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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The National Guard

Citizen-Soldier

The Linkage between Responsible

National Security Policy

and the

Will of the People

MARK P. MEYER

Colonel, ANG

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 6

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

October 1996
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

It is my distinct pleasure to sign the foreword to t

first Air War College paper to win the General Rona

R. Fogleman Award.

As we move into the next century we mu

appreciate the fact that the United States is a mili

nation, and the large standing military of the last 

years is an aberration. The significance of the mili

nation culture cannot be underestimated, and 

must be ingrained into the force designers and fo

maintainers of the future as tomorrow’s Air Fo

continues to play an important role in supporting o

national security policy.

In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Ma

P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of t

linkage between responsible national security pol

and the will of the people. He argues that for o

democratic government to act responsibly, it 

imperative that national policy reflects the will of t

people. It is especially important when the pol

involves the use of the armed forces. In the Unit

States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers 

an essential part of the linkage. Without the existen

and use of the National Guard, the nation trea

dangerously toward inconsistency between the wil

the people and national security policy.

Colonel Meyer builds his case on the assumpt

that National Guardsmen contribute to the legitima

of the military’s role as protector of the count

Citizen-soldiers provide a unifying bond betwe

liberal democratic society and the authoritari

hierarchy of the armed forces. Nevertheless, to ma

the citizen-soldier role work, employers, coworke

and indeed families must all be supportive. La

have been necessary to protect guardmen’s ree

ployment rights. Born in the Nixon administratio

iii
the total force policy has finally achieved a ve

effective blending of Guard, Reserve, and active du

elements. American performance in the Gulf W

proved it.

An understanding of the principles addressed 

Colonel Meyer in this paper will serve the reader w

and will assure that the United States future arm

forces will continue to have the support of the peo

of our great nation.

RONALD R. FOGLEMA

General, USAF

Chief of Staff, Air Forc

iv
About the Author

Col Mark P. Meyer is a graduate of the US Air For

Academy, class of 1972. After six years on active du

as an operational fighter pilot, he spent 18 years a

member of the Colorado Air National Guard. He h

positions as fighter squadron commander, squadr

operations officer, and wing chief of Standardizat

and Evaluation. He completed the National Secur

Management Course, National Defense University, 

1989. Colonel Meyer is a graduate of the Air W

College, class of 1996.

v
The National Guard Citizen-Soldier

The Linkage between Responsible Nationa

Security Policy and the Will of the People

In a speech one year before his election to the pre

dency, Abraham Lincoln stated, “Public opinion is eve

thing. With it nothing can fail. Without it nothing can s

ceed.”1

 For the next five years he struggled to honor th

prophetic words as he held the national consens

through the bloodiest war in US history.

Lincoln recognized that war in a democratic nation 

quires maintaining the “will of the people” through vict

or the cause could be lost off the battlefield as well as on 

His efforts were focused on that principle as he pursu

the national objectives of the war while keeping the maj

ity support for the cause. His success in that endeavor 

proven by his successful reelection in 1864.

The Lincoln administration, with the advice of Lt G

Winfield Scott, made the decision to keep the stand

Army of the United States intact in their posts on the We

ern frontier and rely on the states for recruitment o

volunteer citizen army. The small Regular Army could 

be moved from its western posts quickly and was ina

quate for the needs of the Union in 1861. The initial call 

volunteers raised an army of 91,816 and within fo

months of the firing on Fort Sumter, the Union army h

increased its original strength 27 times. It was the citiz

army that first saved Washington early in the fighting 

the Civil War.2

 In short, the Union successfully fought 

war with an army of citizen-soldiers, and with the invol

ment of those volunteers, maintained the national cons

sus long enough to fight to victory.

For a democratic government to act responsibly, it 

imperative that there be a consistency between natio

policy and the will of the people. It is especially import

when the policy involves the use of armed forces. It is 

contention of this paper that the National Guard and 

citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the consisten

linkage, and that without the existence or use of the N

tional Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inc
sistency between national security policy and the will 

the people.

In A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 

largement, the Clinton administration wrote, “The Uni

States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of 

public. This is true for humanitarian and other nontra

tional interventions, as well as war.”3

 The National Guard

an integral part of the nation’s military, possesses a uniq

ability to influence the actions of the elected representati

of government to reflect the will of the people.

There are limitations in the ability of the active military 

hold to this commitment of the national security strategy. 

Charles E. Heller of the US Army War College wrote ,

Revert to a primarily [active component] contingency force for abou

30 to 60 days without substantial [reserve component] augmentation

and you run the risk that the “will of the people” might never solidify

around what some might perceive as the administration’s “militar

adventurism” using a “mercenary” (All-Volunteer) Regular force

Involving the [reserves] early in any operation, including 

contingency, is absolutely essential for the well-being of the Army and

its fragile relationship with “the people.”4

This paper reviews the tradition of citizen-soldiers of 

United States and identifies their value in providing a l

between the policymakers of the nation and the will of 

citizens in national security policy. It uses the Vietn

War as an example of the failure of this essential link wh

the National Guard was not used, and uses the Pers

Gulf War, fought under the United States’ total force p

icy, as a positive example.

Beyond the contribution that the National Guard ma

in providing combat-ready forces, the Guard first ma

tains consistency with the long tradition in the US o

citizen army. Second, the National Guard provides 

president and Congress a unique means of maintaining 

will of the people while pursuing national objectives.

Original Intent:

Deny Tyranny of Central Government

After the successful fight for independence, the ne

formed United States struggled to establish a governm

that matched its heritage and traditions, yet overcame 

2 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
ills the colonies had suffered under Great Britain’s colon

dominance. Fears of further suppression by a tyranni

power countered arguments for a strong central gove

ment. In finding a solution, the framers of the Constitut

showed their ability to balance political idealism and 

more realistic concern for how men in power might ac

ally behave. They built on their two centuries of colon

experience and at every level of government formed mu

ple institutions that provided checks and a balance 

power. The result was a form of government that guar

teed the rights of individuals and states to protect a

govern themselves and a federal government that provid

for the common defense.5

 The military system the fram

created divided power between the federal government a

the states and further divided military power at the fede

level between the president and Congress.

Just before the Revolutionary War, military practice 

the colonies could be accurately characterized by inte

localism, lack of cooperation, and endemic resistance 

centralized control.6

 All of the English North Americ

colonies, with the exception of Pennsylvania, establish

the principle of universal obligation and citizen-based 

fense.7

 Virtually all colonies required universal milit

training and service for eligible men, requiring the mili

men to arm and equip themselves. 8

 Colonial defense ser

the needs of the local community, and its effectiveness w

totally dependent on the nature and leadership of the in

vidual communities.

Critics of the National Guard have often quoted Geo

Washington from his September 1776 letter of warning 

the Congress that “to place any dependence upon mili

is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.” 9

 However, 

cording to his Sentiments on a Peace Establishment writ

in May 1783, he relied on the militia, a “well-regula

militia,” such as he had in the Continental army at 

close of the Revolution. He contemplated a body of you

men from the community who were properly led and p

odically trained under uniform supervision.10

The structure of the military in the new nation reflec

the founders’ fundamental judgment about the foundat

of the state. Thomas Jefferson wrote,

MEYER 
The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of thei

people, took care to put into the hands of their rulers no such

engine of oppression as a standing army. Their system was to mak

every man a soldier, and oblige him to repair to the standard of his

country whenever that was reared. This made them invincible; and

the same remedy will make us so. 11

The drafters of the Constitution did not have to lo

back more than a few years to cite an example of 

danger of large standing armies. In 1783, the Continen

army had felt powerful after their defeat of the Briti

Feeling betrayed by Congress over forsaken promises 

wages and pensions, officers of the army conspired to ov

throw Congress. Only after being dissuaded by Geo

Washington did they abandon their plans for a coup. T

attempted coup reinforced the general belief held in Am

ica that a strong standing army, by its very nature, i

threat to liberty.12

The majority of the convention drafting the Constitut

accepted the notion that long-standing armed forces 

variably become a tool of tyranny. 13 Evidence of this fac

that the Continental army was allowed by Congress to d

band to all but 80 men after the Revolution. 14 Sam Hu

ington explained this American ideology of minimiz

force structure in peacetime in The Soldier and the St

Large military forces, he contends, are a threat to liber

economic prosperity, democracy, and peace.15

The alternative, a citizen-based defense, was not with

critics. The criticism started in the colonial and revoluti

ary periods with accusations of lack of national loya

improper leadership, and inadequate training. That cont

versy has reappeared over the entire history of the citiz

soldier. The operational effectiveness of the volunteer tra

tion in the United States remains in contention today.

It may not be the operational history, however, that is 

important as the political, social, and institutional con

bution of the volunteer tradition in American history. 16 T

militia dominated the early military tradition because 

American citizens feared the monarchy and any stro

central government. The nation in its infancy was m

concerned about tyranny from within than external 

fense. States felt a strong need for control over their o

defense, and individuals wanted to maintain their o

4 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
arms against any impingement on their rights as citize

The citizen-soldier tradition is embedded in American m

tary history.

Constitutional Guarantees

and the Early Days

It is in the foundation of the Constitution that all leg

mate authority derives from the people. Therefore, a co

lary principle of the Constitution is civilian control of 

military.17

In addition to civilian control, the framers purpos

crafted a compromise between military effectiveness a

political control. They designed deliberate inefficiencies 

part of the protection of society from the power a

authority of the military. They put their trust in balan

the diffusion of power, and shared responsibility. 18 Milit

authorization was divided between the militia under st

control and the Army and Navy under federal control.

The drafters of the Constitution had argued over 

status of the militia, but the issue was seldom in dou

The Federalists won a victory when Article I, Section 8 g

the Congress the power “to provide for calling forth 

Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Ins

rections and repel Invasions.” The Constitution a

charged Congress with organizing, arming, and discip

ing the militia.19 The president, in Article II, Section 2, w

named commander in chief of the Army, Navy, and 

state militias (when the militias are called into the serv

of the United States).20

The anti-Federalists wanted to secure the rights of 

states to maintain military forces. When the issue of 

cost of standing forces was joined with the dangers of c

tralized political control, the Federalists conceded that 

nation’s land force would depend upon the militia for 

major source of operational units. The Second Amendm

to the Constitution was adopted reflecting civilian con

and decentralized power: “A well regulated Militia, be

necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” T

future debate of 150 years would revolve around w

MEYER 
would control the militia, the states or the federal gove

ment.21

The first test of the federal army/state militias comp

mise came with the War of 1812. President Madison 

cured congressional approval of a wartime army of 166,0

men to be composed primarily of militiamen. 22 The Wa

1812 can hardly be considered a pure military succe

but of ultimate significance is that an army raised out 

the militia system achieved the objectives of the war.

Compulsory militia service of the early days of the 

public disappeared by the Civil War. After the war, volu

teer companies kept alive the concept of the citizen-sold

long enough to lay the foundations of the modern Natio

Guard.

As the nation has grown, the citizen-soldier has chan

in character, role, and capability, but the concept rema

rooted deep in US tradition. Professionalization and ind

trialization of war have challenged the institution of 

National Guard, but they have certainly not killed it. 

1944, John McAuley Palmer, brought out of retirement 

Chief of Staff Gen George C. Marshall, drafted a docum

concerning postwar force structure. It stated that Am

can wars have, “in the main,” been fought using citiz

soldiers, and that including or integrating the citizen-s

diers in peace “is merely a proposal for perfecting 

traditional national institution to meet modern requ

ments which no longer permit extemporization after 

outbreak of war.”23

The National Guard has survived in concept even as 

institution has evolved. Most Americans are no longer fe

ful of a tyrannical central government ruling under 

power of a standing army, but the citizen-soldier remai

States remain jealous of their rights to maintain a lo

militia and have made sound use of them throughout 

history. The militias’ heritage is strong and their purpos

defined. It remains accepted in our culture that the av

age citizen be available to defend both the community d

ing local emergencies and the nation at times of war. As 

other aspects of America’s public life, the Constitution h

proven both durable and elastic in providing the necess

forces for America’s defense.24

6 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
Citizen-Soldier: The Civil-Military Bridge

According to Brig Gen Thomas J. Matthews, comma

ing general of the US Army 353d Civil Affairs Comma

“The great thing about a democracy is that it allows or

nary people to enjoy extraordinary success and do extra

dinary things.”25 Our society relies on common citizens 

accept responsibility for every aspect of public administ

tion and maintenance. Ordinary citizens rise to every po

tion of political leadership including the presidency. Ev

individual also has the right to compete for positions 

business or public service. One of those opportunities, 

right and choice, is participation in the military service.

Americans not only have an opportunity but an obli

tion to participate in the republican form of government

is only in that way that the government maintains leg

macy, since legitimacy requires that national policy refl

the will of the people. A lack of understanding between c

leadership and the people results in unpopular natio

policy, which leads to disaster in a democracy.

Likewise, a separation between national military po

and the concerns of the citizenry under the protection 

the military invites the potential for the tyranny t

Thomas Jefferson warned about. Legitimacy of milit

policy is similarly at stake and needs to be analyzed. T

legitimacy of the armed forces is guaranteed as long as 

military meets three conditions.

1. The function of the military coincides sufficiently w

the goals defined by the political community.

2. The military subculture coincides sufficiently with 

political culture.

3. The composition of the armed forces represents 

composition of the political community.26

The existence of citizen-soldiers helps to ensure the m

tary’s legitimacy. As both civilians in the community a

members of the military structure, citizen-soldiers serve 

bridges between national policy and the population, bu

ing mutual understanding on national defense and c

defense issues. With respect to national security issu

citizen-soldiers are our society’s mechanism for buildin

MEYER 
strong relationship between the public and civilian lead

ship.

Citizen-soldiers, who are leaders in war, are also lead

in peace. Because of their experience and military edu

tion, they are, in the eyes of their civilian contacts, 

tional defense experts. Their knowledge tends to form 

basis for public opinion on military issues. As part of 

local electorate, citizen-soldiers influence elections 

sharing personal opinions with other voters in the comm

nity.

These soldiers work in the community, go to chu

there, raise families there, pay taxes there, and are 

vested in the schools, community affairs, politics, and 

cial conscience. Between work, leisure activities, neighb

hood, children’s and spouses’ activities, and busin

contacts, citizen-soldiers form hundreds of casual and f

mal relationships. Those who know them presuma

know of their military connection and when a pertin

defense issue arises, their opinions are given special c

sideration due to their personal knowledge and intere

These soldiers have inordinate influence among friends 

those issues.

Citizen-soldiers contribute to society in both roles 

citizens and as soldiers. They have the opportunity to g

double value or double harm, based on their dual roles 

society. In the ideal form, citizen-soldiers take up arms 

the behest of country, retain civilian values while servi

bring ingenuity into the military structure, and eas

resume civilian pursuits once their tours of duty are ove

Congress has traditionally played the role of critic of 

military and military policy as formed by the execut

branch of our government. Generally aware of the attitu

and parochial interests of their constituencies, congre

men are in a natural and constitutional position to act 

the watchdog of national military policy. Citizen-soldi

act as significant agents to enlighten both political lead

ship and fellow citizens of the common concerns of 

military and the general population.

The citizen army is a historic unifying bond between 

liberal democratic society and a hierarchical military for

“An army tied closely to the whole body of the nation 

8 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
most likely to respect nonmilitary national aims, whil

citizenry accustomed to military service is best prepared 

pass judgment on military issues.”28

Active duty soldiers are not usually in a position to p

vide this bond. As full-time professional soldiers, they h

less direct connection to society during their time of se

ice. They work on military installations and often live th

as well. Many active duty soldiers shop, attend chur

and send their children to schools on their assigned bas

When they vote, they tend to vote on national issues 

absentee balloting and have less means than the citiz

soldier of communicating their ideas to their political le

ership.

Statistics in September 1994 show that among all of 

reserve component forces, 5,439 facilities are spre

throughout 4,216 different communities. The total of 

members of the Ready Reserve was 1,795,811. 29 Based 

a 1994 population of 260 million, there is one Natio

Guard or Reserve member for every 145 men, women, a

children in the United States. These citizen-soldiers 

spread throughout the 50 states, District of Columbia, a

US territories and collectively have an influence on Am

can public policy.

Predictably there are occasional tensions between c

zen-soldiers’ positions in the community and their dut

in the military. Pressures from employers over requi

absences for duty, different values of civilian coworke

and family pressures of managing two careers play a p

in splitting citizen-soldiers’ loyalty and commitment. As 

other constitutional checks and balances, this rea

forces every citizen and the political leadership to evalu

the cost of military involvement in foreign exploits.

Despite these outside pressures, however, the citiz

soldiers’ primary function in uniform is to perform milit

responsibilities when called for either federal or state se

ice. The first objective of the National Guard is to contr

ute to a professional and competent defense force.

To succeed at war fighting, military men and wom

must possess distinct values, attitudes, procedures, a

organization, but at the same time must represent Am

can society.30 The military ethic is distinct from the nor

MEYER 
of society because of the life and death responsibility t

is inherent in the military responsibility. The training s

diers receive helps prepare them to carry out those diffic

responsibilities. A tenet of Francis Lieber’s Code (Gene

Orders No. 100) taught to Americans in 1863 stated t

“men who take up arms against one another in public w

do not cease on this account to be moral beings, respon

ble to one another and to God.” 31 With strong attachme

to both civilian and military sectors, citizen-soldiers h

better chances of keeping tensions in balance than do fu

time soldiers who are daily immersed in the military p

fession. In fact, there is value gained in both sectors 

citizen-soldiers who successfully deal with tensions a

bridge the gap.

Scholars from the US Army War College recently 

sessed that the end of the cold war, in conjunction with 

ongoing sociocultural diversification of the United Stat

may further isolate the military from mainstream Americ

culture and affect civil-military relations.32 As Americ

sense an end to any realistic threat to peace in the U

they will feel less of a need for a strong military defen

capability. At times like these, the bond between the m

tary and society grows weaker. For Americans to maint

an intellectual connection between political and milit

leadership, they need to employ every tool to build pol

cal-societal understanding.

Likewise, as the size of the active military decreases 

response to the reduced global threat, its presence in co

munities will decrease as well. Active duty facilities 

being consolidated, and bases are being closed to redu

overall defense spending. As the active military abando

many locations and consolidates in single, larger popu

tions, many communities are left without any milit

presence. The National Guard and Reserve forces’ armor

and training centers are becoming many communities’ o

connection to military thought.

The National Guard relies on the local and federal pol

cal systems to provide adequate training space and fac

ties. Air National Guard combat units require airspace 

flying activities and Army National Guard units need lo

tions to operate their equipment for training. Negotiatio

10 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
with local authorities for facilities and resources, pub

relations events, and concerns for environmental imp

inform the politicians and communities of the mission a

mission requirements of the local units. As communit

balance the positive and negative impacts of their lo

military units, their understanding of defense requ

ments increases. Likewise, the military leadership’s sen

tivity to the environmental and social impact of their tra

ing on the community grows. As all players negotiate a

compromise, the necessity for a military structure reac

a proper balance in the community. This has been iden

fied as “civil-military fusion” and is the desired result i

democratic society.33

Mechanisms for Society’s Understanding

of Military Policy and Activity

Reflecting again on the original intent of the citizen-s

dier army, the National Guard’s mission is to provid

national and state defense force made up of members 

the general population. This section discusses how citiz

soldiers fulfill their dual roles and how they serve 

bridges between the military and society as well as betwe

society and national security policy.

In American democracy, any mechanism which bui

mutual understanding between the military and soci

helps ensure that military policy and military activities 

main properly focused for the public good. The follow

paragraphs highlight mechanisms unique to the Natio

Guard which serve that purpose.

Employer Support

Business employers suffer one of the greatest liabilit

of the Reserve Component Policy. Despite the benefits t

military experience brings to a guardsman’s full-time j

an employer must accommodate absences for training a

active duty. Coworkers must take up the slack when 

guardsman is absent, and often the employer is not able 

hire a competent replacement to cover even extended 

sences because of special skills requirements. Federal 

offers the individual guardsman seniority protection, 

MEYER 
security, and reemployment rights after required milit

training and activation. For this reason, the employer m

hold a vacancy for the guardsman’s return from act

duty and in many cases continue to maintain the cost 

personal benefits during periods of absence. No one ha

greater investment in the National Guard program th

the employer, especially in small businesses.

Consequently, to build strong understanding and s

port, programs have been established to inform the e

ployers of the need of military deployments and training

Department of Defense (DOD) Special Task Force Rep

on Quality of Life stated that “employer support for 

Reserve component is key to long term stability and eff

tive employment of the Total Force concept.” 34 In 1972 

DOD created the National Committee for Employer S

port of the National Guard and Reserve. 35 Now there are 

state-level committees that maintain relationships w

major employers and reach other employers through Kiw

nis, Rotary, and other fraternal organizations. Emplo

support of the Reserve forces is critical if the Reserves 

to maintain a high-caliber membership. Importantly, e

ployer support programs are active within National Gu

organizations and are readily supported by local co

manders.

In their own self-interest, business leaders have stro

political connections for a variety of reasons. Since one 

their interests is their employees’ military commitmen

their connection to the political process gives emplo

support programs a natural political impact. Busin

leaders, with their strong voice in political affairs, help 

ensure that their employees’ involvement in military tra

ing and deployments is legitimate and worthwhile. Th

programs, therefore, have value in influencing responsi

national security policy.

Community Outreach: Building a Human Bridge

Community outreach programs raise public awaren

of the military and serve to build positive civilian-milit

links. These are elective programs that are beyond the 

quirements of the Guard mission but which contribute 

both the community and the skills of the guardsmen. 

12 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
example, Army Guard medics throughout the country h

set up clinics in underprivileged neighborhoods to perfo

critically needed diagnostic and clinical care such as d

tal and visual checkups.

The militia is also useful in helping police maintain 

der in large public events. One visible example was 

Pope’s visit to Denver when over a million youth gathe

for a parade and overnight outdoor worship service. T

Guard’s medical, transportation, and manpower contri

tions were critical to maintaining a safe and orderly eve

The event received national media coverage with posit

publicity for the National Guard.

Reserve Education

A number of government-funded education programs 

National Guard and Reserve officers and enlisted peo

are effective in tying military and civil communities 

gether in local colleges and universities around the cou

try. After World War I, military leadership hoped for 

proved civil-military relations and emphasized training a

education of the civilian components of the military. T

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) emerged mak

military education available in many colleges and so

high schools. ROTC intended to build public support a

take advantage of local pride.36

Charles Moskos, a military sociologist, in Public Opin

and the Military Establishment, states, “The continu

presence in substantial numbers in the armed forces 

officers from a wide variety of civilian educational ba

grounds and institutions is one of the best guarant

against the establishment in this country of a milit

caste or clique.”37 ROTC remains as the primary educat

avenue of the officer corps in the armed forces includ

the National Guard and Reserve.

The National Guard sponsors an education benefit p

gram as a recruitment tool for their enlisted membersh

This program is popular and gives many guardsmen 

opportunity to complete higher education in local colle

and universities.

National Guard and active duty military members w

return to the community bring their values and such sk

MEYER 
as fire fighting, electronics, and medical expertise, alo

with training in leadership, discipline, loyalty, coura

selfless service, and responsibility that they learned in 

service. Gen James McCarthy, former deputy comman

of the US European Command, stated that “the milita

then, is a key reservoir of the larger moral, spiritual a

social values upon which our nation was founded.” 38 T

facet of military service offers immeasurable added value 

the national moral fiber and skill level of the community

State Role of the National Guard

The National Guard as the state militia provides a po

erful armed force to cope with civil disturbance and dis

der as well as providing manpower to deal with natu

disasters. National Guard membership comes from 

community, is a reflection of the community, and ha

stake in the outcome of any local disaster. At the discret

of the governor of the state, the National Guard is availa

for any domestic requirement within state boundaries.

During local crises, the National Guard can be critica

meeting the immediate needs of the community. Many p

ple see their National Guard in action only during tim

when the Guard is activated for state emergencies. 

those times, the community sees the value of the Gua

and the training guardsmen have received pays signific

dividends for the people they defend. The blending of m

tia and active forces for national defense purposes and 

availability of the militia for domestic purposes is a succ

of American democracy.

Provides Military Knowledge to Congressmen

A generation ago, three-quarters of the members of C

gress were veterans. Today, only a third of the House me

bers have served in the military. 39 Many of those ser

short enlisted tours and had a limited or negative exp

ence. In many cases, the National Guard unit in their d

trict is the only exposure that congressmen have with 

military.

The National Guard adjutant general facilitates c

gressmen’s exposure to the military. The adjutant gene

14 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
who in most states is a political appointee of the govern

maintains close ties with the state legislature and the f

eral congressional contingent. A large part of the adjut

general’s responsibility is to gain support from the st

and federal legislatures for facilities, training airspace, m

neuver areas, and mission training opportunities. The 

jutant general’s influence with the state legislature and 

congressional contingent is by necessity well developed 

most states. His influence, along with that of other pro

nent guardsmen, is effective in educating the state’s po

cal leadership of the activities and needs of the Natio

Guard organization.

Flexible National Policy:

Contingency Operations Worldwide

In this era, since the end of international bipolarism, 

US has become increasingly involved worldwide in lo

level contingency operations. Sometimes labeled ope

tions other than war, these events demand multiple a

sometimes long-term commitments from the US milita

Because of the variety of skills in the National Guard a

Reserve forces, especially among the combat support a

combat service support units, the reserve component w

be very useful in fulfilling future military commitments.

Reserve forces provide the national command auth

ties flexible options in responding to international em

gencies. Reserve component units are well suited to tak

their turns in staffing military commitments on a p

planned basis. Recent changes to the federal law prov

the president great flexibility in activating the Reserves 

either a voluntary or involuntarily basis for as much 

270 days without declaring a national emergency, as lo

as he gives 24-hour notice of his intentions to the C

gress. This authority gives the president the opportunity 

send a clear message to any potential adversary that 

US is serious about its position on an issue. Calling on 

National Guard and Reserves gives clear notice that 

nation is willing to make the necessary commitment 

ensure its national security. Activations for the Pueblo 

sis, Cuban missile crisis, and Berlin crisis are good exa

MEYER 
ples of the effectiveness of this political tool available to 

president.

Influence of the National Guard

on National Security Policy

By constitutional authority and legislative action, 

national command authorities of the United States c

exercise a wide variety of reactions to threats on natio

security. The reaction may or may not involve the milita

but when the situation calls for a military response, 

use of the National Guard raises the level of significance 

the response. In calling the National Guard, the presid

demonstrates a greater commitment to the cause and 

sures the involvement of a large sector of the natio

population. Political, military, and economic risks p

heavily in the authorities’ decisions.

The Vietnam War was fought almost exclusively by prof

sional active duty forces. A robust draft augmented th

forces with conscripts, most of whom could not avoid it.

A combination of professional active duty military plus 

National Guard and Reserve fought the Persian Gulf W

These members were part of the all-volunteer total force.

The Persian Gulf War illustrated a positive relations

between national security policy and the will of the peo

with amicable civil-military relations. The Vietnam War 

lustrated just the opposite.

The US is at the point today where National Guard a

Reserve involvement is necessary for even small mobili

tions. This total force concept has evolved through pain

historical experience and significant changes in natio

security policy. The next section focuses on mobilization 

nonmobilization of the National Guard and Reserve for

as a key determinant in building and maintaining “ci

military fusion,” the responsible use of the military in a

ing for the national defense.

Vietnam: Weak Civil-Military

Relations with Nonmobilization

The Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wro

“War cannot be divorced from political life; and whene

16 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
this occurs in our thinking about war, the main links t

connect the two elements are destroyed and we are 

with something pointless and devoid of sense

Clausewitz could have used the US war in Vietnam as 

case in point. One of the great tragedies of the Vietn

War is that it was fought, at least in its later stages, 

spite the opposition of the US population. The fact t

President Johnson did not seek reelection in the midst 

the war is testimony to his failure to maintain the supp

of the electorate in the war.

In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara a

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended a call-up 

235,000 members of the Army National Guard and Ar

Reserve. The proposal for a reserve activation was m

vated partly by military concerns, but also by political c

siderations. JCS Chairman Gen Earle G. Wheeler stat

“We felt it would be desirable to have a reserve call-up 

order to make sure that the people of the United Sta

knew that we were in a war and not engaged at so

two-penny military adventure.”41

President Johnson overruled his defense secretary’s r

ommendation and announced that monthly draft ca

would be raised from 17,000 to 35,000. He said that 

was not essential to order Reserve units into serv

now.”42 He astounded the defense establishment by 

refusal to call up the Reserves to support expansion of 

war, perhaps the most fateful decision of the entire c

flict. Johnson’s refusal was apparently motivated in p

by reluctance to spread the effects of the war through

the population. Certainly, many more families, along w

virtually every town and city in the US, would have be

affected by a call-up of any proportion. A much differ

class cross section and a much greater political imp

would have resulted had he used the Reserve forces a

not depended on draftees, a force comprised mostly 

those who could not engineer a deferment. His decis

was an attempt to prosecute the war on a low-key bas

He wanted to fight a war without admitting he was fight

a war.43

Had he called the reserve components, the men a

women fighting the war would have cut across the e

MEYER 
nomic, political, and social strata in most American co

munities. That could have served as a litmus test of 

political will. President Johnson consciously avoided t

test, to the long-term detriment of America’s commitm

to the war.44 Mobilization would have sparked national 

bate on the whole issue of support for the war. 45

Brig Gen Michael W. Davidson, adjutant general of 

Kentucky National Guard, described calling up the N

tional Guard and Reserve as a political sound barrier, o

that Johnson was not willing to break. 46 It was the bigg

mistake of his presidency. That was an issue which sho

have been squarely confronted, not sidestepped.

General Davidson goes on to say that “if American 

tional security policy making is soundly developed a

broadly based, there will not be a political sound barrier 

overcome in calling up the National Guard and Rese

forces.”47 President Johnson’s attempt to limit the war 

draftees in order not to involve the national consciousn

was a violation of trust with the nation.

The Pueblo crisis in 1968 forced President Johnson 

in part, alter his policy. To immediately make forces av

able and send North Korea a strong message, a number 

National Guard and Reserve units were recalled to act

dutyC20,034 National Guard and Reserve soldiers were 

called with approximately 50 percent eventually serving 

Vietnam.48 The reason they served in Vietnam was becau

of the influence of the military leadership, not due to a

change in policy from the Office of the President. Nonet

less, it was a minuscule fraction of the two-and-one-h

million soldiers who served in Vietnam. The politics of m

bilizing the reserve component forces was complex a

controversial. It is probably not coincidental that Johns

announced even the small muster of National Guard a

Reserve forces for Vietnam in the same speech in which 

withdrew from consideration for reelection.49

Except for the professional active duty personnel, 

wrong people fought the war. They were not a cross sect

of all of America. As draftees, they were nonvolunteers, a

consistently were from lower income families. They we

by and large, the nonpolitically connected and those w

18 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
did not choose to go to college or get married to earn 

deferment.

A telling 1970 statistic is that only 8 percent of the so

of senators and congressmen who had come of age sin

the US became involved in Vietnam ever saw combat. 

one on the House Armed Services Committee had a son 

grandson who saw duty in Vietnam. Only one, Maryla

Congressman Clarence Long’s son, was wounded. 50 If 

national leadership had little personal stake, they had li

motivation to ensure responsible national policy.

Those who were more fortunate or politically connec

figured out that the National Guard and Reserve for

would not be mobilized. Those organizations then beca

a haven for those who were willing to accept a six-y

reserve commitment in lieu of the draft. Former Vice Pre

dent Dan Quayle was not an anomaly. He was a politica

connected individual who took a legal, some would 

rational, but certainly not an active role in the milita

Many like him did the same. In the late 1960s, Natio

Guard personnel were overwhelmingly white, male, a

middle class. They were lambasted as a bastion of est

lished privilege that systematically excluded minorities. 5

The National Guard and Reserve units paid the pr

Their legitimacy was undercut. Their professional memb

ship was devastated not only by their inability to part

pate as they had been trained but by the reputation th

were gaining as a result of the nonmobilization policy. M

rale was at an all-time low. According to the official histo

the Army Reserve’s ability to go to war was near zero. 52

Collectively, the nonmobilization policy, the unequal d

policy, the lack of domestic support, and the extended ye

of the war devastated the entire military and its credibil

Both the regular forces and the Reserves suffered from 

decision not to utilize reserve component forces. There w

five results of these dysfunctional policies.

1. Rather than go for multiple tours, many experien

veterans left the service.

2. The Army suffered problems of nonprofessionalis

drug use, and racial strife.53

MEYER 
3. Conscientious reservist leadership became frustra

with the recruits who had motivations that were antim

tary.

4. Upgrades in equipment were withheld from the N

tional Guard, further harming professional morale.

5. Leadership in combat was mostly young and inex

rienced while the nation declined to tap the experien

base in the National Guard.

The nation suffered because it was getting no value 

the money it had spent on the National Guard and Rese

forces. Many Americans were incensed that their sons a

husbands were being drafted to risk death in Southe

Asia while men who had received drill pay for years stay

at home.54

American communities collectively had no stake in 

war because their local National Guard units remained 

home. Individual families suffered, but there was no org

ized outcry from the grass roots. The general US popu

tion had no motivation to ensure that the sacrifices 

those who did serve were in some way validated by 

eventual outcome.55

The lessons of Vietnam led directly to a change in 

serve policy. President Johnson’s nonmobilization “sk

ton in the closet” had a large impact on the forthcom

total force policy.56 This new policy would have the opp

tunity to prove itself in the Persian Gulf mobilization.

The Total Force Policy

The total force was born from Nixon administration p

icy, conceived in 1970 and formally adopted as natio

security policy in 1973. The concept grew not only out 

the US experience in the Vietnam War, but with the end 

the draft and the decline in defense budgets. 57

A common description of the armed forces at the end 

the Vietnam War was the “hollow force.” 58 Not only was 

military’s reputation poor in the eyes of the public, but r

capability also rapidly deteriorated for a number of r

sons. The quality of recruitment was affected negativ

when conscription ended because educated persons w

no longer motivated by the draft to voluntarily join 

20 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
service and branch of their choice. Major force reductio

drove many experienced personnel out of the military. M

tivation in the National Guard and Reserve forces was p

because of carry-over problems from their nonmobilizati

Except for the few units that mobilized, Reserve for

themselves lacked confidence in their legitimacy. The s

tem was sick, and the US military needed a total makeo

of its force structure.

That makeover came in the form of total force policy a

its concomitant policy for the all-volunteer force. Defe

reports in 1970 and 1971 during system analysis had l

guage like “Defense planning will now emphasize . . . 

need to plan for optimum use of all military and rela

resources available to meet the requirements of Free Wo

security,” and “These Free World military and related 

sources—which we call ‘Total Force’—include both Act

and Reserve components of the US.” 59

Total force policy, which relies on the reserve com

nents, rests on three pillars. The first is cost. In the po

war reductions, a larger total force could be realized 

cause of the lower peacetime sustaining costs of Natio

Guard organizations compared to similar active organi

tions. Direct unit comparisons by the DOD indicate 

National Guard military units cost between 25 and 40 p

cent less to operate than regular military units. 60

The second is the experience level of the Guard a

Reserve forces, which is higher on average than active d

units because of the stability of the units and the rec

experience of members from active duty service. For 

stance, in the Air National Guard (ANG), approximately 

percent of the pilots have previous experience in the act

components. Additionally, ANG pilots fly their entire 

reers and are not generally required to stand down at a

period in their career for staff assignments. That mea

that the average experience level in the ANG cockpits 

eight to 10 years greater than the active component.

The third is the tradition of the citizen-soldier and 

close ties to the community.61

The designers of the total force policy felt that the fun

mental shortfall in Vietnam was a lack of understand

and support for the war among the American people. Th

MEYER 
recognized that to gain that support they would have 

ensure the involvement of community-level support. In 

article AVietnam Baggage," Gen Michael Davidson wro

“A Total Force structure, melding the Active and Rese

component forces would have the effect of making it v

difficult, if not impossible, for America to go to war ag

without the broad support implicit in a major Natio

Guard and Reserve call-up.”62

The primary leaders of the total force concept were G

Creighton Abrams, Army chief of staff late in the Vietn

War, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The lessons 

Vietnam led General Abrams to conclude that the credibi

of the military depended on the will of the American peo

and the commitment to deploy the citizen-soldiers as an in

gral part of that force.63 He noted that it was only with t

commitment from the grass roots that American opinion a

support could be solidified. He felt that the only way to reg

credibility of the US defense establishment was to involve 

citizen-soldier in the total force.64 General Abrams’ goal w

to intertwine the active and reserve components so co

pletely that to fight any war, a president would have to obt

congressional support and, in turn, as Carl von Clausew

states, “the will of the people.”65 Abrams was quoted as s

ing, “If we’re ever going to war again, we’re going to take 

Reserves with us.”66

The total force would implement an all-volunteer c

cept, reduce the size of the active duty forces, a

strengthen the reserve component. In this manner, Sec

tary Melvin Laird intended to rebuild public confidence 

the military. This trend back toward the citizen-soldier 

tion in American armed forces was a traditional one clos

tied to American political values and the nature of o

democratic system.67

The total force served the purpose of giving the rese

components back their legitimacy and confidence. Re

encing total force policy, Secretary Laird stated, “Memb

of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, w

be the initial and primary source for augmentation of 

active forces in any further emergency requiring rapid a

substantial expansion of active forces.”68 Laird’s succes

as secretary of defense, James Schlesinger, stated, “T

22 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
basic concept of the Total Force has in itself provided 

new sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now 

growing evidence that they will be called and have a role 

play in future emergencies.”69

The Persian Gulf War:

Civil-Military Relations with Mobilization

The first large-scale implementation of total force po

came in 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 

subsequent Persian Gulf War. The Army called up m

reservists than the other services. They activated 1,0

reserve units—just short of 150,000 personnel—and 

ployed 69 percent of them (708 units) to the Persian G

These reserve units represented all facets of the Arm

combat, combat support, and combat service suppo

They served in field artillery, military police, maintenan

medical, engineer, and petroleum as well as several ot

types of units. At one point, 25 percent of all Army pers

nel serving in Southwest Asia were members of the rese

component.70

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve also ma

a significant contribution to the Persian Gulf War. T

primary contributors by unit specialty were strategic a

tactical airlift, air refueling, tactical reconnaissance, ae

post, combat communications, medical and aeromed

evacuation, and tactical fighters. Virtually all Reserve air

personnel became involved in the air mobility effort. Twe

of 13 ANG KC-135 tanker units were activated and f

ANG and Reserve fighter squadrons were mobilized. 

cording to the National Guard Bureau, 10,456 air guar

men were mobilized for active duty during Operations D

sert Shield and Desert Storm.71 Of the total Air Fo

personnel in theater by the end of the war, 12,000 of 

55,000 (22 percent) were members of the Air Reserve Co

ponent.72

Gen Colin Powell, in testimony before the House Arm

Services Committee on 3 December 1990, comment

“The success of the Guard and Reserve participation c

not be overemphasized. Their participation has been a s

nificant factor in affording us flexibility and balance.” 

commented at the end of the war that the contributions 

MEYER 
the reservists were “magnificent . . . one of the major s

cess stories of the entire operation.” 73

The contribution of the citizen-soldier in the Pers

Gulf goes well beyond numbers and combat participati

Since a large reserve mobilization requires congressio

notification and ultimate approval, the president can 

longer deploy significant forces for combat without c

gressional approval. The total force policy guarantees t

without broad and deep support for US military act

abroad, the deployment of Reserve forces from as many 

4,200 separate communities in the US would become 

impossibility. Without the Reserve component forces, 

US simply cannot go to war. 74

It is for this reason that total force policy, and theref

the citizen-soldier, ensures that politicians have to gau

the national will prior to committing US forces, since 

fight a war other than a very small contingency requi

mobilization of the reserve components.

The symbolic yellow ribbons tied on trees across Am

ica in commemoration of every home-town soldier who w

deployed were powerful symbols of community support 

the war. The communities had a motivation to ensure t

the sacrifices of those who served were in some way v

dated by the outcome. The political leadership, which 

responsible to its constituency, has not only the politi

pressure, but the responsibility therefore to share in 

communities’ concern for validation. Collectively, ev

constituency exerted significant influence on their congr

sional delegations.

Participation of the Reserve forces in the Persian G

War forced the political leadership to consider the desi

of the population before committing troops and to have 

interest in ensuring the outcome was commensurate w

the manpower commitment in numbers and lives. This 

rect connection between civil leadership and the military 

what the democracy of the United States is all about.

The testimony to the success of the use of the citiz

soldier in the war and the implementation of total fo

policy was the overwhelming public support for the w

the president, the military, and the congressmen w

backed it.

24 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
Readiness, Availability, and Capability:

National Guard Necessities

Despite the unique value of the National Guard and 

serve forces and their role in promoting “civil-military 

sion,” the total force must not compromise in its ability 

act as a credible and potent fighting force in times of 

tional emergency. There has certainly been no lack of cr

cism of the militia, volunteers, and National Gua

throughout history. In fact, documentation is clear t

there are 388 years of criticism since the first colonial m

tias were formed. A positive national consensus on 

National Guard has been achieved only in the last 

years, since the success of Operation Desert Storm pro

the viability of the total force policy.

Criticism has traditionally been on lack of readine

poor officer leadership, and lack of availability on sh

notice. The criticism has been offset, however, by co

plaints from the Reserve forces that they have been und

funded and not allowed to train in first-line equipme

denying their usefulness for rapid deployment. Much 

both the criticism and the responses have been valid, le

ing the controversy wide open to biased interpretation.

It is in the interest of the nation for national defen

policy to allow all National Guard and Reserve forces to 

properly trained, be led by competent commanders, and 

equipped with first-line equipment. If we fail in this poli

we will find in the future good reason to rely on the act

duty forces alone to implement military force and deny 

nation the benefits of the total force.

An organization with primary interest in ensuring t

the National Guard is viable and a significant player in 

total force is the National Guard Association of the 

(NGAUS). Its purpose is to make certain that the Natio

Guard is properly equipped and structured to be able 

fight along side the active duty forces in times of natio

emergency. NGAUS exercises its influence with the C

gress and the president for this purpose.

NGAUS is similar to the Reserve Officers Associati

the Air Force Association, and dozens of other military 

litical action groups that have the interests of their spec

service or component in mind. NGAUS gets particula

MEYER 
large attention because of its political strength. Its pow

comes from its ability to tie the needs of the Natio

Guard for readiness to specific units in the constituenc

of congressional legislators.

The next section illustrates the significance of the inf

ence of NGAUS through a historical example. Whether 

influence is proper or not is controversial and beyond 

scope of this paper. The fact is, however, that the politi

influence of NGAUS is reality that must be addressed 

cause it has been and remains a significant power of 

National Guard in shaping national security policy.

National Guard Influence on

National Security Policy

Even as World War II was raging, Gen George C. M

shall, Army chief of staff, realized that postwar pressu

would require dismantling the military. He called on B

Gen John McAuley Palmer to help “develop a post-w

military system that would be consistent with our tra

tions, and one which might therefore expect favorable c

sideration by the American people and Congress.” 75

General Palmer had been described by General Marsh

as the “civilian conscience of the US Army.” 76 He felt t

the citizen-soldier was valuable if given proper professio

training and was isolated from the state politics surrou

ing the National Guard. He advocated universal milit

training which would substitute a massive citizen rese

force for a large peacetime professional Army and wo

minimize the cost of national defense. Organization a

training would be a federal responsibility. The Natio

Guard with its divided state and federal loyalties would 

dissolved as a federal reserve force.

The postwar transition of the military force struct

was influenced by several factors: the need to reduce 

size of the active duty military, the need to maintain 

sufficient force that could fulfill new worldwide comm

ments, the abundance of excess wartime armor and a

craft, and the competing military and political factions t

had a stake in the postwar military structure.

Significant political haggling ensued. Pressure to ma

tain an active duty force existed because of the percept

26 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
that National Guard mobilization, reorganization, a

training performance had been poor. The National Gu

public relations had failed them. Guard leadership felt t

they were scapegoats for inadequacies in prewar Ar

plans, organization, facilities, and equipment.

Through their powerful lobby, NGAUS, National Gu

officers subsequently became politically active. The NGA

president, Maj Gen Ellard A. Walsh, who was also 

president of the Adjutant Generals Association, set up 

Washington headquarters to defend the National Guar

interests against the Regular Army. American domes

politics were employed in the interservice struggle in 

late and postwar period.

The Guard, represented by its chief political org

NGAUS, is one of the most effective pressure groups 

American politics. There are five primary reasons for this

1. The National Guard is a public institution sanction

by the Constitution’s military clause.

2. The National Guard is a nationwide institution w

units deeply rooted in communities in nearly every c

gressional district.

3. The National Guard profits from its close connectio

with state governments and political party organizatio

The National Guard within the state is administered by 

adjutant general who is usually a political appointee of 

governor.

4. NGAUS is a tightly disciplined organization with cl

and readily communicated basic goals.

5. Nearly 100 percent of the commissioned cadre 

NGAUS members.77

NGAUS used grassroots contacts between individ

guardsmen and congressmen in their districts. The g

was to gain attention and to alert congressmen on 

Guard’s position on issues. Carefully cultivated friendsh

often facilitated the Guard’s appeals to Congress. Its in

pendence of the War Department and expertise in rese

matters were highly valued by Congress. 78

General Walsh was determined that the Guard surv

as the nation’s first-line combat reserve force after Wo

War II. NGAUS insisted that it be guaranteed participat

MEYER 
in the postwar planning process, maintain its position 

the Army’s first-line civilian reserve component, and ret

its dual state-federal status.79 As a result of the Guar

influence, General Palmer reversed his position and sid

with the National Guard.

A compromise was reached. The National Guard 

cepted universal training to ensure its position as the p

mary Army reserve component, and this was accepted 

Palmer and Marshall.80 The consensus was acrimoniou

obtained, but Marshal, who wanted action before warti

enthusiasm waned, accepted the compromise and u

National Guard influence for this joint agenda. At the sa

time, under Gen Henry H. Arnold, the Army Air For

(AAF) studied the prospect for postwar National Guard 

units. The study recommended that separate Natio

Guard air component units be established as the first l

of reserve air forces.

Air staff officers had reservations about putting hi

technology aircraft in the Guard’s air component and w

well aware of the difficulty in identifying a state-related 

mission. They also realized the wisdom of any plan t

would increase public support for the AAF as a separ

service. They, therefore, put their support behind an 

National Guard that would share with the Army Natio

Guard a dual state-federal status.81

General Marshall, determined to win NGAUS support 

his postwar plans and to stretch austere postwar milit

budgets as far as possible, directed the AAF to create 

Air Guard as a part of a dual-component air reserve s

tem. The AAF bowed to Marshall’s pressure, thereby m

mizing its political problems and achieving its long-ch

ished goal of independence from the Army. 82

The aggressive fight between AAF interest in a separ

Air Force, the Army command interest in maintainin

strong postwar military, and the National Guard insiste

on establishing itself as the dominant reserve force, b

Army and Air, resulted in a compromise that met eve

one’s objectives. This compromise demonstrates that 

National Guard Bureau and NGAUS, powerful rep

sentatives of the citizen-soldier, had a large part in est

28 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
lishing postwar force structure and national security p

icy.

Conclusion

A DOD special task force stated,

Because of the shrinking military population, fewer people hav

direct contact with military service members. The significan

decline in military experience of the American public and legislativ

members poses the risk of having an all-volunteer force isolated

from the general population, or worse, alienated. Historically, th

reserve component has played a significant role in assuring a bette

understanding of the need for military forces and developin

support for military members within the states and communities. 83

This finding of the task force capsulizes perfectly the n

to maintain a high percentage of the US military force 

the Guard and Reserve.

The reliance on the Guard follows a long-term tradit

in the United States for the use of an individual who 

both citizen and soldier with loyalties and close assoc

tions with both roles. Tradition and the Constitution se

to guard the individual rights of Americans, and the c

zen-soldier fulfills that protection. He has both direct a

indirect influences on his elected officials, which gives h

and his community a stake and position in policy decis

making.

Former Secretary Laird said recently in evaluating 

success of total force policy, “It has been the personal co

mitment of every citizen-soldier that has turned the To

Force concept into what it has become today, the foun

tion of America’s security posture.”84

The role of the Guard and Reserve forces in two twen

eth century wars demonstrates their value in ensuring 

public trust when US forces are used abroad. The resul

the absence of the reserve component in the Vietnam W

and its necessity in the Persian Gulf War is a clear m

sage for the future.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said recently, 

the future, Reservists will play a larger role and Amer

must remember the actual and potential sacrifices Rese

ists make to serve the nation. The American people m

be ready to support [these] Reservists, their families, a

MEYER 
their employers in the greater role they will play in Am

ica’s defense.”85

We should not underestimate the impact of the yel

ribbons on every tree on every main street in America. W

a strong National Guard and its membership of citizen-s

diers, national security policy will remain consistent w

the will of the peopleCthe ultimate requirement of our 

mocracy.

Notes

1. Quoted in John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 16th ed., ed. Ju

Kaplan (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1992), 448.

2. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New Y

Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 199–201.

3. Office of the President of the United States, A National Sec

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The W

House, February 1995), 13.

4. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 

Answers (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 134–35.

5. Allan R. Millett, “The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier,” in R

ard H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military under the Constitution of 

United States, 1789–1989 (New York: New York University Press, 19

98.

6. Jerry Cooper, The Militia and the National Guard in America S

Colonial Times: A Research Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Pr

1993), 16.

7. Millett, 98.

8. Cooper, 15.

9. Col Charles E. Heller, “Antagonism between Active and Res

Components in Historical Context,” Officer 71, no. 10 (October 1995), 

10. Frederick B. Wiener, “The Militia Clause of the Constitution,” 

vard Law Review, December 1940, 183.

11. Millett, 97.

12. Maj Larry A. Helgeson, “Moral Obligations from Our Oath to 

U.S. Constitution,” USAFA Journal of Professional Military Ethics, 1

7–8.

13. Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, American Civil-Mil

Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Str

gic Studies Institute, 24 April 1995), 2.

14. Wiener, 183.

15. Maj Paschal A. Aquino, Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of 

All-Volunteer Force, Research Study (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Comm

and Staff College, May 1977), 18.

16. Cooper, ix.

17. Gen James P. McCarthy, “Civil-Military Relations in a Democr

The Perspective of an American General,” Airpower Journal (Spanish 

tion) 3, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 3.

30 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER
18. Johnson and Metz, 3.

19. Millett, 101.

20. “Military Clauses in the US Constitution,” as cited in William 

Snyder, ed., The Reserve Components: A Primer for the Active Forces 

War College, May 1995), 157.

21. Millett, 101.

22. National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure 

Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretar

Defense, RAND Report MR-140-1-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RA

1992), 17.

23. Heller, 40.

24. Millett, 104, 114.

25. Brig Gen Thomas J. Matthews, “The Military and the Nati

Economy,” lecture text, audience unknown, 1993–1994, 11.

26. Aquino, 42.

27. Ibid., 14.

28. Snyder, vi.

29. Reserve Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, FY 1994 

port (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 19

105, 153.

30. Johnson and Metz, 1.

31. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Mili

Ethics (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 7.

32. Johnson and Metz, 16.

33. Ibid., 13.

34. Department of Defense, “Special Task Force Report on Qualit

Life,” Officer, December 1995, 30.

35. Capt Arthur E. House, “Guardsmen and Their Employers,” 

tional Guard, May 1982,12.

36. Capt James S. Parker, “The Role of the Military in Society,” Ed

tion Journal, Winter 1977, 29.

37. Ibid., 31.

38. McCarthy, 3.

39. Tim Zimmerman, “Will the Smiles Fade?” U.S. News, 11 Decem

1995, 45.

40. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

41. National Defense Research Institute, 31.

42. Ibid.

43. Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integratio

Wartime,” Parameters, Summer 1991, 37–38.

44. Brig Gen Michael W. Davidson, “Vietnam Baggage: The Non-m

lization Option,” Military Review, January 1989, 27.

45. Sorley, 39–40.

46. Davidson, 26–27.

47. Ibid., 28.

48. Ibid., 27.

49. Ibid., 29.

50. Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Hau

Generation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1984), 141.

MEYER 
51. Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air Nati

Guard, 1943–1969 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 19

152.

52. Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citize

History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983 (Washington, D

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 211.

53. Sorley, 38.

54. Gross, 152.

55. Sorley, 39.

56. Davidson, 25.

57. Melvin R. Laird, “25th Anniversary of Total Force,” Officer 71

11 (November 1995), 19–21.

58. Grant T. Hammond, “No More Vietnams: Force Structure, 

Reserve Components and Desert Storm,” in National Security Deci

Making, Book 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, June 1991), 205.

59. Laird, 19.

60. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The 

tional Guard: Defending the Nation and the States , A-124 (Washing

D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1993), 33.

61. Snyder, v.

62. Davidson, 28.

63. Laird, 19.

64. Ibid., 27.

65. Heller, 40.

66. Ibid.

67. Hammond, 204.

68. Ibid., 205.

69. Heller, 40.

70. Glenn D. Reisweber, U.S. Army Guard and Reserves: Beyond 

sert Storm and into the Future (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgrad

School, December 1992), 14.

71. Charles J. Gross, The Air National Guard and Persian Gulf C

(National Guard Bureau Historical Services Division, 1994), 21.

72. Ibid., 9.

73. Reisweber, 15.

74. Hammond, 204–205.

75. Gross, 8.

76. I. B. Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and 

Army of a Democracy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 638.

77. Gross, 11.

78. Ibid., 12.

79. Ibid., 14.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 19.

82. Ibid., 21.

83. Department of Defense, 22.

84. Laird, 27.

85. Ibid.

32 THE NATIONAL GUARD CITIZENSOLDIER