1

In his petition for review, Oming refers to withholding of removal and the

Convention Against Torture only three times. Two of the references simply indicate

the Immigration Judge’s denial of those applications and are found in sections

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 03-3971

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George William Oming,

Petitioner,

v.

John Ashcroft, Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

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Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

[UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: December 17, 2004

 Filed: January 25, 2005

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Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

PER CURIAM.

George William Oming, a native and citizen of Uganda, petitions for review

of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture.1

 Oming argues that the BIA violated its own regulatory procedure when it
entitled “Case Summary and Request for Oral Argument” and “Statement of Case.”

The third reference is found in a section entitled “Jurisdiction.” To the extent Oming

attempts to challenge the denial of his applications for withholding of removal and

protection under the Convention Against Torture, we hold that Oming has waived

those issues on review. See Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner waived claim for protection under the Convention

Against Torture because there was no meaningful argument on the claim in his

opening brief).

2

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i), the BIA member assigned to a case is

required to employ the AWO procedure if the member determines that the result

reached by the IJ was correct, that any errors by the IJ were harmless or nonmaterial,

and that either “[t]he issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or

federal court precedent and do not involve the application of precedent to a novel

factual situation[,]” or “[t]he factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so

substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion in the case.” 

-2-

decided to employ the affirmance-without-opinion (“AWO”) procedure in his case.

We dismiss Oming’s petition because we do not have jurisdiction to consider the

issue he has raised.

On March 13, 2002, Oming was served with a notice to appear, charging that

he was subject to removal for having remained in the United States longer than

authorized. Oming conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denied Oming’s application for asylum because Oming failed to establish

that he filed the application within one year of arriving in the United States and failed

to establish that he qualified for an exception to the one-year filing requirement. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). The IJ also denied Oming’s applications for

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture because

Oming failed to establish past persecution and failed to establish that it was more

likely than not that he would be persecuted or tortured in Uganda. The BIA affirmed

the IJ’s decision using the AWO procedure.2
-3-

Oming asserts that the IJ’s denial of his asylum application was based on

alternative reviewable and non-reviewable grounds—specifically, the merits of his

asylum claim and the timeliness of his application, respectively. Oming argues that

we should remand to the BIA because use of the AWO procedure provided no

guidance as to whether the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on a reviewable or nonreviewable basis. Contrary to Oming’s assertion, the administrative record clearly

shows that the IJ denied Oming asylum solely based on the untimeliness of his

application.

We agree with Respondent that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

decision to employ the AWO procedure in Oming’s case. In Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367

F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No. 02-3879 (8th Cir.

Sept. 1, 2004), we held that “the BIA’s decision whether to employ the AWO

procedure in a particular case is committed to agency discretion and not subject to

judicial review.”

Accordingly, we dismiss Oming’s petition for review. 

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