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THE RELATIONSHIP OF MONETARY 

POLICY AND RISING PRICES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 17, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 112–20 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

FRANCISCO R. CANSECO, Texas 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

LARRY C. LAVENDER, Chief of Staff 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY

RON PAUL, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina, Vice 

Chairman 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

(IV) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

March 17, 2011 ................................................................................................. 1 

Appendix: 

March 17, 2011 ................................................................................................. 25 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011 

Grant, James, Editor, Grant’s Interest Rate Observer ........................................ 6 

Lehrman, Lewis E., Senior Partner, L.E. Lehrman & Company ........................ 4 

Salerno, Joseph T., Professor, Pace University, New York .................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Paul, Hon. Ron .................................................................................................. 26 

Grant, James .................................................................................................... 28 

Lehrman, Lewis E. ........................................................................................... 33 

Salerno, Joseph T. ............................................................................................ 48 

(1) 

THE RELATIONSHIP OF MONETARY 

POLICY AND RISING PRICES 

Thursday, March 17, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC MONETARY

POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron Paul [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Paul, Jones, McHenry, 

Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, and Schweikert. 

Chairman PAUL. This hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome our three witnesses today, and they will be 

further introduced when they are ready to give their testimony. 

The ranking member, Mr. Clay, is going to be coming later, but 

he has advised me that we can go ahead and start the hearing. 

So I will start with an opening statement and those who want 

to give opening statements can do so, as well. I will advise that we 

will have some votes, probably in about 20 minutes or so, and we 

might have to take a 30-minute break. But we will deal with that 

when the time comes. 

I consider these hearings very important. A few weeks ago, we 

had hearings on the Federal Reserve’s relationship to the unemployment problem, and the Fed has been given two mandates: one, 

to keep low unemployment, which they haven’t done a very good 

job of; and two, to maintain price stability. And the evidence is 

mounting that they haven’t been doing a very good job with maintaining price stability either. 

Most people refer to rising prices as inflation and that is the conventional wisdom. But many of us concentrate on things other than 

just rising prices and seeing rising prices as a symptom of the basic 

problem, which means that when a money supply has increased, 

the value of that currency goes down and inevitably it will lead to 

rising prices, unfortunately not uniformly, which means that some 

people suffer more than others. 

But the one thing that is done when prices rise is that a lot of 

scapegoats are found. And this has been traditional throughout history. 

As a matter of fact, as long ago as 40 centuries, 4,000 years ago, 

the very first known price controls occurred in ancient Egypt. They 

put on price controls because prices were going up and they didn’t 

want to deal with the real issue, which was the monetary issue. 

2 

And that is a modern phenomenon too. The United States has 

done this during wartime periods, during wars in the 20th Century 

as well as another time in the 1970s, saying that if we can just control prices, we will take care of the problem. 

So they are always looking for something to blame for the rising 

prices. Sometimes it is energy. In the 1970s, it was energy, and 

boycotts caused rising prices. Even today, the Middle East crisis is 

causing prices to go up and it does have an influence, but it is not 

the whole cause. 

Any type of crisis will contribute to rising prices. Sometimes 

labor is blamed for the inflation of prices and sometimes it is 

weather. Sometimes the blame is placed on the speculators. Once 

prices start rising, well, if the speculators are doing it, they are 

buying too much stuff and they are hoarding and they become the 

scapegoats. 

Also, business people, when they make profits, can be accused of 

contributing to the price inflation. And sometimes, we just blame 

foreigners for not managing their currencies quite well and causing 

our prices to go up. 

But one of the most bizarre arguments by the conventional wisdom of those at the Federal Reserve, and other places, is that it 

is excessive growth. We are having too much growth these days 

and therefore we have to slow it up. And literally, that is what 

they do. 

If they have an inflationary period and they are concerned about 

rising prices, I think if we just kill the economy, yes, it will. Decrease demand and you will have price adjustments. But that is a 

heck of a way to solve the problem, which is the monetary problem. 

But growth, in itself, doesn’t cause higher prices. If you have a 

healthy economy, you are more likely to lower prices with excessive 

growth. 

We had tremendous growth in the electronics industry—telephones and computers and TVs. In spite of the monetary inflation, 

we still saw prices drop. 

So this whole idea that you have to slow up the economy in order 

to keep prices down, in order to stimulate growth of the economy, 

all you have to do is print money, I think people are starting to 

realize that is a hoax and it is coming to an end. 

The definition of inflation, by many of us, is the increase in the 

supply of money. Ludwig von Mises, the great Austrian economist, 

argued this case clearly. And I used to think it was just semantics, 

but he argued that it was more than that. It was deliberate, so that 

we in charge—the monetary people in charge didn’t want to address the subject of money and why they are responsible, rather 

than these other issues. 

I consider this very, very important because it is so unfair. If 

governments and central banks increased money, prices went up 

and wages went up and profits went up all equally, I guess no big 

deal, but why do it, if that is what is happening? 

What happens, though, is some people benefit at the expense of 

others. And I think it is a reasonable assumption to say, which 

many have said in the free market school, that if you destroy a currency, you will destroy the middle class. A sound currency encourages the middle class. And I believe that the inflation of prices, 

3 

when prices go up, are most damaging to the poor and low- to middle-income people because they suffer the consequences much more 

so than those who can protect themselves. And therefore, it is a tax 

on the poor and the middle class. They tend to lose their jobs and 

get the higher prices. 

So to me, it is very, very important that we address the subject. 

And now, I would like to yield to the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Walter Jones from North Carolina. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the 

panel that is here today, thank you. I think I agree with the chairman that I don’t—as a centrist in my philosophy, as it relates to 

the people in my district, I really believe this is a critical and very 

important hearing because the relationship between monetary policy and rising prices brings me to my brief statement. 

I do the grocery shopping in my family. I have been married for 

46 years, and I have been doing the grocery shopping that whole 

time. I found this editorial in the Wall Street Journal that I think 

tells why this is an important hearing today—t says I cannot eat 

my iPad—the subtitle was ‘‘Federal Reserve bombs in Queens.’’ So 

let me just say that. But this is one of the comments in the article: 

‘‘Come question time, the main thing the crowd wanted to know 

was why they are paying so much more for food and gas?’’ 

Keep in mind, the Fed doesn’t think food and gas matter in its 

policy calculations because they aren’t part of core inflation. In 

other words, food and gas, in the eyes of the Fed, are not part of 

the core inflation. 

So Mr. Dudley tried to explain that other prices are falling: 

‘‘Today, you can buy an iPad 2, that costs the same as an iPad 1 

that is twice as powerful. You have to look at the prices of all 

things.’’ 

Then from the crowd, someone quipped, ‘‘I can’t eat an iPad.’’ Another attendee asked, ‘‘When was the last time, sir, that you went 

grocery shopping?’’ 

So, this hearing today is extremely important and I am delighted 

to be part of it and I look forward to the question period. But I 

want to see it end with one comment. I have my staff email my 

district every time that we are going to hold a hearing, Mr. Chairman. And when we hold a hearing, I bring to this debate, this 

hearing, comments from my district. 

I just want to mention one and then I will close: 

‘‘I have been retired from Ma Bell for 22 years and my pension 

has only increased once. We did get a small cost of living too, but 

a couple of years ago, that stopped. For people like us, in this situation, we are getting drained. The way things are going, my wife 

and I will have to hope to die before we cannot afford to live.’’ 

That is why this is a very important hearing, and I thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for the time you just allowed me. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Huizenga, do you care to make a statement? 

Okay. There are no other opening statements, so we will now 

proceed to the testimony. I will introduce the three witnesses, and 

then we will proceed. 

4 

Lewis Lehrman will be the first one to give his testimony. Mr. 

Lehrman is an active proponent of the gold standard and former 

member of President Ronald Reagan’s Gold Commission. After 

serving as president of Rite Aid in the 1970s, Mr. Lehrman ran for 

governor of New York on the Republican and Conservative party 

ticket. In addition to being a senior partner in his investment firm, 

Mr. Lehrman continues to remain active in a number of political 

and civic causes. 

Next, we will hear from James Grant. Mr. Grant is a noted investor and publisher of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer. A former 

columnist for Barron’s, he is the author of five books on finance 

and financial history. He has appeared on numerous television programs and his writings have been featured in numerous publications, including The Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, and 

Foreign Affairs. 

And finally, we will hear from Professor Joseph Salerno, who is 

a professor of economics at Pace University in New York. He is also 

vice president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, and has written extensively on monetary policy and theory, 

banking, and comparative economic systems. He received his MA 

and Ph.D. in economics from Rutgers University. 

So we will proceed, and Mr. Lehrman, you can give us your 

statement. 

All of your written statements will be made a part of the record, 

so we ask that you give us a 5-minute summary. 

Proceed. 

STATEMENT OF LEWIS E. LEHRMAN, SENIOR PARTNER, L.E. 

LEHRMAN & COMPANY 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I want to thank you for the time. I want to thank 

my colleagues, Mr. Grant and Mr. Salerno, who have carried on the 

most distinguished research in monetary history, monetary theory, 

and monetary policy. 

Since the expansive Federal Reserve program of quantitative 

easing began in late 2008, oil prices have almost tripled. Gasoline 

prices have almost doubled. Basic world food prices, such as corn, 

sugar, soybeans, and wheat have almost doubled. The Fed credit 

expansion from late 2008 through March 2011 created almost 2 

trillion new dollars on the Federal Reserve balance sheet alone. 

This new Fed credit triggered, as the chairman was just suggesting, a commodity and a stock boom, because the flood of new 

credit could not be fully absorbed by the U.S. economy, then in recession. 

Indeed, Chairman Bernanke recently suggested that quantitative 

easing aimed to inflate U.S. equities and bonds directly, thus, commodities, of course, indirectly. 

But some of the excess dollars raced into the foreign exchange 

markets, calling a fall on the dollar on foreign exchanges. 

Now with quantitative easing, the Fed seems to aim at depreciating the dollar. 

Foreign mercantilist countries such as China purchased these depreciating dollars on the foreign exchanges, adding them to their 

official reserves. Issuing an exchange, they are pegged undervalued 

5 

currencies. This new money is promptly put to work, creating speculative bull markets and booming economies in China. The emerging market equity and economic boom of 2009 and 2010 was the 

counterpart of sluggish economic growth in the United States during the same period. 

But in the year 2011 and 2012, we will witness a Fed-fueled economic expansion in the United States. Growth for 2011 in the 

United States will, I believe, be about 3.5 percent or more, unless 

there is an oil spike. Another oil spike, combined with even greater 

catastrophe in Japan. 

The consumer price index, the so-called CPI, will be suppressed 

because unemployment keeps wage rates from rising rapidly. The 

underutilization of physical and industrial capacity keeps producer 

prices and finished prices from rising as rapidly as they otherwise 

would. Thus, the flood of new Fed credit has shown up first in commodity and stock price rises. 

But commodity and stock inflation inevitably engenders social effects. Two generations of inflationary, monetary, and fiscal policies 

have been a primary cause of the increasing inequality of wealth 

in American society. 

Bankers and speculators have been and still are the first in line, 

along with the Treasury, to get zero interest credit from the Fed. 

The bankers were also the first to get bailed out. Then, with the 

new money, they financed stocks, bonds, and commodities, anticipating, as in the past, a Fed-created boom. 

A very nimble financial class, in possession of cheap, near zero 

interest credit, is able, at the same time, to enrich themselves and 

to protect their wealth against inflation. But middle-income professionals and workers on salaries and wages and those on fixed incomes and pensions are impoverished by the very same inflation 

that subsidizes bankers and speculators. 

So if the problem is an unstable dollar, inflation and deflation, 

boom and bust, what is the solution? I remember Senator Robert 

Kennedy saying once, ‘‘If you do not have a solution, you do not 

have a problem.’’ 

The solution is a dollar convertible to gold at a fixed value. This 

is the necessary Federal Reserve discipline, to secure the long-term 

value of middle-income savings and pensions and to backstop the 

drive for a balanced budget. 

The gold standard would terminate the world dollar standard by 

prohibiting foreign official dollar reserves. Thus, the special access 

of the government and the financial class to limitless Fed and foreign official credit would end with the gold standard. 

Equally important, the gold standard puts control of the supply 

of money into the hands of the American people as it should in a 

constitutional republic. 

If the Fed creates more dollars than the people at home and 

abroad desire to hold, they can exchange excess paper for gold at 

the fixed value, requiring the Fed to slow down credit creation in 

order to maintain the statutory gold convertibility of the dollar. 

To accomplish this monetary reform, the United States can lead: 

first, by announcing future convertibility on a date certain of the 

U.S. dollar, the dollar itself to be defined then in statute as a 

weight unit of gold, as the plain words of the Constitution suggests; 

6 

second, by convening a new Breton Woods Conference to establish 

mutual, multilateral, gold convertibility of the currencies of the 

major powers at a level which would not, lower nominal wages; and 

third, to prohibit by treaty, the use of any currency but gold, as official reserves. 

The gold standard is not perfect. But it is the least imperfect 

monetary system tested in the only laboratory we human beings 

have available to us: the laboratory of human history. 

The dollar as good as gold is the way to restore America’s financial self-respect and to regain its role as the equitable leader of the 

world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehrman can be found on page 

33 of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. 

We will go next to Mr. Grant. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES GRANT, EDITOR, GRANT’S INTEREST 

RATE OBSERVER 

Mr. GRANT. Mr. Chairman, good morning. I have the honor of 

testifying—thank you. 

The original Federal Reserve Act said nothing about zero percent 

interest rates, quantitative easing, inflation targeting, stock price 

manipulation or indeed, paper money. 

The law, rather, projected an institution, ‘‘to provide for the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks to furnish an elastic currency to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, 

and for other purposes.’’ 

We should have known. 

‘‘For other purposes’’ was the operative phrase. Mission creep is 

endemic to bureaucracy, of course, but few government departments have crept, indeed galloped, faster, further toward a more 

unhelpful direction than our own Federal Reserve. 

Central banking has elited into a kind of central planning. 

And to top it all, the Fed has unilaterally added a third mandate 

to the two Congress conferred on it some years ago. The ‘‘Bank of 

Bernanke’’ is today the self-appointed booster of stock prices. 

Now, the progenitors of the Fed, notably Senator Carter Glass of 

Virginia and the economist H. Parker Willis, had no time for Wall 

Street. They were rather devoted to commerce and agriculture and 

to decentralization of finance. 

It would sorely grieve those two to discover that in their absence, 

the Fed’s zero percent funds rate has simultaneously served to 

starve savers and to fatten speculators. 

It should likewise grieve us, the living. 

There is something deeply and fundamentally wrong in American 

finance. 

According to Chairman Bernanke, himself, in private testimony 

before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in November of 

2009, 12 of this country’s largest 13 national institutions were at 

the risk of failure in the fall of 2008. 

In our Great Recession, nominal GDP was down top to bottom 

by no more than 4 percent or less. 

7 

In our Great Depression, 1929 and 1933, nominal GDP was down 

by 46 percent, that is to say the economy was virtually sawed in 

half, yet most banks did not fail. 

The predecessor to today’s Citigroup was notably solvent. You do 

wonder if only one 21st Century American financial institution 

could stand up to anything like the Depression of yesteryear, well 

not eager to find out, the Fed insisted once, no truck with even the 

statistical absence of inflation, let alone with outright deflation. 

Still less of course, with the Depression, so it boons its balance 

sheet and it presses its interest rate to the floor. That is not of 

course the end of the story. The dollar is thereby materialized, the 

interest rate thereby suppressed, have unscripted consequences. 

They inflate prices and investment values, and because prices 

and values are the traffic signals of a market economy, the Federal 

Reserve unintentionally becomes the cause of crashes and pileups 

on our financial streets and highways. Some of these accidents, notably the 2007, 2009 residential real estate debacle are the monetary equivalent of a chain reaction on a foggy California freeway. 

The trouble with our monetary Mandarins is that they believe 

impossible things. They have persuaded themselves that a central 

bank can pick the interest rate that will cause the GDP to grow, 

payrolls to expand, and price to levitate by just 2 percent a year, 

no more mind you, as they measure it. 

It is impossible, experience and common sense both attest, yet 

they hold it to be true. Today’s dollar, it is weightiness 

uncollateralized by anything except the world’s faith in us. That too 

seemingly in history’s judgment would be an impossibility yet here 

it is. 

Yet that faith justifiably is today fading. William F. Buckley famously and persuasively said that he would rather be governed by 

the first 400 names in the Boston phone directory than by the faculty of Harvard. 

Unaccountably, this Congress has entrusted the value of the dollars that we own, we transact, to an independent committee dominated by monetary scholars. In one short generation, we have 

moved to the Ph.D. standard from the gold standard. 

I submit, Mr. Chairman, it is past time to reconsider. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grant can be found on page 28 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman, and we will go on to 

Professor Salerno. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH T. SALERNO, PROFESSOR, PACE 

UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK 

Mr. SALERNO. Chairman Paul and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I am very honored to be here. 

The old argument has come back into vogue that modern inflation is desirable to prevent the far greater evil of deflation. This 

has been given a scientific sounding name of ‘‘inflation targeting.’’ 

In the past decade, this view has been promoted both by former 

Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan and current Federal Reserve 

Chairman Bernanke. But this view is based on a fundamental confusion. It confuses deflation with depression, which are two very 

different phenomenon. Falling prices are, under most cirVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:32 May 27, 2011 Jkt 065679 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65679.TXT TERRIE
8 

cumstances, absolutely benign and the natural outcome of a prosperous and growing economy. The fear of falling prices is not the 

phobia, a deflation phobia which has no rational basis in economic 

theory or history. 

Let us look at the experience of the past 4 decades with respect 

to the products of the consumer electronics and high tech industries. For example, a mainframe computer sold for $4.7 million in 

1970 and probably is the size of this room, while today, one can 

purchase a PC that is 20 times faster for less than $1,000. The first 

hand calculator was introduced in 1971 and was priced at $240, 

and by 1980, similar hand calculators were selling for $10 despite 

the fact that the 1970s was the most inflationary decade in U.S. 

history. 

The first HD TV was introduced by Sony in 1990 and sold for $36,000. When HD TV began to be sold widely in the United States 

in 2003, their prices ranged between $3,000 and $5,000. Today, 

consumers can purchase one of much higher quality for as little as 

$500. 

In the medical field, the price of Lasik eye surgery dropped from $4,000 per eye in 1998 when it was first approved by the FDA to 

as little as $300 today. 

No one, not even a Keynesian economist, would claim that the 

spectacular price deflation in these industries has been a bad thing 

for the U.S. economy. Indeed, the falling prices reflect the greater 

abundance of good which enhances the welfare of American consumers. 

Nor has price deflation in these industries diminished profits, 

production or employment. In fact, the growth of these industries 

has been as spectacular as the decline in the prices of their products. But if deflation is a benign development for both consumers 

and businesses in individual markets and industries, then why 

should we fear a fall in the general price level, which of course is 

nothing but an average of the prices of individual goods? 

The answer given by theory and history, is that a falling price 

level is the natural outcome of a dynamic market economy operating with a sound money like gold. 

Under a gold standard, prices naturally tend to decline as technological advance and investment in additional capital goods rapidly improve labor productivity and increase the supply of consumer goods while the money supply grows very gradually. For instance, throughout the 19th Century and up until World War I, a 

mild deflationary trend prevailed in the United States. 

As a result, an American consumer in the year 1913 needed only 

$0.79 to purchase the same basket of goods that required $1 to purchase in 1800. In other words, due to the gentle fall in prices during the 19th Century, a dollar could purchase 27 percent more, in 

terms of goods, in 1913 than it could in 1800. 

Contrast this with the current-day consumer who once paid $22 

for what a consumer in 1913 paid only $1 for. 

The secular fallen prices under the classical gold standard did 

not impede economic growth in the United States, in fact deflation 

coincided with the spectacular transformation of the United States 

from an agrarian economy, in 1800, to the greatest industrial 

power on earth by the eve of World War I. 

9 

Ironically, while Chairman Bernanke just reaffirmed again a few 

days ago that the Fed will persist in its inflationary policy of quantitative easing to ward off the imaginary threat of falling prices, 

signs of inflation abound. 

I will skip over, in my testimony, the review of inflation in the 

commodity markets which was given by Mr. Lehrman. But let me 

just add that as a result of skyrocketing prices of agricultural products such as corn, wheat, soybeans, and other crops, the price of 

farm land in the United States has been soaring, particularly in 

the Midwest, where land prices increased at double-digit rates last 

year and regulators now are fearing a bubble. 

And just today it was reported that wholesale food prices in the 

United States rose by 4 percent last month, the most in 46 years. 

That is since the stagflationary 1970s. 

Not only does Chairman Bernanke seem unfazed by these inflationary developments, but what is more astounding, he appears to 

welcome the rapid increase in stock prices as evidence that QE2 is 

working to right the economy. He seized on the Russell 2000 index 

of small cap stocks, which has increased 25 percent in the last 6 

months, stating, ‘‘A stronger economy helps smaller businesses.’’ 

In other words, despite the stagnant job creation and sluggish 

growth of real output, Mr. Bernanke has declared Fed policy a success on the basis of yet another financial asset bubble that threatens again to devastate the global economy. This would be farcical 

if it were not so tragic. But what else can be expected from a leader 

of an institution whose very rationale is to manipulate interest 

rates and print money. 

And I will just end on the following. Just today, hot off the presses, USA Today reported substantial evidence that a new tech bubble is starting to grow. Facebook is estimated to be worth $75 billion on private markets and is reported to be bidding against 

Google for a $10 billion purchase of Twitter. 

Over the last year, there have been 48 tech IPOs, which is 28 

percent of all deals. And the stock prices of these tech IPOs have 

jumped 19 percent on their first day of public trading. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Salerno can be found on 

page 48 of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. There are votes on the Floor, so we 

are going to take a recess, but we will be back shortly. 

[recess] 

Chairman PAUL. The committee will come back to order and we 

will go into the question session right now. I will start off by taking 

5 minutes for that. 

I do want to welcome once again, the three witnesses and I appreciate very much you being here, and talking about a very important subject. Not only for our business climate and our employment, but also for all Americans who suffer the consequences of rising prices. This hearing has been set up mainly to sort out the relationship of monetary policy and why prices go up. 

A lot of people, as I mentioned in my earlier statement, would 

like to blame everything else and try to avoid the Federal Reserve 

completely. But I do want to start off with a question about the opVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:32 May 27, 2011 Jkt 065679 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65679.TXT TERRIE
10 

posite of what people call inflation, and it was touched upon in the 

testimony, and that is the deflation. 

Deflation of course, for some of us, would mean that the money 

supply is shrinking as it did in the 1930s but other worry about 

prices going down and there is—I guess there are some people who 

justifiably worry about it especially when they are overextended 

and they have to pay their debts. But overall, if we are on a sound 

monetary system, if we are on a commodity standard it may well 

be that prices would go down. 

I would like to ask Professor Salerno to distinguish between 

these two, between deflating the money supply and prices going 

down and who then would best benefit if prices actually dropped? 

Mr. SALERNO. If we use deflation to mean falling prices, it is the 

mechanism by which people are benefitted, even on a fixed income, 

when we have increases in productivity, increases in productivity 

result from technological progress and more savings and investment in the economy. So workers become much more productive, 

more goods are produced in a given hour, and at the same wages 

their standards of living go up because their dollars become more 

powerful in exchange. 

If you prevent this drop in prices, then many people who were 

not involved in the original increase in productivity, people who are 

in other industries or people, especially on fixed incomes, people on 

pensions, and insurance policies, will benefit from the falling 

prices. Their real incomes go up. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. I want to ask Mr. Lehrman a question about the long-term effects of gold. You brought up the subject 

of gold and some of the advantages. There have been studies done 

with gold and stability of prices over long periods of times. Even 

with an imperfect gold standard, do we not have a fairly good 

record of stability in prices when it wasn’t a Fiat currency? 

Mr. LEHRMAN. We do, Mr. Chairman. If you will permit me to 

wave a piece of paper at you, in my testimony, I have charted the 

price of gold or the value of the dollar—was all that heard before? 

We do have the history of the general price level under the gold 

standard and I have prepared in my written testimony a chart 

which shows that since the end of the gold standard, that is to say 

the class of gold standard in 1914 on the eve of the First World 

War, the value of the dollar as measured by the CPI, adjusted for 

the available statistics, before 1920, has fallen to $0.05. The value 

of an ounce of gold in March, well on March 15th, or I should say 

even March 17th, today, 1910, was $20 per ounce of gold. 

On March 15th or March 17, 2011, one century later, the price 

of gold is approximately $1,400 per ounce. So the price of gold is, 

as it were, the reciprocal of the fall in the value of the dollar over 

the same period. 

During the history of the American Republic from let us say the 

Constitution of 1788, 1789, we can chart the price level quite accurately. And in my testimony I submit such a chart, with Coiny Jack 

of 1792, essentially Alexander Hamilton’s, Coiny Jack, the 1792, 

which made the dollar convertible to precious metal, primarily 

under the circumstance that the silver is first but by 1834 we were 

on to the gold standard. 

11 

If you take the price level under the gold standard, from 1834, 

and of course make the exception for the Civil War which went on 

for a very long period was a convertible of suspension. But if you 

take from 1834 until 1914, you will find under the gold standard 

that the general price level or the CTI as we would say today was 

exactly in the same position. 

In other words, over the long run, near a century, there was neither a fall in the general price level, siflation, as Professor Salerno 

might describe, nor was there any general inflation. So that is—in 

testing monetary theory, or even economic theories we have only 

one laboratory, it is the laboratory of human history. 

And in the laboratory of human history, we find that the gold 

standard, proven by the price level stability from 1834 until 1914 

for example, that the gold standard provides virtual stability in the 

price levels on the average level of general prices. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman and we will go on now 

to Mr. Luetkemeyer for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Grant, you 

made an interesting statement during your testimony that, ‘‘The 

only thing holding up our dollar was the faith in it.’’ Would you 

elaborate just a little on that, I have some agreement with you on 

that. And that I think that our whole system right now seems to 

be held together by the confidence that we will be able to pay 

something back and forth versus the actual collateralization, the 

actual asset backing of the actual—there being some value there. 

I think—it would appear to me that the whole system is held together by just the confidence between you and I, that we can do 

business versus the actual asset that is there. 

Could you elaborate a little bit on your statement and whether 

you think that is the right perception or not? 

Mr. GRANT. Yes, Congressman, I do. To a degree, every monetary 

system is faith-based. One must have confidence in the quality of 

the metal, if there is collateral behind the currency. 

Never, I think until the present day, has the world been on a 

system of pure paper. The dollar is the Coca Cola of monetary 

brands. It is a remarkable achievement in that it is today treated 

as good money, the world over, though the cost of production is essentially nothing. 

And this is a pretty flattering expression of confidence by the 

world in America and its institutions. However, faith must be continually refreshed. It is not perpetual. I think that the very size of 

this so-called quantitative easing program has crystallized doubts 

as to the nature of the currency and of its underlying value. 

In the language of modern finance, the dollar is a derivative. It 

used to derive its value from the collateral behind it, mainly gold. 

In 1971, if you were a foreign official institution, you presented 

your $35 to the Treasury and said you would prefer to have an 

ounce of gold and you got it. 

Over the past 40 years that has been of course, out the window. 

And so the dollar is in the language of modern finance, a kind of 

a nonsequitur; it is a derivative without an underlying asset. 

Sometime recently, a reader of the Financial Times wrote to the 

editor and said, ‘‘Sir, the scales have fallen from my eyes. I think 

I finally understand the meaning of quantitative easing. I think I 

12 

finally get it. What I no longer understand is the meaning of the 

word money.’’ 

I think the very size and the audacity and the physics of the project of materializing $600 billion effortlessly has captured the 

imagination and the doubt of the American people, and indeed of 

the world’s money-holding population. 

May I close with, to me, the greatest crystalizing, clarifying line 

about money in American literature, and it happens to be from a 

novel. It is a Laura Ingalls Wilder novel called, ‘‘Farmer Boy.’’ And 

this is a story of a boy growing up in Upstate New York, hard 

scrabble, dairy country, in which—campaigned for governor, he carried all of this country, by the way, with a huge majority. 

But Alonzo, this child turns up at the county fair and he asks 

his father very definitely for a nickel and his father miraculously 

materializes $0.50 from his pocket and he says to the kid, not 

wanting to let the moment pass without the moral instruction, he 

says, ‘‘You know what this is?’’ And the boy actually can’t think of 

anything to say. And the father says, ‘‘It is money, do you know 

what money is?’’ And the boy again, is silent. And the father says, 

‘‘Money is work.’’ And for the past 40 years, money has been a concept. It has been the project of a Ph.D., and I think the world 

would like it to be work. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay, along those lines, obviously the key too 

is considering it to erode the confidence in our dollar and right now 

the dollar is sort of the gold standard around the world. What happens if our dollar goes away or like some other people are trying 

to look to a different currency. How does that impact out country, 

in your view? 

As no longer being the standard— 

Mr. GRANT. I think we have to answer the question. I think we 

have to consider our unique privilege in creating a currency that 

is treated as good money the world over and which only we can 

lawfully create. This is called the Reserve Currency Privilege and 

both Professor Salerno and Mr. Lehrman have written really important stuff on this. But the nature of our franchise, of American 

franchise is that we import, we pay with our dollar bills created at 

essentially no marginal cost. 

These dollars we ship effectively to Wal-Mart suppliers in Asia, 

the dollars wind up, because the suppliers don’t need it, on the balance sheet of the central banks of our Asian creditors. The Asian 

creditors turn right around and buy Treasury securities. 

So it is as if the dollar has never left the 50 States. So that is 

what we have and if the world were to lose this astounding confidence in the institution of the Federal Reserve we would lose that 

franchise, this privilege of seignorage, this reserve, this—what was 

the last term they—exorbitant privilege. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Exorbitant privilege. 

Mr. GRANT. And we would quickly find that we, like Paraguay 

and other nations not uniquely blessed with a reserve currency 

would have to suffer a lower standard of living. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. Congressman, I wonder if I may just add a couple of numbers to the question? 

13 

Mr. LEHRMAN. May I interrupt? 

Chairman PAUL. Yes, you may, but I wanted to advise the members if they would like, there will be a second round of questioning, 

also. 

Yes, go ahead Mr. Lehrman. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Mr. Grant’s comment is so compelling, and I think 

the numbers themselves are illuminating. The official reserves of 

foreign central banks held in custody at the Federal Reserve System itself, published in the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve 

every Thursday evening at 4:00, those official reserves now amount 

to $3.5 trillion invested in U.S. Government securities, primarily in 

U.S. Treasuries, the residual in Federal agency securities. 

That just gives you a quantitative estimate of the mechanism 

that Mr. Grant just described. The best way also, if I might say, 

to think about this is that this is the credit provided to our government, to the Treasury in deficit by the purchases by foreign central 

banks who are mostly mercantilists wanting to maintain undervalued currencies. This is the credit provided to our U.S. Government. 

Until we end the official reserve currency system and, I might add, the unlimited discretion of the Federal Reserve to buy $600 

billion worth of U.S. Government securities in a mere 8-month period, until we end that, all efforts to control the deficit will be 

unavailing. 

All of the great conscientious efforts of so many of the Congressmen, especially freshman Congressmen, Republicans and I believe 

some Democrats too, all of them will be unavailing. We have gone 

through 40 to 50 years of every President declaring that he was 

going to reduce spending and the deficit, even President Reagan, 

a great President, wound up with deficits running somewhere between 3 percent and 7 percent output. 

The reason is that the U.S. Government grows through the deficit spending which is authorized and then it is financed in combination by the Federal Reserve System and the official reserves 

which are accumulated and reinvested in U.S. Treasury by foreign 

governments making limitless credit available. When limitless 

credit is available event to an individual, over a very long period 

of time, we can be assured that they will make use of it. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. 

Now, to Mr. Schweikert, from Arizona. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That limitless credit as an individual would be an interesting concept. 

Can I go—something I have ultimately wanted to ask and if our 

two—the two trading partners that actually buy most of our debt 

which is China and Japan, what happens—what sort of cascading 

effect, at all if there is, let us say Japan right now; bless them with 

their disasters and things they are facing, begins to have fairly 

substantial steps up in inflation. All we were seeing, regionally, 

rather aggressive inflation in areas of China, what potentially does 

that do in our inflation indexes? 

And could we actually start from the right and go left? 

Mr. SALERNO. I think the big danger is that if Japan needs extra 

imports and so on as their economy slows down in reaction to this 

disaster, and they begin to offload reserves of American currency 

14 

which are actually government securities, there could be a cascading effect as it puts downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. And 

if China does the same thing, then we are at the situation where 

there—the only thing that the U.S. Government can do to finance 

this deficit is to borrow from the American people. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. But that is also our bond prices functioning, 

start having to move up to be able to sell the product. That was 

actually going to be the second half of my question. 

But even just—let us say there was just a national inflation stepup within Japan and China. What do you see from just that in the 

price of the products being imported and exported? 

Mr. SALERNO. To the extent that China keeps its exchange rates 

with us, their prices would actually become higher in relation to us 

and we would actually have an increase in our exports and a decrease of imports from China. So for mercantilists, that would sort 

of be a good thing. 

So given the system of exchange rates that we have today, there 

would not be a huge impact on the U.S. price level of those developments. Although, the problems in Japan if their economy slows 

down, that would put an upward tick on world prices and there 

would be some effects on consumer prices here in the United 

States. 

Mr. GRANT. Agreed. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. No, no I appreciate brevity. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Agreed, Congressman. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay, now going back in the other direction. 

What if we actually start to see the nation of China, which is the 

second biggest buyer of our debt, now they have to start to begin 

to finance their own reconstruction so they no longer are participating as much in the U.S. debt market so now we have lost one 

of our customers. So we start to tick up our own bond rates. 

What do we face? 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Do we go from right to left? There are at least two 

alternatives. One would be that despite Japan not absorbing U.S. 

dollars in exchange for exports and then adding them to their official reserves, that other emerging countries who have absorbed 

enormous amounts of dollars in their banking systems and then 

into their official reserves, which have risen even more dramatically than Japan, in the last 10 years, that they too would absorb 

whatever Japan no longer absorbs. 

I might add that Japan had been out of the market for absorbing 

U.S. dollars and then investing them in U.S. Government securities 

in custody of the Fed for a good long while until recently, as the 

yen strengthened and they of course wanted to lower its value in 

order to maintain their valued export industries. 

The other possibility is that there was no other emerging country 

or major country willing to absorb the residual of the securities and 

were the United States balance of payments to remain the same, 

all fairly large assumptions, the dollar would then fall on the foreign exchanges until there was intervention by countries who did 

not want the dollar to become increasingly competitive in the export markets or until the Federal Reserve reduced the volume of 

credit they were issuing talk in the market especially the subsidizing of banks and the U.S. Treasury and deficit. 

15 

For a concrete example of that, that is exactly what Paul Volcker 

did in 1981, 1982. He imposed the most Draconian credit contraction in American history since the Great Depression, or least comparatively with all other recessions. He put the Fed’s fund rate up 

to 20 percent the prime rate hit 21 percent. 

Unemployment in New York State that Jimmy referred to, in 

1982, which was my year on the campaign, the unemployment rate 

in New York hit 11.2 percent. The unemployment nationally, in 

1982, under the Volcker credit contraction policy hit almost 11 percent nationally, higher than at any time during the so-called Great 

Recession. 

So that these two options, namely a great fall in the dollar with 

no residual buyer of excess foreign dollars in the foreign exchange 

markets, combined with Federal Reserve contractions, presents us 

with two unattractive alternatives. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, without objection, can I have 

another 60 seconds? 

Mr. GRANT. Briefly, the more birthday candles I blow out, the 

less certain I am about cause and effect with bond prices and interest rates. Paradox seems to govern many of these markets. For example, the difficulties, the tragedy in Japan has forced the yen not 

downward but upward as the Japanese repatriate assets from 

abroad to finance the holes in their income statements and balance 

sheets. To attempt to suppress the rise in the yen the Japanese 

buy more dollars. They help to finance our deficit even in the midst 

of their travail and our interest rates have been going down since 

1981. For 30 years, bond prices ostensibly have been rising and interest rates falling. 

I think probably that no matter what happens with respect to 

the dollar, no matter what happens with regard to these hearings 

or with the congressional approach to monetary policy, the chances 

are that the next 30 years would see more likely interest rates rising and falling. Interest rates have tended to rise and fall in generation length intervals since the late 19th Century. 

Mr. SALERNO. Foreign confidence in the dollar is precarious. So 

that if there is a drop in the dollar as the foreign demand for the 

dollar falls, I think what you are going to see is a cascading effect. 

There is already talk among China and Brazil and the president 

of the IMF of moving towards this sort of a gold-based reserve currency or a currency that has basket weight entities. 

But at that point, I think then it could be a vicious circle in 

which it feeds on itself, the dollar drops, if the Fed doesn’t contract 

the money supply what you will get is an explosion upward of import prices, no more cheap shopping at Wal-Mart. And it is so precarious, but a few years ago there is evidence that—now that drug 

dealers are beginning to offload their $100 bills, 80 percent of the 

$100 bills that are printed in the United States are not in the 

United States, they are financing drug deals they are hedging 

against inflation. 

And they are beginning to stop using them and they are replacing them with EUR 500 notes. So that is just sort of the first step. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, forgive me, but should I be worried about that? 

16 

Chairman PAUL. I think we all should be, and we should have 

been a long time ago. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Something about when the drug dealers have 

attended their monetary economic classes I—we are in trouble. But 

please, I interrupted. 

Mr. SALERNO. No, that is what I was going to say. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. I would like to talk a little bit about the measurement of price inflation. The government depends on this CPI, 

there is an old CPI and a new CPI. John Williams has spent some 

time as a free market person, trying to keep us honest about what 

the CPI is really doing. And of course traditionally, when the government makes reports, they talk about core CPI and they drop off 

those unessential things like food and energy and it seems like the 

markets very frequently accept whatever they say. 

‘‘Oh, inflation is only 2 percent; prices are only going up at the 

rate of 2 percent.’’ Of course, eventually, I think the numbers catch 

up, even with the government. In the 1970s, he did admit that 

prices were going up at a 15 percent rate. 

But my question is, talk a little bit about the difference about the 

CPI, how good is it, how accurate is it? Is it—does John Williams 

have a good point there, saying that the revamping of it—what do 

you all look at if you want to know how prices are going up? I know 

we all look at the CPI and the PBI and it seems to have the immediate effect, but where do you put your most importance, what 

price measurement do you use? 

All three of you, could you give me your comment? 

Mr. SALERNO. Varese’s once said that the housewife who just 

checks a few prices in the supermarket and keeps track of them is 

much more scientific than the arbitrary price indexes that are used 

by economists and statisticians. But I tend to look at something 

called median CPI which is calculated by the Cleveland Fed. It is 

not perfect and it shares some of the same problems as the CPI 

itself. But also I like to look at the raw prices of goods and what 

has happened over time, to them. 

I do want to mention that these adjustments are just ridiculous. 

We have a substitution bias adjustment which, if the price of prime 

beef goes up, they don’t include that increase; they reduce that and 

they say, ‘‘Well, people can eat chicken at a lower price.’’ So the full 

increase is not reflected. 

They have hedonic adjustments, if a car gets two-side airbags, 

‘‘The increase in the price of the car has to be reduced by the fact 

that it is a higher quality now.’’ And new technology adjustments, 

the iPad as someone talked about, when that comes into play, that 

is a deflating force. Despite the fact that other prices are going up 

at a certain rate, that rate is reduced for that reason. 

Chairman PAUL. Are there any other comments? 

Mr. LEHRMAN. I think it may be Mr. Williams’ research, Mr. 

Chairman, I am not sure, I cannot quote the author for certain, but 

in his research on the CPI, he used the methodology that was in 

force in 1980. And if one were to use the methodology in force in 

1980 without the hedonic adjustments, without the substitution effects and so much of the changes which have occurred, that the 

price level is increasing at approximately 8 percent by that methodVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:32 May 27, 2011 Jkt 065679 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65679.TXT TERRIE
17 

ology as opposed to the methodology presently adopted by the Bureau of Labor. 

And for purposes in our investment business, we pay no attention whatsoever to these fictitious Ph.D.-created mechanisms otherwise known as the CPI. Even the PPI leaves much to be desired 

up until—for the longest period of time, up until the Second World 

War, which was a period, certainly before the Great Depression, of 

the greatest economic growth the world had ever experienced, it 

was the Industrial Revolution. It was the Wholesale Price Index, 

which was used to measure the level of prices. 

The CPI and the PPI themselves aren’t innovations. So looking 

at commodity prices, looking at equity prices which themselves are 

articles of wealth in the market and are excluded from the CPI, 

means to anybody who is involved in business, corporate capital allocations, or if you will, in long-term investing, one has to ignore 

the publication on a monthly basis of the CPI and PPI and look at 

the actual prices in the market which serve as indicators of the 

cost of production of producing another article of wealth to the 

market. 

Chairman PAUL. Would it not be true that if they would use the 

CPI, wouldn’t some groups of people suffer more by rising prices, 

and other groups be more protected? Everybody is not going to be 

penalized the same way, even if we did look at those numbers. The 

average person might spend their money differently. If your income 

is $25,000 a year, the inflation rate might be much more painful 

than if you were making a couple of hundred thousand a year. 

Mr. GRANT. Or depending on your age, it—a younger person 

spends a great deal of his or her money on consumer electronics, 

that personal CPI is plummeting. He or she is in clover. It seems 

to me, and Professor Salerno will know whereas I am surmising, 

but it seems to me that the ancients posited that inflation is not 

too much money chasing too few goods, inflation is too much 

money, that which the money chases is variable. In one cycle, it 

might chase skirts at retail, and in another cycle, it might chase 

the Russell 2000 Stock Index. 

And I think the complacency of our masters, the Fed, with respect to inflation, has to do with their overlooking this most basic 

concept about inflation. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Conversely, if I may, with the—with respect to 

the younger generation and the amount of money they spend on 

technology, with ever falling prices, you have the entire world of 

emerging markets, not to mention middle-income families and 

poorer families in the United States driven from subsistence level 

to starvation by basic food prices. The milk price has doubled in 

the past year and a half. Food prices, we know, have risen, depending upon the supermarket, anywhere from 15 percent to 20 percent 

in basic foods. 

So, I believe that the political turmoil for example in North Africa, indeed all around the world, and some of the protests, the intensive protests about issues which in the past, in the United 

States have been received without quite the kind of ferocious protests, I think are related to the frustration that middle-income and 

poorer families all around the world are feeling. 

18 

As the political class is indifferent to what the effect of the commodity price is, the basic food and food prices have done to those 

on subsistence or near subsistence level, as they feel ever more the 

threat of starvation. 

Chairman PAUL. Mr. Schweikert. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, actually—is it pronounced 

‘‘Lehrman?’’ 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Actually, heading in that same direction, just— 

and I know this is a bit of a lark, and there are other components 

that go into that food price. While our farm policies in this country 

subsidize certain commodities crops—or make them more expensive 

around the world. I once sat down with some agricultural economists who basically said U.S. agricultural policy kills people in 

Sub-Saharan Africa. So when you talk about the food prices, particularly what we see around the world, and some of the protests 

breaking out, what is a combination of just purely organic inflation 

and also government policy. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Government subsidies in the agricultural sector, 

as you suggest Congressman, are themselves very controversial. In 

the end, if I can make it brief, it is a question of, compared to 

what? 

The common agricultural policy of the European Union causes, 

for example, corn prices and wheat prices and they too are great 

producers and exporters, to be about twice or more the level of 

basic agricultural prices in the United States because the United 

States farmer is the most efficient producer of all basic food goods 

and high-protein goods such as meat products, in the world. 

So, that the elimination of subsidies in the United States, it is 

true, might make the production, the total output of farm goods 

sometimes—in some areas in which we export 50 percent of our 

own output to the world at very cheap prices relative to the rest 

of the world, those subsidies might reduce the prices, but it is also 

true I think that the profitability of the industry would change and 

the supply therefore would contract in the U.S. market in general 

and thus make less of our output in the farm sector available for 

export to countries: (A) which do not product sufficient food to feed 

their population; or (B) have to buy much more expensive goods 

subsidized at much higher rates of subsidy from the European 

Union. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Lehrman, I know we are not doing agriculture, but isn’t there also, the flip side of that domestic agriculture in these foreign countries is also suppressed because we import a cheaper product than they can actually produce it domestically? 

Mr. LEHRMAN. If I understand the question, are they able to import U.S.— 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. No, no, yes, often our commodity hits the country often at a price that is sometimes below what they would domestically produce. And so therefore all— 

Mr. LEHRMAN. That is correct and that is because we produce it 

so cheaply in this country relative to the rest of the world. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. And therefore, if we hit any price bumps or 

those things there they have no domestic agricultural safety net? 

19 

Mr. LEHRMAN. They do not, in some countries, most countries 

have a—most countries that are well advised have a food sufficiency strategy, the Chinese being a particular and a good example 

of this. Whereby believing that they always have to be prepared for 

a war, that—and this used to be the United States’ policy, that food 

sufficiency in time of war, total war, was absolutely indispensable 

since only a blue water navy could fully protect the sea lanes in 

order to import food in the event it was blockaded by the enemy. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent 

for another minute or 2 minutes? 

Chairman PAUL. Granted, yes. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Now, back to what I was actually really hoping 

to ask. Okay, if I was a market observer and I have a fixation of 

watching bonds and bond futures, but I think one of those over 

there said as his birthdays move along he sometimes isn’t sure 

what those numbers really mean. If you were me and you are trying to watch the financial markets, where do I go to see a tell of 

both my future on interest rates and a tell of my future in inflation? Let us start from the far side and come back. 

Mr. SALERNO. I think the tell on inflation is the long-term bond 

markets which will crystalize inflationary expectations in the 

longer-term bonds. And I think contrary to what Chairman 

Bernanke and the Fed believed when they engaged, when they undertook QE2, long-term bond rates did not fall they went up. And 

that because of the expectations that were stimulated, of an inflation in the future. 

Mr. GRANT. With respect, I think that there is no long-term tell 

on anything, especially inflation, especially interest rates. Two examples from history, one in 1946, April, the long-dated U.S. trades 

at an astonishingly low 2.2 percent, 2.2 percent. At that time, the 

CPI was running in double-digits when General Marshall delivered 

his famous Marshall address at Harvard the next year, the CPI 

was even higher, close to 20 percent, bond yields rather lower, but 

Marshall was looking backwards. He was looking at the Depression 

and not forward to the prospects of a full generation of inflation 

and rising interest rates, observation number one. 

Observation number two is, in the spring of 1984, bond yields are 

quoted at 14 percent, 14 percent and the CPI is at 4 percent, the 

market was looking backward to the experience of the tumultuous 

and wholly profitless period, 35 years of a bear market in bonds, 

rising interest rates, 1946 to 1981. 

So the bond market to me is like an—it is like a badly trained 

waiter, looking at his shoes, looking left, not meeting your eye. He 

is—the bond market is an arbitrage market, that is it is priced, 

principally, I submit, off of the cost of financing a portfolio of bonds 

and not with regard to a possible scenario for the future. 

The stock market is meant to look forward, the bond market I 

think is rather present minded. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. Observation three, agreed on all the propositions 

that Mr. Grant just put forward. The one exception, I believe, on 

forecasting, would be that when an economy is fully employed, all 

resources—labor, capital, savings—are fully mobilized, the banking 

system is fully committed to full output and we are the authorities 

then because prices were advancing to establish wage and price 

20 

controls then I think as the—as you the observer or the bond investor or speculator, you could bet on a rising level of interest rates 

and thus a falling bond market in the future. 

And the example I would cite would be the infamous example of 

President Nixon deploying the Federal Reserve to pump up the 

money supply in 1971 on the verge of the 1972 elections. Having— 

on August 15, 1971, declared the dollar no longer convertible to 

gold. And in 1972 with the effects of the vast inflation which were 

developing as a result of the Fed policy, imposing wage and price 

control. 

We know what happens after that. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, can I ask that there be no more 

cursing like that. Those are dirty words. 

Chairman PAUL. Which words? 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Wage and price controls. 

Chairman PAUL. Oh. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me just because there is one. In the whole sort of discussion of tells and inflation and my fear of a classic sort of cascading event, it is sort of 

the miniature version of a black swan; we float much of our U.S. 

debt, very short term. Our WAM is, I think, actually somewhat 

dangerously short. If we start to hit some ticks on the short end 

of the curve, what—does that create a ratcheting affect both on interest rates and therefore inflation or should I just stop worrying 

about it? 

Mr. GRANT. No, you should really worry. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. You should worry substantially. The average maturity of the U.S. Treasury debt is approximately 4 years which is 

very short for a country which is approaching a level of direct debt 

equal to total national output. We are at the level of interest rates 

now subsidized by the Federal Reserve, despite their marginal rise, 

as Professor Salerno suggested, we are at the level of interest rates 

to rise close to market rates which are typical of full employment. 

The level of debt service payments would rise by an order of 

magnitude, consume that part of the Federal budget, the total Federal budget which today is almost unthinkable and could be only 

as little as 4 or 5 years away. 

And all of the talk about cutting $100 billion of spending would 

be consumed by the fact that the level of interest rates had risen 

from several hundred billion to as much as $700 billion, $800 billion. So the political leaders of our country, the Congress, need to 

worry very much about a rise in the level of interest rates from 

their present subsidized level to market interest rates associated 

with a more fully employed economy. 

Mr. GRANT. Think about how this might just look in retrospect. 

We are sitting here in 2011, we have a Federal Reserve that is suppressing money market interest rates, it is funds rate notoriously 

is zero. We are running $1.5 trillion a year, public deficit we are 

running deficit on current account of 3 percent to 4 percent, 5 percent, depending on the fiscal quarter, of GDP. We are enjoying generation low market interest rates and the measured rate of inflation as they measure it is comfortable. 

That is the moment—and one can imagine looking back on this 

moment saying, couldn’t we see that this was Nirvana that nothing 

21 

better was going to be coming down the pike. In fact, as Mr. 

Lehrman has suggested, market interest rates were going to revert 

to something like normal. So if the long-dated Treasury bond goes 

from 3.25 percent to 6 percent, and if money market interest rates 

go from zero to 3 percent, or 4 percent that presupposes an immense increase, as has been suggested, in the cost of financing 

these debts, these are the good old days with respect to interest 

cost. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Anything else to be shared? 

Mr. SALERNO. I agree with both Mr. Grant and Mr. Lehrman. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. All right. Thank you for your tolerance, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. You are welcome. Thank you. 

I have a couple more additional questions that I want to touch 

on before we adjourn. The opposition, those people who believe in 

a monetary system quite different than you describe, the people 

who believe in Fiat money and the creation of money out of thin 

air, do they deliberately have a purpose for dealing with the debt? 

We know that the debt won’t be paid, do they actually believe that 

it is a proper policy to liquidate the debt by just reducing the debt 

by devaluing the money because real debt goes down? 

If you have a $14 trillion debt and you can get inflation going 

again, because I sense when I talk to individuals at the Federal Reserve that they would sort of like inflation to come back. 

Do they ever actually in their writings describe that this is one 

way you can handle the debt? And likewise, is there ever an argument by those who believe in that system that this is one way you 

can lower real wages without lowering nominal wages? If there is 

a correction it is necessary, wages, maybe they should go down. 

But nobody can quite accept the idea of, we are going to lower 

your wages, but we will lower the real wage by inflating the currency. Do we have evidence that they actually use that as a policy? 

Would anybody care to answer that? 

Mr. SALERNO. In academic writings, increasingly they are talking 

about adjusting wages through the device of inflation. As far as the 

debt is concerned, it is hard to know people’s motives but the 

standard argument is that we owe much of it to ourselves and increasingly more to the rest of the world but that we would still, as 

a reserve currency, we can pay the rest of the world off by simply 

printing money to pay those debts. 

They don’t go on and say that in fact what we are really doing 

is repudiating the debt over time. 

Chairman PAUL. I have trouble, politically, as others would, to 

describe our position about what to do when a bubble forms. Those 

of us who believe in sound money don’t create the bubbles; they 

come from the excessive amount of credit that is created. 

But when the crisis hits and the bubble bursts, we can do a lot 

of things like we have done in the last 2 years—we just turn off 

the printing presses and the spending and hope that is going to 

take care of it. Others would argue that we just do nothing like we 

did in 1921. How do we handle this politically, because right now 

it is virtually impossible to talk to—people are saying, let us just 

not do anything. Any suggestions on how you present this to people 

who want to and feel compelled to do something? 

22 

Mr. GRANT. I have a modest suggestion speaking as a non-politician. I would suggest, as an interim step before the promulgation 

of a new gold standard, let us say as an interim step to that, I 

would suggest to the Congress, respectively, that the Congress admonishes the Federal Reserve to speak in plain language, in plain 

English. For example, ‘‘quantitative easing’’ should be called money 

printing. ‘‘Quantitative easing’’ should not be allowed in the official 

discourse. 

Similarly, the chairman used the phrase ‘‘portfolio balance channel’’ to convey the Fed’s intentions to manipulate stock prices higher. In place of ‘‘portfolio balanced channel,’’ I would suggest the 

Congress admonish the Fed to use the term ‘‘thimble rigging,’’ an 

ancient Wall Street term, or a little more clinically, ‘‘manipulation.’’ 

So if we talk about money printing and manipulation, the public 

will understand what is afoot. These three-dollar words signify 

nothing, and I think that Congress should outlaw them. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. I wish not to assail the motives of any man. But 

I would say, directly, in answer to your question, Dr. Paul, that it 

is not, I think, correct to blame or to assign motives to those who 

are manipulating the monetary system. We live in America, in a 

world of institutions that were created over time and created a set 

of facts and circumstances in which men and women find themselves operating. 

The academics believe that the Federal Reserve System should 

be a form of the GOSS plan; it should be sort of general manager 

of the national economy if not the world economy. But they have 

been trained to think that way. In the economics department of almost every graduate school, this is the way they are trained to 

think. They are either neo-Keynesians or they are members of, if 

you will permit me to say it, the discredit moniterus school. 

So that it is sufficient to say that the system is flawed, it is imperfect that the Federal Reserve manipulates interest rates as well 

as the money supply. That foreign officials, the governments are financing the Treasury, creating inflation, without attributing base 

motives to the individuals who are operating in a set of institutions 

which were bequeathed to them sort of by chance or by historical 

developments rather than by any satanic design. 

Mr. SALERNO. From an academic perspective, Keynesian economics and even the moniterus have no place for bubbles in their theories. They deal with the effect of the money supply on current production and employment, and so on. So that when Chairman 

Greenspan made a statement that—in the early part of the last 

decade, there is no bubble, you wouldn’t know if there was one and 

if there was one we wouldn’t do anything about it because it would 

cause recession. 

Most macroeconomists agreed with him. Now, that is starting to 

change and they are starting to cast around for some sort of an explanation of bubbles. But what they have seized on now is 

irrationalities in the markets which certainly from the off stream 

perspective, it is not true. What we look at is the manipulation of 

the interest rate by the Fed, there is a ready explanation for the 

creation of bubbles. 

Chairman PAUL. I had a Federal Reserve Board Chairman testify 

before the committee that the gold standard had some merits but 

23 

it was unnecessary because central bankers have now learned how 

to manage a Fiat currency in a manner in which it would mimic 

the gold standard. Would anybody care to comment about where 

the flaw is in that thinking? 

Mr. LEHRMAN. I am anxious to comment on that, Dr. Paul. 

Under—and I must say Mr. Greenspan made the same insipid remark. Mr. Greenspan and Mr. Bernanke will have to then explain 

why it was that two of the greatest booms in American history, and 

two of the greatest panics and busts in American financial history, 

occurred under their 25-year watch. 

We have the just unparalleled boom in the U.S. equity market 

focused on the Internet stocks of the late 1990s and a collapse 

under Mr. Greenspan’s tutelage of not only the stock market but 

a fall in the economy and a rise in unemployment. This is not what 

Mr. Greenspan, I think, believes would be the characteristics of an 

economy regulated with a stable price level, under the gold standard. 

And equally, Mr. Bernanke himself, who was the Vice Chairman 

of the Fed under Mr. Greenspan, would have to explain the near 

catastrophic boom generated by the Federal Reserve in the real estate market in the United States among other markets. The great 

panic and the bust which have then led to Mr. Grant’s quantitative 

easing one, two and— 

Mr. GRANT. Money printing. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. —money printing, one, two, one and two. So that 

this is just an—it is incredible that a responsible academic economist from Princeton or one preceding him, from NYU, could have 

the temerity to suggest. 

All of their 25 years presiding over the U.S. monetary system is 

a witness to the contrary. 

Mr. GRANT. I would say something a little bit different, and I 

would echo Mr. Lehrman’s earlier observation that gold standard 

is the least imperfect system, but it is not people-proof. Long before 

the Federal Reserve was conceived, let alone enacted, we saw plenty of booms and busts. We got rich we got poor, there was a terrific 

boom in Great Plains farm land in the 1880s, Moody’s hadn’t even 

been invented. 

For a really fouled-up economy, you don’t need anything except 

people; that goes without saying. But what the gold standard did 

was to introduce an element of reciprocal movement in money from 

one country to the next, in one country that participated in the 

gold standard to the next. 

So I think the telltale feature of our present day landscape that 

shows you how far we have come from the gold standard is the existence of the 3 trillion and counting dollar bills on the balance 

sheets of our mercantilist counterparts, counterparties, in Asia. 

That never happened, it couldn’t have happened in the gold 

standard because creditors and debtors exchanged cash to clear 

trades. 

The failure of AIG is so instructive in this respect. AIG, this immense insurance company with this ever so brilliant financial products group, didn’t do one thing. It didn’t mark its positions to market. Finally came the day of judgment and it argued with Goldman 

Sachs about what these things were worth, AIG said 100 cents on 

24 

the dollar, Goldman Sachs said not close, Goldman Sachs won that 

debate and AIG failed. 

As with AIG and Goldman Sachs, so it is today with the United 

States and its Asian trading partners. We never clear our trades. 

Our dollars go there, and they come right back here. We run 25 

consecutive years of debts on a current account and there will be 

for us, as there was for AIG, a moment in truth in which we must 

settle. 

Mr. SALERNO. I just want to add that the statement that you 

quoted by the Fed Chairman shows a complete innocence of any familiarity with the history of monopolies. The Federal Reserve has 

a legal monopoly of printing money. In history, every monopolist 

that has been granted a legal monopoly has used it. 

Now, they could use it for motives they believe are altruistic. You 

can use it to cure unemployment or think you can use it for that. 

Or to keep interest rates low. But the point is, even if Mother Teresa was reincarnated and was given this monopoly, she would use 

it to print money to feed poor people, but the effects would be exactly the same: bubbles; manipulated interest rates; and inflation. 

Mr. LEHRMAN. I want to demur. I think Mother Teresa would be 

a sound money lady. 

Chairman PAUL. I want to thank our very excellent panel for 

participating in this very important hearing. 

I have a couple of announcements before we adjourn. Without objection, all members’ opening statements will be made a part of the 

record. The Chair notes that some members may have additional 

questions for these witnesses which they may wish to submit in 

writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 

30 days for members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

March 17, 2011 

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