alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: "Lane, Dennis" <DLane@stinson.com>

To: Jeb Stenhouse/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 01/24/2012 03:41 PM

Subject: RE: Technical inquiry regarding Kansas City BPU comments on CSAPR revisions rule

This responds to EPA’s January 20 phone request for further information 

regarding KC Board of Public Utilities’ (“BPU”) request for additional 

allowances to serve customers located within BPU’s 69 kV service area. 

Specifically, Mr. Mark requested information regarding the projected annual 

and ozone season loads to be served by BPU’s Quindaro 1 unit (“Q1”), which 

serves the area, for 2012 and subsequent years. To project the 2012 and 

subsequent annual and ozone season load demands to be served by Q1, BPU 

calculated Q1’s average annual and ozone season generation for the latest 

available three-year period, 2008-2010. Based on those calculations, BPU 

projects that the 2012 and subsequent loads to be served by Q1 will be:

Annual - approximately 558,523 MW hours

Ozone season (May 1 – Sept. 30) - approximately 228,467 MW hours. 

To meet those projected load demands, Q1 will need a total of 1771 annual SO2 

allowances, 2358 annual NOx allowances, and 924 ozone season NOx allowances.

We appreciate EPA’s attention to this matter. If you have any further 

questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Dennis Lane

Dennis Lane | Partner | Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP

1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 | Washington, DC 20006

T: 202.572.9906 | F: 202.572.9981

DLane@stinson.com | http://www.stinson.com/
#### IN RE DOE

No. 306P97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 401

Petition by petitioner (Jane Doe) for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 4 September 1997.
Sub Filer Id


    Exhibit
      10.2

    


    EMPLOYMENT
      AGREEMENT EXTENSION

    


    THIS
      EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT EXTENSION (the “Agreement”) is made and entered into
      effective as of March 31, 2006 between FindEx.com, Inc., a Nevada corporation
      (the “Corporation”), and William Terrill (“Officer”) as a term extension to the
      previous Employment Agreement originally entered into on June 7,
      2002.

    


    R E C I T A L S

    


    
      	A.  	
              Officer
                desires to remain employed by the Corporation as Chief Technical
                Officer
                pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the Employment
                Agreement
                dated June 7, 2002.

            


    

    


    
      	B.  	
              The
                Corporation desires to employ Officer in such capacity pursuant to
                the
                terms and conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement dated
                June 7,
                2002.

            


    

    


    THE
      PARTIES AGREE to extend the term of the Employment Agreement for a period of
      two
      years from this date. All terms and conditions set forth in the Employment
      Agreement dated June 7, 2002 shall remain in effect for the additional two-year
      term extension.

    


    WITNESS
      WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement effective as of the day and
      year first above written.

     

    OFFICER:

     

    /s/
      William Terrill

    William
      Terrill

    


    


    COMPANY:

     

    /s/
      Steven Malone

           
      Steven Malone 

    FindEx.com,
      Inc.
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Home                 > Browse by Title > Earnings in Southwestern Petroleum Industry, April 1943

              																	Brown, Joe E.					 and 	Randle, C. Wilson. 						*Earnings in Southwestern Petroleum Industry, April 1943 : Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 762*,												Washington, D.C: 								G.P.O., 										1944,									https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/4246,			accessed on September 22, 2024.						    

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<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>    5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements for the 33 weeks ended April 3, 1999, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             APR-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                  APR-03-1999
<CASH>                             57,414
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                      34,645
<ALLOWANCES>                            0
<INVENTORY>                       152,217
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  251,920
<PP&E>                            820,560
<DEPRECIATION>                    492,679
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  1,089,250
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             178,302
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                             0
<COMMON>                              300
<OTHER-SE>                        307,317
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    1,089,250
<SALES>                         1,417,293
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                1,417,293
<CGS>                             995,724
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     995,724
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  471,337
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 27,148
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   (76,916)
<INCOME-TAX>                          567
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               (77,483)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                      (77,483)
<EPS-BASIC>                       (2.58)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (2.58)


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-2530

CLARENCE N. FOXWORTH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; JIM ADKINS,

Manager,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. William M. Nickerson, District Judge.

(CA-97-3096-WMN)

Submitted: January 15, 1998 Decided: January 27, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clarence N. Foxworth, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his

civil complaint as frivolous. We have reviewed the record and the

district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Foxworth v. New

York Life Ins., No. CA-97-3096-WMN (D. Md. Sept. 18, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Order filed July 2, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-15-00105-CV

___________

STEPHEN MANLEY, Appellant

V.

FIRST CASTLE HOMES AND ELIZABETH ALEXANDER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 321010189

O R D E R

No reporter’s record has been filed in this case. The official court reporter 

for the 189th District Court informed this court that appellant had not made 

arrangements for payment for the reporter’s record. On May 19, 2015, the clerk of 

this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that do 

not require a reporter=s record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, provided 

this court with proof of payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). 

Appellant filed no reply. 
Accordingly, we order appellant to file a brief in this appeal within thirty 

days of the date of this order. If appellant fails to comply with this order, the court 

will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM
§ 767.25 Factors considered in assessing penalties. ( a ) Factors to be taken into account in assessing a penalty may include the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the alleged violation; the respondent's degree of culpability; any history of prior offenses; ability to pay; and such other matters as justice may require.
( b ) The Director of the NHHC may, in consideration of a respondent's ability to pay, increase or decrease a penalty from an amount that would otherwise be warranted by other relevant factors. A penalty may be increased if a respondent's ability to pay is such that a higher penalty is necessary to deter future violations, or for commercial violators, to make a penalty more than the profits received from acting in violation of the SMCA, or any regulation or permit issued thereunder. A penalty may be decreased if the respondent establishes that he or she is unable to pay an otherwise appropriate penalty amount.
( c ) If a respondent asserts that a penalty should be reduced because of an inability to pay, the respondent has the burden of proving such inability by providing verifiable, complete, and accurate financial information to the Director of the NHHC. The Director of the NHHC will not consider a respondent's inability to pay unless the respondent, upon request, submits such financial information as the Director of the NHHC determines is adequate to evaluate the respondent's financial condition. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Director of the NHHC may require the respondent to complete a financial information request form, answer written interrogatories, or submit independent verification of his or her financial information. If the respondent does not submit the requested financial information, he or she will be presumed to have the ability to pay the penalty. ( 1 ) Financial information relevant to a respondent's ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, the value of respondent's cash and liquid assets and non-liquid assets, ability to borrow, net worth, liabilities, income, prior and anticipated profits, expected cash flow, and the respondent's ability to pay in installments over time. A respondent will be considered able to pay a penalty even if he or she must take such actions as pay in installments over time, borrow money, liquidate assets, or reorganize his or her business. The Director of the NHHC's consideration of a respondent's ability to pay does not preclude an assessment of a penalty in an amount that would cause or contribute to the bankruptcy or other discontinuation of the respondent's business.
( 2 ) Financial information regarding respondent's ability to pay should be submitted to the Director of the NHHC as soon after receipt of the NOVA as possible. In deciding whether to submit such information, the respondent should keep in mind that the Director of the NHHC may assess de novo a civil penalty, enforcement costs and/or liability for damages either greater or smaller than that assessed in the NOVA.
#### Nicholas Ferrara, Appellant, v. Ethel Remlein, Defendant. Pinter & Cowan, Respondents.

In a proceeding to substitute attorneys for the plaintiff in a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 31, 1961, as ordered that the first or former attorneys shall have a lien of 20% of any recovery in the action, whether by settlement or trial. Order modified by reducing the former attorneys’ lien to 12%%. As so modified, order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, without costs. Plaintiff’s former attorneys had a 50% contingent retainer. Prior to the making of the motion for substitution, plaintiff’s then trial counsel suggested that a reasonable lien would be 15% of the gross recovery and plaintiff’s incoming attorney suggested 10% as a compromise between the 5% lien that he thought would be reasonable and the figure of 15% suggested by plaintiff’s then trial counsel. On the motion, plaintiff requested that the compensation of the former attorneys be fixed on *“*the basis of the retainer ”, whereas such attorneys requested that a lien of 20% be fixed. There was no request that their fee be fixed in a definite dollar amount based on *quantum meruit,*or that the fixation of the fee be deferred until the conclusion of the action. There is no claim that the action has actually been settled. Under the circumstances, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for Special Term to fix the fee of the former attorneys on a percentage basis *(Schwed*v. *Parks,*14 A D 2d 806; *Konick*v. *Kerbawy,*7 A D 2d 745). However, on this record, the fixation of the fee at 20% was grossly excessive. In our opinion, 12%% would be adequate and appropriate compensation. Beldock, P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

June 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

133955 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver & (18) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, BRIAN NUCKOLS, Justices Claimant-Appellant,

v SC: 133955 COA: 277137 Oakland CC: 2006-078132-AE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant,

and

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & ECONOMIC GROWTH/ UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY, Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 9, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that th e questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court.

l0618 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 26, 2007

Clerk
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-3866

___________________________

Randal Mauderer

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Iowa Attorney General’s Office, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: March 23, 2017

Filed: March 28, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Randal Mauderer appeals after the district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1

§ 1983 action, in which he alleged that his recommended participation in a Sex

The HonorableRebecca Ebinger, United States DistrictJudge for the Southern 1

District of Iowa. 
Offender Treatment Programviolated his constitutional rights; and that the conditions

of his exercise privileges while in segregation violated both his constitutional rights

and the Americans with Disabilities Act. We conclude that the action was properly

dismissed for the reasons stated by the district court. See Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d

781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 1915A(b) dismissal is reviewed de novo). 

Accordingly, we affirm, see 8th Cir. R. 47B, and we deny the appellate motions.

______________________________

-2-
#### ESTIS *vs.*PRINCE & GARLICK.

[ACTION ON INJUNCTION BOND GIVEN DUBING THE WAS IN 1863.]

*Injunction bond; not void because talcen and approved by officers of a government in rebellion, against the United States.*— An injunction bond taken by a register in chancery in pursuance of an order of the chancellor granting an injunction in 1863, is not void on the ground that these officers represented a government in rebellion against the United States.

Appeal &om Circuit Court of Eussell.

Tried before Hon. Littleberry Strange.

Pacts are stated in the opinion.

G. D. *&*G. W. Hooper, for appellant.

Sheldon Toomer and L. P. McCoy, *contra.*

B. F. SAPPOLD, J.

This suit was brought by the appellant to recover damages on an injunction bond given by the appellees to restrain her from prosecuting in the probate court her claim for dower in the lands of her husband.

The defendants pleaded that the bond was executed in 1868, and that the chancellor under whose order it was taken, and the register in chancery who approved it, and to whom it was payable, were not lawful officers, and had no authority of law for their action ; that they were officers of a government in rebellion against the United States. A demurrer to this plea was overruled, and the plaintiff took a non-suit.

The ruling of this court has been, that the acts of the courts and their officers in this State during the late civil war are not void.— *Griffin v. Ryland,*45 Ala. 688. The, demurrer ought to have been sustained. No other question is presented, either in the assignment of errors or the argument of counsel.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
#### In the Matter of TC Contracting, Inc., Respondent, v 72-02 Northern Blvd. Realty Corp., Appellant, and Soil Solutions, Inc., Respondent.

[833 NYS2d 622]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm an arbitration award dated October 1, 2004, 72-02 Northern Blvd. Realty Corp. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Schulman, J.), entered November 10, 2005, which, inter alia, granted the petition and denied its cross motion to vacate the award.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

*763“Courts are bound by an arbitrator’s factual findings, interpretation of the contract and judgment concerning remedies. A court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one. Indeed, even in circumstances where an arbitrator makes errors of law or fact, courts will not assume the role of overseers to conform the award to their sense of justice” *(Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York,*94 NY2d 321, 326 [1999]). Nor may the reviewing court “re-weigh or re-examine the evidence” *(Matter of McMahan & Co. [Dunn NewFund I],*230 AD2d 1, 5 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

However, in addition to the grounds listed in CPLR 7511 (b) (1), “[a] court may vacate an award when it violates a strong puli lie policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on an arbitrator’s power under CPLR 7511 (b) (1)” *(Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, supra*at 326).

The Supreme Court properly determined that the arbitration award did not violate a strong public policy, was not irrational, and did not clearly exceed a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power *(see Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y,*1 NY3d 72, 79 [2003]). Rivera, J.P., Skelos, Angiolillo and Balkin, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21




                                SUBSIDIARIES OF
                          AMERICAN CLASSIC VOYAGES CO.
                          ----------------------------



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                              Jurisdiction Under   Percentage
           Name of Subsidiary                  Which Organized    of Ownership
------------------------------------------    ------------------  ------------
<S>                                               <C>                 <C>
The Delta Queen Steamboat Co.                     Delaware            100%

    DQSB II, Inc.                                 Delaware            (1)

    Cruise America Travel, Incorporated           Delaware            (1)

    Great River Cruise Line, L.L.C.               Delaware            (2)

    Great Ocean Cruise Line, L.L.C.               Delaware            (2)

    Great AQ Steamboat, L.L.C.                    Delaware            (2)

    DQSC Property Co.                             Delaware            (1)



Great Hawaiian Cruise Line, Inc.                  Delaware            100%

    Great Independence Ship Co.                   Delaware            (3)

    Oceanic Ship Co.                              Delaware            (3)

    Great Hawaiian Properties Corporation         Delaware            (3)

    American Hawaii Properties Corporation        Delaware            (3)

    CAT II, Inc.                                  Delaware            (3)

</TABLE>







(1) 100% owned subsidiaries of The Delta Queen Steamboat Co.
(2) 99% owned subsidiaries of The Delta Queen Steamboat Co. and 1% owned
    subsidiaries of DQSB II, Inc.
(3) 100% owned subsidiaries of Great Hawaiian Cruise Line, Inc.