NTELLIGENCE ARCHIPELAGO 

in the Globalized Era

Melanie M. H. Gutjahr

JOINT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CO

LLEGE

1962

JOINT

M

ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

O

LLEGE

1962

i

THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHIPELAGO

The Community’s Struggle to Reform

in the Globalized Era

Melanie M. H. Gutjahr

WASHINGTON, DC

May 2005

The views expressed in this book are those of the author 

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

Joint Military

C

Intelligence College

e

n

t

e

r

f

o

r

Strategic Intelligenc

e

R

e

s

e

a

r

c

h

iii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Commentaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Art Grant, Raytheon Company

Russell E. Travers, National CounterTerrorism Center

Review Essay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Failures, Fallacies and Fixes: Posturing Intelligence for the Challenges

of Globalization, by Russell E. Travers

Author’s Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv 

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Methodology and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Significance of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Fundamental Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What is Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What is Intelligence Reform? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

What is Oversight?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

What is Globalization?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3. Past: Historical Perspective: Shapers of the Intelligence Community

During the Cold War (1945-1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

National Security Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Bipolar Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Intelligence Community in the 20th Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Cold War Intelligence Reform 1947-1989. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Cold-War Era Reform Efforts in Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4. Recent Past: Stalled Reform (1990-2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Post-Cold War Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Post-Cold War Intelligence Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
iv

Post-Cold War Reform in Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 

Hart-Rudman Commission 1999-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5. Present: Post 9/11 Strategies for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

9/11 Surprise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Joint Inquiry Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Luminaries Respond to 9/11 Committee Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Reform Effects of Presidential Executive Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

6. Intelligence in the Post-9/11 World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Globalization and the Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Information Revolution and the Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

7. 21st Century: The Rocky Road Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

A Changed Community Since 9/11? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Post-9/11 Community-Wide Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

The Way Ahead: The Networked Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Horizontal Integration and the IC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Congressional Oversight and the IC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

8. Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Protecting the Turf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Passage of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . . . 167

Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

DNI and Community Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

9. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
v

Appendix A — National Security Act of 1947, as amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Appendix B — Cold-War Intelligence Reform 1945-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Appendix C — Post Cold-War Intelligence Reform 1990-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Appendix D — Talking Heads Intelligence Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Appendix E — Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Appendix F — GAO Human Capital Management Reference Tables . . . . . . 249

Appendix G — Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . 251

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the following individuals who made this

research project possible.

The senior leadership of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency who

selected me as the NGA participant in the FY2004 Intelligence Research Fellows

Program at the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (CSIR) at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), and colleagues in my assigned organization,

NGA/Enterprise directorate (Information Management), who promoted my

application.

Mr. Art Grant, LTC (U.S. Army, Ret.), former House Intelligence Committee

staff member and currently Vice President, National Intelligence, Space and

Geospatial Programs for the Raytheon Company; and Russ Travers, Deputy

Director, National CounterTerrorism Center, who reviewed the manuscript and

provided commentaries.

Dr. Russell Swenson, Director of the CSIR. His editorial comments and direction have been invaluable to the completion of this project.

The library research staffs at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, who provided source assistance. An anonymous

NGA analyst, who provided map reconstruction assistance.

Lastly, the author would like to express a heartfelt appreciation to my family—

Hannah and Joshua Gutjahr—for their continued support and encouragement.

ix

COMMENTARIES

In her research project, The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’s Struggle to Reform in the Globalized era, Ms. Melanie Gutjahr has made a significant

contribution to our understanding of how Intelligence is conducted, the future

implications for our national security if changes do not occur, and the role the

recently enacted “Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004” will play in

helping to determine the future of U.S. Intelligence. Her diligent research combined with her personal knowledge of the arcane and esoteric world of intelligence provides the basis for her clear analysis and strong conclusions. This is an

excellent body of work, worthy of study by anyone interested in U.S. Intelligence

and interested in making a world class Intelligence Community even more effective than it is today.

Her description of the history of the U.S. Intelligence Community and efforts

to reform it since World War II provides the necessary context for understanding

the Community’s current organization and the public and private calls for change.

She describes in detail the most significant attempts to reform U.S. Intelligence

and the responses of career Intelligence officers. Her descriptions show recurring

themes throughout the period suggesting that important shortcomings have

repeatedly not been addressed. It is this repetitive resistance to change that makes

her historical narrative both troubling and sad. In many instances, it appears that

career intelligence officers respond to criticisms by asserting that change has

occurred after the critiques were developed and therefore suggestions for reform

apply to a Community that no longer exists. It certainly is true the intelligence

domain is very dynamic and today is different than yesterday, this week is rather

different than last week, and this month is very different than six months ago. But

it is quite clear that the recurring themes demonstrate a failure to acknowledge

problems and to create a future that addresses the fundamental shortcomings of

today, yesterday, last month, last year–and tomorrow. The career intelligence

officer response to arguably the nation’s worst strategic surprise on September

11th appears to be no different than responses in the past: you don’t understand

intelligence, leave us alone, we will fix it on our own. Ms. Gutjahr’s work provides the essential understanding of this context.

Her analysis of the implications if changes do not occur is very important.

Moreover, her understanding of the effects of “globalization” and the significance

of the digital age are of great value in appreciating the urgency for reform. She

assesses the imperfect “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of

2004” and the opportunity it gives the nation to “get it right.” Unfortunately, she

does not reveal unbridled optimism about the future of intelligence reform.

Career intelligence officer responses to the new law—and other agents for
x

change—so far appear to be no different than they have been in past. Nonetheless, as she advises:

Reform must be construed as a Community-wide, never-ending series

of process improvement tasks. Processes and procedures that guarantee

success against our opponent today will be ill-advised as we face

tomorrow’s enemy. The Community must maintain a constant watch

against complacency.

As Ms. Gutjahr notes, much remains to be done and the only people who can

get it done are the career intelligence officers who are never seen publicly and

have devoted their lives to keeping us all safe. The intelligence archipelago must

become a sea without islands.

Art Grant

Vice President, National Intelligence, Space and

Geospatial Programs, the Raytheon Company

Ms. Gutjahr makes a valuable contribution to what has been, thus far, a woefully inadequate discussion of intelligence reform. Despite high profile Commissions, legislative initiatives, and more focus on the Community than has existed

in many years, the quality of the debate remains shallow and confused. Unfortunately, the various external efforts to date have done a far better job of chronicling

intelligence failures (a valuable contribution to be sure) than they have of recommending workable solutions. From all appearances it will fall to practitioners

who actually understand the workings of this very complicated Community to lay

out a way ahead. This book will be a valuable reference to support that effort.

Ms. Gutjahr’s effort is particularly important because the ability of the IC to

successfully deal with globalization is the single most important issue confronting the new DNI. It has implications for the structure, culture, training and very

nature of what we do and how we do it. The topic will dominate any sophisticated

discussion of intelligence reform for at least the next decade and Ms. Gutjahr is

on the leading edge of that discussion.

Russ Travers

Deputy Director, National CounterTerrorism Center
xi

REVIEW ESSAY

Failures, Fallacies and Fixes: Posturing

Intelligence for the Challenges of Globalization

Russell E. Traversi

Six decades ago, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States

struggled to develop a security strategy to confront the Soviet Union. After two

years of debate and indecision, the National Security Act of 1947 established the

intelligence and security architecture that eventually won the Cold War. Modified

over time, that national intelligence apparatus served us well against a monolithic

enemy; a talented workforce, extraordinary technical capabilities, and the sheer

brute force attendant to spending immense sums on intelligence, gave rise to

many successes.

We’re now 15 years past the end of the Cold War. We’ve suffered a series of

intelligence failures, and we’ve seen myriad still-born reform efforts. With the

political imperative generated by the 9/11 Commission, we have “The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004” (the Legislation). And

more recently we have the “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD

Commission). Are we on the road to “fixing” intelligence, or are we at risk of

making it worse? In truth, either outcome is entirely possible. Intelligence reform

has become such a cottage industry that the debate is confused, and good ideas

are routinely interspersed with those that are ill conceived. Certainly we will need

to fight the inclination to check the “fix intelligence” block and move on to other

issues; if we’re going to get this right, we are in the very opening stages of a protracted and complicated series of changes to the Intelligence Community. But

how should we be moving forward? Are we focusing on causes or symptoms?

What problems are we trying to correct? And how do we go about fixing them?

We need to take a very clinical approach to these questions as we implement the

Legislation and continue efforts to reform an Intelligence Community that

remains ill equipped for the challenges of the 21st Century.

i Russ Travers works for the Defense Intelligence Agency and is assigned as a Deputy Director of

the National CounterTerrorism Center (NCTC). The views expressed in this article are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the

United States Government.
xii

Looking back over the past fifteen years, our critics will, with varying degrees

of justification, point to our failure to project the demise of the Soviet Union, the

unanticipated Indian nuclear test, the inadvertent strike on the Chinese Embassy,

the surprise launch of the North Korean Taepo Dong-1, the incorrect assessments

of Iraqi WMD, and, of course, 9/11. What do these failures–these symptoms—

have in common? In actuality: virtually nothing. The reasons run the gamut: a

mismatch between taskings and resources, technical collection inadequacies, a

lack of HUMINT sources, inadequate validation of sources, gaps in databases,

analytic blinders, substandard analytic art, and shortfalls in information dissemination to analysts and operators. This is in no way a blanket indictment of the

Community: there are many brilliant people doing wonderful work. But there are

systemic problems that permeate all aspects of our business. Fixes will be neither

easy nor fast, and it is not at all clear that either the Legislation or the WMD

Commission envisions the necessary remedies.

While intelligence reform is cast in terms of avoiding more failures, we should

not lose sight of the historic context. The current imperative should be to ensure

that the Intelligence Community is up to the challenges of globalization–where

an economic problem in one region can quickly affect conditions around the

globe, or technology controls are easily circumvented, or information about the

deadliest weapons known to mankind are available at a keystroke, or military

capabilities can be either rented or bought, or radical ideologies can be pushed

from a cave in Afghanistan to a worldwide audience, or, in a huge challenge to

our constitutional order, the foreign and domestic divide simply doesn’t mean

much anymore. In such an environment, we need to help the policy community

build on the many opportunities provided by the upsides of globalization, while

accurately forecasting and dealing with the very serious downsides. 

The essence of our mission hasn’t changed very much; we need to get the facts

straight, provide them when/where needed, and be regarded as a source of objective analytic expertise that will keep the policy debate intellectually honest and

help inform the country’s risk equation. So why are we struggling with such ageold tasks? The answer, unfortunately, is much more complicated than the discussion leading up to either the Intelligence Reform Act or the WMD Commission

Report would suggest. This commentary addresses the nature of the IC’s problems, debunks some of the conventional wisdom, and suggests a series of principles that could serve as a road map for some of the reforms that need to be

pursued.

As we think about reform of the Community, we need to start with a sound

understanding of the underlying problems, after which improvements will begin

to suggest themselves. Thus we begin with the proposition that the Community’s
xiii

problems can be clinically explained in the simplicity (and tyranny) of the Intelligence Cycle. By doctrine the process of “doing” intelligence is divided into a

cycle: the policy community provides general direction, and from that we do our

planning; we determine whether we need new collection to address the relevant

issues; we utilize the data–newly collected and/or resident in databases to perform analysis; we then disseminate that analysis to our consumers who provide

us feedback—and the cycle begins again. While the Intelligence Cycle is much

maligned these days, and there are clearly many instances where such a structured approach doesn’t apply, it still offers a useful framework for dissecting the

problems that have developed over the past 15 years. 

Reform Through The Lens of The Intelligence Cycle

Planning and Direction

Because the Planning and Direction portion of the Intelligence Cycle sets in

train an inescapable logic for virtually everything that follows, it is difficult to

overstate its importance. And unfortunately it is also difficult to communicate

how badly it is broken. There are two issues at work: the development of national

security policy, and the management of the IC to best inform that policy. Both are

in flux. 

First, an uncertain, difficult world has bedeviled those responsible for national

security strategy. We came out of the Cold War indisputably “number one,” but

woefully unprepared for the discontinuity attendant to losing the Soviet Union as

our organizing principle. As a country we are well into our second decade of geopolitical confusion. While trite, it is true that we don’t yet have our George Kennan article for an era of globalization. With no consensus about the nature of our

interests or how best to defend them, we have been in a prolonged transition since

the early 1990s. The Executive Branch coined its share of buzz words: “engage,”

“enlarge,” “assure,” “dissuade,” and the like, but from an intelligence perspective

there has simply been no actionable way to prioritize resources. 

Internal management of the IC matched geopolitical confusion with its own.

Faced with the demand for a peace dividend, the Community absorbed 20-25 percent cuts and embarked on a host of flawed prioritization schemes (throughout

the 1990s our international challenges always seemed to occur in the lowest priority countries–Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans). Because there was no stomach for

reorganization, the Community largely kept the existing structure and forced IC

core missions to fit it–in essence “function” followed “form” rather than the other

way around. This was most clearly seen in the fundamentally flawed effort to

divide analysis into political, economic, and military subcomponents and divide

analytic responsibilities around the Community; anyone interested in the roots of
xiv

analytic intelligence failures need not look much further. Finally, the Community

gravitated to the only thing that could support resource demands at the time:

intelligence “support to military operations.” DoD, anxious about fixing shortcomings of DESERT STORM, provided ample justification through the National

Military Strategy requirements. This focus on support to the military proved

responsible for skewing intelligence resources away from a more balanced view

of national security.

Collection

The basic flaws in the Planning and Direction portion of the Intelligence Cycle

gave rise to subsequent problems in collection throughout the 1990s–in ongoing

as well as planned collection. The immediate problem was associated with being

whip-sawed from crisis to crisis. Almost invariably crises occurred in relatively

low-priority countries and required a massive surge effort to build a sufficient

base of knowledge; clearly some collectors surge better than others, but overall

the Intelligence Community can be justifiably proud of the way it marshaled collection resources. There was, however, an opportunity cost of surging and that

was reflected in diminished work on target development and basic database maintenance; the mistaken attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade reflected just

such neglect. Moreover, the collection community was confronted with an

increasingly complex environment as a result of the dizzying pace of information

technology advances; it was being run ragged by current crises and was falling

farther behind the technology curve.

In the near-term, the collection picture was oriented toward reacting to an ad

hoc national security policy, and the future collection picture was overwhelmingly oriented toward support to the military. The demand to support two nearly

simultaneous large-scale contingencies and the information dominance requirements of Joint Vision 2010 and JV2020 were consuming programmed resources.

We had inadvertently created the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone; the

national security strategy (the Planning and Direction portion of the Intelligence

Cycle) and its heavy emphasis on total military superiority, gave the IC its guidance: the IC needed to support this level of military planning, so, in effect, the

collection community had license to steal. The very demanding (expensive) key

performance parameters and the composition of the ultimate constellation flowed

directly from the military strategy; we are still feeling the financial squeeze—the

Future Imagery Architecture shortfalls epitomize the problem. Finally, forgotten

in much of the discussion of technical collection was human intelligence; it

wasn’t deemed very relevant to the 1990s discussion of intelligence support to

two major regional contingencies. While HUMINT is all the rage today, we can

trace the under-investments of the last decade directly to the focus on support to
xv

military operations and the perceived greater relevance of the more technically

oriented disciplines of IMINT, SIGINT, and to a lesser degree, MASINT.

Analysis

While the Community invested in collection to support an apparently endless

supply of requirements, analysis was inevitably short-changed. For any number of

reasons we would find ourselves woefully unable to deal with an increasingly

complex world. There is no question that a number of our key analytic problems

were the result of self-inflicted wounds. More on that later. However, at least four

significant problems that undermined the relevance and quality of our analysis

were set in train by the intelligence cycle–indeed, they can all find their lineage in

Planning and Direction shortcomings. The first, and perhaps most obvious problem was the near-term, reactive orientation of U.S. national security strategy. With

an ad hoc foreign policy that had little long-term vision, there was virtually no

interest in or patience for longer-term intelligence analysis. As a country we operated from day to day, and our Community analysis reflected that reality; unfortunately, when trend analysis focuses on weeks and months instead of years and

decades, we are in trouble. The next two problems acted in concert and further

undermined sophisticated, contextual analysis. Because Community investments

were oriented primarily toward supporting military operations, we focused more

on counting and reporting than analyzing; we operated at the “data end” of the

spectrum rather than the “knowledge end.” But of even more import, the Community, with Congressional prodding, adopted a management philosophy that divided

up analytic responsibilities and parceled them out between and among Departments and Agencies. Now think about this: globalization represents, by definition,

the growing interrelationship among politics, religion, culture, economics, technology and security. And at that precise moment in history, the Intelligence Community was, as a matter of conscious design, embarking on a self-imposed

Balkanization–divvying up among production centers these various analytic disciplines as if they were unrelated. Contextual analysis never had a chance. 

To top matters off, a further side-effect of trying to manage and de-conflict

the efforts of a dozen national-level agencies was the introduction of a significant level of bureaucratic friction—it became very difficult to get things done;

managers across the IC found themselves focused more on alleviating that friction, fighting for scarce resources, or being assigned to mind-numbing tiger

teams, working groups, steering committees or process action teams. As a result

they were less focused on the business of knowledge. In the final analysis, desk

analysts were often left to operate without adequate substantive supervision, and

we were developing, and expanding, a cadre of managerial functionaries with
xvi

abysmal substantive expertise; they largely measured success in their careers by

being managers of intelligence rather than doers of intelligence. 

And so, at a time when globalization was confronting the Intelligence Community with the most complicated world in human history, the structure was ill conceived, analysts were ill prepared and managers were increasingly divorced from

substance. We had hard-wired failure into the system, and didn’t even realize it.

Dissemination and Feedback

Mediocrity was winning by default in our core analytic function, but the Intelligence Community’s ability to piggyback on technological innovation in support

of dissemination was, and is, a huge success story. The movement of electrons

instead of paper revolutionized dissemination. And thanks to the vision of those

focused on weaning the Community off proprietary solutions and on to off-theshelf approaches, the future is bright. However, there are serious challenges. We

are moving unevaluated information at the speed of light not only to analysts, but

also to a very broad range of consumers; we are empowering those who wish to

create their own “intelligence shops,” thereby enabling them to search out intelligence (no matter how questionable or badly sourced) to support preconceived

notions. The increasing power and reach of our dissemination network will only

exacerbate that problem.ii

Faced with a flood of information, consumers often perceive intelligence

assessments as just one more stream of information–a stream that may not be as

timely, as sophisticated, or as aesthetically well packaged as other sources (we

don’t tell a story very well). Moreover, dissemination and feedback are further

complicated by the times in which we find ourselves. An ad hoc security strategy

implies that policymakers at all levels are increasingly tactical in their outlook.

As a result, we see an insatiable appetite for information in which almost no

detail is too trivial. Further, in an era of globalization, Executive Branch Departmental responsibilities are blurred and policymakers’ interests expand beyond

traditional “lanes in the road.” As they look to their organic intelligence elements

to meet ever-expanding interests, these organizations are being pushed into areas

they are ill-equipped to address. The IC finds itself spending an inordinate

ii This is not merely a problem with policy consumers. Some intelligence analysts, overwhelmed

with the amount of available information, do the same thing–search massive data holdings in a

manner that inadvertently provides information to support a preconceived hypothesis but doesn’t

highlight contradictory material. Indeed, this mirrors a broader societal problem; portions of the

U.S. body politic deal with information overload by searching out newspapers, cable channels,

websites or even movies that support their own political views. This general tendency toward

self-selection is undermining everything from objective intelligence analysis and reasoned policy

making to informed political debate. 
xvii

amount of time chasing down meaningless details, debunking erroneous reports

that policy has embraced, pursuing angles that are not relevant to the problem at

hand, or navigating a steep learning curve trying to address unfamiliar issues. Of

course we must go the extra mile and address consumer interests. But intelligence

isn’t a “free good”; the IC must do a better job of managing consumer expectations and explaining the opportunity costs of indulging off-the-wall “science

projects.”

Finally, feedback is critically important to ensure that the Intelligence Community gain policy insights–particularly in a rapidly changing world. Unfortunately,

perceived sensitivities on both sides may limit the access of intelligence officers

into policy deliberations. In addition, it is a rare policymaker who will make time

to provide a backbrief to analysts, and their sensitive reporting cables will often

stay in policy channels, never making it to the desk analyst. 

So, having gone full circle, the lack of feedback further undermines the broken

Planning and Direction component of the Intelligence cycle, and the vicious circle begins anew.

The Intelligence Community’s Self-inflicted Wounds

The logic of the Intelligence Cycle explains many problems and reflects the

fact that within the U.S. Government are many shared failures. But the IC has had

some control over its own destiny and has much to answer for. Analysis is the

clearest case in point. In the 1990s the analytic component of the Intelligence

Community was beginning to lose its competitive advantage and simply wasn’t

adapting rapidly enough. With the collapse of the Soviet Union our ability to hide

behind classification markings was eroding; we could still stamp things “secret,”

but we had lost the monopoly on information and were increasingly secondguessed by academics, journalists, and even policymakers who had access and

expertise rivaling ours.

In the marketplace of ideas, ours were no longer compelling, and we were not

training people to compete. As the WMD Commission and others have noted,

analysts weren’t sufficiently inquisitive when it came to questioning what a

source said or why he said it; and the collection community was loathe to let the

inquisitive analysts get their noses too far under the collection tent. Ask a young

analyst to discuss the role of “assumptions” or “rules of evidence” or “hypotheses” and you would be just as likely to get a blank stare as a coherent discussion

of analytic art.

We had created a generation of reporters rather than analysts. Unfortunately,

even getting the “facts” straight in a world of web sites, instantaneous communi-
xviii

cation, and circular reporting can be problematic. Analysts are generally better at

the “who,” “what,” and “where,” somewhat worse at the “how” and “when,” and

often miserable at the “why” and the “so what.” We simply haven’t brought in

and trained sufficient numbers of analysts equipped to handle the latter kinds of

contextual questions; how many cultural anthropologists have we hired over the

past decade? The corollaries are endless, but two stand out. First, we are generally bad at dealing with uncertainty–the standard fare of the intelligence analyst;

despite the fact that the single greatest uncertainty may be the role the U.S.

chooses to play in the world, Intelligence Community analysts are tempted to

consider the future in terms of three-digit accuracy when we have, at best, onedigit confidence. And second, we tend toward “worst case analysis,” piling

assumption on top of dubious report on top of speculation. There appears to be no

penalty for over-warning, and we have done it often.

Other factors have magnified the impact of inadequate analyst training. The IC

remains conflicted about the essence of analysis–what it is, and who does it. On

the one hand we tend to blur the distinction between those organizations that

should have a truly analytic mission, and those that have more of a situational

awareness function. Terrorism analysis remains the perfect example. By taking a

relatively anarchic approach, we have had an explosion of “fusion centers.” A lack

of critical mass and something resembling seven-year-old soccer ensues; with too

many organizations chasing the latest intelligence report, and far too many enthusiastic amateurs doing the analysis, the work product can be shallow and the Community is sub-optimized. On the other hand we may need to rethink the meaning

of “all-source” intelligence, relative to Signals or Imagery Intelligence. Clearly the

“single INT” Agencies must make their “take” available to the broader Community. However, many NSA and NGA analysts routinely, and appropriately, use

other disciplines to inform their work, and they often know their target at least as

well as their all-source colleagues. As a Community we need to make the best use

of our collective talent. This almost invariably means building teams of analysts

from across the Community; it has worked every place it’s been tried.

The Horizon For “Fixes”

Before focusing on “fixes,” it is best to examine the future security environment. As we look out over the next 5-10 years, we can’t separate intelligence

reform, and the IC’s claim on resources, from the global security picture and the

U.S. domestic political debate.

On the security side we can be assured that the Middle East will remain in turmoil, that North Korea is at least a near-term problem, that China is a long-term

challenge, and that Russia will pose some unique security concerns. Certainly it
xix

is true that nation-state development of WMD and long-range missiles will

always be a concern.iii But beyond such long-standing issues, the principal challenges will continue to be those associated with the downside of globalization–

particularly the threat posed by international terrorism and the potential use of

WMD against the homeland.

The likelihood and timing of this threat manifesting itself are huge uncertainties. There is no question that the extraordinary efforts of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, coupled with those of the U.S. military and other USG elements

involved in the offensive war against terrorism, have inflicted huge losses on Al

Qaeda. But global conditions are a veritable petri dish for jihadists, and we are

not going to succeed by killing these people until they like us. The smart money

almost certainly says that terrorists are being created faster than we are killing or

capturing them. They are more junior, less experienced and more prone to making mistakes. But the new generation is more computer-savvy, and as their experience grows and they become ever more empowered by information and

technology, the threat will grow more complex.

Timing, however, is critical as we go about planning to confront such a threat.

Absent a clear and present threat perception, democracies don’t plan well for

future security challenges. And the longer we go without a major attack on the

homeland, the greater the likelihood that there will be a recalibration away from

the traditional national security accounts and toward the concern about deficits

and a host of domestic challenges. One wonders how long the country is going to

support continued growth in the defense and intelligence budgets. 

Information Sharing—a Red Herring

If the Intelligence Community is not well postured to deal with such an extraordinarily complex security environment, how do we fix it? For those in search of

simple solutions to complex problems the latest nominee appears to be “information sharing.” Clearly there is much work to be done, though by any objective standard the Community has made huge strides in this area since 9/11. However, it is

also critical to recognize that the complex range of policy, technical, security, and

legal challenges attendant to information sharing belies any simple solutions. More

importantly, while information sharing is critical, it’s just not the answer to all our

problems. A number of observations are warranted:

iii While the IC is coming in for its share of criticism, it is instructive to note that the IC’s own mid1990s assessment of Iran’s development of ICBMs is proving to be far more accurate than that of

the late 1990s Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S.
xx

—Information Sharing - Necessary (But not Sufficient): It is certainly true that

some doctrinal tenets like “need to know” must be reexamined in a globalized

world. The cadre of analysts who work many of the transnational problems is

going to need much broader access than has traditionally been the case because

of the potential nexus between and among terrorism, proliferation, crime and narcotics. The Community hasn’t come to grips with this fact.

—Balance is Critical: There will always be legitimate constraints on the free flow

of information. Source sensitivities are real: Imagine how much better off we’d be if

the fact of UBL’s use of SATCOM had not made it into the press several years ago.

Special Access Programs, ongoing operations, liaison-provided information, and U.S.

persons’ privacy rights will all serve to properly limit the free flow of information. 

—Dots Do Not Get Randomly Connected: Some seem to believe that if we just

“open our doors”–to potential federal, state, local and private sector authorities—

“the answer” will appear. Unfortunately analysis just doesn’t work that way; the

amount of daily terrorism “intelligence” that is completely erroneous, utterly

irrelevant or absolute nonsense is already overwhelming. We really don’t want

everyone free to render an opinion. Rather, we want to ensure, for example, that

analysis regarding jihadist interest in airplanes is circulated so that FBI offices in

Phoenix or Minneapolis know to be on the lookout for, or have the context to, the

dot they’ve uncovered. 

—Effective Information Sharing a Growing Concern: If an organization posts

something to its webpage, it can claim to have shared information. Whether the

right people know the information/analysis is there, and actually make use of it, is

entirely another matter. Indeed, we’ll almost certainly be dealing with precisely

this problem in the post mortems of our next intelligence failure; the relevant

intelligence will have been posted, but the right analysts never found it among the

terabytes of available information. XML tagging will certainly prove of some

use, but as we move up the complexity chain from data to information to knowledge to wisdom, its utility may be open to question.

—Finally... Information-Sharing is no Panacea: Conventional wisdom seems

to suggest that as soon as we fix information-sharing we’ve fixed intelligence.

Even the 9/11 Commission has stated that “the greatest impediment to all-source

analysis.... is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”iv If only

it were true. In actuality, information-sharing generally operates at the data end of

the data/knowledge spectrum—where pieces of information are discrete. In some

iv The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Upon the United States. Official Government Edition, 416.
xxi

cases having that data might be extraordinarily important, but most of the intelligence failures of the last 10 years have occurred at the knowledge end of the

spectrum and had little to do with sharing a particular piece of information. In the

final analysis, without appropriate business process changes, we could find that

pushing more electrons to more organizations will simply result in these same

organizations being wrong faster.

Principles For Reform—an Insider’s View

If information-sharing won’t fix all our problems, what do we do? Assuming

the depiction of the IC’s problems is reasonably accurate, it is not at all clear what

the fact of a Director of National Intelligence alone does to fix them. Our problems developed over decades and will not be fixed by moving a few boxes around

or transferring some money between accounts. Indeed the answer is not to throw

more money or more people at the problem. The fixes will need to be structural,

systemic and cultural; they are going to be difficult to implement and progress

will be slow in coming. The following ten basic principles map back to the major

problems and are intended to help evaluate prospective changes:

—Address the Major National Security Issue First: Even assuming agreement

on the evaluation of the problems, reasonable people will disagree on the solutions. As the complexity of the IC overhaul increases, so too will the number of

moving parts and the potential for serious disarray. Accordingly, our initial focus

should be on terrorism and devoted to ensuring that the IC is optimally postured;

for instance, the National Counter Terrorism Center must be empowered and

must have a critical mass of the best analysts and other necessary capabilities to

confront terrorism. Only then should the DNI move on to other major initiatives.

—Achieve Unity of Purpose: While superficially straightforward, this blinding

flash of the obvious extends well beyond the IC and is not guaranteed by the

appointment of a DNI. Who is responsible for what? How many task forces, operations centers and “redundant” efforts are appropriate? Do we need a “lead federal Agency” approach in different regions overseas to counter terrorism? Do we

need other “joint” structures domestically to synchronize an array of homeland

security, law enforcement, intelligence and military efforts? Unless and until we

address these kinds of very difficult questions, Departmental and Agency prerogatives will be confused with, or substituted for, the national interest and the government will remain badly sub-optimized.

—Form Should Follow Function: The logic is simple: Determine, in broad

strokes, what the IC needs to address and structure it accordingly, ensuring an

appropriate balance between resources committed and the relative need/importance of the consumer. The required changes are fundamental: In an era of global-
xxii

ization few analytic issues of any consequence are one-dimensional. As such we

need to focus on structures that promote analytic integration; analysis is simply

not additive and as a result the entire approach of parceling out discrete pieces of

the same problem set must be reexamined. The foreign/domestic angle will be

particularly problematic.

—Tend to the Military: With the exception of a small policy support shop

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services, military

intelligence should be narrowly focused on supporting near-term military operations and contingency plans. This would, for example, argue against a separate all

encompassing “China Center” subordinate to the DNI. Military intelligence

should have primary responsibility for current Chinese military capabilities.

Long-term “futures” work—because it inherently involves broader geopolitical

trends, economics and so forth, would be largely outside the domain of Defense

Intelligence.

—Maximize the Potential for Objectivity. With regard to collection, as is painfully evident from the WMD Commission, we need to broaden the evaluation of

sources beyond the potentially myopic collectors; this is particularly true for

HUMINT where analysts themselves must evaluate sources with an eye to weighing value and credibility of sources with respect to the question at hand. At the

same time, with regard to analysis, when Cabinet-level officials such as Department heads have preconceived notions, and yet they have direct control over

intelligence organizations that in effect speak for the country on substantive

issues, with huge policy and budgetary implications, we can expect to see analytic bias.

—Focus on Knowledge. Far too many managers spend the bulk of their time in

non-substantive meetings, de-conflicting production responsibilities, trying to

apply metrics to inherently non-measurable subjects, dissecting prioritization

schemes and the like. They often play virtually no role in the analytic work product. Clearly we need to focus on the training of our analysts, but in addition, by

streamlining the analytic configuration such that a single manager has primary

responsibility for the major regional and functional issues of concern to the USG,

we could dramatically reduce the managerial functionary component within the

Community. Analytic quality would quickly rise.

—The State/INR Model to Competitive Analysis: A strong central “intelligence

factory” should produce analysis for the country with much smaller departmental

structures free to track critical issues and ensure alternative analysis is allowed to

flourish.v INR reflects a model for conducting such analysis with small numbers

of high quality analysts; NIEs would continue to be the venue to bring together

such views. Two related issues: first, too much competitive analysis would be
xxiii

abdicating IC responsibility, simply resulting in policymakers choosing from the

conclusion they liked best; second, while “red cell” work is important, care must

be taken to prevent analytic “imagination” from running amok and becoming a

“sum of all our fears” approach–connecting dots that aren’t really there.

—Achieve Balance in the Intelligence Cycle: Once we optimize the structure

so that we are, in fact, configured to confront the major security challenges of this

millennium, we then need to establish balance between collection and analysis.

Research and development is critical to developing future collection capabilities.

But we must limit the unfunded mandates associated with these new capabilities;

we need to more fully appreciate the attendant downstream costs of processing

and exploitation. And within the collection domain, are allocations being made in

rough proportion to the relative importance of the threat against which they are

best postured to collect?

—Develop A System of Systems Approach: At the risk of buying into the

buzzword bingo approach to intelligence reform, there are three fundamental

changes that would vastly increase system-wide effectiveness: first, a single personnel system for intelligence officers, and an attendant IC University to provide

world class cradle-to-grave professional development; second, an IT infrastructure allowing database interoperability that is so self-evidently important; and

third, programmatic simplification to reduce the massive bureaucracy associated

with our Byzantine programmatic and budgetary processes. Each of these relatively straightforward concepts masks massive complexity.

—Be Careful: The notion that we can implement major reform and “do no

harm,” at least in the short run, is ludicrous. Even if we “get it right,” the transition from “where we are” to “wherever we are going” will be extraordinarily

tricky. The disruption will be substantial, potentially dangerous, and must be mitigated and phased in properly to avoid significant risk to the Country. The DNI

ought to assemble the best minds, give them six months to report back on the tenplus-year plan (yes, it’s going to take at least that long) to address the second-,

v This will be an extremely emotive subject, but if we accept the integration imperative and the need

to bring managers back into the substantive equation, in addition to an NCTC and a WMD Center,

the optimal solution for the country may be a consolidation of some parts of the Directorates of

Intelligence of the CIA and DIA. The science and technology (S&T) component of the current

military service centers would be subordinated to the strategic S&T office found in the consolidated DIA/CIA Directorate for Intelligence, under the DNI. Smaller staffs would remain within

DoD to be in direct support of OSD and the Service Secretaries. Clearly the need to ensure support

to the Combatant Commanders would be a key concern. DoD’s Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence and the Joint Staff would need ample tasking authority to ensure such demands could

be met. An active-duty four-star military officer as Deputy DNI should certainly help.
xxiv

third-, and fourth-order issues necessary to fix a Community ill-postured to deal

with the problems of the 21st Century.

Limits to Reform

The desired end-state just isn’t that difficult to envision. Don’t be misled by the

commentators, academics, and many other self-proclaimed experts who have no

clue what it means to be a collector or desk analyst. We do not need a “revolution” in intelligence or any one of the many other slogans that are being bandied

about. We just need to ensure relevance in this extraordinarily complicated era of

globalization. To do so, we need to get the facts straight and produce high-quality

analytic products that make it to the appropriate consumer, when they need it, and

in a manner they desire; once we do, and when our assessments begin standing

the test of time, we won’t have to worry about our analysis being cavalierly dismissed, or policy organs forming their own “intelligence shops”–the political cost

of doing so would simply be too high. The principles laid out above are designed

to address the IC’s various systemic problems and get us to precisely that end

state. They would allow us eventually to reestablish the essential expertise and

credibility, without which we will continue to flounder.

However, when all is said and done, there is still one major problem that intelligence reform will not fix–the drift in, and lack of consensus about—U.S.

national security policy. Because we are so terribly under-invested in all levers of

power other than the military, we can apply the adage “When all you’ve got is a

hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” As we think about the challenges of

globalization, the Intelligence Community has a huge role to play in informing

our country’s risk equation, but the IC is almost never going to compensate for

policy shortcomings. Unless and until we figure out who we are as a country, and

how we are going to relate to the rest of the world–and then build consensus

around that vision–we will continue to see intelligence failures—and policy failures that get dressed up and presented as the former.
xxv

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

A colleague once emphatically asserted that people are inflexible beings who

only change at the margins; they do not stray from the core of who they are. This

is not to say that individuals cannot change through self-actualization but rather

that individuals are “who they are,”—“what you see, is what you get” and significant change is difficult if not impossible. The author believes this phenomenon is

even truer for institutions. Institutions do not stray from their initial design constructs. Countless reorganizations attest to this; at some point, once again—the

organization looks comparable to an earlier design. Hence, if an organization is

poorly designed from its conception it is likely to remain a poorly functioning

organization. The leading “best practices” will provide minimal improvement.

Management alone cannot provide seminal change in a poorly designed organization. 

Regrettably, the U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Community (IC), with the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at its hub, has been the foremost example of

poorly designed organization—an organization that may truly have been “Flawed

by Design.”vi Since its inception with the passage of the National Security Act of

1947 (P.L. 80-253), the CIA and its Community have been the subject of over 300

reform initiatives. A mere five weeks after “opening for business” in October

1946, the Secretary of Defense demanded a meeting to discuss the “present and

widespread belief that our Intelligence Group [sic] is entirely inept.”vii Shortly

thereafter, less than two years later, two executive branch commissions examined

Would you tell me please which way I ought to go from here? asked

Alice. That depends a good deal, on where you want to get to, said the

Cat. I don’t care much where..., said Alice. Then it doesn’t much matter which way you go, said the Cat. ...so long as I get somewhere,

Alice added as an explanation. Oh, you’re sure to do that, said the Cat,

if you only walk long enough.

—Lewis Carroll

Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

vi Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NCS (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1999) vii Memo for the files by John H. Ohley, 24 October 1947; Department of Defense File—Subject

File, 1947: Central Intelligence Agency, Papers of John H. Ohley, HSTL (citation as noted in

Rudgers), 152.
xxvi

the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA, and identified fundamental

administrative and organizational loopholes in the initial legislation.viii There

have been Presidential “Blue Ribbon” Commissions, House and Senate Intelligence Committee Commissions, noted scholarly reviews, inter-agency and intraagency reviews, as well as major syndicated news organizations all hammering

for intelligence reform, mostly to no avail. William E. Odom, LTG (Ret), former

Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), believes “structural reform has

largely been ignored” [by multiple responsible principals]. First, Congress has

proved reluctant to delve into structural issues. Second, the CIA and most directors of central intelligence have also resisted serious review of structural problems. Thus, according to Odom, a quiet and informal consensus that nothing

structurally is wrong has prevailed, not only in Congress and in the Intelligence

Community itself but in the most recent presidential commission as well. The

third point is that private intelligence reform studies have followed suit.ix

With the exception of the creation in 1996 of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), now known as the National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency (NGA),x there has not been any major structural intelligence reform

despite countless recommendations for it to happen. In the NGA case, initially,

the concept of a national imagery agency surfaced as one of the recommendations

from the Boren (Senate) and McCurdy (House) Committees in 1992—“Creating

a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect,

viiiRichard A. Best, Jr., “Appendix C, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,” CRS

Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28

February 1996), 4, URL:<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html>,

accessed 11 May 2004. Cited hereafter as CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996. ix William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 2003), 3. x The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was created on 1 October 1996 by the 1997

Intelligence Authorization Act. This is only the second agency to be created by a legislative act,

with the CIA being the first. This unique origin means that unlike the National Security Agency

(NSA) or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which could be eliminated by the President, or the

Secretary of Defense, NIMA could only be eliminated by an act of congress. It combined the following organizations: Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), Central Imagery Office (CIO), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Imagery Processing, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), Defense Intelligence

Agency’s (DIA) Photographic Interpretation Section (DIA/PGX), Defense Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) and CIA’s imagery-related elements/programs. For a more in-depth review

of this process, see Anne Daugherty Miles, Joint Military Intelligence College, The Creation of

the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Congress’s Role as Overseer, Occasional Paper

Number Nine (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002). In November 2003,

the 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act renamed NIMA, the National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency (NGA). 
xxvii

exploit, and analyze imagery.”xi However, it was not until DCI Candidate John

Deutch’s confirmation hearing that the concept of consolidating the “management of all imagery collection, analysis, and distribution” received wider considerationxii and eventual legislation. Interestingly, Leo Hazlewood, the Deputy CIA

Director for Science and Technology and later Deputy Director, NIMA, indicated

Deutch’s announcement [consolidating imagery functions] “came as a complete

surprise to the bureaucracy at Langley” [CIA Headquarters].xiii This process

exemplifies intelligence reform directed at improving the efficiencies and effectiveness of intelligence via structural and organizational change. In contrast, historically, since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, intelligence

reform of any note has focused mostly on correcting perceived abuses of power.

Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),xiv created in December 2002, is a member of the Intelligence Community, its creation was not primarily an intelligence reform initiative as much as it was a domestic security

initiative. DHS is primarily a consumer of intelligence; it does not have an intelligence collection responsibility. Similarly, the accretion to the community of the

U.S. Coast Guard in 2002 was merely an expansion of the list of diverse organizations that make up the Intelligence Community, and was not intended to alter

the information flow or any longstanding practices of the Community.xv

Intelligence oversight has not burdened the Community. For decades its components operated not only in secrecy but with expectations of impunity. There were

few instances of activist oversight even though intelligence oversight was an explicit

charge of Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees,

xi CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996, 29. xii U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Confirmation Hearings of John

Deutch, 104th Cong, 1st sess., 26 April 1995, 1, 8 and 9. xiiiMiles, 1. xiv Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to oversee the government’s

effort to prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. This was the largest reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the Department of Defense. In the desire to create a bettercoordinated domestic security program, DHS was given control over 22 executive branch agencies to include the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Secret Service. (Philip Shenon, “9/11 Panel is Said to Urge New Post for Intelligence,” New York Times,

online ed., 17 July 2004, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/17/politics/17panel.htm, accessed

19 July 2004.) xv Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 amended the National Security Act of

1947, making the U.S. Coast Guard a member of the National Foreign Intelligence Community

despite the objections of the Director of Central Intelligence. For more information, see Kevin E.

Wirth, The Coast Guard Intelligence Program Enters the Intelligence Community: A Case Study

of Congressional Influence on Intelligence Community Evolution, MSSI thesis (Washington,

D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002).
xxviii

respectively. As an example, the subcommittees were very supportive when CIA

overthrew the governments of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. Surprisingly, the

subcommittees were not appalled when former DCI Director Dulles briefed them

after the fact about the overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh. Not

only did these committees support this action but also they were surprised at “how

very cheaply” they had been able to accomplish the mission.xvi Congressional oversight responsibility was exercised predominantly as “advocacy oversight.” Former

Congressman Robert F. Ellsworth reflected on the conciliatory atmosphere that prevailed between Congress and the IC:

When you think back to the old days, it was a different world and a different perception of us and our role in the world. The political zeitgeist

of the time was the CIA was wonderful. In politics, anybody who

wanted to make trouble for the CIA was seen to be a screwball and not

to be countenanced.xvii

Change is not inevitable within the Intelligence Community. At best, however, change within the Community has been marginal. By the mid 1970s,

congressional oversight had evolved to be one of public interest—if the public is interested loudly enough, Congress will investigate. For example, the

creation of the two Congressional oversight committees—Senate Select Committee for Intelligence (SSCI) in 1975 and the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1977—was not a major intelligence reform

initiative although initially each was heralded to be just that. These committees were established as a result of the Pike and Church Committees investigating “illegal, improper or unethical activities” by any agency of the federal

government.xviii These investigations began in the aftermath of the Vietnam

War, Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon. Congress regulates

through two actions—the power of the purse and the power to investigate.

Legislative initiatives from these two oversight committees was merely a logical extension of their responsibility. From the period 1947-1974, oversight

by Congress in essence involved only a “keep in touch” relationship with the

executive branch, rather than vigorous monitoring. 

xvi Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 2nd ed. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 5. xviiSmist, 5. xviiiThe U.S. Senate appointed a select investigative committee under the leadership of Senator

Frank Church on 27 January 1975. The House created a select investigative committee under the

chairmanship of Representative Lucien Nedzi on 19 February 1975 but this committee never coalesced and a second committee under the chairmanship of Representative Otis Pike convened on

17 July 1995.
xxix

The Intelligence Community quite often becomes the lightning rod for

“perceived intelligence failures.” Often, this criticism is thoughtful and well

deserved. Lack of substantive reform within the Community is legendary.

Steadfast parochialism, inflexible corporate culture, and stonewallingxix are

often cited as barriers to change. George Tenet, former Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) and head of the CIA, when called before the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, stated “...if I failed

or made a mistake, I’ve been evolutionary in terms of [managing] the community. Maybe I should have been more revolutionary.”xx

However, not all impediments to change belong incestuously to the Intelligence Community: Partisan politics, an inflexible fiscal apparatus, ambiguous

national security policy, rivalries among and between the military services

and influential lobbying groups are but a few of the many reasons why effective intelligence reform has not occurred in over six decades. Additionally,

quite frequently in cases of intelligence failure, according to Richard Betts,

“the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but

most often by the decision makers who consume the products of information...intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.”xxi For significant change to occur it will require a coordinated

vision/partnership involving the Executive Branch, Congress, the Intelligence

Community and the American free press to serve as the guardian of public

trust. Without the involvement of all, change will remain marginal.

xix Webster’s II New College Dictionary, 2001, page 1086, defines “stonewalling” as 2a. To engage

in delaying tactics: STALL <“Stonewalling for time to close the missile gap” –James Reston> b.

To refuse to answer or cooperate <“I want you to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment...” –Richard M. Nixon>. xx George Tenet, “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Intelligence,” Washington Post, online

ed., 14 April 2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11115-2004Apr14?>,

accessed 15 April 2004. xxi Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” in

Intelligence and Military Misfortunes, chap.11 of Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application,

2d rev ed., eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden (Carlisle Barracks: United States

Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 1995), 295. Originally published in World

Politics 31, No. 1 (October 1978): 61-89.
xxx

Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War and the Community’s subsequent

loss of focus and clarity with the demise of the Soviet problem,xxii the Community, according to Gregory Treverton, “appears to be drifting, unsure of what it

does and for whom. It remains mired in institutions, processes and habits of mind

that may have been appropriate to the Cold War but manifestly are not now.”xxiii

Our 21st Century intelligence organizations need to be as flexible and astute as

our 21st Century adversaries are because the United States does not have an institutional alternative to the Intelligence Community. As Jordan and others remind

us, “Intelligence is an inherent function, whether performed ill or well, of every

state; the governing authority must provide itself with intelligence in order to be

effective and to protect itself.xxiv

Within these pages, the author explains why the Intelligence Community was

not set up, nor has it evolved, to assess the rapidly globalizing world. Nonetheless, she contends that the Community must change to reflect the current national

security environment. Acting CIA Director and former Deputy CIA Director John

E. McLaughlin, recalling that he has lived through several national debates about

the future of intelligence, remarked, “National initiatives to change intelligence

tend to be a mix of pain and gain, but there appears to be an appetite for it again,

in both parties and among key segments of the public.”xxv History, however,

favors the status quo. 

Alice, dear, your longest walk is still to come!

xxiiRobert Gates indicated it was a myth that the Intelligence Community was “totally dominated by

the Soviet problem” during a Georgetown colloquium hosted by John H. Hedley in late 1994 and

early 1995. Gates also thought the community had been unfairly criticized for failing to adjust its

priorities since the end of the Cold War; he felt the IC had made a continuing effort to do so. For

more detail, review John H. Hedley, A Colloquium: The Intelligence Community: Is It Broken?

How to Fix It? URL: http://www.cia.ic.gov/dci/csi/studies/ 96unclass/hedley.htm. xxiiiGregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. xxivAmos A. Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1999), 144. xxvWalter Pincus, “McLaughlin Defends CIA, Cites Reform in Speech: Deputy Director Rejects

Idea of Intelligence Czar,” The Washington Post, 7 July 2004, A21.
1

INTRODUCTION

The events of 11 September 2001 visited against the Americ

exposed the raw vulnerability of the United States. The very organizati

tral Intelligence Agency (CIA)—created by the National Security A

prevent “another strategic surprise attack”1

 stands accused of failing to 

Subsequently, after the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the S

Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) began a formal review of U.S

estimates concerning Iraq’s WMD programs, the presumed existen

had been the pretext for the invasion. David Kay was tapped by 

Tenet to head a 1,400-strong WMD search party, known as the Iraq S

(ISG). “I’m confident, he said, “that we will reach the goal of u

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, including where w

where weapons may have been removed and the exact status of tha

the time the war commenced.”2

However, seven months later, Kay admitted “Let me begin by say

almost all wrong. It is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles 

militarized, chemical and biological weapons there.”3 The Senate Sele

completed its investigation and concluded that flawed intelligence h

presumed WMD. Senator Pat Roberts, co-chair of the committee, d

If 9/11 was not an event sufficient to jolt the status quo, what is 

to take? How can he [President Bush] have great confidenc

intelligence community after it has proven confused before Se

11 and completely wrong on the threat posed by Iraq?

—Senator Robert Graham 

Former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Inte

1 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor became the raison d’etre for establishmen

Intelligence Community—prevent the recurrence of strategic surprise. 2

 Michael Duffy, “So Much for The WMD,” Time, 9 February 2004, 42. 3

 Duffy, 42-46.
2

specifically the CIA, was caught in this latest maelstrom.

“The Intelligence Community will never bat 1.000; it can’t get there

Representative Porter Goss (R-FL), former Chairman of the House In

Committee and former CIA employee. “We’ve been watching too m

Bond movies, to think it always comes out all right in the end. It d

Indeed, according to Mark M. Lowenthal, “intelligence is not about tru

is such an absolute term that it sets a standard intelligence rarely would 

achieve. It is better—and more accurate—to think of intelligence as ‘

reality.’”6

While recognizing that the nature of intelligence makes it an imperfe

at best, it is reasonable to expect a high level of efficacy after fifty plu

refining tradecraft. Acting DCI7 and former Deputy DCI John E. M

sought to pre-empt criticism of the failings of the Intelligence Commu

formance before the 11 September 2001 attacks and the U.S.-led invasi

in 2003 when he declared: 

What shortcomings there were—and there were shortcomings—we

result of specific discrete problems that we understand and are w

our way to addressing or have already addressed...Experience

impressions that are just a few years old [referring to the period sin

September 2001] may be seriously out of date. There has been a re

olution in intelligence—from recruiting and technology to intera

cooperation and morale.8

The present author contends that the decades of failing to institute 

intelligence reform has seriously crippled the Intelligence Communit

to tackle aggressively the challenges of the 21st Century. Unless refo

tives address the fundamental structural problems that have plagued 

munity since its inception, change will not be revolutionary, as M

suggests, but rather marginal at best. Lee H. Hamilton, Vice-Ch

4

 Sen Pat Roberts (R-KS), “Perspectives,” Newsweek, 19 July 2004, 19. 5

 Sen Porter Goss (R-FL), “An Inquiry That’s Awash in Disputes at the Outset,” Inte

Douglas Jehl in New York Times online ed., 2 February 2004, URL www.nytimes.com

02/international/middleeast/02ASSE.htm, accessed 2 February 2004. 6

Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ P

6. Cited hereafter as From Secrets to Policy. 7

 DCI George Tenet resigned on 11 July 2004 and John E. McLaughlin, the former 

became Acting DCI on that date. 8 Walter Pincus, “McLaughlin Defends CIA, Cites Reform in Speech: Deputy Direc

Idea of Intelligence Czar,” Washington Post, 1 July 2004, A21.
3

known as the 9/11 Commission, in a spirited response to the questi

charge now? [in charge of intelligence], replied “...you can’t argue 

is in charge!”9

The world of intelligence has been upended by both politics and t

Given the problem sets of the Cold War—nation-states aligned w

United States or the Soviet Union—it followed that collection a

adversaries would be static, deliberate, and regimented. Moreover, b

mation was not readily available and sources limited, the business 

War was secrets. Whereas the intelligence world of the Cold War c

sidered a world of small quantities of information regarded as r

reports and satellite photos; the intelligence world of tomorrow i

enormous amounts of often unreliable information.11

 Even our national technical means, a euphemism for satellite co

tems, now yield data vastly exceeding our processing and analytic

extract timely and “actionable” intelligence. As an example, whil

no SIGINT [signals intelligence] suggesting that al-Qai’da was spe

geting New York and Washington, D.C., or even that it was planni

on U.S. soil,” according to LtGen Michael V. Hayden, Director NS

obtain two pieces of information suggesting that individuals with t

nections believed that something significant would happen on Sept

Unfortunately, “Because of the processing involved,” stated H

[NSA] were unable to report the information until September 12th.

proclaims, “The communications revolution alone provides grou

pecting that major structural reforms in the IC are long overdue.”13

Finally, whereas the grand strategy of containment provided a 

narrow definition of the relationship between two Superpowers a

for nearly fifty years, now, almost fifteen years since the end of th

no such shorthand adequately captures the relationship between 

States and Others. “We had won the Cold War, but there w

9

 Lee H. Hamilton in Government Affairs Committee Hearing, C-SPAN, airdate 

10 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping Intelligence in an Age of Information (Camb

bridge University Press, 2001), 6. 11 Treverton, 34. 12 LtGen Michael Hayden, Director, National Security Agency, “Testimony befo

Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent S

tee, 17 October 2002.” URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/ 101702hay

13 William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Hav

University Press, 2003), 4.
4

James Woolsey, We have slain the bear, but there are still a lot o

around.”15 There was to be no “peace dividend.” Issues such as terro

balism, weapons proliferation, pandemics, environmentalism, WMD

tional narcotics trafficking and organized crime, the growth of mul

organizations and the emerging prominence of non-governmental 

tions (NGOs) have become the escalating global intelligence th

nascent challenges of the 21st century. Some Cold War threats to 

security from such adversaries as North Korea, Iran, and China rem

ever, these have been overshadowed by the transnational threats.

The Issue

This study addresses the future of the Intelligence Community in lig

century issues/challenges/threats. In addressing this issue, the author rev

of the chief intelligence reform proposals or legislative activities during 

years of the U.S. intelligence service and throughout the Cold-War era, 

the turbulent mid-1970s, on into the 1990s, and concludes with a review 

ommendations from the Joint Inquiry Report and the 9/11 Commissi

leading to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 200

is whether these ongoing schemes for reform, including the new legislatio

ficient for the effective operation of the Community in a globalized envir

Methodology and Limitations

The methodology used in this study is principally historical an

review of primary and secondary source documents interpreted throug

of the author, who has over two decades of experience in the Intellige

munity, as a tactical and strategic Army signals intelligent (SIGIN

DOD contractor, and federal government systems engineer. The a

informed by interviews with select military and civilian professionals, a

and other professionals. The author also attended numerous sympo

briefings during fiscal year 2004 to gain additional perspectives from a 

academic and intelligence professionals.

This research was limited by several factors. Predominantly, this 

limited by the realization that the voluminous amount of primary sou

14Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Preside

They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 552. 15 John H. Hedley, “A Colloquium The Intelligence Community: Is It Broken? How 

Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1994): 12.
5

abilities of this author to gather and absorb in their entirety withi

allotted. Instead, this author distilled the published perceptions o

luminaries within their respective fields as well as intelligence-rela

sional testimony and investigatory panel recommendations. 

Furthermore, although the author attended many outstanding sem

by such prominent agencies as NSA, The Heritage Foundation, Nati

Intelligence Association (NMIA), Armed Forces Communications a

ics Association (AFCEA) and DIA, most of these presentations w

attribution. This condition facilitated forthright and at times, lively d

the subject matter, which are reflected in the author’s presentation; 

could not make reference to specific, illuminating comments. Additi

of the presentations were caveated with a special information hand

tion, “For Official Use Only” which prohibits their inclusion verbati

Understandably, U.S. government intelligence is inherently linked 

the words of Sherman Kent, “Certainly intelligence must not be the 

policy, but this does not mean that intelligence has no role in pol

tion.”16 However, in this study the author did not scrutinize the co

American domestic and foreign policy; this task is better left to the p

themselves, to the political scientists, and to the armchair diplom

given interpretive allowances not accorded a U.S. government emplo

ing herself in a written record. 

Significance of Research

The author’s intent is that this study further stimulate debate on 

the Intelligence Community and its primacy in assessing curren

threats to our national security. In September 2003, the Center for 

Intelligence (CSI) sponsored a conference with 85 experts to discuss 

tions for this new world [post 9/11]. Following are two selected

comments on restructuring the Community, which were recorded i

ence report:

Whatever management philosophy you may think is good, you 

come up with the Intelligence Community the way it is. Alm

change, even random change, would probably improve it.17

16 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Pr

sity Press, 1949), 201.
6

years at least equal to what weve seen in the previous 10 years, we ha

ter be prepared to make radical changes in the way we do intelligence

If the Community is unwilling to make visible changes that are rec

and understandable to the “talking heads” and more importantly to the 

public, then a wake-up notice will come from outside the Community

executive order or congressional legislation. This study presents an arg

rational, professionally based, but overdue intelligence reform.

17 Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign Polic

in Center for the Study of Intelligence Conference Report, January 2004, 15. Cited her

Intelligence for a New Era. 18 Intelligence for a New Era, 15.
7

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

What is Intelligence?

Intelligence holds distinct meanings for different people. To the ty

can, it conjures up “cloak and dagger activities” in a distant land or 

activities” within our borders. To a military commander it is know

enemy over the horizon. To the analyst, it is information awaiting cla

the policymaker, it is information that meets stated or understood n

resource manager, it is the respective components that carry out all th

tions. Intelligence is all those things sheltered under the umbrella of n

rity—defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of internal sec

words of Sherman Kent, former Chairman of CIA’s Office of Nationa

Intelligence means knowledge...it means an amazing bulk an

ment of knowledge...the kind of knowledge our state must 

regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will n

nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan a

ignorance.19

Kent asserted that intelligence can be thought of as a process, a pr

as an organization. Mark M. Lowenthal, a prominent intelligence s

this formulation:

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and n

be further urged--all that remains for me to add, is that you k

whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success 

in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are g

defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issu

—George Washington to Colonel Elias 

26 Ju

19 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: P

versity Press, 1949), 3.
8

tant to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and pro

to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of 

processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; a

carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.20

Generally, intelligence has been placed into two categories—tactical an

This delineation was driven primarily by the principal consumer—mil

manders or policymakers. Operational (tactical) intelligence is knowledge 

immediate situation and is based almost entirely on straightforward o

Strategic intelligence has a wider base and broader objective, integrating e

politics, social studies, and the study of technology.21 Strategic intelligenc

policymakers with the “big picture” whereas tactical intelligence provides 

yard” view. The main difference between strategic and tactical warning 

horizon. According to Charles “Charlie” E. Allen, Assistant Director of Ce

ligence (ADCI) for Collection, the cynic would say that strategic war

enough away that we don’t have to worry about it, and that tactical warn

we don’t have time to do anything about it because it’s too late. 22

Intelligence differs from information in that information is anythin

be known, regardless of how it may be discovered. Intelligence, on 

hand, is a subset of information; it responds to specific policy require

exists as a capability for policymakers. Any other activity is either w

illegal. “All intelligence is information; not all information is intel

Lowenthal states. Intelligence is distilled knowledge created by people

Regardless of its definition, while the best information cannot guaran

policy in a complex and dangerous world, policy made without intellige

sion, or at least with too little of it, can succeed only by accident.25 If in

does not change prevailing mindsets, what good is it?26

20 From Secrets to Policy, 8. 21 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American S

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 4. 22 Charles E. Allen, “Intelligence: Cult, Craft, or Business?”, briefing presented at C

Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Guest Presentations ,Spring 2000, In

Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, July 2001, URL: http://pirp.h

vard.edu/pubs_pdf/allen/allen-i01.pdf, accessed 1 April 2004. 23 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 2.

24 Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Ho

versity Press, 1999), 143. 25 Jordan and others, 144.

26 Treverton, 5.
9

Throughout the years, intelligence reform has become a catch-a

any “change” proposed to the Intelligence Community. Efforts to tw

munity have been proposed regardless of which political party is 

House, which party has the majority in Congress or who sits as th

Central Intelligence. Proposals generally have fallen into three broad 

cal categories of proposals:

● To improve the efficiency of the Intelligence Community i

text of the Cold War

● In response to specific intelligence failures or improprieties

● Post-Cold War efforts to refocus Intelligence Communit

ments and structures.27

During the mid-1970s, intelligence reform initiatives were prop

most instances enacted to correct abuses. For example, concerned wi

tions of CIA involvement in Chilean presidential elections, Cong

passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which required that the presi

the expenditure of CIA funds for noncollection activities in foreign c

to issue a “finding” that declared the activity in question to be “imp

national security” of the United States. This finding was to be rep

House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees.28 

ing note: The passage of this amendment and its replacement, the 

Oversight Act of 1980, has not hampered CIA operations. There 

reported any instance of a CIA operation not being conducted for la

dential finding. However, a former House Intelligence Committee 

cated that, in view of this requirement, some operations have been m

R.T. Gooden traces three epochs of the modern United States 

Community beginning with the creation of the CIA. He notes that 

periods, 1947-1976, 1977-1986, and 1987-1995, has ended with 

change imposed by Congress. For example, during the first so-calle

result of the Church and Pike Commissions, two Congressional ov

mittees were created. His conclusion is that the existence of a related

crisis between the executive and the Congress can be modeled. Hi

sists of the following criteria for crisis. First, there is a latent Congr

satisfaction with IC performance. Second, there is a triggering event 

27 CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996, cited in Mark M. Lowenthal, Intell

Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 223-224. 28 Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence (New York: Praeger, 1984), quoted in Amo

others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
10

dor on the part of the executive so that a perceived cover-up inflame

lic. Fourth, the President should be of the opposite party with resp

majority in Congress.29 

It could be argued that if any event was a catalyst for significant chan

what occurred on 11 September 2001. The 9/11 actions spurred con

and public outcry, thereby instigating two major congressionally manda

tigations. Furthermore, the allegation that Iraq possessed weapons 

destruction (WMD) became the premise for a U.S. preemptive offens

on that nation. However, this premise was based on faulty, distorted in

estimates. Weapons inspectors as well as a congressional investigation 

that Iraq did not possess WMD. These examples satisfy the first three 

Goodden’s model. However, the current president, George W. Bush, is 

can elected for a second term with a Republican-controlled Congress

den’s model is correct, there will not be fundamental change im

Congress. However, the acrimonious debates that raged over the pass

intelligence reform bill between the Senate and the House, as well a

many members of the same chambers in the fall of 2004, underscores t

of Goodden’s fourth criterion. Although an intelligence reform bill, t

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, was passed in th

days of the 108th Congress, as of this writing it had not been fully imp

While some lawmakers hailed this Act’s passage as the rightful measu

to prevent another terrorist attack against the United States, others such 

lican Representative Dana Rohrabacher, (R-CA) thought otherwise. “I

sion of legislation,” stated Rohrabacher. “It is trying to make people 

because they think something is being done. It will be duplicative and a

ment to getting things done in the Intelligence Community.”30

What is Intelligence Oversight?

The term oversight has two distinct but related definitions. The first

tentional omission or mistake that implies neglectfulness. Within the In

Community, this definition conveys the sense of analytical failure. As 

ple, the failure of the community to detect India’s resumed nuclear testi

1998 is an oversight. “We did not get it right. Period,”31 George Tene

29 R. T. Goodden, “Legislative Control of Intelligence”, in Intelligence and the Law

of Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application, eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thom

(Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 1

30 Martin Kady II and John Donnelly, “Many Decisions Ahead After Intelligence B

CQ TODAY, 7 December 2004.
11

feasance, not malfeasance. Nonetheless, the categorization of an inte

ure as an oversight does not provide repudiation of responsibility no

The second definition: watchful care or management or superv

implies a custodial relationship. The ensuing discussion centers on 

definition of intelligence oversight.

The U.S. Constitution was written to separate the executive, leg

judicial powers and it provides a series of checks and balances. The 

sion is often referred to as “the invitation to struggle.” The Foun

sought to give each of the branches “the necessary means and person

resist encroachments of the others.”32 One of the most significant ta

to Congress is the responsibility to oversee the activities of the exec

The concept of congressional oversight is established by Article 

paragraph 18, United States Constitution which states: “Congres

Power...To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 

Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 

in the Government of the United States, or in any Departmen

thereof.”33

Accordingly, there are three questions which should be addressed 

ing this responsibility. First, Is the executive branch obeying the law 

ing activities in accord with the mandate provided by the U

Constitution and legislation passed by Congress? Second, Are ther

that have arisen or any deficiencies that have been uncovered that ne

rected? Third, in light of time and events, How can the performance 

of government deemed essential and entrusted to the executiv

improved and strengthened?34

Despite this longstanding responsibility enshrined in the constit

gence oversight is relatively new in Congress. The executive branc

intelligence policy from the passage of the National Security Act o

1974. Although Congress could have played a much stronger role in o

ing this period, it chose to exercise its oversight responsibilities p

through its appropriation authority. Congress elected to delegate 

31Treverton, 1. 32 The Federalist (Indianapolis: Modern Library, 1937), 337, quoted in Frank J. 

gress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 2nd ed. (Knoxville, The U

Tennessee Press, 1994), 1.

33Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 156. 34 Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Commun

(Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 12.
12

cal approach to oversight reflects the thinking of those like Senator Lever

stall, (R-MA), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who 

“There are things that my government does that I would rather not know 

A former CIA legislative counsel during this time observed that “We allo

gress to set the pace. We briefed in whatever detail they wanted. But 

problems was you couldn’t get Congress to get interested.”36

Congress vigorously reasserted itself in the mid-1970s, amid an up

government mistrust and allegations of incompetence. This was the t

period of executive branch improprieties—Watergate break-in, afterma

nam, domestic spying on Vietnam anti-war protestors and other disside

and CIA involvement in foreign presidential elections and indirect hum

abuses to mention a few. During this time the Church and Pike Commi

formed to look into the abuses. A consequence of this oversight actio

creation of the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence in 1976 a

House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence in 1977. The for

these committees was unique: In the history of Congress there had ne

been a permanent select committee.37

Congress discharges its oversight responsibility through a variety o

sional measures, the first and foremost being control over the entire fe

get. Article I, section 9, paragraph 7 of the constitution explicitly 

money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appr

made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and 

tures of all public money shall be published from time to time.”38Other 

include congressional hearings, senate confirmations, treaty ratification

executive branch reporting requirements, congressional investiga

reports, hostage taking,39 and requiring prior notice of covert action.40

The executive branch, on the other hand, discharges its oversight resp

via the National Security Council (NSC) Office of Intelligence Progra

is the highest-level organization within the executive branch that provid

35 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 161. 36 Smist, 5.

37 Smist, 11.

38Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 156. 39 Taking hostages refers to Congress withholding action on issues that are importan

executive branch. According to Mark M. Lowenthal, critics argue that hostage taking is 

unwieldy tool; supporters of Congress argue it is used only when other means of reach

ment with the executive have failed. 40 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 156-161.
13

Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to carry 

actions.41

What is Globalization?

Globalization is the emotionally charged expression of the 2

Often, its mere mention invokes images of its encompassing an 

nature: Americanization of culture, loss of national identity, swe

sourcing, and at the extreme, the prostitution of young children 

However, flash forward to another image and globalization mean

accessibility, transparency, and cooperation, presenting the opportu

nomic growth and the reduction of poverty. “The term [globalizatio

provides an allegedly objective diagnosis of world conditions; en

doctrinal preference; precipitates a counter-creed (or antithesis) tha

preference; and generates a pointed political-cultural critique designe

existing global power hierarchy,”42according to Zbigniew Brezinski.

Three definitions of globalization expounded below illustrate diff

sional perspectives.

Every generation, at least in the 20th century, has some kind of 

ideology that gives them a map of the world. For 50-odd yea

1990, the Cold War gave you the map of the world and impac

virtually everything. The word that gives us the map of the wo

1990 is the concept of globalisation [sic]...the term refers to the 

tion of the economy at a global level and involves two main 

Most trades take place among multinational corporations [tha

enormous part of the economic activity of the world. The secon

is that where the world economy used to be dominated by physi

modities and goods, now the major activity taking place in th

economy is the flow of money in the form of derivatives, foreig

ments and the like.43

—Dr. Ia

School of Oriental and African Studies at the University o

41 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 154. 42 Zbigniew Brezinski, Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New 

Books, 2004), 140. 43 Ian Linden, “What is Globalisation?” Geographical, October 2003, 44.
14

it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and tech

gies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling 

viduals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the 

farther, faster, deeper, cheaper than ever before, and in a way t

enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and n

states farther, faster, deeper, cheaper than before. This process of g

ization is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutali

left behind by the new system.44

—Thomas Fr

New York Times co

Globalization is a dynamic process of the economic integration of 

ally the entire world. At least four aspects of this increased eco

integration are worth bearing in mind...first, increased interna

trade...second, increased interpenetration of markets by c

flows...third, globalization of economic products...and fourth, in

ing institutional harmonization of economic policies, legislation

structure.45

—Jeffrey D

Director of the Center for International Development at Harvard Un

In its simplest forms, globalization is defined by two complementary 

a phenomenon, globalization is defined as a substantial “expansion of 

der networks and flows.46 Undoubtedly, this definition is the one th

familiar—the borderless flow of goods and monies made possible by a 

of technological advancements. Processes flow throughout the worl

regard to the physical boundaries of the nation-states. Geographical lo

the most part, has become irrelevant. Globalization is a long-term proce

to globality—a more interconnected world system in which interdepe

works and flows surmount traditional boundaries (or make them irrelev

44 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and 

1999), 8. 45 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Geography of Economic Development (Newport: National W

2000), URL:< http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/autumn/art6%2Da0

accessed 29 June 2003. 46 Ellen L. Frost, “Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda,” in The 

tury: Globalization and National Security, ed. Richard Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Wash

National Defense University Press, 2000), 37, 47 Frost, 37.
15

ing globalization. Two of these indices, the A.T. Kearny/Foreign 

balization Index and the Index of Economic Freedom, published by 

Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, as well as two scholarly 

tions of the globalized world, one by Jeffrey D. Sachs and one by T

Barnett, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Not surprisingly, 

reflect certain common threads—while globalization is not necess

sum game, the consummate winners are those nations that have 

government, advanced technology, and the highest level of econom

that is, healthy capital flows, foreign investment, strong records of 

the like. These are just a few of the characteristics that facilitate suc

gration or globalization. 

Systemic globalization reigns as the dominant element of the c

rity environment. Globalization can be seen as the defining aspect o

post-post-Cold War international system, and therefore an approp

the system itself.48 Logically, any discussion of a grand strategy fo

States, and for the Intelligence Community’s role in its formu

include globalization. 

48 Sam J. Tangredi, “Introduction,” in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sa

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), xxv.

17

PAST: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SHAP

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DUR

THE COLD WAR (1945–1989)

National Security Act of 1947

The end of World War II saw the U.S. emerge as the most pow

on earth. Its homeland was untouched by war, and its enormou

potential had produced wartime machinery not only for its own 

navies but for those of its allies as well. The collapse of German

meant total victory. Technologically, the country was in an u

position. American development of the atomic bomb was probab

important single event to affect postwar international relations.49 

economic strength was unfathomable for the other countries eme

protracted war. As an example, in 1945 the United States pos

thirds of the world’s gold reserve, and its gross national produc

We have two great lessons from World War II. One was we cou

again be without a permanent operating intelligence agency. 

ferent branches of government received volumes of informat

would come in daily. No central location was there where all th

mation could be centered, collated, and studied. If we had 

operation, we could have very well had a naval base prepared 

Harbor. The information was never centralized and studied. 

was that we could never go through another war with the Navy 

ment and the War Department as separate operations in com

with one another. If the army or navy had given as much time to 

ing the enemy as they gave to fighting each other, the war cou

ended a good deal sooner.

—President Harry S. Truman to Clark C

49 Amos A. Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: T

kins University Press, 1999), 66.
18

economies were in ruins.

In the mid 1940s, in recognition of its acquired global position and t

panying challenges, the United States began to reorganize many asp

government. As Clark Clifford51 noted, “It was not accident that g

reorganization coincided with the development of the Truman Doctrine

shall Plan, NATO, Point Four, and the policy of containment: thes

required new machinery.”52

Discussions concerning the role of centralized U.S. intelligence 

time— while not the center of the debate, as was the military unificatio

did engage prominent, post-World War II government and military lead

[W]e need to adjust our intelligence system to the broad basic f

which move and control people and nations, and to conceive it on 

bal basis. Our intelligence needs to interpret these factors, aware 

not confused by their outward manifestations in governments.53

—Harold 

Director, Bureau of the Budget 18 Ma

[W]e should know as much as we possibly can of the possible inte

capacity of any other country in the world....Prior to entering the w

had little more than what a military attache could learn at dinner, m

less over coffee cups....Today I think we see clearly we must know 

the other fellow is planning to do, in our defense....The important 

is that the necessity applies equally outside the armed forces. It in

the State Department and other functions of Government and it s

therefore be correlated on that level.54

50David Jablonsky, Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Or

port, CT: Praeger, 1995), 22. 51 Clark Clifford was a lawyer during Truman’s administration who came to Washing

to work in the White House Map Room (President Roosevelt’s wartime operations cen

helped draft the legislation that became the National Security Act of 1947. 52 David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intellige

1943-1947 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 1. 53 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, P

Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces: Hearings..., 78th Cong., 3d sess. (Wa

D.C.: USGPO, 1944), 303-304 (citation as noted in Rudgers, 94). 54 U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Department of the Armed Forces, De

Military Security: Hearings..., 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1945

tion as noted in Rudgers 95).
19

Senate Military Affairs Committee Testimony 18 Oct

Detailed moment-by-moment knowledge of all aspects of civ

military activity within the territory of an enemy is essential 

planning in times of peace or war...There is a great need for a pe

national organization which not only deals with broad questions 

but also collects, evaluates and disseminates a continuous stream 

ligence data.55

—General Henry “Hap

Chief of the Army Air F

In our government today there is no permanent agency to take 

functions which OSS will have ceased to perform. These functi

in reality essential in the effective discharge by this nation of its 

bilities in the organization and maintenance of peace.56

—William “Bill” J. 

And so it was with the passage of the National Security Act 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Council (NSC) 

tral Intelligence Agency (initially known as the Central Intellig

(CIG)), as well as the Department of the Air Force57 came into bei

created the framework and institutional structures that domina

national security decisionmaking today. The act popularized a term

security”—that was to be the province of no single agency of the U

government, and established a cabinet-level committee charged w

the president on the “integration” of the various aspects of natio

policy.58

While the United States remained painfully aware of the attack at Pea

was united in its desire to prevent another strategic attack, its protect

55 General Henry Arnold, Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army 

the Secretary of War (n.p., 1945), 65, 67 (cited as noted in Rudgers 95). 56 Donovan to Smith, 25 August 1945, “Strategic Services Unit as of 1 October 

SSU, Office of Assistant Secretary of War, RG 107, Records of the Secretary of War, 

noted in Rudgers 42). 57 The National Security Act of 1947 provided for many things other than just the 

aforementioned organizations. For more detailed information, consult U.S. Statutes 

495-510. There have been numerous amendments since 1947. 58 Carnes Lord, “NSC Reform for the Post-Cold War Era,” Orbis, 44, no. 3 (Sum
20

tion among the military departments were at their zenith, thereby derailing 

ranging, collaborative War Department proposals. With the signing of this 

President Truman capped off four years of some of the most intensive and 

public debate about the military institutions in U.S. history.59 Truman mea

an intelligence confederation—a small central agency that would coordin

ate, and disseminate intelligence but not collect it. But this intelligence ar

was anything but a confederation after the passage of the National Secu

1947. This arrangement protected all existing intelligence units [military s

granting each exclusive control over its own sphere of activity and by crea

weak central coordinating body called the Central Intelligence Group. Pol

ers, particularly the president, were far more concerned with consolidatin

tary services than with establishing any kind of peacetime central i

agency.60 Accordingly, these agencies (NSC, JCS, CIA) were creatures 

and compromise. They arose from one of the most bureacractic battles in 

history. Other than Truman, according to Zegart, “nobody in the executive 

tive branches sat around thinking about ideal or optimal agency organiz

War and Navy departments, the intelligence bureaucracy, and the Congre

too busy guarding their own interests to worry about national ones.”61

The National Security Act of 1947 created for the first time in Americ

a permanent American intelligence service—the CIA. Previously, from t

can Revolution up to World War II, intelligence had been primarily a war

ity. Most intelligence activities were disbanded or at least deempha

hostilities had ended. Time magazine noted in 1946 that the United State

is going to join, after all these years, in the game of spying o

neighbors. Harry Truman did not say so, but that is the idea. Other 

powers have always maintained espionage systems along with 

armies and navies. The U.S., with a mixture of trust and indiffe

never has...That historical innocence, which ended with the fia

Pearl Harbor is now gone.62

Samuel Tower, a New York Times reporter, wrote in August 1947:

One of the final steps before adjournment, largely overlooked 

avalanche of last-minute legislation, was the stamp of approval 

59 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Sta

ford University Press, 1999), 57. 60 Zegart, 163-165.

61 Zegart, 10.

62 “Intelligence,” Time, 4 February 1946, 24.
21

effective world-wide American intelligence service of its own

with America playing a major independent role in world aff

country has also embarked on the hidden game of internati

national security.63

The responsibilities of this new intelligence organization were gener

as follows: coordinating government intelligence activities, advising 

intelligence matters, evaluating and distributing intelligence informatio

services of “common concern” in the intelligence field as determined 

and “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting 

security” as defined by the NSC. The law was explicit that “the Agency 

police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions

would be an independent, central agency and as such not part of a polic

Appendix A of this study—The National Security Act of 1947, as Ame

the provisions as they relate to the creation of the CIA.65 On 18 Septem

Central Intelligence Agency was officially opened for business; Am

intelligence was now operating. By 26 September CIA’s Office of Rep

mates published its first “intelligence estimate,” a “Review of the World 

Relates to Security.”66 A mere five weeks after “opening for business,” 

of Defense met with the FBI Director and armed services intelligence 

cuss the “present and widespread belief that our Intelligence Group [s

inept.”67 [Author’s note: This statement is not further elaborated.]

And what a world it was becoming.

The Bipolar Environment

After World War II, instead of drawing inward as it had after Wo

rejecting a role in leading the new world order, America now embr

found destiny. The Marshall Plan,68 undertaken in conjunction with 

Doctrine,69 marked the emergence of the United States as a world p

63 Rudgers, 148.

64 Rudgers, 147.

65 The National Security Act has been amended numerous times since its enactm

any reference to “as amended” signifies legislation passed after 1947. 66 Rudgers, 149.

67 Memo for the files by John H. Ohley, 24 October 1947; Department of Defens

File, 1947: Central Intelligence Agency, Papers of John H. Ohly, HSTL (citation as 

ers, 150). 68 The Marshall Plan was a massive economic aid program launched in 1948 de

restore Europe’s economy.
22

resources and adopt an activist role in seeing that U.S. interests ab

maintained.70 Most great powers had “risen through the ranks” by m

long apprenticeship in international involvement and conflict. Ameri

other hand, turned to world involvement in the second transition perio

the notions, habits, and practices developed during a national existenc

on separation from that world. Unlike Great Britain or the Soviet U

United States became a global superpower almost without training o

tion.71 The combination of power, commerce and ideology that drove A

to expand their influence in the world led them to believe that elite 

American principles and national interests were the same thing; furthe

advancement of American power and influence was not only good for 

but also good for the rest of the world.72

As the wartime alliance between the United States and the Sov

quickly unraveled, opposition to communist expansion became the fu

principle of American foreign policy. George Kennan outlined a strate

focusing on the Soviet Union—“The main element of any U.S. policy 

Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilian

ment of Russian expansion tendencies.”73 Kennan emphasized that the 

not going away because Soviet legitimacy was based on the fiction of a

American menace. As such, in his view the world must give up its 

visions of making the world safe for democracy and should focus on 

balance-of-power world in order to contain the Soviet expansion unt

throughout the Soviet Union insisted on major domestic reforms, thus 

ing Soviet foreign policy.74 According to Kennan, writing as “X” in h

Foreign Affairs essay in 1947:

The main element of any [US] policy ...must be that of patient bu

and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies...b

69 In a 12 March 1947 message to Congress, President Truman stated, “I believe tha

the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subju

believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way

in Jablonsky, 25. This declaration became known as the Truman Doctrine. 70Jordan and others, 69.

71 Jablonsky, 23.

72 Robert Kagan, “One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West”?, Survival 44, n

2002-03): 136. 73George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947

quoted in Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The John

University Press, 1999), 67. 74Jablonsky, 24.
23

Russians] show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peac

stable world...Soviet power bears within it the seeds of 

decay...Russia, as opposed to the Western world is...by far the 

party...in actuality: the possibilities for American policy ar

means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best...Th

States has in its power to promote tendencies which must ev

find their outlet in either the breaking or the gradual mellowin

Soviet power.75

 Over the course of the next ten years the doctrine of containment 

to define the U.S. overall national security policy as expressed th

remainder of the 20th Century. Berkowitz states,

For the next fifty years no one attending meetings at the Whit

Pentagon, or CIA needed to debate first the principles. Everyo

where the threat lay, and everyone understood the strategy t

United States had adopted to counter it: containment. Unite

leaders assumed that the most important factor in shaping glob

was the threat of Soviet expansion.76 

Thus, not only did this doctrine define the U.S. political landscap

by Berkowitz, but it also came to characterize and influence the U

base, economy, military composition, international relationships, a

ricula and the like. Zbignew Brzezinski, at the height of the Cold W

the immensity of effort expended by the U.S. military:

More than a million American troops stationed on some 400 m

almost 300 minor United States military bases scattered all 

globe. . [That there were] more than forty-two nations tied to th

States by security pacts, American military missions training t

ers and troops of many other national armies, and the appro

two hundred thousand United States civilian government empl

foreign posts all makes for striking analogies to the great 

imperial systems.77

75 X (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no

quoted in Francois Heisbourg, “How the West Could Be Won,” in One Year After: A 

for the West? Survival 44, no.4 (Winter 2002-2003): 146. 76 Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the I

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 3. Cited hereafter as Berkowitz and Go

Truth. 77 Jablonsky, 49.
24

and to a limited degree centralize, the developing intelligence effo

United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a Soviet Un

upon expanding communism.78 Most importantly, for the Intelligence 

nity is that Soviet expansionism provided a consistent and relatively p

enemy. While the Soviet problem was not the only issue confronting 

was the singular issue of such magnitude that for over five decades it s

Community’s structure and intelligence collection efforts.

Intelligence Community in the 20th Century

After the end of World War II, American intelligence services had a

cious beginning. As reflected in a 1976 Senate Select committee report, 

lishing a peacetime central intelligence body, the United States as one o

powers came late to defining the need for an intelligence institution as 

its foreign policy....The decision to create a separate agency implied r

of the intelligence function as an integral part of the foreign and mi

cess.”79 While intelligence has always known its importance in war, 

cance in times of peace has not long been established. It seems incre

almost fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, not to recognize the 

intelligence plays in supporting American national defense in times of 

to use the current military terminology, Military Operations-Other-T

(MOOTW); however, in 1945 this was not so apparent. Initially, the o

the future in the mid-1940s seemed one of peace and of international co

Therefore, the issuance of Executive Order 9621 in October 1945, to a

78 Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boerstling, “Appendix C, IC21: The Int

Community in the 21st Century,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congre

Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 February 1996), >URL:<http://

www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html>, accessed 11 May 

hereafter as CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996. 79 U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to 

Activities, Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Militar

gence, book IV, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), 1 (citations a

Rudgers, 1). 80 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conceives MOOTW as a “diverse set of activities th

arms control, combating terrorism, Department of Defense support to counter-drug ope

enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ens

dom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil aut

nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, p

tions, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and 

support to insurgency” as cited in Jordan and others, 239. For more detailed informatio

Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War” (Joint Public

16 June 1995. 
25

anomalous. As one historian notes, Trumans concern about the po

opment of an American police state was the single most important fa

ing him to block early central intelligence agency proposals.”81

At the end of World War II, the Office of Strategic Services had ap

3,500 civilian employes, 8,000 army personnel and 800 from the N

and Coast Guard attached to it.82 One OSS veteran affectionately 

OSS as:

sheltered screwballs, crackpots, and adventurers along with pr

from Ivy League universities, ex-diplomats, and ex-soldiers

unprecedented number of heirs to great fortunes. Every sort of 

ized and esoteric skill was represented, from professors of Sa

demolition experts, cryptologists, judo instructors, sharpshoo

specialists in guerilla warfare.....No scheme was too wild to co

Its personnel and secret assets were transferred to the State Depa

Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS)84 and to the War D

the Strategic Services Unit.85

Nonetheless, the abolishment of the OSS did not signal the end o

support to national security; a centralized postwar intelligence syst

an objective for policymakers. By January 1946, Truman issued his 

Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities to the secretaries o

and navy. These three and a personal representative of the presiden

nated the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and held responsi

planning, developing and coordinating of all foreign intelligence acti

a presidentially appointed Director of Central Intelligence was the C

gence Group (CIG), subordinate to the NIA, which would draw its 

ties, and personnel from the three departments represented on the 

National Intelligence Authority Directive (NIAD) 5,87 issued on 8 

the National Security Council, allowed the DCI to “centralize” resea

ysis in “field of national security intelligence that are not presental

formed or are not adequately performed.”88 This directive, NIAD-5, 

81 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven, CT: 

Press, 1989), 29. 82 Rudgers, 11.

83 Rudgers, 10.

84 Rudgers, 43.

85 Rudgers, 44.

86 Rudgers, 90.
26

sophisticated analytical capability and the CIG, a [primeval] national in

service authorized to perform strategic intelligence and engage in c

activites abroad.89 Even so, the CIG remained essentially a transitional 

tion pending the legislative creation of a permanent organization as 

compromise in the face of government opposition to a centralized orga

Very few seasoned intelligence officers spoke kindly of the CIG. Willi

former DCI, had a few less-than-complimentary words to say about the 

the general consensus of professional intelligence people was th

CIG was a disorganized assembly of parts, not a working machine

ger but not much better than before. What was worse, it even fai

perform that specific function for which it was created. Separate i

gence reports from G-2, ONI, State Department and a host of 

agencies still flooded the President’s desk. The CIG merely adde

more, albeit an iteresting one, to the unstanchable stream.91

Another former OSS and CIA analyst, Ray Cline observes that:

When attempts were made to prepare agreed national estimates o

basis of intelligence available to all, the coordination process was 

minable, dissents were the rule rather than the exception, and ever

icymaking official took his own agency’s intelligence appreci

along to the White House to argue his case. The prewar chao

largely recreated with only a little more lip service to coordination

And so it was on 18 September 1947 that the “personnel, property, a

of the Central Intelligence Group” transferred to the CIA and “such gr

shall cease to exist,”93 the CIA opened for business.

87 NIAD 5 was replaced by NSCID 1, titled “Duties and Responsibilities,” which est

basic responsibilities of the DCI and interagency workings of the Intelligence Commun

sions of NSCID 1 are declassified and can be viewed at the National Archives and Rec

istration, Record Group 263 (CIA), NN3-263-91-004, box , HS/HC-500 (citation as no

Warner, 7.)

88 National Intelligence Authority Directive number 5, 8 July 1946, reprinted in FRU

quoted in Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution, 3. 89 Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, DC: 

the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 3. 90 Rudgers, 129.

91William Colby, Honorable Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 69-70. 92 Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 197

93 Section 102(f), National Security Act of 1947, see Appendix A-National Security 

amended, this document for more detail.
27

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigatio

Office of Intelligence Research (Department of State), the Intellige

(Army), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Diretorate of 

(Air Force), and associated military signals intelligence offices, mai

Security Agency (ASA) and the Navy’s OP-20-G. During the Co

number of elements of the United States Government receiving “fund

to be appropriated for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-r

ties” grew significantly, reflecting the transforming threat environme

the exact annual intelligence budget remains classified, in 1997, th

was publicly revealed, the intelligence budget stood at $27 billio

inclusion of NIMA (now NGA) in 1996, the IC boasted of the fol

cies—CIA, Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Intelligence Ag

National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Of

Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, Department of State

of Treasury, Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Bureau of 

(FBI), and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).95 Of nationa

agencies, only two IC members—CIA and NGA—exist in law. 

arrangement has guaranteed congressional tweaking of these intellig

zations whenever Congress sees fit to do so. Until the emplacement 

of the Director of National Intellligence in February 2005, it also ens

tweaking would provoke a response from the Executive Branch (

been the president’s principal intelligence advisor and the NGA is a 

port agency under the Secretary of Defense). NSA, created by NSC

1952; NRO, created in 1960 by Air Force Order 115.1; and DIA, cre

by DOD Directive 5105.21, could be eliminated by a “stroke of the 

President or the Secretary of Defense.96

Cold War Intelligence Reform 1945-89

Efforts to fine-tune the Intelligence Community are as old as the 

itself. While dysfunctional organizations get fixed, disappear 

become irrelevant and ignored, the IC seems immovable.97 By the 

man’s presidency in 1953, the National Security Council (NSC) ha

teen Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) to clarify further the re

promulgated by the National Security Act. The NSC issued many of 

94 Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 25. 95 CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996.

96 Dan Elkins, LCDR USN (Ret.), An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide, 5

ington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997), 6. 97 Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 27.
28

the responsibilities of the DCI and the interagency workings of the In

Community.98 As the Community matured, the criticisms and calls f

did not abate; they increased. Some thirty-plus years hence, accordin

reports, and virtually every year for the past two decades, at least o

within the IC has been the subject of a scandal or investigation.99 There 

over 300 initiatives to reform the Community since the passage of th

Security Act of 1947.

Generally, proposals have fallen into two categories—those ini

improve efficiency and effectiveness, and to correct abuses such as illeg

and civil rights infringements. The character of these proposals reflect

American foreign policy and the international environment as well as 

security and governmental accountability concerns at the time of t

mencement.100 As an example, early intelligence reform proposals su

First Hoover Commission in 1949 were concerned with efficiency and 

ness. The Soviet Union, a former ally, was becoming an increasing thre

U.S. concentrated its national defense efforts on this emerging targe

ingly, many of the reform recommendations reflected the need for imp

in intelligence coordination efforts, U.S. covert actions and counterin

capabilities. By the mid-1970s and 80s, intelligence abuses such as the 

break-in, human rights abuses and the Iran-Contra Affair dominated t

agenda; consequently, delimiting intelligence activities instead of 

improvements became the primary focus of reform.

Appendix B to this study, Cold War Intelligence Reform 1949-1989

summary highlights of selected Cold-War era intelligence reform propo

by executive branch commissions and major legislative initiatives. Thi

means an exhaustive display of report findings and recommendations

these reports were voluminous. As an example, probably the most notor

mission report during this era, the Senate Select Committee to Study Go

tal Operations, affectionately known as the Church Committee Report

in with 183 recommendations in its final report.101 This committee’

alleged assassination plots alone consisted of over 8,000 pages of sw

mony.102 The present author primarily reviewed the 1996 Congressiona

Service (CRS) Report by Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew B

This author did not attempt to evaluate the success or failure of any pro

98 Warner, 7. 99 Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 27. 100 CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996. 101 CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996. 102 Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community

(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee, 1994), 69.
29

comings identified year after year, or in many cases, decade after dec

serious flaws. The following table shows the author’s categorization 

ings/recommendations from selected Cold-War era intelligence refor

This table distills the information in Appendix B.

Cold-War Reform Initiatives 1945-1989

Source: Compiled by author

Year Title Admin

DCI 

Roles/

Responsibilities

IC 

Relations Analysis

DCI 

Budget 

Authority

Centralize IntelCIA 

Admin

C

O

s

1945 NSCID No.1 Truman X

1949 First Hoover 

Comm

Truman X X X X X

1949 Intell Survey 

Group

Truman X X X

1954 Doolittle 

Comm

Eisenhower X

1955 Second 

Hoover 

Comm

Eisenhower X 

1958 NSCID No. 

11st Rev

Eisenhower X X X

1959 BruceLovettEisenhower X 

1971 Schlesinger 

Report

Nixon X X

1972 NSCID No. 

1 2nd Rev

Nixon X X X X

1975 Murphy 

Comm

Ford X X 

1975 Rockefeller 

Comm

Ford X X X X 
30

Measures to Improve Efficiency and Effectivene

The table above provides a general idea of the intelligence reform i

sidered by the White House as well as Congress and their respective r

dations/corrective actions. Certain recurring threads of reform emerge 

consistently been voiced throughout the last half century. Of particular 

consistent concern over the dual role of the DCI as the central intelligen

nator and primary IC resource manager. It has long been recognized tha

implementation of these two roles has eluded every DCI since 1947. I

to particular concern over budget authority for the DCI, there has 

appeared concern over the quality of analysis in the Community.

Year Title Admin

DCI 

Roles/

Responsibilities

IC 

Relations Analysis

DCI 

Budget 

Authority

Centralize IntelCIA 

Admin

Con

Ove

sigh

1975 Church 

Comm 

Senate

Ford X X X 

1976 Pike Comm 

House

Ford X X X X 

1976 Clifford 

Proposal

Ford X

1976 Cline 

Proposal

Ford X X 

1976 EO 11905 Ford X X

1978 EO 12036 Carter X

1978 Draft Nat 

Intel Reform

Carter X X

1978 FISA/ FISC Carter X

1981 EO 12333 Reagan X X X X

1985 Turner 

Proposal

Reagan X X 

1987 Iran-Contra 

Investigation

Reagan 

Source: Compiled by author (Continued)
31

influence over the entire IC budget. Executive Order 12036 gran

Stansfield Turner at the time, budget authority over the DIA and Pen

gence arms. However, President Reagan rescinded this EO in 1981

remains the case that the DCI’s influence is heavily dependent upon 

ment of a cooperative working relationship with the other agenc

chiefly the Secretary of Defense as well as the White House.

In 1971, a report suggested creating the position of Director of N

ligence (DNI). Although this was the first time, it would not be the 

when reformers proposed the position. The DNI discussion occurre

throughout the Cold War—for example, in the Draft National 

Reform Act of 1978 and Turner Proposal (1985)—and the DNI discu

into the Post-Cold War era as well. In sum, the 1971 report rec

“strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under control and 

production to an adequate level of quality and responsiveness.”104 In 

an innocent omen perhaps, this report noted the Community’s “im

in...size and cost” with “apparent inability to achieve a commensur

ment in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products.”105

More than a half-century after enactment of the National Security 

still did not have the authorities required to discharge efficiently an

his Community-wide responsibilities. In 1981, E.O. 12333 designate

the primary intelligence advisor to the President and NSC on nat

intelligence. Additionally, it granted the DCI more explicit autho

development, implementation, and evaluation of the National Fo

gence Program (NFIP).106 Yet, approximately 80-85 percent of the 

gence program resources have continued to reside within the D

Defense. The DCI has not had authority over those funds; the 

Defense has controlled the purse strings.

103 Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “Can Spy Agencies Ever Work Together?” Ch

Monitor, 21 July 2004, URL http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0721/p01s02-us

accessed 28 February 2005. 104 A Review of the Intelligence Community, 10 March 1971, 23-33 (citation as 

16). Cited hereafter as Schlesinger Report, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 Februar

105 Schlesinger Report, 1; CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996. 106 Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, C

1992), 107.
32

Frequently throughout the Cold War, the question of the role and re

ties of the Community not only came into question, but also ebbed a

with the political environment at the time. In the late 1950s, the CIA 

cized for being “too heavily involved in Third World intrigues while 

the hard intelligence on the Soviet Union”107 whereas a few years ea

gress had privately applauded the efforts to overthrow the governmen

and Guatemala. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the IC stood accused o

too heavily on the Soviet problem and perversely, unable to predict 

demise. Ultimately, according to Lowenthal, the Community overesti

size of the Soviet economy and underestimated the portion of it d

defense, which in all probability stood at 40 percent of the annual So

(Gross Domestic Product).108 He noted further that some believed the h

spent on defense [intelligence spending implied] in the 1980s had not b

sary because the Soviet Union would have finally collapsed on its ow

some critics, this “intelligence failure,” failing to predict the collap

Soviet Union, was sufficient reason to demand profound reorganizat

Intelligence Community. Nonetheless, supporters of intelligence poin

frequent reporting on internal strife of the Soviet Union and its satellit

evidence that useful collection and analysis could take place and make 

contribution to national security.110

In the end, repeated attempts to tweak the CIA and the Community 

outside” without parallel attention to collection and analysis tradecraf

inside demonstrate a basic reality—the expectations of the CIA in th

Security Act clearly describe an agency whose mandate has far ex

capacity to perform.111 Innumerable reform recommendations as well 

tive orders have sought to strengthen the role of the DCI. Yet, witho

budget authority and overall authorities relating to Community 

requirements and intelligence activites, the DCI was not able to be

“great intelligence integrator.” According to Zegart, the CIA that eme

the National Security Act of 1947 satisfied the War and Navy departm

kept control over their assets]. However, the intelligence-centered or

for national security remained weak by design.112 Its structural weakne

ued throughout the remainder of the last century and into the 21st centu

107Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Miffli

445-448 as cited in CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 108 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 180. 109 Gates, 552. 110 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 181. 111 Zegart, 188. 112 Zegart, 174.
33

RECENT PAST: STALLED REFORM 

(1990-2000)

As the free world grows stronger, more united, more attractive 

on both sides on the Iron Curtain—and as the Soviet hopes 

expansion are blocked—then there will have to come a time of 

in the Soviet world. Nobody can say for sure when that is goin

or exactly how it will come about, whether by revolution or tr

the satellites, or by a change inside the Kremlin.

Whether the Communist rulers shift the policies of their o

will—or whether change comes about in some other way—I ha

doubt in the world that change will occur.

I have a deep and abiding faith in the destiny of free me

patience and courage, we shall some day move on into a new e

—President Harry S. T

Farewell Address 15 Janua

I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a com

sive and co-ordinated (sic) foreign intelligence program for all 

agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should 

through the creation of an inter-departmental group, heading u

the State Department, which would formulate plans for my a

This procedure would permit the planning of complete coverag

foreign intelligence field and the assigning and controlling o

tions in such manner that the needs of both the individual agen

the Government as a whole will be met with maximum effectiv

—President Harry S. T

Letter to Secretary of State, Transfer of OSS to Sta
34

Hans Morgenthau, renowned political scientist, referring to the two 

ers, spoke of a “worldwide balance of which the United States and 

Union are the main weights, placed on opposite scales...[other region

functions of the new worldwide balance, mere ‘theaters’ where the pow

between two great protagonists is fought.”113 This drama played out w

emn and dramatic flare for decades between the two great superpowe

almost a half century after the bilateral struggle began, the Cold War be

two great superpowers had ended. 

At last, the world change that Truman prophesized in his farewell s

come about—at the cost to the American taxpayers of almost $2 

This struggle produced an ever more capable and ever more costly w

intelligence apparatus—human intelligence agents in distant lands

cated satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, and signal intelligence 

posts aimed at understanding the capabilities of its greatest rival an

threat. For decades, the Community spoke of the ominous nuclear an

tional threats of the Soviets and its Eastern European Empire; lik

Defense Department procured state-of-the-art weaponry to match an

its formidable opponent. Robert Gates as DCI suggested that the gre

tribution of the CIA and the IC during the last half of the Cold Wa

there were no strategic surprises—no more bomber or missile gap

abruptly startled the nation decades earlier.115 Relying predominantly 

rior satellite capabilities, the Community provided with confidence to 

icymakers, Congress, and the international community detailed kno

Soviet forces and capabilities.

At the height of the Cold War, approximately 50 percent of the in

budget was earmarked for covering the Soviet Union and relate

everything else was secondary.116 As a military signals intelligence 

officer assigned to the National Security Agency (1986-89), th

author observed firsthand the primacy placed upon the Soviet p

referred to as A Group. By far, A Group received the largest share o

and garnered priority placement of critically skilled personnel. Dep

funding being appropriated based on the concentration of mission 

ments, A Group would logically receive the largest share. Just after 

113 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

(New York: Knopf, 1967), 149. 114 Gates, 532. 115 Gates, 562. 116 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy.
35

mobilized in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT S

With a lack of a recognizable, imminent threat, policymakers, 

private citizens alike began calling for “peace dividends” such a

emphasis on domestic issues, a smaller, more mobile military and 

restructuring of the Intelligence Community. Washington was fo

peace dividend, according to John MacGaffin, former CIA Dep

for Operations, and the Intelligence Community was not able to 

Post-Cold War vision. “How do you get out of bed in the mornin

at a transnational issue?” MacGaffin queried.117 Francis Fuku

lated in his provocative thesis, “The End of History,” that the tri

Western model of liberal democracy and a market-oriented eco

over socialism and other political-economic systems demonstrate

democracy is the only viable option for modern societies.118 A

national security of the United States no longer confronted an 

peril; socialism had failed, the West had won. The White Hou

gress promoted and the public expected reductions in military pe

equipment; similarly, the Intelligence Community, always a 

favorite to tinker with, faced its own reductions. Human intellig

tions both in personnel and in funding were seriously depleted 

time. James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, indic

“peace dividend resulted in a 30 percent decline in funding fo

Directorate of Operations—the men and women in the clandes

who penetrate terrorist networks, recruit spies and steal secrets—

sonnel downsizing of nearly 20 percent.”119

As an illustration of the fiscal austerity facing the DoD and 

effect on the Community, the amount requested in the FY 1998 b

real terms 40 percent less than it was in 1985, the peak of the Cold 

tionally, as a share of the U.S. GDP, outlays fell to the lowest r

since before World War II, just three percent.120 Nonetheless, as e

soon demonstrate, the end of the Cold War did not imply a more 

national environment. The Cold War may have ended but a hot p

117 Gregg Sangillo and Siobhan Gorman, “Smarter Intelligence a Post-9/11 Prio

Journal (22 May 2004): 1575. 118 Francis Fukuyama and others, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in the Bottl

The National Interest (Summer 1999), accessed via Proquest, 24 November 2003. 119 James Pavitt, “Change and the CIA,” Washington Post, 6 August 2004, A19. 120 Amos A. Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: 

kins University Press, 1999), 552.
36

increased challenges from regional instability and disorder that 

increasing U.S. military and humanitarian support. General Coli

then JCS Chairman, noted:

The decline of the Soviet threat has fundamentally changed the co

of the threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning. W

still plausibly identify some specific threats—North Korea, a wea

Iraq, perhaps even a hostile Iran. But the real threat is the unknow

uncertain. In a very real sense, the primary threat to our secu

instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that n

expected or predicted.121

Strangely enough, as President George H.W. Bush was announcing t

War “peace dividend” would allow a 25 percent reduction in U.S. milit

Saddam Hussein’s forces were invading Kuwait.122 The first major w

Post-Cold War era had begun.

While the Cold War between two superpowers meant a long peac

bal stability for most of the industrialized world for over fifty years, 

not the case in the Third World.123 Nearly all of the Third Worl

were engaged in one or more of the 127 wars that claimed over 2

war-related deaths during the same period. The Third World becam

able market for sophisticated arms produced in the developed world

Speaking at Harvard University in the Spring 1992, Richard Kerr, a

Deputy Director of CIA, presented his thoughts on intelligence:

121 General Colin Powell, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affair

1992, 3 (citation as noted in Jordan and others, 544). 122 President George Bush, “Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium,” 2 August 

(Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, doc. 1190). 123 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (New York: Pantheon, 2004), 

Emran Qureshi entitled “The Enemy Of My Enemy Is My Enemy,” in Washington Post 

25 March 2004, 1. Qureshi notes that the struggle against the Soviets made use of the p

the Third World, which concentrated and privatized violence within non-state actors. W

variety terrorists existed before, none had the reach and the desire to refashion Muslim 

globally until after the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. According to one source Mam

the financing and arming of the jihadis in Afghanistan was the “largest covert operation 

tory of the CIA,” amounting to approximately $3 billion in aid. Furthermore, it is estim

35,000 mujaheddin from 43 Muslim countries fought and trained in Afghanistan, with 

100,000 additional Muslim radicals passing through Pakistan and Afghanistan. 124 David Jablonsky, Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World O

port, CT: Praeger, 1995), 56.
37

essentially, we have lost the enemy that the structure was 

designed for; we have lost the simplicity of purpose and cohe

essentially had driven not only intelligence, but has driven th

try for forty plus years....The intelligence system we develo

possible because we had consensus, because there was agre

nearly every level even across party lines....Very seldom did w

about the fundamental premise. We argued how best to s

problem, how to deal with the problem, where best to put the 

but very seldom did we face fundamentally the argument of 

this is all a phony threat.” It just did not happen....these ques

going to become more commonplace because it is not at al

that there is consensus about the future, about the threat, if t

threat, and what the nature of the threats are to this country

there are threats....I think none of those, either individually o

tively, can be seen as life-threatening to this country; they do

ardize its very existence.125

125 Richard J. Kerr, “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence System in the Post-S

Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, G

tions, Spring 1992. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Contro

URL <http://harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/kerr/kerr-i94-4.pdf>, accessed 1 April 2004.
38

onstrated to the world the first prominent example of the potent

“Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),” which matched new tech

particularly information technologies, with new tactics and orga

concepts.127 A Department of Defense official saw DESERT 

DESERT STORM as crossing a new frontier in applying modern in

technologies to perform C3

I [command, control, communications] 

He further stated:

Revolutionary techniques have included the adaptation of 

secure telephone units to pass voice, data and pictures, distri

automated command and control systems and the use of large 

bers of near instantaneous intelligence systems capable of prov

information in picture form to all military echelons. It is th

sustained large-scale joint military operation in the micro-pro

ing era.128

Paradoxically, this dazzling success also demonstrated to the wor

other nation-state could compete militarily with the United States in 

tional war scenario. Therefore, rather than engage the U.S. directly, the 

nance of U.S. military power almost assuredly disposes adve

asymmetrical attack.129 The same technology that provided U.S. militar

acy would be used to attack its vulnerabilities.

126 Not all talked of successes. Then-DCI James Woolsey testified before the HPSC

that General Schwarzkopf’s primary criticisms of intelligence support during the Gulf 

lack of timely imagery support. Woolsey stated, “we must proceed to build the capabili

imagery intelligence to battlefield commanders. During DESERT STORM, our comma

out they had to wait too long for far too few pictures of battlefield areas...and in the field 

wait longer still...because of antiquated procedures for delivering them.” (U.S. Congre

Representative, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing, The Current an

State of Intelligence. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 February 1994. URL: <http://www.fas

gress/1994_hr/hpsci022494.pdf>, accessed on 1 June 2004. 127 Jordan and others, 547. The authors speak of five lessons of DESERT STORM 

U.S. foreign policy. The fourth lesson (cited above) being that the RMA as a new form 

tional warfare holds the potential to change the way policymakers view the military ins

power in the future. The other lessons include: 1) the world is still a very dangerous pl

has a unique leadership role to play in world affairs as the residual superpower of the C

contributions of allied coalitions are crucial; ad hoc coalitions may be the only feasible 

most serious regional challenges in the future; and 5) U.S. military forces were depend

logistical support of our allies, particularly for airlift, sealift, and in-theater transportati

128 Ronald Elliot, “C3I Warfare Moves into New Era,” Defense News, 7 January 199

tion as noted in Richard A. Best, Jr., “Reforming Defense Intelligence,” CRS Report fo

91-475 F, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 11 
39

did not revolutionize the IC—antiquated, incompatible computer s

the norm. The explosive telecommunications market, “made it clear 

had to recapitalize if we were going to keep up,” stated Lt Gen Mic

Director NSA. “The danger was not that SIGINT would go awa

would cease to be an industrial strength of American intelligence

recounting a February 2001 “60 Minutes II” interview where he 

technological challenges facing NSA, observed that “al Qa’ida did 

develop a telecommunications system. All it had to do was harvest 

of a three trillion dollar a year telecommunications industry—an 

made communications signals varied, global, instantaneous, co

encrypted.”131

The national security agenda of the Post-Cold War remained po

throughout the 1990s. For instance, as 1998 began, CIA’s analytica

focused on the priorities established with the White House. By y

percent of the crises that occurred that year were in “low-priority are

major “developments” such as the global financial crisis, the Kos

India’s nuclear test were unanticipated.132 In another example, befor

Pentagon in late 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin asked the Def

Board to conduct a study to determine whether the military forces w

129 As documented a few months after the 11 September 2001 terrorists’ attacks a

in “Bin Laden Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa’ida’s Comb

Middle East Media Review of International Relations, Special Dispatch Series No. 

ary 2002. URL: <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi, accessed 7 December 200

ally, the author, Abu ‘Ubeid Al-Qurashi, a bin Laden lieutenant, explained the Al-Q

doctrine. The following excerpts relate to asymmetric warfare:

In 1989[referring to the first Gulf War], some American military experts predicte

mental change in the future form of warfare...They predicted that the wars of th

tury would be dominated by a kind of warfare they called “the fourth generation 

Others called it “asymmetric warfare.” ...This new type of warfare presents sign

culties for the Western war machine and it can be expected that [Western] armies 

fundamentally. This forecast did not arise in a vacuum—if only the cowards [am

Muslim clerics] knew that fourth-generation wars have already occurred and tha

ority of the theoretically weaker party has already proven; in many instances, na

have been defeated by stateless nations.

Abu ‘Ubeid Al-Qurashi further proclaims the Islamic victories within the past twenty 

the best armed, best trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the U.S.S.R. 

stan, the U.S. in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in southern Leb

130 LtGen Michael V.Hayden, USAF, “Investigation of Sept 11,” 17 October 200

LexisNexis, 12 January 2004. 131 Hayden. 132 “Time for a Rethink - America’s Intelligence Services,” The Economist News

April 2002, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, 28 January 2004.
40

Edward C. Shy Meyer directed this report and his comments reflec

strategic focus in national security. Meyer indicated that it was difficul

ate readiness in the absence of policy guidance on what the force was 

“to be ready to do.” 133

A poorly defined national security strategy created an almost untenab

ment for the Intelligence Community. Although the IC had throughout it

broad understanding of policymaker preferences and the country’s most 

interests, this understanding does not provide the basis for making a cohe

plans for investments, collection systems, personnel recruitment and train

Post-Cold War Intelligence Reform

Reshaping the IC for the 21st Century became the mantra of the 19

Post-Cold-War U.S. political environment demanded a smaller, more 

cient intelligence capability. Senator David L. Boren (D-OK), Chairm

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, cautioned, “If the Intellige

munity fails to make these changes,135 it will become an expensive and 

dinosaur just when America most needs information and insight into th

new challenges that it faces.”136

133 “Framing the Problem of PPBS,” BENS Tail-to-Tooth Commission Report, Janua

URL: http://www.bens.org/images/PPBS2000-Framing.pdf, accessed 10 Novem

134 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 203. 135 Refer to Boren-McCurdy Act 1992, this chapter and Appendix C – Post-Cold-W

gence Reform (1990-2001) for a list of proposed intelligence reforms.

Post Cold-War Reform

Source: Compiled by author

Year Title Admin

DCI 

Roles/

ResponsibilitiesIC 

Relations Analysis

DCI 

Budget 

Authority

Centralize 

Intel

CIA 

Admin

1992 BorenMcCurdyBush 41 XXXX X

1992 Intell Reorg

Act

Bush 41 X X

1995/96 PDD-35 Clinton X X X X

1995/96 Brown/

Aspin

Clinton X X 
41

Boren-McCurdy Act 1992

In February 1992, both the Senate Intelligence Committee (Sen. D

Chair) and the House Intelligence Committees (Rep. Dave McCurdy

separate plans for omnibus restructuring of the Intelligence Commu

the challenges of the Post-Cold War world. Its drafters envisioned t

the Intelligence Community’s counterpart to the Department of Def

nization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act). Although there were 

of the plan, they had many similarities. In fact, most of the recomme

been proposed previously but had not been addressed legislatively. 

als called for:

● Creating a Director of National Intelligence with authority t

and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the IC to in

DOD, and to direct their expenditures; task intelligence age

temporarily transfer personnel;

● Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (

one for analysis and estimates and the other for IC affairs;

● Creating a separate Director, CIA, subordinate to DNI;

● Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the IC;

● Creating a National Imagery Agency within DOD to collec

and analyze imagery. (House version would divide these e

two separate agencies)

● Authorizing the Director, DIA to task defense agencies with 

requirements and to shift personnel, funds, functions from 

intelligence agency to another.137

136 Sen. David L. Boren, (D-OK), “The Intelligence Community: How Crucial?

Affairs, 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 53. 

Year Title Admin

DCI 

Roles/

ResponsibilitiesIC 

Relations Analysis

DCI 

Budget 

Authority

Centralize 

Intel

C

Ad

1995/96 C21 Clinton X X

1996 Intel Reform

Act of 1996

Clinton X

Note: While the Hart-Rudman Commission concluded that the basic structure of the IC did not require changing, it did 

increased recruitment of HUMINT sources on terrorism as one of its three steps toward improvement. Consult Append

more information.

Source: Compiled by author (Continued)
42

have authority over all U.S. intelligence programs and budgets, would fi

the internecine rivalry for control of the Intelligence Community that h

for decades between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.138 Both b

have created a National Intelligence Center by consolidating the Com

analysis and estimative efforts in one place, to include stripping the 

analytical capabilities. The CIA would still run covert operations and m

human intelligence collection. Additionally, this National Intelligen

would be in charge of all intelligence collection.139

Although both the House and the Senate held hearings on their respe

there was no expectation that the legislation supporting these sweeping in

changes would be enacted in 1992. Senator Boren directed the Senate In

Committee’s General Counsel L. Britt Snider to draft an intelligence bi

“bold and provocative” and that would stimulate the executive branch int

imaginatively about intelligence work.140 The Senate Intelligence C

noted Title VII of the intelligence authorization bill “provided for the fi

law a comprehensive statement of responsibilities and authorities of th

and officials of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”141 The United States in

service may have begun its formal operations in 1947 but decades later

munity still operated without any charter documents formally prescri

those specific responsibilities entailed. In 1971, the Nixon Administratio

sidered and then rejected the idea of a Director of National Intelligence. 

ally, during the Carter Administration, the draft National In

Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 also would have provided statu

ters and created a DNI. However, in the case of the 1978 reform effort, 

House nor Senate Intelligence Committees reported out the bill.

In a 1992 Foreign Affairs article, Ernest R. May argued his position a

Boren-McCurdy legislation while Senator Boren stated his position f

137 Richard A. Best, Jr., “Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004,” CR

Congress, RL32500, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of C

July 2004, CRS-30, >URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf>>, accessed 2

2004. Cited hereafer as CRS Report, July 2004. Note: This is an updated version of a 

compilation entitled, Appendix C, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Centu

ard A. Best, Jr., and Herbert Andrew Boerstling. 138 Smist, 286. 139 Pamela Fessler, “Chairman Boren, McCurdy Urge Leaner, Revamped Operation

sional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 February 1992, 316. 140 Fessler, confidential interview; Smist 286. 141 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Special Report, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.

1993, 3 (citation as noted in Smist, 286).
43

McCurdy bills as drafted would solve the problems of the past, not 

He took exception with the provisions dealing with the National Se

cil, budgets, a revamped CIA and the proposed new analysis agency.

ular note is May’s opposition to putting the entire intelligence budg

DNI, with the secretary of defense “responsible for ensuring that the 

resource decisions of the DNI are implemented by elements of DoD

to May, the intelligence tsar [DNI] could find himself spending mon

satisfy requests from the Pentagon.144

On the other hand, Senator Boren argued for a closer relationship 

itary and civilian intelligence. To bring about this closer integration, 

the Community must be able to set budgetary and programmatic prio

entire community. The DCI or DNI must be able to reprogram fund

nel them accordingly from one area or agency to another.145 Ques

individuals who contend the United States either does not need intel

or no longer needs a separate Intelligence Community, Boren 

change must come in two areas—new priorities and a new structure 

to those priorities.146 His arguments for a new Community structur

foundation of the proposed Boren-McCurdy legislation.

In the end, the legislation did not pass. Had the Boren-McCur

passed—replacing previous executive directives with statutory manda

(or DNI) would have the authority to direct collection and analytical effo

the Intelligence Community.147 A decade earlier in 1981, President Re

ored to strengthen the role of the DCI through Executive Order (E.O.) 12

the absence of explicit legislation, the DCI once again continued to lack 

all aspects of the IC, predominantly in the areas of budget and personnel

Although the Boren-McCurdy legislation failed, President Bush s

intelligence authorization bill managed under the leadership of Senat

law in October 1992 for FY93. Title VII amended the National Se

1947 and according to Smist, it was one of the most important piec

gence legislation passed since the creation of CIA. It enacted organiz

ters for the Intelligence Community and established the foundation

142 Ernest R. May, “Intelligence: Backing into the Future,” Foreign Affairs, 71, n

1992), 63. 143 May, 64-65. 144 May, 67. 145 Boren, 59. 146 Boren, 54. 147 CRS Report, 29 July 2004, CRS-31.
44

If recommendations for charter legislation sound familiar, it should. Ch

lation was one of the Church’s Committee’s most important rec

tions...back in 1976! Also, using the intelligence authorization proces

Boren is credited as being the person primarily responsible for creatin

pendent CIA IG (FY1990), revising the legislation concerning how cov

would be approved and reported to Congress (FY 1991),149 and spon

short-lived National Security Education Act of 1991 (FY1992).150 The Ir

Committee had initially recommended the covert action revisions in 198

Smist highlights the passage of the National Security Education Act, d

train future generations of national security specialists, as the one actio

symbolizes Senator Boren’s tenure as Chairman of the Senate Intelligenc

tee. Regrettably derailed by congressional politics, the House Committe

repeal the Act in 1993.151 At the same time, however, the ever-magnanim

mittee granted the DCI authority to award fifty-dollar savings bonds at h

science fairs “to recognize the importance of science, mathematics, and e

to the national security.”152 According to Smist, no better example can b

illustrate what Richard Cohen calls “the perversity of Congress.”153

Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of th

U.S. Intelligence Community (Brown-Aspin Rep

Another congressional commission established in September 1994 p

the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-359) once ag

the holy grail of intelligence—“Given this radically changed global env

are intelligence capabilities still needed? If so, can their efficiency and 

ness be improved?”154 

148 Smist, 285. 149 Smist, 287. 150 Smist, 289. 151 Smist, 310. Smist indicates the program cut was not due to merit but rather a dir

attack by the Glickman (replaced McCurdy in 1993) committee on Senator Boren for n

ing the Clinton budget. The New York Times reported: “Today’s voice vote had little to 

merit. This was punishment of a chairman turned political pariah. (“Tribute, a Political 

Taken Back,” New York Times, 19 June 1993 as cited in Smist, 310). 152 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization A

Year 1994, 29 June 1993, 27 (citation as noted in Smist, 310). 153 Richard Cohen, “Bonne Chance,” Washington Post Magazine, 11 July 1993, 3. 154 Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 

Preparing for the 21st Century: An appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Washington, DC: GP

Hereafter cited as Brown-Aspin Report.
45

sion concluded that:

The current program budget structure and diffused responsibili

basic business areas have resulted in unnecessary duplication, in

ability problems, and other inefficiencies. These problems exi

the NFIP, and among the NFIP, JMIP and TIARA activities, c

substantial obstacle to the efficient use of intelligence resources

Because of these inefficiencies, the Commission proposed restruc

NFIP budget by creating new discipline-oriented programs for SIG

MASINT, and HUMINT, each with a single program manager. The 

also recommended that the total amounts appropriated for intellig

closed. President Clinton implemented this recommendation for F

1998. This is the source for the annual amount of $26 billion plus wh

noted frequently in unclassified correspondence.

Checklist for the Future of Intelligence

Shortly after Congress chartered the Brown-Aspin Commission, 

University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) hosted a se

ings entitled “American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century: A 

on the Future of Intelligence After the Cold War.”156 Appendix D - T

on Intelligence Reform, provides selected highlights from this Che

appendix also highlights additional opinions from various inte

national security professionals on reform issues and challenges in t

War era.

One ISD colloquium checklist item—to create a joint Committ

gence comprising House and Senate members, appointed by the le

supported by a small staff157—warrants discussion. Early in the h

Community (1956), the Senate pushed a joint Senate-House CIA c

oversee intelligence but this resolution was soundly defeated.158 The

1970s, both the Senate and the House created permanent intelligence 

Unquestionably, Congress as the overseer of the United States fo

gence program has a lawful and important role. However, colloq

pants expressed concern about the extent of congressional oversight 

155 Brown-Aspin Report. 156 John Hedley, ISD Occasional Paper 1, Checklist for the future of Intelligence 

MD: Reproductions, Inc., 1995), v. Cited hereafter as Checklist. 157 Checklist, 26. 158 Smist, 8.
46

does for the President. According to John Hollister Hedley, author of 

list, “Fearing trouble with either appropriations or investigative hearing

accusation goes—the Intelligence Community grows more concerned 

tecting its congressional flank than serving the executive branch, and is 

responsive to Capitol Hill.”159 Other concerns centered on the amount o

DCI spends on Capitol Hill answering congressional inquiries; con

scrutiny had by the mid-1990s become so detailed as to be unwor

beyond the scope of ordinary oversight; and finally, intrusive oversight 

to de facto congressional pre-approval of executive actions instead of p

the expected monitoring and reviewing.160 The latter concern reflect

tional separation-of-power principles and issues. 

These concerns did not surface just during this colloquium but 

voiced throughout the Community. More than one senior exec

expressed frustration with the amount of time spent responding to con

inquiries. Quite often, questions asked are similar in nature but have 

from different congressional committees, with each committee requiri

rate response format. As a former senior financial manager for an in

agency, the present author has experienced first-hand the excruciatin

detail required in preparing congressional budget justification books 

While recognizing the lawful and important role of congressional ov

could be conducted more efficiently and effectively by the creation 

intelligence committee. However, because there are multiple congressi

mittees which exercise some level of intelligence oversight—pred

Armed Services, Appropriations, SSCI, HPSCI—it is unlikely any of t

mittees will relinquish their power of the purse to a joint committee.

The Brown-Aspin Committee considered but did not recommend a s

committee. The Committee explained its non-consideration as follows

Creating a single joint committee would not substantially redu

number in Congress needing access to intelligence, but would r

the degree of oversight. It would also eliminate the checks an

ances inherent in having committees in each body separately co

intelligence funding. A joint committee would no longer handle 

nations received by the Senate.161

159 Checklist, 25. 160 Checklist, 26. 161 Brown-Aspin Report.
47

In addition to the Brown-Aspin Commission, the House Intellige

tee under the Chairmanship of Larry Combest, (R-TX) initiated its o

review of intelligence issues. The IC21study was the boldest, mo

and most radical of the proposals for IC reform.162 It sought to dete

“intelligence norms”—organizations, products, practices, relationsh

of doing business that extend throughout the IC—are still relevan

Century; which need to be either revised or replaced; and what 

should be added.163 The IC2I Overview and Summary declared:

Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms o

zations, missions, or functions. Neither are there any preconce

to the “right answer” for the future of the IC.164

This Committee concluded that a major key to an improved IC i

of “corporateness”—the idea that agencies and employees of th

behave as part of a more closely integrated enterprise working tow

defined common end: the delivery of timely intelligence to civil 

decisionmakers at various levels.165 To achieve this “corporateness,” 

agement should be strengthened, core competencies (collection, ana

tions) should be reinforced and infrastructure should be consolidat

possible. Furthermore, the DCI should have a stronger voice in the 

of the directors at NFIP Defense agencies.

Most of the IC21 recommendations were consistent with the B

Report (see Appendix C—Post-Cold War Intelligence Reform for 

For example, the IC21 Committee saw no compelling reason to red

rent, divided oversight system to a joint committee. It concluded, 

oversight system had been largely effective, and clearly has respon

problems that prompted the creation of the current committees”166 [i

in 1975-76].

162 Abraham H. Miller and Brian Alexander, “Structural Quiescence in the Failu

Intelligence Reform,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(Summer 2001): 235. 163 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on In

Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, 104th Congress, 9 April 1

www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/uc21/ic21001.html>, accessed 21 Octobe

ter cited as IC21. 164 IC21, Overview and Summary, 2. 165 IC21, Overview and Summary, 5. 166 IC21, Section XV. Congressional Oversight, 1.
48

period were in agreement on the advisability of a greater degree of cen

and enhanced authority for the DCI, with the exception of Georgetow

scientist Roy Godson and Harvard historian Ernest May, who found tha

failure of centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting the reaso

needs of the various components of the national security bureau

In any case, the centralized model was probably better suited 

Cold War, with its emphasis on “national” level intelligence abo

Soviet strategic nuclear threat, than to the present period when d

mental, regional, and tactical intelligence requirements have exp

and gained new urgency.167

Post-Cold War Reform in Context

A common perception held by Congress and the American public w

Community had lost its focus after the end of the Cold War and nee

guidance and direction.168 Hence, congressional reform during the 1990

trated on measures that sought to improve the efficiency, effectiv

accountability of the IC. Perhaps the most significant structural chang

out of the countless reform recommendations of the 1990s was the crea

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), now known as the 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The Defense Authorization A

(P.L. 104-201) (IAAFY97) established NGA. Recall that the con

National Imagery Agency was proposed initially by the Boren-McCur

tion in 1992. Yet, the creation of NGA was anything but a smooth proc

paper articles discussing committee differences referred to the dispute 

ring “turf battle par excellence.”169 Helen Sullivan, Office of the Depu

Counsel, DoD and primary drafter of the NIMA legislation, had this to 

the process:

[i]t has been said that it can be easier to get legislation [to effect i

gence reform] through Congress than the executive branch. NIMA 

be proof of that. If we had tried to seek an administration solut

the problem, having the DCI and the Secretary of Defense sign 

167 Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution, 13. 168 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Commission on Intelligence, Special Report of the 

mittee on Intelligence United States Senate January 4,1995 to October 3, 1996, 105th C

sess., S. Rept.105-1, 22 January 1997. URL: <www.emergency.com/int03.htm>, a

October 2003. Cited hereafter as SSCI Special Report 22 January 1997. 169 Anne Daugherty Miles, The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Age

gress’s Role as Overseer, Occasional Paper Number Nine (Washington, DC: JMIC, 20
49

cies, and we would probably still be waiting for approval. Bu

cies can take a look at senior leadership, recognize the am

turnover at that level and wait them out.170

In her Senate confirmation hearing as the first Deputy DCI for 

Management (Brown-Aspin Commission and IC21 Study recom

nominee Joan Dempsey unmistakably pinpoints the most fundame

of intelligence organizations—protecting the “turf”:

It’s somewhat amusing to me—and I’ve spent most of my care

Department of Defense...and when I was in DoD there was alw

fear that a very powerful DCI with a full-time emphasis on inte

and managing the Community would fail to support the DoD th

needed to be supported with intelligence. Since I’ve come ov

Central Intelligence Agency side of the Intelligence Commun

found the same fear, but this time directed at what DoD is goi

to subvert the role of the DCI.171

The IC21 Committee may have commanded that “everything is o

but the sacred cows were still the guests of honor. Every mother kn

because everyone got a slice of the chocolate cake, does not mean t

be arguments over who got the biggest slice!

U.S. Commission on National Security/21s

Century (Hart-Rudman Commission)

This Commission, commonly known as the Hart-Rudman C

began in mid-1998 but it did not publish its first report until 1

1999, two weeks shy of FY2000, the next budgetary period, and t

shy of the next millennium. Two former congressman, Gary Hart, 

Warren B. Rudman (R-NH), were Commission Co-Chairs. Its fina

not made available to the public until 15 February 2001. The pr

chose to categorize this Commission as belonging to the Post-Cold 

of the 1990s because it has it origins during this decade. Reform 

170 Helen Sullivan, “Creation of NIMA,” 45 (citation as noted in Miles, 22). 171 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing, Nominati

Dempsey to be Deputy Director of Intelligence for Community Management,105th C

Senate Hearing 105-1056, 21-22 May 1998, 1 (citation as noted in Best, CRS Repo

CRS-36).
50

9/11 Reform initiatives. 

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century initially be

National Security Study Group (NSSG). The concept for this Commis

from a conversation between President William J. Clinton and Congress

Gingrich, (R-GA), Speaker of the House in 1997. According to Rudma

and Gingrich were discussing some upcoming legislation when Clinton r

book he was reading that reminded him of their conversation. Basically, C

referring to what became the National Security Act of 1947, when after W

“ten to twelve very distinguished Americans got together to look at the w

ply of the government and what it should look like” for the remaining 

years of the century.172 Rudman related that Gingrich told Clinton, “You 

President, we ought to do just that for the twenty-first century, because wh

in place was put there for the Cold War, and isn’t necessarily what we oug

in place for the next fifty years—for the first half of the twenty-first centur

With that pronouncement (and the House and Senate approval), the C

began its laborious task of examining whether “institutions designed in one w

may not be appropriate for the future.” The Secretary of Defense chartered 

mission in mid-1998 under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Comm

There would be three phases to this monumental undertaking: Phase I wou

the world emerging in the first quarter of the century, Phase II would design 

security strategy appropriate to that world, and finally, Phase III would prop

sary changes to the current national security structure to implement Phase II 

This Commission looked at the United States government as a whol

idea that “fifty years [since 1947] is a long time for any policy structure 

particularly during a period of such vast change.”175 The final reports of 

mittee encompassed three and one-half years of effort, which culminate

substantive reports published separately: Phase I (1999), Phase II (2000), 

172 Warren B. Rudman, “Perspectives on National Security in the Twenty-First Cent

ing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Guest Pre

Spring 2002. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, June 

URL:http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/rudman/rudman.i02.pdf>. Accessed 1 April 200

173 Rudman, 2. 174 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Comi

can Security in the 21st Century Major Themes and Implications Phase I Report on the 

Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, 15 September 19

URL: http://www.nssg.gov, accessed 1 November 2003. Cited hereafter as Hart-Rud

Report. 175 Hart-Rudman Phase I Report Foreword, iv.
51

standing of the major renderings of each of the three reports. After the 

September 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission received considera

exponentially more so than its initial release months earlier. Cons

author chose to provide an annotated version of the Commission’s fift

dations in APPENDIX C—Post-Cold-War Intelligence Reform (1990

The Hart-Rudman Commission did not specifically address 

reform. However, because “intelligence serves and is subservient t

intelligence works best when tied to clearly understood policy goals

dent to highlight this consummate work; therefore, all three phases a

briefly. The Commission did delineate “steps” that the Intelligence 

should undertake to ensure successful implementation of the Phas

These steps are addressed in “Phase III, Road Map for National Secu

ative for Change,” in this chapter.

While the Hart-Rudman Commission did not address the intellig

national security per se, the IC senior leadership had recognized its 

an executive-level Community offsite on 11 September 1998, the I

concluded that “failure to improve operations management, resourc

and other key issues within the [IC], including substantial and swee

in the way the nation collects, analyzes, and produces intelligenc

result in a catastrophic, systemic intelligence failure.”177

1999 Phase I Report: Emerging Global Security

Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century

The Commission articulated twelve beliefs about the United S

relationship with the rest of the world—the emerging world envir

should be expected, these beliefs were consistent with the annual r

the Post-Cold War environment circulated among the Communit

think tanks and focus groups. To summarize these beliefs, the 

believed the U.S. would remain a primary political, military, and c

through 2025; militarily it would remain the principal force in the w

science and technology would continue to make explosive advancem

tribution will be uneven; likewise, economic growth will not occur am

ments evenly and widespread poverty will persist. Additionally, inc

176 Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, xi. 177 U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcom

rorism and Homeland Security, Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Perf

to 9-11, Report, 107th Cong., 2 sess., 17, July 2002, URL: http://www.fas.org/irp

2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html, accessed 21 October 2003.
52

(NGOs) would grow in number and importance. Weapons of mass d

(WMD) and weapons of mass disruption would proliferate.

Two Commission points, Numbers 11 and 12, bear repeating verbati

in the context of the events that would occur two years hence, in Septem

these beliefs bore a prophetic truth. These beliefs were:

11. We should expect conflicts in which adversaries, because of cul

ities different from our own, will resort to forms and levels of violence 

to our sensibilities.

12. As the United States confronts a variety of complex threats, it wi

dependent on allies; but it will find reliable alliances more difficult to 

and sustain.178

Drawing upon such beliefs about the future, the Commission drafte

conclusions that forecast the international security environment for 

twenty-five years.179 (See Appendix C).

Even though as Casey Stengel lamented, “Forecasting is always diffi

cially about the future,”180 undoubtedly, these conclusions will come 

with varying degrees of effect over the course of the next twenty-five y

In summary, the Hart-Rudman Commissioners concluded that th

report “points to two contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, te

cal, and intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid 

forces of social and political fragmentation.”181 The Commission reg

transformation of human society to be of the magnitude of that betwee

cultural and industrial epochs but in a drastically reduced time frame. 

2000 Phase II Report Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Pr

Security and Promoting Freedom

178 Hart-Rudman Phase I Report Our View of the Future, 3. 179 Hart and Rudman Phase I Report Conclusions, 4-7. 180 DCI R. James Woolsey invoked Casey Stengel during testimony to the HPSCI o

ary 1994. U.S. Congress, House of Representative, Permanent Select Committee on In

Hearing. The Current and Future State of Intelligence. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Feb

URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_hr/hpsci022494.pdf, accessed on 1 

181United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a Nationa

A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom Phase II Report on a U.S. N

Strategy for the 21st Century, 15 April 2000, 5. URL: http://www.nssg.gov, accessed 

2003. Cited hereafter as Hart-Rudman Phase II Report.
53

cepts that should guide the formulation of U.S. national strategy. Am

egy must strike a balance between two key aims, reported the Comm

one hand, the aim is to embrace a more integrated world as a requis

freedom, security, and prosperity for all Americans and others; while 

hand, this strategy must lessen the forces of global instability to p

benefits.182

The Commission indicated that to preserve American liberties an

goals in a new age, America’s priority objectives and key policy obj

be these:

● To defend the United States and ensure that it is safe from th

of a new era.

● To maintain America’s social cohesion, economic compe

technological ingenuity, and military strength.

● To assist the integration of key major powers, especial

Russia, and India, into the mainstream of the emergin

tional system.

● To promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global 

and improve the effectiveness of international institutions an

tional law.

● To adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a 

which America’s partners seek greater autonomy and respon

Additionally, the Commission emphasized that the challenges to 

making necessitate the need for greater integration between traditi

security agencies such as State, Defense, and the Intelligence Com

other U.S. agencies such as Justice, Commerce, Treasury, and the l

more, the Commission stressed the need for more effective partn

state and local governments. Recognizing that preventive diplomacy 

ciated tools (political, economic, other partnerships) may not alwa

Hart-Rudman Commission stipulated the five kinds of military cap

the U.S. requires in this new environment:

● Nuclear capabilities to deter and protect the United States an

from attack;

● Homeland security capabilities;

● Conventional capabilities necessary to win major wars;

182 Hart and Rudman Phase II Report; Thinking About Strategy, 6. 183 Hart and Rudman Phase II Report; Key Objectives, 8-12. 
54

● Humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.184

2001 Phase III Report Road Map for National Security: Imperative fo

After examining the strategic environment (Phase I) and a strategy 

it, the Commission concluded that significant changes must be made in 

tures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus.185

Astonishingly, the Hart-Rudman Commission concluded that the st

the Intelligence Community did not require change. A few years late

Gary Hart, one of the speakers at a World Affairs Council of Northern 

symposium on Intelligence Community Reform and at the time, Co-C

pendent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperitives, stated:

[The Hart-Rudman Commission] did not undertake to design a 

Cold War intelligence structure. But we strongly urged the new a

istration [Bush Administration] to begin that process. Indeed, I 

the Clinton Administration should have undertaken a lengthy stu

how Post-Cold War intelligence in America should be produced a

whom.186

All of the Phase III recommendations in order of their presentat

United States Commission on National Security/21st Century are 

Appendix C—Post-Cold War Intelligence Reform.

Hart-Rudman Commission Summary

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st century is perhap

comprehensive attempt to capture the essence of American national sec

the efforts encapsulated in the passage of the National Security Ac

Clinton and Gingrich saw their initial historical discussion become an e

for 21st-Century government restructuring. Incidentally, when Ging

duced this legislation there was a consensus for this Commission. It 

gressional and White House support; the time had come to define 

security policy for the 21st century. According to Rudman, “It went lik

184 Hart and Rudman Phase II Report, Implications for National Security, 14. 185 Hart-Rudman Phase III Report, viii. 186 Gary Hart, former Senator (D-CO), speaker at the World Affairs Council of Nort

nia symposium, “Intelligence Community Reform,” San Francisco, CA., 18 November 

tape viewed in the John T.Hughes Library on 1 June 2004. Other speakers included Da

(former FBI), Jane Wales (President, World Affairs Council), John McGaffin (CIA), Ja

(CIA), and John Andrews (Bureau Chief, Economist).
55

body was behind it.

Unfortunately, once again as in the past, enthusiasm and ultimatel

government reform waned. This Herculean effort to restructure the 

for the 21st Century, mandated by Congress to be provided to the in

ident in January 2001, became just another shelved commission rep

elaborate public relations attempts to get the word out on the Hart-R

mission Reports, these efforts fell short of the expected responses. 

Rudman, although representatives from every major media outlet an

work attended the February 2001 Senate roll-out of this Commission 

one of the three major networks, ABC, devoted time to it during its 

total of eight seconds. Furthermore, only two newspapers, The Was

and The Los Angeles Times, provided decent coverage of the eve

noted that a New York Times reporter walked out of the February pres

halfway through. When the Commission Executive Director (Char

called the reporter to inquire why he left, the reporter replied, “Hell, 

kind of story the Times reports. That’s just one of these governmen

pile up and get thrown in the dustbin.” Ironically, the first time any

ica, according to Rudman, knew that there was a National Security 

(NSSG) in the pages of the newspaper of record of the United Sta

York Times, was on 12 September 2001.188

As most of America knows by now, the U.S. Commission on N

rity/21st century, pointed out that in its first report dated Septembe

first conclusion—America will become increasingly vulnerable to h

on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely pro

last sentence of this conclusion that now seems tragically pres

“Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numb

After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, some of the Hart-R

mission Report recommendations were finally implemented, alth

originally suggested. After much debate, a reluctant White House 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The next chapter 

two of the major investigations, known as the Joint Inquiry and the 9

sion, that were undertaken in response to the terrorist attacks on 

States. Strangely, Gary Hart, the co-chair of the most comprehens

U.S. national security since 1947, was not called to testify before th

187 Rudman, 2-3. 188 Rudman, 5. 189 Hart-Rudman Report Conclusions, 4.
56

preparing its final report, Hart questioned why he and others had no

to testify:

I am increasingly asked what information our earlier commis

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, has prov

9/11 Commission and why that information has not been mad

When told that the 9/11 Commission has not asked for any pub

mony from us, most people are incredulous. If the 9/11 Comm

really trying to find out what was known and when it was kno

ask, why would your national security commission’s warnings 

ommendations not be of direct relevance and urgent interest?...

ple answer to all these questions is: I don’t know why we have 

called to testify.190

Why indeed?

190 Gary Hart, “Gary Hart: A Paul Revere No One Wants to Hear From,” salon.c

2004.
57

PRESENT: POST 9/11 STRATEGIES FOR R

The 9/11 Surprise?

This point must be underscored. Without a doubt, terrorists were re

the 11 September 2001 murder of 2,749 innocents in New York, 184 

Washington, and 40 innocents in Pennsylvania. As tragic as the even

tember 2001 were, 9/11 was not a surprise attack. It may have been 

surprised us beyond our worst nightmares but it was not a surprise attac

statement may appear self-contradictory, it is not. A surprise attack wou

the United States had no forewarning of an attack. After three plus ye

ing questions, investigations, and examinations, we know this is not th

were warnings not heeded and warnings missed, information not shar

mation not processed. “The 9/11 attacks were a shock,” the 9/11 pan

“but they should not have come as a surprise.”191 For the present a

review of selected statements presented to the Senate Intelligence Com

I don’t think anybody could have predicted that these same peop

take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, taken ano

and slam it into the Pentagon; that they would try to use an airpla

missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile. All of this reporting about 

was about traditional hijacking. You take a plane—people were wor

might blow one up, but they were worried that they might take a p

use it for the release of the blind Sheikh or some of their own people

National Security Advisor Condoleez

May 2002 Press 

The Joint Inquiry confirmed that, before September 11, the Intelligen

munity produced at least twelve reports over a seven-year period su

terrorists might use planes as weapons.

Joint Inquiry 

Decemb
58

attacks demonstrated that portents had been building for years.

Historically, we know from an aviation perspective, as reiterated in 

ment of Karen Breitweiser, Co-Chairperson, September 11th Advo

crashing an airplane into a building was not unimaginable. In fact, ther

multiple attempts to do so:

● In 1993, a draft document depicting a scenario where an a

bombs national landmarks was circulated throughout the Pe

the Justice Department and to the Federal Emergency Mana

Agency (FEMA).

191 David Von Drehle, “Analysis: the Findings-America’s Failings, in Depressing D

ington Post, 23 July 2004, A20.

On an emotional level, the September 11 attacks have been compared to the 

Pearl Harbor sixty years prior. While both the 9/11 and Pearl Harbor attac

abashedly intelligence failures, they are dissimilar. Frank L. Borch, in “Compar

Harbor and “9/11”: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military 

sibility? Journal of Military History, 67, no. 3 (July 2003), accessed via Pr

December 2003, compares the attacks of 9/11 to the Japanese attacks on Pea

and points to dissimilarities in the nature of the failure, level of readiness, and 

responsibilities. He acknowledges that it is possible to compare the two as int

failures providing there is recognition that the nature of the two intelligence f

dissimilar. Borch states, “those in command in Hawaii had sufficient intelligenc

tify a higher state of vigilance (and prepare a better defense),” and he further 

“no information had been collected (or probably could have been) that wo

caused the FBI or FAA to respond differently on 9/11.” 

The present author strongly disagrees with his premise concerning 9/11 that 

mation had been collected which would have warranted a different response. 

tion had been collected but it was not properly disseminated nor was its im

properly recognized. As Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Joint Inquiry Com

explained:

While the specifics of the September 11 attacks were not known in adva

relevant information was available in the summer of 2001. The collective 

nificance of that information was not, however, recognized. Perhaps a

result, the information was not fully shared, in a timely and effective man

both within the Intelligence Community and with other federal agencies
59

company aircraft with the intent to crash it into a company b

Memphis.

● In 1994, a lone pilot crashed a small plane onto the Wh

grounds.

● In 1994, an Air France flight was hijacked by members of t

Islamic Group, intending to crash the plane into the Eiffel To

● In 1995, Philippine authorities uncovered a plot, Project B

blow up 11 airlines over the Pacific and in the alternate pl

planes were to be flown into civilian targets in the U.S. T

selected included: CIA Headquarters, The World Trade C

Sears Tower, and the White House.192

Historically, we know from a national security and intelligence pe

presented in the Statement of George Tenet, DCI, that asymmetric at

U.S. interests were a logical response to U.S. military superiority:

● In the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate we warned, “A

and free democracy, the United States is particularly vulnera

ious types of intelligence attacks. Several kinds of targets 

cially at risk: National symbols such as the White Hous

Capitol, and symbols of U.S. capitalism such as Wall Stre

grids...places where large numbers of people congregate

large office buildings,...and airports and other large transpor

minals. Civil aviation will figure prominently among possib

targets in the United States.”

● In 1999, during open session testimony, “I told you there 

slightest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, an

pathizers are planning further attacks against us.” I said, “He 

wherever in the world he thinks we are vulnerable” and we 

cerned that one or more of Bin Laden’s attacks could occur at 

● In 2000, during open session testimony, I told you, “Ever

have learned recently confirms our conviction that (UBL) 

strike further blows against America” and that he could strik

additional warning.”193

Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Director, imparted these pre-9/11 k

respect to the Usama Bin Ladin that confronted the Intelligence Com

192 Karen Breitweiser, “Investigation of Sept 11,”18 September 2002, accessed v

12 January 2004. 193 George Tenet, “Investigation of Sept 11,”17 October 2002, accessed via 

12 January 2004.
60

American civilian and military personnel worldwide.

● During a three-year period, the IC acquired information indi

Laden’s intent to carry out attacks inside the United States.

● In 1998, the DCI’s statement “we are at war” with Bin Laden 

East Africa embassy bombings) and that no resources 

spared by the IC in that regard.

● Over a seven-year period, the IC accumulated information 

international terrorists were considering using airplanes as w

● Spring/Summer of 2001, numerous indicators detected by t

major impending terrorist attack which would have drama

quences for governments and cause mass casualties.194

The controversial 6 August 2001 Presidential Daily Brief (P

tonebox on next page) entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in 

yet another example that the terrorist attacks upon the U.S. were in 

prise attacks. Several times during the spring and summer of 200

Bush asked his briefers if any of the threats pointed to the U

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the CIA decided to wr

communicating their view that the threat of a Bin Laden attack i

States remained both current and serious. This became the 36th 

thus far that year (2001) concerning Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and t

indicating the possibility of an attack in the United States. Preside

the Commissioners that the 6 August 2001 PDB was historical in n

did not recall discussing it with the Attorney General or whether 

Security Advisor had done so. The President said that if his advis

him there was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to 

it. That never happened.196

194 Eleanor Hill, “Investigation of Sept 11, 17 October 2002, accessed via Lexis

ary 2004. 195After much castigation from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks U

States Commission (9/11 Commission), the White House acquiesced and declassifi

approved it for release on 10 April 2004. The following text was printed in the 9/11 

Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon th

(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 261-262. Cited hereafter as the 9/11 R

presentation includes italics and bold as it appeared in the 9/11 Commission report. 

cate redacted material. 196 9/11 Report, 260.
61

Bin Laden Determined to Strike the U.S.

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin L

1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Laden im

television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the 

World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told 

wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [—] service. An Egyp

Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [—] service at the same time that Bin Laden w

to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Lade

ous attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahm

has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Ai

but that Bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zabaydah encouraged him and helped facilita

tion. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zabaydah was planning his own US atta

Ressam says Bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Em

Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operation

advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates su

Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some mem

Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa `ida members, including some who are US citizens—have resided in 

to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structur

aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our e

East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the m

A Clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Laden cell in New York wa

Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat rep

as that from a [--] service in 1998 saying that Bin Laden wanted to hijack a U

gain the release of “Blind Saykh” ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and other US-held ex

Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicio

this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of atta

ing recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout t

considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our 

UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Laden supporters was in the US 

attack with explosives.
62

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, in her testimony to 

Commission, testified, “It did not warn of attacks inside the United 

was historical information based on old reporting. There was no n

information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks 

United States.”197 

Additionally, Lt Gen Hayden in his testimony before the Joint Inqu

responding to ‘What did NSA know prior to September 11?” testified:

Sadly, NSA had no SIGINT suggesting that al-Qa’ida was speci

targeting New York and Washington, D.C., or even that it was pla

an attack on U.S. soil. Indeed, NSA had no knowledge before Se

ber 11th that any of the attackers were in the United States...To 

into some perspective, throughout the summer of 2001 we had 

than 30 warnings that something was imminent. We dutifully rep

these, yet none of these subsequently correlated with terrorist at

The concept of “imminent” to our adversaries is relative; it can 

soon or simply sometime in the future.” 198

While the United States may not have known the precise date, place 

of these catastrophic attacks on 11 September 2001, they are, nonethel

tragic example of predictable surprise. Predictable surprises are events, 

to two Harvard professors—see tone box on next page—that could 

anticipated and prepared for. In many cases, the warning signs were p

years. Watkins and Bazerman acknowledge that many surprises are tru

the-blue unpredictable and in those cases leaders should not be blamed 

foresight especially when all reasonable preventative measures have b

Viewed in this context, 11 September 2001 was not one of these. It was 

prise attack but rather an attack that indelibly surprised the governm

United States. “If only Osama had faxed an X-mark-the-spot map to 

ford ranch showing the Pentagon, the Capitol, the twin towers and 

“BOOM!” scrawled in Arabic, wrote Maureen Dowd, a New York Tim

columnist, “That might have sparked sluggish imaginations. Or mayb

197Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Transcript: Rice’s Testimony on 

ington Post FDCH E-Media, online ed., http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-d

A61252-2004Apr8, accessed 14 April 2004. 198 Hayden. 199 Maureen Dowd, “Head Spook Sputter,” The New York Times, online ed., 15 April 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/opinion/15DOWD.html?th=&page wanted=prin

accessed 19 April 2004.
63

Senator Richard C. Shelby, (R-AL), Vice-Chairman and former 

the SSCI, expressed no inhibitions in his criticism of Community 

lack thereof, when he adamantly stated:

Long before the September 11 attacks, I made no secret of my 

of disappointment in the U.S. Intelligence Community for it

mance in a string of smaller-scale intelligence failures during 

decade. Since September 11 I have similarly hid from no one m

that the Intelligence Community does not have the decisive and 

Predictable Surprise

Two Harvard University professors, Michael D. Watkins and Max H. Bazerm

able Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, Harva

Review, March 2003: 72-80, refer to predictable surprises as disastrous 

could have been anticipated and prepared for. Predictable surprises arise o

of recognition, prioritization, or mobilization. They studied predictable su

occurred in business and government and they ascertained that an or

inability to prepare itself can be traced to three kinds of barriers: psycholog

zational, and political. While a leader might not be able to eliminate the

entirely, they can be minimized.

They cited the case of the Royal Dutch /Shell Company and Greenpeac

who occupied an obsolete oil-storage platform called the Brent Spar as a cl

ple of predictable surprise. In 1995, Shell decided to junk the Spar. But en

protesters boarded the site to prevent its demolition. It became a public rela

mare as Shell blasted the protesters with water cannons. Soon protests and 

Shell products mounted throughout Europe. Shortly thereafter, Shell ab

plans. Shell had the information it needed to predict what would transpire b

all the warning signs, Shell never foresaw the looming calamity. 

In a brief examination of 9/11, Watkins and Bazerman infer that the failure t

and take precautionary measures can be traced to lapses in recognition, p

and mobilization. They stipulated that:

Information that might have been pieced together to highlight the precise 

the threat remained fragmented among the FBI, CIA, and other government

No one gave priority to plugging the security holes in the aviation system be

chologically, the substantial and certain short-term costs of fixing the proble

far larger than the uncertain long-term costs of inaction. And the organizati

sible for airline security, the airlines, had the wrong incentives, desiring fa

cost screening to boost profitability. Inevitably, plans to fix the system fell a

certed political lobbying by the airline industry.
64

challenges of the 21st Century...The failures of September 11 

generally not ones of reckless commission but rather of nervous 

sion. They were failures to take the necessary steps to rise above 

parochial interests and concerns in the service of the common go

advocate no crusade to hold low-level employees accountable f

failures of September 11...The IC’s rank-and-file deserve no dis

for resource decisions and for creating these policies...Respons

must lie with the leaders who took so little action for so long, to ad

problems so well known.200

James R. Thompson, (R-IL), former governor and member of the 9

mission, commented that, “Blame, if there’s blame, has to be spread 

board. Even the public could be said to have failed, because the Americ

never demanded more or better.” The Washington Post further rep

though quick, the historical judgment [of 9/11 attacks] seems conclus

American leadership failed across the board.201

At least 100 families of the victims of 11 September 2001 are d

more. They decided to sue the airlines and government agencies afte

the federal government’s compensation offer—$250,000 minimum f

though awards could top $1 million. The lawsuit charges that the ai

government agencies knew in 2001 that terrorist groups were targetin

and airports and failed to respond accordingly with sufficient steps to fo

attacks. The reasons for rejecting the compensation offer are varied 

families hoped the lawsuit would uncover information about governmen

porate missteps while others disliked the idea that taxpayers would be f

bill for the federal compensation. Nonetheless, the majority of the fam

accepted the federal compensation offer—2,924 of the total eligible of 

Two major investigations were launched to look into the events of 9/

first, the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before 

the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Joint Inquiry)204 under th

of Staff Director Eleanor Hill, began in February 2002 and completed 

gation in December 2002. The unclassified version was published mid-

200 Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-AL), “September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in 

Intelligence Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby,” 10 Decemb

URL: <http://intelligence.senate.gov/Shelby.pdf>, accessed 21 October 2003. Cited h

Shelby on 9/11 and IC Reform. 201 Von Drehle, A20. 202 Michelle Garcia, “Nearly 100 Families are Suing Over 9/11: Federal Compensa

saken,” Washington Post, 23 January 2004, A9.
65

United States (9/11 Commission) was established by the Intelligenc

tion Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306). Thomas H. Kean presided as C

H. Hamiliton was the Vice-Chair. The 9/11 Commission published 

July 2004. Committee staff members as well as a complete listing o

dations by both committees are provided in Appendix D—Talking H

gence Reform, and Appendix E—Post-9/11 Intelligence Reform, 

Recommendations specifically addressing IC functions and capabil

cussed later in this chapter.

These investigations grew not from executive leadership but fro

roots efforts of family members of victims lost to the tragedy of S

Robin Wiener, a board member of the Families of September 11 sa

to understand the role that each of these agencies and cabinet office

whether or not they were doing their jobs—and if not find out w

want any other family to suffer the way we suffered.”205

Before discussing these two investigations surrounding the events 

important to acquaint the reader with another report on intelligenc

tion completed more than three years ago but which still has not bee

Congress. In May 2001, President Bush established National Secur

tial Directive-5 (NSPD), which established a Commission on Intellig

203 Four inquiries into the U.S. Intelligence Community have been initiated sinc

not discussed further in this project relate to WMD. The Senate Intelligence Comm

tion, led bySenators Pat Roberts (R-KS) and John D. Rockefeller IV, (D-WV), in its 

reported in Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A20: “Either the IC overstated evidence 

sessed chemical and biological weapons and was actively reconstituting its nuclear 

claims were not supported by underlying evidence.” The other investigation, the Pr

mission, was led by former Senator Charles S. Robb (R-VA) and federal judge Laur

man. They were to report their findings to the president by 31 March 2005. This com

report on how the United States collects, analyzes and disseminates intelligence rela

of mass destruction. This inquiry also was to determine what information the White 

Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion of that country. 204 The Senate Intelligence Committee (section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 

Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the SSCI) and the House Intelligence Committe

(1)(b) of the rules of the House of Representatives and Rule 9 of the Rules of Proce

HPSCI) authorized an investigation to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry. 

Cited as: U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, P

Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activi

After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 1

Rept. 107-792, December 2002, Preamble, 1. Cited hereafter as Joint Inquiry Repor

205 Scot J. Paltrow, “White House Hurdles Delay 9/11 Commission Investigation

and Interviews are Subject of Tense Talks as Tight Deadline Looms,” Wall Street Jo

ed., 8 July 2003, <http: // online.wsj.com/public/us>, accessed 9 July 2003. 
66

ist attacks occurred on 11 September 2001. Very little is known publ

this Commission, or the Scowcroft Panel, as it is commonly know

headed by Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft (USAF Ret), Chairman of the Presid

eign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and former national securi

The final report remains classified and only brief accounts have been 

openly. An NGA senior executive who participated in this panel inf

present author that most participants immediately returned to their 

agencies after the 9/11 attacks. At that point, he had no further involv

did comment that by 11 September 2001, the panel had completed the

that remained was drafting the cover letter to accompany the panel’s re

In November 2001, according to published reports in the CQ W

Scowcroft panel recommended a major realignment of the intelligenc

This realignment would include moving the National Security Agen

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Imagery and 

Agency (NIMA now known as the National Geospatial-Intelligenc

(NGA)) from the control of the Pentagon to that of the Director, Cent

gence (DCI).206 The New York Times reported that the Scowcroft panel 

the management of the 15 intelligence agencies and their budgets to 

under the direction of a single person. However, it is uncertain whether 

intelligence chief would also have been the director of central intel

whether that function would be separated.207

Apparently, these recommendations received a less than enthusias

tion from the Defense Department. According to one senior intellig

cial, “The Scowcroft report was stopped dead in its tracks by [Se

Defense] Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense didn’t want to lo

over its intelligence agencies.”208

Interestingly, in September 2002, speaking before the Joint House a

Intelligence Committee, Scowcroft was asked to comment on the DoD 

for an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. He replied:

206 Chuck McCutcheon, “Push for Intelligence Overhaul Losing Momentum on the 

Weekly, 27 April 2002, 1109. 207 Philip Shenon, “9/11 Panel is Said to Urge New Post for Intelligence,” New York 

online ed., 17 July 2004, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/17/politics/17pane

accessed 19 July 2004. 208 Shaun Waterman, “Intelligence Community Reform Stalls,” United Press Intern

11 December 2003, accessed via LexisNexis, 28 January 2004.
67

look like a housekeeping measure within the Defense Depar

really think that it ought to be viewed in the light of the struct

cussions that are going on, whether it’s the report of my gro

there are many other things going on—because it will have p

implications for the intelligence community as a whole. And, 

to me to make a one single step unassociated with all the oth

that your committees are now deliberating would be a mistake 

then you either predetermine the direction of the structure or y

to change it to go back again. So I would urge, as a first step

decision be made on anything which ipso facto will affect th

community.209

The talk around town was that Rumsfeld trumped the Scowcroft p

licly announcing the Defense Department’s intention to create the U

knowing full-well the recommendations of the Scowcroft panel. O

2003, Stephen Cambone was sworn in as the first U.S. Undersecretar

for Intelligence (USDI). His 100-person office guides the policies, p

budgets of the defense intelligence agencies (NSA, NRO, NGA, DI

sees the military services’ intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissanc

programs.210

As Time reported in April 2004:

The report [Scowcroft] was so sensitive that Bush has yet to p

copy to Congress, and Scowcroft was not allowed to give 

Commission a detailed brief on it findings. The plan went into 

in large part because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

any dilution of Pentagon authority over the spy networks.” 211

Shortly after the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, Sen

Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-SD) sent a letter to President Bush r

209 U.S. Congress, Joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee, “September 

mittee Hearing: Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger,” URL: http://www.comp

line.org/2002/Congressionalinquiry091902b.html>, accessed 21 October 2003. 210 Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Interview with Stephen Cambone,” Defense News, 

December 2003, URL: http://www.defensenews.com/story, accessed 9 December 2

211 Michael Duffy, “How to Fix Our Intelligence: The CIA and FBI Desperately 

Reformed to Deter the Next 9/11. But are They and the Administration Willing to C

26 April 2004, online ed., URL: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/prinout/

0,8816,1101040426-612372.html>, accessed 27 April 2004. Cited hereafter as How 

Intelligence.
68

report would assist Congress in its current review.

As of December 

Scowcroft Report still has not been released to anyone outside the Whi

Joint Inquiry Commission

Although U.S. citizens have come to expect thoughtful reflection and 

essary, stalwart examination of perceived government failings or m

reconstructing the government’s activities leading up to and surroundin

tember 2001 proved difficult because of executive-branch-imposed barr

report accompanying the fiscal guidance for the FY 2002 intelligence au

bill (a few weeks after 9/11), the House Intelligence Committee declared

a fundamental need for both a cultural revolution within the intelligenc

nity as well as significant structural changes.213 However, if there was a 

the revolutionaries were not invited. Before the first anniversary of 9/11

the call for a cultural revolution had been replaced by the bureaucratic wa

orchestrated procedures to avoid the task at hand, that is, investigate the e

ing up to the tragic events of 11 September 2001. “The impetus for get

tural changes in place seems to have been wasted. Hopefully something 

out of this [joint congressional inquiry], but I’m not all that optimistic,”21

Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA chief of counterterrorism operations. 

Almost a year and a half later (February 2002), the Senate and Hou

gence Committee agreed to conduct a Joint Inquiry into the activities o

ligence Community. This joint action was unprecedented in con

history; never before had two permanent committees joined together to 

single, unified inquiry. This Committee had one year to complete its go

● Conducting a factual review of what the IC knew or shou

known prior to 11 September 2001, regarding the internationa

ist threat to the United States, to include the scope and nature 

possible international terrorist attacks against the United States 

interests;

● Identifying and examining any systemic problems that ma

impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or pre

these attacks in advance, and

212 Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus, “Key Idea of 9/11 Panel is Faulted: Commission 

ligence Chief in White House,” Washington Post, 31 July 2004, A10. Cited hereafter as 

Idea Faulted. 213 McCutcheon, 1109. 214 McCutcheon, 1109.
69

ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist a

Should not this unprecedented, distinguished group of individua

been entrusted to provide oversight as authorized by the U.S. Cons

had an edge in obtaining requested information from the U.S. govern

did not. Even as major intelligence agencies in the Inquiry—CIA, 

provided substantial support and allowed access to large volumes of 

the Joint Inquiry encountered access limitations that by the Joint I

account, “limited the scope of the Inquiry’s work.” 216 Numero

branch agencies to include the White House, denied the Joint Inqu

pertinent information as the following examples attest:

● PDB – White House determined and DCI and CIA agreed t

access. Eventually, this denial even extended to prohibiting 

sonnel from being interviewed about the PDB process. 

● Foreign Liaison Relationships – DCI refused to allow 

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) reports relating to the CIA

relationship with numerous foreign governments. Hence, 

Inquiry could not ascertain the level of cooperation/informa

ing with the U.S. in countering Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida pri

tember 11.

● Budget – Lack of resources had been highlighted repeate

IC. A logical exercise would have been to compare the 

request for monies with the treatment of those requests fr

the originating agencies, within the Administration, and by 

While agencies and Congress provided some information, 

House and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) refuse

information regarding agency budget requests submitted to 

the actions OMB undertook to increase or decrease these req

● NSC-Level Information – Denied access to most NSC-lev

sions. Also, denied access to, or a briefing concerning, the fin

conclusions of the report of the National Security Presiden

tive-5 (NSPD) Commission on Intelligence Reform (Scowc

mission).

● DCI Interview – Interview with DCI was delayed then ma

tional on further discussions with DCI staff. DCI George Ten

ally testified in an open and closed session and the interview 

denied on that basis.

215 Joint Inquiry Report, Part One—Findings and Conclusions, I. The Joint Inqu

216 Joint Inquiry Report, Access Limitation Encountered by the Joint Inquiry, 1.
70

been reportedly prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS

Inquiry had wanted to determine the relationship between CIA 

military involving counterterrorism operations prior to 9/11

were allegations of military reluctance to become involved 

effort against Bin Ladin prior to September 11. The JCS Lega

sel, supported by DoD General Counsel and the NSC, den

request as outside the scope of the Joint Inquiry’s authority. La

Inquiry received a summary briefing of the options.217

Furthermore, many of the Intelligence Community agencies restricte

Inquiry’s access to information by insisting that legal or congressional a

sonnel be present to monitor all interviews of their personnel. Many int

had been pre-briefed by their respective agency as to what the agenc

was on certain matters or urged them not to range too broadly in their 

Additionally, the Community imposed information delays by requirin

information from one agency found in another agency’s file had to be 

by the originating agency before the information could be released; red

tain information; and refusing to provide electronic access to in

thereby requiring paper copies to be duplicated before release.218

Nevertheless, despite attempts to thwart the investigative process

Inquiry investigation was completed. The complete list of findings is an

their entirety in Appendix E—Post-9/11 Intelligence Reform. The Join

Conclusion—Factual Findings—are presented below:

In short, the Intelligence Community failed to capitalize on bo

individual and collective significance of available information 

appears relevant to the events of September 11. As a result, the 

munity missed opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot by 

ing entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to u

the plot through surveillance and other investigative work with

United States; and finally, to generate a heightened state of ale

thus harden the homeland against attack.

No one will ever know what might have happened had more co

tions been drawn between these disparate pieces of informatio

will never definitively know to what extent the Community would 

been able and willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may 

emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence Community

217 Joint Inquiry Report, Access Limitation Encountered by the Joint Inquiry, 1-5. 218 Joint Inquiry Report, Access Limitation Encountered by the Joint Inquiry, 5-7.
71

of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of 

ing and preventing Usama Bin Laden’s plan to attack the Unit

on September 11, 2001.

219 (Italics added by present author).

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks U

United States (9/11 Commission)

The 9/11 Commission also had a less than auspicious beginnin

launching a presidential inquiry into the events surrounding 9/11, 

Roosevelt had done shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harb

waited almost a year before it formed the panel and then the White H

its creation, its budget and its duration.220 Speaking publicly, Preside

an independent investigation would distract leaders from his newly-

on terrorism.221 Senator Jon Kyl, (R-AZ), senior member of the S

“We’re in the middle of a war right now, and everybody’s engaged in 

think that most of us want to direct attention from the first priority he

ever, not everyone agreed with this excuse for the delays. After al

States was involved in a world war when Roosevelt commissioned 

Commission in the early 1940s. Vincent Cannistraro stressed, “Th

that we’re at war and that since we’re in the middle of it, we don’t ha

any reflection—I don’t buy it because theoretically, this is going to b

for a long, long time.223 Nonetheless, after the Joint Inquiry exposed 

sharing issues relating to the September 11 hijackers, congressiona

an independent commission mushroomed, in the words of a Wall S

reporter. Consequently, one year later, the White House reverse

announced “strong support” for the 9/11 Commission.224

In the words of the National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upo

States, “Our mandate was sweeping.” The law directed us to inve

and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2

ing those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencie

immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terror

219 Joint Inquiry Report, B. Conclusion-Factual Findings, 33. 220 How to Fix Our Intelligence. 221 At the time, in 2002, when President Bush made this statement, the United S

actively engaged in a war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in retaliation for harbo

and Al Qa’ida. The United States had not yet ousted the regime of Saddam Hussein 

222 McCutcheon, 1110. 223 McCutcheon, 1110. 224 9/11 Commission Delays.
72

cation, and other areas as determined relevant by the Commission.

eventual White House endorsement was not enough to allow the Com

undertake this review. What they needed was a “strong arm of persuasio

tor Charles Schumer (D-NY) held a news conference on 9 July 2003, a 

the bipartisan 9/11 Commission issued its first interim report, blasting t

cooperation from federal agencies. He observed, 

Here’s what the stonewalling included: no response from the De

Department to repeated commission requests for information rela

the operations of NORAD, the Joint Chiefs, and the DoD’s hist

office; continuing delays in sharing of documents in the possess

the Department of Justice, despite repeated DOJ promises to pr

the material; a disturbing insistence by DOJ that any interview the 

mission conducts with a DOJ official can only be undertaken 

presence of a DOJ representative.

Less than full cooperation from the CIA and Department of Hom

Security, which have been slow to produce documents outlining th

of counterterror resources and immigration practices.226

Furthermore, the avowed White House “strong support” proved to be 

ably less than advertised. The 9/11 Commission issued three subpoenas 

House documents and twice threatened to do the same for presidenti

records prepared by the CIA. Eventually, the White House granted lim

ment access to a select number of Commissioners but provided only 

summary of the CIA-prepared briefings to the remaining members.227 

April 2004, almost a year after the existence of the 6 August 2001 PD

known publicly; the PDB was declassified and released. Other executiv

ments, such as refusing the request for a 60-day extension to complet

report, setting a one-hour time limit for the President to address the Co

ers and the refusal to allow National Security Advisor Condoleezza Ric

in public were eventually resolved. President Bush agreed to a 60-day 

and Congress approved it. Bush and Vice-President Cheney finally spok

11 Commission—they spoke together in private to a select number of 

sioners for a limited amount of time. Rice did testify publicly before the 

225 9/11 Report, Preface, xv. 226 Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), “U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) Holds N

ence on 9/11,”9 July 2003, via LexisNexis, accessed 12 January 2004. 227 Mike Allen and Dan Eggen, “Bush Backs off Limit on 9/11 Questioning: Talk to P

to be Open-Ended,” Washington Post, 10 March 2004, A3. Cited hereafter as Bush Backs 
73

secretary, maintained that the White House had been cooperative b

more than two million pages of documents, more than 60 compact 

than 800 audiocassette tapes, more than 100 briefings, and more th

views.228 Stephen Hess, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

the interplay between the White House and the 9/11 Commission:

The jockeying between the two sides [White House and the 9/

mission] has seemed almost scripted. This seems to me to be th

of most controversial commissions. It’s sort of a back-and-for

almost traditional....They always want more than the preside

executive branch wants to give them, and the executive branch 

objects before giving in on some things.229

After a review of more than 2.5 million pages of documents; aft

with more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries, which encomp

every senior official from the current and previous administratio

responsibility for the mandated topics; and following 19 days of pu

with testimony from 160 witnesses,230 the word processors fell s

presses roared. The 9/11 Commission had completed its work and 

final report on 22 July 2004.

The present author, speaking to a former senior executive intellig

ist, expressed her sense of frustration over the countless reform recom

made by scores of talented individuals and how these repeated recom

were shelved time and time again without action or minimal action 

taken. After casually mentioning the galvanizing effects of the publ

the 1960s (civil rights movement, Vietnam War activists) had on in

government to take action, this colleague asked jokingly, “What, you 

ple to “take to the streets” over intelligence reform. Hell, the ge

doesn’t know the first thing about the Intelligence Community.” Ho

July 2004, the public began educating itself on the Intelligence Com

than a week later, 600,000 copies of the initial press run had be

200,000 more copies were being printed. Additionally, the Comm

site, which includes free access to the report, recorded more tha

hits.231 By 12 September 2004, the 567-page, 9/11 Commission Fin

228 Bush Backs off Limit, A3. 229 Dan Eggen, “For the Record: While House vs. 9/11 Panel: Resistance, Res

ington Post, 9 March 2004, A2. 230 9/11 Report, Preface, xv. 231 Mike Allen and Dan Eggen, “Bush May Move Soon on 9/11 Report: Preside

Announcing Plans for Revamping Intelligence System,” Washington Post, A6.
74

remained the Washington areas Number 1 Nonfiction bestseller for se

and counting.232 Lest one think that the interest in the 9/11 report is on

the Beltway,” it also a garnered the top spot on The New York Times bes

as well. It hit No.1 in sales on the Amazon.com website. The New Y

News positioned the 9/11 Report cover emblazoned in a red box with 

“Act Now!” on its 23 July 2004 cover.233 As of 10 October 2004, 1.5 m

ies are in print and it has been named as a finalist for a National Book 

the National Book Foundation.234 The New York Times reported plans b

Entertainment to make the 9/11 Commission Report into an eight-h

series on NBC!235

“Let’s Get Ready to Rumble”236 – Discussion of J

Inquiry/ 9/11 Commission Recommendations 

“Since the plotters were flexible and resourceful, we cannot know w

single step or series of steps would have defeated them,” 9/11 Commiss

man Thomas H. Kean admitted at a news conference the day the Co

released its report. “What we can say with a good deal of confidence is 

of the measures adopted by the United States government before 9/11 

or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot...The government fai

tect the American people. The United States government was simply 

enough in combating the terrorist threat before 9/11.”237 “This was a 

policy, management, capability, and above all a failure of imagi

Although the Commission could not determine whether the attacks c

been prevented, it did identify ten “Operational Opportunities” that we

in detecting the plot to attack the United States (see tonebox below).

232 Book World, “Washington Area Bestsellers,” Washington Post, 12 September 20

233 Philip Kennicott, “Remembering: A Novel Approach,” Washington Post, 1 Augu

234 Jeff Baenen, “9/11 Report Is Up for National Book Award,” Washington Post, 14 

2004, C4. 235 “9/11 Report to Be TV Mini-Series,” New York Times, 15 November 2004, B2. 236 Michael Buffer, announcer for professional boxing events. 237 Dan Eggen, “9/11 Panel Chronicles U.S. Failures: Final Report Faults Two Adm

and Calls for Broad Reform,” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A18. 238 E.J. Dionne, Jr., “A Lesson From 9/11: Openness,” Washington Post, 23 July 20
75

The Commission identified 28 major recommendations in the Rep

titled “What to Do? A Global Strategy.” As the title suggests, these r

tions provide the fundamental underpinnings of what this U.S. nati

should be. These recommendations are listed in Appendix E—Post 

gence Reform. As they do not relate specifically, but rather genera

these recommendations are not discussed further in this report. 

10 Missed Opportunities — 9/11 Report

1. January 2000: CIA does not watchlist Khalid al Mihdhar or notify 

learned Mihdhar possessed a valid U.S. visa.

2. January 2000: CIA does not develop a transnational plan for tracking M

his associates so that they could be followed to Bangkok and onward, in

United States.

3. March 2000: CIA does not watchlist Nawaf al Hazmi or notify the FBI wh

that he possessed a U.S. visa and had flown to Los Angeles on 15 January 2

4. January 2001: CIA does not inform the FBI that a source had identified 

Tawfiq bin Attash, a major figure in the October 2000 bombing of the USS C

ing attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpur with Khalid al Mihdhar.

5. May 2001: CIA official does not notify the FBI about Mihdhar’s U.S. v

U.S. travel, or Khallad’s having attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting (identifi

reviewed all of the relevant traffic because of the high level of threats).

6. June 2001: FBI and CIA officials do not ensure all relevant information re

Kuala Lumpur meeting was shared with the Cole investigators at the June 11 

7. August 2001: FBI does not recognize the significance of the informatio

Mihdhar and Hazmi’s possible arrival in the United States and thus does n

quate action to share information, assign resources, and give sufficient p

search.

8. August 2001: FBI headquarters does not recognize the significance of 

tion regarding Moussaoui’s training and beliefs and thus does not take adeq

to share information, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain 

regarding Moussaoui’s ties to al Qaeda, and give sufficient priority to deter

Moussaoui might be planning.

9. August 2001: CIA does not focus on information that Khalkd Sheikh Mo

a key al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as th

mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked “Mukhtar” 

Binalshibh and Moussaoui.

10. August 2001: CIA and FBI do not connect the presence of Mihdhar, 

Moussaoui to the general threat reporting about imminent attacks.
76

security institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions con

win the Cold War.”239 Although the United States has the peopl

resources, the Commission underscored the need for the government t

them more effectively, achieving “unity of effort.” The Commission pro

major recommendations to realize this unity of effort. (For more preci

mendations proposed by the Commission, see Appendix E.)

● Unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning agains

ist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a Nationa

terterrorism Center (NCTC)

● Unifying the Intelligence Community with a new National 

gence Director

● Unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort a

knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system th

scends traditional governmental boundaries

● Unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improv

ity and accountability

● Strengthening the FBI’s homeland defense capabilities.240

Of all the recommendations put forth by the Commission, cre

National Counterterrorism Center, the National Intelligence Director an

sequent intelligence centers, and letting the Pentagon have lead respon

covert paramilitary operations have become the most controversial an

addressed further below. According to Philip D. Zelikow, executive dire

9/11 Commission, the Intelligence Community structure proposed by 

mission is modeled on the reform of the U.S. military under the G

Nichols Act of 1986—unifying the military under a single, unified co

ensure coordination. Zelikow remarked in a recent interview, “Ours is n

cea. We may not have all the right answers, but we looked at other 

someone can come up with a better way, they should....[our propo

designed to make a difference in the real world for real problems and 

just academic fixes.241

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the NCTC be built on the f

of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).242 The TT

239 9/11 Report, 400. 240 9/11 Report, 400-401. 241 Walter Pincus, “9/11 Panel’s Plan Would Reduce Influence of CIA: Experts Pre

ment of Roles,” Washington Post, 29 July 2004, A6. Cited hereafter as Pincus 9/11 Pan

CIA Influence.
77

ally, the head of the NCTC, appointed by the president with rank co

to a deputy head of cabinet, would have authority to evaluate the pe

the people assigned to the Center. The Commission stresses the im

joint action for three primary reasons—the virtue of joint planning; t

of having someone in charge to ensure a unified effort; and, finally th

critical skill sets. The NCTC would perform joint planning with 

responsibilities assigned to lead agencies such as State, CIA, FBI, 

the combatant commands. However, the NCTC would not execute 

The director of the NCTC would report directly to the national intell

tor and indirectly to the president. The NCTC would lead strategic 

provide net assessments—comparing enemy capabilities and inten

U.S. defenses and countermeasures. In this strategic role, the N

absorb most all of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and DIA’s Join

Task Force (JITF-CT).243

The Commission recognized that this arrangement might result in 

tion of “too much power” in one place. Nonetheless, law or exe

would define the parameters of this organization. The National Secu

would still arbitrate interagency policy disputes.244

After their lengthy investigation, the 9/11 Commission recogn

need to restructure the Intelligence Community can be attributed to 

that were apparent before and after 9/11. These problems constitute 

the current IC structure is not compatible with the challenges facing 

nity in the 21st Century:

1. Structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work. Nation

gence continues to be stove-piped through specific collection dis

2. Lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-dom

A common set of standards encompassing both arenas for both i

processing and personnel must be set in place.

3. Divided management of national intelligence capabilities. Follow

242 As noted in 9/11 Report, 401, the TTIC created in 2003 is based at the CIA h

is staffed with various agency representatives. However, the CIA also has a fusion c

Counterterrorist Center. Then there is the Defense Intelligence Agency with its coun

center-the Joint Intelligence Task Force (JITF-CT), Homeland Security concentrate

vulnerabilities. The FBI created the Terrorist Screening Center and is building its an

ity. The U.S. Government cannot afford all this duplication—there is not enough ex

around. 243 9/11 Report, 401-405. 244 9/11 Report, 406.
78

and signal intelligence capabilities of the NSA, NGA, and NRO, re

a comparatively greater demand made by the Defense Department 

technical systems.

4. Weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. The priorities f

tion are national; however, agencies are organized around what the

or the way they collect it.

5. Too many jobs. The DCI has too many jobs—run the CIA, manage 

brief the president—all tasks that are complex and secret. Over the 

the Community has encompassed many agencies, and the Commun

grown more arcane. The DCI lacks the authority to control the purs

hire or fire senior managers and the ability to set standards for info

infrastructure and personnel.245

The suggestion that there be a single director of national intelligen

tainly not a new recommendation: the Joint Inquiry proposed creating 

did the unreleased, classified Scowcroft study. Historically, the Boren

Act in 1992 called for creating a Director of National Intelligence

Schlesinger Report in 1971 criticized “unproductive duplicative” colle

tems and the failure in forward planning to coordinate the allocation of 

That report considered the creation of a DNI to correct these problems

ever, Schlesinger’s recommendation was not included in the final rep

instead recommended a “strong DCI who could bring intelligence c

control and intelligence production to an adequate level of quality an

siveness.” Before that, in 1955, the Second Hoover Commission reco

that the DCI concentrate on intelligence issues facing the entire commu

Nevertheless, while the specifics of all these recommendations have 

will continue to be debated, intelligence professionals, scholars, nation

specialists and others have carried forward a debate in the open press. I

said that anyone who have ever stood before a microphone has an opin

intelligence reform. This is certainly the case in the aftermath of the p

245 9/11 Report, 407-409. 246 A Review of the Intelligence Community, 10 March 1991, 1 (citation as noted in

Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boertling, “Appendix C, IC21: The Intelligence Commun

21st Century,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research S

Library of Congress, 28 February 1996), 16. >URL:<http://www.access.gpo.gov/c

house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html>, accessed 11 May 2004. Cited hereafter as CRS Rep

dix C, February 1996. 247 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations wit

Intelligence Activities Intelligence, Final Report, Book I, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 1 

noted in CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996).
79

urged caution in moving too quickly with intelligence reform as ind

following views: 

We must not allow false urgency dictated by the political cal

overtake the need for serious reform...There is no debate a

need to reform our 20th Century intelligence infrastructure. Wh

tion is unacceptable, serious consequences will come with refo

icymakers owe it to the American people to understan

consequences before they act.248

—Senator Chuck Hage

It is important that we move with all deliberate speed; however

too quickly risks enormous error. And we are considering im

matters while at war. If you more unwisely and get it wrong, the 

will be great.249

—Donald 

 Secretary 

I sincerely urge those who, with the best intentions, seek to 

nation’s intentions, seek to heal the nation’s wounds and imp

intelligence community, to adopt the ancient medical di

“first, do no harm.” If we rush to implement sweeping chang

cially at the time when threats to America are as great or gre

they have been at any time since September 11, we may 

harm than good.250

—James 

former CIA Deputy Director for O

Whether the pace of reform is slow or swift, the intelligence refor

sounds across the nation. Shortly after the Commission release

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice observed, “I don’t think 

of whether there will be intelligence reform. I think there will be fu

gence reform. It’s a matter of how and precisely what will be done.”

248Sen Chuck Hagel (R-NE), “Intelligence Reform and False Urgency,” Washing

August 2004, A17. 249Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, “Rumsfeld: Use Caution in Intellige

Washington Post, 18 August 2004, A10. 250 Pavitt, A19. 251 Dan Eggen, “9/11 Panel Chronicles U.S. Failures: Final Report Faults Two A

and Calls for Broad Reform,” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A18.
80

● Lt Gen James R. Clapper, (USAF Ret), Director, NGA:

I do not believe that we [national agencies—NGA, NSA, NRO] h

be administratively embedded in the Department of Defense—o

that matter, any cabinet department—in order to sustain such su

As things stand now, our major customers get to determine wh

and to what extent, we provide support to our other cabinet d

ments, who also have legitimate and growing demands for our 

ucts, services, and solutions.

The underlying basis for the current configuration of the Intelli

Community is Cold-War inspired...That is no longer the operativ

adigm. We have a much different threat and we need, according

adjust organizationally.

Like the President, I agree with the 9/11 Commission recommen

that we need an empowered National Intelligence Director. I belie

NID should manage at least three agencies—CIA, NSA, NGA and

haps NRO....This does not mean that our support to military oper

would in any way be compromised. In fact, I would assert it wou

even better than it is today. Our direct support to military operati

required by law in the case of NGA—would continue to the nine 

batant Commands and, increasingly, to levels far below the tradi

boundary of these Commands, or even their subordinate Joint 

Forces.252

● Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State: 

[creating a new national intelligence director could guard against 

intelligence like that behind] some of the sourcing that was used t

me the basis upon which to bring forward that judgment [Ira

WMD] to the United Nations [and that] were flawed, 

wrong....with an important, empowered national intelligence dir

you are less likely to have those kinds of mistakes.253

252 Lt Gen James R. Clapper, USAF (Ret), Director, National Geospatial-Intelligenc

D/NGA Testimony Before HPSCI on 9/11 Commission Report,” 19 August 2004. 253 Walter Pincus, “Support for Intelligence Plan: Powell, Ridge Back One Directo

to Bush on Specifics,” Washington Post, 14 September 2004, A4.
81

Over the past 30 years, through abuse, neglect and poor leader

CIA has slowly ground to a virtual halt. More broadly, the 

intelligence “community”—structurally dysfunctional and 

effective oversight—essentially failed in its analyses of the tw

threats of the late 20th Century: the Soviet Union and radical I

In addition, as it [restructuring] would be unfettered by agenc

and bias, the new staff could have a dramatic impact on wh

“inertial budgeting”—the practice of funding systems and p

this year because we did it last year—and instead could make 

ble to focus resources on new priorities or to exploit new tech

in a timely way. 

The military’s unified command structure...is a sound mode

new director’s office...Giving the new director a fixed term th

laps administration, as suggested by some in Congress, is the r

to avoid the post’s becoming politicized.254

● William E. Odom, former director NSA (1985-1988):

No organizational design will compensate for incompetent incu

but some designs prevent competent incumbents from perform

The 9/11 commission’s design for a new national intelligence 

(NID) is sure to accomplish the latter. There is already a 

bureaucracy above the CIA, NSA, DIA and other intelligence a

and it consists of the Community Management Staff and the 

Intelligence Council. It simply has not been used effectively 

the director of central intelligence is double-hatted....Creatin

with three deputies...would make things much worse. It woul

turf battles and prevent effective budget management

[fixed term for NID] It’s a bad idea....There is no way to dep

the role of the president’s intelligence chief. It is a desirable as

but intelligence is just as political as policymaking and militar

tions. The popular notion that apolitical intelligence will pre

policies is an illusion. Intelligence chiefs can be no more effec

their political leaders or military commanders will allow them 

demand that they be. The intelligence failures surrounding 

attacks and in Iraq are primarily political failures. Effective le

254 Robert C. McFarlane, “Restructuring From the Top...,” Washington Post, 1 A
82

sions to fix intelligence problems.

● William S. Cohen, former secretary of defense (1997-2001):

Creating an effective joint staff will be no easy task. Traditions an

habits die hard.... One of my principal concerns about the com

sion’s recommendations is making sure that the NID office, howe

is structured, [should be] prohibited from having any advocacy ro

operational matters...Those charged with collecting, collating an

tilling intelligence should not indulge in policy debates.

Congress must be vigorous in the exercise of its oversight respon

ties. And as Congress examines deficiencies within the exe

branch, it should give equal weight to the need to reform its own 

getary and oversight processes.

If we are serious about real reform, we have to contemplate bo

intended and unintended consequences of any changes tha

made....But virtually every reorganization of an institution aim

improving efficiency and decision-making will eventually 

weaknesses or produce dislocations that will, in turn, need 

reengineered.256

● Gary Hart, former senator (D-CO) and Vice-Chair, Hart-R

Commission:

It would be a disaster [if NID went into the Cabinet or White H

staff]. You have to have a clear organizational separation between 

responsible for generating intelligence and those policymakers w

consumers. You mix them and you will inevitably get political 

sures affecting the quality of the information....Unless the new m

control over the whole intelligence budget of government, you s

have added a new layer of bureaucracy and set it up to fail....Ever

proposal...has foundered on the refusal of the Pentagon to give 

inch of control of its own intelligence budget.257

255 William E. Odom, “Restructuring From the Top...,” Washington Post, 1 August 

256 William S. Cohen, “Restructuring From the Top...,” Washington Post, 1 August 

257 Gary Hart, “Heeding the 9/11 Panel,” interview by David S. Broder, in Wash

8 August 2004, B07.
83

research: 

With the intelligence czar and a unified intelligence center, th

would lose the competitiveness that’s been an important eleme

successes until now....It seems to me that whatever structure i

the principle of competitive analysis, as well as a system in wh

ple can argue and disagree, needs to be preserved. And thos

need to be heard by the national security advisor or the preside

It may seem paradoxical, but the only thing we need as much 

petitiveness among agencies is coordination, especially if we 

with the commission plan to maintain separate agencies....H

joint coordination center might have helped [lack of coordina

9/11], but having an overarching czar wouldn’t have solved th

lem....the real coordination isn’t going to come from the top—

be encouraged at a lower level, among analysts.

But there ought to be real discussion about how any reconfigur

ligence structure would work. The thought that the presiden

going to adopt all these things [commission recommendations

cially in an election year—is just wacky. You have to look at 

intelligence structure before you can say yea or nay.258

● Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), Chairman of the Senate In

Committee and eight other Republicans called for more 

changes in intelligence organizations than proposed by the 9

mission. Their plan would have removed the CIA’s three m

torates—operations, analysis and technology and turned 

separate entities reporting to separate directors; NSA and N

be put under the DNI; and the human intelligence (HUMINT

nent within DIA would be removed from the Pentagon

defended his proposal saying,

We didn’t pay attention to turf or agencies or boxes. I’m t

build a consensus around something that’s different an

bold...No one agency, no matter how distinguished its hi

more important than national security.259

258 Phyllis Oakley, “Restructuring From the Top...,” Washington Post, 1 August 

259Dan Eggen, “GOP Plan Calls for Revamping Intelligence: Pentagon, CIA Wo

Many Duties,” Washington Post, 23 August 2004, A7.
84

as a whole, it did provoke discussion among Washingtons profe

als. George Tenet, former DCI, was especially critical of Robert’s 

saying the proposal:

Would gut the CIA...is a dangerous misunderstanding o

business of intelligence...Senator Robert’s proposal is 

another episode in the mad rush to rearrange wiring diagram

an attempt to be seen as doing something. It is time for som

to slam the brakes on before the politics of the moment drive

security of the American people off a cliff.260

Julius Kobyakov Major General SVR (Retired), former KGB o

posted this interesting musing, reflecting on Senator Pat Rober

KS) intelligence reform proposal:

Distinguished members:

Back in the heyday of Cold War some of my KGB collea

toyed with an idea of breaking up the C.I.A. by setting i

against the F.B.I. and both of them against the Pentagon. M

were harebrained schemes but none had been as sweeping a

one proposed by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas. (This is n

imply that present setup is perfect.)

But as a KGB/SVR veteran, who lived through quite a 

sweeping organizations of the Soviet/Russian era I can shar

general experience.

It usually looks swell on charts with all the bells and whistle

when you try to implement it the place stops working, th

falls apart with some of the best people running sway [aw

And then the ones, who for this or that reason stayed behin

faced with an enormous Sisyphean labor of trying to jump 

the new bastard, or parts of what once was a functioning sys

This may take years.261

260Dan Eggen and Charles Barrington, “Many are Cool to Intelligence Plan: Bush Ex

ervation; Tenet Says GOP Proposal would ‘Gut the CIA,” Washington Post, 24 August 2

261 Major General Julius Kobyakov, Ret., email to Intelligence Forum listserv, subje

Intelligence Reform,” 23 August 2004.
85

After weeks of speculation as to what the White House woul

response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, President Bus

Executive Orders on 27 August 2004. They:

● Directed the Strengthened Management of the Intelligence 

nity

● Established the National Counterterrorism Center

● Strenghened the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Prote

cans

● Established the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americ

Liberties

These EOs are presented in more detail in Appendix E. 

The first EO, Directing the Strengthened Management of the 

Community, amended EO 12333, which had been the guiding but o

tive IC directive for decades. The DCI, until the NID262 is created 

will discharge the responsibilities outlined in this EO. In the op

author, this EO did nothing more than perhaps tighten the gloves 

(NID) to enable a more capable punch but the heavyweight champi

Defense Department in the fight for intelligence dollars. Much of the 

this Executive Order expanded on authority the DCI already had w

coordinating activities across the Community, as granted by EO 

senior congressional aide reported that the orders seem to have th

“This time, we really mean it.”263 Without full budget authority, the 

decide how funds should be appropriated among the agencies, to inc

tagon, the NID will remain weak. Although Bush stated, “We belie

ought to be a national intelligence director who has full budgetary au

authority only pertained to the NFIP—that 70 percent of the intelli

262 Two of these EOs—strengthening the management of the IC and the creation 

were meant to be interim measures until such time as Congress passed legislation. A

cussion, the House approved its compromised version on 8 December and the Sena

ber 2004. President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention A

law on 17 December 2004. One of the main provisions of this legislation was the se

Director of Central Intelligence position from the Director of Central Intelligence A

No longer would the head of the IC be dual-hatted. The National Intelligence Direc

known as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), is the new head of the IC. Th

orders issued by President Bush were co-opted by the enactment of this legislation. T

Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 will be discussed briefly in a subseque

263 Walter Pincus, “Analysis: Bush’s Intelligence Moves Don’t Attain Scope Ur

Panel,” Washington Post, 2 September 2004, A4.
86

money goes to support defense organizations such as NSA, NGA and 

only organization the DCI truly manages is the CIA. The other 3

remains under the control of the Defense Department and is dispersed 

Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence an

Activities (TIARA) programs. According to the White House, its p

“avoid the disruption of war effort that a more far-reaching restructu

create.”264 Describing the President’s NID proposal as it exists now, 

Gates said, “it’s creating a new layer of bureaucracy in the Intelligence 

nity....The NID position, without direct control of a single line agency 

zation, will eventually have its authorities eroded, eventually becomi

intelligence czar, but eunuch.”265

It is difficult to understand how the current “war efforts” in Iraq and A

argue against restructuring as these cannot even be considered compara

war effort during World War II when the U.S. industrial, societal and in

organizations underwent a massive restructuring. Within a relatively 

frame during WWII, the United States revamped its economy to create an 

industrial base to supply U.S. and Allied forces; inducted millions of its 

fight globally dispersed enemies and simultaneously defeated the Axis 

Germany, Italy and Japan. Moreover, within months of the end of WWII, 

States steadied itself to face the emergence of communism and the evolv

Union. At the same time, the U.S. restructured not only its armed service

ishing the Army Air Corps and creating the Air Force but created the CIA

JCS with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. 

The EO creating the National Counterterrorism Center restricted its c

rorism activities. The NCTC would not have the authority to direct cove

terrorism operations abroad or at home, and though it would be in

planning of operations, it would not execute them. Operations execution 

with the FBI, CIA, and Pentagon depending on the activity. John E. Mc

Acting DCI, in referring to the NCTC, which was created by the second 

order, said, “[NCTC] would be a kind of clearinghouse of what needs t

and then the doing would be passed on to those who must do it.”266

264 Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, “Bush Plan Draws on Advice of 9/11 Panel: N

Gives Intelligence Chief More Budget Power,” Washington Post, 9 September 2004, A

265 Walter Pincus, “Bush’s Plan Limits Intelligence Chief: Other Would Carry Out O

Washington Post, 11 September 2004, Washington Post A4. Cited hereafter as Bush’s P

Intel Chief. 266 Bush Plan Limits Intel Chief, A4.
87

promptly share information relating to terrorism with other agencie

terterrorism functions. It required a Presidential Directive in essence

to the senior managers of one intelligence agency that they shoul

their secret information with other senior managers of other intellige

within the Intelligence Community. Policy decisions worked to 

exchange of information prior to 11 September 2001. These policies 

long ago, before their current implications could be envisioned. 

The “information sharing” EO ordered the DCI to establish comm

across the Intelligence Community and to establish an Informat

Council that will plan and oversee an interoperable terrorism-inform

environment. Amazingly, sixty years after the enactment of the Nati

Act of 1947, it is finally agreed that Intelligence Community memb

able to communicate with other Intelligence Community members. A

may have supposed that at the very least, EO 12333, which in part 

DCI full responsibility for the production and dissemination of nat

intelligence”267 would have ensured such communication. Again, w

weakness of executive orders, in comparison to the edicts of legislat

The fourth EO, enacted on the heels of the 9/11 Commission Rep

President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties. As the 

the President created this board to ensure the safeguard of legal rights 

cans. The Deputy Attorney General is the Chair and the Under Secreta

and Transportation Security of the Department of Homeland Security 

Chair. Other members are senior officials across the federal governme

Perhaps no other organization, public or private, has been scru

thoroughly than the Intelligence Community. The time for thought

has now passed, however. Clearly, 9/11 demonstrated the weakn

almost 60-year old intelligence service. With the constraints of th

removed, globalization is once again the prime mover in the world 

requiring the Community to employ new business processes and p

understand effectively this rapidly changing environment.

As an example, Imam Samudra represents the new face of the enem

balized 21st Century. Samudra, who was charged in the deadly Bali 

2002 that left 202 people dead—mostly foreign (Western) touri

authored a book entitled “Me Against the Terrorist.” A chapter of pa

267Section 1.5 (a,d,e,h,k), Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United Sta

Activities (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 27).
88

target of would-be hackers (and often an easy target due to lax computer 

Samudra explains how to commit credit card fraud, complete with acco

web links for specific instructions. According to The Washington Post, S

among the most technologically savvy members of the underground Isla

ment in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiah. He sought to finance the B

ings through credit card fraud but it is not known if he was success

arrangement. Evan F. Kohlmann, a U.S. consultant on international terro

cated that online credit fraud is an increasingly attractive source of fun

Qa’ida operatives in several parts of the world.268 The next chapter wil

compelling examples of challenges/threats facing the Community in the 

tury. As Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) maintains, the situation is basic D

“If you don’t understand changes in your habitat, you will die.”269

268 Alan Sipress, “An Indonesian’s Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into Cyberspace

New Threat, Militant Offers Tips on Credit Card Fraud,” Washington Post, 14 Decembe

269 “Time to Rethink – America’s Intelligence Services,” The Economist News

20 April 2002, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, 28 January 2004.
89

INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST-9/11 WO

Globalization and the Intelligence Commun

One cannot discuss the role of the Intelligence Community in the 21s

the need to reform or transform its current structure without discussing 

which it operates—that being a globalized environment. Globalization

sence of interconnectedness, is not a new phenomenon270 nor is it stric

of Westernization; it is a function of the economic integration of nea

world. “Over thousands of years, globalization has progressed through 

migration, spread of cultural influences and dissemination of knowledg

standing (including of science and technology),”271 maintains Cambrid

Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. In fact, the period of globalization pre

War I was quite similar to the era the world is experiencing now, with 

being that Great Britain was the dominant global power like the United 

Comparing the volumes of trade and capital flows across borders and 

labor across the borders, relative to the GNPs and the populations res

similarities are apparent. Falling transportation costs—sea lanes, railw

biles, airplanes defined the first era of globalization in the 20th century 

In the Post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fau

within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them

terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, th

lenges have become transnational rather than international. Th

defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century.

—The 9/11 Commission 

22 Ju

270 Richard N. Haass, “Policy Makers and the Intelligence Community: Support

Policy in the Post-911 World,” Studies in Intelligence, 46, no. 3 cites multinationa

transnational religious movements, substantial international capital flows, global pa

emergence of global networks of commerce, and non-governmental organizations a

dations as examples that globalization is not a new phenomenon. These examples o

predate not just the end of the Cold War, but the World Wars as well. 271 Amartya Sen, “If It’s Fair, It’s Good: 10 Truths About Globalization,” Canad

14 July 2001, accessed via LexisNexis, 30 September 2004.
90

the Russian Revolution and the Great Depression interrupted 20th Century 

tion, as did WWII and the protracted Cold War. The Cold War was an in

system, which, according to Thomas Friedman, was replaced by another 

new era of globalization. “It turns out that the roughly seventy-five-year p

the start of World War I to the end of the Cold War,” says Friedman, “was 

time-out between one era of globalization and another.272 Falling teleco

tions and PC costs would come to define the second era of globalization 

century that would rapidly accelerate and extend its reach.

The growth in international trade has been touted as a source of 

productivity for all participants. Most economic evidence supports t

While wages of workers in overseas locations such as China, Bangl

Central America are not comparable to those in the United States

cases, the existing wage structure has raised the standard of living 

workers. A recent Columbia University study showed that in some d

companies, multinational corporations pay their workers more than 1

above the going wage in their own factories (subcontractors may pa

prevailing wage). Additionally, wage differentials against wom

decreased faster in industries that compete internationally.273 E

maintain that trade is not a zero-sum game but rather a positive-s

whereby there is an opportunity for increased diversity of products, 

specialization, transmission of information and technology, and the l

transportation costs decreased and more transportation options beca

able, international trade mushroomed during the 20th Century. In 1

foreign exchange trading was measured in millions of dollars. By 19

recorded at $820 billion and astonishingly, six years later, the dai

exchange trading had exploded to $1.5 trillion daily and climbing. Pr

ital cash flows from developed countries to developing countries me

the millions in the early 1900s but by 2000, it was in the hundreds o

of dollars.275

A second truth about globalization espoused by Amartya Sen is th

ization in itself is not a folly: It has enriched the world scientificall

272 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and 

1999), xvi. 273 Fagdish Bhagwati, “Coping with Antiglobalization: A Triology of Discontents,” 

Affairs, (January/February 2002): 5. 274 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Geography of Economic Development (Newport: National 

lege, 2000), 2. URL: <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/Autumn/art6%2DA

accessed 29 June 2003. 275 Friedman, xvii.
91

and economic interrelations have reduced poverty.

However, w

not be a zero-sum game, globalization has not affected nations eq

cial fact, according to Jeffrey D. Sachs, professor of International T

vard University and director of the Center for International Dev

that “globalization is taking place in a world of astounding ine

greatest inequality in world history.”277 Robert K. Kaplan writ

entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel

yama’s Last Man—healthy, well fed, and pampered by technolog

larger part is inhabited by Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life 

nasty, brutish, and short.”278Today, one-half of all humanity—three 

ple—live under the $2-a-day line.279

Historically, these inequalities did not always exist at the lev

Throughout world history, most countries were poor with not muc

wealth up through 1800. However, shortly thereafter, fostered by ind

and mechanized technology, Western European (particularly Britain

Atlantic nations (particularly the United States) prospered. In 1820, th

of the world was Western Europe, with a per capita income around $

poorest was Sub-Saharan Africa, with a per capita income around $

between wealthy and poor nations was approximately 3:1. During 

years, the rich nations got richer and most poor nations got poorer. W

pean and U.S. income grew twentyfold while in Sub-Saharan Afri

miserly threefold. However, what is more shocking still is that by 20

Saharan Africa region had only reached a per capita level comparable 

the 1820s! In other words, economically in 180 years, this regi

advanced 20 years. Looking at the dispersion between the very rich

and the very poorest countries,280 the ratio becomes 40:1, 50:1, and ev

Regionally speaking, the oil-rich Middle East countries have not fare

economically. In the past 25 years, the Middle Eastern economies have 

2.8 percent GDP growth, slightly more than Sub-Saharan Africa.282 In 1

dle East accounted for 13 percent of global exports; by 2004 that percenta

3 percent, with an overwhelming share being in oil and natural gas. A ge

276 Sen. 277Sachs. 278 Robert K. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopula

and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” The Atlantic, 

ruary 1994, URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/anarchy.htm>, 

June 2004. 279 Sebastian Mallaby, “The World Bank’s Force of Nature,” Washington Post, 2

2004, A19.
92

Simply put, contends Thomas P.M. Barnett, the Middle East exports oil 

ism and virtually nothing else of significance to the global economy.”283

Location, location, location. The three most important factors in 

(geography) are also crucial in the distribution of the world’s wea

identified two major barriers to international development—a clim

geographical, or physical transport, barrier. Virtually all of the rich 

are outside of the tropics and almost all of the poor countries are loca

them with the exception being Singapore and Hong Kong. The la

tion—some 90 percent of world trade when measured in we

volume284—is transported by sea and therefore, proximity to marke

for successful international trade. The poorest seven countries in th

Chad, Mali, Niger, Central Africa Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, and B

in the tropical zone and all are landlocked. Additionally, tropical and 

ically disadvantaged countries have experienced greater humanitar

and social disaster.285

While there may be countless discussions as to the reasons for econom

and stagnation in these regions, the underlying reasons are the same today a

when Adam Smith identified them in 1776—closing doors means losing 

world knowledge. Sachs reported, “Open economies grew 1.2 percentage 

year faster than closed economies, controlling for everything else, becaus

open you are, the more integrated you are into today’s world network of idea

technologies and management innovations.286 Global Trends 2015 foreca

280 Joseph Nye in “Globalisation and Discontent,” The World Today, 57, no. 8/9 (Aug

accessed via ProQuest, 14 January 2004. He pointed out that, according to the United N

Development Program, the ratio of incomes of the 20 percent of the people in the world 

richest countries, compared to 20 percent living in the poorest countries, had increased 

1960 to 74:1 in 1997. In comparison, the inequality only increased from 7:1 in 1870 to 

1913. Equally striking according to Nye was the uneven distribution of benefits to indiv

within and across countries. For example, in Brazil in 1995, the richest tenth of the pop

received almost half on the national income, and the richest fifth had 64 percent, while 

fifth had only 2.5 percent and the poorest tenth had less than one percent. 281 Sachs. 282 George Tenet, “Testimony on World-Wide Threats,” 7 February 2001, accessed v

Nexis, 5 February 2004. 283 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Son

218.284 Globalization and Maritime Power, Ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: Nat

versity Press, 2002), xxvi. 285 Sachs, 8. 286 Friedman, 219.
93

continue to fall behind economically due to endemic internal and/or reg

and failure to diversify their economies. Additionally, a large segment o

landmass extending from Central Asia through the Caucasus to parts o

Europe faces dim economic prospects.287

Measures of Globalization

Undoubtedly, the main face of globalization is in economics; noneth

reality is that globalization is also changing the very nature of internatio

Richard Haass,288 former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Policy P

at Department of State and now President of the Council on Forei

stressed that globalization should be viewed more broadly, beyond mer

exchange. “Globalization is the totality and velocity of connections 

tions—be they economic, political, social, cultural, that are sometime

control or even knowledge of governments and other authorities....It is a 

transnational phenomenon.289 The following paragraphs represent three 

points on the complexities of globalization. The first view, offered by 

Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, assesses a country’s level of ec

ness over a range of factors from level of trade to property rights. The 

offered by A.T. Kearney and Foreign Policy, assesses a country’s lev

across four components of global integration—economic integration, 

tact, technological connectivity, and political engagement. Finally, th

offered by Thomas P.M. Barnett, professor of warfare analysis and con

Pentagon, categorizes the world into areas where globalization has tak

Functioning Core, or simply the Core, and where globalization has n

Integrating Gap, or the Gap. Barnett posits a new security paradigm th

the 21st century, namely, Disconnectedness defines danger.290

287 Central Intelligence Agency, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Fu

government Experts, NIC2000-02, December 2000, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/report

globaltrends2015/index.html. 288 Richard Haass, in Haass, 2, cautions that U.S. foreign policy should be based 

mental dynamics shaping the international environment and not just the events of th

months (referring to 9/11 attacks), no matter how significant they may be; otherwis

policy risks becoming tactical and temporary rather than strategic and sustainable. H

there are five fundamental factors shaping the future of international relations: glob

fate of democratic governance, the changing nature of security, the evolution of our 

relations with other major powers, and the future of the American power. 289 Haass, 2. 290 Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Go

Why We’ll Keep Going to War,” Esquire, 1 March 2003, accessed via ProQuest, 11 

Cited as Pentagon’s New Map (Esquire). 
94

nomic Freedom views globalization through a kaleidoscopic lens. T

annual country-by-country report on openness of economies worldw

trates that “the road to growth is paved with liberty.” This recurring s

sures how well 155 countries have scored against 50 variables divide

factors—trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government inter

the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investmen

and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and inf

black) market activity. The editors did not include Angola, Burund

Sudan and Iraq due to civil unrest or anarchy and did not include S

Montenegro due to data unreliability. Lower scores are the most 

higher scores indicate less economic freedom. The bottom line of th

straightforward and should not be surprising—countries with the 

nomic freedoms also have higher rates of long-term economic grow

more prosperous than are those with less economic freedom. Not su

none of the 18 countries comprising the North Africa/Middle East r

classified “free.” For the tenth year running, North Korea has th

honor of being the least economically free country with the wors

score on all ten factors.291 This study defines economic freedom as th

of government coercion or constraint on the production, distributio

sumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citize

tect and maintain liberty itself.292 The top ten and the bottom t

countries are highlighted in the tables on the facing page.

291 Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2004 Index of E

Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2004 and New York: Wall Stre

2004), URL: <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.html>, acces

ary 2004. Cited hereafter as 2004 Economic Freedom Index. 292 2004 Economic Freedom Index, Chapter 5, 49.
Top Ten Economically Free Countries

More Free

Trade 

Policy

Fiscal 

Burden

Govt 

Intervention $$ Policy

Foreign 

Invest

Banking/

Finance

Wages/ 

Prices

Property 

Rights Regulation

Informal 

Market 

Rank

Rank Country Score

1 Hong Kong 1.34 1.0 1.9 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5

2 Singapore 1.61 1.0 2.6 3.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0

3 New Zealand 1.70 2.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0

4 Luxembourg 1.71 2.0 4.1 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0

5 Ireland 1.74 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0

6 Estonia 1.76 1.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5

7 United Kingdom 1.79 2.0 3.9 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0

8 Denmark 1.80 2.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0

9 Switzerland 1.84 2.0 3.4 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0

10 United States 1.85 2.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.5

Bottom 10 Least Free Economically Countries

Least Free

Trade 

Policy

Fiscal 

Burden

Govt 

Interventi

on $$ Policy Foreign Invest

Banking/

Finance

Wages/

Prices

Property 

Rights Regulation

Informal 

Market

Rank Country Score Rank

146 Tajikistan 4.15 146 4.10 4.09 4.11 4.21 4.15 4.30 n/a n/a n/a147 Venezuela 4.18 147 3.71 3.88 3.78 3.43 3.48 3.43 3.58 3.63 3.28148 Iran 4.26 148 4.30 4.63 4.84 4.69 4.56 4.76 4.80 4.79 n/a149 Uzbekistan 4.29 149 4.29 4.39 4.61 4.56 4.64 4.68 n/a n/a n/a150 Turkmenistan 4.31 150 4.21 4.39 4.39 4.40 4.39 4.50 n/a n/a n/a151 Burma 4.45 151 4.35 4.33 4.45 4.28 4.15 4.31 4.38 4.45 n/a152 Laos 4.45 152 4.73 4.81 4.75 4.80 4.75 4.63 4.70 4.51 n/a153 Zimbabwe 4.54 153 4.63 4.39 4.21 4.04 3.89 4.16 3.89 3.79 4.09

154 Libya 4.55 154 4.48 4.60 4.90 4.85 4.95 4.95 4.95 4.95 n/a

155 North Korea 5.0 155 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0

95
96

Index that tracked and assessed changes in four key components of glob

tion. The first component, economic integration, looked at trade, fore

investment (FDI) and portfolio capital flows in addition to investment in

ments and receipts. The personal contact component assessed internati

and tourism, international telephone traffic and cross-border remittance

sonnel transfers. The third component, technological connectivity, cons

number of Internet users, the number of Internet hosts, and the number 

servers within a country. Finally, the fourth component, political engage

tracked through a country’s membership in international organizations, 

and financial contributions to United Nations (UN) Security Council mis

fication of selected multilateral international treaties, and the amount 

ment transfer payments and receipts.293 Although only 62 countries are r

in the 2004 index, these 62 ranked countries represent 96 percent of t

gross domestic product and 84 percent of the world’s population.294

This index was designed to measure the extent of globalizing force

travel, telecommunications and the like in selected countries and makes no 

as to whether the net effect of globalization is “good” or bad.” It does no

competitiveness. Nevertheless, previously the index results have shown th

global nations are also those with the “strongest records of equality, the m

protection for natural resources, the most inclusive political systems, the l

ruption,” and are countries “where residents live the longest, healthies

where women enjoy the strongest social, educational, and economic pr

Leading the ranks for Internet hosts and secure servers per capita, the Un

finally broke into the Top 10. Nonetheless, the U.S.’s not being a signator

key international treaties during the past decade such as the Internationa

Court (ICC) and Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty, assured the U.S. a 60

rankings in terms of signing international agreements.296

293 “Measuring Globalization: Economic Reversals, Forward Momentum,” Foreign 

March/April 2004, 58. Cited hereafter as A.T. Kearney Index/FP. 294 Data collected for the 2004 index was obtained from a variety of sources such as 

Bank’s World Development Indicators 2003, International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Int

Financial Statistics Yearbook 2003 and Balance of Payment Statistics, Telecommunicati

International Telecommunications Union Yearbook of Statistics 2003, World Tourism O

tion’s Compendium of Tourism, Netcraft’s Secure Server Survey 2003, and CIA’s Worl

2003 as cited in FP/A.T.Kearney/FOREIGN POLICY Globalization Index. The data, in 

spreadsheets, are available online at www.foreignpolicy.com and www.atkearney.c

295 A.T. Kearney/FP, 68. 296 A.T. Kearney/FP, 63.
97

Magazine Globalization Index297

297 Foreign Policy, A.T. Kearney, “Measuring Globalization: Economic Reversals, 

Momentum,” Foreign Policy, online ed., February 2004, http://www.foreignpolicy.c

issue_marapr-2004/countrydetail.php, accessed 26 February 2004.

Rank Country Rank Country

1 Ireland 32 South Korea

2 Singapore 33 Philippines

3 Switzerland 34 Argentina

4 Netherlands 35 Tunisia

5 Finland 36 Taiwan

6 Canada 37 Chile

7 United States 38 Uganda

8 New Zealand 39 Romania

9 Austria 40 Senegal

10 Denmark 41 Saudi Arabia

11 Sweden 42 Nigeria

12 United Kingdom 43 Ukraine

13 Australia 44 Russian Federation

14 Czech Republic 45 Mexico

15 France 46 Pakistan

16 Portugal 47 Morocco

17 Norway 48 Thailand

18 Germany 49 South Africa

19 Slovenia 50 Columbia

20 Malaysia 51 Sri Lanka

21 Slovak Republic 52 Peru

22 Israel 53 Brazil

23 Croatia 54 Kenya

24 Spain 55 Turkey

25 Italy 56 Bangladesh

26 Hungary 57 China

27 Panama 58 Venezuela

28 Greece 59 Indonesia

29 Japan 60 Egypt

30 Botswana 61 India

31 Poland 62 Iran
98

Source: Modified by author and produced by an Analyst at the National Geospatial-Intelli

Agency, 22 March 2005, from Marc A. Miles, and others, 2004 EIndex of Economic Freedom 
99

(Washington, DC:The Heritage Foundation, 2004) and Wall Street Journal, 2004.
100

problem with globalization is that too many experts treat it as a binary 

Either it is great and sweeping the planet, or it is horrid and failing 

everywhere. Neither works.... [The] new world must be defined by whe

ization has truly taken root, the Functioning Core and where it has not

Integrating Gap.”298 Expansive network connectivity, financial transac

eral media flows, and collective security are highlights of the Function

These areas are North America and much of South America, the Europe

Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia (India and China299), Australia and Sou

and they are linked by trade, migration and capital flows. The Core are

tute 4 billion of the 6 billion total for world population. The remaining t

people are concentrated within the Gap—countries where globalizatio

or absent and where countries are saddled with repressive political regim

spread poverty and disease. The Gap area includes the Caribbean Rim

all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, 

of Southwest Asia. An old Pentagon hand, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur C

Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation, notes that “T

a petri dish of grief, repression, terrorism and disease...and 9/11 show

wall ourselves off from it.” 300

Emerging Threats

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has spread dramatically 

it, two major changes have come to the international security environ

first, the source of mass violence, has migrated from the state to the i

Unfortunately, the United States witnessed the most spectacular d

“Super-empowered individuals”301 when nineteen ticketed passengers 

deered four airplanes on 9/11. The U.S. response was against a Super-e

individual, Osama bin Laden, and his supporters, and was not a retalia

against Afghanistan. The U.S., a nation-state of unparallel political, 

and military power, is at war with Super-empowered individuals. 

298 “Pentagon’s New Map” (Esquire). 299 China as part of the Functioning Core? Yes. The line between the Core and Gap, 

Barnett, is constantly shifting but he suggests that the direction of change is more critic

degree. Barnett, Pentagon’s new map, 129. 300 As quoted in Greg Jaffe, “At the Pentagon, Quirky Powerpoint Carries Big Punch

of ‘Gap’ States, Mr. Barnett Urges Generals to Split Force in Two; Austin Powers on S

The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2004, A1. 301 Thomas Friedman coined this term in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Ne

rar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 13-14.
101

of protection from attacks from a like-nation state. It followed that if 

prepared militarily to defend against a like nation-state, any smaller t

be easily countered. Unfortunately, the United States was and is wo

pared for attacks from non-state actors. Warren Rudman, commentin

Commission Report stated: 

The report itself addressed that we have an asymmetric threat 

is absolutely stunning when you look at the amount of money w

on the armed forces. We have an incredible Navy, a great Air 

wonderful Army, smart weapons, and great technology, w

worthless in the defensive sense against terrorism. They don

You can’t deploy an Army division against a cell of Al Qaeda 

ester, New York, that you don’t know is there.302

The second major change to the international security environ

nation-states still “compete” but now “friends” and “enemies” alik

into “competitors.”303 Yet, the recurring and in many cases, sustaine

the unglobalized, disconnected world—or as Barnett calls this are

demonstrates that competition for many remains more of guns and b

dollars and cents. According to RAND, the number of violent confl

throughout the 1990s in every part of the world with the excep

Saharan Africa. Not surprisingly, the Middle East is the world’s mo

region with an average of 10.3 soldiers for every 1,000 people; wh

has 6.4, North America 4.5, South America 2.8 and South Asia 1.6

out the U.S. military responses since the end of the Cold War indic

whelming concentration of activity in the regions that are excluded 

ization’s growing Core.305 

302 Warren B. Rudman, “Perspectives on National Security in the Twenty-First C

Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard Universit

tations, Spring 2002. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Con

4. URL: <http://www/pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/rudman/rudman.i02.pdf>, accesse

303 Friedman, 12. 304 “Headlines Over the Horizon: Analysts at the RAND Corporation Lay Out T

tional-Security Developments that Aren’t Getting the Attention They Deserve,” Atla

(July/August 2003): 89. Cited hereafter as RAND. 305 “Pentagon’s New Map” (Esquire).
102

Transnational Issues Matter

As early as 1997, the Defense Department recognized that in the 

future the United States would likely face threats that were non-sta

While the potential existed for major theater war in the Middle East 

Korean peninsula, in its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DoD ind

the absence over the next ten to fifteen years of a “global peer competit

that most of the threats facing the United States would involve failed st

snational dangers, and asymmetric challenges.306 A Specialist in Int

Terrorism with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of 

speculates that if there is a trend emerging in the latest phase of terr

jihad era, it is the existence of a two-level challenge. The challenge 

United States and others is the hyperreligious medley of small groups o

and, according to Cronin, the much broader enabling environment of b

nance, nonexistent social services, and poverty307 that defines much of 

oping world.308

Terrorism – Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, a trend in

ing terrorist attacks on U.S. targets had become disturbingly alar

Attacks increased from a low of 66 in 1994 to a high of 200 in 

International attacks against U.S. targets or persons increased fro

percent of the world total in 1993-1995 to almost 50 perce

2000.309 Globally, in 2003, there were 625 terrorism deaths, the l

number since 1998. Additionally, terrorists injured 3,646 peopl

largest increase in six years.310

Illegal Drugs – Efforts to curtail opium-growing and heroin labora

in Afghanistan appear to have failed miserably. “Drug trafficking 

306 Amos A. Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The 

kins University Press, 1999) 248. 307 Michael Mousseau in “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” Internatio

27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 6, reminds his readers that the direct, casual linkages betw

and terror are more elusive than scholars suggest. Mousseau is not aware of any compr

explanations in print for how poverty causes terrorism nor has there been any correlatio

the two. Consequently, Mousseau believes that the call for increased foreign aid to fight 

misplaced and he doubts if it will have any significant positive effect in combating terr

fact, it may increase the terrorist threat by making their relative, material deprivation k

especially, young, vengeful men, who become willing recruits to terrorist operations. 308 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terro

national Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 38. 309 Cronin, 43.
103

now, said Avaz Yuldashov of the Tajikistan Drug Control 

“Drugs, weapons, ammunition, terrorism, more drugs, more ter

it’s a closed circle,” said Col. Alexander Kondratiyev, a senior 

officer who served with Tajikistan border guards. The U.

Enforcement Agency (DEA) had two agents to cover all of Afg

there are no DEA agents in Tajikistan or neighboring Kyrgy

Altogether, 28 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces are involved in op

duction, employing more than 1.7 million people. Opium pr

accounted for 3,600 tons—three-quarters of the world’s product

Guatemala has become the hottest destination for Colombian 

destined for the United States. The trafficking is bringing with 

violence and instability. The U.S. Ambassador there describes 

sational mob-style killings as “like something from the Godfath

majority of Guatemala’s 12 million live in poverty, 30 percen

read or write, and half of Guatemala’s population is under 

without job prospects. Hugo Beteta, a Guatemalan planning 

said, “Poor idle youths see two choices: migrate to the United 

get involved in the drug trade.”313

Weapons Proliferation – It is estimated that Abdul Qadeer K

Pakistani nuclear scientist, netted $100 million dollars for the 

technology he sold to Libya alone. In addition to dealing wit

Khan’s network sold nuclear equipment to Iran and North Kore

menting on Libya’s efforts, Robert Joseph, who heads Nation

rity Council’s counterproliferation efforts, said, “The progr

much more advanced that we assessed. It was much larger 

assessed.”314

310 Peter Slevin, “New 2003 Data: 625 Terrorism, not 307,” Washington Post, 23 

Note: As cited in Slevin, the State Department initially reported 307 deaths base

tion supplied by the CIA. Based on this information, Deputy Secretary of State Ric

stated that it “provided clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight.” CIA emp

Brennan blamed antiquated computers and personnel shortages for the errors and di

tions that the administration purposely fabricated the figures. 311 Mark McDonald, “As Heroin Flourishes, So Could Terror,” Philadelphia Inq

2004, A1. 312Michele Alliot-Marie, “Afghanistan’s Drug Boom: The Opium Problem Cou

thing That’s Being Done to Help the Afghan People,” Washington Post, 6 October 2

313 Mary Jordan, “Pit Stop on the Cocaine Highway: Guatemala Becomes Favo

U.S.-Bound Drugs,” Washington Post, 6 October 2004, A20.
104

Now we have the power to launch a missile with a 2,000-kilo

range. Iran is determined to improve its military capabilities. 

Americans attack Iran, the world will change....They will not d

make such a mistake.” The range of this missile would put pa

Europe within reach for the first time. State Department spokesm

Adam Ereli stated, “We view Iran’s efforts to further develop its m

capabilities as a threat to the region and to the United States inte

and all the more so in light of its ongoing nuclear program.”315

Infectious Disease – HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria collec

have caused 25 percent of all deaths worldwide. An estimated 4

lion people are already infected with HIV/AIDS and it is expa

rapidly. The rate of HIV/AIDS infection has increased 1300 perc

the last five years in Eastern Europe.316 The AIDS pandemic, pa

larly in Africa, is notorious. The United Nations reported that 2

lion people in Sub-Saharan have HIV/AIDS, and in some countr

percent of the adult population are infected with HIV. During 

some 900,000 southern Africans died from AIDS, leaving more 

three million children without one or both parents.317 The Na

Intelligence Council publication, Global Trends 2015: A Dialog 

the Future With Nongovernment Experts, stated that AIDS will r

the average lifespan in some African countries by as much as 30 

years, thereby, generating more than 40 million orphans and con

ing to poverty, crime and instability.318 Equally disturbing is th

that AIDS is decimating the ranks of the African armed forces. A 

RAND study reported these staggering data on the militaries hit h

by HIV/AIDS infection: Zimbabwe (50 percent), Angola (40-6

cent), Tanzania (15-25 percent), Congo-Brazzaville (10-25 per

Cote d’Ivoire (10-20 percent), the Democratic Republic of the C

(40-60 percent), Eritrea (10 percent) and Nigeria (10-20 percent

rate of infection in the South African National Defense Force 

amazing 90 percent in some units.319 

314 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Pakistani’s Nuclear Earnings: $100 Mi

New York Times, online ed., 16 March 2004, URL: <http: //www/nytimes.com/2004/03

tional/asia/16NUKE.html?>, accessed 17 March 2004. 315 “Iran’s Missles Can Now Hit Europe, Ex-Official Says,” Reuters, Washington Pos

2004, A21. 316 Haass, 4. 317 RAND, 86. 318 Global Trends 2015.
105

America 950,000; Caribbean 430,000; Latin America 1.6 

Western Europe 580,000; Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.3 

East Asia 900,000; South and Southeast Asia 6.5illion; and 

32,000.320

Counterfeit Goods-“Interpol believes there is a signific

between counterfeiting and terrorism in locations where t

entrenched terrorist groups,” stated Ronald Noble, the inte

police network’s secretary general. Interpol has linked terror

counterfeiting in the Middle East, Europe and Latin Area. T

sels-based World Customs Organization estimated more than $

lion in counterfeit products last year, 6 percent of glob

Confiscated counterfeit goods thus far have included auto part

CDs, cigarettes, shampoo and toiletries. Noble commented th

inevitable that terrorists would follow organized crime into the 

feiting business.321

Terrorist Sanctuary in West Africa – U.S. General Charl

deputy commander of European Command, expressed his con

al Qaeda-affiliated groups are active in Mauritania, Mali, C

Niger. Terrorists are continuing to trade in diamonds in spite of 

tional efforts. “The terrorist activity is not going to go awa

area....If we don’t do something about it, we are going to ha

problem on our hands.”322

Conurbations – Ninety-five percent of population increase in 

ing years will take place in developing countries. The prospect

will continue to draw people from rural, interior regions to 

overcrowded metropolitan areas that will further strain the sta

structure and services.323 Examples of conurbations include W

ton-to-Boston (35-40 million people), Sao Paulo, Brazil (30 

plus), and Baghdad (4.3 million).324 By 2007, for the first 

human history, a majority of the world’s population will live in 

319 RAND, 86. 320 Ellen Nakashima, “U.N. Cites Record in HIV Cases, Faults Prevention as Ina

ington Post, 7 July 2004, A14. 321 News Reports, “Terrorist Profiting in Illicit Goods: Interpol Chief Warns Ab

ing,” International Herald Tribune, 26 May 2004. 322 Douglas Farah and Richard Shultz, “Al Qaeda’s Growing Sanctuary,” Wa

14 July 2004, A19. 323 Haass, 4.
106

Korea may have trained as many as 600 computer hackers to l

cyber-attacks against the United States and South Korea. Alth

computers are a rarity and Internet access in North Korea is almos

existent, the Defense Ministry maintains North Korea information 

fare capabilities had reached the level of advanced countries.326

These issues require a more agile, streamlined, fluid, cooperative an

rative Intelligence Community, in other words, the IC needs to operat

tively as its adversaries do. As an example of what needs to change wit

to engage effectively against the threats of the 21st century, Douglas 

Richard Schultz refer to the activities of al Qaeda and Hezbollah in W

as lessons for the current intelligence reform debate. Farah is currentl

fellow at the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence while on leave 

Washington Post and Schultz is the director of security studies at Tuf

sity. They contend that despite General Wald’s reporting of al Qaeda

activities and diamond trafficking in this area, the Intelligence Comm

particularly the CIA, has dismissed these reports as inaccurate or irrele

attributed this attitude to the state-centric culture within the IC as a hold

the Cold War era. This culture must be changed to reflect the nation

threats posed by armed groups, operating beyond state control, as de f

in large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. Farah a

presented four guides to intelligence reform that can be drawn from the 

of al Qaeda and Hezbollah in West Africa: 

● Terrorists and other armed groups are sophisticated in their e

tion of “gray areas” where governments are weak, corruption 

pant and the rule of law is nonexistent. 

● Terrorists are adaptable and learn from each other and their ow

takes. 

● Terrorist networks and criminal networks can take over faile

such as Liberia and Afghanistan and turn them into multifacete

national threats.

● The Intelligence Community reacts poorly to information that 

on its radar screen.327

324 Patrick M. Hughes, “Future Conditions: The Character and Conduct of War, 201

briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Gue

tions, Spring 2003. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, 

URL: http://pirp.harvard.edu/Pubs-pdf/Hughes/Hughes-i03-1.pdf, accessed 1 A

325 Hutchings. 326 World in Brief, Washington Post, 6 October 2004, A22.
107

Barnett maintains that America can only increase its security wh

connectivity or expands globalization’s reach, by expanding the C

shrinking the Gap. In the Post-9/11 world, Barnett envisions a split-l

in a way unlike any previous recommendations. The first milita

“Leviathan,” would be hard-hitting, ready to take on conventional fo

the current military structure and the other, the “System Administra

focus on bringing dysfunctional states into the mainstream through 

ing operations.328 Theoretically, the predominant U.S. military o

March 2003 against Iraq and the subsequent follow-on operations 

been a classic application of Barnett’s proposed force structure. Us

model, the Leviathan (U.S. military and Coalition Forces) neutralize

during the period March-May 2003 through overwhelming force. Sin

the System Administrators (military forces, international agencies

local populace, and the like) have begun nation-building activities. U

while military strength (personnel and equipment superiority) were 

the Leviathan phase, successes of System Administrators phase ha

The nation-building efforts have been thwarted by violent and dea

operations. This has forced the military to sustain large numbers of c

to protect the combat support and combat service support troops and 

tract personnel involved in reconstruction efforts. In many parts of 

insurgent violence has escalated to the point where all military h

combat troops and all civilians combat casualties; there is no distinc

the two. The U.S. Department of State reported in its “Post Reports

hensive guide to Iraq:

the security situation throughout Iraq remains unstable and th

gent elements continue to be extremely active, and they continu

get not only Coalition Forces but civilians who are viewed “as 

the United States.” The total number of attacks in August [200

nearly 2,800...the high-water mark in terms of sheer num

attacks. The road that runs from [the airport to the Internation

continues to be the scene of improvised explosive devices, sm

fires, and RPG attacks, despite concerted efforts by the mi

secure the route.”329

327 Farah and Shultz, A19. 328Jaffe. 329 Al Kamen, “In the Loop: There’s No Place Like Zone,” Washington Post, 8 O

A23.
108

the $7.1 billion obligated for Iraq reconstruction projects, almost one th

amount has been spent on security. The breakdown of dollars for Iraq id

few as 27 cents of every dollar spent on Iraq’s reconstruction benefiting 

directly—30 percent Security; 15 percent Corruption, fraud, mismanag

percent Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. Embassy overhead; 

Contractor profits, Other (insurance/salaries of non-Iraqi workers 1

Intended reconstruction projects 27 percent.330

The current nation-building obstacles in Iraq would not be surprising 

Army Lieutentent General, Patrick M. Hughes, former Director DIA and 

DHS Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis. Speaking at the 

Information Policy Research at Harvard University in early 2003, Hughe

Peacekeeping operations is an activity that the U.S. military, and fr

most of the security and intelligence elements of the United State

not well trained for. They’re not equipped for it, and they’re not 

focused well for it, although they’ve had to do it for many years. I t

can characterize the Department of Defense’s view about peaceke

like this: We’ll do it because we have to, but we don’t want to do 

don’t like to do it. We are trained, equipped, and meant for the co

of war. Peacekeeping is somebody else’s problem.

[Commenting on the on-going Iraq operations, Hughes continued]: 

specifically, what it means is that we’re going to be there in some gu

and I use that word advisedly—for quite a while. It might be und

umbrella of the United Nations, but it will be a guise. It’s us, folk

United States of America, and nobody else is going to remain in the 

math of conflict and shepherd Iraq into the future, whatever that m

Once again, there might be a big sign somewhere painted blue and 

that says “United Nations,” but let’s face it, it’s mainly a facade.331

How prevalent have peacekeeping operations become in the 21st 

According to A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, [ex

current military coalition operations in Iraq] although the financial and 

contributions to U.N. Security Council missions declined slightly in 20

still four times higher than in1998. Eighty-nine countries supported 15 

bal missions with 39,000 personnel. The developing countries of B

330 Jonathan Weisman and Robin Wright, “Funds to Rebuild Iraq are Drifting Away f

State Department to Rethink U.S. Effort,” Washington Post, 6 October 2004, A18. 331Hughes, 2-4.
109

irony concerning peacekeeping operations is the example of mutin

Bissau soldiers who seized key buildings and killed Gen Verissimo 

reia, the commander of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, in October 2

ousted Kumba Yalla in a previous coup in 2003 of this West African 

soldiers were demanding payment for past peacekeeping duty abroa

What Does this Mean for the IC?

As George Tenet succinctly informed the Senate Armed Service

during the DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing, the IC faces unique ch

America stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and bla

created a kind of cultural asymmetry. To us, Afghanistan seem

far away. To members of al-Qa’ida, America seemed very cl

sense, they were more globalized than we were.334

Mr. Chairman, what I want to say to you now may be the most i

thing I tell you today. The steady spread of Usama bin Ladin’s 

sentiment—through the wider Sunni extremist movement and 

the broad dissemination of al-Qa’ida’s destructive expertise—

that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future...with 

out al-Qa’ida in the picture....For the growing number of jihadi

ested in attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on 

Homeland is the “brass ring” that many strive for—with or 

encouragement by al-Qa’ida’s central leadership.335

Cronin likewise does not foresee any immediate abatement of 

terrorism:

The coincidence between evolving changes of globalization, th

ent weaknesses of the Arab region, and the inadequate A

response to both ensures that terrorism will continue to be 

serious threat to the U.S. and Western interests in the twenty-

tury...The current wave of international terrorism, characte

332A.T. Kearney/FP, 58. 333 “World in Brief,” Washington Post, 7 October 2004, A26. 334 The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission 

Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 261-

after as 9/11 Report. 335 George Tenet, “DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing: The Worldwide Threat 200

in a Changing Global Context,” Presented to Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 
110

is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it; the U.S. respo

this reality has been reactive and anachronistic.336

Globalization—the good, the bad, and the ugly—will continue to pre

rity challenges for all nations. However, because the United States is 

with globalization and blamed for its ill effects, particularly by the disa

and alienated populations of developing countries, the effects of glo

present significant security challenges for the United States and subseq

the Intelligence Community. According to Cronin, globalization rep

onslaught by oppressive forces against the less privileged people in co

cultures who are repelled by the fundamental changes these forces are b

angered by the distortions and uneven distributions of benefits th

Whether unintentional or not, the United States is projecting uncoordi

nomic, social, and political power even more so than its military power

“Globalization—including its darker potential—is a fact, not a policy 

the United States or anyone else,” states Haass. “How we respond to it, th

matter of policy....The future of international relations will be shaped 

extent by how the bright and dark sides of globalization interact and ho

and peoples respond.”338 U.S. national intelligence exists to respond 

policy requirements and to inform policymakers. IC capabilities wi

reflect the capabilities of its adversaries much as “containment” during 

War era defined the collection requirements and capabilities of the C

The Community has witnessed the gradual decline of the nation-states’ 

cal power and the accelerated rise in the power of transnational threats p

since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, yet the Communit

realigned its resources accordingly. “In recent years, the escalation of tra

threats and demands for peacekeeping around the world has increased th

tive to strengthen the management and organization of US intelligence w

states Larry C. Kindsvater, Executive Director for Intelligence Commun

“The Community is not managed and organized to directly address nati

rity missions and threats.” 339 The DCI’s “Community authorities” have 

ented toward the CIA and not the Community as a whole.

336 Cronin, 30. 337 Cronin, 45. 338 Haass, 5. 339 Larry C. Kindsvater, “A Senior Officer’s Perspective: The Need to Reorganize th

gence Community,” Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003), 34.
111

ings in the U.S. intelligence apparatus in the 21st Century, most nota

gence sharing. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, despite the increas

chatter and recognition of an increased threat, the IC analytical 

Qa’ida was nothing short of pitiful. For example, at the CIA’s Cou

Center (CTC), with worldwide responsibilities for all terrorist threat

five analysts assigned to work on al-Qa’ida between 2000 and 1

2001. This was an increase over the numbers who worked this prob

between 1998 and 2000—only three analysts worked it then.340 Keep 

was after DCI George Tenet issued a 4 December 1998 directive to 

officials and his deputy for community management, stating, “We 

want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA 

munity.”341 Tenet declared war against al-Qa’ida in the aftermath 

Africa embassy bombings and because terrorist attacks against U.S

U.S. interests had been steadily rising. Including part-time analysts w

where in CIA, the total number of analysts dedicated to this immine

fewer than 40.

The remainder of the Community did not fare much better. The F

than ten tactical analysts and only one strategic analyst assigned 

NSA had only a limited number of Arabic linguists dedicated fu

Qa’ida and these same linguists were used to support other high-pr

and translation activities as well. DIA and the Department of State

Intelligence Research (INR) were primarily interested in anti-terrori

protection issues overseas. State had one analyst dedicated to al-Qa

had 30 analysts devoted to Sunni extremists and on any given day, t

might not be involved with al-Qa’ida-related issues.342 In late 2000, 

then Chief of the CTC, concerned about protecting sources a

declined FAA’s offer of nearly two-dozen analysts to address transpo

rity issues in exchange for broader information sharing.343 The

plainly illustrate the lack of authority the DCI possessed over the C

even as Director of Central Intelligence, he could not effectively 

direction and priorities of the Community. The DCI may have decl

few enlisted to the cause. 

340 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perman

mittee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before a

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 107-351 an

792, December 2002, C. Systemic Findings, 59. Cited hereafter as Joint Inquiry Re

341 9/11 Report, 356. 342 Joint Inquiry Report, Part 1 Findings and Conclusions, 59 343 Joint Inquiry Report, C. Systemic Findings, 60.
112

integrator of intelligence as envisioned by framers of the National Secu

1947. Subsequent authorities such as the National Security Council In

Directives (NSIDs) during the Truman Administration, according to Wa

more explicit in outlining prohibitions than they were in clarifying the p

of the DCI. Consequently, every DCI exercised a looser rather than tig

sight of common IC issues.344 The DCI’s authorities have not improve

ably since then despite numerous executive orders to strengthen them.

Most recently, the 9/11 Commission noted the limitations of the DC

ity over the direction and priority of the IC, especially its elements 

Department of Defense. According to the Commission:

The DCI has to direct agencies without controlling them. He do

receive an appropriation for their activities, and therefore does no

trol their purse strings. He has little insight into how they spend 

resources. Congress attempted to strengthen the DCI’s author

1996 by creating the deputy DCI for Community Managemen

Assistant DCIs for Collection, Analysis and Production, and Adm

tration. But the authority of these positions is limited and the vis

central management clearly has not been realized.345

The recently passed Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention A

in theory remedies this situation by establishing a Senate-confirmed D

National Intelligence (DNI) who shall not serve as the Director of the C

head of any other element in the Intelligence Community. This sep

powers is the most significant change to the IC structure.

This act grants the DNI specific budgetary and personnel realignme

ties. The Director of OMB apportions National Intelligence Program (N

formerly called NFIP, at the “exclusive direction” of the DNI for alloca

elements. The DNI manages NIP appropriations by “directing the all

allocation” of these appropriations through IC agency heads. Additio

DNI may transfer or reprogram NIP funds from any IC element with so

lations—the total amount to be moved out in any fiscal year cannot ex

million, is less than 5 percent of the impacted agency’s NIP budget an

terminate an acquisition program. However, the DNI cannot exercise th

ity unilaterally as the OMB and the affected agency must approve this 

344 Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origins and Evolution, 7. 345 9/11 Report, 357.
113

department head.

Regarding IC personnel transfers, within twelve months of est

newly authorized intelligence centers, the DNI may transfer not more 

people to these centers. This action is contingent upon approval of O

gressional consultation. Also, the DNI can transfer unlimited numbe

nel from one IC element to another for not more than two yea

transfers of this nature are allowed only if personnel are being “tra

higher priority intelligence activity, and the transfer supports an em

improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.” Respect

sional committees must be notified of such transfers.347

Information Revolution and the Intelligence Com

If there were a Moore’s Law348 for transportation, such as air 

modern commercial aircraft would cost $500, circle the earth i

minutes, and use only five gallons of fuel. However, it might on

size of a shoebox. 

—Gord

Without question, information and communications techno

been prime global integrators, changing the way we communic

we receive our information. “Printing made us all readers,” said 

News president Lawrence Grossman. “Xeroxing made us all publ

vision made us all viewers. Digitalization makes us all broadcast

346 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summ

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Cong. 2nd sess., 6 Decem

hereafter as GAC Summary. 347 GAC Summary. 348 In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel (semiconductor microchip comp

that the density of transistors on a semiconductor microchip doubles roughly every 

other words, the processing power of a computer doubles. This has been constant fo

decades. Moore’s Law has been the driver for the explosive rise in PC and Internet u

rate of technological change in communications, medical equipment and electronic

Bainbridge, in a speech presented at 2003 Nanotechnology Conference and Trade S

ing Technologies, San Francisco, CA, 23-27 February 2003, URL: < http://mysite

william.bainbridge/dl/nbic.htm>, accessed 13 October 2004, notes that Moore’s 

“repealed” within a decade because transistors on conventional chips are nearing the

limits. If so, the U.S. semiconductor industry could evaporate. Therefore, there is a 

from American government and industry, in nanotechnology that could extend Moo

another decade or two. 349 Friedman, 49.
114

Square protests, former Secretary of State James Baker said that live 

“signaled a powerful new phenomenon: the ability of the global co

tions revolution to drive policy...[to] create a powerful new impe

prompt action that was not present in less frenetic times.”350 The U.S

ment used media coverage of live events initially to its advantage by 

reporters to embed with the front line troops leading up to and incl

assault on Baghdad during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Censo

enforced sparingly and when enforced, done so for operational secu

rently, Iraqi insurgents under the presumed leadership of Jordanian 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are using the powers of the Internet, print, 

media to broadcast their cause. A recent Washington Post article rep

Zarqawi is using his role as leader of the insurgents to become a ma

in the broader Islamic jihad movement. Anthony H. Cordesman, sen

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, indicated tha

has shown sophistication in using the media, taking responsibility 

for bombings and appearing in a series of videos of beheadings [vi

on the Internet].351

To get an idea of how just how connected the world has become, L

leading U.S. telecommunications-equipment company, in an annual re

stockholders stated: 

● Every minute, 5 million email messages are sent out.

● Every hour, 35 million voice mail messages are left.

● Every day 50,000 people sign up for wireless phone service.

● Every day 37 million people log onto the Internet.

● Every week 630,000 phone lines are installed.

● Every 100 days Internet traffic doubles.352

Additionally, a 2000 University of California-Berkeley study 

more than 610 billion email messages were delivered that year. The 

sisted of 2.1 billion static pages and was projected to double in 200

350 David A. Radi, “Intelligence Inside the White House: The Influence of Executiv

Technology,” Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard U

Guest Presentations, March 1997. Incidental Paper, <URL:http://pirp.harvard.edu/p

radi/radi-i97-3.pdf>, accessed 1 April 2004. 351 Walter Pincus, “Iraq Called ‘Springboard’ for Insurgency Figure: Intelligence E

Jordanian Militant Zarqawi Wants Broader Role in Jihad Movement,” Washington Post

2004, A25. 352 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Ce

York: The Free Press, 2003), 199.
115

photographs, databases—totaled two exabytes in 2000--an exab

the 18th power. Confused yet? EMC, a computer storage maker, 

every word ever spoken by every human being on the planet 

recorded history were added together, it would equal five exabytes 

tion. Within two years time, by 2002, information storage wo

exceed five exabytes.353

Declining telecommunications costs, as well as reductions in p

puter and telephony equipment costs, have propelled the informatio

Much of this decrease could be attributed to the deregulation broug

Telecommunications Act of 1996 when companies spent billions 

long-distance lines nationally and around the globe. Less than four p

long-distance lines in the ground are being used now, so costs 

increased capabilities are likely. As an example of plummeting tele

tions costs, the cost of a link capable of carrying 2,000 calls simult

decreased from $155,000 a month in January 2000 to $6,200 a mon

2004. In 1920, a 10-minute call between Los Angeles and Ne

$26.17—the equivalent of almost $250 in 2004 dollars; the costs in 

same 10-minute call was 50 cents.354 International telephone traffi

ued its rapid ascent for a total of 135 billion minutes in 2002. 

equated to 21 minutes per person for every person on the planet—a

plus of us!

Many of the largest countries showed the largest connectivity in

example, the A.T. Kearney Globalization Index indicates that in Chi

ber of Internet users increased 75 percent in 2002, in Brazil, 78.5 pe

India, 136 percent. Meanwhile, the Middle East as a whole remain

world’s least connected areas, although even here the number of I

was up by 116 percent.355 Wireless communications (mobile teleph

proliferated in developing countries, allowing countries such as Bot

gary, Indonesia, and South Africa to be more connected than ever. 

time, in 2002 the number of mobile telephones per capita worldw

353 Russ Mitchell, “The Ghosts in the Machine: Can Technology Find Terrorists

can Spectator, Nov/Dec 2001, accessed via ProQuest, 4 December 2003. 354 Christopher Stern, “So Long to Long Distance? Calling Packages, Internet P

Ending a High-Cost Category,”Washington Post, 5 August 2004, E4. 355Note: According to A.T. Kearney/FP Globalization Index, 59, the digital divi

users may be narrowing but the infrastructure divide remained constant. The 2002 d

world’s total number of Internet hosts (computers permanently tied to the Internet). 

million new hosts added globally, developing countries still had less than 10 percen
116

itants to 17.95 for landlines.

Regardless of the measurements used to gauge the world’s com

tions patterns, electronic communications have become as ubiquitou

food—they’re everywhere, and represent a $3 trillion-per-year com

tions industry!357 The question for the Intelligence Community is, 

this information explosion affected the Community’s ability to co

cess, analyze and disseminate intelligence?” Lt. Gen. Michael V

Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security 

answered this question in part with his testimony before the Joi

gence Community of the events of 11 September 2001, on 17 Octo

He stated:

The volume, variety and velocity of human communications 

our mission more difficult each day. A SIGINT agency has to 

like its target. We have to master whatever technology the 

is using....We had competed successfully against a resource-

oligarchic, technologically inferior, and overly bureau

nation state. Now we had to keep pace with a global telecom

nication revolution, probably the most dramatic revoluti

human communications since Gutenberg’s invention of the 

able type.358

The peace dividends of the 1990s had devastating effects on the 

ization efforts of the community in terms of personnel and recapi

DCI George Tenet remarked that NSA was hiring no new technolo

ing the greatest information technology change in our lifetime.359 D

1990s, NSA downsized its workforce by one-third and reduced i

proportionately. “The Agency [NSA] accomplished the downsizing 

imposed on it in the easiest and most humane way possible,” said H

shut the front door.” However, according to Hayden, during this sam

telecommunications surged ahead. Mobile cell phones increased fro

lion to 741 million—an increase of nearly 50 times. Internet users w

4 million to 261 million—an increase of over 90 times. Half as m

lines were laid in the last six years of the 1990s as had been laid in 

356 A.T. Kearney/FP, 60. 357 9/11 Report, 88. 358 Hayden. 359 George Tenet, “Investigation of Sept 11,”17 October 2002, accessed via LexisNe

ary 2004.
117

billion minutes to over 100 billion.

Undeniably, the Intelligence Community is awash in digit

tion, which is affecting every aspect of the intelligence proces

collecting against Cold-War era military command and control 

were hierarchal, familiar and often predictable, the Communit

endeavor to collect against loosely affiliated, networked adver

commercial off-the-shelf communications equipment and 

devices.Unequivocally, operations required to penetrate an 

information system, literally touching the system in most 

extremely sensitive and perishable. These types of operati

human intelligence (HUMINT).361 “A setback of inestim

quences in the war against terrorism occurred when Usama bin 

his key lieutenants stopped using a phone following 1998 pres

our [NSA] intercepts,”362 Hayden told the Joint Inquiry Comm

To appreciate the challenges posed to the Community, particularly 

by these new transmission media, consider these sobering facts and 

noted in a July 2004 Washington Post article:

● A single strand of fiber-optic cable exceeds the capacity of a

communications satellites orbiting the globe. Email, in 200

expected to be the equivalent of 40 copies of the fully digit

ings of the Library of Congress.

360 Hayden. 361 Much discussion during the past decade has centered on the decimation of HUM

to lack of funding and the purging of DO during Stansfield Turner’s short reign as DC

and the recruitment restrictions imposed by another DCI, John Deutch. Berkowitz, in 

itz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: T

2003), 201, dismisses these assertions. Regarding Turner’s reign, Berkowitz reminds 

since Turner ran the CIA—four presidents, twelve Congresses, and six directors of CI

and gone. Therefore, if the U.S. wanted to make changes to HUMINT operations, the

many opportunities. In regard to Deutch’s reign as DCI, most members of Congress as 

officers on the “scene” today supported the restrictions on controversial HUMINT sou

gence budget cuts and the intelligence priorities that supposedly slighted HUMINT. 

More recently, in George Tenet, “Investigation of September 11,”17 October 2004, a

isNexis, 12 January 2004, Tenet stated: “It will take us another five years to have the kin

service our country needs. There is a creative, innovative strategy to get us there that req

commitment, leadership and funding.” Berkowitz debunks Tenet’s timetable. Berkowitz 

oft-repeated line that “HUMINT sources take decades to rebuild,” is simply not true. He 

iam Casey put together a network of HUMINT agents during World War II in just eight

362 Hayden.
118

per day.

● Telephone calls can now be sent over the Internet, using a protoco

Voice-over-Internet (VOIP) or voice-over-IP as it is commonly ca

2005, enough fiber-optic cable to support VOIP will have been 

carry the equivalent of one Library of Congress every 14.4 second

Disconnected Intelligence Community

Nonetheless, as the outside world became more connected, the Commun

less so. Speaking before the 9/11 Commission in April 2004, Tenet admitted 

the mid-1990s, the Community was not able to keep pace with technologica

the Community “lost close to 25 percent of our people and billions of dollar

investment.”364 The consequences of forced deferment of intelligence sy

infrastructure due to reduced funding are many. Perhaps one of the most vi

January 2000 when catastrophic failure struck NSA’s powerful computers 

described as a software anomaly in the communications infrastructure), whic

able to process information for three days.365 Another is the creation of NIM

but without the requisite funds (“enormous shortfalls” according to Tenet) to 

merge and modernize its geospatial and imagery functions. Another c

deferred investment is the Community’s aging satellite constellation.366

Technological change, when it occurred, remained for the most part 

endeavor. Community agencies sought improvements to existing system

ported their respective specializations. These improvements tended to b

line. Minimal, if any, consideration was given to integration of system

Lehman, 9/11 Commissioner and former Secretary of the Navy, while co

on the importance of information sharing, expressed this frustration with 

munity: “There are no protocols [standards] for the Intelligence Comm

sharing. This is an IT problem. It’s a deep, embedded, functional problem 

out the Community for common protocols for information.”367

363 Michael A. Wertheimer, “Crippling Innovation—And Intelligence,” Washington P

2004, A19. 364 George Tenet, “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Intelligence,” Washing

online ed., 14 April 2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11115

2004Apr14?>, accessed 15 April 2004. Cited hereafter as Tenet, 9/11 Commission, 14 

365 “A Special Relationship? The US and UK Spying Alliance Is Put Under the Spo

don Financial Times, 6 July 2004. 366 Tenet, Investigation of Sept 11. 367 Tenet, 9/11 Commission, 14 April 2004
119

$200 million dollars away from current, still-active, still-producing 

investing those dollars in future capabilities. “$200 million per year wa

what we needed, and in fact, I could only make about one-third of that 

as our program went through the Executive Branch and the Congress.”3

Peter to Pay Paul” scenario played out throughout the Community as age

sought to recapitalize their information systems and infrastructure by 

monies from other areas. Older systems due to be decommissioned with

became, in essence, bill-payers for any modernization effort not curren

many cases, this pickpocket approach to program management fel

intended goal. Consequently, due to a host of reasons, systems that were 

missioned continued operation beyond their “expiration dates” thereby b

tional expenditures for both the recapitalization efforts as well as for co

the bill-payer system(s). 

Decades ago, T. S. Eliot noted, “Where is the knowledge we have 

mation?” The Community has outstripped its ability to process, exp

lyze the information it collects. Tragically, even as the Joint Inquiry 

This inquiry uncovered no intelligence information in the poss

the Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 1

fully considered, would have provided specific, advance warni

details of those attacks. But it also noted, 

Within the huge volume of intelligence reporting that was 

prior to September 11, there were various threads and pieces 

mation that, at least in retrospect, are both relevant and signific

The Community, in particular the CIA and FBI, missed numerou

opportunities to detect the 9/11 plot (as noted on page 75). The “threads 

information” could not be woven into a coherent pattern because thi

resided in segmented databases that could not be accessed easily within 

alone between Community agencies; resided in hand-written notes know

writer; and resided in the thoughts of seasoned analysts who chose 

368 Hayden.

Note: NSA has two major modernization efforts underway—Project GROUNDBR

TRAILBLAZER. GROUNDBREAKER is an outsourced IT activity and TRAILBLAZ

to revolutionize how to produce SIGINT in a digital age. Hayden related that a future p

jointly (NSA/private corporation) develop a data mining system. Nevertheless, accordi

Inquiry Report, 55, “NSA’s highly publicized TRAILBLAZER program was often cite

cials as the solution to many of these problems [lack of current analytical tools to ident

ligence amidst large volumes of information], but the implementation of those solution

years away and confusion still exists at NSA as to what will actually be provided by th

369 Joint Inquiry Report, III. Findings and Conclusions, 7.
120

biases and misunderstood legal statutes that prevented collaboration among 

John C. Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, testifying before the 9/11 

sion, reported on the terrible shape of the FBI’s computer technology 

mation management:

The Bureau essentially had 42 separate information systems, no

which were connected. Agents lacked access to even the most 

Internet technology. These problems didn’t just hamper intera

communication, they hindered information sharing in the J

Department, the Intelligence Community, and communication 

state and local law enforcement. It’s no wonder, given the state o

technology, that the Phoenix memo warning the terrorists may be 

ing in commercial aviation was lost in the antique computers 

Washington headquarters.370

James R. Thompson, 9/11 Commissioner, read parts of Janet Reno’s 

General during the Clinton Administration) prepared testimony before 

9/11 Commission which disputed the existence of the “wall,” (se

below). He quoted her as remarking:

There are simply no walls or restrictions on sharing the vast majo

counterterrorism information. There are no legal restrictions at all 

ability of the members of the Intelligence Community to share i

gence information with each other. With respect to sharing be

intelligence investigators and criminal investigators, information le

as a result of a physical surveillance or from a confidential sourc

legally be shared without restriction. While there are restrictio

information gathered by grand jury investigations or Title III wireta

practice they did not prove to be a serious impediment since ther

very little significant information that could not be shared.371

370 John C. Ashcroft, “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing,” Washington Post, on

13 April 2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9088-2004Apr13

14 April 2004. 371 Janet Reno, “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing,” Washington Post, online e

2004, 58, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9088-2004Apr13?, acc

April 2004. Cited hereafter as Reno /11 Commission Hearing 13 April 2004, 58. Note: 

read from Reno’s prepared testimony page number 5 but the exchange between Thomp

Reno was cited as listed.
121

The Wall

John C. Ashcroft surprised the 9/11 Commission during his testimony in John 

“Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing,” Washington Post, online ed., 13 Apr

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A9088-2004Apr13?, accessed 1

165-166, when after noting that the single greatest structural cause for the 

11th problem was the “wall” that segregated or separated criminal investigato

gence agents, he announced that Jamie Gorelick was the author of the 1995 

in his words, was the basic architecture for the wall, and she was a membe

Commission. The day following Ashcroft’s testimony, Representative F. Jam

brenner, Jr. (R-WI), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee in Dan 

Walter Pincus, “House Member Seeks Gorelick’s Resignation,” Washington P

2004, A12, called on Gorelick, former deputy attorney general during the Clin

tration and the 9/11 Commissioner in question, to resign, arguing she has 

conflict of interest” because of the memo she drafted nine years ago.

Gorelick, responded to this charge in “The Truth About ‘the Wall,’”Washington P

2004, B7. Gorelick stated: “This is simply not true,” and listed the following five 

1) I did not invent the “wall,” which is not a wall but a set of procedures imple

1978 statue (the Foreign Intelligenc e Surveillance Act) and federal court de

preting it. The law said that intelligence investigators could conduct electr

lance in the United States against foreign targets under a more lenient stan

required in ordinary criminal cases, but only if the “primary purpose” of the 

were foreign intelligence rather than a criminal prosecution.
122

Thompson then asked Reno, “If you were to have used those words 

opinion directed to the members of the Intelligence Community and s

to members of the FBI and CIA...the members of the Intelligence C

would be astounded. Or am I wrong about that?” Reno responded:

I think some would have been astounded. I think it’s again very i

tant to understand—and I think I learned from this how importan

when you announce a policy, when you try to do something, tha

make sure you train, you get feedback from people. And I think o

the things I failed to do was to get feedback from them to unde

exactly what their problems were with it, try to accommodate 

interests and proceed to ensure a full exchange of information.372

The following are just a few of the examples cited in the Joint Inqu

highlighting technological roadblocks to information sharing within t

gence Community.

● FBI—Over the years, the FBI has failed to develop sufficient c

to collect, store, search, retrieve, analyze, and share info

within its own agency and with other agencies. As of 26 Sep

2) According to the FISA Court of Review, it was the Justice Department und

dents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the 1980s that began to read 

ute as limiting the department’s ability to obtain FISA orders if it intended to 

criminal prosecution. The practice of prohibiting prosecutors from directing int

investigators was first put into place in those years as well.

3) Mr. Aschcroft’s own deputy attorney general, Larry Thompson, formally re

the 1995 guidelines in an August 6, 2001, memo addressed to the FBI and th

Department.

4) The memo I wrote in March 1995—which concerns information-sharing in tw

ular instances, including the original World Trade Center bombing—permits fr

dination between intelligence and criminal investigators than subsequently per

the 1995 guidelines or the 2001 Thompson memo

5) Nothing in the 1995 guidelines prevented the sharing of information between 

and intelligence investigators.

Gorelick did not resign as it quickly came to light that there was no “conflict of 

The only conflict seemed to be the partisanship displayed by the U.S. Attorney 

and the House Judiciary Committee Chairman.

372 Reno, 9/11 Commission Hearing 13 April 2004, 58.
123

the Counterterrorism Division, dating back to 1995. One 

stated that “Communications coming into our building fr

from CIA, cannot be integrated into our existing database

setup for failure in terms of keeping a strategic picture of w

up against.”373

● NSA—Language analysts still conduct the bulk of their 

pencil and paper and create their own personal “database” 

cards. Obviously, the information on the index cards cannot 

made available to other Community analysts.374

● NSA/CIA—While working-level relationships and co

between NSA and CIA employees were good, mid- and u

agement-level relationships were strained. CIA thought NS

to control technology use and development and NSA though

engaged in operations that were in NSA’s purview. No less 

executive-level memoranda were necessary to reach agre

authorities on one counterterrorism effort.375

Information-Sharing a Policy Issue

Bruce Berkowitz, noted author and former CIA officer, spent 20

Scholar-in-Residence at the CIA’s Sherman Kent Center for Intellig

sis. During this period he looked at how the Directorate of Intelligen

information technology and how it might use IT more effectively. W

ity of DI analysts impressed Berkowitz, he expressed concern about 

lack of awareness of and access to new information technology and 

could benefit them in their work.376

● Despite supporting improvements in communications capab

external IC agencies, the email interface requires unfamilia

ing protocols and offers no searchable directory, underm

speed and convenience of electronic communication. 

● CIA analysts cannot easily communicate with DoD using 

level SIPRNET system. SIPRNET is the standard means of 

cation throughout DoD.

373 Joint Inquiry Report, Part One Findings and Conclusions, 58. 374 Joint Inquiry Report, Part One Findings and Conclusions, 58. 375 Joint Inquiry Report, Part One Findings and Conclusions, 57. 376Bruce Berkowitz, “The DI and “IT:” Failing to Keep Up With the Information 

Studies in Intelligence 47, no.1 (2003), 67. Cited hereafter as Berkowtiz DI and “IT
124

CIA cannot control further dissemination once the document h

posted. CIA prefers to list its products on CIASource—an A

maintained website that requires CIA access certification and 

uisite equipment to view its site.378

● The most used analytical database is CIRAS (Corporate Info

Retrieval and Storage). While an improvement over past s

CIRAS is extremely primitive when compared to what is cu

available commercially. 379

These limitations make it difficult for CIA analysts to communicate 

IC analysts in a classified environment. Berkowitz maintains that the 

security environment sends an implicit message to CIA analysts: “that t

is a threat, not a benefit; that the CIA does not put a high priority on ana

IT easily or creatively; and worst of all, that data outside the CIA’s ow

are secondary to the intelligence mission.”380 In his judgment, lack of 

while a constraint, is not the primary obstacle to improved IT effectiven

if more money were available, the CIA (DI) would not be able to use t

more effectively unless it changed its operating procedures and culture.3

The aforementioned limitations annotated by Berkowitz as well as t

tioned in the Joint Inquiry Report reflect that circumstances, while tec

in context, are not constrained by technology; they are constrained 

Technological solutions exist. Inherent CIA and subsequent Commun

decisions have imposed limitations and obstacles to sharing informat

the Community and outside the Community. Although Berkowitz exam

the CIA’s IT environment, similar scenarios of limited connectivity 

access restrictions are prevalent throughout the Community. When 

spoke with Michelle Westlander, Deputy Technical Executive for the 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency about Community interoperability i

maintained that Community information-sharing obstacles were solvab

been for some time...Multi-level security options, currently availa

enable the Community to communicate more easily and more efficientl

377 In Dan Verton, “Rice Grilled on Information-Sharing Shortfalls,” ComputerWorl

8 April 2004, URL: <http://www.computerworld.com, accessed 14 April 2004, Intelin

deployed in 1994 as the first IC intranet for classified information, has grown to more t

lion web pages. This massive growth, according to Verton, has led some in the IC to lik

ing an Intelink search to “shooting craps.” 378 Berkowitz DI and “IT,”68. 379Berkowtiz DI and “IT,” 69. 380 Berkowtiz DI and “IT,” 68. 381 Berkowtiz DI and “IT,” 69.
125

erability and collaboration within the Community—Agencies cultu

cies are.382 The 9/11 Commission Report recognized this salient fa

best information technology will not improve information sharing s

intelligence agencies’ personnel and security systems reward protect

tion rather than disseminating it....Technology produces its best res

organization has the doctrine, structure, and incentives to exploit i

nately, the Community is wanting in all three areas.

Fewer than ten years ago, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Chairman of the N

ligence Council and then Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of 

at Harvard University, and Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret) 

Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, stated, “Knowledge, mo

before, is power. The one country that can best lead the informatio

will be more powerful than any other. For the foreseeable future, th

the United States.” We understand that America possesses milit

nomic strength but its more subtle comparative advantage, acco

authors, is its ability to collect, process, act upon and disseminate 

America’s information edge is equally as important a force multipl

ican diplomacy as other elements of soft power—democracy an

kets.383 Although their premise that information is a form of na

appears sound, the U.S. lead in the information revolution in 2004 

cannot be taken for granted any longer. 

“Technology is no longer a U.S. monopoly,” stated Aris A. Papp

M. Simon, Jr., senior Community Management Staff (CMS) offic

now facing the same reality that confronted the Soviets: technolog

382 Effective 4 June 2004, the DCI released a new Community-wide directive, D

ligence Community Policy on Intelligence Information Sharing. One aspect of this 

requires IC components to utilize a specific infrastructure and common policies, ser

dards for all new IC systems to foster secure sharing of information. In theory, DCID 

step in the right direction to ensure Community-wide standardization of IT systems

test will be successful implementation. 383 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Fo

75, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 1996), 20.

Nye defines soft power as the ability to achieve a desired outcome in internation

through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or g

agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can re

of one’s ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preference of ot

can make its power legitimate in the perception of others and establish international 

encourage them to channel or limit their activities, it may not need to expend as ma

traditional economic or military resources. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: 

Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990) for more information.
126

This simple fact now represents an enormous challenge to US intelli

Two Cold-War era collection capabilities—Satellite imagery and s

communications intercepts—provided the U.S. an unparalleled “in

edge.” However, in the 21st Century these capabilities may no long

the edge they once did. Many of the IC’s collection capabilities have 

licly disclosed, alerting our adversaries to our techniques. For exa

relaxation of the previous Cold-War restrictions on satellite imaging 

gies as well as advances in satellite and optical sensor technologies, s

development of imaging satellites that were smaller, cheaper, and m

than the relatively large and expensive Landsat and other commercial 

Furthermore, the reduction of technical and cost barriers such as 

computer processing capability, user-friendly software, Internet acc

and decreased storage costs created a broader range of customers and 

satellite imagery.385

Satellite imagery is commercially available to any potential buye

or foe. As an example, during the 2001 Operation ENDURING FR

campaign, Space Imaging was the only U.S. company with commer

ery on orbit at the time for the areas of interest to the U.S. governm

U.S. had an option with Space Imaging, and with other companies a

buy all of the time on orbit over a particular place. Consequently, 

that the U.S. had “full and complete access to all of that image

tion...without competition,” according to Roberta E. Lenczowski, t

technical executive, NGA purchased all commercial imagery over 

stan and Pakistan for a period of two months. Lenczowski also state

Space Imaging would be more than happy to point out is that if s

else had come to them with a contract to buy all the time, they woul

in negotiation with them.”386 DigitalGlobe, another commercial rem

ing imaging company, can provide image resolution of six-tenths o

The only restriction is that under Department of Commerce guide

commercial imagery with less than approximately eight-tenths of a 

more must have a twenty-four hour delay in distribution. A twenty-

delay would prevent the potential disclosure of any real-time high-

tactical operation.387

384 Aris A. Pappas and James M. Simon, Jr., “Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions

gence Community—2001-2015,” Studies in Intelligence, 46, no. 1 (2002), 42. 385 John C. Baker, Ray A. Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell, “Introduction,” in 

Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency, eds. John C. Bak

Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2001), 5.
127

the area of signals and communications intercept. Intercepts have b

by the use of digital communications, encryption devices, and fibe

missions while at the same time, the ever-decreasing costs of t

ensures that secure communications is available to all—Auntie Em a

too. Pappas and Simon project that any U.S. advantage in intelligen

systems will diminish as the rest of the world acquires technology v

commercial, off-the-shelf tools. The current and future security envi

more-level technological playing field presupposes that “the IC w

surprises from both the use of known technology in unexpected w

innovative application of a combination of new technologies.388

386 Roberta E. Lenczowski, “NIMA and the Intelligence Community,” briefing p

ter for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Guest Presentations, Sprin

tal Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, July 2003, 15, URL: htt

pirp.harvard.

edu/pubs_pdf/lenczow-i03-1.pdf>, accessed 1 April 2004. In the briefing, Lencz

“Never has shutter control been invoked. Never.” She then explained that shutter co

the U.S. government licensing conditions with the U.S. commercial remote sensing 

conditions are applied through the Department of Commerce. These commercial im

in turn inform any international customers of these constraints. According to Lenczo

behind shutter control as an option the government can exercise is the shortest perio

the smallest footprint, so that the remainder of the commercial activity is not inhibi

387 Lenczowski, 21. 388 Pappas and others, 43.

129

21ST CENTURY: THE ROCKY ROAD AH

A Changed Community Since 9/11?

Mark Lowenthal, Assistant Director of Intelligence for Analysis 

tion, speaking before the House Permanent Select Committee on 

questioned whether the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation

the many changes made since the attack. Lowenthal asked, “Do the r

tions speak to the Community that exists today or the Community t

mission was investigating that existed that morning on 9/11? Anothe

of the 9/11 recommendations, John Hamre, former Deputy Defen

[Clinton Administration], remarked, 

We have a huge American problem, and it starts in the Nation

rity Act of 1947. It divided the Intelligence Community into tw

foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence....It didn’t ma

much during the Cold War, because most of the problems we

seas....Then comes terrorism....The terrorists don’t care about 

borders.

—Anonymous Part

Center for the Study of Intelligenc

“Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign 

Conference, Septemb

We recommend significant changes in the organization of the 

ment. We know that the quality of the people is more import

the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest aspec

9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual 

straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the p

Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not hav

The 9/11 Commission 

22 Ju
130

sional recollection...but if you were to listen to our public disc

it’d sound like we’ve done nothing, and it sounds like we’re just 

and vulnerable today as we were on September 10, 2001, the day b

the attacks.389

Inherent in their comments is the implication that if the 9/11 Comm

ommendations speak for the Community as it existed Pre-9/11 and not 

then further change may not be warranted. George Tenet, DCI for se

knew well the bureaucratic inertia that plagues the Community. Richard 

noted Columbia University professor, reports that shortly after 9/11, in 

leaked to the press, Tenet declared it was time to end business as us

through red tape and “give people the authority to do things they migh

narily be allowed to do....If there is some bureaucratic hurdle, leap it...

have time to have meetings about how to fix problems, just fix them

maintains that reform in a bureaucracy means reorganization; reor

means changing relationships of authority; and that means altering c

balances.390 Has the Community reformed itself in the Post-9/1

Lowenthal and Hamre imply, something the Community had not be

accomplish in its five and one-half decades of existence?

Undoubtedly, there has been a flurry of movement within the In

Community since the events of 11 September 2001, and any action t

often-strained Community relationships, regardless of the scope, woul

ficial. However, have these changes been undertaken under the gui

“doing something” for the sake of public recognition that somethin

done? As an example, we can look at the issue of recruitment. The C

has long waited for increased hiring authority to fill its ranks after yea

or minimal hiring. All of the major IC agencies have major recruitm

ongoing: NSA boasts of receiving 100,000 resumes since 9/11;391 th

had over 57,000 people apply for jobs as intelligence analysts;392 an

receives 2200 resumes weekly.393 Yet, even with the many aspirants, 

nity personnel demands exceed supply of qualified applicants, an

389 As quoted in Walter Pincus, “September 11 Commission Critics Question Panel

New Measures: Report Said to Overlook Changes,” Washington Post, 10 August 2004

390 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs, 81, no 1 (January/Febru

52.391 Stephen Barr, “NSA Makes No Secret of Stepped-Up Recruitment Effort,” Wash

26 April 2004, C2. Cited hereafter as Barr, NSA Recruitment. 392 Stephen Barr, “Talk of 9/11 Report Centers on Importance of People, Rather Tha

Washington Post, 15 September 2004, B2.
131

only competes with each other for critical personnel such as qual

Eastern and South Asian linguists; they compete with each other fo

cation of security clearances.394 The Information Analysis and I

Protection (IAIP) Directorate of DHS had only filled 36 percent of 

authorization as of January 2004.395 With hundreds of thousands o

as old hires backlogged in the security pipeline, this competition 

resources is detrimental to all concerned. Yes, it is good that the Co

hire, but without a prioritization of critical skills across the Comm

centralized hiring program to support this prioritization, has the inc

solved this shortage or exacerbated it? Additionally, how many of 

will still be available after waiting more than a year for a secur

before they can draw their first federal paycheck?

One high-demand skill is foreign language fluency. The nationa

well as the military services are critically short of linguists. The Ar

Executive Agent for the Defense Language Institute and Foreign La

ter (DLIFLC), which trains over 3,500 linguists annually in 23 lang

Monterey (CA) campus and 85 languages through the Washingto

according to LTG Keith B. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

(DCSINT), the thousands of additional requirements in Arabic

Pashto, Urdu, Dari and other languages have exhausted the Army’s 

in the Active and Reserve Components, which provide trained lingui

of DoD and national agencies. As a result, the Army has outsource

6,000 linguist requirements in support of GWOT. The costs in FY20

contract linguists exceeded $250 million. “Given the number of lingu

393 “Foreign Policy Association: DDO’s Remarks, 24 June 2004, URL: http://w

canintelligence.us/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=18>, acces

2004. 394 The 9/11 Commission recommended the creation of a single federal security 

improve the government’s security clearance process. This will be no easy task. In t

Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Proposed Reforms(W

GPO, 14 September 2004), it is noted that the already-taxed system is confronted w

impediments such as the lack of a government-wide database of clearance informat

clearance workload, and too few investigators, all hindering efforts to provide timel

clearance determinations. The increase in security clearance requests since 9/11 ens

situation will not improve in the short term. According to the report, it takes 16 time

tive effort and 6 times the adjudicative effort to conduct a Top Secret investigation th

level investigation (17). The number of requests for Top Secret clearances for indus

increased from 17 to 27 percent from 1996 through fiscal year 2003. 395 U.S. Congress, House, (Democratic Members) House Select Committee on H

rity, America at Risk: The State of Homeland Security Initial Findings, 108th Cong

ary 2004, 3. Cited hereafter as Democratic Members Homeland Security Report.
132

sity for the foreseeable future, Alexander noted.

Furthermore, as another overarching example, consider the amoun

information technology (IT). By the end of FY2004, the Defense Depar

to have spent almost $27 billion on IT and consulting services; the IC 

billion. These amounts are small in comparison to the total the Pen

have spent in 2004, $460 billion.398As an example, one military pro

Army’s Future Combat System, recently had its modernization progra

tured. This increased the cost by between $20 billion or $25 billion and 

essary because the originally structured program had only a 28 percent 

success.399 In fact, the Intelligence Community spends less money on 

expenditures than the government loses in one year—$20.7 billion in 

annual erroneous payments made by the federal government.400 Noneth

amount is sufficient to have improved Community members’ ability to 

cate with each other. But has communication improved? 

Christine Healey, a 9/11 Commissioner, reported during Committee 

that basic connectivity is still a problem for some FBI field offices. A W

field office employee informed the Commission that as of August 200

could not email anyone at the Department of Justice from his desk. F

Washington field office, the second largest field office in the nation, sti

one Internet terminal on each floor.401 The DHS Chief Information Offi

396 Incidentally, the shortage of Arabic linguists is not a recent deficiency. As report

R. Simpson, “Language Lessons for Pentagon: Lack of Arabic Speakers Hinders Com

Battle for Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2003, A4, prior to 9/11, the Army ha

half of its 84 budgeted positions for Arabic translators and interpreters, according to a G

which was by far its biggest shortfall in language specialists. In 2000, DLIFLC gradua

bic linguists but by 2003 this number dropped to 354 graduates. However, DLIFLIC of

dict the number to rise because of the number of students in the pipeline. 397 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 2005 Joint M

ligence Program (JMIP) and Army Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA

108th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 April 2004, 13. Cited hereafter as Alexander, SAS Testimony

398 Anitha Reddy, “Local Firms Respond to a Changing U.S. Military,” Washington 

ed., 26 April 2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40181-

2004Apr25?language=printer>, accessed 29 April 2004. 399 Renae Merle, “Army Raises Cost of Combat Modernization: Futuristic Project I

Drones, Unmanned Vehicles, “Smart’ Munitions,” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A23

400 General Accountability Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Ri

ernment Perspective (Washington, DC: GPO, January 2003), 26. Also, available online 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-95. 401 “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism

ton Post, online ed., 14 Apil 2004. <URL: www.washingtonpost.com/ac2wp-dyn/ A122

2004Apr14?, accessed 15 April 2004.
133

divisions and their disparate information technology systems are goi

start operating cohesively. “If we can’t send classified emails from o

retary to another undersecretary, or undersecretary to [the departme

I’d argue we’ve got a bit of a problem,” he declared.402 LTG William 

Commanding General, Combined Arms Center U.S. Army Training 

Command (TRADOC), commenting on Operation IRAQI FREE

“command, control, communications, computers, intelligence” (C4I

cal level, noted:

No matter how perfect a future network and CP (command 

build, it won’t do much good until we fix the overarching pro

bandwidth management. Limited bandwidth was a major issu

OIF. While fixed command and control installations reliably 

bandwidth communications, the communications architecture fo

or semi-mobile CPs at the tactical level is too fragile and no

enough to support our needs. It affected collaboration, informat

ing and in some cases, the Commander’s ability to command.40

The following paragraphs are representative of the current (2004

lenging the Intelligence Community as identified in the open pres

may not be intuitive that some of these examples are specifically add

lenges facing the IC; however, they may affect the IC indirectly. 

point, border/airport security is not a function of the IC but rathe

Patrol; the Community does not check credentials at U.S. borders 

ports. Nonetheless, the Community (FBI, CIA, NSA, State, DHS) i

for contributing to the compilation of terrorist watch lists and rela

that are used to check passenger identification. Another example con

fiscal programs. Strong fiscal management policies and procedures a

to assure continued funding for current programs but perhaps most 

for future program development.

John E. McLaughlin, as Acting DCI, boasted that the Communit

going a “real revolution in intelligence”—from recruiting and te

interagency cooperation and morale.” McLaughlin made this 

response to criticisms of the Intelligence Community’s performance 

402 Ellen McCarthy, “Homeland Security Wants Better Integration,” Washington 

2004, E4. 403 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconvention

Capabilities Subcommittee, C4I Interoperability: New Challenges in 21st Century 

Cong., 2nd sess., 21 October 2004.
134

Community were current as of mid-2004. Do these issues reflect a 

within the Community—a reflection that the Community has really ch

do they reflect the continued inefficiencies of business as usual? 

Post-9/11 Community-Wide Issues

Information-Sharing/Technology/ Policy

Disparate Watch Lists Still Abound — Eighteen months after 

the General Accountability Office (GAO) reported nine federal 

cies maintained twelve separate lists with different names,40

described them as “diffuse and nonstandard,” creating a dang

enforcement gap. In September 2003, the President issued a direc

merge the multiple, disparate terrorist watch lists. The new dat

and multi-agency Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) were to be o

tional by 1 December 2003. However, by then it only contained 

11,250 names culled from the State Department’s TIPOFF watc

and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center; it is expected to 

tain over 60,000 names. FBI Director Robert Mueller used the an

of lining up the colors on a Rubik’s cube in describing the challen

organizing the mismatched data from the various agency watchl

CIA, Justice, State, Defense, DHS. “Each of the agencies has dif

information and different fields and different records and also a d

ent set of criteria for making their lists,” said Mueller. “These 

exist [to merge all the data],” said Roy Hite, GAO’s Information 

nology Director.405

Erroneous “Do Not Fly” Lists Snag Congressmen — Represen

John Lewis (D-GA) and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) ar

of the many travelers who have been flagged at airports as a res

having appeared on the government’s terrorist watch lists. The 

list is a collection of names from the FBI and intelligence agencie

is managed by the TSA and provided to the airlines. However, eac

line has its own system for matching the names. According to se

experts, the reasons for the false matches is because the lists are 

on antiquated technology and are unevenly administered by airlin

404 Frank Davies, “Grahman, 2 Allies Introduce Overhaul of U.S. Intelligence,” Mia

1 August 2003, 17A. 405 Samatha Levine, “Spinning Terror’s Rolodex: Creating a Master List of Bad Guy

Out to be a Tall Order,” U.S. News & World Report, 2 February 2004, 31.
135

alone filed to have their names removed from the no-fly list

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit in U.S. 

Court for western Washington on behalf of John Shaw, a 75 

retired minister and eight others. They had been repeatedly 

and interrogated at airports.407

FBI Relying on 1980s Technology — Many FBI officials repo

they do not know what information is in its files. The FBI’s Au

Case Support system, a 1980s-era technology, “user-unfriend

tem, cannot be used to store or transmit top secret or sensitive c

mented information. In his testimony before the 9/11 Com

James L. Pavitt, former CIA Deputy Director for Operations, 

that for a variety of reasons, significant information collecte

FBI never gets uploaded into the Automated Case Support sy

gets uploaded long after it is available. A December 2003 De

of Justice (DOJ) IG report stated that the FBI still had not est

adequate policies and procedures for sharing intelligence. “We 

ding ourselves if we think that there is a seamless integration a

of the agencies,” said Michael Rolince, the acting Director of th

of Intelligence. John Brennan, Director of TTIC, reported 

“cacophony of activities” within the IC but no strategy and p

According to Pavitt, there is no national strategy for sharing 

tion to counter terrorism.408

FBI’s Modernization Effort is Folly — After the 9/11 attacks

embarked on a $600 million computer modernization program 

Trilogy. A centerpiece of this massive effort was the Virtual C

(VCF), a modern database for storing and indexing all case inf

by agents that was to be completed by late 2003. This effort wou

agents to share files electronically. Nevertheless, in January 20

spending $170 million on the Virtual Case File system, the F

doned its efforts due to serious system deficiencies. An ind

research report by the National Research Council indicated that 

406 Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials: Some Ended Has

by Making Slight Change to Name,” Washington Post, 21 August 2004, A8. 407 “Nation in Brief,” Washington Post, 5 November 2004, A4. 408 James L. Pavitt, “Testimony of James L. Pavitt Before the National Commiss

Attacks Upon the United States, 14 April 2004, URL: <http: //www.9-11commissio

hearing8/staff_statement_5.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2004. Cited as Pavitt, 9/11 Com

mony, 14 April 2004.
136

designed with criminal investigation requirements in mind. S

Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) observed: “The FBI’s long-anticipated V

Case File has been a train wreck in slow motion. As recently as last 

the FBI was still claiming that VCF would be completed by the e

2004, and that it would at last give the FBI the ‘cutting-edge techno

it needs. Now we learn that the FBI began to explore new option

August, because it feared that VCF was going to fail...The FBI ne

stop hiding its problems and begin confronting them early on.”409

Foreign Relations Affected by Lack of Information-Sharin

Sharing of information among countries is still problematic

“third-country rule” prohibits the country receiving the tip from 

ing it on to anyone else. The United States, France, Britain, R

and others all observe this rule. Vince Cannistraro, a former 

counterterrorism chief, thinks the third-party rule “makes it im

ble to have a European CIA” and it should be discarded in the w

terrorism. “When you’re talking about transnational groups th

no excuse for keeping the old rules. They need to devise a syst

share that kind of information, they need to do it multilaterally

they need to do it right away.” 410

NSA’s Technological Edge Less So — The Washington Post rep

that Harry D. Gatanas, NSA’s senior acquisition executive, is 

about what happened at NSA over the past fifteen years: The 

breaking organization lost its technological edge. NSA lost its 

when the Internet ushered in commercial innovation that out

NSA’s advancements. “All these companies are out there bu

things and the adversaries have access to that technology,” said 

nas. “We don’t want to have blinders on: We want to look at thes

technologies.” Approximately 85 percent of all NSA’s procure

are technology-related. In 2003 NSA spent more than $2 billion 

ing goods and services from companies in Maryland.411 Un

nately, Congress severely crippled NSA’s momentum to mode

when it passed the FY 2004 National Defense Authorizatio

409 Jonathan Krim, “FBI Rejects Its New Case File Software: Database Project Has 

$170 Million,” Washington Post, 14 January 2005, A5. 410 Dafna Linzer, “Rules Still Hinder Intelligence Sharing,” Associated Press, onlin

28 March 2004, URL: http://www.mercurynews.com, accessed 29 March 2004. 411 Ellen McCarthy, “NSA is Making No Secret of Its Technology Intent,” Washing

24 June 2004, E1.
137

ity effectively stripped NSA of its ability to manage directly 

modernization program. This action has restricted NSA’s a

invest broadly in unproven but highly promising technolog

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and L

now holds this authority.412

Wartime Intelligence Constrained by Policy — LTG Keith 

ander, DCSINT, reported that quick access to useful inte

remained a major battlefield problem [in Iraq]. “Intelligence 

constrained by policies that restricted dissemination and use, e

at the tactical level,” said Alexander. The Army pinpointed 12

gence areas that require “fixing.” Alexander stated, “We must 

technology to permit rapid data exploitation by users who nee

urgently.” We haven’t figured out a way to share information “

tally” and still ensure that it remains secret.” Stephen Cambone

secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), in written te

indicated that intelligence gathering remains “burdened by leg

cies and stovepiped activities that are...not integrated either w

Defense Department or between the Defense Department and t

ligence Community.”413

Who’s In Charge of Domestic Threats? — Two senators, Ca

(D-MI) and Susan Collins (R-ME) of the Senate Armed Servic

mittee, questioned why they still have no answer to their qu

which federal agency is ultimately responsible for the analysi

eign and domestic intelligence on threats to the United States. 

Defense Department, Homeland Security Department, or th

Collins said, “I am told the reason we haven’t received an answ

letters is the DHS, DoD and CIA can’t agree on an answe

implies to me that the lines of authority are not clear and 

answer is still being devised.”414 In June 2004 a series of co

news releases, press conferences and television appearances b

ney General Ashcroft, FBI Director Mueller, and Homelan

412 Michael A.Wertheimer, “Crippling Innovation—And Intelligence,” Washingt

2004, A19. 413 William Matthews, “U.S. Army Cites Deficiencies With Data Collection,” De

online ed., 12 April 2004, URL: <http://www.defensenews.com/story.Phy?F =2803

ica>, accessed 10 November 2004. 414 Chris Strohm, “Senators Ask Who’s in Charge of Homeland Intelligence,” G

25 March 2004, URL: http://www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm?, accessed 29 Ma
138

was in charge. Roger Cressey, terrorism expert, criticized the joint 

DHS statement hastily issued to assuage previous uncoord

announcements saying, “The fact that two and a half-years afte

we have to have a press release from the Justice Department to sa

DOJ and DHS are working well together, are working in coordina

[that] should not give the American people a whole lot of comfort

Security Clearance/Personnel

Security Clearance Backlog Keeps Growing — DoD’s backl

security clearance investigations and adjudications reached 360,0

September 2003. Additionally, the number of top-secret clea

requests by 2003 totaled 27 percent of all clearance requests, com

to 17 percent in 1995. A February 2004 GAO report indicate

8,000 investigators would be required to eliminate the backlog. Y

of December 2003, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM

DoD have only a combined total of 4,200 investigators of which 

are federal employees; the remaining investigators are private co

tors.416 Another report indicated the estimated backlog for ov

reinvestigations for clearances grew from 300,000 in 1986 to 

500,000 in 2000. Now, on average, it takes 375 days to grant a se

clearance to industry personnel, up 56 days since 2001.417

The IC Wants You — In the biggest recruitment drive in decades

plans to hire 7,500 people from 2004 through 2008, particularly 

cants who possess foreign language skills (Arabic and Chinese 

plus), and those in the fields of engineering, mathematics, com

science and procurement as well as non-technical fields. Approxim

4,500 of these new hires will replace NSA employees who 

mostly through retirement, and the remainder are new positions. It 

three to five years to train most employees and seven years to b

new language specialist up to speed.418 Under a new Pentagon p

DoD can hire as many as 2,500 experts with state-of-the-art know

415 Justin Rood, “Ashcroft, Mueller and Ridge En Route to Hill Spotlights,” CQ Hom

rity – Intelligence, 1 June 2004 via http://homeland.cq.com/hs/news.do, accessed 2 

416 Ellen McCarthy, “Dealing With Clearance Insecurity,” Washington Post, 15 Apri

417 Carolyn Duffy Marsan, “Management Strategies—Worth the Wait: Security Clea

More Than a Year to Obtain, But Federal IT Work Pays Well,” Network World, 7 June 2

418 Stephen Barr, “Pentagon Can Hire 2,500 Experts for National Security,” Washin

26 March 2004, B2.Stephen Barr, “Pentagon Can Hire 2,500 Experts for National Secu

ington Post, 26 March 2004, B2.
139

a one-year extension possible. Policy advocates maintain 

approach will help the government attract the talent it needs to 

ize technology and revamp internal organizations.419 Similar 

ment efforts are underway at other IC agencies.

Language Shortages Impede Translation Efforts — The 

Department’s Inspector General found that the FBI as of April 

not translated more than 123,000 hours of recordings “in langu

marily related to counterterrorism activities and more than 

hours of recordings in languages connected to counterinte

probes.” These figures represent a 30 percent backlog of audio 

ings in these categories. The IG report indicated despite the 

620 additional linguists since 9/11, “nearly 24 percent of ongoi

terintelligence and counterterrorism intercepts are not bein

tored.” 420 The language shortages are in Arabic, Urdu, Fa

Pashto. The IG also reported that the FBI’s lack of computer 

capacity is impeding translation operations. In some cases, thi

tion means that surveillance recordings may be deleted before 

reviewed and even though the deletions can be restored from 

translators have no idea in advance if something was deleted. 

now spends $70 million annually on language services com

$21 million in FY2001. 

Little is Known About Radical Islam — Michael Rolince, t

ing Director of the Washington field office, reported that alth

FBI knows “ten times” more now about the radical Islamic com

than before 9/11, its knowledge is at about 20 on a scale of 1 to 

Federal Government Top Heavy with Bureaucrats — A B

Institution study released in July 2003 by government scholar 

Light indicated that the federal government is top-heavy with m

ers of high-ranking bureaucrats than ever before, a situatio

419 Barr, B2. 420 Dan Eggen, “FBI Backlogged in Translation of Counterterrorism Wiretaps,” 

Post, 28 September 2004, A25. Note: The surveillance recordings backlog no doub

increased FISA warrants. In 2003, the number of secret surveillance warrants issued 

rorism and espionage cases under FISA exceeded the total number of wiretaps issue

cases as noted in Dan Eggen and Susan Schmidt, “Data Show Different Spy Game 

Washington Post, 1 May 2004, A1. The number of FISA warrants approved in 2003 

1,700) was an 85 percent increase over 2001 total (934). 421 Pavitt, 9/11 Commission Testimony, 14 April 2004.
140

officials who run the Intelligence Community agencies. The num

senior federal executives rose to 64 in 2004 compared with just 

1960 and 51 in 1998. “It [the increase] explains why information 

are sometimes so sluggish and it also explains why we can’t hold 

body accountable for what goes right or wrong,” said Light. “The

just so many places that decisions get made, or not made, that you 

really figure out who is responsible.” The trend in the private secto

reduce the corporate layers. “Many companies began a long ma

streamline and flatten,” said Michael Useem, a Professor of Ma

ment at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. “E

body with any management sense whatsoever says it is a good ide

only for information coming up, but to ensure actions get taken an

snarled in endless approval and red tape.”422

 Analysis

● State Publishes Inaccurate Terrorist Attack Data — Th

Department’s report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, in indicat

the number of global terrorist attacks was at the lowest ebb in 

thirty-four years, was simply wrong. At the request of th

Department, the Terrorist Threat and Integration Center 

revised its statistics for 2003. Larry C. Johnson, former CIA 

and former State Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, urged 

rection. He stated, “When you read the report, TTIC did not a

data] properly. Even a third-grader could have found this. Th

counts in 2002 and 2003 were at the highest levels in history.42

TTIC, formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to address the failure 

intelligence agencies to “connect the dots,” has personnel fro

FBI, DoD, State and Homeland Security. It maintains a data

known and suspected terrorists with more than 100,000 nam

and a Top Secret web site available to 2,600 users with a searc

bility covering 3.5 million documents. John Brennan, TTIC D

stated, “The good news is now we in the TTIC for the first tim

this access which is unparalleled in the U.S. government. T

news is that we have all these different systems.” Brennan had 

ferent computer systems under his desk. TTIC analysts can

422 Christopher Lee, “Agencies Getting Heavier on Top: 17 Executive Titles Create

1960,” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A27. 423 R. Jeffrey Smith, “State Dept. Concedes Errors in Terror Data,” Washington Pos

2004, A17. 
141

issue affecting the TTIC is how much of a respective co

agency’s guarded information is willingly given to the Cente

● IC Wrong on Iraqi WMD — The Senate Intelligence Co

Commission on Iraq’s WMD Program reported that the In

Community “overstated” the evidence that Iraq possessed 

and biological weapons and was actively reconstituting i

program, in short, that the claims were “not supported by th

ing intelligence.”425 The Commission’s report indicated th

official warned CIA about questionable reliability of an Iraq

who was the chief source of allegations regarding Iraq’s m

logical facilities. After seeing a draft of Secretary of State 

Powell’s scheduled 5 February 2003 address to the United N

DIA employee, assigned to CIA, questioned the “validity of 

mation.” According to the DIA employee, this information “

further inquiry before we use the information as the backbo

of our major findings for the existence of a continuing Iraq

gram!” The employee also emailed the deputy chief of the 

Task Force. The deputy chief later told the Senate Intellige

mittee he reassured the employee that the war [Operati

FREEDOM] was not going to hinge on what the source [Cu

discredited Iraqi defector] said.426

● CIA Analysts to Receive Source Information — In eva

prewar assessment of Iraqi’s WMD program, an internal C

revealed several occasions where CIA analysts mistakenly th

source had been corroborated by multiple sources when in a

only came from one source. In light of this finding, Tenet, t

the time, ordered an end to the long-standing practice of w

source information from the analysts. This practice, while d

protect agents’ identities, also maintained the bureaucra

between the Directorate of Operations (DO) and the Dire

Intelligence (DI). According to Jami A. Miscik, CIA’s Deput

for Intelligence, the internal review also identified another 

reliance on “inherited assumptions” or failing to retest p

424 “Terrorism Center Wrestles Technology, Secrecy,” Reuters, 28 April 2004. 425 Dana Priest and Dafna Linzer, “Panel Condems Iraq Prewar Intelligence: Se

Faults 2002 Estimate Sent to Hill, Accuses the CIA of “Group-Think,” Washington 

2004, A1. 426 Walter Pincus, “Skepticism About Defector’s Weapons Allegations Ignored,” 

Post, 13 July 2004, A12.
142

aspect of our tradecraft that needs to be examined, said Miscik

do we ensure we are not passing along assumptions that haven

sufficiently questioned or reexamined?”427

● Threat Assessment Will Take DHS Five Years to Complete — 

gress created the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Pr

Directorate (DHS) to analyze intelligence related to the terroris

and to match threats to specific homeland vulnerabilities. Rob

couski, DHS Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, in

that a comprehensive terrorist threat and vulnerability assess

unlikely to be completed within the next five years.428 The IAIP 

a skeletal organization with only 60 employees in its information

sis wing of 300 employees total. These IAIP personnel repres

than two-tenths of 1 percent of all DHS employees. Tom Ridge

tary of DHS, stated, “We accept the notion that we’re not where w

to be. I’m not sure I accept the criticism that we could do it faste

Classification

● Too Many Secrets — The Information Security Oversight 

(ISOO), part of the National Archives, reported that the feder

ernment “discovered” more than 14 million new secrets in 200

percent increase from the previous year. For the year prior to 

tember 2001, the number was 8 million.430 Representative Chri

Shays (R-CN), Chairman, House Government Reform Comm

National Security Panel, stated “There are too many secrets...

knows how much is classified and the system often does not 

guish between the critically important and the comically irr

[example—terrorist plot to kidnap Santa Claus and inserted in

sified traffic].” Carol A. Haave, Deputy Undersecretary of Defe

Counterintelligence and Security, indicated that most misclassi

was unintentional, resulting perhaps from misunderstandings 

ure to declassify no longer sensitive data. “Collectors of info

can never know how it could best be used. We have to move to 

driven environment,” stated Haave. Haave also indicated th

weakness, particularly for anti-terrorism efforts.431

427 As quoted in Walter Pincus, “CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses,” Washington P

12 February 2004, A1. 428 Democratic House Members Homeland Security Report, 3. 429 Siobhan Gorman, “On Guard, But How Well?” National Journal, 3 May 2004, 6

430 Al Kamen, “In the Loop: Millions of Secrets,” Washington Post, 4 May 2004, A
143

● Airport Screeners Continue to Perform Poorly — A Dep

Homeland Security Inspector General report indicated that c

ing in 15 airports in November 2003 revealed screeners per

poorly as they had prior to the 11 September terrorist attack

its inception in November 2001 until January 2004, the Tran

Security Administration (TSA) has spent more than $10 

passenger and baggage screening. 433

● Border Fingerprinting at Least Five Years Away — T

Department Inspector General determined it will probably ta

four more years (until 2008) for the FBI and Border Patrol sys

combined to quickly check fingerprints for the more than o

illegal immigrants434 who are caught each year. The FBI 

database contains 10-digit fingerprints, which are superior bec

a crime scene may only have one fingerprint. However, t

Patrol’s separate system contains approximately six million 2

gerprints while a second database contains an undisclosed 

10-digit fingerprints.435 Incidentally, although DHS annou

there were 1,000 agents along the 5,525 mile border with C

was accomplished by removing several hundred border agent

1,989 mile border with Mexico.436

431 Michael J. Sniffen, “Secrets Perplex Panel: Classified Data Growing to Inclu

Irrelevant,” Washington Post, 3 September 2004, A17. 432 “Airport Security Still Lacking,” Washington Post, 23 September 2004, E2. 433 Democratic House Members Homeland Security Report, 5. 434Illegal immigration into the United States is predominantly a post-1965 and M

rence according to Samuel P. Huntington, distinguished Yale University scholar. In 

tington, “The Hispanic Challenge,” FP Foreign Policy, March/April 2004, he reports 

a century after adoption of the U.S. Constitution, there were no national laws restric

ing immigration, and only a few states imposed modest limits. During the next 90 y

immigration was minimal. However, that changed with the 1965 immigration law, i

portation, and Mexican emigration policies. The U.S. must now contend with massi

gration (apprehension rate was 1.6 million in the 1960s but by the 1990s this increa

million) across a porous 2,000 mile border. Huntington remarks that the U.S/Mexic

tion is unique: “No other First World country has such an extensive land frontier wit

country.” It is apparent the face of immigration has changed. In the 1960s the princ

foreign-born population was relatively evenly spread amongst Poland, U.K., Canada

Italy. However, in the 1990s this distribution changed—to Cuba, India, Philippines, 

Mexico, with the Mexican numbers being very large. 435 “Records Gap Leaves Borders Vulnerable: Report Says U.S. Border Patrol W

plete FBI Fingerprint Files for Years,” Washington Post, 3 March 2004, A11. 436 Democratic House Members Homeland Security Report.7.
144

cargo containers entered through the U.S.s 361 ports in 2003 

these six million, 5.4 percent were inspected—nearly double 

centage from 2002.437 It is noteworthy that the number of in

ports has increased; however, the flip side is that 95.6 percen

cargo containers were NOT inspected at all. 

Financial Issues

● Government’s Fiscal Ills — David M. Walker, Comptroller 

and Head of the General Accountability Office, indicated that 

majority of federal fiscal programs and policies were put i

decades ago but have not undergone a fundamental review in 

“The simple truth is that the base of government is not oka

time to streamline and simplify the federal government’s or

tional structure to make it more economical, efficient, effectiv

ble, responsive and accountable. During a December 2003 Pre

speech, Walker stated, “The bottom line is that, in my view, the 

government’s current financial statements and annual reports 

give policymakers and the American people an adequate pictur

government’s overall performance and true financial condition

a serious issue.”438 Furthermore, GAO auditors for the eighth y

row could not provide a definitive opinion on the quality of the 

government’s consolidated financial statements (fiscal year

2004). They could not determine whether the federal books me

ally accepted accounting principles. At least 10 of 23 major a

and departments restated their 2003 statements to correct fi

errors.439

● Poor DoD Fiscal Management Procedures — A recent GAO 

stated, “Overhauling DoD’s financial management represents 

challenge that goes far beyond financial accounting to the very 

the department’s range of business operations and managem

ture.” GAO reported that of the 25 government-wide “high ri

six belong to DoD and DoD shares three other high-risk area

identified four underlying causes of DoD’s inability to solve i

437 “Terrorism Expert Calls Seaports Vulnerable,” Washington Post, 28 January 200

438 Stephen Barr, “GAO Chief Refuses to Stop Doing the Math,” Washington Post, 

2004, C2. 439 Christopher Lee, “GAO Again Finds Fault With the Federal Books: Auditors Sa

ernment’s Records Are So Inadequate They Cannot be Evaluated, but Bush Official Cite

Washington Post, 21 December 2004, A23.
145

accountability for correcting problems; 2) deeply embedde

resistance to change, including military parochialism and s

operations; a lack of results-oriented goals and performance 

and monitoring; and inadequate incentives for seeking chang

These underlying causes are applicable to any number of IC 

as well.

Are these examples evidence of a Revolution already underw

gence? This author thinks not. These are examples of continuing lac

zation, lack of authorities, lack of accountability, poor fiscal m

duplication of services, and the like. Improvements have been 

throughout the Community, such as the new analytical fusion initiat

NGA and NSA, increased Community personnel assignments/du

agency headquarters as well as deployment forward with military co

joint operation efforts; however, these improvements should not be v

sons for arbitrarily dismissing the vocal critics of the IC. Most im

have been marginal, small scale, mostly cosmetic overtures. The afo

examples affirm that despite large infusions of money (lack of reso

been blamed for past inadequacies) and assurances that the Com

changed its practices, business within the IC continues as it has since 

few notable exceptions), since the end of the Cold War, and for th

since 1947.

With the cornucopia of commercially available technology, it is s

vast parts of the IC operate not only independently of each other bu

outdated computers and analytical tools. The Community’s commu

connectivity problems are technological in nature, but technology is 

ble for these divisions. Community policies prohibiting or limiting 

are responsible. Scot McNealy, Sun Microsystems President and CE

phrase: “The network is the computer.” This was not a cheap mark

the mid-1990s to increase Sun’s bottom line, but rather was the 

understanding that an individual computer is merely a communic

The computer’s real value is in its ability to link to other computer

own individual processing power. On the other hand, the network is 

upon which knowledge can be “shared, amplified, and recreated” 

forms. It is these networked pieces of information which added toge

more than the sum of their parts. 441 This concept is the antithesis of 

dition of maintaining information flows in stovepipes.

440 General Accountability Office, Department of Defense: Status of Financial M

Weaknesses and Progress Towards Reform (Washington, DC: GPO, 25 June 2003)
146

was recalled to active duty and assigned to the 1

Information Operations 

(known then as the Land Information Warfare Activity, LIWA ) at Fort B

working a special terrorism-related project. We struggled frequently in our 

gain access to NSA data. The requirement for special access briefings, sy

ing, and message release authority were but a few of the policy roadblocks 

All concerned parties could easily have worked together to meet these req

but there was little NSA effort to expedite the processes. While the sit

changed somewhat, there is still a reluctance to share information as noted 

conversation with one of my former team members. He is a fully cleared i

analyst who requested specific raw data from NSA. Unfortunately, NSA’s r

this analyst’s inquiry was all too typical, “If we gave you access to the dat

might do something with the information.”442 This response illustrated the 

hold of the old Cold-War, restrictive “need to know” principle, rather tha

“need to share” imperative.

The Way Ahead: The Networked Community

Kevin O’Connell, RAND Intelligence Policy Center Director and 

Tomes, NGA New Concepts Office Deputy Chief, advocate rethinking 

rity controls and policies. “The underlying logic of information compartm

its appeal in an era where much is uncertain, where we grapple with 

rather than the collective pieces of a known puzzle and where we wa

abstraction and cognitive capabilities to intuit otherwise hidden relation

year after 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary for Defense, testifying 

Joint Inquiry, expressed his thoughts on sharing information:

A culture of excessive compartmentation will hinder our ability to 

new threats.... There is much more that we can do to exploit the full 

fits of new information technologies such as data mining and change 

tion....Partly because of the inescapable need for security of inform

the Intelligence Community lags behind the private sector in its abi

tag and store massive amounts of data, and to mine that informat

determine patterns. Again, a culture that discourages collaboration a

sharing of information forfeits these new technological advantages

need to break down information so those who need it, get access to it

441 Russ Mitchell, “The Ghosts in the Machine: Can Technology Find Terrorists?”Th

Spectator (Nov/Dec 2001), accessed via ProQuest, 4 December 2003. 442 Jeff Mitchell, intelligence analyst at 1st IO Command, interview by the author, 1 M

443 Kevin O’Connell and Robert R. Tomes, “Keeping the Information Edge,” Policy 

122 (Dec 2003/Jan 2004), accessed via ProQuest, 14 June 2004.
147

munity has continued to perfect its ability to deliver strategic warn

“indicators” of a surprise attack. The 9/11 Commission in its final 

four elements common to the “rigorous analytical methods” develo

ensuing years. These elements are: 1) think about how surprise atta

launched; 2) identify telltale indicators connected to the most danger

ities; 3) where feasible, collect intelligence on these indicators; a

defenses to deflect the most dangerous possibilities or at least trigg

warning.445 The 9/11 Commission further reported that these analyt

“did not fail; instead, they were not really tried.”446 However, in the 

national security landscape, there are no tripwires, no single bit of 

that will provide the U.S. strategic warning. These analytical metho

fected throughout the Cold War against an enemy (the Soviet Unio

changed incrementally. Consequently, the traditional bureaucratic m

ligence was befitting for an organization that monitored the Soviet th

the Soviet Union itself was such an incorrigibly bureaucratic system

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing con

how best to provide intelligence in the Post-Cold War, information-

ment. Chapter 4 has highlighted the significant reform initiative

1990s, which sought to better align Community resources. For th

these reform initiatives were unsuccessful. According to Bruce Be

consensus centered on five ideas that are necessary to provide the 

gence. First, the Community needs to have a wide field of vision t

ever-changing threat landscape. Second, it must have organizationa

flexibility. Third, it must be flexible in focus. Fourth, it needs mul

communication connecting people who have information with the 

need it. Finally, an intelligence organization needs to have direc

and transparency between intelligence producers and consumers.44

erally accepted ideas are the characteristics of a networked organiz

the traditional bureaucratic organization represented by the definin

istics of division of labor, a hierarchical structure and chain of c

444 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perman

mittee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry on Counterterrorist Center Customer Perspect

ber 2002, accessed via LexisNexis, 12 January 2004. 445 The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission 

Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 346. 

as 9/11 Report. 446 9/11 Report, 348. 447 Bruce Berkowitz, “Better Ways to Fix Intelligence,” Orbis, 45, no. 4 (Fall 20

hereafter as Berkowitz, Better Ways. 448 Berkowitz, Better Ways 609-610.
148

tion ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan operation), was present

Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2004. General John P. Abi

U.S. Central Command nominee, told the Committee, “Intelligenc

most accurate that I’ve ever seen on the tactical level, probably the 

ever seen on the operational level, and perplexingly incomplete on th

level with regard to weapons of mass destruction.”449 Many intelligen

sionals maintain that analysts have become so intensely absorbed 

intelligence that in-depth strategic analysis is wanting. Obviously, 

trend which does not foster “best” intelligence.

Understanding the type of organization needed in the 21st Century is 

but changing the organization to reflect this need is a difficult task in

new model of intelligence, the networked and adaptable organization, 

to Berkowitz, is not compatible with the long-held beliefs about how in

organizations are supposed to operate. Berkowitz advises:

A traditional bureaucracy is ill suited for using modern inform

technology, especially networked communications. In an open-

tecture, networked organization, the number of opportunities fo

viding, supplying, or sharing information—and, thus, the power 

network–increases exponentially as each new member joins.450 

bureaucracy’s traditional chain of command, lines of authority

mission responsibilities are all aimed at channeling and limitin

opportunities of organization members to interact with each othe

with outsiders. A bureaucratic intelligence agency erects its own 

ers to the information revolution.451

However, the networked organization is precisely the type of orga

structure necessary for optimal functioning of the Intelligence Commu

21st Century. It would be naïve and terribly misguided to suppose t

good for the global marketplace and readily available—the latest “gi

449 Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine,” A

Today, 33, no. 6, (Jul/Aug 2003), accessed via Proquest, 6 November 2003. 450 This concept is referred to as Metcalfe’s Law. Metcalfe’s Law is expressed as 1) 

of possible cross-connections in a network grows as the square of the number of compu

network and 2) the community value of a network grows as the square of the number o

Robert Metcalfe is the founder of the Ethernet protocol for computer networks. This in

was obtained from URL: http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,sid7_gc

html, accessed on 15 November 2005. 451 Berkowitz, Better Ways, 615.
149

noted in Global Trends 2015,

IT-driven globalization will significantly increase interaction 

terrorists, narcotrafficers, weapons proliferators, and organize

nals, who in a networked world will have greater access to info

to technology, to finances, to sophisticated deception-and-den

niques and to each other. Such asymmetric approaches—

undertaken by states or nonstate actors—will become the d

characteristics of most threats to the U.S. homeland.452

The Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission demonstrated the o

failure of the Community to communicate both vertically within its o

and horizontally across them. This failure to communicate not only 

lack of technical capability but the inability of personal communica

The Joint Inquiry, in criticizing the IC, noted, “the Community too o

focus on that information and consider and appreciate its colle

cance...the Community failed to capitalize fully on available, an

important, information.”453 In its recommendations, the 9/11 Com

posed that,

Information be shared horizontally, across new networks that t

individual agencies....An outstanding conceptual framework 

kind of “trusted information network” has been developed b

force of leading professionals in national security, information 

ogy, and law assembled by the Markle Foundation (see “Mark

dation” tonebox on next page).454

Without the ability to communicate effectively, the Community b

knowledge-based network, but what Russ Mitchell would describe as 

ago.”455 The Community—its analysts and its databases—remains isola

islands. The Community must break down its self-perpetuating stovepip

452 Central Intelligence Agency, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Fut

government Expert, NIC2000-02, December 2000, URL: <http: //www.cia.gov/cia

globaltrends2015 >, accessed 29 September 2004. 453 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perman

mittee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before a

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 107-351 an

792, 20 December 2002, 10-11. 454 9/11 Report, 418. 455 Mitchell, “Ghosts in the Machine.”
150

claimed General Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. While t

does not believe the business of intelligence will ever become unimp

alone irrelevant, she does believe that the Intelligence Community, i

improve itself, like those companies described by Tom Peters—can 

“self-destructing”—tearing down the bureaucratic barriers to continuall

itself (see “Subduing Stovepipes”). “Ultimately, reform is not about in

in the classic sense of intelligence cycles and consumer-producer relat

O’Connell and Tomes allege. “It is about information and knowledg

and foresight, agility and flexibility, leadership and vision.”456

456 O’Connell and Tomes.

Markle Foundation

The Markle Foundation is a private philanthropic organization. Zoë Baird, a forme

Department and White House Attorney (Clinton Administration) directed the Ta

on National Security in the Information Age with James Barkdale, co-founder of N

Communications. Its first report, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Informa

The First Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, issued in 7 October 2002, 

the importance of creating a decentralized network of information sharing and a

address the challenge of homeland security. Creating a Trusted Network for H

Security: Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, released 2 D

2003, reaffirmed the principles for capitalizing on the U.S. strengths in informa

technology and how the government should create networks; it proposed building 

mation network called the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Response E

(SHARE). Incidentally, the Second Task Force Report indicated that “sharing of 

related information between relevant agencies at different levels of government 

only marginally improved in the past year [2003]....sharing remains haphazard 

overly dependent on...personal relations among known colleagues.” For more 

tion consult: http://www.markletaskforce.org.

In a criticism of the first Task Force Report, in Marcia Savage, “No Rave Review

no. 1016, 14 October 2002, accessed via ProQuest, 28 January 2004, Steve C

Chief Security Officer for a security-consulting firm, said the task force recom

tions would have little impact. “There is a place for a task force like this, but 

ineffective because they are not lobbying for the government to pass laws to h

ple accountable for security in business and for service providers that provide 

services. Government should set the example: The coming together of bure

the sharing of information between the FBI, CIA and whoever else will neve

unless it is mandated.” 
151

Horizontal Integration and the IC

Community-wide integration, at least at the systems level, is the e

concept of horizontal integration (see Principles of Horizontal Integrat

Recognizing the need for a more integrated Intelligence Community

Department (USDI) and the Intelligence Community (ADCI-C) initi

agency effort (Horizontal Integration Senior Steering Group ((HISSG45

and formulate a vision for the national security community (DoD, IC a

Security Community). This effort resulted in a focus on “processes and 

Subduing Stovepipes

Tom Peters, described as “the most influential business thinker of our ag

hailed as the guru of gurus of management” on the jacket cover of his newe

Imagine! Business Excellence in a Disruptive Age (London: DK, 2003). H

pages 102-108 his thoughts on organizational stovepipes—50 “Immodest Id

ing to sort out what he calls the “Stovepipe Myopia”—the unwillingness/ina

ple in various parts of an organization to talk to people in other pa

organization, and in other associated organizations. The following are a 

selected ideas. Peters liberally uses punctuation and capitalization to stres

consequently, the same conventions he used were applied here.

No STOVEPIPES!

ALL on the Web

Open access!

INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS = “Our ‘Culture’”

Partner with B.I.C. (Best in Class)

We Use the Word “PARTNER” Until We Want to Barf!

We Also Use the Word “TEAM” Until We Want to Barf!

Buttons and Badges Matter.

We Believe in “High Tech, High Touch,”

Open the “Talent Market.”

FIRE “TURF” KINGS”

457 In addition to the HISSG reviewing major issues relating to system integratio

nity also has the National Intelligence Collection Board, chaired by Charlie Allen a

Intelligence Analytic and Production Board, chaired by Mark Lowenthal, Vice-Cha

National Intelligence Council and Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Ana

that systems focus on national needs and priorities. The Mission Requirements Boa

by Allen and Lowenthal, works with the Community to develop the long-range requ

systems acquisition five to fifteen years ahead.
152

to acquire, synchronize, correlate, and deliver National Security Com

with responsiveness to ensure success across all policy and ope

sions.”458 Inherently, the concept of horizontal integration is all abo

getting the right data to the right user at the right time. To accom

indicated in the process graphic, requires transforming the Prod

Model (TPED) intelligence process that defines the Community to

Consumer-Centric Model (APEC) Model of the future. Data previou

Principles of Horizontal Integration

The concept of horizontal integration is not new nor is it strictly a government-

tive. In the 1990s, the term horizontal organization began appearing in manage

A horizontal organization is a flatter organization structure whereby cross-fun

to-end work flows link internal processes with the needs of both suppliers and 

Frank Ostroff, a management consultant, in The Horizontal Organization: Wha

zation of the Future Actually Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customer

Oxford University Press, Inc., 1999), 10-11, describes applicable principles: 

1. Organize around cross-functional core processes, not tasks or functions.

2. Make teams, not individuals, the cornerstone of organizational design and pe

3. Decrease hierarchy by eliminating non-value-added work and by giving 

bers who are not necessarily senior management the authority to mak

directly related to their activities within the process flow.

4. Use information technology (IT) to help people reach performance obj

deliver the value proposition to the customer.

5. Emphasize multiple competencies and train people to handle issues an

ductively in cross-functional areas within the new organization.

6. Promote multiskilling, the ability to think creatively and respond flexibly t

lenges that arise in the work that teams do.

7. Build a corporate culture of openness, cooperation, and collaboration, a 

focuses on continuous performance improvement and values employee em

responsibility, and well-being.

Ostroff stresses that companies adopting these principles also must have 

demanding, aspirations-driven senior leadership, a focus on key custome

kets, a strong performance ethic, world-class capabilities in at least one dim

ical to delivering the value proposition, and other fundamentals, such as 

balance sheet and capital structure management and adequate investment 

and development (Ostroff, 67).

458 Keith E. Herrington, “Inside DIA: Horizontal Integration—The Transformat

for U.S. Intelligence and the National Security Community,” Communique [DIA ne

August 2004, 10-11.
153

usable due to network-centric standards and more available at the ear

consumability. This all-encompassing concept requires the end-to-

ment and integration of all enterprise information and intelligence 

requirements, tasking, collection, operations, content management

exploitation, fusion and analysis. 459

“The need for horizontal integration is very urgent,” stated Char

lie” Allen, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection:

I believe not only that the threat to this country over the nex

and beyond requires us to do this—to become a more effective 

cient intelligence community—but also that we are going to be 

by the Congress that it expects this community to become m

grated and more collaborative.460

459 The earliest point of consumability, as defined in Herrington 11, refers to pro

only as much as required to render it useful and usable to consumers. Timeliness of 

ensured because minimal handling occurs between the sensor/collector and the con

data are available securely to the consumer without regard to collection methods. Th

of consumability will vary between consumers. 460 Robert K. Ackerman, “Horizontal Integration Challenges Intelligence Planne

no. 2 (October 2003), accessed via ProQuest, 22 January 2004.

Source: Herrington, 10.
154

technical systems, it became aware that the complexity of today

required a more integrated approach—cross-discipline action, cro

multiple-source access, and the like. “In the past, we built one sy

time...we did not sit down and say, ‘How should that system be 

with the others?’ Today, we cannot do that any longer and tha

remarked Allen. “If we had thought this way [horizontal integration] 

had embarked on the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA),461 we 

would have had less difficulty and had a much better system.”462

Undoubtedly, horizontal integration of intelligence systems is the w

for vast improvements in Community-wide information sharing and 

tion. Descriptively speaking, according to Ackerman, the IC is in a ra

international adversaries, and to win, the IC must link disparate data sy

information processes to learn enemy intentions and plans. This race 

encompasses both data exchange at the collection level and information 

at various levels of command and throughout civil government dec

ing.463Yet, this race is one that will not be won quickly, easily, or witho

Any future DoD and Community system developmental efforts will in

HI at the onset of system design. Understandably, it is less complex an

the initial build to design systems with the requisite security and integ

tures. However, the fielding of these new systems is not forthcoming; t

zontally integrated systems will not be deployed for as long as ten ye

interim, for the multitudes of existing intelligence systems, costly and o

bersome work-arounds or stopgap fixes will be required for Commu

data exchange.

An example currently underway to improve communication between 

systems is the Horizontal Fusion Portfolio. The Office of the Assistant S

Defense for Networks and Information Integration in January 2003 create

folio to accelerate the fielding of DoD’s net-centric warfighting vision. Th

and other federal agencies will invest funds to enhance the technology 

comprising the Portfolio. These applications will eventually be integrated i

461 As reported in Dougles Jehl, “Boeing Lags in Building Spy Satellites,” The New Yo

4 December 2003, C1 the next generation of reconnaissance satellites initially had a budg

lion, but the NRO Director acknowledged that the project was “underfunded” and “under

would require an additional $4 billion. The Senate Intelligence Committee earlier had blam

contractor, Boeing and the FIA program office for “mismanagement and poor planning.” 

NRO’s scaled-backed expectations of what Boeing had promised it could deliver, several 

senior officials estimated only a 50-50 chance Boeing would meet the 2006 initial launch 

462 Ackerman. 463 Ackerman.
155

NET). In the Horizontal Fusion-NSA initiative, individual NSA analyst

to access some DoD information deemed at or below their individual sec

cation using a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel. While NSA analy

unprecedented access into military databases, it is not a two-way street; 

have access to NSA computers. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio Ma

stands the IC’s hesitancy about posting potentially sensitive informati

puter network:“The technology is available...that will prevent [users] fr

information [they] are not allowed to see.” The Horizontal Fusion offi

million in its FY 2004 budget for its programs.464

Another example is the collaboration between NGA and NSA a

Los Angeles Times reports that Project Geocell has provided real-t

warning to field operatives and the White House and NGA-NSA 

posted together in Iraq. “The NGA and NSA are acting closer toget

any intelligence organizations in history,” said Joan Dempsey, Execu

of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.465

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

President to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to 

sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, 

tribal and private sector entities through the use of policy guidelines 

ogies.”466 This type of network was proposed initially by the Markl

Task Force and later adopted as one of the 9/11 Commission Repor

dations. Zoë Baird, Task Force Director, said that although the gover

to use the information to prevent terrorism, “The challenge of this w

the policy rules. That will be more challenging than the technology.”

As expected with any “new” initiative, there has been oppositio

and Tomes identified six long-standing impediments to Community-

tion efforts. The view of this author is that these are Community 

impediments. To address them requires a commitment by the Comm

leadership to rectify. Their six points are: First, the Community limits 

464 “Intelligence Agency to ‘Tunnel’ Into Pentagon Information Databases,” Insi

gon, 29 January 2004.

465 Bob Drogin, “THE NATION: Two Agencies Melding Minds on Intelligence-N

and National Geospatial-Intelligence are Sharing Intercepted Messages, Satellite Data a

vide Real-Time Tips,”Los Angeles Times, 31 December 2004, accessed via Proquest, 7 

466 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summ

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Cong. 2nd sess., 6 Decem

467 As quoted in Robert O’Harrow, Jr., “Senate Bill Proposes Anti-Terror Databa

ties Groups Express Concern, Washington Post, 28 September 2004, A4.
156

of intelligence disciplines and the security and legal restrictions on data 

Second, where one sits with regard to intelligence determines where one 

reform issues. Third, the lack of tangible intelligence reform results fro

of support from middle and senior managers to aggressively support inn

The fourth point refers to the continued reform debate with only 

change—the pathos of “studying without action.” The fifth impediment 

rent fiscal management system with its intelligence-planning processes t

essentially “formalized systems to tend fiscal rice bowls.” They asse

compartmentalizing the planning and funding of information and knowl

ing, compartmentalization practices are reinforced. Finally, too often, 

discussions become stuck on marginal issues.469

Yet, by far the biggest obstacle facing horizontal integration is not te

Not surprisingly, it is Community policies and cultural issues. As Cha

observes,

I believe that policies, processes, culture and so-called turf issue

be some of the more difficult and frustrating aspects of making thi

happen....There have been self-imposed barriers employed by 

elements of the Intelligence Community—problems of sharing, 

lems of collaboration, problems of security. Some agencies find it 

cult to share intelligence with others.470

468Michael Wertheimer, former NSA Senior Technical Director wrote in “Crippling 

tion—and Intelligence,” Washington Post, 21 July 2004, A19, that given a dollar to spe

gence, the most profitable near-term return continues to come from existing systems. T

particularly true now that the current transnational and terrorist threats have encouraged 

consumers toward intelligence on demand. Unfortunately, this inverted cycle of demand 

comes at the expense of laying the groundwork for future capabilities. Wertheimer mai

the U.S. is not heeding the disruptive shift that is occurring with the growing dominanc

Internet. “History and best business practices obligate us to encourage “disruptive inno

create new sources and methods for intelligence....to succeed we must demand far less 

intelligence product from the Signals Intelligence Community, give it [NSA] control of 

and allow it to plan for a disruptive future.”

An insightful book dealing with the failure of initially successful companies to conti

is Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 

to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). He describes how good busine

such as focusing on the most profitable products that are in high demand can actually w

great firm. Christensen shows how mainstream customers initially reject truly breakthro

tions or “disruptive technologies” because they cannot use them initially. A follow-on b

ton M. Christensen and Michael E. Raynor, The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Su

Successful Growth (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2003). 469 O’Connell and Tomes. 470 Ackerman.
157

ing and collaboration. The most important aspect is people. Evon Jo

Vice President and Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the Dial C

computer company, speaking at Computerworld’s Premier 100 IT L

ference, agrees that there is too much focus on IT as technology an

on people: “Before you get to tools, you need to invest in human cap

ate the ideas the tools will enable.”471 Captain Robert L. Hubbard, fo

Chief, Transnational Warfare Group (DIA) believes that the Intellige

nity’s current analytical deficiencies have evolved largely because 

budget-based-vice-requirements-based intelligence force planning 

tion strategies. Hubbard argues:

In its efforts to respond to pressures to streamline and reduce c

lowing the Cold War, the Intelligence Community has created 

of resource planners, programmers, and budgeters with ins

knowledge of national security requirements and a corps o

gence substantive experts lacking in the ability to express p

and quantitatively the intelligence resources they need to 

national security objectives.472

He maintains that the Community at large has yet to demonstrate 

force reengineering strategies in response to the threat environme

integrative and coherent. 

Strategic capital management is the ideal centerpiece of any se

management initiative. According to a 2004 GAO report, “succ

change management initiatives in large public and private sector o

can take 5 to 7 years to create the accountability needed to ensure thi

a result, committed and sustained leadership is indispensable to m

changes in the Intelligence Community.473 J. Christopher Mihm, GA

Director for Strategic Issues, testifying before the Subcommittee on 

Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, stated in September 2004: 

471 Kathleen Melymuka, “Premier 100 Panel Weighs Infrastructure Hype, Reality

Coming, But Not as Fast as Vendors Like to Think,” Computerworld, online ed., 9 M

URL: http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,90931,00.html

March 2004. 472 Robert L. Hubbard, “Another Response to Terrorism: Reconstituting Intellig

for 21st Century Requirements,” Defense Intelligence Journal, 1 no.1 (2002), 72. 473 Government Accountability Office, Human Capital Considerations Critical t

sion’s Proposed Reforms (Washington, D.C: GPO, 14 September 2004), cover pag

ter as GAO Human Capital Report.
158

meet current and emerging challenges or to drive the needed tra

mation across the federal government. The basic problem has be

longstanding lack of a consistent approach to marshaling, man

and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize govern

performance and ensure accountability because people define the 

nization’s culture, drive its performance, and embody its know

base.474

Committed, sustained, highly qualified, and inspired leadership

persistent attention by all key parties in the successful implemen

of organizational transformation are indispensable to making l

changes in the Intelligence Community.475

Mihm further commented that the experiences of leading organiza

gest that a performance management system will be helpful to the Com

it moves from a “need to know” to a “need to share” culture. “An effect

mance management system is a vital tool for aligning the organiz

desired results and creating a ‘line of sight’ showing how the team, un

ual performance can contribute to overall organizational results.”476 A

provides GAO’s suggested key practices for mergers and transformatio

effective performance measurement. The Community could employ 

guiding principles.

Congressional Oversight and the IC

Congress plays a significant role in reforming the Intelligence Co

Without congressional support, reform initiatives and transformational 

will not receive the priority they deserve because Community leaders 

tinue to be hindered by inadequate authorities and resources. “Intellig

inherent function, whether performed ill or well, of every state; the 

authority must provide itself with intelligence in order to be effective a

tect itself.”477 The recent 9/11 Commission Report recognized the cr

Congress plays in securing our nation against its enemies.

The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized that strengthening con

oversight is both difficult and important:

474 GAO Human Capital Report, 2. 475 GAO Human Capital Report, 6. 476 GAO Human Capital Report, 8. 477 Jordan and others, American National Security, 5th ed., (Baltimore: The Johns H

versity Press, 1999), 144 .
159

sional committee jurisdiction and prerogatives....Tinkering 

existing structure is not sufficient. Either Congress should crea

committee for intelligence using the Joint Atomic Energy Com

its model, or it should create House and Senate committees w

bined authorizing and appropriations powers....The other ref

have suggested—for a National Counterterrorism Center and a 

Intelligence Director—will not work if congressional oversi

not change too. Unity of effort in executive management can be 

is fractured by divided congressional oversight.478

This recommendation would bring major change to congressional bus

Presently, both current and new intelligence programs and their respec

levels are discussed in both the House and Senate Intelligence Committ

the House (HAC) and Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) set th

spending levels. The recommendation to grant one congressional comm

ers to set intelligence priorities and approve its expenditures is radical, as 

the most powerful committees, the Appropriations, Armed Services and 

tions committees, to relinquish some of their powers. Lee H. Hamilt

“Structural change is essential, because you must have budget authority 

tive oversight. What you have now is not working...There’s a lot more in

gress in reforming the executive branch than in reforming themselves.” 

Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, com

ter-of-factly, “I don’t think it will fly.” A GOP House aide, speaking on 

was more succinct stating the recommendation “doesn’t have a snowba

hell.” Interestingly, Representative John P. Murtha (D-PA), member 

Appropriations Committee, indicated that public indifference to this de

easy for Congress to resist changing its “arcane, tradition-bound structure

had one person at home ask me about this stuff. It’s a Washington thin

John McCain (R-AZ) accused the appropriators of “trying to protect their 

“If we do not give this new permanent intelligence committee the appropr

ity that they need, then there will be no reform and a vital part of the 9/1

recommendations will be neutered.”480 Former Senator Bob Kerrey (D

Commissioner, called Congress’s refusal to take up congressional over

geous. The American people should be angry.” He indicated that it wo

better to drop the executive-branch changes [from the 9/11 Commission 

478 9/11 Commission Report, 420. 479 Quotations from Charles Babington, “Hill Wary of Intelligence Oversight Ch

Lawmakers from Both Parties Resist Recommendations of 9/11 Commission,” Was

12 September 2004, A5. 480Dewar, Senate New Oversight Structure. Note: Congress failed to address thi

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
160

Unless you put in strong oversight, it isnt going to work.

Why is appropriation authority so important? Think of the simp

ington golden rule of economics: “He who has the gold, rules.” T

gence Community as well as its major contractors quite frequently 

ignore the pressures of the intelligence committees because the “pow

purse” resides with the appropriators. According to McCain, “the a

tors rule here—the fix is in.” So how “special” are the appropriation

tees? McCain compiled a study indicating that in the past 10 years 

the Republicans have controlled Congress, the number of “earmark

barrel spending projects moving through the appropriations comm

risen from 4,126 a session to 14,040. The Senate defense appropria

committee alone gets more than 3,000 requests for special projects a

the session [108 Cong. 2 sess. (2004)], the House Appropriations C

received more than 33,000 requests.482

The sheer number of congressional committees monitoring intelli

security—83 as reported by the Hart-Rudman Commission—alone att

need to improve congressional oversight. The Department of Homelan

responds to 88 congressional committees and subcommittees.483 The 

amount of resources required to prepare for congressional appearances or 

to congressional queries could be better spent elsewhere. This is not to sa

gressional oversight is not necessary but rather a large proportion of con

curiosity could be better served by its own Congressional Research Servi

The budgetary process is in need of reform. Only twice in the last 50 

all appropriations bills been enacted by the beginning of the fiscal yea

ingly, since Congress must enact these bills each year, Congress cannot 

time necessary to provide effective program oversight. The Congression

Office (CBO) estimated that each year there is about $90-$120 billion in 

rized appropriations. Changing to a biennial budget would allow Cong

time for review. Additionally, government agencies would enjoy more st

ing. This would be a big plus for the IC, which during the past few years 

rely on annual supplemental funding for many of its operations.484

481 David Ignatius, “Hypocrisy on Spy Reform,” Washington Post, 8 October 2004, 

482Ignatius, A35. 483 Dan Morgan, “Overhaul of Congressional Panels Urged: Report Finds Respons

Accountability Lacking,” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A21. 484 “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Reform Prop

ernment Printing Office, URL: <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=08729814703+41+0+...>, accessed 21 August 2004.
161

generally served DoD well as a strategic planning process since its 

the 1960s. However, according to the first Business Executives 

Security (BENS) Tail-to-Tooth Commission Report, because of i

tices and external demands over the subsequent years, PPBS 

bureaucratized to the point of being insufficiently agile to perform 

purposes. Its original purposes were forecasting and describing the 

strategic environment and defining the military capabilities it requ

ing resources to meet identified missions according to establishe

integrating the military service programs; and formulating the an

budget.486 Forty years later, however, PPBS has become a “broke

system with more than 5,000 program elements (PE) that genera

budgetary trivia.”487Henry Kissinger once referred to the governm

efforts in this way: “What passes for planning is frequently the p

the familiar into the future.”488 The United States spends more on n

rity than any other nation; likewise, we should expect more for our 

In today’s environment, PPBS (and the Capabilities Programming a

System—CPBS) no longer constitute an effective strategic planning 

inflexibility has become readily apparent since 9/11. The Intelligence 

besieged with burgeoning requirements, has had to rely on yearly supple

to sustain continuing operations. The central recommendation to the S

gence Committee suggested by Cofer Black, former Director of the CIA

rorist Center, aiming to improve the IC’s counterterrorism efforts, was s

My central recommendation is to support the war with peo

money and appropriate operational authorities. We can’t win th

the cheap. Lurching from supplemental funding to supplemen

ing is not a very effective way to support a global counterterror

ligence war. Provide multiyear funds so that we can manage 

our programs effectively. Resources won’t solve all of our pro

but resources will solve the majority of them.489

485 The Intelligence Community has a similar program called Capabilities Progr

Budgeting System (CPBS). NFIP program managers use this system to propose and 

requests and by the DCI to control the allocation of NFIP resources. It too is in need 

486 “Framing the Problem of PPBS,” BENS Tail-to-Tooth Commission Report, Ja

URL: http://www.bens.org/images/PPBS2000-Framing.pdf, accessed 10 Nov

Cited hereafter as BENS. 487 “Intelligence Resource Management,” Potomac Strategies & Analysis, Inc., Dec

488 BENS. 489 Cofer Black, “Investigation of Sept 11 Intelligence Failures,” 26 September 2

via LexisNexis, 12 January 2004.
162

given CIA [and the Community] healthy increases, too much of the new 

stay within deficit ceilings, is given in yearly supplemental bills. With

tained financial commitment to pay for increased recruiting and training 

managers cannot put the requisite clandestine service and other valuabl

nity-wide intelligence programs in place. “It’s a hell of a way to run a r

the way,” Pavitt recounted. “We’ve got money now to deal with the cr

moment and the crisis of the moment is Iraq and terrorism. There’s some 

nowhere near the kind of investment that’s necessary.”490

In brief, to provide for an effective, reformed Intelligence Commu

gress can best put its own House (and Senate) in order. In the followin

the author assesses the reform potential of hurriedly enacted intelligen

tion in the fall of 2004. In view of the inability of the Intelligence Com

reform itself thoroughly, Congressional action appears to offer the ultim

tus for correcting the deficiencies noted in the present chapter.

490 Dana Priest, “Retired Official Defends the CIA’s Performance,” Washington Pos

ber 2004, A23.
163

POST 9/11 INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Protecting the Turf

The usually staid Washington-in-August was anything but that in 

of 2004 after the release of the long-awaited 9/11 Commission 

events of 9/11 created an “opportunity,” remarked Richard K. Be

ride entrenched and outdated interests, to crack heads and force 

consolidation and cooperation that have been inhibited by bureauc

pation.”491 It seemed that anyone who knew anything about the 

Community and national security was someone with something to 

tions emerged to bring Congress back early from its recess to disc

Commission recommendations and propose legislation prior to th

2004 election! That did not happen, but Thomas Kean, Co-Chai

Commission, warned that Congress was moving too slowly to nego

prehensive intelligence reform package. “If we lose the moment

lose the whole thing,” said Kean. “We need a bill, and we need 

James L. Pavitt disagreed that creating a National Intelligence Di

would necessarily fix the IC problems:

There’s no use trying, said Alice. One cannot believe im

things.

I daresay you haven’t had much practice, said the Queen.

When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. 

Why sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible thing

breakfast.

—Lewis 

Alice’s Adventures in Won

491 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (January/

February 2002): 52. 492 Dan Eggen and Helen Dewar, “Intelligence Reforms May be Stalled: 9/11 Pa

Momentum Loss; Victims’ Kin Critical,” Washington Post, 15 October 2004, A13.
164

that terrorist strikes against the U.S. are more likely] is simply not 

There are no easy fixes. Terrorism is not going to be gone a few 

from now. My children, your children are going to have to worry 

this a long time from now. If that’s true, we’re not going to just m

all better, make the nation safer overnight by making a new bu

cratic structure.493

For the fourth election year in a row, Congress had to return to a 

session494 after the November election to take up unfinished business of 

Congress. A chief question was whether Congress would pass a comp

intelligence reform bill prior to its adjournment. One basic issue495 on 

House and Senate had difficulty in reaching agreement was the recurren

tle over control of intelligence spending. The Senate version called for 

the NSA, NRO, and NGA to be declassified and consolidated unde

National Intelligence Director; whereas, under the House version, in

funding would remain classified, hidden within the Pentagon’s overall 

surprising vote against two of the Senate’s most powerful and senior 

Senators Ted Stevens, Chairman Appropriations Committee and Robe

(D-WV), this committee’s ranking minority member, occurred as t

hammered out its intelligence reform proposal. The Senate voted again

proposal, 55 to 37, to drop the recommendation to declassify the intellig

get and voted against Byrd’s proposal, 62 to 29, to eliminate the budge

ers of the NID.496

With two days in December 2004 remaining for Congress to pass 

gence reform bill, the prospects looked dim. In late November, House 

Dennis Hastert (R-IL) had pulled the bill from floor consideration after 

493 As quoted in Dana Priest, “Retired Official Defends the CIA’s Performance,” Wa

Post, 5 November 2004, A23. 494Note: The 20th Amendment to the Constitution in 1933 changed the presidential i

and congressional calendars in the hopes of eliminating the need for post-election sessi

theless, as noted by the Senate Historical Society and reproduced in Helen Dewar, “An

gress to Return for Another Lame-Duck Stint: Post-Election Meetings to Finish Work 

November,” Washington Post, 27 October 2004, A23, Congress’s affinity for lame-duck 

becoming prevalent. 495 For an assessment of the major similarities and differences between the two bills 

the House initially on 8 October 2004 and the Senate initially on 6 October 2004, cons

(9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act) and S.2845 (National Intelligence Reform 

2004): A Comparative Analysis by the Congressional Research Service, updated 21 Oc

496 Helen Dewar, “Senators Offer New Oversight Structure: Intelligence Panels Would 

Reworked,” Washington Post, 5 October 2004, A4. Cited hereafter as New Senate Oversig
165

Senate negotiators who had been deadlocked since October trying 

the separate reform bills. House Armed Services Committee Chair

Hunter (R-CA) objected to provisions he believed would give the 

gence director (NID) authority over Pentagon intelligence collecti

and House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenne

sought provisions to make it easier to deport immigrant suspects a

driver’s license to undocumented immigrants.497 Both had express

wart determination not to change their positions but later relented 

and persistent negotiations. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) referred 

provisions as a “poison pill” that could have prevented any passage 

reform in 2004.498

Hunter, backed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Ge

Myers and the rest of the JCS, expressed two major arguments agai

some of the Pentagon’s control (see tonebox on next page). The fi

maintained that the proposed NID budget powers would affect future 

possibly at the expense of combat troops. The chief complaint was 

power with a civilian czar [NID] could undermine the ability to get i

the front lines. “If the military is stripped of their ability to control the

gence lines, it can prove to be a deadly mistake,” Hunter declared.499

Sensenbrenner, angered by the House’s removal of previously a

immigration changes, charged that “This bill [amended House bill] fa

the strong provision in the House bill because my Senate colleague

‘too controversial.’ That’s unfortunate, because their refusal to co

security provisions on their merits will keep Americans unnecessa

Sensenbrenner also objected that the bill did not include a provisio

have prevented the release of suspected terrorists who seek political a

“There’s been a lot of opposition to this from the first. Some of 

Pentagon. Some of it, quite frankly from the White House, despite w

ident has said,” acknowledged Senate Intelligence Committee Chair

Pat Roberts (R-KS) on a weekly news talk show. Roberts further co

497 Walter Pincus, “No Intelligence Compromise Seen: Lawmakers See Slim Ch

sage in December Session,” Washington Post, 23 November 2004, A9. Cited hereaft

gence Compromise. 498 Brian DeBose, “Senate Approves Intelligence Bill,” The Washington Times, 9 

2004, A1. Cited hereafter as Senate Approves Bill. 499 Diamond, 6. 500Brian DeBose, “House OKs Intelligence Reform Bill,” The Washington Times

2004, A1.
166

expressed a somewhat more guarded optimism. Senator Mitch McC

KY) commented, “The bill may be on life support, but I think it’s st

ing.”502 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman (sic) Sus

(R-ME) said, “I don’t see reopening of the issue in conference. We’v

mised as much as we can...The bill is not dead, but is in trouble...on

chance it could pass in December.”503

501 Walter Pincus, “Passage of Intelligence Bill Called Doubtful: Lawmakers Say B

Need to Lobby,” Washington Post, 22 November 2004, A3. Cited hereafter as Intelligen

sage Doubtful. 502 Intelligence Bill Passage Doubtful, A3. 503 No Intelligence Compromise, A9.

Operational Intelligence Funding

As noted in John Diamond, “Intelligence Impasse Mainly a Question of Con

Civilians, Military Share Power Already, “ USA Today, 29 November 2004, 6, m

ligence professionals disagreed with Hunter’s criticism and viewed his actions a

ter of control, noting that the military (field commanders) generally get top 

“What you see here is the forces of the status quo protecting their turf in the C

and in the bureaucracy,” said Susan Collins, (ME-D), Chair of the Government

Committee. David Burpee, NGA spokesman, noted that rarely do disputes ove

coverage priorities require arbitration at the DCI level. “It works pretty smoothly

lives are at risk, the interests of the combat commander and those in politic

coincide,” Burpee stated. Gregory Treverton, head of the intelligence policy 

the RAND Corporation, agreed stating, “If people are fighting a war, they’re goi

first claim no matter what.” Treverton further noted, “When you ask, ‘Why do we 

little intelligence on the weapons of mass destruction target in Iraq?’ the ans

sometimes that we were so busy with force protection.” Walter Pincus, “Turf W

Intelligence Bill: Pentagon Allies at Odds with Advocates of New Director,” Wa

Post, 27 October 2004, A4, reported that some skeptical legislators and staff m

viewed the turf war over control of intelligence spending as a ploy by those op

the creation of the NID or concerned that their committees will lose clout. Othe

that previous budget disputes between former CIA Director George Tenet an

tary of Defense Rumsfeld were settled easily. One former CIA colleague state

never wanted to take on money issues...the problem was more in theory than 

tice.” A senior Rumsfeld aide stated, “Everyone wants actionable intelligence 

unfiltered, and sometimes there is professional disagreement on how. But I ca

of a disagreement over funds and have been told we worked closer [with the C

at any time in history.” 
167

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

After much debate, round-the-clock negotiations, and last-m

House appeals for support,504 the House approved legislation on 8 

restructure the Intelligence Community in a vote of 336 to 75.505 Th

lowed suit on 9 December in a vote of 89 to 2. Senators Robert C. B

and James M. Inhofe (R-OK) voted against the measure. Byrd belie

sure was prepared too hastily and voiced his opposition when the S

was introduced initially in August 2004. “No legislation alone can f

rorist attack on our nation,” Byrd said after Senate approval of the bi

echoing Byrd’s criticism of the bill’s “rush to judgment,” stated “I a

needs more time...without exception every time we’ve rushed to d

and then accepted promises that we would get it fixed in three weeks 

it never seems to happen.”507

On 17 December 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004—a 563-page bill that has been 

“largest overhaul of U.S. intelligence-gathering since the passage of 

Security Act of 1947.” Bush stated during the Act’s signing cerem

lesson of September the 11th, 2001 is that intelligence agencies 

together as a single, unified enterprise.”508 The IC has long been reg

504 As reported in Philip Shenon and Carl Hulse, “House Leadership Blocks Vote 

Bill,” The New York Times, 21 November 2004, A1 when negotiations stalled and fu

mise appeared uncertain, House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) decided to block 

proposed intelligence bill. Hastert said, “It’s hard to reform; it’s hard to make chang

to keep working on this.” Later both President Bush and Vice-President Cheney tel

leading opponents of the intelligence reform bill in attempts to persuade them to rec

ner their support for the measure. In the days leading up to the eventual passage of 

Senate and even White House officials met in a conference committee to hammer o

ences. As reported in Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, “Analysis: Director’s Control 

Washington Post, 8 December 2004, A1, “The president and the vice president’s int

House members were absolutely key in moving this bill forward,” said Susan Collin

505 Brian DeBose, “House OKs Intelligence Reform Bill,” The Washington Time

2004, 1, reported that of the 336 supporters of the bill—152 were Republicans, 183 

one Independent while 67 Republicans and eight Democrats voted against the bill. T

members did not record a vote. 506 Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Bill Clears Congress: Bush Expected to Approv

Reforms Next Week,” Washington Post, 9 December 2004, A4. Cited hereafter as In

Clears Congress. 507 Senate Approves Bill, A1. 508 Peter Baker and Walter Pincus, “Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill: Presid

Find an Experienced Hand to Guide 15 Agencies,” Washington Post, 18 December 2

hereafter as Bush Signs Reform Bill. 
168

former DCI, once remarked that his predecessor, Robert Gates, had w

that his position as DCI was like that of the kings in medieval France: 

all swear fealty to you, but do not fear you. 509 Unquestionably, this act 

Community person responsible to the president, Congress and the Ame

lic—the Director of National Intelligence. However, only implemen

further evaluation of this Act will determine if the authorities granted t

truly facilitate a “single, unified enterprise” with the DNI at its helm o

this Act, like so many reform initiatives before it, brings only margina

because its provisions had been compromised to the least common de

to ensure its passage.

Appendix G highlights intelligence reform provisions as extracted 

United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Summary 

gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The majority o

addresses agency and department provisions that are non-IC related—

predominantly law enforcement (LE)-related and are not discussed furt

report. Furthermore, Appendix G identifies these non-IC related pro

their respective titles only. Two examples of LE initiatives stipulated b

include 1) the FBI is given the authority to raise the mandatory retirem

65 for 50 FBI employees per fiscal year through 30 September 2007510 

Secretary of Homeland Security, in each fiscal year 2006 through 2010

rized to increase the number of border patrol agents by not less to 2,00

to available appropriations.511 For more detailed information on these 

as well as the intelligence provisions, consult the online version of t

gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at http://www.gpo

serialset/creports/intel_reform.html. The provisions briefly discussed h

national intelligence definition, the DNI and its budget and personnel a

and the creation of national centers; other intelligence-related prov

noted in the appendix.

National Intelligence Definition

The Act redefined “national intelligence” as including all informatio

in the U.S. or abroad that pertains to more than one agency and involves 

509 “Time to Rethink – America’s Intelligence Services,” The Economist Newspaper 

20 April 2002, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, 28 January 2004. 510 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summary 

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Cong. 2nd sess., 6 Decembe

Cited hereafter as GAC Summary. 511 GAC Summary, 12. 
169

of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on natio

land security.512 This new definition emphasizes “WMD” as a sepa

of information related to U.S. national security issues.

Director of National Intelligence

The Senate-confirmed Director of National Intelligence is restricte

ing as the Director of CIA or the head of any other IC element.513 

Office of the DNI will remain at CIA headquarters but has only un

2008 to find new quarters—the DNI may not be collocated with any 

ment after that time. The DNI will become the President’s principa

advisor, a role formerly assigned to the DCI by EO 12333.

For decades, intelligence reform initiatives have attempted to ai

the execution of his dual-hatted role and responsibilities as DCI a

CIA, by creating assistant DCI positions and a large Community M

Staff (CMS), all with limited success. The 9/11 Commission Repo

the DCI had “too many jobs” and “no recent DCI has been able to 

[DCI, Director of CIA and Principal Intelligence Advisor to th

effectively. Usually what loses out is management of the Intelligen

nity....”514 The congressional solution granted the DNI authority 

personnel billets within the Office of the DNI, plus an additional tra

Community personnel to assist in the management of IC responsibi

present author questions whether these 650 Community personne

more successful in managing the Community than were the approx

personnel in past years. She suggests that a lack of personnel was 

mary reason for continual Community management issues but rath

lack of substantive authorities to make “things happen.” As the fol

graphs illustrate, the recently legislated but not yet implemented a

the DNI may centralize more “power” than that enjoyed by the D

unclear whether they are powerful enough to run the Community 

unified enterprise.

512 GAC Summary, 5. 513 GAC Summary, 1. 514The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission 

Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 409. 

as 9/11 Report. 515 GAC Summary, 2.
170

Under the new provisions the DNI shall “develop and determine” th

Intelligence Program (NIP) budget based on proposals submitted by 

agencies; “ensure the effective execution” of the annual budget; and “m

implementation and execution of the NIP.” At present, it is uncertain if 

visions are more “powerful” than the authority in EO 12333 (signed in 

granted the DCI “more explicit authority over the development, implem

and evaluation of the NFIP.”516 One aspect of the Act that promises to 

the DNI’s budget authorities is that the Director of OMB must appo

funds at the “exclusive direction” of the DNI for allocation to the IC 

The DNI, in turn, manages these NIP appropriations by “directing the 

or allocation” through the IC department heads.517

Although the DNI was granted authority to transfer and reprogram 

Act imposed three stipulations on such actions. All transfers or reprog

must 1) be for a higher priority intelligence activity; 2) must support an 

need, improve program effectiveness, or increase efficiency; and 3) 

involve funds from the CIA Reserve for Contingencies or a DNI R

Contingencies. These stipulations are not without merit. However, the 

only move funds after OMB and affected agency approval and only if t

in a single fiscal year is less than $150 million, is less than 5 percent of 

ment’s NIP funds, and does not terminate an acquisition program. If th

element concurs, then these limits do not apply.518 These monetary am

small—“decimal dust” according to one critic519—when one consider

reported budget of $40 billion.

With approval of OMB, the DNI may transfer 150 Community-fund

nel to the Office of the DNI. Once the national intelligence center is c

DNI may transfer an additional 100 personnel but to do so, the DNI m

approval from Director of OMB and notify appropriate Congressiona

tees. The DNI may also transfer an unlimited number of personnel to a

element if the same three stipulations required above to transfer or 

NIP funds are met. Once again, approval must be granted by the OMB a

priate Congressional committees must be notified.520

516 Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, CT: 

1992), 107. 517 GAC Summary, 1. 518 GAC Summary, 2. 519 David E. Kaplan and Kevin Whitelaw, “Intelligence Reform—At Last,” U.S. New

Report, 20 December 2004, 31. 520 GAC Summary, 2.
171

getary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S

Community operate as a coherent whole.”521 These provisions gr

ably less authority than recommended by the 9/11 Commission and a

of compromised provisions. Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, Director of N

closed House hearing in August 2004, spoke of the need for greater 

ity when he stated, “More is better than less; total is better than part

of all possible worlds would be to close out today’s DCI and replac

feckless [DNI].”522 “You’re still not in charge,” commented James S

Assistant DCI. “Without control of budget and personnel, all you 

authority to use tact and goodwill.”523

Creation of National Centers

National Counterterrorism Center

The Act gave Congressional authority and support for the Nationa

rorism Center (NCTC), originally created in September 2004 by exe

The NCTC will serve as the primary organization in the U.S. Go

analyzing and integrating terrorism and counterterrorism informatio

that concerning purely domestic counterterrorism, which is under th

the FBI.524 The Director of the NCTC (D/NCTC) is a Senate-confir

and its director may not simultaneously serve in any other capacity 

tive branch. The D/NCTC reports to the DNI on budget and intellig

but to the President on the planning and progress of joint counterterr

tions. The NCTC is charged with conducting “strategic operation

which covers missions, the objectives to be achieved, the tasks to b

interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignm

and responsibilities.525

National Counterproliferation Center

Although the President may create a national counterprolifer

within 18 months after the promulgation of the Intelligence Reform 

Prevention Act of 2004, he may ignore this requirement if he determ

521 9/11 Report, 411-414. 522 Kaplan and Whitelaw, 31. 523 Kaplan and Whitelaw, 31. 524 U.S. President, “Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center,”27 Augu

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html, accessed 2 S

525 GAC Summary, 8.
172

tion of weapons of mass destruction. His waiver must be in writing and 

to Congress.526

National Intelligence Centers

This Act authorizes the DNI to establish other National Intelligence 

address intelligence priorities. Within their areas of intelligence resp

these centers will have primary responsibility for providing all-sourc

and for identifying and proposing to the DNI intelligence collection an

tion requirements.527

The Reform Act’s Potential Weaknesses

There are high expectations in some quarters that the Intelligence R

Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 is just what America needs for greater 

its homeland. When signing the legislation President Bush stated, “Our 

ligence enterprise will become more unified, coordinated, and effecti

enable us to better do our duty, which is to protect the American p

Additionally, he said, “The many reforms of this act have a single goal: 

that the people in government responsible for defending America hav

possible information to make the best possible decisions.”529

While many of the Act’s provisions will move the Intelligence Co

Federal Government, and in some cases, State and local governments 

more secure environment and improve the sharing of information am

entities, it would be naïve to see this Act as a panacea for all that ails th

nity. Its passage has ended the debate on the question “Should There B

The answer is “Yes.” However, the ambiguity of many provisions as w

question of whether this Act engenders intelligence reform, has cr

debates for intelligence professionals, the American public and the pre

ponder. The following paragraphs are reflective of a few of those ongo

526 GAC Summary, 8. 527 GAC Summary, 8. 528 Bryan Bender, “US Intelligence Shake-Up Meets Growing Criticism,” Boston G

ary 2004, A1. 529 Jennifer Loven, “President Signs Measure Overhauling Intelligence: Aiming to I

Network in Wake of 9/11 Attacks, Bill Creates Counterterror Center, New Director,”As

Press, 17 December 2004, accessed via http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom

bal-bush1217,0,6868674.story. 
173

One of the most glaring deficiencies in the Intelligence Reform 

ist Prevention Act of 2004 is the failure of Congress to reform its

ure of Congress, once again, to get its own House (and Senate

disgraceful. Two of Congress’ own—Representative Christophe

CN) and Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) expressed th

sure with their colleagues:

During the monumental struggle to pass much-needed inte

reforms, one absolute truth about Washington was reinforce

hardest thing to do in this town is to take someone’s power 

does not matter if pending legislation is vital to our national se

even if it is three years overdue; it’s only human to protect one’

More than three years after the creation of the Department of Hom

rity (DHS), Congress had failed to create one permanent authorizin

in each chamber tasked with conducting oversight of DHS. The 9/11 

Report stressed that the two “other reform measures—National 

Director and the National Counterterrorism Center—will not work 

sional oversight does not change too. Unity of effort in executive 

can be lost if it is fractured by divided congressional oversight.” T

sion called congressional oversight for intelligence and counterter

functional.”531 Just how fractured is the oversight of DHS? Th

committees with oversight of DHS decreased slightly from 88 to 79 

Congress—DHS now responds to requests for information from 79 

Every single senator and at least 412 of the 435 representatives hav

of responsibility for homeland security operations. Compare this wit

ment of Defense, with its budget 10 times that of DHS and hundreds 

more personnel, reporting to “only” 36 committees and subcommitt

then Director of DHS Tom Ridge and other top DHS officials testifi

before various committees and subcommittees.532 This is congressio

run amok.

Let us examine a Community management issue likely to cro

desk, to illustrate the intelligence oversight nightmare that Congr

address. Retired Army Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, DHS Deputy 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, commented dur

530 Reps.Christopher Shays (R-CN) and Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), “Congress, R

self,” Washington Post, 22 December 2004, A27. 531 9/11 Report, 420. 532 “Homeland Security Oversight,” editorial, Washington Post, 28 December 20
174

them. We have to look, search, test, assess. You dont just get a

tree...We need people, but we need good people.”533 For the sake o

let us assume that the DNI, as authorized by the Act, has completed t

requirements to transfer Community personnel. The Office of t

already completed the arduous process of determining that DHS i

high priority intelligence activities and that the transfer of Commun

to assist DHS in these activities will support an emergent need, impr

effectiveness, or increase efficiency. Now, the only remaining require

Director of National Intelligence—the CEO of U.S. intelligence—to 

personnel it needs in a timely manner is to notify the appropriate c

committees of such transfers—all SEVENTY-NINE of them!

Shays and Maloney have introduced changes to the Rules of the H

resentatives for the 109th Congress to consider. Their proposal would

● Create a permanent standing committee on homeland sec

exclusive jurisdiction.

● Create a permanent standing committee on intelligence with 

jurisdiction over intelligence and counterterrorism.

● Create a 14th Appropriations subcommittee to deal with intell

They admit these proposals will not be easy to enact, but they m

are a no-brainer from a national security perspective. 

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) remarked that the Senate Intellige

tee “tinkered with oversight responsibilities” but brought nothing 

“We will have a status quo intelligence committee without the comb

zation and appropriations power.” The Senate Intelligence Commit

ing” consisted of decreasing its own membership by two, but at the 

increased the size of the staff for each of its 15 members by one—

15. Purportedly, this increase of staff would be necessary becaus

intended to combine its authorization and appropriations activitie

mended by the 9/11 Commission. However, after adding the additio

ees, the Senate Intelligence Committee decided to continue 

intelligence programs but created a new intelligence subcommitte

Senate Appropriations Committee to handle the money.535

533 Katherine Pfleger Shrader, “Analysts Are in Great Demand: Intelligence Age

for Talent,” Washington Post, 30 December 2004, A24. 534 Shays and Maloney, A27. 535 Walter Pincus, “Senate Realigns Intelligence Procedures; New Reform Statu

Some Changes,” Washington Post, 23 December 2004, A21.
175

Governmental Affairs Committee, chaired by Senator Susan Col

However, it then only authorized the committee oversight of 38 p

Department of Homeland Security’s budget and only eight (8) p

175,000 employees. As reported in the Washington Post, Collins bec

trated as DHS agencies were taken away from her panel that she re

are just going to end up with jurisdiction over [then-Secretary] Tom 

sonal staff. That is about what is going to be left.”536

During floor debate in the 105th Congress, McCain, then Cha

Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, after losing a m

jurisdiction for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) aw

panel and give it to Collins’ panel, expressed his frustrations by calli

that the Coast Guard remained in his committee. McCain stated, “W

just stop, why don’t we call it a night and say the heck with this fa

crazy. This is stupid.”537 Reforming the existing congressional overs

tees remains a necessary Congressional action.

DNI and Community Relationships

Mark Lowenthal has recognized the importance of Community r

noting that:

All “wiring” diagrams, no matter how sophisticated, are d

They portray where agencies sit in relation to one another, but t

not portray how they interact and which relationships matter a

Moreover, although we are loath to admit it, personalities do 

However much we like to think of government as one of laws a

tutions, the personalities and relationships of the people filli

important positions also affect agency working relations.538

Without question, the DNI’s relationship with Congress as well a

relationship with other IC agency heads is pivotal for success. How

relationship that matters most in defining its role and relative powe

tionship the DNI has with the chief executive. “The director of na

gence is not going to be able to do this job if the President has any d

536 Walter Pincus, “Congress Resists Key Recommendation of 9/11 Panel: With

tion, Homeland Security Department Officials Report to 88 Panels on Capitol Hill,” 

Post, 1 January 2005, A4. Cited hereafter as Congress Resists Key Recommendatio

537 Congress Resists Key Recommendation, A4. 538 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (CQ Press: Washin

2003), 30.
176

have the real confidence of the president.

Whether we have a dru

truly effective manager will depend on the president,” in the words of fo

Stansfield Turner. “These other people—the secretary of defense, th

general—are cabinet officers with huge departments and congression

tions behind them.”540 “If the president doesn’t back this person up 

battle with Rumsfeld [Secretary of Defense], then the position is effect

tered,” said Roger Cressey, a former White House counterterrorism ad

ing the Clinton administration.541 William Webster, former DCI and D

the FBI, noted the DNI must have a strong relationship with the 

“That’s one of the most important things—his ability to work with m

the Community and to work cooperatively with Congress in its oversig

sibilities and the president to whom he will report.”542 

President Bush, responding to a reporter’s question on his pick for th

presented his own list of DNI qualifications when he replied, “I’m go

somebody who knows something about intelligence and capable and h

ready to do the job—and I’ll let you know at the appropriate time w

such a person.”544 Paul C. Light, a government reform professor at 

University and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, considers 

tion of the DNI to be the most important appointment President Bush 

in the executive branch. “You need someone who knows something abo

539 Phillip Shenon, “Next Round is Set in Push to Reorganize Intelligence,” New Yo

20 December 2004, A19. 

540 Kaplan and Whitelaw, 31. 541 David S. Cloud, “Huge Challenge Awaits Intelligence Chief,” Wall Street Journa

ber 2004, A4. 542 Faye Bowers, “The New Top in Redrawn US Intelligence,” Christian Science M

December 2004, 2. 543 Many names were bandied about as to who might be considered for the DNI pos

current CIA Director Porter Goss had early on been considered a likely candidate, his h

ing of senior CIA employees had not endeared him to many in Congress and as such h

tion appeared unlikely. The following list of possible DNI’s was reported in Bowers, 2

Michael Hayden—current Director, NSA; Thomas Kean—Co-Chair of 9/11 Commissi

Hamilton—Co-chair of 9/11 Commission; Representative Peter Hoesktra (R-MI)—Ch

House Intelligence Committee; Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)—Ranking Demo

House Intelligence Committee; and Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)-Former Chairm

Armed Services Committee. Possibilities for active or retired military as mentioned in 

cus, “President Gets to Fill Ranks of New Intelligence Superstructure: Reform Legisla

Be Signed into Law on Friday,” Washington Post, 16 December 2004, A35, include: R

eral Tommy R. Franks—Former commander in Afghanistan and Iraq and Retired Adm

O. Studeman—Former CIA deputy director. 544 Cloud, A4.
177

author is drawn to Diogenes own futile search for an honest man 

President’s search will be more successful. Senator John D. Rocke

WV), Vice-chair of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 

recently passed intelligence reform legislation left the role of the 

with uncertainties but “it was better to be a little vague” in writing 

“The person chosen to be DNI should be one of the five most power

government and his or her actions will eliminate the vagueness.”546 

Analysis

Some former intelligence professionals have expressed concern th

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 with its o

changes could be overshadowing more serious “down-in-the-wee

security issues that must be addressed and resolved. Former N

Retired Army General William Odom and other intelligence profess

critically of the Act as failing to address the lack of accurate intellig

in from the field and the shortage of analysts. As evidenced by their 

ments, the Act does not appear to “fix” intelligence shortcomings.

I feel sorry for these 9/11 families who thought passing this inte

bill will improve things. They have been swindled. The mor

about it, the more awful it is. It’s tragic.”547

Retired Army General Willi

Former Direc

It does little to address analytic and collection capabilities. I’m 

mistic the so-called reforms are going to lead to quality intelli

does nothing to remedy the poor source information we have.548

Vincent Ca

Former head of CIA’s Counterterrori

It’s a sham. I don’t think it changes anything.549

545 As quoted in Martin Kady II and John Donnelly, “Many Decisions Ahead aft

Bill Clears,” CQ TODAY, 7 December 2004, 2938. 546 Walter Pincus, “National Intelligence Director Proves to be Difficult Post to F

ties Over Role, Authority are Blames for Delay,” Washington Post, 31 January 2005

547 Bender, A1. 548 Bender, A1. 549 Bender, A1.
178

Former CIA 

They add an extra layer. But the problem is not a structural one. [Be

the 9/11 Commission declined to blame individuals for the intelli

failure, it had to find fault somewhere] the Commission concluded, 

fore, that “it must have been the system, it must be something with ho

organized ourselves.” That is 90 percent wrong. It is the people, stup

Ray Mc

Former CIA (clandestine service) 

I suppose the American people look to their leaders for safety and 

rity, and the new national intelligence director will give the impr

of there being somebody in control of the whole intelligence co

nity. But I don’t think there is much to it in substance.551

Michael S

Former head of CIA’s Bin Lad

It’s half a reform bill. They’ve done some positive things, bu

haven’t dealt with the analytical side. We need what some call a 

nese wall. This is necessary so that the analysts are totally indepe

from and without any loyalty to any [intelligence collector]....I 

believe you will solve a lot of the problems we’ve seen either in th

up to 9/11 or the run-up to Iraq until you separate collection from 

ysis....This bill doesn’t address that.552

550 Bender, A1. 551 Mark Huband, “Ex-CIA Officer Dismisses Reforms,” London Financial Times, 1

2004, A6. 552 A.L. Bardach, “Interrogation: Listen to the Admiral,” Slate, online ed., 16 Dece

URL: <http://slate.msn.com>, accessed 17 December 2004. Note: Mark Lowenthal 

gence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 45, briefly discusse

esting phenomenon” among analysts: Different analytical groups have a preference for 

types of intelligence. He indicates that a CIA analyst may put more emphasis in human 

sources (HUMINT) because it is a product of his own agency’s activities whereas an al

lyst in the Defense Department may not. Inman often refers to this misplaced kinship t

collection source over another in his comments.

The following is an example of why Inman and others insist on separating analysts 

tors. Although a DIA official warned CIA about the questionable reliability of an Iraqi 

example, the erroneous CIA-source information remained in a 5 February 2003 speech 

Secretary of State Powell to the United Nations concerning weapons of mass destructio
179

Former Direc

Former Vice Direc

Former Director of Naval In

Former Deputy Di

Assorted Ambiguities and Unsettling Provisi

Throughout the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention A

there are instances where provisions forthrightly contradict one anot

very least, are confusing. For example, in Title 1 (intelligence section

charged with establishing “uniform security standards and proced

ever, a later section, Title III (security clearances section) states tha

dent designates a single entity [not further defined] to oversee 

clearance process and develop uniform standards and policies for acc

fied information.”553

Representative David Obey (D-W), ranking minority member o

Appropriations Committee, notes that “One of the bill’s most glarin

ings is that it does not guarantee that dissenting or alternative views 

clearly stated to the President. That was a major problem in the dec

war in Iraq.”554 The Act does stipulate however, that within 180 d

effective date of the Act, the DNI will establish a process to condu

analysis and within 270 days will notify the Congressional intellige

tees of its implementation.555

One of the reasons some of the Act’s provision are confusing is th

had less than twenty-four hours to read the final version of the leg

House completed its vote on Monday, 8 December 2004 and it went 

to the Senate for approval. However, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV

two senators who voted against this legislation, offers another reaso

sage. According to The Nation, Byrd suggests that in the Post-9

members of Congress do not have the stomach for an honest debate 

ing terrorism or defending liberty. Byrd, speaking of the Senate, rem

pygmies on the battlefield of history, we cower like whipped dogs i

political pressure when it comes to issues like intelligence reform.”5

553 Intelligence Bill Clears Congress, A4. 554 John Nichols, “Flawed Intelligence Bill,” The Nation, 3 January 2004, 6. 555 GAC Summary.7. 556 Nichols, 6.
180

the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, serious reform has e

Intelligence Community for decades. In the continuing absence of 

intelligence reform legislation, it appears likely that this trend will 

Michael Warner, of the CIA History Staff at the Center for the Study 

gence, surmises that the ambiguity [about intelligence] is likely to e

the same reasons it arose in the first place: no one can agree on wh

replace it. These same obstacles faced Truman in 1945. 

Everyone has a notion of what intelligence should be or how reform 

implemented, but everyone also has a specific list of changes they will 

ate. The mix of preferences and objections produces a veto to almost 

posal, until the one that survives is the one policymakers and legislat

the least.557

557 Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, DC: 

the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 17.
181

CONCLUSION

Although Deputy Commerce Secretary Samuel W. Bodman, in 

below, was responding to a comment on the government’s vision for 

ing, his comments are indicative of the way Washington works.

I will tell you, it is very hard for this government to have a v

anything. We are totally stovepiped, and we live within these c

ments. This is not by the way of a complaint. This is not by th

an excuse. It is by way of a fact. Congress likes it this way, and 

organizational changes in the federal government is, as many 

know, a massive undertaking, a several-year job. It is not a 

month job. It is a several-year job, and so you don’t do it ve

because it’s certainly not worth it.558

Perhaps the image in the past decade of an Intelligence Communit

unsure of what it does and for whom,”559 is reaching its zenith. Debor

a recent RAND Intelligence Community Fellow, described eight trend

the IC has reached a strategic inflection point,560 a time when an orga

change, become irrelevant, or cease to exist. Change is needed for su

much because of past mistakes but because the external environm

become so different. Trends illustrating this altered environment inclu

● The nature of the threat to U.S. security

● The nature of warfare and military strategy

Alice soon came to the conclusion that it was a very difficu

indeed.

—Lewis 

Alice’s Adventures in Won

558 Johnathan Weisman, “Bush Economic Aide Says Government Lacks Vision,” 

Post, 13 December 2003, A1. 559 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Informati

Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. 560 Andrew Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points 

Every Company and Career (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 3-6.
182

● The U.S. national security strategy for addressing these change

● The quality and quantity of information in general and the spe

which it can be shared

● Technology, which is outpacing the ability of large organiza

adapt organizationally and operationally

● The expectations of intelligence consumers

● The expectations of the American public561

Through exploration of the trends cited above, the present research h

foundation for appropriate modifications in the intelligence process, o

from within.” Without question, the Intelligence Community is a vast

cratic beast; however, the Community should be capable of change. 

noted, successful transformation efforts appear to have three things in 

First, there is a period of strategic reflection about the “business” b

attempts to change it. Second, change agents stay with the organiz

enough to see their ideas or efforts come to fruition. Lastly, a mechanism 

evaluate how well the change proposal serves strategic objectives.562 

munity has repeatedly fallen short on all three of these criteria.

Consider the FBI, an example of an organization whose attempt to 

itself has been fraught with institutional failure. In December 2004

named its sixth counterterrorism director since 9/11 and further disc

all of the senior positions in that office have turned over at least o

then.563 Two weeks later, the FBI abandoned its newly developed $17

computer system before it was fully launched due to severe system 

cies.564

Former DCI George Tenet knows too well the difficulties inherent in 

that lie ahead in changing an organization. Testifying before the 9/11 

sion in April 2004, he responded to a question from Commissioner John 

former Secretary of the Navy, who asked, “How do you do a revolutio

losing sight of the business you’re in?”

561 Deborah G. Barger, “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence,” SA

vol. 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004), 28. 562 Barger, 29. 563 Dan Eggen, “FBI Names 6th Counterrorism Chief Since 9/1l,” Washington Post, 

ber 2004, A17. 564 Jonathan Krim, “FBI Rejects Its New Case File Software: Database Project Has 

$170 Million,” Washington Post, 14 January 2005, A5.
183

engagement, recommendations to come forward. I think its—

like me and John [McLaughlin] and people working in the busi

certainly inform....I think it’s hard when you’re sitting—I m

day I retire, I’ll be a great person to sit on one of these things

love to do it. [Tenet retired as DCI a few months later in July 2

But I think that the important thing is, it’s very hard for peop

they’re sitting in the in-box on the crisis of the day to be refle

think you’ve got to separate the current group to allow—we 

you the data, give you our experience and talk to you about 

think you almost need a separate group of people who ha

around this.

But you also need people who have revolutionary ideas about 

ogy and how it works and a new mindset, because the peopl

recruiting aren’t 30-year veterans anymore. You’re attracting 

new labor force that doesn’t remember the Cold War, and they 

structure that’s going to be more agile and mobile and more te

ically proficient.

And once people lose sight of where the country needs to be, t

and fits in cycles that this Community has gone through has 

Let’s get budgeting on a two-or three-year cycle. Let’s allow us 

programs in depth. Let’s really look at basic expenditures 

course of time. Let’s put the metrics in place. But I’ll tell you, y

build this Community in fits and starts. It won’t happen and the 

will suffer. And you know, this, I think, is a debate that has to b

quite publicly.565

There is no denying that reform of the monolithic Intelligence 

entrenched by decades of parochialism, nurtured by lackadaisical c

and executive oversight, burdened by a bureaucratized strategic plan

and excused from public scrutiny, is going to be hard in reality, real

ertheless, as Barger concluded in her review of intelligence reform:

The Intelligence Community must transform itself when face

constant barrage of new realities; its management culture a

565 George Tenet, “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Intelligence,” Wash

online ed., 14 April 2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/

2004Apr14, accessed 15 April 2004.
184

ment of the external environment. Intelligence management mus

the workforce prepare for and adapt to not one, but a continuing 

of revolutionary changes.566

Change will require not only the “three-way partnership among 

catalysts who bring new ideas to the table, legislative overseers wh

new ideas through funding and legislation, and internal supporters w

ate and then implement change,”567 but will also require the Americ

establishment to report on these efforts as guardians of the public w

immediate task for the external catalysts, the legislative overseers

supporters, and the press is to restore public confidence in the compe

integrity of the nation’s intelligence system. The late historian Rich

tadter said, “the reformist impulse often wanders over the border 

reality and impossibility.”568 Preserving at least some of the utopian 

tions of intelligence reform without inevitable disappointment may 

While it is true that the Intelligence Community will never bat 1.000

not mean that the Community cannot improve its batting average! 

less, Richard K. Betts cautions,

at the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence 

takes will come less from any structural or procedural tweak 

from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of 

officials. How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunatel

never been clear.569

Only time will tell whether intelligence “reform” envisioned wit

sage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 200

realized; whether this Act, like the countless reform initiatives of the 

aimed to alter the IC’s business-as-usual processes and procedure

amounted to the re-arrangement of deck chairs or even whether th

sures distracted from other more pressing national security needs 

intelligence professionals suggest. As a born and raised Missourian 

“Show Me” State, this author requires more convincing than just 

piece of paper (or all 563 pages) that “change” is forthcoming. Ana

566 Barger, 30. 567 Barger, 30. 568 As cited by Robert J. Samuelson, “Seduced by ‘Reform,” Washington Post, 2 Jun

569 Richard K. Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This T

eign Affairs, 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004), accessed via ProQuest, 21 August 2004.
185

ars, the American public, and the press.

Nonetheless, this author believes that for now the significance o

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 lies not in i

sected to determine whether it calls forth the myriad changes 

facilitate a more secure national security environment in a globa

certainly does not. Rather, this Act and its ensuing changes—whe

tous or marginal—must be seen as the start of Community reform 

Century, not the endgame.

Joan Dempsey, Executive Director of the President’s Foreign 

Advisory Board, warned in an October 2004 speech that “We are 

ning of intelligence reform, not the end. We are making our first te

toward changing the way we do intelligence in this country, and we 

away from completing it.”570 This author disagrees with Ms Demps

in an ever-changing environment, where adaptability ensures surv

gence reform will never be complete. Reform must be construed a

nity-wide, never-ending series of process improvement tasks. Pr

procedures that guarantee success against our opponent today 

advised as we face tomorrow’s enemy. The Community must ma

stant watch against complacency.

Pendleton Herring, chief intellectual architect of the National Se

1947 and Paul Nitze, architect of NSC 68—the blueprint for Amer

in the Cold War, served their country long and well. Nevertheles

and October 2004 respectively, the inevitable occurred. Mr. Henn

Nitze died. It would be fitting for us now to lay to rest those Cold 

that are embedded in the organizational, procedural, and also, the 

processes of the Intelligence Community. The Cold War era has 

Old ideas have served this country long and well, but now new pro

lished on the foundation of “need to share,” not “need to know” m

Community in this globalized world. The challenges of today dem

tions of tomorrow, not the perfection of the past. The Intelligence 

must change itself, and with some rapidity. This process will be f

the Community’s becoming an integrated whole, rather than re

archipelago that it is. In the fashion of the enduring words of Pre

ham Lincoln’s 1862 Congressional Address, the Community too 

the occasion:

570 David E. Kaplan, “Intelligence Reform—at Last,” U.S. News & World Repor

2004, 32.
186

occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 

sion. As our case is new, so we think anew and act anew.
187

Act of 1947, as amended

Title 1—Coordination for National Securit

National Security Council

SECTION 101. (a) There is established a council to be known as 

Security (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Council”).571

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of 

Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Co

side in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with r

integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to 

security so as to enable the military services and the other departmen

cies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters i

national security.

The Council shall be composed of—

1 the President;

2. the Vice President;

3. the Secretary of State;

4. the Secretary of Defense;

5. the Director for Mutual Security [now abolished];

6. the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board 

abolished];

7. the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive 

ments and of the military departments, the Chairman of t

tions Board [now abolished]; and the Chairman of the R

and Development Board [now abolished]; when appoint

President by and with the advice and consent of the Sen

serve at his pleasure.

571 National Security Act of 1947, as amended, http://www.history-matters.co

church/rockcomm/html/Rockefeller_0144a.htm, accessed 3 August 2004.
188

SECTION 102.

(a) There is established under the National Security Council a Cent

gence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be 

thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall a

exercise the powers of the Director during his absence or disability. Th

and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and 

advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned offic

armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among i

in civilian life: Provided, however, That at no time shall the two positi

Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by com

officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed 

tor, or Deputy Director, then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Direc

shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohi

(military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect 

if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department 

Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air For

the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, pow

functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or direc

exercise, as Director or Deputy Director) with respect to the arme

vices or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the D

ment of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any b

bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the per

(military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the ap

ment of the office of the Director, or Deputy Director, of a co

sioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and s

is such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or 

he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolumen

quisite, right privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of an

status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer 

while serving in the office of Director or Deputy Director, conti

hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the t

his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (
189

payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length o

for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed f

funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Int

Agency. He shall also be paid by the Central Intelligence 

from such funds an annual compensation at the rate equ

amount by which the compensation established for such 

exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowance

(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, d

period in which such commissioned officer occupies the 

Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Centr

gence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwi

rized and appropriated for the armed services of which 

member.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 [now 7501] of T

provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence ma

cretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of 

whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in 

of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right o

or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department 

the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the U

Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities o

Government departments and agencies in the interest of national sec

be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Securi

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concern

intelligence activities of the Government departments and ag

relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Counc

coordination of such intelligence activities of the departm

agencies of the Government as relate to the national security

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national 

and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such int

within the Government using where appropriate existing agen

facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, s

law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions: Prov

ther, That the departments and other agencies of the Governm

continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate depa

intelligence: And provided further, that the Director of Centr
190

methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies

additional services of common concern as the National Se

Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centra

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli

affecting the national security as the National Security Counci

from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Co

approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and a

the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the nation

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence

intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by su

ments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter 

shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for c

evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the writt

of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal 

Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intellig

information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be e

the national security.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) o

tion has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, F

ary 5, 1946 shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence 

are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such 

shall cease to exist. Any unexpected balances of appropriations

cations, or other such funds available or authorized to be made 

able for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized 

made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. 
191

1945-1989572

Truman Administration 1945-1953

● NSCIDs Nos. 1-15 were promulgated by the end of Truman’

tration. NSCID No. 1, “Duties and Responsibilities,” replac

5.573 NSCID No. 9 created the National Security Agency.574

1949 First Hoover Commission (Eberstadt Report)

Selected Major Findings/Comments:

● National Security Organization, established by National Se

of 1947, [to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working we

● Principal concern was the adversarial relationship and lack 

nation between the CIA, the military and the State Departm

ing in unnecessary duplication and the issuance of dep

intelligence reports that have often been subjective and biase

● Particular concern noted in professionalism of military in

and inadequacies of medical and scientific research.577 

572Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boerstling, “Appendix C, IC21: The 

Community in the 21st Century,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Con

Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 February 1996), URL:<http://www.ac

congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html>, accessed 11 May 2004. Cited hereaft

Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. If this source document indicated the nu

mendations noted in the original reports then this author indicated the number in pa

CRS authors provided a summary review and this author further delineated their eff

pose of her report. 573Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, D

the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 7. 574According to author James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on Americ

Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), 55, President Truman mandate

24 October 1952 memorandum, that NSA be established effective 4 November of th

officially acknowledged the creation of the agency when he signed NSCID No. 9 on 

1952 (citation as in Elkins, 20). 575The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Governmen

Report on National Security Organization, Appendix G, January 1949, 3 (citation a

and Boerstling, 6). Cited hereafter as the Eberstadt Report, CRS Report, Appendix 

ary 1996. 576 Eberstadt Report, 76, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 577 Eberstadt Report, 77, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
192

● Positive efforts [must] be made to foster relations of mutua

dence between [CIA] and the several departments and age

serves.578

● Stressed that the “CIA must be the central organization of the n

intelligence system”579 and favored a civilian DCI with a long 

office.580

● Supported establishing a legal framework for budgetary pro

and authority and in maintaining the CIA budget secret to 

“administrative flexibility and anonymity that are essential to s

tory intelligence.581 

● U.S. needs a central authority to collect, collate, and evaluate sc

and medical intelligence.582

1949 Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Repo

Major Findings/Comments:

● Many recommendations highly critical of the CIA and DCI.583

● Criticized the quality of national intelligence estimates and DC

ure to take charge of the estimate production.584

● CIA’s current trend in secret intelligence should be reversed in 

its mandated role as coordinator of intelligence.585

Recommendations (56): 

● Proposed large-scale reorganization of the CIA to end overlapp

duplication of functions.

● Incorporate covert operations and clandestine intelligen

one office586 as well as replacing existing CIA offices wi

578 Eberstadt Report, 16, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 579 Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Governm

(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 293 (citation as note

and Boerstling, 7). 580 Darling, Arthur B., Introduction to Chapter VIII (citation as noted in Best and B

581 Darling, Arthur B, 18 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 7). 582 Eberstadt Report, 289, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 583 “The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence: A R

National Security Council, “1 January 1949 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 8)

after as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1

584 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 5, 11, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1

585 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 39, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 199
193

operations.

● Increased coordination between DCI and Director, FBI in t

counterespionage.588

NOTE: This commission played a role in creating the Board of N

mates (BNE). The BNE, designed to review and produce National 

Estimates (NIEs), was assisted by an Office of National Estimates 

drew upon the resources of the entire community.589

1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

● Further expanded the authorities of the CIA. Admin authorit

the establishment of procurement authority and travel and t

personnel.

● Transfer and receive funds from other government agencies.

● DCI responsible for protecting sources and methods.

● CIA exempted from laws requiring disclosure of its operati

nization, people, function, salary, number of employees).

● DCI could admit up to 100 aliens per year

● DCI could certify appropriated funds expenditures. Did n

conform to other reporting laws.590

Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961

1954 Doolittle Report

Major Findings/Comments:

● CIA properly placed in the organization and laws relating to 

tions were sufficient.591

586Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 129, 134 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 Febr

587Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 11 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1

588Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 58 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1

589 The work of the BNE is described in Donald P. Steury ed., Sherman Kent and 

National Estimates: Collected Essays (Washington: Center for the Study of Intellig

(citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 9). 590David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intel

1943-1947 (Lawrence: KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 166. 591 The Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, 30 Se

Appendix A, 54 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 11). Cited hereafter as Do

CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
194

● Called for more efficient internal administration...natural tend

over classify documents originating in the Agency.592

● Increase cooperation between the clandestine and analytical s

the CIA.593

1955 Second Hoover Commission (Task Force on Intelligence A

Selected Major Finding/Comment:

● Need to reform CIA’s internal organization 

Recommendations (9):

● Day-to-day administration of CIA delegated to executive of

chief of staff so DCI can concentrate on issues affecting th

Community.594

● Establish a congressional oversight committee and a presidenti

sory committee.595

● Systematic rechecking of all personnel every five years...to ma

tain that none has succumbed to some weakness of intoxicants 

ual perversion.596 NOTE: This is the first time, the term “intel

community” linked departmental agencies and the CIA.597

1958 NSCID 1 Revisions

● Eisenhower approved the first major revisions to NSCID 1 a

preamble stressing the need for efficiency across the entire n

security effort. Also, added community responsibilities and cre

United States Intelligence Board (USIB).598

1959 Bruce-Lovett

592 Doolittle Report 14, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 593 Doolittle Report 17, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 594 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, A Re

gress, Intelligence Activities, June 1955, 70-71 (citation as noted by Best and Boerstlin

hereafter as Clark Task Force Report, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996 595 Clark Task Force Report, 71, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 596 Clark Task Force Report, 74, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 597 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, A Re

Congress, Intelligence Activities, June 1955, 13 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstlin

598 Warner, 8.
195

● Criticized the CIA for being too heavily involved in Th

intrigues while neglecting the hard intelligence on t

Union.599

Recommendations:

■ U.S. reassess its approach to covert action programs, and a perma

tative position be created to assess the viability and impact of 

programs.600

1959 National Security Act of 1959

Kennedy Administration 1961-1963

1961 Taylor Commission

Major Findings/Comments:

● Evenly critical of the White House, the CIA, the State Depar

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their roles in Operation Zapa

Pigs).601 

Recommendations:

● Creation of the Strategic Resources Group (SRG)—mech

planning and coordination of overall Cold War strategy,

● Seek JCS opinions in planning paramilitary operations,

● Review of policy constraints placed upon U.S. 

● Reaffirmed its commitment to ousting Castro from power.60

599 Peter Grose, Gentlemen Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mi

445-458 (citation as noted in Best, 12). Cited hereafter as Bruce-Lovett, CRS Repo

IC21 February 1996. 600Bruce-Lovett, 447-448, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 601Bruce-Lovett, 532 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 602The report was published as Operation Zapata: The “Ultrasensitive” Report 

of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs (Frederick, MD: University Publications 

Inc., 1981) 40 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 14).
196

Major Findings/Comments:

● CIA IG internal investigation which criticized the CIA Direct

Plans for not having consulted the CIA’s Cuban analysts bef

invasion. CIA bore the blame.603

Recommendations:

● No recommendations were identified in source material. CIA 

the report as a personal attack on CIA and DCI Dulles. The few 

who read the report characterized it as professionally shabby.60

Johnson Administration 1963-1969

Due to the U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam, with the exception o

ren Commission investigating the Kennedy assassination, there were 

investigations.

Nixon Administration 1969-1974

1971 A Review of the Intelligence Community (Schlesinger Re

Major Findings/Comments (47):

● Noted the community’s “impressive rise in...size and cost” w

“apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement 

scope and overall quality of intelligence products.”605

● Criticized unproductively [sic] duplicative collection systems 

failure in forward planning to coordinate the allocat

resources.606

603 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA 

Simon and Schuster, 1995), 268 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 15). 604 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon 

Schuster, 1987), 278 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 14). 605 A Review of the Intelligence Community, 10 March 1971, 1 (citation as noted in 

Cited hereafter as Schlesinger Report, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 606 Schlesinger Report, 8-9, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
197

● Considered the creation of Director of National Intelligen

enhancing DCI’s authority, and establishing a Coordinator o

Intelligence (CNI) as White House-level overseer of the IC.6

NOTE: The Schlesinger Report led to a limited reorganizatio

IC under presidential directives dated 5 November 1971. This 

called for: An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in p

reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activi

in the production of national intelligence.608 Two boards we

lished—Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) t

the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated IC budget and th

gence Community Staff (ICS) to assist the DCI in guiding t

Nonetheless, both boards lacked statutory authority necess

IRAC did not have statutory authority to bring the intelligenc

under DCI control and the ICS did not have statutory authorit

sary for an expanded community-wide role.609

1972 NSCID 1 Revisions

● Nixon issued a directive based on the Schlesinger Report gra

more authority. NCS approved second major revision to NSC

● Added four major DCI responsibilities: 

● Plan and review all intelligence activities and spending, 

submitting annually to the White House the IC’s overall 

program/budget;

● Produce national intelligence for the President and 

policymakers;

● Chair all community-wide advisory panels;

● Establish intelligence requirements and priorities.610

607 Schlesinger Report, 25-33, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 608 “Reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Weekly Compilation o

Documents, 4 November 1971, 1467-1491, 1482 (citation as noted in Best, 16). 609 Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 16 January 1962; quot

89-414F, 46 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 17). 610 Warner, 9.
198

1975 Commission on the Organization of the Government for 

Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission)

Major Findings/Comments:

● Noted the fundamental difficulty that while the DCI has line au

over the CIA he only has limited influence over other intel

agencies, but the Commission did not think this arrangement 

be changed.611

Recommendations: 

● DCI have an office close to the White House and be accorded 

and direct contact with the President.612

● Strengthen PFIAB and more intensive review of covert ope

prior to their initiation but although Congress should be noti

President should not sign such notification since it is harmful 

ciate “the Head of State so formally with such activities.”613

● Intelligence requirements and capabilities process needs to be 

lished at the NSC-level in a officially approved five-year plan. 

prepare a consolidated foreign intelligence budget614

● Replacement of BNE with eleven National Intelligence O

(NIOs) to draft the NIEs.615

1975 Commission on CIA Activities within the United States

(Rockefeller Commission)

Major Findings/Comments:

● Concerned with CIA internal security activities—infiltra

domestic organizations, collection of information about U.S. 

domestic activity and drug use and communications equipment 

on unsuspecting persons.

611 U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of For

Report, June 1975, 92 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 17). Cited hereafter as 

Report, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 612 Murphy Report, 98-99, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 613 Murphy Report, 100-101, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 614 Murphy Report, 101, CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 615 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
199

resources improperly.

Recommendations:

● Number of proposals to delimit CIA’s authority to colle

intelligence within the United States.

● Consideration given to appointing DCIs from outside of CI

no DCI serve longer than 10 years. Also, two deputies 

appointed; one to serve as administrative officers and the oth

itary officer.

● FBI and CIA submit to NSC a detailed agreement setting f

dictions of each agency and proposal for effective liaisons be

two.

● All intelligence agencies review their classified holdings a

sify as much as possible.617

1975 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Ope

Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee)

Major Findings/Comments:

● Concentrated on illegalities and improprieties by the CIA 

revelations about assassination plots organized by the CIA. 

its mandate extended to all intelligence agencies.618

Recommendations (183):

● Omnibus legislation be enacted to spell out purposes o

intelligence activities and define the relationship betw

activities and Congress; urged intelligence agencies char

and responsibilities; and prohibitions or limitations on cert

gence activities.

● Presidential authorization and congressional committee n

for covert action activities.

● DCI should be recognized by statute as the President’s prin

eign advisor and responsible for preparing the national in

616 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 617CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 618CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
200

viding guidance to intelligence operations.

● Monies for national intelligence budget should be appropriate

DCI rather than to IC directors.

● Deputy DCI for the IC should be established.

● Recommended barring political assassinations, efforts to subve

ocratic governments, and support for police/internal security fo

violations of human rights.

1976 House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committe

Major Findings/Comments:

Recommendations: 

● Except in time of war, covert actions should not include assass

congressional oversight committee notified within 48 hours o

dential approval of covert actions; and that, covert actions te

no later than 12 months from the date of approval or reconside

● All intelligence-related items must be included in the Presiden

get and that this figure be disclosed.

● Prohibit transfer of funds between intelligence agencies a

reprogramming of funds within agencies would require congre

approval.

● DCI should be separate from managing the CIA.

● DIA should be abolished and its functions split between the C

OSD.

● CIA should be divided into two separate agencies, one for analy

one for clandestine and covert operations.619

1976 Senate Committee on Government Operation Hearings (

and Cline Proposals)

Recommendations (Clifford):

● Create the position of Director of General Intelligenc

serve as the President’s chief advisor on Intelligence ma

and as principal point of contact with congressional in

gence committees.620

619 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996, 23-25. 620 U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Government 

Oversight of U.S. Government Intelligence, Functions, Hearings, 21 January – 6 Febru

203-204 (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 25).
201

● DCI given broad powers over the entire IC and that CIA b

into two agencies—one for analysis and one for clandestine 

● DCI be elevated to cabinet-rank.621

1976 Executive Order 11095 

● Identified DCI as the President’s primary intelligence ad

principal spokesperson for the IC. Responsible for devel

NFIP.

● Delineated responsibilities of each intelligence agency.

● Established three-member Intelligence Oversight Board (IO

● Placed restrictions on physical and electronic surveillance 

can citizens.622

Carter Administration 1976-80

1978 Executive Order 12036 

● Superseded EO 11905. 

● Formally recognized the establishment of the NFIP.623

● DCI now had full and exclusive responsibility for approva

budget.624 Note: During the Carter Administration, DCI 

Turner was given budget authority over the DIA and Pentag

gence arms. However, this EO was rescinded by President R

1978-80 Proposed Charter Legislation

Recommendations:

● The draft National Intelligence Reorganization and Refor

1978 would have provided statutory charters to all intellige

cies and created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) t

head of the entire IC but it was never reported out of either 

621 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996. 622 Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976, United States Foreign Intelligenc

summarized in Alfred B.Prados, Intelligence Reform: Recent History and Proposals

88-562 F, 18 August 1988, 18. 623 Executive Order 12036, 24 January 1978, United States Intelligence Activitie

624 Warner, 10. 625 “Can Spy Agencies Ever Work Together,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 July 
202

Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (P.L.95-811) was enacted.

● 96th Congress introduced charter legislation as well but only 

alone legislation passed such as the bill reducing the number o

mittees requiring notification of covert actions. 626

1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

● Established comprehensive legal standards and procedures for 

of electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence and cou

telligence within the United States. This was the first legislative 

rization for wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveilla

intelligence purposes against foreign powers and foreign agent

ated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).627

Reagan Administration 1980-88

1981 Executive Order 12333 

● Detailed the roles, responsibilities, missions, and activities of t

● Designated the DCI as the primary intelligence advisor to th

dent and NSC on national foreign intelligence.

● Granted the DCI full responsibility for the production and dis

tion of national foreign intelligence. 628

● Granted the DCI more explicit authority over the development

mentation, and evaluation of the NFIP.629

1985 Turner Proposal

Recommendations:

● Reduce the emphasis on covert action.

● Implement a charter of the IC.

● Separate the DCI and Director, CIA; create Director of N

Intelligence.630

626 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996, 25-26. 627 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Special Report of the S

mittee on Intelligence 4 January 1995 to 3 October 1996, 105th Cong. 1st sess., 1997. 

1, 15-16. 628 Section 1.5 (a, d,e,h,k), Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United States 

Activities (citation as noted in Best and Boerstling, 27). 629 Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, CT: 

1992), 107. 630 CRS Report, Appendix C, IC21 February 1996.
203

Recommendations (Tower Commission):

● Establish procedures for covert actions.

Recommendations (Congressional Select Committees):

● Presidential findings should be made prior to initiation 

action, in writing, and should be made known to select m

Congress no later than 48 hours after approval.

● If extremely sensitive then only four congressional membe

notified instead of the existing requirement for eight.631

631 U.S. Congress, 100th Congress, 1st session, Senate Select Committee on Se

Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and U.S. House of Representat

Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Report of the Cong

mittee Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Add

S. Rept 100-216/H. Rept. 100-433, 17 November 1987, 423-427 (citation as note

Boerstling, 28).

205

Intelligence Reform 1990-2000632

Bush Administration, 1989-1993

1992 Boren-McCurdy 

These were separate plans for omnibus restructuring of the IC in

the Senate (Boren) and the House (McCurdy). These plans, the Sen

gence Reorganizations Act of 1992 and the House’s companion bill, 

as an intelligence counterpart to the Goldwater-Nichols Departmen

Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly known as the Goldwater-

Both proposals recommended:

● Creating Director of National Intelligence with authority t

and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the IC to in

DOD and to direct their expenditures; task intelligence age

temporarily transfer personnel;

● Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (

one for analysis and estimates and the other for IC affairs;

● Creating a separate Director, CIA, subordinate to DNI;

● Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the IC;

● Creating a National Imagery Agency within DOD to collec

and analyze imagery. (House version would divide these e

two separate agencies)

● Authorizing the Director, DIA to task defense agencies with 

requirements and to shift personnel, funds, functions from 

intelligence agency to another.633

The effort would have provided statutory mandates for agencies 

tional authority was created by executive branch mandates. However

tion was not adopted, although provisions were added to FY1994 

Authorization Act (P.L. 102-496) that provided basic charters for 

agencies and set forth in law the DCI’s coordinative responsibili

632 Richard A. Best, Jr., “Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004,” 

Congress, RL32500, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library o

July 2004, CRS-30, >URL:http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf>>, accesse

2004. Cited hereafter as CRS Report, July 2004. Note: The is an updated version o

compilation entitled, Appendix C, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st C

ard A. Best, Jr., and Herbert Andrew Boerstling. 633CRS Report, July 2004, CRS-30.
206

Armed Services Committee inhibited its passage.

1992 Intelligence Organization Act

● This Act passed as part of the Intelligence Authorization A

1993; much of its text came from the S.2198 introduced by S

tor Boren (see above).

● Specified the roles of the DCI for the first time (as oppos

duties).

● Codified the DCI’s budget powers by requiring DCI approv

IC budgets before incorporating into NFIP and prior app

before reprogramming any NFIP funds.

● Upon approval of White House, Congress, and affected agen

head, the DCI could shift funds and personnel from one N

program to another.635

Clinton Administration, 1993-2000

1995 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-35)636

● Increasing number of military deployments necessitated the 

for tactical intelligence support. The IC support of this dire

resulted in a diversion of shrinking national, strategic in

gence resources to growing, tactical missions.637

● Divided intelligence priority into hard targets, upper tier gr

such as the rogue states and transnational issues and global 

erage (lower tier) includes everything else.

634CRS Report, July 2004, CRS-31. 635 Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, DC: 

the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 12. 636 Intelligence Community officers told the Joint Inquiry in U.S. Congress, Senate, 

mittee on Intelligence and House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint I

Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 1

107th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792, December 2002, C. Sy

ings, 49 that the lack of adequate separation between tiers made it difficult to choose be

ities and intelligence prioritization was often confusing. An NSA official described PD

cumbersome. For example, NSA had some 1,500 formal requirements by 11 Septembe

ering virtually covering every situation and target. Almost 200,000 Essential Elements 

tion (EEIs) were reflective of these requirements. 637 Warner, 13.
207

Community (Aspin-Brown Commission) 

Report titled “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of 

gence but was commonly known as the Aspin-Brown Report. Th

was formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of 

post-Cold War environment. P.L. 103-359 set forth nineteen separa

the commission to address, including determination of intelligence n

orities in the post-Cold War world, whether or not existing o

arrangements provide the most effective and efficient framework t

needs, and what resources would be necessary to satisfy these requir

● Designating the Attorney General to coordinate law enforce

response to global crime. Sharing of information between L

should be improved.

● Establishing two new DCI deputies—one for IC and one f

day management of CIA. Both would be Senate-confirmed p

● DCI would concur with appointments of heads of national in

elements within DoD and evaluate their performance.

● Realignment of intelligence budgeting procedures with 

(SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT) managers.

● Recommended disclosing the intelligence budget.

● With regard to congressional oversight, appointments to in

committees should be treated like appointments to other con

committees rather than set number of years. 639

1995-96 IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (a H

Study)

House Intelligence Committee Staff Study undertook a major r

roles, functions and structure of the Intelligence Community. Speci

ommendations initially called for a major restructuring of the Com

lowing are selected recommendations:

● DCI stronger voice in appointment of directors of NFIP age

● DCI should have greater programmatic control of intelligen

and intelligence personnel.

● Establish within the NSC a Committee on Foreign Intelligen

638CRS Report, Appendix C, February 1996, 29-30. 639CRS Report, July 2004, CRS-32.
208

duction and one for IC-wide budgeting, requirements and co

management and tasking, consolidated infrastructure managem

system acquisition.

● Create a Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) to serve as p

manager of JMIP and program coordinator for TIARA.

● Establish a Community Management Staff (CMS) with I

authority over, and coordination of, requirements, resources, a

lection.

● Separate the Clandestine Service (all human intelligence) fr

CIA and report directly to the DCI.

● Establish a Technical Collection Agency.

● Establish common standards and protocols for technical collect

tems, from collection through processing, exploitation and dissem

● Establish a Technology Development Office to perform Com

R&D functions.

● House Intelligence Committee should be made a standing com

without tenure limits.640

1997 Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996

● Required the SecDef to win concurrence of DCI for appoi

directors to NSA, NIMA, and NRO; DCI would also write 

formance appraisals for these directors.

● DDCI for Community Management and ADCI for Collec

Analysis and Production, and Administration.

According to Odom, this Act did not change the basic structure of th

changes, while probably beneficial, must be regarded as largely cosm

ernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century (Fa

National Institute for Public Policy, 1997), 6.

1999-01 Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st 

(Hart-Rudman Commission)

The Hart-Rudman Commission did not specifically address in

reform. This Commission looked at the United States government as 

The final reports of this Committee encompassed three and one-hal

effort, which culminated in three substantive reports published separate

(1999), Phase II (2000), and Phase III (2001). 

640CRS Report, July 2004, CRS-33.
209

First Quarter of the 21st Century (15 September 1999

The Commission articulated 12 beliefs about the future that laid th

upon which their conclusions were drawn.

Conclusions for the next twenty-five years:

1. America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attac

homeland, and our military superiority will not protect us.

2. Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will cr

vulnerabilities for U.S. security.

3. New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it toge

4. The national security of all advanced states will be inc

affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global econom

structure.

5. Energy will continue to have major strategic significance.

6. All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some wi

7. The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will e

8. Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizin

on neighboring states.

9. Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate 

ing of civilian populations.

10. Space will become a critical and competitive military enviro

11. The essence of war will not change.

12. U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, 

excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.

13. The United States will be called upon frequently to interven

ily in a time of uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fe

ward-deployed forces.

14. The emerging security environment in the next century wil

different military and other national capabilities.641

641Hart and Rudman Phase I Report, 4-7.
210

goals in a new age, Americas priority objectives and key policy objec

be these:

● Defend the United States and ensure that it is safe from the dan

a new era.

● To maintain America’s social cohesion, economic competiti

technological ingenuity, and military strength.

● To assist the integration of key major powers, especially China, 

and India, into the mainstream of the emerging international syst

● To promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global ec

and improve the effectiveness of international institutions and 

tional law.

● To adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new 

which America’s partners seek greater autonomy and responsib

The Hart-Rudman Commission stipulated the five kinds of military 

ties that United States requires in this new environment:

● Nuclear capabilities to deter and protect the United States and i

from attack

● Homeland security capabilities

● Conventional capabilities necessary to win major wars

● Rapid employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities

● Humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.643

2001 Phase III Report Road Map for National Security: Impe

Change (published 15 February 2001)

The Commission proposed structural changes with recommendatio

key areas:

● Ensuring the security of the American homeland

● Recapitalizing key institutions in science and education

● Redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch

● Overhauling the U.S. government’s military and civilian pe

systems

● Reorganizing Congress’s role in national security affairs.644

642Hart and Rudman Phase II Report Key Objectives, 8-12. 643 Hart and Rudman Phase II Report, Implications for National Security, 14. 644 Hart-Rudman Phase III Report, viii.
211

did not require change. However, it did look at the supporting role 

plays and identified three areas of emphasis, “steps,” that when unde

promote successful implementation of the other report recommendat

● Recommend that the President order the setting of nation

gence priorities through National Security Council guidan

DCI.

● IC should emphasize the recruitment of HUMINT sources 

ism as one of its highest priorities, and ensure that existing o

guidelines support this policy.

● The Community should place new emphasis on collection an

of economic and science/technology security concerns, an

rate more open source intelligence into its analytical produc

Phase III Recommendations

These fifty recommendations are listed in order of presentation in 

document, Appendix 1, The Recommendations, The United States 

on National Security/21st Century. The original document was co

indicate recommendations that could be implemented via Congres

(red), Executive Order (blue) or agency head or congressional leader

Phase III Recommendations- Securing the Homeland

1. The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to 

America’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of atta

homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and p

fail.

2. The President should propose, and Congress should create, a 

Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibilities for p

coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities 

in homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management 

(FEMA)should be a key building block in this effort.

3. The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the 

Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the NHSA, while 

ing them as distinct entities.

645 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change—The Phase III Rep

Commission on National Security/21st Century, 15 February 2001, URL: http://ww

accessed 1 November 2003. Hereafter cited as Hart-Rudman Phase III Report.
212

include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of an

assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and pr

National Intelligence Estimates on these threats.

5. The President should propose to Congress the establishment 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the 

of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.

6. The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should 

homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, an

Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equip

undertake that mission.

7. Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland 

rity issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight. Members s

be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligenc

enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include me

of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio me

from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.

Phase III Recommendations-Recapitalizing America’s Strength

ence and Education

8. The President should propose, and the Congress should support

bling the U.S. government’s investment in science and technology 

by 2010.

9. The President should empower his Science Advisor to establish 

military R&D objectives that meet changing national needs, and 

responsible for coordinating budget development within the re

departments and agencies.

10. The President should propose, and the Congress should fun

reorganization of the national laboratories, providing individual lab

ries with new mission that minimize overlap.

11. The President should propose, and Congress should pass, a Na

Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) wit

sections: reduced-interest loans and scholarships for students to p

degrees in science, mathematics, and engineering; loan forgivene

scholarships for those in these fields entering government or milita

vice; a National Security Teaching Program to foster science and 
213

opment of science and math teachers.

12. The President should direct the Department of Education 

with the states to devise a comprehensive plan to avert a loomi

age of quality teachers. This plan should emphasize raising teac

pensation, improving infrastructure support, reforming the cer

process, and expanding existing programs targeted at districts w

cially acute problems.

13. The President and Congress should devise a targeted pro

strengthen the historically black colleges and universities in our 

and should particularly support those that emphasize science, m

ics, and engineering. 

Phase III Recommendations-Institutional Redesign

14. The President should personally guide a top-down strategic 

process and delegate authority to the National Security Advisor 

dinate that process.

15. The President should prepare and present to the Congress a

national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge 

NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President sho

tinue to submit budgets for individual national security departm

agencies for Congressional review and appropriations.

16. The NSC should be responsible for advising the Presiden

coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, 

defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement act

well as the traditional national security agenda. The NSC Adv

staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policyma

operational role.

17. The President should propose to the Congress that the Sec

Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security C

18. The President should abolish the National Economic Counci

uting its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Dome

icy Council and its international economic responsibilities 

National Security Council.

19. The President should propose to Congress a plan to reorg

State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with the respo
214

Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the 

Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would o

in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management.

20. The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. A

for International Development be consolidated into the State Depar

21. The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic 

ning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocat

resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assis

and Budget Office.

22. The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the 

Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, 

would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as wel

expenses for personnel and operations.

23. The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisit

knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to function 

tively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan ad

panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees, 

and non-career alike.

24. The Secretary of Defense should propose to Congress a restruc

plan for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Polic

would abolish the office of Assistant Secretary for Special Oper

and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and create a new office of an 

tant Secretary dedicated to Strategy and Planning (S/P).

25. Based on a review of core roles and responsibilities of the sta

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the militar

vices, and the CINCs, the Secretary of Defense should reorganiz

reduce those staffs by ten to fifteen percent.

26. The Secretary of Defense should establish a ten-year goal of red

infrastructure costs by 20 to 25 percent through outsourcing and p

zation as many DoD support agencies as possible.

27. The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should move the 

drennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of a presid

term.
215

require the Services and defense agencies to compete for the allo

some resources within the overall defense budget.

29. The Secretary of Defense should establish and employ a t

acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a second, “fa

for a limited number of potential breakthrough systems, especia

in the area of command and control.

30. The Secretary of Defense should foster innovation by di

return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of 

weapons and support systems.

31. Congress should implement two-year defense budgeting s

the modernization element of the DoD budget (R&D/proc

because of its long-term character, and its should expand the use 

tiyear procurement.

32. Congress should modernize Defense Department auditing a

sight requirements by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, 

and the Federal Acquisition Regulations.

33. The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to shif

threat-based force sizing process to one which measures requ

against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence e

of potential adversaries’ capabilities, and national security ob

once these are formulated in the new administration’s national 

strategy.

34. The Defense Department should devote its highest prio

improving and furthering expeditionary capabilities.

35. The President should establish an Interagency Working G

Space (IWGS) at the National Security Council to coordinate al

of the nation’s space policy, and place on the NSC staff those 

necessary expertise in this area.

36. The President should order the setting of national intelligenc

ties through National Security Council guidance to the Director 

tral Intelligence.

37. The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize the 

ment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of th

gence Community’s highest priorities, and ensure that op
216

values and principles.

38. The Intelligence Community should place new emphasis on c

tion and analysis of economic and science/technology security con

and incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical pro

Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing signifi

the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for coll

and analysis.

Phase III Recommendations-The Human Requirements for Na

Security

39. Congress should significantly expand the National Security E

tion Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, huma

and foreign languages in exchange for military and civilian service 

nation.

40. The Executive and Legislative Branches should cooperate to 

the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the impedi

that have made high-level public service undesirable to many 

guished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number o

ate confirmed and non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) po

by 25 percent; shorten the appointment process; and revise drac

ethics regulations.

41. The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign S

system by revamping the examination process, dramatically impr

the level of on-going professional education, and making leader

core value of the State Department.

42. The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurd

the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring process, and se

that strengthened professional education and retention programs ar

thy of full funding by Congress.

43. The Executive Branch should establish a National Security S

Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide a co

policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Exe

Branch.

44. Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery GI B

well as strengthen recently passed and pending legislation supp
217

fied veterans.

45. Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to d

ize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of enlistm

missioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.

46. The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bi

bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to natio

rity and foreign policy.

47. Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build pro

encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and expe

both national security and foreign policy.

48. Congress should rationalize its current committee structure 

best serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it shou

the current authorizing committee with the relevant appropriati

committee.

49. The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on for

icy and national security consultation with Congress and 

resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation 

priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressio

ers as part of this effort.

50. The President should create an implementing mechanism t

that the major recommendations of this Commission result in th

reforms necessary to ensure American national security and glo

ership over the next quarter century.

219

This appendix contains a collection of reform recommendations f

intelligence and national security specialists. Their respective musin

provided for informational purposes. Interested readers are encourag

original source for more information. Also, a membership listing 

whenever the committee composition was identified. Interestingly

missioners are repeat performers such as Brent Scowcroft, Gary Hart

ton, Bob Kerrey, James Schlesinger (now deceased), R. James W

Warren B. Rudman. The Washington Post refers to these wise men—

former government luminaries—as a small club of professional 

who are called in to take over where our elected representatives find 

dangerous to handle. The Post reports, “As the federal government in 

punts its problems to commissions, the commission-sitters p

Solomonic advice, which is then generally ignored—until the 

demands the formation of a new commission.”646

1994/95 Colloquium The Intelligence Community: Is it Broke

to Fix It?647

Robert Gates’ suggestions for a starting agenda:

● Areas of greatest savings for the intelligence budget lie in th

intelligence arena. DMI should be created. Keep decentraliz

ing functions.

● Do not duplicate military intelligence analysis in the Co

Give DIA the CIA military analysis efforts.

● Eliminate the differentiation between the NFIP and TIARA

comes to technical collection systems, national systems a

systems.

● Complete the vertical integration of stovepipes—the colle

tems. Create the National Imagery Agency.

● Build an open-source gateway.

● Need a new requirements and evaluation process.

● CIA needs to be smaller and more focused. Covert, paramili

bility should be moved out of CIA and into DoD. 

646Dana Milbank, “The Small Bundle of Names Tied Up With Blue Ribbons,” T

Post, 4 February 2004, C9. 647 John H. Hedley, A Colloquium: The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? 

URL: http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/index.htm. 
220

administrative structures.

● DCI should continue to be head of CIA.

● IC needs to accelerate move toward greater openness.

● If IC doesn’t change, it will be forced upon the Community.

Colloquium Members:

Chairman, The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.

The Honorable Robert M. Gates The Honorable Dan Glickman

The Honorable Lee Hamilton LTG William E. Odom (Ret)

Gen Brent Scowcroft (Ret) Anthony Arend

Les Aspin Charles Battaglia

Charles Cogan Chester Crocker

Carl Ford Gary Foster

Alton Frye Tobi Gati

Allan Goodman David Gries

John Hollister Hedley Jim Hoagland

Sarah Holmes William G. Hyland

Max M. Kapelman Richard J. Kerr

Brian Latell Douglas MacEachin

John M. McMahon Cranwell Montgomery

Walter Pincus Elizabeth Rindskopf

Britt Snider Christopher Straub

George Tenet Thomas G. Weston

Casimir A. Yost

1995 Aspin-Brown Commission

The Commission was formed to assess the future direction, prio

structure of the IC in the post-Cold War environment.

Committee Members:

Chairman, Harold Brown Former Chairman,

Les Aspin (Deceased)

Vice-Chairman, Gen Lew Allen, Jr., 

Warren B. Rudman USAF, (Ret)
221

Tony Coelho David H. Dewhurst

Representative Norman D. Dicks Senator J. James Exon

Wyche Fowler, Jr., Stephen Friedman

Representative Porter J. Goss Anthony S. Harrington

Robert J. Hermann Lt Gen Robert E. Pursley,

USAF, (Ret)

Senator John Warren Paul D. Wolfowitz

1996 LTG James R. Clapper, Jr.(Ret) Radical Ruminations

Radical Ruminations Premise:

● Conduct all national collection as a coherent, unitary activity

● Designate/empower a single national collection “czar”

—Bring all intelligence resources to bear operationally, reg

of stovepipe “INTs”

—Enable systematic, meaningful trade-off between/among

collection disciplines

—Don’t end individual/unique endeavors of “INTs”

Structure/organization:

● “Re-invent” DIRNSA as collection czar

● Transition gradually

—Technical/open source collection first

—HUMINT later 

● Reassign INFOSEC missions

—Free “protective IW” role of “spy baggage”

—Let NSA focus on homogeneous intelligence missions

648 LTG James R. Clapper, Jr. (RET), “A Proposed Restructuring of the Intellige

nity,” Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard Univer

sentations, Spring 1996, Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and C

1997, URL: http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/clapper/clapper-i97-1.pdf>, accessed 
222

endeavors, regardless of regime/medium

Processes:

● “One-stop shopping” for collection requirements

● Customers express one intelligence need—not in four dis

unique languages

● Conduct all national production as a coherent, unitary activitiy

● Designate/empower a single national production “czar”

—Maintain institutional integrity of production centers, but c

cate resources where appropriate

—Designate authoritative executive agents

Infrastrucuture:

● Establish infrastructure “czar,” but retain information mana

within collection/production elements

● Infrastructure officer also heads national services staff that c

manages and decentrally executes:

—Security

—Personnel

—Administration

—Pay and finances

—Logistics

—Training and education

—Etc.

1999-2001 The United States Commission on National Security/21s

Committee Members:

Executive Director, Gen Charles G. Boyd (Ret)

Co-Chairman, Gary Hart Co-Chairman, Warren B. Rud

Commissioners:

Anne Armstrong Norman R. Augustine

John Dancy John R. Galvin

Leslie H. Gelb Newt Gingrich
223

Donald B. Rice James Schlesinger

Harry D. Train Andrew Young

2002 Joint inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities B

After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI 107th Congress)6

Chairman, Bob Graham (D-FL)

Vice Chairman, Richard C. Shelby (R-AL)

Carl Levin (D-MI) Jon Kyl (R-AZ)

John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) James M. Inhofe (R-OK)

Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) Orrin Hatch (R-UT)

Ron Wyden (D-OR) Pat Roberts (R-KS)

Richard J. Durbin (D-IL) Mike DeWine (R-OH)

Evan Bayh (D-IN) Fred Thompson (R-TN)

John Edwards (D-NC) Richard Lugar (R-IN)

Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI 107t

Congress)650

Chairman, Porter J. Goss (R-FL)

Ranking Democrat, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)

Doug Bereuter (R-NE) Sanford D. Bishop (D-GA)

Michael N. Castle (R-DE) Jane Hartman (D-CA)

Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY) Gary A. Condit (D-CA)

Jim Gibbons (R-NV) Tim Roemer (D-IN)

Ray LaHood (R-IL) Silvestre Heyes (D-TX)

Randy “Duke” Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA)

Cunningham (R-CA)

Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) Collin C. Peterson (D-MN)

649U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perman

mittee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before 

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 107-351 an

792, December 2002, viii. Cited hereafter as Joint Inquiry Report. 650 Joint Inquiry Report, ix.
224

Saxby Chambliss (R-GA)

Terry Everett (R-AL)

Joint House/Senate Inquiry Staff651

Director, Eleanor Hill Previous Director, Britt Snider 

Deputy Director, Rick Cinquegrana

David Barton Ann Barton

Daniel Byman Michael Davidson

George Ellard Rahul Gupta

Kay Holt John Ivicic

Michael Jacobson Everette Jordon

Miles Kara John Keefe

Thomas Kelley Dana Lesemann

Patti Littman Catherine Lotrionte

(departed summer 2002)

Arthur Menna Lewis Moon

Patrica Ravalgi Alonzo Robertson

Robert Rosenwald Michael Smith

Catherine Williams

2003 LTG (Ret) William E. Odom’s Recommendations652

Extracted from his book Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure 

However, the book is based principally on a study supported and publis

National Institute for Public Policy in 1997 entitled, Modernizing In

Structure and Change for 21st Century. Odom was Chairman of the Stu

● Make no statutory changes in the DCI’s authority.

● Strengthen the role of the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

● Relocate the Directorate of Intelligence.

● Restructure the CMS.

● Retain the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Intel

Community Executive Committee.

651 Joint Inquiry Report, x. 652 William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America (New Haven

University Press, 2003).
225

● Keep the Defense Human Intelligence Service as a single DoD 

tion under the operational control of the director of operations o

● Create an overt human intelligence organization within the 

joint activity that coordinates its activities with the CIA as th

human intelligence manager.

● Put all the DIA’s electronic intelligence collection under NS

imagery intelligence collection under NIMA (now NGA).

● Create a DoD counterintelligence management center with o

control and policy, and program management authority ove

tary service counterintelligence capabilities.

● Abolish the National Reconnaissance Office and transfer it

offices to NSA and NIMA. Alternately, retain the NRO but 

independent budget. It would sell its procurement services to 

NIMA, which would include funds for satellite procureme

own budgets. ...Major collection agencies should not have 

tions of their operating assets funded through an indepen

program. All of the foregoing changes are essential to mak

intelligence structure fit the reforms of the IC at large. What 

structure changes make sense within the DoD?

● Make the director of DIA the coordinating manager of all in

support to material and force development—both joint and b

vices.

● Create within the DIA a “net assessment” center, responsib

to the secretary of defense, which makes judgments about th

of U.S. forces versus potential adversary forces as a basis fo

military force requirements.

National Institute for Public Policy Participants:653

Dr. William R. Graham LTG Harry E. Soyster, USA 

Mr. Robert E. Rich Dr. Gregory F. Treverton

Ms. Elisabeth R. Rindskopf, Esq. Lt Gen James R. Clapper,

USAF (Ret)

2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U

(9/11 Commission Report)

653 Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century (VA: 

tute for Public Policy, 1997), cover page.
226

Chair, Thomas H. Kean

Vice Chair, Lee H. Hamilton

Richard Ben-Veniste Bob Kerry

Fred F. Fielding John F. Lehman

Jamie Gorelick Timothy J. Roemer

Slade Gorton James R. Thompson

Commission Staff: Seventy-eight staffers contributed to this effort.

Executive Director, Phillip Zelikow

Deputy Executive Director, Christopher A. Kojm

General Counsel, Daniel Marcus
227

Reports

2002 Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities B

After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Joi

In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct an un

Joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. T

tee was limited to approximately one year’s duration.654

These findings are presented verbatim from the Joint Inquiry 

source document.655

Factual Findings:

1. Finding: While the Intelligence Community had amassed 

deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Laden and 

rorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and 

nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 200

theless, the Community did have information that was clearly 

to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered fo

lective significance.

2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligen

munity experienced a significant increase in information indica

Bin Laden and al Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. intere

very near future.

3. Finding: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer 

the Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively 

stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of 

attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimony and in

confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence Comm

the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Lade

654 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perman

mittee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before 

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 107-351 an

792, December 2002, Part One-Findings and Conclusions, 1. Cited hereafter as Joint 

(section). 655Joint Inquiry Report III. Findings and Conclusions, 7-10.
228

tions of plans and intentions to attack in the domestic United States

4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 

the Intelligence Community received information indicating that 

ists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of a

as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelli

Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reacti

this form of threat.

5. Finding: Although relevant information that is significant in retr

regarding the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community 

to September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus o

information and consider and appreciate its collective significan

terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence Co

nity demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with th

transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in th

stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not 

nized as potentially significant at the time and therefore not di

nated, and some required additional action on the part of f

governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have 

established. For all those reasons, the Intelligence Community fai

capitalize fully on available, and potentially important, information

Note: the Joint Inquiry Committee report further identified ten add

sub-findings which elaborated on the Intelligence Community’s an

cal deficiencies annotated in Finding 5.

Systematic Findings:

The Joint Inquiry identified a number of systemic weaknesses with

According to the Inquiry, “if not addressed, these weaknesses will c

undercut U.S. counterterrorist efforts.” The systemic findings are pres

batim from the Joint Inquiry source document:

1. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community wa

ther well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to 

the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets with

domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collectio

erage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. domestic intelligence cap

ties. The U.S. foreign intelligence agencies paid inadequate attent

the potential for a domestic attack. The CIA’s failure to watchlis

pected terrorists aggressively reflected a lack of emphasis on a p
229

employees failed to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Mazmi. At h

counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective 

intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and moni

tively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international 

groups operating in the United States. Taken together, these p

greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly 

ous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the United 

2. Finding: Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S. Gover

a whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive 

errorist strategy for combating the threat posed by Usama Bi

Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) w

unwilling or unable to marshall the full range of Intelligence Co

resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United S

3. Finding: Between the end of the Cold War and September 1

overall Intelligence Community funding fell or remained even 

stant dollars, while funding for the Community’s counterterroris

increased considerably. Despite those increases, the accumu

intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirements process, th

decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on sup

tal appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community r

effectively against an evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencie

resource and requirements process were compounded by pro

Intelligence Community budgeting practices and procedures.

4. Finding: While technology remains one of this nation’s greate

tages, it has not been fully and most effectively applied in suppor

counterterrorism efforts. Persistent problems in this area includ

of collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a re

to develop and implement new technical capabilities aggressi

FBI’s reliance on outdated and insufficient technical systems, 

absence of a central counterterrorism database.

5. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community

standing of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic f

quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis and 

were not always used effectively because of the perception in so

ters of the Intelligence Community that they were less imp

agency counterterrorism missions than were operations person

quality of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many 

were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without a
230

analysis targeting Bin Laden and a persistent inability to comprehe

collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence. These an

deficiencies seriously undercut the ability of U.S. policymakers to 

stand the full nature of the threat, and to make fully informed decis

6. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community w

prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volum

foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it collected. Ag

within the Intelligence Community experienced backlogs in m

awaiting translation, a shortage of language specialists and lang

qualified field officers and a readiness level of only 30% in the mo

ical terrorism-related languages.

7. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s ab

produce significant and timely signals intelligence on counterterroris

limited by NSA’s failure to address modern communications techn

aggressively, continuing conflict between Intelligence Community age

NSA’s cautious approach to any collection of intelligence relating to 

ties in the United States, and insufficient collaboration between NS

the FBI regarding the potential for terrorist attacks within the United S

8. Finding: The continuing erosion of NSA’s program manag

expertise and experience has hindered its contribution to the fight a

terrorism. NSA continues to have mixed results in providing timely 

nical solutions to modern intelligence collection, analysis, and inf

tion sharing problems.

9. Finding: The U.S. Government does not presently bring toget

one place all terrorism-related information from all sources. Wh

CTC does manage overseas operations and has access to most I

gence Community information, it does not collect terrorism-r

information from all sources, domestic and foreign. Within the I

gence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant coun

rorism information, prior to September 11. This breakdow

communications was the result of a number of factors, including 

ences in the agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures. Inf

tion was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelli

Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and be

the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.

10. Finding: Serious problems in information sharing also per

prior to September 11, between the Intelligence Community and re
231

cies as well as state and local authorities. This lack of commu

and collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the Int

Community, of access to potentially valuable information in th

against Bin Laden. The Inquiry’s focus on the Intelligence Co

limited the extent to which it explored these issues, and this i

that should be reviewed further.

11. Finding: Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Co

did not effectively develop and use human sources to penetrat

Qa’ida inner circle. This lack of reliable and knowledgeabl

sources significantly limited the Community’s ability to acquir

gence that could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks

at least, the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited) counter

sources was a product of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison 

12. Finding: During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence 

nity was bracing for an imminent al-Qa’ida attack, difficulties 

applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 

lance and the FISA process led to a diminished level of coverag

pected al-Qa’ida operatives in the United States. The effect 

difficulties was compounded by the perception that spread am

personnel at Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA pro

lengthy and fraught with peril.

13. Finding: Redacted. Unclassified version not available.

14. Finding: Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use 

itary assets to conduct offensive counterterrorism efforts in Afg

or to support or participate in CIA operations directed against a

prior to September 11. At least part of this reluctance was drive

military’s view that the Intelligence Community was unable to 

the intelligence needed to support military operations. Although 

military did participate in [redacted] counterterrorism efforts to 

Usama Bin Laden’s terrorist network prior to September 11, 20

of the military’s focus was on force protection.

15. Finding: The Intelligence Community depended heavily on 

intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of 

errorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism a

The results were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflec

differences in the ability and willingness of the various foreign 

to target Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida network. Intelligence Co
232

services adequately, either within the Intelligence Community o

broader U.S. Government liaison and foreign policy efforts. This re

on foreign liaison services also resulted in a lack of focus on the de

ment of unilateral human sources.

16. Finding: The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the U

States appear to have been financed, in large part, from monies s

them from abroad and also brought in on their persons. Prior to Se

ber 11, there was no coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy to 

terrorist funding and close down their financial support networks. 

was also a reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government to tra

rorist funding and close down their financial support networks. 

result, the U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial suppo

Usama Bin Laden’s terrorist activities effectively.

17. Finding: Despite intelligence reporting from 1998 through the 

mer of 2001 indicating that Usama Bin Laden’s terrorist ne

intended to strike inside the United States, the United States Gover

did not undertake a comprehensive effort to implement defensive 

sures in the United States.

18. Finding: Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterr

strategy adopted by the U.S. Government did not succeed in elimi

Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground for Usama Bin L

terrorist network. A range of instruments was used to counter al-Q

with law enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because 

means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce r

Although numerous successful prosecutions were generated

enforcement efforts were not adequate by themselves to target or 

nate Bin Laden’s sanctuary. While the United States persisted in o

ing the rule of law and accepted norms of international behavio

Laden and al-Qa’ida recognized no rules and thrived in the safe 

provided by Afghanistan.

19. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community a

U.S. Government labored to prevent attacks by Usama Bin Laden a

terrorist network against the United States, but largely without the b

of an alert, mobilized and committed American public. Despite i

gence information on the immediacy of the threat level in the sprin

summer of 2001, the assumption prevailed in the U.S. Governme

attacks of the magnitude of September 11 could not happen here
233

reality and gravity of the threat.

Recommendations:

These recommendations were condensed by the present author fr

Inquiry Report, Recommendations, December 10, 2002.656 In mo

Joint Inquiry Report offered specific steps to accomplish a particula

dation, as outlined below. 

1. Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to c

sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who 

the President’s principal advisor on intelligence and shall have the 

of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to 

entire U.S. intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. 

subsequent recommendations referring to DNI imply that this fir

mendation has been adopted; otherwise, DCI should be replaced fo

2. Current efforts by the NSC to examine and revamp existin

gence priorities should be expedited, given the immediate need 

guidance in intelligence and counterterrorism efforts.... Fin

establishment of IC priorities, and the justification for such p

should be reported to both the House and Senate Intelligence Co

on an annual basis.

3. The NSC should prepare a U.S. government-wide strategy 

bating terrorism, both at home and aboard....Consistent with a

law, the strategy should effectively employ and integrate all ca

available to the IC against those threats.

4. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism s

created.

5. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full deve

within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective a

terrorism information fusion center.

6. The FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic capabilit

and expeditiously as possible.

7. Congress and the Administration should carefully consider ho

structure and manage U.S. domestic intelligence responsibiliti

656Joint Inquiry Report, Recommendations, 1-17.
234

determine their adequacy in pursuing counterterrorism at hom

ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights guaranteed und

Constitution.

8. The Attorney General and the Director, FBI should take nec

action to ensure FBI and other IC members receive in-depth train

use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to address 

ist threats to the United States; FISA search results are disseminate

timely manner; and FBI assesses the threat of international terr

within the U.S.

9. The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committee 

continue to examine FISA and its implementation thoroughly to dete

whether its provisions adequately address present and emerging thre

10. Director, NSA should present to the DNI and Secretary of Defe

June 30, 2003 and report to the House and Senate Intelligence Co

tees a detailed plan that describes the solutions for the technologica

lenges for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and the products and 

associated with this get-well program (author’s naming conven

Also, NSA collaborates with CIA and FBI within limits of law.

11. DNI should require measures be implemented to greatly enhan

recruitment and development of workforce with the intelligence 

and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts. Specifi

expand and improve counterterrorism training programs; build upo

visions of Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2003 regardin

development of language capabilities; expand existing IC Reserve C

expand and improve educational grant programs focused on intellig

related fields; enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and cult

diverse workforce; and Congress should consider enacting legis

modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the conc

jointness throughout the IC.

12. Steps should be taken to increase and ensure the greatest retu

this nation’s substantial investment in intelligence, including bud

for long-term counterterrorism capabilities; consider a separate cla

IC budget; counterterrorism investment should be accompanied by 

cient flexibility; and outside agency to conduct cost-benefit analy

the resources spent.
235

Congress by June 30, 2003 on the extent to which revisions in 

and multilateral agreements would strengthen U.S. counter

efforts.

14. Congress should maintain vigorous, informed, and construct

sight of the IC. To achieve this, the National Commission on 

Attacks Upon the United States should consider: changes in the 

ary process; changes in the rules regarding membership in the 

committees; whether oversight should remain separate committ

a joint committee; extent that classification decisions impair 

sional oversight; and how congressional oversight can best con

the continuing need of the IC to evolve and adapt to changes in 

ject matter of intelligence and the needs of policymakers.

15. President should review and consider amendments to the E

Orders, polices and procedures that govern national security c

tion of intelligence information, in an effect to expand access to 

information to federal agencies outside the IC, for state and loca

ities, and for the American public. Congress should review the 

policies and procedures that govern the national security classifi

intelligence information and its protection from unauthorized di

16. The DCI should report to the House and Senate Intelligence 

tees no later than June 30, 2003 as to the steps taken to impleme

tem of accountability throughout the IC, to include proce

identifying poor performance and affixing responsibility for it

recognizing and rewarding excellence in performance.

17. The Administration should review and report to the House an

Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 regarding what prog

been made in reducing the inappropriate and obsolete barrier

intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in countert

what needs to be done and what legislative measures are require

18. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full deve

of a national watchlist center that will be responsible for coo

and integrating all terrorist-related watchlist systems.

19. The IC, and in particular the FBI and the CIA, should agg

address the possibility that foreign governments are providing sup

are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. 
236

On 24 March 2004, DCI George Tenet submitted a written Stateme

Record before the 9/11 Commission. He stated that the Joint Inquiry R

made 19 recommendations to improve the nation’s ability to combat 

and that the IC has taken action on all that are within the IC’s control. T

author indicates in parentheses the number associated with the above-

ommendation she believed the IC action addressed. The following a

extracted verbatim from the DCI’s written statement:657

1. The President signed National Security Presidential Directive 

create a dynamic process for articulating and reviewing intelli

priorities. DCI Directive 2/3 established a National Intelligence P

ties Framework as a mechanism to translate the national foreign i

gence objectives and priorities approved by the National Se

Council into specific guidance and resource allocations for the I

gence Community. (2)

2. In February 2003 the President issued the National Strategy for 

bating Terrorism, incorporating strategic planning elements of na

security, homeland security, combating weapons of mass destru

securing cyberspace, and protecting critical infrastructure. (3)

3. The Position of National Intelligence Officer for Transnational T

has been established and an officer and deputy are in place. (4)

4. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center was established in May 2

enable the full integration of terrorist threat-related information and 

ysis. The Center is a joint-venture composed of officers from five 

partners (CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland, Department of De

Department of State), as well as from organizations such as the N

Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, and Capital Polic

Center reports directly to the DCI in his or her statutory capacity a

of the Intelligence Community. (5)

5. The FBI is making considerable progress strengthening and impr

its domestic capability in such fields as counterintelligence, coun

rorism, and analysis and reports. The Bureau has developed a str

plan outlining its top counterterrorism priorities, increased hirin

657George Tenet, “Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intel

Before the National Commission on Terror Attacks Upon the United States,” 24 March 

www.9-11commission.gov//hearings/hearing8/tenet_statement.pdf, accessed 1 May 20
237

the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces to all 56 Field Offic

28 Resident Agencies. (6)

6. An Interagency FISA Panel has been established to prioritiz

intelligence collection pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Sur

Act when resources are not sufficient to permit timely proce

FISA requests. (8)

7. A plan to resolve SIGINT technical challenges, provide 

reviews of products and funding, and integrate collection and 

capabilities of NSA, CIA, and FBI has been submitted to the H

Senate Intelligence Committees. (10)

8. Measures to enhance recruitment and development of a Co

rorism workforce are underway. These include signing the 

Direction for Intelligence Community Language Activities dir

provide objectives for investment decisions in language training

ing a five-year, $15 million investment in new computer-deliver

ciency tests used by the Intelligence Community; and making 

training mandatory for all Counterterrorist Center line officers. (

9. A DCI Directive was issued to address intelligence informat

rity in the context of providing expanded access to intelligence 

tion outside the Intelligence Community. (15)

10. The Information Sharing Workshop Group was established u

authority of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Co

Management and the Intelligence Community Deputies Comm

develop a comprehensive strategy for sharing information amon

gence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism

11. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 established the 

Screening Center to integrate all terrorist-related watchlist system

12. Finally, the CIA and the FBI, as well as other Intelligence 

nity agencies, continue collection and analysis programs to try 

mine the extent to which foreign governments are providing supp

are engaged in terrorist activity targeting the U.S. (19)
238

States (9/11 Commission Report)

Congress and the President created the National Commission on 

Attacks Upon the United States (Public Law 107-306) on 26 Novembe

investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorists attacks of S

11, 2001,” including those relating to intelligence agencies, law en

agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow o

terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional 

and resource allocation, and other determined relevant by the Commiss

Recommendations:

How to Do It?

These recommendations were extracted verbatim from the 9/11 Co

Report, Chapter 13, entitled, “How to Do It? A Different Way of Orga

Government.’’659 Because this chapter reflected those recommenda

affect the IC organization, the author choose to present these recomm

first. Chapter 12, “What to Do? A Global Strategy” provided recommen

what should be considered in U.S. national strategy. These recommend

low the list associated with Chapter 13.

Unity of Effort Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide

● We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterroris

ter (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist 

Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mode of nation

ernment organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint 

tional planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel fr

various agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority 

uate the performance of the people assigned to the Center.

Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community

● The current position of Director of Central Intelligence sho

replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main a

responsibility: (1) oversee national intelligence centers on 

658 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terr

Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), xv. Cited herea

Report. 659 9/11 Report, Chapter 13, 362-428.
239

national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that 

to it.

● The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA

capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by b

human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger 

program, with high standards and sufficient financial ince

renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operatio

so they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring 

relationship between human source collection and signals co

the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance betwe

eral and liaison operations.

● Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilita

tions, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the 

Department. There it should be consolidated with the capa

training, direction, and execution of such operations alre

developed in the Special Operations Command.

● Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have desc

overall amounts of money being appropriated for national in

and to its component agencies should no longer be kept se

gress should pass a separate appropriation act for intelligenc

ing the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of do

been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work. 

Unity of Effort in Sharing Information

● Information procedures should provide incentives for s

restore a better balance between security and shared knowle

● The President should lead the government-wide effort to 

major national security institutions into the information revo

should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and 

issues across agencies to create a “trusted information netwo

Unity of Effort in the Congress

● Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterr

now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem

considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the 

of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single 

in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and app

authorities, is another.
240

review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are be

judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this d

and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the 

to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that 

mittee should be a permanent standing committee with a n

staff.

● Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no n

should minimize as much as possible the disruption of nati

rity policy making during the change of administration by ac

the process for national security appointments. We think th

could be improved significantly so transitions can work m

tively and allow new officials to assume their new respons

quickly as possible.

Organizing America’s Defenses within the United States

● A specialized and integrated national security workforce 

established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguist

veillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, an

to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbu

deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

● The Department of Defense and its oversight committee sh

larly assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies 

ning to defend the United States against military threa

homeland.

● The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight c

should regularly assess the types of threats the country face

mine (a) the adequacy of the government’s plans—and th

against those plans—to protect America’s critical infrastru

(b) the readiness of the government to respond to the threa

United States might face.

What to Do?

These recommendations were extracted verbatim from the 9/11 

Report, Chapter 12, entitled, “What to Do? A Global Strategy.660

6609/11 Report, Chapter 12, 361-398.
241

● The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual o

terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic s

keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all el

national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work 

countries that can help.

● If Musharraf [Pakistan President] stands for enlightened mod

a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the Uni

should be willing to make hard choices too, and make th

long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustainin

rent scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should sup

stan’s government in its struggle against extremists 

comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to suppo

ter education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to 

ficult choices of their own.

● The President and the Congress deserve praise for their 

Afghanistan so far. Now the United States and the internati

munity should make a long-term commitment to a secure 

Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable o

to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must 

become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. T

States and the international community should help the Af

ernment extend its authority over the country, with a str

nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives.

● The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be c

openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine 

build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are p

publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It shou

a shared commitment to political and economic reform, 

make common cause with the outside world. It should includ

interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translat

commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatr

Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism

● The U.S. government must define what the message is, wha

for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in 

committed to treat people humanly, abide by the rule of la

generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Musl

can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. T
242

but visions of violence and death. America and its friends hav

cial advantage—we can offer these parents a vision that mig

their children a better future. If we heed the views of thoughtf

ers in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus can be 

● Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, 

respect these principles, the United States must stand for a 

future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that sho

gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal gover

were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America

and interests.

● Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals 

vigorously. America does stand for its values. The United 

defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and crim

Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United 

does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic wo

extremists will gladly do the job for us.

❏ Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite 

and radio, the government has begun some promising initiative

sion and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Af

These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Bro

Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It 

them.

❏ The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, a

programs that reach out to young people and offer them know

hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identifie

ing from the citizens of the United States.

● The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in 

ously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund

will be spent directly for building and operating primary and 

ary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly in

their own money in public schools.

● A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should 

economic policies that encourage development, more open so

and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their fami

to enhance prospects for their children’s future.

● The United States should engage other nations in developing 

prehensive coalition strategy against Islamic terrorism. There 

eral multilateral institutions in which such issues should be add

But the most important policies should be discussed and coor
243

good place, for example, to develop joint strategies for tar

rorist travel, or for hammering out a common strategy for 

where terrorists may be finding sanctuary.

● The United States should engage its friends to develop a com

lition approach toward the detention and humane treatme

tured terrorists. New principles might draw upon Article 

Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict. That a

specifically designed for those cases in which the usual la

did not apply. Its minimum standards are generally accepte

out the world as customary international law.

● Our report shows that Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or mak

of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt 

States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferatio

weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening cou

eration efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initi

supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

● Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain fron

ter in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The government has r

that information about terrorist money helps us to unders

networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. In

and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small n

financial facilitators—individuals al Qaeda relied on for thei

raise and deliver money—at the core of al Qaeda’s revenu

These efforts have worked. The death or capture of several 

facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to 

and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and m

money. Captures have additionally provided a windfall of in

that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption.

Protect Against and Prepare for Terrorists Attacks

● Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against te

targeting their money. The United States should combin

travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a s

intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and con

rorist mobility.

● The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a 

work of screening points that includes our transportation s

access to vital facilities such as nuclear reactors. The Presid

direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the 
244

lems and setting common standards with system wide goals i

Extending those standards among other governments could d

cally strengthen America and the world’s collective ability to in

individuals who pose catastrophic threats.

● The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported 

Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometri

exit screening system, including a single system for speeding q

travelers. It should be integrated with the system that provides 

to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States. Linking bi

passports to good data systems and decisionmaking is a fund

goal. No one can hide his or her debt by acquiring a credit card 

slightly different name. Yet today, a terrorist can defeat the 

electronic records by tossing away an old passport and slightly 

the name in the new one.

● The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the Am

people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major effort 

laborate with other governments. We should do more to excha

rorist information with trusted allies and raise U.S. and global 

security standards for travel and border crossing over the medi

long term through extensive international cooperation.

● Secure identification should begin in the United States. The 

government should set standards for the issuance of birth cer

and sources of identification, such as drivers’ licenses. Fraud in 

fication documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At man

points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding 

sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that 

are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrori

● Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. T

government should identify and evaluate the transportation ass

need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending 

select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, a

develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort. T

should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (

state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders. In me

effectiveness, perfection is unattainable. But terrorists should p

that potential targets are defended. They may be deterred by a 

cant chance of failure.

● Improved use of “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists should 

delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS co
245

should utilize the lager set of watchlists maintained by the fe

ernment. Air carriers should be required to supply informati

to test and implement this new system.

● The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to 

the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives o

gers. As a start, each individual selected for special screeni

be screened for explosives. Further, the TSA should conduc

factors study, a method often used in the private sector, to u

problems in screener performance and set attainable obje

individual screeners and for the checkpoints where screen

place.

● As the President determines the guidelines for informatio

among government agencies and by those agencies with t

sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals ab

information is shared.

● The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmen

should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actu

rially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supe

the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civi

If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines 

sight to properly confine its use.

● At this time of increased and consolidated government autho

should be a board within the executive branch to oversee ad

the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the g

makes to defend our civil liberties.

● Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on 

ment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington, 

New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. We u

the contention that every state and city needs to have some 

infrastructure for emergency response. But federal homelan

assistance should not remain a program for general revenue 

should supplement state and local resources based on the ri

nerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should n

money as a pork barrel.

● Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt th

Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multipl

tions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. 

proven frameworks for emergency response. We strongly s

decision that federal homeland security funding will be con
246

fied command procedures. In the future, the Department of Ho

Security should consider making funding contingent on agg

and realistic training in accordance with ICS and unified co

procedures.

● Congress should support pending legislation which provides fo

dited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public 

purposes. Furthermore, high-risk urban areas such as New Yo

and Washington, D.C., should establish signal corps units to 

communications connectivity between and among civilian auth

local first responders, and the National Guard. Federal funding 

be given high priority by Congress.

● We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recomm

standard for private preparedness. We were encouraged by Se

Tom Ridge’s praise of the standard, and urge the Departm

Homeland Security to promote its adoption. We also encour

insurance and credit-rating industries to look closely at a com

compliance with the ANSI standard in assessing its insurabil

creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard 

define the standard of care owed by a company to its employ

the public for legal purposes. Private-sector preparedness is no

ury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 world. It is 

at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money, and national sec

2004 Executive Orders

The following four Executive Orders (EOs) were issued by Presiden

27 August 2004. Many of the provisions of these EOs—strengthening 

ment of IC and creation of the NCTC—are interim measures to be t

Congress enacts legislation.

Executive Order Strengthening Management of the Intelligence

Community661

● Amended EO 12333. Until the NID is created, the DCI has al

responsibilities outlined in this EO.

● Acts as principal advisor to the President for intelligence.

661 U.S. President, “Executive Order Strengthened Management of the Intelligence 

nity,”27 August 2004, URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-6

accessed 2 September 2004.
247

sis, and dissemination of intelligence of whatever nature and 

● Coordinate the annual consolidated NFIP budget and repor

dent the effectiveness of implementation of NFIP by IC

● Recommend and concur in selection of IC heads

● Supervise the newly created NCTC

● Set standards and qualifications for training, education, car

opment of personnel and the establishment of common sec

cies within IC

● Determine intelligence collection priorities, manage collec

ing, and resolve conflicts in tasking of national collection as

● Ensure integrated intelligence collection against enduring a

ing national security threats

Executive Order for a National Counterterrorism Center662

● Serve as the primary organization in the U.S. Government f

ing and integrating terrorism and counterterrorism in

excepting purely domestic counterterrorism information.

● Conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism 

integrating all instruments of national power

● Assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for cou

ism activities 

● Ensure that agencies have access to and receive all source in

to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independ

native analysis.

● Serve as central knowledge bank on known and suspected 

and international terror groups

Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism In

with the Public663

● Agencies that possess or acquire information must give acc

rorism information to other agency heads with counterterro

tions while protecting individual privacy under the law

662 U.S. President, “Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center,”27 Augu

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html, accessed 2 Septemb

663 U.S. President, “Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Inf

Americans,”27 August 2004, URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20

accessed 2 September 2004.
248

Improve information sharing by: protecting sources and m

while also creating unclassified versions whenever possible

mizing compartmentalization whenever possible; being free o

nator controls whenever possible; creating incentives for infor

sharing

Establish Information Systems Council to plan for and oversee the 

interoperable terrorism information environment to facilitate the shar

rorism information among appropriate agencies

Executive Order Establishing the President’s Board on Safe

Americans’ Civil Liberties664

● Advance the policy of protecting the legal rights of all Am

including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy gua

by federal law

● Board advises President on effective means to implement the P

● Board is Chaired by Deputy Attorney General and Vice-C

Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security DHS. 

bers include senior officers from DOJ, FBI, DHS, CIA, NSA

OMB, Treasury, TTIC

664 U.S. President, “Executive Order Establishing the President’s Board on Safegua

cans’ Civil Liberties,”27 August 2004, URL: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200

20040827-3.html>, accessed 2 September 2004.
249

Management Reference Tables

Table 7-3 Key Practices and Implementation

Steps for Mergers and Transformations*

Practice Implementation Steps

Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. ■ Define and articulate a succinct and 

reason for change.

■ Balance continued delivery of servic

and transformation activities.

Establish a coherent mission and integrated 

strategic goals to guide the transformation.

■ Adopt leading practices for results-o

planning and reporting.

Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at 

the outset of transformation

■ Embed core values in every aspect o

organization to reinforce the new cultur

Set implementation goals and a timeline to build 

momentum and show progress from day one.

■ Make public implementation goals an

■ Seek and monitor employee attitude

appropriate follow-up actions.

■ Identify cultural features of merging o

increase understanding of former work 

■ Attract and retain key talent.

■ Establish an organizational knowledg

inventory to exchange knowledge amo

organizations.

Dedicate an implementation team to manage 

the transformation process.

■ Establish networks to support implem

■ Select high-performing team membe

Use the performance management system to 

define the responsibility and assure 

accountability for change.

■ Adopt leading practices to implemen

performance management systems wit

safeguards.

Establish a communication strategy to create 

shared expectations and report related 

progress.

■ Communicate early and often to buil

■ Ensure consistency of message.

■ Encourage two-way communication.

■ Provide information to meet specific 

employees.

Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain 

ownership for the transformation.

■ Use employee teams.

■ Involve employees in planning and s

performance information.

■ Incorporate employee feedback into 

and procedures.

■ Delegate authority to appropriate org

levels.

Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain 

ownership for the transformation.

■ Adopt leading practices to build a wo

organization.

* Government Accountability Office, Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Proposed Reform

GPO, 14 September 2004), 5. Cited hereafter as GAO Human Capital Report.
250

1. Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals. . An explicit alignment h

individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals.

2. Connect performance expectations to crosscutting goals. Placing an emphasis on collabora

interaction, and teamwork across organizational boundaries helps strengthen accountability fo

3. Provide and routinely use performance information to track organizational priorities. Individu

performance information to manage during the year, identify performance gaps, and pinpoint im

opportunities.

4. Require follow-up actions to address organizational priorities. By requiring and tracking follow

on performance gaps, organizations underscore the importance of holding individuals account

making progress on their priorities.

5. Use competence to provide a fuller assessment of performance. Competencies define the s

supporting behaviors that individuals need to effectively contribute to organizational results.

6. Link pay to individual and organizational performance. Pay, incentive, and reward systems th

employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational results are based on valid, reli

transparent performance management systems with adequate safeguards.

7. Make meaningful distinctions in performance. Effective performance management systems 

provide candid and constructive feedback and the necessary objective information and docum

reward top performers and deal with poor performance.

8. Involve employees and stakeholders to gain ownership of performance management system

direct involvement helps increase employees’ and stakeholders’ understanding and ownership 

system and belief in its fairness.

9. Maintain continuity during transitions. Because cultural transformations take time, performan

management systems reinforce accountability for change management and other organization

** GAO Human Capital Report, 8
251

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 200

The following outline and highlights were extracted from the U

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Summary of Intelligence 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.665 With the exception of ZERO p

congressional oversight reform, this Act provided agency- and dep

reform provisions. For brevity, only selected elements relating to the 

lighted; only headings are provided for all others. For a more co

review of this Act, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Intelligence Reform a

Prevention Act of 2004 Conference Report, 108th Cong. 2nd sess. S

Governmental Affairs Committee Summary.

TITLE I

Director of National Intelligence

Establishes a Senate-confirmed Director of National Intelligence 

DNI cannot serve as the Director of the CIA or as the head of any o

of the IC. The DNI shall not be located in the Executive Office of th

National Intelligence Program

The National Foreign Intelligence Program is re-designated as 

Intelligence Program (NIP).

Authorities of the DNI

Budget Build: DNI shall “develop and determine” the annual N

proposals provided by respective IC agency and organization he

agency and organization heads must also furnish the DNI an

requested budgetary information.

Budget Execution: DNI shall “ensure the effective execution” o

intelligence and intelligence-related activities budget. The Directo

apportion NIP funds at the “exclusive direction” of the DNI for IC al

DNI “directs the allotment or allocations” of such appropriations

comptrollers are then responsible for allocating, reprogramming, or 

NIP funds “in an expeditious manner.” The DNI “shall monitor the 

tion and execution of the NIP by the heads of elements of the IC”. If 

665United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summa

gence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Cong. 2nd sess., 6 Decem
252

DNI must notify the President and Congress within 15 days of such dis

Transfer and Reprogramming of Funds: DNI directs all transfers 

gramming of NIP funds under the following guidelines: 1) must be fo

priority intelligence activity; 2) must support an emergent need, improv

effectiveness, or increase efficiency; and 3) may not involve funds from 

Reserve for Contingencies or a DNI Reserve for Contingencies. This 

transfer or reprogram must be approved by OMB after consulting 

affected department heads and must be less than $150 million or less t

cent of the department’s or agency’s NIP funds for a single fiscal yea

more, it cannot terminate an acquisition program. If the affected depart

concurs then these limits do not apply.

Transfer of Personnel: The DNI is authorized 500 new personnel bi

the DNI may transfer 150 NIP personnel to the Office of the DNI for 

than two years. Within the first year after the creation of the national in

center, the DNI may transfer 100 Community personnel to that cen

Director must approve and appropriate Congressional committees mu

fied of such transfers. DNI can transfer unlimited numbers of person

the Community providing these transfers 1) are to higher priority in

activities; 2) support an emergent need, improve program effectiv

increase efficiency. Appropriate Congressional committees must be n

such transfers.

Tasking and Analysis: DNI established objectives and priorities for 

manages and directs tasking of collection, analysis, production, and d

tion of national intelligence. DNI approves requirements for collection 

sis. DNI may establish national intelligence centers as necessary.

Personnel Management: DNI, in consultation with heads of other IC 

develops personnel policies and programs. Rotation policies should see

cate within the IC the joint officer management policies established by 

water-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Protection of Sources and Methods: DNI shall protect sources an

from unauthorized disclosure and is responsible for classification guide

Foreign Liaison: DNI coordinates relationships between intelligenc

rity services for foreign governments or international organizations.

Acquisition/Milestone: DNI has same acquisition and appropriatio

ties given the CIA Director in the CIA Act of 1949 with the exceptio

funds without regard to any law or regulation concerning the expe
253

tems with the exception of those DoD programs for which the D

authority with the SecDef. If DNI and SecDef cannot reach agreem

President resolves.

Common Services: DNI consults with heads of other IC agencies 

if common concern efforts can be accomplished more efficiently 

dated manner.

Appointments: DNI recommends to the President nominees for P

uty DNI and for CIA Director. DNI has right to concur in the appoin

ommendation for the heads of NSA, NRO, and NGA; the Assistant 

State for INR; the Directors of the Offices of Intelligence and Counte

at DOE; the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the 

of Treasury; the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence at the 

Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security for Information Analys

DNI must be consulted for appointments or recommendations for th

DIA and the Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for I

Office of the DNI

Staff: CMS will transfer to Office of the DNI.

Co-Location: Beginning 1 October 2008, the Office of the DNI w

located with any other IC element.

Deputy Directors: Senate-confirmed Principal Deputy DNI. Prin

DNI may appoint not more than four additional deputies.

National Intelligence Council: Is established in the Office of the 

General Counsel: Senate-confirmed General Counsel in the O

DNI.

Civil Liberties Protection Officer: Appointed by the DNI.

Director of Science and Technology: Established within the Offic

National Counterintelligence Executive: Moved to the Office of t

Inspector General: Established within the Office of the DNI.
254

Revised definition of national intelligence includes information gath

U.S. or abroad that pertains to more than one agency and involves thr

U.S., its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation

weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on national 

land security.

Information Sharing

Requires the President to establish an Information Sharing Environme

facilitate the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate Fed

local, tribal and private sector entities. This provision calls for specific im

tion of information sharing activities to be completed by a specified 

within 180 days of enactment, agency-wide capabilities review must be c

within 270 days President must issue guidelines for acquiring, accessin

and using information, and in consultation with the Privacy and Civi

Oversight Board provide guidelines to protect privacy and civil liberties. 

President will designate a Program Manager who is responsible fo

tion sharing across the Federal Government and who will oversee the i

tation and management of the ISE. An interagency panel, base

Information Sharing Council created by EO 13356, will be established 

the President and Program Manager and to facilitate interagency coord

Privacy and Civil Liberties

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: Created within the 

Office of the President to ensure that privacy and civilian liberties co

considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive b

icies related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. Board wil

a Senate-confirmed chairman and Senate-confirmed vice chairman a

three other members appointed by the President. All members serve a

sure of the President.

Analysis

Alternative Analysis: DNI shall establish a process and assign an ind

entity the responsibility of ensuring that IC elements conduct alternativ

Safeguarding Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis: DNI shall identi

vidual with the Office of the DNI who is available to analysts within th

the DNI to counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and as 
255

politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence 

Analytical Integrity: DNI shall assign an individual or entity to en

ished intelligence products produced by any IC element are time

independent of political considerations, based on all sources of ava

gence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft. The 

entity assigned this responsibility, on a regular basis, shall cond

reviews of IC’s finished intelligence product to determine whether 

based on all sources of available intelligence, properly described th

reliability of underlying sources, properly caveated and expressed 

or confidence in analytic judgments, and properly distinguished betw

ing intelligence and the assumptions and judgments of analysts.

Preservation of Authorities

President shall issue guidelines to ensure effective implementation o

ties provided to the DNI in a manner that does not abrogate the statutory 

ties of the Director of OMB or heads of executive branch departments.

National Counterterrorism Center

National Counter Terrorism Center is established in the Office of the D

is Senate-confirmed and may not simultaneously serve in any other c

executive branch. Director reports to the DNI on budget and intelligenc

to the President on the planning and progress of joint counterterroris

(other than intelligence operations). NCTC conducts “strategic oper

ning”—defined as the mission, the objectives to be achieved, the tas

formed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the a

roles and responsibilities. NCTC Director monitors the implementatio

operational plans and obtains relevant information from departments an

the progress of such entities in implementing the plans.

National Counterproliferation Center

National Counterproliferation Center shall be established within 18 

enactment or President may waive this requirement if President dete

does not materially improve the government’s ability to halt the prolifera

ons of mass destruction. Waiver must be in writing and submitted to Co

National Intelligence Centers 

DNI is authorized to establish National Intelligence Centers (NIC

intelligence priorities. Within their areas of intelligence responsibility, 
256

and proposing to the DNI intelligence collection and production requirem

will ensure the NICs are sufficiently staffed and that the IC shares info

facilitate their mission. Each will have a separate budget account.

Joint Intelligence Community Council

Chaired by the DNI. Membership includes the Secretaries of State

Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General and o

dential-designees. JICC assists the DNI by advising on budget and oth

and by ensuring the timely execution of the programs, policies, and di

the DNI.

Education and Training

DNI develops a comprehensive education, recruitment, and trainin

meet linguistic requirements for the IC. DNI will bring together Comm

cational components to promote joint education and training. DNI esta

IC Scholarship Program for students in exchange for IC service.

Open Source Intelligence

DNI ensures that the IC makes efficient and effective use of open sou

mation and analysis.

Effective Date/Implementation Plan

Title I is to take effect no later than six months after enactment (NL

2005). President will submit to Congress an implementation plan NLT 

after effective date. Within 60 days of the DNI’s initial appointment, the 

appoint individual to Office of the DNI positions.

“Lookback” Provision

DNI will submit to the Congressional intelligence committees NLT 

after the effective day of the Act, a report on the progress made to impl

title and such recommendations for additional legislative or administra

as the DNI considers appropriate.

TITLE II

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FBI is given authority to raise the mandatory retirement age to 65 ye

for 50 FBI employees per fiscal year through 30 September 2007 (bas

years after enactment). FBI has discretionary authority to establish a
257

ees during periods of emergency.

TITLE III

Security Clearances

President designates a single entity to oversee the security clear

and develop uniform standards and policies for access to classified 

The President also designates a single entity to conduct clearance in

Establishes a national database to track clearances.

TITLE IV —TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Subtitle A-National Strategy for Transportation Security

Subtitle B-Aviation Security

Subtitle C-Air Cargo Security

Subtitle D-Maritime Security

TITLE V — BORDER PROTECTION, IMMIGRATION 

MATTERS

Subtitle A-Advanced Technology Northern Border Security Pilot 

Subtitle B-Border and Immigration Enforcement

Subtitle C-Visa Requirements

Subtitle D-Immigration Reform

Subtitle E-Treatment of Aliens Who Commit Acts of Torture, 

Killings, or Other Atrocities Abroad

TITLE VI — TERRORISM PREVENTION

Subtitle A-Individual Terrorists As Agents of Foreign Powers (

Provision)

Subtitle B-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Subtitle C-Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Antiterro

cal Corrections

Subtitle D-Additional Enforcement Tools

Subtitle E-Criminal History Background Checks
258

Subtitle G-Providing Material Support to Terrorism

Subtitle H-Terrorist and Military Hoaxes

Subtitle I-Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement A

Subtitle J-Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Ac

Subtitle K-Pretrial Detention of Terrorists

TITLE VII — 9/ll COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 2

Subtitle A-The Role of Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, and the Military in t

Terrorism

Subtitle B-Terrorist Travel and Effective Screening

Subtitle C-National Preparedness

Subtitle D-Homeland Security Grants

Subtitle E-Public Safety Spectrum

Subtitle F-Presidential Transition

Subtitle G-Improving International Standards and Cooperation to Fig

ist Financing

Subtitle H-Emergency Financial Preparedness

TITLE VIII – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A-Intelligence Matters

The NID shall establish a formal relationship, including informatio

between elements of the IC and the National Infrastructure Simulation 

Subtitle B-Department of Homeland Security Matters

Subtitle C-Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Prote

Subtitle D-Other Matters
259

ADCI Assistant Deputy Director Central Intelligence

AFCEA Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Asso

ASA Army Security Agency

BNE Board of National Estimates

CBJB Congressional Budget Justification Book

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIG Central Intelligence Group

CIO Central Imagery Office

CIRAS Corporate Information Retrieval System

CMS Community Management Staff

CP Command Post

CPI Corruption Perceptions Index

CSI Center for the Study of Intelligence

CTC Counterterrorism Center

C41 Command and Control, Communications, Computers

Intelligence

DARO Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

DCI Director Central Intelligence

DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DDNI Deputy Director for National Intelligence

DDPO Defense Dissemination Program Office 

DI Directorate of Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DMI Director of Military Intelligence

DNI Director for National Intelligence

EO Executive Order

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

EEI Essential Elements of Information

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GAO Government Accountability Office

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HAC House Appropriations Committee

HI Horizontal Integration

HSTL Harry S. Truman Library

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IRAC Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
260

ICS Intelligence Community Staff

IG Inspector General

IAAFY Intelligence Authorization Act Fiscal Year

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IOB Intelligence Oversight Board

IT Information Technology

IWGS Interagency Working Group on Space

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism

JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program

MASINT Measurement and Signals Intelligence

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NDI National Director for Intelligence

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NHSA National Homeland Security Agency

NIA National Intelligence Authority

NIAD National Intelligence Authority Directive

NIC National Intelligence Council

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NIO National Intelligence Officers

NMIA National Military Intelligence Association

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSEA National Security Education Act

NSSC National Security Service Corps

NSSG National Security Study Group

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONE Office of National Estimates

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

OPM Office of Personnel Management

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

OSS Office of Strategic Services

OOTW Operations Other Than War

PE Program Element

PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PL Public Law
261

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

SAC Senate Appropriations Committee

SES Senior Executive Service

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SMO Support to Military Operations

SOLIC Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict

SRG Strategic Resources Group

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TSA Transportation Security Agency

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

UN United Nations

USIB United States Intelligence Board

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
262
263

“A Special Relationship? The US and UK Spying Alliance Is Put Under th

London Financial Times, 6 July 2004.

Ackerman, Robert K. “Horizontal Integration Challenges Intelligence Pla

58, no. 2, October 2003. Accessed via ProQuest, 22 January 2004.

“Airport Security Still Lacking.” Washington Post, 23 September 2004, E2

Allen, Charles E. “Intelligence: Cult, Craft, or Business?” Briefing presente

Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Guest Present

2000. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Cont

URL: http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/allen/allen-i01.pdf>. Access

1 April 2004.

Allen, Mike and Dan Eggen. “Bush May Move Soon on 9/11 Report: Pres

Announcing Plans for Revamping Intelligence System.” Washingto

2004, A6.

———.“Bush Backs off Limit on 9/11 Questioning: Talk to Panel Leade

Ended.” Washington Post, 10 March 2004, A3.

Alliot-Marie, Michele. “Afghanistan’s Drug Boom: The Opium Problem C

erything That’s Being Done to Help the Afghan People.” Washingt

tober 2004, A27.

Appendix I of Results of the 1973 Church Committee Hearings on CIA Mis

1984 Iran/Contra Hearings. URL: <http://pw1.netcom./`ncoic/cia_

cessed 3 August 2004.

Ashcroft, John C. “Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing.” Washington P

13 April 2004, URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn

2004Apr13?language=printer>. Accessed 14 April 2004. 

Babington, Charles. “Hill Wary of Intelligence Oversight Changes, Lawmak

Parties Resist Recommendations of 9/11 Commission.” Washington 

tember 2004, A5.

Baenen, Jeff. “9/11 Report Is Up for National Book Award.” Washington Po

2004, C4.

Bainbridge,W.S. Speech presented at 2003 Nanotechnology Conference an

“Converging Technologies.” San Francisco, CA, 23-27 February 200

/mysite.verizon.net//william.bainbridge/dl/nbic.htm>. Accessed 13 O

Baker, Peter and Walter Pincus. “Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill: Pr

Now Must Find an Experienced Hand to Guide 15 Agencies.” Wa

18 December 2004, A1.

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Ag

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982.

Bardach, A.L. “Interrogation: Listen to the Admiral.” Slate, online ed., 

2004, URL: <http://.slate.msn.com>. Accessed 17 December 2004
264

view, 24, no. 1 WinterSpring 2004: 2331.

Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pentagon’s New Map. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Son

———.“The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Going to War

We’ll Keep Going to War.” Esquire, 1 March 2003. Accessed via ProQu

2004.

Barr, Stephen. “GAO Chief Refuses to Stop Doing the Math.” Washington 

18 January 2004, C2.

———.“NSA Makes No Secret of Stepped-Up Recruitment Effort.” Washing

April 2004, B2.

———.“Pentagon Can Hire 2,500 Experts for National Security.” Washingt

March 2004, B2.

———.“Talk of 9/11 Report Centers on Importance of People, Rather Than 

Washington Post, 15 September 2004, B2.

Bender, Bryan. “US Intelligence Shake-Up Meets Growing Criticism.” Bosto

January 2004, A1. 

Berkowitz, Bruce. “Better Ways to Fix Intelligence.” Orbis, 45, no. 4 (Fall 2

619.

———.“The DI and “IT:” Failing to Keep Up With the Information Revolutio

in Intelligence 47, no. 1. (2003): 67-74.

———. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. 

The Free Press, 2003.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allen E. Goodman. Best Truth: Intelligence in the I

Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.

———. Strategic Intelligence for American Security. Princeton: Princeton 

Press, 1989.

Best, Richard A., Jr. “Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004.” 

for Congress. RL32500. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research S

brary of Congress, 29 July 2004.>URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL3

Accessed 25 August 2004.

———.“Reforming Defense Intelligence.” CRS Report for Congress, 91-47

ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 J

Best, Richard A., Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boerstling. “Appendix C, IC21: The I

Community in the 21st Century,” CRS Report for Congress. Washin

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 February 1996

tp://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html>. 

Accessed 11 May 2004. 

Betts, Richard K. “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs. 81, no. 1 (January/Fe

2002): 43-59.

Bhagwati, Fagdish. “Coping with Antiglobalization: A Triology of Discontent

Affairs, 81, no.1 (January/February 2002): 2-7.
265

trine. Middle East Review of International Relations, Special Dispa

344, 10 February 2002. URL: <http://www.memri.org/bin articles.

jects&Area=jihad&ID=SP34402.

Black, Cofer. “Investigation of Sept 11 Intelligence Failures.” 26 Septem

cessed via LexisNexis, 12 January 2004.

Book World. “Washington Area Bestsellers.” Washington Post, 12 Septem

Borch, Fred L. “Comparing Pearl Harbor and “9/11”: Intelligence Failure? 

preparedness? Military Responsibility? Journal of Military History, 

2003). Accessed Proquest 4 December 2003.

Boren, David L., Sen. (D-OK). “The Intelligence Community: How Cruc

Affairs, 71, no.3 (Summer 1992): 52-62.

Bowens, Gregory J. “Clinton Accepts Budget Freeze, Vows to Fight Deep

gressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 31 July 1993, 2077.

Bowers, Faye. “The New Top in Redrawn US Intelligence.” Christian Sc

15 December 2004, 2.

Breitweiser,Karen. “Investigation of Sept 11.” 18 September 2002. Acce

Nexis, 12 January 2004.

Brezinski, Zbigniew. Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. N

Basic Books, 2004.

Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Reform 

U.S. Government Printing Office. URL: <http://frwebgate4.access.g

bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=08729814703+41+0+...>. Accessed 

2004.

Central Intelligence Agency. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the F

government Experts. NIC2000-02, December 2000, <http: //www.

ports/globaltrends2015 >. Accessed 29 September 2004.

———. Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign Policy. Presented 

the Study of Intelligence Conference Report, January 2004.

Christensen, Clayton M. The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technolog

Great Firms to Fail. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.

Clapper, James R. Clapper, Jr., Lt Gen, USAF (Ret). “A Proposed Restruc

Intelligence Community.” Briefing presented at Center for Informa

search, Harvard University, Guest Presentations, Spring 1996. Incid

Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, January 1997. 

pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/clapper/clapper-i97-1.pdf>. Accessed 1 A

———.Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. E-mail to NG

Subject: “D-MAIL #16 – D/NGA Testimony Before HPSCI on 9/1

Report.” 19 August 2004.
266

Cloud, David S. “Huge Challenge Awaits Intelligence Chief.” Wall Street Jou

21 December 2004, A4.

Cohen, William S. “Restructuring: From the Top....” Washington Post, 1 Au

B1+.

Cohen, Richard. “Bonne Chance.” Washington Post Magazine, 11 July 1993, 

Colby, William. Honorable Men. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.

Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transpa

John C. Baker, Ray A. Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell. Arli

RAND, 2001.

Congressional Research Service. H.R. 10 (9/11 Recommendations Implemen

and S.2845 (National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004): A Comparativ

Updated 21 October 2004.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Te

International Security 27, no.3 (Winter 2002/03): 30-58.

Davies, Frank. “Graham, 2 Allies Introduce Overhaul of U.S. Intelligence.” M

Herald, 1 August 2003, 17A.

DeBose, Brian. “House OKs Intelligence Reform Bill,” The Washington Time

8 December 2004, A1+.

———.“Senate Approves Intelligence Bill.” The Washington Times, 9 Dece

A1+. 

Dewar, Helen. “Another Congress to Return for Another Lame-Duck Stint: Po

Meetings to Finish Work Set for Mid-November.” Washington Post, 

2004, A23.

———.“Senators Offer New Oversight Structure: Intelligence Panels Would 

Reworked.” Washington Post, 5 October 2004, A4.

Diamond, John. “Intelligence Impasse Mainly a Question of Control: But Civ

Military Share Power Already.” USA Today, 29 November 2004, 6.

Dionne, E.J., Jr. “A Lesson From 9/11: Openness.” Washington Post, 23 July 

Dowd, Maureen “Head Spook Sputters.” New York Times, online ed., 15 Apr

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/opinion/15DOWD.html?th=

wanted=print& pos.... Accessed 19 April 2004.

Drogin, Bob. “THE NATION: Two Agencies Melding Minds on Intelligence

Angeles Times, 31 December 2004. Accessed via Proquest, 7 January 2

Duffy, Michael.“So Much For The WMD.” Time. 9 February 2004, 42-46.

________, “How to Fix Our Intelligence.’’ Time, 26 April 2004, online ed., U

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1101040426-6123

Accessed 27 April 2004.

Eggen, Dan. “FBI Backlogged in Translation of Counterterrorism Wiretaps.” W

Post, 28 September 2004, A25.
267

2004, A17.

———. “For the Record: While House vs. 9/11 Panel: Resistance, Reso

ington Post, 9 March 2004, A2.

———.GOP Plan Calls for Revamping Intelligence: Pentagon, CIA W

Many Duties.” Washington Post, 23 August 2004, A1+.

———.“9/11 Panel Chronicles U.S. Failures: Final Report Faults Two A

and Calls for Broad Reform.” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A1+.

Dan Eggen and Charles Barrington. “Many are Cool to Intelligence Plan: B

Reservation; Tenet Says GOP Proposal Would ‘Gut the CIA.’” Wa

24 August 2004, A3

Dan Eggen and Helen Dewar. “Intelligence Reforms May be Stalled: 9/11 

Fears Momentum Loss; Victims’ Kin Critical.” Washington Post, 1

2004, A13.

Dan Eggen and Susan Schmidt. “Data Show Different Spy Game Since 9/11

Post, 1 May 2004, A1.

Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus. “House Member Seeks Gorelick’s Resignatio

ton Post, 15 April 2004.

Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus. “Key Idea of 9/11 Panel is Faulted: Commis

telligence Chief in White House.” Washington Post, 31 July 2004, A

Eilperin, Juliet. “U.S. Firms Look Ahead to Emissions Cuts Overseas: W

Ratifies Treaty is Key.” Washington Post, 3 October 2004, A13.

Elkins, Dan, LDCR, USN (Ret.). An Intelligence Resource Manager’s 

Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997.

Farah, Douglas and Richard Shultz. “Al Qaeda’s Growing Sanctuary.” Wa

14 July 2004, A19.

Fessler, Pamela. “Chairman Boren, McCurdy Urge Leaner, Revamped 

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 February 1992: 316-31

Flynn, Stephen E. “The Neglected Home Front.” Foreign Affairs, 83, no. 

October 2004): 20-33. 

“Foreign Policy Association: DDO’s Remark.” 24 June 2004, URL: http

canintelligence.us/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=18>

June 2004.

“Framing the Problem of PPBS.” BENS Tail-to-Tooth Commission Report

2000. URL: http://www.bens.org/images/PPBS2000-Framing.pdf. 

November 2004.

 Friedman, Thomas L. “Small and Smaller.” New York Times, online ed., 

2004. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/opinion/04FRIE.h

4 March 2004.
268

Francis Fukuyama and others. “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in the Bottle R

The National Interest 56 (Summer 1999). Accessed via Proquest, 24 Nove

Garcia, Michelle. “Nearly 100 Families are Suing Over 9/11: Federal Compe

Forsaken.” Washington Post, 23 January 2004, A9.

Gates, Robert M. From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five 

and How They Won The Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 199

“Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces,” Chapter 5 in Globalization an

Power. Ed. Sam J. Tangredi. Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

2002.

Globalization and Maritime Power. Ed. Sam J. Tangredi. Washington, D.C

University Press, 2002.

Goodman, Jr., Glenn W. “Interview with Stephen Cambone.” Defense News. 

8 December 2003, URL: http://www.defensenews.com/story. Accessed 9 

2003.

Goo, Sara Kehaulani. “Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials: Some Ended Has

ports by Making Slight Change to Name.” Washington Post, 21 Augus

Gorelick, Jamie S. “The Truth about ‘the Wall’.” Washington Post, 18 April 2

Gorman, Siobhan. “On Guard, But How Well?” National Journal (6 March 2

703.

Goss, Sen. Porter (R-FL). “An Inquiry That’s Awash in Disputes at the Ou

view by Douglas Jehl. In New York Times, on line ed., 2 February 2

www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02international/middleeast/02ASSE.html

2 February 2004.

Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense: Status of Financi

ment Weaknesses and Progress Towards Reform. Washington, DC: GP

2003.

———. Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Pr

forms. Washington, D.C: GPO, 14 September 2004.

———. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Government P

Washington, DC: GPO, January 2003.

Graham, Bob, Sen. (D-FL). “Past Intelligence Failures Set Us Up For More.” 

by Marie Cocco. Long Island Newsday, 17 February 2004.”

Graham, Bradley. “Intelligence Changes Concern Pentagon: Creation of Ne

May Hurt Military Operations, Officials Warn.” Washington Post, 11 A

A19.

Grier, Peter and Faye Bowers. “Can Spy Agencies Ever Work Together,” Ch

ence Monitor, 21 July 2004, 01

Grose, Peter. Gentlemen Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. Boston: Houghton Mif
269

lenge Every Company and Career. New York: Doubleday, 1996.

Haass, Richard. “Policymakers and the Intelligence Community: Supportin

Policy in the Post-9/11 World.” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (20

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article01.html. Accessed 24 

Hagel, Sen. Chuck (R-NE). “Intelligence Reform and False Urgency.” Wa

3 August 2004, A17.

Haines, Gregory K. “Looking for a Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee 

and the CIA.” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 81-90.

Hamilton, Lee H. Government Affairs Committee Hearing. C-SPAN. A

2004.

Hart, Gary. “A Paul Revere No One Wants to Hear From.” Salon.com, 6 A

———.“Heeding the 9/11 Panel.” Interview by David S. Broder. Washingt

gust 2004, B07.

———. Speaker at the World Affairs Council of Northern California symp

ligence Community Reform.” San Francisco, CA., 18 November 20

viewed in the John T.Hughes Library on 1 June 2004.

Hayden, Michael V., LtGen, USAF. “Testimony before the Joint Inquiry of 

lect Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Com

tober 2002.” URL:http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/ 101702h

“Headlines Over the Horizon: Analysts at the RAND Corporation Lay Ou

tional-Security Developments that Aren’t Getting the Attention T

Atlantic, 292, no. 1 (July/August 2003): 84-90.

Heisbourg, Francois. “How the West Could Be Won.” In “One Year After: 

egy for the West?” Survival 44, no 3 (Winter 2002-03): 145-155.

Hedley, John Hollister. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Fo

Georgetown University. ISD Occasional Paper 1: Checklist for the F

ligence.” Gaithersburg, MD: Reproductions, Inc., 1995.

———.“A Colloquium: The Intelligence Community—Is It Broken? H

Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1994): 11-18.

Herrington, Keith E. “Inside DIA: Horizontal Integration—The Transforma

for U.S. Intelligence and the National Security Community.” Commu

2004, 10.

Hersh, Seymour M. “Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar 

Dissidents in Nixon Years.” New York Times, 22 December 1974, 1

Hill, Eleanor. “Investigation of Sept 11.” 17 October 2002. Accessed via L

January 2004.

“Homeland Security Oversight.” Editorial. Washington Post, 28 Decembe

“How a Bill Becomes Law. Washington Post, 18 August 2004, C14.
270

puter Data. Washington Post, 25 February 2004, B1+.

Huband, Mark. “Ex-CIA Officer Dismisses Reforms.” London Financial 

December 2004, A6.

Hubbard, Robert L. “Another Response to Terrorism: Reconstituting Intellig

ysis for 21st Century Requirement.” Defense Intelligence Journal

2002): 71-80.

Hughes, Patrick M. “Future Conditions: The Character and Conduct of Wa

2020.” Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, H

versity, Guest Presentations, Spring 2003. Incidental Paper: Seminar 

gence, Command and Control, July 2003. URL: <http://pirp.harvard.ed

Hughes/Hughes-i03-1.pdf>. Accessed 1 April 2004.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Hispanic Challenge.” Foreign Policy, 141(M

2004): 30-53.

Hutchings, Robert. Chairman National Intelligence Council. Keynote speech 

at the International Security Management Association, “Terrorism and 

Security.” Scottsdale, AZ, 14 January 2004. Printed in National I

Council Speeches/Statements via online. URL: <http://www.od

speeche _terror_and_econ_sec.html. Accessed 13 October 2003.

Ignatius, David. “Hypocrisy on Spy Reform.” Washington Post, 8 October 20

“Intelligence.” Time. 4 February 1946, 24.

“Intelligence Agency to ‘Tunnel’ Into Pentagon Information Database.” Inside 

gon, 29 January 2004.

“Intelligence Resource Management.” Potomac Strategies & Analysis, Inc., 

2003, 64.

“Intelligence and the Law,” Chapter 7 of Strategic Intelligence: Theory and A

2d rev ed. Eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden. Carlisle Ba

United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 1995

“Intelligence and Military Misfortunes,” Chapter 11 of Strategic Intelligence: 

Application. 2d rev ed. Eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodd

Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Center for Strategic 

1995.

“Intelligence, Ethics, and Open Society,” Part IV of Strategic Intelligence: 

Application. 2d rev ed. Eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodd

Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Center for Strategic 

1995.

“Introduction,” in Globalization and Maritime Power. Ed. Sam J. Tangredi. W

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002.

“Iran’s Missles Can Now Hit Europe, Ex-Official Says.” Washington Post, 

2004, A21.

Jablonsky, David. Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New W

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.
271

Gap States, Mr. Barnett Urges Generals to Split Force in Two; Au

Soundtrack.” The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2004, A1.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy New Haven, C

versity Press, 1989.

Jehl, Douglas. “Boeing Lags in Building Spy Satellites.” New York Time

2003, C1.

———.“CIA Report Finds Its Officials Failed in Pre-911 Efforts,” New 

January 2004, A1+.

Joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee. “September 19, 2002 Comm

Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger.” UR

www.complete911timeline.org/2002/Congressionalinquiry091902b.h

ed 21 October 2003.

Jordan, Amos A. and others. American National Security, 5th ed. Baltimore

Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Jordan, Mary. “Pit Stop on the Cocaine Highway: Guatemala Becomes Fav

U.S.-Bound Drugs.” Washington Post, 6 October 2004, A20.

Kady, Martin II and John Donnelly. “Many Decisions Ahead After In

Clears.” CQ TODAY, 7 December 2004.

Kagan, Robert. “Strategic Dissonance.” In “One Year After: A Grand S

West?” Survival 44, no. 4 (Winter 2002-03): 135-156.

Kamen, Al. “In the Loop: There’s No Place Like Zone.” Washington P

2004, A23.

———.“In the Loop: Millions of Secrets.” Washington Post, 3 May 2004

Kaplan, David E. and Kevin Whitelaw, “Intelligence Reform—At Last.” 

World Report. 20 December 2004, 31-32. 

Kaplan, Robert K. “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopu

ism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Pla

online ed., February 1994. URL: <http://www.theatlantic.com/Polit

archy.htm>. Accessed 22 June 2004.

Kean, Thomas H. and Lee H. Hamilton. “Intelligence Reform Can Wai

Washington Post, 8 September 2004, A23.

Kennicott, Philip. “Remembering: A Novel Approach.” Washington Post, 1 

B1+.

Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeto

ton University Press, 1949.

Kerr, Richard J. “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence System in the Post

Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harva

Guest Presentations, Spring 1992. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Inte

mand and Control, August 1994. URL: http://pirp.harvard.edu/p

kerr-i94-4.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2004
272

ligence Community. Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 3337.

Kobyakov, Julius Major General (Ret.). Email to Intelligence Forum listserv. 

“U.S. Intelligence Reform.” 23 August 2004. 

Komarow, Steven. “Army Studies Lessons of Iraq: Report Lays Out Streng

nesses Revealed in War.” USA Today, 18 February 2004, 8.

Kraus, Clifford. “Oklahoman Who Opposed Foley to Lose House Intelligence 

York Times, 9 January 1993. A1.

Krim, Jonathan. “FBI Rejects Its New Case File Software: Database Projec

Nearly $170 Million.” Washington Post, 14 January 2005, A5. 

Lardner, Jr., George. “McCurdy No ‘Shrinking Violet: Intelligence Panel to Sw

nesses, Push for Reorganization.” Washington Post, 7 February 1991, 

Leary, William M. Ed. The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Docum

versity of Alabama Press, 1984

Lee, Christopher. “Agencies Getting Heavier on Top: 17 Executive Titles Cre

1960.” Washingon Post, 23 July 2004, A27.

———.“GAO Again Finds Fault With the Federal Books: Auditors Say Th

ment’s Records Are So Inadequate They Cannot be Evaluated, but Bu

Cites Progress.” Washington Post, 21 December 2004, A23.

Lenczowski, Roberta E. “NIMA and the Intelligence Community.” Briefing p

Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Guest Pre

Spring 2003. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intelligence, Command a

July 2003. URL:http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/lenczow-i03-1.pdf>. 

April 2004.

Levine, Samantha. “Spinning Terror’s Rolodex: Creating a Master List of B

Turning Out to be a Tall Order.” U.S. News & World Report, 2 Februar

Linden, Ian. “What is Globalisation?” Geographical 75, no. 10 (October 2003

Linzer, Dafna. Rules Still Hinder Intelligence Sharing.” Associated Press, on

March 2004, URL: <http://www.mercurynews.com>. Accessed 29 Ma

Lohr, Steve. “Many New Causes for Old Problem of Jobs Lost Abroad.” New 

Times, online ed. 15 February 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/

ness/15JOBS.html?>. Accessed 17 February 2004.

Lord, Carnes. “NCS Reform for the Post-Cold War Era.” Orbis 44, no. 3 (Sum

433-450.

Loven, Jennifer. “President Signs Measure Overhauling Intelligence: Aiming 

Spy Network in Wake of 9/11 Attacks, Bill Creates Counterterror Cente

rector.” Associated Press, 17 December 2004. Accessed via http://www

sun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-bush1217,0,6868674.story.

Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 2nd ed. Washington

Press, 2003.

———. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1
273

27 September 2004, A19.

Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. New York: Pantheon, 2

Markle Foundation. Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security: Pr

ica’s Freedom in the Information Age: Second Report of the Mark

Task Force. 2 December 2003. Accessed via http://www.markleta

July 2004.

———.Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age: The First 

Markle Foundation Task Force. 7 October 2002. Accessed via http:/

taskforce.org, 1 July 2004.

Marsan, Carolyn Duffy. “Management Strategies—Worth the Wait: Securi

Take More Than a Year to Obtain, But Federal IT Work Pays W

World, 7 June 2004, 65.

Matthews, William. “U.S. Army Cites Deficiencies With Data Collection.” 

Online ed., 12 April 2004, URL: <http://www.defensene

Phy?F=280391&C=America>. Accessed 10 November 2004.

May, Ernest R. “The Intelligence Community: How Crucial?” Foreign Af

(Summer 1992): 63-72.

McCarthy, Ellen. “Dealing With Clearance Insecurity.” Washington Post, 

2004, E1+.

———.“Homeland Security Wants Better Integration.” Washington Po

2004, E4.

———.“NSA is Making No Secret of Its Technology Intent.” Washington 

2004, E1+.

McCutcheon, Chuck. “Push for Intelligence Overhaul Losing Momentum o

CQ Weekly, 27 April 2002, 1109-1110. 

McDonald, Mark. “As Heroin Flourishes, So Could Terror.” Philadelphia 

May 2004, A1.

McFarlane, Robert. “Restructuring: From the Top....” Washington Post, 1 

B1+.

Measuring Globalization: Economic Reversals, Forward Momentum. Fore

(March/April 2004): 54-69.

Melymuka, Kathleen. “Premier 100 Panel Weighs Infrastructure Hype, Re

Are Coming, But Not as Fast as Vendors Like to Think.” Compute

ed., 9 March 2004. URL: <http://www.computerworld. Com/

0,4814,90931.html. Accessed 11 March 2004.

Merle, Renae. “Army Raises Cost of Combat Modernization: Futuristic Pr

Drones, Unmanned Vehicles, “Smart’ Munitions.” Washington Post

A23.

Milbank,Dana. “The Small Bundle of Names Tied Up With Blue Ribbon

Post, 4 February 2004, C1+.
274

Nine. The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Cong

as Overseer. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 200

Miles, Marc A., Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady. 2004 Index o

Freedom. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2004 and New Y

Street Journal, 2004. URL: <http://www.heritage.org/research/feat

countries.html>. Accessed 14 January 2004.

Miller, Abraham H. and Brian Alexander. “Structural Quiescence in the Failu

and Intelligence Reform.” International Journal of Intelligence and Co

ligence, 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 234-261.

Mitchell, Jeff. Intelligence analyst at 1st Information Operations (IO) Comm

view by the author, 1 March 2004.

Mitchell, Russ. “The Ghosts in the Machine: Can Technology Find Terror

American Spectator 34, no. 8 (Nov/Dec 2001). Accessed via ProQuest, 4 

2003. 

Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century. VA: N

stitute for Public Policy, 1997.

Morgan, Dan. “Overhaul of Congressional Panels Urged: Report Finds Respo

Accountability Lacking.” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A21.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Pe

New York: Knopf, 1967. 

Mousseau, Michael. “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror.” Internat

rity 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 5-21.

Nakashima, Ellen. “U.N. Cites Record in HIV Cases, Faults Prevention as Ina

Washington Post, 7 July 2004, A1+. 

“Nation in Brief.” Washington Post, 5 November 2004, A4.

National Security Act of 1947, as amended. <http://www.history-matters.co

church/rockcomm/html/Rockefeller_0144a.htm>. Accessed 3 August 2

News Reports. “Terrorist Profiting in Illicit Goods: Interpol Chief Warns Abo

feiting.” International Herald Tribune, 26 May 2004.

Nichols, John. “Flawed Intelligence Bill.” The Nation, 3 January 2004, 6.

Nye, Joseph. “Globalisation and Discontent.” The World Today, 57, nos. 8/9

2001). Accessed via ProQuest, 14 January 2004.

———.and William A. Owen. “America’s Information Edge.” Foreign Affai

(March/April 1996): 20-36. 

Oakley, Phyllis. “Restructuring: From the Top....” Washington Post, 1 August 

O’Connell, Kevin and Robert R. Tomes. “Keeping the Information Edge,” Po

122 (Dec 2003/Jan 2004). Accessed via ProQuest, 14 June 2004.

Odom, William E. Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America. New Have

University Press, 2003.
275

Groups Express Concern. Washington Post, 28 September 2004, A

Ostroff, Frank. The Horizontal Organization: What the Organization of th

ally Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customer. New York

versity Press, Inc., 1999.

———.The Horizontal Organization: What the Organization of the F

Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customer. New York: Oxf

Press, Inc., 1999. Review by Bert A. Spector. The Academy of Mana

utives, May 1999, 97-98.

Paltrow, Scot J. “White House Hurdles Delay 9/11 Commission Investigatio

and Interviews are Subject of Tense Talks as Tight Deadline Loom

Journal, online ed., 8 July 2003, <http: online.wsj.com/public/us>. A

2003.

Pappas, Aris A. and James M. Simon, Jr. “Daunting Challenges, Hard Deci

Intelligence Community—2001-2015.” Studies in Intelligence 46, 

39-47.

Pavitt, James. “Change and the CIA.” Washington Post, 6 August 2004, A

———.“Testimony of James L. Pavitt Before the National Commission o

tacks Upon the United States.”14 April 2004, URL: <http: //ww

sion.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_5.pdf>. Accessed 20 Ap

Peters, Tom. Re-Imagine! Business Excellence in a Disruptive Age. Londo

Pincus, Walter. “Analysis: Bush’s Intelligence Moves Don’t Attain Scope 

Panel.” Washington Post, 2 September 2004, A4.

———. “Bush’s Plan Limits Intelligence Chief: Others Would Carry Ou

Washington Post, 11 September 2004, A4.

———.“CIA Alters Policy after Iraq Lapses.” Washington Post, 12 Febru

———. “Congress Resists Key Recommendation of 9/11 Panel: Without 

Homeland Security Department Officials Report to 88 Panels on 

Washington Post, 1 January 2005, A4. 

———. “Goss Pick Withdraws From CIA Consideration.” Washington P

2004, A10.

———. “Intelligence Bill Clears Congress: Bush Expected to Approve 

forms Next Week.” Washington Post, 9 December 2004, A4.

———. “Iraq Called ‘Springboard’ for Insurgency Figure: Intelligence Ex

danian Militant Zarqawi Wants Broader Role in Jihad Movement

Post, 21 October 2004, A25.

———. “McLaughlin Defends CIA, Cites Reform in Speech: Deputy D

Idea of Intelligence Czar.” Washington Post, 7 July 2004, A21.

———. “National Intelligence Director Proves to be Difficult Post to Fill: 

Over Role, Authority are Blames for Delay.” Washington Post, 31 

A4.
276

December Session. Washington Post, 22 November 2004, A9.

———. “Passage of Intelligence Bill Called Doubtful: Lawmakers Say Bus

Need to Lobby,” Washington Post, 22 November 2004, A3.

———. “President Gets to Fill Ranks of New Intelligence Superstructure: Re

islation is Set to Be Signed into Law on Friday.” Washington Post, 16 

2004, A35.

———.“Senate Realigns Intelligence Procedures; New Reform Statue Call

Changes.” Washington Post, 23 December 2004, A21.

———.“September 11 Commission Critics Question Panel’s Study of New M

Report Said to Overlook Changes.” Washington Post, 10 August 2004

———. “Skepticism About Defector’s Weapons Allegations Ignored.” Washi

13 July 2004, A12.

———.“Support for Intelligence Plan: Powell, Ridge Back One Director B

Bush on Specifics.” Washington Post, 14 September 2004, A4.

———.“Turf War Stalls Intelligence Bill: Pentagon Allies at Odds with A

New Director.” Washington Post, 27 October 2004, A4.

———.“9/11 Panel’s Plan Would Reduce Influence of CIA: Experts Predict R

of Roles.” Washington Post, 29 July 2004, A6.

Pincus, Walter and Dana Milbank. “Bush Plan Draws on Advice of 9/11 Panel

posal Gives Intelligence Chief More Budget Power.” Washington Post

ber 2004, A1+.

Pincus, Walter and Dana Priest. “Goss Brings 4 Staffers From Hill to CIA: Ne

Quickly Makes His Mark on Agency with Personnel Decision.” Washi

5 October 2004, A3.

Priest, Dana. “Retired Official Defends the CIA’s Performance.” Washington 

vember 2004, A23.

Priest, Dana and Dafna Linzer. “Panel Condems Iraq Prewar Intelligence: Sen

Faults 2002 Estimate Sent to Hill, Accuses the CIA of “Group-Think.” W

Post, 10 July 2004, A1+.

Priest, Dana and Walter Pincus. “Analysis: Director’s Control is a Concern.” W

Post, 8 December 2004, A1.

Radi, David A. “Intelligence Inside the White House: The Influence of Exec

and Technology.” Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy 

Harvard University, Guest Presentations, March 1997. Incidental Pape

tp://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/radi/radi-i97-3.pdf>. Accessed 1 April 

“Records Gap Leaves Borders Vulnerable: Report Says U.S. Border Patrol 

Complete FBI Fingerprint Files for Years.” Washington Post, 3 March 

Reddy, Anitha. “Local Firms Respond to a Changing U.S. Military.” Washingto

line ed., 26 April 2004. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/a

A40181-2004Apr25?>. Accessed 29 April 2004.
277

April 2004. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/w

2004Apr13?>. Accessed 14 April 2004. 

Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United State

Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996, http://www.acce

int001.html. Accessed 1 December 2004.

Results of the 1973 Church Committee Hearings on CIA Misdeeds, and 

Contra Hearings. URL: <http://pw1.netcom/`ncoic/cia_info.htm. A

gust 2004. ed., 8 April 2004. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com

A61252-04Apr8>. Accessed 14 April 2004.

Roberts, Sen. Pat (R-KS). “Perspectives.” Newsweek, 19 July 2004. 

Rood, Justin. “Ashcroft, Mueller and Ridge En Route to Hill Spotlights.” C

Security – Intelligence, 1 June 2004 via http://homeland.cq.com/hs

cessed 2 June 2004.

Rudgers, David F. Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Centr

Agency, 1943-1947. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 200

Rudman, Warren B. “Perspectives on National Security in the Twenty-F

Briefing presented at Center for Information Policy Research, Harva

Guest Presentations, Spring 2002. Incidental Paper: Seminar on Intel

mand and Control, June 2003. URL: http://www/pirp.harvard.edu

man/rudman.i02.pdf>. Accessed 1 April 2004.

Rumsfeld, Donald. Secretary of Defense. “Rumsfeld: Use Caution in In

form.” The Washington Post, 18 August 2004, A1+.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. The Geography of Economic Development. Newport: N

lege, 2000. URL: <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/20

art6%2DA00.htm>. Accessed 29 June 2003. Samuelson, Robert J

‘Reform.” Washington Post, 2 June 2004, A25.

Sanger, David E. and William J. Broad. “Pakistani’s Nuclear Earnings: $1

New York Times, online ed., 16 March 2004, URL: <http://www/

2004/03/16/international/asia/16NUKE.html?>. Accessed 17 March 

Sangillo, Gregg and Siobhan Gorman, “Smarter Intelligence a Post-9/11 Pri

al Journal (22 May 2004): 1572-1579.

Savage, Marcia. “No Rave Reviews.” CRN, 14 October 2002. Accessed v

28 January 2004.

Schumer, Charles, Sen. (D-NY). “U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY

Conference on 9/11, 9 July 2003. Accessed via LexisNexis, 12 Janu

Sen, Amartya. “If It’s Fair, It’s Good: 10 Truths About Globalization.” Can

sion, 14 July 2001. Accessed via LexisNexis, 30 September 2004.

Shays, Christopher, Reps. (R-CN) and Carolyn Maloney (D-NY). “Congre

Thyself.” Washington Post, 22 December 2004, A27. 
278

Intelligence Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. She

10 December 2002l, URL: http://intelligence.senate.gov/Shelby.pdf. Ac

21 October 2003.

Shenon, Philip. “Next Round is Set in Push to Reorganize Intelligence.” New Y

20 December 2004, A19.

———.“9/11 Panel is Said to Urge New Post for Intelligence.” New York Ti

ed., 17 July 2004. URL: <htpp://www.nytimes.com/2004/17/olitics/17

>. Accessed 19 July 2004.

Shenon, Philip and Carl Hulse. “House Leadership Blocks Vote on Intelligence 

York Times, 21 November 2004, A1.

Shenon, Philip and Eric Lichtblau. “Sept.11 Panel Cites CIA for Failures in Te

New York Times, online ed., 15 April 2004. URL: http://www.nytimes

04/15/politics/15PANE.html. Accessed 19 April 2004.

Shrader, Katherine Pfleger. “Analysts Are in Great Demand: Intelligenc

Scramble for Talent.” Washington Post, 30 December 2004, A24.

Simpson, Glenn R. Language Lessons for Pentagon: Lack of Arabic Speak

Commanders in Battle for Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2003

Sipress, Alan. “An Indonesian’s Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into Cyberspa

of New Threat, Militant Offers Tips on Credit Card Fraud.” Washingt

December 2004, A19.

Slevin, Peter. “New 2003 Data: 625 Terrorism Deaths, Not 327.” Washingt

June 2004, A1.

Smith, Jeffrey R. “Senate Panel Rejects Request to Increase Intelligence Budg

ington Post, 17 July 1993. A2.

———.“State Dept. Concedes Errors in Terror Data.” Washington Post, 10 

A17.

Smist, Frank J. Jr. Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Commun

Knoxville: The University of Tennessee, 1994.

Sniffen, Michael J. “Secrets Perplex Panel: Classified Data Growing to Includ

cally Irrelevant.” Washington Post, 3 September 2004, A17.

Stern, Christopher. “So Long to Long Distance? Calling Packages, Intern

Swiftly Ending a High-Cost Category.” Washington Post, 5 August 20

Strohm, Chris. “Senators Ask Who’s in Charge of Homeland Intelligence.” Gov

25 March 2004. URL:<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0304/032504

cessed 29 March 2004.

Tenet, George. “DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing: The Worldwide Threat 2

lenges in a Changing Global Context.” Presented to Senate Armed Ser

mittee, 9 March 2004.

———. “Investigation of Sept 11.” 17 October 2002. Accessed via LexisNex

12 January 2004.
279

ed., 14 April 2004. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp

2004Apr14?>. Accessed 15 April 2004.

———. “Testimony on World-Wide Threats.” 7 February 2001. Accessed 

Nexis, 5 February 2004.

———. “Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intellige

National Commission on Terror Attacks Upon the United States.” 2

URL: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/tenet_S

Accessed 1 May 2004.

 “Terrorism Center Wrestles Technology, Secrecy,” Reuters, 28 April 2004

The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commissio

Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton & Comp

The Global Century: Globalization and National Security. Ed. Richard Ku

L. Frost. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000

“Time to Rethink – America’s Intelligence Services.” The Economist News

April 2002. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis, 28 January 2004.

“Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Intelligence.” Washington Post. 

Apil 2004. <URL: <www.washingtonpost.com/ac2wp-dyn/A11115-

Accessed 15 April 2004.

“Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearing on Law Enforcement, Counterterr

ington Post. Online ed., 14 Apil 2004. <URL: www.washingtonpo

dyn/ A12238-2004Apr14?. Accessed 15 April 2004.

Treverton, Gregory F. “Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrin

trol Today. 33, no. 6. (Jul/Aug 2003). Accessed via Proquest, 6 Nov

———.Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information. Cam

bridge University Press, 2001.

United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. New World C

ican Security in the 21st Century Major Themes and Implications Pha

the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of th

5 September 1999. URL:< http://www.nssg.gov>. Accessed 1 Novem

United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. Road Map fo

Security: Imperative for Change—The Phase III Report of the U.S. Comm

tional Security/21st Century. 15 February 2001. URL: <http://www.n

cessed 1 November 2003.

United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. Seeking a N

gy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom P

on a U.S. National Strategy for the 21st Century. 15 April 2000. 

www.nssg.gov>. Accessed 1 November 2003.

U.S. Congress, House, (Democratic Members) House Select Committee on 

curity, America at Risk: The State of Homeland Security Initial F

Cong., 2nd sess., January 2004.
280

and Capabilities Subcommittee. C4I Interoperability: New Challen

Century Warfare. 108 th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 October 2004.

U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Staff Stu

Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. 104th Cong., 9 April 1996

tp://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rptIc21/ic21001.html>. Accessed 

2003.

U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Intelligen

zation Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004.H.Rept 1

U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing

rent and Future State of Intelligence. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 24 Febr

URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_hr/hpsci022494.pdf>

on 1 June 2004.

U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subco

Terrorism and Homeland Security. Counterterrorism Intelligence Capa

Performance Prior to 9-11. Report, 107th Cong., 2 sess., 17, July 2002. 

/www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html. Accessed 2

2003. 

U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Confirmation Heari

Deutch, 104th Congress, 2nd sess., 26 April 1995. 

U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perma

Committee on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry on Counterterrorist Center Cu

spective, 19 September 2002. Accessed via LexisNexis, 12 January 200

U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Perma

Committee on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 

Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. 107th 

sess., S.Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792, 20 December 2002.

U.S. Congress, Joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee, “Septembe

Committee Hearing: Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger.” U

complete911timeline.org/2002/Congressionalinquiry091902b.html>.A

21 October 2003.

U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Intelligence and House, Permanent Select 

on Intelligence. Investigation of September 11, Hearings, 107th Cong., 2

September, 17 October 2002, 2. Accessed via LexisNexis, 12 January 20

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 2005 Joint 

telligence Program (JMIP) and Army Tactical Intelligence and Relate

(TIARA). Hearings, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 April 2004, 13. 

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summa

Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, 108th Cong

6 December 2004.
281

Committee on Intelligence United States Senate January 4, 1995 

1996. 105th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept.105-1, 22 January 1997. URL

gency.com/int03.htm>. Accessed 21 October 2003.

U.S. President. “Executive Order Strengthened Management of the Intellig

nity.” 27 August 2004. URL: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/rele

20040827-6.html>. Accessed 2 September 2004.

U.S. President. “Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center. 27 Au

URL: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.h

ed 2 September 2004.

U.S. President. “Executive Order Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism I

Americans.” 27 August 200. URL: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/re

20040827-4.html>. Accessed 2 September 2004.

U.S. President. “Executive Order Establishing the President’s Board on 

Americans’ Civil Liberties.” 27 August 2004. URL: <www.whitehou

releases/2004/08/20040827-3.html>. Accessed 2 September 2004.

Verton, Dan. “Rice Grilled on Information-Sharing Shortfalls.” ComputerW

ed. 8 April 2004, URL: <http://www.computerworld.com. Acce

2004.

Von Drehle, David. “Analysis: The Findings—America’s Failings, in D

tails.” Washington Post, 23 July 2004, A1+

“Washington in Brief: Terrorism Expert Calls Seaports Vulnerable.” Wa

28 January 2004, A04.

Warner, Michael. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. Washingto

for the Study of Intelligence, 2001. 

Waterman, Shaun. “Intelligence Community Reform Stalls.” United Press 

11 December 2003. Accessed via LexisNexis, 28 January 2004.

Watkins, Michael D. and Max H. Bazerman, “Predictable Surprises: The D

Should Have Seen Coming,” Harvard Business Review (March 2003

Webster’s II New College Dictionary, 2001.

Weisman, Johnathan. “Bush Economic Aide Says Government Lacks Visi

ton Post, 13 December 2003, A1+.

Weisman, Jonathan and Robin Wright. “Funds to Rebuild Iraq are Driftin

Target: State Department to Rethink U.S. Effort.” Washington P

2004, A18.

Wertheimer, Michael A. “Crippling Innovation—and Intelligence.” Washi

July 2004, A19.

Wirth, Kevin E. The Coast Guard Intelligence Program Enters the Intellig

nity: A Case Study of Congressional Influence on Intelligence Com

tion, Unpublished MSSI Thesis, Washington, D.C.: Joint Militar

College, 2002
282

 “World in Brief,” Washington Post, 7 October 2004, A26.

Zegart, Amy B. Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. 

CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

“9/11 Report to Be TV Mini-Series.” New York Times, 15 November 2004, B
283

Melanie M.H. Gutjahr has recently completed a year as an 

Research Fellow at the Joint Military Intelligence College on sabbat

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, where she is a systems e

Gutjahr has more than twenty-six years of wide-ranging experien

intelligence (SIGINT) operations, computer operations, financial 

and technical training. At NGA, she has served as a senior financial 

deputy division chief.

Prior to joining NGA in 1999, Ms. Gutjahr worked as a princi

systems analyst and senior technical trainer for civilian firms whose 

other Intelligence Community and U.S. government agencies. Addi

Gutjahr has served as an adjunct faculty member at Aiken Technical 

Ms. Gutjahr is a Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) an

as the Deputy G2 for United States Army Pacific (USARPAC). A

officer, she has served in command and staff level positions in both 

tactical environments. Colonel Gutjahr is a graduate of the U.S. Arm

and General Staff College. She was mobilized to active duty in supp

tion DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and most recently, Opera

EAGLE.

Ms. Gutjahr holds a BS from the University of Missouri-Colum

from Boston University, and a CSS (Certificate of Special Studies in 

tion and Management) from Harvard University Extension School

honor graduate from the National Defense University Informatio

Management College and is a Department of Defense-certified Chief 

Officer and Chief Information Assurance Officer. Ms. Gutjahr holds 

from the National Security Agency as an Education and Training Of

Ms. Gutjahr has been active in community affairs, having served a

counselor and on the Board of Directors for a county-wide social se

zation. In addition, she held elected office for a community orga

interfaced with county and state legislative officials. She has received 

land gubernatorial appointments to an advisory committee and 

twelve years as chairperson. The author may be contacted at gutjahrm

NTELLIGENCE ARCHIPELAGO 

in the Globalized Era

Melanie M. H. Gutjahr

JOINT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CO

LLEGE

1962

JOINT

M

ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

O

LLEGE

1962
nd encourages research

mproves Intelligence

erational consumers

ndustry and government, and has

of Information and Security Review,

h the National Technical Information

ding the history of U.S. national

t-WWII intelligence. She examines

e of reshaping itself quickly and

ation. Finding a negative answer

 may generate the wherewithal to

ligence Reform Act of 2004.

2005924958

1-932946-03-9