FINAL 

13 March 2013 

Preliminary Assessment 

Report for Naval Defensive 

Sea Area 

Department of the Navy 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command Northwest

1101 Tautog Circle 

Silverdale, WA 98315

Kiska Island 

Alaska 
FINAL 

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR 

NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA 

KISKA ISLAND 

ALASKA 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command Northwest 

Silverdale, Washington 

March 13, 2013
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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 

Document Title: Final Preliminary Assessment Report for Naval Defensive 

Sea Area 

Site Name/Location: Kiska Island, Alaska 

Document Control No.: 0313.503 

33762079.R-3 

Report Coverage: This document presents the results of a preliminary 

assessment conducted to evaluate the possible presence of 

munitions and explosives of concern in the marine 

environment within the Naval Defensive Sea Area at Kiska 

Island resulting from training exercises and ordnance 

handling activities between 1940 and 1950. 

Organization Title: Naval Facilities Engineering Command Northwest 

Address: 1101 Tautog Circle, Suite 203 

 Silverdale, Washington 98315 

 (360) 396-6387 

Navy Remedial Project Manager: Grady May 
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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................................................... vii 

1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1-1

1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................ 1-2

1.2 PROJECT SCOPE ............................................................................................... 1-2

2.0 SITE Background ................................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1 SITE LOCATION AND SETTING .................................................................... 2-1

2.2 SITE DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................... 2-1

2.3 SITE OWNERSHIP HISTORY .......................................................................... 2-1

2.4 SITE OPERATIONS AND WASTE CHARACTERISTICS ............................. 2-4

2.4.1 Historical Waste Management Practices ................................................. 2-6

2.4.2 Regulatory Compliance ........................................................................... 2-7

2.5 SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION .................................................................... 2-7

2.5.1 Source Descriptions ................................................................................. 2-8

2.5.2 Historical Aerial Photography Evaluation ............................................. 2-10

2.5.3 Evidence of Munitions and Explosives of Concern or Related Hazardous 

Substances in the Marine Environment ................................................. 2-10

2.5.4 Estimated Quantity of Munitions and Explosives of Concern ............... 2-15

3.0 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS AND TARGETS ....................................................................... 3-1

3.1 MARINE SETTING ............................................................................................ 3-1

3.2 PHYSICAL RELEASE PATHWAY .................................................................. 3-1

3.3 CHEMICAL RELEASE PATHWAY ................................................................. 3-2

3.4 HUMAN EXPOSURE TARGETS ...................................................................... 3-3

3.5 MARINE EXPOSURE TARGETS ..................................................................... 3-6

4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................... 4-1

4.1 IDENTIFIED SOURCES .................................................................................... 4-1

4.2 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS .................................................................................. 4-2

4.3 AREAS POTENTIALLY CONTAINING NONCOMBAT MEC IN THE 

MARINE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................... 4-3

4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 4-3

5.0 REFERENCEs ....................................................................................................................... 5-1
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APPENDICES 

A Executive Order 8680 

B Historical Aerial Photo Interpretation 

C 3Rs Explosives Safety Guide, Maritime Industry 

FIGURES

2-1 Location and Relative Position of the Islands in the Rat Island Group, Aleutian 

Islands, Alaska ................................................................................................................. 2-2

2-2 Extent of the Naval Defensive Sea Area Surrounding Kiska and Little Kiska Islands ... 2-3

2-3 Locations of Former Barge and Ship Piers, February 1944, Kiska Island .................... 2-10

2-4 Target Locations for a Rocket and Bombing Exercise Conducted by Patrol Squadron 

Two, May 1950, Kiska Island ........................................................................................ 2-11

2-5 Locations of Known Allied In-Water Ranges, October 1943, Kiska Island ................. 2-13

2-6 Photographs of Japanese Ordnance on the Bottom of Kiska Harbor, 1989 ................... 2-14

3-1 Conceptual Site Model ..................................................................................................... 3-5

4-1 Former Range Area Potentially Containing MEC at Kiska Harbor, Kiska Island .......... 4-5

4-2 Former Range Area Potentially Containing MEC at Little Kiska Island ........................ 4-6

4-3 Former Range Area Potentially Containing MEC Off Mutt and Jeff Coves, Kiska 

Island ................................................................................................................................ 4-7

4-4 Former Range Area Potentially Containing MEC Off Gertrude Cove, Kiska Island ...... 4-8

4-5 Former Range Area Potentially Containing MEC at Off Beach and Bluff Coves, 

Kiska Island ..................................................................................................................... 4-9

PLATE

4-1 Locations of Areas Potentially Containing Munitions and Explosives of Concern within 

the Naval Defensive Sea Area at Kiska Island
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AA antiaircraft 

AMNWR Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge 

AMTB antimotor-torpedo-boat 

DMM discarded military munitions 

HMX cyclotetramethylene tetranitramine 

km kilometer 

MC munitions constituent 

MEC munitions and explosives of concern 

mm millimeter 

MMRP Military Munitions Response Program 

MRP Munitions Response Program 

NAAF Naval Auxiliary Air Facility 

NARA National Archives and Records Administration 

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

NDSA Naval Defensive Sea Area 

PA preliminary assessment 

RDX cyclotrimethylene trinitramine 

TNT trinitrotoluene 

UAA University of Alaska Anchorage 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

UXO unexploded ordnance 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 

Kiska Island and Little Kiska Island were withdrawn from the public domain for naval purposes 

in 1903. During World War II the Empire of Japan occupied Kiska Island from the June 7, 1942 

until the July 28, 1943. The Allied forces bombarded the Japanese positions on and around 

Kiska from June 7, 1942 to August 15, 1943. After retaking the island in August 1943, the U.S. 

Army and Navy established defensive operations there for approximately one year. The 

Department of the Navy was given control of Kiska on May 2, 1949. As part of the defensive 

operations, in-water ranges with mobile guns were established. The Navy formally returned 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands to the Department of the Interior on February 23, 1951. 

A Naval Defensive Sea Area (NDSA) is a water area set aside by executive order of the 

President of the United States because of its strategic nature, or for purposes of defense. The 

NDSA at Kiska Island was established on February 14, 1941 by Executive Order 8680, included 

as Appendix A. This NDSA includes the territorial waters between the extreme high-water 

marks and the 3-mile marine boundaries. 

According to 32 CFR Part 761, Subpart A §761.3 (a), there are three NDSAs in Alaska under the 

control of the Secretary of the Navy: Kiska Island, Kodiak Island, and Unalaska Island. The 

Navy addresses in-water ranges at the NDSA for Kiska Island in this preliminary assessment 

(PA) report. The Navy addresses the NDSAs for Unalaska and Kodiak Islands in separate 

preliminary assessment reports. The Navy is not addressing any other area in Alaska with 

coastal defense artillery. 

The Navy’s Munitions Response Program (MRP) addresses the National Defense Authorization 

Act of 2000 that required the Department of Defense to establish a program that addresses the 

potential explosives safety, health, and environmental issues caused by munitions and explosives 

of concern (MEC) and munitions constituents (MC) used or released on sites from past 

operations and activities. Because there is evidence of practice in-water ranges within the NDSA 

at Kiska Island, the Navy initiated a PA of this NDSA. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) evaluated the terrestrial environment at Kiska and Little Kiska Islands under the 

Formerly Used Defense Sites program. 

Previous environmental and ordnance investigations conducted in similar water body areas have 

identified the potential for waters of NDSAs to be contaminated with MEC. These activities 

include practice firing of coastal defense and antiaircraft (AA) guns at fixed and towed targets, 

aerial gunnery firing practice at surface targets, aerial bombing practice at fixed targets, ordnance 

lost overboard during handling activities, and in-water ordnance disposal. 
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1.1 PURPOSE 

The purpose of a PA is to differentiate sites that pose little or no potential threat to human health 

and the environment from sites that warrant further investigation (USEPA 1991). The Navy 

completed this PA report to evaluate the potential for releases that may pose a potential threat to 

human health or the environment as a result of historical operations at in-water ranges and other 

areas suspected of containing MEC within the NDSA at Kiska Island. . The findings in the PA 

report were used to make recommendations for addressing any action at the NDSA. The 

presence of MEC within the NDSAs beyond the known limits of in-water ranges resulting from 

combat activities during World War II are beyond the scope of this investigation. 

1.2 PROJECT SCOPE 

The scope of this project consists of a records review and preparing the related PA report. The 

records review includes an extensive search for information regarding historical operations of inwater practice ranges and ordnance handling points located within the NDSA at Kiska Island. 

The PA report includes a summary of information assembled during a review of pertinent books, 

reports, public historical records, web sites, and aerial photographs. Interviews were conducted 

with individuals knowledgeable of MEC finds or historical ordnance activities. 

This PA is based on review of records conducted on-site at facilities in the Seattle, Anchorage, 

and Washington, D.C. areas. Records that might exist at the Museum of the Aleutians on 

Unalaska Island and Kodiak Military History Museum located in Kodiak, Alaska were not 

included. 

Therefore, the records review consisted of information held by the following agencies or 

facilities: 

 U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE), Alaska District 

 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) II, College Park, 

Maryland 

 NARA, Regional Branch, Seattle, Washington 

 NARA, Regional Branch, Anchorage, Alaska 

 Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, 

D.C. 
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 Navy Department Library, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 

 3rd Wing U.S. Air Force History Office, Anchorage, Alaska 

 Anchorage Museum, Anchorage, Alaska 

 University of Alaska Anchorage Consortium Library, Anchorage, Alaska 

 Z.J. Loussac Library–Main Branch, Anchorage, Alaska 
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2.0 SITE BACKGROUND 

2.1 SITE LOCATION AND SETTING 

Kiska is an island in the Rat Island group of the Aleutian Island chain in Alaska. It is 

approximately 22 miles (35 km) long and varies in width from 1.5 to 6 miles (2.4 to 9.7 km). It 

is located at 51° 57′ 51′′ north latitude, 177° 27′ 36′′ east longitude. The Rat Islands are a 

volcanic group of islands located between Buldir Island to the west and Amchitka Pass to the 

east. The largest islands in the group from west to east are Kiska, Little Kiska, Segula, 

Hawadax, Khvostof, Davidof, Little Sitkin, Amchitka, and Semisopochnoi. Figure 2-1 shows 

the location of the Rat Island group and the relative positions of the individual islands. 

The Rat Islands are situated at a convergent boundary between two tectonic plates that make up 

the Earth’s crust. The more southern or Pacific Plate is being subducted under the more northern 

North American Plate. This results in an area that is spotted with active and dormant volcanos 

and very earthquake prone. Earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 6 on the Richter scale are 

common. 

2.2 SITE DESCRIPTION 

The study area for this PA consist of the known in-water range areas established for target firing 

of the costal artillery and AA batteries installed on Kiska Island by Allied forces, known in-water 

practice bombing targets, and on-water ordnance handling locations within the 3-mile limit of the 

NDSA. Figure 2-2 shows the extent of the NDSA surrounding Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. 

2.3 SITE OWNERSHIP HISTORY 

The U.S. purchased Alaska, which includes the Aleutians, from Russia in 1867. Kiska Island 

and Little Kiska Island were withdrawn from the public domain for naval purposes in 1903 

(USACE 2004). A 10-man Navy weather station was the only U.S. military presence on the 

islands prior to the Japanese occupation in 1942. The islands were invaded and occupied by 

Japanese forces from June 7, 1942 until July 28, 1943 (Garfield 1969). After the Japanese 

abandoned the island, the U.S. Army established the Kiska Island Garrison Site and Little Kiska 

Island Harbor Defense Site, while the U.S. Navy established the Kiska Naval Auxiliary Air 

Facility (NAAF) in September 1943 (USACE 2004). 
L i t t l e K i s k a L i t t l e K i s k a

I s l a n d I s l a n d

K i s k a I s l a n d K i s k a I s l a n d

A m c h i t k a A m c h i t k a

 I s l a n d I s l a n d

S e m i s o p o c h n o i S e m i s o p o c h n o i 

I s l a n d I s l a n d

L i t t l e L i t t l e

S i t k i n S i t k i n

I s l a n d I s l a n d

H a w a d a x I s l a n d H a w a d a x I s l a n d

S e g u l a I s l a n d S e g u l a I s l a n d

Davidof Davidof

 Island Island

K h v o s t o f K h v o s t o f

I s l a n d I s l a n d

U.S. NAVY

Delivery Order 0040

Naval Defensive

Sea Area

Kiska Island, Alaska

0

I

105

Scale In Miles

Figure 2-1 

Location and Relative Position of the 

Islands in the Rat Island Group 

Aleutian Islands, Alaska 

Path: T:\NAVY\SeaDefense\MXD\Draft\Kiska\Figure2-1 Locationl.mxd

AA l

l ee uu tt i

i aa nn II ss llaann dd

CC hhaa iinn

Rat Islands

177° E

178° E

179° E

52° N
L i t t l e K i s k a L i t t l e K i s k a

I s l a n d I s l a n d

Kiska

 Harbor

Vega Bay

Gertrude Cove

Little Kiska Head

Jeff Cove

Mutt Cove

Beach Cove

Bluff Cove

Approximate Extent of Naval Defensive Sea Area

K i s k a I s l a n d K i s k a I s l a n d

Tanadak Pass Ta n ad a k I sl a nd Ta n ad a k I sl a nd

U.S. NAVY

Delivery Order 0040

Naval Defensive

Sea Area

Kiska Island, Alaska

0

I

42

Scale In Miles

Figure 2-2 

Extent of the Naval Defensive Sea Area 

Surrounding Kiska and Little Kiska Islands 

Path: T:\NAVY\SeaDefense\MXD\Draft\Kiska\Figure2-2 Extent of NDSA Kiska.mxd
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The Navy decommissioned NAAF Kiska Island on September 19, 1944, as the Army declared 

the Kiska Island Garrison and Little Kiska Harbor Defense Sites as excess and placed them in 

inactive status on December 3, 1945. As the Army had no permanent interest in Kiska Island, it 

returned control of these sites to the Department of the Navy on May 2, 1949. The Navy 

formally returned Kiska and Little Kiska Islands to the Department of the Interior on February 

23, 1951 (USACE 2004). 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands remain undeveloped and uninhabited since their abandonment 

after World War II. The former Japanese occupation site on the island (including surrounding 

waters) was designated a national historic landmark (the highest level of recognition accorded to 

historic sites in the United States) on February 4, 1985, and is protected under federal law. 

Collecting artifacts from a national landmark is illegal. These islands are also a part of the 

Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge (AMNWR) that is managed by the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service. Activities at or near Kiska and Little Kiska Islands may include historical 

research, site-seeing, camping, photography, hiking, fishing, and diving. None of these activities 

are prohibited. However, because of the remoteness of these islands, they are likely not 

frequently visited. A danger sign posted in Kiska Harbor warns visitors of the presence of MEC 

and prohibits digging. 

2.4 SITE OPERATIONS AND WASTE CHARACTERISTICS 

Human activities on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands during World War II consisted of active 

warfare between Allied forces and the Empire of Japan. In June 1942, the Japanese invaded 

Kiska and began military development in the area surrounding Kiska Harbor. The Japanese 

occupation force consisted of approximately 7,800 men from assorted Army, Navy, and air units. 

The main camp area includes numerous aboveground and underground structures, a seaplane 

ramp, a submarine base with a marine railway, and docks for unloading supply ships and barges. 

The Japanese began construction of an airfield located north of Kiska Harbor that was not 

completed. Harbor defenses included the installation of 16 coastal defense guns and 69 AA 

batteries (Cohen 1993). Because of the circumstances of the Japanese withdrawal during July 

1943, these guns remained on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. Several of the larger guns remain 

on the islands today. 

The Allied forces bombarded the Japanese positions on and around Kiska from June 7, 1942 to 

August 15, 1943. An estimated 3,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Kiska by Allied forces 

during this period (USACE 2004). A World War II veteran who served on a flight combat crew 

during the bombardment of Kiska said that bombs were dropped on targets in the water, 

including ships and float planes (Cochran 2012). In addition, surface bombardment by naval 

units between August 1942 and 1943 resulted in the following number of high-explosive rounds 

fired on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands (USACE 2004): 
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 14-inch: 243 rounds 

 8-inch: 1,686 rounds 

 6-inch: 5,145 rounds 

 5-inch: 9,234 rounds 

On August 15, 1943 an invasion force of approximately 34,400 Allied troops came ashore at two 

beaches located along the northwestern shore of the island. These troops found the island 

abandoned by the Japanese. 

Once reacquired by Allied forces, the 38th Naval Construction Battalion was assigned the initial 

operations at Kiska (Alaska Geographic Society 1995). They were responsible for establishing 

all base facilities and waterfront development, including reconstruction of the Japanese barge 

dock and construction of a ship dock, both extending into Kiska Harbor. The naval installation 

established at the site of the old Japanese submarine base was authorized as a NAAF (USACE 

2004). 

The airfield started by the Japanese and completed by the Allies was limited in its usefulness. 

Unusually strong crosswinds made the strip hazardous, and the limited length made landings by 

larger planes impossible. Kiska Bay did provide limited protection for the landing and use of 

seaplanes. The original Allied plan for the island called for the completion of the airfield with a 

protective garrison cantonment for 15,000 troops. Military construction records dated February 

29, 1944 document construction of the airfield and housing for 3,525 troops, with an anticipated 

completion date of June 1944 (NARA II, RG77:390/1/30/5 Box 118). As the war progressed, 

military planners recommended that an Army base be developed at Adak and air bases be 

established there and on Attu (Morison 1951). Kiska was reduced in importance, and by May 1, 

1945, 165 troops were garrisoned on island and operated a weather station, a communications 

center, and an emergency air field (NARA II, RG77:390/1/30/5 Box 126). 

Bomb disposal and booby-trap-removal activities were conducted while the Allied forces were 

on island. These removal activities were restricted to on-land finds. No record has been found 

to suggest the removal of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the marine environment of the 

NDSA surrounding Kiska Island. 

On 1948 maps the area around Kiska and Little Kiska Islands is marked as a “prohibited area” 

and defined as an NDSA and airspace reservation closed to the public. An aeronautical chart 

from the same period marks the area as a “danger area.” Danger areas usually signified that the 

area was being used for military purposes involving target practice. This Danger Area was not 

present on the 1955 aeronautical chart. The islands were most likely used for military exercises 

during this period (USACE 2004). 
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2.4.1 Historical Waste Management Practices 

The primary waste of concern for this investigation is MEC within the marine environment of 

the NDSA surrounding Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. MEC includes UXO, discarded military 

munitions (DMM), and MCs in high enough concentrations as to present an explosive hazard. 

The nature of ordnance handling and use within an active combat zone, such as Kiska and Little 

Kiska Islands, results in waste entering the marine NDSA by the following mechanisms: 

 Ordnance fired over water from coastal defense guns and AA batteries during 

target training and gun function testing that did not detonate as intended 

 Ordnance lost into the water during transfer from transport ships to the shore, 

either at a fixed dock or an explosive anchorage situated in the harbor away from 

shore installations 

 Ordnance lost overboard during fleet operations, including the sinking of ships 

 Excess ordnance deliberately disposed of (referred to as DMM) into the marine 

environment at the conclusion of hostilities 

 In the case of Kiska and Little Kiska, ordnance deliberately dropped or fired by 

Allied forces during the Japanese occupation of the islands that did not detonate 

as intended 

Ordnance that was fired or dropped that did not detonate as intended is known as UXO. An 

unknown quantity of MEC was lost, discarded, deliberately dropped, or fired into the marine 

environment of the NDSA surrounding Kiska and Little Kiska Islands during World War II. As 

much as 30 percent of the explosive ordnance that was dropped or fired during World War II did 

not detonate as intended (Francis and Alama 2011). 

The USACE evaluated Kiska and Little Kiska Islands under the Formerly Used Defense Sites 

program and presented the findings in an archive search report (USACE 2004). The evaluation 

applied to the on-land hazards of potential ordnance explosive and chemical warfare material. 

The USACE performed a Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) Site Inspection in 

2011 and is preparing a final report as of early 2013, which identifies in-water ranges. 
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2.4.2 Regulatory Compliance 

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 required the Department of Defense to 

establish a program addressing military munitions as part of the Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program (DERP). The Navy’s MRP complies with this requirement. The purpose 

of the MRP is to address the potential explosives safety, health, and environmental issues caused 

by MEC and MCs used or released on sites from past operations and activities. Based on Navy 

MRP policy (U.S. Navy 2007), the following criteria is used for inclusion of water sites in the 

MRP: 

Shallow water areas where munitions releases are known or suspected to have 

occurred prior to September 30, 2002, where Navy actions were responsible for 

the release, and where the site is not: 

 Covered by water deeper than 20 fathoms (120 feet) 

 Part of, or associated with, a designated operational range 

 A designated water disposal site 

 A Formerly Used Defense Site 

 A result of combat operations 

 A maritime wreck 

 An artificial reef 

2.5 SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION 

The sources of MEC released into the marine environment at Kiska and Little Kiska Islands by 

Allied forces consist of coastal defense and AA gun batteries, supply transfer points, air combat 

units of the Army Air Corps 11th Air Force, and air units and ships attached to the 17th Naval 

District. Other sources of MEC may include the Japanese or Allied troops that may have 

disposed of or lost ordnance items overboard in the water, particularly in the Kiska Harbor, while 

they were present on the island. 

According to a reference librarian at the Navy Department Library, detailed records of training 

exercises, which are part of the operational records, were not required to be retained for the 

historical archives. Therefore, details of training exercises typically do not exist in the archived 

records. In rare instances, training exercise records may exist in the archive record if they were 

provided by a private individual (Knechtmann 2012). A limited amount of training records for 

Kiska Island was discovered during the archive records review. Information obtained from these 

training records is summarized in Section 2.5.3. 
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2.5.1 Source Descriptions 

Information reviewed for this PA report identified the following Allied coastal and AA gun 

batteries on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands (USACE 2004, NARA II, NARA Anchorage, and 

NARA Seattle): 

 One 90-mm antimotor-torpedo-boat (AMTB) gun, 65th AA Artillery Group 

 One 37-mm AMTB gun, 65th AA Artillery Group 

 Four guns of unknown size, K Battery 203rd Coastal Artillery 

 Four 40-mm M-1 AA guns, Navy AA Battery 411 

 Six 20-mm Mk-4 AA guns, Navy AA Battery 411 

 Ten .50-caliber, water-cooled machine guns, Navy AA Battery 411 

Information obtained indicates that defensive guns were installed in the vicinity of Kiska 

Harbor, Mutt Cove, Jeff Cove, Gertrude Cove, Beach Cove, Bluff Cove, and Little Kiska Head 

(Figure 2-2). However, the exact locations of the Allied gun batteries were not determined 

during this investigation. No map identifying the locations of the Allied guns was discovered. 

Available information suggests that the Allied guns were mobile and were removed from the 

island as the troops withdrew. Lastly, there is no information suggesting that Allied troops used 

the abandoned Japanese guns for defensive purposes. 

Two piers (a small barge dock and a long ship dock) were constructed into the northwest portion 

of Kiska Harbor between North Head and Trout Lagoon. Figure 2-3 shows the locations of these 

former structures. The Allied forces used the piers during their operations on the island to 

offload supplies, including ordnance. Remnants of the ship pier are still visible in Kiska Harbor 

today. 

From June 11, 1942 until August 15, 1943, the 11th Air Force and air units of the 17th Naval 

District dropped every type of conventional bomb in the U.S. arsenal on Kiska and Little Kiska 

Islands. As previously stated, an estimated 3,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Kiska during 

this period (USACE 2004). Because of the ever-changing weather conditions in the Aleutian 

Islands, these bombs were frequently dropped through heavy overcast without visual contact 

with the ground surface. In addition, ships attached to the 17th Naval District bombarded the 

Japanese positions multiple times. 

During the pre-invasion period from May 24 to August 15, 1943, the bombardment reached its 

maximum intensity. Allied forces bombarded Kiska with 600 tons of explosives fired from 

naval ships and an additional 1,310 tons dropped by air combat groups during this period (Naval 

Historical Center 1993). 
Ship Pier

Barge Pier

U.S. NAVY

Delivery Order 0040

Naval Defensive

Sea Area

Kiska Island, Alaska

0 0.075

I

0.15

Scale In Miles

Figure 2-3 

Locations of Former Barge and Ship Piers 

February 1944, Kiska Island 

Path: T:\NAVY\SeaDefense\MXD\Draft\Kiska\Figure2-3 BargeShip Piers Kiska.mxd

K i s k a I s l a n d K i s k a I s l a n d

Little Little

Kiska Kiska

Island Island
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From May 26 to 29, 1950, Patrol Squadron Two of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Air Force conducted 

nine rocket and bombing strikes against stranded and abandoned ship targets in Kiska Harbor 

from its base at Naval Air Station Kodiak. The results of rocket firing and bombing were not 

officially observed. The purpose of the exercise was to compile cruise-control data, increase 

confidence of pilots, train in coordinating bombing and rocket attacks at long range, and fly in 

potentially harsh weather conditions. Ammunition payloads included a full load of gun 

ammunition, six water/sand filled bombs, six 5-inch rockets, and eight 3.5-inch rockets (USACE 

2004). The targets for this exercise are shown as triangular symbols A, B, and C on Figure 2-4. 

2.5.2 Historical Aerial Photography Evaluation 

Aero-Data Corporation in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, performed an interpretation of available 

aerial photography of Kiska Harbor within the Kiska Island Naval Defensive Sea Area to 

assist in the evaluation of the in-water ranges during and after World War II. Their report is 

included as Appendix B. Aero-Data acquired aerial imagery, satellite imagery, maps, oblique 

photographs, and ground photographs were acquired from both public and private sources. 

The imagery and maps were registered to a common coordinate system and interpreted. 

Oblique photographs and ground photographs were also obtained, which showed locations 

where munitions were probably offloaded from ships. 

Vertical aerial photography obtained for this study was geo-registered. In addition, maps 

showing the boundary of the Site and maps of other features were geo-registered to the aerial 

photography. Although no stereoscopic aerial photography from World War II was found, 

available images were used to identify areas where ships and landing crafts were visible in the 

aerial photography. Ground photographs revealed that the beach was crowded with supplies and 

probably munitions. No features, such as targets, were detected in the water offshore although a 

few ships were anchored in deeper water. 

2.5.3 Evidence of Munitions and Explosives of Concern or Related Hazardous Substances 

in the Marine Environment 

Quarterly training reports of AA firings at Kiska show Battery 411 firing four 40-mm guns, four 

20-mm guns, and ten .50-caliber machine guns. During a typical training exercise, up to 190 40-

mm rounds, 700 20-mm rounds, and 1,630 .50-caliber rounds were expended (USACE 2004). A 

hydrogen-filled balloon was used as a target for AA. No record was found to indicate that AA 

guns were stationary. It is believed that the guns were mobile, and the exact positions from 

where they were fired were not identified during the archive review. 

Test firings with 37-mm, 40-mm, and .50-caliber weapons took place on October 2, 1943 in the 

following areas: 
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 Area 1 – Kiska Harbor: The installations on the shoreline of Kiska Harbor from 

Trout Lagoon to South Head would fire into an area creating a danger zone from a 

line running between North Head and Kano Bight to 3,500 yards off shore from 

this line. 

 Area 2 – off Little Kiska Head on azimuth of 40° out over Tiger Cove: The 

danger zone extended 5,000 yards off shore in this section. 

 Area 3 – off Little Kiska Head on azimuth of 140°: The danger zone extended 

5,000 yards down South Pass. 

 Area 4 – off Mutt and Jeff Coves: The danger zone included all the area within a 

line drawn from Bukhti Point and Hatchet Point. 

 Area 5 – off Gertrude Cove: The danger area included Gertrude Cove and the 

area 5,000 yards offshore from a line extending between Hamburger Point and 

Ethel Cove. 

 Area 6 – off Beach and Bluff Coves: The danger area extended offshore 5,000 

yards. (The source figure shows the danger area extending to the north beyond 

Beach Cove to the north end of Barley Cove.) 

The extent of each of these in-water firing range danger areas is shown on Figure 2-5. 

Additional information discovered during the records search indicated that at the beginning of 

1944, test firing of 40-mm, 20-mm, and .50-caliber guns on Kiska Island was conducted once 

each month (OIC 1944a). Two documented training exercises were discovered. On February 8, 

1944 all 40-mm, 20-mm and .50 caliber gun crews participated in AA balloon target practice. 

The number of rounds fired was not reported (OIC 1944b). On March 8, 1944, Battery 411 

conducted AA balloon target practice for all 40-mm and .50-caliber gun crews and 20-mm gun 

crews #3 and #4. During this practice, 112 40-mm rounds, 540 20-mm rounds, and 530 .50-

caliber rounds were fired (OIC 1944c). Effective April 1944, the frequency of these AA training 

sessions become weekly (OIC 1944d). 

Much research has been conducted on Kiska and Little Kiska Islands regarding the Japanese 

occupation during World War II. This includes an underwater survey of Kiska Harbor 

conducted in 1989 by the National Park Service with the cooperation of the U.S. Third Fleet. 

During this survey, divers photographed MEC on the bottom of Kiska Harbor (Cohen 1993). 

Examples of these photographs are reproduced as Figure 2-6. These particular ordnance items 

were determined to be of Japanese origin. Documentation of recovery for these MEC items was 

not found. More recently in 2007, a diver retrieved an unexploded Japanese grenade on the 


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seafloor in Kiska Harbor, but then dropped it overboard when he realized the danger it posed 

(Morrisett 2012). 

A World War II veteran who served on a flight combat crew in the Aleutian Islands indicated 

during an interview that “at the end of the war, unused ordnance items were disposed of at the 

end of docks” (Cochran 2012). In 2007, during a dive off the Kiska ship dock, a diver reported 

seeing “just thousands of small arms shells on the seafloor” (Deffendall 2012). 

During research for this investigation, records from the 11th Air Force from 1940 to 1945 were 

reviewed. This review identified documentation that on at least one occasion Allied forces 

dropped eight 500-pound and eight 1,100-pound bombs with long-delay fuses into Kiska Harbor 

to prevent submarines from entering the harbor (673rd Air Base Wing 2012). The final 

disposition of these bombs was not reported. 

2.5.4 Estimated Quantity of Munitions and Explosives of Concern 

No reasonable estimate of the quantity of MEC in the marine waters of the NDSA surrounding 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands can be determined from the information reviewed for this PA. 

During a typical training exercise, up to 190 40-mm rounds, 700 20-mm rounds, and 1,630 

.50-caliber rounds were expended (USACE 2004). 

However, given the extensive Allied bombardment of Kiska and Little Kiska Islands during the 

Japanese occupation, the existence of photographed Japanese MEC in Kiska Harbor, the 

documented use of Kiska Harbor as a training target in 1950, and the reported fact that up to 30 

percent of ordnance may not have detonated as intended, there is ample possibility that MEC 

exist in the marine waters of the NDSA surrounding these islands. 
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3.0 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS AND TARGETS 

This section of the PA report discusses the release mechanisms and associated exposure 

pathways for MEC residing in the marine environment. This includes evaluation of the surface 

water migration pathway, the sediment exposure pathway, and target organisms that are 

potentially exposed to the hazards. When evaluating the fate and transport of the MCs and the 

actual potential impact of releases of these MCs on both humans and aquatic life, a variety of 

complex interactions between the physical and chemical properties of these chemicals must be 

understood (USEPA 2003). 

3.1 MARINE SETTING 

As described in Executive Order 8680, the Kiska Island NDSA includes the territorial waters 

between the extreme high-water marks and the 3-mile marine boundaries (Appendix A). Typical 

maximum water depths in this area reach approximately 40 to 60 fathoms (240 to 360 feet), but 

exceed 300 fathoms (1,800 feet) off Cape Saint Stephen at the southern end and Sirius Point at 

the northern end of Kiska Island. 

These waters are adjacent to the AMNWR, established on December 2, 1980 when the Alaska 

National Interest Lands Conservation Act was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter. This 

act combined 11 previously established refuges totaling about 3 million acres, dating back to the 

early 1900s with 1.9 million additional acres. The AMNWR includes the islands of the Aleutian 

chain, including Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. The purpose of the AMNWR is “to conserve 

fish and wildlife populations and the marine resources upon which they rely” and provide “the 

opportunity for continued subsistence uses by local residents.” 

3.2 PHYSICAL RELEASE PATHWAY 

As stated previously, releases of MEC into marine surface water results from the following 

activities: 

 Ordnance fired over water from coastal defense guns and AA batteries during 

target training and gun function testing that did not detonate as intended 

 Ordnance lost into the water during transfer from transport ships to the shore, 

either at a fixed dock or an explosive anchorage situated in the harbor away from 

shore installations 
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 Ordnance lost overboard during fleet operations, including the sinking of ships 

 DMM deliberately disposed of into the marine environment at the conclusion of 

hostilities 

 In the case of Kiska and Little Kiska, ordnance deliberately dropped or fired by 

Allied forces during the Japanese occupation of the islands that did not detonate 

as intended 

Reviewed records and interviews suggest that the activities listed above may have released 

DMM or UXO into the marine surface waters of the Kiska Island NDSA. 

A number of complex factors affect the fate and transport of MCs released in the underwater 

environment. These factors include the nature of the delivery of the ordnance item to the 

underwater environment, its potential for corrosion, and associated release of MCs. 

Underwater releases of MCs can occur when casings deteriorate (most notably from corrosion), 

rupture upon impact, or undergo a low-order detonation. MCs may be released immediately 

after impact or only partially contained within the remains of the delivery system. When 

ordnance undergoes a low-order detonation or breaks apart upon impact, the MCs, such as bulk 

explosives, can be scattered over the impact area (USEPA 2003).

3.3 CHEMICAL RELEASE PATHWAY 

Because MEC can remain relatively intact in the marine environment, MCs can be released 

through pinhole cracks that develop over time as a result of corrosion, or through the screw 

threads linking the fuse assembly to the main charge. 

Corrosion of the iron and steel in casings is a complex process that occurs in the presence of 

water and oxygen. The potential corrosiveness of the local environment could vary greatly. The 

effects of immersion and corrosion on the release of MCs in various underwater environments 

depend on site conditions. Even though salt water is potentially more corrosive the higher the 

salt saturation, exposure to oxygen is a key requirement for corrosive effects. In environments 

where wave action and tides cause mixing with the atmosphere (typical of the Aleutian Islands), 

the oxygen content of the water, especially shallow water, can create a high potential for 

oxidation (USEPA 2003). 

A variety of factors in the underwater environment may either reduce the potential for corrosion, 

or affect the nature of the release from an ordnance item releasing MCs. At higher pH levels, if 

the right conditions are present (e.g., carbon dioxide saturation or temperature), submerged or 
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buried metal may develop a coating of calcium carbonate, with a corresponding increase in 

corrosion resistance. In the absence of oxygen, such as the anaerobic conditions that can exist 

where there are large concentrations of unoxidized metals or high content of organic matter, or in 

deeper, cold waters, corrosion in the underwater environment can be virtually stopped. It is also 

possible that submerged MEC can develop a coating consisting of biological materials (e.g., 

coral, barnacles, and plants) that can seal the item off from the environment, as well as make it 

more difficult to locate (USEPA 2003). 

Although no empirical evidence exists regarding the rate of corrosion or encrustation acting on 

MEC in the marine environment at Kiska Island, photographs were taken of Japanese UXO on 

the bottom of Kiska Harbor during a 1989 underwater survey conducted by the National Park 

Service in cooperation with the U.S. Third Fleet (Cohen 1993). These photographs indicate 

varying degrees of corrosion or encrustation of the ordnance items after approximately 46 years 

in the marine environment. However, even after this length of time, these items are easily 

identified as MEC in the photographs (Figure 2-6). 

3.4 HUMAN EXPOSURE TARGETS 

Although Kiska Island is part of the AMNWR, commercial fishing does occur in the surrounding 

waters, including the associated NDSA. Therefore, human exposure to MEC could occur 

through accidental direct contact resulting from commercial fishing, anchoring in the area, or 

direct contact as a result of recreational or research dives into the marine environment of the 

NDSA. 

The risks from MEC in the underwater environment are driven by two different effects: the 

physical explosive hazard associated with direct encounter with DMM or UXO and the 

environmental health hazard associated with the release of the MCs contained in MEC. As 

mentioned in Section 2.4.2, Regulatory Compliance, current Navy policy is to include sites in the 

Navy MRP where munitions releases of shallow water areas are known or suspected and for only 

those sites covered by water no deeper than 20 fathoms (120 feet) (U.S. Navy 2007), which is the 

approximate depth limit of recreational diving. Although MEC items may be located at depths 

greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet), human and marine exposures at 20 fathoms (120 feet) or less 

are the primary exposures of concern in this report, based on the Navy MRP policy. 

During fishing operations, MEC have been pulled up in fishing equipment from depths greater 

than 20 fathoms (120 feet). The skipper of the Aleutian Sable (Jay Hebert 2012) said that he has 

pulled up ordnance on several occasions, as recent as June 2012, near the Chelan Bank where he 

fishes. The Aleutian Sable typically fishes for sablefish in water that is 250 to 450 fathoms 

(1,500 to 2,700 feet) but has fished as deep as 650 fathoms (3,900 feet). Therefore, human 
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exposure to MEC exists at depths greater than the 20-fathom (120-foot) limit specified in the 

Navy MRP. 

The conceptual site model of the Kiska Island NDSA is presented on Figure 3-1. Because Kiska 

Island is uninhabited and remote, the only two populations of potential exposure to MEC are 

commercial fishers and recreational or research divers. These populations are discussed in the 

following paragraphs. 

Recreational or Commercial Fishers: The physical explosive hazard is a completed pathway 

for fishers (recreational or commercial), who may accidently detonate MEC. Commercial fishers 

could potentially bring up MEC in their fishing nets, as reported in two articles of such an event 

in the Bering Sea near Dutch Harbor (Paulin 2012 and Rosenthal 2012a). In addition, a 

commercial vessel’s anchor could potentially detonate or get caught on MEC on the seafloor. 

Therefore, potential physical explosive hazards for recreational and commercial fishers are 

considered complete and could be significant. 

In addition to the physical explosive hazards associated with MEC, potential health hazards are 

also associated with exposure to the MCs released from ordnance items. However, because any 

release would be occurring into such an enormous volume of water that is subject to significant 

mixing by tidal movements and storms, the probability of fishers coming in direct contact with 

dangerous concentrations of MCs in the environment is remote. Therefore, this pathway is 

considered incomplete for recreational and commercial fishers. 

Recreational or Research Divers: Recreational or research divers could come into direct 

contact with MEC during an underwater dive. Recreational or research divers will not typically 

dive deeper than 20 fathoms (120 feet). Divers could encounter MEC in these shallow waters, 

particularly within Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove. These areas are 

relatively protected and are not marked for rip tides on nautical charts of the area. Divers may be 

drawn to known wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor and Gertrude Cove, although the waters of Kiska 

Island are not an area of popular diving as they are extremely remote. There were conversations 

posted on www.scubaboard.com of divers wanting to explore the areas containing shipwrecks at 

Kiska Island. 

It is also known that the wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor were used as targets in training exercises 

during the 1950s. These shipwrecks are located close to the shoreline (approximately 20 to 50 

feet) in water depths ranging from 2 to 8 fathoms (12 to 48 feet) (Figure 2-4). Because the 

waters of Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove were designated danger areas 

during gun training conducted during 1943, the potential pathway for a physical explosive hazard 

to a diver is considered complete in these areas. However, the likelihood of a diver coming into 

physical contact with UXO from these gun-training activities is considered low. There is a 

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higher likelihood of a diver coming into physical contact with MEC (either Japanese or Allied) 

resulting from combat operations conducted during World War II. 

As discussed above for fishers, potential health hazards associated with exposure to the MCs 

released from ordnance items would also be unlikely for recreational and research divers. The 

probability of divers coming in direct contact with MCs in the environment is remote. 

Therefore, this pathway is considered incomplete for recreational and research divers. 

The main concerns regarding MCs in the vicinity of Kiska Island are likely related to impacts to 

the marine environment, as discussed in the following section. 

3.5 MARINE EXPOSURE TARGETS 

Exposure to MEC in the surface water of the Kiska Island NDSA is limited to mammals, birds, 

fish, and benthic organisms found in the marine environment. Marine mammals, fish, birds, and 

benthic organisms within the Kiska Island NDSA could potentially have daily exposures to any 

MEC lost or discarded there. The risk to these creatures from detonation of the ordnance is 

remote. However, release of the constituents contained in the munitions could potentially impact 

the quality of the surface water and sediments and present a potential hazard to the marine 

environment. Direct exposure of munitions by marine receptors could occur when munitions are 

washed up during storm events or tidal action onto beaches, or buried in sediment. Therefore, 

exposure to chemical constituents of the explosives within the ordnance can be considered a 

potentially complete pathway as the marine environment slowly consumes the metal casings. 

The major environmental concern associated with releases of MCs in the underwater 

environment is the impact to sediments. Sediments support biological communities that are the 

food for marine life. The main concerns include the following: 

 The continued health of the biological community and its ability to support the 

ecosystem 

 Potential uptake of chemicals into the plants and sea life that ultimately form part 

of the food chain for people and other marine life 

 Chemical constituents of explosives that may be suspended in water and 

potentially available to marine life 

Many MCs could be potentially toxic to aquatic organisms. However, the potential for aquatic 

toxicity is not completely understood because of the complexity of the marine environment. 

Aquatic toxicity is affected by the several factors that influence the fate and transport of the MCs 
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and the dose exposure of the aquatic organism. MCs are often not detected in the marine 

environment because of a variety of factors that includes advection, dispersion, diffusion, 

photolysis, plant uptake, and biotic transformation. There is also evidence that the some of the 

common compounds of MCs such as RDX do not bioaccumulate in aquatic tissue (USEPA 

2003). In contrast, some of the common metals of MCs such as lead and mercury bioaccumulate 

in aquatic tissue. However, the effects of bioaccumulation depends on several factors: the 

concentrations of the chemicals (dose), the pathways by which receptors are exposed, the 

duration, and the sensitivity of the exposed population. 

Surface water in the immediate vicinity of a continuing source such as constituents leaking from 

a cracked or leaking ordnance casing or a low-order detonation, may contain MCs in measurable 

quantities. The munitions compounds of interest include, but are not limited to, military 

explosive compounds such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), pentaerythriol tetranitrate, 

cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), and cyclotetramethylene tetranitramine (HMX) as they 

occur in munitions, as well as any breakdown products. There are many factors affecting the fate 

and transport of these chemicals. TNT is more water soluble than RDX and HMX and is 

therefore more likely to be found in small concentrations in water. Since RDX and HMX have 

low water solubilities, they are more likely to be dispersed as small particles by currents to 

sediments (which may be uptaken by plants), or dispersed in the water column (which exposes 

the aquatic biota via ingestion or dermal contact). 

MCs differ in how easily they bind to sediments. MCs not easily bound to sediments may act as 

a source of continuing release to water, or as a source for aquatic life uptake. Since TNT is more 

water soluble than RDX or HMX, it is less likely to bind to sediments and more likely to be 

immediately absorbed into water. However, TNT also tends to be more susceptible to 

photodegradation and biotransformation, particularly in shallow water. The process of 

biotransformation causes TNT’s amino biotransformation products to bind to the humic acids in 

sediments more strongly than RDX or HMX. This tendency to bind to sediment can reduce the 

overall concentration of TNT’s biotransformation products in water, in spite of their relatively 

higher water solubility compared to RDX and HMX. 

Biouptake and bioaccumulation of MCs into the food chain via aquatic plants and other 

organisms that grow in sediments is not well understood. Research on phytoremediation has 

shown that plants can take up MCs such as TNT, RDX, and HMX, which will also undergo some 

biotransformation in the plants’ tissues (USEPA 2003). Research has shown that TNT has very 

low bioacummulation potential (Yoo et al. 2006). RDX also has low bioconcentration potential 

in aquatic organisms (ATSDR 2012). 

The MCs (including the most common ones, TNT, RDX, and HMX) are likely to present low 

ecological risk under expected exposure scenarios in the marine environment. Although, there is 
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not extensive research on the toxicological effects of munitions in the marine environment, a 

study in 2005 (Rosen and Lotufo) concluded that exposure to RDX did not cause toxicity in 

amphipods (invertebrate species). Furthermore, MCs typically undergo extensive transformation 

upon contact with marine sediment and have low potential for bioaccumulation in aquatic 

organisms. Therefore, the exposures of terrestrial and aquatic populations to MCs via sediment 

and surface water at Kiska Island are considered complete, but insignificant. 
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4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

This section presents a brief summary of the information presented in this PA report, as well as 

conclusions regarding the potential for exposure to MEC present in the marine environment for 

both human and marine species. 

The stated objective of this project is to perform a review of activities related to the operations of 

in-water ranges located off Kiska and Little Kiska Islands in Alaska. These operations include 

all activities that had the potential for release of ordnance into the marine environment that may 

pose a potential threat to human health or the environment. 

4.1 IDENTIFIED SOURCES 

The sources of MEC released into the marine environment of the Kiska Island NDSA by Allied 

forces consists of coastal defense and AA gun batteries, supply transfer points, air combat 

training by units of the 11th Air Force, and air combat training by units of the U.S. Navy. 

Locations identified by this PA where these actions occurred are shown on Plate 4-1. 

The presence of MEC within the NDSAs beyond the known limits of in-water ranges resulting 

from combat activities during World War II are beyond the scope of this investigation based on 

the Navy MRP. However, in the case of Kiska and Little Kiska Islands, ordnance dropped or 

fired by Allied forces may be the predominant source of MEC found. 

Two piers were constructed into the northwest portion of Kiska Harbor and were used by Allied 

forces during their operations on island to offload supplies, including ordnance (Figure 2-3). 

Information obtained during an interview conducted for this PA indicates the presence of 

“thousands of small arms shells on the seafloor off the Kiska Docks” during 2007 (Deffendall 

2012). Remnants of one of these piers are still visible in Kiska Harbor today. 

Records from May 1950 indicate that Patrol Squadron Two of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Air Force 

conducted nine rocket and bombing strikes against stranded and abandoned ship targets in Kiska 

Harbor (Figure 2-4). No information was discovered to indicate if this was an isolated or 

common occurrence. 

Information reviewed for this PA report identified the Allied coastal and AA gun batteries on 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands consisting of one 90-mm AMTB gun, one 37-mm AMTB gun, 

four 40-mm M-1 AA guns, six 20-mm Mk-4 AA guns, ten .50-caliber water-cooled machine 

guns, and four guns of unknown size. The exact locations of the Allied gun batteries were not 

determined during this investigation. However, information obtained indicates that defensive 
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guns were installed in the vicinity of North Head, Kiska Harbor, Mutt Cove, Jeff Cove, Gertrude 

Cove, Beach Cove, Bluff Cove, and Little Kiska Head and that regular practice firing occurred at 

these locations (Figure 2-5). 

Other sources of MEC may include the Japanese or Allied troops that may have disposed of or 

lost ordnance items overboard in the water, particularly in the Kiska Harbor, while they were 

present on the island. MEC of Japanese origin was photographed on the harbor bottom as 

presented in section 2.5.3. 

4.2 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS 

As Kiska Island is uninhabited and remote, the only two populations of potential human 

exposure to MEC are commercial or recreational fishers and recreational or research divers. The 

physical explosive hazard is a complete pathway for fishers and divers who may accidently 

detonate MEC. Commercial fishers have been known to unintentionally haul up MEC in their 

fishing nets or attached to their traps. In addition, a commercial vessel’s anchor could 

potentially detonate or get caught on MEC on the seafloor. Therefore, potential physical 

explosive hazards for commercial fishers are considered complete and could potentially be 

significant. 

Recreational or research divers will not typically descend deeper than a maximum of 20 fathoms 

(120 feet). MEC could be encountered in these shallow waters by a diver, particularly within 

Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove. These areas are relatively protected 

and are not marked for rip tides on nautical charts. Divers may be drawn to known wrecked 

ships in Kiska Harbor and Gertrude Cove. The wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor were known 

targets for aerial rocket/bombing training in the 1950s. Because the waters of Kiska Harbor, 

Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove were designated danger areas during gun training 

conducted during 1943, the potential pathway for a physical explosive hazard to a diver is still 

considered complete in these areas. However, the likelihood of a diver coming into physical 

contact with UXO resulting from gun training exercises is considered low. There is a higher 

likelihood of a diver coming into physical contact with MEC (either Japanese or Allied) resulting 

from combat operations conducted during World War II. 

Exposure to MCs within the ordnance can be considered a potentially complete pathway as the 

marine environment slowly consumes the metal casings. The major environmental concern 

associated with releases of MCs in the underwater environment is the impact to sediments. 

Sediments support biological communities that are the food for marine life. However, the MCs 

are likely to present low ecological risk under expected exposure scenarios in the marine 

environment. Therefore, the exposures of terrestrial and aquatic populations to MCs via 
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sediment and surface water within the Kiska Island NDSA are considered complete, but 

insignificant. 

4.3 AREAS POTENTIALLY CONTAINING NONCOMBAT MEC IN THE MARINE 

ENVIRONMENT 

Five areas within the Kiska Island NDSA have been identified as potentially containing DMM, 

practice-fired UXO, or practice-dropped UXO. To be consistent with the Navy MRP, each area 

contains known or suspected munitions releases that occurred prior to September 30, 2002, 

where Navy actions were responsible for the release and the site is not covered by water deeper 

than 20 fathoms (120 feet). These individual areas are defined as follows: 

 The area within Kiska Harbor surrounding the ship pier, barge pier, three 

rocket/bombing targets, and the seafloor within the former gun range extending 

northeast, as shown on Figure 4-1 

 The area off Little Kiska Island, as shown on Figure 4-2 

 The area including all of Mutt and Jeff Coves and the adjacent seafloor between 

Bukhti and Hatchet Points, as shown on Figure 4-3 

 The area including all of Gertrude Cove and the adjacent seafloor extending 

southwest, as shown on Figure 4-4 

 The area including all of Beach and Bluff Coves and the adjacent seafloor, as 

shown on Figure 4-5 

The Navy MRP does not address MEC that is in water greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet). 

Fishers can encounter MEC at depths greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet). 

4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based on this preliminary assessment of the NDSA at Kiska Island, the Navy recommends the 

following: 

1. Kiska and Little Kiska are not eligible for inclusion in the MRP program because most of the 

potential MEC is the result of combat operations. 

2. Site inspections or surveys are not recommended because 
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a. The frequency of human exposure to MEC (fishers or divers) is expected to be 

minimal because Kiska Island is remote and uninhabited. 

b. It is illegal for anyone to remove items (including MEC) from the waters surrounding 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands because the water in this area is part of a national 

historical landmark. 

3. The Navy will perform a non-time-critical removal action (NTCRA) to initiate a Notice to 

Mariners and an information advisory to increase awareness of the presence of MEC in the 

area. The Navy will request that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

include a Notice to Mariners on navigational charts for Kiska Island. The warning will notify 

fishers and divers to be extremely careful when within the NDSA for Kiska Island because 

MEC exist in the waters around Kiska Island. In 2013, the Navy intends to distribute copies 

of an educational fact sheet titled 3Rs Explosives Safety Guide, Maritime Industry (U.S. 

Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety 2010) to fishers in the main fishing ports in the 

Aleutians which include Dutch Harbor and Kodiak areas. The full-color 12-page fact sheet 

informs readers of the dangers of encountering munitions from the seafloor and promotes 

safety by following the “3Rs” of explosives safety: recognize, retreat, and report. A copy of 

this fact sheet is included in Appendix C 





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5.0 REFERENCES 

673rd Air Base Wing, History Office, Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska. 

Site visit July 2012. 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). 2012. Toxicological Profile for 

RDX. January 2012. 

Alaska Geographic Society. 1995. “World War II in Alaska” Alaska Geographic 22(4). 

Cochran, James, combat flight crew member during World War II. 2012. Telephone interview 

with Tom Abbott and Dave Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: his wartime experiences in the Aleutians. Phoenix, Arizona. July 25, 2012. 

Cohen, Stan. 1993. The Forgotten War, A Pictorial History of World War II in Alaska and 

Northwestern Canada. Vol. 4. Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, Inc. Missoula, 

Montana. 

Deffendall, Rodger, diver who lives in Dutch Harbor. 2012. Telephone interview with Tom 

Abbott and Dave Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: his personal diving 

experiences in the Aleutian Islands. Unalaska, Alaska. October 1, 2012. 

Francis, Steven and Ioane Alama. 2011. WWII Unexploded Ordnance, A Study of UXO in Four 

Pacific Island Countries. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji. 

Garfield, Brian. 1969. The Thousand Mile War, World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. 

University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks, Alaska. 

Knechtmann, J. Allen. 2012. Discussion with reference librarian at Navy Department Library, 

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., re: training records. June 29, 2012. 

Morison, Samuel Eliot. 1951. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 

Volume 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Naval Institute 

Press. Annapolis, Maryland. 

Morrisett, Robin. 2012. Personal interview about his personal diving experiences in Unalaska 

and Kodiak areas. Dutch Harbor, Alaska. September 25, 2012. 

National Archive and Records Administration II (NARA II). 2012. College Park Maryland. 

Site research visit June 2012. 
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National Archive and Records Administration (NARA Anchorage). 2012. Pacific Alaska 

Regional Office, Anchorage, Alaska. Site visit July 2012. 

National Archive and Records Administration (NARA Seattle). 2012. Pacific Alaska Regional 

Office, Seattle, Washington. Site visit May 2012. 

Naval Historical Center. 1993. The Aleutians Campaign: The Official Navy History of the Only 

World War Two Invasion of US Soil. Published by the Naval Historical Center, 

Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. 

Officer in Charge (OIC). 1944a. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, 

Alaska. Navy 422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. January 20, 1944. 

———. 1944b. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. February 20, 1944. 

———. 1944c. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. March 20, 1944. 

———. 1944d. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. April 20, 1944. 

Paulin, Jim. 2012. “Bering Sea Fishermen Reel in WWII-Era Bomb.” Dutch Harbor 

Fisherman. Dutch Harbor, Alaska. July 28, 2012. 

Rosen, G. and G.R. Lotufo. 2005. “Toxicity and Fate of Two Munitions Constituents in Spiked 

Sediment Exposures with the Marine Amphipod Eohaustorius estuarius. Environmental 

Toxicology and Chemistry 24:2887–2897. doi: 10.1897/04-611R.1. 

Rosenthal, Lauren. 2012a. “Black Cod Boat Turns Up World War II ‘Bomb’.” Online article 

posted at http://kucb.org/news/article/black-cod-boat-turns-up-world-war-ii-bomb/. July 

19, 2012. 

———. 2012b. Reporter with KUCB-FM. Telephone interview with Tom Abbott and Dave 

Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: the landmine and projectile pulled up 

by the crew of the fishing vessel Aleutian Sable while fishing near Dutch Harbor in June 

2012. July 31, 2012.
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 2004. Archive Search Report Findings, Kiska and 

Little Kiska Islands (Including Kiska Island Garrison Site, Little Kiska Island Harbor 

Defense Site, and Kiska Naval Auxiliary Air Facility). Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program for Formerly Used Defense Sites, Ordnance and Explosives. 

USACE, Saint Louis District. Project Number F10AK013704. 

U.S. Navy. 2007. Environmental Readiness Program Manual. OPNAV Instruction 5090.1C 

from Chief of Naval Operations. Chapter 19, “Munitions Response.” October 30, 2007. 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003. Handbook on the Management of 

Ordnance and Explosives at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred Ranges and Other 

Sites, Review Draft 2.

Yoo, L J., G.R. Lotufo, A.B. Gibson, J.A. Steevens, and J.G. Sims. 2006. “Toxicity and 

Bioaccumulation of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene in Fathead Minnow (Pimephales promelas).” 

Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 25:3253–3260. doi: 10.1897/06-067R.1. 
APPENDIX A 

Executive Order 8680
Executive Order 8680--Establishing naval defensive sea areas around and naval airspace 

reservations over the islands of Kiska and Unalaska

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 8680 of Feb. 14, 1941, appear at 6 FR 1014, 3 CFR, 

1938-1943 Comp., p. 892, unless otherwise noted. 

Alaska

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as 

amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 

1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme highwater marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and 

Unalaska are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of 

national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Defensive Sea 

Area", and "Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area" and the airspaces over the said territorial 

waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes 

of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval 

Airspace Reservation", and "Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation". 

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter 

either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other 

craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless 

authorized by the Secretary of the Navy. 

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into 

either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the 

Secretary of the Navy. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with 

the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of 

Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may 

be necessary to carry out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval 

defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code 

as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this 

order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties 

prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

[EO 8680 amended by EO 8729 of Apr. 2, 1941, 6 FR 1791, 3 CFR, 1938-1941 Comp., p. 919]
APPENDIX B 

Historical Aerial Photo Interpretation 
INSERT TEXT FROM PHOTO INTREPRETATION SUBCONTRACTOR 
APPENDIX C 

3Rs Explosives Safety Guide, Maritime Industry
Plate 4-1 

Locations of Areas Potentially Containing Munitions and Explosives of 

Concern within the Naval Defensive Sea Area at Kiska Island 
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3.0 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS AND TARGETS

This section of the PA report discusses the release mechanisms and associated exposure 

pathways for MEC residing in the marine environment. This includes evaluation of the surface 

water migration pathway, the sediment exposure pathway, and target organisms that are 

potentially exposed to the hazards. When evaluating the fate and transport of the MCs and the 

actual potential impact of releases of these MCs on both humans and aquatic life, a variety of 

complex interactions between the physical and chemical properties of these chemicals must be 

understood (USEPA 2003). 

3.1 MARINE SETTING

As described in Executive Order 8680, the Kiska Island NDSA includes the territorial waters 

between the extreme high-water marks and the 3-mile marine boundaries (Appendix A). Typical 

maximum water depths in this area reach approximately 40 to 60 fathoms (240 to 360 feet), but 

exceed 300 fathoms (1,800 feet) off Cape Saint Stephen at the southern end and Sirius Point at 

the northern end of Kiska Island. 

These waters are adjacent to the AMNWR, established on December 2, 1980 when the Alaska 

National Interest Lands Conservation Act was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter. This 

act combined 11 previously established refuges totaling about 3 million acres, dating back to the 

early 1900s with 1.9 million additional acres. The AMNWR includes the islands of the Aleutian 

chain, including Kiska and Little Kiska Islands. The purpose of the AMNWR is “to conserve 

fish and wildlife populations and the marine resources upon which they rely” and provide “the 

opportunity for continued subsistence uses by local residents.” 

3.2 PHYSICAL RELEASE PATHWAY

As stated previously, releases of MEC into marine surface water results from the following 

activities:

• Ordnance fired over water from coastal defense guns and AA batteries during 

target training and gun function testing that did not detonate as intended 

• Ordnance lost into the water during transfer from transport ships to the shore, 

either at a fixed dock or an explosive anchorage situated in the harbor away from 

shore installations
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• Ordnance lost overboard during fleet operations, including the sinking of ships 

• DMM deliberately disposed of into the marine environment at the conclusion of 

hostilities

• In the case of Kiska and Little Kiska, ordnance deliberately dropped or fired by 

Allied forces during the Japanese occupation of the islands that did not detonate 

as intended

Reviewed records and interviews suggest that the activities listed above may have released 

DMM or UXO into the marine surface waters of the Kiska Island NDSA.

A number of complex factors affect the fate and transport of MCs released in the underwater 

environment. These factors include the nature of the delivery of the ordnance item to the 

underwater environment, its potential for corrosion, and associated release of MCs. 

Underwater releases of MCs can occur when casings deteriorate (most notably from corrosion), 

rupture upon impact, or undergo a low-order detonation. MCs may be released immediately 

after impact or only partially contained within the remains of the delivery system. When 

ordnance undergoes a low-order detonation or breaks apart upon impact, the MCs, such as bulk 

explosives, can be scattered over the impact area (USEPA 2003).

3.3 CHEMICAL RELEASE PATHWAY

Because MEC can remain relatively intact in the marine environment, MCs can be released 

through pinhole cracks that develop over time as a result of corrosion, or through the screw 

threads linking the fuse assembly to the main charge.

Corrosion of the iron and steel in casings is a complex process that occurs in the presence of 

water and oxygen. The potential corrosiveness of the local environment could vary greatly. The 

effects of immersion and corrosion on the release of MCs in various underwater environments 

depend on site conditions. Even though salt water is potentially more corrosive the higher the 

salt saturation, exposure to oxygen is a key requirement for corrosive effects. In environments 

where wave action and tides cause mixing with the atmosphere (typical of the Aleutian Islands), 

the oxygen content of the water, especially shallow water, can create a high potential for 

oxidation (USEPA 2003). 

A variety of factors in the underwater environment may either reduce the potential for corrosion, 

or affect the nature of the release from an ordnance item releasing MCs. At higher pH levels, if 

the right conditions are present (e.g., carbon dioxide saturation or temperature), submerged or 
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buried metal may develop a coating of calcium carbonate, with a corresponding increase in 

corrosion resistance. In the absence of oxygen, such as the anaerobic conditions that can exist 

where there are large concentrations of unoxidized metals or high content of organic matter, or in 

deeper, cold waters, corrosion in the underwater environment can be virtually stopped. It is also 

possible that submerged MEC can develop a coating consisting of biological materials (e.g., 

coral, barnacles, and plants) that can seal the item off from the environment, as well as make it 

more difficult to locate (USEPA 2003). 

Although no empirical evidence exists regarding the rate of corrosion or encrustation acting on 

MEC in the marine environment at Kiska Island, photographs were taken of Japanese UXO on 

the bottom of Kiska Harbor during a 1989 underwater survey conducted by the National Park 

Service in cooperation with the U.S. Third Fleet (Cohen 1993). These photographs indicate 

varying degrees of corrosion or encrustation of the ordnance items after approximately 46 years 

in the marine environment. However, even after this length of time, these items are easily 

identified as MEC in the photographs (Figure 2-6). 

3.4 HUMAN EXPOSURE TARGETS

Although Kiska Island is part of the AMNWR, commercial fishing does occur in the surrounding 

waters, including the associated NDSA. Therefore, human exposure to MEC could occur 

through accidental direct contact resulting from commercial fishing, anchoring in the area, or 

direct contact as a result of recreational or research dives into the marine environment of the 

NDSA.

The risks from MEC in the underwater environment are driven by two different effects: the 

physical explosive hazard associated with direct encounter with DMM or UXO and the 

environmental health hazard associated with the release of the MCs contained in MEC. As 

mentioned in Section 2.4.2, Regulatory Compliance, current Navy policy is to include sites in the 

Navy MRP where munitions releases of shallow water areas are known or suspected and for only 

those sites covered by water no deeper than 20 fathoms (120 feet) (U.S. Navy 2007), which is the 

approximate depth limit of recreational diving. Although MEC items may be located at depths 

greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet), human and marine exposures at 20 fathoms (120 feet) or less 

are the primary exposures of concern in this report, based on the Navy MRP policy. 

During fishing operations, MEC have been pulled up in fishing equipment from depths greater 

than 20 fathoms (120 feet). The skipper of the Aleutian Sable (Jay Hebert 2012) said that he has 

pulled up ordnance on several occasions, as recent as June 2012, near the Chelan Bank where he 

fishes. The Aleutian Sable typically fishes for sablefish in water that is 250 to 450 fathoms 

(1,500 to 2,700 feet) but has fished as deep as 650 fathoms (3,900 feet). Therefore, human 
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exposure to MEC exists at depths greater than the 20-fathom (120-foot) limit specified in the 

Navy MRP.

The conceptual site model of the Kiska Island NDSA is presented on Figure 3-1. Because Kiska 

Island is uninhabited and remote, the only two populations of potential exposure to MEC are 

commercial fishers and recreational or research divers. These populations are discussed in the 

following paragraphs. 

Recreational or Commercial Fishers: The physical explosive hazard is a completed pathway 

for fishers (recreational or commercial), who may accidently detonate MEC. Commercial fishers 

could potentially bring up MEC in their fishing nets, as reported in two articles of such an event 

in the Bering Sea near Dutch Harbor (Paulin 2012 and Rosenthal 2012a). In addition, a 

commercial vessel’s anchor could potentially detonate or get caught on MEC on the seafloor. 

Therefore, potential physical explosive hazards for recreational and commercial fishers are 

considered complete and could be significant. 

In addition to the physical explosive hazards associated with MEC, potential health hazards are 

also associated with exposure to the MCs released from ordnance items. However, because any 

release would be occurring into such an enormous volume of water that is subject to significant 

mixing by tidal movements and storms, the probability of fishers coming in direct contact with 

dangerous concentrations of MCs in the environment is remote. Therefore, this pathway is 

considered incomplete for recreational and commercial fishers. 

Recreational or Research Divers: Recreational or research divers could come into direct 

contact with MEC during an underwater dive. Recreational or research divers will not typically 

dive deeper than 20 fathoms (120 feet). Divers could encounter MEC in these shallow waters, 

particularly within Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove. These areas are 

relatively protected and are not marked for rip tides on nautical charts of the area. Divers may be 

drawn to known wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor and Gertrude Cove, although the waters of Kiska 

Island are not an area of popular diving as they are extremely remote. There were conversations 

posted on www.scubaboard.com of divers wanting to explore the areas containing shipwrecks at

Kiska Island.

It is also known that the wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor were used as targets in training exercises 

during the 1950s. These shipwrecks are located close to the shoreline (approximately 20 to 50 

feet) in water depths ranging from 2 to 8 fathoms (12 to 48 feet) (Figure 2-4). Because the 

waters of Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove were designated danger areas 

during gun training conducted during 1943, the potential pathway for a physical explosive hazard 

to a diver is considered complete in these areas. However, the likelihood of a diver coming into 

physical contact with UXO from these gun-training activities is considered low. There is a 

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higher likelihood of a diver coming into physical contact with MEC (either Japanese or Allied) 

resulting from combat operations conducted during World War II. 

As discussed above for fishers, potential health hazards associated with exposure to the MCs 

released from ordnance items would also be unlikely for recreational and research divers. The 

probability of divers coming in direct contact with MCs in the environment is remote. 

Therefore, this pathway is considered incomplete for recreational and research divers. 

The main concerns regarding MCs in the vicinity of Kiska Island are likely related to impacts to 

the marine environment, as discussed in the following section. 

3.5 MARINE EXPOSURE TARGETS

Exposure to MEC in the surface water of the Kiska Island NDSA is limited to mammals, birds, 

fish, and benthic organisms found in the marine environment. Marine mammals, fish, birds, and 

benthic organisms within the Kiska Island NDSA could potentially have daily exposures to any 

MEC lost or discarded there. The risk to these creatures from detonation of the ordnance is 

remote. However, release of the constituents contained in the munitions could potentially impact 

the quality of the surface water and sediments and present a potential hazard to the marine 

environment. Direct exposure of munitions by marine receptors could occur when munitions are 

washed up during storm events or tidal action onto beaches, or buried in sediment. Therefore, 

exposure to chemical constituents of the explosives within the ordnance can be considered a 

potentially complete pathway as the marine environment slowly consumes the metal casings. 

The major environmental concern associated with releases of MCs in the underwater 

environment is the impact to sediments. Sediments support biological communities that are the 

food for marine life. The main concerns include the following: 

• The continued health of the biological community and its ability to support the 

ecosystem

• Potential uptake of chemicals into the plants and sea life that ultimately form part 

of the food chain for people and other marine life

• Chemical constituents of explosives that may be suspended in water and 

potentially available to marine life

Many MCs could be potentially toxic to aquatic organisms. However, the potential for aquatic 

toxicity is not completely understood because of the complexity of the marine environment. 

Aquatic toxicity is affected by the several factors that influence the fate and transport of the MCs
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and the dose exposure of the aquatic organism. MCs are often not detected in the marine 

environment because of a variety of factors that includes advection, dispersion, diffusion, 

photolysis, plant uptake, and biotic transformation. There is also evidence that the some of the 

common compounds of MCs such as RDX do not bioaccumulate in aquatic tissue (USEPA 

2003). In contrast, some of the common metals of MCs such as lead and mercury bioaccumulate 

in aquatic tissue. However, the effects of bioaccumulation depends on several factors: the 

concentrations of the chemicals (dose), the pathways by which receptors are exposed, the 

duration, and the sensitivity of the exposed population. 

Surface water in the immediate vicinity of a continuing source such as constituents leaking from 

a cracked or leaking ordnance casing or a low-order detonation, may contain MCs in measurable 

quantities. The munitions compounds of interest include, but are not limited to, military 

explosive compounds such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), pentaerythriol tetranitrate, 

cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), and cyclotetramethylene tetranitramine (HMX) as they 

occur in munitions, as well as any breakdown products. There are many factors affecting the fate 

and transport of these chemicals. TNT is more water soluble than RDX and HMX and is 

therefore more likely to be found in small concentrations in water. Since RDX and HMX have 

low water solubilities, they are more likely to be dispersed as small particles by currents to 

sediments (which may be uptaken by plants), or dispersed in the water column (which exposes 

the aquatic biota via ingestion or dermal contact). 

MCs differ in how easily they bind to sediments. MCs not easily bound to sediments may act as 

a source of continuing release to water, or as a source for aquatic life uptake. Since TNT is more 

water soluble than RDX or HMX, it is less likely to bind to sediments and more likely to be 

immediately absorbed into water. However, TNT also tends to be more susceptible to 

photodegradation and biotransformation, particularly in shallow water. The process of 

biotransformation causes TNT’s amino biotransformation products to bind to the humic acids in 

sediments more strongly than RDX or HMX. This tendency to bind to sediment can reduce the 

overall concentration of TNT’s biotransformation products in water, in spite of their relatively 

higher water solubility compared to RDX and HMX. 

Biouptake and bioaccumulation of MCs into the food chain via aquatic plants and other 

organisms that grow in sediments is not well understood. Research on phytoremediation has 

shown that plants can take up MCs such as TNT, RDX, and HMX, which will also undergo some 

biotransformation in the plants’ tissues (USEPA 2003). Research has shown that TNT has very 

low bioacummulation potential (Yoo et al. 2006). RDX also has low bioconcentration potential 

in aquatic organisms (ATSDR 2012). 

The MCs (including the most common ones, TNT, RDX, and HMX) are likely to present low 

ecological risk under expected exposure scenarios in the marine environment. Although, there is 
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not extensive research on the toxicological effects of munitions in the marine environment, a 

study in 2005 (Rosen and Lotufo) concluded that exposure to RDX did not cause toxicity in 

amphipods (invertebrate species). Furthermore, MCs typically undergo extensive transformation 

upon contact with marine sediment and have low potential for bioaccumulation in aquatic 

organisms. Therefore, the exposures of terrestrial and aquatic populations to MCs via sediment 

and surface water at Kiska Island are considered complete, but insignificant.
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4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This section presents a brief summary of the information presented in this PA report, as well as 

conclusions regarding the potential for exposure to MEC present in the marine environment for

both human and marine species. 

The stated objective of this project is to perform a review of activities related to the operations of 

in-water ranges located off Kiska and Little Kiska Islands in Alaska. These operations include 

all activities that had the potential for release of ordnance into the marine environment that may 

pose a potential threat to human health or the environment. 

4.1 IDENTIFIED SOURCES

The sources of MEC released into the marine environment of the Kiska Island NDSA by Allied 

forces consists of coastal defense and AA gun batteries, supply transfer points, air combat 

training by units of the 11th Air Force, and air combat training by units of the U.S. Navy. 

Locations identified by this PA where these actions occurred are shown on Plate 4-1. 

The presence of MEC within the NDSAs beyond the known limits of in-water ranges resulting 

from combat activities during World War II are beyond the scope of this investigation based on 

the Navy MRP. However, in the case of Kiska and Little Kiska Islands, ordnance dropped or 

fired by Allied forces may be the predominant source of MEC found. 

Two piers were constructed into the northwest portion of Kiska Harbor and were used by Allied 

forces during their operations on island to offload supplies, including ordnance (Figure 2-3). 

Information obtained during an interview conducted for this PA indicates the presence of 

“thousands of small arms shells on the seafloor off the Kiska Docks” during 2007 (Deffendall 

2012). Remnants of one of these piers are still visible in Kiska Harbor today.

Records from May 1950 indicate that Patrol Squadron Two of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Air Force 

conducted nine rocket and bombing strikes against stranded and abandoned ship targets in Kiska 

Harbor (Figure 2-4). No information was discovered to indicate if this was an isolated or 

common occurrence. 

Information reviewed for this PA report identified the Allied coastal and AA gun batteries on 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands consisting of one 90-mm AMTB gun, one 37-mm AMTB gun, 

four 40-mm M-1 AA guns, six 20-mm Mk-4 AA guns, ten .50-caliber water-cooled machine 

guns, and four guns of unknown size. The exact locations of the Allied gun batteries were not 

determined during this investigation. However, information obtained indicates that defensive 
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guns were installed in the vicinity of North Head, Kiska Harbor, Mutt Cove, Jeff Cove, Gertrude 

Cove, Beach Cove, Bluff Cove, and Little Kiska Head and that regular practice firing occurred at 

these locations (Figure 2-5).

Other sources of MEC may include the Japanese or Allied troops that may have disposed of or 

lost ordnance items overboard in the water, particularly in the Kiska Harbor, while they were 

present on the island. MEC of Japanese origin was photographed on the harbor bottom as 

presented in section 2.5.3. 

4.2 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS

As Kiska Island is uninhabited and remote, the only two populations of potential human 

exposure to MEC are commercial or recreational fishers and recreational or research divers. The 

physical explosive hazard is a complete pathway for fishers and divers who may accidently 

detonate MEC. Commercial fishers have been known to unintentionally haul up MEC in their 

fishing nets or attached to their traps. In addition, a commercial vessel’s anchor could 

potentially detonate or get caught on MEC on the seafloor. Therefore, potential physical 

explosive hazards for commercial fishers are considered complete and could potentially be 

significant.

Recreational or research divers will not typically descend deeper than a maximum of 20 fathoms 

(120 feet). MEC could be encountered in these shallow waters by a diver, particularly within 

Kiska Harbor, Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove. These areas are relatively protected 

and are not marked for rip tides on nautical charts. Divers may be drawn to known wrecked 

ships in Kiska Harbor and Gertrude Cove. The wrecked ships in Kiska Harbor were known 

targets for aerial rocket/bombing training in the 1950s. Because the waters of Kiska Harbor, 

Gertrude Cove, Mutt Cove, and Jeff Cove were designated danger areas during gun training 

conducted during 1943, the potential pathway for a physical explosive hazard to a diver is still 

considered complete in these areas. However, the likelihood of a diver coming into physical 

contact with UXO resulting from gun training exercises is considered low. There is a higher 

likelihood of a diver coming into physical contact with MEC (either Japanese or Allied) resulting 

from combat operations conducted during World War II. 

Exposure to MCs within the ordnance can be considered a potentially complete pathway as the 

marine environment slowly consumes the metal casings. The major environmental concern 

associated with releases of MCs in the underwater environment is the impact to sediments. 

Sediments support biological communities that are the food for marine life. However, the MCs

are likely to present low ecological risk under expected exposure scenarios in the marine 

environment. Therefore, the exposures of terrestrial and aquatic populations to MCs via 
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sediment and surface water within the Kiska Island NDSA are considered complete, but 

insignificant.

4.3 AREAS POTENTIALLY CONTAINING NONCOMBAT MEC IN THE MARINE 

ENVIRONMENT

Five areas within the Kiska Island NDSA have been identified as potentially containing DMM, 

practice-fired UXO, or practice-dropped UXO. To be consistent with the Navy MRP, each area 

contains known or suspected munitions releases that occurred prior to September 30, 2002, 

where Navy actions were responsible for the release and the site is not covered by water deeper 

than 20 fathoms (120 feet). These individual areas are defined as follows: 

• The area within Kiska Harbor surrounding the ship pier, barge pier, three 

rocket/bombing targets, and the seafloor within the former gun range extending 

northeast, as shown on Figure 4-1 

• The area off Little Kiska Island, as shown on Figure 4-2 

• The area including all of Mutt and Jeff Coves and the adjacent seafloor between 

Bukhti and Hatchet Points, as shown on Figure 4-3 

• The area including all of Gertrude Cove and the adjacent seafloor extending 

southwest, as shown on Figure 4-4 

• The area including all of Beach and Bluff Coves and the adjacent seafloor, as 

shown on Figure 4-5 

The Navy MRP does not address MEC that is in water greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet). 

Fishers can encounter MEC at depths greater than 20 fathoms (120 feet). 

4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based on this preliminary assessment of the NDSA at Kiska Island, the Navy recommends the 

following: 

1. Kiska and Little Kiska are not eligible for inclusion in the MRP program because most of the 

potential MEC is the result of combat operations. 

2. Site inspections or surveys are not recommended because 
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a. The frequency of human exposure to MEC (fishers or divers) is expected to be 

minimal because Kiska Island is remote and uninhabited. 

b. It is illegal for anyone to remove items (including MEC) from the waters surrounding 

Kiska and Little Kiska Islands because the water in this area is part of a national 

historical landmark.

3. The Navy will perform a non-time-critical removal action (NTCRA) to initiate a Notice to 

Mariners and an information advisory to increase awareness of the presence of MEC in the 

area. The Navy will request that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

include a Notice to Mariners on navigational charts for Kiska Island. The warning will notify 

fishers and divers to be extremely careful when within the NDSA for Kiska Island because 

MEC exist in the waters around Kiska Island. In 2013, the Navy intends to distribute copies 

of an educational fact sheet titled 3Rs Explosives Safety Guide, Maritime Industry (U.S. 

Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety 2010) to fishers in the main fishing ports in the 

Aleutians which include Dutch Harbor and Kodiak areas. The full-color 12-page fact sheet 

informs readers of the dangers of encountering munitions from the seafloor and promotes 

safety by following the “3Rs” of explosives safety: recognize, retreat, and report. A copy of 

this fact sheet is included in Appendix C 





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5.0 REFERENCES 

673rd Air Base Wing, History Office, Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska. 

Site visit July 2012. 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). 2012. Toxicological Profile for 

RDX. January 2012. 

Alaska Geographic Society. 1995. “World War II in Alaska” Alaska Geographic 22(4). 

Cochran, James, combat flight crew member during World War II. 2012. Telephone interview 

with Tom Abbott and Dave Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: his wartime experiences in the Aleutians. Phoenix, Arizona. July 25, 2012. 

Cohen, Stan. 1993. The Forgotten War, A Pictorial History of World War II in Alaska and 

Northwestern Canada. Vol. 4. Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, Inc. Missoula, 

Montana. 

Deffendall, Rodger, diver who lives in Dutch Harbor. 2012. Telephone interview with Tom 

Abbott and Dave Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: his personal diving 

experiences in the Aleutian Islands. Unalaska, Alaska. October 1, 2012. 

Francis, Steven and Ioane Alama. 2011. WWII Unexploded Ordnance, A Study of UXO in Four 

Pacific Island Countries. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji.

Garfield, Brian. 1969. The Thousand Mile War, World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians. 

University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks, Alaska. 

Knechtmann, J. Allen. 2012. Discussion with reference librarian at Navy Department Library, 

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., re: training records. June 29, 2012. 

Morison, Samuel Eliot. 1951. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 

Volume 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944. Naval Institute 

Press. Annapolis, Maryland. 

Morrisett, Robin. 2012. Personal interview about his personal diving experiences in Unalaska 

and Kodiak areas. Dutch Harbor, Alaska. September 25, 2012. 

National Archive and Records Administration II (NARA II). 2012. College Park Maryland. 

Site research visit June 2012. 
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National Archive and Records Administration (NARA Anchorage). 2012. Pacific Alaska 

Regional Office, Anchorage, Alaska. Site visit July 2012. 

National Archive and Records Administration (NARA Seattle). 2012. Pacific Alaska Regional 

Office, Seattle, Washington. Site visit May 2012. 

Naval Historical Center. 1993. The Aleutians Campaign: The Official Navy History of the Only 

World War Two Invasion of US Soil. Published by the Naval Historical Center, 

Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

Officer in Charge (OIC). 1944a. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, 

Alaska. Navy 422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. January 20, 1944. 

———. 1944b. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. February 20, 1944. 

———. 1944c. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. March 20, 1944. 

———. 1944d. Report of Weekly Drills, Naval Auxiliary Air Facility, Kiska, Alaska. Navy 

422. Report to Alaskan Sector Commander. April 20, 1944. 

Paulin, Jim. 2012. “Bering Sea Fishermen Reel in WWII-Era Bomb.” Dutch Harbor 

Fisherman. Dutch Harbor, Alaska. July 28, 2012. 

Rosen, G. and G.R. Lotufo. 2005. “Toxicity and Fate of Two Munitions Constituents in Spiked 

Sediment Exposures with the Marine Amphipod Eohaustorius estuarius. Environmental 

Toxicology and Chemistry 24:2887–2897. doi: 10.1897/04-611R.1. 

Rosenthal, Lauren. 2012a. “Black Cod Boat Turns Up World War II ‘Bomb’.” Online article 

posted at http://kucb.org/news/article/black-cod-boat-turns-up-world-war-ii-bomb/. July 

19, 2012. 

———. 2012b. Reporter with KUCB-FM. Telephone interview with Tom Abbott and Dave 

Hose, URS Corporation, Seattle, Washington, re: the landmine and projectile pulled up 

by the crew of the fishing vessel Aleutian Sable while fishing near Dutch Harbor in June 

2012. July 31, 2012.
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 2004. Archive Search Report Findings, Kiska and 

Little Kiska Islands (Including Kiska Island Garrison Site, Little Kiska Island Harbor 

Defense Site, and Kiska Naval Auxiliary Air Facility). Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program for Formerly Used Defense Sites, Ordnance and Explosives. 

USACE, Saint Louis District. Project Number F10AK013704. 

U.S. Navy. 2007. Environmental Readiness Program Manual. OPNAV Instruction 5090.1C 

from Chief of Naval Operations. Chapter 19, “Munitions Response.” October 30, 2007. 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2003. Handbook on the Management of 

Ordnance and Explosives at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred Ranges and Other 

Sites, Review Draft 2.

Yoo, L J., G.R. Lotufo, A.B. Gibson, J.A. Steevens, and J.G. Sims. 2006. “Toxicity and 

Bioaccumulation of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene in Fathead Minnow (Pimephales promelas).” 

Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 25:3253–3260. doi: 10.1897/06-067R.1. 
APPENDIX A 

Executive Order 8680
Executive Order 8680--Establishing naval defensive sea areas around and naval airspace 

reservations over the islands of Kiska and Unalaska

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 8680 of Feb. 14, 1941, appear at 6 FR 1014, 3 CFR, 

1938-1943 Comp., p. 892, unless otherwise noted. 

Alaska

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as 

amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 

1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme highwater marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and 

Unalaska are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of 

national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Defensive Sea 

Area", and "Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area" and the airspaces over the said territorial 

waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes 

of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval 

Airspace Reservation", and "Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation".

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter 

either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other 

craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless 

authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into 

either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the 

Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with 

the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of 

Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may 

be necessary to carry out such provisions. 

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval 

defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code 

as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this 

order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties 

prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973). 

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof. 

[EO 8680 amended by EO 8729 of Apr. 2, 1941, 6 FR 1791, 3 CFR, 1938-1941 Comp., p. 919]
APPENDIX B 

Historical Aerial Photo Interpretation
 

STATEMENT OF OPINIONS

WAYNE M. GRIP

AERO-DATA CORPORATION

CONCERNING INTERPRETATION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS 

OF KISKA ISLAND NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA

IN

THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS, ALASKA

NOVEMBER 2012

Wayne M. Grip
Introduction 

I was engaged to perform an historical aerial photography study of Kiska Harbor within the Kiska Island 

Naval Defensive Sea Area. I was asked to obtain and interpret aerial photography for the World War II 

time period.

Aerial imagery, satellite imagery and maps were acquired of the Site from both public and private sources. 

In addition, I obtained the USGS 1:250,000 topographic map of Kiska. The imagery and maps were 

registered to a common coordinate system and interpreted. Oblique photographs and ground photographs 

were also obtained, which showed locations where munitions were probably offloaded from ships.

The primary purpose of this study was to use historical aerial photography to identify potential areas 

impacted by legacy ordnance activities.

Statement of Qualifications 

My name is Wayne M. Grip. I have a BS degree in Geology from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. 

After I received my degree in Geology, I served as a cartographic officer in the US Air Force for four years

from 1967 through 1971. In this position, I interpreted aerial photography and satellite imagery to produce 

air target charts (maps). Following my release from active duty, I worked for the Louisiana Department of 

Natural Resources (LADNR) for five years as a geologist. In this position, I flew photomissions and 

interpreted aerial photography to evaluate mining permit applications and to monitor oil and gas and 

mining operations. I also conducted many on-site inspections to determine the compliance of regulated 

facilities with environmental standards. 

In 1982, I co-founded Aero-Data Corporation. I worked part-time for Aero-Data until 1985 when I left the 

LADNR and went full time with Aero-Data as its president. As of 2012, I have worked for Aero-Data for 

thirty years. I am currently the president and principal owner. Aero-Data specializes in aerial mapping and 

environmental studies using aerial photography and historical maps. I have over thirty-five years of 

professional experience in this field. I have served as an expert witness in the areas of photointerpretation, 

photogrammetry, and hydrology in both Federal and State courts in the United States. I am also an active 

licensed pilot with over 2,500 hours of flying time as pilot in command including over 1,000 hours of 

photomissions. In the past thirty years with Aero-Data Corporation, I have completed over 700 

environmental site investigations in more than thirty states using historical aerial photography. 

Information Considered 

This report is based upon vertical monoscopic aerial photography, oblique photography, ground 

photography and maps of the Site as well as my experience and training. Attachment A is a listing of the 

aerial photography, documents and other information that I have relied upon.

Production of Geo-Registered Images and Maps 

Following my standard procedures, I have produced geo-registered imagery of the vertical aerial 

photography obtained for this study. In addition, maps showing the boundary of the Site and maps of other 

features were geo-registered to the aerial photography. The imagery and maps are included in the 

attachments to this report. 

Methods and Materials 

Aerial research and acquisition 

The historical aerial photography study of the Site began with research for available photo coverage from 

public and private vendors. Vertical, oblique and ground imagery were acquired. 

Because of the typically poor flying weather and remoteness of Kiska Island, the availability of 

photography during the war years was very limited. There was almost no aerial photography identified that 

was taken during WWII. Conventional aerial photography is normally taken of developed areas during 

clear weather with good visibility and lack of cloud cover. These conditions are very rare in the Aleutians 
and there are no developed areas on Kiska. 

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) catalog was researched using their Online 

Public Access (OPA) system. Through OPA, several record groups were identified as having possible 

photographic coverage. The record groups were as follows:

• RG 18 – Records of the Army Air Forces

• RG 23 – Records of the Coast and Geodetic Survey

• RG 37 – Records of the Hydrographic Office

• RG 80 – General Records of the Department of the Navy

• RG 373 – Records of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Aero-Data Corporation forwarded this information to Do You Graphics in Maryland, who performed onsite 

research at NARA to verify coverage. Upon completing their research, Do You Graphics sent Aero-Data 

Corporation the results of their findings. No aerial photographs from the requested World War II time 

period were found at NARA. 

Additional photographic collections were reviewed, including the Alaska Digital Archives, which provides 

online access to the Alaska State Archives, Alaska State Library, Alaska State Museum and University of 

Alaska collections; the Library of Congress, the National Geodetic Survey; the Naval History and Heritage 

Command; the United States Department of Agriculture Aerial Photography Field Office; the Alaska District 

of the United States Army Corps of Engineers; and the United States Geological Survey. No stereoscopic

aerial photography from World War II was available from these sources. When available, ground 

shots and oblique imagery were obtained from these sources.

All imagery that was obtained was examined for proper geographic coverage of the Site. Although some of 

the ground photos obtained do show the offloading of munitions on beaches, the photos lack sufficient 

identifiable geographical features that would enable us to map the precise geographical position where

these ordnance activities occurred on Kiska Island. The dates of the imagery were included in metadata 

and other documentation provided to us from the photo providers.

Scanning of Selected Photography 

The vertical and oblique photographs that were obtained from the Naval History and Heritage Command 

were scanned using a flatbed scanner. All other imagery was obtained in digital format.

Geo-referencing of Imagery and Maps

The chosen coordinate system of UTM Zone 60 NAD83 was derived from the already geo-referenced 

5/12/2012 DigitalGlobe WorldView2 satellite imagery. I compared the historical vertical aerial photos and 

maps with the 2012 satellite imagery to identify common features that would allow me to register the photo 

or map geographically. Using ArcGIS, each historical photo or map was scaled and registered to the UTM 

coordinate system using photo-identifiable features common with the satellite imagery. These features 

included a stream channel, a road network and the shoreline.

Photointerpretation

It is an accepted practice in photointerpretation to rely upon different types of information such as oblique 

aerial photography, ground photography, maps and ground surveys in addition to vertical aerial 

photography and the interpreter’s experience and training. This study relied primarily upon aerial 

photography, maps and my experience and training. 

Photointerpretation of the Site was conducted in the GIS using the oblique and ground photos as the 

primary source of data. The locations of features visible on the historical imagery were transferred to the 

current scene satellite imagery and historical maps when possible.

The interpreted images, registered maps, oblique photography and ground photography located in the 
interpretations section of this report contain specific information that must be viewed by the reader in order 

to fully understand this report. The mapped images (Attachment B) constitute the primary source of 

information in this report. 

Summary

The mapped images depict symbols locating areas where ships and landing crafts were visible in the 

aerial photography. Ground photographs revealed that the beach was crowded with supplies and probably 

munitions. Bull dozers were being used to move the supplies about the beach as the tracks from tracked 

vehicles were clearly visible on the photography. No features were detected in the water offshore although 

a few ships were anchored in deeper water.

The recent photography reveals many bomb and shell craters which still remain today on the surface of 

the barren landscape of Kiska. These craters could be accurately mapped should it become necessary at 

some time in the future.
ATTACHMENT A - AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS

DATE SOURCE TYPE RATIO FRAMES DESCRIPTION

1951 - Limited 

revisions in 1983 USGS MAP 1:250,000 "Kiska" Topographic Map

12/30/1942

United States Army Corps 

of Engineers MAP

From "Defense Environmental Restoration Program for 

Formerly Used Defense Sites Ordnance and Explosives, Archive 

Search Report Kiska Island Garrison (B & L), Project Number 

F10AK013704, Final 16 August 2004"

5/12/2012 DigitalGlobe WorldView2 COLOR Orthophoto Satellite Imagery.

Jun-1942

Naval History & Heritage 

Command BW 80-G-11691

Vertical Aerial Photograph. Kiska Harbor. Layout of Japanese 

landings used for the United States attack on the Japanese 

base there on June 18, 1942.

Aug-1943

Naval History & Heritage 

Command BW 80-G-42784

Oblique Aerial Photograph. Five LCTS and an LCM Land Supplies 

on a Kiska Beach, soon after the initial landings of the Allied 

Forces. Supplies, vehicles, and men on beach, and many troops 

on hills inland.

3/24/1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW

UAF-1970-

11-73

Vertical Aerial Photograph. Bombing damage from a U.S. air 

raid on Japanese forces on Kiska Island.

Aug-1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P430-33

Ground Shot. Invasion craft unload supplies on beach at Kiska 

Harbor.

1942-1945 Alaska Digital Archives BW

AMRC-b80-

75-10

Oblique Aerial Photograph. Aerial view of Kiska Harbor and 

surrrounding area.

8/22/1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P80-007 Ground Shot. Camp area. Trout Lagoon.

Aug-Sept 1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P40-06 Ground shot. Disabled landing craft at Kiska Harbor.

Aug-1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P430-27

Dump near Kiska Harbor for wrecked Japanese aircraft. 

Disassembled airplane parts are strewn across ground. Behind 

the dump are a line of ships pulled up on beach.

Aug-1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P430-26

Ground shot. Coast Guard operated LST (Landing Ship, Tanks) 

discharging equipment through bow doors onto beach at Kiska 

Harbor.

8/29/1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P80-051 Ground shot. Panorama of Kiska Harbor.
ATTACHMENT A - AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS

DATE SOURCE TYPE RATIO FRAMES DESCRIPTION

Aug-1943 Alaska Digital Archives BW ASL-P430-47

Ground shot. Fleet Air Wing Four personnel move boxes of 

ammunition from landing barge onto beach at Kiska Harbor.
	

	


	

	
 		
	







 	



	





  















































	  	 
 	


	

	
 		
	








 

	








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Attachment C - Exhibit Notes

Name Description Notes

Exhibit 1 Kiska Site Map

Site Map on USGS Quad Map with ares of 

study delineated with black boxes

Exhibit 2 Kiska Harbor DRG Study area of Kiska Harbor - USGS Quad Map

Exhibit 3

Kiska Harbor 6/1942 Aerial Superimposed on 

2012 Imagery

Georeferenced monoscopic aerial photo from 

1942 with mooring points and ships mapped

Exhibit 4

Kiska Harbor 6/1942 Aerial Zoom Superimposed 

on 2012 Imagery Same as Exhibit 3 but zoomed in

Exhibit 5

Kiska Harbor 3/24/1943 Aerial Superimposed on 

2012 Imagery

Georeferenced monoscopic aerial photo from 

1943 with mooring points and ships mapped

Exhibit 6

Kiska Harbor 3/24/1943 Aerial Zoom 

Superimposed on 2012 Imagery Same as Exhibit 5 but zoomed in

Exhibit 7 Kiska Harbor 5/12/2012

Recent Monoscopic satellite image of study 

area two piers mapped from 2012 imagery

Exhibit 8

Kiska Harbor 12/30/1942 Map Date 

Superimposed on 2012 Imagery Two maps georeferenced to 2012 imagery

Exhibit 9

Kiska Harbor All Mapped Features in Study 

Superimposed on 5/12/2012 Imagery

Composite map showing all pier/mooring 

features and ships in the study

Exhibit 10 Kiska Harbor 6/1942

Vertical Monoscopic photo showing layout of 

Japanese landings

georeferenced and mapped on Ex. 3 and 

Ex. 4

Exhibit 11 Kiska Harbor 8/1943

Oblique Photo of LCTs and an LCM landing on 

beach

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 12 Kiska Harbor 3/24/1943

Vertical Monoscopic photo showing damage 

from US Air Raid georeferenced and mapped

Exhibit 13 Kiska Harbor 8/1943 Ground photo of invasion craft on beach

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 14 Kiska Harbor 1942-1945 Oblique Photo of Kiska Harbor

Exhibit 15 Kiska Harbor 8/22/1943 Camp area, Trout Lagoon - Kiska.

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo
Attachment C - Exhibit Notes

Exhibit 16 Kiska Harbor Aug - Sept 1943 Ground photo of disabled landing craft

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 17 Kiska Harbor Aug 1943

Ground photo of dump for wrecked Japanese 

aircraft

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 18 Kiska Harbor Aug 1943 Ground photo of LST on beach

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 19 Kiska Harbor 8/29/1943 Panorama of Kiska Harbor

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo

Exhibit 20 Kiska Harbor August 1943 Ground Photo of US forces with ammunition

insufficient features in imagery to 

register photo
APPENDIX C

3Rs Explosives Safety Guide, Maritime Industry
Maritime 

 Industry

3Rs Explosives Safety Guide

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Many vessel crews tell sea stories about 

catching suspicious items in their nets 

or dredging gear. The lucky crews live 

to spin their own tales, while others 

become the subject of tragic sea stories.

In July 1965, such a tragedy took place 

aboard the fishing vessel (FV) Snoopy. 

The FV Snoopy was trawling for scallops 

off the coast of North Carolina when it 

caught a large cylinder in its net. A witness 

said he could clearly see a long round 

object swaying in the net amidships, over 

the deck.

What happened next is unclear; but an 

explosion caused the loss of the FV Snoopy

and eight members of her crew.

What went wrong? Was it preventable? 

Could something have been done to save 

the crew? While all these questions were asked, no one but the FV Snoopy’s crew 

knows what actually happened that day. However, the tale of the FV Snoopy is 

meaningful if others learn from this tragedy.

(Note: Both commercial and sport divers should also be aware of the hazards 

munitions present).

To protect your crew and vessel if you encounter or suspect 

you have encountered a munition at sea, follow the 3Rs of 

explosives safety: Recognize, Retreat, Report.

During commercial operations such as fishing, 

clamming or dredging; nets; bottom tending gear; and

dredges may catch or dredge up munitions from the 

ocean. These munitions should be considered a serious 

danger to a vessel and its crew.

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Unexploded Ordnance Recovered During 

Dredging

A Clean Torpedo (top) and a Heavily 

Corroded Torpedo on the Seafloor (bottom)
2

The military has conducted training and combat operations at sea for centuries. 

Prior to 1970, the U.S. military as well as the militaries of other nations also seadisposed of excess, obsolete and unserviceable munitions either en route to port 

or as part of planned disposals. In the 1970s, the U.S. military stopped the practice, 

now only allowing it in an emergency. Mariners are cautioned they could encounter 

munitions during commercial operations, such as fishing or dredging. Using 

common sense and basic knowledge, Mariners can spin their own story rather 

than becoming a character in a tragic 

sea tale.

Munitions can be encountered anywhere 

at sea, not just in charted hazard areas. 

Munitions that may be encountered 

include mines, torpedoes, depth 

charges, artillery shells, bombs and 

missiles. These munitions, which can 

contain high explosives or chemical 

agents, can present a serious danger to 

a vessel and its crew. 

• Munitions, to include those that have 

been lying dormant in sea or fresh 

water for many years, should be 

considered extremely dangerous. 

• In some cases, munitions that have been in water for a long period may 

become more sensitive. 

• Regardless of whether encountered on land or recovered from the sea, 

munitions can explode when handled.

• Munitions submerged in sea or fresh water for any length of time may be: o Like new and easy to identify;

o Heavily encrusted with sea growth and difficult to identify.

Various Recovered Projectiles

Projectile and Cartridge Case on Seafloor

This guide includes drawings representative of munitions that may be 

encountered at sea. Drawings may help in recognizing suspect munitions.

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3

MUNITIONS ARE DESIGNED TO BE DANGEROUS

Munitions are designed to injure, maim, or kill people, or to destroy equipment 

(e.g., vessels). The best protection from the potential hazards associated with 

munitions is to heed the warnings on nautical charts, avoid known disposal areas, 

and follow the 3Rs (Recognize, Retreat, Report).

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND CHEMICAL AGENTS

Beginning in World War I, the Department of Defense (then, the Department of 

War) designed toxic chemical agents to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate an 

enemy. In the past, the United States and other countries sea-disposed chemical 

munitions and chemical agents in bulk containers, such as 55-gallon drums. As 

a result, some munitions or containers 

recovered from the sea may contain 

toxic chemical agents.

Vessel crews should be alert for 

conditions or signs that could indicate 

the presence of toxic chemical agents:

• Unusual odor from equipment or fish;

• A stinging sensation in the eyes, or 

burning or irritated skin;

• Corroded containers or suspicious 

clay-like lumps.

If chemical agents are suspected, immediate action is 

necessary to protect the crew and vessel.

If You Suspect You Have Encountered a Chemical Munition:

• Move all crew members up wind;

• Close all doors and hatches;

• Shut down all ventilation systems;

• Steam into the wind to carry contaminants away 

from the crew;

• Contact the U.S. Coast Guard for assistance

In case of physical contact with toxic chemical 

agents, immediately rinse the contaminated area with large amounts of water (if 

possible, use warm soapy water), even if no effects are felt. 

Munitions on the Seafloor

Recovered Chemical Filled Projectile

Chemical Filled Projectile Recovered from 

Clam Bed
4

Crewmembers should not work in a 

contaminated area and every effort 

should be made to prevent the spread 

of contaminants. Fishing vessels that 

have come into contact with toxic 

chemical agents must not bring their 

catch ashore until it has been checked 

and released by the appropriate state’s 

Department of Environmental Health. 

Sea life contaminated by chemical 

agents is unsuitable for human or animal 

consumption. 

Because munitions present a potential explosive hazard, 

they should never be touched, moved or disturbed (handled); 

however, at sea, the specific action required will depend on 

the circumstances. 

• If possible, crews should avoid bringing munitions (or suspect 

munitions) onboard. If a munition is ensnared or fouled in 

gear, retreat by carefully jettisoning the munition, or by cutting 

away the gear. If this is not possible, carefully secure 

the munition onboard and move and keep the crew as 

far away from the munition as possible. 

• Great care should be taken to avoid bumping the 

munition; each action carries risk.

NEVER BRING A MUNITION OR SUSPECT

MUNITION INTO PORT

Munitions Not On Board

If an actual or suspect munition is recovered:

• Immediately stop all operations;

• Do not bring the munition or gear containing it 

onboard, if possible;

• Do not allow the munition to come or remain along side the vessel where wave 

action may cause contact with the hull;

A Clean Aerial Bomb Prepared for 

Shipping (above) and an Aerial Bomb on 

the Seafloor (below).

A Clean 5-inch Caliber Projectile (above) and Recovered 

5-inch 38 Caliber Projectiles 

(below)

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5

• If a munition is in the gear and has not been brought 

onboard, try to safely lower it back into the water and, 

as indicated below, note the position and report it to the 

U.S. Coast Guard.

• If in shallow water (less than 130 feet), lower the 

munition to the bottom, buoy off the net or dredge 

recovery lines (remain in the immediate area).

• If in deep water, stream the munition as far aft as 

possible and maintain steerageway as necessary. 

• Remain in the area while awaiting assistance.

Munitions Onboard

• If the gear is brought over the deck with an actual or 

suspected munition, but remains suspended and can 

continue to be safely suspended in place or nearby, 

immediately:

• Secure the munition with guy lines to prevent further movement;

• Keep the crew away from that area.

If a suspect munition is brought onboard:

• Keep unneeded crew members as far away as possible.

• Decide whether to do one of the following:

o Carefully jettison it, or

o Retain it onboard.

• If jettisoned, note and report position.

• If retained onboard:

o Limit handling and avoid hitting or bending any part of the munition;

o Stow the munition on deck as far away as possible from heat sources, vibration 

and the crew, but limit handling; o Firmly chock and lash the munition to prevent movement;

o Cover and/or wet to minimize the potential for:

- Deterioration of metal parts and release of any fill;

- Explosives to dry out and become sensitive to shock. o Keep crew away from item.

o Request assistance (Channel 16--156.800 MHz).

• If within 2 or 3 hours of land, the safest measure is to notify the U.S. Coast Guard 

and move to a rendezvous area offshore.

A Clean Rifle Grenade 

(above) and a Recovered 

Grenade. Item is about 

four inches long.
6

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Careful observation is necessary prior to reporting, so that proper instructions and 

assistance can be provided. The information you provide may be combined with 

other reports to produce new warnings to mariners 

and update nautical charts.

When actual or suspect munitions are encountered 

at sea, the vessel’s captain should notify the U.S. 

Coast Guard and provide the below information, 

as soon as possible. (Note: If a munition is 

encountered while in port [e.g., during off loading or 

processing] call 911.)

• The vessel’s position (use World Geodetic System 1984 [WGS-84] 

for reporting).

• If the exact position is unknown, give approximate coordinates, or a range and 

bearing from a charted feature.

• The activity being conducted when the munition was encountered (e.g., fishing, 

dredging).

• A general description of the munition’s key features (size, shape, fins, props, 

markings) and condition. (Never attempt to clean, open, or tamper with a 

munition in any way).

• The action taken (e.g. stowed or jettisoned).

• If jettisoned, also provide:

o The position of the release, water depth, and buoys or markings used;

o A description of any entanglement (e.g., net, dredge) or other details.

• Any unusual odors, if noticed.

• Whether the munition was jettisoned:

o In or near a charted munitions dump;

o Near (within 1,000 yards of) any surface or sub-surface structures.

THE US COAST GUAR D WILL NOTIFY THE APPROPR IATE 

MILITARY EXPLOS IVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL UNIT TO ARRANGE 

FOR REQUIRED SUPPORT .

Floating Mine Washed Up on Beach
7

Depth Charges

Length 28" / Diameter 18" to 25"

Depth Bomb

Length 50" to 59" / Diameter 15" to 18"

Practice Depth Charges
8

Projected anti-submarine-warfare weapons

Representative torpedoes
9

Miscellaneous Mine Floats 

Length 10" to 24"

Diameter 12" to 18"

Projectiles

Lengths 20 mm to 16" 

3" to 5" in Diameter (Typically)
10

Bomb Body Lengths 39" to 97"

Diameter 7" to 19"

Markers and Signals

Lengths 10" to 18" (Approximately)

Diameter 2" to 5" (Approximately)

Aerial Bombs
Don’t Forget

Follow the 3Rs

• Munitions are dangerous and may not be easily recognizable!

• Avoid military and former military ranges and disposal areas!

• Do not bring munitions on-board!

• Never bring a munition into port, unless directed to do so by USCG!

Recognize 

When you may have encountered a munition.

Retreat 

If you know or suspect you have encountered a munition, jettison it or 

secure it and keep the crew from the immediate area.

Report 

Immediately notify the US Coast Guard of the vessel’s or 

munitions’ location and provide a description of the munition. 

Emergency contacts: 

• In Port: Call 911

• At sea: Use Channel 16 (156.800 MHz)

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For additional information call 

U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety 

at (918) 420-8919 

or see 

the US Army’s UXO Safety Education website 

https://www.denix.osd.mil/uxosafety 

FEBRUARY 2010
Plate 4-1 

Locations of Areas Potentially Containing Munitions and Explosives of 

Concern within the Naval Defensive Sea Area at Kiska Island