AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Innate Insurgent Advantage

Can Training and Planning Bridge the Gap?

Gary W. Boyd

Department of the Air Force Civilian

Wright Flyer Paper No. 57

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
ii

Project Editor

Ernest Allan Rockwell, PhD

Published by Air University Press in January 2016

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

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iii

Contents

Foreword v

About the Author vii 

Abstract ix

Casualties and Chaos 1

Analysis of Change Impact 11

Examining the Data 20

Conclusion 23

Abbreviations 33

Bibliography 35

v

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer Papers. 

Through this series, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) presents a 

sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distancelearning students. This series has long showcased the kind of visionary 

thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation 

pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. 

As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, actionable knowledge—research that addresses some of the most complex 

security and defense challenges facing us today.

Recently, The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print 

editions to an electronic-only format will fire even greater intellectual 

debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as 

the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers 

via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach 

more readers but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve 

resources. In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues 

of The Wright Flyer Papers at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all

.asp?cat=wright.

Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to 

disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our 

Air Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will 

stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, 

space, and cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative 

and improved ways to defend our nation and way of life.

THOMAS H. DEALE

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

vii

About the Author

I was assigned as senior historian to the Combined Air Operations 

Center in Saudi Arabia during the early phase of Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF). As such I witnessed the operation unfold from the combined forces air component commander historical perspective. While 

there was a generalized sense of accomplishment by the end of Operation 

Anaconda in March 2002, there was also a sense of frustration with regard to joint planning and the US Air Force’s (USAF) role in Afghanistan; 

special operations forces dominated all aspects of the campaign. The 

USAF had not even been included within the execution plans for Operation Anaconda until almost too late. Airlift and support for OEF had 

been brokered on-the-fly with the expectation that OEF was but a transitory battle in a new war on terror. By June 2002, US Central Command 

told Airmen to prepare for a “rolling start” on a whole new chapter, the 

invasion of Iraq in what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 

I returned to home station in July 2002 and had less than a year before I 

deployed again—this time to US European Command (USEUCOM) in 

April 2003 as historian for the vanguard of USAF units assigned to the 

Phase IV rebuilding of post-invasion Iraq. I never made it to Iraq, as the 

security situation and insurgency evolved into generalized instability, 

and instead I set about capturing data for USEUCOM’s support of OIF 

from Stuttgart, Germany. The overarching feeling within the command at 

that time was one of confusion. The planning, training, doctrine, and 

equipment of that era had been designed for massive force-on-force conflicts, and not much thought had been given to training Airmen for extended missions in post-war environments; nation building was eschewed. The strategic lapses embodied by the Beirut barracks bombing 

in 1983 and the Somalia relief crisis a decade later reinforced a message 

that the mistakes made in those events were not readiness-related so 

much as they were fool’s errands to have sent forces there in the first 

place. Rather than patch the deficits in the asymmetrical side of doctrine 

and training, military members continued as before, training for large 

fights while neglecting insurgencies in the main. The ability-to-surviveand-operate training and gear were focused on a generalized war involving chemical weapons and large forces. It took years for training and 

equipment to catch up with the realities of modern insurgencies. Even 

after the end of the large occupation in Iraq, there remained a significant 

argument regarding whether or not the surge in Iraq “worked.” The argument permeated not only military scholarship but also military-friendly 

research centers. The question of what caused the shift in fortunes in Iraq 

is one of the key questions of modern military scholarship. My central 
viii

discovery in examining the issue is that there were many fortuitous 

changes that took place in consonance with the surge of troop levels in 

Iraq in 2007. Many positive shifts in American fortunes in OIF and later 

OEF were facilitated by having enough boots on the ground and on-demand logistics and airpower to help secure critical cities and towns. The 

fact that the surge’s utility is debated is a positive argument of its relevance, because success breeds many authors and failure is an orphan. The 

surge in troops was helpful—but not alone decisive. The surge provided 

space so that training, equipment, doctrinal, and planning enhancements 

could have maximum impact. The surge and these enhancements coexisted, and ultimately each part remained an important cohesive part of 

the whole picture.
ix

Abstract

This study examines the role of training, planning, and technological 

changes in helping turn around coalition and American efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The 

United States rushed headlong into protracted stabilization, security, 

transition, and rebuilding (SSTR) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Despite the wealth of historical, doctrinal, and experiential knowledge 

available to help mitigate casualties and restore security in such operations, the United States and its coalition partners failed to adequately 

plan, train, or equip their individual forces until years after the start of 

the conflict.

The objective of this research was to determine if training, planning, 

doctrine, and concomitant technological advances helped turn the tide in 

OIF and later OEF as the United States and its forces institutionalized 

new doctrines and embraced the lessons of history. The United States and 

its coalition partners made great strides in reversing what had been virtual lost causes and reshaping planning, training, strategy, and tactics to 

affect meaningful successes and gradual withdrawal throughout the region. This brief study examines the methods, training, and decisions that 

helped make moderate successes possible after particularly dark days 

from 2004 through 2006.

The evidence suggests that dedicated planning and training were indeed decisive in bridging the advantages enjoyed by insurgents fighting 

in their homeland with ample outside and local support—even if a little 

late to the need in the concentrations required for moderate success. It is 

hoped this paper will contribute to a permanent knowledge storehouse 

on effective end-state operations after so high a price was paid for the 

knowledge by this generation of warriors. The author retains copies of all 

documents used to compile this work.

1

Casualties and Chaos

A study of the American military tradition was warranted with regard 

to insurgencies. Indeed, insurgency was a near constant in the American 

way of war. America’s War of Independence was an insurgency with relatively low casualties—4,435 killed in action during eight years, with 

roughly five times as many wounded. In the two Seminole Wars, which 

were true counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the United States suffered more than 1,500 killed in action among its regular troops, plus at 

least an equal number among the state militia, against a much smaller 

and more confined enemy. Later planners largely viewed those wars as 

disastrous. Much of the nineteenth century saw the United States in 

COIN operations against Native Americans and enclaves of insurgents 

prior to and during the Civil War. The United States showed a definite 

military facility against insurgencies during its early history but used 

ruthless and near-genocidal tactics to achieve local superiority, destroying whole villages and hunting areas while employing crude, but effective, biological agents such as smallpox blankets in a barely restrained 

onslaught against native peoples.1

In the modern era, the Vietnam War represented the critical litmus 

test for American COIN operations prior to the start of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Those three conflicts—

along with Operation Allied Force, discreet operations following the 

Arab Spring, and Operation Odyssey Dawn—provided useful case studies 

for the examination of casualties, tactics, and relative outcomes of modern 

COIN operations. For examining the utility and efficacy of training and 

planning, these case studies also provided a unique contemporary window on American operations. Each operation was uniquely successful or 

unsuccessful depending upon one’s historical placement. Vietnam was 

often considered a resounding defeat for the American way of war. Yet, 

seen pragmatically from the point of view of its limited objective to stabilize Eastern Asia and keep the “dominoes” from falling against American 

spheres of influence, Vietnam so exhausted America’s enemies that the 

relatively modest objectives implicit in the containment strategy were 

achieved. The Vietnamese themselves suffered horrific casualties, and 

their economy was ruined for more than a generation. For the United 

States, the cost of the war was high, and scholars must examine the 

national treasure consumed by the ideology of the containment strategy 

through the prism of actual worth. If ever a war had no winners, it was 

the Vietnam conflict; however, observers have ignored many lessons of 

that war, dearly purchased, based on the subjective appraisal that it was a 

“lost war.”2
2

Background to the Current State of Operations

In Allied Force, the United States had so matured its airpower and 

precision-strike capabilities that its military suffered no combat deaths 

and only fractional losses of its attacking aircraft. In that conflict—although 

operating more as a peacekeeping force than COIN aggressor—the 

United States was, for over a decade, limiting its exposure to casualties, 

achieving its objectives of halting genocidal civil war in the Balkans, and 

reaching some degree of political stability. In OEF and OIF, the United 

States was thrust back into a mode of operations it had not experienced 

in such concentration since the Vietnam War. Casualty numbers spiked 

as poorly orchestrated COIN operations with little definable and state 

milestones became the objectives of the conflicts.3

 Training and planning 

proved inadequate to the challenge. Losses mounted during the decade as 

doctrine, equipment, and training raced to reassert a material advantage. 

This is what a recent study calls “dominating the fight.” Maj Gen Robert 

H. Scales, US Army, retired, a military analyst and historian, observes 

that “ground forces are ‘not dominant’ in combat partly because of inadequate equipment and training. Compared to the overwhelming superiority that the United States has in naval and air warfare, when it comes 

to ground combat, the American military ‘hasn’t come as far as it should,’ 

says Scales. ‘It doesn’t dominate in the tactical fight.’”4

During the past several years, despite not being completely dominant 

in all spheres of battle, the US military—especially the United States Air 

Force (USAF)—has tried to enhance the training afforded its expeditionary 

forces, albeit rather slowly. Doctrinal changes have attempted to correct 

deficits in planning and strategy that have allowed America’s enemies to 

operate, if not with impunity, at least in relatively painful freedom of 

action. In the US military’s training centers, there was a conspicuous emphasis on preparing for stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and better defining war objectives through enhanced planning, which included sober analyses of lessons learned in the 

present conflicts. The whole COIN doctrine underwent a significant 

change. The United States began to examine war—not through the lens of 

legacy beliefs and subsets of general war but through flexible doctrine 

that recognized that war was multispectral and that asymmetrical war and 

SSTR activities were ongoing responsibilities within the doctrinal continuum.5

In RAND’s seminal study How Insurgencies End, researchers analyzed 

COIN operations through the centuries to determine the conditions that 

brought about the actual end to operations. They also considered whether 

the governments under siege survived, won, or capitulated in the face of 
3

these actions. Commissioned by the United States Marine Corps initially 

to review operations in the al-Anbar province of Iraq in 2006, the study 

blossomed over four years to encompass an examination more of the totality of such operations. RAND found 89 insurgencies useful to study 

and looked at the variables within each, determining the conditions 

necessary for governmental, outsider, or insurgent success. As researchers 

examined the outcomes of these insurgencies, 16 were still in progress, 28 

had been won by governments and 26 by insurgents, and 19 were tossups. The history of contemporary insurgencies revealed the significant 

challenges posed by such operations. Insurgents could be successful with 

little or no technology or equipment, requiring mostly a persistent view 

of a long war of attrition that RAND calculated lasted an average of 10 

years. RAND’s study concluded that successful insurgencies almost always required external support. In this way, the characterization of insurgent guerrillas in the popular imagination—ill-clad revolutionaries 

armed almost exclusively with tenacity and having limited technology 

and supplies—was almost completely a myth. In reality, insurgents were 

generally proxy warriors for other nations or well-funded entities such as 

religious jihadists/fundamentalists. Overcoming such an adversary to 

bring about conditions permissive enough for indigenous people to govern 

and for the United States and its allies to leave did not merely require 

stubbornness and withstanding attrition. Instead, insurgencies were 

complex, lengthy fights involving international factions that necessitated 

numerous levers of power to contain or dampen. Counterinsurgencies 

also demanded considerable unique training and planning. Despite their 

reputation, insurgencies were rarely isolated civil wars.6

Since adopting a comprehensive expeditionary-training approach as 

well as optimizing the use of better planning and technology, the US military began to close the gap on the innate insurgent advantage during the 

past several years—beginning with a surge that was cognizant of what 

insurgencies required to thrive in OIF in 2007 to the present day. Declining 

casualties in Afghanistan after the successful elimination of Osama bin 

Laden in May 2011 (in a neighboring state that facilitated the insurgency) 

indicated the United States had turned a corner on the modern derivation of COIN/SSTR operations. As for end-state operations and planning, recent operations were far more prudently undertaken. For 

example, the Arab Spring did not bring about limitless commitments in 

additional theaters but rather moderated responses focusing on sustainable, and mostly positive, outcomes consistent with national strategic imperatives. In sum, the gap had been bridged between the innate insurgent 

force advantage in SSTR operations and the modern fighting force of the 

United States. Where national objectives dictate, COIN forces now have 
4

significantly improved, doctrinally-driven planning and better equipment, tactics, and training to confront long-haul insurgencies. Whether 

or not a future bridge remains between American capability and insurgent advantages depends greatly on many of the budgetary and resource 

decisions that will drive the Department of Defense (DOD) during the 

next few fiscal years.7

Insurgencies Should Influence Doctrine

Never was a problem so clearly demonstrated as America’s unpreparedness for SSTR operations in the early twenty-first century. Unable 

to match combat strength, technical capability, or large-force training, 

enemies in Southwest Asia practiced the teachings of Sun Tzu and Mao 

Tse-tung. Prepared for a long war of attrition and fueled by religious fervor, 

they deliberately engaged the occupation forces and banked on the historic impatience of Western democracies with regard to long campaigns 

and persistent fatalities. Going to war was naturally a drastic enterprise 

with profound ramifications for all parties. The US military in particular 

found itself embroiled in many low-intensity conflicts during its history, 

especially in recent history. Researchers tend to classify the past 25 years 

as the post–Cold War era. In many ways, this is not a useful classification. 

It is important to understand that the Cold War never existed in a vacuum; rather, it was mostly a grouping of small “hot wars” and technological competition revolving around a de facto stalemate at the macro 

levels of Eastern and Western strategic capabilities. The Cold War’s 

underpinnings—possible nuclear annihilation—remained. “Cold War” 

as a loose frame of reference for a nuclear-capable world after the end of 

World War II had some utility. As a means to doctrinally define an epoch, 

the term was not so useful and in fact was misleading and dangerous with 

regard to planning and training. The reality remained: the world and 

warfare entered into a nuclear-capable phase in July 1945 that presented 

an ongoing existential dilemma still relevant to contemporary planners. 

The posturing armies of East and West defined the popular conception of 

the Cold War; nuclear capability and the immediate dangers of such 

weapons still define the present. After 1989 the United States remained in 

a state of perpetual nuclear readiness while engaged in worldwide conflict, despite the overarching wish for peace dividends and demobilization. Small wars and end-state operations against insurgents were not 

post-1989 challenges. In a recent study of small unit operations in SSTR 

scenarios, Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields, the authors 

make the following statement (the term “Soldier” can be supplanted by 

Airmen, Marines, or special forces working in small tactical units):
5

The country is now engaged in what has been identified as an “era of persistent 

conflict” in which the most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating 

in small units. More than for soldiers in Vietnam, Korea, and WWII, today’s soldier 

must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in 

Iraq and Afghanistan show that while the US soldier is a formidable fighter, his 

contemporary suite of equipment and support does not enjoy the same high degree 

of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms—yet it is the soldier 

who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability.8

The relative power and success of the US military allowed military 

planners the conceit of ad hoc end-state SSTR and COIN operations— 

brute force end games with little prior planning, training, or outcome/

exit management. The 33,000 American lives lost in Vietnam, and the 

perhaps more than 1,000,000 losses suffered by American adversaries 

there, did little to change this paradigm into the present century—despite 

voluminous scholarship on the lessons of the war and occasional changes 

on doctrinal emphasis on small wars. The protracted challenges of OIF 

and OEF COIN/SSTR operations forced leaders to take a fresh look at 

training, planning, and national priorities in an attempt to moderate further 

damage and stem the chaos and planning omissions that brought about 

the problems in both campaigns. Although major combat operations had 

been completed in Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001, as the forces 

transitioned to SSTR, casualty rates grew alarmingly. In Iraq, fully 97 percent of losses occurred after major combat operations.9

At the end of May 2013, American fatalities in Iraq since March 2003 

totaled 4,486, while in Afghanistan the total since October 2002 was 

2,227. The numbers diminished appreciably in both campaigns as training, planning, and strategy began to catch up with operations and security enhancements after 2007. Both operations were punctuated by a late 

surge of troop strengths followed by tactical enhancements and gradual 

withdrawal. As this paper was written, the United States expected to draw 

down forces in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. As with the end of any 

occupation, the best the United States could hope for was an enhanced 

security posture and the possibility that the nascent governments of both 

Iraq and Afghanistan would have a chance to thrive despite civil war. 

Short of a Pax Romana, there was little else to be achieved in an insurgency with such cultural differences. Also reassuring, the advent of the 

Arab Spring had thoroughly taught the United States the dangers of complete intervention in Southwest Asia. Pres. Barack Obama emphasized, 

“The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And 

we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, 

the protection of civilians in Libya. In the coming weeks, we will continue 

to help the Libyan people with humanitarian and economic assistance so 

that they can fulfill their aspirations peacefully.”10
6

While Libya presented ongoing challenges, the United States had signaled its appreciation of the limits of power and was not inclined to do 

much more than distant support and small-unit operations. Often, the 

best outcome for COIN operations was to avoid them, if strategic imperatives did not necessitate an all-in approach. The differences in application of force, planning, and training could not have been more pronounced. In Libya, the United States suffered no casualties until after 

ceasing operations. Likewise, civilian casualties were especially light in 

comparison with earlier operational analogs that had used so much airpower and standoff weaponry. The United Nations estimated that 60 

civilians were killed and another 55 wounded by the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s intervention; up to that time, civilian casualties had 

been high and rising as the Libyan dictator, Mu‘ammar Gadhafi, tried to 

intimidate his warring populace with indiscriminate shelling.11

Retooling Contingency Training

In 2003, after the termination of active combat operations in Iraq, the 

doctrinal aspects of end-state operations were still in flux and the military was badly prepared for the onslaught to come. In a contemporary 

article for Parameters, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict 

Success,” Army doctrinal expert William Flavin used the word “train” 

only once, as an informal suggestion for incorporating the civilian entities 

that should do the heavy lifting in an SSTR scenario to be a part of endstate exercises.12 A decade later, the COIN experience and lessons learned 

in Southwest Asia had transformed Flavin’s work. Rather than looking at 

SSTR as something best performed by civilian entities after relatively 

quick military disengagement, the Army had taken to heart that endstate operations were highly predictable and relied on an extensive military presence for extended periods of time. It was wistful thinking that a 

quick “exit strategy” was the prime impetus for operations in unstable 

occupations.13

It would be difficult to understate how insufficiently prepared and illequipped the US military was for protracted end-state operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2006. Much of the equipment, light brigade–

centric or otherwise, was not designed for the dictates of an insurgency, 

especially if not available in strength. Infantry and logistical vehicles were 

highly vulnerable to improvised electronic devices and ambushes. The 

USAF was better postured for COIN support, but while it had mostly 

invested in high-technology aircraft since Operation Desert Storm, it 

found that lower-tech aircraft such as the A-10 and B-52 were typically 

more relevant than the newer technology attack platforms. The stability 
7

operation—Phase IV in OIF—was never adequately planned and thus 

not implemented. USAF units assigned to Phase IV deployed elsewhere 

or stayed on in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and 

United States European Command to assist elsewhere, such as Liberia or 

the Horn of Africa. Eventually, the instability in Iraq reached crisis proportions. The lines of supply became so tenuous the USAF used heavy 

airlift to bypass the need for convoys. Convoys, when used, were so depleted of trained and equipped infantry that poorly trained Airmen and 

Soldiers were forced to take over duties in lieu of infantry in many dangerous corridors. In all, it was a recipe for trouble, and casualty figures 

bore that out.14

Searching for the root of failed policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Flavin 

acknowledged the historical precedent for unpreparedness in COIN 

operations—first with the British experience in North America in the 

late eighteenth century and later with the US military after Vietnam. In 

both cases, there were difficulties resourcing a worldwide, major–conflict–

postured enterprise at the same time as fielding a fully trained COIN/

SSTR-postured force. Flavin’s 2011 work, rather than giving scant attention to training, actually revolved around it—indeed with a full section devoted to it. It was a hard and costly slog to this recognition by the Army 

as an institution, which seems to confirm John Boyd’s pronouncement 

about doctrine becoming nearly instantaneously dangerous dogma once 

committed to paper.15

In the USAF, the heady days of air superiority and precision-guided 

munitions had led to a similar lack of preparedness with regard to SSTR 

and COIN operations by 2001. The USAF concentrated on the strategic 

and tactical superiorities it had enjoyed since the end of the Vietnam War 

and had given ground operations and security operations scant attention, 

preferring to trust in the abilities of ground and special forces units to 

secure areas around air bases and operating areas. Still, with its extensive 

airlift and logistical responsibilities, the USAF could scarcely afford to 

leave its Airman to the mercy of chaotic insurgencies. Led by Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld (20 January 2001–18 December 2006), 

the United States had chased the tantalizing prospect of reducing its footprint and engaging in conflicts with the lightest possible forces. For a 

time in Afghanistan, that approach almost seemed vindicated. However, 

COIN warfare required a degree of security and buy-in from the local 

populace that could not be optimally provided with scant resources and 

military personnel on the ground, and the “hard slog,” as Rumsfeld himself termed it, was inevitable. The secretary had advocated for a very light 

invasion force and had a tendency to push planning to meet his vision of 

military transformation. As well documented by historians, invasion
8

planning for OIF and end-state SSTR planning had been woefully inadequate and unrealistic.16 These patterns were familiar throughout the 

DOD at the time. When the production schedule for the mine-resistant 

ambush protected (MRAP) fighting vehicle would not keep up with demand, for example, Secretary Rumsfeld advocated that personnel retreat 

to armored vehicles–only operations when outside the wire. Such advice 

was dispensed in typical “snowflake” form, without a hint of changing the 

training, forces, or doctrinal dynamic of the insurgency that made it impossible for coalition forces to operate safely. Rumsfeld indicated that 

insurgents “are going to change tactics to fit the equipment.”17

Perhaps the most important requirement to improve the training, 

readiness, equipment, and planning in contemporary SSTR operations 

was the departure of Secretary Rumsfeld since his policies and preferences lay in quick victories, light forces, and speedy departures. Personalities dominate every military. An intrusive leadership style coupled 

with passionate preconceptions on the shape, size, and character of the 

military have been a dominant part of American military history. Secretary Rumsfeld was the exemplar of the intrusive manager. He was famous 

for issuing reams of snowflake positional memos and guidance on all aspects of DOD operations. Often his personality stifled dissent and confounded better judgment. He could be oddly fatalistic and obstinate. His 

famous quote from a Kuwait town hall event for the military still resonates: “As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They’re not 

the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”18 The statement 

was blunt, and it shifted the blame to the military for the ongoing insurgency dilemma for being unprepared and badly equipped for COIN operations. The statement also implied that COIN warfare was a vexing 

planning anomaly for the DOD in that land forces were insufficiently 

trained to cope with security conditions in post-invasion Iraq, although 

the what had been predicted as far back as the end of the First Gulf War.19

His personal investment in a sparse and “transformational” strategy 

made efforts to tailor SSTR difficult. The SecDef emphasized covert operations and small-unit quick actions. Whereas there was a place for this 

suite of capabilities, overreliance on unique light forces was detrimental 

to solving the problems that came with occupation—holding territory, 

projecting strength, and maintaining security. Large and positive changes 

in force composition and COIN doctrine transpired almost immediately 

from the date of Secretary Rumsfeld’s departure, but these were acutely 

necessary due to the strategic planning and operational deficits that had 

marked the turbulent era. The media was quick to correlate positive 

changes with new defense secretary Robert Gates, in 2007, and it was true 

that retired general officers had even begun to make almost unprece-
9

dented lobbying efforts/overtures for change at the top in the DOD in 

2006. However, many successful programs of later implementation preceded Secretary Rumsfeld’s departure—though it should be noted that 

the planning and strategic choices that fared badly in Iraq rested greatly 

with him.20

Even without intervention from the SecDef—far from institutionalizing 

the lessons of the past, such as the Chinese offensive of 1950–51 and the 

Bien Hoa Air Base attacks of 1968—the US military had crafted most of 

its training and readiness emphasis on getting joint forces or air expeditionary forces (AEF) to and from the battle. The expectation was that 

technological superiority and Red Flag–type training would ensure mission success. On that latter score, the USAF was wildly successful—as 

indeed the Army had been in its AirLand capabilities in the initial forceon-force engagements. Success tended to evaporate once Americans 

forces entered into extended occupations. The USAF found that its mobility 

exercises and operational readiness inspections lacked the elemental training emphasis required to help Airmen survive in nonpermissive environments outside the air base fence line. The USAF, especially the Second 

Air Force, recognized the training and doctrinal deficits for Airmen 

engaged in dangerous duties in the SSTR and support phases of COIN 

operations. Identifying the problem and confronting it realistically required years of hard-won effort, not to mention funding commitments 

and an infusion of new thinking and flexibility on the part of leadership. 

For example, in 2004 Maj Gen John F. Regni, Second Air Force commander, 

noted that

for the past five months our staff has been exploring and developing a concept to 

transform how AETC [Air Education and Training Command] provides various 

types of training to our deployed personnel. The main thrust behind this effort has 

been the need to synchronize both training content and delivery with the Air Force’s 

transformation into an expeditionary force. Key factors influencing the study have 

been theater-specific operational requirements, the growing need for on-demand 

training, shifts in deployment cycles and the need to balance training availability for 

our airmen while in deployed and reconstitution phases of the AEF cycle. Global 

training delivery is an intrinsic component for any solution to these needs. Based on 

our research the enabling technology for global delivery is now available.21

A wide set of changes took place in consonance with increasing the 

forces available for SSTR in OIF and OEF. With freedom of action that 

was no longer bound to proving the concept of light-force footprints and 

small operational unit actions and with the charter to basically fix broken 

strategy and tactics, the United States embarked on ambitious course 

corrections in 2007 and beyond leveraged on better training, planning, 

doctrine, and equipment.
10

Altering Planning and Training

The situation on the ground in OIF and OEF by early 2007 was especially bleak. As many critics had predicted in 2002, Iraq in particular had 

become a quagmire. Despite the official emphasis on transformation and 

new thinking, troops on the ground in Iraq were at least as vulnerable as 

ever to asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices (IED). 

Convoy and logistical protection had gotten so bad that the USAF had 

begun to fly supplies around Iraq to the greatest extent possible, and Airmen had taken on traditional Army roles in ground convoy protection. 

Indeed, many Airmen in what had been traditionally support skills, such 

as supply and logistics readiness, found themselves combat veterans in 

their first few months of assignment to the USAF. That practical reality 

caused the USAF to enhance its predeployment training and to develop 

ways to give its “Battlefield Airmen” survival skills in the new reality. 

AETC began to emphasize expeditionary and global learning environment (EAGLE) realistic exercises, centering initially on Lakehurst Naval 

Air Station and Fort Dix, New Jersey, early in OIF. The Second Air Force 

commander, Maj Gen William Fraser, began to formalize efforts to align 

this “EAGLE Flag” concept with operational imperatives, stating that 

“without a doubt, we agree that the Air Force transition from Cold War 

to Expeditionary Forces drives the need to transform training and education to synchronize with AEF cycles.” He added that “fundamentally, we 

also agree that an Integrated Learning Environment (ILE) combining 

timely training, education, learning management, and performance support 

are essential to the success of this effort both in garrison and deployed.”22

By mid-2004, the USAF chose to conduct additional training as Airmen prepared to depart for their AEF cycles. As the war and urgency 

necessitated changes, the expeditionary training shifted to meet the needs 

of all Airmen who had deployment taskings as the AEF cycle expanded 

and began to break and more and more Airman went on extended tours to 

the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). As the DOD ramped up 

forces to finally meet the security needs of Iraq, the USAF tailored training to provide increasingly realistic preparation for Airmen suddenly 

thrust into the fore as convoy protection troops or quasi-infantry support 

personnel outside the garrison. The initial EAGLE Flag concept was inadequate for actual combat operations. It emphasized some aspects of 

SSTR skills, such as host-nation and weapons training, but the EAGLE 

Flag concept was geared toward Airmen who would serve in operations 

centers—not convoy duty. 

The USAF recognized that predeployment training had to improve 

and provide more realistic scenarios, and until there was a centrally focused 
11

training campus, bases offered ad hoc training to their deploying Airmen 

that varied wildly in emphasis from weapons safety to field training exercises. Airmen arriving in the AOR from different bases, even within the 

same major command, had different predeployment training in “ability 

to survive and operate” skills. In early 2005, Gen Donald Cook, the AETC 

commander, sought assistance from the DOD to provide a generalized 

combat skills campus. He proposed training “our Airmen on expeditionary 

minimum-essential tasks they will need outside the fence line—be they 

negotiating contracts, driving fuel trucks, or conducting security patrols.” 

He specified that “this will be a combat-focused environment, schooling 

both officer and enlisted Airmen in ECA skills needed to survive and 

complete their missions in a hostile, fast-paced environment.23 It was not 

until 2007 that a site survey and proposed way ahead for expeditionary 

skills training was formalized. After that, expeditionary skills training 

and joint expeditionary training were fast-tracked, coinciding with the 

surge in troop levels taking place in Iraq and, later, in Afghanistan.24

Analysis of Change Impact:

Battlefield Airmen and Realistic, Timely 

Counterinsurgency Training

Across the military, 2007 proved to be a watershed year for turning the 

tide in SSTR operations. As the USAF formalized what it termed “Battlefield Airmen” skills and lessons learned, the other services also began to 

shift doctrine, training, and planning to a more realistic approach to 

COIN requirements. There was also finally support from the DOD for 

sufficient forces to secure Iraq and later Afghanistan. The IED war of attrition, which punctuated the dismal days after major combat operations 

halted in Iraq in May 2003, was indicative of having an enemy with too 

much freedom of movement and indigenous support. As the RAND 

study on how insurgencies conclude stipulates, insurgencies—when 

successful—are rarely self-supporting.25 In Iraq, IEDs and insurgent operators had significant international monetary and logistical support. 

Coalition forces were not adequately postured to ensure safety and security outside of narrowly defined zones of operations. This led to an intimidated local populace that could earn more from placing IEDs or conducting kidnappings than from trying to operate a business that could be 

characterized as “collaborating” with Western occupiers. The surge of 

troops allowed operational breathing space to pacify and secure broader 

swaths of Iraq while reassuring the local populace that there would be 
12

safety in tending to business as usual rather than abetting guerrilla 

operations.26

There was a doctrinal shift away from some of Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld’s precepts—in particular, the utter reliance on lightly 

equipped special operations units. In Afghanistan in 2002, almost the 

entire occupation was under control of special forces or retailored airborne and ranger units leading small joint task forces. Their primary mission was to root out arms caches and former al-Qaeda terror cells, and 

they were ill-equipped for long-term peacekeeping duty and SSTR operations. They were air mobile and designed for lightning-quick operations 

and not long-haul garrison work. Not surprisingly, Afghanistan remained 

a troubled area of resurgent chaos throughout the decade as the United 

States pulled capability out of that country to support operations in Iraq. 

Poorly provisioned for long-haul SSTR, the veterans of the conflicts developed the expertise and skills that no predecessor American military 

units had ever dreamt of—hard-won lessons during an entire decade that 

transformed doctrine, tactics, and equipment. By the time of the Iraq 

surge, the synergy of this training, experience, and new equipment had a 

telling impact.27

Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

In particular, the MRAP personnel carrier vehicles; new intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tactics and platforms—especially 

better fusion between intelligence collection and action on the battlefield; 

and the novel use of in-theater airlift made a huge contribution to ongoing operations. The MRAP was emblematic of a rapid procurement 

program hatched through hard lessons learned and doctrinal shifts. The 

program itself, adapted while still in development as tactics and weaponry 

in Iraq changed with the addition of more armor, greater engine performance, and enhanced suspension and as the insurgents began fielding 

higher-power penetrating devices. Most of the MRAP vehicles’ developmental testing took place at the Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland under 

the command of Col John Rooney, US Army. Rooney had extensive 

experience in the improvisational bolt-on, up-armor packages for vehicles 

in Iraq in 2005 and was a combat veteran who had learned difficult lessons especially useful in the rapid development and fielding of the MRAP 

program. The program included concurrent test development and training, including the rapid initiation of maintenance and operations training at “MRAP University” at Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas. 

While there were many variants and subvariants of the MRAP, the concept itself was unified around a common standard for personnel protec-
13

tion, and it was successfully fielded in less than two years. The V-shaped 

basic hull, optimized for blast protection, originated from COIN operations during Rhodesia’s civil war in the 1970s. From a nascent concept in 

2004, the first-production MRAP “Cougars” were ready for DOD orders 

by January 2007. A year later, 1,000 had been delivered.28

By 2009 MRAP vehicles began to sport Common Remotely Operated 

Weapon Stations (CROWS), further reducing personnel vulnerability; 

gunners now could fire their weapons from within the vehicle using cameras 

and other systems to direct fire. By the time of their closure in fiscal year 

2013, MRAP production lines had manufactured more than 12,000 units. 

Initial estimates were that adoption of the rapidly developed MRAP program would reduce casualties in IED attacks by about 80 percent, and 

subsequent operations bore that out (fig. 1). MRAP vehicles were not 

invulnerable to rollover or outright destruction, but their presence on the 

battlefield complicated insurgent actions and required greater precision 

for lethality on the part of the enemy. Again, MRAP development and 

implementation were part of a pragmatic strategy to counteract the 

asymmetric advantage of attacking convoy and logistical traffic, and the 

program’s massive introduction was an important technological milestone and achievement in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom to moderate an insurgent advantage.29

Figure 1. Personal testament to improved personnel protection. A member of 

the special forces wrote a note on the door of an MRAP that reads, “This truck 

saved my life as well as 5 others on 02 Apr 08 at 2300 in Basrah, IZ [International Zone].” (Photo courtesy of US Army, “MRAPs on the Move,” Army 

Times, 13 June 2008, http://wwwarmy.mil/article/9979/mraps-on-the-move/.)
14

M1A1/2 Upgrade/Tank Urban Survivability Kit 

One of the more surprising aspects of the war in Iraq was the vulnerability of main battle tanks to insurgent forces using penetrating-type 

IEDs. In Operation Desert Storm, the M1A1 Abrams tank in particular 

had developed a reputation as nigh invulnerable to small weapons. In the 

intervening years, insurgents and peer enemies had developed countermeasures, including the use of shaped thermal and shaped penetrating 

devices and large-caliber artillery rounds as remotely triggered antiarmor devices. The typical array of reactive armor, designed for armor 

piercing standoff weapons, proved insufficient for crew safety. The DOD 

contracted the M1A1/2’s manufacturer, General Dynamics Land Systems, 

to develop countermeasures to the new reality. Again, 2006–2007 would 

prove to be a critical year for the heaviest weaponry as well. Eventually 

the DOD procured 505 Tank Urban Survivability Kits (TUSK) for the 

main battle tanks used by Army and Marine operators in urban settings. 

The TUSKs included add-on reactive armor tiles that looked oddly 

curved, like slate roofing tiles; an armored shield for gun loaders; 

enhanced communication equipment for better mobile contact with 

troops outside the sealed vehicles, with what was called the tank-infantry 

phone; a thermal weapon sight; and a new thermal driver’s rearview camera. 

TUSK entered service on M1A1/M1A2 tanks in late 2007 and was deployed to Iraq as soon as it became available. In consonance with the 

MRAP, the TUSK M1A1/2s and the surge in troops again staunched a 

glaring vulnerability for COIN warfare.30

Doctrinal and Field Manual Emphasis Shifts

Along with enhanced joint training and technological innovation, the 

Army revised its field manuals (FM) for stability operations, coalition 

training, and COIN and incorporated these shifts into its leadership development courses. Many of the precepts of Gen David Petraeus’s earlier 

work on insurgent operations were formalized by the end of 2006 and 

implemented along with surge operations in 2007 and beyond.31 There 

was not universal praise for the surge and Petraeus’s strategy. Dr. Edward 

Luttwack made a very public attack against such a strategy in his article 

“Dead End: Counterinsurgency Operations as Military Malpractice.”32

Luttwack’s point of view was that of the majority opinion in early 2007 as 

war fatigue and frustration permeated American society. Some experts 

counseled patience and recommended waiting for the truly structural 

changes that would spring from the official version of the Army’s FM 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency.

33 Leading COIN expert Col David Kilcullen argued 

that Dr. Luttwack possessed an incomplete idea of what contemporary 
15

operations entailed and indeed presented a very narrow and harsh view 

of the populations in Southwest Asia. Luttwack had inflammatorily 

stated, “Better government . . . is certainly wanted in France, Norway, and 

the United States but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many 

people prefer indigenous and religious oppression.”34 Kilcullen’s own 

experience had been different. He described a population that was yearning for stability and security—far afield from a Western, almost jingoistic 

view of Islam. In one of his meetings with a tribal chieftain on the PakistanAfghanistan border, Kilcullen recounted the leader telling him, “you 

want to bring us ‘democracy’ at the national level, but we already have 

democracy within the khel. What we want from the government is security, 

honor, justice, and prosperity. If anyone offers us those things, we will 

fight for him to the death. If democracy only brings elections, what use is 

it?”35 To Afghan tribes, security was something that was eagerly greeted 

but parochially instituted. The larger whole was a collection of such 

tribes, each with unique requirements and challenges.

Planning and Organizational Enhancements

In 2004, in the midst of the mayhem into which the Iraqi insurgency 

had devolved, the DOD urged Congress to fund a “Manhattan Project–

like” effort to help defeat the IEDs proliferating throughout the AOR—

especially in Iraq. By 2008 the emergent Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) had spent approximately $14 billion 

studying the problem and implementing new operational concepts to 

defeat/counter IEDs. The organization was chartered to conduct strategic 

planning, rapidly acquire counter-IED technology, fuse operations and 

intelligence data for rapid strikes against IEDs (and insurgent groups 

who placed them), and, finally, adequately train and provide trainers to 

operational personnel combatting the IED menace.36

The JIEDDO was taken to task by the Government Accountability Office for not providing ready metrics or having definable goals through 

which to justify its large budget and personnel. Over time, the JIEDDO 

became another part of an enhanced planning and operational cycle with 

regard to the SSTR operations in OIF and OEF. Since insurgents used 

IEDs as an army would use artillery and these weapons caused more than 

70 percent of coalition casualties by 2007, it was important that military 

leaders confront the hard reality presented by that weapon and create an 

entity that emphasized its ultimate defeat. Secondly, having a JIEDDOtype organization allowed the services to concentrate on core missions 

and survival training, while allowing a dedicated cadre to parse out solutions to the IED challenge. Training and planning paid dividends in that 
16

experience and allowed the military experts to understand trends in IED 

attacks. After all, the IEDs did not plant themselves but were instead part 

of an elaborate subculture within the end state—almost more accurately, 

a weapon of economics as much as asymmetrical warfare. As Capt Stephen 

Capeheart, US Army, an intelligence officer who worked in Baghdad, 

explained to journalist Greg Grant,

When [insurgents are] low on money, they start kidnapping . . . They ask for ransoms 

typically in the $15,000 to $20,000 range for an average Iraqi citizen, more for the 

wealthy and foreigners. Money in hand, it takes the bombers about a week to buy 

explosives and assemble bombs in factories hidden in rural areas. Once built, the 

bombs are moved to safe houses inside Baghdad, then quickly used before they can 

be discovered. While bomb-makers assemble the devices, reconnaissance cells chart 

the behavior of American patrols, looking for the best place to attack to cause maximum 

casualties. Ten days of heavy roadside bomb attacks begin, then the insurgents run 

out of money and the cycle starts anew.37

In Afghanistan, the overarching funding source for the insurgency 

was the opium crop. Again, as with surges in kidnapping, inflow of money 

after the opium harvest was a leading indicator of insurgent movement. 

What to do about that “cash crop” vexes leadership to the present moment. 

Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan had tremendously rugged and remote terrain, 

making some of the lessons learned in Iraq irrelevant for the insurgents 

in OEF. No matter what, technology would have to play a larger role in 

Afghanistan. Stemming the tide of opium money had proved nearly impossible. Destroying the opium crops had deprived the world of additional drugs but bred new insurgents, while local Afghanis withstood 

economic deprivation and insurgent intimidation. Trying to relieve the 

pressure by paying farmers for the production of less profitable crops had 

increased pressure from the Taliban. Short of economic solutions to pacify 

the countryside, the United States was forced to rely more upon technology 

and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). Over the course of the organization’s brief existence, the planning, training, and continuous lessons 

learned—conducted under the auspices of the JIEDDO—brought about 

numerous innovations that helped stem the tide of IED lethality in Iraq. 

While the random nature of violence in insurgencies made absolute 

safety impossible to ensure, the JIEDDO did implement several novel 

technological innovations. These included the self-protective adaptive 

roller kit; IED/weapons vest recognition devices at the entry control 

point; Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Afghanistan Support Plan 

(WASP); and trained, expert search and destroy counter-IED teams. 

Additionally, at 55 DOD locations, vehicle optics sensor systems were fielded; 

a route clearance optics system was developed; and station training in 

counter-IED warfare was provided. From almost no capability in 2001, train-
17

ing and planning had allowed amplified counter-IED theory and practice 

into a practical discipline within the DOD by 2012. Various biometric data 

had also been accumulated on members of the Afghan National Security 

Forces, making entry by insurgent fighters much harder in secured areas.38

Leveraging RPVs and ISR. Aviation technology also leapt ahead for 

COIN warfare. Though drones and ISR had been integral for operational 

success from the start of OEF, by 2007 ISR platforms began to do analytical 

“before and after” high-speed comparisons of highly trafficked areas vulnerable to IEDs and ambush. More robust Predator drones roamed the 

battlefield awaiting quick-turn instructions to intervene, even as insurgents were burying or otherwise hiding explosive devices. While ISR and 

RPV platforms could not be everywhere, the continuous sorties by ISR 

platforms offered commanders a much better battle picture by 2007 and 

beyond and allowed the combined force air component commander 

(CFACC) in the combined air operations center a means to engage in 

COIN like never before. From the early days of OEF and Operation Anaconda, where A-10 Warthogs hastily entered the battlespace with little or 

no prior planning (the USAF had been omitted from much of the planning and operational dynamics of that key early battle), the CFACC now 

was positioned to intervene positively and on demand throughout most 

of the theater of battle.39

Joint Expeditionary Training Implemented. While they had taken a 

circuitous route to the desired end, the armed forces began to implement 

a realistic predeployment training requirement and syllabus for all of 

their “battlefield” personnel by 2008. The USAF activated the 602nd 

Training Group (provisional) on 3 May 2007 to formalize USAF instruction and present a cohesive chain of command for the “in lieu of ” taskings.40 Detachments for the 602nd included Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Polk, 

Louisiana; and—the stalwart since 2004—Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

New Jersey. The training piece with regard to countering the innate 

insurgent advantage cannot be overstressed. In consonance with the 

602nd Training Group, Air Force Central Command activated air expeditionary groups and air expeditionary squadrons within the AOR to 

provide command and control for battlefield Airmen. By 2008 expeditionary training and command and control had finally been formalized 

within the Air Force—in some respects catching up with the other services 

that, with doctrinal changes and realistic training syllabi (such as vehicle 

rollover training) began to earnestly reflect an emphasis on expeditionary 

and COIN skills for its personnel moving into dangerous areas. Training 

had suffered from an emphasis on large group actions and the possible introduction of weapons of mass destruction. Planners used doomsday training 

scenarios to limit expenditures on generalized COIN/SSTR training for the 
18

bulk of military and DOD personnel. The end result was that many military and some select contract and civilian personnel had insufficient survival training and personnel protection equipment (PPE) to be loosed into 

the midst of a guerrilla war such as OEF and OIF. As those wars widened 

beyond the capacity for special forces, it was essential that some remedial 

forms of COIN and SSTR training be implemented as soon as was practicable. But again, the wish for a smaller force, quick extraction from the 

AOR, and a reliance on remote airpower stifled introduction of comprehensive COIN training for a vulnerable population. It supported the more 

comprehensively trained maneuver units and manned essential SSTR outpost and reconstruction teams or had work “outside the wire.”41

Bridging that training gap, for example getting personnel adequately 

armed and equipped with appropriate PPE and leveraging combat experience and survival techniques, took time—too much time, frankly. 

However, it did have an impact on the battlefield at roughly the same 

time the surge and doctrinal and technological changes began to flow 

freely into the AOR. Personnel returned to their units and the training 

and doctrinal branches of their respective services as combat veterans—

sometimes with less than a year of actual service. Tapping that expertise 

and hard-won experience was truly a point of emphasis within the American military and over time had the cumulative effect of better preparing 

the force for an AOR in insurgency. By 2011 the Air Force had adopted a 

policy that would “synchronize, standardize and integrate” all joint expeditionary training (JET) training roughly 10 years after the 9/11 attacks. 

The new Air Force JET continuum would be four-tiered (fig. 2).42

AETC as L-MAJCOM WILL

SYNCRONIZE-STANDARDIZE-INTEGRATE

HAF

Policy

&

Guidance

Expeditionary Training Continuum

Deployment-Ready

Expeditionary Skills Training

USAF EC Assigned

Expeditionary Skills Training

Foundational

Expeditionary Skills Training

Mission-Specic

Expeditionary Skills Training

RTCs RTCs

Tier 1 Tier 2

Tier 3 Tier 4

Figure 2. Continuum of USAF JET as developed in 2011. (Reproduced from Brig 

Gen Richard Devereaux, briefing, to Gen Stephen Lorenz, AETC commander, 

subject: Expeditionary Skills Training, 4 May 2011, AETC Historical Archives, 

AETC/A2/3/10, Randolph AFB, TX.)

By 2005 the Army, with arguably the greatest need to develop better 

expeditionary skills and SSTR training, had developed a novel approach 
19

to the process. The Army had been wed to the concept of “whole-unit” 

readiness training at its battlefield training ranges, but that type of training was better suited for large-force maneuver training than for individuals 

operating in an insurgent environment. The Army and USAF attempted 

to find alternatives to extended field training and together experimented 

with a novel technological approach in partnership with the University of 

Texas and Texas A&M University on a computer-based simulation that 

could be used for training anywhere in the world at any time: the Joint 

Expeditionary Force Learning Environment–Virtual (JEFLE-V). The 

services hoped that JEFLE-V would “address a Joint Service issue related 

to lack of expeditionary skill sets and joint interoperability opportunities 

that are not trained in formal training or education programs among the 

services. These skill sets are typically trained either locally or on the job 

and mainly learned from real-time experiences, which may include failures 

as well as successes. This knowledge currently depends on real-world experiences or exercises.”43

The Army and Marine Corps invested heavily in intense irregular warfare (IW) training under the auspices of General Petraeus as commander of 

the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and 

opened the Counterinsurgency Training and Doctrinal Center in 2006. 

The JEFLE-V concept proved to be nothing more than a proof of concept, 

and, in the end, the services moved toward comprehensive field training 

as a better means of preparing personnel. Doctrinal changes to develop 

better and more realistic IW and COIN training environments meant 

that half measures such as JEFLE-V were out of the question by 2008. In 

fact, the DOD issued Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, in December 

2008, stipulating that the services must “improve proficiency for IW and 

to maintain capabilities and capacity” and directing each service to assign a lead agency for IW. Furthermore, the directive required services to 

develop “collaborative policies, plans, and procedures, including collaborative training and exercises that promote interoperability, for steady-state 

and surge activities.”44 The Army created the Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell 

at the CAC, and other agencies followed suit: the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations/Light Intensity Conflict, the Joint Staff 

J7 IW Office, United States Special Operations Command J7/9 (IW), the 

Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare Integration, the Navy Irregular 

Warfare Office, and the Air Force Irregular Warfare Integration Office.45

The move to make IW and COIN training and planning an integral 

part of the DOD’s approach to combat readiness had been gradual until 

the issuance of FM 3-24 in December 2006. After that date, the services 

regularly released doctrinal updates on COIN and IW operations and 

formalized training, preparation processes, and planning. Thus, the period 
20

after that date was a watershed as the study and preparation for COIN 

expanded and formalized like no other time in recent history. As articulated in FM 3-24,

They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either 

a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected 

to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish 

institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic 

services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of 

law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination 

and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international 

agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign 

are daunting; however, the discussions in this manual alert leaders to the challenges 

of such campaigns and suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges.46

Examining the Data

The enhanced training and planning under way by 2007 had yielded 

numerous structural and technological changes as SSTR operations began their culmination phase in Iraq. The United States entered both OEF 

and OIF with insufficient planning and COIN resources save for special 

forces. It took almost five years and several important leadership changes 

to confront the actual challenges of the battlefield, to begin yielding results positive enough for extrication of most personnel from Iraq, and to 

develop plans for similar disengagement in Afghanistan by 2014. Critics 

assailed the efficacy of the surge in both OIF and OEF and often failed to 

appreciate the doctrinal, training, and technological pieces that accompanied the fielded forces after 2007. Safer ground personnel theoretically 

enhanced the value and utility of remotely piloted vehicles and groundsupport sorties by military aviation of all types. Better targeting from less 

vulnerable aerial assets would be expected to have resulted from such 

battlefield enhancements, and the data support that conclusion.47

For IEDs and related insurgent-caused deaths, the results had been 

getting steadily better over the past several years. By March 2013, the data 

showed great improvement in many areas:

The Pentagon has filled the skies over Afghanistan with high-tech sensors, and the 

effect has been measurable. From March through May, troops in vehicles found 64 

percent of improvised explosive devices before they blew up, an 11 percentage-point 

increase over the previous quarter. Troops on foot patrol discovered 81 percent, a 4 

percentage-point increase, according to the Pentagon’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). 

 The rate of discovery before bombs exploded hovered around 50 percent for 

years. The most important measure of progress: IEDs caused less than half of troop 

deaths for the first time in five years.
21

 “We are, in terms of detection of all types of IEDs, vastly better than we were a 

year ago,” Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told USA TODAY in an interview. He credited airborne surveillance with driving progress against IEDs.48

The data looked positive but must be understood as a fusion between technology, training, and experience. Personnel had to be competent at finding 

and dealing with insurgent attacks no matter how excellent the technology, 

and such competence was manifested through an experienced training cadre 

and veteran force that offered competent instruction and mentorship.49

The war logs of OIF from 2007 to 2011 have been extensively studied 

to examine the efficacy of American COIN/SSTR strategies—especially 

those of the surge and related buildups. By 2009 US and coalition forces 

were winning most encounters with insurgents, fatalities were down 

across the board, and many measures of host-nation security had improved substantially. Kidnapping rates and civilian-on-civilian violence 

diminished markedly. Some counterindicators showed unusual spikes, 

such as “first-to-fire” and “escalation-to-firefight” gross numbers, but in 

Iraq, the trends were positive—especially diminishing support for insurgents. The positive gains in stability and security set the stage for a generalized withdrawal. Thus, it can be argued that the COIN strategy in Iraq 

allowed the Iraqis space for self-determination. Old issues such as 

whether Winston Churchill should have drawn three nations rather than 

one remained but were beyond the capacity of a nation intent on withdrawing and not dominating the long-term future of Iraq.50

The election of Pres. Barack Obama effected a change in emphasis 

from OIF to OEF as the new president was anxious to implement some of 

the successful Iraq strategies in Afghanistan—with the hope to withdraw 

from active conflict in the latter within a few years. Thus, while a troop 

surge occurred in Afghanistan in 2009–2010, US military leaders in OEF 

also took full advantage of experiential improvements as well as training, 

planning, and technology—as had their peers in Iraq. While conditions 

were different, the United States appeared to be on track for withdrawal 

of most forces by 2014.51 As strategist David Kilkullen put it, 

We need to do four things—what we might call “essential strategic tasks”—to succeed 

in Afghanistan. We need to prevent the re-emergence of an Al Qaeda sanctuary that 

could lead to another 9/11. We need to protect Afghanistan from a range of security 

threats including the Taliban insurgency, terrorism, narcotics, misrule and corruption. We need to build sustainable and accountable state institutions (at the central, 

provincial and local level) and a resilient civil society. Then we can begin a phased 

hand-off to Afghan institutions that can survive without permanent international assistance. We might summarize this approach as “Prevent, Protect, Build, 

Hand-Off ” (emphasis in original).52
22

Kilcullen thought that truly working this option would require at least 

10 years and perhaps a commitment in excess of two billion dollars a 

month to stabilize Afghanistan in the best case. The money and political 

will was not conducive to such a long-term commitment, but again, some 

of the leading indicators for success of operations in Afghanistan had 

improved. Moreover, if the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces leave Afghanistan, it will be on their own 

terms and for reasons of economic interests. Combat fatalities spiked initially after the Afghan surge but diminished sharply to just more than 30 

for the first half of 2013. By most important measures, SSTR operations 

in Afghanistan have been enhanced by training, planning, and equipment upgrades—again years late, but measurably better than they were. 

The late start to better training, planning, and equipping for Afghanistan 

was exacerbated by the emphasis on Iraq. The start was deferred so long 

that political will to stay the course in Afghanistan—now 11 years into 

SSTR—was virtually nonexistent.53

The ostensible reasons for conducting OEF—the destruction of al-Qaeda 

safe havens and capacities as well as leadership targets including Osama 

bin Laden—have been accomplished. Nation-building goals in Afghanistan were never very realistic given the long history of tribal and religious 

strife there, but neither could such goals be artfully “hoped” out of existence. While not completely ignored in military doctrinal centers, the 

“dangers of nation building” seemed nonetheless to confound a whole 

generation of American military scholars.54 The losses in Afghanistan, 

such as they were in 2013, remained less than those citizens lost on 11 

September 2001 in the United States. The goals and forces in Afghanistan 

shifted like sands on a windy and decaying beach, but the essential truth 

was that OEF was a punitive endeavor that had exacted much in the way 

of retribution on America’s erstwhile enemies in al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For all of the unrealistic optimism that followed the toppling of the 

Taliban in 2001, by 2009 there had developed an equally unrealistic negativity and fatalism about COIN and SSTR in OEF. While 2009 brought 

unprecedented levels of violence and instability to the region, such developments did not mean all was lost either. The book Descent into Chaos: 

The U.S. Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia was particularly evocative of that side of the information war. Its author, Ahmed 

Rashid, recounted terrible event after terrible event and did not see the 

coming changes to COIN; he was pessimistic about almost every future 

prospect in Afghanistan. Despite the tone, after 400 pages of dire recollections and predictions, he recommended that the United States embark 

on aggressive nation building and “develop a long-lasting peace and stabilization program in the area.”55 As hard as it was to stabilize nations 
23

amid a generalized insurgency, it was harder to satisfy the political imperatives of the domestic media audience intent on having it both ways—

withdrawal and SSTR. There was only so much the United States could 

achieve in a region driven by centuries of war and tribal power struggles.

By 2010 COIN goals were codified and some new doctrinal values 

were institutionally imposed—especially the escalation of force. The 

United States and NATO had moved significantly toward better planning, training, and doctrine. Events, while still dire in the sense that any 

war is dire, began to progress toward a more stable and permissive end 

state in Afghanistan. NATO personnel had strict guidance on permissible 

actions with the intentions of limiting the cultivation of new insurgents 

and building true relationships and bridges to the civil population.56 After 

a period of apprenticeship in SSTR, Afghanistan too had yielded some 

great successes, including the eradication of bin Laden.57

Gen Stanley McChrystal set about to construct a continuous COIN 

learning campaign in Afghanistan, which was given to International 

Security Assistance Force members as they came into the country:

We must think of offensive operations not simply as those that target militants, but 

ones that earn the trust and support of the people while denying influence and access 

to the insurgent. Holding routine jirgas with community leaders that build trust and 

solve problems is an offensive operation. So is using projects and work programs to 

bring communities together and meet their needs. Missions designed primarily to 

“disrupt” militants are not.58

As OEF began to wind down, personnel had an impressive training, doctrinal, and planning wellspring from which to draw.

Conclusion

But [Gen George C.] Marshall’s outward calm and his kind 

words to his chief subordinate veiled the blood-draining certainty that American boys, farm boys from Iowa and Wisconsin 

and Illinois, had died in North Africa in great numbers when a 

little more preparation and better leadership might have saved 

their lives.

—Mark Perry

Partners in Command: George Marshall and

Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace

British prime minister Winston Churchill created a perpetually tenuous 

security condition when he arbitrarily forced three disparate religious 

sectors/sects together into modern Iraq in mapping that country’s post–

World War I borders. Afghanistan, another legacy of the British Empire, 
24

had endured centuries of imperial violence dating back to before the days 

of Alexander the Great, making the long-term political stability for that 

nation dubious at best—no matter how long the United States or NATO 

stayed there. In both cases, the best strategy for COIN was to stabilize, 

secure, and withdraw at such a time as the nascent political entities of 

those nations had a fighting chance of self-rule. Both were mired in civil 

war among competing versions of Islam as well as with secular/nonsecular 

and modern/conservative factions. Rebuilding was part of a noble strategy, 

but insurgents tend to target progress in any form. Such an intense insurgency made it unrealistic to think of a harmonious postwar phase in 

either country. Imposing Western democracy was never a viable option 

for the foreseeable future. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States 

ousted the sponsors of al-Qaeda; hunted down the leaders of that terrorist 

group, including Osama bin Laden; and ultimately stabilized the country 

significantly enough to give it at least a chance for survival. That was as 

far as any surge or COIN warfare could take NATO and the United States, 

but again, much had been learned and implemented since 2001, giving 

some reason for optimism.59

In Iraq, even after 20 years of peacekeeping and no-fly zones, the postinvasion stabilization and reconstruction was badly conceived and executed and was only salvaged years later by the gradual changes in training, 

tactics, and troop levels that leadership allowed. Iraq was a costly endeavor, 

but by 2007 and beyond, the innate insurgent advantage had been largely 

bridged by the United States. The US military finally yielded to pragmatism, 

changing its doctrine, training, and technology to match the real 

enemy—not the ghosts of a former superpower but the actual insurgency 

operations under way. Once this realism in planning and training was 

carried out, concomitant doctrinal changes, new leadership, enhanced 

force levels, and better equipment allowed the United States to set favorable conditions for withdrawal. The data reveals a steady improvement in 

security, casualties, and effectiveness of SSTR/COIN activities.60

Recommendations

For military scholars, the key lessons of the past several years should 

inform ongoing doctrine and are to be recommended. First, insurgencies 

and asymmetrical terror attacks were neither aberrations nor possessed 

of unbeatable attributes. The insurgencies retained weaknesses, and most 

had outside supporters and money that allowed them to operate. Kilcullen 

observes that “far from being a one-off challenge, we may look back on Al 

Qaeda as the harbinger of a new era of conflict.”61
25

Second, COIN was not a rare phenomenon in the US military tradition; rather, large wars were the anomalies. Further, nothing a military 

does to prepare for COIN/SSTR engagements hurts preparedness at 

other levels. Indeed, training all personnel to survive asymmetrical wars 

helps them in all contingencies—which often break down into small unit 

actions—and should be the norm that pays dividends forever.

Third, technology must be leveraged at all times to consider asymmetrical weaknesses an insurgent or terrorist group could exploit, not 

merely while engaged in such a conflict. It remained important to keep 

the work of the last decade moving forward to meet the next insurgency 

or wave of attacks.

Fourth, planning for SSTR requires awareness that all successful international military interventions lead to some form of occupation—

permissive or otherwise. The default position should have been that 

SSTR planning included adequate training for insurgent possibilities, 

energized technological enhancements, protection of extended lines of 

communications, and provision of realistic options for commanders to 

save lives and resources.

Fifth, planning can never conveniently omit COIN and SSTR in endstate operations. Nor can such planning delegate major or all responsibility 

to nongovernmental organizations or diplomatic entities. Security was 

required for success, and that meant that military involvement had to be 

readily on hand. Recent contingencies were planned like a Shakespearean 

fight scene in which actors fight unscripted random actions with suggested 

outcomes, resulting in only the dimmest allusions to actual choreography.

On the one hand, insurgents have many advantages, including their 

ability to do great harm by striking at random intervals and in small 

numbers. They can easily manipulate the information war with outsized 

coverage and hand-wringing, even in a failed campaign such as the Tet 

offensive. Insurgents can blend in with their environment and often inflame local passions against invaders or nonadherents to conservative 

religious precepts. Finally, they require only stoic patience and a modicum 

of support to outlast great nations’ wills or electoral processes. On the 

other hand, they have vulnerabilities. They can be watched and eradicated from great distances. A prepared and trained force can recognize 

dangers and attacks and avoid or overwhelm such obstacles. Finally, 

planning and innovative technology can leapfrog the tactics and strategies 

of insurgents at various levels.62

The joint force had begun to really institutionalize some of these tenets 

of modern SSTR operations by 2009. As Col John M. Spiszer, US Army, 

notes, “Counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan are different from 

those in Iraq. In fact, they are even different from one Afghan province to 
26

another.” “Nevertheless,” he adds, “Army doctrine provides an excellent 

baseline for operations. Task Force Duke used doctrine, the lessons of 

prior units, guidance from Regional Command-East and ISAF, and a 

dose of common sense to get its ten yards in N2KL [Nangarhar, Nuristan, 

Konar, and Laghman provinces] by the summer of 2009.63 At the tactical 

level, a tremendous summation of recommendations and lessons learned 

accompanied Spiszer’s study:

• a focus on the populace in the context of hope and faith instead of 

hearts and minds;

• ANSF [Afghan National Security Force] development;

• Soldier restraint;

• leader focus on unity of effort;

• continuity with previous good units; and

• continuous, planned battlefield circulation.64

According to Spiszer, “Task Force Duke had 39 of its personnel pay the 

ultimate sacrifice during our operations there. Over 280 received the 

Purple Heart, and over 300 received medals for valor. We owe it to them 

to get it right.”6 

Summation

The data from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 

Freedom confirm that adequate training and planning can bridge the innate insurgent advantage to buy the time needed for peacekeeping and 

SSTR. Planning and training in this context mean adequate preparation. 

Bridging insurgent advantages as an occupation force requires taking 

COIN seriously enough among the hierarchy of military preparations to 

adequately confront challenges by making realistic planning and training 

a high priority. In the past, COIN was studied but never as part of a comprehensive revisitation of training, planning, and doctrinal transformation. In the present conflict, a paradigm shift took place from late 2006 to 

the present, and that had a telling, if belated, impact in that the United 

States was able to extract the bulk of its forces from Iraq while that nation’s 

new government functioned. In Afghanistan the situation had certainly 

moved toward greater security and fewer casualties as the United States 

prepared to withdraw in 2014—this after finally bringing significant portions of al-Qaeda, including its leader, to justice. While nothing can force 

a nation to adopt positive governance, a prepared, sufficiently manned 

and equipped COIN force can buy the space needed for next-iteration 
27

governments to succeed or fail of their own accord. The great insurgencies 

of the past have sometimes yielded powerful and humane nations but 

often result in despotic dictatorships in another guise, depending largely 

on outside support. The arc of history may indeed bend toward justice, 

but only if populations are given breathing space from cruel violence and 

genocide. Therefore, commitments to SSTR and COIN warfare should 

not be taken lightly in the future. British general Rupert Smith likened 

the small conflicts proliferating throughout the world today as vanguards 

of a generational shift in warfare; “war amongst the peoples” had supplanted state-on-state violence in the main.66

COIN warfare was not merely a laboratory to test the efficacy of some 

new technology or implement some shifting tertiary military doctrine to 

be borrowed for larger conflict. Rather, small wars were now ubiquitous 

enterprises of no small danger—with complexities and corresponding 

challenges that were uniquely their own. Yet they stood as vulnerable to 

scholarship and preparation as any other campaign or enemy. Planning, 

training, and innovation were the essential means to a reasonable end for 

SSTR. There were no shortcuts or sleight-of-hand doctrines that trumped 

those factors. It took US forces and leadership several years to set in motion 

procedures and training that might have saved countless lives if implemented prior to 2001. The data pointed to the need for adequate preparation for a type of war seen frequently within US history. COIN and SSTR 

training and planning should not require the emergency incipient within 

fast-moving operations to receive adequate support and funding. Perhaps the largest lesson of the contemporary conflicts was to not abandon 

the new emphasis on SSTR training, doctrine, procedures, and equipment after the end of US and NATO involvement in Southwest Asia. The 

need to prepare for irregular warfare will not dissipate for the foreseeable 

future, and the US military must remain prepared to execute it.67

While insurgents had many advantages, they also had exploitable 

weaknesses. They were often aided from the outside and frequently technologically challenged, especially at night. They embodied the face of repression and terror and depended utterly on a nation such as the United 

States to not take them seriously with dedicated planning, training, and 

technological deficits. Insurgents depended on shiftless apathy and the 

dictates of larger missions to allow them freedom to conduct depredations in extended wars of attrition. They also counted on the information 

war and media to instill a sense of hopelessness on their larger enemy. 

Throughout history, insurgents were often their own worst enemy if allowed to percolate. Vietnam lost a million citizens and ruined its economy, 

but its leaders declared their generational warfare successful—even when 
28

a strategy of engagement with the United States would likely have yielded 

the same results with a fraction of the suffering and at a much quicker pace. 

A central lesson to be learned in the contemporary way of war remained relevant: to not embolden insurgencies through incompetence 

and lethargy. Since the days of Pyrrhus, military engagement should be 

measured against its true costs and fractionalized further still with a 

cold-eyed estimation of its likely human toll—no matter how seemingly 

worthwhile the goal. History compels us to take COIN/SSTR deadly 

seriously—train for it, plan for it, and secure the battlefield. Most insurgencies draw from outside sources not invested in reasonable and painless solutions but rather focused on national interests dictating that their 

likely major adversary be bled dry over a long period of time—as long as 

possible. Even “small wars” were a manyfold tragedy for all concerned 

when a powerful nation goes unprepared into COIN scenarios. Knowing 

this, the United States must embrace the lessons learned after 2007 in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to prepare and equip for extended 

fighting in nonpermissive urban and regional settings against ensconced 

ideological and foreign-supported fighters. Insurgencies define the worst 

traits resident within warfare and mankind, from atrocity to terrorism, 

and a military member must be trained and prepared to handle their bitter 

and personal horrors.

Notes

1. Hannah Fischer, American War and Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 13 July 2005).

2. Ibid.; and Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2010).

3. Fischer, American War and Operations Casualties.

4. Sandra Erwin, “Study: US Soldiers Not Adequately Equipped for War,” National Defense Magazine, 13 May 2013, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/

post.aspx.

5. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stabilization, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 November 2005, http://fas.org/irp/

doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf.

6. Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End. 

7. Ibid.; Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2013); and Welsh, Vision for the United States Air Force.

8. National Research Council, Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, May 2013), vi.

9. Agence France-Presse, “97 Percent of US Death Toll Came after ‘Mission Accomplished,’” InfoWars.com, 24 March 2008, http://www.infowars.com/97-percent-of-us-deathtoll-came-after-mission-accomplished/; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End; and 

Fischer, American War and Operations.
29

10. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya” (press release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 18 March 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya.

11. United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (New York: 

Human Rights Council, 8 March 2012), 16, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/

HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.19.68.pdf.

12. William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” 

Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 95–112.

13. Ibid.

14. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Random House, 2006), 3–55; and Thomas Ricks, 

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

15. Flavin, Finding the Balance: US Military and Future Operations (Carlisle, PA: 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College, March 2011), 1–4.

16. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story, 3–55.

17. Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, to Donald Di Rita, undersecretary of defense, memorandum, subject: Armored Vehicle Issue, 20 December 2004, Rumsfeld Paper 

Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; and Spencer Ackerman, “Civilians Missing from Action,” Washington Independent, 13 May 2008, https://web.

archive.org/web/20140421142621/http://washingtonindependent.com/1371/civilians-missing-from-action.

18. Bill Kristol, “The Defense Secretary We Have,” Washington Post, 15 December 

2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A132-2004Dec14.html.

19. Rick Atkinson, Crusade; The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 488–500.

20. Peter Wehner, “Rumsfeld Is Wrong on the Surge,” Commentary Magazine (blog), 9 

February 2011, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/02/09/rumsfeld-is-wrong-onthe-surge/; and David Margolick, “The Night of the Generals,” Vanity Fair, April 2007, http://

www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/iraqgenerals200704.

21. Maj Gen John F. Regni, commander, Second Air Force, “Expeditionary and Global 

Learning Environment CONOPS [Concept of Operations],” 28 June 2004, HQ AETC History Office, Randolph AFB, TX.

22. Maj Gen William M. Fraser III, director of operations, HQ AETC, Randolph AFB, 

TX, memorandum, subject: CONOPS Expeditionary and Global Learning Environment (EAGLE), 28 June 2004.

23. Gen Donald Cook, commander, AETC, to Vice Commander, Expeditionary Combat Airman Training Campus, memorandum, 28 January 2005.

24. Ibid.

25. Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End.

26. Wehner, “Rumsfeld Is Wrong on the Surge.”

27. Sahrad V. Oboroi, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency as Seen through the 

Iraq War Logs: A Preliminary Evaluation” (master’s thesis, University of Chicago, August 

2011), http://home.uchicago.edu/~mstaisch/Sharad/SharadOberoi_MA-Thesis.pdf.

28. Seth Blakeman, Anthony R. Gibbs, and Jeyanthan Jeyasingam, “Study of the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program as a Model for Rapid Defense Acquisitions” (master’s professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008). 

29. Kris Osborn, “Army Refining Long Term MRAP Plan,” Military.com, 25 May 2012, 

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/05/25/army-refining-long-term-mrap-plan.html. 

30. “Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK), U.S. Army,” Defense Update, 10 December 

2006, http://defense-update.com/products/t/tusk.htm.
30

31. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Guide 3501, Joint Training System: A 

Guide for Senior Leaders, 8 June 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsg3501.pdf; 

US Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008, http://

www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf; and US Army FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006.

32. Edward N. Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Operations as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s Magazine, 33–42, February 2007, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384.

33. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

34. Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Operations.”

35. David Kilcullen, “Edward Luttwack’s ‘Counterinsurgency Malpractice,’” Small 

Wars Journal (blog), 15 April 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/edward-luttwakscounter

insurgency-malpractice.

36. US House, Committee on Armed Services, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD’s Fight against IEDs Today and Tomorrow (Washington, DC: US 

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, November 2008).

37. Greg Grant, “Homemade Bombs, High-Tech Response,” Government Executive, 15 

June 2007, http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2007/06/homemade-bombs-hightech-response/24662/.

38. Department of the Army, Procurement Programs: FY 2012 Budget Estimate, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (Washington, DC: DOD, February 

2011).

39. Tom Vanden Brook, “Improved Sensors, Images Let Drones Fight,” Military Times, 

16 July 2012, http://archive.militarytimes.com/article/20120716/NEWS/207160305/Improved-sensors-images-let-drones-fight-IEDs.

40. Air Education and Training Command (AETC) Special Order G-07-24, 3 May 2007, 

Supporting Document 101, History AETC, 2006–2007, United States Air Force Historical 

Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

41. Nick Plante, “Army Trains Airmen for ‘Outside the Wire’ Mission,” USAF News, 21 November 2006, http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/128987/army-trains

-airmen-for-outside-the-wire-mission.aspx.

42. Brig Gen Richard Devereaux, briefing, to Gen Stephen Lorenz, AETC commander, 

subject: Expeditionary Skills Training, 4 May 2011, AETC Historical Archives, AETC/A2/3/10, 

Randolph AFB, TX. 

43. Lloyd W. Walker, Final Report, Joint Expeditionary Force Learning Environment–

Virtual (Austin: University of Texas Press, January 2007), http://uxxi.org/docs/R0479.pdf.

44. DOD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, 1 December 2008, http://www.dtic.

mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf /300007p.pdf.

45. Ibid. 

46. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, foreword.

47. Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl P. Mueller, Air 

Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and 

Assistance Missions (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006), http://www.rand.org/

pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf.

48. Vanden Brook, “Improved Sensors, Images Let Drones Fight IEDs.”

49. Oboroi, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency”; Connable and Libicki, How 

Insurgencies End; and Vanden Brook, “Improved Sensors, Images Let Drones Fight IEDs.”

50. Ibid.
31

51. Barack Obama, “Afghanistan, the New Way Forward” (speech, US Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1 December 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/

blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address.

52. David Kilcullen, “Crunch Time in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (blog), 9 

February 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/crunch-time-in-afghanistan-pakistan.

53. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Guide 3501, Joint Training System: A 

Guide for Senior Leaders, 8 June 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/cjcsg3501.pdf; 

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency; and CJCS, “Defense Transformation Update for 

SECDEF, 2006–2008” (briefing, CJCS/J5, Pentagon, Washington, DC, August 2006), http://

library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/870/2006-08%20re%20Defense%20Transformation.pdf.

54. Tony Karon, “Afghanistan: The Perils of Nation-Building,” Time, 17 October 2001, 

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,179962,00.html.

55. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 418.

56. Stanley McChrystal, commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

Standard Operating Procedures 373, Direction and Guidance for Escalation of Force, 8 February 

2008 (amended 10 April 2010), https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/go/100.ATSC/639043BB809F-480C-B3AA-35320F4538C0-1300783787948; and Gen Stanley McChrystal, commander, 

ISAF, to Whom It May Concern, memorandum, subject: COMISAF/USFOR-A COIN Training Guide, 10 November 2009, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/COIN/repository/

COMISAF_COIN_Training_Guidance.pdf.

57. John M. Spiszer, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned by a Brigade 

Combat Team,” Military Review, January–February 2011, 73–79, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada535377.

58. McChrystal, memorandum, 3.

59. Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2004), 225–29; and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

60. Oboroi, “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency”; Connable and Libicki, How 

Insurgencies End; Vanden Brook, “Improved Sensors, Images Let Drones Fight IEDs”; 

Defense Manpower Data Center, “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Casualty Summary by Month,” November 2001–June 2013, Defense Casualty Assessment System, https://

www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml.; and Christian, “QDR Signals 

JSF [Joint Special Forces] and Counterinsurgency Planes Live,” Defense Tech (blog), 1 

February 2010, http://defensetech.org/2010/02/01/qdr-signals-jsf-and-counterinsurgencyplanes-live/.

61. David Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 

294.

62. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

63. Spiszer, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 73–79. 

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 292–93.

67. Lt Col Brendan McBreen, US Marine Corps, “Notes for Advisors on FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency” (Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 28 January 2008), http://

www.2ndbn5thmar.com/coinman/Notes%20on%20FM%203-24%20Counterinsurgency.

pdf; and Christian, “QDR Signals JSF and Counterinsurgency Planes Live” (blog).

33

Abbreviations

AEF air expeditionary force

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AOR area of responsibility

CAC Combined Arms Center

CFACC combined force air component commander

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COIN counterinsurgency operation

CROWS Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station

DOD Department of Defense

EAGLE expeditionary and global learning environment

FM field manual

FY fiscal year

IED improvised explosive device

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IW irregular warfare

JEFLE-V Joint Expeditionary Force Learning Environment–

Virtual

JEIDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

JET joint expeditionary training

MRAP mine-resistant ambush protected

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Association

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

PPE personnel protection equipment

RPV remotely piloted vehicle

SSTR stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction

TUSK Tank Urban Survivability Kit

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

WASP Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Afghanistan

Support Plan