FM 3-09.12 

MCRP 3-16.1A 

Tactics, Techniques, 

And Procedures for Field Artillery 

Target Acquisition

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 144 000085 00
Preface

This publication contains the doctrine, organization, tactics, 

techniques, and procedures required to manage field 

artillery target acquisition (TA) organizations, systems, 

personnel and equipment. It updates information formerly 

contained in FM 6-121 and incorporates emerging doctrine 

and information about targeting, the military decision 

making process (MDMP), new equipment, and Advanced 

Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) 

considerations as they apply to the functions performed by 

the targeting officer and the radar section leader. 

The material contained in this manual applies to all 

personnel involved in the targeting and target acquisition 

process. These personnel include: 

• Maneuver commanders and their staffs. 

• Field artillery commanders and their staffs. 

• Fire support element (FSE personnel). 

• Members of division artillery and FA brigade 

tactical operations centers. 

• Personnel assigned to target acquisition batteries, 

target acquisition detachments, and radar platoons. 

• Other personnel involved in the targeting or 

intelligence processes. 

This manual describes current and emerging TA 

organizations. These organizations include target 

acquisition batteries and radar platoons of active and 

reserve components, the corps target acquisition 

detachment (CTAD), radar platoons of the interim brigade 

combat team (IBCT) and interim division artillery 

(IDIVARTY), and the STRIKER platoon. Technical and 

tactical considerations for employing weapons locating 

radars are discussed in detail. This includes the AN/TPQ47 that is currently being developed. New information 

contained in this manual includes duties and 

responsibilities for key TA personnel, rehearsals, stability 

operations and support operations, rotary and fixed wing 

radar movement procedures, and automated target data 

processing. The methodology used by weapons locating 

radars to acquire, track and locate threat weapon systems is 

also discussed. 
Users at different echelons will focus on different chapters 

and appendices based on their specific mission 

requirements and operational focus. Chapter 1 discusses 

targeting, MDMP, and rehearsals from a target acquisition 

viewpoint. Chapters 2 and 3 provide information about TA 

organizations and TA personnel duties and responsibilities. 

Chapter 4 is focused on the technical aspects of employing 

weapons locating radars and the associated requirements. 

Chapter 5 discusses tactical employment and management 

of radar systems. This chapter provides information 

required for commanders and their staff to effective employ 

radars in support of military operations. Finally, Chapter 6

discusses stability operations and support operations and 

associated radar employment considerations. The 

information in the supporting appendices provides the 

additional technical information and procedures required to 

facilitate the effective employment of radar systems. 

The provisions of this publication are the subject of the 

following North Alantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and Quadripartite 

Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs): 

• 2008/503, Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring, and 

Location Reports. 

• 2029/514, Methods of Describing Ground 

Locations, Areas, and Boundaries. 

The proponent of this publication is Commandant, US 

Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), ATTN: 

Requirements Development Determination and Integration 

(ATSF-FD), Fort Sill, OK 73503-5600. 

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns 

and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. 
FM 3-09.12 (FM 6-121)

MCRP 3-16.1A

21 JUNE 2002

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

 

 

 

 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff

Official:

 Administrative Assistant to 

the 

Secretary of the Army

 0215608

 

 

 

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be

distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 110068, requirements for FM 3-

09.12. 

 

 

By direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

EDWARD HANLON JR.

Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps 

Commanding General 

 

 
Chapter 1 

Targeting, Target Acquisition, and the Military 

Decision Making Process 

This chapter provides an overview of targeting fundamentals, field 

artillery target acquisition processes, and target acquisition integration into 

the military decision making process (MDMP). Target acquisition, by 

nature, is an integral part of the targeting process and requires the 

interaction among many groups within a given organization. Field artillery 

target acquisition plays a key role in the targeting process. Without 

accurate targeting data, indirect fire systems are of limited value. 

Targeting is a command responsibility that requires the participation of 

key members of maneuver and field artillery coordinating and special 

staffs. It is a critical component of the MDMP that focuses battlefield 

operating systems to achieve the commander's intent. As such, the 

targeting process focuses on mission requirements. The mission, 

commander's intent and guidance drive the targeting process. These inputs 

allow unit personnel to determine the targets to be engaged, how to locate 

and track the targets, when and how to engage the targets, along with 

determining if, when, and how target assessment will be accomplished. 

The methodology used to drive the targeting process is Decide, Detect, 

Deliver and Assess (D3A). This chapter discusses D3A, the role of field 

artillery target acquisition (TA) and how TA fits into the MDMP process. 

DEFINITION OF TARGETING 

Targeting is the part of the military decision making process used to focus 

battlefield operating systems (BOSs) to achieve the commanders intent. 

The methodology used to translate the commander's intent into a plan is 

decide, detect, deliver, and assess. The functions associated with this 

methodology help the commander decide what to attack, how to acquire 

those targets, and when those targets are acquired, how to attack them in a 

way that disrupts, delays or limits the enemy's ability to achieve his 

objectives. Simply stated, targeting is the process of selecting targets and 

matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational 

requirements and capabilities.

TARGETING METHODOLOGY 

Targeting is a combination of intelligence functions, planning, battle 

command, weaponeering, operational execution and combat assessment 

(CA). The D3A methodology facilitates the attack of the right target at the 

right time with the most appropriate asset. Integral to this process is target 

tracking. Tracking is essential to the detect and deliver functions. Tracking 
also impacts the ability to assess a target and implement subsequent 

reattack decisions. Targeting is a continuous process that maintains pace 

with the dynamics of an ever-changing battlefield situation. In addition to 

the enemy situation, the inputs that drive this process come from higher 

headquarters' plans and orders. Specifically, they are the mission, intent, 

and specified/implied tasks. 

DECIDE

The first and most important step in the targeting process is the decide 

function. Deciding the targets to be attacked provides the overall focus and 

sets priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning. Targeting 

priorities must be set for each phase or critical event of an operation. 

Successful targeting is directly related to the commander's battle plan. 

Therefore, the targeting team must understand the unit's mission. This 

understanding starts with mission analysis. Once the commander and staff 

complete the mission analysis, the commander issues the restated mission. 

The restated mission is the starting point for the targeting process. 

Key to the decide function is the intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(IPB). During this process, situational templates and event templates are 

developed and used to ascertain suspected enemy locations and 

movements for targeting purposes. IPB identifies the enemy courses of 

action (COA) and subsequent high value targets (HVT) are identified from 

a target value analysis (TVA). HVTs are those targets or assets believed to 

be essential for the enemy commander to accomplish his mission. As the 

MDMP continues friendly COAs are developed and wargamed. As a 

result of wargaming, HVTs whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the 

success of the friendly plan are identified. These targets are high payoff 

targets (HPT). Effective engagement of HPTs is essential to the successful 

execution of the friendly COAs. The inability to acquire or achieve the 

specified effects against a HPT always requires a reassessment of the 

friendly COA to make adjustments based on a changed enemy situation. 

Several products are developed during the decide phase of targeting. 

These products are: 

• High-payoff target list (HPTL) - a prioritized list of HPTs. 

• Intelligence collection plan (ICP) - answers the commander's 

priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence 

requirements (IR). This includes HPT designated as PIR. 

• Target selection standards (TSS) - designated target location 

accuracy, target posture and time requirements that must be met 

before attacking a target. Targets not meeting TSS requirements 

are considered target indicators and aren't attacked. 
• Attack guidance matrix (AGM) - document addressing which 

targets will be attacked, how when and the desired effects. The 

commander approves this product. 

In addition, other products are developed or refined during the decide 

phase. They include, but are not limited to: 

• Decision support template (DST). 

• Targeting synchronization matrix (TSM). 

• Combat assessment (CA) requirements. 

• Target nominations - air interdiction (AI), Army Tactical Missile 

System (ATACMS), electronic warfare (EW) etc. 

As a result of the decide function, the targeting team will determine which 

targets will be acquired and attacked to meet the commander's intent; 

when and where (time and space) they may be found and by whom; how 

the targets will be acquired and attacked; assessment requirements; and the 

synchronization of sensors and attack systems with the scheme of 

maneuver. This results in the tasking of TA assets. The targeting 

synchronization matrix identifies targets designated for acquisition by 

field artillery TA assets. 

DETECT

Detect is the next critical function in the targeting process. The detect 

function translates target priorities developed during the decide function 

into the ICP and TA tasking contained in the operations order (OPORD). 

The G2 or S2 is the primary staff section directing the effort to locate and 

identify HPTs. The collection manager oversees this effort and directs the 

tasking of acquisition assets against appropriate targets. Since there aren't 

enough assets to detect all targets, prioritization is essential. Therefore, 

radar schedules and zones are established to support the detection effort 

with focus on PIR and HPTs. It is essential that all acquisition assets be 

used effectively and efficiently. Duplication of effort must be avoided 

unless it is required to confirm a target. At the division, the analysis and 

control element (ACE) manages the collection plan to avoid duplication. 

The analysis and control team (ACT) manages the collection plan at the 

brigade. 

HPTs must be detected in sufficient time to synchronize their attack with 

the commander's battle plan. Precise taskings must be given to acquisition 

systems designated to detect a specific target. Mobile targets must be 

detected and tracked until they are attacked. Further, tracking of mobile 

targets must be planned in sufficient detail to allow the handoff of a target 

from one collection asset to another when required. Tracking priorities are 
based on the commander's concept of the operation and targeting 

priorities. 

Once detected, targets are passed to the fire support element (FSE) for 

engagement. The FSE passes the target to the appropriate command or 

asset for execution. HPTs may be passed directly from a sensor to a firing 

unit when authorized by the maneuver commander. This is accomplished 

by establishing a sensor-to-shooter link. This is a useful technique for 

engaging critical targets with a short dwell or target decay time. 

Targets and suspected targets may be passed to the targeting team by a 

number of means. It is essential that the proper information be passed to 

facilitate analysis and attack. As a minimum, target reports should include: 

• Reporting agency. 

• Date-time group (DTG) of the sensor acquiring the target. 

• Description of the activity. 

• Size and orientation of the target. 

• Target location and altitude. 

• Target location error (TLE). 

• Dwell time. 

• Target posture (stationary or rate and direction of movement). 

The information from the target report is compared with the TSS. If the 

TSS requirements are met, the target is attacked. 

DELIVER

The deliver function of the targeting process executes the target attack 

guidance supporting the commander's battle plan. The attack of targets 

must satisfy the attack guidance developed during the decide function. 

Successful target attack implements tactical and technical delivery 

decisions and supporting actions. The attack of a target starts with the 

review of the attack guidance. Initially, the target to be attacked is 

validated. Validation includes reviewing the acquisition system and its 

associated accuracy, time of acquisition, and target posture. The validated 

target is passed to a designated delivery unit/system for attack. Depending 

upon the delivery system, other factors warrant consideration. These 

include weather, Class III and V availability, planning time, SEAD 

capability, risk, coordination requirements, fire support coordinating 

measures (FSCM), and notification of unit/system conducting battle 

damage assessment (BDA). 

ASSESS
Physically assessing effects resulting from the application of military force 

is a necessary task. Assessment is conducted either by direct observation 

or estimating damage based on the munitions delivered, target 

characteristics and target location error (TLE). Damage assessments 

provide the commander with information that expresses target damage on 

the basis of overall mission accomplishment. CA is used to determine the 

success of force employment during military operations. The requirements 

for CA are identified during course of action development and wargamed 

to ensure they can be executed. CA consists of three elements: 

• BDA. 

• Munitions effects assessment (MEA). 

• Re-attack recommendation. 

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the 

application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a target. 

BDA is further analyzed to provide an objective assessment of effects 

against the enemy in relation to the friendly COA. The commander uses 

CA, to obtain a snapshot of his effects on the enemy. It provides an 

estimate of the enemy's remaining combat capabilities and intentions after 

attack. This helps the commander determine if the targeting effort is 

accomplishing his objectives. As part of the CA process, BDA helps 

determine if target re-strike is necessary. BDA requirements are identified 

during the decide phase and are included in the intelligence collection 

plan. BDA has three components: 

• Physical damage assessment. 

• Functional damage assessment. 

• Target system assessment. 

Physical damage assessment estimates the quantitative effects of physical 

damage from blast, fire or fragmentation expressed as a percentage of the 

target damaged. Often, a unit's focus for BDA stops here. Information 

from physical damage assessment is sometimes displayed using a killboard or other type of scorecard. BDA should include all three of its 

components to provide the commander with useful information. 

Functional damage assessment estimates the effect of attack on a targets 

ability to perform its intended mission, when compared to operational 

objectives established against the target. This assessment uses multiple 

intelligence sources to determine the amount of time required for the 

enemy to replace capabilities lost during the attack. 

Target system assessment is an overall assessment of targeting 

effectiveness against an entire target system such as enemy fire support. 

The same assessment can be applied to a specific unit. Unlike the 
functional damage assessment, target system assessment is a relatively 

permanent assessment. 

MEA is conducted concurrently with BDA. MEA is used to determine if 

adjustments are needed to attack recommendations. MEA may result in a 

modification of the weapon system, attack methodology, munitions and/or 

delivery parameters used to attack a target. 

The re-attack decision is the final step in CA. Based on BDA and MEA, 

the targeting team considers the level to which operational objectives have 

been achieved through the targeting process. Recommendations for reattack are presented to the commander based on this analysis. 

Results from the assess function often require changes to plans and 

decisions. This may result in the update of several products from the 

decide phase. These include: 

• IPB products. 

• HPTL. 

• TSS. 

• AGM. 

• Intelligence collection plan (ICP). 

• Operations plans and orders. 

TARGETING MEETINGS 

The targeting meeting is a critical event in a unit's battle rhythm, the 

timing of which serves to nest the unit's battle rhythm into the higher 

headquarters' targeting process. It should be the minimum length required 

to present targeting information, situation updates, provide 

recommendations and obtain decisions. The purpose of targeting meetings 

is the same regardless of the level at which they are conducted. The major 

differences are the time focus, the number of targeting team members, and 

the available assets. The basic procedures for conducting targeting 

meetings are the same. This discussion focuses on the maneuver brigade 

since it has the widest applicability to FA target acquisition personnel. 

The targeting meeting brings the targeting team together to synchronize 

the targeting process and obtain approval for and/or changes to the 

targeting products. It focuses and synchronizes the unit's combat power 

and resources toward finding, tracking, attacking and assessing HPTs. 

Purposes of a targeting meeting include: 

• Verifying and updating the HPTL. 

• Verifying, updating and re-tasking available collection assets for 

each HPT. 
• Allocating delivery systems to engage each target. 

• Confirming the assets tasked to assess the target once attacked. 

• Identifying target nominations for attack by division or joint assets. 

• Synchronizing lethal and non-lethal assets to include information 

operations (IO). 

The timing of the targeting meeting is crucial. It must be effectively 

integrated into the unit's battle rhythm and nested into the higher 

headquarters' targeting cycle to ensure that the results of the targeting 

process can be implemented. Thus task organization changes, 

modifications to the reconnaissance, surveillance and security (RS&S) 

plan, air tasking order (ATO) nominations, changes to the HPTL and 

essential fire support tasks (EFST) all must be made with the awareness of 

the time available to prepare and execute. 

Preparation and focus are keys to successful targeting meetings. Each 

representative must come to the meeting prepared to discuss available 

assets, capabilities, limitations and assessment requirements related to 

their staff area. This means participants must conduct detailed prior 

coordination and be prepared to bring inputs and/or information with 

them. This preparation must be focused around the commander's intent 

and a solid understanding of the current situation. At the maneuver 

brigade, the following are typical inputs by targeting team members: 

• S2: 

– Current enemy situation. 

– BDA for targets engaged since last meeting. 

– Current RS&S plan. 

– Planned enemy courses of action (situation template). 

– Collection assets available and those that must be 

requested from higher. 

• S3: 

– Current friendly situation. 

– Maneuver assets available. 

– Current combat power. 

– Requirements from higher headquarters. 
– Changes to commander's intent. 

– Changes to task organization. 

– Planned operations. 

• FSO: 

– HPTL, TSS, AGM or a consolidated matrix. 

– Changes to the EFST. 

– Fire support assets available. 

– Proposed HPTL, TSS, AGM, EFST for time period 

discussed. 

– Recommended changes to FSCM for period being 

discussed. 

• Targeting Officer: 

– HPTs that have been attacked and associated BDA. 

– Radar status. 

– Active radar zones. 

– Counterfire acquisitions. 

• Other Staff Products: The specific situation dictates the extent of 

the remaining targeting team members' participation. They must be 

prepared to discuss in detail their own BOS assets and capabilities, 

the integration of their assets into targeting decisions, and the 

capabilities and limitations of enemy assets within their BOS. 

The XO is responsible for keeping the meeting focused. He describes the 

agenda and specifies the time period to be addressed. He is the arbitrator 

of any disagreements that may arise and ensures the meeting stays on track 

with the stated purpose and agenda. Table 1-1 shows an agenda with the 

information covered by core targeting team members. 

Table 1-1. Targeting Meeting Agenda

AGENDA
WHO WHAT

S2 

Representative 

- Weather 

- Enemy situation and decision points (event 

template) 

- BDA for targets engaged since last meeting 

- Analysis of enemy most likely and dangerous 

COAs for next 24-36 hrs 

- Recommended changes to PIR 

- Briefs RS&S plan 

S3 

Representative 

- New requirements from higher HQ 

- Summarizes current situation 

- Provides status of combat power 

- CDRs guidance and intent 

- Planned OPS during the focus period 

FSCOORD or 

FSO 

(ALO) 

- Briefs current TGT products: HPTL, AGM, 

TSS, EFST etc. 

- Status of fire support (FS) assets 

- Approved preplanned air requests and TGTs 

planned for next 2 ATO cycles 

- Proposed HPTL with TGT locations for 

concurrence and approval 

- Recommend, in conjunction with (ICW) the 

ALO, changes to working preplanned air requests 

Targeting 

Officer 

- Briefs HPTs that have been attacked and 

associated BDA 

- Provided radar status and active radar zones 

- Briefs counterfire situation 
EW Officer - Brigade EW plan 

Brigade XO - Approve/modify proposed CCIR, force 

protection priorities, RS&S plan, HPTs, CAS/AI 

nominations 

Once everyone understands the enemy's most likely COA for the next 24-

36 hours, the state of current operations in relation to the plan, and the 

targets recommended as HPT, the XO leads the team through the D3A 

process for that time period. This includes: 

• Deciding and prioritizing which collection asset will detect and 

trigger the target attack. 

• Determining where the target will be found. 

• Determining which system will attack the target and the effects to 

be achieved. 

• Deciding when and where the target will be attacked. 

• Determining assessment requirements to include the system to 

assess effects and when the assessment must be provided. 

• Determining re-attack criteria. 

Once all targeting decisions are made and the commander's approval is 

obtained, new fragmentary orders (FRAGO) and taskings are prepared and 

disseminated. 

THE ROLE OF FIELD ARTILLERY TARGET ACQUISITION 

Field Artillery (FA) target acquisition plays a key role in the targeting 

process. Without accurate targeting data, indirect fire systems are of 

limited value. 

Weapons locating radars (WLR) are one of the primary means of locating 

enemy indirect fire systems. Tasks for WLRs are integrated into the ICP 

developed during the decide phase of the targeting process. These tasks 

often support EFSTs. Radar taskings are identified in the TA Tab of the 

field artillery support plan (FASP) in the radar execution matrix. When 

appropriate, tasks are noted on the DST for special actions at specific 

points in the battle. Specific functions of WLRs include: 

• Locating enemy indirect systems and generating artillery target 

intelligence. 

• Locating enemy indirect fire systems and generating fire missions. 

• Registering and adjusting friendly artillery and mortars. 

• Validating the location of friendly fires. 
• Providing target intelligence and information to allow friendly

forces to take force protection measures while generating fire 

missions to attack enemy indirect fire systems. 

RELATIONSHIP OF TARGETING TO MDMP 

Targeting is a commander-driven process and starts with the receipt of the

mission. As the targeting process develops, each targeting function occurs 

simultaneously and sequentially. 

Initially, the decide function coincides with the MDMP from the mission 

analysis through the issuing of the approved plan or order. The detect 

function starts with the commander's approval of the plan or order and is 

accomplished during execution of the plan or order. Once detected, targets 

are attacked and assessed as required. After an operation commences, the 

targeting process becomes cyclic with all the functions happening 

simultaneously. Targeting meetings are used as a vehicle to focus the 

targeting process within specified time periods. Figure 1-1 shows the 

relationship between the D3A methodology and the MDMP along with 

products generated during the targeting process. 

Figure 1-1. Relationship of Targeting to the MDMP

TARGET ACQUISITION INTEGRATION INTO THE MDMP 

The target acquisition planning process must be integrated into the fires 

planning process and the MDMP if TA assets are to be effectively 

employed. TA planning starts when the mission is received and continues 

throughout the entire D3A process. The targeting officer must be focused 

on the requirements for TA systems throughout this process. 
RECEIVE THE MISSION/MISSION ANALYSIS

The targeting officer starts his mission analysis as soon as the initial 

warning order is received. The targeting officer gathers all the information 

pertinent to TA assets for incorporation into the fire support estimate. This 

happens concurrently with the mission analysis. TA information contained 

in the fire support estimate includes a detailed status of all radars, strikers, 

reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Pertinent information about radars 

should include: 

• Status of all assigned and attached radars. 

• Current radar locations. 

• Anticipated support requirements including: 

– Position areas. 

– Personnel. 

– Survey. 

– MET. 

– Communications. 

– Maintenance. 

– Security. 

– Classes of supply. 

This information is updated throughout the fires planning and MDMP 

process. 

During mission analysis the targeting officer reviews the order based on 

the commander's intent, concept of operation, areas of operations and 

interest, tasks, limitations, constraints, and anticipated enemy actions that 

may require special consideration. This identifies the amount of available 

time and the specified, implied and essential tasks. Time considerations 

are important because time dictates when STRIKERs and radar need to 

deploy to support the mission. The essential tasks become the foundation 

for EFST and essential field artillery tasks (EFAT) that will ultimately 

specify how TA assets will be employed. 

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
The targeting officer participates in COA development at the maneuver 

unit TOC with the FSO and the FSCOORD. This ensures that FS 

planning, and ultimately TA planning, is fully integrated into the 

maneuver MDMP. As a result of the COA development process, EFST 

and EFAT are developed to support each COA developed. These 

determine the requirements for radar coverage, zones, triggers, radar 

position areas, movement requirements, cueing agents and risks to the 

radars. This information is incorporated into the COA sketch and 

statement, and the RS&S plan. The COA analysis culminates with a COA 

brief to the commander. The commander issues his guidance and 

adjustments are made to each COA. 

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING) 

During wargaming, each COA is analyzed independently to determine if 

they are executable. Every individual EFST and EFAT is analyzed and 

decision points determined. Wargaming often results in adjustments to the 

COA and changes to TA requirements. During the wargame, every task 

assigned to a TA asset is analyzed for feasibility. TA tasks and actions are 

modified, if required, and recorded on the appropriate DST or 

synchronization matrix. 

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND APPROVAL

After completion of COA analysis, each COA is compared against a 

predetermined set of criteria designed to identify which COA best 

accomplishes the mission. The COA that best accomplishes the mission 

becomes the basis for recommending a COA to the commander during the 

COA decision brief. Once the commander makes his decision and issues 

his guidance, the staff makes any adjustments to the COA that might be 

required. The targeting officer then makes any required adjustments to TA 

coverage and employment requirements. A final warning order is sent to 

subordinates and the information (TA plan) from the MDMP process is 

used in the development in the operations order or plan. The TA plan 

developed during the MDMP becomes part of the fire support annex and 

TA Tab. The positioning and activities of strikers become part of the 

finalized RS&S and observation plans. The publishing of plans and orders 

completes the initial MDMP. TA planning and coverage is continually 

updated and refined throughout the operation as part of the D3A process. 

REHEARSALS 

TA personnel must have an understanding of the different types of 

rehearsals, rehearsal techniques, and the role that they play during 

rehearsals. The radar section leader and targeting officer regularly 

participate in combined arms rehearsals and support rehearsals. The 
specific rehearsals are the combined arms rehearsal, fire support rehearsal, 

and FA unit and technical rehearsals. The fire support rehearsal should 

always be conducted prior to the combined arms rehearsal. Further, the FA 

and FA technical rehearsals should be conducted prior to the fire support 

rehearsal if possible. A detailed discussion of rehearsals is at Appendix J. 

RADAR CONSIDERATIONS FOR AFATDS GUIDANCES 

Guidances contain information used in the decision making processes of 

AFATDS. These guidances affect the manner in which AFATDS 

processes information received from radar and other observers. They can 

be used to supply information, impose restrictions, filter and select data, 

and make decisions concerning data and assets. The targeting officer and 

the radar section leader must understand how guidances affect targeting 

decisions, fire mission processing and radar acquisition processing. 

When a call for fire (CFF) is sent from Firefinder to AFATDS, it is 

processed using AFATDS guidances at the receiving AFATDS. If the CFF 

fails AFATDS guidances, the mission is denied. In AFATDS, the target 

contained in the failed CFF would be entered into the suspect target list for 

comparison with other targets already on file. If no solution or 

combination occurs, the target will remain on file and be compared with 

incoming suspect targets until the target decay time is reached. 

When an Artillery Target Intelligence (ATI) report is sent to AFATDS 

from a Firefinder it may become a CFF. Based on guidances, an ATI 

target may generate a fire mission by combining with a target already in 

the suspect target list. If the target type meets the criteria for combination 

and the target type is in the High Payoff Target (HPT) list, it will generate 

a CFF. Even without combination, if the target sent by Firefinder is in the 

HPT list and meets the accuracy and reliability guidances, it may become 

a fire mission. 

Guidances are used to determine if raw target data can be used to develop 

a fire mission. They determine fire mission precedence and mission value. 

Some guidances are merely record keeping tools. Others allow the 

information to be placed into a written plan (e.g., an OPORD, or FS 

Annex). Some guidances are used to determine how or when to shoot a 

target and the associated munitions, effects, and fire support systems. 

Commanders specify guidances to insure the successful engagement of 

targets. During fire mission processing, guidances play a vital role in 

determining the best attack solution for a given target. 

The types of guidances are not organized by category. They are spread 

across six different categories. Example, under the category Target you 

will find Target Selection Standards (TSS). This is a filter guidance. Also 
under Target you will find High Value Target List. This is a screening 

guidance. 

The six guidance categories are: 

• Target. 

• FS attack. 

• Unit and sensor systems. 

• FA attack. 

• C3 (command control and communications). 

• Miscellaneous. 

Guidance information is normally supplied by higher echelon units and is 

distributed to other units in the command and support chain. There are 

four types of guidances: 

• Filter guidance. Determines if a target should be shot. 

• Screening guidance. Determines how and when to shoot a target. 

• Target analysis guidance. Determines the optimum munition and 

fire unit to achieve the desired effects on the target. 

• Information guidance. Are information only guidances and have no

affect on fire mission processing. 

This section provides an explanation of the guidances that are used in 

mission processing and how they affect Firefinder missions. These are 

primarily Filter and Screening guidances. Guidances that do not affect 

Firefinder mission processing are not discussed. 

Before guidances are applied, AFATDS classifies targets by their 

description. AFATDS calls these descriptions target categories. Within 

each target category there are Target Types. Firefinder calls these Target 

Type and Subtype. Many of the guidances in AFATDS allow one to 

specify guidance for each individual target type. When a call for fire is 

received at AFATDS, the target type of the mission is used to determine 

the specific guidance that has been established for that target type. 

Some of the guidances used in fire mission processing are called 

FILTERS. Filter guidances determine if a target should be shot. For 

example, if a target is a duplicate of another target, the second call for fire 

is eliminated; the Target Duplication guidance filters out duplicate targets. 

Other guidances determine HOW or WHEN to shoot the target. These are 

called screening guidances. They prioritize targets relative to one another 

and provide information about the munitions type, volume of fire and 

required effects. 
Other guidances are considered preferences. These are attack analysis 

guidances. For these guidances, any entry specified on the CFF may not 

result in the exact solution provided since other information may be taken 

into account. For instance, when shooting a certain target type, the 

preference may be to shoot DPICM, TIME, 2 PLT volleys. But if no units 

have DPICM, other shell/fuze combinations will be chosen. If available, 

alternatives will be given. Nonetheless, specified preference may be 

ranked higher than other alternatives and may be the suggested option. 

Preference guidances allow blank entries to be made; for these guidances, 

blank entries just mean no preference. 

The first guidances applied are filters. Target duplication is a filter 

guidance. If AFATDS receives a target that duplicates an active fire 

mission and the target received is the duplicate of this target, the computer 

will recommend denying the second target. 

Target Selection Standards (TSS) are the primary filter guidance 

considered when an ATI or CFF is processed by AFATDS. ATIs are 

always checked against TSS. If the ATI fails the TSS guidance it will be 

considered a "Suspect" target and be sent to the target generation function 

for further processing. CFFs may be checked against TSS if the operator 

elects to do so (simply by selecting the "Check CFFs against TSS" option 

on the TSS guidance window). CFFs failing TSS will likewise be sent to 

target generation as a suspect target. If the "Check CFFs against TSS" 

option is not selected, all CFFs will pass TSS. TSS consists of three 

primary checks: 

• Accuracy. Is the TLE of the target less than or equal to the "Max 

TLE" in the TSS guidance. 

• Report Age. Is the time difference from the "DTG Acquired" of the 

target to the current time less than or equal to the "Max Report 

Age" in the TSS guidance? 

• Reliability. Is the observer reliable in reporting this type of target 

(if not the target will fail TSS)? 

When checking TSS, AFATDS checks the Target Location Error (TLE) 

and "time acquired/sensed" for the target. The observer's unit data is also 

checked to determine if the observer is "reliable" for the specific target 

type. AFATDS determines these three critical elements of information as 

follows: 

• The TLE used on the mission will be based on: 

– The TLE submitted with the target data. 
– A calculation considering the sensor's range to target (for 

targets sent by Q36 or Q37 Radars only). 

– The TLE value for the observer in the AFATDS database 

(when an ATI is received directly from the observer). 

– A default value considering the unit type that sent the 

ATI. 

• The "DTG Acquired" used on the mission will be based on: 

– The "Time Acquired" or "Time Sensed" submitted with 

the target data. 

– If a time is not provided, AFATDS will use the time the 

target was received at the first AFATDS computer as the 

"DTG Acquired". 

• The observer's reliability used during the TSS check is based on: 

– The reliability indicator (Reliable vs. Non Reliable by 

individual target type) in the observer or radar's unit data. 

– If the reporting sensor is not an observer or radar unit 

type, it is assumed to be reliable and will pass the 

"Observer Reliability" aspect of TSS. This situation occurs 

when a target is entered at an AFATDS. 

Screening guidances are applied after filter guidance. The first screening 

guidance is the High Value Target List (HVTL). The HVTL specifies 

when to attack the target (Planned, As Acquired, Immediate or Excluded), 

the effects on the target (Suppress, Neutralize, Destroy or allows an 

operator entered effects percentage) and a weight of each target category 

relative to one another (each category can be given a value between 0 and 

100). This information is established for each target category. The HVTL 

is used in two ways: 

• As a starting point for creating the target management matrix 

(TMM). 

• To provide priorities for target categories. 

The TMM is also a screening guidance. For each target type, this guidance 

allows the target type to be placed in a High Payoff Target List (HPTL), 

an Excluded Target list or a non-HPT List. For HPTs and non-HPTs, it 

allows entry of when to attack the target and the effects on the target. For 
HPTs it establishes weights to be set to rank HPTs relative to one another. 

Weights are established as follows: 

• For non-HPT targets, the HVTL weighting for a target's target 

category is the same as the weighting for the target type. 

• For HPTs, it allows an additional weighting of a target type above 

the highest weighting in the HVTL. The new weighting is the 

highest HVTL weighting plus the assigned weighting for the HPT. 

For example, if the highest weighting of all categories set in the 

HVTL is 95 and the HPT is given a weighting of 20, the real 

weighting of the target type is 115. 

• For all target types, the TMM specifies whether to route the target 

to IEW (Intel/Electronic Warfare) for coordination and/or perform 

TDA on the target. 

• When the TMM is cleared and the window is closed without reassigning any or all of the target types, all remaining unassigned 

target types will be assigned to the non-HPT or excluded list. If the 

target type's category is set to excluded in the HVTL, the target 

type will be put into the excluded list, otherwise it will be put into 

the non-HPT list. The "When" values (e.g., As Acquired, 

Immediate) and the effects values (e.g., Suppress, Neutralize) will 

be taken from the HVTL for the target type's category as well. 

Mission Prioritization is the final screening guidance. This guidance 

determines the ranking of fire units and Target Areas of Interest (TAI) and 

determines if On Call targets have higher priority than non On Call 

targets. It also allows the weighting of the four basic components that 

determine a mission's value. Target Type weighting (from TMM), TAI 

ranking, Priority of Fires ranking and On Call Targets. Finally, this 

window allows entry of Fire Mission Cutoff Values that a mission must 

meet or exceed in order to be considered by a given system. 

After all screening guidances are checked and total mission value is 

assigned to the target, the target is sent back to filter guidances to check 

the mission cutoff value. The Mission Cutoff Value is a "filter" guidance 

that determines which systems (FA, Mortar, Naval Surface Fire System 

(NSFS) or Air) are allowed to shoot the mission. The mission's total value 

is compared with this and if the value is not GREATER than that of a 

certain system then the mission will not be shot by that system. For 

example, if the mission's value is 34 and FA is set to 30, FA will be 

considered if any FA assets are capable. If NSFS is set to 50, NSFS will 

not be recommended to shoot it. 

After all filter and screening guidances have been checked and passed, the 

mission is sent to the attack analysis guidances. These determine the 

optimum munition and fire unit to achieve the desired effects on the target. 
Chapter 2 

Field Artillery Target Acquisition Organizations 

This chapter discusses target acquisition organizations and the duties and 

responsibilities of radar section personnel and USMC counterbattery radar 

platoon personnel. The duties of other TA personnel are discussed in 

Chapter 3. 

HEAVY DIVISION TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY 

The heavy division target acquisition battery (TAB) is responsible for 

locating enemy indirect fire weapons and registering and adjusting 

friendly artillery in the division's battlespace with sufficient accuracy and 

timeliness for attack by friendly units. The TAB locates indirect fire 

targets with its organic Q-36 and Q-37 radars. An assistant counterfire 

officer (WO/131A) and a target processing section are provided to the 

DIVARTY or FA brigade TOC to support counterfire operations. The 

addition of the TAB processing section to the counterfire headquarters 

provides viable 24-hour counterfire operations capability. The target 

processing section of the DIVARTY or FA brigade TOC normally 

controls the Q-37 radars. Q-36 radars are normally attached to DS FA 

battalions and controlled by the DS FA battalion S2. The TAB survey 

platoon provides location and directional control to TAB elements and 

aids the DIVARTY or FA brigade survey section as required. Table 2-1

shows the composition of the target processing section and Figure 2-1

shows the organizational structure of the heavy division TAB. 

Table 2-1. Heavy Division TAB Target Processing Section

Target Processing Section

TITLE MOS RANK NUMBER

Asst Counterfire Officer 131A0 CW2 1 

Senior FA Targeting NCO 13R SFC 1 

Targeting NCO 13F SSG 1 

Targeting Processing SP 13F SGT 1 

Targeting Processing SP 13F SPC 1 

Targeting Processing SP 13F PFC 1 
TOTAL 6

Figure 2-1. Heavy Division Target Acquisition Battery

DIVISIONAL MLRS TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY 

The Divisional MLRS battalion TAB is organic to the heavy division 

MLRS battalion. The divisional MLRS battalion is organized with a 

headquarters, headquarters and service battery (HHS), three six-launcher 

MLRS firing batteries and a TAB. The functions of the divisional MLRS 

battalion TAB are the same as for the heavy division TAB. The 

differences are the organizational structure and the parent headquarters. 

Unlike the heavy division TAB, this organization does not have a separate 

survey platoon. It only has a single survey section that is part of target 

acquisition platoon (TAP) headquarters. Further, the target processing 

section only has five personnel (see Table 2-2). Figure 2-2 shows the 

organizational structure. 

Table 2-2. Division MLRS Battalion TAB Processing Section

Target Processing Section

TITLE MOS RANK NUMBER
Asst Counterfire Officer 131A0 CW2 1 

Senior FA Targeting NCO 13R SFC 1 

Targeting NCO 13F SSG 1 

Targeting Processing SP 13F SPC 1 

Targeting Processing SP 13F PFC 1 

TOTAL 5

Figure 2-2. Divisional MLRS Battalion Target Acquisition Battery

SEPARATE BRIGADE TARGET ACQUISITION PLATOON 

The TAP of the separate brigade provides the brigade with acquisition of 

threat mortar, artillery, and rocket systems to provide target intelligence 

and information to allow friendly forces to take force protection measures 

and enable counterfire mission processing. The TAP also adjusts friendly 

fire and registers mortars and artillery with its organic Q-36 radar. The 

TAP is found in the HHS of the direct support field artillery battalion in 

the separate infantry brigades of the National Guard. These brigades are 

often referred to as enhanced brigades (EB). This organization consists of 

a platoon headquarters, Q-36 radar section, meteorological section and a 
survey section. This organization is capable of supporting all of the 

separate brigade's target acquisition requirements. The TAP may be 

augmented with additional assets based on the tactical situation. 

Figure 2-3. Separate Infantry Brigade Target Acquisition Platoon

CORPS TARGET ACQUISITION DETACHMENT 

The Corps Target Acquisition Detachment (CTAD) is assigned to corps on 

the basis of one per light division. It is designed for attachment to light 

infantry, airborne, and air assault division artilleries or their reinforcing 

heavy field artillery brigade upon deployment. The CTAD acquires threat 

artillery, rocket, and missile systems to provide target intelligence and 

information to allow friendly forces to take force protection measures and 

enable counterfire mission processing. The CTAD consists of a 

headquarters section, a PADS team, and two Q-37 radar sections. The 

detachment headquarters is provided to each light, airborne, air assault 

division artillery TOC, or their designated counterfire headquarters to help 

process counterfire targets. 
Figure 2-4 Corps Target Acquisition Detachment

The allocation of this organization will change upon fielding of the Q-47 

radar. Once the Q-47 is fielded, each corps will be allocated with its own

dedicated CTAD in addition to those already allocated to support light, 

airborne and air assault divisions. 

INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TARGET ACQUISITION 

PLATOON 

The interim brigade combat team (IBCT) TAP provides acquisition of 

threat mortar, artillery, and rocket systems to provide target intelligence 

and information to allow friendly forces to take force protection measures 

and enable counterfire mission processing. The platoon consists of one Q36 and one Q-37 radar team, a meteorological team and a survey team. 

The platoon deploys in whole or part within tailored force packages. Once 

in theater, the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) controls the 

employment of the platoon and any additional counterfire radars attached 

or augmenting the brigade. When in theater, whether it deploys early or 

with the field artillery battalion, the platoon and/or individual radars will 

always establish a direct digital and voice link with the FECC. It may also, 

on occasion, establish an AFATDS digital quick fire channel directly with

a delivery unit. The meteorological section provides meteorological 

support to artillery, mortars and radars to enhance the accuracy of their 

fires. The survey team provides common survey to field artillery firing 
units and mortars when required. The survey capability is limited and 

lacks redundancy because the survey team has only one position and 

azimuth determining system (PADS). 

Figure 2-5. Interim BCT Target Acquisition Platoon

The composition of teams in this organizational structure is the same as 

for sections in the TAB. 

INTERIM DIVARTY HIMARS BATTALION TARGET ACQUISITION 

PLATOON 

The IDIVARTY HIMARS TAP provides acquisition of threat artillery, 

rocket, and missile systems for the interim division to provide target 

intelligence and information to allow friendly forces to take force 

protection measures and enable counterfire mission processing. The 

platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, three Q-37 radar sections, a 

meteorological section and a survey section. The platoon deploys in whole 

or part within tailored force packages. Once in theater, the Fires and 

Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) controls the employment of the platoon 

and any additional counterfire radars attached or augmenting the division. 

When in theater, whether it deploys early or with the HIMARS battalion, 

the platoon and/or individual radars will always establish a direct digital 

and voice link with the FECC and may establish a AFATDS digital quick 

fire channel with a delivery unit. The meteorological section provides 
meteorological support to artillery, radars and mortars to enhance their 

accuracy. Like the IBCT, the survey capability is limited to one PADS. 

Figure 2-6. IDIVARTY HIMARS Battalion Target Acquisition Platoon

STRIKER PLATOON 

The STRIKER platoon provides the maneuver brigade commander with 

high technology observation teams that are dedicated to executing fires 

throughout the depth of the brigade's battlespace. This mission includes 

calling for conventional artillery and rocket fires, providing laser 

designation for smart munitions and, as a secondary mission, providing 

reconnaissance and surveillance for the brigade. The STRIKER platoon is 

one of the brigade's main observation and surveillance assets and is 

heavily relied upon to provide observation and attack critical targets in the 

brigade deep fight. Light units are organized with three striker teams and 

heavy units have six striker teams. Table 2-3 shows the striker platoon's 

organization. 

Table 2-3. STRIKER Platoon Organization

STRIKER Platoon

TITLE MOS RANK NUMBER
Platoon Leader 13A0 1LT 1 

Platoon SGT 13F40 SFC 1 

Driver 13F10 PFC 1 

STRIKER Team

TITLE MOS RANK NUMBER

Fire Support SGT 13F20 SGT 1 

Fire Support 

Specialist 

13F10 SPC 1 

Fire Support 

Specialist 

13F10 PFC 1 

AN/TPQ-37(V)8 RADAR SECTION 

There are currently four versions of the Q-37 in service, the AN/TPQ37(V)8, AN/TPQ-37(V)7, AN/TPQ-37(V)6, and the AN/TPQ-37(V)5. All 

four versions of the radar have a crew of 12. Table 2-4 depicts the 

organization of the AN/TPQ-37(V) radar section. Regardless of 

equipment, the mission of the Q-37 radar section is the same. The primary 

mission is to locate enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar firing positions. In 

addition, the Q-37 performs high-burst, datum-plane and impact-predict 

registrations, and adjust-fire mission processing. The designated 

counterfire headquarters controls the Q-37 radar and support is provided 

by the TAP or TAB. 

Table 2-4. AN/TPQ-37(V) Section Personnel

Title Rank MOS Number

Radar Section Leader CW2 131A0 1 

Section Chief SSG 13R30 1 

Senior Firefinder Radar Operator SGT 13R20 2 

Radar Repairer SPC 35M10 1 

Firefinder Radar Operator SPC 13R10 3 

Power-generation Equipment Repairer SPC 52D10 1 
Firefinder Radar Operator PFC 13R10 3 

Total 12

AN/TPQ-36(V)8 RADAR SECTION 

The AN/TPQ-36 weapons locating radar section has a crew of six. Its 

primary mission is to locate enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing 

positions. This radar is optimized to detect high-angle indirect fire. 

However, it is equally capable of producing accurate grid locations for 

indirect fire units using low-angle fire. As a secondary mission the 

friendly fire mode can be used to perform high-burst, datum-plane, or 

impact-predict registrations. The fire direction center can use the impactpredict data provided by the radar in the friendly fire mode to conduct 

adjust-fire missions. 

Use of the radar in the friendly fire mode may be required when no 

registration data and observers are available, and the mission dictates that 

the target is a high payoff target and must be destroyed. This secondary 

mission is performed only when absolutely necessary. Table 2-5 depicts 

the section organization. 

Table 2-5. AN/TPQ-36(V)8 Section Personnel

Title Rank MOS Number

Radar Section Leader CW2 131A0 1 

Section Chief SSG 13R30 1 

Senior Firefinder Radar Operator SGT 13R20 1 

Radar Repairer SPC 35M10 1 

Firefinder Radar Operator SPC 13R10 1 

Firefinder Radar Operator SPC 13R10 1 

Total 6

DUTIES OF RADAR SECTION PERSONNEL 

The duties of radar section personnel are essentially the same for all 

weapons locating radars regardless of organizational structure of the 
assigned target acquisition unit. The following paragraphs provide duties 

for each section member. 

RADAR SECTION LEADER

• Advises the commander and staff of tactical and technical 

considerations affecting employment of the radar. 

• Participates in the MDMP. 

• Reconnoiters and selects the site for the radar. 

• Supervises the activities of all radar personnel. 

• Examines and interprets standard operating procedures, orders, 

directives, and technical publications for data pertinent to 

employment of radars and associated equipment. 

• Reviews and consolidates requisitions for tools, repair parts, 

technical supplies, publications, and equipment. 

• Coordinates technical support to include MET and survey. 

• Coordinates logistics and security requirements and liaises with the 

supported unit. 

• Commands and directs the operations of the radar section 

• Supervises maintenance personnel performing maintenance or 

repair of the radar. 

SECTION CHIEF

• Supervises the operations and operator maintenance of radar 

equipment. 

• Ensures compliance with safety procedures. 

• Provides completed initialization worksheets to operators. 

• Plans and supervises hasty survey. 

• Instructs personnel in all aspects of radar operations and associated 

techniques. 

• Assists the radar section leader in site selection. 

• Organizes and maintains local security and unit defense. 

• Assumes command of the section in the absence of the radar 

section leader. 

SENIOR FIREFINDER RADAR OPERATOR

• Operates and supervises the operation of the radar set. 

• Assists in the emplacement and concealment of the radar position. 

• Assists the section chief in all of his duties. 

• Provides technical guidance to radar operators. 

FIREFINDER RADAR OPERATOR

• Emplaces and march-orders the radar and ancillary equipment. 
• Initializes and operates all radar and ancillary equipment. 

• Determines and corrects the altitudes of weapon locations from a 

contour map. 

• Transmits the final locations to supported FDC or target processing 

section and keeps the necessary records. 

• Operates and performs maintenance on the radar's prime movers. 

• Performs hasty survey. 

• Provides local security. 

• Performs other duties assigned by the section chief. 

RADAR REPAIRER

The radar repairer performs unit level/DS maintenance on the radar and 

assists the radar technician as required. He performs the following specific 

duties: 

• Performs unit maintenance using built-in-test/built-in-testequipment (BIT/BITE), fault detection and isolation. 

• Isolates failures to a line replaceable unit (LRU) or shop 

replaceable unit (SRU) that can be replaced by a crewmember. 

• Uses fault-isolation-test, replaces cards, modules, components and 

selected piece-parts. 

• Troubleshoots, adjusts, aligns and repairs using BIT routines and 

test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) authorized 

by the maintenance allocation chart (MAC). 

• Replaces and/or forwards unserviceable equipment to depot 

maintenance. 

• Performs connector repair on certain specified cables. 

• Provides local security and performs other duties assigned by the 

section chief. 

POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT REPAIRER

The power generation equipment repairer repairs and maintains tactical 

utility and precise power generation equipment. The power generation 

repairer is assigned only to Q-37 radar sections. Power generation repair 

support for Q-36 radar sections is provided by the power generation 

repairer assigned to the TAP or headquarters platoon of the parent TA 

organization or supported unit. The power generation equipment repairer 

performs the following duties: 

• Troubleshoots mechanical and electrical systems and components; 

diagnoses and isolates malfunctions; tunes engine, and replaces 

components. 

• Test operates repaired equipment. 

• Assists in radar operations as required. 
• Provides local security and performs other duties assigned by the 

section chief. 

USMC COUNTERBATTERY RADAR PLATOON 

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) counterbattery radar (CBR) 

platoon is organic to the headquarters battery of the USMC artillery 

regiment. The platoon consists of a headquarters section, four AN/TPQ46A radar sections, and a target processing center (TPC). The primary 

mission of the CBR platoon is to locate enemy rocket, mortar, and artillery 

weapons and process all acquired enemy locations in a timely manner for 

counterfire and intelligence purposes. Secondary missions that can be 

assigned by the supported artillery unit are adjusting or registering 

artillery. 

The CBR platoon is normally employed as a unit and controlled by the 

regimental artillery commander. The TPC is established in the regimental 

artillery main combat operations center (COC) or co-located with the fire 

support coordination center (FSCC) at the Division COC. The CBR 

platoon commander works closely with the regimental S2 and S3 to ensure 

that all CBR assets are being optimally utilized and that all counterfire and 

intelligence data generated by those assets are being processed correctly. 

The CBR platoon commander coordinates the employment of radars 

operating under regimental control. The S2 and S3 provide guidance as 

deduced from the plan of observation and the S3 designates areas that will 

receive radar coverage. Based on this guidance, the CBR platoon 

commander selects a sector of search and general position area for each 

radar section. The radar section leader selects the actual radar site. 

Meteorological and survey support are provided to the CBR platoon by the 

artillery regimental headquarters battery. If attached to a direct support 

field artillery battalion, the artillery battalion survey team will provide 

survey support. Figure 2-9 shows the organization of the CBR Radar 

Platoon. 
Figure 2-9. USMC Counterbattery Radar Platoon

PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

The platoon headquarters consists of the platoon commander and the radar 

employment chief. They perform duties similar to the radar platoon leader 

and platoon sergeant in U.S. Army TA organizations. Table 2-6 shows the 

composition of the platoon headquarters. 

Table 2-6. USMC CBR Platoon Headquarters Personnel

Title Rank MOS Number

Platoon Commander CWO3 0803 1 

Radar Employment Chief MSG 0848 1 

Total 2

AN/TPQ-46A RADAR SECTION

The AN/TPQ-46A weapons locating radar section has a crew of nine 

marines. Its primary mission is to locate enemy mortars, artillery and 

rocket firing positions for counterfire and intelligence purposes. This radar 
is optimized to detect high-angle indirect fire. It is also capable of 

developing accurate grid locations of indirect fire units using low-angle 

indirect fire. As a secondary mission the friendly fire mode can be used to 

perform high-burst, datum-plane, or impact-predict registrations. The fire 

direction center can use the impact data provided by the radar in the 

friendly fire mode to conduct adjust-fire missions. Table 2-7 shows the 

composition of the AN/TPQ-46A radar section. 

Table 2-7. AN/TPQ-46A Radar Section Personnel

Title Rank MOS Number

Section Leader SSGT 0848 1 

Watch Chief SGT 0842 1 

Watch Chief/ Radar Operator CPL 0842 2 

Radar Operator LCPL 0842 3 

Radar Operator PFC 0842 2 

Total 9

The AN/TPQ-46A radar is the same as the AN/TPQ-36(V)8. Components 

of the radar are discussed in Chapter 4. 

TARGET PROCESSING CENTER

The TPC is a detachment of the CBR Platoon. The TPC aids in processing 

counterfire targets and provides liaison between the supported unit and 

radars. Under most circumstances, the TPC is located with the regimental 

fire support coordination center (FSCC) to take advantage of available 

intelligence, facilitate clearance of counterfires and coordinate air attack of 

counterfire targets with the division air officer. Table 2-8 shows the 

composition of the TPC. 

Table 2-8. Target Processing Center Personnel

Title Rank MOS Number

Processing Section Leader GYSGT 0848 1 

Processing Team Leader SGT 0844 2 

Recorder/Plotter CPL 0844 2 
Recorder/Driver PFC 0844 2 

Total 7

DUTIES OF USMC COUNTERBATTERY RADAR PLATOON 

PERSONNEL 

The following paragraphs provide the duties and responsibilities 

performed by USMC radar platoon personnel. The duties performed by 

USMC radar platoon personnel are very similar to those performed by U.S 

Army TA personnel. 

PLATOON COMMANDER

The platoon commander's duties are similar to the target acquisition or 

radar platoon leader's duties in Army TA organizations. The platoon 

commander performs the following duties: 

• Commands and directs the operations of the platoon. 

• Advises the supported commander and staff on the technical 

considerations affecting the employment of radars and 

recommends the general locations of radar sites. 

• Performs reconnaissance and selection of radar sites with the radar 

section leader. 

• Examines, writes and interprets SOPs, orders, directives and 

technical publications for data pertinent to employment of radars 

and the processing of counterfire and intelligence data. 

• Supervises the activities of all radar platoon personnel. 

• Inspects and tests equipment to determine the adequacy of 

maintenance. 

• Reviews and consolidates requisitions for tools, repair parts, 

technical supplies and equipment. 

• Coordinates survey, logistical and security requirements. 

RADAR EMPLOYMENT CHIEF

The duties of the radar employment chief are similar to the duties of target 

acquisition or radar platoon sergeant in Army TA organizations. The radar 

employment chief performs these duties: 

• Performs the duties of the platoon commander in his absence. 

• Plans, coordinates and supervises the internal functioning of the 

platoon, to include, maintenance, repair, inventory, logistics, 

administration and training. 

• Assists the platoon commander. 
• Orders maps and trig lists for operational areas. 

RADAR SECTION PERSONNEL

Radar Section Leader

The duties of the radar section leader are similar to the radar section chief 

in Army TA organizations. The radar section leader performs the 

following duties: 

• Assists the Platoon Commander in the selection of radar sites. 

• Evaluates the radar site after selection to determine the location of 

all equipment, vehicles, and local security. 

• Supervises the march order, emplacement, camouflage, local 

security and all other activities within the radar site. 

• Provides completed initialization worksheets to the radar operators. 

• Checks all initialization data entered into the radar computer prior 

to the operator entering into the operational program. 

• Ensures adherence to safety procedures by section personnel. 

• Instructs radar personnel in radar operations and MOS related 

skills. 

• Conducts hasty survey as necessary. 

• Commands the radar section. 

• Plans and supervises the maintenance of all section equipment. 

• Orders parts for repair/replacement of radar equipment through the 

radar employment chief. 

• Determines all manual terrain following data. 

Radar Watch Chief

The duties of the radar watch chief are similar to the duties of the senior 

Firefinder radar operator in Army TA organizations. The radar watch chief 

performs the following duties: 

• Assists the radar section leader in the accomplishment of his 

duties. 

• Performs the duties of the radar section leader in his absence. 

• Initializes the radar. 

• Operates or supervises the operation of the radar. 

• Provides technical guidance and training to the radar operators. 

• Performs other duties assigned by the radar section leader. 

Radar Watch Chief/Radar Operator
This individual performs the same radar operator duties as other radar 

operators. When this person is the senior individual present in the radar 

section, he also performs duties as the radar watch chief. 

Radar Operator

The duties of the radar operator are similar to the duties of the radar 

operator in Army TA organizations. The radar operator performs these 

duties: 

• Operates, emplaces, and march orders the radar and all auxiliary 

equipment. 

• Performs operator maintenance on the radar and all auxiliary 

equipment. 

• Provides local security and unit defense. 

• Camouflages the radar and all auxiliary equipment. 

• Performs other duties assigned by the radar section leader or watch 

chief. 

TARGET PROCESSING CENTER PERSONNEL

Processing Section Leader

• Performs the duties of the radar employment chief in his absence. 

• Trains and supervises the personnel within the target processing 

section. 

• Performs the duties of the Platoon Sergeant of the radar platoon. 

• Assists the supported unit's S2 and S3 within the COC to ensure 

proper integration of the Target Processing Center into the COC, 

and the timely processing of counterfire and intelligence data 

generated by the radars. 

• Ensures that the Target Processing Center is fully manned and 

functioning at optimum efficiency to support all operational 

commitments. 

• Makes liaison with the supported unit's Battery Gunnery Sergeant 

to ensure that all Target Processing Center personnel are included 

in the unit local security plan. 

The Processing Team Leader

• Performs the duties of the processing section chief in his absence. 

• Supervises the operations of his watch section within the Target 

Processing Center. 

• Provides technical guidance and training to the members of his 

watch section. 

• Performs other duties assigned by the processing section chief. 
The Recorder/Plotter

• Records counterfire and intelligence data received from the radar 

teams. 

• Plots all counterfire and intelligence data received to include radar 

data, flash and crater analysis rays, to ensure authenticity and to 

produce actual target data. 

• Passes all counterfire and intelligence data to the supported unit's 

S2 after it has been checked, and assists the S2 in processing that 

information. 

• Performs other duties assigned by the processing section leader or 

processing team leader. 

The Recorder/Driver 

The recorder/driver performs the same duties as the recorder/plotter. In 

addition, the recorder/driver performs duty as a vehicle driver. 
Chapter 3 

Duties of Field Artillery Targeting and Target 

Acquisition Personnel 

This chapter discusses the duties of key field artillery targeting and target 

acquisition personnel from radar platoon to battlefield coordination 

detachment. The field artillery targeting officer and radar section leader 

play key roles in the targeting and target acquisition process. FA targeting 

officers provide the FSCOORD and maneuver commander with an 

invaluable resource for planning and synchronizing the integration of FA 

target acquisition into combined arms operations. Table 3-1 shows the 

duty positions discussed in this chapter. 

Table 3-1. Key Target Acquisition Personnel

Rank Position Operational Locations

CPT/LT Target Acquisition Battery/Detachment 

Commander 

DIVARTY TOC 

LT Radar Platoon Leader TAB 

SFC Radar Platoon Sergeant TAB 

CW4 Targeting Officer Battlefield Coordination 

Detachment 

SFC Targeting NCO Battlefield Coordination 

Detachment 

CW4/CW3 FAIO Corps and Division ACE/ISE 

CW5/CW4 Targeting Officer Corps and Division FSE 

CW3 Counterfire Officer DIVARTY TOC 

CW2 Assistant Counterfire Officer DIVARTY TOC 

SFC Senior Targeting NCO DIVARTY TOC 

SFC Targeting NCO DIVARTY TOC 

CW2 Brigade Targeting Officer Maneuver Brigade Main CP 

CW3 FA Brigade Targeting Officer FA Brigade TOC 
CW2 GS FA Battalion Targeting Officer FA Battalion TOC 

CW2 Division MLRS BN Targeting Officer DTAC/Aviation BDE 

CW2 IBCT Targeting Officer Targeting Cell, FECC 

SSG IBCT Targeting NCO Targeting Cell, FECC 

CW2 IBCT Counterfire Officer Counterfire Cell, FECC 

CWO3 (USMC) Targeting Information Center Regimental HQ FSCC 

SFC FA Battalion Target Acquisition Platoon 

Sergeant 

FA Battalion TOC 

TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY/DETACHMENT COMMANDER 

The target acquisition battery (TAB)/detachment (TAD) commander 

commands the entire battery/detachment in garrison. When deployed, the 

commander supervises the HQ platoon element's coordination of 

maintenance, supply, administration, and communications support. 

However, supported units assume all support functions once TAB/TAD 

assets are committed. In addition, the commander performs the following 

duties: 

• Acts as a special staff officer providing TA expertise and advice to 

the DIVARTY/FA brigade commander during the planning and 

execution of the counterfire battle at the counterfire headquarters 

or acts a TOC duty officer in the divisional MLRS battalion TOC. 

• Assists in developing, writing, and disseminating TA Tab to the 

FASP. 

• Ensures the battery is deployed and functioning in accordance with 

the FASP. 

• Ensures the battery elements receive proper administrative, 

logistic, and maintenance support. 

• Coordinates higher-level maintenance support to facilitate mission 

requirements. 

• Monitors the employment of all TA assets within the division area. 

• Performs other duties as directed by the DIVARTY S3 and 

divisional MLRS battalion commander. 

RADAR PLATOON LEADER 

The radar platoon leader is the officer in charge of the radar platoon. He 

supervises the activities of the radar platoon. Other duties include the 

following: 
• Performs necessary tactical coordination for FA radars in general 

support (GS) of the division. This coordination includes 

communications, security/force protection support and ADA, 

positioning (engineers and land clearance), logistics, and 

administration. 

• Inspects maintenance of platoon vehicles and equipment. 

• Monitors the mission support requirements of all TA radars within 

the division area. 

• Informs the TAB commander and counterfire officer on the status 

of field artillery TA radars. 

RADAR PLATOON SERGEANT 

The radar platoon sergeant is the senior enlisted soldier in the platoon. He 

assists the radar platoon leader in the performance of his duties. His other 

responsibilities are: 

• Trains and rates radar section chiefs. 

• Coordinates survey support for GS radars as required. 

• Supervises maintenance and training of five TA radar sections. 

• Provides input to radar deployment orders (RDO) as necessary. 

• Provides input to the counterfire officer required to construct and 

maintain the TA capabilities chart. 

• Monitors the deployment of the radar sections and recommends 

general position areas, search areas, and cueing agents to the 

counterfire officer. 

• Coordinates the distribution of replacement personnel and 

administrative actions. 

• Facilitates maintenance support for the TA radars. 

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION TARGET ACQUISITION 

PLATOON SERGEANT 

The FA target acquisition platoon sergeant is the senior field artillery 

targeting noncommissioned officer in the FA battalion assigned to light 

units and separate brigades of the National Guard. He assists the target 

acquisition platoon leader in the performance of his duties. His other 

responsibilities are: 

• Coordinates survey for assigned radars as required. 

• Provides input to RDOs as necessary. 

• Constructs and maintains the TA capabilities chart. 

• Monitors the deployment of the radar section and recommends 

general position areas, search areas, and cueing agents and cueing 

guidance to the S2/S3. 

• Facilitates maintenance support for TA radars. 
• Collects and disseminates information provided by the intelligence 

section and applies their products to the tactical employment of TA 

assets and counterfire operations. 

• Monitors the operations, status, and current and proposed locations 

of FA radars in zone. 

• Assists the S2 in developing TA coverage to include command and 

control relationships of organic and attached TA assets. 

• Provides input to the S2 for consolidation into the TA Tab. 

• Helps maintain the artillery order of battle database and target 

files. 

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT TARGETING 

OFFICER 

The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) targeting officer is a 

senior warrant officer. He performs duties assigned by the plans officer. 

Some of the duties of the BCD targeting officer are: 

• Receives and helps integrate target lists from the ARFOR TOC 

into the joint target list. 

• Coordinates and integrates the ARFOR target list during 

development of the ATO. 

• Answers questions regarding ARFOR target list priorities, timing 

of attack, desired means of attack, and effects. 

• Provides update briefings as required on the status and operation of 

ARFOR deep operations assets. 

• Supervises operation of AFATDS for target development and 

information exchange with the ARFOR TOC. 

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT TARGETING NCO 

This senior NCO performs duties assigned by the BCD plans section 

senior fire support noncommissioned officer and is responsible for setup 

and operation of the plans section. His duties include: 

• Sets up the map board depicting the planned friendly situation. 

• Establishes communication links with the ARFOR G3 plans 

section, deep operations coordination cell (DOCC), and theater 

missile defense (TMD) cell. 

• Processes ARFOR requests for AI and CAS by using standard 

theater army command and control system (STACCS), theater 

battle management core system (TBMCS), and AFATDS. 

An additional skill identifier (ASI) of F9, AFATDS operator/supervisor is 

required. 
CORPS AND DIVISION FIELD ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE 

OFFICER 

Field artillery intelligence officers (FAIO) have key responsibilities in the 

targeting process. They are the link between the detect and deliver 

functions of D3A. FAIO's performs these specific duties: 

• Co-locates in the analysis and control element (ACE)/intelligence 

support element (ISE) with the all source targeting section with 

access to the communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic 

intelligent (ELINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and situation 

development sections. 

• Develops targets from available intelligence. 

• Establishes connectivity between the all-source analysis system 

(ASAS) in the ACE/ISE and AFATDS in the FSE. 

• Ensures proper translation of all-source analysis system (ASAS) to 

AFATDS target types facilitating target attack. 

• Assists with establishing alarm criteria in the ASAS targeting 

computer to expedite the reporting of critical targets, defined by 

type, location, size, and reporting time. 

• Provides fire support subject matter expertise to the ACE during 

the MDMP process to assist in developing the order of battle, IPB 

products, HVTL and likely NAIs. 

• Monitors the enemy situation and recommends changes to 

targeting priorities and attack means. 

• Provides input concerning the threat, TSS, attack guidance, and 

HPTL. 

• Provides information to the ACE/ISE regarding accuracy 

requirements and timeliness of information for fire support 

systems. 

• Ensures targets meet TSS requirements before being passed to the 

FSE for engagement 

• Advises the FSCOORD or DFSCOORD when changes in the 

situation warrant reassessment of the HPTL and AGM. 

• Refines and updates AI and ATACMS nominations to corps. 

CORPS AND DIVISION TARGETING OFFICER 

The corps and division targeting officer reviews, correlates, and prepares 

all targeting products and information briefed during rehearsals and 

targeting meetings in accordance with command directives. The targeting 

officer ensures that the current situation in AFATDS contains the proper 

guidances and FSCM. He is also responsible for consolidating, 

coordinating and disseminating the restricted target list. In addition, the 

targeting officer performs the following duties: 
• Develops targets from available intelligence. 

• Works with the collection manager and FAIO to integrate targeting 

requirements into the ICP. 

• Prepares the HPTL/AGM. 

• Passes targeting products to the TAC FSE and subordinate FSEs. 

• Participates as a member of the targeting team. 

• Keeps the FAIO informed about changes to HPTL, AGM and TSS. 

• Keeps the DFSCOORD and G3 targeting chief informed about 

issues concerning targeting and fire support. 

• Participates in the MDMP process. 

• Submits CAS/AI and ATACMS nominations to corps. 

• Provides the commander with a unit resident nuclear target 

analysis capability to support operations in a potential nuclear 

environment. 

DIVISION COUNTERFIRE OFFICER 

The counterfire officer (CFO) is assigned to the DIVARTY headquarters 

where he manages TA assets for the division. He develops and issues 

radar deployment orders (RDOs) to all radar sections controlled by the 

division. Duties of the counterfire officer include the following: 

• Supervises the target processing section at the division counterfire 

headquarters. 

• Follows TSS when developing enemy targets and suspected 

targets. 

• Provides target location error (TLE) information on available FA 

TA assets to the FSE or FSCOORD as a basis for their TSS 

recommendations to the targeting team. 

• Acts as the principal advisor to the S2 on employment of FA TA 

assets. 

• Writes the TA Tab to the FASP. 

• Coordinates TA planning and execution with the DIVARTY or FA 

brigade plans officer, the order of battle (OB) officer, and the TAB 

commander. Recommends the following: 

• Target acquisition coverage and cueing schedule. 

• Command and control of TA assets. 

• Positions for FA target acquisitions resources. 

• Tracks TA assets. 

• Uses AFATDS/IFSAS and the target production map to ensure that 

TA assets are properly oriented and cued and targets are 

expeditiously attacked. 

• Ensures targeting information from other sources is developed to 

produce targets. 

• Monitors and operates the DIVARTY TA/intelligence frequencymodulated (FM), and digital nets. 
DIVISION ASSISTANT COUNTERFIRE OFFICER 

The assistant counterfire officer is assigned to the TAB and positioned in 

the counterfire headquarters when deployed. He is the assistant TOC team 

chief for the B shift. Some of the duties of the assistant CFO are: 

• Acts as the CFO when the DIVARTY counterfire officer is absent. 

• Supervises the targeting element of the counterfire headquarters. 

• Ensures targets generated by the targeting element are passed to 

the fire control and operations elements for action. 

• Ensures information from shelling reports (SHELREPs) and 

mortar bombing reports (MORTREPs) are integrated into the 

target development process. 

• Recommends target selection standards for field artillery TA 

assets. 

• Recommends general position areas for field artillery TA 

resources. 

• Ensures that all targeting element maps, charts, and records are 

kept current. 

• Acts as a cueing agent for radars, when required. 

• Assists the DIVARTY S2 in the integration of TA assets into the 

intelligence collection plan. 

• Assists the counterfire officer with writing the TA Tab to the 

FASP. 

SENIOR FIELD ARTILLERY TARGETING NCO 

The 13R40 (SFC) targeting NCO assigned to the CTAD performs all 

duties normally performed by the 1SG of a TAB. In addition, the senior 

field artillery targeting NCO performs the following duties: 

• Conducts map reconnaissance of general position areas for location 

of weapon locating radars assigned to the CTAD. 

• Collects and disseminates information provided by the intelligence 

section and applies their products to the tactical employment of TA 

assets and counterfire operations. 

• Monitors the operations, status, and current and proposed locations 

of FA radars. 

• Assists the CFO in developing TA coverage to include command 

and control relationships of organic and attached TA assets. 

• Provides input to the S2 for consolidation into the TA Tab. 

• Provides the CFO with recommendations for positioning GS TA 

assets, and establishing sectors of search and radar zones. 

• Helps maintain the artillery order-of-battle database and target 

files. 

• Assists in the development of cueing guidance for all TA assets. 
TARGETING NCO 

The 13F40 (SFC) targeting NCO assigned to the CTAD is responsible for 

setup and operation of the target processing section. His duties are: 

• Leads, supervises, and trains the targeting element. 

• Sets up and maintains all targeting element maps, charts, and 

records. 

• Ensures AFATDS is properly initialized and used in conjunction 

with the targeting information from the target production map and 

other sources to produce targets. 

• Assists in recommending employment of fire support means to 

include Naval gunfire and CAS. 

• Ensures targets generated by the targeting element are passed to 

the fire control and operations elements for action. 

• Ensures information from shelling reports (SHELREPs) and 

mortar bombing reports (MORTREPs) are integrated into the 

target development process. 

• Helps maintain the artillery order of battle database and target 

files. 

BRIGADE TARGETING OFFICER 

The targeting officer from the DS FA battalion normally resides in the 

maneuver brigade Main CP. He facilitates the exchange of information 

between the analysis and control team (ACT), brigade combat team (BCT) 

S2, DS battalion S2 and the FSE. He performs these duties: 

• Coordinates with the striker platoon leader on striker team 

availability and positioning. 

• Helping the BCT S2 develop the target acquisition and 

reconnaissance and surveillance plans. 

• Helps provide staff supervision of target acquisition assets 

attached, organic or under control of the BCT. 

• Develops, recommends, and disseminates the HPTL and AGM, to 

the FSE, CP and subordinate elements. 

• Coordinates with the BCT S2 for target acquisition coverage and 

processing of HPT. 

• Produces the TSS matrix for TA assets working for the BCT. 

• Manages target lists for planned fires. 

• Works with the DS battalion S2 to integrate counterfire operations 

into the BCT plan. 

• Coordinates and distributes the restricted target list in coordination 

with the FSO. 

• Acts as the brigade FSO in his absence. 
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE TARGETING OFFICER 

The FA brigade targeting officer's duties are determined by task 

organization and the mission assigned to the FA brigade. The field 

artillery targeting officer primary duty is acting as a counterfire officer 

when the FA brigade is assigned the mission as counterfire headquarters. 

The targeting officer's normal duties include: 

• OIC for the targeting element. 

• Advises the commander/S3 on employment of any attached TA 

assets. 

• Develops the TA Tab to the FASP. 

• Develops RDOs for any attached radars. 

• Recommends radar coverage and positions for attached radars. 

• Builds target files derived from radar acquisitions to identify trends 

in indirect fire systems positioning. 

• Maintains the enemy order-of-battle database. 

• Ensures target production overlays are properly maintained. 

• Ensures maneuver graphics are up to date. 

• Battle tracks acquisitions and friendly FA / TA assets both 

manually and digitally. 

GENERAL SUPPORT FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION TARGETING 

OFFICER 

The GS FA battalion targeting officer assists the FA battalion S2 and S3 

with targeting conducted at the FA battalion level. He also has additional 

responsibilities in counterfire and radar employment based on the 

battalion's assigned mission. The primary responsibilities of the GS FA 

battalion targeting officer are: 

• Requests BDA from higher headquarters. 

• Conducts predictive combat assessment (CA). 

• Provides targeting input through the use of automated devices. 

• Assists the FA battalion S2 in tracking the enemy order of battle. 

• Assists the FA battalion in tracking the friendly scheme of 

maneuver. 

In division and corps GS FA battalions, the targeting officer is in the 

intelligence section. In addition to his targeting duties, he functions as an 

assistant S2. His duties include the following: 

• Assist the S2 and S3 in target production, processing, and 

administration and external targeting coordination. 

• Assist the S2 with order of battle development and IPB. 
• Help the battalion S2 write the intelligence, TA, and surveillance 

portions of the FASP, to include the RDO when applicable. 

• Help plan for and manage attached, organic, and OPCON TA 

assets. 

• Assist the battalion S2 and S3 with development and execution of 

the FA TA and counterfire plans. 

• Assist the S2 in identifying commander's critical information 

requirements (CCIR). 

• Supervise the intelligence section in the absence of the S2. 

• Perform officer in charge (OIC) shift duties for the S2 section. 

• Conducts CA and requests BDA from external sources/higher HQ. 

DIVISION MLRS BATTALION TARGETING OFFICER 

The division MLRS battalion (DMB) targeting officer can perform the 

same duties as the GS FA Battalion Targeting officer or perform alternate 

duties in support of the aviation brigade or division deep operations. When 

performing these alternate duties, the DMB targeting officer assists the 

aviation brigade FSO with targeting and SEAD planning to support 

division deep strikes with attack aviation. He also plans deep targets for 

future shaping operations. The primary responsibilities of the DMB 

targeting officer when performing these alternate duties are: 

• Uses electronic intelligence (ELINT) overlays to 

implement/facilitate SEAD plans and conduct complementary 

SEAD in support of deep attack aviation assets. 

• Receives targets of opportunity and BDA reports directly from 

Apache and Kiowa helicopters conducting attack operations. 

• Supports the aviation brigade FSO by running the FSE to enable 

the FSE to conduct 24-hour operations. 

• Recommends CFZ coverage on critical fuel and re-supply 

positions (FARP). 

IBCT TARGETING OFFICER 

The IBCT targeting officer locates in the targeting cell of the FECC and 

works closely with the lethal and non-lethal effects cell of the FECC to 

develop targets. He focuses on target information received from TA 

sources and uses AFATDS to collect, analyze and process this information 

into required target guidance and instructions. In addition, the targeting 

officer performs these duties: 

• Develops and provides IPB products to other targeting team 

members. 

• Works with the effects battle captain to develop, periodically 

assess and update: 
– TSS. 

– HPTL. 

– DBA requirements. 

– Attack/effects guidance matrix (A/EGM). 

– Target/effects synchronization matrix (T/ESM). 

– DST. 

– Targeting requirements to focus reconnaissance, 

surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) assets and 

operations 

• Requests and obtains combat assessment reports. Assess and 

makes recommendations to update targeting products and 

operations. 

• Supports IBCT targeting meetings as required. 

IBCT TARGETING NCO 

The IBCT targeting NCO teams with the targeting officer in the targeting 

cell of the FECC to provide a 24-hour capability to plan and coordinate 

targeting operations. The targeting NCO performs these duties: 

• Operates and maintains the targeting AFATDS. 

• Maintains the targeting situational awareness (SA) display. 

• Maintains the target production display. 

• Inputs targeting SA information into the FECC SA display. 

• Updates and purges targeting files. 

• Ensures acquired targets are processed and forwarded to the lethal 

effects cell or the appropriate fires and effects assets in accordance 

with the T/ESM. 

• Maintains classified files for the targeting and counterfire cells. 

• Performs duties of the targeting officer when he is unavailable. 

• Prepares and maintains required daily journals and reports. 

• Ensures essential digital and voice connectivity. 

IBCT COUNTERFIRE OFFICER 

The IBCT counterfire officer locates in the counterfire cell of the FECC. 

He coordinates and controls the employment of the IBCT TAP in 

consultation with the deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD), the FA 
battalion S2 and S3 and the IBCT S2. The counterfire officer performs the 

following duties: 

• Recommends and updates: 

– TA coverage. 

– Command and control of FA TA assets. 

– Position areas for FA TA assets. 

• Orients FA TA assets to ensure required coverage of the IBCT 

battlespace. 

• Tracks FA TA assets. 

• Processes target attack with the lethal effects cell. 

• Maintains situational understanding (SU) of targeting operations. 

• Recommends TSS. 

• Uses TSS to develop enemy artillery targets and suspect targets. 

• Provides target location error (TLE) information on available TA 

assets to the DECOORD as a basis for TSS recommendations to 

the targeting team. 

• Supports the targeting officer and the effects battle captain (EBC) 

in providing targeting products. 

• Advises the IBCT commander and effects coordinator (ECOORD) 

on counterfire and targeting operations. 

• Supports targeting meetings as required. 

USMC TARGETING INFORMATION OFFICER 

The USMC targeting information officer (TIO) is a member of the 

artillery regiment special staff. He is responsible for advising the division 

fire support coordinator and his staff on all targeting matters. He is 

intimately involved in the IPB process with the division G2 and develops 

targeting products for the maneuver commander. He is located at the 

division FSCC. His duties and responsibilities include, but are not limited 

to: 

• Produces or assists in the production of the: 

– HVTL. 

– TSS. 

– HPTL. 

– AGM. 
• Coordinates with TA agencies to facilitate rapid information 

gathering and responsive fires. 

• Coordinates with the G2 during the execution of the intelligence 

collection process. 

• Ensures the identification, dissemination and engagement of 

targets to support the maneuver commander. 

• Ensures reporting and analysis of battle damage assessment and 

munitions effects. 
Chapter 4 

Employment 

To effectively employ FA radars, one must understand the technical 

characteristics of radars, how the radar acquires targets, and the technical 

requirements for radar employment. FA target acquisition personnel 

provide the technical expertise required to support radar employment 

planning by the controlling FA headquarters. TA personnel pay an integral 

role in the MDMP process thus ensuring that radars are integrated into the 

operational plan. Once the plan is completed, radar operators exploit the 

technical aspects of the radars to maximize their effectiveness and enhance 

survivability. 

SECTION I - DETECTION, VERIFICATION, AND LOCATION 

METHODOLOGY

HOSTILE MODE 

Weapons locating radars spend the majority of their time operating in the 

hostile mode. It is important to understand how the radar acquires and 

tracks projectiles in flight and extrapolates weapons location from this 

information. Both the Q-36 and Q-37 operate in the same manner. The 

radar performs these basic steps to determine a hostile firing location: 

• Establishes the search fence. 

• Verifies penetration of the search fence. 

• Validates the trajectory. 

• Tracks the projectile. 

• Extrapolates the firing location and determines the impact predict 

point. 

Several conditions must exist for the radar to achieve a solution and 

provide a weapon location and impact predict point. First, the range to the 

projectile must be such that the radar beam strikes the object on the 

ascending branch of the trajectory. In hostile mode, the radar will only 

detect objects on the ascending branch of their trajectory. Further, the 

object must also be large enough to create a radar return and its speed 

must be within the radar's operational parameters for the radar to "see the 

object". Once the radar sees the object, it determines the trajectory of the 

object. The object must display a ballistic trajectory or the radar rejects it. 

Once, the object is detected it must be tracked for sufficient time for the 

radar to achieve a solution. The amount of track time required to achieve a 

solution differs by radar type. The required tracking times are: 
• Q-36: 3-5 seconds. 

• Q-37: 5-8 seconds. 

The radar can only determine locations from objects presenting 

characteristics within the technical capabilities of the radar and that pass 

through the possible detection area of the radar. It is important to 

understand the possible area in which the radar can detect an object. 

The possible detection area is a three dimensional space defined by the 

minimum and maximum range, search sector, and the vertical scan of the 

radar. Planning ranges are used for the purposes of this discussion. 

However, the maximum planning range for a radar is not an absolute. It is 

the range at which the probability of detection becomes low enough to be 

unsuitable for planning purposes. Nonetheless, objects may be detected 

beyond the maximum planning range. Conversely, objects within the 

planning ranges may not be detected. Planning ranges for the AN/TPQ36(V)8 and AN/TPQ-37 are: 

• AN/TPQ-36(V)8 - 14.5km for artillery, 18km for mortars, and 

24km for rockets. 

• AN/TPQ-37(V) - 30km for artillery and mortars, 50km for rockets. 

The search sector is the area left and right of the radars azimuth of 

orientation where the radar can locate targets. The maximum search sector

is plus or minus 800 mils from the azimuth of orientation for a total of 

1600 mils. The search sector can be narrowed based on the tactical 

situation. Figure 4-1 depicts a possible search sector and associated range 

limits. 
Figure 4-1. Search Sector and Range Limits

The vertical component of the detection area is vertical scan. This area 

extends vertically from the radar's search fence to the maximum scan 

elevation of the radar. Figure 4-2 shows the vertical scan capabilities for 

the Q-36 and Q-37 radars. The three dimensional area shown in the 

diagram is the area where an object can be detected and tracked. 

Figure 4-2. Vertical Scan

There must be a sufficient amount of vertical scan at the points where an 

object passes through the detection area for the radar to track it and 

compute a solution. The amount of available vertical scan is called track 

volume. Radars require a minimum of 50 mils of track volume to track a 

round for long enough to achieve a solution. Figure 4-3 shows the concept 

of track volume. 
Figure 4-3. Track Volume

There are two other major factors that affect the radar's ability to detect, 

track and achieve a solution for a target. They are aspect angle and speed

of the object. The aspect angle is the angle measured from radar antenna to 

the target path of the object. The aspect angle must be greater than 1600 

mils. This means the object must be traveling toward the radar. Objects 

with aspect angles approaching 1600 mils may not be detected. The 

velocity of the object must also be considered. The velocity must be 

within the minimum and maximum velocity thresholds for the specific 

radar. Figure 4-4 depicts the concept of aspect angle and Figure 4-5

provides the velocity requirements for the Q-36 and Q-37 radar. 
Figure 4-4. Aspect Angle

Figure 4-5. Velocity Requirements

DETECTION, VERIFICATION AND LOCATION PROCESS 

Establishing the search fence is the first step performed by the radar for 

detecting an object. The radar accomplishes this by transmitting a series of

beams that conform to the terrain. Once an object penetrates the search 

fence, the radar determines the objects speed, elevation, range and 

azimuth. The radar uses this information to predict the object's next 

location and to send out verification beams to determine if the object has a

ballistic trajectory. 
Figure 4-6. Object Verification

If a ballistic trajectory is verified, the radar sends out a series of tracking 

beams. These beams provide the radar with the information required to 

mathematically extrapolate a predicted launch and impact point. The radar 

stops sending out tracking beams when the following conditions exist: 

• A solution is computed for the acquisition. 

• Three sequential misses happen for the Q-36 or five sequential 

misses for the Q-37. 

• The predicted azimuth for the next track update is outside the left 

or right limit of the radar' search sector. 

• The predicted elevation of the next track is above or below the 

radar's minimum or maximum search elevation. 

Figure 4-7 depicts how an object is tracked. 
Figure 4-7. Object Tracking

THE RADAR BEAM

To completely understand how the radar functions one must understand 

the structure of the radar beam and how the radar uses the beam to track 

an object traveling through the detection area. A radar beam is actually 

composed of four individual beams that comprise a track cluster. We

normally refer to this track cluster simply as a radar beam. Figure 4-8

shows a cross section of a radar beam. 
Figure 4-8. Radar Beam

There are three possible outcomes when an object passes through the 

search fence and the radar transmits a verification or tracking beam. The 

outcomes are miss, hit, or plot. A miss occurs when the projectile strikes 

none of the individual beams in the track cluster. A hit occurs when at 

least one beam in the track cluster is struck, but not all. A plot occurs 

when the following conditions occur: 

• All four beams of the track cluster detect the object. 

• The detected range of the object is within 75 meters of the 

predicted range. 

• The detected azimuth is within 20 mils of the predicted azimuth for 

the Q-36 or 15 mils for the Q-37. 

• The detected elevation is with 15 mils of the predicted elevation 

for the Q-36 and 10 mils for the Q-37. 

When the radar achieves an adequate number of plots it computes a 

solution for the weapons location and impact predict point. The number of 

plots required to achieve a solution varies based on radar type, initial 

detection range and the tracking time. In general, the Q-36 needs between 

3-15 plots depending on the reasons for track termination. The Q-37 

requires 5-12 plots at ranges less than 30 km and a minimum of 15 plots at 

ranges greater than 30 km. Figure 4-9 summarizes the tracking process. 

Figure 4-9. Tracking Process

FRIENDLY FIRE MODE 
The methodology used by the radar to detect, track and determine an 

impact or burst location in the friendly mode is the same as that for the 

hostile mode. The major differences are the size of the search fence, angleT and orientation of the radar. In friendly mode the radar tracks projectiles 

as they travel away from the radar. Therefore, the radar detects and tracks 

the projectile on the descending leg of its trajectory. The detection area in 

the friendly mode is significantly smaller since the search sector must be 

narrowed to approximately 440 mils. Finally, angle-T, the angle formed 

by the radar and gun-target lines, must be between 800 and 1200 mils. A 

detailed discussion of friendly fire mode procedures is contained in 

Appendix C. 

SECTION II - RADAR SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

MISSIONS 

The primary mission of AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 weapons-locating 

radars is to detect and locate enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets quickly 

and accurately enough to permit immediate engagement. Their secondary 

mission is to observe registrations and help the FDC adjust fire for 

friendly artillery units. The secondary mission should be performed only 

when absolutely necessary. Radiation time should be reserved for the 

primary mission. 

AN/TPQ-36(V)8 

The AN/TPQ-36 is optimized to locate shorter-range, high-angle, lower 

velocity weapons such as mortars and shorter-range artillery. It can also 

locate longer-range artillery and rockets within its maximum range. For 

mortars and artillery, the higher probability of detection extends to 

approximately 14,500 meters for artillery and 18,000 meters for mortars. 

Rockets can be detected with reasonable probability out to 24,000 meters. 

Minimum and maximum detection ranges can be established; however, at 

least 900 meters difference in maximum and minimum ranges is required. 

The radar's antenna electronically scans a horizontal sector from 230 mils 

to 1,600 mils in width. The Q-36 can search up to 6,400 mils by using the 

extended azimuth search function. With extended azimuth search, the 

computer automatically traverses the antenna from two to four positions 

and performs its target location functions. 

The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 can be emplaced and ready for operation within 9 

1/2 minutes with a crew of four and can be march-ordered within 4 1/2 

minutes during daylight hours. (Emplacement and march-order times do 

not include the time needed to set up or take down camouflage nets.) 
TARGET CLASSIFICATION

Q-36 legacy systems classify acquisitions as three distinct target types. 

The types are artillery, mortar or unknown. Both cannons and rockets are 

classified as artillery. The probability of a correct target classification is 

90%. The Q-36 does not classify targets by subtype. Therefore, mortar 

targets are classified as mortar/unknown and artillery targets are classified 

as artillery/unknown. The unknown target type is interpreted differently 

depending on whether the receiving device is an initial fire support 

automated system (IFSAS) or AFATDS. The unknown target will default 

to target type personnel/unknown in IFSAS and target type terrain/feature 

in AFATDS. 

The Q-36(V)8 radar has the added capability of classifying acquisitions as 

rockets. However, like Q-36 legacy systems. it does not classify targets by 

subtype. 

Probability of location

The probability of location varies based on target type, range, quadrant 

elevation, and number of projectiles being simultaneously tracked. Other 

factors that may affect probability of location are target elevation above 

the mask, wind velocity, precipitation and the electromagnetic spectrum. 

In general, the Q-36 can locate up to ten simultaneously firing weapons 

with quadrant elevations greater than 300 mils without degradation in 

location probability. This holds true as long as no more that two 

projectiles are being tracked or new firings do not occur at ranges greater 

than 7500 meters from acquisition being processed. When both of these 

conditions occur, the probability of location may decrease by as much as 

55%. Wind, rain and electromagnetic countermeasures do not degrade the 

performance of the radar when the following conditions exist: 

• Winds do not exceed 35 miles per hour. 

• Rain does not exceed 2 millimeters per hour. 

• When a 100-watt ground based emitter's radiation is separated by 

five or more beam widths from the radar azimuth. 

The probability of locating a mortar projectile is 90% or greater at ranges 

from 3000-18,000 meters over the center 1067mils of the radar's search 

zone. Outside the center zone the 90% location band is from 3000-15,000 

meters. For ranges from 750-3000 meters the probability of location 

decreases from 90% to 45% in a linear fashion based on range. 

The probability of locating cannons is 70% or greater for all ranges 

between 3,000 and 14,500 meters over the center 1067 mils of the radar's 

search zone. Outside the center zone the 70% location band is from 3,000 
to 11,500 meters. Figure 4-10 shows the higher probability coverage areas 

for mortars and artillery.

Figure 4-10. Q-36 Mortar and Cannon Coverage Areas

Finally, the probability of locating rockets is at least 80% across the entire

radar sector for all ranges from 8,000-24,000 meters. As previously 

discussed the target will be categorized as artillery. The range to the target

and the results of IPB will likely be the only indicator that a target is a 

rocket. Figure 4-11 depicts the coverage area for rockets. 
Figure 4-11. Q-36 Rocket Coverage Area

ACCURACY

The accuracy, or target location error (TLE), is generally characterized as 

the percentage of locations computed that are within a certain distance of 

the actual firing location for a specific type of projectile. TLE is generally 

characterized as the radius in meters from the actual weapon locations that 

90% and 50% of the computed weapon locations would be located. TLE is 

an important factor in determining the method of target attack. The 

maximum 50% TLEs by projectile type are: 

• Mortar - 40m or .4% of range whichever is greater. 

• Cannon - 65m or .65% of range whichever is greater. 

• Rocket - 120m or 1% of range whichever is greater. 

The maximum 90% TLEs by projectile type are: 

• Mortar - 100m or 1% of range whichever is greater. 

• Cannon - 150m or 1.5% of range whichever is greater. 

• Rocket - 300m or 2.5% of range whichever is greater. 

Table 4-1 provides 50% TLE data and Table 4-2 provides 90% TLE data. 

Table 4-1. Maximum 50% Target Location Errors

Target 

Category 3km 5km 8km

Ranges

11km 14km 15km 18km 24km

Mortar 40m 40m 40m 44m 56m 60m 72m 

Cannon 65m 65m 65m 72m 91m 

Rocket 120m 120m 140m 150m 180m 240m 

 

Table 4-2. Maximum 90% Target Location Errors 

Target 

Category 3km 5km 8km

Ranges

11km 14km 15km 18km 24km

Mortar 100m 100m 100m 110m 140m 150m 180m 

Cannon 150m 150m 150m 165m 210m 
Rocket 300m 300m 350m 375m 450m 600m

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 consists of an operations control group (OCG), 

antenna transceiver group (ATG), equipment trailer group (ETG), remote 

control display terminal (CDT), power distribution group (PDG), trailer 

mounted auxiliary generator, and a M998 HMMWV for transporting the 

auxiliary generator trailer. Figure 4-12 depicts the complete AN/TPQ36(V)8 system. 

Figure 4-12. The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 Radar System

Operations Control Group

The OCG is the focal point for operating the radar. It consists of a 

lightweight multipurpose shelter (LMS), a M1097 HMMWV, and the 

vehicle cab control console (VCCC). The LMS houses the operations 

central (OC), which controls radar operations. The LMS consists of a 

paper map display, two operator control stations (OCS), a radar signal 
processor, two environmental control units, a gas particulate filter unit, a 

remotable control display terminal (CDT), a line printer and 

communications equipment. Each OCS consists of a LCU and a color 

monitor. During normal operations, the right OCS is used to control the 

radar set. The left OCS is used for planning and as an alternate control 

console. The communications equipment contained in the shelter consist 

of the EPLRS and remote devices to control the two SINCGARS radios 

contained in the ATG. The VCCC contains equipment for remote control 

of communications, site selection, and location reporting operations from

the HMMWV cab. It contains the connections for a removable LCU that 

allows these functions to be performed during movement. Figure 4-13

shows the operations control group. 

Figure 4-13. Operations Control Group

Antenna Transceiver Group

The ATG consists of the antenna, antenna trailer and all of the radiating 

elements and associated feed, tilt sensor, beam steering unit, and boresight 
telescope assembly. The antenna is erected to the vertical position during 

operations and lowered to the horizontal position for transport. The OCG 

HMMWV transports the ATG. Figure 4-14 depicts the ATG. 

Figure 4-14. Antenna Transceiver Group

Equipment Trailer Group

The ETG consists of a modified M116A3 trailer that provides storage and 

transport of section equipment. The ETG contains four cable spools. The 

two upper center cable spools contain two 50-meter remote CDT cables. 

These cables connect the remote CDT to the ATG shelter. The two lower 

outside spools contain the shelter cable set. The shelter cable set consists 

of a 50-meter prime power cable that provides power from the ATG to the 

shelter and a 50-meter data cable that provides signal interface between 

the ATG and the shelter. Refer for Figure 4-15 for cable locations. 
During movement, the ETG is towed by the M1097 that contains the 

primary generator pallet. 

Figure 4-15. Equipment Trailer Group

Remote Control Display Terminal

The remote CDT consists of a LCU and a CDT and permits the remote 

operation of shelter components. The CDT is normally stored in its case 

inside the shelter until required for operations. It is removed for use along 

with one of the LCUs from inside the shelter. Normally the left LCU is 

removed from the shelter. The CDT can be remoted up to 90 meters from

the shelter using the remote CDT cables stored on the ETG. This allows 

the required 10 meters of slack in the cables. Figure 4-16 shows the 

configuration of an operational remote CDT. 
Figure 4-16. Remote Control Display Terminal

Power Distribution Group

The power distribution group consists of generator pallet mounted on a 

M1097 HMMWV, and the prime and auxiliary power cables. The 

generator is a 400HZ 10KW precise power generator mounted on a special 

pallet. The prime and auxiliary power cables are contained on two spools 

that are mounted on either side of the generator pallet. The prime power 

cable is a 40-meter cable that connects the PPG generator to the ATG. The 

auxiliary power cable is a 40-meter cable that connects the auxiliary 

generator to the shelter. This allows the operation of the second air 

conditioner contained in the shelter. Figure 4-17 depicts the PPG. 
Figure 4-17. Prime Power Group

Trailer Mounted Auxiliary Generator

The trailer mounted auxiliary generator is a PU-799 or 400HZ 10KW

generator mounted on a M116A2 trailer. The trailer is towed by the 

M998/M1038 utility HMMWV during movement. Figure 4-18 shows the 

trailer mounted auxiliary generator. 

Figure 4-18. Trailer Mounted Auxiliary Generator

AN/TPQ-37 

The AN/TPQ-37 is a phased-array artillery locating radar system designed 

to detect mortars artillery and rockets. The Q-37 is optimized to locate 
longer-range, low-angle, higher velocity weapons such as long-range 

artillery and rockets. However, it will also locate short-range, high-angle, 

lower velocity weapons thus complementing the AN/TPQ-36. The Q-37 

has a minimum range of 3 kilometers and a maximum range of 50 

kilometers. For artillery, the higher probability of detection extends out to 

approximately 30 kilometers. Minimum and maximum detection ranges 

can be established for the Q-37. However, there must be at least 900 

meters difference in maximum and minimum ranges. 

The Q-37 sector of search is from 300 mils to 1,600 mils. Although the Q37 is not equipped with the extended azimuth search function, the antenna 

can traverse a full 6400 mils. The Q-37 is normally deployed 8 to 12 

kilometers behind the FLOT and can be emplaced and ready for operation 

within 30 minutes and march-ordered within 15 minutes during daylight 

hours. (Emplacement and march-order times do not include the time 

needed to set up or take down camouflage nets.) 

TARGET CLASSIFICATION

The Q-37 classifies acquisitions as three distinct target types. The types 

are artillery, mortar or rocket/missile. The Q-37 does not differentiate 

subtypes for these target types. The subtypes default to unknown. The 

target classifications generated by the Q-37 for transmission to 

IFSAS/AFATDS are MORT/UNK, ARTY/UNK and RKTMSL/UNK. 

The algorithm used to locate mortars is a post-fielding software patch 

designed to provide an addition capability for operation needs. The mortar 

functionality has not been fully tested so probability and accuracy data is 

not available. The acquisition ranges for mortars are the same as the 

ranges for artillery. 

PROBABILITY OF LOCATION

The factors affecting the Q-37's probability of location are the same as for 

the Q-36. In general, the Q-37 can locate up to ten simultaneously firing 

weapons with quadrant elevations greater than 300 mils without 

degradation in probability of location. This is true when no more that two 

projectiles are being tracked or new firings do not occur at ranges less than 

6,000 meters or greater than three-quarters of the specified range for a 

specific projectile type. When both of these conditions occur, the 

probability of location may decrease to a probability of detection no lower 

than 50%. Wind and rain do not degrade the performance of the radar 

when the following conditions exist: 

• Winds do not exceed 40 miles per hour with gusts to 75 miles per 

hour. 
• Rain does not exceed 5 inches per hour with horizontal wind gusts 

of 40 miles per hour. 

The probability of locating a cannon projectile is 85% or greater at ranges

from 4,000-30,000 meters when weapon quadrant elevations are greater 

than 200 mils at ranges less than 10,000 meters and 300 mils at ranges 

greater than 10,000 meters. The ranges vary depending on the size of the 

projectile. The range fan for detecting light cannon is from 4,000 to 

20,000 meters over the entire search sector. For medium cannon, the range 

fan is from 4,000 to 25,000 meters over the center 1067 mils of the search 

sector and 4,000 to 20,000 meters over the outside sector of the search 

sectors. The range fan for heavy cannon is from 4,000 to 30,000 over the 

center 1067 mils of the search sector and 4,000-22,000 meter over the 

outside search sectors. Figure 4-19 shows the higher probability coverage 

areas for cannons. 

Figure 4-19. Q-37 Cannon Artillery Coverage Areas

The probability of locating long-range rockets up to 762mm in diameter is 

at least 85% for quadrant elevations greater than 300 mils. The detection 

ranges are between 4,000 and 50,000 meters over the center 1067 mils of 

the search sector and 4,000-37,000 meters across the outside search 

sectors. Figure 4-20 depicts the coverage area for long-range rockets. 
Figure 4-20. Q-37 Rocket Coverage Areas

ACCURACY 

The accuracy, or target location error for the Q-37 is characterized in the 

same manner as for the Q-36. The maximum 50% TLEs by projectile type 

are: 

• All cannon - 35m or .35% of range whichever is greater. 

• Long-range rocket - 70m or .4% of range whichever is greater. 

The maximum 90% TLEs by projectile type are: 

• All cannon - 90m or .9% of range whichever is greater. 

• Long-range rocket - 175m or 1% of range whichever is greater. 

Table 4-3 provides 50% TLE data and Table 4-4 provides 90% TLE data. 

Table 4-3. Maximum 50% Target Location Errors 

Target 

Category 4km 10km 20km

Ranges

22km 25km 30km 37km 50km

Mortar N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 

Cannon 35m 35m 70m 77m 88m 105m 

Rocket 70m 70m 80m 88m 100m 120m 148m 200m
 

Table 4-4. Maximum 90% Target Location Errors 

Target 

Category 4km 10km 20km

Ranges

22km 25km 30km 37km 50km

Mortar N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 

Cannon 90m 90m 180m 198m 225m 270m 

Rocket 175m 175m 200m 220m 250m 300m 370m 500m 

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

The AN/TPQ-37(V)8 consists of an operations control group (OCG), 

antenna transceiver group (ATG), power distribution group (PDG), trailer 

power distribution unit, M998/M1038 HMMWV and a FMTV for 

transporting the trailer power distribution unit. Figure 4-21 depicts the 

major components of the AN/TPQ-37(V)8 system. 
Figure 4-21. The AN/TPQ-37(V)8 Radar System

Operations Control Group

The OCG is the focal point for operating the radar. It consists of a S-250 

shelter, a M1097 HMMWV, and the shelter cable set. The shelter contains 

the computer, printer, signal processor, displays, B-scope, weapons 

location unit, and the magnetic tape unit. The shelter cable set consists of 

two 50-foot cables. These cables connect the shelter to the ATG. One 

cable is a power cable that provides power from the ATG to the shelter. 

The second cable is a data cable that allows data exchange between the 

antenna and the shelter. The cables are stored on cable spools attached to 

the back of the shelter during movement. An alternate method of storing 

the cables is to place them in the HMMWV bed under the shelter. This 

allows the cables to remain connected to the shelter during movement. 

This technique is often used since it shortens the required emplacement 

time for the radar. Figure 4-22 shows the operations control group. 
Figure 4-22. Operations Control Group

Antenna Transceiver Group

The ATG consists of the antenna, modular azimuth positioning system

(MAPS), a modified M1048A1 antenna trailer and all of the radiating 

elements and associated feed, receiver preamplifiers and receiver 

protectors, azimuth and elevation positioning circuits, beam steering 

circuits, tilt sensor, and boresight telescope. The antenna is erected to the 

vertical position during operations and lowered to the horizontal position

for transport. The PDG 5-ton truck tows the ATG during movement. The 

modified M1048A1 trailer is equipped with the medium track suspension 

system (MTSS). The MTSS is designed to improve the mobility of the 

trailer when traveling over soft soil, sand, mud and snow covered terrain. 

MAPS is an inertial surveying system designed for use in the ground 

mobile environment. It provides the radar with an on-board position 

location and survey capability. MAPS uses a vehicle motion system to 

determine the location of the radar antenna. MAPS provides the radar with 

the following information: 

• Horizontal position (easting and northing) to the nearest meter. 

• Altitude to the nearest meter. 

• Grid azimuth to the nearest mil. 

Figure 4-23 depicts the ATG. 
Figure 4-23. Antenna Transceiver Group

Power Distribution Group

The PDG consists of generator pallet mounted on a M923/925 5-ton truck, 

and the prime power cable. The generator is a 400HZ 600KW precise 

power tactical quite generator mounted on a special pallet. The prime 

power cable is contained on a spool that is mounted on the left rear of the 

generator pallet. The prime power cable is a 32-meter cable that connects 

the PDG generator to the ATG via a power distribution box with an eightmeter cable. This allows the PDG to be positioned up to 30 meters from

the ATG given the requirement for 10 meters of slack in the cable. Figure 

4-24 shows the PDG. 
Figure 4-24. Power Distribution Group

Trailer Power Distribution Unit

The trailer power distribution unit (TPDU) is a PU-806 or 400HZ 60KW 

generator mounted on a M200A1 trailer. The trailer is towed by the 

FMTV during movement. Figure 4-25 shows the TPDU. 

Figure 4-25. Trailer Mounted Auxiliary Generator

AN/TPQ-37 Version Differences

There are currently four versions of the Q-37 in service, the AN/TPQ37(V)8, AN/TPQ-37(V)7, AN/TPQ-37(V)6, and the AN/TPQ-37(V)5. 
The upgrade between the version 5 and version 6 radar added Kevlar to 

the ATG. Version 7 added the modified M1048A1 trailer with MTSS. The 

major upgrades occurred between version 7 and version 8. The differences 

between version 8 and previous versions include: 

• The operations central (OC) shelter is transported on a M1097 

HMMWV instead of an M35A2 2-1/2 ton truck. 

• The antenna is mounted on the M1048A1 trailer instead of the 

M1048 trailer. 

• A M925 5-ton truck has replaced the M813 series generator truck. 

• The 800 or 900 series cargo truck has been replaced by a medium

tactical vehicle (MTV). 

• The antenna transceiver group (ATG) contains a modular azimuth 

positioning system (MAPS). 

• The ATG has an improved cooling system. 

• The PDG generator pallet and ATG contain wheels that allow the 

components to be loaded onto C-130 and C141 aircraft without 

external ground equipment. 

• The antenna transceiver group has fragmentation protective 

plating. 

• The antenna contains an upgraded transmitter. 

• The radar shelter contains upgraded operations control. 

• The radar is Package 11 software compatible. 

Figures 4-26 and 4-27 depict the operational configurations of these 

radars. 

Figure 4-26. Radar Set AN/TPQ-37(V)
 

Figure 4-27. Radar Set AN/TPQ-37(V)8

SECTION III - TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SITE SELECTION, POSITIONING 

AND OPERATIONS

SITE SELECTION 

The technical aspects and characteristics of radars determine the 

requirements for site selection. The radar section leader selects the actual 

radar site from the position area(s) identified by the DS field artillery 

battalion S2 and radar section leader during the MDMP or as designated 

by the targeting or counterfire officer. The technical considerations for site 

selection include: 

• Slope. 

• Area in front of the radar. 

• Screening Crest. 

• Aspect angle. 

• Electronic line of sight. 

• Track volume. 

• Proximity of other radars. 

• Cable lengths. 

SLOPE
Slope is an import consideration for the proper positioning of the radar. 

The slope of the terrain must be 7 degrees (120 mils) or less to ensure 

proper leveling of the ATG. The ATG will not operate properly without 

leveling. There are also safety considerations associated with sighting the 

radar on slopes greater than recommended. Some slope is advantageous 

and enhances radar functioning. Slope also provides drainage to the radar 

sight that can help prevent radar components from becoming stuck during 

periods of heavy or continuous rainfall. 

AREA IN FRONT OF THE RADAR

The area in front of the antenna should be clear of foliage that extends 

above the bottom of the antenna. Radar signals can be attenuated by more 

that 1 dB per meter of heavy foliage. A few meters of foliage can severely 

reduce radar effectiveness. A clear area in front of the radar minimizes 

attenuation of the radar beam. This area should extend 200 meters in front 

of the radar for the Q-36 and 300 meters in front of the radar for the Q-37. 

The ideal site will have a clear area in front of the radar that has a gentle 

downward slope for approximately 200-300 meters and then gradually 

rises up to the screening crest. This reduces multipath errors. Multipath 

errors are errors in target location created when radar transmit or return 

signals travel by more than one path. 

SCREENING CREST

A screening crest increases the survivability of the radar by serving as a 

defense against enemy observation (visual and infrared), direct fire, and 

electronic countermeasures. The screening crest also helps attenuate 

sound. Ideally, the screening crest should be in friendly territory and 

located approximately 1000 meters in front of the radar, perpendicular to 

the radar's azimuth to center sector. The vertical angle to the screening 

crest should be between 15 and 30 mils for the Q-36 and 5 and 15 mils for 

the Q-37. The optimum vertical angle is 10 mils. Further, the difference 

between the highest and lowest points on the screening crest should not 

exceed 30 mils. A difference of more than 30 mils reduces the ability of 

the radar to produce enough track volume to compute a weapon location 

or impact predict point. The vertical angle between the radar antenna and 

the top of the screening crest is called a mask angle. Appendix F contains 

a detailed discussion of mask angle. 

ASPECT ANGLE

The aspect angle is the angle between the radar beam and the target path. 

The aspect angle must be more than 1600 mils in hostile mode and 

between 800 and 1200 mils (angle-T) in friendly mode. Since the radar is 

a doppler radar, a target moving directly away or directly toward the radar 
produces the greatest change in frequency and a more accurate target 

location. 

ELECTRONIC LINE OF SIGHT

The overriding consideration in the selection of a radar site is electronic 

line of site. The radar must have electronic line of sight (ELOS) to the 

projectile being detected to acquire the weapon. However, ELOS to the 

weapon is not required. The radar technician should verify ELOS before 

occupying the site. This can be done manually or with the Firefinder 

Position Analysis System. Verifying ELOS before occupying a radar site 

can save valuable time by eliminating untenable radar sites prior to their 

occupation. 

TRACK VOLUME

Track volume is the amount of vertical coverage required by the radar to 

detect a projectile and compute a solution. The track volume is determined 

by the vertical scan of the radar and the amount of vertical scan lost 

because of the terrain contour, or screening crest in front of the radar. 

Firefinder radars require 50 mils of track volume to detect a projectile. 

Further, the difference between the high and low mask angles should not 

exceed 30 mils. A detailed discussion of track volume is contained in 

Appendix F. 

PROXIMITY OF OTHER RADARS

Other radar systems or active emitters can interfere with radar coverage by 

attenuating or jamming the radar beam. Radars and emitters close in 

proximity or azimuth of search may cause jamming. Inadvertent jamming 

can be avoided by careful planning of radar positions. 

CABLE LENGTHS

Cable lengths must be considered when selecting a radar site. The cables 

determine the maximum extent to which the components of the radar can 

be dispersed. The location of system components is determined by terrain 

contour, foliage, site access, and threat. Ideally, the radar components 

should be positioned to take advantage of naturally available cover and 

concealment. Nonetheless, cable lengths may dictate the actual positions. 

Table 4-5 provides a consolidate listing of cable lengths for the Q-36. 

Table 4-5. Q-36 Cable Lengths

Cable Length (m)
Prime Power Cable 32m (105 ft.) 

ATG Power Cable 8m (26 ft.) 

Shelter Power Cable 50m (164 ft.) 

Shelter Data Cable 50m (164 ft.) 

Based on these lengths, the Q-36's OCG can be placed up to 40 meters 

from the ATG and 30 meters from the PDG. The remote CDT can be 

located up to 90 meters from the shelter when using both CDT cables. 

Emplacement of system components must allow for 10 meters of slack in 

the cables to prevent damage to cable heads and connectors. Table 4-6

shows the cable lengths for the Q-37. 

Table 4-6. Q-37 Cable Lengths

Cable Length (m)

Prime Power Cable 40m (131 ft.) 

Auxiliary Power Cable 40m (131 ft.) 

CDT Cable (x2) 50m (164 ft.) 

Shelter Power Cable 50m (164 ft.) 

Shelter Data Cable 50m (164 ft.) 

Based on the cable lengths in Table 4-6, the Q-37 OCG can be placed 40 

meters from the ATG. The PDG can be placed up to 30 meters from the 

ATG given the combined lengths of the prime power and ATG power 

cable. The requirement for 10 meters of cable slack also applies to the Q37. 

SITE ACCESS

The radar site should have more than one route of approach. Routes of 

approach should be accessible by section vehicles, free from enemy 

observation, and capable of being guarded by a minimum number of 

personnel. The quality of access must also be considered. Some essential 

considerations include: 

• Accessibility during poor weather conditions. Can the position be 

accessed during periods of rain and snow? Positions that may 
deteriorate during inclement weather should be avoided to prevent 

stranding the radar. 

• Overhead clearance. Avoid locations where trees, power or 

telephone lines may damage radar components when entering and 

exiting the position. Check the clearance requirements for tunnels 

and overpasses to ensure section equipment does not exceed 

requirements. 

• Bridges. Check the bridge classifications on routes to radar 

positions. Ensure that the bridge classification of section 

equipment does not exceed the load bearing capabilities of the 

bridge. 

• Fords. Check fords to ensure they are passable to the radar section 

equipment. The ATG for the Q-36 and Q-37 can only ford 30 

inches of water. If heavy rains are expected some positions may 

become untenable because of fording restrictions. 

• Obstacles. Check routes for current and planned obstacles. These 

obstacles may include road craters, tank ditches, abates, or wire 

obstacles. Also check for natural obstacles such as fallen trees and 

rockslides. Ensure that the access is sufficient to allow egress after 

combat has occurred. Rubble from buildings, utilities and fallen 

trees should not prevent the radar section from displacing from a 

position. 

POSITIONING 

Positioning is based on the technical requirements and capabilities of the 

radar and tactical considerations. The overriding factor in positioning is 

mission accomplishment. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, 

and civil considerations (METT-TC) are paramount when selecting radar 

positions. The DS battalion S2 in conjunction with the targeting officer or 

controlling FA headquarters designates general position areas for radars. 

The radar section leader selects the actual radar site within the position 

area. 

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Radar position areas are selected based on IPB, the range capabilities of 

the radar, and METT-TC. A through analysis of METT-TC will dictate 

which factors are most important. Generally, in a traditional battlespace, 

radars are positioned far enough from the FLOT to acquire enemy 

weapons, prevent loss of the radar to enemy action, and avoid unnecessary 

movement. This maximizes radar coverage and cueing time. Given the 

radar's minimum range and the necessity to avoid conflicts with 

maneuvering friendly forces, the Q-37 is normally positioned 8-12km 

from the FLOT and the Q-36 3-6km behind the FLOT. This rule of thumb 

may change based on the tactical situation. In stability and support 
operations, radars may be positioned inside an intermediate staging base 

(ISB) or enclave. 

Mission

Radars must be positioned where they can best accomplish their mission. 

Several factors drive positioning in relation to mission considerations. The 

supported unit, commander's guidance, associated command and support 

relationship, and required sector of search dictate in general where the 

radar must be positioned. The requirements to conduct hostile and friendly 

operations add specificity to positioning requirements. Further, the 

requirements to establish priority zones influence radar positioning. 

Enemy

The enemy situation and capabilities greatly influence where a radar must 

be positioned. A through IPB is essential to determining radar locations. 

IPB influences positioning in two ways. First, IPB identifies the areas 

where enemy systems are anticipated. This information and the 

commander's targeting guidance dictate the positioning and orientation of 

the radar. Further, IPB identifies enemy threats that must be considered 

when positioning the radar. These threats may include suspected locations 

of ground threats or special purpose forces, electronic warfare threats, 

major ground and air avenues of approach, and anticipated requirements 

for repositioning. 

Terrain (and Weather)

Terrain effects movement, cover, concealment, communications, and 

positioning. In mountainous terrain, identifying positions that maximize 

the radar's range and capabilities is difficult. A position with an optimum 

screening crest may be difficult if not impossible to find. Terrain may also 

narrow the search sector because of inadequate electronic line of sight. On 

the other hand, flat or open terrain makes concealment difficult. Heavy 

rains, snow, sand storms, and dust storms can attenuate the radar signal 

and degrade the probability of location. Heavy rains and snow can make 

some terrain impassable or the soil unstable. The effects of terrain and 

weather upon positioning must be considered or mission accomplishment 

will be jeopardized. 

Troops

The size of the area to be covered and the number of radars available 

affect both positioning and employment. When multiple radars are 

available to support a unit, smaller search sectors may be assigned to 

specified radars. Further, positions should be selected that facilitate mutual 
support between radars. This allows one radar to assume all of or part of 

another radar's search sector and priority zones during displacement and 

movement. The number of crewmembers assigned to a radar section can 

also affect positioning. Sections manned at less than authorization may 

require additional support to accomplish the mission. This support may 

include security or maintenance above normal levels. Co-locating or 

positioning the radar in the vicinity of another unit may be required. 

Time Available

The time available for reconnaissance, liaison, movement, occupation, and 

position improvement must be considered. Mission requirements and the 

amount of time available to position radars may require that a radar 

initially position in a less than optimum position then reposition at a later 

time as mission requirements dictate. 

Civil Considerations

Civilians in the battlespace may impact positioning and radar operations. 

Positioning requirements may include additional security considerations 

when there is a hostile local populace. In addition to direct threats, 

movement routes may become blocked or congested by the local 

populace, refugees, or obstacles. However, a cooperative or friendly 

populace may enhance positioning options. Fixed facilities or other civil 

structures may become available for use by the radar section. Local 

logistical support may also be available. 

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Cover

When possible, section equipment should be placed in a defilade, 

hardened structure or prepared position to protect the radar and crew. This 

provides the crew and some equipment with protection from hostile fire. 

Even so, the radar's ATG cannot be completely covered. The ATG can 

only be placed in a location that provides cover to the top of the ATG 

trailer. This provides protection for the ATG electronics while providing 

an unobstructed line of sight for the antenna. Placing the radar in a 

covered position also helps dissipate noise from the ATG and PDG, 

lowers susceptibility to direct observation, and reduces the radar's thermal 

and infrared signatures. In situations where a defilade or prepared position 

is unavailable, the radar crew should consider burying the radar data and 

power cables. The data cable is one of the most vulnerable components of 

the radar system. It is susceptible to damage by indirect fires or by a 

vehicle driving over the cable. One broken or damaged wire in the cable 

can render the cable useless. The power and data cables should be buried 
in hand-dug trenches six inches deep, 12 inches deep when crossing roads. 

The trench should be free of rock and debris, as should the soil used to fill 

the trench. Engineer equipment should not be used to fill the trench 

because damage may occur to the cables and excess soil compaction may 

prevent recovery of the cables during radar displacement. 

Concealment

Maximum use of natural concealment, such as trees and shrubs, should be 

considered in selecting a sight for the radar. Care should be taken to avoid 

obstructions in front of the antenna that might attenuate the radar beam. 

Buildings and other manmade structures can be used to conceal some 

section equipment. Concealment is also affected by where the radar site is 

located. The unit's IPB should identify likely enemy observation points. 

When possible, radar sites should be selected that avoid direct observation 

from these areas. 

Communications

Communications between the radar and the supported unit will normally 

be conducted using FM digital and/or voice communications over 

SINCGARS or EPLRS. Electronic line of sight is required for FM 

communications. Radar positions must have adequate line of sight to 

facilitate FM communications with the supported unit. Further, radar 

positions must be in range of the organic communications or 

retransmission support must be provided 

RECONNAISSANCE 

The radar section leader conducts reconnaissance of general positions 

areas received from the controlling FA headquarters and selects actual 

radar positions. The reconnaissance will normally include a map 

reconnaissance, a site analysis using the FireFinder Position Analysis 

System (FFPAS), and a ground or air reconnaissance if time permits. At a 

minimum, a map reconnaissance and FFPAS analysis should be 

conducted. FFPAS is an excellent tool. However, it cannot replace the 

information gained from an actual ground or air reconnaissance. An actual 

reconnaissance is invaluable in determining the conditions in the position 

area and along movement routes. 

MAP RECONNAISSANCE

The map reconnaissance is used to determine the following: 

• Tactical situation in the position area. This requires a thorough 

review of the situational template and operational graphics. This 
review should identify contaminated areas, obstacles, minefields, 

known friendly and enemy locations, enemy observation posts, and 

enemy avenues of approach. 

• Routes into and out of the position area. 

• Identifying landmarks that can aid in hasty survey and navigation. 

• Bridges, fords and bypasses leading into and out of the position 

area. 

• Possible ambush and controlling terrain sites. 

• Units that may be operating in the vicinity that may assist with 

security or medical assistance. 

• Tentative radar sites for ground reconnaissance. 

• Inter-visibility lines that may provide screening crests. 

• Contour lines to provide information about ground slope. 

• Significant terrain features that may enhance survivability or 

degrade radar performance. 

• Possible alternate positions. 

FFPAS ANALYSIS

Once tentative radar sites are determined, FFPAS is used to analyze the 

suitability of the site. FFPAS can provide the following information: 

• Screening crest. 

• Mask angle. 

• Electronic line of sight. 

• Optimum search fence. 

• Estimated performance of the radar. 

• Slope of the terrain. 

GROUND RECONNAISSANCE

A ground reconnaissance should follow the map reconnaissance to 

determine passability of movement routes, validate position suitability, 

and facilitate the rapid occupation of the position. The ground 

reconnaissance is based on the factors of METT-TC and the technical and 

tactical considerations that influence radar operations. During the ground 

reconnaissance the radar section leader or section chief should accomplish 

the following: 

• Determine routes of ingress and egress to the position area. 

• Search and mark the area for obstacles and mines. 

• Determine alternate positions and rally points. 

• Determine the exact locations for the ATG and OC. 

• Select a location for the PDG that minimizes its effects on 

operations. 

• Determine vehicle locations that facilitate displacement. 
• Measure and evaluate the screening crest. 

• Obtain survey control to support MAPS/GPS requirements. 

• Provide local security. 

SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 

Survivability of the radar must be considered when selecting radar 

positions. Radars are susceptible to enemy ground attack, air attack, 

indirect fires and electronic warfare. A through IPB will identify possible 

threats. 

GROUND AND AIR ATTACK 

The radar section can take precautions to protect itself against ground and 

air attacks. The best protection against a direct attack is to position the 

radar in areas that prevent direct observation by enemy forces. This is 

important since most attacks by indirect fire or special purpose forces are 

initiated as a result of direct observation. Positioning outside of known 

enemy avenues of approach and air axes of advance will help avoid attack 

by enemy ground and air forces. Security measures may include dedicated 

maneuver forces or military police to provide on-site protection, or mutual 

support provided by units in the vicinity of the radar position. Mutual 

support arrangements might consist of early warning or incorporation of 

the radar in the supporting unit's defense plan. In addition, the radar 

section can protect itself by using cover and concealment. Selecting 

positions with natural or existing manmade cover and concealment is best. 

Engineer assets may also be tasked to provided prepared positions. 

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The radars electromagnetic signature makes it susceptible to electronic 

attack and radio direction finding (RDF). Standard signal security 

procedures can reduce the radar vulnerability to RDF. Detection by air and 

ground-based EW systems may present a greater problem. The IPB will 

identify known EW threats to the radar. Possible EW threats may include 

the IL-20 COOT (air), NRS-1, and NRS-X (ground systems). These 

systems are found in former Soviet-bloc countries. Selecting sites that 

lower the radar's electronic signature helps protect the radar against ECM 

threats. 

Occupy Optimum Sites 

The best countermeasure to enemy EW is to occupy optimum sites. An 

optimum site is one in which the radar is emplaced on level terrain having 

a gentle downward slope for the first 200-300 meters in front of the radar 

then a sharp rise to a screening crest. 
Screening Crest

The use of a screening crest is critical when an enemy has ECM 

capabilities. The screening crest diffracts the radar beam making if 

difficult to determine the direction of the radar beam. 

Double Screening Crest

The use of two screening crests makes the radar more difficult for the 

enemy to locate. The second crest further diffracts the radar beam making 

it more difficult to accurately locate the radar. 

Tunneling

Tunneling is the technique of reducing the side, top, and back lobes of 

radiation by careful site location. Tunneling is accomplished by sighting 

the radar where vegetation is located to the sides and rear of the radar 

antenna. Tunneling may also be accomplished by digging-in or 

sandbagging the position. The use of tunneling will reduce vulnerability to 

direction finding of side lobe radiation. 

Orient on Soft Background

If there are no terrain features or vegetation to reflect or absorb the radar 

beam beyond the target area, the background is open. Unrestricted access 

to non-reflected radar beams is an ideal situation for enemy DF operators. 

Orienting on a soft background such as foliage, tree lines or brush reflects 

the radar beam and makes it more difficult to DF. Hard backgrounds such 

as rock, buildings, bunkers or other structures also reflect radar beams. 

However, soft backgrounds are better than hard backgrounds. The 

reflection of radar beams causes a phenomenon known as the multipath 

effect. During reflection the beam is bent and phase shifting occurs. This 

results in the same signal being received from multiple directions and out 

of phase making the signal more difficult to DF. The optimum background 

is an open background above a screening crest. 

Reduce Radiating Time

The shorter time the radar transmits the lower the probability that the 

enemy will DF and obtain a fix on the radar. Transmission time should be 

reduced based on the enemy's detection capabilities to prevent being 

acquired. As a general rule, continuous radiation time should not exceed 

two minutes when the enemy has ECM capabilities. The radar 

survivability matrix in Table 4-7 can be used as quick reference to 

determine the total amount of radiation time from a position. Total 

radiation time should be adjusted based on the tactical situation. In 
situations with no ECM threat, continuous radiation should be the norm.

The survivability flow chart in Figure 4-28 provides a detailed process for 

evaluating the electronic threat and determining total radiating time. 

Table 4-7. Survivability Matrix

 
Figure 4-28. Survivability Flowchart

Operating Through Electronic Countermeasures
Operating through electronic countermeasures consists of detecting the 

presence of jamming or interference and performing actions to minimize 

or eliminate the effects of jamming. 

Q-36. The radar indicates jamming by displaying a vertical line at the 

jamming azimuth on the operational display, by a printed jam strobe 

message, the INTFR/JAM indicator being lit on the operations screen, or 

for some types of jamming, displaying many short duration tracks on the 

monitor. To avoid degradation of radar performance the following tactics 

may be used: 

• Turn on the radar's electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) 

feature. 

• Avoid operation within line of sight or in the same sector as the 

jammer. 

• Operate on a different frequency than the jammer. 

• Use deception. 

Turning on the radar's ECCM functions allows the operator to activate the 

jam strobe and pulsed interference rejection functions. The jam strobe 

identifies jamming and identifies the azimuth of the jamming while pulsed 

interference rejection helps filter out interference from the jammer. If 

pulsed interference rejection doesn't work the other tactics can be 

implemented. Line of sight issues can be avoided by selecting optimal 

radar sights. Relocating a radar to avoid jamming may or may not be 

possible based on the tactical situation. Changing radar frequencies will 

sometimes help avoid the jammer's operating frequency. Increment 

frequencies one at a time and determine from the jam strobe indicator if 

the jammer is still present. Increase the frequency, starting at the lowest 

frequency, the least amount necessary to avoid degrading the radar's 

performance. If these steps don't work, it may be possible to fool the 

jammer by ceasing to radiate for a few minutes. Change frequencies then 

resume operations. This may help prevent the jammer from staying on the 

radar's operating frequency. 

Q-37. The tactics for working through ECCM for the Q-36 are applicable 

to the Q-37. Further, the Q-37's jam strobe and pulsed interference 

rejection functions are similar to the Q-36. In addition, the Q-37 has a 

clear channel sensing (CCS) function. CCS is automatically turned on 

when the radar's operational program is entered. CCS passively scans the 

radar's 49 search beam positions using all 15 frequencies of each beam 

position and determines which frequencies are free of jamming or 

interference. A frequency report is provided to the operator. During 

operations, the CCS function disables frequencies and provides operator 

alerts based on the radar frequency mode in use. There are three frequency 

modes. They are: 
• Single frequency. 

• Diversity (the normal operating mode). 

• Electronic countermeasures avoidance (ECMA). 

In single frequency mode, the radar operates on a single frequency for all 

beams. If jamming is detected on the frequency, CCS activates the 

DEGRADED/PRFM warning light indicating the radar is operating in a 

degraded mode. In diversity mode, a different frequency is used for each 

beam position. Up to five frequencies can be selected by the operator for 

each beam position. When operating in diversity mode, CCS disables 

individual frequencies within beam positions to avoid jamming. When 

only one frequency remains and it is not clear, CCS activates the 

DEGRADED/PRFM warning light. Finally, the radar can be operated in 

the ECMA frequency mode. This mode is used to combat ECM when 

ECM is seriously degrading the radar's performance. It should only be 

used under this condition because ECMA mode degrades the radars 

performance. In this mode, radar frequencies and beam positions are 

selected at random. 

ANTIRADIATION MISSILES

Antiradiation missiles (ARM) can pose a significant threat to radars. US 

ARM employment uses the AGM-88 High speed Antiradiation Missile 

(HARM). Coalition Forces also employ the Alarm, Armat, AS-6, AS-9, 

AS-11 and AS-16. (Note: HARM and ARM can be used interchangeably, 

but the US exclusively uses the term HARM.) ARMs are of particular 

concern because friendly aircraft may inadvertently attack a radar (or 

"emitter") if unaware of its presence and operating frequencies. For 

example, if aircrews are unaware that an AN/TPQ-36 is radiating in the 

aircraft's area of operations it may be engaged as a possible SA-6 radar 

and attacked. Further, coalition aircraft may not have the ability to 

discriminate between enemy and friendly radar signatures exacerbating the 

risk to friendly radars. Danger to friendly radars may occur during 

situations where JSEAD is employed in support of deep maneuver 

operations, aerial interdiction or when receiving close air support. 

Coordination of radar information during the planning process can reduce 

the risk to friendly radars. The targeting technician must ensure that 

location is constantly updated and this information is passed to the 

battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). The Corps EWO must be 

cognizant of all emitters found on the battlefield, friendly, neutral and 

threat. The electronic order of battle (EOB) must include all emitters and 

be constantly updated to prevent a fratricide incident. It is imperative that 

the planners ensure that all radar locations are identified and disseminated. 

Pertinent information about radar in the AO can be submitted with the air 

support request for preplanned missions and passed directly to the aircraft 

by the ALO during terminal control of CAS. Information submitted for 
preplanned missions is analyzed at the air operations center (AOC) and 

aircraft rules of engagement (ROE) are developed and published in the 

airspace control order (ACO) and the special instructions (SPINS) of the 

air tasking order (ATO). The following information, as a minimum, must 

be passed to AOC via the BCD to deconflict radar operations and ARM 

employment: 

• Radar type and purpose. 

• Radar location. 

• On-air/off-air times. 

• Emitter parametrics. 

• Frequency range. 

• Pulse repetition frequency (PRF). 

• Pulse repletion interval (PRI). 

• Pulse width. 

• Scan type/rate. 

• Site specific patterns. 

• Physical site set-up. 

• Communications capabilities. 

• Coordination frequencies and call signs. 

If radar and ARM missions cannot be deconflicted, emitter shut down 

techniques must be used during ARM employment. This process can be 

tedious and time consuming. Preplanned CAS missions normally allow 

sufficient time to coordinate shutdown. However, during immediate CAS 

missions this may not be the case. The supported ground commander must 

balance the risk of fratricide with the need for SEAD to support immediate 

CAS. In some cases, the ground commander may decide it is neither 

tactically sound, nor possible, to quickly and effectively shut down 

friendly emitters. TTP for the employment of ARM are contained in FM 

90-35, Multiservice Procedures for Antiradiation Missile Employment in a 

Joint Environment. Table 4-8 contains the Q-36 and Q-37 radar technical 

parameters for deconflicting radar operations and ARM employment. 

Table 4-8. Radar Operational Parameters

Parameter Q-36 Q-37

Radar Type Pulse Doppler Pulse Doppler 

Frequency Range 9.37 - 9.99 Ghz 3.1 - 3.39 Ghz 

PRF 7692.3 - 14,705 pps 2793.3 - 5050.1 pps 

Pulse Width 1 millisecond 10.75 milliseconds 
Modulation Type Chirped pulses Chirped pulses 

Peak RF Power Output 73.6 dBm minimum 120 kW min 

Duty Cycle 0.012 0.041 

LOCATION AVERAGING 

Location averaging is a functional part of the radar operational program 

that eliminates duplicate targets and prevents the loss of targets by 

eliminating backlogs in the radar's temporary display queue. This function 

is automatically turned on when the radar's operational program is loaded. 

Nonetheless, location averaging can be turned off if a requirement exists 

to identify target locations in close proximity to one another. 

When a target is located it is placed in the temporary target queue pending 

operator action. Targets remain in the temporary queue until the operator 

stores or transmits the target. Storing or transmitting the target removes 

the target from the temporary queue and places the target in permanent 

storage. This frees space in the temporary queue. If the temporary queue 

becomes full, all further target acquisitions are lost until space is freed in 

the temporary queue. Location averaging automatically frees space in the 

temporary queue by averaging new targets with targets in permanent 

storage. If a new target is within 200 meters of a target in permanent 

storage, the radar will automatically average its location with the target in 

permanent storage, update the stored target's location, and remove the new 

target from the temporary input queue. This saves space in the input 

queue, eliminates duplicate targets, and saves permanent storage space. If 

the new target does not correlate with a stored target, it is placed in the 

temporary input queue pending operator action. Figure 4-29 demonstrates 

the concept of location averaging. 
Figure 4-29. Location Averaging

AUTOMATIC HEIGHT CORRECTION 

Height correction is an essential function that must be performed to 

accurately locate enemy weapons. Height correction is required because 

the radar thinks the altitude of the target is the same as the high or low 

datum plane depending on which was used to initialize the radar's 

computer. Without height correction the radar will locate a hostile weapon 

by backtracking the trajectory until it intersects the datum plane used 

during initialization instead of using the actual terrain altitude. This can 

cause a significant error in target location. 

The radar automatically performs height correction when digital terrain 

data is available, accurate, and loaded into the system. In the absence of 

digital terrain, manual height correction must be used. Figure 4-30

demonstrates the importance of height correction. 
Figure 4-30. Height Correction Example

In the example shown in Figure 4-30, the initial height in the height 

display is 1000 feet (the height of the low datum plane), whereas the 

actual weapon location height is 1500 feet. Therefore, the weapon location 

indicated on the site map will be incorrect, and the height of this location 

will not agree with the height indicated by the height display. If the correct 

weapon location height of 1500 feet is known, it can be entered directly. 

When the new height is entered, the backtracking solution moves along 

the projectile trajectory to the intersection with the new height and that 

new point becomes the displayed weapon location. When the height of the 

location indicated on the site map and that indicated by the height display 

agree, no further height correction is required and the displayed location is 

correct. 

AUTO CENSORING 

The radar's auto censoring function is used during anticipated periods of 

heavy enemy fire or when the radar begins locating more than 10 targets 

per minute. Auto censoring maximizes the radar's ability to locate new 

firing positions, saves computer-processing time and saves space in the 

permanent target list. It accomplishes this by eliminating duplicate target 

tracks that exceed a specified threshold count. When auto censoring is on,

the radar examines each new track for proximity to an existing weapon 

location. If the new track is within 500 meters of a known target, and 

exceeds the established threshold count, the track is dropped. The 

threshold count is the maximum number of tracks allowed from a know 

location. It can be set from 2-16 tracks. Normally, a lower threshold count 

is established during periods of higher enemy fire. Care must be exercised 
when using auto censoring since this function causes the radar to ignore 

acquisitions.

FIREFINDER POSITION ANALYSIS SYSTEM 

The FireFinder Position Analysis System (FFPAS) is a computer tool that 

facilitates the sighting and set-up of radars. FFPAS determines radar 

coverage at a particular location by assessing the radar's ability to locate 

different types of enemy weapons. FFPAS is capable of performing, in 

minutes, calculations that require significantly more time when done 

manually. The rapid analyses capability of this computer-based system

allows the radar section leader to quickly analyze alternative sites and 

evaluate potential radar coverage. FFPAS significantly reduces the time 

required to perform a detailed radar site analysis.

SITE ANALYSIS

The radar site is evaluated by specifying the position in the terrain 

database. The radar operator positions the radar in FFPAS by specifying 

the position's easting, northing and local reference datum on a pop-up 

menu. On a second menu, the antenna's mechanical azimuth boresight, left 

and right sector scan limits, and its minimum and maximum coverage 

ranges are specified. This information is used to construct a terrain plot. 

Figure 4-31 shows an example terrain plot. 

Figure 4-31. FFPAS Terrain Plot
The white "+" at the center of this figure denotes the radar location, while 

the annular wedge depicts the radar coverage zone for the selected site. 

The terrain plot provides the operator with a topographic map of the area 

around the radar. The color code can be quickly changed to match the 

height characteristics of the local terrain or those of a small area on the 

terrain plot. By clicking on a particular point, the easting, northing and 

altitude of that point are provided to the user. The user can also magnify a 

region of this plot by placing a rectangle zoom box around a desired area. 

The user can now produce several additional plots to evaluate the radar 

sighting, any or all of which can be active simultaneously. The screen 

angle plot shown in Figure 4-32 shows a terrain profile. 

Figure 4-32. Screen Angle Plot

The screening crest as a function of range can be obtained directly from

this plot. The range to the terrain is color-coded. The rectangular box on 

this plot denotes the left and right azimuth scan limits and the upper and 

lower elevation scan limits. 

Figure 4-33 shows a clutter plot. This plot shows where radar returns from 

stationary objects can degrade radar performance. 
Figure 4-33. Clutter Plot

Weapon Location Analysis

FFPAS provides the ability to perform a computer analysis of the radar's 

performance against probable enemy weapon location and aim points. 

This allows the operators to assess the radar's sighting and set-up based on 

battlefield intelligence in a variety of scenarios. FFPAS accomplishes this 

task by first allowing the user to specify the weapon type, location and aim 

point, and both the quadrant elevation (QE), and muzzle velocity for a 

shot, and then by estimating the ability of the radar to determine the 

location of the weapon. 

FFPAS models several generic weapon types, including mortars, light, 

medium and heavy artillery, and both light and heavy rockets. Also, 

specific weapon types can easily be included in the system. FFPAS will 

inform the operator if the shot parameters that have been input are not 

within the capabilities of the weapon. For achievable shot's, all relevant 

data (e.g., the distance from the weapon to the impact point, the range 

from the radar to both the weapon and the impact point, etc.) are 

displayed. The system automatically computes the minimum QE values. 

The operator may then change the muzzle velocity or the QE value to 

analyze other firing conditions. The maximum QE can be obtained at the 

push of a button. 

The weapon model parameters used in FFPAS include the allowable range 

of values for muzzle velocity, atmospheric drag coefficients, and the radar 
cross-sectional area (RCS) of the projectile as a function of its aspect 

angle. This ensures the projectile's trajectory is correctly modeled and the 

radar signal strength is accurately determined. Once a shot has been 

specified, it can be overlaid onto all FFPAS plots. 

Four additional pieces of information are provided to the operator on 

FFPAS plots. They are: 

• P (Solution): The probability that the radar will collect a sufficient 

amount of data with a suitable target to interference ratio (TIR) to 

solve weapon location equations. 

• CEP: The circular error probable for the weapon location estimate. 

• P (Location): The probability that the CEP will be within the 

radar's specification. 

• Condition Color: A simple means for characterizing the radar 

performance through a green/yellow/red/black color code. The 

condition color has been designed to give the user a rapid means of 

assessing the sighting evaluation, especially under stressful 

conditions. A thorough assessment of the results can then be 

performed when time permits. 

In addition to the data above, tabular data describing the radar 

characteristics for both the projectile and the environment are provided for 

each point along the simulated trajectory. 

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Safety is an important consideration when operating and working around 

Firefinder radars. Possible safety concerns include radiation, wind, noise 

and electrical hazards. 

RADIATION

When the radar transceiver is energized, it poses a microwave radiation 

hazard to personnel. The radiation hazard area for the AN/TPQ-36 radar 

extends 5 meters in front of the antenna within a 1600-mil fan about the 

boresight for all transmitting operations. For narrow-sector azimuth scan 

angles less than 400 mils, an additional sector must be controlled to a 

distance of 30 meters from the antenna. For fixed-beam mode, the hazard 

area extends to a distance of 75 meters in front of the radar. The narrowscan hazard sector usually applies to friendly fire mode operations and 

fixed-beam to certain maintenance operations. In addition, microwave 

radiation may cause the accidental detonation of some types of live 

ordnance out to 268 meters, especially those electrically armed or 

detonated. If the radar is to be emplaced near an airfield or ammunition 

site, liaison should be made with the organizations responsible for the 
operations of those facilities. Microwave radiation poses the same types of 

safety hazards for the AN/TPQ-37. However, the microwave radiation 

produced by the AN/TPQ-37 poses a safety hazard at increased ranges. 

The hazard area for the AN/TPQ-37 extends 7 meters in front of the 

antenna within a 1600 mil fan about the boresight for all transmitting 

operations. For narrow-sector scan, an additional sector must be controlled 

out to 40 meters. For fixed-beam mode the hazard area extends out to 100 

meters in front of the radar. Like the Q-36, the hazard area for electrically 

armed or detonated explosives is 268 meters from the antenna for the full 

1600 mil sector of scan. 

WIND

Because of the large surface area of the AN/TPQ-36 antenna, high wind 

velocity can cause serious safety hazards. Whenever wind velocity reaches 

a constant 52 mph or gusts up to 75 mph during operations, the antenna 

must be placed in the stowed position. When non-operational, the radar 

must be stowed when winds reach 65 mph with gusts to 100 mph. 

Camouflage nets also should be lowered or removed to prevent damage to 

equipment or injury to personnel. The same hazards exist for the AN/TPQ37. However, the radar must be stowed when the wind velocity reaches a 

constant 40 mph with gusts up to 75 mph during operations. When nonoperational, the antenna must be stowed when winds reach 80 mph with 

gusts up to 119 mph. 

OTHER HAZARDS

Other hazards include noise and electrical hazards. Using hearing 

protection when working around power generation equipment can mitigate 

noise hazards. Finally, overhead power lines and improper grounding of 

radar equipment can cause electrical hazards. To prevent these hazards, 

radio antennas should be tied down during movement and position areas 

should be selected that eliminate overhead electrical hazards. Further, 

section equipment must be properly grounded during operation. 
Chapter 5 

Tactical Employment of Field Artillery Target 

Acquisition Systems 

This chapter discusses concepts and procedures pertinent to the tactical 

employment of the field artillery target acquisition systems. The tactics, 

techniques and procedures (TTP) contained in this chapter are applicable 

to the traditional roles of target acquisition. TTP for stability operations 

and support operations are discussed in Chapter 6. 

SECTION I - RADAR EMPLOYMENT

Sound tactical planning is required to effectively cover the division zone 

of responsibility with TA assets. TA planning is conducted at all tactical 

levels as an integral part of the MDMP process. This ensures TA assets are 

fully integrated into combined arms operations. The controlling FA 

headquarters is responsible for employing TA assets in accordance with 

the operational plan. This section discusses the tactical considerations for 

employing radars. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Command and control are often confused with command and support 

relationships. Command and control is the exercise of authority and 

direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached 

forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control 

functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 

communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in 

planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission. 

Command is the authoritative act of making decisions and ordering action; 

control is the act of monitoring and influencing this action. While 

command and control may be discussed separately for understanding, in 

practice, command and control is a unified entity. The commander cannot 

command effectively without control and cannot exercise control without 

command. The commander uses command and control, which includes the 

staff, to make effective decisions, to manage the uncertainty of combat, to 

employ military forces efficiently, and to direct the successful execution 

of military operations. In short, the goal of command and control is 

mission accomplishment. 
Control is the dissemination of the commander's decisions, guidance, and 

intent with subsequent supervision and adjustment of subordinate forces' 

execution to ensure compliance with the commander's intent. Control may 

take place before, during, and after operations. Control may be exercised 

directly or indirectly by directive, plan, or procedure. Information and 

time are critical to control. The commander, with the help of his staff, uses 

control to regulate forces and functions of subordinate and supporting 

units in military operations to ensure mission accomplishment. Control is 

based on situational information, such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, 

time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), from all sources. The 

commander uses this information to adjust the resources, concept, or 

objective of the plan or to exploit success in operations. Staffs help 

commanders exercise control by: 

• Acquiring and applying means to accomplish the commander's 

intent. 

• Defining limits. 

• Determining requirements. 

• Allocating means. 

• Monitoring status and performance and reporting significant 

changes to the commander. 

• Developing specific guidance from general guidance. 

• Forecasting change. 

Command and control is facilitated by establishing an organization for 

combat that ultimately assigns a command relationship to every TA asset. 

There are three command and control methodologies for employing TA 

radars. They are: 

• Centralized control at the DIVARTY or FA brigade. 

• Decentralized control by attaching radars to a subordinate FA unit. 

• Combination of centralized and decentralized control. 

The command and control methodology used is based solely on mission 

requirements. 

CENTRALIZED CONTROL

TA assets may be held under the centralized control of the division 

artillery or its reinforcing FA brigade. Centralized control optimizes 

coverage to support the commander's intent. Under centralized control, the 

S2 in concert with the counterfire officer/targeting officer will: 

• Designate a general position area, sector of search, and zones for 

each radar. 

• Establish cueing guidance. 
• Designate cueing agents. 

• Control radar movement. 

• Designates who receives radar targets. 

When the FA brigade has control of TA assets, the division artillery 

should provide the target processing element from the TAB with its 

associated equipment to the FA brigade. Like the division artillery, the FA 

brigade headquarters does not have an organic target processing element 

and thus does not have target processing capability without augmentation. 

Regardless of which headquarters exercises control, subordinate battalions 

may be tasked to provide logistical, survey, and security support because 

of the dispersal of radars across the division. 

DECENTRALIZED CONTROL

Under decentralized control, TA assets are provided to subordinate units 

for their direct control and employment. Q-36 radar sections are normally 

attached to DS or reinforcing (R) FA battalions. When attached, the radar 

is considered an integral part of the DS Battalion support package to the 

brigade combat team (BCT). The FA battalion S2, in conjunction with the 

targeting officer, controls the radar, executing the same responsibilities as 

the division artillery S2 and counterfire officer. Q-36 sections are 

responsible for covering the supported BCT zone of responsibility. The 

BCT FSO and targeting officer coordinate mission requirements and 

priorities with the S2 based on the BCT commander's guidance and intent. 

Normally division artillery retains centralized control of Q37 radars. 

However, Q-37 radars may be placed under the control of a multiple 

launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion or other fire unit based on mission 

requirements and the tactical situation. 

COMBINATION CONTROL

Any combination of centralized and decentralized operational control of 

radars may be used according to the situation. For example, two Q-36 

radars may be assigned to the DS battalions supporting the two committed 

BCTs while the remaining Q-36 and two Q-37s are kept under division 

artillery control. 

Regardless of the radar control option used, logistical support is a key 

factor in tactical employment. Normally, TA radar sections are attached to 

another FA unit for administrative and logistical support. For a discussion 

of the logistical support entailed by such attachment, see Appendix H. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 
TA assets are organized for combat to best meet the commander's intent 

and accomplish the assigned mission. This is done by establishing 

command relationships. The commander establishes command 

relationships for TA assets in accordance with army doctrine. An 

important consideration when selecting the command relationship is the 

desired method of control. Radars may remain under the centralized 

control of the controlling headquarters or decentralized control may be 

established. Any combination of centralized or decentralized control may 

be used based on the tactical situation. 

Placing a TA element under another unit using one of the following 

methods forms a command relationship: attachment, operational control 

(OPCON), or tactical control (TACON). Command responsibilities, 

responsibilities for service support, and authority to organize or reassign 

component elements of a supporting force remain with the higher 

headquarters or parent unit unless the authorizing commander specifies 

otherwise. The command relationships and inherent responsibilities are 

depicted in Table 5-1. 

Table 5-1. Command Relationships

 Inherent Responsibilities

Relationship 

with: 

Task 

organized 

by: 

Positioned 

by: 

Provides 

liaison: 

Maintains 

commo 

with: 

Priorities 

established 

by: 

Gaining 

unit can 

further 

impose: 

Attached Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

Per 

Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

Attached, 

OPCON, 

TACON, 

GS, 

GSR, R, 

DS 

OPCON Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit(see 

note) 

Gaining 

Unit 

Per 

Gaining 

Unit 

Parent 

Unit and 

Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

OPCON, 

TACON, 

GS, 

GSR, R, 

DS 

TACON Gaining 

Unit 

Parent 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

(maneuver) 

Per 

Gaining 

Unit 

Parent 

Unit and 

Gaining 

Unit 

Gaining 

Unit 

GS, 

GSR, R, 

DS 
 NOTE: Except when involving Multinational forces in NATO, then Parent Unit. 

ATTACHMENT

Attachment is the placement of units or personnel in an organization 

where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to the limitations 

imposed by the attachment order, the commander of the formation, unit, or 

organization receiving the attachment has the responsibility to provide the 

attached units with sustainment support above its organic capability. 

However, the parent formation, unit, or organization normally retains the 

responsibility for transfer, non-judicial punishment, courts martial and 

human resources support such as strength accounting, promotions and 

other essential personnel services. 

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon 

at or below the level of combatant command is operational control 

(OPCON). Operational control is inherent in command authority. 

Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, 

and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 

Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through 

the commanders of subordinate organizations. Operational control 

provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ 

those forces, as the commander in operational control considers necessary 

to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. 

TACTICAL CONTROL

Tactical control (TACON) is the command authority over assigned or 

attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made 

available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish 

missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at 

or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control allows 

commanders to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistics assets 

but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct 

administrative and logistical support. 
SECTORS OF SEARCH 

Sectors of search are areas on the battlefield where radars focus their 

capabilities. Sectors of search are determined during the IPB process and 

refined in the decide function of the D3A cycle. During the decide 

function, decisions are made concerning what targets should be acquired 

and attacked, where and when targets are likely to be found, and who can 

locate them. Doctrinal employment considerations, in conjunction with 

templates and intelligence produced during the IPB process, dictate the 

areas in which the radar search should be focused. The location of friendly 

boundaries, fire support coordinating measures, and the common sensor 

boundary (CSB) may also affect the assignment of search sectors. 

ZONES 

Zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search into areas of 

greater or lesser importance. Zones focus radar coverage on the combined 

arms commander's battlefield priorities. A zone is a geometric figure 

placed around an area that designates the area as more, or less, important. 

Four types of zones can be entered into a Firefinder radar: 

• Critical friendly zones (CFZ). 

• Call-for-fire zones (CFFZ). 

• Artillery target intelligence zones (ATIZ). 

• Censor zones (CZ). 

Targets developed by the radar are displayed for transmission in order of 

priority based on the zone from which they were developed. There are two 

categories of zones, priority and censor. The Q-36 and Q-37 can store a 

total of nine zones. 

PRIORITY ZONES

Priority zones are prioritized areas for locating hostile weapon systems. 

There are three types of priority zones in order of precedence: 

• Critical friendly zone (CFZ). 

• Call for fire zone (CFFZ). 

• Artillery target intelligence zone (ATIZ). 

All other weapon firing locations identified by the radar are displayed 

after locations identified within priority zones. Firing locations identified 

within a CFZ or CFFZ generate a FM;CFF message. All other acquisitions 

generate an ATI;CDR message. 

CFZ
A CFZ is an area established around a friendly unit or location that is 

critical to the success of the combined arms commander's plan. When the 

computer predicts an enemy round will impact in a CFZ, the radar 

generates a call for fire on the location from which the round was fired. 

This happens automatically unless overridden by the radar operator. A 

FM;CFF message is sent to controlling FA headquarters as a priority 1 

message. The CFZ provides the most responsive submission of targets to 

the fire support system. The CFZ does not have to be within the radars 

search zone. 

CFFZ

A CFFZ designates a search area from which the commander wants to 

attack hostile firing systems. A CFFZ would be placed around an enemy 

fire support position identified by IPB as a HPT. A CFFZ generates the 

second highest priority fire request. A target identified in a CFFZ 

generates a FM;CFF priority 2 message. The commander may upgrade the 

priority, to priority 1, for certain CFFZ. A CFFZ must be in the radar's 

sector of search. 

ATIZ

An ATIZ is an area in enemy territory that the commander wishes to 

monitor closely. Any weapon detected in an ATIZ will be reported ahead 

of all acquisitions other than those from CFZs or CFFZs. Detections from 

an ATIZ generate an ATI;CDR. 

CENSOR ZONES

Censor zones (CZ) are areas from which the radar is prohibited from 

reporting acquisitions. A CZ is normally placed around friendly weapon 

systems to prevent them from being acquired by other friendly radars. The 

CZ is most often used in non-linear situations or during cross FLOT raids 

or infiltration. Care must be used when employing a CZ since the radar 

ignores all acquisitions coming from the CZ. This remains true even if the 

hostile weapon is firing at a unit inside a CFZ. Figure 5-1 depicts the use 

of a CZ. 
Figure 5-1. Censor Zone

DEVELOPING ZONE DATA

Zone data must support the tactical plan and satisfy the radars 

requirements for data input. The DS battalion S2 and the targeting officer 

develop zone data for the Q-36 and the counterfire officer develops zone 

data for Q-37's. The data is entered and transmitted from the TOC to the 

radar using the automated RDO (see Appendix G). The following 

considerations apply when developing zone data: 

• Up to nine zones can be entered in the radar. All zones may be of 

one type or any combination of types. 

• A zone must be defined by a minimum of three and a maximum of 

six coordinates. 

• An azimuth should not intersect the boundary of a zone more than 

two times as shown in Figure 5-2. 

• A radar zone cannot intersect or touch another zone. 

• No more than two zones can be along the same search azimuth for 

radars using the S-250 shelter. (See Figure 5-3). 

• Grid coordinates must be listed and entered sequentially. 

• Zone coordinates cannot fall outside the sector of search (except 

for CFZ). 
Figure 5-2. Zone Rejected Zone Crossed Beam 3 Times

 

Figure 5-3. Zone Rejected 3 Zones On One Beam
ZONE MANAGEMENT 

TA assets are employed to support counterfire operations. Counterfire is 

part of the combined arms commander's overall battle plan and not a 

separate operation. Radar zones are managed to comply with the 

commander's guidance and intent and are an important part of force 

protection and the prioritization of fire support efforts. Understanding the 

maneuver commander's plan, and integrating fire support officers into the 

development, refinement and triggering of planned zones is key to 

successful radar zone management. Planning guidance may be found in a 

number of different documents. These locations include the fires 

paragraph, tasks to subordinate units and coordinating instructions of the 

operations plan or order, and the fire support annex. Information from 

these sources provides the necessary guidance and information to initiate 

zone planning. 

There is a distinct difference between zone management in the brigade 

sector, and zone management in the division sector. At the brigade combat 

team (BCT), BCT and task force FSOs are directly involved in the 

planning, refinement and triggering of the zones. Accordingly, the BCT 

FSE prioritizes BCT requirements and allocates radar zones to support the 

scheme of maneuver. The planning for and availability of redundant radar 

coverage by DIVARTY Q-37s is critical to the BCT's success. This 

coverage must be included in planning guidance and coordinated as early 

as possible. 

The DIVARTY counterfire officer (CFO) is responsible for employing 

division TA assets. Accordingly, he must be involved in the planning of 

the BCT's counterfire operations and fully understand their TA support 

requirements. The BCT FSE, targeting officer, and the DS FA battalion S2 

must coordinate their requirements for available GS fires and additional 

radar coverage with the DIVARTY CFO. Coordination between the 

DIVARTY CFO and BCT targeting team members is crucial to the 

success of the counterfire battle. 

Basic guidelines for zone planning include: 

• Use top down planning and bottom up refinement. 

• Include the top down radar zone plan in the maneuver order. 

• FSOs, S2s, and targeting officers conduct bottom up refinement 

that reflects the developed situation template, force protection 

priorities, and scheme of maneuver. 

• The brigade targeting officer or division counterfire officer 

manages zones by resolving duplication, time phasing zones by 

priority, including zones on the FS execution/synchronization 
matrices, and providing zones to radar sections via the radar 

deployment order (RDO) or radar execution matrix. 

• The radar section leader performs technical zone management at 

the radar. 

• Refine and update zones as the operation progresses. 

ZONE MANAGEMENT PLANNING SEQUENCE

The following procedure provides a list of activities essential for 

successful zone planning. 

• Prioritize operational sector and scheme of maneuver events for 

zone planning based on the commanders intent/guidance 

(commander, FSCOORD, FSO, targeting officer and CFO). 

• Develop zones during the course of action (COA) development 

and the wargaming process (S2/G2, FSOs, targeting officers and 

CFO). 

• Approve and allocate zones to subordinate FSEs that support the 

scheme of maneuver, meet the commander's priorities for force 

protection and facilitate the engagement of high payoff targets 

(commander, targeting team, FSE and CFO). 

• Develop and assign decision points as triggers for the execution of 

planned zones (S2, FSE, targeting officer). 

• Incorporate decision points (triggers) for planned zones and radar 

movement into the appropriate decision support template (DST), 

synchronization/execution matrices and intelligence collection plan 

(ICP) (S2/G2, FSO, FAIO, targeting officer and CFO). 

• Refine to ensure nominated zones facilitate the scheme of 

maneuver and the commander's intent for force protection 

(commander, targeting team and CFO). 

• Rehearse planned zones (radar movement, zone activation and 

Counterfire Battle drill) during combined arms, FA technical and 

fire support rehearsals (commander, FSCOORD, FSO, targeting 

officer, G2/S2, radar and CFO). 

• Refine zones during execution as the IPB improves or the scheme 

of maneuver changes (FSOs, targeting officers, G2/S2 and CFO). 

• Develop positioning guidance for the radar that optimizes the 

probability of acquisition and supports the coverage of planned 

zones (S2, S3, radar and CFO). 

ZONE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Responsibilities for radar employment and zone management must be 

fixed to focus the planning process and execution. The combined arms 

commander is ultimately responsible for counterfire and his staff's fixed 

responsibilities must include: 
• FSCOORD: 

– Translates the commander's intent for force protection 

and engagement of enemy indirect fire weapons. 

– Ensures force protection and counterfire priorities are 

articulated in the commander's fires paragraph to the 

OPORD. 

– Recommends zones to the commander during the 

planning process. 

• Targeting team: 

– Synchronizes all target acquisition assets and zone 

development to facilitate the D3A process. 

– Ensures planned zones are synchronized with the 

applicable elements of the High Payoff Target List, 

(HPTL). 

– Allocates, verifies, and updates zones to ensure the 

commander's intent for force protection and engagement is 

met. 

– Assigns cueing agents corresponding to NAIs, TAIs, 

PIRs and IRs associated with planned zones. The 

designated cueing agents should be included in the RS&S 

plan and be in position to trigger activation of the zone. 

• FSO/targeting officer: 

– Provides guidance to lower echelon FSOs/targeting 

officers and solicits force protection measures - CFZs. 

– Ensures priorities and triggers are developed for the 

activation and inactivation of zones. 

– Integrates planned triggers into the appropriate 

DST/synchronization matrixes. 

– Incorporates planned zones into the combined arms and 

fire support rehearsals. 

– Ensures zones are sent to S2s/CFOs for inclusion in the 

radar deployment order (RDO). 
• Operations officers (G3/S3): 

– Incorporates decision points, planned zones, and radar 

movement into the DST and synchronization matrix. 

– Ensures the TA TAB to the Field Artillery Support Plan 

includes coordination measures for zone development and 

radar positioning. 

– Ensures land management for the radars is coordinated 

with maneuver elements. 

– Determines attack guidance and firing unit assignment to 

support the responsive engagement of counterfire 

acquisitions. 

– Monitors range capabilities of both the acquisition agent 

(radar) and engagement systems to ensure positioning and 

movement supports the counterfire plan (zones/force 

protection priorities). 

• Task force FSOs: 

– Develops priority zones to support the task force plan - 

CFZs/CZs. 

– Nominates zones to the brigade commander 

(FSO/targeting officer) for approval and priority. 

– Develops precise triggers along with identifying and 

assigning cueing agents for priority zones. 

– Ensures the developed triggers are incorporated into the 

supported units DST/synchronization matrix. 

– Establishes ownership and responsibility for the zones. 

– Ensures any changes to the scheme of maneuver are 

compared against the planned zones. 

– Ensures refinement is completed and sent to the DS FA 

battalion S2 for transmission to the radar. 

– Activates and refines zones during execution. 

• DS battalion S2: 
– Develops CFFZs based on the templated enemy artillery 

positions and known intelligence data. 

– Nominates zones to the targeting team for approval and 

inclusion into the ICP. 

– Receives approved zones from the BDE FSO/targeting 

officer for inclusion into the RDO. 

– Constructs radar employment plan and RDO in 

conjunction with the radar section leader. 

– Refines zones as IPB improves or the scheme of 

maneuver changes (updates RDO). 

• Radar section leader: 

– Ensures the capabilities/limitations of the radar system 

are considered during the planning process. 

– Selects radar positions that support the coverage of the 

planned zones and facilitates movement to support the 

scheme of maneuver. 

– Identifies zone restrictions violated during the planning 

process. 

– Performs technical zone management of the radar 

employment plan. 

COMMON SENSOR BOUNDARY 

Target duplication between Firefinder radars is likely during combat 

operations. In addition, the sheer volume of targets passed from the radars 

may overwhelm the targeting element, especially if the radars are under 

centralized control. An effective method of reducing or eliminating target 

duplication is to establish a common sensor boundary (CSB). The CSB is 

established by the counterfire headquarters and divides TA search areas 

into acquisition management areas for Q-36 and Q-37 systems. The CSB 

is generally depicted by using: a grid line, phase line, or major terrain 

feature. Q-36 radars should not limit their maximum range to the CSB or 

establish CFFZs beyond it. Likewise, Q-37 radars should not limit their 

minimum range to the CSB or establish CFFZ short of it. When possible, 

the CSB should be positioned in conjunction with the coordinated fire line 

(CFL). This eliminates the requirement to clear Q-37 generated fire 

missions. The CSB is not a fire support coordinating measure. It is a zone 
management tool used by the counterfire headquarters to enhance the 

effectiveness of radar coverage. 

The following factors influence the placement of the CSB: 

• Availability of attack systems. 

• Range of attack systems. 

• Range and operational mode of TA radars. 

• Known and suspected locations of enemy indirect fire systems. 

• Type and availability of munitions. 

The location of the CSB is adjusted based on the tactical situation. 

Repositioning of radars, changing enemy situations, and the establishment 

or deletion of fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) may dictate 

adjustment or deletion of the CSB. Figure 5-4 shows the use of the CSB. 

Figure 5-4. Common Sensor Boundary

CUEING 

Cueing is the process designed to prompt or notify the radar to begin 

radiating to acquire hostile fire. Determining when and how to best cue the 

radar is one of the most difficult planning decisions. There are as many 

different methods to cue a radar as there are situations when it should be 
cued. Targeting technicians, S2/G2s and FSOs must establish cueing 

guidance based on the maneuver commanders guidance. Both authority to 

cue and priority for cueing requirements must be clearly understood. 

Planned random schedules based solely on hours of the day are not 

recommended and are usually ineffective. Unnecessary cueing subjects the 

radars to enemy direction finding. Therefore, cueing should be event 

driven to provide maximum support during critical phases of the battle. 

The cueing of radars may be centralized or decentralized. Centralized 

cueing routes all cueing requests through the radar controlling 

headquarters. Centralized cueing may be less responsive based on the 

level of activity on communications nets and the number of nets the 

request to cue must go through. During decentralized cueing, the 

controlling FA headquarters establishes cueing guidance, to include 

authorized agents, communication links, and conditions under which the 

radar may be cued. At maneuver battalion or task force (TF) level, the 

radar cueing instructions are given in the radar deployment order. At 

maneuver brigade and above, where a written operation plan (OPLAN) or 

operation order (OPORD) is used, the cueing guidance should be in the 

TA tab to the FA support plan. When cueing agents other than FA assets 

are designated, cueing guidance should be given in the basic order as 

coordinating instructions or tasks to subordinate units. 

The critical factor when planning radar cueing is responsiveness. Cueing 

should allow the radar to locate enemy positions during initial volleys of 

fire, preferably the first rounds. There are two techniques for cueing; 

situational (pro-active), and demand (reactive). Situational and demand 

cueing may be used separately or in combination. 

SITUATIONAL CUEING

Situational cueing is the preferred technique for cueing radars and is the 

most responsive. This method ties cueing to events and/or triggers that are 

determined during the IPB and planning process. For example, during 

offensive operations an event or trigger may be a breaching or air-assault 

operation. In a defensive operation, cueing may be tied to suspected 

enemy phases of fire depicted on the decision support template. 

Situational cueing focuses the radar on the commander's intent and what is 

critical. 

DEMAND CUEING

Demand cueing is the activation of a radar once the enemy is known to 

have begun firing. For demand cueing to be effective, cueing agents must 

be designated and a responsive communication system between the agents 

and radar established. Specific cueing guidance must also be established to 
fully exploit the radars capabilities and minimize or eliminate unnecessary 

radiation. The situation will dictate who best can cue the radar and the 

specific conditions under which it should be cued. Possible cueing agents 

may include: 

• Combat observation/lasing teams or strikers. 

• Forward observers (FOs); (FISTS). 

• Observers inOH-58D helicopters. 

• Rear area CPs. 

• Brigade or division-level EW systems. 

• Scouts. 

• G2/S2s. 

• FSOs. 

• CFOs/targeting officers.

Cueing must be based on real-time information so that the radar has a high 

probability of tracking projectiles when it is turned on. Consider the 

situation where a task force FSO is designated as a cueing agent (refer to 

Figure 5-5). The following events occur: 

• 1 - The task force assembly area receives hostile artillery fires. 

• 2 - The task force FSO immediately cues the radar. 

• 3 - The radar responds and locates the hostile artillery firing on the 

task force. 

• 4 - The radar transmits a call for fire to the DS FA battalion.

• 5 - The battalion FDC executes the attack in accordance with the 

established attack guidance. 
Figure 5-5. Demand Cueing

TARGET ACQUISITION RADAR ROLE DURING OFFENSIVE 

OPERATIONS 

The primary role of TA radars in the offense is to locate enemy targets for 

attack by friendly fire support systems. During offensive operations, 

particular attention must be given to planning TA operations to facilitate 

future operations. TA planners must ensure a smooth transition from one 

phase to the next by providing continuous radar coverage across the zone 

of operations. Requirements for radar positioning and movement are 

identified during the MDMP and tied to specific events. This allows 

continuous coverage by facilitating mutually supporting coverage between 

radars. The FSCOORD monitors this process closely to ensure that the use 

of terrain, movements and radar zones are properly coordinated. 

The first consideration for radar zones in the offense is CFFZs. 

Establishing CFFZs facilitates immediate counterfire to suppress enemy 

artillery that may disrupt the scheme of maneuver. CFZs may be planned 

through the zone of operation or along the axis of advance and activated 

when entered by friendly forces. This is particularly important in areas 

where friendly forces are most vulnerable, for example, at river crossings, 

breach sites or open areas. 

Control of radars will generally be more decentralized to facilitate 

command, control, movement, and cueing. The controlling FA 

headquarters will designate cueing agents that can cue radars by calling 

them directly. This is necessary to streamline the TA and counterfire effort 

when committed maneuver forces may be particularly vulnerable to 

enemy indirect fire. 

TARGET ACQUISITION RADAR ROLE DURING DEFENSIVE 

OPERATIONS 

The primary role of TA radars in the defense is to provide target 

intelligence and information to allow friendly forces to take force 

protection measures and enable counterfire mission processing. TA 

planners must also consider transitions to offensive operations such as 

counterattacks. Positioning, task organization, and on-order missions 

should facilitate transitions. 

The first consideration is the use of the radar's zone capabilities to provide 

coverage for critical units or installations using CFZs. The combined arms 

commander should indicate the assets that are deemed essential to ensure 

mission accomplishment. If the commander does not identify these assets, 

the FSO or targeting officer must query the commander for the necessary 
guidance. Once the guidance is obtained, the information is passed to the 

controlling FA headquarters for implementation. 

The second consideration for the use of zones is areas in which to use 

CFFZs. On the basis of IPB and other target indicators, CFFZs are used to 

monitor suspect areas from which enemy artillery fires may jeopardize the 

mission. This facilities the use of counterfire to suppress, neutralize or 

destroy those targets. 

ATIZ may be established in areas where we are not sure about enemy 

artillery and need to develop the situation. They can also be used in areas 

of suspect enemy artillery that the commander wishes to monitor closely 

but are out of friendly artillery range. Finally, a CZ might be used around 

friendly artillery or mortar positions when their location would expose 

them to detection by friendly Firefinder radars. 

RADAR TASKING PROCEDURES 

There are several methods for specifying coverage for radar sections. They 

include the radar deployment order (RDO), the radar execution matrix, 

and the AFATDS RDO format. All three methods provide the required 

information for conducting radar operations. However, the primary 

method for orienting radars is digitally using the AFATDS RDO. IFSAS 

equipped units may routinely use the radar execution matrix or the 

traditional RDO. However, IFSAS equipped units can use the 

SPRT;FILTER and SPRT; SEARCH formats to orient the radar. Detailed 

procedures for using these methods of orienting radars is included in 

Appendix G. 

SECTION II - COUNTERFIRE OPERATIONS

Counterfire gains freedom of action for all friendly maneuver forces. It 

can be accomplished by the fire support system using both lethal and 

nonlethal means. Counterfire is not a separate battle. It is inseparably tied 

to close and deep operations and is part of the overall combined arms fight 

to achieve fire superiority. While a fine line may exist between counterfire 

and attack at depth, once an indirect fire target is capable of affecting the 

close fight, its attack is considered counterfire. Intelligence assets must be 

prioritized to accurately locate targets. Attack assets (such as artillery, 

mortars, close air support, attack helicopters, naval gunfire and EW assets) 

must be brought to bear on the enemy total fire support system. 

Counterfire is the combined arms commander's responsibility. The 

FSCOORD is his primary advisor and executor. Field artillery target 

acquisition exists to support the combined arms commander's scheme of 

maneuver during the offense and provide radar coverage for his most 

vulnerable assets during the defense. Effective use of target acquisition 
enhances observation of critical terrain; for example, avenues of approach, 

potential assembly areas, and possible enemy reconnaissance routes. 

Combined arms commanders must emphasize that all combat information 

must be reported through fire support as well as operational channels. The 

commander ensures proper positioning of TA assets for optimal 

probability of detection and maximum effectiveness of counterfire. 

CORPS 

The corps' counterfire role is focused on deep, proactive, counterfire. In 

most situations, the division orchestrates and executes counterfire in 

support of corps close operations. The corps resources divisions to 

conduct close counterfire operations. This allows an orderly and calculated 

division of labor. Just as the division separates and deconflicts the radar 

coverage and counterfire efforts of the division and maneuver brigades, so 

must the corps deconflict the efforts of the corps and division. The corps 

normally accomplishes this through the use of division forward 

boundaries, phase lines, or simply by deconflicting specific target sets. 

The corps normally assumes responsibility for locating and attacking army 

artillery groups (AAG) and army groups of rocket artillery (AGRA) while 

divisions locate and attack division artillery groups (DAG), although this 

is not always the case. 

Corps has a myriad of assets to conduct counterfire operations to include 

elements of the corps artillery, corps aviation brigade, Air Force air 

interdiction and reconnaissance sorties, Army reconnaissance and attack 

helicopters, and EW. The corps facilitates the division counterfire fight by 

allocating resources. These resources often include FA brigades, CAS, 

attack helicopters, EW, and intelligence support. In the case of light 

divisions, the corps provides divisions with a CTAD to provide Q-37 

support. CTADs are allocated based on the number of assigned light 

divisions. There aren't any CTADs or TABs allocated to the corps for 

direct corps use. In some situations, and after careful consideration, corps 

commanders may temporarily draw on divisional FA assets to support 

corps counterfire operations. However, diversion of limited divisional 

acquisition, processing, and attack assets entails the risk of their 

destruction and non-availability to support division operations during 

critical phases. Equally important is the timing of their return to divisional 

control, particularly in the heat of battle. The return must be carefully 

planned and coordinated. 

Corps artillery contributions to the overall counterfire effort include the 

responsibility to: 

• Implement the organization for combat of corps artillery 

counterfire assets by retaining FA assets at corps level or allocating 
them to subordinate divisions in accordance with missions and 

guidance issued by the corps HQ. 

• Supervise preparations and execution of counterfire responsibilities 

by subordinate corps elements within counterfire sectors of 

responsibility established concurrently with the designation of 

maneuver boundaries and AOs for subordinate divisions. This 

includes targets within a division's or adjacent unit's AO, if 

requests for such support have been submitted and approved by 

corps. Within capability, corps may also respond to requests for 

additional fires from adjacent units. 

• Detect multiple rocket launcher battalions, helicopter forward 

operating bases, and other counterfire targets with organic FA 

assets, reinforced by collectors from the corps' military intelligence 

brigade, long-range reconnaissance units, and special operations 

forces (SOF). 

• Attack threat fire support systems with MLRS and cannon 

battalions of corps FA brigades to a range of 30 km (60 km for 

guided MLRS (GMLRS)). Beyond 60 km, ATACMS, Army 

aviation, Air Force sorties, and ground maneuver forces may be 

available for target attack. 

• Recommend the acquisition of additional sensor and attack assets 

from echelons above corps (EAC), the joint task force (JTF) 

commander, or other services. 

• Assess the success of efforts to protect friendly units from threat 

fire support systems. As needed, recommend modifications to 

intelligence collection and attack priorities to enhance force 

protection through a more effective attack of enemy counterfire 

targets. 

By allocating corps assets, issuing attack guidance, and identifying corps 

HPTs, corps influences how subordinate divisions fight their counterfire 

battle. They can shape a division's counterfire effort by attacking threat FS 

systems in depth, providing MLRS and ATACMS fires, and EW support. 

Within divisional AOs, corps commanders: 

• Define areas of counterfire responsibility by establishing 

boundaries for subordinate units. 

• Provide IPB products and critical intelligence information 

developed at corps or higher and adjacent HQ. 

• Attack targets nominated by the divisions or tasked by corps. 

Corps, after coordination with division FSEs, may attack threat FS 

targets within divisional AOs by massing fires to achieve required 

effects (for example, massing fires to neutralize a reconnaissance 

strike complex). Also, procedures for attacking threat systems 

firing across boundaries must be coordinated. However, in all 
cases the division must orchestrate and give final approval for all 

corps fire missions within its AO. 

• Provide divisions with additional assets for detecting and attacking 

threat FS systems. 

A detailed discussion of corps counterfire operations is contained in FM 3-

09.6. 

DIVISION

Counterfire responsibilities at the division essentially mirror those at 

corps. Successful prosecution of the divisional counterfire battle destroys, 

neutralizes, or suppresses hostile indirect fire systems in both offensive 

and defensive operations, thereby protecting friendly elements from the 

effects of enemy artillery fires. This, in turn, provides friendly combined 

arms forces with the necessary freedom of action and flexibility to 

prosecute the direct firefight relatively unencumbered by threat artillery 

fires. This is particularly critical for light units and any mechanized 

elements conducting dismounted operations, e.g., breech operations. 

Since most threat FA systems are located in a division's AO, the 

preponderance of counterfire takes place within this area. Divisional 

organic FA counterfire assets are limited to the division multiple launch 

rocket system (MLRS) battalion in heavy divisions supported by its 

organic TAB. One of the two FA brigades that will normally augment a 

DIVARTY in an attached or reinforcing status will normally be designated 

as the counterfire headquarters and be given the responsibility for planning 

and executing the division's counterfire battle. However, even in this case, 

the DIVARTY commander as division FSCOORD retains overall 

responsibility for orchestrating the division's counterfire effort. A detailed 

discussion of division counterfire operations is contained in FM 3-09.5. 

ROLE OF FA BRIGADES IN DIVISION COUNTERFIRE OPERATIONS

Unless specifically task-organized, FA brigades do not possess organic TA 

capabilities. If divisions assign reinforcing or attached FA brigades the 

counterfire role, the division must augment the brigade HQ with 

acquisition and processing assets in the form of Firefinder radars and the 

TAB/CTAD target processing section. Assignment of the counterfire 

mission should receive prior corps artillery concurrence to ensure 

availability of the FA brigade to perform the counterfire role for the 

duration of the operation. 

IBCT AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS 
The Army's transformation to an objective force has created designs for 

interim BCT (IBCT) and divisions. The interim force designs place the Q36 and Q-37 in the IBCT adding flexibility and enhanced force 

capabilities. The IBCT may employ its radars while operating as an 

autonomous force, early entry force, or as part of an interim division force. 

When acting as an early entry force, the IBCT would perform its own 

counterfire operations in the same manner as a traditional division. The 

main differences are: 

• The IBCT has fewer radars, one Q-36 and one Q-37. 

• May or may not have counterfire support from a division. 

• Fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) performs functions as 

the counterfire headquarters. 

In the IBCT, the FECC positions and tasks radars based on IPB and the 

commanders guidance. The Q-36 radar is positioned to acquire mortars 

and short-range artillery while the Q-37 radar is positioned to acquire 

longer-range artillery and rockets. Deconfliction of coverage in 

autonomous operations is simple since the FECC controls both radars. 

Even so, a CSB might be established to segregate Q-36 and Q-37 coverage 

areas. If established, the CSB should be placed in conjunction with the 

IBCT coordinated fire line when possible. This eliminates the need to 

clear acquisitions before firing. Radar zones are established in the 

traditional method based on operational needs. In more non-linear 

situations, call for fire zones (CFFZ) may be pre-cleared to facilitate target 

attack. A non-linear battlespace may place the radars in a firebase type 

situation instead of a typical zone of action. The CSB might be a circle 

surrounding the force with the Q-36 acquiring targets inside the circle and 

the Q-37 acquiring targets outside the circle. Figure 5-6 depicts this 

concept. 
Figure 5-6. IBCT Counterfire Operations

IBCT AND DIVISION INTEGRATED OPERATIONS 

There are several options for conducting counterfire operations when the 

interim division FECC controls counterfire operations. The interim

division might conduct traditional counterfire or decentralize its 

counterfire operations when operating in a non-linear, non-contiguous AO. 

The interim division may also assume control of all IBCT Q-37s to 

support division operations. Further, in cases of a non-linear battlespace, 

the division might task the IBCT with conducting all counterfire 

operations for the division in a designated area. 

Decentralized counterfire operations tasks IBCTs with the mission of 

acquiring targets and providing TA coverage traditionally performed by 

the division. This might be done when the division is conducting nonlinear 

operations or in a linear battle space when the division needs to 

concentrate on a specific target. For example, an IBCT might be tasked to 

acquire and attack DAG systems while the division focuses on an AAG or

AGRA. Or, the IBCT might be tasked to provide all the radar coverage 

with in its AO. Servicing these targets might remain a division

responsibility unless the division allocates additional delivery systems to 

the IBCT. 

INTERIM FORCE DECENTRALIZED LINEAR COUNTERFIRE OPERATIONS

Deconfliction of radar coverage during decentralized operations may be 

more difficult since the IBCT has its own Q-37s. CSBs are traditionally 

used to segregate the coverage areas of Q-36 and Q-37 radars. Unless the 
division is controlling IBCT Q-37s, it must establish graphical control 

measures to deconflict the coverage of IBCT and division Q-37 radars. 

Possible control methodologies may include the use of IBCT forward 

boundaries, phase lines, or designating specific target sets or coverage 

areas for IBCT Q-37s. Figure 5-7 illustrates a method of deconflicting 

radar coverage and responsibilities in a linear battlespace. 

Figure 5-7. Decentralized Counterfire Operations

INTERIM FORCE DECENTRALIZED NON-LINEAR COUNTERFIRE 

OPERATIONS

The TA assets of the IBCT and interim division provide the force 

commander with a greater ability to support counterfire operations in a 

non-linear environment. The division can assign IBCTs autonomous 

counterfire responsibilities in their AOs and provide TA and counterfire 

coverage in the remaining division areas. The division accomplishes this 

by establishing graphical control measures and zones of responsibility 

(ZOR) to segregate the division and IBCT counterfire fights. This is very 

important when IBCTs are attacking along axes and have assailable flanks 

or when there are large gaps between IBCT AOs. IBCT radars establish 

their coverage areas to correspond with the IBCT's AFATDS ZOR. Each 

division controlled Q-37 establishes the specific coverage areas designated 

by the division FECC. These coverage areas are developed based on IPB 

and focus only on those areas affecting division operations. This allows 
the FECC to focus counterfire operations on critical areas and systems and 

eliminate coverage of areas that pose little threat to the force. 

SECTION III - STRIKER EMPLOYMENT

MISSION 

The mission of the striker platoon is to provide the maneuver brigade 

commander with high technology observation teams that are dedicated to 

executing specific fires tasks throughout the depth of the brigade's 

battlespace. This mission includes calling for conventional artillery and 

rocket fires, providing laser designation for smart munitions and, as a 

secondary mission, providing reconnaissance and surveillance for the 

brigade. Although originally conceived to designate for Copperhead 

missions, Strikers can provide final ballistic guidance for any munition 

requiring reflected laser energy. At present, the team can provide laser 

designation for smart munitions delivered by Army, Air Force, Marine 

Corps or Navy aircraft. 

OPERATIONS 

The platoon headquarters provides leadership and control of striker 

platoon operations. Each striker team has the organic communications 

equipment to operate on two nets during mounted operations. During 

dismounted operations, they have the ability to operate on only one net at 

a time. The teams have at least four potential nets on which they may have 

to operate: 

• Brigade digital fire support net. 

• Brigade operations and intelligence net. 

• Brigade voice fire support net. 

• Brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) internal net. 

The primary net should be the brigade digital FS net. If striker teams have 

good digital communications on that net, they can perform their primary 

mission and most other agencies can send them digital messages. The 

brigade SOP or order should specify times or situations when they need to 

check in on one of the other nets. 

The striker platoon supports the targeting process by detecting, tracking, 

initiating target attack and reporting BDA. During the decide phase of the 

targeting process, striker teams are assigned specific HPTs to observe and 

or attack, normally in conjunction with a specific NAI or TAI. The striker 

team positions to observe the NAI or TAI and attack the specified HPTs. 

If the target is only designated for observation, the striker will report and 
track the target. Or, the striker may accept a target cross-cued by a sensor 

or other intelligence source. If the target is designated for attack, the 

striker will initiate target attack passing the mission to the BCT FSE over 

the digital fire support net. Upon completion of attack, the striker reports 

any required BDA. 

The BCT commander and his staff determine the role of the striker 

platoon. The striker platoon is normally attached to or controlled by the 

BRT with the platoon leader acting as the BRT FSO. In any case, the BCT 

commander and his staff focus the striker platoon's efforts, clearly stating 

the platoon's task and purpose as early as possible. This allows the striker 

platoon to be incorporated into the RS&S plan during the decide phase of 

targeting. This further enables the platoon to deploy early, well in advance 

of the BCT's main body, and accomplish its designated detect, track and 

deliver and assess functions. 
Chapter 6 

Stability Operations and Support Operations 

Target acquisition radars are well suited to support stability operations and 

support operations across the entire spectrum of conflict from peacetime 

military engagement (PME) to major theater war (MTW). Target 

acquisition radars can support these operations as a single radar section or 

as part of a TA organization. Early entry forces are deployed to support 

the Commander in Chief's (CINC) or other Joint Force Commander's 

(JFC) concept of operations in a pre-crisis or crisis situation. They must 

deploy rapidly, enter the operational area, secure the lodgment, and 

immediately present a credible deterrent force. To do this, they must have 

lethal and survivable units. Target acquisition radars support these early 

entry requirements by providing counterfire coverage, verification of 

hostile and friendly fires and enhancing the accuracy of friendly fires. 

FORCE PROJECTION 

Force projection operations usually begin as a response to a crisis 

somewhere in the world. Target acquisition radars, TA platoons, or TABs 

will usually deploy in the initial stages of a force projection operation to 

provide counterfire coverage for critical assets. Many Army contingency 

plans call for establishing an intermediate staging base (ISB) to introduce 

contingency forces into a theater to demonstrate national resolve against a 

potential adversary. On these occasions, the Air Force will use strategic 

airlift (C-141s, C-17s and C-5s) to establish the ISB. If this show of force 

fails and U.S. forces are committed, C-130s, CH-47s and UH-60s will be 

likely choices to move these forces from the ISB to the area of operations. 

Larger equipment may be transported by rail or ship when necessary. TA 

radars are deployable on all Air Force standard transport aircraft. 

However, some radars require significant preparation and disassembly for 

aircraft movement. 

STABILITY OPERATIONS 

The TA radars may participate in a number of stability operations. 

Stability operations include: 

• Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). 

• Arms control. 

• Humanitarian and civic assistance. 

• Security assistance. 

• Support to counter drug operations. 

• Combating terrorism. 
• Peace operations. 

• Show of force. 

• Support for insurgencies. 

• Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 

The types of stability operations and extent of participation may vary. 

However, TA radars are best suited to support peace operations, shows of 

force, FID and NEO. TA radars might, in rare circumstance, be required to 

provide support for insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. 

PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations (PO) encompass three types of activities: support to 

diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement. The 

environment of peace operations and related concepts, principles, and 

fundamentals are described in FM 3-07.3, Peace Operations. TA radars are 

ideally suited for participating in peace keeping and peace enforcement 

operations. 

Peace Keeping

Peace keeping operations (PKO) support diplomatic efforts to maintain 

peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two or 

more belligerent nations, and as such, require the consent of all parties 

involved in the dispute. The US may participate in peacekeeping 

operations when requested by the United Nations, with a regional 

affiliation of nations, with other unaffiliated countries, or unilaterally. US 

personnel may function as impartial observers, as part of an internal 

peacekeeping force, or in a supervisory and assistance role. Peacekeeping 

often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to 

deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. 

These operations follow diplomatic negotiations that establish a mandate 

for the peacekeeping force. The mandate describes the scope of the PKO 

in detail. It typically determines the size and type of force each 

participating nation will contribute. It also specifies the terms or 

conditions the host nation intends to impose on the presence of the force 

or mission and a clear statement of the functions the peacekeeping force is 

to perform. 

A peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at 

violence-prone locations. It collects information through means such as 

observation posts, patrols, convoys and aerial reconnaissance. TA radars 

are ideally suited to this task. Their ability to acquire and classify targets 

provides a means for holding belligerents accountable for their use of 

indirect fire systems. These acquisitions can be used to direct 

peacekeeping forces to a hostile firing location or vector other intelligence 
gathering systems, such as the UAV, to validate the incident. This 

information can be used during negotiations between belligerents. Further, 

the possibility of using the acquisitions for attack operations also acts as a 

deterrent. 

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement operations (PEO) are the application of military force, 

or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to 

compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or 

restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO do not require the consent of 

all parties. PEO maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to 

reach a long-term political settlement. Army forces assigned a PEO 

mission must be able to conduct combat operations. PEO normally 

includes one or more of six subordinate operations: 

• Forcible separation of belligerents. 

• Establishment and supervision of protected areas. 

• Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement. 

• Movement denial and guarantee. 

• Restoration and maintenance of order. 

• Protection of humanitarian assistance. 

TA radars may support PEO in a traditional counterfire role, and/or by 

providing accountability for fires. TA radars are particularly suited for 

accountability operations. They can track hostile and friendly fires and 

assist with developing historical records to document fires by all parties. 

This information can be used to support diplomatic actions. Further, the 

friendly fire functions of the radar may play a significant role in situations 

where the precision of friendly direct fires must be validated. The 

information generated by radars can play a key role in denying 

belligerents the opportunity to exploit the propaganda value resulting from 

collateral damage caused by intentional or errant indirect friendly or 

hostile fires. 

SHOW OF FORCE

A show of force is a mission carried out to demonstrate US resolve in 

which US forces deploy to defuse a situation that may be detrimental to 

US interests or national objectives. Shows of force lend credibility to the 

nation's commitments, increase regional influence, and demonstrate 

resolve. These operations can influence other governments or politicomilitary organizations to respect US interests and international law. They 

can take the form of combined training exercises, rehearsals, forward 

deployment of military forces, or introduction and buildup of military 

forces in a region. The appearance of a credible military force can 
underscore national policy interests and commitment, improve host-nation 

military readiness and morale, and provide an insight into US values. 

TA radars are well suited for this role. They can support shows of force by 

providing coverage for critical assets and, should the situation escalate, 

support the employed force with targeting data. Furthermore, participation 

in shows of force positions radars in country to support follow-on forceprojection operations. TA radars can then be used to provide coverage for 

aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) and sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) 

in the deployment phase of a contingency operation. 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense (FID) is participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another 

government to free or protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and 

insurgency. FID consists of indirect support, direct support not involving 

combat operations, and combat operations. Combat operations include 

offensive and defensive operations conducted by U.S. forces to support a 

host nation's fight against insurgents or terrorists. TA radars might support 

combat operations where the insurgent force possesses a creditable 

indirect fire threat. 

NONCOMBAtaNT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) relocate threatened civilian 

noncombatants from locations in a foreign nation to secure areas. 

Normally, these operations involve US citizens whose lives are in danger 

either from the threat of hostilities or from a natural disaster. They may 

also include host nation citizens and third country nationals. Army forces, 

normally as part of a JTF, conduct NEO to assist and support the 

Department of State. NEO remove noncombatant Americans and others 

from the threat of being killed or taken hostage. Relocating these potential 

targets expands options available to diplomatic and military authorities. 

NEO can be conducted as a prelude to combat actions, as part of deterrent 

actions, or as part of a PO. Most often, evacuation force commanders have 

little influence over the local situation. They may not have the authority to 

use military measures to preempt hostile actions, yet must be prepared to 

protect the evacuees and defend the force. The imminent threat may come 

from hostile forces, general lawlessness, dangerous environmental 

conditions, or a combination of all three. Correctly appraising the threat 

and the political-military environment in which forces operate is key to 

NEO planning. 
TA radars may support NEO in cases where there is an indirect fire threat 

to evacuees. Radars would establish radar coverage and zones for 

evacuation routes, control points, evacuation centers, APOE, and SPOE. 

SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

In support operations, Army forces provide essential support, services, 

assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations 

beyond their capabilities. Army forces conduct support operations to assist 

foreign and domestic civil authorities to prepare for or respond to crises 

and relieve suffering. The overarching purpose of support operations is to 

meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time until 

civil authorities can accomplish these tasks without Army assistance. TA 

organizations and soldiers may participate in support operations as part of 

a larger Army force. Radars will seldom be used. However, in certain 

instances, radars may be required to provide coverage for critical assets or 

support counterterrorism activities during foreign humanitarian assistance 

operations when a credible indirect fire threat exists. The following 

paragraphs identify the types and forms of support operations. 

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The two types of support operations are domestic support operations 

(DSO), and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Army forces conduct 

DSO in the US and its territories and FHA outside the US and its 

territories. Army forces have broader requirements and more significant 

and extensive obligations in DSO than FHA. Army forces normally 

conduct FHA operations only in a permissive environment. In uncertain 

and hostile environments, Army forces conduct FHA operations as part of 

larger stability or offensive and defensive operations. It is in these 

situations that radars may be used. 

FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

During DSO Army forces perform relief operations, support to incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), support to civil law 

enforcement, and community assistance. In FHA Army forces most often 

conduct relief operations; however, FHA may also involve support to 

incidents involving WMD and community assistance. Army forces 

involved in support operations execute overlapping activities. The forms 

of support operations are: 

• Relief operations. 

– Disaster relief. 
– Humanitarian relief 

• Support to incidences involving WMD. 

– Domestic preparedness. 

– Protection of critical assets. 

– Response to WMD incidents. 

• Support to civil law enforcement. 

– Support to antiterrorism/force protection. 

– Support to counterdrug operations. 

– Civil disturbance operations. 

– General support. 

• Community Assistance. 

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS 

AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

Stability operations often involve an operational area that is non-linear. 

This environment requires consideration of employing radars in an area 

that extends 6400mils around the radar. In these situations, IPB, 

positioning, masking and aspect angle require additional attention. 

POSITIONING

The S3/S2 and the targeting officer determine position areas for radars and 

the radar section leader selects the final radar site based on FFPAS and 

visual sighting. At the division level, the S3/G3 and CFO determine 

position areas. Often, radars will require a position that permits 6400mil 

coverage. Further, the tactical situation may require positioning of the 

radar within the lodgment area. Positioning inside a lodgment area 

requires careful consideration of site improvement. The radar section 

leader coordinates site improvement or "hardening" directly with 

supporting engineers or designated host nation agencies. Site improvement 

normally includes survivability of the radar, safety, and line of site. 

Engineers can dig positions or build berms to protect radar components. 

Berms should be constructed to the height of shelter and vehicles. The 

antenna should be bermed to the height of the antenna trailer. This 

provides protection for ATG electronics while providing a clear line of 
sight for the antenna. Engineers may also clear obstacles to provide a clear 

line of site. Safety for units in the vicinity of the radar is also a 

consideration. The heat and radiation generated by the radar poses a 

personnel hazard. These hazards are minimized by positioning the radar a 

safe distance from troops (see Chapter 4 for MSDs). Elevating the antenna 

above the level of personnel and vehicles can mitigate the radiation 

hazard. This is accomplished by sighting the radar on elevated terrain or

building a berm to elevate the ATG above friendly troops and vehicles. 

Figures 6-1 and 6-2 depict improved radar positions. 

Figure 6-1. Improved Radar Position (Top View)

 
Figure 6-2. Improved Radar Position (Side View)

Other positioning considerations include providing security and 

eliminating interference, or jamming, between radar systems. Jamming 

should be considered when selecting positions and search sectors. Radars 

in close proximity or sectors of search that cause radars to point their 

antennas at one another may cause jamming. Search sectors should be 

planned to avoid this problem. Techniques such as frequency splitting may 

also be used to eliminate jamming. Care should be taken to maintain the 

correct vertical angle when splitting frequencies with the Q-36. Finally, 

security should be considered. Radar sections are not manned adequately 

to conduct 24-hour operations and provide their own security. Security can 

be provided by a dedicated security force or by collocating the radar with 

other friendly elements. Dedicated security should be allocated to protect 

the radar when it is positioned away from other friendly units and there is 

a plausible threat. Operations from within a lodgment may reduce or 

eliminate the need for dedicated security. 

MASKING

The radar section leader must consider visibility (masking) when 

operating in an area of varied elevations, dense trees or foliage, or high 

buildings. This assumes a greater importance when the radar must cover a 

6400mil sector. The FireFinder Position Analysis System (FFPAS) may be 

used to conduct site analysis and determine the optimum initialization 

data. Further, blind spots in the radar's coverage can be determined and 

reported to the S3/G3 for appropriate action. A detailed discussion of 

FFPAS is contained in Chapter 4. 
ASPECT ANGLE

In non-linear situations, aspect angle is an important consideration. Aspect 

angle is the angle between the radar beam and the target path. The aspect 

angle must be greater than 1600mils for the radar to acquire hostile 

targets. 
Appendix A 

Automated Target Data Processing 

This appendix explains how AFATDS processes target indicators and 

suspect targets. The intent of this appendix is to provide targeting and 

counterfire officers with a detailed understanding of the procedures and 

functions that AFATDS uses to perform the functions previously 

performed using manual target cards. It provides the detailed information 

necessary to effectively use AFATDS to manage the processing of targets 

and target indicators. This appendix includes AFATDS target generation 

functions, target indicator processing, suspect target processing, target 

damage assessment, file maintenance and target purging. 

GENERAL 

The amount of processing required to develop a target varies extensively. 

In its simplest form, target data processing is the passing of a target from a 

known, accurate, and reliable source to the fire control element (FCE) or 

fire direction center (FDC) for attack within established attack guidance 

and target selection standards (TSS). In its most complex form, it is the 

collation of target indicators and suspect targets from diverse sources into 

a target identification and location accurate enough to justify attack. 

In ABCS equipped units, target data is transmitted and processed 

automatically according to the commander's guidance and TSS stored in 

the AFATDS computer. 

AFATDS uses the Target Generation function to automate the tasks 

performed by the targeting and target processing elements of the 

DIVARTY or Field Artillery Brigade TOC. The Target Generation 

function consists of a series of processes that compare and combine target 

information to generate targets and update the suspect target list and target 

indicator file. Target Generation takes suspect targets, Artillery Target 

Intelligence (ATI) targets, and target indicators (such as shell reports) as 

inputs, and through several processes eliminates duplication, determines 

and refines suspect target locations, and generates targets. The Target 

Generation function can be turned on or off based on the targeting needs 

in a given tactical situation. The outputs of this function are generated 

targets and an updated suspect target list and target indicator file. Some 

key definitions related to Target Generation are: 

• Target Indicators are directional information that forms a ray (line) 

from a given point, in a given direction, to a derived maximum 

distance along which a possible enemy target may be located. 

Examples of target indicators include shelling, flash, and jam 
strobe reports. A target indicator will have a target type (e.g. 

"Artillery, Unknown", "EW Equipment"). 

• Target Data are grid producing information received at AFATDS 

via a fire request (e.g., a call for fire received from an observer or a 

fire mission initiated by an AFATDS operator) or intelligence 

information (e.g., ATI report received from an observer). Target 

data are also produced by AFATDS. For example, AFATDS uses 

intersecting target indicator rays to determine a grid location, 

thereby generating target data. 

• A target is target data that has passed TSS, and therefore, is worthy 

of attacking because it meets the commander's criteria for 

reliability, accuracy, and timeliness. Targets undergo further 

mission processing to determine if a fire mission will be initiated 

based on comparisons to additional targeting and attack guidance, 

the target's relative value to other targets, and if attack systems are 

capable of engaging the target. 

• A suspect target is target data that has failed TSS and may not be 

worthy of attacking because it does not meet the commander's 

criteria for reliability, accuracy or timeliness. Suspect targets are 

further refined until they pass TSS and the operator initiates a fire 

mission on the suspect target, or the suspect target decays (based 

on target decay guidance) and is deleted from the suspect target 

list. 

TARGET INDICATOR PROCESSING 

ROUTING TARGET INDICATORS

If an Operational Facility (OPFAC) does not routinely process shelling 

reports, a routing function is available to forward shelling reports to a 

designated OPFAC for processing. For example, a battalion FSE receives 

a shelling report from one of his observers. The battalion FSO may direct 

that the report be forwarded to DIVARTY (or the designated counterfire 

headquarters). The following procedure is used to forward a shell report. 

Select "Alerts & Messages" -à "Messages" à "Configure Receiving Setup" 

and highlight the "Target Indicators" message type and input the 

DIVARTY address (make sure DIVARTY is in your communications 

configuration). This procedure routes the shelling report to the appropriate 

processing element. 

AFATDS AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF TARGET INDICATORS

AFATDS always performs certain functions when a target indicator is 

initially received whether it was received from an observer or created 

through operator input. When AFATDS receives target indicator data, 

some of the information required to process the indicator may or may not 
be present. AFATDS automatically determines missing information based 

on reporting observers' unit data and default data files. Missing 

information is determined as follows: 

• Target Indicator Number - If the received target indicator does not 

have a target indicator number, one is assigned based on the next 

available target indicator number from the OPFAC target indicator 

number block. The target indicator number must always begin with 

"II". If a target indicator is received with a number that does not 

begin with "II", the number will automatically be replaced with an 

"II" number. AFATDS maintains a target indicator numbering 

block, which the operator cannot edit. This block goes from 

"II0000 to II9999". 

Note: When you enter a target indicator into AFATDS do not enter a 

target number (AFATDS will automatically number the indicator).

• Target Indicator Decay DTG - If Target Indicator Decay DTG for 

the target indicator is not provided AFATDS computes the DTG 

by adding target decay guidance for the target type to the DTG of 

acquisition/report. The DTG of report will default to the current 

time if not provided. 

• Target Type - If the received target indicator does not specify a 

target type, one is assigned based on the following rules: 

– If the weapon type is Artillery: Artillery, Unknown. 

– If weapon type is Mortar, the target type is based on the 

reported caliber, otherwise the target type is Mortar, 

Unknown. If the caliber of the mortar is reported, AFATDS 

will determine the target type as shown in Table A-1. 

Table A-1. Mortar Caliber Target Type Mapping

Reported Caliber Target Type

108-150mm Mortar, Heavy 

61-107mm Mortar, Medium 

< 60mm Mortar, Light 

Not given Mortar, Unknown 

– If the weapon type is Rockets or Missiles: Rocket or 

Missile, Unknown is used. 
– If the weapon type is an Electronic Emitter (or any other 

electronic target), then the target type is Electronic Warfare 

Equipment. 

• Sensor Directional Error - If the target indicator does not include 

the sensor directional error (mils) then it is determined based on 

the default value for the reporting sensor's unit data or unit type in 

Table A-2. 

Table A-2. Sensor Characteristics

Sensor Type 

Sensor

Laser On

Hand

Target Location 

Error (TLE)

Directional 

Error (mils)

FO Yes 80 10 

FO No 400 10 

FIST Yes 80 5 

FIST No 400 5 

COLT Yes 80 5 

COLT No 400 5 

Observer not FA Yes 80 5 

Observer not FA No 400 5 

Air Observer Yes 270 5 

Air Observer No 400 5 

Naval Observer Yes 80 5 

Naval Observer No 400 5 

Mortar Observer Yes 80 5 

Mortar Observer No 400 5 

ANGLICO Yes 80 5 

ANGLICO No 400 5 

AFAC Yes 270 5 
AFAC No 400 5 

FCT Yes 270 5 

FCT No 400 5 

Radar AN/TPQ-36 N/A 100 or 1.0% of range 1 

Radar AN/TPQ-37 N/A 90 or 0.9% of range 1 

Radar AN/TPQ-47 N/A TBD TBD 

JSTARS N/A 400 1 

All Others Yes 400 5 

All Others No 400 5 

• Sensor Location - If the sensor location at time of report is not 

provided, then that sensor unit's most current location is used to 

determine this value. If no location for the reporting unit is 

available, the target indicator report is discarded. 

TARGET SIMILARITY

AFATDS uses target similarity to determine if targets should be combined 

or if target indicators are close enough to generate target data. Table A-3

lists target categories, types and their similarity to other targets. The 

matrix number is the individual number for that target type. The similar to 

matrix numbers are the targets that are considered similar to the target 

type. The matrix is also used for target duplication checks. 

Table A-3. Similar Target Matrix

Matrix 

Number

Target Type Similar To Matrix 

Number

1 ADA, Heavy 1, 3, 6, 2, 4, 33, 28 

2 ADA, Light 2, 3, 6, 1, 4, 33, 28 

3 ADA, Medium 3, 1, 6, 2, 4, 33, 28 

4 ADA, Missile 4, 6, 1, 3, 2, 33, 34 

5 ADA, Position Area 5, 42, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 
6 ADA, Unknown 6, 3, 1, 2, 4, 33, 28 

7 Ammunition Dump 7, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 

8 CP, Battalion 8, 11, 12, 10, 13, 9 

9 CP, Division 9, 11, 8, 10, 13, 12 

10 CP, Forward 10, 8, 12, 11, 9, 13 

11 CP, Regiment 11, 9, 8, 19, 13, 12 

12 CP, Small 12, 10, 8, 13, 9 

13 CP, Unknown 13, 8, 10, 11, 12, 9 

14 Guidance Equipment 14, 15, 88, 89, 94 

15 Navigational Aids 15, 14, 88, 89, 94 

16 Bridge, Floating Pontoon 

Footbridge 

16, 17, 18, 45, 61, 60, 62, 

63 

17 Bridge, Floating Pontoon 

Vehicle 

17, 16, 18, 45, 61, 60, 62, 

63 

18 Bridge, Footbridge, Raft 18, 16, 17, 45, 61, 60, 62, 

63 

19 Building, Concrete 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 

20 Building, Unknown 20, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 

21 Building, Masonry 21, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 

22 Building, Special Purpose 22, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 

23 Building, Metal 23, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 

24 Building, Wood 24, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 

25 Bunker 25, 26 

26 Pillbox 26, 25 

27 Artillery, Heavy Self-Propelled 27, 29, 28, 31, 30 

28 Artillery, Light Self-Propelled 28, 29, 30, 31, 27, 38, 35 
29 Artillery, Medium SelfPropelled 

29, 27, 28, 31, 30 

30 Artillery, Towed 30, 31, 28, 29, 27, 38, 35 

31 Artillery, Unknown 31, 29, 30, 28,27 

32 Missile, Heavy 32, 34, 33, 4 

33 Missile, Light 33, 34, 40, 41, 32, 43, 4 

34 Missile, Medium 34, 32, 33, 4 

35 Mortar, Heavy 35, 37, 38, 39, 36, 28, 30 

36 Mortar, Light 36, 37, 39, 35, 38, 28, 30 

37 Mortar, Medium 37, 36, 35, 39, 38, 28, 30 

38 Mortar, Very Heavy 38, 35, 37, 39, 36, 28, 30 

39 Mortar, Unknown 39, 35, 37, 38, 36, 28, 30 

40 Rocket-Missile, Anti-Personnel 40, 41, 33, 64, 43 

41 Rocket-Missile, Anti-Tank 41, 40, 64, 33, 43 

42 Rocket-Missile, Position Area 42, 5, 40, 41 

43 Rocket-Missile, Unknown 43, 40, 41, 43 

44 Boat 44, 48, 47, 46, 52 

45 Ferry Bridge 45, 16, 17, 18, 63 

46 Helicopter, Attack 46, 47, 48, 52, 44 

47 Helicopter, Cargo 47, 46, 48, 52, 44 

48 Helicopter, Observation 48, 46, 47, 52, 44 

49 Vehicle, Heavy Wheel 49, 50, 51, 95 

50 Vehicle, Light Wheel 50, 49, 51, 95 

51 Vehicle, Utility 51, 49, 50, 95 

52 Aircraft 52, 46, 47, 48, 44 
53 Defile 53, 59, 54, 57, 58, 55, 56 

54 Hill 54, 59, 53, 57, 58, 55, 56 

55 Landing Strip 55, 58, 56, 57, 59, 53, 54 

56 Railroad Segment 56, 58, 55, 57, 59, 53, 54 

57 Road Junction 57, 55, 56, 58, 59, 53, 54 

58 Road Segment 58, 55, 56, 57, 59, 53, 54 

59 Terrain Feature 59, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 

60 Bridge, Vehicle, Concrete 60, 62, 61, 17, 16, 18, 63 

61 Bridge, Vehicle, Wood 61, 18, 60, 62, 17, 16, 63 

62 Bridge, Vehicle, Steel 62, 60, 61, 17, 16, 18, 63 

63 Bridge Site 63, 16, 17, 18, 45, 60, 61 

64 Anti-Tank Gun 64, 77, 41, 40 

65 Armored Personnel Carrier 65, 66, 79, 80, 78 

66 Armored Vehicle 66, 65, 79, 80, 78 

67 Assembly Area, Mechanized 

Troops 

67, 70, 69, 71, 68 

68 Assembly Area, Troops 68, 70, 67, 69, 71 

69 Assembly Area, Troops and 

Armor 

69, 67, 70, 68, 71 

70 Assembly Area, Troops and 

Vehicles 

70, 67, 69, 68, 71 

71 Assembly Area, Unknown 71, 68, 70, 67, 69 

72 Infantry 72, 76, 81, 75, 74, 82, 73 

73 Machine Gun, Heavy 73, 82, 74, 72, 76, 81 

74 Machine Gun, Light 74, 82, 73, 72, 76, 81 

75 Observation Post 75, 12, 76, 72, 81 
76 Patrol 76, 72, 81, 75, 74, 82, 73 

77 Recoilless Rifle 77, 64, 40, 41 

78 Tank, Heavy 78, 80, 79, 66, 65 

79 Tank, Light 79, 80, 78, 66, 65 

80 Tank, Medium 80, 78, 79, 66, 65 

81 Work Party 81, 76, 72, 75, 74, 82, 73 

82 Weapon, Crew Served 82, 73, 74, 72, 76, 81 

83 Class I Supply Dump 83, 84, 7, 86, 87, 85 

84 Class II Supply Dump 84, 83, 7, 86, 87, 85 

85 Supply Dump, Unknown 85, 83, 84, 7, 86, 87 

86 Chemical Products Complex 86, 87, 83, 84, 7, 85 

87 Petroleum Products Complex 87, 86, 83, 84, 7, 85 

89 Electronic Warfare Equipment 89, 88, 94, 14, 15, 93, 91, 

92, 90 

90 Counter-Battery Radar 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 89, 88 

91 Counter-Mortar Radar 91, 90, 92, 93, 94, 89, 88 

92 Direction Finding Radar 92, 91, 90, 93, 94, 89, 88 

93 Ground Surveillance Radar 93, 92, 91, 90, 94, 89, 88 

94 Search Light 94, 88, 89, 14, 15, 93, 92, 

91, 90 

95 Reconnaissance Vehicle 95, 49, 50, 51 

DIRECTION AND DISTANCE

The direction and distance of the target indicator ray is determined by: 

• Direction of ray originates from the sensor/shell impact location. 

• Length of ray is based on the following: 

– Use length provided, if given. 
– If a flash to bang is provided, use Distance = 350 X Time 

(sec). The result is the length of ray in meters. 

– If length or flash to bang time is not provided, the ray 

length is based on the target type as shown in Table A-4: 

Table A-4. Default Target Indicator Length

Target Type Ray Length 

(meters)

Mortar, Very Heavy 9700 

Mortar, Heavy 7200 

Mortar, Medium 7200 

Mortar, Light 4200 

Mortar, Unknown 7200 

Artillery, Heavy, SP 37,500 

Artillery, Medium, SP 24,700 

Artillery, Light, SP 15,300 

Artillery, Towed 24,700 

Artillery, Unknown 24,700 

Rocket/Missile, AntiPersonnel 30,000 

Rocket/Missile, AntiTank 30,000 

Rocket/Missile, Position 

Area 

30,000 

Rocket/Missile, 

Unknown 

30,000 

Missile, Heavy 300,000 

Missile, Medium 100,000 

Missile, Light 100,000 
Electronic Warfare 

Equipment 

30,000 

DISPLAY

Target indicators are displayed as "fans" based on the sensor directional 

error. Figure A-1 shows a target indicator with a 10,000 meter length and 

a sensor directional error of 10 mils. 

Figure A-1. Target Indicator Display

Each target indicator ray has an assigned color based on target type. The 

colors of target indicator rays are shown in Table A-5. 

Table A-5. Default Target Indicator Color

Target Type Ray Color

Mortar, Very Heavy Yellow 

Mortar, Heavy Yellow 

Mortar, Medium Yellow 

Mortar, Light Yellow 

Mortar, Unknown Yellow 
Artillery, Heavy, SP Red 

Artillery, Medium, SP Green 

Artillery, Light, SP Blue 

Artillery, Towed Green 

Artillery, Unknown Black 

Rocket/Missile, Anti-Personnel Orange 

Rocket/Missile, Anti-Tank Orange 

Rocket/Missile, Position area Orange 

Rocket/Missile, Unknown Orange 

Missile, Heavy Orange 

Missile, Medium Orange 

Missile, Light Orange 

Electronic Warfare Equipment Black 

TARGET INDICATOR FUNCTION

Based on the tactical situation, the AFATDS operator may or may not 

want the system to run the Target Indicator function. AFATDS allows the 

operator to turn target indicator processing on or off. When the target 

indicator processing is "off", AFATDS adds the target indicator to the 

target indicator list with no additional processing or comparisons. When 

Target Indicator Processing is "on", AFATDS performs the following 

checks (in order): 

• Compares the target indicator against the current (but non-active) 

target files (i.e. targets on the "On-call", "Suspect", "Planned" and 

"Inactive" target lists). If the indicator ray covers a similar target, 

the OPFAC with target indicator processing duty is notified of the 

"Target Indicator Match" via an alert and reviews information on 

the target indicator and all matched targets. The operator may take 

various actions from this alert: 

– Selectively initiate fire mission(s) against the target(s) 

indicated as a match. This will open the initiate fire mission 

screen already filled out for the selected target. 
– Add selected matched target(s) to an existing fire plan. 

This will place the targets on the selected fire plan. 

– Display the target indicator fan-target comparison. This 

graphically displays the indicator fan and the associated 

matched target(s) on the map. 

– Selectively update matched target(s) with a new "last 

updated" value based on the target indicator DTG of 

acquisition/report. 

– Delete the target indicator. This will discard the received 

target indicator data and will not add it to the target 

indicator list. 

– Continue Processing the Target Indicator. This will add 

the target indicator to the target indicator list for possible 

combination with existing target indicators. 

• Compare the target indicator with other target indicators already on 

file. If the target indicator did not match a target or the operator 

selected "Process TI" from the target match window, AFATDS 

will add the new target indicator to the target indicator list and 

determine if it can be combined with existing target indicators. See 

Figure A-2 for an example of target comparison The following 

rules are used in this comparison: 

– The new target indicator is compared against existing 

target indicators in the target indicator file that have a 

similar target type. Only target indicators that have not 

passed their decay DTG are considered. 

– When target indicator rays of three or more of the 

compared target indicators intersect to form a point or 

common area, and all points are located within 400 meters, 

AFATDS automatically combines the rays and generates a 

new target number and passes the target to the TSS check 

for further processing. Combined TIs are deleted from the 

TI list. 

– If no match is found, the new target indicator is added to 

the target indicator file. The operator can purge the target 

indicator list of target indicators when their "decay time" 

DTG is passed. To do this simply select "automatically 

purge" option on the target indicator list window. 
Figure A-2. Target Indicators-Target Comparison

Figure A-3 provides a summary of the possible results of target indicator

processing. 
Figure A-3. Target Indicator Processing

SUSPECT TARGET PROCESSING 

Suspect targets represent target information that has not passed TSS. This 

section discusses how AFATDS processes suspect targets after TSS 
failure. The operator may turn Suspect Target Processing "on" or "off". 

When it is turned off, all suspect targets are simply added to the suspect 

target list with no further processing. When it is turned on, AFATDS 

evaluates each suspect target against other suspect targets to combine the 

new suspect target with an existing suspect target and generate a target 

with a better TLE and/or more current DTG. AFATDS applies the 

following considerations when identifying suspect targets for combination 

and applying the associated target data for the "new" (combined) target: 

• Decay Time. Only suspect targets that have not passed their decay 

DTG are considered for combination. 

• Target Type. Only targets with a similar type will be considered 

for combination. For example, an "Artillery, Unknown" target 

would not be combined with a "Building, Metal" target. 

• Target Size. The target size and TLE, for the new or extracted 

suspect targets is used to determine overlap. If an overlap exists 

between the new target and a single existing target and the overlap 

area meets or exceeds the operator established percentage of 

overlap required, then the two targets match. Basically, the overlap 

percentage tells AFATDS how close two targets must be 

(considering the area and TLE of each target) in order to combine 

them. Figure A-4 shows some examples of this comparison. 

Figure A-4 Suspect Target Overlap

If multiple overlaps exists between the new suspect target and two or more 

existing suspect targets and each overlap area meets or exceeds the 

operator established percentage of overlap required, then the following 

rules apply: 

• The suspect target with the greater degree of similarity to the new 

suspect target is combined with the new suspect target. 

• If the degree of similarity is the same, the suspect target with the 

greater degree of overlap with the new suspect target is combined 
with the new suspect target. Figure A-5 illustrates multiple target 

overlap. 

Figure A-5. Multiple Target Overlap

When two targets are combined, the new target is sent to TSS for further 

processing. Both of the "parent" targets (the two that were combined) are 

removed from the suspect target list.

The operator may specify the "Overlap %" to be used by AFATDS when 

considering targets for combination. A larger percentage (like 75%) will 

result in fewer, but more accurate, combinations than a smaller percentage 

(like 25%). As with the target indicator list, the operator may decide to 

have the suspect target list purged of targets when their "decay time" DTG 

is passed. To do this simply select "automatically purge" option on the 

suspect target list window. Finally, the operator may see the targets on the 

suspect target list that were generated by AFATDS (these will be the 

targets that have a "yes" in the "Combined?" column of the list). There is 

an option to "uncombine" a combined target if desired. 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECEIVING ATI MESSAGES FROM PACKAGE 10 

IFSAS.

An ATI;CDR message received from IFSAS could be treated as a fire 

request, intelligence data, mission fired report (MFR), On-Call Target, or 
Planned Target depending upon the information contained in the message. 

Table A-6 summarizes the various dispositions possible for an ATI 

message received by AFATDS. 

Table A-6. ATI Results When Received From IFSAS 

Fire 

Request 

Indicator

Mission 

Fired 

Indicator

Record 

Target 

Indicator

Confirm 

Target 

Location

Delete 

Target

Update 

Target

Disposition

Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Fire Request 

No Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A MFR 

No No Yes N/A N/A N/A Record As 

Target (On 

Call List) 

No No No Yes N/A N/A Planned 

Target List 

No No No No N/A N/A Suspect 

Target 

No N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Planned 

Target List 

(Update) 

No N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Planned 

Target List 

(Update) 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR RECEIVING ATI MESSAGES FROM PACKAGE 11 

IFSAS.

An ATI message received from a Package 11 device could be treated as a 

fire request, intelligence data, MFR, On-Call Target, or Planned Target 

depending upon the information contained in the message. Table A-7

summarizes the various dispositions possible for an ATI received by 

AFATDS. 

Table A-7. Suspect Target Processing

Mission 

Fired

Target 

Number

Message 

Designator

Message 

Action is not

Message is 

ATI

Disposition
Indicator 

Set?

Provided 

and 

Message 

Action is 

"Change " 

or 

"Delete"

is "Shell 

Report"

Specified 

and Target 

Data 

(Number, 

Type, and 

Location is 

Provided)

"Coordinate " 

or "ATI 

Azimuth" and 

Message 

Action is 

"Add"

Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A MFR 

No Yes N/A N/A N/A Planned 

Target List 

(Update) 

No No Yes N/A N/A Target 

Indicator 

No No No Yes N/A Target Info 

Query 

Request 

No No No No Yes ATI Sent 

To TSS 

If the message does not fit into the rules contained in Table A-7, it will be 

displayed upon receipt to the AFATDS operator. A summary of the 

possible results of suspect target processing is provided in Figure A-6. 
Figure A-6. Suspect Target Processing

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 

Target Damage Assessment (TDA) is a function of AFATDS that allows 

target disposition to be entered by the observer on the MFR after attack of 
a target. TDA can be flagged in the commanders guidance of AFATDS, 

causing targets to remain active until disposition is received from the 

observer for the particular target. TDA in AFATDS guidance is target type 

specific. Therefore, it is not very useful in the determination of TDA on a 

particular target generated from the suspect target processing function. 

Flagging an individual target type in the target management matrix 

(TMM) will cause that target type to remain active until the reporting 

sensor sends a MFR for that target that contains target damage. This 

requires eyes on target. A target generated by the suspect target or target 

indicator processing function will have the processing AFATDS station as 

the observer. This station very seldom has eyes on target. 

FILE MAINTENANCE AND TARGET PURGING 

File maintenance for suspect target and target indicator processing consists 

of purging targets that are no longer valid. This can be done manually or 

automatically. Manually deleting targets from the suspect target or target 

indicator list involves selecting the target list requiring maintenance and 

reviewing individual targets, and validating or deleting individual targets 

from the target list. The most effective method of performing file 

maintenance is to set target purging to automatic. This automatically 

purges targets based on the target decay time established in the TSS. This 

is accomplished by selecting "Automatic Purge" on the suspect target or 

target indicator list. 
Appendix B 

Crater Analysis and Reporting 

Although greater reliance should be placed on reports from trained teams, 

all personnel should know how to analyze craters and make the proper 

report. Since crater analysis teams are not authorized by TOE, each unit 

(including units normally located in rear areas) should select and train at 

least one team of two or three members. To adequately support their 

maneuver unit, fire support personnel must know how to analyze and 

report crater information. 

GUN AND HOWITZER SHELL CRATER ANALYSIS 

The projectile direction of flight can be determined fairly accurately from 

the projectile crater or ricochet furrow. It is possible to obtain, the azimuth 

of a ray that will pass through or near the enemy position by accurately 

locating the crater and determining the direction of flight. While it is 

possible to determine the direction to the firing weapons from one crater 

or ricochet furrow, an enemy firing unit may be located by plotting the 

intersection of the average azimuths from at least three widely separated 

groups of craters. 

In crater analysis, differences in angle of fall, projectile burst patterns, 

directions of flight, and time fuze setting will help distinguish between 

enemy weapons firing on a given area. 

Refer to FM 3-3 for guidance on friendly troop safety from the effects of 

craters contaminated with chemical agents. Refer to FM 3-3 also for 

guidance in marking craters containing chemical, biological, or 

radiological contamination. 

VALUE OF ANALYSIS

By analyzing shell craters, the crater analysis team can: 

• Verify, as confirmed locations, suspected locations that have been 

obtained by other means. 

• Confirm the presence of enemy artillery, rockets, or mortars and 

obtain an approximate direction to them. 

• Detect the presence of new types of enemy weapons, new calibers, 

or new ammunition manufacturing methods. 

INSPECTION OF SHELLED AREAS
Shelled areas must be inspected as soon as possible after the shelling. 

Craters that are exposed to the elements or are abused by personnel 

deteriorate rapidly and thereby lose their value as a source of information. 

SURVEY OR CRATER LOCATION 

Areas must be located accurately enough for plotting on charts, maps, or 

aerial photographs. Deliberate survey is not essential; hasty survey 

techniques or map spotting will usually suffice. Direction can be 

determined by use of an aiming circle or a compass. 

DETERMINATION OF DIRECTION 

PATTERN

A clear pattern produced on the ground by a detonating shell indicates the 

direction from which the shell came. 

FACTORS AFFECTING PATTERN

Because of terrain irregularities and soil conditions, typical shell crater 

patterns are the exception, not the rule. Side spray marks are a principal 

part of the pattern caused by fragmentation. Base spray is negligible from 

gun and howitzer projectiles but is appreciable from mortars. The width, 

angle, and density of the side spray pattern vary with the projectile, angle 

of impact, type of fuze, terminal velocity of the projectile, and soil 

composition. 

In determining direction, the following must be considered: 

• Effect of stones, vegetation, stumps, and roots in the path of the 

projectiles. 

• Variations in density and type of soil. 

• The slope of the terrain at the point of impact. 

From any group, only the most clearly defined and typical craters are used. 

MARKS ON VEGETATION AND OTHER OBJECTS

Marks made by a round as it passes through trees, snow, and walls often 

indicate the direction from which the round was fired. The possible 

deflection of the shell upon impact with these objects must be considered. 

Evidence of such deflection should not be overlooked. 

DRIFT AND WIND EFFECTS
Drift and lateral wind effects do not materially change the direction of the 

shell axis during flight. 

RICOCHET FURROWS

Often, when an artillery round with a delay fuze is fired at low angle, it 

bounces or ricochets from the surface of the earth. In doing so, it creates a 

groove, which is called a ricochet furrow. This groove is an extension of 

the direction of fire. Care must be taken, however, to determine that the 

shell was not deflected before or while it was making the furrow. 

CRATER ANALYSIS 

The initial step in crater analysis is to locate a usable crater for use in 

determining the direction to the hostile weapon. The crater should be 

reasonably fresh and clearly defined on the ground. Since the crater is the 

beginning point for plotting the direction to the enemy weapon, the grid 

coordinates of the crater should be determined as precisely as time and the 

method used will allow. The direction to the firing weapon must be 

determined by one of the methods described below, depending on the 

angle of the trajectory and type of fuze fired. Shell fragments must be 

collected for use in identifying the type and caliber of the weapon. 

LOW-ANGLE FUZE QUICK CRATERS (ARTILLERY) 

The detonation of a low-angle fuze quick projectile causes an inner crater. 

The burst and momentum of the shell carry the effect forward and to the 

sides, forming an arrow that points to the rear (toward the weapon from 

which the round was fired). The fuze continues along the line of flight, 

creating a fuze furrow. There are two methods of obtaining a direction to a 

hostile weapon from this type of crater. These are the fuze furrow and 

center of crater method and the side spray method. The best results are 

obtained by determining a mean, or average, of several directions obtained 

by using both methods. 

FUZE FURROW AND CENTER OF CRATER METHOD

In the fuze furrow and center of crater method, one stake is placed in the 

center of the crater and another is placed in the furrow at the point where 

the fuze was blown forward to the front of the crater. A directionmeasuring instrument is set up in line with the two stakes, and the 

direction to the hostile weapon is measured. A variation of this method is 

to place a stake where the shell entered the ground instead of in the fuze 

furrow and determine the direction in the same manner. This variation 

method is rarely possible since the explosion of the shell usually destroys 
indications of the point of entry. The five steps of the fuze furrow and 

center of crater methods are as follows: 

• Place a stake in the center of the crater. 

• Place a second stake in the fuze furrow. 

• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the stakes and 

away from fragments. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the hostile weapon. 

Figure B-1. Fuze Furrow and Center of Crater Method

SIDE SPRAY METHOD

Another method used to measure the direction to a hostile weapon is to 

bisect the angle formed by the lines of side spray. The seven steps in 

measuring the direction of a fuze quick crater by the side spray method are 

as follows: 

• Place a stake in the center of the crater. 

• Place two stakes, one at the end of each line of side spray, equal 

distant from the center stake. 

• Hold a length of communications wire (or another appropriate 

field-expedient means) to each side spray stake, and strike an arc 

forward of the fuze furrow. 

• Place a stake where these arcs intersect. 
• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the center

stake and the stake at the intersection of the arcs. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the firing weapon. 

Figure B-2. Side Spray Method

LOW-ANGLE FUZE DELAY CRATERS (ARTILLERY) 

There are two types of low-angle fuze delay craters - ricochet and mine 

action. 

RICOCHET CRATERS

The projectile enters the ground in a line following the trajectory and 

continues in a straight line for a few feet, causing a ricochet furrow. The 

projectile then normally deflects upward and at the same time changes 

direction. The change of direction usually is to the right as the result of the 

spin, or rotation, of the projectile. The effect of the airburst can be noted 

on the ground. Directions obtained from ricochet craters are considered to

be the most reliable. The five steps required to determine direction from a 

ricochet furrow are as follows: 

• Clean out the furrow. 

• Place a stake at each end of a usable straight section of the furrow. 

• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the stakes and 

away from fragments. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the weapon. 
MINE ACTION CRATER

Mine action occurs when a shell bursts beneath the ground. Occasionally, 

such a burst will leave a furrow that can be analyzed in the same manner 

as the ricochet furrow. A mine action crater that does not have a furrow 

cannot be used to determine the direction to the weapon. 

Figure B-3. Ricochet Furrow Method

HIGH-ANGLE SHELL CRATERS (MORTARS) 

In a typical high-angle mortar crater, the turf at the forward edge (the

direction away from the hostile mortar) is undercut. The rear edge of the 

crater is shorn of vegetation and grooved by splinters. When fresh, the 

crater is covered with loose earth, which must be carefully removed to 

disclose the firm burnt inner crater. The ground surrounding the crater is 

streaked by splinter grooves that radiate from the point of detonation. The 

ends of the splinter grooves on the rearward side are on an approximately 

straight line. This line is perpendicular to the horizontal trajectory of the 

round. A fuze tunnel is caused by the fuze burying itself at the bottom of 

the inner crater in front of the point of detonation. Three methods may be 

used to determine direction from a high-angle mortar shell crater-main 

axis, splinter groove, and fuze tunnel. 

MAIN AXIS METHOD
The four steps used to determine direction by the main axis method are as 

follows: 

• Lay a stake along the main axis of the crater, dividing the crater 

into symmetrical halves. The stake points in the direction of the 

mortar. 

• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the stake and 

away from fragments. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the weapon. 

Figure B-4. Main Axis Method

SPLINTER GROOVE METHOD

The five steps used to determine direction by the splinter groove method 

are: 

• Lay a stake along the ends of the splinter grooves that extend from

the crater. 

• Lay a second stake perpendicular to the first stake through the axis 

of the fuze tunnel. 

• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the second

stake and away from fragments. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the weapon. 
Figure B-5. Splinter Groove Method

FUZE TUNNEL METHOD

The four steps used to determine direction by the fuze tunnel method are: 

• Place a stake in the fuze tunnel. 

• Set up a direction-measuring instrument in line with the stake and 

away from fragments. 

• Orient the instrument. 

• Measure the direction to the weapon. 

Note: If the angle of fall is too great (a 90 degree angle), the fuze

tunnel method cannot be used.

Figure B-6. Fuze Tunnel Method

ROCKET CRATERS 
A rocket crater resulting from a rocket impacting with a low or medium

angle of fall is analyzed in the same manner as an artillery crater resulting 

from a projectile armed with fuze quick. However, if the rocket impacts 

with a high angle of fall, the crater is analyzed in the same manner as a 

crater resulting from a mortar round fired with fuze quick. (See paragraph 

on low-angle fuze quick craters.) The tail fins, rocket motor, body, and 

other parts of the rocket may be used to determine the caliber and type of 

rocket fired.

SHELL FRAGMENT ANALYSIS 

Identification by weapon type and caliber may be determined from shell 

fragments found in shell craters. Dimensions of the parts, as well as those 

of the complete shell, vary according to the caliber and type of shell. 

Figure B-7. Typical Shell

DUDS AND LOW-ORDER BURSTS

The most logical means of identifying the caliber of a projectile is to 

inspect a dud of that caliber. However, since a dud may not always be 

available or may be too dangerous to handle, a low-order burst is the next 

best means of identification. When the explosive filler is not completely 

detonated, a low-order burst occurs and large shell fragments result. Such 

large pieces can be used to identify thread count, curvature, wall thickness, 

and so forth. 

HIGH-ORDER BURSTS
A high-order burst normally results in small-deformed fragments. These 

fragments are useless for identification purposes unless they include a 

section of either the rotating band or the rotating band seat. Fragments of 

either of these sections positively identify the shell, since each shell has its 

own distinctive rotating band markings. 

ROTATING BANDS AND BAND SEATS

A shell may be identified as to caliber, type, and nation of origin from the: 

• Pattern or rifling imprints on rotating bands. 

• Width, number, and size of rotating bands. 

• Dimensions and pattern of keying or knurling on the rotating band 

seat. 

• Dimensions and pattern of rotating band seat keying and knurling 

impressed on the rotating band. 

US and former Soviet block artillery require a rotating band or band seat 

for spin-stabilized projectiles. Except for the rotating bands and band seats 

of the tail fins, different types of shells may be identical in one or more 

dimension (such as wall thickness). However, shells are seldom alike in 

two or more dimensions. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain shell 

fragments from two or more dimensions to make a positive identification. 

For a discussion of interior ballistics and how rifling imprints are made on 

rounds as they are fired, see FM 3-09.40 (6-40). 

TAIL FINS

A mortar can be identified from the tail fins. Tail fins often are found in 

the fuze tunnel of the crater. A mortar that is not fin-stabilized may be 

identified from the pieces of the projectile on which the rifling is 

imprinted. 

FUZES

Since the same type of fuze may be used with several different calibers or 

types of projectiles, it is impossible to establish the type and caliber of a 

weapon by this means. 
Figure B-8. Shell Fragment and Tail Fin Identification of US Ammunition

 
Figure B-9. Ammunition Available to Potential Enemies

This section implements STANAG 2008, Edition 6, and QSTAG 503, Edition 1.

SHELLING REPORTS 
The division artillery is responsible for counterfire. Therefore, bombing 

reports (BOMREPs), SHELREPs, MORTREPs, and rocketing reports 

(ROCKREPs) should be forwarded as quickly as possible to the 

DIVARTY TOC or the designated counterfire headquarters through either 

fire direction or fire support channels. If a DS battalion receives a report 

and that battalion decides to attack a target developed from it, the report of 

action taken and a target damage assessment, if available, should be 

forwarded to the DIVARTY TOC or designated counterfire headquarters 

when the action is completed. Shelling reports are forwarded manually 

using the artillery counterfire information form or by using the target 

indicator processing functions contained in AFATDS. See Appendix A for 

a detailed discussion of AFATDS procedures. 

ARTILLERY COUNTERFIRE INFORMATION FORM 

The information obtained from a crater should be forwarded by the most 

rapid available means in the format of DA Form 2185-R. The artillery 

counterfire information form standardizes reporting procedures and 

complies with STANAG 2008 and QSTAG 503. No matter how little 

information has been obtained, do not hesitate to forward the information.

Fragmentary or incomplete information (a radio or telephone report) is 

often of value in supplementing or confirming existing information. This 

radio or telephone report may be followed by a written report on DA Form 

2185-R. 

Any usable fragments obtained from crater analysis should be tagged and 

sent to the battalion S2. As a minimum, the tag should include the 

following information: 

• Location of the crater. 

• Direction to the hostile weapon. 

• Date-time group of the shelling. 

The DS artillery S2 forwards the information contained in a SHELREP to 

the counterfire officer (CFO) at the designated counterfire headquarters. 

The CFO plots the location of the crater and a line representing the 

direction measured to the weapon on a SHELREP overlay. He compares 

the information with that received from other sources and tries to locate 

enemy weapons from the intersections of direction lines to weapons of the 

same caliber. 

EXAMPLE

The information in the following situation is illustrated on the completed 

DA Form 2185-R in Figure B-10. You are the executive officer of Battery 

A, 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery, located at grid NP392841. Your call 
sign is A3F22. At 0545, the enemy shelled your position for 2 minutes 

with a total of eight rounds of high explosive (HE). The tempo and pattern 

of bursts suggest an enemy four-gun battery. Your battery commander 

believes that the enemy intent is harassment. Your SHELREP team

determines the direction to the enemy battery to be 4,810 mils. The team

also located a fragment that includes a part of the rotating band seat. The 

shell was identified as an enemy 122-mm howitzer projectile. 

The SHELREP team makes entries on the DA Form 2185-R. However, 

personnel do not complete the four blanks in the heading of the form. (The 

receiving agency completes these blanks; for example, the battalion S2 

section.) 

The information contained in Columns B and K of Section I is encoded for 

security reasons. The current call sign or code name for the unit is entered 

in Column A. Column B is not applicable when this form is used for crater 

analysis. 

Sections II and III are completed in the target production section of the 

DIVARTY TOC. 

Figure B-10. Artillery Counterfire Information Form
EQUIPMENT 

Three elements - direction, dimensions, and curvature - must be measured 

for crater analysis. The equipment used by the crater analysis team should 

consist of the following items: 

• Aiming circle (M2 compass), stakes, and communications wire to 

obtain the direction from the crater to the weapon that fired the 

projectile. 

• A curvature template to measure the curvature of the fragment to 

determine the caliber of the shell. The template can be constructed 

of heavy cardboard, acetate, wood, or other appropriate material. 

• Defense Intelligence Agency Projectile Fragment Identification

Guide for measuring fragment dimensions (DST-1160-G-029-85, 

with Change 1, dated 27 Jan 89). 

Figure B.12 Curvature Template
Appendix C 

Firefinder Friendly Fire Mode 

FIREFINDER MISSIONS 

The secondary mission of Firefinder radars is to support friendly firing 

elements. This mission is performed only when the commander deems it 

absolutely necessary. The reason is that the secondary mission takes the 

radar away from its primary mission of locating hostile weapons. Also, it 

exposes the radar to possible location by hostile EW systems for other 

than its primary mission. In the friendly fire operational mode, Firefinder 

radars can provide accurate actual burst, datum-plane, or predicted-impact 

location data. These data allow firing elements to determine registration 

corrections for nonstandard conditions. Because the radar cannot radiate in 

friendly fire mode and hostile fire mode at the same time, the commander 

must issue specific guidance as to when and how friendly fire mode will 

be used. This determination is made based on METT-TC, availability of 

observers, and the ability of the supported unit to meet the requirements 

for accurate predicted fire. 

FRIENDLY FIRE MODE 

When operating in the friendly fire mode, the Firefinder radar sets up a 

horizontal "window" through which the projectile must pass. The window 

is referred to as the friendly fire search fence as shown in Figure C-1. For 

operations in friendly fire mode, the normal search fence of 1,600 mils 

(used in the hostile fire mode) is focused to a width of approximately 440 

mils. The narrowed search fence provides the best probability of detecting 

and tracking rounds fired. The radar tracks projectiles until an airburst is 

detected, the selected datum plane altitude is intersected, or the radar has 

enough data to predict the point of impact. 
Figure C-1. Friendly Projectile Tracking

In the optimum friendly fire radar-tracking situation, the angle (angle-T) 

made by the radar-orienting point (radar-target) line and the gun-orienting

point (gun-target) line is from 800 to 1,200 mils. See Figure C-2. 

Figure C-2. Angle-T

Before the Firefinder radars can conduct a mission in friendly fire mode, 

specific information must be stored in the friendly fire buffer of the radar 

computer. Data required in the friendly fire buffer are as follows: 

• Submode type of mission. 

• Battery location (easting, northing, and altitude). 

• Registration point location (easting, northing, and altitude). 

• Maximum ordinate of the trajectory to the nearest meter from the 

appropriate tabular firing table (TFT) (maximum ordinate above 

gun). 

• Quadrant elevation or fall angle from the TFT (Table G). 

• Target number. 

Orienting data required for the friendly fire buffer and for the actual 

conduct of the mission are contained in the FM;INTM and follow-up 

messages to observer (FM;MTO) received from BCS. During non-digital 

operations, the orienting data are transmitted by voice to the radar using 

VHF-FM radios. When the required data listed above are entered, the 

computer will either accept the search fence or reject it by showing an 

error message to the operator. The radar operator must then coordinate 

with the firing unit for adjustments to the firing data or orienting point that 
will allow the radar to observe the rounds in the friendly fire mode. 

Legacy systems can store up to three sets of data in the friendly fire buffer 

for later use. The Q-36(V)8 can store six sets of data in the friendly fire 

buffer. 

In friendly fire mode, the radar can perform three types of missions: 

• Observe a high-burst (HB) registration (artillery airburst mode). 

• Predict impact locations (artillery impact-predict mode). 

• Observe a datum-plane registration (artillery datum-plane mode). 

These friendly fire mode missions support the two types of registrations 

conducted by the FDC. The radar high-burst registration provides "did hit" 

observations for the FDC high-burst registration. The radar impact-predict 

and datum-plane registrations provide "did hit" observations for the FDC 

mean-point-of-impact (MPI) registration. The MPI calculations by the 

FDC differ for the two types of radar observation, because they 

correspond to different orienting points. All of these calculations are 

discussed in detail in FM 3-09.40 (6-40). 

When operating in the friendly fire mode the radar provides friendly units 

with accurate actual burst, datum-plane, or predicted-impact location data. 

It has five different mission sub-modes that are used to provide this data. 

They are: 

• Mortar datum plane (MD). 

• Mortar impact prediction (MI). 

• Artillery airburst (AA). 

• Artillery datum plane (AD). 

• Artillery impact prediction (Al). 

The radar can also observe adjust fire missions. The observation functions 

performed by the radar to observe an adjust fire mission are the same as an 

impact predict registration. 

HIGH-BURST REGISTRATION 

For a high-burst registration, the high-burst altitude above the registration 

point is the actual orienting point for the radar. The high-burst altitude is 

located two probable errors in height above the registration point 

expressed up to the next 10 meters. The radar must be able to observe this 

point and begin tracking the trajectory of the round at least 350 meters 

before the burst. This ensures the radar can track the round to the burst 

point. If the radar cannot observe the orienting point, the radar operator 

will be notified by an error message. The radar section must then 

coordinate with the firing unit to select a new high-burst altitude (or 
orienting point for the radar) that meets the technical tracking criteria of 

the radar. The radar operator passes the grid coordinates and altitude of 

each observed burst to the firing unit. The firing unit must then determine 

registration corrections as it would for a regular high-burst registration. 

IMPACT-PREDICT REGISTRATION (MEAN POINT OF IMPACT) 

In an impact-predict mission, the radar uses the friendly fire mode to track 

the round on its descending trajectory toward the registration point and to 

predict where the round will impact without actually observing the ground 

burst. To provide data, the radar must track the round along its trajectory 

for a sufficient distance above the radar's screening crest. If the radar 

cannot track the round far enough along its trajectory, it will notify the 

operator that it has limited track coverage. Coordination must then be 

made with the firing unit to end the mission or to continue it by selecting a 

new registration point. The predicted burst locations are reported to the 

FDC, which then averages them as "did hit" data and compares them to 

the fired "should hit" data of the registration point to obtain MPI 

registration corrections. 

DATUM-PLANE REGISTRATION (MEAN POINT OF IMPACT) 

The datum-plane registration is a lesser-used capability of Firefinder 

radars. During a datum-plane registration, the FDC selects a registration 

point, for example, a grid intersection. The altitude for the datum-plane 

registration is the altitude of a selected horizontal datum plane above the 

registration point through which all rounds will pass. The radar must be 

able to observe the rounds in flight as they pass through this altitude. In 

calculating firing data, the FDC uses the altitude of the datum plane as the 

altitude of the registration point. If the radar cannot track along the 

trajectory for a sufficient distance to its datum-plane orienting point, the 

same error messages will be displayed to the operator as for a high-burst 

registration. The firing unit must then adjust the altitude of the target. 

When the radar observes the registration rounds, the coordinates reported 

to FDC are those of each penetration or intersection point of the datum 

plane at the datum plane altitude rather than the predicted location of 

impact. The FDC corrects the "should hit" data by the altitude difference 

between the datum plane and the actual registration point. The FDC must 

then compute registration corrections in the same way it would to obtain 

"did hit" data for an MPI registration. Detail procedures for the conduct of 

all friendly fire missions, digital formats and voice communications are 

outlined in FM 6-40. Procedures for manually recording fire mission data 

are provided and outlined under the friendly fire log. 

FRIENDLY FIRE LOG 
The radar operator uses DA Form 5310-R (Firefinder Friendly Fire Log) 

to record all the pertinent data for any type of friendly fire operation. The 

form is designed for use with either a digital or a conventional FDC. 

However, it is not necessary to use DA Form 5310-R when friendly fire 

missions are transmitted by digital means since all messages transmitted 

and received by the radar are recorded on the radar's printer. DA Form 

5310-R should be used anytime a friendly fire mission is sent by voice or 

when the printer is not operational. 
Figure C-3. Friendly Fire Log
Appendix D 

Field Exercise Mode/Embedded Training 

USES 

Field exercise mode (FEM) and embedded training are off-line, separate 

computer programs that function with the radar's existing operational 

programs to allow the radar to be used in a training mode. FEM is part of 

the operational program for systems equipped with (V)7 shelters and 

embedded training is a part of the operational program for systems 

equipped with (V)8 shelters. These off-line training programs provide the 

operator with realistic operating scenarios for the purpose of evaluating 

and improving proficiency. The scenarios include real-time simulation of 

hostile and friendly weapons fire. 

FEM/embedded training increases the radar operator's ability to process 

targets and communicate with other net subscribers. It allows radar 

operators to perform all normal mission-processing functions. However, 

when the simulation is running the radar will not radiate when the radiate 

switch lamp is pressed. FEM/embedded training allows trainers to develop 

scenarios that present radar operators with a high density of hostile and 

friendly targets and conduct real or simulated communications with other 

net subscribers. 

SECTION AND/OR PLATOON TRAINING 

FEM/embedded training provides a vehicle for training an individual radar 

section or an entire radar platoon in either a garrison or field environment. 

The system's ability to simulate digital communications or communicate 

with actual tactical systems makes this possible. An individual section can 

train by itself and the scenario will replicate all digital communications. 

Or, a radar section or sections can send their acquisitions to an actual FDC 

or counterfire headquarters. This provides the opportunity to train the 

target processing section and targeting team members while providing 

realistic training for all radar operators. 

GUNNERY TEAM TRAINING 

The entire gunnery team can benefit from the use of FEM or the 

embedded training program during rehearsals, before the conduct of actual 

operations, or during command post exercises (CPXs), live-fire training, 

and maneuver exercises. These programs allow the development of 

scenarios that reflect the actual tactical situation or exercise event list. This 
facilitates training of the entire gunnery team and provides the capability 

to conduct fire support and technical rehearsals for actual situations. 

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 

The common steps for developing training using FEM or embedded 

training program are: 

• Step 1. Determine training goals (mission requirements for the 

exercise). These should include: 

– Mission-essential task list (METL) requirements. 

– ARTEP mission training plan (AMTP) requirements. 

• Step 2. Analyze resources to include: 

– Training areas available. 

– Support available: 

 IFSAS/AFATDS (battalion or DIVARTY). 

 Aggressor. 

 Pyrotechnics. 

 FIST elements. 

 Other. 

• Step 3. Develop an OPORD: 

– Determine intelligence sources and estimates. 

– Determine commander's targeting criteria. 

– Determine commander's priority guidance for radar. 

– Use the FEM overlay and embedded training target table to 

determine the following data for the RDO: 

 Radar location. 

 Search data. 

 Zone data. 

 Reporting channels. 

 Cueing agents. 

– On the basis of the scenario and OPORD, identify simulation 

targets to be used. 
• Step 4. Develop a plan for updating and changing the tactical 

situation and mission. The plan should include: 

– Tactical movements. 

– Intelligence updates. 

– Radar search and zone data. 

– Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) situation. 

– EW threat. 

– Cueing agents. 

• Step 5. Develop the scenario target tables using the detailed 

procedures for selecting and loading target data into the FEM or 

embedded training simulation program. 

EMBEDDED TRAINING

Planning and developing the embedded training scenario and simulation 

data should be a team effort between the S2, targeting officer, and the 

radar section leader. The team should follow these steps. 

• Step 1. Review each phase of the tactical operation to determine 

and record probable enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing 

locations. 

• Step 2. Once the locations have been determined for each phase 

and/or event they are sequenced into a simulation target table for 

the radar. 

• Step 3. Load the target table using the Scenario Generation screen. 

• Step 4. The operator selects ADD on this screen and enters each 

target separately with the following elements of data: Weapon 

Type, Weapon Velocity and Quadrant Elevation, Weapon Location 

(complete UTM grid/altitude), Impact Location (complete UTM 

grid/altitude), Firing Interval, Time On and Time Off, and Volley. 

• Step 5. After entering each individual target, the operator must 

wait for a response to determine acceptability of the data entered. 

If the program accepts the target with no response, the data 

becomes a part of the scenario target file. 

• Step 6. These targets are entered, numbered, and/or time 

sequenced. 

• Step 7. After all targets from the target table have been entered and 

accepted, the scenario is saved for use in the training exercise. 
Note: This is a lengthy and time-consuming process, and it must have the 

support and cooperation of the command elements to achieve success. 

FEM

Radar equipped with the FEM program can also use the target table 

designed by the command team to prepare for training exercises. 

However, the procedures for determining and loading target data are 

totally different from those used in embedded training. To design and load 

target data into the FEM program these steps must be followed: 

• Step 1. Load FEM targets from the target tables located in the 

radar operator's manual into the FEM program. 

• Step 2. After all targets are loaded, each target is recalled 

individually and plotted on a transparent overlay as it appears on 

the radar map drum. This process is continued until all targets 

loaded into the FEM program are recorded on the overlay. 

• Step 3. The overlay is removed from the map drum and used by the 

command team to determine data for the target table. 

• Step 4. The overlay is positioned on the command team situation 

map with the radar position on the overlay aligned with the radar 

position on the map. 

• Step 5. The overlay is traversed in azimuth until target numbers on 

the overlay are located over the enemy locations plotted by the 

team. 

• Step 6. The target number corresponding to starting enemy 

locations is recorded and the process continues through all 

subsequent locations and events as determined in the scenario 

review. 

• Step 7. The target numbers, radar location, radar azimuth, and call 

for fire zones around those enemy locations are recorded as part of 

the target table. 

Note: Call for fire zones must be placed around the enemy locations 

for the radar to produce a fire mission. Zone data is not required if a 

call for fire is not desired. 

• Step 8. Repeat steps 4 through 7 on all radar and enemy locations 

until the scenario sequence of events is complete and all target data 

is recorded in the table. 

Scenario development is not complete until exercise control measures are 

developed. These measures should be developed in conjunction with the 

sequence of events to facilitate a productive training exercise. 
IMPLEMENTING THE SCENARIO 

CONTROL ELEMENT

The command or exercise control element determines commander's 

priority guidance for radar, radar search data, cueing agents, and cueing 

guidance. These determinations are based on: 

• The scenario. 

• METT-TC. 

• Intelligence estimates. 

• Target value analysis (TVA). 

• High-payoff target list. 

• Commander's attack guidance. 

• Targeting priorities. 

• The FEM target overlay. 

• FEM target table. 

• The scenario event target table for (V) 8 systems. 

The control element implements the scenario using the aforementioned 

considerations. 

CUEING AGENTS

Cueing agents are designated and provided a copy of the scenario target 

tables by the command or control element. They must be able to identify 

the cueing criteria required and the method they are to use to cue the radar 

section. When the cueing criteria are met during the exercise, the cueing 

agent sends the cue command to the radar. 

RADAR SECTION

After receiving the initial search data and commander's priority guidance, 

the section prepares the radar to support the mission. When notified by the 

command or control element, the radar operator turns on the appropriate 

simulation targets. The section then waits for the cue command from the 

cueing agent. When the section receives the cue command, the operator 

turns on the radar transmitter, processes the targets, and transmits them 

digitally to the controlling headquarters. 

CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS

The controlling headquarters processes targets received from the radar 

according to the commander's criteria established in their tactical fire 

direction system. The commander's criteria should conform to the exercise 

guidance issued by the command or control element. Normally, fire 
missions will be generated for priority targets. Artillery target intelligence 

reports will be sent to the TOC and/or the targeting element where they 

will be entered in the tactical fire direction system. 

TOC AND/OR TARGETING ELEMENT

The TOC and/or targeting element will process the weapon locations and 

impact predictions. 

FIRING ELEMENT

Upon receipt of fire missions, the firing unit generates firing commands 

(live or dry fire). 

NOTE: Use of the FEM or Embedded Training program during livefire exercises can generate fire missions in an impact area if the proper 

search and zone data are entered into the radar. Other targets will 

provide useful training for the TOC and targeting elements. 
Appendix E 

The AN/TPQ-47 Radar 

This appendix contains an overview of the system components and 

characteristics of the AN/TPQ-47 (Q-47) radar system. It provides 

technical employment considerations and tactics, techniques and 

procedures for employing the Q-47. This appendix also includes 

considerations and procedures for site selection, positioning, deployment, 

and safety. 

SECTION I - TECHNICAL ASPECTS

AN/TPQ-47 EQUIPPED TARGET ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONS 

The Q-47 radar is organic to Heavy Division Target Acquisition Batteries 

(TAB), the TAB of Divisional MLRS battalions and Corps Target 

Acquisition Detachments (CTAD). Two Q-47 radars are organic to each 

of these organizations. In addition, the Q-47 is organic to the Target 

Acquisition Platoon (TAP), DS artillery battalion of the Interim Brigade 

Combat Team (IBCT) and the Radar Platoon of the HIMARS battalion of 

the Interim DIVARTY (IDIVARTY). The IBCT contains one Q-47 and 

the IDVARTY contains three Q-47. In addition, each corps has two Q-47s 

organized in a CTAD to support TBM and counterfire operations. This 

CTAD is assigned to both heavy and light corps and is provided in 

addition to the CTADs assigned to support light and airborne divisions 

within a corps. 

HEAVY DIVISION TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY

The Heavy Division Target Acquisition Battery is responsible for locating 

enemy indirect fire weapons, and registering and adjusting friendly 

artillery and in the division's battlespace. It locates indirect fire targets 

with its organic Q-36 and Q-47 radars. An assistant counterfire officer 

(WO/131A) and a target processing section are provided to the DIVARTY 

or FA brigade TOC to support counterfire operations. Q-36 radars are 

normally attached to DS FA battalions and controlled by the DS FA 

battalion S2. The target production section of the DIVARTY or FA 

brigade TOC normally controls Q-47 radars. The heavy division TAB 

survey section provides location and directional control to TAB elements 

and aids the DIVARTY or FA brigade survey section as required. 
Figure E-1. Heavy Division Target Acquisition Battery

DIVISIONAL MLRS BATTALION TAB

The divisional MLRS battalion TAB is organic to the heavy divisional 

MLRS battalion. The divisional MLRS is organized with a HHS, Three 

six-launcher MLRS firing batteries and a TAB. 
Figure E-2. Divisional MLRS Battalion Target Acquisition Battery

CORPS TARGET ACQUISITION DETACHMENT

The Corps Target Acquisition Detachment (CTAD) was originally 

assigned to corps on the basis of one per light division assigned to the 

corps. It was designed to support light infantry, airborne, and air assault 

division artilleries or field artillery brigades upon deployment. With the 

fielding of the Q-47, and additional CTAD will be assigned to each corps 

for retention and use by the corps. The mission of the Q-47 equipped 

CTAD is to provide acquisition of threat artillery, rocket, and missile 

systems to provide target intelligence and information to allow friendly 

forces to take force protection measures, enable counterfire mission 

processing and support TMD operations. The CTAD consists of a 

headquarters section, a PADS team, and two Q-47 radars. The processing 

(HQ) section is provided to corps artillery TOC, light, airborne, air assault 

division artillery TOC, or their designated counterfire headquarters to help 

process counterfire targets. 

Figure E-3. Corps Target Acquisition Detachment

INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TARGET ACQUISITION PLATOON

The Interim Brigade Combat Team Target Acquisition Platoon (IBCT 

TAP) provides acquisition of threat mortar, artillery, and rocket systems to 

provide target intelligence and information to allow friendly forces to take 

force protection measures and enable counterfire mission processing. The 
platoon consists of one Q36 and one Q47 radar, a meteorological section 

and a survey section. The platoon deploys in whole or part within tailored 

force packages. Once in theater, the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell 

(FECC) controls the employment of the platoon and any additional 

counterfire radars attached or augmenting the brigade. When in theater, 

whether it deploys early or with the field artillery battalion, the platoon 

and/or individual radars will always establish direct digital and voice links 

with the FECC and may establish an AFATDS digital quick fire channel 

with a delivery unit. The meteorological section provides meteorological 

support to artillery, mortars and radars to enhance their accuracy. The 

survey section provides common survey to field artillery firing units and 

mortars when assets are available. The survey capability is limited and 

lacks redundancy because the section has only one position and azimuth 

determining system (PADS). 

Figure E-4. Interim BCT Target Acquisition Platoon

INTERIM DIVARTY RADAR PLATOON

The Interim DIVARTY (IDIVARTY) Radar Platoon provides acquisition 

of threat artillery, rocket, and missile systems to provide target intelligence

and information to allow friendly forces to take force protection measures, 

enable counterfire mission processing and support theater missile defense 

(TMD) operations. The platoon consists of three Q-47 radars, a 

meteorological section and a survey section. The platoon deploys in whole 

or part within tailored force packages. Once in theater, the Fires and 

Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) controls the employment of the platoon 
and any additional counterfire radars attached or augmenting the division. 

When in theater, whether it deploys early or with the HIMARS battalion, 

the platoon and/or individual radars will always establish a direct digital 

and voice link with the FECC and may establish an AFATDS digital quick 

fire channel with a delivery unit. During TMD operations, the radar may 

establish a direct link with the Army and Air Defense Missile Command 

(AAMDC) through the AFATDS in the AAMDC Attack Operations Cell. 

The meteorological section provides meteorological support to artillery, 

mortars and radars to enhance their accuracy. The survey section provides 

common survey to field artillery firing units and mortars when assets are 

available. The survey capability is severely limited and lacks redundancy 

because the section has only one position and azimuth determining system 

(PADS). 

Figure E-5. IDIVARTY HIMARS Battalion Target Acquisition Platoon

AN/TPQ-47 RADAR SECTION 

The Q-47 radar section is comprised of nine personnel. This is a decrease 

of three personnel when compared to the Q-37 section. The Q-47 section 

contains the same military occupational specialties as the Q-37. Table E-1

shows the section organization. 

Table E-1. Radar Section Organization
Organization Title Grade MOS Quantity

Target Acquisition Radar Technician CW2 131A0 1 

Section Chief SSG 13R30 1 

Senior FireFinder Radar Operator SGT 13R20 1 

FireFinder Radar Operator PFC/SPC 13R10 4 

Radar Repairer SGT 35M20 1 

Power Generation Equipment Repairer SPC 52D10 1 

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 

The Q-47 is the next generation replacement for the Q-37. The Q47 is a Sband phased array radar system that uses radar technology and computercontrolled signal processing to perform detection, verification, tracking, 

and classification of projectiles, rockets and missiles. The phased-array 

antenna allows the radar to switch beam positions electronically, thus 

providing a capability to search for new targets while simultaneously 

tracking targets already detected. It also enables the radar to detect and 

locate weapons firing simultaneously from 25 to 50 different locations at 

ranges from 3-300 km while using three different modes of operation. The 

Q-47 is also capable of registering and adjusting friendly indirect fire 

while simultaneously maintaining hostile surveillance. The detection and 

location functions of the system are similar to the Q36(V)8 and Q37. 

SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

The complete Q-47 System consists of the following components: 

• The Antenna Transceiver Group (ATG). 

• The Operations Central (OC). 

• The Portable Operations Suite (POS). 

• The Prime Power Group (PPG). 

• M1078 Truck Cargo. 

• M1097A2 HMMWV Reconnaissance Vehicle. 

• PU 806 trailer mounted generator. 

The operational configuration consists of the ATG, OC, POS, and PPG as 

shown in Figure E-6. 
Figure E-6. The AN/TPQ-47 Operational System

ANTENNA TRANSCEIVER GROUP

The ATG is the main component of the radar. It consists of the antenna; 

electronics cabinet; trailer, pallet, and leveling system; and cabinet 

storage. The antenna contains the power amplification modules, power 

supplies and MAPS/GPS. The electronics cabinet contains the power 

distribution unit, processor and associated software, and leveling controls. 
Figure E-7. The Antenna Transceiver Group

OPERATIONS CENTRAL

The operations central (OC) is the focal point for operating the Q-47. The 

OC consists of a modified AN/TPQ-36(V)8 shelter mounted on a 

HMMWV. The shelter contains two common hardware system-2 (CHS-2) 

computers (GD Versatile Computer Unit (VCU)), systems software, Force 

XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below (FBCB2), and required 

communications equipment. During movement a VCU is removed from

the OC and placed in the LMTV to support operations on the move. The 

available communications equipment includes an EPLRS, a tactical 

communications interface module (TCIM), an interface with the two ASIP 

radios contained in the ATG. 
Figure E-8. Operations Central

PORTABLE OPERATIONS SUITE

The portable operations suite (POS) provides the capability to operate the 

radar system, with or without the OC, from a distance of up to 100 meters 

from the ATG. POS operations require that one VCU from the OC be 

removed and installed in the POS. The two ASIP radios contained in the 

ATG can be operated from controls on the POS. The POS can be moved 

and emplaced by two crewmembers. 
Figure E-9. The Portable Operations Suite

PRIME POWER GROUP

The PPG consists of a MEP-816A 60KW, 400 Hz generator set mounted 

on a Stewart and Stevens M1080 LMTV and a trailer mounted MEP 806, 

60KW, 400 Hz generator set. The ATG power cables, POS cables and 

generator grounding equipment are mounted and stored on the LMTV. 

The LMTV contains a CHS-2 monitor and keyboard inside the cab to 

communicate with the central processing unit (CPU) and communications 

equipment in the ATG. This allows digital communications during 

movement. 
Figure E-10. The Prime Power Group

SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 

MODES OF OPERATION

The Q-47 has three modes of operation. The normal mode, like the Q-37, 

allows the radar to detect hostile mortars, artillery and rockets. The fast 

scan mode increases the number of targets that can be tracked and the 

TBM mode allows detection of missiles and heavy rockets. 

Normal Mode

Normal mode corresponds most closely to a combination of the hostile 

and friendly mode of the Q-37. However, the Q-47 can simultaneously 

perform hostile and friendly operations in the normal mode. In normal 

mode the Q-47 can acquire and track more than 25 simultaneous in-flight 

projectiles in the radar's coverage area. The radar provides target location, 

impact prediction and target classification. The target location error (TLE) 

for impact prediction is 300m. The TLE for hostile target location is 

discussed in paragraph later in this appendix. 

Friendly operations allow the radar to register artillery at ranges of 3-

60km. The radar can locate the point of airburst with a spherical error 

probable of 20m or .2% of range which ever is larger. The circular error 
probable (CEP) for a datum plane is located to the same accuracy. The inflight projectile track capacity of the radar drops to 17 when conducting 

friendly fire operations. 

Fast Scan Mode

Fast scan mode is very similar to normal mode. Fast scan mode allows the 

radar to acquire and track more than 50 simultaneous in-flight projectiles. 

Some degradation of range and accuracy occurs in fast scan mode with 

range and accuracy approaching the capabilities of the Q-37 radar. 

TBM Mode

TBM mode supports theater missile defense (TMD) alerting by 

determining launch points, impact predict points and state vectors for 

TBM acquisitions. Two state vectors are determined, one at the missile's 

entry point and one at the missile's exit point from the radar beam. TBM 

data are transmitted to TMD activities with the 5.13 broadcast message 

using AFATDS. 

Range and accuracy

The Q-47 provides a substantial increase in range and accuracy over the 

Q-37. Like the Q-37, the Q-47 is optimized for rockets and cannons. The 

probability of locating an enemy system in normal mode is .85 or higher 

throughout the entire range fan for a specific target category. The Q-47 

can locate light and heavy mortars at ranges out to 18km and heavy 

mortars out to 30km with the same probability of location. It locates 

artillery and light rockets out to 60km and heavy rockets out to 100km. 

General planning ranges are 18km for mortars, 60km for artillery and light 

rockets and 100km for heavy rockets. 

Figure E-11 shows the range fan for hostile operations in normal mode. 

The same range fan applies to the fast scan mode. 
Figure E-11. Range Fan for Normal Mode Operations

In TBM mode, the Q-47 locates missiles and heavy rockets to the same

accuracy as normal and fast scan modes. TBM mode provides an extend 

location range of 300km for missiles and 140km for heavy rockets. The 

radar fan extends from the radar, plus or minus 533 mils from the azimuth 

of orientation, to a range of 300km. The radar can also detect missiles in 

the area from plus or minus 533-800 mils from the azimuth of orientation. 

However, the range is significantly diminished. Figure E-12 depicts TBM 

coverage for missiles. 
Figure E-12. TBM Coverage

TARGET LOCATION ERROR

Target location error (TLE) based on a .85 probability of location varies 

with range. TLE is an important consideration for determining the delivery 

system for attacking certain targets. The TLE is .25% range with an 

minimum TLE established by target type. Table E-2 provides TLE in 

meters by range band and target type. 

Table E-2. Target Location Error 

Target 

Category 

Target 

Type 

10km 18km 30km 40km Ranges 

50km

60km 100km 150km 300km

Mortar Light 30m 45m 

 Medium 30m 45m 

 Heavy 30m 45m 75m 

Artillery Light 30m 45m 75m 100m 

 Medium 30m 45m 75m 100m 125m 

 Heavy 30m 45m 75m 100m 125m 150m 

Rocket Light 30m 45m 75m 100m 125m 150m 
 Heavy 50m 75m 100m 125m 150m 250m 

Missile Light 50m 75m 100m 125m 150m 250m 375m 

 Medium 100m 100m 125m 150m 250m 375m 750m 

The Q-47 has the ability to classify mortars, artillery, rockets and missiles. 

Table E-3 provides a break down of target types and U.S. surrogate 

systems. 

Table E-3. Target Classifications

Target Category Target Type Caliber U.S. Surrogate 

Mortar Light 60mm 60mm 

 Medium 81-120mm 81mm &120mm 

 Heavy 160-240mm None 

Artillery Light 105-122mm 105mm 

 Medium 130-155mm 155mm 

 Heavy 170-240mm None 

Rocket Light 70-179mm None 

 Heavy 180-300mm MLRS 

Missile Light 340-530mm ATACMS 

 Medium 540mm-1100mm None 

Missiles are further characterized by a combination of length, launch 

weight, boost phase burn-time, and range. Light missiles are generally £ 7 

meters in length, have a launch weight of £ 4500kg, have a boost phase 

burn-time of £ 45 seconds, and have a range of £ 300km. Medium missiles 

are generally £ 12 meters in length, have a launch weight of £ 7500kg, 

have a boost phase burn-time of £ 160 seconds, and have a range of £ 

600km. Table E-4 shows typical threat weapon systems by target type. 

Table E-4. Threat Weapon Systems 

Target Target Threat Systems 
Category Type 

Mortar Light 

 Medium Type 63, 2S9, 2S12, 2S23, 2B9, M1992 

 Heavy M-160, M-240, 2S4 

Artillery Light D-30, D-74, 2S1, M 1974, M1977 

 Medium M-46, D-20, 2S3, 2S5, 2A36, 2S19, 2A65, M1973, 

M1975 (130mm gun), G5, G6, GCT, MkF3 

 Heavy M1989 KOKSAN GUN, 2S7 

Rocket Light BM-11, BM-21, PRIMA 

 Heavy BM22, M1991 (240mm MRL), 

ASTROS II, 9A52 

Missile Light FROG-7, SS-21, SS-23, SCUD-A, 

SCUD-B 

 Medium SCUD-C 

SITE SELECTION 

The technical aspects and characteristics of the Q-47 determine the 

requirements for site selection. These requirements include: 

• Slope. 

• Area in front of the radar. 

• Screening Crest. 

• Aspect angle. 

• Electronic line of sight. 

• Track volume. 

• Proximity of other radars. 

• Cable lengths. 

The site selection requirements for the Q-47 are basically the same as 

those for the Q-37. The requirements that differ include the area in front of 

the radar and cable lengths. 

AREA IN FRONT OF THE RADAR
The area in front of the antenna should be clear of foliage that extends 

above the bottom of the antenna. This clear area minimizes attenuation of 

the radar beam. This area should extend 300 meters in front of the radar. 

The ideal site will have a clear area in front of the radar that has a gentle 

downward slope for approximately 300 meters and then gradually rises up 

to the screening crest. This reduces multipath errors. Multipath errors are 

errors in target location created when radar transmit or return signals 

travel by more than one path. Finally, the area in front of the radar should 

be clear of personnel for a distance of 217 meters. Safety considerations 

are discussed later in this appendix. 

CABLE LENGTHS

Cable lengths must be considered when selecting a site for the Q-47 radar. 

The cables determine the extent to which the components of the radar can 

be dispersed. The required dispersal of system components is determined 

by the terrain contour, foliage, site access, and threat. Ideally, the radar 

components should be positioned to take advantage of naturally available 

cover and concealment. The cable lengths dictate the maximum dispersal. 

Table E-5 shows the cable lengths for the Q-47. 

Table E-5. Cable Lengths

Cable Length (ft.) 

Signal/Control/LAN Cable (x2) 165 (50m) 

ATG Power Cable 100 (30m) 

OC Power Cable 100 (30m) 

Based on these lengths, the OC or POS could be placed up to 90 meters 

from the ATG and 20 meters from the prime power group. 10 meters of 

slack should be maintained in the cables to prevent damage to the 

connectors and cable ends. To obtain the maximum dispersal between the 

OC and the PPG both sections of cable must be used at the same time. 

Figure E-13 shows the emplaced radar and actual cable lengths. 
Figure E-13. Emplaced Q-47

POSITIONING 

Positioning is based on the technical requirements and capabilities of the 

radar and tactical considerations. The overriding factor in positioning is 

mission accomplishment. Paramount in selecting radar positions is 

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil considerations 

(METT-TC). The S2/targeting officer or counterfire officer from the 

controlling FA headquarters designates the general position area. The 

radar section leader selects the actual radar sight within the position area.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The position area for the Q-47 is selected based on the IPB, the range 

capabilities of the radar, and METT-TC. A through analysis of METT-TC 

will dictate which factors are most important. Generally, in a traditional 

battlespace, the Q-47 is positioned far enough from the FLOT to acquire 

the enemy weapons based on IPB, prevent loss of the radar to enemy 

action, and avoid unnecessary movement. This maximizes radar coverage 

and cueing time. Given the 3km minimum range and the necessity to 

avoid conflicts with maneuvering friendly forces, the Q-47 is normally 

positioned 8-12km from the FLOT. This rule of thumb may change based 

on the tactical situation. In early entry operations and TMD operations, the 

Q-47 may be positioned further to the rear or in an intermediate staging 

base (ISB). In general, planning ranges for the Q-47 are 18km for mortars, 

60km for artillery and 100km for rockets. Planning ranges may be 

modified based on the mode of operation and the target sets to be 

acquired. Of the tactical considerations, only the considerations for 
mission differ from the METT-TC considerations for other Firefinder 

radars. 

Mission

The Q-47 must be emplaced where it can best accomplish its mission. 

Several factors drive positioning in relation to mission considerations. The 

supported unit, commander's guidance, associated command relationship, 

and required sector of search dictate in general where the radar must be 

positioned. The requirements to conduct hostile and friendly operations or 

operate in TBM mode add specificity to positioning requirements. Further, 

the requirements to establish priority zones influence where a radar must 

be positioned. 

SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

Survivability of the radar must be considered when selecting radar 

positions. Radars are susceptible to enemy ground attack, air attack, 

indirect fires and electronic warfare. The Q-47 also produces a significant 

heat signature that can be detected by infrared detection devices. A 

through IPB will identify threats to the Q-47. 

SAFETY 

Safety is an important consideration when operating and working around 

the Q-47. Like the Q-37, one must be aware of wind and radiation hazards. 

However, the Q-47's unique design presents additional considerations. 

RADIATION

When the radar transceiver is energized, it poses a microwave radiation 

hazard to personnel. The hazard distance for the Q-47 is much greater than 

the distance for the Q-37. The hazard distance for troops extends in front 

of the radar for 217 meters over the radars full 1600-mil area of scan. The 

radar also poses a hazard for electrically detonated explosives. Figure E14 depicts the radar's radiation hazard area. 
Figure E-14. Troop Radiation Hazard Area

HOT SURFACES

The Q-47 antenna is air-cooled antenna unlike the Q-37 that has a liquidcooled antenna. Therefore, the antenna and control surfaces generally 

maintain a higher temperature. Some components may require a cool 

down period before performing maintenance. Control panel surface 

temperatures should normally be less than 120 degrees Fahrenheit at an 

ambient temperature of 77 degrees during normal operation. Other 

surfaces should not exceed 140 degrees Fahrenheit at an ambient 

temperature of 77 degrees. Surface temperatures may exceed these 

temperatures when ambient temperatures are higher. 

WIND

Because of the large surface area of the antenna, high wind velocity can 

cause serious safety hazards. When the wind velocity reaches a constant

speed of 40 mph or higher or wind gusts exceed 75 mph the antenna must 

be placed in the stowed position. 

LIFTING HAZARDS

Many of the Q-47's line replaceable units (LRU) weigh in excess of the 

37-pound single person lift requirement. Exercise care when removing or 

transporting these items. Table E-7 provides a list of LRUs exceeding the 

one-person lift requirement. 

Table E-7. LRU Weights
LRU Weight (lbs) 

MAPS 44 

Receiver 51 

Exciter 56 

BSC 60 

ARC 63 

PAM 66 

PSU (1) 67 

APU 73 

DPU 100 

ANTENNA ROLL OVER

The ATG is top heavy and can present a roll over hazard during 

positioning. Care should be exercised when emplacing the antenna 

because the antenna can unexpectedly move after leveling under certain 

conditions. The ATG should be sited on level ground. The ATG center of 

gravity (CG) may shift if sited on sloped or soft terrain. High winds may 

exacerbate this condition. Combinations of high wind load and CG 

movement may contribute to tip over. The Q-47 is equipped with software 

to monitor and alert the operator if the roll angle exceeds 2 degrees. 

NOISE

Hearing protection should be worn when working around power 

generation equipment and the ATG. Noise generated by the ATG cooling 

fans may generate noise levels in excess of 85 decibels in areas adjacent to 

the ATG during operations. 

SECTION II - OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

The Q-47 radar provides the capability to conduct theater missile defense 

(TMD) operations. Depending on the theater and the theater's level of 

maturity, the Q-47 might be required to support a joint force headquarters, 

Army forces commander (ARFOR) or corps as they conduct TMD 
operations. The radar may or may not be deployed as part of its parent 

organization. These factors will directly influence the command and 

support relationship established for the radar and its ultimate employment. 

In cases where the radar deploys or operates without its parent 

organization, support requirements become a major consideration. This 

appendix discusses TMD, doctrine, Q-47 TBM mode capabilities, and 

TTP for Q-47 participation in TMD operations. 

TMD MISSION

Theater air and missile defense operations encompass all activities focused 

on the identification, integration, and employment of forces supported by 

theater and national capabilities to detect, identify, classify, locate, track, 

discriminate, minimize the effects of and destroy air and theater missile 

threats (to include large-caliber rockets). TMD protects the force and 

critical assets from attack by theater missiles, which include ballistic 

missiles, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and large caliber rockets. 

Doctrinally, tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) are surface launched missiles 

with ballistic trajectories. These missiles are further characterized as shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles 

(MRBM). SRBM include TBMs with ranges up to 1000km. MRBM have 

ranges from 1000 to 3000km. The light and medium missile classifications 

of the Q-47 both fall into the SRBM category. SRBM include the entire 

family of SCUD missiles. 

Attack Operations

Attack operations destroy, disrupt, or neutralize theater missile (TM) 

launch platforms and supporting command, control, and communications 

(C3) nodes, logistic structures, and reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition (RSTA) platforms. Attack operations include offensive 

action by air, land, sea, and special operations forces. The joint force 

commander (JFC) normally tasks component commanders to conduct 

attack operations within their area of operations (AO). Subordinate 

commanders control attack resources and coordinate and their operations 

according to joint doctrine and procedures. The joint force air component 

commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander to plan and 

conduct attack operations against TM that are outside other component 

commanders AO. 

Attack operations can be preemptive or reactive. A sustained effort is 

required to reduce the enemy's TM capability and involves the execution 

of mutually supporting tasks. The detection, acquisition, classification, 

identification, tracking, and attack tasks are highly dependent on a near 

real time C4I process and rapid targeting capability. Attack operations use 

all-source intelligence, missile-warning systems, air defense radar, and Q-
47 radar to locate and target enemy TM systems, their components, and 

supporting nodes. 

Operational Objectives

The JFC employs theater missile defense forces to achieve two primary 

operational objectives: gain control of the air environment and protect the 

force and selected assets. At the operational level, the Army contributes to 

theater counterair operations and to theater missile defense. Army 

combined arms forces provide support for offensive counterair (OCA), 

defensive counterair (DCA), and TMD active defense and attack 

operations. 

Tactical Objectives

Objectives of air and missile defense operations at the tactical level are to 

protect corps and division forces as they plan and execute battles and 

engagements. Every participant in Army air and missile defense 

operations, maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence, has a role in 

achieving those objectives, as do the joint forces that support corps and 

division operations. Air and missile defense objectives at the tactical level 

are an extension of the operational-level objectives, but are more specific. 

Tactical-level air and missile defense operations support the overall 

objectives of corps and divisions. The emphasis at the tactical level is on 

protecting the force rather than on gaining control of the air environment 

or protecting geopolitical assets. 

THE ARMY AND AIR DEFENSE MISSILE COMMAND (AAMDC)

The AAMDC is the Army's operational lead for Army theater air and 

missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC supports the ARFOR 

commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander 

(JFLCC). The AAMDC is normally under command of the ARFOR 

commander, or if a JFLCC is designated, the AAMDC may be OPCON or 

TACON to the JFLCC. The AAMDC usually collocates with the 

ARFOR/JFLCC headquarters, but dependent on METT-TC, may collocate 

with the joint air operations center (JAOC). The location of the 

commander and his role is also dependent on METT-TC. Normally, the 

AAMDC does not have C2

 of any attack operations (field artillery or 

aviation) or passive defense forces (chemical). However, the AAMDC 

operations section monitors aspects of their operations/capabilities that 

may impact AAMDC operations. In the event of a missile launch, the 

operations section receives missile launch, state vectors, and TBM impact 

points from the Q-47 and other air defense systems, disseminates early 

warning, and after analysis passes targeting recommendations on the 

enemy's launch platforms and associated infrastructure to the deep 
operations coordination cell (DOCC). It also develops plans to support 

future operations and assists integration of TMD time sensitive and 

planned air tasking order (ATO) target missions. 

AAMDC Attack Operations Cell

The attack operations cell supports ARFOR deep operations and joint 

force offensive counterair (OCA) attack operations through analysis and 

targeting focused specifically against the TM threat. Analysis includes 

such actions as developing TM intelligence requirements (IRs), building 

operational patterns and profiles, identifying trigger events, analyzing 

launch events, conducting countermobility analysis, and identifying 

information operations (IO) warfare vulnerabilities. Q-47 acquisition data 

provides input to support these analyses. Targeting actions include 

nominating attack strategies and submitting target nominations and 

mission requests. These validated TM nominations are normally 

forwarded electronically to the DOCC via AFATDS for immediate or 

preplanned execution. 

Attack Operations Cell Organization

The attack operations cell and its automated equipment are shown in 

Figure E-15. This equipment includes the automated deep operations 

coordination system (ADOCS), the advanced field artillery tactical data 

system (AFATDS), the all source analysis system remote workstation 

(ASAS RWS), the generic area limitation environment (GALE), the joint 

services workstation (JSWS), and laptop computers. 
Figure E-15. Layout of Attack Operations Cell

This equipment is described below: 

• ADOCS is an integrated set of automated tools used for mission 

planning, coordination, analysis, and data management. It displays 

a variety of data including friendly and enemy unit locations, air 

corridors, restricted fire areas, and operational graphics. It is used 

to submit TM target nominations to the DOCC and provide 

friendly artillery and fire support coordination measure (FSCM) 

situational awareness to the attack operations cell and LNOs. 

• AFATDS is an automated workstation that displays friendly 

artillery database information and facilitates management of fire 

support operations by processing fire mission requests and air 

support mission requests. It is used to submit TM target 

nominations to the DOCC and provide friendly artillery and FSCM 

situational awareness to the attack operations cell and LNOs. The 

Q-47 transmits target location, impact predict location and state 

vectors from target acquisitions directly to this AFATDS. 

• ASAS RWS receives and correlates data from strategic and tactical 

intelligence sensors and sources. This data includes electronic, 

signal, imagery, and human intelligence. The RWS displays the 

enemy and friendly situations and includes tools that can be used 

to perform IPB, situation and event analysis, and target planning. 
• GALE is an automated workstation that contains a comprehensive 

terrain database. It is capable of analyzing terrain and predicting 

the most probable locations of enemy launch areas, forward 

operating bases, hide sites, and support areas. It is also capable of 

modeling the movement of enemy mobile launch platforms and 

predicting where they are going, what roads they will be using and 

the time required to reach their destinations. 

• The JSWS is an automated workstation that receives surveillance 

imagery from the joint surveillance and target attack radar system 

(JSTARS) platforms that are imaging fixed targets or tracking 

enemy mobile launch platforms. The JSWS displays this imagery, 

enabling the operator to provide accurate targeting information, 

including fixed and mobile target locations, speed, target 

classification, and direction of movement. 

• The laptop computers are used for operational, administrative, and 

intelligence information dissemination purposes and providing 

connectivity via the SIPRNET to AAMDC staff and LNOs and 

other SIPRNET users. 

Liaison

The AAMDC provides liaison teams to support its TMD mission. It 

deploys liaison teams to all major theater C2 headquarters and to the 

ARFOR DOCC, BCD and ACE. At the DOCC (and when necessary at the 

analysis and control element (ACE) based on METT-TC), the AAMDC 

liaison teams assist with the air and missile IPB and bring an air and 

missile focus to deep operations. The AAMDC nominates TAMD targets 

for prosecution either within the air tasking order (ATO) cycle or as a time 

sensitive target. The AAMDC DOCC LNOs assist in the target 

nomination process, provide the AAMDC with non-TMD deep targets of 

interest, inform the AAMDC of the availability of Army attack assets, and 

monitor the status of the target nomination request. These liaison teams 

have the ability to digitally receive and process Q-47 acquisitions. This is 

an important capability that provides flexibility when employing Q-47 

radars in support of TBM operations. 

ARFOR TMD OPERATIONS

The AAMDC is responsible for conducting TMD operations for the 

ARFOR when the ARFOR is responsible for TMD operations in its AO. 

The radar support for the ARFOR is provided by Q-47's from an IBCT, 

IDIVARTY, divisional TAB or CTAD depending on the size of the force 

acting as the ARFOR and the maturity of the theater. A division or corps 

headquarters is likely to act as an ARFOR. The digital architecture and 

command and support relationships for the Q-47 radars are basically the 
same whether the corps or division acts as the ARFOR. Only the parent 

organization of the radars would differ. 

Corps as ARFOR Headquarters

When the corps acts as an ARFOR headquarters, Q-47 support should 

normally be provided by the CTAD allocated to the corps. The number of 

radars placed in the TMD mode is determined by the IPB and 

commander's guidance. The AAMDC conducts targeting for TMD 

operations. However, the Q-47s remain under the command of the 

corps/ARFOR. The radars have an assigned command relationship. The 

Corps FSE/DOCC controls the radars. Acquisitions are reported to the 

corps FSE/DOCC, AAMDC and AAMDC DOCC LNO. Figure E-16

depicts the digital architecture for a corps acting as an ARFOR with a 

supporting AAMDC. 

Figure E-16. ARFOR TMD Q-47 Digital Architecture

TBM acquisitions are transmitted from the radar to the DOCC/FSE, 

AAMDC and AAMDC LNO on one digital net via AFATDS. The 

information received in the DOCC is used for targeting, situational 

development and attack operations. The information received at the 

AAMDC is used for TMD targeting, passive missile defense and crosscueing air defense systems such as the Patriot radar. Care must be taken to 

avoid duplication of effort. One method for preventing duplication is to 

specify which agency will generate target nominations or fire requests for 

specific targets. The DOCC/FSE should process and conduct attack 

operations for heavy rockets. The corps has assets to immediately attack 

these targets based on range and the TLE of acquisitions. The AAMDC 
should process missile acquisitions since the TLE of the acquisition is too 

large for ATACMS and the target dwell time is too short. The AAMDC 

can use the acquisitions in conjunction with other intelligence systems to 

develop a viable target for ATACMS or generate an air nomination. All 

target nominations and air requests are sent from the AAMDC to the 

DOCC for processing. 

Missile targets could be attacked immediate upon detection with TACAIR. 

The TLE and response time requirements are such that the target can be 

attacked even if it departs the launch point. The options for air attack are 

to pass the target through the BCD to an aircraft flying a TMD AIRCAP, 

if available, or to divert an AI mission. Air requests could also be sent 

directly from the AAMDC to the BCD through the AAMDC LNO at the 

BCD. This procedure should be coordinated in advance to avoid 

duplication of effort. 

CORPS AND DIVISION TMD OPERATIONS

Corps commanders exercise control over most of the ground forces in the 

theater. Objectives of air and missile defense at the corps level are 

protecting the force, providing freedom to maneuver, controlling the air 

environment, and destroying enemy air and missile power on the ground 

and in flight. At division, the focus shifts increasingly toward providing 

freedom to maneuver by protecting the force. These perspectives relate 

directly to the different battlefield characteristics and requirements at each 

command level. Q-47 radars are managed to accomplish these objectives. 

Corps Employment of Q-47 Radars

Corps has a CTAD to accomplish its counterfire and missile defense 

objectives. Depending on the TBM threat, corps may place one or both Q47s in TBM mode. In the absence of a creditable TBM threat, both Q-47s 

would operate in normal or fast scan mode. Acquisitions from the Q-47s 

would go directly to the corps FSE/DOCC and, if so designated directly to 

a field artillery brigade or subordinate battalion for attack. Acquisitions 

would also go to the corps G2 to support intelligence operations. Figure E17 depicts a digital architecture for corps TBM operations. 
Figure E-17. Corps TBM Acquisition Architecture

Division Employment of Q-47 Radars

A division uses the two Q-47 radars from the radar platoon of its target 

acquisition battery to provide TBM support. In a unit organized with an 

IDIVARTY, three Q-47 radars are available in the TA platoon of the 

HIMARS battalion. Further, each IBCT has a Q-47 radar upon which the 

division could task. Normally, the division would be focused on 

counterfire and the Q-47s would operate in normal or fast scan mode. The 

division might place one Q-47 in TBM mode to obtain the addition range 

capabilities for detecting heavy rockets. Further, an AFATDS quick fire 

channel might be established between a Q-47 and the counterfire 

headquarters or a subordinate battalion to facilitate immediate engagement 

of targets. A division organized with an IDIVARTY has additional 

flexibility. A division in an early entry scenario may routinely place a 

radar in TBM mode when acting as an ARFOR headquarters. Q-47's in 

heavy or Army XXI divisions would send acquisitions to the designated 

counterfire headquarters and/or FSE. The FSE processing the acquisitions

in the heavy division is the main FSE. The TAC FSE would receive the 

acquisitions in the ARMY XXI division. In divisions organized under the 

interim or object force structure, acquisitions would be transmitted to the

fires and effects coordination cell (FECC). 
Figure E-18. Division TBM Acquisition Architecture

Q-47 TBM CAPABILITIES

In TBM mode, the Q-47 can detect TBMs at ranges from 12-300KM. The 

associated target location error (TLE) is 50m or .25% of range for light 

missiles and 100m or .25% for medium missiles whichever is greater. The 

maximum TLE is 750m at 300km for medium missiles. The TLE is too 

large to provide targetable data for ATACMS Block I/IA at most ranges 

without validation by a second detection source. The main detection 

footprint extends from the radar +/-533mils from the azimuth of 

orientation out to a range of 300km. The radar can also detect missiles in 

the area from plus or minus 533-800 mils from the azimuth of orientation. 

However, the range is significantly diminished. The minimum range is 

12km for light missiles and 25km for medium missiles (See Figure E-12). 

The Q-47 can also detect heavy rockets in TBM mode. For missile targets, 

the Q-47 will compute and transmit a missile's state vector, launch point, 

and impact predict point in near real-time. 

Target Categories

The Q-47 categorizes detections in TBM mode as light or medium missile 

or heavy rocket based on size, velocity and trajectory. Heavy missiles are 

not detected as their range is greater than that of the Q-47. 

Light Missiles. Light missiles are guided during part of their trajectory 

and have a free flight stage. They are the fastest missiles during the initial 

burn stage and are easier to detect during the boost stage of their ascent. 

Typically the range of these missiles is proportional to the weight of their 
warhead. Warheads filled with gaseous agents or ultra-light explosive 

devices would extend the range considerably. Ranges usually vary from 

25km to 150km. The Q-47 classifies detections as light missiles based on 

size, velocity and trajectory. Velocities vary from 800 to 1500 meters per 

second. ATACMS is considered a light missile. Threat systems in this 

category include the SS-21, SS-23, SCUD-A, and SCUD-B. 

Medium Missiles. Medium missiles fly from 40-300km at velocities of 

1100 to 2300 meters per second. They are missiles similar in performance 

to the SCUD and SS-21. There is no U.S. weapon in this category. The 

threat system in this category is the SCUD-C. The NoDong is a heavy 

missile based on range. 

Heavy Rockets. Heavy rockets are larger than 155mm, may be 

programmed internally, and may have a guidance-affected trajectory. They 

normally fly through more than one layer of atmosphere during their 

trajectory and may carry multiple payloads. These rockets have a velocity 

from 700 to 1200 meters per second. The Q-47 can detect heavy rockets at 

ranges up to 100km. MLRS is classified as a heavy rocket. Threat systems 

in this category include the BM22, M1991 (240mm MRL), ASTROS II 

and 9A52. 

CORPS COUNTERFIRE 

The increased range capability of the Q-47 and the allocation of two Q-47 

radars to each corps provide the corps with a capability to conduct reactive 

counterfire without stripping a division of its assets. The level of reactive 

counterfire operations must be balanced with the requirements to conduct 

TMD operations. The introduction of reactive counterfire operations at the 

corps is a departure from current counterfire roles. The corps role in 

current doctrine is normally focused on deep, proactive, counterfire. In 

most situations, the division orchestrates and executes counterfire in 

support of corps close operations. The corps provides resources to the 

division. This allows an orderly and calculated division of labor. Just as 

the division separates and deconflicts the radar coverage and counterfire 

efforts of the division and maneuver brigades, so must the corps deconflict 

the efforts of the corps and division. The division uses the common sensor 

boundary (CSB) to segregate the coverage areas for the Q-36 and Q-37. 

The corps must also segregate the coverage areas for division and corps Q47 to prevent duplication. One method is for the corps to establish a corps 

common sensor boundary (CCSB). This measure is established based 

upon IPB and analysis of the enemy fire support system. The corps 

normally places the CCSB to segregate the responsibility for locating and 

attacking DAGs and AAG/AGRAs. The corps could also establish a phase 

line to delineate areas of coverage. In either case, the location of fire 

support coordinating measures relative to the CCSB or phase line must be 
considered. CCSB should be placed on or forward of the CFL or FSCL, 

when possible, to eliminate the need to clear targets prior to engagement. 

DIVISION COUNTERFIRE 

Counterfire operations at the division are enhanced by the Q-47. However, 

the basic procedures unchanged. Reactive counterfire is affected by the Q47's increased range and ability to classify targets. The ability to classify 

targets enhances counterfire operations by identifying specific target types 

for generation of fire missions based on the unit's High Payoff Target List 

(HPTL). This target classification capability can also be leveraged by the 

TPS when combined with the target build-up function in AFATDS. The 

TPS can establish a target build-up area with an associated target type that 

will generate a fire mission when the designated number of targets is 

located in the specified area. Finally, the enhanced range provides the 

capability to acquire the majority of threat artillery and rocket systems. 

This enhanced range also provides the corps with a system capable of 

detecting threat systems in areas where the corps normally conducts its 

operations. 
Appendix F 

Firefinder Mask Considerations 

This appendix explains how to calculate the track volume for the 

Firefinder radars. It is intended for use by the radar section leader to 

enable him to determine whether a radar site will provide enough track 

volume to locate hostile firing positions. It also provides procedures for 

correcting insufficient track volume. 

DEFINITIONS 

The following definitions are associated with mask: 

• Flat mask is a single mask angle or a default value in the radar 

when no mask angle is entered into the radar computer. The flat 

mask default for the AN/TPQ-36 radar is 20 mils. The flat mask 

for the AN/TPQ-37 radar is 8 mils. 

• Mask angle is the vertical angle from the radar to the top of the 

mask, or screening crest, at a given azimuth. The lowest mask 

angle and the highest mask angle are calculated and entered in the 

radar's computer during initialization. 

• Mask variation is the difference between the lowest and highest 

mask angles. 

• Vertical scan is the maximum vertical scanning capability of a 

specific type of radar. Vertical scan for the AN/TPQ-36 radar is 

approximately 80 mils with all scanning frequencies enabled. Each 

frequency that is disabled results in a loss of approximately 2.5 

mils of vertical scan. Vertical scan for the AN/TPQ-37 radar is 

approximately 104 mils. Since this radar uses phase or phase scan 

rather than the phase or frequency scan used by the Q-36, no 

vertical scan is lost when some of the frequencies of the Q-37 are 

disabled. 

Figure F-1. Radar Characteristics
TRACK VOLUME 

The amount of track volume is determined by the vertical scan of the radar 

and the amount of vertical scan that is lost because of the terrain contour, 

or screening crest, in front of the radar. From any radar position, the 

altitude of the screening crest along the terrain contour in front of the 

position will vary across the radar's sector of search. This varying 

screening crest altitude results in varying mask angles along the terrain 

contour. The variance between the smallest mask angle and the largest 

mask angle reduces the radar's vertical scan. 

Sometimes this reduction is enough that the available scan coverage is less 

than the 50-mil track volume required by the radar to extrapolate weapon 

locations. When the track volume is reduced below 50 mils, the radar 

section leader must compensate by artificially adjusting the low mask 

angle, narrowing the search sector, or by moving the radar to a new 

position that provides adequate track volume. 

Whenever possible, an aiming circle or other accurate measuring device 

should be used to determine mask angles along the terrain contour. These 

measured mask angles are entered in the computer to depict the terrain 

contour. Otherwise, the radar will radiate into hill masses that are higher 

than the flat mask default in the radar computer. The Q-36 has the ability 

to conduct automatic terrain following to determine mask angles. 

Automatic terrain following can be used when digital terrain is available 

for the location of the radar site. This capability allows the radar section 

leader to compute mask angles before occupying a radar site. Automatic 

terrain following is not as accurate as taking manual measurements from 

the radar site. Therefore, manual mask measurements should be taken as 

soon as practical after occupying a new radar site. 

TRACK VOLUME CALCULATION AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 

The Firefinder search fence starts at the lowest mask angle entered in the 

radar computer (or at the flat mask default value if no lowest mask angle is 

entered) and goes to the highest point of the vertical scan. The first step in 

calculating track volume for the radar site and search sector is to subtract 

the low mask angle from the high mask angle. This difference must then 

be subtracted from the vertical scan of the radar. The result is the track 

volume for the radar site. Figure F-2 shows the procedure for calculating 

track volume. 
Figure F-2. Track Volume

Although the ideal mask variation may be met, the maximum allowable 

mask variation for a radar can be calculated by subtracting the 50 mils of 

track volume required for firing weapon location from the vertical scan of 

the radar. The maximum allowable mask variations are: 

• Q-36 - 30 mils. 

• Q-37 - 54 mils. 

Thus, any mask variation exceeding the allowable maximum variation 

would not allow enough track volume for the radar to determine firing 

weapon locations. In that event, some action must be taken to regain 

enough track volume to perform the radar mission. Possible actions 

include doing nothing, raising the low mask angle, narrowing the search 

sector, or moving the radar. If nothing is done a dead space is created 

where projectiles cannot be detected. Figure F-3 depicts a dead space area. 
Figure F-3. Dead Space Area

In the example in Figure F-3, the mask variation is 60 mils, which only 

allows 20 mils of track volume over portions of the search sector. This 

creates a dead space area. The result is an area where hostile weapons 

cannot be detected. Figure F-4 shows the possible adverse effects of a 

dead space area. 
Figure F-4. Effects of a Dead Space Area

The first solution is to raise the low mask angle. This will provide enough 

track volume to eliminate the large dead space area. Nonetheless, this 

solution will produce a small dead space area under the low mask area. 

This may or may not be acceptable. Figure F-5 shows the result of raising 

the low mask angle. 

Figure F-5. Raising the Low Mask Angle

The next solution might be to narrow the search sector or move the search 

sector. This will lower the mask variation and eliminate the dead space in

the search sector. This still leaves an area with no radar coverage. 

Narrowing the search may not be acceptable based on the tactical 

situation. Figure F-6 depicts narrowing the search sector. 
Figure F-6. Modifying the Search Sector

If none of these solutions are acceptable, the radar must be moved to 

another site to provide the required coverage. The radar section leader 

must recompute mask angles and track volume at the new location. 
Appendix G 

Target Acquisition TAB to the Field Artillery Support 

Plan 

The purpose of the TA tab to the FA support plan appendix is to assign 

missions, consolidate field artillery TA assets, establish target processing 

flow, and assign and coordinate responsibilities not covered in unit SOPs. 

This appendix explains the preparation of the TA tab and its enclosures. 

SECTION I - TARGET ACQUISITION TAB

DESCRIPTION 

The TA tab is a managerial tool used primarily by the DIVARTY (or FA 

brigade) and DS battalion staffs. It is used to ensure that all TA assets are 

employed to support the overall combined arms operation. Although no 

specific format for the tab is prescribed, the five-paragraph operation order 

format is used when the TA tab is issued separately from the FA support 

plan. The TA tab is an integral part of the field artillery support plan, 

which is an appendix to the fire support annex of the operation order. This 

hierarchy is shown below: 

• Operation Order ___________(52d Mech Inf Div). 

• Annex D (Fire Support). 

• Appendix _________(Field Artillery Support Plan). 

• Tab ________(Target Acquisition). 

• Enclosures____________(ex. Capabilities Overlay). 

PREPARATION 

In the DIVARTY headquarters, the DIVARTY S2 is responsible for the 

preparation of the TA tab. He is assisted by the counterfire officer, the 

TAB commander, the assistant counterfire officer, and the targeting 

officer. In the FA brigade, the TA tab also is developed by the S2 assisted 

by the targeting officer. In separate maneuver brigades, the TA tab is 

produced jointly by the FA battalion S2 with assistance from the S3, and 

targeting officer. The TA tab usually consists of the heading, five major 

paragraphs, and the enclosures. The TA TAB is normally produced at the 

DIVARTY/ FA BDE. 

TARGET ACQUISITION TAB HEADING 
The tab heading includes the security classification, the title line, 

references, and the time zone used throughout the operation. The 

classification is shown at the top and bottom of each page of the 

document. Refer to figure G-1. 

(CLASSIFICATION) 

TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX _________________

(FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) 

TO OPORD ____________.

References: Map, Series (Number and Geographic 

Area, If Necessary), Sheet Number(S) (And Name, If 

Necessary), Edition __________, Scale __________. 

Time Zone Used Throughout:_(ALL CAPS)____ 

Figure G-1. Target Acquisition Tab Heading

MAJOR PARAGRAPHS 

SITUATION (PARAGRAPH 1)

This paragraph includes the friendly situation, supported units, and other 

TA assets in sector. Include specific enemy and friendly information that 

form a basis for threat assessments required for the radar deployment 

order. 

MISSION (PARAGRAPH 2)

This paragraph should be a clear, concise statement of the target 

acquisition mission. It contains who, what, when, where and why. 

EXECUTION (PARAGRAPH 3)

The execution paragraph explains how the mission will be accomplished. 

It contains the following subparagraphs: 

• Concept of the Operation. This subparagraph (3a) gives the 

commander's concept for target acquisition. This should include 

identification of designated cueing agents and general cueing 

guidance. Specific cueing guidance is listed in the coordination 

subparagraph (3e). 

• Processing. The processing subparagraph (3b) is used to denote 

target processing flow. This targeting information flow describes 
the relationship between the target acquisition asset and the 

headquarters controlling it. This paragraph does not represent the 

actual communications nets used but shows the destination flow of 

targeting information. This paragraph should list all field artillery 

TA assets and headquarters controlling them. The following are 

examples of the types of information that may be included in the 

processing subparagraph: 

– AN/TPQ-36 section reports targets to the controlling DS 

battalion FDC. 

– AN/TPQ-37 section reports targets to the DIVARTY (or FA 

brigade) target processing section. 

– Aerial observers report targets to the controlling headquarters 

TOC. 

– DS battalions report targeting data to the DIVARTY TOC. 

– DIVARTY TOC will exchange targeting information with the 

supporting FA brigade TOC (especially when it acts as the 

alternate DIVARTY TOC). 

The target processing flow is based on the tactical situation and command 

relationships. 

• Visual Observation. This subparagraph (3c) covers ground 

observation. Ground observation is also covered in Enclosure 1 to 

the TA tab, which is the consolidated visibility diagram. This 

diagram covers the entire division sector to include forward 

observers. Time is a critical factor in assembling this enclosure. 

• Radar. This subparagraph (3d) deals with the command 

relationships assigned to FA radars. FA radars may be assigned a 

command relationship of attached/OPCON/TACON to FA 

battalions or higher FA headquarters. An example mission for an 

AN/TPQ-36 section might be as follows: AN/TPQ-36, Section 3, 

Btry C, 1-30 FA; Mission: Attached to 1-51 FA (See RDO, 

Enclosure 5.) 

• Coordination. The coordination subparagraph (3e) covers 

information that is not addressed in the unit tactical standing 

operating procedure (TACSOP). As a minimum, the paragraph 

should contain the following: 

– The requirement for the supported DS battalion to report radar 

locations and sectors of search to the DIVARTY target processing 

section. 
– Cueing guidance established by the DIVARTY counterfire 

officer. 

– Common sensor boundary (CSB). Firefinder radars sharing or 

having overlapping search sectors need to be identified. 

Consideration must then be given to the establishment of a CSB. 

The CSB is indicated by a series of grid coordinates to define its 

location. 

– Coordination for communications nets and relays, if required. 

– Additional coordination for survey and security, if required. 

SERVICE SUPPORT (PARAGRAPH 4)

This paragraph lists service support requirements as required. It may refer 

to the service support annex. 

COMMAND AND SIGNAL (PARAGRAPH 5)

The fifth paragraph lists required information as necessary. It may refer to 

the fire support annex. 

ENCLOSURES 

Enclosures to the TA tab should include the following: 

• Enclosure 1 is a consolidated visibility diagram. Contains visibility 

information for non-radar type observers (i.e. STRIKERS). 

• Enclosure 2 is a capabilities overlay. It normally contains the 

following: 

– Major unit boundaries, FEBA, and FLOT. 

– Major search sectors to include primary and alternate sectors, 

zones with type and number, and radar type and section 

description. Primary zones are depicted by solid lines, alternate 

zones, by dotted lines. Section SOPs should specify color coding 

for individual radar data. 

– Common sensor boundary, drawn as a solid line labeled with 

CSB and the effective DTG. 

– Major unit locations, especially those covered by the CFZ. 

– Overlay title, classification, and register marks. 
• Enclosures 3 through 5 are the AN/TPQ-36 RDOs. 

• Enclosures 6 through 7 are the AN/TPQ-37 RDOs. 

It may not always be possible to include all RDOs as enclosures. This is 

especially true for radars attached to subordinate FA battalions. 

The following sample TA TAB provides an example of how a TA TAB 

might be constructed. 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN 

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO 

ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD 

DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

References: 

Map, series M745, DEUTSCHLAND, sheet L5118 

(Marburg) 

Edition: Ausgabe 4 DMG 

Scale: 1:50,000 

Map, series M745, DEUTSCHLAND, sheet L5120 

(Ziegenheim) 

Edition: Ausgabe 4 DMG 

Scale: 1:50,000 

Map, series M745, DEUTSCHALND, sheet L5318 

(Amoneburg) 

Edition: Ausgabe 4 DMG 

Scale: 1:50,000 

Map, series M745, DEUTSCHLAND, sheet L5320 

(Alsfeld) 

Edition: Ausgabe 4 DMG 

Scale: 1:50,000 

Time Zone Used Throughout: ZULU 

1. SITUATION.

The enemy offensive has been halted, resulting in the current dispositions. Intelligence 

reports indicate the enemy is regrouping and is capable of launching a new offensive
within 48 hours. See Annex B (Intelligence). 

2. MISSION.

On order, the target acquisition assets of the 52d Mech Div, Btry C [TA], 1-30 FA, and 

STRIKER teams will acquire targets, initiate fire missions, and report combat and/or 

targeting information in support of offensive operations in zone to defeat the enemy and 

prevent his massing for a new offensive. 

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1-A-1 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED) 

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO 

ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD 

DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. 52d Mech Div target acquisition assets will deploy 

well forward in sector to locate high-payoff targets and protect friendly forces, 

with long-range TA assets acquiring targets at maximum range to support the 

offensive operation to reestablish the international border. Priority of TA effort 

to 1st Bde then 2d Bde. 

b. Processing. General support radars will send their targeting information 

directly to the DIVARTY TOC. Radars direct support to DS FA battalions will 

report information to their respective battalions. Targeting information 

developed at DS battalion level will be sent to DIVARTY. 

c. Visual Observation. STRIKERs will report location and zone of observation 

thru BDE FSE to the DS FA Battalion. 

d. Radar. See capabilities overlay at Enclosure 2. 

(1) AN/TPQ-36, Sec 1, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA 

Mission: Attached to 1-90 FA (155, SP) 

See RDO, Encl 3 (omitted) 

(2) AN/TPQ-36, Sec 2, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA 

Mission: Attached to 2 90 FA (155 SP)
See RDO, Encl 4 (omitted) 

(3) AN/TPQ-36, Sec 3, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA 

Mission: Attached to 3-90 FA (155, SP) 

See RDO, Encl 5 (omitted) 

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1-A-2 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED) 

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO 

ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD 

DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

(4) AN/TPQ-37, Sec 4, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA 

Mission: Attached 52d DIVARTY (155, SP) 

See RDO, Encl 6 

(5) AN/TPQ-37, Sec 5, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA 

Mission: Attached 52d DIVARTY 

See RDO, Encl 7 (omitted) 

e. Coordination. 

(1) Survey. Radar Sections 1 through 3 will receive survey support from 

their respective DS battalions. Cdr, Btry C (TA), 1-30th FA will provide 

survey support for Radar Sections 4 and 5. 

(2) Common Sensor Boundary. Effective 0100001Z a common sensor 

boundary will be established along PL DOG. Once 1st Bde has 

completed fording operations vic NB191353 and secured Objective 

BONE, a new common sensor boundary will be established along PL 

CAT. 

(3) Reports. DS battalions will report radar locations, sectors of search, 

and planned CFFZs, and CFZs to DIVARTY for all attached radars. 

(4) Met. Q-36 coordinates for met data from DS battalion TOC; Q-37 

receives data from DIVARTY TOC. 

(5) Cueing Maximum radiation time is based on the current ELINT
threat assessment. The DIVARTY S2/CFO will update the ELINT threat 

throughout the mission on the DIVARTY CF net. Designated cueing 

agents for Q-36 are DS battalion S2, task force FSO, and brigade FSO. 

Q-37 cueing agents will be the DIVARTY CFO and reinforcing FA 

brigade S2. 

(6) Firefinder Zones. Commander's guidance states all maneuver 

objectives when occupied will be covered by CFZs within the radar 

boundaries. DS battalion S2s will ensure that suspected artillery 

positions are covered by CFFZs. 2d Bde Q-36 ensure that a CFFZ is 

input for the town of STRANG vic NB1045. No CFFZs are to be placed 

outside boundaries. Force protection zones (CFZs) will be planned by 

the appropriate FSEs. 

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1-A-3 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED) 

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO 

ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD 

DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Radar Sections 1 through 3 will receive logistical support from their respective DS 

battalions. Cdr, 2-19 FA (MLRS) will provide logistical support for Radar Sections 4 

and 5. 

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. Btry C (TA), 1-30 FA TOC located at NB050670. 

b. Signal. Current SOI KTU 1062, Edition BB in effect. 

Encl 1: Visibility Diagram. 

Encl 2: Capabilities Overlay. 

Encl 3-5: RDO. Radar Sections 1 through 3 (AN/TPQ-36) (omitted) 

Encl 6: RDO, Radar Section 4 (AN/TPQ-37). 

Encl 7: RDO, Radar Section 5 (AN/TPQ-37) (omitted). 

UNCLASSIFIED
D-1-A-4 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED 

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 1 (VISIBILITY DIAGRAM) TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) 

TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO 

OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1-A-1-1 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED) 

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 2 (CAPABILITIES OVERLAY) TAB A (TARGET

ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA SUPPORT PLAN) TO ANNEX D (FIRE
SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 01-1 (GOLD DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1-A-2-1 

SAMPLE TA TAB TO FA SUPPORT PLAN (CONTINUED) 

ENCLOSURE 6, TAB A (TARGET ACQUISITION) TO APPENDIX 2 (FA 

SUPPORT PLAN) TO ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 

01-1 (GOLD DRAGON), 52D Mech Div.

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION WHEN FILLED IN) 
UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION WHEN FILLED IN) 

D-1-A-3-1 

SECTION II - RADAR DEPLOYMENT ORDER

DESCRIPTION 

The RDO (DA Form 5957-R) is an enclosure to the TA tab. DA Form

5957-R replaces DA Form 5364-R (Commander's Target Criteria 

Message). The RDO designates the information required by each radar 

section leader to deploy his radar section and begin operations. NOTE: 

This form may be modified. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 

DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION S2

The DS battalion S2 is the TA manager for assets 

attached/OPCON/organic to the battalion. He is responsible for 

developing and issuing the RDO to the radar section leader (MOS 131A). 

When developing an RDO, the S2 must coordinate with the maneuver 

brigade targeting officer (brigade FSE) to integrate TA assets into the 

overall scheme of maneuver and collection plan. 

DIVISION ARTILLERY COUNTERFIRE OFFICER 

The counterfire officer is the TA manager for the division artillery. He is 

responsible for developing and issuing RDOs to radar sections that are 

controlled by division artillery. 

FA BRIGADE COUNTERFIRE OFFICER

The brigade CFO has the same responsibilities as the DIVARTY CFO for 

TA assets under control of the FA brigade. 

DA FORM 5957-R 

The instructions for completing DA Form 5957-R are explained below. 

• Heading. In the first block, list the radar section number, and circle 

the type of radar involved. In the second block, enter the mission. 

• Location. Enter a primary and an alternate general position area for 

the section. The radar section leader will select the actual site and 

report its location. 

• Search Sector. In this section, describe the search sector. Select a 

primary azimuth only. Then determine the left and right sector 

edges. These edges are normally approximately 800 mils left and 

right of the primary azimuth. Range search limits can be specified. 

• EW Threat Assessment. In this section indicate the EW threat 

assessment. Specify whether an EW threat exists, if it is affecting 

friendly assets, and the type of threat. If there is an EW threat you 

may use the Firefinder survivability flow chart in conjunction with 

the commanders risk assessment and METT-TC to determine 

emission limits. 

• Cueing Agents. In this section list, in priority by call sign, agents 

that can cue the radar. 

• Reporting Channels. In this section list the communications nets on 

which the radar is to operate. Include the call sign for each. 
• Zone Data. In this section include zone data. List the type of zone 

and zone number (for example CFZ1), and coordinates of the 

zones (minimum of three points and maximum of six points). In 

the description column, list the description of the activity (if any) 

in the zone. Also list the command priority for CFFZs when 

upgraded from priority 2. (See sample RDO Figure G-2). 

Procedures for developing zone data are found in Chapter 4. 

Figure G-2. Radar Deployment Order (DA Form 5957-R)

AUTOMATED RADAR DEPLOYMENT ORDER PROCEDURE 
The radar deployment order (RDO) is used to establish the location and/or 

coverage area of a radar unit. The normal method used to send a RDO to a 

radar from an AFATDS equipped unit is to open the radar unit icon menu 

and select RDO. The user then selects Current Location: or Next Location: 

radio button to determine the unit location to be sent for the deployment. 

The Next Location: field can be use to inform the AFATDS operator of a 

possible future deployment location. Unlike the NEXT radio button that 

acts as a movement order, the Next Location field is information only. 

This information remains resident in the AFATDS and is not transmitted 

to the radar. The Effective Time: is the time that the unit is operational at 

the new location or capable of a new coverage area. The range fan is then 

determined by entering the Direction Of Search (mils), Right Azimuth 

(mils), and Left Azimuth (mils). Radar Zones are added or removed from 

the list as required. Radar zones must be built in the geometry files before 

the can be added to the RDO. The Send button then saves the data to the 

database and transmits the RDO. See Figure G-3. 

Figure G-3. Radar Deployment Order (AFATDS)

The radar will not receive the RDO itself. The AFATDS will convert data 

in the RDO to the SPRT;SEARCH and SPRT;FILTER formats for 

transmition to the radar unit. Complete procedures for the AFATDS RDO 

can be found in TM 11-7025-297-10 and TB 11-7025-297-10. From an 

IFSAS equipped unit the operator sends SPRT;SEARCH and one or more 
SPRT;FILTER messages to the radar. Regardless of who sends the 

information, the radar will receive the following information: 

• Radar Search Area Message (SPRT;SEARCH). This message is 

used to provide the radar with new search area data. If the 

RADIATE ON switchlamp is lit, the message is followed by 

**CAUTION** SET RADIATE OFF BEFORE ENTERING 

DATA. If the message data is unCAKed, it may be semiautomatically stored by entering function code 20 and answering 

yes to the RSDSTORE? prompt. Otherwise, you must unCAK the 

data and enter it manually using function code 20. See Figure G-4. 

Figure G-4. Assigned Search Area.

• Priority/Censor Zone Message (SPRT;FILTER). This message is 

used to provide the radar with data for adding or deleting priority 

or censor zones. Each zone message contains the coordinates of up 

to three zone points. If a zone is defined by more than three points, 

then two zone messages are required. If the entire set of zone 

points has been received, ZONE MESSAGE COMPLETE is 

displayed. Otherwise, ADDITIONAL ZONE MESSAGE 

REQUIRED is displayed. A complete zone data message is 

automatically stored if all of the following conditions are met: 

– One is operating in secure mode. 

– Sequence number is correct, 

– Data not CAKed, and zone data valid. ZONE DATA STORED is 

then displayed, and no operator action is needed. 

If you are operating in unsecure mode and the message data is unCAKed, 

you may store the new zone semi-automatically by entering function code 

26 and answering yes to the ZONESTORE? prompt. Otherwise, you 

must unCAK the message data off-line and enter it manually. See Figure 

G-5. 
Figure G-5. Assigned Zone

If you receive this message from an AFATDS equipped unit you will first 

receive a delete filter message for each of the one to nine zones you have 

stored. Behind the delete messages you will have the new filter or filters.
Appendix H 

Field Artillery Radar Support Requirements 

TA radars will often be widely dispersed across the battlefield and require 

support from units that may not be familiar with radar support 

requirements. This appendix outlines the major support requirements for 

TA radars. 

SURVEY 

Common datum/common survey is critical for successful employment of 

TA assets as well as all other battlefield operating systems. The specific 

survey data required for each TA radar system is described below. 

• AN/TPQ-36: 

– Grid zone. 

– Site location (universal transverse mercator (UTM) coordinates 

within 10 meters CEP). 

– Distance from near stake (radar location) to far stake (orienting 

point). This distance should be at least 250 meters. The minimum 

distance is 100 meters. However the further out the distance the 

better the accuracy that the system will report. 

– Azimuth from near stake to far stake (0.4 mil probable error 

(PE)). 

– Vertical angle from near stake to far stake (0.5 mil PE). 

– Altitude of the near stake (10 meters PE). 

• AN/TPQ-37: 

– Grid zone. 

– Site location (UTM coordinates within 10 meters CEP). 

– Distance from near stake (radar location) to far stake (orienting 

point). This distance should be at least 250 meters. The minimum 

distance is 100 meters. However, the further the distance the better 

the accuracy that the system will report. 
– Azimuth from near stake to far stake (0.4 mil PE). 

– Altitude of the near stake (3 meters PE). 

MODULAR AZIMUTH POSITIONING SYSTEM

The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 and AN/TPQ-37(V)8 radars are equipped with the 

Modular Azimuth Positioning System (MAPS). MAPS provides required 

survey for Firefinder systems. However, MAPS requires external survey 

support to provide the initialization data and update points required for 

operation. MAPS initialization requires the use of an initial survey control 

point of 5th order or higher. Before MAPS can be initialized, the ATG 

must be parked over the survey control point. Once initialization begins it 

takes between 9 and 15 minutes to complete. Once the initialization data is 

stored, the ATG can be moved to a different location in preparation for 

operations. The MAPS can be turned off after initialization and as long as 

the ATG is not moved it will maintain all data. MAPS must be turned on 

and operational before the ATG can be moved. 

COMMUNICATIONS 

Firefinder radars use voice and digital communications to communicate 

with the supported unit. The primary method of communications is always 

digital. Radar acquisitions and mission data are transmitted digitally to the 

supported FDC or controlling headquarters for receipt by IFSAS, 

AFATDS, BCS or FDS. 

The use of wire enhances communication responsiveness, security, 

minimizes the effects of jamming, and minimizes the possibility of enemy 

intercept by radio direction finders. The supported unit is responsible for 

providing and installing wire. Nonetheless, the use of wire may be 

impractical in situations requiring frequent moves or widely dispersed 

positions. FM radio becomes the primary means of communication in 

these situations. 

The enemy situation must be considered when planning and conducting 

communications. Enemy EW capabilities may dictate changes in normal 

radar communication procedures. 

COMMUNICATION NETS

The AN/TPQ-36 section normally operates in a battalion operations/fire 

net digitally and a command net for voice communications. Usually, these 

two nets belong to the supported DS battalion. However, these operating 

nets may be modified by individual units depending on command 

instruction and SOP. 
The AN/TPQ-37 section normally operates on the TA/intel net digitally 

and a command net for voice communications. The AN/TPQ-37 usually is 

under the control of the DIVARTY or FA brigade TOC and passes target 

information directly to the counterfire officer at the controlling TOC. The 

radar may also be directed to pass targets to a DS or GS FA battalion. In 

such cases, the supported unit must provide all communications data. This 

includes signal operating instructions (SOIs). 

DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS

Digital communications addresses and authentication codes are prescribed 

in current cryptographic and authentication manuals. If digital 

communications are not available, the radar operator uses standard voice 

procedures to pass target information over the DS battalion operations/fire 

net or the force artillery command/fire net to the supported unit FDC. 

Firefinder radar systems interface digitally with IFSAS, AFATDS, BCS, 

and FDS. Computer data needed for interface are input during 

initialization and can be changed by use of function codes or functional 

displays depending on the version of the system control shelter. 

The digital messages used by Firefinder radars are divided into two groups 

- receive messages and transmit messages. Messages are displayed 

according to the priority level of the message. There are three priority 

levels for messages - 1 (highest), 2, and 3 (lowest). See the digital message 

format table for a display of which messages are received and/or 

transmitted. 

The Firefinder radar can store net member data (member identifications 

and unit types) for up to ten receivers of various types. These receivers 

include: 

• TACFIRE/IFSAS/AFATDS 

• BCS (Battery Computer System) 

• MLRS (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) 

• FF (Firefinder) 

• PALADIN (Howitzer system) 

Firefinder radars can communicate digitally with any of the receivers 

listed above. However, only one net member at a time may be selected for 

communications. 

Table H-1. Digital Message Formats

MESSAGE TYPE TRANSMITT/ FORMAT PRIORITY
RECIEVE NAME

Priority/Censor Zone R SPRT;FILTER 3 

Radar Search Area R SPRT;SEARCH 3 

MET Data R MET;TA 3 

Radar Location T/R FM;OBCO 3 

Friendly Fire Battery R FM;INTM 2 

Friendly Fire Target R FM;MTO 2 

Radar 

Ready/Registration 

T/R FM;SUBS 2 

Fire Mission T/R FM;FOCMD 1 

Priority target report T FM;CFF 1 

Target report T ATI;CDR 3 

Free Text T/R SYS;PTM 1 

Communication Test T/R MD;XMT5 3 

Datum Report T SPRT;DATUM 3 

NOTE: The Firefinder radar is able to communicate with other digital 

devices. However it is still limited to 35 characters in the free text message 

format. 

VOICE COMMUNICATIONS

When digital communications are not possible, the radar section must 

report targets by voice. A target that would normally be sent digitally in 

FM;CFF format will be sent as a voice call for fire. The radar section 

should initiate a fire-for-effect mission with the supported FDC. The call 

for fire contains six elements. These elements are listed below in the order 

in which they are used. For a detailed explanation of each element, see FM 

3-09.30 (FM 6-30). 

• Observer identification (or radar call sign). 

• Warning order (for example, fire for effect). 

• Target location (grid of target). 

• Target description (for example, enemy artillery). 
• Method of engagement. 

• Method of fire and control. 

Although direction is not one of the six elements of the call for fire, it is 

transmitted by the radar section as part of the initial call for fire. Radar 

observer direction is always reported as 6400 mils. 

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Each radar section operates in two tactical FM radio nets as directed by 

the controlling headquarters. Two AN/VRC-92A radios are available for 

this purpose. These radios are equipped with speech secure devices for 

secure voice transmissions. The radar section also has radio equipment in 

the command/reconnaissance vehicle; however, the unit TOE will 

determine the types and quantities. In addition, some sections are equipped 

with an EPLRS. EPLRS provides near real time, jam resistant, secure data 

distribution and communications, identification, position location, 

navigation aid, and automatic reporting for tactical forces. 

ADMINISTRATION 

When the radar section is attached to a unit, the unit of attachment is 

responsible for providing routine personnel and administrative support. 

The radar section's parent unit forwards mail, pay, and routine distribution 

to the unit of attachment's headquarters for distribution to the radar 

section. 

MESS 

The unit to which the radar is attached supports the section with rations 

and water. 

MAINTENANCE 

NON-RADAR MAINTENANCE

The supported unit provides organizational and direct support maintenance 

of all non-radar specific equipment. 

RADAR-SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE

FA radar systems are maintained at four maintenance levels, 

operator/crew, organizational, direct support, and depot. 

Unit-Level Maintenance
Unit maintenance consists of operator performed scheduled preventive 

maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and organizational level 

scheduled and unscheduled maintenance as prescribed by the maintenance 

allocation chart. Each radar section should have on hand the parts 

authorized by the mandatory parts list to perform organizational and direct 

support maintenance. These parts are mandatory and do not require 

demand support. The radar repairer (MOS 35M) is responsible for 

performing organizational and direct support maintenance and the 

supervision of operator performed PMCS. The 35M is also responsible for 

identifying equipment faults that require higher-level maintenance. The 

radar section leader performs supervisory maintenance tasks. 

The radar repairer is responsible for requesting depot maintenance under 

supervision of the radar section leader. These requests go through the 

controlling unit headquarters. 

The radar repairer (35M) from the radar section performs selected tests 

and repairs and replaces components. He has a complete set of tools, test 

equipment, and repair parts at his disposal. If on-site repairs cannot be 

made, the radar will be evacuated to a rear location for major repairs. In 

addition to the section radar repairer, each TAB and CTAD has a radar 

repairer and DS-level test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment 

(TMDE) to isolate DS-level faults to facilitate repair of Firefinder radars. 

Depot Maintenance

The depot can completely overhaul and recondition major end items and 

assemblies that are beyond the capabilities of field maintenance units. The 

appointed depot for Firefinder is Tobyhanna Army Depot. 

Repair Parts

The logistics concept for FA radar systems does not place any unusual 

demands on the supply system. The MPL governs the supply of Firefinder 

peculiar items. Each radar section deploys with its MPL. The supported 

unit provides common expendables and the parent unit forwards systempeculiar expendables to the section on an as required basis. 

SECURITY 

Because of its small size, the FA radar section cannot provide its own 

security in a tactical situation. For this reason, the radar section must fall 

under the security of an adjacent unit or be augmented with personnel and 

weapon systems to provide security. Similarly, when deployed, the section 

cannot perform other security or administrative functions, such as forming 
NBC or crater analysis teams. The deployed section falls under the 

responsibility of the supported unit for these functions. 

PETROLEUM, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS 

The supported FA unit supplies Class III petroleum products to the radar 

section as part of its normal petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) 

distribution process. The supported unit must understand the fuel 

consumption rates for radar systems so their fuel requirements can be 

incorporated in supported unit's logistics plan. The consumption rates for 

Q-36 and Q-37 are: 

• AN/TPQ 36 Generator Set MEP 813A. 

• Fuel consumption. 1.07 gallons per hour. 

• Fuel capacity. 12.5 gallons (DF-1,DF-2, DF-A, JP4, JP5 or JP8). 

• AN/TPQ 37 Generator Set MEP-816A. 

• Fuel consumption. 5.37 gallons per hour. 

• Fuel capacity. 43 gallons (DF-1,DF-2, DF-A, JP4, JP5 or JP8). 

METEOROLOGICAL DATA 

MET data are crucial to the accuracy of hostile weapon location and 

friendly fire data. The MET parameters entered during radar initialization 

affect radar performance by correcting for atmospheric refraction. They 

are also important in estimating the effect of wind, temperature, and 

density on the projectile's trajectory. However, the greatest effect on the 

accuracy of hostile and friendly weapon impact prediction is caused by 

wind. 

The MET data required for the Q-36 and Q-37 differ in the MET data 

elements used by the radar. The Q-36 only uses wind speed and direction 

from the target acquisition MET whereas the Q-37 requires relative 

humidity and temperature from the target acquisition MET along with 

barometric pressure from the computer MET. 

Digital MET messages are transmitted to the radar using the MET;TA and 

MET;CM message formats. Data elements used by the radar are: 

• Relative humidity (RH)(Q-37 only). 

• Temperature in degrees Kelvin (Q-37 only). 

• Barometric pressure in millibars (Q-37 only). 

• Altitude of MET data station. 

• Wind speed (must be entered when greater than 20 knots). 

• Wind direction in mils. 
Current software extrapolates temperature, pressure, and relative humidity 

back to the radar's altitude assuming the standard atmospheric lapse rate 

and constant relative humidity. However, the most accurate correction for 

refraction is obtained from the temperature and relative humidity 

measured at the surface as near the radar as possible. Therefore, the header 

and line 00 of the most current target acquisition MET message should be 

used to obtain temperature and relative humidity. The wind speed and 

direction should also be taken from the target acquisition MET. The MET 

line used for wind speed and direction is determined by the altitude of the 

radar and the altitude of the expected detection area based on screening 

crest, and the difference between the radar and MET station altitudes. 

Generally speaking, the line used should provide the wind speed and 

direction approximately 1000 meters above the radar altitude. Barometric 

pressure is also required. This comes from the corresponding computer 

MET. The line used from the computer MET must correspond to the same 

altitude as the line used from the target acquisition MET. For example: if 

you use line 11 of the target acquisition MET (900 to 1000 meters), you 

would then use line 3 of the computer MET (1000 meters). See Table H-2. 

Table H-2. MET Altitude Comparison

Line 

Number

Computer MET 

Altitude

TA MET Mdp 

Altitude

TA MET Altitude 

Range

00 MET Station Alt. MET Station Alt MET Station Alt 

01 200 25 0/50 

02 500 75 50/100 

03 1000 150 100/200 

04 1500 250 200/300 

05 2000 350 300/400 

06 2500 450 400/500 

07 3000 550 500/600 

08 3500 650 600/700 

09 4000 750 700/800 

10 4500 850 800/900 

11 5000 950 900/1000 
12 6000 1050 1000/1100 

13 7000 1150 1100/1200 

14 8000 1250 1200/1300 

15 9000 1350 1300/1400 

16 10000 1450 1400/1500 

17 11000 1550 1500/1600 

18 12000 1650 1600/1700 

19 13000 1750 1700/1800 

20 14000 1850 1800/1900 

21 15000 1950 1900/2000 

22 16000 2050 2000/2100 

23 17000 2150 2100/2200 

24 18000 2250 2200/2300 

25 19000 2350 2300/2400 

26 20000 2450 2400/2500 

27 NA 2550 2500/2600 

It is also necessary to determine the MET station altitude. This can be 

determined from the header line of either the target acquisition MET or the 

computer MET. Station height in the header of both MET messages is 

entered in tens of meters and is equal to altitude. Figure H-1 shows the 

header line of the computer MET message. 
Figure H-1. Identification line

COMPUTER MET

The following paragraphs explain the entries in the computer MET 

message. Refer to figure H-1. 

• Identification Line. The ID line is arranged in four six-digit groups. 

Thus the symbols for the ID line are METCMQ, LaLaLaLoLoLo, 

YYGoGoGoG, and hhhPdPdPd. The ID line is shown in Figure H-1. 

– Group 1. Group 1 consists of METCMQ. The symbol METCM 

is placed at the beginning of each computer MET message. This 

symbol indicates that it is a MET message and that it contains 

computer-type MET data. The digit under the symbol Q represents 

the global octant in which the MET section is located. For 

convenience in determining the geographical location of the 

reporting MET section, the globe was divided into octants 

numbered 0 through 8. 

– Group 2. Group 2 consists of LaLaLaLoLoLo or XXXXXX. These 

six spaces are used to specify the location to the nearest tenth of a 

degree. The symbol LaLaLa represents the latitude to the nearest 

tenth of a degree. The symbol LoLoLo represents the longitude to 

the nearest tenth of a degree. When the longitude is over 100° , the 
first digit is dropped. The XXXXXX is used to signify standard six 

digit grid coordinates. 

– Group 3. Group 3 consists of YYGoGoGoG. The symbol YY 

represents two digits for reporting the Greenwich date of the 

observation on which the message is based. The Greenwich date 

may differ from the local date, depending on the location and the 

hour of the day. The symbol GoGoGo represents three digits for 

reporting hours in tens, units, and tenths of hours. The symbol G 

represents the duration of validity of the message in hours. US 

forces always enter 0 in the space under G since the period of 

validity is not predicted. Other NATO forces use digits 1 through 8 

in this space. A code of 9 indicates a predicted validity of 12 hours. 

– Group 4. Group 4 consists of hhhPdPdPd. The symbol hhh 

represents the MET station altitude in tens of meters above mean 

sea level. The symbol PdPdPd represents the surface pressure in 

millibars. When the surface pressure is 1,000 mb or higher, the 

first digit is dropped. 

• Explanation. The identification line (for transmittal) is shown in 

Figure H-1 and explained as follows: 

– The METCM1 indicates a computer-type MET message and a 

station location in octant 1. (The only difference between a 

computer MET and a target acquisition MET identification line 

would be in this field. The target acquisition MET would read 

METTAQ). 

– The 347984 indicates station location at 34° 42'N latitude and 

98° 24'W longitude. 

– The 251380 indicates the date of the message is the 25th day of 

the month, GMT date, at 1348, and it is from a US Army artillery 

MET section. 

– The 036974 indicates the station altitude is 360 meters above 

mean sea level and the surface pressure is 974 mb. 

• Message Body. (METCM) The remaining lines of the computer 

MET message (ZZdddFFF TTTTPPPP) represent surface and zone 

MET data. The symbol ZZ represents the line number that 

identifies the reported MET information with the appropriate 

atmospheric layer. The line numbers begin with 00 (surface) and 

are numbered consecutively through line 26 (line 27 for the target 

acquisition MET). The symbol ddd represents the true direction 
from which the wind is blowing. The direction is reported in tens 

of mils. The symbol FFF represents the true wind speed in knots. 

The symbol TTTT represents the virtual temperature. This 

temperature is expressed to the nearest 0.1° K. The symbol PPPP 

represents the air pressure. This pressure is expressed to the nearest 

millibar. The lines of the computer MET message are encoded and 

transmitted in eight-digit groups with two groups for each line. 

TARGET ACQUISITION MET

The header line of the target acquisition MET is nearly the same as the 

computer MET. The only difference is the first six characters will be 

METTAQ instead of METCMQ. The following paragraphs explain the 

rest of the entries in the target acquisition MET. Refer to Figure H-2. 

Figure H-2. Target Acquisition MET

• Message Body (METTA). The remaining lines of the target 

acquisition MET consist of additional groups. In the target 

acquisition MET message zones are equal to lines in the computer 

MET message depicted in Figure H-1. 

– Group 5 consists of CCCNNN. The symbol CCC represents the 

height of the base of the lowest cloud at the point of observation. It 

is given in tens of meters and is not used by Firefinder. The symbol 

NNN represents mean refractive index at the surface in N units. If 

NNN is not to be included in the message, these missing data will 

be indicated by three slashes (///). 

– Group 6 consists of ZtZtdddFFF. The symbol ZtZt represents the 

zone number code. The symbol ddd represents the mean wind 

direction for the zone given in thousands, hundreds, and tens of 

mils. For zone number 00, the value is the wind direction at the 

MET section location. The symbol FFF represents the mean wind 

speed of the zone in hundreds, tens, and units of knots. For zone 

number 00, the value is the wind speed at surface. 

– Group 7. This group consists of ttttUU. The symbol tttt 

represents the mean air temperature of the zone in hundreds, tens, 

units, and tenths of a degree Kelvin. For zone number 00, the value 

is the air temperature at surface. The symbol UU represents the 
mean RH expressed as a percentage in tens and units. A mean RH 

of 100 percent is denoted by 00. 

– Group 8. Group 8 consists of 99999. This group is a message 

terminator. It is used only when the message is transmitted by 

telegraphic means. 

For additional information on the atmospheric structure of MET messages 

and an in-depth explanation of header and data lines of the MET;TA and 

MET;CM messages see FM 3-09.15 (6-15), Field Artillery Meteorology. 
Appendix I 

Air Movement Procedures for Target Acquisition 

Radars 

Mission requirements may dictate that TA radars be moved by fixed wing 

or rotary wing aircraft. This is often the case when a radar must be 

operated from a forward operating base (FOB) and ground movement is 

not feasible, or the initial deployment was conducted without some or all 

of the radar sections prime movers or equipment transporters. Tactical 

movements will normally be conducted by C-130, UH-60 or CH-47D. The 

movement distance, airfield and aircraft availability will determine the 

method of movement. 

SECTION I - HELICOPTER MOVEMENT

CONSIDERATIONS FOR HELICOPTER MOVEMENT 

Adequate planning is essential for the air assault or air movement of a 

radar section or TA organization. The radar section or TA organization's 

immediate higher headquarters conducts planning for these operations. 

The higher headquarters may be the DIVARTY, DS battalion or other task 

force headquarters. Elements assigned to the higher headquarters will 

normally assist the TA organization or radar sections with loading, 

staging, landing zone (LZ) and pickup zone (PZ) operations. The planning 

for an air assault uses the reverse planning process and consists of the 

ground tactical plan, the landing plan, air movement plan, and loading and 

staging plan. 

The ground tactical plan is the foundation for a successful air assault. All 

other plans support this plan. It specifies actions in the objective area 

required to accomplish the mission and set the stage for subsequent 

operations. Tactical employment requirements for radars are part of the 

ground tactical plan. 

The landing plan enables accomplishment of the ground tactical plan. It 

sequences elements into the AO. Units must arrive at the designated 

locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. 

The air movement plan supports the ground tactical plan and the landing 

plan. It specifies the schedule and provides instructions for air movement 

of troops, equipment, and supplies from the PZ to landing zone (LZ). It 

also addresses coordinating instructions regarding air routes; air control 

points; aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations; and the planned use of 
attack and reconnaissance helicopters, including security and link-up 

operations. The air movement plan reflects the detailed coordination with 

the air mission commander (AMC) and the aviation LNO, who provide the 

technical and tactical assistance and recommendations. 

The loading and staging plan depends on the air movement plan and 

ensures that troops, equipment and supplies are loaded on the correct 

aircraft. It prescribes arrival times of ground units and their equipment at 

the PZ in the proper order and location for movement. A good loading and 

staging plan incorporates unit integrity, cross loading, a bump plan and 

bump priorities. 

The plan for conducting the air assault operation is provided to key 

participants during the air mission brief (AMB). All details of the 

operation are coordinated and synchronized prior to the AMB. 

LOADING

The radar section conducts pre-combat inspections (PCI) and rehearsals 

well before the staging phase to ensure leaders and soldiers are adequately 

prepared to execute the mission. The radar section will ensure loads are 

packed according to the load plan and will begin pre-rigging loads without 

losing operational capabilities. A checklist may be used to facilitate 

loading. Figure I-1 provides an example section level checklist. 
Figure I-1. Example Section Checklist

STAGING
During staging the radar section moves to the PZ at the designated time to 

rig the section's equipment. Loads are staged in accordance with the 

staging plan. Loads should be separated in line by 100 meters during 

daylight hours or 150 meters during limited visibility, and by 35 meters 

laterally. Whenever possible, personnel will stage near their loads and 

move from their loads to the aircraft for loading. Each chalk leader 

provides the aircraft crew chief with a load manifest. 

PICKUP ZONE OPERATIONS

The supported headquarters establishes PZ security, marks the PZ, 

provides a NCOIC and/or hook-up teams. Security sweeps are conducted, 

listening and observation posts established, and counter-reconnaissance 

initiated. These actions must occur early enough to ensure the security of 

the unit assuming PZ posture. Finally, the PZ is marked. Figure I-2

provides an example of a pickup zone for a Q-37 air assault mission. 

Figure I-2. Example Pickup Zone

HOOKUP

Hookup teams require two persons per hook, one to hookup the load and 

one to stabilize the hookup person. A third person is required for a static 

probe if reach pendants aren't available. Teams face the aircraft during 

hookup and wear helmets, gloves and goggles (a set of NVGs should be 
available at night). Once the load is hooked, teams exit the load, move 

outside the rotar disk area and monitor the load for problems. The team

must be prepared to re-rig the load if required. 

LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS

The advance party secures the area and prepares for the arrival of the main 

body. During movement of Q-37 radars, the primary purpose of the 

advance party is to ensure the ATG is set down in the correct location. 

Emplacement procedures start as soon as the main body arrives. Figure I-3

shows an example landing zone for a Q-37 section. 

Figure I-3. Example Landing Zone

Q-36 SLING LOAD PROCEDURES 

The Q-36 radar section can be sling loaded and moved by CH47D and 

UH-60 helicopters. The Q-36 section requires a minimum of four UH-60 

or two CH-47D aircraft to air lift an operational system. A combination of 

UH-60 and CH-47D aircraft may also be used to airlift the radar section. 

However, the Lightweight Multipurpose Shelter (LMS) must be removed 

from the M1097 HMMWV before sling loading by the UH-60 because the 

OC's weight exceeds the helicopter's external lift capacity. Further, an 

external lifting device capable of lifting at least 3300 pounds is required to 
remove the LMS in preparation for sling loading. Detailed procedures for 

removing the LMS from the HMMWV are contained in TM 11-5840-380-

10. Single point sling procedures for use with the UH-60 are contained in 

FM 4-20.199 (10-450-4). 

NOTE: The Q-36 radar's issued antenna cover is prone to tear and 

separate from the load and should be replaced with a sheet of plywood, 4 

feet x 8 feet x 3/4 inches. This is a critical step in preparing the Q-36 for 

sling load to protect the antenna face in the event the pilot does not offset 

the load prior to releasing the clevis. Severe damage may occur if the 

clevis lands on an unprotected antenna array. 

The Q-36 radar section can be airlifted by CH47D without disassembly of 

radar components. Tandem dual point rigging procedures are used to 

transport the OC with ATG, PDG HMMWV with PU-799 and 

reconnaissance HMMWV with cargo trailer. Additional load combinations 

are possible. They are outlined in FM 4-20.199 (10-450-4) and FM 4-

20.199 (10-450-5). Some rigging procedures require adjustments based on 

changes from Q-36(V)7 to the Q-36(V)8 and will require local 

certification until certified by the Combined Arms Support Command. 

OC RIGGING PROCEDURES

The OC can be moved by one CH-47D using a dual-point load. Two 

persons can prepare and rig this load in 15 minutes. The following 

materials are required to rig the OC for movement: 

• Chain length, part number 38850-00053-101, from a 10,000-pound 

capacity sling set (4 each). 

• Coupling link, part number 577-0615, from a 10,000-pound sling 

set (4 each). 

• Tape, adhesive, pressure-sensitive, 2-inch wide roll. 

• Cord, nylon, Type III, 550-pound breaking strength. 

• Webbing, cotton, 1/4-inch, 80-pound breaking strength. 

• Felt sheet, cattle hair, Type IV, 1/2-inch or suit-able padding. 

• Padding, cellulose. 

Once the materials are secured the load is prepared for rigging. The load is 

prepared using the following steps: 

• Extend the sling leg chains by connecting one additional chain 

length to each chain on a 10,000-, 25,000- or 40,000-pound 

capacity sling set with coupling links. 

• Fold mirrors forward in front of the windshield for added 

protection and tie together with Type III nylon cord. 
• Secure the shelter to the truck using wire rope or tie-down 

assemblies. 

• Secure all equipment inside the shelter with tape, nylon cord, or 

lashings; close and secure shelter vents and door with nylon cord 

or tape. 

• Secure environmental control unit cover with duct tape. 

• Disconnect the power cord from the rear panel and secure it to the 

rear platform with Type III nylon cord. Lower the power panel 

door and secure the door. 

• Secure all equipment and cargo inside the vehicle with tape, nylon 

cord, or lashings. Secure the doors shut if installed. 

• Ensure the fuel tank is not over 3/4 full. Inspect fuel tank cap, oil 

filler cap, and battery caps for proper installation. 

• Engage the vehicle parking brake and put the transmission in 

neutral. 

• Ensure the front wheels are pointed straight ahead. Tie down the 

steering wheel, using the securing device attached under the 

dashboard. 

• Tape the windshield in an X formation from corner to corner. 

• Install the lift provisions on the outer ends of the rear bumper. 

• Remove the upper antenna mounting bracket if installed. 

Once preparations are completed the load can be rigged using the 

following steps: 

• Connect 2 sling legs to apex fitting number 1. Position the apex 

fitting on top of the shelter. 

• Loop the chain end of the sling legs through their respective lift 

provisions that protrudes through the hood. Place link number 3 in 

the grab hook. 

• Connect 2 sling legs to apex fitting number 2. Position the apex 

fitting on top of the shelter. 

• Loop the chain end of the sling legs through their respective lift 

provisions located on the outer ends of the rear bumper. Place link 

number 40 in the grab hook. Do not use the lifting shackles located 

near the center of the rear bumper for sling load lift provisions. 

• Wrap the rear slings with padding where they contact the shelter 

sides. 

• Secure all excess chain with tape or Type III nylon cord. 

• Cluster and tie or tape (breakaway technique) the sling legs in each 

sling set on top of the vehicle to prevent entanglement during 

hookup and lift-off. 
Figure I-4. LMS Shelter Mounted on the M1097

After the rigging is complete, the load is attached to the helicopter's cargo

hooks. The hookup team stands on top of the shelter. The static wand 

person discharges the static electricity with the static wand. The forward 

hookup person places apex fitting 1 onto the forward cargo hook. The aft 

hookup person places apex fitting 2 onto the aft cargo hook. The hookup 

team then carefully dismounts the vehicle and remains close to the load as 

the helicopter removes slack from the sling legs. When successful hookup 

is assured, the hookup team quickly exits the area underneath the 

helicopter to the designated rendezvous point. The procedures for 

derigging are the reverse of the preparation and rigging procedures. 

ATG RIGGING PROCEDURES

The ATG can be moved by a CH-47D using a single-point load. The same

procedures are certified for the UH-60. Two persons can prepare and rig 

this load in 20 minutes. The following materials are required to rig the 

ATG for movement: 

• Sling set (10,000-pound capacity). 

• Chain length, part number 38850-00053-101, from a 10,000-pound 

capacity sling set (4 each). 

• Coupling link, part number 577-0615, from a 10,000-pound sling 

set (4 each).

• Plywood, 4 feet x 8 feet x 3/4 inches with edging. 

• Tape, adhesive, pressure-sensitive, 2-inch wide roll. 

• Cord, nylon, Type III, 550-pound breaking strength. 

• Webbing, cotton, 1/4-inch, 80-pound breaking strength. 

• Felt sheet, cattle hair, Type IV, 1/2-inch or suitable padding. 

• Padding, Cellulose. 
Once the materials are assembled the load is prepared for rigging using the 

following procedures: 

• Connect one additional chain length to each chain of the sling set 

with the coupling link. 

• Engage the trailer parking brake. 

• Secure the doors closed with Type III nylon cord. 

• Place the radar set in the travel mode and place the sheet of 

plywood on top of the antenna, firmly against the BSU. Route and 

secure a CGU-1/B across the width of the plywood at the center of 

the array. Hook a second CGU-1/B to the front right tiedown 

provision of the trailer. Route the tiedown diagonally over 

plywood and secure to the rachet to the left rear of the stowed 

ground rod, the lower tiedown provision, or the trailer frame. 

Repeat the procedure on the left side of the antenna routing the 

tiedown diagonally over the plywood. 

After preparation the load is rigged for movement. The procedures are: 

• Position apex fitting on top of the trailer (but not on top of the 

radar panel). Route outer sling legs 1 and 2 to the front of the 

trailer (lunette end) and inner sling legs 3 and 4 to the rear. Sling 

legs 1 and 3 must be on the left side of the load. 

• Loop the chain end of sling leg 1 under the trailer A-frame just aft 

of the lunette and through the keeper from left to right on the left 

side of the drawbar. Place the link number 3 in the grab hook. 

Repeat with sling leg 2 on the right side of the drawbar. 

• Route the chain end of sling leg 3 through the left rear lift 

provision located on the rear of the trailer. Place link number 25 in 

the grab hook. Repeat with sling leg 4 through the right rear lift 

provision. Secure the excess chain with Type III nylon cord. 

• Cluster and tie or tape (breakaway technique) all sling legs 

together on top of the trailer to prevent entanglement during 

hookup and lift-off. 

After rigging, the load is attached to the helicopter. The hookup team 

stands on top of the ATG trailer frame. The static wand person discharges 

the static electricity with the static wand. The hookup person places the 

apex fitting onto the aircraft cargo hook. The hookup team then carefully 

dismounts the ATG and remains close to the load as the helicopter 

removes slack from the sling legs. When successful hookup is assured, the 

hookup team quickly exits the area underneath the helicopter to the 

designated rendezvous point. The hookup team must use care to avoid 

damaging the radar antenna. The following precautions are applicable: 

• Do not stand on the radar panel during hookup. 
• Due to limited clearance between the helicopter and the top of the 

ATG, the hookup team may want to use an extended sling system

on this load and hook this load from the ground or the bed of a 

truck. Polyester round slings are recommended for use as vertical 

pendants. The extended sling legs may not be ideal for flying this 

load "nap of the earth" in a tactical environment. 

• Hookup of this load presents substantial risk of damage to the load 

or injury to the hookup personnel. Use of a reach pendant is 

recommended for this load. 

The procedures for derigging are the reverse of the preparation and rigging 

procedures. When releasing the apex fitting after setting the load down, 

the helicopter pilot should hover to the side to prevent damaging the radar 

panel. 

Figure I-5. AN/TPQ-36 Antenna Transceiver Group

UTILITY HMMWV WITH TRAILER MOUNTED GENERATOR

The utility HMMWV and trailer-mounted generator can be moved by a 

CH-47D using a dual-point tandem load. Two persons can prepare and rig 

the HMMWV in 15 minutes and the generator set in 10 minutes. The 

following materials are required to rig this load: 

• Sling set (10,000-pound capacity) (2 each). 

• Tape, adhesive, pressure-sensitive, 2-inch wide roll. 

• Cord, nylon, Type III, 550-pound breaking strength. 
• Webbing, cotton, 1/4-inch, 80-pound breaking strength. 

• Strap, cargo, tie-down, CGU-1/B (2 each, or more as required to 

secure cargo). 

• Felt sheet, cattle hair, Type IV, 1/2-inch or suitable substitute. 

Once the materials are assembled the load is prepared for rigging. Attach 

the generator set to the truck by placing the lunette on the pintle hook and 

securing the latch. Secure the safety chains, cables, and hoses. Position the 

vehicle on level ground so both the truck and generator set are in a straight 

line. The load is prepared using the following procedures: 

• Fold mirrors forward in front of the windshield and tie together 

with Type III nylon cord. Remove the doors and secure to the seats 

with Type III nylon cord. 

• Secure all equipment and cargo inside the truck with tiedown 

straps, tape, or Type III nylon cord. 

• Ensure the fuel tanks are not over 3/4 full. Inspect the fuel tank 

cap, oil filler cap, and battery caps for proper installation. 

• Engage the vehicle parking brake and put the transmission in 

neutral. 

• Ensure the front wheels are pointed straight ahead. Tie down the 

steering wheel, using the securing device attached under the 

dashboard. 

• Retract the lunette leg and secure with Type III nylon cord. 

• Secure all lids, doors, and caps with tape or Type III nylon cord. 

• Ensure the trailer parking brakes are set. 

• Route the hook portion of a CGU-1/B tiedown strap through the 

left rear inboard tiedown provision located near the pintle on the 

rear bumper of the truck and through the mounting bracket on the 

front of the trailer A-frame. Connect the hook to the ratchet of the 

CGU-1/B. 

• Repeat the above procedure on the right side of the load. 

• Tighten both CGU-1/B tiedown straps at the same time. Secure the 

excess strap and safety the ratchet handles in the closed position 

with tape. 

One the load is prepared it can be rigged using the following steps: 

• Position the apex fitting of sling set 1 in the bed of the vehicle. 

Route outer sling legs 1and 2 to the front of the vehicle and inner 

sling legs 3 and 4 to the rear. Sling legs 1 and 3 must be on the left 

side of the load. 

• Loop the chain end of sling leg 1 through the left front lift 

provision that protrudes through the hood. Place link number 79 in 

the grab hook. Repeat with sling leg 2 and the right front lift 

provision. Secure excess chain with tape or Type III nylon cord. 
• Route the chain end of sling leg 3 through the sling guide in the 

upper left corner of the tailgate. Loop the chain end through the 

left lift provision on the bumper and thread back through the sling 

guide in the tailgate. Place link number 3 in the grab hook. Repeat 

with sling leg 4 and the right rear lift provision. 

• Cluster and tie or tape (breakaway technique) all sling legs 

together on top of the vehicle to prevent entanglement during 

hookup and lift-off. 

• Position apex fitting of sling set 2 on the trailer but not on top of

the generator. Route outer sling legs 1and 2 to the front of the 

trailer and inner sling legs 3 and 4 to the rear. Sling legs 1 and 3 

must be on the left side of the load. 

• Loop the chain end of sling leg 1 through the left front lift 

provision located near the A-frame on the front of the trailer. Place 

link number 52 in the grab hook. Repeat with sling leg 2 through 

the right front lift provision. Secure excess chain with tape or Type 

III nylon cord. 

• Route the chain end of sling leg 3 through the left rear lift 

provision. Place link number 36 in the grab hook. Repeat with 

sling leg 4 through the right rear lift provision. Secure excess chain 

with tape or Type III nylon cord. 

• Pad the chains where they contact the load. 

• Cluster and tie or tape (breakaway technique) all sling legs 

together on top of the trailer to prevent entanglement during 

hookup and lift-off. 

Figure I-6. M998/M1038 HMMWV and Trailer Mounted Generator

Once rigging is complete, the load can be hooked up to the helicopter. 

Two hookup teams are required for this load. The static wand person 

discharges the static electricity with the static wand. The forward hookup 

person stands in the bed of the truck and places apex fitting 1 onto the 
forward cargo hook. The aft hookup person stands on the generator fender 

and places apex fitting 2 onto the aft cargo hook. The hookup team then 

carefully dismounts the trailer and remains close to the load as the 

helicopter removes slack from the sling legs. When successful hookup is 

assured, the hookup team quickly exits the area underneath the helicopter 

to the designated rendezvous point. The procedures for derigging are the 

reverse of the preparation and rigging procedures. 

M1097 AND ETG RIGGING PROCEDURES

The procedures for this equipment are the same as for the HMMWV with 

trailer mounted generator. 

Q-37 SLING LOAD PROCEDURES 

The AN/TPQ-37(V)8 is certified for CH-47D helicopter sling load in the 

dual point configuration. The antenna must be removed from the ATG 

trailer before sling loading. A 40-ton crane is required to remove the 

antenna from the antenna trailer and reconfigure the system after 

movement. Therefore, the ATG becomes stationary after movement. If the 

trailer is to accompany the antenna, it must be rigged as a separate load. 

The threat must be carefully evaluated before deciding to move the radar 

by helicopter since the radar is unable to displace without external support. 

Helicopter movement of the radar is used in exceptional circumstances 

and is used only when mission requirements make this type of movement 

an absolute necessity. The following procedures provide data for moving 

the minimum essential equipment using non-standard rigging procedures. 

These procedures require local certification. The minimum essential 

equipment can be moved with two CH-47Ds. However, it is preferable to 

use three CH-47Ds with separate lifts for the OC and PU-806. In addition, 

a UH-60 or CH-47D is required to move the advance party. The primary 

section personnel travel on the CH-47Ds with the radar components. The 

remaining section equipment with drivers will normally move forward by 

ground with the 40-ton crane. Procedures for rigging the remaining section 

equipment are found in FM 4-20.199 (10-450-5). 

ATG RIGGING PROCEDURES

The ATG antenna can be moved by one CH-47D using a dual-point load 

configuration. Two persons can prepare and rig this load in 15 minutes 

once the antenna is removed from the M1048 transporter. The following 

materials are required to rig the antenna for movement. 

• Sling Set, 25,000-lb. capacity with one additional apex fitting 

(25,000-lb capacity). 

• Reach Pendant Assembly, NSN 4020-01-337-3185 (2 each). 
• Tape, adhesive, pressure sensitive, 2-inch wide roll. 

• Cord, nylon, type III, 550-pound breaking strength (1 spool). 

• Webbing, cotton, 1/4-inch, 80-pound breaking strength (1 spool). 

• Plywood, sheet, 3/4-inch thickness (3 each). 

• Cargo straps, 5,000-pound capacity, CGU-1/B (5 each). 

Once the materials are assembled the load is prepared for rigging using the 

following procedures: 

• Configure the Antenna unit for march order. If the antenna unit is 

mounted on its transport trailer, a 40-ton crane must be used to 

remove it for helicopter transport. If the trailer is to accompany the 

unit, it must be rigged and transported as a separate load. Detailed 

procedures for removing the antenna from the transport trailer are 

contained in TM 11-5840-355-10. 

• Ensure that the maintenance tent frame and cover are stowed and 

secured in their proper position. 

• Ensure that all cover panels, cabinet doors and vents are installed 

and secure. 

• Secure all loose equipment with tape or nylon cord. 

• Ensure that the rear door is closed and secured with its locking 

handle. Door rods must be secured in their cups. 

• Ensure that the antenna transport cover is secured tightly to the 

lacing brackets with its bungee cord. If necessary, secure the 

antenna with additional nylon cord. 

Once preparations are complete the load is rigged using the following 

procedures: 

• Cover top of radar with 3/4-inch plywood and secure with 5K 

straps. Figure I-7 shows the preparation and placement of plywood 

on the antenna. Do not stand on top of the load until the plywood is 

in place. 

• Rotate both antenna tie-down ratchet handles toward the center to 

prevent sling interference. 

• Turn pear-shaped lift rings to rotate the apex of each ring upwards, 

in the direction of lift. 

NOTE: This load is rigged to fly so that lift provisions on TOP are 

forward. 

• Forward sling set (2 sling legs): 

• Connect two sling legs to apex fitting number 1 (for front cargo 

hook). Position apex fitting on top of the load and secure one reach 

pendant to the apex fitting. 
• Forward lift rings are on top of antenna. Loop the chain end of 

sling leg 1 through front left lift ring and insert link 55 in the grabhook. Repeat with sling leg 2, passing chain end through front 

right lift ring and inserting link 55. 

• Remove slack from front sling legs, and tie securely with 

breakaway tape on the top corner of the sling guides to prevent 

tangling. 

• Aft sling set (2 sling legs): 

• Connect two sling legs to the apex fitting number 2 (for rear cargo 

hook). Position apex fitting on top of the load. 

• Rear lift rings are at the aft end of antenna. Loop the chain end of 

sling leg 3 through the left rear lift ring and pass through the sling 

guide. Insert link 10 into the grab-hook. Repeat with sling leg 4. 

• Remove slack from rear sling legs, and tie securely with 

breakaway tape on the top corner of the sling guides to prevent 

tangling. 

• Wrap excess chains and secure with tape or nylon cord. 

• Secure padding to the slings in the areas where the chain may rub 

antenna. 

• Cluster and tie, with cotton webbing (breakaway technique), the 

slings of each sling set together on top of the antenna to prevent 

entanglement during hookup and lift-off. 

Once rigging is complete, the load is hooked up to the helicopter. The 

hookup team remains close to the load as the helicopter removes slack 

from the sling legs. When the helicopter is overhead, the forward hookup 

person places reach pendant 1 onto the forward cargo hook, and the aft 

hookup person places reach pendant 2 onto the aft cargo hook. When 

successful hookup is assured, the hookup team quickly exits the area 

underneath the helicopter and move to the designated rendezvous point. 

De-rigging is the reverse of the preparation and rigging procedures in 

steps 1 and 2. Caution the pilot to hover to one side before releasing the 

sling load to prevent damage to the radar unit. 
Figure I-7. ATG Plywood Preparation

RIGGING PROCEDURES FOR THE OC AND TRAILER POWER 

DISTRIBUTION GROUP

The OC and the trailer power distribution group (TPDU) can be moved by 

one CH-47D using a dual-point load configuration. Two persons can 

prepare and rig the OC or AGU in 15 minutes. This load can be 

completely rigged by four persons in 15 minutes. The following materials 

are required to rig the antenna for movement: 

• Sling sets, 25,000-pound capacity (2 each). 

• Sling set safety clamps (2 each). 

• Reach Pendant Assembly, NSN 4020-01-337-3185 (2 each).

• Tie-down chains (load binders), air cargo, (2 each). 

• Cord, nylon, Type III, 550 pound breaking strength (1 spool).

• Tape, adhesive, pressure sensitive, 2 inch wide roll. 

• Webbing, cotton, 1/4 inch, 80 pound breaking strength (1 spool). 

• Cellulose or felt padding. 

NOTE: The tongue weight of the trailer exceeds the pintle weight of the 

M1097 and will require local certification. Use separate loads rigged IAW 

FM 10-450-5 when three aircraft are available. 

The following actions are required to prepare the load for rigging: 

• Attach the trailer to the truck. 

– Place the trailer lunette in the truck pintle hook ensuring the 

trailer brakes are disengaged. Lock and tape the pintle and connect 

the trailer safety chains to the truck. 
– Raise landing leg and lock in stowed position. Secure the landing 

leg with pins and tape. 

– Install truck lift provisions on the outer ends of the rear bumper. 

Remove tiedown provisions from the front bumper and install on 

the inner lift points of the rear bumper. 

– Secure the trailer to the truck to prevent it from pivoting in flight 

by routing one end of the cargo chain through the left (driver side) 

truck inner lift provision located on the rear bumper. Route the 

other end of the cargo chain strap through the A frame to trailer 

mounting bracket. 

– Repeat with another cargo chain strap on the right side of the 

truck and trailer. 

– Tighten both cargo chain straps simultaneously to ensure straight 

alignment during flight. Secure the ratchet handles in the closed 

position using tape or nylon cord. 

• M1097 HMMWV. 

– Remove antennas and fold down the mounting brackets to their 

stowed positions. Secure all loose equipment inside the shelter 

with tape, nylon cord, and/or tiedowns. Close and secure door. 

– Ensure the fuel tank is no more than 3/4 full. Inspect fuel tank 

cap, oil filler cap, and battery caps for proper installation. 

– Fold the truck mirrors rearward into cab area and tie them 

together with nylon cord. Remove the doors and secure them 

inside the truck. 

– Secure all loose equipment, cargo and antennas inside the truck 

with nylon cord, tape and/or tiedowns. 

– Engage the truck parking brake. Place the transmission in 

neutral. 

– Ensure the truck's front wheels are positioned straight and 

forward. Secure the steering wheel using either the securing devise 

under the dash or nylon cord. 

• PU-806. 

– Engage parking brake 
– Secure door latches shut with tape 

After preparations are complete, the load is rigged in the following 

manner: 

• M1097 HMMWV. 

– Attach one of the pendants to the apex fitting of one of the sling 

sets. Position the sling set (sling set 1) on top of the shelter. Route 

outer sling legs 1 and 2 to the front of the truck and inner sling legs 

3 and 4 to the rear of the truck. Sling legs 1 and 3 must be on the 

left side of the truck. 

– Loop the chain end of sling leg 1 through the left front lift 

provision that protrudes through the hood and insert link 35 in the 

grabhook. Repeat with sling leg 2 and the right front lift provision. 

– The rear lift provisions are located at the outer ends of the rear 

bumper. Do not loop the chain ends through the tie-down shackles 

located near the center of the bumper. Loop the chain end of sling 

leg 3 through the left provision and insert link 10 in the grabhook. 

Repeat with sling leg 4 and the right rear lifting shackle. 

– Secure excess chain with tape or nylon cord. 

– Raise the pendant and apex fitting above the truck. Secure the 

rear sling legs to the rear lift rings of the shelter with 80 pound 

breakaway webbing. Ensure that the front legs are to the sides of 

the truck. 

– Take up slack in all truck sling legs, cluster and tie (breakaway 

technique) together on top of the truck, to prevent entanglement 

during hookup and lift-off. 

• PU-806. 

– Attach the remaining pendant to the apex fitting of sling set 2. 

Position sling set 2 on top of the trailer. Route outer sling legs 1 

and 2 to the front of the trailer and inner slings 3 and 4 to the rear 

of the trailer. Sling legs 1 and 3 are routed to the left side of the 

trailer. 

– Route the chain end of sling leg 1 through the lift point near the 

A frame at the front left of the trailer. Insert link 68 into the grab 

hook. Pull sling tight and pad area of sling that will make contact 

with the antenna and plywood. Tie a breakaway through a whole 
drilled through the plywood. Repeat with sling leg 2 at the right 

front of the trailer. 

– Loop the chain end of sling leg 3 through the left rear lift 

provision, insert link 80 into the grab hook. Place the sling leg 

through the sling guide on the antenna and pull up until tight. 

Remove the sling leg from the guide, pad it where it makes contact 

with the antenna. Replace it in the guide, pull up tight and tie a 

breakaway to prevent it from slipping down. Repeat with sling leg 

4 at the right rear lift provision. 

– Secure excess chain with tape or nylon cord. 

– Take up slack, cluster trailer sling legs together, and tie a 

breakaway to prevent entanglement during hookup and lift off. 

Two hookup teams are required for this load. One hookup team stands on 

the cab of the truck and the other stands on a fender of the trailer. The 

truck hookup team places the reach pendant of sling set 1 into the forward 

cargo hook. The trailer hookup team places the reach pendant of sling set 

2 onto the rear cargo hook. Do not use the center cargo hook. The hookup 

teams then carefully dismount the truck and trailer and remain close to the 

load as the helicopter removes the slack from the sling legs. Ensure the 

apex remains in the proper position on the loop of the reach pendants. If 

the tiedown straps connecting the truck and trailer loosen upon liftoff, the 

load should be set down and the ratchets tightened. When successful 

hookup is assured, the hookup team quickly exits the area underneath the 

helicopter to the designated rendezvous point. De-rigging is the reverse of 

the preparation and rigging procedures in steps 1 and 2. 

SECTION II - FIXED WING AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT 

Air transport is used to move vehicles, personnel and equipment when 

time is a critical factor. When transit time is not critical, other modes of 

transport should be used. The type of aircraft will vary based on the 

operational requirements, aircraft availability, movement distance, airfield 

availability, threat, amount of equipment to be moved, equipment 

preparation time, and external support requirements. Radar sections will 

normally be transported by C-5A, C-17, C141, or C-130. The C-5A and C141 are designed for strategic intertheater transport. The C-17 can function 

as a strategic intertheater or a tactical intratheater transporter. The C-130 is 

tactical intratheater aircraft. The C-130 will normally be the aircraft of 

choice for tactical movements. The basic procedures are the same for both 

strategic and tactical air movement. 
There are specific requirements for preparing radar section equipment for 

loading on specific aircraft. The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 can be loaded on all of 

the aforementioned aircraft without disassembly of components. The only 

special requirement is that the OC Shelter/HMMWV must be driven cab 

first into C-130 and C-141 aircraft. The AN/TPQ-37(V)8 can be 

transported in roll-on/roll-off configuration on C-5A and C-17 aircraft. For 

transport on C-130 and C-141 aircraft, the generator group must be 

removed from the generator truck and the ATG must be removed from the 

transporter to fit into the aircrafts' cargo holds. A crane and K-loader (or 

additional empty M925 5-ton truck with winch) are required to remove the 

ATG and generator group from their transporters and load them onto the 

aircraft. The same equipment is required for off-loading and reassembly of 

components. 

AIR LOADING OPERATIONS

Planning for air load operations begins with receipt of the mission at the 

TA organization or radar section's higher headquarters. Just as in sling 

load operations, air loading is planned using the reverse planning process. 

The plan for air loading must address preparation and coordination, air 

movement, re-configuration of equipment, and execution of the ground 

tactical operation. Once the mission analysis is completed a warning order 

is issued to the deploying elements. The warning order should contain the 

following information: 

• Type of mission. 

• Number and type of aircraft. 

• Time and location of Joint Inspection (JI). 

• Departure airfield and time. 

• Arrival airfield and time. 

• Area of Interest. 

• Special Instructions. 

• Attachments/ Detachments. 

Upon receipt of the warning order the radar section will conduct PCIs for 

air load operations, section rehearsals and begin preparing loads without 

losing operational capability. PCIs specific to air loading include: 

• Winches are operational and complete, including slave cables, 

control unit, all hooks and chains. 

• 25K sling sets are available to lift equipment at the JI scales. 

• Required bridge plates and shoring are on-hand. 

• T-handle lead bars are present and serviceable. 

Once preparations are complete the radar section moves to the departure 

airfield. Unit equipment is initially placed in a marshaling area. In the 
marshaling area, personnel and cargo manifests are prepared, equipment 

and vehicles are assembled into chalks or loads, and moved to the alert 

holding area. At the alert holding area, the departure airfield control group 

(DACG) accepts the Army's equipment and supplies. They inspect them 

and ensure all passengers are accounted for and available. From the alert 

holding area, the load is directed to the call forward area where a joint 

inspection is carried out by the aerial port element of the Air Force tanker 

airlift control element (TALCE) and the DACG. Final briefings are given, 

manifests reviewed for accuracy, and personnel and baggage escorted to 

the aircraft for loading. The aerial port element of TALCE then receives 

the cargo at the airfield loading ramp/ready line and, in conjunction with 

the loadmaster, loads and secures it aboard the aircraft. 

A variety of techniques can be used to load aircraft. Aircraft are usually 

loaded according to the unit's load plans. However, the aircraft loadmaster 

is the final authority on how cargo is to be loaded and positioned aboard 

an aircraft. The DACG normally does the loading under the supervision of 

the loadmaster. 

DEPARTURE AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

The air terminal commander or civilian operator is responsible for air 

terminal operations at the departure airfield. The Army or other service 

component commander will provide a DACG to control Army activities at 

the terminal. The DACG may also be responsible for loading and 

unloading aircraft and cargo at these facilities. Deploying units coordinate 

with the DACG for their responsibilities in processing through the 

terminal. The TALCE supervises Air Force operations at the air terminal. 

The DACG and the TALCE must coordinate support responsibilities prior 

to the start of operations. Departure airfield operations consist of four 

separate areas of activity for the unit, DACG, and TALCE. These areas 

are the marshaling area, the alert holding area, the call forward area, and 

the loading ramp area. The TALCE coordinates the overall airlift 

operations at the departure airfield. 
Figure I-10. Departure Airfield Operations

Marshaling Area Activities

The marshaling area is provided by the installation or base commander of 

the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) from which the deploying 

unit stages its departure. Marshaling area activities are the responsibility 

of the deploying commander. These activities may take place within the 

deploying unit's permanent area or in another area to ease movement and 

control. In either case, the marshaling area activities should take place as 

close as possible to the departure airfield. Its location should not cause 

unnecessary congestion to airfield operations or undue hardship to the 

deploying unit. It may be the area where units may start, continue, or 

complete preparation for loading. 
The installation/base commander (or the parent organization) who 

provides the marshaling area will assist the deploying forces. The 

deploying unit should not be required to perform support functions thus 

permitting concentration on preparation for the deployment. 

The home station installation or parent organization is responsible for the 

movement of its subordinate units. The deploying unit should do the 

following: 

• Establish liaison with the DACG and other activities. 

• Coordinate a joint planning conference. 

• Perform final preparation of vehicles and equipment according to 

air transport guidelines (to include weighing and marking center of 

balance). 

• Ensure that adequate shoring material is on hand and readily 

available. 

• Prepare personnel and cargo manifests. 

• Assemble personnel, supplies, and equipment into aircraft loads 

according to established load plans. 

• Ensure planeload or troop commanders are appointed and properly 

briefed on their responsibilities. 

• Develop alternate (bump) plan for chalks in the event aircraft 

becomes non-mission capable. 

• Pass control of unit aircraft loads to the DACG at the alert holding 

area. 

The DACG is responsible for the following: 

• Maintaining liaison with the deploying unit. 

• Arranging with the TALCE for Air Force technical assistance 

required by the deploying unit. 

• Establishing communications. 

• Maintaining liaison with the aerial port section of the TALCE. 

• Calling aircraft loads forward from the marshaling area and 

assuming control in the alert holding area. 

Alert Holding Area

The alert holding area is the equipment, vehicle, and passenger control 

area. It is normally located in the vicinity of the departure airfield. It is 

used to assemble, inspect, hold, and service aircraft loads. Control of the 

load is transferred from the individual unit to the DACG at this point. The 

deploying unit is responsible for the following: 

• Ensuring that the aircraft load arrives at the alert holding area at 

the time specified by the DACG. 
• Providing the DACG with passenger and/or cargo manifests and 

required documentation. 

• Correcting load discrepancies identified during pre-inspection. 

• Ensuring vehicle drivers remain with the vehicles until released. 

The DACG is responsible for the following: 

• Ensuring loads arrive at the alert holding area at the time agreed 

upon by the deploying unit and TALCE. 

• Receiving, inventorying, and controlling aircraft loads as they 

arrive at the alert holding area. 

• Inspecting aircraft loads to ensure that they are complete and 

correctly prepared. Ensure required shoring, floor protection 

materials, and 463L dunnage are available. 

• Verifying accuracy of weight and balance markings. 

• Establishing a discrepancy correction area. 

• Inspecting documentation for accuracy and completeness. 

• Providing emergency maintenance, POL, and related services, as 

needed, to accomplish the out-loading mission. 

• Directing or guiding aircraft loads to the joint inspection area (call 

forward area). 

The TALCE will assist the DACG as required. 

Call Forward Area

The call forward area is that portion of the departure airfield where the 

joint inspection is conducted. A final briefing is provided to deploying 

troops and all manifests reviewed for accuracy. The deploying unit will 

correct all discrepancies found by the DACG/TALCE joint inspection. 

The DACG is responsible for the following: 

• Establishing communications with TALCE and deploying units. 

• Assisting in the joint inspection of aircraft loads and manifests. 

• Ensuring that passenger/cargo manifests are correct. 

• After loads have passed inspection, moving equipment forward to 

the ready line segregated by load. 

• In the event of aircraft aborts or discrepancies in the planned 

allowable cabin load (ACL), reassembling aircraft loads with the 

assistance of the TALCE and preparing required manifest changes. 

• Ensuring that discrepancies found during the joint inspection are 

corrected. 

• Maintaining statistical data to account for the current status of all 

unit personnel and equipment scheduled for air movement. 

• Ensuring the deploying unit adheres to the established movement 

timetable. 
• Providing loading team personnel and support equipment to 

include one pusher vehicle per load team. 

• Providing gloves, goggles, ear protection, and reflective devices 

for load team members. 

• Escorting aircraft loads to the ready line and ensuring that all 

personnel are briefed. (Personnel will be briefed on flight line 

safety, including driving procedures, smoking rules, and other 

applicable local safety requirements.) 

• Retaining a final corrected copy of each passenger/cargo manifest 

and inspection record. 

• Ensuring that deficiencies noted during the joint inspection are 

relayed to the alert holding area and the unit. This action will 

prevent recurrence of the same deficiencies. The DACG provides 

emergency services as required and agreed upon at the joint 

planning conference to ensure uninterrupted operations. 

• Providing fueling and de-fueling capability and emergency 

maintenance for vehicles to be transported. 

• Providing passenger holding areas as required. 

The TALCE is responsible for the following: 

• Coordinating with the DACG on all changes required to the 

aircraft configuration. 

• Together with the DACG, conducting the joint inspection using 

DD Form 2133. 

• Providing passenger briefing guide for the passengers' 

representative to brief the troops for on/off load procedures. 

• Briefing vehicle drivers and passengers on flight line safety, 

driving procedures, smoking rules, and special precautions. 

• Providing a team chief for each loading team. 

• Providing passenger escort to the aircraft. 

• Notifying the DACG when loads are to be dispatched to the 

loading ramp area ready line. 

• Accepting loads at the ready line and load aboard the aircraft. (If a 

TALCE is not available, the aircraft loadmaster will accept the 

load.) 

• Providing airflow information to the D/AACG. 

DD Form 2133, Joint Airlift Inspection Record is used for conducting the 

joint inspection. A copy of this form is at Appendix K. 

Loading Ramp Area

The loading ramp area, including ready line area, is controlled by the 

TALCE. The planeload commander or troop commander is responsible for 

the following: 
• Following directions of load team chief or passenger escort. 

• Monitoring and controlling aircraft passengers. 

• Retaining one copy of the final passenger/cargo manifest. 

• Providing assistance in loading and securing the aircraft load as 

requested by the load team chief. 

• Ensuring that vehicle drivers and equipment operators follow the 

instructions of the load team chief or primary loadmaster while 

loading equipment on the aircraft. 

The DACG is responsible for the following: 

• Transferring control of the aircraft load to the TALCE at the ready 

line and monitoring the loading. 

• Providing load teams to assist in loading and securing aircraft load 

as required by the load team chief. 

• Maintaining coordination with the deploying unit representative 

and TALCE. 

• Obtaining individual aircraft load completion time from the 

TALCE. 

The TALCE is responsible for the following: 

• Accepting planeloads from the DACG at the ready line. 

• Ensuring that all drivers have been briefed on flight line safety. 

• Ensuring that each aircraft load is positioned at the proper aircraft 

at the specified time. 

• Maintaining liaison with the aircraft crew and the DACG. 

• Coordinating with the aircraft primary loadmaster and ensuring 

that loads are placed aboard the aircraft in time to meet the 

scheduled departure time. 

• Providing (if required) and operating MHE and special loading 

equipment according to AR 59-105/AFR 76-7/OPNAVINSTR 

4630.13D/MCO 4660.2 and agreements established during the 

joint planning conference. 

• Maintaining communications with the DACG and deploying units. 

• Providing aircraft primary loadmaster with required copies of the 

passenger/cargo manifests and retaining a copy for TALCE files. 

• Briefing aircrews, as required. 

The load team chief is responsible for the following: 

• Receiving loads at the ready line. 

• Directing and supervising the loading teams and vehicle drivers. 

• Coordinating with the aircraft primary loadmaster, directing all 

loading operations, and ensuring all equipment and supplies are 

properly restrained in the aircraft. 
• Coordinating with the TALCE ready line coordinator for any 

special assistance or equipment needed. 

• Collecting required copies of the passenger/cargo manifest and 

making sure that they are given to the aircraft primary loadmaster. 

• Passing load completion time to the airlift operations center (AOC) 

section of the TALCE. 

ARRIVAL AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

Activities at the arrival airfield (aerial port of debarkation (APOD)) are 

similar to those of the departure airfield. Loads are off-loaded, equipment 

is reconfigured, and the unit moves from the airfield to its area of

operations. The main areas of the arrival airfield are the off-load ramp, the 

holding area, and the unit marshaling area. The TALCE will supervise offloading arriving aircraft. The arrival airfield control group (AACG) will 

escort loads to the holding area and assist the unit in assembling and 

moving to the marshaling area. Figure I-11 depicts a notional APOD. 

Figure I-11. Notional Aerial Port of Debarkation

Off-Load Ramp Area Activities

The off-load ramp area activities are controlled by the TALCE. Each load 

will be released to the AACG for return to unit control at the holding area. 

The chalk leader or troop commander will perform the following: 

• Provide assistance to the loadmaster.

• Comply with instructions from the off-load team chief when 

unlashing and off-loading from the aircraft. 
• Ensure that all aircraft tie-down equipment is returned to the 

TALCE. 

• Retain all shoring and dunnage for redeployment. 

• Provide one copy of the passenger and cargo manifests to the 

arrival airfield control group (AACG). 

The AACG will perform the following: 

• Maintain coordination with the deploying unit and TALCE 

representative. 

• Provide off-load teams and support equipment as required. 

• Accept each planeload from the TALCE at the established release 

point. 

• Remove shoring and dunnage from the aircraft and transfer it to 

the unit. 

The TALCE will perform the following: 

• Advise the AACG of the airflow and expected arrival of aircraft. 

• Plan and supervise aircraft parking. 

• Receive passenger and cargo manifests from the aircraft 

loadmaster. 

• Supervise off-loading the aircraft, including removal of shoring 

and dunnage. 

• Provide all MHE and special off-loading equipment including 

operators, as required, in accordance with AR 59-105/AFR 76-7 

and agreements established during joint planning conferences. 

• Provide ITV by reporting arrival of loads and release to the 

AACG. 

Holding Area Activities

The deploying units are responsible for providing unit liaison personnel to 

AACG and for assisting the AACG as required. The AACG will perform 

the following: 

• Coordinate with the TALCE and the deploying unit. 

• Provide support to arriving units as determined during the joint 

planning conference. 

• Maintain in-transit visibility of arriving loads. 

• Release aircraft load to the deploying unit commander or his 

representative at a predesignated location. 

• Coordinate MHE and transport of the movement of aircraft pallets 

to the unit marshaling area for pallet breakdown. 

• Provide fuel, oil, and minor maintenance for transported vehicles. 

• Provide emergency services to accomplish the mission. 
Unit Marshaling Area

The deploying unit terminates the air movement at its marshaling area. 

Equipment is reconfigured for onward movement. Units will perform the 

following: 

• Install equipment previously removed for transport. 

• Ensure that all aircraft pallets and nets are returned to the TALCE 

or AACG. 

• Perform required maintenance checks, including refueling. 

• Prepare and organize for movement (convoy, rail, airlift, and 

inland water). 

Q-36 LOAD PROCEDURES FOR C-130 AIRCRAFT 

The AN/TPQ-36(V)8 section can be loaded into two C-130 aircraft. The 

following procedure provides the tasks required to prepare and load the 

radar into the C-130. The OC shelter must be driven into the aircraft cab 

end first. The other vehicles and equipment are backed into the aircraft. 

All other procedures for loading the aircraft are in accordance with the 

aircraft general cargo loading manual and the aircraft loadmaster. Figure I12 depicts section equipment loaded into the aircraft cargo hold. Notice 

that to load the aircraft in this configuration the PPG tows the ATG and 

the OC tows the ETG. This is opposite of the normal operational 

configuration. 

Figure I-12. C-130 Load Configuration
OC LOAD PREPARATIONS

The following procedures are used to prepare the OC for air loading. Refer 

to Figure I-13. 

• Remove drain plug (1) from shelter floor. 

• Loosen 10 captive screws (2) and lower pressure relief vent (3). 

• Remove shelter antennas and store inside the shelter. Lower the 

three antenna Brackets (4). Confirm that the hinges are down. 

• Prepare the shelter for movement by stowing and securing all lose 

equipment and supplies inside the shelter. 

• Check to see if the HMMWV contains less than 3/4 tank of fuel. If 

not, drain tank to less than 3/4 full. 

Figure I-13. OC Shelter

ATG LOAD PREPARATIONS

The following procedures are used to prepare the ATG for movement. 

These procedures are the same as those required for towing by a 

HMMWV. 

• Secure all ATG trailer equipment. 

• Stow the antenna. 

• Stow the primary power cable. The cable is rewound onto the 

curbside reel of the PPG. 

• Lower the ATG trailer. 

• Stow the ATG trailer and ground strap. The ground strap is wound 

around the retaining clip on the roadside of the ATG trailer. The 

rod is stowed in the retaining brackets on the back of the ATG 

trailer. 
• Install the antenna weather cover and secure with four tiedown 

straps. 

• Couple the ATG trailer to the PPG HMMWV. 

Q-37 LOAD PROCEDURES FOR C-130 AIRCRAFT 

The AN/TPQ-37(V)8 radar section can be loaded into five C-130 aircraft. 

Prior to loading the radar, the antenna must be removed from the M1048 

trailer and the generator pallet must be removed from the MTV/M925 5-

ton truck. The overall preparations for loading the Q-37(V)8 are the same 

as for the Q-36(V)8. The required equipment is assembled, vehicles 

cleaned, fuel load adjusted to 3/4 tank or less and loose equipment and 

secondary loads secured. The aircraft loads are organized as follow: 

• Chalk 1: The generator pallet prime mover (MTV/M925) is backed 

into the aircraft and tied down by AF personnel. This chalk is 

loaded after chalks 2 and 3, but should arrive at the APOD first to 

off load the generator pallet. There are no special requirements for 

the M925; use procedures for chalk 4 when loading the MTV. 

• Chalk 2: ATG and Trailer. This load requires the C-130 ramp to be 

positioned horizontally, at a level even with the top of the trailer. 

This requires shoring under the ramp support, a solid or built up 

wooden block, commonly called a "milk crate" (Figure I-15). The 

amount of shoring will depend on how level the ground is. Locally 

manufactured bridge plates (see Figure I-16) are used to span the 

gap between the trailer and the aircraft's ramp. Additional shoring 

is required under the ATG and trailer leveling jacks. The onboard 

winch is used to pull the ATG onto the C-130, guided by personnel 

using the T-handled lead bars (see Figure I-17). The winch on the 

trailer acts as a break for the load. Once the ATG is in position, the 

ramp is lowered, and the trailer is backed onto the aircraft and the 

loads secured. Figure I-14 provides a detailed checklist of 

preparations and procedures. 
Figure I-14. ATG and Trailer Loading Checklist
Figure I-15. Ramp Support and Shoring

Figure I-16. Bridge Plates
Figure I-17. ATG and Trailer Loading

• Chalk 3: PDG (Generator) and HMMWV w/S250 Shelter. This 

chalk is loaded similarly to chalk 2. The load also requires shoring 

to support the ramp, at a level even with the back of the 

MTV/M925 truck (see Figure I-19), unless a K-loader is used. 

When using the truck, the different heights of the C-130 and the 

truck bed create a steep incline with the ramp. Personnel must use 

extreme care that the load does not get out of control. When using 

the MTV, kneeling the rear tires will reduce the height difference. 

Once the PDG is loaded, and the truck or K-loader is pulled away 

from the aircraft, the shelter truck is backed into the aircraft, and 

both loads are secured. Figure I-18 contains a detailed checklist for 

this load. 
Figure I-18. PDG Generator and HMMWV with S250 Shelter Loading Checklist
Figure I-19. Shoring for PDG Generator

• Chalk 4: MTV. Section personnel "kneel" the MTV by letting the 

air out of the tires, reducing the height to clear the top of the C-130 

door. The MTV is then backed onto the aircraft and tied down. 

This chalk is loaded after chalk 3, but should arrive at the APOD 

second to facilitate down loading of the ATG and trailer (Figure I20). 

Figure I-20. MTV Loading Checklist

• Chalk 5: RECON (M998)/ PU 806, 60 KW GENERATOR 

TRAILER. The generator is pushed into the aircraft using the
pintle mounted to the front bumper of the vehicle. The push 

vehicle is backed out of the aircraft, and then the RECON vehicle 

is backed into the aircraft. Crew ties equipment down. Figure I-21

contains a checklist for this load. 

Figure I-21. RECON Vehicle and Generator Trailer Loading Checklist
Appendix J 

Rehearsals 

A rehearsal is the act or process of practicing an action in preparation for 

the actual performance of that action. Rehearsing key combat actions 

allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to translate 

the relatively dry recitation of the tactical plan into visual impression. This 

visual impression helps them orient themselves to both their environment 

and to other units during the execution of the operation. Moreover, the 

repetition of combat tasks during the rehearsal leaves a lasting mental 

picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. Rehearsals are 

conducted at all force levels. However, the discussions in this appendix 

focus on the brigade level since the basic procedures are the same at all 

levels. 

REHEARSAL TYPES 

There are five types of rehearsals. They are the confirmation brief, 

backbrief, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal, and battle drill or 

SOP rehearsal. Each type of rehearsal achieves a specific result and has a 

specific place in the MDMP time line. The purposes of these rehearsals 

are: 

• Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is routinely performed 

by a subordinate leader immediately after receiving any 

instructions, OPORD, FRAGO, etc. Subordinate leaders brief the 

higher commander on: 

– Their understanding of his intent. 

– Their specific task and purpose. 

– The relationship between their unit's mission and the mission of 

other units. 

• Backbrief. The backbrief is normally performed throughout the 

MDMP. This rehearsal allows the commander to clarify his intent 

early in the subordinate's tactical estimate process. The higher 

commander uses backbriefs to: 

– Identify problems in his concept of operation. 

– Identify problems in subordinate unit commander's concept of 

operations. 
• Determine how a subordinate intends to accomplish the mission. 

• Combined arms rehearsal. The combined arms rehearsal is 

normally conducted by a maneuver unit headquarters and 

performed after the subordinate units have issued their OPORD. 

This rehearsal ensures: 

– The subordinate units plans are synchronized with the other units 

in the organization. 

– The plans of all subordinate commander's will properly achieve 

the intent of the higher commander. 

• Support rehearsal. Support rehearsals are normally performed 

within the framework of a single or limited number of BOS. 

Examples include the FS rehearsal or the CSS rehearsal. Support 

rehearsals are performed throughout the MDMP timeline. 

Although these rehearsals differ slightly by BOS, they achieve the 

same result: 

– Ensure the soldiers responsible for a particular BOS can support 

the higher commander's plan. 

– Ensure all assigned missions will be performed. 

– Synchronize the particular BOS support plan with the maneuver 

plan. 

• Battle drill rehearsal or SOP rehearsal. The purpose of a battle drill 

or SOP rehearsal is to ensure all participants understand a 

technique or a specific set of procedures. This rehearsal is 

performed by all echelons, but most extensively at platoon, squad, 

and section levels. These rehearsals are performed throughout the 

MDMP timeline. This type of rehearsal is not limited to published 

battle drills. It could be the rehearsal of a TOC shift change, 

obstacle breach lane-marking SOP, actions a POL section takes at 

a ROM site or a section action in the defense of a radar site. 

REHEARSAL TECHNIQUES 

Techniques for performing rehearsals are limited only by the 

resourcefulness of the unit. Generally six techniques are used: 

• Full dress. 

• Reduced force. 

• Terrain model. 

• Sketch map. 
• Map. 

• Radio. 

These six techniques range from extensive preparation, in time and 

resources, to minimal preparation. As they are listed, each takes a 

decreasing amount of time and resources to prepare and conduct. Each 

rehearsal technique provides different degrees of understanding for the 

participants and has different security risks. Figure J-1 shows the rehearsal 

techniques in their relative positions, considering: time, resourcing, 

OPSEC, participation, and level of understanding gained. 

Figure J-1. Benefits and Resourcing for Rehearsal Techniques

Considerations for these six rehearsal techniques are discussed based on 

time, echelon, operational security (OPSEC), and terrain. 

FULL DRESS REHEARSAL

The full dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the 

mission. It involves every soldier and system participating in the 

operation. If possible, units should conduct full dress rehearsal under the 

same conditions, weather, time of day, terrain, etc., as the force will 

encounter during the actual operation. This may include the use of live 

ammunition. The full dress rehearsal is the most difficult to accomplish, 

especially at higher command levels. 

Considerations for the full dress rehearsal include: 
• Time. Full dress rehearsals are normally the most time consuming 

of all the rehearsal techniques. At the BDE and TF levels, ensure 

you do not encroach subordinate unit timelines by scheduling a full 

dress rehearsal at your own convenience. For smaller units 

(company and below), full dress rehearsals are the most effective 

technique for ensuring everyone in the operation understands their 

part of the mission. 

• Technique. Immediately prior to the full dress rehearsal, units 

might consider holding a reduced force rehearsal to ensure the 

leaders thoroughly understand the mission. Although this may look 

like it will require more time, the time spent with just the leaders 

will ensure the full dress rehearsal goes smoothly and efficiently. 

• Echelon. A subordinate unit can perform a full dress rehearsal as 

part of a larger unit's reduced force rehearsal. 

• OPSEC. The movement of a large body of the force will certainly 

attract attention from the enemy. Units must develop a plan to 

ensure the rehearsal is protected from the eyes of the enemy. 

• Terrain. Terrain management for the full dress technique can be 

difficult if it is not planned into the initial array of forces. The 

rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared and maintained 

throughout the rehearsal process. During offensive operations, a 

second set of graphics must be developed for the rehearsal to 

mirror the actual plan. During the defense, the rehearsing unit may 

already be occupying the terrain, and a second set of graphics may 

not be necessary. 

REDUCED FORCE REHEARSAL

This rehearsal technique normally takes less time and resources than a full 

dress rehearsal because it involves only the unit's and subordinate unit's 

key leaders. Terrain requirements are the same as for a full dress rehearsal, 

only the number of participants changes. The commander first decides the 

level of leader involvement desired. The selected leaders then rehearse the 

plan while traversing the actual or like terrain. Commanders often use this 

rehearsal to rehearse the fire control measures in an engagement area. 

However, as during full dress rehearsal, it is highly susceptible to enemy 

combat intelligence activities. The reduced force rehearsal allows the 

leadership to rehearse the mission before moving to the full dress 

rehearsal. 

Considerations for the reduced force rehearsal include: 

• Time. The reduced force rehearsal normally requires less time than 

the full dress technique. This is an excellent way for smaller units 

to ensure leaders understand all required missions before moving 
to a full dress rehearsal. However, consider the subordinate unit's 

time table prior to scheduling the rehearsal. 

• Echelon. A small, subordinate unit can perform a full dress 

rehearsal as part of a larger unit's reduced force rehearsal. 

• OPSEC. This rehearsal is not as likely to become an OPSEC 

problem as the full dress because the rehearsing unit is smaller. 

However, the number of radio transmissions remains about the 

same as the full dress and must be considered. 

• Terrain. Terrain management for the reduced force rehearsal can 

be just as difficult as the full dress. The rehearsal area must be 

identified, secured, cleared and maintained throughout the 

rehearsal process. As with the full dress rehearsal, a second graphic 

may have to be developed mirroring the actual plan but modified 

to fit the rehearsal terrain. 

TERRAIN MODEL REHEARSAL

This rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than the key leader 

rehearsal and is the most popular technique. The commander decides on 

the level of leader involvement, and then has a scale terrain model of the 

area of operations constructed. An accurate terrain model can help 

subordinate leaders visualize the battle and their commanders' intentions. 

When possible, the commander should place the terrain model where it 

overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations. However, if the 

situation requires more security, the terrain model can be placed on the 

reverse slope within walking distance of a point overlooking the area of 

operations. The model's orientation should coincide with the actual 

orientation of the terrain to help participants orient to the actual area of 

operations. The size of the terrain model can vary from where icons are 

moved to represent units to a large model on which the participants can 

walk. A large model helps reinforce participants' perception of relative 

positions of units on the actual terrain. 

Considerations for the terrain model rehearsal: 

• Time. The most time-consuming part of the technique can be the 

construction of the terrain model. Units must have a clear SOP 

stating who builds it, how it is built, and when it is built to ensure 

the model is accurate, large enough, and in sufficient detail to 

rehearse the mission. 

• Echelon. Terrain model rehearsals can easily involve many 

different types of leaders. This, combined with the efficient use of 

time, makes it a very effective multi-echelon technique. 

• OPSEC. This rehearsal can become an OPSEC problem if the area 

around the rehearsal site is not secured. The collection of 

commanders and their vehicles can bring attention from the enemy. 
Upon completion of the rehearsal, ensure the terrain model is 

sanitized. 

• Terrain. Terrain management is not as difficult as the previous 

techniques. The location of the site must be easy to find for the 

friendly commanders, yet invisible to the enemy. The optimum 

location is overlooking the terrain on which the mission will be 

performed. 

SKETCH MAP REHEARSAL

Units can use this technique almost anywhere day or night. The 

procedures are the same as for a terrain model rehearsal, except the 

commander uses a sketch in place of a model. Sketches must be large 

enough for all participants to see as each subordinate walks through the 

interactive verbal execution of the operation. Units move symbols to 

represent their maneuver and location on the sketch. This technique is very 

effective for confirmation briefs and backbriefs. 

Considerations for the sketch map rehearsal: 

• OPSEC. As with the terrain model, this rehearsal can become an 

OPSEC problem if it is performed outside and the area around the 

rehearsal site is not secured. Another concern is that the collection 

of commanders and their vehicles can bring attention from the 

enemy. 

• Terrain. The optimum location is overlooking the terrain on which 

the mission will be performed. 

MAP REHEARSAL

The map rehearsal procedures are similar to the sketch map rehearsal, 

except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale 

as being used to plan and control the operation. 

Considerations for the map rehearsal: 

• Time. The most time-consuming part is the rehearsal itself. The 

setup for this rehearsal is normally the easiest because it only 

requires maps and the current operational graphics. 

• OPSEC. As with the terrain model technique, this may be an 

OPSEC problem if it is performed outside and the area around the 

rehearsal site is not secured. Another concern is the collection of 

commanders and their vehicles can bring attention from the enemy. 

• Terrain. The optimum location is overlooking the terrain on which 

the mission will be performed. 
RADIO REHEARSAL

The commander and his staff conduct radio rehearsals by interactively and 

verbally executing critical portions of the operation over established 

communications networks. This is accomplished in a general sequence of 

events that the commander establishes. Because of the obvious dangers 

involved with using this particular rehearsal, only the essential, mostcritical portions of the operation are rehearsed. When used, these 

rehearsals include all communications facilities and equipment necessary 

to conduct that actual portion of the operation. To be effective, all 

participants must have working communications equipment and a copy of 

the OPORD and overlays. The TOC can rehearse tracking the battle 

simultaneously. 

Considerations for the radio rehearsal: 

• Time. This method can be very time consuming if the unit does not 

have a clear SOP for performing this rehearsal. Using this 

technique requires all units to have operational communications 

systems. 

• OPSEC. As with the full dress and key leader rehearsals, this 

rehearsal can become an OPSEC problem because of the volume 

of the radio transmissions and potential compromise of information 

through enemy radio monitoring. A different set of frequencies 

should be used to protect the ones to be used for the operation. The 

use of wire systems is an option but does not exercise the radio 

systems, which is the strong point of this rehearsal technique. 

SCRIPTING AND CONDUCTING THE REHEARSAL 

An effective technique for controlling the rehearsals is to use a script. The 

script keeps the rehearsal on track and serves as the checklist to ensure 

that all BOS are represented and all outstanding issues are addressed 

during the rehearsal. The script has four major parts: 

• The agenda. 

• The response sequence. 

• Unit actions checklist (friendly and enemy). 

• Sequence of events. 

AGENDA

Rehearse using the tools you will use when fighting the battle: the 

OPORD, synchronization matrix, and the DST. Use these tools to drive 

the rehearsal and to also help keep the rehearsal focused. During fire 

support rehearsals, use the fire support execution matrix. These products 
can be used as a rehearsal agenda from company through brigade. If time 

is short, use the agenda as the menu to select events to be rehearsed. Since 

these items are issued to the subordinates during the OPORD, 

subordinates are more prepared for the rehearsal because they know which 

events will be rehearsed. 

RESPONSE SEQUENCE

Ensure the players respond in a logical sequence. This sequence must be 

determined prior to the rehearsal. One sequence might be by BOS; another 

might be by unit as the organization is deployed from front to rear. 

Whatever sequence you use, it must be determined before the rehearsal. 

Posting the response sequence at the rehearsal site is helpful. 

UNIT ACTIONS CHECKLIST

• Friendly. Each player uses a standard format to describe his unit or 

staff action. Use of this type of checklist ensures that all significant 

points are covered quickly. This also helps increase the 

understanding of the other players because they are able to key on 

a common sequence of information. Properly used, the checklist 

allows the rehearsal to move quickly and improves comprehension. 

• Enemy. The enemy force must be portrayed effectively and 

quickly without distracting from the rehearsal. A technique is to 

establish a unit action checklist like that of the friendly units, but 

from the enemy perspective. 

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The following paragraphs provide a generic sequence of events for a 

rehearsal. Although developed for a combined arms rehearsal, this 

sequence can be used for FS rehearsals with a few modifications. This 

example can be used for BDE-, BN/TF-, or CO/TM-level rehearsals and 

will support any rehearsal technique. 

• Step 1. Ground rules. 

– Call roll; START ON TIME. 

– Quickly review your SOP to see if you have new players at the 

rehearsal. 

– Ensure a recorder is ready. 

– State the agenda being used (OPORD, synchronization matrix or 

DST) and the rehearsal type. 
– Provide an orientation to the rehearsal tools (terrain model or 

visible key terrain, unit icons, etc.) and important graphic control 

measures. 

– Designate the point in the operation that the rehearsal will start. 

One event prior to the first event being rehearsed allows for proper 

deployment of forces. 

– Ensure everyone understands the parts of the plan to be 

rehearsed. 

• Step 2. Deploy the enemy. Deploy the enemy on the rehearsal 

product, as they would look at the rehearsal start point. Restating 

the enemy equipment should not be required. 

• Step 3. Deploy the friendly. Deploy the friendly forces (including 

adjacent units) at the rehearsal start point. As friendly units are 

initially posted to the rehearsal product, they should state their: 

– Task and purpose, task organization and strength. 

– Some units may need to brief their subordinate unit positions at 

the start time, as well as any particular points of emphasis to 

include FARPs, and ROM. 

• Step 4. Advance the enemy. Begin advancing the enemy on his 

most likely course of action (situational template) as it pertains to 

the point on the execution matrix. Since in Step 2 the enemy was 

deployed up to the point the rehearsal will start, the enemy 

continues to maneuver from there. Depiction must be definitive, 

tying enemy actions to specific terrain or friendly units' actions. An 

accurate portrayal of the situational template developed for the 

staff wargaming process must be communicated. The enemy is 

uncooperative, but not invincible. 

• Step 5. Decision point. Upon completion of the enemy action, 

conditions must be assessed to determine if a decision point has 

been reached. These are the decision points taken directly from the 

DST. 

– At a decision point: as decision points are reached, the XO states 

the conditions for success. The commander states his decision to 

continue on the current course or select a branch. 

– If the commander decides to continue the current COA, the next 

event from the matrix is stated and the friendly units are advanced 

(Step 2). 
– If a branch is selected, the commander states why he has selected 

that branch. The first event of that branch is stated, and the 

rehearsal continues from that point until all events of the branch 

are rehearsed. 

Not at a Decision Point: if the unit is not at a decision point and not at the 

desired end state, then the rehearsal continues with the XO stating the next 

event on the synchronization matrix, and friendly units are advanced (Step 

2). Use the predetermined sequence as units continue to act out and 

verbalize their actions. 

• Step 6. End state of the branch is reached. End the initial phase of 

the rehearsal after the desired end state of the COA or the branch is 

achieved. In an attack this will usually be on the objective after 

consolidation and casualty evacuation are complete. In the defense, 

this will usually be after the decisive actions such as the 

commitment of the reserve, the final destruction or withdrawal of 

the enemy, and casualty evacuation are complete. 

• Step 7. Recock. After the initial phase, "recock" to the situation at 

the first decision point. The XO should state the criteria for a 

decision to change the plan. Assume these criteria have been met 

and then re-fight the fight from that point forward, all the way until 

the desired end state is attained. Complete any coordination to 

ensure understanding and requirements are met; record any 

changes. Go to the next decision point and assume that the criteria 

have been met. Repeat the previous steps until all decision points 

and branches have been rehearsed. 

• Step 8. Follow-up and coordination. As small issues arise during 

the rehearsal, they are recorded. At the end of the rehearsal, the 

recorder states these issues for review and final decision. This 

ensures the flow of the rehearsal is not interrupted. "War stopping" 

issues raised anytime during the rehearsal must be immediately 

addressed. This coordination is one of the key points of the 

rehearsals. If it is not done immediately, it will be difficult to get 

the word to all the players later. 

STAFF SUPPORT ACTIONS

The staff updates the DSM/DST and provides it to each leader prior to 

departure. The targeting officer and radar section leader will be personally 

involved in updating TA related products. These include input to the 

RS&S plan, radar zones, cueing agents, triggers and radar movement and 

positioning. This is the final opportunity for subordinates to identify and 

resolve dangling issues. Make sure all coordination done at the rehearsal is 

clearly understood by all players and captured by the recorder. All changes 

to the published order are, in effect, verbal FRAGOs. As soon as possible, 
the battle staff should collect the verbal FRAGOs into a written change to 

the order. 

BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSAL 

Fire support rehearsals are important for ensuring the synchronization of 

the fire support plan with the scheme of maneuver. Technical fire control 

details should be addressed in the DS FA battalion and FA technical 

rehearsals. The fire support rehearsal should focus on maximizing the 

ability of the fire support system to support the plan and achieve the 

commander's intent. 

Although this is a FS rehearsal, the brigade must be closely involved to 

ensure synchronization of the FS plan with the maneuver plan. Whenever 

possible, the brigade commander should participate as well. Normally the 

brigade sends the XO, S-3, S-4, S-2, engineer, FSO, ALO, targeting 

officer, army aviation LNO, forward support battalion (FSB) 

representative, and the striker platoon leader and strikers, if available. Key 

representatives from the DS FA battalion include the commander, S3, S2, 

FDO, and radar section leader. From the maneuver TFs, the commander, if 

available, S-3, FSO, scout platoon leader, and mortar platoon leader. The 

DS FA battalion commander normally conducts this rehearsal for the 

brigade commander. The brigade FSO and the targeting officer assist him. 

The FS rehearsal normally lasts about 1 to 11/2 hours. There is seldom 

time to rehearse every target. Rehearse at a minimum the priority targets. 

The purpose of the FS rehearsal is to ensure synchronization of the FS 

effort within the unit and to ensure that the FS plan supports the 

commander's intent. FS rehearsals should occur prior to the combined 

arms rehearsal. Normally the technique selected for the rehearsal is the 

radio technique, although the terrain model technique works as well. 

REHEARSAL SCRIPT

• Step 1. - Agenda. Use the fire support execution matrix. Normally 

prior to the rehearsal, the DS FA battalion FDO will announce the 

brigade consolidated target list by number, grid and any special 

instruction for the targets. Establish the response sequence early, 

and post where all participants can see it. See Figure J-2. If the FS 

rehearsal occurs prior to the combined arms rehearsal, then 

selection of branches to rehearse is done by the FSCOORD. If it 

occurs after the combined arms rehearsal, then the sequence the 

branches are rehearsed mirrors that of the proceeding combined 

arms rehearsal. 
Friendly Unit Actions 

• What is the task and purpose of the action or target? 

• When are the conditions or trigger met? 

• Where is the target, and where is the observer location? 

• Who is responsible for the target, the backup, which radio net 

and backup? 

• What are the desired effects? 

Figure J-2. Friendly Unit Actions

• Step 2 - Deploy the enemy. Intelligence update as required. 

• Step 3 - Deploy the friendly. The FSCOORD states the FSCM in 

effect at the starting point of the rehearsal and provides last-minute 

guidance. 

• Step 4 - Advance the enemy. The DS FA battalion S2 and targeting 

officer advance the enemy one critical event at a time. When the 

S2 finishes describing the event, all fire supporters execute their 

portion of the fire support plan triggered by the action. 

• Example scenario: 

– The following is a deliberate attack example. The response 

sequence is front to rear; several units were left out for brevity. 

The sequence is: striker, TF Mech, TF 1-1, . . . ALO, . . . and S2. 

The DS FA battalion S2 states: It is now H+6. SBF Mech has been 

established; all three enemy platoon positions are being obscured 

by smoke and suppressed by SBF Mech. TF 1-1 is moving on Axis 

Slam just approaching PP1. 

– The striker team would respond: This is striker team 2; I am 

backup for TGT AE0005 vicinity NA123456. TF 1-1's closure on 

PP1 is the trigger to fire. I will observe the TGT from vicinity NA 

345678 and call it on FS net. . . . The alternate method is. . . .The 

TGT purpose is. . . .The desired effects are. . . . Break. . . .FDC, 

this is striker team 2 fire TGT AE0005, over. The FDO would 

repeat the call for fire and issue a message to observer to include 

time of flight. The observer would end the mission. 

– The TF Mech FSO would respond: No Action. 

– The TF1-1 FSO would respond: This is TF 1-1 FSO; I am the 

priority for TGT AE0005. Our closure on PP1 is the trigger to fire 

TGT AE0005, NA 123456. Alpha Team FIST will observe the 

TGT from vicinity NA 234567 and call it on FS net. . . .The 
alternate method is. . . .The TGT purpose is. . . . The desired 

effects are. . . .Break. . . .FDC, this is TF1-1 FSO fire TGT 

AE0005, over. The FDO would repeat the call for fire and issue a 

message to observer to include time of flight. If the Alpha Team 

FIST is participating, then he would fire the TGT instead of the TF 

FSO. The observer would end the mission. 

– The ALO would state: This is BDE ALO, TF 1-1 closure on PP1 

is my trigger. Four A-10s with Mavericks are at IP Cheese. The 

ALO would continue with magnetic heading from IP to TGT, TGT 

description, location, and elevation, method of marking location of 

friendlies, egress, time from IP to target. Any SEAD or ACA 

changes in support of CAS should be rehearsed with the CAS 

mission. 

– The S2 or targeting officer states: radar section 1 , this is 

S2/targeting officer. TF 1-1 closure on PP1 is my trigger, call for 

fire zone number 1, and critical friendly zones 4, 5, and 6 are in 

effect now. Cue radar schedule Jane, 12 minutes, over. 

– The radar section leader would respond: S2/targeting officer, this 

is radar section leader, call for fire zone number 1, and critical 

friendly zones 4, 5, and 6 are in effect. Cue radar schedule Jane, 12 

minutes, out. 

For each target rehearse grid location, trigger point, engagement criteria, 

primary and backup observer and communications method, method of 

engagement and attack guidance. Ensure the DS battalion S3 presents the 

battery movement plans and out-of-action cycles. Rehearse the radar target 

handoff and include clearing the fires at the TF level if TF FSOs are 

involved. The rehearsal of priority counterfire targets is required when 

rehearsing priority targets. Have the radar section leader insert one or two 

acquisitions per phase of the rehearsal. 

• Steps 5 - 8 are conducted as previously discussed. 

RESULTS

This rehearsal ensures the validity of the FS plan. It illustrates why fires 

are needed in relation to specific maneuver events and what they are 

intended to accomplish. It crosswalks observers with shooters and ties 

them to a condition or event on the battlefield. It ensures that FS performs 

the assigned EFSTs and meets the commander's intent. When properly 

performed, the rehearsal practices the redundancy of observers and nets by 

having both the backup and primary shoot the targets. The FS plan is 

validated with the scheme of maneuver, the commander's intent, and 
attack guidance. It ensures the obstacle plan is coordinated with the FS 

plan and both support the maneuver plan. Finally it ensures the control 

measures for protecting and controlling aerial and ground forces are in 

place, integrated, and understood by all. 

BRIGADE COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL 

After receiving an OPORD, subordinate leaders must be afforded the 

necessary time to complete their own planning prior to a parent unit's 

combined arms rehearsal. This planning window provides time for critical 

mission analysis, course-of-action development and analysis, and OPORD 

publishing. This ensures subordinate commanders have time to assign 

responsibility for specified tasks and resolve issues discovered in the 

parent commander's OPORD. 

The commander, XO, and primary staff, the subordinate unit commanders 

and their S3, targeting officer, S2, and FSO must attend. Other pivotal 

players in the unit mission must attend as well. These include the normal 

leadership slice along with units operating in direct support such as 

aviation units and strikers. Whenever possible, flank units and the higher 

unit should be invited to attend. When time is short, attendance may be 

modified. 

Usually, there is insufficient time to rehearse the entire operation. About 1 

to 1 1/2 hours is a good rule but is METT-TC dependant. If too much time 

is consumed, separate BOS support rehearsals and subordinate unit 

combined arms rehearsals will lack sufficient time. Ensure you prioritize 

those critical events that demand leader visualization of their 

synchronization. Rehearse the most important event first, and, as time 

permits, continue to rehearse subsequent events. Subordinates should 

arrive prepared to rehearse the prioritized events. 

REHEARSAL SCRIPT 

• Agenda. Use the DST and the synchronization matrix to facilitate 

the rehearsal. Establish the response sequence before the rehearsal 

starts. Post it where all participants can see it. 

• Sequence of Events. Use the steps discussed in the general 

discussion about rehearsals. 

• Rehearsal activities. The FSO, targeting officer, strikers and radar 

section leader rehearse the same task, purpose and actions for the 

events rehearsed during the fire support rehearsal. Incorporating 

these activities in the combined arms rehearsal ensures that all fire 

support and target acquisition activities are synchronized with the 

maneuver plan. 
Appendix K 

Example Tools And Procedures 

There are numerous factors that must be considered when employing 

target acquisition assets on the battlefield. The purpose of this appendix is 

to provide a collection of formats, procedures, and ideas that have been 

collected from Combat Training Centers (CTCs), and TO&E units that can 

be used to facilitate radar mission planning and employment. Most of the 

forms and procedures can be modified to meet changing unit requirements 

FIREFINDER RADAR SECTION TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES 

Employment of Firefinder radars must meet the commander's 

intent/guidance and be synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. Troop 

leading procedures and the radar section leader's involvement in the 

planning process are essential for successful radar employment and 

responsive counterfire. The radar section leader requires usable tools to 

facilitate mission preparation and execution. The ability to develop and 

issue clear warning orders, time lines, pre-combat checks, pre-combat 

inspections, and priorities of work are key to any successful mission. 

Troop leading procedures provide the required guidance to focus the radar 

section's preparation for and execution of the radar employment plan. 

Using standard troop leading procedures helps clarify mission 

requirements, fix responsibilities and make the best use of available time. 

Troop leading procedures provide a vehicle for preparing the section for 

operation and help free the radar section leader to participate in the DS 

battalion's counterfire planning process. 

SUGGESTED TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

• Receive the mission (SITTEMP, operations graphics, 

RDO/execution matrix). 

– Perform mission analysis, assess threat (S2/G2, radar section 

leader, section chief). 

– Review critical tasks, positioning guidance, planned zones 

(S2/G2, radar section leader, section chief). 

– Prioritize pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and pre-combat checks 

(PCCs), (radar section leader, section chief). 

– Prepare a timeline (radar section leader, section chief). 
– Conduct risk assessment/management. 

• Issue a concise warning order to your section, (radar section 

leader). 

– Section mission. 

– Positioning guidance. 

– Threat and counter measures. 

– PCI priorities. 

– Timeline. 

• Make a tentative plan, (radar section leader, section chief). 

– METT-TC Considerations. 

– Logistical resupply. 

– Survivability measures. 

– Section rehearsals, (site occupations/displacements, defense, 

etc.). 

• Initiate movement, (radar section leader, section chief). 

– Conduct PCIs. 

– Perform rehearsals. 

– Issue movement order and risk assessment. 

• Conduct reconnaissance, (radar section leader or section chief). 

– Select sites to support mission requirements. 

– Perform/coordinate survey requirements. 

– Make site assessments for survivability, maneuver support, site 

defense, etc. 

• Complete the plan, (radar section leader, section chief). 

– Report site assessments to S2/G2. 
– Prepare a verbal order for section. 

– Develop route strip maps, preliminary site defense plan. 

– Develop battle-tracking overlays for reconnaissance vehicle and 

shelter. 

• Issue the order, (radar section leader, section chief). 

– Focus on movement, positioning, site defense and survivability 

measures. 

– Be clear and concise. 

– Require a back brief from the section chief and senior radar 

operators. This should be a section huddle, each member must 

understand their role. 

• Supervise, (radar section leader, section chief). 

– Final PCIs. 

– Crew drill rehearsals for occupations, site, defense, shelter, and 

NBC operations. 

– Execution. 

Troop leading procedures can and should be modified to facilitate 

planning and execution of each mission. The steps do not have to happen 

sequentially and may happen simultaneously as METT-TC dictates. 

RADAR SECTION WARNING ORDER (WARNO) 

The warning order (WARNO) given to the radar section must specify the 

initial mission statement and tasks required to perform the mission. The 

example in Figures K-1 and K-2, Radar Section WARNO, provide a tool 

for the extraction of pertinent information from the MDMP and 

subsequent briefings. This example can be modified as required. 
Figure K-1. Radar Section Warning Order
Figure K-2. Radar Section Warning Order (cont.)

RADAR DEPLOYMENT ORDER DA FORM 5957-R 
Figure K-3. Radar deployment Order

RADAR EXECUTION MATRIX 

The formal radar deployment order, Figure K-3 (RDO), can be modified 

to make it more useful and practical. Figure K-4 contains a format for a 

radar execution matrix. This matrix is a modified version of the RDO. The 

matrix is a valuable tool that can be used as is or modified to reflect the 

phases or events of an operation. Figure K-5 shows another example of a 

modified RDO/execution matrix. This example includes a terrain graphic.

NOTE: The radar execution matrix may become classified when filled in 

and must be properly labeled. 
Figure K-4. Radar Execution Matrix 
Figure K-5. Example Modified RDO/Execution Matrix
QUICK REFERENCE POSITION SELECTION WORKSHEET 

The following is an example of a quick reference position selection 

worksheet. This tool may be used with other IPB products in the selection 

of radar positions. 

Figure K-6. Quick Reference Position Selection Worksheet

RADAR POSITIONING AND MOVEMENT SYNCHRONIZATION 

CHECKLIST 

The radar positioning and movement synchronization checklist can be 

used in conjunction with the RDO or Execution Matrix, and the quick 

reference position selection worksheet to assist in synchronizing the radar 

with the fire support plan. 
Figure K-7. Radar Position and Movement Synchronization Checklist

VOICE RADAR REGISTRATION PROCEDURE

The following is an example of how to perform a radar registration using 

FM voice communications. 

• BN FDC (BTRY FDC), this is (BN FDC), Perform (type) (Radar) 

registration at grid _______, altitude ______, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Perform (type) (Radar) registration at grid 

________, Altitude _________, out. 
• (BTRY) FDC (Radar) This is (BTRY FDC), prepare to copy, 

over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC) This is (Radar), prepare to copy, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (Radar) This is (BTRY FDC), observe (type) (IE: 

MPI, High burst, datum plane) registration, at grid _______, 

altitude _______, MAX ORD _______, QE________ (specify if 

meters or feet), and HEIGHT OF BURST_______ (if a high burst 

or datum plane), firing unit grid _______, firing unit altitude 

______, report ready to observe, over. 

• (RADAR) Observe (type) registration at grid _______, altitude 

_______, max ord ______, QE _________, and height of burst 

______ (if necessary), firing unit grid _______, firing unit altitude 

________, will report ready to observe, out. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC) this is (Radar), ready to observe, request 

shot and splash, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Request shot and splash, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY), Shot, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY), Shot, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY), Splash, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY), Splash, out. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC) Did hit grid __________, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Did hit grid _________, out. 

At this point repeat the last 6 steps until the necessary number of good 

rounds have been observed by radar. BN FDC will end mission. 

• (BN FDC) (Radar) and (BTRY FDC), this is (BN FDC), End of 

mission, over. 

• (RADAR) End of mission, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC End of mission, out. 

NOTE: Height of burst for Radar Registrations is the height of registration 

point plus height of ground above sea level (The height of the registration 

point above sea level). Radar will forward did hit information for each to 

BN/BTRY FDC via normal mode of communication. 

VOICE RADAR ADJUST FIRE MISSION 

The following is an example for performing a Radar adjust fire mission 

using voice FM communications. 

• (RADAR) (BN FDC), This is (Radar), Hostile weapon (Number 

and type of possible) firing, at grid _______, Altitude _______, 

Time ________, over. 

• BN FDC Hostile weapons firing at grid _________, out. 
• BN FDC (BTRY FDC), This is (BN FDC), conduct adjust fire 

mission with (Radar), at grid _________, Altitude _________, 

over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Conduct (Radar) Fire Mission, at grid __________, 

altitude ___________, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (Radar), This is (BTRY FDC), authenticate 

_________, over. 

• (RADAR) I authenticate __________, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (Radar), This is (BTRY FDC), MAX ORD 

________, QE_________, ALTITUDE _________. Request ready 

to observe, over. 

NOTE: (BTRY) will also have to provide grid and altitude of firing BTRY 

(center gun) if Radar does not have this information already. 

• (RADAR) Max ord _______, QE _______, ALTITUDE 

__________ out. (At this point, wait while Radar loads their 

computer with information.) 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), This is (Radar). Ready to observe, 

request shot and splash, 1 round, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Request shot and splash, 1 round, out. (Wait for 

guns to fire.) 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY), Shot, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY), Shot, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY), Splash, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY), Splash, out. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), Did-hit grid is _________, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Did-hit grid _______, out. (At this point (BTRY) 

makes corrections.) NOTE: Subsequent adjust rounds may be 

required. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), This is (Radar), fire for effect, request 

shot and splash, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC Fire for effect, request shot and splash, out. 

At this point, Radar will follow the mission, like a friendly fire mission, to 

compile did-hit information. 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY FDC), Shot, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), Shot, out. 

• (BTRY) FDC (BTRY FDC), Splash, over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), Splash, out. 

Repeat the previous 4 steps until (BTRY) completes rounds and Radar 

logs did-hit information. 
• (BTRY) FDC (Radar), This is (BTRY FDC), Rounds complete, 

over. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), Rounds complete, out. 

• (RADAR) (BTRY FDC), This is (Radar). End of mission, over. 

• (BTRY) FDC (Radar), End of mission, out. 

Radar will then forward did-hit information to BN/BTRY FDC via normal 

mode of communications. 

JOINT AIRLIFT INSPECTION CHECKLIST 

DD Form 2133 is used by the Military Airlift Command for the inspection 

of equipment to be loaded on military aircraft. 

Figure K-8. Joint Airlift Inspection Record (side 1)

Figure K-9. Joint Airlift Inspection Record (side 2)

RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET 

The risk management worksheet provides a starting point to logically track 

the process of assessing hazards and risks. It is used to document risk 

management steps taken during the planning, preparation, and execution 

of training and combat missions and tasks. Use the following guidelines 

for completing the worksheet: 

• Block A-D: Self explanatory. 

• Block E: Identify the specific task relating to the mission or overall 

task to be performed. 

• Block F: Identify Hazards - Identify hazards by reviewing METTTC factors for the mission or task. 

• Block G: Assess Hazards - Assessment includes historical lessons 

learned, intuitive analysis, experience, judgment, equipment 

characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations. 

Determine the initial risk for each hazard by assessing the 

probability and severity. 

• Block H: Develop Controls - Develop one or more controls for 

each hazard that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk 

of a hazardous incident. Specify who, what, where, why, when and 

how for each control. 

• Block I: Determine Residual Risk - Determine the residual risk for 

each hazarding by assessing the probability and severity. 

• Block K: Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk - Select the 

highest residual risk level and circle it. This becomes the overall 

mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether the 

controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk 

is too great to continue the mission or task, the commander directs 

development of additional controls or modifies, changes, or rejects 

the COA. 

• Supervise and Evaluate - This step is not on the worksheet. Plan 

how each control will be monitored for implementation and 

reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determined if the 

controls worked and if they can be improved. Pass on lessons 

learned. 
Figure K-10. Risk Management Worksheet
Appendix L 

Risk Management 

Risk is the chance of injury or death to individuals and damage to or loss 

of vehicles and equipment. Risk, or the potential for risk, is present in 

every combat and training situation. Risk is mitigated through the use of 

risk management procedures. The primary objective of risk management is 

to protect combat power through accident prevention thus enabling units 

to win the battle quickly and decisively with minimal loss. Risk 

management takes place at all levels during every operation. It is an 

integral part of tactical planning. Radar section leaders, section chiefs, and 

soldiers must understand and use risk management and fratricide reduction 

measures to ensure that the mission is accomplished in the safest possible 

manner consistent with mission constraints. This appendix outlines the 

process used to identify and address individual hazards. It also provides a 

discussion of responsibilities for implementing a risk management 

program. Additional information about risk management is contained in 

FM 3-100.14 (100-14). 

SECTION I - RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

This section outlines the five steps of risk management. Leaders must 

always remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on 

situational awareness. One should never approach risk management with 

"one size fits all" solutions to possible hazards. Rather, in performing the 

steps, consider the essential tactical and operational factors that make each 

situation unique. 

IDENTIFY HAZARDS 

A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that 

could entail injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of 

equipment and property; or some other sort of mission degradation. 

Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards. Leaders' 

must identify the hazards associated with all aspects of the mission, paying 

particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must 

never be an afterthought. Leaders must begin the process during their 

troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout the operation. Table 

L-1 lists possible sources of risk that a unit might face during tactical 

operations. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC. 

Table L-1. Sources of Battlefield Risks
Sources of Battlefield Risk

Mission

• Duration of the operation. 

• Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well-developed and easily 

understood?) 

• Proximity and number of maneuvering units. 

Enemy

• Knowledge of the enemy situation. 

• Enemy capabilities. 

• Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance. 

Terrain and Weather

• Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, rain, snow, and 

smoke. 

• Precipitation and its effect on mobility. 

• Extreme heat or cold. 

• Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water 

obstacles). 

Troops

• Equipment status. 

• Experience that units conducting the operation have working together. 

• Danger areas associated with weapon systems. 

• Soldier/leader proficiency. 

• Soldier/leader rest situation. 

• Degree of acclimatization to environment. 

• Impact of new leaders or crewmembers. 

• Friendly unit situation. 

• NATO or multinational military actions combined with U.S. forces. 

Time Available

• Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by 

subordinates. 

• Time available for PCCs/PCIs. 
Civil Considerations

• Applicable ROE or rules of interaction (ROI). 

• Potential stability operations and support operations involving contact 

with civilians (such as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or 

counterterrorism). 

• Potential for media contact and inquiries. 

• Interaction with host nation or other participating nation support. 

ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS 

Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each 

hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous incidents). Use the 

following steps. 

• Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided. 

• Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to 

determine the probability that the hazard can occur. 

• Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or 

avoided. Severity, defined as the result or outcome of a hazardous 

incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or illness (including 

death), loss of or damage to equipment or property, environmental 

damage, or other mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable 

publicity or loss of combat power). 

• Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, 

determine the associated risk level (extremely high, high, 

moderate, and low). Table L-2 summarizes the four risk levels. 

• Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, 

and risk level, as well as the operational factors unique to the 

situation), complete the risk management worksheet. (Refer to 

Appendix K for a risk management worksheet.) 

Table L-2. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution

Risk Level Mission Effects

Extremely 

High (E) 

Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution. 

High (H) Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of 

required mission standards. Not accomplishing all parts of 

the mission or not completing the mission to standard (if 

hazards occur during mission). 
Moderate 

(M) 

Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of 

required mission standards. Reduced mission capability (if 

hazards occur during the mission). 

Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on mission 

success. 

DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS 

This step is accomplished in two substeps: develop controls and make risk 

decisions. These substeps are accomplished during the "make a tentative 

plan" step of troop-leading procedures. 

• Develope Controls. After assessing each hazard, develop one or 

more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the 

risk (probability, severity, or both) of potential hazardous 

incidents. When developing controls, consider the reason for the 

hazard, not just the hazard by itself. 

• Make Risk Decisions. A key element in the process of making a 

risk decision is determining whether accepting the risk is justified 

or, conversely, is unnecessary. The decision-maker (commander or 

the unit leader, if applicable) must compare and balance the risk 

against mission expectations. He alone decides if the controls are 

sufficient and acceptable, and whether to accept the resulting 

residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary, he directs 

the development of additional controls or alternative controls; as 

another option, he can modify, change, or reject the selected COA 

for the operation. 

IMPLEMENT CONTROLS 

Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate 

hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls is the most important 

part of the risk management process; this is the chain of command's 

contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes 

coordination and communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and 

subordinate units and with individuals executing the mission. Leaders 

must ensure that specified controls are integrated into OPLANs, OPORDs, 

SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that 

controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood at all 

levels. If leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls 

will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk 

management controls include the following: 
• Brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and 

controls. 

• Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs. 

• Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels. 

• Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible 

(at least 4 hours in any 24-hour period). 

• Use buddy teams. 

• Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety. 

• Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish 

maneuvering units. 

• Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on 

dangerous terrain. 

• Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas. 

• Limit single-vehicle movement. 

• Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel. 

SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE 

During mission execution, leaders must ensure that risk management 

controls are properly understood and executed. They must continuously 

evaluate the unit's effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into 

areas that need improvement. 

• Supervision. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to 

ensuring that effective risk management controls are implemented. 

• All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and 

execution to ensure standards and controls are enforced. In 

particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well 

as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques 

include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs, confirmation briefs, 

buddy checks, and close supervision. 

• During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk 

management controls, both to determine whether they are effective 

and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, 

identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent 

danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning 

and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions. 

• Evaluation. Whenever possible, the risk management process 

should also include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit 

performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous 

situations. Leaders should then incorporate lessons learned from 

the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions. 

SECTION II - IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES
Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and accountable for 

managing risk. They must ensure that hazards and associated risks are 

identified and controlled during planning, preparation, and execution of 

operations. The unit leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical 

risks and accident risks. The same risk management process is used to 

manage both types. The unit leader alone determines how and where he is 

willing to take tactical risks. The unit leader manages accident risks with 

the assistance of his platoon sergeant, NCOs, and individual soldiers. 

BREAKDOWN OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 

Despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to 

be assumed, the risk management process may break down. Such a failure 

can be the result of several factors; most often, it can be attributed to the 

following: 

• The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know 

about the risk. 

• A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and 

does not want to bother his unit leader or section leader. 

• Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved. 

• Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in being 

able to avoid or recover from a hazardous incident. 

• Subordinates who do not fully understand the higher commander's 

guidance regarding risk decisions. 

RISK MANAGEMENT COMMAND CLIMATE 

Leaders provide direction, set priorities, and establish command climate 

(values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power 

requires leaders to embed risk management into individual behavior. To 

fulfill this commitment, one must exercise creative leadership, innovative 

planning, and careful management. Most importantly, one must 

demonstrate support for the risk management process. 

Leaders and others in the unit chain of command can establish a command 

climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the following 

actions: 

• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior 

through leadership by example and emphasis on active 

participation throughout the risk management process. 

• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is 

responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and 

for providing them to subordinate leaders. 
• Understand your own and your soldiers' limitations, as well as your 

unit's capabilities. 

• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them. 

• Prevent a "zero defects" mindset from creeping into the unit's 

culture. 

• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates' mastery of their trade 

and their ability to execute a chosen COA. 

• Keep subordinates informed. 

• Listen to subordinates. 

Leader, subordinate leader, and individual soldier risk management 

responsibilities include the following: 

• Make informed risk decisions. Establish and then clearly 

communicate risk decision criteria and guidance. 

• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals. 

• Train the risk management process. Ensure subordinates 

understand the who, what, when, where, and why of managing risk 

and how these factors apply to their situation and assigned 

responsibilities. 

• Accurately evaluate the unit's effectiveness, as well as 

subordinates' execution of risk controls during the mission. 

• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established 

limits. 
Glossary 

AACG arrival airfield control group 

AAG army artillery group 

AAMDC Army and Air Defense Missile Command 

AAR after-action review 

ABCS army battle command system 

ACE analysis and control element 

ACC air component commander 

ACL allowable cabin load 

ACT analysis and control team 

ADOCS automated deep operations coordination system 

A/EGM attack/effects guidance matrix 

AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system 

AGM attack guidance matrix 

AGRA army group of rocket artillery 

AI air interdiction 

ALO air liaison officer 

AMB air mission brief 

AMC air mission commander 

AO area of operations 

AOC air operations center 

AOE army of excellence 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 
ASAS all-source analysis system 

ASAS RWS all-source analysis system remote work station 

ASIP advanced lightweight single channel ground and airborne radio system 

improvement program 

ARFOR army force 

ARM antiradiation missile 

ATACMS army tactical missile system 

ATG antenna transceiver group 

ATI artillery target intelligence 

ATIZ artillery target intelligence zone 

ATO air tasking order 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BCT brigade combat team 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BDE brigade 

BIT built-in-test 

BITE built-in-test-equipment 

BN battalion 

BOMREP bombing report 

BOS battlefield operating systems 

BRT brigade reconnaissance troop 

BTRY battery 

C2 command and control 

C3 command, control, and communications 

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
CA combat assessment, civil affairs 

CAS close air support 

CBR counterbattery radar 

CCIR commander's critical information requirements 

CCSB corps common sensor boundary 

CDT control display terminal 

CEP circular error probable 

CFFZ call for fire zone 

CFL coordinated fire line 

CFO counterfire officer 

CFZ critical friendly zone 

CG center of gravity 

CHS-2 common hardware system-2 

CINC commander in chief 

CMP collection management plan

COA course of action 

COC combat operations center 

COMINT communications intelligence 

CP command post 

CPU central processing unit 

CSB common sensor boundary 

CSS combat service support 

CTAD corps target acquisition detachment 

CTAPS contingency theater automated planning system 

CZ censor zone 
D/AACG departure/arrival airfield control group 

DACG departure airfield control group 

DAG division artillery group 

DECOORD deputy effects coordinator 

DFSCOORD deputy fire support coordinator 

DIVARTY division artillery 

DOCC deep operations coordination cell 

DRU dynamic reference unit 

DS direct support 

DSO domestic support operations 

DST decision support template 

DTG date, time group 

D3A decide, detect, deliver, assess methodology 

EA engagement area, electronic attack 

EAC echelons above corps 

EB enhanced brigade 

EBC effects battle captain 

ECM electronic countermeasures 

ECCM electronic counter countermeasures 

ECMA electronic countermeasures avoidance 

ECOORD effects coordinator 

ELINT electronic intelligence 

ELOS electronic line of sight 

EOB electronic order of battle 

EPLRS enhanced position locating system 
ER-MLRS extended range multiple launch rocket system 

EW electronic warfare 

FA field artillery 

FAIO field artillery intelligence officer 

FARP fuel and re-supply position 

FASP field artillery support plan 

FBCB2 force XXI battle command-brigade and below 

FCE fire control element 

FDC fire direction center 

FDS fire direction system 

FECC fires and effects coordination cell 

FEM field exercise mode 

FFPAS Firefinder position analysis system 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM frequency modulation 

FRAGO fragmentary order 

FSC fire support center 

FSCC fire support coordination center 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordinating measure 

FSCOORD fire support coordinator 

FSE fire support element 

GALE generic area limitation environment 

GPS global positioning system 
GS general support 

GSR general support reinforcing 

HBMPI high burst mean point of impact 

HIMARS high mobility artillery rocket system 

HMMWV high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle 

HPT high payoff target 

HPTL high payoff target list 

HVT high value target 

HVTL high value target list 

HZ hertz 

IBCT interim brigade combat team 

ICP intelligence collection plan 

ICW in conjunction with 

IDIVARTY interim division artillery 

IFSAS initial fire support automated system 

IMINT imagery intelligence 

IO information operations

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

IR intelligence requirement 

ISB intermediate staging base 

ISE intelligence support element 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JFAAC Joint Force Air Component Commander 

JFC Joint Force Commander 

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander 
JI joint inspection 

JSTARS joint surveillance and target attack radar system 

JSWS joint services workstation 

JTF joint task force 

KG kilogram 

KM kilometer 

LCU lightweight computer unit 

LMS lightweight multipurpose shelter 

LMTV light medium tactical vehicle 

LNO liaison officer 

LOS line of sight 

LZ landing zone 

LRU line replaceable unit 

MAC maintenance allocation chart 

MAPS modular azimuth positioning system 

MDMP military decision-making process 

MEA munitions effects analysis 

METCM computer meteorological message 

METTA target acquisition meteorological message 

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil considerations 

MFR mission fired report 

MHE material handling equipment 

MLRS multiple launch rocket system 

MORTREP mortar bombing report 

MPI mean point of impact 
MPL mandatory parts list 

MRBM medium range ballistic missile 

MSD minimum safe distance 

MTO message to observer 

MTSS medium track suspension system 

MTV medium tactical vehicle 

MTW major theater war 

NAI named area of interest 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation order 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSFS naval surface fire system 

OC operations central 

OCA offensive counterair 

OCG operations control group 

OCS operator control station 

OOTW operations other than war 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operations plan 

OPORD operations order 

OPSEC operations security 

PADS position and azimuth positioning system 

PAM power amplifier module 

PCI pre-combat inspections 

PDG power distribution group 
PE probable error 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PKO peace keeping operations 

PMCS preventative maintenance checks and services 

PME peacetime military engagement 

PO peace operations 

POS portable operations suite 

PPG prime power group 

PRF pulse repetition frequency 

PSU power supply unit 

PZ pickup zone 

QE quadrant elevation 

QSTAG quadripartite standardization agreement 

R reinforcing 

RCS radar cross-sectional area 

RDO radar deployment order 

RDF radio direction finding 

RH relative humidity 

ROCKREP rocketing report 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROI rules of interaction 

 

RFA restrictive fire area 

 
RS&S reconnaissance security and surveillance 

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

RWS remote work station 

SA situational awareness 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defense 

SHELREP shelling report 

SINCGARS single channel ground and airborne radio system 

SIPRNET secret internal protocol router network 

SOF special operations forces 

SOI signal operating instructions 

SOP standard operating procedure 

SPINS special instructions 

SPOD sea port of debarkation 

SRBM short range ballistic missile 

SSC small scale contingency 

ST special text 

STACCS standard theater army command and control system 

STANAG standardization agreement 

SU situational understanding 

TA target acquisition, theater air 

TAB target acquisition battery 

TACAIR tactical air 

TAC FSE tactical fire support element 

TACON tactical control 

TACSOP tactical standard operating procedures 
TAI target area of interest 

TALCE tanker airlift control element 

TAMD theater air and missile defense 

TAP target acquisition platoon 

TBM tactical ballistic missile 

TBMCS theater battle management core system 

TCIM tactical communications interface module 

T/ESM targeting/effects synchronization matrix 

TF task force 

TFT tabular firing table 

TIO targeting information officer 

TIR target to interface ratio 

TLE target location error 

TM theater missile 

TMD theater missile defense 

TMM target management matrix 

TOC tactical operations center 

TOE table of organization and equipment 

TPC target processing center 

TPDU trailer power distribution group 

TPS target processing section 

TSM targeting synchronization matrix 

TSS target selection standards 

TTP tactics, techniques and procedures 

TVA target value analysis 
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

VCCU vehicle cab control console 

VCU versatile computer unit 

WLR weapon locating radar 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

ZOR zone of responsibility 
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