A guide to

papers citing

antitrust cases

involving standards

or certification

NBSIR 79-1921

December 1979

U S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

Office of Engineering Standards

r l —QC

100

.1156

79-1921

1979

NBSIR 79-1921

A GUIDE TO PAPERS CITING ANTITRUST CASES

INVOLVING STANDARDS OR CERTIFICATION

feH-ssa?' Bweaji

3 J 1 980

not PiCC- Gjl(

i L1 Rs.

\H

Carol Chapman Rawie

Office of Engineering Standards

National Engineering Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

U S. Department of Commerce

Washington, D.C. 20234

December 1979

Luther H. Hodges, Jr., Under Secretary

Jordan J. Baruch. Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS. Ernes. Ambler. Director

CQSTIENTS

Abstract 1

Introduction 1

Overview 3

Timberlake Article, 1944 3

King Paper, 1972 3

Harter Memorandum, 1972 . . . . , 4

Hoffman Chapter in Hie Solar Market, 1978 4

FTC Report on Standards and Certification, 1978 5

Cases 5

Conclusions 12

References 14

List of Cases 17

iii
.
A GUIDE TO PAPERS CITING ANTITRUST CASES

INVOLVING STANDARDS OR CERTIFICATION

Abstract

Since at least 1912, standards and certifications for

products ranging from lumber to milk cans have been at

issue in antitrust cases. Studying these cases may provide

information about the economic effects of standards and

certifications based on standards -- in particular, their

impacts on competition and innovation. This paper

describes several articles and reports which examine the

antitrust history of standards. It is intended as a research tool to help economists and others decide which

(if any) antitrust cases they should study to learn more

about the economic effects of standards.

Introduction

For over 75 years, trade associations, standards

organizations, professional societies, and other private sector

groups have been writing standards for products, processes, and

test methods. These standards, and certifications based on
them, have benefited industry and other parts of society in

many ways, but in some instances they have also had

anticompetitive consequences. Since at least 1912, standards

and certifications for products ranging from lumber to milk

cans have been at issue in antitrust cases. While

standards-se tti ng and related activities have not been the main

focus of these cases, they have been cited as contributing to

restraint of trade.

Several attorneys have examined the legal history of

standards in order to point out antitrust pitfalls of voluntary

standards work and/or to suggest ways to improve the voluntary

standards system. This paper describes some of the conclusions

of these studies, taking them in chronological order, and then

very briefly describes specific antitrust cases cited in the

studies. It is intended as a research tool. The purpose is to

help economists and other researchers determine which -- if any

\ -- antitrust cases they may wish to study in order to learn

more about the economic effects of standards. —

It should be emphasized that this is not a legal search

(the author is an economist, not a lawyer), but merely a survey

of articles and reports by attorneys who have searched the

legal literature.
3

O verview

This section provides an overview of selected papers

concerning antitrust aspects of standards.

Timberlake Article, 1944

In 1944, E.C. Timberlake published an article on antitrust

aspects of standards which cited a large number of cases either

2 / completed, in litigation, or under investigation. — He

concluded that, in general, standards activities would be

subjected to a rule of reason when there are antitrust

questions. Benefits to consumers resulting from standards

would probably have great weight in court decisions, according

to Timberlake; however, if standards were part of a price-fixing scheme or boycott ( per se violations), they would

be held to be unreasonable as a matter of law, regardless of

the surrounding ci rcums t ances.

Timberlake pointed out that agreements to adhere to

standards might well be considered illegal under a "rule of

reason," although they are not illegal per se. For this

i

l reason, he said, standards development groups should make it

clear that all parties are completely free to follow or ignore

standards as they choose.

i

I

II I King Paper, 1972

One of the most comprehensive reviews of the antitrust

cases involving standards is an unpublished paper written by

Jon King while he was a research associate at the Federal Trade

i
4

Commission. According to King, standards setting is most

likely to lead to antitrust abuses rf:

* Standards setting is used to limit production or aid in

product withholding agreements.

* It is used to aid price fixing.

* It leads to agreements not to sell non-standard products.

* There are due process problems in the standards

development; or

* Standards are unreasonably rigid or arbitrary, thereby

3 / excluding competition.

The paper contains a careful review of antitrust cases

involving standards.

Harter Memorandum, 1972

In 1972, Philip J. Harter wrote a paper on the antitrust

implications of standards which was published as an Appendix to

a report prepared by Battelle Laboratories for the National

4 / Bureau of Standards. —' Harter concluded that unless

standards are used to support other illegal activities,

standards efforts are likely to be free of antitrust problems

so long as they meet "rule of reason" criteria concerning their

reasonableness and method of creation.

Hoffman Chapter in The Solar Market, 1978

In a chapter published in the proceedings of an FTC

symposium. The Solar Market , Joel Hoffman provided a good
5

overview of the antitrust aspects of standards and

5 / certification. — Like others who have looked into the

subject, he pointed out that unless standards fall into the

categories of activities considered by the courts to be illegal

per se (price-fixing, horizontal market allocation agreements,

group boycotts, certain tying agreements, and agreements to

limit production), the legality of standards would have to be

challenged under a "rule of reason." A standard would be

illegal only if it were found to create an "unreasonable"

restraint of trade.

FTC Report on Standards and Certification, 1978

In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission published a report.

Standards and Certification , in conjunction with a Proposed

Trade Regulation Rule.—^ The report criticized private

sector standards and certification activities as sometimes

being ant i compet i tive and/or misleading. It cited specific

examples of allegedly improper activities, including practices

which led to antitrust lawsuits.

Cases

This section describes specific cases involving standards

or certification.
6

Before 1930

Standard Sanitary was a 1912 case which dealt with sanitary

enamelware. In this case, manufacturers were charged with

price fixing and it was held that standards were used to

illegally eliminate "seconds" from the market. — In the

Tile Manufacturers' Credit Association case, resolved in 1923

with a consent decree, the tile makers were charged with price

fixing, including a conspiracy to standardize tile and

eliminate many current products. Timberlake interpreted the

court opinion as allowing standardization only so long as there

was no agreement to adhere. —' And in Trenton Potteries

(1927), the trade association was charged with price fixing

supported by an effort to exclude second-grade pottery from the

9 / market through standards. —

In Appalachian Coals (1933), the Supreme Court tacitly

approved standard classifications for coal in order to prevent

misrepresentation. —^ The order entered in Joseph Dixon

Crucible (1939) allowed standards programs for pencils so long

as there was no agreement to eliminate non-standard items. —

1940-45

Some cases involving standards have been settled with

consent decrees. In Southern Pine Association (1940), the

trade association was enjoined by a consent decree from

excluding nonmembers from standardization and grade-marking (a

12 / form of certification) activities. — In National Lumber

Manufacturers (1941), another consent decree enjoined grade
7

marking of lumber when not carried out in good faith to promote

13/ competence in rendering inspection services. —

The Carpet Manufacturers consent decree, entered in 1941,

specifically prohibited agreements to make only standard items

14/

or to eliminate items. — The Associated Marble consent

decree (1941) allowed standards so long as they did not

discriminate against any competitor or restrain the sale of

marble; the standards could not forbid production of

in/

non-standard marble. — And in the 1941 Synthetic Nitrogen

case, standardization was alleged to be a means of price

fixing. The consent decree prohibited fixing the kind of

nitrogen-bearing fertilizer to be bought or sold. —7

Some FTC complaints were still pending when Timberlake

described them in his article. One of these was Tennessee

Products . In that case, a 1941 FTC complaint indicated that

the FTC thought standardization of packages for charcoal was

illegal wtien done in connection with price fixing. —^ In

the -1941 Crepe Paper complaint, standard colors and sizes were

18/ challenged as being part of a price-fixing conspiracy. —

Soon after that, the Crouse-Hinds complaint claimed that

standardization helped support a conspiracy to fix prices on

19 / traffic signal devices. — A similar situation was alleged

in the Liquid Tight Paper Container Association complaint in

1942. —

According to Timberlake, in 1943, FTC issued a cease and desist order In the Matter of the Electrical Alloy

Section which directed respondents to stop fixing prices and to

stop setting uniform resistance standards for wire where the

21 /

purpose was to fix prices. —
An indictment brought in 1942 in the American Brass case

charged that a trade association's standardization program

aimed to exclude non-members from the market for flexible metal

hose and tubing. The trial of the case was postponed for the

22 / duration of the war, according to Timberlake. —

1945-1960

In the Milk and Ice Cream Can case (1946), the court held

that standardization of can models and sizes facilitated price

fixing. —

The 1948 Coupon Book Manufacturers consent decree was one

of several cases cited by King where standardization was

expressly allowed so long as it did not have the effect of

24 / restraining sale of nonstandard items. —

In U.S. Gypsum (1948), the Justice Department claimed that

producers had standardized gypsum board in order to eliminate

competition and that they had tried to prohibit sales of

nonstandard sizes. However, while reversing on other grounds,

the Supreme Court did not disturb the District Court's finding

25/ that the evidence did not show improper standardization. —

And in the 1949 Tag Manufacturers case, standardization was

found to benefit consumers, since it allowed them to make

26 / better purchasing decisions. —

In the 1949 Bond Crown case, the FTC charged that

standardization of commodities was used to promote a price

fixing conspiracy; its cease and desist order, upheld in
9

courts, found excessive uniformity of products, even down to

97 / the matter of decoration. — Similarly, in C-O-Two Fire

Equi pment (1952), the court attacked "artificial"

standardization of fire extinguishers where this was associated

28 / with price fixing and other illegal activities. —

A number of cases which centered on price fixing

conspiracies were settled in the 1950's through consent

decrees. The decrees enjoined attempts to limit production of

nonstandard items. Cases cited by King include General

Electric Company (1953; restrictions on lamp quantities or

types were forbidden) — ; Cincinnati Milling (1953;

defendents were forbidden to agree on sizes or types of milling

30/ machinery) — ; Vertical Turbine Pump (1954; manufacturers

were prohibited from agreeing to establish uniform size

selection charts, efficiency evaluation charts, etc., for

31 / vertical turbine pumps) — ; and Roll Manufacturers Institute

(1955; only standards which would have the purpose or effect of

32 / preventing sale of nonstandard rolls were prohibited) —

.

According to Harter, National Malleable Steel (1958) is one

of the few antitrust cases dealing with compatibility standards

(as opposed to standards for minimum quality). It involved

alleged price fixing on railroad couplers. However, the

standardization of railroad couplers was found to be legal

because there was: (1) competition in railroad couplers, (2) a strong safety benefit from the standard, and (3) no boycott to

enforce the standard (members were free to accept or reject).

33/
10

1960-1970

Hoffman cited Roof ire Alarm v. Royal Indemnity ( 1963 ) to

support his statement that standards have been upheld as reasonable in most of the cases where they were the crux of the

matter.—

Harter cited Appl i cat ion of ASTM (1964) to support his

statement that independent organizations whose standards may be

used as a basis for certification are safe from antitrust

liability if they set reasonable standards, acting in good

faith. (ASTM was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the

Johns-Manvi 1 1

e

case; following ASTM's application, the court

held that ASTM was not a co-conspirator and that the defendants

had not effected anticompetitive standards under ASTM's

auspices. )—

In Radiant Burners (1961), a manufacturer of ceramic gas

burners was denied an American Gas Association (AGA)

certification seal on its product. Since utilities would not

supply gas for nonapproved burners, the effect was to exclude

Radiant Burners from the market. Radiant Burners' complaint

was dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a

cause of action. This decision was reversed by the Supreme

Court, which held that Radiant Burners had stated a sufficient

cause of action when it alleged that there was refusal to

36 / supply gas for approved burners . —
11

In National Macaroni (1965), a trade association agreed to

keep the content of an expensive type of wheat, durum, to 50%,

in macaroni. FTC charged that the agreement was a per se illegal attempt to depress the price of durum wheat. The court

37/ upheld FTC's cease-and-desist order. —

In Structural Laminates (1968), a plywood association was

sued for failing to revise a plywood standard to keep up with

technical change. But the court found that in the absence of a

bad purpose, mistakes in standards setting did not themselves

38 / create antitrust liability. —7

The 1978 FTC report describes cases where certification

programs based on standards have treated foreign and domestic

producers differently. One of these was Johns-Manvi 1 1

e

(1967),

in which a certification requirement for special testing of

foreign-made asbestos cement pipe was accepted as legitimate by

the court because it was reasonable to expect that damage might

39/

occur during shipment. —

After 1970

Another case involving certification of foreign-made

products is U.S. v. ASME, et al (1972). In this case, the

National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors was

indicted for limiting certification to domestic producers. In

a consent decree, the Board agree to set up a program for

40 / foreign producers. —
12

The FTC Report mentioned three private suits brought

against certifiers on antitrust grounds, but in all three

41 /

cases, the complaint was either withdrawn or dismissed. —

Conclusions

From the case reviews, we see what kinds of standards

activities are most likely to be challenged under antitrust

law. The following observations are based on the reports and

articles described above.

In the past, when standards efforts led to antitrust suits,

it was almost always because they were part of a larger effort

to restrain trade. Most often, they were challenged as part of

a scheme to limit production and/or to fix prices. Standards

efforts seemed in most danger of being prohibited if they

supported a per se violation such as price fixing, while

otherwise a "rule of reason" was used to determine their

legality. However, in some of the more recent lawsuits,

•

* i standards and certifications seem to have been the central

element under scrutiny.

Courts have sometimes considered economic and technical

merits of standards, including their safety or other benefits

to consumers. But because a standard is technically poor does

not necessarily mean it is illegal.
13

How standards are enforced has been of great importance to

courts. A boycott of non-standard products is likely to be

illegal, and agreements to adhere to standards in order to

eliminate non-standard items are also likely to be prohibited.

But even if firms do cooperate in setting standards, and then

follow the standards, it does not automatically mean they have

agreed to adhere to the standards.

Courts have also frowned on standards which discriminate

against some firms such as non-members of the promulgating

and/or inspecting association, and at least some private suits

have been brought by manufacturers claiming their products were

unfairly excluded from the market by certification

requ i remen ts

.
14

REFERENCES

1. The reports and articles described in this paper appear

to be the most comprehensive and/or up-to-date on the subject.

However, there are also a number of other writings which deal

with the antitrust aspects of standards, including the

following: David Hemenway, Industrywide Voluntary Product

Standards , Cambr i dge, Ma: Ballinger, 1975, pp. 76-8; Karl E.

Bakke, U.S. Dept, of Commerce Gen'l Counsel, address before the

American Bar Assn's Nat'l Institute on Antitrust Law,

Hollywood, Fla., Feb. 27, 1975; U.S. Federal Trade Commission,

Preliminary Staff Study (Precis): Self-Regulation -- Product

Standardization, Certification and Seals of Approval , 1972;

American Nat'l Standards Institute, "Antitrust Implications of

Metric Conversion," (pamplet), 1971; The National Commission

on Product Safety, Final Report , 1970, pp. 58-59; Richard

McLaren, Assist. Attny Gen'l, Letter to Arnold B. Elkind,

Chairman, Nat'l Commission on Product Safety, June 17, 1969;

Edwin M. Zimmerman and Richard W. McLaren, Letters to Malcolm

W. Jensen, Chief, Nat'l Bureau of Standards Office of Weights

and Measures, Nov. 27, 1968, and March 4, 1969, respectively;

T. Richard Witmer, "Consumer Goods Standards and the Sherman

Act," in Dickson Reck, Ed., National Standards in a Modern

E conomy . New York, Harper & Bro., 1956; and Ralstone Irvine,

"The Legal Implications of Standardization," presented at the

Sixth Nat'l Conf. on Standards, Washington, D.C., Oct. 24, 1955.

See also statements filed in connection with FTC's 1979

hearings on the proposed Trade Regulation Rule for Standards

and Certification: the Association of Home Appliance

Manufacturers (AHAM), Comments on Proposed Federal Trade

Commission Trade Rule on Standards and Certification , March 16,

1979, pp. 1-3 through 1-5; American Society for Testing and

Materials, letter to Henry Cabell, Federal Trade Commission, re "Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Standards and Certification,

Public Record No. 215-61: ^ Standards and Certification Rule

Comment , " March 15, 1979, pp. 16-17, 23; Underwriters

Laboratories Inc., Statement of Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

on FTC Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on Standards and

Certification, May 1979 , Exhibit I V - 6 . On pp. 1-3 and 1-4 of

its comments, AHAM cites two cases involving standards which

were not mentioned in the literature reviewed for this paper:

U

.

S. v. Consolidated Laundries , 291 F. 2d 563 (1961)

"[activities of standards developers that exclude equivalent

products are actionable under the Sherman Act); and

Professional Golfers Assn , 358 F. 2d 165 (1965) (allegation

that standards exclude inferior products when less restrictive

alternatives are available can and will be judicially

considered).

2. E.C. Timberlake, "Standardization and Simplification

Under the Antitrust Laws, "29 Cornell Law Quarterly 301

(1944).
15

3. Jon E. King, "Antitrust Laws and Standardization--What

Role the Trade Association," unpublished ms., FTC, circa 1972

pp . 35 -36 . 4. Philip J. Harter, "Antitrust Implications of Industry

Standards Requiring Intermanufacturer Capability," in Battelle

Columbus Laboratories, Study of Strategies for Market

Aggregation , National Bureau of Standards, 1973.

5. Hoffman, Joel, "Antitrust Issues in Setting and

Enforcing Product Standards," in F.T.C., The Solar Market:

Proceedings of the Symposium on Competition in the Solar Energy

Industry, Washington, D.C., U.S. GPO, 1978.

6. 43 FR 57269, Dec. 7, 1978.

7. Standard Sanitary Mfrg Co. v, U.S. , 226 U.S. 20 (1912);

King, p. 36; Hemenway, p. 76 (see footnote 1 above).

8 . U.S. v. Tile Mfrs Credit Assn, et al (S.D. Ohio, 1923);

Timberlake, p. 310.

9. U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co ., 273 U.S. 392 (1927);

King, p. 36.

10. Appalachian Coals, Inc, v. U. S. , 288 U.S. 344 (1933);

Timberlake, p. 305.

11. In the Matter of Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., et al, 29

F.T.C. 749 (1939); Timberlake, pp. 314-15.

12. U.S. v. So. Pine Assn , 1940-43 Trade Cas. para. 56,007

( E . D . L a~. 1940); FTC Repo7t , p. 209; Timberlake, p. 310.

13. U.S. v. Nat'l Lumber Mfrs Assn., C.C.H. Trade Reg.

Sr vc . (9th Ed. ) Par. 52,593 (D.D.C. 1941); Timberlake, p. 311.

14. U.S. v. Institute of Carpet Mfrs. of America, Inc.,

CCH Trade Reg. Service (9th ed.) Par. 52,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);

Timberlake, p. 310.

15. U.S. v. Associated Marble Cos., et al ., CCH Trade Reg.

Sr vc. (9 th ed. ) Par. 52,612 ( N . D . CT] 1941 ) ; T imberl ake, p. 311.

16. U.S. v. Synthetic Nitrogen Products Corp., et al. , CCH

Trade Reg. Service (9th ed.) Par. 52,700 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);

Timberlake, p. 311.

17. In the Matter of Tennessee Products Corp., et al. , FTC

Dkt 4535 ( issued 1941, pending 1944); Timberlake, p. 312

.

1 8 . In the Matter of Nat'l Crepe Paper Assn, of America,

et al , FTC Dkt 4606 (issuedOct. 7,1941, pend i ng in 1944 )

;

Timberlake, p. 312.

19. In the Matter of Crouse-Hinds Co., et al , FTC Dkt 4610

(issued Oct. 9^ 1941, pending in 1944); Timberlake, p. 312.

20. In Re Liquid Tight Paper ContainerAssn 40 FTC 630

(1945); Timberlake, p. 3l3; King, footnote 146.

21. In the Matter of the Electrical Alloy Section, et al,

FTC Order No. 4558 (March 16, 1943); Timberlake, p. 313.

2 2 . U.S. v. American Brass Co. et al

.

(S.D.N.Y. )

;

Timberlake, p. 306.

23. Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute , 152 F.2d. 478, 482

(7th Cir. 1946); King p. 40.

24. In Re Assn of Coupon Book Mfrs , 45 FTC 219 (1948);

King pp. 38-9.
16

25. U . S . v . U .S . Gypsum Co

, 67 F. Supp. 397 (D.D.C.

1946), rev'd on other grounds , 333 U.S. 364 (1948); King p. 38;

Timberlake, p. 305.

26. Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC , 174 F . 2 d 452 , 462

(1st C i r . 1949); King, footnote 129.

27. Bond Crown and Cork Co. v. FTC , 176 F . 2 d 974 (4th Cir.

1949); King, p. 40.

28. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. U.S. , 197 F.2d 489 (9th

Cert. 1952), cert, den. , 344 U.S. 892 (T952 ); King, p. 40 and

footnote 155.

29. U.S. v. General Electric Co ., 115 F. Supp. 835

( D . N . J . 1953 ) ; King, footnote 145.

30. U.S. v. Cincinnati Milling Machine Co ., 1954 Trade

Cas. Par. 67,733 ( D . M i c h . , 1954 ) ; King, f oo t no te 145.

3 1 . U.S. v. Nat 1 ! Assn of Verticle Turbine Pump Mfrs , 1954 , Trade Cas. Par. 67,803 (D.Cal. 19 54); King, f oo t no te 145.

32. U.S. v. Roll Mfrs Institute , 1955 Trade Cas. Par.

68,110 (W.D.Pa.1955); King, footnote 145.

3 3 . National Malleable & Steel Castings Company , 19 57

Trade Cases Par. 68890 ( N . D . 0 h i o , 19 57) aff'd per curiam 358

U.S. 38 (1958); Harter, p. 4.

34. Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 202 F. Supp.

166 (E.D.Tenn. 1962), aff'd 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.

den. 373 U.S. 949 (19637:

35. Application of A.S.T.M. , 231 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.Pa.

1964); Hoffman, p. 72, and Harter, p. 10.

36 . Radiant Burners, Inc, v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co, , 364 U.S. 656 (1961 ) ; Hoffman, p. 68; Harter, p. 12; and King,

p . 43 . 37. N a t

' 1 Macaroni Mfrs Assn v. FTC , 345 F. 2d 421 (7th

Cir. 196571 Hoffman, p. 71 and King, p. 37.

38. Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douqlas Fir Plywood

Ass 1 n , 261 F. Supp. 154 (D.Or. 19 66 ) af f'399 F.2d 155 (9th

Cir. 1968) cert, den. 393 U.S. 1024 (1969 ) ; Harter, p. 8.

39. U.S. v. Johns-Manville , 1967 Trade Cas. Para. 72,184

(E.D.Pa. 1967); FTC Report , pp. 207-8, King p. 45.

40. U.S. v. ASME et al , 1972 Trade Cas. para. 74,028

(S.D.N.Y. 19721 (consent decree); FTC Report , p. 207.

41. In one case, it was alleged that the standard for

backflow preventers (a plumbing product) excluded the

plaintiff's product. However, this suit was withdrawn. Watts

Regulator Co. v. U. of So. Ca. , No. W76 881-RF (C. D.Cal., filed

March 18, 1976); FTC Report pp. 143 and 175-6; and conversation

with Bob Schroeder, FTC, July 1979. The suit was dismissed in

Wheel i ng-P i ttsburgh Steel Co. v. Underwriters Laboratories,

Inc. (No! 74-C-3697, N.D.I11. , dismissed 1978), FTC Report, pp.

170-171 and Underwriters Laboratories, Statement , footnote 1,

above, p. IV-b. The suit was also dismissed in Assoc

Certification Inc, v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (No. CA

4-74-69, N.D.Tex; dismissed, 1974), FTC Report , pp. 216-7 and

U.L. Statement , p. I V - 15 . On p. 214, the FTC Report also

mentioned another antitrust action -- E 1 i ason Corp . v . N at 1 1 Sanitation Foundation (No. 36-353, E.D.Mich, filled Dec. 2,

1974 ) ~ but did not describe the charges.
17

List of Cases in Chronological Order

Page or footnote (f) number*

Case Timberl . King H arter Hoffman FTC

Standard Sanitary, 1912 36

Tile Mfrs Credit Assn., 1923 ... 309 .... f 144

Trenton Potteries, 1927 36

Appalachian Coals, 1933 305

Joseph Dixon Crucible, 1939 .. .. 314

Southern Pine Assoc., 1940 310

Nat'l Lumber Mfrs, 1941 311

Carpet Manufacturers, 1941 310 38

Associated Marble, 1941 311 38

Synthetic Nitrogen, 1941. 311

**Tennessee Prod., 1941 312

**Crepe Paper, 1941 312

**Crouse-Hinds, 1941 ...312

Elect'l Alloy Section, 1943 ... .313 .... f 146

American Brass, 1944 306

Liquid Tight Paper, 1945 313 ....fl46

Milk and Ice Cream Can, 1946 .. .313 40

Coupon Book Mfrs, 1948 38 ......

U.S. Gypsum, 1948 305 38

Tag Manufacturers, 1949 .... f 1 2 9

Bond Crown, 1949 40

C-O-Two Fire Equipment, 1952 40

General Electric Co., 1953 f 1 4 5

Cincinnati Milling, 1954 f 1 4 5

Vertical Turbine Pump, 1954 .....fl45

Roll Mfrs Instititute, 1955 f 1 4 5

Nat'l Malleable Steel, 1958 34 4

Radiant Burners, 1961 43 . ...12

Roofire v. Royal Indemn. ,1963-. f 1 7 7 . . .10

Applicatn of A.S.T.M., 1964 45 . . . . 10

National Macaroni, 1965 37

Johns-Manvi 1 1 e, 1967 45

Structural Laminates, 1968 .44 7

ASME, 1972

Assoc' d Certification, 1974

Eliason Corp., filed 1974

Watts Regulator, filed 1976

Wheel i ng-P i ttsburgh, 1978

209

71

68

72

71

208

72

207

216

214

143

170

*The page cited is generally the first page on which the case

is mentioned.

**These cases were pending when Timberlake wrote his article.

Date given is the year when the complaint was issued.
NBS-1 I4A (REV. 8-76)

U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. 1. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO. BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA NBSIR 79-1921 SHEET

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

A Guide to Papers Citing Antitrust Cases Involving

Standards or Certification

7. AUTHOR(S)

Carol Chapman Rawie

8. Performing Organ. Report No.

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20234

11. Contract/Grant No.

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND COMPLETE ADDRESS (Street, City, stete, ZIP)

Same as "9" above.

13. Type of Report & Period Covered Final

f,!sr.vX. .. >

:: ; ~'f

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

| | Document describes a computer program; SF-185, FIPS Software Summary, is attached.

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or leaa factual aummary of moat aighificant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or

literature survey, mention it here.) Since at least 1912, standards and certifications for products ranging from

lumber to milk cans have been at issue in antitrust cases. Studying these cases may provide information about the economic effects of standards and certifications

based on standards — in particular, their impacts on competition and innovation.

This paper describes several articles and reports which examine the antitrust

history of standards. It is intended as a research tool to help economists and

others decide which (if any) antitrust cases they should study to learn more about the economic effects of standards.

17. KEY WORDS (six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the firat key word unless a proper name;

separated by semicolons)

Antitrust; certification; competition; economics of standards; law; standards;

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