ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 1 

China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017 was an 

important “first” for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had 

never operated a base on foreign territory. It was also a milestone in 

a gradually expanding PLA presence in the Red Sea region. Over the previous 

decade, China deployed peacekeepers to conflicts in the oil-producing states 

of Sudan and South Sudan, conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of 

Aden, and increased its military diplomacy throughout the area. By the time 

the Djibouti base opened, the PLA was already maintaining a presence of more 

than 2,000 personnel in the region—far more than in any other area outside 

the Indo-Pacific. While PLA capabilities have remained largely concentrated 

in Asia, its Red Sea presence showcased an increasing ability to project power 

to other regions and suggested that additional deployments may occur as China 

seeks to defend its overseas interests.1

 The PLA role in the region has also entered the Chinese popular imagination: the navy’s evacuation of Chinese and 

foreign citizens from Yemen in 2015 was the basis of Operation Red Sea, one of 

China’s top grossing films of 2018.

Assessing China’s presence in the region has value for several reasons. 

First, analysts increasingly see the Red Sea not as a barrier between the African and Asian continents but as a security “zone” in which conflicts span both 

sides.2 While the PLA is not a major actor, its growing presence could affect 

conflict dynamics and regional governance. Second, the United States has clear 

interests in the region, including freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and 

its two chokepoints and the stability of littoral countries that produce a large 

volume of global oil supplies. China’s military activities in the region may influence those interests in various ways. Third, the lessons the PLA learns from 

its deployments in the region may enhance its ability to conduct expeditionary 

The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s 

Growing Military Presence in 

the Red Sea Region

by Joel Wuthnow

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow 

in the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at National Defense 

University.

Key Points

◆ China has gradually expanded its 

military footprint in the Red Sea 

region, an area of critical importance 

for global maritime commerce and 

energy production. Key aspects 

include a People’s Liberation Army 

role in United Nations peacekeeping, 

anti-piracy patrols, and a new base in 

Djibouti.

◆ China’s military presence—its largest 

outside the Indo-Pacific—supports 

Beijing’s diplomatic relations in the 

region, contributes to China’s maritime security interests, and provides 

useful lessons in building an expeditionary capability.

◆ U.S. officials need to address operational safety and counterintelligence 

issues and determine whether China’s presence—which also includes 

military diplomacy and arms sales—

is eroding traditional U.S. advantages 

as a security partner.

◆ Opportunities for military cooperation should be explored in areas 

where U.S. and Chinese interests 

align, such as disaster management 

and maritime safety.

January 2020

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

operations elsewhere, and could even contribute to its 

combat readiness in the Indo-Pacific as PLA personnel 

gain real-world experience. Finally, the ways in which 

the PLA behaves in the Red Sea—including its interactions with the U.S. military—could provide an indication of how it may act in other theaters.

This study sketches the contours, drivers, and implications of these developments. The key finding is 

that PLA presence in the Red Sea area, while currently 

modest, creates several challenges that U.S. officials 

will have to address, including questions of operational 

safety as U.S. and Chinese forces come into contact, 

risks of exposing the PLA to sensitive U.S. operations 

and capabilities, and the possibility that the attractiveness of the United States as a regional security partner could wane as China takes on increasing roles in 

this arena. The study provides suggestions for how the 

Department of Defense can manage those risks while 

also pursuing the sometimes overlooked principle of 

U.S. defense strategy that “we remain open to cooperate where our interests align.”3

 Indeed, the study argues 

that there are some avenues of additional cooperation 

that should be discussed in future U.S.-China militaryto-military engagements.

A Complex Geopolitical Situation

Describing the PLA role in the region requires a 

brief discussion of the area’s political geography. At the 

center is the 1,400-mile Red Sea, which links the Mediterranean and Arabian seas via the Suez Canal and the 

Bab el-Mandeb, respectively. Europe-Asia trade valued at $700 billion transits the sea annually, including 

6.2 million barrels/day in oil (roughly 9 percent of the 

world total).4 The region is also home to several major 

oil-producing countries including Saudi Arabia, United 

Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman; Sudan and South Sudan also both produce oil in smaller quantities as well as 

other natural resources, such as copper and chromium. 

Ports on the African side of the Red Sea, many built by 

Arabian Peninsula countries, provide exporters a chance 

to tap into Africa’s growing consumer class.5

 Consumer 

spending on the African continent is slated to rise from 

$1.4 trillion in 2015 to $2.5 trillion in 2030, with Red 

Sea littoral countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and 

Sudan among the largest potential consumer markets.6

Regional peace and stability are complicated by 

several problems. Somali piracy has waned in recent 

years due to international anti-piracy efforts, but al 

Qaeda–linked terrorists continue to carry out attacks. 

Civil conflicts also plague Sudan, South Sudan, and 

Yemen. Regional instability has been aggravated by 

two sets of rivalries, one involving a competition for 

influence between the Gulf states, Egypt, and Turkey, 

and the other between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In both 

cases, regional powers “see Africa as a new arena for 

competition and building alliances, particularly as the 

Horn is poised for strong economic growth over the 

next generation.”7

 Moreover, Saudi-Iran tensions have 

spilled over into proxy conflicts and have resulted in 

direct attacks on commercial shipping, some carried out 

by Houthi forces in Yemen.8 Prospects for conflict are 

exacerbated by the lack of an effective regional security 

architecture: Saudi Arabia’s bid to establish a security 

forum has foundered due to regional rivalries.9

Great power maneuvering adds an additional layer 

of complexity in regional politics. Russia, driven by pursuit of market opportunities, access to raw materials, 

and larger ambitions to promote a “multipolar world,” 

has increased its economic and security role in the region, including plans to develop military bases in Sudan 

and Eritrea.10 China, as discussed below, has growing 

trade and investment stakes in addition to maritime 

security interests, which have led to a larger military 

footprint. U.S. interests include counterterrorism, stability of global oil markets, countering Iran’s pursuit of 

regional hegemony, and freedom of navigation, which 

are protected in part by a U.S. military presence in Djibouti and the Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain. The conflux 

of Russian, Chinese, and U.S. interests and presences 

has led to speculation about intensified Great Power 

Competition in this theater.11
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 3 

China’s Expanding Military 

Presence

China’s military presence in the region has gradually expanded since November 2007, when the first batch 

of Chinese peacekeepers arrived in Darfur, Sudan. Well 

over 2,000 PLA personnel are in the region at any given time, distributed between ground forces assigned to 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Sudan 

and South Sudan; sailors taking part in anti-piracy escort 

operations in the Gulf of Aden; and marines located at 

China’s inaugural overseas base in Djibouti. Other Chinese military activities in the region include frequent 

high-level visits, port calls, participation in regional exercises, and arms transfers to a number of recipients (see 

figure). Each category is discussed in turn.

UN Peacekeeping. China has more than 1,400 personnel assigned to two UN peacekeeping missions in 

the region, Darfur (UNAMID) and South Sudan (UNMISS), representing about two-thirds of deployed Chinese peacekeepers worldwide.12 PLA personnel in both 

countries are drawn from several group armies based 

in the Beijing area and serve for 12 month rotations.13

China’s presence in Darfur includes 225 engineering and 

medical troops primarily responsible for building and 

repairing roads, bridges, and other infrastructure, and 

providing medical support to other peacekeepers and local citizens.14 Since June 2017, China has also allocated 

a squadron of four Mi-171 multipurpose helicopters, 

which conduct missions such as air patrol and transportation.15 China’s contribution to UNMISS, which began 

in September 2011, includes a 331-person engineering 

Figure. China's Military Presence in the Red Sea Region

Arms Recipient Peacekeepers

Base

Escort Task Force

Port Call

Source: Author using Google MyMaps in compliance with Terms. ©2019 Geobasics-DE/BKG (©2019). Google, Inst. Nacional, Maps GISrael, ORION-ME.
4 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

and medical contingent with responsibilities similar to 

those in Darfur.16 Since February 2015, China has also 

deployed a 700-person infantry battalion to South Sudan, 

which has assisted in guarding UN convoys, facilities, and 

internally displaced persons camps.17 In July 2016, two 

Chinese peacekeepers assigned to this mission were killed 

when militants tried to enter a UN compound.18

Anti-Piracy Patrols. The PLA Navy has conducted 

regular anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden 

since December 2008. These operations have provided 

protection for more than 6,000 Chinese and foreign civilian ships.19 This mission emerged from an upsurge in 

Somali piracy in the mid-2000s, which also spurred the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European 

Union (EU) to establish an anti-piracy presence in the 

region, but has continued despite a major decline in piracy incidents in recent years.20 To date, China has carried 

out more than 30 escort task forces (ETFs), with each 

serving for 3 to 4 months before rotation. ETFs typically 

include 3 to 4 surface vessels such as destroyers, frigates, 

and replenishment ships (manned by 600 or more sailors), drawn from all three navy fleets. Since 2013, China 

has also deployed submarines with some ETFs, prompting widespread foreign speculation about China’s true 

military ambitions (discussed below).21 While China’s 

ETFs operate independently, Beijing has participated 

in regional anti-piracy coordination and informationsharing mechanisms.22

Djibouti Base. In August 2017, China opened its 

first overseas military installation in Djibouti, a tiny African country located adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb. China thus became the latest foreign country to lease a base 

in Djibouti, alongside the United States (which operates 

Camp Lemonnier, home to 4,000 U.S. personnel), France, 

Japan, and Italy.23 Beijing’s 10-year lease on the property 

requires annual payments to the Djiboutian government 

of $20 million.24 The PLA base, according to Chinese accounts, is designed to support other military activities in 

the region, including peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions.25

Key facilities include barracks, eight hangars and a tarmac 

for helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, and underground facilities.26 The base is operated by a PLA Marine 

Corps mechanized infantry company, which, in addition 

to operating the base, has conducted live-fire counterterrorism exercises at a nearby training facility.27 China is 

also constructing a dedicated naval pier at the commercial 

Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port that will be long enough to 

“accommodate multiple ships at the same time by nesting 

ships outboard one another.”28

Military Diplomacy. China’s presence in the region 

also includes a variety of cooperative activities. According to a U.S. National Defense University (NDU) database, the PLA conducted 178 activities with 10 Red Sea 

countries between 2002 and 2018, including meetings 

of senior officials held both in China and in the region, 

port calls (usually conducted by ETFs returning from the 

Gulf of Aden), and participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises (see table 1).29 For example, in January 

2017, an ETF visited the Saudi port of Jeddah, where 

it held a deck reception for local Chinese citizens and 

various exchanges with the Saudi navy.30 As in many 

other countries, China maintains defense attaché offices 

in embassies across the region, which typically consist of 

between 2 and 10 PLA officers.31 In addition to their 

responsibilities in managing host-country military relations, those personnel act as overt intelligence collectors. 

Opportunities for officers from partner states to enroll in 

degree- and short-term programs at China’s NDU and 

other academies also support China’s military relationships in the region.32

Arms Transfers. Over the last 15 years, most Red 

Sea countries have purchased Chinese military weapons 

and equipment. Data collected by the international think 

tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

reveal that Chinese arms exports during this period included multiple rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, 

armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and other assets 

(see table 2). In the last few years, the most common 

Chinese export items have been large unmanned combat 

aerial vehicles (UCAVs) such as the Wing Loong-1 and 

-2, which have been purchased in bulk by Egypt, Saudi 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 5 

Arabia, and the UAE. Beijing has apparently focused on 

this market because most other UCAV producers are 

banned from exporting them due to restrictions under 

the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Agreement.33

Explaining China’s Military 

Presence

China’s growing military footprint in the Red Sea 

region advances three broad objectives: supporting China’s larger economic and diplomatic agenda in select 

countries; ensuring sea line security in a region critical 

for Chinese trade, not only by countering piracy but also 

by monitoring U.S. operations; and gaining experience in 

conducting expeditionary ground and naval operations, 

which can be applied globally.

Supporting Broader Foreign Policy Objectives. One 

of Beijing’s priority goals is maintaining access to crude 

oil supplies. In 2017, five Red Sea states provided roughly 22 percent of China’s oil imports; at the top of the 

list were Saudi Arabia ($20.5 billion in sales) and Oman 

($12.4 billion).34 The region is thus integral to China’s 

strategy of diversifying oil imports among many different 

partners. China also has important trade and investment 

interests in several states, most notably Saudi Arabia, 

Ethiopia, and Egypt. In 2017, Chinese exports to those 

three states, which are among China’s “comprehensive 

strategic partners,” surpassed $30 billon.35 Over the past 

decade, China has also signed major investment and 

infrastructure development deals in the region totaling 

more than $13 billion.36 Many of these are now branded 

as Belt and Road Initiative projects. Examples include 

China Ocean Shipping Company’s 20 percent share in 

the Suez Canal terminal, China Merchants Group’s 24 

percent stake in the port of Djibouti, and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation’s (Sinopec's) 38 percent 

share in a Saudi oil refinery.37 Diplomatically, Beijing 

relies on support from regional partners on controversial issues such as China’s treatment of Uighurs to offset 

criticism from Washington and other Western states.38

The PLA’s role in defending these interests is largely indirect. In the case of South Sudan, despite foreign 

media assertions to the contrary, PLA infantry has not 

deployed to protect oil fields or Chinese oil workers.39

Those troops have instead been tasked with various force 

protection missions in and around the capital Juba. The 

link between the PLA and China’s oil interests in South 

Sudan, which includes an agreement whereby China will 

acquire one-sixth of its oil output in return for infrastructure loans,40 is more convoluted: China agreed to provide 

the battalion to persuade the UN Department of Peace 

Operations to support Beijing’s petition to have the protection of South Sudan’s oil industry included in the UNMISS mandate.41 Beijing originally preferred to deploy 

Exercises Port Calls Visits to China Chinese Visits to Country 

Bahrain 0 1 1 1

Djibouti 1 26 4 3

Egypt 1 3 13 28

Eritrea 0 0 2 1

Ethiopia 0 N/A 3 6

Oman 1 27 2 1

Qatar 0 1 4 1

Saudi Arabia 1 8 4 3

Sudan 3 1 9 3

UAE 1 3 3 2

Yemen 0 11 1 2

Source: NDU Database. Note: no records were found for Somalia.

Table 1. Chinese Military Diplomacy with Red Sea States, 2002–2018
6 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

PLA troops to oil-producing regions, but agreed to send 

them wherever they were needed as part of the deal.42

Several PLA activities augment China’s public diplomacy in host nations. Though not directly connected 

to China’s oil interests, PLA peacekeepers in Sudan 

and South Sudan have supported China’s cultivation 

of “soft power” by building and repairing infrastructure 

and providing medical services.43 Another example is the 

dispatch of the Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark

to the region. In late 2010, for instance, the ship visited 

Djibouti, Kenya, and other countries, where it “provided 

medical care to more than 15,500 people and performed 

97 major operations.”44 China’s 2019 defense white paper 

applauded personnel at the Djibouti base for donating 

“over 600 teaching aids to local schools.”45 Such activities 

not only counter negative impressions of China in the 

region but also provide an argument Beijing can leverage 

on the international stage to reduce fears about China’s 

rising power.46

China’s military also supports stronger relations 

with host countries at the elite level. Senior leader interactions are a chance for Chinese officials to reaffirm 

support for China’s larger “strategic partnerships” with 

these states and to explore avenues for further cooperation among their respective armed forces. Moreover, 

travel to the region by senior officials, involving costly 

time commitments, is itself a sign of China’s investment 

in building these partnerships.47 Top PLA officials have 

visited most countries in the region, but their travel patterns reveal that some countries (for example, Egypt and 

Ethiopia) have been prioritized over others (see table 1). 

Arms sales, particularly of assets that can only or most 

cost efficiently be acquired from China, offer Beijing 

another opportunity to develop influence with elites in 

countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, supporting 

broader foreign policy objectives in these states.

Safeguarding Maritime Security Interests. Beijing has two basic interests in protecting maritime traffic through the Red Sea. The lesser interest is ensuring 

crude oil shipments through the Suez Canal and Bab 

el-Mandeb. Closure of either chokepoint would put a 

fraction of China’s oil imports at risk, potentially requiring substitutions from other sources. However, the effects 

would be modest in comparison to a disruption of the 

Strait of Hormuz or Strait of Malacca, through which a 

much larger percentage of global oil supplies and Chinese 

Recipient Years Delivered Items 

Bahrain 2016 Self-propelled MRL

Djibouti 2014 WMA-301 assaulter; Y-12 transport aircraft 

Egypt 2012–2018 K-8 trainer; ASN-209 UAV; Wing Loong-1 UCAV; Wing Loong-2 UCAV

Ethiopia 2012–2014 Type-89 APC; AS365 helicopter; VN-4 APC; VP3 APC

Oman 2003 WZ-551 APC

Qatar 2017–2018 BP-12A SSM; SY-400 MRL

Saudi Arabia 2008–2017 PLZ-45 self-propelled gun; CH-4 UCAV; Wing Loong-1 UCAV; Wing 

Loong-2 UCAV

Somalia 2017 Tiger APV

Sudan 2003–2018 A-5C attack aircraft; WZ-551 infantry fighting vehicle; BT-6 trainer; FN-6 

SAM; Red Arrow-8 anti-tank missile; WS-1 MRL; FB-6 SAM; FN-6 SAM; 

FTC-2000 trainer; Python-3 SRAAM

UAE 2013–2017 Wing Loong-1 UCAV; Wing Loong-2 UCAV; AH-4 towed gun

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. 

Note: No records were found for Somalia.

Key: APC: armored personnel carrier; APV: armored personal vehicle; MRL: multiple rocket launcher; SAM: surface-to-air missile; SRAAM: shortrange air-to-air missile; UAE: United Arab Emirates; UAV: unmanned aerial vehicle; UCAV: unmanned combat aerial vehicle.

Table 2. Chinese Arms Transfers to Red Sea States, 2003–2018
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 7 

imports travel.48 China’s greater interest lies in protecting 

seaborne trade routes to and from Europe. China’s total 

trade in goods with the EU in 2018 surpassed $500 billion, with a majority of it traveling through the Red Sea.49

Threats to commercial shipping from state or nonstate actors could raise prices for Chinese firms and consumers 

by increasing maritime insurance rates or forcing ships 

to use the much longer Cape of Good Hope route.50 It is 

thus no surprise that the Red Sea forms a key link in the 

“Maritime Silk Road,” the oceanic component of the Belt 

and Road Initiative.51

Driven by limited power projection capabilities and 

financial incentives to free ride, Beijing still largely relies on the U.S. Navy and others to maintain security in 

critical sea lanes. However, China’s naval presence in the 

Red Sea reflects at least an incipient desire to avoid overreliance on U.S. largesse. One reason was the explosion 

of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the mid-2000s, 

which required a comprehensive multinational effort to 

combat. Encouraged by Washington, Beijing responded 

to a UN Security Council call for all capable states to 

assist in those efforts, even if its primary focus was on 

protecting Chinese-flagged vessels. Somali piracy has 

declined significantly in recent years, though occasional 

upticks create an ongoing rationale for China’s ETFs.52

China’s base in Djibouti supports those operations by 

providing rest, replenishment, and resupply services for 

Chinese naval crews.53

While piracy has been the most common threat to 

Chinese maritime shipping, the more serious (but less 

likely) threat is a potential U.S. interdiction of Chinese 

supply routes in a future conflict. Chinese analysts have 

expressed concern about the ability of the U.S. Navy 

to blockade Chinese trade in multiple regions, including the Red Sea. Senior Captain Liang Fang, a professor at China’s NDU, includes the Suez Canal and the 

Bab el-Mandeb among 16 global maritime chokepoints 

“that the United States wants to control, which poses 

great threats to both China’s military and economic 

activities.”54 Free riding on the U.S. Navy thus carries a 

strategic risk. The ETFs provide some “far seas” experience to Chinese surface and submarine crews, which is a 

necessary first step in preparing to counter a U.S. blockade. Moreover, one purpose of China’s Djibouti base is 

to monitor U.S. naval activities near the Bab el-Mandeb, 

which could provide opportunities for Chinese forces to 

consider ways in which U.S. operations targeting Chinese shipping could be frustrated.

The Djibouti base can also be interpreted as the 

Western anchor in a larger attempt to protect Chinese 

seaborne trade through the Indian Ocean. Chinese strategic writings have long described the need to establish a 

stronger naval presence through Southeast Asia and into 

the Indian Ocean.55 Xi Jinping’s declaration of a Maritime Silk Road linking Asia with Europe, combined 

with growing Sino-Indian and Sino-U.S. frictions, put 

added pressure on the navy to defend China’s transregional supply routes.56 Djibouti is likely only the first of a 

series of bases that will provide shelter and logistics support for Chinese forces, with others likely in countries 

such as Pakistan and Cambodia.57 As former U.S. Africa 

Command commander General Thomas D. Waldhauser 

noted, China may also establish more bases in Africa, 

which could play a role in protecting supply routes in a 

region of growing importance for Chinese exports.58 A 

related sign of China’s intent to strengthen its regional 

presence is the participation of submarines—which play 

no clear role in anti-piracy operations—in some of China’s ETFs.59 Submarines would be integral to operations 

to deny U.S. or Indian forces the ability to target Chinese 

shipments in a conflict.60

Gaining Experience in Expeditionary Operations.

Chinese military strategy does not currently envision 

conducting major combat operations outside China’s 

immediate periphery, but does regard military operations other than war (MOOTW) in distant regions as 

a core PLA function.61 MOOTW, including anti-piracy, HA/DR, and noncombatant evacuations, became 

more prominent in the early 2000s with an expansion 

of China’s global economic interests and the proliferation of Chinese citizens living abroad and were central to 

Hu Jintao’s call for the PLA to prepare for “new historic 
8 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

missions” in 2004.62 The evacuation of more than 35,000 

Chinese citizens from Libya in early 2011 put a spotlight 

on the scale and complexity of protecting Chinese interests overseas.63 While multiple services have an overseas role, the navy’s is the most prominent: China’s 2015 

defense white paper stated that the navy should strike 

a balance between its traditional focus on “near seas defense,” with a greater emphasis on “far seas protection,” 

including sea lane protection.64 Nevertheless, the PLA’s 

ability to execute such missions was hindered by limited 

power projection capabilities, inadequate regional familiarity, and lack of experience operating far from home.

Participation by Chinese ground and naval forces in 

the Red Sea area of operations has helped to close some 

of these gaps. UN peacekeeping operations such as those 

in Sudan and South Sudan afford the ground forces opportunities to hone their ability to plan, manage, and sustain deployments to distant regions. In UNAMID that 

responsibility includes maintaining a helicopter squadron far from China, and in UNMISS it involves supporting a deployed infantry battalion. These missions are 

also chances for ground force personnel to learn how to 

coordinate with external actors (including the UN bureaucracy and other troop-contributing countries) and to 

acquire some cultural acuity and foreign language proficiency, which may be useful in other expeditionary circumstances. The dangerous conditions in South Sudan, 

in particular, provide an opportunity for PLA officials 

to gauge the readiness of army units to respond to similar conditions elsewhere and handle problems related to 

morale and welfare.65

Anti-piracy operations have likewise spurred the 

PLA Navy to improve its ability to operate in the far 

seas. Relevant lessons gleaned by the ETFs include 

the move toward a “port-based refueling structure,” 

replacing China’s previous overreliance on embedded 

replenishment ships, and a greater capacity to adapt to 

“mission-specific details rather than following uniform 

models” for carrying out escort operations.66 These lessons could be useful if the navy is called on to protect 

sea lanes in other regions, such as Southeast Asia or the 

Gulf of Guinea.67 Additional lessons were gained from 

the March 2015 evacuation of nearly 800 Chinese and 

foreign citizens from Yemen, which required Chinese 

frigates to divert from the Gulf of Aden and adapt to a 

rapidly deteriorating situation.68 This experience could 

inform naval planning for future noncombatant evacuations. Participation in ETFs also provides Chinese naval officers and crews a degree of familiarity with the 

regional operating environment through port calls and 

bilateral drills.

The PLA’s experience in Djibouti offers China insight into the mechanics of managing a forward base. 

This includes negotiating a status of forces agreement 

with a host government, maintaining productive relations with the local population, securing contracting 

services from local companies, and operating within 

prevailing laws and cultural norms. Success in these areas implies adequate foreign area expertise within the 

PLA as well as effective coordination among the PLA 

and other relevant Chinese actors, including the Foreign 

Ministry and the Chinese embassy. The experience of 

Djibouti also requires the PLA to learn how to safely 

manage relations with foreign forces, one example being 

deconfliction of military air traffic. Given its proximity 

to other bases—Camp Lemmonier is less than 10 miles 

away—Djibouti also provides a vantage point for the 

PLA to observe how other militaries plan and conduct 

forward operations. With no prior experience working 

through these issues, Beijing could face a steep learning curve.69 However, the lessons derived from Djibouti 

could be instrumental as China negotiates, plans, and 

operates future bases in other locations.

Implications for the United States

As a starting point, there are a number of reasons 

not to inflate the current and future importance of China’s deployments around the Red Sea. One is that the 

PLA remains a peripheral security actor. In peacekeeping, 

China contributes only a small fraction of the personnel assigned to UNAMID (5.3 percent) and UNMISS 

(6.4 percent); several other countries contribute far more 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 9 

troops to these missions.70 Hence PLA participation, 

while helpful, is not critical to the success of those operations. In anti-piracy, China is one of many independent 

deploying nations, alongside India, Japan, South Korea, 

and Russia, in addition to two multinational initiatives, 

the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 and the EU-led 

Operation Atalanta.

71 An end to China’s ETFs would 

have a limited effect on regional maritime security, due to 

the declining incidence of Somali piracy and the ability of 

others to intervene if sea lane security were endangered. 

In terms of scale, China’s three to four naval ships pale 

in comparison to the dozen or more surface ships and 

submarines assigned to U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, not to 

mention the larger regional navies, such as those of Saudi 

Arabia or Egypt.72 Moreover, China’s base in Djibouti, 

while an important “first” for the PLA, is only one of several foreign military bases in that country.

China’s military presence is also limited because of 

the lack of cohesiveness between different PLA units 

in the region. While the Djibouti base is intended as a 

transit and logistics hub for different forces, there is no 

apparent coordination among ground forces deployed 

to peacekeeping operations in east Africa, the ETFs in 

the Gulf of Aden, or marines based in Djibouti itself. 

Moreover, while all these forces are nominally supervised by the joint staff department in Beijing, there is 

no clear regional joint command structure tying PLA 

forces together (that is, a Chinese equivalent of a U.S. 

joint task force). This limits China’s ability to carry out 

joint contingency operations even in terms of MOOTW. 

In practice, Chinese interlocutors suggest it is likely that 

disparate forces are supervised by their own service headquarters.73 Unless the PLA can establish a joint mechanism, China’s military presence in the region will not be 

more than the sum of its parts.

Looking ahead, projections of a major increase in 

PLA deployments are problematic for several reasons.74

First, the PLA’s primary missions, such as preparing for a 

conflict with Taiwan or enforcing territorial claims in the 

South China Sea, are located in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The need to prepare for combat in China’s own neighborhood thus places a constraint on the PLA’s ability to 

contribute to MOOTW elsewhere. Second, China’s defense budget growth continues to slow, and will be further impacted by slowing Chinese economic growth.75

Resourcing an increase in forces allocated to other regions could thus be a challenge. Third, in terms of maintaining regional stability, Beijing has incentives to continue to rely on others. Peacekeeping in Sudan and South 

Sudan, for instance, is mostly handled by other states. 

Counterterrorism operations against al-Shabab are led 

by the African Union (supported by U.S. special operations forces).76 The U.S. Navy and other regional powers 

underwrite the security of critical sea lanes, including 

chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of 

Hormuz. Thus, even though it has reasons to increase its 

presence abroad, Beijing will still have financial incentives to continue free riding.

It is also doubtful that the PLA will become mired 

in regional conflicts. One reason is an aversion to casualties when core Chinese territorial interests are not at 

stake. As one vignette, the death of two Chinese peacekeepers in South Sudan in July 2016 resulted in a situation in which PLA personnel no longer venture “outside of their base except when holding drills.”77 Even 

with a UN mandate, it is hard to imagine PLA troops 

being inserted in highly volatile circumstances such as 

in Somalia, where they may face their own Black Hawk 

Down incident. More important, Beijing has adopted a 

neutral position in regional disputes due to the need to 

retain positive relations with all sides.78 Whereas Washington has been willing to align with Riyadh, most recently by deploying troops to protect Saudi oil fields, 

Beijing has balanced its relations between Riyadh and 

Tehran.79 An exception is that Chinese arms have made 

their way onto regional battlefields, with a Chinesemade UCAV reportedly operated by Saudi Arabia shot 

down in Yemen by Houthi rebels in April 2019. China’s 

desire to remain on the sidelines of regional conflicts 

means that Beijing will likely avoid selling arms in 

numbers that would tip the scales in favor of one side 

or another.80
10 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

While the PLA’s role in the region should not be 

overstated, U.S. officials will still need to address three 

evolving challenges. First are operational safety issues. 

In 2018, Chinese forces in Djibouti were implicated in 

widely reported incidents in which military-grade lasers 

were targeted at U.S. military aircrews, resulting in injuries.81 In June 2019, a senior U.S. Defense Department 

official revealed that PLA personnel in Djibouti were 

involved in several other unsafe activities, including attempts to “constrain international airspace” around the 

Chinese base, using drones to interfere in U.S. military 

flight operations, and attempts to gain unauthorized 

access to Camp Lemonnier.82 Some of these activities 

might have constituted probes of U.S. defenses, some 

perhaps designed to defend China’s base (for example, 

attempting to obstruct U.S. military flights over the 

base), while others may have been part of a larger pattern 

in which China has used tools below the threshold of 

armed conflict to register discontent with U.S. policies.83

In any case, such dangerous actions not only create safety 

concerns for U.S. personnel but could also cause an incident that might escalate into a direct clash.

The implication is that clear rules of behavior need 

to be established regulating Chinese activities in Djibouti. Incidents such as lasing, trespassing, and obstructing military air traffic are not governed by existing U.S.-

China military agreements on unplanned maritime and 

air-to-air encounters.84 In order to prevent an accident—

a goal that serves the interests of both states—U.S. and 

Chinese officials should pursue similar agreements on 

how their respective forces can safely coexist in Djibouti. 

Those rules should guide discussions of incidents between local commanders as well as between more senior 

U.S. and Chinese officials. Beijing might be reluctant to 

sign such an agreement due to friction in larger U.S.-

China relations or other reasons, but Washington can 

still raise the idea and put Beijing in the position of playing the spoiler. An alternative would be to pursue a multilateral negotiation over a set of rules involving other 

foreign military forces in Djibouti and periodic discussions on implementation. The benefit would be to leverage U.S. allies, such as France and Japan, that likely share 

similar concerns about China’s behavior. Even if China 

did not participate, formulating a multilateral framework 

could help in calling out problematic PLA actions.

A second challenge is avoiding unintentional contributions to the development of PLA warfighting capabilities. As discussed, Chinese participation in peacekeeping 

and anti-piracy operations has resulted in lessons that 

may be applied in other circumstances. PLA forces are 

also undoubtedly drawing lessons from observations of 

U.S. operations in and around Djibouti. While some of 

these skills may be most relevant to MOOTW, others 

could facilitate stronger PLA combat capabilities closer 

to home. For instance, Chinese interlocutors acknowledge 

that peacekeeping operations have resulted in improvements in command and control among small army units, 

which may have value in a future ground conflict with 

India or on the Korean Peninsula.85 Submarine deployments in the Gulf of Aden could provide the PLA Navy 

with useful operational data and experience that could be 

employed in a naval clash with India or the United States. 

Counterterrorism training in Djibouti could contribute 

to the proficiency of PLA Marine Corps special operations units, which may utilize that expertise in the South 

China Sea or elsewhere.

The fungibility of certain skills between MOOTW 

and combat operations means that the United States 

needs to carefully consider the risks of military exchanges with the PLA in the area. MOOTW-related cooperation is not specifically prohibited under current U.S. 

law, but participation in some U.S. or coalition activities could provide the PLA insight into restricted areas 

such as force projection and joint or combined combat 

operations.86 Substantive cooperation, such as Chinese 

participation in a multinational flotilla targeting Houthi 

activities off Yemen, would be difficult to manage while 

mitigating the risks of exposure in these areas.87 Counterterrorism cooperation with the PLA, though nominally focused on shared interests such as combating al 

Qaeda, could also provide insight into U.S. special operations doctrine and capabilities (and could send the 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 11 

wrong message, as Beijing uses “counterterrorism” as a 

pretext for crackdowns on dissidents in Xinjiang). Finding the line between cooperation that enables PLA warfighting capabilities and activities that advance common 

interests with few negative side effects may be difficult, 

but the onus should be on those proposing such activities 

to explain the risks and how they will be mitigated.

Third is the problem of China’s increasing relevance 

to the region as a security partner. In the context of 

evolving U.S.-China global competition, China’s influence primarily flows from its status as a top trade and 

investment partner for many states, while the United 

States retains important strategic advantages as a military ally and security assistance provider.88 Nevertheless, 

Beijing’s development of stronger “strategic partnerships”—which include military, intelligence, and law enforcement components such as dialogues, exercises, arms 

sales, information-sharing agreements, and counterterrorism cooperation—could weaken U.S. advantages in 

the security realm. China’s growing attractiveness as a 

security partner—though bounded by factors such as 

Beijing’s preference not to take sides in regional disputes 

and the desire by states to balance their relations between 

China and the United States—could have several ramifications for U.S. interests, such as a smaller market for 

U.S. defense firms, an uptick in authoritarianism that 

could result from Chinese assistance in helping states 

combat internal dissent, and diminished access for U.S. 

military forces during peacetime and in a conflict.

China’s ability to compete with the United States 

in the security arena will vary on a country-to-country 

basis. Analyzing the problem in greater detail would 

require a net assessment of the U.S. and Chinese military presence and security assistance activities in select 

countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This would, 

by necessity, be a “team effort” since the Red Sea spans 

two combatant commands (U.S. Africa Command and 

U.S. Central Command) and two State Department regional bureaus (African and Near Eastern affairs). Such 

an assessment would inform decisions on where, if at all, 

Washington needs to increase its level of security cooperation to offset China’s gains. In some cases, it may be 

that continuing U.S. advantages are so strong that little 

needs to be done. In other cases where adjustments are 

required, U.S. planners should think through not only 

the provision of material assistance such as foreign military sales but also other initiatives that demonstrate U.S. 

commitments, such as more frequent high-level visits 

or more places reserved for officers in U.S. professional 

military education courses.

Despite these challenges, the potential value of 

Sino-U.S. military cooperation in the region should 

not be completely discounted. As a 2017 chapter coauthored by Randall Schriver, former U.S. Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, 

points out, there are generally more opportunities for 

cooperation with the PLA outside than within Asia.89

Unlike the Indo-Pacific, China is not seeking to eliminate U.S. alliances in the Red Sea, has no territorial or 

resource disputes that put it at odds with U.S. allies, and 

is focusing on MOOTW rather than warfighting or 

deterrence missions. Beijing and Washington also have 

a series of common interests in the region, including 

combating nontraditional security threats and avoiding 

a broad escalation of tensions that could threaten global 

oil supplies and put commercial traffic in the Red Sea 

at risk. PLA contributions to regional security, albeit 

limited, should be encouraged and avenues of productive cooperation identified.

While interactions that expose the PLA to sensitive 

U.S. capabilities and operations should be avoided, some 

types of cooperation might be feasible. For instance, the 

two sides might contemplate a regional exchange focused 

on MOOTW. A model would be the annual U.S.-China 

disaster management exchange led by U.S. Army Pacific, 

which typically consists of a tabletop exercise and a smallscale field exchange.90 A Red Sea version would consider 

how both militaries would coordinate and deconflict 

activities in a future conflict, such as exploring how the 

two sides could organize a noncombatant evacuation of 

U.S., Chinese, and third-country civilians. Another option would be a dialogue between China’s ETF and U.S. 
12 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

Fifth Fleet, which would not only give U.S. observers a 

chance to gain better insight into Chinese operations but 

also serve as a platform for reaffirming U.S. commitment 

to freedom of navigation and other norms, augmenting 

messages delivered to the PLA in other venues.91 Yet another possibility is a dialogue in which U.S. and Chinese 

defense academics would share perspectives on Red Sea 

conflicts and float proposals for cooperation. Each of 

these options would involve few costs and risks and could 

result in mutually beneficial outcomes.

PLA activities in the Red Sea are unique for now: 

in no other region outside its immediate neighborhood 

does China maintain anything more than a token military presence. While China’s military capabilities will 

continue to be focused on the Indo-Pacific, the experience it gains in the Red Sea region will be useful as 

China considers increasing its presence elsewhere. This 

study suggests that such an expansion would involve 

certain tradeoffs. On one hand, PLA contributions to 

MOOTW may bolster regional stability and relieve the 

burden on others, including the United States. However, 

the downsides include opportunities to improve PLA 

combat readiness, the ability to use deployed forces to 

monitor or create nuisances for U.S. operations, and a 

possible reduction in the value regional states place on 

their security partnerships with Washington. The ways 

that the U.S. Defense Department manages these tradeoffs in the Red Sea, including mitigating risks and exploring cooperation, could set the tone for U.S.-China 

military interactions in other theaters.

Notes

1 For discussions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a 

nascent expeditionary force, see Timothy R. Heath, Developments 

in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities, 

Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, January 21, 2016; Kristen Gunness and Oriana Skylar 

Mastro, “A Global People’s Liberation Army: Possibilities, Challenges, 

and Opportunities,” Asia Policy 22 ( July 2016), 131–156.

2 See, for example, Zach Vertin, “Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf 

States Are Playing a Dangerous Game in the Horn of Africa,” Foreign 

Affairs, January 15, 2019, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/east-africa/2019-01-15/red-sea-rivalries>; Payton Knpof, 

“Why the U.S. Needs a Special Envoy for the Red Sea,” United States 

Institute of Peace (USIP), October 23, 2018, available at <www.usip.

org/publications/2018/10/why-us-needs-special-envoy-red-sea>.

3 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, June 1, 2019), available at < https://media.defense.gov/2019/

Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSEINDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

4 “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and 

Natural Gas Shipments,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

August 27, 2019, available at <www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.

php?id=41073>.

5 “The UAE Is Scrambling to Control Ports in Africa,” The 

Economist, July 19, 2018, available at <www.economist.com/middleeast-and-africa/2018/07/19/the-uae-is-scrambling-to-control-portsin-africa>.

6 Landry Signé, Africa’s Consumer Market Potential: Trends, Drivers, Opportunities, and Strategies, with Chelsea Johnson (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution, December 2018).

7 Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact, 

Report No. 206 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019); Somalia 

and the Gulf Crisis (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018).

8 Caleb Weiss, “Analysis: Houthi Naval Attacks in the Red Sea,” 

Long War Journal, August 17, 2019, available at <www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2019/08/analysis-houthi-naval-attacks-in-the-red-sea.

php>.

9 Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Arabia Seeks New Political Bloc in 

Strategic Red Sea Region,” Reuters, December 12, 2018, available at 

<www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-diplomacy/saudi-arabia-seeksnew-political-bloc-in-strategic-red-sea-region-idUSKBN1OB1Z9>.

10 Paul Stronski, Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa 

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

2019).

11 See, for example, David Shinn, “In Red Sea Region, Competing Outside Powers Complicate U.S. Interests,” USIP Analysis 

and Commentary, December 19, 2018, available at <www.usip.org/

publications/2018/12/red-sea-region-competing-outside-powerscomplicate-us-interests>; Pamela Faber, “Great Power Competition in 

the Red Sea? Yes, and . . . ,” CNA In-Depth, July 8, 2019, available at 

<www.cna.org/news/InDepth/article?ID=3>.

12 As of August 2019, China had a total of 2,152 deployed United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, including a small number of armed 

police. The other UN peacekeeping operations involving significant 

PLA presence include Lebanon with 410 peacekeepers, Congo with 

218, and Mali with 413.

13 The Central Theater Command (TC) is responsible for 

Chinese participation in both the United Nations Mission in South 

Sudan and United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur. Other 

TCs have responsibility for the other UN peacekeeping operations 

where China has a major presence (in Congo, Lebanon, and Mali). 

For a discussion of the scale and characteristics of the PLA’s UN 

peacekeeping participation, see Dennis J. Blasko, “China’s Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations: Understanding the Numbers,” 

China Brief 16, no. 18 (December 5 2016), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-contribution-peacekeeping-operationunderstanding-numbers/>.

14 “China Sends 100 Peacekeepers to Sudan,” China Military 

Online, December 11, 2018, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.

cn/view/2018-12/11/content_9375529.htm>.

15 “China’s 3rd Peacekeeping Helicopter Detachment to Darfur 

Sets Out,” China Military Online, August 21, 2019, available at 

<http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/21/content_9597189.

htm>.

16 “First Echelon of China’s 10th Peacekeeping Force to S. Sudan 

(Wau) Sets Off,” China Military Online, September 18, 2019, available 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 13 

at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-09/18/content_9627913.

htm>.

17 “5th Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion to S. Sudan ( Juba) Established,” China Military Online, November 8, 2018, available at <http://

english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-11/08/content_9338169.htm>.

18 Zhuang Pinghui, “Two Chinese UN Peacekeepers Killed, Two 

Seriously Injured in Attack in South Sudan,” South China Morning 

Post, July 11, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1988348/two-chinese-un-peacekeepers-killed-twoseriously>.

19 “China Sends New Naval Fleet for Escort Mission,” Xinhua, 

August 29, 2019, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-

08/29/c_138348595.htm>.

20 According to the International Chamber of Commerce 

International Marine Bureau (ICC-IMB), actual or attempted piracy 

incidents in the Gulf of Aden included four in 2014, zero in 2015, one 

in 2016, and one in 2018. See Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: 

Report for the Period of 1 January–30 June, 2018 (London: ICC-MB, 

2018), 6, available at <www.icc-ccs.org/reports/2018-Q2-IMB-PiracyReport.pdf>. By contrast, attacks between 2007 and 2008 numbered 

about 100 annually. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, Six 

Years at Sea . . . and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China’s 

Maritime Commons Presence (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2015), 18–19.

21 Erickson and Strange, Six Years at Sea . . . and Counting, 99.

22 Ibid., 164–167.

23 For details on other foreign presence in Djibouti and the surrounding area, see Zach Vertin, “Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, the Horn 

of Africa & the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea,” Brookings, January 

2019, available at <www.brookings.edu/interactives/red-sea-rivalries/>; 

and Neil Melvin, The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa 

Region (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2019).

24 Melvin, The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa 

Region, 4.

25 This includes providing medical support for Chinese personnel 

in the region. See China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: 

State Council Information Office, 2019), 15.

26 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 111.

27 Ibid. See also “PLA Base in Djibouti Conducts Anti-Terrorism 

Exercise,” People’s Daily Online, May 15, 2018, available at <http://

en.people.cn/n3/2018/0515/c90000-9460275.html>.

28 According to one analysis, the pier will be able to accommodate all PLA Navy ships other than an aircraft carrier and Type 

071 amphibious transport dock. See Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and 

Patrick deGategno, China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The 

Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base (Arlington, VA: CNA, July 2017), 26.

29 The countries surveyed include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen. For a 2003–2016 version 

of the database, see Kenneth Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John 

Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, 

China Strategic Perspectives 11 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2017), 

available at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249864/

chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/>.

30 “Chinese Naval Fleet Visits Saudi Arabia,” China Military 

Online, January 10, 2017, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

view/2017-01/10/content_7446160.htm>.

31 China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 

(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), 26.

32 Details on foreign officers at China’s National Defense University are limited, but an interlocutor explained that students come 

from “virtually all” countries with which China maintains diplomatic 

relations. Courses are offered in various languages, including English, 

French, and Arabic. For a general picture of China’s training of foreign 

officers, see John S. Van Oudenaren and Benjamin E. Fisher, “Foreign 

Military Education as PLA Soft Power,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 

2016), 105–118.

33 China Military Power, 107. For additional details, see Greg 

Waldron, “China Finds Its UAV Export Sweet Spot,” Flight Global,

June 14, 2019, available at <www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/chinafinds-its-uav-export-sweet-spot-457947/>.

34 The source is the UN Comtrade Database, available at <https://

comtrade.un.org/>. Other suppliers include South Sudan ($1.3 billion), 

Egypt ($888.2 million), and Sudan ($293 million).

35 Ibid. Comprehensive strategic partner (全面战略伙伴) is a label 

China uses to denote its priority diplomatic relationships.

36 American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment 

Tracker, available at <www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.

37 Ibid.

38 For instance, in July 2019, countries such as Saudi Arabia, 

Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain signed a letter 

to the UN Human Rights Council supporting China’s position on 

Xinjiang. See Tom Miles, “Saudi Arabia and Russia Among 37 States 

Backing China’s Xinjiang Policy,” Reuters, July 12, 2019, available at 

<www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/saudi-arabia-andrussia-among-37-states-backing-chinas-xinjiang-policy-idUSKCN1U721X>.

39 See, for example, Nicholas Bariyo, “China Deploys Troops 

in South Sudan to Defend Oil Fields, Workers,” Wall Street Journal, 

September 9, 2014, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/china-deploystroops-in-south-sudan-to-defend-oil-fields-workers-1410275041>.

40 Okech Francis, “China Gets a Sixth of South Sudan Oil 

Output to Build Highways,” Bloomberg, April 5, 2019, available at 

<www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-05/china-gets-a-sixthof-south-sudan-oil-output-to-build-highways>.

41 Colum Lynch, “U.N. Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil 

Interests in South Sudan,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2014, available at 

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/16/u-n-peacekeepers-to-protectchinas-oil-interests-in-south-sudan>.

42 Ibid. For further analysis, see China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan, Report No. 288 (New York: International Crisis 

Group, 2017).

43 Effectiveness in shaping public perceptions in these countries 

is unclear due to lack of survey data. However, fieldwork in a different 

case (Cambodia) demonstrated that local residents often have a highly 

favorable view of China following interactions with PLA peacekeepers. See Miwa Hirono, “China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: 

The Lessons of Cambodia—What Now for Sudan?” International 

Peacekeeping 18, no. 3 (2011), 328–343.

44 Peter W. Mackenzie, Red Crosses, Blue Water: Hospital Ships and 

China’s Expanding Naval Presence (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2011), 15–16.

45 China’s National Defense in the New Era, 15.

46 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “China’s Blue Soft 

Power,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015), 1–21.

47 For an analysis of top Chinese leader travel patterns, see Scott 

L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders, “Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign 

Policy Priorities,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012), 

163–177.

48 One analysis based on 2006 data found that a 100 percent 

disruption of the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb straits would impact 
14 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

4.5 and 3.3 million barrels per day, where a 100 percent disruption to 

the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca would impact 17 and 

15 million barrels per day. See William Komiss and LaVar Huntzinger, 

The Economic Implications of Disruptions to Maritime Oil Chokepoints 

(Arlington, VA: CNA, 2011), 26.

49 See UN Comtrade Database, available at <https://comtrade.

un.org/>. While China has opened several freight rail links to Europe, 

the total value of goods transported over rail in 2016 was only $22.9 

billion. That value is expected to rise to $76.5 billion by 2020, still a 

fraction of China’s overall trade with the European Union. See Jakub 

Kakobowski, Konrad Poplawski, and Marcin Kaczmarski, The Silk 

Railroad: The EU-China Rail Connections: Background, Actors, Interests 

(Warsaw: Center for Eastern Studies, 2018), 5.

50 Maritime insurance rates have risen by more than 10 times in 

conflict-prone areas of the Middle East. See “Marine Insurance Premiums Soar for Middle East Transit,” Insurance Marine News, June 19, 

2019, available at <https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/marine-insurance-premiums-soar-for-middle-east-transit/>. 

Using the Cape of Good Hope route would add approximately 43 days 

transit time. See World Shipping Council, “The Suez Canal—A Vital 

Shortcut for Global Commerce,” available at <www.worldshipping.

org/pdf/Suez-Canal-Presentation.pdf>.

51 For an overview, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Colin Flint, 

“The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” Geopolitics

22, no. 2 (2017), 223–245.

52 Kieron Monks, “Piracy Threat Returns to African Waters,” 

CNN, January 3, 2018, available at <www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/africa/

piracy-resurgence-somalia/index.html>.

53 Downs, Becker, and deGategno, China’s Military Support 

Facility in Djibouti, 30. See also “Chinese Navy Imprints Its Escort 

Efforts on Embankment of Djibouti,” China Military Online, March 

18, 2019, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-03/18/

content_9452242.htm>. China’s 2019 defense white paper noted that 

the base had “provided equipment for the maintenance of four escort 

task groups” and had “offered medical services for over 100 officers on 

board.” China’s National Defense in the New Era, 15.

54 Liang Fang, On Maritime Strategic Access [海上战略通道论] 

(Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2011).

55 For instance, the 2013 Science of Strategy identified the need 

to expand China’s “strategic zone” to cover the western Pacific and 

northern Indian oceans. See Academy of Military Science Military 

Strategy Research Department, Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

Academy of Military Science, 2013), 13. See also Conor Kennedy, 

“Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy,” China Brief 19, 

no. 6 (March 22, 2019), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/

strategic-strong-points-and-chinese-naval-strategy/>.

56 See, for example, Wang Hongguang, “Seeing China’s Strategic 

Directions Today from History” [从历史看今日中国的战略方向], 

People’s Daily Online [人民网], March 12, 2015, available at <http://

history.people.com.cn/n/2015/0312/c372326-26681791-2.html>.

57 As Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici argue, such a “string 

of pearls” would not be sufficient for China to “dominate” the Indian 

Ocean. However, such a structure could enable more frequent PLA 

Navy patrols in sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean. 

Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: 

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, with Scott 

Devary and Jenny Lin, China Strategic Perspectives 7 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2014), available at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf>.

58 John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Chief: Expect More Chinese 

Bases in Africa,” Stars and Stripes, March 6, 2018, available at <www.

stripes.com/news/africom-chief-expect-more-chinese-bases-inafrica-1.515263>.

59 Erickson and Strange, Six Years at Sea . . .and Counting, 98–102.

60 According to a U.S. assessment, submarine participation in 

escort task forces (ETFs) “were probably also conducting area familiarization, and demonstrating an emerging capability both to protect 

China’s sea lines of communication and to increase China’s power 

projection into the Indian Ocean.” Annual Report to Congress: Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), 22.

61 Science of Military Strategy, 161. For a discussion on how the 

concept military operations other than war is defined in different parts 

of the PLA, see Fan Gaoyue and James Char, Introduction to China’s 

Military Operations Other Than War (Singapore: RSIS, 2019), 4–6.

62 For an excellent discussion of the “new historic missions,” see 

Daniel M. Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu 

Jintao’s Military Legacy,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis 

Tanner, Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 81–128.

63 Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, Protecting 

China’s Overseas Interests (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 48–51.

64 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: State Council Information 

Office, 2015), available at <http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_

paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm>.

65 The most controversial case occurred in July 2016 when 

Chinese peacekeepers under fire apparently abandoned their posts. A 

UN report blamed a faulty command structure and “lack of leadership 

on the ground” for the incident. See “Letter Dated 1 November 2016 

from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 

Council,” US Security Council, November 1, 2016.

66 Erickson and Strange, Six Years at Sea . . . and Counting, 

196–197.

67 Incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have been much 

higher than in the Gulf of Aden in recent years. While China does 

not have a standing ETF, it has participated in regional exercises. See 

“Nigeria, China, France, Portugal Navies Combat Piracy in the Gulf of 

Guinea,” China Military Online, June 4, 2018, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-06/04/content_8051363.htm>.

68 James T. Areddy, “China Evacuates Citizens from Yemen,” Wall 

Street Journal, March 30, 2015, available at <https://www.wsj.com/

articles/china-evacuating-citizens-from-yemen-1427689845>.

69 For an excellent analysis, see Eric Kiss, “The Three Enablers: 

Managing and Assuring Access for People’s Liberation Army Bases 

and Overseas Operations,” paper presented at the NBR–Army War 

College–U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Conference on the People’s 

Liberation Army, October 19–21, 2018.

70 See UN Peacekeeping, “Troop and Police Contributors,” 

available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-policecontributors>. Data are from May 2019. Larger troop contributors 

in the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 

include Egypt, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Tanzania. In the United Nations 

Mission in South Sudan, larger troop contributors are Bangladesh, 

Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Nepal, and Rwanda.

71 Details on CTF-151 are available at <https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/>. Details on Operation

Atalanta are available at <https://eunavfor.eu/>.

72 Details on U.S. force structure are available at <www.cusnc.

navy.mil/Task-Forces/>.

73 Discussions with PLA interlocutors, 2018–2019.

74 Some media reports have claimed that China’s base has 

facilities for up to 10,000 PLA personnel, implying a future major 

expansion of PLA presence in the region. See, for example, Laura 

Zhou, “China Sends Troops to Military Base in Djibouti, Widening Reach Across Indian Ocean,” South China Morning Post, July 13, 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 303 15 

2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2102422/china-sends-troops-military-base-djibouti-widening>.

75 Phillip C. Saunders, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019.

76 “Attack in Somalia Kills U.S. Service Member, Wounds Others,” Defense.gov, June 8, 2018.

77 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, China’s Evolving Role as a UN Peacekeeper 

in Mali, USIP Special Report 432 (Washington, DC: USIP, September 2018), 4, available at <www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/chinasevolving-role-un-peacekeeper-mali>.

78 Ilan Goldenberg and Ely Ratner, “China’s Middle East Tightrope,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2015, available at <https://foreignpolicy.

com/2015/04/20/china-middle-east-saudi-arabia-iran-oil-nucleardeal/>; Joel Wuthnow, Posing Problems Without an Alliance: China-Iran 

Relations after the Nuclear Deal, China Center Strategic Forum 290 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2016), available at <https://inss.ndu.

edu/Media/News/Article/654743/posing-problems-without-analliance-china-iran-relations-after-the-nuclear-deal/>.

79 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “New U.S. Aid to Saudi Arabia Will 

Include 200 Troops,” New York Times, September 26, 2019, available 

at <www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/world/middleeast/troops-defensesaudi-pentagon.html>.

80 “Saudi-Led Coalition Drone Downed in Yemen,” Medium, 

May 22, 2019, available at <https://medium.com/dfrlab/saudi-ledcoalition-drone-downed-in-yemen-7d465edc37b2>.

81 Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “Laser from Chinese Base 

Aimed at U.S. Military Pilots in Africa’s Skies, Pentagon Charges,” 

Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2018, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/

laser-from-chinese-base-aimed-at-u-s-military-pilots-in-africas-skiespentagon-charges-1525351775>.

82 Geoff Hill, “Chinese Military Taking ‘Irresponsible Actions’ 

Toward U.S. Forces in Djibouti, Intel Chief Says,” Washington Times, 

June 16, 2019, available at <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/

jun/16/china-us-military-clash-over-djibouti-airspace/>.

83 Lasing incidents were not confined to Djibouti. In 2017–

2018, at least 20 incidents were also reported in the Pacific. See Euan 

McKirdy, “Suspected Chinese Lasers Target U.S. Aircraft Over the 

Pacific, U.S. Military Source Says,” CNN, June 22, 2018, available at 

<www.cnn.com/2018/06/22/politics/pacific-ocean-us-military-jetslasers-intl/index.html>.

84 Protocols on U.S.-China maritime encounters were signed in 

November 2014, while an air-to-air annex was signed in September 

2015. These agreements are available at <https://archive.defense.gov/

pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf> 

and <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-CHINA_AIR_ENCOUNTERS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf>.

85 Discussion with PLA interlocutor, 2019.

86 The 2000 National Defense Authorization Act restricts cooperation in 12 areas, including force projection operations. Available at 

<https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/106-65.pdf>.

87 Phil Stewart, “U.S. Wants Military Coalition to Safeguard 

Waters off Iran, Yemen,” Reuters, July 9, 2019, available at <www.

reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-usa-coalition/us-wants-militarycoalition-to-safeguard-waters-off-iran-yemen-idUSKCN1U42KP>.

88 In the context of the Indo-Pacific regional order, see G. John 

Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and 

Middle State Strategies in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 20, no. 

20 (2015), 1–35.

89 David M. Finkelstein, Phillip C. Saunders, and Randall G. 

Schriver, Joint U.S.-China Think Tank Project on the Future of U.S.-

China Relations: An American Perspective (Washington, DC: CSIS, 

2017), 28.

90 “U.S. Army Participates in 14th Annual Disaster Management 

Exchange in Nanjing, China,” Army.mil, November 13, 2018, available 

at <www.army.mil/article/213729/us_army_participates_in_14th_annual_disaster_management_exchange_in_nanjing_china>.

91 Occasional discussions between China’s ETF commander and 

the CTF-151 commander, who is typically from a U.S. ally/partner 

country, have taken place. See, for example, “A New Era of Partnership between CTF-151 and China’s ETG-150,” Combined Maritime 

Forces, July 13, 2014, available at <https://combinedmaritimeforces.

com/2014/07/31/a-new-era-of-partnership-between-ctf-151-andchinas-etg-150/>.

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

(CSCMA) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies serves as a national focal point and resource center 

for multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on 

the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

develop, eld, and deploy an effective military instrument 

in support of its national strategic objectives.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors 

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

Phillip C. Saunders

Director

CSCMA

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Laura J. Junor

Director for Research

and Strategic Support

For helpful comments on previous drafts, the author 

thanks Gawdat Bhagat and Phillip C. Saunders. This 

publication also benefited greatly from the author's 

participation in a U.S. Institute of Peace Senior Study 

Group on China and the Red Sea. A report based on 

that group's work is forthcoming in 2020.
16 SF No. 303 ndupress.ndu.edu

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