COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
JONATHAN MATHEW KNIGHT ,

Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ,

Appellee. § § § § § § No. 08

- 16

- 00123

- CR

Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1 of El Paso County, Texas (TC# 20150C06154 )

O P I N I O N A jury convicted Appellant of assault causing bodily injury, family member, and he was sentenced to 270 days of incarceration in the El Paso County Detention Facility. On evidentiary and constitutional grounds, Appellant challenges admission of two items of evidence: (1) a recording of a 911 call; and (2) the computer

- aided dispatch report of the call (CAD report). We affirm. BACKGROUND On July 4, 2015, at 3: 07 in the morning, Officers Lugardo Garcia and Joshua Arroyos of the El Paso Police Department were dispatched to a m otel room in El Paso, Texas , to respond to a 911 call reporting assault family violence in progress

. A female caller , sounding hysterical and crying , reported she had been hit by her boyf riend and her face was swollen. As she asked for2

help, a male voice could be heard in the background and they continued arguing while the call taker asked for further information

. Dur ing the call, she identified Appellant as her assailant and gave the motel room number among other bits of information. Within minutes, o fficers arrived

on scene . Appellant answered when officers knocked at the room she identified

. As the door opened, t hey could also see a female in side whom they believed to be the c aller who asked for help. O fficers immediately separated the parties to speak to them individually. The female identified herself as Valerie Nieto. Initially, Officer Garcia spoke to Nieto inside the hotel room, while Officer Arroyos spoke with Appellant outside in the parking lot

. 1
Officer Garcia described Nieto as being distraught and crying , and he saw “bruising to her face.” Officer Arroyos also testified he observed that Nieto had “ r edness ” and injuries to her face , was crying, and appeared to be in distress while speaking to the officers

. Officer Garcia took photographs of Nieto’s visible injuries, some of which were introduced into evidence. These photographs depicted injuries to her lower lip and to the left side of her face, a cut next to or below her eye, bruising and swelling on the right sid e of her face, and fresh blood below her nose

. Neither Officer Arroyos nor Officer Garcia observed any injuries on Appellant at th e time they spoke

. 2 Upon concluding their investigation, the officers arrested Appellant, and he was subsequently charged by information with causing bodily injury to Valerie Nieto by striking he r about the head with his hand.

1 Neither statement was introduced into evidence. In addition, Officer Garcia took a family violence video statement from the complainant, but that was also not introduced into evidence.

2 In addition, at trial, the State introduced a booking photograph of Appellant , which did not reveal any apparent injuries to his face.3 The Admission of the 911 recording and the CAD Report
At trial, the State sought admission of two items: (1) a recording of the 911 call , and (2) the cal l taker’s report pertaining to the call (CAD report)

. Appellant objected to both exhibits on
t wo grounds: first, that neither exhibit was properly authenticated as the caller did not i dentify herself during the 911 call and the State failed to sufficiently link the exhibits to the incident reported ; and, second, that admission of the exhibits violated Appellant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses at trial. First, t he State called Wilmarie Andino, custodian of r ecords for the El Paso Police Department ’s 911 call center , to testif y about retrieval of the records at issue. In a voir dire examination outside the presence of the jury, Andino explained that all calls received through the computer and phone systems of the 911 call center were date and time stamped by the system

. As

c all s are received, the call is r oute d by the system to the next available call taker and is automatically recorded once the call is answered. While on the call, the call taker documents
p ertinent information needed for first responders being dispatched

. As a custod ian of records, Andino retrieve s 911 records by u s ing information such as an address of occurrence, date and time, or a related law enforcement number. Andino testified that all 911 records are made at the time of the call, regularly kept by the El Paso Police Department, and contain firsthand information reported by the 911 caller to the call taker

. Andino testified that she personally retrieved both the recording and the CA D report related to the 911 call on the morning in question which were marked as State’s Exhibits One and Two

. Andino further
t estified on voir dire that she had listened to the recording, and that she could identify the voice of the call taker, but not t he person who made the call.4

Following Andino, the State called Officer Garcia who testified on voir dire that he was familiar with the complaining witness’s voice due to his interaction with her in the motel room on the morning in question. He further te stified that he had listened to the 911 record ing and believed that the caller’s voice on the recording was that of the complaining witness. After hearing arguments from both sides, the tri al court ruled in favor of the State a s to admission of both the 911 recording and the CAD report of the call

. Before admitting the two exhibits, the State re

- called Andino to testif y in front of the jury

. As before, Andino testified that the 911 recording and the CAD report were records that were regularly k ept by the El Paso Police Department, and that they both had an El Paso Police Department number on them, which allowed her to identify records requested w hen she retrieved them for trial. She further testified on voir dire examination that she personally placed the 911 recording on the CD that the State intended to play for the jury, and that her handwr iting was on the outside of that exhibit. Over Appellant’s continuing objection, both the recording and the CAD report were admitted into eviden ce and the recording was pl ayed for the jury. As discussed in more detail below, o n the recording, the complaining witness, who is heard crying and upset, immediately states that her boyfriend had “just” hit her in the face , and that she needed help. She identified her boyfriend by name as the Appellant but did not give her own

name . A male voice is also heard in the background , and the two can be heard arguing during the call , and the caller can also be heard screaming at him at times , complaining about the injuri es he had inflicted on her

. At one point, the caller states that Appellant had hit her five times. After the recording was played, Officer Garcia testified he recognized the voices on the recording as being Nieto and Appellant with who m he had interacted after being dispatched to the motel, but5

he coul d not identify the call taker. Following trial, t he jury found Appellant guilty of one count of assault causing bodily injury of a family member, as charged in the information, and was sentenced t o 270 days in the county jail. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION
In four related issues, Appellant challenges the admission of the 911 recording and the CAD report

. In Issue One , Appellant contends the trial court abuse d its discretion and asserts that
t he 911 recording and associated CAD report were not properly “ authenticated ” for admission into evidence. In Issue Two, Appellant contends that the trial court should not have admitted the 911 recording because the complaining witness’s voice was not sufficiently identifie d by the witnesses at trial. In Issues Three and Four, Appellant contends that the admission of both the 911 recording and the CAD report violated his right to confront witnesses. We disagree with all four issues. AUTHENTICATION OF THE EXHIBITS Standard of Review and Applicable Law Under Texas Rules of Evidence Rule 104(a), a preliminary question to be decided by the trial court is whether to admit evidence at trial

. Tienda v. State , 358 S.W.3d 633, 637

– 3 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

. T o be admissible, e vidence must be relevant ; and, if it is not “authentically” what its proponent claims it to be , it is not relevant

. Id. at 638. To sufficiently authenticate an item of evidence, including sound recordings, Rule 901(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item in question is what the proponent claims it to be

. T EX .R.E VID
. 901(a); see also Leos v. State , 883 S.W.2d 209, 211

– 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (recognizing that Rule 901 governs the admissibility of6

electronic recordings, including “sound recordings”). T he proffering party may present the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge sufficient to authenticate the proposed evidence.
See T EX .R.E VID
. 901(b)(1). As well, Rule 901 (b)(6) provides that the proffering party may submit “evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time to: (A) a particular person, if circumstances, including self

- iden tification, show that the person answering was the one called; or (B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.” T EX .R.E VID
. 901(b)(6). This method may be used to authenticate a call made to a 911 call center, as such calls are made in the regular course of a 911 center’s “business of emergency dispatching.” 3 Esnard v. State , No. 05

- 02

- 01812

- CR, 2003 WL 22332395, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Oct. 14, 2003, no pet.) (no t designated for publication). Appellate review of a trial court ’ s ruling on the preliminary question s of whether an item of evidence has been properly authenticated is deferential, and the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion. Tie nda , 358 S .W.3d at 638 (citing Druery v. State , 225 S.W. 3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007 ) ); see generally Davis v. State , 313 S.W.3d 31 7, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (t he trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion ). Therefore,
i f the trial court’s decision on issues of authenticity falls within a zone of reasonable disagreement, it will be upheld on appeal. Tienda , 358 S.W. 3d at 638; see also B untion v. State , 482 S.W.3d 58, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
I ssue One: Linking of Stat e’s Exhibits One and Two to the Actual 911 Call In Issue One, Appellant argues that the two exhibits that the State entered into evidence

—

3 Appellant contends, without citation to authority, that the call was not made to a “place of business.” We agree with the Court in Esnard , however, that a 911 Call Center operates as a place of business for emergency calls. Esnard v. State , No. 05

- 02

- 01812

- CR, 2003 WL 22332395, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Oct. 14, 2003, no pet.) (no t designated for publication)

.7

the 911 recording and the CAD report

— were not properly authenticated as being related to the call received on the morning of July 4, 2015 , by an unknown female . Specifically , Appellant
argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to link the two exhibits to the actual call that was made by the complaining witness

. Appellant contends that Andino’s testimony was insufficient to authenticate the exhib its, as she only testified about the 911 call center’s “standard practices” in terms of how calls are received and recorded, and how recordings and CAD report s

are stored and retrieved . Appellant claims Andino fa iled to testify with respect to how she established that the two exhibits in question were authentic representations of the recording and
C AD report relating to the 911 call that was received on the morning in question

. There are several problems with App ellant’s arguments. First, we note that Appellant did not raise this challenge to the evidence in the trial court.
To preserve a challenge for appellate review, a defendant must object to the admission of evidence in the trial court, stating the specific grounds for his objection

. See, e.g ., Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (where defendant only objected to admission of evidence on hearsay grounds, he waived his right to argue that the evidence violated his ri ght to confrontation on appeal); see generally T EX .R.A PP .P . 33.1 (as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate re view, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court, stating the grounds for the complaint with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds wer e apparent from the context). Thus, n ew grounds may not be added on appeal that were not raised in the trial court. Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 536 ; T EX .R.A PP .P . 33.1

. Here, the record shows that A ppellant object ed on the basis of hearsay, C onfrontation8

C lause violation , and a failure to identify the complaining witness’s voice on the recording ; however, he did not object on the ground that the exhibits were not authentic representations of
t he records associated with the 911 call received from complainant on July 4 , 2015

. Thus, we find that Appellant failed to preserve error a s to this specific complaint.
Moreover , even if we were to consider this issue preserved for review , we would find it to be without merit, as the exhibits were properly authenticated by Andino’s testimony. Appellant does not appear to dispute that Andino had sufficient knowledge regarding the stand ard procedures followed by the call c enter in receiving, st oring , and retrieving records. And in fact, we note that Andino testified extensively regarding those procedures during both her direct and voir dire examinations. However, contrary to Appellant’s argument, Andino’s testimony was not limited to simply
exp laining the gene ral procedures followed by the call c enter. Instead, she testified that she was personally responsible for retrieving the exhibits in question the day before trial , and that she knew the exhibits she retrieved were related to the July 4 ca ll, as the number s on the exhibits correlated
to the police number assigned to the case. Andino f urther testified that before she retrieved the exhibits, they had been in the continuous custody of the El Paso Police Department

. Andino also testified that after she retrieved the recording, she placed it on a CD, which had her handwriting on it, thereby enabling her to identify the recording as the same one received by the Call Center on July 4. In addition, Andino testified that she had listened to the re cording, and that she could identify the call taker’s voice on the recording submitted as evidence

. Further, we note that the CAD report itself had identifying information on it, linking it to the 911 call in question. Specifically, the report had the El Paso Police Department case number9

on it, date and time stamped at 3:07 a.m. on July 4, 2015, and stated that it related to the 911 call reporting assault family violence in progress at the motel room where the defendant and complain ant were later located by law enforcement who responded

. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to authenticate the exhibits in question as being what they purported to be, i.e., evidence of the call received by the 911 Call Center on the morning in question. See, e.g ., Montoya v. State , 43 S.W.3d 568 , 571 (Tex . App.

— Waco 2001, no pet.) (911 recording was prope rly authenticated under Rule 901, where an officer testified that she was the custodian of the 911 tapes, had listened to the tape in question, that the tape was ma de in the ordinary course of business at the Fort Worth Police Department, that it was made at or near the time of the events recorded, that the record was made by a person with the responsibility for making such record, and that the record was made by a p erson with kn owledge of the events recorded); see also Esnard , 2003 WL 22332395, at *2 (911 call recording was ad missible under Rule 901 where custodian of records testified that all 911 calls are recorded and the call related to the busin ess of emergency dispatching); Kelly v. State , No. 14

- 96

- 00788

- CR, 1998 WL 724856 , at *4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] October 1, 1998, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (911 recording was admissible under Rule 901 where 911 custodian testified that the call i n question came from a convenience store that was robbed on the night of the capital murder case on trial, she was able to identify most of the voices on the tape, and she personally reviewed and copied the relevant portion of the dispatch call). A ppellan t’s Issue One is o verruled.

Issue Two: Authentication of V oice on the 911 Reco rding In Issue Two, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the 911 recording because complaining witness Valerie Nieto did not identify herself on the recording , or10

alternatively, that the trial court erred by allowing Officer Garcia to id entify Nieto ’ s voice

. We disagree. There are a variety of methods by which a caller’s voice may be authenticated or identified on a telephone recording. As Appellant correctly points out, one method of establishing the identity of a caller on a recording is through self

- identification. S ee , e.g., Mosl e y v. State , 355 S.W.3d 59, 69 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 201 0 , pet. ref’d) ( methods of authenticating the identity of a telephone caller include “ self

- identification of the caller coupled with additional evidence such as the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge and facts known peculiarly to the calle r ”); Manemann v. State, 878 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1994, pet. ref’ d) (same). In addition, Rule 901 allows for a witness to o ffer an “ opinion identifying a person’ s voice

— whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording

— based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker. ” T EX
. R. E VID
. 901(b)(5) ; see also Manemann, 878 S.W.2d at 338 ( noting that se lf

- identification is not the only method of identifying a caller’s voice, and that instead the testimony of the recipient of a call that he recog nized the voice of the caller was

“ competent to establish the identity of the caller, when the recipient at eit her a prior or subsequent time has been in the caller ’ s presence and heard him speak ” )

. Manemann, 878 S.W.2d at 338 (citing Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316 (Miss. 1989) )

. Moreover, the person making the identification of the caller need not be the recipient of the call, and may instead b e a third party , such as a police officer, who has simply listened to a recording of the call and is able to identify the voice due to his familiarly with it

. See, e.g .,11

Diamond v. State , 496 S.W.3d 124, 142 (Tex. App.

— H oust on [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (authentication of jail phone calls held proper, in part, because officer interviewed defendant after his arrest and testified that he recognized defendant’s voice as the voice on the phone calls); see also Carreon v. Stat e , No. 08

- 00

- 00521

- CR, 2002 WL 725252, at *3 (Tex. App.

— El Paso April 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (in drug

- delivery case, where undercover officer testified that the two voices on a tape recording were his voice and the defendant’s voice, the tape was properly authenticated); Jones v. State , 80 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ( informant’s identification of voice of defendant from whom he made a drug buy was sufficient to authenticate the tap e under R ule 901); Brooks v. State , 921 S.W.2d 875, 880 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff ’ d , 957 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (in drug delivery case, where undercover officer recorded a drug transaction and later testified as to the identity of the voices on the recording, the testimony of the officer was sufficient to authenticate the recording).
Here , Officer Garcia testified that he had listened to the 911 recording and was able to identify the voice of the caller as being Nieto based on his interview wi th her when he responded
to the motel room she had described

. In addition, he was also able to identify Appellant’s voice on the recording based on his interaction with him at the motel as well. We note that in the trial court, Appellant reacted with skepticism about Officer Garcia’s ability to identify Nieto’s voice based on his limited interaction with her. Ultimately, however, as a finding of fact, the trial court determine s Officer Garcia’s credibility on t he issue. See Manemann , 878 S.W.2d at 338 (noting that it is ultimately up to the trier of fact to determine whether the voices on a recording have been accurately identified). On review, we find that the trial court’s finding is supported by ample12

evide nce. Appellant has cited no authority, nor are we aware of any, that would render Officer Garcia’s testimony inadmissible or insufficient for purposes of identifying the voices on the 911 recording. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Officer Garcia’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate the 911 recording

. Appel lant’s Issue Two is o verruled. CONFRON TATION CLAUSE In his third and fourth issue s, Appellant argues that both the 911 recording and the CAD report contained testimonial statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Because we find that the statements in question were not test imonial in nature, we disagree. Applicable Law and Standard of Review The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that an accused shall have the right to confront witnesses in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. C ONST . amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to cross

- examin e a witness applies to
st atements that are considered “testimonial” in nature

. Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 53

- 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1365, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). T herefore, a d efendant’s Sixth Amen dment rights are violated if a witness’s out

- of

- co urt testimonial statements are admitted at trial, unless the witness was unavailable, and the defendant had had a prior opportuni ty to cross

- examine the witness

. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 53

- 54, 124 S.Ct. at 1365

. Hence, to implicate the Confrontation Clause, an out

- of

- court statement “ must (1) have been made by a witness absent from trial and (2) be testimonial in nature. ” Woodall v. State , 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing13

Crawford , 541 U.S. at 5 0

– 52, 59, 124 S.Ct. at 13 63

- 64, 136 8

- 6 9 ); see also Woods v. State , 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that the threshold question under a Crawford analysis is whether an out

- of

- court statement was testimonial or non

- testim onial in nature); In re
M.H.V.

- P., 341 S.W.3d 553, 557 (Tex. A pp.

— El Paso 2011, no pet.). The C ourt in Crawford did not define the term “testimonial,” but did identify three types of “core” tes timonial evidence, including “statements that were made under circumstanc es which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial [

. ] ” Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51

– 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (citation omitted)

. This type of “ core ” testimonial evidence includes statements that were made in the course of police interrogation in non

- emergency situations, and where the primar y purpose of the interrogation wa s to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington , 5 4 7 U.S. 813, 813

– 14, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2268

– 69 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Although 911 call takers may no t necessarily be law enforcement officers themselves, they are considered an agent of law enforcement, and , in some circumstances, their questions to a caller
may be considered the equivalent of a police interrogation. Davis , 5 4 7 U.S. at 813, 823, 126 S.Ct.
at 2268, 2274. Therefore, as a threshold matter, statements made in response to a 911 call taker’s questions must be analyzed to determine if they should be co nsidered testimonial under the holding
in Crawford

. Id. at 817, 126 S.Ct. at 2270

- 71. The test is an objective one, and one of the key question s is whether the primary purpose of the call was to “enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 828, 126 S.Ct. at 2277; see also Ford v. State , No. 08

- 14

- 00093

- CR, 2016 WL 921385, at *3 (Tex. App.

— El Paso Mar. 9, 2016, pet. ref ’ d) (not designated for publication). Thus , a reviewing court must14

determine w hether the questions asked by the respo nding call taker were intended to “ elicit [] a response fro m the caller that would enable h i m to take steps to resolve the emergency ,” or whether they were “ directed at eliciting information about the defendant’s actions to be used in a future prosecution. ” Ford, 2016 WL 9 21385 , at *3. Statements made to resolve an ongoing emergency
are not typically considered testimonial in nature

. Id

. , at *2. However, once the emergency ends, statements made during a 911 call may thereafter become testimonial. See Davis , 5 4 7 U.S. at 829, 126 S.Ct. at 2277; Ford , 2016 WL 921385, at *3

– 4. As well, statements that describe past events, rather than events that are occurring in the present, are more likely to be considered testimonial. See Davis , 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S .Ct. at 2278 (statements made in response to an officer seeking to determine “what is happening” are less likely to be testimonial than statements made in response to questions seeking to determine “what happened”). Whether a statement is testimonial or n ot presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo

. See Langham v. State , 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Issue Three: 911 Recording & Confrontation Clause Requirements In Issue Three, Appellant contends the trial court committed rever sible error asserting that the 911 recording contained testimonial statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Appellant argues the call started as non

- testimonial but eventually evolved into testimonial statements once complainant spoke in past tense that she was assaulted by Appellant. We disagree.
In Ford v. State , we utilized four factors in determining whether statements made during a 911 call should be categorized as being testimonial

. See Ford , 2 016 WL 921385, at *3 (citing Martinez v. State , 236 S.W.3d 361, 371

– 72 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2007, pet. dism’d, untimely15

filed) )

. These factors are: (1) whether the caller was describing events as they were actually occurring; (2) whether a reasonable lis tener would recognize that the caller was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) whether the 911 dispatcher ’ s questions were meant to elicit responses in order to resolve the present emergency, rather than to simply learn what had happened in the past; and (4)

w hether the call took place in an environment that was not tranquil or was unsafe. Id . (citing Martinez , 236 S.W.3d at 371

– 72). Here, Appellant focuses only on the first two factor s in t he ana lysis, arguing that Nieto was primarily de scribing past events d uring her 911 call, and that any ongoing emergency had ceased by the time she made the majority of her statements

. In making this argument, A ppellant acknowledges that Nieto began her call by speaking more in the present tense, stating that Appellant had “just hit” her, and that the call therefore “started out as non

- testimonial.” Appellant
argues , however, that the call soon “evolved into testimonial statements subject to the Confrontation Clause,” as Nieto began describing events in the “past tense,” re porting that Appellant had previously hit her five times. Appellant argues that even though Nieto was crying and hysterical during the call, it was clear that the assault was over, and that Nieto no long er faced an ongoing emergency. Appellant likens his case to situation s compared in Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. at 227 6 , wherein one complainant provided statements to police while events were happening and the other spoke hours afterward from a place of safety. While w e recognize , as the Court did in Davis , that a 911 call could in fact begin with non

- testimonial statements and could later evolve into testimonial statements depending on the circumstances, we find no evolution in this case.16

Here , at the very start of her 911 call, N ieto immediately volunteered that she ha d “just” been hit by Appellant ; and further, she later described that Appellant had hit her five times . In context, i t was clear that the assault she described had only just occurred and she was asking for police h elp while she remained in the presence of her assailant

. In addition, she de scribed her injuries in the present tense, and stated that she was in current need of medical attention. Therefore, viewed objectively, we conclude that the primary purpose of Nieto ’s call was to report her current emergency and to receive assistance rather than to act as a witness who is relat ing a story about something that had occurred in the past but not then needing aid

. See Dixon v. State , 244 S.W.3d 472, 485 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) ( call made by complainant of assault , who advised 911 call taker that the defendant had recently hit her, was directed at reporting her current situation, rath er than to report past events). Similarly, based on our re view of the 911 recording , we conclude that a reasonable listener would believe that Nieto was still facing an ongoing emergency during the entirety of the 911 call. Throughout the call, Nieto was sobbing and sounded hysterical

. At various times s he could be heard arguing about her injuries and yelling at her assailant who remained present in the room. Moreover, Nieto expressly stated that she needed “help,” and wanted law enforcement to come to her aid which could in dicat e she remained in fear of further harm

. Moreover, the questions asked by the 911 call taker were not directed at ascertaining what had happened in the past, but rather were directed at ascertaining the nature of Nieto ’s emergency, her location, and her need for medical attention

. Specifically , the 911 call taker asked for the location of the motel where she was located, the room number, if she needed medical attention, the name and description of her assailant, what he hit her with , whether he used any weapons , and17

whether there we re any weapons at the scene . We note that these are the type of questions which a 911 call taker may ask pertaining to the law enforcement response to aid Nieto and to ensure their safety upon arrival

. See, e.g., Ford , 2016 WL 921385, at *5 (recognizing that a 911 operator may question the caller regarding whether the defendant had any weapons to determine her safety, as well as the safety of the officers who had been dispatched to the scene). In his briefing , Appellant has not identified any questions a sked by the call taker that went beyond what was necessary to resolve the ongoing emergency that Nieto was facing , or that appeared to be directed at information use d for a later prosecution. See Santacruz v. State , 237 S.W. 3d 822, 830 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (where complainant called 911 following an assault for the primary purpose of obtaining assistance, and the primary purpose of the 911 operator’s questions were to enable police to assist her, the statements made during the

ca l l were deemed non

- testimonial). Accordingly, we conclude that all of the factors set forth above weigh in favor of a conclusion that the statements made on the 911 recording were not testimonial in nature, and that the trial court therefore did not err in admitting the recording in its entirety

. Appel l ant’s Issue Three is overruled.

Issue Four: CAD Report & Confrontation Clause Requirements In Issue Four, apart from the 911 call itself, Appellant argues that the CAD report contained testimonial statements , and thus, its admission violated the Confron tation Clause of the U.S. Constitution

. Appellant points out that neither the call taker nor the individual who prepared the
CAD report from the call taker’s notes testified at trial, and the custodian of records acknowledged during her testimony that she did not have personal knowledge of information contained in the18

r eport

. Appellant contends th e report fall s within the “core class of testimonial statements ” of concern in Crawford , likening statements in the report to various categories of pretrial statements , such as “ex parte in

- court testimony,” affidavits, custodial examinations, and “prior testimony” that was not subject to cross

- examination

. Although Appellant acknowledges that the custodian testified at trial that the CAD report was produced for the benefit of the first responders, he contends that the CAD report was nevertheless created “under circumstances which would lead [an] objective witness to believe that [the] statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Appellant’s compla int appears to be two

- fold, first, that he was not able to cross - examine either Nieto about the statements contained in the CAD report, and second , that he was not able to cross

examine the individual who prepared the CAD report about th e statements contai ned therein. In support of his argument, Appellant relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s holding in Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U.S. 647, 665, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2717, 180 L. Ed.2d 610 (2011) , in which the Court held that a report of a blood

- alcohol analysis was testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, Bullcoming determined that the analys t who authored the report had p repared it primarily for use in a criminal prosecution. Id. Therefore, the Court held that the admission of the report violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witness es , as the analyst was not present in court subject to cross

- examination regarding
out

- of

- court statements made in his report. Id. In response, the S tate contends that CAD reports , unlike the type of reports described in Bullcoming , are not prepared for use in prosecution, and are , instead , business records made at or near the time of an event to provide a police response or other emergency aid to a caller

. Thus, the State argues that statements contained within a CAD report are not testimonial in nature under19

most circumstances

. In support of its argument, the State relies on United States v. Hughes , 840 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. deni ed , 137 S.Ct. 1354 (2017) , in which that Court addressed a similar argument. Hughes noted that the evidence presented at trial established that the primary
purpo se of a CAD report was to “ provide information to the officers who are responding in the field in realtime to allow them to address whatever ongoin g emergency is being reported. ” Id. at 1384. The Court further noted that the CAD report in that case consisted primarily of the 911 caller’s statements made during the call itself, and those statement s were no different than the type found admissible in Davis , i.e., statements made by a caller who was facing an ongoing emergency . Id

. Therefore, t he Court held the trial court had not err ed in admitting a CAD r eport

. Id.
We agree with the State that the statements Nieto made, as contained in the CAD report, were no different than those contained in the 911 call itself. T he r eport simply documented the information given by Nieto during the 911 call, including her l ocation, th e name and d escription of her assailant , her allegation that she had been hit more than once, and her request for police help and medical attention. As set forth above, we h ave already concluded that Nieto ’s statements were not testimonial in nature ; and therefore, the fact that Nieto was not present in trial and subject
to cross

- examination did not violate Appellant’s S ixth Amendment rights

. Likewise, we also do not believe that Appellant’s inability to cross

- examine the individual who prepared the CAD r eport violated those rights. Unlike the statements contained in the analyst’s report in Bullcoming , in which the analyst made independent statements about the testing that he did and his test results, the individual who prepared the CAD report did not make any independent statements that were testimonial in nature, and instead, simply entered descriptive notes from the 911 call itself. Distinct from Crawford concerns, Appellant’s object ion s at trial to20

the CAD report were focused more on the allegation that the report contained hearsay “off the recording,” and it improper ly “bolster [ed] ... the tape itself [

. ] ” And finally , we agree with the State that even if the admission of the CAD report was in
error, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to its cumulative nature. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized, error in the admission of evidence is harmless where it proves the same fact as other properly

- admitted evidence at trial. S ee, e.g., Clay v. State , 240 S.W.3d 895, 905

– 06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; Brooks v. State , 990 S.W. 2d 278, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). This harmless error analysis applies to alleged Crawford errors as well. Thus, in
Davis v. State , 203 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that when faced with a Crawford

- error claim, before the error can be deemed harmless, the reviewing court must be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of Crawford

- barred evidence “ wou ld probably not have had a significant impact on the mind of an average juror. ”
See Davis , 203 S.W.3d at 852. In other words, a reviewing court must determine whether there was a “ reasonable possibility that the Crawford error, within the context of the entire trial, ‘moved the jury from a state of non

- persuasion to one of persuasion’ on a particular issue. ” Id . at 852

- 53. In that case, the Court determined that the Crawford error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was cumulative of other evid ence that was properly admitted at the defendant’s trial. Id . at 853

- 56. The same analysis applies in the present case . A s we set forth above, there is nothing in the CAD report, other than minor details regarding when law enforcement was dispatched and arrived on the scene, that differs from the statements that Nieto made during her 911 call

. Therefore, as the recording of Nieto ’s call was properly admitted at trial, and played for the jury,21

we conclude that the admission of the CAD report

— which added no additional details regarding the assault

— would not have had a significant impact on the mind of the average juror. Accordingly , we conclude that any error in admitting the CAD report was harm less beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s Issue Four is ov erruled. CONCLUSION The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice August 15, 2018 Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ. (Do Not Publish)