Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Revenge 

of the Melians:

Asymmetric Thre a t s

and the Next QDR

K E N N E T H F. M c K E N Z I E, J R.
the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University,

where he is a member of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group.

Prior to this assignment, he commanded the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which

deployed to the Mediterranean as the Ground Combat Element of the 24th Marine

Expeditionary Unit. LtCol McKenzie also served as a platoon commander, rifle

company commander, infantry battalion executive officer, and division operations

officer, among other assignments. He also has been the Marine Officer Instructor

at the Virginia Military Institute and a speechwriter for the Commandant’s Staff

Group at U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters.

LtCol McKenzie is a graduate of The Citadel, where he earned a bachelor’s

degree in English and master’s in history. He was graduated with honors from the

advanced course at the U.S. Army Armor School, is a distinguished graduate of the

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and is a recipient of the Clifton B. Gate

Award from the School of Advanced Warfighting at Marine Corps University.

■ ■ ■ ■

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The Revenge 

of the Melians:

Asymmetric Threats 

and the Next QDR

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

McNair Paper 62

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2000
Op i n i on s , con clu s i on s , and recom m en d a ti on s , ex pre s s ed or implied herei n , a r

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Contents

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter One

What is Asymmetric Warfare? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defining Asymmetry—Characteristics: Disparity of Interest—

Targeting the Will of the Opponent—Attaining Strategic 

Effect on All Levels of War—The Importance of Effectiveness—

The Threat-Response Dynamic—A Final Example: The 

Gulf Tanker War—Conclusions

Chapter Two

A Typology of Asymmetry: What,

Who, and When? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The What: The Range of Potential Asymmetric Threats—

The Who: Regional, Rogue, and Nonstate Actors—The 

When: Likelihood During Phases of a Crisis—Conclusions

Chapter Three

Looking in the Mirror: Where Are Our 

Asymmetric Vulnerabilities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Measuring Conventional Military Superiority—Examining 

the Homeland—Quantifying the Homeland: What Are 

the Targets?—Examining Potential Vulnerabilities
p

Categorizing the Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

What Are the Ten Asymmetric Threats?—Conclusions

Chapter Five

An Option of Difficulties —Countering 

Asymmetric Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Current Initiatives: The State of Play Today—Summarizing 

Current Initiatives—Doing Better: Beginning with Three 

Ideas—Policy Recommendations—An Option of Difficulties?

Chapter Six

Conclusions: The Uneasy Athenians . . . . . . . . . 9

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List of Tables

1. Asymmetric opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Conventional antideployment approaches . . . . . . . . . 

3. Conventional anti-invasion approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. Summarizing antiaccess measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. A question of timing: relative likelihood

of asymmetric use during phases of a crisis . . . . . . . . . 

6. Measuring the effectiveness of JV 2010

concepts and some potential asymmetries . . . . . . . . . 

7. What’s the homeland? Breaking it out . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. Summary of ten asymmetric threats . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword

T

his essay is a product of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QD

2001 Working Group, a project of the Institute for National Str

gic Studies at the Na ti onal Defense Un ivers i ty. S pon s ored by 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the working group is an indep

den t , h on e s t - bro ker ef fort inten ded to build intell ectual capital for 

u pcoming QDR. More spec i f i c a lly, it aims to frame issu e s , devel op 

ti on s , and provi de insights for the Ch a i rm a n , the servi ce s , and the n

administration in three areas: defense strategy, criteria for sizing conv

tional forces, and force structure for 2005–2010.

One of the group’s initial tasks was to assess the future secu

environment to the year 2025. This was pursued by surveying the av

able literature to identify areas of consensus and debate and by deepen

knowledge of asymmetric threats to the United States both at home 

abroad, given their potential appeal to likely adversaries in view of Am

ica’s conventional military superiority. The essay that follows grew ou

that latter effort and reflects a growing consensus that the issues posed 

a s ym m etric threats should occ u py a more prom i n ent place in defe

strategy and force planning.

This essay makes a unique contribution to the growing literat

on asymmetric threats by providing a conceptual framework for think

a bo ut su ch thre a t s , of fering an approach to determining wh i ch thr

should receive the greatest attention from defense planners, and sugg

ing concrete steps that the Nation should take to address them.

Michèle A. Flournoy

Project Director
Introduction

I

n 416 B.C., the Athenian-led Delian League, then the dominant n

power of the Hellenic World, was locked in a death struggle with 

rival, Sparta, and its Peloponnesian allies. In the wake of the battl

Mantinea, and on the eve of the ill-fated naval expedition to Syracuse, 

small island of Melos in the northern Cretan Sea had become an objec

s tra tegic con cern to At h ens wh i ch sought to force Melos to join 

Delian League and pay tri bute . The Melians ref u s ed and cl a i m ed 

moral right of a state to remain neutral.“Right, as the world goes, is o

in qu e s ti on bet ween equals in power,” a n s wered the At h en i a n s ; “T

strong do what they wish and the weak suffer what they must.”1

One may admire Melian principles and courage, if not strat

acumen. Their heroic stubbornness cost the Melians their existence. 

Athenians slaughtered all adult males and sold the women and child

into slavery.

The Melian Dialogue by Thucydides, an account of the excha

recorded between the Athenian negotiators and the Melians, has bee

locus classicus for the realistic study of international relations for mill

n i a — e s pec i a lly the notorious At h enian refusal to be con s tra i n ed by 

u n en force a ble dicta of hypo t h etical intern a ti onal law. Weak states h

long sought to counter the overwhelming political, economic, and m

tary superiority that great powers can bring to bear. Melos, treading a 

miliar path, sought succor against one power through an alliance with 

other, Sparta, which failed.

Absent a powerful ally, the most effective responses from wea

states have been those that sought to counter the hegemon’s power in

rectly through superior military organization, crafty diplomacy, wily e

onage, or terror. Modern counterparts of the Melians can add weapon

mass destruction with a long reach to this traditional arsenal.
The Melians might have survived, had they been able to raise th

cost to the Athenians of attacking their island. Weak nations today can d

what Melos could not—inflict severe damage on attacking forces or a dis

tant homeland. As weak nations, and even nonstate groups, contemplat

i n ti m i d a ting or punishing a dominant power on a scale incon ceiva bl 

2,500 ye a rs ago, we might speak met a ph ori c a lly of the reven ge of t h 

Melians and hear far-distant applause of those islanders.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Americans are in som

sense the modern analogues to the ancient Athenians. Because the Unite

S t a tes is the worl d ’s stron gest power, it is inevi t a ble that hostile nati on 

will seek ways to undermine its great strength by asymmetrically attack

ing its vulnerabilities.

The cen tral thesis of this essay is that the abi l i ty of the Dep a rt

m ent of Defense to exec ute its porti on of U. S . n a ti onal policy in the nea

to mid-term is based on the a bi l i ty to maintain clear and unambi g u ou 

co nven tional military su peri o ri ty in the face of em erging asym m etri 

t h re a t s, co u p l ed with the abi l i ty to defend the homel a n d.

2 Tod ay, the inter

est of the defense establ i s h m ent in asym m etric threats is nothing mor

than a modern recogn i ti on of an en du ring trut h : we a ker powers , bo t 

s t a te and non s t a te , wi ll rel en t l e s s ly seek ways to miti ga te the dom i n a n c

of the stron g.

This analysis will adopt a three-part approach to analyzing asym

metric threats:

■ What is asymmetric warfare?

■ What are the asymmetric threats we face?

■ What can we do to counter asymmetric threats?

This introduction will establish the broad framework for the sub

sequent analysis. Chapter one will attempt to answer the question “wha

is asym m etric warf a re ? ” What does the term mean? More parti c u l a rly

what does it signify for the defense establishment? In establishing this re

l a ti on s h i p, c u rrent def i n i ti ons of a s ym m etric warf a re wi ll be ex a m i n ed 

and a more nu a n ced con cept wi ll be propo s ed . F ive ch a racteri s tics o

asymmetric warfare will be introduced. As part of chapter one, illustrativ

asymmetric approaches will be examined within their historical and op

erational contexts. Finally, some conclusions about measures of effective

ness for different asymmetric approaches will be advanced.

Chapter two will begin the process of answering the second ques

tion by posing a typology of asymmetric approaches and organizing th

current range of asymmetric threats facing the United States. This chapte
wi ll build upon the historical analysis of ch a pter on e , but wi ll tu rn 

focus to contemporary and future threats. Chapter three will operatio

i ze the ra n ge of po ten tial asym m etric threats by com p a ring po ten 

a s ym m etric threats against two sys tem s : the opera ti onal principles 

bodied in Joint Vision 2010 and the critical infrastructure of the Un

States. In chapter four, the range of asymmetric threats will be evalua

in terms of potential danger, and threats likely to pose the greatest dan

will be identified.A series of future case studies are included in this ch

ter to give a sense of immediacy and granularity to the threats.

Ch a pter five repre s ents the policy com pon ent of this stu dy. T

ch a pter wi ll eva lu a te current Un i ted States initi a tives against asym m e

t h re a t s , assessing the ef fectiveness of ex i s ting po l i c y. A set of s pecific po 

recom m en d a ti ons wi ll then be adva n ced for con s i dera ti on du ring the 2

Q u ad rennial Defense Revi ew. Some of these wi ll be out s i de the purvi ew 

the Dep a rtm ent of Defen s e , requ i ring acti on ac ross the Federal Gove

m en t , as well as by state and local govern m en t s .

Before we begin this analysis, we must address the skeptic’s qu

tion: is the new found lure of asymmetric warfare nothing more than 

fense faddism? This is a re a s on a ble su s p i c i on given the ra p i d i ty w

which this term has sprung up and spread within defense circles. Is th

in other words, less here than meets the eye?

It will become apparent in the following pages that increased 

tention to asymmetric warfare is justified and timely. Throughout hist

nations in conflict have attempted to take advantage of the weaknesse

their adversaries while maximizing their own strengths to achieve a 

proporti on a te ef fect — one of the ch a racteri s tics of what we now 

asymmetric warfare. This study, however, recognizes a new aspect of 

asymmetric dimension of war; that the incontestable global conventio

military superiority of the United States, coupled with the proliferatio

we a pons of mass de s tru cti on and the death of s tra tegic distance , h 

made the Armed Forces uniquely vulnerable to asymmetric threats.
What is Asymmetric

Warfare? 

. . .victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break th

framework which had come to be taken for granted and to make the victor

a ll the more co m pl ete by co n f ro n ting the antagonist with co n ti n gen ci e 

which he had never considered.3

—Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

T

his chapter will establish a working definition of asymmetric war

f a re by examining current def i n i ti on s , t h en proposing a va ri a n 

that will be applied throughout the rest of this study. Five recurrin

ch a racteri s tics that are useful in analyzing asym m etric approaches als

wi ll be introdu ced as themes that re s on a te thro u gh o ut the rest of t h 

paper, with historical examples to highlight different aspects of both suc

cessful and unsuccessful asymmetric approaches.

Defining Asymmetry

The use of the term a s ym m etric wa rf a re is new in U. S . G overn

m ent circl e s . It does not appear in the 1990 Base Force , the 1993 Bo t tom 

Up Revi ew, the 1995 Com m i s s i on on Roles and Mi s s i ons of the Arm e

Force s , or any annual Sec ret a rial Report to the con gress until 1998.4In

f act , the first men ti on of the term was in the 1997 Quad rennial Defen s 

Revi ew (QDR) report .5 Si n ce then , the asym m etric threat indu s try ha

been rocketing ahead . The Na ti onal Defense Pa n el that shadowed th

QDR ef fort , the 1999 U. S . Com m i s s i on on Na ti onal Sec u ri ty / 2 1s t Cen tu ry

and a host of o t h er analyses have since wei gh ed in on its sign i f i c a n ce .6 Th 

Na ti onal Defense Un ivers i ty, in the 1998 ed i ti on of its annual Stra tegic As 

se s s m en t , devo ted an en ti re ch a pter to asym m etric thre a t s , wh ereas in pre

vious vo lumes the term had never been men ti on ed . The term figured larg
with the publ i c a ti on of the Na tional Mi l i t a ry Stra tegy in 1997 for the firs t

ti m e , and also in the Na tional Securi ty Stra tegy.

8 The 1999 Joint Stra tegy

Revi ew, an internal analytical stu dy prep a red annu a lly for the Ch a i rm a n ,

foc u s ed on the asym m etric thre a t .9

The U.S. military’s working definition of asymmetric warfare says

that “advers a ries are likely to attem pt to circ u mvent or undermine U. S .

s trengths while ex p l oi ting its we a k n e s s e s , using met h ods that differ significantly from the usual mode of U.S. operations.”

10 A recent Joint Staff

def i n i ti on opines that asym m etric warf a re consists of “u n a n ti c i p a ted or

n on - trad i ti onal approaches to circ u mvent or undermine an advers a ry ’s

s trengths while ex p l oi ting his vu l n era bi l i ties thro u gh unex pected technologies or innovative means.”11

In Decem ber 1999, A Na tional Securi ty Stra tegy for a New Cen tu ry,

the fundamental nati onal sec u ri ty doc u m ent of the Un i ted State s , def i n ed

a s ym m etric warf a re in this manner: “u n conven ti onal approaches that avoi d

or undermine our strengths while ex p l oi ting our vu l n era bi l i ti e s .”

12

The ex i s ting def i n i ti on s , while narrowly acc u ra te , s eem insu f f icient in explaining asymmetry. It will be argued in this chapter that a better definition of asymmetric warfare would be: Leveraging inferior tactical

or opera tional strength against Am erican vulnera bi l i ties to ach i eve dispro -

po rti o n a te ef fe ct with the aim of u n d ermining Am erican wi ll in ord er to

a ch i eve the asym m etric acto r ’s stra tegic obje ctive s. The key differen ces in

this propo s ed def i n i ti on are the el em ent of d i s propo rti o n a te ef fe ct—

achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources—

and the explicit recognition of the importance of the psychological component. These elements are essential to considering how an asymmetric

actor can achieve strategic objectives through an operation—even a failed

operation—that, from the perspective of the larger power, is only a tactical attack.

There is an important caveat to this definition: asymmetric warfare does not equate automatically to an attack on the homeland. Unfortunately, much recent attention in the literature has tended to obscure the

fact that asymmetric approaches exist on all levels of war, and forces in

the field as well as nations have been seeking them for as long as warfare

and diplomacy have been practiced. The attack on the homeland is only

the most ex treme—and po ten ti a lly most dangero u s — ex pre s s i on of a n

asymmetric strategic attack.
Any con s i dera ti on of a s ym m etric threats must start with th

most basic asymmetry of all: disparity of interest. The matrix below high

lights the fact that the greatest incentive for using asymmetric approache

rises from a real or perceived disparity of interest. When a weak adversar

has a vital interest that con f l i cts with the nonvital interest of a stron 

state, the former has the greatest incentive to use asymmetric approaches

G iven the bre adth of Am erican sec u ri ty intere s t s , t h ere wi ll b

many areas of potential conflict where no vital interest is at stake for th

United States, but where a regional actor has vital interests. We should re

member that a rich man’s small-scale contingency may be a poor man

m a j or theater war. The gre a test ch a n ce for su ccess for an advers a ry in

such a scenario is when U.S. interest remains relatively low.

Table 1. Asymmetric opportunities

Adversary interest Adversary interest

is nonvital is vital

U.S. interest is nonvital Lowest incentive Most effective

for both sides opportunity for 

adversary use of 

asymmetric approaches

U.S. interest is vital Low incentive for Most dangerous 

weaker side situation

Asymmetric approaches can work in three ways within this idea

First, they can deter U.S. entry into crises where there is no U.S. vital in

terest by thre a tening disproporti on a te damage to the Un i ted State s 

Would the loss of Seattle to a ballistic missile attack be a reasonable trad

for the unconditional surrender of a hostile Pyongyang government? Ab

s ent a vital Am erican intere s t , su ch a threat would exercise a powerf u 

sobering effect on U.S. planners. This is probably the most effective illus

tra ti on of this con cept , and also the most likely to have a po s i tive out

come for the weaker state.

Secon d , i f a dec i s i on has been made to em p l oy U. S . forces in a con

ti n gency that non et h eless remains bel ow the level of vital nati onal intere s t 

an asym m etric approach by an advers a ry that thre a tens to ra p i dly caus

d i s proporti on a te ef fect may halt U. S . en try, or accel era te a wi t h d raw a l . I
m ay become very ex pen s ive in terms of human and material co s t , t h en a

we a ker state might calculate that a shocking display of force might cause

the Un i ted States to rec a l c u l a te the co s t - ben efit of en ga gem en t .

Th i rd , an asym m etric approach may en a ble regi onal actors to

pursue aggressive strategies indirectly, making it hard to marshal American wi ll to act . In form a ti on opera ti on s , terrorist attack s , and other unconven ti onal approaches all may tend to make it very difficult to trace

sponsorship with the certainty required by the United States for action,

ultimately diffusing our response until it may be too late to act effectively.

To this end, regional states will work very hard to “manage” their relationship with the Un i ted State s , while pursuing dual goals of attaining regional objectives and preventing our interference.

Does this mean that it is advantageous to be weak? Intriguingly,

the Melian Di a l ogue of fers a paradoxical twist for modern ti m e s . Th e

final measure between the Melians and the Athenians was the ability of

the Athenians to apply unconstrained power against their weaker adversary; this is no longer the case. The nature of international relations, and

the approach of f ree soc i eties to war, l i m i t s — properly—our abi l i ties to

apply maximum force against potential threats.

From this is born an inversion of the Melian Dialogue: At certain

l evels of en ga gem en t , “ It is the weak who do what they can, the stron g

who suffer what they must.”

13 Nowhere is this more pronounced than in a

co ll i s i on of i n terests in wh i ch the Un i ted States has rel a tively little at

stake, while a weaker adversary sees the issue as life or death.

As long as the stakes of a conflict stay below the level of vital interest to the United States, the weaker power may be able to manipulate

the terms of engagement. It is in this area that the initiative lies with the

we a ker of the two powers . The risk to the we a ker power is that ei t h er

through miscalculation or intent the issue becomes of vital interest to the

United States. It has been said that the archetypal asymmetric actor wants

to ach i eve a “ Mogad i s hu , not a Pe a rl Ha rbor.”1 4 If the cro s s over to U. S .

vital interest occurs, the opportunity for effective asymmetric approaches

a bove the tactical level for the we a ker party is gre a t ly redu ced , and the

trad i ti onal interpret a ti on of the Melian Di a l ogue wi ll be re a f f i rm ed .1 5

When U.S. national will has been mobilized, the strong will prevail.

Two examples from history dem on s tra te the two different outcom e s . The first illu s tra tes the su ccessful app l i c a ti on of an asym m etri c

approach in an environment where no U.S. vital national interest was at
proach at the strategic level

On 3 October 1993, a task force of Delta Force troops and U.S

Army Ra n gers attem pted to captu re key aides to Somali warl ord Mo

h a m m ed Ai deed . Al t h o u gh the force used hel i copters for inserti on an

was arm ed with soph i s ti c a ted we a pon s , the opera ti on tu rn ed sour. Be

cause of the unanticipated loss of a helicopter, the force became trappe

in an urban maze that made it difficult to ex p l oit tech n o l ogical adva n

tages, particularly when the foe was willing to expend prodigious num

bers of human lives in densely packed assaults. The confidence of an elit

and highly capable unit led it into a situation where it became vulnerabl

to the Somalia Na ti onal All i a n ce (SNA ) , wh i ch had stu d i ed U. S . t acti c s 

waited patiently for an opportune window of vulnerability, and sprung an

i m prom ptu but lethal co u n ters tro ke . Am erican casu a l ties nu m bered 1

killed and 73 wounded, and hundreds of Somalis died. Often overlooked

is the fact that the operation was a tactical success: it accomplished its ob

j ective . The ef fect , t h o u gh , on dec i s i on m a kers in the Un i ted States wa

profo u n d , p a ra ll eling that of Tet and Bei rut . Cert a i n ly the Somali war

l ords who parti c i p a ted in this fight could not have pred i cted the en or

mous ef fect their en co u n ter would have on U. S . policy in Som a l i a , bu

they knew good things would flow from U.S. casualties; the ultimate out

come of the battle was an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces in Somalia.

This is an excellent example of how a tactical event, whatever its outcom

on the battlef i el d , can direct ly influ en ce nati onal stra tegy, p a rti c u l a rl

when no U.S. vital interest is at stake.

The second example illustrates the danger of miscalculation. An

a s ym m etric approach that may even be tacti c a lly ef fective can draw th

strategic ire of a stronger power by miscalculation. A clear example of thi

is the Japanese decision in 1941 to initiate hostilities against the Unite

States. The ultimate aim of Japanese strategy was to expand to the south

in order to gain unfettered access to oil and other vital natural resources

The Am erican pre s en ce in the Philippines was a po tent threat on th

flank of any such advance, and Japanese strategists concluded that even

tually the United States would enter the war against them—it was only 

question of when. Given this belief, it seemed reasonable to conduct no

only a series of attacks on U.S. forces in the Philippines, but also a spoil

ing attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, forward-based at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese planners calculated that by removing the primary U.S

of fen s ive we a pon from play at the very beginning of h o s ti l i ti e s , t h e
Even after losses were made good , U. S . forces would have to opera te at

great distances from home bases wh en attacking the Japanese Empire .

The stra tegic goal was to indu ce war we a riness in the Un i ted State s .

Viewed in this manner, the Japanese strategy was for a limited war, fought

with limited means, and with a limited objective.

Un fortu n a tely for Ja p a n , the attack on Pe a rl Ha rbor, while ri ch

with precedent from Japanese military history, h ad a stra tegic ef fect oppos i te that de s i red . If Japan had hoped to fight a limited war, Pe a rl Ha rbor

en su red that the Un i ted States would fight a war of u n l i m i ted means for

what became a vi rtu a lly unlimited obj ective : the uncon d i ti onal su rren der

of Ja p a n . This well illu s tra tes the open - en ded natu re of a s ym m etri e s : l i mi ted tactical su ccesses can ulti m a tely bring massive stra tegic failu re . Pe a rl

Ha rbor was the key el em ent in the en try of the Un i ted States into Worl d

War II. The pri ce of m i s c a l c u l a ti on proved very high for the Ja p a n e s e .1 7

These two examples highlight the fact that when there is no U.S.

vital interest at stake, innovative asymmetric approaches can potentially

shape U.S. national will. The danger, as the Japanese learned, is that there

can be a fine—and moving—line between the vital and nonvital interests.

Targeting the Will of the Opponent

Asymmetric approaches can achieve powerful effect through manipulation of the psychological element. Aimed directly at the will of the

opponent, they can compensate for materiel or other deficiencies. While

the met h od of the approach may be tacti c a l , the psych o l ogical ef fect is

sought at the strategic level. This is a key distinguishing feature of asymmetry—the continual focus on strategic effect, enabled by reliance on the

p s ych o l ogical com pon ent of the approach sel ected . In functi onal term s ,

the target becomes the mind of the opponent, in particular the will of the

antagonist. It is a reaffirmation of the Clausewitzian principle that “War is

an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”18

Three examples from history illustrate this point. The first, from

World War I, is that of Lenin and the sealed train. The Russian Czar had

a b d i c a ted the Rom a n ov Th rone in Ma rch 1917, but the Germans sti ll

f aced a two - f ront war as the Keren s ky govern m ent attem pted to do its

p a rt to keep pre s su re on the Germ a n s . To the Great German Gen era l

Staff, the endurance of Russia in the face of staggering defeats was a significant problem. In an attempt to kick-start the squabbling revolutionaries who circl ed around the Provi s i onal Govern m ent in Petrograd and
deadly, ruthless, and totally committed communist revolutionary into th

body po l i tic of Ru s s i a . The revo luti on a ry was Len i n , wh o, in Wi n s ton

Churchill’s immortal words, was transported “like a plague bacillus from

Switzerland into Russia.”

19 Lenin, of course, was devoted to the overthrow

of all noncommunist governments, so this action shows clearly how des

perate the Germans were.

Their bold action paid off in the short term. Lenin energized th

communists, and the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Gov

ernment in the October 1917 revolution and eventually left the war. Th

Germans achieved their short-term goal: “the greatest possible degree o

chaos in Russia.”

20 The long-term effect of this injection of ideas was t

ch a n ge the co u rse of world history; u l ti m a tely it rebo u n ded upon th

Germans in the form of a powerful Soviet Union. There is no clearer cas

in modern history of the power of an idea used as a we a pon . Had th

Germans not brought Lenin home from exile, it is unlikely that the Bol

s h eviks would have sei zed power as they did, and the co u rse of h i s tor

would have been different.

A second example of an attem pt to opera te direct ly against an op

pon en t’s wi ll in the face of s erious material and opera ti onal mismatch e 

was the Japanese con cept for the defense of the home islands in 1945, i n

the face of an ex pected All i ed inva s i on . Af ter the fall of O k i n aw a , Ja p a n e s 

Im perial He ad qu a rters began work on the plans for the defense of t h 

h ome islands from amph i bious attack . Th ey correct ly anti c i p a ted that th

i n i tial All i ed attack would fall on Ky u s hu , s o ut h ernmost of the home is

lands and accepted this battle as the dec i s ive one for the defense of t h 

h om el a n d .2 1 By this time in the war, Japanese planners had a clear under

standing of the overwh elming power of Am erican air su pport . Th eir plan

of defen s e , k n own as Ket su - Go, fe a tu red the mobi l i z a ti on of the en ti r

Japanese nati on in su pport of the defense of the hom el a n d . Th eir inten 

was to defeat U. S . f i repower and maneuver su peri ori ty by defending no

on the be aches but inland and by avoiding the movem ent of re s erve force 

that would become vu l n era ble to U. S . a i rpower. By forcing con ti nual cl o s 

battles and preven ting the full app l i c a ti on of U. S . f i repower, t h ey hoped t

cause en o u gh U. S . c a su a l ties to we a ken civilian mora l e . The goal was neve

o utri ght defeat of U. S . forces (except among ex trem i s t s ) ; i n s te ad , it was 

ra ti onal calculati on that, by causing en o u gh casu a l ties in the fight fo

Ky u s hu , t h ey might avert the inva s i on of Hon s hu .
by the Ja p a n e s e . This was an asym m etric approach that was never fully

s o lved by the Un i ted States Nav y. Fu n cti on a lly, k a m i k a ze s were the antecedents of tod ay ’s cruise missiles. Th ey were ch e a p, nu m ero u s , a n d

lethal. Off Okinawa and in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was exposed to

the threat. The Japanese inflicted 3,389 fatalities, achieving a ratio of 1.78

Am ericans kill ed for each k a m i k a ze s orti e .2 2 This tactic would on ly become more effective as U.S. forces closed on the Japanese home islands.

The U.S. plan to lessen kamikaze attacks was based on attacking

Japanese airbases, early warning, effective fighter interception, and point

defense. It has been estimated that the Japanese would have been able to

gen era te as many as 7,500 k a m i k a ze s orties of f Ky u s hu that might have

destroyed as much as a third of the invasion fleet.23

These three examples demonstrate the value—and difficulty—of

undertaking operations against the national will of an opponent. The example of Lenin and the sealed train has many parallels to information operations today. The examples of the Japanese plan for the defense of their

home islands are more conventional illustrations, but all three examples

take aim at the will of their foe, rather than its fielded forces.

Attaining Strategic Effect on All Levels of War

As ym m etric approaches have been app l i ed on all levels of w a r,

but the most effective asymmetric approaches seek to attain strategic effect regardless of the level on which they are applied. It follows that there

m ay be a def i n i ti onal blu rring bet ween the level of the acti on and the

level of the effect, and for the asymmetric actor, the goal is to produce effect on the highest possible level.

The stra tegic level en com p a s s e s , in the broadest sen s e , acti on s

taken to accomplish national-level security and foreign policy objectives.

Within the context of asymmetric warfare, these are actions that typically

promise the greatest “bang for the buck” for any adversary, since they are

designed to influence the basic outcome of a conflict. Actions on the tactical and operational level may yield strategic outcomes, the ideal objective of any asymmetric approach.

A classic example of a favorable strategic outcome deriving from

a tactical action is the Beirut Bombing of 1983: The truck-bomb attack

on Battalion Landing Team 1/8 in October 1983 ranks as one of the most

su ccessful attacks in modern history. It was both tacti c a lly bri lliant and

politically fruitful at the strategic level, since it led to the withdrawal of
attributes of a successful asymmetric approach that it could be held up a

the “essence of asymmetry.” Tactical and strategic surprise were achieved

and the cost to the attacker (probably Syria) was minuscule compared to

the blow to American will. This tactical event ultimately had a vastly dis

proportionate strategic effect, while preventing the United States from re

s ponding with overwh elming conven ti onal su peri ori ty by ob s c u ri n 

“ownership” of the attack.

The operational level includes actions against theater-level force

and the stra tegic dep l oym ent infra s tru ctu re . O f n a rrower scope than

strategic asymmetries, they are regional in focus. A good example of thi

is the employment of Serbian air defense during Operation Allied Force in

March-June 1999. During this operation, frequently the Serbian “air de

fense system simply did not ‘come up’ to challenge NATO strikes.”

25 Mos

em i t ters stayed of f . This preven ted North At l a n tic Treat Orga n i z a ti on

(NATO) air forces from achieving the requisite level of suppression of ai

defen s e s , forcing NATO pilots to opera te at high er than opti mum alti

tu des wh en bom bi n g. As Gen eral John P. Ju m per, Com m a n der U. S . Ai 

Forces Europe, remarked: “We learned from this war that it is a differen

ball game when SAMs don’t come up to fight—everything that we do i

based on the bad guy’s willingness to engage.”26

This tactic was, in effect, analogous to Tirpitz’ “risk fleet” strateg

before World War I, when the very existence of a capability, despite bein

vastly weaker than its stronger opponent, influenced British planning. In

much the same manner, NATO could not afford to ignore the potentia

re s i dent in the wi t h h eld capabi l i ty. While the Serbs ulti m a tely did no

su cceed in defe a ting the NATO air campaign , this approach did sign i f i

cantly reduce its effectiveness. The Serbs were unable to gain strategic ef

fect from this action, and it must be considered a partially effective asym

metric approach.

On the tactical level , a s ym m etric opera ti ons are undert a ken

against fielded forces, the enabling structures that allow them to operate

and through selection and manipulation of the battlespace. By their ver

nature, tactical asymmetries often promise the least overall “bang for th

buck,” even though they may embody remarkable technological or tacti

cal concepts. A clear example of this is Japan’s use of the torpedo in Worl

War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) placed great emphasis on th

torpedo in the years following the Russo-Japanese War, even though tor

pedoes performed poorly in that war. The IJN always saw itself fightin
ten tial en em i e s , and the use of torpedoes at night and in con d i ti ons of

limited visibility was intended to be a counter.27 Interestingly, early torpedoes continued to underperform. It wasn’t until the eve of World War II,

almost four decades after the birth of the torpedo concept in the Japanese

Navy, that the IJN finally developed, in the form of the Type 93 oxygen

torpedo, the ultimate torpedo of World War II.28

This is an excell ent example of an or ga n i z a ti on seeking an innovative way to overcome a perceived def i c i ency of nu m bers and firepower by

em phasizing a tech n o l ogical co u n ter, yet sti ll app l i ed within an overa ll

s ym m etric con s tru ct of w a rf i gh ti n g. It was a very su ccessful asym m etri c

a pproach , p a rti c u l a rly since it was kept sec ret from Ja p a n’s po ten tial en emies until it had been ex ten s ively em p l oyed in combat du ring World Wa r

I I . De s p i te significant tactical adva n t a ges that acc ru ed from their adva n ced

torpedo tech n o l ogy and doctri n e , the Japanese were not able to tra n s l a te

the tactical adva n t a ges ren dered by the torpedo into stra tegic re su l t s .

The Importance of Effectiveness

Determining effectiveness is critical in evaluating asymmetric approaches. What works and what doesn’t work? Effective asymmetric approaches tend to have several common characteristics. From the perspective of the target , t h ey are unex pected acti on s , and the most ef fective

response may be counterintuitive. The intuitive response may worsen the

s i tu a ti on . A good analogy is com bi n ed arms warf a re ; i de a lly, a force on

the receiving end of a com bi n ed arms attack wi ll be forced to ex po s e

more of its force to another perhaps more damaging form of attack while

attempting to compensate for the most visible threat. When executed, effective asymmetric approaches create shock effects within the defender’s

command sys tem that make it impo s s i ble for the defen der to attain his

original goal,“in practical terms a consequential state of a fighting system

which can no longer accomplish its aims . . . which derives from physical

and psychological factors alike.”29

Perhaps most importantly, effective asymmetric operations cause

a disproportionate amount of damage to the target for the investment in

resources, time, and money by the attacker. Ideally, this effect is felt at the

strategic level, regardless of the level at which the operation is carried out.

The import a n ce of ef fectiveness is illu s tra ted by an asym m etri c

approach that, while technically elegant and full of promise, failed utterly

to gain traction: the Japanese balloon attacks on the United States during
du cted a high ly soph i s ti c a ted and su s t a i n ed co u n terva lue attack on th

con ti n ental Un i ted States by floa ting large hyd rogen gas ball oons from

l a u n ching bases in nort h ern Hon s hu ac ross the Pacific Ocean in the je

stream. These balloons typically carried several small incendiary and frag

mentation bombs. The Japanese intent was to foment panic and instabil

ity by setting fire to the huge forest tracts in the Pacific Northwest.

Over 9,300 balloons were launched between November 1944 and

e a rly April 1945. O f t h e s e , as many as 1,000 re ach ed the con ti n en t a 

Un i ted State s , of wh i ch approx i m a tely 285 were ei t h er recovered or de

stroyed. Balloons landed as far east as Iowa, and as far south as Texas, al

though most landings occurred in the Pacific Northwest.

Army Air Force and civil defense planners in the Un i ted State 

rapidly recognized the nature of this threat and clamped a rigid securit

blackout on all aspects of the balloon attack. This proved vital in denyin

the Japanese inform a ti on they could have used to refine their approach

and perhaps make their balloons more lethal. On 5 May 1945, six peopl

on a Sunday school outing were killed as they examined a crashed balloon

near Bly, Oregon. They were the only casualties caused by this sequence o

a t t ack s . Th ere is no evi den ce of f i res started as a re sult of this ef fort .3 

This was an ineffective asymmetric approach: the defender was never se

ri o u s ly thre a ten ed , and the ef fective inform a ti on denial by the Un i ted

States made it impossible for the Japanese to adjust their approach.

These attacks were unex pected , and for a while they cre a te

con f u s i on in the Un i ted States (among those who knew abo ut them ) 

On the other hand, t h ey could not provi de the disproporti on a te re su l t 

that are cri tical for an ef fective asym m etric attack , p a rti c u l a rly in a situ

a ti on of total war, wh en the Un i ted States had all the adva n t a ges of 

f u lly mobi l i zed econ omy and the wi lling assistance of the media in con

tro lling the story.

The Threat-Response Dynamic

Our own actions and strategic choices will drive the nature of th

a s ym m etric thre a t . As we refine opera ti onal practi ce s , po ten tial adver

saries will look to find ways to counter. This process of action-reaction i

inescapable. Responses by potential adversaries will come from two broa

c u rren t s : t h eir specific opera ti onal and histori c a l - m i l i t a ry heri t a ge an

outlook, and their reaction to the nature of the perceived threat from th

United States.
Nations develop strategic personalities over time that can be a useful tool in divining their approach to asymmetric warfare.31 How has the

s t a te trad i ti on a lly defen ded itself? Is there a legacy of a s ym m etric warfare? If the state achieves the capability for weapons of mass destruction,

will its outlook be coercive or deterrent oriented? What countries are its

po ten tial advers a ri e s , and what is its rel a ti onship to the Un i ted State s ?

Answers to these questions spring from the culture of the nation and provi de revealing clues in looking for po ten tial advers a ry approaches to

asymmetric warfare.

By way of ex a m p l e , the of t - c i ted German approach to war that

proved so effective in 1940–41 had less to do with a search for asymmetric approaches to their potential foes than it did with the affirmation of

l ong-standing core com petencies of the Prussian and su b s equ en t ly the

German Army. These included a strong preference for the flanking attack,

superior officer training at all levels, and the institutionalization of mission-oriented tactics that encouraged small-unit initiative.32

IJN fascination with torpedo tactics, already discussed, is another

ex a m p l e . While the use of the torpedo was cl e a rly a re s ponse to a perceived tactical disadva n t a ge in qu a n ti ty and size of big guns, the use of

these tactics also harken ed back to ancient ten dencies in Japanese warf a re—the use of s m a ll groups of w a rri ors figh ting sem i - i n depen den t ly

against “the heart of the enemy.”33

Reaction to the Perceived U.S. Threat 

This is a parti c u l a rly difficult ch a ll en ge for Am eri c a n s , who of ten

find it hard to see things from the pers pective of forei gn cultu re s . We

would do well to rem em ber that other nati ons well understand the ultim a te fate of the Melians at the hands of the At h enian Empire . To som e ,

Am ericans are the em bod i m ent of a modern At h enian Empire . Ru m bl i n gs

f rom fri ends in Eu rope abo ut the Un i ted States as a “hyperpower ” ref l ect a

growing con cern abo ut a unipolar world order.3 4 However, the fact that

o t h ers re act to what we do also provi des opportu n i ties to influ en ce this

eternal circle of acti on - re acti on to our adva n t a ge . The ch oi ces we make ,

the em phasis we place on certain programs while de - em phasizing others ,

can all have a cumu l a tive ef fect in determining the re acti ons of o t h ers .

A Final Example: The Gulf Tanker War

The recurring themes that have been raised in this chapter can be

applied to a recent example. Throughout most of the decade of the 1980s,
the horrors of 2 0t h cen tu ry indu s trial warf a re : the indiscri m i n a te use o

chemical weapons, “city-busting” attacks with both manned aircraft an

SCUD missiles, and naval warfare in the form of attacks on merchant ves

sels plying the narrow channels of the Persian Gulf.

In Febru a ry and Ma rch 1986, the Iranians appe a red to gain th

upper hand in the bloody struggle, as their forces finally captured the Fao

Peninsula.35 Growing more desperate, the Iraqis stepped up their attack

on Iranian tankers. This created several problems for the Iranians. It wa

not po s s i ble to rep ly in kind against Ira q . The Iraqis po s s e s s ed an in

s i gnificant nav y, and their oil moved thro u gh pipelines into Tu rkey, o

was tra n s s h i pped from the Gu l f S t a tes of Kuwait and Saudi Ara bia in

n eutral bo t tom s . Im ports fo ll owed the same trail in revers e : to neutra 

ports in the Gulf (predominantly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and then vi

transshipment to Iraq.36

In seeking a way to stri ke back at the Ira q i s , the Iranians wer

f aced with three opti on s : a t t ack the pipelines in Tu rkey, a t t ack neutra 

ships carrying war material to Kuw a i ti or Saudi port s , or stri ke tanker

carrying Iraqi oil out of the Gulf. All three choices were problematic. Th

Iranians chose the third option: to attack tankers “in burden” exiting th

Gulf from states that were supportive of Iraq. Functionally, this meant at

tacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi ships, and it formed the core of an asymmet

ric approach that would be eventually expressed not only strategically—

in the choice of the target—but tactically—in the manner of the attack.

Iran had some unique adva n t a ge s . The Iranian Nav y, wh i l 

greatly weakened from the revolution of 1979, was still the most powerfu

indigenous navy in the Gulf. Geography also helped. The long coastline o

Iran gave ample opportunity to attack the shipping channel that ran th

l ength of the Gu l f and the natu ral ch o kepoint of the Strait of Hormu 

and its approaches in the Gulf of Oman. Because of the bottom contou

in the Gulf, the main shipping channel ran in the north, closer to Iran.

Iran had mines, su rf ace - to - su rf ace missiles (SSMs), and a nu m

ber of s m a ll su rf ace combatants with wh i ch to exec ute this stra tegy. Th 

Iranians also were well acqu a i n ted with the po ten tial of mine warf a re . In

1 9 7 3 , du ring a joint exercise with the Un i ted State s , a sen i or Iranian of f i

cer noted the “ vu l n era bi l i ty of the Persian Gu l f to gueri lla min

w a rf a re .”

3 7 Ad d i ti on a lly, the Iranians pre su m a bly regi s tered the re s pon s 

of the Un i ted States and its allies to the 1984 mining of the Red Se a , du r

ing wh i ch 19 ships stru ck mines. The Iranians may have drawn thre
the mines. Even tu a lly, s trong circ u m s t a n tial evi den ce implicated Libya ,

but there was no “smoking gun.” Secon d , the mines were very ef fective in

reducing traffic in the Red Se a , even though no ships were su n k . Th i s

d a m a ged the Egyptian econ omy, a goal of L i bya . Th i rd , the Un i ted State s

took no immed i a te ret a l i a tory acti on against Libya . Th ere were , h owever,

con trad i ctory and less re a s su ring lessons as well . The Un i ted States and

its allies rem oved the mines in an intern a ti onal ef fort , a n d , even tu a lly,

the incident “h a rden ed the Re a gan ad m i n i s tra ti on’s stance tow a rd Libya ,

l e ading ulti m a tely to the April 1986 air stri ke s .”

3 8

In late 1986, the Iranians began to attack shipping in the Gulf. In

1 9 8 6 , 10 tankers were attacked . In 1987, the nu m ber of ships attacked

rose to 91. Th ere was nothing the Iraqis could do to stop these attack s ,

and the Gulf States themselves lacked both the means and the will to take

defen s ive measu re s . In i ti a lly, the Iranian approach seem ed to pay dividends, but in December 1986 the Kuwaitis requested information about

ref l a gging their ve s s els under U. S . co l ors . Even tu a lly, the Un i ted State s

agreed to reflag a number of Kuwaiti tankers and to provide convoy protection for them and other vessels transiting the Gulf.

The Iranians had little de s i re to provo ke the Un i ted State s . Despite their inflammatory rhetoric, they pursued a campaign that was designed to hurt Iraq and Iraq’s supporters while minimizing the possibility

of superpower intervention. The U.S. Navy adopted an operational concept built around “deterrence, intelligence, surveillance, presence, retaliati on , a n d , l a s t , MCM [mine co u n term e a su re s ] .”

3 9 The initial em ph a s i s

was on presence and deterrence. It did not work.

Sometime in the early summer of 1987, the Iranians decided to

begin exec uti on of a mine campaign in intern a ti onal waters , a l t h o u gh

t h ey fasti d i o u s ly avoi ded attacking combatant ve s s els with ei t h er thei r

SSMs or small cra f t . Th ere were dangers for Iran in raising the stake s .

Mines, while slightly more difficult to trace to their sponsor, also held the

danger of striking a U.S. warship or even a Soviet vessel. On 24 July a reflagged tanker, the Bridgeton, struck a mine in international waters while

u n der escort of the U. S . Navy (in fact , B ri d geto n was the first ve s s el to

transit under protection—hardly an auspicious omen).

The Am erican re s ponse was swi f t . Ad d i ti onal forces were deployed to the Gulf, including MCMs that had not been deployed initially.

Over time, the U.S. Navy and its allies were able to establish a strong and

credible presence throughout the Gulf. The operational environment was
sively prosecute an antishipping war against Iran, with the tacit approva

of the United States. Iraqi attacks on Iran-bound vessels (and, occasion

a lly, by acc i dent on U. S . w a rs h i p s , n a m ely the St a rk and the C h a n dl er

were as frequent as Iranian attacks.40

This low level of en ga gem ent con ti nu ed thro u gh o ut 1987. Th 

Iranians em p l oyed mines as their best bet to redu ce tanker traffic an

other shipments to Iraq. At the same time, Iraq continued to use airpowe

to strike Iranian vessels. The U.S. Navy and its allies provided escorts fo

ships en route to the Gulf States—effectively supporting Iraq. In Septem

ber 1987, the Iranians were caught red - h a n ded laying mines, wh i c

largely removed any veil of deniability for them.

Events came to a head in the early spring of 1988, when the Iraqi

began a bom b a rd m ent of Teh eran with SCUD missiles, while con c u r

ren t ly retaking the Fao Pen i n su l a , a s s i s ted by the use of ch em i c a 

weapons. On 14 April, Iran’s run of good luck with mines ended when th

frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine. The ship was saved by superio

s e a m a n s h i p, but the U. S . re s ponse was powerf u l . On 18 April 1988, i n

Operation Praying Mantis, two Iranian oil platforms,a frigate, and severa

fast attack craft were destroyed. The rules of engagement were extende

to enable allied forces to render aid to any friendly or neutral nonbelliger

ent outside the declared war zone. Because of the geography of the Gulf

Iraqi attacks tended to occur within the declared war zone, while Iranian

attacks occurred outside the zone.41

The turn of fortunes in the ground war, coupled with the disas

trous events at sea, forced Iran to reevaluate its policies. It had attempted

to apply an asymmetric approach to the task of hurting Iraq’s economy

while rh eo s t a ti c a lly con tro lling the likel i h ood of an en co u n ter with th

U.S. Navy. The principal weapon was mine warfare. While Iran did som

limited damage to Iraq’s war economy, ultimately the war of the tanker

was a failu re for Ira n . It exemplifies the open - en ded and unpred i ct a bl 

nature of asymmetric approaches. The instrument proved too blunt, an

even tu a lly a U. S . w a rship was stru ck . Iran was not prep a red to risk wa

with the Un i ted State s , even wh en the USS Vi n cen n e s m i s t a ken ly sho

down Iran Air flight 655 on 3 July 1988, with heavy loss of life. Surpris

ingly, the shootdown of the flight may have provided the catalyst to en

the Ira n - Iraq war. Iran was too ex h a u s ted to con ti nue and, in mid-Ju ly

accepted the terms of a UN cease-fire.42
that they had some advantages in confronting the United States only so

long as they were able to maintain an asymmetry of interest. They consciously made decisions in this light, refraining from taking escalatory acti ons that they ju d ged would be vi ewed as inflammatory by the Un i ted

States. Ultimately, they were unable to prosecute this strategy, but the failure lay in execution rather than the concept itself, which sought to minimize the possibility of a conflict with the United States.

Second, the Iranian use of mines and other forms of unconventional naval warfare sought disproportionate effect at low risk and cost.

They were able to achieve this at times, but ultimately they were unable to

execute this component of their strategy. This reflects an Iranian misreading of the ef fects of mine warf a re and access denial stra tegies upon the

Un i ted State s , s i n ce these were the issues that provo ked an en l a r ged

United States presence in the Gulf—exactly the opposite of what the Iranians desired.

It is important to note that, in the final analysis, the Iranians were

the losers in this struggle, and their defeat was a strategic disaster of the

first magnitude for them. The tactics and technologies they applied were

u n a ble to carry the load of a dual stra tegy that sought to stri ke at the

Iraqis while minimizing United States (and its allies) presence in the Gulf.

This is a particularly important case study for yet another reason:

it may fore s h adow futu re advers a ry asym m etric approach e s , both in

terms of strategy and technology. The Iranians chose a relatively low-risk

and den i a ble approach , and they implem en ted it with what they hoped

were ch e a p, n on a t tri but a ble tactics using a rel a tively low tech n o l ogy

weapon—mines. The overall strategy had some merit, and its failure does

not mean that we will not see some variant of it again. Finally, it’s worth

noting that a number of escalatory options against the United States and

its allies were never executed by the Iranians. Their attempt to manage the

conflict with the United States and its allies in the Gulf while fighting a

total war with Iraq demonstrates considerable strategic sophistication. It

is likely that dual-track approaches of this nature will recur.

Conclusions

This ch a pter has sought to define asym m etry by examining the

c u rrent def i n i ti on s , and then to refine ex i s ting thinking by ex p l i c i t ly

proposing the concept of disproportionate effect as the desired outcome
been identified and are useful in understanding asymmetry:

■ Disparity of interest is a key factor in assessing an adversary’s incen

tive to adopt asymmetric approaches.

■ The will of the opponent is the ultimate target, and understandin

this is fundamental to understanding asymmetric warfare.

■ Asymmetric approaches operate on all three levels of war, but seek

strategic effect.

■ E f fectiveness is important in eva lu a ting asym m etric approach e 

(they don’t always work).

■ A dynamic process of threat and response is an inescapable factor in

any analysis of asymmetry.

The examples that attend each of these themes demonstrate tha

asymmetric approaches are not new to the strategic landscape. They also

dem on s tra te that innova tive and exo tic thinking can produ ce dra m a ti 

benefits for the weaker power in a confrontation. What gives immediac

to the study of asymmetry is the realization that new weapons and capa

bilities are creating new vulnerabilities. Many of these new weapons hav

characteristics that are ideal for use in an asymmetric approach.

The idea of disproportionate effect is particularly compelling as 

jumping-off point for chapter two. In evaluating the historical develop

ment of asymmetric approaches, the most ominous conclusion is that th

po ten tial de s tru ctiveness of these asym m etric approaches has incre a s e

dramatically in the latter half of the 20th century. The confluence of nu

clear we a pon s , ch emical we a pon s , and bi o l ogical we a pons with actor

who are searching for cheap and innovative ways to address strategic im

balances makes the possibility of catastrophic outcomes far greater than

at any time in the past.

A Typology of Asymmetry:

What, Who, and When?

B

uilding upon the recurring themes established in chapter one, thi

chapter will attempt to organize and draw some useful conclusion

about the range of potential asymmetric threats that we could fac

t h ro u gh the year 2010, using the fra m ework of wh a t, wh o, and wh en

First, what are the general types of potential asymmetric approaches tha

we could reasonably expect to see employed? After these have been estab

lished, the who will be considered, from a conceptual basis. Last, the ques

ti on of wh en wi ll be discussed . Timing is important in asym m etry, a n d

different approaches are more likely to be employed at different times in 

crisis. The chapter will end with a discussion of general conclusions tha

can be drawn from this analysis.

The What: The Range of Potential 

Asymmetric Threats 

This secti on iden tifies a typo l ogy of six po ten tial asym m etri 

threats: nuclear, chemical, biological, information operations, operationa

con cept s , and terrori s m . E ach po ten tial threat wi ll be discussed and as

sessed within each of the three levels of war, with a focus within the leve

of war to which its effects could reasonably be expected to predominate

The most likely con cepts for em p l oym ent of these threats wi ll be dis

cussed and analyzed. Why these six categories of threats? They are logica

descendants of asymmetric approaches used throughout history—they a

promise disproportionate effect, and all have the potential to migrate ef

fects upward to the strategic level. There are key differences from the past

h owever: the gre a test ch a n ge at the beginning of the 21s t cen tu ry is th

dramatically increasing effectiveness of technology and its ability to con

ju re gl obal ef fect from local even t s . The most dra m a tic and po ten ti a ll

lethal threats are those associated with the ugly triad of weapons of mas

1
formation technology.

In this six-part typology, the WMD elements of nuclear, chemical,

and bi ol o gi c a l h ave become the “u sual su s pect s” wh en discussing asymmetric threats. They are dangerous, to be sure, but there are alternatives

open to the asymmetric actor. Information operations involve the manipulation, both offensively and defensively, of data of all types. The term can

also refer to the denial of information-intensive operations fundamental

the Am erican military ’s opera ti onal doctri n e . Opera tional co n cept s refer

to the broad app l i c a ti on of “l ow tech n o l ogy ” and “no tech n o l ogy ” a pproaches to asymmetry, as well as to the innovative application of legacy

s ys tems and tacti c s . Terro ri s m refers to the acti ons of n on s t a te actors ,

both internal and external, who may apply approaches from the other elements of asymmetry.

Nuclear Weapons

The ultimate expression of power in the world today is the poss e s s i on of nu clear we a pon s . Owning nu clear we a pons all ows a state or

nonstate actor to have a seat at the “high stakes” table. This idea has been

reinforced by such recent events as the Gulf War and NATO operations

over Kosovo. The former Indian Army Chief of Staff, General K. Sundarji,

is reputed to have said that a principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a

state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and

unless it possesses nuclear weapons.43

De s p i te the fri gh tening specter of a dispers i on of nu clear materials from the form er Sovi et Un i on’s massive stock p i l e , nu clear we a pons ess en ti a lly remain the provi n ce of s t a te s .4 4 Non s t a te actors do not possess the

com bi n a ti on of s k i ll , foc u s , and or ga n i z a ti onal abi l i ty to build them (alt h o u gh they could steal or buy them ) . Nu clear we a pons are tech n i c a lly demanding to bu i l d , even for modera tely indu s tri a l i zed state s , and cre a ti on

of a firs t - gen era ti on atomic capabi l i ty is a long way from ef fective

we a pon i z a ti on , wh i ch implies miniatu ri z a ti on , h a rden i n g, ef fective targeti n g, command and con tro l , and means of del ivery. It is important to note ,

t h o u gh , that nu clear we a pons can be em p l oyed wi t h o ut miniatu ri z a ti on ,

a l t h o u gh the probl em of del ivery becomes more com p l ex and dem a n d i n g.

For these reasons, for the next decade or even longer, the number

of states that possess indigenously developed, reliably deliverable nuclear

we a pons wi ll be very small : the Un i ted State s , Ru s s i a , Fra n ce , E n gl a n d ,

China, and Israel.45 Of these, Russia, France, China, and England have the

unambiguous capability to deliver a “conventional” (i.e., ballistic missile)
that possess self-developed nuclear weapons that may be—and certainl

eventually will be—weaponized is composed of Pakistan and India.

Other states could join this club by obtaining weapons or fissil

m a terial from ex ternal source s , and the co u n tries and sources are obvi

ous: Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. All may be attempting to obtain eithe

com p l ete we a pons or near- a s s em bly - re ady com pon ents from form e

Soviet stocks. It is possible that these states may be closer than we know

Tactical Employment

On the tactical level , a nu clear we a pon could be em p l oyed di

rectly against maneuver or support forces in the field. The method of de

livery could range from short-range ballistic missile or tactical aircraft de

livery to mining or other covert means. In this context, the asymmetry o

a pproach is pri n c i p a lly derived from the deterring ef fect that advers a r

possession of such a weapon would have on U.S. responses to crises. Ac

tual state-sponsored use of a nuclear weapon against forces in the field i

the least effective method of employment of a nuclear weapon—in fact

in many ways it is no more than the ultimate symmetric response.

Advers a ries wi ll be hesitant to em p l oy nu clear we a pons on th

t actical level for several re a s on s : f i rs t , unless the attack is a com p l et

strategic surprise, tactical maneuver forces can disperse rapidly, making i

hard to a chieve military effect commensurate with political cost. Second

it will be very easy to trace ownership of the attack, particularly if it is de

livered by conventional means. Third, use of nuclear weapons against U.S

forces wi ll almost cert a i n ly invi te a staggering re s ponse that might no

stop short of the imposition of unconditional surrender. Last, adversarie

will not have many nuclear weapons, and targeting fielded forces is surel

the least cost-effective method of employment.

If an adversary decides to employ nuclear weapons in this man

n er, conven ti onal means—ball i s tic missile, t actical airc ra f t — a re th

methods that have the least chance of success, while leaving a clear tra

back to the attacker. Missiles and aircraft can be intercepted, and the at

tacker may not have the technological confidence to hazard such a critica

attack with such an unsure means of delivery. The greatest chance of suc

cess against fiel ded maneuver forces may be the em p l oym ent of ei t h e

covert means of insertion by special operations forces (SOF) or terroris

operatives, or by the use of nuclear mines. The use of nuclear mines is ap

pealing, particularly in a defensive situation in which the adversary is giv

ing up ground to a U.S. advance. This would permit hardening and th
to discover before detonation.

For these re a s on s , s t a tes that have nu clear we a pons wi ll be loath to

em p l oy them direct ly against U. S . force s . Th ey may be more likely to emp l oy them against all i ed or coa l i ti on force s , who gen era lly wi ll be less prep a red to deal with nu clear attack . Th ey may also be more likely to attem pt

to target fixed combat su pport activi ti e s , su ch as airb a s e s .4 6 An o t h er po s s ibi l i ty is the targeting of U. S . w a rs h i p s , p a rti c u l a rly modern cultu ral icon s

l i ke airc raft carri ers . The lu re of this is com p l i c a ted by the form i d a ble diff i c u l ty of del ivering a we a pon close en o u gh to damage a carri er.

Nu clear we a pons wi ll have the most po ten tial uti l i ty in the early

s t a ges of a major theater war, wh en they can thre a ten or deter U. S . dep l oym ent into theater. Th ey wi ll be of less uti l i ty after U. S . forces close and the

t h e a ter matu re s , but they wi ll again become a significant factor in the en ds t a te of a major theater war, p a rti c u l a rly if the advers a ry sees the po s s i bi li ty of c a t aclysmic defe a t . In this case, the tem pt a ti on wi ll be strong to use

a ny and all means in a spasmodic re s ponse to ei t h er ch a n ge the ti de of b a ttle or simply inflict reven ge on the Un i ted States or its all i e s .

The use of nu clear we a pons against U. S . forces on the tacti c a l

level is unlikely at the hands of a rational state actor. The tactical employment of nuclear weapons against forces in the field isn’t really a practical

asymmetric approach. If executed, it would tend to create a case of “vital

n a ti onal intere s t” for the Un i ted State s , wh ere perhaps there wasn’t on e

before. The concept of disproportionality would then be turned upon its

head, and high risks would be accrued by the actor with very little gain.

The threat of use is more probl em a ti c , a l t h o u gh threats against fiel ded

forces also carry many of the risks of a deterring strategy while reaping

few of the advantages.

Operational Employment

Nu clear we a pons can be em p l oyed against the dep l oym ent and

theater support infrastructure in order to deter, slow, or even halt the deployment of forces into an area of responsibility (AOR). Attacks against

f i xed targets wi ll obvi o u s ly be easier to plan and exec ute than attack s

a gainst forces in the fiel d . The adva n t a ge of em p l oym ent against fixed ,

rear area targets is that inste ad of t a r geting the most-prep a red force s

( u su a lly tactical maneuver forces that possess or ganic mobi l i ty ) , t a r get s

can be selected from nonmobile forces that will have less self-protection

and little ability to move.
Ballistic missiles, manned aircraft, or SOF can all be employed to delive

nuclear weapons against airfields, ports, command posts, logistic areas, o

even hu m a n i t a rian lod gm en t s — a ll with a gre a ter degree of con f i den c

than at the tactical level, because these targets are, by and large, fixed and

nonmobile. To borrow a term from Cold War strategic nuclear doctrine

at the operational level, asymmetric targets increasingly become counter

value, instead of counterforce.

It follows that, for a state actor, the greatest opportunity to em

ploy, or to threaten to employ nuclear weapons, will be in the early stage

of a conflict. The intent will be to initially deter and complicate U.S. forc

dep l oym ent con s i dera ti on s , and po ten ti a lly to de s troy cri tical dep l oy

ment infrastructure in order to actually prevent physical deployment. I

employed early enough, critical aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and

su rf ace ports of deb a rk a ti on (SPODs) might be de s troyed or degrade

before U. S . forces even arrive , c re a ting an ambiguous situ a ti on for th

Na ti onal Command Aut h ori ties (NCA). It seems clear that if nu cl e a 

we a pons are em p l oyed against U. S . force s , the re s ponse wi ll be over

whelming and direct; but what if they are employed against an ally, an

few, if any, U.S. forces feel the results? 

The use or even threat of this may well dampen the en t husiasm o

po ten tial U. S . a llies for parti c i p a ti on in a coa l i ti on stru ctu re . It may well b

that the direct threat of nu clear em p l oym ent against an ally or po ten ti a 

a lly very early in a crisis wi ll have the ef fect of d i s su ading that nati on from

p a rti c i p a ting with the Un i ted States in a coa l i ti on . This threat of opera

ti on a l - l evel em p l oym ent of nu clear we a pons against U. S . regi onal allies o

p a rtn ers has the gre a test promise of s tra tegic ef fect migra ting upw a r

f rom an opera ti onal act for a regi onal actor. In terms of actual use, t a r get

ing both po l i tical and military su pporting stru ctu res inste ad of f i el de

forces promises far gre a ter retu rn than direct tactical em p l oym en t .

Strategic Employment

By def i n i ti on , this is the threat or the use of a nu clear we a pon

against the U.S. homeland. In this case, strategic effect is sought by direc

s tra tegic attack . In con s i dering the uti l i ty of s tra tegic nu clear attack , i 

seems clear that, for a regional power or rogue state, the greatest asym

m etric uti l i ty for these we a pons is in their deterring ef fect . A dem on

strated, credible ability to strike the U.S. homeland will have a soberin

effect on U.S. decisionmakers as they consider bombing a regional adver

sary’s capital, or even deploying forces in the face of threats or warning
the po s s e s s i on of nu clear we a pon s , and the dem on s tra ted (or even su spected) capabi l i ty to del iver them against the Am erican hom eland wi ll

have the effect of compressing the box within the quadrant marked “U.S.

i n terest is vi t a l ” in the asym m etric opportu n i ty table in ch a pter on e . It

may require unambiguous vital interest indeed for an American president

to attack a state that has the capability to execute a countervalue attack on

the United States.

Th ere is another side to this argumen t , t h o u gh , and that is wh en

an asym m etric actor crosses the nu clear Ru bi con from deterren ce and coerc i on to actual use. It is difficult to con ceive of a ra ti onal actor el ecting to

em p l oy nu clear we a pons against the Un i ted States in a direct stra tegic att ack . To do so would invi te annihilati on . G iven this, t h o u gh , the deterri n g

ef fect of a U. S . re s ponse wi ll cert a i n ly erode in a war in wh i ch the regi on a l

actor sees events going badly against it. If it looks as though the Un i ted

S t a tes and its allies plan to ei t h er bomb a co u n try to su bm i s s i on or occ u py

its capital, t h en there is little to lose, and in a g ö t terd ä m m erung s cen a ri o,

the po s s i bi l i ty of actual stra tegic em p l oym ent becomes incre a s i n gly likely.

Few states have the capability to deliver such a weapon by conven ti onal means (airc raft or missile), and the robust natu re of the U. S .

strategic warning system is such that even if a successful attack were generated, clear and unambiguous evidence of the source would probably be

readily available. Delivery by covert means is a more difficult subject. A

nuclear weapon could be brought into this country by any one of a hundred methods, and could be positioned against a countervalue target by

competent SOF. If the United States were engaged in a confrontation at

the time, the motive and attacker would be clear. Even without strategic

forensic evidence, the linkage would probably be enough to allow a massive response. The issue becomes more clouded when dealing with a boltfrom-the-blue attack at a time when identification of the attacker would

be difficult to establish. Perhaps even a third party would initiate such an

attack with a view to provoking the United States to retaliate against the

presumptive guilty party—a false flag tactic.

Targets in the U.S. homeland would almost certainly be countervalue. It is unlikely that any potential adversary would be able to infiltrate

or launch enough weapons to achieve significant strategic-level military

results from such an attack.47 Given the tremendous political considerations of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil against any target, the logic would

tend to drive a potential attacker to seek the most lucrative and shocking
or Chicago, would probably lead the list of alternatives. They are also th

easiest to target because of their size.

In an ex ten ded major theater war, a ggre s s ive U. S . ef forts to de s tro

or neutra l i ze a foe’s nu clear del ivery stru ctu re may re sult in another re

s ponse from the heart of the Cold War—a “use ’em or lose ’em” ref l ex . In

this case, an oppon ent cannot stand by and see its stra tegic trump card

t a ken aw ay. This does not imply that U. S . forces should not attem pt to d

t h i s , on ly that we must be prep a red for an advers a ry to use its we a pons i

we en ga ge in aggre s s ive WMD redu cti on du ring a regi m e - t h re a tening war

The t h re a t of using nu clear we a pons direct ly against the U. S 

h om eland is a powerful asym m etric measu re . It ach i eves clear stra tegi 

effect and operates directly against the will of the United States. Such an

approach might very well tend to make the United States ask hard ques

tions about just where its vital national interests lie. Many of these asym

metric advantages could easily be lost, however, if a threat were actuall

carried out. A nuclear attack would provoke a powerful and unrelentin

response from the United States. There is a fine line between the positiv

d i s proporti on a te stra tegic ef fect ach i eva ble by the po s s e s s i on of nu cl e a 

we a pon s , and the po ten ti a lly disastrous con s equ en ces of actual us

against the United States.

The last consideration is the use of nuclear weapons by nonstat

actors against the United States. It is the least likely alternative because o

the difficulty of procuring, infiltrating, and emplacing the weapon. It is

however, a possibility, and may ultimately prove the most troubling of al

the strategic nuclear threats. Such an attack could be just as damaging a

anything launched by a state actor, but it would be difficult to establish

responsibility.

Conclusions About Nuclear Weapons

Ma rtin van Creveld has wri t ten that the devel opm ent of t h 

atomic bomb and the concentration camp are together the most signifi

cant expressions of the power of the state in this century.48 The threat o

use of nu clear we a pons has the gre a test ef fect on the stra tegic level , a l

though threats on both the operational and tactical levels will create simi

lar disproportionate benefits. In terms of actual employment, use agains

regi onal su pporting infra s tru ctu res is prob a bly the most ef fective . Th i 

u n derlines the idea that it wi ll never be a good idea to use nu cl e a 

weapons directly against U.S. forces or the U.S. homeland.
greatest threat when used in a technically nonlethal role—as the generators of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) that will threaten our

information systems. For that reason, the threat of HEMP attack will be

dealt with in the discussion of information operations.

Chemical Weapons

Of the three elements of WMD, chemical weapons are generally

considered to be the least damaging. On the other hand, they are also the

easiest to proc u re , a n d , i f h i s tory is any guide , less sti gma is assoc i a ted

with their use. They have been used extensively by Iraq against not only

Ira n , but the Ku rd s .4 9 A large nu m ber of s t a tes possess some form of

ch emical we a pon s . ( As of Decem ber 1997, 106 states had ra ti f i ed the

Ch emical We a pons Conven ti on [CWC] of 1 9 9 3 .5 0 Ch i n a , Cu b a , Egypt ,

Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Taiwan,

Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia are all suspected of maintaining some

form of chemical weapons stocks.51)

Tactical Employment

As with nu clear we a pon s , the use of ch emical we a pons on the

t actical level against U. S . m a n euver forces—the most-re ady part of t h e

U. S . force stru ctu re—is co s t - i n ef fective . Some of the del ivery com p l i c ations that apply to nuclear weapons are also operative here, although the

use of s h orter- ra n ge arti ll ery and tactical rocket del ivery may parti a lly

a m el i ora te this. Ch emical we a pons wi ll be more ef fective wh en used in

con ju n cti on with imagi n a tive and po ten ti a lly asym m etric opera ti on a l

concepts, such as defense in depth in complex terrain. The application of

ch emical we a pons against ref u gee or other non combatant pop u l a ti on s

could be an attractive opti on that could stress the capabi l i ties of U. S .

forces to care for both themselves and a large pool of suffering noncombatants and dramatically cloud the picture of the battlefield.

U. S . forces are gen era lly well prep a red to fight and win in a

chemical environment, both as a legacy of decades of preparation to fight

the Soviets and as a function of a renaissance of tactical chemical awareness in the past five years. Even so, the use of chemical weapons on the

tactical battlefield will tend to slow the tempo as units are forced to don

pro tective over ga rm ents and con du ct ch emical recon n a i s s a n ce and frequ ent decon t a m i n a ti on . Sl owing the tem po of opera ti ons wi ll be a key

component of any attempt to counter U.S. dominance.
weakness that may be exploitable through asymmetric approaches on th

tactical level. Attacks against allied forces will require the United States t

provide support for less capable forces, stretching thin our capability t

provi de adequ a te ch emical defense covera ge for our own force s . At th

same time, the use of chemicals against allies instead of the United State

in a coalition may avoid a massive U.S. response. At a minimum, it wi

create an element of ambiguity when weighing responses.

The bottom line is this: using chemical weapons against tactica

U.S. maneuver forces will not change the basic dynamic of a campaign

The use of chemical weapons will slow the pace of fighting, but it will no

change the formula of victory. Since this is the application of a weapon o

limited effectiveness against a strong and prepared opponent, it is hard t

consider chemical employment against U.S. forces in the field as a poten

tially effective asymmetric approach. Used in this manner, it really isn’t an

a s ym m etric approach . It doe s n’t ach i eve disproporti on a te ef fect , a n 

there is little possibility for upward migration of effect. It may also spar

a massive U.S. response.

On the other hand, employment against allied units or a civilian

population remaining on the battlefield may prove to be far more effec

tive. Such an approach may bring an adversary huge political dividends a

well, if the United States is unable to rapidly correct potential deficits in

a ll i ed ch emical defense training and equ i pm en t , and provi de su ccor t

threatened civilians. This approach does promise disproportionate effect

and may well be able to achieve significant strategic effect through an ag

gressive information operation.

Operational Employment

Many of the considerations regarding nuclear weapons apply also

to the use of chemical weapons on this level. The most likely targets wil

be the deployment infrastructure that allows U.S. forces to enter a theater

command and con trol fac i l i ti e s , and the combat su pport and com b a 

service support infrastructure that support the operations of U.S. and al

lied air forces. Another potential target will be the host nation population

in the theater service area, with the intent of stressing host nation, allied

and U.S. medical support systems as well as political unity.

Th ere are a nu m ber of po ten tial del ivery opti on s , ra n ging from

ballistic and cruise missile to SOF, aircraft, and terrorists. The most cost

effective option may be cruise or ballistic missiles. This choice of deliver

systems will be dictated by the relatively inefficient size-to-lethality rati
penetrating deep into a theater area (although this may be more attractive

in an immatu re theater, before a com preh en s ive U. S . i n tegra ted air defense system is in place). Special operations forces can be used to employ

chemicals on the operational level, but the size of the mixture needed to

be effective, as well as the difficulty of efficient dispersal, will tend to reduce the effectiveness of this approach. As with nuclear weapons on the

operational level, the threat of employment of these weapons can be effective in splitting all i a n ce partn ers aw ay from the Un i ted States in the

early stages of a regional crisis.

Strategic Employment

Ch emical we a pons can play a role in stra tegic attack , wh i ch , a s

with nuclear weapons, means an attack on the U.S. homeland. While they

a re less lethal than bi o l ogical agents and not as de s tru ctive as nu cl e a r

we a pon s , t h ey are inheren t ly more stable (an important con s i dera ti on

when dealing with less well-trained operatives) and can still be very effective, particularly when employed against indoor and point targets.

Ch emical we a pons do not have the shock and horror cach et of

bi o l ogical or nu clear on e s , but that is a rel a tive con s i dera ti on—a few

pounds of VX or SARIN depo s i ted into a busy su bw ay stati on in New

York or Washington would have a tremendous psychological effect. The

example of Aum Shinriko’s attack in the Tokyo subway, incompetently executed and with diluted SARIN, is cautionary.52 Perhaps the greatest disti n cti on bet ween ch emical we a pons (and bi o l ogical we a pons) and nuclear weapons is that it may prove more difficult to trace the origin of a

s tra tegic ch emical or bi o l ogical attack . For this re a s on , the threshold of

employment may be lower than with nuclear weapons.

Conclusions About Chemical Weapons

Ch emical we a pons are the least po tent of the WMD tri ad . Th ey

do not have the open - en ded po ten tial for disaster that haunts both nu cl e a r

and bi o l ogical we a pon s . Th ey are easier to produ ce than nu clear we a pon s

but requ i re a larger and more vi s i ble infra s tru ctu re than that requ i red for

bi o l ogical agen t s .5 3 Th ey have a track record of use thro u gh o ut this centu ry, wh i ch prob a bly means that we wi ll con ti nue to see them em p l oyed .

Across the spectrum, chemical weapons offer the most asymmetric effect when employed as threats against regional allies. A regional aggressor can normally expect to be able to threaten the homeland of adjacent states with these we a pon s . E m p l oym ent in this manner prom i s e s
through on its threats to actually employ these weapons, scrupulous at

tempts to avoid U.S. forces may make it very difficult for the United State

to respond forcefully, while possibly crumbling a regional alliance.

Biological Weapons

An intere s ting historical para ll el may be devel op i n g. In the firs 

decade of the 20th century, the all-big-gun Dreadnought battleship becam

em bl em a tic of n a ti onal power. These ships were built (or ordered) no

only by leading powers like England, Germany, and the United States, bu

also by lesser powers like Chile, Greece, and Turkey, which had no obvi

ous compelling reason for their use. Even as the numbers of these ship

grew, though, the hidden dynamics of war at sea changed their utility, an

they were supplanted by the aircraft carrier as the ultimate weapon. Few

of these magnificent weapons were ever employed. In much the same wa

today, even as lesser states pursue the nuclear totem, it may well be that in

the 21st century nuclear weapons will be relegated to secondary status be

hind bi o l ogical we a pon s . The latter are ch e a per than nu clear we a pon s 

easy to move or hide from prying inspectors, and, most importantly, pro

fo u n dly let h a l . Th ey can be em p l oyed in a manner that might make i

hard to trace sponsorship of an attack.

A key distinction needs to be established at the beginning of an

discussion of biological warfare. While there are many different types o

bi o l ogical agen t s , t h ey may be catagori zed as ei t h er con t a gious or non

contagious agents. The former can be passed from one human host to an

o t h er, ei t h er direct ly or indirect ly. The latter cannot be passed in thi

m a n n er. This has no be a ring on let h a l i ty or infecti o u s n e s s ; n on con t a

gious agents like anthrax could have lethality rates in excess of 80 percen

in an unprotected population, which indicates a high degree of infectiou

rel i a bi l i ty.5 4 A con t a gious agent su ch as plague has the po ten tial to ulti

mately reach a much larger proportion of the targeted population. Mini

mal contagiousness generally has been a desired characteristic of biologi

cal we a pon s , a l t h o u gh there are con tra ry vi ews .5 5 In World War II, t h 

Japanese developed plague, a highly contagious agent that also had hig

l et h a l i ty and infectious rel i a bi l i ty, and planned to em p l oy it against th

United States.56

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 outlaws th

po s s e s s i on of su ch capabi l i ti e s .5 7 De s p i te this, t h ere is com pelling evi

dence that the Soviet Union and its successors continued to work on an

offensive biological warfare program “at least until 1992.”

58 Other states
believed to have produced operational quantities of biological weapons.59

Iraq is believed to possess a capability as well, despite the best efforts of

United Nations inspectors in the wake of the Gulf War.60

Tactical Employment 

Biological weapons, like all WMD, are less effective on the tactical

level, for many of the same reasons that pertain to chemical weapons. Biological agents are even more volatile and susceptible to biodegradation

and corruption than chemical agents. They are also more difficult to disperse over a wide area. The most likely dispersal options for an opponent

would inclu de rocket arti ll ery, a rti ll ery, a i rc ra f t , and SOF. The pri n c i p a l

problems would be devising methods to protect the biological cargo during transit to the target and ensuring adequate area coverage in an open

environment. Weather and time of day are of fundamental importance in

selecting attack profiles.

The target of a tactical biological weapon attack may well be inoculated against the most common agents. In short, on the tactical level,

the use of bi o l ogical we a pons is another case of an attack against the

s tron gest part of the defen s e , s om ething that is co u n ter to asym m etri c

warfare. The same considerations that apply to the tactical use of chemical weapons apply here—this isn’t an asymmetric approach, although the

use of bi o l ogical we a pons against a civilian pop u l a ti on within a battlespace could create problems even more significant than those caused by

ch emical we a pon s . The medical stresses in particular could prove far

more complex and long term.

Operational Employment 

The use of biological weapons against theater-level targets offers

the most lucrative and cost-effective employment option of all forms of

WMD use. Biological weapons enjoy the same deterring effect as chemical weapons on the operational level, but they can be far more potent in

effect. The threat of anthrax, tularemia, or Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) against a theater APOD or SPOD that depends upon host nation support could have a crippling effect on the flow of U.S. forces into

theater. They are more attractive than nuclear weapons because it is more

difficult to trace sponsorship of an attack.

Ma ny airl i n e s , i n cluding those mobi l i zed in su pport of U. S . dep l oym ents (the Civil Re s erve Air Fleet , or CRA F ) , m ay not fly into are a s

with reported bi o l ogical we a pons attack s .6 1 Wi t h o ut these cri tical en a bl ers ,
t h e a ter of opera ti on s . The use of a n t h rax (for example) in even smal

qu a n ti ties might cause heavy casu a l ties and tie up medical and other infra

s tru ctu re ; even the hint of its use, co u p l ed with an aggre s s ive inform a ti on

w a rf a re campaign , m i ght tu rn our stra tegic dep l oym ent stru ctu re on it

h e ad .Ad d i ti on a lly, t h e a ter infra s tru ctu re , su ch as command po s t s , l ogi s ti c 

n ode s , and other key el em ents of the combat servi ce su pport back bon e , i 

vu l n era ble to these attack s .

It might be very difficult to establish clear culpability in the cas

of the employment of a biological weapon. Unlike the nuclear or chemi

cal we a pon that is del ivered via a cruise or ball i s tic missile, bi o l ogi c a 

agents, by virtue of their extremely favorable weight and cube to lethalit

ratio, lend themselves to covert application by SOF. While we are certainl

not defen s eless against these thre a t s , clear evi den ce to trace own ers h i 

may not be available.

Bi o l ogical we a pons of fer many of the same coercing vi rtues o

nuclear weapons within a regional environment. The principal advantag

of biological weapons will be the potential for employment without clea

responsibility. If introduced by SOF or terrorists, it might be very difficul

to link a regi onal actor to a specific attack — h owever strong the motiv

and our suspicions. For this reason, they represent ideal asymmetric ap

proaches. While the attack will be operational, the effect will be strategic

Strategic Employment

A host of recent movies and books, such as The Cobra Event b

Richard Preston, have highlighted this threat, and it joins nuclear attac

at the most-dangerous end of the scale. When considered for its potentia

coercing or deterrent va lue against the Un i ted State s , this threat en j oy

every advantage of the strategic nuclear threat, but it can be delivered in 

more covert manner. For this reason, the firewall between deterrence and

use may not be as strong as in the nuclear case. There may be a greate

likelihood of employment. As outlined in the operational and tactical dis

c u s s i ons above , bi o l ogical we a pons are mu ch easier to del iver than nu

clear weapons, and, depending upon the agent used, the attack might no

even be recognized until well after the fact. Biological attack also is mor

deniable than nuclear attack.

Bi o l ogical we a pons become even more of a threat wh en con s i d

ering non s t a te actors , p a rti c u l a rly terrori s t s , a l t h o u gh the likel i h ood o

use dec re a s e s . While not minimizing the thre a t , it is useful to con s i de

that no “m a i n s tre a m” terrorist or ga n i z a ti on has ever el ected to pursu 
or ga n i z a ti on s , i n cluding those with mill en a rian vi ews , m ay not have this

re s tra i n t . It is re a s su ring that the or ga n i z a ti onal skill s , s c i en tific knowled ge , and cool heads (and hands) requ i red for the con ceptu a l i z a ti on and

del ivery of a bi o l ogical we a pons attack are not norm a lly assoc i a ted wi t h

radical terrorist gro u p s .

Conclusions About Biological Weapons

Nu clear and bi o l ogical we a pons share an unfortu n a te com m on a li ty: t h ey can end the world as we know it. Bi o l ogical we a pons are easier to

produ ce and easier to hide than ei t h er nu clear or ch emical we a pon s .6 3 Th e

m et h od of a t t ack can be circ u m s pect and difficult to trace . Wh en emp l oyed to deter, t h ey can ach i eve stra tegic ef fect , a n d ,l i ke nu clear we a pon s ,

cause the Un i ted States to com press the “ vital nati onal intere s t” box . If a

blu f f is call ed , t h ey can of fer the adva n t a ge of forensic ambi g u i ty. For these

re a s on s , in the short to mid term , bi o l ogical we a pons wi ll incre a s i n gly become the tool of ch oi ce for both state and non s t a te actors con tem p l a ti n g

a s ym m etric approach e s . The likel i h ood of actual em p l oym ent is high er in

a regi onal theater of opera ti ons than direct ly against the con ti n en t a l

Un i ted State s . At the same ti m e , the implicit threat of use as a deterring or

coerc ive tactic against the con ti n ental Un i ted States wi ll on ly ri s e .

Information Operations

The modern U. S . m i l i t a ry ’s con cept of f i gh ting is built upon the

ra p i d , ef f i c i ent exch a n ge of vast amounts of i n form a ti on .6 4 In this, i t

m i rrors the cultu ral and business ex p l o s i on of i n form a ti on exch a n ge unl e a s h ed in the last 20 ye a rs by the power of the pers onal com p uter and

the worl dwi de web. This gl obal sys tem su pports not on ly the financial

well - being of the Un i ted State s , but also the opera ti on of an incre a s i n g

proporti on of the physical infra s tru ctu re nece s s a ry for day - to - d ay life in

the Un i ted State s , f rom air traffic con trol to hyd roel ectric plant managem en t . All i ed with this is the growth of a gl obal cultu re that fo s ters the

rapid exch a n ge of i n form a ti on on a bewi l dering va ri ety of su bj ect s . Th i s

is the envi ron m en t , ri pe with both promise and danger, for inform a ti on

opera ti on s .6 5

Tactical Employment

It is difficult to compete with the United States technologically on

the tactical level. Tactical combat information systems are generally well

protected and resistant to direct attack. The best asymmetric approaches
n i ques that wi ll make it hard for U. S . i n tell i gen ce - ga t h ering sys tems to

gain a clear picture of the battlespace. This could be coupled with aggres

s ive decepti on opera ti ons and a psych o l ogical warf a re campaign tha

seeks to magnify U.S. missteps. This means taking advantage of the fac

that in a world of near-instantaneous global communications, a tactica

event can have immediate strategic effect. The bombing of the al Firdo

command and con trol bu n ker in down town Ba gh d ad du ring the Gu l 

War while it contained civilians, and the mistaken bombing of an Alban

ian refugee convoy during Allied Force, are but two examples of U.S. tacti

cal actions with adverse implications that were magnified immensely b

adversarial manipulation of information—and by our own clumsiness in

re s pon d i n g.

6 6 Denial or degrad a ti on of our su peri or battlef i eld vi s i on 

coupled with relentless attempts to gain strategic effect from U.S. tactica

missteps, will characterize adversary tactical information operations.

Operational Employment

On the operational level, it will become easier to enter and con

duct computer network attack (CNA) against the family of systems, both

cl a s s i f i ed and uncl a s s i f i ed , that su pport the U. S . dep l oym ent infra s tru c

ture. This is because an increasing percentage of information traffic wi

be carried on systems external to the Department of Defense (DOD).Ou

a llies and coa l i ti on partn ers wi ll be at least as vu l n era bl e . Even the we

pro tected U. S . defense intern et sys tems are depen dent to some degre

u pon uncl a s s i f i ed ro uting and vu l n era ble public domain stru ctu res a

they go through what has been called the “last mile” between the DOD

m a i n t a i n ed NIPRNET (non cl a s s i f i ed intern et pro tocol ro uter net work 

and the end user.67

At the same ti m e , advers a ries wi ll target regi onal allies and an

coalition structure with psychological operations and propaganda. When

conducted in conjunction with the threat or actual use of other asymmet

ric approaches (i.e., WMD), a powerful synergy can be obtained, linkin

information operations with events on the ground, whether real or imag

ined. Charles Dunlap, writing in How We Lost the High Tech War of 2007

outlines an extreme but thought-provoking scenario: a regional opponen

m i ght el ect to em p l oy nu clear we a pons against his own pop u l a ti on 

blaming the United States for the attack.

The management of publicly released information will remain 

core competency for any crisis. What people see, read, and hear both in

the Un i ted States and abroad wi ll ulti m a tely shape their percepti ons o
nu m ber of h i gh tech n o l ogy aids, the fundamentals remain the same as

t h ey were du ring World War II: “This was total war, and total war requ i red the calculated circ u l a ti on of f act s , wh i ch were a we a pon more

deadly than bullets and bombs.”68

Strategic Employment

A potential cyber attack against the U.S. homeland has probably

received more recent media attention than any other form of asymmetric

w a rf a re . As a soc i ety, the Un i ted States is both rel a tively and absolutely

more dependent upon computer systems for activities ranging from personal banking to management of highways than any other nation in the

world. Some of these systems are protected, most are not, but virtually all

a re interl i n ked to some degree that increases their vu l n era bi l i ty.6 9 O u r

a bi l i ty to iden tify and defend against these po ten tial attacks is fra gmented—to some extent simply because of the breathtaking scope of the

threat. It may prove very hard to identify attackers, and the line between

criminal activity and state-sponsored attack will be blurred.

This will remain one of the most potentially effective domains for

an asymmetric opponent. An attacker will be able to maintain a high degree of deniability, and the potential for damage is unlimited. The nearest

analogy is to strategic biological warfare, where an open-ended threat is

coupled with a target-rich environment that is only partially protected.

HEMP—The Underestimated Threat

Perhaps the most dangerous and misu n ders tood form of i n formation warfare attack is the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)

threat: a combination of nuclear weapons and information warfare that

can challenge the very heart of our operational doctrine and national stability. For this reason, it will be dealt with under this heading, although it

has obvious application at other levels of war.

HEMP is a principal byprodu ct of the ex p l o s i on of a nu cl e a r

we a pon deton a ted above the eart h’s atm o s ph ere , typ i c a lly above 30 kilom eters . The envi ron m ents produ ced by a nu clear ex p l o s i on can be con s i dered direct (e.g. , m echanical) and indirect (e.g. , el ectri c a l ) . For an ex p l os i on at or near ground level , the direct envi ron m ents are the most obvi o u s ,

and are the re sults of the convers i on of the bom b’s po ten tial en er gy into

t h ermal and kinetic form s , re su l ting in fire and blast damage .7 0 Thu s , t h e

obvious physical envi ron m ents of a nu clear ex p l o s i on—the fireb a ll , bl a s t ,

l i gh t , and heat—are direct envi ron m en t s . One indirect ef fect of a nu cl e a r
the eart hs atm o s ph ere of ga m m a - ray en er gy to radio frequ ency en er g

that prop a ga tes tow a rd the eart h’s su rf ace .7 1

The higher the altitude of the explosion, the less the direct effect

(blast) of the weapon, and the greater the indirect effects (HEMP) will be

an exoatmospheric burst would be optimum.A burst at an altitude of 30

k i l om eters , for ex a m p l e , would have several important impact s : f i rs t , 

greater altitude would expand the line-of-sight coverage of the burst (and

HEMP is a line-of-sight effect), but would also reduce the HEMP field

over what could be produced at lower altitudes (each weapon has an opti

mum burst height to produce the largest HEMP fields). At 300 kilome

ters, a burst centered over central Nebraska could generate HEMP envi

ronments over 90 percent of the continental United States.

Space systems are uniquely vulnerable to nuclear radiation out

puts and dispersed EMP, which is a derivative environment produced b

HEMP, as well as exposure to delayed radiation effects, resulting from po

tential enhancements to the Van Allen belt following high altitude explo

s i ons above 40 to 50 kilom eters (a lower bu rst hei ght wi ll not have a

much effect).72 A particularly ominous aspect of the danger to space sys

tems is the fact that an exoatmospheric explosion anywhere over the sur

face of the earth could affect satellites. A nation seeking to threaten satel

lite systems might choose to detonate the warhead over its own territory

for example, with the goal of “pumping” the Van Allen belt. It has been

estimated that in 1995 there were over 40 declared satellites on low earth

orbit (LEO) performing “a variety of military, commercial, and scientifi

m i s s i ons that would be thre a ten ed .”

7 3 O n going launch programs sinc

t h en have ad ded large nu m bers of Tel ede s i c , O rbcom m , and Glob a l s t a 

communications satellites. All of these systems are potentially vulnerabl

to trapped radiation belts and dispersed EMP from high-altitude bursts

While it is likely that not all satell i tes would “go down” as the re sult o

“single event effects,” the increase in the total ionizing radiation accumu

lation at satellite altitudes will dramatically shorten effective service life

As an ex a m p l e , the Hu bble space tel e s cope , a satell i te that is on LEO

could have its effective service life shortened from 15 years to 22 month

as a result of an increased accumulated ionizing dose caused by a 50-kilo

ton exoatmospheric explosion.74

Virtually all electronic systems in the United States today are po

ten ti a lly vu l n era ble to HEMP, ra n ging from tel evi s i ons to mainfra m 

computers, and from telephone systems to aircraft and satellites.75 When
clude transient, resettable, or permanent upset of digital logic circuits and

performance degradation or burnout of electronic components. The collected energy itself can cause malfunction or device failure directly; or it

can trigger the system’s internal power sources in unintended ways, causing damage by the power sources within the system itself.76

This applies to many military com mu n i c a ti ons sys tems as well .

Over time, modern electronic systems have become increasingly vulnerable to HEMP as a result of transistorization and the use of solid-state and

i n tegra ted - c i rcuit tech n o l ogi e s , wh i ch opera te at very low vo l t a ge s . O f

course, the major issue for vulnerability is the level of the HEMP-induced

transients that reach the sensitive electronics.

Systems can be protected by creating a barrier between the EMP

field (which can produce short circuit currents in the area of 10 kiloamperes on power transmission lines) and the system to be protected. The

most con s erva tive approach is the cre a ti on of a “ Fa rad ay cage ,” a comp l etely cl o s ed and perfect ly con du cting shell . This met a llic shield wi ll

provi de absolute pro tecti on against vi rtu a lly any con ceiva ble HEMP

threat. The problem, of course, is that the protected system is useless, because it has no input or outp ut capabi l i ty. The current approach to

s h i elding is based on integral shielding with pen etra ti on con tro l , wh i ch

attempts to provide shielding, yet retains penetrations into the protected

a rea that are managed by su r ge pro tectors for input power lines, wi re

mesh or transparent conductive-film coatings for windows where visibili ty is requ i red , m etal hon eycomb for ven ti l a ti on port s , and con du cti n g

gaskets for doors and hatches.

Th ere are also new po s s i bi l i ties on the hori zon : s i l i con carbi de ,

for ex a m p l e , u s ed inste ad of s i l i con in sem i con du ctors , is to l erant to a

mu ch broader ra n ge of both tem pera tu re and vo l t a ge .7 7 Ex ten ded systems, such as the integrated electronic banking system across the United

States, will always be much harder to protect, since the weakest link in the

system will allow entry to other components.

Despite shielding, relatively little of either the commercial or the

military world is effectively and verifiably protected. Within the Department of Defense, tactical military communications systems are probably

the most vu l n era bl e , fo ll owed cl o s ely by theater command and con tro l

architecture. The threat, of course, extends even farther, to tactical aircraft

a n d , in fact , to a ny s ys tem that uses adva n ced solid-state el ectronics to
U.S. military today—from wheeled vehicles to helicopters.78

The satell i te con s tell a ti on , both military and com m erc i a l , wi t h

the excepti on of certain sys tems rel a ted to the Si n gle In tegra ted Opera

ti on Plan (SIOP), is po ten ti a lly vu l n era ble to HEMP. According to on 

observer, “Quite simply, the use of commercial satellites is now so tightl

woven into the fabric of our commercial and military endeavors that th

consequences of the loss of these assets is unthinkable, yet such loss is 

very real possibility.”79

What is shielded? The systems related to strategic command and

control are protected.80 The weapons systems associated with SIOP execu

tion are also presumably protected. Not much else is definitely safe. As 

general principle, our strategic command and control is better prepare

for the potential effects of EMP than are our tactical forces.81

While the world of HEMP is little known and even arcane, ther

is one notable source of serious study and analysis. The Soviet Union em

braced HEMP as an integral part of its strategic warfighting concept dur

ing the Cold War and devoted a significant part of its strategic order o

battle to achieving decisive HEMP effects in a general nuclear war.

82 It i

reasonable to assume that others have studied Soviet analyses.

The statem ent attri buted to Indian Gen eral Sundarji abo ut th

need to have nuclear weapons when confronting the United States doe

not go far enough—not only are nuclear weapons needed, but also a de

l ivery sys tem capable of l of ting a nu clear we a pon to an alti tu de o

100–300 kilom eters in a regi onal battlespace . The abi l i ty to do this wi 

threaten to drive a stake through the very heart of the operational princi

ples that drive U.S. warfighting doctrine. We are now, and will be increas

ingly in the future, reliant on secure information systems to deploy ou

forces and to em p l oy them ef fectively in a theater. HEMP thre a tens a

least to disrupt our ability to do this, and at worst to prevent us from de

veloping the “information synergy” fundamental to Joint Vision 2010 (JV

2010). Allies and coalition forces will probably have lower levels of pro

tection than U.S. forces and a commensurately greater risk.

An exoatmospheric nuclear detonation offers a regional state th

ability to apply nuclear weapons in a nonlethal application (a 20-kiloton

burst at 150 kilometers altitude will produce no visible radiation, blast, o

fire effects on the ground) that will still have profoundly disruptive effect

on U.S.space, air, ground, and sea operations. It could change the charac

ter of a theater war from that of a Desert Storm to a Verdun, namely, from
be local in nature and very hard to pass both laterally and vertically. Most

importantly, the use of nuclear weapons in this manner avoids crossing

the nuclear Rubicon—a direct attack upon U.S. forces that would bring a

clear, unequivocal response. A HEMP attack is a sideways swipe that will

force the NCA to think long and hard. Is an exoatmospheric nuclear exp l o s i on—in wh i ch no U. S . pers on n el die as a direct re su l t — s eri o u s

enough to warrant a nuclear response against a Baghdad, Tehran, or Pyongyang? Of course, many personnel will be in grave danger after such an

attack, even if no one dies from blast, heat, or radiation. Planes and helicopters may fall from the sky, fire control architecture and tactical radios

may not work, and vehicles may not move.

Is this an overstatement of the threat? The use of HEMP will affect advers a ry as well as fri en dly sys tem s , and those soc i eties that have

moved directly to cell phones as their basic communications architecture

may be more vulnerable than societies (including some of our potential

theater-level adversaries) with modern fiber-optic cabling. Despite this, as

a general principle it is reasonable to say that HEMP effects will tend to

h ave more nega tive ef fects on or ga n i z a ti ons that are reliant upon el ectronics,and that almost uniquely describes the U.S. approach to warfighting—an approach that will become accentuated further as we move into

the 21st century.

An attack against the U. S . h om eland using HEMP remains the

most po ten ti a lly disru ptive and dangerous po s s i bi l i ty. An ef fective attack

could cause incalculable con s equ en ce s , s eri o u s ly ret a rding if not reversing U. S . c a p a bi l i ties in the inform a ti on age . The abi l i ty to del iver this

kind of a t t ack wi ll requ i re the abi l i ty to del iver an intercon ti n ental ball i stic missile to an alti tu de of bet ween 100 and 500 kilom eters over the center of the North Am erican con ti n ent (or altern a tively the orbital placem ent of a satell i te ) . This is hard to do covert ly. The “s tra tegic foren s i c s”

wi ll be clear and unambi g u o u s , and a regi onal actor that chose this opti on would be risking its very nati onal su rviva l . Un l i ke the thrust of Sovi et Cold War scen a ri o s , n a ti onal dec a p i t a ti on would be impo s s i ble to

ach i eve , and the stra tegic forces of the nati on would be largely pro tected

and ava i l a ble for a re s pon s e .

Even so, a regi onal state with the capabi l i ty to del iver su ch an att ack would possess a qu a l i t a tively high er order of deterren ce than one limi ted to regi onal attack . Several regi onal powers seem to understand this

con cept cl e a rly and are working feveri s h ly to devel op an intercon ti n en t a l
a l tern a tive . The panic el em en tthat would attend even a cred i ble thre a 

to launch su ch an attack would have to be taken into account by U. S .p l a n

n ers in a cri s i s .

Alternative Operational Concepts

At the end of the mill en n iu m , the Un i ted States remains inten 

on harnessing technology as the engine that drives our vision of warfight

ing. As recently as November 1999, the Commander of the Army Materie

Command, General John Coburn, posited that “The history of warfare i

the history of tech n o l ogy.”8 3 Th ere are many who would disagree wi t h

this assertion. Perhaps seduced by our own cultural limitations, we hav

been slow to recognize that others, either through choice or by necessity

may not follow the same path. A recently released series of interviews on

the Chinese book No - Limit Wa rf a re qu o tes one of its aut h ors , Sen i o

Colonel Qiao Liang, as saying “If we were to try to use high technology to

counter U.S. high technology, that would in fact land us in the U.S. trap

We could never catch up to them on that track. So for a poor and wea

country to try to use high technology to counter the United States would

in fact be like throwing eggs against a rock.”84

In ch oosing not to com pete direct ly against the Un i ted State 

tech n o l ogi c a lly, o t h er nati ons can ch oose to rej ect the dialectic that is th

“We s tern Way of Wa r.” In the opera ti on of the Hegelian dialecti c , t h e s i 

com petes with anti t h e s i s , re su l ting in synthesis, wh i ch su b s equ en t ly incor

pora tes el em ents of both com peting approach e s . This approach tends to

produ ce military or ga n i z a ti ons that conver ge in doctrine and hardw a re 

m i rroring each other to some degree . This conver gen ce is at the very cen

ter of We s tern military history. As Sen i or Co l on el Qiao Liang argues, po

ten tial advers a ries may make a conscious attem pt to reverse this proce s 

and avoid mirroring We s tern military or ga n i z a ti ons and approaches to

w a r.

8 5 Cl e a rly, s ome of this rh etoric is the re s ponse of a we a ker state tha

must make the best of the hand it has been de a l t , and even the most imag

i n a tive altern a tive opera ti onal con cepts may not prove ef fective wh en

c a ll ed upon to opera te against our conven ti onal su peri ori ty.8 6

A refusal to adopt We s tern approaches may go well beyond qu e s

ti ons of opera ti onal conver gen ce and military ef fectiven e s s . The most lu

c ra tive po ten tial approach could be to seek adva n t a ge by opera ting wel

o ut s i de the moral fra m ework of the trad i ti onal We s tern approach , re

j ecting what we see as universal norms of beh avi or. The wri ti n gs o

Ra l ph Peters (The New Wa rrior Class) and Ch a rles Dunlap (How We Lo s 
co u rs e , su ch approaches bring their own limitati ons and cultu ral bi a s e s

in vi ewing U. S . s oc i ety and re s o lve . In parti c u l a r, t h ere is a wi dely hel d

vi ew that U. S . s oc i ety is pretern a tu ra lly sen s i tive to even minor casu a lti e s , yet recent evi den ce indicates this may not be so.8 8

Regional aggressors or rogue states may choose to view their populations as assets to be expended, using what has been called the “operational maneuver of starving women and children.”

89 If innocent civilians

a re starvi n g, l eft ex po s ed to the el em en t s , or attacked in any one of a

number of ways available to a modern state, their condition will become

of intense interest to the theater commander. The regional commanderin-chief (CINC) will have to take their well-being into account in his operational plans and be prepared to allocate scarce assets to care for them.

Anyone who asserts that this will not become a competing priority with

ongoing military operations is unfamiliar with the power and political soph i s ti c a ti on of n on govern m ental or ga n i z a ti ons (NGOs) and the pre ssures exerted by the “CNN effect.”

As ym m etric actors may also ch oose to disrega rd the con cept of

vi ctory and defe a t , i llu s tra ted in the convers a ti on bet ween an Am eri c a n

and a North Vietnamese officer, Colonel Harry Summers and Colonel Tu,

in Hanoi on 25 April 1975: “You know you never defeated us in the field,”

said Summers. “That may be true,” replied Tu,“but it is also irrelevant.”

90

Since the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein has attempted to

exec ute just su ch a stra tegy, wh ereby, over ti m e , just remaining in the

game against a superpower, regardless of the beating his forces are taking

at the hands of No rt h ern Wa tch, has con ferred po l i tical cred i bi l i ty in

many parts of the world (not least of all, in Iraq).

The Iraqis may understand Clausewitz better than we do: “War,

however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresponsiveness would be no war at all), but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war must be taken as applying to

both side s . O n ce aga i n , t h ere is interacti on . So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I

am not in control; he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.”91

Tactical Employment

While a combination of technological approaches and innovative

tactics can be used against U.S. forces, the best counter of all may rest in

b a t t l e s p ace sel ecti on . If an oppon ent can force the fight to com p l ex

u rb a n , m o u n t a i n , or ju n gle terra i n , U. S . s en s ors and we a pons acc u rac y
the ri ght ground may well prove to be the most significant adva n t a g

re s ting with an advers a ry, and U. S . forces may not be able to refuse t

enter these killing grounds.92

Other supporting tactical asymmetric approaches can include th

use of the civilian pop u l a ti on as hostage s , as human shiel d s , and a

weapons with which to overstress U.S. and allied medical systems. All o

these factors will tend to reduce the effectiveness of precision engagemen

systems, clouding the picture of the battlefield, and requiring greater ex

posure by U.S. forces. If nothing else, they always invite the opportunit

for tactical mistakes, which an effective information operations campaign

would then turn to great effect. On the other hand, it is important to rec

ogn i ze that po s i tive tactical re sults may have nega tive stra tegic implica

tions. The event itself may be of less importance than how it is presented

on the global stage.

Operational Employment

The use of a n ti access con cepts can deter, s l ow, or prevent U. S 

forces from entering an AOR. The technologies for antiaccess are not new

but how they are employed and “advertised” will determine effectiveness

Th ey ra n ge from high - tech to low - tech , f rom conven ti onal sea-base

mines to shoulder- f i red su rf ace - to-air and su rf ace - to - su rf ace missile

(SAMs and SSMs). When combined with unfavorable terrain, and agains

a backdrop of low to moderate U.S. interest, these approaches may gain

powerful advantage. They will tend to be less effective when a vital U.S

national interest is at stake.

Antiaccess measures can be grouped into four broad and overlap

ping categori e s : deterring measu re s , coercing measu re s , a n ti dep l oym en 

measures, and anti-invasion measures. They can be either conventional o

W M D. While the specifics of po ten tial WMD anti access measu res hav

been covered in detail earlier in this chapter, they will also be briefly dis

cussed in this section, since they represent the “high end” of access denia

Deterring measu re s a re those acti ons and sys tems that are de

s i gn ed to prevent the Un i ted States or our allies from dep l oying forces o

o t h er forms of po l i ti co - m i l i t a ry assistance to a regi on in a cri s i s . Th i 

would be accom p l i s h ed thro u gh a display of force or diplom acy tha

m a kes the cost of the propo s ed acti on appear too high , wh en con s i dere

a gainst the level of U. S . n a ti onal interest at stake . These norm a lly ar

pre - h o s ti l i ty measu re s , a l t h o u gh deterren ce can opera te even after a con

f l i ct begi n s .
rhetoric about potential employment would be deterring measures. The

backdrop to this would, of course, be the adversary’s calculations about

the level of U.S. national interest at stake, balanced against the contemp l a ted acti on . The ava i l a bi l i ty of W M D, and more parti c u l a rly, t h e

dem on s tra ted abi l i ty to del iver a WMD attack against the con ti n en t a l

United States, would probably be the highest expression of this form of

deterrence.93

Coercing measu re s com bine military threat and diplom acy and

are aimed at regional states to cause them to refuse or limit U.S. basing or

deployment. This is the implicit or explicit capability and resolve to strike

at nations within a region that would be necessary to support the deployment of U.S. and allied forces. The highest expression of this form of coercion would be the possession of ballistic missiles that could reach popul a ti on cen ters of the co u n tries in qu e s ti on , co u p l ed with W M D. Le s s

obvious but equ a lly ef fective opera ti onal capabi l i ties would inclu de a

c red i ble SOF threat for em p l oym ent of W M D, su rf ace - to - su rf ace cru i s e

missile threats, the ability to interdict economically critical lines of communication, and the potential to incite destabilization operations against

the regime in power. There are many more. In fact, virtually any weapon

or technique discussed below can be employed to this end. The ultimate

intent is to drive a wedge between regional and extra-regional states (presumably the United States with its allies) by demonstrating that the cost

of siding with America will be too high.

An ti d epl oym ent measu re s a re the military we a pons sys tems and

the tactics, techniques, and procedures, both active and passive,that could

be employed to prevent or slow the deployment of U.S. and allied forces

by air or sea to friendly ports and debarkation airfields in an AOR. They

a re also the measu res undert a ken against forw a rd - dep l oyed U. S . Nav y

and allied warships to deny or limit their freedom of movement and action in contiguous ocean areas.

Anti-invasion measures are the military weapons systems and the

tactics, techniques, and procedures, both active and passive, employed to

deny U.S. and allied forces the capability to execute sea control, amphibio u s , a i rborn e , air assault, air su peri ori ty, and air- to - ground mission s

within an AOR. Many of them are the same systems and tactics that are

used for antideployment, but there are some significant differences. The

principal difference is that the state in question is now defending its own
Conventional Prevents, limits,

antideployment or denies what

weapon or tactic U.S. capability? Benefits Risks

Tether, bottom, ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap, highly ■ Must be placed at

rising mines forces by sealift effective selected target area

■ Naval freedom ■ Reasonably

of action deniable

Free-floating ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap ■ Indiscriminate

mines forces by sealift ■ Highly deniable ■ Not responsive to 

■ Naval freedom retasking or 

of action redeployment

Surface-to-air ■ Ability to utilize ■ Cheap ■ Operationally diff i c u 

missiles aerial ports of ■ “High leverage” to employ in target

debarkation (APODs) technique if special nation—possibility

■ Air freedom operations forces of attribution

of action employed against

targeted APODs

Submarines ■ Ability to move ■ Effective ■ Clearly attributable

forces by sealift ■ “High leverage” ■ Expensive

■ Naval freedom technique ■ Probability of

of action ■ More effective as loss high

a threat than as

an actual weapon

■ Very discriminate

Cruise missiles ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap ■ Limited range—

forces by sealift ■ Discriminate geographically

■ Naval freedom ■ High coercive dependent

of action value ■ Limited eff e c t i v e n e s 

■ Ability to use against modern navie

APODs ■ Clearly attributable

Theater ballistic ■ Ability to move ■ Very high coercive ■ Limited eff e c t i v e n e s 

missiles (conventional forces by sealift value against sea-based

warheads) ■ Naval freedom ■ Difficult to counter targets

of action ■ “High leverage” ■ Clearly attributable

■ Ability to use threat that will require ■ Expensive

APODs disproportionate

resources in air

assets to counter

Tactical aviation ■ Ability to move ■ Discriminate ■ Clearly attributable

forces by sealift ■ “High leverage” ■ Operationally

■ Naval freedom technique—Can be difficult to execute

of action very effective against ■ Probability of loss

■ Ability to use “air bridge” very high if employed

APODs

(continued)
borders and the area it may have invaded , i n s te ad of proj ecting power

into neighboring states (although this will surely continue).

In ad d i ti on to the capabi l i ties out l i n ed above , certain back bon e

or enabling capabilities are highly desirable. These include, first, a spacebased reconnaissance capability, either indigenous, through relationships

with states that do possess military space sys tem s , or thro u gh com m erc i a lly ava i l a ble sys tem s ; and secon d , a com preh en s ive recon n a i s s a n ce -

strike complex able to conduct reconnaissance, process information, develop intelligence, and execute a strike plan based on these.

Un derstanding the disti n cti on abo ut the level of U. S . n a ti onal interest at stake is fundamental to analyzing anti access approach e s . If t h e

Un i ted States seeks access and a vital nati onal interest is at stake , t h en it

wi ll be difficult to stop us. The loss of a carri er or a nu m ber of B – 2

bom bers , for ex a m p l e , m i ght be accept a bl e — i f the obj ective is import a n t

en o u gh . Convers ely, the threat of losing a carri er or a large nu m ber of

m a n n ed airc raft may be en o u gh to deter the Un i ted States in situ a ti on s

wh ere our interest is very low. Th ere is also a hidden and dangerous dynamic at work for the state that makes these calculati ons—a shocking and

su ccessful attack on a U. S . a s s et may well prove to be the catalyst that drives U. S . i n terest to a far gre a ter level than it might have otherwise been .

These calculati ons of deterren ce wi ll need to be very caref u lly undert a ken

by po ten tial foe s , and the risks of get ting it wrong are su b s t a n ti a l .

Conventional Prevents, limits,

antideployment or denies what

weapon or tactic U.S. capability? Benefits Risks

Special operations ■ Ability to use ■ Discriminate ■ Possibility of

forces infrastructure in ■ Deniable compromise and

host country ■ High leverage loss of deniability

■ “Diminishing re t u rn s ”

as security responds

Artillery systems ■ Ability to use ■ Cheap ■ Very limited range

sea- and aerial ports ■ Discriminate ■ Geographically

of debarkation dependent

■ Clearly attributable

1 See John Stillion and David Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and

Ba ll i s ti c - Missile At t a cks: Te ch n ol o gy, S cen a ri o s , and U. S . Air Fo rce Re s po n se s ( Santa Mon i c a , C A :

RAND, 1999).
Conventional Prevents, limits,

anti-invasion or denies what

weapon or tactic U.S. capability? Benefits Risks

Passive measures ■ Ability to execute ■ Can deter and ■ Usually not eff e c t i v 

(cover and cross-beach perhaps limit planning ■ Fixed and immobile

concealment, vertical amphibious assaults, for forcible entry ■ Can be breached

and horizontal airborne landings, operations or avoided

engineering, and air assault ■ Relatively cheap

the development of landings, and air

defensive ground interdiction and

tactical positions close air support

in depth)

Surf zone mines ■ Ability to execute ■ Can deter and ■ Fixed and immobile

amphibious perhaps limit planning ■ Can be breached

operations for forcible entry or avoided

operations

■ Relatively cheap

Tether, bottom, ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap ■ Must be placed at

rising mines forces by sealift ■ Highly effective selected target area

■ Naval freedom ■ May be difficult to

of action place against a capabl

navy executing sea

control tactics

Free-floating mines ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap ■ Indiscriminate

forces by sealift ■ Not responsive

■ Naval freedom

of action

Surface-to-air ■ Ability to execute ■ Relatively cheap ■ Countermeasures

missiles aerospace tasks readily available

■ Use invites

counterattack

■ Cannot offer a

decisive result

Submarines ■ Ability to move ■ Effective ■ Expensive

forces by sea ■ “High leverage” ■ Probability of loss

■ Naval freedom technique high

of action ■ More effective as a

threat than as an

actual weapon

Cruise missiles ■ Ability to move ■ Cheap ■ Limited range

forces by sea ■ Geographically

■ Naval freedom dependent

of action ■ Limited effectiveness

■ Ability to use aerial against modern navies

ports of debarkation (continued
The integration of the various antiaccess asymmetric approaches

that use both the diplom a tic and military el em ents of power and bo t h

conventional and WMD means can give a clear picture of the range of alternatives available to a state to execute a comprehensive antiaccess strategy, with all its operational and tactical enabling approaches.

Strategic employment on the tactical level that is well beyond accepted norms (such as the state-sanctioned raping of captive U.S. servicewomen depicted by Charles Dunlap in How We Lost the High Tech War of

2007) can have direct strategic application on either softening or hardening U.S. national will. Some defense thinkers take the position that such

potential future atrocities would have a softening effect.94 This is not an

u n con te s ted hypo t h e s i s ; Am ericans both in and out of u n i form may

prove resilient in the face of warrior tactics.95

Conventional Prevents, limits,

anti-invasion or denies what

weapon or tactic U.S. capability? Benefits Risks

Theater ballistic ■ Ability to move ■ “High leverage” ■ Limited eff e c t i v e n e s s

missiles (conventional forces by sealift asset that will require against sea-based

warheads) ■ Naval and aviation U.S. and allies to targets

freedom of action counter with a large 

■ Ability to use number of critical air, 

APODs space, and special

operations assets

■ Effective counter

may not be available

Tactical aviation ■ Ability to move ■ Discriminate ■ Operationally

forces by sealift ■ ”High leverage“ difficult to execute

■ Naval freedom technique ■ Probability of loss very

of action ■ Can be very high

■ Ability to use effective against 

APODs ”air bridge“

■ Possibility of single

”high value“ attack

Artillery systems ■ Ability to execute ■ Cheap ■ Limited range

forcible entry by ■ Geographically

air or sea dependent

■ Limited eff e c t i v e n e s s

■ Easily targeted
What is When will

Antiaccess the goal of it be Who is What is the What is the

approach the approach? employed? the target? ”low end“ ”high end“

Deterrence Prevent During peace U.S. and Diplomatic Overt threat of

or limit and early allies contacts, weapons of

U.S./allied in a crisis ”saber- mass destrucinvolvement rattling“ tion (WMD)

in a crisis employment

against U.S.

forces, allies,

and the

continental U.S

Coercion Prevent, limit, During peace Regional Economic, Overt threat

or deny and through- states military-to- of WMD

access for out a crisis military, employment

U.S./allies diplomatic against targete

in a crisis pressures regional state

Anti- Prevent, limit, Early in Regional Mines WMD

deployment or deny a crisis states and employment

deployment of U.S. strategic against

U.S./allied deployment regional states

forces in a system, to and U.S.

crisis or war include sea- strategic

based forces deployment

and air and system, to

sea ports, include seaincluding based forces

potential and air and

intermediate sea ports

staging bases and ISBs

(ISBs) in range

Anti-invasion Prevent, limit, Mid- and late- U.S. and Mines, WMD

or deny crisis allied tactical surface-to-air employment

forcible entry forces and missiles, against regiona

of U.S./allies supporting air defense states and U.S.

in a war infrastructure artillery, allied forces

passive strategic

protection deployment

system, to

include seabased forces

and air and sea 

ports and ISBs
just as the troops of the 2d Marine Division rapidly breached the trenches

of Iraqi infantry forces during Operation Desert Storm. Technology may

well prove the equal of fanaticism.

The po s s i bi l i ties inherent in altern a tive opera ti onal con cept s

cross the levels of war and are tightly wound into a cycle of action-reaction with potential U.S. counters. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss

some United States concepts and operational constructs while examining

this form of a s ym m etry. Two arguments active among U. S . defen s e

thinkers today must be considered. The first is concerned with the types

of forces and the opera ti onal approaches that the Un i ted States should

adopt in the face of the growing WMD and access-denial threat. The second deals with how we should deal with the vast areas of urban complex

terrain that are expanding to cover mu ch of the pop u l a ted worl d . Th i s

terrain pre s ents a dra m a ti c a lly more difficult opera ti onal envi ron m en t

for U.S. forces, who have long avoided fighting in cities when they have

had the choice.

The WMD and anti a ccess arg u m en t: This argument asserts that

the lethality of theater ballistic missiles, armed with various WMD, will

m a ke it prec a rious to dep l oy gro u n d , n ava l , and tactical air forces to a

theater in a crisis.96 The potential gain we will enjoy from their deployment will be offset by the vulnerability that attends their presence in the

t h e a ter within ra n ge of en emy we a pon s . The altern a tive? More cru i s e

missiles and stra tegic bom bers dep l oying direct ly from the con ti n en t a l

Un i ted States or other distant regi onal bases and arm ed with prec i s i on

weapons and other standoff munitions.

This argument has some attracti on s , to be su re . If our gro u n d ,

naval, and tactical air forces aren’t there, then they can’t be attacked. The

problem with this approach is that it ignores the shaping component of

the nati onal military stra tegy by drawing down on forw a rd - dep l oyed

force s . We dep l oy forces forw a rd on perm a n ent and ro t a ti onal bases in

order to dem on s tra te intere s t , build cl o s er ties to fri en d s , and dem ons tra te re s o lve to po ten tial en em i e s . This approach would largely ign ore

this vital component of current U.S. strategy, and substitute for it something more akin to “Fortress America.” This would be a “New Look” for

the early decades of the 21st century that would, in fact, share many of the

disadvantages of the Eisenhower administration’s strategy. The most notable similarity is a lack of flexibility and a very limited capability to apply
of employment of WMD. This is an example of worst-case planning dri

ving all other scenarios, even those that are far more likely to occur. It als

minimizes the large number of actions that can be taken by forward-de

ployed forces both in peacetime (as part of a CINC’s Theater Engagemen

Plan, or TEP) and in crisis.

The avo i d a n ce of ci ti e s : It is vital to recogn i ze that there ar

places—the “dark and bloody ground”—where U.S. forces will need to b

able to fight and prevail. It will not always be possible to engineer scien

tific and technical soluti ons to all of these probl em s . Th ere is a tren d 

based on our love affair with technology, that may lead us to seek to avoi

going into environments—particularly urban complex terrain—that wi

tend to degrade and minimize our maneuver, firepower, and information

advantage. This could lead us to develop powerful yet brittle forces tha

cannot prevail across the potential spectrum of engagement. At a mini

mum, it would invite obvious asymmetrical responses to an overwhelm

ing yet narrowly based conventional advantage.

It has been argued that we should su rround com p l ex terra i n , a n 

t h en let cities “ wi t h er on the vi n e .”

9 7 Un fortu n a tely, we wi ll not alw ays hav

the lu x u ry of doing this. As the bank robber said wh en qu e s ti on ed abo u

why he robbed banks: “Well , t h a t’s wh ere the mon ey is.” Ci ties are the cen

terp i ece of vi rtu a lly all cultu re s , both east and we s t , and the growing urb a n

i z a ti on of the world means that we must learn to master the skills requ i re

to prevail in this envi ron m en t .9 8 This is not a ref ut a ti on of tech n o l ogy, fo

the answer to the probl em wi ll requ i re the most soph i s ti c a ted and capabl 

tech n o l ogy ava i l a bl e — but it is ulti m a tely a probl em of human wi ll an

s k i ll . Our po ten tial oppon ents see this; we should not ign ore it.

The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force are studying the problem

of u rban warf i gh ti n g : the Army thro u gh a series of Adva n ced Con cep

Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and the Marine Corps through it

Urban Warrior series of experiments. The Air Force is studying the role o

airpower in the urban environment.99 While none of the series of experi

ments or research to date has yielded a breakthrough idea for success in

the dangerous urban environment,many small and very cheap incremen

tal improvements have been identified.

The need to master the urban environment may be more impor

tant in small-scale contingencies (SSCs) than in major theater wars. In 

major theater war, the theater commander may have the luxury of bein

able to maneuver away from urban terrain while achieving his objectives
forces will require entry into urban complex terrain—we will not be able

to pick and choose where evacuations, embassy reinforcements, and humanitarian operations will occur.

What does this mean? As we de s i gn the forces that wi ll exec ute the

n a ti onal military stra tegy, we need to avoid cre a ting forces ef fective aga i n s t

a band of s cen a rios too narrow and opti m i s ti c , overly reliant on tech n o logy.1 0 0 In some futu re war we do not want to find ours elves in the po s i ti on

RAF Bom ber Command found itsel f in 1942: u n a ble to ef fectively attack

c ri tical target s , the RAF attacked the city of Lu beck because it would bu rn

well , ra t h er than for any significant opera ti onal con s i dera ti on .1 0 1

Terrorism

Terrorism is included in this matrix of threats even though it is

an uncomfortable fit. Terror can be a means chosen by a state actor, and

in that interpret a ti on , it fits more or less into all of the previous categories. For this categorization, though, the intent is to highlight the danger of nonstate sponsored groups that operate outside the framework of

i n tern a ti onal rel a ti on s . Th eir financial and scien tific base wi ll be narrower than state-sponsored organizations, but this is compensated for by

t h eir re adiness to sel ect more radical tech n i ques that would be su i c i d a l

for groups linked to states.

As has already been highlighted, the rise of the United States as

the global lightning rod for everything that happens in the world today

tends to attract would-be attackers. The global reach of American culture

on ly rei n forces this. Wh en co u p l ed with the growing ava i l a bi l i ty of

weapons that promise massive and visible results with minimal outlay, the

po ten tial for non s t a te actors to invo ke we a pons form erly re s erved for

states is clear and growing. The Cold War formula of “least likely = most

dangerous” is fast eroding, and many unsavory scenarios can be imagined

that are all reasonably likely to occur.

The Who: Regional, Rogue, and Nonstate Actors

A peer competitor is the least likely opponent to emerge within

the time frame of this analysis (through 2010). For this reason, it is not

included here.A regional adversary

102 is possible, and even likely. The representative goal of such a regional opponent would be the pursuit of regional hegemony. The United States would most likely face this adversary

in a coalition of some form. An opponent of this nature could reasonably
a s ym m etric opti ons—at least from the more egregious WMD and war

rior alternatives.

Few if any inhibitions will act to brake the asymmetric strategie

selected by a rogue state. Such a state can expect to act with little or no in

ternational support, so there is less incentive to avoid extremes of behav

ior. At the same time, such a state may gamble that the only way to gain

international support will be by self-inflicted attacks, coupled with an ag

gressive strategic IW campaign that would attempt to pin the blame fo

such an attack on the United States and its allies.

The non s t a te advers a ry spans a very broad va ri ety of t h re a t s 

ranging from the most plausible (handbills nailed to telephone poles) t

extreme (anthrax releases in subway stations). For this reason, generaliza

tions about these organizations are difficult.

In examining po ten tial advers a ri e s , the more ties a state has t

the existing international community, the less likely such a state will be t

select an asymmetric strategy that would place it beyond the pale of th

s oc i ety of n a ti on s . This can be re s t a ted in another manner: the more 

state has to lose,the less likely it will be to adopt a strategy that could pro

duce unlimited liability if unsuccessful.

The When: Likelihood During Phases of a Crisis

Ta ble 5 pre s ents the rel a tive likel i h ood of d i f ferent po ten tial op

pon ents ch oosing to em p l oy asym m etric approaches as a functi on o

ti m e . The oppon en t s — regi on a l , rogue state , and non s t a te actors — a r

a rrayed down the left-hand co lu m n . Within each row are arrayed th

most likely forms of a s ym m etric altern a tives that have alre ady been dis

c u s s ed (nu cl e a r, ch em i c a l , bi o l ogi c a l , i n form a ti on opera ti on s , opera

ti onal con cept s , and terrori s m ) . The five co lumns repre s ent the po ten ti a 

phases of a cri s i s . E ach phase would pre s ent disti n ct ly different opti on 

and altern a tives for an advers a ry to con s i der the use of an asym m etri 

a pproach . Pe ace repre s ents a non c risis state of i n tern a ti onal rel a ti ons in

wh i ch there is no particular focus on a state or regi on . A crisis repre s en t 

a hei gh ten ed state of d i p l om a tic focus on a particular state or regi on , i n

cluding po ten tial all i a n ce or coa l i ti on diplom a tic mobi l i z a ti on . Dep l oy

m ent is the movem ent of U. S . and all i ed forces to an AO R . E m p l oym en 

is the exec uti on of combat opera ti ons in an AO R . The dep l oym ent an

em p l oym ent phases may overl a p. Term i n a ti on repre s ents the en d game o

a major theater war or small-scale con ti n gen c y; for purposes of t h i 

a ble to the Un i ted States and its all i e s .

The rel a tive likel i h ood of em p l oym ent ra n ges from lowest t

highest. When reading this table, it is important to understand that this i

not an attem pt to make a ju d gm ent on wh en an asym m etric stra teg

might be best used; rather, it simply indicates at what stage an adversar

might be more likely to select an asymmetric approach.

Several con clu s i ons em er ge from this tabl e . F i rs t , WMD ar

“boo ken d ” opti on s . Th ey are more likely to be useful ei t h er as coerc i n 

m e a su res or as actual we a pons at the very beginning or the en d game of 

con f l i ct . At the begi n n i n g, even the threat of t h eir em p l oym ent may slow

or stop U. S . dep l oym ent into a theater. A lesser- i n clu ded outcome of t h i 

wi ll be the po l i tical fra gm en t a ti on that can occur among a coa l i ti on stru c

tu re wh en faced with su ch a scen a ri o, p a rti c u l a rly wh en there are wi del

d i s p a ra te levels of NBC prep a redness among all i e s . At the end of a majo

t h e a ter war or small-scale con ti n gency that is going badly for the aggre s

s or, the tem pt a ti on wi ll be to “use ’em or lose ’em ,” and this wi ll be mor

pron o u n ced if t h ere is a ch a n ce of regime rep l acem en t . The more deco u

p l ed a state is from the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty, the more pron o u n ce

the po s s i bi l i ty of a blind and po ten ti a lly disastrous use of W M D.

Second, it is very hard to draw conclusions about how a nonstat

actor might choose to time the employment of asymmetric alternatives

but the activities of a regional actor or a rogue state might increase th

opportunities for a nonstate actor to conduct operations. It is conceivabl

that such an operation might be intended to have a “false flag” effect tha

would prom pt the Un i ted States to take acti on sought by the non s t a t

actor against a regional opponent.

Third, the specifics of the situation will always carry more weigh

than any generalized theory. In particular, this applies to the category o

con cept - b a s ed asym m etric approach e s . Terra i n , c u l tu ral con s i dera ti on s 

and the level of national interest at stake are ultimately of more impor

tance than anything else in determining these relationships.

Conclusions 

Two principal con clu s i ons can be drawn from this ex a m i n a ti on

of the wh a t - wh o - wh en of a s ym m etry. F i rs t , a nu m ber of po ten tial adver

s a ries are ex p l oring stra tegi e s , the most dangerous and thre a tening o

wh i ch are usu a lly based on the acqu i s i ti on of W M D, that may narrow

certain gaps with the Un i ted State s , but at a po ten tial grave overa ll co s 
m i l i t a ries that cannot functi on ef fectively in a trad i ti onal manner, a s

t h ey focus on the asym m etric approaches that seem to of fer the most

promise of fast re sults against the Un i ted States and its all i e s .

The second ob s erva ti on deals with the rel a tive import a n ce of

we a pons of mass de s tru cti on within the typo l ogy of a s ym m etry. It is

inviting to reduce the asymmetric argument to a discussion of the strategic WMD threat to the United States homeland. This is a dangerous oversimplification, because, while it captures the most destructive and frightening end of the asym m etric spectru m , it also ign ores a nu m ber of f a r

m ore likely app l i c a ti ons of a s ym m etry. We a pon s — rega rdless of t h e

type—are themselves of less importance than the effect they create in the

mind of the attacked. There is a powerful congruence, to be sure, between

WMD and immediate strategic effect, but there are also other, less dangerous ways to achieve similar effects. We should not limit our thinking

a bo ut how to defend against asym m etric approaches to too narrow a

band that encompasses only the most dangerous.
Looking in the Mirror:

Where Are Our Asymmetric

Vulnerabilities?

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.103

—Clarke’s Third Law, Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future

The people who can destroy a thing, they control it.104

—Frank Herbert, Dune

T

he central thesis of this paper is that the Department of Defense

portion of U.S. national policy in the near to mid-term is based on

the ability to maintain a clear and unambiguous conventional mili

tary superiority, coupled with the ability to defend the homeland in th

face of potential asymmetric threats. This chapter will outline the concep

tual stru ctu re of both U. S . m i l i t a ry opera ti ons and the most import a n 

physical and psychological elements of our homeland. Potential vulnera

bilities within these concepts and structures will be described and exam

ined. At the end of the chapter, some conclusions will be offered that wi

establish the groundwork for chapter four, which will assess the danger o

possible asymmetric attacks on the United States and its forces.

Measuring Conventional Military Superiority

U. S . conven ti onal su peri ori ty is em bod i ed in the capabi l i ty to

ra p i dly ach i eve overwh elming battlespace dom i n a n ce against any oppo

nent, and to prevail quickly and with acceptable loss. It draws its doctrina

codification from the “big four” concepts of JV 2010, the Chairman’s vi

sion of the future battlefield: dominant maneuver, precision engagement

full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These overarching con

cepts are useful at the macro level, but we need to look at what they mean

on the gro u n d . Is it po s s i ble to establish some rel a tive measu res o

5
If s o, can we then con s i der some po s s i ble vu l n era bi l i ties to asym m etri c

approaches? The answer to both questions is a qualified yes.

What Are the Operational Expressions of JV 2010 Capabilities?

Dominant maneuver ach i eves its goals thro u gh four en a bl ers .

F i rs t , i n form a ti on su peri ori ty cre a tes a com m on pictu re of the battlespace while denying the same to the enemy. Second, highly capable and

agile combat units are employed to use this degree of information superiority to strike enemy forces at the most advantageous time and place, in

both a close and deep battle. Th i rd , forces are dep l oyed ra p i dly bo t h

i n ter- and intra t h e a ter, i n tegra ting ra p i dly with forw a rd pre s en ce force s

to figh t . Fo u rt h , obj ectives are ach i eved wh en ever po s s i ble thro u gh the

manipulation of effects, not through the application of mass. The measures of effectiveness will be whether or not CINC objectives can be met

through, first, rapid operations that yield decisive results; second, acceptable U.S. and allied casualties; and third, acceptable collateral damage. In

Desert Storm, the great “left wheel” of the coalition is a good example of

an effective application of dominant maneuver.

Pre cision en ga gem en t ach i eves opera ti onal ex pre s s i on thro u gh

t h ree key en a bl ers . F i rs t , i n form a ti on su peri ori ty is used to ra p i dly exch a n ge targeting inform a ti on among mu l tiple sen s or platform s , proce s s

i n form a ti on into acti on a ble intell i gen ce , and then convey it to the shoo ter

in near- re a l - ti m e . Secon d , mu l tiple sen s or sys tem s , both manned and unm a n n ed , su rveil the battlespace . And third , ef fect s - b a s ed targeting is app l i ed . The measu re of ef fectiveness wi ll be wh et h er we can con du ct ef fective en ga gem ents that meet CINC targeting goals with accept a ble co ll a tera l

d a m a ge and U. S . and all i ed casu a l ti e s . As with all measu res of ef fectiven e s s , this remains a qu a l i t a tive ju d gm en t , the most important com pon en t

of wh i ch wi ll be the CINC to l era n ce for error.

Two co u n terpoi s ed examples from history illu s tra te this. In

preparing for the invasion of France in 1944, the decision was made to attack the transportation system that would be used to move German reinforcem ents to the lod gm ent are a . This invo lved a conscious dec i s i on to

target railyards and switching facilities inside French towns. Early civilian

co ll a teral casu a l ty proj ecti ons were qu i te high , but Gen eral Ei s en h ower

considered the potential gain worth the risk. As it turned out, casualties

were mu ch lower than proj ected , and the “Tra n s port a ti on Plan” gre a t ly

slowed the movement of German units. More recently, though, in Operati on De sert Sto rm, the bom bing of the al Firdos command and con tro l
of Iraqi civilians, proved to be too much for the traffic to bear,and sub

s equ ent stri kes were mod i f i ed and the force of the air campaign less

ened.105 The difference in what degree of error a CINC was willing to ac

cept (or all owed to accept because of pressing diplom a tic re a l i ties) wa

va s t ly different in these two cases. This is ulti m a tely an ex pre s s i on o

whether the nation’s vital interests are at stake.

Fu ll dimensional prote cti o n gains its opera ti onal ex pre s s i on

t h ro u gh two key en a bl ers : the use of i n form a ti on su peri ori ty to ra p i dly ex

ch a n ge inform a ti on con cerning the current threat to U. S . and all i ed force s 

i n cluding the abi l i ty to pro tect our own inform a ti on sys tem s , and the abi l

i ty to provi de ef fective and ti m ely force pro tecti on measu re s , active , p a s

s ive , and preem ptive , wh en requ i red . The measu res of ef fectiveness tha

wi ll determine how well full dimen s i onal pro tecti on is being exec uted ar

s i m p l e : the force dep l oys ,f i gh t s , and redep l oys with minimum U. S . and al

l i ed casu a l ti e s . This is a qu a l i t a tive measu rem en t . The nu m ber of c a su a l ti e 

that wi ll be accept a ble wi ll of co u rse be scaled against the natu re of t h 

t h reat and wh et h er or not vital interests are at stake . Two ex treme case

f rom history would be the inva s i on of Norm a n dy in 1944, and the inva

s i on of Gren ada in 1983. Norm a n dy invo lved the su rvival of the nati on 

Gren ada did not. The rel a tive pri ce the Un i ted States was wi lling to pa

was sign i f i c a n t ly different in each of these two scen a ri o s .

Focused logistics operates through three enablers. First, informa

tion superiority allows the broad-based sharing of a common picture o

the force’s logi s tics po s tu re , while pro tecting this cri tical inform a ti on

f rom com prom i s e . Secon d , s m a ll er, h i gh ly re s pon s ive logi s tics el em en t 

will be tailored to provide timely support, with the added benefit of re

ducing the logistics footprint and the concomitant need for force protec

tion. Third, logistics support will use highly mobile organizations capabl

of sustained operations at a very high tempo. The measure of effective

ness will remain the one against which logisticians have been measure

for cen tu ri e s : opera ti onal tem po does not degrade because of l ogi s ti c 

bottlenecks or slow throughput.

The key to all aspects of JV 2010 is the absolute requ i rem ent t

dom i n a te the inform a ti on warf a re spectru m . JV 2010 is ulti m a tel

nothing more than a form of what the Navy calls “n et work cen tric war

f a re ,” a broader con cept that ex p l i c i t ly places the full spectrum manage

m ent of i n form a ti on at the core of a vi s i on of i n tegra ted air, s p ace , l a n d 

and sea com b a t .1 0 6
There are vulnerabilities that an intelligent opponent can exploit.

Table 6 outlines several measures that could be applied against each of the

capabilities and their operational expressions. In general, though, potential effective asymmetric approaches seem to have the following common

characteristics when arrayed against JV 2010:

■ Deny rapid and dec i s ive acti on thro u gh battlespace sel ecti on and

denial of ti m ely access (including envi ron m ental manipulati on if

necessary)

■ Maximize opportunities for collateral damage

■ F i ght a very aggre s s ive IW campaign that aims direct ly at disproportionate effect

■ Use the civilian population to stress U.S. theater infrastructure

■ Avoid ef fective targeting thro u gh passive , active , and disru ptive

measures

■ Inflict mass casualties when possible

■ Complicate U.S. logistics by reducing usable infrastructure

■ Lengthen operations: time is the friend of the weak and the enemy

of the stron g ; an advers a ry who just stays on his feet against the

United States and a coalition will eventually gain credibility, regardless of the tactical/operational picture.

The Un i ted States military is a fe a rs ome force to be reckon ed

with. It possesses many strengths, not the least of which is the ability to

ad a pt ra p i dly to new and demanding con d i ti on s . All of the asym m etri c

a pproaches above have been tri ed at one time or another against U. S .

forces, and most of them have failed. However, we are not invulnerable.107

A student of our style of war who seeks to distill our vulnerabilities to a

basic common denominator would seek to reduce our ability to dominate

the inform a ti on spectrum while increasing our casu a l ti e s — a ll wh i l e

stretching the engagement out over a long period of time.

Examining the Homeland

The preceding section examined threats to the military forces of

the Un i ted State s . This secti on wi ll attem pt to analy ze the most fundamental responsibility of any state: the ability to protect its citizens in their

homes from attack. The United States has not suffered a serious conventional attack on its homeland by another state since the War of 1812.108

On the other hand, the U.S. homeland has been threatened several times.

As has been previously discussed, in World War II, Japan attempted, with
little su cce s s , to float incen d i a ry we a pons on ball oons into the Pac i f i 

Northwest, and the end of the war cut short its plans to conduct biologi

cal we a pons attacks on the Un i ted State s . G erm a ny also had plans fo

long-range bombers and successors to the V–2, but none were developed

before Germ a ny fell . Du ring the long dec ades of the Cold Wa r, Sovi e

missiles were targeted against both U.S. cities and military installations; in

potential asymmetries

Potential

Conventional Operational Measure of asymmetric

capability expression effectiveness approach

Dominant ■ Information ■ Rapid, decisive ■ Deny access

maneuver superiority operations ■ Slow deployment

■ High-capability ■ Acceptable U.S./ ■ Lengthen operations

combat units allied casualties in time

■ Force projection ■ Minimal ■ Avoid decisive

■ Achieve objectives collateral damage engagements

through manipulation ■ Maximize U.S. 

of effects, not mass casualties

■ Exploit alliance

weaknesses

Precision ■ Information ■ Effective ■ Deny effective

engagement superiority engagements that targeting; seek to

■ Reconnaissance, meet CINC targeting maximize U.S.

surveillance, and goals with acceptable casualties and publicize

target acquisition collateral damage and all collateral damage

■ Effects-based U.S./allied casualties opportunities through

aggressive information

operations

Full dimensional ■ Information ■ Acceptable U.S. and ■ Drive fight to

protection superiority allied casualties during ground that minimizes

■ Protect forces, force deployments, advantages of U.S., and

facilities, and lines of combat, and seeks to lengthen fight 

communication from redeployment and cause maximum 

continental U.S. U.S./allied casualties

to theater

Focused logistics ■ Information ■ Operational tempo ■ Seek to reduce usable

superiority not degraded because infrastructure to stress

■ Smaller, responsive of logistics bottlenecks logistics system

in-theater footprint or slow throughput ■ “Operational 

■ Sustained high- maneuver of women

speed mobile and children”

capabilities
Operation Anadyr by placing SS–4 ballistic missiles in Cuba.

Th ere have been several non s t a te attacks on the U. S . h om el a n d

s i n ce the end of the Cold Wa r. The most spect acular from an ex tern a l

n on s t a te source was prob a bly the Ja nu a ry 1993 bu n gl ed attem pt by Islamic ex tremists to bl ow up the World Trade Cen ter in New York . Th e

most deadly attack was the result of an internal nonstate actor: the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 by a

fragmented antigovernment group.

Th reats to the hom eland are not new. Two new el em en t s , h owever, are our preeminent position in the world today and the accelerating

co llapse of s tra tegic depth that began with the devel opm ent of the airplane and was further aided by the development of space as a medium of

w a r, pe ace , and com m erce . Most import a n t ly, t h o u gh , the ex p l o s i on of

i n form a ti on tech n o l ogies has nega ted many of the physical con cepts of

security that have traditionally defined how states view themselves.

Combined with this smaller and more volatile world is the dramatically increased availability of WMD and other technologies that can

create mass disruption, if not destruction, of a society like America’s that

is heavily reliant upon information management systems.

Quantifying the Homeland: What Are the Targets?

By building on the work done by the President’s Commission on

Critical Infrastructure Protection, ten critical targets have been identified.

The commission identified these eight: the transportation infrastructure,

the oil and gas produ cti on and stora ge infra s tru ctu re , the water su pp ly

infrastructure, the emergency services infrastructure, the banking and finance infrastructure, the electrical power infrastructure, the information

and com mu n i c a ti ons infra s tru ctu re , and the govern m ent servi ces infrastructure. For purposes of this study, the defense infrastructure was added

to these eight. Finally, to ensure a focus on the ultimate goal of our nati onal infra s tru ctu re — to provi de servi ces to the people of the Un i ted

S t a tes—a sep a ra te category was ad ded as the tenth po ten tial target : t h e

pop u l a ti on of the Un i ted States itsel f . These infra s tru ctu res provi de the

s ervi ces nece s s a ry for our well - being and way of l i fe , ra n ging from the

control of our civil airspace to the coordination of local emergency services and the maintenance of our system of commerce and banking.
Potential

Critical Measure of asymmetric

Target component effectiveness approach

Transportation ■ National airspace ■ Air traffic flows ■ Physical attack using 

infrastructure system safely and on or weapons of mass

■ Airlines, aircraft, near time destruction (WMD) or

airports ■ Mass transit traditional terrorist

■ Roads and operates efficiently, means

highways without lengthy delays ■ Information 

■ Trucking and ■ Hazardous materials warfare (IW) attack 

personal vehicles conveyed safely aimed at disruption 

■ Ports, and efficiently of operating 

waterways, vessels ■ Roads operate safely systems (including 

■ Mass transit and with minimum electromagnetic pulse)

(rail and bus) to moderate delays

■ Pipelines (natural in central urban areas

gas, petroleum, ■ Freight carrier

other hazardous systems operate safely

materials) and efficiently

■ Freight and longhaul passenger rail

■ Delivery services

Oil and gas ■ Production, holding ■ Production, storage, ■ Physical attack using 

production and facilities, refining and and distribution WMD or traditional

storage infrastructure processing facilities, systems operate terrorist means

pipelines, ships, efficiently and safely ■ IW attack aimed at 

trucks, and rail without intrusion disruption of 

systems for the into the public domain operating systems

processing and

distribution of

natural gas, crude

and refined petroleum,

and petroleumderived fuels

Water supply ■ Sources of water, ■ Water availability ■ Covert attack with 

infrastructure reservoirs, holding remains assured chemical or 

facilities, aqueducts, ■ Water for emergency biological agents 

other transportsystems services is available ■ Physical attack usin

including pipelines, WMD or traditional

cooling systems, terrorist means

and other delivery ■ IW attack aimed 

mechanisms at disruption of 

■ Filtration, cleaning, operating systems

and treatment systems ■ Simple contaminatio

■ Systems for dealing

with water runoff,

waste water, and

firefighting (continued
Potential

Critical Measure of asymmetric

Target component effectiveness approach

Emergency services ■ Medical, police, ■ Emergency systems ■ Physical attack using 

infrastructure fire, and rescue and personnel are WMD or traditional

systems and personnel readily available terrorist means

■ Emergency system ■ IW attack designed 

is not overtaxed by to increase friction in 

requirements command and control 

systems

■ Overstress capability 

to respond by the scope 

of the potential event

Banking and finance ■ Retail and commer- ■ Monetary systems ■ IW attack aimed at 

infrastructure cial organizations, are protected and disruption of operating 

investment institutions, physical and systems, to include 

exchange boards, electronic safety do electronic theft

trading houses, not become an issue ■ Physical attack using 

reserve systems, in public domain WMD or traditional

including associated terrorist means

operational organizations, government

operations, and

support activities

■ Storage, investment,

exchange, and

disbursement functions

Electrical power ■ Generation stations ■ Electricity is ■ Physical attack using 

infrastructure ■ Transmission and available with minimal WMD or traditional

distribution networks disruptions terrorist means

■ Transportation ■ IW attack aimed at 

and storage of fuel disruption of 

essential to this system operating systems

Information and ■ Computing and ■ Information ■ IW attack aimed at 

communications telecommunications technology systems disruption of 

infrastructure equipment, software, function with minimal operating systems

processes, people disruptions (including electro-

■ Processing, storage, ■ Data is not lost or magnetic pulse)

transmission of data irreversibly damaged ■ Physical attack using 

and information WMD or traditional

■ Processes and terrorist means

people that convert

data into information

and information

into knowledge

■ Data and

information themselves

(continued)
Examining Potential Vulnerabilities

Table 7 lists the ten categories of targets in the leftmost column

The second co lumn iden tifies the cri tical com pon ents of e ach

infrastructure—the nuts and bolts that must interact ef f i c i en t ly. The third

co lumn iden tifies broad measu res of ef fectiveness that seek to establish how

well the sys tem must functi on in order to remain ef fective . While thes

m e a su res of ef fectiveness are su bj ective ju d gm en t s , t h ey are con s erva tiv

and ref l ect mainstream thinking on what a re a s on a ble level of f ri cti on i

Potential

Critical Measure of asymmetric

Target component effectiveness approach

Government ■ Capabilities at ■ Federal, state, and ■ Physical attack using 

services Federal, state, and local capabilities are WMD or traditional

infrastructure local levels to able to effectively terrorist means

coordinate essential deal with emergency ■ IW attack aimed at 

needs of public situations disruption of operating 

■ Public faith in systems

government services ■ Overstress capability 

remains high to respond by the scope 

of the potential event

Defense ■ Military installations ■ Military installations, ■ Physical attack using 

infrastructure ■ Military units units, and personnel WMD or traditional

■ Military command are able to execute terrorist means

and control capabilities missions without ■ IW attack aimed at 

serious disruption disruption of operating 

■ Public faith in systems

military remains high

Population ■ Physical security ■ No mass casualty ■ Physical attack using 

■ Well-being attacks exceed the WMD or traditional

ability of appropriate terrorist means

government services ■ Indirect attacks 

to respond against sense of well-

■ The American being by successful 

people’s sense of attacks against 

well-being remains supporting 

high, including faith infrastructures

in American institutions ■ Multiple attacks

■ Effective counters that cannot be stopped

are immediately 

employed against 

population attacks
becomes a more difficult task, s i n ce there is little em p i rical evi den ce on

h ow the Am erican people would re act to direct attack s . In ef fective governm ental re s ponses and su s t a i n ed su ccessful attacks over time may have a

gre a ter nega tive ef fect than a single spect acular attack .

The last column identifies some asymmetric approaches that an

opponent might use to attack infrastructures and the civil population.

The table shows, first, that while all infrastructures are vulnerable

to both traditional and WMD attack, the common theme is their vulnerabi l i ty to inform a ti on warf a re attack s . In form a ti on tech n o l ogy in the

United States (and everywhere else in the developed world, for that matter) is characterized by a profound and overarching interdependence between systems.

A second theme is that, when considering attacks on the homeland, certain forms and methods of attack will tend to produce enormous

l evera ge in the public mind: the use of WMD and massive inform a ti on

disruption are the most obvious. Other forms of attack, while capable of

great local lethality, will not enjoy the same leverage.

Ultimately, the most important resource that must be protected is

the population itself. All of the infrastructures directly contribute to this

en d , but the heart of the matter remains the requ i rem ent to pro tect

Americans from harm. It is likely that American citizens will understand

and cope with nonrepetitive attacks on our population and its supporting

infrastructures. The most dangerous threat may be that of repeated, sustained attacks against the population or an identifiable infrastructure that

the civil government is unable to stop. This is a tried and true recipe for

terrorists through the years. When coupled with the capacity to generate

mass catastroph e s , it may prove to be the threat that we must guard

against most strenuously.
Categorizing the Threats

What rough beast, its hour come round at last, Slouches toward Bethlehem

to be born?

—William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming

T

he previous two chapters have established the what, who, and when

of asymmetry, and have also attempted to describe the military and

c ivil stru ctu res and military opera ti onal practi ces of the Un i ted

States that are the potential target sets for asymmetric actors. This chapte

wi ll integra te these two lines of a r g u m en t , and attem pt to make som 

clear disti n cti ons abo ut what the most dangerous threats are to th

United States. This will form the basis for the policy component of thi

paper, chapter five, which will outline specific actions that can be taken t

pre s erve both our military su peri ori ty and the integri ty of the Un i te

States homeland from asymmetric attack.

It is essen tial to discri m i n a te bet ween different levels of t h re a t 

Ot h erwi s e , we are con f ron ted by a veri t a ble smor ga s bord of t h re a t s —

s ome re a s on a bl e , s ome incred i bl e , but all difficult to plan for unless w

differentiate between them. Thinking in a discriminate manner will len

s tru ctu re and a com p a ra tive approach to asym m etric thre a t s , and pa

h eed to the cauti on a ry that “ we should not spend more time inven ti n 

a s ym m etric opti ons for other states than those state s’ l e aderships d

themselves.”

110 At the same time, it is not productive, within the limits o

this study, to establish a threat list that explicitly proposes, for example, 

nu m ber 1 threat to the Un i ted States that is markedly different from 

number 4 threat. It is productive, though, to posit that some threats stand

out as more dangerous than others, and are therefore worthy of specifi

policy counters.

6
have guided the discussion of asymmetric warfare throughout this paper:

■ Asymmetric actors pit strength against vulnerability, seeking disproportionate effect

■ A perceived or actual dispari ty of i n terest is the en du ring background to asym m etric approaches (and there is a cro s s over poi n t

that may prove deadly to the asymmetric actor)

■ The target is the will of the opponent (and this is the psychological

component of asymmetry)

■ The desired effect is on the strategic level, regardless of the level of

war the approach is implemented

■ There is an interaction of threat and response that is based on what

the United States does, as well as the culture of the potential asymmetric actor

■ Effectiveness is important.

From this broad integration of the relative danger of each potential asymmetric approach against the potential targets, it is possible to extract the more specific set of dangerous threats that we will face. As a result of t h i s , ten po ten tial asym m etric threats are discussed bel ow. Th ey

are not ranked, and none is singled out as “most dangerous” to the United

S t a te s . Su ch a com p a ri s on would be invi d i o u s : these are all dangero u s

threats, and they are representative of other threats that have not been included. These ten threats form a reasonable spectrum of potential asymmetric approaches that could be practiced against the United States from

which our own policy decisions can be crafted. Selection of these threats

wi ll all ow det a i l ed ex a m i n a ti on of po ten tial scen a ri o s , and it wi ll also

provi de a more explicit basis for devel oping ef fective co u n ters . “ Futu re

case stu d i e s” h ave been appen ded to some of the threats to provi de a

sense of immediacy.

What Are the Ten Asymmetric Threats?

The first asym m etric approach con s i dered is the threat of a nuclear or biological attack against the American homeland. The damage that

could be done by such an attack is much greater than any other possibili ty. For this re a s on , po s s e s s i on of nu clear or bi o l ogical we a pons and

means of delivery give a regional competitor or a rogue state a credible

means of influencing U.S. decisionmakers. This is true disproportionate

ef fect . Any U. S . pre s i dent would have to wei gh altern a tives of war and

peace very solemnly against the U.S. national interest when the opponent
value attack on the United States.

It is con ceiva ble under certain circ u m s t a n ces (i.e., wh en a na

ti onal interest of the Un i ted States is not unambi g u o u s ly invo lved) tha

this type of threat would severely compress our range of options.111 Thi

is a threat that opera tes almost purely at the stra tegic level of w a r. As 

threat, this is both a highly dangerous possibility and one that is increas

ingly likely, and for these reasons this alternative is the only asymmetri

approach considered among these ten that is based on the principle of co

ercion and might not actually employ a weapon. It is the threat of attac

that coerces or deters po ten tial U. S . acti on in this case; an actual attac

may well surrender many of the advantages of an asymmetric approach

The threat of su ch an attack could inclu de ei t h er covert or con

ven ti onal means. Conven ti onal means—cruise or ball i s tic missile, o

m a n n ed airc raft—is less likely as a means of del ivery for a non - peer com

peti tor. Tech n o l ogical con s i dera ti ons alone would make it difficult to de

l iver su ch a we a pon to the con ti n ental Un i ted State s , and the trail back t

the source would be clear and unequ ivoc a l . An altern a tive opti on wo u l 

i nvo lve the covert infiltra ti on of a nu clear we a pon or a bi o l ogical we a pon

i n to a major urban cen ter. The po s s i bi l i ty of an irra ti onal state actor can

not be disco u n ted , h owever, wh en the stakes are so very high , and the de

l ivery of a small nu m ber of nu clear we a pons by ball i s tic missiles should b

con s i dered a vi a bl e , t h o u gh less likely “l e s s er inclu ded ” case of this thre a t 

Crossing the line between coercion and actual attack would be 

very dangerous step for any state . For this re a s on , coerc ive asym m etri 

approaches of this nature could be coupled with an intensive diplomati

and information operations campaign designed to achieve limited result

below the threshold of actual use. The vignette that follows describes jus

such an attempt.

Vignette 1: The Disputed Middle Ground

Westland and Eastland share a common bord er and have be en

l o cked in peri odic co n f l i ct going ba ck gen era tions over a dispu ted oil-ri c

area of several hundred square miles that lies between them. The area is con

trolled by Eastland. Eastland’s oil is not considered vital to the United States

but it is vital to a number of Western European nations and Japan.

Westland is larger and more powerful than Eastland. Westland, be

cause of its repressive governmental policies and attempts to foment revolu

tion among nei gh b o ring state s , is a regional pa ri a h , but does en joy so m 
gi o n , that are oppo sed to U. S . pol i ci e s . Westland is largely equipped wi t h

legacy Warsaw Pact equipment, most of it in need of maintenance. Recognizing this, and having access to significant oil revenues, Westland has pursued

m a ny attem pts to devel op not only an indigen ous WMD capa bi l i ty, to include biological agents and delivery systems, but also sophisticated delivery

systems. They have tested the TRIGON–4, a ballistic missile with near-intercontinental range. It has been the best judgment of the CIA that Westland

does not possess weaponized nuclear devices.

While Eastland does not have a fo rmal defen se tre a ty rel a ti o n s h i p

with the United States, since the end of the Cold War it has purchased significant amounts of military equipment from the United States. Despite this, it

is wi d ely re co gn i zed that Ea s t l a n d ’s military strength is only a fra ction of

Westland’s, and in a general war between the two states, Westland will likely

preva i l . An info rmal rel a tionship has be en establ i s h ed betwe en the Un i ted

States and Eastland that includes periodic ground, air, and sea exercises of

Un i ted St a tes fo rce s , pa rtial prepo s i tioning of sel e cted military equipm en t ,

and extensive staff talks. Plans have been developed and refined for the rapid

movement of air, ground, and naval forces to the defense of Eastland in the

event of an attack by Westland. America’s regional allies and NATO are full

partners in these plans.

The discovery of new and extensive oil deposits in the disputed area

breaks the uneasy peace between Eastland and Westland. Westland delivers a

dem a rch e to Eastland demanding full co n trol of the oil fiel d s . Appa ren t ly,

Westland has decided that its own oil fields, while still productive, are nearing exhaustion. Eastland’s new fields offer the best hope for long-term economic se c u ri ty. Co n c u rren t ly, Westland masses three arm o red divisions on

the border between the two countries. It is the judgment of the U.S. theater

CINC that these fo rces can overrun the dispu ted oil fields in less than 12

hours, and defeat Eastland within 72 hours, to include the occupation of the

capital city.

Eastland ref u ses the Westland dem a rch e and mobi l i zes the Im perial Gu a rd . At the same ti m e , Eastland se cret ly requests the depl oym ent of

U. S . fo rce s . The regional co m m a n d er- i n - ch i ef co n c u rs , and requests the imm ed i a te movem ent of four A E F s , two Ma rine prepo s i tioning bri ga d e s , two

Army prepo s i tioning bri ga d e s , and three carri er battle grou p s . While the

Joint St a f f is co n s i d ering these re q u e s t s , Westland fires what is asse s sed to be

a TRIGON–5 missile that pl a ces a satell i te on low earth orbit—a feat they

were not bel i eved to be capa ble of for at least anot h er five ye a rs . A ra p i d
pa ble of d el ivering a nu clear wa rh e a d - e q u iva l ent against more than hal

the co n ti n ental Un i ted St a te s , with a proba ble ci rcular error of betwe en fiv

and ten miles.

Within hours of the successful launch of the satellite, a secret diplo

m a tic co m munique from the “ Ma xi mum Le a d er ” of Westland to the U. S 

President is delivered through a third party’s embassy. The note is short an

to the point: 

We now possess 10 TRIGON–5 missiles. As you can see , t h ey

a re capable of re aching your co u n try. More to the poi n t , we also

possess a nu m ber of nu clear we a pon s , wh i ch we have obt a i n ed

f rom form er Sovi et stock s . P h o togra ph s , we a pons serial nu mbers , and other technical data on 10 of these we a pons are appen ded . These we a pons are in the 170-kiloton ra n ge . We invi te

you to do u ble ch eck this inform a ti on with the Ru s s i a n s , who are

u n aw a re of these missing we a pon s . Ad d i ti on a lly, we possess bi ol ogical we a pons that we have devel oped ours elve s . You wi ll also

k n ow that the TRIGON–5 possesses the throw - wei ght to carry

these we a pons to the Un i ted State s , a l t h o u gh regret t a bly our acc u racy at this time wi ll preclu de their use against anything other

than a large urban are a . You wi ll also note that the TRIGON–5 is

c a p a ble of p l acing these we a pons on orbi t , and in su ch a manner

that wi ll invi te exoa tm o s ph eric el ectrom a gn etic attack . Your scien tists can instru ct you in the po ten tial ef fects of su ch a “n onl et h a l ”a t t ack .

Our requirement is simple: we want co-ownership of the disputed oilfield. We do not demand the surrender of Eastland, and

we do not demand Eastland’s embarrassment—merely that Eastland recognize that Westland owns 50 percent of the oilfield, and

that Westland will be the executive agent for the operation of the

field. How you convince Eastland to accept this is your business.

There can be no deployment of any U.S. air, ground, or sea forces

into Eastland, or within 500 nautical miles of either the Eastland

or Westland coast. Again, how you couch this in palatable terms

to your regi onal and NATO allies is your bu s i n e s s . We wi ll not

make political capital of your efforts here—so long as you do it.

Last—doubtless your military leaders will argue for preemption of some kind. We urge you not to accede to this. Ask them

how they did in “the great SCUD hunt” against Iraq—and know
t wo things wi ll happen : we wi ll deton a te a nu clear we a pon in

conjunction with your attack on the outskirts of a major city in

Westland and then blame you loudly and effectively; second, we

will destroy a major American urban area. Alternatively, we may

select an exoatmospheric HEMP attack. And, of course, you cannot be certain that the satell i te now on orbit does not carry a

radio-command nuclear weapon. As you know, it crosses over the

United States many times every day. Ask your scientists what the

effects will be of a 170-kiloton low-earth-orbit explosion. In closing, we ask you to consider whether these oil fields really constitute a vital nati onal interest to the Un i ted State s , p a rti c u l a rly

when we are more than willing to cooperate with you in concealing the fact that this dialogue—and our new capability—ever exi s ted . This is a matter of n a ti onal su rvival for us. Is it a matter

worth the lives of millions of American citizens?

The next asym m etric threat is that of a co n certed info rm a ti o n

wa rf a re attack against our national info rm a tion sys tems infra s tru ctu re , to

i n clu de the inform a ti on managem ent sys tems vital for the opera ti on of

the cri tical infra s tru ctu res of p u blic safety, tra n s port a ti on , and banking

and finance . The rel a tive likel i h ood of this attack is high , given our dependence upon such systems. The potential damage could be severe, but

it would probably not approach the devastation possible from a nuclear

or biological attack. The single caveat to this assessment would be that a

HEMP strategic attack on the United States could be devastating to the

entire national information infrastructure. Because of the combination of

opportunity and vulnerability, this is assessed as a very real threat, whose

potential scope will only grow with time.

Such an attack targets the will of the United States by operating

d i rect ly against the civil pop u l a ti on . It en j oys disproporti on a te ef fect ,

and, if used as a threat or coercing tactic, could have many of the deterring advantages of nuclear and biological weapons.

Su ch an attack could run the ga mut from attacks of prec i s i on

d i s ru pti on aimed at specific el em ents of i n f ra s tru ctu re (air traffic control sys tem s , for example) to a cultu ra lly disru ptive attack based on

H E M P.

1 1 2 The Un i ted Sa tes remains uniqu ely vu l n era ble to these form s

of a t t ack because of the increasing digi ti z a ti on of vi rtu a lly everything in

both the public and priva te sector.1 1 3 In fact , the com p l ete interdependen ce and sys tem of s ys tems approach that ch a racteri ze inform a ti on
cessful IW attack .

What is cl e a r, t h o u gh , is that a HEMP attack would be pro

fo u n dly de s tru ctive to the Am erican way of l i fe . As alre ady discussed , 

nuclear weapon detonated at between 100 and 500 kilometers above th

cen ter of the co u n try would cause no deaths due to direct ef fects (fire 

blast, radiation), but could cause thousands of deaths due to the creation

of an adverse electromagnetic environment: massive power loss, aircraf

flight control systems failures, the possible destruction of the commercia

satellite constellation, and a myriad of other effects that would, in all like

lihood, have the ultimate effect of ending, at least temporarily, the infor

mation age in this country.

The dangers to the attacker are very high in a strategic HEMP at

t ack . As has alre ady been out l i n ed , the stra tegic command and con tro 

and con ti nu i ty of govern m ent functi ons of the Un i ted States are pro

tected against this type of attack, and the track of a missile or a weapon

already on orbit would be easy to investigate. It would be much more dif

ficult to find the re s pon s i ble party invo lved in a less direct inform a ti on

w a rf a re attack . As propo s ed bel ow, su ch an attack would gain ef fective

ness if employed in concert with other asymmetric operations. In the vi

gnette below, and continuing the argument of vignette 1, Westland elect

to conduct a biological attack on the United States and follow it up with 

cyberattack that will take advantage of the additional stress placed upon

power and other systems.

Vignette 2: Cyberattack on New York—A Matter of Trust

It is rush hour in New York City. At the very busy 34th Street Subwa

Station of the Red Line, no one notices two small light bulb-size glass con

t a i n ers that are thrown onto the tra ck . Ea ch contains ten grams o

weaponized bacillus anthracis. Within minutes, 20 g rams of dried anthrax

spores are circulating among the commuters on the crowded Red Line. Theo

retically, one gram of dried anthrax spores contains approximately 10 mil

lion lethal doses.114 Within 2 or 3 days, hospitals throughout the New Yor

area are reporting large numbers of people with fever, malaise, and other flu

like symptoms. Within 4 to 5 days, it is clear that this is not the flu. Althoug

some pe ople improve for short peri ods of ti m e , re s p i ra to ry distress sets i

rapidly, along with a host of other life-threatening symptoms. Medical inter

vention generally cannot reverse the course of the disease after the onset o

symptoms, and so the vast majority of people who are sick will die.
about 126,000 people—then fatalities would number around 120,000. The

high number of fatalities reflects the simple fact that after the onset of clear

s ym pto m s , tre a tm ent is usu a lly inef fe ctive . Proba bly anot h er 1.3 mill i o n

pe ople would flood the alre a dy overl oa d ed medical sys tem—the “ wo rri ed

well ,” who are uninfe cted but fri gh ten ed . The em ergency servi ces sys tem s

within the New York area would be overwhelmed.

By the third day of the anthrax attack on New York City, the hospitals in Manhattan and in the adjoining boroughs are overwhelmed; the National Guard has been called out and federalized, and the U.S. military is beginning to deploy medical and other support elements into the city. Just after

dark along the east coast of the United States, hackers operating from outside

our borders gain access to the protected servers of Consolidated Edison. They

are helped in this by a well-paid insider, who furnishes them with the access

codes needed to gain system administration privileges. Consolidated Edison

buys most of its power from Canadian sources, and the electrical grid is controlled through an Oracle-based operating system and database. The system

used by Consolidated Edison, unlike Oracle software used by the U.S. military, does not use “trusted software.” Elements of the code have been written

outside the United States. This allows the insertion of malicious code into the

system that was dormant until called to life.

Within two hou rs , most of New Yo rk is wi t h out power. A ch a otic situa tion be comes disastrous on Ma n h a t t a n . B u t , within six hou rs , the damage to

the auto m a ted power managem ent grid has be en repa i red , and as the su n

comes up the next morn i n g , power has be en gen era lly re s to red — but hundred s

h ave died throu gh out the nigh t , pa rti c u l a rly pa ti ents who were on re s p i ra to r

su ppo rt—a ch a ra cteri s tic of a n t h rax thera py—in overf l ow annexes to New

Yo rk’s hospitals. Mi l i t a ry power sys tems are unaffe cted , and most hospitals are

a ble to run of f t h eir own internal gen era to rs , but many of the pa ti ents are not

in the hospitals. In isol a ti o n , this would not have be en a pa rti c u l a rly damagi n g

a t t a ck , but wh en ex e c u ted in co n cert with ot h er measu re s , it provokes a powerful and lethal syn ergy.

The next asymmetric threat is that of biological and chemical attacks against host nation support and alliance forces in an area of responsibility, with the dual goal of splitting a coalition and eroding the national

will in the United States. An attack of this nature would seek to exploit

we a ker el em ents of a coa l i ti on by attacking with pri n c i p a lly bi o l ogi c a l

and ch emical we a pon s . The rel a tive likel i h ood of this form of a t t ack is

high in a major theater war environment, and the relative danger to U.S.
of this form of attack could also be used to coerce potential regional allie

in the early days of a crisis.

Su ch an attack — or threat of an attack — would be directed

a gainst the we a kest el em ents of a ny coa l i ti on or host nati on . It wo u l 

strictly avoid targeting U.S. forces, and would instead be directed agains

the personnel who are the vital theater enablers for U.S. forces. The mos

lucrative form of this attack might be to target civilians critical to offload

ing U.S. equipment as it enters a theater. They will not be under militar

discipline, will not have any NBC training and will have little or no pro

tective equipment, to include the requisite series of inoculations that U.S

and all i ed forces pre su m a bly wi ll have had . These workers are th

Achilles’ heel of any theater that will require the heavy flow of U.S. force

through a limited number of ports of entry, either air or sea.

If the will of regional allies can be degraded by these threats or b

actual employment, then it could have a pernicious effect on the will o

the Un i ted States to parti c i p a te . For a regi onal aggre s s or, it fo ll ows tha

threats would initiate eventual use. It might be that good effect for the ag

gressor could be obtained by simple coercion, but the line from threat t

em p l oym ent is easier to cross within a regi onal scen a ri o, and wh en th

primary targets will not be U.S. forces.

Vignette 3: Just Getting There!

It is C+3 in a major theater wa r. S outhland has be en inva d ed by it

h o s tile nei gh b o r, No rt h l a n d . The Un i ted St a tes has begun ex e c u tion of 

l o n gstanding co n ti n gency plan to flow fo rces into the two deepwa ter po rt 

and three intern a tional airf i elds in Sou t h l a n d . The U. S . plan calls for th

rapid introdu ction of t h e a ter airpower to slow the adva n ce of the fou 

m e ch a n i zed and two infantry divisions of No rt h l a n d , and then the move

m ent of U. S . ground fo rces by stra tegic airlift to link up with two prepo s i

ti o n ed bri gade sets of e q u i pm en t , and two prepo s i tioning bri gade sets tha

wi ll arrive by fast sealift by C+5. Du ring the morning of C + 3 , t h ou gh 

s ym ptoms of a n t h rax are noted in small nu m bers of s teved o res who wi 

wo rk to of f l oad the ships as they arrive . The nu m bers affe cted are small , bu 

s i mu l t a n e ou s ly No rthland begins to broadcast this to the en ti re wo rld vi 

CNN and the intern et . Within 24 hou rs the po rts are vi rtual ghost town s , a 

the wo rkers flee the urban cen ters . The Un i ted St a tes of fers inoculation to it

S outhland all i e s , and feveri s h ly wo rks to va cci n a te all mem bers of the inter

n a tional coa l i ti o n , but there isn’t en ou gh va cci n e . U. S . civil re serve pilot 

d e cline to fly to desti n a tions in the theater that have repo rted infe cti o n . T h 
c a ses of s i ck n e s s , and all i ed nations within the AOR cl o se their bord ers to

U. S . d epl oying fo rce s . The ef fe ct of this is to slow the abi l i ty of U. S . a i rpower

to maintain the so rtie gen era tion ra te re q u i red to slow the No rthland att a ck . S ou t h l a n d , se eing this and realizing that U. S . ground fo rces wi ll not be

a rriving in a ti m ely manner, el e cts to sue for pe a ce and cedes large po rti o n s

of its nation to No rt h l a n d .

The next asym m etric threat is that of WMD attacks aga i n s t

s tra tegic depl oym ent sys tem s, i n cluding air and seaports of deb a rk a ti on in

t h e a ter, en ro ute fac i l i ti e s , and en a bling infra s tru ctu re . The pri m a ry

t h reat is that of ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pon s . The rel a tive likel i h ood

of an attack su ch as this is high in a major theater war or near- m a j or thea ter war scen a ri o. The po ten tial for damage is high . Ma ny of the con s i dera ti ons that app ly to the previous thre a t , a t t acks on all i ed and coa l i ti on

force s , a re also opera tive here . Th ere are also some gre a ter ri s k s , bec a u s e

in this case the attack is now being del ivered direct ly against U. S . force s

as they en ter a theater.

An attack of this natu re would be a cen tral com pon ent to an

antiaccess strategy that would seek to slow the arrival of U.S. forces into

an AOR. Chemical attacks would be the least effective but easiest to exec ute . Bi o l ogical warf a re attacks would gain high levera ge—it would not

take more than a very small attack, coupled with an aggressive information operations plan, to severely disrupt the large number of nonmilitary

enabling systems that support the deployment architecture. It is possible

that a lesser included or alternative to this form of attack would be the aggressive employment of conventional SOF and perhaps terrorists who operate against the deployment infrastructure without using WMD.

Vignette 4: Just Getting There—Again

It is C+3 in a major theater wa r. S outhland has be en inva d ed by its

h o s tile nei gh b o r, No rt h l a n d . The Un i ted St a tes has begun ex e c u tion of a longstanding co n ti n gency plan to flow fo rces into the two deepwa ter po rts and

t h ree intern a tional airf i elds in Sou t h l a n d . The U. S . plan calls for the ra p i d

i n trodu ction of t h e a ter airpower to slow the adva n ce of the four mech a n i zed

and two infantry divisions of No rt h l a n d , and then the movem ent of U. S .

ground fo rces by stra tegic airlift to link up with two prepo s i ti o n ed bri gade set s

of e q u i pm ent and two prepo s i tioning bri gade sets that wi ll arrive by fast

sealift by C+5. Co n c u rrent with its attack sou t h , No rthland unleashes a ba rra ge of i m proved SCUD–B missiles on the arrival po rts and airf i elds that U. S .
f ro m . T h eir wa rheads contain V X , and while the acc u racy isnt pa rti c u l a rl

ef fe ctive , l a rge areas of the po rts and airf i elds are bl a n keted with the pers i s

tent agen t . The immatu re theater ba ll i s tic missile defen se sys tem proves ef fe c

tive against only about 60 percent of the incoming missiles, and No rthland i

bel i eved to have a SCUD–B sto ckpile of several hundred . This has two imme

d i a te ef fe cts: The depl oym ent of U. S . fo rces is sign i f i c a n t ly slowed , and larg

el em ents of U. S . a i rpower must be ded i c a ted to “S C U D - bu s ti n g ,” wh i c

b ri n gs a poor retu rn on the inve s tm ent in ti m e , p i l ot s , and aircra f t . The re su l 

is that No rthland fo rces are able to overrun most of S outhland befo re the U. S 

d epl oym ent can be co m pl eted , and U. S . fo rces are wi t h d rawn to nei gh b o ri n 

cou n tries—and su b se q u en t ly face the need to ex e c u te a fo rci ble en try opera

tion in ord er to re s to re the terri to rial integri ty of S ou t h l a n d .

The next asymmetric threat is that of information warfare, includ

ing the threat of HEMP attack against forces in an AOR. This is a poten

threat across the spectrum of information operations, but the most dan

gerous form is the use of HEMP to degrade U.S. and allied capability t

ach i eve inform a ti on dom i n a n ce . The rel a tive likel i h ood of this form o

attack is moderate—the technical requirements to successfully prosecut

such an attack are daunting—but the danger to U.S. forces would be ver

high if the attack proved successful.

As a gen eral pri n c i p l e , of fen s ive inform a ti on warf a re wi ll grow

less fruitful for an opponent as the level of warfare moves from strategi

to tactical. It is harder to enter U.S. tactical computing systems, and a va

riety of aggressive U.S. defensive information operations will be concur

rently taking place. The use of HEMP at this level, though, maximizes th

adva n t a ges of d i s ru pti on inherent to this we a pon while minimizing th

dangers of an attack on or above U.S. soil with nuclear weapons.A HEMP

attack in a regional conflict would strike directly at the heart of the U.S

concept of warfighting: the rapid management of information. It migh

be possible to destroy all tactical communications in an AOR, severely de

grade theater com mu n i c a ti on s , de s troy all satell i te su pport functi on s 

damage or destroy many aircraft, and cause a staggering number of po

tential problems in virtually all U.S. military equipment.

States that possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems will also

h ave the po ten tial deterring ben efit that acc rues from this capabi l i ty. In

actual opera ti on , h owever, this threat would exist bel ow the stra tegi 

level, although favorable strategic effects could be secured by operation

that follow such an attack.
It is C+10 in a major theater war. Southland has been invaded by

its hostile neighbor, Northland. The United States has executed a longstanding contingency plan and has deployed forces into the two deepwater ports

and three international airfields in Southland. U.S. airpower has stopped the

a dva n ce of the four mech a n i zed and two infantry divisions of No rt h l a n d ,

and U.S. ground forces have linked up with two prepositioned brigade sets

and two prepositioning brigade sets, and have begun to establish themselves

in the field. Southland forces have defended in good order and are ready to

u n d ert a ke of fen s ive opera ti o n s . The theater co m m a n d er is prepa ring to

counterattack to restore the international boundary between Southland and

Northland. Just after midnight on C+10, Northland fires a modified SCUD

to a high altitude over the battlespace. While SCUD firings are not new in

this theater, the assessed trajectory does not fit an attack profile that has been

experienced before. The theater staff is still in an attack assessment conference with SPACECOM when a 100-kiloton nuclear weapon detonates at an

altitude of 200 kilometers near the geographic dead center of the battlespace.

A nu m ber of t h i n gs happen very quick ly on the grou n d . Ta cti c a l

co m mu n i c a tions ce a se; veh i cles with adva n ced sol i d - s t a te el e ctro n i cs stop

running. Many theater backbone data transmission up- and down-links are

rendered useless. In the air, Army helicopters literally fall from the sky, and

some Air Force aircraft are brought down as well. The JSTARS picture disappears, and no contact can be established with the aircraft; the same is true

for AWACs.

On the be a ch , U. S . Navy ships can be se en on the hori zo n , but it

isn’t possible to communicate with them electronically in the hours after the

explosion: much of their electronics have been damaged as well.

The worst damage, though, is reserved for space-based systems. The

effect of the explosion charges the Van Allen radiation belt and destroys all

commercial satellites in low earth orbit (LEO); satellites in half-geosynchronous and synchronous orbit, including GPS satellites, have varying degrees of

adverse effects. While assured command and control systems based on MILS TAR remain active , vi rtu a lly all ot h er satell i te co m mu n i c a tions sys tem s

cease to function, either immediately, or in the near future. 115 The CINC has

lost his common operating picture.

No American troops are killed or injured as a result of the explosion

i t sel f . In fact , it wi ll even tu a lly be determ i n ed that the explosion occ u rred

over Northland.
of fighting with the principles of JV 2010, he must now face Northland wit

tools and techniques that would be well known to Sir Douglas Haig in fron

of Passchaendale in 1917. The core principle of U.S. warfighting doctrine—

the ability to rapidly and efficiently share vast amounts of information—i

no more. On this new battlefield, high-lethality systems will now fight wit

very limited intelligence beyond direct visual range.

Northland formations continue to move south. They appear to hav

suffered de gradation as well, but they now enjoy an uncontested numerica

superiority in what is becoming an infantry fight.

The next asym m etric threat is that of ba t t l e s pa ce sel e cti o n: we ma

be forced to fight in places wh ere our inform a ti on and other forms of su pe

ri ori ty are blu n ted . A scen a rio su ch as this would see an oppon ent see k i n 

to len g t h en our opera ti ons in time while maximizing opportu n i ties for U. S 

c a su a l ti e s . The rel a tive likel i h ood of this met h od of a t t ack is high — i f t h 

terrain wi ll su pport it—and the po ten tial for danger is also high .

The world is becoming more urbanized,and U.S. forces will often

be forced to enter and operate in this terrain—perhaps most of the time

The examples of Stalingrad, Hue City, Manila, and Mogadishu are clea

and evident.

Vignette 6: Going to Town—Terrain and Warrior Tactics

No rthland attacks Southland with little wa rn i n g . Due to unfo rtu

nate geography, the Southland capital, Prime City, is located just 40 kilome

ters from the intern a tional bord er betwe en the two cou n tri e s . Within 2

hours, the Northland strategy is clear: attack to seize Prime City with a com

bination of infantry and SOF, while mechanized formations fan out in an

attempt to bypass the city. By the very speed of their attack, they are able t

overrun the su bu rbs of Prime Ci ty, wh i ch has over 12,000,000 occ u pa n t s 

s pread over several hundred sq u a re miles of d evel oped terra i n . By use o

SCUD–Bs with ch emical wa rheads fired in pers i s tent ba rri ers , t h ey hav

prevented the population of Prime City from fleeing south; instead, they re

main largely within the ci ty, and are now su bje ct to the vi ci ous stre et - to 

street fighting that is going on between Northland attackers and Southlan

defenders. U.S. forces, some already within Southland, respond immediately

The CINC has long arg u ed with the Southland Gen eral St a f f that Pri m 

City should not be defended; it is too close to the border, and the huge urban

sprawl makes it very hard to employ sophisticated U.S. sensors and weapons

Now, in the heat of battle, and with the city’s population still trapped within
the war in Prime Ci ty. In the open areas away from Prime Ci ty, mu ch of

No rthland armor has be en destroyed or has gone to ground to avoid U. S .

airpower, but the battle still rages within the capital.

By C+7, t h ere are three divisions of No rthland infantry in Pri m e

City, and they hold a little less than half of its area. The CINC’s preference

would be to methodically isolate the city from Northland lines of communic a ti o n , and then let No rthland fo rces starve . The fact that there are over

10,000,000 civilians still within the city, though, makes this strategy untena bl e . On C+8, t h ere are video repo rts from within the ci ty of mass ex e c utions, and it becomes clear that it will be Northland strategy to force the U.S.

m i l i t a ry to en ter the ci ty and fight to ret a ke it: the altern a tive wi ll be to

stand by while millions of i n n o cent civilians are kill ed . The pre s su re fro m

Southland on the U.S. NCA is strong, and on C+9, U.S. infantry begin to

fight their way into the city. It will be a long and bloody process, even with

abundant close air support and the latest in urban warfighting technology.

The next asymmetric threat is that of non-WMD antiaccess measures, namely, mines, missiles, and other tried-and-true measures that can

slow deployment or forcible entry operations. The relative likelihood of

these tactics being employed is high, and the potential for damage at the

operational level is also high.

This approach applies legacy sys tems from the Cold War alon g

with newly emerging systems to prevent the entry of either amphibious,

airborne, or air forces. It is a tactic that has limited opportunity for success unless applied in concert with other measures. This has the greatest

ch a n ce of su ccess in a small-scale con ti n gen c y, wh ere there is no direct

U.S. vital national interest at stake. The Serbian air defense system during

Allied Force, already discussed, is an excellent example of just such an antiaccess strategy.

The next asymmetric threat is that of the employment of warrior

tactics; methods of fighting and conduct on the battlefield and in a region

that grossly violate norms of behavior in an attempt to shock and disrupt

an oppon en t . The rel a tive likel i h ood of these tactics being em p l oyed is

high, and the potential for damage to U.S. forces is moderate. Vignette 6

incorporates an example of this approach.

Another asymmetric threat is that of a chemical attack against the

continental United States. The potential for chemical attack is often left in

the shadow of the biological warfare threat to the homeland, but it is a

d i s ti n ct ly sep a ra te thre a t , with a sligh t ly high er rel a tive likel i h ood of
weapons into the United States than nuclear weapons. This is also a les

dangerous method of attack, for it does not draw the international revul

sion that attends biological weapons. The potential for large-scale damag

to the United States is low. This is less an alternative for state actors than

for nonstate actors with limited resources and delivery alternatives.

The last asymmetric threat is the one that we can’t even envision

the wild card. Threats will emerge that we cannot plan for. While most o

them will spin off what the United States does, they will take root in th

fertile soil of their own unique culture and basis of experience, and ma

prove to be the most dangerous of all.

Ta ble 8 su m m a ri zes our assessment of what con s ti tutes the ten

asymmetric threats to the United States worthy of consideration. It is im

portant to reemphasize that this is certainly not intended to be an all-in

clu s ive list of t h re a t s . Ot h er threats that are both lethal and dangero u 

Table 8. Summary of ten asymmetric threats

Relative Relative 

Threat danger likelihood

Threat of nuclear or biological attack High High

against the U.S. homeland

Information warfare (IW) attack against Moderate High

U.S. homeland*

Biological and chemical attacks against host High High

nation support and alliance forces in an area 

of responsibility (AOR) (coalition splitting)

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack High High

against strategic deployment systems

IW (including high-altitude electromagnetic pulse) High Moderate

attack against forces in an AOR

Battlespace selection High High

Non-WMD antiaccess measures Moderate High

Warrior tactics Moderate High

Chemical attack against U.S. homeland Low Moderate

The Wild Card Unknown but High

potentially high

* An electromagnetic pulse attack would raise the relative danger to “High”in this category.
against U.S. forces is not included here, based on the judgment that such

a nuclear attack (however effective) would surrender many of the advant a ges of a s ym m etry; and ch emical and bi o l ogical attacks against fiel ded

U. S . force s , while cert a i n ly dangero u s , wi ll not dra m a ti c a lly ch a n ge the

o utcome of an en ga gem en t . In the area of i n form a ti on opera ti on s , t h e

cyber and EMP threats are emphasized, even though traditional information warfare techniques remain a very real and dangerous threat.

Conclusions

Four of these threats employ some form of WMD as their principal opera tive el em en t . Two of the threats ex p l i c i t ly em p l oy inform a ti on

operations, while several others would depend heavily upon information

operations as a supporting element of the primary strategy. Two are relatively “low tech” approaches.

The WMD approaches all have a significant deterring com pon en t ,

and actu a lly draw their strength from the disproporti on a l i ty inherent in

po s s e s s i on of nu clear or bi o l ogical we a pon s . This approach , a n d , to a

l e s s er degree , the others , s eek to cause the Un i ted States to be very cauti o u s

a bo ut what wi ll be decl a red a vital nati onal intere s t . Th ere is, h owever, a

flip side : mu ch of the disproporti on a l i ty and all of the adva n t a ges of d i sp a ri ty of i n terest would be lost in the event of an actual em p l oym ent of

these we a pon s .

Ba s ed on this understanding of what the main asym m etri c

t h reats to the Un i ted States are , what acti ons can be taken to co u n ter

them? This will form the basis for the next chapter.
An Option of Difficulties—

Countering Asymmetric

Threats

I

n 1759, Bri tish Gen eral James Wo l fe , in examining the redo u bt a bl 

French fortress of Quebec, observed that “war is an option of difficul

ties.” His words ring as true now as then. Nothing is ever easy in war

or in planning for war. Remembering this is a good starting point for th

final part of this analysis, because when examining actions we can take t

counter asymmetric threats, none will be easy, and we will often have t

choose from a range of difficult choices.

This chapter begins by outlining what steps are being taken now

to reduce the dangers of the asymmetric threats to the United States iden

tified in chapter four. A short summary of existing programs and policie

that pertain to each threat will be introduced. Any recommendations fo

a way ahead must have a sound grounding in current practices. In man

of these areas, it will be argued that we can and must do better. It will b

proposed that the starting point for improving our responses is the estab

lishment of a broad conceptual model to counter asymmetric threats tha

will provide a framework for specific responses. Three concepts for deal

ing with asymmetric threats will be introduced. Linked to each of thes

three main ideas will be a series of specific policy recommendations tha

address deficiencies in current approaches. Some of these recommenda

ti ons en compass a broader arena than the Dep a rtm ent of Defen s e . Th 

chapter will close by looking at the potential programmatic and politica

costs of implementing these recommendations.

Current Initiatives: The State of Play Today

In the area of the threat of nuclear or biological attack against th

U.S. homeland,

116 six principal policy initiatives are active:

■ Ma i n ten a n ce of a cred i ble policy of not ruling out use of nu cl e a 

weapons in response to WMD employment against the U.S. home

land, U.S. forces, or allies

8
■ Continuing implementation of PDD–39 (U.S. Policy on Combating

Terrorism)118

■ Implementation of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destructi on Act of 1996 (Nu n n - Lu ga r- Dom enici amen d m ent to the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997)119

■ Im p l em en t a ti on of provi s i ons of PDD–63 (Cri tical In f ra s tru ctu re

Protection)120

■ Continuing to conduct tests in advance of a decision on fielding an

ef fective limited nati onal missile defense sys tem capable of h i gh -

confidence interception of small numbers of ICBMs.

The Un i ted States has no capabi l i ty to defend the hom el a n d

against ballistic missile-delivered WMD attack. The success or failure of a

ballistic missile attack would depend solely on the technical competency

of the attacker. Any asymmetric actor can see the advantages of developing some form of this capability.

Of course, a ballistic missile-delivered attack is only one of many

options open to an opponent seeking ways to attack the U.S. homeland

with WMD. Covert delivery may be more likely.121 A broad variety of initi a tives are underw ay at the federa l , s t a te , and local levels to prevent or

minimize the effects of a biological or chemical attack. Despite these enco u ra ging devel opm en t s , m a ny of these initi a tives are sti ll immatu re ,

funding is inadequate, and much remains to be done in the area of consequence manag ement in terms of training, organizing, and health system

enhancements. There is little agreement on who is in charge, and little rati on a l i z a ti on of federa l , s t a te , and local or ga n i z a ti onal arra n gem en t s .

Metrics need to be established to determine investment and training requirements.122

In the area of an i n fo rm a tion wa rf a re attack against the U. S .

homeland, there are two principal active initiatives:

■ Implementation of the recommendations and provisions contained

in the Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection as embodied in PDD–63

■ E s t a bl i s h m ent of Joint Task Force on Com p uter Net work Defen s e

(JTF–CND).123

The scope of the inform a ti on warf a re probl em is now well unders tood , and within the Dep a rtm ent of Defense an aggre s s ive program is underw ay to rem edy known def i c i en c i e s . The po ten tial probl em is more difficult in the priva te sector, wh ere myri ad opportu n i ties for attack must be
f ra s tru ctu re itsel f . The Un i ted States remains singularly vu l n era bl e , p a rti c

u l a rly in the priva te sector, to po ten tial HEMP attack . The more com p l e

and the more interdepen dent a sys tem is, the more vu l n era ble it becom e s 

In the area of a WMD attack against strategic deployment systems

two initiatives are active:

■ Con du cting tests and moving to field an ef fective theater ball i s ti 

missile defense (TMD) system

■ L i m i ted tactical decon t a m i n a ti on sys tems at A P O D s , S P O D s , a n d

other organic unit capabilities are being fielded.124

The United States currently has only a very rudimentary and lim

i ted theater- l evel ball i s tic missile defense sys tem , a l t h o u gh ex ten s ive in

vestments have been made in both land- and sea-based systems. The de

con t a m i n a ti on and detecti on sys tems now fiel ded would be stre s s ed to

provide coverage for U.S. personnel, and will certainly be inadequate t

protect HNS personnel vital to the theater deployment infrastructure.

In the area of i n fo rm a tion wa rf a re (including HEMP) attac

a gainst fo rces in an AO R , l i m i ted initi a tives are underw ay. In i ti a tives in

this field are generally related to protection of information systems from

cyberattack. Limited actions have been taken against the HEMP threat.

This area is a key vu l n era bi l i ty. Si gnificant ch a n ges are neede

n ow in ex i s ting policy on HEMP pro tecti on . Ex i s ting standards do no

cover all military sys tem s , and even more civilian sys tems are unpro

tected. The increasing emphasis on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sys

tems for military app l i c a ti on on ly increases the po ten tial danger. Coa l i

tion interoperability requirements may also raise additional challenges t

system integrity and protection.

In the area of biological and chemical attacks against HNS and al 

liance forces in an AOR (coalition splitting), while U.S. forces possess vary

ing degrees of chemical and biological protection, our potential allies and

coa l i ti on partn ers , p a rti c u l a rly those out s i de of NATO, a re tra i n ed an

equipped at a much lower level. Additionally, in a regional war scenario

the civilian pop u l a ti ons of po ten tial allies and host nati ons wi ll be di

rectly vulnerable to this form of attack.

In the area of ba t t l e s pa ce sel e cti o n, no clear soluti on is at hand

The services are pursuing their own visions of how to address this threat

The Army Dismounted Labs and the Marine Corps Urban Warrior serie

of ex peri m ents are dealing direct ly with these ch a ll en ging issu e s . Joi n 

Staff efforts during the last JSR/QDR cycle helped the joint communit
early to tell how effective the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) initiatives will be in establishing a joint perspective. The challenge for an expanded JFCOM role in experimentation will be to preserve a healthy diversity of approach at the service level, while ensuring interoperability at

the joint level . The ju ry is sti ll out on how ef fective JFCOM wi ll be in

catching up on service efforts and achieving this delicate balance of oversight and nurturing.

In the area of non-WMD antiaccess measures, the same initiatives

as stated above are active: service initiatives predominate, and there is little joint con s en su s , t h o u gh there are signs of growing aw a ren e s s .1 2 5 Th e

recently initiated JFCOM Joint Experimentation Programs may be useful.

The Navy is working aggressively to address the mine warfare component

of the problem, but much remains to be done.

In i ti a tives in the areas of wa rrior tacti cs and wild card thre a t s

share common themes: some innovative work is proceeding at the service

level, but there is little at the joint level. The Joint Nonlethal Directorate is

the principal exception to this. Aside from service-level experimentation,

there are few attempts to explore the extent of what is possible. The Marine Corps Ellis Proj ect and the Ch i ef of Naval Opera ti ons Exec utive

Panel are each examining the possibility of technological surprise. More

thought needs to be given to studying and “red teaming” foreign military

options, such as the translation of Chinese writing on military developm ents spon s ored by the Office of Net As s e s s m ent within the Pen t a gon .

Ac ross the boa rd , it seems likely that this ef fort wi ll ben efit from the

gre a ter focus and depth that JFCOM ex peri m en t a ti on programs wi ll

bring, if properly implemented.

Summarizing Current Initiatives

The programs and policies selected as a starting point are repres en t a tive , not all - i n clu s ive . Th ere undo u btedly are others that arguably

deserve greater emphasis. Even bearing these considerations in mind, establishing an understanding of where our efforts are seems to be the natural starting point for determining where we can do better.

Two key ob s erva ti ons can be drawn from this policy overvi ew.

F i rs t , broad dispari ties in level of ef fort , i n tere s t , and po ten tial ef fectiveness mark our re s ponses ac ross the threat are a s . This is rel a ted to the second key ob s erva ti on : no overa rching or co h erent theme ties all el em ents of

po ten tial asym m etric co u n ter measu res toget h er. This lack of a unifyi n g
en ced po l i c i e s . Im proving our re s ponses to the asym m etric threat mu s 

begin with adopti on of a con s i s tent ph i l o s ophy of h ow to deal with asym

m etry, b a s ed upon a con s i s tent def i n i ti on . Su ch a ph i l o s ophy can be de

rived cl e a rly and simply from the rec u rring themes of a s ym m etric ap

proaches laid out in this stu dy.

Doing Better: Beginning with Three Ideas

To effectively counter asymmetric threats, our policies need to re

flect three interlinked concepts. First, our policies must minimize our vul

n era bi l i ties to asym m etric attack by deterring po ten tial attackers and b

h aving the capabi l i ty to su cce s s f u lly defend against asym m etric attack 

against both deployed forces and the homeland, if deterrence fails. Shoul

an asym m etric attack prove su cce s s f u l , we need dem on s tra ted com pe

tency in consequence management at home and the operational flexibil

ity to prevail in the face of asymmetric attack for deployed forces. Posses

s i on of these capabi l i ties wi ll tend to make asym m etric attacks les

attractive to potential adversaries.

Second, our policies must accentuate our unique strengths by con

tinuing to pursue transformation objectives that embody the operationa

expression of Joint Vision 2010 and its successor documents. In doing this

we must avoid overreacting to asymmetric threats. The American way o

w a r, em phasizing speed , s h ock , and rapid battlespace dom i n a n ce , is in

herently asymmetric itself when compared to the capabilities of most po

tential opponents. Our way of war works, and we do not need to overcor

rect in attempting to anticipate asymmetric approaches.

Th i rd , in dealing with asym m etric thre a t s , it wi ll be cri tical t

prevent disproportionate effect. This is the heart of asymmetric advantage

and it must be countered at all levels of war, although preventing the up

ward migration of tactical and operational effect to the strategic level i

the most important component of this approach.

These three ideas all su pport what must become a basic under

standing of the Dep a rtm ent of Defense in dealing with asym m etric issu e s 

For the Un i ted State s , d i s p a ri ty of i n terest with a broad ra n ge of po ten ti a 

oppon ents is an en du ring re a l i ty. As long as we remain a gl obal power wi t h

m a ny stra tegic intere s t s , s ome interests wi ll alw ays be less important than

o t h ers . It is the DOD opera ti onal task in dealing with the issue of a s ym

m etric warf a re to en su re that Un i ted States forei gn policy opti ons are no

a rti f i c i a lly circ u m s c ri bed or com pre s s ed by state or non s t a te actors wh o
en ga gem ent in an issue wh en it is inimical to their intere s t s .

Policy Recommendations 

A nu m ber of s pecific acti ons are recom m en ded to implem en t

this objective. In order to maintain coherence, the recommendations are

grouped under the three organizing ideas: minimizing vulnerabilities, accentuating our unique strengths, and preventing disproportionate effect.

Some of these recommendations will require broader action from departments and agencies across the Federal Government, as well as state and

local governments. When a proposed action falls partially or wholly outside the Department of Defense, this is noted. There is significant overlap

between the recommendations, and most will have positive effect under

m ore than one or ganizing ide a . Thu s , these recom m en d a ti ons are not

prioritized, nor are they listed in a proposed order of adoption.

Specific Actions to Minimize Vulnerabilities

We must act to reduce the direct threat of strategic attack against

the American homeland. This requires the earliest possible deployment of

an ef fective limited nati onal missile defense sys tem (NMD) capable of

h i gh - con f i den ce intercepti on of s m a ll nu m bers of I C B M s . This recomm en d a ti on acts against the threat of d i rect attack on the Un i ted State s

h om eland with ball i s tic missile-del ivered W M D. It is unders tood that

such a defense will only limit one potential avenue of attack for an aggressor, who may still choose to employ a myriad of covert means to attack

the United States with WMD. It is also understood that deploying a ballistic missile sys tem should on ly be part of a com preh en s ive approach to

s tra tegic defen s e . A com preh en s ive approach to this probl em must also

embrace a broad range of counterproliferation initiatives, an explicit deterrence strategy, and a variety of activities designed to prevent or minimize the possibility (and consequences—see recommendations that follow) of a covert attack.

De s p i te the fact that a ball i s tic missile defense sys tem wi ll on ly

provi de covera ge against one of s everal attack opti on s , it is sti ll recomm en ded , pri n c i p a lly because it wi ll com p l i c a te a po ten tial attacker ’s

probl em by rem oving one of fen s ive altern a tive .1 2 6 The opera tive word in

the statem ent of the probl em is “t h re a t .” Defen s ive sys tems of this natu re

act ex p l i c i t ly to redu ce a com pon ent of the po ten tial thre a t , t hus ex p a n ding the ch oi ces for futu re NCA wh en con f ron ted with an oppon en t

a rm ed with W M D - equ i pped missiles.
a t t ack on the hom eland by dem on s tra ting a capabi l i ty for con s equ en c

m a n a gem en t . This requ i res the ex p a n s i on of the Nu n n - Lu gar “f i rst re

sponder” training from its current level of 120 cities to at least 240 citie

as soon as po s s i bl e . L a r ger cities may need larger te a m s , and perh a p 

more than one or two. A number of key supporting actions are recom

mended in concert with this proposal:

■ The existing system for regional stockpiling of medical equipmen

and medicines, which is controlled by the Centers for Disease Con

trol (CDC), should be expanded, based on updates from the intelli

gen ce com mu n i ty. This sys tem should inclu de met h ods for inven

tory control with “global visibility.” The DOD should be tasked t

devel op con ti n gency plans for rapid movem ent and con cen tra ti on

of these resources.

■ Si gnificant improvem ents have been made in the level of ep i dem i o

l ogical mon i toring within the Un i ted State s ; these ef fort s , also unde

the directi on of the CDC , should be con ti nu ed . This wi ll be hel pf u 

in more ra p i dly detecting a covert bi o l ogical or ch emical attack .

We need to con ti nu o u s ly reeva lu a te the basis for our planning

Current efforts have been criticized as being too rooted in the threat o

“what people think terrorists could do, not on what they have done in th

past or what they are able to do given considerable technical difficulties o

procurement, production, and delivery.”127 This can lead to programmati

decisions that are too focused on “worst case planning, which may skew

governmental focus away from the types of attacks that are more likely t

occur.”128 All of our programs need a healthy sense of balance: there ar

too many scare scenarios out there now. This tension between worst cas

planning and a broader-based approach must be observed at all times. I

isn’t a bad thing, because it tends to cast a skeptical eye on the more out

ra geous po s s i bi l i ti e s . While the bi o terrorism of The Cob ra Even t m a

make for chilling reading, in Oklahoma City a “conventional” attack wa

the deadliest terrorist incident ever on American soil.

In the long term , Dep a rtm ent of Defense su pport for local and

state agencies for consequence management (CM) should come primaril

from the Reserve Components, and over time elements of the Army Na

tional Guard should be restructured to reflect this.129 This can be accom

plished by dual-missioning in the short term; ultimately, however, the re

qu i rem ent for WMD re s ponse and con s equ en ce managem ent in th

con ti n ental Un i ted States should evo lve into a pri m a ry mission for th
ti on wh i ch the Army Na ti onal Gu a rd has had with local govern m en t a l

s tru ctu res and its ulti m a te re s pon s i bi l i ty for the defense of the Un i ted

S t a te s . Wh en in a state su pporting ro l e , the Gu a rd is exem pt from the

provisions of posse comitatus (18 USC 1385), which prohibit Federal military forces from performing law enforcement duties.130

Re s tru ctu ring should be ori en ted tow a rd enhancing and broadening the extant capability to assist in routine and contingency planning

for CM activities and in incident response. Incident response would include C4

infrastructure support, augmentation of physical security, emergency mobile medical asset s , NBC recon n a i s s a n ce , and mass evac u a ti on

operations if required.131

The capability to deploy from the United States for some of these

forces will become of lower priority. Eventually, first call on designated elements of the National Guard force structure should be linked to requirem ents for WMD (and other) con s equ en ce managem ent within the

United States, and only secondarily any requirement to deploy on short

notice in support of theater contingency plans. This will require a huge

change in thinking on the part of the Guard—it will need to reorient inward as a first priority. There will be resistance to this idea, and it may be

argued that such a reorientation of a significant portion of the National

Gu a rd wi ll dissu ade en l i s tm en t s , p a rti c u l a rly among po ten tial soldiers

who seek service in combat and combat support forces. While not minimizing this recruiting challenge, there is an obvious attraction of recruiting for forces that could make a concrete difference in six hours in a nati onal em er gen c y, ra t h er than perhaps in 120 days in a “s econd major

theater war (MTW)” CINC operations plan.

Under this proposal, the highest priority for the National Guard

would be pre - a t t ack , a t t ack managem en t , and po s t - a t t ack con s equ en ce

management within our borders. The National Guard would still retain

the ability to support limited rotational deployments overseas in support

of the active com pon en t , and would sti ll have a “s tra tegic re s erve” m i ss i on , a l t h o u gh it would no lon ger be ex p l i c i t ly linked to short - term regi onal warf i gh ting opera ti ons plans. The re s tru ctu ring of the Gu a rd

would be designed to increase the current numbers of low-density, highdemand units cri tical to con s equ en ce managem en t : ch em i c a l , m ed i c a l ,

military police, and other combat service support capabilities.132

The first step tow a rd this end would be a det a i l ed analysis of

just what would be requ i red to make su ch a broad ch a n ge in thinking,
en compass more than just the Na ti onal Gu a rd , because of the growi n 

role of the Guard in rotational deployments in support of peace, humani

tarian, and other operations. The increasing percentage of critical comba

service support force structure embedded in the Reserve components wil

need to be closely reevaluated, although this proposal would not neces

sarily require large adjustments in this area. This is a good time to con

duct such an analysis and to act on its findings. The comprehensive re

s tru ctu ring of the Army invi tes a para ll el ren a i s s a n ce in the Na ti on a 

Guard. These changes would reaffirm the long-standing relationship be

t ween the Am erican people and the Na ti onal Gu a rd and retu rn som e

thing directly to the communities with whom the Guard is affiliated.

Specific Actions to Accentuate Unique Strengths

We need to take immediate steps at the interagency level to im

prove our strategic intelligence posture that monitors the global environ

ment and actively scouts for potential asymmetric approaches that migh

t h re a ten us. This ef fort must go beyond our trad i ti onal advers a ries an

examine new and innova tive threats that may ari s e . “Wild card s” wi l

emerge, and the earlier that we can sense them, the more effective our re

sponse will be. In many cases, the knowledge that we are looking and lis

tening will present a potential deterrent effect in and of itself.

This wi ll requ i re su b s t a n tial retooling of our tech n o l ogical bas

for information collection as it listens to a world that is both increasingl

en c rypted and less depen dent upon broadcast sign a l .1 3 3 The qu a l i t a tiv

edge that the United States enjoyed for so long in electronic monitorin

has eva pora ted , and we may never be able to fully recover it. The ex

panded use of human intelligence will only begin to fill this void.134

A key el em ent of i n tell i gen ce ga t h ering is en su ring it is ulti m a tel

d i s s em i n a ted to those who need it, both within the Un i ted States an

a m ong our all i e s . This is typ i c a lly the gre a test weakness of a ny intell i gen c

progra m . Pa rt of this practi ce of ex p a n ded dissem i n a ti on must be the con

ti nuous process of s h a ring the latest ava i l a ble inform a ti on on and co u n ter

to po ten tial asym m etric threats with allies and likely coa l i ti on partn ers .

We need to take steps to assure that we will have continued acces

to those areas where we may be called upon to deploy in order to deter

and, if necessary, to fight and win. Specific components of this are:

■ F i eld ef fective theater ball i s tic missile defense sys tem s , both uppe

and lower tier, that will provide high-confidence coverage of arriva
host nati on su pport infra s tru ctu re , and both U. S . and all i ed landand seabased forces.135 The current approach to testing and deployment appears to be broadly on track.

■ Th ro u gh military - to - m i l i t a ry con t acts with allies and po ten ti a l

coa l i ti on partn ers , en su re a com m on com petency in NBC pro tecti on is establ i s h ed and maintained , and that procedu res are established and rehearsed as integral parts of CINC plans for combined

m e a su res to be taken in the event of NBC attack . This should inclu de the com m on provi s i on of a single standard of prophyl a x i s

across a combined force.

■ Continue to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures and the

associated equipment necessary to ensure continued access for amph i bi o u s , a i r- del ivered , and air forces in envi ron m ents ac ross the

spectrum of engagement—from benign to forcible entry.

For air forces, this translates into a continual refinement and improvement of the ability to destroy or degrade enemy air defenses, particularly against a foe who chooses to employ his weapons in innovative and

nontraditional ways. As Major General Bruce Carlson, USAF, has noted,

“The SEAD [su ppre s s i on of en emy air defenses] capabi l i ty that we’ve

built in the U.S. Air Force is a little bit dependent on the enemy fully utilizing his assets—if they’re not emitting, then you’re not suppressing very

mu ch .”

1 3 6 Fu n cti on a lly, this means we need to have a “de s tru cti on”

(DEAD) capabi l i ty as well as a “su ppre s s i on” (SEAD) capabi l i ty. It also

means that we need to continue to explore the technical and tactical feasibi l i ty of ex treme lon g - ra n ge air opera ti on s , for circ u m s t a n ces wh en the

threat will require distant basing.

For ground forces, the principal requirement will be the ability to

conduct forcible entry operations and subsequent logistical sustainment

in extremely austere environments, potentially with an extended “across

the be ach” or limited airh e ad flow of su pplies for len g t hy peri od s . Th e

Marine Corps MV–22 and AAAV amphibian vehicle will provide the cap a bi l i ties for ex ten ded - ra n ge forc i ble en try from ac ross the hori zon to

objectives well inland, bypassing potentially defended beaches. The topto - bo t tom re a s s e s s m ent of Army or ga n i z a ti on wi ll yi eld a force that is

both ligh ter and sign i f i c a n t ly more dep l oya ble than the current on e .

Aside from parachute infantry and air assault forces, how this force will

i n tegra te into forc i ble en try opera ti ons remains to be fully re s o lved , i n

terms of equipment, doctrine, and structure.
s m a ll fast attack cra f t , and coastal su bm a rine thre a t , and to en su re saf

p a s s a ge for amph i bi o u s , su rf ace fire su pport , and fo ll ow - on logi s ti c 

ships wi ll be para m o u n t .1 3 7 Si n ce 1950, 18 U. S . Navy ships have been

d a m a ged or su n k . Mines were re s pon s i ble for 14 of t h e s e . In ad d i ti on t

loss of l i fe , the cost to the nati on has been many mill i ons of do ll a rs . Th 

a ggrega te cost of the mines that caused this damage has been esti m a te

at $11,500. Mines remain the principal threat to both warf i gh ting and

su s t a i n m ent ve s s el s , and the program of ei ght antimine “a s s i gn ed sys

tem s” ( one su bm a ri n e - l a u n ch ed , one su rf ace com b a t a n t - l a u n ch ed , a n d

six hel i copter- l a u n ch ed) wi ll be cri tical in correcting this lon g - term def i

c i en c y. All joint forces must be prep a red to con du ct opera ti ons for ex

ten ded peri ods of time in hazardous ch emical and bi o l ogical envi ron

m en t s , and overcome this ch a ll en ge thro u gh pro tective measu res on th

gro u n d , in the air, and at sea.

In concert with industry, we need to undertake to ensure that a

f utu re military and specific civil com mu n i c a ti ons and satell i te sys tem 

em ph a s i ze rad i a ti on - to l erant microel ectron i c s . This would inclu de al

satellites launched by the United States, not just military-specific systems

It is not fiscally feasible to harden all, or perhaps even military, satellite

against direct (i.e., kinetic or directed energy) attack, but satellite system

can have high er levels of envi ron m ental pro tecti on de s i gn ed to co u n te

such tactics as the “pumping” of the Van Allen belt. It has been estimated

that, for total programmatic costs of between 1 and 5 percent, this goa

can be obtained.138 At the same time, a selective retrofitting of critical U.S

t h e a ter and tactical level com mu n i c a ti ons sys tems needs to be under

taken, with a goal of providing adequate HEMP protection for those sys

tem s . This cost wi ll be sign i f i c a n t ly high er, ref l ecting the difficulty an

greater expense of modifying existing systems, instead of designing pro

tection into the system from the beginning. This could cost as much as 1

percent of each program. For this reason, this decision needs to be base

on a careful study of the backbone systems necessary to execute JV 2010

in the face of HEMP attack.

Any attem pt to rejuven a te the declining rad i a ti on - to l erant mi

c roel ectronics indu s try wi ll requ i re a significant govern m en t - defen s 

i n du s try partn ers h i p, wh i ch wi ll have to also make it financially attrac

tive for non m i l i t a ry satell i tes to incorpora te hardening principles int

t h eir de s i gn . This wi ll not be ch e a p, s i n ce hardening requ i res both new
wi ll be launch ed into space .

While the interagency process for dealing with the consequences

of mass catastrophic terrorism in the United States has been refined and

i m proved with the establ i s h m ent of a cen tral coord i n a tor within the

White House, particular emphasis needs to be placed on the nature of the

support DOD will provide in such an event from an interagency perspective. This is particularly important regarding the utilization of low-density, high-demand units and equipment in the Guard, Reserve, and Active

Components, units such as chemical decontamination units and medical

su pport el em ents that might be needed for simu l t a n eous con ti n gen c i e s

outside of the United States. This will require DOD to come to a clear and

explicit understanding of h ow it wi ll su pport the civilian govern m en t

when faced with a catastrophic attack on the United States. It seems only

reasonable to expect that the time of greatest danger for an attack on the

continental United States might be during a significant international crisis in wh i ch many of our forces are dep l oyed abroad . In this instance ,

worst-case planning is prudent.

The Department of Defense should begin this process by ensuring that all theater contingency plans are thoroughly coordinated through

the Joint Staff and po ten tial dual claims (bet ween theater CINCs and

homeland defense) on low-density, high-demand assets and stored equipm ent and su pplies unique to catastrophic managem ent are decon f l i cted

and prioritized. Associated risks should be assessed and articulated, and

this decon f l i cti on , pri ori ti z a ti on , and risk assessment should be understood at the interagency level.

We should be red teaming our own capabilities so that we have

an accurate net assessment of our strengths and weaknesses. This is an effort that is important enough to have both protection and continuity, and

it needs to be loc a ted out s i de the intell i gen ce com mu n i ty, a l t h o u gh it

must have strong ties to it. For such an organization to have credibility, it

must possess not on ly analytic capabi l i ti e s , but also opera ti onal respectability—it must be staffed with operators as well as analysts. It must

also have access, and access means high-level sponsorship. There is a need

for this concept at every level of the Department of Defense: the services,

the Joint Staff, and in the combatant commands. On the Joint Staff such

an organization would be charged with review of plans and operational

con cepts from an advers a ri a l , i n tell i gen ce - b a s ed , and opera ti on a lly va l idated perspective as well as other taskings from the Chairman. In time,
tional combatant command. The services have strong vested interests in

looking ahead at alternative futures, and in continually refining their Titl

X (USC) responsibilities.

Specific Actions to Prevent Disproportionate Effect

Last, it has been argued throughout this analysis that the ultimat

goal of any asymmetric approach is to seek strategic effect against the wil

of the oppon en t . This can be ach i eved thro u gh deterren ce or coerc i on 

or — on ce battle is joi n ed — t h ro u gh su ch approaches as warri or tacti c 

and battlespace selection. While every action recommended to this poin

will tend to contribute to the reduction of this effect, the most importan

step that can be taken in this regard is to explain clearly to the American

people the purpose of an opera ti on . While it has become conven ti on a 

wisdom in some circles that the people of the United States will not ac

cept even minimal casu a l ties in military opera ti ons far from hom e , t h 

truth is actually more complex. In fact, it seems likely that if the goals and

objectives of American involvement in operations abroad are clearly and

explicitly explained, support at home will be both broad and deep.

What does this mean? Telling the American people what we ar

doing wh en their figh ting men and wom en are in harm’s way, and wh

they are there will be ever more important in a world in which the hierar

chy of information is flattening. Other advocates, perhaps unfriendly t

our interests, will also be telling their side of the story. We must take ad

vantage of every opportunity made possible by our vast information sys

tem of s ys tems to explain what we are doi n g, and we must do it bet te

than our potential opponents.

An Option of Difficulties?

This ch a pter answers the qu e s ti on po s ed at the beginning of t h i 

p a per: what can we do to cou n ter asym m etric thre a t s ? The proposals out

l i n ed above argue for both the con ti nu a ti on and ref i n em ent of ex i s ti n 

progra m s , and in some cases for the adopti on of n ew on e s . Some have ob

vious ben ef i t s , but wi ll requ i re pre s i den tial dec i s i on (i.e., the dep l oym en 

of a NMD), because of the larger po l i tical and diplom a tic con s equ en ce s 

Some wi ll requ i re the breaking of l on g - h eld parad i gms (i.e., the role of t h 

Na ti onal Gu a rd ) . These wi ll be difficult ch oi ce s .

The recom m en d a ti ons having the gre a test fiscal impact invo lv

the fielding of both nati onal and theater ball i s tic missile sys tem s . Wh i l 

s i gnificant sums have been spent and are now curren t ly progra m m ed , 
re s o u rce s . O f l e s s er but sti ll significant fiscal impact is the recom m en d ati on to improve and pro tect our inform a ti on arch i tectu re from HEMP,

and a po ten tial re s tru ctu ring of the Army Na ti onal Gu a rd for con s equ en ce

m a n a gem en t . The single recom m en d a ti on having the gre a test po ten ti a l

dom e s tic po l i tical vo l a ti l i ty is the recom m en d a ti on to re - tool el em ents of

the Army Na ti onal Gu a rd to bet ter face the dom e s tic con s equ en ce mana gem ent thre a t , and to shift aw ay from its current em phasis on large - s c a l e

dep l oym ents from the Un i ted States in su pport of t h e a ter war plans.

The objective of these recommendations is to gain the best relative competitive advantage for our nation at the least cost—in human life

and national treasure—in a strategic environment in which our interest

in any given en ga gem ent may not be as great as our advers a ry ’s . In

preparing for this environment, it is important that we do not design our

responses so narrowly that we become prisoners of our own actions. For

that reason, these recommendations have sought to fulfill a basic responsibility of civil government—the protection of its citizens and their property — wi t h o ut becoming fixated on the defense of the Un i ted State s

h om eland as the beginning and end of the asym m etric thre a t . Su ch an

a pproach would entail passivi ty, and passivi ty is not in the Am eri c a n

ch a racter. The dual obj ectives of pro tecting our citi zens at home wh i l e

advancing American interests abroad form the most effective possible response to asymmetric threats. We must do both. These recommendations

will help us do them better.
Conclusions: The Uneasy

Athenians

T

he idea that weaker states or nonstate actors will attempt to find in

n ova tive ways to com pen s a te for their inferi ori ty is the basis fo

a s ym m etry. Against At h en s , Melos was unable to find a way t

compensate for its aggregate inferiority. The lesson of Melian failure ha

not lost its haunting immediacy in the retelling down through the cen

turies, and potential enemies of the United States may well see themselve

as latter-day Melians, just as we are cast as modern Athenians. Since it wil

be difficult to ch a ll en ge the Un i ted States direct ly, our oppon ents wi l

seek to find our vulnerabilities, and will ruthlessly exploit them.

The first task of this paper was to define asym m etry, bu i l d i n 

upon the existing body of current definitions. A new definition was pro

po s ed , one that em ph a s i zed the psych o l ogical com pon ents and dispro

porti on a te ef fects of a s ym m etric warf a re . Expanding on this def i n i ti on 

six rec u rring themes were iden ti f i ed that gave stru ctu re to the work i n 

definition. The basic theme was that asymmetric options flourish for th

weaker party when there is a disparity of interest between the two antago

nists. The target of all asymmetric approaches is the will of the opponent

and this is ach i eved thro u gh the pursuit of p s ych o l ogical ef fect on th

strategic level, regardless of the level of war on which the asymmetric ap

proach is employed. Each of these concepts was illuminated by an histori

cal example, because historical and operational context is vitally impor

tant in understanding asymmetric warfare.

The second task of this paper was to determine what the asym

m etric threats are to the Un i ted States and to come to a ju d gm ent on

what we should concentrate on in defense planning. This required estab

lishing a broad typo l ogy of a s ym m etry. Six threats were iden ti f i ed : nu

clear, chemical, biological, information operations, alternative operationa

concepts, and terrorism. Each of these was examined in depth, across th

9
of United States conventional military superiority was examined for potential vulnerabilities. The same process was applied to the critical infrastructures that provide basic services in the United States. The integration

of asymmetric threats and our potential vulnerabilities enabled the creation of a list of the most serious asymmetric threats to the United States.

The establishment of such a set of potential threats gives discipline to the

planning proce s s , and all ows for the de s i gn of a ppropri a te co u n ters .

Without this assessment of what is truly threatening, and what is not,it is

difficult to craft a coordinated plan.

The final task of this paper was to give advice on what we need to

do to improve our ability to counter asymmetric approaches. This began

by eva lu a ting the current status of ex i s ting initi a tives and by making

some frank judgments about where improvement is needed. The principal cri ticism of our current approach to the asym m etric threat is that,

s i n ce we do not have a single accepted con cept for how to or ga n i ze for

a s ym m etric defen s e , t h ere is little coord i n a ti on bet ween ex i s ting initi atives. A top-down, simple, and clear concept is the starting point, based

on three imperatives: minimize our vulnerabilities, accentuate our unique

strengths, and prevent disproportionate effect. Based on these three organizing ideas, recommendations were made that would attempt to prevent

another Mogadishu and deter another Pearl Harbor.

At the beginning of a new millennium, the United States is ubiquitous, and ubiquity brings vulnerability. We will be most effective in this

confusing world by realizing that only former great powers have seen the

end of asymmetric threats. If we are the Athenians, then we should be uneasy At h enians and rem em ber that, while the Melians even tu a lly su ccumbed to Athenian power, they did not possess the asymmetric options

ava i l a ble to tod ay ’s po ten tial advers a ri e s . In ti m e , the At h en i a n s , too,

passed from the stage because they could not adapt to new strategic chall en ge s . Tod ay sheep gra ze and ch i l d ren play among the bro ken walls of

Piraeus, the imperial port of once-mighty Athens.
Endnotes

1 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides,A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed

Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352.

2 For the purpose of this study, Alaska, Hawaii,and U.S. territories and mandates are explicitl

considered to be part of the homeland.

3 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Rela

tions, 1957).

4 Al t h o u gh the Com m i s s i on on Roles and Mi s s i ons iden ti f i ed com b a ting pro l i fera ti on o

weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, peace operations,and operations other than wa

(OOTW) as emerging mission priorities. See Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Rol

and Missions of the Armed Forces, by John P. White, Chairman, and members of the Commission o

Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 24,1995

ES–4.

5 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Departmen

of Defense, May 1997). See also Bruce W. Bennett et al., “What Are Asymmetric Strategies?” Docu

mented Briefing prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense; delivered to the Quadrennial De

fense Review Team, 1997.

6 Tra n sfo rming Defen se: Na tional Securi ty in the 21s t Cen tu ry; Repo rt of the Na tional Defen s

Panel, by Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, and members of the National Defense Panel (Arlington, VA

National Defense Panel, December 1997); and New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Cen 

tury (Washington, D.C.: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 1

1999).

7 Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Nation

S tra tegic Stu d i e s , Na ti onal Defense Un ivers i ty, 1 9 9 8 ) , and Wi lliam S. Co h en , An nual Repo rt to th

President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999).

8 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, by William J. Clinton (Washington, D.C.: Th

White House,1998),and National Military Strategy of the United States of America, by General Henr

H. Shelton (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997).

9 The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is prepared each year by the Joint Staff as part of the form

strategy development and planning process within the Department of Defense.

10 Cohen, Annual Report to the President, 2.

11 Extracted from an internal briefing for the Joint Staff in June 1998.

12 Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 26.

13 Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forc

(New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 62.

14 This ob s erva ti on was of fered by W. Seth Ca rus of the Cen ter for Co u n terpro l i fera ti on Re

search at the National Defense University. The examples of Pearl Harbor and Mogadishu, of cours

are at the distant poles of the argument. Both will be discussed in this chapter.

15 Some particularly insightful analysis on this subject has been done by Dr. Bruce Bennett o

RAND Corporation and is incorporated in his unpublished brief: “Establishing a Baseline for New

Force Planning Constructs: Comparing Analysis of QDR 1997.” The author received this brief in Oc

tober 1999.

9
121–125,and Keith B. Richburg, “In War on Aideed,UN Battled Itself, The Washington Post, December 6, 1993, 1.

17 A good summary of this, while somewhat dated,is Louis Morton,“Japan’s Decision for War,”

in Command Decisions, ed.K.R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

1990),99–124. See also David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics,and Technology

in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), Chapter 13,

“The Great Gamble.”

18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

19 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1918–1928,The Aftermath (New York:Scribner’s,1923),

63. See also Michael Pearson, The Sealed Train (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), 64.

20 Pearson, The Sealed Train, 64.

21 This discussion is based on Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Em -

p i re ( New York : Ra n dom Ho u s e , 1 9 9 9 ) , 1 8 8 – 1 9 1 , and more gen era lly on Ch a pters 12 and 13:

“Kamikazes, Civilians, and Assessments,” and “The Eclipse of Olympic.”

22 Ibid., 182.

23 Ibid., 186–187.

24 See George P. Schulz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles

Scribners Sons, 1993), 227–234.

25 Rebecca Gra n t , The Ko sovo Campa i gn: Aero s pa ce Power Made It Wo rk ( Arl i n g ton , VA : Ai r

Force Association, September 1999), 15.

26 Ibid., 16.

27 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 129–131.

28 Ibid., 268–271.

29 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theor y (Portland,OR: Frank Cass, 1997),16.Shock is obtainable on all thr ee levels of war: strategic, operational,

and tacti c a l . Sovi et theory te aches that there are three el em ents to its practi ce , beginning with the

identification of the elements of the center of gravity: exact points of strength and weakness; delibera te cre a ti on of vu l n era bi l i ti e s ; and ex p l oi t a ti on of these vu l n era bi l i ti e s . In conven ti onal military

thinking, in the West this can be caused by a “turning maneuver,” or in Soviet doctrine a “turning

over,” or obkhod. “When such conditions are realized,the opposing system is forced into a situation in

which it will lose its abilities both to accomplish its original aim,and to regain its operational equilibrium.”

30 Robert Mikesh, Japan’s World War II Balloon Bomb Attacks on North America (Washington,

D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1973).

31 The concept of a state’s “strategic personality”is well articulated in R. D. Blackwill and A. B.

Carter, “The Role of Intelligence,” in R. D. Blackwill et al., New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S.

Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relation Press, 1993), 217 and 236–237. Although tied to the

nuclear issue, the concept has wider applicability as well.

32 For the best g eneral discussion of this,see James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von

Seekt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992).

33 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 130–131.

34 Craig R. Whitney, “Anxious French Mutter as U.S.Envoy Tries to Sell Globalization,” The New

York Times, December 2, 1999, A–12.

35 M.A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf:

1833–1992 (New York: Free Press,1992), 120. Chapters 6,“Not while this President Serves: The Reagan Administration and the Gulf, 1981–1987,” and 7, “The Tanker War, 1987–1988,” form the basis

for much of this analysis.

36 Ibid., 120–121.

37 Ibid., 130.

38 Ibid., 131.

39 Ibi d . , 1 3 5 – 1 3 6 : No mine co u n term e a su res ve s s els were on hand in the Gu l f the day the

Bridgeton was struck.

40 The Iraqis launch ed 88 attacks on ships in 1987 and the Iranians launch ed 91. Ron a l d

O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (May 1988): 32.

41 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, 144.
43 From Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biologica

and Chemical Environment, Occasional Paper of the Center for Counterproliferation Research (Wash

ington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 4.

44 Strategic Assessment 1999, 96. Also, see the dated but still very useful Graham T. Allison et al

Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Mater 

ial, CSIA Studies in International Security #12 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 28.

45 See R.A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical Terrorism

and Covert Attack (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press and the JFK School of Government, 1999), for a goo

summary of “who has what,” based on a synthesis of unclassified sources.

46 It is my position that this is the far more likely scenario for use. For purposes of organization

though, this has been grouped under the operational level.

47 With one excepti on : the stra tegic dep l oym ent sys tem has cri tical nodes that could be de

graded through nuclear attack: ports,airfields, marshaling areas, and key bridges and transportatio

infrastructure.

48 Martin van Creveld, “The Fate of the State,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 17.

49 Falkenrath, America’s Achilles’ Heel, 91, 226–227.

50 Ibid., 71.

51 Ibid., 64.

52 Ibid., 19–26.

53 See U. S . Con gre s s , O f f i ce of Tech n o l ogy As s e s s m en t , Te ch n ol o gies Un d erlying We a pons o

Mass Destruction, OTA–BP–ISC–115 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 77–8

and throughout for an excellent discussion.

54 Ibid., 77–81 and throughout for an excellent discussion.

55 It has been asserted, in particular, that the former Soviet Union viewed contagiousness as 

desirable characteristic of biological weapons, and sought to increase the contagiousness of its bio

logical weapons accordingly.

56 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, 77.

57 Falkenrath, America’s Achilles’ Heel, 67.

58 Ibid., 67–68.

59 Ibid., 67.

60 Ibid.

61 See R. J. L a rs en and R. P. Kadl ec. , B i ol o gical Wa rf a re: A Post Cold War T h reat to Am eri c a

Strategic Mobility Forces (Pittsburgh, PA: Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Stud

i e s , Un ivers i ty of P i t t s bu r gh , 1 9 9 5 ) , 12 and thro u gh o ut for an excell ent discussion of the stra teg

mobility threat posed by these weapons.

62 Falkenrath, America’s Achilles’ Heel, 46–59.

63 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, 8.

64 Hen ry H. S h el ton , In fo rm a tion Opera tions: A Stra tegy for Pe a ce , The De ci s ive Ed ge in Wa 

(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999).

65 Two recent su rvey works on the current state of i n form a ti on opera ti ons are : Za l m a

Khalilzad and John P. White, eds., The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA

RAND, 1999),and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict i

the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

66 For a discussion of the al Firdos bunker, see Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gu

(Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995), 190.

67 Bob Brewi n ,“ Pen t a gon Hit by ‘World Wi de Wa i t ,’ ” Fed eral Co m pu ter We e k, Novem ber 1

1999, 1.

68 Anthony Cave Brown, “C”: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Win 

ston Churchill (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 278.

69 Robert T. Marsh et al., Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures: The Report o

the Pre s i d en t’s Commission on Cri tical In f ra s tru ctu re Prote ction (Wa s h i n g ton , D. C . : The Pre s i den t

Commission on Infrastructure Protection, 1997). Hereafter referred to as the Marsh Report.
“ Radar and Radio Effect s ,” and XI, “The Electrom a gn etic Pulse and its Effect s ,” and S.J. Mc Gra t h ,

“The Electromagnetic Pulse Environment and Its Influence on Tactical Electronic and Communicati ons Equ i pm en t ,” Un p u bl i s h ed thesis for MS in Tel ecom mu n i c a ti on s , Naval Po s t gradu a te Sch oo l ,

Coronado, CA, March 1992.

71 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 515.

72 Ibid., 518.

73 R.C. Webb et al., “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” Defense Elec -

tro n i cs, August 1995, 2 4 . See also Ma rtin Libi ck i , I ll u m i n a ting To m o rrow ’s Wa r, Mc Nair Pa per 61

(Wa s h i n g ton , D. C . : Na ti onal Defense Un ivers i ty, In s ti tute for Na ti onal Stra tegic Stu d i e s , O ctober

1999), 14: “The few really good eyes in the U.S. space inventory may be vulnerable to attack.”

74 Webb, “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” 24.

75 See Andrew Koch,“Interview: Dr. Jay Davis, Director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction

Agency (DTRA),” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 16, 2000, 32: “An EMP attack ‘is technically quite

simple to do with a relatively crude nuclear weapon,’ he adds.‘If you look at the effects of that on our

communications and telecommunications systems, and if you look at the more problematic effect of

EMP from a high - a l ti tu de bu rst over US forces or over part of the USA, it becomes an attractive

equalizer for a less sophisticated military opponent or even a terrorist.’”

76 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 520–532.

77 Norman Friedman,“Russians Offer EMP Counter,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (August 1997): 91–92.

78 See Bruce D. Nordwell,“EMP, High-Powered Microwaves Pose New EW Threat to Aircraft,”

Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 26, 1998, 68.

79 Webb, “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” 21.

80 Testimony of Mr. Gil I. Klinger (Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space) to the

House Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Su bcom m i t tee on Mi l i t a ry Re s e a rch and Devel opm en t , Ju ly 16, 1 9 9 7 ,

Y4.SE2/1 A:997–98/18, 5.

81 Testimony of Dr. Lowell Wood (Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution,and

Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, CA) to the House National Security Subcommittee on Militar y

Research and Development, July 16, 1997, Y4.SE2/1 A:997–98/18, 5.

82 Ibid.

83 Quoted in Daniel Verton, “Army Battles Irrelevancy,” Federal Computer Week, November 15,

1999, 10.

84 Sha Lin, “Two Senior Colonels and No-Limit War,” Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao in Chinese, June 28, 1999, 5 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation).

85 See Charles J. Dunlap, “21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths,” Landpower in the

2 1s t Cen tu ry: Prepa ring for Co n f l i ct ( Ca rl i s l e , PA : U. S . Army War Co ll ege , April 1998), 8 3 – 9 3 , for a

good analysis of this.

86 For a broad sampling of Chinese thinking in this area,see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates

the Fu tu re Securi ty Envi ro n m en t (Wa s h i n g ton , D. C . : Na ti onal Defense Un ivers i ty Pre s s , 2 0 0 0 ) , a n d

Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997).

87 See also Fred Kennedy et al., “A Failure of Vision,” Airpower Journal (Summer 1998): 84–94.

88 P. D. Fe aver, and C. G el p i , “ How Ma ny Deaths Are Accept a ble? A Su rprising An s wer,” T h e

Washington Post, November 7,1999,B–3, which describes the results of the Triangle Institute for Sec u ri ty Studies (TISS) Ca su a l ty Avers i on Su rvey, con du cted du ring the peri od Septem ber 1998

through June 1999.

89 This term was used in a brief the author received at Headquarters, Task Force Eagle, 1st Cavalry Division, Tuzla, Bosnia, January 1999.

90 Harry G. Summers,Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982), 1.

91 Clausewitz, On War, 77.

92 See Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, 47–50 for a thoughtful discussion of this problem.

93 See Gerald Segal,“Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999):

30, for an analysis of the effect of China’s nuclear force on U.S. strategic calculations.
95 For example, Benjamin C.Schwarz, Casualties: Public Opinion and U.S. Military Interventio

( Santa Mon i c a , C A : RA N D, 1 9 9 4 ) , finds that U. S . c a su a l ties might actu a lly increase the wi ll of t h 

American people to pursue victory instead of withdrawal.

96 Robert W. Ch a n dl er, To m o rrow ’s Wa r, Tod ay ’s De ci s i o n s ( Mc Le a n , VA : A M C O DA Pre s 

1996). See also Greg Weaver and D. J. Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass Destruction Un 

dermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power (Mclean, VA: AMCODA Press, undated). Also i

this camp is Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclea

Age(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999).

97 Robert H.Scales,Jr., “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfal

of Urban Warfare,” in Future Warfare (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 173–185.

98 See Allen Hammond, Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Islan

Press, 1998), 72–74, for a discussion of the urbanization of the world.

99 Air power theorist John Warden argues that it may be possible to exercise crowd control i

an urban envi ron m ent with “a com bi n a ti on of AC–130s and hel i copters in the air equ i pped wi t 

s e a rch l i gh t s , l o u d s pe a kers , ru bber bu ll et s , en t a n gling ch emical net s , and other para ph ern a l i a .” Se

John Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century,” in Karl P. Magyar et al., eds., Challenge an

Re s po n se: An ti ci pa ting U. S . Mi l i t a ry Co n cern s ( Ma x well Air Force Ba s e , A L : Air Un ivers i ty Pre s 

1994), 330.

1 00 Paul K. Van Ri per and Robert H. S c a l e s , J r. , in “ Prep a ring for War in the 21s t Cen tu ry,” i 

La n d power in the 21s t Cen tu ry: Prepa ring for Co n f l i ct ( Ca rl i s l e , PA : U. S . Army War Co ll ege , Apr

1998),3–12,make the point that “In an uncertain world, we dare not base force requirements on pre

conceived assumptions about whom we might fight in the next century or how.”

101 And this gen era ted the Ma rch 1942 attack on Lu beck , an unimportant north German coa s t 

town of little stra tegic sign i f i c a n ce . See the Royal Air Force’s Official Hi s tory, by Ch a rles Web s ter an

Noble Fra n k l a n d , vo l .I , The Stra tegic Air Of fen s ive Against Germ a ny ( Lon don : Her Ma j e s ty ’s Stati on a r

O f f i ce ,1 9 6 1 ) ,3 9 2 . The incident “s h owed the ex tent . . . to wh i ch a town might become a target main

because it was opera ti on a lly vu l n era bl e .” See also Max Ha s ti n gs, Bo m ber Co m m a n d ( New York : Di 

Pre s s ,1 9 7 9 ) ,1 4 7 – 1 4 8 .

102 Also known to some as a “regional near-peer” adversary or competitor.

103 Clarke’s Third Law, from Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits o

the Possible (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 21.

1 04 S c i en ce ficti on classic by Frank Herbert , Du n e ( New York : Putnam Pu blishing Gro u p

1 9 8 4 ) ,4 0 9 .

105 A good discussion of the arguments surrounding the “transportation plan” is found in W. W

Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower’s Decision of March 25,1944 (Austin,TX

University of Texas Press, 1981). For the al Firdos bunker, see Murray, Air War in the Persian Gul

190–192.

106 The best general discussion of this is D. S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka,and F. P. Stein, Network Cen 

tric Wa rf a re: Devel oping and Levera ging In fo rm a tion Su peri o ri ty, 2

d ed . revi s ed (Wa s h i n g ton , D. C 

DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999), 87–114, but also throughout.

107 There are a number of sharp critiques of JV 2010. Two worth noting are Charles J. Dunlap

J r. , “Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team As s e s s m en t ,” and F. G . Hof f m a n , “Joint Vision 2010—A Ma ri n 

Perspective,” both in Joint Force Quarterly 17 (Autumn/Winter 1997–1998):47–49 and 32–38, respec

tively.

108 Noting the significant exceptions of Pearl Harbor and the Alaskan islands in World War I

109 The data in this table,and many of the underpinnings of arguments developed in this sec

tion, are derived from the previously cited Marsh Report.

110 Paul F. Herman, “Asymmetric Warfare: Sizing the Threat,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law En 

forcement 6,no. 1 (Summer 1997): 180. This excellent article deals clearly with the conceptual under

pinnings of asymmetric warfare.

111 A good su m m a ry of this can be found in Brad C. Robert s ,“ From Non pro l i fera ti on to An t

pro l i fera ti on ,” In tern a tional Securi ty ( Su m m er 1993): 1 5 8 ,“ In the Un i ted State s , pro l i fera ti on is like

to sharpen the deb a te abo ut vital versus peri ph eral nati onal intere s t s ,u n dermine the po l i tical su ppo

for military interven ti on , or even long term en ga gem en t ,i n c rease U. S . vu l n era bi l i ty to coerc ive diplo

m acy by regi onal actors , and narrow the room for maneuver in [the] intern a ti onal envi ron m en t .”
113 Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors, 11–13.

1 14 Ba s ed on Office of Tech n o l ogy As s e s s m en t , Te ch n ol o gies Un d erlying We a pons of Mass De -

struction, 78: “One g ram of dried anthrax spores contains more than 1011 particles; since the lethal

dose by inhalation in monkeys is between 103 and 104spores,a gram of anthrax theoretically contains

some 10 million lethal doses.”

115 Webb et al., “The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” 22–24.

116 The threat of a chemical attack against the homeland,although a different threat,is assumed

as a “lesser included” consideration for purposes of analysis here.

117 PDD–62,signed on May 22,1998, expands and more clearly focuses PDD–39,and “creates a

new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces

the mission of the many U.S.agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and

clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs from apprehension and

pro s ec uti on of terrorists to increasing tra n s port a ti on sec u ri ty, enhancing re s ponse capabi l i ties and

pro tecting the com p uter- b a s ed sys tems that lie at the heart of Am eri c a’s econ omy.” Ad d i ti on a lly,

PDD–62 established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,

and Co u n ter- terrorism within the Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Co u n c i l . This inform a ti on is taken from the

Wh i te Ho u s e ,“ Fact Sheet on Com b a ting Terrori s m : Pre s i den tial Dec i s i on Di rective 62,” May 22,

1998.

118 PDD–39, signed on June 21, 1995,establishes broad measures to combat terrorism through

reducing vulnerabilities, deterring, and responding, to include NBC consequence management. The

thrust of this PDD is against terrorist attack on the homeland using WMD. Taken from PDD–39: U.S.

Policy on Combating Terrorism (unclassified abstract), Chapter Report, 09/26/97,GAO/NSIAD–97–

254, Appendix 1.

119 The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was designed to increase training of potential first responders to WMD terrorist incidents within the United States. By the end of

1998, 40 U.S. cities had received training, with training ongoing in an additional 80. As part of this

progra m , e ach de s i gn a ted city receives $300,000 from DOD for pers onal pro tecti on , decon t a m i n ation, and detection equipment. The Public Health Service will assist in the establishment of Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in each o f the cities, at a cost of approximately $350,000 per city for

equipment and pharma ceuticals. This information is taken from The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Resource Page,

“United States response to CBW terrorism and domestic preparedness” (http://cns.miis.edu/research/

cbw/domestic.htm).

120 PDD–63, signed on May 22,1998,was based on many of the recommendations of the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection as given in the Marsh Report, and called for these key

steps to be taken:

—Improved interagency coordination for critical infrastructure protection

—Definition of the roles and responsibilities of U.S. agencies in fighting terrorism

—Establishment of departmental Chie f Information Offic ers (CIOs) within the Federal Go vernment, with responsibilities for information assurance

—Designation of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism as the govern m ental of f i cer re s pon s i ble for implem en t a ti on of the provi s i ons of

PDD–63

—Improvements in capabilities for protecting the national information structure,the most important of which is the creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI

—Prom o ti on of p a rtn erships with indu s try and other priva te players to en h a n ce com p uter

s ec u ri ty

—S tu dy plans for minimizing damage and recovering ra p i dly from attacks on vital infra s tru ctu re .

See White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presi -

dential Decision Directive 63, May 22, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998).

1 21 See the te s ti m ony of J. S t a p l eton Roy, Assistant Sec ret a ry of S t a te for In tell i gen ce and Research,in John Donnelly, “Intelligence Officials: Missiles Attack on U.S.‘Unlikely,’” Defense Week, February 14,1. The testimony of Mr. Roy and other officials before the Senate Intelligence Committee indicated that they consider covert means of attack more likely than a direct missile attack.
tion (Washington, D.C., December 15, 1999).

1 23

JTF–CND was establ i s h ed Decem ber 4, 1 9 9 8 , with re s pon s i bi l i ty for defense of DOD net

works and computer systems.

1 24 S t a tem ent of Ma rk E. G ebi cke , Di rector, Mi l i t a ry Opera ti ons and Ca p a bi l i ties Is su e s , Na

ti onal Sec u ri ty and In tern a ti onal Af f a i rs Divi s i on , G en eral Acco u n ting Office , before U. S . Sen a t

Committee on Veteran’s Affairs, March 17,1998: “Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations o

DoD’s Plans to Protect U.S. Forces” (GAO/T–NSIAD–98–83), p. 2. According to Mr. Gebicke, “ther

are deficiencies in doctrine, policy, equipment,and training for the defense of critical ports and air

fields.”

125 For example, see unattributed,“Navy Mine Warfare Official Warns Judgment Day is Com

ing,” Inside the Navy, November 22,1999,7. As cited herein,the Navy’s mine warfare program has $

billion budgeted against it across the future years defense plan, but at least one of the seven mine

clearing systems is being slipped.Dale Gerry, Navy Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mine and Underse

Warfare,is concerned about the Navy’s ability to meet the goal of outfitting one carrier battle grou

with organic mine countermeasures by 2005.

1 26 Two differing pers pectives on this issue can be found in (for the affirm a tive) Hen ry A 

Kissinger, “The Next President’s First Obligation,” The Washington Post, February 9,2000,21,and (fo

the negative) George Lewis,Lisbeth Gronlund,and David Wright,“National Missile Defense: An In

defensible System,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1999–2000): 120–131.

1 27

John Pa rach i n i, Cen ter for Non pro l i fera ti on Stu d i e s , Mon terey In s ti tute of In tern a ti on 

Studies, “U.S.Government Spending to Combat Terrorism: Chart and Analysis” (http://cns.miis.edu

research/cbw/ternarr.html).

128 Ibid., 2.

129 See the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Stud

Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1999).

130 This builds on recommendations in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Reserve Com 

ponent Study completed in 1999,and the 1999 Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Ma

Destruction (WMD) Study (Washington, D.C.: Science Applications International Corporation, Feb

ruary 1999).

1 31 O S D, Re serve Co m po n ent Stu dy, C – 1 , 2 . The 1999 Repo rt to the Na tional Gu a rd Bure a 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Study, 4, identified 141 potential support roles for the Nationa

Gu a rd , and then ref i n ed them to “47 mission con s i s tent po ten tial Na ti onal Gu a rd WMD re s pon s 

support roles.”

132 Here is an example of how such a restructuring might be accomplished, based on Annex C

“Missioning RC units for CM and critical infrastructure physical security,” in the Reserve Componen

Study cited above. Beginning by assuming that a surge chemical decontamination capability is neede

for e very major metropolitan area in the United States with over 200,000 people, then the require

ment will be for 76 organizations with this capability. If the unit of measure is a chemical compan

then a r equirement would exist for 76 chemical companies. There are 42 chemical companies in th

Reserve Components, of which 9 are in the National Guard and 33 in the Army reserve. All are cur

rently tasked under existing regional warplans. For these reasons, dual-missioning existing companie

is not feasible. Developing 76 chemical companies including procurement of equipment and person

nel retraining would cost in the neighborhood of $200 million.

133 See Seymour Hersh, “The Intelligence Gap,” The New Yorker, December 6,1999,58–67, for 

d i s c u s s i on of the ch a ll en ges facing the Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Agen c y. For ex a m p l e , “the Nort 

Koreans . . .have bought encrypted phones from Europe,high-speed switching gear from Britain,an

up-to-date dialing service from America—a system the NSA cannot readily read.”A U.S.“intelligenc

official” went on to say that “All their military stuff went off ether into fiber—from high frequenc

radio tra n s m i s s i on to fiber- optic cable lines.” F i ber- optic cable is both capable of c a rrying mu c

more traffic than any radio transmission,and cannot be readily read by external monitoring system

See also Douglas Farah,“New Drug Smugglers Hold Tech Advantage,” The Washington Post, Novem

ber 15, 1999, 1., which outlines some of the encr yption techniques readily available to well-funde

transnational criminal organizations.

1 34 Fa l ken ra t h , Am eri c a’s Ach i ll e s’ He el , 2 8 2 – 2 8 6 , m a kes some of these recom m en d a ti ons i

Chapter 5, “Recommendations: An Agenda for the American Government.”
1 9 9 9 ,2 6 .

1 37 Un a t tri buted ,“ Navy Mine Wa rf a re Official Wa rns ‘ Ju d gm ent Day ’ Is Com i n g,’ ” Inside the

Navy, November 22, 1999, 7.

1 38

Jo s eph C. An s el m o, “ U. S . Seen More Vu l n era ble to Electrom a gn etic At t ack ,” Avi a tion We e k

and Space Technology, July 28, 1997, 67.

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Paper series:

61

Illuminating 

To m o rro w ’s Wa r

Martin C. Libicki

60

The Revolution in

M i l i t a ry Affairs: 

Allied Perspectives

Robbin F. Laird and 

Holger H. Mey

59

Right Makes Might:

F reedom and Power 

in the Information Age

David C. Gompert

58

S e a rching for Part n e r s 

Regional Org a n i z a t i o n s

and Peace Operations

William H. Lewis and 

Edward Marks

57

M o d e rn U.S. Civil-Milit

Relations: Wielding the

Te rrible Swift Sword

David E. Johnson

This essay is a product of the

Q u a d rennial Defense Review (QDR)

2001 Working Group, a project of

the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense

U n i v e r s i t y. Sponsored by the

C h a i rman of the Joint Chiefs of

S t a ff, the working group is an

independent, honest-broker eff o rt

intended to build intellectual capital

for the upcoming QDR.

One of the gro u p ’s initial tasks

was to assess the future security

e n v i ronment to the year 2025. This

was pursued by surveying the

available literature to identify are a s

of consensus and debate and by

deepening knowledge of

asymmetric threats to the United

States both at home and abro a d ,

given their potential appeal to likely

adversaries in view of America’s

conventional military superiority.