future in terms of the Warring States era in Chinese history) The 

the classics of Chinese statecraft were produced was a time whe

competition to become 'qaegemon" featured stratagems, small w

conferences, treaties, and what Western scholars of internati

would label "anarchy." One set of "lessons" (among many

become a hegemon; another was how to survive destruction a

a predator)- hegemon. 

One specific Chinese premise from the ancient statecraft o

States era seems to influence Chinese authors who write abo

States today--the concept of how to diagnose and deal wi

"%egumon'" (ha) that seeks to dominate several other less power

way hegemons conducted themselves during the Warring St

ancient China forms one of the sources of the classic lesso

statecraft. Unfortunately, lessons from Chinese statecraft abou

a predatory hegemon are little known in the West, and there i

Westerners to the famous stories in Chinese traditional stat

known to all our authors. 2 According to interviews with Ch

1The Warring States era (475-221 B.C.) was "the flowering age for the C

exerted a definite influence on works of later centuries," according to K. L. 

Chinese Fables (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1993), 8. 

2A forthcon~ study for OSD Net Assessment discusses Chinese military w

since 1993 on the contemporary relevance of ancient Chinese statecra

following books: Samhiliufigujin tan (Ancient and modem discussions on th

Zhisheng taolue--Su. 7J zha.zheng zhLvingguanlun (Strategies of superiority~q

knowledge and action in war), Bu ~han er qu rot Z4n" bing--Zhongguo gudai xin

~g (Conquest without combat--ancient Chinese psychological warfare tho

Zhongguo ]idai ~han~heng gailan (An outline of warfare in past Chinese dyn

XXXV 
product of the multipolar world structure in China 2500 y

"there are a surprising number.of similarities between Sun Zi

contempora~' multipolar trend,"and that "in the 1990s, the w

multipolar era ve~ similar to the time of Sun Zi. ''3 General G

Vice President of the Academy of Milita~- Science (A_MS), wri

is "extremely distant from modem times, but still shines wi

math" and "the splendid militaw legacy created through the b

of our ancient ancestors... [today] has a radiance even more 

Others claim that China should study "treasuries" of strat

Warring States. Many books have been published in the la

revival of interest in ancient statecraft has been officially ble

commission of China's generals. The director of research at th

Department of the People's Liberation ,am-ny published six volu

on ancient statecraft in 1996 that contained specific advi

comprehend the current and future security" environment, s 

s~-----Shujiayu)4,~ia dej~oliang (Power stratagems--a contest of losers an

bingfayu sanshiliuji (Sun Zi's the art of war and the thirt3"-six stratagems), Z

jingcui (The essence of the ancient Chinese Art of war), Sun Zi bingfa de ddanna

studies on Sun Zi's the art of war), and Ershiwu lijunshi mouluegushijingxuan 

stories on ancient military strategy). 

3Liu Chungzi, "Sun Zd yu dangdai junshi douzheng" (Sun Zi and cont

struggles), Zbongguojunshi kexue (China Military. Science) 33, no. 4 (Winter 

4Gao Rui, Zhongguo shanggujunsbi shi (Chinese ancient military, history)(Bei

chubanshe, 1995), 2. 

5See the three two-volume sets by Chai Yuqiu, Mouluefia (Strategists), M

theories), and Moulue ku (Treasury. of strategies)CBeijing: Guangxi renmin 

XXXVi 
, , 

strength was greater, war should be avoided. Colonel Wu Chu

writes that these six points "are relatively complete, they si

epitome of [today's concept of] Comprehensive National Powe

However, much like current times, Chinese ancient str

attempted to help their country achieve dominance through 

methods. According to Wu Chunqiu, calculating CNP can aid 

just for war but also to "coordinate a political and diplomatic 

psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them

one's own CNP can also aid a country in promoting developmen

Two studies by the late Herbert Goldhamer of the tLRND 

sought to outline some of the content of Chinese statecraft 

unique perceptions, v One of Goldhamer's insights relevant to thi

emphasis on how China's ancient statecraft demanded efforts to 

future. He points out that ancient China's first Minister was 

Universal Calculator"; that the philosopher Han Feizi demanded 

be based on cost-benefit calculations; and that the philo

persuaded an enemy general to surrender by showing he co

through a "seminar game" what the outcome of the battle wou

eWu Chunqiu, Guangyi da zhanlue (Grand strategy)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe

7Herbert Goldhamer, TheAch4ser (New York: Elsevier, 1978); Herbert Goldh

Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corpo

8Goldhamer, The Adviser, 130-132. 

xxxvii 
thousand ages. If vour Highness allows it to slip away.., the

anti-Qin alliance. ''n 

With regard to calculating the future, Goldhamer sugges

writings from ancient China contained "principled predict

intuition or guess work. For example, Lord Shang, a famous 

warned that the price for neglecting quantitative calculations 

even a state with a large population and a favorable geogra

"will become weaker and weaker, until it is dismembered .... T

did not rely on their beliefs but on their figures. ''~2 The subj

statecraft in a multipolar world explored by Goldhamer remain

China's process of strategac assessment, especially judging 

increase of Chinese military" publications about the releva

statecraft in the last few years. 

GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY 

Warring states that rose too fast suffered attack, dismemberm

complete extinction. In the final phase of the Warring State

literate Chinese knows, a brilliant strategist formed a coalition 

9Goldhamer, Reali~' attd Belief in MiCra.r)" Affairs, 32-33. 

:"~Huang Yhagxu, "Maq)4 Zhongguo gudaijunshi six'iang @ong de minbenjingsherT

the spirit of relying on the people in Chinese ancient military thought), Zh

(China Milita-, 3' Science) 34, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 121-125. Colonel Huang des

from divination to calculation in the Spring and Autumn era. He is a Rese

depamnent of Mao Zedong Military Thought at AMS. 

::Goldhamer, The Adviser, 121. 

:~Ibid., 135-136. 

xxxvni 
present is too poor and weak and must avoid being dragged in

conflicts about spheres of influence, or stmggtes over natur

Deng's much-quoted advice also is to "yield on small issues w

term in mind." 

How is Deng's advice about dealing in the future with 

hegemon actually applied? Dr. Yan Xuetong, Director of th

Foreign Policy" at the China Institute of Contemporary. Internation

(CICIR), China's largest international research institute, warned 

in 1997 dlat the probability of China's avoiding war for at least 1

will increase the more China avoids any confrontation not o

current global hegemon but with at least two of the other major 

his colleague at CASS, Liu Jinghua, who warns about the dang

from 2020 to 2030, when the U.S. leadership will finally realize 

power is about to surpass America's, the CICIR center directo

from ancient times, the hegemon will form a coalition to strang

too) a rising power when he fears he is to be replaced. Den

additional word of advice was bu chu tou--never be the leade

translated, "Don't stick your head out." 

President Jiang Zemin has issued traditional-st3,1e, poetic 

sets of 16 Chinese characters that continue Deng's cautious 

avoiding confrontation with the hegemon) 3 Under Jiang Zemin, 

set of writings (five books in 1996) has advocated that Ch

programs be focused on the potential revolution in military a

l~The 16-character policy, put forward by Jiang is, "To enhance confidence, de

promote ccx~perafion and avoid confrontation" (zengl~a .x4nren, jianshao mafan, fa

dzdk~. Quoted in Lu Zhongwei, "On China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations

Their Recent Exchanges of Top-level Visits," Contemporag, International Re

(December 1997): 9. 

xxxix 
ultranationalist and well-connected author He Xin advoca

"under the banner of opposing the hegemon" should align w

American nation in the world, explicitly citing the powerful p

Warring States coalition. Critics of He Xin, especially authors f

employer, CASS, point out that the Warring States era ende

brilliant statesman adroitly broke up the coalition and becam

emperor of China, which may be just what He Xin fears. He p

future ambition of the United States is to impose world domi

IIe Xin's critics, however, project a sharp decline in the gl

United States, asserting that in two decades or so: 

• The United States will inevitably decline to one of fi

• Japan, the European Union, Russia, and China will 

United States. 

• The United States, Russia, and China will have nucle

From this viewpoint, dealing with the dangerous hegemon is on

problem. Within two or three decades, or so, the problem wil

happened many times in the Warring States era. 

Patience and caution are thus seen to be wiser than aggr

building against the United States. Dr. Yan Xuetong, of CIC

that the ruling American hegemon can be kept from using f

China's rise as long as certain policy goals are maximized: annu

exports up to 9 percent and avoiding simultaneous confron

t4Mi Zhenyu, Zbon<oguoo~lofa~gfazhangouxiang (China's national defense deve

CBeijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988). Excerpts translated in Michael Pil

Viea,s of Future Wa~are (XVashington: National Defense University Press, 

Zhenyu is a tormer '*;ice President of the Academy of Military Science (A

xl 
Outcome 

The 

international 

en~dromnent 

for a rising 

power 

Very Relatively 

favorable favorable 

Relatively 

unfavorable 

Very 

unfavor-. 

able 

Index Numbers of Individual Indexes 

Index 4 3 2 1 

Anticipated > 10 0 

time of being 

drawn into a 

war 

Unity with the 

strategic 

interests of 

other powers 

The increasing 

share of export 

markets 

Be in unity 

with the 

United 

States and 

one power 

>0.3 

>5 

~10 

Be opposed 

to the 

United 

States and 

in unity 

~4th three 

powers 

>0.1 

g0.3 

Source: Yan Xuetong, "Zhongguo jueqt de guoii huanjin: 

>0 

~5 

Be opposed 

to the 

United 

States and 

one power 

>0 

g0.'l 

Be 

opposed 

to the 

United 

States and 

two 

powers 

~0 

pinggu" (An Assessment o

environment of China's rise), Zhanluz),uguanli (Strategy and Management) 20, no. 1 (19

Not all authors are as optimistic as Dr. Yan. Indeed, his fel

CICIR, Zhang Wenmu, presents a more pessimistic diagnosis a

Wamng States premises. The hegemon needs resources, and suc

presents a set of dangers China will face because of America's de

xli 
United States went to war. Zhang writes that in 1998 the Unit

"two arms" strategy to contain both Russia (with NATO en

China (with the new Japan Defense Guidelines and promo

Threat Theory). 

In addition, Zhang predicts that the United States want

both Chinese and Russian access to Central Asian oil and gas. 

this strategic goal, the United States will promote the future in

Tibet from China. If there is internal turmoil in Tibet or f

Muslim Xinjiang, Zhang predicts that the United States will 

international no-fly zone as it did after the Gulf War. In a dis

this would amount to "dismembering" Tibet and Xinliang, th

of China's geopolitical position. This is particulady dangero

Soviet collapse started with the independence of the Baltic 

reaction from Tibet and Xinjiang would affect China's indus

and cause the loss of the high plateau, which provides natura

the west. Zhang therefore recommends that China take the lead 

Afghan civil war (which he says the United States is prolo

covert aid to the Taliban fundamentalists). At the same time, Zh

more caution. China must get the Central Asia oil market ori

It is better to place high priority on land transport of oil 

China's superiority in ground forces can protect, rather than 

future on sealanes for oil supplies that the United States 

threaten with their powerful navies, is These recommendat

counterparts in the Warring States era. 

:5Zhang Wemnu, "Meiguo de shiyou diyuan zhanyue yu Zhongguo Xiz

anquan" (.~anerica's geopolitical oil strategy, and the security of China's T

regions), Zhanlueycguanli (Strategy and Management) 27, no. 2 (1998): 100

xlii 
today's hegemon before it is too late. He Xin cites the pr

\Faring States era, because "the past can help us understand th

outlines key points: t7 

• "The world situation, after the severe changes in the 

and Eastern Europe, in form actually appears amazingly 

situation in the latter period of the Warring States, where 

powerful countries facing each other and one country dom

• qThe United States "will sacrifice different countries' na

and independent sovereignt3, , take the entire world mad ch

American World Empire...[and] become the director, arbit

16He Kin himself has been compared by a \Vestem analyst to the strategis

States era that he so admires: "'Fiae Party. leadership throughout its hist

intellectuals and ideologues to rationalize the quirks of its decisiomnaking. "

and astute intellectuals of this kind ~,e a fimction nc~t dissimilar to that of t

imperial court; or perhaps their role can be likened to that of tile itinerant 

~hi shz) or the 'strategists' (zongheng/ia) of the Warring States period. Some

hands have proved to be highly capable men, as the case of Chen Boda, Ch

Qiaomu in the 1940s and 1950s, or Yao Wenyuan in the 1960s. Though he 

the prominence of the above-listed figures, over recent years another inteUec

on the scene to vie x~ith clever young things employed by Zhao Ziyang and h

name is He Xin." See He Xin, "A Word of Advice to the Politburo," tran

and introduced by Geremie Bamae, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs

1990): 50. 

:7He Xin, Ztwnoguoflcaa'ng)~, shifie weilai (China's rejuvenation and the world's 

Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 41. 

18In addition to the one superpower (the United States) and four powe

Germany, and Russia) usually cited by Chinese authors, He Xin also inc

England. Ibid., 30. 

xliii 
• "China must pay close attention to those countries th

to American interests, or are potential strategic enemies. It 

in mind that the enemies of enemies are one's own allies.

• "China should do all that it can to warn and help these 

prevent them from bcing destroyed by the United States 

Eastern European bloc was. It must bring togeth

antihegemonism force under the flag of fighting hegemon

• "Know this: the more the United States encounters tr

places in the world, the more difficult it is for it to concen

on dealing with China and the greater the opportunitie

existence and development." 

• "China must seek allies among all countries that 

.~xnerica's potential opponents today or in the future. The f

regions are especially worth serious attention: Japan (~n

potential strategic opponent in the Asia-Pacific); Germa

future potential strategic opponent in Europe); and th

peninsula (a border region that is of important strategic 

China). I solemnly put forward a three-point plan, 'Join Jap

Germany, stabilize the South.' ,,21 

Somewhere between the cautionary advice of Deng Xiao

and Zhang Wenmu, and the bold demand of He Xin for anti

building, lies the strategic advice offered by Liu Jinghua, of CA

"?Ibid., 31. 

2Clbid., 41. 

21Ibid., 41-42. 

xliv 
collapse." One part of this "Great Wall" must be a parmership 

defeat Western containment of China, which will be attempted 

access to capital markets and technolo~, promoting Western va

military power "as the core" against China. 22 Implicit here, too

has plen~- of time and needs mainly not to provoke the he

intervening two decades until the Great Wall can be made rea

Another diagnosis and recommendation projects onto the 

the kind of "knowledge from ancient statecraft that a true preda

ought to have. This is a kind of mirror image from the W

According to General Li Jijun, one of China's most distingu

authors and a former Vice President of ,MMS, the greater dange

survival is not warfare but zhanlue wuda0---"strategic misdire

current multipolar world structure. General Li describes the U

being particularly adept at this strategy, as powerful hegemons 

According to Genera Li, the United States brought about t

the Soviet Union with strategic misdirection. Washingto

stimulated the Soviets to increase their defense budget to 

through various means, including the Strategic Defense In

Wars"), which the United States had no intention of deploying, 

United States also supported the opposition in Poland and Afgh

down the price of oil to cut off the main source of Soviet fore

and exacerbated the domestic Soviet political crisis. In 1990

again used strategic nfisdirection against Saddam Hussein, in or

his rising power in the Gulf. As supposedly revealed by an Am

22Liu Jmghua, "Ershi yi shiji ershi sanshi niandai Zhongguo jueqi ji waijia

(Diplomatic strategic alternatives for a rising China in 2020 to 2030), Zhanlue

and Management) 4, no. 3 (1994), 119. 

xlv 
NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in s

Chinese journal interviewed several PLA generals about the attac

that one reason for the United States to bomb the embassy 

misdirection. An article in the June issue of Zhongguo Pinglun co

Western forces are attempting to drag China into the mire of 

The United States is planning to pursue a TMD [theater mi

system.., so that the Chinese will step into the shoes of the 

Union. In an aura race with the United States, China will consum

power, and collapse without a battle. ''24 A key strategy of the W

was to attempt to do just this to an opponent. 

Having made the point that these nine authors from five 

institutes use lessons and metaphors from the Warring States er

statecraft, the first chapter presents several debates underway 

authors about the exact nature of the future "multipolar" securi~" 

China will face in the decades ahead. 

~lAJijun, "Zhanlue wenhua" (Strategic culture), Zhongguojunshi kexue (China 

38, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 8-15. 

2a"China Must be Ready to Fight a World War--PLA Believes That the Wes

Major Conspiracies Against China," Sing TaoJih Pao (Hong Kong), May 28, 199

CHI-1999-0528,June 1, 1999. 

xlvi 
Secur#y Environment 
THE VISIONS OF MORE TI-L-M',! 30 AUTHORS are presented in this 

the geopolitical features of the future. They reveal debates betw

and reformist authors about which nations will be the most pow

what -kinds of international alignments will form, and the natur

Cold War transitional pattern. 

THE CURRENT ASSESSMENT, 1986-9

China's current assessment of the future security." environment i

kind of calculations Sun Zi and the Warring States strategists wo

It was issued before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the en

War and can be dated to early 1986. The assessment characteriz

world as being in a "new era" of transition that will last se

During this period, great rivalries will emerge among the pow

local wars will be fought (as large as Korea in 1950 or the Gulf 

as a "re-division of spheres of influence" and a struggle for wo

takes place. Bosnia is one example of the strife that typifies th

the Bosnia conflict is frequently called a "struggle between the 

and the European Union for domination of Europe." NATO 

which China opposes, is another example of this "struggle to re-

of influence." The outcome of this transitional period of "tu

have the following eight features: 

• After the transition period is complete, there will no 

"superpowers" but instead a "multipolar world" in whi
the United States are due in large part to extremely high def

and diminishing competitiveness in CNP. 

• Today's "sole superpower" is in severe decline. The 

risks declining so extensively in contrast to the rise of othe

it will fall to the level of a mere "common major nation. ''2 T

weakening of U.S. strength in the decades ahead is an imp

of the Chinese assessment, so this study provides more 

subject than on China's views of other major powers. 

• After the transition to the multipolar world, a new "w

will emerge to govern international affairs, one that 

resemble the current Chinese proposal of the "Five Principl

Coexistence." Chinese authorities assert that world poli

1800s always has had a "system" or a "strategic pattern.

rules, there is a competition among powers that includes a g

of spheres of influence. Chinese historical textbooks discus

System" of 1815-70; an intermediate system when Germ

each unified and Japan launched the Meiji Reform; th

1An .American view of the prospects for world multipolarity is found in Charl

"The Unipolar Moment" FordgnAffairs 70, no. 1 (,America and the World, 19

Krautharnmer argues that there is but one first-rate world power and he f

doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so t

powers coequal with the United States . . . But we are not there yet, nor wil

Similarly, Joseph Nye, Jr., in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American P

Basic Books, 1990), 235, argues, "At one extreme multipolarity merely refer

of power. At the other it refers to a number of roughly equal powers, able an

alliances frequently to maintain their equilibrium." 

die Fang, "Guodu shiqi de guoji xingshi" Cl-lae international situation dur

period), in 2000: Shifie xiang hechu qu? (2000: where is the world going?)

(Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1996), 319. 

4 
has modified the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Sta

what Deng Xiaoping called "Socialism with Chinese Chara

will the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia ultim

their own socialist characteristics. 

• Some Chinese rnilitat T authors believe that there is no

revolution in military affairs (RNLR) that will radically 

warfare. Several recent Chinese books assert that the Uni

not exploit the RMA as well as other nations in the de

China's generals "plan to be better, to be ahead of ever

become latecomers who surpass the old-timers" in the ne

• A major global nuclear war is highly unlikely for two 

official forecast is a sharp change from the forecasts of C

that a global nuclear war was inevitable. 6 Therefore, China 

cut its defense spending from more than 6 percent of 

3Chen Xiaogong, a semor military, intelligence officer ,and former U.S. Adanti

fellow, has written that the question of the transition period will be "Should t

into a peaceful and stable place based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 

which is beneficial to economic development in an absolute maiority of cou

Feng and Chert ~-~Gaogong, "The World Is in the Transition Period of a New 

Replacing the Old," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), January 4, 1991

91-021,January 31, 1991, 11-15. 

~Chinese views of the RaMA will be treated in detail in chapter 6. 

SMi Zhenyu, Zbongguoguofangfazhangouxiang (China's national defense devel

(Beijing: Jiefangjun cliubanshe, 1988). Excerpts translated in Michael Pill

Views of Future Wa~Care (Washington: National Defense University. Press, 1

Zhenyu is a former Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (A3

~Mao's assessment predicted an inevitable Soviet-.amaerican war in Europe

forces would drive NATO forces toward file Chamlel and result hx a "Duxdd

under fire of the United States from continental Europe. 
• There are many global forces at work for luan (turbulenc

also may be translated as chaos), including the potential 

militarist takeovers of Japan and India. The "main trend" 

toward "peace and development," but "potential hot spo

could lead to the involvement of major powers and regio

direct military confrontation.'" As suggested by one writ

even in Asia: "Although the Asia-Pacific region has been r

since the end of the Cold War, there are also many uncerta

certain hot-spot problems are not handled properly, th

conflicts, confrontations, and even war in this region, thu

peace, stabili~,, and prosperity, of the region. ''s 

Within the framework of this strategic assessment, Ch

discuss a number of subjects in their journals and books. 9 Fo

VMajor General Pan Zhengqiang, "Current \Xlorld Military Situation," Renm

Daily), December 23,1993, 7, in FBIS-CHI-94-005, January 7, 1994, 27-29. 

the Institute for National Security Studies of the National Defense Uni

Beijing. 

SZhu Chenghu, "Focus Attention on the Converging Points of Interest 

United States" (in Chinese),Jiefangiun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 1

Deputy Director of the Strategic Research Institute of the National De

Beijing. 

9For examples of comprehensive studies On the current and future secu

sponsored by three different institutions, the Chinese Academy of So

Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and the China Institute 

International Relations, see ~ Runchang and Gao Heng, eds., Shijie ~heng

anquan ('lhe new world political structure and international securit3,)(Be

chubanshe, 1996); Chen Qimao, ed., IG, a shift de shijiegqu da zhuanhuan (Ma

world structure at the turn of the century)(Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chub

Li Zhongcheng, Kava shift de shijie zhengzhi (Trans century world politi
• The United States is exploiting Russian weakness by enl

in order to increase its domination of its European NATO 

• The United States ("its hegemonistic ambitions furth

forcing Japan to increase its financial support for U.S. bases 

Japan under the guise of the Defense Guidelines. ~° 

• The United States arranged the Bosnian settlement 

dominate further its European NATO allies. 

• Japan is seeking to embroil the Unites States and Chin

that will weaken both Washington and Beijing. n 

• Some in the United States are fearful of China and seek 

block China's gradually increasing influence by promot

Threat Theory. This is wrong because "China has neither th

the will to compete with the United States and other big po

affairs. ''12 

• Central Asia may be the location of political strug

among the big powers as the former Soviet sphere of i

divided. For example, a recent article stated, "Followi

Union's disintegration, the United States has cast its cov

Central Asia, the 'second Middle East of the next century'

chubanshe, 1997). 

l°Zh,-mg Taishml, "Ri-Mei junshi guanxi de xin fazhan" (New developments 

militat 7 relationship), Guo~ @anlueym~jiu (International Strategic Studies) 4

1997): 16-18. Zhang is a Research Fellow at the Chinese Institute of Inter

Studies CIISS. 

:'Feng Shaokui's article on this issue is discussed below. 

;2Chen Peiyao, "Big Power Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region," SIIS 

(November 1995): 1. 
in Central Asia. ''13 

• NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999 w

U.S. plan to gain control over Eurasia. "On the surface, the 

the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by NATO troops seems 

'humanitarian considerations' but some important ge.ostra

are undoubtedly hidden behind this operation, m4 An a

"Vvllat are NATO's Motives in Bombing the Federal 

Yugoslavia," explained, "Kosovo is located in the middle 

Peninsula and the peninsula is at the meeting point of Euro

Africa. It is an important corridor joining the north, south, 

and leading to Asia and Africa .... The United States know

importance of the Bal "lcm region and has regarded it as a 'ne

consideration'.... In this region, it can strengthen its secu

the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic to the west; can c

'southern wing of NATO' to the south through converg

Middle East strategy-; can infiltrate ~md exp~d in the Blac

Caspian Sea regions to the west, that is, the outer Caucasu

Asia regions, weakening and squeezing out Russian forces 

and taking a step further, can press on to China's northwest

to coordinate from afar with its Asia-Pacific strateg3,; an

exercise restraints on its European allies to the north, 

NATO move southward. In this way, the United States w

:3Zhou Xiaohua, "Roundup: Overt and Covert Russia-U.S. Rivalry in China

Domestic Service, December 28, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-99-004,January 4, 19

>Wang Yizhou, "A Warning Issued at the End of the Century," Shifie Zhishi, 

1999): 7-10, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0623,June 24, 1999. 

8 
contrast to Western scholarly books and articles, where the aut

to make clear his debt to earlier work and narrowly and modes

his new contribution. Thus, no Chinese author writing in the 

the origins of the current view of the future security, environm

have established that it was Huan Xiang, Deng Xiaoping's n

adviser, who had both access to scholarly experts from Shan

experience as China's ambassador to Britain, who annotmced 

early 1986, just after the U.S.-Soviet summit. Huan's speeches 

1984 and 1985 described a world structure that was changing, 

unclear what actions the major players would take and its char

not yet determined: 

• "The two largest military powers are weakening and 

militarily they are developing in the direction of multipo

the Star Wars plan develops, multipolarization could d

bipolarization, and could again return to bipolarization

"sYan Zheng, "What Are NATO Motives in Bombing the Federal Republi

Renr~/_ant, m, no. 4 (April 15, 1999): 37-39, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0516, May 

Zhang Dezhen, "On U.S. Eurasian Strategy," Renmin Ribao, June 4, 1999

1999-0605,June 4, 1999. "The recent aggressive war flagrantly waged by th

forces against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has laid bare the fact tha

would not hesitate to make a reckless move to pull out the last 'nail' in E

the Balkan region and the entire Europe under its control .... By expan

influence at both the east end and the west end of Eurasia, the United St

in encircling Eurasia in two directions and in bringing pressure to bea

countries. In view of the U.S. infdtration into and the U.S. 

Gulf-Caucasus-Caspian Sea-Central Asian region, it could be said, the 

attained step by step its strategic goal of first placing Eurasia and then the w

its control." 
must go through a long period of hard work... 30 to 50 y

make it truly powerful. ''t7 

Beginning in January 1986, the uncertainty" about the future w

had disappeared, and its transformation and transition had defi

stages. TM Huan explained, "Future international politics and e

facing a new period, m9 

• "In the confrontation between the two superpowers, ch

deeper and more significant than those of the past have oc

:6Huan Xiang, "Xin jishu geming dui junshi de ying.,dang" Ci'he influe

technological revolution oi1 militage, affairs), in Huan Xiang wenji CFhe collected 

Xiang0(Beijmg: Shijie ztfishi chubanshe, 1994), 2: 1263. This article was ori

in Ia'beration~'lrmy Daily, June 7 and June 14, 1985. 

~THuan Xiang, "Yatai diqu x-i.ugshi he Mei-Su de zhengduo zhanlue" (The situa

Pacific region and U.S.-Soviet rivaL~." strategy.), in Huan Xialeg wenji, 1115. This 

appeared in Guoji zhanwang (International Outlook), no. 14 (1984). 

:~Soon after Huan Xiang began to discuss the new multipolar era, another 

man)" of the ke 3' tenets of the current assessment of the rnultipolar world stru

source article. See Gao I Ieng, "Shijie zhanlue geju zhengxiang duoji.hua fazhan

of global strategic multivolarity), Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defense Uni

no. 2 (1986): 32-33. 

'gHuan Xiang, "Wo guo 'qiwu' qijian mianlm guoji zhengzhi jingji huanjin

analysis of the international political and economic envirom'nent that China 

its seventh five-year plan), in Huan Xiang wenji, 1300. Originally, an interview 

from the Shanghai shijiejinoji dabao. 

~°Huan Xiang, "Zhanwang 1986 man guoji xmgshi" (Prospects for the 19

situation), m Huan Xiang wenfi, 1291. Originally publistmd in Liaowa~ no. 1 

10 
p

• "The focal point of the competition has been raised 

emphasis, which was solely on the struggle for military- su

a contest of entire economic, scientific and technologica

political comprehensive strength. Thus for the next sev

strengthening Comprehensive National Power will be the 

• "The development toward multipolarity is divided into 

first step is the big triangle... China, the United States 

Union .... After China's national might and military p

developed dunng the Korean War and the Indo-China war, 

to recognize that China is a vet 3" powerful nation. Currently

of its domestic and international policy, its position in the 

definite. Western Europe and Japan also are regarded as 

have not completely formed the power of a pole. To for

force, it must be seen if they can be independent with the in

own hands .... As the world moves toward a multipolar 

the first large triangle stage, and in the future as it moves 

pole world, when the United States and the Soviet Union a

problems, they must think about the China factor, and 

poles. ''23 

~lIbid., 1292-1293. 

~Zlbid., 1291-1292. 

~tuan Xiang "Dui shijie xingshi fazhan qushi de fenxi ji junwei fichu zhu

zhanlue juece de lillun yiju" (An analysis of the development trends in the w

the theoretical basis of the central milita_,), commission's strategic decision co

to the "period of peace"), in Huan Xiang wenji, 1327-1328. Originally publish

17 
In Europe the square is the United States, the Soviet U

Europe, and Western Europe. ''24 

• "Japan considers the United States to be its main econom

for deployment of its offensive and for making challenge

wants to strive to be on equal footing with the United States 

and politically, but further, it is deliberately planning, wh

ripe, to surpass the United States and replace America's wo

hegemony. Once it has economic hegemony, political, 

hegemony would not be too difficult. ''as 

China's national security analysts became very, concerned 

administration proposals for a "new international order" 

conference in 1991 to discuss their own views. 26 The phrase 

Order" was first used by then Soviet President Mikhail Gor

November 1990 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu

Summit in Paris and at the U.N. General Assembly speech on 

1988, when he announced severe reductions in Soviet m

including Soviet forces stationed in the Warsaw Pact coun

according to a congressional research study, may have s

unraveling of support for the Communist parties in Eastern Eu

24Huan Xiang, "Kex'ue juece yu guoji huanjing" (Scientific decisionm

international environmcnt), in Huan Xiang u.rnji, 1395-1396. 

2Slbid., 1400. 

2~wo ardcles on the subject are Ye Ru'an, "Conceptions of the World's Futu

Propositions Concerning the new International Order," Shijie zhishi (World 

13 (July 1, 1991), in FBIS-CHI-91-140, July 22, 1991; and speeches at a sy

issue by 18 Chinese analysts published in Sbifie zhio-hi (World Knowledge)

1991), in FBIS-CHI-91-141,July 23, 1991. 

12 
y 

apparent taboo in two national journals. The episode bega

Dazhou, a well-known senior analyst at the Institute of Aa'ner

the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), published 

detailed criticism of the orthodox assessment of the com

tnultipolarity. ~ It is difficult for may foreign observer to kno

article remained within the bounds of scientifically "seeking tru

that Deng X.iaopmg demanded m 1978, or whether it was a "po

that threatened Communist Party- doctrine, because Central Par

which authoritatively set the range of debate, are never made p

those inte~'iewed said the article tested the outer limits of Pa

about the future world. 

The article met with a vigorous response from a senior gen

intelligence. In a departure from the tradition of merely stating 

debating anyone else, the PLA general actually quoted long pas

reformer's article. The general then wrote that these views w

without foundation, and unsupportable and, worst of all, played 

of the United States) ° 

::Stanley R. Sloan, "The U.S. Role in a New World Order: Prospects for Geo

Vision" (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 28, 1991). 

28Luo Renshi, "Strategic Structure, Contradictions and the New World O

Strategic Stu&'es 19, no.1 (March 1991): 1-6. 

2~'ang Dazhou, "Dui lengzhan hou shijie geju zhi wo jian" (My opinion on t

world structure), H~ingyu Fazhan (Peace and Development) 60, no. 2 (Jun

3CHuang Zhengji, "Shijie duojihua qushi buke kangju" (The inevitab

mulfipolarity), Catoji zhanlueyanfiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no. 

1-3. This article parallels the same author's views in an article entitled 

Situation," International Strategic Studc'es 24, no. 2 (june 1992): 1-5. The journ

13 
stated that no one is willing yet to openly publish the vie

resistance by the military and some civilians who cling to the 

assessment. This "debate" may have been addressed at the 1

annual month-long meeting of China's most senior leaders. If s

the importance of these contradictou" ~:o articles on the 

environment. 

In his article, Yang Dazhou heretically argues against e

features of the orthodox view of the future securitv environ

fotax,ard a reformist scenario: 

• The United States will maintain its superpower status fo

decades. 

• The United States will maintain its alliances with Japan 

• There will not be a period of"uncertainty" in the nex

decades. 

• There will not be an extended transition period fea

toward multipolarity. 

• A "pluralistic" world stnmture of"one superpower and 

already exists. 

• Only the United States is really a "pole" able to decid

any region, as it did with the Dayton Accords. "The Unit

a leading role that no other nation can replace.., the on

is a 'pole.' " 

• China "does not have sufficient qualifications to be a 

• For more than 20 years, no other nations, including tho

World, will emerge as major powers to challenge the 

CIISS and is sponsored by Chinese milita~ intelligence, in which General 

14 
that an unsolicited article by General Huang Zhengji merited publ

though it was very, "sharp" (hostile in tone) and "out of the ordin

General Huang quoted passages from Yang's article without dire

and reasserted the orthodox view on each of these points: 

• U.S. decline is inevitable and continuing, U.S. global 

already severely limited. 

• Five-pole multipolarity is inevitable, especially as fri

between the United States and Japan and Germany (as proved 

summits be~-een the European Union 0EU) and Asia, which 

declining United States). 

• The rise of the Third World has transformed world pol

continue to restrain the United States. 

• Local wars are certain, even though '"peace and develo

main trend" during the transitional period of uncertainty" in 

ahead. 

3~Yang Dazhou, "Dui lengzhan hou shiiie geju zb5 wo jian," 43-44. 

3ZYang may have an ally in the author of a book published by the Ch

Contemporary. International Relations (CICIR). On its last page, the author c

future muhipolar structure's principal parts will be the five powers, the United 

China, Japan, and German),. The United States will no doubt become 'o

multipolar world," but its comprehensive strength will be comparatively more 

that of other poles, its relations with the other poles also probably will be fri

mutual relations lx~tween the four other poles, and its ability, to conform to ch

will be a little bit stronger. Therefore, can it be said: the U.S. in the future is 

muldpolar world,' but we also can say it is 'the first pole.' " See Lin Huisheng, G

suan),igua (l'elling Uncle Sam's fortune)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995), 22

/5 
international influence: the Association of South East A

(ASE,~M\-) refusal of U.S. demands that Burma not be admitte

of ASEAN; Russian and European defiance of U.S. pressure no

Iran; and Brazil's blocking of U.S. efforts for a free-trade 

America. 33 

The second method to reinforce the orthodox and ignore th

is repetitive articles by senior officials. One novel example is 

of a speech gaven at Harvard University in December 1997 

Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, General Xiong G

contained all the features of the orthodox view. According t

Beijing, the use of Harvard as the location and a senior PLA p

the "awesome" vehicle was an emphatic message to reformers

33Chen Feng, "1997 man di gnoji zhanlue rdngshi'" Cl"he strategic situatio

~hanltte)'anjiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 (January 1998): 

interviews, Colonel Chen served in the Situation Room of the Chinese m

headquarters in Beijing. He now is at the Chinese mission to the United Nati

Shen Qurong, Director of CICIR, provides similar examples of how U

activities have been rebuffed around the world: "During the Iraqi crisis o

inspection, the United States did not hesitate to spend several billion U.S. do

a large number of naval and air units tt3.4ng to launch military attacks against 

short only because of opposition from the majority of the countries 

including Russia, France, and China. At the Geneva meeting on human 

States was forced to drop its anti-China human rights proposal for lack o

motion against Cuba was also voted down by the conference. The United 

dominate the peace process of the Middle East, but Europe and Russia w

leading role with it, and israel did not energetically cooperate with it. In 

resulting from India's nuclear tests, the United States did not give a strong 

and the eight-nation group had a divergence of opinion, so Pakistan was for

seriously undermining the international nuclear nonproliferation system 

United States over a long period." See Shen Qurong0 "The World is Expe

of Crises," l_£aowan~ no. 27 (July 6, 1998): 6, in FBIS-CHI-98-216, August 

16 
 Any efforts for seeking hegemony and world domin

result in accumulating contradictions and fermenting war

• "Only by facing up to and promoting such a trend as th

of multipolarit)" can we bring about peace and prosperity.

• "The practice of resolving contradictions among count

on augmenting military blocs, strengthening military allianc

in military confrontation is not conducive to preservi

safeguarding security." 

• "It is necessary to develop a new concept. I think the F

of Peaceful Coexistence, which has been consistently in

Chinese Government for years, shall constitute an importa

for establishing a global security, system in the 21st centur

• As to the extent of future local wars, Xiong states the 

14 million in the First World War, 60 million in the Secon

and as high as 24 million in the "40 years of the Cold Wa

TECHNIQUES FOR SHOWING DISSEN

As stated, the orthodox and reform views rarely confron

Therefore, the open "debate" between Yang Dazhou and Huan

without precedent in dealing with such core issues as to wheth

• The United States is really declining 

• Local wars will arise 

~Xiong Guangkai, "/vlianxiang 21 shiji de guoji anquan xmgshi yu Zhonggu

(Gearing toward the international security situation and the building of Chi

in the 21st century), C, uq)'zhcmlueffaqiu (International Strategic Studies) 48, n

1-4. 

17 
of different points of view on an issue, or a journal will publish 

of several scholars from a conference in a way that shows disag

For examplc, in 2000: Where is the World Going?, Yang Zheng 

different scenarios for the future world structure, but he o

scholar's name in one scenario, does not distinguish betwee

Chinese and foreign analysts, and does not examine or gave hi

on the feasibility of these possible scenarios. 3s 

In 1997, a ve~" senior analyst at CICIR, Li Zhongcheng, 

different views of the future world structure by analysts at CIC

Although they are not described as being part of a debate, th

3SThe six scenarios are: One, the world is cutlently in a transition era 

mulfipolar wodd. Two, there will be a "multilayered multipolar world" (,4,40 ,

because "tile multipolar structure is not a unilevel equal rank system." R

fields different countries will have greater power. For example, the Unit

Commonwealth of Independent States ((]IS) vdll be the militaD" poles; the Un

and Europe will be the economic poles; and the l lnited States, the CIS, Chin

and the Third World will be the political poles. Third, there will be no p

world structure. "In the foreseeable future, the world will be a world of s

turbulent and unstable world .... In this world without poles, there are no 

is a great lack of stability." However, there will be "a completely n

international structure." Fourth, there will be a "three pole era" formed by 

Europe and Japan. Fifth, there will be "the age of the Comprehensive 

competition," where strength "will not again be determined by superiority 

such as economics, politics or military, affairs." Sixth would be "Han Suyin'

serious economic and Financial confrontation, military, interventionism, m

influence of \Vestem culture and models. Yang Zhengfs only ambiguous rema

having qeft Yalta,' the world is seeking a direction and center of resistence, e

exists in two of the above possibilities and feasibilities, and all have put forw

anticipated theoretical and factual foundations. However, the developmen

does not change according to people's subjective wishes; its laws of moti

difficult to dictate." See Yang Zheng, ed., 2000: 3"hijie xiang hechu qu?, 22-24

18 
The views of Yan Xuetong of CICIR are representative o

scenario, "the theory on finalizing the basic design of multi

asserts, "The basic establishment of the great nations' strategi

1996 caused the post-Cold War transition from a bipolar struc

super many strong structure to be completed. ''37 Finally, the wri

Baoxian and Yu Xiaoqiu of CICIR offer a third scenario, w

similar to that of Huang Zhengji and the orthodox camp, that "

is forming" and that countries other than the five most powerfu

in strength. They argue, "The development of the multipol

accelerating" and % new group of powers will rise" that 

"restricting role with regard to the five major powers, [and] w

multipolarit3: trend of the world structure to be even more 

vaned. ''38 Li does not directly criticize any of the authors whos

presents, although his own views appear to be much clo

represented in the third scenario. 

Authors sometimes resort to citing respected foreign exper

dissent. For example, in 1997 in a book published by CIC

authors, who are presumably aware of the orthodox position 

~Xi Runchang, "Shijie zhengzhi ~dn geju de chuxing ji qi qianjing" (The em

the world's new political structure and its prospects), Heping yu fa@

Development), no. I (1997), cited in Li Zhongcheng, Kua shot'& shijie ghengz

world politics)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997), 29. 

37Yah Xuetong, "1996-1997 nian guoji xingshi )ha Zhongguo duiwai guanxi ba

on the 1996-1997 international situation and China's foreign relations), 

(Strategy and Management), supplementary issue (1996-1997), cited in Li Z

shiji de shifie ~heng~hi, 31. 

3SSong Baoxian and Yu Xiaoqiu, "Shijie duojihua qushi jistm fazlla

multipolarity trend continues to develop), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), Dec

cited in Li Zhongcheng, Ksla shift de sbifie zheng~hi , 32. 

19 
CICIR writes, The new international structure has 

characteristics, the most important of which is the replacement 

'units' O.uan). The nature of 'poles' is long-term stable confro

nature of 'units' is that the dominant position of key countrie

by the nature of specific affairs .,,40 These definitions elude the 

Much of Yang Dazhou's article challenged the orthodox view 

this very tactic of establishing and clarifying definitions for 

phrases, such as "pole," "transition era," "pluralization" (duo

"multipolarization" (duojihua), and "major nation" (daguo) ve

(qia,,gg~o). 

For example, Yang defined what constitutes a "pole" 

standards of the Cold War era, when the United States and th

were the only two poles. "l'he "tour strong," consequently

because "when compared to the Soviet Union, there still is a gr

Similarly, in his argument against those who claim that th

transition era that will go on for an undetermined long perio

argues that by definition a transition is not indefinite. "Some 

that the post-Cold War transition period could continue for 20

"Iqais type of argument is not appropriate; a 'transition period

ending time. Suppose the 'transition period' goes on for 20 o

3~'Wu Hua, .qhen \~:eib, and Zhen Hongtao, .Nan Ya ~hi shi Inch¢ (T

Asia--India)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997), 2. 

<'Yah Xuetong, Zhongguoguajia liyifenxi (-\nalysis of China's national mteres

renmin chubanshe, 1996), 55. 

<Yang Dazhou, "Dui lengzhan hou shijie geju zhi wo jian," 43. 

20 
g 

in a transition period, various views can be found on how long it 

real consensus appears to exist on the subject. Many authors 

vague predictions without giving a time frame of when multip

emerge, other than "in the early 21st century." For example, He 

State Council International Studies Center writes, "Because the 

of the old world structure by a new one is taking place un

conditions, this transition era certainly will be comparatively l

believes that it will "continue into the early part of the next cen

Chen Qimao, former president of the Shanghai Institute for 

Studies (SIIS) breaks down the transition period into three stag

world will go through before a ruultipolar structure is establish

stage was from 1989 to 1991, when the fall of communism in Ea

and the Soviet Union brought about the end of the Cold W

according to Chen, the world is in the second phase, from the S

to "the basic formation of the new multipolar structure." H

during this stage, where "the old structure has already ended, 

structure has not yet formed,.., a situation of 'one super (the U

many strong (the European Union, Japan, Russia, China),' or the 

3-5 layered structure has emerged--1 (one superpower, the Un

(two military powers, the United States and Russia), 3 (three econ

the United States, Japan, and Europe), 5 (five political power

States, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China)." He foresees the 

"complex and changeable, turbulent and unstable" until "the beg

next centur),," when "the period of major changes will come t

42Ibid., 42. 

a3He Fang, "Guodu shiqi de guoji xingshi," in 2000: Sbifie xiang hechu qu?, 31

21 
Lieutenant General Li Jilun, Vice President of the Acade

Science (~MMS), wrote, "Because of the fast development and g

science, technolo~, and economics, the dispersion of wodd po

up." Therefore, the creation of a "wodd structure of multipo

•.. might take 10 or 20 years to take shape. ''4s However, a few 

extended the timetable for the transition period. "By the mid

believe, the world will have gradually built a real multipolar 

mature security structure as well so that absolute hegemo

declined and this is likely to dictate a globa.l trend in the sec

21st centu~'. ''~ 

Other differences of opinion exist about who will be a 

world has gone through its transition period and finally form

structure. For example there is the issue of a European pole. 

such as Gao Heng of CASS, believe that Germany as an inde

will be one of the wodd's five poles, not the EU. The First 

Chinese Embassy in Germany, ShangJin, regards unified G

biggest winner of the Cold War" and the future ovedor

economy? ~ Several authors assert that Germany is striving for 

4aChen Qimao, "Qianyan'" (Introduction), in Kua shift de shifie geju da zhuanhu

in the world structure at the turn of the century-), ed. Chert Qimao (Shangh

chubanshe, 1996), 1-2. 

45Li Jijun, Junshi lilun yu ~hanzheng shijimz (Notes on military- theory and 

(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994), in Pillsbuo', Chinese Views of Futu

46Li Jijun, "This Centu~as Strategic Heritage and Next Centuries Strategi

ba0 (Liberation Amay Daily), July 28, 1998, 6, in FBIS-CHI-98-229, .Augu

4vShangJin, 'q'ong~4 sannima hou de Deguo" (Germany, three years after re

yu Fazhan (Peace and Development) 47, no. 1 (February 1994): 42-44. 

22 
Constitution that forbids Germany from sending its troops 

supported NATO instead. The French and British decision t

keeping troops to Bosnia was also "meant to belittle Germany

Other analysts argue that while Germany may be the st

Western European nations, it still is no match for the Unite

Europe has that potential. In a study conducted by SIIS, W

asserts that none of the Western European nations individually 

to constitute a pole, but the joint strength of the European U

provides it with "pole" qualifications, but once its integratio

progressed mad solidified, it will then be able to contend wi

States for global influence: 

Each independent country, in the European Union, including 

which is the most powerful, when viewed globally, is at most 

power, but the European Union taken as a whole, is a force t

completely equal to the United States... if Europe wants to 

United States and play the role of a future world leader, . . 

important basic condition is EUropean unit},. This is to say, Eu

not only realize economic integration, but also political integ

during this process establish a powerful military, force. As of 

European Communi~ and the European Union still are a

sovereign nations. 49 

48Qi Deguang, "The Bosnian Civil War. Retrospect and Prospect," Contem

Relations 4, no. 8 (August 1994): 10-11. Qi is an Associate Research Profes

'~'ang Houkang o "Lengzhan hou Ouzhou geju de bianhua" (Post-Cold 

Europe's structure), in Kua shytde sbijie g~u da @uanbuan, 153-154. 

23 
century can it rise again? People can not eliminate this possibili

is shared by a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, Shen Guolian

"Today not a single country in Europe, including such Europ

Germany, France and Britain, can possibly be independen

integration and cope with the complex and fierce challenges 

Europe can only become one of the poles in the world by way 

and playing a role in the muhipolar order. ''sl 

\X/hether or not Third World countries will play a signifi

furore multipolax world also is an issue where Chinese authors 

Like Yang Dazhou, Chen Qimao believes that the CNP o

countries will continue to grow in the early part of the next ce

not see their strength increasing fast enough to allow them to 

the power of the five poles. Chen, however, predicts that 

somewhat more quickly than Yang, "The power of India, Braz

will greatly increase, but until the early 21st century (before 20

prospect for any of them to become one of the world's poles. 

He Fang estimates that great changes involving Third World 

have occurred in the world by the end of the next decade. He w

of the developing countries shows even more so the irreve

relative U.S. decline .... By 2010, seven of the world's ten eco

5Clbid. 

5~Shen Guoliang0 "Prospects for the Development of the European U

Strategic Studies 45, no .3 0uly 1997): 30. 

52Chen Qimao, "Qianyan" (Introduction), in Kua shiji de shijie geju da ~6uanh

24 
of the Kosovo crisis and the bombing is that they led to re

previous assessments of the pace of U.S. decline and the rate 

world is moving toward multipolarization. It appears that the r

represented by Yang Dazhou, gained support as a result of U.

actions in Yugoslavia. A clear post-Kosovo trend has been t

Chinese authors admitting that the transition to multipola

delayed: "An analysis of the situation at the present stage show

deeds of the United States have slowed down the multipolari

and made it more difficult for the international community" t

political and economic order in the next century. ''s4 A key elem

assessment is the corresponding issue of why the time frame for 

to the new world structure has been greatly extended--the 

remains powerful. Not only are some authors no longer focus

U.S. decline, but rather, they are predicting that its strength may 

to increase: 

The United States, as the sole superpower, occupies a relatively p

single, superpower position of domination, and it will for 

maintain the momentum of expansion .... Right now multipolar

lost its momentum for "accelerated development." Multipolariza

course of historymay be more complicated and tortuous than onc

It would be more appropriate for us to describe today's 

"single-superpower pluralism" than "multiple powers 

53He Fang, "With Multipolarity Now Evolving, the Superpowers are G

I Iistory," Sha~ghaiJiefaag Ra'bao (Shanghai Liberation Daily), April 22, 1996. 

54Li Donghang, "Dangerous Attempt to Resist Multipolarization Proces

(Liberation Army Daily), May 26, 1999, 5, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0604, May 2

25 
g pgg

to enjoying relative superiority in the technological industry 

strength. ''s6 According to Xiao Lian of the North ,American Ins

future U.S. economic domination may last many decades b

success of U.S. strategy', l:-Ie gives several reasons. First, "no m

European economy is reorganized or integrated, Europe wil

control the Japanese and the Asia-Pacific economies unless the 

participates in this process. By the same token, no matter how t

economic cooperation zone is built, Europe will be unable to pl

role in the Asia-Pacific economy unless the United States tak

process." The second reason Xiao lists is that "United State

controlled the \XTFO [World Trade Organization], the World 

had a bigger say in the IMF [International Monetary. Fund] to d

States has time and again succeeded in consolidating and enhanc

over the world economy." This success includes "co

manipulating the foreign exchange markets the world over" 

"huge profits by virtue of its economic and financial strength 

position of the U.S. dollar. ''5~ 

Another argument put forward bv Chinese authors to expla

multipolarization is that the other poles do not yet have t

independently stand up to the United States. For example, Shen 

of the International Strategic Studies Office of the Insti

~e~Xlang Zhuxtm, "Effects of Kosovo on Global Security," La'aowang, no. 20 

10, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0622,June 23, 1999. 

S6Ibid. 

~TXiao Lian, "On U.S. Economic Expansion and Hegemonism," Renmin R

7, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0610, June 8, 1999. 

26 
partnerships are an additional factor boosting current American 

One author stated, "Internationally, the United States has forme

hegemonist alliance, turning some international political, ec

military organizations into U.S. tools for hegemony. ''s9 Shen 

claiming that it is an "ill omen that the unipolar world domi

United States takes the form of a U.S.-Europe and a U.S.-J

hegemony." According to Shen, because the U.S. share of the wo

will drop in the future, "this means that its economy will be unab

adequate backing for its hegemonist practices," so it must tely o

maintain its superiority. "In order to establish a unipolar globa

the United States needs a group of helpers no matter whether 

from the political, economic, or military angle." However, S

while "this group of helpers"-- NATO and Japan--may 'qo

hegemony outwardly," it "is actually dominated by the United Sta

in other words, a unipolar hegemony still dominated by the U

Such a practice can considerably prolong the life of the U.

unipolar hegemony and greatly put off the formation of a mul

setup. ''(~ 

Other Chinese analysts, while recognizing that the 

multipolarization process has decreased, and predicting furthe

U.S. power, also emphasize that the current trend does not mean 

5SHsu Taochen, "Wodd Facing Seven Ill Omens at Turn of Century--Inte

Research Fellow Shen Jim (part 2 of 3)," Ta Kung Pao (t-long Kong), May 

FBIS-CHI-1999-0608,June 10, 1999. 

~"~,Vang Zhuxun, "Effects of Kosovo on Global Securitttty." 

~°Hsu Taochen, "World Facing Seven Ill Omens at Turn of Century--Inte

Research Fellow Shen Jiru." 

27 
A few years ago, people were over-optimistic about the "multip

They thought that the "mulfipolar" trend would "move faster 

Some even thought that the multipolar world had already taken s

NATO use of force against Yugoslavia 2uld its attack on t

Embassy, some people went to the other extreme and believ

'unipolar' trend now reigned supreme and the world remained 

world. Both views are rather biased. Judging from the present si

multipolar pattern has not yet taken shape, but the trend cannot b

Recent developments only serve to show that the trend of mult

obviously slowing down and that the U.S. pole will be further str

but the plots of the United States to build a "unipolar world" w

dominate everything can never succeed) 2 

The reason cited by most authors for the ultimat

multipolarization is that the other poles will become more powe

into greater conflict with the United States: "The true essenc

point of the U.S. pursuit of hegemonism is to establish an inte

under U.S. dominance, but the developing countries will not 

even its allies will not allow it. ''63 ,amother author writ

cooperation and coordination between Europe and the Un

obviously growing, conflicts and differences remain," and a

same situation also applies to the U.S. relationship with J

61"On the New Development of U.S. Hegemonism,"Renmin Ribao, May 27

CHI-1999-0527, May 27, 1999. 

a2Xiao Feng, "World Trends Under U.S. Global Strategy, Part One of Tw

May 31, 1999, p.6; in FBIS-CHI-1999-0601, May 31, 1999. 

63"On the New Development of U.S. Hegemonism. 

e'Xiao Feng, "\Vorld Trends Under U.S. Global Strategy, Part One of Two

28 
SH_MNGHAI'S ELABORATE STUDIES 

The "orthodox" features of the future security, environment ca

many books and articles of the 1990s, but those from Shanghai 

very" dlorough and elat0orate. According to interviews conducted 

in Beijing, open-source assessments are based on inte

Government documents approved by Deng Xiaoping in th

Several officials pointed out that President Jiang Zemin has en

features of Deng's assessment. SIIS has a close relationshi

developed while he was mayor of Shanghai. Perhaps because of 

relationship (and because Shanghai is far from the rigid, offic

Beijing), SIIS publications often provide extensive details abo

security environment. 66 SIIS publications, particularly those 

President Chen Qimao, who has also written articles forQiu S

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party,', are authorit

greater detail and background about the future security enviro

~Ma Ling, "The Attempt Behind the 'Bombing in Error'-- Interview with Re

Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong," "la Kung Pao (Hong Kong), May 17, 19

CHI-1999-1518, May 17, 1999. 

66For example, see Chen Qimao, Kua shiji de s@'ie g~u da zbuanbuan (Major c

structure at the turn of the century)(Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 

67For example, see Chen Qimao, "Lengzhan hou daguo zhengzhi juezhu d

CI'he New direction of the post-Cold War political rivalry of the major powe

(1995): 39-44. Chen has also presented his views on the future security 

American publications. See Chen Qimao, ".New Approaches in China's For

Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (March 1993): 237-251. Du

President of sIIS, Chen was a foreign relations advisor to former Shangh

Daohan andJiang Zemin. More recently, he has been a visiting Research Fe

State University and Princeton University and currendy is president 

29 
Historically speaking, the disintegration of an empire is a long a

process. The Eastern Roman Empire began to decline at the 

12th century and was destroyed by the Ottoman Empire in 

whole process took more than 200 years, during which class con

intensi~'ing, [and] . .. invasions from the outside constantly too

Chen then compares the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the c

Soviet Union. Chen points out that the full process of the 

former Soviet Union is not complete. He notes that there are 

Russians living in republics outside Russia and 20 million othe

in Russia. He forecasts, "Due to the rise of nationalism, this 

lead to a great deal of explosive potential." The process of r

completion of the process of disintegration of the former Sovie

argues, will "become one of the important causes of turb

transitional era." He reminds us that the former Soviet 

superpower and in World War II it "utterly routed the im

Germany." 

Chen draws on several episodes of Chinese history to illu

process of the emergence of a new era can take many decades. H

the decline of the Eastern Han Dynast), (25 B.C.-220 

establishment of the Western J in Dynasty, (265-316 A.D.), a pe

80 years during which the "war lords fought each other, the Thr

dominated their own territories, while the masses lived in dire po

International Relations Society. 

*OChen Qimao, "Tile Transitional Era: Roots of Turbulence and Features 

Affairs," SIISJourna! 1, no. 2 (1994): 15-32. All other quotes in this sect

article, unless otherwise noted. 

30 
tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Austro-Hungar

According to Chen, contradictions mnong these three empi

several wars. He states, "Territorial issues were always so sensiti

disturbance could have resulted in enormous turbulence, thus 

danger of another world war." Chen adheres to the concept put f

Chinese analysts that the Vienna System built upon the Anti-N

the Versailles System established after World H;ar I, and the Yalta 

upon World War II created new political maps and divide

influence among the great powers relatively rapidly, bec

international conference agreements that these great powers were 

out after the wars. 

Without such a war or international conference to mark t

Cold War, Chen states that a new world system cannot be crea

victorious powers' conferences, "nor can spheres of influenc

quickly." Thus, Chen believes violence is ahead, and the "r

spheres of influence will be a long-term and tortuous process ..

among big powers for spheres of influence is under way." Ru

maintain as its sphere all its former Soviet boundaries, while 

doubt that Western nations want to have East European cou

NATO and to put them under the protection of the West.

struggle for redividing spheres of influence in Europe, Che

"struggles between the United States and Japan for the dominati

Asia-Pacific as well as struggles among Germany, France, and B

dominating role in Europe have not yet Surfaced, but they do 

themselves through a series of signs." Such struggles involve 

influence spheres and "will become significant roots for the 

turbulence in the transitional world." 

In Europe, Chert agrees with many Chinese analysts that Ger

major winner of the Cold War and has the best prospects to b

31 
"indirect demonstration of the straggle between the United S

European Union" over who will dominate the future of Europ

Chen, like many Chinese analysts, directly attacks the con

United States is the sole superpower and that there is a unip

pattern. Will there be American hegemony? According to Cher

facts emerging after the end of the Cold War have proved that 

wrong." He believes that many issues "demonstrate that Amer

control its allies has decreased." However, "The Yalta System 

Pacific region was not so complete and solid as that in Europe." 

that a looser, multipolar system has long existed in Asia b

American failure in the Vietnam War and the Soviet failure i

War, which reduced the two superpowers' influence. He 

capacity" to control the region was already much less than th

Because of these devdopments, man)- contradictions and dispute

Pacific region were not covered by the bipolar system." O

acknowledges that the Asia-Pacific region has a number of uncer

as territorial disputes, the Korean problem, the Taiwan is

leadership succession in several countries. However, the regio

become a place where "the centers not only are relatively indepen

in mutual check and balance" among the United States, Russia, 

and ASEAN. 

Using the indicators of CNP (described in chapter 5), Chen 

"the heyday when the United States dominated the Asia-Paci

gone forever." Thus, the multipolar structure has begun to take 

in the Asia-Pacific than in other regions of the world, so tha

already to say that "no single power can have the final say in th

region." This has been achieved without a Yalta, a Versailles

conference. The role of China has become a source of reg

because of its rapid economic growth and its adherence to the F

32 
implication is that a strong, unified China eliminates the influe

great powers (who caused wars), so Chinese stabilia; will help 

of transition and bring the new era to East Asia first. 69 

FIFTY-YEAR STRUCTURES 

One of the important premises on which Chinese assessme

future securig' environment are based is the concept of "wor

(zhanlue shifie geju)7 ° This term is used to refer to the design 

pattern, which, according to Chinese, generally exists for se

before undergoing a major transformation. Each "world struc

on the organization and state of relations among the great 

world. The process by which one world strategic pattern gives aw

usually is a major war. One author writes, "A world pattern is 

stable international structure formed by tile interrelations a

between the main forces in the world during a certain historic

The changes in the world pattern are based on the changes in th

the world's main contradictions, and they accompany internatio

phenomena such as turbulence, division, alignment and crises

conflicts and war. ''71 The basic Chinese catechism identifies four 

strategic patterns" dunng the past 200 years. One scholar at C

together a grid (table 2) illustrating characteristics of the worl

20th century. 

6~Liang Yufan, 'q"he Rise of Asia and Asian Regional Security," SITS Journal 1

7~lhis Chinese phrase has been translated by Chinese authors as "structure

"regime." The terms are used interchangeably in this volume. 

7:Yang Zheng, ed., 2000: Shifie xiang hechu qu?, 25. 

33 
systems 

Types of war or 

disputes 

International 

security models 

Goals 

Decisive factors 

of forces 

World 

economic 

systems 

Nature of 

international 

relations 

World War 

Military alliance 

and balance of 

power 

Domain and 

colony 

Military and 

diverse empires 

Plantation system 

and 

discriminatory 

economic blocs 

Struggle for 

hegemony 

Cold War and 

local war 

Military blocs 

and nuclear 

deterrence 

Orbit and 

global 

hegemony 

Military and two 

superpowers 

Two large 

closed markets 

of socialism and 

capitalism 

Power politics 

Cold War, local 

war, and 

economic war 

Alliance, nuclear 

deterrence, and 

balance of power 

Comprehensive 

strength of state 

Military, 

economic and 

pluralist powers 

Transitional 

global market 

economy 

Power politics 

and interdependence 

Source: Liu Jiangyong, "On the Establishment of Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dia

C~m,)I~erna~analRda~am4, no. 2 (February 1994): 32. Liu is a Senior Fellow and D

Asia Division at CICIR. 

The first world structure, called the "Vienna System" by 

lasted 40 to 50 ),ears and was set up by the victorious nations 

Napoleon. These four powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia, 

established a world structure that was centered entirely on 

characterized by mutual bargaining and the use of "spheres of 

preserve stability,. The second structure, which also lasted 40 to 

34 
Germany in 1870 and its defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian 

The third world structure derived from the conduct of the 

won World War I. In a manner similar to the creation of the V

Pattern, the new Versailles System was established by the stro

powers (the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan). As 

with the Vienna Conference after the Napoleonic Wars, the 

Conference of 1919 "redivided the world" and laid down the 

next "era." However, the October Revolution established the So

this period and Moscow participated in the Versailles System, w

the pattern whereby imperialism ruled the whole world. ''73 \X,,q

this era, several Chinese authors refer to it as the Versaille

System, arguing that the three major treaties signed at the 

Conference of 1921 played a major role in shaping the world str

time. 74 

The fourth world structure is known in China as the Yalta Sy

derived from the Yalta Summit involving the Llnited States, Br

Soviet Union in February 1945. Most Chinese claim this confer

out the spheres of influence in Europe and Asia for the United S

Soviet Union." With respect to China, the Yalta Summit inc

recognition of "U.S. control over Japan," while the United S

"satisfied the Soviet Union's wishes to regain Saldaalin Island, e

Mongolia to become independent, and enlisted northeast C

V~Chen Feng and Chen Xiaogong, "The World is in the Transition Period of 

Pattern Replacing the Old," 11-15. 

7~Ibid., 3. 

V4For example, a discussion of the Versailles-Washington System, as well as 

Yalta Systems, can be found in Yang Zheng, 2000: Shijie :~iang hechu qu?, 24-3

35 
has "basically disintegrated," they recognize it continues in Nor

the division between North Korea and Souda Korea and in t

territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo over the north

There have been some Chinese references to the unresolve

Taiwan's sovereignty, also being a part of the Yalta System bec

legal status was not resolved either at Yalta or the 1951 San Fr

Conference. 

Within a world structure there is also what is known as 

(shijie zhixu), or the ways and mcans by which nations interact 

each other: 

A world structure refers to a relatively stable international fram

strategic situation formed on the foundation of a certain power 

world order then refers to, on the basis of the world stru

mechanisms and rules of the motion of international relation

handling intemafional affairs and international contact). The two 

generalities (both take the power balance as their base) and differe

75Chen Feng and Chen Xiaogong, "The World is in a Transition Period of t

Pattern Replacing the Old," 3. Yang Dazhou of CASS offers a different vers

that led to the formation of the post-V~'orld War II Cold War structure, w

established in 1949. "In 1949 three major events occurred, making that year t

of the new structure: First, the Western nations, with the United States as the 

NATO, which was directed against the Soviet Union, revealing the prelude 

Second, the Soviet Union successfully exploded a nuclear bomb, giving the So

means to contend with the United States. Third, new China was established

to occur in the world's power balance, which greatly benefitted the 'social

Dazhou, "Dui lengzhan hou shijie geju zhi wo jian," 42. 

36 
both military, strength and CNP. The struggle for peace and de

will shift the competitive rank orders of variou

according to their CNP, which is based on the economic and 

policies they pursue. At the same time, in the military, doma

different rules to the international competition, including the use 

the competition for military superiority. This field has bee

primarily by military authors in China, although a few civilian a

also written about the consequences of local war and the dev

military technology, rr 

The rivalries and struggles to achieve CNP and military- sup

greatly contribute to the turbulence that characterizes the transition 

Chinese analysts. As a consequence, the "new era" will feature 

factors and inevitable local wars that will last for several deca

many Chinese articles mention the current trend of "relaxation

warn that there are prospects for more wars in the future. Three N

write, "The overall situation is one in which frequent regional con

outcome of the changing strategic pattern and internation

disorder. ''78 

The certainty of future local wars does not seem to be deba

contrary,, all Chinese analysts expect frequent local wars in the de

76He Fang, "Guodu shiqi de guoji xingshi," in 2000: Sbijie .xqang becbu qu?, 322

the State Council International Studies Center. 

77This topic is discussed further in chapter 6; forecasts of how the United St

the military, competition are found in chapter 2. 

78Xia Liping, Wang Zhongchun, Wen Zhonghua, and Xu Weidi, "Shijie zha

zhuyao tedian yu qushi" (The world strategic situation----characteristics and tre

fa~ban (Peace and Development) 47, no. 1 (February. 1994): 14-18. The autho

National Defense University Strategy institute. 

37 
Furthermore, there are many explicit references to the level o

caused by each of these past local wars. Different measures of de

have been used, including logistics. In 3 years of war in Ko

bombs were used; Vietnam required twice that number; and t

consumed nearly 8 million tons of supplies. Chinese art

"revolution in science and technology" expect future wars to hav

levels of destruction. 

Not only have Chinese authors noted that the intensig" and s

wars are escalating, but they cite another major trend in the 

frequency with which they have been occurring since the Cold 

According to Li Zhongcheng of CICIR, "In the 40 years of th

there were 190 regional conflicts, an average of four per year. 

years after the end of the Cold War there were 193, an average o

seven times that of the former year average. ''s° Other authors

predict future trends, have tracked the specific number of conf

distinguishing between wars that are new and those that are c

from the previous year. Li Qinggong, a Research Fellow at CII

Throughout the world in 1997 there were altogether 38 armed con

local wars of various scales, an increase of 8 in comparison with t

occurred in 1996, but a decrease of 8 from the 46 that took pl

peak year of 1995. Of all these local conflicts and wars, 8 

occurred in 1997, an increase of 2 in comparison with the numb

1996, but a decrease of 8 in comparison with the number of 16 a

7~'Liao Yonghe, "Pingrman duojihua }na hti duojihua qian.,d" (On the new p

politics), Sbijiefi'ngii.y~¢ zhengzhi (World Economics and Pohtics) 184, no. 12 0D

67-69. Liao is on the staff of the European Institute at CASS. 

SeLl Zhongcheng, Kua Shift de shifie zbeng~hi, 185. 

38 
future role of arms control or the United Nations in building i

trust or reducing the probability of the use of force. Since 1980

entered global economic institutions like the World Bank and I

Monetary Fund but has never accepted the jurisdiction of 

security arrangements such as U.N. peacekeeping forces, s2 

Chinese authors appear to assume other nations share their 

the future role of military force. Chinese assessments about fu

competition suggest they see other countries preparing themselve

of regional wars. For example, an article by two PLA analysts cla

United States thinks % new threat surpassing the confrontation 

East and the West in the past 45 years" is emerging. With regar

they argue, 'Whe Russian military thinks that the process of easing 

have an irreversible nature and that the danger of war still exists in 

Japan, they assert, "faces military threats and serious competitors

Japan will continue to beef up military strength and improve w

equipment." Concerning India, the PLA analysts claim that 

"India's security situation in the 1990s is still very grim, ther

continue to improve overall milita~, strength and strategic 

S:Li Qinggong, "Dangqian de guoji junshi anquan xingshi" (f'he current intern

security situation), Gu~//zhan/ueyanj~ (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 

9. 

saChinese analysts are not entirely negative about the role of die United Nation

world structure. For example, Sa Benwang, a Senior Researcher at CIIS, when p

the world pattern will be like in 2015 or 2020, writes, "International organizati

United Nations will continue to exist and be strengthened." Sa Benwango "P

International Strategic Patterns in the 21st Century," idaowarg, no. 37 (Septem

41-42, in FBIS-CHI-98-268, September 29, 1998. See also the section, "Can the 

the World's GovemmentY' in Gut Longlongo "Xin shiqi Lianheguo de diwei he 

position and role of the United Nations in the new period)," in IOta sh*ji 

zhuantman, 357-359. 

39 
world..~ an ideological organization, it is laying down some h

for the outbreak of World War III. The world has become mor

An article in Zhongguo Pinglun, which interviewed general

military research institutes, brought up a similar issue, warnin

must be ready to fight a world war." It said, "after NATO 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Chinese strategists believ

peacetime truly comes, world war could erupt at any moment. C

fully prepared for it. ''Ss However, although the potential for a th

was mentioned following U.S. and NATO actions in Yugoslavi

of Chinese authors still claim that ultimately peace and dev

prevail. ShenJiru of CASS argues, "The military actions taken b

hardly change the general trend of peace and development" for 

• "First, economic gtobalization is a powerful material f

large-scale wars." 

• "Second, the outcome of a war is determined by the ba

economic and military strength, public attitudes, and moral 

~,o sides. We do not deny the great destructiveness of mod

as well as the unprecedented cruel~, of modern warfare. N

has been proven in history that wars are not necessarily w

strength. France did not win the Algerian War with its adva

a~Chen Feng and Chen Xiaogongo "The World is in a Transition Period of t

Pattern Replacing the Old," 3. 

~'Experts on NATO's New Strategy and Related Issues," Beifing Review, no. 2

s~"China Must Be Ready to Fight a World War PLA Believes That tile We

Major Conspiracies Against China," Sing TaoJih Pao (Hong Kong), May 

FBIS-CHI-1999-0528, June 1, 1999. 

40 
struggle of all people in the world. ''86 

As before the Kosovo crisis, Chinese analysts maintain 

contradiction that regmnal wars will continue to exist even thou

development are the main trend. "For the 21st century

development will still be the theme of the times. We should 

waver in this judgment .... However, limited war will be unav

the roots of war will still be there. ''sv 

Sources of Wars 

What will be the causes of the regional wars that will occur th

transi6on period as the new world structure is in the process of 

old one? \~Alere will they take place? k~qao will be involved? Ch

explain the outbreak of local wars in the 1990s as having two m

first, the ethnic, religious, historical, and territorial disputes previ

up and restricted by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation were fr

following the end of the Cold War; and second, as the new worl

forming, there is competition and contention for power, i

economic resources. As the transition period progresses, the ho

local wars are focused will not be static but are expected to 

conflicts come to an end and new ones emerge, and as relation

powers develop. Former SIIS president Chen Qimao explains: 

36Hsu Tao-chen, "United States Still Makes Old Mistakes, Exclusive interview 

HongKong Ta KungPao, May 21, 1999, p. A6; in FBIS-CHI-1999-0604, May 2

a Research Fellow and director of the International Strategic Research Sectio

of World Economics and Politics, CASS. 

87Wang Zhuxun, "Effects of Kosovo on Global Security." 

41 
the current world still is not stable, s8 

Consequently, the local wars will occur for a variety, of rea

participants ranging from small groups to major powers, an

worldwide. 

Several Chinese authors have suggested that the fault lines 

in the multipolar security environment will not be the same 

bipolar Soviet-American confrontation. Following the end of 

the main area where local wars were focused was in Centra

Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, most Chinese 

not predicnng protracted peace and stability, consider the region

armed conflicts to have subsided to some extent and see the 

hot spot as shifting to Africa. A People's Dai& article reported 

"According to statistics, nearly half of all the local wars th

worldwide this year happened in Africa .... Though these co

the nature of civil wars and were local, they have nevertheless p

threat to peace and stability and have caused the concern of th

community. ''s9 Chinese analysts do not foresee the proble

disappearing any time in the near future and expect that there w

be frequent wars. For example, Li Zhongcheng of CICIR write

of the century, and the early part of next century, it is extremel

there will appear in the African Great Lake region a situation 

~Chen Qimao, "Qianyan," 2. 

~7_2aang Dezhen and Zhu Manting, "Relations Among Big Nations Profoun

Multipolar Trends Quickened," ReJz,m'n R/baa (People's Daily), December 15, 

CHI-98-001,January 1, 1998. 

42 
and frequent regional conflicts. 9~ 

Many Chinese analysts point out that the proliferation of 

religious, and territorial wars has not meant that the major powe

been involved in the conflicts. In fact, a number of analysts cite h

and milita~" interventionism as contributing to and exacerbatin

Wang Xuhe of the Strateg T Department at ~%\1S stated, "

threatening international security are pluralizing, becoming more c

and have more layers, but hegemonism and power politics 

considerably long period still be the major threats to international 

With regard to the two current hot spots, Africa and the Middle 

Feng, a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, writes, 

The conflicts in Africa and the Middle East have their respectiv

e.g., the complicated ethnic or cultural contradictions, frontier 

disputes and internal struggles, etc. However, if analyzed from 

perspective, these conflicts reflect the struggle to control these 

between the great powers. Conflicts in these regions all h

intervention from those powers involved. The United States, ma

use of the chance that France had adjusted its African policy, tried 

means to create its own agents in Africa and to drive the French fo

of its sphere of influence. In the Middle East, because the U.S. 

WLi Zhongcheng, Kala Shift& shijie @eng@i, 192. 

91Ibid., 191. 

92Wang Xuhe, "Dangqian guoji anquan xingshi de zhuyao tedian" (The main 

of the current international security situation), Shijiejing, ii~, Zheng@i (World E

Politics) 209, no. 1 (January. 1998): 7. 

43 
forces clashing with local people and shooting a number of Serb

the United States "sending an 'expeditionary" air force' to Bosn

psychologically the Serbian people;" and France "continuous

milita~ intervention against the Republic of Central Africa. ''94 

Following NATO militm 3, strikes against Yugoslavia in spri

was a tremendous increase in criticism and alarm about U.S

being a source of war. One author writes, "Hegemonism and 

are still developing, and there will be no peace under heav

century. ''9s Wang Jincun, a senior researcher at CASS portra

States as "striving to build a single-polar world and to 

hegemony." After the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chine

Belgrade, Wang wrote that the United States is employing milita

one means for achieving its goal: "What desetwes more attent

United States, not yet satisfied with its Cold War achievements

more advances through military means. Therefore, there has app

closer growing link between the new Cold War and 'hot war

interference by the United States in iraq, Somalia, 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bombing against Sudan and Afg

especially the ongoing air strikes against Yugoslavia, setx'e 

examples.'96 

Chu Shulong of CICIR pointed out, "The number of 

frequency with which the United States has used force in vario

~3Chen Feng, "1997 man de guoji zhanlue xingshi," 5. 

94Li Qinggong, "Daugqian de guoji junshi anquan xingshi,'" 10. 

95~(lang Zhuxun, "Effects of Ko~ovo on Global Security." 

~%VangJincun, "Global Democratization--Camouflage of U.S. Hegemony

1999, in FBIS~CHI-1999-0527, May 27, 1999. 

44 
War syndrome in the United States and it became enthusiastic 

intervention activities. ''gs One article noted that, "Since 199

States has dispatched troops more than 40 times, and 10 of the

military interventions." It concludes, "Given the large amount o

evidence, the United States has become the world's major source 

arms expansion and implementation of hegemonism and powe

it has become a major threat to the world's peace. It is predicta

countries will become test spots for the high- and new-techno

of the United States and the victims of its war machine. ''99 

97Chu Shulong, "Sino-US Relations Pushed into Perilous Waters," Shijie zhish

1999): 9-10, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0622,June 23, 1999. 

'~Luo Renshi, "What about the 'New Gunboat Policy'," flefangiun bao, May 20, 

CHI-1999-0326, May 20, 1999. A more extensive description of the history

decline of U.S. interventionism comes from Wang Zhuxun, who states, "The 

is tiding on the third expansionist upsurge in its history. During the first upsu

from the end of the 18th century to early 19th century., the United States capit

internal strife brought on by the revolutionary movement and the War of Nap

European continent, and put forward the Monroe Doctrine. It went fi*ll force 

Western Henri.sphere, and txied its best to turn America into the Americans' 

the second upsurge, which lasted from the end of the 19th century to the ea

the United States developed from free capitalism to monopoly capitalism, 

national strength tremendously. Under the guidance of Mahan's theory 

vigorously expanded overseas .... Now, the United States is in a new peri

Factors such as the weakening of its Cold War opponent and its sustained e

have placed the United States in a new window Of strategic opportunity.' The 

launched in this strategic backdrop. This will be an important factor tha

direction headed by the international strategic situation in the 21st century.

"Effects of Kosovo on Global Security." 

~"just See How the United States Expands its Arms and Prepares for War,

1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0603,June 1, 1999. 

45 
is in midstream, not knowing if it can get to the opposite ban

there will be any dangerous rocks or reefs. I believe that thi

water will go on for several years, and we need to observe whe

or the Korean peninsula will be next. ''1°° An article in the L

DaiS, after asserting that U.S. "gunboat policy will inevitably 

wars and disorder all over the world," predicted that U.S. milita

may not be limited to smaller nations in the future. "The targe

a small nation, but it could be a big country tomorrow! The 

Kosovo today, but it could be any counm, that does not me

tomorrow .... War increasingly wilt become the major means 

United States to establish a polarized pattern. Wars are not 

US. '~101 

In addition to hegemonism and power politics and ethnic

territorial reasons, Chinese analysts see the straggle for econom

another major source contributing to local wars in the tra

Colonel Liu Mingde states, "The Marxists hold that the confli

interests is the root of war." He explains that the Arab-Israeli 

do with Israel's hea W reliance on the Jordan River" and that th

and the Gulf War were about petroleum. Similarly, the civil wa

is a war between dm "poor" Serbs and the "rich" Slovaks a

concludes, "Competition in Comprehensive National Power 

1°:2via Ling, "The Attempt Behind the 'Bombing in Error'---Interview with R

Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong." 

i°tBi Changhong, "Polarization Attempt and Danger ofV£Zar,"fiefan~'un ba

in FBIS-CHI-1999-0528, May 21, 1999. 

46 
natural resources and markets. In this situation, the world prob

enter a new "Cold War" (economic, political war), ~ven a "Warri

era" with numerous local and regional hot wars emerging. :°3 

It is this struggte for economic resources that could lead to di

between the major powers. While many Chinese authors imply th

not be a war among the five major powers, that they very likely wi

in the regional wars but probably not against each other, ther

viewpoint that believes the potential for conflict exists. TM Three an

Strategy Institute at NDU write, "The majority, of regional co

world are civil wars, social turmoil, and civil coups. Althou

influence and interference from some other countries, these inte

not develop into military confrontations between large countries

they warn that, "Potential conflict areas do exist that may pos

direct military confrontations between large countries or region

large-scale an-ned conflicts and local wars happen in these regions

in drastic changes in the world situation and harm the glo

situation. ''10s 

A likely area for future conflict among the powers will be 

where "abundant natural resources will become the target o

:°2Liu Mingde, "The Implications of the Changes in Warfare After Disin

Bipolar Structure," Internalional Strategic Xtuckes 24, no. 2 (June 1992): 7-8. 

l°~He Xin, Zhongguo fuxingg,u shij~e weiloi, 8. 

I~For an example of the former view, see General Pan Zhengqiang, "The 

Military Situauon," Renm/n ribao (People's Daily), December 23, 1993, 7, in FB

January 7, 1994. 

:°SXia Liping, Wang Zhongchun, Wen Zhonghua, and Xu Weidi, "Shijie zh

zhuyao tedian w qushi," 14-18. 

47 
hinterland." Yang predicts, "The number of countries involved 

The European Union also regards the Central Asian region 

resources base that can replace the Gulf in the future .... Intern

covet the treasure chest that is Central Asia. ''1°; 

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was seen by a numb

authors as part of the organization's efforts to gain influence 

the region. Li Yonggang, a scholar at the Chinese Society fo

Management, says geopolitical, economic, and energy inter

motivations for NATO actions, for once NATO controlled the 

a direct path to Central Asia. He writes, 

• "From the angle of geopolitics, Kosovo is located in 

the Balkan Peninsula, which is situated among the three 

Europe, Asia, and Africa; as such, Kosovo has a dec

position. To NATO, with control over the Balkans, it 

westward to the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, and sou

consolidate the 'southern wing of NATO,' offering a link 

in the Middle East. Eastward in the region of Black Sea and 

that is, the region of outer Caucasus and Central Asia

infiltrate, expand, and weaken and push out the power ma

Russia." 

• "Viewed from the angle of economic interests, NAT

powers have been quietly, secretly enthusiastic about gettin

l°tYang Shuheng, "Lengzhan hou daguo he diqu liliang dui Zhongya de 

struggles over central Asia by major nations and regional forces in tile post-C

H@ingyufazhan (Peace and Development) 60, no. 2 (June 1997): 26-29. 

iCVlbid., 45. 

48 
countries in Central Asia. This will have extremely far-reach

economic, and cultural significance. This is the gener

economic, and financial strate~, of Europe." 

• "What should also be noticed is that by putting the Ba

control and moving westward, there is the possibility, of ma

vast geographic area rich with oil and natural gas. ''*°s 

An additional source of instability in Central Asia has been 

by Gao Heng of CASS, who believes that "the developmen

resurgence activities" could lead to conflict. 1°9 Moreover, Chen Fe

argues that the contention in Central Asia could be exacerbated by 

activities and exercises of foreign troops. For example, when 

States, "for the first time since the end of World War II, sent re

(more than 500 personnel of one battalion under the 82nd Airborn

to the region to take part in military maneuvers, it indicated that 

to control the region between the big powers has spread from ec

political fields to military and security fields. ''n° 

1°SLi Yonggang, "Looking at the U.S. World Strategy Against the Backdrop 

Crisis" excerpt published in Zhongguo Tongxutt She (Hong Kong), May 27, 1999

1999-0528, May 27, 1999. 

:°gGao Heng "Shijie daguo guanxi de xin tedian" (New characteristics of the rel

the world's major nations), Shijiejingiiyu zheng~bi (World F, conomics and Poli

0anuary 1998): 8. 

v:°Chen Feng o "1997 rtian de guoji zhanlue x~gshi,"5. 

49 
remains one of the regions in the world with fewer cases of a

and such a situation can still be maintained in the years to com

are backed up by the few number of local wars in the region. 

For a long time, especially in the post-Cold War era, the Asia-

been a comparatively stable region. Statistics show that in 1991 

end of the Cold War, 29 armed conflicts and local wars occu

world, out of which 6 were in the Asia-Pacific. In 1997 the total 

armed conflicts in the world increased to 38, while it was kept 

,~ia-Pacific, namely the internal armed conflicts in Afghanistan

Cambodia, the Philippines and Myanmar, as well as that between 

Pakistan in Kashmir. The armed conflicts in the Asia-Pacif

remain the least in the world, but also have decreased to som

intensity.~2 

However, many authors argue that despite the low number of 

greater stability, in the 1990s, there still is serious potential for th

to become a hot spot. 

Chen Peiyao, president of SIIS has pointed out, "During 

East Asia was the region where military, conflicts and loc

constantly seen. The end of the Cold War did not bring an 

ntFor example, Colonel Xu Weidi of the NDU predicts that the two great 

be the East Asian littoral (because of territorial disputes) and the Eurasia

Central Asia and the Persian GulE See Colonel Xu \X'eidi, '"Post Cold W

Environment," World Militao" Trends (Beijing: Academy of Milita~" Science

:l~Zhang Changtai, "1997 man yatai diqu xingshi zongshu" (Roundup o

situation in 1997), Gu~i @anIueA'a~ffiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 

20. 

50 
Zhongcheng, of CICIR, major issues such as the Korean penin

the Nansha Islands, and the Diaoyu islands "make it clear tha

Asia-Pacific region there exists the kindling for regional conflic

The Japanese parliament's adoption of the U. S .-Japan Securit

in spring 1999, also is considered to be a source of future confli

does it signify the rise of militarism in Japan, considered by 

serious potential factor for instability in the region, but it also "

capacity, of the U.S. military to intervene in the Asia-Pacific... 

Japan as a forward base, U.S. military forces would have to r

Hawaii and south to Australia." Lu Gua0g~,e , a fellow at the Chin

Defense Strategic Institute, claims that together with NAT

Japanese military alliance has become one of "the two black hand

tyrant to do evil." He sees NATO military strikes in Yugos

bombing of the Chinese embassy as omens of future U.S. 

actions. "Everything that NATO does can be regarded as the mo

most realistic mirror of what we understand as the subs

Japanese-US military, alliance and of how Japan and the United 

in the Asia-Pacific region. The 'experiment' carried out in the Fed

of Yugoslavia by US-led NATO also provides a vivid exa

Asia-Pacific countries. ''n6 

n3Chen Peiyao, "East Asian Security: Situation, Concept and Mechanism," T

no. 2 (July 1997): 2. 

tt4Shen Qurong "Post-War Asia Pacific: Historical Lessons and Common Eff

Future," Contemporary International Relations 5, no. 11 (November 1995): 7. 

n SLi Zhongcheng, Kua slnji de sht)'ie zhengzhi, 192. 

U6Lu Guang~,e, "Going Against the Tide of History, Threatening World Peac

June 6, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0617,June 18, 1999. 

51 
China, and so it produces stuff like the theory of the Chi

suppress China. If the United States is unable to curb the 

China's development in the next 10 to 20 years, it will have 

effort. During this period, therefore, the United States may dev

ways to cause trouble." However, Colonel Zhang does not fore

the United States going to war in the near tenn. "Unless t

changes over Taiwan or other issues, the United States at pr

have the gall to take the initiative in attacking Chma's territory

be vigilant. ''nv Chu Shulong of CICIR also predicts that eff

China could lead to problems, "Negative and extremist 

domestic politics, external strategy, and diplomacy toward China 

dangerous for world peace and development and for the pres

of Sino-US relations. ''ns These views are echoed in the yearly 

the International Situation--1997-1998, published by the Chine

Strategy, and Management, where Yah Xuetong of CICIR war

conflicts between China and the United States, as China's powe

the "desperate" United States struggles to maintain its leading 

In history,, the rise of a new world power often leads to 

international wars, but these wars are not necessarily cau

expansion of a rising power. Some of them resulted from t

policies of a hegemonic power in maintaining its hegemony

British War (1812-1814) is a typical example. In order to constr

of the United States, Britain blocked American shipments to 

nSMa Ling, "The Attempt Behind the 'Bombing in Error'--Interview with R

Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong." 

uSChu Shulong, "Sino-U.S. Relations Pushed into Perilous Waters." 

52 
Deng Xiaoping Thought 

In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping apparently described, in sti

documents, four alternative scenarios, each of which was based o

"basic contradiction" that would characterize the new era. He su

• series of major conflicts in the world that might lead to war in 

characters: "East, West, South, and North." The first set of co

West, is posited as the conflict between the United States an

Union---~at is, between socialism and capitalism; the seco

suggests West-West conflicts between developed capitalist cou

third scenario South-North conflicts are between the developing 

countries and the developed capitalist countries; and the fourt

view sees South-South conflicts as differences between Third Wor

that can lead to warfare. In 1989 Deng predicted that two of 

conflicts could result in new Cold \Vars. "I hope the Cold War 

I am disappointed. Perhaps when one cold war ends, two more co

already started. One is directed against the south and the third wor

against socialism. ''12° 

A crucial part of Deng's formulation of the sources of futu

that China will never be a source of war, nor.does China aspire 

superpower, even though Chinese officials since 1988 have explic

11%'an Xuetong, "The International Security, Environment of China's Rise," 

genxi baogae---1997-1998 (Study reports on the international simation--1997

Zhanlue yu guanli chubanshe, 1998), 82-83. This book has 10 authors, four fro

from CICIR, one from CSSM, and one unidentified. 

12°Selected [Porks of Deng Xiaopin~ vol. 3, 344, quoted in "/-Iegemonism Sh

,Mlowed to Act Wdlfully,"Qiush~; no. 11 (June 1, 1999): 6-7, 10, in FBIS-CHI-1

18, 1999. 

53 
a Taiwan independence flag, it will lead to a major crisis i

between the two shores. On that occasion, if the United State

other countries publicly intervene, it will lead to a serious arme

or escalate to a local war. Its influence will go beyond the A

region, and have global and historical impact. 12: 

CHINA'S ROLE IN MULTIPOI2iRITY 

Chinese analysts assert that China need not be purely passive but 

trend toward multipolarity and increase its pace. For examp

Europe move toward becoming a pole. One author argues that 

to play a bigger international role as a "powerful independe

unfolding multipolar world, so it is "seeking at the same tim

bond with the world's major powers," and issued an im

document entitled, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with Ch

1997. Feng Zhongping of CICIR calls this "a strategic 

According to Feng, this new relationship with China will "help 

long cherished endeavor to assert itself on the world stage a

independent 'pole' in wodd affairs." The reason the EU can be

is because of "China's status in the unfolding world power 

similar argument is put forward by Shen Yihui, who states that "

to count on China for support," because '%rest Europe's build

with China will enable itself to play a bigger part in internation

also conducive to quickening the process of world multipolariz

12'Gao Heng, "Dongbei Ya de anquan geju ji weilai qushi" (Northeast Asia's 

and future trends), 21 shift (21st Century), no. 6 (1995): 36. 

t:~Feng Zhongping, "An Analysis of the China Policy of the European Un

International Relations 8, no. 4 (April 1988): 1-6. Feng is Deputy Director of 

Western European Studies at CICIR. 

54 
FINDINGS 

The current assessment of the future security environment publi

in 1986, following the U.S.-Soviet summit, and can be attribut

Xiaoping's national security" advisor, Huan Xiang. Its orthodox 

a future multipolar world are subject to muted revision and deb

the disagreements which this chapter has examined in some deta

form the poles of a coming multipolar world; how "pole" should 

and on what basis classifications should be made; the tran

multipolar world and how to characterize the turmoil and world 

such a transition period; and finally, how Chinese analysts in

construe recent events as evidence for the prevailing orthod

conversely for the reformist view. 

The Basic Framework 

The Chinese assessment of the current and future security e

depicts the present world as being in an era of transition to a 

structure. During this period, great rivalries will emerge among' 

and many local wars will be fought, as a struggle for world lead

place. Chinese authorities assert that world politics since the 1800

had a "system" or a "strategic pattern" (the "Vienna System" of 

intermediate system when Germany and Italy each unified and Jap

the Meiji Reform; the "Versailles System" of 1920-45; the "Yalta 

1945-89; and the present "transition era.') Under those rules

"2-~Shen Yihui, "Cross-Century European-Chinese Relations," i.daowang o no. 14 (

40-41, in FBIS-CHI-98-114, April 24, 1998. For an additional article discus

Sino-EU relations see Wang Xingqiao, "A Positive Step Taken by the Euro

Promote Relations with China," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, July 1, 1998

98-191,July 10, 1998. 

55 
so that it can challenge the Russian and Chinese spheres of 

the east, while NATO challenges them from the west. 

• Japan is seeking to embroil the Unites States and Chi

that will weaken both Washington and Beijing. 

• NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999 

U.S. plan to gain control over Eurasia. 

The decline of U.S. power and influence is a key feature of the 

that after the transition period is complete, there will no 

superpowers but instead a "multipolar world" in whi

nations---China, the United States, Japing, Europe and Russia-

roughly equal comprehensive national power. International af

multipolar "world system" will be governed by the "Fiv

Peaceful Coexistence," and hegemons and power politics 

prevail. 

Debates 

Chinese authors rarely refer to each other, seldom provi

bibliographical information, and hardly ever mention or admit 

of debates or differences of opinions, let alone criticize other au

The precedent was broken however in 1997 when two n

carried two articles, one reformist in nature, and the other o

openly challenged and criticized the other point of view ab

transition period and the coming world of multipolarit3,. Y

senior analyst at the Institute of American Studies of CAS

debate, when he published a direct and detailed criticism o

assessment of the future security environment. The article met 

response from a senior general in militaq" intelligence, H

56 
 Whether the United States will lose its allies 

• \X/hat the future role of Third World nations will be. 

In his article, Yang Dazhou put forward a reformist sce

current and furore security environment, which conflicted with 

of the key features of the orthodox view. He argued: 

• "lhe United States will maintain its superpower status for 

decades. 

• The United States will maintain its alliances with Japan an

• There will not be a period of "uncertainty" in the next 

decades. 

• There will not be an extended transition period featu

toward multipolarit3,. 

• A "pluralistic" world structure of"one superpower and f

already exists. 

• Only the United States is really a "pole" and able to decid

in any region. 

• China "does not have sufficient qualifications to be a 'p

• For more than 20 years, no other nations, including those 

World, will emerge as major powers to challenge the five st

• It is not likely large local wars will break out among na

In rum, General Huang reasserted the orthodox view by conte

Yang's points: 

• U.S. decline is inevitable and continuing; U.S. global 

already severely limited. 

57 
rnam trend, during the transitional period of uncertainty.

ahead. 

Other differences or variances in opinion also exist ab

issues, however, rather than engaging in a direct debate, some C

employ more subtle techniques for showing dissent, such as b

experts in order to show an opposing view, or rising above 

inventing new definitions of orthodox terms. Sometimes a "n

might set forth conflicting scenarios or different points of view 

authors, or a journal will publish the comments of several s

conference in a way that shows disagreements exist. 

The NATO strikes on Yugoslavia and the NATO b

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999 highlight

concerning the future world structure, because they re

reevaluation of previous assessments about the current transiti

reformist view clearly gamed support on the issues of the pace 

and the rate of multipolarization. This new trend was manife

number of articles admitting that the transition to multipol

postponed. The cause for the delay was largely attributed to t

United States remains powerful. Not only were some auth

focusing on current U.S. decline, but rather they predicted t

may even continue to increase. However, other Chinese 

recognizing that the pace of the multipolarization process h

emphasize that the current trend does not mean that the U.S

establish a unipolar world. It is only a temporat T setback, the 

about the world moving toward a relatively equal multipolar st

been altered. 

58 
few authors about the possibility of a third global war. 

The regional wars that will prevail throughout the curren

noted to be increasing in intensity, scope and frequency. According 

authors, they stem from three major sources: 

• Ethnic, religious, historical and territorial disputes. 

• Hegemonism and military" interventionism, particularly on 

the United States. 

• The competition for power, influence and economic reso

new world structure is formed. 

While a number of authors stress that the major powers will not 

in wars against one another, other authors cite struggles over 

conflicts that could lead to such types of confrontations. 

New regional war "hot spots" are expected to emerge as th

period progresses, and aside from file current problem areas 

Balkans, Africa, and the ,Middle East, Central Asia and the Asi

considered to be potential candidates. Whether or not the Asia

remain stable is a subject for debate among Chinese analysts. 

peninsula, Taiwan, the Nansha Islands, and the Diaoyu islands, 

conceivable seeds for major conflicts, all of which could some

China. Although Deng Xiaoping asserted that China would never 

of war, China's rise as a global power is considered to be anot

cause of instability. Several authors have written about U.S. efforts

decade or two, to contain China's development and preven

international affairs. They warn of potential conflicts between C

United States, as China's power increases and the "desperate" U

struggles to maintain its leading position. 

59 
While many authors imply that there will not be a war 

major powers, there is another viewpoint that believes th

conflict exists among the major powers. A likely area for 

among the powers will be Central Asia, due to its strategic p

natural resources. 

The current debates among Chinese security, analysts all m

elaborate on the four alternative scenarios Deng Xiaoping d

mid-1980s. Each was based on a different "basic contradicti

characterize the new era. Deng summarized a series of major 

world that might lead to war in four Chinese characters: "Ea

and North." The first set of conflicts, East-West, is posited 

between the United States and the Soviet Union--that is, be

and capitalism; West-\Vest conflicts are characterized as 

developed capitalist countries; South-North conflicts are 

between the developing Third World countries and the deve

countries; and South-South conflicts are defined as the diffe

Third World countries that can lead to warfare. A crucial 

formulation of the sources of future warfare is that China 

source of war, nor does China aspire to become a superpowe

As noted, the formulation used by Chinese authors duri

forecast the future securig' environment is similar to th

statements first made 15 years ago by Deng. Huan Xiang, his n

adviser, first announced the features of the current view of the 

environment in early 1986, just after the U.S.-Soviet summit: 

"The new stage of U.S.-Soviet relations will further wea

to control and influence their respective "allies .... The w

multipolar W trend will further develop." 

60 
and military, hegemony would not be too difficult." 

61 
CHINA'S SECURITY ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN PREDICTING U.S. D

long time. In fact, the idea that U.S. strength is weakening and th

will no longer be effective throughout the world is not new 

Using internal Chinese documents, Professor Robert S. Ross has 

alleged in the early 1980s. For example, U.S. concessions in wh

August 17, 1982, communique between the United States an

explained as due to U.S. "power decline." Ross cites one analys

at that time that the U.S. "position of strength is declining" an

will "lead to failure everywhere. ''1 

According to official Chinese Marxism, a "capitalist" United 

avoid decline forever. Even in military strength and technolo~', 

development of the revolution in military affairs (P,_,\.L~_), are

United States currently is considered to hold the leading posi

military experts claim that there are several reasons the Un

destined to fall behind other nations. This "inevitable" declin

hegemon is a decisive feature of China's assessment of the fu

U.S. decline, there will be no multipolar structure in which a risi

seek protection. Without the fading away of U.S. milita D, 

Europe and Japan, a rising power will have no new parmers 

align. Additionally, without U.S. decline, Chinese Marxism wou

false. 

Since 1991, some Chinese military authors have described 

military, weaknesses ~a~d forecasted that after two decades th

:Robert S. Ross, "China Learns to Compromise: Change in U.S.--China 

1984," China Quarterly 28 (December 1991): 742-773. 

63 
decline and the problems it will face in future wars 

• How U.S. military weakness is one factor affecting 

decline. 

This is the first of several chapters to deal with Chinese writi

future implications of the R~\£A,, which is also an important 

chapters about Comprehensive National Power (CNP), Japan

future wars. PLA authors assert that the United States will do we

only in its initial period of a decade or so, then other nations li

Japan will surpass America in developing future R~'VLai-type fo

with the RNLA will affect victory in future war, because "Non-

will not possess the qualifications for future high-technology w

"lhe assessment of U,S. rrulitary decline is reinforced by Ch

authors. As mentioned in chapter one, authoritative civilian an

a decline in America's diplomatic role in the 21st century', as 

opens up the potential for new alignments and "parmerships," a

Europe seek to improve their relations with China. According 

statecraft of the Warring States era, a too-powerful hegemon 

destroy a rising rival. However, a coalition or a series 

partnerships" could save a rising power from such destruction if 

were declining. Chinese authors claim, "Today the t

multipolarization in the world is quickening, which prevents the 

2For a discussion of the implementation of the RMA in Russia, Germany, Fran

Japan, see Li Qinggong, "1997 nian di guoji junshi anquan xingshi" C/he inte

security situation in 1997), Guofizhan~eyanfat (International Strategic Studies) 

1998): 10-11. 

3Su Zhisong, Kua sh~i dejumhi :dnguandian (New military points of view a

century) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1997), 14. 

64 
information warfare, networks of systems, and "digitized" c

However, while Chinese analysts acknowledge America's c

position in the field, many also point to existing and future we

they can be exploited, and why other countries will surpass the 

For example, the scope of negative predictions about how th

will implement an RMA varies little among five books pub

authors at the Academy of Military Science (.~MS) in the last 

critiques of the United States range from technology issues 

which U.S. military and government attitudes and philosoph

and limit creativi~', development, and implementation of the R

the authors emphasize the greater potential of other coun

China, in the area of innovation. Gao Chunxiang writes that U

provide us with the train of thought in future information war

to stay clear of the enemy's main force and strike at his weak p

his strengths and attack his weaknesses, adopt his good points a

shortcomings, use the indigenous to create the foreign, seek 

"Zhang Linhong, "U.S. Glob',d Strategy Seeks World Donmlation," Zhen

(September 11,1997): 2-4, in FBIS-CHI-97-350, December 18, 1997. 

5See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of Chinese views on the RA.IA. 

~Wang Pufeng, Xinxi ~han~hengyujunshi geming (Information warfare and 

military affairs)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995); Li Qingshan, Xinj

jishu ~hanzhen ~ Cl'he new revolution in military- affairs aud high-technolog

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995); Gao Chunxiang, ed., Xinjunshigeming 

revolution in military affairs)(Beijmg: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996); Zh

Xiaozhuo, A'fei-E :,~njunshigeming (America, Russia, and dm new revolution 

CBeiiing: Junshi kexuc chubanshe, 1996); Han Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 27 

jianshe (Foreign military development toward the 21st century)(Beijm

chubanshe, 1996). 

65 
g g, 

major obstacles in "establishing a digitized battlefield: ''9 

• Intcrservice rivalry. The U.S. Air Force and Navv do no

the U.S. Army's digital forces experiments and have a "ne

attitude." Both houses of the U.S. Congress are also said to 

as indicated by the statement, "Senate Armed Services Co

Land Forces Subcommittee Chairman, John Warner, believe

still lack the technical skills to use digitized equipment 

Another Senator is quoted as saying, "Army troops are 

digitized battlefields, and as soon as a digitized network is d

would be unable to fulfill their combat missions. ''1° 

• Insufficient funds. The U.S. defense budget has been 

many years, and recently even for digital forces. 

• The technology is too complex. "If you want to bu

battlefield, you must resolve the foUowing six technical issu

sensors information into digitized coded form; proces

information; making digitized connections; joining digitiz

7Gao Chunxiang, ed., Xinjunshigeming lun, 202. 

S~'ang Pufeng 'Wingjie xinxi zhanzheng de fiaozhan" (The challenge of info

Zhongguojunshi kexue (China Military Science) 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 

Pillsbury., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington: National Defense Unive

326. 

°Hart Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 21 shiji de waiguojunduijianshe, 47. 

:°Ibid., 47. 

66 
Another important example of Chinese beliefs is America, 

Revolution in Mih'ta~y Affairs, by two officers at the AMS, who 

United States will at first be successfully innovative during the 

of the R/VIA but later will be surpassed by one (or more) vig

They explain that the United States will ultimately lose its statu

superpower because it will fail to exploit the ~\4A for se

including: 

• American military arrogance following the Gulf W

fundamental innovation, especially in the area of ne

concepts which are crucial for an tLMA. 

• Information technolo~" and other new military techn

universally available through commercial enterprises a

restricted by the U.S. Government, so the United State

current advantage. 

• Smaller defense budgets have historically produced mo

than the giant U.S. budgets. 

• New, innovative "measures of effectiveness" t

innovation, and nations other than the United States are 

more in this area, even when they have to buy weapo

advanced nations. '3 

Wang Zhenxi, a Senior Adviser at the China Institute o

Strategic Studies (CIISS), provides additional insight into w

::Ibid., 47-48. 

12Ibid., 48. 

lz~Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-E xinjunshigemin~ 41-45. 

67 
Counting on its technical superiority, the United States claims 

the forerunner in the military revolution and that it even has s

lead of 30 to 50 years over other nations that no country can ca

advance shoulder to shoulder with it before 2020. We say th

technology is an agent behind the military revolution, but not th

Wang next employs the same definition of RIVlA used by .amdrew 

and other .American proponents: 

It depends on the combined action of social, political, econ

scientific and technological factors for a military revolution to 

and proceed smoothly ..... ~md in the military" field it hinges o

innovation of the military technology., doctrines and org

structure. 

To the surprise of Westerners, Wang differs from _Amaericans 

expect the United States to be the world's leader in the R~'vLt: 

It is not necessarily the existing most technologically advanced c

will eventually achieve the best results in the military revolution. 

not be ruled out that in the current military- revolution certain cou

advance new military, thoughts or doctrines, thus pinning 

technological supremacy the U.S. primarily expects to possess in 

information .... If the social, political, economic, scie

technological, and military thought factors are taken into accoun

not absolutely limited to the United States as the only country' tha

a military revolution.l" 

:~Wang Zhcnxi, "The New Wave of the World Revolution in Military Af

Strategic Stu&'es 44, no. 2 (April 1997): 8-9. 

68 
the RM.A: 'CHow to balance investment in the present versus t

the fundamental contradiction facing the U.S. Department of D

QDR examined three different strategic paths to solve this tough 

QDR chose a third path--to strike a balance between the pr

future "that embraces the RMA in an evolutionary way .... 

exploit the RMA has been adopted as the general principle o

development of the QDR. ms 

The Chinese criticize the U.S. Army for already "being t

blind alley of technology." A I_a'beration Arm), Daily article state

which the U.S. is developing is no more than the use of a nation

to transform the existing units as well as the e,viyting weaponry a

of the Army, and the U.S. Army is already trapped in the 

technology." The article warns, "If the United States goes on wi

practice, the milita_, T revolution it is engaged in will not be a th

one," and predicts "The United States will not exploit the R~L

According to some Chinese military authors, the United 

knows China can defeat it in 2020. General Pan Junfeng states th

States will not have formed a full information warfare force un

of the 21st century. He explains three ways that in future w

computers can be very vulnerable. "We can make the enem

centers not work by changing their data system. We can caus

headquarters to make incorrect judgments by sending disinform

dominate the enemy's banking system and even its entire 

:SLu I~hong, "Meiguo xin 'si nian fangwu pinggu baogao' pouxi" (An analys

report of the quadrennial defense review), Guoji zhanlueyanjiu (International 

46, no. 4 (October 1997): 7-10. 

:~Zhang Feng, '"Historical Mission of Soldiers Straddling Twenty-First Ce

Army Daily, January 2, 1996, 6. 

69 
• Increase research on militarv doctrine 

• Establish operational theory' 

• Train high-quality people in advanced degrees 

• Establish combat laboratories and learn from the six l

United States has created 

• Create sha shoujian, or "magic weapon trump cards ''.7 

FUTURE MILITARY WEAKNESSES 

Some Chinese authors have treated the question of .Am

extensively as they analyze the future security environment, so 

to know the baseline of how China assesses the United St

general, Chinese authors assert the following points about curren

weakness: 

• The United States barely won the Gulf War. 

• Saddam could have won with a better strateg'y. 

• The United States today cannot "contain" Chinese po

• The United States is unable to execute its military, s

major regional contingencies. 

• U.S. munitions cannot damage deep underground bunk

in China). 

':General Pan Junfeng, "Dui :,an junshi de jidian kanfa" (Several views on new 

Zhongguojunshi ke:~te (China Military Science) 35, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 11

Director oft.he Fore,gn Militat T Studies Department of AMS in Beijing. Sim

how China can exploit U.S. weaknesses and improve its position in the P~

Gao Chunxiang, Xin_lun~higemlng lun, 199-202, and Wang Pufeng, Xinxi ~

geming, 201-203. 

7.0 
techniques can supposedly defeat U.S. forces? ° There are freq

to China's "defeat" of U.S. fbrces in both Korea and Vietna

States is said likely to fall behind others in the ~MA. It is said t

ISRelevant books include: Chen Haihong, Meiguojunshi liliang dejueqi (The 

militat T strength)(Huhehaote: Nei Menggu daxue chubanshe, 1995); Cui 

Yongnan, Mdjun lianhe ZT¢o~han (U.S. military joint operations)('Beijing

chubanshe, 1995); Hu Siyuan and Chen Hu, Meijun hangtian zban (U.S. mili

(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995); Pan xiangtmg and Sun Zhanp

tiaojian xia Meijun jubu ~han~heng (American military local warfare unde

condifions)(Beijing:. Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1994); Wang Fang and others, Shij

(The centutses ultra-tyrant--America)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997)

Meiguo youxian gbangheng lilun yu shijian (U.S. limited warfare theory and 

Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995); Wang Zhuo, Xiandai Meijun hou

logistics)(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995); Yin Chengkui, Gao Gui

Su Yusheng, Mdjunga0jg-hu uuqizhuangb~[ying~ongyuJazhan (Use and develop

technology weapon~)(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995). 

:gSee the 10-book Modem U.S. Military Studies Series (Xiandai Meijtmyanjiu 

by authors from China's National Defense University in 1995. Hu Siyu

Xiandeu'Mdguo kong+cn CI]ae modern U.S. Air Force)(Beijing: Guofang da.,me 

1, state, "The U.S. Air Force is the most modern Air Force in the worl

Wang Zhongchun, Zhao Ziyu, and 7_.hou Bailin, Xiandai Meiguo lujun 01ae m

(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995), write, "The U.S. Army is the arm

level of modernized equipment in the world today." Yin Gu, Li Jie, and Lei 

Meiguo haijun 01ae modem U.S. Naw)(Beijin ~ Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1

United States is cummtly the world's only maritime superpower." Finally, W

tezhong guozhon budm'yu re,bonA ~mzhan (U.S. Special forces and specia

Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1995), 1, states, "The U.S. Special Combat U

equipment and the largest scope of any special combat force in the world

2~InJanuary 1998, a weekly column entitled "Future Warfare" began to appe

Army Daily that included advice on how an "inferior" national force can 

force. 

71 
Both the challenge of new military technology and the need to u

Chinese statecraft figure in this sto~" of the founding of China; 

often mentioned when Chinese authors address the 21st centur

In general, most Chinese analysts since 1991 have acknowle

United States is the "sole military superpower" and ha

technologically advanced army, na W and air force in the worl

humorously, one analyst writes, "ln the last 20 years, people hav

at the mere mention of U.S. military strength. ''22 However, they 

this characterization of narrow technological superiority, would me

in a U.S. conflict with China. Chinese authors repeatedly em

major, fatal weaknesses characterize the American Armed Force

universally cite Chairman Mao's requirement that the dialecti

Chinese military science requires assessment of weakness as wel

The Chinese view is that the United States suffers from 

logistics weaknesses and several operational weaknesses. Chi

believe Saddam Hussein, using Chinese-style strategy, could ha

these weaknesses in order to defeat the United States. 

2:"Riber~ Junshi jishu lingxian Meiguo" (]apar~ leading the U.S. in militat 3, tec

wenchai (Military Digest) 4, no. 2 (1996): 18. This article asserts that Japan h

fighter aircraft to exceed the turn rate of U.S. fighters; that F- 117 exteriors mi

U.S. military electronics depend on Japan and that Japan could shift the Ru

balance of power in missile accuracy if it sold the same electronics to Russia th

United States. 

2Z~ru Chi, "Gulf War Reveals U.S. X,Veak Points," Ilottg Kong Ta Kung Pao, Ma

in FBIS-CHI-91-058, March 26, 1991, 2. 

72 
illustrates the gradual weakening of U.S. power since World W

The United States is described as a country that "must cro

or Pacific Oceans and go to Europe or Asia" before any seri

From 1961 to 1968, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson incorpor

response strategy, for fighting ~'o-and-a-half wars simultaneo

military authors refer to these as a war with the Soviet Union 

war with China and Asia, and halfa war with a regional power i

as the Middle East. As America's overall national strength decli

from 1969 to 1980, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter realized 

fell short of ambition" to fight two-and-a-half wars, so U.S. m

shifted to fighting one-and-a-half wars. Chinese called this "f

war either in Europe or Asia, and at the same time a small war 

region. ''24 

The Chinese posit that ,~anerican weakness can be seen 

definition that the Gulf War should have been a "half war,

required almost all ,~nerica's conventional weapons, its reser

called up, 6 months were needed for the United States to 

deployment of troops in the Gulf, and it had to hire foreign 

troops, equipment, and supplies. Chinese analysts point out 

percent of the weapons and equipment for the Gulf War had to 

foreign ships and foreign aircraft because the United States la

airlift and sealift. After detailing the extent of U.S. dependen

transportation, one author wrote, "Huge inputs were [needed] m

to guarantee one battlefield's requirements; if it had to simultan

the requirements of two battlefields, the current U.S. 

22For example, see Su Enze, "Haiwan zhanzheng Meijun 'Shipa' " (''Ten fea

during the Gulf War), Junshi wenzhai ~liliary Digest), no. 13 (1995): 24. 

2%X"u Chi, "Gulf War Reveals U.S. Weak Points," 2. 

73 
They cite other U.S. advantages in the Gulf War, not to be re

such as the cooperation of the 28 countries in the coalition and th

countries in imposing a blockade against Iraq. Chinese analysts a

Asnerica's "strong dependency on allies" is a potential vulnerabi

multination joint combat operations because of problems inherent 

One author writes that during the Gulf War, "Due to difference

various allied countries' troops, in the areas of war interests, com

weapontT, culture, and language, numerous difficulties inevitab

command coordination. This could provide the opponent 

opportunities it could exploit, including dividing and disintegrating 

politically, and destroying the countries militarily one by one. ''2

Chinese militau, specialists also point out that in spite of all th

provided by the alliance, it took Iraq only several hours to capture 

the allied forces took more than 30 days to recover Kuwait. 

One important assessment concludes that if it was so dif

United States to win a "half war" against Iraq with so many adv

its coalition forces, the United States would not do well fighting 

China and Asia. A PLA author asserts that it would be "'hard t

result" of a United States war with China and Asia: 

If we have to predict, then the chance of its winning is only 30 

because the U.S. Forces have never fought a "whole" war overse

25Zhen .~-'~, Kelindun junshi ~banlue flu &" er d Chaoxian ~banzbeng shexiang (C

strategy and the scenario of a second Korean war)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chuba

Z6Wu Chi, "Gulf War Reveals U.S. Weak Points," 2. 

27Li Qingshart, Xinjunshigembgp*cgaojishu zbanzbe,tg Oqae new rcvolution ha mil

high-technology warfare) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995), 188-189. 

74 
to the Chinese assessment, "The relentless pressure of the 

driving the Getmmas farther and farther back, and the defeat o

almost a certainty"' before the United States opened the s

Normandy. Even in the European theater, the United States 

both the Soviet Union and Britain, while in the Asian theater th

enjoyed the combat cooperation of "China, Britain, and the S

NORTH KOREA CAN DEFEAT AMERI

Chinese military authors also appear to devalue the effecti

forces in a future Korean scenario. According to a colonel a

factors ensure U.S. defeat "if in the next few years a Korean 

His main points are: 

• The United States will not have 6 months to deploy a

Instead, "the Korean People's Army will surpris e attack So

bases, ports and communication lines." 

• "U.S. casualties will not be as low as in the Gulf W

Korean peninsula, the population is dense, with river 

mountains, roads are few, unsuitable to armor . . . ca

extremely high." 

• "North Korea's mountains are wrapped in clouds and 

difficult for the U.S. ~dr Force and high-technology, weapo

play to their vast superiority,." 

28\X,'u Chi, "Gulf War Reveals U.S. Weak Points," 2. 

~9Ibid., 2. 

75 
year 2000 will be 70 percent of today. 3 

WEAKNESSES IN THE GULF WAR 

The Chinese perception of .American strategic weakness based o

further compounded by the assertions of many Chinese military

American operational weaknesses could one day make U.S. for

vulnerable to a Chinese style strategy,. ,~aa overall assessment of th

from the Vice President of AMS, Li Jijun, who writes that du

War, 

U.S. Armed Forces revealed many weak points. For example, th

consumption was too great, and it could not last long. There 

reliance on the allied countries. The high-tech equipment was inte

its key links were rather weak; once they were damaged

effectiveness was greatly reduced. Also if the adversary of the Uni

was not Iraq, if the battle was not fought on the flat desert, i

,~rned Forces struck first during the phase when U.S. Armed Fo

still assembling, or if Iraq Armed Forces withdrew suddenly befor

Armed Forces struck, then the outcome of the war might have b

different. 31 

Several books published in the mid-1990s purport to analyze 

weaknesses in detail. One published in ~,Lay 1996 by Major Gener

Foreign X~itary Studies Director at the National Defense Univer

3CZhen X.i, Keh'ndunjunsbi ghanlue yu oh" er d Chaoxian ghanzheng shexiang, 66-68

31IA J ijtm,Jum4n lilsmyu ghangbeng shij, imt (Notes on militat T theory, and military, s

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994), in Pillsbury, 227. 

76 
• Ports and airfields are vulnerable in initial deployment

• Each high-tech weapon has its own weakness. 

• Aircraft carriers depend on E6 Prowlers. 

• U.S. forces are optimized for deserts, not mountains. 

These represent a common theme in PLA views of future warf

is proclaimed to be a declining power with but two or thre

primacy left. U.S. military forces, while dangerous at present, 

and can be defeated by China with the right strate~-. Th

"defeating the superior with the inferior" ~yiruo shengqian$~

recommended approach in some of this PLA writing is the re

"the inferior" to pre-emptively strike the "superior" in order t

nerve centers and block his logistics. Chinese military books a

U.S. weaknesses date back at least to the Gulf War in 1991 an

appear, drawing on analysis of that conflict. Ten strategies th

been employed to exploit U.S. operational weaknesses during 

were cited by Chinese military analysts. 

• FortiJS'psitions. One representative analyst states, "Noth

reflect an Army's fighting ability than combat involvin

fortified positions." The Chinese explain American succe

Iraqi fortifications as due to the terrain in Kuwait and S

which is "a flat desert" where it is "difficult to build lo

fortifications" because the sand layer is so thin. Even with t

of Iraqi weakness, "The United States took a long time to ta

in 38 days they flew 10,000 sorties, and eliminated only 40 

32Li Zhiyun, Mdguo lianke Zuozhanyanjiu (Studies on U.S. Joint operation

Guanfang daxue chubanshe, 1995). 

77 
cannot destroy fortifications with walls greater than 10 me

deep underground facilities, especially in mountainous areas. 

analyst concludes, "If the Iraqi forces could have relied on 

areas and built tunnels with layers more than 10 meters or 

of meters thick, then even if the U.S. forces could have cut s

away from the peak, they could not have hurt the Iraqi for

bit." 

Using this measure of effectiveness, Chinese ana

:American capabilities to "penetrate or blow up a protective 

meters thick" or the battleship Wisconsin's 1-ton shells that ca

reinforced concrete protective layer as thick as 4 meters

underground bunkers are portrayed as invulnerable to Amer

it press reports are accurate, China has a series of undergr

in the mountainous area west of Beijing that protec

underground command center. Chinese use of tun

mountainous areas for command centers and protection o

and air force equipment dates back to the Korean War 

described with pride in Chinese historical accounts. It is th

that Chinese military, leaders take comfort in this .American 

weakness. 

• Exp/o# weaknesses. Several Chinese articles criticized the 

commanders for not exploiting well-known American weak

Vietcong and North Vietnamese knew how to play o

weaknesses, but the Iraqis did not learn from those lessons. 

33Wu Chi, "Gulf \'Car Reveals U.S. Weak Points," 2-3. 

3aHo Poshih, "The Chinese Military, is Worried About Lagging Behind in Ar

Kong Tatg Tai, March 9, 1991,17-18, in FBIS-CHI-91-050, March 14, 1991, 3

78 
does not have any combat capability before entering 

.According to past examples of local wars, the Israeli Air For

in launching surprise attacks in several wars because of its "

and meticulous planning and preparations" and because "th

slackened their efforts, lowered their guard, had insufficient 

issued inappropriate combat commands. ''36 Another cruci

Chinese analysts criticized Iraq for not making surprise 

pointed out by Gao Chunxiang. When discussing the co

logistics safeguards, he stated, "If the lraqi military, had m

attack on the rear of the U.S. military and multination troops

of the war could have been rewritten. ''~7 

• Pment apeda~d training. According to the Chinese, the 

the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct special training tbr se

before the war and to remain on a high state of alert. "This 

helped to win superiority and take the initiative." Accordi

analysts, "Air power's relative strength is complicated. I

quality and quantity of weapons, the training level and fi

personnel, the logistics support capabilities, and comba

concepts." These are referred to as "a balance of static 

Chinese analysts do not believe is as useful a measure of ef

3SSong Xinzhi and Su Qingyi, "Reassessing Constraints on Air Power" Jiefangj

Army Daily), January 25, 1991, 3, m FBIS-CHI-91-029, February, 12, 1991

"~6Ibi&, 40. 

37Gao Chunxiang, Xinjunshigeming fun, 201. 

79 
"smoke screens supplemented by the spray of water." Th

used these "screens" to "make it impossible for the laser-

dropped by the U.S. Air Force to hit the Hanoi electric p

Some Iraqi special measures were effective, however. Q

Government source, Chinese analysts state, "Only a doze

700 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in the first 2 days of air r

of the effectiveness of air defense self-protective measure

and "air defense exercises in cities." In the long run, Ch

trust the use of protracted and guerrilla warfare to wear dow

Harassing attacks can create confusion, cause losses, an

morale of the political system. 39 

• Study' high-tech weapon vu~erabi~)'. A series of Chinese art

how individual U.S. high-tech weapons systems each h

particular weaknesses and flaws that must be studied and e

the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile can be shot down by Ch

to-air guided missiles. Chinese missiles have "on sev

downed U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance pla

great shock to the United States." The HQ-2 surface-to-air 

made by China is acclaimed to have a "killing probabilw

than 90 percent" when three missiles are launched simulta

the effective range of about 30 kilometers¢ ° 

• Camouflage tanks. ,another measure of effectiveness show

militao, weakness involves Iraqi tanks and American eff

~'SSong Xmzhi and Su Qingyi, "Reassessmg Constraints on Air Power," 40

39Ibid., 40. 

4°Ho Tawei, "Exclusive Report: China-Made Weapons Display Their Mi

East" Hong Kong Tang T~,January 26, 1991, 10, in FBIS-CHI-91-024, Februa

80 
ggy ,

Presidential Republican Guard divisions." According to Zh

a defilade can usually cope with two to three offensive tank

capabilities." There were 4,000 Iraqi tanks in Kuwait t

concealed in "solid defilades." Therefore, Zhai estimated, on

of a tank in a defilade was exposed, and camouflaging m

discover or hit directly. 41 

What is the significance of these military calcula

comments confirm the use of operations research by Chi

Trading offone tank vs. two to three tanks when the defend

defdade is a good example. The suggestion that the 2,200 U

penetrated Northern Kuwait would not be able to succes

1,000 T-72 tanks contains a number of miscalculations, 

determination that a U.S.-crewed M-1 tank is roughly eq

Iraqi-crewed, 20-year-old, Soviet-made T-72 tank and that e

superiority" is inadequate. 

• Destrq)' the nonlinear. U.S. combat theory for high-tech l

criticized by one Chinese analyst, who believes that the nonl

combat, where "fairly large gaps can emerge between the 

of one's own troops," means there is the potential for "an

Qingshan writes, "During the Gulf War, the U.S. military 

from the coast of the Persian Gulf... was approximately 3

In this 150,000-square-kilometer combat area, the U.S. mil

17 divisions, and the average interval between each div

kilometers. It is thus clear that the gaps exposed by the non

~lZhang Chunting, "Chinese Military Research FeUows on the Gulf War," L

edition) 28 (January 1991): 7, 8, in FBIS-CHI-91-022, Februat 3, 1, 1991, 6-

81 
comparing the static totals. His comparisons are particula

because Iraq's quantitative military, indicators approach th

Hart said that Iraq had 1.1 million troops, 5,500 tanks, 780 c

and 40 to 50 naval vessels. U.S. and coalition forces cou

troops, 3,100 tanks, 2,2900 planes, and some 200 naval vess

qualit T and capability- to Iraq. 43 

• Estabk'sh a nuckar deterrent. The Chinese media (and int

author) stress that Iraq did not have a nuclear deterren

United States needed to make nuclear threats in order to a

over Iraq. According to the Chinese, Saddam treated seriou

to the British Broadcasting Corporation by Vice Presiden

on February 1, 1991, that he "would not rule out using nu

in the war against Iraq." This assertion seems to sug

conventional forces alone of the U.S.-led coalition co

defeated lraq without a nuclear threat, which presumably 

so successful in deterring China. 

• Assess airpo~er. Chinese assessments of American a

include specific measures of effectiveness and imply the use 

research. U.S. airborne warning and control systems (A

"raised by more than 30 percent thc probabilit T of atta

hitting their targets." This would be effective even for old a

Chinese assessments of the Falklands War emphasized that 

Argentina did not enjoy advanced air power, it achieve

distinction of downing 18 British ships and won widesprea

42Li Qingshan, )(injunshi gemingyu gao jishu ~han,~hene~ 189. 

4ZZhang Chunting, "Chinese Militat T Research Fellows on the Gulf War," 

82 
achieved. 

This misperception allows an obsolete 30-year-old fighter 

maiority of China's Air Force) to become effective by a

AWACS aircraft mad electronic ja,runing aircraft, which Ch

process of acquiring. This is not a proper approach to a

balance of air power and could lead to a maior miscalculation

militat 3" leaders actually use such concepts, they wo

underestimate the damage that advanced fighter aircraft can do 

defended by obsolete fighters. 

U.S. AIRCILMa~f CARRIER VULNEtL~_BILIT

The aircraft carrier battle group still is the "epitome" of combat 

second to none on the ocean, writes Ymg Nan. But according to 

of how the weak can defeat dae strong, aircraft carrier battle 

numerous "weaknesses." A weaker opponent can still achieve 

"the mouse will rule the elephant" (laoshu zhi da.'~ang). His main 

• The entire aircraft carrier battle group has numerous rada

and infrared and electromagnetic signatures, so it is very 

effectively conceal them. 

"Sun Hongwd, "New Developments in the Use of .,Mr Power," Jiefangiun bao (L

Daily), March 22, 1991, 3, in FBIS-CHI-91-072, April 15, 1991, 55-57. 

45Ying Nan, "Hangmu de biduan ji fan hangmu zuozhan" (Aircraft carrier d

aircraft carrier operations), Xianckdjunshi (Contemporary Military Affairs) ([an

15. See also Lin Xinghai, "Hangkong mujian bingfei zhan wu bu sheng" (.Airc

not invincible),Junshi shilin (Militat T History.), no. 7 (1998): 28-30. 

83 
For example, U.S. aircraft carriers generally use MK

launchers, and each launch requires 1.5 to 2 tons of fre

every 500 launches, specialized technical personnel grou

and overhaul it at sea for 1-2 days; after every" 2,500 launch

is returned to home port for 3 to 6 weeks of repairs. 

• Aircraft carriers need 1 to 4 special supply ships that 

the target of an enemy's attack. 

• The antisubmarine and antimine capability of an aircra

group is relatively poor. During World War II, nine aircra

percent of the total number of aircraft carriers tha

bombarded and sunk by submarines. 

• Since the 1980s, new high technology in submarines 

threat of submarines to aircraft carriers to increase. 

• Although it is difficult for mines to directly sink and de

aircraft carrier, the damage and deterrent role created by m

the navies of all countries uneasy. 

• Elevators, catapult launchers, and arresting devices al

xnalnerable. The elevators move planes to the deck, so if they 

the aircraft carrier is unable to do anything. 

• The U.S. Navy, has reduced the number of S-3 airc

ships accompanying aircraft carriers. 

• AWACS aircraft operating from a carrier will be the 

of other navies wishing to attack aircraft carriers. 

• Unmanned planes can repeatedly launch attacks agai

carrier battle group, forcing the ship's catapult launcher t

laundl fighters for take off, causing it to lose large amounts 

fresh water. 

• Aircraft carriers are ~nalnerable to electronic equi

medium and small ships, on offshore islands and ree

84 
example, in a discussion about how the newest and highest skys

world are all being built in Asia, and many in China, one auth

the 20th century fades, the United States seems to be cedi

supremacy to the East. Does that imply that the coming ce

coming millennium will belong to the Orient? ' "~ However, as w

debates on the period of transition to a multipolar world, Chine

differ in their views on the extent and rate of U.S. decline. S

focus on the concrete, specific aspects of American weaknesses

examine overall U.S. power and compare it with that of other 

One of the authors of a major study on the changing worl

the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) asserts tha

is relative. He explains, "Position of strength is a relative conce

country's position of strength is high or lo:,v, strong or weak, 

only through a comparison with other countries. In genera

decline of ?m'~erica's position of strength is the contrast between 

the United States and that of other major nations." The auth

state that at present, no country will increase its strength quic

surpass the United States before the early 21st century. The 

Germany, and other major European and Asian countrie

America's position of strength to new challenges, but they 

constitute a major threat to ,~Mnerica's superpower status. This 

<Li Haibo, "Heading for the 21st Century," Beij)'ng Review 37, no. 39 (Septem

2, 1994): 9. 

4~For a discussion on how tile Kosovo crisis and the NATO bombing of file C

in Belgrade in spring 1999 led to a re-evaluation of previous assessments o

U.S. decline, see chapter one, the section titled "Post-Kosovo I~.'bate." 

85 
of the Western nations; therefore, the process of its relative 

convoluted, not direct." 

He goes on to claim that "Certain far-sighted intelligent U

have -already clearly pointed out that in the new century th

transformed from a superpower to a common power (puton

Fang, at the State Council International Studies Center, also be

United States will be a common power in the future; however

possible exemption for U.S. military" strengr21. He writes, "

period will be ~amaerica's cvolution process from a superpower 

power; its milita~" force perhaps will not be included, but its 

declining."5° 

Social issues are frequently cited by Chinese analysts as an 

United States has serious troubles. Particularly when comp

countries, the United States is depicted as leading the w

problems. 5~ For example, one author referred to America 

4~Ding Xinghao, "Shijie geju zhuanxing qi zhong de Meigmo" (The United 

transfomlation of the world structure), in Kua shift de shijie geju da @uanbuan 

tile world structure at the turn of the century.), ed. Chen Qimao (Shangha

chubanshe, 1996), 118. 

49Chen Qinmo, "Qianyan" (lntrc~duction), in IG~a sbiji de shijie geju da ~buanh

~°He Fang, "Guodu shiqi de guoji rdngshi" (The international situation du

period), in 2000: Shijie Mang hechu qu? (2000: where is the world going?)

(Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1996), 319. 

~'IA comparison of how the United States stands up to the European Un

issues, economics, science and technology, and military affairs comes from 

the future world structure, Europe and Japan are the only forces that have 

to struggle with tile United States for the leading world position, as will be 

Europe has more advantageous conditions than Japan; Japan's weak points ar

points .... The population of the EU is more than half that of the Unite

86 
• Right-wing extremist groups (militias and white 

groups)" 

• "Destruction of the family and the problems of children 

• "Crime and drug use" 

• "Generation gaps" 

• "Spiritual and moral crisis ('spiritual deficit' and 'mor

'excessive sexual indulgence')" 

[gross national product] surpasses Japan's and is comparable to America's. 

world trade has already exceeded America's. The European savings rate i

Japan and long ago greatly outstripped that of the United States. Euro

technology have very strong competitive power, based on Japanese statisti

110 important technology areas, Europe is in the leading position in 34. Eur

the world is not as great as Japan's, it has comparatively vast territory, the 

countries of Europe is very vigorous, and natural resources can be obtain

channels .... In Europe, on the basis of sovereign nations, each country al

military force; if in the future after they establish a common military structu

engage in arms expansion, it will not, like Japan, give rise to contrary politic

When comparing internal conditions, Europe surpasses the United States in 

The standard of living of the people in Western and Northern Europe is n

the United States and there are far fewer city, evils than in the United States. 

many racial and national problems as in the United States. The slums often s

States almost cannot be found in Western and Northern Europe. Accordi

American children, 22 percent live in poverty, but in Germany it is only 5 per

of Europe's middle and elementary school education is higher than Americ

rate and number of drug users are less than in the United States. Weste

Europe, in the social welfare areas of medical insurance, old-age pensions an

subsidies also are better than the United States." See, Wang Houkang, "Lengz

geju de bianhua" (Post-Cold War changes in Europe's structure), in Kata s

~buanhuan, 153-154. 

S2Yang Zheng, ed., 2000: Sbijie xiang bechu qu?, 110. 

87 
•.. due to the quickening development of the worlds multipola

that intemadonally, the U.& is subject to greater challenges and r

on the other hand .... America's own deep social problems and 

becoming more and more revealed to the world, so that U.S. in

influence is naturally declining. -'4 

LOSS OF ALLIES 

What are the long-term consequences of the United States d

others rise? Chinese authors assert that as Japan and Weste

nations gain more and more power, they will seek influence in 

affairs commensurate with their strength and demand equ

relationships with the United States. In keeping with the wor

toward multipolarity, the decreasing gap between U.S. CNP and 

and Europe means America's allies will be asserting themse

unwilling to remain the subordinate partners of the United Stat

to its "Unipolar World Strate~,. ''s5 

An article by four analysts at the China Institute of C

International Relations (CICIR) states, "As a result of their econ

more and more countries now dare to say 'no' to the United Sta

53Wa~_ Guang, Meiguo de shehui bing (American social diseases)(Chengdu

chubanshe, 1997), 1-5. 

~Ibid., 311. 

SSWang Naicheng, "Beiyue dongkuo dui Mei-E-Ou guanxi de ying:dang

NATCYs eastward expansion on relations between the United States, Russia an

~hanlueyanfiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no. 4 (October 1997): 18. 

88 
United States .... Of more concern to the United States is th

traditional European allies, Japan, etc., are also gradually drifting 

hardly of one heart and one mind with the United States on m

For its part, the United States, with its "global domination 

expected to fight to hold on to its position of world leadership an

leading to direct conflicts and struggles with Japan and Europ

America will be able to maintain its alliances in the short t

analysts foresee that in the long run: 

• The United States will lose its global prominence. 

• The United States will gradually lose its powerful 

Europe and Japan as the three powers descend into fierce 

political rivalries. 

• As their conflicts with the United States increase, Japa

will work to improve their relations with China. 

Jin Dexiang, a senior analyst at CICIR, believes, "Changes 

economic status of the United States, Japan, and Germany have 

reaching impact not only on their external and internal policie

56Yan Xiangiun , Yang Bojiang, Chu Shulong and Dao Shulhl, "A Survey o

Pacific Security/' Contemjoorag" Internationa/Relations 8, no. 7 0uly 1994): 1, 2

57yuan Peng, ".~m Arrogant and Lonely Superpower The Tradition 

Hegemony," Z.bongguoQingnian Ba0, May 26, 1999, 3, in FBIS-CHI-1999-060

Yuan is at CICIR. 

58Yan Tao, "U.S. Determination on Use of Force and Its 'Global Domina

Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, February 15, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-046, Fe

89 
arena. According to Jin, Japan therefore is beefing up its mi

and "filling tip the vacuum left behind by U.S.-Soviet military, 

in the Asia-Pacific region. Germany, too, is seeking a majo

through several tactics. It is striving for a Bonn-centered Europe

Zone while "trying its best to overtake Japan and catch up w

States in the 21st century."Jtn believes, '"lhe scramble ibr the p

role already exists among America, Europe, and Japan," co

"rival~, and contention among the three economic power cente

Europe, and Japan promise to replace U.S.-Soviet contention 

race as an all-important world issue. ''6° 

\XPnile Jin argues that simply the economic power of 

provided it with the foundation to assert itself on the worl

authors point to the fact that the joint economic strength of t

greater than that of the United States according to some ind

discussing the economic contention and friction that exist be

and United States, for example, Yang Dazhou of the Chines

Social Sciences (CASS) writes, "Europe already possesses 

strength to contend with the United States; the GNP of the Eu

nations already exceeds ,America's. ''61 

In addition to economic considerations, another major f

many authors that has contributed to the increasing rivalry betwe

-~gJin De,dang, "America vs. Japan and Germany: kVhy are There Growth I

is Next?," Contempora 9" International Relations 2, no. 5 ~]ay 1992): 8; oth

paragraph are from 10-12. "~X'aaen he wrote this article jm was Vice Preside

~Ibid. 

61Yang Dazhou, "1997 nian guoji zheugzhi xingshi de tedian" (The character

international political situation), Shifiejingiiyu zhengzhi (World Politics and Eco

1 (January. 1998): 6. 

90 
contradictions between the United States and Europe and Japan 

rise. ''63 Three CICIR analysts claim that the combination of "e

cohesion" and the growth of the EU means 

a transformation process has been underway to turn the tr

parmers into strategic rivals .... This results in transatlantic bic

quarrels in political, security', economic and trade fields. Bilater

grew over Bosnia, NATO, trade and other issues with ne

disputes. Thus the demise of a common strategic goal had put t

built up in the Cold War in jeopardy and pushed it close to th

collapse .6, 

Several analysts at CICIR argue that the United Stat

"leadership capacit3: and cohesive force" are weakening and t

to "cotton up" to its allies by supporting Germany and Jap

permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, allowing E

a certain amount of self-defense strength and encouraging J

greater role in Asia. They explain that the United States does th

'soft control' over these countries. ''6s Most authors, however, b

6:Jin Dexiang, "America vs. Japan and Germany, 12. 

6~a Benwango "Perspectives of International Strategic Patterns in the 21st Ce

no. 37 (September 14, 1998): 41-42, in FBIS-CHI-98-268, September 29, 1

G4Yang Mingjie, Gan Ailan, and Cao Xia, "Groping for a New Trans-Atla

Conterapora 9' International Relations 6, no. 4 (April 1996): 4. The authors are A

Professors at CICIR 

6SXu Zhixian, Zhang Minqian, and Hong Jianjun, "On the Foreign Strateg

China Policy of the U.S., \XTestem Europe and Japan at the Turn of the Centu

International Relations 8, no. 3 (/vlarch 1998): 12-14. 

91 
position to show that the United States was seizing overall co

Another analyst suggests that a key factor causing the U

enlarge NATO is that "the United States finds its national po

... [and] it seeks to rely on NATO to continue its leading role i

According to Chinese analysts, America's goal through the N

expansion is both to weaken and encircle Russia, and to provi

means of consolidating and furthering its leadership positi

Zhang Liangneng, an analyst at CICIR, states "NATO eastwar

a vital strategic step for the United States to control Europ

Russia." However, Zhang asserts that the United States may 

realize its aspirations where Europe is concerned, because 

The Western European countries, particularly France and Ger

already realized that the era when they had to rely purely on 

States to maintain regional security in Europe is gone. Only by 

economic and political integration, enhancing military an

cooperation, establishing united defense institutions and military 

C,6yang Shuhengo "Ou, Mei, E zai Bohei de juezhu" (I'he rivalry among E

States, and Russia in Bosnia), HeOingyufazhan (Peace and Development) 

1994): 29-32. 

eTQi Deguang, "The Bosnian Civil War:. Retrospect and Prospect," Contem

Relations 4, no. 8 (August 1994): 10-11. Qi is an Associate Research Profes

caWan Shirong, "Shi ren zhumu de beiyue zuzhi dongkuo wenti" (N

expansion, an issue attracting world attention), Guoji wentiyanjiu (Internation

1 (January 1996): 12-17. 

92 
eastward expansion, they are not entirely the same in regard t

objective, style and pace of the extension. While the United Stat

make use of the NATO move to maintain its own leadin

European affairs, Western Europe wants to build up its own 

through NATO expansion so as to get rid of.American contro

Research Fellow at CIISS, Wang Naicheng, expects that this "U

contradiction of control and counter-control" will become m

acute, because each side will intensify its efforts to establis

"Europe is striving to change its role during the Cold War peri

partner utterly controlled by and dependent upon ,America. It 

that power be shared in order to establish an equal, true partne

United States, but the United States refuses to concede a

becoming even more domineering, Wing vigorously to consolida

as the overlord in NATO. ''vl 

Europe is not the only place where Chinese authors pred

struggle for leadership; they also foresee conflicts between the 

allies around the globe as Europe moves to expand its infl

particular is pointed to by Chinese as an area where Europe

striving to establish closer ties. An article by three CICIR anal

Euro-American contention will be even more fierce in areas 

transatlantic region, especially in the Asia-Pacific. The European 

6~'Zhang Liangneng, "Western Europe and NATO Enlargement," Contem

Relations 7, no. 5 (May 1997): 19. Zhang is an Associate Research Professo

7°Feng Yujun, "Moscow vs. NATO: Compromise Will Not Dispel 

Contemporary International Relations 7, no. 5 (May 1997): 13. Feng is an A

Professor at CICIR. 

71Wang Naicheng, "Beiyue dongkuo dui Mei-E-Ou guanxi de yingxiang," 

93 
regions, presaging further decline in U.S. global influence. They 

addition to seeking "stability and equilibrium in world political a

order," one of the main goals of the summit was to "further 

dominance in the global economy and international relations and 

attempts to seek post-Cold War global hegemony. ''73 Chen F

Research Fellow at CIISS, pointed out that the Asia-Europe s

that "for the first time the United States, as the only superpower 

was unable to take part in this significant international confere

As the desire to be independent poles grows among Europea

in Japan, Chinese analysts predict that they will work to improve 

with China. Three CICIR analysts conclude that the result 

struggles among the Cold War allies will be that .America, We

and Japan will "attach more importance to the China factor in 

strategies" because of the "enhancement of China's Comprehen

Power and the extension of China's international influence. ''v~ Li 

also at CICIR, agrees that China will become a new focus in 

relations because of its increased strength, but argues that Ch

importance may actually be one of the factors that comes betw

"With the improvement of its political big power status, Japan w

independence in dealing with regional and international affai

even though more stress has been laid on keeping vigilance over 

the U.S:-Japanese alliance, it will be very difficult for Japan an

72Yang Mingjie, Gan Ailan, and Cao Xia, "Groping for a New Transadantic 

V3Ibid., 8. 

7"Cheng Feng, "Retrospects and Prospects of the Internatioval Strategic Sit

75Xu Zhixian, Zhang Minqian, and Hong Jianjun, "On the Foreign Strateg

China Policy," 12-14. 

94 
relations with Russia and China. ''v~' 

According to Gao, Germany is "also focusing on improvin

with Russia in order to expand its influence, even though it 

'leading partner' in Europe. ''8 Gao, like other authors, 

developing closeness in German-French-Russian relations a

creation of a large triangular relationship among the three. W

CASS explains that "political triangles" such as the German-F

one "constitute new geopolitical centers" that alter Europe

structure. :9 Hu Ning of the Center for Peace and Developme

Germany, France, and other Western European nations a

improve relations with Russia at the same time that NATO 

eastward expansion, because Russia can serve as a counter 

States. Europe "needs to draw support from Russia's power 

U.S. domination of European securi~, affairs, with the aim of b

Russian-Western European 'multipolar restrict and balance

reLi Zhongcheng, 'q~e Role of an Emerging China in World Politics," Contem

Relations 8, no. 2 (February 1998): 13. Li is a Research Professor in the Divis

World Studies. 

'~'Gao Heng, "Shijie daguo guan:d de ~ tedian" (New characteristics of the 

the world's major nations), Shifiejinoffiyu zbengghi CWorld Economics and P

(Januaq, 1998): 8. 

7Slbid., 8. 

r%V~u Guoqing, "Xi Ou lianhe you you ~ jinzhang, dnli ziztm jinyibu zen

new progress in the unification of Western Europe, and its independenc

fi, rther strengthened), Shijaijin~i)~, z4)engghi (World Economics and Politics) 2

1998): 17. 

-~]--lu Nmg, "Beiyue dongkum~g .-danxi" (A brief analysis of N AT(') eastward e

y¢fazha*: (Peace and Development) 64, no. 2 (May 1998): 31. 

95 
expect the alliances to endure in the short term. Regarding the 

and Europe, for example, Wang Naicheng of CIISS writes 

"their contradiction has intensified," he believes that "in the fore

• . . coordination and cooperation will remain the central 

relations." Because of Russia's existence as a common potent

Europe's continued, though decreasing, dependence on the U

securig" affairs, and because of economic interdependence, "it 

change in a short time the feature of the relationship where the 

is the principal and Europe is the subordinate .... Nevertheless

force linking .America and Europe in NATO from the beginnin

Cold War era has weakened with each passing day, and the 

quite intense at times, has been developing continuously." He b

EU integration continues, the pattern of the U.S.-EU relationshi

"With the progress in EU political, economic and defense 

certainly Western European countries will pose even graver chal

hegemony."82 

Wang's views are shared by Sa Benwang of CIIS, who sees t

of the alliances between ?unerica mid Japan and Europe as 

believes that they will not abruptly end: "The centrifugal trend o

Japan away from the United States as head of the alliance will fu

and the tendency of the alliance to weaken will be hard to stop. O

will also be a tortuous and complex process; it is expected 

relations will be maintained up to 2015. ''s3 Views similar to tho

above two analysts are presented more strongly by three CICIR 

SlQuoted in Wang Naicheng, "Beiyue dongkuo dui Mei-E-Ou guanxi de yi

S2Ibid., 20. 

~3Sa Benwang o "Perspectives of International Strategic Patterns in the 21st 

96 
goals. ~" 

SELF-PROPHECY OF DECLINE 

Chinese analysts quote ,Mnerican authors out of context t

distinguished Americans agree with China's assessment. I

American authors frequently predict drastic decline for their cou

warnings are always linked to a set of recommendations that, if 

save the day and avert the fall. Chinese authors omit 

recommendations, thereby giving their readers the impression 

Americans predict their nations's own inevitable weakening. 8

Henry, Kissinger has been quoted as stating that America wi

a "beggar policeman," because the United States sought coaliti

the Gulf War. A glowing review of a book by Zbigniew Brz

Contro~ in China's most prestigious military journal subtly distor

of the book. Brzezinski suggests that the United States will 

global leadership role if it does not improve its materialistic valu

a more attractive model civilization than it does at present. 

Colonel Pan Jiabin of the Academy of Military Science, the bo

representative of \Vestem thought, especially that of h

Government views?' Pan then misquotes Brzezinski: "The U.

~Yang Minglie, Gan Ailan, and Cao Xia, "Groping for a New Transatlant

8sChinese analysts do this for other countries, as well as for Taiwan. See 

shebm" qiwen daguan (Dae unheard of magnificent spectacle of Taiwan societ

chubanshe, 1992). 

97 
degree, it has too much trust in its own strength, does not take 

of anything~ and is prone to make many mistaken policy decisio

Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Pon, e

example of Aa'nerican writing frequently cited by Chinese analy

argues that high military" spending leads to the weakening of the 

Soviet Union, while low military, spending allowed Germany and 

CICIR analystJin Dexiang, quotes Kennedy on the link between 

budgets and the decline of a country's economy and overall na

"If... too large a proportion of the state's resources is diverted 

creation and allocated instead to militau" purposes, then that is 

to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the 

state overextends itself strategically.., it tuns the risk that 

benefits from extemal expansion mav be outweighed by the gre

it all--a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned 

period of relative economic decline."Jin then puts forward his ow

the United States is already entrapped in the danger zone 

Kennedv. "As a matter of fact," he writes, "Washington today do

'run the risk' of weakening national power, it is actually bogged 

quagmire of relative decline. Relentless expansion of war industry

~Pan Jiabin, " 'Stliqu kongztfi: 21 shiji qianye de quanqin hunluan'--Burejisi

yanbian de fenxi yu r~nshi" (Out of control: global turmoil on file e

centu~'--Brzezinski's an~ysis and understanding of the evolution of t

structure), 7JJot~gguojuns~" k.~vue (China Milita~, Science) 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995

is at the Foreign Military Studies Department of .~MS. 

*VMa Ling, 'qhe Atteml, t Behind the 'Bombing in Error'--Interview with Re

Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong," Ta Kat,g Pao (Hong Kong), May 17, 19

CHI-1999-1518, May 19, 1999. Zhang is Director of the Science and Techn

and Research Section of NDU. 

98 
~nerica's foreign policy in the official Communist Party, new

particularly vivid. For example, the United States was lik

Germany in eight specific ways in a long article that concluded t

of such Nazi-like policies would end in "complete failure. ''89 

In lieu of excerpting many other articles that also describ

polio 7 as a search for world domination, this one will be quote

detail to reveal the Chinese assessment of ~nerican goals clear

responding to the rhetorical question of how the United States t

Germany are alike: 

• "First, their setf-centeredness and ambition to seek 

exactly the same. In his notorious book, Mein Kampf, Hi

'ethnic superiority' and `living space,' maintaining that hum

one that observed the law of the jungle, and that ethnic G

expand and become the 'lord of the earth.' If we ask which 

world wants to be the 'lord of the earth' like Nazi Germ

past, there is only one answer, namely the United States, 

hegemonism." 

• "Second, the United States has outdone Nazi German

to increasing military budgets and expanding its armament

United States has yet to launch a new world war, the size o

expansion and the frequency of its use of military strength 

far exceeded those of Nazi Germany in the past." 

~Jin Dexiang, ".America vs. Japan and Germany," 3. 

~"Observer, "kYge Urge Hegemonism Today To "Fake a Look at the Mirror o

D,n'/y, June 22, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0622. 

99 
expansionist tactic and the Nazism of the past? 

• "Fourth, the trend toward replacing global international 

with military alliances is not without precedent. After World 

proposal ofthen-U.S. President Wilson, 44 countries form

of Nations in 1920 .... Germany was a pen'nanent m

league's executive council. It withdrew from the league in 

due to restrictions on its program of arms expans

preparations .... Of course, the United States and its 

withdraw from the United Nations. But is not the w

repeatedly bypassed the United Nations and wantonly inter

countries through their military alliance or bloc very similar 

way of Germany?" 

• "Fifth, the strategic priorities and directions of global 

basically similar. Hitler made Europe a strategic priority

Europe is also the U.S. global strategic priori b, ... the Un

reinforced its military alliance with Japan in Asia, ma

important accomplice in its armed intervention agains

countries. This is also an attempt to gain control of the 

Asian continents from the Western and Eastern fronts, wi

goal of fulfilling its strategy" of dominating the world." 

• "Sixth, the methods they employed in dismembering o

territories and encroaching upon their sovereignty through e

ethnic contradictions were vet 3 , similar. Hitler, to secure t

for taking over the Balkans, plotted in June 1937 the 'Gre

annexing Czechoslovakia by employing its ethnic issues. C

was a multiethnic country and its Sudetenland was inha

Germans. Gorpel [name as transliterated] clamored th

Germans in Sudetenland were 'tortured' and Germany co

to 'watch as an onlooker'.... In less than five months, N

100 
were considered to be the most advanced weapons of the 

airplanes, tanks, and long-range artillery, to massacre peace

anti-Fascist countries, but also built concentration camps 

and in other areas to slaughter Jews and prisoners of war w

technology. Executioners drove hundreds and thousands 

gas chambers and poured cyanide through air holes in th

them all. Today, the U.S. hegemonists used high-tech wea

FRY civilian facilities several hundred miles away from the 

with laser and global position systems several thousand me

sky,, treated innocent and peaceful citizens as live targets. Th

of missiles by the U.S.-led NATO to attack the Chines

Yugoslavia was a barbaric atrocity" that the then-Nazi Ger

dared to commit." 

• "Eighth, there is no difference between brazen un

international law and aggressive acts. What is the differenc

modem-day hegemonists who willfully undennine interna

the erstwhile Nazi Germany?" 

• "x,X/hen we read world history, we know that many em

dominated for some time finally ended in decline. Parti

century, the worldwide colonial system that the Western po

several hundreds of years has collapsed. They employ the wi

that fortune is now on their side and that it seems to be t

United States~e sole superpower in the world--to domin

and to become 'the master of the globe'.... Even though 

rampant for a while, they will eventually end in complete 

Although this article is harsher in tone and more intempera

it does not deviate much in substance from Chinese auth

condemn the '"negemonic" goal~ of the United States. Some au

101 
p

status as a superpower. As evidence, analysts cite _&n

vulnerabilities, including failure to invest fully in the R_b, ZA, w

and logistics, intractable domestic problems, and frequent inab

diplomatically. 

Chinese authors emphasize several problem areas that the 

faces in implementing the tL\.LA~ and maintaining its leading 

main criticisms of ?unerican weaknesses are outlined below. 

• Interservice rivalry 

• A decreasing defense budget 

• Complex technolog 9" 

• The universal availability of technology throug

enterprises after its development 

• Easily damaged information networks 

• The greater potential of other countries in the area o

Several Chinese analysts suggest that China can exploit t

weaknesses and improve its own development of the R~\.L~. C

analysts also use examples from the Gulf War to illustrate U

Many state that the outcome of the Gulf War could have been d

had employed different tactics and exploited the following U

• The United States had insufficient means of transpor

• U.S. munitions cannot damage deep underground bu

• Various U.S. weapons systems have their own specif

• The United States did not have superiority in its eff

Iraqi tanks. 

102 
• Permitting the United States time to build up its logistic

special training for several months before the war 

• Not employing "special measures," such as harassing 

It should be noted, however, that Chinese assessments do 

United States as "weak" in any absolute sense at the prese

characterize the United States as a true hegemon in eve~" w

example, a series of books on the U.S. Armed Forces 

technological superiority in practically every field, despite U

since 1991. 90 Nevertheless, they assert that the United States w

in military innovation after 2010. 

U.S. military ~nerabilities are only one contributing factor 

process of U.S. decline depicted by Chinese analysts. '~\lhile 

focus on specific areas where America is weakening, such as in m

or domestic social problems, other analysts argue that the count

relative, that it is only declining compared to other nations w

increasing. One predicted outgrowth of this trend of falling nat

is that the U.S. is expected to lose its allies. As the power of Euro

increases, and they no longer must depend upon America eith

economically, they are expected to come into greater conflict 

Consequently, rivalries and struggles are expected to gradu

alliances to weaken and fade. Moreover, at the same ti

relationships are deteriorating with the U.S., Chinese analyst

Japan and Europe will be striving to improve their ties to Chin

9CThe United States has cut defense personnel by 40 percent, to the smallest 

Weapon purchases have declined nearly 70 percent. The 1999 defense bud

40 percent below its 1985 level hl xe',d terms, with oldy 3.1 percent of gross d

for defense, the smallest share since 1940. 

103 
in the future security environment in the same way for a dec

but declining. In the picturesque terms of ancient Chinese stat

is a decaying hegemon whose leaders are as yet unaware th

unavoidable, so the U.S. leadership is pursuing several dangero

strategies, such as: 

• Attempting to limit Russia's recovery and access to r

• Practicing limited containment of China's rising influ

• Fomenting conflict between China and Japan 

• Investing (too slowly) in a potential RMA 

• Using the Bosnia conflict to maintain domination of 

• Falsely spreading the China Threat Theory in ASEA

• Seeking military bases and new NATO allies in Cent

• Aiding separatist movements in Tibet, Taiwan, and X

China's authors propose a number of countermeasures to 

American maneuvers. Deng Xiaoping's public proclamations w

coolheaded" and to "'taoguangg'anghu2'--bide our time 

capability--to avoid conflict with the United States during 

suffers inevitable decline. Other authors sound more stringent 

Vice President of AMS urges vigilance, because the declinin

will attempt "strategic deception" of other major powers, incl

it did the Soviet Union with the phony "Star Wars" threat, and 

it tricked Iraq into invading Kuwait so the United States c

Iraq's growing power. The Director of tile Foreign Policy Ce

largest security research institute warns that the United Stat

coalition to "strange'" China if the proponents of the China 

become strong in the United States. 

104 
aggressive advice about how China should deal with the declin

hegemon has been coud~ed in specific analogies to ancient stat

connected scholar proposes China help to form a global anti-

with any and all nations opposed to the United States. His colle

him for such alan-nist proposals. Several analysts have written th

"too late" for the United States to contain China. 

105 
THE INEVITABLE RISE OF JAPAN AND I

CHINA'S ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN AND INDIA differs sharply from 

will be seen in this chapter's survey of 82 Chinese authors on t

of these two countries. Chinese authors have addressed Japan's 

to become the strongest or second-strongest world power by 20

ambitions to dominate China, its drive to attain equivalence w

States in both nuclear and conventional weapons, its prospects 

a revolution in military affairs (RMA), and its efforts to conta

by instigating conflict between China and the United States. D

exist among Chinese analysts about Japan's future, but the rang

not extensive. There are those who see only "some elements" in 

the above-mentioned ambitions, rather than a dedicated Ja

Chinese assessments of India resemble (on a smaller scale) 

Japan's future role, suggesting that similar premises are at wo

China's authors examine its two democratic and capitali

Following India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in particular, num

authors have accused India of pursuing a policy of military ex

attaining independence, in order to become a military power, c

and dominate and control South Asia and the Indian Ocean. 

~For example, Shen Qurong, the President of the China Institute o

International Studies (CICIR), writes that only "some elements" in Japan are t

conflict between the United States and China. Feng Shaokui of the Chinese A

Science (CASS), however, writes that it is Japan's official policy goal to do 

107 
independent Taiwan. 2 One reason for this wariness may b

Marxism counsels suspicion of the predatory motives of any c

Another may be that ancient Chinese statecraft recommends vi

nearby rivals, especially those with whom one has disputed terr

does with Japan and India. Chinese authors themselves s

additional cause for concern has to do with history and culture, 

still prevalent memories of past wars. For example, an extre

comes from General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Acade

Science (AMS), who writes that Japan's strategic culture is 

ruthless, bloodthirsD, , and a "self-made freak. ''3 While not 

Japanese, the Indians as a culture are also described as ambi

written by the late Premier Zhou Enlai described India's "bloo

(interbreeding) with the British and explained that the Indian 

"took over from British imperialism this concept of India a

Asia," and want to have "a great Indian empire" that domina

2Zhang Wenmu, "Meiguo de shiyou diyuan zhanlue yu Zhongguo X.iz

anquan" (U.S. petmleuna----geostrategy and the regional security of China's Ti

Zbanlueyuguanli (Strategy and Management) 27, no. 2 (1998): 100-104. Zh

of CICIR. 

3Li Jijun, "Lun zhanlue wenhua" (Strategic culture), Zhongguojunshi kex

Science) 38, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 8. Lieutenant General Li is Vice Presiden

4The Sino-Indian Border Di~tte (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), 1

India inherited the British imperialist philosophy continue to be expressed t

an article in the Liberation Army Daily claimed that, "India has always consid

'natural successor to the great British empire.' It believes that since the 

fomaedy the 'lake of Britain,' it should now be includcd in the sphere of in

See Liu Yang and Guo Feng, "What is the Intention of Wantonly En

Ventures--India's Military Development Should be Watched Out F

(Liberation Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-141, May 23, 

108 
aggressive military powers. In other words, the fact that Japan 

democracies counts for little in the eyes of Chinese analysts 

future security, environment. Instead, several Chinese author

statecraft and strategic culture arguments to portray Japan 

derogatory- ten-ns usually reserved for totalitarian regimes. Japan's 

is purportedly to replace the United States as world hegemon, 

merely in pursuit of regional hegemony. No author says so, but 

few welcome Japan or India as a potential strategic partner for C

these two are "nearb) #' powers to be opposed rather than "distan

whom to seek partnerships. 

India's CNP will remain inferior to China's, according to civ

but military- analysts write that India is already ahead of China i

and defense spending. Japan's prospects with respect to the tL~v

high. Japan is expected to become a major nuclear and conven

power, co-equal or superior to China, Russia, and the United 

future military equivalence to the United States can come throug

CNP or through its implementation of the Ra\,LA_, and "Japan's 

Forces will strive to be on an equal footing with the United Sta

of conventional military- forces. ''s A more nationalistic Chine

Xin, warned in 1989 about Japan's long-term goals in harsher 

in the overall strategic arrangement will completely carve up and 

Casting off the United States, nibbling at China, fostering co

with the Soviet Union, and striving for world hegemony ve~

SHan Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 21 shot'& wmguojunduijianshe (Foreign mili

toward the 21st century)(Beijing. Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 75-76. Sever

on the R/VIA stress Japan's potential. 

109 
long-term strategy for the future multipolar world is said to be 

to turn the United States against China in the decades al~ead so 

"sneak" past the United States in CNP while the United States 

the pseudo threat of Chma. s Japan's motive is said to be 

historical ambition to dominate Asia, in pursuit of which 

China's CNP and also break free of its dependency on the Unit

these goals can be achieved if Japan (or India) succeeds in 

Americans that China is a threat and a challenge to A

leadership. Even the usually moderate Beijing Redew asserted 

sinister China Threat Theo~- was manufactured first in Japan 

this purpose. 9 

6He Xin, Z/mn&0u0fuxingyu shijie weilai (China's rejuvenation and the world'

Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 3. 

7The text of the "Murder with a Borrowed Knife" ~#'e da0 sha ren) strat

enemy's intention is obvious and the ally's attitude hesitant, induce the ally 

while preserving one's own strength." According to a translation of the 3

Haicherg the purport of this strategy is, "To avoid getting incriminated for 

a person can sometimes conduct the act with a 'borrowed knife: which 

someone who holds a grudge against the victhn. By inducing a third pa

murder, one WIU be able to achieve one's goals without being held res

military, contexts, the idiom advises the commander to exploit the confli

powers. To fight a strong enemy, he should find out the power groups th

this enemy and thereby induce them to fight it in his stead. In this way, h

result with half the effort." Sun Haichen, ed. and trans., The IP~les of War:. 3

from Andent China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), 24-25. 

SFeng Zhaokui, "Ri-Mei anbao tizhi yu Riben de daguo zhanlue" (The J

system and Japan's strategy for world power status), Shifiejineojiyu ghengzhi 

and Politics) 204, no. 8 (August 1997): 47-49. Feng serves in the Japan In

%,rang Zhongren, "China Threat Theory Groundless," Beifing Renew (luly 16

Japanese protagonist was Professor Murai of the National Defense Acade

110 
fear of being attacked front and rear. Consequently it used the 

as its excuse for conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Zhang 

realized that "in order to ease pressure from the United States 

nuclear tests), india must challenge China," because India and t

similar strategic aims concerning containing China. Zhang wri

In the next century, to split China's western part, or more spec

split China's Tibetan region . . . is probably the target of th

world's geopolitical st-rategy. Having pushed Russia northward, 

political barrier like Tibet or Xinjiang between China and the oil-

countries in Central Asia conforms to the strategic interests of th

control permanently the world's geographic and energy ce

dovetails with India's political plot to create a Tibetan buffer zon

China and India. Currently, India is pulling out all the stops to co

West that it is willing to play the vanguard for the \Vest's effort 

this goal, under the prerequisite that the West will adopt an ap

policy towards its nuclear option. 

According to Zhang, the mutual objective explains why the sanct

on India by the West were not as harsh as those inflicted on Ira

problem. 1° 

Chinese authors assess the future roles of Japan and 

international security" environment mainlv as future rivals of Chin

on a belief in their sinister long-term hegemonic strategies and o

power they will use to back up their plans. Ahhough in overall C

definite differences in the three countries' scores, in terms of m

mZhang Wcmmu, "The Issue of South Asia in Major Power Politics," I-long 

September, 23, 1998, B1, in FBIS-CHI-98-293, October 21, 1998. 

111 
capita defense expenditures, Chinas figures are 1.6 p

percent, respectively. 

• In the comprehensive comparison of national defense 

value is 62.42 and China's, 48.32.11 

AMS assessments of India show that China is: 

• Inferior to India in naval power (India has two aircra

• Stronger than India in long-range missiles 

• Inferior to India in overall weapons technology 

• Lower than India in defense spending per capita 

• Higher than India in overall defense, scoring 48.32 v

• Superior, but "the superiority- is not great, mz 

These current "scores" comparing China to India and Japa

in Chinese assessments. Instead, many authors focus on the 

ultranationalist, militarist takeovers of the governments of e

New Delhi, or both. In such scenarios, China could find itself 

giants to the east and south, two nations that might even f

against China. A stream of articles in the 1990s by Chinese 

Japan and India tends to ignore the democratic and even pacifi

which Western anal~ts focus. Rather, the Chinese seem to be d

themselves as to how soon current indicators of political, 

:aHuang Shuofeng, Guqia shengshuai lun (On the rise and fall of nations)

chubanshe, 1996), 496. 

:2Ibid., 497. 

112 
domestic development and other factors that will make Japan, lik

nations, behave in a predatory imperialist fashion, t3 

The Chinese have not always been so negative in their vie

military development and actually encouraged it in the 1970s. 

not ua~fil the mid-1980s that China reassessed its support (offere

for Japanese military modernization. Chinese military figures ha

Japan to increase its defense spending to meet the Soviet threat. 

the Chinese deputy chief of the general staff encouraged Japan 

share of defense expenditures from 1 percent of the gross nat

(GNP) up to 3 percent, nearly triple Japanese defense expend

advice had been followed by Tokyo, Japan's budget today woul

$40 billion but U.S. $150 billion, more than 20 times China's cla

budget. 

Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese delegation to Beijing in Sep

"I am in favor of Japan's Self Defense Force buildup. ''14 At th

faced a threatening security environment, and its support for Jap

defense efforts may have been related in part to Beijing's interes

Japanese weapons and defense-related technology. China als

*3For an overall study of Japan's politics, society and economics see Liu Jiangy

de dben--Zheng~bi, jin~i, waijiao a'in qushi (Japan across the century--new po

and foreign relations trends)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995). The edit

collection is the CICIR director for Japan studies. See also Chen Shao, 

zonghe guoli de fazhan ji pinggu" (An assessment of Japan's postwar compre

power devdopmtait), Te~pingrang ~,eba0 (P"aaific Journal), no. 3 (December 199

is on the staff of IWEP at CASS. 

:'Cited in Michael Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card?," Foreign Policy, no. 33 (Wint

113 
atoasecut 3, advso, t6 

Today, Chinese security experts seem united in the view th

securig, environment, Japan will be primarily locked in 

competitive struggle with the other gxeat capitalist power cente

3maerica; this is a consistent Chinese Marxist-Leninist view of J

Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser, Huan Xiango 

Aa'nerica's allies would all begin to free themselves from U.

Japan's future strate~- toward China and Russia is seen in da

geopolitical framework of a powerful Japan now escaping 

declining America, but also colliding with America's escap

capitalist allies. The 1990s have seen no change since 

assessment in 1986. For example, Japan's present and future ge

are treated as being the same in five subsequent annual 

international securiu, environment conducted by CICIR, whic

duties for the ~finistt T of State Security, publishes an annual "W

article. The authors are not the same each year, but their vi

future role appear to be consistent: 

1993: "Japan and Germany, the ~'in rising economic giants, a

the golden opportunity, of the demise of the former Soviet Union

Cold War, and the relative decline of the United States . . . i

status of major powers in the year ahead. ''17 

l~Ibid., 16. 

l~See Huan Xiang, "Sino-U.S. Relations Over the Past Year," Ldaowang 0an

FBIS-CHI, January 15, 1988. 

:TLi Zhongcheng and Guo Chuanlin, "~X'odd Trends 1993," Contempora~" In

3, no. 1 (January 1993): 2. Li and Guo are Research Fellows at CICIR. 

114 
power. ''19 

1996: "The United States, Europe, and Japan will encounter new 

with each other in the context of economic regionalism. The Eu

0EU) will speed up its involvement in the East Asian econom

inevitably lead to a triangular competition .... The intensified ef

Europe and Japan to infiltrate Latin .~nerica will also pose a 

dominant position enjoyed by the United States in its 'backyard

unfolding competition among the United States, Europe, and Jap

framework of their e.xisting relationships will cause more troubles 

its endeavor to maintain its leading position. ''2~ 

1997: "The United States will strive for maintaining global unip

status as the sole superpower intact. Its strong desire for world l

meet with ever-mounting challenges and rejection. The EU

increasing CNP, will tt T hard to reach out for the center of th

Japan will come up with more measures for winning the sta

power. ''21 

"~Yang Mingjie, Ouyang Liping, and Bing Jinfu, "World Oudook 1994

IntematianalRelations 4, no. 1 (January 1994): 9. Yang, Ouyang, and Bing are re

Division for Comprehensive International Studies at CICIR. 

t%.i Zhongcheng and Wang Zaibang, "World Oudook 1995," Contemporary Inter

5, no. 1 (January. 1995): 7-8. Li is Director of the Division for Comprehensi

Studies and Wang is a Doctor of Laws at CICIR. 

2~Yv'ang Zaibang and Yang Mingjie, "World Political Oudook 1996," Contemp

Relations 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 5-6. Wang and gang are both on the staff a

~Li Zhongcheng, "~Zodd Politics," Contempora{y International Rdau'ons 7, no. 1 

1. 

115 
pppy y , 

firmly control the scale and direction of its use." However, 

effectiveness of U.S. strategy is limited, because "Facts mak

move toward further relaxation in the Japanese-U.S. militar

alliance is a difficult-to-reverse trend. ''22 Some analysts, such as 

also from CASS, suggest Japan's nuclear ambitions will estra

United States and "will very likely damage the 50-year-old U.S

relationship. ''23 An article in the I_a'beration Army Dai~v predi

long-term view, this relationship may be a 'two-edged sword

in strengthening its military, alliance relationship with the Un

means and not an end for becoming one of the world's pol

spreads its wings and gradually advances toward becoming on

poles, its tendency to break away from the United States will 

An article in the foreign ministry journal Worm Knowledg

Japan's increasing power and confidence in the relationship. 

American-Japanese relations "have entered the most turbule

postwar era, and Japan no longer plays the obedient lamb 

States." However, like other analysts, the author claims t

urgency to this problem: 'L°dthough there are contradictions o

Japanese relations, no radical change in the basic pattern of re

22Gao Heng, "Dongbei Ya de anquan geju ji weilai quski" (Northeast Asia'

and future trends), 2l S,Si_fi (The 21st Century), no. 6 (1995): 34. 

23l'~"1g Zhaokui, "Lengzhan jiexu dui Ri-Mei keji guanxi de xiangying" C[he 

of the Cold War on U.S.-Japan relations in science and technology), Heping)

Development) 48, no. 2 ~{ay 1994): 5-13. 

2'Liang Ming, "A New Trend that Merits Vigilance," Jiefangjun bao, Ju

FBIS-CHI-1999-0616,June 17, 1999. 

116 
political and military, needs, with Rightist forces in Japan wishing 

United States to achieve their target of building Japan into a 

rnilita~ power and the United States wishing to rely on Japan t

its qine of defense' in East Asia, the two countries have come cl

in recent years. ''2~ A CICIR analyst elaborates further: "For a lon

will not part company with America, although it will change its po

the latter. This is because Japan's economy relies heavily on the U

Its security and politics also need support from the United State

times the Japanese-U.S. relationship is one of cooperation and 

and of conflict and coordination. ''2: 

However, Japan's dependency on Amcrica will bc greatly 

overcome, if the assessments of other Chinese analysts rega

current and future development are correct. For example, one 

areas in which many Chinese believe Japan holds the world's m

position is high technology. Praising the progress it has made in 

innovation, one author writes, "This basic research will be 

position in the future science and technology competition, espe

energ T, space navigation, civil aviation, ocean development, bio

superconduction, the magnetic suspension train, fiber-optics com

2sziJian, "Two Problems in u.s.-Japanese Rdadons:' Sbz)~ ~Lrbi (World Kn

1990), in FBI,%CHI, August 6, 1990: 1-2. 

26Xiao Feng, "World Trends Under US Global Strategy, Part One of Two:' Re

31, 1999, 6, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0601, May 31, 1999. 

27Xu Zhixian, "Xin shiqi RJ'ben waijiao ~banlue de tiaogben~' (Readjustment o

policy in the new era), Xiandaiguojiguanxi (Contemporary International Rela

(December 1995): 12. 

117 
Not only do Chinese authors emphasize specific areas 

believe Japan already is superior to America, but some perce

catching up and even pulling ahead of the United States in o

power. According to an article in World Knowledge, the major U

adversary is shifting to Asia, specifically to Japan, because 

indicators show "Japan is swiftly shrinking its gap with the U

the fields of economics and science and technology, and eng

competition with the United States": 

• Japan has outstripped the United States in per capita 

• Japan's domestic fixed-assets invesunent has topp

United States to rank first in the world. 

• Japan's per-capita savings rate is higher than that of the 

ranking first in the world. 

• In certain high-tech fields, Japan has caught up to or 

United States. 

• The United States is in an adverse trade position wit

• International loans by Japanese banks exceed those b

• The United States has become the world's largest debto

Japan has become the world's largest creditor nation. 

• Japan provides more foreign aid than the United St

countD~ that provides the most foreign aid in the world. 

28Chert Shao, "Zhanhou Riben zonghe guoli de fazhan ji pinggu,'" 99. 

~X'Pdberz Junshi jishu lingxian Meiguo" (Japan: leading the U.S. in military 

wenchai (Military Digest) 4, no. 2 (1996): 18. 

118 
chapter five, Chinese analysts who quantitatively measure CN

predicted that Japan will surpass the United States in the future

However, it must be pointed out that in the late nine

assessments of Japan's short-term development have been 

Chinese journals, particularly when comparing its economic situa

of its leading rivals, the United States and Europe. As an example

a senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of Internatio

Studies (CIISS), suggests, "Japan's performance is rather ba

developed nations. Suffering from the aftermath of the collapse 

economy, the Japanese economy has been weak in recovery w

fluctuations and is estimated to barely maintain growth by 

Another author, Jian Yuechun of the China Institute of Internat

(CIIS), forecasts, "The Japanese economy will be weak for a lo

period of real recovery for the Japanese economy will not co

time. ''3a The Depu b, Director of the Division of East Asian Stud

has even written that the country's economic problems are havi

impact on its rivalry with the United States and Europe for globa

"The unstable political situation and weak economy shoo

supporting Japanese diplomacy, and the 'Japan can say no' posit

3°Li Changjiu, "The Asian Century and the Shift to Asia in the Focus of U.S

Relations," Shifie ghishi (World Knowledge)0uly 1, 1994): 1-7. 

31Chen Feng, "1997 nian de guoji zhanlue xingshi" (The international strat

1997), Guoji ~hanlue).anjil~ (Intemational Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 (January

32Jiang Yuechun, "Features, Causes and Prospects of the Protracted Japan

IntemationalSt, tdes, no. 2-3 (1995): 18. Jiang is the Deputy Head of Asia Pacific 

119 
ppy , 

Japan's diplomatic development will be slowed down. Howev

that with its comprehensive national strength, Japan will tide 

temporary economic problems sooner or later• In this sense, 

underestimate Japan's diplomatic development. 34 

Contrasting Views 

Before going into a discussion of Chinese views on Japanese 

useful to contrast a carefully selected "mainstream" ,ama

Japanese strategic policies with the Chinese "mainstream" view

more respected American specialist on Japan than the late Edw

who served as President John F. Kennedy's ,~'nbassador to Ja

than two decades at Harvard Universit3,, where he trained 

American scholars in Japanese studies. He is the co-author 

Fairbank of a college textbook on East Asia used for thr

addition to his scholarly writings, Reischauer frequently wrote e

33yang Bojiang, "The Trans-Cenmry Tendencies of Japan," Contempora[7 I

8, no. 8 (August 1998): 17. 

34Chiang Feng, "Japan Is Not Cross-Strait Relations Mediator--Interview

Shanghai Intemalional Relations Society. President," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 

in FBIS-CHI-98-055, February 26, 1998. 

3SThere are dissenters from the U.S. mainstream whose views are clos

Chinese. For example, in Blindu'de: Why Japan is Still on Track to O~rtake the U

('i'okyo: Kodansha International, 1997), 324, Eamonn Fingleton states, 

headed for a truly dramatic change in the balance of power in the next tw

•.. Japan could be outpmducing the United States by a factor of two or thre

2050." However, Fmgleton avoids claiming this is inevitable and prescribes 

United States can employ to save itseI£ See also George Friedman and Me

Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991). 

120 
that period, Japans military spending was low compared to 

seemed to have active political parties and a lively parliament, a

the military in politics was extremely limited. Japan agreed at the 

Conference (1921-22) to limit its naval development for 

Reischauer's view, the ,American occupation purged Japan of th

military leaders of the 1930s and returned Japan to its roots in de

responsible diplomacy of the 1920s. However, this is not 

assessment. 

Future Militadsm 

There is a range of debate among China's leading Japan special

direction of Japan's future development. 3s Almost all see it as i

Japan will seek and assume a greater international political role c

with its global economic influence, and that an increase in its m

will accompany this new position, g"nat is debated, however, is 

which the count~"s drive to be a world power and its growing 

will affect its democracy and foreign policy. Will the conservati

Japanese society and politics gain the ascendency and Japan on

down the "road to militarism?" Chinese analysts question whe

•6/aJb, September 11, 1964, 27-28. 

~7Some American scholars dissent from Reischauer's positions, as shown by I 

who argues that Japanese and Western models of capitalism and democracy ar

Henry. Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant: How the fapanese Economy Works (kX'ashi

Institution, 1976), 10-12. 

~3In interviews, He [rang of the State Council's International Study Cente

moderate about Japan's future, while Major General Pan Junfeng is perce

alarmed about the future threat of Japanese militarism. Pan heads the AMS 

Studies Department. 

121 
implications for Japanese future policy is as pessimistic as 

optimisticJ ° According to Liu Jiangy,'ong, "Japan's militarism 

thoroughly exposed and criticized." He acknowledges tha

occupation took "some measures for Japan's demili

democratization, such as disbanding its armed forces, arr

criminals, as well as supervising the formulation and adop

postwar constitution of peace." However, in Liu's view, 

occupation failed to temamate the century-old force of Japane

class-A war criminal was released and became Japan's prime m

Troop 731, which had engaged in biological warfare ex

exempted from trial. In March 1950, all remaining class-A 

criminals in custody were released, thus "preserving the remna

militarism. ''1 More recently, in 1995 "Japan's right-wing force

and published a series of materials in preparation for reversi

Liu was particularly concerned that Japan's prewar imperia

history, still has considerable influence. This theory" first appear

of the Meiji emperor, when the government claimed, "The 

supreme deity, who has been Japan's ruler ever since the birth o

Liu writes that the m}~a was "derived from Japan's earliest fai

Today, Japanese "right wingers" are still "deeply immersed 

perception of history" and now want to amend Japan's constit

39Zheng Yin, "Duoyuarthua de Yatai diqu xin geju" (The Asia-Pacific regi

structure), in Kua sbiji de shijieg~u do Ztn,anhuan (Nlajor changes in the wo

rum of the cenmt3'), ed. Chen Qimao (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chuban

'mLiu Jiangyong, "Distorting History will Misguide Japau," Conlen~ora~y I

5, no. 9 (September 1995): 1-11. 

41Ibid., 3. 

122 
of these Japanese concepts, Yukichi Fukuzawa, even defined 

Japanese War of 1894-95 as a "war between civilization and b

which Japan found itself with a sense of superiority, against 

China. Liu argues that Japan's "sense of superiority"' has a

ground" and is "daily expanding." Liu lays emphasis on the 1995 

Japanese prime minister to pass a resolution in parliament 

opposition to war and aggression. Nearly 40 percent of the memb

parliament opposed passage of the resolution, and two associat

more than five million signatures, 4 percent of Japan's populati

it. Liu notes the significance of the Diet members who vote

resolution, including a number of"second-generation heredity, D

who are "influenced by their fathers in their perception of war

Liu is also concerned that Japanese right-wing organizations, 

were disbanded in 1945, have made a comeback since the mid-19

number 1,900. Some have "propaganda vans on the streets of To

slogans to sing praises of the holy war for greater East Asia." S

organizations have collectively published the book, Ia'sten!Japan

which is aimed at blocking any further investigation into t

responsibility for the war. Liu contrasts Japan's attitude with 

legislation of Germany, a law passed in 1994 that sentences 

prison anyone who denies the truth of the Holocaust. He w

cannot help thinking that Japan has legally retained the freedom 

wing forces to reverse the verdict on Japan's history of aggress

4qbid. 

43Ibid., 10. In another article concerning Japanese militarism, Liu argues t

"when Japanese politics are sharply turbulent, divisive, and in the midst of 

neonadonalist ideological trend is lifting its head in Japan." His main example 

leader who wishes to "have Japan become an ordinary, country" that can sen

123 
militarism refusing to conscientiously plead guilty, and attempti

the old dream of the so-called "Greater East Asian Co-prosper

• . . The trend of politically right deviations in Japan has ar

worries and high ~qgilance among the peoples of Asia. '4 

The release in Japan in May 1998 of "Pride, The Fatal Mom

eulogizing one of the great advocates of the Co-prosper W 

Japanese class-A war criminal, Hideko Tojo, drew numerous a

for "boisterously glori~.'ing" Tojo and the "Japanese evil war 

and was cited as an example of the continued existence and p

militarism. "The making of this reactionary movie is not someth

It reflects the continuing existence of militarist thinking in Ja

expressed in it are not anything new, but belong to the 

promoted by Japan's postwar ultrarightist force. What is wor~

and take part in international contlicts just like the United States, B

According to Liu, tiffs leader has suggested adding a Section 3 to the Japa

foUowing Article 9, Section 2, the substance of which is that Japan could "po

forces aimed at peace making as well as an international joint mobile force 

at the invitation and under the conunand of the United Nations." Liu sa

open a channel for Japan to intervene militarily in international matters, cr

terms for Japan to strengthen its military, force, and giving itself defense fo

use force." He adds that "there is a 'great debate' among all Japanese 

suggestions. See Liu Jiangyong, "Japanese Politics and Hata's Diplomatic A

Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary Intemadonal Relations), no. 6 (June 1994): 6

"4Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-Pac

zhanlueyanjiu (Strategic International Studies) 43, no. 1 (January 1997): 

Research Fdlow at CIISS. In August, the Chinese press did report that Prim

and other Japanese Ministers stated they would not visit the Yasukuni S

avoid stirmlg criticism from neighboring countries." See the Beijmg Xinhua 

report of August 7, 1998, "'Xinhua Reports Obuchi Not To Visit Yasukun

CHI-98-219, August 19, 1998. 

124 
Rightist forces in Japanese politics are on the rise, and certain 

politicians have come out from behind the stage to the front and 

to sway Japan's policy directions .... and in recent years more 

agitation for revising the constitution has been stirred up; fol

passage of the bills related to the new guidelines, quite a number 

in Japanese political circles have again clamored for re

constitution, babbling that the constitution enacted 50 years a

longer meet the demands of the development of the times. U

agitation, many people in Japan agree that the constitution 

revised; and once this is done, the development of Japanes

strength is bound to become "uncontrollable. ''~ 

Some Chinese authors temper their discussions of Japan

by pointing out that it is only one seg-nent of Japanese socieq, an

advocates extreme nationalism, not the general public. For 

Heng of CASS believes that the American occupation did 

militarism in Japan, and worse, because the United States wanted 

to counter the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China during th

"It preserved Japan's entire national machinery and war machin

the names were changed)." Today, he writes, "In file Northeast 

the greatest undetermined factor is Japan. Facts make clear th

who advocate that Japan should restore the militarist line are 

getting more power." However, Gao believes the general Japanes

not support the militarists, although he warns, "If Japan's do

4SDaJtm, "A Japanese Movie Confusing Right and Wrong," Beijing Xinhua D

May 23, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-143, May 27, 1998. See also, "No ~0(&fi

Criminals--Comment on Japanese Reactionary Movie 'Pride, the Fateful M

ri/,aa (People's Daily), May 14, 1998, 6, in FBIS-CHI-98-135, May 15, 1998

~Liang Ming, "A New Trend that Merits Vigilance," 4. 

125 
extreme nationalism, is decreasing." However, he also cautio

Japanese diplomatic environment into account, in the next 

political and economic development is not smooth, nationa

continuously rise. For example, some Japanese will possibly 

views regarding the country's historical acts of aggression, some 

the question of revising the Constitution. ''48 

Lu GuangTe , a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Str

argues that a revival of militarism is not inevitable in Japan, b

are the Japanese people opposed to it, but it runs counter to th

peace and development in the world today: "The main curre

today.., is peace and development, and the cries of the peop

world in demanding justice and equality and the establish

international political and economic order cannot be blocked

aTGao Heng, "Dongbei Ya de anquan geju ji weilai qushi," 35-36. A 

concerning the view that overall Japanese society and politicians are not ad

expansiomsm, can be found in Zheng Yin, "Duoyuanhua de Yatai diqu 

shotdd be pointed out that although the ideological trend of militarism in Ja

and continuously crops up in Japan's political circles, this does not illustrat

thought already occupies a political position in Japan. All previous govern

Japan have upheld and effectively carried out the policy of light arms, st

Japan cannot easily change this policy, the Japanese people will not again be 

the road to militarism. In the future, Japan will still maitdy rely on its eco

technology strength, coordinated foreign affairs, culture and other variou

appropriate military force to realize its strategic objectives." 

%'ang Bojiang, 'q'he Trans-Century Tendencies of.Japan," 17. For an exte

Japanese Constitution and efforts to revise it see, ,exgng Zhangjun, Ra'b

(Studies on Japan's Constitution)(Beijing: Stfishi chubanshe, 1997). 

126 
author writes, "A historical issue that has confronted Japan 

Meiji Restoration is this: should Japan exist as part of Asia 

United States and Europe?" He suggests that for the "third 

changed its national direction." The author continues to sa

Japan has decided to become more involved with Asian econom

"this strategic shift naturally has attracted profound concern in n

the world, particularly its neighbors in Asia. ''s° Therefore, 

Chinese analysts becomes how will Japan act with regard to its 

article by l:bur CtC1R analysts states, "Japan is now on the 

turning point since the Meiji Restoration. A debate is well un

country- on whether Japan should grow into a 'peaceful 

emphasizes making contributions to the world' or 'a mini sup

military role to play.' ,,sl 

Of even greater concern to the Chinese is how Japan may v

Chinese national interests as it strives to become a major politic

4~Lu Guangye, "Going Against the Tide of Histo~, Threatening World Pe

June 6, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0617, June 18, 1999. Lu's azgument i

authors. For example see, Wang Dajun, "An Important Step in Pursuit o

Xinhua, May 24, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0526, May 24, 1999. "The path t

today is very. similar to one that led it to war many years ago. Whereas man

promoted the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' now it h

the United States to engage in their so-called 'new world order.' Such a p

runs counter to the wishes of the majority of peace-loving people in Japan

Japan's neighboring countries that want mutual respect and peaceful existen

of the times." 

5°Zhang Dalin, "Economic Regionalism, Protectionism Drive Japan's Mo

International Studies (January, 1994): 17-21. 

SlYan Xiangjun, Yang Bojiang, Chu Shulong and Dao Shulin, "A Survey 

Pacific Security.," Contemporary International Relations 4, no.7 0uly 1994): 3. 

127 
relationship. Several Chinese authors mention that in recent 

politicians have stated that Sino-Japanese relations are equally a

Japan as u.s.-Japanese relations. However, Lu writes that 

assurances, "It would be very hard for Japan to manage deftly 

relationships on an equal footing when it has to make a strateg

Other authors argue that Japan sees the relationships as b

importance, only because, in its efforts to become a power, it 

advantage of China's strength and international standing, wh

time working to contain China and intervene in its developme

• "Japan needs to use China's power and influence to im

status while on the path to becoming a political power, b

time it wants to have a louder voice in the bilateral relatio

• "It hopes that China can maintain political stability, w

to interfere in China's democratization and human rights.

• "Japan supports China's economic reforms and ope

through providing assistance, while imposing restrictions.

• "In the international community, Japan welco

participation while trying to reduce China's influence o

countries." 

• Japan is "attempting to have a breakthrough in ties wit

to develop a 'quasi-official' relationship with Taiwan. Rec

witnessed a growing pro-Taiwan force in Japan." 

S2Lu Zhoagwei, "On China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations.--A Comment 

Exchanges of Top-Level Visits;' Contemporary lnternationa/Relations 7, no. 12 

7. 

S3Ibid., 3, 5. 

128 
wants to use Japan for the same end. 5s At AMS, the director 

military studies department, a Japan specialist, has described 

Japanese militarism and its consequences for Japan's future m

Asia. He and others worry that "Attempts by the United State

hegemony by playing China and Japan against each other will 

The United States may try to encourage differences among the W

countries. ''s6 

When asked by outsiders about the prospects for Chines

with Japan on security issues in the future, the typical Ch

~Xu Zhixian, "Xin shiqi Riben waijiao zhanlue de tiaozheng,"13. Japan's nee

also be viewed from a different angle, as a sign of weakness; for example

indication of Japan's four 'worries' at present when considering its China p

general setting of the successive fixes of the Sino-Russian relationsh

relationship and Sino-American relationship, the sustained laggard in 

relationship is bound to lighten Japan's weight in the foreign policy of Chin

Japan in a disadvantageous position. Second, the excessive reliance on the 

not only cause damage to Japan's image, but will also be detrimental to the fu

of Japan-China relations. Third, Japan may fall short of its desire to becom

member of the U.N. Security Council for lack of the necessary support fro

ffby any chance the development of Japan-Chiata economic relations cmtno

Japan wiU lose its geoeconomic superiority. Therefore, Japan has no choic

China's status in its diplomatic agenda, making the Japan-China relationsh

second only to the Japan-U.S. relationship, for it needs help from China 

economic interests, and the pursuit of a position as a political big power." X

Minqiau, and Hong jianjun, "On the Foreign Strategy and Trends in the C

United States, Western Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Centu

International Relations 8, no. 3 (March 1998): 16. 

SSShen Qurong, "Postwar Asia Pacific----Historical Lessons and Common E

• Future," Contemporary International Relations 5, no. 11 (November 1995): 5, 7

~l,iu Jiangyong, "On the Establishment of Asia-Pacific Multilateral S

Mechanisms" Contemporary International Rtlations 4, no. 2 (February 1994): 2

129 
Minister Miyazawa in 1992-93 brought to an end the postw

Prime Minister Yoshida, who advocated that Japan concentrat

development at home and investment in Asia, while relyin

security umbrella, with Japan's own defense concentrating solel

islands. The so-called Miyazawa doctrine to form a regional fo

Asian security issues modeled on the Conference On 

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was criticized by Chinese auth

veiled effort to contain China. \X, qaen Japan then supported ~m

in Iraq and passed the Peace Keeping Operations Law, wh

Japanese forces in U.N. missions for 1 year, Chinese analysts 

as yet another step in the return to militarism in Japan. 

When Japan's Self-Defense Forces participated in the U

Cambodia, Beijing objected even though japan sent only unarm

Beijing seems divided between those who wish to discourage J

buildup and believe it may be unde~:ay, and the more pessim

Japan's militarization is inevitable and can only be postponed 

China's national security research organizations seem unit

that in the future Japan will play an independent role as a 

power, s8 This is in sharp contrast with most American views of J

Nixon, for example, raised the prospect of a Chinese-Japanese 

that could dominate East Asia economically and militarily, s9 

some calculations, the arithmetic combination of the Japanes

S"Li Defu, Daoguo kun bing---Ri'ben O-he hard pressed soldiers of the islan

Shishi chubanshe, 1997"). 

-~"Lu Left, Wu Youchang, and Hu Ruoqing, P-a'benfuguo ghi mi (The riddle of J

country)(Beijing: Jiefangjun wen yi chubanshe, 1994). 

S%ee the interview with Richard Nixon in Time, April 2, 1990, 49. 

130 
economic concept was used to explain that "the present Japan-

economic frictions have not reached the stage of endangering 

cooperation between both sides." In other words, an increase 

American economic friction beyond a certain threshold may well 

becoming an independent military power. Nevertheless, The N

reported that a Chinese official revealed that the Chinese milit

for additional defense spending in the 5-year plan to deal w

militat T capabilities. 6t In November 1995, China called for t

American bases in Okinawa and called into question the need fo

mutual security treaty in the post-Cold XX-ar environment. 

Against this backdrop, die recent revisions of the U.S.-J

Guidelines have proved especially worrisome for China, because 

the alliance was expanded in ways that China felt directly 

national interests. One author writes, "Last April, the United Sta

signed a joint declaration on security bmarantees to strengthen 

cooperation. This was aimed at preventing China from rising, get

and positing a challenge to the United States. 'm In the Study 

InternationalSituaEon-1997-1998, a yearly compilation of the vie

from a variety of institutes published by the Chinese Society fo

c'>ZhaoJieqi, "The Present Status and Prospect of Japan--U.S. Military Relati

Strategic Stuch'es (English edition), no. 4 (1989): 12-15. See also Ge Gengfu, 

Development of Japan's Defense Policy and Defense Capabilities," Internatton

edition), J anuat T 13, 1989, in JPRS-CAR-89-032, 6-12. 

e:See Nicholas D. Kristof, "China, Reassessing its Strategy, Views Japan W

Times, October 23,1993. 

¢2Zhu Chun and Xie Wenqing, "The U.S. Chh~a Policy and Sino-U.S. R

Toward dm 21st Century," International Stratgic Studies (English edition) 4

1997): 36. Zhu and Xie are Senior Research Fellows at ClISS. 

131 
guidelines with the United States the purpose of Japan and 

strengthen the strategic deterrence against China . . . China b

called imaginary, enemy under the Japanese-American Security 

One of the chief causes for Chinese concern is that the n

indicates, both in terms of geographic coverage and time of a

United States and Japan plan to involve themselves in China's 

the wording referring to the geographic area encompassed by 

changed from the "Far East" to "Japan's surrounding areas," 

that not only is Taiwan included, but the Nansha Islands as we

time of ioint Japan-U.S. military operations is no longer limite

on Japan, but now includes both peacetime and conting

"surrounding areas." Many Chinese analysts were particularly 

comments of japanese officials on the subject. Zhang Chan

stated, "Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Siroku Kaliyarna o

that ~apan's surrounding areas should naturally include the Taiw

that ~apan will not sit idle if the U.S. troops set out for the Taiw

exposing clearly their intents of interfering in China's internal af

of the new guidelines. ''64 

At present, China is most concerned about a poss

manipulative role in Taiwan politics, possibly encouraging Ta

toward independence and a close relationship with Japan. Zbigni

has revealed in his memoirs that China insisted on a promise fr

63Liu Jiangyong, "smo-Japanese Relations and file New U.S.-Japan Defens

G~¢oji .vingshigen~4 baogao---1997-1998 (Study reports on the international 

1998)(Beijing: Zhanlue yu guanli chubanshe, 1998), 121. 

64Zhang Changtai, "1997 nian Yatai diqu xingshi zongshu" (Roundup of 

situation in 1997), Gu#'z4aanlueyanfiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 

23. Zhang is a Research Fellow at CIISS. 

132 
CASS, "During the Cold War,... Japan played the role of 

America that of a 'spear.' The new strategic assignment the .Joi

has allotted to Japan is through providing logistic suppo

corresponding military, role in preventing disputes in the Asia-P

In other words, the role of Japan has changed from a 'shield' in t

of an auxiliary 'spear.' ,,6s The Chinese fear is that Japan's expa

functions will further fuel the development of militarism and 

the Right. A Research Fellow at CIISS writes that there is a dire

between U.S.-Japan security cooperation and the efforts of som

put their country back on the road to militarism: 

Adjustment in Japan-U.S. military relations will enable Japan t

opportunity to achieve a new breakthrough in military policies a

encourage the turn to the right in domestic politics in Japan .... 

some time, there has been growth of the rightist tendency 

reversal of the verdict on the history of Japan's aggression and tr

itself of the status of the vat!quished nation. Although this is 

manifestation of the rightist forces in Japan, it should also be n

same time that it is closely related to Japan's strengthening of 

relations with the United States, which indicates that there are in

people in Japan attempting to seek a military upswing by streng

military relations with the United States. 66 

65Zhao Jieqi, '"Redefinition' of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its 

Watjiaofikan (Foreign Affairs Journal), no. 41 (September 1996): 36-37. 

6~Zhaag Taishan, "Ri-Mei junshi guanxi de xin fazhan----Cong Ri-Mei xiug

zhidao fangzhen kan" (New developments in the Japan-U.S. militar

perspective on the revision of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guideli

yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no.4 (October 1997): 17. 

133 
sphere of its militat T intervention and is attempting to include C

into its 'theater missile defense system,' thus sowing the seed of 

future peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. ''~'~ Lu Gu

at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, went so f

The NATO bloc mad the Japanese-US militat T alliance have 

t-wo black hands helping the g, rant to do evil .... Eve~'thing 

does can be regarded as the most direct and most realistic mir

we understand as the substance of the Japanese-US military, alli

how Japan and the United States will act in the Asia-Pacific 

"experiment" carried out in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

NATO also provides a vivid example for the Asia-Pacific coun

He Xin: A Dissenting View 

At the "high end" of alarm about Japan's future intentions a

toward China, one must count He Xin, perhaps China'

hypemationalist author and an advisor to then Premier Li Pen

~VLiu Jiangyong, "Sino-Japanese Relations and the New U.S.-Japan Defense 

6~"Commentary on U.S. Intention," Xinhua, June 6, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1

1999. 

"9Lu Guangve , "Gohlg agahlst file Tide of HJsto~', Tllreatexmig \g'orld Peace

"Ex'perts Co,mnent on the Strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. Militan. ,Mlia

(Liberation Amay Daily), June 6, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0617, June 

ZhangJinfang, "Serious Threats to China's Security," No. 1 in series, "Exp

the Strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. Military .Alliance," Jiefangjun bao 

Daily), June 4, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0616, June 17, 1999; and Lia

Trend that Merits Vigilance;' No. 2 in series, "Experts Co/nment on the Str

Japanese-U.S. Militat T ,Mliance," fiefangi,,n bao (Liberation Army Daily), J

FBIS-CHI-1999-0616, June 17, 1999. 

134 
established global strategic goals." 

• "The Soviet Union and China, currently and in the fu

historical period, will not have any conflicts of fundam

goals." 

• "China and Japan and China and the United States w

a long period have potentially contradictory" strategic goa

• "Sino-Soviet cooperation and economic development 

crush Japan's fantasy of carrying out new colonialism in 

• "Against the background of crises in natural resource

the 21st century, Japan's strategic focus will turn to the E

• "Japan and the Soviet Union very" likely will cooper

Siberian oil and gas natural resources, mineral resour

reserves." 

• "At the same time, in the overall strategic arrangem

completely carve up and isolate China." 

• "Casting off the United States, nibbling at China, fo

relations with the Soviet Union, and striving for world h

likely will be Japan's basic strategic global policy." 

v°Iie Xirg Z,5one~',0fua&g.)~ s~jk wdga/(China's rejuvenation and the world's 

Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 1-3. After He Xin presented this article 

an abstract was published in Z£x~e (Independent Studies), no. 5 (1989). 

135 
declining. ''72 Chinese analysts argue that the level and extent of Ja

development reveal that it is moving beyond self-defense

operations and potential military expansionism. Liu Jiangyo

writes, 

The Japanese Government has repeatedly promised that "Jap

become a military power threatening the security of other cou

actions, however, seem to indicate otherwise. In recent years, ther

showing that Japan is no longer satisfied with a capability to defe

security. More and more it shows an aspiration to involv

international military activities and to increase rapidly the power 

tech conventional forces. For this purpose, it plans to invest abo

billion each year in the coming four years. Not long ago, th

Institute for Defense Studies under the Ministry of Defense adv

Japan should build its own nuclear-propelled submarines and 

range troop projecting capability before the year of 2015. Th

doubt raise increasing concerns among its Asian neighbors. 7-~ 

An immediate problem for China is the Japanese develo

antiballistic missile defense system in cooperation with the 

Detailed Chinese commentary has also emphasized Japanese pl

additional military airlift, aerial refueling, long-range antish

aircraft (the FSX), and other military acquisition plans as cle

71yan Xiangjun, Yang Bojiang, Chu Shulong, and Dao Shulin, "'A Survey o

Pacific Security," 4. 

7:Chert Peiyao, "East Asian Security: Situation, Concept and Mechanism," 

2 (lilly 1997): 4. 

'-'Liu Jianm,ong, "Japan in 1997," Contempora~ International Relations 7, no. 1 (J

136 
For example, a Research Fellow at CIISS, which is sponsore

intelligence, writes, "Japan is unwilling to lag behind the tid

military revolution. Using every opportunity, Japan has not on

practice of "building the country through scientific and technolo

to 'building the country through scientific and technological c

also put the emphasis of military reform on enhancing the five ca

the capabilities of intelligence, sea lane defense, island defense, t

defense, and long-distance transportation. ''vv Even on the iss

weapons, some analysts predict that in the future, Japan w

become a nuclear power: 

Evidence indicates that Japan is increasing its nuclear potential 

slogan of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and is possib

nuclear energy to serve its political and military goals. As one of 

number of nuclear power countries in the world, Japan's nuc

facilities make up over one tenth of the world's total .... The de

of nuclear electricity is an indicator of the increase of nuclea

There is no doubt that Japan has the capacity to produce a nuc

• . . It should not be excluded that some day Japan can po

reseamh on and produce nuclear weapons .... As the only count

74Colond Xu Weidi, "Post-Cold War Naval Security Environment," Wo

('Beijing: National Defense University, 1996). 

"~IAJiensong, "Continued Naval I)evdopments in Nations on China's Periph

Bingqigh£¢hi (Ordinance Knowledge)(May 12, 1997): 17-20. 

;C'Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-Pacif

nLi Qinggong, "Dangdai de guoji junshi anquan xingshi" (The current inte

security situation), Gu0j;t" zhanb, e)wtjkt (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 

9. 

137 
INDIA 

Chinese assessments of India's future development and inte

frequently stress its dangerous military potential and the instab

democracy. For many years, Chinese analysts have been a

prospects of intense rivalry with India, another great ancient em

of a well-publicized agreement in September 1993 on confid

measures regarding disputed territory, Chinese authors recently 

concerned that there are countervailing manifesta6ons o

geopolitical rivalry. They include Chinese M-11 missile comp

Pakistan in response to concern about Indian nuclear 

development; Chinese irritation about India's tacit suppor

independence; Indian allegations about a disruptive Chines

Kashmir dispute; and China's efforts to sell weapons to India

After May 1999, PLA authors such as Peng Guangqian of AaM

the United States will exploit India to contain China, adding a

"danger" from India. Writings from 25 Chinese authors are r

following section. 

A Future Arian Great Power? 

There is some debate among Chinese analysts about the positi

India in the 21st century. As discussed in chapter one, orthod

7SDing Bangquan, "Adjustments and Trends in Japan's Military Strategy," Wo

(Beijmg: Academy of Military Science, no date). 

!gj. Mohan Malik, "China-India Relations in the Post Soviet Era: the Continu

China Quarterly (lune 1995): 317-355. 

138 
jp, jpg

development so far as population and territorial size and regional 

concerned. It is expected that India will become a newly rising f

neglected in the upcoming structure of the Asia-Pacific. ''8° 

former president of SIIS, believes that India's power "will gr

but until the early 21st centuu, (before 2010) there is no prosp

to become one of the world's poles. ''8~ On the other side of the 

view that India is too weak to contend in the future world struct

years of development... India has not extricated itself from 

poor country, and its average output per capita is far down in w

India has been demanding for a long time to become a permane

the U.N. Securit 3- Council, and to achieve an interna

commensurate with having the second highest population in 

fact, however, India's international status has been continuall

8°Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia

International Strategic Studies (English edition) 43, no. 1 (lanuary 1997): 28. 

mChen Qirnao, "Qianyan" (Introduction) in/Ota s&)~ de shijiegeju de da Zhua,zhua

in the world structure at the turn of the century) , ed. Cheaa Qin~ao (Sh~u~gha

chubanshe, 1996): 153-154. Hua Biyun of CICIR also discusses the subject: 

Asian nation," not only strategically located on the Indian Ocean, a major t

in "area, population, and economic development level, common developin

compare with it. It possesses relatively strong Comprehensive National Pow

factors natural resources, manpower, economics, science and technology., mi

political and international influence). According to the research of specialist

CNP wa.~ number 9 in the world, and it will rise to number 8 by the end of t

Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo" (India: striving to 

power in the nex-t century.) Xiandaiguojiguanxi (Contemporary International R

1 (January. 1996): 21. 

139 
nation, it has a dual nature in multiple areas. India has tremend

and faces numerous grim challenges. ''83 For example, in ter

economic development, Chinese assessments tend to discuss b

has made great strides and that it still has a long way to go. 

CICIR, while noting that India's reforms "have attained specta

and predicting continued accomplishments, also lists numero

factors" that will hinder rapid success: 84 

1. The people's standard of li~fing is low. 2. Base facilities are poo

is a serious shortage of energy, resources. 3. After initial 

correcting financial imbalance, a relapse appeared. 4. Reform of s

enterprises is slow. 5. In a democratic system opposing parties o

government policy. *s 

S2Hu Weimin, "India Uses the 'Nuclear Counter' to Bargain," Renmin Ra'ba

(Guangzhou South China News Sl~pplement), July 28, 1998, 14, in FBIS-CH

1998. 

S3Ye Zhengjia, "Bum 21 shiji de Yindu'" (India enters the 21st centut3'), I

(English edition) 61, no. 3 (July 1996): 20. 

eaAccording to Hua, India's successes include, "the national economy has s

the state of international income and expenditures has improved.., inve

industry is brisk.., the investment market has gradually been perfected." H

lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 22-23. 

SSIbid., 23-24. Ye Zhengjia makes a similar assessment: "Looking at the o

India's economic development in the 50 years since independence, its chara

it has been both stable and slow .... In more than 40 years, India has alre

relatively complete national industry system, and industrial output value 

fore, f'rc~t. The township and village middle class has reached about 200 mill

the world's ten newly rising markets. However, on the other hand, India s

with the most people in abject poverty in the world." Ye treats India's scienc

in a similar manner, focusing on both the positive and the negative. "In

140 
development levels will grow further apart.., therefore, India c

'China's replacement market,' although its influence is rising. '

China's research on India's future also focuses on the rang

laactors affecting stability in Indian politics mad government. 

concern has been the role played in Indian politics by relig

organizations, and the extent to which they will influence the 

Indian domestic and foreign policiesY One important article st

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may take over India and turn it t

Hindu chauvinistic policies. 88 The rise of nationalism is an

concern for Chinese analysts, because the BJP drew on Indian 

gain support for the nuclear tests, and the government may dr

to boost its efforts to attain regional hegemony. One analyst 

power ambitions form a strong contrast with the decline of rea

status, and this is an important reason for the continual rise of 

India in recent years .... The BJP, which rode this whirlwind 

to take power, has seized the opportunity brought by the nucle

the 'people's will' card to the outside world and the 'intere

technology is in a leading position among developing nations," but there 

"defects." Ye Zhengjia, "Bum 21 shiji de Yindu," 22. 

eeHua Biyun, "indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 26. 

SrFor example, see Jiang Yili, "Yindu jiaojiaopai zuzhi shijie Yindujiao dahui C

analysis of the VH'P A Hindu religious organization), Nanyayanjiu (South 

no. 3 (1994): 62-68. Jiang is in the Asia-Pacific Institute of CASS. 

~Jiang Yili, "Dangdai Yindujiao" (Contemporary Hinduism), Shifie zongi

World Religions) 61, no. 3 (September 1995): 18. Ye Zhengjia also discu

Hinduism is gaining prominence in Indian politics. Ye Zhengjia, "Bum 21 sh

See also Yang Xuexiang, Indu wenhua shenmi zbi mi O"he riddle o

mystery)(Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1994). 

141 
very complex, making it difficult for the country to mainta

stability. ''9° 

One area where Chinese authors assess India as having sign

is in military, affairs. For example, Hua Biyun asserts, "India's mi

is number four in the world. ''91 Two CICIR analysts write, "Du

few decades, India has enhanced its military strength and rapid

its national defense industry'." They explain that India's 

development of science and technology" has been a key factor 

its military power. "India currently has 3 million scientists an

following only the United States and Russia, to be third in the 

scicnce and technology, troops are India's precious 'intelligence 

play a decisive role in national defense studies and war produ

predict that India's military power will continue to grow in the 

Through several years of continuous effort... India's nation

science and technology, and war production has undergone a hug

its reliance on other countries has been reduced, and its degr

sufficiency has increasingly risen. Now India has the capacity to b

vessels and submarines. It designs and produces aircraft carrier

submarines, missile destroyers, and equips Russian-made C-gra

submarines with medium-range missiles. The new tanks produce

~Iu \X.'eimin, "India Uses the 'Nuclear Counter' to Bargain." 

°'°Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 24. See al

"Evolving Indian Political Scene" Contemporary International Relations 6, no. 6 (J

9tHua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia slfiji de jingii daguo," 22. For other d

the prospects for India's future military, development example see, Wu Hua a

Zln'sbi---Incb¢ Cl~e lion of south Asia----India)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997)

"Yindu daodan nerlg dadao Beijing ma. v' (Can Indian missiles hit Beijing.

~.lilitary Digest), no. 1 (1995): 43. 

142 
on naval development, and many analysts stress India's powerful 

discussions of the country's military capabilities. "In order 

strategic objective of seeking regional hegemony and exercising 

the Indian Ocean, India has focused attention on strengthen

India's Na W now ranks 7th in the world and it is one of a sma

countries in the world, and the only one in South Asia, to po

carriers." An article written following India's nuclear tests m 

"The Indian Navy is the strongest one in the South Asian subcon

charged with the missions of 'countering' the Pakistan Navy an

the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea on the east and west 

Indian peninsula, and, when conditions permit, deterring the 

within Indian sea space." It details India's future developm

forming: 

a sea-based, submarine-launched nuclear strike capability by the 

century, .... By the late 20th century to the early 21st, the Indian 

add dozens of new warships of all types including 20-plus more 

large and medium combat ships, with its naval might toppin

troops. By that time, the Indian naval fleet will have extended 

defense line 600 nautical miles beyond a blue-water fleet with 

combat capability .... The Indian Naw's steadily stronger cont

Indian Ocean, particularly of the two strategic channels of the Pe

and the Strait of Malacca, is likely not only to cause potential co

navies operating in the region and to affect the navigational order 

mLiu Xiaofei and Pan Xiaozhu, "lndu lizheng chengwei junshi gon~,e daguo" 

to become a military, industrial power), Xtandai guoji guan.x4 (Contempor

Relations) 77, no. 3 (March 1996): 26-28. 

143 
mediator between India and Pakistan. For example, She

professor at Beijing University, argues that two of the "importa

India's nuclear poli W are.., to counter what it considered a p

threat from China; and.., to use its status as a nuclear pow

permanent member state of the U.N. Security Council. ''94 

generous toward Pakistan, which he says maintains its nu

because 

it is the most economical way of facing up to India .... It 

Pakistan is able to produce 10-15 nuclear warheads and u

materials. Pakistan's nuclear stance has become the pillar of 

defense strategy, .... It is vet 3 • difficult to break the nucle

between the two countries. From now on either party's imprude

issue will not only destroy any progress made in the securit 3, d

will probably push these countries to the brink of nuclear war

He adds that the Kashmir issue 

93Zhang Minhui, "The India and Pakistan Navies After the Nuclear Tests,"Ji

7 (July 4, 1998), in FBIS-CHI-98-224, August 12, 1998. 

°*Ye Zhengjia of CIIS has put forward a similar argument, stating, "The goal 

defense and security strategy is to counter Pakistan... its long term goal is 

. . . India's basic relations with other South Asian nations can be sum

interdependent and mutual contradictions and antagonism. This last asp

obstacle to India's efforts to establish a world power position. Of course

factor determining whether India attains a world power position lie

comprehensive power." (24) India has said, "now there is a 'muhipolar w

made itself one of the six world poles along with the United States, Russia, C

Japan, On this basis it has put forward that India has the qualifications to be

member of the U.N. Securi~, Council." Ye Zhengjia, "Bum 21 shiii de Yi

144 
defending a faith. To both countries, to give up Kashmir means 

not only territory, but also a principle and a belieE 

Shang is not optimistic, noting that "there is a complete sta

moment on Kashmir. ''9s In the security dialogue between India 

Shang advocates that "China should not try to serve as a 

continue to provide advice on promoting the alleviation of ten

A new assessment of the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmi

an article in the Ia'beration Army Daily, which "sees a U.S. cons

conflict, and believes, "Fighting between India and Pakistan 

would benefit the United States regardless of the outcome." Th

Ding Zengyi depicted "the United States as 'sitting on a hill 

tigers fight,' waiting to reap the benefits of their conflict." Th

"South Asia strategy is to control India and Pakistan, maintain 

power in South Asia and use India to contain China." The arti

that "In the present India-Pakistan armed clash over Kashmi

hard to avoid a scenario where both parties are losers again ...

result in a weakened Pakistan and a limited India for the United 

long as the exchange of fire between India and Pakistan does n

nuclear war, it would benefit the United States' South Asia strateg

9"~-olaang 1 luipeng, "Indian-Pakistani Security Dialog and China's Policy Tow

in Guoji xingsbigen.x4 baogao, 1997-1998 (Study reports on the international 

1998)(Beijing: Zhanlue yu guanli chubanshe, 1998), 192. This was written 

Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in the summer of 1998. 

96Ibid., 197. 

~"PRC Sees U.S. Conspiracy in Indo-Pakistan Conflict," Hong Kong Agen

June 12, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0612,June 12, 1999. 

145 
y 

In the decades ahead, an A_~ian multinational securi b- coalition 

would have to include several larger powers, roughly equiva

economic and militam/capacity.-. Using the CNP scores of Chine

example, it could be calculated that Japan, Russia, and India w

to balance China. Rapid growth rates for Russia and India, 

bring these two Asian nations into the same league as China a

would then be available as strong partners in a coalition in A

weak states that would tend to ally themselves with the threat

seek isolation and neutraliD,. Because of their potential to 

balance of power, the quality of economic decisionmaking in 

Moscow in the near term will determine whether these powe

capability" to form coalitions, let alone the intention to do so. 

authors have considered this possibilig,. 

Historical Rivalries 

Chinese authors debate whether the historical origins of Indi

China can ever be resolved, or must inevitably remain a sou

conflict. On the optimistic side of this debate, some authors 

historical issue can be overcome and no longer be a barrie

future Sino-Indian relations. On the pessimistic side, how

authors emphasize the depth of Indian hostilit T. Even the op

word "dangerous" to warn of the consequences if India does 

past and see it the "right" way. For example, Ye Zhengjia, a S

Fellow at CIIS, stated in an interview with the Indian magazine 

personal view is that it is a precondition [for the development 

relations] to see the right situation m 1962," that tile two sid

forward smoothly without clarifying all the facts." He explain

146 
I do not think India is doing the right thing on the Dalai Lama 

personal view, the Tibetan problem is even more importan

boundary question. The British (imperialist Raj) perception

influenced the mind of the Indian ruling classes, is very w

dangerous: 'when there is a problem in Tibet, raise it!'.., but if 

think of interfering in Tibetan affairs, the future could be dang

At the height of the polemics in 1962, after China had at

frontier posts (claiming self-defense), the Chinese Governmen

opinion of why India had expansionist ambitions. The Chinese v

motives was that Indian leaders had interbred with their B

occupiers, thereby absorbing "British imperialism" and leadin

relationship" with the British. 99 China also implied that India

Western aid meant that India had been "bought" by the West. 

quoted this sentence from Prime Minister Nehru's Autobiograp

imperialist expansionist ambitions: "Though not directly a Paci

will inevitably exercise an important influence there." 

China claimed that this statement shows that the "goal p

ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unp

India's histo~'." A small national state "can only be a vassal in 

empire." Nehru was not alone in his ambition, China stated, 

middle classes "took over from British imperialism this conc

~'Clarifiying the Facts About 1962 is a Precondition," Prontline 15, no. 19 (

1998), http://www.the-tdndu.com/tline/f11519/15190170.hma. 

~The Sino-lndian Border Dispute, 103. 

147 
has stepped up its persecution of Chinese nationals in India 

spread seeds of hatred for the Chinese people. ''mr 

Another cause for China's hostility was tile claim that Ind

treason" in Tibet in 1950. k\,hile China's securi~: was "seriously 

the U.S. ag~ression in Korea," India "brazenly did wha

imperialists had not dared to do. They forcibly occupied mor

square kilometers of China's territory." In 1959, "the fourth da

started its rebellion in March, Nehru wrom to Zhou £-nlai 

den~md for 90,000 square kilometers and adding a claim for a

in the west, making the total area claimed three times as large 

China responded testily to Indian charges that China is an 

power, stating, "It is true that historically China had been pow

invaded other countries, but that occurred under the rule 

landlord class. ''~°e Nehru's statements were "utterly outr

"preposterous" ,and formed a slander campaign from 1959 t

Nehm made more than 300 speeches using "the most malic

vilifying China," such as saying that China is "ttTing to flaunt h

a crude and violent way.., to keep a foot on our chest." Neh,-u 

China noisily" on the bounda~" question and "he has also trie

despicable sinister way to sow dissension between Chin

countries. ''1°3 

I ×'Ibid., 97. 

!:'ilbid., 33. 

~C2lbid., 106. 

:c'31l~id. 

148 
148. China asked Nehm, "According to your logic, do vou or do 

that India's huge population is also a menace to other countrie

A fin:d motive for the activation of the rivalry was India's eff

Tibet from China's suppression of the Buddhist monks in the n

progress. India's actions seemed closely related to the road to Tib

built secretly across the disputed territoq, prior to the 1959 T

India's effort in Tibet to protect Buddhism fiom a society tha

Buddhism was a source of hostile corrunents by China, espec

India seemed to be cooperating with the American CIA in th

"religious" effort, u,,, 

China and India also had military skirmishes again in 1987

appearance of improved diplomatic relations, India and Chin

common ground to settle their horder dispute. Behind tha

enduring rivalry exists that has been intensified by India's de

both nuclear weaix)ns and a ballistic missile, which put much of 

range of Indian nuclear warheads. 

The Enduring Relevance of Histo{y 

Following its nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian Governm

China threat--a clear manifestation of the continued infl

historical rivalries in Sino-Indian relations. A Qn'na l)ai~' artic

Indian leaders "thought spreading the theo U of a China th

useful. Howcvcr, since they could not find rely factu~ basis, 

:':~Sun Keqin and Cui Hongjian, eds., Ezhi Zho,(~guo---Shenhua .)u xia

China---~uvth aald realit],,9(Beijing: Zhongguo ylmshi ctn,banshe, 1996). (~hapte

CIA in Tibet. For U.S. articles on CIA operations m Tibet, see William M

Mission to "iibet," Air and Space (l_)ecember 1997/j am,ary 1998): 62-71, and 

(;ave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in 60s> Files Show," Los A~lge/es Times, Septemb

149 
blasting the government for creating the theory as an excuse f

tests, and to keep the BJP in power. :~s They were particu

because it "wrecked in a single day the results of improving rel

these two countries over the past 10 years and more. ''1°: A 

Dai}, article stated, "Unexpectedly, just as Sino-Indian relations 

continually, the Indian authorities have insolently jumped out a

and ct T about the China Threat Theo~,, openly regarding China 

to India seelmag regional hegemony in an attempt to land Chi

position and boost its own morale. If this is not regional heg

is it then? ''ms 

Yaaa Xuetong of CICIR expressed concern that India may 

China Threat Theory into reality. "\'~qaat merits attention 

vigorous spread of the China Threat "lheory may betoken 

danger. For a long time India has repeatedly pushed fo~:ard 

policy., threatening its neighboring countries in various ways. 

started a large-scale border war against China; it also provided 

territory for the Dalai clique and encouraged them to engage 

'°'~"'I-Iistot'3' Shall Not be Denied, Facts Speak Louder than Words," re

Xinhua Domestic Setwice, May 18,1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-139, May 19, 19

~x~'One of the main purposes of creating a theory [China Threat Theory] i

political power.... It is now choosing to create an external threat to meet 

nationalist patties and thus keep them in the govenmmnt." Yan Xuetong

Created a 'China "lllreat TheotT'," Guangmmg Ra'bao, Nlay 19, 1998, in FBIS

20, 1998. 

~c"7I.i Wenyun, "Imtia: Nuclear Tests Condemned, Lobbying Suffers Setba

(People's Daily), June 28, 1998, 3, in FBIS-CHI-98-187, July 6, 1998. 

:°3Dong Guozheng, "Hegemonist Ambition is Completely Exposed," J&fano

Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-140, May 20, 1998. 

/50 
sources of Indian aspirations of hegemony and its related goal 

nuclear weapons. For example, an article in the Liberation Army 

"The desire among some Indians to seek regional hegemony has 

the), are bent on intimidating others and forcing neighboring 

'respect' India .... Prior to India's independence, Indian Congress 

Nehru pointed out in his book, India's Discoveo,: 'With its cur

India simply cannot play a secondary role in the world. India sho

vigorous or disappear from the scene.' ,,n0 

Far from disappearing from the scene, Chinese author

"Through 50 years of efforts, India now boasts a mighty, ar

"military strategic targets" are "to seek hegemony in South 

China, control the Indian Ocean, and strive to become a military.

contemporaq, world." One reason for India's "ambition of sc

military hegemony in the region" is that "it believes that sin

Ocean was formerly the 'lake of Britain,' it should now be in

sphere of influence of India. ''nl 

.amother article also mentions the British legacy in Indian as

argues that India lacks the real strength to achieve its go

contemporary' era, India has always considered itself to be 

successor to the great British empire.' It is dreaming of becom

big nation and a world power as well. However, it is also 

:r'~Yan Xuetong, "Why Has India Created a 'ctm~a Threat Theory." 

:~'Ding Zeng~, "India's Attempt to Seek Hegemony has been Long-Staalding

Liu Wengno, A Member of the China ~mth Asia Socie .ty." 

~l:I.iu Yaalg and Guo Feng, "~'hat is the Intention of Wantonly Enga

Ventures--India's Military Development Should Be \"/.,'atched Out Fo

(l.iberafion Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-141, May 21, 19

151 
time, succeeding Indian Governments have viewed nuc

development as an import~mt mem'ts to seek great-power 

dominate South Asia and fl~e Indium Ocean. '''3 Wang Chi

agrees, although he argues that Pakistan's strong foreign ti

India's domestic situation, are the factor hindering hegemony

India is self assured of being the South Asian re0on's numbe

nation, its econormc and military power has absolute superiority.

the objective conditions to serve as South Asia's 'hegemon.' Pa

number two major nation on the South Asian subcontinent, a

its strength is far inferior to India's, it seeks a power balance o

Asian subcontinent, and its determination to contend with India 

India, Pakistan still has the support of the United States m~d 

Eastern Muslim nations, so it is truly possible that it has the c

present a challenge to India's senior position, thus destroying 

structure with India at the center, on the South Asian su

Therefore, India has tried to achieve its re~onal strate~c go

building a military force that has a powerful deterrent ef

countries of South Asia, and nuclear weapons are ... its tool. n

::2Dong Guozheng, "Hegemonist .Aa'nbition is Completely Exposed." 

:lZZhang Changtai, "It Would be Hard t()r the Indian Govermnent to Get O

by Conducting Nuclc-~ar "l~sts,"Jie~n~mt Bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 20

CHI-98-140, May 20, 1998. 

t t"ffv'ang Chiming, "Qian xi lndu kua)me 'he menkan' de beijing" (A br

background of India's crossialg the "nuclear threshold"), Hepi*tg ),re f

Developlnent) 65, no. 3 (August 1998): 24. 

/52 
• Will achieve CNP equal to the United States by 2010 

• Wants to restrain China's rising influence 

• Seeks to foment conflict between the United States and 

• Will continue to have a militaristic, strategic culture 

• \Yv'ill straggle for resources in Central Asia and Siberi

United States ",rod Russia 

• Will have ever-increasing conflicts with both Europe an

States 

• Will develop nuclear weapons eventually, earlier if K

them 

• Will face a dangerous environment of potential conflict 

Europe, and the United States 

• Seeks (covertly) to become the military equivalent o

States. 

China's analysts write that India, as a smaller scale version o

has a militaristic, religion-based strategic culture, seeks to 

neighbors, has had covert nuclear ambitions for two decades 

nuclear tests in 1998, attempts to foment conflict between Chi

nations, and has some areas of milita U superiorit T over China

current navy. However, India's economic reforms are judged in

catch up with China and enter file multipolar world as the sixth 

CNP scores for 2010 place it no higher than number nine (,~\,IS

((]ASS), only about half of China's CNP score in 2010. 

153 
RELY ON CHINA 

CHINA HAS MADE HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC FORECASTS about Russ

for recover T and return to the ranks of the top five powers 

security environment. Few analysts in the United States share t

about Russia's future, nor would ,americans agree with the prop

nationalisfc Chinese authors, like He Xin, that China must form 

strategic partnership with Russia in order to balance the rise of 

Japan. One orthodox senior analyst explains that the geopolitic

"Russia needs to rely on China. Because both the United Stat

regard Russia as a potential force to reduce their influence in the 

region, and Japan has territorial disputes with Russia, Chi

cooperation can, to a great extent, resist U.S. and Japanese forc

maintain the power balance in Asia. ''1 

Chinese military estimates of Russian national power by 

place Russia as the second- or at least the third-ranking countr

overall military, power. Applying the ancient statecraft of the W

Chinese authors refer to the geopolitical nightmare of a power

Japan joining with a declining but still powerful America to isolat

China. A strong Chinese partnership with a recovering Russia is 

countermeasure. This chapter, which introduces the views o

authors on Russia, lists the Factors they foresee Russia will fac

dangerous security environment. In spite of these dangers, they b

also has advantages, such as its potential parmership with China 

1Gu Guanfll, "Russian Foreign Policy in Evolution," Contemporary Internation

11 (November 1994). 

155 
a multipolar environment. Chinas authors seem to see a rewa

"parmership" in the decades ahead. This chapter also desc

sympathy for the dangers that a weak Russia will face from J

and the United States as these three powers attempt to carve o

former Soviet sphere of influence in Central Asia and Eastern 

DEBATES ON RUSSIA 

According to interHews with civilian experts, after the collapse 

Union, it took 2 years for Chinese analysts to reach a consensus 

and future significance of the Soviet collapse (addressed at t

chapter). It is apparent from Chinese articles written since the c

reached that China has decided Russia's decline will end and 

able to play its assigned role as one of the five poles in the mu

foreseen by l)eng Xiaopmg and t [uan Xian in 1986. Indeed, 

aligned with China in the future multipolar world, now th

somewhat weakened from its Soviet days and has a smaller 

product (GNP) than China. According to one author, Russia's 

in Europe, or "the level of a medium country.'' Additionally, b

has forsaken Marxism, Marxist ideolo~, cannot be a sour

2Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-l~ xi, zjunshigemi, g (America, Russia, m

in military affairs) (Belling: Junshi ke=le chubanshe, 1996), 2. 

S(;ao Chunxiang, ed., Xinjunshigemi, g lun (On the new revolution in militar

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 196. 

':Yang Shuheng, "I.,e,lgzh,~q hou de Zhong-Mei-E guan,,d" (Sino-U.S.-Russ

the Cold ~X.'ar," tfepingyuf'azhan (Peace and Development) 51, no. 1 (l;ebru

42. 

156 
1950s, to estrangement mad then border clashes in the 1960s, 

p,x)ved "hard to understand," in the words of one People's l,ib

(PLA) officer interviewed for this study. 

In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese analys

continue to portray the future role of Russia as one of the five 

(along with China, Japan, Europe, and the United States) that 

future world b'Amlce of power. Nevertheless, a few years ago, Ch

saw Russia's i~mnediate future as uncertain) At least four s

mentioned, although none of them would upset the "inevitable" 

a five-power mttltipolar structure laid down by Deng Xiaoping

• FurlherJragmentation could bring warfare within mad b

republics, including an independent Siberia.: 

• CT;ronic oz~ might bring neither a full collapse nor anv 

but just gridlock mad a continued limping along. 

• Succe.~ful transJbrmation built around the old Russian co

relations among the republics and a territorial settlemen

5Gilbert Rozman, 7~e CJdneae Debate About So*4et Sodalism (Princeton, NJ: Prhi

Press, 1987), 3. 

~'Yan Jin, Bai Xue, mxd Zhang ,XSngping, Shuangto,gingfli.xiang hechu--guoji ~aT~

0X~ere is the double-headed eagle flying--Russia on the international stag

chubanshe, 1995). 

~The most dramatic scenario of an independent Siberia occurs in the first no

warfare that the PLA has published--a~iao Liang, Mo ri zhi men--Dan.)'uan g

&yiqiejie nan dou buyaofasheng (Door to doomsday--I hope file disasters descri

place)(Beijing: Kunhm clmt~anshe, 1995). Siberian independence is declar

distraction of Clmmse arnled threes attempting to limit a war between India 

order to preserve a balance of power in South Asia, even though India has no

The author se~'es in the General Political Department of PLA. 

157 
Bv 1995, Chinese writings about Russia became more optim

military authors envisioned Russia increasing its military po

decades by exploiting the RM, A, ahead of other nations. In any 

authors deny that the collapse of the Soviet Union caused fu

world politics to "break" or be "transformed. ''9 They asser

anticipated the end of the bipolar world as early as 1986, 5 y

Soviet collapse. 

Although there is a general consensus among Chinese 

Russia's position as a pole in the future multipolar world, C

suggest there are dangers to Russia in the decades ahead: 

• The United States will continue to exploit a weaken

coping with short-term domestic economic and political p

• Russian success in implementing the Ri\.LA_ ahead o

certain. 

• As Russia rebuilds its Comprehensive National Power 

be under pressure from the United States and Europe to 

Japan to the East. 

SAn example of an optimistic assessment of Russia's future is Yu Sui, "Du

yu zhengce de ji dian kanfa" (Some observations on Russia's situation anti po

guan.xq (Contemporary International Relations) 76, no. 2 (February 1996): 1

9According to 7~hu Cliun, of the C.3mla Institute of International Strategic Stu

affiliated with Chinese military intelligence, "The maintenance of a balance

relations in the Asia-Pacific region by the four big powers, the United States, 

China and Japan is of great significance to peace and stability in this regio

Into the Question of Sexmrity and New Order in the Asia-Pacific Region," In

Stuch'es (English edition) 19, no. 1 ~'Iarch 1991): 14. 

158 
g\gy

decline in Russia's CNP, in the long run they forecast that 

difficulties will gradually be overcome. 

At present, however, the Chinese view Russia as a factor 

during the period of transition to a multipolar world. When 

overall situation in file Asia-Pacific, Zh~mg Changtai, a Research 

China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), writes

Russia remains an uncertain factor where there are still ups and 

the political arena .... For the future, the struggle among "a

factions around redistribution of powers will continue to develop 

intensifi/; the position of the military has declined with 

dissatisfaction, and it is a severe test for President Yeltsin 

government whether they can maintain stabilit 3, in the armed for

Chinese analysts also see economic problems precluding stabilit 

current development and do not believe the economy will reco

A Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) analyst estim

sho/'t term it will be difficult for the Russian Federation's econom

to take a turn for the better, economic recover" will necessitat

period of time . . . by tile year 2005 it will be able to break e

*CZhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-P

Intetwational Strategic Studies 43, no.l (January 1997): 31. 

11For an analysis of Russia's economic crisis see Sun Zhanlin, "News Analys

Russian Financial Crisis Occurred," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, Septe

in FBIS-CHI-98-264, September 25, 1998. 

159 
huge number of complex contradictions and problems," the s

of the most critical issucs it is currendy facing: 

• "Economic depression has endangered political stab

• "The state of social politic~ order is becoming serious

the pervasive spread of crime and terrorist activities. 

• "The trend of local independence mid loca.lities actin

is difficult to contain." 

• The uncertainv," of President Yeltsin's health. ~~ 

According to the study, the combination of the above problems 

difficult for people to make an optimistic appraisal of R

situation and the entire country's situation at the end of 

However, at least with regard to Russia's economic prospects, 

positive ,and puts forward a timetable predicting future de

reconstruction. It forecasts that 1997-98 will be "the true tu

Russia's economy," 1999-2005 will bring "stable recovery..'," 

Russia will see "sustained growth. ''is This growth will permit g

in attaining strategic go',ds to "restore its position as a gr

::'Dons Bainan, "Euluosi lianbang he qian Sulian diqu qita guojia de fazh

development prospects for die Russian federation and the other countries of 

region), in Kaca shift & shijDgeju da ghuanhuan ('Maior changes tit tile world st

of tile centre30 , ed. Chen Qimao (Shanghai: Shanghai jiao)m chubanshe, 1

t•Wang Liiiu ,and Liu Gulling, eds., Kaca shift de E'Latod (Russia today ,and in 

(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997), 7840. 

14Ibid. 

'Slbid., 128-131. 
National Power will require time. However, the framework of R

major nation and the factors of its actual strength have not disap

particular, Russia l:X)ssesses a huge nuclear weapons arsenal and ar

that can not be belittled. ''~7 Similarly, Chen Qimao, former preside

writes, "In the short term it will be difficult for Russia to revi

potential cannot be underestimated .... From the long-term view, 

gradually recover and develop, and although it can not again 

superpower, it still will be a global power. '''8 Yt, Sui, of the Central 

International Liaison Department, sums up Chinese analysts greate

about Russia's mid- to long-term prospects, saying, "We would ra

that Russia will rejuvenate at an earlier date and at a quicker pace

DANGERS IN TIlE 

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

Not only do Chinese analysts predict continued domestic proble

Russia's path to establishing its position as one of the five poles of 

multipolar world, but they also examine the numemt,s threats to 

securit?" environment. One author writes, 

"llle correlation of forces is moving in an unfavorable direction for 

•.. Russia's geopolitical environment is becoming worse .... The 

::'Ibid.> 176• 

I"Ibid, 198. 

::'Chen Qmiao, "Qianyan" (Inlroduclion), in Kua s@7 de sldjie<oeju da zhuanhuan, 

:';"l'11 Sui, "The Big Power¢ Relationships ii, Northeast .'\sia," Inteneatio,sal.lTrategic 

3 (1994). 

161 
as being the biggest challenges currently endangering R

environment. In fact, some have blamed the West for contribu

continued domestic problems. For example, several authors a

the reasons that Russia has not recovered more rapidly is "the 

assistance provided by the Western powers. ''-~t "lhe insufficient 

by Chinese authors as the \Vest's desire to keep Russia weak, s

grow and once again be a challenge to America and NATO

States and other Western countries . . . [have] continued 

mentally', trying to take advantage of Russia's current politica

milita,'y weakness to pursue a policy of containment in o

westernize and split Russia and prevent it from restoring its 

po\ver. ~22 

However, Chinese analysts note that the ~(:est wants Rus

but not chaotic," and therefore must temper its efforts to inhi

power. ~ Xue Gang, a Research Fellow at CIISS, explains, "T

attitude toward Russia is like this: on the one hand it contin

support the present government in Moscow in order to stabil

XLi Haoyu, "ShL, d E'Luosi de guojia anquan zhanlue" (A tentative analysis 

security strategy'), I Ieping.yu Fa.Than (Peace and Development) 50, no. 4 (N

2:Song Yimin, "Dulianti de :danzhuang ji fazhan qianjing" (The 

Independent States current situation and its fimlre), Hepingyu.fa~han (peace 

50, no. 4 (November 1994): 21-23. Another article stressing how little "

gave Russia is Zb_ang Yebai, "Meiguo dui E'Luosi de yuanju" (,~*erican a

f-tqbing.yufazhan (Peace and Development) 49, no. 3 (Augmst 1994): 44-4

~Wang Rui and Zhang Wei, "A Prelmfinary .~lalysis of Russian Military St

Strategic Smches 45, no. 3 0uly 1997): 39. 

~'~Li Haoyu, "Shixi E'Luosi de guojia anquan zhanlue," 27. 

/62 
community- of democratic countries; and to complete strategic 

of Russia so as to prevent Russia from staging a comeback. ''26 C

Chinese analysts assert, "It is not a simple policy regression for 

to redefine NATO as its chief threat. It is an inevitable result 

strategic collision between Russia and the Western powers to 

respective strategic interests .... Containing NATO expans

becomes a major goal of Russian military, strateg3,. ''2~ However, 

24Xue Gang, "The Present Security Policy Framework of Russia," Internationa

no. 1 (1995). A CICIR analyst has noted that the United States cannot push R

its efforts to weaken and contain its development. "As for Washington, 

confrontation with Russia is also in its own strategic interests. Examination o

Russia policy reveals its duality. On the one hand, it intends to guard agai

Russia out of concern for Moscow's reviving potential and alleged 'hnperial am

may someday evolve into a regional dominating power threatening Wash

leadership. As a matter of fact, the NATO eastern expansion is essentially a 

strategic move against such an eventuality. On the other hand, it attempts 

encourage Russia at the same time. Russia's position on the nuclear issue an

failure of Moscow's economic transition are closely related to U.S. stratcgic ob

these circttmstances, possible confrontation ~dth Moscow on this issue would 

vital U.S. interests." See Zhang Minqian, "Waslfington and NATO Expansio

International Relations 7, no. 5 (May 1997): 4-5. Zhang is an Associate Resea

CICIR. 

25Wang Naicheng, "Beiyue dongkuang dui Mei-E-Ou guanxi de yingxiang" 

NATO's eastward expansion on relations between the United States, Russia and 

.~hanlue2anfiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no. 4 (October 1997): 20. W

Research Fellow at CIISS. 

2~Feng Yujun, "Moscow vs. NATO: Compromise Will Not Dispel A

Contemporag" International Relations 7, no. 5 (May 1997): 14. Feng is an Ass

Professor at CICIR. 

27Wang Rui and Zhang Wei, "A Preliminat 3' Analysis of Russian Military. Str

/63 
g gg

"Short of an evident increase in economic and milita~, stren

future, Russia will still be in a passive position before the N

expansion. ''29 

Chinese authors often seem genuinely worried and even 

the hostile securig, environment in which a weakened Russi

for decades ahead until its comprehensive power is rebuilt

Russia's current weakness in the face of NATO seems exa

statement: 

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the S

had already inflicted upon Russia a loss of a strategic depth o

one thousand kilometers, and now NATO expansion would 

its military frontier eastward by more than 700 kilometers. It is 

the current strength of NATO conventional forces is three 

Russia. If that of the first batch of members-to-be are also 

NATO would be militarily stronger than Russia by nearly 4 

would be a tremendous military pressure on Russia's western 

Russia's position is restrained by its worsening national powe

economically and militarily, NATO enjoys overwhelming adv

total GNP of its member states is 20 times that of Russia, an

expenditure is 10 times Russia's. On the part of Russia, t

superpower is now not only crisis ridden economically an

weakened militarily, but also bogged down in domestic politi

consequence, its opposition to NATO expansion to Eastern 

2~Zhang Minqian, "Washington and NATO Expansion," 5. 

~Ji Zhiye, "Russia in 1997," Contempora 9' International Relations 7, no. 1 (Ja

164 
completely encircle Russia and that the United States and Weste

nations have already begun to lay the foundation for the ultimate 

eastward expansion. At present, they claim the West is penetrati

through econorruc and milita_,'y means. "The United States has de

a more active role in the ethnic and local conflicts in the re

refused to let Russia have special peacekeeping privileges in th

A Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, Wang Naicheng, even 

NATO did eventually incorporate this area, such a developmen

the end of Russia's hope of becoming pole in the future mul

"Further NATO expansion to the Baltic nations, Ukrain

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries will m

space for strategic survival contract to the maximum. This wo

than to strike at the root of Russia, for she might finally lose 

base upon which she could be an independent pole in the worl

Wang asserts that Russia is doing its utmost to prevent th

scenario. "With the first line of defense in Central-Eastern E

through, Russia is exerting every, effort to build and entrench o

line, tolerating no entry into the 'forbidden zone.' -32 

Two articles written in 1998 foresee the three Baltic Nation

Latvia, and Estonia-- becoming the next in line to fall into NA

citing the signing of the "U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership" i

the first meeting of the Partnership Committee in July as prelim

People's Daily article asserts, "The formal launching of NA

expansion shows that East Europe is being drawn into the w

mFeng Yujun, "Moscow vs. NATO: Compromise Will Not Dispel Appreh

31Li Haoyu, "Shixi E'Luosi de guoiia anquan zhanlue," 27. 

32Wang Naicheng o "Beiyue dongkuang dui Mei-E-Ou guanxi de yingxiang,

165 
from Russian control. 33 

Other analysts see the Central Asian nations as the m

targeted by the West. A CICIR study holds that "~"estem na

United States at the head, have stood in the wav of the C

process, particularly toward Ukraine, and have actively carrie

divide and disintegrate." U.S. invitations to Ukraine and Uzb

NATO ,are extremely dangerous to Russia's security" interests, 

is considered to be an "important strategic partner" by the We

the Ukrainian Minister of National Defense expressed that at a 

Ukraine "would not eliminate the possibilit3: of enter

Additionally, Ukraine and a few Central Asian countries have 

Parme~hip Relationship" documents with NATO. One articl

is through these Peace Partnerships that the United States 

increase its infiltration of the region, "on the pretext of 'med

conflicts, and, in the name of 'maintaining peace', dispatc

Western military forces to weaken ,and push out Russia's 

region." It concludes, "In essence it is a repeat of the 19th 

rivalry' mnong the great powers for Central Asia, and a way 

Asian countries into the United States 'chess pieces.' ,,35 

The future U.S. challenge to Russia is even more serious 

contain Russia's power. In addition to luring former Soviet r

3"~Xu Hongzhi, "'llle United States Upgrades Ties with the Three Baltic St

('People's Daily), July 21, 1998, 6, in FBIS-Cl-tI-98-209, July 29, 199

Bmgzhong, "Another Move bv the United States on tile Chessboard Eu

Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, Januat 3, 18, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-021

-":Wang Lijin and Lin GuLling, eds., tOca shiji de E'l.;iosi, 189-190. 

e:'\X.;ang Guang, "New U.S. Central Asia Strategy Evaluated" (in Ctmmse), 

(Contemporary International Relalioxls), no. 11 (November 1997): 13-16. 

766 
RUSSIA'S RESPONSE 

~qlile some Chinese authors regard Russia as passive and weak 

these threats, others see Russia as taking a stand a

countermeasures against U.S. and NATO policies. For example, 

a Research Fellow at CIISS, states, "The plan of 'NATO eastwa

pursued by the United States and other Western countries ha

stage of implementation, but Russia has not weakened its opp

taken new countering actions in an attempt to build the R

Germany axis to oppose the control of the United States ov

security affairs and offset the impact of'NATO eastward expa

Guilin, an Associate Research Professor in the Division for Rus

Europe Studies at CICIR writes, "Clearly, Moscow intends to re

as both the basis ~br its great power strateg3~ and the bulwark a

eastern expansion." He believes that despite drawbacks and 

exist in inter-CIS relations, such as worries about "Mosc

domineering intention," Russia will not lose out to the West in th

influence over the nations of the former Soviet Union. 39 "Shared 

sustain the CIS in the face of difficulties . . . (and) cooperation w

~Yang Shuheng, "Lengzhan hou daguo he diqu liliang dui Zhongya de 

struggles over Central Asia by major nations and regional forces in the post-C

H•ingyufazhan (Peace and Development) 60, no. 2 (june 199"/): 29. 

3~Ibid., 45. 

38Li Qinggong, "Dangqian de guoji junshi anquan xingshi" (Current inte

securi~, situation," Guoji zhanlue)anjiu (International Strategic Studies) 4

1998):8. 

39Liu Guiling, "Whither CIS?," Contempora~7 International Relations 8, no. 7 (J

167 
its oil and gas. 41 Therefore, Liu predicts that CIS integration 

although it will be gradual. Fin',ally, he concludes, 

Looking beyond the current Russian financial crisis, it can 

estimated that along with further improvement in overall con

stronger Russia's urge to make bigger strides in winning back its 

power status in international life, the greater CIS cohesion and 

the organization's profile in a multipolar world of the 21st cen

Chinese analysts recognize that on international issues othe

eastward expansion, Russia also has strategic interests that conf

of the West. In the Iraqi weapons inspection crises, they ass

came out ahead in its dispute with the United States over how 

problem: 

In resolving this conflict, there has been practically a struggle be

and the United States, or a struggle between Russia and the Un

and Moscow has scored the most points .... All these efforts we

Russia m an effort not only to head off a war in the Gulf regi

to pave the way" for strong economic ties with Iraq when the U.N

are eventually lifted .... Russia is, of course, aware that Wash

not like the strengthening of Russia's position in the Middle E

increasing role of its diplomacy in the region. "3 

'°Ibid., 33-35. 

4:Ibid., 34. 

4~Ibid., 36. 

43Wang Daudi, "Russia's Role, Goal in Resolving Iraqi Crisis," Beijing 

Service (February 24, 1998), in FBIS-CHI-98-055, March 3, 1998. 

168 
dangers posed by NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis and R

response, while others emphasize Russia's eventual return to p

ways this was manifested during the crisis. 

Chinese analysts regarded NATO strikes against Yugoslavia 

plan of eastward expansion, an effort "to bring the strategic 

Balkans under control, in order to further contain and weake

prevent Russia from rising up again. '''~ \g'hile one CICIR analyst 

that NATO "wanted to issue a warning to Russia, and furthe

international standing," other authors were much more explicit

in the I_a'beralion Arm)' Daily, claimed: 

The ultimate aim of the United States in launching air strik

Yugoslavia is to remove the last obstacle on the 'crescent 

surrounding Russia and to further narrow Russia's strategic space

a knife in Russia's traditional sphere of influence not only contai

but gives Eastern Europe and the former Soviet countries a sense 

making them realize that they are lacking military securiq, assu

forcing them to throw themselves more resolutely into the NA

This move really kills two birds with one stone. '~ 

44Wang Naicheng, "Failure of the New Strategic Concept," Jiefangiun bao (L

Daily), May 22, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0601, May 22, 1999. 

45Yuan Peng, "An .&rrogant and Lonely Superpower--The Tradition 

Hegemony," ZbongguoQingnian Bao, May 26, 1999, 3, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0609

Yuan is at CICIR. 

"6I.i Donghango "Dangerous Attempt to Resist Mulfipolarizafion Proces

(Liberation ,-M'rny Daily), May 26, 1999, 5, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0604, May 26

169 
actions in Yugoslavia is that it is an attempt to get throu

corridor in the south and extend their sphere of economic influe

Asia and even further to a wider scope. ''~ 

Wang Naicheng, of CIISS, also considers power in Central 

of the goals of NATO: "If NATO succeeds in stationing its tro

and taking up strategically important places to the east, it ca

threats against Central Asia, thus weakening the control of R

CIS and undermining its foundation." Wang even warned 

incursions could harm Russia's efforts to return to power. "If th

influence of NATO can drive straight into the scope of in

former Soviet Union through the Balkans, Russia is botmd 

weakened and will encounter more difficulties in realizing i

strategy, of becoming a pole in the future multipolar world. ''4s 

Chinese analysts note how the United States exploited Rus

weakness during the Kosovo crisis, counting on Russia's depend

to keep it from taking a stand against NATO actions. Zhang Z

NDU, writes, "The United States has already accurately gauged 

disposition. When it started bombing the FRY, it was feelin

cards and did not know what Russia would do." However, "t

in dealing widl Russia they only need to use economic methods 

a bit of money, and everything will be fine. In addition, the Eu

(EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also declared 

willing to help Russia resolve its economic crisis and provide 

47Li Yonggang, "Looking at the U.S. World Strategy, Against the Backdr

Crisis," excerpt published in Zbongguo Tong.x"un She (l-long Kong), May 27, 19

1999-0528, May 27, 1999. 

~Wang Naicheng, "Failure of the New Strategic Concept." 

170 
alternative but to retreat." However, Colonel Liu points out th

States was fbrced to make "certain concessions to Russia... be

is still a military power that cannot be lightly 'stirred up.' ,,s0 

Dr. Shen Jim, a Research Fellow and Director of the 

Strategic Research Section of the Institute of World Economic

at CASS, argues that despite its weakened power, Russia will n

in the face of the NATO threat: 

It is difficult for Russia to make any substantial moves. The fu

reason for this is that its national strength is too weak. Its total 

output is less than the military, expenditure of the United States; i

expenditure is only about 1/45th that of the United States, or 

billion. Consequently, few Russian army divisions are completely 

nowadaFs .... Nevertheless, the Russian Government also unders

NATO's strategic aim is to further weaken Russia to make it 

third-class countt T with no chance to rise up again forever .... 

entrance into the 20th centut 3, was marked by its defe

Russian-Japanese War. This time, Russia is certainly unwilling 

entrance into the 21st century marked by losing the Balkans 

fight. 5" 

"/via Lhtg, '"Ilie Attempt Belmld the 'Bombing in Error'--Interview with Re

Commentator Zhang Zhaozhongo" Ta IG~ng Pao (Hong Kong), May 17, 19

CHI-1999-1518, May 17, 1999. Zhang is Director of the Science and Techn

and Research Section of NDU. 

SZLiu Gang, "~X&y Has Russia Changed Its Role," iL~nmin ffbao, June 

FBIS-CHI-1999-0624, June 25, 1999. 

SlHsu Tao-chen, "United States Still Makes Old Mistakes, Exclusive interview 

Hang Kopg Ta IOcng Pao, May 21, 1999, A6, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0604, May 21

view is presented in ,'s,Liao Feng, "World Trends Under U.S. Global Strate

Two," Renmin Ra'bao, May 31, 1999, 6, m FBIS-CHI-1999-0601, May 31, 199

171 
However, when the United States was in a dilemma over the 

it had to seek Russia's assistance. As a consequence, the latter 

of mediator and increased its international status. ''s2 The fac

troops entered Kosovo before NATO troops was viewed by 

even further evidence of Russian power and a sign of potent

influence in the future. 

Like magical soldiers descending from the sky, a spearhead det

the Russian peacekeeping force arrived in Pristina, capital of Ko

Yugoslav Federation, at 0130 on 12June .... It should be said th

Russia's national strength is weak at present, it is still very exp

handling international affairs, and the action of its peacekeep

being the first into Kosovo has already scored highly in in

politics. It shows to the whole world that Russia can still play a 

in international affairs, that Russia will continue to exert a majo

in postwar Kosovo issues, and that Russia can make things hot 

53 when necessary. 

is 'no longer what it was' and dares not break up with the West, it i

concessions m a weak-kneed fashion. A nation which once defeated N

defeated Hider during ~X"orld x,Var Two cannot be ordered about for a l

economic strength has been weakened and its political situation is unstab

strength, especially its nuclear arsenal, is still there. Once it has recovered su

on its feet, its conflicts with the West, especially with U.S. hegemonism: are 

It will not accept the attempts of the United States to build a 'unipolar wo

52Ma Shikun and Zhang Yong "United States: Winner or LoserY' Renmin Rib

6, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0611,June 11, 1999. 

53Qi Changming, "Unusual Significance of the Russian Army's Stealing a Ma

Jiefangiun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 13, 1999, 4, ha FBIS-CHI-19

1999. 

172 
, g p

Chinese foreign poli W theory that only weak nations have allian

that time was regarded negatively, "Because of dependency 

Russia's foreign affairs policy lacked independence, causing its 

position to suffer a disastrous decline and incurring domestic 

opposition. ''ss However, in the mid-1990s, the focus of Russia's 

began to widen, with greater attention being given to other 

world, s6 Li Zhongcheng, a Research Professor in the China and W

Division at CICIR, writes, "Russia, bent on recovering its form

global power, will intensify its efforts in pursuing an om

diplomacy so as to regain and expand its influence in the 

community. ''57 

Chinese analysts assert that it was the threats to Rus

environment from the West that caused it turn to the East, m

general and China in particular the new targets of its diplom

"While NATO was busy preparing its eas~'ard expansion an

States and Japan redefined the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which b

field of cooperative defense, China and Russia announced a pl

54Gao Heng, "Lengzhan hou Mei-E-De sanbian guanxi" (The trilateral relat

United States, Russia and Germany in the post-Cold War period"), H~oing)Tcf

Development), 60, no. 2 (June 1997): 10. 

ssWang Lijiu and Liu Guiling, eds., Kua sbiji de E'Luosi, 3. 

~Several authors point to 1996 as the specific year in which Russia began to 

West and shift the focus of its foreign policy to the East. For example, "The y

a turning point in Russia's foreign policy." Ji Zhiye, "Russia in 1997," 31. See 

and Liu Guiling, eds., Kua skiff de E'Luosi, 4. 

57Li Zhongcheng, "World Politics in 1997," Contempora[y International Relations 

1997): 1-2. 

173 
political space as soon as possible .... After the disintegration of 

Union, certain changes have taken place in the geopolitical situa

are unfavorable to Russia. From the west, the eastern expansion 

has taken on a strong momentum, while in the south it is facing 

by separatists .... Russia has made it a top priority to establ

neighboring areas." Developing relations with China is significan

for the improvement of Russia's surrounding environment, but a

tim:re prospect of its far east area. "~ 

Chinese authors see the Sino-Russian parmership as be

sides. 6° Not only does Russia gain by having a counterweig

eas~:ard expansion, but several studies also point to the econom

that can be derived through improved relations, because "the 

especially complementary- in terms of resources, industrial s

~Li Zhongcheng, '¢Yhe Role of an Emerging China in World Politics," Contemp

Relations 8, no. 2 (February 1998): 14. 

5°'Shi Ze, "Lun xin shiqi de Zhong-E guamxi" (Perceptions on Sino-Russian 

new era)," Gouji ~banlueyanjiu (International Studies) 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 

6°A CICIR study provides a positive assessment of Sino-Russian relations, 

main reasons why Sino-Russian relations have made headway in die past seve

continue to develop in the future. First, "No major disputes and problems exis

and Russia." Neither country interferes in the internal affairs of the other, 

Tibet, and human rights. Second, both sides have learned from past histor

Third, "On international issues, the two countries have numerous common 

and common interests that are not mutually exclusive." Fourth, "The

geographical position and complementary economic structures create the c

two countries' reforms and economic development." See Wang Liuji and Liu 

de E'Luasi, 224-225. 

174 
ggg g

Russian relationship will have a comprehensive effect for Ch

Russia's market and restrain the West. °: 

Stud), Reports on the International Situation-1997-1998, a yearl

of the views of authors from a variety of institutes published b

Society for Strategy" and Management, contained an article th

Russia and China are very natural strategic partners. The autho

writes, "Even if the next Russian President takes office with 

influence in the year 2000, Russia's unique diplomatic and cult

its consciousness as a great power, and the natural characterist

the Orthodox Eastern Church will make it difficult" for Russia 

the West. The process of catching up for Russia has lasted "se

years, since Peter the Great, [and] has not made Russia entirely 

He further points out, "Since 1992 pro-Western radicals in 

gradually lost power on the Russian political stage." This is a str

argument. According to Zheng, a good reason for Russia to help 

"Russia has considerable influence in the continents of Europe 

will undoubtedly promote the setting up of China's position of a 

power in the world. ''~3 

elShi Ze, "Lun xin shiqi de Zhong-E guanxi" 12. 

S2Liu Jinghua, "Ershi yi shiji ershi sanshi niandai Zhongguo iueqi li waijia

(China's rise and diplomatic strategy in the twenties and thirties of the 21st 

yuguanli (Strategy and Management) 4, no. 3 (1994): 119. 

63Zheng Yu, "New Changes in the Russian Security Envimmnent and 

Strategic Partnership Relations (in Chinese)," in Guoji xingsbigenxi baogao--

reports on the international ~imafion 1997-1998)(Beijing: Zhanlue yu guanli c

137. 

175 
From the long-term view, the massive energy development proje

next century, already agreed upon will be an important source of s

China's even greater energy demands in the early 21st centur

inevitable economic recover)" which Russia will have m tile 

century, China will be a great market unmatched by the We

because of its geographical advantage or its consistent demand for 

product mix of Russian goods. The absorption by China of 

chemical, metallurgical and energy products will play a big role as 

to support the development of Russia's Eastern Region. 

Zheng also points out that "China's participation in the dev

Russia Far East oil and gas fields will have an important strategic 

in the next century. ''6s Military affairs is a final area where China 

from improved relations. Zheng argues, "in Chinese-Rus

cooperation, China should absorb and use Russian achievements 

research on American weapons and combat methods in order to 

in its straggle in Taiwan and to exercise Chinese sovereignty, 

China Sea. ''66 

Chinese analysts do point out troubles that exist in Sino-Russ

which could become hindrances to continued improvement, and a 

have warned Moscow not to interfere in Taiwan or take other s

China's interests. The Vice President of CIIS put forward three m

areas in the bilateral ties: 

S4Ibid., 138. 

CSIbid., 137. 

'~qbid., 138. 

176 
deliberately making rifts in the bilateral relations." 

• "In the boundary areas, the two countries have resolv

of the boundary issues, but still a small number of bo

determined. Some regional forces and politicians are ob

boundary delimitation work." 

• 'Whe issue of Taiwan still remains an important issue a

Russian relations. While actively expanding economic and 

and people-to-people exchanges with Russia, the Taiwan a

are attempting to seek official relations with Russia, to 

political forces in Russia have given certain responses. ''G7 

Other authors cite similar issues, but argue that the current trend 

relations will outweigh the problems. Feng Yuiun , an Assis

Professor in the Division for Russian and East Europe Stu

writes, 

Side by side with deepening bilateral relations, there has arisen an 

undercurrent in Russia, which spreads such allegations agains

"population invasion," "economic penetration," "military challe

"geostrategic contradictions." It has affcctcd somewhat the ex

bilateral relations. Yet this frenzy remains after all only a tribu

mixed up with many factors of Russian domestic politics. The m

in Russia's China policy still considers China as a reliable partne

top priority in Russian foreign policy to the expansion of rel

China) ~ 

67Shi Ze, "Lun xin shiqi de Zhong-E gum:d," 15. 

~Feng Yujun, "Reflections on the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," Contem

Relations 8, no. 8 (August 1998): 8-9. 

177 
and Russia have been showing a positive momentum of stable 

mad full dynanfic. ''r'9 

Other authors write about how Sino-Russian relations will 

regional stability" mad the world's multipolar development: "The 

Sino-Russian strategic cooperation has given an impetus to a

major power relations and a strong stimulus to the tende

multipolar world. ''v° Li Zhongcheng of CICIR even predic

improved relations will be better than those China has with the 

In the near future, China's ties with Russia will be much closer 

the United States . . .There exist no "natural" or "artificial" 

friendly cooperation between China and Russia; China sha

common views on major world issues with Russia than China s

the United States and the United States shares with Russia; 

Russia both stick to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

MILITARY DEVELOPMENT 

Chinese mlalysts often point to Russian military power as o

factors contributing to its continued existence as a major nation 

and tyelieve that in international affairs it will rely on its militaD, 

it copes with its domestic economic and political problems. 

Russian military, while strong, still can not compare to that 

Union. One author writes about Russia's current force: "Its milita

declined and its defense capabili~, has seriously weakened 

69Shi Ze, "Lun :d.nsliiqi de Zhong-E gt, anxi," 1. 

7°Feng Yujun, "Reflections on the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," 3. 

7!Li Zhongcheng, "The Role of an Emerging China in World Politics," 12. 

178 
• "The largest difficulty currently facing the Russian m

funds are seriously insufficient." 

• "The serious shortage of funds greatly influences 

military's work in troop training, logistics supplies, equip

professionalizing troops, and other projects." 

• "Troop replenishment difficulties have brought the R

one disaster after another. Because of unrest in the Ru

situation and the low level of the troops' social position and 

young people's enthusiasm for participating in the military 

low, and evading military service is extremely common." 

• "Various objective factors are causing a sharp rise in 

in the Russian armed forces." 

• "In the war in Chechnya, the Russian military" rev

command coordination was not at its best, its coordinated f

chaos, its information reconnaissance was sluggish, its logist

were lacking, it had low officer-soldier morale, and there we

weak points. ''73 

However, according to the study, Russia's military reforms 

because of its problems in Chechnya, which "critically influ

military reform process," even though Russia still "lacks a 

reform strategg'." Failures during the war in Chechnya res

72Li Haoyu, "Shixi E'Luosi de guojia anquan zhanlue," 24. 

73Wang Lijiu and Liu Gulling, eds., IG~a shiji de E'Luosi, 283-289. 

179 
Russian anny's effectiveness. ''~s Chinese authors point out that, 

that Russian national power has dramatically declined and it

forces have been reduced on a large scale," Russia has no choice 

the deterrent role played by the nuclear force in safeguardi

security,. ''v6 A People's Dai D, article stated, 

Russia, not reconciled to having been reduced to a "second-clas

tries hard to restore its status as a big country with its "nuclear 

• After beginning to expand eastward, NATO has steadily cl

Russia, and Russia has been reduced to an inferior position wit

the balance between Russia and \X'estem countries in conventio

forces. Thus, Russia should all the more attach importance to 

weapons in its hands. 

The article predicts that Russia will invest heavily in the de

nuclear technology so that it will retain its military" power: 

To balance its nuclear weapons with those of the United States, 

still allocated a huge sum of money, despite its financial straits, 

accelerate development of the "xg.~ite Poplar M" intercontine

missiles. This year, Russia will deploy this new kind of guided 

replace gradually the SS-25 powered intercontinental ballis

missiles. Russia is also developing a new series of fburth-generat

submarines called "God of the North Wind," and the first mod

7albid., 289, 295. 

75Wang Rui .and Zhang Wei, "A Preliminary, Analysis of Russian Military S

7~Ibid., 40-41. 

180 
Few Russian army divisions are completely equipped nowadays. A

cannot even afford fuel, its aircraft carriers have had to be sol

metal. Under these circumstances, Russia can only barely manag

up its nuclear forces, but nothing else. Russian military personages 

that, in the future, Russia will have to be more and more reliant o

forces. Therefore, in conducting any future militar T activities, 

lost the possibility ofmakhlg choices. ,-ks far as Russia is concerned

fights or does not fight. But if the latter is chosen, it is very pro

it will have to use nuclear weapons, because any other weapon

Russia is now incomplete. Russia would be unable to operate m

a normal way due to financial problems as well as a shortage o

staff. Frankly, it just lacks file material base to adopt any strategy, 

which would escalate step by step/* 

Despite Russia's weakened military force, Chinese analysts em

it still is quite powerful when compa,'ed to that of other countrie

to Chinese assessments, Russia currently has the second m

milita~- in the world after the United States, and in the short 

country" will be able to surpass it. For example, Yan Xuetong of 

"Russia's superiority" over China, Japan, and Germanv in the ar

and conventional weaponw.., can be preserved until early ne

77TangJinxiu, "Contest and Compromise Between Russia and the United Stat

Disarmament," Renmin I~aao (People's Daily), March 17, 1998, 6, in FBIS-CH

25, 1998. 

~Hsu Tao-chen, "United States Still Makes Old Mistakes, Exclusive interview 

~gYan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia/iyifen:vi (An analysis of Cblna's national i

Tianiin renmm chubanshe, 1996), 55. 

18I 
decreased by around 45 percent, and it has suffered a disastrou

its position as a militaD" superpower to a very large extent; it c

Russia is a milita~: power that is second only to the United 

second only to the United States in terms of the hi

expenditures." China accordingly, still falls behind Russia in 

Based on Huang's calculations, in 1996, China's military power 

percent of the Russian score. In strategac weaponry, China's scor

percent of Russia's; in national defense expenditures, Chi

percent; and in average national defense expenditures per pers

per capita defense expenditures, China's scores were 4.7 p

percent, respectively2 ~ 

"SECRS]T" RNLai EFFORTS 

As Russia assumes its place as one of the five poles in 

structure, Chinese military analysts believe Russia will also be 

RMA, probably ahead of the declining United States. Two of

authors of America, Rusda, and the Revohm'on in Mih'ta.r)' Affairs, de

fall from its "superpower pinnacle" as the reason Moscow "t

be unable to compete with the United States in this new RMA." 

the new R?v'LR tide that is currently rising in the world, the 

without a doubt is in the central position that is the focus 

However, they contend that several factors favor a surprise, a

do better at the R_~vL~. than the United States: "Because mili

~°Huang Shuofengo Guojia shengshuai lun (On the rise and fall of nafions)(

Press, 1996): 405, and Huang Shuofeng, Zongbeguoli lun (On comprehensiv

(Beijhlg: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992): 218. 

8: Hu aug, Guojiashotgshuai lun, 496. 

182 
able to exploit the RaMA rapidly, which would enhance Russian m

Russian rrulitary specialists invited to AbelS find their w

favorably in Chinese journals. 83 Even though "up to now [Mos

not completely implemented a new IL~vUk plan.., this does not 

the figures in Russia's military and political leadership and mili

circles lack a full understanding and urgent desire regarding th

it does not mean that Russia is willingly allowing its former op

far ahead in the spring fide of this new ILM_&... they are trying t

the future when Russia will enter the period when it completely c

new tLMA. ''~ Despite its current economic weakness, Chinese 

as Gao Chunxiang of AMS see that, "Russia's high-level military 

leadership continually make speeches on issues related to the R

draw lessons from the new technology the United States needs t

RMA." The place in Russia where this is done is "the General 

Academy and other military learning organizations." The Chin

s2Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei.E xinjunshigeming, 2. 

~The views of General Vladimir Slipchenko, of the Russian Academy of Milita

suggested in Kamsomolskaya Prauda October 15, 1996. He said that new weapon

physical principles "will form the basis of many states' armed forces in 10 to 

• . Explosives are currendy being developed which will be 30 to 50 times m

•.. The main attack dement ,x-ill be five to eight times faster then sound air- a

cruise missiles.., militaxy lasers will be used to disable militat 3, space systems .

energy emission at a target it is possible to turn an enemy division into a he

idiots.., dcctromagnetic weapons.., ionizing (plasma) weapons . . . our 'like

West and the East are devdoping new weapons and means of employing them

to take up the challenge of the times. >'' According to interviews conducted in 

study, Chinese militat 3, officers are now studying at advanced Russian military 

they become aware of Russian views. 

8*Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao X_iaozhuo, Mei-E xinjunshigemin$~ 139. 

183 
CIISS, writes, 

With the introduction of the program of "three-phased milita

Russia has begun to speed up the process of the new military 

with an even clearer objective, i.e., carrying out the profession

the armed forces, enhancing military, scientific research, updating 

on a large scale, and restoring its position as a major military 

achieve this goal, Russia on the one hand is adjusting its militar

and reorganizing its military industries, and on the other hand is 

its input in the development of military high technology, u

nuclear force and promoting its conventional force. In order t

future information warfare, Russia specially held a roundtab

which introduced the "doctrine of information securit3," and 

step up its development of information weapons so as to achi

balance of power. ''s6 

IMPLICATIONS OF TI IE SOVIET COLLA

As noted in the Preface, Chinese "debates" about the securit3, en

quite different in s~'le and content from the debates of Wester

public commentators. Debates about Russia have been particu

and secretive in the two decades since the death of Chairman 

According to interviews in China, these past debates remai

not all issues in them have been fully resolved. A secretive 

character of the USSR was carried out in the mid-1970s dlro

references to Chinese ancient histo~- by authors using pseud

individuals or groups involved. The authors pretended to ho

SSGao Chunxiango ed., Xinjunshigeming lun,196. 

86Li Qinggong, "Current International Military Security, Situation," 10-11. 

184 
The collapse of the Communist Party, in the Soviet Union 

China's leaders had difficul~ maintaining their claim that so

superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Conseq

early nineties, a debate ensued over the causes of the col

implications for China. In the first phase of the debate, from 

United States was assessed to be completely responsible for the c

Soviet Union through a process of containment and ideologic

called "peaceful evolution." However, this view was overturned 

stage of "scholarly" debate in 1992-93. s9 

AMERICAN SUBVERSION? 

Close examination of Chinese commentary from 1990 to 19

veiled debate took place among various institutes and individ

causes of the Soviet disintegration and its consequences 

communism. The debates were initially restricted to intern

journals. Using an old Mao quotation, an initial explanation wa

an American strategy, dating back to John Foster Dulles, 

characters for "peaceful evolution." An early assertion of thi

Soviet collapse appeared in Hong Kong in December 1991 i

affiliated with the People's Republic of China (PRC): 

87See Michael Pillsbury, "Sino-American Security Ties: The View from Mo

Beijing," lnternationalSecun~y 1, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 124-142. 

~Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism. 

*gFor a review of several U.S. books on why the Soviet Union collapsed, 

Kelley, "Gorbachev and Beyond: An Empire Transforming.W' Parameters 2

1998): 141-149. 

185 
say that without overt or covert support from the Unite

disintegration of the Soviet Union could not have been realize

have been achieved so successfully and so precipitously." 

According to the "peaceful evolution" strategy,, the leve

States used against the fon-ner Soviet Union (and which would a

were trade, economic cooperation, technolog T transfer, diplo

and educational exchanges, religious freedom, and so on. An

estimates that the West enjoyed a superiorit3~ in these "weapons

1980s, the estimated advantage that the Western countries enj

socialist countries in material terms was calculated by the Chi

However, in terms of mass media, the advantage was calcula

20:1. The analyst argued that Westem countries have emplo

media as a weapon to infdtrate socialist countries mad disinteg, at

internal speech by a Chinese leader warns, 

In the wake of traumatic changes in Eastern Europe and the 

coup in the Soviet Union, the task of countering peaceful evo

become ever tougher. The developed countries headed by the Un

attempt to conquer the whole world in terms of ideology, imp

Western values as democracy, freedom and human rights . . 

already caused revolts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

naturally would targmt China. 92 

V'JTa IGcng Pao (/-long Kong), December 28, 1991. 

91Wang Jiafu, "Strategic Analysis of the Internal Factors Affecting Trauma

Soviet Union," Sodet Social Science Research, no. 1 (1992): 2. 

~2Cited in Zhang Jialin, (',hina's Re.~onse to the Do~,Ifall oJ" Communism in Eas

Soviet Union. 

186 
Keming, the former chief of the Liaison Department of Ch

Committee. Liu, a leading Soviet expert, criticized Mikhail Gorb

thm'~dng" and his personality. 93 In Liu's view, when Gorbachev 

multiparty" system and separation of powers, he completely neg

of Soviet political structure and brought an end to the Comm

power. Gorbachev was a negative example for China; thus L

China should avoid: 

• Tile adoption of a multiparty" system, which abandon

role of the Communist Party 

• A pluralist ideology, in which Marxist-Leninism no long

only ideological foundation 

• Talk of democratic socialism rather than communism as 

of the party 

• Rejection of democratic central control of the Commu

its transformation into a loose political organization to

factions. 

Liu's thesis holds that the neglect of politics and ideology, 

leadership, together with Gorbachev's political errors an

corruption (including the bribe~" case of Leonid Brezhnev's s

caused the downfall. 

By mid-1992, however, a new analysis emerged. Scholars p

analysis challenged the idea of Western imperialists pus

evolution in the Soviet Union. If they had been at it since the 1

93Liu Keming~ "The New Thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev's Reform," S

Research, no. 1, (1992): 1. 

187 
pgy 

errors in economic policy that caused the Soviet collapse. 9

Chinese analysts, the logic of the "peaceful evolution" thes

attacked by many analysts in the second phase of the 1990-199

one thing, not a single American soldier had entered the 

Chinese analysts instead suggest that problems such as ag

ignored; the ethnic issue was mishandled; and the 

overcommitted, especially with the invasion of Afghanistan an

to Cuba. In general, they said, economic factors were key to t

In an interesting twist, the new argument held that 

isolation had caused the Soviet system to fall behind, along 

centralized planning and an excessive military budget. The imp

diagnosis was tllat if China could avoid highly centralized p

defense spending, and isolation, then China could also avoid 

Soviet Union. Professor Luo Zhaohong also criticizes the econ

the Soviet Union because it left out of its theoretical foundat

value, profit, and competition and it overemphasized state-own

which had no autonomy" and had their production geared to an 

plan rather than market commands. This, he concludes, destro

of enterprises and hampered the quantity and quality of pro

were no incentives to innovate. Technological progress and co

the West were impossible. 96 

~Luo Zhaohong, "Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Impact on the 

and Political Landscape" C m Chinese), Sbijkjingiyu zbe~to~bi (World Econom

no. 10 (1992), 1. The author interviewed Professor Luo in January 1998. 

95See Zhang Jialin, China's Re~onse. 

~Luo Zhaohong, "Disintegration of the Soviet Union," 5. 

188 
of the U.S. GNP, maintaining strategic parity with strategic 

surpassing the United States in conventional forces put an unbea

on the Soviet economy. The Chinese quote Gorbachev's ad

speech in February 1981: "This is the most militarized eco

world. ''gv 

Gorbachev's personality and policies may have accelerated 

collapse, but in the Chinese view, decades of overly centralized 

excessive military- expenditures were the root causes of the colla

between American and Soviet living standards was 10 to 1, 

Chinese calculations, with the per capita GNP in the Soviet Un

about $2,000. 

The conclusions for China of this new thesis were not t

evolution" should be cut offby seclusion and isolation from We

influences; rather, the issues would be successful management of 

to maintain ever higher living standards, further devolution 

toward a market economy, and efforts to continue technologi

After nearly 2 years of debate, in what seems to be a tradition 

process, a major conference was held in Beijing in May 1992. Th

published in the journal World Economics and PoEtics. ,am importa

this policy process was a statement made by Deng Xiaoping du

of Southern China in early 1992. In remarks conveyed through in

Deng supposedly said, "A planned economy does not equa

Whether something is socialist or capitalist, Deng pointed out

whether it will benefit the living standards of the people. He crit

~Liu Keming, "Formation, Development and Major Lessons of the Militarizat

Economy," Soviet Studies, no. 3 (1992): 6. 

189 
over the causes of the collapse of the USSR and its implicati

Today, Chinese analysts see the Soviet decline as a cauti

generally speaking they regard Russia with sympathy. In spit

extensive problems, Chinese analysts "officially" continue 

future role of Russia as one of the five equal poles that will sha

world balance of power. They forecast that its decline will even

that Russia will hmrease its militaD." power by exploiting the RM

of other nations. Although Russia's inevitable recovery, and po

are commonly accepted by Chinese analysts, what will happen 

during the transition to a multipolar world is the subject of con

of view. Authors recognize that Russia will continue to h

political, and social instability. ~,~at they disagree upon is 

turmoil will prevail. Additionally, most analysts discuss the nu

to Russia's future security environment, but they differ in ho

response to these dangers. 

CAfinese authors do not foresee Russia's severe crises and d

preventing it from assuming its position as a pole, because t

that the framework of its former power and status still exi

potential for future development. Some authors argue that prom

with China would be a way for Russia to improve its current 

Not only would it be helped by strengthened economic ties 

strategic partnership would also be a means for counterbalanci

to its security environment, particularly by providing a co

NATO eastward expansion. 

It is Russia's past efforts and its future abilities to deal with 

from the U.S. and NATO that are the main subjects of debate 

~Ia'aowang, no. 7 (1993): 1. 

190 
obtain oil and gas. There have even been warnings that if Ru

prevent these incursions, it could lose its foundation for beco

However, other analysts see Russia adopting countermeasures aga

NATO policies that are commensurate with its current power a

of future influence. 

Chinese discussions of Russian military, strength tend to 

categories--those that focus on the negative aspects of its curre

those that make positive predictions about the future. When 

Russian military today, many authors examine its numerous 

although its arsenal of nuclear weapons is often considered to 

of its inadequacies. More optimistic assessments are made a

military affairs, when analysts examine the country's developm

In particular, some authors assert that as Russia assumes its pl

it will be developing the P,x\,tA., probably ahead of the declining U

~malysts argue that its current milita~, power is the key factor co

its continued existence as a major nation in the world,, con

country" will give priority- to promoting the RMA. The belie

Russia inevitably overcomes its problems, gradual sustained grow

it to be able to rapidly exploit the RMA, enhancing both its mili

as well as its overall CNP. 

191 
Senior Colonel Luo Y~|an (left), son of 

Premier Zhou Enlai's intelligence director, 

and Senior Colonel Zhai Zhigang (right), 

who has ana!yzed US, weaknesses in the 

Persian Gulf War~ are seen here standing at 

the erm-ance to the Academy of Militaw 

Science in Belling 

General Xiong Guangkai (center), Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic 

Studies and PLA Depuw Chief of Staff for Intelligence. writing in Aprir 1998, he observed, 

'~Any efforts for seeking hegemony and world domination can only result in accumulating 

contradictions and fermenting war." Dr. Chu Shulong (right), who served as Director of 

North American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporaw International Relations., wrote 

in a June 19~) anic[e, 'In the U.S Defense Depamnent and the intelligence departments, 

there are a number of experts, strategists, and government officials who fhbricate and publish all kinds of" 'reports,' and stir up all kinds of 'cases' for which there is no factual evidence, in order to create strategic opinion for the ~China threat.'" The author, Michael 

Pillsbury, is seen at the left. 

1,92 
Liu Huaqtu (center) is Director of the State 

Council Foreign Affairs Bureau, ~ijing+s 

equivalent to the National Security ~Jviser 

to the President of the lJnited States. Liu 

Shaoming (second from right) is deputy 

chief of the Chinese Embassy in Washing° 

ton. Shen Qurong (left) is President of the 

China Institute of Contemporary Interna+ 

tional Relations+ Shen nomd in an article 

published in September 19~, "A military 

revolution (RMA} is underway .... the Lon+, 

don+based International Institute for Stmte+ 

gic Studies says that along with the advance 

of this revolution, some small and mediurasize nations will no longer be condemned to 

a perpetual inferior position relative to the 

Western world." 

Senior Colonel ~ng Baocun (right) of the 

DepaAn+lent of Foreign Military Studies, 

Academy of Military Science, has published 

a nomber of a~icles on information warfare 

He is shown here" with the former U.S. 

defen~ atmch~ to China, Admiral Eric 

McVadon, at Beifing's Fourth International 

Sun Zi Conference in October 1998. 

Qin Lizheng, Secretary General of the China 

F~tures Research S<xqety, seen in his office 

at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Senior Colonel Zhu Chenghu is the Deputy 

Director of the Institute of National Security 

Studies at the PI~ National Defense L)nivero 

sity. In June 1998, Zhu wrote that 'Although 

tl~e Asia=Pacific region has been relatively 

stable since the end of the Cold War~ tl~e~w 

are also many unce~'tainties there. If ce~ain 

hot-spot problems are not handled properly, 

they may cause conflicts, confrontations, 

and even war in this region, thus wrecking 

the peace, stability, and prostxerity of the 

region." 

Senior Colonel Chen Xiaogong is a wellknown author whose articles have appeared 

in the iournal of the China Institute of Inter.- 

national Strategic Studies. He serves in a key 

role in PLA intelligence as director of the 

assessment and analysis division. In 1991~ 

he said, ":It is certain that the five major 

powe~ will be the focus of the world, bu~ 

the relative strengths of the various poles 

will be unbalanced." 

Yao Yunzhu~ a senior colonel in the Foreign 

Military Studms Depa~ment at the Academy 

of Milita W Science, wrote in the Winter 199~ 

issue 0,l the Korea,~.tounaal e?/'I~?/ke,'ese 

Analysis that there have H~een qmated 

debates" inside the Pl~ about the "international environment, the real and potential 

threats China will face, the kinds of warn {:hal 

China is likely to t~ engaged in, and the 

ways and means to fight such wars." She 

concluded, "It would be to{) early to condude that ~he PLA has abandoned its traditional doctrine altogether Most Chinese 

milita W analysts consicier that the changes 

made so far are compatible with traditional 

dc×:trine, at least with the basic ideas it 

emb~ies. People's War and Active Defense 

are still directing the Chinese PLA in its long 

march toward rnodemia~tion." 

194 
This office building in downtown Beijing 

houses most of the research institutes of the 

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 

The "Book City" Building near ~ijing Universipy, sells titles about the fllture distributed 

by major Chinese publishing co.mpanies, 

Beijing headquarters of the P~-sponsored China Institute of Intemao 

tional Strategic Studies, chaired by General Xiong Guangkai~ 

19.5 
Yang Dazhou, formerly of New China News 

Agency, now is an author at the lnstitum of 

American Studies, Chinese Academy of 

Social Sciences. Yang's June 1997 article in 

the journal Peace a*zd DetJelopment challenged the views of the orth~ox strategists 

in several ways. He criticized the view that a 

multipolar world structure is ~already" 

restraining American hegemony. Instead, 

Yang stated the United States is the only 

gIobal +'pole," that China is not yet a "pole," 

and that three decades may ~ needed t~r a 

true multipolar power balance to develop. 

General Li Jijun has written that during the 

Persian Gulf *OK/at [7+S+ forces demonstrated 

manyweaknesses+ He argued that, ++If the 

adversa W of the U~~ited States was not Iraq, 

if the battle was not fought on the tlat 

desert, if the Iraqi armed forces struck first 

during the phase when the [LS+ A~ned 

Forces were still assemMing,, or if Iraqi 

armeci ff~rces withdrew suddenly before { I+S 

Forces st~lck+ then the otJtcome of the war 

might have been quite different/" 

Senior Colonel ~'u Rusong, Academy of Mib. 

itary Science division chief for ancient military doctrines, is the author of many books 

and a~icles on Sun Zi's Art qf Ig~ar 

196 
The China Society for Strategy and Management, on the grounds of the former ILS, legation 

in Beiiing, publishes a jo,urna~ known for thoughtAJl a~ic|es on nationalistic themes, such as 

Zhang Xgdenmu's prediction that the United States will try to separate Tibet from China to 

gain access to oil supplies from Central Asia+ 

Beijing headquarters of the China Institute of International Studies, sponsored by the Foreig:n 

Ministry and headed by Ambassador Yang Chengxu~ The historic building was fo~erly the 

embassy of Austrim 

197 
Senior Colonel Wu Chunqiu of the Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, is the author of 

a~icles on grand strategy and the concept of Comprehensive National Power. He wrote, "China's wise 

ancient strategists never advocated relying only on 

military power m conquer the enemy, but emphasked 

combining military power with the nonmilitary power 

related to war in order to get the upFmr hand." 

Wang Jisi is Director of the Chinese A¢:ademy of Social 

Sciences, institute of American Studies, one of several 

institutions that analyze U,S. Affairs~ The institute atso 

publishes a journal, Metguoyanjiu (American Studies). Educated at Oxford, he has published many a~ides on American foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, 

and U.S. strategy toward China. 

Chang Men.long (left) was ~nior engineer of the ~ijing Institute of" System Engineenng of 

the Conmlission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. Gao Heng (center) is ~e founder of the Institute of Grand Strategy and a well-known ~'holar at the Institute 

of World E~xmomy and Politics, Chinese Academy of S~I Sciences. Gao pioneer~ studies 

of multi~larity in 1~. In a more recent article in the journal 21st Centuo:, he wrote that if 

the United States and Japan intervene to protect an independent Taiwan, a maior war will 

ocoar and will escalate, with ~'global and historic implications°" On the ~ght is Senior Colonel 

Wang Zhongchun of the Institute of National SecnriW Studies, National Def~n~ UniversRy, 

Bei}ing, who has authored several bc~ks on the Unimd States 

1,98 
GeneralYao Youzhi became Director of the 

Strategy Depamneni of tile Academy of 

Milita W Science in 1~)8 He is also the Secretary General of the Sun Zi Society and has 

wriuen many articles on ancient military 

thoughL In the summer 1999 issue of 6Dina 

Milita~, Science he concluded, "The [LS. 

bombing of Yugoslavia and the Chine~ 

Embassy in Belgrade challenges the global 

trend toward multiF×)lari W " 

Lieutenant General Liu Jingsong (center) was President of the Academy of MilitaD* Science 

and the former commander of Lanzhou and Shenyang Military Regions on the border with 

Russia. In a 1~)7 issue of National ~je, zse Unwe~ityJour~;,al, he advised~ "Surprise and 

dominating the enemy by striking fi~t are ef'fective combat methods for seizing battlefield 

initiative, pa~icutarly when wea[x)n~' is inferior. Not only can you upse~ the enemy's war 

plan and operational preparations, you can strengthen the combat eft)ectiveness of our ow~ 

army's tromp cards (shashoujian)." At right is Senior Cotone| Peng Guangqian of the Academy of Military Science Strategy Department, who, in August 1999, sta{:ed in Liberatio,~ Ar'J~ O 

F)ai{I, that Taiwan President Li Denghui is *'a t:est tuix: baby manufactm'ed by the ~,gTtest '~ The 

author is seen at the lefL 

199 
Dr. Yah Xuetong is Director of the South 

and Southeast Asia Division, China Institute 

of Contemporaw International Relations, 

and the author of a book on how" to analyze 

national interests as well as co-editor of a 

book on the securi W environment Facing a 

rising China. He has a doctorate from the 

l lnivemi W of California at Berkeley and is a 

frequent visitor to the United States. His 

cha~ on the probabili W of war between 

China and the United States in the next 10 

years appears on page xli of this bc×~k. 

Beijing headqua~ers of the China Institute of Contempora W International Relations, which has 

a stuff of 500, a public journal, and its own press. It is s~)nsored by the State Council and 

Ministw of State Security. The Vice President of the institute, Song Baoxian (s~cond from left), 

and Japan s~cia]ist Liu Jiangyong (left) welcome the author and Colonel Greg Man, USA 

(third from right}, and his wife, Shirley Kan, from the U.S. Congressional Research ~ervice. 

200 
Major General Pan Junfeng serves as director of the 

Foreign Military Studies Depa~ment, Academy of Militaw 

Science, Fluent in Japanese, he wrote in ChJ~'~a Military 

5E'ience, '"we can make the enemy's command centers not 

work by changing their data system. ~gee can cause the 

enemy's headquarters to make incorrect judgments 

by sending disinformation, We can dominate the enemy's 

banking system and even i~s entire social orderJ' 

Senior Co]ond Zhang Zhaozhong is direcm: ~ of the science 

and technology teaching and research section at the PI{.A 

National Defense UniversRy. Hong Kong's newspaper 

Ta Ko,lg Pao in May 1999 called him China's °leading 

mihta W commentator2' In an interview he said, "The ne×~ 

10 to 15 years wilt be the most dif-ficuh and most important 

period in China's developmenL The United States has 

already realized that this is the best peri~t for containing 

China. During this period, thereR~re, the United Sta~es 

may devise all kinds of ways to cause tremble." Zhang 

added, "The United States at present does not have the gall 

to take the initiative in attacking China's territo W. But we 

must be vigilant. "~ 

The Shanghai Institute for International Studies occupie> a modern btdlding. The American 

studies co-director, "fang Jiemian. is seen standing in the fronl row (second t:rom [et~) next to 

tile author and II.S s~cialist Ding Xinghao. The institute pt~blishes journals, books, and an 

annual reviews, of world polifi~ s 

20'1 
Huan Xiang, national security adviser to Deng Xiaoping, wrote 

in 1986, '%s the world moves toward a nmltif×~lar~, five pole 

wodd. when the United Stares and the Soviet Ilnion are con~- 

sidering problems, they nmst think about the China factor, and 

also the other poles." tapan, he continued, "not only wants to 

strive to be on equal fk:~oting with the United States economi~ 

calty and politically, but A~her, it is deliberately planning, 

when the time is ripe, to surpass the United States and replace 

Anlerica~s worldeconomic hegemony Having economic hegeo 

mony, then political and militaw hegemony, would not be too 

difficuR/" In 1985 Huam listed R>ur technologies l~Jr a technological revolution in miiita W affairs: precision=guided tactical 

weapons, long--range strategic vehicles, a system formed by 

satellite communications and reconnaissance, and rapid and 

comprehensive data processing with computem. 

fie Xin, the atLthor of several best-selling books, has wri~- 

ten, +'The world situation, after the severe changes in the 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. in fk)rm actually apf~'ars 

amazing|y similar to the situation in Che latter periCx] of the 

Warring States, where there were six powerful conntries 

f~Jcing each other and one country, dominating .... In the 

early period [of the Warring States eral, the six countries 

'joined horizontally,' and fk~r a number of decades eff~ec~ 

tively resisted the pow'erful Qin threat. However, in the 

later peri~xt, one after another they accepted Qin proteco 

{ion and were willing to become its satellite countneso "I%e 

result was their collapse in 10 yearn. They were each 

destroyed by the Qin threat .... It is now necessary to form 

a modem strategy of ~joining horizomalty~... China m,ast 

seek al|ies among all countries that could ~'come ~'xerica's potential opponents today or in the fl~ture," 

Lieutenant General Richard A° Chi|coat, USA, President of the National Defense University 

(center), is shown here escorting his Chinese counterpart, Lieutenant General Xing Shizhong 

(leR), during a visit to Neliis Air Folve Base, Nevada, as par~ of a tour of U.S, milRary installations conducted under the Memorandum of Coo~mtion and Reciprocal Relations. At right is 

Major General Gong Xianfu, the PRC defense attach6 to the United States. 

202 
A L.N.IQUE ASPECT OF CHINA'S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS of the fu

environment is the "scientific" method used to predict power rela

the major nations. Chinese ancient statecraft from the Warrin

focused on how a wise leader made strategy, according to the p

state. Sun Zi warned that the outcome of war depends on 

assessment of power through calculations and estimates of enem

and weaknesses. Consequently, more so than most Western futur

authors want to forecast the future international status hierarchy

by which they make such strategic assessments is through the m

and comparison of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). 

CNP (ungheguola) refers to the combined overall conditions a

of a country in numerous areas. During the Cold War and the 

confrontation, a nation's power was largely determined by milita

in the current transition period, as the world moves toward m

military might is no longer the main defining factor of stren

elements such as economics and science and technolog)- h

increasingly important in the competition for power and infl

world. An evaluation of current and future strength requires the 

a varie~, of factors, such as territory, natural resources, m

economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreig

international influence. CNP is the aggregate of all these facto

203 
Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive ind

equations for assessing CNP. It '.'ill be seen that their analyti

not traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western soc

something unique to China. 

Several assessments of the current and future CNP o

nations are provided in this chapter, including estimations o

in the future security" mvironment of 2010 and 2020. The con

reflect the differences seen in chapters 1 and 2 about both t

the world is moving toward multipolariD- and the rate of 

national power. For example, of the 20 authors introduced 

some authors write, "It is certain that the five major powers w

of the world, but the relative strengths of the various 

tmbalanced,"-" while others emphasize, "The strength and politi

the five powers are gradually getting closer. ''3 This "debate

also important to ,analysts of the Ri\'Lq, because knowing a na

determine which side will win a war and ,*'hich side will bette

RN.L&_) To stun up, the future CNP scores for major powers ca

:Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), February. 26, 199

Shuofeng, Zongbe~¢oh'bm (On comprehensive national power)(Beijing: Zhon

cbuban~he, 1992), 7. 

~Chen Xiaogong, "The World Strategic Pattern in the 1990s," Internationa

no. 1 (NIarch 1991): 7. 

3yah Xuetong and Li Zhongcheng, "Zhanwang xia shiji chu guoji zhengz

on internationM politics in the early next century), Xiandai gt¢oji guan

International Relations) 92, no. 6 (lune 1997). 

*According to Li Qingshan, "Through the analysis of belligerent countri

NationM Power, even before a war has begun, people frequently can kno

204 
focuses on two studies that contain elaborate descriptions o

assessments were conducted, and which represent the orthodox 

views. After the following overview of the two abovementioned 

chapter is divided into four main sections: 

• The origins of the concept of CNP under Deng Xiao

historical antecedents in Chinese ancient statecraft 

• Qualitative analysis of CNP as viewed from a varieg" o

• Methods for quantitatively assessing CNP 

• The estimates made by several Chinese authors about the 

future rank order of the major powers. 

ORTHODOX "vERSUS REFORM 

To illustrate how China assesses CNP, the findings of two boo

by the Academy of Milita_ D" Science (.~M'4S) are contrasted with tho

by the civilian Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The 

of both institutes use premises established by Deng Xiaoping 

and some of the authors were apparently directly involved 

estimates. From AMS, this chapter draws on interviews w

published work of Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng. His ortho

differ from those presented in the reform assessment published 

CASS researchers. The reformers had as senior advisor noted 

Heng. According to interviews, Gao helped to invent the key Chi

advance." Li Qingshan, Xinj>~nshigemingyugaojishu zhangheng O-he new revol

affairs and high-technology warfare)(Beiiing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995)

205 
public the implications of China's surpassing the United States

is not mentioned by AMS or CASS authors. The public

institutes agree that China will, at most, become merely one p

equals, in spite of its much faster growth rate and much larger 

territot T. \\,tlere the AMS and CASS books differ is mainly in 

the raze of China's rise and ?u'nerica's decline. They also diff

assess milita~- power. By examining this "debate" about the 

environment, foreign observers can better understand how i

future are "argued" among both civilian and military analysts

According to interviews in Beijing, the assessments of futu

by CASS and AMS are not projected beyond 2010 because to d

the China Threat Theory. However, for this study, the ,%

estimated growth rates and their baseline power scores for 2

project 2020 findings. It is apparent that CASS and AMS us

rates AMS grox~mh estimates have China's CNP increasing sev

than the C_,~_SS pace; the CASS rate for Japan is also much slo

assessment has U.S. CNP decreasing 1 percent a year, to b

Japan, which is growing by 1 percent a year. 

The estimates of the orthodox authors support the asse

Xiaoping and Li Peng that the multipolar world is approac

based on projected A_MS scores, the United States and China wi

equal national power. However, the reform view published by 

CASS predicts different results. Its CNP scores for the p

.&merican unipolar superpower, not multipolarity. Projecte

show that by 2020 Japan will be number one, followed closel

~See Gao tIeng, "Slzijie zhanlue geju zheng,'dang duojihua fazhan" Cf

structure is developing toward multipolariq'), Guofa*g davue .'alebao (

University Journal), no. 2 (1986): 32-33. 

206 
Ancient Chinese Strategists as Antecedents 

Although the phrase "Comprehensive National Power" did n

into existence until the 1980s, the concept has ancient cult

"evolved from the concepts of 'power,' 'actual strength', 

power.' -6 Although a number of authors cite Marxist-Lenin

foundation for CNP studies, even earlier discussions of the ne

the overall power of different countries can be found in s

ancient military classics. The studies of Herbert Goldhamer pro

examples of ancient Chinese strategists who emphasized the n

calculations about the future] 

In his book Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, a distinguished a

gives examples from Sun Zi's The Art of War, Wu Zi's The A

Guan Zhong's Guan Zi, to show how, "to a certain extent, th

warfare in Chinese ancient literature embodies primitive

unsophisticated national power thought. ''s He explains, "In g

power theories frequently (or above all) are closely related to 

Therefore, measurements must include not only military str

other forces that have to do with carrying out a war. "China

strategists," Wu writes, "never advocated relying only on mi

6Wang Songfen, ed., S@ie @uyao guojia ~onghe guoli bifiaoyanfiu (Compara

comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: H

1996), 23. 

7See Herbert Goldhamer, The Adviser (New York: Elsevier, 1978); and H

ReaEty and Belief in Milita~ Affairs: A First Draft (Santa Monica, CA: The IL

1979). 

%V4u Chunqiu, Guangyi da @anlue (Grand strategy)(Beijing: Shishi chuban

subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from the same page. 

207 
Wu Chunqiu writes, 'Whese six points include the factors of nati

population, domestic embodiment power, the legal system, 

quantity" and qualit3: of troops, as well as international aid. 

assessment based on modem views, these factors are relatively 

are the epitome of Comprehensive National Power." Finally, the 

discussed in Guan Zi are areas that, when assessed, show the 

and development of a count~"s national power. 

One of the largest and most famous geopolitical coalitio

Chinese history was based on power calculations similar to as

CNP. The director of the military research division of the 

Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Colonel 

recounts that in 334 B.C., during the Warring States era, the stra

proposed that the six states of the vertical pillar of the strategic 

made up the Warring States geopolitical game board unite 

hegemonic state of Qin. Su Qin explained that together, the la

nations was five times greater than the territory of Qin, and th

military power was ten times greater than that of Qin. If the six n

together to attack Qin, it would be destroyed. Su Qin successfu

all six to "unite vertically" (he zong) to prevent their destruction

by Qin's hegemony. It was not until the next centutn7 that 

strategist was able to break up this coalition, which had be

quantitative calculations of comparative power. 9 

Wu Chunqiu points out that the ancient Chinese stratagem 

without war" also has great relevance to the concept of CNP. 

the stratagem is a famous quotation from Sun Zi's The Art of War

the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." According to 

"°thai Yuqiu, MoulueJia (Strategists)(Beijing: Lan tian chubanshe, 1996), 511

208 
are political wars, economic wars, science and technolo~ wa

wars, etc. To sum up in a word, it is a war of Comprehensive Na

Although military power is an important factor, in peacetime it 

a backup force, and plays the role of invisible might." 

Modern Beginnings 

Compared to China, American studies of the future negle

hierarchy and the rank order of the great powers. One reaso

noble hope that war and geopolitics have become obsolete. W

have warned that errors in assessing power may explain why w

that it is extremely difficult to assess geopolitical power ac

almost poetic account is from the remark by the great English st

Bolingbroke: 

A precise point at which the scales of power turn.., is imper

common observation . . . they who are in the rising sca

immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence 

successful experience gives them afterwards. They who are 

concerned to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge o

same manner and from the same prejudices. They continue 

power no longer able to hurt them, or they continue to 

apprehensions of a power that grows daily more formidable. 12 

:~"gVu Chunqiu, Guangyi da zhanlue, 17. rMl other quotations in this paragrap

17-18. 

:1Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes oflVar (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 1

:ZQuoted in Aaron Friedberg, The Weao" Titan (Princeton: Princeton Unive

14-15. 

209 
only were the United States and the Soviet Union at a stale

military struggle, but the strength of countries that were oppose

increasing. The international environment was changing, and th

of economic issues and conflicts was growing. Military force w

the main index for judging a count~"s strength. Numerous 

contributed to a countD~'s power and were playing a greater ro

such as economics, science and technology, and popular will. 

to be a means for measuring the sum of the "forces restricting 

included China. Deng wrote: 

If at the end of the new century China attains a "comparative

level," then there will be a major increase in the power restricti

China again goes through thirty to rift), years of construction, a

close to the level of developed countries, then at that time it w

harder for a war to be foughtJ 4 

In order to make more accurate assessments about the futu

power, count~: strength had to be evaluated in a variety of area

Zhu Liangyin and Meng Renzhong of .&MS write, 'qDeng X

keen foresight and.., established the theoretical basis for the em

formation of his Comprehensive National Power theory, ms g,

*SZhu Liangyin and Meng Renzhong, "Deng Xiaopillg zonghe guoli sixiang 

on Deng Xiaoping's Comprehensive National Power thought), in Xin shiq

)'anjiu (Studies of new period military economic theory), eds. Li Lin and 

(Beiiing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995), 42. The subsequent quotes in this par

pages 43-44. 

lqbid., 44. 

lSIbid., 43. ,MI other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 44-46. 

210 
go on to state that Deng Xiaoping believes that military pow

means for ensuring that economic power will rise, protectin

general interests, and canting out global strategic goals. There

on the one hand emphasize economic power as being 

Comprehensive National Power, we must on the other hand de

to the development of military- power, the element with the m

in Comprehensive National Power." 

Zhu and Meng write that science and technology are con

"the guiding force in raising Comprehensive National Pow

established through Deng's emphasis on the need for 

technological research and advancement in the military and eco

They claim Deng further developed the sacred classics of Mar

by adding his unique idea of the "primary" productive role o

technolo~-. "Marx talked about science and technology being 

force and this is very" accurate, but perhaps today saying it t

sufficient, I think that they are the primaq, productive force." 

Deng Xiaoping's new assessment of the security" environm

means to compare China to other countries. According to a b

Colonel Huang Shuofeng of :'MMS, the specific phrase "C

National Power" was put forward by Colonel Huang himself 

with Deng. In On Comprehena'~e National Power, Huang describes 

as part of a study on China's national defense strategy- in t

Chinese scholars looked at the "national power equations" of 

the West German professor William Fuchs as possible way

analyze the international balance of power. After rejecting them 

use of the concept of "power politics," the absence in their equa

Iqbid., 49. 

211 
Comprehensive National Power. 1~ 

In observing the discourse of the Chinese Colmnunist Part

how important something is can come from the strained effo

creation with appeals to precedents from the sacred Marxist clas

that Comprehensive National Power is sufficiently importan

claims. Colonel Huang Shuofeng cites Marx, Engels, and Mao 

for "guiding thoughts on studying Comprehensive National 

relationship to warfare, TM emphasizing Engels' discussion in A

the important role of economics and other factors in militar

also mentions Lenin's statement, "War is a test of every nat

economic and organizational power," and writes that Lenin's 

the language of today," would be that war "is a test of e

Comprehensive National Power. ''~9 

According to Colonel Huang, Chairman Mao Zedong also 

the development of the concept of CNP through his "strategy 

situation as a whole," which applied Marxist-Leninist the

military strategy. In his writings, Mao not only emphasized the r

material components, such as military and economic power, 

balance of power, but also the function of spiritual componen

the influence of leaders and popular will. In "Strategic Iss

Revolutionat 3, War," Mao wrote, "Victory or defeat in 

determined by both side's various military, political, econom

conditions; this is not an issue. However, it is not simply jus

17Huang Shuofeng, Zongheguoli lun, 94. 

18Ibid., 98. 

19Ibid., 96-97. 

212 
Q

The close connection between warfare and national power, whic

basis of earlier Chinese strategic theory on the subject, of cou

prominent issue today. However, because the foundation a

exerting one's power and influence have diversified, because con

countries are more focused on nonmilitary, issues, and becaus

resolved through diplomatic and economic channels, Chinese 

number of disciplines, both military and nonmilitary, today use t

CNP to make assessments in their particular areas. CNP s

"warfare" today in general terms in an "all directional econom

more specifically in future warfare to predict "who is capable 

victory in a new RMA war. ''~ 

High-Technolo£y Wapfare 

The basis of a discussion on employing the framework of CNP 

outcome of future wars in The New Revolution in Mih'ta{y Aff

technolog~ Wwfare, by Li Qingshan, a People's Liberation Army (

is highly similar to the arguments put forward by China's anci

Sun Zi and Wu Zi both discussed how victory or defeat in war 

in advance if a comparison is done of certain factors that c

country's strengths. Li Qingshan agrees: "Through the analysis 

countries' Comprehensive National Power, even before a w

2°Ibid., 97. 

21Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi dazhanlue ,99. 

22Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Shtjie quanfangwd jingji .~han O'he world

economic war)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991). 

23Li Qingshan, _~'njunshigemingyu gaojislm zhangbeng~ 191. 

213 
of the war are the changes that take place in this comparison o

the process of military operations, as well as the results 

struggles, ideological struggles, and economic struggles." 

Li's book asserts that the R~\,La, will not override prev

premises for making strategic assessments. Li claims that h

weaponry" "can change the appearance of warfare, but it can

laws of victorv in warfare. VictoD, or defeat in war is, of cours

technological means used by the belligerents, but it is not the so

Historically, in numerous wars the victors have been both t

technically inferior weaponry and those who have techn

weaponry. Technology," is not the only factor determining victo

war. ''~ Li links the tLMA to CNP. lenin wrote, '%\.;at is a test o

complete economic and organizational power," which Li ass

new RMA warfare "is still a comprehensive test of the lev

strength." 

During development of the 1LNLA_, Li believes that CNP w

be composed of a country's strength in five major areas--polit

military affairs, science and technology, and foreign affairs---ea

discusses with regard to its influence and role in war. Beginnin

affairs, he states, "Warfare is the continuation of politics 

countG-'s strategic intentions, the desires of the people, organi

and decision making ability. ''z According to Li, if a country's d

organizational capabili~', or strategy" is weak, unfocused, or 

factors will outweigh "actual" strength in determining the out

2~Ibid., 192. All other quotes in this paragraph are from page~ 191-193. 

2Slbid., 191. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 191-193. 

ZSIbid., 192. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from 192-193. 

214 
and technological development will be of major importanc

victoo,. ~ 

Economic RivaMes 

~qfile Li Qingshan views the component factors of CNP from 

of their relevance to warfare, authors Tong Fuquan and Liu Y

them with more economic issues in mind. Tong and Li

evaluating and comparing countries' CNP stems from the 

world conflicts and rivalries over "science and technology, in

foreign trade, finance, and natural resources.''" They divide 

major parts---economics, politics, science and technology

affairs--placing economics in the most crucial position. "Ac

strength," they write, "is, of course, the major compo

Comprehensive National Power, and to a certain extent, a c

economic strength represents its Comprehensive National Pow

2;As discussed in chapter 2, Wang Zhengxi, a Senior Adviser at the 

International Strategic Studies (CIISS), when writing about why other cou

the RMA ahead of the United States, also links development of the RMA to 

on its technical superiority,, the United States claims itsdf to be the foreruu

revolution and that it even has such a great lead of 30 to 50 years over oth

country can catch up and advance shoulder to shoulder with it before 

military technoloKv is an agent behind the military revolution, but not the on

on the combined action of social, political, economic, and scientific and tec

for a military revolution to take place and proceed smoothly .... If th

economic, scientific and technological, and military thought factors are t

then it is not absolutely limited to the United States as the only country

military revolution." See Wang Zhenxi, "The New Wave of the World Rev

Affairs," IntemationalStrategic Studies 44, no. 2 (April 1997),: 8-9. 

Z~Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Sfnjie quanfangu'djing/i ~tsan, 232. The subseq

paragraph is from page 232. 

215 
strength does not translate into a strong role in international po

A similar relationship exists between the extent of a countw

strength and the level of its scientific and technological develo

the authors recognize the importance of military power, they a

on its connection to the other factors: 

Actual military strength also is an area that can not be 

Comprehensive National Power; if a countr?"s military, power is n

it is out of the question that this country could have 

Comprehensive National Power. In general, the size o

expenditures is both a reflection of whether a country's actu

strength is strong or weak, and an important sign of whether it

is powerful, additionally, the development of military, technolog

to actual scientific and technological strength. Therefore, in a cer

the enhancement of actual milita~ strength is a strong sy

country's powerful Comprehensive National Power. 3° 

Strategy and Structure 

Sun Zi's emphasis on the importance of knowing and then 

opponent's strategy, has also found its way into the study of CN

for the New World Structure," by Xi Runchang of,~\'lS, is an ef

tile future world structure based on each area that c

Comprehensive National Power--strategy, population and nati

military affairs, economics, and international influence. How

discussion on evaluating and comparing CNP, Xi emphasizes o

of definite significance to the future security environment--the 

29Ibid., 232. 

~'~Ibid., 233. 

216 
national competition strategy,, in order to participate in th

competition" and, if they have, how quickly it was implem

• "Whether or not a nation's policymakers, whe

Comprehensive National Power's hard national power, 

means for participating in the international competitio

prominent development position. ''33 

• How a country's leadership "effectively utilizes" 

writes, "In the current information age, for any major 

strategic competition, whether they take action early or tak

extremely important with regard to gaining the leading po

Today, according to Xi, the United States, Europe, and Japan, b

"overwhelmingly ambitious" goals and because they have mo

implement their strategies, are ahead of other countries. "B

Russia and China, particularly Russia, are especially slow in the 

In a certain sense, this is an important reason why, in today

competition, Russia and China are in defensive positions, or a

been late to enter the ranks of the maior competing nations."3

3tXi Runchang, "Shijie xin geju zhanwang" (Prospects for the new world s

zheng~bi xin geju.)~¢ guoji anquan (I'he new world political structure and inte

eds. ~ Runchang and Gao Heng (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996

~2Ibid., 44. 

~3Ibid., 45. 

34Ibid., 45. 

3Slbid., 46. 

217 
strategy to be a component of CNP. Rather, he breaks the ma

their functions down in the following manner: "In the current ag

and development have become the main trends in the wor

countries, to different degrees, recognize that economics are th

science and technology, especially high technology, are the gu

is the guide of the guide; national defense is the backup force

policies are the key factor playing a unifying and coordinating 

Not only can studies of CNP aid a country in ma

assessments of the international situation, but they also are an i

for analyzing a country's own strengths and weaknesses. Fur

explains that countries can learn from mistakes made by othe

analyzing the development of both their national strate~" and C

National Power. Like many Chinese authors, Wu cites the c

Soviet Union as an example of a policy failure in the CNP com

QUANTITATIVE FACTORS 

What exactly are the specific components of CNP? Some Ch

discuss CNP only in a qualitative sense, dividing it into a few 

Others, however, engage in quantitative analysis with detailed 

the contents of CNP. Authors share certain factors, but t

discrepancies. Wu Chunqiu writes, "Because different coun

conditions are not the same, and researchers' personal goals 

interpretations of the concept of national power vaD'. In the b

a countD,'s power includes natural factors and social (manma

includes material factors (hard national power) and spirit factors 

ee~u Chtmqiu, Guang~i da~hanlue, 94. The subsequent quotes in thi~ paragrap

102 and 103. 

218 
The CASS Index Framework 

The current Foreign Minister of Russia once headed the Inst

Economics and Politics (IM]EMO), an influential Russian resea

Since the 1950s, China has had its own IMEMO, the Inst

Economics and Politics (IWEP), within CASS. Comparati

Comprehensive National Power of the World'a- Major Nations is th

group of researchers in the Office of Statistics zmd Anal

Published in December 1996, the book puts forward a detaile

the characteristics and roles of the CNP component fac

measurement methods to evaluate them; and provides exten

from the results of examining the CNP of 18 countries. The 

their subject matter carefillly: 

We believe that Comprehensive National Power is the organic 

different powers of a sovereign state during a certain period o

the base which all countries rely on for e>dstence and develop

is the foundation on which world powers establish their i

position and give full play to their influence and roles. Specifica

condensed sum of the entire calculations of societies' various ex

development factors at a certain time, space, and under certain c

The book divides CNP into eight major areas: natural resou

economics, foreign economics, science and technoloD,, m

government capabillity, foreign affairs capability, and socia

37Ibid., 95. 

3~Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie Zbuyao guojia Zonghe guoli bij~ao yanjiu, 25. 

219 
• CNP is composed not only of actual power; latent or po

also has a contributing role. Examples of the latter include th

scientific and technological research before being applied an

natural resources that exist but that have not yet been deve

• The contents of CNP and the roles of these factors 

throughout history and will continue to do so in the future; t

aspects may be added or dropped when evaluating different 

Today, the rapidly increasing significance of information a

power is a case of a new factor of growing importance. The 

"In the current world, because of the development of n

communication, different types of information about mark

be promptly delivered to various places in the world, th

factor, in international relations, the role of information pow

and can be compared with political and economic factors. 

In order to objectively assess the CNP of different cou

needed measurable, unified standards. To this end, they sough

the eight component factors) a set of specific indexes. The c

index system capable of evaluating countries at different devel

and with varying social, political, and economic systems m

indexes selected had to be general enough to be applicable t

nations of the world; be representative of all the factors th

Comprehensive National Power; and have data sources that we

and feasible. The authors wanted to include "both indexes for 

and indexes for amount per person; both quanti b, indexes and qu

39Ibid., 36. 

220 
AaualEconomicStrength (total): gross domestic product (GDP); industry productio

energy production, steel output, cement output, logs output); food supply ca

output, degree of self-sufficiency in grain); energy supply capability ( volume of 

volume of energy consumption, crude oil processing capability); total cotton ou

A~ualldconomie Slrengtb (per person): GDP per person; industry production capab

production, steel output, cement output, logs output); food supply capability 

average calories per person); energy supply capability (volume of energy consum

Produclion E~cien W social labor production rate; industry labor production ra

production rate 

Material Consumption LeveZ' volume of energy consumption based on GDP calcul

Structure: the proportion of the tertiary industry in the GDP 

Foreign Economic Activities Capability 

Total import and export trade; total import trade, total export trade 

Total international reserves; international reserves (not including g~ld); gold res

Science and Technology Capability 

Proportion of research and development in the GDP; number of scientists and en

of scientists and enganeers per 1,000 people; proportion of machinery and transp

exports in total exports; proportzon o f high-technolog3, intensive exports in tot

Social Development Level 

Edua~,0n LenA'education expenditures per person; proportion of people studying 

proportion of people studying in secondary school education 

Cultural Level: adult literacy rate; number of people per one thousand who get a 

Health Care LeveZ" health care expenditures per person; number of people doctors 

number of people nurses are responsible for 

Communications: number of people who have a telephone per 100 people 

Urbanizatlo~. Proportion of the urban population in the total population 

Military. Capability, 

Number of military personnel; military expenditures; weapons exports; nuclear w

of nuclear launchers; the number o f nuclear warheads) 

Goverm'nent Regulation and Control Capability 

Proportion of final government consumption expenditures in the GDP; pr

government expenditures in the GDP; investigation through interviews asking 

Foreign Affairs Capability 

Uses ten factors in a "ne~'e network model" to carry out a broad assessment. 

Source: Wang Songfen, ed., .~hifie %h*o,ao guo~a zonghe guoli b#iao yanjiu (Compara

comprehensive national power of the world's malor nations)(Changsha: Hunan chub

221 
detailed analysis of the major component factors of CNP and th

indexes. Huang writes, "Comprehensive National Power resear

order to accurately analyze the international strategic situation and 

comprehensive power of enemy states, allies, and one's own co

purpose of scientifically planning one's own national strate

making. ''41 Only relying on theoretical research is therefore in

m -akmg this sort of assessment, and instead systems theory and 

methods must be utilized to develop qualitative and quantita

Consequendy, Humlg's objective in creating an index system is to 

and systematically" describe the characteristics and developme

of a countt3.'s CNP "in order to cart 3" out scientific quantitative 

Huang describes CNP as a large, complex system compo

levels or subsystems, within which there are numerous interlinke

factors. He divides the CNP index system into four 

subsystems--the material power (hard) index subsystem, the 

(soft) index subsystem, the coordinated power index subsys

environmental index subsystem: 

The material power and spirit power indexes mainly reflect a 

needed strength for existence and development; the coordinat

index mainly reflects the organization, command, managem

decisionm -aking levels of the leadership mechanism; and the envi

*~Ibid., 64. 

~:Huang Shuofeng, Zongheguo~'lun, 159. AU other quotes in this paragraph are 

157. 

222 
example, when viewed overall, national defense is a hard factor, b

its components, such as national defense ideology and military the

The "spiritual (including psychological) and intellect power soft f

"determine the effectiveness of the material form (hard) natio

include politics, foreign affairs, and culture and education. 43 

The coordinated power index subsystem is important because, 

CNP to develop effectively, the factors that constitute materia

power "require macro adjustment and control, and coordinat

ment. ''44 These functions are important both at the national level 

the lower levels of the specific areas. Although some of the soft po

are contained both in their own system as well as in the coordin

index, they operate differently in the capacity of the latter. As 

factors they influence the material fotan factors, but within the 

power index they regulate the relationship between the hard and 

Finally, the environment index subsystem comprises three 

international environment (the world structure and the different 

power), the natural environment (a count~,'s natural resources, a

geographic and ecological conditions), and social environment (

economic and social systems and their stability). These three a

influence, both negatively and positively, the development of 

factors. 

Each of the components of the four major subindexes is 

subindex, and together they all form what Huang refers to as a CN

index system. For each of these sub-subindexes, he provides det

42Ibid., 162. 

43Ibid., 164. 

4qbid., 165. 

223 
economic relations; foreign military relations; diplomati

capability-; international contribution capability." 

"Science and Technology Power Subsystem: Science and techno

(scientists and engineers, technological personnel); investmen

and technology (total, proportion of the GNP); science and tech

(high science and technology, general science and technolog3/); 

technology system; scientific and technological progress spee

and technological progress contribution; scientific and technolo

and applications." 

"National Defense Power Subsystem: Standing army (nuclear, co

and reserve forces; national defense investment; national defe

and technology and national defense industry; national defens

installations; strategic material reserves and logistics safeguar

defense education and training; national defense system establ

national defense ideology of the people and troop morale; milita

After listing the above specific indexes, Huang 

Comprehensive National Power index system' is the concrete 

the concept of Comprehensive National Power; it also is the q

for appraising Comprehensive National Power," and th

foundation for his "Comprehensive National Power dynan

which will be discussed later. "m Before setting forth this equati

arranges his index system into a network structure so that it can 

quantified. However, in this diagram, "The Structural N

4Slbid., 169, 170, 172. 

~Ibid., 173. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from the same p

224 
Foreign Methods 

Chinese authors often explicitly criticize foreign quantitative analy

Three foreign formulas for assessing CNP frequently ment

negatively and positively, are those created by Ray Cline, William 

the Japan Economic Planning Department, Comprehensive Plan

in a study entitled Japan's Comprehensive National Power. 

As noted earlier, according to Huang Shuofeng, Deng Xia

Chinese scholars in 1984 to analyze the future security environm

of a study on China's national defense strategy for the year 2000

examined existing Western formulas, but Huang rejected Cline

power equation" because it does not include a way to evaluate 

technology power; it is a static equation and therefore does no

variations in and development of a country's CNP over time; 

means for judging the soft, intangible factors are not objective 

Huang finds fault with William Fuchs' formula because it measu

hard material factors and completely ignores the soft ones. T

study, done in 1987, is criticized by the authors of The IPbrld's A

Economic War, Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, because its index 

calculation methods are narrow and unscientific. They write that 

of the Japanese group was "done in order to serve the Japanese G

established guiding principles and policy. ''47 

As is common in China's assessment techniques, pat~ of th

concepts may be borrowed. For example, in "Prospects for the 

Structure," in order to make "an objective and unassuming ass

*TTong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Shijie quanfangweijinefi zban, 234. 

225 
S refers to national strategy 

W is national will. 48 

In great contrast to General Hum~g's cot~unents, Xi believes C

to be "relatively objective," including the standards for the s

as strategy, which is one of Xi's main areas of focus. CASS, 

measurement techniques (which will be explained in greater 

only adapts aspects of Cline's method but combines it with 

Japanese study. 

One foreign study on the analysis and measurement of 

that is not criticized by Chinese analysts is the International 

Report, a yearly study conducted by the World Economic Foru

Lausanne Management Institute. (A few Chinese institute

departments even contribute to it.) The Chinese period

Management praises the report, saying that it is "an important fo

different countries' government circles and business circle

making policy decisions, and has extensive authoritativeness. 

1996, the magazine stated that each year it would publish th

report showing the rank order of China's international comp

according to the various power indexes, s° 

Runchang, "Shijie zhengzhi xin geju," ,14. The quote in the next senten

page. 

49"Zhongguo guoli jinzhengli baogao" (China's international competi

Zhanlue)xguan]i (Strategy and Management), no. 2 (1996): 1. 

5°The report is often cited by Chinese authors, who refer to China's c

rankings. For exanlple see Wu Zhaohong and Shui Jiayue, "Strive to Im

Competitiveness," Qiushi, no. 6 (March 16, 1998): 32-34, in FBIS-CHI-9

226 
data from the hard indexes are standardized through index 

methods, which "combine R. S. Cline's comprehensive calculation 

assigning values and the comprehensive index calculation met

Japan's Comprehensive National Power. ''5' Afterwards, it is sep

calculated unit values. The hard indexes are divided into two gr

indexes (those directly related to GDP growth per person) and indi

(those inversely related to GDP growth per person). The former 

biggest value as 100, the latter set takes the lowest value 

"successively calculate the deserved value of the different countri

indexes." 

An investigation method of posing questions to specialists 

the case of some of the intangible soft factors not easily me

example, in order to assess government regulation and control, the 

asked some of the participants at the 1994 China World Econom

annual meeting questions about 9 aspects of government reg

control in 18 countries. The answers from 59 specialists, s

professors then underwent a computerized analysis. For for

another soft factor, the group "designed a nerve network mo

factors related to capability in foreign affairs activities--populatio

natural resources, military, affairs, economics, science and technol

ideology, system of organization, and image--to make asses

obtained vague data of the different countries' foreign affairs 

afterwards the data were standardized." For all the standardiz

standardized, differentiated levels collection method was adopted 

basic plan data model." Based on these different methods, the 

S~Wang Songfen, ed., Sh~'e Zhuyaoguojia gongheguoli t~)~ao)'anjiu, 71. All othe

paragraph are from pages 71-72. 

227 
those countries with extensive natural resources and comp

populations, such as Canada and Australia, receive high valu

do not correspond to their actual economic strength and role i

Such results arise because in those countries per-person rates 

economic and social factors are fairly high. Second, when asse

authors assert it must be recognized that the importance a

various factors change over time. For example, during war, e

Cold War, military strength and the various factors that contrib

most crucial components of CNP. However, during peacet

development, foreign trade, and social development rise 

"Therefore, based on different time periods and different mis

need to be made and weights need to be assigned to ensu

conclusions are scientific and objective." Last, not only is 

indexes in each of the eight major areas not equal---natura

fourteen, while foreign economic capabil W has only two--b

regardless of its value or importance, is allotted the 

Consequently, in the second stage of CNP measurement, t

results of the basic plan are revised through qualitative analys

weights to both the eight major component factors and their s

In general, the researchers determined the weighted coeff

for the different indexes based on the following principles: 

• In times of peace, domestic and foreign economic a

most central and important part of CNP. 

• The significance of science and technology in 

international competition is growing. 

~Ibid.,168. 

228 
Table 4. Weighted Coeflidents of Major Component Factors 

National Power Factor \Xieighted 

Total CNP 

Natural resources 

Economic activities capability 

Foreign economic activities capability 

Scientific and technological capability 

Social development level 

Military capability 

Government regulation and control 

capability. 

Foreign affairs capability, 

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shifie zhuyao guofia zonghe guoli bljTao .yanfiu (Comparat

comprehensive national power of the world's malor nations)(Changsha: Hunan chuban

Additionally, the different indexes within each of the maj

also. assigned weights. As examples, within the science and techn

the index for proportion of research and development in the 

index for technoloD, personnel both have weighted coefficient

index for the proportion of machinery and transportation equip

in total exports and the index for the proportion of high-techno

exports in total exports are both 0.20. AU four indexes constitutin

factor--the number of military personnel, military expenditu

exports, and nuclear weapons--are assigned equal weights of 0

S3Ibid., 169. The weighted coefficients for the factors and indexes are from 

229 
Japan 1.2 14.3 7.3 

Germany 1.3 11.1 9.3 

France 1.3 10.6 5.7 

Italy 1.1 9.8 5.9 

England 1.4 8.5 4.6 

Canada 2.6 9.3 2.7 

Australia 2.6 8.0 1.3 

S. Africa 0.9 3.6 0.3 

USSR 5.7 9.4 1.9 

Russia 4.2 6.7 1.3 

China 4.0 7.5 Z2 

India 2.1 4.8 0.5 

Indonesia 1.6 3.1 0.7 

Korea 1.2 4.3 1.6 

Brazil 2.7 5.8 0.7 

Mexico 1.6 4.1 0.8 

Egypt 0.8 Z6 0.2 

230 
7.3 0.4 5.7 4.8 

8.0 0.8 6.8 5.1 

7.2 1.1 6.9 4.6 

6.7 0.4 6.5 4.2 

7.4 0.9 6.4 6.4 

8.1 0,2 5.9 4.0 

7.0 O. 1 5.6 3.6 

3.3 O. 1 5.4 3.0 

5.8 9.9 5.3 6.0 

6.1 6.6 3.5 5.3 

Z0 Z5 4.8 5.0 

1.7 0.9 4.6 4.2 

Z0 0.2 4.3 3.0 

5.3 0.5 5.3 3.5 

3.4 0.2 4.5 3.8 

3.8 0.1 4.2 3.4 

Z6 0.3 5.0 3.3 

Source: Wang, ed., Shifie zhuyao guofla zongheguo/i bi)taoyanjiu (Comparative studies of 

national power of the world's major natmns)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 171

231 
analysis in the second stage of measurement causes the 

calculations to be closer to the specific national conditions o

countries, making them more reliable and believable. ''ss 

Forecasted Weighted Plan. The researchers at CASS evaluated 

1980, mad 1990 and also made forecasts of what the CNP of 

will be in the years 2000 and 2010. Based on the principles o

plan, they predicted the potential future role and influence o

component factors mad adjusted their weighted coefficien

Because of the growing significance of science and technology, 

communications, the weighted coefficients for science and t

social development level were raised from 0.15 to 0.17 and fro

respectively. The natural resources categorv had the greatest r

0.08 to 0.06. Both government control and regulation capabi

foreigaa affairs capabilig', were reduced bv 0.01 to weighted 

0.07, and the weights allotted to the two economic factors and 

capability remained the same. Once again, the data from the 

taken as the base; using the new weighted coefficients, as we

projections of the 18 countries' GDP in 2000 and 2010, fore

CNP are calculated. "Ilae projected CASS CNP scores a

qualitative assessments of the future role and developmen

cotmtries are discussed at the end of this chapter. 

The AMS Dynamic Equation 

Compared to the researchers at CASS, Huang Shuofeng of A

much more detailed analysis of his measurement and calculatio

54Ibid., 167, 

55Ibid., 2. 

232 
y gpg

structure, but also through the interchange of energy" flows, mater

information flows of science and technology, economics, and f

within the international environment. ''s~ Therefore, in order to b

developments and variations in CNP, a type of "motion equatio

Based on the principles of systems theory, coordinated studies, 

studies, Huang summed up: "The interconnections, inter-re

interactions between the numerous subsystems must be analyz

quantitative relations, and in order to arrange the entire syste

dynamic equation;" calculations are made using various metho

are used to compare the CNP of the different countries; and p

made about future trends in the "international Comprehensive Na

contest." Not surprisingly, Colonel Huang generates final calc

different from his civilian colleagues at CASS. 

The CNP Funcu'on. Colonel Huang defines the growth and 

process of CNP as "the process of taking a group of factors and 

into output, under fixed domestic and foreign environments

conditions." This process can be depicted numerically 

"Comprehensive National Power function": 

Y, = F (xl, x2, ..., x,; t) 

In the equation: 

the CNP n component factors are xl, x2, ..., x, 

S6Huang Shuofengo Zongheguoh'lun, 175. The other quotes in this paragraph are 

and 188. 

233 
p, pg p

Marxist materialist dialectics theory, system." In materialist dia

every material thing is an independent object, but through its co

interaction with other objects it becomes a part of a "un

Including too many component factors with their exten

numerous intercormections would make the national power 

complicated. Huang thus simplifies the function by using "ma

• with the biggest roles in the allocation, control, and 

comprehensive national output Y,." He selects three of the fou

subsystems from his CNP index system to be the variables: h

represented by H, ; soft variables, indicated by S,; and coordin

depicted by ~. The new national power function is then writt

¥, = F (H,, S,, K0 

So that calculations can be made using this new form of the n

function, it is rewritten using Newton's third law, where Z × 

¥, = K, × (H0 = × (SOP 

In the above function: 

H, stands for the "mass" of CNP 

S, represents the "acceleration" of CNP 

K, is the coordinated coefficient 

0~ is the "hard elasticity" index" 

is the "soft elasticit3' index." 

234 
the basis for measuring and assessing Comprehensive Nat

However, the measurement of the Comprehensive National Po

evolution process, requires studying the Comprehensive Na

dynamic equation. ''sT 

The Main CNP Dynamic Equation. Before setting forth his m

Huang explains that CNP is a complex system with many sub

nonlinear interaction. "Therefore, when using dissipation struc

analyze the evolution and development process of the C

National Power system, you must use a nonlinear differential eq

an equation is: 

ar, Y,) 

dt M 

\Vchere: 

Y, stands for the national power function at time t 

refers to the national power yearly growth rate 

M is "the greatest value for a system variable that the 

(international, domestic and natural) will permit." 

Just as the CNP system has numerous subsystems and su

so too, does the CNP dynamic equation have several layers 

Although Huang does not explain them all, he provides 

subequations for population growth, gross national product, na

5Vlbid., 188-189. All quotes and equations in this section are from 189-191

235 
is for military power, which he divides into strategic and conv

The former is "assessed on the basis of the composite index o

of attack forces, means of deliver 3, and nuclear warheads' quanti

(.precision, reliability, existence rate, tufang rate), and nu

capability." The latter is "determined by troop combat ab

maneuverability, and the extent of armament efforts." The eq

m, x -- a. x b, + c t 

/~l i-1 

(i=l, 2,..., n, n=4) 

In the formula: 

M, indicates conventional military force in period t 

m, indicates the total number of troops in period t 

al indicates soldier quality 

a2 indicates weapons effectiveness 

a 3 indicates logistics supplies and facilities quality 

a 4 indicates organization and command quality 

b, indicates strategic reserve capabilities in period t 

c, indicates the extent of armament efforts in period t. 

A counttT's military- power also can be measured by using the 

military" expenditures and military capital. 

Total military" capital (including weapons and facilities) i

adding the past milita~' investment depreciation surplus tota

new investment total. Its equation is: 

>'Ibid.; all quotes and equations in this section are from 191. 

2.36 
Then total military investment I, can be calculated through its 

that year's gross national product. Its equation is: 

I, = S x GNP, 

In the formula, S indicates, in year t, the new militat 3, inv

proportion of that year's GNP,. ''59 

Four Assessment and Measurement Methods. After 

"Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation" and 

subequations, Huang outlines four different assessment and 

methods for evaluating CNP: the index number method, used t

hard factors of the dynamic equation; a specialist evaluation m

soft factors; weighted coefficients, assigned to the coordinated 

vague judgment method, to assess some of the undetermined 

the index number method, after the data have been generate

different subequations of the CNP dynamic equation, index 

established for it. These index numbers are set based upon a u

which the value of the U.S. data from each equation is given the 

of 100. The indexes of the other countries are then set according

using the new indexes, the CNP of the different countries is c

the national power function. The results of Huang's calculation

table 6. 

Huang also projects the future Comprehensive Natio

countries; however, the only explanation he provides of his m

order to forecast the future world strategic structure, 

~°'Ibid., 202. All quotes and equations in this section are from 202-203. 

237 
strengths and weaknesses of CNP are the measures for the r

nations," and uses the above discussed "Comprehensive N

dynamic equation" as the starting point for conducting his new 

Huang's explanation of his original equation is almost identical t

in On Comprehendve National Power, except that he gives f

regarding-the science and technology power subequation. Befo

on how the "Comprehensive National Power equation" can 

upon to measure the rise and fall of nations, Huang calculates th

of overall CNP and its various factors for six countries. Unfortu

not make any predictions about the future CNP for the differen

he did in his previous book. The results of his new quantitative 

United States, Japan, Germany, Russia, China, and India differ 

dem,'ed 7 years before. A dear trend is that (as a percentage of t

the CNP of all countries analyzed is growing faster than wa

1989. A comparison of Huang's statistics from his two book

table 7. 

The original "Comprehensive National Power dynam

measures only a country's strength at a given time; it does no

the level of this power and its component factors influen

development and well being. Its numerical results allow for th

of CNP for different countries, but they do not illustrate the o

interaction and competition between these countries. In setting 

"rise and fall of national power equation," Huang explains 

°°Ibid., 220. 

61Huang Shuofeng, Guojia shengshuai/un (On the rise and fall of nafions)(C

chubanshe, 1996), 337. 

238 
.~ ~ 

a~.{ = 

a~ 

239 
Germany 378 558 62 

France 276 385 - 

England 214 281 - 

Canada 137 177 - 

Australia 113 148 - 

USSR 387 648 - 

Russia - - 58 

China . 222 , 437 48 

India 144 274 35 

Brazd 156 268 - 

3 3 3 64 

5 6 - 47 

7 7 - 36 

10 10 - 23 

11 11 - 19 

2 2 - 65 

- - 4 - 

6 5 5 37 

9 8 6 24 

8 9 - 26 

Source: The scores for 1989 and 2GX9 are from Huang, Zangbeguali hm, 220-221. The scor

Huang, Guwa shengshuaitur4 405. "Ihetr scores as a percentage of the U.S. score were gen

for comparison purposes. 

system is "just like the organic world, it is a competitive a

evolutionat T process, where both vigorous and declining phenom

The goal of the new equation is to quantitatively analyze this "c

developing evolutionary, process," in order to determine the l

and decline of nations. Huang divides his discussion of the "

national power equation" into two parts, its use in evaluating 

country by itself, and its use in assessing two nations that are 

with each other. 

In the first situation, which I Iuang refers to as "an environm

initiative is in one's own hands," the equation can be used to 

62Ibid., 379. 

240 
no matter how prosperous this species was in the past, it will 

escape its destructive fate, such as occurred with the dinosaurs

In the case of nations, Huang writes, if a country has p

decisionmaking, which "deviates from the development t

international and domestic strategic environment" (such as thro

hegemony and arms expansion and focusing too much of its ec

military arena, which hurts civilian development and leads 

political instabili~), then the country will fall. 64 Once aga

"Regardless of how prosperous it was in the past, this country w

to escape its tCate of complete collapse. The disintegration of the 

is a tTpical example." However, Huang explains, if the species ca

changed environment, and ifcotmmes uphold policies that are in 

the needs of the domestic and internation',d environments, then 

start a prairie fire," and they both can gradually develop and st

"lhe second part of Huang's discussion on the uses for the 

of national power equation" deals with how national strength 

the interaction between two forces in a "struggle for existence e

Huang writes, "The modem international struggle for existen

analysis is the competition of Comprehensive National Power. 

the competition is the struggle for strategic resources, including 

technological resources, economic resources, natural resourc

resources, information resources, etc., the key elements of C

National Power. ''6s One purpose for the equation, therefore, is 

62Huang, Guojia shengshuai lun, 382..MI subsequent quotes in this paragraph ar

page. 

~Ibid., 382. All other quotes in tiffs paragraph are from die same page. 

651bid., 383-384. 

241 
uag wtes tat te appcatoote equatoto te 

allows him to illustrate, "the laws of a competition, in an 

environment, between two arbitrary countries on the 'batt

Comprehensive National Power competition. ''~ The potential 

a competition he describes as falling into four general categor

• Both countries could be "destroyed" through an 

nuclear war. 

• One count~' could force another into a "fatal positio

• There could be "unequal coexistence," where o

dominated by another. 

• Two countries could coexist and "promote the prosp

other through "mutual cooperation and reliance." 

The last possibili~,, which sounds similar to the "Five Princip

Coexistence," is regarded by Huang to be "the model for t

world order.' "6~' Unfortunately, Huang does not provide any nu

from calculations using "the rise and fall of national power eq

FORECASTS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN 

CASS 

Prior to presenting its projected CNP.scores for the years 2000 

CASS study sets forth some main findings about the future pro

66Ibid., 385. 

~7Ibid., 386-387. 

242 
strength or the gross size of its economy measured in tema

power parity, (PPP). At least a decade will be needed for PLA m

to take effect. China's three strongest components of CNP a

resources, rapid growth rate, and military manpower and weapo

these are offset by two important weakness--its low level o

technology and its low "social" development. China must focus 

policy" and raising both its science and technology and its nation

level. Using PPP and the forecasts from the models of "Glob

Forecasts" and "Project Link," in 1990 China already had a GD

trillion, which would be the second largest in the world. PPP

misleading. Using official exchange or conversion rates, Chin

only the 10th largest economy in the world, with about $369 b

even lower average per capita rank order (17th). Additionally

capita GDP is at best $1,950, ranking 16th in the world. 

German)'. Germany will remain the third-ranking power in th

Japan and the United States for several decades, but it will not p

or militate- role equivalent to its economic status. Germany's gap 

file United States will decrease. However, this will occur only b

relative decline of the United States. Germany will likely fall fur

faster growing Japan. Germany may perhaps be overtaken by f

France, now in fourth place in CNP. Only if Germany can 

misgivings of its neighbors and d~e United States, and only afte

develop its actual power and benefit from the superior science an

in Europe, thereby closing the gap with Japan. There will t

competition to see who will be the world's second-ranked 

necessary to watch closely this competition for second place b

and Germany after 2010 because it will significantly affect the 

Germany's prospects to increase its competitive standing depen

sound economy (foreign reserves, exports, and foreign invest

243 
One source of Russian decline is that Russia is the target of effo

and the United States to further weaken its status. Only after 

will Russia be able to become once more the number-one Eu

ahead of Germany, France, and Britain. However, before this ca

middle decades of the 21st centut3-, Russia will continue to fal

and Germany in ('NP even after 2010. 

France. Since the 1970s, France has consistently placed six

global competition. France has the potential to improve its re

in CNP in the decades ahead, if it reorients its trade from Afri

exploits its impressive base in science and technolog9". Howeve

overcome a large national debt, weak industries, and high une

this is done, France can move ahead even to fourth place in 

2010. 

Great Bpitain. Despite its ranking as eighth in the world in C

scores vet 3 - high in economic indexes. During the decade from 

London will rank eighth. Even though Britain is challenge

territorial size, it makes superb use of its limited space ,and c

productivity. In military terms, even though Britain is a nuclear 

will decline, while the nonnuclear rntlitat3- forces of Japan and 

increasingly improve and close this military gap. Because o

factors, Britain will probably be surpassed by Italy by 2010. It

give Rome a greater role as its surpasses Britain and rises 

seventh-ranking power. 

India. Reforms in India began 13 years after those in Chin

reform process is still influenced by political instability. Politics 

the extent of further reform. At the same time, India's defense 

increase. Its state-owned enterprises are only slowly being priv

The Rank Orderin 2000-2020. By 2010, China will have imp

order by only one level, rising from the world's ninth pow

244 
decline by 2010. India will remain in 13th place. 

Although CASS predicts only what the CNP of the world's 

will look like in 2010, by using their statistics from 1990, 2000

is possible to project forward tile scores another 10 years to 20

the projec6ons, in 2020 Japan will pass the United States to plac

in the world; China will move into seventh place, ahead of En

Korea will pass China, jumping into the number six spot; and R

even further, to number nine. The rank of all other countries w

salTle. 

The Future of Japan and the United States. Japan's CNP score by 

almost as high as that of the United States. Assuming Japan sus

CNP growth rate, Japanese CNP in 2020 will surpass the Un

about 19 percent--an extraordinary fnding of the CASS civ

obviously fulfills the prediction by Deng Xiaoping's advisers in t

that the United States will lose its hegemony as the multip

arrives. Yet it seems to open the potential for a new hegemony 

The CNP scores of Japan and the United States are both tw

the scores for Russia and China--a situation that does n

predictions of five "poles" in a multipolar structure. Rather

possibility that a security alliance of the United States and Japa

their CNP scores) would score four times higher than China a

China and Russia could combine their CNP scores in an allianc

still have but half the score of the combination of the United Sta

A comparison of tables 8 and 9 shows that CASS findings co

with those of the _&MS; this contrast becomes even greater when 

projected forward another 10 years. In order to compare the C

245 
France (4) 150 (4) 

Italy 125 (6) 137 (5) 

England 116 (7) 115 (7) 

Canada 92 (9) 86 (10) 

Australia 71 (11) 66 (12) 

South Africa 34 (16) 32 (16) 

USSR - 

Russia 131 (5) 121 (6) 

China 102 (8) 110 (8) 

India 53 (13) 55 (13) 

Indonesia 37 (15) 39 (15) 

South Korea 87 (10) . 105 (9) 

Brazil 69 (12) 75 (11) 

Mexico 49 (14) 51 (14) 

Egypt 

129 (5) 141 

115 (7) 

116 (6) 

1oo (8) 

78 0o) 

36 (15) 

184 (-'2) 

(139) (4)* 

94 (9) 

51 (13) 

34 (16) 

70 (11) 

62 (1-9) 

46 (14) 

30 (17) 26 (1,") 23(1D 

*In oriDnal chart to denote what retro Russia proieetions might have been. 

Source: The scores for 1990, 2000 and 2010 are from Wang Songfen, ed., Sh#ie 7htO'aoo

),a~)¢ (Comparat*ve studms of the comprehensive national power of the world's malo

Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 438. The scores for 2020 were generated by the author. 

of CASS and _&MS, it was necessary, to calculate the CNP 

country as a percentage of the U.S. CNP score (table 10). Two 

differences between the orthodox and reform calculation resu

from the comparison are: 

246 
Colonel Huang of,~MS also calculates the CNP of the major n

world, with results that are greatly different from those generat

Huang forecasts CNP scores only for the year 2000, but by usin

CNP growth rates he provides, it was possible to project forwa

to 2010 and 2020. These estimates show China passing Japan in th

passing Germany in 2011, becoming equal with the U.S. in 20

taking the number-one position in the CNP rank order in 2022 

In his second book, Huang provides 1996 CNP scores tha

those of On Comprehensive National Power, in that they show Jap

more powerful than Germany's. However, the revised 1996 scores 

the big differences in CNP forecasts between CASS and AMS co

rise of China and the decline of the United States. 

C-~rl ) Versus GDP Forecasts 

For comparison purposes it is useful to contrast predictions of 

with future Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Some analysts consi

index to be an excellent indicator of a nation's power, but 

simply is one factor contributing to overall CNP, and a country

CNP rankings are not always the same. While Huang Shuo

provide any statistics on future GDP, part of the CASS process o

CNP is to first estimate GDP (table 11). "As a comprehensiv

reflects a country's actual economic strength, GDP and Co

National Power are closely interrelated, and GDP is an importan

part of Comprehensive National Power... countries whose" GD

Past, also have comparatively dear strengthening of their CNP, an

247 
to have the reverse outcome. According to the CASS estim

rank number 4 in GDP in 2010, while it will be number 8 th

"Itae country, with the biggest predicted difference in GDP and 

however, is Russia. CASS calculations place Russia fifteenth in 

ranking, s, but sixth in those for CNP. 

Table 9. Score and Rank Projections to 2020 of AMS C'~'P S

Country 1989 2000 20;0 2020 

United States 593.33 (1) 816.85 (1) 1066.21 (1) 1391.71 (

USSR 386.72 (2) 648.34 (2) - - 

Germany 378.10 (3) 558.23 (3) 772.36 (2) 1068.63 (

Japan 368.04 (4) 537.39 (4) 736.35 (4) 1009 (4

China . 999.33 (6) . 437.35 (5) 768.57 (3) 1350.63 (

France 276.35 (5) 384.93 (6) 507.36 (3) 668.73 (6

Engtand 214.08 (,'7") 281.24 (7) 353.05 (8) 

136.64 (10) 

443.19 (8

Brazil 156.05 (8) °.267.70 (9) 419.72 (7) 658.09 (7

India 144.16 (9) 274.08 (8) 468.15 (6) 799.67 (5

Canada 177.41 (10) 

119-.59 (11) 147.91 (11) 

220.56 (9) 

Australia 185.67 (10) 

274.18 (9

233.07 (1

Source: The scores for 1989 and 2000, and the yearly growth rates are from Huang Shu

(On comprehensive national power)(Beiling: Zhongguo shehui kexue ehubanshe, 199-

2010 and 2020 were generated by the author. 

C~Wang So~,fen, ed., Sh~ie ~htg"aoguojia wngheguoli tnjlaoyanjiu, 432-433; the 

434. 

248 
>, 

t~ 

<S 

~~~1~~1~1 

t~ 

249 
Chinas economy could be the worlds largest by 2020, Li Z

CICIR states, "Whether the above cited estimates have erro

people would disagree that China's overall national strength 

behind the United States, but may catch up with Japan and 

exceed Russia. ''69 Other Chinese authors also refer to the p

findings of Western organizations to backup their assertions of 

power. Chen Zhongjingo former president of CICIR, agre

Department of Defense report that by 2010 China will be nu

GNP7 ° 

Other Predictions 

The team at CASS and Colonel Huang at AMS are not th

analysts to calculate and predict future CNP; in fact, virtually e

book about international relations and the future security

mentions the concept. The CASS and ,~MS studies are uniq

provide extensive details and explanations about their a

calculation processes, as well as numerous data tables of the

other Chinese authors only mention CNP in general terms o

predictions, do not elaborate on how they derived their conclus

despite their lack of details, it is important to set forth other c

forecasts as a contrast to those of CASS and AMS. 

*~Li Zhongcheng, "The Role of an Emerging China in World Politics," Conte

Relations 8, no. 2 (February 1998): 10. 

'°Chen Zhongjing, C, uoji ghanlue wenti (Problems of international strate

chubanshe, 1988). 

250 
Japan 2932.1 3691.5 4865.3 

Germany 1618.3 2092.6 2626.8 

France 1194.8 1450.3 1785.1 

Italy 1095.1 1325.7 1647.8 

England 975.5 1182.7 1455.7 

Canada 569.4 721.2 914.2 

Australia 294.5 397.8 534.6 

South Africa 102.1 119.2 149.8 

Russia 382.5 225.6 367.4 

China 369.9 928.2 2003.8 

India 303.2 477.0 814.7 

Indonesia 106.3 198.0 408.1 

South Korea 244.0 487.2 976.4 

Brazil 476.0 746.1 1215.2 

Mexico 244.0 341.2 529.8 

Egypt 48.0 65.9 92.95 

1.61 2.81 

2.21 2.8

0.73 2.7

0.85 2.6

0.73 2.7

1.26 3.1

2.29 3.5

-0.02 2.6

-16.2 2.9

11.67 8.2

3.57 5.3

6.74 6.2

7.00 7.2

Z52 6.0 

2.48 4.0

3.06 3.3

Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Sh~iie ZDuyaa guojia Zanghe guah" bijiaa yanfiu (Comparati

comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chuban

251 
Japan 2 2 2 3 2 

Germany 3 3 3 4 3 

France 4 4 5 5 4 

Italy 5 5 6 7 6 

England 6 6 7 6 7 

Canada 7 9 10 8 9 

Australia 12 12 12 9 11 

Soufll Africa 16 16 16 15 16 

Russia 9 14 15 - 5 

China 10 7 4 9 8 

India 11 10 11 13 13 

Indonesia 15 15 14 16 15 

South Korea 14 11 9 11 10 

Brazil 8 8 8 12 12 

Mexico 13 13 13 14 14 

E~'pt 17 17 17 17 17 

Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shifty Zh~Zw guojia Wnghe guoh bifiaoyanjT"u (Compar

comprehensive national power of the world's maior nanons)(Changsha: Hunan chub

252 
are shown in table 13. In addition to Yu and Wang, the CASS 

briefly describes the work of Huang Shuofeng, but does not com

his or Yu and Wang's analysis methods or results with its own. 

CICIR Calcukations. Yan Xuetong of CICIR also calculates CNP 

which he breaks down into six factors: manpower, natural 

economics, politics, military, affairs, and history, and culture

explanation he gives for his measurement process is that he use

index average value method.., to conduct quantitative analysis. 

zMthough Yah does not calculate the past CNP scores 

countries, or forecast their future CNP, he describes the "pos

unbalanced power development trend '' as a situation where "t

China, Japan, and Germany is relativdy tending toward strengthen

United States, Russia, England and France are moving toward dec

assessment of China's CNP is quite positive: "China's national po

is particularly outstanding, accelerating the speed of the changes in 

of strength." However, he does note that when viewed on a g

"China already is one of the world's great nations, but if a nat

comp'arison is carried out among the five major post-Cold War p

China still is only a regional power," for "there is a very large gap 

indexes of China, Russia, Japan, and Germany, and that of 

States. ''73 Yan is optimistic about the future development of Chi

7tYu Hort~:i and Wang Youdi, '"Zonghe guoli cedu pingjie (Measuring the value of 

national power)" Kefijthbu yu duice (,qciendfic and technological progress and ways 

it) 1989, 5, in Wang Songfen, ec[, Shzfi'e ~ g@'ia .wngfg guoli bifiao.y'anjiu, 50-51. 

7.~an Xuetong, Zbongguoguojia liyifenxi (_Amalysis of China's national interests)(H

renmin chubanshe, 1996), 88. 

'3Ibid., 57, 94-95. 

253 
Table 13. Hubei Science Commission c-2qP Caa'ulations (19

Function Dimension Structure Level 

Caunt 9" (F~) L s 

United States 0.5049 0.9262 

Soviet Union 0.2048 0.8252 

Japan 0.1434 0.8815 

Germany 0.0854 0.8839 

England 0.0621 0.9178 

France 0.0609 0.8907 

China 0.0757 0.6409 

Canada 0.0489 0.9225 

Italy 0.0454 0.8757 

Australia 0.0207 0.9133 

India 0.0298 0.6256 

Egypt 0.0057 0.7509 

Source: Yu Hongyi and Wang Youdi, "Zonghe guoli cedu pinglie (Measuring the va

national power)" Ktfij/nbu)u di~dae (Scmntific and "l'echnologaca[ Progress and Ways of 

5, in Shijte zb~aa guafia zongheguoli bijTaayanflu, Wang Songfen, ecl., 50-51. 

74Ibid., 89. 

254 
\ratllral Resources 1 O. 04 O. 7 I 

Politics 1 0.5 0.7 0.5 

Economics::'::" 1 0.6 0.17 0.1 

Milia 9" Affairs 1 0.14 0.3 0.6 

Culture 1 0.9 1 0.9 

Total 1 0.44 0.53 0.6 

*In general it is believed that 200 million is most ideal for the population of a gre

population is well over that, so it has a negative effect on national power growth, added 

overall education level is lower than the four other countries, therefore its index is smalle

United States, Japan, and Russia. 

**The economic index is based on 1993 GNP; China's and Russia's indexes wer

average values of exchange and PPP calculations. 

Source: Yah Xuetong, Z/mngguoguqfia I~qfenx'i (Analysis of China's national interests)(Tianji

chubanshe, 1996), 95. 

1994 Confidential Cagwlations. According to the Hong Kon

ChengMine~ a confidential report, "War to be Won," about the pe

2010, was released in 1994 by the Policy Research Office of the C

Council, the Policy Research Office of the Central Military Com

the Policy Research Office of the Communist Part), Central 

Classified as confidential, it was a document to be studied by de

Beijing and the provinces. The main points are that the two 

Taiwan Strait will be unified and the comprehensive national 

China will be in the top three in the world. China's GNP, exclu

255 
any of the Chinese studies discussed in this chapter. The 199

those countries they had in common, as well as a few additions, 

States (1), Singapore (2), Hong Kong (3), Canada (10), Britain 

(14), Australia (1N, Taiwan (16),Japan (18), France (_91), China 

Mexico (34), Korea (35), Brazil (37), Indonesia (40), India (41

(42), and Russia (46). For some of the above nations, majo

place in comparison to their rankings from the previous year: J

9 to 18, Korea from 30 to 35, and Brazil from 33 to 37. On 

Taiwan rose from 23 to 16, aald China from 27 to 24] 6 

FINDINGS 

In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping asserted that it was import

future trends in CNP, a concept that helps guide China's reform

economics, science, defense, and other factors. Although it w

1984, Chinese authors justifi," the concept as stemming from a

strategists as well as Chairman Mao. CNP scores are impor

powers because they can help identify: 

• The stares hierarchy in world politics 

• The power of potential rivals and potential partners 

• \\rho will best exploit the RI\'L.~, 

VSAccordmg to Professor .Allen S. Whiting, ".Although Cheng Ming is a Hon

has a good track record of acquiring authentic PRC classified documents." 

"East Asian Militae,, Securities Dynamics," Asia-Pacific Research Center, St

Februat T 1995, 49, fcxomote 9. The article also stated that China will have t

carriers and a PLA reduced to only 1.5 million from today's 3 lniUion. 

Chinese spacecraft will be lannched and a space station will have been esta

ve"World's Competitive Countries List," The Associated Press, April 21, 1998

256 
to measure future growth rates in national power. 

The militaD, team's quantitative results are consistent with th

Chinese view that a multipolar world structure is emerging an

hegemony is ending. In particular, according to the milita~ estima

quantitative power score by 2010 shows a decreasing gap between 

States and the other major powers. By 2020, the U.S. score will e

China, assuming China's power growth rate continues to be 

double the U.S. rate of 2.7 percent. Germany and Japan will also 

CNP growth rates than the United States, ranking third and fou

power after the United States and China in 2020. If these grow

extended another decade or so, China, Japan, and Gennaaly will all 

or surpass the United States in CNP, but the United States will re

of Russia (which is not scored because of uncertainty,') and India, 

rank order of CNP. 

The civilian team's results contradict the orthodox view 

emerging multipolar structure. "l-he most striking contrast is the as

China's growth rate relative to the United States (table 15). The c

does not rank China equal to the United States by 2020 but me

number eight in the world, with a projected power score of only ab

U.S. CNP by 2010 and 2020. A second contrast is that the civ

quantitative results place Japan not number four in the world 

equal to the United States. Japan pulls ahead of the United S

percent in 2020. China in 2020 will still rank only seventh in the w

not only the United States and Japan, but Germany, Frarlce, Ita

South Korea in CNP. 

These differences between the civilian "reform" and military" 

estimates of the future geopolitical power hierarchy take on sig

light of the claims made by Deng Xiaoping and many Chinese au

257 
Table 15. A Comparison 0fCASS attd AMS Growth Ra

AMS CASS 

Count 9, 1989-2000 1990-2000 2000-2010 

United 2.7% -1.36% -1.16% 

States 

Japan 3.2 1.36 1.2 

China 5.8 .85 .78 

Source: Huang Shuofeng, Zongheguah" lun (On comprehensive national power)(Beijin

kexue chubanshe, 1992): and Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie Zhuyaoguojia zongheguo~ bifia

studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha

1996). 

Chinese military authors assert that national power s

determine the outcome of wars. If so, the Chinese military- team

results suggest China has little to fear from Japanese national 

and still less by 2020 when Japan will slip to fourth place. Bette

ofrnilita_ry, threats to China, the military team's results suggest C

three-fourths of the power score of the United States by 2010 a

equal to the United States by 2020. 

258 
CHINA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONME

linked to its views of future warfare. This chapter introduces 

authors who may be divided into the three schools of thought in 

that analyze likely wars and recommend what types of prepa

should undertake. 

WHERE WILL LOCAL WARS OCCUR? 

Chinese articles and books describe the current "new era" as one 

in which the new world strategic pattern is in the process of rep

one. They predict that regional wars will be a significant part of 

"If large-scale armed conflicts and local wars happea~.., it can res

changes in critical regional situations and immensely harm the glo

situation. ''1 Where will these wars break out? Several Chinese 

suggested that the fault lines of future war in the multip

environment will not be the same as during the bipolar Sov

confrontation. Colonel Xu Weidi of the National Defense Unive

predicts that the two great zones of war will be the East Asian litt

of territorial disputes) and the Eurasian zone, including Central 

Persian Gulf. 2 At present, half the world's 48 local wars are in A

1Xia Lipmg, Wang Zhongchun, Wen Zhonghua, and Xu Weidi, "Shijie zha

zhuyao tedian yu quski" (The world strategic situation--characteristics and tr

fazhan (Peace and Development) 47, no. 1 (February 1994): 18. 

2Colonel Xu Weidi, "Post Cold War Naval Security Environment," Worl

(Beijmg: Academy of Military Science, no date). 

259 
concludes, While the balance of power will still play an imp

pursuit ofhegemonism will further destabilize the original fra

Asia. ''4 Hegemonism runs counter to the Asian reality of the ri

of power centers and comes into conflict with the ever-m

demand to be master of its own house. "It actually puts 

confrontation with these multiple forces." Shen criticizes Jose

U.S. Assistant Secretat 3, of Defense, by quoting him as bei

change from American leadership to having an American role 

of power in East Asia. 

No matter where wars break out, Chinese authors suggest 

mare causes of wars will be the struggle for economic resourc

Liu Mingde states, "The Marxists hold that the conflict of eco

is the root of war." He explains that the Arab-Israeli dispute 

Israel's hea W reliance on the Jordan River" and that Iran-Ir

Gulf War were about petroleum. Similarly, the civil war in Yug

between "poor" Serbia and the "rich" Slovenia and Croatia

that "competition in Comprehensive National Power has 

scrambling for resources among nations. ''s 

A likely area for future wars will be Central Asia, where "ab

resources will become the target of a struggle" between the maj

United States wants the energy resources, but Russia is unwill

the status of a second-rank country" and will resist the 

eShen Qurong ','May Earlier Maturity- Come to Peace: Thoughts on Asia's Fu

International Relations 6, no. 9 (September 1996): 14. 

4Ibid., 14. 

SLiu MJagde, '"The Implications of Changes m Warfare After the Disintegra

Structure," Guoji zhanlueTanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 24, no. 2 (

26O 
wpUgC

an energy, resources base that can replace the Gulf in the fu

International forces covet the treasure chest that is Central Asia

WI-LA_T KIND OF WARS COULD AFFECT CH

Since 1994, several dozen articles have appeared in the Chinese 

militat 7 journals that purport to discuss China's current and fu

strategy. These articles are not all in agreement. At least three 

more schools of thought may be distinguished. 

People's Wear Scenan'os 

• The enemy--the United States, Russia, or Japan--will inva

subjugate China. 

• The war will last many years. 

• China's leaders will move to alternative national capitals du

• China's defense industrial base will arm rmllions of militia in 

until the enemy can be defeated by the main army. 

eYang Shuheng, "Lengzhan hou daguo he diqu liliang dui Zhongva de z

struggles over Central Asia by major nations and regional forces in the post-Co

l-Iq~ing)'ufaghan (Peace and Development) 60, no. 2 (June 1997): 29, 45. 

261 
Local War Scenarios 

• The opponent will not be a superpower. 

• The war will be near China's border. 

• The war will not be a deep invasion. 

• China will seek a quick military decision. 

• Rapid reaction forces will defeat the local forces of Japan

Central Asia, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, or Indonesia. 

Local war is identified by the authors' call for China to p

protracted People's War with national mobilization, but for 

scale "local war under high-tech conditions," or simply L

zhanzheng). These authors frequently cite a speech by Deng 

Central Military Commission in 1985 to explain the origins 

Deng's speech flatly decreed that the world would not be seei

or a major nuclear war for "a long time to come." In the de

speech, more than 30 conflict scenarios have been spelled o

Chinese analysts from this school of thought, as well as in in

7A ~cent endorsement of People's War appeared January. 9, 1998, in Liber

quoted Defense Minister Chi Haofian, who at the National Defense Univer

high-tech conditions, we still need to insist on People's War.'" Chi said th

the product of histozical and dialectical materialism." 

262 
Ra~IA Scenan'os 

The opponent---perhaps the U.S., Russia or Japan--will have advan

satellites for communications and reconnaissance, stealth aircraft, nucl

and nanotechnology. Therefore China must: 

• Close an " information gap." 

• Network all forces. 

• Attack the enemy C3I to paralyze its operations. 

• Pre-empt enemy attacks. 

• Use directed energ T weapons. 

• Use computer viruses. 

• Use submarine-launched munitions. 

• Use antisateUite weapons. 

• Use forces to prevent a logistics buildup. 

• Use special operations raids. 

The third school of thought probably dates only from 

represented by a few books and perhaps a few dozen articles, altho

in the I'¢MA seemed to increase after file NATO bombing camp

Serbia in 1999. However, its proponents include several generals 

(or are recently retired from) high positions in China's most influen

institutions. This third school of thought recommends that China 

future warfare along the lines of concepts first discussed by 

~The author conducted over 60 interviews with Chinese military and civilia

March 1995 to October 1998. 

263 
past decade have been discussing the same subject. The subje

new; it had been discussed earlier in books such as Gener

Chinese National Defense Concepts, published in 1988. \X/hat was 

Beijing was the enthusiasm; even the official newspaper, Libera

began to publish almost weekly articles about the military-tech

and its implications for China. In October 1995, the official m

a national conference had been held to discuss the implication

revolution in milita~- affairs. 

Soviet military science and its Chinese counterpart expli

use of "scientific" forecasts about the changing nature of fu

other words, it is not optional but mandated by "militar

strategists must concern themselves with the search for th

"revolutionary" changes in warfare, brought about mainly b

change, rather than falsely assuming that mere evolution

continue3 ° 

Qktggong, "Dangqian de guoji juns|fi aaxquan xingslfi" CFhe current in

security situation), Gu~" ~a, tlueyanfiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no

9. Li is a Research Fellow at China Institute of International Strategic Stu

tOOne description of RMAs comes from a Senior Adviser at CIISS, who w

typical view in our country, has it that human |fistory has thus far witu

revolutions: The earliest one emerged with bare-handed fights; the second 

the extensive military use of 'cold steel' after the invention of metallurg

change in the military field came to the fore when human society stepped 

areas, as gunpowder was invented and firearms were used militarily on a la

found itself in the period of mechanized warfare following the manu

combustion engines and the fabrication and broad military utilization of m

from the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century; and the fifth re

affairs began to emerge during the second half of this century in company 

military application of nuclear weapons, electronic and micro-elec

computers, remote sensing and control technology, new material and 

264 
and its related requirement to anticipate military revolut

"experiment scientifically" with organizations, exercises, an

equipment. Rather, American studies of how military innovation 

to emphasize the somewhat accidental role of the relatively ra

genius who invents a new concept, pushes a new doctrinal ide

resource allocations together with his organizational allies. 

Like the RMA school, the Local War school also borrow

American concepts. After the Gulf War in 1991, local 

incorporated many aspects of American strategy into their con

war. More than 40 books, published by the Academy of Mil

(.A2vlS) and NDU, drew on examples from the Gulf War in orde

how China's concept of local war should be implemented in the 

Most of this writing focused on how the Chinese military may ha

itself from an American-style Gulf War offensive action. In a sim

in the last 5 years the main Chinese military newspaper Liberatio

has published several hundred articles attempting to descri

doctrine and Chinese military exercises designed to cope with 

enemy." These articles and books leave little doubt that t

equipment, and uniforms that will be possessed by this high-tec

be the forces of the United States or its military allies. 

These three schools of authors cannot be easily reconciled. W

budget it is hard to prepare for all three types of future 

oceaneering and bioengineering technology, and aerospace technology, as 

epochal character of the historical transition period and the evolution in t

situation." Wang Zhenxi, "The New Wave of Military Revolution in the XYgo

yanjiu (I.ntemational Strategic Studies) 44, no. 2 (April 1997): 2. 

nV. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (London: MacDonald and James, 

265 
War. They explicitly describe future local warfare as concl

matter of days or weeks, in which there will be no time 

population; instead, there will be an intense tempo. Succ

certainly require China to consider pre-emptive strikes against 

or beyond China's borders in order to achieve an "early, deci

Since the early 1980s, foreign scholars have declared in a s

that local war has become the official strategic doctrine o

conclusions may have been premature. Not only have the neo

continued to appear, but in interviews conducted by the 

Chinese militarv officers have declared that local war doctrin

written for China's .A.nned Forces, nor has it been formally 

Central Milita~" Commission, at least as of 1995. Dennis 

Assistant Army Attachd in Beijing, has pointed out that the

People's Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine of Local War, in 

articles since 1985: 

On two separate occasions in the fall of 1994 and early 19

general and a senior colonel at the AMS (Academy of Milita D

Belling) denied that what is known in the West as the "PLA's 

l,ocal War" even exists or is anything as formal as the U.S. Ar

defined by FNI 100-5 .... Indeed, no formal "Doctrine of Loc

been formulated or even ordered to be developed by the G

Department .... Vv't~ile it is possible that these three differ

assigmed to the AMS and numerous contributors to Chin

publications are trying to deceive foreigners about the curr

Chinese militat 3, thinking, informal conversations with officer

266 
given to the further development of China's nuclear forces, wh

seem connected to Local War theory. Additionally, a series o

articles has appeared advocating a Chinese blue water navy, whic

to have no link to the Local War doctrine. PLA naval authors ass

war at sea covers two large zones of "active defense." Within th

from the PRC coast out to the "First Island Chain," there are 

each with its own naval forces providing a "multilevel in-dept

sea:" 

• Out to 50 miles, which is defended by radar, missile

coastal patrol boats such as missile speedboats and fast g

where laying mines and clearing enemy mines are vet-)- imp

• From 50 to 300 miles from the coast, which is defend

destroyers and corvettes, including ship-based helicopters 

• From the Korean peninsula to the Ryuk)~u and Spratly Is

is defended by submarines with advanced missiles and 

planes. 13 

The second island chain the Chinese Na W aspires to patrol ext

line from the Aleutians through Guam and the Philippines. Ho

"island chains" are not discussed by PLA Navy authors who wr

tL~vL~. 

"2Dennis Blasko, "Better Late Than Never. Non-equipment Aspects of PLA 

Modernization," in Chinese Military Modernization , eds. C. Dennison Lane, Mark 

and Dimon Liu (Washington: AEI Press, 1996), 131. 

13Captain Chen Yungkang and Lieutenant Colmnmlder Chai ~X'enchung, "

Evolving PRC Naval Strategy," China Mainland ~Fgapei, September 1, 1997): 

267 
satellites in space, and efforts to paralyze an enemy's comm

system by nonnuclear attacks on its homeland. These articles a

major conferences that focused on a future potential revolu

affairs cannot be neatly fitted into the framework of either 

authors or the advocates of "local war under high tech cond

INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS 

OF THE THREE SCHOOLS 

These three schools may be seen as independent viewp

individual could hold. They may also reflect institutional "ho

schools' authors work. RMA advocates (who tend to be sen

a few major generals) seem to be employed by the AM

components of the Commission on Science, Technology" a

National Defense (COSTIND) complex, such as the Ch

Corporation and its research institutes like the Beijing Inst

Engineering. Local war authors occupy most of the highest 

PLA and also are employed at the NDU, which trains al

generals. People's War school authors seem to be senior 

members of the General Political Department, and senior mili

Armed Police (PAP) leaders. 

FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE THREE SC

The three schools may also to some extent reflect the current 

existing fbrce structure, its efforts in doctrinal development, th

its inventory, and the types of conflict scenarios used as poin

260 ° 
LOCAL WAR SCHOOL 

PEOPLE'S WAR SCHOOL / i!i!  ̧:

/ 

A 

Peopk's War School 

According to Dennis Blasko, the base of the pyramid represents 

War school, which encompasses the vast majority of the People

Arm), today. The military thought of Mao Zedong provides th

foundation for this school) s 

14In the following discussion of the force structure of the three schools, the a

indebted to Dennis Blasko's observations. See Dennis J. Blasko, "A Ne

Structure," in The People's La'beration Arm)' in the bformation Age, eds. James C. 

Richard H. Yang (Santa Momca, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1999), 258-28

lSFor examples of Chinese writing on People's Warfare, see Liu Sheng'e and M

jubu ghanzheng tiaofian xia de renmin zhangheng ('People's War under the cond

technology warfare)(Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1996); Song Shilun, A 

into Mao Zedong's Military Thought (in Chmese)(Beiiing: Junshi kexue chubansh

Pufen& ed., Mao Zedongjunshi x~hanlue hm (On Mao Zedonges military, strategy)

269 
pg, 

explains that even a "superior" enemy can be defeated through 

of Mao's concepts, "In a high-tech war, one should still d

principles of people's war to defeat the superior enemy, for pe

maximumly promote our combat superioriu, and degrade 

superiorly-. In a high-tech war, as long as we persist in allying 

forces, combining various combat forms and integrating arm

with non-armed operations, we can employ the great role of pe

isolate the enemy. ''~6 

These forces are trained to defend the mainland, its adjacen

space from invasion. They would fight along side the militia a

an invader using concepts devised by Mao 60 years ago that h

kexue chubanshe, 1993); and Xia Zhengnan, Mao Zedongjunshi ghanlue lu

military methodology)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995). See also 

articles, -all in Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Wasrare (Washington: 

University Press, 1997): Chen Zhou, "Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng 

youxian zhanzheng lilun zhi butonge' (Chinese modem local war and U

Zhongguojunsbi kexue (China Military ,Science) 33, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 4

"Shilun woguo xfin shiqi de guofang zhengce" (Defense policy in the new er

ke:,-ue (China Military Science) 29, no. 4 (~rmter 1994): 43-49; Shen Kui

zhanzheng zhong yilieshenKvou de bianzhengfa (Dialectics of defeating the 

inferior), Zbon~0fivnsht" he.\rue (China Military Science) 29, no. 4 0,Vinter 1994

Naiming0 "lianchi jiji fan~-u, shixing xiandai fiaojian xia renmin zhanzheng" 

defense and modem people's war)," in Deng Xiaaping ~banlue sixiang lun (On 

Strategic Thought), eds. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (Beijing: Junshi 

1994), 9-80-298; WeiJincheng, "Information War. A New Form of People's W

Jiefang/~m bao (Liberation Army Daily),June 25, 1996; and Zhao Nanqi, "Xu'" 

theory of defense moderIfization), in Deng Xiaoping ~hanlue si, xT"ang lun (On 

strategic thought), eds. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (Beijing: Junshi 

1994), 1-12, foreword. 

16Shen Kuiguan, "Gao jishu zhanzheng zhong yilieshengyou de bianzhen

defeating the superior with file inferior)," Zbongguojunshi kexue (China Militar

4 0,Vinter 1994): 105-109, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Wa(are, 218-2

270 
fight against domestic and foreign enemies, and to win the war. B

file rapid development of science and technology and its wide a

militarily, there have been many new changes and new charact

modem wars. But these changes and characteristics have in no wa

the role and function of people's warfare in future anti-aggression 

the same time, the future people's warfare must also ada

characteristics of modem wars. 18 

The enduring legacy and utilization ofMao Zedong's militar

be seen both in the continued publication of articles and books 

theories, as well as in its continued application in China's mi

today. For example, in 1994, the six-volume Mi~'ta O, Writings ofMa

published; it contains 1,612 military cables, orders, comments 

reports, letters, and theoretical works on military affairs tha

between August 1927 and December 1972. The introduction pub

People's DaiS, on June 13 stated that most of the writings had neve

published and that the work is "the most systematic and comp

Mao's military writing. 

A case where Mao's philosophy and strategies have been re

reported by China National Defense News in 1994. An ar

"Discussions on 'Concentrating Forces to Fight a War of A

disclosed: 

tTWang Naiming, "Jianchi jiji fang)u, shixing xiandai tiaojian xia renmm zhan

to active defense and modem people's war). In Dens XiaffMng .zhanlue sixia

Xiaoping(s strategic thought), eds. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (Beijing

Press, 1994), 280-298, in Pillsbury.-, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 43. 

13Fang Ning, "Shilun woguo xin shiqi de guofang zhengce" (Defense policy 

Zhongguojunshi keaT~e (China Military Science) 29, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 43

Chinese Views of Future Wa~are, 54-55. 

271 
contended that the forms of concentrating forces should b

from "group" concentrations to "scattered" concentrations 

advance concentrations to mobile concentrations) ~ 

Stratagem and deception are particularly important in Peop

tactics these units practice are similar to d~ose used in the War 

(1937-45), the War of Liberation (1945-49), the Korean War (

the 1979 conflict with Vietnam. The campaign against Vietnam 

major PL& engagement against a foreign foe, and its shortcom

the stimulus for the military modernization efforts of the 1980

It is this segment of the PLA that will be reduced by 500,0

as announced bv President Jiang Zemin at the 15th Party

September 1997. A large portion of the 500,000-man reducti

already has been, transferred to PAP. As defined by the March 

Defense Law, PAP is part of the Chinese ~M'rned Forces but is or

separate from the PLA. The National Defense Law define

mission of the PLA as a defensive fighting mission, or external d

the primary, mission of PAP is safeguarding securit T and main

19 China National Defense News, June 3, 1994. More recendy Xinhua reporte

Political Department entrusted the Nanjing Political Academy with tile run

to study how to teach the course 'An Introduction to Mao Zedong ~lao

academies and schools a few days ago. More than 130 teachers for polit

academies and schools of the armed forces and the Armed Police Force carri

study and discussion on how to improve the teaching of this course. Th~ stud

session was aimed at seeking unity in the guiding ideology, purposes, and req

teaching of the course '.-ha Introduction to Mao Zedong Thought,' energetica

key points, difficult points, teaching methods, and teaching characteristics o

raising the overall teaching level of the course 'An Introduction to Mao Zed

all academies and schools of the axmed forces." "Academy Runs PLA Ses

Mac, Zcdong Thought," Be.ijing Xinhua Domestic Sen, ice, June 12, 1999, in 

0612,June 12, 1999. 

272 
Square in 1989. 

Local War School 

The second tier of the PLA pyramid is the Local War school, wh

maybe 15 percent of all army, navy, and air force units. The wri

Xiaoping contain the theory that justifies this school. 2° In the 

PLA began its modernization program, it developed rapid 

experimental forces, and what has been labeled the "Doctrine o

Local war is understood to be a limited war on the periphery 

would be short but intense, utilizing advanced technolog3" weapo

fighting in a ioint and combined arms effort. It envisions an ele

projection (the ability, to transport combat forces beyond China's 

by definition is regional, not global. Some rapid reaction and 

units have been the recipients of the numerically limited impo

hardware reported so vigorously by the media. Many units in th

2%ix representative articles on local war by senior officers are: Liu Huaqing

jiaqiang guofang xiandaihua jianshe" (Defense modernization in histori

Zhongguojunshi ke.x~#e (China Military Science) 29, no. 4 (X~'inter 1994): 7

"Woiun houqin xiandaihua jianshe de zhinan" (Future logistics modernizatio

kex'ue (China Military Science) 26, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 2-10; Yang Huan, "\V

wuqi zhuangbei de fazhan" (Chma's strategic nuclear weaponry), in H

(Retrospect and prospect Chinese defense science, technology and industry)(

gougye dmbanshe), 157-159; X,X~u Jianguo, "Gaojishu zhanzheng zhong de h

hushi" (Nuclear shadows on high-tech warfare), Zhongguojunshi kexue (China 

33, no. 4 0,V~'mter 1995): 107-109; Chen Benchan, "Woguo zhuangjiabing 

fazhan de huigu yu zhanwanff' (Research and development of armor), in H

(Retrospect and prospect: Chinese defense science, technology, and industry)(

gongye chubanshe), 169-171; Ding Henggao, "Guofang keji gongye fazha

wenti de sikao" (Reforming defense science, technology and industry), Zh

(China Military Science) 27, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 67-73; all in Pillsbury, Clffn

IVa~re. 

273 
has no combat experience in this type of conflict, n At t

development and dissemination of doctrine on how the PLA w

a war are extremely limited. The number of units actually prepa

to these modern standards is problematic, but this portion o

expected to grow in the future. There has been concern rega

need for development in this area; for example, in 1994, the Vic

the State Information Center, Wu Jiapei, admitted that China 

years behind the United States and the West in the technica

information networks. He urged China to "speed up the 

renovation of its 'information highways' and improve its man

them. ''= Additionally, after the U.S. accidental bombing of 

embassy in Belgrade, there may have been an increased co

members of the Local War school to "improve the qualig, 

armament development. ''23 An organizational change was a

"Beijing's latest response to the Kosovo crisis and the Cox R

which prompted calls from diplomats and military sources to 

People's Liberation Army's combat capacity, to check the Uni

Western Alliance's military status. ''24 

21Dennis J. Blasko, "A New PLA Force Structure," 258-288. 

22S andT Daily, April 16, 1994. 

23For example, the Liberation Army Daily, June 9, 1999 quotes General 

director of the General Armament Deparunent of the PLA spe "aking on the 

24C,,xy Huang, "Beijing Sets Up Panel on High Tech Weapons," Hong Kong S

1999, 6, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0611, June 14, 1999. The article further stated

setting up a powerful task force.., under the all-powerful Central Military C

a revival of the mah~aand's endeavor from the late 1950s to 1970s, when Mars

was assigned by chairman Mao Zedong to head an army of leading scie

technicians and intelligence officers to develop China's first nuclear bo.mb

274 
THREE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE SCENA

Different types of conflict scenarios emerge from the d

alternative Chinese schools of thought. In interviews with Ch

officers, there are distinctive premises and assumptions made 

three schools of thought about Asian conflict scenarios. From 

of the eternal Mao framework, the most significant and likely 

take-over of a major power by a madman bent on the invasio

"turn China into a colony." Whether Russian, Japanese, or ~

madman could successfully carry, out the first phase of his 

penetrate several hundred miles into China along several axes 

This school is obviously vulnerable to allegations of "fi

war." The example of a 7-year war (1937-45) against the Japa

with a loss of over 20 million Chinese lives occurred during the 

Chinese military officers over the age of 55. This school 

particularly committed to the need to maintain a defense mob

and defense industry for production of weapons in the deep inte

where an alternative command center m:d national capi

established for the years required to repulse the madman's inv

The Local War school of thought focuses on entirely diffe

Its concern is to repel enemy forces infringing on Chines

maritime resources. The associated authors refer to 30 i

occupied by China's enemies, as well as China's disputed borde

all its neighbors, including North Korea. They are also con

headed by General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general staff in c

intelligemce and military research units, will comprise officials from several ce

civilian agencies." 

275 
RETREAT BUT SLOW THE INVADER 

MULTIYEAR WAR FROM INTERIOR 

Chinese military authors have nerer repuch'ated the writings of Chairman Mao. The 

proclaim that People's War is the essence of China's milita 9, thinka'ng. 

Local wars may not be small. Examples cited by Loca

include China's conflict with Vietnam in 1979 and with the U

Northern Korea in 1950-51. In March 1979, China mobilized a

ground forces, to achieve a 2:1 superiorit T over the 100,00

troops (mainly militia) and over 1,200 tanks and 1,500 heavy 

in support of the attack. No air or sea forces were involved. Ch

many as 50,000 casualties, with 5,000 deaths. The Chinese off

to withdraw from Cambodia in return for a Chinese withdrawal 

was rejected by Vietnam. as 

25A proximate cause for this Chinese invasion was Vietnam's seizing a nu

hilltops inside Cl~la and shelling Chinese nearby villages in December 19

were harrassment of Chinese fishermen by file Vietnamese Navy, Vietname

least 200,000 ethnic Ctfinese, Viemam's invasion of Cambodia and liquidation 

govermnent there, and Vietnam's growing military, alliance with the Soviet 

276 
Figure 3. Local War Scenarios 

y p

imperialism.., directly threatened our northeastern borders .... 

not Korea itself but to invade China . . . to save our neighb

ourselves.., only resistance can make the imperialists learn th

LOCAL WAR SCENARIOS 

• USE OF RAPID REACTION FORCES 

• DEFEND AT BORDER OR FRONTIER 

Most Chinese authors in the past decade discuss Local War doctrine. 

X'Harvey Nelson, Power and lnsecud~: Bet~g and Moscow and Washington, 1949-198

Westview Press), 12. 

27The source is "Declaration of all Democratic Parties," November 4, 19

'sOpposingAraerica, Assisting Korea" Movement (Beijing: New China Bookstore, 

Later, General Wu Xiuquan at the United Nations Securit 3, Council describ

master plan to invade China that included bases and atxangements in Japa

Taiwan, and the Philippines. 

277 
ggp

including tactical guided missiles. In an implicit rebuke 

advocates and neo-Maoists, General Wang emphasizes, "In co

the strength of its potential enemies, the information te

information weapons of the Chinese Armed Forces will all b

quite some time." He also warns about the need to be the fi

RMA: 

Those who perceive it first will swiftly rise to the top and 

advantage of the first opportunities. Those who perceive 

unavoidably also be caught up in the vortex of this revolut

military will receive this baptism. This revolution is first a re

concepts. 29 

Other articles by the tLMA school stress, "The submarine wiU ri

to become a major naval warfare force" with the "appearance 

arsenal ships and underwater mine laying robots." Space w

conducted by na W ships which can destroy satellite reconnaissa

space systems. Tactical laser weapons will be needed for ant

~Chinese authors freqlmnfly refer to Andrew Marshall, Head of the Office of 

at the U.S. Department of Defense. For example, Peng Guangqian of AMS

United States and meeting Marshall wrote, "He ~,Iarshall] emphasized that 

power with tremendous potential, that is worth special attention, currendy, alt

is behind the U.S. in military technology, if China makes a breakthrough 

innovation, filer* it is very possible that it will be in the leading rank of coun

Peng Guangqian, "Meiguo junshi gemmg de jili changdaozhe, Maxie'er" (T

of the U.S. RMA, belarshall),Junshi wenchai (Military Digest) 4-3 (1996): 92-9

29Wang Pufeng, "Yingjie xinxi zhanzheng de tiaozhan" (The challenge of info

Zhougguo~sha'ke:cue (China Military Science) 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 8-18, in 

Views of Future WagCare, 317-326. 

278 
• PRE-EMPT THE SUPERIOR--ANTI-ACCESS 

• ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY--ASAT, INFO WAR 

• DESTROY G a, PREVENT ENTRY OF LOGISTICS 

• PRE-EMPTIVE PARALYSIS OF THE ENEMY 

In the 1990s, Chinese military authors began to address how the re~lution in milita{y aff

nature of wa~are. Their scenarios emisioned attacks on China by a supe~ower. 

One theme of the RNL& school is the need to change the 

effectiveness used to design and develop military equipment 

with one analyst proposing that future weapons systems 

organizations be judged largely on the basis of the "intensi~, wi

use information technology." It is apparent from this proposal 

weapons and equipment nov," being procured in China would s

low level, if measured by the "Information Intens W 

Effectiveness." Thus, this article is a harsh criticism of the reco

3°Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, "21 shiji haizha

century naval warfare), Zhongguojunshi kex~ue (China Military Science) 30, no. 

28-32, in Pillsbury., Chinese Views of Future fFaFfare, 261-274. 

279 
show two tendencies: on the one hand, owing to their overestimat

importance of technology and underestimation of the role of strate

people consider themselves to have nothing worthy of praise; on 

hand, however, with the belief that strategic principles can re

development of technology, some are sure that the magic weap

down by their forefathers can bless them to win every battle. T

opposite tendencies are both lopsided views. This article puts fo

idea that the military revolution will push the military strategy of 

a new level. Though some ideas in the article are open to discu

problems it raises warrant careful reflection. 32 

How should foreign observers assess and understand these 

Chinese strategic writings? The Asian conflict scenarios implici

school of thought involve equipment and capabilities for C

enemies that are not possessed by Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, 

India, the Central Asian states, South Korea, or Japan at th

missions of long-range, precision strike, information warfare op

attacks against space satellite reconnaissance systems imply that 

or the United States is part of the scenario. 

These three Asian conflict scenarios seem mutually exclus

"strategic debate" underway that has not been resolved? Some 

to past debates on militar)- strategy. According to Yan Xuetong 

31Chang Mengxiong, "21 shiji wuqi he jundui zhanwang" OVeapons of th

Zbongguojunshikeseue (China Military Science) 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 19-24

Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 249-260. 

32Su En2e, "Strategy of the East is Advancing Toward a New Phase 

Welcoming the Challenge of a Military Revolution" C m Chinese), Jiefangju

Army Daily), March 5,1996, 6. 

280 
probably was the reform view opposed to the orthodox Peopl

The President of AMS apparently sided with the local war view. 

interviews in Beijing, the AMS actually "staffed" out the for

local war concepts. Yan continues the story to the late 1980s: 

After the Cold War, a consensus has basically been reached 

questions among Chinese military circles, i.e., in order to ensure 

of the country's economic achievements against war damages, th

army must commit itself to the task of engaging the enemy 

China's territory-. Additionally, because wars China might be i

during the post Cold War period will most probably be high-tech 

the Chinese army must acquire the ability, of winning a high-tech 

so as to keep the enemy outside the country's territory. 

Yan here introduces an evolution of the original local war view 

on border disputes--by the early 1990s, the view emerged th

fight local war beyond its borders. Yah writes: 

Consequently, a strategy, of active defense that lays stress on enh

army's rapid response capability." and readiness for any high-tech 

has become China's current military strategy for national def

objective of this strate~- is to prevent war from breaking out, o

that, to keep them outside of China's territory. 33 

Yah Xuetong's description of the debates in China's inilitary 

is supported by Yao Yunzhu, a senior colonel in the AMS Fo

Studies Department, who writes that there were "heated debat

33yah Xuetong, "China's Post-Cold k~'ar Security. Strategy'." Contemporary Inte

5, no. 5 (1995). 

281 
p

Active Defense are still directing the Chinese PLA in its long m

modernization."as 

Even with this insight about the 1980s, analysis in the 1

difficult because the three groups under review decline to ackn

other. They do not "debate" in a Western sense of the word, and 

not always clear cut. For example, People's War may be invok

the importance ofinfonnafion warfare, as is done by Wang Pufen

use a practical combination of information warfare and Marxis

military thought to guide information warfare and issues 

construction. ''36 Another example where People's \gear and Info

are linked is given by Wei Jincheng, who writes: 

The concept of People's War of the olden days is bound to conti

enriched, improved and updated in the information age to take on 

new form .... only by bringing relevant systems into play mad c

human intelligence with artificial intelligence under effective or

3~Yao Yunzhu, "The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 

Korean Journal of Defense Analj's£" 7, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 57. 

3Slbid., 80. 

e6Wang Pufeng, "Yingjie xinxi zhanzheng de tiaozhan," in Pillsbury., Chine

Wag'are, 325. Wang further clarifies his argqlment in a book on information 

tLM_A stamag0 "Based oil fighting an information war with existing weaponry, 

is technically weak, but in the combat arena China's strength is People's W

warfare is warfare's technical form, it determines the large quantity, of inform

used in war. People's \X~arfare is warfare's political form, it determines the rig

warfare. Their content is different in nature, but on China's battlefield, Chi

Warfare to fight intormation warfare, or in information warfare it fights a P

must take these two different natured things and fuse them into a warfare 

Pufeng, Xinxl zhan~.hengycjtmshigeming (Information Warfare and the revol

affalrs)(Beijing: Junshi kcxue chubanshe, 1995: 203-204.) 

282 
among the three schools: 

• Those who still champion Chairman Mao's People's W

defense" against likely opponents in the 21st century ben

China after a pre-emptive nuclear strike 

• Those who (in the name of "Deng Xiaoping's 

thinking") want China to follow aspects of Soviet milita

conventional warfare with a balance among ground, naval, 

ready to repel limited aggression on Chinese territory 

• A third (new and small) school that has been inspired b

of Ogarkov and the Soviet General Staff Academy abo

"revolution in military affairs," which anticipates a world in 

century in which China will have the world's largest econ

least roughly equivalent in nuclear forces to Russia an

triangular nuclear equivalence never seen before, in which 

of effectiveness will be needed to calculate the balanc

power. 39 

3VWei Jincheng, "Information War. A New form of People's War," Jiefangj

.Army Daily), June 25, 1996, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Furore Warfare. 

3~An anthropologist has observed that Chinese involved in factional disp

conflict by denying to outsiders that the other factions even exist. Few 

foomote other analysts or comment about other's work in any article or boo

K. Pillsbury, "Factionalism Observed: Behind the 'Face' of Harmon

Community," The ChinaQuarterly, no. 74 (June 1978): 241-272. 

3°This new third school has no senior leader like Mao or Deng to serve as 

tends to cite American specialists about the ILM.A (including Andrew W. M

reference to Mao or Deng. It will be important if the speeches of President 

incorporate this school rather than continuing (for the past 5 years) to endors

283 
In contrast to the lack of debate on general warfare doc

warfare" appears to be mt area for constructive debate am

analysts. As would be expected, RMA advocates see "space warfa

to the outcome of future wars. However, the advocates of L

People's War seem to view "space warfare" as not particularly 

China. They suggest it was mainly important as part of the ov

balance that shifted back and forth during the Cold War competi

the United States and the Soviet Union. Some have taken note 

of American and Russian antisatcllitc developments. 

How do these analysts judge the future space balance? 41 Som

extremely concerned about China's relative weakness in this a

openly advocated a Chinese "space warfare headquarters" to 

future antisatellite capability, and ballistic missile defense 

"superpower monopoly" of space, in spite of China's curren

position that antisatdlite weapons (ASATs) should be banned and 

of both the Mao and Deng approaches. 

~°Each of the three schools of thought identified above--People's ~1ar, com

information warfare, and RMA--has certain themes that identify, it. Fo

advocates, one clue is appeals for "defense conversion," or the production 

products (to assist with the politically correct goal of economic growth), b

maintaining the capabilit)" to shift rapidly back to wartime intensity of pro

weapons to arm the millions who will be mobilized to defeat the invader. 

4:For a strategic framework, see Liu Mingtao and Yang Chengiun , Gaofishu .~

daodan @an (Nfissile wars during high tech warfare)(Beijing: Guofang dax'ue ch

284 
at several sites with several reliable launchers; both a manned s

and a Chinese space station are budgeted. Articles have also 

importance of reducing satellite vqAnerability by using very smal

need for anti-ASAT capabilities to defend Chinese satellites, a

develop a capability to strike first at enemy space capabilities. 

THE RMA IN CIIINA 

RMA Forecasts 

In the view of those authors this study labels "RN~A_ advocat

decline will be further accelerated by an inevitable RMA that 

reduce the relative military power of any nation that does not pu

with great vigor? 3 The articles give no hint of any debate abo

but in the United States there has been a great deal of debate i

military journals not only about how to exploit the next poten

in military affairs, but also about what it may mean. 

Views on the RMA in the United States range from the ass

U.S. Air Force has already demonstrated the next tLM, A in the 

the opposite view that no one has yet begun to appreciate what 

look like in 20 years or more because the potential for change 

~Bao Zhongxing, "Jianshe tianjun gouxiang" (The notion of building a spac

.xq, mdw.huajiartshe, NDU Research Department, Military Construction Resea

442. Cited in Alastair lain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Co

Deterrence," IntemationaISe~u@ 20, no. 3 ~Vinter 1995): 24. 

4"~Wang Pufeng, Xinxi ~hanzheng)'ujunsbi geming (Information warfare and 

military affairs)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995); Li Qingshan, Xinju

jisbu ~ban~eng (Yhe new revolution in military affairs and high-technolog

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995); Gao Chunxiang, ed., Xinjunshigeming 

revolution in military affairs)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996). 

285 
around 2030 from the existing junior one. Then, there will be 

qualitative leap in the military field of all countries--the possess

military- forces of high-qualit T personnel, integrated C'I systems, 

training and education, intelligent arms, scientific system of or

and creative military, doctrines .... It will enter a new phase wh

intelligent and new concept weapons such as robots, nonlethal 

psychological skill and precision-system defense technology, are 

in actual combat and widely equipped in troops. There can be a 

of the brand-new mode of warfare adopted in operations, e.g. the 

paralyzing war, space war, robot war, electronic war and knowl

etc. 4a 

Some Chinese authors seem to leave open the possibility, th

the United States, will be the first to exploit the R~\,L~\ in two or t

Other authors emphasize instead the massive obstacles China mu

Civilians, too, forecast that any nation that exploits the tGVu~ m

defy a superpower. Shen Qurong, president of CICIR, writes: 

A milita~" revolution (R_MA) is underway .... the London-base

for International Strategic Studies says that along with the advan

revolution, some small and medium-size nations will no 

condemned to a perpetual inferior position relative to the \\,'est

On the contratT, the)' will increasingly have the opportunity 

capabilities of offering direct opposition to kglestern military- sup

the 21st century.. 4s 

"'Wang Zhenxi, "The New Wave of Military Revolution in the World," G

(International Strategic Studies) 44, no. 2 (April 1997): 2. Wang is a Senior A

4SShen Qurong "May Earlier Maturity. Come to Peace: Thoughts on 

Contempora17 Intemationa! Relations 6, no. 9 ('September 1966): 11. 

286 
Open-source Chinese military writing on future warfare sugge

may not be as friendly to the Pentagon as the Pentagon is to C

numerous Chinese books and articles suggest an active research 

been underway for several years to examine how China should d

military, capabilities to defeat the United States by exploiting th

effectively and more rapidly than the United States, particularl

new technology, to "defeat the superior with the inferior" with 

asymmetric warfare. 

These two subjects, the RMA and asymmetric warfare, are c

in some PLA writing. A book published in May 1996 by Maj

Zhi~xm, Foreign Military, Studies Director at the National Defen

contains articles by 64 PLA authors describing in detail an exten

weaknesses of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. This boo

common theme in PLA views of future warfare~America is 

be a declining power with but two or three decades of prim

military forces, while dangerous at present, are vulnerable, even d

and can be defeated with the right strategy, namely "defeatin

with the inferior." Part of the recommended asymmetric approa

the PLA writing is the requirement for "the inferior" to pre-em

the "superior" in order to paralyze his nerve centers and block 

Asymmetric War 

The second aspect of PLA views of future warfare is the r

exploit the RMA so that China can even more rapidly and effec

the superior with the inferior." One statement never found 

source writing is any declaration that China will one day be the w

military power. Rather, the eventual end state of the current p

transitional period is always proclaimed to be "multipolarity

287 
Advocates 

To understand the IL\,IA and to develop innovative defense pr

announced in May 1996 that it had formed a strategic resea

would combine research on traditional Chinese statecraft w

experiments designed to generate innovative military operatio

Several national conferences have been convened to assess th

of the R2VLa, for China, including whether traditional or ancien

be applied to exploit the RNLA_ and asymmetrical strategy. The 

of the new center in 1996 specifically praised several books b

that were previously published in the 1980s about the applica

strategy to future warfare. 48 Earlier, China announced the f

Institute of Grand Strategy, which would have responsibility fo

approaches of other major powers to security issues in the 21

Both these new institutions (and several existing ones) ta

type of approach by assembling experts from a variety of C

institutions to examine strategic alternatives more than one o

~See chapter five. 

~Tq'he importance of innovation in developing the RaMA has been stressed b

For example, Colonel Zhang Zhaozhong of NDU has stated, "If we have 

can we win the nex't war? Answer. Innovation is the soul of a natio

development, and although China's economic strength does not match tha

countries, and our military expenditure cannot reach the level of the wes

more that this is so, the more we need the spirit of innovation." Ma Li

Behind the 'Bombing in Error'--Interview with Renowned Military Co

Zhaozhong," TaKungPao (Hong Kong), May 17, 1999, A4, in FBIS-CHI-1

1999. Zhang is Director of the Science and Technology, Teaching and R

NDU. 

*SThree were entided, A 1X'ew Version of the 36 Stratagems, Strategy in the Three 

Eastern Zbou Strategies. 

288 
advocated "active defense" and Local War programs, and the 

since 1994 by Chinese nfilitat T authors who urge that China mus

or among the first in the world, to exploit information and stealth 

to acquire an entirely new 9"pe of armed forces that bears no re

the 1985 program laid down by Deng Xiaoping. 

Proposals and Programs 

Books and journals put out by several military- publishing hou

suggest that at least 50 military- officers now write about future 

the R_\,LA. Some propose specific programs for China, such a

means to counter U.S. stealth aircraft. Others suggest m

approaches that propose new doctrine and new weapons progr

broad warnings about what will happen to China if it ignores th

Some articles by these "tLMA advocates" seem to be reports o

formed within single service research institutes. The Air Forc

Institute authors focus on the crucial future role of "space force

the Israeli pre-emptive dawn attack that destroyed most of the 

Force on the ground as an example of the "inferior" defeating th

through a surprise attack. Similarly, Navy Research Institute auth

the submarine will become the most important ship in the 

because of its stealthiness and its abilit T to destroy the large sur

a "superior" enemy naW. 

PLA authors seem to have begun to assess the R/VL~_ alm

ago, 49 even before the concept was well known in United Stat

49This highly tentative speculation could help to explain the many Chine

references, recently uncovered by Mark Stokes, to previously unknown Chin

develop laser weapons, antisatellite weapons, high-powered microwave weap

guns, and other advanced technologies. Stokes examines them in his forthcomi

289 
non-nuclear weapons will become conventional strategic weap

certain strategic targets can be reached." He suggests that 

changes in military organization, and new military organiza

"strategic troops should be established." Huan listed four tech

technological RNL~: precision-guided tactical weapons, long-r

vehicles, a system formed by satellite communications and re

and rapid and comprehensive data processing with computers, s° 

by Abels authors began to appear at least as early as autumn 1

Qunqiu's seminal article in China Mi/e Taty S&nce and AMS V

General Mi Zhenyu's book, Chinese National Defense Developme

would be useful to review these representative articles m~d boo

the Chinese RMA advocates before discussing their implicatio

China's National Defense DevehpmenZ Concepts, published by a t

leadership of General Mi Zhenyu, a Vice President of the Acade

Science, is one of China's most important studies of futu

suggests: 

U.S. Au: Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies. 

~rluan Xiang, "Xin jishu geming dui junshi de yingxiang" (I'he influ

technological revolution on military affairs), in IIuan Xian& wenji (The collecte

Xiang)(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 1259. The article was origin

]iefangiun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 7 and 14, 1985. See also Huan 

geming yu woguo duice" (The new technological revolution and china's de

Huan Xiangwenjz; 1074-1088; and Huan Xiang, "Jiefangjun yaoyong yu yinjie 

de tiaozhan" 0nae People's Liberation Army must bravely meet the chal

technological revolution), in Huan Xiang wenji, 1089-1094. 

SlSee Mi Zhenyu, Zhongguo guofang fa~han gouxiang (China's national defe

concepts)(Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988), in Pillsbury, Chinese Views 

361-381. 

290 
even a decrease. 

• '%Vhen we compare the discrepancy, of a half generation 

in the year 2000 with the two- to three-generation discrepanci

difference in competitive effectiveness could be greater." "

start today to plan to be better, to be ahead of everyone, how can 

make use of the opportunities, and become latecomers who 

old_timers? ''s2 

National Conferences 

In January 1996, the Ia'beraa'onArmy Daily recommended the next 

should take with regard to the tC'VLa,. Here are some representativ

that illustrate typical optimism: 

• "China is among those countries which had an early 

world's new military revolution. A nationwide campaign of em

studying the new technological revolution was started in Chi

• "Shen Weiguang put forward the concept of information 

as 1987." 

• "In December 1994 and October 1995 COSTIND held s

experts from inside and outside the Armed Forces on the R

• Chinese seminar participants concluded the best app

RMA is to "set up a macro-control system," develop "scie

and demonstrations" and take steps to "build up combat 

(because the U.S. Army has built up six combat laboratorie

• China should develop "it's own unique lethal weapons

"inlay the old framework with new technologies." 

e2Ibid. 

291 
ASYNLMETRIC WARFARE 

Strategy 

In "Weapons of the 21st Century," Mr. Chang Mengxiong, the 

Engineer of the Belling Institute of System Engineering o

suggests 'W4e are in the midst of a new revolution in military te

in the 21st century both weapons and military units will be 

intensified. ''s4 

Chang has a keen eye for spotting American military w

suggesting asymmetric approaches in which "the inferior 

superior." Chang writes that future C3I systems will be c

"attacking and protecting space satellites, airborne early

electronic warfare aircraft and ground command sites will bec

forms of combat." Like many Chinese authors, Chang sees 

weapons such as lasers and high-powered microwave weapons 

way to conduct asymmetric attacks. 5s 

In terms of asymmetric warfare, one of Chang's most vivi

of a Chinese boxer. "Information-intensified combat meth

Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who 

5"*Zhang Feng and Libing Yan, "Historical Mission of Soldiers 

Century--Roundup of Forum for Experts on How to Meet the Challe

Military Revolution," Jiefang/un bao (Liberation Army Daily), January 2," 1996

96-061,January 2, 1996. 

5aChang Mengxiong, "21 shiji wuqi he jundui zhanwang," in Pillsbury, Chin

Warfare, 249-260. 

S~Ibid. 

292 
• "We must gain air and sea superiority, but win 

superiority first of all.'" 

• Deterrence will be a new operational concept. 56 

Like nuclear deterrence, "information deterrence" will be vi

if "the power with a weaker information capability can delive

attack on the information system of the power with a stronger 

system." In a very important point, Chang stresses, "Even if tw

are generally equal in weapons, unless the side having a weaker 

capability is able effectively to weaken the information capa

adversary, it has very little possibility of winning the war. ''57 

Sea Po~gr 

In the first of two articles on 21st century naval warfare, C

Zhongchang and his coauthors from the Chinese Na W Rese

suggest that "certain cutting-edge technologies are likely to be ap

naval warfare. ''ss They point out how China could adopt severa

approaches to defeating a larger and more powerful navy. Thes

include disabling a more powerful na W by attacking its 

communications and surveillance systems and even attacking 

themselves from space. Shen writes, "The mastery of outer sp

prerequisite for naval victory, with outer space becomi

~Ibid. 

57Ibid. 

"~sShen Zhongchang, Zhang Haiying and Zhou Xinsheng, "21 shiii haizha

cennlry naval warfare), Zhongguojunshi ke:eue (China Military Science) 33, no. 

28-32, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 261-274. 

293 
use shore-based missiles and aircraft instead of deve

(symmetrical) naval fleet: "As land-based weapons will be sh

in reaction capacity, strike precision, and range, it will be p

formations at sea, even individual warships. ''6° 

A third asymmetric approach will be for China to pio

weapons," such as tactical laser weapons, that "will be used 

missile dcfcnse systems" and stealth technolo~, for both 

cruise missiles: "Lightning attacks and powerful first strik

widely used. ''61 

A fourth asymmetric approach will be for China to a

logistics of the superior naW. Shen explains that the vul

~Mnerican-stTle na W will grow in the future because future na

expend large ,amounts of human and material resources so 

survival will face a greater challenge." He predicts that "

supply lines and logistic security" bases will find it hard to sur

that file Gulf War's daily a~runtmitio,~ expenditure was 4.6 t

Viemam War and 20 times that of the Korean War, with an o

rate of about 19 million gallons a day, suggesting American n

are vulnerable because of relatively unprotected supply lines 

A fifth asymmetric approach will be for China to attack 

command and information systems. In a second article

Zhongchang and his co-authors list new technologies that w

59Ibid. 

~Ibid. 

~ilbid. 

62Ibid. 

294 
• Jamming enemy communication facilities with electron

• Attacking communication centers, facilities, and comm

• Destroying electronic systems with electromagnetic pu

• Destroying computer software with computer viruses 

• Developing directed energy weapons and electroma

weapons. 

A sixth asymmetric approach to naval warfare is to use sub

new types of torpedoes. Shen predicts that the most powerful n

in future warfare will be submarines. He writes, "After the Firs

the dominant vessel was the battleship. In the Second World W

aircraft carrier. If another global war breaks out, the most pow

will be the submarine. ''64 Torpedoes do not require a submarine 

be launched from Chinese small patrol boats. 

Air Power 

In "The Military Revolution and Air Power," Major General Zh

President of Air Force Command College, and Colonel Zhang Ch

a case that the RAM.& will strengthen aerospace forces more than o

63Shen Zhongchang, Zhang Haiying and Zhou Xinsheng, "Xin junshi gem

h~un jiamhe" (]"he military revolution m naval warfare), Zhongguojunshi kexu

Science) 34, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 57-60, 82, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Fu

284. 

~Ibid. 

65Zheng Shenxia and Zhang Changzhi, "Xin junshi geming yu kongzhong lil

miliary revolution in air power), Zbongguojunshi kexue (China Military Science) 

1996): 50-56, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Wa~are, 297-309. 

295 
conclude that "this explains that information is the key to victo

to General Zhengo China's future air force must integrate spa

defense forces into one. Following the struggle for air control, h

control will become a decisive component of strategic initiati

In "21st Century Air Warfare," Colonel Min Zengfu of 

Command Institute argues, "The air battlefield will beco

significant" in future warfare. He, too, stresses that China's air 

"linked" to space forces. Min concludes that not only is it corr

who controls outer space controls the earth," but also "T

superiority," one must control outer space. ''66 

Nanotechnology Weapons 

An article by iVlajor General Sun Bailin of the Academy of Nfil

particularly important because it illustrates how asymmetric a

military forces could be carried out with extremely advance

General Sun points out that U.S. dependence on "information s

will make it vulnerable to attack by microscale robot "electrical 

systems."~v 

The targets would be ~Sa-nerican electrical power systems, c

systems, transportation networks, seaports and shipping, highw

broadcast stations, telecommunications systems, computer ce

and enterprises, and so forth. Sun also suggests that U.S. milit

°aMin Zengfu, "21 shiji kongzhong zhanchang guankui" (21st centuu, air 

junshi keaue (China Military Science) 30, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 33-40, in Pillsb

of Future IUa~are, 285-296. 

~'Stm Bailin, "Nanotechnology Weapons on Furore Battlefields," .Nationa

1996), in Pillsbury., Chinese Views of Future Wa~are, 413-420. 

296 
into warfare, remote control equipment can be used to activate th

robots, so that they can destroy or "devour" the enemy's equip

'5~lagic Weapons" 

In "MilitaD, Conflicts in the New Era," Major General Zhe

points out that the well-known scientist Qian Xuesen "laid bar

of the milita~- revolution" to be information technology. 68 Zheng

Mengxiong, advocates new measures of effectiveness. 

in a rare remark that apparently criticizes Local War theorists, 

"Where shall we place the nucleus of high-tech development? W

put the main emphasis of local high-tech wars?" Zheng re

consensus on these issues has yet to be reached throughout the 

still tend to place greater emphasis on hardware instead of soft

the present instead of the future. Such a transitional 'optica

hindering us from gaining a correct grasp of major contradict

concludes by recommending a conscientious study of the R~MA, 

military development, and "magic weapons" that can really serve 

COMBAT CONCEPTS 

The COSTIND journal, Contempora D, Mik'ta~y Affairs, published 

March 1996 by Chen Huan, who calls for rapid technology de

c~Z'heng Qinsheng,' ~'Military Conflicts in the New Era" Jiefaneojun bao (Liberat

June 16, 1996, 6, in Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future WaCare, 399-407. 

297 
transported by land and sea with the vertical airdrops of a

and the third form is five-dimensional--air, land, sea, spac

magnetic---long-range combat." 

• Outer space combat: 'q'he following new-concept weap

forth in a continuous stream--all these weapons will ma

the fifth dimension----operational space--following land

electromagnetism: 

-Laser weapons 

- U I trahigh frequency weapons 

-Ultrasonic wave weapons 

-Stealth weapons 

-Electromagnetic guns. 

Because the efficacy of these new-concept weapons d

hard-shell support of a space platform, once the space p

their efficacy will be weakened and they will even becom

this way, the two sides in a war will focus on offensive 

operations conducted from space platforms in outer sp

operations will certainly become a new form in future w

Armed Forces, a new service--the Space Force--is be

slaowing that the idea of outer space combat is close to 

theory to actual combat. ''7° 

69Chen Huan, "Di san ci junshi geming bijiang chansheng shenyuan ying

military revolution), Xiandaijtmshl (Contemporary NJ21itary Affairs) 30, no. 

Pillsbury,, Chinese Views of Future VP'a~(are, 389-398. 

V°Ibid. 

298 
that making the computer an operational means of attacking 

a strike has already become a reality".., for example, conce

source in the integrated circuits of enemy computers and, whe

activating the virus by electronic measures, then prop

duplicating it..&gain, for example, with the aid of electromag

a virus can be injected from a long distance into the enemy

and comanunication systems and into the computers on ai

and other weapons, causing nonlethal destruction." 

• Radiation combat: "In the wars of the past, the pow

casualties mainly depended on the effects of kinetic energ3, 

energy, but the weapon systems produced by the third milita

mainly use sound, electromagnetism, radiation, and othe

mechanisms. The main radiation weapons are laser weapons

weapons, particle beam weapons, and subsonic wave w

possess enormous military potential." 

• Robot combat: "The main t3,pes of military robots on a

or about to be put on active service in the armed force

countries of the world are vehicle emergency robots, n'unel

minesweeping robots, reconnaissance robots, transporta

electronic robots, and driver robots. Later, there will app

robots, chemical defense robots, patrol robots, and eve

intelligent tanks, unmanned intelligent aircraft, and other robo

71Ibid. 

299 
allocating resources among three distinct paths. Two of these p

refomas. Advocates of these two reform schools seem to be arr

third group of conservative traditionalists who have been losing 

the allocation of defense investments. There is muted debate 

schools and discussion about how to invest defense spending 

ahead. The outcome of this debate may shift the future bala

resource allocations. 

Investments Recommended by RMA Advocates 

Since at least 1994, RMA visionaries (represented in numero

five books in 1997) have been calling for China to attempt t

United States in the next two decades by investing mainly in t

advanced military technology and in new doctrines and new 

along the lines of American and Russian writings on a potential 

by the tone of the authors in this RMA school, they have 

successful. One of their members complained in an unusual si

the main military newspaper in February 1998 that the r

innovation in doctrine, technology- and organization has not b

Books by these authors have warned that if China tries to matc

technology" in the short term (rather than by leapfrogging), after 2

will only be further behind. This warning has not been heeded 

and more influential Local War school. 

Investments Recommended by Power Pr~ection Advocate

A second reformist school of thought, identified by its use of 

local war or power projection, seems to be somewhat more c

RMA advocates that it has gained a significant share of 

investment. Like the ICMA advocates, this Local War school 

300 
This school counts among its members most of the 

command of the Chinese Armed Forces. However, Local W

while satisfied at the direction of defense investment, seem discont

kvelof funding the central government is providing. Thus, the a

school express veiled criticism of the pace and scope of the de

China's power projection forces. They complain, for example, th

neighbors possess more advanced military technology. They co

slow pace of Chinese programs to develop aerial refu

replenishment, airborne warning and control aircraft, a national c

control system, sufficient airborne and amphibious forces, an a

program, and fighter aircraft. In the nuclear field, they express 

U.S.-supplied theater missile defense will neutralize China's n

targeted on its Asian neighbors and the United States. This group 

is not comfortable with the level of investment of defense reso

they seem pleased at its goals. They may seek additional resourc

economy prospers. 

Investments Recommended by People's War Advocates 

A third school of thought probably still commands the greater pa

defense investment. They still endorse the concept of People's W

defense, and they benefit most by the status quo in China's A

They probably resist the innovations of both the RMA advo

Local War reformers, because their main preference is to preserv

largest standing army and to maintain China's complete reliance o

defense production; they oppose troop cuts and the purcha

weapons systems. The PLA was 7 million strong in the early 19

after major controversy was it reduced to 3 million, with a re

(debated for the past 5 years) that another 500,000 may be cut 

301 
FINDINGS 

The debates and the competition for defense resources am

schools can result in very different outcomes over a decade o

future. For example, the Local War or Power Projection school m

pose a challenge to U.S. naval and air forces in the Western 

time, the Chinese have explicitly stated they intend to attain mil

out to the "first island chain" (roughly 500 to 1,000 miles fro

their power projection forces. They cannot operate in this a

Chinese authoes emphasize that enormous natural resources awa

bv China in this area. China's authors claim that China in the pa

humiliated by Japan and the Westem imperialists because it l

military technology. China particularly lacked advanced naval 

it lost the province of Taiwan and other areas. Yet this school 

the necessary resources if the programs championed by the othe

must also be funded. 

In order to commit more resources to either power 

developing RMA technology and doctrine, China must resolv

number of threats that will otherwise continue to claim the l

defense investment. If these kinds of threats are reduced, then 

Local War advocates can claim a larger share of defense resour

econorruc growth rate continues to be three or four times faster 

economic growth rate (8 percent for China, 2.5 percent for hhe U

then the estimates of the World Bank suggest that in the first 

20th century, China will have enormous resources with whi

power projection and/or RM_~. capabilities. In some scenario

Chinese defense investment could exceed that of the United Sta

decades. 

302 
United States. In contrast, a China focused on defense investm

inward" would be vet T different. China may decide to focus "i

• Layered strategic air defense 

• Enhanced underground defense complexes 

• Extensive ground forces around the national capital 

• Border defense forces 

• A large People's Armed Police for internal stability 

subversion 

• Inefficient defense industries located in interior provin

• Fixed positional defenses for the largest ener~" projec

• Deployments in the north to hedge against the reviv

nationalism 

• Forces opposite Taiwan for amphibious invasion if Ta

independence. 

Much more needs to be known about China's secre

decisionmaking process before a thorough understanding is a

why China's leaders may select one path instead of another. Th

worth attempting, g'hether the People's War advocates continu

China's militat T investment decisions may become an is

importance to the United States over the long term. 

No Chinese author has yet publicly identified the relationsh

three different "schools of future warfare" and alternative f

environments. It is plausible that such debates are still too sens

for open publication. One could speculate, however, that a long

environment of"peace and development" would be a forecast t

RMA advocates and who propose that China should identify- new 

303 
that Beijing would have to invest heavily in the program of th

Finally, one could imagine that People's War advocates w

Chinese authors who emphasize the threat of dismembe

subversion, or a land invasion by a future fascist Japan, or e

power of a madman like Hitler in India, the United States, or 

304 
MULTIPLE DEBATES 

CHINESE ANALYSTS HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE of what the overall f

environment will look like--there will be a multipolar world str

the major nations have relatively equal Comprehensive Na

(CNP), international relations will be governed by the Five 

Peaceful Coexistence, and the world will no longer be domina

politics and hegemonic superpowers. However, the characte

transition period to this multipolar world are not subject to the 

As has been discussed, Chinese authors do not debate in the W

of the word. Not only do they lardy admit publicly to the existen

their writings usually do not even refer to, let alone criticize, o

views. However, through excerpts and quotes from the writing

civilian and military analysts, by allowing the authors to 

themselves," it becomes clear that Chinese analysts hold a variet

the features of the current and future security environment. Thes

differing views, while they do not always constitute debates--the

conflicting and opposing ideas, to merely a difference in e

important to our understanding the premises of Chinese national 

basic "debates" are outlined below, followed by the book's ma

The Rate of Mult~ola,ization 

• First and foremost, the issue of the time frame of the 

itself is uncertain. At what rate is the world moving toward 

how long will the transition last? Predictions range from va

about early next century, to more long-range outlooks of se

305 
qp

current superpower status to become one of the equal pole

security environment is a given, a premise that is not debat

how long this process of decline will take is not a certainty

of the spectrum authors argue that the United States is 

serious decline and that its power is weakening; at the othe

the view that the United States will be able to mainta

suprenmcy for several decades. As was discussed in chapter 

NATO strikes in Yugoslavia and the bombing of the Chi

in spnng 1999, a new feature was added to the debate when 

began to predict that there would be further increases in U

• The type of decline the United States is experiencing is 

depicted in different ways. As was seen in chapter two, there 

of whether current U.S. decline is actual, or is merely 

compared to the rise of other countries. A similar issue w

in the chapter on CNP, where the scores of Chinese Acad

Sciences (CASS) had U.S. CNP declining through 2020; ve

of Militan, Science (AMS) scores which had U.S. CNP incre

2020, but showed that the CNP of other countries was r

faster rates. 

• Will the United States lose its allies? One of the key fac

as contributing to U.S. decline is that its relationships w

Europe will deteriorate, and direct conflicts and struggles w

break up the partnerships. In chapter one, Yang Dazhou a

United States will maintain its "alliances. However, although 

how long they expect it will take ~br friction to cause th

crumble, in the views of most of the authors presented in 

fierce rivalries are inevitable. 

306 
will be five poles--the United States, China, Japan, Russia

However, some analysts debate about what the role of the 

will be. India in pamcular, as was discussed in chapter four

of opposing views over whether it will gain enough streng

a potential pole. 

• What will be the rank order of the major nations 

multipolar world? In terms of comprehensive national po

actually be equality, in the future multipolar world? \rvqa

increase most rapidly during the transition period? Chapter 

that the quantitative assessments of CNP conducted by CA

as well as other individual analysts, result in very different p

future security environment. 

The Roles of Japan and Russia 

• The main issue of debate concerning Japan is whethe

become a militarist power. Chinese analysts differ in 

consider Japanese culture and society, to be inherently 

whether it is only conservatives in the government and so

segments of society that want to lead the country back dow

militarism." Will the country's drive to be a world power a

military, force affect its democracy and tbreign policy? W

public be able to contain the.portion of Japanese society an

advocates extreme nationalism? 

• During the current transition period, Russia is'generall

Chinese as facing numerous dangers to its security environm

authors analyze very differently Russia's responses and abili

these threats. Some analysts depict Russia as passive and w

of NATO expansion (there are even some warnings about 

307 
corrm~n themes continuously repeated by Chinese authors 

and development are the main trend" of the times, and that 

war will not occur. However, after the Kosovo crisis and t

the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999, the 

WWIII was mentioned by several authors. 

• While it is generally accepted that regional wars wi

during the transition period, their characteristics are sub

\gVnere will they occur? Where will be the major hot spot

Eastern Europe, Africa, Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific? 

involved? Will there be wars among the major powers? 

involved in these wars, or even worse, will China be a so

• Related to the questions of where the wars will occur

be about, and what participants will be involved, is the 

kinds of war they will be. Will the doctrines of the People

the Local War School, or the RMA School be needed to 

contingencies? 

A CLEAR PICTURE 

Tile public writings of Chinese authors from the major rese

portray a clear picture of the future security environment. The 

be "peace and development" and a "muhipolar world." But, t

be wars and other future dangers for China from the same fo

back in the 1970s, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou En

Kissinger threatened China--Russia, Japan, India, and Am

analysts still study and respect Mao's essays and explicitly confir

established by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s about the comin

world is still accurate. Chinese authors have added new det

308 
National Power (CNP) 

• Whether Japan or India will inevitably fall under control 

leaders. 

The Chinese assessment of the current and future security 

depicts the present world as being in an era of transition to 

structure. During this period, great rivalries will emerge amon

and many local wars will be fought, as a "re-division of spheres 

and a struggte for world leadership takes place. Chinese analysts p

examples of the current struggles to divide spheres of influenc

• The United States arranging the Bosnian settlement 

dominate further its European NATO allies. 

• The United States forcing Japan to increase its financi

U.S. bases and forces in Japan under the guise of the Defens

so that it can challenge the Russian and Chinese spheres of in

the east, while NATO challenges them from the west. 

• Japan seeking to embroil the Unites States and China 

that will weaken both Washington and Beijing. 

• NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999 

U.S. plan to gain control over Eurasia. 

After the transifon to the multipolar world, a new "world 

emerge to govern international affairs, one that will probably 

current Chinese proposal of the "Five Principles of Peaceful 

Chinese authorities assert that world politics since the 1800s a

a "system" or a "strategic pattern." Under the rules of such 

"strategic pattern" there is a competifon among powers that inc

309 
• "As the world moves toward a multipolar.., five po

the United States and the Soviet Union are considering 

must think about the China factor, and also the other pol

• Japan "not only wants to strive to be on equal fo

United States economically and politically, but further, i

planning, when the time is ripe, to surpass the United S

America's world economic hegemony. Once it has econo

political and military hegemony would not be too difficu

Chinese authors rarely refer to each other and almost neve

authors by name, but in 1997, two unusual articles broke this 

in two national loumals. The episode began when Yang D

known senior analyst at the Institute of American Studies 

Academy of Social Science (CASS), published a direct and de

of the orthodox assessment of the coming world of multipolar

met with a vigorous response from a senior general in milita

Huang Zhengji. In a departure from the tradition of merely 

without debating anyone else, the People's Liberation Army g

quoted long passages from the reformer's article, then wrote t

were ridiculous, without foundation, and unsupportable, and w

played into the hands of the United States. The two articles refl

among the senior leadership of China about: 

• ~lepace of the decline of the United States 

• The rate of the rise of"multipolarity" 

• Whether the U.S. will lose its allies 

• What the future role of Third World nations will be. 

310 
• There will not be a period of"uncertainty" in the next 

decades. 

• There will not be an extended transition period feat

toward multipolarity. 

• A "pluralistic" world structure of"one superpower and 

already exists. 

• O~fly the United States is really a "pole" able to decide 

any region, as in the Dayton Accords. "The United States p

role that no other nation can replace.., the only country tha

• China "does not have sufficient qualifications to be a 

• For more than 20 years, no other nations, including those 

World, will emerge as major powers to challenge the f

therefore the phrase used by many analysts " 'one super m

actually not appropriate." 

• It is not likely large local wars will break out among n

General Huang quoted passages from Yang's article without di

and reasserted the orthodox view on each of these points: 

• U.S. decline is inevitable and continuing; U.S. globa

already severely limited. 

• Five-pole multipolarity is inevitable, especially as f

between the United States and Japan and Germany (as prove

summits between the European Union and Asia, which 

declining United States). 

• The rise of the Third World has transfomaed world po

continue to restrain the United States. 

311 
of the Kosovo crisis and the bombing is that they led to the 

previous assessments of the pace of U.S. decline and of the ra

world is moving toward multipolarization. It appears that the 

represented by Yang Dazhou, has gained support as a res

NATO actions in Yugoslavia. A clear post-Kosovo trend has be

of Chinese authors admitting that the transition to multipo

delayed. A key element in the new assessment is the issue o

frame for the transition to the new world structure ha

extended--the United States remains powerful. Not only are so

longer focusing on current U.S. decline, but rather they are pr

strength may even continue to increase. However, other C

while recognizing that the pace of the multipolarization proc

also emphasize that the current trend does not mean that th

will be able to establish a unipolar world. It is only a setback i

to a new world structure. 

After the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

seemed to question whether the main trend of the times st

development, and some authors even mentioned the possib

world war. 

Chinese analysts explain the outbreak of local wars in the 1

two major causes: first, the ethnic, religious, historical, and terr

previously covered up and restricted by the U.S.-Soviet con

free to emerge following the end of the Cold War; and seco

world structure is forming, there is competition and conten

influence, and econormc sources. Chinese analysts differ about 

future local wars occurring. Some see the main local war "hot sp

to Africa or the Middle East, while others focus on Central Asi

Pacific. 

312 
Chinese analysts suggest that a potential cause of war in th

has to do with China's rise as a global power. Several authors 

about likely U.S. efforts in the next decade or two to co

development and prevent its rise in international affairs. T

potential conflicts between China and the United States, as C

increases and the "desperate" United States struggles to maint

position. These predictions conflict with Deng Xiaoping's asserti

will never be a source of war although apparently a war could 

China. 

Debate about the future role of the United States concern

decline of future U.S. capability, but also how other nations m

policy. One author asserts China will face danger earlier beca

some elements in Japan) is instigating long-term confrontation 

United States and China. He maintains Japan will do this in ord

own ambitions to replace the United States as the world's he

Chinese authors claim to see througll other conspiracies, poi

there are already many "hidden signs" of the struggles now shap

multipolar world. For example, U.S. officials use the China Thr

scare Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) int

military relations with America. There are also "hidden signs" in 

Bosnia, and Eastern Europe that the United States is maneuverin

its "hegemony" and "carve up" the former Soviet "sphere 

Chinese authors use words right out of Warring States texts to de

U.S. strategies to maintain its position as '`hegemon," the ancient 

leading state in the Warring States era. 

Deng Xiaoping himself used expressions from the Warri

other ancient texts to advise future Chinese leaders on strategy'. C

must "taoguang:y'anghu/'--the literal translation means "Hid

313 
In the Warring States era, states that rose too fast s

dismemberment, and even complete extinction. In the fina

Warring States era, as eve~ literate Chinese knows, Su Q

strategist, formed a coalition that stood for several years ag

rising state of Qin. The United States and Japan, if provoked, c

a rising China. To counter this, nationalistic authors like He X

the initiative to fore1 a coalition against the United States t

banner of opposing the hegemon," would align China w

American nation in the world. Other proposals to protect a risi

the ruthless hegemon are more defensive: 

• China's forecasted energy needs will be enormous i

could make China vulnerable to the United States. Therefo

urges that China's energy must be sought through pipelines 

Central Asia. He asserts that China's relative military superio

forces can better protect these energy" assets than if Chin

from the Persian Gulf and must rely on sealanes threatene

or Japanese naval forces. 

• President Jiang Zemin has issued traditional-s~'le, po

in sets of 16 Chinese characters that continue Deng's a

confrontation with the hegemcm. 

• UnderJiang Zemin, an additional set of writings (five b

97) has advocated that China's military programs be f

potential revolution in military affairs (RM_A) rather than 

current weapons. According to these books, the potential 

"mature" until at least 2030, by which time Chinese m

calculate that China (or possibly Japan) will score highest 

314 
• The current multipolar world is "'amazingly" similar t

States era. 

• Ancient statecraft is useful and has been blessed by a c

China's generals. 

• As during the Warring States era, there is currently a g

national survival from deception and from falling victim 

deception" by a major power. The United States and Japan a

active in strategic misdirection (zhanlue wudao). Chinese ana

that the U.S. deception that caused Moscow to overspend on 

a factor in the Soviet collapse, and Washington may even 

Saddam into invading Kuwait, according to the Vice Pre

Academy of Military Science. Articles by two senior analyst

Institute of Contain[reran 7 International Relations and one a

that Japan may attempt strategic misdirection of the United 

conflict with China, in order to mask its own ambitions of s

replacing the United States as the world hegemon. 

• In the Warring States era, successful leaders could div

and see through their rivals' conspiracies. 

~%Mt~RICA'S DECLINE 

Chinese national security specialists have been describing Americ

future security, environment in the same way for a decade: d

declining. Chinese authors project a sharp decline in the glob

United States, asserting: 

• As the United States and Russia reduce nuclear forc

attain nuclear equivalence. 

315 
In the picturesque terms of ancient Chinese statecraft, Americ

hegemon whose leaders are as yet unaware that their fate i

Authors claim the United States is pursuing strategies, such a

• Attempting to limit Russia's recover 3" and access to r

• Practicing limited containment of China's rising influ

• Fomenting conflict between China and Japan 

• Investing (too slowly) in a potential R;vLA 

• Using the Bosnia conflict to maintain domination of 

• Falsely spreading the China Threat Theory- in ASEAN 

• Seeking military bases and new NATO allies in Centr

• Aiding separatist movements in Tibet, Taiwan, and X

Other authors sound warnings. The Vice President of th

Military Science urges vigilance because the declining Uni

attempt "strategic deception" of other major powers, including C

in the case of both the Soviet Union, with the phony "Star Wa

Iraq, with the invasion of Kuwait so the United States could d

growing power. The Director of the Foreign Policy Center at 

security" research institute warns that the United States may fo

to "strangle" China if the proponents of the neo-McCarthyis

Theory become too strong in the United States. 

Chinese assessments do not treat the United States as 

absolute sense at the present time, however. For example, a seri

the U.S. Armed Forces asserts that the U.S. has military, 

superiority in practically every field, despite U.S. reduction

316 
guide Chinas reforms, and that CNP calculations should include 

science, defense, and other factors. Although calculating CNP was 

in 1984, Chinese authors justif 3, the concept as stemming both fr

Chinese strategists and Chairman Mao. CNP scores are importan

powers because they can help identify': 

• The status hierarchy in world politics 

• The power of potential rivals and potential partners 

• Who will best exploit the ~MA 

• Which side will win a war 

• The trend toward world multipolarity and U.S. decline. 

Two contending scientific teams in Beijing have calculated estima

the CNP scores of major powers will be in 2010. The military te

parallel the "orthodox" authors' predictions about the futu

environment: 

• The U.S. quantitative power score by 2010 shows a dec

between the United States and the other major powers. 

• By 2020, the U.S. CNP score will equal China's, assum

power growth rate continues to be 5.8 percent, double the U.S

percent. 

• Germany and Japan will also have higher CNP growth ra

United States and will become the third- and fourth-ranking wo

after the United States and China in 2020. 

• If these growth rates are extended another decade or so, C

and Germany will all three equal or surpass the United State

317 
Japawscoe 0 pecet getate Uted Sta

• China in 2020 will be seventh, behind Japan, the 

Germany, France, Italy, and even South Korea in CNP. 

THREATS FROM JAPAN AND INDIA 

China's assessments of Japan and India are similar because 

analytic premises the Chinese use about nations that have terri

with China, and both are capitalist and democratic. India is ass

of half-scale version of Japan. Chinese authors suggest that Jap

• Wants to restrain China's rising influence 

• Seeks to foment conflict between the United States an

• Will continue to have a militaristic strategic culture 

• Will struggle for resources in Central Asia and Siber

United States and Russia 

• \Vfll have ever increasing conflicts with both Europe a

States 

• Will develop nuclear weapons eventually, and earlier if 

them 

• Seeks (covertly) to become the military" equivalent 

States. 

As a smaller scale version of Japan, China's analysts write that 

a militaristic, religion-based strategic culture. They assert th

dominate its neighbors, had covert nuclear ambitions for two de

its nudear tests in 1998, attempts to foment conflict between Ch

nations, and has some areas of military superiority over Chin

current naW. However, India's economic reforms are judged 

catch up with China and enter the multipolar world as the sixt

318 
form of future strategic partnership. 

• China forecasts that Russia will return to the ranks of t

powers in the future security" environment. 

• Some nationalistic Chinese authors like He Xin propose 

must form a long-term strategic partnership with Russia i

balance the rise of a militaristic Japan. 

• One orthodox senior analyst explains the geopolitica

involved: "Russia needs to rely on China. Because both the Un

and Japan regard Russia as a potential force to reduce their i

the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan has territorial disputes w

Chinese-Russian cooperation can, to a great extent, resis

Japanese forces, as well as maintain the power balance in Asi

• Russia has advantages, such as its potential partnership 

and advanced military concepts and technology, that cause Chin

the Russians as far more likely to successfully exploit the Ri\,

United States. One military- author argues, "Russia will use t

maintain its militat 3, superioriD-.., and is secretly taking aim at 

commanding position in the RMA. ''2 Another milita~- author 

the Russian General Staff Academy is focusing on the Ik~,~\. 

"Gu Guanfu, "Russian Foreign Policy in Evolution," Contemporary International Re

(1994). 

2Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-E :dnjunshigeming (America, Russia and t

in military affairs)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 2. 

aGao Chunxiang, ed., Xinjunshigeming lun (Oil the new revolution in military af

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 196. 

319 
resource allocations. 

• Investments Recommended by the RMA Advocates. Since 

RMA visionaries (represented in numerous articles ~md 

1997) have been calling for China to attempt to leapfrog the 

in the next two decades by investing mainly in the most ex

military technology, and in new doctrines and new organizat

lines of American and Russian writings on a potential RM

the tone of the authors in this 1LMA School, they have 

successful. 

• Investments Recommended by the Poa~r Projection Advoca

reformist school of thought, identified by its use of the co

war, or power projection, has advocated evolutionary re

evolutionary, reformers are caught between the traditional 

who currently have the lion's share of the investment bu

RaMA advocates, who appear to be championing unrealist

eyes of the Local War reformers. Local War advocates, wh

the cuprent ck'rection of defense investment, seem discontented 

of funding the central government is providing. 

• Investments Recommended by the People's War Advocates. A t

thought probably still commands the lion's share of Ch

investment. It still endorses the concept of People's W

Defense, and opposes troop cuts and the purchase of for

systems. The People's War school may not be completely a

the reforms of the Local War advocates regarding l

projection, as long as the expense does not compromise the 

army and a suitable defense mobilization base and doe

dependence on foreign weapons or foreign technology. 

320 
No Chinese author has yet publicly identified the relationship amon

different "schools of future warfare" and alternative futu

environments. It is plausible that such debates are still too sensiti

for open publication. One could speculate, however, that a long-te

environment of"peace and development" would be a forecast tha

RMA advocates and those who propose that China should i

technologies and new operational concepts and even set up ne

military organizations in order to leapfrog ahead a generation. Sim

War advocates would welcome a second type of forecast abou

security environment over the next two decades that emphasiz

probability of local wars along China's frontiers. These local 

include Taiwan's declaring independence, or maritime border dis

South China Sea or Central Asia. Such a forecast would mean 

would have to invest heavily in the program of these advocates. 

could imagine that People's War advocates would welcome Chin

who emphasize the threat of dismemberment, foreign subversio

invasion bv a future fascist Japan, or even the rise to power of a m

Hitler in India, the United States, or Russia. 

321 
CIIS 

CIISS 

CIS 

CMC 

CNP 

COSTIND 

CSCE 

CSSM 

DOD 

FISS 

GDP 

GNP 

GSD 

IMEMO 

IWEP 

MSS 

NCNA 

NDU 

PAP 

PLA 

PPP 

PRC 

QDR 

RM_& 

SIIS 

Relations 

China Institute of International Studies 

China Institute of International Strategic Stu

Commonwealth of Independent States 

Central Military Commission 

Comprehensive National Power 

Commission on Science, Technology and Ind

National Defense 

Conference on Security, and Cooperation in E

Chinese Society for Strategy" and Managemen

Department of Defense 

Foundation for International Strategic Studie

gross domestic product 

gross national product 

General Staff Department 

Institute of World Economics and Politics (M

Institute of World Economics and Politics (B

Ministry of State Security 

New China News Agency 

National Defense University 

People's Armed Police 

People's Liberation Army 

purchase power parity 

People's Republic of China 

Quadrennial Defense Review 

Revolution in Military Affairs 

Shanghai Institute for International Studies 

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structure at the turn of the century.). Shanghai: Shanghai liaoyu chu

Chen Zhongjing. Guoji @anlue wenti (Problems of international stra

Shishi chubanshe, 1988. 

Chu Shulong, ed. Kua shot" de ¥leiguo CFhe United States in this century 

Beiiing< Shishi chubanshe, 1997. 

Cumdge, Nicholas. Zhi laohu (Paper tiger). Translated by Wang Zhong

Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997. 

Du Gong, ed. Zhuanhuan zhong de shifiegeju O'he world structure in tra

Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1992. 

Gu~" zhengzhi xin zbixu wenti (Problems in the new international pol

Edited by Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo (Chin

Contemporary International Relations). Beiiing: Shishi chubanshe

Hou Ruoshi. Zhanlue xuanzeyu ~yuanpeizhi (Strategy choices and the 

natural resources). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1990. 

Huang Shuofeng. Guofia shogshuai lun (On the rise and fall of nation

Hunan chubanshe, 1996. 

Huang Shuofeng. Zonghe guoli lun (On comprehensive national po

Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992. 

Li Cong. Di san shijie lun (Fhe third world). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chub

347 
Li Zhongcheng, ed. Kua shift de shijie zbengzbt" (Trans century world po

Shishi chubanshe, 1997. 

Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian. Guojt" zhengzbixue gmlun (Gen

international politics). Beijinff Zhongyang bianshi chubanshe, 1

Lin Huisheng. Gei shanmu dashu sumt)qgua (Telling uncle sam's fo

Shishi chubanshe, 1993. 

Liu Jiangyong, ed. Kua shtji de riben---Zhengzhi, jingji, wazfiao xin qushi (J

century--new political, economic, and foreign relations trends). 

chubanshe, 1993. 

Liu Ling and Hong Yuyi, eds. Guoji guan~q shijianbian Ban ge shiji sh

concise history of international relations--half a century of 

conditions). Beijing~ Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1986. 

Liu Tihe, ed. Dong Ou shichang jqngii Zouxiang (Eastern Europe m

trends). Beijing< Shishi chubanshe, 1993. 

Lu Lei, Wu Youchang, and Hu Ruoqing. Rdbenfuguo zhi rag (The ridd

wealthy country). Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1994. 

Lu Zhongwei. Xinjiujiaoti de dongyageju O~he new structure replaces 

Asia). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1993. 

Lunwen zhai),ao xuanbian,)'ing)i ben (Selected excerpts from research 

version). Beijing. Guoji jishu jingji yanjiusuo, 1993. 

348 
Mei Ren, ed. Meiguo liren zongtong O-he U.S. presidents). Beijing: Shish

1997. 

Mo Huilin, YiJinwu, Xu Xianqi, and Xu Zuolin. Dangdm" ~iben@uyi--p

(Contemporary capitalism----analysis and lessons). N.p.: Junshi kexu

1993. 

Pan Shiying Xiatu~" zhanlue sikao.--lengzhan hou de zhanlue #lun (Though

strategy-----post-Cold War strategic theory). Beijing. Shijie zhishi chu

Peng Qian, ed. Menoexing ha, Ra'ben.t--Ra'ben @eng@i Zouxiancfingshilu (W

troth Japan!--Japan's political trends alarm). Beijing: Xin shilie chu

Shen Zhixun and Ding Kuisong. Yi ge quanli shidai dejieshu--Qiao@i Bu

end of an era of power--a biography of George Bush). B

chubanshe, 1994. 

Song Zhangjun. Ra'benguo xianfaym~fiu (Studies on Japan's constitution). B

chubanshe, 1997. 

Su Jingxiang. Meiguojingii @ong de waiguo tou,~ (Foreign invesmaent 

economy). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995. 

Tang Hui and Liang Ming. Dahe "chaoba" meng (Fhe great dream of "

Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995. 

Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang. Sht)i'e quart fangwei jingii zhan 01

directional economic war). Beijing: Junshi kexue chubansfie, 199

Wan Guang. Meiguo de shehui bang (U.S. social diseases). Chengdu: Si

chubanshe, 1997. 

349 
Wang Songfen, ed. S&j't'e zhgrao guojia zonghe guah" btjqao.yanfiu (Compar

the comprehensive national power of the world's maior natio

Hunan chubanshe, 1996. 

Wang Yizhou. Da,gdai guoji zhengzhi xi lun (Contemporary intern

analysis). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1995. 

Wang Zaibang. Baqaan wenckng lun pipan BuMdun senlin lixi de h'sbi kao

of the hegemonic stability theory---a study of the h/story of the 

system). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1994. 

Wu Guifu, ed. Meiguo quanqiu zhanlue tiaozheng (U.S. global strateg

Beijing. Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1996. 

Xi Runchang and Gao Heng, eds. Sh~lie zhengghi ,xqn geju )'u guoji an

world political regime and international security). Beijing: 

chubanshe, 1996. 

Xiaochuanhejiu, Shiyuanzhenshentailang, and Dubushengyi. Ra'b

"bu" RiMdjian degenben wenti 0apart still should say "no"--the 

between Japan and the United States)(in Japanese). Translated b

yuan waiguo junshi yanjiu bu (Academy of Military Science, F

Research Department). Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1992. 

Yah Jin, Bai Xue and Zhang Xingping. Shuangtous.ingfei xiang hechu--g

de E'Ia~osi (Where is the double headed eagle flying--Russia on th

stage). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995. 

Yang Baihua and Ming Xuan. Zibenzhupg guojia zhe,tgzht" zhidu ~'he p

of capitalist countries). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1984. 

350 
political systems). Beijinff Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1992. 

ZhangJiliang, ed. Guojiguanxi xuegailun (An introduction to internation

Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989. 

Zhang Tuosheng, ed. Huanqiu tong d liang re---Yi dai lingxiumen de guoji zh

(Simultaneous global temperature shifts---one generation of leaders' i

strategic thought). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993. 

Zhong.Ao Yatai diqu anquan guoji yantao hui xueshu lunwenji. (A collection o

from the Sino-Australian workshop on Asia-Pacific security). Beijing

guoji youhao lianluo hui heping }al fazhan yaniiu zhongxin/Aoda

daxue ao-ya guanxi yanjiu zhongxin, 1996. 

Zhou Rongkun, ed. Kua sht)}'de sh~jiejingit" (Trans-century world econom

Shishi chubanshe, 1998. 

Zi Shui and Xiao Shi. Jingti Riben junguozhqyi (Be on guard again

militarism). Beijing: Jincheng chubanshe, 1996. 

Zi Zhongjun, ed. Zhanhou meiguo wat)'t'ao sbi--Cong Tulumen dao I_dgen (Ha

postwar American foreign relations--from Truman to Reagan). B

zhishi chubanshe, 1994. 

CHINA'S CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE 

Feng Lin, ed. 21 Shift Zhongguo dayuce (Major forecasts for 21st cen

Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1996. 

He Xin. Weijiyu Fand (Crisis and introspective thinking). Beijing: G

chubanshe, 1997. 

351 
secret private plane). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dang xiao c

Ling Xingzheng. Shensheng de shanhujiao--:\ranshajisbi O"he sacred co

from Nansha). Beijing. Haichao chubanshe, 1994. 

Liu Guoguango ed. Hainan jin~ji fazhan ghanlue (Hainan's econom

strategy). Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1988. 

Ma Hong and Sun Shangqing, eds. Jingji baipishu: Zbongguo fingii ,xin

1995-1996 (Economic white paper. China's economic situatio

1995-1996). Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1996. 

Shi Bike. Zhongguo da qushi (China megatrends). Beijing. Hualing ch

Wang Jiacheng. Zhongguo nen~uan: chengji, wenti, zhengce he zhanwang 

resources: achievements, problems, policy and prospects). Beij

chubanshe, 1994. 

WangJinglun. Mao Zedong de £viangzhu)i he Deng Xiaoping de xianshizbu

lun ZhonAguo (Tvlao Zedong's idealism and Deng Xiaoping's rea

of U.S. scholars on China). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1996. 

Weng Jieming, Zhang Ximing, Zhang Tao and Qu Kemin, eds. 

Zbongguo shebui fazhan ~buangkuang.yu qusbi (China's social devel

and trends, 1996-1997). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe

Weng Jieming, Zhang Ximing, Zhang Tao and Qu Kemin, eds. Z

qianhou de ~heng~tu'jt'ngit'finxiyuyuce (China 1997-97 politica

analysis and forecasts). Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chuban

Wu Jie. Deng Xiaoping d.x'iang lun {yingwen) (On Deng Xiaoping th

Waiwen chubanshe, 1996. 

39-2 
development report, 1997). Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1997. 

Yan Xuetong. Zhongguo guojia Iz3¢fenxi (An analysis of China's nation

Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996. 

Zhao Yi and Zhao Keyi, eds. Zhon~uo shangye)inhangyewuyu caozuo (I'he b

operation of the China Commercial Bank). Beijing: Zhonggu

chubanshe,1994. 

TAIWAN 

Mei Zi, ed. Mei-Taiguana4 zhongTao Uliao xuanbian (A selection of import

on U.S.-Taiwan relations). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1996. 

Tai Baolin. Taiwan shehui qiwen daguan (The unheard of magnificent 

Taiwan society). Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992. 

Taiwan.yanjiu ~enjq (Collected works on Taiwan research). Edited by Zhon

kexueyuan Taiwan yanjiusuo (Chinese Academy of Social Scien

Institute). Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1988. 

Wei Xiutang. Huashuo Taiwanren (Talking about the Taiwanese). Be

chubanshe, 1997. 

THE FI JTURE 

Cohen, I. Bernard. Kexuegeming sin" (Revolution in science). Translated by 

Li Chengzhi, Li Changshengo and Chen Dan. Beijing: Junshi kexue 

1992. 

353 
and opportunities in the 21st century--the global e

development). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1992. 

354 
g w Cy yv

How have maior nations conducted strategic assessments of th

environment? Studies of this question by more than 30 authors 

sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment, U.S. Department o

to uncover lessons that may be of value to the production of 

strategic assessments. One lesson is that there are different nation

making strategic assessments. By viewing China in comparative p

it may be possible to understand better how China deals with its 

problems. 

DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 

What is strategic assessment? 2 It is sometimes confused with 

analysis of foreign forces and international trends. The maior differe

strategic assessment is an analysis of the interaction of two or mo

security establishments both in peacetime and in war, usually ourse

potential enemy. It is the interaction of the two belligerents that is 

concept, not an assessment of one side alone. In historical an

possible prior to the outbreak of past wars to obse~-e what the hi

of leadership on each side did to "assess" the outcome and nature 

:Readers may be surprised about how secretive China remains in the national se

spite of openness in all other areas. After all, China is one of the most open n

world in many respects. In 1966 it had over $100 billion of foreign direct in

largest in the world after the United States, and was the second most popular d

foreign tourism, after France. 

2Two colonels at the Academy of Military Science define "strategic assessment" a

Zi in the Art of if'ear Their new translation into English faults the weU-known 

1963 by Brigadier General Samuel Griffiths for "serious errors," including us

"estimates" instead of "strategic assessment." See Pan Jiabin and Liu Ruixiang, 

Chinese-English Bilingc~al Reader (Beijing: Junstfi kex-ue chubanshe,1993), 123-124

355 
assessment. For example, it is a mistake to examine static, side

on-force comparisons of numbers of weapons and tnilita~

analyzing the way these weapons and units would actually in

combat. It is another mistake to fail to define correctly who 

and who a foe in wartime, so tile question of international 

alliances cannot be ignored. Another error is to deduce inco

opponent's peacetime training exercises, published milita~" 

peacetime military- deployments what may be the way forces a

themselves in combat, especially in a war of many months or 

beyond the original plan of war that was drafted at tile outs

war, the more time for factors involving the entire nation

economy to be brought into play and the less import

deployments, doctrines, and plans become. Another mistake is 

routines or rigid measures of effectiveness designed 

management of efficiency in meeting budgetat T or other stan

future military" effectiveness during a war, which may bear li

to peacetime management problems. 

Professor Stephen Peter Rosen of Harvard University has 

of examples of these errors. For example, between August 

1940, the U.S. Na W senior leadership strategic assessments o

of the military- capabilities of the United States paid little atte

future war might unfold. It mainly satisfied U.S. Na W peacetim

"simple comparisons of the number of U.S. Navy and Imperial 

ships ... no sense of the possible wartime interaction between 

let alone between the two nations. ''3 The static use of countin

~'Stephen Peter Rosen, "Net Assessment as an AnMytical Concept," in 

O*trselter, eds..Zaidrew x,V. Matshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen (Bould

Press, 1991), 288. 

356 
one advantage in the sector in which they achieved a breakthroug

Germans could make rapid, deep penetrations to destroy rear areas 

that the French concept of operations after World War I had bee

infantry movements behind preplanned, centrally directed artiller

dependent on fixed headquarters with fixed telephone lines; an

German Air Force would completely neutralize French air power a

absolute air superiority-. Only a strategic assessment focusing on thes

of the interaction of the two belligerents would give any indicat

outcome of the warJ 

In the broadest definition, "strategic assessment" implies a 

peacetime and wartime competition between two nations or two all

includes the identification of enemy vulnerabilities and weak

comparison to the strengths and advantages of one's own side. Ac

Professor Rosen, "'The militar 3" theoretician Carl von Clausewit

deserves credit for being the first to try to delineate the general c

net assessment at the level of national military- interaction. ''s One 

Clausewitz' book On War asks a simple question: How can th

leadership know how much force will be necessary to bring to bea

potential enemy? Clausewitz replies, 

We must gauge the character of... (the enemy) government and 

and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evalu

4Rosen, 296-297; Assessing the Correlation of Forces: France 1940 (Washington: BD

the Office of Net Assessment, June 18, 1979). 

5Rosen, 286. 

357 
Assessment requires considering the potential interaction of 

According to Clausewitz, "One must keep the dominant charac

belh'gerents in mind.": 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NET ASSESS

The practice of strategic assessment by the U.S. Department of 

past 25 years has been divided into six categories of studies an

first involves efforts to measure and forecast trends in v

balances, such as the maritime balance, the Northeast Asia

power-projection balance, the strategic nuclear balance, t

military balance, and tile European milita~, balance between N

former Warsaw Pact. Some of these studies look 20 or 30 years 

to examine trends and discontinuities in technology', economic 

other factors. 

A second type of assessment focuses on weapons and forc

with efforts to produce judgments about militaoT effectiveness 

"revealed U.S. and Soviet differences in measuring combat ef

often showed the contrast between what each side considere

combat. ''8 

The third set of studies examines lessons of the past u

evaluations as well as gathering data on past performance of w

the context of specific conflicts. A fourth set analyzes the role 

6Carl yon ('lausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Princeton University Press, 1976), 586. 

~Ibid., 595. 

aGeorge E. Pickett, James G. Roche, and Barry D. Waits, "Net Assessm

Review," in On Not Cop~¢s~hg Ourrelves, 169-171. 

358 
done with slightly different assumptions .... rather it should b

extent possible, an assessment structured as the Soviet would str

using those scenarios they see as most likely and their criteria and 

measuring outcomes.., the Soviet calculations are likely to make 

assumptions about scenarios and objectives, focus attention upon 

variables, include both long-range and theater forces (convention

as nuclear), and may at the technical assessment level, perform 

calculations, use different measures of effectiveness, and per

different assessment processes and methods. The result is th

assessments may substantially differ from American assessments

Studies analyzing perceptions are difficult because the data use

be inferred from public writings and speeches. Implicit biases o

based on our own education and culture must also be avoided. 

A fifth effort of American net assessment sponsors studies th

new analytical tools, such as developing higher "firepower scor

be used for the Air Force and Navy as well as the initial inventor

forces. In the early 1980s, a multiyear effort was funded at 

Corporation to develop a Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) 

analytic device for examining combat outcomes of alternative s

A sixth category of studies is professional analyses of particu

concern to the Secretary of Defense that may involve identifying 

advantages and distinctive competencies of each size military f

highlighting important trends that may change a long-term balanc

future opportunities and risks in the military, competition; and a

strengths and weaknesses of U.S. forces in light of long-term 

security environment. Past practitioners from the Office" of the 

9Andrew W. Marshall, "A Program to Improve Analytic Methods Related to St

Poli~7 Sciences (November 1982): 48. 

s9 
ASSESSMENTS BEFORE WORLD WAR 

An insightful set of seven historical examples of strategic ass

1938 to1940, produced for the Office of Net Assessment, a

comparison of the styles of strategic assessment practiced in 

Germany, Italy, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, 

number of''lessons learned" are relevant to any effort to unders

Chinese leadership conducts strategic assessment of its f

environment. Marshall specified four categories of strategic as

• Foreseeing potential conflicts 

• Comparing strengths and predicting outcomes in givcn 

• Monitoring current developments and being alerted 

problems 

• Warning of imminent military danger. 1° 

Sun Tzu proclaimed full confidence in the "calculations" he 

temple" before hostilities. "Modem net assessment follow

principles, if not his confidence in outcomes. The important allu

temple' and the role of faith. ''n 

The main problem was how to frame assessments, particular

to political-military factors such as who were the potentia

potential allies, mad what international alignments would b

outcomes of future wars. Purely military issues were how to we

types of combat power, especially new concepts of operations l

power in the Blitzkrieg or the role of submarines. Errors and su

1°Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies (Princeton: Princeton Universit

vWilliamsoa Murray and Allan R. Millett, Calculations: Net Assessment and th

WarlI (New York: Free Press, 1992), 2. 

360 
Union could play as a second front for Hitler. The French mad

of error: they neglected the scenario that Germany might f

France's East European allies and underestimated the role of air 

Blitzkrieg, despite detailed reports from French intelligence. 

correctly assessed the potential for Japan to remain neutral and c

that Hitler would invade along a southern approach toward the Ba

by Stalin's use of alternative scenarios in annual war games. 

U.S. errors were "big picture" problems. Pdthough the U

eventually in 1940 developed five alternative scenarios (RAINB

from 1920 to about 1935, it initially mistakenly believed it h

potential enemy 0apan) and therefore planned for only one m

scenario---Plan ORANGE--for war in the Pacific to liberate th

from a Japanese attack. The Naval War College played this scena

and other war games an estimated 120 times. Then, with the rise 

years of American assessments had to be discarded when the st

shifted to winning first in Europe, while staying on the defe

Pacific. 

The most relevant comparison for China may be the Sovie

this is also the most secret. As Professor Earl Ziemke put i

decades of research on Soviet military affairs, even when he 

historical data to look back from 1990 to 1940: 

The Soviet net assessment process cannot be directly observed. Li

obiect in outer space, its probable nature can be discerned o

interactions with visible surroundings. Fortunately, its rigid

environment has been somewhat subject to countervailing condi

Tukhachevsky and his associates conducted relatively open disc

print. 

361 
counterparts in Beijing today and were prominent in Moscow in 

General Staff Academy and the National War College. Another 

that the Communist Party leader chaired a defense council or 

committee and in these capacities attended peacetime military 

was involved deciding the details of military strategy, weapons a

war planning. 

362 
for discussions on foreign policy and defense issues. However, 

institutions are quite different. Although their staff produce j

books, and participate in international conferences, much a

"counterparts," do, they have additional roles. 

Cited Authors at the Seven Main Institutes 

CIIS CIISS NDU 

Jiang Yuechun 

Shi Ze 

Ye Zheng3ia 

Song Yimin 

Chen Feng 

Chen Xiaogong 

Huang Zhengli 

Hu Ping 

Li Qinggong 

Liu Mingde 

Lu Dehong 

Sa Benwang 

Shen Guoliang 

Wang Naicheng 

Wang Zhenxi 

Xie Wenqing 

Xiong Guangkai 

Zhang Changtai 

Zhang Taishan 

Zhu Chun 

Bao Zhongxing 

I.i Zhiyun 

Liu Chunzi 

Pan Zhengqiang 

Wang Zhongchun 

Wen Zhonghua 

Xu Weidi 

Yang Xuhua 

Yu Guoh'ua 

Zhang Zhaozhong 

Zhu Chenghu 

Chen P

Chen Q

Ding X

Wang H

Xia Lip

Zhang J

363 
Huang Yingxu 

LiJiiun 

Li Qingshan 

Liu Gang 

Liu Jmgsong 

Liu Tinghua 

Luo Yuan 

Meng Renzhong 

Mi Zhenyu 

Pan Jiabin 

Pan Junfeng 

Peng Guangqian 

Liu Jinghua 

Luo Zhaohong 

Shen Jim 

Wang]isi 

WangJtncun 

Wang Songfeng 

Wu Guoqing 

Xi Runchang 

Xiao Lian 

Yang Dazhou 

Yang Shuheng 

Zhao Jieqi 

Gan Allan 

Gu Guan fu 

Guo Chuanlin 

HongJianiun 

Jm Dexlang 

Li Yiyan 

Li Zhong~heng 

Liu Gulling 

Liu Jiangyong 

Lu Zhongwei 

Ouyang Liping 

Qi Dequang 

Sun Bailin 

Wang Naiming 

Wang Pu feng 

Wang Xuhe 

Wu Chunqiu 

Wu Rusong 

Yao Youzhi 

Yao Yunzhu 

Zhat Zhigang 

Zhao Nanqi 

Zhao Xiaozhuo 

Zhen Xi 

Zhu Liangyin 

Zhu Xiaoli 

Shen Qurong 

Song Baoxian 

Wang Liuli 

Wang Zaibang 

Xu Zhiman 

Yan Xianglun 

Yan Xuetong 

Yang Bojiang 

Yang Minglie 

Yu Xiaoqiu 

Yuan Peng 

Zhang Liangneng 

Zhang Minqian 

Zhang Wenrnu 

The primary difference between these Chinese institutes a

research institutes is their "ownership." Research institutes are 

the major institutional players in the national security decision m

in China. Their staffs in many cases have access to what in the 

considered government classified information such as cables fr

abroad. Unfortunately, it is difficult to be precise about thes

Members of these institutes often decline to discuss in any de

nature of their internal reports. They are not puppets, howev

research institutions are. important in their own right for the creat

364 
not hide their affiliations with the Ministry of State Security, 

leadership, and their access to classified materials, but they like t

open source research and publicafons. They are proud of their 

foreign visitors, their extensive travel abroad, their forei

capabilities, and their record of publishing short-term predi

foreign political events, things that more cautious analysts do not 

also hosts many U.S. visitors to China. 

CICIR employs about 500 professional analysts, slightly la

Academy of Military Science (AMS) and much larger than 

Institute of International Studies (SIIS), the China Institute of 

Strategic Studies (CIISS), and the China Institute of Internat

(CIIS), but dwarfed by the 5,000 at the Chinese Academy of S

(CASS). CICIR has a campus-like compound in northwest Bei

dozens of open-source materials are air mailed daily. In the Uni

equivalent institute might cost $50 million or more annually to op

maintains its own publishing house (Shishi chubanshe) and bo

publishes a monthly journal in Chinese, Xiandaiguojiguanxi (C

International Relations). One or two articles are selected from th

in each issue to be translated and distributed free for exchan

counterparts. 

CICIR seems to focus on analysis and forecasts based lar

source publications and interviews with foreign leaders. It has its 

college. Numerous foreign visitors have been impressed with 

CICIR briefmgs and articles. CICIR analysts can disagree with ea

conduct limited debates, even in the presence of foreign visitors. C

known for its boldness in making forecasts about political, ec

military trends. A recent collection of articles by the director of 

Division examined Japan in the 21st century. The author-edito

365 
OF INTER_NATIONAL STUDIES 

These two research institutes are under the budgetary control o

Ministry. Graduates of China's Foreign Affairs College may be as

CIIS and SIIS. Each institute is much smaller than CICIR, neith

100 professional staff. They publish journals and use the Forei

press for publishing books and research reports. The CIIS journ

yanjiu (International Studies) features articles by its staff, wh

diplomats on rotation. The SIIS has numerous publications, i

annual Guoji xingshi nianjian O~he Yearbook Survey of Internatio

the biweekly Guoji ghanwang (World Outlook), and Guoji wenti (

Review), as well as two journals of English language translation

articles from the main journal, SIIS Paper and SIISJournal. 

SIIS focuses on future issues more boldly than CIIS

diplomats/analysts seem more comfortable with research on th

and near-term trends. Both institutes avoid dealing with milit

warfare issues. Each has an impressive building and happily rec

visitors, CIIS in Beijing and SIIS in Shanghai. There are fiv

research departments: American Studies, Japanese Studies, Europ

Asian-Pacific Studies, and Comprehensive Studies, which focu

issues. 

CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENC

Once part of the Chinese Academy of Science, the Chinese Acade

Sciences (CASS) was established in 1977. It occupies a 12-stor

downtown Beijing and maintains a professional staff of 5,000 

has its own publishing house for books. It houses five institutes: 

of World Economics and Politics, the Institute of American 

Institute of Russian Studies, the Institute of Japan Studies, and 

366 
g g g 

newspaper, reported recently, "According to the conference he

today to discuss information-related affairs of the Chinese Acade

Sciences, last year central leaders and other high-ranking offic

commented on hundreds of CASS research reports, some of 

republished in documents of the Central Committee of the State 

research results were studied and applied by relevant departmen

CASS research is oriented toward the future, both in term

domestic development and the world structure. In 1998, CASS 

to be focused on establishing a new set of research projects th

"major historical challenges and opportunities facing China aft

years or after even several decades in the next century" .... A

'research plan on major issues in 2010' is being discussed 

including the following aspects: the experiences and lessons of the 

of the Soviet Union, development trends of modern capitalism, t

of property rights system and public ownership in a market econo

globalization and national economic security, the mechanism 

socialist democracy, problems of central and west China, and 

corruption."2 

Many of China's most famous human rights activists after th

incident in 1989 came from CASS, such as the former director of 

for Marxist Leninist Studies and the former director of the 

Political Science, Su Shaozhi and Yan Jiaqi, who are well known l

:"Central Leadership Attaches Importance to 'Think Tanks'; Heeds the View

the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Before Making Major Decisions," Ta K

3, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-062, March 7, 1998. 

2Zhu Huaxin, "Provide Theoretical Support for China in the 21st CenturymN

m Reforms at the Chinese Academy of Social Science," Renmin ribao (

September 18, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-265, September 24, 1998. 

367 
[y] y pg

from his summit in the U.S. in October 1997, "Jiang asked t

draft a manual on democracy for mandatoq: reading by high-ra

The manual to be passed out with booklets on human rights a

law, will feature sections on the historic development of democ

models of democracy and China's own democratic path. ''a How

shakeup in the top leadership of CASS, in October 1998, may 

institution in a more conservative direction. The Hong Kong Sta

that the retirement of four vice-presidents, including Liu Ji, was, 

by many as consolidating academy president Li "l'ieying's pow

ACADEMT OF MILITARY SCIENCE 

Founded in 1958, die Academy of Military Science (e-MMS) prod

books and classified reports for the Chinese military stra

process. Of all the research institutes, :~MS is the most secr

visited by foreigners. It occupies a large compound northwest 

employs more than 500 professional military staff (a 10-minute 

National Defense University)..&MS has no students (other tha

graduate student program). It performs analysis for the C

Commission and the General Staff Department. It participates 

organized by other important organizations such as the C

Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. 

The president of the Academy of Military Science is usually 

equivalent to a DepuD' Chief of Staff. This would transla

3Kadly Chen, "China to Test Waters of Political Reform," Wall Street Journ

~Fong Tak-ho, "Politburo Reshuffles Ctlinese Academy of Social Sciences," H

October 26, 1998, 6; translated FBIS-CHI-98-299. See also, "CPCCC Cha

Comanittee into Part,;., Group," Zhone~uo xinwen she, October 26, 1998, in FB

368 
acknowledge a counterpart relationship with the General Staff 

Moscow. 

The AMS has 10 departments, each of which has 50 or more o

a few of which publish their own journals: Planning and O

Department; Strategic Studies Department; Operations a

Department; Military Systems Department; Military History D

which publishes the bi-monthly Military History; Foreign Mili

Department, which publishes the monthly World Midta~y Rev

Encyclopedia Department; Center for Mao Zedong Military.- Thou

for Political Education of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); and 

Operations Research, which publishes the quarterly Mi~ta~y System 

According to the introductoty brochure describing the institute, 

"national center for military studies; AMS plans and coordinates 

all the research programs concerning military science .... AMS has 

progress in war gaming, command automation, machine tran

military data bases. It has formed its own operational and tactica

systems, military experts systems, and specific research models." 

AMS seems to be more closed to foreigners than the Natio

University.- (NDU)--its staff rarely travel abroad, and no foreign 

receive permission to visit the AMS Compound without an exte

by the unit called the General Staff Foreign Affairs Bureau, one 

which is to control contact between foreigners and sensitive Chin

organizations. An article in May 1998 commemorating the 40th 

of the founding of the AMS mentioned, however, that since.it has 

the leadership of Chain'nan Jiang Zemin, the institute has "gradual

contacts with foreign institutions and organizations for milita

research, and enabled a setup of research open to the outside w

place." The article, however, praised the institute for "having com

369 
the regularization of our army under the new situation, s 

The strategy department of AMS publishes books on milita~

strategy, with a focus on tile military thinking of ChaiITnan Ma

decade, it added books on the strategic thinking of Deng Xiaop

book by the longer president of the Chinese Academy of Militar

Categories of Mi~ta~' Science by General Zheng Wenhan, off

footnotes to Soviet works on the same subjects and employs 

established in Soviet military science publications. Chinese 

explicitly acknowledge their debt to Soviet militat T science 

military terminology'. Readers are not made aware of the Sovi

in China in the early 1950s because there were political pen

senior Chinese general officers in the 1950s for assuming po

Communist leaders deemed to be pro-Soviet. Perhaps this 

Chinese military authors still do not refer to their deep Soviet 

matters of doctrine and terminology. 

The Chinese Academy of Military- Science has a mission 

future warfare and the fi~ture security environment. Like its 

counterpart, it still must use Marxist-Leninist "military sc

includes the notion of "dialectics" in analyzing tedmological 

military doctrine. According to both Soviet and Chinese authors, 

over time of "military dialectics" will more or less automatica

nature of warfare quite drastically as a completely new synth

from the clash of thesis and antithesis. To examine the future 

~'Xiao Pu and Jiang Wenming, "Be A Good Forertmner of Great Military R

Scientific Research Undertakings Advance m a Pioneering Spirit Thanks t

Three Generations of the Party's Core Leadership," Beijing Xinhua Dome

19, 1998, in FBIS-C/-II-98-139, May 21, 1998. The article provides a history 

under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaopingo and Jiang Zemin. 

370 
Although the AlVlS does not have regular classes, in 1988 s

most important military strategists created a doctoral progra

science at the AMS, authorized by the State Council. It is signifi

of the two major fields for doctoral degrees is "Future Warfare." 

director is General Li Jijun, who has had a lo,ag association with t

Significantly, General Li supervised the 38th Group Army near 

1983 to 1988, when it was the test bed for the new Chinese c

mechanized group army (corps). Prior to that experimental wor

had been with Academy of Military Science for many years, parti

field of foreign army studies. He compared strategic concepts 

Army with U.S. joint force doctrine. There are five senior officer

in charge of the new doctoral program: General Mi Zhenyu, fo

Commandant; General Wang Zhenxi; General Wang Pufen

Director of the Strategic Research Department; Senior Colonel Q

the Strategy Department; and Zhang Zuiliang. General Mi 

Commandant of the AMS beginning in 1985 and is the author of 

book on Chinese national development concepts published 

described in chapter 6. General \Fang Zhenxi is a specialist in fo

studies, who served as military attachd in both Yugoslavia and R

1977 to 1983. He became head of the Foreign Military Studies D

1986. General Wang Pt,feng was the Depu w Director of the Strat

Department at the AMS in 1991. In an interview in China Dail).

1992, General Wang called for more attention by the PLA to the 

information warfare. He has been a prominent author on the 

malitary affairs (R_MA). 

Since 1992, there has been a limited restoration of con

China's Academy of Military Science and its Soviet model, the 

Academy. A former Vice President of the Soviet _Academy was 

371 
combining three colleges, one for logistics instruction

polifcal/commissar instruction, and a more general military, aca

_&MS, the NDU trains hundreds of students annually. It also 

publishing house (Guofang daxue chubanshe) that produces 50 or 

annually, including textbooks. Much more open than the _&MS

the past decade hosted hundreds of foreign military delegation

travel widely abroad. An exchange of letters between the U

Washington and the Chinese NDU in Beijing established 

program between the two institutions on the premise that the

counterparts. 

Operating under the Central Military Commission, NDU h

functions: to train military commanders, officers, and governm

and, as described by the brochure handed out to visiting f

"conduct research into the modernization of national defens

advise the Central Military Comrmssion and other military he

making decisions." Its 13 teaching divisions "specialize in: stra

operational art of way, command and management; arms and serv

military studies; Marxist theories; political work; international ec

politics; logistics studies; science and technology; foreign langu

training; and audiovisual teaching." 

In the past decade, a Scientific Research Department at N

subordinate Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) 

increasingly involved in efforts to redefine Chinese military 

doctrine. A comparison of the two major journals produced by N

Academy of Military Science shows they have different pers

methodologies. The Guofan daxue xuebaa (NDU Journal) seems mo

in local war issues and has published very little on the po

compared to the AMS journal. Perhaps to correct the NDU nea

it announced in 1996 the fonna6on of a center for milita D" resea

372 
AND MANAGEMENT 

Founded in 1989, the Chinese Society for Strategy and Manage

occupies a building in the former U. S. Embassy compound, 

during the 55-day Boxer Siege in Beijing. It publishes a leng

journal, Zhanlue yu guanh' (Strategy and Management), conta

forecasting the future security environment. According to 

describing the institute, "Many famous veteran national leade

and writers who have made great contributions to China's m

serve as its senior advisers." The chairman of the CSSM is 

Premier of the State Council Gu Mu, and one of the Vice Chairm

Defense/vlinister Zhang Aiping, who is perhaps best known in 

successful management of the Chinese nuclear weapons prog

CSSM articles have been described by some as more national

journals of CASS and CICIR. 6 CSSM journal articles have disc

of Chinese nationalism, v In 1996, the journal announced it w

publish China's ranking in the various international indices of co

and Comprehensive National Power. In 1997 and 1998, CS

annual strategic assessment, written by authors from CICIR, C

AMS. 

STile East West Center in Honolulu published a study in 1996 on the 

nationalism, the sole references of which were to "nationalistic" articles fro

7For example, ~ Wang Hui and Zhang Tianwei, "Wenhua pipan lilun yu da

minzu zhuyi wend" (Cultural criticism theory, and the issue of contem

nationalism), Zbanlueyu guanli (Strategy and Management) 5, no. 4 (199

Gongqin, "Minzu zhuyi yu Zhongguo zhuanxmg shiqi de yishixingtai'" (Nat

ideology of China's period of change), Zhanlueyuguanli (Strategy and Mana

(1994): 21-25; and Dong Zhenghua, "Minzu zhuyi yu guojia liyi" (Nationa

interests), Zhanluejuguanli (Strategy and Management) 5, no. 4 (1994): 26-27

373 
with whom to co-host conferences on political/military" issues

future of the security, environment. As a result of its close co

both the Foreign Ministry, and Chinese Military Intelligen

sometunes take more controversial positions than other better "k

institutions. For example, in 1995 FISS published Can 

Independent?, a book other research institutions and publishin

declined to print because it was too controversial in concludin

danger existed in Taiwan's movement toward independence. 

CO_'VLMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOG

AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFEN

The Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for Nati

(COSTIND) coordinates at least six ministq,-level defen

complexes, which seem to be responsible for both production 

and development for future defense weapons and equipment. 

magazines and books with assessments of the future. COSTIN

publishing house, newspaper, and series of journals, most of 

released publicly. Some Chinese interviewed complained th

shrouds itself in secrecy not so much to prevent foreign obse

maintain its autonomy from the Chinese militat3/services an

Staff. 

There is apparently resen~nent that hundreds or thousands 

employees wear military uniforms and are assigned military rank

they have never participated in militaq, units or received formal 

General Staff officer said COSTIND officials can be spotted o

their nonuniform socks, coats, sweaters and general nonmilita

even while wearing PLA uniforms. The COSTIND headquarte

37"4 
people. COSTIND has published a series of books on the histor

defense science and technology since the 1950s. One theme is 

have "three moves on the chess board," a Chinese metaphor for 

have weapons acquisition plans thought through in terms of an act

sequence of possible opponents. 

China Aerospace S&nce and Technology Coqooralion (CA

In addition to the central research institutes of COSTIND, assessm

future security environment are also prepared by a number of 

research institutes in the complex, such as the CASC. 

China Aerospace is not a corporation in the Western sense. It 

ministries and firms that manufacture weapons and civil-use e

aviation and missiles. 9 It is particularly important in providin

assessments of the future of space warfare. 1° The Chinese 

Corporation complex, together with the Ministry of Electronics

two organizations most interested in the RMA. Chinese analysts i

1LMA as a reduction in emphasis on armor, artillery, large naval 

manned fighter aircraft that are all "products" of other parts of 

not China Aerospace. According to the version of 21st-cent

SCOSTIND is being restructured. See Hadan Jencks, "COSTIND is Dea

COSTIND4 Restructuring China's Defense Scientific, Technical, and Industrial 

People's l_,iberationArmy in the Information Age, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Ri

(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1999), 59-77. 

9See China Today D~ense Science and Technolog~ (Beijing: National Defense Industr

voL 1; and Mark Stokes, "China's Strategic Modernization," U.S. Army War Co

Studies Institute, forthcoming. 

l°A restricted journal, Spate E/ectronk Warfare, has been published for sever

described in Mark Stokes. 

375 
The China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS) i

public research insutution subordinate to the General S

Department. CIISS publishes a quarterly in Chinese and English

yanjiu (International strategic studies). However, CIISS is locate

secrefve General Staff Department of the PLA. Its chairman is 

of the General Staff for Intelligence General Xiong Guankai 

at Harvard in December 1997 on the future security, environme

in chapter 1). Because of China's traditional secrecy about mil

few retired military attach& and a few civilians at the CIISS p

"window" on general staff and military intelligence assessmen

It is unfortunate that foreign visitors are not permitted to vi

Staff Department. The GSD, several blocks from the 

Compound facing the lake at Beihai Park, may have over 2,000 

1950s the GSD had Soviet advisors resident for several yea

structure probably resembles the former Soviet General S

Department manages operations and probably is the national co

for all PLA forces. The Second Department is the military intel

and has its own headquax'ters building. Its chief is usually a d

staff of the PLA and is a prominent representative sent abr

diplomacy missions. Unlike the well-known Second Departmen

its Third Department is the "no such agency" of China and 

responsible for signals intelligence, which foreign experts suc

Ball believe may be the world's third- or even second-largest co

intelligence organization after the United States and possibly 

t:The sole source on this matter seems to be Desmond Ball, "Signals Intel

Jane's Intelligence Review 7, no. 8 (August 1995): 365-370. 

376 
as high as 2000 analysts and professional staff, according to on

The Second Department and possibly the Third have their own h

compounds in northern Beijing. According to interviews, 

Department's director, as a Deputy" Chief of the General Staff

serves as the PLA representative in foreign policy discussion

Politburo level. It would be a mistake to see the GSD Second De

a counterpart to the American Defense Intelligence Agency bec

policy role the DIA lacks. Rather, the GSD Second Departme

perform not only the functions of DIA foreigal intelligence co

analysis but also the policy deliberation role played by the 300 

staff under the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense fbr Internatio

Affairs. Thus, the CIISS quarterly journal merits attention. 

12Nicholas Efrimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

1994). 

577 
Chang Memgxiong, 198, 280, 292, 297 

Chen Feng, xxxi, 5, 16, 35, 36, 40, 43, 

44, 49, 94, 119, 363 

Chert Huan, 297, 298 

Chen Peiyao, 7, 50, 51, 136, 347, 363 

Chen Qimao, 6, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 41, 

42, 86, 120, 122, 139, 160, 161, 347, 

363 

Chen Shao, 113, 118, 364 

Chen Xiaogortg, 5, 35, 36, 40, 194, 204, 

363 

Chen Yungkang, 267 

Chen Zhongjing, xxvii, 250, 347, 364 

Chu Shulong, xx~-iii, xxx, 44, 45, 52, 89, 

127, 136, 192, 347, 364 

Cui Hongiian , 149, 345 

Dao Shulin, 89, 127, 136, 364 

Deng X_iaoping, v, xxi, xxx, xx'xvii, 

xxxviii, xli, xlii, 5, 9, 13, 29, 53, 55, 59, 

60, 104, 113, 114, 156, 157, 190, 202, 

205, 206, 210,211,225, 245, 256, 257, 

262, 270, 271,273, 283,289, 290, 308, 

310, 313, 314, 317, 343, 344, 352, 353, 

370 

Ding Xinghao, 86, 201,344, 363 

Dong Bainan, 160 

Dong Guozheng, 150, 152 

Feng Yuiun , 93, 163, 165, 177, 178, 364 

Feng Zhaokui, 110, 116, 364 

Gala Ailan, 91, 94, 97, 364 

Gao Chunxiang 65, 66, 70, 79, 156, 183, 

Guo Feng, 108, 151 

Hart Shengmin, 65, 66, 10

He Fang, 4, 21, 24, 25, 37, 

He Xin, xxxviii, xl, xlii, xli

110, 135, 155, 202, 314, 

352 

Ho Poshih, 78 

Ho Tawei, 80 

Hong Jianiun , 91, 94, 129, 

Hong Yinxian, xxx, 348 

Hu Ning, 95 

Hu Ping, xx'vii, 363 

tlua Biyun, 139, 140, 142 

Huan Xiang, xxx, 9, 10, 

114, 202, 290, 310, 352 

Huang Shuofeng, 112, 1

205, 211,212, 219, 222, 

238, 248, 253, 258, 347

Huang Yingxu, xxxvi, 364 

Huang Zhengji, 13, 15, 1

363 

ji Zhiye, 164, 173 

Jiang yili, 141,364 

Jiang Yuechun, 119, 363 

Jiang Zexxml, xxxvii, 29, 

367, 368, 369, 370 

Jin Dexiang, 89, 90, 91, 98

l.i Donghang, 25, 169 

Li Haibo, 85 

Li Haoyu, 162, 165, 179 

379 
y, 

Li Yonggang, 48, 49, 170 

Li Zhiyun, 76, 77, 287, 338, 363 

Li Zhongcheng, xxiii, 6, 18, 19, 38, 42, 

43, 51, 94, 95, 114, 115, 173, 174, 178, 

204, 250, 348, 364 

Liang Ming, 116, 125, 134, 349 

Liang Shoude, x~x, 348 

Liang Yufan, 33 

Liao Yonghe, 38, 364 

Lin Huisheng, 15, 348 

Liu Chunzi, 363 

Liu Gang, 171,328, 364 

Liu Guiiing, 160, 166, 167, 173, 174, 

179, 364 

Liu Jiangyong, 34, 113, 122, 124, 129, 

132, 134, 136, 200, 348, 164 

Liu Jinghua, xlii, xliii, 175, 364 

Liu Keming, 187, 189 

Liu Mingdc, xxxi, 46, 47, 260, 363 

Liu Tinghua, 341,364 

l.iu Xiaofei, 143 

Liu Yang, 108, 151,333 

Liu Yichang, 213, 215, 225, 326, 328, 

349 

Lu Dehong, 69, 363 

Lu Zhongwei, xxxvii, 128, 346, 348, 364 

Luo Renshi, 13, 45 

Luo Yuan, 192, 364 

Luo Zhaohong, 188, 189, 364 

Ma Hong, xxvii, 352 

Ma Jmsheng, xxvii, 352 

Ma Ling, 29, 46, 52, 98, 171,288 

Ouyang Liping, 115, 3

Pan Jiabm, 97, 98, 355

Pan Junteng, 69, 70, 1

Pan Zhengqiang, 6, 47

Peng Guangqian, 138, 

278, 284, 329, 343, 

Qi Changming, 172 

Qi Dequang, 364 

Qiao Liang, 157, 354 

Sa Benwang, 39, 91, 96

Shang Jin, 22 

Shen Guoliang, 24, 36

Shen Jiru, 26, 27, 40, 4

Shen Qurong, 16, 51, 

260, 286, 364 

Shen Weili, 20, 335, 33

Shen Yihu, 54, 55 

Shen Zhongchang, 279

Shi Bike, xxvii, 352 

Shi Ze, x.'~,ii, 174, 175

Song Baoxian, 19, 200

Song Qiang, xxviii, 345 

Song Xinzhi, 79, 80 

Song Yimin, 162, 363 

Su Enze, 73, 280 

Su Qmgyi, 79, 80, 326 

Su Zhisong, 64, 329 

Sun Bailin, 296, 364 

Sun Hongwei, 83 

Sun Keqin, 149, 345 

380 
Wan Guang, 88, 350 

Wan Shirong, 92 

Wang Chiming, 152 

Wang Dajun, 127 

Wang Dandi, 168 

Wang Houkang, 23, 87, 363 

Wang Jiafu, 186 

Wang Jincun, 44, 364 

Wang Jisi, xxx, 198, 350 

Wang Liuji, 174, 364 

Wang Naicheng, 88, 93, 96, 163, 165, 

169, 170, 363 

Wang Pufeng, 65, 66, 70, 269, 278, 282, 

285, 326, 343, 364, 371 

Wang Rui, 162, 163, 180 

Wang Songfeng, 364 

Wang Xingqiao, 55 

Wang Xuhe, 43, 332, 264 

Wang Yizhou, 8, 350 

Wang Zaibang, 115, 350, 364 

Wang Zhenxi, 67, 68, 215, 265, 286, 363, 

371 

Wang Zhongchun, 37, 47, 71, 198, 259, 

339, 363 

Wang Zhuxun, 26, 27, 41, 44, 45 

Wei Jincheng, 270, 282, 283 

Wen Zlaonghua, 37, 47, 259, 363 

Wu Clai, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78 

Wu Chunqiu, xxxv, 198, 207, 208, 209, 

213, 218, 329, 364 

Wu Hua, 20, 142, 336 

Wu Guoqing, 95, 364 

Wu Rusong, x.~iv, 196, 341, 364 

Xi Runchang, 6, 19, 216,217, 226, 350, 

Xu Weidi, 37, 47, 50, 137, 

Xu Zhixian, 91, 94, 117, 1

Yah Jin, 157, 350 

Yah Tao, 89 

Yah Xiangjun, 89, 127, 13

Yah Xuetong, xxxvii, xxxv

19, 20, 52, 53, 150, 151,

253, 255, 280, 281,353, 

Yah Zheng, 9 

Yang Bojiartg, 89, 120, 126

Yang Dazhou, 13, 14, 15, 

24, 25, 36, 56, 57, 90, 

311,312, 364 

Yang Mingjie, 91, 94, 97, 

Yang Shuheng, 48, 92, 156

Yang Xuexiang, 141,351 

Yang Xuhua, 363 

Yang Zheng, xxx, 4, 18, 

351 

Ye Zhengjia, 140, 141, 14

Ying Nan, 83 

Yu Guohua, 337, 363 

Yu Sui, 158 

Yu X.iaoqiu, 19, 364 

Yuan Peng, 89, 169, 354 

Zhang Changtai, 50, 124, 

152, 159, 363 

Zhang Changzhi, 295, 296 

Zhang Chunting, 81, 82 

Zhang Dezhen, 9, 42 

Zhang Feng, 69, 292, 325 

Zhang Haiying, 279, 293, 

Zhang Jialin, 185, 187, 18

381 
Zhang Xingpmg, 157, 330 

Zhang Yebai, 162 

Zhang Yong, 172, 344 

Zhang Zangzang, xx'vii, 345 

Zhang Zhaozhong, 29, 46, 52, 98, 170, 

171,201,288, 363 

Zhao Jieqi, 131, 133, 364 

Zhao Xiaozhuo, 65, 67, 156, 183, 319, 

339, 364 

Zhen Hongtao, 20, 336 

Zhen Xi, 74, 76, 339, 364 

Zheng Qinsheng, 297 

Zheng Shen.,da, 295, 296 

Zheng Yu, 175 

Zhou Enlai, 108, 148, 185, 192, 308, 

343 

Zhou Xinsheng, 279, 293, 295 

Zhu Chtm, 131,158, 363 

Zhu Chenghu, 6, 194, 363, 372 

Zhu Liang3,in , 210, 364 

Zhu Manfing, 42 

Zhu Xiaoli, 65, 67, 156, 183, 319, 339, 

364 

382 
Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting to 

Marshall, Director of Net Assessment. Previously he served on 

several U.S. Senate Committees. 

In 1975-76, while an analyst at The RAaND Corporation, h

articles in Foreign Poky and InternationalSecutity recommending tha

States establish intelligence and military ties with China. The propo

commended by Ronald Reagan, Henry Kissinger, and James Schle

became U.S. policy. 

Dr. Pillsbury studied Mandarin Chinese for two years at t

Center in Taipei, Taiwan, under a doctoral dissertation fellow

National Science Foundation. He earned a B.A. from Stanford Un

a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has taught graduate course

foreign policy at Georgetown University, the University of Calif

Angeles, the University of Southern California, and the Naval P

School. Dr. Pillsbury is a member of the Council on Foreign Relat

International Institute for Strategic Studies. 

The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance p

Samantha Blum on this book and on Chinese Vieu~s of Future 

published by NDU Press. Ms. Blum earned her B.A. in East A

from the College of William and Mary and her M.A. in East A

from the University of Illinois and was a research assistant t

Patricia B. Ebrey for the book The Camtm'dge Illustrated Hist

(Cambridge University Press, 1996). She studied Chinese at 

Language Institute and at the Johns Hopkins University-Naniin

Center for Chinese and American Studies. 
y gg pf

China's. Yet it remains largely unknown to us, even though--

book demonstrates--much of it is available through the open 

2llichael Pillsbury's rare combination of facility in Chinese lan

standing of strategic thought to identify the important materi

available here for the first time to an English speaking audience

should take a cop3, of Pillsbury's book with them so they can 

that need to be raised.'" 

~Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, former Under Se

of Defensc for Policy 

"Dt: Pillsbury's book is a most valuable and yet most troublesome 

able ability of Chinese leaders to misperceive, to revel in paran

almost absurd lengths to justify the world as they want to see it, 

itself fully in this book. "1his great country with its great problem

debate about the future security environment. How that debate 

eno~,ous moment to the United States .... We owe Dr. Pillsbury 

Defense University a huge debt of gratitude." 

--Ambassador Richard L. Armitage, formerAssistan

of Defense for Internation',d Affairs 

"~like Pillsbury has again accomplished what no other Americ

has. He has documented authoritative Chinese views of the sec

in their own words. It is a tough read but a must read." 

--Ambassador James R. Lilley, former U.S. Ambassa

"In an often confused and ill-informed China debate, Mike Pillsbur

real public service in presenting and assessing a broad range of 

vital securiO~ issues shaping U.S.-China relations. Pillsbury has g

tant first-hand source and a one-stop shopping reference on Chin

policy debates which can only lead to a more informedAmerican 

--Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STU

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY