CASE STUDY N O. 1

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace 

and Stability Operations

Volker Franke

Department of Political Science & International Affairs

Kennesaw State University

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

© 2010 by National Defense University. All rights reserved. Published 2010.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or 

National Defense University. Material in this case study may be used with approriate citation.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 1

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Security by Contractor: 

Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations

Volker Franke

Department of Political Science & International Affairs

Kennesaw State University

I have never yet found a contractor who, if not watched, would not leave the

government holding the bag.

Senator Harry S. Truman, 1941

Any military that intends to be relevant beyond its national borders will be

working with the private sector.

Doug Brooks, President

International Peace Operations Association, 2008

INTRODUCTION

September 16, 2007, approximately 12:08 p.m., Nisour Square, Baghdad

City. The white Kia sedan had finally come to a complete stop, its chassis

riddled with bullet holes. Its occupants, an Iraqi medical student and his

physician mother, had both been killed in a barrage of gunfire. The chaos

had begun just fifteen minutes before, with the nearby detonation of a bomb

while a heavily armed convoy was rushing American VIPs through the

crowded streets of the Iraqi capital. When the shooting stopped, seventeen

Iraqis were dead and many more wounded. Were these just more unfortunate casualties of the Iraq War? Was this business as usual in the hot zone of

a complex and dangerous occupation? Or did something go really wrong

here?

What complicates the scenario further is the fact that the shooters were

employees of Blackwater Worldwide, a North Carolina-based private security company. Blackwater had been operating in Iraq since the summer of

2003 after receiving a $27 million no-bid contract to provide security for

Ambassador J. Paul Bremer, then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).1 The Iraq War was a watershed event for a rapidly growing private security industry that today populates and defines postwar stabilization

and reconstruction efforts. At the time of this writing, there are nearly two

hundred thousand individuals working on contract in Iraq—considerably
2 INTRODUCTION Volker Franke

more than there are coalition military troops. Doug Brooks, president of the

International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), the private security

industry’s trade organization, opined in a 2008 article that “every military

that expects to be relevant beyond its national borders in the future will be

working with the private sector.”2 Well-known commentator Robert Kaplan

agrees: “The idea of a large American military presence anywhere without

contractors is now unthinkable.”3

The vast majority of those contractors fulfill logistics and operational

support functions (such as cooks, construction workers, mechanics, or truck

drivers). Yet an estimated twenty-five to thirty thousand contractors provide security or security support services. About three-quarters of the 7,300

private security personnel working for the Department of Defense (DOD)

in Iraq carry weapons and are authorized to use force in self-defense, in

defense of persons they are contracted to protect, or to prevent threats

against the life of civilians.4

The Nisour Square shootings were by no means an isolated incident. But

it was the bloodiest in a series of violent episodes involving Blackwater and

other American contractors since the occupation began. A congressional

investigation following the September 2007 incident revealed that “Blackwater has been involved in at least 195 ‘escalation of force’ incidents in Iraq

since 2005 that involved the firing of shots by Blackwater forces.” This, the

report continued, “is an average of 1.4 shootings per week.”5 Coming on the

heels of the Abu-Ghraib prison scandal, concerns about the indiscriminate

use of force stoked anger and resentment among the Iraqi government and

people.6

Demanding the dismissal of Blackwater from the U.S. government’s payroll, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki explained after the Nisour Square

shooting: “What happened was a crime. It has left a deep grudge and anger,

both inside the government and among the Iraqi people.”7

Although Congress, in the fiscal year 2007 Defense Budget appropriations bill, had already conceded that private security contractors working

with the U.S. military and embassy staff would no longer enjoy immunity,

the Bush administration rejected demands for the ouster of Blackwater.8 In

January 2009, the Iraqi government finally rejected a renewal of Blackwater’s license to operate, effectively banning the company from Iraq.

The first section of this case traces the history and rise of the security

industry and categorizes the types of firms providing security and security

support services. Next, the case illustrates the reasons and motivations for

individuals to seek employment as security contractors and discusses the

implications of the growing market for privatizing security for the U.S. military. Finally, the case explores the advantages and shortcomings of outsourcing security functions and illustrates some of the dilemmas associated with

“security by contract.”
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 3

THE RISE OF AN INDUSTRY

A 2008 report from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated

that between 2003 and 2007, U.S. government agencies awarded contracts

totalling around $85 billion to private sector companies performing services

in the Iraqi theatre. In 2008, these companies employed some 190,000 onsite individuals, approximately as many as there were U.S. soldiers deployed

at the height of the Iraq War and “at least 2.5 times higher than that ratio

during any other major U.S. conflict.”9 As of May 2009, there had been a

confirmed 451 contractor casualties in Iraq.10

Of course, the use of contractor personnel in the theatre of operations is

not new. Throughout history, states hired outsiders to fight their battles. “In

some eras,” Peter Singer, director of the Brookings Institution’s 21st Century

Defense Initiative and an expert on private security issues, acknowledges,

“these private entrants into conflict were individual foreigners, brought in to

fight for whichever side bid the highest, known as ‘mercenaries’ in common

parlance. In other periods, they came in the form of highly organized entities. For both, the important factor was their goal: private profit, derived

from the very act of fighting.”11

For example, during the American Revolutionary War, George Washington contracted with civilian merchants to deliver supplies to his troops. At

the same time, German landgraves (erstwhile German noblemen with jurisdiction over a particular territory) sold into service some thirty thousand

soldiers as auxiliaries to the British to fight against the American revolutionaries. These so-called Hessians12 were not mercenaries in the strict sense, as

they did not voluntarily hire out their services for money. Instead, as in

many eighteenth century armies, most of these soldiers were conscripts,

debtors, or petty criminals who fought for low pay and, in some cases,

received nothing but their daily food. 

Apart from those outsourced combat functions, field armies during the

1700s and 1800s relied on contracted wagons, drivers, and civilians to perform construction functions and almost all medical care.14 During World

War II, contractor functions expanded to address the increasingly complex

technical needs posed by maintenance of military aircraft, vehicles, and signal equipment. Reliance on contractors rose further during the Korean and

Vietnam wars in support of weapons systems, establishing base camps and

depots, and providing logistical functions. For instance, by one estimate,

“More than 50 percent of the direct-support helicopter maintenance needed

during those two wars was provided by contractors.”15

With the inception of the all-volunteer force in the 1970s, concern

mounted about the military’s reliance on contractor support. A 1982

Defense Science Board report noted that despite satisfactory performance

during crises and combat, “there were no formal mechanisms to ensure

[contractors’] continued performance.”16 Subsequently, DOD reversed

course and steered maintenance away from contractors and back toward

Source: Human Rights First13
4 THE RISE OF AN INDUSTRY Volker Franke

“organic” sources. According to DOD Directive 1130.2, issued in January

1983:17

Contractor field services (CFS) . . . shall be used when necessary to accomplish

military mission, when provision of services by DOD engineering and technical

services specialists is impractical and when required skills are not available

within the Military Departments . . . the use of CFS is limited to a period not to

exceed 12 months after the DOD components achieve self-sufficiency in the use

of new equipment or systems.”

In July 1990, however, the pendulum swung the other direction again

and the Pentagon cancelled Directive 1130.2. During operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. military used civilian contractors extensively, yet nowhere near where contractor engagement would be a decadeand-a-half later: in all, the Pentagon engaged seventy-six contractors who

deployed some 9,200 employees to Iraq in support of Gulf War I. The Pentagon hired its contractors on hundreds of separate contracts. Not surprisingly, the results were mixed. A number of contracts contained poorly

defined statements of work or none at all and oftentimes ambiguous contract requirements. As a result, many contractors performed inadequately

and inefficiently and left their customers dissatisfied.18

Filling the Security Vacuum

What prompted the corporate evolution of services supporting military

operations? What factors sparked the rapid and unrestrained rise of the private security industry between the two Gulf wars? Singer attributes the

privatization of security to three dynamics: “The end of the Cold War, transformations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers

and civilians, and a general trend toward privatization and outsourcing of

government functions around the world.”19

More specifically, a combination of force downsizing—the number of

soldiers worldwide declined by about one-third, from twenty-nine to twenty

million between 1988 and 200220—and higher demand for force contributions to provide aid or support military interventions created the higher

demand for private security.21 By and large, private military actors, Singer

found, particularly thrive in “periods of systemic transition” and “areas of

weak governance.”22

The end of the Cold War “provided a vacuum in the market of security.”

At the same time as militaries downsized and investments in the “peace dividend” rose, global threats became “more varied, more capable, and more

dangerous.”23 While many had hoped for a “new world order,”24 states collapsed, inciting widespread instability and violence virtually anywhere but in

the developed Western world. Commentator Robert Kaplan predicted the

“coming anarchy” as a result of these failures of governance.25
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 5

Simultaneously, globalization, including the post-Cold War opening of

international markets, produced mixed results for different parts of the

world, leaving the “bottom billion,” as renowned World Bank economist

Paul Collier calls the least developed, in poverty, malnourished, undereducated, marginalized, and disconnected.26 According to Peter Singer, those

with little hope constitute “a huge reserve for the illegal economy, organized

crime, and armed conflict.”27 The combination of a growing number of disaffected and an oversupply of dislocated military-aged labor provided a market flood of soldiers ready to fight for whoever not only paid the bill but also

offered a means of subsistence. 

With large budget cuts and force reductions, an emerging need for international interventions to curb civil war, the prevalence of ethnic strife and

genocide, and a rapidly growing demand by weak or besieged governments

for contracted fighting services, the conditions were ripe for the rise of the

private security industry. 

Security, Inc.

To date, there is neither a universal, agreed definition of the label “private

security contractor” nor a common understanding of how to classify the

firms providing security functions. Brookings Institution expert Singer distinguishes three types of firms:28

• Military provider firms, such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline

International (both now defunct), supply combat-type services,

including participation in actual fighting. These firms function as

force multipliers for their clients, who typically include weak or fragile

states having relatively low military capability and facing immediate

and high-threat situations.29

• Military consulting firms offer advisory and training services, thus

assisting a client’s armed forces. Although these firms do not themselves operate on the battlefield, they provide strategic, operational,

and/or organizational analysis—known in military terminology as

the “commander’s estimate.” 

• Military support firms provide supplementary military services,

including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation, thereby freeing up the client’s military capability to focus

on core combat functions. 

Referring to the security industry as the “peace and stability” or “contingency” industry, IPOA classifies its corporate members into three sectors:30

• Logistics and support companies provide logistics and supply, threat

assessment, consultancy, mine clearance, medical services, construction and engineering services, and waste management. 
6 THRILL RIDE VS. PAYCHECK Volker Franke

• Private security companies (PSCs) offer security-related services,

including personal protection (also known as a protective security

detail); static site security (for example, government buildings or

training facilities); protection of critical infrastructure (for example,

ports, oil installations and pipelines, power stations, and power lines);

convoy protection; and security consulting, planning, and advice.

Although contractors working this type of security detail in Iraq and

Afghanistan almost invariably carry weapons, they are not permitted

to engage in offensive combat operations and are authorized to use

force only in self-defense. 

• Development and security sector reform companies provide services

aiding security sector reform, which typically entails reducing the size,

budget, and reach of the military, police, secret services, intelligence,

and the justice system and reforming them to become more transparent and accountable to their citizens, and supporting democracy and

governance, economic and business development, and crisis mitigation and recovery.

THRILL RIDE VS. PAYCHECK

The September 2004 issue of Rolling Stone featured the story of an American

tattoo artist, rock singer, and former Marine who made his living selling

armed protective services in Iraq.31 Coming on the heels of the mutilation of

four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah in April 2004 and the horrible pictures of the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib prison that had made headlines

earlier that same year, the growing involvement of private security firms in

the war against terrorism came to the forefront of public attention. 

Moreover, the picture of the industry painted in the media was less than

flattering. Many commentators quickly likened individual security contractors to greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries, “freelance soldiers . .

. who, for large amounts of money, fight for dubious causes.”32 Some commentators began comparing the booming security market to the Alaskan

Gold Rush. For instance, the Times of London asserted, “In Iraq, the postwar business boom is not oil. It is security.”33

IPOA president Doug Brooks sharply criticizes this sort of sensationalist

news reporting: “The reality is that our members specialize in providing critical services professionally and ethically in chaotic environments. Such operations are inherently risky, and implementation is always challenging but too

often misunderstood and misconstrued by outsiders. Frequently we find

ourselves responding to inaccuracies propagated by irresponsible journalists, activists, and even academics.”34

Mercenaries differ from both professional soldiers and from most private

security contractors in that they fight for employers other than their home

government. According to the 1977 Additional Protocol of the 1949
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 7

Geneva Convention, a mercenary takes part in the fighting but is neither a

national nor member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Instead,

he is “motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,

material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to

combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that

Party.”35

An October 2007 report by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries

concluded that “a number of private security companies operating in zones

of armed conflict are engaging in new forms of mercenarism” and warned

that “states that employ these services may be responsible for violations of

internationally recognized human rights committed by the personnel of

such companies.”36 The working group also expressed concern that only

thirty states had ratified the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and that the United

States has neither signed nor ratified the UN Mercenary Convention or the

Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention.

Rejecting the UN report, a spokesman for the U.S. mission of the UN

offices in Geneva released a statement denying that security guards working

under U.S. contract in Iraq were mercenaries: “Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever nationality, are mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women who put their lives on

the line to protect people and facilities every day. . . . The security guards

working for U.S. government contractors in Iraq and elsewhere protect

clearly defined United States government areas, and their work is defensive

in nature.”37

With the end of the Cold War, contracting their professional skills to

security firms became hugely attractive to scores of individuals with a considerable range of differing experiences and qualifications. Eager to expand

business and profits, Blackwater, for instance, actively recruited highly qualified ex-Special Forces soldiers to deploy in Iraq and offered them salaries

that dwarfed basic military pay. Clearly, “When a guy can make more money

in one month than he can make all year in the military or in a civilian job, it’s

hard to turn down,” explains ex-Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Dale McClellan, one of the original founders of Blackwater.38

Today, the private military contractors (PMC) Web site advertises:

“The pay for PMC’s in dangerous places like Iraq is generous. Experienced

people can make $500–750 a day. But it’s not all for the money, for many it’s

a new career path that has a sense of duty for country while helping to assist

in building a new democracy.”39

And indeed, it is not all about the pay. Contracting offers “a chance for

many combat enthusiasts, retired from the service and stuck in the ennui of

everyday existence, to return to their glory days on the battlefield under the

banner of the international fight against terrorism.”40 As a former Navy

SEAL explains, “It’s what you do. Say you spent twenty years doing things

like riding high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of a
8 McARMY VS. MacARTHUR Volker Franke

sudden, you’re selling insurance. It’s tough.” For a fifty-five-year old police

officer, the decision to sign on with Blackwater meant “the last chance in my

life to do something exciting.”41

A senior vice president for one of the U.S.-based security firms describes

the contractor motivation this way: “We found that their military experience

has provided an interesting culture for many of our employees. Collaboration and team cohesion, hierarchy of command, comradery, they enjoy this.

Yes, money is also a motivating factor, but what drives people is their desire

to serve their country in an indirect way and get the team cohesion they are

accustomed to.”42

The majority of contractors, expert-author Robert Young Pelton found,

are “ex-military or police who have realized that their specialized training

has limited value in the civilian world, and who, in order to provide well for

their families, take serious risks for the healthy pay it affords. However,

roughly 10 percent of those I have met consider themselves professional

career contractors who do it because they enjoy strapping on armor and

heavy weapons for the well-paying, high-risk, adrenaline-packed thrill

ride.”43 And the industry is sufficiently diverse to provide employment for

individuals with very different professional backgrounds and personal motivations.

Defining a professional profile for security contractors proves difficult.

“Blackwater is like a fucking restaurant. You’ve got hundreds of people coming through. They usually fall into two categories. You’ve got the underthirty crowd—the whippersnappers just looking for the biggest paycheck.

Then you got the over-thirty crowd—the guys with a family and kids that

are looking for a company to work for.”44

Most important for companies is to choose and train the right people.

Today, security firms subject potential employees to a fairly rigorous vetting

process. The American security firm senior vice president explains, “As in

many industries, there is a lot of hype early on. And if it is a rapidly growing

industry, there may be problems with vetting early on as well. But the market has weeded out those companies that have not behaved ethically, legally

or morally. At my company, we have a very detailed vetting system. We use

psychometric tools for selecting employees, which helps us determine

whether they fit in the culture and how they will operate under stress. We

are confident that we can weed out potential problem employees.”45

MCARMY VS. MACARTHUR 

When General Douglas MacArthur addressed the graduating class at West

Point in 1962, he told them: “Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed

words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you

will be.”46 But the U.S. military has changed significantly since those days.

Shortly after the inception of the all-volunteer force, sociologist Charles

Moskos observed that the military was moving from a traditional institu-
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 9

tional structure to a civilian or occupational format. Military service as a

“calling to the nation” was giving way to being “just another job.”47 Moskos

concluded that the U.S. military was shifting from an institutional format,

legitimated by values and norms transcending individual self-interest in

favor of a presumed higher good, to an occupational format, legitimated primarily in terms of marketplace concerns instead of normative considerations. 

This shift has considerably impacted recruitment, retention, and

rewards. Tim Horton, now head of public relations for Logistical Supply

Area Anaconda in Balad, the biggest U.S. base in Iraq, and a transportation

officer with twenty years of military experience, explains:

What we have today is an all-volunteer army, unlike in a conscription army

when they had to be here. In the old army, the standard of living was low, the

pay scale was dismal; it wasn’t fun; it wasn’t intended to be fun. But today we

have to appeal, we have to recruit, just like any corporation, we have to recruit

off the street. And after we get them to come in, it behooves us to give them a

reason to stay in.48

What does it take to keep soldiers in the military? Horton says, “There

are some creature comforts in this Wal-Mart and McDonald’s society that

we live in that soldiers have come to expect. They expect to play Xbox, to

keep in touch by e-mail. They expect to eat a variety of foods.”49 Gone are

the MREs (meals-ready-to-eat) that soldiers solidarily complained about for

decades. Today, soldiers take their chow at buffet-style cafeterias, wandering

between the omelet station, soft drink fountains, and salad and dessert

bars—all of course staffed by private contractors.

At a time when the military is overstretched and deployments are

extended involuntarily, recruitment easily falls short of its target, and retention becomes an issue, especially when individuals with expert military skills

can more than double their pay by “going private.” As demand for security

experts increases, the U.S. military finds itself in a new position—competing

in the marketplace for the best and the brightest. 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates expressed his concern about these

developments in the fall of 2007: “[M]y personal concern about some of

these security contracts is that I worry that sometimes the salaries they are

able to pay in fact lures some of our soldiers out of the service to go to work

for them.” Gates was so concerned that he asked the Pentagon to work

toward including “non-compete clauses” in military contracts in order to

“put some limits on the ability of these contracts to lure highly trained soldiers out of our forces and work for them.”50

Asked about Secretary Gates’s recommendation during the Blackwater

hearing following the Nisour Square shooting, the company’s founder, Erik

Prince, responded that he had no objections against a “non-compete

clause,” but he believed that “it would be upsetting to a lot of soldiers if they

didn’t have the ability to use the skills they learned in the military in the
10 OUTSOURCING: THE ART OF CUTTING WASTE Volker Franke

private sector.”51 When asked about his company’s profits during the same

hearing, Prince simply told the House Oversight Committee: “We’re a private company . . . and there’s a key word there—private.”52

For Doug Brooks, “Too much is made of the competition between army

and private sector”:

[T]he pay ain’t as good as it is made out to be—the benefits that are given to

U.S. troops are pretty damn good, and if you include those in [the pay] it is

almost a wash. Contractors do have a higher proportion of cash in their pay, but

ONLY when they’re actually working. . . . [Y]ou’re only employed half the

time—if you’re lucky. And much of your unemployed time is spent trying to

line up your next contract. So split the $500–700 in half, take away the benefits

and the contracting jobs don’t look so sexy compared to military life. If you’re

particularly professional and experienced then the money can be good, for the

vast majority it ain’t a long career choice.53

OUTSOURCING: THE ART OF CUTTING WASTE

In 1982, faced by growing federal deficits, President Ronald Reagan set up

the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control to root out waste and inefficiency

in the federal government. Its chairman, conservative industrialist J. Peter

Grace, concluded, “government-run enterprises lack the driving forces of

marketplace competition, which promote tight, efficient operations.”54 By

contrast, “[t]urn government operations over to the private sector and you

get innovation, efficiency, flexibility.”55

Almost immediately upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton administration implemented a 40 percent drop in the U.S. defense budget and reduced

force levels by more than 30 percent to about 1.4 million troops. With growing concern over the efficiency of the federal bureaucracy, the Clinton

administration and Congress challenged federal agencies to become more

performance oriented and cost-effective by adapting “performance-based”

management concepts from industry. And a decade later, the Office of Management and Budget reported “cost savings in a range of 20 to 50 percent

when federal and private sector service providers compete to perform these

functions.”56

On September 10, 2001, precisely one day before the 9/11 terrorist

attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told senior staff that the

Pentagon was wasting $3 billion a year by not outsourcing many noncombat

duties to the private sector:

Why is DOD one of the last organizations around that still cuts its own checks?

When an entire industry exists to run warehouses efficiently, why do we own

and operate so many of our own? At bases around the world, why do we pick up

our own garbage and mop our own floors, rather than contracting services out,
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 11

as many businesses do? And surely we can outsource more computer systems

support.57

In an effort to clarify the scope of outsourcing, the 2001 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) Report emphasized that “only those functions that

must be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD. Any function that can

be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.”58 The

2001 QDR required DOD to separate its functions into “core” and “noncore” in terms of whether or not each is directly necessary for warfighting.

As a result, functions now fall into three broad categories: 

• Functions directly linked to warfighting and best performed by the

federal government. In these areas, DOD will invest in process and

technology to improve performance.

• Functions indirectly linked to warfighting capability that must be

shared by the public and private sectors. In these areas, DOD will

seek to define new models of public–private partnerships to improve

performance.

• Functions not linked to warfighting and best performed by the private

sector. In these areas, DOD will seek to privatize or outsource entire

functions or define new mechanisms for partnerships with private

firms or other public agencies.59

In part because of the uneven contractor performance during the first

Gulf War, the U.S. Army began using a contract system known as the Logistical Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in the early 1990s.60 Four LOGCAP contracts have been awarded since 1992: LOGCAP I (1992–1997)

was awarded to Brown and Root Services (now Kellogg, Brown & Root

[KBR], since 2007 a subsidiary of Halliburton Corporation) for logistics

support in several regions including the Balkans; LOGCAP II (1997–2002)

went to Dyncorps International for peacebuilding work in Bosnia; and

LOGCAP III was competitively awarded to KBR in December 2001 primarily for support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, Jordan,

Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.61 While LOGCAP I cost $815 million,

LOGCAP III cost American taxpayers more than $15 billion in its first three

years alone.62

With the current LOGCAP IV, the Army awarded four performance

contractors in 2007 to deliver services, including supply operations, field

operations, engineering and construction, communication networks, transportation and cargo, facilities maintenance, and repair. Under LOGCAP IV,

“performance contractors will compete for individual LOGCAP task orders,

fostering a competitive situation designed to control costs and enhance

quality.”63
12 OUTSOURCING: THE ART OF CUTTING WASTE Volker Franke

Cost Savings Is Big Business

Security contracting is big business. From 2003 through 2007, U.S. government agencies obligated a total of $85 billion for contracts principally performed in the Iraqi theatre. This accounts for almost 20 percent of the $446

billion appropriated in toto for activities in Iraq but does not include contracts supporting operations in Iraq that are performed outside the Iraqi theatre. 

For the eighteen-month period 2007 through the first half of 2008, the

Government Accountability Office reported that DOD, State, and the U.S.

Agency for International Development spent at least $33.9 billion on almost

fifty-seven thousand contracts for efforts such as construction, capacity

building, security, and a range of support services for U.S. forces and other

government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. About three-fourths of the

reported obligations were for contracts with performance in Iraq.64

The CBO estimates that the total U.S. government spending on private

security services was $6 billion–$10 billion over 2003–2007, with $3 billion–$4 billion allocated to private security contractors operating in Iraq.65

Similarly, the IPOA’s Doug Brooks estimates the annual value of providing

private security services to contingency operations worldwide at $20 billion,

of which private security companies accounted for U.S.-$2 billion–$4 billion.66

Does outsourcing security achieve its objectives and save money? In the

aftermath of the Nisour Square incident, Congress held a hearing in October 2007 to inquire whether the government’s heavy reliance on private

security contractors was a wise use of taxpayer funds.67 According to contract documents, Blackwater had billed the U.S. government $1,222 per day

for each individual protective security specialist, amounting to $455,000 per

contractor per year. By comparison, an Army sergeant at the time earned

between $140 and $190 per day in pay and benefits, for a total of $50,000 to

$70,000 per year. And, as commanding general of the Multinational Force

Iraq, General David Petraeus was making about $180,000 per year.

However, a recent CBO study asserts that these figures skew the comparative analysis of the cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security functions,

since the $1,222 per day reflects the contractor’s billing rate, not the amount

paid to the individual employee. By its very nature, the billing rate will have

to exceed pay, because it includes the contractor’s indirect cost, overhead,

and profit. Instead, the CBO suggests, [a] better comparison would involve

a soldier’s ‘billing rate’—the total cost to the government of having soldiers

fill the deployed security positions for one year.”68 In addition, the CBO

report concludes that contractors generally bid various numbers of personnel in different labor categories, so a singular focus on security guards further skews the assessment. 

To get a better comparison, the CBO performed an analysis reflecting all

types of personnel as well as nonlabor costs (for example, vehicles and other

equipment):
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 13

That analysis indicates that the costs of the private contractor did not differ

greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing similar

functions. During peacetime, however, the military unit would remain in the

force structure and continue to accrue costs at a peacetime rate, whereas the private security contract would not have to be renewed.69

These calculations are based on the salaries of American contractors.

The IPOA’s Doug Brooks says, however, “Hire Iraqis to guard bases who

know the culture, pay them market value of $700 per month instead of

$15,000, and you can really save cost. One thing that is completely overlooked is the benefits this brings to the local population. Contractors compete with one another, so they will hire locals. That is cheaper, and they

provide skills training and employment.”70

Maximizing Profit

Of course, all cost-benefit calculations assume effective management and

oversight. But especially in times of inordinate growth of a specialized industry, overpricing and cheating become a concern. And indeed, reports

abound that charge security contractors with fraud, overbilling, wasteful

spending, and “inadequate planning and inadequate oversight.”71 For

instance, the Pentagon’s own auditing office found that KBR may have

billed DOD for 36 percent more meals than it actually provided. According

to the Raleigh, NC, News & Observer, Blackwater paid its employees $600

per day but billed Dubai-based Regency Hotel and Hospital Company

$815. Regency, in turn, billed Eurest Support Services (ESS), who billed

KBR, who billed the federal government an undisclosed amount.72

The News & Observer described how overbilling worked in the case of

one individual contractor working for Blackwater:

Blackwater added a 36 percent markup, plus its overhead costs, and sent the bill

to a Kuwaiti company that ordinarily runs hotels. That company, Regency

Hotel, tacked on its costs for buying vehicles and weapons and a profit and sent

an invoice to a German food services company called ESS that cooked meals for

the troops. ESS added its costs and profit and sent its bill to Halliburton, which

also added overhead and a profit and presented the final bill to the Pentagon. It

is nearly impossible to say whether the cost . . . doubled, tripled or quadrupled.73

While potential cost savings are powerful incentives for outsourcing government functions, the private sector’s motivation is to maximize profit. The

problem, industry expert Peter Singer says, is that “the incentives of a private

company do not always align with the clients’ interests—or the public good.

In an ideal world, this problem would be kept in check through proper

management and oversight; in reality, such scrutiny is often absent.”74
14 OUTSOURCING: THE ART OF CUTTING WASTE Volker Franke

Allegations of war-profiteering as a result of open-ended, “cost-plus” contracts outraged members of Congress and the American public. 

Early in the Iraq War, things had really run out of control. Henry Bunting, a retired Army staff sergeant and former Halliburton purchasing officer,

said he “heard a common refrain in 2003 in Kuwait from managers of KBR . .

.: ‘Don’t worry about price. It’s cost-plus.’” Bunting continued, “[t]here is no

question the taxpayer is getting screwed. There is no incentive for KBR or

their subs to try to reduce costs. No matter what it costs, KBR gets 100 percent back, plus overhead, plus their profit.”75

Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) was furious: “Halliburton is

gouging the taxpayer.”76 According to David Walker, the comptroller general of the United States, “The outsourcing of government has escalated

across the board over the past five years, although oversight of the process

has shrunk during this same period.” In an interview with The Center for

Public Integrity, Walker noted “particular problems with military contracting.”77

In early 2007, Congress passed the War Profiteering Prevention Act

intended to “prohibit profiteering and fraud relating to military action, relief,

and reconstruction efforts, and for other purposes.”78 In February 2007,

then Senator Barack Obama introduced a bill aimed at closing the legal

loophole that had allowed private contractors to escape prosecution.79 But

his legislation, like other similar measures, never passed the Senate and

never became law. 

Finally, in October 2007, following the Nisour Square shooting, the

House passed legislation improving oversight over the booming security

industry. The MEJA (Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act) Expansion

and Enforcement Act (H.R. 2740) subjects all contractors in war zones, now

including also those working for the State Department, to the jurisdiction of

U.S. criminal law.80 Moreover, the fiscal year 2008 Defense (H.R. 1585) and

Intelligence (H.R. 2082) authorization bills further improves control and

oversight. “These bills together,” explains Representative David Price (DNC), “should dramatically change the way our government uses and oversees contractors on the battlefield and in sensitive intelligence areas.”81

Aware of the billing problems, President Obama, in his first address to a

joint session of Congress on February 24, 2009, promised: “We’ll eliminate

the no-bid contracts that have wasted billions in Iraq.”82 And in March, he

promised that the American people’s money will “be spent to advance their

priorities—not to line the pockets of contractors or to maintain projects

that don't work.”83

The Cost of Cost Savings

The quest to cut costs may backfire. For example, in early 2002, the U.S.

Army cut funding to its Intelligence Center’s interrogator school at Fort

Huachuca, AZ, effectively setting loose about half of its instructors. This

move, critics alleged, would “cripple the Army’s ability to properly train its
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 15

counter-intelligence personnel at a time when intelligence assets are sorely

needed to fight the war on terrorism.”84 “What’s most astonishing,” Pratap

Chatterjee, managing director of Corpwatch.org, stated in an interview, “is

that once they lay these people off, they turn right around and hired a private

company to hire these very same people at probably double the pay to come

and work as private contractors without being assigned as part of the military command structure, which means they’re able to go in as civilians. They

don’t face court-martial, and they can do what they want.”85

In response to the Nisour Square shootings, the State Department created a Force Investigation Unit to look into Blackwater contractors’ alleged

use of force, effectively hiring contractors to investigate possible crimes

committed by other contractors. It is like “outsourcing henhouse security to

a fox,” industry expert David Isenberg opined.86

But apart from this conflict of interest, some experts also see a potential

violation of the law, because federal acquisition regulations do not permit

the hiring of contractors for jobs “considered to be inherently governmental

functions,” including “the direct conduct of criminal investigations.”87

Given the explosion of contracting with little public debate or formal

policy decisions, some observers warn that “contractors have become a virtual fourth branch of government.”88 But the problem goes deeper than the

flagrant cases of waste and fraud. Watchdog groups allege the following:

• Competition appears to have sharply eroded. A New York Times analysis, for example, shows that in 2005 less than half of contracts (48

percent) were competitive, down from 79 percent in 2001.

• Even the most sensitive and secret government jobs are now being

outsourced. For instance, some 70 percent of the budget for intelligence collection goes to private contractors.89

• The most successful contractors may no longer be “those doing the

best work, but those who have mastered the special skill of selling to

Uncle Sam.”

• Contracting typically results in less public scrutiny, as programs are

hidden behind closed corporate doors and are not subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.90

Do not Blame the Messenger

Although even the most outspoken critics acknowledge that the government

cannot function without contractors, the current trend, a recent study of

experts appointed by the White House and Congress found, “poses a threat

to the government’s long-term ability to perform its mission” and could

“undermine the integrity of the government’s decision making.”91
16 CONDUCT UNBECOMING Volker Franke

But placing all the blame on the contractors would be shortsighted.

“Agencies are crippled in their ability to seek low prices, supervise contractors and intervene when work goes off course because the number of government workers overseeing contracts has remained level as spending has

shot up.”92

Indeed, the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded in its October 2007 report:

“The Institutional Army has not adjusted to the challenges of providing

timely, efficient, and effective contracting support to the force in Operation

Iraqi Freedom. . . . Essentially, the Army sent a skeleton contracting force

into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support

our warfighters.”93 This is not surprising, given that the Army cut its contracting workforce in half in the mid-1990s and has kept it stagnant since.

Yet, complexity has increased dramatically in the past decade and workload

is up by more than 600 percent.94

Doug Brooks explains: “If we don’t use contractors, then who is going to

complete those functions? And if we use contractors, we better get the contracting right. Cost overruns are often related to deficiencies in contract

management and oversight. Contractors are often the ‘fall guys.’ For obvious reasons, you will not point out that problems are actually the client’s

fault. You make it to the front pages and get hammered in the headlines and

you suck it up!”95 He explains further:

Take the competitive contracts vs. noncompetitive contract numbers with a

grain of salt. Often competed contracts have to be modified in such a way that it

is administratively easier to simply re-award them to the firm that already won

the contract as an ‘urgent and compelling’ sole-sourced contract. This has been

especially true in contingency operations. It saves the government the time and

cost of rebidding the contract. And time is usually more important than money

in contingency operations.96

“It is clear,” so the House Appropriations Committee concluded, “that

DOD currently lacks the means to provide proper oversight of its service

contracts, in part because of an insufficient number of contract oversight

personnel.”97 This view is shared by experts in the field. As one former

senior army general officer remarked, “In Iraq contract management for

non-LOGCAP was a ‘pick-up game.’ When done at all, it was a secondary

function.”98

CONDUCT UNBECOMING

To industry members and critics, tighter oversight was long overdue. Singer

explains, “Even when contractors do military jobs, they remain private businesses and thus fall outside the military chain of command and justice systems.”99 Unlike military units, private companies can decide which contracts
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 17

to take, and they can walk away from any contract and abandon operations if

they become unprofitable or too dangerous. Of course, in doing so, companies may jeopardize their prospects for repeat business.

And indeed, numerous firms delayed, suspended, or ended their operations in Iraq, leaving the military in the lurch to pick up the slack. As James

Surowiecki commented in The New Yorker, “No contract can guarantee that

private employees will stick around in a combat zone. After the Iraq War,

some contractors refused assignments to dangerous parts of the country.

That left American troops sitting in the mud, and without hot food. . . .”100

Moreover, when things go wrong, as they did in Abu Ghraib, holding

private contractors accountable for their actions has proven difficult. “It’s

bad enough,” industry watcher David Isenberg concludes, “that the CIA

[Central Intelligence Agency] has reverted to torture in its questioning of

terrorist suspects and covered up evidence by destroying the tapes; but it’s

even worse to hand these tasks over to private companies operating under

classified contracts that are themselves illegal to disclose and who are

answerable only to their stockholders.”101

The watchdog group Human Rights First arrives at a sobering assessment: “The failure to investigate and prosecute these violent attacks has created a culture of impunity that angers the local population, undermines the

military mission, and promotes more abuse by contractors over time.”102

In its investigation of the Nisour Square shooting, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation concluded that at least fourteen out of the seventeen shootings

were unjustified and that Blackwater guards had “recklessly violated American rules for the use of lethal force.”103 Iraqi authorities went a step further

and characterized the incident as “deliberate murder.” Nonetheless, the

guards could not be prosecuted under Iraqi law because of an immunity

proclamation made by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the governing

authority installed by American troops following the invasion. 

Dating back to a CPA order from June 2004, contractors working for

U.S. agencies were immune to Iraqi law with regard to all actions performed

in fulfilment of their contractual obligations. A June 2003 CPA notice specified the status of contractor personnel:

In accordance with international law, the CPA, Coalition Forces and the military and civilian personnel accompanying them, are not subject to local law or

the jurisdiction of local courts. With regard to criminal, civil, administrative or

other legal process, they will remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the

State contributing them to the Coalition.104

And CPA Order No. 17 (Section 4.3) specified that non-Iraqi “contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed

by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract or sub-contract

thereto.” As a consequence, none of the contractors implicated in the Abu

Ghraib prison scandal were prosecuted for their abusive interrogation techniques. 
18 CONDUCT UNBECOMING Volker Franke

Things finally turned around in December 2008 when, in a first application of the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act, five Blackwater guards

were indicted for their involvement in the Nisour Square shooting. According to Doug Brooks, “Some fifty MEJA cases appear to be pending right

now, but that information is confidential. We are quite happy with those

developments, but we would like to see an open MEJA process. Ultimately,

it would be great to have one comprehensive bill for all contractors.”105

Self-policing of an Industry

To date, most disciplinary actions, particularly for minor offences, are still

left to the industry. Brooks knows this situation might not be ideal, but “in

any environment like that, you don’t have the luxury of boards of appeal and

courts for minor offences. What happens is the people are fired. Unfortunately, that’s what you have to do in this environment.”106

The International Peace Institute admonishes that “the absence of effective regulation leaves responsible industry players and investors without the

guidance they require, and allows less responsible players to indulge in contractual fraud and price gouging, and to hide the true social and economic

costs of their activities—including violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”107

Even the very latest regulatory schemes fall short of providing comprehensive mechanisms for controlling the behavior of security firms or of individual contractors. In September 2008, seventeen states, including the

United States, finalized the so-called Montreaux Document, the first international document to describe international law as it applies to the activities

of private military and security companies whenever these are present in the

context of an armed conflict.108 Itself not legally binding, the Montreaux

Document provides important guidance to states—there is no comparable

guidance tailored to the industry. But “The absence of effective standards

enforcement arrangements,” the International Peace Institute concludes,

“casts a pall over the industry as a whole, exposing it to claims that it does

not respect human rights.”109

While there is currently no regulatory industry standard, there are strong

incentives for companies to monitor their employees’ behavior and adopt

self-regulating mechanisms to strengthen transparency, accountability, and

predictability. Many, but far from all, of the private security firms operating

in Iraq adhere to the IPOA’s Code of Conduct, developed as an ethical standard for corporate members operating in conflict/postconflict environments. The Code of Conduct pledges IPOA members to respect human

rights; operate with integrity, honesty, and fairness; recognize and support

legal accountability; work only for legitimate and recognized governments,

international and nongovernmental organizations, and lawful private companies; and ensure adequate training and vetting of their personnel.110

As of March 2009, the IPOA serves a total of fifty-three corporate members, all of whom have signed its Code of Conduct and have pledged to
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 19

abide by the ethical standards established therein. And self-regulation seems

an attractive choice for many companies. IPOA membership has more than

doubled since 2006. Roland Vargoega, owner and president of Dynsec

Group, affirms: “Our membership in IPOA has helped differentiate our

company by the fact that our clients can see that we live up to the highest

standard within the industry. By such, IPOA has helped us win contracts.”111

And Brooks affirms, “[o]ne of the great misconceptions is that the industry seeks to evade laws, regulations and accountability. In fact, rules and

guidelines can make commercial operations far easier, more predictable and

simpler. They also serve as a barrier for entry to less professional companies

and limit the ability of those firms to tarnish the entire industry.”112

However, at this time, there is no uniform evaluation of the IPOA or

similar corporative codes or their implementation by government agencies.

Notably though, Blackwater is missing from the IPOA member roster.113

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CFS Contractor field services

DOD Department of Defense

ESS Eurest support services

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

IPOA International Peace Operations Association

KBR Kellogg, Brown & Root

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

MRE Meal-ready-to-eat

PMC Private Military Contractor

PSC Private security company

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

SEAL Sea, Air, Land

USIS U.S. Information Service

ENDNOTES

1. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary

Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007).

2. Doug Brooks, “Recipe for Success,” Journal of International Peace Operations, 4,

2 (Sept.-Oct. 2008): p. 6. 

3. Robert D. Kaplan, “Outsourcing Conflict,” TheAtlantic.com, September 2007,

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200709u/kaplan-blackwater (accessed February 25,

2009).

4. Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in
20 ENDNOTES Volker Franke

Iraq,” August 2008, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.

pdf (accessed March 31, 2009).

5. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Memorandum,”

October 1, 2007, p. 1, http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf

(accessed March 30, 2009).

6. James Risen and Timothy Williams, “U.S. Looks for Blackwater Replacement in

Iraq,” New York Times, January 30, 2009, p. A1.

7. “Iraqi leader suggests U.S. Embassy cut ties with Blackwater,” USA Today,

September 20, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-19-black

water-almaliki_N.htm?csp=34 (accessed May 27, 2009).

8. Farah Stockman, “Contractors in War Zones lose Immunity,” Boston Globe,

January 7, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2007/01/07/contrac

tors_in_war_zones_lose_immunity/ (accessed May 27, 2009).

9. CBO, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq” (Washington, DC:

August 2008), p. 1. The CBO study pointed out that the contractor-military ratio was also

1:1 (at twenty thousand estimated personnel) during the reconstruction efforts in the

Balkans. See page 13 of the study. 

10. See www.icasualties.org, here specifically http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Con

tractors.aspx. For further information, see also http://www.dbacomp.com/Casualties.html

(both accessed June 2, 2009).

11. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry,

updated edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 19.

12. These troops were called Hessians, since more than half of them originated

from the German district of Hesse-Kassel.

13. See http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/pmc/pages.asp?country=us&id

=10&misc1=exec-sum (accessed March 26, 2009). Readers ought to note that the

contractor ratios in earlier conflicts (for example, the Korean War or World War II) were

much lower, since reconstruction efforts began only after the fighting had ended, while in

Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, reconstruction and military operations are/being/were

undertaken simultaneously.

14. CBO, “Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces” (Washington, DC:

October 2005), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6794/10-20-MilitaryLogistics

Support.pdf (accessed March 31, 2009).

15. Ibid., p. 1.

16. CBO, “Logistics Support,” p. 2.

17. Quoted in ibid., p. 2.

18. CBO, “Logistics Support.”

19. Peter W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2005): p.

120.

20. Bonn International Center for Conversion, Conversion Survey 2005 (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2005).

21. Herbert Wulf, Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace (Baden-Baden:

Nomos, 2005).

22. Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 20, 38.

23. Ibid., p. 49.

24. The phrase and the hope for a new world order were initially stated by

President George H. W. Bush in a speech before the United Nations (UN) General

Assembly in 1990. For details, see Robert W. Gregg, About Face? The United States and the

United Nations (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 135–136.

25. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold

War (New York: Random House, 2000).

26. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 21

Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

27. Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 51.

28. Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 88–100.

29. With plenty of highly skilled individuals with military training looking for

employment and a rapidly expanding global security market, companies offering combat

and combat support services blossomed in the mid-1990s. Early success stories included

the South African-based company Executive Outcomes, whose engagement forced

negotiations in Angola and facilitated the end of fighting in Sierra Leone. For further detail,

see also Wulf, Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace; and David Keen, Conflict

and Collusion in Sierra Leone (London, New York: James Currey Publishers, 2005).

30. Doug Brooks, Testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform, June 13, 2006, http://ipoaonline.org/en/gov/ipoashays.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009).

31. Tish Durkin, “Heavy Metal Mercenary,” Rolling Stone, Sept. 9, 2004, www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/6477829/heavy_metal_mercenary (accessed March 19,

2009).

32. Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 40.

33. Quoted in Scahill, Blackwater, p. 146.

34. Brooks, “Testimony,” p. 3.

35. Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol 1, Article 47, http://www.unhchr.ch/

html/menu3/b/93.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).

36. See “Private Security Companies Engaging in New Forms of Mercenary

Activity, Says UN Working Group” (Geneva: UN press release, November 6, 2007), http:/

/www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/

AC7F341BE422A006C125738B0055C48C?opendocument (accessed June 2, 2009).

37. Alexander G. Higgins, “US rejects UN Mercenary Report,” USA Today,

October 17, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_

x.htm (accessed June 2, 2009).

38. Quoted in Scahill, Blackwater, p. 146.

39. See http://www.unitedpmc.com/companies.htm (accessed March 26, 2009).

40. Quoted in Scahill, Blackwater, p. 146.

41. Ibid., p. 146.

42. Interview with the author on background, March 26, 2009.

43. Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New

York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), p. 95.

44. Ibid., p. 92.

45. Interview with the author on background, March 26, 2009.

46. The text of the speech is available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/

PrintArticle.aspx?id=98124731 (accessed March 27, 2009).

47. Charles Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military

Organization,” Armed Forces & Society 4 (Winter 1977): pp. 41–50.

48. Quoted in “Tomgram: Pratap Chatterjee, Inheriting Halliburton’s Army,”

February 19, 2009, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175036/pratap_chatterjee_

inheriting_halliburton_s_army (accessed March 27, 2009).

49. Ibid.

50. Quoted in House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

“Memorandum,” p. 14.

51. Quoted in Scahill, Blackwater, p. 24.

52. Thomas Frank, “Government by Contractor is a Disgrace,” Wall Street Journal,

November 26, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122765980278958481.html

(accessed March 24, 2009).

53. Doug Brooks, e-mail to the author, April 4, 2009.
22 ENDNOTES Volker Franke

54. Quoted in Frank, “Government by Contractor,” http://online.wsj. com/

article/SB122765980278958481.html (accessed March 25, 2009). For further detail on

the findings of the Grace Commission, see also http://www.uhuh.com/taxstuff/

gracecom.htm, and http://www.thetruthnews.info/GraceCommissionReport.pdf (both

accessed March 25, 2009).

55. Ibid.

56. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, “The

President’s Management Agenda” (Washington, DC, 2002), p. 17, http://www.mbe.

doe.gov/me2-1/a76/PresMgmtInit.pdf (accessed March 19, 2009).

57. The text of the speech is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/

speech.aspx?speechid=430.

58. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” September 30,

2001, p. 53, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed March 30,

2009).

59. Ibid., pp. 53–54.

60. More detail on LOGCAP can be found at http://www.global security.org/

military/agency/army/logcap.htm (accessed February 19, 2009).

61. For further detail, see http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/27/18864-armysegues-from-logcap-iii-to-iv/ (accessed June 02, 2009).

62. CBO, “Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces.” LOGCAP III was

awarded as a cost-plus-award-fee contract. As such, the contractor is reimbursed “for all

reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs to perform the work, plus a base fee and an award

fee,” based on successive award bands ranging from “average” to “excellent.” LOGCAP III

was designed with a 1 percent profit margin and an additional 2 percent bonus for

“excellent” work.

63. See http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/27/18864-army-seguesfrom-logcap-iii-toiv/ (accessed June 2, 2009).

64. Government Accountability Office, “Contingency Contracting: DOD, State,

and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Washington,

DC: GAO, September 19, 2008), http://www.gao. gov/new.items/d0919.pdf (accessed

February 23, 2009).

65. CBO, “Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces.”

66. Brooks, “Testimony.” Revising his initial estimates, Brooks now acknowledges

that “it is unlikely that PSCs in Iraq ever did much more than $1 billion in business a year,

and globally maybe $2 billion at the most.” Doug Brooks e-mail to the author, April 4,

2009.

67. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Memorandum.”

68. CBO, “Contractors’ Support,” p. 14.

69. Ibid., p. 14.

70. Doug Brooks, interview with the author, March 25, 2009.

71. Erik Eckholm, “The Reach of War: Congress; Auditors testify about Waste in

Iraq Contracts,” New York Times, June 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/

world/the-reach-of-war-congress-auditors-testify-about-waste-in-iraq-contracts.html?sec=

&spon=&pagewanted=all (accessed March 30, 2009).

72. Joseph Neff and Jay Price, “Contractors in Iraq make Costs balloon: Extensive

Paramilitary Work earns Profit on several Levels,” News & Observer (Raleigh, NC), Oct.

24, 2004, p. 1, http://www.newsobserver.com/front/story/241329.html (accessed

February 23, 2009).

73. Ibid., p. 1.

74. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” p. 124.

75. Quoted in Neff and Price, “Contractors in Iraq make Costs balloon,” p. 1.

76. Quoted in Eckholm, “The Reach of War.” 
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 23

77. Bill Buzenberg, “Baghdad Bonanza: The Top 100 Private Contractors in Iraq

and Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: The Center for Public Integrity), http://

projects.publicintegrity.org/wowII/ (accessed February 25, 2009).

78. The text of the legislation is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s119is.txt.pdf (accessed March 27,

2009). For detail on the Senate bill, see http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200701/

010407b.html (accessed June 2, 2009).

79. The text of the bill is available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/

billtext.xpd?bill=s110-674 (accessed June 02, 2009).

80. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2740&tab= summary (accessed March 19, 2009).

81. See http://price.house.gov/list/press/nc04_price/121207.shtml (accessed

March 27, 2009).

82. Barack Obama, “Address to Joint Session of Congress,” February 24, 2009,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-ObamaAddress-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress/ (accessed February 25, 2009).

83. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/04/priorities_not-lining-thePockets-of-Contractors/ (accessed March 27, 2009).

84. Jon Dougherty, “Army to cut funding for Intelligence School?” WorldNetDaily,

January 30, 002, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ ID=26243

(accessed March 18, 2009).

85. .

Pratap Chatterjee, interview with Democracy Now, May 12, 2004; transcript at

http://www.democracynow.org/2004/5/12/private_contractors_ and_torture_at_abu

(accessed March 18, 2009).

86. David Isenberg, “Dogs of War: Who watches the watchers?” Middle East Times,

October 17, 2008, http://www.metimes.com/Security/2008/10/17/dogs_of_war_who_

watches_the_watchers/4aaf/ (accessed March 25, 2009).

87. For further detail, see Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 92-1,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/policy_letters/92-1_092392.html

(accessed June 2, 2009); a list of inherently government functions is provided in Appendix

A. The Project on Government Oversight has posted the full and unedited U.S.

Information Service (USIS) contract on its Web site. The contract specifies that USIS is to

assist the Regional Security Office in Baghdad by “investigating incident scenes;

interviewing witnesses, collecting and analyzing evidence; preparing detailed, accurate and

concise written reports; testifying in judicial and administrative proceedings; analyzing

incidents for compliance with policy, laws and regulations; reviewing incidents for

identifiable patterns or notable deficiencies in policy, training or procedures; maintaining

case files and tracking the status of investigations; preparing statistical reports and

providing other investigative-related services.” For further detail, see http://

pogoarchives.org/m/co/usis-contract-20080601. pdf (accessed March 25, 2009).

88. Ibid.

89. See also Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence

Outsourcing (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); and Frank, “Government by

Contractor is a Disgrace.”

90. Ibid.

91. Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, “US: In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest

Role Ever,” New York Times, February 4, 2007.

92. Ibid.

93. The report is available at http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Com

mission_Report_Final_071031.pdf, here p. 8 (accessed March 26, 2009).

94. The dollar value of army contracts increased by 331 percent (from $23.3 billion

in 1992 to $100.6 billion in 2006) and the number of contract actions increased 654

percent (from 52,900 to 398,700) over the same period. See ibid., p. 30.
24 ENDNOTES Volker Franke

95. Doug Brooks, interview with the author, March 25, 2009.

96. Doug Brooks, e-mail comment to the author, April 4, 2009.

97. Gansler Commission Report, p. 42.

98. Ibid., p. 41.

99. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” p. 124.

100. Quoted in David Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover: PMCs in Iraq,”

Conference paper, prepared for “Market Forces: Regulating Private Military Companies

(New York: New York University School of Law, Institute for International Law and

Justice), March 23–24, 2006, p. 5, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/pmcs0603.pdf

(accessed March 30, 2009).

101. David Isenberg, “Dogs of War: Inherently governmental?” United Press

International, May 9, 2008, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php? id=15028 (accessed

March 25, 2009).

102. Human Rights First, “Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture

of Impunity” (New York, January 15, 2008), p. iii, 

103. Ginger Thompson and James Risen, “US: Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps

Indict Others,” New York Times, December 9, 2008, http://www. nytimes.com/2008/12/

09/washington/09blackwater.html?ref=world (accessed March 30, 2009).

104. The texts of the CPA orders can be found at http://www.pscai.org/

cpadocs.html (accessed March 19, 2009).

105. Doug Brooks, interview with the author, March 25, 2009.

106. Peter Spiegel, “Iraq: No Contractors facing Abu Ghraib Abuse Charges,”

Financial Times, August 9, 2005, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12535

(accessed March 18, 2009).

107. James Cockayne, et al., “Beyond Market Forces: A Feasibility Study for a

Standards Implementation and Enforcement Framework for the Global Security Industry”

(New York: International Peace Institute, September 8, 2008), p. x, http://

www.unwg.rapn.ru/en/analytics/IPI_Study_-_EXEC_SUMM_CONSULT_DRAFT.pdf

(accessed March 30, 2009).

108. The Montreaux Document is the product of an initiative launched

cooperatively by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

It was developed in a series of meetings between 2006 and 2008, with the participation of

experts from seventeen governments and in consultation with representatives of civil

society and of the private military and security industry. The document reaffirms the

obligation for states to ensure that private military and security companies operating in

armed conflicts comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. The

document lists some seventy recommendations, derived from good state practice,

including verifying the track record of companies and examining the procedures they use to

vet their staff. The text of the document is available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/

siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-170908/$FILE/Montreux-Document-eng.pdf

(accessed June 2, 2009).

109. Cockayne et al., “Beyond Market Forces,” p. 5.

110. The latest version of the IPOA Code of Conduct, adopted in February 2009, is

available at http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofcon ductv12en.html (accessed March

29, 2009).

111. See http://ipoaworld.org/eng/testimonials.html (accessed March 19, 2009).

112. Brooks, “Testimony,” p. 3.

113. An updated membership list is available at http://ipoaworld.org/eng/

memberslist.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
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