alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Paul Maddaus, Respondent, v. Thomas T. Bowman, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for malpractice, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated March 4, 1958, which denies his motion to strike the action from the Trial Calendar on the ground that plaintiff had failed to furnish him with an authorization to obtain hospital records, as required by subdivision (d) of section 3 of the Statement of Readiness Rule of this court, applicable to the Supreme Court in the counties within the Second Judicial Department (Rules App. Div. [2d Dept.], special rule, eff. Jan. 15, 1957, as amd.). Order reversed; without costs, and motion granted unless, within 20 days after entry of the order hereon, plaintiff shall furnish to defendant an authorization to obtain copies of plaintiff’s hospital records; if plaintiff complies with this condition, the order denying defendant’s motion shall be deemed affirmed, without costs. In our opinion, subdivision (d) of section 3 of our Statement of Readiness Rule does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution by denying equal protection of the laws (cf. *Gair*v. *Peck,*6 N Y 2d 97, cert. denied 361 U. S. 374); it does not conflict with sections 352 and 354 of the Civil Practice Act; it is in harmony with the modern trend toward compulsory pretrial disclosure of parties’ claims; it is consistent with the complex of statutes and rules adopted to achieve the salutary effects flowing from such pretrial disclosure (cf. Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 288, 296-a, 306; Rules Civ. Prac., rules 116, 117, 121-a); and it is within the court’s inherent and statutory power to control the order of its business, and to so conduct its business as to safeguard the rights of all litigants, to preclude unfair procedural advantage to any party, and to prevent needless disruption of orderly court procedures (see *Kriger*v. *Holland Furnace Co.,*12 A D 2d 44). Beldock, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 15.13

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements of Elron Electronic Industries Ltd. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-111310
and 333-10570) of our report dated February 23, 2004 on our audit of the
consolidated financial statements of Ingeneo Technologies LTD. as of December
31, 2003 and 2002, and for the years then ended, which is included in the Elron
Electronic Industries Ltd. annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended
December 31, 2003.


Tel-Aviv, Israel                        /s/ Kesselman & Kesselman
    June 21, 2004                       Certified Public Accountants (Isr.)
                                        A member of PricewaterhouseCoopers
                                           International Limited
### SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL REORGANIZATION AUTHORITIES
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jovan A. Martin, Appellant.

[833 NYS2d 805]—

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis A. Affronti, J.), entered January 22, 2004. The judgment, upon a jury verdict, convicted defendant of grand larceny in the fourth degree, attempted robbery in the first degree and assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, attempted robbery in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.15 [4]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress the written statement that he gave to the police because he asked to speak to his grandmother. We reject that contention. The record establishes that defendant was 17 years old when he gave the written statement to the police. He thus was “legally an adult . . . and there was no requirement that his family be present during police questioning” *(People v Page,*225 AD2d 831, 833 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 883 [1996]; *see People v Lewis,*277 AD2d 1010, 1011 [2000], *lv denied*96 NY2d 736 [2001]). The mere fact that the police denied defendant access to his family during questioning does not require suppression. Rather, a “showing that the isolation resulted from official deception or trickery is required before suppression becomes available under [the] theory” that defendant was unlawfully denied access to his family *(People v Salaam,*83 NY2d 51, 55 [1993]), and no such showing was made here. Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Centra and Peradotto, JJ.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Matthew James Leachman

Appellate case number s : 01

- 20

- 00841

- CR

, 01

- 20

- 0084 2

- CR

, 01

- 20

- 0084 3

- CR

Trial court case number s : 1694181 , 1694180, 1694182

Tria l court: 248th District Court of Harris County

On No vember 29, 2021, Appellant Matthew James Leachman filed a “ Motion to Exceed
Len gth L imit ” with regard to his “ further motion for en ba nc recons ideration. ” Appell ant ’ s motion is granted.

It is so ORDERED

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Veronica Rivas

- Molloy

Act ing individually

Date: December 14 , 2021
### §8319. Removal of members of the uniformed services from rolls; restoration; reappointment

(a) The President may drop from the rolls a member of a uniformed service who is deprived of retired pay under this subchapter.

(b) The President may restore—

(1) military status to an individual dropped from the rolls to whom retired pay is restored under this subchapter or under section 2 of the Act of September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 648); and

(2) all rights and privileges to the individual and his beneficiaries of which he or they were deprived because his name was dropped from the rolls.

(c) If the individual restored was a commissioned officer, the President alone may reappoint him to the grade and position on the retired list held when his name was dropped from the rolls.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 564.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 2287. | Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. 87–299, §1 "Sec. 8", 75 Stat. 646. |

Statutes at Large

The words "and section 3282 of Title 18" are omitted as unnecessary.

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 2 of the Act of September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 648), referred to in subsec. (b)(1), is set out as a note under section 8322 of this title.
### **CHAPTER 31A—TELEMEDICINE AND DISTANCE LEARNING SERVICES IN RURAL AREAS**

Sec.
950aaa.
Purpose.
950aaa–1.
Definitions.
950aaa–2.
Telemedicine and distance learning services in rural areas.
950aaa–3.
Administration.
950aaa–4.
Regulations.
950aaa–5.
Authorization of appropriations.

#### Termination of Chapter

For termination of chapter by section 1(b) of Pub. L. 102–551, see note set out under section 950aaa of this title.
#### STATE v. DANIELS

No. 506A90-2

Case below: Mecklenburg County Superior Court

Motion by Attorney General to dismiss petition for writ of certiorari denied 3 October 1997.
#### § 746.5 Government inventions available for licensing.

Government inventions normally will be made available for the granting of express nonexclusive or limited exclusive licenses to responsible applicants according to the factors and conditions set forth in §§ 746.6 and 746.7, subject to the applicable procedures of § 746.11. The Chief of Naval Research may remove a prior designation of availability for licensing of any patent(s) or patent application(s), provided that no outstanding licenses to that invention are in effect.
_____________

No. 95-3837WM

_____________

City of Kansas City, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

v. * District of Missouri.

*

James Frederick Newport, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

_____________

Submitted: February 27, 1996

 Filed: March 6, 1996

_____________

Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

James Frederick Newport filed a petition to remove to federal court

state criminal proceedings pending against him in the Sixteenth Judicial

Circuit of Missouri, Kansas City Municipal Division. The district court

determined that removal was improper because Newport alleged no causal

connection between his purported duty as a member of the United States Army

Reserves and the pending charges for littering and disorderly conduct. The

district court dismissed the petition. We agree with the district court

that Newport was not entitled to removal. See Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S.

9, 33 (1926); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1989). The

appropriate course of action, however, was not dismissal, but remand to the

state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) ("If it clearly appears . . . that

removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary

remand."); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3) ("judgment of conviction [in the state

criminal proceedings] shall not be entered unless the prosecution is first
-2-

remanded"); Continental Cablevision of St. Paul, Inc. v. United States

Postal Serv., 945 F.2d 1434, 1441 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991).

We thus vacate the district court's dismissal order and remand to the

district court for remand to the state court. Newport's motion to expand

the record is granted.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### § 941.800 General requirements for bonding of surface coal mining and reclamation operations.

Part 800 of this chapter, *General Requirements for Bonding of Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations Under Regulatory Programs,* shall apply to all surface coal mining and reclamation operations.
### SUBCHAPTER III—CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM
Exhibit 3.1


                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
                      RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                       OF
                         ENERGY CONVERSION DEVICES, INC.


      ENERGY CONVERSION DEVICES, INC., a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
(the "Corporation"), does hereby certify:

      FIRST: The following amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation of said
Corporation was duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 242,
Title 8, Chapter 1, Delaware Code:

      The first sentence of Article Fourth is to be modified to read as follows:

           "FOURTH: The total number of shares of all classes of stock which
           the Corporation shall have authority to issue is 50,930,000 shares,
           of which 500,000 shares shall be Class A Common Stock of a par value
           of one cent ($.01) per share, 430,000 shall be Class B Common Stock
           of a par value of one cent ($.01) per share, and 50,000,000 shares
           shall be Common Stock of a par value of one cent ($.01) per share."

      SECOND: That the capital of the Corporation will not be reduced under, or
by reason of, same amendment.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this amendment to be signed
by its President and Chief Executive Officer and its corporate seal to be
hereunto affixed by its Secretary this 18th of March 2004.

                                    ENERGY CONVERSION DEVICES, INC.


                                   /s/ Robert C. Stempel
                                   _____________________________________
                                   By:  Robert C. Stempel
                                        Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

ATTEST:

/s/ Ghazaleh Koefod
__________________________________
Ghazaleh Koefod, Secretary
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 22
- 11079 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,** versus **Demetrius Nathaniel Butler,** Defendant

— Appellant **.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:14
- CR
- 349 - 1

**__________ ____________________**  Before **Higginbotham, Graves,** and **Ho,** Circuit Judges **. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** T h e Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Demetrius Nathaniel Butler has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Butler has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the re levant portions of the record

**_____________________** * This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir .**  **R .**  47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 25, 2023 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-11079 Document: 00516763750 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023No. 22
- 11079

2 reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is **GRANTED** , counsel is excused from further resp onsibilities herein, and the appeal is **DISMISSED** . See **5th Cir. R.**  42.2 . Case: 22-11079 Document: 00516763750 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/25/2023
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 25, 2013

h0617

Order 

Clerk

June 25, 2013

146777

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 146777

COA: 307763

Genesee CC: 09-025647-FH

GLEN ALLEN GRAY, II,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 14, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
### §1735. Consultation

The Secretary and the Administrator shall cooperate and consult in the implementation of this chapter.

(July 10, 1954, ch. 469, title IV, §405, as added Pub. L. 86–341, title I, §14, Sept. 21, 1959, 73 Stat. 610; amended Pub. L. 87–703, title II, §201(4), Sept. 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 611; Pub. L. 89–808, §2(E), Nov. 11, 1966, 80 Stat. 1536; Pub. L. 101–624, title XV, §1512, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 3650.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1990—Pub. L. 101–624 amended section generally, substituting present provisions for provisions requiring funds and authority under this chapter be used to assist friendly countries determined to increase their self-reliance in food production and managing population growth.

1966—Pub. L. 89–808 substituted provisions respecting self-help in meeting food requirements and in resolving problems relative to population growth for provisions respecting entry into agreements for participation in supply and assistance program on a proportionate and equitable basis.

1962—Pub. L. 87–703 substituted "In the case of such agreements, the Secretary may enter into agreements with other friendly and historic supplying nations" for "In entering into such agreements, the Secretary shall endeavor to reach agreement with other exporting nations".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1990 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 101–624 effective Jan. 1, 1991, see section 1513 of Pub. L. 101–624, set out as a note under section 1691 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1966 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–808 effective Jan. 1, 1967, see section 5 of Pub. L. 89–808, set out as a note under section 1691 of this title.
### SUBCHAPTER IV—KIWIFRUIT
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-01-00058-CR

Jermaud Desmond Bennett, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY, 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 20,206-CR, HONORABLE JACK HAMPTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury found appellant Jermaud Desmond Bennett guilty of possessing less than four

grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (c) (West

Supp. 2002). The jury assessed punishment, enhanced by a previous felony conviction, at

imprisonment for forty-five years and a $10,000 fine. We will affirm.

Appellant’s first and second points of error assert violations of article V, section 7 of

the Texas Constitution. That section provides that a district court “shall conduct its proceedings at

the county seat of the county in which the case is pending, except as otherwise provided by law. He

shall hold the regular terms of his Court at the County Seat of each County in his district in such

manner as may be prescribed by law.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 7 (emphasis added). The seat of Milam

County is Cameron, but appellant’s trial was held in Rockdale. 

The commissioners court in counties with a population of less than 30,000 “may

provide for, operate, and maintain a branch courthouse outside the county seat.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t
 

1

 The population of Milam County according to the 2000 census is 24,238. Texas Almanac at

232 (2001).

2

Code Ann. § 292.0231(b) (West 1999).1 “On approval of the commissioners court . . . a court . . .

may . . . conduct any function at the branch courthouse that [it] is authorized to conduct at the

courthouse located inside the county seat.” Id. § 292.0231(d). On December 22, 1995, the Milam

County Commissioners’ Court designated the Roger Hashem Juvenile Justice Center in Rockdale as

a branch courthouse and approved its use as a branch courthouse by the 20th District Court. See

Tex. R. Evid. 204 (judicial notice of county ordinances). No violation of article V, section 7 is

shown. Points of error one and two are overruled. 

In his third point of error, appellant asserts that the court should have suppressed

evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search. Appellant does not specify the evidence in question,

but we assume he refers to the cocaine found during the search incident to his arrest for public

intoxication. Appellant did not move to suppress this evidence and did not otherwise object to its

admission. No error is presented. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Tex. R. Evid. 103(a).

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Affirmed

Filed: March 21, 2002
3

Publish
FILED

June 11, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

APRIL 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) NO. 02C01-9708-CC-00324

Appellee, )

) GIBSON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. DICK JERMAN, JR.,

BRUCE COLE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Sentencing)

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION

I concur in all respects with the opinion by my colleague, Judge David G.

Hayes, with exception of the refusal to allow certain credits. I believe the statutory

scheme clearly requires credit for time served in a community corrections program

even if participation in the program is a condition of probation. 

As noted by my colleagues, the statute expressly requires credit for time spent

in a community corrections program when a community corrections sentence is

revoked. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(e)(4). My colleagues then conclude,

however, that to allow credit for participation in the community corrections program

when it is a condition of probation would in most cases only encourage the

probationer to intentionally violate probation after completion of his Release Eligibility

Date so as to terminate his sentence and all further supervision. I find nothing in our

law indicating that a probation revocation and reinstatement of the original

penitentiary sentence terminates the sentence just because the offender has

surpassed his Release Eligibility Date. Obviously, one is not necessarily released,

nor is the sentence terminated, upon reaching a Release Eligibility Date. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-501 et. seq. The determination of release must be made by the

Board of Paroles. 

Moreover, my colleagues sweepingly conclude that a probationer is not

entitled to jail credit. In doing so they overlook Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-
2

106(e)(3)(B). If an offender is first placed in a community corrections program,

subsequently transferred to ordinary probation and then violates probation, the court

is expressly required to award credit for the time served in the community corrections

program upon probation being revoked. 

Community corrections is a special program with strict requirements. The

legislative intent is clear: a person participating the community corrections program

gets credit for the time served in the program. To allow credit for one participating

only in the community corrections program and to deny credit for one participating in

both community corrections and probation does not make a whole lot of sense to me.

It’s just that simple. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial of credit for the time

of participation in the community corrections program.

_________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
#### TROTT, Appellant, v. SCHMITT, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 24, 1905.)

Action by William- Trott against Valentin Schmitt.

PER CURIAM.

Order modified, by inserting a provision requiring the respondent to pay all costs of the action up to the time of the granting of the order as a condition of allowing the amendment to the answer, and, as modified, affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to the appellant.